LOCAL DYNAMICS IN
INFORMAL SETTLEMENT DEVELOPMENT:
A CASE STUDY OF YOGYAKARTA,
INDONESIA

by

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this research is to explain the processes by which communities develop their settlements outside of formal planning and regulatory frameworks in order to recommend ways these processes could be improved. Drawing on empirical evidence from the development processes of four ‘kampung’ or informal settlements along the Code River in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, this research examines how, without formal-legal status over their settlements, kampung people gained the resources and security necessary to develop their settlements.

The research found that the success of particular kampung communities in developing their settlements depends on the ability of kampung people to develop informal-reciprocal relations with external agencies. Although kampung people enjoy some forms of autonomy over the development process of their settlements and are able to carry out significant improvements to their settlements, their position continues to be weak. They are still very much dependent upon the assistance of the state and external agencies. The nature of policy formulation and implementation in relation to kampung problems is characterized by a fluid and reciprocal series of interrelations among many individuals and agencies, within and outside government. In this context, formal laws and regulations play a secondary role to informal-personal mechanisms. Patron-client relations exist between government officials and kampung people, and these relationships significantly determine the level of government support to each kampung. Such mechanisms are inherently unfair, because only a few kampung people have the capacity to take advantage of these mechanisms.

This study concludes that the Indonesian government needs to treat housing and kampung issues as part of a broader social welfare policy and should create more transparent and fairer mechanisms to guarantee equal opportunities for access to urban resources and decision making processes. This study argues that kampung people and their local institutions, the RT and RW, have a potential for playing more active roles in the dynamic process of urban and housing development. This study suggests ways in which kampung people could be further empowered and calls for more active involvement of intermediary agencies, such as NGOs and other voluntary organizations, to assist kampung people in mobilizing their resources and negotiating with other parties. Finally, this study suggests that the government’s approaches to the promotion of more formalized and regulated urban and housing development should be carefully re-examined in accordance with the social, cultural, and political contexts of Indonesian society.
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# ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY OF INDONESIAN TERMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABRI</td>
<td>Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Indonesian Armed Forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abdi dalem</td>
<td>Sultan's servant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adat</td>
<td>local/customary law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adipura</td>
<td>noble city award; an award presented by the central government to the local government for their efforts in improving the quality of urban environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alun-alun</td>
<td>square at front and rear of palace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMD</td>
<td>Abri Masuk Desa (military goes to village)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arisan</td>
<td>rotating credit funds as a means to rotate local financial resources among community members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APBD</td>
<td>Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah (Budget of Income and Expenditure of Local Government)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAL 1960</td>
<td>Basic Agrarian Law in Indonesia, promulgated in 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bandes</td>
<td>Bantuan Desa (village assistance or funds); presidential grants for village development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangdes</td>
<td>Pembangunan Desa (government village development office)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bappeda</td>
<td>Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Daerah (Regional/Local Development Planning Board)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>becak</td>
<td>pedicab, trishaw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beteng</td>
<td>fort or wall surrounding the kraton or palace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPS</td>
<td>Biro Pusat Statistik (Central Bureau for Statistic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTN</td>
<td>Bank Tabungan Negara (the State Mortgage Bank)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>camat</td>
<td>head of sub-district (kecamatan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cangkok</td>
<td>owner of land block on which tenants have built houses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>desa</td>
<td>village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIY</td>
<td>Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta (Special Province of Yogyakarta)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditako</td>
<td>Dinas Tata Kota (City Planning Office)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DKP</td>
<td>Dinas Kebersihan dan Pertamanan Kota (City Cleaning and Park Department)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPU</td>
<td>Dinas Pekerjaan Umum (Department of Public Works)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRD</td>
<td>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (People's Representative Assembly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gardu ronda</td>
<td>night watch shelter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gelandangan</td>
<td>vagrants, homeless people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOLKAR</td>
<td>Golongan Karya, the ruling party of Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>gotong royong</td>
<td>sharing burdens, working together, mutual co-operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gubernur</td>
<td>Governor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HGB</td>
<td>Hak Guna Bangunan (right of building)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HGU</td>
<td>Hak Guna Usaha (right of land use)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HM</td>
<td>Hak Milik (ownership right)</td>
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</table>
hak pakai  use right
IAI  Ikatan Arsitek Indonesia (Indonesian Institute for Architect)
IMB  Ijin Mendirikan Bangunan (building construction permit)
INPRES  Instruksi Presiden (presidential grant scheme)
IUIDP  Integrated Urban Infrastructure Development Program
juru-kunci  caretakers
YUDP  Yogyakarta Urban Development Project
kabupaten  regency or county, or sub-provincial level of administrative area
kakilima  vendors or street stall sellers
kawulo  subjects, commoners
kecamatan  sub-district, an administrative-government unit above the kelurahan
keluarga  family
kelurahan  the lowest unit of administrative-government unit in urban area
kerja bakti  duty work or community working activity
KIP  Kampung Improvement Program
KKN  Kuliah Kerja Nyata (student extension program)
koperasi  co-operative
kotamadya  urban district (Municipality)
kraton  palace
KTP  kartu tanda penduduk (identity card)
kumuh  slums
ledok  gully
lurah  chief of Kelurahan
LKMD  Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa (Village Public Security Council)
lomba desa  village competition/contest
LSM  Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat (People’s Self Reliance) or Non Government Organizations/NGOs
magersari  traditional form of ownership of building located on land belong to another
mancanegara  outer territories
MCK  mandi, cuci, kakus (public bathroom)
MOHA  Ministry of Home Affairs
murah  cheap
MKB  Manunggaling Karya Bakti (the merging of efforts and duties)
mushola  prayer house
musyawarah-mufakat  discussion leading to consensus
negara  state
negara gung  greater state or capital
ngindung  customary land tenure system based on social considerations
PBB  Pajak Bumi dan Bangunan (Land and Building Tax)
PDAM  Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum (gov. water supply enterprise)
P3HT  Proyek Penertipan dan Peningkatan Hak Tanah (special project initiated by BPN directed to improve land status and land record)
peremajaan  rejuvenation, urban renewal
Perumnas  National Housing Development Cooperation
pembangunan  development
pengindung  people who built housing under ngindung system
Perda  Peraturan Daerah (local regulation)
PKK  Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga (Family Welfare Association)
PLN  Perusahaan Listrik Negara (Gov. Electric Supply Enterprise)
Poldas  Pola Dasar Pembangunan (development guidelines)
Prokasih  Program Kali Bersih (clean water river campaign)
propinsi  province
PUKY  Perkumpulan Usaha Kematian Yogyakarta
(Rakorbang)  Rapat Koordinasi Pembangunan
(redevelopment coordination meeting)
rakyat  people, commoners
REPELITA  Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun (five year development plan)
RK  Rukun Kampung (community unit)
RSS  Rumah Sangat Sederhana (core housing or very simple housing)
RT  Rukun Tetangga (neighbourhood unit) section of RW
RW  Rukun Warga (community unit), section of Kelurahan after 1989
rukan  social harmony; the ideology of community
sambatan  form of mutual aid, especially in constructing house
satpam  private security guard
swadaya  self-help; self-reliant
talud  dike
tukang  construction worker, skilled artisan
undang-undang  national law
wayang kulit  shadow puppet
wali kota  city mayor
wedikengser  sand bank, riverflat area
wong cilik  little people, commoners
wong gede  big people, aristocrats, nobility

NOTES ON CURRENCY

The Indonesian currency is the rupiah (Rp.). Important to note that since the financial
crisis in some Asian countries including Indonesia in the mid 1997, the value of rupiah
has dropped dramatically.

Rp./ C$

<table>
<thead>
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<td>August 1995</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 1996</td>
<td>1,650</td>
</tr>
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<td>March 1998</td>
<td>6,000</td>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION:
THE KAMPUNG IN INDONESIA:
PLANNING IN THE CONTEXT OF ‘INFORMAL’ SETTINGS

This research is concerned with the way in which kampung people in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, form, improve, and defend their settlements. It focuses upon the dynamic efforts of kampung people to organize collectively and engage in relations with other segments of society. These strategies are necessary for increasing their access to urban resources and the decision-making processes related to their kampung. This introductory chapter presents the background, objectives, methods, and structure of the dissertation.

1.1 Research Background and Problem Statement

1.1.1 Kampung Issues in Indonesia

Providing adequate and affordable housing for millions of the urban poor is one of the most difficult challenges facing developing countries with fast-growing urban populations. In Indonesia, it is predicted that every year more than one million housing units should be built to meet Indonesia’s housing demand (Herlianto, 1993). As agreed by the international community and stated in the Global Strategy for Shelter in the Year 2000 (GSS), it is the responsibility of all governments to provide adequate and affordable shelter for all. This commitment was further strengthened by the Habitat II Conference in Istanbul, which declared that the right to housing is part of human rights per se. The realization of adequate and affordable housing for all, however, is not easy.
In Indonesia, while there are many supply problems in the formal housing sector (both the public and the private sectors), the shortfall has been effectively compensated for by informal or popular settlements,¹ in the form of kampung.² As argued by Struyk et al. (1990) kampung settlements have provided serviceable and affordable shelter for a majority of Indonesian urban households. It is true that many kampung face pervasive infrastructure problems, especially in regard to water supply, drainage, and sanitation. In general, though, kampung have met the basic needs of millions of urban dwellers. The flexibility and the variety of housing arrangements within the kampung have enabled millions of migrants to find accommodation in kampung, whether temporarily or permanently. Further, the social environment of the kampung has also enabled new incoming migrants to adapt incrementally to urban lifestyles.

Despite the very clear evidence of the significance of the kampung in Indonesian urbanization and development, the government tends to favor the formal housing sector, and to direct its assistance to it. Rather than trying to enhance the effectiveness of the popular sector, government efforts tend to create more impediments for this sector; access to the basic elements of housing development, particularly land and finance, tends to be limited. It is true that under the Kampung Improvement Program (KIP), the government has helped the poor to receive a basic degree of minimum

¹ In this research the terms ‘informal’ or ‘popular’ settlement and self-help housing are used interchangeably. In brief, both terms refer to housing or settlement development that is executed outside the procedures and regulations developed and imposed by the state, and is produced by both individuals households and communities without reliance on either government or private funding institutions. Further discussion of the term is presented below in pages 10-13.

² Detailed discussion of the term kampung is presented in Chapter Three. In brief, this study defines kampung as typical informal settlements in urban areas in Indonesia. It should be noted that in the Indonesian language no letters are added to nouns to indicate a plural form. I have not anglicized such words by adding -s for the plural.
housing infrastructure. It would be wrong, however, to believe that by itself the existence of a program like KIP could solve all of the housing problems of Indonesia.

Further, many government policies and programs concerning urban development and housing, including KIP, continue to be conducted in a top-down manner and neglect the potential role that the community can play. A critical point seems to be that the complexities of kampung issues are as yet poorly understood; this is particularly true concerning the potential of kampung people for determining the development process of their settlements. Until now, too little attention has been given to the challenges and problems faced by local communities and by the poor, who are, after all, the most important actors in urban and housing development.

With, on the one hand, increasing urbanization and demand for affordable housing and, on the other hand, the failure of the 'formal' housing development sector to provide affordable housing, kampung are sure to continue playing their important role in Indonesian cities. It is clear that the problem and challenge for policy makers and planners in Indonesia is how to deal with the rapid development of cities within the complex economic and socio-political dimensions of 'informality' or 'illegality' represented by the phenomenon of kampung. In this context, two fundamental questions need to be answered: Why are some communities more successful in improving their settlements than others? And is 'formalization' or 'legalization' necessary for the successful development of informal settlements?
1.1.2 Informal Settlement: Two Issues Remain Unresolved

Since the beginning of the debate concerning informal settlements, ‘illegality’ and ‘community autonomy’ have remained central but unresolved issues. From the practical point of view, there is no clear answer as to whether ‘legalization’ and ‘total autonomy’ are necessary and sufficient conditions to generate settlement improvement. More important, however, is that there are no clear answers as to what the broader economic, social, and political consequences of giving or not giving legalization and total autonomy to communities actually are (Fitzwilliam Memorandum, 1991).

Within the context of urban and housing development, it would be ideal if there were a legal system that could guarantee open, equal and reciprocal relations among the various parties involved in urban and housing development. Particularly in the situations of imbalanced distribution of power and resources that exist in many developing countries today, the fundamental function of a legal system should be to achieve a more balanced and democratic society, in which local communities and the poor would have autonomy over the resources and the decision-making processes related to their settlements. In practice, however, these sorts of legal guarantee are often not present.

Further, the concept of legality is itself highly contextual, dependent upon a settlement’s particular social, political, and cultural circumstances. As argued by Alsayyad (1993), the specific relationship between the state and the communities cannot be fully understood simply from the written laws and regulations. Therefore, as Leaf (1994:12) has proposed, inquiry into this issue should acknowledge that the real source of authority is crucial, since the state and the legal system are not always considered by the inhabitants of informal settlements as the primary source of authority.
He explains that, although informal settlements operate wholly or partially outside the legal framework of the state, they must nonetheless follow some sort of rule of law. In other words, we have to understand the ‘extra-legal’ means by which such settlements evolve and change.

In brief, as the literature indicates, despite the many efforts which have been directed toward developing effective planning and policy approaches for informal settlements, the problems of informal settlements remain unresolved. Many factors contribute to this situation, but the fundamental factor seems to be the fact that current policy and planning approaches regarding informal settlement neglect the unique social, cultural, and political situations of societies in developing countries such as Indonesia. The fact that the nature of the state and its legal system (laws and regulations) in countries in the developing world are different from those in the developed world suggests that we have to examine carefully and critically the role of laws and regulations in these societies (Gray, 1991:775; Rahardjo, 1994).

It is a common criticism that, rather than serving as a normative guidance for the working of society, laws and regulations in developing countries such as Indonesia often only serve the need of those in power to maintain the status quo, or as means of social control. As a result, many laws and regulations concerning urban and housing development may have been developed but remain ineffective, as they function more for decorative purposes than as a guidance for the workings of society (Lev, 1987; Cotterrell, 1992).
1.1.3 Problem Statement: Planning in the Context of 'Informal' Settings

This research is concerned with the fact that the current policy and planning approaches regarding informal settlements in Indonesia are not able to account for the 'informal' or 'extra-legal' means by which kampung people gain resources and security. Such approaches therefore fail to suggest effective means to enhance and sustain the capacity of kampung people to develop and improve their own settlements.

The literature (discussed in detail in the following chapter) suggests that informal settlement development is not a simple conceptual matter, but rather a complex issue, involving many actors and agencies with different interests and agendas. In this context, it is crucially important to begin an inquiry into several important socio-political factors, both formal and informal, legal and extra-legal, that could enhance and sustain the capacity of communities to develop and improve their settlements. If the poor are to be sheltered adequately, there are many reasons to continue to evaluate whether or not informal settlement development, represented in Indonesia by the phenomenon of the kampung, can work well, and whether or not kampung people can achieve a significant measure of autonomy in determining their futures.

1.2 Research Objectives and Questions

The objective of this research is to explain the means by which communities develop and improve their settlements outside formal planning and regulatory frameworks. Drawing on research concerning the development process of four kampung located along the Code River in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, this research examines how, without obtaining formal-legal status in regard to their settlements, kampung people...
gained the resources and security necessary to develop and improve their settlements. Such an examination is helpful, in order to improve policy and planning approaches concerning informal settlement.

To achieve the above objective, this research focuses on three areas of inquiry:

(1) The internal aspects of kampung. These are the internal situations within communities that influence kampung development; the problems and challenges faced by kampung people in mobilizing and managing internal resources. Several questions are crucial in this context: What are the characteristics of community-based organizations within kampung? How do they mobilize resources within the kampung? What are the leadership roles within the kampung? In short, what are the problems and challenges which kampung people face in increasing their access to urban resources and the decision-making processes related to their settlements?

(2) The broader socio-political factors outside the community. These are the socio-political realities outside the kampung or community, including the nature of the state, the state’s institutions, and the government’s policies and attitudes toward kampung, all of which influence kampung development. In this context, several questions need to be addressed, such as: How are the government’s policies and programs in regard to kampung formulated and implemented? Is the state basically supportive, helping kampung people as much as it can, or are its policies part of a broader means used to continue to control them? Why does the state tolerate illegal aspects of the process? In short, particular attention must be given to exploring the state’s attitude toward kampung. In a context in which there is increasing worldwide
pressure to roll back state intervention in urban development, it is important to evaluate the effects of such trends on kampung people.

(3) The networks or linkages among communities and other segments of society. How do the social, cultural and political relations among communities and various state and non-state agencies influence the success of settlement development? Several crucial questions related to this issue are: What actors and agencies are involved in the housing development process? What are their resources, interests, strategies, and actions in regard to the process? What roles do laws and regulations play in the popular housing sector? What roles do NGOs play in settlement development? In brief, how are networks between kampung people and various state and non-state agencies developed and what are the implications of such networks for kampung development?

1.3. The Significance of the Study

In reading the quite substantial amount of literature on Indonesia’s kampung, it is notable that little has been done to document the socio-political dynamics behind the development processes of Indonesia’s kampung. Most studies on Indonesia’s kampung describe them as typical residential areas in a stagnant condition, and merely outline their physical characteristics. Most writings on kampung also describe them as unpleasant areas, home of the poorest and most disadvantaged of city residents. The dynamic struggles of kampung as communities, as organized groups of people, with their own values, needs, interests, and agendas directed at defending and improving their kampung and their lives, have never fully been explored. This neglect is
particularly clear in relation to the way in which kampung people develop networks with external agencies, to increase their access to urban resources.

Many studies, such as those by Devas (1980), Silas (1983, 1984, 1992), Soegijoko (1985), Steinberg (1992), or Taylor (1987), focus on the evaluation of a single-standard improvement program for kampung: the Kampung Improvement Program (KIP). There are some discussions in these writings regarding the selection criteria for the kampung chosen to be upgraded, and this indirectly gives some understanding of the variations in physical conditions among the kampung. Still, there has been as yet little discussion regarding the socio-political dynamics behind the formation, improvement, and consolidation processes of kampung.

