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Chapter 1.

Bismarck and the Triple Alliance.

In 1871 the unification of Germany was practically complete, and the task now before Bismarck was to consolidate, not to augment the stately fabric he had erected. With January 18, 1871, Europe entered on the age of Bismarck, "Germany in the age of Bismarck", was transformed into "Europe in the age of Bismarck", the centre of gravity of European diplomacy was transferred to Berlin. Peace was necessary to ensure a period of solidification of the Empire; Germany had won by war the terms on which she desired to live with her neighbors, now she wished for no more than the maintenance of the conditions and their development into a permanent system.

To the fulfillment of this wish, however, there was one danger—a humiliated France inevitably would dream of a time when a successful war of revenge might be waged—but the France of 1871 could never accomplish this single handed. The question then was how to keep France isolated and the rest of the world convinced that it was to their interest to accept this situation as desirable. "The isolation of France and the German hegemony of the Continent
were complementary aspects of the same problem and were complementary results of a single aim." (1)

The first step towards ensuring France's isolation was the revival of the Triple Alliance of Russia, Austria and Germany. In this revival Bismarck reckoned on the ill-will of Russia to Great Britain and the genuine Russian fear of liberal and radical tendencies in France and Great Britain. The sacred cause of royalty was declared to be imperilled. "Germany, Austria and Russia should hold together to resist those dangerous and evil influences of England, if order was to be maintained in Europe." (2) Dynasticism and order were to be pitted against republicanism and revolution. The Sovereigns met in 1871 at Gastein and Salzburg and in 1872 at Berlin and the Emperor William returned the visits at Petersburg and Vienna,—the reconciliation prepared by the peace of 1866 proceeded rapidly. The Crown Prince wrote to his cousin, the ruler of Roumanis, "No formal treaty was concluded", but the understanding was complete. In 1873, Victor Emmanuel came to Berlin and was forgiven for his readiness to join Napoleon in 1870 by his accession to the monarchical entente. Bismarck had accomplished his purpose, he had secured Germany's eastern frontier, he had stopped Italy from gravitating towards her sister Latin race; France was without an ally. The Kings of Holland and Sweden visited Berlin, and Belgium was compelled to alter her penal code because Germany did (1) Robertson, p. 330. (2) Lord Fitzmaurice, p.110-111
not think it adequate to deal with radicals. The pacific penetration of Europe by Germany had begun.

Everything went well except in France. Her recovery from the terms inflicted after the Franco-Prussian war was all too rapid and Bismarck viewed with resentment the recuperation of the "hereditary foe". There was a great danger of a restoration of a Catholic Bourbon monarch which might bring France back into the circle of dynasticism and might even become the centre of a Catholic coalition against Prussia. France increased her army, and in so doing she was acting in accordance with Bismarckian principles. But France with a strong army would be a desirable ally for Russia and the fear of such an alliance haunted Bismarck. This would mean the restoration of the hostile Balance of Power against Germany, which had been destroyed in 1866 and 1871 in the wars with Austria and France. In the winter of 1874-1875, Bismarck tried to pick a quarrel with France because the French bishops had endorsed the papal encyclical, condemning the arrest of Cardinal Ledochowske. Furthermore on March 10, the French Parliament had passed the military "Law of the Fourth Battalions" and in it Bismarck saw only one thing, the preparation for revenge. Accordingly he provoked the war scare by a violent press campaign on the menace involved in French armaments. "He.. succeeded in making the Emperor and the Crown Prince
"believe that France was meditating an invasion of Germany through Belgium! And...they...ordered the War Depart-
ment to make ready for defence."(1) However Britain and Russia protested, on appeal from France; Europe desired peace but not a peace based on the permanent obliteration of France. The consequence was Lord Odo Russell was able to write to Lord Derby from Berlin on May 15, 1875, "We may certainly reckon on peace this year. Next year peace must depend on the state of Bismarck's combinations for the completion of his task—the unification of Ger-
"many—Russia permitting." (2)

The Eastern Question was a more important strain on Bismarck's system. Great Britain definitely took a place upon the European stage. The revolts of Montenegro, Bosnia, Serbia and Bulgaria and the intervention of Russia followed by the Russo-Turkish war and the treaty of San Stefano brought Europe dangerously near a general war. Bismarck made the Berlin Memorandum, (May,11,1876), but Great Britain refused to be a party to it. Great Britain and Austria had not forgotten Russian action in 1870. Austria's interest in the Balkans was too deep for her to remain out of a war between Russia and Great Britain. Germany was in a dilemma, if she remained neutral she would lose her prestige, if she sided with Austria or Russia it was certain that France would find an ally in her (Germany's) enemy. The situation was be-
coming dangerous for the safety of Bismarck's Entente of

the three Emperors, and at all costs then war in the Near East must be prevented from spreading and the European problem settled by diplomacy not arms.

Britain, supported by Andrassy, the Austrian Minister, demanded the revision of the Russo-Turkish treaty by the Concert of Europe. Bismarck's attitude was to emphasize the need of peace, the justification of a European revision, and the disinterest of Germany. "He quietly disclaimed all idea of dictating to any of the Great Powers; Germany however, could perform the one humble and efficient task—'that of the honest broker'—facilitating business between clients at cross-purposes, all of whom were the broker's friends." (1) He was, however, drawing attention to Germany's power and by so doing, showing that it was because she was so strong that Germany could be so calm.

On the whole the Congress of Berlin which met to settle the Eastern question under Bismarck's presidency testified to Germany's hegemony. "The honest broker", not merely acted as a clearing house, for two of the clients at least—Austria and Russia—he wrote the contracts and settled the article transferred and the price paid. In 1878 it was established quietly that henceforth Continental European business must go through the Berlin Exchange in the Wilhelmstrasse, and business which did not do so was subject to German disapproval, and was (1) Robertson, p. 339.
done at the buyer's and seller's peril. Thus, in spite of the phrase about the Pomeranian grenadier (1), we see Germany's interest in the Near East beginning to grow. By 1878 Turkey had been taught to recognize that while Russia was an enemy, Austria at best a very interested friend, and Great Britain a useful ally or open foe, Germany would protect the Ottoman Empire in return for political and commercial control. But the Eastern Question was by no means settled, the Balkans were not assigned to the Balkan peoples and this failure was largely due to Bismarck. Turkey had lost half her European dominions; Russia received Bessarabia much to the resentment of Roumania; both Bulgaria and Montenegro, though the latter increased her territory, sighed regretfully for the now defunct treaty of San Stefano; Serbia was incensed by the transfer of Bosnia to Austria; Russia was by no means satisfied with the diplomacy of Britain and Austria, while the latter country received Bosnia and Herzegovina for merely remaining neutral. The latter assignment was not carried out without some difficulty, for the inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina objected to being transferred to Christian rule. When the Austrian troops crossed the frontier 'to restore order and welfare', they were met with the opposition of a holy war, and it was not without some considerable difficulty that the two provinces (1). Bismarck said the whole Balkan dispute is not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier.
were brought under Hapsburg subjection. Austria had obtained in addition the right to station garrisons in the Sanjak of Novibazar, a narrow strip of territory separating Serbia and Montenegro and connecting Bosnia and Macedonia. However, after the events in Bosnia she decided to move cautiously and an agreement was finally arrived at with Turkey, whereby Austria occupied the western portion while Turkey remained in the Sanjak.

German hegemony and Bismarck's central position at Berlin enabled him to have rival groups to bargain with, by maintaining the national antagonisms of Russia, Austria and Great Britain. Furthermore he was able to continue the isolation of France. He seems to have passed on the confidential information received from the three capitals and used it to poison one against the other and all disliked each other much more.

After 1878 Russia got out of hand, the Nationalist party proclaimed that Bismarck had instigated the Russian attack on Turkey in order to favor Austria. At Paris and St. Petersburg the desirability of a Franco-Russian alliance was openly canvassed. The fear of France now weighed heavily on Bismarck's mind and the consequence was he went to Vienna and incidentally received a triumphant ovation. Vienna recognized Germany's services to Austria in the Balkans and without German support Francis Joseph could not face Russia.

The proposal of an Austrian alliance had a much different effect on the German Emperor. He dubbed it a perfidy,
for to him it violated the dynastic connection, the support of Russia in every Prussian crisis, and the solidarity of 'the system of order on a monarchical basis'. The Crown Prince supported the Chancellor and the Emperor finally yielded, due to his fear of a ministerial change. The secret treaty was signed on October 7, 1879 and remained secret until February 3, 1888. In the published text the alliance provided for three eventualities; first if either party was attacked by Russia the other was to come to its assistance with its whole military force; if either party was attacked by another Power than Russia the other was to observe a benevolent neutrality; if Russia increased her armaments so as to menace either of the contracting Powers, the Tsar was to be informed that an attack on one was directed against both. Bismarck thus retained the initiative and secured control of Austrian policy.

The whole question to Bismarck closed a crisis and marked a climax in his policy. He saw that Austrian and Russian ambitions were in conflict after 1878, though the Emperor did not, and through this foresight he made his choice. France was still isolated and Russia now was in the same position, yet the possibility of a Russo-German alliance was passed over for the following reasons. The Chancellor knew that a Russian alliance must commit Germany to the Russian antagonism to Great Britain as well as to the Russian antagonism to Austria, while the alliance with Austria was heralded by Lord Salisbury as "good tid-
ings of great joy". On the other hand the alienation of Great Britain and Austria would probably have involved a renewal of the Anglo-Austrian alliance of 1856 to which France would have been a partner.

Secondly, Russian possession of Constantinople was an important consideration, all German ambitions in the Balkans would be ended thereby. It meant that either Germany must support Russia in her Eastern quarrel with Great Britain or else the treaty was negative. Bismarck was confident that he could control Austrian chauvinism, but a complete German control of Russian policy was not a practical proposition. Teuton and Slav could not work together for a common interest as could Teuton and Magyar.

In the third place a Russian alliance left the main gateway of Central Europe—the Danube—in neutral and probably hostile hands. Without this control as complete as that of the Rhine, Germany could not dominate Central Europe as completely as German hegemony demanded. Moreover Bismarck reckoned with Austrian support to bring Roumania into the system and this was accomplished promptly. This further step brought Serbia and Bulgaria into the sphere of Austrian and thus of German, policy, for it placed Roumania as a German outpost on the north and the fear of an Ottoman Empire under German influence on the south. The maintenance of the Austrian monarchy coincided with the maintenance of the Prussian State regime and checked Slav influence. It set the seal of German approval on an
alliance of German and Magyar to crush all non-German and non-Magyar elements.

On the other hand there were two disadvantages—the Polish question and the Austrian future in the Balkans. Bismarck foresaw in 1879 that the interests of Vienna and Berlin in Polish policy were not identical and might easily become antagonistic. The Vatican, with its trusteeship for Roman Catholic Poland, had an influence on Roman Catholic Vienna and Budapest that foreshadowed the gravest complications. Nor could the Dual Monarchy, in face of the Ruthenian population in Galicia threat the Poles as Prussia treated the Province of Posen. A liberal policy at Vienna toward the Austrian Poles went ill with the drastic oppression of Polish Prussia by Berlin. If Austria did not conform with German policy in this sphere of action the basis of the Treaty of 1879 might crumble away entirely. There was a similar danger in the Balkans. The occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was nominally a transitory arrangement, its conversion into an annexation was a permanent bait to Austria, but Germany secured a powerful control for she could always refuse to support the conversion. The ally in shining armour stood behind Francis Joseph and the Magyars, not in the interest of Austria but of a Prussianized Germany.

"Bismarck was a continentalist, and remained a continentalist to the end of his days; that is, he held as an axiom that German supremacy must rest on mastery of the
strategical and political situation in Europe." (1) Austria-Hungary and the Balkans could not be separated, for the problem of South-eastern Europe was that of the Dual Empire and they were essential to German hegemony. 1875 proved that Europe would not tolerate a further expansion westward at the expense of France and Belgium. But a south-eastern expansion could secure British neutrality, for it would be at the expense of Russia. It is safe to conclude that the way was prepared for the inclusion of Italy and without the Dual Alliance Italy could not have been secured. Furthermore after 1879 the diversion of France became more important than her isolation and with it went the diversion of Russia and of Great Britain. These developments led to the Triple Alliance and the consequences of the consummation of the Chancellor's diplomacy.

After 1878 Nihilism became strong in Russia, and the assassination of Alexander II terrified his successor into terrorism. His disgust with democracy in Great Britain and republicanism in France caused him to consider the necessity of an international union of dynasties against the menace of revolution and no doubt in Bismarck's hands laid the basis of the compacts of 1884 and 1887. The danger of infection from the Liberal West was great both to Alexander and Bismarck. This was not all however—five other characteristics can be traced—the Eastern question, the problem of the Mediterranean, the revival of France, the renewed activity and policy of Great Britain and the colonial movement. Their combination provided the problem for Bismarck...
and his disentanglement of them constitutes the history of his foreign policy from 1879 to his fall in 1890.

Bismarck had to decide what was the interest of Germany in the Near East and he found the decision very difficult. One school in Germany argued that the integrity and the revival of the Ottoman Empire ought to be made a primary German interest. Bismarck was not prepared to go that length; he recognized that it involved an irreconcilable breach with Russia and a serious antagonism to Great Britain. He still had his eye on France and feared an alliance of France and Russia and a rapprochement between Great Britain and Russia. The Near Eastern question from 1879-1890 was summed up in the antagonism of Austria and Russia in the Balkans and in the rivalry between Great Britain and France in Egypt. These two problems brought the question of the Mediterranean into the main diplomatic theatre.

The isolation of France was proving difficult. The International Exhibition of 1878 mirrored her recovery from the collapse of 1870; the impression in Paris, according to Lord Lyons was that Bismarck considered it a sort of defiance of Germany. The Republic was working hard to make good the blunders of the Second Empire and would seem be an ally worth having. There were three possible allies—Great Britain, Russia and Italy. The colonial movement combined with the situation in the Mediterranean gave Bismarck a chance of checkmating the rapprochement.

After 1880 the 'scramble for Africa' began seriously, and the Powers which had started late in the foundation of
colonies had to move quickly to forestall those which had started early. In 1881 France went to Tunis. This colonial expansion suited Bismarck, for the more France spent in men and money on these ventures, the less she would have for her eastern frontier in Europe; she would find European allies by colonial expeditions but European rivals. French and British ministries would come to grief at home because French and British expeditions came to grief abroad. Furthermore, Tunis and the French Mediterranean ambitions brought France into collision with Italy. The latter foresaw a situation of isolation—with whom could she ally? "Italia irredenta"—Trieste and Istria,—the Alpine frontier of the Napoleonic kingdom of Italy of 1810,—the Balkan littoral of the Adriatic were under German control. If she could not get these from Austria single-handed how much less chance had she with Germany standing behind Austria; she knew full well the meaning and terms of the Dual Alliance. The way was paved then, if the invitation was extended, for Italy's accession to the Dual Alliance.

Early in 1882 the Italian Ambassadors at Vienna and Berlin expressed Italy's desire to enter an alliance with Austria and Germany. Bismarck's reply was that Germany had no differences with Italy and providing Austria was agreeable to the union it would be easy of accomplishment. Negotiations in Austria were not quite so simple but thanks to the compromising attitude of Bismarck and no doubt to his desire to have a new ally, the agreement was finally signed
on May 20, 1882. "If Italy were attacked by France without 
"provocation, her partners would come to her aid. Italy, in
"turn, would help Germany against a French attack. If one 
"of the Allies (or two) were attacked and engaged in war 
"with two or more Great Powers, the casus foederis would 
"arise for all. If a Great Power threatened the security 
of one of the signatories, and that one was forced to make 
"war, the others would observe benevolent neutrality, re-
"serving the right to take part in the conflict if they
should see fit. If peace was threatened, the Allies would 
"consult with regard to military measures. The pact was to
"hold for five years, and to be kept secret. At Italy's
"wish each of the Allies signed an Additional Declaration,
'affirming that the treaty could in no case be regarded as
"directed against Great Britain." (1) Thus Italy was not 
prevented from improving her friendship with Great Britain 
and the more strained Anglo-French relations became, the 
greater became the possibility of Anglo-assistance to Italy; 
the better Anglo-German relations became, the better would 
become the relations of Great Britain and Italy. Italy 
was desirable as a middle term between Great Britain and the 
new Triple Alliance.

For Bismarck the accession of Italy had every advantage 
and no disadvantages. Italy from 1878-1882 was in a rest-
less state, but after the latter date Italian policy came 
under the control of the Wilhelmstrasse. The Triple Alliance 
completed Central Europe; it closed the Alpine passes and
(1). Gooch, pp. 67 and 68.
barred the gate to Vienna; it opened the Mediterranean to Germany and rent away from France the ally of the sister Latin race and made it henceforward necessary for her to keep two of her best corps to guard against invasion through the Maritime Alps. The serious menace of 1869 and 1871 of an alliance of France, Austria and Italy in a war of revenge, was shattered. Austria had been secured in 1879, Italy was now secure. An Anglo-French alliance was not likely at this time due to the Egyptian situation. The Triple Alliance largely undid the benefit to France of the hint to take Tunis. In the future Italy's Mediterranean claims might be much more serious if Berlin found it convenient to back them.

An added advantage lay in the use which Italy could be put to curb Austria. There was little fear of the former breaking loose, defying Berlin and Vienna while France was hostile and Britain only vaguely friendly. But Austria was a different matter. Italian claims and aspirations in Albania were used after 1882 to keep Austria in order. The Triple Alliance to Bismarck was important for it secured the Continental position, the backbone of Bismarckian Central Europe. While it was difficult at times to prevent the two allies from quarrelling it called forth Bismarck's skill as an arbiter, a position which he desired. In short the Alliance was an open re-insurance against the liabilities incurred in 1879.

As regards France, the Triple Alliance was the policy
of isolation and diversion in one. It is believed that in 1882 an attempt was made to include Spain, but this attempt did not come to a treaty; Spain was left to 'moral penetration' by Germany. After 1882 France was quietly or openly encouraged from Berlin to pursue colonial aims. In 1881 Bismarck compared Gambetta to a drummer in the sick-room of Europe. But the latter's fall and death soon after ended the policy of cultivating good will of Great Britain, of unifying the Latin races and making a democratic Republic a power for democracy in Europe. After 1882 Ferry's policy in Egypt and the Far East steadily estranged Britain and Bismarck took care to hold this breach open. He played one off against the other by encouraging England in Egypt and France in the Far East and the Pacific. Franco-German relations began to pick up while London became disquieted.

The Chancellor had hopes of the renunciation of the revanche spirit when then the two countries could march together and Great Britain would have to fall in line or the same process of isolation would be taken against her. His hopes failed however with Ferry's fall in 1885, which, coupled with a colonial failure sharply awakened France to the truth that Alsace and Lorraine remained the monument of German victory and French defeat. Ministry followed ministry and instead of welcoming a conciliatory France, Bismarck held her up as more than ever actuated by a revanche policy. Furthermore, the colonial movement and Egypt brought on a severe Anglo-Russian crisis.
and involved Germany in friction with Great Britain.

The relations of Britain and Germany after 1871 are susceptible of various interpretations. Bismarck's dislike of Gladstone is beyond dispute, for Gladstone's principles of foreign policy and international relations as well as his system of home politics was to Bismarck both dangerous and futile; Gladstone's distrust of Bismarckianism, very apparent from 1880 to 1885 was largely responsible for the refusal of Great Britain to join Germany. Bismarck seems to have held the view that Britain was essentially a naval, maritime and colonial Power and as such should not be actively interested in purely continental affairs.

"British Liberalism, in particular, introduced also into international relations 'cant' phrases and formulae—humanity, the Concert of Europe, the unity of European moral interests, arbitration, moral responsibility, Blue Books, amenability to public opinion, and 'nations rightly struggling to be free'—and had always done so from Canning onward." (1) Britain's intervention in 1875 had led to a serious rebuff and even more serious had been the action of the Beaconsfield ministry in the crisis of 1877-1878. A war between Britain and Russia over Constantinople and the Balkans would create a dilemma for Austria and hence for Germany. The insistence of the Gladstone ministry in 1880 on fulfilling the terms of the Treaty of Berlin was very disconcerting.

Yet Bismarck did not underrate British strength. After (1). Robertson, p. 413.
1871 his chief aim was to encourage British goodwill to Austria and Italy, at keeping France and Great Britain apart and Russia and Great Britain in strained tension, in which Germany could maintain the tension yet prevent a complete rupture. Down to 1884 the two countries could maintain the friendliest of relations for no direct antagonism existed in which Great Britain and Germany were the chief actors. The Egyptian question provided Bismarck with what he wished. It made Great Britain more dependent on German goodwill and it could, properly handled, separate France and Britain, and prevent an alliance. On January 11, 1889, he said that the peace of Europe could best be secured by the conclusion of a treaty between Germany and England, pledging them to mutual support, and the reply of Salisbury on March 22 following was in essence, a "Would that it were possible!" Such an alliance would indeed by a blessing for both countries, and for the peace of Europe—all the British Cabinet agreed to this—but the matter could not be concluded just at present; but Lord Salisbury thanked Bismarck warmly for the suggestion and hoped that he would live to see the time when he could accept it. Those were the days moreover when Mr. Joseph Chamberlain in conversation with Herbert Bismarck "went so far as to say Sine Germania nulla Salus". Such an alliance would have been a triumphant addition to the Triple Alliance. Austria and Italy got along very well under the existing agreement, why should not Great Britain
and Russia, furthermore in case of a disagreement of the
two latter Powers, British support would have strengthened
Germany's hand in dealing with St. Petersburg. But after
1884 the colonial question was a cause for friction.

As German unification was now complete, colonies be­
came more a desideratum as 'the appurtenances and appar­
atus of Empire', to give the nation an imperial world pos­
ition. By 1880 the industrialization of the country was
proceeding by leaps and bounds, it was inevitable that the
German trader should seek outlets for capital and markets
outside Europe. But there was one disadvantage, the German
emigrant was lost to Germany because there was no Germany
outside Europe. "In Europe the German trader could say
"'civis Germanus sum'--a claim that no European state was
"likely to underrate, but in the Pacific or on the coast
"of East or West Africa the claim lost its force."(1)
The white ensign of Great Britain was everywhere, the
French tricolour, defeated in Europe was being planted
steadily outside France, but the German flag was missing
even where trade was in German hands.

Bismarck was however hostile to the new idea of colon­
ialism; it was a new idea and furthermore it was not his
own. He recognized that Germany's success had stirred the
deepest jealousies and resentment; it might be overthrown
by coalitions; Germany he knew was not able to defy the
world. The maintenance of German control of central Europe
necessitated an invincible army; any reduction of strength
(1). Robertson, p. 415.
on objectives outside this main theatre would mean a corresponding weakening of the hegemony in Europe. The task of watching and controlling Austria, France, Russia, Italy, Spain—of anticipating the eventualities in the Near East and Mediterranean—became harder as the European Powers grew or copied Bismarckian principles and methods. Moreover, Bismarck foresaw the inevitability of rivalries outside Europe caused by a colonial campaign which would react on the position in Europe. There were two chief colonial States in Europe—France and Great Britain. If Germany competed with France, the policy of diversion would be stopped and the latter would concentrate on Europe. Competition would not drive Great Britain back on Europe—she was primarily colonial and only secondarily continental. But there was a possibility of her forming an anti-German coalition, a Franco-British alliance, and even of much deeper penetration into Europe than heretofore; an eventuality which Bismarck did not wish. A concerted of Europe directed by Great Britain spelled the end of German supremacy in Central Europe, Bismarck had to choose between Continentalism and Colonialism.

Throughout this whole period he seems to have persistently desired friendship with England. Antagonism would jeopardize the Triple Alliance. In 1890 an article written under Bismarck's inspiration laid down the following: "Italy must be able to rely on the assistance of the English Fleet for the Triple Alliance cannot protect the
"Italian coasts. Hence Italy has to think of England, and consideration of England may conceivably limit Italy's freedom of action. As long as Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy are united in the Triple Alliance and as long as these three States may reckon on the assistance of English sea-power the peace of Europe will not be broken."

Other forces were working however. The situation in Great Britain—embarrassment in Egypt, strained relations with France, the Irish and Franchise questions, a quarrel brewing with Russia in the Middle East—prevented her from quarrelling with Germany. German public opinion demanded colonies, the government was not too strong, a general election was likely. Bismarck saw the importance of a popularly desired stroke in foreign policy with the rather unstable home conditions. The situation in Great Britain afforded the cue for the plunge into colonial activity. The German government used the argument that German goodwill in Britain's Egyptian policy depended on British goodwill in German colonial policy. Public opinion in Germany demanded colonies and the policy adopted by Bismarck, while winning him popularity was one which public opinion persuaded itself to be anti-British. The alienation of Germany from Great Britain was proceeding.

The colonial question marks a definite chapter in Anglo-German relations. Yet at the same time that German public opinion was turning definitely anti-British, Bismarck does not seem to have been as antagonistic.
could be harried, almost bullied, she must understand that international relations were the result of bargains and she must make concessions that could be represented as German diplomatic victories; but above all, she must not be driven into an enemy alliance. Consequently from 1884-1890 Bismarck exerted pressure on successive British Cabinets in proportion as he saw necessary, thinking apparently not so much of the colonies but of Germany's prestige, Franco and Russo-German relations and the Triple Alliance. Just how far the antagonism between Great Britain and Germany has been intensified by the colonial policy—how far the creation of a German fleet has been caused by the same policy are questions of the greatest significance in the years following Bismarck's fall.

He had taught Germany the gospel of power and had proved its efficacy. The colonial movement was the expression of that power and a demand for its realization by methods which made for a super state. Bismarck sought throughout to maintain his conception of Central Europe with its European state relations based upon the situation from 1848-1870, and its theory of alliances directed chiefly against France. But the colonial and industrial movements were producing a different situation. The struggle was shifting from European centres, from the Wilhelmstrasse, Downing Street, the Ball Platz and the Quai d'Orsay to the Europe beyond the seas. Still Bismarck adhered to his own conception, and the last ten years of his career witnessed an attempt to bring Russia into the Triple Alliance system.
The new Tsar Alexander III had not the same friendly connection with Prussia as had Alexander II. He was torn between the desire to represent a powerful Russia and the fear of Nihilism and in fact Liberalism in any form. There was a Liberal Ministry in Great Britain, and it presented a menace both to the Tsar and to Bismarck, hence there was a distinct fear and a strong possibility of a Russo-German alliance against the Liberal principles. In 1881 the Tsar was approached and the question of an international anti-Nihilist and anti-Socialist league was mooted. Great Britain was the trouble, she was never, even under a Conservative regime, willing to wreck her constitutional free press and free speech system at the dictates of Berlin or St. Petersburg. But at this time home affairs were not exactly such that she could spend her energies on combating the European situation. On the other hand the Tsar proved tractable. He replaced the anti-German Ignatieff by de Giers and when Skobeleff died Katkoff lost influence and Berlin and Petersburg came closer together. No doubt Austria became uneasy, but this did not affect Bismarck. The consequence was, in the Spring of 1884, (March 24) Bismarck made his first Reinsurance Treaty, in the Autumn of that year, at a meeting of the three Emperors a verbal endorsement of the pact was given.

Apparently it was to hold good for three years; it provided that if one of the three contracting parties made war on a fourth Power the other two were to maintain a benevolent neutrality. In Balkan problems they were to consult
their own interests, but in cases of disagreement between two Powers there was to be a casting vote with the third. Turkey was to come under a kind of joint Protectorate which would be responsible for the execution of the terms of the Treaty of Berlin. The occupation of the Balkan principalities was forbidden to all the three signatories.

Bismarck triumphed, Russia seems to have gained nothing. It is true however, the latter was freed from fear of German or Austrian interference in the event of a struggle with Great Britain in the Middle East. Had Bismarck interfered in such an event, France and Britain would almost certainly have been thrown together and there was a strong possibility that Italy would have deserted the Triple Alliance. The Tsar's independence seems to have been sacrificed to his Conservative principles. Russia turned to Central Asia and antagonized Great Britain; the latter was diverted to Egypt and the Middle East and both Russia and Great Britain were alienated from France. Russia retired from Europe and the Balkans and thereby a Russo-Austrian conflict was obviated. Russian and British influences were weakened in Turkey and German influence strengthened. The situation was pleasing to Bismarck, while he did not want an open breach between Russia and Great Britain, still he wanted the highest tension possible short of war, if they would both turn to Berlin for friendship then the Wilhelmstrasse was the central exchange of European rivalries to just the extent which he wished. Liberal Britain was being deserted,
what an argument for the old, safe, Conservative system—let the outside world compare the prestige of Gladstone and Bismarck.

The Entente of 1884 was primarily directed against France, she was undoubtedly the fourth Power which the allies had in mind when the agreement was ratified. But it did more, it made Bismarck arbiter and mediator between Russia and Austria. While a quarrel between Russia and Germany was not very probable, Austria and Russia, both having interests in the Balkans, were likely to come to blows and the 1884 agreement gave Bismarck just the chance to exert his authority to keep both in order. Russia was absorbed in Central Asia and Bismarck had now a much better chance to secure the desired control over Austrian policy. He could not however, control the national consciousness of France, nor could he control the expansion of Nationalism of the Balkan peoples. With the fall of Ferry, the question of Alsace Lorraine was recalled to the French memory. The Boulanger affair of 1886-1889 created a menace while the Schoenebele incident almost brought an open rupture.

In 1885 the eyes of Europe were again turned to the Balkans. The two Bulgarias were united, much to the anger of the Tsar, and contrary to expectations Austria did not support the Bulgarian policy. Bismarck, wishing, no doubt, to please Russia, and realizing that by so doing he would not definitely antagonize Austria since her attitude all through was one by no means of active support, supported Russia's position. The consequence of the whole situation
was, Alexander of Bulgaria had to resign, realizing that one man could not stand alone against Europe.

The crisis was by no means over however, for the Great Powers were drawn more and more into the controversy. The Treaty of 1881 had reconciled Berlin and Russia but had only temporarily patched up the rift of Austro-Russian rivalry in the Balkans. Bismarck had repeatedly announced that Germany had no interests in Bulgaria which he never ceased to regard as within the Russian sphere of influence, and true to his principle of leaving Russia a free hand in the Near East, he was prepared for a Russian protectorate over Turkey through control of the Straits and even for the occupation of Constantinople. From the beginning of the crisis he had warned Kalnoky, the Austrian Minister, to do nothing to provoke Russia and to faithfully observe the Treaty of 1881; and he now proposed that Russia and Austria should divide the Balkans into an eastern and western zone of influence. The suggestion was approved in Russia but opposed in Vienna; to the probable occupation of Bulgaria by Russia, Austria prepared to offer armed resistance as Kalnoky regarded it in no way covered by the Berlin Treaty.

On September 25, General Nicholas Kaulbars, brother of the former Minister of War, entered Sofia as the Tsar's representative to restore Russian influence. He ordered the liberation of the Prince's (Alexander's) kidnappers and the postponement of the elections for the Grand Sebранje which was to choose a new ruler. The regency declined to obey
and was strengthened by the elections. The new Assembly, strongly anti-Russian, chose Waldemar of Denmark, a brother of the King of Greece for its prince but the invitation was declined. The Russian candidate was vetoed by Great Britain and Italy. Kaulbars after declaring the whole proceeding illegal withdrew from the country.

Austria had hitherto appeared to side with Russia over the Bulgarian question, but Andrassy now drew up a memorandum to the Emperor arguing that Austria's sphere was in the Near East and that she must prevent Russia from bringing all the Slavs under her influence. He complained that Kalnoky had brought her back to the Balkans whence she had been removed by the Treaty of Berlin and his policy of admitting Bulgaria to be in the Russian sphere would lead to a loss to Austria's influence. The German alliance was to him enough. But other leading Russophobe politicians protested that even the German alliance was worth little if Austria had to yield to Russia. Furthermore, Kalnoky declared that a military occupation of Bulgaria would compel Austria to take action and Bismarck advised Russia not to provoke Austria.

Great Britain and Italy as has been said, were indignant over the whole affair, though the former, having no direct concern in Bulgaria took no action. Bismarck was determined not to be drawn into the quarrel. He sincerely believed that Bulgaria was recognized under the Treaty of Berlin as under Russian sphere of influence. Russian
public opinion at this time did not regard him as a friend it was at the time when he was fighting Russia's battle against his own Austrian ally that Katkoff opened his campaign to turn the Tsar towards Paris. This took place in a spirited Press campaign of the "Moscow Gazette". Katkoff argued that to promise neutrality in a Franco-German war denoted hostility to France, since it enabled Germany to remove her troops from the east. A strong France was essential to European equilibrium and a weak France meant the isolation of Russia. The Tsar seemed to be favorably impressed but it was not shown to Giers the Foreign Minister who retained full confidence in Bismarck. Freedom of the Press was not a Russian characteristic, hence at home and abroad the sentiments expressed in the "Gazette" were naturally taken as approved by the Tsar.

Bismarck's reply was the introduction of a new Army Bill on January 11, 1887. Speaking in support of this Bill he touched on the Russian situation when he said, "we do not expect an attack or hostility from Russia....."nor do I believe that Russia seeks alliance in order to "attack us. We shall not have troubles with Russia unless "we go and seek them in Bulgaria as our opposition journals "demand.....What is Bulgaria to us? It is all the same to "us who rules there and what becomes of her....The East-"ern question is not a casus belli for us. We shall allow "nobody to throw a noose round our neck and embroil us "with Russia. The friendship of Russia is of much more "value to us than that of Bulgaria. The difficulty is
"not to keep Germany and Russia, but Austria and Russia "at peace, and it is our duty to ingeminate peace in "both Cabinets. We risk being called pro-Russian in Aust-
"ria and still more in Hungary, and pro-Austrian in Russia. "That does not matter if we can keep the peace---There "are special Austrian interests for which we cannot inter-
"vene, and there are German interests for which Austria "cannot intervene. We do not ask Austria to take part in "our quarrels with France, or in colonial difficulties with "England, and in like manner we have no interests in Const-
"antinople." (1)

The Chancellor now turned to the west where a new and sinister figure occupied the stage in the person of General Boulanger. He had been Director of Infantry at the War Office in 1882, Commander of the Army in Tunis in 1884, and in 1886 Freycinet chose him as Minister of War. In this position he worked on the "revanche" spirit and it was possible that had he remained in office long enough he would have convinced the people that he was the man to reconquer Alsace-Lorraine, such was his strength that Freycinet did not dare to get rid of him and on the fall of the Freycinet Ministry his successor, Goblet, retained the War Minister.

