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THE EFFECTS OF THE UNIT "INDIANS IN TRANSITION"
UPON THE ATTITUDES OF WHITE HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS
TOWARDS INDIANS

by

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ABSTRACT

The study examines the problem of attitude measurement, with specific reference to the effectiveness of a book Indians in Transition prescribed for use in British Columbia secondary schools.

The treatment consisted of an ordered one month classroom exposure to the three sections of the book, which roughly follow the Canada Studies Foundation recommended format of: statement of the problem, roots of the problem, and possible solutions to the problem.

Rationale for predicting a positive change in attitude largely derived from the writings of Hovland and Fishbein, and demonstrable parallels between their theories and the materials in Indians in Transition.

The design was a randomized intact groups assigned to experimental and control modes, post-test only format, involving a sample of some three hundred lower mainland secondary students. Control groups did not receive a related Indian-based treatment, but were engaged in studies of a neutral nature--the regular exploration unit of the grade 10 curriculum. This introduced a possible "Hawthorne" effect, but was unavoidable due to the absence of any other specifically attitude-oriented program dealing with Indian problems on any systemized basis.

The other major problem appeared to be a lack of strict definition and control over the application of the treatment. However this problem, which derived in part from the practical, non-laboratory nature of the study, did not prevent significant findings, and thus perhaps serves to emphasize the usefulness of this material in a wide range of classroom situations.

It was necessary to develop a new instrument for the study. This was a Thurstone type scale based loosely upon an earlier general scale by Remmers. It was tested for sensitivity by means of validity and reliability tests and was found satisfactory.

Significant difference was found at the .05 level between experimental and control groups, and thus it was concluded that groups of students subjected to a Continuing Concerns approach unit on Canadian Indians demonstrate a more positive attitude toward Indians than do groups of students following the regular curriculum.

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CHAPTER ONE - THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

Background

The roots of this study lie in the work of the National History Project culminating in the book What Culture? What Heritage? by A. B. Hodgetts, published by the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education in 1968. The National History Project carried out a massive descriptive study, funded by Trinity College School, of the quality of instruction in Canadian history, Social Studies and civic education in elementary and secondary schools throughout Canada. The study was mainly concerned with what has come to be known as Civics--particularly the influence of formal instruction in developing the feelings and attitudes of young Canadians toward their country and its problems, and the knowledge upon which these attitudes are based. To quote from Hodgetts:

"The two-year study took the form of:

The Student Questionnaire: an opinion survey and an attempt to determine the role of the school and other socializing forces in forming these opinions. It has been administered, in French or English, mainly at the grade 12 level, to some 10,000 students across Canada.

The Open-Ended Essay: a simple little question which we first began to use almost by accident to take up slack fifteen minute times at the ends of classes we were observing. Students were asked to write a short essay on the topic "What do you think

of Canada, and what do you think of Canadian History?" Essays, in French or English, were submitted by slightly more than 1,000 students from five provinces, Quebec, Ontario, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia. As will be shown later, and contrary to expectations, these essays have provided some of our most illuminating information.

The student Interview: an hour-long structured interview designed to find out what degree of correlation, if any, exists between the quality of instruction in Canadian Studies and the information, feelings and attitudes of the students toward Canada. It was administered during the summer of 1966 to a group of 72 grade 10 boys from Ontario and Quebec.

The teacher Interview: a one-and-one-half-hour structured interview designed to explore teachers' interest in and attitudes toward Canada and Canadian History, the difficulties and successes they were experiencing in teaching Canadian History, and the recommendations they had for making it a more meaningful subject. Five hundred of these interviews have been gathered from teachers of Canadian history or Social Studies in all ten provinces.

The Student-Teacher Questionnaire: designed primarily, but not exclusively, to determine the quality of instruction in Canadian studies that these future teachers had received from their respective universities. It was administered in French or English to both regular and summer school students in 14 faculties of education.

The Preliminary Interview: used by the Director in the early months of the project to determine the areas of concern that school and university authorities thought we should investigate. This two-hour, loosely structured interview was administered to about 200 persons directly concerned with some aspect of Canadian studies.

The School Profile and Classroom Observations: we observed some 850 teachers in 247 schools in 20 cities across Canada. Our observations were recorded in essay form as well as on a detailed check list. This list contained 95 descriptive categories and was accompanied by a 75-page handbook.

While in each school, we also interviewed the principal and recorded, again on a check-list, such things as ethnic and socio-economic background of the students, the audio-visual materials available for Canadian studies, the number of Canadian history books in the school and classroom libraries and the extent to which these books were being used. We also gathered a tremendous number of what, for lack of a better name, we have called "handouts"--such things as mimeographed assignments, essay topics, reading lists, internally set examinations, and so on. Literature of the types listed below was also studied.

Departments of Education Handouts: data on the scope and sequence of all history courses in the ten provinces, the prescribed or authorized textbooks, materials related to the methods of instruction, aims and contents of all Canadian studies courses, and copies of provincially set examinations in these subjects.

Current Literature: through a clipping and reading service, we have tried to keep up with newly published books and articles directly related to our field of inquiry."¹

There is no doubt that some aspects of the methodology, evidence and conclusions of this report are open to question, but the sheer scope and numbers involved give credence to its findings. The damning fact that emerged was that most students were judged to have completed their schooling without a fundamental political, cultural, economic, or social understanding of their nation.

"Why is there a Canada? What is its nature? They simply didn't have a real awareness of the distinctive characteristics of the exposed, multi-ethnic and regionally diverse nature of the total Canadian environment. In fact the findings suggest that school studies about Canada often had the effect of strengthening the divisive influences in our society. These conclusions led to further study, research and a series of inter-

views and conferences out of which, some \$345,000 later, emerged the Canada Studies Foundation."²

Specifically, the findings which relate to this study were almost universally devastating in their assessment of the state of Canadian studies. There was a chapter devoted to each area observed--the course of study; the classroom and its activities; and the cognitive and affective results manifested in the students. In each case the findings indicated that the reality of the situation fell far short of stated objectives and standards.

In the area of courses of study the findings were that without exception the interests and concerns were those that preoccupied academic historians of the 1920's, narrowly confined to constitutional and political history. More vital topics such as minority rights, protests, class movements, urbanization, the impact of industrialization, art, education and religion upon Canadian society and peoples are virtually ignored. Controversy, differing historical viewpoints and interpretations, the contributions and vicissitudes of native peoples and immigrants are avoided in nearly every case. The emphasis was clearly on memorization of discrete, descriptive, facts; with no analysis, no valuing, no attempt at realism or relevance.

The classroom observations yielded the same sort of

devotion to lecture or textbook-oriented factual recall. The study demonstrated that even if shortcomings in subject matter were corrected by the development of new programs, present teaching methods would ensure that very little valuable learning would occur.

The chapter on the students themselves is the most discouraging, for here is manifested the results of failures in curriculum and method. Canadian high school graduates have neither the intellectual skills, the knowledge (despite the great emphasis on factual recall), nor the attitudes that their mentors proclaim as objectives necessary for responsible Canadian citizenship. They are uninspired and apathetic about their heritage, firmly entrenched in their regionalism and intolerance.

In every case the damning general statements in the respective chapters are backed by statistical information; and each chapter is followed by an appendix of raw data. In each case the statistical treatment is relatively unsophisticated but appropriate to the straightforward descriptive work attempted. By its multiplicity and variety of methods, by its large sample sizes and simplicity of design, the study is convincing in its condemnation of Canadian civics education.

The chief recommendation of the report was that a Canadian studies consortium be formed to carry on investiga-

tion of the problem, to recommend action, and to research, fund and produce new programs and methods for Canadian studies. As a consequence the extremely well-funded Canada Studies Foundation was founded in February, 1970.

"Behind the work of the foundation is the viewpoint expressed in the Hodgetts report that teaching about Canada in the schools, contrary to all its stated objectives, tends to strengthen the divisive influences in our society. It does not counterbalance the inevitable and desirable regionalism of Canada by giving students an adequate understanding of the total Canadian environment. The Hodgetts report and studies done by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism reveal that most schools have not lessened prejudicial attitudes nor have they fostered an awareness of the distinctive characteristics of our multi-ethnic society.

Broadly speaking, the foundation assists in the development and coordination of project teams of educators in different parts of Canada. The teams consist of classroom teachers, university professors of different disciplines, experts in learning theory and practice, and administrators. The ultimate aim of the projects that are being funded is to develop classroom materials and teaching methods that will reflect the nature of Canadian society in all its diversity and help students to understand and become more involved in their total Canadian environment. Typically, materials used in Nova Scotia to teach children there about British Columbia have been produced in Toronto publishing houses. We happen to think that British Columbia might play a role in interpreting this province to others, and vice versa."³

The method of study developed and endorsed by the Canada Studies Project is the "Continuing Concerns," or "Continuing Problems," approach--(problems worthy of our continuing concern). This involves an empirically based inquiry designed to ascertain that a given problem does in

fact exist; an examination of the historical background and varying viewpoints implicit in the problem via documents, anecdotes, role-playing, poetry and literature, factual and emotional data, and other sources of high impact and interest; and finally an attitude-centred analysis of the alternative positions and proposed solutions for that problem, in which the student is encouraged to take and defend a stand based upon his value system and his knowledge of the facts surrounding the issues.

From an inventory of the many continuing problems facing Canadians, the Canada Studies Foundation has selected four major areas for treatment in the above manner. Each was held to be of supreme importance and urgency, and of truly national scope. First among these was the relations between the various ethnic and linguistic groups in Canadian society, including the relations between French and English speaking Canadians, and the relationships between white Canadians and native Indians.

One of the larger teams under Project Canada West, (a regional arm of the Foundation) is the one from Manitoba. This group is producing materials for classroom use in examining the latter problem of native-white relations. However, it is not expected that these materials will be available for some time, as the process of investigation, analysis and study precedes actual production of classroom materials. All the Foundation projects are proceeding with

painstaking caution, exhaustive examination of objectives, methods and materials, pilot studies, committee reports, and thorough research. As a consequence, materials are not likely to be readily available until about 1975.

"The Foundation hopes to accomplish its goals within five years and then go out of business. When materials from the projects . . . are actually in use there will have to be an assessment and evaluation of them."⁴

However, this evaluation of the concerns and methods of the new Canadian studies as they are actually implemented in the schools need not be left entirely to the middle-distant future. A Canada Studies-type Continuing Concerns unit, treating Indian-white relations, does exist and has been in use in B.C. High Schools since September, 1971. This book, Indians in Transition,⁵ was designed as a self-contained unit expressly modelled after the above described approach by the author, Gerald Walsh, of the University of British Columbia.

Walsh created this book specifically as a response to the statements of the Foundation indicating a need for materials treating this area of national interest in this manner. Because it is a one man project, not constrained by deliberations in search of consensus, by meetings and position papers, by the need to report back findings and progress to a higher body at frequent intervals, the book was produced in a fraction of the time that any of the larger

projects can hope to be. Thus it had been in use two full school years and offered a unique opportunity to preview the effects of the content, goals and methods of the Foundation materials before they are actually available for widespread use. Though it must be admitted that the book cannot in fact be termed a pilot project of the Foundation, its conscious adherence to Canada Studies Foundation concerns and methods, the impact that Foundation materials are expected to have in the near future, and the simple fact that Indians in Transition is in itself a new resource widely used in B.C. Schools, all contribute to making an assessment of its usefulness a worthwhile endeavour.

The Problem

The problem, therefore, was to determine whether or not the resource materials in Indians in Transition, as they are used in the schools, bring about the desired positive attitude toward Indian people, relative to the measured effects of the more traditional curriculum content.

Definitions of Terms

Fishbein, upon whose writings the theory of this study in some part rests, supplies definitions of the critical terms belief and attitude:

"Belief is defined as the probability dimension of a concept--is this given relationship probable or improbable? Attitude is defined as the evaluative dimension of a concept--is it good or bad?"⁶

Operationally, for this study, attitude was defined as the positive or negative affect as measured by the instrument (a Thurstone type scale constructed specifically for this research). Beliefs, then, are operationally the statements which make up that same instrument (and are therefore given a positive or negative probability value by the research subject).

Hypotheses

The general hypothesis was that groups of students subjected to a Continuing Concerns approach unit on Canadian Indians would demonstrate more positive attitudes toward Indians than would groups of students subjected to the normal, non-Indian centred, non-attitude based activity.

Specifically, those groups of students subjected to Indians in Transition would score higher on a Thurstone scale of attitudes toward Indians, constructed for this study, than would those students subject to neutral, non-attitudinal materials.

The null hypothesis: $H_0: \mu_1 = \mu_2$

The alternative hypothesis: $H_1: \mu_1 > \mu_2$

Where: μ_1 and μ_2 represent the mean scores of populations represented by the treatment and control groups respectively.

Rationale of the Hypotheses

The rationale leading to such a prediction must knit closely with the intentions and methodology of the treatment. The theory of attitude change which most closely aligns with Walsh's ideas as manifested in Indians in Transition is that laid down by Fishbein in "The Relations Between Belief and Attitude." The following quotations from Fishbein are interspersed with relative comments concerning corresponding portions of Indians in Transition, and will be footnoted as a whole, not individually.

Fishbein's theory implies that attitude change will occur when:

"(1) an individual's beliefs about an object change . . . "

This is precisely the goal of the first section of Walsh's book--to provide empirically sound data in order to clear up any misconceptions the reader may have about Indians.

" . . . and/or (2) when the evaluative aspect of beliefs about an object change . . . "

Again, Indians in Transition attempts to bring about this very shift in part two, using affective-emotional historical accounts of the Indian's experience with white culture, designed to encourage the student to re-evaluate his beliefs. Thus, while empirical data in the first section may persuade the subject that the stereo-type "drunken Indian" is not as universally applicable as he once thought, the affective content of the second section is designed to further attitude

change by tempering his disdain for that sector of the Indian population that can at a given moment be accurately described as "drunken" with some understanding of the antecedent conditions.

"It should be noted that beliefs about an object may change in two ways: (1) new beliefs may be learned, that is, new concepts may be related to the attitude object, new stimulus-response associations may be learned, and (2) the strength of already held beliefs may change, that is the position of beliefs in the habit family hierarchy may be altered..."

The treatment was designed to introduce new and persuasive data in part one in order to bring about (1), and to affect the relative importance of existing and newly-learned beliefs particularly in part two, but also to an extent in part one.

The general emphasis in the unit upon beginning with the initial belief system and attitudes of the student, rather than assuming a clean slate, is echoed in Fishbein's statement that:

" . . . the amount and direction of attitude change will be a function of (1) the individual's initial attitude and, thus, the number, strength, and evaluative aspects of his salient beliefs, and (2) the number, strength, and evaluative aspects of the new beliefs he learns. Here, however, an important distinction must be made between learning the contents of an attitude change communication and learning something about an attitude object."

Thus, rather than preaching a "desirable" set of beliefs about Indians, and expecting the student-subjects to adopt a correspondingly "enlightened" attitude, the unit

acknowledges an initial belief-attitude system and encourages the student to analyze it in the light of new data and widespread viewpoints.

" . . . an individual's attitude toward some concept will only change if he learns something new about the concept, if he forms a new S-R association. Simply learning that the communication says S is R will not produce attitude change. To use the terminology of Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953), attitude change only occurs when the individual 'accepts' the communication."

Indians in Transition attempts to achieve this acceptance by involving the student in "ought" situations, by asking him to analyze and value, rather than memorize rote fact. It is in this aspect of internalization that the third part of the book has its greatest intended effect. The empirical data which substantiate this theory of attitude change are reviewed and criticized in Fishbein's article, included in the appendix.⁷

The Assumptions Made in This Study

The first and fundamental assumption, of course, was the one made in most studies of attitude change--that a pencil and paper self-reporting instrument is a valid measurement of attitude. In that it can be argued that responses to such an instrument are in fact behaviour, that the treatment and hypothesized results are essentially cognitive, and that this method is at present the most precise method of gauging the behavioral manifestations

of such cognitive phenomena, the assumption is not untenable.

It was also assumed that the belief and attitude structures of the subjects were sufficiently open and flexible that new cognitive and affective data would have a significant effect upon them. Further, it was assumed that the school can have a role in attitude formation, that the latter was not solely determined by other, non-academic learning and experience. Finally it was assumed that the teachers involved in the study used the materials as they were intended to be used, not simply as an unstructured source of materials "about Indians."

Delimitation of the Study

Only those teachers who agreed to use the book substantially as it was intended to be used--that is, as a three part relatively structured unit designed to facilitate attitude change--were included in the pool from which the treatment groups were randomly selected. Those who selected only a few sources from the book, or used the book such that it does not comprise the main focus of a unit on Canadian Indians, were eliminated as unsuitable for either control or treatment classification.

The subjects of the study were restricted to British Columbia Lower Mainland Tenth Grade students in schools not having a significant Indian population. This served to eliminate the confounding effects that appreciable social interaction with Indians might have had.

Justification of the Study

The study was justified on the basis of its being an opportunity to preview the performance of the Continuing Concerns Approach before its widespread introduction in the form of numerous Canada Studies Foundation projects, and on the purely pragmatic basis of evaluating this new and expensive resource material upon its introduction into the schools. The evaluation was unidimensional (only the apparent attitude change was measured) and practical (only the actual performance of the book, as it is being used, not as it might theoretically or potentially be used, was assessed). Thus it was both a useful and simple design, and might be replicated, with modifications, in order to provide much-needed evaluation of new materials in Social Studies and other academic areas.

CHAPTER TWO - REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

There is much evidence to substantiate the idea that attitudes toward races can be changed in the classroom, though it has seldom related to Indians. Thurstone himself established as long ago as 1933 that the presentation of motion pictures can have a significant effect upon the racial and social attitudes of children--and that such change persists for a relatively long time.⁸

Another researcher to which the instrument in this study partially owes its genealogy, H. H. Remmers, used the scale included in Appendix D to show that teaching materials taking as little as fifteen minutes of class time may produce significant changes in the attitude of White high school students toward Negroes. Furthermore, he showed that these changes will persist after a full year.⁹ An extensive review of the earlier literature of race attitude change is available in Stember, Education and Attitude Change--The Effect of Education on Prejudice Against Minority Groups, Institute of Human Relations Press, 1961.

More recently, Georgeoff, Jones, Bahlke and Howard¹⁰ hypothesized that the Caucasian members of classes experiencing a curriculum of Negro history, culture and

literature would discover that the Negro had a great and significant past, and would be more likely to view the Negro as an equal. This experiment, carried out in twenty-two integrated fourth grade classrooms was of a pretest posttest three group control group design. The pretest was to ensure equivalence in an intact groups situation, but unfortunately limits the degree to which the findings can be generalized. Other limiting factors were unequal numbers in the experimental and control modes, and the fact that the authors did not establish that their instrument--of the sociometric type--in fact was in itself a valid measurement of attitude as they defined it.

The findings of the study were that there was significant change for the experimental group comprised of White and Negro children from different neighbourhoods (the Negro children being bussed to the schools in question). There was no significant change for the experimental group of Negro and White children from the same neighbourhood, nor for the control group of similar composition. Unfortunately there was no control group equivalent to the different-neighbourhood experimental group, so it cannot be determined if the significant change was the result of a treatment-cultural naivete interaction, as would seem to be the case.

Another study involving racial groups other than Indians was that of Elrod,¹¹ hypothesizing that prejudice

would be reduced in high school students exposed to a film serving as a persuasive element in reducing prejudice. An adapted Bogardus Social Distance Scale was administered as a pretest to each of fifty-four subjects in two classes. One week later the film An American Girl, dealing with prejudice, was administered and one class immediately rewrote the Bogardus as a posttest. Group two had a discussion on the film and its topic the following day and then completed the posttest. This difference immediately raises the question of history as a confounding factor. Another weak point in the design is the lack of a true control group. However, the brevity of the time lag and the fact that gain scores were used tends to counterbalance these possible flaws. A two-tailed t-test on the difference in mean scores from pre to posttest for each group revealed that both achieved significant gains at the .01 level. In view of the directional hypothesis, it is somewhat surprising that the more powerful one-tailed test was not used.

The group having the discussion showed less change, and the authors concluded that this substantiated the evidence that discussion following a persuasive communication allows the subject to revert to original attitudes. However, intervening events of another nature may have confounded this result, and the mere fact of time differential may explain it. The idea of reversion via discussion may apply to one kind of communication and be totally contrary to the

dynamics of another. Hovland's ideas about communication "acceptance" figure heavily here. Presumably discussion could have the exact opposite effect from reversion if the communication was truly "accepted" and internalized, rather than merely noted or observed.

Again the overall findings of this study indicate that there is reason to believe that school materials can bring about desired attitude change, despite the fact that it deals with a variety of racial and national groups, but not Indians. Though it was possible, because of the lack of a control group, that the gains were partially the result of regression, history, or test-learning, they were substantial enough that it can be assumed that the school materials had a positive effect.

Rubin's¹² study of the effects of filmed media versus similar lecture, reading and discussion topics, in finding that the latter proved superior (though both showed significant gains), seems to seriously question Elrod's contention that reversion had occurred through discussion. This is especially clear when it is noted that Rubin's media treatment gain scores could well have resulted from regression, test learning, maturation and other factors that plague studies with no control group. Thus while the far greater gains of the discussion type treatment may at least partly be accredited to the treatment, the same is not necessarily true of the media treatment. Other diffi-

culties with this study were the differing lengths of treatment--four months media, versus a concentrated six weeks of seminars--and the instrument, which was constructed by the author according to his own criteria and not validated formally. Thus the results of this study are chiefly valuable to the extent that they substantiate or agree with other more rigorous research.

Closer to the proposed study in that it involves the use of readings to bring about stimulus-response changes, and is limited to white subjects not in social contact with the attitude objects, is the Litcher-Johnson study.¹³ The prediction was that the presentation of the stimulus concept (Negro) in association with positive printed stimuli would change the response pattern to the original stimulus.

This very strong study was also a pretest-posttest, control group design, with sixty-eight subjects evenly and randomly assigned to control and treatment modes. This study avoided many of the confounding variables possibly affecting the others by true randomization. The fact that elementary subjects were used ensured that the experimental and control teachers had unusual control over many potential confounding variables. For instance, it is known for certain that the multi-ethnic readers were the only source of this nature in the classrooms. The great length of the treatment period (four months) may have made the questions

of history and maturation more salient, but the control group design is considered adequate in counterbalancing these effects. And despite Remmer's evidence this extended treatment period seems more typical of school, as opposed to laboratory, practise, and more credible in terms of long term behavioral results. This study, like the proposed research, avoids the confounding effect of direct social contact with the race in question by limiting its sample (and thus its population), to schools with no Negroes.

The instruments used were two social distance tests, (the Clark Doll Test and the Show Me Test); a Categories Test, designed to ascertain the relative importance of colour in the child's value system; and a comparison test, in which the subject ranks Whites and Negroes on such traits as honesty, laziness, neatness, truthfulness and the like. All were administered individually at the beginning and end of the study.

The findings were that on all four tests there was a significant difference between treatment and control groups. The pre-test, used as an indicator of pre-treatment equivalence, naturally limits the degree to which the findings can be generalized, as does the restriction to Negro-naïve children. However, this latter limitation is not very serious in light of the fact that it is precisely this population that needs this type of academic exposure most.

Another study using literature which resembles that used in Indians in Transition is that of Standley and Standley.¹⁴ The attitude object was Negroes, and again the design was a pre and posttest control group type. The hypothesis was that exposure to literature written by and about blacks would produce more openness and less prejudice as measured by the Rokeach Race Belief Scale. A small problem arose over the definition of "openness", which was not defined other than by example. Operationally the difficulty was solved by recognizing openness as that which the Rokeach Scale measures, but even this has its shortcomings in terms of inferring from results.

The treatment resembled parts two and three of Indians in Transition, in that it was comprised of literary records of vivid situations in which Blacks were intimidated and discriminated against (corresponding to part II), and exercises in which the reader must make a judgement in a confrontation situation between Black and White, together with discussions of this type (resembling the valuing part III of Indians in Transition).