More recent studies, such as those by Guinness (1986), by Jellinek (1991), or by Sullivan (1992), present comprehensive research on the kampung, particularly in terms of the dynamics of the relationships between residents and community organizations within the kampung. As is typical of anthropological studies, however, the focus of such work is generally on single kampung, and this creates an impression of generic similarity; not enough attention has been given to the variations among urban kampung and to the dynamic relations between kampung people and the government, the private sector, and other social groups. This present study is intended to broaden our understanding of kampung; it uncovers the dynamic process behind the development of kampung from both inside and outside; it brings the discussion of kampung into its wider connection with the urban environment.

From a practical point of view, the significance of this study involves suggesting improvements in the way in which government agencies, planners, NGOs, and
communities can deal with the informal housing sector, as found in the Indonesian kampung. Such suggestions cover five crucial areas: (1) the way in which the government formulates and implements policies and programs concerning the informal housing sector; (2) the way in which the government formulates and enforces regulations concerning housing development; (3) the way in which communities consolidate and mobilize their resources; (4) the way in which communities can increase their access to urban resources and the decision-making process related to their settlement; and (5) the way in which intermediary agencies, such as NGOs, academics, religious groups, and the private sector mediate or support such community interests.

Housing comprises such a fundamental aspect of society that the study of housing may also advance our understanding of society. This study examines housing issues within the context of social and political issues, such as power relations and community empowerment. From a theoretical point of view, therefore, this study contributes to our understanding of the nature of the state, the state’s policies, the nature of community, and the relationship between the state and society.

1.4 Conceptual Framework

1.4.1 Informal\textsuperscript{3} Settlement: Beyond the ‘Formal-Informal’ Distinctions.

Some might argue that it is very important for writing or research on informal

\textsuperscript{3} It should be noted that a discussion of the informal housing sector cannot be narrowly focused, as it is closely related to the much broader issue of the informal sector emanating from the dualistic economy of cities in the developing world, or what McGee has termed ‘peripheral capitalism’ (McGee, 1984). This dissertation is aware of this fact, but it does not intend to replicate the already extensive writings or reviews concerning the concept of informal sector. Such reviews can be found in McGee (1971, 1977, 1984), ILO (1972), Hart (1973), Moser (1984), Amin (1982), or Sanyal (1988). The most recent review concerning the issue appeared in the Regional Development Dialogue, Vol. 17, No.1. 1996.
settlement to begin with a standard and relatively rigid definition and classification of terms, in order to avoid confusion and misinterpretation. Attempts to define informal settlement, however, are fraught with problems, since the phenomena associated with this concept are so complex and diverse, depending both on geographical characteristics and on underlying cultural, social, and political contexts (McGee, 1984).

In the literature, housing markets are usually categorized into two broad sectors: 'formal' and 'informal', based upon the degree of adherence to regulations concerning land ownership, land development, and building standards. The formal sector refers to housing development that is constructed according to regulations developed and imposed by the state; while the informal, or popular, sector refers to housing which is constructed outside the system of legal regulation imposed by the state. In many countries the formal sector does not exceed 20 per cent of the total urban housing supply, and in some cases it is less than 10 per cent. The informal, or popular, sector is much more complex and is described by a variety of terms, such as 'spontaneous,' 'unplanned,' 'squatter,' 'substandard housing,' or 'slums.' Such terms take on different connotations in different social and regional contexts.

In general, this study deals with the informal housing sector, which encompasses a wide range of residential environments in terms of layout patterns, dwelling types and

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4 There are two different housing production systems classified under the formal sector, depending on source of capital and motive of production. The first is the public sector: housing produced by government agencies, for basically non-profit motives. The second is the private sector: housing produced by private agencies, for profit.

5 As McGee (1984) has suggested, it should be remembered that these two different housing production systems reflect the broader structural model of a dualistic economy of cities in the developing world. The formal sector or the capitalist sector has little interest in expanding its activities in low-income housing, as it does not generate significant profit. While the informal sector or the non-capitalist mode of production has managed, through a variety of means, to provide low-cost housing without help from either the government or the capitalist sector.
land tenure arrangements; the phenomena being studied go beyond the narrow 'formal-informal' and 'legal-illegal' distinctions. There is now general agreement that most informal settlements fall somewhere along a continuum from formal to informal and from legal to illegal. Not only are there a great many variables that could determine the legal aspect of a particular settlement, but also that the settlement itself is a historical product of an ongoing process, a complex mixture of formal and informal elements (Burgess, 1985b). Thus, if we can quite properly classify settlements in terms of the legal conditions that existed at the time of their formation, there is no reason to consider that such settlements must remain in that category. In this dissertation, therefore, the term popular or informal settlement is used very broadly, encompassing a wide range of residential environments in terms of layout patterns, dwelling types, and land tenure arrangements.

As advocated by Turner (1972) more than two decades ago, this study argues for the importance of discussing informal settlements in terms of ongoing processes. Acknowledging that there are many physical or spatial manifestations of popular or informal settlements, this study is concerned with the processes by which such settlements are created, i.e. the dynamics of networks and negotiations among various parties within and outside a community that influence the development of a particular settlement.

In other words, it is crucial to remember that the idea of self-help also refers to the 'process' by which communities provide their own settlements. It refers to the collective efforts of a community, as an organized group of people with particular interests, to provide not only housing and related infrastructure, but also social
institutions that enable community members to develop healthy social relations. Thus, the discussion of the issue of informal settlement within the overall issue of 'self-help,' must be concerned with the ability of communities to shelter themselves, the process by which communities, with or without help from other agencies, struggle collectively to create their own settlements (Harms, 1982:21, 1992:34).

As will be discussed further in Chapter Three, the term kampung itself is conceived and used in terms of the basic ideas presented above. The physical manifestations of kampung are perhaps distinctive, compared to the standardized housing complexes developed by the private sector. More important than such physical manifestations, however, kampung represent a dynamic process by which groups of people--mostly the poor--provide their own housing, control their environments and engage in collective efforts to improve their lives.

1.4.2 Self-help Housing Theory: Between 'Autonomy' and 'Dependency'

In proposing "autonomy toward housing" Turner (1972, 1976) argued that the most basic question of self-help housing lies in who makes the most fundamental decisions. He stated that:

"When dwellers control the major decisions and are free to make their own contributions in the design, construction, or management of their housing, both this process and the environment produced stimulate individual and social well-being. When people have no control over nor responsibility for key decisions in the housing process, on the other hand, dwelling environments may instead becoming a barrier for personal fulfillment and a burden to the economy" (Turner and Fichter, 1972:241).
As Turner further elaborated his thesis in several writings, it is clear that he stresses the importance of user control over the housing process. Turner argued that people should be given 'total control' or 'total freedom' over the decision-making process, or what then became a famous slogan for self-help: 'freedom to build.'

However, the fact that individuals and communities are inevitably engaged in various relations and interactions with other actors and agencies outside communities means that such total freedom in the decision-making process is impossible. Further, exclusive autonomy or freedom is also unrealistic, in that, even if they achieved it, communities could not increase their access to resources that are commonly dominated by external agencies. Thus, even when the state 'backs off,' communities are still not entirely free or autonomous, as they are involved in complicated networks with various other segments of society. It is, therefore, the nature and quality of such networks that determine the success of settlement development. The more the reciprocal nature of such networks could be developed, the more communities would benefit from such networks.

This dissertation takes a more realistic approach concerning self-help or informal settlement. Here, self-help does not refer to 'total freedom' or 'total control' over the housing process; rather it implies the ability of communities to engage in reciprocal relations or negotiations with external agencies, in order to increase access to urban resources and to the decision-making process. This ability is determined by many factors, but particularly important is the ability of community leaders and organizations to understand local urban politics and to become involved in them actively and strategically on behalf of their communities.
1.4.3 Informal Settlement Development as A Negotiation Process: The Importance of ‘Informal’ Networks

As they appear in much of the literature, many ideas and strategies concerning informal settlement seem to be formulated and prescribed under the assumption that they could be implemented in a political vacuum, with all parties concerned agreeing on both the ends and means of such strategies. The implication is that all parties involved in the housing development process have some commonality of interests, for which they then all agree to work together in an ideal partnership. The UNCHS, for example, defines partnership as “a mechanism for ensuring that the comparative advantages of different actors in the development process are exploited in a mutually-supportive way, i.e. that the strengths and weaknesses of the public, commercial, private and non-governmental sectors are harmonized so that maximum use is made of the strengths, while minimizing the potential for inefficiency caused by the weaknesses” (UNCHS, 1993).

Further, in relation to the role of communities, most ideas and strategies concerning informal settlement begin with the assumption that a community is monolithic, with one clear set of interests, as well as firmly consolidated by strong community organization and leadership, so that, once resources and power are distributed, community dynamics would work effectively and be sustained. Such strategies also imply that legal systems, laws and regulations, serve to provide neutral guidance, in which relations and conflicts among parties could be mediated and resolved.

Of course, these assumptions neglect the fact that the actual process of informal settlement development is very complicated. It is now better understood that the process involves various parties, each with their own interests, which are not always able to be
accommodated. This relates not only to the internal aspects of communities, but, more importantly, to the relations between communities and other segments of society. This holistic conception of informal settlement development is illustrated in Figure 1.1 below.

Figure 1.1
Informal Settlement Development as A Negotiation Process: A Framework
As the figure illustrates, informal settlement development may be understood as a negotiation process between communities and external agencies. In this process, the ability of particular communities to form, improve, and defend their settlements is dependent upon the nature and the quality of networks between communities and other parties, i.e. between local structure and supra-local structure. Local structure, or internal structure affects the ability of communities to manage change. This includes changes in community values, needs and interests, and depends upon four components: community resources, community cohesion, community leadership, and community organization. External structure means the broader socio-political setting, or what Leeds (1994) calls the 'supra-local structure.' The nature of this varies, depending upon the socio-political system of each country, and the nature of the state and the state ideology, but such factors include both formal and informal, or 'modern' and 'traditional,' socio-political systems.

As a socio-political unit, a community enters into various modes of networks with other segments of society. It is the nature and quality of such networks, including reciprocal or cooperative exchanges; unbalanced exchanges; hostile, competitive or autonomous relationships; or several of these at once, that determine the level of a community's success. Only communities that can develop beneficial networks with other segments of society are likely to succeed, because it is only by engaging in such networks that access to urban resources and decision making processes can be obtained. What is particularly important is that this understanding has to encompass the historical and contemporary relations between the state and each community, and the rule of law as a normative guidance for these relations.
Within a hierarchical, patronage-ridden society such as that of Indonesia, it could be predicted that networks between communities and external agencies would not always be balanced, since the external parties (state and non-state) are far more powerful and resourceful than are the communities. However, as Scott (1977:125) argues, it is important to remember that some degree of reciprocity must exist in these networks. Thus, in certain circumstances, communities can maximize the benefits possible from such relations. The fact that external parties (including the state) do not always constitute a unitary system provides opportunities for communities to alter the relationships and to maximize the benefits to be gained from such relations. Further, and perhaps most important, communities must understand the fact that the negotiation process goes beyond the formal or modern legal system; it involves a complex set of rules outside the formal system, in which personal interests, attitudes, and behaviors—as opposed to the formal constraints of legally-binding codes—take on greater social significance (Rahardjo, 1994).

In brief, this study hypothesizes that, within a hierarchical, patron-client structure of power relationships, such as that which is commonly found in Indonesia, the formal-legal framework is relatively unimportant or secondary, since, by many criteria, 'informal' mechanisms work more effectively and benefit both the state and society. In the case of kampung development, therefore, the success of particular kampung in improving housing depends very much on the ability of people in the kampung to maximize the benefits derived from their patronage relationships with state officials and institutions.
In this situation, what is ultimately needed is the creation of a more democratic institutional system, which could ensure equal opportunities for access to resources and the decision-making process in a more permanent and continuous way. However, while waiting for this ideal long-term political goal, it should be clear to communities that they will have better access to resources and the decision-making process only if they are effectively able to organize collective actions and to act politically. This issue will be discussed further in Chapter Two.

1.5 The Study Area

The focus of this study is the kampung along the bank of the Code River in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. The settlements or kampung along the Code River stretch along seven kilometers, from the north to the south of the city of Yogyakarta, and provide housing for a large member of the city's poor. Kampung people along the Code River experience the effects of environmental and economic pressures to a greater extent than do other urban dwellers of Yogyakarta, yet have the least resources to solve these problems.

The city itself can be considered as a center of Javanese culture, while its role in the development of the new Republic of Indonesia in the 1940s made Yogyakarta into a special place for Indonesians. It is now the capital city of the Yogyakarta Special Province and Indonesia's second most popular tourism destination, after Bali. In 1995, the municipality of Yogyakarta had a population of 466,313; it is, by Indonesian standards, considered to be a medium-size city.
However, as urban growth has expanded beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and the area has become the place of residence for about one million people, Yogyakarta can no longer be considered a medium-size city. The city is undergoing rapid development and transformation. This includes the displacement, consolidation, and transformation of urban kampung in the city center; the formation of new kampung on the urban fringe; and the incorporation and transformation of rural villages into urban kampung. As many kampung become overcrowded, the incoming migrants settle on 'marginal' land, such as river banks, abandoned Chinese cemeteries, railway embankments, and vacant land throughout the city. The process of kampung formation in Yogyakarta is still occurring and is creating massive headaches for the urban government, which wishes to develop a modern and orderly city.

The kampung along the Code River present a complex of persistent problems which are common with popular settlements in Indonesia in particular, and with those in developing countries in general; such problems are related to the issues of 'marginality,' 'informality,' and 'illegality.' The kampung along the Code River provide an example of urban settlements which are marginal physically as well as economically, compared to formal-modern 'real estate' complexes; yet socially and politically such settlements show a community's potential for further improvement and development. The development process of the kampung along the Code River shows the ambiguity of the government's attitude toward popular settlements and the inadequacy of existing legal and institutional frameworks in dealing with the complex problems represented by the kampung phenomenon.
Figure 1.2
The City of Yogyakarta
1.6 Research Methodology

1.6.1 Approach

In general, this study employs a political-economy approach or perspective which takes the view that land and housing markets are not exclusively determined by economic factors. The social, cultural and political dimensions are thought to be of at least equal importance (Fitzwilliam Memorandum, 1991). This study is of an exploratory and evaluative nature, with emphasis placed on a qualitative research method (Berg, 1995). Although a large amount of quantitative data was compiled and used in this research, most of the analysis developed in this study is based on qualitative data and information. The exploratory nature of the research is also due to the fact that the socio-political dimensions of kampung have not yet been extensively studied; a broad understanding of the phenomenon is therefore required.

As suggested by the Fitzwilliam Memorandum (1991), quantitative research on housing needs to be complemented by a qualitative-sociological investigation through case studies, in order to achieve a better understanding of how popular settlements are formed and consolidated. Such case studies provide important evidence to answer the question why, with reference to global political and economic forces, one settlement or community prospers, while another, similarly situated with regard to its internal-national situation, stagnates or develops in a different way.

This dissertation, therefore, deliberately takes a very broad approach to the issue under discussion. First, in view of the fact that this issue has never been comprehensively explored in the Indonesian context, such a broad perspective will be very useful for later investigators who wish to examine the issue in more detail. Second,
it is hoped that the author’s direct experience of living in a kampung also provides opportunities for an insider’s point of view in the analysis of kampung development.

1.6.2 Case Study Selection

For the purpose of a more detailed analysis concerning the socio-political process of the development of the kampung, four kampung were selected as case studies. These four kampung possess: (1) differences in their physical and social aspects; (2) differences in their respective ages and in their stages of development; (3) differences in their development processes; (4) differences in the government’s attitude toward them; and (5) differences in the degree of community mobilization (see Table 1.1).

All together, these four case studies present the dynamics of the development process of kampung and show the social and political dimensions that determine that process. They show that the process of settlement development varies, depending on the local dynamics of each settlement. Developed along the same river, but with different strategies, each kampung had different results. By comparing and assessing facts and evidence from these four case studies, a better understanding of the development process of the kampung and factors crucial in the process can be achieved.

A case study approach, like the present study, could be criticized, however, for not placing the discussion into a broader or more general context. Generalizations based on this approach could also be fatally flawed, if the uniqueness of the case being studied were not clearly explained (Yin, 1984; Gilbert, 1991). Being special in many ways, the characteristics of Yogyakarta as an area for such case studies would have to be carefully
examined before generalizing from it to Indonesia as a whole. As will be discussed further in Chapter Four, Yogyakarta, as a city with a relatively complex historical background, presents a unique Indonesian city. Still, a study of this city may offer an important contribution to a better understanding of the whole relationship between cities and kampung, and between the state and communities in Indonesia.

Table 1.1
Characteristics of Case Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Case Study 1 Ratmakan</th>
<th>Case Study 2 Gondolayu/Kotabaru</th>
<th>Case Study 3 Terban Baru</th>
<th>Case Study 4 Blimbingsari Baru</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Physical Aspects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Distance from the city center</td>
<td>0.2 Km.</td>
<td>2 Km.</td>
<td>2.5 Km.</td>
<td>3.5 Km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lot size (sqm)</td>
<td>50-200</td>
<td>communal well-designed</td>
<td>50-100</td>
<td>50-80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Settlement pattern</td>
<td>irregular</td>
<td>communal</td>
<td>regular/grid</td>
<td>irregular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Housing size (sqm)</td>
<td>50-200</td>
<td>well, pipe</td>
<td>50-100</td>
<td>50-80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Water services</td>
<td>well, pipe</td>
<td>pump well</td>
<td>well, pipe</td>
<td>well, pipe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Electricity</td>
<td>legal</td>
<td>pirate</td>
<td>legal</td>
<td>legal, pirate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Private toilet</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sanitation</td>
<td>on site, river</td>
<td>river</td>
<td>on site, river</td>
<td>river, cemetery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Waste disposal</td>
<td>river</td>
<td>river</td>
<td>river</td>
<td>river, cemetery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Social Aspects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Pop. Density (person/Ha)</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Economic level</td>
<td>low-middle varied</td>
<td>low informal sector</td>
<td>low varied</td>
<td>low informal sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Occupation</td>
<td>mosque, hall, library, gardu ronda</td>
<td>mosque, hall, library, gardu ronda</td>
<td>mosque, hall gardu ronda</td>
<td>mosque, gardu ronda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Public Facilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C. Historical Background</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Formation process</td>
<td>gradual, individual</td>
<td>mobilized</td>
<td>mobilized</td>
<td>spontaneous, individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Land invasion process</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D. Special Characteristics</strong></td>
<td>A government supported kampung</td>
<td>An architect-designed kampung</td>
<td>A community organized kampung</td>
<td>A spontaneous unorganized kampung</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.6.3 Survey Process, Data Sources, and Analysis

The author's interest in and observation of the kampung actually began quite long ago, in 1979, when, as a student needing an affordable room, I became a resident of kampung Blimbingsari, adjacent to Case Study 4 of this study. It was in this kampung that I gained a direct experience of living with kampung people. My first academic study on kampung, however, did not begin until 1986, when, together with two colleagues, I conducted an intensive study of one kampung located on the bank of the Code River (Setiawan et.al, 1987). From that point, my interest continued in further observing kampung issues. Thus, in 1987 and 1988, I documented the formation process of a squatter settlement in the Chinese cemetery (Case Study 4 in the present research), also located on the bank of the same river (Setiawan, 1987). My intensive observation of the kampung along the Code River started in 1992, when I had an opportunity to join a research team that was asked by the government to study the potential and problems of kampung development along the Code River (P4N-UGM, 1993; Setiawan, 1993).