This retention of Boulanger intensified a situation already dangerous. A Franco-Prussian war seemed sure during the first weeks of 1887 and Salisbury was forced to consider what would be the British attitude if it should break out. M. Flourens, the new Minister of Foreign

(1) Gooch, p. 131.
Affairs in France, telegraphed to M. Herbette the French Ambassador to Berlin on December 17, 1886, "France wishes "peace; she has need of it; she will do nothing to trouble "it." Herbette replied at the beginning of 1887 that, "Germany makes preparations for war and one must be ready "for any eventuality." (1)

On April 20 an event occurred which seemed sure to precipitate the crisis. On that day a Frontier Commissioner of Police, Schnaebele, was invited by a German Commissioner to discuss matters of administration. He crossed the German frontier and was promptly seized and imprisoned at Metz. The French Government was naturally incensed. "All the circumstances of the case at once made it a matter "of international significance. The original right of the "German authorities to indict and arrest a French citizen "on a charge of treason was at least questionable. Then too, "the arrested man was in the employ of the French Govern- "ment, wearing its uniform, and in performance of his dut- "ies at the time he was taken. The very question of whether "or not the arrest was made on German territory was in dis- "pute. Finally, the capture had been brought about through "a most dishonorable stratagem. Out of all these complica- "tions, the last became the decisive issue and was proved "the only one upon which the German Government recognized "that it must yield. Had not the point been quickly and "clearly established infinite and dangerous possibilities "of diplomatic controversy lay ahead." (2)

(1). Bourgeois et Pages, p. 221
(2). Fuller, pp. 173-174.
If it was Bismarck's intention to merely offer an excuse for French resistance and thereby produce a good cause for German attack, it seemed on a fair way to success. General Boulanger had reacted to the crisis just as the Germans could have expected. He advocated a large scale military demonstration and even took preparatory measures on his own responsibility. Some of his ministerial colleagues supported him and it was only with the intervention of President Grevy that the programme was stopped. After much delay and investigation Schnaebele was finally released. Bismarck justified the German action but induced the Emperor to grant the liberation on the grounds that "through the doctrine of international law the crossing of a frontier, when done on the strength of official agreement between the functionaries of neighboring states, must always be looked upon as carrying with it the tacit assurance of a safe conduct." (1)

While there seems to have been no definite proof of Bismarck's direct blame for the incident still, to sum up in the words of Mr. Fuller, "the proceedings against Schnaebele, down to his actual arrest, must have had their (the Bismarck's, father and son) sanction in full knowledge of the infinite possibilities of international difficulties which that act would open up. Only the choice of means by the local agent proved unfortunate. When proof of the character of the plot was produced, Count Bismarck betrayed surprise and chagrin; yet the agent never suffered for his clumsiness. The Chancellor had let it be seen that he

(1) Fuller, p. 178 (from German Foreign Office publication, - 9.)
yielded solely on this issue among all those that were raised—

"and he further displayed extreme irritation at being obliged
to yield at all. The settlement was deliberately delayed
in the face of a growing agitation in France which affected
even the Ministry. But counsels of moderation prevailed.
The French Government took its stand firmly upon an irref-
utable case and could not be pricked into assuming a shade
of responsibility for a conflict. Failing to throw this
"responsibility upon France, Bismarck knew from previous
"experience that he could not count upon Russia's neutral-
"ity if the conflict came. Germany simply had to back down,
"Schnaebele was set free. After his liberation this second
"crisis of 1887 passed quietly away." (1)

Bismarck desired the renewal of the Treaty with Russia
which had less than two months to run after the closing of
the Schnaebele incident. It was a useful means of in-
fluencing Russia's policy in the East and it was a guar-
antee against a Franco-Russian alliance. However it ap-
ppeared by none means certain that the renewal would take place.

True the pro-French editor of the "Moscow Gazette" was
gradually losing ground before the Germanophil Foreign
Minister, Giers. An agreement was signed between the
Ministry of France and the French firm of Rothschild for
the conversion of Paris Banks of a block of Russian credit
obligations, a relatively small transaction but a beginn-
ing of the shift of Russia's financial policy from Berlin
towards Paris. Yet, there were still obstacles in the way
(1). Fuller, pp. 183-184.
of the fulfillment of this alliance—chief among them being the attitude of Tsar Alexander III. He was sincerely attached to the upholding of the conservative principles in Europe. His prospective ally however seemed as firmly committed to radical tendencies. Furthermore there were rumors of a ministerial crisis in France, a further emphasis of the instability of the French Government.

Bismarck did all he could to convince the Tsar of the value of German friendship. He made the most of the Boulanger affair. In an interview with General Kaulbars he did his best to produce an impression of friendliness to Russia and sincerity to his offers to support her advance in the Balkans—always provided Austria was not to lose thereby. He was careful to point out, that failing a peaceful solution Germany would stand in the way of a Russian victory over Austria in war. Still the whole proceedings left in the mind of Kaulbars the impression that Bismarck really wanted to engage Russia in Bulgaria so as to gain a free hand for Germany against France, in fact this competition seems to have been current in Russia.

In May, Schuvaloff, The Russian Ambassador brought to Bismarck the Russian proposals for a separate treaty. The first article was a mutual pledge of benevolent neutrality in the event of war between either party and a third Power. This meant granting to Russia a free hand against Austria, a confliction with German obligations to the latter. To prove this confliction Bismarck read to Schuvaloff the text of the Secret Treaty of 1879. The Russian Ambassador
rejoined that Russia could only promise neutrality if Germany did not attack France. An agreement was reached, and on June 18, 1887, Schuvaloff and Herbert Bismarck, (now Foreign Secretary) signed a three year treaty.

"The German and Russian Courts, ran the preamble, have "resolved to confirm the agreement between them by a special arrangement in view of the expiry on June 27 of the "Secret Treaty of 1881, renewed in 1884.

"I. If one should find itself at war with a third "Great Power, the other would maintain a benevolent neutrality, and would try to localize the conflict. This provision would not apply to a war against Austria or France, if resulting from an attack by one of the contracting parties. "II. Germany recognizes the rights historically acquired "by Russia in the Balkan peninsula, especially the legitimacy of her preponderant and decisive influence in Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia. The two Courts engage to admit "no modification of the territorial status quo of the said "peninsula without a previous agreement, and to oppose every "attempt to disturb this status quo or to modify it without "their consent.

"III. The two Courts recognize the European and mutually obligatory character of the principle of the closing of the Straits. They will take care that Turkey shall make no exception to this rule in favor of any Government "by lending the Straits to warlike operations. In case of "or to prevent infringement, the two Courts will inform "Turkey that they would regard her as placing herself in a
"state of war towards the injured party and as depriving her-
"self thenceforth of the security of her territory under the
"Treaty of 1878.

The Treaty was completed by an "Additional and very
"secret Protocol",

"I. Germany, as in the past, will lend her assistance
"to Russia to re-establish a regular and legal Government
"in Bulgaria, and promises not to consent to the restorat-
"ion of the Prince of Battenberg.

"II. If the Tsar should be compelled to defend the
"entrance of the Black Sea in order to safeguard the inter-
"ests of Russia, Germany engages to accord her benevolent
"neutrality and her moral and diplomatic support to the
"measures he may find necessary to guard the key of the
"Empire."

The Treaty was kept strictly secret, Bismarck merely
informing the Austrian Government that Russia had declined
to renew the League of the Three Emperors. Austria had re-
fused an unlimited guarantee in 1879, hence he had to find
other means of guarding Germany against a French attack;
and in promising neutrality if Russia were attacked he was
not undermi_ning his Austrian alliance, which promised Ger-
man support only to repel an attack. Germany retained a
certain hold over Russian policy—Bismarck had purchased
the assurance of Russian neutrality in a war provoked by
France by a promise of German neutrality in a war pro-
voked by Austria.
The hostility of Russia and France to Germany and Great Britain compelled Salisbury and Bismarck to keep in close touch, and Great Britain's association with Austria and Italy, in defense of the status quo in the Mediterranean made her almost a partner in the Triple Alliance. In the correspondence between them during the month of November, Bismarck assured Salisbury that Prince William, who would soon ascend the German throne, would not favor an anti-English policy, that the preservation of Austria as a strong, independent Power was to Germany a necessity, and further that Germany, "should be neutral as long as her interests are not in danger. Germany will never fight for Russia; but Germany will be compelled to join in the fight if the independence of Austria is threatened by Russian attacks, or if England or Italy were in danger of being overrun by French armies. Such is the course of German policy from which neither Monarch nor Minister can divert it." Salisbury's reply concluded with the remarks, "Your Serene Highness has removed my apprehensions by the great frankness with which you have exposed the true situation to me. You have, in the first place allowed me to see the Treaty between Austria and Germany, which established that under no circumstances could the existence of Austria be imperilled by resistance to illegal Russian enterprises. In the second place you have conveyed to Sir Edward Malet (the British Ambassador to Berlin), on the part of the Emperor, his moral approbation of any agreement which may be come to by Austria, Italy and England on the three
bases submitted to us; and in the third place, you have convincingly explained to me that the course of Germany must be dictated by the considerations of national interest felt by the nation at large, and not by the personal prepossessions of the reigning Sovereign.

"I believe that the understanding into which England and the other two Powers are now prepared to enter, will be in complete accordance with her declared policy and will be loyally observed by her. The Grouping of States which has been the work of the last year, will be an effective barrier against any possible aggression of Russia; and the construction of it will not be among the least services, which your Serene Highness has rendered to the cause of European peace."

While Bismarck sought safety from the Bulgarian question in his secret Re-Insurance Treaty with Russia, Kalnoky, the Austrian Minister, sought allies in checking Muscovite ambitions in the Near East. Salisbury was anxious to thwart Russian advances southward and had expressed himself as favorable to co-operation with Austria; but Italy's interest was less direct and her help was to cost much more. The Triple Alliance had not entirely established enduring relations of confidence among the allies. However, Austria needed Italian help in the event of a Bulgarian crisis and Italy was alarmed by the growing influence of Boulanger in France. Consequently, the Triple Alliance which was nearing the end of its five years' term stood a fair chance of renewal. Robilant, the Italian Foreign Minister, asked for
a guarantee of the status quo in the Mediterranean, a guarantee against a French advance on Tripoli or Morocco. Further, that in case of a partition of Turkey between Austria and Russia, Italy would receive compensation in the Balkans. Kalnoky was not at all favorable, but Bismarck feared a Franco-Italian rapprochement and urged a compromise.

"On the whole the renewal of the treaty seems to have been due to the urging of Italy to the extent that it no longer exhibited the purely defensive nature so characteristic of the first treaty. Austria-Hungary and Germany were pledged to take part in wars which could no longer be regarded as a defense against unprovoked attack of a hostile Power." (1) Italy was not entirely successful, for Austria was not ready to enter engagements which might embroil her in a war with France for the sake of the Italian Mediterranean programme. Bismarck was desirous of keeping Germany as far as possible aloof from active participation in the Balkans because of the 1887 Treaty with Russia. A compromise was finally made, presumably adopted on Bismarck's initiative, which provided for a division of Germany's and Austria's obligations. The consequence was three Treaties were concluded.

The first, signed by representatives of the Three Powers, repeated the provisions of that of 1882. The second, a separate Treaty between Austria and Italy, concerned the Balkan question. "Austria and Italy, desiring

(1). Pribram, p. 254.
"the maintenance of the status quo in the Orient, will try to prevent any change injurious to either. But if in the course of events the status quo in the Balkans or the Ottoman coasts and islands of the Adriatic or Aegean becomes impossible, and if, owing to the action of a third Power or otherwise, either finds necessary a temporary or permanent occupation, this occupation shall only take place after an agreement based on the principle of a reciprocal compensation for every advantage, territorial or other, which each obtains." (1)

The third, a separate Treaty between Germany and Italy, concerned the West. "If France made a move to extend her occupation or even her protectorate or her sovereignty in Tripoli or Morocco, and in consequence Italy, to safeguard her position in the Mediterranean, should feel she must undertake action in the said territories or even have recourse to extreme measures in French territory in Europe, the state of war between Italy and France would constitute on the demand of Italy, the casus foederis. If in such a war, Italy should seek territorial guarantees, Germany would not object, and if necessary will facilitate that object." (2) Other provisions, recently revealed, "bbligated Germany to aid Italy with all her military strength, even if Italy without being attacked by France, should consider herself forced, by the conduct of the latter Power in Tripoli or Morocco, to attack either the African or

(1). Gooch p. 147
(2). Ibid p. 147
"the European possessions of France. Just as significant, "and as completely unknown until now, are the contents of "Article 4. of the German-Italian separate Treaty. In this "article Germany expressed her readiness to promote the ex-
tension of Italian territory at the expense of the enemy, in "case of the successful termination of such a war waged in "common against France." (1)

Italy did not insist upon the renewal of the protocol of 1882 relating to Great Britain for the reason that short-
ly before she had made an agreement with that country. The provisions were,

"I. The status quo in the Mediterranean, the Adriatic, "the Aegean and the Black Sea shall be maintained as far as "possible. Care must therefore be taken to prevent any change "to the detriment of the two Powers.

"II. If the status quo proves impossible, no modifica-
tion shall take place except after agreement.

"III. Italy is entirely ready to support the work of "Great Britain in Egypt. Great Britain is disposed, in case "of encroachment by a third Power, to support the action of "Italy at every other point of the North African coast, "especially in Tripoli and Cyrenaic.

"IV. Mutual support in the Mediterranean to the extent "that circumstances shall permit shall be afforded in every "difference between one of the parties and a third Power." This agreement was encouraged by Bismarck and concurred in by Austria.

The latter power now had a rapprochement with Britain

(1) Pribram, p. 255.
and encouragement to oppose Russian interference in Bulgaria, in spite of Bismarck's warning of "In Bulgaria I am Russian". The new Prince Ferdinand waited for neither the recognition of the Sultan nor for the sanction of the Powers before he took the throne. Russia proposed to eject him and appoint a Russian general regent and Turkey addressed a note to the Powers calling attention to the offence. Salisbury counselled non intervention but when Crispi, the new Premier came to power through the death of his predecessor (Depretis), and when he championed Ferdinand, the situation became grave.

Before the close of 1887, Austria and Great Britain and Italy made a second Mediterranean agreement guaranteeing the status quo in the East based upon the previous Treaties and laying down definite provisions regarding the position of Turkey. By this pact Turkey was protected in her position as independent guardian of European interests. She was prohibited from ceding her suzerainty over Bulgaria or over the Straits to any other Power. Furthermore, failing her adherence to these principles the three Powers would join in punishing her and occupying her territory. If on the other hand she were attacked in contravention of the status quo, the three Powers would join in protecting her. Spain was later included in a guarantee against France and a maintenance of the Mediterranean status quo by a Spanish-Italian exchange of confidences.

During the closing months of 1887, Austro-Russian tension became acute. It was only by strong warning on
Bismarck's part of the position of Germany as a means of keeping equilibrium between the two Powers, by his emphasis of Germany's interest and friendship for both of her allies, that a conflict was staved off. By carefully worded diplomatic speeches he minimized the Bulgarian situation and advised a peaceful solution. The Tsar made a final attempt at settlement by declaring Ferdinand must withdraw and then Bulgaria could be free to choose a ruler. Germany and France were in accord but Austria demurred. It was not enforced however and Russian policy had to confess defeat. Bismarck had carefully held the balance and Austrian policy had in reality won. For the next few years Bulgaria leaned on Austria and Turkey.

In March 1888 the German Emperor William I died and his death was followed three months later by that of his son Frederick. The succession passed to William II. Practically the first thing the new monarch did was to make a visit to Russia and he did so under Bismarck's diplomatic guidance that Germany should not obstruct Russia in anything that was not vital to Austria. On the other hand the Kaiser should neither ask any concession nor offer any. The visit was a success and good feeling was general between the two parties.

The Kaiser and Bismarck agreed as to the necessity of intimate relations with Great Britain. In 1889 Bismarck instructed the German Ambassador to present a request for
an alliance between the two countries, pledging them to mutual support against a French attack. However Salisbury was forced to table the proposal owing to the fear of breaking up the Ministry because of popular opposition to such a Treaty, which he knew existed. A few days later the question of the exchange of Heligoland for German South-west Africa was made by Chamberlain in an interview with Herbert Bismarck. This matter, though favorably considered apparently by both sides, was not settled and while the Kaiser expected to sign the agreement in 1890, Bismarck decided that the next move should be made by the British Government.

The Kaiser's visit to England was a pronounced success and feeling between the two countries was in general full of confidence thereby. A new figure was appearing in German diplomacy, that of the Emperor himself. In 1890, resolving to rule in fact as well as in theory, and perceiving that in his own eyes and in the eyes of the world, Bismarck was considered the uncrowned King of Germany, William II took the step which relegated the hitherto predominant figure in European diplomacy to a position of retirement.

On the whole, the fruits of Bismarck's policy in the light of after events, was the beginning of the two armed camps into which Europe was divided on practically every question of international import from 1905-1914. Prince
Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador to London says of this "Triple Alliance policy", "We should have abandoned definite the fated tradition of pushing Triple Alliance policies in the Near East; we should have recognized that it was a mistake to make ourselves solidary with the Turks in the South and the Austro-Magyars in the north; for the continuance of this policy, which we had started at the Berlin Congress and had afterwards zealously developed was bound in time, and particularly in case the requisite adroitness should be found wanting in the supreme directing agencies, to lead to the collision with Russia and the World War." (1) The Central European policy meant that Germany would be—and as events proved she was—bound to be involved in an Austrian quarrel.

There is no doubt that if at any time Bismarck desired war he could have had it. He differed from his rivals not so much in intrigue, in ruthlesslessness and unscrupulousness but rather in ability and success. On the other hand there seems to have been an absence of any suggestion or desire that the world had anything to look forward to in the future different from the present. All he had to offer was the continuance of the rivalries of the Great Powers each of them insisting merely on protection of its own interests. There was no stress on the general interest of Europe as a whole. When the Balkan troubles threatened a conflict between Austria and Russia he practically

(1). Lichnowsky, p. 39.
denied the existence of such general interest.

Had the terms of the Treaty of Frankfort been submitted to general consideration and revision, it is possible that the revanche spirit would never have existed. The Alsace Lorraine question produced the trouble during the whole period of Bismarck's tenure of office—it prevented permanent peace—it caused the growth of armaments, and caused the fear of a European coalition against Germany. Had both countries been forced to accept a settlement drawn up by Europe peace might have been maintained.

"The chief criticism is not Bismarck's desire for war it is under his guidance peace came more and more to depend merely on precarious military alliances and that in this system no place was found for recognition and development of those general interests on which the very spirit of peace depends. All through the Balkan question there is a painful repetition of the view that what happens is not a German consideration only to the extent that it affects the relations of the Great Powers to one another and to Germany. The German attitude right down to 1914 as regards the Balkan question was a support of the Austrian case. While Bismarck was in power, Germany maintained the Central European hegemony but with his fall matters took a different turn. As Lichnowsky said, "Given a properly conducted German policy, which keeps us in touch with Russia, Austria-Hungary is our vassal, and must
"come our way without an alliance and without reciprocal "services. Under a misdirected policy, we must go Austria's "way". (1) This was the case in 1914.

(1). Lichnowsky, p. 43
Chapter 1.

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Chapter 2.

The Dual Alliance and English Uncertainty.

With the fall of Bismarck and the assumption of his place as dictator of German diplomacy by Wilhelm II, the policy of Germany entered upon a new phase. To just what extent German hegemony was extended and how far the system of alliances was continued forms a new chapter in the history of European diplomacy. Wilhelm II had voiced his sentiments of friendship with England and France, and with the dismissal of Bismarck he seemed more and more inclined to a modification of the doctrine of isolation of the latter country. In 1890 France and Great Britain came to an agreement regarding colonial enterprise in Africa, the former to have protectorate over Madagascar and the latter over the Sultanate of Zanzibar. There is little doubt that this rapprochement contributed a good deal towards promoting German negotiations with Paris. Here again a colonial agreement was made—Germany consenting to the French protectorate over Madagascar and France reciprocating with recognition of German rights over the coastal strip of Zanzibar hitherto leased from the Sultan.

French satisfaction over this convention seems to have caused Wilhelm II to believe that he had forgotten the war of 1870. Apparently the Emperor did a great deal at this time to make a rapprochement. The French Government was invited to form a committee of French artists for the
projected International Exposition of Fine Arts to be opened in Berlin, May 1, 1891—the Chamber courteously refused to officially associate itself with this undertaking but offered no objections. In February the Emperor dined at the French Embassy in Berlin and later he sent a letter of condolence because of the death of the French painter, Meissonnier. The Empress Victoria made a visit to Paris, ostensibly incognito and as a lover of Art. However, her relations with the German Embassy and the importance attached by Germany to her visit formed a pretty clear proof of the political signification that was accorded the incident by her countrymen. Many thought her the forerunner of the Kaiser. The German Press expressed the hope of seeing, "the ideas of revenge which haunt the French people" disappear—the question remained, would France be amicable?

Meanwhile the Boulangiste Press, always ready to exploit the "revanche" idea, protested. The Empress visited the Château de Versailles and the ruins of the Château St. Cloud—both associated with the War of 1870. This was a bad diplomatic break; indignation meetings were held, the Parisian artists who were to have gone to Berlin retracted their acceptance and the situation again became tense.

The French Government showed itself desirous of avoiding a crisis but the Kaiser displayed great anger. The German Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a conversation with Herbette (French Ambassador to Berlin) said that German tolerance had limits and that the slightest mark of discourtesy to the Empress might unloose catastrophe. However
the Empress left Paris the same day. The "North German Gazette" declared that such an event would enlighten Europe and show her from what side peace, which was so dear to her, was menaced. The same day the most rigorous formalities were re-established on passports in Alsace. The whole affair closed with the circular by which the French Foreign Minister explained to the French Ambassadors what had happened and disclaimed responsibility of his Government.

The Triple Alliance had been renewed, and with the disastrous outcome of the German offers of conciliation just related, France now found herself more menaced than ever. She now looked for an ally and the logical Power— to which she turned— was Russia. The latter had for some time been alive to the advantages to be obtained by such an alliance. Political sympathy had been re-inforced by economic need. When Bismarck had closed the German Bourse to Russian loans, (November 1887) and encouraged Press attacks on Russian securities, he drove his formidable neighbor into the arms of the French Bourse. Russia had hitherto raised her loans mainly in Germany, but now the political no less than the economic advantage of supplying Russia with money became clear to French financiers. A loan was negotiated on December 10, and this was increased during the next year. The result was, at the beginning of 1891 the total debt amounted to around three billion francs.

While these financial negotiations were going on the
military party was working behind the scenes. In November 1888, an incident occurred, unknown to the public, which committed Russia as much as did the acceptance of a loan. The Russian Grand Duke Vladimir visited Paris and informed Freycinet, the Minister of War, of his wish to inspect the new French rifle. The War Minister consulted his colleagues and the transaction was authorized. Two months later the Military Attache inquired if French experts would examine a similar type of rifle which might be manufactured in France for Russia. The Ministers again agreed and Russian artillery officers travelled to Paris and consulted with French experts. The next step was a request by the Russian Ambassador to allow engineers to study the powder factories with a view to erecting similar factories in Russia. Finally in 1889 the Military Attache asked if France would manufacture 500,000 rifles. Freycinet agreed upon the provision that these rifles would never fire at Frenchmen. The assurance was given and the manufacture began in 1890.

The following year another outstanding event took place which tended more than ever towards a Franco-Russian agreement. The Russian Government sent an invitation to the French fleet to visit Russian waters; the French Government decided to accept the invitation under the reservation demanded by the Anglophil Ribot (Minister of Foreign Affairs) that on the return the fleet should make a trip to Portsmouth. In July 1891, the Cabinet at Paris hesitated no
longer. On the 22nd. of that month, the French fleet commanded by Admiral Gervais, was received at Kronstadt with extraordinary enthusiasm. The welcome which the French sailors had meted out to them in Petrograd and Moscow exceeded expectations, but the climax was reached when the Tsar, standing with bared head listened to the playing of the Marseillaise by the naval band. This homage publicly rendered to the Republic "did more than ten treaties to persuade our (the French) nation that the Russian alliance was concluded and that is was indissoluble." (1)

The visit created a profound impression throughout Europe and in certain quarters alarm. The Belgian Ambassador in Berlin reported, "the German Government never believed in the possibility of a France-Russian alliance. "It will........accumulate explosive material to which certain people are only too anxious to apply a match. The rapprochement is based solely on the common hatred for Germany and must therefore have an aggressive character."

The Belgian Minister in London pronounced, "The Franco-Russian alliance cannot fail to be aggressive without disappointing the hopes which have given it birth."

The significance of the event taken by Europe in general seems to have been correct in the light of the statement of Ribot on July 24. "We think, after the renewal of the Triple Alliance, that we should fortify the guarantees which our entente assures us. We will there-" (1). Debidour, p. 171
fore receive very favorably any proposals they may make. If Russia is thinking of an alliance to pursue certain political aims, we should examine it with care; but I gather the projected accord would be simpler. We think it enough to agree that the Government will confer on any question threatening peace, and if peace be menaced by a member of the Triple Alliance, France and Russia would at once take measures to prevent a surprise—in other words, would agree to mobilize as soon as a member of the other group mobilized, the conditions of mobilization to be fixed by the Staffs. Such an accord is all that we wish at present, and circumstances were never more favorable to its conclusion."

On August 22 there were exchanged between M. de Mohrenheim Russian Ambassador to France, and President Freycinet, two letters verifying by written agreements the entente which the Kronstadt visit had begun. These letters were never published and the exact text is unknown, but the two Governments declared their wishes to unite their efforts to maintain peace on one hand and the European equilibrium on the other. They pledged themselves simply to act together on all questions which related to the general peace in case it should be menaced. All that remained now was to make this entente into a veritable alliance. Russia was not willing to act so quickly however and Freycinet himself voiced the necessity of a military convention. The first step had been made and on referring to it he said
"on September 9, "The Government of the Republic, despite superficial changes, is capable of sustained designs; it brings to the accomplishment of national tasks a consistency not inferior to that of any monarchy; no one doubts today that we are strong; we shall prove that we are wise. "We shall know how to maintain, in a new situation, the tranquility, the dignity, the measure which in evil days prepared our recovery." (1)

These overtures were followed by further appeals to the French investors—money was required in Russia for railways and public works. Response was forthcoming and the loan was many times over subscribed. However many had bought in order to sell and the price fell and dragged down other Russian loans. The Russian Government itself bought in the bonds and the situation was saved. The upshot of these financial transactions was that by 1893, when the Dual Alliance was completed, "the French investor had staked four milliards on the political and economic solvency of his new friend." (2)

Still the Franco-Russian entente was not yet an alliance, though doubtless the French nation regarded it as such. By listening to the Marseillaise at Kronstadt, the Tsar had not necessarily protested against the Treaty of Frankfort. In spite of his distrust of Germany he had never wished for war. He wished simply to intimidate the

(1). Debidour, p. 172.
(2). Gooch, p. 176.
authors of the Triple Alliance and to prevent an attack to which he believed himself to be open, from them. By him as by Bismarck the armed peace was to be the system imposed and for a long time he was unwilling to unite in a common action with the French Republic, the home of anarchy where nihilism could grow up. The Tsar believed France incapable of re-establishing her finances and military strength, and of offering that force of resistance that Russia had a right to demand from her ally. Boulangism was a disquieting element. The persistence of monarchial parties who tried from day to day to re-establish their dynasties, and the unhappy frequency of ministerial crises which seemed to eliminate all rigidity and all consistency from French Government—all these objections had figured largely in the Tsar's resistance to one project for some years. This timidity had been encouraged by many in Russia—noably by the Chancellor de Giers, whose German tendencies were well known and who contributed largely towards the end of 1891 towards restoring a feeling of security regarding Germany, and attempted to minimize the significance of the Kronstadt manoeuvres.

On the other hand the situation in France was not clearly understood. Boulangism died with its leader who committed suicide September 20, 1891. The Republic was growing stronger under a strong President, Carnot. The military law of July of that year was already bearing fruit; Freycinet, for three years Minister of War, gave
the army a solidity which augured well for success in future wars. He had reorganized the General Staff, prepared a serious plan of mobilization, reorganized plans of armament and munitions. On the whole he had given the military strength of the country a new footing which should have offered a solid guarantee of French resources and efficiency. The Tsar had no longer any reason to doubt French strength and France had every reason to hope that he would no longer refuse his entire confidence.

The French Government wished that he would give a positive sanction to the agreement of August 22, by consenting to conclude a military convention which would determine with some precision the means by which the two Powers would propose, in case of need, to guarantee the menaced peace and equilibrium. Freycinet and Ribot did not waste any opportunity. On consulting the Russian Ambassador they were advised to approach the Tsar during his holiday in Denmark. Accordingly Jules Hansen, an honorary Embassy advisor, (Danish by birth but French by naturalization), was sent to Denmark in September with an 'aide-memoire' for the Tsar. The reply was that Alexander would consider the matter on his return home.

In November, Giers visited Paris and he discussed the project of the convention not only with Hohenheim but with Freycinet and Ribot. He observed that there was a question change in the European situation, no longer was there a question of German hegemony. When, however the French statesmen urged the necessity of a peace time milit-
ary agreement he replied that he could not discuss such a proposal—that was for the Tsar alone to determine. Though the question was in no way settled, the Governments commenced diplomatic co-operation as if they were already military and political allies. They agreed to inform the Sultan that the proposed entente was not pointed against Turkey, but to add that their good will towards her depended upon her aid in frustrating the manoeuvres of the Triple Alliance. It was further agreed to preserve the status quo in the Mediterranean. The French Ambassador in Turkey received a dispatch from Ribot regarding this agreement between the two Powers. A few days later Giers forwarded his instructions to the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople. "The rapprochement has as its immediate result, produced everywhere an appeasement and a feeling of security which Europe has lacked for many years. Our Near East policy is the status quo and the prevention of others from exerting influence over the Sultan contrary to our views—such as the recent attempt of the Triple Alliance aided by England, to intimidate him by the dispatch of fleets in Turkish Waters. Encourage him to believe that the equilibrium is now restored, and that France and Russia can guarantee him against aggression by the rival group. "The insinuations as to Russia's supposed aggressive intentions are false. Tell the Sultan not only that we do not menace him, but that, so long as he maintains loyal neutrality we would be ready to defend him. France is equally free from thoughts of aggression. Her chief interest in
"the East is Egypt, the occupation of which she desires to shorten. Russia hopes that the Sultan will not recognize "Ferdinand. France has had no official dealings with the "illegal Government which has installed itself at Sofia. "The only delicate point in our relations in the East is "the Holy Places. Co-operation is impossible since Russia "must defend the Orthodox against attacks of other Confess­ions and France is Protector of the Catholics. The agents "of both must therefore act as moderators."

On December 11, the new French Ambassador, the Mar­quis de Montebello had his first audience with the Tsar, who though friendly made no reference to the alliance. Giers gave the assurance that his master favored a milit­ary convention but did not believe in the necessity of hurry, and wished to discuss the matter with a high French officer such as Miribel or Boisdeffre. Ribot drew up a scheme which was revised by Freycinet and then sent to Alexander. The latter referred it to his Minister of War, General Wannovski, for leisurely study and then left himself for Copenhagen.

The Tsar had very little wish for war and at the be­ginning of June 1892 he went to Kiel to make a visit to the Kaiser to show him that he remained friendly. In order to allay any feeling of uneasiness that this visit might produce in France, Alexander instructed his cousin, the Grand Duke Constantine to visit President Carnot, who was at Nancy at that time on an official mission. The
visit was received with enthusiastic demonstration and served to show to what extent the French nation realized the friendliness of the Emperor of Russia and to what extent they were persuaded that he was already a French ally.

However the negotiations were not over and in spite of the impatience of the French Ministers, they were given to understand that the greatest of tact was necessary. Influence in some quarters in Russia was being brought to bear to convince the Tsar that his hand was being forced. A change of Ministers in France was feared and leakage of the negotiations was considered very undesirable. Giers feared warlike tendencies on the part of France and there was a strong possibility that Germany would declare war when she learned that the convention was signed. On the whole the Tsar wished the Treaty to be secret, he believed that at that moment peace was not menaced but he needed at least two years to complete his railways and munitions and to recover from the depredations of famine. Furthermore the Panama scandals of that year provoked Parliamentary troubles in France and in the eyes of the Tsar compromised French credit. As a result of this affair the President of the Council, Loubet, though not guilty himself, resigned and was replaced by Ribot who called together a new Ministry (December 5, 1892). To make matters worse the Russian Ambassador was accused of being one of the beneficiaries of the Panama Company and it was not
until well into the Spring of 1893 that he was acquitted and the Tsar's anger over the proceedings appeased.

A short time later the projected convention was taken to Saint Petersburg by General Boisdeffre of the French General Staff. After discussion by the military staffs and by Wannovski and Obroucheff, chief of the Russian General Staff, it was at last signed on August 17 by Boisdeffre and Obroucheff and then submitted to the Tsar. The latter declared that he approved it in principle and had only a few unimportant modifications to make. The document was shown by Obroucheff to Giers, who was at this time sick, The Foreign Minister approved it but reserved his final endorsement until his recovery. Though progress was slow it was proceeding with little if any opposition and yet the French negotiations added further reasons to the procrastination by their incautious suggestion of three minor alterations in the convention. The most important of these was to the effect that, in place of the clause binding both parties to secrecy, they suggested that the Treaty should only be divulged with the consent of both parties—explaining that the President had no power to make treaties without the knowledge of Ministers. Innocent though they seemed to the French, these alterations proved to Russia further excuses for delay. These negotiations were not without their effect outside of France and Russia. The attitude of Germany was menacing. In reply to the convention of August 1892, which was not unknown to Germany though not generally understood, the
Government at Berlin had put on foot the project of a new military law which would augment the German army by 800,000 men for the duration of seven years. In November Chancellor Caprivi intimated that Germany had no reason for waging an offensive war, that she had nothing to gain by so doing, but it was necessary for her to take precautions in view of the possibility of a new Boulangerism and of a Franco-Russian alliance. He considered it certain that if Russia wished to make war she would not attempt it without the concurrence of France. In spite of his arguments the Law was defeated in the Reichstag. Dissolution followed, the Government was successful in the ensuing elections and on the 15th of July the new Law was passed. Shortly afterwards great military manoeuvres took place in Lorraine. The Kaiser who was present, took this occasion to pronounce at Metz, "that Germany would keep the annexed countries and would never consent to give them back to France." The system of passports was rigorously applied and the German language was declared obligatory in this province beginning with January 1, 1894.

The presence of Prince Victor Emmanuel at the manoeuvres was not overlooked in France. Franco-Italian relations were not of the best due to the economic rupture of 1888 and due to the colonial question in Africa. Bad feeling was further produced by the death of several Italian citizens in a brawl at Aigues-Mortes in August 1893. In one instance reprisals took place against French citizens and unfriendly demonstrations were made at the French
Embassy in Rome. The Italian Government intervened and re-established order; likewise in France indemnities were accorded the families of the victims. But popular feeling remained over-excited and the general view prevailed in France of suspicion of Italian projects for armaments and attack.

The Franco-Italian situation had a further disquieting effect on the Tsar but the coldness which existed at this period between France and Great Britain had a better effect on Alexander. The colonial rivalries especially in Africa, drew the two countries apart and particularly alarmed Great Britain. The European situation thus served to persuade France that she had made a mistake in seeking to reopen negotiations after the draft had been approved by the Tsar. But now that definite reasons for delay seemed past it was confidently expected that the settlement would be reached during the Winter of 1893. The Panama crisis though not forgotten was passed and seemed no longer to compromise the future of the Republic. The conflicts between France and Italy and France and Great Britain, which Alexander might have expected did not materialize. On the other hand the Tsar still looked with disapproval on the military law passed by the Reichstag. It was pointed out to him that it was expedient to make proof of his good wishes towards France, if not in an offensive alliance, at least by an express agreement which, while guaranteeing peace for the time being would permit him not to fear war.
Without wishing at that time to go so far, the Tsar was willing to anticipate a formal alliance by a public demonstration of friendship which, recalling the Kronstadt demonstrations, would give the world striking proof of a moral agreement which existed between the two countries. He resolved to give France the courteous attention which he had received from her in 1891.

In October a Russian squadron visited Toulon. The reception accorded the men in Paris, Lyons and Marseilles publicly ratified the work which French statesmen and soldiers had been secretly carrying on for several years. "France knew nothing of the military convention or the difficulties which had prevented its signature; but she felt that she had found a powerful friend, who was already an ally in fact if not in name." (1) But still the Tsar refused to hurry and it was not till December 17 that he saw the French Ambassador and expressed delight at the welcome of his fleet. He was however, disturbed by frequent changes in the Ministries of War and Foreign Affairs and made no reference to the Treaty. On December 27, a letter from Giers brought good news, it read in part as follows, "After examining by supreme order the project of August 1892, and submitting my view to the Emperor, I beg to inform you that the text of this arrangement may henceforth be considered as definitely adopted in its actual form." The French Ambassador replied that France

(1). Gooch, p. 182.
also considered it binding. The proposed changes were not pressed—France was by this time thankful, after so much delay, to get what she could. On December 31, 1893 the document was signed by Giers and Montebello, and it was not revealed by the French Government till 1918, when the Soviet regime overthrew Tseredom.