Again the pretest was chiefly used to ensure equivalence of the numerically slightly different treatment and control groups (19 vs. 22), and the statistical analysis of the difference in posttest mean scores indicated there was a behavioral change as measured by the Rokeach scale. In

In implying that more of this type of instruction should be undertaken, the authors stressed the concern for recognizing preconceptions and using both cognitive and affective data to break down stereotypes - a dominant theme in Indians in Transition.

Transition

Another study sharing this concern with the potential of both cognitive and affective data in attitude formation was the unsophisticated but persuasive Likover¹⁵ study of twenty-six elementary children's attitudes toward Negroes. The sample was divided into matched, (not random), treatment and control groups of thirteen each, with treatment receiving Black history through readings, stories, dance, song, art, and discussion, and a chronological, multi-viewpoint narrative of struggle and suffering similar to that in Indians in Transition. Both groups were evaluated according to a relatively structured interaction scale (there were five Negroes in each group), according to rigorously kept process records, and mother interviews after the treatment or neutral activity period of two weeks was complete.

By far the most dramatic evidence of change was found in the mother interviews, though the process records showed a difference, as did the interaction scale (but its findings were the least striking). The study relies heavily on anecdotal evidence, and paints a persuasive picture of

of attitude change in the treatment group. Though there is a conscientious effort at maintaining structure and objectivity in its observations, the study is not ironclad in its rigour and precision, but again is credible in that its findings do not contravene those of more scientifically objective research studies.

Due to the paucity of research on attitudes toward Indians, it has been necessary to draw from studies regarding attitudes toward other groups. However, with the awakening of a consciousness concerning the role of native Indians has come the beginnings of a body of research into this problem. Fisher¹⁶ utilized a three group (two treatment and one control) pretest posttest design, using six reading selections and discussion, not as propaganda, but presenting Indians realistically and sympathetically. Eighteen fifth grade classes from three distinct districts, one integrated, one essentially White, and one essentially Black, were randomly chosen such that each of treatment A (readings only) treatment B (readings plus discussion), and control (neutral activity) had two classes from each district for a total of six classes per group. All were pre and post tested with the Test of Attitude Toward American Indians for Children in Upper Elementary Grades, a discrimination technique fusion of Thurstone psychophysical and Likert summated ratings. Fisher found the alternate forms reliability of his instrument to be .89, and validated it by

correctly predicting that Indians would outscore naïve non-Indians, who would outscore non-Indians surrounded by a reservation on a preview test.

It was found, as hypothesized, that the reading material changed the attitude in question, and that the reading material plus discussion had an even greater effect. However, it was noted that the control group also gained, though not significantly--thus perhaps substantiating the belief that non-control group designs are subject to criticism in that they do not control for whatever variables caused this gain.

Other incidental findings which bear upon similar studies, included the fact that the integrated classes showed the greatest change, the black ranked second, and the all-white classes changed least, and that analysis showed that for a given individual, a gain in information was accompanied by greater attitude change. The first once more points out the possible confounding variable of inter-racial social contact, and the latter substantiates the view that there is a cognitive role in attitude change as well as an affective.

The final study in this review is the one most closely parallel to the proposed research in theory, method subjects, and attitude object. Pecoraro¹⁷ constructed a series of special lessons emphasizing the positive aspects

of the Indian, his art, cultural heritage, contribution to contemporary society, little-known history, and his relations with the white man. The lessons were centred around colour-sound film, slide-tape presentations, readings, commercial materials, and discussions--all stressing student involvement. A control group pre and posttest design was used. The instruments were a semantic differential, IBM scored; a Thurstone type attitude scale adapted from an attitude toward Negroes scale in Shaw and Wright; and an open-ended sentence completion test. There were Indian and non-Indian subgroups in both the treatment and control modes. Two schools were involved--a rural non-Indian school and a reservation school.

Findings were that as a result of the treatment unit the non-Indian children showed significant gain on the semantic differential, but failed to show any gain on the attitude scale. Comparing the treatment and control groups of non-Indian children, it was seen that the treatment group scored significantly higher on posttest of the semantic differential, but again showed no significant superiority on the attitude scale. The zero gain on the attitude scale, combined with the control group's loss on the same from pre to posttest, indicates that the adaptation of a negro-object test for Indians was simply not sensitive enough to overcome the effects of regression as demonstrated in the control group loss.

Other findings were that the Indian children outgained the White children on both measures, scored significantly higher on posttests, and in general reflected more change, indicating heightened self-image. Since there were no Indian-naïve subjects, there was no opportunity to measure the interaction of treatment and Indian naivete.

The open-ended sentence completions were reported verbally, were not quantified or classified formally, but apparently demonstrated positive change for all treatment groups. This aspect of the study added valuable insight as to the degree and type of attitude change incurred, but due to its informality, could not have stood as the study's only methodology. The combination of all three measurements makes this experiment's findings very convincing, whereas each of the instruments was not entirely definitive in itself.

The implications of this study, as with the others, is that this type of persuasive, involving communication, based at least partially on cognitive as well as affective activities, can bring about attitude change measurable by a wide variety of instruments. Furthermore, by their success in prediction, these studies indicate that there is indeed room for improvement in students' racial attitudes--even in the self-images of members of the minorities themselves.

It would appear that there is a great need in our schools for well planned materials dealing with racial and social problems.

CHAPTER THREE - METHODOLOGY

Measuring Instrument - (See Appendix D)

The instrument used was a Thurstone type scale for measuring attitude toward Indians, constructed specifically for this study. A pool of statements about Indians, ranging from extremely positive to extremely negative in their evaluative aspect, was accumulated and presented to a body of judges. Since the time of Thurstone's article, it has been established by practise that a much lower number of judges than he had stipulated will give a valid scale. Thus it was determined the the panel for this research would number approximately twenty-five to thirty-five. Each of the thirty judges was a lower mainland teacher active in Indian Education and had experience with Indian children. These "experts" ranked each of one hundred-plus items on a scale of one to eleven, negative to positive. Using the Method of Equal Appearing Intervals, and traditional Thurstone statistical methods, thirty to forty items were selected for the final instrument. The precise method of constructing a Thurstone scale is contained in the article "Attitudes can be Measured" by Thurstone, included in Appendix D, along with a typical Thurstone scale.

Items such as these were included in the initial pool:

Indians should be regarded as any other group.

Indians are the noblest people on earth.

Indians are lazy drunken bums.

Indians have social problems, but these are not of their own making.

Indians should be prohibited from leaving the reservations.

Indians have long enjoyed a unique and special understanding of nature.

Indians should be allowed to intermarry with any group they so choose.

Education beyond grade 10 is wasted upon the Indian.

Indians are not very smart compared to other groups.

Indians tend to be dishonest and sly.

Method of Scoring

Subjects were asked to agree or disagree with each of the items on the final instrument and the median of the scale values of statements endorsed was the score for each individual. These values were determined by the judges using the Equal Appearing Intervals Method. Item scale values are shown alongside corresponding statements in Appendix D.

Validity

The validity of the instrument rests in the authority of the expert judges, and was substantiated by comparing scores of a known positive group (Indian Education Students) with those of a more neutral group (undergraduates in other

fields), it having been very difficult to isolate a known negative group in this case. The mean for twenty-two Indian Education students taking the test was 7.3. For the twenty-two Education students not taking Indian Education, the mean was 6.5. This difference proved significant at the .10 level, but not at the .05 level. Since at this educational and cultural level it is agreed that a generally positive racial outlook is expected for all subjects, such findings indicate at least an acceptable degree of sensitivity for the instrument. A known negative group would likely have provided more significant differences.

Reliability

Reliability was determined by split-half administration of this test to each of the above groups, and by comparison of scores in consecutive administrations of the instrument. The split-half reliability was computed at .94, and the test-retest reliability was computed at .89. Both are considered acceptable levels for this use.

Design

The experimenter was unable to randomly assign individuals to treatment and control groups, therefore the method of randomized intact groups was used. That is, it was classes (and teachers) that were randomly assigned to control and experimental treatments, and class mean scores,

rather than individual scores, that were used for analysis. While this made the required number of subjects higher, it also tended to make for a more powerful design in terms of finding significance, by reducing the error term in the variance.

The design was a randomized intact groups assigned to experimental and control, posttest only format.

R (classes) X O

R (classes O

Treatment was carried out in normal Social Studies classes for approximately one month, during which time the control groups were engaged in neutral studies, not specifically aimed at changing attitudes toward Indians; that is, the regular exploration sector of the grade 10 curriculum. Thus the only manipulated variable was treatment-nontreatment.

No pretest was used, because of the potential sensitizing effects, and because findings could be generalized only to a population experiencing such a pretest. Thus testing as main effect, and possible interaction, were controlled, and it is possible to generalize to a large population; namely, all urban grade ten classes who have been subjected to Indians in Transition systematically for about a month, and who have not had significant social experience with Indians.

Because of the random assignment of classes, teacher differences and selection were controlled for. Variables such as history (perhaps a T.V. special on White-Indian relations), and maturation were controlled for by the non-treatment group. Instrument decay and regression were irrelevant to the study.

Sampling Procedure

Teachers of grade ten classes in Lower Mainland schools were interviewed to determine their willingness to administer Indians in Transition as specified for the treatment group in this study. Only teachers (and thus classes) in schools having no significant Indian population were included. From the pool of willing teachers, ten classes were randomly drawn for treatment and ten for control, these conditions prevailing for one month.

Collection of Data

At the end of the month of treatment or neutral activity, the instrument was administered, with ten class means for treatment and ten class means for control being computed. Then a grand mean for treatment and a grand mean for control were computed. Tables of class means, deviation scores, and Grand Means are provided.

Analysis of Data

The simple t-test for significance of difference between two means was optimal, the power being increased by

the use of randomized groups. It was a one-tailed test because of the directional hypothesis, and the level of significance was set at .05.

CHAPTER FOUR - WEAKNESSES TO BE CONSIDERED

The chief weaknesses of this design derived from the author's lack of authority in the schools. Due to a lack of any administrative authority, there was no opportunity for random assignment of individuals to treatment and control. And even though this problem was largely solved by random assignment of intact groups, there remained the problem that the pool from which this sample was drawn may in fact have differed systematically from the population of Indian-naive classes in the lower mainland. The pool consisted of classes whose teachers had indicated by interview that they were willing to participate in the study; that is, use or not use the material at the designated time in the designated way. This incurred two limitations: there may have been great variance in teacher interpretation of this material, over which the author had little control; and teachers administering the unit as part of the study may have done a more effective job of presentation than might the teacher population. However, the first limitation can be partly discounted in that teacher variance in the sample may in fact have legitimately represented a similar spectrum in the population. The second problem of a semi-Hawthorne effect upon teacher performance is a problem which plagues most in school research, and could have only been removed by subterfuge or hidden measurement--an impossibility in this case.

A second weakness was the fact that there was no control over the content of other courses, such as English, in which inter-racial materials might have been introduced, thus confounding the results. Because classes do not move from subject to subject in intact groups, there was no guarantee that control groups would counterbalance this, though it might be assumed that students experiencing such material would have distributed themselves about evenly in treatment and control groups by chance.

A point, perhaps vulnerable to criticism, is the fact that the control condition was specifically neutral and not attitude-oriented, thus perhaps introducing a "Hawthorne Effect" in favour of the Experimental condition. However, it must be pointed out that no such attitude-oriented program presently exists which might be matched against the Indians in Transition treatment. The present curriculum concentrates on White exploration of British North America, with little or no consideration of Indian matters or contributions. Thus it is more valid to measure Indians in Transition against the non-attitudinal material actually in use, than it would be to manufacture some other, less neutral control condition.

The author would have liked to have had more than ten intact group means in each mode, but due to the selection process by interview, and the projected pool size, this was

about the maximum that resources allowed.

It is also recognized that the study was limited in that it treated only an urban population, and though it was hoped a random selection of treatment and control groups would result in socio-economic and cultural equivalence, there is no guarantee that some intervening factors introduced by sampling from many schools did not produce some sample peculiarity.

The author realizes that the design was simple (with no blocking of factors, analysis of variance, or sophisticated statistical analysis), but feels that this contributed to a stronger design in view of the available resources. Such straightforwardness should also contribute to its persuasiveness insofar as school administrators and other lay persons are concerned, in view of the results.

In sum, it would seem that the greatest weakness was in the lack of strict definition and control over the treatment--and that this problem lay in the essentially practical, non-laboratory, but real-setting of the study. That the results demonstrate significant change despite this difficulty, demonstrates that much more clearly the value of the Continuing Concerns approach and Indians in Transition. A highly structured and limited treatment might have yielded more varied and comprehensive data, but a more realistic reflection of actual practise such as this proved of more value in assessing this method and material as it is actually used.

CHAPTER FIVE - DATA AND CONCLUSIONS

Table One - Experimental Condition

<u>Class</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Class Mean</u>	<u>Deviation Score</u>	<u>(Dev. Score)²</u>
1	28	6.6	-.23	.0529
2	27	6.7	-.13	.0169
3	31	7.3	+.47	.2209
4	33	6.5	-.33	.1089
5	34	7.0	+.17	.0289
6	28	6.7	-.13	.0169
7	31	6.8	-.03	.0009
8	32	7.0	+.17	.0289
9	26	7.1	+.27	.0729
10	29	6.6	-.23	.0529
Total	Total	Grand Mean	Net	Total
10	299	6.83	0	.6008

$$\text{VARIANCE} = S_1^2 = .06675$$

Table Two - Control Condition

<u>Class</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Class Mean</u>	<u>Deviation Score</u>	<u>(Dev. Score)²</u>
1	31	5.7	-.25	.0625
2	28	5.8	-.15	.0225
3	30	6.0	+.05	.0025
4	26	5.9	-.05	.0025
5	32	6.0	+.05	.0025
6	33	5.5	-.45	.2025
7	31	5.9	-.05	.0025
8	32	6.3	+.35	.1225
9	29	6.2	+.25	.0625
10	31	6.2	+.25	.0625
Total	Total	Grand Mean	Net	Total
10	303	5.95	0	.5750

$$\text{VARIANCE} = S_2^2 = .06398$$

Test of Hypothesis

Null Hypothesis: $H_0: \mu_1 = \mu_2$

Alternative Hypothesis: $H_1: \mu_1 > \mu_2$

Where μ_1 and μ_2 represent the mean scores of populations represented by the treatment and control groups respectively.

To test the null hypothesis, the one-tailed t-test was employed:

$$t = \frac{\bar{X}_1 - \bar{X}_2}{\sigma \sqrt{\frac{1}{N_1} + \frac{1}{N_2}}} \quad \text{where } \sigma = \sqrt{\frac{N_1 S_1^2 + N_2 S_2^2}{N_1 + N_2 - 2}}$$

$$\bar{X}_1 = 6.83$$

$$\bar{X}_2 = 5.95$$

$$N_1 = 10 \text{ (classes)}$$

$$N_2 = 10 \text{ (classes)}$$

$$S_1^2 = .06675$$

$$S_2^2 = .06398$$

$$\sigma = \sqrt{\frac{(10 \times .06675) + (10 \times .06398)}{10 + 10 - 2}} = .852$$

$$t = \frac{6.83 - 5.95}{.852 \sqrt{\frac{1}{10} + \frac{1}{10}}} = 2.31$$

This fell within the area of rejection for the 95th percentile of a t-table with 18 degrees of freedom. Thus the null hypothesis was rejected, and the alternative hypothesis was accepted. The difference in grand means was highly significant at the .05 level.

Operationally, it was concluded that the classes of students subjected to Indians in Transition scored significantly higher on the constructed Thurstone-type scale of attitudes toward Indians than did those classes subjected to the regular, non-attitudinal materials.

More generally, it was concluded that groups of students subjected to a Continuing Concerns approach unit on Canadian Indians demonstrate a more positive attitude toward Indians than do groups of students subjected to the regular, non-Indian centred curriculum, insofar as the scale used was a valid measurement of such attitudes.

CHAPTER SIX - POSSIBILITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

In that the hypothesis tested out as predicted, there are several avenues of continued research open. Most obvious is replication in rural areas, as opposed to urban. It would also be advantageous to replicate in areas where there is a significant Indian population, thus determining whether the treatment-racial naïveté interaction seen in many other studies holds true. This study might also determine if these materials affect the Indian's self-image significantly, or if such materials can improve actual racial interaction in integrated situations. This brings to mind other adaptations of the material in conjunction with more overt behavioral attitude measures, perhaps using interaction analysis.

The relationship between cognitive and affective data in bringing about attitude could be pursued by introducing some measurement of information gained during the treatment, and correlating scores on this and the attitude instrument. It could be determined if there was a differential effect upon members of subcultures or races. In the past it has been shown that non-Whites tend to respond better to anti-prejudice material even when the race in question is not their own. Do Oriental students respond more positively

to Indians in Transition than do White students? Is there a differential effect in terms of socio-economic status?

The Continuing Concerns approach could be applied to other attitudinal problems such as pollution, and the results measured. Today everyone advocates environmental education, but it is not known whether such programs are having an effect.

Obviously, further work could be done in evaluating or perhaps modifying the constructed Thurstone-type scale. Its validity could be further tested against known groups; its reliability substantiated by replication and test-retest procedures. The sensitivity and usefulness of such an instrument can only be determined by repeated frequent application.

Finally, since it has been shown that the effectiveness of this particular text can be measured in terms of one of its stated objectives, there is no reason why other material in our Social Studies classroom cannot be similarly evaluated in terms of their proclaimed objectives. It is time we sought more empirical feedback about the methods and materials in use throughout our school system.

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APPENDIX "A"

Indians in Transition

An Inquiry Approach

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McCLELLAND AND STEWART LIMITED

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ONE

The Problem

During the period since the end of World War II the question of racial and inter-cultural relations have become an important focus of concern both at the international and the national level. The superiority of the white man, an idea long accepted without serious question, has been repeatedly and persistently challenged. The peoples of Asia and most of Africa have freed themselves from European colonial domination. Within nations racial minorities have asserted their rights to equality as never before. Recent events in the United States have shown that minority groups within a democratic society who have been classified as inferior by that society are no longer willing to accept that status. First the Negroes, then the Indians and the Mexicans and now the poor people, have taken action to improve their conditions. Their tactics have ranged from non-violent protest to the threat of militant action and the disruption of American society.

Canada has until now been more fortunate in the case of its principal racial minority, the Indians. This has not been because Canadians have been wiser or more just but because the Indians of Canada have been slower to become aroused and to demand improvements in their status. But there are unmistakeable signs that Indians in this country are rapidly becoming more conscious of the disadvantages under which they live and their demands for change are becoming increasingly militant. There is more than a faint possibility that if Indians fail to achieve improvements in their situation by peaceful means, some of them may resort to more violent methods. It is doubtful whether such methods would benefit the Indians; it is certain that they would not be beneficial to Canadian society. The problem for Canada today, then, is to find ways in which the aspirations of these first Canadians for a better life can be satisfied.

The following selections are introduced to show some of the realities of the social, economic and political conditions in which Indians live and to show how the problem is seen from a number of different viewpoints.

1. Are there any cases, in your opinion, in which the discriminating behaviour is justifiable?
2. Select two or three of the examples. In each case, try to imagine that you are Indian or Métis. How would you react?

Examples of Inferior Treatment

The few [examples] that are listed below were chosen because they represent the standard policies of groups of White people rather than the prejudiced behavior of individual persons. Each example was verified by the Social and Economic Research Office in the course of its study.

1. Three years ago an Indian family left its reserve and settled on the fringe of a White village. Adult members of the family sought and obtained employment with various White employers and managed to save some money. Last year they decided to move to the village site proper. A house was chosen for purchase and a small deposit made to guarantee the contract. When villagers heard of the sale, they urged the owner to refund the deposit. They feared that other Indians would also want to stay in the village. The money was refunded and the Indian family is still residing in the fringe settlement, fully aware of the efforts made to prevent them from integrating. The Secretary-Treasurer related this incident to one of the research assistants, concluding, "We do not have any Indian problems in town because we know how to deal with them."
2. One of the devices used in the study to arrive at an estimate of the population of Indian descent living in large villages and towns was to check each name on the provincial voters' list. As this was being done in one town, a municipal official, who had taken part in the enumeration advised, "That list will not help very much. We did not list Half-Breeds and Indians for fear they would believe they have earned residence in town and ask for relief."
3. News that Treaty and Non-Treaty Indians were moving in prompted the Municipal Council of one village to discuss this matter at its regular meeting. The council decided to have an inspection of their homes and surroundings made at once and if found unsuitable or their inhabitants liable to be on relief, to have their homes condemned and action taken to have them removed from the village.
4. Married couples applying to Welfare agencies to adopt children are queried about nationality preferences. They are asked whether they would accept Métis and Indian children. Approximately 75 per cent answer in the negative. Amongst those who would not object to Métis and Indian children are many parents who would accept them only if their Indian physical characteristics were not too pronounced.
5. Theatre usherettes in at least two Manitoba towns are instructed by theatre proprietors to make Indians sit in a special section of the building.
6. The House Committee of an urban church received a request from a group of Indians for the monthly use of a meeting room. After considerable discussion the Committee refused on the basis that the Indian group might include some undesirables who would not respect church property.

Table A. Per cent distribution of main sources of employment of bands by industry and/or occupational status

Bands Ranked a/c Average Per Capita Real Income from Gainful Employment	Per Capita Real Income	Average Months Employment Per Worker	Average Months Employment Per Job	Forestry	Fishing	Guiding	Handicrafts	Food Gathering	Farm Labour	Casual Unskilled	Skilled	Clerical	Professional	Farm Proprietor	Proprietor Non-Farm	Trapping
Skidegate	1252	10.6	6.7		21.6		4.9				70.3				3.24	
Caughnawaga	793	9.2	8.2							6.5	83.6	8.5			3.0	
Walpole Is.	715	6.16	5.9		2.9	3.0	6.5			55.4	8.0	8.1		8.7	3.5	3.8
Sheshaht, V.I.	664	10.7	10.7		.8			2.0		24.8	72.3					
Lorette	630	10.5	8.7			3.0	14.0			32.3	18.5	10.1	2.0		19.5	
Squamish	630	8.0	8.0		1.5		2.1			62.6	28.3	1.7			1.7	
Tyendinaga	516	8.3	8.0							24.5	36.5	12.0		17.5	4.6	
Curve Lake	350	7.3	3.1			6.8	8.1	10.2		30.6	28.5				8.1	8.0
Six Nations	350	7.5	4.0						13.9	35.8	26.8	2.1	8.5	12.9	4.7	
Mistassini	341	5.6	5.6	8.1	2.9	2.3				27.6	2.3	1.4				54.3
Masset	336	3.8	3.8		20.5		6.0			52.2	14.9			1.9	4.3	
Dog Rib Rae	332	5.67		8.0	12.3		4.0			28.6		4.0				42.5
Port Simpson	325	6.9	4.35		30.0					36.4	24.6				5.5	2.1
Kamloops	314	9.5		7.2					5.0	51.8	8.6	1.4		11.5		
Sarcee	302	6.7	2.82				10.7		17.8	21.4	10.7	6.9		23.5		
Fort William	298	8.1	6.45	31.7						40.1	16.9	8.4				
Williams Lake	291	7.5	3.23	13.3				26.6		23.9	10.6			25.7		
Moose Factory	284	6.24		6.1						48.0	24.6	4.9				12.3
Fort Alexander	255	7.1	1.7													
River Desert	250	4.9	3.5	53.4		15.4	2.7			5.6	5.1	6.2	2.5	2.6	3.7	6.2
St. Mary's	249	7.27	2.3	55.8			3.3	4.2	6.2	22.5	1.2				3.3	
Attawapiskat	247															

The Roots of the Problem

Enough has been said in Part One to show that there exists a basic problem in Canada with respect to its first citizens. With a few exceptions they are poor; they hold the most poorly-paid jobs and suffer high unemployment rates; they are relatively poorly educated; they are subject to prejudice and discrimination. In a real sense they live as strangers in the land that was owned entirely by their ancestors before the white man came. They are a people who have been robbed of their heritage. Small wonder then that some are apathetic and without hope, while many are bitter and cynical about the intentions of the white majority.