Much of the data and information for this present study, therefore, represents an accumulation of my ten years of observations and experiences related to kampung. As my previous studies and observations were not directed to the issue of 'illegality' and 'community autonomy,' I conducted another two series of intensive field observations and conducted interviews for the purpose of this dissertation. The first was in the summer of 1995 (May to August); during that time, field observations concerning the development of the riverside dike and its effect on housing and settlement improvements were conducted. Along with these observations, interviews with actors and agencies involved in the formation, improvement, and consolidation processes of
kampung along the river were conducted. Having experience with kampung issues for several years, I was able to identify the significant actors and agencies to be interviewed. However, initial interviews with several respondents often led to other respondents who were considered to have more information regarding the research questions proposed in this study. Five groups of actors were identified and interviewed in this study: (1) government officials; (2) NGO leaders; (3) community leaders; (4) kampung dwellers; and (5) academics. A list of the names of people interviewed is provided in Appendix 1.

In addition, four informal discussion meetings with members of the communities involved were also conducted, in which each community’s problems and potential were discussed. These meetings, which were attended by kampung members, kampung leaders, students and observers, provided opportunities for the author to discuss kampung issues with community members. It was from these informal meetings that I was able to focus on several important issues and several key actors during my second series of field observations and interviews.

The second series of field observations and interviews was conducted during the summer of 1996 (May to September), when more detailed issues concerning the four case studies were explored. Again, during these observations interviews with individuals and agencies involved in the development process of the four kampung were conducted. These interviews were conducted with the particular purpose of reconfirming several issues that had appeared in the first series of interviews and observations. These interviews focused on respondents’ perceptions of the whole process of kampung development in the study area, particularly their perceptions of
government involvement and their attitudes toward the process as it affected them. As was observed in 1995, the role of leadership in the kampung seems to be crucial; a survey of the leadership profiles of the kampung in the study area was therefore conducted during the second series of observations. This included interviews with 20 kampung leaders (See Appendix 2 and 3).

In general, most of the actors involved in the development process of the four kampung selected as case studies were willing to meet me and to be interviewed. By getting to know the kampung leaders personally and by explaining my interests openly and honestly, I was able to get information and attain insights into the ways in which they mobilized resources and developed linkages with external agencies in order to develop their kampung. Insights that I gained from them about the development process of kampung, particularly about the complex relationships among actors and agencies involved in the process, proved to be important ingredients of this study. Interviews were conducted as informal discussions, rather than as formal question-answer sessions, but were directed at answering research questions proposed in this study (See Appendix 2 and 3). It was found that an unstructured interview format was useful, as it encouraged respondents to talk freely on selected issues. Interviews with government officials, NGO leaders, and academics were conducted in the Indonesian language, while interviews with kampung leaders and members were conducted in Javanese. Interviews were not recorded. Instead, brief notes were made, including names, data cited and key words, to facilitate my further inquiry.

Along with the two intensive series of observations conducted during the summer of 1995 and 1996, secondary data related to the research topic were also
collected. These included maps, statistical data from several government agencies, government reports and documents, and planning documents related to the city and the study area. In addition, reports from journals, magazines, and newspapers, representing public discussions and opinions concerning urban and housing issues, were also documented and analyzed.

It is important also to mention that three seminars were conducted specifically to gain input from academics and other people interested in the topic. The first was in June 1995, at the Department of Architecture, Gajah Mada University; the second was in July 1995, at the ‘Urban Forum’ of NGOs interested in urban issues; and the third was in September 1996, at the Center for Cultural Studies and Social Change, Gajah Mada University. The first two seminars were aimed at obtaining input on the research proposal, while the third was aimed at discussing the preliminary findings gained from the field work.

Based on the field observations, interviews, small discussions with kampung members, and also the seminars mentioned above, multiple sources of evidence from four kampung with different physical and social characteristics, developmental stages, strategies, and results were collected. These findings were then compared and analyzed, using a method known as the comparative method (Glasser and Strauss, 1970). By this method, variations (in this case, the ways in which the state and the society in each case study responded to the same legal framework in relation to kampung development) found in each kampung were coded and iteratively compared with other kampung. It was from these comparisons that a comprehensive understanding of the development process of the kampung along the Code River was able to be developed.
1.7 Structure of the Dissertation

Following this introductory chapter on the background, objectives, significance, methods, and data sources of this research, Chapter Two presents a review of several aspects of the informal housing sector, focusing on the importance of networks between communities and other segments of society.

Chapter Three provides the context for the research, by discussing kampung in the context of Indonesian urbanization and current government urban and housing policies. It discusses why it is important to conceptualize kampung as communities which have rights to urban resources and services. Further, drawing on policy documents, secondary data, and related studies, this chapter evaluates the Indonesian government’s policies and programs concerning housing development; it argues that a reformulation of policies and programs is crucially needed, in order to achieve greater equity in urban development.

Chapter Four brings the discussion down to the local context, the city of Yogyakarta. It provides the historical background of the city and discusses the transformation processes occurring today. These facts are presented in order to understand the broader socio-political reality outside kampung.

Chapter Five describes the study area, the kampung along the Code River, and discusses the historical development of the area. This chapter argues that the kampung along the Code River are not socially marginal nor physically deprived but neglected by government agencies and other social forces.

Chapter Six presents the main empirical evidence of this research. It describes and examines in detail the development process of four kampung along the Code River.
This discussion includes the historical development of each kampung and the relationships among actors and agencies in the development process. This chapter also describes government intervention in relation to the kampung along the river, in the form of a riverside dike project; this project provides evidence for the strong role that the government plays in the whole process of kampung upgrading.

Chapter Seven presents an analysis of the dynamic process of kampung development. This chapter shows how kampung development is actually a socio-political process, involving various actors with different resources and interests. The four case studies show that the success of a particular kampung in gaining legal status depends very much on the ability of people in that kampung to develop reciprocal networks with state officials or institutions.

Chapter Eight evaluates four factors important to kampung development: (1) the internal aspects of each community; (2) the role of the state; (3) the role of laws and regulations; and (4) the role of intermediary agencies. It is clear from the case studies that, although kampung communities have some degree of autonomy over the process of kampung development, they are still very much dependent upon the assistance of the state and external agencies.

Chapter Nine presents the study’s conclusions and recommendations. It outlines the main findings of the research and suggests some ideas for developing a more appropriate policy and planning approach toward informal settlements. Further, this chapter also proposes some directions for further research concerning housing issues, both in Indonesia in particular and in developing countries in general.
CHAPTER 2
INFORMAL SETTLEMENT:
COMMUNITY, NETWORKS, AND ACCESS TO RESOURCES

Many theoretical concepts about the urban poor and communities in the developing countries have been developed on the assumption that the poor form a class apart. Not only have the urban poor been portrayed as physically segregated, economically exploited and marginalized, they have also been viewed as socially and politically excluded. Yet the fact that they exist within the broader economic, social, and political structures of the urban environment suggests that it might be more useful to start from a different perspective: that the urban poor are not an isolated group or class apart, but rather are closely linked to, and interact with, other segments of society. In other words, in reality, the urban poor are engaged in complex and dynamic networks of interaction with other parties or agencies involved in the urban development process.

These networks take many forms and dimensions, including economic, religious, cultural, social and political relations, but it is clear that they are crucial for the poor to continue to survive and to pursue their interests. Once communities have developed networks with other segments of society, they enter into what Leeds (1994) calls the 'supra-local structure'; this is the broader socio-political setting outside communities, including the nature of the state, the state ideology, and the rule of law.

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1 As this study focuses on housing/settlement development, it should be noted here that when the term 'local-urban politics' is used, it does not deal with the whole range of political participation by the community. Rather, it focuses on the modes of action organized by communities to increase their access to urban resources and the decision-making process related to settlement development.
The term 'supra-local politics' itself is ambiguous, but, within the context of urban development, it denotes a dynamic process by which power and resources are negotiated and shared among all the actors involved in urban development (Schulz, 1979; Saunders, 1986). For communities, involvement in supra-local politics means an engagement with other segments of society (state agencies, the private sector, NGOs, and other social groups)² with the particular objective of defending and pursuing their interests as communities (Nelson, 1979). Only communities that can develop beneficial networks with other segments of society are likely to succeed, because it is only by engaging in such networks that access to urban resources and the decision-making process can be obtained.

This chapter deals with a very basic question concerning informal settlement: why some particular communities are more successful in improving their settlements than others? This chapter begins by discussing four patterns of networks and explaining why patron-client networks survive in urban areas in developing countries. This is followed by a discussion concerning the internal aspects of community, exploring in particular the factors that are important in mobilizing community resources, such as 'community cohesion' and 'community leadership.' From here, a discussion of the external aspects of community is presented, including the role of the state, the role of law, and the role of intermediary agencies such as NGOs.

² As argued by Schulz (1979) and Saunders (1986) the locality of parties involved in local-urban politics is important, as it specifically refers to locally based actors such as local government agencies or municipalities, local units of the central government, local units of state agencies (the police, military, judiciary institutions), the local private sector, and other local social and political groups. Desai (1995) calls this the 'micro' and 'meso politics' of community organizations, meaning the ties between the internal aspects of basic-level institutions and their higher agencies.
2.1 How are Networks between Communities and other Segments of Society Developed?

The scant literature on the way in which networks of relations among local communities and other segments of society are developed suggests that at least four patterns or types can be distinguished. These four are: (1) patron-client relations; (2) ethnic associations; (3) certain types of political parties; and (4) special-interest associations (Nelson, 1979:382). As will be discussed below, these four patterns can be distinguished in terms of three aspects. First, is the nature of the relations: whether instrumental, ideological, cultural, ethnic, or functional; second, is the structure of the relations: whether vertical, inbalanced, or horizontal; and third, is the forms or media of relations, whether personal or impersonal, informal or formal.

1) Patron-client Relations. The first pattern of networks that mediate between the community and the broader society is that of patron-client relations. As defined by Scott (1977:124-125), patron-client relations are:

"a special case of dyadic ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron."

In patron-client relations, the nature of the relationship is instrumental, meaning that such relations are purposefully developed by both patron and client for their mutual interests. Although the structure of relations remains hierarchical or vertical, and therefore the balance of benefits may heavily favor the patron, some reciprocity does exist. It is this reciprocal nature which distinguishes the patron-client structure from
other, purely coercive, structures. Further, patron-client relations are also characterized by the informality and flexibility of such relations. This flexibility is important, as it contributes to the relationship’s survival, even during rapid social change; it tends to persist as long as the two partners still have something to offer one another.

Initially, patron-client relations were most prevalent in rural society, but many studies have shown that such relations have also appeared and developed in the rapidly growing cities in developing countries. Studies such as those by Roberts (1968), Jackson (1978), and Gay (1990) document the ways in which patron-client relations exist in urban society, and how such relations shape the development process and the struggle of the poor for urban resources. Many factors contribute to the existence and development of patron-client relations in cities, such as the dependent mentality of rural migrants or residual rural attitudes on the part of some migrants (Giusti, 1971), but it is the persistence of imbalances in power and resource distribution, as well as the relative absence of firm or formal and impersonally guaranteed physical, economic, and social security in urban areas in developing countries, that make patron-client relations persist as they do (Scott, 1977; Nelson, 1979; Gay, 1990; Roniger, 1994).

2) **Ethnic Association.** Ethnic association refers to the way in which a group of urban dwellers is organized, based on ethnic loyalty and common cultural and traditional values and norms. ‘Ethnic’ in this case refers to an ascriptive category of people, which is endogamous and broader than a clan or extended family, the members

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3 Some writers, such as Nelson (1979) or Jackson (1978) differentiate between patron-client relations and traditional leader-follower relations (e.g. African urban chiefs) in that the latter involve more coercion and manipulation. Further, while the traditional follower in principle owes loyalty to his leader, regardless of whether the leader has ever aided him specifically, patron-client relations depend on a reciprocal flow of benefits and favors.
of which view themselves and are viewed by the broader society as distinct and separate, by virtue of culture, history, and social organization and customs (Nelson, 1979:215). The structure of such relations is commonly horizontal, but in some cases ethnic leaders are in the best position to gain benefits from such relations. Ethnic groups usually have their own distinctive formal and informal codes of conduct, which all members follow.

These qualities show that ethnic relations, unlike patron-client relations, are not present everywhere. Such relations are central in countries with heterogeneous ethnic groups, such as in most of Africa and South Asia, and are moderately important in Southeast Asia. Many Latin American countries are ethnically mixed, but there the divisions among ethnic groups have not been particularly important in local politics. Theoretically, such factors as urbanization, education, and improved communication and transportation could all lead members of different ethnic groups to meet and mingle with each other. But after more than a century of social, technological and economic change, the most striking fact is not the erosion of ethnicity, but rather its persistence, and the often heightened sense of ethnic identity which is widely apparent.

Several factors contribute to the persistence of ethnic associations in the modern urban world, but according to Nelson (1979) a broadened sense of ethnic identity seems to be the main reason. Further, the transformation of ethnic ties into mechanisms for individual security and progress in the modern world has also contributed to the persistence of ethnic association in urban areas. As documented by many studies, ethnic associations have been an effective mechanism by which particular segments of urban society can defend and attain their interests (Gugler, 1975).
3) Political Parties or Political Machines. The third type of network by which urban communities can interrelate with other segments of society is through political parties. In this type of network, parties seek to make alliances with a community, thereby receiving block political support from their followers in that community. The basis for such relations is usually ideological, ranging from populist, Marxist, to reform. Compared with patron-client and ethnic relations, political party relations can be said to be structured more horizontally and to be more formal, consisting of relations in which specific rules and procedures for member participation are usually established.

As documented by many studies, the practice by which political parties gain electoral support from the poor settled in low-income urban areas is widespread, but it is most persistent in Latin America countries. Many factors contribute to this, such as the political system of the countries, the nature of political parties, etc.; but the percentage of the population living in urban areas seems to be the main factor. In many Latin America countries, where more than half of the population is urban, it is logical for political parties to attempt to gain support from the urban masses. This contrasts with many Asian or African countries, where parties seeking electoral votes may give low priority to the urban population, simply because the overwhelming majority of the electorate is still rural.

4 Perhaps the best explanation of the nature and consequences of the relations between the urban poor and political parties is the one presented by Castells (1983) in his monumental book The City and the Grassroots. In this book, Castells argues that the strength and scope of the concerns of political movements among the urban poor could only be maximized in alliances with proletariat-based parties.

5 Empirical studies conducted in Latin American countries in the late 1970s demonstrated that most social movements involving the urban poor do not represent deviations from the dominant social order, but rather are closely related to the political systems within which they occur. See, for example, Squatter and Oligarchs (Collier, 1976), The Poverty of Revolution (Eckstein, 1977), or Housing, the State and the Poor (Gilbert and Ward, 1985).
In some cases, as in Brazil, it is through such relations that the urban poor increase their access to urban services (Leeds and Leeds, 1976). But, in other cases, as in Mexico, relations with the governing party may well reduce success in making demands (Eckstein, 1977). Many factors contribute to the inability of communities to gain benefits from political party associations, but many studies have found that in this regard the quality of community leadership is crucial. In many cases, political parties or government agencies have been able to co-opt community leaders for their own benefit (Eckstein, 1977; Gilbert and Ward, 1985).  

4) Special-interest Associations. The urban poor can also develop networks with other segments of society through special-interest associations. The basis for such associations is functional and pragmatic, and the primary goal is to advance their members' shared interests through cooperation. In other words, the basis for membership in this type of relation is the possession of mutual interests in fairly specific areas, such as religious matters, occupational concerns, cultural and educational interests, etc. Such associations are horizontally structured, meaning that all members have the same opportunities to take part in the association.

Unlike patron-client relations, this form of relations tends to be more formal, but it is not totally impersonal. Such associations therefore differ from patron-client networks, where the basis for membership is common loyalty to a leader, and where horizontal ties among members may be limited. Special-interest associations also differ

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6 Co-optation is here defined as the situation in which an informal, loosely-structured group is led by its leaders to formally affiliate with a supra-local institution. It occurs when the leader believes, often mistakenly, that formal affiliation will further the interests of those whom he represents, by providing better access to the agencies distributing resources (Desai, 1995:60-61).
from ethnic associations, where the range of potential interests may extend to virtually any aspect of life. In contrast to political party associations, special-interest associations are much smaller and more narrowly focused. Therefore, although special-interest associations are numerous and active, their impact is constrained by their small size and narrow base of support (Nelson, 1979:384).

Special-interest associations are also politically ineffective, because their main goal is only to influence government authorities on certain issues, rather than to gain a share in political power. Further, they are also not free from control by, or influence from, external agents; in many cases, through co-opting the leaders, external agencies have been able to use special-interest associations for their own benefit. Some special-interest associations such as neighborhood organizations have even been created simply as instruments of regime control (Collier, 1976; Sullivan, 1992; Desai, 1995).