"France and Russia being animated by an equal desire "to maintain peace" ran the preamble,"and having no other "aim than to be ready for a defensive war, provoked by "an attack of the forces of the Triple Alliance against "one or other of them have agreed." If France was att­acked by Germany alone or Italy supported by Germany, Russia would use her whole force in attacking Germany. If Russia was attacked by Germany or Austria supported by Germany, France would use her whole force against Ger­many. In the event of the Triple Alliance forces or of any member of it mobilizing, France and Russia would im­mediately and simultaneously mobilize their whole forces and bring them as near as possible to their frontiers. France was to contribute 1,300,000 men and Russia 700,000 to 800,000 and these forces were to attack so that Germany would be engaged on the East and West. The two General Staffs were to co-operate and exchange any information re­lative to the armies of the Triple Alliance which came to their knowledge. The two nations were not to conclude peace separately, were to keep all clauses of the alliance strictly secret and it was to have the same duration as the Triple Alliance.
The secret was not revealed until January 1895. Ribot declared that France had associated her interests with those of another in the interest of peace and the European equilibrium, but he would go no farther in revealing particulars. A week later the French and Russian squadrons entered German waters together and steamed through the Kiel Canal. France had, through the presence of a powerful ally restored her dignity and was able to participate in celebrations where before it might have been difficult for her to do so.

The Kaiser was profoundly disturbed by the alliance and on September 26, 1895 he wrote to the Tsar, "I perfectly know that you do not dream of attacking us, but you cannot be astonished that the Powers get alarmed seeing how the presence of your officers and high officials in an official way in France fans the inflammable Frenchman into a white-heated passion and strengthens the cause of chauvinism and "revanche". If you are allied for better or worse with the French, well then, keep those damned rascals in order and make them sit still." A month later he wrote again. "It is not the friendship of France and Russia that makes me uneasy, but the danger to our principle of monarchism through the lifting up of the Republic on a pedestal. The constant appearance of Princes, Grand Dukes, etc., at reviews, burials, dinners, races, with the head of the Republic, makes Republicans believe they are quite honest, excellent people, with
"whom Princes can consort and feel at home. The Republicans are revolutionists de n*atura. The French Republic is from the source of the Great Revolution, and propagates its ideas. The blood of Their Majesties is still on that country. Has it since then ever been happy or quiet again? Has it not staggered from bloodshed to bloodshed and from war to war till it scoured all Europe and Russia in streams of blood? Nicky, take my word, the curse of God has stricken that people forever. We Christian Kings and Emperors have one holy duty, imposed on us by heaven—to uphold the principle by the Grace of God. We can have good relations with the French Republic but never be intimate with her. I always fear that in frequent and long visits in France people without feeling it imbibe republican ideas." (1)

However his warnings were wasted on the Tsar, who with the Tsarina made a visit to France in 1896 and received a great ovation. President Faure returned the visit in 1897 and he was followed two years later by Delcassé. The latter secured the Tsar's consent to an addition to the military convention as follows, "The Governments, always bent on the maintenance and equilibrium between European forces confirm the diplomatic arrangement formulated in August 1891. They decide that the project of the military convention of 1893 shall remain operative as long as the diplomatic accord."

The conclusion of the Dual Alliance was of paramount importance for the whole of Europe, not only for France and Russia. French recovery from the events of 1870 was emphatically proven by her alliance with a first-class Power. Few in France knew but what the alliance contained assurance regarding the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine and few were affected by prejudice against the monarchical institutions of their ally due to the satisfaction at receiving a powerful friend. The economic gain to Russia was great. The Siberian Railway project necessitated a great deal of capital and France was able and eager to make advances. It was easy to see that Bismarck was gone. France was no longer isolated and the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia was a thing of the past. "Henceforward Europe was divided into two armed camps, and entered on the path which led straight to the catastrophe of 1914. The Triple Alliance remained stronger than its rival, and so long as it could count on the sympathy of Great Britain its position was unassailable. But if Great Britain should ever be compelled to transfer her support from the older to the younger group, the diplomatic situation would be transformed, and balance of power would be tilted against the Central Powers." (1) Furthermore, though peace still existed it no longer remained with the Triple Alliance whether it would be troubled or not. "Over against the great political constellation formed by Germany,

(1). Gooch, p. 187
"Austria-Hungary and Italy now stood another equivalent com-
posed of France and Russia capable of contending and of
"conquering and it no longer depended solely on the first
"that the European equilibrium was menaced or troubled."(1)

One of the first effects of the Franc-Russian Alliance was to cause an active irritation in Great Britain. The "Russian bogey" had been for a long time very real to the minds of statesmen and such an alliance was by no means likely to allay this fear. Furthermore French views on the colonial question had been for some time in opposition to those of Great Britain and these differences were more than likely to be accentuated now that France was strong. Germany was now confirmed to the idea of "Welt-
politik" and both Great Britain and France were unwilling to be left behind. The former controlled the sea and hence had the best equipment for the "race of Empire", but France was determined to make up for the loss of the Rhine provinces outside of Europe. Africa remained the chief theatre of the conflict but the diplomatic struggle was not isolated to that continent.

The question of the New Hebrides in 1887 was settled by a mixed commission of British and French naval officers being appointed to protect the life and property of the settlers. France had conquered Tunis with Great Britain's approval though not to the satisfaction of Italy. The annexation of Burma in 1885 made Siam a buffer between British dominion on the west and French Indo-China on

(1). Debidour, p. 194.
the east; the result was a long drawn out and at one moment at least a dangerous dispute as to the respective boundaries. Waddington made proposals of settlement in 1889 and 1892 but Salisbury took little or no action and shortly after this he was succeeded in the Foreign Office by Lord Roseberry.

In 1893 a crisis arose, not from the disputed frontier, but because France had certain grievances against Siam which peaceful measures would not settle. Lord Roseberry admitted the justice of the French claim but when France enforced them in April 1893 a British ship was ordered to Bangkok to watch events. When France threatened a blockade two more ships were sent. Assurances were given that no French vessels would be sent up the Menam River but the same day two of them were ordered to proceed. Two weeks later a French ultimatum was delivered, a blockade was proclaimed and friendly vessels were given three days to leave. Lord Roseberry telegraphed that on no account must the "Linnet" (one of the British vessels) leave as it was impossible to allow British subjects to be left at the mercy of an unruly Oriental population. The latter incident happened on July 30; two days later Siam accepted the French demands and on August 3, the blockade was raised. The crisis was over, but there had been a strong possibility that the tension which was acute might have snapped under the strain. The Governments now proceeded to discuss the boundaries of the buffer between Burma and
Indo-China. France did not wish Great Britain to cross the Mekong River but her wish was not complied with. Early in 1895 Britain occupied the disputed territory and on January 15, 1896 the boundaries were finally fixed. While Salisbury was criticized as giving in too much to France in the settlement, still Anglo-French antagonism was thus ended at least in the Far East.

Rivalry in the Nile Basin far outweighed the latter two incidents in importance. There were many in England who were desirous of withdrawing from Egypt, for instance Gladstone expressed the hope that Salisbury would "take some step to relieve us from the burdensome and embarrassing occupation of Egypt." But not so, when in 1892 the Khedive appointed an Anglophobe Premier, Lord Roseberry vetoed the appointment and informed him that such changes of Ministers must be ratified by the English Government; Roseberry won and a protest followed from the French Government regarding the "high-handed proceeding". The only result was an increase of the British garrison.

On May 12, 1894 Great Britain concluded a treaty with the Congo Free State by which the Bahr-el-Ghazel district on the Upper Nile, regarded by Britain as her sphere of influence, was leased to King Leopold for life—this arrangement at once secured Belgian recognition to the British claim. In return a strip of territory for the proposed Cape to Cairo Railway was leased by Leopold to Great Britain. This was a bad piece of bargaining be-
cause the Bahr-el-Ghazel territory was not Britain's to give and the lease of the strip of territory to Britain violated a former Congo-German Treaty of 1884. Germany protested against the latter transaction and it was annulled. But by far the most serious protest came from France, over the Belgian acquisition. She argued, the Congo State was no longer neutral by signing this Treaty, the balance of power in Africa was upset, and failing cancellation of this clause, France must also take immediate steps in African occupation. Following this line of argument she formally protested to London and Brussels, declared the convention contrary to law and null, and ordered the Commander of the Upper Ubanghi to prepare for the defence and maintenance of French rights on the African continent.

Discussions took place at the French Foreign Office and Great Britain gave way, released Leopold from the Treaty and did not insist on the lease. The same day France and the Congo signed a Treaty by which the latter agreed not to occupy part of the territory leased by Great Britain and recognized French rights to the Upper Ubanghi Basin. France—now that public interest was aroused as to the possibilities of the territories between the Congo and the Nile—decided to send a mission under Colonel Monteil to reinforce French posts in the Upper Ubanghi and connect them by telegraph and river communications with the coast. The France-Belgian Treaty however obviated any action on Monteil's part and he was ordered to the Ivory Coast.
Negotiations began between Great Britain and France towards an agreement regarding their respective spheres of influence on the Upper Nile. There was no final arrangement made and it is significant that from this failure dates the race for the Upper Nile which culminated in Fashoda.

The French colonial group had roused a great deal of interest in Africa, and at the beginning of 1895 the Government was urged to prevent fresh British encroachments. Rumors of this policy led to the declaration of Sir Edward Grey, on which British policy was to rest till 1904, "Rumours have come with regard to the movements of expeditions in various parts of Africa, but we have no reason to suppose that any French expedition has instructions to enter, or the intention of entering, the Nile Valley. And I will go further and say that, after all I have explained about the claims we consider we have under past agreements, and the claims which we consider Egypt may have in the Nile valley, and adding to that the fact that those claims and the view of the Government with regard to them are fully and clearly known to the French Government, I cannot think it possible that these rumours deserve credence, because the advance of a French expedition under secret instructions right from the other side of Africa into a territory over which our claims have been known for so long would be not merely an inconsistent and unexpected act, but it must be perfectly well known to the French Government."
"that it would be an unfriendly act, and would be so viewed by England." (1)

This declaration aroused great anger and astonishment in France for the following reasons; in the first place, the Monteil mission had been diverted to the Ivory Coast many months earlier, secondly, the district from which France was warned off belonged to Turkey, not to Great Britain, and finally a threat of war accompanied a claim which was legally indefensible. At once the French Ambassador, Baron de Courcel, complained to the British Foreign Secretary, Kimberley. According to Courcel in the conversation which ensued Kimberley gave the assurance that the declaration of an Under Secretary was less solemn than by the Foreign Secretary and that it was a claim which France was free to accept or reject. Furthermore, he added, "I look forward to the end of our occupation, when it will no longer be a bone of contention. The good understanding of the two countries is worth more." A great deal of importance was attached to this conversation by the French Foreign Office and as a result a copy was shown to Kimberley who confirmed its accuracy. The principle of a French counter claim was admitted, Lord Grey was corrected and the impossibility of an English exclusive right being based on a temporary occupation was recognized.

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shape of a speech of the Foreign Minister in which he stated—though not in the same words—that France flatly refused "to recognize the new 'Monroe Doctrine' in the "valley of the Nile; and France proceeded on her way in "equatorial Africa, with the watchword 'first come, first "served' inscribed upon her banner." (1)

The Unionist Government returned to power in England in 1895. They acknowledged Grey's declaration and proceeded to form plans for the reconquest of the Sudan—no longer was there talk of evacuating Egypt. The Kruger telegram showed Germany's hostility and an effort was made to secure French assent to South African ventures. Salisbury informed the French Ambassador of the proposed British expedition to Dongola to destroy Mahdism. He asked French co-operation on condition that there be no advance beyond Dongola. The French Ambassador favored the project, so did the French Foreign Minister, but the rest of the Cabinet rejected it.

On March 16, the English Government decided on an advance to Dongola to create a diversion and save Egypt from the Dervishes, who had risen owing to Italian attempts to conquer Abyssinia. This project was bitterly attacked by Sir William Harcourt, Mr. Morley and other members of the Opposition, but without avail. In France the advance was interpreted as the beginning of the reconquest of the whole of the Sudan and the postponement of the

(1). Gooch, p. 277.
evacuation of Egypt. Accordingly, after warning Great Britain of her opposition, the French Government along with her Russian ally voted against credit for the expedition in the Caisse. Germany supported it however and though France appealed to the Mixed Tribunals and obtained a veto, the British Government found the money elsewhere and succeeded in occupying Dongola. Salisbury intimated that though the advance would not be continued, still Khartum could not be left permanently in the hands of the Dervishes.

French opposition now took a more concrete and decided form. Marchand was entrusted with an expedition to extend French influence to the Nile and anticipate the English by arriving there first. The French Government was ignoring the Grey declaration and was fully aware that it would incur British opposition. This Government (Bourgeois) fell on April 29, 1896, and Hanotaux returned to the Foreign Office. While sympathetic towards colonial ambitions the latter realized the gravity of the situation in light of the recognition by Germany Austria and Italy of Britain's action. Accordingly while not recalling Marchand, he sent orders to the Governor of the Upper Ubanghi advocating peaceful penetration. "The Marchand mission is not a military enterprise. "There is no thought of conquests. The policy which you "have pursued for two years and of which our establishment "in the Nile valley should be the crown must be strictly "followed." However in spite of these words the good
intentions of France did not satisfy.

A further source of irritation arose over the question of the annexation of Madagascar. A treaty had been signed in 1885 transferring the foreign relations of the country to French control, admitting a French resident to the capital and ceding the Bay of Diego Suarez and the surrounding territory. There was no mention of a Protectorate and France was not to interfere in internal affairs. Great Britain had consented to this situation in 1890 in return for concessions in Zanzibar, but the Government of Madagascar refused to allow France the expected influence. Such was the situation in 1894 when the French Government delivered an ultimatum demanding recognition of their influence throughout the island. These demands were only partly accepted and a war of conquest began. The capital was occupied in 1895 and the following year the rebellion was suppressed and the island annexed. The Bourgeois Cabinet said, "In consequence of the difficulties encountered in the exercise of its Protectorate, the Government of the Republic was to make a military intervention to make its rights respected and to assure its guarantees for the future." (1) Britain gave in grudgingly, but high tariffs were inaugurated and British trade was virtually suppressed, consequently Franco-British relations were further embittered.

The year 1897 marked an attempt on the part of

(1). Debidour, p. 218
France to improve her diplomatic position. In April an interview occurred between Chancellor Hohenhôle and Hanotaux, which was very cordial in its nature; furthermore the boundaries of Togoland were amicably settled in July. Franco-Italian relations were also improving. "In 1896, in consideration of certain economic concessions, Italy recognized the French position in Tunis. In 1898 the 'tariff war' terminated." (1) To add to this one of the most accomplished of French diplomats, Camille Barriere—went to Italy in 1897 as French Ambassador.

Meanwhile both Kitchener and Marchand were making their respective ways towards the Upper Nile, the one from the north, the other from the west. When the Dongola project was launched Mr. Rennell Rodd was sent to Abyssinia, by the British Government, to convince Menelek that there was no threat against his territory or independence. The mission was successful and a treaty was signed on May 14, 1897, which pledged Abyssinian neutrality during the operations against Khalifa and secured a promise from the ruler to do all in his power to prevent arms and ammunition from passing through this dominions to the Mahdists. In return the Somaliland frontier was modified in his favor.

French ambitions were also attracted to the Lower Niger. Early in 1897 the disputed claims in these territories were referred to a Joint Commission in Paris but

(1). Ewart, p. 230.
still French expeditions pushed forward. English feeling became embittered and the occasion brought forth Chamberlain's proposal for the organization of a frontier defense force whether or not the difference reached a satisfactory solution. The Commission resumed deliberations in the Autumn and the French negotiators sought to include the left bank of the Niger and asked in addition for the north and east shores of Lake Chad in return for concessions in the navigation of the Niger. However Sir Edmund Monson the British Ambassador, pointed out that a settlement such as was proposed, would lead to the opening up of a road to the Nile with results possibly in contravention to the Grey Declaration, which the existing Government still adhered to.

While there was no mention of Marchand, still by confirming the Grey Declaration, Salisbury had constituted a solemn warning. The French reply in the words of Banotaux consisted in part of the following, "The French Government cannot refrain from repeating the reservations which it has never failed to express every time that questions relating to the valley of the Nile have been brought forward. The declaration of Sir Edward Grey gave rise to an immediate protest by our representatives, and I myself, in the name of the Government made declarations to which I consider I am all the more justified in referring from the fact that they have called forth no reply from the British Government." Meanwhile the Niger negotiations
dragged on, the colonial party in Britain making threatening speeches and emphasizing the extent of British interests in these territories. Finally however, on February 18, 1898, the British delegates recognized French claims which secured the union of Senegal, the Niger and the Ivory Coast. Four months later the agreement was signed and the West African boundary question was cleared up.

There still remained the question of the Nile valley. In March, Kitchener's advance began and on the eighth of the following month the province of Berber was liberated by the battle of Atbara. By this time the Niger Convention between the two mother countries had been ratified by the French Ministry but that ratification was followed next day by the fall of the Ministry and Delcasse entered the Foreign Office. In July (10th) Marchand reached Fashoda through his arrival was not known until September.

On the second of that month, Khartum was captured and the Khalifa was utterly routed. Delcasse offered the English Ambassador his congratulations on the victory, "despite the differences about Egypt of the two Governments." He further expressed his desire that all causes of difference should be settled amicably and by frank discussion. Upon hearing of this conversation Salisbury took the attitude that all territories which were subject to the Khalifa had passed by right of conquest to the British and Egyptian Governments, "H.M. Government do not consider that this right is open to discussion but they would be prep-
"ared to deal in the manner suggested by his Excellency 
"with any territorial controversies in regard to regions 
"not affected by this assertion." Delcassé merely re­
marked that the phrase "territories subject to the Khalifa", 
was rather vague, and that he had no accurate knowledge of 
their extent. (1)

Meanwhile Kitchener had received news of the presence 
of the French flag at Fashoda and on September 10, he steam­
up south to meet Marchand. He notified the latter of the 
British victory and the approaching arrival of the British 
force. Marchand sent his congratulations and stated further, 
"I offer you my best wishes on your arrival on the Upper 
"Nile and shall be happy to welcome you at Fashoda in the 
"name of France." On the 19th, Kitchener arrived and while 
he showed himself courteous towards the French representat­
ive, still he did not hide the fact that the presence of 
the French at Fashoda was regarded as a direct violation 
of Egyptian and British rights, and he must protest again­
st the hoisting of the French flag in the Khedive's domin­
ions. He offered to convey Marchand and his followers 
north on a British gunboat, but the French General asked 
time to get new instructions from his Government.

The negotiations which followed were of great import­
ance for they marked a very tense period in Anglo-French 
diplomatic relations. They lasted until November 4, and 
during that period the British Government gave to under­
(1). Gooch, p. 289
stand that it would consent to no compromise. France must surrender and do so unconditionally. While England did not desire war, still she was ready to back her claims by armed force. The Press and public opinion in both countries became impatient and both prepared for the worst. However, France gave way and on November 4, Baron de Courcel informed Salisbury that Fashoda would be evacuated. The Prime Minister announced the end of the crisis, "There will be plenty of discussion, but a cause of dangerous controversy has disappeared, and we can only congratulate ourselves. Delcassé candidly admitted that "A conflict would have involved sacrifices disproportionate to the object." He had given way to Great Britain and resolved now, rather than to play into the hands of Germany by quarrelling with her, (Great Britain) to bring about a "bonne entente" between the two Powers.

On January 19, 1899, an Anglo-Egyptian Convention was signed fixing the status of the Sudan and establishing a joint sovereignty. The British and Egyptian flags were to be used together, the supreme military and civil command to be vested in a Governor General appointed by the Khedive with the consent of the British Government and the country governed by martial law till further notice. The characterization of the new regime by the Prime Minister was, "We hold the Sudan by two titles—first as having formed part of the possessions of Egypt, and then by the title, much older and much less complicated, which is called the right of conquest. In the first written communication to
"the French Government I was careful to base our title on "the right of conquest, because I think it is the most "useful, the most simple and the soundest of the two."

After the Fashoda negotiations the French Ambassador, Baron de Courcel, was succeeded by Paul Cambon who was destined to play a leading part in the Anglo-French reconciliation. Feeling between the two countries was beginning to take a decided turn for the better, though the final entente was not to come for four years. On March 21, 1899, Great Britain recognized France's right to expand from West Africa towards the Sahara and the Sudan while she in turn recognized Britain's right in the Nile valley though not necessarily British claims in Egypt. The easy arrival at this agreement brought forth the proposal by M. Cambon that there were other matters which might be settled in an equally friendly spirit. Salisbury however, while having confidence in Delcassé, was still suspicious of a sudden change in the French Ministry and resolved to "wait a bit". The period of waiting was to last until 1904 and during that time many events were to happen.

The ten years which had elapsed since the fall of Bismarck witnessed a great change in the diplomatic situation. The Reinsurance Treaty with Russia had lapsed and had not been renewed, whereas the Franco-Russian rapprochement was consolidated into a definite alliance. This entente was an answer to the Triple Alliance and was brought about largely by the change in control of German policy. Bismarck had been careful not to drive Russia into the arms of France,
while practically the first acts of William II had this effect. That division of Europe into two armed camps which we will see more plainly from 1905 to 1914 was now beginning. Primarily the Franco-Russian Alliance had been only intended for the preservation of peace. But in the Summer of 1899 Delcassé succeeded in getting it extended by the addition—"and maintenance of the balance of power in Europe." It was agreed at the same time, that the military conventions, which were originally only to have held good as long as the Triple Alliance existed, should remain in force for the same length of time as the diplomatic agreement. As to this Delcassé wrote that it was precisely when the alliance was dissolved that the military conventions would be necessary. "What would happen if the Triple Alliance were dissolved, if for instance the Emperor Francis Joseph suddenly disappeared and if Austria were threatened with a break up, which might perhaps be favored by others, and from which they might anyhow hope to benefit......What could make it more urgently necessary for France and Russia not only to have common aim but to be prepared to achieve it?" (1)

Great Britain had departed from her traditional policy of maintaining the balance of power by her friendliness with the Triple Alliance in 1866. During the decade 1890-1900, while it was one of English uncertainty and continual colonial friction with France, still Anglo-German (1) Montgelas,p.226.(from French Yellow Book,"L'Alliances Franco Russe" #93-95.
relations were by no means of the best and it only re­
mained for a few years to elapse till that fear of alliances,
so real to Bismarck, was to culminate in the Anglo-French
and Anglo-Russian ententes. The history of the negotiations
which preceded these events marks a period in itself and
must be treated separately in a new chapter.
Chapter 2.

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Chapter 3.

Anglo-German Relations, 1890-1903.

The year 1898 ended with France and Great Britain somewhat closer than before. M. Delcassé, the French Foreign Minister is reported to have said when he entered on his duties at the Quai d'Orsay, "I do not wish to leave here, I do not wish to leave this armchair, until I have re-established a friendly understanding with England." (1)

This avowed intention opened the way for a new orientation of French policy and began the efforts of the early years of the twentieth century for an Anglo-French entente.

Great Britain was undoubtedly at this time in a deplorably isolated position. Such phrases as the advantage of a "free hand" and "splendid isolation", to the contrary, the situation was by no means healthy. In fact as Sir Edward Grey says, it was not splendid nor was it isolation. "Great Britain finished the long drawn out South African war amid the muttering of Europe, but still in peace. A study of the European Press of the years 1901 and 1902 shows how isolated, how unpopular, how vindictively regarded was England. The Swiss Press alone showed some good feeling." (2)

Anglo-German relations were drifting from bad to worse and in order to clearly understand

(1). Stuart, p. 12
(2). Mowatt, p. 262.
the diplomatic situation, some account of these must be given. It will be necessary to go back a few years in order to show one of the leading causes of the Anglo-French Entente, the existence of a common suspicion of Germany.

In 1890 a treaty was signed between Great Britain and Germany by which the latter recognized a British Protectorate over Witu and the Somali Coast in Africa, and transferred Uganda to the British sphere of influence; agreed to a British Protectorate over Zanzibar excepting the coastal strip which had been leased to the German East African Society and recognized the basin of the Upper Nile to the borders of Egypt as within the British sphere. In return Great Britain promised to influence the Sultan to sell the coastal strip to Germany and Germany received the corridor to the Zambesi and the island of Heligoland.

The Treaty found opponents in both countries, but in England there seems to have been no thought at this time of war with Germany—France and Russia presented too great a danger. In Germany however there were more vigorous attacks, especially from the Colonial Party who believed that they had received a bad bargain. On the other hand, Caprivi, the new Chancellor, countered with the argument that, "a friendly England, the barter of worthless territory for a long strip of the coast in full sovereignty, "the acquisition of Heligoland, which England might have "given to France in a similar colonial deal," (1) was not (1). Gooch, p. 203.
a bargain to be ashamed of. While the Kaiser welcomed with unqualified satisfaction the new acquisition, he considered that a formidable fleet was essential to the power and prestige of the Empire and the possession of Heligoland by a foreign Power would of necessity obviate such German naval strength.

In March 1890 the Prince of Wales visited the Kaiser at Berlin. The latter, wearing the uniform of an English Admiral, expressed the hope that the German army and the English fleet would keep the peace of the world. In 1891 his visit to England made him a guest of the nation and here again he re-iterated his desire for peace and friendship with England and emphasized the fact of the consanguinity of the two nations as a guarantee of good feeling and essential unity of purpose. Every summer the Emperor crossed to Cowes for the regatta and members of the English Royal Family could count on a warm welcome in Berlin. Again in 1893 Wilhelm stated that, "should it ever happen that the two navies have to fight side by side against a common foe, the famous signal, 'England expects every man to do his duty', will find an echo in the patriotic heart of the German navy." Caprivi seems to have had the same sentiments. He wrote to Hatzfeldt, the Ambassador at London, "I fully agree that the aim of our policy is gradually to win England for an official adhesion to the Triple Alliance. In any case everything must be avoided which could provoke a rupture of the friendly relationship now happily
prevailing. A real and lasting estrangement would jeopardize the Triple Alliance through its effects on Italy, and indeed might force us to fall back on Russia." The same year further colonial agreements were made regarding the Cameroons and Togoland.

However in 1894 the diplomatic sky began to darken and Anglo-German relations began to lose their confidential aspect. A Franco-German treaty of that year benefitted France and aroused British annoyance at a time when Franco-British relations were anything but good. A few months later the treaty concluded between Great Britain and the Congo Free State aroused German ire. Nevertheless colonial friction at this time did not serve to sever friendship and in June the Kaiser was appointed Colonel of the First Regiment of Dragoon Guards, he was now a "member of the staff of English officers."

The opening of the Kiel Canal in 1895 brought a squadron of the English Navy to share in the festivities and here again the Emperor voiced his friendly sentiments, "We have tried to form our ideas in accordance with yours and in every way to learn from you. The history of the British Navy is as familiar to our officers as to yourselves. I am not only an Admiral of the Fleet but a grandson of the Mighty Queen. I hope you will express our heartfelt thanks to Her Majesty for her graciousness in sending you here." Meanwhile Caprivi had been replaced by Hohenlohe. He was to last for three years and during this period the Kaiser was more his own Foreign Minister than at any time.

See Chapter 2, p. 69.
87.

during his reign. "It was precisely in this period that "German policy assumed a new and dangerous orientation. "The wholesale breach with Bismarckian tradition and the "adoption of a 'forward policy' took place not on the fall "of the Great Chancellor but on the fall of his successor."(1)

The annual visit to Cowes followed a month after the Kiel opening but this time the reception in England had lost its spontaneity and good feeling. The Kaiser's manners and familiarity displeased the English Prince, but political differences had an even greater effect. German South-East African activities had produced a feeling of distrust among a part of the English public and a section of the Press displayed a coolness which bordered on hostility to the Imperial visitor. The result was a Press duel between the two countries.

A new source of discord arose over the Armenian problem on which Britain and German views disagreed. Salisbury, had proposed an abandonment of the British policy towards Turkey after the failure of the Constantinople Conference of 1876. His suggestion was dismissed, but after experiencing Turkey's attitude after the Berlin Congress and the Armenian massacres of 1894 he became definitely convinced that more radical measures should be taken in dealing with this country.

In 1895 he was appealed to by Germany for aid to Italy over the Abyssinian question. The Prime Minister re-

(1). Gooch, p.211.
plied that giving Italy the desired facilities would excite French jealousy. He was in favor of the reversion of Albania and Tripoli but Germany feared that such a proposal would involve a partition of the Turkish Empire which she refused to countenance. Salisbury asked for an interview over the Eastern question with the Kaiser when he came to Cowes. The interview was fixed for August 8, it took place and no settlement was reached, in fact the disagreement seems to have been complete. The effect of this whole discussion served to further enmity—the two parties parted with mutual distrust and ill-feeling.

The immediate cause of the estrangement was the difference between British and German attitudes towards Turkey—but it was Africa which was to strain the bonds of friendship almost to the breaking point. In 1884 President Kruger had visited Berlin and had received a welcome by Bismarck. No alliance was made though Kruger asked for one (1), since the treaty he had recently signed in London forbade alliances with foreign states without British approval. A few years later Germany had become a Great African Power and there was now a possibility of an alliance between German and Boer to resist British pressure. In 1894 two German warships were dispatched to Delagoa Bay as a demonstration against British interference with Portugal. When on January 27, 1895, the German Consul at Pretoria expressed the hope that the President was aware that Germany was a real friend,

Kruger's reply was, "Our little Republic, only crawls about among the Great Powers; but we feel that if one of them wishes to trample on us the other tries to prevent it."

The British Ambassador at Berlin complained to the German Foreign Secretary (Marschall) that Germany was fostering a spirit in the Transvaal contrary to its position in international law. The Foreign Secretary's reply was that his country's aim was to preserve her material interests which she had created for railways and the development of commercial relations with the Transvaal. For this reason German interests demanded the status quo. If Great Britain also desired to preserve it she must curb the activities of Rhodes and Jameson who were endeavoring to absorb the Transvaal in British South Africa. While the answer was that Jameson was aiming at an economic, not a political union of South Africa, Marschall replied that this too was contrary to German interests.

Throughout 1895 the two countries were openly antagonistic in South Africa. Kruger requested to be allowed to annex the territory between Swaziland and the Sea, but his request was declined on the grounds that Britain would be unable to defend her interests in that territory. Great Britain then proceeded to annex the district herself. Meanwhile the German ships lay in Delagoa Bay, Kruger protested against the action and a movement was set on foot in the Transvaal to regain the right of concluding treaties. The complaints continued and the British Government made a sharp protest at the Berlin Foreign Office through the person of
the British Ambassador, Sir Edward Malet.

The Jameson Raid called forth protests from the Berlin Foreign Office and negotiations took place between Marschall and the French Ambassador to determine what steps the two countries could take to limit England's "insatiable appetite". In the meantime the raid had become a miserable failure. The news reached Berlin January 2, and the following day brought forth the famous "Kruger telegram" of the Kaiser. "I heartily congratulate you on the fact that you and your people, without appealing to the aid of friendly powers, have succeeded by your unaided efforts in restoring peace and preserving the independence of the country against the armed bands which broke into your lands."

"I express to Your Majesty my deepest gratitude for Your Majesty's congratulations", replied Kruger, "With God's help we hope to continue to do everything possible for the existence of our Republic." "The Kaiser, the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister share the responsibility for launching this high explosive into the already ruffled waters of Anglo-German relations, and it is immaterial in whose brain the idea arose. On the following morning, Marschall sent for the Times correspondent, and explained that the telegram was a State action and that it was necessary to give England a lesson. The Kaiser was equally aware what he was doing, and steps were taken to safeguard the fleet. Before the news of Jameson's surrender arrived, he wrote a letter to the Tsar which reveals his excitement and indignation. 'The Transvaal Republic has been suddenly
"attacked in a most foul way, as it seems not without England's knowledge. I have used very severe language in London and have opened communications with Paris for comm-
on defence of our endangered interests as French and Ger-
man colonies have immediately joined hands to help the out-
raged Boers. I hope you will also kindly consider the
question, as it is one of the principles of upholding tr
"treaties. I hope all will come right, but come what may,
"I will never allow the British to stamp out the Transvaal'.
"In the light of this temperamental utterance the Leader's
"statement in his Memoirs that he disapproved the telegram
"is not convincing."(1)

Whatever may have been the general feeling in Germany over the incident, it is certain that indignation in Eng-
land was great. Of the whole question Sir Edward Grey says, "When all the facts were known many people at home
"felt indignant that an act of gross aggression should
"have been perpetrated by any British persons or organized
"on British territory; they were disgusted by the hollow
"pretext, put forward by those who defended it as necessary
"to protect women and children in Johannesburg: to every-
"body the collapse of the Raid showed that it was an act
"of folly. We could not, therefore, be surprised that the
"Raid was condemned by foreign opinion, nor could we justly
"resent that condemnation. But why should the German Em-
"peror make it his business and his alone, to appear as

(1). Gooch, p. 219.
"the friend and even the champion of President Kruger? The German Emperor's telegram to President Kruger did undoubtedly cause surprise and resentment in Britain. It passed, however, without incident, for the Raid had put Britain clearly in the wrong and President Kruger in the right, and our business was to clear up the mess as best we could by legal prosecution of the chief actors in the Raid and by parliamentary enquiry into the responsibility for it. It is not necessary to pursue the matter further, but the German Emperor's telegram, though it made no diplomatic "incident" had its effect on British minds. Suspicion grew, later on, that Germany was encouraging President Kruger in order to make trouble for Britain in South Africa and though the dramatic demonstration of the German Emperor's telegram may not have initiated this suspicion, the recollection of the telegram strengthened it in later and more dangerous years." (1)

Kruger was informed that Great Britain would at any price oppose foreign interference. The German Government realized that it had gone too far. On January 6, Marschall explained to Sir Frank Lascelles that the Kaiser had no unfriendly intentions in sending the telegram, and complained of the Press attacks. He further stated in a speech in the Reichstag on February 13 that the relations of Germany and the Transvaal were founded on the Commercial Treaty of 1885 which gave most-favored-nation treatment and secured commercial and industrial freedom to

(1). Grey, Vol. I. p. 36
German subjects. Germany had no wish to intervene in the Transvaal and did not wish a Protectorate. The Boer distrust of British policy was due not to German prompting but to the aims of certain British subjects. Relations with the British Government had always been friendly and the British Government had done its best to stop the Raid.

Despite these explanations however, the work of the Kaiser's early years was completely undone. The Anglo-German intimacy which stood a fair chance of birth owing to the existing Franco-Russian alliance now seemed certain never to see the light. The consequences of the telegram in Great Britain were to increase the British resolve to remain paramount in South Africa and to augment suspicions of Kruger who had intrigued with a foreign Power. The German Government realized that British naval control of the sea prevented them assisting the Boers and there were no more attempts to interfere in South Africa. Still the Boers continued to regard Germany as a powerful friend and many of them believed that aid would be forthcoming in any future struggle.