Such a state of affairs is wrong. It runs contrary to the ideals of justice and equality of treatment to which we in Canada are committed. It is also dangerous because in the growing discontent of Indians lies a threat to the peace and stability of Canadian society. It is therefore a moral problem as well as a political one, and it may be stated thus: what are the Canadian people going to do in order to provide the Indians in Canada with the opportunity to live a free and full life?

This is a difficult problem to which we will return later. Before doing so, we will try to answer another question: precisely how did the present situation develop? In tracing the experiences of Indians in their contact with the White Man and his culture, we should achieve a better understanding of the problem.

What then did happen in the collision between the culture of the White Man and the cultures of the various Indian tribes? We already know some of the answers to this question. We know, for example, that the Indians were displaced from ownership of most of the land known today as Canada. We also know that in some way these "first citizens" became second-class citizens. But there are other questions we need to ask and to answer if we are to have a genuine understanding of the present situation. Here are some of them:

1. Why were Europeans so successful in taking over the

country? Did the Indians resist? If so, why were they unsuccessful?

2. What were the effects on them of the introduction of European religion, contact with fur traders, and elements of European civilization such as alcohol, firearms, and smallpox and other diseases to which they had no immunity? How did these things affect their traditional ways of life – their economies, technologies, political organizations, their customs and their beliefs about life? In other words, what price, material and psychological, did the Indians pay for their encounter with Europeans?
3. What contributions did the Indians make, either directly or indirectly, to the establishment of the White Man in this part of North America?

As you study the selections that follow, bear these questions in mind. The answers to them help us to understand the difficulties in which the Indians of Canada find themselves today.

1.

The Beothuk Indians of Newfoundland

On September 14, 1829, the English newspaper *The London Times* contained an article which told a tragic story. It announced the death of a woman and the end of a people.

DIED – At St. John's, Newfoundland, on the 6th of June last in the 29th year of her age, Shanawdithit, supposed to be the last of the Red Indians or Beothuks. This interesting female lived six years a captive among the English, and when taken notice of latterly exhibited extra-ordinary mental talents. She was niece to Mary March's husband, a chief of the tribe, who was accidentally killed in 1819 at the Red Indian Lake in the interior while endeavouring to rescue his wife from the party of English who took her, the view being to open a friendly intercourse with the tribe.

The story of the encounter of the Beothuk and the White Man has been summarized by a Canadian scholar, Diamond Jenness.

my tribe was powerful, but now many of my people die every winter. Some children are born, but they are no good – they die soon."

Now in the interests of ethnology, if not of humanity, would it not be worth somebody's while to send a qualified doctor to patch up as best he might the remnants of the tribes of the Casca and Liard Indians, and prevent the spread of contagion? A good deal of money is spent annually by the Dominion and the various Provincial Governments in doing whatever is done for the Indians of Canada – surely a little might be spared for this outlying part of the country; and let the man whose salary it pays be a doctor and not an Indian agent. No surveys are wanted; no reservations need be staked off; for, if the present state of affairs continues but a few more years, extinction will put every Indian beyond the limitation of the agent's reserve.

Warburton Pike, *Through the Subarctic Forest* (London: Edward Arnold, 1896), pp. 86-87, 98-99.

1. What effects of culture contact does Pike observe?
2. "What was the matter with them all?" The chief explained what had happened to his people, but did not really explain why. In the light of what you have learned so far, write a paragraph giving your answer to the question.
3. Pike deplores what has happened to the Indians. What action does he propose? Discuss the adequacy of his analysis and his proposals.

5.

Industrialization and Urbanization

The Indians of Canada did not have the opportunity to recover from the effects of the impact of the white man's culture on their own. While still disorganized by the results of the contact with fur traders, missionaries, and settlers, they found themselves in a country that was growing steadily in population while at the same time rapidly becoming industrialized. The industrialization of Canada in the twentieth century had tended to keep the Indians off balance and disoriented. Modern industry has certain essential requirements. Workers must have specialized skills, and these require special education and training. A modern factory, office, or other business operation, in order to be successful in a competitive world, has to be efficient; efficiency requires that workers are on the job regularly, at specific times and for specific periods. Production schedules have to be achieved and deadlines have to be met. These requirements are rigorous enough for those reared in the white culture, but they are specially difficult for the Indians. For many reasons Indians have not benefited greatly from the education provided for them. As to the question of time – punctu-

ality and regular attendance – Indians often find it difficult to adjust to the white man's sense of time. Furthermore, they have less tolerance to the boredom of the humdrum routine of the dull, repetitive jobs which are a part of the industrial way of life. Add to this the rapid growth of towns and cities, and one can get some idea of the feelings of confusion and helplessness that assailed the Indians. One of their more eloquent spokesmen, Chief Dan George, conveys these feelings in this moving statement.

.... Was it only yesterday that men sailed around the moon . . . And is it tomorrow they will stand up on its barren surface? You and I marvel that men should travel so far and so fast. . . . Yet, if they have travelled far then I have travelled farther . . . and if they have travelled fast, then I faster . . . for I was born a thousand years ago . . . born in a culture of bows and arrows. But within the span of half a life I was flung across the ages to the culture of the atom bomb. . . . and from bows and arrows to atom bombs is a distance far beyond a flight to the moon.

I was born in an age that loved the things of nature and gave them beautiful names like Tes-wall-u-wit instead of dried up names like Stanley Park.

I was born when people loved all nature and spoke to it as though it has a soul I can remember going up Indian River with my father when I was very young I can remember him watching the sun light fires of Mount Pay-nay-nay as it rose above its peak. I can remember him singing his thanks to it as he often did singing the Indian word "thanks" so very very softly . . .

And then the people came more and more people came . . . like a crushing rushing wave they came hurling the years aside!! and suddenly I found myself a young man in the midst of the twentieth century.

I found myself and my people adrift in this new age but not part of it. Engulfed by its rushing tide, but only as a captive eddy . . . going round and round On little reserves, on plots of land we floated in a kind of grey unreality ashamed of our culture which you ridiculed unsure of who we were or where we were going uncertain of our grip on the present weak in our hope of the future And that is where we pretty well stand today.

I had a glimpse of something better than this. For a few brief years I knew my people when we lived the old life I knew them when there was still a dignity in our lives and a feeling of worth in our outlook. I knew them when there was unspoken confidence in the home and a certain knowledge of the path we walked upon. But we were living on the dying energy of a dying culture that was slowly losing its forward thrust.

I think it was the suddenness of it all that hurt us so. We did not have time to adjust to the startling upheaval around us. We seemed to have lost what we had without a replacement for it. We did not have the time to take your 20th century progress and eat it little by little and digest it. It was forced feeding from the start and our stomach turned sick and we vomited.

Do you know what it is like to be without mooring? Do you know what it is like to live in surroundings that are ugly and everywhere you look you see ugly things strange things strange and ugly things? It depresses

man, for man must be surrounded by the beautiful if his soul is to grow.

What did we see in the new surroundings you brought us? Laughing faces, pitying faces, sneering faces, conniving faces. Faces that ridiculed, faces that stole from us. It is no wonder we turned to the only people who did not steal and who did not sneer, who came with love. They were the missionaries and they came with love and I for one will ever return that love.

Do you know what it is like to feel you are of no value to society and those around you? To know that people came to help you but not to work with you for you knew that they knew you had nothing to offer . . . ?

Do you know what it is like to have your race belittled and to come to learn that you are only a burden to the country? Maybe we did not have the skills to make a meaningful contribution, but no one would wait for us to catch up. We were shoved aside because we were dumb and could never learn.

What is it like to be without pride in your race, pride in your family, pride and confidence in yourself? What is it like? You don't know for you never tasted its bitterness.

I shall tell you what it is like. It is like not caring about tomorrow for what does tomorrow matter. It is like having a reserve that looks like a junk yard because the beauty in the soul is dead and why should the soul express an external beauty that does not match it? It is like getting drunk and for a few brief moments an escaping from ugly reality and feeling a sense of importance. It is most of all like awaking next morning to the guilt of betrayal. For the alcohol did not fill the emptiness but only dug it deeper.

And now you hold out your hand and you beckon to me to come across the street . . . come and integrate you say . . . But how can I come . . . I am naked and ashamed. How can I come in dignity? I have no presents . . . I have no gifts. What is there in my culture you value . . . my poor treasure you can only scorn.

Am I then to come as a beggar and receive all from your omnipotent hand? Somehow I must wait . . . I must delay. I must find myself. I must find my treasure. I must wait until you want something of me . . . until you need something that is me. Then I can raise my head and say to my wife and family . . . listen . . . they are calling . . . they need me . . . I must go.

Then I can walk across the street and I will hold my head high for I will meet you as an equal. I will not scorn you for your deeming gifts and you will not receive me in pity. Pity I can do without . . . my manhood I cannot do without.

I can only come as Chief Capilano came to Captain Vancouver . . . as one sure of his authority . . . certain of his worth . . . master of his house . . . and leader of his people. I shall not come as a cringing object of your pity. I shall come in dignity or I shall not come at all.

You talk big words of integration in the schools. Does it really exist? Can we talk of integration until there is social integration . . . unless there is integration of hearts and minds you have only a physical presence . . . and the walls are as high as the mountain range.

Come with me to the playgrounds of an integrated high school . . . see how level and flat and ugly the black top is . . . but look . . . now it is recess time . . . the students pour through the doors . . . soon over here is a group of white students . . . and see . . . over there near the fence . . . a group of

native students and look again the black is no longer level mountain ranges rising . . . valleys falling . . . and a great chasm seems to be opening up between the two groups . . . yours and mine . . . but no one seems capable of crossing over. But wait soon the bell will ring and the students will leave the play yard. Integration has moved indoors. There isn't much room in a class room to dig chasms so there are only little ones there only little ones for we won't allow big ones at least, not right under our noses so we will cover it all over with black top cold black flat and full of ugliness in its sameness.

I know you must be saying tell us what *Do* you want. What do we want? We want first of all to be respected and to feel we are people of worth. We want an equal opportunity to succeed in life but we cannot succeed on your terms we cannot raise ourselves on your norms. We need specialized help in education . . specialized help in the formative years special courses in English. We need guidance counselling we need equal job opportunities for our graduates, otherwise our students will lose courage and ask what is the use of it all.

Let no one forget it we are a people with special right guaranteed to us by promises and treaties. We do not beg for these rights, nor do we thank you . . . we do not thank you for them because we paid for them and God help us the price we paid was exorbitant! We paid for them with our culture, our dignity and self-respect. We paid and paid and paid until we became a beaten race, poverty-stricken and conquered.

But you have been kind to listen to me and I know that in your heart you wished you could help. I wonder if there is much you can do and yet there is a lot you can do . . . when you meet my children in your classroom respect each one for what he is . . . a child of our Father in heaven, and your brother. Maybe it all boils down to just that.

The difficulties faced by Indians in adjusting to the requirements of a rapidly-changing industrial society have been studied by anthropologists. The two tables which follow are summaries of the cultural beliefs and preferences of Indians before contact with Whites and after prolonged exposure to the White Man's culture. They should help us to see what changes have occurred and how the changes have not helped Indians to cope with modern Canadian society.

1. If ambition to succeed through competition and striving to achieve one's own ends is important in our society, how would an Indian who believed in the traditional values get on in our society?
2. A white person judging an Indian in terms of the White value orientation might easily come to the conclusion that he is lazy, careless about the future, and unambitious. How might an Indian judge an average White person in terms of traditional Indian values?
3. What signs do you see in our society of groups of White people adopting values similar to the traditional Indian values?

Table II. Dominant Value Orientation prior to White Dominance

White	Indian-Eskimo
Human nature is evil but perfectable	
Man dominates, exploits and controls nature	In harmony with nature
Future-oriented	Past and present oriented
Doing and activity oriented	Being-in-becoming
Individualistic	Collaborative (tribal)
Capitalistic (commercial)	Communitistic in the non-political sense (sharing)
Nationalistic	Communal

C. Hendry, *Beyond Traplines* (Toronto: The Anglican Church of Canada, 1969), p. 32.

1. What is the traditional attitude towards time? How does it differ from that of Whites? What would be the Indian attitude towards such things as long-range planning, meeting future deadlines, etc.?
2. If you were managing an industrial undertaking e.g. a factory or a logging operation, would you tend to prefer to employ a person with the White orientation or the traditional Indian value orientation? Explain and defend your decision.

Table I. Indian Accommodation and/or lack of Accommodation to the Dominant White Culture

Before	After Sustained Exposures to Whites
In harmony with nature, a sense of wholeness	Loss of integrated whole and personal integrity
Community concept of possession	Cumulative concept applied to the individual
Collaborative relations (collateral)	Individualistic relations
Friendliness and trust	Hostility, contempt, suspicion
Concrete behavior governed by moral codes	Increased license due to cultural breakdown
Interdependence	Ecologically trapped in poverty, dependent on subsidies, and uneconomic occupational activities

Ibid., p. 35.

1. What are the attitudes towards White society which have been generated in Indians by prolonged exposure to White culture? How would these attitudes make it difficult for Indians to adjust to an environment predominantly White? (e.g. an industrial plant in which most of the workers were white, a modern Canadian town or city, etc.)
2. What would probably be the attitudes of Indians who remained in an impoverished reservation environment towards those Indians who "made it" in the white man's world?
3. How have the effects of culture contact made the Indians susceptible to alcoholic excess? How does excessive drinking make their adaptation to modern society more difficult?
4. Generally speaking, how would you describe the effects of culture contact on Indian personality? Do these effects contribute to the Indians' ability to adapt successfully to an urban-industrial way of life?

Despite the difficulties facing them in the urban and industrial world, there has been a significant movement of Indians off the reserves. The figures for British Columbia may be taken as typical of nation wide trends during the ten year period 1960-1970.

	On Reserve	Off Reserve	Total
1960	32,210 (83.2%)	6,520 (16.8%)	38,730
1970	32,935 (66.3%)	16,716 (33.7%)	49,651

This is not to suggest that the traffic is all one way - off the reserve. Many Indians who leave the reserve find that they cannot make a satisfactory adjustment to life off the reserve, so they return. But the trend is definitely there. Life on many reserves means poverty and dependence. The young in particular are attracted by the apparent opportunities in the larger society. Some make a successful, or at least a satisfactory, adjustment. Many more, however, have been attracted to towns and cities, but do not have the skills they need in order to succeed. Unable to secure employment, they find themselves on the welfare rolls and living in poor accommodation on the fringes of the community. Unfortunately in this condition, they render themselves liable to prejudice and discrimination. Too easily they are labelled lazy, drunken, and irresponsible. These people are in a kind of no-man's land. They do not have the psychological support that life on the reserve could provide, nor have they found acceptance in the larger society. At best, this is a marginal existence of psychological and material deprivation; at worst, it leads through loneliness to tragedy. This poem, written by a young Indian man about the Skid Row area of Vancouver, tells of the route travelled by many young Indians, men and women alike.

Hardened Artery

Vancouver, a sprawling city, a brawling city, a knocked-down-dragged-out kind of city.

This is the city of bright sounds, the fight sounds and the thirty-cents-short-to-get-tight sounds.

Listen Jack . . . do you hear that beat? Do you hear the rustling of restless feet . . . and muffled shuffle of night, flowing down on a down, down street of a down, down town?

You're at Hasting and Columbia Jack, the end of the track and there's no turning back, because this is the corner!

This is the Corner man! and this is the East End of Town.

The East End of Town, and some people say its the best end of town, and you're standing on wasting street, a bitter tasting street, a foot-sore drag calle, Hasting Street . . .

You want to see this street for real?

Be a lamp post.

This is a bruised street, a used street, a very much accused street.

It's a sometime street, a funtimes street, but mostly it's a you're-just-about-through street!

A tired street, a liared street, and when you're with it and having it rough, it a "God it's hell to-be-wired street."

This is an odd sort of street, a people who forgot-God-sort-of street.

A drab buildinged homely street, a sure-as-hell lonely street. It's a great street full of bad ones, a street full of sad ones, slouching and staring, their pale face wearing a look of indifference and their slumped shoulders bent from the weight of the monkey.

These are the night people, the living-in-fright people.

These are the face hardened, these are the case hardened.

These are the tough ones, the always-got-stuff ones.

The quick ones, the slick ones, and the five o'clock bile-throated sick ones.

This is the corner man, and down here is really down. Take a good look around. Take a good look! A GOOD LOOK!

BE A LAMP POST

The First Citizen, No. 1, November 1969, p. 2.

One institution which has come into being in response to the problem is the Friendship Centre. Many Friendship Centres have sprung up. Rural centres serve as "drop in" places where people of Indian ancestry can meet and get information about what they may expect when they move from the reserves or remote areas to towns and cities. Those in the urban centres refer Indians to community services and agencies which can provide them with assistance, find jobs and housing, secure legal aid, provide lo-

from emergency funds, offer recreational and group activity programs and numerous other services.

Some figures may convey an idea of the extent of the work:

In the year ending March 31, 1966, the Canadian Indian Centre of Toronto saw 15,338 persons participate in their programs, with an average monthly attendance of 1,728 during the period.

Between May, 1965 and August, 1966, the Winnipeg Centre sponsored an Alcoholics Anonymous group, referred 32 people to legal aid, 5 to the National Parole Board, 286 to the Indian Affairs Branch, made 326 job placements, and operated a home-finding service.

During 1966, the Calgary Indian Friendship Society placed 1,450 men and women in jobs, referred 250 to other services and agencies, gave legal advice to 175, found housing for 125, provided special tutoring for 32 students and made loans to 135 people.

Clearly the work being done by these centres across the country is valuable, although they are all working with inadequate budgets and underpaid staff. A study sponsored by the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development states:

The number of Indian people moving into the cities and towns of our country is already large and will undoubtedly increase substantially as over-population of the reserves forces Indian people to move elsewhere. The problem is already serious and governments have been slow to recognize a trend that cannot fail to create serious problems in the very near future.

Indians and the Law (Ottawa: Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1967), p. 54.

It recommends that the work of Friendship Centres be encouraged by substantial increases in federal, provincial and municipal grants; and that the Citizenship Branch of the federal government study ways of assisting the centres to develop sound programs for Indian people coming into the cities and towns.

The chairman of the group making this study, Dr. Gilbert Monture, summarizes the problem in his preface to the report:

The transition from the relatively happy and secure life of the reserve to the highly competitive urbanized life of our cities and towns has been made necessary by overwhelming economic pressures. However, it often inflicts too severe a strain on a people ill-equipped by tradition, temperament, education, and economic attitudes to withstand. (Many

non-Indians are also breaking under this strain and are indulging in dangerous forms of escape from the realities of life.) Add to this the latent non-acceptance of the Indian by much of the non-Indian society and the difficulty of adjustment to the white man's standards of moral and social conduct becomes compounded. Small wonder that many Indians seek to withdraw and exhibit a disregard for the concepts and the values of the dominant society. I am of the opinion that just as the blame for the present unhappy condition does not rest solely on the shoulders of any one of the parties involved, the ultimate solution can be found only by joint and sincere action.

Ibid., pp. 7-8.

1. The choice available to Indians seems to be either to remain on the reserve or to enter urbanized life. What are the implications of each choice?
2. What are the special difficulties Indians have to cope with if they are to make a successful adjustment to urbanized life? In what ways are non-Indians better prepared for this way of life?
3. Give one or two examples of "the latent non-acceptance" of the Indian mentioned by Dr. Monture. Explain how these would make successful adjustment difficult.
4. Dr. Monture mentions that some non-Indians are cracking under the pressure of modern urban-industrial living and are indulging in dangerous forms of escapism. Give examples of these. Are changes in our way of life needed to reduce stress? If so, what changes you suggest?

Despite the difficulties, some Indians have made a successful adjustment to the urban-industrial way of life. Many have competed successfully with white men in business. There are individual Indians, for example, who own fishing boats and equipment worth hundreds of thousands of dollars, and who make incomes in the five figure bracket. Indians have distinguished themselves in many aspects of Canadian life. You may be able to add to this list of some who are active at the present time:

Dr. Gilbert Monture, internationally-known engineer and world expert on mineral economics.

Ethel Brant Monture, noted authority on Indian culture and traditions

Senator James Gladstone

Len Marchand, Member of Parliament

George Clutesi and Gerald Tail Feather, painters of renown

Dr. Howard Adams, a spokesman for Indians and Métis in Saskatchewan

Harold Cardinal, author of *The Unjust Society*

Chief Dan George, actor in plays and films
Jean Paul Noret, a prominent radio announcer
Buffy Sainte-Marie and Alanis Obomsawin, folk singers
Dr. A. Spence and Dr. Peter Kelly, Anglican and United Church ministers.

Questions for Discussion

1. It is often argued by Indian critics that the history taught to Canadian students is biased and unfair in that it conveys misconceptions about Indians and their role in Canadian history. To what extent do you think this criticism is justified?
2. Discuss the ideas expressed in these statements taken from school textbooks:
 - a) Who calls, the Redman poor and sick,
he calls.
Who comes, the white man rich and strong,
he comes.
Who watches to see that pity reigns,
God watches.
 - b) "They fought more ferociously than any other Indians that we encountered in our westward movement."
 - c) "The white man from Europe brought with him knowledge and skill far greater than that of the wisest Indian."
 - d) "Indians were doomed by the coming of the white man. The number of Indians was small because they didn't know how to develop America's natural resources, that is the soil, the minerals, the water power and the other natural riches of the land."
 - e) "The missionaries regarded the Indians primarily as souls to be saved. They taught the Indians agriculture and handicrafts."
 - f) "It is probable that the North American tribes, in the course of their wanderings, lived for generations in the frozen waste of Alaska. This experience deadened their minds and killed their imagination and initiative."
 - g) "How, for instance, could the missionaries express the idea of a loving father to natives whose conception was that of cruel and evil spirits?"
 - h) "After the laws were passed [legalizing the treaties with the Indians], the condition of the Indian improved somewhat. Thousands of Indians continued to live in squalor on their reservations, but other thousands took their place as citizens."
3. The Indians were not the only people who came under the impact of European culture. India, China and Japan were influenced by Europeans. But whereas Indian cultures were shattered by the contact, those of the countries mentioned were changed but not to such a great degree. How do you account for the difference?
4. It may be argued that, without the co-operation of the Indians and without the benefit of the technology that they had developed to enable them to cope with their environment, white men could not succeed in establishing themselves in Canada.

THREE

Solving the Problem

In Parts One and Two we have looked at the problem of Indians in Canadian society and we have traced the historical development underlying the problem. We have seen that Indians are poor compared to the majority of other Canadians and that they are becoming relatively poorer. With a few exceptions they work at the poorest paid jobs and suffer a high level of unemployment. Many are dependent on some kind of welfare payment. Generally speaking they have benefited little from the kind of education that has been provided for them. We have seen, too, that they are subjected to many forms of discrimination.

The historical study has shown that the Indians of Canada are a people who have been disinherited both territorially and culturally. Today they are a people who live uncertainly between two cultural worlds – the one consisting of the remnants of a traditional culture, shattered by that of the White Man, and the other the world of the White Man's culture. They are unable to return to the past. The march of historical events has made that impossible. Hitherto they have not been able to make a satisfactory adjustment to a world dominated by Whites. A few have entered the world of the White Man and have been successful in it, usually at the price of assimilation. Many do not wish to enter this world, especially if the price of admission is the sacrifice of their identity as Indians. Meanwhile, they remain second-class citizens.

But things are stirring. An increasing number of Indians are voicing dissatisfaction with their poverty, inferior social status, and the general hopelessness of their lives. They are becoming increasingly aware of what has happened to them in the past and how this has affected what they are today. The number who are angry and impatient is growing. They want a new deal and they want it soon. The demands for action will grow, as the rapidly growing Indian population intensifies pressure on the resources of the reserves.