Table 2.1
Types of Networks between Communities and External Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basis of Relations</th>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Patron-client</td>
<td>instrumental, reciprocal,</td>
<td>vertical/hierarchical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>imbalanced/unequal</td>
<td>cross-class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>informal, personal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>flexible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Ethnic Associations</td>
<td>cultural, ethnic loyalty/identity</td>
<td>less hierarchical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>cross-class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>informal, personal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Political Parties</td>
<td>ideological/political</td>
<td>horizontal, cross-class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>but can be class-based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>more formal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Special-interest Groups</td>
<td>functional, mutual interests</td>
<td>horizontal, autonomous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>formal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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2.2 Persistence and Transformation of Patron-client Networks

According to Nelson (1979:383), of the four patterns or types of network presented above, the patron-client relation is the most dominant. In other words, patron-client relations overlap with and penetrate all other types of networks. Thus poor urban members of an ethnic group are likely to seek patrons, individually or collectively, among more affluent co-ethnics. Special-interest groups may seek institutional or individual patrons among the authorities. Leaders within special-interest groups or ethnic groups may also act as patrons for their members. Political party associations may also be viewed as institutionalized patron-client relations.\(^7\)

Rising levels of education, a more balanced distribution of resources and power, and more formal institutions that guarantee people’s economic and social security, are all factors that can make patron-client relations less necessary. However, the persistence of social, economic, and political inequalities means that patron-client relations, for better or worst, will continue to be an important means for the urban poor to further their interests and meet their needs (Scott, 1977; Jackson, 1978; Nelson, 1979; Gay, 1990). Moreover, the fact that in many developing countries public laws and regulations cannot guarantee adequate protection against conflicts faced by the poor, forces the poor to continue to seek protection from patrons. As noted by Roniger (1994), it is interesting that, while modernization and economic growth are apparent in many developing countries, not only has the patron-client system survived, but it has even flourished or become more complex.

\(^7\) Scott (1977) argued that, in many Southeast Asian countries, political parties do incorporate patron-client clusters into their party structures and get the maximum benefit from them.
As described by Scott (1977:132-134), particularly in the case of Southeast Asian countries, what has happened is the transformation of traditional patron-client relations into more contemporary ones. He notes several aspects that characterize this transformation process, such as the duration of bonds (from more persistent to less persistent), the scope of exchange (from multiplex to simplex), the density of coverage (from greater density to lesser density); but what seems to be important in this transformation is the nature of the resources that the patron and client seek to exchange.

If, in the traditional patronage system the patron’s power was mostly operated based on personally controlled local resources (land, protection, etc.), within the contemporary patronage system external resources are becoming more important. In other words, a patronage system that is mainly based on the distribution of local offices or local land control is seldom sufficient to sustain a patron in a new environment, in which various social, economic, and political institutions represent competing sources of patronage. The growing importance of external resources, in most cases, leads to competition among patrons, each of whom recruit various followings with the particular resources under that patron’s control.

This shift is important, as it makes the relations between patrons and clients less complex, but also more fluid or flexible. In a contemporary setting, clients have to seek a variety of patrons, who can provide them with a variety of benefits or resources. Gay (1990) noted a similar transformation in Brazilian society. In spite of radical

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8 In this context, it is important to note that cities offer a wide range of possible patrons. As noted by Nelson (1979:182), among the more important of these are: employers or (for the self-employed) suppliers or important customers; officials or politicians at various levels of the national and local bureaucracy; local neighborhood leaders; shopkeepers; professionals and other high status individuals, who belong to the same neighborhood associations or church; priests and other religious functionaries.
transformations in the structure of Brazilian society, patron-client relations have survived and even flourished. A similar process was also found by Johnson (1977) in Beirut, by Van Der Linden (1989) in Karachi, by De Wit (1989) in Madras, and by Desai (1995) in Bombay.

Lastly, it is always important to remember that, although patron-client networks do help the poor to meet their most immediate and urgent needs, they hamper the formation of more autonomous and independent communities. In a broader socio-political context, such networks also hinder efforts to transform in any fundamental way a very hierarchical society into a more egalitarian and balanced one. In other words, patron-client networks tend to maintain the status quo, and even to strengthen existing imbalances in power and resource distribution; they are a key element in the mechanism of dependency and control, which help both to legitimate and to mask structures of domination (Lemarchand, 1981).

2.3 Internal Aspects of Community

The patterns and results of community involvement in local urban politics, however, are shaped not only by communities’ ties with other segments of society, but also by their internal aspects. The term ‘internal aspects’ means the conditions within a community, i.e. the strengths and weaknesses that are caused by four important factors: the community’s history and internal cohesion; community values; community

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9 However, in his study of the poor community in Rio de Janeiro, Gay (1990) found that patron-client relations are now based primarily on the exchange of goods and services, rather than on the exercise (or threat) of power.
leadership; and community groups. The following discussion will explore this issue, but first several problems found in many writings about community will be discussed.

2.3.1 Understanding Community

So far in this chapter, the term ‘community’ has been presented with little explicit description. In general ‘community’ has been used to refer to a group of individuals, mostly poor, with specific social networks in a specific physical setting. This is, of course, a very brief definition that need further discussion, particularly in view of the fact that the concept of community itself has changed over the years. Without retracing once again the development of the concept of community already presented in the literature, this section will highlight five important perspectives concerning community that are related to the issue of the community enabling approach.

First, as most writers have agreed, conceptualizing and describing the meaning of community in terms of a basic dichotomy, as formulated by Tonnies (gemeinschaft-gesellschaft dichotomy), Durkheim (mechanical-organic dichotomy), and Wirth (rural-urban dichotomy), although very useful, are subject to criticism as being too simple and therefore inadequate to explain the realities (Flanagan, 1993). It is widely understood now that the nature of community is marked by complexities which go beyond narrow traditional-modern and rural-urban distinctions.

Second, although there is an increasing appreciation of communities as specific social networks that are not necessarily bound within specific territorial settings, the spatial dimension of community remains still to be acknowledged. This idea is especially important, as this dissertation discusses community in relation to urban and
housing issues. In other words, while acknowledging the possible erosion of the spatial dimensions of community, in the context of urban housing development, the territorial and spatial aspects of community continue to play an important role, as they contribute to anchoring the social network (Flanagan, 1993). In this study, therefore, the concept of community covers a neighborhood in which a group of people engage in dynamic interactions, bound by a specific territory or spatial setting; i.e. a settlement.

The third important perspective concerning community is the need to give more appreciation to the idea of a community as a socio-political unit, as an organized group of people that is formed intentionally for a particular goal or objective (Nelson, 1979). The structure of this organization or association may vary, ranging from a very informal and temporary group fully developed by local people, to a semi-permanent or permanent association developed and managed through the intervention of external agencies. The most important factor is that such communities engage in collective action to express and realize their needs and interests. In other words, their existence and their rights in the socio-political process have to be acknowledged (Korten, D. 1986; Friedmann, 1992). Community is thereby seen as a process through which people take initiatives and act collectively (Checkoway, 1995).

The fourth important perspective concerning community is the growing realization that a community is not necessarily a passive victim of modernization and globalization. Community as a group of human agencies is not always wiped out by modernity or global influences. The fact that many cities and communities are still able to manifest a unique form of development suggests the ability of local variables or human agencies to modify or transform global modernization influences. As has been
argued, simple arguments that view local communities as pale reflections of the globalization process and of external influences overlook the capacity of communities to act as groups of free human agents (Gottdiener, 1985; Flanagan, 1993).

A final perspective concerning community is a growing understanding that a community is not always a monolithic body with unified, clear-cut interests; such a view neglects the fact that any community also comprises various individuals, with different and even conflicting interests. Contrary to popular belief, communities are not always unified; in many cases, community organizations are unable to consolidate their membership and resources. In this context, it is therefore very important to consider the fact that attempts to mobilize the internal resources of a community are unlikely to succeed unless all community interests are accounted for.

Having reviewed five important perspectives concerning community, a more comprehensive understanding of the idea of community can now be developed. Such an understanding is particularly significant to the context of this study; in this context, community refers to a group of people, living in a specific historical and territorial setting (settlement-neighborhood), with particular values, interests, and goals, and which is organized or functions as a means for collective action (group/association) to meet common needs, interests and objectives. In this study, community is thus to be conceived of in its totality: it covers three main components: its 'form' (locality, settlement/neighborhood), its 'substance' (a group of people with particular values, needs, and interests) and its 'function' (groups/associations for collective action).
2.3.2 Community Organization: Incentive to Organize

As community is to be conceived of as an organized group of people with mutual interests who engage in collective efforts to defend and pursue those interests, it is therefore important to question what incentives there are for communities to establish organizations or associations. Why are community organizations common and effective in some areas and ineffective in others? Nelson (1979:253-255) suggests that two aspects are important in this context: commitment to the neighborhood, and the physical and legal status of the neighborhood. A core group of permanent, stable and committed urban dwellers is an essential prerequisite for the establishment of a community organization. Temporary or short-term migrants are not likely to be willing to establish a community organization, or to become involved in existing community organizations.

The physical and legal status of a settlement is also an important factor in the development of a community organization. At least a substantial core of residents must feel that some aspect of settlement creates a shared problem—a problem important enough for them to be willing to devote time, energy, and also money to its solution. In informal settlements, the most commonly shared problem is the threat of eviction. Therefore, both new settlements not yet legally accepted by the authorities, and older settlements under threat of dissolution are very likely to establish community organizations. However, community organizations are also formed without any external threat, particularly when the physical conditions of settlement are so bad that improvements cannot be delayed. Community associations are commonly most active and effective in early settlement stages, when communities lack both legal recognition and basic services (UNCHS, 1982).
2.3.3 Capacity to Organize: The Role of Leadership

Stability and shared problems, however, do not automatically produce effective community organization. The social cohesiveness of a community, which is important for generating and sustaining dynamic community organization, is affected by many factors. Among these are community history, the size and physical features of a community, and its leadership quality (Nelson, 1979; UNCHS, 1982; Desai, 1995). The history of a settlement, including the circumstances of its formation, significantly affects social cohesion. Settlements that are formed through planned invasions commonly have stronger social cohesion. Settlements that are formed by incremental accretion are less likely to have well-developed and dynamic community organizations, because such settlements lack the unifying experience of an invasion. Long-established and stable settlements in the inner city may also be fairly cohesive and dynamic, by virtue of shared traditions, values, and history (Nelson, 1979:260).

On top of these factors, however, the nature and quality of leadership is believed to be a dominant factor (Nelson, 1979; Laquian, 1983). Although community members may share history, values, problems, and interests, without a leader who has the ability to mobilize collective efforts, community cohesion means nothing. A community may have many resources and potentials, but if it does not have trusted, powerful and skillful leaders, those potentials and resources cannot be mobilized. Conversely, a community with much less potential can be effectively mobilized under skilled leadership. Further, as any community is engaged in various networks with other external agencies, a community leader must also have the ability to communicate with those agencies.
Understanding supra-local politics, therefore, is very crucial for effective community leadership.\textsuperscript{10}

From the perspective of informal settlement, it is therefore crucially important to consider that, if collective efforts are to be strengthened, the first barrier lies in the incapacity of community leaders and community organizations to mobilize both internal and external resources effectively, for the benefit of the community. In other words, effective community mobilization can only be achieved through a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of conflicts and their resolution within communities. This includes an understanding of the history of the community, the nature of leadership within the community, and the norms and values used by the community to resolve conflicts.\textsuperscript{11}

2.3.4 Guarantee for Success: Opposition or Constructive Engagement?

So far, the success of community development programs has been conceived in terms of the ability of the community to manage and mobilize internal resources (Korten D., 1986).\textsuperscript{12} Such ideas may be relevant in a situation in which a community is

\textsuperscript{10} Although community leadership is crucial, it might be misleading to assume that community organizations are set up primarily to further the community's interests. As already warned by Laquian (1983), it is possible that such organizations are mainly a reflection of the community leadership structure. It takes careful participatory observation and the cooperation of community informants to really understand leadership in low-income communities.

\textsuperscript{11} In the case of rural development, Korten F. (1983:189-195) has identified several obstacles to mobilizing community resources or to organizing collective action. These obstacles are: (1) lack of an appropriate local organization; (2) lack of organizational skills; (3) poor communication facilities; (4) factionalism and differing economic interests; (5) corruption.

\textsuperscript{12} Korten D. (1986) argues for the importance of 'community management,' a process by which local citizens plan for their own self-defined needs, using their own resources and opportunities. As his focus is clearly on a rural setting, many important ideas that Korten expressed concerning the community development approach should be carefully and critically examined if they are to be implemented in urban settings.
assumed to have total autonomy or control over its resources. Within a clientelist structure, however, where resources and power are not controlled within the community itself, management and authority over resources by communities become more complicated. To survive, communities cannot depend only upon their own resources; they must engage in an exchange of resources, however imbalanced it may be.

It is commonly believed that the resources for housing development are limited. While in some cases this situation is true, in other cases it is not. In some areas, rather than the availability of resources, the most crucial problem seems to be resource accessibility. Land, for example, may be available around a city, but since most of this land is in the hands of developers, most people do not have access to it. Credit for housing is perhaps also available; however, since most informal workers are unable to provide any formal or legal guarantees (e.g. collateral), they are excluded from obtaining such credit. Building codes and standards may also exist and be simple enough to implement, but as long as the bureaucratic procedures involved in their implementation are too difficult, most people will prefer to neglect them.

The importance to communities of external networks is, therefore, that such networks increase communities’ access to the resources they need. By engaging in extensive networks with external agencies, a community can engage in various exchanges and negotiations, which means that its opportunities to access urban resources are increased. An important aspect of such negotiations or exchanges is that the resources involved are not always ‘material’ resources; they can take the form of social, cultural, or political resources (Scott, 1977). In some cases, therefore, when communities (as clients) need material resources that they do not have (e.g. land,
building materials, infrastructure, etc.), they may receive these resources from other, more powerful agencies (patrons) and give in exchange their political resources (e.g. electoral votes or loyalty) or social human resources (e.g. the mobilization of free labor).

Community development strategies, particularly the more radical ones, often totally reject or oppose the role of the state and suggest a radical social reformation. This dissertation acknowledges the important role that the state plays, but critically questions the tendency toward domination and power abuse by the state apparatus. It does not advocate direct opposition to the state, but believes in making use of the state’s weaknesses, in order to obtain more balanced social relations. This view is thus prepared for constructive engagement with the state, while at the same time searching for more transparent and fair mechanisms that can be used to mediate such conflicts as arise or to reinforce cooperative relations. Perlman (1987) has said correctly that, from the viewpoint of the people and the community, self-help or informal settlement is neither romantic nor heroic. It is a survival strategy, based on the widest available freedom of choice to allocate scarce time and resources.

2.4 Informal Settlement and the Role of the State

From the above discussion, it is clear that informal settlement development is actually a socio-political process, involving various actors and agencies within and

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13 Castells (1983), for example, argues that lower class movements do best when they have total autonomy/freedom, without ties to the state. In practice, however, most community movements that are generated without ties to the state face more problems than solutions. As documented by Schuurman and Naerssen (1989), without a certain degree of democratic space, the state in developing countries will try to destroy any urban social movement, since this, by definition, questions the state’s functions, legitimacy and ideology.
outside the community. In this process, all actors engage in various networks, alliances, conflicts, and resolutions, in which each tries to maximize its benefits within the existing power structures. The power relations within society are, therefore, particularly important to the success of informal settlement development. These relations, in turn, are shaped by the state’s attitudes and responses toward the poor and toward informal settlements.

In their study of Latin America, Gilbert and Ward (1985) found that popular housing development or self-help practices have been integrated into a wider pattern of state power; ‘social control’ has thus been the main goal of state intervention. Using patronage relations, governments continually use neighborhood associations as a means of enlisting support. Further, since ‘illegality’ permits actions which favor friends and penalize enemies, illegal settlements lend themselves extremely well to the practice of patronage and to manipulation by politicians and governments; ‘illegality’ can thus provide a stabilizing function.

It is now increasingly accepted, however, that treating the state as a monolithic body overlooks the fact that the state is an extremely complex set of institutions and agencies, with overlapping, contradictory, and inconsistent interests and attitudes, both vertically and horizontally. Doebele (1994:45) argues that governmental agencies in all

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14 Other studies, such as those by Collier in relation to Peru (1976) and Eckstein in relation to Mexico City (1977), have also shown the same pattern, in which the state has used settlement issues for political ends. In other words, community actions have been integrated into the broader structures of state power and social control. See also Schuurman and Naerssen (1989) and Eckstein (1990).

15 In the case of Latin America, Gilbert and Ward (1985:179-181) found three basic mechanisms were utilized. The first was the co-optation of leaders—where an informal, loosely-structured group was led to affiliate itself formally with a supra-local institution. The second was the institutionalization of the channels of political mobilization—where the state sought to develop formal channels to each community. The third was a system of clientelism—where the leader of a community maintained a personal relationship with the politicians who controlled the resources required by that community.
countries, however hierarchical such agencies may appear on organization charts, in fact often promote policies that are far from consistent, either with each other, or in effectively advancing the interests of any single dominant class. Viewing the state as a single power, which consistently and intentionally determines the settlement development process, overlooks the fact that state agencies and state officials have different interests, resources, and behaviors.\textsuperscript{16} Although, in general, the state controls power and resources, in many cases the state is weak and ineffectual.\textsuperscript{17}

Evidence has shown that the interests of the various components of the state and factions of capital may sometimes be contradictory and conflictual in relation to popular settlement. Therefore, even within a patronage structure, there is the possibility that communities (as clients) may coerce the state (the patron) into providing necessary services. Another possibility is that clients may also try to secure needed services or resources elsewhere, from a different patron. The fact that the state is not always a unitary body suggests that there is an opportunity for communities to control their relations to the state. For communities, it is important to understand that they should learn and master the art of manipulating the operations of the state and market forces, rather than rejecting all state support.

\textsuperscript{16} Particularly in relation to former colonies in Asia and Africa, Schuurman and Naerssen (1989) argue that it is important to recognize that societies should not be viewed in terms of a dichotomy between the state and the masses. Such societies are the product of complex, socially-based groupings—religious, ethnic, etc.—of patron-client relationships, and of pre-capitalist power structures, whether traditional or implanted by colonialism.