The question of the reconquest of the Sudan received encouragement from Berlin but the British people never forgot the challenge to their South African position and furthermore the German public was angered by the Press attacks on the action of their ruler. "The Triple Alliance itself was weakened by the shock. At the height of the crisis the German Government had vainly sounded the Powers as to co-operation and Italy accompanied her refusal with the moment-
ous declaration that in the event of Great Britain joining in a Franco-German war she would refuse to recognize the "casus foederis, since the Italian fleet would be unable to defend her coasts. Friendship with England, publicly declared Rudini, who had succeeded Crispi as Premier, was the necessary complement to the Triple Alliance." (1)

The Siberian Railway scheme caused Russia to look with covetous gaze at Port Arthur for a terminus. France naturally supported the aims of her ally but the surprising thing was the association of Germany with her two rivals. the Tsar favoured Germany taking a coaling station on Chinese soil. This was the price of German aid, and whatever may have been the advantages of a Russo-German entente in the Orient, the lasting enmity of Japan had to be reckoned with. The latter country had been admitted to the status of a Great Power in 1894 when Great Britain showed her confidence and good-will by signing a Treaty (July 16) by which she surrendered extra-territorial jurisdiction in five years and allowed Japan to frame her tariff freely, while in 1895 Britain had declined to take part in the coercion that followed the Japanese victory over China. Hence the policy pursued by Germany was anything but likely to make for friendship -- she had associated with two Powers definitely Anglophobe, in opposition to a rising Power in the Orient which enjoyed British support. The way was open for the Angle-Japanese agreement.

In 1897, as a result of the murder of two German missionaries in the province of Shantung, Germany seized Kiao-
In the negotiations with China, she secured the punishment of the offenders, financial compensation for the mission, a lease of the territory of Hai-Chau for ninety-nine years and permission to build a railway to join the proposed Chinese system. A town was built at Tsingtau, but its connection was at the mercy of Great Britain and its security depended on Japanese goodwill. While Great Britain was given assurance by the German Government that there was no desire to displease, Salisbury offered no protest but he announced that in the event of any other foreign encroachments in China, Britain would protect her own interests in that country.

Russia quickly followed the example set by Germany. The Chinese Government authorized the Russian fleet to winter in Port Arthur and the Russian answer to British inquiries was that China had offered hospitality due to the ice-bound state of Vladivostock. Japan received the same reply. Two British gunboats anchored at Port Arthur and the Russian Government warned that their presence caused a bad impression. Later the declaration was made that China had given Russia the first right of anchorage. Salisbury complied and the British boats left. The result was, Russia now secured a lease of the Port from China. As far as England was concerned, "the Russian occupation... was... a matter of serious concern in its relation to the British naval position in the Far East. The British Government negotiated with the Chinese to lease Wei-Hei-Wei as a counterpoise to the Russian move, the object no doubt
"being to have a base in the north of China, where a British naval force could be stationed to control any naval force that Russia might base upon Port Arthur. Even so, however, the relative naval position in the Far East was felt to be altered to (our) Britain's disadvantage, and there was much criticism of Lord Salisbury's Government, to which some members of that Government were no doubt sensitive."(1) "I congratulate you most heartily," wrote the Kaiser to the Tsar, "We two will make a good pair of sentinels at the entrance of the Gulf." (2) Germany had thus championed Russia against Britain's interests in the Far East and thus added further strength to the Anglo-German friction.

Two further causes of estrangement emerged in the middle 'nineties'—those of commercial rivalry—"made in Germany"—and naval rivalry. German industry was rapidly forging ahead and German goods were entering England in increasing quantities much to the discomfiture of English manufacturers. The doctrine of "Weltpolitik" was being vigorously proclaimed by many members of the Pan-German League. (3) While some of the more irresponsible demanded that Greater Germany should embrace all the Germanic peoples—German Switzerland, German Austria, Flemish Belgium, Holland and Luxemburg—the idea did not become official policy. Yet it increased the uneasiness of Europe and gave rise to the fear that Germany was an aggressive Power.

(1). Grey, Vol I. p. 37
(2). Gooch, p. 226.
(3). Miss Wertheimer in her work "The Pan-German League"—shows that this group was a decided minority.
In March 1897 a moderate shipbuilding programme was rejected much to the anger of the Kaiser. While the poor showing made by the German vessel at the celebration in honor of Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee increased Wilhelm's resolve to raise his navy to the standard of the army. Admiral Von Tirpitz was appointed head of the Admiralty and under the leadership of this strong naval man German naval plans went ahead rapidly. A few weeks later, (June 28, 1897) another change was made in the German official staff when the Foreign Minister Marschall was succeeded by Berhard von Bülow. The Kaiser told Bülow, that his task would be to conduct Germany into realms of Weltpolitik and to secure the building of a fleet. The monarch had at last secured the services of an experienced diplomatist, a brilliant debater, an accomplished Parliamentary manager, and a convinced Imperialist. "The times are past", declared the new Foreign Secretary in his first speech in the Reichstag, "When the German left the air to one of his "neighbors, the sea to another, and reserved the sky for "himself." For the twelve following years the Kaiser, Bülow and Tirpitz worked harmoniously together, and the three men must be held jointly responsible for a policy which changed the face of the world.

In 1898 Tirpitz succeeded in getting his first naval Bill passed in spite of the opposition of the Radical and Socialist parties in the Reichstag. With the passing of this Bill the German navy as a factor, in international politics came into existence. The programme called for
twelve battleships, eight armoured vessels for coast defence, ten large and twenty-three small cruisers. In addition a Navy League was founded to educate the people to a realization of the need of sea power; and in a speech at Dantzig (September 23, 1898) the Kaiser uttered the words, "Our future lies on the water".

Meanwhile the tension between Great Britain and the Dual Alliance had been growing more acute; (1) Fashoda was as yet a more grave cause of friction than any Anglo-German clash. The memory of the Kruger telegram still remained and the incident was not forgiven, but the Triple Alliance steadily supported British policy in the reconquest of the Sudan and there were no attempts to interfere in her South African policy. The clash with Russia over Fort Arthur brought forth Chamberlain's speech in which he said "He who sups with the devil must have a long spoon"—Russia had to be reckoned with in China and Afghanistan. An Anglo-Russian agreement was not possible because what Russia asked England could not give. In May 1898 the Kaiser notified the Tsar that England had asked for an alliance and asked the Russian monarch what would be his action if such an event took place. The Tsar's answer was that Germany could count on the friendship of Russia but the Kaiser must settle for himself what value to attach to the British offer. No advance was made to the British proposals as the Kaiser and his advisers considered the goodwill of Russia too important. Wilhelm wrote to Nicholas on August 18, "Since I comm-

(1) See Chapter 2, p. 73 to 79.
Communicated with you in May, England has now and then re-opened negotiations with us, but has never quite uncovered its hand.

"They are trying hard, as far as I can make out to find a continental army to fight for their interests. But I fancy they won't easily find one, at least not mine. Their newest move is to wish to gain France over from you." (1)

Whatever may have been the feeling in England at this time the English Cabinet has not made any official offer. Co-operation was still possible and the existing situation in Portugal offered a convenient field for joint action.

The finances of that country were in poor condition, the interest on German and English loans was in arrears and the German Government proposed a deal. The two countries—expecting to be approached by Portugal and wishing to keep her from turning to France—agreed to reply that they could only finance her jointly and that as security for a loan the colonies should either be pledged or handed over. In October 1898 a secret Treaty was signed which divided the colonies into spheres of influence, Southern Mozambique, Northern Angola, Madeira, the Azores and Cape Verde Islands falling to Great Britain and Southern Angola and Northern Mozambique to Germany. However Portugal's finances escaped collapse and the Treaty did not come into effect. It seems clear that Salisbury was very reluctant to make the agreement and had done so "only in deference to German insistence". (2) The consequence was in 1899 the Marquis de Soveral, the Portuguese Minister in London induced him to renew the old guarant-

(1). Gooch, p. 302.
(2). Grey, Vol. I. p. 44.
ee against attack in an exchange of communications known as the Treaty of Windsor. This pact was kept secret from Germany and in 1900 when references were made to it and German inquiries resulted, the reply was that the Anglo-German agreement was in no way infringed on.

In 1899 Cecil Rhodes visited Berlin; the problem of the Cape to Cairo Railway was very real to him, and there was a possibility of an Anglo-German agreement. An interview with the Kaiser was arranged and turned out to be very cordial. Wilhelm promised every facility for carrying the trans-African telegraph through German East Africa. The agreement was signed in the Autumn of 1899. In return for permission to carry the telegraph through German territory the Company promised not to build a railway line to the Atlantic except through German South West Africa. It was further agreed that, if, Germany could not finance a railway through German East Africa, Rhodes would undertake the task. He was delighted both with the agreement and with his host and expressed that delight in no uncertain way.
"The policy of alliance and co-operation with Germany was ".....desired and advocated by the two most convinced, energetic and influential exponents and promoters of British "Imperialism. Mr. Chamberlain's speech and Mr. Cecil Rhodes' "will are striking evidence of this."(1)

The Samoan problem provided another cause of friction between the two countries. Holstein did not have any good feelings toward Salisbury and the relations between the two men became extremely strained during the Summer of 1899. The
condominium under which Samoa had existed since 1889 had proved unworkable. Holstein hinted that the Kaiser would break off diplomatic relations if a satisfactory agreement were not reached. Salisbury refused to negotiate under such pressure. The consequence was Hatsfeldt invited Eckardstein to get in touch with Chamberlain. The former secured the approval of Berlin for his proposal to surrender German claims in Samoa in return for compensation in other parts of the colonial field. Finally an agreement was reached by which Germany ceded her rights to Samoa in return for the British Solomon Islands and a portion of the Gold Coast. Tirpitz disapproved of the pact and he was able to win the support of Bülow and the Kaiser. Before final ratification could be obtained the Boer War broke out and Germany's bargaining power was strengthened.

Meanwhile the leading Powers had gathered at the Hague to discuss the reduction of armaments. The conference of all the European Powers, the United States and Japan opened on May 18, 1899. When Russia proposed that there should be no increase of armies or military budgets for five years, the German representative explained that his country was not under a heavy burden and refused to discuss the reduction of armaments. It is significant to note that the Russian proposal was due to the fact that France and Germany had improved their artillery—Russia could not lag behind. The cost however would be great, and Russia as well as other Powers would profit by an agreement not to buy new guns. This was a severe blow for under the increasing
growth of land and sea forces the potential danger of every state to its neighbors was increased and the diplomatic tension was greatly augmented. The German fear of France on one hand and the Slav danger on the other, coupled with the doctrine of national self-sufficiency which she held to so strongly offered an excuse for her action at this time. The results of the Conference were slight, consisting of an agreement that the restriction of expenditure on armaments was desirable for the material and moral welfare of mankind. While it attempted to humanize the rules of war Great Britain refused to recognize the immunity of private property at sea. Of greater significance however was the creation of a permanent Arbitration Tribunal. The General Act of the Conference was signed by twenty-six of the twenty-eight Powers on July 29, but armaments continued to increase and two months later the Boer War broke out.

When it seemed certain that the outbreak was only a question of time, Eckardstein, suggested that public opinion in Germany, misled by the Kruger telegram and Boer propaganda, should be reoriented; so that in case of war the German people should not be swept by an orgy of sentiment into hostility to England. But when finally the Wilhelmstrasse was forced to try and change the direction of public opinion it was ... too late ... The German people had been given a violent impetus in the wrong direction, a sound policy in regard to the war had been seriously prejudiced and the excellent opportunities of exploiting the situation in favor of Germany could no
"longer be properly made use of." (1) The position of England at this time was most certainly that of isolation. France and Russia seemed hostile, Jules Hansen had journeyed to Berlin to see whether Germany would share in intervention. (2) Germany was not quite so unfriendly as she had been, but she was scarcely a friend; the United States was practising non-intervention in matters European; Japan had not yet turned towards England and Austria and Italy took no active part in the affairs of Europe. On the whole Europe took the attitude that, "the war was an attack upon a small country by aggressive British Imperialism........The war was regarded as aggression upon a small State; and sympathy with the Boers and dislike of Britain found free and even violent expression." (3)

On November 19, the Kaiser again made a visit to England and it turned out to be a complete success. Still it was much more than a personal reconciliation between Wilhelm II and Prince Edward for Bülow accompanied the Emperor and matters of state politics were discussed. There was a meeting between the Kaiser accompanied by Bülow, and Chamberlain. "On this occasion Chamberlain raised the question of an alliance, and got the distinct impression that both the Kaiser and Count Bülow were very favorable to the idea. He wrote to Eckardstein on December 1. 'I had two lengthy conversations with the Emperor which con-

(1). Eckardstein, p. 122
"firmed my previous impressions of his extraordinary ability and grasp of European politics. Count Bülow, whose acquaintance I was delighted to make also greatly impressed me. He expressed a wish that I might at some time to say something as to the mutual interests which bound the United States to a triple understanding with Germany as well as to Great Britain." (1) While this letter was written after Chamberlain's Leicester speech it really is the explanation and reasons for his remarks which consisted of the following: "There is something more which I think any far-seeing English statesman must have long desired, and that is that we should not remain permanently isolated on the continent of Europe, and I think that the moment that aspiration was formed it must have appeared evident to everybody that the natural alliance is between ourselves and the great German Empire. We have had our differences with Germany......but, at the root of things, there has always been a force which has necessarily brought us together. What, then, unites nations? Interest and sentiment. What interest have we which is contrary to the interest of Germany? I cannot conceive any point which can arise in the immediate future which would bring ourselves and the Germans into antagonism in interests......I can see many things which must be a cause of anxiety to the statesmen of Europe, but in which our interests are clearly the same as the interests of Germany and in which that under-

(1). Eckardstein, p. 130.
"Standing of which I have spoken in the case of America "might if extended to Germany, do more perhaps than any com- "bination of arms in order to preserve the peace of the "world. If the union between England and America is a "powerful factor in the cause of peace, a new Triple Alli- "ance between the Teutonic race and the two branches of the "Anglo-Saxon race will be a still more potent influence in "the future of the world. I have used the word 'alliance' "but again I desire to make it clear that to me it seems "to matter little whether you have an alliance which is "committed to paper, or whether you have an understanding "in the minds of the statesmen of the respective countries. "An understanding is perhaps better than an alliance." (1) 

Unfortunately however the speech did not have the desired effect in Germany. While public opinion in Eng- land had welcomed the Imperial visit with a sense of re- lief, the anti-English agitation in Germany had been grow- ing. "People in Berlin seemed never to reflect that Peter- "burg and Paris were only waiting for an opportunity to "come to an understanding with Great Britain over the head "of Germany and to sell their neutrality during the South "African War at as high a price as possible." (2) The situation in Germany was too much for Bülow who, though never entirely favorable towards the alliance, succumbed to popular opinion in a speech in the Reichstag. This was not without its effect upon Chamberlain who wrote to 

(1). Grey, Vol. I. p. 41 
(2). Eckardstein, p. 136.
Eckardstein, "I will say no more here about the way in which Bülow has treated me. But in any case I think we must drop all further negotiations in the question of the Alliance. Whether it will be possible to return to them after the end of the South African War that has raised so much dust—must be left for further consideration. I am really very sorry that all your hard work should seem to have been in vain... Everything was going so well, and even Lord Salisbury had become quite favorable and in entire agreement with us as to the future development of Anglo-German relations." (1) Bülow had explained his position to Eckardstein on December 16, but his explanation was in vain. (2)

Shortly after the outbreak of the Boer War the Kaiser made another urgent appeal for a strong Navy. The fleet of the 1898 programme was not considered adequate to defend colonial Germany. Tirpitz had the same view and he was concurred with by the Foreign Secretary. An event which occurred a few days later greatly strengthened this campaign. Three German merchantmen were stopped by British cruisers and searched for contraband on the east coast of Africa. The "General" and "Hertzog" were released but the "Bundesrat" was taken to Durban and sent before a Prize Court. Of this incident Eckardstein says, "There are few in all probability who realize how serious was the crisis in Anglo-German relations during the three weeks that we

(1). Eckardstein, p.151.
"were negotiating for the release of this steamer. We were "all the time within a hair's-breadth of a rupture. The "whole negotiation was from the first heavily handicapped "by a note which the German Government addressed to Lord "Salisbury; which note for sheer offensiveness is probably "unique in all the history of modern diplomacy. Lord Salis­"bury, in his reply, expressed somewhat sharply his surprise "at the document that was in all respects a departure from "diplomatic usage." (1) However Salisbury gave in, released the ship and promised not to trouble German vessels any more. It was a victory for Germany and while feeling had been very acute,—in fact an ultimatum had been seriously considered—the effects were not so grave for it gave a decided impetus to the scheme for the expansion of the German Navy.

A second Navy Bill was drawn up proposing to double the programme of 1898 and it left the provision of credits to the annual Budget. This Bill met with less opposition than the first, being opposed only by the Socialist Party. The programme was passed with little difficulty much to the delight of the Kaiser, while Bülow, though satisfied did his best to reassure foreign opinion.

Britain's isolated position gave rise to rumors of mediation of intervention on behalf of the Boers. Count Mouravieff, the Russian Foreign Minister, visited Paris and discussed the situation with the French Government and a short time after the Russian Ambassador in Berlin sent (1). Eckardstein, p. 152.
a note on behalf of the Tsar and his Foreign Minister calling on Germany to intervene in concert with Russia and France for the termination of the war. Jules Hansen had journeyed to Berlin on a similar mission. His visit was a failure, and though it was known in London—thanks to Eckardstein who had warned the Foreign Office of his intrigues—the English Cabinet took little or no notice of it. As regards the Russian proposal the German Government replied that Germany could not entertain such a scheme so long as it had to reckon with the hostility of its French neighbor. They inquired whether France and Russia would be ready to join her in a guarantee of each other's European possessions. This proposal produced the expected result, for France was by no means ready to recognize the Treaty of Frankfort. A similar inquiry came from Russia in October 1901 and it met the same fate at the hands of the German Government. Throughout this period there seems to have been a pronounced refusal of the Kaiser and Bülow to associate themselves with Boer sentiment. Eckardstein gave the English Prince definite assurance that all the leading persons in Foreign Policy in Berlin took the same attitude in Foreign Affairs as Wilhelm II; (1) while Sir Frank Lascelles, the British Ambassador, testified that the German Government never took any hostile step during the war.

In the Autumn of 1900 Kruger fled from Pretoria and was greeted with great enthusiasm in Paris. Travelling to Cologne early in December he was notified that the Kaiser would not receive him. When he proposed to go to Berlin
in hope that the Kaiser would change his mind the project was immediately vetoed. Though this action was attacked in the Reichstag, Bülow who had now become Chancellor, replied that a visit would have been of no advantage to either party. This action produced a favorable impression in Great Britain which was confirmed by the Kaiser's hurried visit to Osborne upon hearing of Queen Victoria's approaching death. The relations of the two courts became increasingly friendly thereby, but it is perhaps questionable as to how far this cordiality extended into popular feeling where commercial rivalry was acutely felt.

Meanwhile the Boxer movement had broken out in China, and the appointment of a commander of the international expedition for the relief of the Legations in Pekin provided another source of controversy. Russia desired the chief post, but Great Britain and Japan objected fearing undue strengthening of Russia's power in the Far East. The Kaiser seized the opportunity and invited Salisbury to propose a German commander. The English Prime Minister hesitated but Wilhelm did not wait and sent Field Marshall Count Waldersee to take supreme command. In addition to cooperation between England and Germany for the relief of the Legations, the two countries also joined forces to defend China against territorial or commercial encroachment from the north. They agreed on October 16, 1900, that the Yangtse Basin and all other portions of China where they could exert influence should remain open to the trade of every nation and that the integrity of China should be
maintained. There was a definite understanding to maintain the status quo against Russian aggression.

The thoughts of the English Colonial Secretary again turned towards an Anglo-German alliance. Eckardstein and Chamberlain met as guests of the Duke of Devonshire and the proposition was discussed. Chamberlain intimated that the days of a policy of "splendid isolation" were over for England. He was convinced that a combination with Germany and an association with the Triple Alliance was preferable to association with Russia and France. The Kaiser was informed of this conversation and while apparently he did not discuss an alliance himself during his stay, nevertheless the visit created "an atmosphere favorable to negotiation". (1)

Meanwhile the British Government learned that Russia was about to fortify Tientsin. Lord Lansdowne proposed a joint protest but though the Kaiser was willing the German Foreign Office declined. Japan informed Great Britain of a proposed secret agreement between Russia and China and asked for English co-operation to stiffen Chinese resistance. Here again Germany demurred on the grounds that the Yangtse Treaty had no reference to Manchuria and the difference between British and German interpretations caused some annoyance. Lord Lansdowne however was not discouraged and proposed to Eckardstein the possibility of a defensive arrangement. Eckardstein informed Holstein of the project and the latter proposed a larger scheme on March 20; if (1). Eckardstein, p. 185.
III.

If Germany were to guarantee the British Empire, Great Britain should join the Triple Alliance and bring Japan with her, the negotiations to take place in Vienna. (1) However, Berlin complicated the negotiations. The Kaiser believed it was an English scheme to use Germany against Russia. The diplomatic correspondence between the German Foreign Office and Eckardstein over the matter was very lengthy and showed clearly the distrust of Holstein for Salisbury and his conviction that until there was a change of Prime Ministers in England nothing could be accomplished. (2) The negotiations fell through and of the failure Eckardstein says, "Thus the negotiations that had begun so well ended in nothing or rather they ended in the beginning of encirclement and the end of encirclement was the beginning of war". (3).

The effects of the failure of these negotiations was to be far reaching. In January 1902, Britain and Japan concluded a Treaty to last for five years. "The two Governments recognized the independence of China and Korea; but they authorized each other to safeguard their special interests by intervention if threatened either by the aggression of another Power or by internal disturbances. If either Power, in the defense of such interests, became involved in war, the other would maintain strict neutrality. If however either were to be at war with two Powers its partner would come to its assistance." (4) Japan was thus...

(1) Eckardstein, pp. 209 (Dispatch from Holstein, March 25, 1901)
(2) Ibid. pp. 201-220.
(3) Ibid. p. 221
(4) Gooch, p. 332.
admitted to alliance on equal terms and was virtually assured that she would only have one foe in the event of war with Russia. The significance of the alliance to Great Britain rested in the fact that she no longer stood alone.

The Kaiser again visited England in June 1902 and shortly afterwards England and Germany joined forces against Venezuela. President Castro of that State showed little consideration for the nationals of the Great Powers and as both Britain and Germany had grievances, a joint blockade was agreed upon in 1903. The British Press and large sections of the people however viewed the association with profound distaste and this was not without its effect in Germany.

Another source of controversy arose over the question of the Bagdad Railway. In 1902 the Bagdad Railway Company had received a concession to build the line from Lonia to the Gulf. The final convention was signed on March 5, 1903, extending the Railway to the north and south. The concession included permission to work valuable mineral areas, to construct ports at Bagdad and Basra and to navigate the rivers in the service of the Railway. The whole concession required British goodwill to ensure its efficient benefit. Britain was invited to share in control but the invitation was decline. The Cabinet had desired the whole line to be international with equal rights over it for Germany, Great Britain and France. German proposals were not considered to offer sufficient security and therefore the scheme was rejected. This action added further to the widening of the
gulf that was beginning to open between the two Powers.

At this point the Canadian tariff question arose. (1) In 1897 Canada granted a preference of thirty three and one-third percent on English imports much to the annoyance of Germany. Salisbury suggested a new agreement allowing the colonies to make their own arrangements for inter-Imperial trade. Germany continued the most-favored-nation treatment to every part of the Empire except Canada. This agreement was renewed in 1899, 1900 and 1901. But in 1903 the German Government intimated that if Germany were discriminated against in the important colonies the most-favored-nation treatment could, in view of public opinion, hardly be prolonged. The Canadian tariff was revised imposing a surtax of ten percent on the goods of any country which discriminated against Canadian imports. A distinct possibility of German retaliation against England arose but since the British market was too valuable to lose, it was finally decided to waive retaliation measures and the controversy was allowed to subside. Nevertheless it had added to the ill feeling already steadily growing in Anglo-German relations and it helped a good deal towards the new orientation of British policy which was to lead to the Anglo-French Entente of the following year.

Anglo-German relations during the period 1890-1903 are important as showing perhaps the first and chief reason why Great Britain chose alliance with the Entente Powers (1). Schmitt, pp.152-153.
in 1904 and 1907. The feeling of animosity once engendered was easily intensified by later Anglo-German naval rivalry while the memory of the same unhappy relations—no doubt went a long way towards forming Grey's Anti-German sentiment. A detailed account of the numerous frictions during these years, the successive visits of the "caiser and such apparently irrelevant matters as the Anglo-Japanese treaty and Canadian tariff question might seem to have little bearing on the causes of the catastrophe of 1914, but it is necessary to understand these events in order to appreciate why Great Britain chose the path of the Triple Entente rather than that of the Triple Alliance. Furthermore while Great Britain was in an isolated position between the Dual Alliance on one hand and the Triple Alliance on the other, we are now prepared for an account of the new orientation of her policy and her definite linking up with one of the "armed camps" the clashes of which we are to be seen in 1905, 1908, 1912 and 1914.
Chapter 3.
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Chapter 4.

The Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian Ententes.

While Anglo-German relations were steadily drifting from bad to worse those between France and Great Britain were as steadily improving. The outcome of the Fashoda crisis had prepared the way for a new policy between the two countries, whereby they could settle their differences without resort to arms. The French attitude during the Boer War it is true provided a new and powerful irritant, for the action of Jules Hansen and the Franco-Russian negotiations were by no means unknown to England. (1) Still, the Treaty of Frankfort was not forgotten in France and it became plain to be seen that Anglo-German relations were becoming anything but friendly -thus a common rival existed and it grew increasingly evident that efforts for reconciliation were to have favorable conditions in which to develop. Thanks to the work of Sir Thomas Barclay, Paul Cambon and M. Delcassé warmer airs began to blow between the two countries and the diplomacy of the four years 1900-1904 was much more friendly than that between 1890 and 1900.

Sir Thomas Barclay," as one of the leaders of the British Chamber of Commerce in Paris urged the advantages which "the Paris Exposition gave for holding the annual meeting of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Great Britain in Paris that year (1900)." (2) The meeting was a great success

(1). See Chapter 3, p.108.
116.

and English visitors flocked to the Exhibition. The caricatures of Queen Victoria which had appeared in the French Press and which had called forth Chamberlain's Leicester speech, disappeared and though Kruger's visit was still to take place, nevertheless the seed had been sown.

With the accession of King Edward and the resignation of Salisbury a new era was inaugurated. In the Spring of 1903 the King visited Paris in an official capacity and received a reception as Tardieu says, "not indeed enthusiastic, but at first respectful and soon sympathetic. The path was open." (1) In a speech before the English Chamber of Commerce the English Monarch said, "...The days of conflict between the two countries are, I trust, happily over, and I hope that future historians in alluding to Anglo-French relations in the present century may be able to record only a friendly rivalry in the commercial and industrial domain. I hope that in the future as in the past, France and England may be regarded as the champions and the pioneers of civilization and peaceful progress......I trust that the friendship and admiration which we all feel for the French nation and their glorious traditions may in the near future develop into a sentiment of the warmest affection and attachment between the peoples of the two countries." (2) The visit terminated the estrangement which Fashoda had created.

(1). Tardieu, p. 40
(2). Stuart, p. 113.
Two months later President Loubet returned the call. While he and the King were in public giving utterance to friendly toasts and affectionate greetings, Lord Lansdowne and M. Delcassé were privately engaged in very important conversations. The "Times" said of these conferences: "M. Loubet's visit must not be regarded as an isolated phenomenon, a mere complimentary effort standing alone and liable to pass as a simple incident of the hour. It is on the contrary the logical outcome of much that has gone on before, and the crown of efforts continuously made by the statesmen on both sides to sweep away the differences between two great powers whose common task is to carry forward civilization, and to uphold the banner of constitutional liberties." (1)

The era of good feeling thus inaugurated was given an added impetus by a further event which took place on October 14, 1903. M. Cambon brought up the question of an arbitration treaty between the two countries, shortly afterwards M. Delcassé submitted a definite proposal that differences falling under the application of Article 16 of the Hague Convention for the peaceful settlement of international disputes—"differences of a juridicial order, particularly those relating to difficulties of interpretation of existing conventions providing they did not concern the vital interest or honor of either party"—should be submitted to the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The British Government (1). London "Times", July 8, 1903.
ment was willing to accept this and the Treaty of Arbitration was signed on the above date. While doubtless this treaty was worthless as a means of avoiding war had either side wished for an excuse, still it showed clearly the changed attitude of the two Powers and it was noteworthy as being the first treaty of its kind among the great European nations. As M. Paul Deschanel put it, "The recent treaty of arbitration indicates the mutual dispositions of the two countries. Thinking people of both nations are agreed that a hostile policy between the two great liberal nations, between the country of the Habeas Corpus and the country of the Declaration of the Rights of Man would be a crime against civilization." (1)

The situations in Egypt and Morocco also provided the elements of a bargain and the agreement reached between the two Governments over these spheres of influence played an important part in the reconciliation. Morocco had for some time known little of order or security and the conquest of of Algeria gave France a neighborly interest in its tranquility. In 1880 the Powers had met in Madrid and Bismarck informed the French Government that Germany had no interests in Morocco and that the German delegate would model his attitude on that of France. The practice of extending consular protection to natives was limited and all the Powers which signed obtained most-favored-nation treatment. The occupation of Tunis on the east (1). Stuart, p. 116.
and Gambia on the south made many in France desirous of incorporating the whole or part of Morocco in order to round off their West African colonies. The accession of a young and extravagant ruler in 1900 caused friction in the country which the uncertainty of the Algerian frontier augmented. On July 20, 1901, a convention was signed with the French Government associating the two Governments in measures for policing the frontier. A second Convention was signed at Algiers under which France supplied instructions for Moroccan troops to keep order on the frontier and a French bank advanced a small loan. However a revolt broke out against the Sultan and this continued throughout 1903. France could not carry on peaceful penetration without first securing the goodwill of possible competitors. In 1900, Delcassé had secured the benevolent neutrality of Italy by the recognition of her claim in Tripoli. In 1902, Spain made a similar agreement receiving in return Tangier and Fez. Great Britain was next approached.

On April 8, 1904, an agreement between the two countries was signed. Its importance to France can be seen in the declaration of M. Delcassé, "Of all the questions in which the interests of France are engaged none has an importance comparable to the Moroccan question; it is evident that from its solution depends the solidity and development of our African empire, and the future itself of our situation in the Mediterranean." (1) The declaration concerning Egypt (1). Stuart, p. 117.
and Morocco consisted of nine articles the sum and substance of which was a recognition of the paramount interests of France in Morocco by Great Britain in return for a recognition by France of the predominant interests of Great Britain in Egypt. Great Britain declared that she had no intention of altering the political status of Egypt and France undertook neither to demand any time limit to British occupation nor to interfere in any other way. In regard to the public debt a substantial change was made in giving the Egyptian Government a free hand in the disposal of its own resources so long as the payment of interest on the debt was assured. The surplus remaining was to be transferred to the Government. This concession was in no way prejudicial to the financial interests of the French and Russian investors. In addition the French schools continued to enjoy the same liberty as formerly, all rights enjoyed by the French through treaties and customs, including the privilege of engaging in the coast trade between Egyptian ports, were to be respected, liberty of commerce was guaranteed for thirty years with the privilege of renewal and finally Great Britain promised to adhere to the neutrality of the Suez Canal.

In return Britain agreed not to interfere with French action in Morocco and promised to lend assistance in "bringing about such administrative, economic, financial and military reforms as should prove necessary." (1) France declared she had no intention of altering the political status of the country and commercial liberty for thirty years was (1). Stewart, p. 118.
guaranteed. No fortifications were to be permitted on the coast opposite Gibraltar. France was to come to an understanding with Spain in regard to Morocco and to communicate this understanding to Great Britain. Finally the two Governments agreed to afford each other their diplomatic support to secure the execution of this declaration relative to Egypt and Morocco.

A second outstanding achievement was made in 1904 when the two countries settled the Newfoundland dispute. The Treaty of Utrecht (1713) had left a loophole for endless disputes and friction by giving French fishermen "the right to catch and dry fish" on part of the coast known as the French shore. France now renounced her exclusive rights and privileges on the French shore and French fishermen were put upon an equality with the British in taking fish. The surrender of the privilege was compensated by three concessions in West Africa. The frontier between Senegambia and the British colony of Gambia was so modified as to give France access to the navigable capital of French Guinea—Conakry—were ceded by Britain. Finally a modification was made in the frontier between British and French Nigeria, thus giving France a practicable route from the Niger to Lake Chad.

A third document contained a Declaration concerning Siam, Madagascar and the New Hebrides. As regards Siam, the two Powers confirmed the agreement of 1896, (1) in which they undertook to refrain from armed intervention in the (1). See Chapter 2, p.68.
basin of the Menam. All Siamese possessions on the west of this neutral zone and of the Gulf of Siam, including the Malay Peninsula were now recognized by France as being under British influence. While Great Britain recognized all Siamese territory on the east and southeast of this zone as under French influence. Great Britain abandoned the protest which had existed since 1896 against the Madagascar tariff while the "ew Hebrides question—disputes as to jurisdiction over the natives and disputes as to land titles—was referred to a commission which finally reported in February 1906.

On the whole the agreement was received with cordiality in England. Lord Lansdowne argued that the agreements, while intrinsically valuable, should nevertheless be regarded as part of a greater scheme for reconciliation between the two countries. Sir Edward Grey declared that the important part of the agreement was the spirit of goodwill upon which it reposed. While one section of the Press at least took the view that, "All friends of peace and civilization will hail with joy the Anglo-French Convention which has drawn the sponge over some of the most irritating subjects of dispute between the two nations of Europe whose desire for peaceful progress is strongest and most sincere." (1)

In France, though the prevailing note was one of approval, yet some voices were raised in opposition. The political enemies of Delcassé were very harsh but on the whole that attitude seems to have been "France surrenders nothing of importance but obtains most momentous concess-

(1). Cont orar Review Ma 04
ions", (1) or, in the words of M. Delesassé "The convention

is equally advantageous to the two nations, in that each

one of them obtains satisfaction upon the points in which

concerns them most." (2) M. Delesassé won his case and the

agreement passed in the French Parliament.

This Anglo-French agreement was preceded by a Franco-

Italian reconciliation of which account must be given. The

Treaty between Britain and France of March 21, 1899, estab-

lished a delimitation of their boundaries in Central Africa

aroused both interest and fear in Italy. (3) The trade of

Tripoli was feared to be endangered due to the cutting of

the caravan routes to Central Africa through French expan-

sion. Consequently the Italian Foreign Minister (Visconti

Venosta) asked for assurances regarding this question. Ac-

cordingly on December 14, 1900, Barrières informed him,"in

view of the friendly relations which have been established

between France and Italy, and in the belief that this ex-

planation will conduce further to improve them, that the

Convention of March 1899 left the vilayet of Tripoli out-

side the partition of influence which it sanctioned and

that France had no intention of interrupting caravan com-

"unications." (4) Venosta was satisfied and a difference

which might have been serious was thus healed by the recog-

nition of spheres of influence in other nations' possessions--

for Tripoli was a Turkish province. On April 10, 1901, an

Italian squadron visited Toulon and while, the agreement

(1) Stuart, p. 129.

(2) Ibid. p. 131.

(3) See Chapter 2.

(4) Goodh, p. 345.
over Tripoli had been kept secret this visit was direct proof to the world that Franco-Italian relations were becoming more cordial. The renewal of the Triple Alliance in 1902 raised another question. Prinetti, the Italian Foreign Minister informed Paris in June, "In the renewal of the Triple Alliance there is nothing directly or indirectly aggressive towards France, no engagement binding us in any eventuality to take part in an aggression against her, no stipulation which menaces her security and tranquility. The protocols or additional conventions to the Triple Alliance, of which there has been much talk of late, which would alter its defensive character, and would even have an aggressive character against France, do not exist."

In Germany Chancellor von Bülow regretted that a certain part of the German Press seemed uneasy over the Franco-Italian arrangement, "A husband does not take offense if his wife dances a waltz innocently with another. The essential thing is that she return to him, and she will do it if she is best off with him..... The Franco-Italian arrangement upon certain Mediterranean questions are in no way opposed to the Triple Alliance."