(The problem facing Canada is how to make it possible for Indians to live a full and satisfying life within Canadian society. It is a difficult problem. Whether it is fairly met and dealt with will be a test of Canada's claim to be a truly just and democratic society. In Part Three we shall look more closely at the

problem, what proposals are being offered for its solution, and how and why proposed solutions differ. This book will offer no final conclusions. It will be up to you, on the basis of your study of the problem, to arrive at your own conclusions as to what should be done to resolve it.

1. Possible Solutions

What then are the possible answers to the question of the future role of Indians in Canadian society? It seems that there are three: assimilation, separation, and integration.

Assimilation

The dictionary definition of assimilate is "to make or become like; to digest." If a cat eats a canary, it assimilates it. The canary becomes, in some way, a part of the cat. It is absorbed by the cat.

For the Indians, assimilation would mean that they would be absorbed into the larger society. They would no longer be identifiable as different from other Canadians. Eventually, if assimilation were complete, they would inter-marry with other Canadians and disappear as a separate, identifiable part of the population. There would, in effect, be no more Indians as such, but merely Canadians of Indian or partially Indian ancestry.

Separation

This would mean that the Indians would exist as a separate and distinct group. Those who are in favour of this arrangement hold a view which is similar to that held by the separatists in Quebec, or those black people in the United States who want a separate black community.

While remaining within the territory now known as Canada, they would be independent of and separate from Canadian society. They would have a separate Indian society, organized by Indians, governed by Indians, and presumably operating according to Indian ideas and values. This philosophy rejects or considers impossible the integration of Indians into Canadian society. Those who believe in it view with alarm the idea of assimilation. They wish, above all, to preserve an Indian way of life.

Integration

Somewhere between the two schools of thought advocating assimilation and separation, are those who believe that the future

of the Indians lies in some form of integration into Canadian society. Basic to this philosophy is the belief that, within the framework of Canadian society, Indians should be assisted, through financial aid, education, and expert technical advice where required, to break out of their present depressed social and economic conditions, and to live full and satisfying lives. This would mean putting an end to poverty, dependency and discrimination. It would require that Indians take over the responsibility for making the important decisions in matters affecting their lives. They would decide for example, how to implement the kind of education program that will best serve their needs, the way they should organize their government, how to plan for the best use of their resources, etc.

All this should take place within, and with the assistance and co-operation of, Canadian society. Integration differs from assimilation in that the choice would be left to individual Indians to decide for themselves whether they wish to be assimilated into Canadian society or to retain their Indian identity. It differs from co-existence in that a working relationship would be maintained between the Indians and the larger Canadian society. Indians would still be a part of Canadian society, not distinct and separate from it.

Before considering the merits of these different points of view and examining what is being proposed at the present time, we shall look at the way things now stand. We have already studied some of the components of the problem, but we have yet to look at some of the questions raised by it. How, for example, is an Indian defined in law? What is the Indian Act and how does it affect Indians? What relations exist between the Indians and the various levels of government – federal, provincial and local? It is necessary to know something about these matters in order to understand the implications of the proposals, to understand the attitudes of Indian and non-Indian spokesmen, and to appreciate the complex nature of the problem and the difficulties in the way of achieving change satisfactory to everyone concerned.

2. What is an Indian?

The Indian Act defines an Indian as "a person who pursuant to this Act is registered as an Indian or is entitled to be registered as an Indian." If you are legally an Indian, you can live on reserves and are entitled to certain rights. However, a person may be a full-blooded Indian and yet may not be an Indian according to the law, in which case he does not have a right to membership on a reserve or any title to resources or reserve land.

How, then, does one come to be defined as an Indian by this law? Normally, children of registered Indians are Indian. A woman, whether Indian or non-Indian, who marries a treaty or registered Indian automatically becomes a legal Indian.

However, Indian status can be lost. That is, a legal Indian can become, in the eyes of the law, a non-Indian. For example, if an Indian woman marries a non-Indian man, she automatically loses her Indian status. Also, an Indian may choose to give up his Indian status by applying to Ottawa for enfranchisement. Thus he gains full citizenship rights and becomes, in effect, a Canadian like anyone else. In doing so he renounces his treaty or aboriginal rights, gives up forever his right to membership on a reserve and all title to his share of resources or reserve land, and cannot return to the reserve to take up residence. Thus he may cut himself off from the rest of his family and his friends. By the same act he prevents his descendants from establishing a legal Indian identity should they wish to do so. There are many people of Indian descent in Canada today who might wish to be recognized legally as Indians but are unable to do so because an ancestor decided to renounce his legal claims to being Indian.

Even within the legal definition there are differences and distinctions, such as those between treaty Indians and registered Indians. Treaty Indians are those whose ancestors signed treaties with the crown whereby they ceded land in return for specified rights. Registered Indians are those whose ancestors did not sign treaties (in the Maritimes, Quebec, parts of the Northwest Territories, and in most of British Columbia), but who chose under the Indian Act to be regarded as legal or registered Indians. These differences are divisive. Many non-treaty Indians are afraid that association with treaty Indians will weaken their position with regard to aboriginal claims. On the other hand, many treaty Indians believe that association with non-treaty Indians will endanger their treaty rights.

There is a growing impatience, particularly among the younger people, with the anomalies and divisions created by this legal definition. They are seeking a definition of themselves which is satisfying and meaningful because it expresses their true identity, their "Indianness."


It is self-definition, not this network of inhuman legalities or the recently proposed alternative of assimilation, that will foster Indian unity. All the legal definitions fail to accomplish one thing - they fail to solve the real, human problem of identity. . . .

Our identity, who we are; this is a basic question that must be settled if we are to progress. A native person in Canada cannot describe himself without basically talking about himself as a Canadian. Being Canadian is implied and understood. To an Indian, being Indian in Canada simultaneously and automatically means being Canadian. The German Canadian has a homeland called Germany; the Ukrainian has a homeland; even the French Canadian,

20. Rely on reason and logic (your reason and logic) instead of rightness and morality. Give thousands of reasons for things, but do not be trapped into arguments about what is right.

21. Hold a conference on Human Rights, have everyone blow off steam and tension, and go home feeling that things are well in hand.

1. What is the central idea of the cartoon shown on page 141?
2. In what ways are the ideas expressed similar to those expressed by (a) Cardinal, (b) Gambill?
3. On the basis of the knowledge you have acquired so far, do you consider that the cartoon represents the truth about Indians and their relationship to the government, the law and the church?



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1. What idea is this cartoon trying to get across?
2. If Indians do, in fact, generally mistrust white men, what is likely to be their reaction to proposals for change which originate from them?
3. Do these criticisms reflect only the views of a minority of radical individuals who are speaking only for themselves? Or do they express the attitudes of a significant number of Indians? You may be able to answer this by reading the following statement, part of a presentation made in 1969 by the Manitoba Indian Brotherhood to a conference on human rights in Brandon, Manitoba. What view is expressed of the past work of the Federal Government and the Department of Indian Affairs? What similarity does it bear to Cardinal's statement?

Questions for Discussion

1. "We are not going out of Ottawa with answers but with questions. We must, for the love of God, find a means of consultation with the Indians that is honest, open, complete, sincere and constructive. We must ensure that the choices dictated by their values are made available to them. The best thing the government could do is get the hell out of the way."

The Honourable Robert K. Andras, Minister without Portfolio, October, 1968.

This statement was made by the Minister as he began a series of consultations with Indian leaders across the country. To what extent do you think the intention in this statement was reflected in the government *White Paper* on Indian policy?

2. Would you support the *White Paper*, in whole, in part, or not at all? Support your answer with relevant facts and arguments.
3. Give an outline of the Indian affairs policy you would recommend. Make it in the form of a number of recommendations. Briefly justify each recommendation.
4. Predict the consequences of a government attempt to carry out the proposals in the *White Paper*.

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APPENDIX "B"

44. *A Behavior Theory Approach to the Relations between Beliefs about an Object and the Attitude Toward the Object*

MARTIN FISHBEIN

In another paper in this book, Fishbein (see pp. 257 to 266) presented a distinction between beliefs about an object and the attitude toward that object. Generally speaking, attitudes were conceptualized as learned predispositions to respond to an object or class of objects in a consistently favorable or unfavorable way, and beliefs about an object were viewed as hypotheses concerning the nature of the object and its relations to other objects. Consistent with the works of Doob (1947), Lott (1955), Osgood et al. (1957), Rhine (1958), and others, both of these phenomena (i.e., beliefs about an object and attitude) may readily be placed within the framework of behavior theory. As Lott has pointed out, the placement of attitude within the framework of behavior theory "appears to be a more research-oriented and potentially fruitful approach to the problem." (p. 321). Indeed, by following the principles of behavior theory, a model of attitude acquisition and a model of the relationships between beliefs about an object and the attitude toward the object can be generated. Before turning to these models, however, let us briefly consider the behavior theory view of attitudes and beliefs about an object.

ATTITUDE

Consistent with the work of Osgood and his associates (1957, 1965), an attitude may be characterized as a "mediating evaluative response," that is, as a learned implicit response that varies in intensity and tends to "mediate" or guide an individual's more overt evaluative

responses to an object or concept. Two points about this view should be noted. First, attitude is treated as a unidimensional concept; it refers only to the "evaluation" of a concept (i.e., its "goodness" or "badness"). In this respect, it is entirely consistent with Thurstone's (1931) definition of attitude as "the amount of affect for or against a psychological object." Second, as Osgood et al. have pointed out, "every point in semantic space has an evaluative component (even though the component may be of zero magnitude when the evaluative judgments are neutral)." Thus, with respect to any object, an individual has a positive, negative, or neutral attitude; that is, there is a mediating evaluative response associated with every stimulus.

BELIEF ABOUT AN OBJECT

As Fishbein (see pp. 257 to 266 in this book) has pointed out, any belief about an object can be defined in terms of the "probability" or "improbability" that a particular relationship exists between the object of belief (e.g., an attitude object) and any other object, concept, value, or goal. If the object of belief (i.e., the attitude object) is viewed as a "stimulus" and if the object or concept related to the object of belief is viewed as a "response," a belief statement may be viewed as a stimulus-response association. Thus a belief about an object may be seen as being highly related to the probability that the stimulus elicits the response; that is, to the probability that there is an association between the stimulus (the attitude object) and the response (any other concept). Furthermore, it should be noted that an individual has many beliefs about any aspect of

* Specially prepared for this book.

his world. That is, an individual associates many different concepts with any given attitude object. The totality of an individual's beliefs about an object can thus be viewed as a belief system. In addition, this system of responses associated with a given stimulus may also be viewed as a habit-family-hierarchy of responses (Hull, 1943). The higher the response in the hierarchy, the greater is the probability that the response is associated with the stimulus, that is, the stronger is the belief. Empirical evidence supporting this conception of a belief system has been presented by Fishbein (1963).

To summarize, both beliefs about an object and the attitude toward the object have been placed within a behavior theory framework. Attitudes have been viewed as learned, mediating evaluative responses, and beliefs about an object have been viewed in terms of the probability (or strength) of stimulus-response associations. Furthermore, a belief system has been conceptualized as a habit-family-hierarchy of responses. Given these descriptions, a model of attitude acquisition and a model of the relationships between beliefs and attitudes can be developed by following the principles of behavior theory and, in particular, the principle of mediated (i.e., secondary or conditioned) generalization (see Birge, 1941; Cofer and Foley, 1942; Murdock, 1952; Mednick, 1957).

1. A MODEL OF ATTITUDE ACQUISITION

In the foregoing article in this book (pp. 382 to 388), Rhine, working from Osgood's definition of attitude (i.e., "the evaluative dimension of a concept"), develops a model of attitude acquisition based on a consideration of the process of concept formation. Rhine's model may be seen in Figure 1. To review

briefly, Rhine argues that no attitude is present in either *A* (first-order concept) or *B* (second-order concept) of Figure 1. However, "there is an attitude when the mediator of at least one of the first-order concepts is an evaluative one." Thus, as Rhine views it, we first acquire the first-order mediators (or concepts) "thick lips" and "dark skin" from sets of first-order stimuli of lip thicknesses and skin shades. When the stimuli produced by these mediators come to elicit the second-order mediator "Negro," we have a second-order concept, but not an attitude (see Figure 1*B*). It is only when a series of first-order "evaluative stimuli" elicit a first-order evaluative mediator (e.g., "bad"), and the stimulus produced by this evaluative mediator also comes to elicit the second-order mediator "Negro," that an attitude is present (see Fig. 1*C*). Thus, according to this conceptualization, we may acquire the concept "Negro" and *not* have an attitude toward "Negro." The concept and the attitude can be learned independently or simultaneously. Similar views of the relationship between concept learning and attitudes have been presented by Clark and Clark (1958) and Allport (1954).

However, as was pointed out in the discussion of attitude, all concepts contain an evaluative component. That is, there is an attitude, an evaluative response associated with all concepts. Furthermore, it should be noted that as Osgood used the term "concept," it referred to any discriminable aspect of the individual's world; it might refer to any object, person, word, groups of words, and so on. Thus, as this term is used by Osgood, all "stimuli" and all "responses" (verbalizable or not) are viewed as concepts.

In *A* of Figure 1, then, all the "first-order stimuli" of various skin shades eliciting the




Figure 1. Ramon J. Rhine's theory of attitude acquisition (from Rhine, 1958). (A) First-order concept; (B) second-order concept; (C) attitude. *S* = a first-order stimulus; *S_e* = an evaluative stimulus; *r₁* = a first-order mediator; *r_{1e}* = a first-order evaluative mediator; *r₂* = a second-order mediator; *s* = the stimulus produced by a mediator.




Figure 2. A general model of attitude acquisition. (A) First-order concept with attitude; (B) second-order concept with attitude. S = a stimulus; r_1 = a first-order mediator; r_{1e} = a first-order evaluative mediator; r_2 = a second-order mediator; r_{2e} = a second-order evaluative mediator; s = the stimulus produced by a mediator. The higher the stimulus in the stimulus hierarchy, the greater the probability that it will elicit the concept (either first-, second-, or n-order). The evaluative mediators represent a summation of the evaluative responses elicited by the stimuli. The strength of the evaluative mediator, i.e., the attitude, is a function of the evaluative dimension of each of the stimuli and the probability that the stimuli elicit the concept.

mediator or concept "dark skin" also elicit an evaluative response. These evaluative responses are seen as being summative; through the mediation process, the summated evaluative response is associated with the mediator or concept "dark skin." Thus, on future occasions, "dark skin" will elicit an evaluative response that is a function of the stimuli that elicit it (i.e., dark skin). This may be seen in *A* of Figure 2. Similarly, the stimuli produced by other first-order concepts or mediators (e.g., thick lips, curly hair) will elicit evaluative responses at the same time that they elicit the "second-order mediator" or concept "Negro." Therefore, on future occasions, the concept or stimulus, "Negro" will elicit an evaluative response, an attitude, that is a function of the stimuli that elicit it (i.e., Negro). This may be seen in *B* of Figure 2.

The probability that the stimuli (e.g., dark skin, thick lips) elicit the mediator or concept "Negro," also influence the evaluation of (the attitude toward) "Negro." If a stimulus that elicits a strong evaluative response only elicits "Negro" 40 per cent of the time, while another stimulus that also elicits a strong evaluative response elicits "Negro" 80 per cent of the time, the latter will contribute more to the evaluation of "Negro" than will the former. Thus attitude toward any concept is a function of the evaluations of the stimuli that elicit the concept and the probability that these stimuli will elicit the concept.

This conception of attitude acquisition dif-

fers from Rhine's in that, following Osgood et al. (1957), all stimuli have evaluative responses associated with them. Furthermore, every time a new concept is learned, an attitude is automatically acquired with it. Attitude acquisition is an automatic, nonverbalized process that occurs in conjunction with concept learning.

2. A MODEL OF THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN BELIEFS ABOUT AN OBJECT AND THE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE OBJECT

The theory of concept formation and attitude acquisition carries important implications for the study of beliefs about an object and the attitude toward it. If concepts are learned as the theory suggests, it follows that an individual's beliefs about the concept should be some function of the learning process. In the example above, we can assume that at least two of the individual's beliefs about "Negroes" are that (1) Negroes have dark skin, and (2) Negroes have thick lips. Furthermore, if "dark skin" has elicited "Negro" more frequently than "thick lips" has, his belief that Negroes have dark skin should be stronger than his belief that Negroes have thick lips. If, for the purpose of explication, we consider the process of concept formation as input, and beliefs about the object as output, then (even granting the asymmetry of backward and forward association) immediately after concept forma-

tion the output should be highly correlated with or equal to the input. This may be seen in Figure 3, which presents the theoretical model of the output side of the relationship, the model of the relations between beliefs about an object and the attitude toward that object.




Figure 3. Some relations between beliefs about an object and the attitude toward the object. (A) A mediation model; (B) a classical conditioning model; (C) an extension of the classical conditioning model. S = a stimulus (e.g., Negro); r_1 = a first-order mediator (e.g., dark skin); r_2 = a second-order mediator (e.g., Negro); r_e = an evaluative mediator; s = the stimulus produced by a mediator.

In Figure 3A, it can be seen that immediately after concept formation, the concept (or stimulus) elicits the set of responses that have served to define it (e.g., "dark skin," "thick lips," etc.). Each of these mediating responses, however, also serve as stimuli. Viewing these responses in this way (i.e., as stimuli), it can be seen that the right-hand side of Figure 3A is identical to the model of attitude acquisition presented in Figure 2B. That is, "dark skin," "thick lips," etc., will each tend to elicit the concept "Negro" as well as a positive, negative,

or neutral evaluative response. As was discussed above, these evaluative responses summate; through the mediation process, the summated evaluative response becomes associated with the concept "Negro."

In addition, the summated evaluative response (i.e., the attitude) also becomes associated with the concept (or stimulus) through the process of classical conditioning. This can be seen in Figure 3B, where, for the purpose of presentation, only one belief is considered. Following the classical conditioning paradigm, it can be seen that, to a certain degree, the evaluative response (i.e., the UCR—unconditioned response) elicited by "dark skin" (i.e., the UCS—unconditioned stimulus) becomes associated with the concept "Negro" (i.e., the CS—conditioned stimulus). The stronger the association between "Negro" and "dark skin" (i.e., the stronger the belief that "Negroes have dark skin"), the more the evaluation of "dark skin" will become associated with "Negro." However, as already mentioned, an individual has many beliefs about any given concept, and the evaluation associated with each of these beliefs will also become associated, in part, with the attitude object or concept. This can be seen in Figure 3C. Again, it should be noted that the evaluative responses associated with each of the beliefs are viewed as summative; thus it is this summated evaluative response, i.e., this attitude, that becomes associated with the concept (e.g., Negro). Furthermore, the amount of the evaluative response associated with each belief that is available for summation is a function of the strength of the belief. That is, if "Negro" elicits "dark skin" 95 per cent of the time and "thick lips" 60 per cent of the time, the evaluation of "dark skin" will contribute more to the evaluation of "Negro" than will the evaluation of "thick lips."

An individual's attitude toward any object, then, is learned as a result of both mediation and conditioning. The complete model of the relations between beliefs about an object and the attitude toward that object can be seen in Figure 4. It should again be noted that the model of attitude acquisition is included within the model of the relations between beliefs and attitude. Thus it becomes apparent that beliefs about an object and the attitude toward that object are in a continuous, dynamic relationship. Changes in any one part of the system may produce changes in all the other parts. In addition, in Figure 4, it can be seen that




Figure 4. A model of the relation between belief about and attitude toward an object. S = the stimulus, i.e., attitude object; r_1 = first-order mediators elicited by S , indicating belief r , about S ; r_e = an evaluative mediator; r_2 = a second-order mediator.

the summated evaluative response (i.e., the attitude) that is learned in concept formation is identical (for all practical purposes) to the summated evaluative response acquired through conditioning. However, it should be recalled that the discussion above was only concerned with the beliefs an individual held immediately following concept attainment. Once a concept has been learned (or once a given stimulus has been labeled), new beliefs are acquired and some of the original beliefs may be weakened or strengthened. That is, "new" concepts or "responses" become associated with the attitude object, and many of the original S - r asso-

ciations may be positively or negatively reinforced. Each of these changes in belief will affect the evaluation of the attitude object (i.e., the stimulus concept). This may be seen in Figure 5.

In A of Figure 5, it can be seen that, following concept formation, the presentation of a "stimulus" (e.g., Negro— S_N) will elicit a learned, mediating evaluative response (i.e., an attitude— r_e) and a response representing the stimulus (i.e., r_N). That is, the subject tends to read, or to repeat to himself, the stimulus toward which he is attending; he makes a "labeling" response (Hovland, Janis, and Kelly, 1953). Furthermore, it should be recalled that the learned mediating evaluative response is a function of the individual's initial beliefs about the attitude object. Figure 5 is identical to Figure 4, except that the mediating beliefs (e.g., "dark skin," "thick lips," etc.) have been omitted for purposes of presentation.

Once the individual has learned the concept, however, he may learn new associations to it. For example, he may now learn that "Negroes are athletic." This new response (i.e., athletic— r_a) becomes a part of the individual's habit-family-hierarchy of responses to the stimulus "Negro" (S_N). Similar to the other responses in the hierarchy, the response "athletic" may also be viewed as a stimulus that itself elicits a learned mediating evaluative response. This evaluative response elicited by "athletic" will summate with the evaluative response elicited by the attitude object (i.e., Negro), which, it will be recalled, is itself a summated response based on all the other beliefs in the individual's hierarchy. Through the processes of conditioning and mediated generalization, this "new" summated evaluative response becomes associated with the stimulus concept (i.e., Negro);




Figure 5. A model of attitude change. (A) Before learning new information; (B) after learning new information. S_N = the stimulus (e.g., Negro); r_e = an evaluative response; r_N = a mediating response representing the stimulus; r_a = a mediating response representing the newly learned information (e.g., Negroes are athletic); s = the stimulus produced by a mediator.

thus, on future occasions, the attitude object (i.e., Negro) will elicit this "new" summated mediating evaluative response (i.e., this attitude). This may be seen in *B* of Figure 5. It should again be recalled that the stronger the association between "Negro" and "athletic" (i.e., the stronger the S_N-r_a association or the stronger the belief that "Negroes are athletic"), the more the evaluation of "athletic" will contribute to the evaluation of "Negro." Similarly, any change in the strength of previously held beliefs (i.e., weakening or strengthening any of the $S-r$ associations) will also change the evaluative influence of that belief on the final evaluation of the stimulus concept (S_N).

Because most learning probably occurs after the concept is learned (or the stimulus is "labeled"), attitudes can best be viewed as being functions of the individual's beliefs about the attitude object. Indeed, it is possible that many of the stimuli that originally influenced concept formation do not remain in the individual's belief system. That is, they may drop out of the response hierarchy completely either through replacement by new beliefs or through negative reinforcement.

To summarize, then, attitudes are most likely learned initially as part of the process of concept formation. Once the concept has been learned, however, the individual learns many new things about it, that is, he associates many different objects, concepts, values, or goals with the attitude object (the stimulus concept). This set of responses associated with the concept may be viewed as a belief system—a habit-family-hierarchy of responses. The higher the response in the hierarchy, the greater the probability that the response is associated with the stimulus concept, that is, the stronger the belief. Each of these associated responses may also be viewed as stimuli, which themselves elicit a learned mediating evaluative response. These mediating evaluative responses are viewed as summative; through the processes of mediated generalization and conditioning, this summated evaluative response becomes associated with the stimulus concept. Thus, when the concept is presented, it will elicit this summated evaluative response, that is, it will elicit this learned attitude. Finally, it should be noted that the higher the response in the hierarchy (i.e., the stronger the belief), the greater will be the amount of its evaluative response that is available for summation.