\textsuperscript{17} In a broader context, the incapability of governments in Third World countries to perform as unitary powers has been termed by Myrdal (1968) as a problem of the ‘soft-state.’ He points out that, where social discipline and loyalty to the government and its purposes are weak, many middle and higher level bureaucrats may view their jobs as a source of social status and enrichment, not only for themselves, but also for their families or clans whose claims of loyalty outweigh those of the bureaucracy.
2.5 The Role of Non-state Organizations as Intermediary Agencies

As the previous discussion suggests, it is important that the community engage in dynamic relations with external agencies, particularly with the state. It is through this engagement that communities increase their access to urban resources and the decision-making processes related to their interests. The problem is that, because the state has more resources, information, and power available than the community, the state tends to determine both the process and the outcome. The role of non-state organizations\textsuperscript{18} such as NGOs, religious groups, and other social, voluntary groups is therefore crucial. They are needed as catalysts for change, to help strengthen the power of the community, to help mobilize community resources, to channel ideas and resources to the community, and to serve as intermediaries to outside resources (UNCHS, 1988; Cernea, 1989; Davidson and Peltenburg, 1993).

This 'idealistic' role of the intermediary agents, however, is not always easy to transfer into meaningful action. As documented by many studies, such intermediary agents face several problems, both internally and externally (Korten, 1986; Cernea, 1989; Clark, 1991). Among such problems, a fundamental problem is the fact that many intermediary agents work without any comprehensive understanding of the existing socio-political structure (Sanyal, 1994). As argued by Korten (1986), many intermediary agents fail to perform as effective mediators, particularly because they are

\textsuperscript{18} Turner (1988) called such intermediary agencies the 'third system,' i.e. neither the state nor private commercial interests. For Friedmann (1992), intermediary agents are needed as catalysts for change, to channel ideas and resources to the community and to serve as intermediaries to the outside world. Several examples of NGOs' scope for playing a role in the housing process can be found in the collection of case studies from several countries edited by Bertha Turner (1988).
unable or unwilling to develop linkages with the state. Korten argues that the lack of linkages with the state creates more problems than solutions.

In this context, as Turner (1988:177-178) also advocates, it is important that the role of these intermediary agents goes far beyond that of ‘innovator’ or ‘motivator’. In a complex housing process, in which communities have to negotiate with holders of power, intermediary agents should focus their efforts on being effective mediators. This, in turn, challenges intermediary agencies, particularly NGOs, to reevaluate their strategies. As argued by Sanyal (1994), only those NGOs that understand politics and are able to manipulate political forces can genuinely help community development.

2.6 Settlement Improvement and Legalization: Between De Jure and De Facto

One important characteristic of popular settlement is that people gradually improve their settlements over time, as resources permit. According to Turner (1967, 1972) this process of incremental improvement depends fundamentally on the security provided by legal land tenure. Since insecurity of tenure and fear of eviction are considered to be serious obstacles hindering settlement improvement (often termed ‘consolidation’), providing tenure security and freedom from eviction is the natural means for removing this obstacle (Angel, 1983:111). Regularization or legalization is, therefore, promoted on the assumption that security of tenure encourages individuals to put their own energy and resources into improving their shelter and surroundings.

Under the idea of urban productivity promoted by the World Bank (World Bank, 1991), the emphasis on properly regulating aspects of urban development, including those relating to land and housing, is perceived as necessary to increase the
efficiency of the market. Legalization policies for informal settlements are therefore believed necessary, not only because they generate settlement consolidation, but also because they increase the efficiency of the housing market in general.

Tenure security and legalization issues are, however, often subjective and complex. A feeling of security cannot be quantitatively measured and generalized, as it depends upon an individual’s needs and expectations (Doebele, 1987). Empirical evidence suggests that the relationship between legalization and settlement consolidation is not a simple one and that the granting of legal tenure is not in itself sufficient to generate settlement improvement or consolidation (Fitzwilliam Memorandum, 1991). It is perhaps true that legalization often leads to housing improvement. However, it is not always true that legalization is necessary for housing improvement. The level of security perceived by a settlements’ residents does not always accord with the degree of formality or legality of the settlement, as defined by its conforming to the state’s laws or regulations. In other words, security is more a function of perception than of strict legal-formal categorization (Varley, 1987; Garr, 1996).

In this context, as Leaf (1994:13) has suggested, it is important that research on informal settlement consider the difference between de jure and de facto forms of tenure status; that is, the distinction between tenure claims according to written law and

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19 In his analysis of the economic benefits of illegality, Baross (1990) shows that, in general, the price of land in informal housing schemes is comparatively low. This is because of the illegal nature of land development; the avoidance of overhead costs; and the low level of servicing required. Mitra and Nientied (1989) argue, however, that the only benefit of illegal development is a much better distribution of the costs. The total amounts spent on housing and related costs, after a number of years, turn out to be lower in formal housing options.

20 Many studies have been done to document the costs and benefits of regularization. Several examples are: Smart in Hong Kong (1986); Varley in Mexico (1987); Glen et al. in Trinidad (1993); Lagos in some countries in Latin America (1995); Pamuk in Turkey (1996); and Glenn and Wolfe in Caribbean countries (1996).
according to practical circumstances. As planners and policy-makers in developing
countries such as Indonesia are working within a complex legal setting, it is necessary to
understand why and how these *de jure* and *de facto* forms of tenure status work. This,
in turn, requires an understanding of the historical development of laws and the
possible ‘discretion’ applied by officials in enforcing laws and regulations.

Gilbert (1990) has warned that ideas of legality and illegality have been used as
effective means for strengthening the state’s control over the population. Despite
several advantages gained from the informal and illegal status of such settlements, in
fact there are also numerous disadvantages to maintaining illegality. Of these
disadvantages, the most important is that illegality does not provide long-term security
for the poor and guarantee an equitable distribution of resources. Further, illegality has
not only been used by the authorities, i.e. government, as a means of social control, but
has also opened up opportunities for discriminatory action and helped to perpetuate
clientelist ties between government officials and communities.

Thus, while illegal status offers housing options to the majority of the urban
poor, it allows governments simply to lean back and push aside their responsibilities in
the field of housing. Illegality also permits governments to use low-income land and
housing problems as important means of social control, with the goal of maintaining the
status-quo. Leaf (1993b) also argues that the arbitrary application of laws and legal
mechanisms actually forces substantial numbers of people to live under conditions of
continual disenfranchisement.
In brief, as De Soto (1989) has clearly stated, the informal-extralegal system is a fact, but not something that should be idealized or romanticized. For informal settlement development to be effective, therefore, an understanding of the socio-political complexity of the legal system is necessary. This includes extra-legal elements, such as clientelist politics based on personal and hierarchical networks and exchanges, in which legal structures and procedures are manipulated by the various actors involved.

2.7 Concluding Remarks: Informal Settlement: A ‘Temporary’ or ‘Permanent’ Solution?

Finally, it is important to remember that the discussion of informal settlement should take into account the broader social, economic, and political contexts. As McGee (1984) has argued, the issues of the informal sector in general and of informal settlement in particular, are often analyzed within a ‘dualistic’ model of the socio-economic structure of cities in developing countries. Such a broad explanation may be useful in answering the fundamental question concerning informal settlement: are informal settlements ‘temporary’ or ‘permanent’ solutions?

Trapped within a dichotomous view of traditional and modernity, many government officials in developing countries such as Indonesia cannot conceive of informal settlement as anything but a temporary solution to urban and housing problems. Informal settlement is seen by them as a traditional form of housing or urban

21 De Soto (1989) called this a ‘system of extralegal norms.’ He defined this system as the ‘law’ that has been created by residents of informal settlement to regulate and order their lives and transactions and, as such, is socially relevant. Consisting essentially of informal, customary law and of rules borrowed from the official legal system when these are of use, the system is called on to govern life in the informal settlements when formal law is absent or deficient.
element that, with the rapid process of urbanization and modernization, should be totally dissolved and replaced by modern housing complexes. The cases of Singapore or Hong Kong are often used to illustrate the way in which such processes were successfully conducted and it is concluded that they therefore can be replicated. The implication of this view is that policy and planning in support of informal settlement development should never be seriously articulated, since to do so would be contrary to the ultimate goal of ‘modernizing’ the city.

Such a view, of course, should be carefully re-examined, as it contains a serious flaw. As evidence has shown, in the developing world the dualistic nature of the urban economy is not disappearing, but instead is even flourishing. The perpetuation of the dualistic economy arises from the close interaction between the capitalistic mode of production (the formal sector) and the traditional or non-capitalistic mode of production (the informal sector). As McGee (1996:3) argues, it is notable that, even in the new phase of globalization, the continuing growth of urbanization and the economic trajectories of much of the third world have reinforced the continuing growth of the informal sector in the majority of developing countries. It is in terms of the above discussion that this dissertation argues the importance of giving more serious and more thorough attention to informal settlements.
CHAPTER 3
KAMPUNG IN THE CONTEXT OF INDONESIAN SOCIETY:
THE PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF KAMPUNG

Often ideas on community development emphasize that communities should have total control over their own environments, mobilize their members and resources independently, and have a measure of freedom from external intervention, particularly from the state. Such ideas are based on the notion that communities and the state are two separate bodies which necessarily work against each other. Such notions, however, are not historically the case in Indonesian society. The idea of community in the Indonesian context is based on traditional communal values, which are always dependent on local authorities or the state. Since the establishment of the kingship system in the pre-colonial period, communities in Indonesia have depended on patrons or the authorities to provide security and social stability, and to guarantee sufficient food and other goods. Discussions on the idea of community development in the Indonesian context, therefore, should be framed in terms of both the historical and contemporary relationships between communities and the state.

This chapter reviews the historical relationship between communities and the state in Indonesia, in order to gain a better understanding of the concept of community in the Indonesian context. It attempts to view kampung not only as physical entities but also as communities, as socio-political entities that should have some measure of authority over their own futures. This chapter begins with a discussion of the definition of kampung, and shows several problems with recent descriptions of kampung. This is
followed by a review of the historical relationship between the community and the state in Indonesia which stresses the importance of considering kampung as urban communities with the potential to become involved in the urban development process. Finally, a review of the government’s policies and programs on kampung is presented. It shows why a reorientation is crucially needed, particularly in order to defend the kampung people, both in terms of their right to affordable shelter and of their involvement in determining the future of the urban environment.

3.1 Kampung as Physical Phenomena: Some Problems with Definition and Description

Although there now appears to be a consensus among academics that the word kampung refers to a particular kind of residential area within Indonesian cities, the word’s original definition and meaning is actually quite unclear. According to Sullivan (1992:20), the original meaning of the word kampung is derived from the Malay word which means ‘an enclosed compound’, but it has developed several different meanings through the centuries. In Malaysia, it means a village or rural settlement, while among Indonesians kampung has two general meanings and interpretations. Outside Java, particularly in Sumatra, it commonly denotes a ‘village’ or rural settlement, just as it does in Malaysia. However, since Javanese has a specific term for a rural settlement, which is desa, in Java the word kampung commonly refers to a residential area within a city. As will be discussed below, the tendency to define kampung specifically as a residential area within a city seems to be closely related to the development process of
cities in Indonesia and to the colonial government’s attitudes and policies toward cities and kampung.

Atman (1975:216-220) noted that, in general, the actual birth of kampung within Indonesian cities dated back from the start of the industrial revolution, which in Indonesia began in the last two decades of the 19th century. In some ways, the historical development of kampung could be seen as the consequence of the interaction between native Indonesians and the external world. After the abolition of the Culture System in 1870, Indonesia (particularly Java) was open and liberalized for private enterprise. Along with the arrival of plantations managed by the private sector, commercial activities within the cities also emerged at that time. Towns and cities in Indonesia then grew rapidly. Not only Europeans traders, but also many Indonesians hoped to find a better way of life in towns than in rural areas. Consequently, with rapid town expansion the housing situation deteriorated. While rural villages on the urban fringes became urbanized, many new housing units were also constructed, both within cities and on the periphery. In this way, Indonesian urban residential quarters, the kampung, developed.¹

At that time, the Dutch used the word kampung as a term for the enclaves of native groups that were built within urban areas, as well as on the city’s fringe (Atman, 1975; Bogaers, E and de Ruijter, P., 1986). For the Dutch, however, kampung were not seen as an integral part of the urban structure, as their idea of that structure primarily related to the commercial and residential sectors occupied by Europeans, and thus

¹ This process was particularly apparent in towns or cities that were considered as commercial and administrative centers of the Dutch, such as Jakarta and Semarang. In inland traditional cities such as Yogyakarta, the development process of kampung was quite different. As will be further discussed in Chapter Four, kampung in this city were from the beginning an integral part of the capital.
excluded all kampung areas. According to Bogaers and de Ruijter (1986), when in 1904, an administrative decentralization was carried out and municipality status was introduced, the kampung areas were not considered as part of the administrative area of the new municipality; responsibility for the kampung thus continued to be under the native authority. This attitude, of course, should be understood within the context of the general intention of the Dutch to treat native Indonesians differently from the Dutch themselves.

As the city expanded, and more and more peripheral native settlements were incorporated within the built-up area of the city, the word kampung began to be used more to denote a residential area within the city. This was, in part, supported by the new, more positive, attitude toward kampung that began around the 1920s. Since then, there has been a tendency to use the word kampung to refer in particular to a residential area within an urban setting. In 1930, for example, Fleringa mentioned that “Those Inlandsche Gemeenten (native urban communities) are not called desa (village) anymore, but kampung...” (Fleringa, 1930, in Polle and Paul Holstee, 1986:117).

Geertz, in 1956, while acknowledging the ‘rural’ elements of kampung, clearly denotes kampung as urban settlements. In his words: “The kampung type of settlement is

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2 Siregar (1990) notes that maps from the first decades after the establishment of municipality status clearly indicate the structures built along the established roads, but only feature vaguely hatched areas for the kampung. As documented by several writers, the expansion of the city during the colonial period resulted in the relocation of kampung to make way for roads, buildings for the colonial administration, and residential areas exclusively for European residents (Wertheim, 1958; Cobban, 1971, 1988; Bogaers and de Ruijter, 1986; Houben, 1990).

3 The report by Tillema was seen as very influential in changing the attitudes of the authorities toward kampung. This resulted in the ‘Kampung Improvement Program’, initiated by the Dutch authority. This program, called Kampong Verbreting in Dutch, was firstly implemented in Semarang in 1919, under the broad ‘ethical policy’ of the Dutch toward the Indies. Before 1919, the Dutch local authorities were not allowed to concern themselves with the kampung, since that was seen as intervention in the internal affairs of Indonesian authorities (Bogaers and de Ruijter, 1986). By the 1920s, however, many municipalities had commenced a Kampung Improvement Program.
characteristic of town and city life everywhere in Java and is in fact something of a reinterpretation of the village pattern in terms of the denser, more heterogeneous, less organically integrated urban environment” (Geertz, 1956:31).

Despite this quite long recognition of kampung as part of the Indonesian urban phenomenon, however, it is interesting that, even in today’s discussions and writings about kampung, there are still several problems in defining and describing kampung. The first problem is the tendency to define and to describe kampung only in terms of their negative aspects. Kampung are commonly defined as residential areas characterized by: their high-density, irregular patterns of housing lots and pathways; the temporary structure of their buildings; their poor drainage and sanitation systems; and their whole appearance as non-urban settlements in an urban setting. In other words, many descriptions of kampung tend to stress the kampung as settlement areas that are underdeveloped, substandard, and unhealthy for such a modern environment. In fact, as many studies have documented, there are many varieties of kampung, and only a few of them could perhaps be categorized as physically deprived. Some kampung certainly lack some basic infrastructure and services, but many kampung exhibit a lively and healthy environment.

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4 It is interesting to note that, despite the fact that the majority of urban residents in Indonesia live in kampung, until today there is no legal or formal definition accepted by the government for the word kampung. Although Kampung Improvement is formally regarded as one among several government programs on housing, the word kampung does not appear in two important laws concerning urban and housing issues (the Law concerning Housing/Undang-Undang Perumahan No.4 tahun 1992 and the Law concerning Spatial Planning (Undang-Undang Penataan Ruang No.24, tahun 1990).

5 In 1964, for example, although acknowledging the important role of kampung, Wertheim, a prominent Dutch scholar on Indonesia, described kampung in terms that might give an impression to his readers only of the negative aspects of kampung; in his words: “The poor quarters (of Indonesian cities) look village-like, with their unpaved lanes, narrow alleys, and thatched huts, hidden behind foliage in the coils of some slowly flowing dirty river” (Wertheim, 1964:168).
The second problem found in many definitions and descriptions of kampung is that they tend to explain only a particular type of kampung, mostly deprived kampung located in the inner city area occupied only by the poorest and most disadvantaged city residents. Therefore, since, in reality, there are many types of kampung, with different physical, social, and economic characteristics, these definitions have created a biased interpretation. Krausse (1975), for example, classifies the kampung in Jakarta from geographical and socio-economic points of view and distinguishes three types of kampung: the inner-city kampung, the woodland kampung, and the peripheral kampung. Based on his investigation and analysis of 22 kampung in Jakarta, he found that, even within those three broad spatial groupings, there are different settlement types, particularly in terms of the socio-economic characteristics of the residents. Many descriptions of kampung also imply that they are only a superfluous element of the urban fabric. This kind of view should be corrected since in some Indonesian cities, the kampung were already an integral part of the urban structure from the beginning. As will be discussed in Chapter Four, since the beginning of the establishment of the city of Yogyakarta, kampung were clustered together according to a certain pattern, and they served various groups of people (Darmosugito, 1956; Sullivan, 1992).

Another problem found in many definitions and descriptions of kampung is that they tend to see kampung from a dichotomous perspective. The basic distinctions created by many writers are between two contrasting points: urban-rural, legal-illegal, formal-informal, modern-traditional. Within such dichotomies, kampung are always portrayed as the bad or negative term of the two opposing extremes; they are rural settlements located in an urban areas, developed in totally informal and illegal ways,
representing traditional ways of living, and the like. In fact, kampung are best explained in terms of a continuum between traditional and modern, rural and urban, informal and formal, unregulated and regulated. As this study will show, the nature of kampung is marked by complexities, and these blur the distinction between any such two opposing descriptive points. The complexity of the kampung phenomenon, therefore, cannot be portrayed in terms of a simple black-and-white contrast; rather, it is a colorful pictures that represents the dynamics of the social, economic, political, and physical environments of kampung.