In June 1902 the Triple Alliance was renewed and M. Delcassé said, "The declarations made by the Italian Government have permitted us to be certain that Italy's policy through its alliances is directed neither directly or indirectly against France, in no way does it threaten us either in diplomatic form or by international military (1.) Stuart, p. 86.
protocols and in no fashion can Italy become either the in-
strument or auxiliary of an aggression against our country."(1)

At the same time there was no knowledge of the secret
article X whereby, "if France should make a move to ex-
tend her occupation protectorate, or sovereignty under any
form whatsoever, in the North African territories, and that
"in consequence thereof Italy, in order to safeguard her
"position in the Mediterranean should feel that she must
"herself undertake action in the said North African territ-
"ories, or even have recourse to extreme measures in French
"territory in Europe, the state of war which would thereby
"ensue between Italy and France would constitute ipso facto,
"on demand of Italy, and at the common charge of Germany
"and Italy the casus foederis." (2). Furthermore, there was
a provision attacked which declared that the signatory
powers would endeavor to obtain the accession of England.
Hence, while doubtless Delcasse knew nothing of the secret
treaties, his plan for an Anglo-French rapprochement was
perhaps wiser than he was aware of, for with England sup-
porting France, Italy would find it contrary to her interests
to oppose the sister Latin country and there was a distinct
possibility of an Italian secession from the Triple Alliance.
Nevertheless, in an exchange of letters of November 1, 1902,
each Government undertook to maintain neutrality not only
in the case of direct aggression but if the other, "in de-
fense of its honor or security," should be compelled to
take the initiative of a declaration of war. Each assured

(1). Stuart, p. 88.
the other that no military obligation in disagreement with the declaration existed or would be contracted in the future. The agreement was secret, but two years later President Loubet visited Victor Emmanuel and Europe now had a definite announcement of the termination of the feud between the two Latin Powers.

Having received the approbation of Great Britain on the Morocco question, and feeling more secure of the Italian attitude, France now proceeded to her task of reform. The consequence was a movement towards "peaceful penetration" was put on foot. The French Government drew up a scheme of reforms at the close of 1904, to be presented to the Sultan. France was to help secure a strong Morocco by aiding in the training of police. Proposals were made for new roads and telegraphs and a State Bank. The Sultan was agreeable to most of the reforms but suggested discussion over others. However before the discussions were concluded a third party appeared upon the scene.

Germany had at first been friendly towards the Anglo-French Treaty. Delcassé had instructed the French Ambassador to inform the Wilhelmstrasse that Lord Lansdowne and he had been concerned only with the interests of their own countries without detriment to those of any other Power. The official German comment was favorable and the French Ambassador reported that the principal organs recognized that German commercial interests had nothing to fear. "We have no cause to imagine that the Treaty has a point against any other Power," echoed the Chancellor.
"It seems to be an attempt to remove a number of differences by peaceful methods. We have nothing, from the standpoint of German interests to object to in that. As to Morocco, the kernel of the treaty, we are interested in the economic aspect. We have commercial interests, which we must and shall protect. We have, however no ground to fear that they will be overlooked or infringed." (1) However the Pan German party in their annual Congress on June 3 pronounced Germany to be humiliated and demanded the Atlantic coast, the Kaiser nevertheless informed King Edward on his visit to Kiel that Morocco had never interested him. (2)

But on the dispatch of the French envoy to Fez with the programme of reforms, Berlin changed its attitude. The objection was raised that Germany had been "systematically kept aloof", and she considered herself in no way bound by the Anglo-French Treaty. Holstein suggested that the Kaiser should visit Tangier and Germany demanded commercial equality and the independence of the Sultan. German papers pointed out that the French negotiations at Fez were not consistent with the avowed policy of maintaining the status quo. Bülow explained that in view of Germany's economic interests it was to her advantage to keep the open door. The Kaiser wrote to President Roosevelt asking his assistance against any nation which sought exclusive control of the North African state.

(1). Gooch, p. 350.
(2). Eckardstein, p. 126.
Roosevelt's reply was an expression of friendliness towards Germany but a refusal to interfere due to the paucity of America's interests.

On March 31 the Kaiser who had yielded to Bülow's desire (1) landed at Tangier and thus addressed the German Colony, "I am happy to salute the devoted pioneers of German industry and commerce who aid me in my task of maintaining the interests of the Fatherland in a free country. The Empire has great and growing interests in Morocco. Commerce can only progress if all the Powers are considered to have equal rights under the sovereignty of the Sultan and respect the independence of the country. My visit is the recognition of this independence." (2) The result of this and a subsequent speech to the Sultan's uncle in which Wilhelm expressed his desire for Moroccan independence, was profound in France. The French Press spoke of making a second Tunis and Germany believed that Morocco would be taken over before her eyes unless she interfered. Had she known all, these fears were well founded for the existence of secret treaties over the Moroccan and Egyptian questions between England and France provided for just such an eventuality.

A treaty had been signed by Lord Lansdowne and Paul Cambon on April 8, 1904 at the same time as the published documents. The provisions were—"if either Government found itself compelled by the force of circumstances to modify (1). Kaiser’s Memoirs, pp. 107-108 (2). Gooch, p. 352."
its policy in regard to Egypt or Morocco, the provisions regarding commercial liberty, freedom of the Suez Canal and prohibitions of fortifications on the Straits of Gibraltar were to remain. Each Government promised not to oppose the other if it desired to abolish the Capitulations. The third article contained the important point in the agreement. The Mediterranean coast from Melilla to the Subu River should come within the Spanish sphere of influence and be administered by her whenever the Sultan ceased to exercise authority over it. Spain pledged herself to commercial liberty and to abstain from fortifying the Straits. In September 1904, Spain agreed to the Anglo-French declaration and a similar Convention was signed which contemplated partition. These two treaties were not published till 1911 but their provisions were communicated to Petrograd. Germany was thus in a position where she had to act or she would find Morocco closed to her commerce. England and France had guaranteed the status quo and then at the same time made provisions for what they would do when they decided to change it.

The great error was that Delcassé had not procured Germany's assent beforehand. Italian goodwill had been bought by recognition of her claims to Tripoli. Great Britain was placated in Egypt. Whereas, "by incredible "blindness," wrote Rene Millet, "the government took "precautions with everybody except the only one of its "neighbors whom it had serious cause to fear." (1) Hoo-"(1). Gooch, p. 354.
ever the Tangier visit can be no more easily excused for, as Mr. Gooch says, "Its inevitable result was to turn "a limited obligation into a general defensive understanding. It was promptly announced that a British squadron "would visit Brest in July, that a French squadron would "return the visit at Portsmouth and that Kind Edward would "visit Paris in May on his way to join the Queen at Mar-
"Seilles." (1)

After the Tangier demonstration the Kaiser delivered a series of speeches in which he hoped for peace and at the same time counselled unity of the country should it be necessary for an intervention in world politics to take place. The outcome was a circular dispatch from the German Chancellor inviting the signatories of the Treaty of Madrid to a Conference.

The French envoy had been at Fez since February and in April he had so far succeeded in his negotiations with the Sultan as to be able to report that the latter consented to his troops being organized on French models. But a month later a German envoy arrived and the French proposals were rejected. The Sultan intimated that he could only consent to reforms if ratified by an International Conference of the Powers. Great Britain and Russia supported Delcasse and Austria gave her assurance that she would side with the majority--the result was the French Foreign Minister held out. M. Rouvier called a

(1). Gooch, p. 355.
meeting of the Council on June 6th determine French policy. In the session which followed Delcasse urged that France refused to accept the proposal of a Conference. "He showed that Germany's claims that she had not been informed were false; that to find in the text of the Madrid Convention, which merely related to the status of the European Consulates in Morocco the right to submit the Shereefian Empire to a European condominium was a most palpable pretext—finally that Russia, England, Italy, Spain and the United States declared the Conference useless and unnecessary—why then should France accept? The whole proposition was bound to fall through. If France did accept the Conference called by the Sultan at Germany's behest, it would give Germany the right to take part in the affairs of North Africa and henceforth France would be at the mercy of her bluster and caprice." (1) He said, "If you give in today, you will be obliged to give in tomorrow; you will be obliged to give in always. And you do not know, if always, as today you will have with you nearly the unanimous accord of the world." (2) He assured them, of certain assurances which had come to him from the French (our) Ambassador at London from which it resulted that the English Government was ready to consider such an undertaking as to guarantee the common interests of the two nations if they were menaced." (3) The President replied that the acceptance of the British offer would mean war and that the Conference must be held. The opinion

(1). Stuart, p. 189
(2). Debidour, Vol.II. p. 23.
of the Council was made up, they supported the Premier and the Foreign Minister was forced to resign. "Thus ended by "a new humiliation of the Republic the first phase of the "diplomatic campaign undertaken by Germany against French "(our) Moroccan policy." (1)

Delcassé seems to have over-estimated the British offer. He had asked for a promise of armed support but failed to get it. True the "Times" declared in this regard, "With "that statement we have no fault to find. We do not at all "doubt that in such a contingency the English Government "would have supported France with the hearty approval of "the nation." And Lord Lansdowne explained to the French and German Ambassadors, "that public opinion which saw in "the 'theatrical' Tangier journey an unfriendly act against "Great Britain as well as France, could not be expected to "remain indifferent, and might demand intercession if France were attacked." (2) However there seems to have been no direct official alliance—a warning against aggression was very different from a solemn undertaking to engage in hostilities.

M. Rouvier, the Prime Minister, took over the Foreign Office and on June 11 he informed the German Ambassador that France must first know how Germany regarded reforms before a Conference could be held. The German Ambassador's reply was "We insist on the Conference. If it does not "take place, the status quo remains and you must know that

(1). Debidour, Vol II. p. 24
(2). Gooch, p. 357.
"we are behind Morocco." (1) Bülow intimated that Germany could only discuss the programme of reforms when France accepted the Conference. The reorganization of the army and police would be by mandate. Financial reform would be international and the Bank of Morocco supplied and controlled by the Powers. Rouvier's reply was that France had not tried to secure control of the internal or external affairs of Morocco. Further he thought a conference dangerous without previous agreement and useless with it, but he did not definitely decline. Apparently declining would have been dangerous, for in a conversation with Bihourd, the French Ambassador to Berlin, Bülow emphasized the necessity not to let this question, "mauvaise, tres mauvaise," drag on and not to linger on the road, "bord de precipices et meme d'abimes." (2) Furthermore that if France accepted the Conference, German diplomacy would adopt an attitude satisfactory to the French. This conversation was followed by a note in which Germany rejected the French proposals regarding the army and finance since these would be in the interests of France rather than the other Powers. Such a situation was incompatible with the Treaty of Madrid which gave every signatory Power most-favoured-nation treatment.

Meanwhile the Kaiser was endeavoring to get President Roosevelt to join in the appeal and his letter on that occasion is interesting as showing his distrust of the

(2). Ibid. Vol.II. p. 27.
English attitude over the crisis. "Rouvier who has shown
"himself distinctly friendly to Germany", he wrote on June
11,"has indirectly informed the German Chargé that England
"has made a formal offer to France to enter into an offensive
"and defensive alliance with England which would be direct-
"ed against Germany. At present the leading statesmen of
"France are opposed to such an alliance, because they still
"hope to reach a satisfactory agreement with Germany. Ind-
"directly Germany has been given to understand that the
"French Government desire to give her a portion of Morocco
"under the name of a sphere of interest, France taking the
"greater part for herself; but Germany cannot accept. My
"people are sure England would now back France by arms in
"a war against Germany; not on account of Morocco but of
"German policy in the Far East. The British Government has
"asked for time to consider the question of a Conference.
"I feel sure you could now give a hint in London and Paris
"that you would consider a Conference a most satisfactory
"means to bring the Moroccan question to a peaceful solu-
"tion. If not inclined your influence could prevent England
"joining in a Franco-German war started by the aggressive
"policy of France." (1) Roosevelt did intervene and won
French approval of the Conference.

On July 8, France agreed to the Conference while the
British Government also consented on July 12, and on the
first of the following month the French Premier handed the
German Ambassador a programme of reforms relating to the
(1). Gooch, pp. 359-360.
Police, finance and public works which Hadolin accepted on the 26th. The accord was signed a month later and contained the following provisions, the organization of police except on the Algerian frontier was to be international; a State bank was to supply credits for police, troops and public works; Morocco was not to alienate any public service to the profit of particular interests; the conference was to be held at Algerias and both French and German missions were to leave Fez.

Campbell-Bannerman formed a Liberal Ministry in England on December 4, and in a speech of the 22nd. of that month the Prime Minister reaffirmed his adhesion to the policy of the "Entente Cordiale" and at the same time intimated that the general foreign policy would be opposed to aggression and adventure and would be animated by a desire to be on the best terms with all nationalities. Yet the French Embassy was worried because Sir Edward Grey had not renewed the assurances given by Lord Lansdowne. On January 10, 1906, M. Cambon (the French Ambassador) asked Grey what would be Great Britain's attitude in the event of the discussions terminating in a rupture between France and Germany. Furthermore Cambon, "thought it advisable that unofficial communications between the British (our) Admiralty and War Office and the French Naval and Military Attachés should take place as to what action might advantageously be taken in case the two countries found themselves in alliance in such a war." (1)

Grey's reply is best given in his own speech of August 3, 1914. "I said, in my opinion, if war was forced upon France then on the question of Morocco—a question which had just been the subject of agreement between this country and France, an agreement exceedingly popular on both sides—"That if out of that agreement war was forced on France at that time, in my view public opinion in this country would have rallied to the material support of France. I gave no promise, but I expressed that opinion during the crisis, as far as I remember almost in the same words to the French Ambassador and the German Ambassador at the time. I made no promise, and I used no threats; but I expressed that opinion. That position was accepted by the French Government but they said to me at the time—and I think very reasonably, 'If you think it possible that the public opinion of Great Britain might, should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in giving to France the armed support, which you cannot promise in advance you will not be able to give that support, even if you wish to give it, when the time comes, unless some conversations have already taken place between naval and military experts.' There was force in that, I agreed to it, and authorized those conversations to take place, but on the distinct understanding that nothing which passed between military or naval experts should bind either Government or restrict in any way their freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they would give that support when the time arose.......I had to take
"the responsibility of doing that without the Cabinet."

"It could not be summoned. An answer had to be given. I consulted Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime Minister; I consulted, I remember Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of State for War, and the Present Prime Minister, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer. That was the most I could do, and they authorized that on the distinct understanding that it left the hands of the Government free whenever the crisis arose." (1)

The action of Sir Edward Grey at that time presents one of the chief weaknesses of his whole policy. In the first place while he consistently asserted that England was in no way bound to France, he himself authorized the naval and military conversations and it seems strange how he could have thought that they would be carried on without binding the two countries. In his same speech of August 3, 1914, he maintained on one hand that Britain was free to decide for peace, or war, and on the other hand he told of these negotiations which he believed laid Britain under an obligation of honor to stand by France. In the second place he called no Cabinet, giving as his excuse that "it could not be summoned". We know now that it was not impossible to summon the Cabinet. Several Cabinet Ministers were in London at the time while those consulted were at a distance. Even when the Cabinet met after the Election those matters were not brought to their knowledge for many a

day—Lord Loreburn never heard of them while he remained in the Government. Parliament knew nothing of them until August 3, 1914.

The Conference of Algeciras opened on January 16, 1906, with twelve States in addition to Morocco attending. The French demand for the police mandate and her offer to share it with Spain were rejected by Germany who proposed that the Sultan should select officers from the minor Powers and later that she should choose from other nations. France and Spain rejected these suggestions and at the same time discussions on the State bank reached a similar deadlock. However Roosevelt, who promised France fair play, intervened with the Kaiser. He supported a Franco-Spanish mandate for the police. Austria came forward with a proposal that France should organize the police in four ports, Spain in three and Switzerland and Holland in one. Roosevelt disapproved of this as suggesting partition, and a second Austrian proposal of a Franco-Spanish mandate under a Swiss-Inspector-General was at last accepted. The Act of Algeciras was finally signed on April 7.

The provisions of the Act were:—from 2,000 to 2,500 police were to be distributed among the eight ports with forty to sixty Spanish and French officers to act as instructors under the supervision of the Swiss Inspector-General resident at Tangier. The State Bank of Morocco with a board of directors and a High Commissioner appointed by the Moroccan Government and four censors nominated by the Banks of England, Germany, France and Spain who were
to make an annual report, had the exclusive privilege of issuing bank-notes and was to act as disbursing Treasurer for the Empire. The country was to be open to foreign capital. On the Algerian frontier, France and Morocco were to jointly carry out the regulations concerning Customs and the traffic in arms, while Spain and Morocco were to do the same in the Riff country. These were the most important provisions and were those which dealt with the France-German points of conflict.

On the whole France had been backed by Russia, Great Britain and Spain, while the United States continually mediated on her behalf. Germany received little support. Austria did not wish a French quarrel and Italy was bound by her secret arrangement respecting Morocco and Tripoli. France was successful regarding the police mandate, while Germany had established her contention that the Morocco problem was an international concern. Both Governments expressed their satisfaction, though in Germany many expressed the opinion of Herr Basserman, a Liberal member of the Reichstag who said, "Today the Triple Alliance has no further practical utility. The Italian press and population lean more and more towards France. Austria had been too much praised for this role of 'brilliant second' which she herself declined. The Franco-Russian Alliance remains intact, and the disposition of France towards us is less friendly than formerly. We live at an epoch of ali-

"ancess between other nations." (1)

The significant point however is the effect on Anglo-French relations and these can be given perhaps best in the words of Grey, "The net result of all the German effort, first in 1905, when Lansdowne, the author of the "Entente, was still in office, and then in 1906, when a "Liberal Government had succeeded, was to make the Entente "stronger. We had been forced to contemplate the contingency that the Entente might have to fight for its life; "we had, without making any alliance or new obligation, "concerted measures to meet that contingency, if it were "suddenly thrust upon us: and diplomatically the French "trusted us more and not less, after the Algeciras Con- "ference than they had done before it." (2) Great Britain had now definitely established good relations with one member of the Dual Alliance, it is important to next consider the relations with the other member, Russia.

During the time when British and French statesmen were working towards an understanding, Anglo-Russian antagonism remained. The Anglo-German treaty of 1900 and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 enabled Russian advances in the Far East to be controlled. "But," as Grey says, "this arrangement applied only to the Far East. It "left other causes of friction untouched, and if the Russian proceedings in the Far East had been the most

(1). Stuart, p. 223.
recent cause of trouble with Russia, they were not the
most dangerous, the most long-standing, or the most likely
to recur. Russian advances towards the Indian frontier
were the most sensitive and dangerous point. If we were
to get the old, bad rut in which we had so often come to
the verge of war with Russia, we had to work for a definite agreement. Russia was the ally of France, we could
not pursue at one and at the same time a policy of agreement
with France and a policy of counter alliances against Russia. Nor was there any third country with interests
in the region of the Indian frontier with whom we could
concert a policy to control Russian advance. An agreement
with Russia was the natural complement of the agreement
with France; it was also the only practical alternative
to the old policy of drift, with its continual complaints,
bickerings and dangerous friction." (l)

Salisbury had drawn up a plan for adjusting relations throughout Asia and it had been rejected at Petrograd--Persia was the danger point. The inefficiency of Persian Governments, the state of their finances and internal disorders laid the country open to foreign interference and in the closing years of the nineteenth century the rivalry of Britain and Russia at Teheran was unconcealed. While Russian influence at Teheran was not necessarily pressed with a deliberate design of advance to the Indian frontier still each new extension of influence increased British
Still more important to British interests in India was the maintenance of her position in the Persian Gulf, where the East Indian Company had a factory and a Political Agent. Great Britain had a well established position in this locality, yet Russian agents flocked there in large numbers. The result was, on May 15, 1903, Lord Lansdowne made a momentous declaration of British policy, "Firstly, we should protect and promote British trade in the Gulf. Secondly, we should not exclude the legitimate trade of others. Thirdly, we should regard the establishment of a naval base or a fortified port in the Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to British interests, and we should certainly resist it by all the means at our disposal." (1) This warning was followed in November by a naval demonstration in the Gulf and the two acts gave emphatic testimony that Great Britain would brook no interference to her position.

Persia and northern China were not the only fields of Anglo-Russian rivalry however--Tibet formed another source of disagreement. In September, 1900, the Tsar received at Petrograd a Siberian Buddhist who had travelled through Tibet and taught that country to regard Russia as a protector, and Russia to regard Tibet as a pawn in the anti-British game. The Lama persisted in refusing to communicate with the Indian Government and on January 18, 1903, the latter proposed an expedition to Lhasa. The Russian (1). Gooch, p. 371
Ambassador protested and Lord Lansdowne replied that there were no designs on the independence of Persia.

At the end of 1904 the Youngusband Mission crossed the frontier and marched into Lhasa. A month later Tibet signed a treaty undertaking "to erect boundary pillars, to open marts at three places, to maintain an agent at each in order to forward communications, to keep open the roads leading to them, and to raze all forts on the routes to the capital." (1) Furthermore no portion of Tibetan territory should be ceded, sold or leased to any foreign Power; no such Power should be permitted to intervene in Tibetan affairs; no foreign representatives should be admitted; no concessions should be granted unless equivalent concessions were granted to Great Britain and no Tibetan revenues should be pledged to any foreign Power or subject to any such Power. The Treaty was signed on September 7, and on the same day a separate Agreement was signed allowing a British trade agent to visit Lhasa to discuss trade affairs. This latter agreement was repudiated by the British Government, since the Cabinet had assured the Russian Government that no lengthy occupation of territory and no intervention in internal affairs was sought. British demands on questions of boundary, trade and communication had been accepted and the risk of Tibet having political relations with other States was obviated.

At the same time fear was expressed regarding Russia's progress towards Afghanistan. It was thought that she intended building strategic railways towards the frontier—this would mean the maintenance of a much larger army on the Indian frontier and would have been a direct blow at that colony.

The outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war proved a further cause of friction. France was not compelled to join her ally since the Dual Alliance did not extend to the Far East. British opinion favored Japan but the Cabinet observed strict neutrality. Sir Charles Hardinge was sent to Petrograd as British Ambassador with instructions to improve relations and King Edward remarked to Izvolsky the Russian Minister, that the newly signed Anglo-French Treaty encouraged hope of a similar understanding with Russia. Izvolsky deplored the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as an open encouragement to Japan and the Tsar was bitterly hostile.

Trouble arose over the stopping of British and German vessels in the Red Sea when two cruisers of the Volunteer fleet, after passing through the Straits under a commercial flag, assumed the character of warships. The British Ambassador lodged a protest demanding the release of the British ship, the reply was favorable, the ship was not to go to a prize court and assurance was given against a recurrence of such action, but its cargo was still to be examined at a neutral port. The result was the Mediterran-
An squadron was sent to Alexandria. Another British ship was sunk but shortly after an agreement was reached and the Russian Government gave orders for such practice to stop and requested that British cruisers be sent to trans-act these orders. They were successful in their mission and the result was, for the remainder of the war no British vessel was interfered with.

During the later part of October however another event occurred which greatly increased Anglo-Russian friction. The Gamecock fleet of steam trawlers from Hull was on the Dogger Bank on the night of the 21st. and a Russian Vessel, mistaking a fishing signal for that of an enemy warship, fired on the fleet. The result was intense indignation in England—"there was a moment of great and natural "excitement in public opinion." (1) However the two Governments kept calm, the Tsar sent a message referring to the incident as a regrettable misunderstanding and promising compensation to the sufferers. A court of inquiry by an International Commission was promised and Russia would issue instructions to prevent a recurrence of the affair. Delcasse mediated and by February 25, 1905, the situation was cleared up.

The British Government during this period seems to have been unaware of the actions of the Cæsar. He encouraged the Tsar to believe that Berlin was openly sympathetic to Russian aims and on July 28 a commercial treaty was (1). Grey, Vol. 1, p. 53.
signed between the two countries. About the middle of the next month Lord Lansdowne warned the German Ambassador that in the event of Japan becoming involved in war with Germany owing to breaches of neutrality on the part of the latter country, Great Britain would intervene. The Kaiser telegraphed on October 27, "For some time the English Press has "been threatening Germany that she must on no account allow "coals to be sent to the Baltic fleet on its way out. It "is not impossible that the Japanese and British Governments "may launch joint protests against our coaling your ships, "coupled with a summons to stop. The result of such a "threat of war would be the inability of your fleet to pro­"ceed for want of fuel. This new danger would have to be "faced by Russia and Germany together, who would both have "to remind your ally France of her obligations. It is out "of the question that France would try to shirk her duty. "Though Delcasse is Anglophil and would be enraged, he "would be wise enough to understand that the British fleet "is utterly unable to save Paris. In this way a powerful "combination of the three Continental Powers would be form­"ed, and the Anglo-Saxon group would think twice before "attacking it. Before acting you ought not to forget to "order new ships. They will be excellent persuaders dur­"ing peace negotiations. Our private firms would be most "glad to receive contracts." (1) The Tsar expressed his willingness and asked for the outlines of such a treaty. (1). Amer. Hist. Rev. October, 1918, p. 59.
The Kaiser replied, "I have at once communicated with the "Chancellor and we have secretly drawn up the three articles "of the Treaty you wished. Be it as you say, Let us stand "together. Of course the alliance would be purely defensive "against European aggressor or aggressors in the form of a "mutual fire insurance. It is very essential that America "should not feel threatened by our agreement. As for "France, we both know that the Radicals and the anti-Christ-
ian parties, which for the moment are the stronger ones, "incline towards England, but are opposed to war, because a "victorious general would mean certain destruction to this "Republic of miserable civilians. The certainty that France "means to remain neutral and even to lend her diplomatic "support to England gives English policy its present unwont-
ed brutal assurance. This unheard of state of things will "change for the better as soon as France is forced to declare "herself for Petersburg or London. If you and I stand shoul-
der to shoulder, France must openly join us. This will "put an end to made up grievances about so-called breaches "of neutrality. This consummation once reached, I expect "to be able to maintain peace, and you will be left a free "hand to deal with Japan. Of course before we can approach "France that tiresome worth Sea incident, which I am glad "you have referred to the Hague Tribunal must be closed. "I enclose the draft of the Treaty. May it meet with your "approval. Nobody knows anything about it, not even my "
"Foreign Office. The work was done by me and Bülow person-"ally." (1)

The proposed Treaty contained the provisions, if one of the allies were attacked by a European Power, the other would help and the two in case of need would remind France of her obligations under the Franco-Russian agreement. No separate peace was to be concluded. The promise of help included the case where acts, such as the delivery of coal to a belligerent should give rise after the war to complaints by a third Power as to pretended violations of the rights of neutrals. (2) The Tsar proposed an article binding Germany to defend the conquests which Russia expected from the war, but this was rejected as likely to make other Powers think the alliance was formed for annexation purposes. Instead Wilhelm suggested a Russian military demonstration on the Perso-Afghan frontier in order to keep British military forces occupied. Nicholas wished to show the draft to France but the Kaiser rejected this proposal on the grounds that it would be better for Russia and Germany to sign it first, then France would bring pressure to bear upon England to keep the peace. Otherwise France would inform England of the proposal and the outcome would be an attack on Germany by England and Japan. (3)

On December 3, a German ship was stopped under the Foreign Enlistment Act for coaling at Cardiff because its

(2). Ibid. Oct. 1918, p. 68
cargo was believed to be destined for the Russian fleet. This brought forth further pressure from the Kaiser; four days later he wrote, "It is far from my intention to hurry you in your answer about our treaty; but you will, I am sure, be fully alive to the fact that I must now have absolutely positive guarantees whether you intend leaving me unaided in case England and Japan should declare war against me on account of the coaling of the Russian fleet. Should you be unable to guarantee me that in such a war you will loyally fight shoulder to shoulder with me, then I regret I must immediately forbid German steamers to continue to coal your fleet." (1) Accordingly on December 11, an agreement was signed whereby Russia promised to support Germany and Germany to coal the Russian fleet.

After the fall of Port Arthur and the Japanese victory of Tsushima, President Roosevelt, invited both Powers to meet and settle terms of peace. Both agreed and the Treaty was signed on September 11, 1905. The British Government did not press Japan to make peace. On August 12, a new Anglo-Japanese Agreement had been signed to extend for ten years and by which the scope of the agreement was extended to embrace India and committed each of the two contracting parties to come to the assistance of the other if attacked by a single Power. Russia regarded this Treaty as directed against her and considered it as justification for the Russo-German pact which had been signed the previous July.

(1). Gooch, p. 383.
The two Emperors had met at Björko and on July 24 signed the Treaty which contained the provisions—if any European State should attack either Power the other would aid with all its forces. Neither would conclude a separate peace. It was to come into force on the conclusion of peace with Japan and might be cancelled at a year's notice and Russia was to make the terms known to France and invite her signature as an ally. To the Kaiser this seemed a great triumph. He saw in it the fulfillment of his dream of a Continental combine under German leadership to keep England from assuming the European hegemony.

The Tsar seems to have been somewhat uneasy over the Agreement and informed his Foreign Minister Lamsdorff who was intensely surprised. Witte, at first favorable, after seeing the exact text, exclaimed to Lamsdorff, "Does not "His Majesty know that we have a treaty with France?" Lamsdorff became convinced of the impropriety of the pact considering the existence of the Franco-Russian Alliance. However the Kaiser re-assured them that there was no confliction with the latter and in any event France had neglected Russia during the Japanese war whereas Germany had helped in every way without infringing the laws of neutrality.

The Russian Ambassador at Paris sounded the French Government and received the reply that France would never join a German league. Witte wrote to Berlin that the pact was not binding and later, after he was made Prime Minister the Tsar sent a letter to the Kaiser and the Russian Ambassador
was instructed to add that it must remain inoperative until Russia, Germany and France could agree. The Treaty was definitely repudiated and left the way open for a new orientation of Russian policy.

The Tsar began discussions with the British Ambassador, Sir Charles Hardinge, over the questions at issue between Great Britain and Russia, and Sir Edward Grey urged both Governments to encourage mutual confidence. When at the time of the Conference of Algeciras Turkey challenged British occupation of Egypt, the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople informed Turkey that the Russian Government supported the British claims. Furthermore British opinion had sympathized with the reform movement of 1905 and the Duma of 1906 was anticipated with great satisfaction. Witte found the necessity of raising a loan to tide over the financial crisis of the Japanese war very pressing and he turned to France. His success was so great that the Government was enabled to weather the hardships of the period. The German Government retaliating for the failure of the Björke pact forbade participation but British finance for the first time since the Crimean war entered Russia. The more Liberal Press in both France and England cautioned against new loans on the ground that the Government having secured a large sum would try to terrorize the Duma. The institution of the Duma however made even British Liberals more sympathetic and representatives of this body visited London to take part in a gathering of international Parliamentary Repres-
Campbell-Bannerman was to give an address to the gathering but on the morning of the speech he was confronted with the news that the Tsar had suspended the Duma. This called forth from the English Prime Minister the expression, "La Douma est morte; vive la Douma."

The discussions between the two Governments proceeded and were made easier by the substitution of Izvolsky as Foreign Minister he being a statesman already convinced of the necessity of a Triple Entente. On February 1, 1907, a session of Russian Ministers was held to discuss the question of Persia. Hitherto the only solution of this question had been that Persia must fall under Russian influence, and that she must build a trans-Persian railway to the Gulf. This ran counter to English policy and it became increasingly felt that everything must be avoided which could lead to such conflict. The best method was to delimit spheres of influence. The negotiations continued so favorably that on August 31, 1905, Sir Arthur Nicolson and Izvolsky signed a Convention at Petrograd. "The cardinal British object in these negotiations was to secure......forever, as far as a treaty could....from further Russian advances in the direction of the Indian frontier. Russia was to cease threatening and annoying British interests concerned with India. This had been formidable diplomatic weapon in her hands. She was now, once and for all, to give it up. The gain to Britain was great. She was freed from an anxiety that had often preoccupied British Governments; a frequent
"source of friction and a possible cause of war was removed; "the prospect of peace was made more secure." (1) The first agreement concerned Persia. The two Governments engaged to respect the independence of that country and since they both desired peace and order and equal advantages for the trade and industry of all other nations, agreed on the terms; the British Government engaged not to seek concessions beyond a line from Lasr-i-Shirim passing through Bagdad and ending at a point on the Persian frontier at the intersection of the Russian and Afghan frontiers; and not to oppose demands in this region supported by the Russian Government. Russia likewise engaged not to seek concessions beyond a line from the Afghan frontier ending at Bunder Abbas and not to oppose demands in this region supported by the British Government. The third article provided for a neutral zone between the two. "No attempt "was made to include the whole Persian Gulf in the British "sphere of influence," says Grey, "Russia had just been ex­ "cluded from warm water in the Far East as a result of the "Anglo-Japanese Alliance and it seemed to me unreasonable to "try to turn the Anglo-Russian Agreement into an instrument "for expressly excluding her from warm water in the Middle "East. The Persian Gulf was kept outside her sphere but "left in the 'neutral' sphere. Russia gained nothing as "regards the Gulf by the Agreement, but her position was "not made worse." (2)

In regard to Afghanistan, Great Britain declared that she had no intention of changing the political status of the country and would neither take nor encourage Afghanistan to take any measures threatening Russia. Russia recognized Afghanistan as outside her sphere of influence and promised to have all her political relations with that country conducted through the British Government. In a third agreement both Governments engaged to respect the integrity of Tibet and to abstain from interference in its internal administration.

While in many quarters the Anglo-Russian Convention was criticized as a business transaction there was no doubt of its success as a stroke of diplomacy. Russia had now regained her position as a great Power and Great Britain having definitely supported France against Germany needed and now secured Russian support. The Anglo-French Entente and the Dual Alliance had broadened into the Triple Entente which was to clash with the Triple Alliance in matters of European diplomacy and to do so in no uncertain manner. Furthermore on June 9, 1907, a Franco-Japanese rapprochement was concluded by which each agreed to respect the independence and integrity of China with economic equality for all nations. During the following month Russia and Japan signed a similar treaty. Thus the two contending groups were now lined up on the European stage; France, Russia and Great Britain with Japan as a certain ally on
one side, and Germany, Austria and Italy on the other, and this alignment was to last down to 1914. During the years which ensued much was to take place in European diplomacy the subsequent clashes of the two groups must be treated separately.
Chapter 4.

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Chapter 5.

The Triple Alliance versus the Triple Entente.

The Triple Entente was originally a loose diplomatic arrangement brought into being by the Anglo-French convention of 1904 and the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907. In so far as the purpose of the former was to exclude the Germans from Morocco and of the latter to keep them from Persia, the two agreements were directed against Germany. However, unlike the Dual and Triple Alliances they did not deal specifically with European affairs and contained no provisions for action in the event of European complications.

Still in 1906, while Great Britain did not definitely promise armed support to France, nevertheless military conversations were opened between the French and British General Staffs and these lasted down to 1912.

Two years after the Anglo-Russian convention the English King visited the Tsar at Reval and the conversations between the two monarchs gave evidence of a desire, at least on their part for a closer bond of union between the two peoples. At the same time Sir Charles Hardinge, who had accompanied King Edward, expressed the opinion to Izvolsky that "Russia should be as strong as possible on land and at sea", while Stolypin the Russian Premier told Sir John Fisher that "he was devoting all his life to make the (western) frontier impregnable against Germany, both in men and
"munitions, and strategic arrangements." (1)

The reaction of these conversations on Germany was such as to bring forth inquiries from Bülow, but Izvolsky assured him that no open or secret Anglo-Russian convention existed which could run counter to German interests. Moreover, the Kaiser feared the policy of encirclement and in a speech to his officers he said, "It seems they wish to encircle and provoke us. We shall be able to support it. "The German has never fought better than when he has had "to defend himself on all sides." While there seems no direct evidence that the chief actors at Reval had designs against German security, still there was no doubt but that the visit had tightened the bonds between the two Powers.