Thus, in its simplest form, the theoretical

model (see Figure 4) leads to the prediction that an individual's attitude toward any object is a function of (1) the strength of his beliefs about the object (i.e., those beliefs in his response hierarchy) and (2) what Fishbein (1963) has called the evaluative aspect of those beliefs (i.e., the evaluation of the associated responses). Algebraically, this may be expressed as follows:

$$A_o = \sum_{i=1}^N B_i a_i$$

where A_o = the attitude toward object o

B_i = the strength of belief i about o , that is, the "probability" or "improbability" that o is associated with some other concept x_i

a_i = the evaluative aspect of B_i , that is, the evaluation of x_i

N = the number of beliefs about o , that is, the number of responses in the individual's habit-family-hierarchy

Before turning to a consideration of some of the evidence supporting this hypothesis, several points should be made:

1. It should be noted that this prediction is similar to predictions made by other investigators (e.g., Smith, 1949; Cartwright, 1949; Rosenberg, 1956, 1960; Zajonc, 1954; Peak, 1955). For example, Rosenberg, working from the point of view of a consistency principle, has predicted that the affect attached to an attitude object will be highly related to (a) "the perceived instrumentality of the attitude object," that is, the judged probability that the attitude object would lead to, or block, the attainment of "valued states," and (b) the "value importance," that is, the intensity of affect expected from these "valued states."¹ Similarly, Zajonc, working within the framework of a theory of "cognitive set," has predicted that the valence of (i.e., attitude toward)

¹ Algebraically, the central equation of Rosenberg's theory may be expressed as follows:

$$A_o = \sum_{i=1}^N I_i V_i$$

where A_o = the attitude toward the object, I_i = the belief or probability that the object will lead to or block the attainment of a given valued state " i ," V_i = the "value importance" or the amount of affect expected from valued state " i ," and N = the number of beliefs.

any object is a function of (a) the valence of its characteristics, and (b) the "prominence" of these characteristics, where "prominence" refers to "the ability of the characteristic to represent the object," that is, the belief that the characteristic is indeed a defining attribute of the object.² Although there are several theoretical and methodological differences between the various theories that have dealt with the belief-attitude relationship (e.g., see Fishbein, 1961), the important point is that all of them essentially lead to the hypothesis that an individual's attitude toward any object is a function of his beliefs about the object and the evaluative aspects of those beliefs.

2. It should also be noted that this hypothesis is entirely consistent with the way in which most standardized attitude measurement instruments obtain their estimates of attitude. That is, as Fishbein (see pp. 257 to 266 in this book) has pointed out, most of the standard attitude measurement instruments (e.g., Thurstone Scales, Likert Scales, Guttman Scales, etc.) obtain their estimates of attitude through a consideration of a set of the respondent's beliefs about the attitude object and the evaluative aspects of those beliefs. Thus, in a sense, the algebraic formula presented above may be viewed as a general formula for obtaining estimates of attitude. In Figure 3D, however, it can be seen that the only beliefs that serve as *determinants* of an individual's attitude are those that are present in his habit-family-hierarchy of responses. That is, although all of an individual's beliefs about an object serve as indicants of his attitude toward the object, it is only the individual's *salient* beliefs, i.e., those in his hierarchy, that serve as *determinants* of attitude. Although a complete discussion of the distinction between determinants and indicants of attitude is beyond the scope of the present paper, this distinction does suggest that the best estimates of attitude will be

² Algebraically, the central equation of Zajonc's theory may be expressed as follows:

$$A_o = Va(o) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N Va(a) \text{ Prom}(a)}{(N^2 + N)/2}$$

where A_o = attitude toward the object, $Va(o)$ = the valence of the object, $Va(a)$ = the valence of the characteristic "a," $\text{Prom}(a)$ = the prominence of characteristic "a," and N = the number of characteristics.

obtained when the estimate is based solely on a consideration of an individual's *salient* beliefs. Support for this hypothesis may be found in Rosenberg's contribution to this book (see pp. 325 to 331). He found that estimates of attitude based on a consideration of an individual's salient beliefs (i.e., those elicited by the subject) were considerably more accurate than estimates based on a consideration of 35 beliefs selected on an a priori basis.

It should be recalled that most attitude measurement instruments consist of a series of belief statements selected on some a priori grounds. Thus most of the beliefs that they contain are probably not salient for the respondents. Although these instruments will still provide valid estimates (or measures) of attitude, there is undoubtedly some loss in the precision of the estimate. Clearly, the greater the *proportion* and absolute number of salient beliefs contained in the instrument, the smaller will be the loss in validity.

This, however, raises a question about the number of beliefs that can be *salient* for an individual. That is, how many "objects, concepts, values, or goals" can an individual associate with an attitude object at any point in time? Studies on the span of attention or apprehension suggest that, in general, an individual can only perceive, and attend to, six to eleven objects at the same time (Woodworth and Schlossberg, 1954; Miller, 1956). Even though groupings do increase the number of objects that can be perceived, it seems likely that only six to eleven beliefs are salient, that is, are in the individual's hierarchy, at any one time. That is, although an individual may have many beliefs about any given attitude object, there are probably only six to eleven beliefs that actually appear in his hierarchy (i.e., that are above some response threshold) and function as determinants of attitude. Somewhat the same kind of notion has been suggested by March and Simon (1958) in their distinction between "satisficing" and "optimizing." According to these investigators:

Most human decision-making . . . is concerned with the discovery and selection of satisfactory alternatives; only in exceptional cases is it concerned with the discovery and selection of optimal alternatives. (p. 141)

From the point of view presented here, "satisficing" involves only the six to eleven imme-

diately salient beliefs, whereas "optimizing" takes into account many more beliefs.

A recent study by Kaplan (1966) provides some support for the hypothesis that only six to eleven beliefs function as the primary determinants of an individual's attitude. Kaplan asked his subjects to list as many "characteristics, qualities, and attributes" of "Negroes" as they could. The number of beliefs presented by subjects varied from 3 to 25. Two estimates of attitude were computed for each subject—one based on a consideration of all his responses, and one based on a consideration of only "salient" beliefs, with *saliency* being operationally defined in terms of position in the response hierarchy. That is, Kaplan assumed that, at most, a subject might have nine salient beliefs. Thus, even though a subject might have listed more than nine beliefs, only the first nine that he listed were taken into account in this latter estimate of his attitude. Consistent with expectations, the estimates of attitude based only on the "salient" beliefs were more accurate predictors of attitude than estimates based on the total set of beliefs an individual listed.

Although the findings of Rosenberg and Kaplan support the hypothesis that an individual's attitude toward any object is primarily determined by his salient beliefs, and that there are probably only six to eleven beliefs that are salient, it must be made clear that these findings do *not* imply that valid estimates of attitude cannot be obtained from nonsalient beliefs. Indeed, both of these investigators did obtain valid estimates of attitude from considerations of nonsalient beliefs. However, the most precise estimates of attitude were those based solely on salient beliefs and their evaluative aspects. Furthermore, because only salient beliefs function as determinants of attitude, it will be only through a consideration of these beliefs that one will be able to gain an understanding of the genesis of attitude.

3. A final question concerns the types of beliefs that are related to and/or function as determinants of attitude. A review of the literature on attitude organization and change indicates considerable controversy about this question. For example, many investigators (e.g., Krech and Crutchfield, 1918, Katz and Stotland, 1959; Abelson and Rosenberg, 1958) have attempted to distinguish between beliefs that are attitudinal in nature (i.e., those that contain an implicit or explicit evaluation of the attitude

object) and beliefs that are unrelated to attitude (i.e., so-called "descriptive or reportorial" beliefs). Indeed, with very few exceptions (e.g., Campbell, 1950; Zajonc, 1954; Fishbein, 1963), investigators have tended to ignore these "descriptive or reportorial" beliefs in their investigations of attitude. Furthermore, due to the various techniques of item selection that are used, this type of belief is seldom, if ever, found as an item on one of the standard attitude measuring instruments. From the point of view of theory presented here, however, any type of belief (e.g., descriptive, reportorial, instrumental, etc.) may serve as a determinant or indicant of an individual's attitude. That is, any belief that is present in the individual's habit-family-hierarchy has an evaluative mediating response associated with it (i.e., all beliefs have evaluative aspects), and thus it will contribute to the individual's attitude. In addition, it seems reasonable to assume that the strongest beliefs about an object that an individual holds are those beliefs that serve to define and describe the object for him, that is, descriptive beliefs. Because these beliefs are likely to be high in the individual's hierarchy, they probably serve as some of the most important determinants of attitude. Thus, rather than ignore "descriptive or reportorial" beliefs, the present approach suggests that increased attention should be paid to them in future studies of attitude organization and change.

Because most investigators have tended to ignore "descriptive beliefs," it was felt that this type of belief would provide the most severe test of the hypothesis. Thus, in the initial test of the theory presented above, an attempt was made to predict subjects' attitudes toward Negroes from a consideration of their descriptive beliefs about Negroes (i.e., their beliefs about the characteristics and components of Negroes), and from the evaluative aspects of these beliefs. Specifically, following a procedure developed by Maltzman, Bogartz, and Breger (1958), 125 Ss listed what they believed to be the five characteristics that best described Negroes. The ten characteristics of Negroes that were most salient for the population, that is, the ten most frequent responses given by the subjects, were then selected for further consideration (e.g., dark skin, curly hair, athletic, musical, tall, etc.). Although it is clear that not all of the beliefs considered are "pure descriptive beliefs," many of them (e.g., Negroes have dark skin, Negroes have curly

hair, etc.) would be considered as "non-evaluative" and/or unrelated to attitude by most investigators. Two weeks later, 50 of the subjects returned for a second session of the experiment. Using Fishbein and Raven's (1962) evaluative (*A*) and probability (*B*) Scales to measure attitude and belief respectively (see pp. 183 to 189 in this book), each subject rated each of the characteristics on the *A* Scale and each of the belief statements on the *B* Scale. In addition, all Ss rated the concept "Negro" on the *A* Scale. Using the algebraic formula presented above (i.e., $\sum B_i a_i$), estimated attitude scores were computed for each subject. That is, a subject's rating of each belief statement (i.e., B_i) was multiplied by his rating of the characteristic that was related to "Negroes" (i.e., a_i), and these ten products (one for each belief) were then summed. In support of the theory, the Spearman rank-order correlation between estimated and obtained attitudes (i.e., the direct evaluation of the concept "Negro" on the *A* Scale) equaled .801 ($N = 50$, $p < .001$).

In other studies, it has been found that a leader's attitudes toward the members of his group could be predicted from a knowledge of his beliefs about the members' behaviors (i.e., his rating of the "probability" or "improbability" that the member "listened attentively to others," "expressed his opinions tactfully," etc.) and the evaluations of those behaviors (Fishbein, 1965). Similarly, in an unpublished study, Fishbein and Feldman have obtained evidence that a voter's attitude toward a political candidate (on either the Presidential or the Congressional level) is a function of his (i.e., the voter's) beliefs about the characteristics of the candidate (e.g., "he has legislative experience," "he is a farmer") and the candidate's stands on various issues (e.g., "he is in favor of Medicare," "he is in favor of an immediate end to atmospheric nuclear testing"), and his (i.e., the voter's) evaluations of these characteristics and issues.

These findings, together with the previous findings of Rosenberg (1956, 1960), Zajonc (1954), and others, provide strong support for the hypothesis that an individual's attitude toward any object is a function of his beliefs about the object and the evaluative aspects of those beliefs. It should be noted, however, that these findings do not necessarily support the particular theoretical model of the relationships between beliefs and attitudes that has been proposed here. That is, as was mentioned earlier, other investigators have arrived at similar

hypotheses from different theoretical viewpoints. Thus the findings reported above lend as much support to their theoretical models as they do to the one presented here. The model presented here, however, does provide an alternative way of viewing the belief-attitude relationship and thus suggests research hypotheses that would not necessarily follow from the other theories (e.g., the hypothesis that an individual's attitude is primarily determined by only six to eleven salient beliefs). Although a discussion of all the implications of the theory is beyond the scope of the present paper, a few implications are worth considering.

SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY

The most obvious implications of the theory concern the question of attitude change. According to the theory, attitude change will occur when: (1) an individual's beliefs about an object change and/or (2) when the evaluative aspect of beliefs about an object change. It should be noted that beliefs about an object may change in two ways: (1) new beliefs may be learned, that is, new concepts may be related to the attitude object, new stimulus-response associations may be learned, and (2) the strength of already held beliefs may change, that is, the position of beliefs in the habit-family hierarchy may be altered through positive or negative reinforcement. Furthermore, referring back to Figure 5B, it can be seen that the amount and direction of attitude change will be a function of (1) the individual's initial attitude and, thus, the number, strength, and evaluative aspects of his salient beliefs, and (2) the number, strength, and evaluative aspects of the new beliefs he learns. Here, however, an important distinction must be made between learning the contents of an attitude change communication and learning something about the attitude object. That is, an individual's attitude toward some concept will only change if he learns something new about the concept, if he forms a new *S-r* association. Simply learning that "the communication says *S* is *r*" will not produce attitude change.³ To use the terminology of Hovland,

³ It should be noted that learning that "the communication says *S* is *r*" can produce delayed attitude change. That is, over time, the individual may forget the source of information and only recall that "*S* is *r*." This "new" belief about *S* may then lead to attitude change. This phenomenon of delayed change has been referred to as "the sleeper effect" by Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953).

Janis, and Kelley (1953), attitude change only occurs when the individual "accepts" the communication. Unfortunately, most so-called tests of "learning" that are conducted in attitude change studies are merely tests of retention or recall of the contents of the communication, that is, they are measures of the subjects' beliefs about what the communication said, rather than tests of whether the subjects have learned the S-r associations that the message was designed to teach them, that is, measures of the subjects' beliefs about the attitude object.

In addition, it should be noted that according to the theory, every time an individual learns a new belief that associates the attitude object with some positively evaluated concept, his attitude will change in a positive direction. Similarly, if the new belief associates the attitude object with a negatively evaluated concept, his attitude will change in a negative direction. That is, attitude change, as well as attitude per se, is viewed as a function of the *total* amount of affect associated with an individual's beliefs about the attitude object. In contrast to this, most theories based on a notion of "consistency" would predict that attitudes and attitude change are functions of the *mean* amount of affect associated with an individual's beliefs.⁴ According to these theories, if an object is associated with other objects that are positively evaluated, it is "consistent" to have a positive attitude toward it. Similarly, if the object is associated with other objects that are negatively evaluated, it is "consistent" to have a negative attitude toward it. If the object is associated with some objects that are positively evaluated and some that are negatively evaluated, a relatively neutral attitude would be consistent. Furthermore, if the object is associated with "extremely good things," a high positive attitude is consistent; if it is associated with "slightly good things," a low positive attitude is consistent. From a strict consistency viewpoint, then, if an object is associated with some "extremely good things" and some "slightly good things," an individual's attitude toward it should be somewhere between high and low positive if it is to be consistent. Thus, if an individual originally believed that the object was associated with "extremely good things," and then learned some new beliefs associating the object with "slightly good things,"

⁴ A notable exception to this is Rosenberg (1956), who bases his theory on a notion of consistency, yet postulates cognitive summation.

according to most consistency theories these new beliefs (even though they associate the object with positively evaluated things) will actually serve to *lower* the individual's attitude. This prediction is explicitly made in Osgood's congruity theory, and implicitly follows from Heider's balance theory and Festinger's dissonance theory. Thus, although the theory proposed here views attitude organization and change as processes of "cognitive summation," most theories based on a notion of consistency view attitude organization and change as processes of "cognitive balance" or "cognitive averaging."⁵

Finally, it is worth noting that the theory also has implications for an understanding of the relationships between attitudes and behavior. In general, psychologists have had little success in attempting to predict overt behavior of the non-pencil-and-paper type from attitudes. At least one of the major reasons for this lack of success is the fact that the attitude that is measured is usually inappropriate. That is, the attitude that is measured is usually an attitude toward some concept "X," while the behavior that is predicted is Ss behavior with respect to some object "x" (a single instance of the general class of X). For example, an investigator might obtain measures of an individual's attitude toward "Negroes" or "Jews," and then attempt to predict the individual's behavior with respect to a particular Negro or a particular Jew. In the classic study by LaPiere (1934), restaurant, hotel, and motel owners, after giving service "with no trouble" to a Chinese couple, were later asked, "Will you accept members of the Chinese race as guests in your establishment?" Over 90 per cent of the responses to this question were negative. Thus, although these people responded negatively toward the general concept "Chinese," this was not reflected in their behavior toward specific individuals within the general class.

Generally speaking, the attitudes measured on attitude scales, at least when dealing with attitudes toward specific national and ethnic groups, are attitudes based on stereotypes. That is, the beliefs about the group that are salient for the individual are general characteristics (e.g., dark skin, curly hair, musical, athletic, lazy, etc.) that serve to define, describe, and differentiate the general class of stimuli (e.g.,

⁵ For a further discussion of the distinction between summation (adding) and balance (averaging), see pages 437 to 443 in this book.

Negroes) that the person is rating. When a person is confronted with a specific Negro, however, his beliefs are likely to be quite different than those that serve to describe "Negroes in general." Because an individual's attitude toward any object is a function of his salient beliefs about the object, it follows that his attitude toward "Negroes in general" (i.e., the attitude measured on the attitude scale) is likely to be quite different than his attitude toward any particular Negro. Clearly, if a relationship between attitude and behavior does exist (and there are some questions about this assumption), it cannot be found until, at a minimum, attitudes toward the appropriate stimulus object are measured.

Although many of the implications described would also follow from other views of the belief-attitude relationship, the theory proposed in this paper does seem to provide a parsimonious explanation for a considerable number of phenomena in the area of attitude organization and change. The final test of the theory, however, will lie in its ability to generate testable hypotheses and to stimulate research in areas that might otherwise be overlooked.

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APPENDIX "C"

The second stage in the development of intercultural education was perhaps inescapable and might well be called the stage of the simple answers (160). For instance, some teachers encouraged pageants and plays in which young people dressed up in the costumes of their ancestors (116, 126, 133). Meetings in schools and neighborhoods were held in which people were assumed to have developed enduring empathy through sharing background experiences (54). Units were developed on the contributions to American life of outstanding people of minority group backgrounds. The Springfield Plan was proposed by zealous pioneers as a model for other school systems, though responsible leaders in the Springfield, Massachusetts, schools denied they had a panacea (28). Warnings against undue reliance on the transplanting of plans were occasionally sounded (155).

During the stage of the simple answers, few earnest pioneers took steps to validate their answers. Research, especially controlled experimentation, was infrequent. It is little wonder that Cook (34) described intercultural education as moralistic, promotional, and badly confused; that Wirth, in an introduction to Rose's summary (122), pointed out that methods rested upon assumptions which had not been critically and systematically examined; that Williams (171) wrote that a dearth of appropriate research and consequent lack of demonstrated base for action were characteristic.

Intercultural education began to come of age when World War II and the threat of Nazism confronted Americans. The third stage in the development of intercultural education was the stage of the promising practices. National agencies, such as the National Conference of Christians and Jews, the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, and the American Jewish Committee, increasingly stressed and supported intercultural education. For instance, the Anti-Defamation League initiated an excellent series of Freedom Pamphlets. The Bureau for Intercultural Education extended its publications program and also worked in the field with several school systems. New organizations were created, including Intergroup Education in Cooperating Schools (139, 146) and the College Study in Intergroup Relations (33, 35, 36).

An educational technique well utilized for intercultural education was the workshop (52, 84). In the summer of 1942 only two summer workshops in intercultural education took place: those at Colorado State College of Education and at Teachers College, Columbia University. Ten years later, universities were sponsoring 38 variously titled workshops on intercultural and intergroup education (125). In 1956 66 workshops were held in what was increasingly being termed human relations.

Yearbooks disseminated promising practices developed through field studies and in workshops. The 1945 yearbook of the National Council for the Social Studies, *Democratic Human Relations* (142), described possible teaching units, ways to permeate established subjects with intercultural insights, the improvement of guidance, the development of extra-

INTERCULTURAL EDUCATION

Intercultural education, in the sense of systematic educational efforts to bring about better relationships in an American democracy made up of people of varied races, religions, nationalities, and social-class backgrounds, dates approximately from the period of World War I, in which fundamental questions of loyalties were raised. Two philosophies conflicted: assimilation and cultural pluralism. As in many debates between supposedly rigid alternatives, a middle way developed, a philosophy of cultural democracy (163) which called for loyalty to American democratic ideals plus variation in social customs such as those concerned with food, recreation, holidays, and so forth.

As a postwar outgrowth of the loyalties debate, men of good will recommended that American schools put more emphasis upon brotherhood and understanding among Americans of varied backgrounds. Anti-Catholic feeling and the revival of the Ku Klux Klan in the twenties also contributed to the emergence of intercultural education. Intercultural education entered the missionary stage (160) as proponents attempted to sensitize people to the necessity for better intercultural relations, including educational endeavors.

curricular activities, and the utilization of community resources. Two years later the John Dewey Society sponsored publication of *Intercultural Attitudes in the Making* (86), which dealt with the development of attitudes through the influence of parents, the primary teacher, adult-sponsored youth groups, the junior high school teacher, the high-school teacher, gangs, and the school as a whole.

Many hundreds of resource units were written by teachers; the overwhelming majority were unpublished, but a few were nationally distributed. Quillen and Hanna (117) appended a resource unit to their professional book on the teaching of the social studies. Crary and Robinson (41) related activities to selected problems in a unit on civil rights for the National Council for the Social Studies.

The fourth and current stage in intercultural education is the quest for research bases. Research in intercultural relations is difficult. As Allport (5) indicated, it is difficult to know what indexes of change (dependent variables) to look for, to isolate the program of action being tested (independent variables), to create satisfactory control groups, and to know when to evaluate the effects of a program. Bibliographical surveys were helpful to the development of further research. In this connection, Klineberg (87), MacIver (96), Murphy and others (101), and Newcomb (103), as well as Rose (122) and Williams (171), did yeoman work. True, the evaluation studies listed in the bibliographical summaries were bewilderingly diverse as to findings.

If research was to bridge the gap between the problem and attempts to control it, research by teams was needed. One such project was sponsored by the American Jewish Committee and reported in Harper's Studies in Prejudice series. Adorno and others (3) advanced and supported a theory of the authoritarian personality characterized by conventionality and rigidity. Bettelheim and Janowitz (12) explored the dynamics of prejudice and demonstrated a marked correlation between anti-Semitism and social mobility, particularly downward mobility. Ackerman and Jahoda (1) inquired into the relationship between anti-Semitism and emotional disorder. Lowenthal and Guterman (95) and Massing (97) were concerned less with personality patterns of individuals and more with attitude change in the broad context of the community with its complex cultural influences.

Through staff members and students, research was carried on at newly created human-relations training centers at New York University, the University of Chicago, the University of Miami, the University of Pennsylvania, and other educational institutions. Resultant findings have usually been published separately and independently; syntheses are lacking which would afford a basis for comparative appraisal.

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES. Statements of the aims and objectives of intercultural education have been influenced by the theory of cultural democracy (163). In one of the early yearbooks on intercultural education, *Americans All*, Arndt (102, Ch. I) advocated that our culture be an indigenous one, but that in giving it direction we draw upon the social inventions

and creations—congenial to democracy—of all those countries and peoples from which American people have come and are coming. He added that the purposes toward which we need to work must be founded upon principles which lie at the basis of our democratic tradition.

As seen by Vickery and Cole (163), the term *intercultural* described the relationship between and among all racial, religious, ethnic, and socio-economic groups in the United States whose patterns of behavior were distinctive. The key concepts around which a program of intercultural education should be built were cultural democracy, race, religion, culture, majority and minority groups, prejudice, and acculturation. Inasmuch as Cole was executive director and Vickery his associate, this viewpoint was dominant in the Bureau for Intercultural Education during the late thirties and early forties.

With the emergence of the field studies of Intergroup Education in Cooperating Schools during the middle forties, the term *intergroup education* was often used, representing a focus on group relationships which included race, religion, nationality, and social class, yet extended beyond these dimensions. Chworowsky (32) in 1950 defined intergroup education as guidance in the reconstruction of those attitudes and practices which express themselves in prejudiced thinking and feeling and in acts of discrimination and segregation directed against others because of their race, creed, and/or ethnic origin. He added that to these sources of prejudice are sometimes added rural-urban animosity, sectionalism, and even discrimination based on sex or age-group or prejudice against the handicapped. A common development in both intercultural and intergroup education throughout the forties was the recognition that the over-all aim of a more inclusive democratic behavior, regardless of race, creed, or ethnic group, should be stressed rather than the disadvantages of minority-group membership (32).