Finally, another crucial problem found in writings about kampung is that they neglect the importance of perceiving kampung as dynamic entities. Many descriptions of kampung view kampung as end products or static entities, and explain them as they currently exist. In fact, depending on both internal and external factors, kampung change over time; mostly by incremental improvement or consolidation; kampung are always trying to adapt to the dynamic changes of their surroundings. Kampung that are now considered as substandard may change into better living environments; in the same way, kampung that are now considered illegal may also become a legal, since kampung people are always trying to improve incrementally the legal status of their land and buildings. An understanding of the very dynamic nature of kampung is crucially

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6 Atman (1975:216-220) argues that the variety of kampung is best understood through the “rural-urban continuum” theory, explaining the phenomenon as an incremental transition from rural to urban characteristics. He proposes four different types of kampung: (1) the “rural kampung” on the city periphery, in which rural life dominates over the influence of city culture; (2) the “semi-rural kampung,” which is also predominantly a rural settlement, though it is progressively incorporating many urban elements; (3) the “semi-urban kampung,” originally a non-urban environment which has experienced urban infiltration resulting in the destruction of its former rural characteristics; and (4) the “urban kampung,” which is a fully-urbanized area, incorporating some city services and other features characteristic of the city.
important for planners, decision makers, and urban managers, as it will strongly influence the way in which they develop their attitudes and policies toward kampung.

In brief, this dissertation suggests a more neutral, but comprehensive, definition and description of kampung. Kampung as physical phenomena refers to various forms of urban settlements (ranging from new squatters to old-established settlements), with various levels of physical quality (from very poor settlements to better quality settlements), located in various parts of an urban environment (from the center to the periphery), occupied by various socio-economic groups of people (although mostly by the poor), and always changing dynamically. This very open and general definition is important, because it accommodates a more fundamental issue concerning kampung as socio-political units, as urban communities. The next section will discuss this issue.

3.2 Community-State Relation in the Indonesian Context

As we need to broaden our notion of kampung not only as physical entities but also as socio-political entities, we need to uncover the historical relationship between communities and the state in Indonesia. Such an historical account would help to answer a very important question concerning whether or not kampung as urban communities constitute meaningful socio-political units, which have their own values and interests and which have the right to involve themselves actively in the decision-making process related to cities' development.
3.2.1 The History: The Created Indonesian Communities

Originally, Indonesian communities were quite autonomous and independent. In the ancient agrarian period, communities were spread out and isolated within thousands of islands, so that many unique traditions live and flourish within the geography of contemporary Indonesia. In the past, communities were small, consisting of households which embodied the group's unity and which organized communal activities and possessions. However, over time a more hierarchical structure emerged around communities. Kingdoms emerged from this, with the tendency to rule and subordinate component communities into a unity. A consequence of this was the creation of a system of patronage relations, in which the king or other authority acted as a patron and tended to dominate the relationship. Sometimes, in cases of intolerable oppression by the authorities, there were community revolutions or rebellions, but the authority or the king remained a core of power that could rule the community. Indonesian history shows that communities in Indonesia have been the controlled objects in power relationships, always subordinate to the state structure, during the pre-colonial, the colonial, the Japanese-imperial, and the post-colonial periods (Argo, 1993).

In the pre-colonial era, Indonesia consisted of agrarian societies with diverse agricultural production, and therefore village communities operated as collectives of free peasants and enjoyed some degree of autonomy. Indicization or Hinduization and

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7 A discussion on the historical relationship between settlement patterns and governance systems in Asia can be found in Settlement Patterns and Sub-regions in Southeast Asian History (Miksic, 1988).
8 An example of peasant rebellion in Indonesian history is documented by Kartodihadjo (1973) in Protest Movement in Rural Java: A Study of Agrarian Unrest in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries.
Islamization then brought a fundamental change to Indonesian society. 9 Indicization strengthened the feeling of communality and granted legitimacy to the feudal kings and the aristocracy as descendants of gods; while Islam took away the rigid caste system, provided a little room for individual self-actualization, but remained a highly centralized and exploitative regime. According to Tichelman (1980), neither Hinduism nor Islam were ever considered a threat by most Indonesians, because these religions introduced new ways of living that made the communities less rigid, while retaining the existing structure of stable patron-client relations. 10

In the colonial era, 11 the Dutch strategically preserved the traditional mechanisms of governing communities, in order to execute their economic policies without undue social disintegration or conflicts. Several Kings were kept in power (particularly in Java), but, in return for retaining their power, they had to act as mediators between local communities and the Dutch. The Dutch, with the help of local kings, forced the production of an increased agrarian surplus. In other words, in the beginning, the Dutch wanted the principle of hereditary rule, particularly the kings’ ability to create stability through social control, to continue in place. It was through this system that patron-client relations operated in which the patron (the Dutch, the local authorities or the kings) provided security, stability, and a guarantee of goods, in

9 Indicization or Hinduization began in Indonesia in the 8th century, while Islamization began in the 13th century and arrived via Southern India. Further detailed explanation of the evolution of Indonesian society is presented by Tichelman (1980).

10 O’Connor (1983) argues that Indicization is the root of today’s social hierarchy. The underlying concept of the social hierarchy is that each person is dependent on those above and below him, binding them together like the links of a chain. In other words, Indicization transformed the simple mechanical society into a complex organic whole.

11 The truly colonial period of Javanese history began in 1830. For the first time, the Dutch were in a position to exploit and control the whole of the island, and there was not to be any serious challenge to their dominance until the twentieth century (Pemberton, 1989; Ricklefs, 1974).
exchange for loyalty, labor, and other services from their clients (the communities, the peasants).  

After the Dutch, the imperialistic Japanese came with the propaganda slogan "Asia for the Asians," and this offered hope to some Indonesians. Indonesian independence was promised in order to attract nationalist support for Japanese policy. However, the Japanese implemented such propaganda with fascism; the state became a corporate entity, in which all labor became a service to the state. The Japanese thus strengthened the traditional communities and the village system, in order to carry out the state's will. Deriving from the traditional Japanese community and village experience, families were used as units to implement state tasks. In this period, the *Rukun Kampung/RK* (a neighborhood unit) and the *Rukun Tetangga/RT* (a sub-neighborhood unit) were created, in order to create social control and connect communal tasks with efficient and useful state-sponsored goals.  

Upon independence in 1945, the new Indonesian Republic inherited a definite form of community-state relations. The politicians chose the idea of an 'integralistic state' which emanated from the Javanese notion of *kawula-gusti*, an integration between subject and lord (Bowen, 1986; Lubis, 1993). At the community level, both in urban and  

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12 Lev (1987) argued that what the Dutch achieved was not the creation of a state (as the British did for India) but rather an administrative system, which was an efficient way to extract agricultural commodities as expeditiously as possible.

13 For centuries, Japanese and Chinese polities had been composed of small household clusters such as the RK and RT, more so than of aggregates of persons or families. Their basic value was that they minimized the number of discrete units to be governed and greatly facilitated the tasks of maintaining social order, gathering taxes, and controlling and deploying labor forces. By the turn of the nineteenth century, China's population was already 300 million, Japan's 30 million. RT was derived from the Japanese system of *tonarogumi* (10 households), and RW was derived from *chonakai* (10-20 *tonarogumi*). Both *tonarogumi* and *chonakai* were developed during the Showa period, as an element of social control (Sullivan, 1992:137-140).
rural areas, the RK and the RT remained as social organizations protected by and supporting the government. During the Sukarno era, or the so-called Old Order government (1945-1965), 'guided democracy' was promoted, and political parties were prevented from operating freely at the community level. Then, the so-called New Order, which came into power in 1965, maintained this limitation on party politicking at the community level.  

14 A centralized authoritarian regime was recognized as one of the few structures that could impose the stability and order needed to generate economic growth and rational leadership over a large, heterogeneous nation. Such a framework is stable but implicitly stagnant.

In brief, as Tichelman (1980) has mentioned, Asian societies like Indonesia in general have never really emancipated themselves from the state. The state, in whatever form, has been a constant source of material progress, as well as of social and political stagnation in society. In Asia, community and state relations, therefore, should not be seen in terms of Western ideas of individualism and liberalism, which treat the community and state as separate entities. Historically, Indonesian communities have always needed a patron to provide security and support.

3.2.2 The Continuity: Contemporary Indonesian Communities

Inspired by such previous experiences, in 1974 the New Order government passed the Local Government Law (UU No.5/1974), which strengthened the position of

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14 In the early 1970s, the Indonesian government adopted a concept of 'floating masses,' a term to denote the effective cutting off of the rural masses from any organized political-party involvement. In 1975, a formal law was implemented, banning all political party branches below the level of the district capital town.
the central government in relation to the villages and communities. Based on this law, the village is the lowest formal level of government structure, supported by the RK and RT as ‘semi-governmental’ units. With this structure, many village activities now conform to state tasks; thus stability and order are to be preserved.\textsuperscript{15} In this system, about 200 million Indonesians are divided into a system of centralized hierarchical relations: the provincial, county/regency, district/ward, village, RW (neighborhood unit), RT (sub-neighborhood unit), and \textit{Dasa Wisma} (a group of ten households).\textsuperscript{16}

This structure was specially designed and formed to accommodate Indonesia’s very centralized political and governmental systems, which can be characterized as a ‘bureaucratic polity.’ As argued by Jackson (1978), a characteristic of this system is that the role of the bureaucracy (as a component of the state) is very strong; development policies and programs are ordered from the top and are supposed to be implemented by use of patronage relations. In this situation, the only form of political participation which regularly involves large numbers of citizens relates to implementing rather than deciding national policies. This structure is, therefore, important in two ways: as a system of administrative units and organs of social control it helps to secure appropriate political conditions; and it acts as a mechanism for mobilizing labor.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{15} In a different situation, the process by which the state has restructured local organizations for the state’s objectives has also happened in the Philippines, where the state reshaped \textit{barangay} communities, turning them into instruments of federal government, ‘fully subservient to policy from above and supportive of centralization nationally’ (Viloria and Williams, 1987).

\textsuperscript{16} An interesting, detailed explanation of the ‘institutionalization’ or ‘Indonesianization’ of the unique local, traditional community in Bali is presented by Carol Warren (1993) in \textit{Adat and Dinas, Balinese Communities in the Indonesian State}.

\textsuperscript{17} The ways in which the government of Indonesia uses various means or forms of social control for several purposes/objectives are overwhelming. According to Langenberg (1986), ‘ideological formulas’ have been utilized primarily to serve the power interests of the state-qua-state. Langenberg explains how some keywords, such as ‘nation building,’ ‘unity,’ ‘development,’ ‘social order,’ ‘stability,’ and ‘harmony’ can provide an internal, detailed and comprehensive understanding of the state as the interaction of five major factors, namely: power, accumulation, legitimacy, culture, and dissent.
In this system, information and command flow through several stages, from senior levels of government at the national level to senior levels at the provincial level, then to the municipal level, and finally to the villages and society as whole. Thus the state tightens central control over local governments and society, all the way down to the village level, the RW and RT. Sullivan argues that in Indonesia the social units (such as villages, RW and RT) are not the results of an ancient co-operative communal tradition, but rather the results of relatively recent social-political practice. They are basically a product of the Indonesian state. The Indonesian state took most of its inspiration and several already well-formed structural elements from its immediate predecessor, the Japanese military government. These social units carry state directives and propaganda to the populace, and help elucidate and promote various plans, policies, and programs that required broad popular participation.

Warren (1993:231) argues that the state's emphasis on providing basic needs was meant to cement the identification of national development policy with local interests. The implementation of many government programs and the way in which their funding is channeled to communities throughout Indonesia show that a rhetorical identity of interests can be given real substance when well-organized and responsive institutions are capable of making the relationship between communities and state a more reciprocal one.¹⁸ Such a practice, as Bowen (1986) argues, emanates from the idea

¹⁸ In Indonesia, even the provision of basic needs is used as an instrument of social control. Substantial funds are channeled into both rural and urban kampung. Besides, several projects, such as roads, irrigation and school construction programs, and the annual funding from the central government called Bampres (Bantuan Presiden) were distributed to every village and kampung. These grants now require submission of a project proposal and stipulate that a matching value should be made up of self-help (swadaya) contributions from the village, at least in the form of communal labor (gotong royong).
of social interaction as collective, consensual, and cooperative. From this idea is derived the obligations of the individual toward the community, the legitimacy of power, and the relation of state authority to traditional social and political structures. In this system, stagnation results from the belief that the state, the patron, knows best how to manage communal lives and the strong belief that it will do good for the people, the client.¹⁹

3.3 Kampung as Urban Communities, as Socio-political Units

As discussed in the previous chapter, the idea of community in this study is conceptualized in a very comprehensive way; it refers not only to a group of people bounded within a particular territory or setting (settlement, neighborhood), with their own values, needs, interests, and agendas (locality), but also, and very importantly, to the organization of collective actions to fulfill these people’s goals and objectives. To stress the kampung’s function in organizing collective action is crucial, as it implies an acknowledgment of kampung as socio-political units in society, which, however small they may be, have some degree of authority and the ability to enter into relationships with other socio-political units. In the context of community enablement, the ability of communities to engage in relationships with other relevant parties in urban development is crucial, as it determines their success in improving their settlements.

¹⁹Sutherland (1979) explains the cultural background of this phenomenon. According to him, the ethos of Javanes states drew heavily on Indian traditions, which emphasize religious notions of equilibrium between the human and the spiritual. Thus, in this concept, the role of the king, court and government was to maintain and strengthen this connection, to concentrate energy and power, bringing these abstract forces into the service of the state. Such a concept shaped the relationship between the common people and the elite (see also Moertono, 1976; Emmerson, 1976; or Anderson, 1990).
As described earlier, while it is true that after independence kampung communities were formally recognized and considered as social units, their most basic task was, however, to maintain civil order in areas where the mass of the people reside. In other words, the administrative structures of the kampung people, the RT and RK, were established and used as objects of state interest in order to control the urban masses. Consciously and intentionally, the Indonesian state re-created this social structure and the values related to gotong royong (communal co-operation) as a means of social control for the benefit of the state. As argued by Sullivan (1992:181), therefore, although kampung people may derive substantial benefits from this system, this system could easily be used by the state to control the urban masses and to exclude them from full involvement in the urban development processes. While the kampung might be considered as a semi-formal administrative unit (structured under the RT and RK system), at the same time, they are also ‘marginalized’ with respect to control over and access to urban resources and the decision-making process related to urban development in general.

It is now widely accepted that urban and housing development should not be seen as merely driven by economic mechanisms. Urban development is a kind of negotiation process, in which the socio-political factors are believed to be very important. Urban development, therefore, is seen as an arena in which various actors and agencies interact and negotiate with each other, to defend their interests and to meet their goals. As Indonesian cities undergo rapid growth, social changes, and commercialization, it is to be expected that other kinds of actors and agencies will become involved in the urban development process.
From this perspective, it is crucial to begin acknowledging kampung not only as communal units, but also as socio-political units that have the right to determine not only their own settlement or kampung, but also the future of the city. In other words, since kampung communities have their own values, resources, interests, and goals, their political rights and authority in the whole process of urban development should also be acknowledged. Conceptualizing kampung as urban communities, as socio-political units, means that kampung are seen as organized groups of people bound within a particular setting, in which people carry out initiatives and act collectively. The word 'kampung' is thus more than a noun or an adjective, it is also a verb that refers to a process of ongoing participation.

3.4 The Government’s Policies and Programs on Housing and Kampung

It is commonly believed that the Indonesian Government has comprehensively and successfully solved its urban problems, particularly the kampung problem, through its widely known scheme called the Kampung Improvement Program (KIP). Looking more carefully into the Indonesian Government’s policies and programs on urban housing and kampung, however, reveals that such optimistic views must be questioned. Not only does the KIP itself contain several flaws and weaknesses, but further there is no indication that the government’s policies and programs on urban development and housing were based on a comprehensive understanding of housing and urban problems.

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20 As documented by Steinberg (1992:364), since it was first launched in Jakarta in 1969, the program has reached about 8.7 million urban residents, in at least 427 cities throughout Indonesia. It has improved the physical appearance of about 36,225 hectare of kampung areas, not to mention its possible positive impact on the economy of kampung dwellers.
The following discussion will show the weaknesses found in KIP, and also show how the government’s other urban housing programs were not intentionally directed at helping the poor.

1) KIP: Several Weaknesses. Already well known in the literature, KIP is an infrastructure upgrading program for the kampung that focuses upon the installation and improvement of roads, footpaths, water supplies, drainage facilities, and sanitation. It encompasses the idea that the improvement of physical and social facilities in the kampung would also stimulate the improvement of individual houses and eventually upgrade the socio-economic conditions of the community. Several of the program’s weaknesses, however, are commonly discussed.

The first common criticism of KIP is usually of its limited focus, i.e. the physical infrastructure of the kampung (footpaths, drainage and sanitation facilities).\textsuperscript{21} It is true that the program stimulated individual housing improvements and increased house values, but it has also led to the increase of housing rents within the kampung, and therefore may have forced many of the poor to leave the kampung. Further, these physical improvements also tend to be temporary; after several years, many of the improvements made under the programs have decayed and no further improvements are made by either the government or the communities.

The second criticism of KIP is that this program does not have a wider city impact. As the implementation of this program is based on the smallest administrative unit, the kelurahan, its coverage is limited to the area selected annually, based on the

\textsuperscript{21} As found by Taylor (1987:53) in the case of Jakarta, the program did not contribute significantly to the economic conditions of kampung dwellers. Data on overall employment trends collected from surveys indicate that any employment changes were independent of KIP.
government budget. In other words, this program has consistently failed to upgrade more complex infrastructure networks, like the water supplies and sewer systems, which require city-wide action beyond the kampung level. Besides, KIP is also criticized for depending very much on central government funding and neglecting cost-recovery issues. Since its first implementation in Jakarta, followed by other Indonesian cities, the funding for this program has been mostly from the central government.

On top of this, however, KIP has been criticized for not becoming involved in local communities in any real sense. Although it is formally stated that the program should be implemented with the involvement of communities, this does not, in practice, occur. Community participation in the program is generally limited and is not institutionalized. This situation has created a further negative effect, since communities consider that the operation and maintenance costs of such improvements are also the full responsibility of the government. Since, in reality, operation and maintenance generally receive a very low priority in the city budget, many improvements within kampung that were done several years ago are now in a state of serious decay.

It can be concluded, therefore, that, although KIP has benefited millions of urban residents, it should not be seen as the only solution regarding housing issues in

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22 It is important to note that KIP has been implemented in different cities with different approaches (Steinberg, 1992). From writings concerning KIP in Surabaya, it seems that community participation there is incorporated into the program. Among several factors that hinder communities involvement in KIP, it seems that the most basic problem is on the unwillingness of government officials to channel money indirectly into the community (Silas, 1983, 1984, 1992).