The Reval meeting had an influence on affairs in Turkey. The Young Turk movement in favor of reforms had planned an uprising for September but the meeting of the two monarchs seemed to foreshadow foreign intervention to procure these reforms. Consequently it was decided to carry out the coup immediately. The result was successful, a constitution was granted and the whole machinery of autocratic control was scrapped.

While Europe was raising the accomplishment of the Young Turks the harmony was upset by a proclamation of Francis Joseph of Austria announcing the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the evacuation of the Sanjak of

Novibazar. Article XXV of the Treaty of Berlin empowered Austria to construct military and commercial roads through the Sanjak. On March 24, Bülow spoke with sympathy of the project and Zittoni re-echoed the same sentiments in the Italian Chamber when he said, "I was informed of the intention but I could not dispute the right. There is no danger to the Concert or to peace if all the Powers regard railways as an item in the reforms of Macedonia." Aehrenthal, the Austrian Foreign Minister, consulted Izvolsky and found him angry and suspicious over the Sanjak controversy, but in April the latter gave Berchtold, the Austrian Ambassador, a memorandum recording his desire that the entente of the two Powers should be renewed. The conditions were that Austria should agree to the Danube-Adriatic railway which would give Serbia access to the sea through Albania. Aehrenthal suggested the line should run through Albania. Then without consulting France or Great Britain, Izvolsky accepted the railway and announced his readiness, should the maintenance of the status quo prove impossible to discuss changes among them being the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Sanjak, in return for the opening of the Straits to Russian warships. This intimation delighted Aehrenthal and he determined to carry out the project with the least possible delay. He replied that if Russia would advocate the opening of the Straits for Bulgarian and Rumanian warships and would guarantee that Constantinople would not be attacked by a Russian fleet he would evacuate the Sanjak and surr-
ender Austrian rights over Montenegro.

The two Ministers met at Aehrenthal's castle at Buchlau in Bohemia and as there were no witnesses present and the two statesmen later gave different versions of the proceedings, we cannot be sure as to what happened. After this meeting Izvolsky crossed the Alps, intending to discuss events with Italy, France and Great Britain. The Austrian Minister however returned to Vienna and, in order to have Bulgaria on his side in the event of Turkey protesting, he suggested to Ferdinand that he should proclaim Bulgaria's independence of the Sultan. On October 1, the Austrian Ambassadors to France, Italy, Great Britain and Germany were sent with letters from Francis Joseph which they were to deliver on the 5th. Izvolsky arrived in Paris and found a letter waiting for him announcing that annexation would take place on October 7th. Since the French President, (Fañières) was to be absent on the 5th, the audience of the Austrian Ambassador was fixed for the 3rd, and on that day the letter was presented. Upon the President inquiring what would happen to Bulgaria, the reply was, "It is all arranged. Bulgaria will anticipate us by a day."

Thus the news was broken to Europe prematurely at Paris instead of simultaneously at the various capitals.

In France indignation was not so much directed against Austria for her action as against Izvolsky for not consulting her ally before carrying on his negotiations. In Russia and Serbia however, the two countries which were involved
in the agreement and which had known nothing of the preliminary negotiations, stupefaction prevailed. While Izvolsky reassured Serbia that the situation was favorable to her, in public he maintained that Aehrenthal had acted without his knowledge. On October 9, he left for London to secure British consent to his plan.

King Edward had not concealed his displeasure over the proposal when the Austrian Ambassador (Count Meisdorff) presented the Emperor's letter to him. The Press shared the indignation especially the "Times", while Sir Edward Grey on October 7 declared that any modification of the Treaty of Berlin must be approved by another European Congress just as the London Conference of 1871 had specified that "no Power can free itself from the engagements undertaken by treaty nor modify its stipulations without consent of "the contracting parties." The British, French and Russian Ambassadors at Constantinople were instructed to tell Turkey that all changes in the Treaty of Berlin required the endorsement of all its Signatories and a British squadron was sent to the Aegean.

On October 16 the British Foreign Office summarized the discussions, "A Conference was necessary, but it should "be limited to questions arising out of the violations of "the Treaty of Berlin. Its primary object would be to "provide compensation for Turkey and means might perhaps "be found to meet the reasonable wishes of the smaller "Balkan States though not at Turkey's expense." (1) On

the same day a semi-official Anglo-French-Russian pro-
gramme for the proposed Conference was issued at Paris.
Izvolsky had secured the first item of his programme but
the second—compensation for Russia—had been refused.
He had agreed in advance to the annexation of Bosnia-Herze-
govina in return for Austrian support for the opening of
the Straits. Grey on the other hand had known nothing
about the conspiracy against the Treaty of Berlin and
after denouncing Austria's action he could not support
a further encroachment on Turkey by his own ally. Hence
the Foreign Secretary informed Izvolsky that the question
of the Straits must be taken up at the Conference. Bülow
informed the British Government that since Austria was
opposed to a Conference Germany must support her; but a
few days later Aehrenthal explained that Austria had no
objection to the meeting if the programme was settled in
accord with her views and the annexation sanctioned but
not discussed.

Italy, the third partner of the Triple Alliance, was
by no means satisfied with the existing situation. Victor
Emmanuel described the annexation as a blow at the Berlin
Treaty, while ex-Premier Fortis during the debate in the
Italian Parliament gave vent to the following, "There is
only one Power with whom Italy sees a possibility of con-
"flict, and that, I regret to say, is our ally. The Govern-
"ment must invite the nation to new sacrifices to adjust
"our military forces to the needs of the situation." (1)

(1). Gooch, p. 416.
In view of the fact that this speech seems to have had a favorable effect on the House (1) it did not augur well for the solidity of the Triple Alliance. Tittoni explained that the Triple Alliance only guaranteed compensation for Italy in the event of a change in the status quo in Albania or Macedonia and furthermore the voluntary surrender of the Sanjak removed all fear of an Austrian advance to Salonika. He agreed to the necessity of the Conference but could see no gain by abusing Austria.

The annexation was a staggering blow to Serbia and Montenegro who at once began to make military preparations. Milovanovitch, the Serbian Foreign Minister, set forth to visit the various Foreign Offices to ask for an Adriatic corridor as consolation for the annexation. From London he reported, "We must stick to this demand to the end, and so long as Great Britain did not abandon us, the project of success still remained. Great Britain's attitude will likewise encourage Turkey, who is not inclined to yield anything further. We must, I exclaimed, prepare for the war which is inevitable in the near future, if they refuse us this compensation. In reply Grey and Hardinge promised they would persist in supporting our territorial compensation demand so long as Russia should give her support. The entire Press sympathizes greatly with Servia." (2) In Russia the welcome was also warm, the Tsar expressing great sympathy, but at the same time counselling a quiet line of conduct.

(1) Quarterly Review, p. 371.
(2) German White Book, p. 82.
During the closing days of 1908 the situation became tense though Austria still held out unchallenged. She declined to attend a conference without preliminary agreement and unless discussion of the annexation were held out—but if she was to be excused before hand the Conference would have been indeed futile. As far as the Powers were concerned Germany stood by her, Italy officially favored a Conference but at the same time did not wish to break from the Triple Alliance by abusing Austria. Russia was weak, France more or less indifferent to the whole question while Britain was frankly pacific. There were three problems to be solved—the relations of Austria and Bulgaria to Turkey and the relations of Serbia to Austria.

Aehrenthal urged that the withdrawal of Austrian garrisons from the Sanjak was adequate compensation to Turkey for the loss of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However Turkey boycotted Austrian goods and in order to overcome this and at the same time reduce the number of her opponents, Austria decided to pay two and a half millions as compensation for Turkish losses in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was followed shortly afterwards by Bulgaria's decision to pay compensation for her share of the Oriental railways.

Serbia did not think this an adequate solution of the problem and the Triple Entente attempted "to build a bridge for her retreat" (1) Sir Edward Grey promised (1). Gooch, p. 420.
the Russian Government diplomatic aid in securing compensation for Serbia and Montenegro but added that Serbia's claims must, in the interests of peace, be reduced to a minimum. Paris also shared this cautious attitude and the effect was to be seen in Izvolsky's advice to Belgrade. Serbia reported herself ready to cancel her military preparations if Austria would do the same. However Aehrenthal wrote a note requiring from Serbia a direct assurance of a change of attitude and a recognition of the annexation. This brought forth a reply from Serbia which was distinctly unfavorable to the Entente and a more pacific formula was drafted by Sir. F. Cartwright and Aehrenthal.

The solution seemed within grasp but on March 17 the German Ambassador informed Izvolsky that Bülow suggested Aehrenthal should acquaint the Powers that Turkey agreed to the annexation and if Russia approved this Germany and Russia would jointly propose to the European Powers to recognize the annexation in an exchange of notes. This proposal seemed to negative a Conference but Sir Edward Grey speaking for Great Britain expressed himself as content with an exchange of notes if Russia was. Russia postponed her reply and drew forth the following note from Bülow: "The German Government is glad to note that the Russian Government recognizes the friendly spirit of Germany's step and that Russia seems inclined to accept the proposal. It is ready to suggest to the Vienna Cabinet to invite the Powers, while notifying them of the Austro-Turkish agreement, formally to assent to the can-
"ceiling of Article XXV of the Berlin Treaty. Before do-
ing so however, it wishes to be sure that the Russian Cab-
inet is ready to accept the Austrian proposal. /Say we
"Expect a precise answer, Yes or No. Any ambiguous reply
"we must regard as a refusal. In that case we should let
"things take their course. The responsibility for all
"eventualities would rest exclusively on Izvolsky." (1)

After consultation with the Tsar, Izvolsky decided to give
in, giving as his excuse Russia's great danger and the dan-
ger to the world's peace from an Austro-Serb conflict.

Bülow invited Rome, Paris and London to follow this example.

Italy accepted, while Paris replied that she would do so
but hoped Austria would wait till the Austro-Serb conflict
was ended before making her request. Sir Edward Grey
though at first resentful, finally gave in, announcing
that when Serbia had dispatched it and Austria had accept-
ed it, he would recognize the abrogation of Article XXV if
invited to do so. On March 31, Serbia finally surrendered
she recognized that her rights were not infringed by the
annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and she undertook to
alter her policy towards Austria and pledged to reduce
her army. The Triple Entente then gave in to the request
to accept the abrogation of Article XXV, while Austria
in return surrendered the right to police Montenegrin waters.

Thus ended the first conflict of the Alliance since
the Moroccan crisis of 1905-1906. While Bülow boasted in
(1). Gooch, p. 421.
1913 that he had smashed the Entente he perhaps "more than
"any other individual gave it life and being. It was not
"yet a closely-knit combination. France's interest in
"the Bosnian matter was decidedly reserved and Russia took
"scant interest in Morocco," (1) but the two crises had
by no means estranged the three Powers. On the side of
the Triple Alliance, Austria had won her high demands
and the success had given the Empire a new feeling of
self-confidence. The bonds between Germany and Austria
were drawn closer, Germany again having appeared "in shin-
"ing armour". Bülow said, "Austria has right on her side.
"The annexation is no cynical theft, but the last step
"on the road of a political and cultural effort begun
"thirty years ago. She has won her right to the provin-
"ces by hard work; and her formal offence is purged by
"her settlement with Turkey." Again after his retire-
ment he said, "For the first time the Austro-German alli-
"ance proved its strength in a grievous conflict. The
"group of Powers whose influence had been so much over-
"estimated at Algeciras fell to pieces when faced with
"the tough problems of Continental policy." In a sense
he was right, but he did not tell the whole truth for
while the Central Powers had won a victory, it was not at
the expense of the solidity of the Triple Entente. Further-
more both Russia and Serbia had lost in the diplomatic
struggle; the former had to confess herself too weak to
defend the interests of the Slavs throughout the Balkans. Henceforth Belgrade and Petrograd were linked by memories of revenge the result of which was to be seen in 1914.

During the early part of January 1909, the Kaiser wrote to the Tsar deploring the fact of the growing combination of England, France and Russia and finished his letter with the expression: "The Triple Entente between France, Russia and England is being talked of by the whole world as an accomplished fact. English and French papers miss no opportunity of representing this alleged Triple Entente as being directed against Germany, and only too often the Russian Press chimes in joining the chorus. The tendency of Russian policy to prefer to lean on England and France was particularly evident in the present crisis." After Russia gave in the two monarchs remained on friendly terms and in 1910 they reached an agreement in regard to Persia and the Bagdad Railway which some likened to Bismarck's reinsurance Treaty of 1887. Still this good feeling was not general and the Press of each country continued to look with suspicion on the policy of the other.

From the diplomatic correspondence of the Serbian Minister in London, Berlin and Petersburg we learn that the prevailing feeling in those centres was that Izvolsky's policy was clearly directed towards bringing Russia definitely into a position of hegemony of the Slavic peoples. Furthermore the whole crisis had the effect of consolidating and making much stronger the alliances between Russia, Eng-
Austrian humiliation of Russia had aroused intense hatred and gave rise to the belief that the Balkan question could only be settled by war. On the other hand Izvolsky is reported to have said that Italy played an inactive role in the Triple Alliance whereas the harmony between England, France and Russia was continually improving. The fear and belief that war with "Germanism" was inevitable was becoming general and the solidity of the Triple Entente Powers was considered necessary if German hegemony was to be obviated. (1)

Italy failed Austria and even disavowed her previous agreement. While Tittoni had at first supported the annexation, directly England opposed Austria his attitude changed. "At the beginning of December he stated in Parliament that he had not pledged himself to anything as far as Aehrenthal was concerned. The apology he made was that his difficulties had been increased owing to public opinion." (2)

The question of Bosnia-Herzegovina is regarded by Mr. Ewart as a distinct "root" of the War. While the carrying out of Serbia's promise "to change the direction of her present policies towards Austria-Hungary, and in the future to live with the latter in friendly and neighborly relations", must be examined in a later chapter, it is perhaps not out of place here to state that it was just because of the efforts of the Serbian Government to tear Bosnia-Herzegovina from Austria that the Dual Monarchy sent the ultim-

(1). German White Book, pp.73-86.
(2). Montgelas, p. 227.
atum in 1914. "And it thus becomes clear that as Alsace "and Lorraine were at the root of the formation of the "European military combinations (between 1879 and 1914) "so were Bosnia and Herzegovina at the root of the outbreak "of hostilities in 1914". (1) In 1878 the Powers had placed the two provinces under the domination of Austria and in 1908 when Austria assumed her sovereignty Serbia appealed for assistance from Russia to withstand this action. Russia's unpreparedness brought the counsel to pursue a policy of "military preparation and watchful waiting"; in 1914 the occasion arose and this time Russia was ready. This is by no means the whole story, the details must be reserved for a further chapter.

Anglo-German rivalry during the period from 1905-1911 afforded another striking cause for the solidification of the Triple Entente. The relations of the two Governments from the Algeciras Conference to the crisis of Agadir in 1911 were chiefly concerned with the question of naval armaments. This question of naval rivalry had resulted in the sanctioning by the British Parliament of the Cawdor programme of four battle ships annually. Sir John Fisher who had been appointed First Sea Lord in 1904 had proceeded to concentrate the fleet in home waters, while in 1905 the "Dreadnought" was laid down. The latter was a triumph, not only of engineering skill but for the moment a triumph of diplomacy; for the summer of 1905 to July 1907 no battle-

(1). Ewart, Vol 2, p. 948.
ship was laid down in Germany. Mr. Arthur Lee, Civil Lord of the Admiralty, urged Britain to turn her face from France and the Mediterranean to the North Sea. These events had an inevitable repercussion in Germany where Tirpitz secured the passing of a Navy Bill in 1906 adding six cruisers to the fleet and providing for the widening of the Suez Canal. Anglo-German naval rivalry now began in earnest.

However since the Algiers Conference had brought a peaceful settlement of the crisis the Liberal Press in England took advantage of the fact and began a campaign for a limitation of the armaments. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's article in the "Nation" (1) was an invitation to Germany to discuss the problem. It was announced that one of the four battleships of the Cawdor programme would be omitted and the Government strove to have the limitation of armaments discussed at the second Hague Conference in 1907. The offer was communicated to seven Powers but Bülow announced that Germany could not take part in the discussion as she thought it unpractical. Russia and Austria also counselled postponement. In spite of this the matter was brought up at the fourth Plenary Meeting of the Conference by the British Plenipotentiary. Nothing was achieved, however, beyond the reaffirmation of the resolution of 1899.(2)

In 1907 the Kaiser visited Windsor. The effect of

(1). March, 1907.
(2). "That the limitation of military charges which weigh "on the world is highly desirable for increasing the "material and moral well being of humanity". 
this visit was such that statesmen and journalists of both countries hoped to see their peaceful aspirations realized. The general tenor of feeling in both countries became better and was confirmed by the voice of the Foreign Offices. Both Bülow and Sir Edward Grey uttered sentiments of approval that the tension between the two countries was loosening and mutual misunderstanding was disappearing. The Kaiser wrote the the Tsar, "By my visit to England I think I have removed many causes for misunderstanding and distrust, so that the atmosphere is cleared and the pressure on the safety-valve relieved."(1)

The question of an agreement between the two countries regarding the Bagdad Railway was broached by the Kaiser in a conversation with Lord Haldane during the former's visit to Windsor. Haldane referred the matter to Sir Edward Grey who made the condition that France and Russia should be brought into the discussion. Germany feared failure of the Conference and thus that differences between her and the other Powers would be accentuated and Bülow vetoed the suggestion.

Another event, which happened early in 1908, caused great indignation in England. The Kaiser wrote a letter to Lord Tweedmouth on naval policy. It was private correspondence but many thought it an attempt to influence a British First Sea Lord favorably towards Germany at a time when the estimates were coming up in Parliament. Bülow defended the English attacks against his Emperor's action (1). Gooch, p. 435.
characterizing it as a letter wherein, "one gentleman speaks "to another, one seaman to another". This event added further to the clouds which were beginning again to fill the sky of Anglo-German relations.

In the summer of 1908 King Edward VII with Sir Charles Hardinge visited the Kaiser at Cronberg and explained the dangers of naval competition and urged that friendly discussion should take place over the matter. Wilhelm II repeated his assurance of friendship but refused to discuss the naval question. King Edward then visited Francis Joseph at Ischl where he urged the Austrian monarch to exert his influence in favor of the limitation of naval armaments, but to no avail. Whatever may have been the pacific intentions of the English King, there is no doubt that in the eyes of Central Europe his action had the appearance of an attempt to break down the solidarity of the Triple Alliance. This visit took place before the King went to Reval, of these visits and King Edward's conversations the Belgian Minister in Berlin (Baron Greindl) said, "The independent Press.... does not hesitate to express its uneasisness. Whether it be called alliance, entente, or "what you like, that grouping of the Powers, brought into "existence by the King of England personally, does exist; "and even if it is not a direct and immediate menace to "Germany (which it would be going too far to say) it never- "theless constitutes a decrease in the sense of security.(1)

(1). Morel, p. 124 (telegram to M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, May 30, 1908.)
The Belgian Minister concluded his despatch with the remarks, "For thirty years the Triple Alliance has guaranteed "the peace of the world because it was guided by Germany, "and Germany was satisfied with the political division of "Europe. The new grouping is a danger to that peace, be- "cause it is made up of Powers who aim at altering the sta- "tus quo, and who have buried the feuds of centuries in "order to bring their purpose to fruition." (1) Whatever "may have been the truth of the Belgian Minister's remarks, "they provide food for thought and show the attitude of "at least one section of Europe as regards the tightening "of the bonds of the Triple Entente.

In 1908, the publication of an anonymous interview "with the Kaiser in the Daily Telegraph in which he deplor- ed the fact that his assurances of friendship were always "misjudged (2) and stated also that the prevailing sentiment "among a large section of people in Germany was unfriendly "to England, he himself being in a minority, raised another "storm. (3) As a messenger of better relations this inter- view was a failure for there was a great indignation both "in Great Britain and in Germany. It must be remembered "that at this time the two countries were pursuing conflict- ing policies in the Balkan crisis (4) and the situation "thus produced did anything but ease the tension. Fortun- ately the statesmen of both countries kept their heads, "Asquith, Grey and Bülow each making conciliatory speeches.

(1) Morel, p. 125.
(2) "How can I convince a nation against its will?"
(3) Schmitt, p. 249.
(4) See p. 162.
Not so the Imperialist English Press such as the "National Review" which warned against Germany as the enemy, while Lord Roberts counselled compulsory military service as protection against the inevitable conflict with Germany. Sir John Fisher in a secret conversation with the King urged that it was an appropriate time to "Copenhagen" the German fleet at Kiel, a la Nelson. Likewise in Germany the construction of a great fleet was urged steadily forward. With the announcement of a new German naval programme for 1909-1910 English fears received a new impetus and the result was an increase in the estimates for the British navy. At the same time a suggestion was made that the two Admiralties might exchange information but the suggestion was declined by the German Government.

In July 1909 Bülow was succeeded by Bethmann-Hollweg while Kiderlen-Wächter entered the Foreign Office. The former was convinced that a better feeling should and could be developed between Great Britain and Germany and he suggested negotiations over the naval question. The basis of these negotiations was to be—"Great Britain was to be party to an agreement declaring that (a) neither country had any idea of aggression, and that neither in fact would attack the other; and (b) that in the event of an attack made on either Power by a third Power or group of Powers, the Power not attacked should stand aside."(2) There was no objection on the part of the British Government to the first point, but the second would involve forfeiting support to France in case of a Franco-German war. Consequently the proposal:

(1) Morel p. 136
(2) Gooch p. 452
was rejected by the British Government.

In 1910 the Kaiser visited London for King Edward's funeral and negotiations were again reopened. Germany promised a modified programme and this was greeted with a suggestion to discuss temporary naval retardation, to negotiate for an agreement on the basis that the German programme should not be increased and to give assurances that in any British agreement with any other Power there would be nothing directed against Germany. These negotiations lasted into 1911 and appeared to be progressing favorably. The tension seemed to be growing less acute and King George wrote to the Kaiser inviting him to assist at the unveiling of a statue of Queen Victoria. Of this letter the Belgian Minister in Berlin wrote, "It was conceived in particularly cordial terms which produced the most agreeable impression here". The Kaiser accepted the invitation and his reception in England was cordial. However just at this moment when it seems that an agreement might happily have been reached, the German Government took the step over the Moroccan question which brought Europe to the verge of war and Anglo-German relations again became as tense as ever.

Franco-German relations were no more happy during this period than were those between Great Britain and Germany over the naval question, and out of this situation was to grow the third crisis or clash of the Alliances when the field of controversy swung back again to Morocco. In July 1907 a number of French workmen employed on the port works at Casablanca were murdered, the result was French bombard-
ment of the town and the occupation of territory surrounding it. Civil war broke out between Mulai Hafid and his brother Abdul Aziz with the result that the latter was crushed and Mulai Hafid was recognized by the Powers, after he had promised to abide by the Act of Algeciras.

In 1907 Pichon, the French Foreign Minister, encouraged conversations between French journalists and the German Legation at Tangier and in 1908 Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador at Berlin reported the desire of the German Foreign Secretary to form an economic entente. When sentiments of approval of French adherence to the Algeciras Act of 1906 were voiced in the Reichstag there seemed a possibility of a rapprochement. But this possibility was decidedly negatived by an event which happened in September 1908. A number of German residents in Casablanca had in 1906 established an agency for organizing desertions from the French Foreign Legion. In September 1908 this agency persuaded six members of the Legion to desert, provided them with clothing and promised to embark them on a German steamer. Unhappily for the peace of the time they were captured and since two of them were Germans and one a German naturalized French citizen, the German Consul immediately demanded their release.

The matter was referred to arbitration but the German Ambassador demanded the liberation of the three Germans and Bülow threatened that if the demand was not conceded the Kaiser would recall his Ambassador. The British and Russian Ambassadors informed the French Foreign Office that their
Governments approved French action and were ready to stand by her. Two days later Pichon was informed by the Austrian Ambassador that Francis Joseph had persuaded the Kaiser to settle the question amicably. It was referred to the Hague Tribunal and the verdict brought down was to the effect that both parties must share the blame. Even in this minor crisis the alignment of the Powers into opposing camps was seen.

The settlement of the Hague was followed shortly afterwards by a Franco-German pact whereby "The two Governments, animated by an equal desire to facilitate the execution of the Act of Algeciras have agreed to define the meaning they attach to its clauses in order to avoid all cause of future misunderstanding. Consequently France, entirely attached to the maintenance of the integrity and independence of Morocco, resolved to safeguard economic equality and therefore not to thwart German commercial and industrial interests; and Germany, pursuing merely economic interests, and recognizing that the special political interests of France are closely bound up with the consolidation of order and internal peace and resolved not to thwart these interests declare, that they will not pursue or encourage any measure of a kind to create in their favor or the favor of any Power an economic privilege, and that they will seek to associate their nationals in the affairs which they may be able to secure."

This pact produced a partial breathing space in the (1). Pinon, p. 260.
diplomatic conflict. Pichon declared all causes of conflict in Morocco had been removed. The Kaiser expressed his satisfaction and Bülow echoed the same sentiments. Aehrenthal declared, "I rejoice and so do all my countrymen", while Tittoni expressed similar sentiments. Sir Edward Grey spoke for England when he expressed himself glad to see the end of the disagreement. Russia however was not impressed favorably, to her it meant a bait to France to draw her (France) from backing the Russian case in the Balkans.

Izvolsky had taken the Italian Foreign Minister and the King of Italy into his confidence over the annexation question at the time of his conversations with Aehrenthal and his visits to London and Paris. The change that had come over Italy regarding Vienna (1) now drew her closer to Russia. In the autumn of 1909 Nicholas II met Victor Emmanuel at Raccongi. There the two sovereigns entered into an agreement in which the two Powers agreed to adopt a benevolent attitude, Italy if Russia raised the question of the Straits, Russia if Italy went to Tripoli. The basic importance of this treaty rested in the fact that Italy who had been on friendly terms with England for many years and had been closely associated with France since 1902 (2) had now formed an alliance with the third member of the Triple Entente.

Turning again to Franco-German relations over Morocco--

"M. Pichon declared upon innumerable occasions that France

(1) See p. 161.
(2) See above Chapter 4."
"was seeking neither a Protectorate over, nor a conquest of, "Morocco." (1) Yet the agreement with Germany by its very terms was proof enough that French freedom of action was increased. Cooperation between the two countries commenced hopefully. A French company had been granted concessions and Germany now suggested a joint consortium should undertake the contemplated work. The French reply was favorable, but suggested a similar consortium over certain German territory. Negotiations were under way when the Briand Government resigned and a new Ministry (Monis) which had opposed any joint participation with Germany came into power. The consequence was the negotiations ceased and German hopes were disappointed. (2) "La Societe Marocaine de Travaux Publics" had been incorporated on February 17, 1910 (3) in which France was given fifty percent of the shares; Germany twenty five percent; England and Spain seven and one-half percent each; Austria five percent and Sweden and Belgium two and one-half percent each. England and Spain objected because of dissatisfaction over their allotments, but did not press their objections. The company did nothing however, for it was practically ended owing to the change in the French Government.

France had constructed two light railways in Morocco for military purposes. Desiring to convert these into lines

(2). Contemporary Review, Feb. 1912, p. 266
(3). Ibid.
suitable for commercial purposes she began negotiations with Germany in January 1911 and by the middle of February an understanding had been reached. (1) This too was frustrated by the change in the French Government, Cruppi the new Foreign Minister though advised by Jules Cambon to sign, delayed. Cambon deplored the delay and finally Cruppi suggested a new "Project" which the German Foreign Minister, Aiderlen-Wachter, questioned and proposed one or two changes. Cruppi declared himself dissatisfied with the German suggestions and terminated negotiations, "telling Cambon that the contemplated construction would be limited to the work necessary for military purposes; and that the cost would be defrayed by France alone, while the operations would be entrusted to the Société Maro­caine." (2) Once again Germany was disappointed and the breakdown of these negotiations brought forth from M. Philippe Millet, a French publicist the following criticism: "Unfortunately every one of the Franco-German economic schemes failed. The Société Marocaine des Travaux Publics was never allowed to build either a road or a railway......the Franco-German Congo consortium was equally unsuccessful and so was the Franco-German Equatorial railway. It would be unfair to deny that the French Government was responsible for a number of those failures.

(1). Poinearé, p. 89.
"Such was especially the case with the Franco-German con-
sortium in the Congo....It was bitterly attacked in a
more or less direct way by several parliamentary groups,
mainly by Mr. E. D. Morel's French friends. The French
Cabinet did not feel strong enough to resist those attacks,
and dropped the scheme after the Germans had been led to
believe, for a whole year that the matter was satisfactor-
ily settled. Under these circumstances it is not surpris-
ing that the Germans should have thought they were being
cheated." (1).

Meanwhile Franco-Moroccan relations had ben progress-
ing equally unfavorably. France had made two loans to the
Sultan in 1910 and 1911—both equally inadequate. In 1911
an agreement was reached whereby the military force was to
be reorganized under French direction. "The letters which
accompanied the signing of this agreement created a milit-
ary alliance between France and the Sultan as against the
subjects of the Sultan"(2) The French Foreign Minister
said on March 16, "If serious troubles arise which might
prove prejudicial to the general security, the Government
of the Republic will examine the situation with His Maj-
esty Moulay Hafid, and will lend its assistance in the
regions where French agents and authorities have the right
to exercise their activity, in such a way as to avoid
propagation of the troubles and to maintain the sovereignty
and independence of His Majesty conformably to the Act of

(1). Nineteenth Century, June 1912, p. 1049.
"Algeciras. An entente will be arranged between the two
governments with reference to the means by which these
results may be obtained." "Quite clearly," as Mr. Ewart
says, "this was quite incompatible with the specified
basis of the Franco-German agreement of 8 February 1909--
the maintenance of the independence and integrity of the
Shereefian Empire." (1)

This dependence of the Sultan upon French support
incensed the tribes, a rebellion broke out and a French
expedition in support of the Sultan at Fez was necessitated
by the excesses of the rebels. In return for such assistance France asked the Sultan's consent to the stipulations among others,"that the finances should be ad-
ministered with probity and prudence, under French con-
trol; that public works should be undertaken; and that
reorganization of the army, under French direction
should be commenced without delay. In other words
that French control should be still further established." (2)

The news of this project brought forth a warning
from the German Chancellor when he said, "The revolt is
against the Sultan not against the Europeans. I can only
insist on the importance of observing the Act of Algec-
iras for difficulties will begin directly French troops
enter Fez." Kiderlen-Wachter sounded a similar note of
warning, while the German Press began to demand compensat-

(2). Ibid. p. 829.
The French Press was divided over the question while many followed Jaurès in declaring the expedition a fraud as neither the Sultan nor the Europeans were in danger. Spain also looked on the expedition as an excuse for liberty of action defined in the secret Treaty of 1904, and she went to Larosh.

The effect of this action in England can best be explained in the words of Sir Edward Grey's reply to Mr. Dillon in the House on May 2, when he said, "The action taken by France is not intended to alter the political status of Morocco, and H.M. Government cannot see why any objection should be taken to it." (1) Meanwhile the French Ambassador and German Foreign Secretary met at Kissingen and negotiations took place. There was a possibility of a compromise but at that moment the Monis Cabinet fell and was succeeded by Caillaux. Before the new ministry came to any decision the German Government took the step which produced the third clash of the Alliances. On July 1, the "Panther" was sent to Agadir ostensibly—in the words of the despatch to all the signatories of the Act of Algeciras—"to lend help in case of need to German subjects and "proteges as well as to the considerable German interests "in that territory." The action of the French Government had had two results, namely the Spanish lending at Larosh and the despatch of the German man-of-war. The explanation

(1). Morel, p. 216.
given for this act by the German Chancellor was, "It has been urged that the Sultan himself summoned the French to his assistance but a ruler who relies solely on the support of foreign bayonets is no longer the independent ruler on whose existence the Act of Algeciras was based. "We let this be known and suggested to France an understanding, leaving of course, the initiative to her. At first we received no positive proposals from Paris, while the French military power continued to spread in Morocco and the fiction began to be established that France was acting with a European mandate. When therefore German interests appeared to be threatened we sent a warship to Agadir. Never for a moment did we attempt to acquire territory in Morocco. It was not a provocation, but we protect our rights. Morocco was like a festering wound in our relations not only with France but also with England. The expedition to Fez led to an acute stage and rendered an operation necessary, we performed the operation in order to heal the wound." (1)

The news of the "Panther's spring" was received with great indignation in the British Foreign Office. Grey saw in it a necessity of fulfilling the treaty obligations to France (2); Asquith saw in Agadir a menace to British naval supremacy in the Mediterranean. (3) While the Press

(1). Gooch, p. 472.
(2). He was evidently thinking of the secret clauses.
(3). Morel, p. 194.
recalled "the fact that if Great Britain did not interfere over the Morocco question, it was because France in her turn, left her a free hand in Egypt; but that England never dreamt of allowing Germany to set foot in Morocco. (1) The most striking result in England was the speech of Lloyd George (Chancellor of the Exchequer) on July 21 in which he said,"... If a situation were to be forced upon us "in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender "of the great and beneficial position Britain has won by "centuries of heroism and achievement, by allowing Britain "to be treated, where her interests were vitally affected "as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of nations, "then I say emphatically that peace at that price would "be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like "ours to endure." (2) This speech created an sensation everybody knew it was a threat at Germany. Many of Lloyd George's own colleagues keenly resented that a step of such importance should have been taken on the spur of the moment without reference to the Cabinet. (3) Sir Edward Grey's reaction to the crisis was similar to that while he had no immediate desire to participate in the negotiations, in theevent of a rupture he felt that "we should "be obliged to watch over British interests and to be- "come a party to a discussion of the matter."

In the treaty of 1904 Great Britain had promised to

(1). Morel, p. 194.
(2). Grey, p. 216.
give diplomatic support to France in order that she might obtain the execution of the clause of the treaty regarding Morocco. As a result of this promise the support had been given in the quarrel with Germany in 1905-1906 and in 1911 Britain was playing the same part. The Entente was most certainly being hardened into an alliance. In his speech of August 3, 1914, Sir Edward Grey said that in the 1911 crisis he "took precisely the same line that he had taken in 1906", at which time "in my view, public opinion in this country would have rallied to the material support of France." (1) In a conversation with the German Ambassador he maintained that France "was not only justified, but obliged, to protect the capital of Morocco." (2) Further in a conversation with the Russian Ambassador in May he said that even in the case of a lengthy occupation by France, "the English standpoint would remain unchanged and that he did not believe German interests would be in any way violated, for, according to the Agreement concluded between Germany and France, Germany had renounced all political influence, under the condition that her economic interests in Morocco should be protected against all political entanglements. Hereupon Count Metternich assured him of the conciliatory and peaceful intentions of the German Government,expressing, however, the fear that unexpected events might jeopardise the situation. Sir Edward responded that England, in any case and under all circumstances, would fulfill her obligations to

(2). Siebert, p. 583.
"France". (1) Thus out of this crisis it became evident that England without being bound to France by a formal act, was prepared to mobilize not only her Fleet, but also her Army against Germany.

In the meantime Franco-German negotiations were being carried on. The German Government agreed to renounce all territorial pretention to Morocco and to seek compensation in the Congo. France had bought her liberty in Morocco from Spain, England and Italy; Germany now sought compensation. This compensation was to consist of the French Congo. The demands were modified after the attitude of England became evident through Lloyd George's and Sir Edward Grey's speeches. As a result two conventions were signed on November 3 and November 4, whereby France was given a free hand in Morocco subject to certain economic reservations and she ceded to Germany territory in the Congo district, while Germany in turn ceded territories north of the frontier of the French possessions in the Chad region.