Cole (39), looking back in 1953 upon his work ten years earlier, believed that he and Vickery had neglected the interpersonal stakes in intercultural situations, assuming too lightly that right knowledge would change attitudes. He believed that Intergroup Education in Cooperating Schools had included the whole gamut of interpersonal associations in school life, but that on occasion it had failed to focus convincingly the specific intercultural problems in education. He concluded that the intercultural issue in citizenship education should receive a relative and valid emphasis with the interpersonal issue.

Chworowsky (32) believes that human-relations education may become one with education in general. Cook (34) says that the term *human relations* is so broad that it covers emphases which should be central, for example, race and creed. Support for this apprehension may be found by examining articles listed in periodical indexes under "human relations." For instance, Yale University's Institute of Human Relations represents a way of handling pure research into human behavior. Human relations as used by Bullis (25) in Delaware human-relations classes in

volves practical ways of helping children to learn more about the dynamic force of their emotions and to accept their own emotional strengths and weaknesses. Human relations is also often used in a broad "Dale Carnegie" sense. One can understand why one writer titled his article, "Let's Get It Straight: What Are Human Relations?" (18).

A formulation which avoids, on the one hand, the extremes of restriction to race, religion, and nationality and, on the other, the admission of any and all relationships among human beings is that of Duckrey (55). He suggests that intercultural or intergroup education is the intentional effort to develop in people through education an understanding of the total cultural pattern of American life, its diversities and its common ideals. Perhaps too, as pointed out by Watson (168), the problem may be less one of terminology and more one of the adequacy of whatever is done under any terminology. Watson believes that methods developed by and associated with intergroup education in the past are inadequate for the grave intergroup dissensions of today. He is convinced that they tell us little about what to try with Mississippi legislatures and their constituencies.

CURRICULUM. During the forties, the Bureau for Intercultural Education initiated a series of publications. "Problems of Race and Culture in American Education," Vickery and Cole's *Intercultural Education in American Schools* (163), which appeared in 1943, was essentially philosophical rather than research-oriented; it dealt with proposed objectives and methods. A book for high-school students by the anthropologist Hortense Powdermaker, *Probing Our Prejudices* (114), was the first textbook written especially for the emerging field of intercultural education. A report on experimentation in 11 high schools in New York City and Westchester County described a fact-finding project in each school which culminated in presentation of the students' own documentary play (24).

The first research-oriented Bureau publication was *Minority Problems in the Public Schools*, by Brameld (21). He studied administrative policies and practices in seven actual school systems, which were given fictitious names in his report. His report included a chart which synthesized his findings as to the community setting, the school system, the significance of administrative practices and policies for intercultural relationships, and his evaluation in report-card form. He reported a high degree of diversity in intercultural practices and policies. Administrative policy ranged from direct, forthright attack upon minority problems, through a twilight zone of uncertainty, to a policy almost completely opposed to direct attack of any kind.

Bureau publications for direct use in high-school classrooms include *Race Relations in a Democracy* (23) and *Becoming American* (79). Jaworski (80) had earlier written a play for student presentation. A unit for teachers, *Democracy Demands It*, was

Project, *The Learn What They Live*, by Trager and Radke-Yarrow (152), which will be described later in this article.

With support from the National Conference of Christians and Jews, Intergroup Education in Cooperating Schools was launched during the forties as an experimental project; it eventually involved 250 programs in 72 school communities. In the "Work in Progress" series, published by the American Council on Education, the staff of the project reported the outcomes of field work and told of instructional materials developed. Curriculum development in secondary and elementary schools, respectively, was reported in *Curriculum in Intergroup Relations* (143) and *Elementary Curriculum in Intergroup Relations* (145). The emphasis was upon the development of human-relations attitudes, concepts, and skills through systematic in-service work with teachers and resulting revision of existing curriculums through cooperative planning. Taba and Elkins (141) described an eighth-grade program which stressed indirect methods of bringing about attitude change, through fiction, reading, factual studies, group processes, and guidance approaches. Sociometric tests for studying social relations in respect to grouping and group work were reported in *Diagnosing Human Relations Needs* (144).

The Intergroup Education project also conceived literature as a medium for extending the sensitivity of the learner to the values and viewpoints of a variety of culture groups. An introductory book was prepared, and an annotated bibliography on human relations, largely works of fiction, originally developed by Heaton and others, has been kept up to date through occasional revised editions under the title *Reading Ladders for Human Relations* (78).

In the summary report of the study, Taba and others (146) described theory, curriculum development, and organization. The authors concluded that cooperative experimentation in program patterns combining research and program building was both possible and productive. They reported that within the current framework of public-school education considerable emphasis on intergroup education was possible without either straining the framework itself or unnecessarily diluting the work on behalf of better human and group relations.

Studies of the human-relations programs of liberal-arts colleges are limited and inadequate. Smiley (132) surveyed intergroup education on the college level through a questionnaire. For the United States National Student Association, two authors reported on methods of action which might be useful to campus organizations trying to bring about better human relations in colleges (98).

Teacher education has fared better through the four-year field study under the title: *College Study in Intergroup Relations, College Programs in Intergroup Education* (35), an account of more than 200 experimental projects carried on by 24 teacher-training colleges through a period of four years, described

The second volume, *Intergroup Relations in Teacher Education* (36), interprets materials from the College Study. In comparing academic approaches to prejudice and its reduction with group work and community participation, Cook concludes that changes in student attitudes in a desired direction are seldom very great and that little can be learned about change in education unless testing is followed by case studies. He indicates that group-process education and community participation produce greater increases in liberal views than do academic methods, whereas the latter appear to account for greater gains in factual and theoretical knowledge.

Lloyd Allen Cook, in collaboration with E. F. Cook, has followed up the College Study with textbooks for college use which report both the College Study results and subsequent research (37, 38).

Workshops. The workshop is the major technique in current use for orienting teachers to intercultural education. Vickery (162) has pointed out that sponsors of early workshops assumed that racial, religious, and nationality relationships constituted the content of the field; that intercultural concepts and data could be selected from social science and organized as a body of knowledge; that the direct approach was best; that factual knowledge was of primary importance in reducing prejudice; and that topics and units were to be introduced into courses. However, later workshops stressed child growth and development; community studies; curriculum; analysis and interpretation of data, particularly on social and emotional needs; group dynamics; teaching methods and techniques of emotional re-education; and human-relations skills.

Schiff (125) agreed that in 1942 the major emphasis in workshops was upon racial and religious conflicts. He reported characteristic content areas of 1952 workshops as: child growth and development, teen-age tensions, social-class differences, and group dynamics. Partridge (110) has contributed a lively report on her participation in such a group-oriented workshop.

Evaluation of workshops is on the increase. Birnbaum and Wolcott (14) studied institute-type courses and described them as useful. Taba (138) appraised six University of Chicago workshops which were held between 1945 and 1950 and which linked training and action; she concluded that they produced significant changes in orientation, productivity, and leadership. Bogardus (16) reported that at the University of Southern California an experimental group of graduate students after a six-week workshop changed their attitudes in the direction of greater ethnic understanding. He considered the change statistically significant when compared with results from a control group and reported that no decrease was noted nine months after the workshop ended.

Levinson and Schermerhorn (92) attempted to determine what kinds of people enroll in an intergroup-relations workshop and to assess the attitudinal and emotional effects of a workshop on its members. They studied a 1951 Western Reserve University

teachers and social-service personnel who were Protestant, and female. Conclusions were that workshop members were in most part opposed to prejudice, were somewhat conservative-traditionalistic regarding politics and religion, and were slightly anti-authoritarian, with many not disposed to accept a socio-psychological explanation of a group conflict or a militant program for dealing with it.

Franklin (60) studied four workshops and concluded that learning seemed to have been facilitated by democratic participation in selecting the workshop goals and by a friendly workshop climate with a minimum of threat and with a supporting sense of common purpose. There seemed to be a direct connection between workshop outcomes and the amount of support perceived in the back-home setting.

PROBLEMS OF INSTRUCTION. The amount of research on prejudice in general is such that only the summaries of research will be mentioned here. As Allport (5) points out, there are not less than 150 evaluation studies on the resolution of intergroup tensions listed in available bibliographical surveys (87, 96, 101, 103, 122, 171). Reviewing such studies, Van Til and Denemark (159) concluded that the weight of the evidence appeared to support two major sources of prejudice and discrimination toward minority groups: cultural learning and frustration.

Prejudice in Children. Lasker (91), three decades ago, reported ethnic prejudices in children aged five and six and argued that such viewpoints are acquired, not inborn. Criswell (42) reported the first sizable, systematic study of children from kindergarten through eighth grade of whom three fourths were Negro. She found that cleavages were more pronounced between the sexes than between races, that whites did not withdraw from association with Negroes before the fourth-grade level and did not group up before the fifth, and that Negroes began to withdraw from whites by the third grade. Using a "faces test," a set of mixed photographs, Horowitz (77) differed from Criswell by finding a definite color bias from kindergarten on up, with own-color choice most prevalent at upper-grade levels.

Meltzer (99) found ethnic antipathies well formed by the fifth grade. Blake and Dennis (15) reported "bad trait stereotyping" of Negro children by whites at the fourth-grade level. Radke and Lippitt (118) discovered that white Gentile children who had no direct contact with either Jews or Negroes had "strong prejudices" toward them by the age of nine years. Allport and Kramer (7) found that prejudiced white college students had unpleasant memories of ethnic group contact dating back to ages between 6 and 16. Only a fourth of this sample reported the appearance of their first anti-Jewish feeling after the age of 16, only a fifth their first anti-Negro feeling.

Trager and Radke-Yarrow in various collaborations (119, 151) and in the Philadelphia Early Childhood Project (152) have illuminated the early development in young children of consciousness of difference. In Philadelphia varied teachers of kindergarten and first and second grades were selected from six dissimilar schools. Social-episodes tests consisted

of drawings of children in school and neighborhood situations. Role-performance tests were form-board arrangements with dolls. The conclusion was reached that at an early age children do learn about and adopt attitudes toward racial and religious groups. In the third year of the experiment, four teachers were assigned as club leaders to groups of children. Four of the groups of children were taught in accordance with cultural democracy and four groups were taught in accordance with acceptance of the *status quo* (152). Summarizing the study, Trager (149) concluded that young children are aware of racial and religious differences, that they do learn undemocratic values and behavior in the adult social environment in which they live, and that attitudes can be changed.

The findings, with such attendant publicity as the article by Pollock (113), have gone far to contradict the usual assumption that young children have no prejudices. Readable books which suggest approaches to young children, such as that of Stendler and Martin (135), or deal broadly with human-relations education, such as that of Lane and Beauchamp (90), have further extended understanding of prejudice in children and have suggested ways to reduce hostilities.

Caste and Class. Another helpful source of insights for improved intercultural education is research into caste and class, as described by Davis (47), Hollingshead (76), Warner and Lunt (165), and Warner and others (166).

In a series of case studies Davis and Dollard (48) made the first systematic application of the caste-class point of view to child rearing. Davis and Havighurst (49) surveyed Chicago white and Negro middle- and lower-class mothers, with the sample divided into four color-class groups. Significant statistical differences in child rearing were found between classes and colors, with class differences more definitive than color differences. The work of Warner and others (166), the case studies by Davis and Dollard (48), and the Elmhurst study by Hollingshead (76) showed that in school attendance, choice of curriculums, student social status, teacher rewards and punishments, administrative control, and board membership and operation, white upper-class or upper-middle-class children were definitely favored.

Many school programs currently make use of the concepts of social class. The concepts and data on social learning developed by Davis (45, 46), Davis and Havighurst (50), and Eells and others (56) were used in setting up experiments in group development, classroom atmosphere, and interpersonal relations in connection with projects of Intergroup Education in Cooperating Schools. The implications of these ideas for diagnosing classroom atmosphere and student needs were stated by Brady (19, 20), by Hardiman and Robinson (70), and by Robinson (121), who demonstrated the effects of family class-cultures on the learning of meanings, feelings, and values.

Group Dynamics. A third source of research helpful in meeting problems of classroom instruction is the area of group dynamics. Exploration of the

got its impetus from the work and writing of Lewin (93). Benne and Muntz (11) have edited a volume of writings on individual and group development and on the dynamics of interpersonal relations as guides to curriculum change. Thelen (148) developed some principles of learning-by-action techniques and group involvement. In an issue of the *Review of Educational Research* (156) devoted exclusively to research on human relations and programs of action, contributions by Benne, Levit, Horowitz, and Withey reported research on group dynamics.

EVALUATION. Current research throws doubt upon the efficacy of some suggested approaches to improved intercultural education. Allport (5) said that research indicates that information does not necessarily alter either attitude or action, that gains seem slighter than those of other education methods. However, he adds that though facts are not enough, they still seem indispensable. Allport also believes that the evidence is inconclusive as to the effectiveness of direct *versus* indirect approaches, that there are good grounds for doubting the effectiveness of mass media propaganda bombardment, that individual therapy reaches few. On the other hand, the following approaches to developing democratic human relations through intercultural education have some support from research.

Creation of a Democratic Atmosphere. Ackerman and Jahoda (1, 2) found that emotional predispositions to anti-Semitism include anxiety, confusion of the concept of self, unsatisfactory interpersonal relationships, conformity, fear of the different, poor perception of reality, an inconsistent value system, and a poorly developed conscience. Wholesome family relationships prior to and concurrent with helpful school experiences minimize such difficulties.

Giles (53), Kilpatrick (85), Taba (140), and Weston and others (169) believe that a warm, friendly, democratic atmosphere in schools may help to strengthen the healthy attitudes already present in many young people and may, to some degree at least, make up for the shortcomings in home environment experienced by others.

The importance of the classroom teacher in effecting attitude changes and the influence which the attitudes of the teacher have upon those of the students have been pointed out (123, 152). Bostwick (17) stressed the contributions of teachers who began with an analysis of the problems and needs of their own students and of the community in which their students lived. Hilliard (74) called for improvement of social learning and cited the research of Horney, Sullivan, Jersild, and Murphy, which indicates that only the person who learns to accept himself can establish positive friendly relations with others.

Developing a democratic atmosphere in schools involves the grouping of children, the use of leadership roles, and the remodeling of student council. Jennings (81, 82), Jennings and others (83), and Olson (109) described ways of using sociometric data in improving human relations in classrooms. Taba and others (144) stressed the use and interpretation

diaries, and open questions as diagnostic devices for teachers. Grambs, in a readable pamphlet (65), enriched customary uses of the group process. Cunningham and others (43) reported studies and experiments in understanding group behavior of boys and girls.

Bullis (25), to whom human relations means essentially mental health, reports that his Delaware human-relations classes helped boys and girls learn how to get along with themselves and with others; he adds that 12 masters' and doctors' theses have evaluated the program and have indicated that students have benefited from it in personality development (26). Ogemann (104) urges that elementary- and secondary-school students learn about the dynamics of behavior.

Contact Through Situations Involving Cooperation.

The findings reported by Stouffer and others (136), drawn from data obtained by the War Department, and those reported by Whittemore (170) with regard to the experience in the "GI Universities" following the war lend strong support to the broadening of intergroup contacts involving cooperation. Contact is particularly promising when attention is focused on concrete tasks or goals requiring common effort, rather than upon more abstract considerations of justice or of desirable policy which emphasize and reinforce traditional prejudices. The value of contacts in situations involving cooperation was reported by Deutsch and Collins (51) with respect to intergroup contacts in public housing projects, and by Wittenberg (173) with respect to neighborhood projects. Findings by Phelps (111, 112) in school work camps also seem to corroborate the value of this technique. The Philadelphia Early Childhood Project (152) pointed out that contacts need to be accompanied by other change techniques to prevent some prejudiced persons from regarding the contact merely as an exception to their previously formulated generalizations.

A major advocate of broadening intergroup understanding through contacts in situations involving cooperation is Olsen (106, 107). He calls for "guided personal experiences" through the work of resource people, field trips, surveys, service projects, and social living (105). One form of social living, the youth conference, was adapted to a delegate conference for student leaders in Chicago, and this resulted in promising follow-up activities by students (108). Intervisitation among young people has become an established technique in intercultural education for broadening intergroup contacts. Grosse (67), for instance, described intervisitation among third grades in Fresno, and Heap (72) described intercultural camping.

Emotional Sensitization. The work of Prescott (115) and his associates has been a valuable stimulus toward recognizing the emotional facets of the learning process. Davidoff (44) found a positive correlation between empathy and attitude toward minority groups. Kramer (88) directed attention to the emotional as well as the cognitive and action facets of such attitudes. Woodruff and DiVesta (174) observed that an important way of altering attitudes is to alter

the attitude is expressed, a process which must necessarily include emotional considerations.

Part of the work of the staff of Intergroup Education in Cooperating Schools has been devoted to the medium of literature, particularly to novels (78). Reports suggesting the potentialities of literature for both the elementary and secondary levels have also been made by Finley (57) and Franc (59). Trager and Everitt (150), speaking from experience with primary-grade children in the Philadelphia public schools, doubted that books alone are sufficient, but suggested that their value lies in reinforcing, interpreting, and extending the experiences of children. But the studies of Hayes and Conklin (71) indicate the superiority of vicarious experience over direct experience. Hayes and Conklin attribute this to the easy manageability of vicarious experience as contrasted to direct experience and add, somewhat surprisingly, that it is difficult to make direct experience realistic.

Heaton (73) described approaches to the consideration of feelings as facts. Heaton's approach, applied in a classroom with young children, takes the form of levels of discussion focusing successively on: "What happened?" "How did he feel?" "Could this really happen?" "What would you have done?" "What have we learned?" (40)

Sociodrama, involving role playing, is an increasingly popular technique for helping people put themselves in others' shoes. Moreno (100) pioneered applied sociodrama as a diagnostic technique and as a way of training children in problem analysis and social skills. G. Shafel and F. Shafel (128) have described an interesting hybridization of sociodrama and the use of literature.

Techniques used occasionally for emotional sensitization include the study of rumor, an approach summarized in Allport's major study on the nature of prejudice (6). Rumor analysis was used by Schiff in work with a human-relations agency (124) and by Tapp with sixth-grade classes (147). Spontaneous playwriting is reported at the elementary level by Hanszen and Hollister (69). Analyses of the effectiveness of movies as a medium for attitude change have been made by Rath and F. N. Trager (120) and by Sherif and Sargent (129). An occasional use of TV is reported, such as Walker's report on TV programs which raised the question as to what children thought specific culture groups were really like (164).

Community Surveys and Audits. Krech and Crutchfield (89), Lippitt (94), and others have observed that the effectiveness of facts in bringing about attitudinal changes is frequently dependent upon whether those whose attitudes require change are themselves involved in obtaining the facts. Allport (5, 6) indicates the importance of deep first-hand approaches, of learning through participant citizenship, and of social programs attacking discrimination directly. Much of the work of the Commission on Community Interrelations (30, 31, 127) has been devoted to an analysis of the role of action research in intergroup

lair, Minneapolis, and Northtown community self-surveys, noted such concrete changes as the passage of an FEPC ordinance, the admittance of Negroes into a local union, the construction by private builders of a 350-dwelling unit for Negro occupancy, and the first employment of Negroes "as teachers, school principals, policemen, and salesclerks."

Dodson (53) described fundamental field-work experience as characteristic of the professional training in human relations at New York University. Students participated in social services, interviews, and assembly programs and explored faculty-student relationships in the Riverside area, a heterogeneous section of New York City. Generalizing on seven such projects, Giles (64) reported that community agencies are willing to accept their findings, that students are stimulated by them, and that such projects are worth the effort when judged by group productivity and individual learning.

Yet there is little evidence that elementary and high schools are doing much in the way of encouraging community surveys and audits so that individuals themselves may reconstruct their values. In-school action projects are only occasionally described, and among them is Sweet's account of a junior high school program (137). Lack of emphasis on surveys and audits at elementary- and high-school levels may be explained by the same factors Bigelow (13) used to explain the relative lack of activity in teacher education concerning human-relations education as a whole: community pressures, teacher insecurity, and administrative unconcern.

Working Toward Elimination of Segregation and Discrimination. Theoreticians of intercultural education have long pointed out that changing the surrounding attitudes by eliminating discrimination and prejudice is of surpassing importance for the achievement of the goals of intercultural education. Watson (167) made this point in urging action for unity as he summarized the available research on the effects of legislation and social action. Cook (34) pointed out that discrimination teaches prejudice. Ashley-Montagu (8) noted that unless educational programs are accompanied by social and economic arrangements which support the more desirable attitudes, all the institutional pressures upon the individual will be in the direction of a resumption of his original attitudes.

In contrast to the oft-repeated phrase, "You can't legislate good human relations," evidence from studies made in conjunction with the work of the New York State Commission Against Discrimination (4, 131) indicated that patterns of behavior in employment practices could be substantially altered in a short period of time. Especially following the Supreme Court decision of 1954 and the decree of 1955 declaring racial segregation in public schools unconstitutional, there has been a growing recognition of the importance of working toward better human relations through elimination of segregation and discrimination.

At this writing, research on desegregation of public schools is largely descriptive and in the form of case

studies. For instance, the Louisville experience in orderly integration has been described by the superintendent of schools and a journalist (27). The St. Louis achievement of desegregation was analyzed by Valien (154), a sociologist, and Sskwor (134), a human-relations worker involved in the change. Baltimore's experience was described by Bard (9, 10) and Fischer (58). The shift in Washington and its attendant success and difficulties were reported by Hansen (68). A little-known but competent study comparing desegregation in two Illinois communities, Alton and East St. Louis, is an unpublished doctoral dissertation by Turner (153). The Anti-Defamation League has contributed case studies to the literature through reports on Clinton, Tenn. (75), Sturgis, Ky. (61), and Mansfield (62) and Beaumont, Texas (22). Williams and Ryan reported on the desegregation experiences of 24 communities (172), and Grambs, in a Public Affairs Pamphlet (66), generalized on the desegregation process. The experiences in cultural integration of school facilities in several states were assembled by Van Til, who also reported on community action toward integration in Nashville (157).

The best repository for information on desegregation of schools is the Southern Education Reporting Service. Financed by Ford philanthropy, the Service maintains a library of clippings and reports and publishes the *Southern School News*, self-described as "impartial and objective." A synthesis by reporters titled *With All Deliberate Speed* (130), summed up the segregation situation in the South as of 1957.

In individual schools, implementation of the research finding that social supports of democratic behavior are strengthened by elimination of discrimination usually takes the form of unpublicized administrative acts. These include actions concerning fraternities and sororities, school council representation, extracurricular activities, and so forth. However, since such reforms are seldom publicized, research in this connection is lacking.

An occasional publication by an educational organization gathers together case studies and achieves generalizations; examples are two issues of *Educational Leadership* (157, 158) published by the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development. But, in general, educational organizations are conspicuously and incongruously silent on school segregation. The great new frontier in intercultural education, as yet scarcely explored through research, is the problem of desegregation and integration in American schools.

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APPENDIX "D"

10. Attitudes Can Be Measured

L. L. THURSTONE

1. THE POSSIBILITY OF MEASURING ATTITUDE

The purpose of this paper¹ is to discuss the problem of measuring attitudes and opinions and to offer a solution for it. The very fact that one offers a solution to a problem so complex as that of measuring differences of opinion or attitude on disputed social issues makes it evident from the start that the solution is more or less restricted in nature and that it applies only under certain assumptions that will, however, be described. In devising a method of measuring attitude I have tried to get along with the fewest possible restrictions because sometimes one is tempted to disregard so many factors that the original problem disappears. I trust that I shall not be accused of throwing out the baby with its bath.

In promising to measure attitudes I shall make several common-sense assumptions that will be stated here at the outset so that subsequent discussion may not be fogged by confusion regarding them. If the reader is unwilling to grant these assumptions, then I shall have nothing to offer him. If they are granted, we can proceed with some measuring methods that ought to yield interesting results.