23 Recently, the government initiated a new KIP program, called Community Based Project, which provides consultation with local governments and the targeted kampung residents on the determination of needs and the preparation of improvement plans. This program, however, is still heavily top-down, and gives little room for genuine community participation.
Indonesia. It can be considered an ad-hoc solution, that does not guarantee the long-term prospects of the majority of urban residents. In other words, KIP fails to develop the institutional capacity necessary for long-term development processes in kampung; it even tends to enhance people’s dependency on the state.

2) Integrated Urban Infrastructure Development Program/IUIDP: Considering that KIP alone could not solve the magnitude of Indonesia’s urban problems, in 1985, the government initiated a program called Integrated Urban Infrastructure Development Program (IUIDP). With the main aim of increasing the quality of urban environments, this program also has the secondary aim of increasing the capacity of local governments in planning, managing, and evaluating the development of city infrastructure. Within a broader context, then, this program emphasizes decentralizing planning and implementation capabilities and improving coordination at the local level.

As there is no comprehensive evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of this program, it would be unfair to make such an assessment in this study. Three points, however, should be made. First, this program tends to channel limited local government resources to the already wealthy urban residents. Second, the role of local governments has been rather more limited than was expected. Finally, and perhaps most
important, the IUIDP program has also been accused of neglecting the potential for community and private sector involvement. Part of the reason was that the Local Public Works officials, the executing agency of the program, may not have been geared up or ready for community participation. In other words, the nature of the IUIDP seems not to be very open to people’s involvement, and this may hinder the achievement of its objectives (Devas and Rakodi, 1993).

3) Public Housing Sector. Although heavily subsidized, the public housing sector in Indonesia is not working very well. It started in 1976, when the government established a National Housing Development Corporation (Perumnas), with the main task of providing low-cost housing for middle-and lower-income groups. Until 1991, however, with the financial support of the State Mortgage Bank, the Bank Tabungan Negara (BTN), Perumnas had built only 216,556 units, which means only about 14,400 units per year. This is considered a very low number compared with the units constructed by the private sector (which started several years later) at about 992,252 units. In Repelita V (1989-1994) the government has targeted that Perumnas could build 122,500 units (about 24,500 units per year); however, in first two years of operation (1989-1991), Perumnas was able to build only 17,962 units (Herlianto, 1993). Further, this Perumnas housing also fails to reflect the equity aspect of housing development, as most of the housing built by Perumnas was bought by civil servants. Due to increasing

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26 BTN itself shows how some discrepancies have occurred in the public housing sector in Indonesia. Rather than serving the majority of the urban poor, however, BTN served mostly those who have already enjoyed the benefits of development. As documented by Struyk et.al. in 1987-1988, the value of subsidies embodied in BTN loans was about 117 billion rupiah, compared to about 37.5 billion rupiah in the Kampung Improvement Program.
land prices in many cities, it has been reported that now Perumnas cannot continue to build housing (Setiawan, 1993).

Considering that the cheapest housing produced by the formal housing sector was still not affordable by the poor, in 1990 the government proposed the construction of very simple housing units commonly called in Indonesia *Rumah Sangat Sederhana* (RSS).²⁷ These are simple housing units of fifteen square meter of floor area, on a sixty square meter plot of land. The problem is that paying for such housing still requires a regular monthly income and a down payment, neither of which conditions can be met by those who work in informal sector activities with irregular incomes. Further, the program has also tended to be used by some people for speculative purposes. A study done in five cities in Java found that, five years after their construction, at least 30 percent of such housing units had been re-sold (Sastrosasmito et.al., 1996).

4) Private Housing Sector. Although started several years after the public housing sector, in terms of numbers of units built, the private housing sector in Indonesia has shown significant progress. Up to 1991, the share of this sector of the total housing supplied by the formal sector accounted for about 942,352 units, which was almost four times more than the number of units built by Perumnas. The problem is, however, that the beneficiaries of this sector’s expansion are mainly the moderate- and upper-income groups.

²⁷ The housing target for Repelita V, for example, includes the construction of 500,000 RSS housing units which will largely be built by private developers. Private developers, however, feel that there are increasing difficulties in securing land at prices which still allow a reasonable profit margin for them, given that the prices for low income housing are still fixed by the government.
Further, the operation of the private sector has resulted in an increase in land prices and a growing the inequality in land distribution (Herlianto, 1993). As is widely known by Indonesians, the weakness of land management and regulation in Indonesia allows many developers to engage in vast, uncontrolled land speculation and monopolization.28

5) Urban Renewal Programs (Program Peremajaan Kota). The urban renewal program is proposed as a part of government efforts to combat problems of urban development and housing. Its aim is to increase the productivity of cities by revitalizing districts or quarters that are in decay, particularly kampung built on government land. Based on the Presidential Instruction No. 5 of 1990, regarding slum renewal (Inpres No. 5, Th.1990), this program is directed particularly at big cities like Jakarta, Bandung, Medan and Semarang. It was expected that during the Pelita V (1989-1994) 140 urban districts could be revitalized. However, by the third year of Pelita V (1992) only 32 projects had been realized. This program is executed by the Ministry of Public Works, particularly the Directorate of Human Settlement (Cipta Karya, 1992).

As stated in the Inpres No 5 1990, the implementation of this program should meet both the interests of the urban economy in general and the needs of the poor for affordable housing. In many cases, however, especially in Jakarta, such projects tend to harass the poor. They relocate thousands of the poor further to the city's periphery and remove hundreds of hectares of kampung that have already existed in the city for

28 This is particularly clear in the case of increasing numbers of large-scale developments around Jakarta, which cover not only hundreds of hectares, but thousands of hectares. As documented by Firman and Dharmapatni (1994), in total the amount of land requested for housing development in Jakarta over the last 10 years has reached 60,000 hectares.
several decades (Dorleans, 1994). In the future, more innovative mechanisms, that give more opportunities for communities to determine the process will be crucially needed.

6) Land Development Program. The above discussion of the government’s policies and programs related to housing shows, among other things, that the government tends not to approach urban and housing problems in a comprehensive or structural way. In general, they show the government’s intention to have more modernized and formalized land and housing development, but they have not resulted in better, more efficient and equal land markets.

The first effort that showed the government’s intention of achieving a more formalized and marketable land supply was the national program on land registration, called Prona (Proyek Nasional Agraria), initiated in 1974. With the main aim of increasing the percentage of registered land, this program was successful in speeding up the land registration process. Still, it was considered small-scale, in comparison to the magnitude of land problems in Indonesia. As noted by Henssen (1989), only about 15 per cent of land properties in Indonesia have proper legal titles.

Recently, another program to improve land tenure, particularly within urban areas, was launched in cities in Indonesia. It is called Proyek Penertiban dan Peningkatan Hak Tanah (P3HT) and focuses on urban land within kampung. In theory, with careful selection of the areas chosen as project areas, many kampung will benefit from this program. Observations in Yogyakarta, however, have found that the program’s implementation has tended to have insignificant results, particularly due to its the limited budget. Further, there are indications that this program has become subject to
manipulation. It was found in Yogyakarta for example, that this project has also been used to legalize public land occupied by government officials.

In the mid-1980s, considering that the existing urban planning system did not work to guide urban development and that there were many impediments to supplying land for development, the government initiated a ‘land readjustment’ or ‘land consolidation’ program. This land readjustment or land consolidation program was implemented in several cities in Indonesia. Evaluation of this program in Denpasar, however, found that it had caused several unexpected negative results. As this program was implemented in the absence of land price controls, it tended to escalate land prices and give more opportunities to speculators and brokers than to land developers and house seekers. It did not, therefore, serve as an effective tool for increasing the supply of affordable land. It even created a distortion in the land market and hindered the provision of land, particularly to low-income people (Setiawan, 1995).

In order to increase revenues from land development, in the mid-1980s the government introduced a new system of land and building tax, called Pajak Bumi dan Bangunan (PBB). In theory, this kind of land tax can be used as an effective tool in land management. It can even reduce land speculation, which is commonly seen as the main obstacle to the effective working of land markets. This PBB, however, was not

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29 The idea was to follow the model of several Asian countries, notably Korea and Japan, which had successfully utilized this mechanism to support the rapid process of urban development. Three main aims were set for this program: (1) to increase land supply and overcome delays in development; (2) to use development profits to finance public sector utilities, such as roads; and (3) to provide profits to private land owners.

30 This replaced the previous household tax (IPEDA) and was administered directly by the Ministry of Finance, through the PBB office (Kantor Kas PBB) in each kabupaten and kotamadya. Local governments are, therefore, passive recipients of the program and receive about 65 percent of the total tax collected by the PBB office.
intentionally designed for this purpose. Rather than being consciously designed to improve the working of land markets, it was used mainly to increase government revenues. Further, lack of an administrative system, combined with confusion in land ownership, made it difficult to cover all tax objects.

Clear evidence of the government’s orientation toward more liberalized land markets was the issuance of several government regulations in 1993, known in Indonesia as *Paket Oktober* 1993 (Pakto 1993). These were part of a ‘deregulation’ program, directed at removing many of the impediments to the investment process in Indonesia (BPN, 1994).\(^{31}\) It is clear that this mechanism was directed at facilitating land commercialization, and that it gave more power to developers to execute land transactions.

### 3.5 Summary: The Future of Indonesia’s Kampung?

It can be concluded from the above discussion that, despite the clear significance of kampung for Indonesian society, the Indonesian government continues to favor the formal housing sector and to direct its assistance to it. This kind of policy ignores the socio-political aspects of housing markets, and accepts the large social and economic inequalities of capitalism as inevitable; social considerations that are vital to the formulation of urban and housing policies have thus been neglected. Besides, such policies also represent the government’s intention of developing a ‘modern’ urban

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\(^{31}\) Focusing on land and building permit regulations, the Pakto 1993 places more responsibility to manage the investment process at the *Kabupaten* and *Kotamadya* levels. This simplifies the investment process, as previously location permits were issued by a team consisting of several government agencies, both at the *Kabupaten* and provincial levels.
image, an image that is necessary to demonstrate the success of the developmental ideology promoted by the New Order government.

With increasing development and commercialization in Indonesian cities, and growing interest among international agencies, policy makers, and bureaucrats in fostering the economic functions of these cities, the future of Indonesia’s kampung is uncertain. There is considerable doubt that Indonesia’s current policy and planning approaches regarding urban development will be able to reduce existing economic and social inequalities. It is within this context that this dissertation argues the crucial need for conceptualizing kampung as communities, as organized groups of people with their own needs and interests; together with other actors within cities, such communities must have rights and opportunities to transform and develop their environments.

Depending upon both internal and external conditions, the physical appearance of kampung may vary and, in any case, is always changing. Kampung may be physically reshaped by the modernization of the cities in which they exist; this is not the real issue, however, since kampung have always experienced such reconstruction and renovation. The more fundamental issue is whether or not kampung people are to have some kind of authority over the process. Conceptualizing the kampung as socio-political units means that we acknowledge that cities are arenas of socio-political change and progress, in which each socio-political unit or group, including kampung, is an integral part of urban society and has an equal right to be involved in the process.
Table 3.1
Summary of Assessment Concerning Indonesia Government’s Policies and Programs on Urban and Housing Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policies/programs</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Kampung Improvement Program (KIP)</td>
<td>Started in Jakarta in 1969</td>
<td>Limited only to the physical elements and neglects socio-economic issues</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aim: Improve the physical aspects of kampung (basic infrastructure)</td>
<td>Poor operation and maintenance</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Executing agency: PU</td>
<td>Low cost recovery</td>
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<td></td>
<td>No legal backup</td>
<td>Top-down; little community participation</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ad-hoc approach; Increased house rents</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Does not guarantee the long-term future of kampung</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Integrated Urban Infrastructure Development Project (IUIDP)</td>
<td>Started in 1985</td>
<td>Depends upon central gov’t. funding</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Aim: decentralization of urban infrastructure development</td>
<td>Not in accordance with the master plan</td>
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<td></td>
<td>&amp; increasing the local governments’ capacities</td>
<td>Served mostly wealthy urban residents</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Community involvement is limited</td>
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<td>3. Public Housing Sector (Perumnas)</td>
<td>Started in 1976</td>
<td>Heavily subsidized, but small achievement</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Target: low income groups</td>
<td>Not accessible for informal sector workers; Served only a small segment of society</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Contributed small % of housing demand</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Locations are too far from urban centers</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Private Housing</td>
<td>Started in the late 1970s</td>
<td>Served not more than 15% of housing need</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Utilizing commercial bank</td>
<td>Benefited only middle &amp; upper income groups; Increased land speculation &amp; monopolization</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Urban Renewal</td>
<td>Started in 1990 under Impres No.5</td>
<td>Top-down approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aim: urban productivity and revitalization,</td>
<td>Lack of community involvement</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Target: kampung located on Gov’t. land/squatter settlements</td>
<td>Needed big investment</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Caused gentrification</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Destroyed the existing social institution.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Land Development Programs</td>
<td>Consisted of several instruments such as: Prona; P3HT; Land Readjustment; Pakto ‘93</td>
<td>Caused more land speculation &amp; accumulation; Tended to be ad-hoc, no legal backup</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No cost recovery</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Created distortions in land market</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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CHAPTER 4
THE CONTEXT OF THE CITY: YOGYAKARTA IN TRANSITION

As the title indicates, this chapter discusses the city of Yogyakarta, covers its transformation process from its earlier times to the present. Although the discussion will focus on current issues, the historical review of the city is considered to be important, as it provides background on the socio-cultural dynamics of the city, particularly the relationship between the city's leaders and its residents: how, in the past, they created, used, and managed the city, including the kampung. Such an historical evaluation of the city, which stresses the social and spatial changes that have occurred since the foundation of the city, is very important for a critical analysis of the present situation. It shows how local variations—in this case Yogyakarta's Sultanate and its unique social circumstances—can respond differently to national and global pressures. It helps to answer the main question of this study: how relations between the authorities and the communities have developed in response to city growth, as well as the authorities' perception of kampung in the context of urban development.

4.1 The Historical Background: From 'Traditional' to 'Modern' City

The Kingdom of Yogyakarta came into existence in 1755, with the division of the Javanese realm of Mataram (the realm which in the 17th century had exercised hegemony over nearly all of Java) into two halves: the Kingdom of Surakarta (Solo) and
Yogyakarta (Yogya).\textsuperscript{1} In 1756, the city of Yogyakarta, \textsuperscript{2} sometimes called by its nickname, Yogya, the capital of the new kingdom, began to be used as the location for his court by the first sultan (Sultan Hamengku Buwana I, formerly the prince Mangkubumi; r. 1755-1792). Yogyakarta is, therefore, considered a relatively new city, but its rich history has led this city to be viewed as unique by the Javanese. The following section will highlight accounts of the city's history, which can be distinguished into four general periods: (1) the foundations of the city (1756-1792); (2) the colonial period (1793-1942); (3) the Japanese occupation and the nationalist period (1942-1965); and (4) the modern period (1966-onwards).\textsuperscript{3}

1) The Foundations of the City (1756-1792). As commented by Ricklefs (1974), not only did the strong will and power of the first sultan, Hamengku Buwono I (HB I), enable him to lay the foundations of the city, but his relatively long period in power (almost four decades) enabled him to transform his vision of the Javanese city into reality. This is particularly clear in the form of his capital constructed on a roughly rectangular space of about 1,100 hectares, most of it in the narrow north-south corridor between the Code and Winongo rivers, with the palace—the kraton-- at the center. The

\textsuperscript{1} Further descriptions of the history of this division is presented by many authors, including: Ricklefs (1974), Houben (1994), and Pemberton (1989).

\textsuperscript{2} The original name of this city was actually Ngajogjakarta, which was derived from or at the very least had obvious similarity to the Sanskrit name, 'Ayodya' (in modern Javanese, Ngajogja), the capital city in the Ramayana epic. The present name, Yogyakarta, is due to the changes in Indonesian spelling in 1977. For more discussion of the city's name, see Noorduyn, in Archipel 31 (1986).

\textsuperscript{3} Although many authors have studied the history of the Kingdom, little has been done to further explore the history of the capital itself. Several authors such as Selosoemardjan (1962), Ricklefs (1974), or Houben (1994) briefly discuss the city in their writings about the region, but a more specific, comprehensive and deep study on the history of the city has never been done. To the author's knowledge, only Surjomiharjo (1988) has done a quite detailed study of the social aspect of the city. However, he limits his analysis only to the period from the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth century, between 1880-1930. Further work is needed to uncover the complete history of this interesting city.
palace itself was a smaller rectangular complex of about 137 hectares, marked by massive walls (or *beteng*, in Javanese) 3.5 meters high and 5 meters wide; this indicates that a defensive conception of the city was basic to this city’s plan (Darmosugito 1956).  

The period of Sultan HB I was characterized by economic and political prosperity, while the capital itself was considered as a major locus of government and political power in Java. The population grew rapidly in the absence of crop failures and epidemics and with increased food production; it was only about 10,000 people in 1756, but grew to 60,000 by 1825. In the late eighteenth century, the city consisted of several important elements: the *kraton* itself, the *beteng*, the square or *alun-alun*, the main mosque, the main market (Pasar Beringharjo), and the kampung. These elements were perfectly arranged within a simple but elegant urban pattern.

The kampung itself, in the beginning, was an integral part of the city’s structure and its institutions. It was specifically assigned to house the groups of people who served the diverse spiritual or physical needs of the Sultan and the aristocrats. This kampung, therefore, can be considered as a specialized district, serving a special group of society. According to Houben (1992), at least at the beginning, kampung were an

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4 More important than such security functions, however, the ‘*beteng*’ themselves, marked much deeper socio-cultural, and political distinctions between the aristocrats (*wong gedé*), the nobles (*priyayi*), and the commoners (*kawulo*), the little people (*wong cilik*). Within the *beteng*, only those who were considered to be nobles and wielders of power could reside, under the direct supervision of the Sultan. The commoners resided in several quarters outside the wall or ‘*njaba benteng*.’ As described by Selosoemardjan (1962: 23-27), the Javanese concept of the state could be interpreted as one of concentric circles revolving around the *sultan* as their common center, the hub of the universe. Each of those circles reflected a different degree of political or territorial power, depending on their relative distance from the center.
extension of the *kraton* and thus were not seen by the Javanese administration as separate administrative units.