Thus ended the third conflict of the Alliances with France and England more closely together than ever. The conversations between the Military Staffs of the two countries which had been inaugurated during the first Morocco incident were being pressed (2) and the assurances of Sir Edward Grey to Count Metternich that Great Britain would support France, coupled with Lloyd George's speech

(1). Siebert, p. 583. (Germany had not however agreed to the repudiation of the Algeciras Act.
gave ample evidence of the solidity of the Entente. In fact the Russian Ambassador said, reporting a conversation with Sir Edward Grey, "In the event of war between Germany and France, England would have to participate. If this war should involve Russia, Austria would be dragged in too, for, although she has not the slightest desire to interfere in this matter, she will be compelled by force of circumstances to do so. Consequently, it would no longer be a duel between France and Germany—it would be a general war." (1)

Among the results of the Agadir crisis was Italy's seizure of Tripoli. She had secured French and Russian approval of her priority of right in this country and in September 1911 she delivered an ultimatum and proceeded to compel Turkey to respect Italian interests. Germany did not approve of the annexation as she considered it a blow to German interests in Turkey. Sir Edward Grey had consented to the step on two conditions, "the show of a good moral cause and consideration for British trading interests." British public opinion was not so favorable; the Mohammedan complications presented too direct a threat at India. If Grey really wished to detach Italy from the Triple Alliance at this time he had evidently overlooked the Mohammedan question. This action on the part of Italy had an important effect on her position as a member of the Triple Alliance. She had at least the (1). Siebert, p. 598-9.
passive goodwill of the Triple Entente and she had not consulted her own allies before taking the step. She had acted independently at Algediras and the Bosnian crisis and now seemed to be declaring herself definitely independent. "Italy was not bound to obtain our consent "and did not do so," wrote Bethmann-Hollweg; "but when "she wished to attack Turkey in Europe the status quo "in the Balkans became a critical question. We were again "and again compelled to mediate to prevent the differences "of our allies growing into danger." (1) In 1912 a renewal of the Triple Alliance was however arranged but in Bethmann-Hollweg's opinion, "the pristine strength of the Triplice "was gone, for Italy had undertaken too many obligations "to France, England and Russia". (2)

Thus after the crisis of 1911 the situation in Europe stood with the two diplomatic groups definitely opposed to one another and with Italy leaning more than ever away from her allies. During the years 1906-1911, the bonds between France, Russia and Great Britain had been growing tighter and tighter. Though Sir Edward Grey later assured the House that there was no treaty of alliance between France and Great Britain whereby the latter was committed to armed support in the event of war, yet all this time the military conversations had been going on and we know, from Grey's own words, at least in the crisis of 1911 Eng-

(1). Gooch, p. 487.
land was ready to support France by arms. The Bosnian crisis had drawn the three Entente Powers closer together, in fact, this incident "well illustrates one of the effects of the division of the Great Powers into two hostile groups". (1) Russia and Italy had been notified of the annexation and had raised objections only so far as was necessary to get compensations for themselves. Great Britain and France had little interest in the matter, while Serbia suffered no wrong. Her hope of annexing the provinces had been diminished but the claims she put forward were in the opinion of the French Government difficult to justify, were considered satisfied because of the Austrian evacuation of the Sanjak by Russia and were discouraged by the British Government. However Russia wished to retain Serbian friendship, France needed the friendship of both and Great Britain needed the friendship of both France and Russia because of the naval rivalry with Germany. It seems quite justifiable to assert as Mr. Ewart does, that, "had Russia been as well prepared for hostilities as she was in 1914, the world war would have commenced in 1908. And, "as in 1914, consideration of the merits of the quarrel between Austria-Hungary and Serbia would have been irrelevant."(2).

Of the Morocco incidents of 1905-1906 and 1911 it can truly be said,"they may be regarded as having marked

(2). Ibid. p.946.
"the transition from entente relations to practically "military alliance—from the static to dynamic state of "these relations." (1) Germany was within her rights in demanding an international conference in 1905, and the Algeciras Act was a declaration for international equal­ity in Morocco and a denial of exclusive rights of France and Spain to domination. French and Spanish operations in 1911 contravened these provisions and Germany was again within her rights in objecting. With the passing of the 1911 crisis Izvolsky said, and no doubt many in Europe agreed with him, "After the crisis just experienced, the political "situation of Europe is less secure than ever. Beyond all "doubt, any local collision between the Powers is bound to "lead to a general European conflict in which Russia like "every other European Power will have to participate. "With God's help, the conflict may be postponed for a while, "but it may come at any moment we must bear in mind, hour by "hour and we must also arm against it, hour by hour."(2) Before the "local collision" was to come the Balkan wars were to intervene and an account must be given of them in another chapter.

(2). Siebert, pp. 611-612.
Chapter 5.

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Chapter 6.

The Balkan Wars.

In 1912 the conflict of alliances shifted back again to the Balkans, but the crisis in this part of Europe, the fourth crisis, as Sir Edward Grey calls it, was anticipated by further Anglo-German negotiations which must be recounted and estimated as contributory to the final cataclysm in 1914.

English support of France in the Agadir crisis had aroused further enmity in Germany and gave rise to a demand on the part of Tirpitz for a new Naval Bill. However the fact that Anglo-Russian cooperation in Persia was not proceeding as smoothly as it might have been, gave rise to the desire on the part of some in Germany to establish better relations with England. The Persian question revolved around the movement of the nationalists to reform the Government—Sir Edward Grey sympathized with the movement. Russia on the other hand had no sympathy for the nationalist cause and the situation was rather trying. Grey could not openly oppose the Russian viewpoint without endangering the Entente. In 1911, an American, Sinister, was employed by the Persian Government to reorganize their finances, he proceeded to appoint British assistants, in the Russian sphere of influence and Grey had to comply
with Russian demands and join in compelling him to resign. The situation became quite tense and gave serious promise of disrupting the Anglo-Russian Entente, however no serious result took place but there is no doubt that a scar was left in the relations between the two countries.

The upshot of this Anglo-Russian estrangement was a movement for conversations between London and Berlin. Metternich the German Ambassador to London was able to say, "Public opinion is beginning to turn in our direction again (1) and in the early part of 1912 it was agreed that Lord Haldane should undertake a private mission. On February 8, he arrived in Berlin, and the negotiations began. Bethmann-Hollweg suggested that there should be some agreement drawn up, embodying the terms that neither party would make or join any combination directed against the other, and in case of war in which one was involved the other would maintain neutrality and do its best to localize the conflict. While Haldane had been given a copy of the proposed new German Fleet Law there was apparently no mention of any naval agreement in the proposed understanding. While the negotiations were carried on in a friendly atmosphere the statesmen concerned failed to agree upon a formula which would have satisfied their respective policies. Mr. Morel says, "there was a sincere desire on both sides to reach "a solution, but the British Cabinet's secret commitments (1). Siebert, p. 253."
"to France, and contingently, to Russia, made it utterly impossible to arrive at a definite and comprehensive understanding with Germany." (1). Furthermore Izvolsky was able to say that he had learned from conversations with Poincaré and Paleologue that the London Cabinet informed Poincaré of the proposed agreement. The French Premier pronounced himself emphatically against it, since there was no written agreement of political character between England and France; any such agreement with Germany would end Franco-English relations. (2).

An examination of the "Novelle" (the new German Naval law) showed that it would involve an increase in the size and strength of the fleet and accordingly it added to English fears. Even while Haldane's mission was taking place, Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, made a speech at Glasgow in which he reaffirmed Great Britain's determination to maintain naval supremacy at all costs. (3)

In May, Asquith and Churchill met Kitchener at Malta to discuss the Mediterranean problem and at this meeting they came to the decision "of getting the French Navy to police the Mediterranean, while the English Navy should keep the North Sea and English Channel for the French in the event of a war with Germany." (4) In September, the French Government came to a decision to comply with this

(1). Morel, p. 263.
(2). Dickinson, p. 396.
(4). Ibid. p. 266.
policy and in the spring of 1913, the whole Atlantic de-
fence flotilla was demobilized. These naval conversations
appeared to necessitate a closer political understanding
and at the instigation of Poincaré, letters were exchanged
between Paul Cambon (French Ambassador to London) and Sir
Edward Grey defining the nature of the Entente. These
letters emphasized the fact that naval agreements did not
mean an engagement to co-operate in war, and in theory they
left Great Britain's hands free as Grey never tired from
reiterating. But from this date on, France considered
Great Britain as pledged in honor to come to her assist-
ance if she were attacked by Germany. Furthermore, France
was definitely allied to Russia and hence a Russian quarrel
would involve Britain.

While Anglo-French naval agreements were being conclud-
ed and Anglo-German naval rivalry was continuing apace, a
new crisis broke out in the Balkans. The settlement of
the crisis of 1908-1909 had left much ill-feeling. Austria
Russia and Italy all regarded themselves as concerned with
the situation and whatever may have been the merits of the
movement against Turkish misgovernment, it was not sympathy
for Christians as much as interest in their own policies
of power which kept these three Powers watchful over the
Balkan problem. We have seen that in 1906-1908, Russia
advised Serbia to pursue a policy of "military preparation
"and watchful waiting". In 1912, the Balkan League was
formed and it was under Russia's aegis that it came into
being. Under the influence of Hartwig, the Russian Minister at Belgrade, and Mekludoff, the Russian Minister at Sofia, an alliance definitely directed against Turkey was pushed through. Serbia approached King Ferdinand of Bulgaria as early as 1909 and at first with little success. However, by 1911 he had "more and more convinced himself, in the "course of the last few weeks, that constant and close "relations for their mutual support were being kept up "between Russia, France and England, and he is convinced "that the forces of these three Powers are superior to "those of Germany and Austria."(1) "A better example "could not be adduced of the way in which Balkan policies "were determined by those of the Great Powers, and of the "tacit assumption so terribly justified by events that the "Balkan problem would involve a European war."(2)

The Serbo-Bulgarian treaty was signed in March 1912; it was accompanied by a "secret annex" and followed later by a military convention. By the first article of the treaty the two states guaranteed their political independence and territory. By the second article each agreed to support the other in case any one of the Great Powers made an attempt to occupy any Balkan territory under Turkish rule. The military convention specifically mentioned Austria as the "Great Power" of the second article. Hence this treaty was secret, except to Russia, under whose guidance

(1). Siebert, p. 276.
(2). Dickinson, p. 308.
it was framed, and it was directed against Austria. We can begin to see quite clearly how Russia was getting the hegemony of the Slavic peoples and why she should have been involved in 1914.

The "secret annex" dealt with Turkey and specified that if internal troubles should arise in Turkey, or Turkey should be involved in external difficulties which endangered the status quo in the Balkans the two parties should consult as to their action. In case they decided to declare war on Turkey, Russia was to be notified and if they did not agree Russia was to arbitrate as to the action to be taken. Thus while Russia had both Austrian and Italian agreements to maintain the status quo in the Balkans and a promise from Germany that the latter would not support Austria in aggressive action there, at the same time she now had a treaty between the Balkan allies which contemplated destruction of the status quo by war with Turkey or Austria. While the existence of the treaty was made known to both Grey and Poincaré (1) the actual text was apparently not shown to them.

A similar treaty was signed between Bulgaria and Greece, and directed exclusively against Turkey. The two parties pledged themselves to assist one another if either should be attacked by Turkey. Furthermore a military convention was signed and contained a clause "In case one of the contracting Governments should declare war upon a

"State other than Turkey, without a previous understanding
and without the consent of the other Government, the latter
is released from the obligations of Article I but is never­
theless bound to observe, throughout the duration of the
war a friendly neutrality towards its ally".(1) Hence in
a Serbo-Bulgarian War with Austria, Greece would at least
be benevolently neutral."

Thus by the end of 1912, the three Balkan Powers,
Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece were ready for a Turkish war
and at the same time in case Austria was involved, the
action that each would take was known. From the corresp­
ondence of the Russian Ambassador, we learn that the Bal­
kan States had "only one idea—not to allow the favorable
"moment to pass and to throw themselves into the fight
"as soon as possible."(2) On September 30, mobilization
began and the Powers early in October sent a joint note
to the Balkan States--deploring any measure which might
lead to war, and asserting that they (the Powers) would
undertake Turkish reforms and even in case of war they
would allow no spoilation of Turkish territory. At the
same time a note was sent to Turkey intimating that the
Powers would take up the question of reforms. Both notes
drew a negative reply--Turkey asserting her conclusion to
introduce reforms independently of foreign pressure and the
Balkan States declaring direct action on their part to be
necessary, The consequence was war was declared on October 18.

(1). Dickinson, p. 314.
(2). Siebert, p. 357.
The events of the Balkan wars concern us very slightly—the first culminated in the capture of Adrianople and was followed by a truce in December. The Young Turks however denounced the truce and war broke out again in February, 1913. Four months later after more allied victories, the Treaty of London was signed. Before it was ratified the States themselves fought over the spoils and it was not until August that the whole crisis was ended by the Treaty of Bucharest.

It is not the wars themselves which concern us so much as the policies of the Great Powers. None of them, not even Russia, whose interest in the Balkans was so relevant to her hegemony of the Slavs, seems to have wanted the status quo altered by war. While they did not ultimately attempt to stop the disturbance of this status quo they must certainly did their best to avert a European war. To do this, the representatives met in London after the truce of December to agree on a common policy. This conference was the result of a proposal by M. Poincaré and was conducted under the presidency of Sir Edward Grey. The Conference succeeded in averting a general European conflict and the credit for this success is given by Prince Lichnowsky to Sir Edward Grey. "Sir Edward Grey conducted the negotiations with prudence, calmness and tact. As often as a question threatened to become complicated, he suggested "a formula of agreement that met the case and was inevitably accepted. His personality won him equal confidence
"among all who took part in the conference". (1) Furthermore, Lichnowsky asserts that while Germany took the point of view of Austria and Italy, Grey almost never supported France or Russia. (2) Jagow, the German Foreign Secretary contradicts this however (3) and his contention is supported by Benckendorff, the Russian Ambassador to London. (4) Grey himself however gives us the assertion that Germany as well as England worked for peace. (5)

The outcome of the Conference as given by Prince Lichnowsky was "Russia had been obliged to give way to us (Triple Alliance) all along the line; in no instance was it able to attain satisfaction of the Serbien desire. Albania was set up as an Austrian vassal state and Serbia was thrust back from the sea. The outcome of the conference was therefore a new humiliation of Russian national sentiment. As in 1678 and 1905, we had placed ourselves in opposition to the Russian program although our German interests were involved........It is almost needless to add that our extreme Austrophil attitude was not precisely adapted to loosen the Entente or to direct Russia's attention to its Asiatic interests" (6) Whatever may have been the attitude of the Entente as a whole, it seems clear that Russian aspirations as a Serbien champion were by no means

(1). Lichnowsky, p. 49.
(2). Ibid.
(3). Ibid., p. 1-5.
negatived and I think it would not be presumptive to say that the movement towards the hegemony of the Slavs was given an impetus by the defeat of Russian interests at this conference.

Let us examine the policies of the individual powers as regards the Balkan question. Russia's interest was partly nationalistic, the idea of a Slavic-Teutonic war seemed to be growing while, as has been said, the idea of the Balkan States as under Russian protection dated at least as early as 1908. Furthermore the desire to get to Constantinople and the Straits was strong in Russia and the road thither led through the Balkan States. Thus if the Triple Alliance controlled this route Russian objectives would be blocked--hence the friction between Austria and Russia down to and including 1914.

Still in 1912 as in 1908 Russia did not want a general war and further she did not want Bulgaria to acquire too much Turkish territory. To this extent then her aims were satisfied when the conference left Turkey with a strip of European territory barring Bulgaria from Constantinople. Serbian aims were again curbed as in 1908 yet all through the crisis there seems to have been a conviction on the part of Russia that a war with Austria was ultimately inevitable. (1) At the same time it was realized how difficult it would be for England to understand "that a Serbian har-

(1). Siebert, p.401.
"bour on the Adriatic or the size of Albanian territory...... "might step by step lead up to the war". (1) It was under
the aegis of Russia that the Balkan League was formed in 1912,
and during the Russo-Serb negotiations the same counsel
was given as in 1908-1909, namely ".....watchful waiting". Yet at the same time the idea was played up strongly that
the two Balkan wars were regarded "as only the first step
"towards a war with Austria--in other words, a general Eur-
"opean war." (2)

In France, the advent of M. Poincaré as Premier in
1912 and as President in 1913, in which latter position he
was to determine French foreign policy, meant to Russia a
strengthening of the Entente. Delcassé went to Petersburg
as Ambassador and it must be remembered that he had been
forced to resign in 1905 when his policy of war with Ger-
many was rejected. Izvolsky the Russian Ambassador to
Paris kept in close touch with Poincaré and thus a policy
of close intimacy with Russia was introduced. In fact,
Poincaré asserted more than once that in case a European
war broke out over the Balkan crisis, France would join
Russia. (3) In July 1912, he visited St. Petersburg where
he signed a naval convention with Russia. In fact during
the ten years prior to the Great War the Chiefs of the
Military Staffs of France and Russia met annually for the

(2). Ewart, p. 1029.
(3). Siebert, p. 403.
purpose of consultation as to preparation for war with Germany. The minutes of the conference of 1911, 1912 and 1913 have been published in "Un Livre Noir" and they are interesting in dispelling any idea that Germany attacked an unprepared France. In 1912, these military conferences were supplemented by similar conferences between the naval staffs. While the Franco-Russian treaty defined the reason for joint action as an attack by Germany or by Austria supported by Germany on Russia or France (1) Poincaré evidently considered that France was bound to support Russia in her Balkan aspirations as well as to come to her aid in case of direct attack. The policy thus laid down had its result in 1914. Russia had French promises of support, she was strong enough, whereas in 1908 and 1912 she was weak or did not consider the occasion suspicious and consequently the catastrophe occurred. In 1899 Delcassé had obtained a modification of the Franco-Russian treaty so that the two Powers agreed to preserve the "equilibrium between the forces" of Europe, in other words the "balance of power". (2) At this time it was the disruption of the Austrian Empire which menaced the European equilibrium now there was a "perfectly new standpoint of France in the matter of the territorial aggrandisement of Austria in the Balkans, whereas France up to the present, had declared that local, so to speak, Balkan events could not

(1). See above, chapter 2.
(2). Ibid.
"induce her to take any active measures, the French Govern-
ment now appears to admit that an acquisition of territory
on the part of Austria in the Balkans would affect the
general European equilibrium and consequently also the
special interest of France" (1) Izvolsky said that "well-
"informed and responsible persons envisage with much optim-
ism the chances of Russia and France in case of a general
conflagration. This optimistic point of view is based on
the consideration (among others) of the diversion that
will be produced by the united forces of the Balkan States
(except Roumania) who will draw against them a part of
the Austro-Hungarian forces. A favorable element for
Russia and France will be the immobilization of Italy,
who will be tied as much by the African war as by her
special agreements with France." (2) However "on the
whole we may conclude that M. Poincaré's position was
"like that of the other statesmen of Europe. The war, he
"thought, must 'come'; he was ready to take his part in
"it when it did; but meantime he would rather it did not
"come—or not just yet! For one reason, French public
"opinion was insufficiently prepared to comprehend the nec-
"essity for a war about the Balkans; and further financial
"interests were opposed to it." (3)

Turning to the third member of the Triple Entente—

(1). Siebert, p. 393.
(2). Livre Noir I. p. 326.
(3). Dickinson, p. 334.
Great Britain—we find Sir Edward Grey throughout working for peace. The Conference of Ambassadors, as has been said, was conducted in London under the presidency of the English Foreign Minister. Apparently throughout he kept in close touch with both Russia and Germany. At first, respect for the feelings of the Mohammedan part of the Empire prevented Grey from pressing too hardly on Turkey. However this attitude changed as Benckendorff's letter to Sazonoff shows, "The entire conversation with Grey proves that he has completely veered round in his opinions, in "the interests of the maintenance of the Entente, and that "he is resolved, for the sake of the Entente to grant far "greater concessions at the cost of Turkey than he was "prepared to grant hitherto." (1) Britain and Russia agreed to the frontier which was drawn and Grey agreed that the question of the Straits when it was raised should be solved in favor of Russia.

Grey was unwilling to commit himself as to Great Britain's action in case of a European war—and this is shown in Benckendorff's letter of November 1912. "When I drew "Grey's attention to the solidarity of the Triple Alliance, "and asked him if he could tell me anything about England's "attitude, in case our efforts to prevent an Austrian act- "ion were not successful, he replied, after some moment's "reflection, that it was impossible for him to give a "direct answer to a question referring to a possibility, (1). Siebert, p. 387.
"which, since his interview with Mensdorff, no longer appeared probable; and also because the attitude of England depended, above all, on the attitude of the remaining Powers. The attitude of solidarity gives us valuable indications in that respect but no positive facts." (1). However, Grey gave Lichnowsky to understand that Germany must not count on English neutrality in case of war (2) while Sir Arthur Nicolson intimated to Cambon that he thought if the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente came to war, England would take part. (3)

Let us turn now to the attitude of the individual Powers of the Triple Alliance. Austria's interest was direct, for the satisfaction of Serbia's ambitions would have meant the break-up of the Austrian Empire. On the whole, she seems to have made concessions—she consented to the division of the Sanjak of Novibazar between Serbia and Montenegro and while at first opposing it finally agreed to the holding of a conference over the Balkan question. Still she made this policy conditional upon the exclusion of Serbia from territorial additions on the Adriatic. Albania was set up and the difficulty of getting the Powers to agree to the boundaries of this independent state then arose. As far as the Balkan States were concerned, Montenegro protested for a while and complications threatened, she was finally won around and the situation

(1). Siebert, p. 309.
(2). Ibid. p. 423.
was cleared up for the time being. However, the situation was such as to draw forth the following comment from a diplomat of the time, "Owing to their mutual feelings of mistrust the Great Powers had come to such a miserable and shameful pass that their very existence or non-existence, the weal or woe of England, France, Germany, might depend upon the favour and ambition of a few politicians and fanatics the representatives of small States which are less advanced in civilization." (1)

Italy's position during the crisis was more complicated; she was bound by treaties to both the Triple Alliance and the Entente. In 1901 she had signed a treaty with Austria supporting autonomy for Albania and hence she was bound to defend Austrian policy in excluding Serbia and Montenegro from Albania. Thus, if war had broken out over this question Italy, it would appear, would have supported the Triple Alliance. On the other hand the Franco-Italian Treaty of 1902 was interpreted by France as meaning that Italy should remain neutral in any Franco-German war even if France should take the initiative.

The Italian attitude regarding Albania and her own obligations to Austria seems to have astonished Poincaré, but he said "there is no doubt that in the decisive moment Italy will always find it possible to give to the agreement the interpretation she wants." (2) In fact,

(1). Dickinson, p. 324.
(2). Livre Noir i. p. 361.
Izvolsky says "that neither the Triple Entente nor the 
"Triple Alliance can count on the loyalty of Italy, that 
"the Italian Government will employ all its efforts to 
"preserve the peace, and that, in case of war, it will 
"begin by adopting a waiting attitude and then join the 
"camp to which victory is inclining." (1)

Still it is significant to note that in August 1913, 
the Austrian Government communicated to Italy and Germany 
its intention of taking action against Serbia. The Italian 
reply was "If Austria intervenes against Serbia, it is 
"clear that a casus foederis cannot be established. It is 
"a step which she is taking on her own account. There is 
"no question of defense inasmuch as no one is thinking of 
"attacking her. It is necessary that a declaration to this 
"effect should be made to Austria in the most formal way, 
"and we hope for action on the part of Germany to dissuade 
"Austria from this most perilous adventure." (2) Lichnowsky 
gives to this note from Italy the credit of saving Germany 
from being involved in a world war in the summer of 1913.(3) 
However this may have been it is certain that while Italy 
was in the position where she had "bet" on either side 
still she did not at this time desire war.

Germany's part in this crisis seems to have been as pacific as was that of Great Britain. We have Grey's

(1). Livre noir, p. 363.
(3). Ibid. p. 277.
assurance of this and furthermore as Mr. Morel says "If "Germany had wanted war--she that was always ready, as "Bismarck once said to Grisi--a word of encouragement to "Austria was all that would have been needed."(1) While she supported her ally in the negotiations (2) the same as Poincaré supported Russia, it must be remembered that she had also a direct interest in the Balkan question--the Bagdad Railway--whereas France's interest was the indirect "balance of power". The Kaiser seems throughout to have counselled against war even though he assured his support to Austria. Whatever may have been the extent of the feeling in Germany that eventually a war would come with the Slavs, this was no more than the feeling which was extent in both Russia and France that war with Germanism was inevitable. On the other hand we have the testimony of Sazonoff himself who wrote "German diplomacy, and particularly the "German Secretary of State, have from the beginning, seconded my efforts to bring about solidarity of action on the "part of the Great European Powers in the most loyal and "forceful manner. M. von Lieterlen has personally laboured "most zealously to promote an understanding between London, "Paris, Vienna and Petersburg which has now happily been "attained." (3) While the Russian Ambassador in Berlin wrote,"The more I look about me, the more I listen, the

(2). Lichnowsky, p. 49.
(3). Dickinson, p. 336.
"more I come to the conclusion that in Berlin they wish "at all costs to avoid war, and that they have in all "probability made this clear to Vienna." (1) From this evidence then it would seem that Germany was working for peace throughout the whole crisis.

In this crisis as in those of 1908 and 1911, the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente were pursuing divergent and conflicting policies—though Italy which had practically declared her independence of the Central Powers in 1911 now seemed to be watching to see which group would prove to be the strongest. In fact, "1912-1913 like 1908-1909, "was a full dress rehearsal of 1914. All the forces were "drawn up, all the explosives assembled, only as it so "happened no one in those years fired the fuse. Europe "had one last chance, the breathing space of a year."(2) Out of this situation preparation for the final catastrophe went on. Russia and France were closer than ever, thanks to M. Poincaré and Izvolsky. Russian subsidizing of the French Press was carried on quite extensively (3) with the result that the three-year military law was passed and agitation against France letting Russia drag her into a war was stopped. In fact it seems to have been the joint conviction of Poincaré and Izvolsky that war with Germany was inevitable, that the Entente should be strength-

(2). Dickinson, p. 339.
ened and the Central Powers shown that their dictation was over. Together they agreed that the pacific French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Georges Louis, should be replaced by the Germanophobe Delcassé. It was Poincaré's opposition which stopped the agreement between England and Germany, (1) and it was through Poincaré's influence that the naval agreement between England and Russia was effected in 1914, after Izvolsky had brought the Russo-French naval pact of 1912. Izvolsky wrote to Sazonoff concerning his interview with Poincaré in July 1913, "From this interview I was convinced "that Mr. Poincaré is in every respect in accord with us, "considers the moment has finally arrived to realize the "century old aims of our traditional policy, and thereby "restore the European balance of power by the return of the "stolen provinces of Alsace-Lorraine."

However there are other events which must be looked into before the final act in 1914 which touched the spark to the powder magazine. The fact that Austria's enemies in the Balkans were becoming stronger and the probability of an Austro-Russian conflict caused Germany to feel very uneasy. Moreover Italy was an uncertain ally and French enmity was as strong if not stronger than ever. Germany had to defend both her eastern and western frontiers in case of war and the increase in the French army on the west coupled with a similar increase of Russian forces on the eastern frontier was a factor of intense alarm. (2)

(1). See above, chapter 5.
(2). Siebert, pp. 670-671.
The consequence was the German government proposed to draft all conscripted young men into active service and thus increase the size of her standing army. The testimony of the Belgian Minister in Berlin, Baron Beyens, and the American Colonel House (1) is that the whole atmosphere in Germany was charged and peace remained at the mercy of an accident.

In France too, there was alarm, the presence of Poincaré—in close cooperation with Izvolsky—the knowledge of increased German armaments, the subsidized press campaigns, the fears caused by the Balkan crisis and the memories of Tangier and Agadir all contributed to form a strong patriotic sentiment, in fact a sentiment of chauvinism. The Belgian Minister in Paris was able to write in March, 1915, "I realize every day the growth of a feeling of suspicion and chauvinism in France......People demand the immediate, one might say, the jubilant passage of any measure calculated to increase France's defensive strength. The most reasonable people maintain that France must arm herself to the teeth, in order to terrify her opponent and so prevent war." (2)

Russo-German relations also were strained. When towards the end of 1913 the Turkish Government asked Germany for an officer to reorganize its army and Liman von Sanders was sent Russia saw a fresh obstacle to her desire for the

(2). Morel, p. 240.
opening of the Straits. Furthermore, the German Ambassador at Constantinople would be backed up by military power to the prejudice of the Entente Ambassadors. The Russian Press was greatly incensed; in fact Grey told Lichnowsky (speaking of Russia) that he had "never seen them so excited"(1). A compromise was finally reached—a moral satisfaction to Russia—but the embitterment of Sazanoff was far from appeased. This is seen in the fact that he suggested to the Tsar "the necessity of a comprehensive programme of action, "in order to assure for us (Russia) a satisfactory solution "of the question of the Straits in the event of being comp­"elled at no distant period to defend our (Russia's) inter­"ests in the Bosphorus and Dardanelles." (2) Negotiations took place secretly in a Crown Council while the press openly advocated preparedness and made such statements as "The crossing of the Austrian frontier by the Russian army "will become an unavoidable decision" and "The hour is "approaching.........It is necessary to work on the army "from top to bottom, day and night." (3) Increased sums were spent on the army and navy. Finally on June 13,1914 appeared the article "Russia is ready. France must be "ready too". (4) The Russian Army was greatly increased, the French Three Years Service law must be passed hence liberal subsidies were given to the French press to buy

(1). Lichnowsky, p. 57.
(2). Gooch, p. 520.
(3). Morel, p. 276.
(4). Ibid. p. 301.
over opposition to this law. (1) Yes, "Russia was ready"—in 1906 she did not consider herself strong enough to come to grips with Austria; by 1912 the time was not yet ripe but by 1914 all was in readiness—all that was needed was the final act and this time she would no longer counsel delay. It came on June 28, 1914.

Meanwhile, the relations between Great Britain and Germany had been undergoing a slight change for the better. An agreement over the Fortuniaese colonies was negotiated but not finally settled while the question of the Baghdad Railway was disposed of, on June 28, 1914. This temporary detente between England and Germany was foreshadowed upon by Russia with utmost advantage, as the diplomatic documents of the period show. (2) The Russian impatience gave rise to further attempts to tighten the bonds of the Entente and negotiations were entered into between Russia and Great Britain towards a naval agreement similar to that existing between England and France. Yet it is true Sir Edward Grey maintained that no negotiations with any Power had been or were being undertaken which could limit the freedom of the Entente. Thus a look back over the Anglo-French military and naval conferences at London of 1904, the agreement of 1910, and the Anglo-Russian conversations of 1912, it is hard to imagine that Sir Edward Grey meant when he said on June 30, "Yes.

(1) "Netton" (Po. For.) Nov. 24, 14.
(2) "Ibert,"
This then was the situation in Europe but before we turn to the final rupture between the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, we must examine the situation in Serbia which led to the murder of the Archduke. In 1908, after the annexation of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Narodna Odbrana (National Defense) had been formed by a number of influential Serbians. (1) Its activities were said to be cultural and were defined as the "collection of material concerning the situation and condition in Austria-Hungary, and especially the enlightening of the people in Serbia as to the ideals, rights and duties of Serbia and the Serbian people." (2) In 1911 another and secret society called the "Black Hand" was formed having as its aims "the realization of the national ideal; the unification of Serbdom" and "the revolutionary struggle takes precedence over the cultural one" (3) The existence of the latter was known to the Government and in 1914 its leader, Dimitrievich, was chief of the Intelligence Service of the Serbian Army. According to the evidence collected by Miss Durham in her book "The Sarajevo Crime" it was this man who conceived the plot to murder the Austrian Archduke when he arrived at Sarajevo. The details of the plot and the names of those implicated do not concern us here, but the question as to whether the Serbian Government was

aware of the proposed assassination most certainly is of importance. The evidence collected since the war shows that M. Paschitch, the Prime Minister, was aware of the plot and also that no warning of any kind was received by the Austrian Foreign Office. (1) Hence it would appear that the plot to murder the Archduke Franz Ferdinand while no doubt that of a secret society of limited membership (2) and perhaps not directly sanctioned by the Serbian Government was by no means unknown to that Government. Not that the fact of its being known would have averted the war had Europe as a whole been cognizant of this side of the case, and not that this in any way excuses Austria's determined action in 1914, but only to show that after all the final spark which ignited the powder of European alliances and counteralliances might easily have been snuffed out before it had time to cause the catastrophe.

The situation in Europe in July 1914, would seem then to have been as follows: The two rival groups—Triple Alliance and Triple Entente—faced each other each one stronger than ever before. The members of the Alliance were pledged to help one another if one of them was attacked; (3) a similar obligation existed between France and Russia and Great Britain, free as Sir Edward Grey thought, had given verbal assurances to assist France if she were the victim of an unprovoked attack by Germany. These latter

(1). Miss Durham.
(2). Some five hundred members.
(3). Except that Italy was not bound to assist Austria if she were attacked by Russia alone and Austria was not bound to assist Germany against French attack.
agreements were reinforced by military and naval understandings which specified where and to what extent the promised assistance should be given. Thus a hostile act on the part of one Power would inevitably bring the whole of Europe to war. This system of alliances dated from that between Austria and Germany in 1879 with Italy entering in 1882; the Franco-Russian alliance of 1891-1894 may be regarded as a reply to the German move while the later agreements of Great Britain with France and Russia further increased the strength of the Franco-Russian reply. As the years went on the links within each group were tightened and the tendency grew for the two to oppose each other as for instance in 1905, 1908, 1909, and 1912-1913. After the Balkan wars the lines had been drawn tighter than ever.

This "European Anarchy" as Mr. Dickinson has called it (1) was a mighty duel between the two groups. The continued existence of Austrian influence in the Balkans was essential to Germany's plans in Turkey, and for the Bagdad Railway. On the other hand, the same situation was a menace to Russia's aspirations for Constantinople and the Straits. Further increase of Austro-German domination of the near East would negative Russia's hopes and furthermore would upset the European equilibrium or balance of power. Each group seems to have been convinced that the issue would have to be decided some day and hence preparations proceeded rapidly during the years before 1914.

Whether any of them actually desired war is not so clear but it is perfectly evident that either group was prepared to fight rather than concede to its rival any great diplomatic success which would upset the balance unfavorably to them.

Crisis followed crisis from 1905 on, first in Morocco, then in the Balkans, back again to Morocco, to return in 1912-1913 to the Balkans. The latter crisis was hardly settled when the final act was committed and but a short time was to elapse before the two groups were at each other's throats. The final clash came over the question which had menaced peace since 1908 and even, though in less acute form, since the Congress of Berlin.
Chapter 6.

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Chapter 7.

The Outbreak of War.

The murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand on June 28, 1914, brought the Balkan question to a climax—there were two alternatives—the success of the Greater Serbia movement or the complete subjugation and punishment of Serbia. To Austria this meant humiliation or satisfaction, while to Russia, with her Pan Slavic dreams, it meant the realization of her aspirations or defeat of her scheme to reach Constantinople and the Straits. With the Pan-Slavic period always before her eyes and in the light of past events (1) there was no doubt a strong reason why Austria took the attitude expressed in the words of the Emperor to Wilhelm II, "the aim of my Government in the future must "lie in the isolation and diminution of Serbia", as she formed "the nucleus of the Pan-Slavic policy." (2) The Kaiser's reply was that Austria could rely on German help; that he realized Russia would be hostile but was ready for such an eventuality and would not hesitate from standing by his ally and furthermore he was "willing to support "the efforts of the Austrian (your) Government for preventing "the establishment of a new Balkan league under the "patronage of Russia hostile to Austria-Hungary, and over- "more to bring about the accession of Bulgaria to the Trip-

(1). 1908 and 1912-1913.
(2). German Secret War Documents (Franz Joseph to the Kaiser)
"He Alliance". (1) Austria formulated the idea and did not make the proposal at the instigation of Berlin, but this does not however excuse German encouragement to the Dual Monarchy.