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¹ The original manuscript for this paper has enjoyed a great deal of friendly criticism, some of which turns on matters of terminology and some on the assumptions which are here stated. In order to keep this paper within reasonable length, the description of the detailed psychophysical methods used and the construction of several attitude scales are reserved for separate publication. This paper concerns then only an outline of one solution to the problem of measuring attitude.

It is necessary to state at the very outset just what we shall here mean by the terms "attitude" and "opinion." This is all the more necessary because the natural first impression about these two concepts is that they are not amenable to measurement in any real sense. It will be conceded at the outset that an attitude is a complex affair which cannot be wholly described by any single numerical index. For the problem of measurement this statement is analogous to the observation that an ordinary table is a complex affair which cannot be wholly described by any single numerical index. So is a man such a complexity which cannot be wholly represented by a single index. Nevertheless we do not hesitate to say that we measure the table. The context usually implies what it is about the table that we propose to measure. We say without hesitation that we measure a man when we take some anthropometric measurements of him. The context may well imply without explicit declaration what aspect of the man we are measuring, his cephalic index, his height or weight or what not. Just in the same sense we shall say here that we are measuring attitudes. We shall state or imply by the context the aspect of people's attitudes that we are measuring. The point is that it is just as legitimate to say that we are measuring attitudes as it is to say that we are measuring tables or men.

The concept "attitude" will be used here to denote the sum total of a man's inclinations and feelings, prejudice or bias, preconceived notions, ideas, fears, threats, and convictions about any specified topic. Thus a man's attitude about pacifism means here all that he feels and thinks about peace and war. It is admittedly a subjective and personal affair.

The concept "opinion" will here mean a verbal expression of attitude. If a man says that we made a mistake in entering the war against Germany, that statement will here be spoken of

as an opinion. The term "opinion" will be restricted to verbal expression. But it is an expression of what? It expresses an attitude, supposedly. There should be no difficulty in understanding this use of the two terms. The verbal expression is the *opinion*. Our interpretation of the expressed opinion is that the man's *attitude* is pro-German. An opinion symbolizes an attitude.

Our next point concerns what it is that we want to measure. When a man says that we made a mistake in entering the war with Germany, the thing that interests us is not really the string of words as such or even the immediate meaning of the sentence merely as it stands, but rather the attitude of the speaker, the thoughts and feelings of the man about the United States, and the war, and Germany. It is the attitude that really interests us. The opinion has interest only in so far as we interpret it as a symbol of attitude. It is therefore something about attitudes that we want to measure. We shall use opinions as the means for measuring attitudes.²

There comes to mind the uncertainty of using an opinion as an index of attitude. The man may be a liar. If he is not intentionally misrepresenting his real attitude on a disputed question, he may nevertheless modify the expression of it for reasons of courtesy, especially in those situations in which frank expression of attitude may not be well received. This has led to the suggestion that a man's action is a safer index of his attitude than what he says. But his actions may also be distortions of his attitude. A politician extends friendship and hospitality in overt action while hiding an attitude that he expresses more truthfully to an intimate friend. Neither his opinions nor his overt acts constitute in any sense an infallible guide to the subjective inclinations and preferences that constitute his attitude. Therefore we must remain content to use opinions, or other forms of action, merely as indices of attitude. It must be

² Professor Faris, who has been kind enough to give considerable constructive criticism to the manuscript for this paper, has suggested that we may be measuring opinion but that we are certainly not measuring attitude. It is in part a terminological question which turns on the concept of attitude. If the concept of attitude as here defined is not acceptable, it may be advisable to change the terminology provided that a distinction is retained between (1) the objective index, which is here called the statement or opinion, and (2) the inferred subjective inclination of the person, which is here called the attitude variable.

recognized that there is a discrepancy, some error of measurement as it were, between the opinion or overt action that we use as an index and the attitude that we infer from such an index.

But this discrepancy between the index and "truth" is universal. When you want to know the temperature of your room, you look at the thermometer and use its reading as an index of temperature just as though there were no error in the index and just as though there were a single temperature reading which is the "correct" one for the room. If it is desired to ascertain the volume of a glass paper weight, the volume is postulated as an attribute of the piece of glass, even though volume is an abstraction. The volume is measured indirectly by noting the dimensions of the glass or by immersing it in water to see how much water it displaces. These two procedures give two indices which might not agree exactly. In almost every situation involving measurement there is postulated an abstract continuum such as volume or temperature, and the allocation of the thing measured to that continuum is accomplished usually by indirect means through one or more indices. Truth is inferred only from the relative consistency of the several indices, since it is never directly known. We are dealing with the same type of situation in attempting to measure attitude. We must postulate an attitude variable which is like practically all other measurable attributes in the nature of an abstract continuum, and we must find one or more indices which will satisfy us to the extent that they are internally consistent.

In the present study we shall measure the subject's attitude as expressed by the acceptance or rejection of opinions. But we shall not thereby imply that he will necessarily *act* in accordance with the opinions that he has indorsed. Let this limitation be clear. The measurement of attitudes expressed by a man's opinions does not necessarily mean the prediction of what he will do. If his expressed opinions and his actions are inconsistent, that does not concern us now, because we are not setting out to predict overt conduct. We shall assume that it is of interest to know what people *say* that they believe even if their conduct turns out to be inconsistent with their professed opinions. Even if they are intentionally distorting their attitudes, we are measuring at least the attitude which they are trying to make people believe that they have.

We take for granted that people's attitudes are subject to change. When we have measured a man's attitude on any issue such as pacifism, we shall not declare such a measurement to be in any sense an enduring or constitutional constant. His attitude may change, of course, from one day to the next, and it is our task to measure such changes, whether they be due to unknown causes or to the presence of some known persuasive factor such as the reading of a discourse on the issue in question. However, such fluctuations may also be attributed in part to error in the measurements themselves. In order to isolate the errors of the measurement instrument from the actual fluctuation in attitude, we must calculate the standard error of measurement of the scale itself, and this can be accomplished by methods already well known in mental measurement.

We shall assume that an attitude scale is used only in those situations in which one may reasonably expect people to tell the truth about their convictions or opinions. If a denominational school were to submit to its students a scale of attitudes about the church, one should hardly expect intelligent students to tell the truth about their convictions if they deviate from orthodox beliefs. At least, the findings could be challenged if the situation in which attitudes are expressed contains pressure or implied threat bearing directly on the attitude to be measured. Similarly, it would be difficult to discover attitudes on sex liberty by a written questionnaire, because of the well-nigh universal pressure to conceal such attitudes where they deviate from supposed conventions. It is assumed that attitude scales will be used only in those situations that offer a minimum of pressure on the attitude to be measured. Such situations are common enough.

All that we can do with an attitude scale is to measure the attitude actually expressed with the full realization that the subject may be consciously hiding his true attitude or that the social pressure of the situation has made him really believe what he expresses. This is a matter for interpretation. It is something probably worth while to measure an attitude expressed by opinions. It is another problem to interpret in each case the extent to which the subjects have expressed what they really believe. All that we can do is to minimize as far as possible the conditions that prevent our subjects from telling the truth, or else to adjust our interpretations accordingly.

When we discuss opinions, about prohibition for example, we quickly find that these opinions are multidimensional, that they cannot all be represented in a linear continuum. The various opinions cannot be completely described merely as "more" or "less." They scatter in many dimensions, but the very idea of measurement implies a linear continuum of some sort such as length, price, volume, weight, age. When the idea of measurement is applied to scholastic achievement, for example, it is necessary to force the qualitative variations into a scholastic linear scale of some kind. We judge in a similar way such qualities as mechanical skill, the excellence of handwriting, and the amount of a man's education, as though these traits were strung out along a single scale, although they are of course in reality scattered in many dimensions. As a matter of fact, we get along quite well with the concept of a scale in describing traits even so qualitative as education, social and economic status, or beauty. A scale or linear continuum is implied when we say that a man has more education than another, or that a woman is more beautiful than another, even though, if pressed, we admit that perhaps the pair involved in each of the comparisons have little if anything in common. It is clear that the linear continuum which is implied in a "more and less" judgment may be conceptual, that it does not necessarily have the physical existence of a yardstick.

And so it is also with attitudes. We do not hesitate to compare them by the "more and less" type of judgment. We say about a man, for example, that he is more in favor of prohibition than some other, and the judgment conveys its meaning very well with the implication of a linear scale along which people or opinions might be allocated.

2. THE ATTITUDE VARIABLE

The first restriction on the problem of measuring attitudes is to specify an attitude variable and to limit the measurement to that. An example will make this clear. Let us consider the prohibition question and let us take as the attitude variable the degree of restriction that should be imposed on individual liberty in the consumption of alcohol. This degree of restriction can be thought of as a continuum ranging from complete and absolute freedom or license to equally complete and absolute restriction, and it would of course include neutral and indifferent attitudes.

In collecting samples from which to construct a scale we might ask a hundred individuals to write out their opinions about prohibition. Among these we might find one which expresses the belief that prohibition has increased the use of tobacco. Surely this is an opinion concerning prohibition, but it would not be at all serviceable for measuring the attitude variable just mentioned. Hence it would be irrelevant. Another man might express the opinion that prohibition has eliminated an important source of government revenue. This is also an opinion concerning prohibition, but it would not belong to the particular attitude variable that we have set out to measure or scale. It is preferable to use an objective and experimental criterion for the elimination of opinions that do not belong on the specified continuum to be measured, and I believe that such a criterion is available.

This restriction on the problem of measuring attitudes is necessary in the very nature of measurement. It is taken for granted in all ordinary measurement, and it must be clear that it applies also to measurement in a field in which the multidimensional characteristics have not yet been so clearly isolated. For example, it would be almost ridiculous to call attention to the fact that a table cannot be measured unless one states or implies what it is about the table that is to be measured; its height, its cost, or beauty or degree of appropriateness or the length of time required to make it. The context usually makes this restriction on measurement. When the notion of measurement is applied to so complex a phenomenon as opinions and attitudes, we must here also restrict ourselves to some specified or implied continuum along which the measurement is to take place.

In specifying the attitude variable, the first requirement is that it should be so stated that one can speak of it in terms of "more" and

"less," as, for example, when we compare the attitudes of people by saying that one of them is more pacifistic, more in favor of prohibition, more strongly in favor of capital punishment, or more religious than some other person.

Figure 1 represents an attitude variable, militarism-pacifism with a neutral zone. A person who usually talks in favor of preparedness, for example, would be represented somewhere to the right of the neutral zone. A person who is more interested in disarmament would be represented somewhere to the left of the neutral zone. It is possible to conceive of a frequency distribution to represent the distribution of attitude in a specified group on the subject of pacifism-militarism.

Consider the ordinate of the frequency distribution at any point on the base line. The point and its immediate vicinity represent for our purpose an attitude, and we want to know relatively how common that degree of feeling for or against pacifism may be in the group that is being studied. It is of secondary interest to know that a particular statement of opinion is indorsed by a certain proportion of that group. It is only to the extent that the opinion is representative of an attitude that it is useful for our purposes. Later we shall consider the possibility that a statement of opinion may be scaled as rather pacifistic and yet be indorsed by a person of very pronounced militaristic sympathies. To the extent that the statement is indorsed or rejected by factors other than the attitude-variable that it represents, to that extent the statement is useless for our purposes. We shall also consider an objective criterion for spotting such statements so that they may be eliminated from the scale. In our entire study we shall be dealing, then, with opinions, not primarily because of their cognitive content but rather because they serve as the carriers or




Figure 1

symbols of the attitudes of the people who express or indorse these opinions.

There is some ambiguity in using the term attitude in the plural. An attitude is represented as a point on the attitude continuum. Consequently there is an infinite number of attitudes that might be represented along the attitude scale. In practice, however, we do not differentiate so finely. In fact, an attitude, practically speaking, is a certain narrow range or vicinity on the scale. When a frequency distribution is drawn for any continuous variable, such as stature, we classify the variable for descriptive purposes into steps or class intervals. The attitude variable can also be divided into class intervals and the frequency counted in each class interval. When we speak of "an" attitude, we shall mean a point, or a vicinity, on the attitude continuum. Several attitudes will be considered not as a set of discrete entities, but as a series of class intervals along the attitude scale.

3. A FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF ATTITUDES

The main argument so far has been to show that since in ordinary conversation we readily and understandably describe individuals as more and less pacifistic or more and less militaristic in attitude, we may frankly represent this linearity in the form of a unidimensional scale. This has been done in a diagrammatic way in Figure 1. We shall first describe our objective and then show how a rational unit of measurement may be adopted for the whole scale.

Let the base line of Figure 1 represent a continuous range of attitudes from extreme pacifism on the left to extreme militarism on the right.

If the various steps in such a scale were defined, it is clear that a person's attitude on militarism-pacifism could be represented by a point on that scale. The strength and direction of a particular individual's sympathies might be indicated by the point *a*, thus showing that he is rather militaristic in his opinions. Another individual might be represented at the point *b* to show that although he is slightly militaristic in his opinions, he is not so extreme about it as the person who is placed at the point *a*. A third person might be placed at the point *c* to show that he is quite militaristic and that the difference between *a* and *c* is very slight. A similar interpretation might be ex-

tended to any point on the continuous scale from extreme militarism to extreme pacifism, with a neutral or indifference zone between them.

A second characteristic might also be indicated graphically in terms of the scale, namely, the range of opinions that any particular individual is willing to indorse. It is of course not to be expected that every person will find only one single opinion on the whole scale that he is willing to indorse and that he will reject all the others. As a matter of fact we should probably find ourselves willing to indorse a great many opinions on the scale that cover a certain range of it. It is conceivable, then, that a pacifistically inclined person would be willing to indorse all or most of the opinions in the range *d* to *e* and that he would reject as too extremely pacifistic most of the opinions to the left of *d*, and would also reject the whole range of militaristic opinions. His attitude would then be indicated by the average or mean of the range that he indorses, unless he cares to select a particular opinion which most nearly represents his own attitude. The same sort of reasoning may of course be extended to the whole range of the scale, so that we should have at least two, or possibly three, characteristics of each person designated in terms of the scale. These characteristics would be (1) the mean position that he occupies on the scale, (2) the range of opinions that he is willing to accept, and (3) that one opinion which he selects as the one which most nearly represents his own attitude on the issue at stake.

It should also be possible to describe a group of individuals by means of the scale. This type of description has been represented in a diagrammatic way by the frequency outline.

Any ordinate of the curve would represent the number of individuals, or the percentage of the whole group, that indorses the corresponding opinion. For example, the ordinate at *b* would represent the number of persons in the group who indorse the degree of militarism represented by the point *b* on the scale. A glance at the frequency curve shows that for the fictitious group of this diagram militaristic opinions are indorsed more frequently than the pacifistic ones. It is clear that the area of this frequency diagram would represent the total number of indorsements given by the group. The diagram can be arranged in several different ways that will be separately discussed. It is sufficient at this moment to realize that, given a

valid scale of opinions, it would be possible to compare several different groups in their attitudes on a disputed question.

A second type of group comparison might be made by the range or spread that the frequency surfaces reveal. If one of the groups is represented by a frequency diagram of considerable range or scatter, then that group would be more heterogeneous on the issue at stake than some other group whose frequency diagram of attitudes shows a smaller range or scatter. It goes without saying that the frequent assumption of a normal distribution in educational scale construction has absolutely no application here, because there is no reason whatever to assume that any group of people will be normally distributed in their opinions about anything.

It should be possible, then, to make four types of description by means of a scale of attitudes. These are (1) the average or mean attitude of a particular individual on the issue at stake, (2) the range of opinion that he is willing to accept or tolerate, (3) the relative popularity of each attitude of the scale for a designated group as shown by the frequency distribution for that group, and (4) the degree of homogeneity or heterogeneity in the attitudes of a designated group on the issue as shown by the spread or dispersion of its frequency distribution.

This constitutes our objective. The heart of the problem is in the unit of measurement for the base line, and it is to this aspect of the problem that we may now turn.

4. A UNIT OF MEASUREMENT FOR ATTITUDES

The only way in which we can identify different attitudes (points on the base line) is to use a set of opinions as landmarks, as it were, for the different parts or steps of the scale. The final scale will then consist of a series of statements of opinion, each of which is allocated to a particular point on the base line. If we start with enough statements, we may be able to select a list of twenty or thirty opinions so chosen that they represent an evenly graduated series of attitudes. The separation between successive statements of opinion would then be uniform, but the scale can be constructed with a series of opinions allocated on the base line even though their base line separations are not uniform. For the purpose of drawing frequency distributions

it will be convenient, however, to have the statements so chosen that the steps between them are uniform throughout the whole range of the scale.

Consider the three statements *a*, *c*, and *d*, in Figure 1. The statements *c* and *a* are placed close together to indicate that they are very similar, while statements *c* and *d* are spaced far apart to indicate that they are very different. We should expect two individuals scaled at *c* and *a* respectively to agree very well in discussing pacifism and militarism. On the other hand, we should expect to be able to tell the difference quite readily between the opinions of a person at *d* and another person at *c*. The scale separations of the opinions must agree with our impressions of them.

In order to ascertain how far apart the statements should be on the final scale, we submit them to a group of several hundred people who are asked to arrange the statements in order from the most pacifistic to the most militaristic. We do not ask them for their own opinions. That is another matter entirely. We are now concerned with the construction of a scale with a valid unit of measurement. There may be a hundred statements in the original list, and the several hundred persons are asked merely to arrange the statements in rank order according to the designated attitude variable. It is then possible to ascertain the proportion of the readers who consider statement *a* to be more militaristic than statement *c*. If the two statements represent very similar attitudes we should not expect to find perfect agreement in the rank order of statements *a* and *c*. If they are identical in attitude, there will be about 50 per cent of the readers who say that statement *a* is more militaristic than statement *c*, while the remaining 50 per cent of the readers will say that statement *c* is more militaristic than statement *a*. It is possible to use the proportion of readers or judges who agree about the rank order of any two statements as a basis for actual measurement.

If 90 per cent of the judges or readers say that statement *a* is more militaristic than statement *b* ($p_{a>b} = .90$) and if only 60 per cent of the readers say that statement *a* is more militaristic than statement *c* ($p_{a>c} = .60$) then clearly the scale separation ($a - c$) is shorter than the scale separation ($a - b$). The psychological scale separation between any two stimuli can be measured in terms of a law of

comparative judgment which the writer has recently formulated.³

The detailed methods of handling the data will be published in connection with the construction of each particular scale. The practical outcome of this procedure is a series of statements of opinions allocated along the base line of Figure 1. The interpretation of the base-line distances is that the apparent difference between any two opinions will be equal to the apparent difference between any other two opinions which are spaced equally far apart on the scale. In other words, the shift in opinion represented by a unit distance on the base line seems to most people the same as the shift in opinion represented by a unit distance at any other part of the scale. Two individuals who are separated by any given distance on the scale *seem* to differ in their attitudes as much as any other two individuals with the same scale separation. In this sense we have a truly rational base line, and the frequency diagrams erected on such a base line are capable of legitimate interpretation as frequency surfaces.

In contrast with such a rational base line or scale is the simpler procedure of merely listing ten to twenty opinions, arranging them in rank order by a few readers, and then merely counting the number of indorsements for each statement. That can of course be done providing that the resulting diagram be not interpreted as a frequency distribution of attitude. If so interpreted the diagram can be made to take any shape we please by merely adding new statements or eliminating some of them, arranging the resulting list in a rough rank order evenly spaced on the base line. Allport's diagrams of opinions⁴ are not in any sense frequency distributions. They should be considered as bar-diagrams in which are shown the frequency with which each of a number of statements is indorsed. Our principal contribution here is an improvement on Allport's procedure. He is virtually dealing with rank orders, which we are here trying to change into

measurement by a rational unit of measurement. Allport's pioneering studies in this field should be read by every investigator of this problem. My own interest in the possibility of measuring attitude by means of opinions was started by Allport's paper, and the present study is primarily a refinement of his statistical methods.

The unit of measurement for the scale of attitudes is the standard deviation of the dispersion projected on the psychophysical scale of attitudes by a statement of opinion, chosen as a standard. It is a matter of indifference which statement is chosen as a standard, since the scales produced by different standard statements will have proportional scale values. This mental unit of measurement is roughly comparable to, but not identical with, the so-called "just noticeable difference" in psychophysical measurement.

A diagram such as Figure 1 can be constructed in either of at least two different ways. The area of the frequency surface may be made to represent the total number of votes or indorsements by a group of people, or the area may be made to represent the total number of individuals in the group studied. Allport's diagrams would be made by the latter principle if they were constructed on a rational base line so that a legitimate area might be measured. Each subject was asked to select that one statement in the list most representative of his own attitude. Hence at least the sum of the ordinates will equal the total number of persons in the group. I have chosen as preferable the procedure of asking each subject to indorse all the statements with which he agrees. Since we have a rational base line, we may make a legitimate interpretation of the area of the surface as the total number of indorsements made by the group. This procedure has the advantage that we may ascertain the range of opinion which is acceptable to each person, a trait which has considerable interest and which cannot be ascertained by asking the subject to indorse only one of the statements in the list. The ordinates of the frequency diagram can be plotted as proportions of the whole group. They will then be interpreted as the probability that the given statement will be indorsed by a member of the group. In other words, the frequency diagram is descriptive of the distribution of attitude in the whole group, and at each point on the base line we

³ For a more detailed discussion of this law see my article "The Law of Comparative Judgment," *Psych. Rev.* (July, 1927). For the logic of the psychological S-scale see "Psychophysical Analysis," *Amer. J. Psych.* (July, 1927).

⁴ Floyd H. Allport and D. A. Hartman, "Measurement and Motivation of Atypical Opinion in a Certain Group," *Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev.*, XIX (1925), 735-760.

want an ordinate to represent the relative popularity of that attitude.

5. THE CONSTRUCTION OF AN ATTITUDE SCALE

At the present time three scales for the measurement of opinion are being constructed by the principles here described.⁵ These three scales are planned to measure attitudes on three different variables, namely, pacifism-militarism, prohibition, and attitude toward the church. All three of these scales are being constructed first by a procedure somewhat less laborious than the direct application of the law of comparative judgment, and if consistent results are obtained the method will be retained for other scales.

The method is as follows. Several groups of people are asked to write out their opinions on the issue in question, and the literature is searched for suitable brief statements that may serve the purposes of the scale. By editing such material a list of from 100 to 150 statements is prepared expressive of attitudes covering as far as possible all gradations from one end of the scale to the other. It is sometimes necessary to give special attention to the neutral statements. If a random collection of statements of opinion should fail to produce neutral statements, there is some danger that the scale will break in two parts. The whole range of attitudes must be fairly well covered, as far as one can tell by preliminary inspection, in order to insure that there will be overlapping in the rank orders of different readers throughout the scale.

In making the initial list of statements several practical criteria are applied in the first editing work. Some of the important criteria are as follows:

1. The statements should be as brief as possible so as not to fatigue the subjects who are asked to read the whole list.

2. The statements should be such that they can be indorsed or rejected in accordance with their agreement or disagreement with the attitude of the reader. Some statements in a ran-

⁵ Three attitude scales are now in course of preparation by Mr. E. J. Chave, of the Divinity School, University of Chicago, on attitudes toward the church; by Mrs. Hattie Smith on attitudes about prohibition; and by Mr. Daniel Droba on attitudes about pacifism-militarism. The latter two will be published as Doctor's dissertations.

dom sample will be so phrased that the reader can express no definite indorsement or rejection of them.

3. Every statement should be such that acceptance or rejection of the statement does indicate something regarding the reader's attitude about the issue in question. If, for example, the statement is made that war is an incentive to inventive genius, the acceptance or rejection of it really does not say anything regarding the reader's pacifistic or militaristic tendencies. He may regard the statement as an unquestioned fact and simply indorse it as a fact, in which case his answer has not revealed anything concerning his own attitude on the issue in question. However, only the conspicuous examples of this effect should be eliminated by inspection, because an objective criterion is available for detecting such statements so that their elimination from the scale will be automatic. Personal judgment should be minimized as far as possible in this type of work.

4. Double-barreled statements should be avoided except possibly as examples of neutrality when better neutral statements do not seem to be readily available. Double-barreled statements tend to have a high ambiguity.

5. One must insure that at least a fair majority of the statements really belong on the attitude variable that is to be measured. If a small number of irrelevant statements should be either intentionally or unintentionally left in the series, they will be automatically eliminated by an objective criterion, but the criterion will not be successful unless the majority of the statements are clearly a part of the stipulated variable.

When the original list has been edited with these factors in mind, there will be perhaps 80 to 100 statements to be actually scaled. These statements are then mimeographed on small cards, one statement on each card. Two or three hundred subjects are asked to arrange the statements in eleven piles ranging from opinions most strongly affirmative to those most strongly negative. The detailed instructions will be published with the description of the separate scales. The task is essentially to sort out the small cards into eleven piles so that they *seem* to be fairly evenly spaced or graded. Only the two ends and the middle pile are labelled. The middle pile is indicated for neutral opinions. The reader must decide for each statement which of five subjective degrees




Figure 2

of affirmation or five subjective degrees of negation is implied in the statement or whether it is a neutral opinion.

When such sorting has been completed by two or three hundred readers, a diagram like Figure 2 is prepared. We shall discuss it with the scale for pacifism-militarism as an example. On the base line of this diagram are represented the eleven apparently equal steps of the attitude variable. The neutral interval is the interval 5 to 6, the most pacifistic interval from 0 to 1, and the most militaristic interval from 10 to 11. This diagram is fictitious and is drawn to show the principle involved. Curve *A* is drawn to show the manner in which one of the statements might be classified by the three hundred readers. It is not classified by anyone below the value of 3, half of the readers classify it below the value 6, and all of them classify it below the value 9. The scale value of the statement is that scale value below which just one half of the readers place it. In other words, the scale value assigned to the statement is so chosen that one half of the readers consider it more militaristic and one half of them consider it less militaristic than the scale value assigned. The numerical calculation of the scale value is similar to the calculation of the limen by the phi-gamma hypothesis in psychophysical measurement.

It will be found that some of the statements toward the ends of the scale do not give complete ogive curves. Thus statement *C* is incomplete in the fictitious diagram. It behaves as though it needed space beyond the arbitrary limits of the scale in order to be completed. Its scale value may, however, be determined as that scale value at which the phi-gamma curve through the experimental proportions crosses the 50 per cent level, which is at *c*. Still other statements may be found, such as *D*, which

have scale values beyond the arbitrary range of the scale. These may be assigned scale values by the same process, though less accurately.

The situation is different at the other end of the scale. The statement *E* has a scale value at *e*, but owing to the limit of the scale at the point 11 the experimental proportion will be 1.00 at that point. If the scale continued beyond the point 11 the proportions would continue to rise gradually as indicated by the dotted line. The experimental proportions are all necessarily 1.00 for the scale value 11, and hence these final proportions must be ignored in fitting the phi-gamma curves and in the location of the scale values of the statements.

6. THE VALIDITY OF THE SCALE

(a) *The scale must transcend the group measured.* One crucial experimental test must be applied to our method of measuring attitudes before it can be accepted as valid. A measuring instrument must not be seriously affected in its measuring function by the object of measurement. To the extent that its measuring function is so affected, the validity of the instrument is impaired or limited. If a yardstick measured differently because of the fact that it was a rug, a picture, or a piece of paper that was being measured, then to that extent the trustworthiness of that yardstick as a measuring device would be impaired. Within the range of objects for which the measuring instrument is intended, its function must be independent of the object of measurement.

We must ascertain similarly the range of applicability of our method of measuring attitude. It will be noticed that the *construction* and the *application* of a scale for measuring attitude are two different tasks. If the scale is to be regarded as valid, the scale values of the

statements should not be affected by the opinions of the people who help to construct it. This may turn out to be a severe test in practice, but the scaling method must stand such a test before it can be accepted as being more than a description of the people who construct the scale. At any rate, to the extent that the present method of scale construction is affected by the opinions of the readers who help to sort out the original statements into a scale, to that extent the validity or universality of the scale may be challenged.

Until experimental evidence may be forthcoming on this point, we shall make the assumption that the scale values of the statements are independent of the attitude distribution of the readers who sort the statements. The assumption is, in other words, that two statements on a prohibition scale will be as easy or as difficult to discriminate for people who are "wet" as for those who are "dry." Given two adjacent statements from such a scale, we assume that the proportion of "wets" who say that statement *a* is wetter than statement *b* will be substantially the same as the corresponding proportion for the same statements obtained from a group of "drys." Restating the assumption in still another way, we are saying that it is just as difficult for a strong militarist as it is for a strong pacifist to tell which of two statements is the more militaristic in attitude. If, say, 85 per cent of the militarists declare statement *A* to be more militaristic than statement *B*, then, according to our assumption, substantially the same proportion of pacifists would make the same judgment. If this assumption is correct, then the scale is an instrument independent of the attitude which it is itself intended to measure.

The experimental test for this assumption consists merely in constructing two scales for the same issue with the same set of statements. One of these scales will be constructed on the returns from several hundred readers of militaristic sympathies and the other scale will be constructed with the same statements on the returns from several hundred pacifists. If the scale values of the statement are practically the same in the two scales, then the validity of the method will be pretty well established.⁶

⁶ The neutrality point would not necessarily be represented by the same statement for both militarists and pacifists, but the scale separations between all pairs of statements should be practically the same for the two conditions of standardization.

It will still be necessary to use opinion scales with some discretion. Queer results might be obtained with the prohibition scale, for example, if it were presented in a country in which prohibition is not an issue.

(b) *An objective criterion of ambiguity.* Inspection of the curves in Figure 2 reveals that some of the statements of the fictitious diagram are more ambiguous than others. The degree of ambiguity in a statement is immediately apparent, and in fact it can be definitely measured. The ambiguity of a statement is the standard deviation of the best fitting phi-gamma curve through the observed proportions. The steeper the curve, the smaller is the range of the scale over which it was classified by the readers and the clearer and more precise is the statement. The more gentle the slope of the curve, the more ambiguous is the statement. Thus of the two statements *A* and *B* in the fictitious diagram the statement *A* is the more ambiguous.

In case it should be found that the phi-gamma function does not well describe the curves of proportions in Figure 2, the degree of ambiguity may be measured without postulating that the proportions follow the phi-gamma function when plotted on the attitude scale. A simple method of measuring ambiguity would then be to determine the scale distance between the scale value at which the curve of proportions has an ordinate of .25 and the scale value at which the same curve has an ordinate of .75. The scale value of the statement itself can also be defined, without assuming the phi-gamma function, as that scale value at which the curve of proportions reaches .50. If no actual proportion is found at that value, the scale value of the statement may be interpolated between the experimental proportions immediately above and below the .50 level. In scaling the statements whose scale values fall outside the ten divisions of the scale, it will be necessary to make some assumption regarding the nature of the curve, and it will probably be found that for most situations the phi-gamma function will constitute a fairly close approximation to truth.

(c) *An objective criterion of irrelevance.* Before a selection of statements can be made for the final scale, still another criterion must be applied. It is an objective criterion of irrelevance. Referring again to Figure 1, let us consider two statements that have identical scale values at the point *f*. Suppose, further, that

these two statements are submitted to the group of readers represented in the fictitious diagram of Figure 1. It is quite conceivable, and it actually does happen, that one of these statements will be indorsed quite frequently while the other statement is only seldom indorsed in spite of the fact that they are properly scaled as implying the same degree of pacifism or militarism. The conclusion is then inevitable that the indorsement that a reader gives to these statements is determined only partly by the degree of pacifism implied and partly by other implied meanings which may or may not be related to the attitude variable under consideration. Now it is of course necessary to select for the final attitude scale those statements which are indorsed or rejected primarily on account of the degree of pacifism-militarism which is implied in them and to eliminate those statements which are frequently accepted or rejected on account of other more or less subtle and irrelevant meanings.

An objective criterion for accomplishing this elimination automatically and without introducing the personal equation of the investigator is available. It is essentially as follows: Assume that the whole list of about one hundred statements has been submitted to several hundred readers for actual voting. These need not be the same readers who sorted the statements for the purpose of scaling. Let these readers be asked to mark with a plus sign every statement which they indorse and to reject with a minus sign every statement not to their liking.

If we want to investigate the degree of irrelevance of any particular statement which,

for example, might have a scale value of 4.0 in Figure 3, we should first of all determine how many readers indorsed it. We find, for example, that 260 readers indorsed it. Let this total be represented on the diagram as 100 per cent, and erect such an ordinate at the scale value of this statement. We may now ascertain the proportion of these 260 readers who *also* indorsed each other statement. If the readers indorse and reject the statements largely on the basis of the degree of pacifism-militarism implied, then those readers who indorse statements in the vicinity of 4.0 on the scale will not often indorse statements that are very far away from that point on the scale. Very few of them should indorse a statement which is scaled at the point 8.0; for example. If a large proportion of the 260 readers who indorse the basic statement scaled at 4.0 should also indorse a statement scaled at the point 8.0, then we should infer that their voting on these two statements has been influenced by factors other than the degree of pacifism that is implied in the statements. We can represent this type of analysis graphically.

Every one of these other statements will be represented by a point on this diagram. Its x-value will be the scale value of the statement, and its y-value will be the proportion of the 260 readers who indorsed it. Thus, if out of the 260 readers who indorsed the basic statement there were 130 who also indorsed statement No. 14, which has a scale value of, say, 5.0, then statement No. 14 will be represented at the point A on Figure 3.

If the basic statement, the degree of irrelevance of which is represented in Figure 3, is




Figure 3

an ideal statement, one which people will accept or reject primarily because of the attitude on pacifism which it portrays, then we should expect the one hundred statements to be represented by as many points hovering more or less about the dotted line of Figure 3. The diagram may of course be more contracted or spread out, but the general appearance of the plot should be that of Figure 3. If, on the other hand, the basic statement has implications that lead to acceptance or rejection quite apart from the degree of pacifism which it conveys, then the proportion of the indorsements of the statements should not be a continuous function of their scale distance from the basic statement. The one hundred points might then scatter widely over the diagram. This inspectional criterion of irrelevance is objective and it can probably be translated into a more definite algebraic form so as to eliminate entirely the personal equation of the investigator.

Two other objective criteria of irrelevance have been devised. They will be described in connection with the attitude scales now being constructed.

7. SUMMARY OF THE SCALING METHOD

The selection of the statements for the final scale should now be possible. A shorter list of twenty or thirty statements should be selected for actual use. We have described three criteria by which to select the statements for the final scale. These criteria are:

1. The statements in the final scale should be so selected that they constitute as nearly as possible an evenly graduated series of scale values.
2. By the objective criterion of ambiguity it is possible to eliminate those statements which project too great a dispersion on the attitude continuum. The objective measure of ambiguity is the standard deviation of the best fitting phi-gamma curve as illustrated in Figure 2.
3. By the objective criteria of irrelevance it is possible to eliminate those statements which are accepted or rejected largely by factors other than the degree of the attitude-variable which they portray. One of these criteria is illustrated in Figure 3.

The steps in the construction of an attitude scale may be summarized briefly as follows:

1. Specification of the attitude variable to be measured.

2. Collection of a wide variety of opinions relating to the specified attitude variable.

3. Editing this material for a list of about one hundred brief statements of opinion.

4. Sorting the statements into an imaginary scale representing the attitude variable. This should be done by about three hundred readers.

5. Calculation of the scale value of each statement.

6. Elimination of some statements by the criterion of ambiguity.

7. Elimination of some statements by the criteria of irrelevance.

8. Selection of a shorter list of about twenty statements evenly graduated along the scale.

8. MEASUREMENT WITH AN ATTITUDE SCALE

The practical application of the present measurement technique consists in presenting the final list of about twenty-five statements of opinion to the group to be studied with the request that they check with plus signs all the statements with which they agree and with minus signs all the statements with which they disagree. The score for each person is the average scale value of all the statements that he has indorsed. In order that the scale be effective toward the extremes, it is advisable that the statements in the scale be extended in both directions considerably beyond the attitudes which will ever be encountered as mean values for individuals. When the score has been determined for each person by the simple summation just indicated, a frequency distribution can be plotted for the attitudes of any specified group.

The reliability of the scale can be ascertained by preparing two parallel forms from the same material and by presenting both forms to the same individuals. The correlation between the two scores obtained for each person in a group will then indicate the reliability of the scale. Since the heterogeneity of the group affects the reliability coefficient, it is necessary to specify the standard deviation of the scores of the group on which the reliability coefficient is determined. The standard error of an individual score can also be calculated by an analogous procedure.

The unit of measurement in the scale when constructed by the procedure here outlined is not the standard discriminial error projected by a single statement on the psychological con-

tinuum. Such a unit of measurement can be obtained by the direct application of the law of comparative judgment, but it is considerably more laborious than the method here described. The unit in the present scale is a more arbitrary one, namely, one-tenth of the range on the psychological continuum which covers the span from what the readers regard as extreme affirmation to extreme negation in the particular list of statements with which we start. Of course the scale values can be determined with reliability to fractional parts of this unit. It is hoped that this unit may be shown experimentally to be proportional to a more precise and more universal unit of measurement such as the standard discriminial error of a single statement of opinion.

It is legitimate to determine a central tendency for the frequency distribution of attitudes in a group. Several groups of individuals may then be compared as regards the means of their respective frequency distributions of attitudes. The differences between the means of several such distributions may be directly compared because of the fact that a rational base line has been established. Such comparisons are not possible when attitudes are ascertained merely by counting the number of indorsements to separate statements whose scale differences have not been measured.

In addition to specifying the mean attitude of each of several groups, it is also possible to measure their relative heterogeneity with regard to the issue in question. Thus it will be

possible, by means of our present measurement methods, to discover for example that one group is 1.6 more heterogeneous in its attitudes about prohibition than some other group. The heterogeneity of a group is indicated perhaps best by the standard deviation of the scale values of all the opinions that have been indorsed by the group as a whole rather than by the standard deviation of the distribution of individual mean scores. Perhaps different terms should be adopted for these two types of measurement.

The tolerance which a person reveals on any particular issue is also subject to quantitative measurement. It is the standard deviation of the scale values of the statements that he indorses. The maximum possible tolerance is of course complete indifference, in which all of the statements are indorsed throughout the whole range of the scale.

If it is desired to know which of two forms of appeal is the more effective on any particular issue, this can be determined by using the scale before and after the appeal. The difference between the individual scores, before and after, can be tabulated and the average shift in attitude following any specified form of appeal can be measured.

The essential characteristic of the present measurement method is the scale of evenly graduated opinions so arranged that equal steps or intervals on the scale *seem* to most people to represent equally noticeable shifts in attitude.

Please fill in the blanks below. (You may leave the space for your name blank if you wish.)

Name _____

Boy Girl (encircle one) Date _____
 Year in high school _____

Boy	Girl	(encircle one)	Year in high school

Age when school started this year _____ or college _____

What occupation would you best like to follow? _____

Your race _____ Your nationality _____

Directions:

Following is a list of statements about races and nationalities. Place a plus sign (+) before each statement with which you agree with reference to the race or nationality listed at the left of the statements. The person in charge will tell you the race or nationality to write in at the head of the columns to the left of the statements. Your score will in no way affect your grade in any course.

Race					
					1.
					2.
					3.
					4.
					5.
					6.
					7.
					8.
					9.
					10.
					11.
					12.
					13.
					14.
					15.
					16.
					17.

1. Show a high rate of efficiency in anything they attempt.
2. Can be depended upon as being honest.
3. Are mentally strong.
4. Are fine people.
5. Are very patriotic.
6. Are far above my own group.
7. Are noted for their industry.
8. Some of our best citizens are ~~descendants~~ from this group.
9. Are a tactful group of people.
10. Deserve much consideration from the rest of the world.
11. I would be willing to trust these people.
12. Should be permitted to inter-marry with any other group.
13. Command the respect of any group.
14. Are generous to others.
15. Are of a self-sacrificing nature.
16. Are quick to apprehend.
17. Should be permitted to enter this country as immigrants.

[illegible]

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Name _____

Age when school started this year _____ year in high school
or college _____

Your Race _____ Your nationality _____

Following is a list of statements about races and nationalities. Place a plus sign (+) before each statement with which you agree with reference to the race or nationality listed at the left of the statements. The person in charge will tell you the race or nationality to write in at the head of the columns to the left of the statements. Your score will in no way affect your grade in any course.

Race					
					1
					2
					3
					4
					5
					6
					7
					8
					9
					10
					11
					12
					13
					14
					15
					16
					17

1. Are the finest in the world.
2. Are honest.
3. Are the most desirable class of immigrants.
4. Have an ideal home life.
5. Have a high standard of living.
6. Tend to improve any group with which they come in contact.
7. Are superior in every way to the rest of the world.
8. I consider it a privilege to associate with this group.
9. Have an unusual ability for leadership.
10. Are on a level with my own group.
11. The world is better off by having these people in it.
12. Are sincere in their actions.
13. Are religiously inclined.
14. Are sociable.
15. The higher class of this group are superior to us.
16. Are considerate of others.
17. Are courageous in wars.

[illegible]

18. Are sympathetic to others.
19. Can be resourceful when necessary.
20. Should be regarded as any other group.
21. Are equal in intelligence to the average person.
22. I have no particular love or hatred for this group.
23. Are of a gregarious nature.
24. Have a great love of power.
25. Are stingy.
26. I suppose these people are all right but I've never liked them.
27. Must imitate others to succeed.
28. Have a tendency toward insubordination.
29. Will not bear acquaintance.
30. Are always suspicious of others.
31. Are envious of others.
32. Have a tendency to fight.
33. Must undergo many years of civilization before they may be said to have reached our own level.
34. Are discourteous.
35. Are sluggish in action.
36. Are unreasonable in their attitude toward other groups.
37. Are slow and unimaginative.
38. Are disorderly in conduct.
39. I do not see how anyone can be fond of this group.
40. Are a necessary evil to be endured.
41. Are generally sly and deceitful.
42. Are the most despicable people in the world.
43. We should cultivate a national hatred for these people.
44. Cannot be trusted.
45. Are the least respected people in the world.
46. Are inferior in every way to the rest of the world.

②

Scale to Measure Attitude toward
Races and Nationalities

Form
A

Form
B

109

Statement	Form A	Form B
1.	10.9	10.5
2.	10.2	10.2
3.	10.0	10.0
4.	9.9	9.9
5.	9.8	9.8
6.	9.5	9.5
7.	9.3	9.3
8.	9.2	9.2
9.	9.0	9.0
10.	8.9	8.9
11.	8.8	8.8
12.	8.7	8.7
13.	8.5	8.5
14.	8.4	8.4
15.	8.2	8.2
16.	8.1	8.1
17.	8.0	8.0
18.	7.9	7.9
19.	7.7	7.7
20.	6.8	6.8
21.	6.0	6.1
22.	5.8	5.4
23.	4.6	4.5
24.	4.4	4.4
25.	4.2	4.2
26.	3.6	3.6
27.	3.2	3.3
28.	3.1	3.1
29.	3.0	3.0
30.	2.8	2.7
31.	2.5	2.5
32.	2.4	2.4
33.	2.3	2.3
34.	2.2	2.2
35.	1.9	1.9
36.	1.8	1.8
37.	1.6	1.6
38.	1.5	1.5
39.	1.4	1.4
40.	1.3	1.3
41.	1.2	1.2
42.	1.0	1.0
43.	0.9	0.9
44.	0.8	0.8
45.	0.7	0.7
46.	0.4	0.4

Directions for Scoring. The median scale

value of the statements marked with a plus is the attitude score. If an odd number of statements is thus endorsed, the scale value of the middle item of those endorsed gives the score.

For example, if nine statements are endorsed of which the fifth one is item 10, the score for the pupil is 8.9, the scale value of item 10. If an even number of items is endorsed, the pupil's score is the scale value half-way between the two middle items. Example: If ten items are endorsed of which items 7 and 12 are the fifth and sixth in order, the pupil's score will be the scale value of item 12 plus the difference between 8.7 (scale value for item 12) and 9.3 (scale value for item 7), divided by 2, or 9.0.

A high scale value means a favorable attitude, and a low scale value means an unfavorable attitude.

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For studies concerning the validity and reliability of generalized attitude scales see Remmers, H. E. and others, Studies in Attitudes - A Contribution to Social-Psychological Research Methods, Studies in Higher Education XXVI, Bulletin of Purdue University, Vol. XXXV, No. 4, December, 1934.

County _____ City _____ State _____

School _____ Teacher _____ Date _____

Subject _____ Number of months in school year (encircle one)
8, 8½, 9, 9½, 10

Distribution of Scores										
Score	Grade _____		Grade _____		Grade _____		Grade _____		All Grades	
	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls
10.5-10.9										
10.0-10.4										
9.5- 9.9										
9.0- 9.4										
8.5- 8.9										
8.0- 8.4										
7.5- 7.9										
7.0- 7.4										
6.5- 6.9										
6.0- 6.4										
5.5- 5.9										
5.0- 5.4										
4.5- 4.9										
4.0- 4.4										
3.5- 3.9										
3.0- 3.4										
2.5- 2.9										
2.0- 2.4										
1.5- 1.9										
1.0- 1.4										
0.5- 0.9										
0.0- 0.4										
Total										
Av. (Arith. Mean) Score										

Please fill out and mail to

Professor H. H. Remmers,
Division of Educational Reference,
Purdue University,
Lafayette, Indiana.

OVER

SURVEY

Please read the statements below, and circle the number preceding those statements with which you agree. Leave those statements with which you disagree unmarked. Thank-you.

Scale
value

- | | |
|------|--|
| 0.4 | 1. Indians are the lowest form of humanity. |
| 0.7 | 2. I hate anyone belonging to the Indian race. |
| 1.0 | 3. Indians have nothing about them I can admire. |
| 1.2 | 4. Indians tend to be sly and deceitful. |
| 1.4 | 5. Indians are often dirty and smelly. |
| 1.8 | 6. Education beyond grade ten is totally wasted upon the Indian. |
| 2.1 | 7. It would be better if Indians just disappeared as a separate race and culture. |
| 2.5 | 8. Indians have a lot of undesirable traits. |
| 2.8 | 9. Indians cannot look after themselves without government assistance. |
| 3.2 | 10. Indians are considered inferior to others. |
| 3.4 | 11. Indians do not impress me too much. |
| 3.8 | 12. Indians can be unreasonable in their dealings with others. |
| 4.1 | 13. Indians are suspicious people. |
| 4.4 | 14. Indians are fond of pomp and ceremony. |
| 4.6 | 15. Indians are more industrious than some groups, but less industrious than others. |
| 4.9 | 16. Indians have no real justification in being dissatisfied with treaty settlements etc. |
| 5.2 | 17. Indians should be regarded as any other group. |
| 5.5 | 18. Indians can be resourceful when necessary. |
| 5.7 | 19. Indians have been taken advantage of by other groups. |
| 5.9 | 20. Indians have a great deal of pride. |
| 6.2 | 21. Indians are talented craftsmen. |
| 6.5 | 22. Others can benefit from contact with the Indian. |
| 6.9 | 23. Indians are easy to get along with. |
| 7.2 | 24. Indians were better masters of the land than we have proven to be. |
| 7.5 | 25. Indians deserve more direct representation in Ottawa. |
| 7.8 | 26. Indians have been unfairly labelled as savages by novels, T.V., movies etc. |
| 8.0 | 27. Canada is better off for having the Indian people within her borders. |
| 8.3 | 28. Indians were and are a courageous people. |
| 8.5 | 29. Indians are straightforward and honest. |
| 8.9 | 30. Indians could teach us a great deal if we would listen. |
| 9.2 | 31. Indians are skilled at anything they attempt. |
| 9.5 | 32. Indians are one of the most creative of peoples. |
| 9.9 | 33. Indians have long enjoyed a unique and special understanding of nature. |
| 10.1 | 34. Indians have been indispensable in their contributions to this country. |
| 10.5 | 35. Indians understand more than any other people the delicate relationship between man and his environment. |
| 10.8 | 36. Indians are the noblest people on Earth. |