Much has been made of the so-called "Potsdam Conference" of July 5th and 6th, at which war had been decided upon. What actually happened was that, on the afternoon of the 5th and the morning of the 6th, the Emperor had a series of conversations with various highly placed officers, though not with either von Moltke or von Tirpitz, the heads of the Army and the Navy, both of whom were away on leave and neither of whom were recalled. He informed those whom he interviewed of the attitude adopted towards the Serbian crisis. "He made it clear that he did not anticipate the intervention of Russia; but since such intervention was possible, and since it might be supported by France, it was well that the minds of the soldiers and sailors should be prepared. No mobilization nor preliminaries thereto followed these conversations." (2)

The result of the reception of this German reply was the summoning of two Crown Councils on July 7 and July 19, at the latter of which the text of the note to Serbia was settled and it was decided to deliver it on the 23rd. The exact conditions of the demands on Serbia were deliberately

(2). Dickinson, p. 416.
withheld from Bethmann-Hollweg and von Jagow, though apparently the demands of the note were known as early as the 12th to von Jagow.\footnote{Dickinson, p. 420.} They did not obtain a copy of the note until the evening of July 22nd, rather late to protest against its delivery. On the 23rd, the note was presented and it set forth in ten articles Austria's demands on Serbia. These demands were:—to suppress any publication which fosters hatred of, and contempt for, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, to dissolve the Narodna Žabran and other similar societies, to eliminate from public instruction in Serbia that which serves to foster anti-Austro-Hungarian propaganda, to dismiss all officials, military and otherwise, who were guilty of such propaganda, to allow Austro-Hungarian officials to co-operate in the suppression of the anti-Austro-Hungarian movement, to commence a judicial investigation against the members of the conspiracy of June 28, allowing Austro-Hungarian officials to co-operate, to arrest certain officials who had been compromised through the investigation, to prevent smuggling of arms and explosives across the frontier and to give explanations for the remarks of Serbian officials who had expressed themselves in a hostile manner against Austria-Hungary. Finally a reply was to be forthcoming within forty-eight hours. Both von Jagow and Bethmann-Hollweg pronounced the ultimatum too harsh and too severe. The Serbian reply was by no means an uncondi-
ional surrender, and it too was held up by Berchtold and German Foreign Office first learned of its nature and contents through the Serbian Minister in Berlin. Bethmann-Hollweg and von Jagow were satisfied with it, and in the words of the Kaiser, "on the whole the wishes of the Danube Monarchy have been fulfilled. The few reservations which Serbia makes on several points can, according to my judgment be cleared away by negotiations. But capitulation of "the most humiliating kind is thereby announced to the whole "world and through this every cause for war disappears." (1)

It is important to consider the Russian view of the demands. Samonoff denounced them, especially the dissolution of the Narodna Odbrana and Austro-Hungary functionaries taking an active part in suppressing the movement in Serbia; these latter two were settled satisfactorily and hence this ground of complaint was removed. On the whole he seems to have thought that Austria had good reason for complaint but had not framed her demands properly. However he offered no help in the redrafting of the document.

Sir Edward Grey considered the time limit placed on the reply as undesirable but in his opinion the merits of the dispute between Austria and Serbia were no concern to the British Government. In an interview with Cambon the latter expressed an opinion that the demands would influence Russia towards warlike acts and that nothing could be done until Russia had committed herself one way or another. Grey feared (1). German White Book, #293.
Russian action and suggested that Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany should mediate. Accordingly on July 26 the four Powers were notified of this proposal and the answers from France and Italy were favorable to it. Italy made a suggestion that Serbia accept the note as a European note while Austria and Russia stood aside. Apparently this suggestion was completely passed over by Grey; had it been accepted there is no doubt that even at this date (July 27th) a settlement could have been arranged. Germany on the other hand would only take part in mediation at Austria's express wish. Nevertheless the Chancellor evidently desired peace for he wired to Vienna as follows, "By rejecting every sort of mediation we should be made responsible before the whole world for the conflagration. Our situation is all the more difficult as Serbia has apparently given way very far. We cannot, therefore, reject the role of mediator and must lay before the Vienna Cabinet the English proposals. Ascertain Berchtold's view of the English plan and of Sazonoff's wish to negotiate direct with Vienna." (1) On the 28th he wired again to the German Ambassador at Vienna, "The answer now at hand of the Serbian Government to the Austrian ultimatum makes it evident that Serbia has in fact met the Austrian demands in so wide reaching a manner that if the Austro-Hungarian Government adopted a wholly intransigent attitude a gradual revulsion of public opin-

(1). German White Book.
"ion against it in all Europe would have to be reckoned with.

"..... (Russia will be satisfied) if the Vienna Cabinet re-
"peats in Petrograd the definite declaration that territorial
"acquisitions in Serbia lie far from its purpose and that
"its military measures aim solely at a temporary occupation
"of Belgrade and other definite points of Serbian territory
"in order to compel the Serbian Government to a complete
"fulfillment of the demands and to serve as guarantees for
"future good behavior of which Austria-Hungary unquestion-
"ably has a claim after her experiences with Serbia..... As
"soon as the Austrian demands were fulfilled, a withdrawal
"would follow..... You are immediately to express yourself
"in this sense to Count Berchtold emphatically and have
"take the proper step in Petrograd. You are carefully to
"avoid giving the impression that we wish to hold Austria
"back. It is solely a question of finding a method which
"will make possible the accomplishment of Austria's purpose
"of cutting the vital nerve of Great Serbian propaganda
"without at the same time unchaining a world war, and in
"the end if this is unavoidable, of improving as far as
"practicable the conditions under which it is to be waged." (1)

Bethmann-Hollweg did not want to see his ally worsted by
the Pan-Slavic schemes but at the same time he did not wish
to see her take actions that would lead to a world war.

No reply was forthcoming from Vienna however and Beth-

man-Hollweg, due to the fact that disquieting rumors as to Austria's actions were coming from the other capitals sent a further telegram to Tschirschky, the German Ambassador, on July 29. This telegram is important as showing that by this time he was becoming suspicious as to Austrian motives; "I am watching the attitude of the Government at Vienna and its inconsistent procedure towards the various governments with growing consternation. At Petersburg it declares itself to be territorially disinterested, we are left entirely in the dark about its program; Rome is put off with meaningless remarks on the question of compensations; "at London Count Hensdorff himself in contradiction to the solemn declarations of Vienna at Petersburg. Out of these contradictions I must gather that the disavowal of Count Hoyos (who on July 5 or 6 at Berlin had spoken unofficially of Austria's partitioning Serbia) had been decided upon for the gallery and that the Government at Vienna has plans which it considers best to keep secret from us, so as to make sure in all cases of German support while not risking a possible refusal by means of a frank statement." (1)

While still waiting for a reply to the last telegram, Bethmann-Hollweg took up two more peace proposals and supported both at Vienna. One was Sazonoff's suggestion for negotiations by direct conversations between Vienna and Petrograd. (2) This suggestion had been previously re-

(1). German White Book, f361 (July 29th)
(2). How the War Began, f1058.
jected by Berchtold because Sazonoff had intended that the conversations should take up modifications of the terms of the Austrian ultimatum. This to him was a local issue and furthermore he considered the time for a peaceful settlement had passed. The other plan which the German Chancellor took up was Grey’s proposal for mediation between Austria and Russia on the basis of Serbia’s answer to the Austrian ultimatum. In sending this proposal of Grey’s on to Vienna Bethmann-Hollweg made his pledge plan, that Serbia’s answer was a suitable basis for negotiation along with an occupation of a part of Serbian territory as a pledge (1). But Berchtold’s reply was “......the Imperial and Royal Government cannot conceal its surprise at the assumption that its action against Servia was aimed at Russia and Russian influence in the Balkans a supposition which would imply that the propaganda against the Dual Monarchy is not only Servian but also of Russian origin. Aitherto we have presumed that official Russian circles had no connection with the agitation against the Dual Monarchy and our present action is directed solely against Servia, while our sentiment towards Russia are perfectly friendly as we can assure Sir Edward Grey. At the same time the Austro-Hungarian Government must point out that, to its sincere regret it no longer is in a position to meet the Servian reply in the spirit of the British suggestions since at the time when the German request was presented here a state of war (1). Autsky Documents 384.
"already existed between the Dual Monarchy and Servia and "thus the Servian reply had been superseded by events" (1) Bethmann-Hollweg's efforts towards halting Austria's war-like mood were, in the light of these replies, without avail. It is evident then that while Germany had given Austria a "blank cheque" on July 7, later efforts, when the results of the Austro-Serbian quarrel could be more clearly seen and when the Serbian reply was received, were most certainly made to prevent the outbreak. By the time it was too late, already the position of the Chancellor was being weakened by his continual replies to the "aider and military staff, of "No word from Vienna". He was being strongly pressed by them and by public feeling to come to a decision as to Germany's attitude.

Meanwhile it is necessary to look at events in Russia following the assassination. Immediate steps had not been taken in Austria against Serbia though the Austrian Press persisted in making the Serbian people responsible for the crime. This drew forth the remark from Sazonoff, "Russia "would not be indifferent to any effort to humiliate Ser- "bia. "Russia could not permit Austria to use menacing lang- "usage or military measures against Serbia. In short, 'La "politique de la Russie est pacifique, mais pas passive' (2). No doubt the visit of Poincaré and Viviani and the conversa- tions between the officials of the two countries had a great effect on Sazonoff's attitude. On July 24 Viviani

(1). Austrian Red Book XLIV.
(2). Kautsky Documents #140 (Pourtelis to Bethmann July 21)
sent a telegram to the acting Minister of Foreign Affairs in Paris, the burden of which was to the effect that Russia and France might, "by means of a friendly conversation" persuade Berchtold to act in moderation towards Serbia and furthermore it was considered desirable to bring the "advantage of this procedure to the notice of Sir Edward Grey." (1) Evidently the Entente was planning identical "counsels of moderation" when a few hours later the news of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia broke.

This news had perhaps nowhere such a startling effect as in Russia. Russian interests in the Balkans, especially as regards Serbia, we already know; this act was a direct blow at Pan Slavic dreams. What was Sazonoff to do? Poincaré had left Russia and it was practically impossible to get in touch with him as he was now on the high seas. The only hope then was not to localize the quarrel but to seek to have it treated as a question in which the whole of Europe was concerned. Consequently he met and discussed the situation with Paléologue (the French Ambassador) and Buchanan (the English Ambassador) (2) and endeavored to procure a "declaration of complete solidarity of His Majesty's Government with the French and Russian Governments". Buchanan however made no statement of solidarity but Sazonoff "said that he himself thought that Russian "mobilization would at any rate have to be carried out." (3)

(1). Diplomatic Correspondence #22 (July 24)
(2). Ibid. #6 (Buchanan to Grey, July 24)
(3). Ibid.
On July 25, a Grown Council was held and a partial mobilization was decided in case Austria crossed the Serbian frontier. The final order for this mobilization was left to the discretion of Sazonoff. He proposed "direct negotiations" between Vienna and Petrograd on July 26, but two days later the news arrived that Austria had declared war on Serbia and Sazonoff decided to approve the partial mobilization against Serbia. On the 29th the Tsar agreed but on receipt of a wire from the Kaiser that the quarrel could be localized he ordered the cessation of mobilization. Meanwhile however the military staff had decided that partial mobilization was not enough and that general mobilization should be prepared, the consequence was, when Austria refused the German proposals and bombarded Belgrade the Tsar yielded to the war party (on July 30) and approved general mobilization which was to begin on the 31st.

The following points then emerge from the Russian situation. On July 29th, Russian Partial mobilization was in full swing and was caused by the refusal of direct conversations on Austria's part and by her declaration of war on Serbia. The Tsar influenced by the Kaiser's telegram made an impracticable attempt to stop mobilization much to the chagrin of the military staff who wished general mobilization and still carried on their preparations. On July 30 he approved general mobilization thus legalizing the preparations of his staff and conforming with their wishes. The actual mobilization began on July 31st.
The Russian mobilization was answered in Germany by the declaration of the "Threatened State of War" on July 31st, with this the whole German military machine was set in motion though formal mobilization was not declared until August 1. The militarists were now in control in both Berlin and Petrograd and any subsequent efforts for peace could have very little chance of success. If the German Government really desired peace there seems no reason why they could not simply answer Russian mobilization by the same measures. "But the German militarists insisted that "mobilization meant war and therefore Bethmann despatched "the ultimata to Russia and to France, to which but one an-
swer was possible on their part." (1)

In summing up events to the declaration of war by Germany on France and Russia the following points are to be noted. The "blank cheque" to Austria from Bethmann-Hollweg no doubt gave Russia reasonable grounds to fear for Serbia and must be considered Germany's first blunder. This may then be said to have been to some extent responsible for the partial mobilization of Russia decided on July 25. The pressure of German and Russian militarists hindered the Chancellor's "localization" scheme and likewise Sazonoff's "direct conversation" project. The refusal of Germany to accept a four Power conference was her second blunder. The belated attempts of Bethmann-Hollweg to re-

strain Austria were sincere and commendable but they were belated and Russian militarists were able to proceed with general mobilization thus playing into the hands of the German military party. On the other hand we cannot dispute the fact that Russia did mobilize first and it was not until she had done so that Germany took action. The Russian mobilization precipitated the war at a time when Bethmann-Hollweg was endeavoring to restrain his ally and when the Kaiser and the Tsar were in telegraphic communication.

Early in July (6th) the German Ambassador had broached the subject to Sir Edward Grey of England making an attempt to persuade Russia to induce a pacific attitude in Serbia. A few days later the Foreign Secretary gave assurances that he had been endeavoring to persuade the Russian Government to adopt a more peaceful view towards Austria but he thought that much depended on the kind of measures Austria was considering as to whether they would arouse Slavic feelings to too great an extent.

From then on to the day of the Austrian ultimatum Grey apparently was getting anxious for the cause of European peace. On learning the details of the Austrian demands he proposed to Lichnowsky (July 25) an extension of time for the reply. Later when the Serbian reply came to his knowledge he proposed mediation by the great Powers between Austria and Russia.

In the meantime Buchanan the British Ambassador had an audience with Sazonoff on July 4th, (1) the outcome of (1). See above, p. 228.
which has already been given. On the 25th, Grey in a despatch to Buchanan approved of what the Ambassador had said to Sazonoff but he continued, "The sudden, brusque and peremptory character of the Austrian demarché makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will have mobilized against each other." (1) Further in a conversation with the Russian Ambassador on the same day, Grey foresaw that the Austrian mobilization might entail the Russian mobilization. This was seized upon by Berchtold and relayed by him to Sazonoff as "That the Austrian mobilization would entail Russian mobilization". (2) It would appear then that Buchanan's refusal to pledge English support to the Entente was largely negatived by Grey's remarks to Benckendorff. Whether this was the deciding factor in the Russian mobilization it is perhaps hard to say but there is no doubt but that from the 25th on, Sazonoff thought that Grey was rather counting on a mobilization by Russia against Austria. Unfortunately the situation was more involved than perhaps Grey realized and in spite of his pacific intentions he had unwittingly contributed largely to the triumph of the military authorities in Russia.

The German ultimatum was despatched to Petrograd on July 31st. demanding the cessation of general mobilization within twelve hours. Meanwhile the Austrian Ambassador on the 31st made an attempt at direct conversations with Sazonoff.

(2). Current History, May 1925 (from Russian Orange Bk #20)
off—as is shown in his despatch to Berchtold, "I said that "the two of your instructions dealt with the misunderstand-
ing arising out of our refusal to discuss matters any fur-
ther with Russia. As I said even before I was authorized "to do so (1) this conception is erroneous. I pointed out "that you were not only willing to enter into negotiations "with Russia on a most comprehensive basis but even to dis-
cuss the wording of our note inasmuch as it was only a "question of interpretation. (2) Sazonoff's reaction to this "suggestion was such as to draw from him the hope that neg-
otiations might be carried out by the British Government "but that it was necessary for the success of these negot-
ations that Austria should stop her military operations "against Serbia. This resulted in Grey's attempt to com-
promise. He suggested (3) that Austrian military action "should proceed for the present, but that Russia should "stop her mobilization against Austria. This proposal was "favorably received by the German Foreign Secretary but he "said, "that it was no use discussing it until the Russian "Government had sent in their answer to the German demand(4) "—that she inform Germany within twelve hours that she would "immediately countermand her mobilization against the Central "Powers. A favorable reply was not forthcoming. German mob-
ilization was ordered and Grey's attempt at mediation came

The reports of German mobilization led the English Foreign Secretary to take up the question of Belgian neutrality. On the evening of the 31st, he asked both Paris and Berlin whether they would pledge themselves to respect the neutrality of Belgium. The German answer was evasive but the French consented. On the same day Sazonoff brought forth another formula which read as follows, "if Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on Servian territory; if recognizing that the dispute between Austria and Servia has assumed a character of European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look into the matter and determine whether Servia could satisfy the Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign state or her independence, Russia will undertake to maintain her "waiting attitude". This was not letting Austria go so far as to occupy Belgrade as Grey had suggested and furthermore Russia only undertook to "maintain her waiting attitude"—that is to postpone the commencement of hostilities. Grey relayed this formula to all the Cabinets on August 1, without comment but since it meant allowing Russia to continue mobilization, the Triple Alliance Powers naturally did not react towards the suggestion favorably.

This apparently was the last attempt to stave off the conflict. By August 1st, Austria, Germany, Russia and

(1). Br. Blue Book p120. (Buchanan to Grey)
(2). Ibid. p132.
Serbia were mobilized. An inquiry by the German Ambassador at Paris on July 31 as to what course France would pursue in the event of war between Germany and Russia brought forth the reply on the following day that "France will do what her interests demand" (1). The same day orders were given in France for a general mobilization of the army. (2) Germany had already mobilized hence the terms of the Franco-Russian treaty came into effect—the alteration of 1906 specified that if Germany mobilized against Russia, France would reply by mobilization on Russia's behalf or vice versa. (3) The declaration of a state of war between Germany and France then remained merely a matter of form.

The fear of a German ultimatum drew from Grey the assurance on August 2 to Cambon "that if the German fleet "comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to under-
"take hostile operations against French coasts or shipping "the British fleet will give all the protection in its "power. This assurance is of course subject to the policy "of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parl-
"liament and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Gov-
"ernment to take any action until the above contingency of "action by the German fleet takes place." (4) The English Foreign Secretary pointed out that the Government could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany if war broke out between France and Germany but it was necessary for the

(1). German White Book №571.
(2). Br. Blue Book №136 (Bertie to Grey)
(3). See above Chapter 2.
(4). Br. Blue Book №148 (Grey to Bertie, Aug. 2)
French Government to know what measures to take in the defense of their northern coasts. "It did not bind us to go "to war with Germany unless the German fleet took the act-"ion indicated, but it did give a security to France that "would enable her to settle the disposition of her own "Mediterranean fleet." (1) This action had been authorized by the Cabinet but the result was the resignation of three men, Lord Morley, Mr. John Burns and C. P. Trevelyan.

On August 3, the orders were issued for the mobiliza-
tion of the British Expeditionary Force. On the same day the Foreign Secretary made his famous speech in which he reviewed the policy of Great Britain during the successive clashes of the Alliances from 1905 to 1914, at the same time giving the reason for her action in the present crisis. (2)

In that speech Grey proceeded to show why Great Britain was not bound by alliance to go to war on the side of the Ent­ente but at the same time she was bound by honor to do so. While there were no commitments to France nevertheless he told of the military conversations which had been going on since 1906-9 as a general rule two countries do not make military and naval arrangements for action in case of war unless they believe that they are going to act together when the time comes. It is difficult to understand Sir Edward Grey's attitude at this time, the only conclusion one can come to is that he was totally unaware of the destin-

ation to which his policy was leading him.

On August 4, the news reached England that German troops had crossed the Belgian frontier and taking this action as a casus belli the British Cabinet drew up an ultimatum to Germany giving her until twelve o'clock on the night of August 4 to return a satisfactory reply, otherwise, "His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves." (1) No reply was forthcoming and hence at Midnight on August 4, Great Britain had entered definitely into the last and greatest clash of the alliances.

It is significant to note that on August 3, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs (Marquis di San Giuliano) in reply to the German Government's inquiry as to what were Italy's intentions in the crisis, responded that "The war undertaken by Austria and the consequences which might result, had, in the words of the German Ambassador himself, an aggressive object. Both were therefore in conflict with the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, and in such circumstances Italy would remain neutral." (2) Hence Italy which had taken an independent attitude in 1908 and 1912-1913 now definitely willed herself out of the entanglements of the Triple Alliance. The account of her actions later however are another story. When Rouman-

(1). Br. Blue Book #159 (Grey to Boschen)
(2). Ibid. #132 (Grey to Bertie)
ia took the same neutral attitude as Italy, the Central Powers were left to carry on alone.

The final clash of the alliances was not in effect and this time the whole system of armed camps was to bring about changes that few could have predicted during the years preceding 1914. The system inaugurated by Bismarck had grown into a sort of Frankenstein which was to mean the breakdown of the Central European scheme which he had so laboriously built. At the same time it produced effects on the Powers of the Entente the result of which it is impossible today to estimate.

It is necessary to sum up the events of June 28 to August 4, 1914, and furthermore to estimate the forces at work from 1870 on, which resulted in the European cataclysm. Austria believed that the maintenance of her territorial integrity depended on the crushing of the Greater Serbia movement by military force. The Sarajevo murder offered the excuse and Germany's "blank cheque" of July 6, if not promising actual support, at least removed restraint from her ally. The evidence collected regarding the "Black hand Plot" seems to establish pretty clearly the implication of the Serb Government, nevertheless Austria is not thereby cleared of blame. In addition, it is not necessary here to present a justification or condemnation of the methods used by Austria in her quarrel with Serbia. Russia's interference in the Austro-Serb dispute was in accordance with her
treatment of the Serbs as "little brothers" and her desire for Slavic hegemony, there was no suggestion on her part of Serbia's innocence. Even though the whole European system with its two "armed camps", its growing burden of armaments and successive clashes made war eventually certain, still during the early days of the 1914 crisis there were frequent attempts at mediation both on the part of Sir Edward Grey and Bethmann-Hollweg. In the light of the latter fact it is not true to say that Germany pursued a warlike aim. The cause of the interruption of the negotiations towards peace or failing that, a localization of the conflict, was Russia's secret mobilization, the blame for which must rest largely upon the Russian military staff. Even after this mobilization Sir Edward Grey urged cessation of preparations but without avail. Germany was justified in refusing Russia the advantage of an indefinite period in which to complete her mobilization, hence she retaliated with a counter mobilization—the provisions of the Triple Alliance were thus coming into effect. The Russo-German conflict brought the Dual Alliance into effect and France took her stand against the Central Powers. Great Britain during this period refused to openly commit herself though Grey by his conversation with Bendendorff admitted that Austrian mobilization would probably mean a retaliation by Russia. Though he did not openly encourage her, the English Foreign Secretary must be held to some extent responsible for Russia's action. On the other hand no one,
not even his most severe critics, can impute warlike intentions to Sir Edward Grey.

In summing up the general diplomatic background of the War, it is expedient to quote the view of Mr. Bernadotte Schmitt. (1) "The causes of the great war have been analysed from many points of view. The explanation usually offered is the vaulting ambition of this or that power, Germany being most often selected as the offender. Persons internationally minded insist that valid nationalism was a universal disease and draw vivid pictures of the European anarchy. The pacifist points to the bloated armaments, and the Socialist can only see the conflict of rival imperialisms. Facts galore can be cited in support of each thesis. Yet no one of these explanations is entirely satisfactory or the lot of them taken together. Why should the different kinds of dynamite explode simultaneously in August 1914? Why for instance should a war break out between Great Britain and Germany at a moment when their disputes were seemingly on the verge of adjustment? There must have been some connecting link which acted as a chain of powder between the various accumulations of explosive material. And so there was; as one peruses the innumerable memoirs of politicians, soldiers and sailors, from the German Emperor to obscure diplomats, or tries to digest the thousands of documents published since 1918 from the German, (1). Amer. Hist. Rev. April 1914, pp. 448-450.
"Austrian, Serbian, Russian, French, Belgian and British archives, the conviction grows that, it was the schism of Europe in Triple Alliance and Triple Entente which fused the various quarrels and forces into one gigantic struggle for the balance of power; and the war came in 1914 because then, for the first time, the lines were sharply drawn between the two rival groups, and neither could yield on the Serbian issue without seeing the balance pass definitely to the other side." The growth of the schism of Europe has been given in more or less detail throughout the six preceding chapters but in order to clarify and follow out the forces at work since 1871, let us now look at the leading features in the policies of the various countries involved from that date till 1914.

It will be remembered that Austria had joined the Dual Alliance with Germany in 1879 and this had been extended to include Italy in 1882, thus setting up the first grouping of the Powers--the Triple Alliance--on the European stage. The Treaty of Berlin gave Austria control of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and thus frustrated the aims of Serbia. As far as Austria concerns us throughout this period the Serbian question is the main issue. In 1903 a new Serbian dynasty under King Peter was set up, when the preceding king was assassinated; this proved the rallying point of Slav nationalism which looked to Russia for protection. However the integrity of Austria-Hungary
depended upon holding in check the Pan Slav programme and hence the "Balkan tangle" proved a fruitful source for future clashes of the alliances. The first of these came in 1908(1) when Izvolsky, then Russian Foreign Minister, proposed to the Austrian Minister, Count Aehrenthal, that Austria annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, asking as compensation for Russia that pressure be brought to bear on Turkey to open the Straits. The annexation was carried out much to the anger of Serbia which never ceased from that time on, to plot against the Dual Monarchy. Furthermore Russia did not receive the expected compensation and had to confess that she was not strong enough to enforce her demands or defend Slavic interests. While Germany had neither suggested nor desired the annexation, as soon as opposition developed she had appeared "in shining armour" beside her ally and thus gave evidence that the pact of 1879 was by no means void.

Another crisis was precipitated in 1912-1913 by the Balkan wars and here the firm opposition of Germany prevented an Austro-Serbian war. However Serbia's attempt to gain access to the Adriatic was blocked by the erection of the State of Albania. Serbian intrigue continued and finally culminated in the Serajevo murder of June 1914. The policy of Austria—subsequent to the murder has been given in the preceding pages. The delay of the Austrians from (1). That is the first clash over the Balkan question.
July 6 to July 23 in sending the ultimatum to Serbia was due to the desire to get the Wiesner report as to Serbian responsibility for the assassination, the necessity of winning over Count Tisza, the Hungarian Prime Minister, to a war policy, and the decision to wait till Poincaré returned from his Russian visit. But there seems no doubt that the Austrian military party with Berchtold as their spokesman were determined upon war. The army was promptly mobilized on July 25, and on the 28th war was declared in spite of the Serbian reply which satisfied the Kaiser and von Bethmann-Hollweg.

As far as Germany is concerned, we have seen the completion of her unification and bid for European hegemony throughout the period of Bismarck's Chancellorship. The military tradition set up during that period, the bullying of France and the instigation of the system of Alliances, remain her responsibility. The Pan German League so violently denounced by such men as Roland Usher (1) and André Cheradame appears to have been little more than a noisy group of fanatical patriots with but little influence. (2) As Miss Playne has so ably shown, this group was the German section of those imperialists whose influence contributed to the general neuroses of Europe. (3)

The German attitude towards Russia after the failure

(1). "Pan Germanism"
(2). "The Pan German League"—M. Wertheimer.
(3). "The Neuroses of the Nations"—Playne.
to renew the Reinsurance treaties of 1889 was primarily
determined by the fact that she was the ally of Germany's
enemy (France) and the enemy of the second member of the
Triple Alliance (Austria). Russia's ambitions in the
Balkans threatened the integrity of the Dual Monarchy upon
which the future security of Germany depended. Whatever
may have been the exaggeration of the encirclement cry,
there is no gainsaying the fact that failing Austrian
support, Germany would have been surrounded by hostile
and powerful States. 1 It does not seem unnatural that
once unified and cognizant of the possibilities that were
hers, the German Empire should have been desirous of ex-
pansion in the colonial and commercial fields. The inev-
itable results of this policy were conflicts with England
in both fields. The failure to come to an understanding
over the naval question cannot be blamed solely on either
of the two Powers but must be rather attributed to the
whole diplomatic system of Europe throughout the period.

Had there been more of the spirit of arbitration and a
stronger conception of Europe as a unit wherein all States
had to live side by side rather than an emphasis on the
interests of the individual components, there would not
have resulted the system of alliance and counter alliance
with conflicting interests and continual clashes.

There seems little doubt that the blank cheque given
by Germany to Austria on July 6 and 7th, strengthened the
latter's decision to destroy once and for all the Serbian
menace. Though the general terms of the Austrian ultimatum were decided on July 14, they were not intimated in detail to Bethmann-Hollweg till the 22nd. and when the Serbian reply was known in Germany both the Kaiser and the Chancellor considered it adequate and sufficient to dispell any grounds for war. From July 27 to July 29, both the Kaiser and Bethmann-Hollweg endeavored to mediate between Austria and Russia and later when this was too late tried to localize the conflict between Austria and Serbia. The Russian mobilization resulted in a counter mobilization by Germany and from then on the provisions of the Triple Entente came into effect.

The traditional Russian hostility to Germany had been in part allayed by the policy of Bismarck. But from the failure of the renewal of the Reinsurance treaty in 1890 the two countries drifted apart. In 1908 Russia was disappointed over the non-opening of the Straits and her ambitions as defender of Slavic nationalism was thereby given an added impetus. The influence of Poincaré in fostering this ambition of his ally we have already seen. As Baron Korff says in his review of the second volume of the "Livre Noir", "We find new light thrown on the pre-war attitude "of France, strangely, but constantly connected with one "big name, Poincaré: Pichon, Barthow and many other familiar names are frequently mentioned, but none seems to have "played any such prominent role in the building up and "strengthening of the Franco-Russian alliance as Poincaré;
"and besides, with a very evident object—steady preparation for the coming conflict with Germany." (1) Furthermore we have seen that in 1912 Poincaré gave Izvolsky the promise of French support in case Russia were attacked by Germany or Austria, thereby giving her a free hand in the Balkans. It is significant to note in passing that this was two years before Germany gave Austria the same promise.

The Russian bribery of the French press, the substitution of Delcassé for the pacific Louis as French Ambassador to Russia and the close cooperation of Izvolsky and Poincaré during the years immediately preceding the war are interesting points and hardly substantiate the theory that Russia and France were caught unprepared in 1914. The importance of the Russian mobilization as an immediate cause of the war has been pointed out, the unfortunate part is that the Balkan situation could have caused such a catastrophe. Whatever may have been the faults of Austria's treatment of the Slavs no one can deny that from the standpoint of the future cohesion of the Dual Monarchy repression of Slavic nationalism was necessary. The very fact that Europe was divided into two armed camps allowed the situation to assume such grave proportions and made it necessary for the Triple Alliance to take a stand against the Central Powers, over what was primarily an Austro-Serbian quarrel in which Great Britain and France had no immediate interests.

From 1871 on, the "revanche" spirit in France was very strong. She never forgave Germany for the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, nor for the humiliation of the Franco-German war. After the collapse of the Boulanger movement in 1889, the spirit of revanche for a time abated. However, the Morocco crises provided a further irritant and from 1912 on we have ample proof of the warlike attitude of Poincaré.

Poincaré's support of Russia in the Balkans in 1912, in fact the whole story of the Franco-Russian negotiations as recorded in the "Libre "oir" and "Entente Diplomacy and the World" (1) prove pretty clearly that after 1912 France was the dominating spirit in the Franco-Russian alliance and constantly worked to accustom Russia to the idea of a coming war with Germany. In fact as Mr. Schmitt says, "from 1912 to the outbreak of the war, the Dual Alliance presented a solid front at every turn to the rival diplomatic group." (2) In 1914 when the war came the Dual Alliance provisions came into effect and again France took her place beside her ally, in the final clash of the alliances.

From 1870-1914 England's foreign policy underwent great changes. The policy of isolation pursued until 1890 began to give way to the necessity of good relations with the other European Powers. Germany turned towards her and good terms existed between the two countries until

(1). Siebert "Entente Diplomacy and the World"
the Kruger telegram. This was followed by commercial and naval rivalry and divergence of opinion over the Bagdad Railway Scheme; it was not until June 1914 that good feeling was restored. The failure to achieve friendly Anglo-German relations earlier than this was due chiefly to Germany, and particularly to Bülow and Holstein. Further, it was the naval scheme of Tirpitz that helped greatly towards arousing English suspicion and threw Grey into more friendly relations with France and Russia.

The Anglo-French Entente of 1904 and the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907 brought England into the system of alliances. While Sir Edward Grey maintains that the Triple Entente was not an alliance but merely a diplomatic group, we know now that during the years 1905-1912 military and naval conversations had been taking place between the English and French military and naval authorities and plans were drawn up for joint action in case of war. The Anglo-French agreement was never revealed to Parliament, in fact it was never decided upon at a Cabinet meeting (1) and when it was finally explained by Sir Edward Grey on August 3, 1914, considerable consternation resulted. The English Foreign Secretary cannot I think be accused of a warlike or dishonest attitude, but he seems to have followed a policy the result of which he was psychologically unable to estimate.

Lord Haldane who was Secretary of State for War from 1905-1912 relates how he had made every plan during those (1). "Grey, p."
years for the transfer of troops across the Channel. Hence when the war was declared the English officials had but to sign orders prepared during those years. Furthermore Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, has told how after 1911 he became convinced that war with Germany was inevitable and began in every way active preparations for it. (1)

The English action during July 1914 was nothing if not an attempt to stave off the conflict; the chief criticism that can be made is that Sir Edward Grey did not warn Germany quickly and sharply enough as to what England's position would be in the event of an attack on France. However, we must face the fact that the English Cabinet might not have been willing to commit the country and hence the Foreign Secretary was in an embarrassed position until Germany had declared war on France and invaded Belgium.

An estimate of the events from 1870-1914 is not complete without some reference to Italy. She joined the Triple Alliance in 1882 principally due to temporary pique over the French annexation of Tunis and apparently even at this date she was not trusted or considered by Bismarck to be a great asset to the Alliance. (2) Austria was much more a traditional Italian enemy than France and the desire to recover Italia Irredenta soon reasserted itself. Anti-French feeling soon cooled and in 1902 a French-Italian agreement

(1). The World Crisis, 1911-1914.
(2). Fuller, p. 317.
was signed. By 1914 Italy had agreements with the three members of the Entente while she had acted independently in the crises of 1906 and 1912—small wonder then that she finally declared her independence of the Triple Alliance on August 1, 1914. Her final participating in the war on the side of the Allies was purchased by promises of cession of the territories contemplated in the Nationalist programme.

This sums up the policies of the various Powers of the two "armed camps" during the period 1870-1914. The forces of nationalism in each, so admirably pointed out by Miss Playne in her book "The Neuroses of the Nations"; the conflicting economic and commercial interests, and the growth of armaments which eventually reached a saturation point where a catastrophe was bound to occur—have not been touched upon. The root of the whole evil lay in the division of Europe into two armed camps. While in the strict sense of the word, no war is inevitable, still it required in Europe during those years, statesmen of exceptional foresight, men who realized and worked towards an international policy, the very antithesis of alliance and counter alliance—these men Europe lacked. Nor are we to imagine that the war took Europe unawares; enough evidence has been brought forth in the preceding chapters to show that statesmen and soldiers alike had been expecting and preparing for it for years. Small wonder then that there
are thousands of people today in all countries of the world who are looking for a new order and staunchly opposing any return to the old system of alliance and counter alliance.
Chapter 7.

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