What seems not to have occupied the Sultan’s mind at that time was laying the foundations for the city’s governance. There was no formal city administration—no Mayor or similar official was assigned specifically to manage the city or the capital. Nor was any official assigned to administer the kampung – kampung were expected to be as self-contained as practicable and to cause the state the least possible bother. There were ‘informal’ leaders in each kampung who were responsible for civic order within the kampung. However, most of them already held positions as military leaders, bureaucrats, or professionals in their respective kampung (Sullivan, 1992:34).

The above description indicates a more fundamental issue. It seems that beyond the Kraton and the city’s life itself the mass of ordinary people was never considered by the ruler as forming an important part of the state. The explanation for this was, as argued by Sullivan, that the city’s populace at that time never did contribute any taxes or benefits to the state, as the rural people did. In other words, the city’s populace was never considered important by the *kraton* institution, as they never become an important economic source for the *kraton*; the state and the aristocrats therefore had little interest in administering urban areas and governing the people who lived there. Their focus was more on the rural areas, where they could exploit the peasant.

2) The Dutch Colonial Period (1793-1942). One of the important things that marked the end of the Sultan HB I’s reign was the permanent establishment of Dutch
colonialism in Java. Starting during the British interim from 1813-1816, but particularly after the end of the Java War in 1830, the real power in Yogyakarta, as in Surakarta, was in the hands of the Dutch Resident. Although formally retaining their status as independent states, the principalities (both Yogyakarta and Surakarta kingdoms) were bound by contract to the suzerain. The Yogyakarta royal courts were purely decorative and concentrated on the only things left to them, the cultivation of the arts and etiquette (Ricklefs, 1974; Houben, 1994).

Since that period, Western elements, in terms of city planning and building standards, began to emerge. This was particularly shown in the development of about 100 hectares of a new town, or 'kota baru', that clearly marked the 'westernization' of the city. It was not only that its physical appearance clearly distinguished the Dutch quarter from the kampung; more important was the fact that its existence showed the way in which the interests of the kampung people had been subordinated to the European minority. As argued by Houben (1994), the expansion of the European town quarter in Yogyakarta at the expense of kampung shows very well how the land rights of the Javanese population were subordinated to the interests of the European minority.

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5 By this time, the former Mataram empire had been divided permanently into four kingdoms: (1) Kraton Kasunanan in Surakarta (headed by Paku Buwana); (2) Mangkunegaran, also in Surakarta (headed by Mangkunegara); (3) Kasultanan Yogyakarta (headed by Hamengku Buwono); and (4) Pakualaman (headed by Paku Alam). The first two kingdoms now form the present-day municipality of Surakarta in central Java province, while the latter two kingdoms now form the present-day special province of Yogyakarta.

6 This condition remained in effect until the Dutch colonial regime in the Netherlands East Indies collapsed in 1942, after the invasion of the Japanese armed forces. For more detailed discussion of the relations between the Dutch and the Kraton, see Houben (1994).

7 This situation is actually not unique to Yogyakarta; after 1870 (the abolition of the culture system) the development of agrarian capitalism began to emerge more strongly on many towns in Java. This rapid expansion of the towns, unfortunately, had a negative effect on the kampung. Wertheim (1958) mentions that the Europeans tended to buy land where there already were kampungs, so that the native population had to resort to an ever-increasing concentration of housing on the remaining kampung lands.
Thus, in the early twentieth century, the typical features of the city came into being: a juxtaposition of Javanese authority (symbolized by the kraton and the beteng) with the Dutch presence (symbolized by the fort of Vredeburg, the house of the Resident, and the Dutch quarter of Kotabaru). These two elements were surrounded by kampungs where large numbers of indigenous people lived almost without basic provisions. It was at this period that the general pattern of the present-day city was established.

In 1918, the first formal urban administration was created: the office of Bupati Yogyakarta, responsible for three districts: two rural districts and one urban district.\(^8\) The head of the urban district, the negoro, was responsible for all urban affairs (the population was about 100,000 at that time). The head of the urban district was helped by two assistants. Below these two assistants were the kepala kampung, heads of the urban kampung (Dipodiningrat, 1956). Unlike the heads of villages in the rural areas, however, the kepala kampung did not have formal nor functional authority over the urban population. Their only function was to maintain civic order. They were considered to be voluntary, non-paid, and owed their positions primarily to their social rank or their popularity. They were selected by the kampung members, but needed the approval of the authority. To some extent, therefore, their roles were just the same as those which the RW leaders now exercise.

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\(^8\) The creation of a formal urban administration happened a little bit earlier in other towns or cities in Indonesia. According to Wertheim (1958), the first municipal council was inaugurated in Batavia in 1905, in Surabaya, Semarang, and Bandung in 1906, and in Medan in 1909. These municipalities, however, were not created with the primary aim of meeting the needs of their native inhabitants, and it was some years after the formation of the first municipalities before their authorities began to feel a responsibility for increasing distress among the rapidly growing native populations in the towns.
In 1932, in order to strengthen the city governance, another institution was introduced. This was the *kemantren*, wards or sub-districts (later to be known as Kecamatan). Under this system, the whole city, with a population of about 144,000, was divided into nine *kemantren* or wards. The heads of the *kemantren* were considered as public servants, appointed and paid by the palace, while the heads of the kampung remained unofficial. Other than merely administering for the population and delivering government propaganda, this city government, however, did not initiate any program that was directed at improving the welfare of the city’s population or at the physical improvement of the city.

As the effect of the growing educational facilities in the city that attracted many youths from all over Indonesia, the population growth between 1932 and 1942 was quite high, reaching a total population of about 144,000. At this stage, the population density had already reached about 97 persons per hectare and this brought the idea of expanding the city area. As there was no public housing developed for the population at that time, all were housed within kampung. In 1936, a master plan for the city, Karsten’s Plan, was developed. It outlined the future development of the city, which included the expansion of the city’s territory to the north. Although it could not be implemented totally, it formed the basic pattern which the city’s development has followed since then.

3) The Japanese Occupation (1942-1945) and the Nationalist Period (1945-1965). While very short term, the Japanese occupation of some parts of Indonesia, including Yogyakarta, had significant effects, particularly on the urban administration
system. As discussed in detail by Sullivan (1992:136-140), part of the Japanese strategy for mobilizing millions of Indonesians for their interests involved the structuring of urban masses into smaller units called, *rukun kampung* (RK) and *rukun tetangga* (RT).\(^9\)

In 1942, the city of Yogyakarta, which had a population of 190,000, was divided into 100 Kampung/RK (later, in the 1960s, these became 160 RK). Although the very short period of Japanese administration changed nothing in the spatial pattern of the city, the implementation of the RK and RT system has had significant effects on present-day urban administration in Indonesia.

During the critical years from 1945 to 1949, the city of Yogyakarta, the Sultan and the people made a crucial contribution to the development of the nation. Not only did the Sultan’s decision to join the new republic lead to Yogyakarta’s taking a special place in Indonesia, but his offer to the central government to move the national capital to Yogyakarta from Jakarta also showed his total loyalty and commitment to the new republic. From 1946 to 1949, therefore, Yogyakarta was the capital city of Indonesia; a role that caused further deterioration of the city.\(^10\)

As the political and economic situation at that time did not enable the city government to make improvements, no significant infrastructure changes accompanied the physical growth of the city. Beyond the expansion of the area within the city

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\(^9\) In 1947, the RK and RT system was then implemented all over Indonesia and became the standard for urban social-administrative units. The government issued a decree formalizing the status of RK and RT as social organizations which were considered as being helped and protected by the government, but not part of the government apparatus.

\(^10\) This caused further deterioration of some kampung. The arrival of about 60,000 government officials and their families from Jakarta caused many problems – Poliman noted that during that time it was common for one house to be occupied by 6-10 families, due to the acute housing shortage.
administrative boundaries, from 1,480 hectares (prior to 1942) to 3,250 hectares (after 1947), there was no investment in infrastructure, and no kampung improvement programs were initiated. Even though the city was physically deteriorating during this period, this was also the period when the city started to play its new role at the national level. This is particularly clear in the field of higher education, with the development of the Islamic University in 1947 and of the University of Gadjah Mada in 1949, which were then followed by many other secondary and tertiary institutions. Since then, the city has become famous as the most important center for education in Indonesia.

This period was also marked by the creation of the first, modern city government in Yogyakarta. In 1946 the first city council in Yogyakarta was formed, it consists of 30 members, including, interestingly enough, 2 representatives who were RK leaders. Due to the economic and political situation at that time, however, no significant progress was achieved in city governance and administration. Although two city plans were developed during this period, they were not effectively implemented.

4) The Modern Period (1966-onwards). After the ‘New Order’ government led by Suharto came to power in 1966, as in the rest of Indonesia, the new ‘development ideology’ influenced the city’s life and development. An important aspect of this ideology was the emergence of the city beautification idea, aimed at improving and modernizing the physical appearance of the city. With funding from the central government, city officials initiated several urban redevelopment projects. These began in the late 1970s, with the urban renovation project in the Malioboro district. This was
followed by the improvement of basic urban infrastructure throughout the city, though unfortunately this improvement was focused on the city level, not on the kampung level.

In the early 1980s, except for small-and medium sized hotels, there were no luxury hotels in the Malioboro district. By the early 1990s, however, there were already nine luxury hotels in the area. Further, at least ten malls and supermarkets have been developed in the city in the past five years. As a part of a broader agenda to formalize urban governance, in 1981 the state introduced a further intermediate level of the civil service, *kelurahan*. Then, in 1989, as part of the standardization of urban administration across Indonesia, the RK were restructured into smaller units, the *Rukun Warga* (RW) system. In this city 160 RK were reorganized into 618 RW, each consisting of 3-5 RT.

Another important change since the early 1970s was the further development of the city beyond the *Kotamadya*. According to the Yogyakarta Urban Development Project (YUDP), by 1994 the urbanized area of Yogyakarta, called Greater Yogyakarta, covered almost 20,304 hectares, with a population of about 1,008,182.12 Of this Greater Yogyakarta, the municipality of Yogyakarta, or *Kotamadya* Yogyakarta, comprises only about 16.04 per cent (3,250 hectares), while the rest is located within the administrative boundaries of Kabupaten Sleman (11,305 hectares, or 55.67 per cent) and Kabupaten

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11 As noted by Guinness (1986), the 1950s and 1960s witnessed deteriorating economic and political conditions within the city, mostly affecting kampung people. Food supplies were short and crime increased within the kampung.

12 In the next chapter in this dissertation, two different terms will be used when discussing the city. When the term *Kotamadya* Yogyakarta is used, it refers to an area within the administrative boundary of the municipality of Yogyakarta. On the other hand, when the term YUDP area, or greater Yogyakarta, is used, it refers to the proposed urbanized area of the city, about 20,304 hectares.
Bantul (5,742 hectares, or 28.29 per cent). With an average population growth of about 1.63 per cent per year during 1980-1990, it is predicted that by the year 2005 the YUDP area will house at least 1,244,192 people.

Under this rapid urban growth, the city plan was considered not to be working effectively. This plan was started in 1971, when the city government developed a new master plan for the city. Like the previous ones, this plan was not formally approved, so that it was never fully implemented. Again in 1986, the city government initiated another master plan, called the *Rencana Induk Kota* 1985-2005. This is the first master plan ever approved by the legislative council of the city and the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA). It outlines the future development of the city, including plans for a green area along the banks of the three rivers which flow through the city. This plan created much controversy as people considered the plan to be too rigid, particularly in regard to the setting of building standards.

In 1991, to conform with MOHA Decree No.5 of 1987, which stated that every master plan or *Rencana Induk Kota* (RIK), should be reviewed every five years and should be elaborated in detail, a detailed land-use plan, or *Rencana Detail Tata Ruang Kota* (RDTRK), was then developed. This plan also received approval from the legislative council of the city and now has its legal status as a local regulation (Perda No. 5. of 1991). In addition to these plans, it should also be noted that several other area and sectorial plans were also developed with the same not very effective results; these created even more confusion and duplication of efforts in managing the city.
Figure 4.1
The Kotamadya and the Proposed Greater Yogyakarta
4.2 The City and the Kampung

As described previously, in their earlier period, the Yogyakarta kampung were considered as an integral part of the kraton and the city; kampung were considered special districts or quarters, designated for special groups of people or professions. Spatially, the locations of the kampung indicate that the city was planned carefully; kampung that housed the kraton army were located to the south of the kraton and formed a grand horseshoe pattern around the kraton. Kampung that served the day-to-day operations of the kraton were located inside the beteng, while others were located outside the beteng. The early growth of the city, therefore, was marked by a gradual 'rippling out' of kampung from the central kraton to the beteng and beyond, as new kampung were established for growing number of state functionaries, courtiers, foreigners, and those serving them (Kasto, 1976; Sullivan, 1992).¹³

As the city expanded and the kraton lost its control over the city and populace, the process of what Sullivan (1992:25) calls the 'vulgarization' of the Yogyakarta kampung began. At this time, perhaps beginning with the Java War in 1830, the kampung started to lose their original character and take on their present-day status as residential quarters for the urban populace.

¹³ These roles of kampung are shown today in the names of the neighborhoods they inhabit -- among these three general categories of kampung can be distinguished. The first are those which house the military units of the kraton such as: kampung Bugisan; Surokarsan; Ketanggungan; Demangan; Wirobrajan; Patangpuluh; Jogokaryan; Prawirotaman; and kampung Mantrijeron. The second are those for the princes, nobles and other high court officials that could not be accommodated within the 'njeron Beteng,' such as: kampungs Notoprajan, Bintaran, Pringgokusuman, Notoyudan, Wirogunan, and Sosrodipuran. The third are those for various professional groups such as kampung Pajeksan for the prosecutors (jeksa), Gandekan for the court heralds (gandek), Dagen for the woodworkers (undagi), Jlagran for the stonemasons (jlagra), Siliran for the lamplighters (silir), Kauman for the Muslim officials (kaum), Njagalan for the butchers (jagal), and Kumatir for the palace overseers (kumatir).
In the early decades of the twentieth century, the city expanded and new kampung were established on the fringe of the city. Beginning in the early 1970s, a time at which the city started to grow beyond its formal-administrative boundaries, more kampung were established both at the fringe and at the center of the city. This produced the result which can now be seen in the various types or categories of kampung. From a general observation, four types or categories might be distinguished.

The first is what might be called 'traditional' kampung. These are kampung that were established at the beginning of the city and originally were assigned as specialized districts for special units of society. These kampung are located close to the kraton, and they can be distinguished from other kampung by their names (see notes No. 13). The second type or category of kampung might be called 'riverbank kampung,' those which are located along the three rivers running through the city. This category includes both old and new kampung and always creates controversy, as these kampung represent complex problems or conflicts related to illegality or informality issues—this explains why the present study focuses on these riverbank kampung. The third category of kampung might be called 'urban fringe kampung,' those which were transformed from rural settlements located on the fringe of the city. The fourth type might be called 'squatter kampung,' those that were developed by occupying vacant or abandoned land scattered around the city, such as: abandoned Chinese cemeteries; the riverflat; railway embankments; or other vacant land owned by the government or the Sultan.

Further detailed study is needed to assess the significance of this very general categorization for the development of policy and program toward kampung in
Yogyakarta. As will be described further in the next chapter, however, the fact that the kampung located along the river has distinct physical characteristics and history suggests that a very rigid-standard program like KIP would not effectively solve kampung problems.

4.3 The Socio-Economy of the City: Kota Murah?

As described above, since its creation Yogyakarta has never become an important economic center; the real economic activities of the region were never based in the city or even conducted there. Since the beginning, the city served mostly as an administrative and political center, rather than as an economic center. Economic activities within the city were limited to serving the city’s day-to-day life and contributed very little to the economy of the region. There were no important industrial or trade activities within the city, except for one central market, pasar Beringharjo, which functioned more as a retail center than as a genuine trade center.

This situation changed in the early 1980s, particularly with the development of the tourism industry and many educational institutions in the city. From the 1970s to the 1990s, at least 20 luxury hotels were developed, not to mention dozens of ‘non-starred’ hotels that were developed all over the city. By 1995, the city had around 275 hotels (starred and non-starred hotels) with 5,699 rooms and 10,379 beds (BPS Kotamadya, 1995). With about 700,000 to 900,000 tourists coming annually to the city, this sector

14 In economic terms, this is actually the main characteristic of cities discussed by Nas (1986) and other writers such as Cobban (1971). Unlike coastal cities such as Jakarta/Batavia or Surabaya, where trade was really the main source of the economy of the city, a city-state like Yogyakarta never became an important economic center of the region; its wealth was mainly based on the exploitation of the rural area.
contributes a significant proportion of the city’s economy; together with the trade sector, tourism contributes about 19.45 per cent of the city’s total domestic product.\textsuperscript{15}

In addition, as about 70 per cent of tourists are backpackers who come to the city for cheap accommodation and meals, they therefore patronize small hotels, home-stays and restaurants run by local small entrepreneurs. In other words, not only does the tourism industry increase the economy of the city in general, but, more importantly, this sector has provided many job opportunities for people, including jobs for informal sector workers selling handicrafts, food, and other tourism-related services.

In 1990, there were at least 60 universities and colleges in Yogyakarta, with about 160,000 students. This large number of universities and colleges, not to mention hundreds of other formal and informal educational institutions that offer a variety of non-degree education programs, surely has a significant impact on the economy of the city. According to a YUDP study, with about 70 per cent of the total number of students coming from outside Yogyakarta, the city receives at least 8,500 million rupiah (equal to about $5 million Canadian) per month, or about 102 billion rupiah per year—a significant number for the city and its population, since the entire Provincial Government Budget in 1991/1992 was only a little bit higher, at about 110 billion rupiah (YUDP, 1991). Further, it is important to note that a larger part of this money goes directly to local low-income people, who provide rooms, meals, and other services.

\textsuperscript{15} According to \textit{kotamadya} (Kotamadya Yogyakarta, 1996), in 1994 the biggest sectors contributing to the domestic product of the city was the services sector (including education) (24.37%), trade and tourism (19.45%), banking (16.51%), transport and communication (16.27%), industry (12.01%), and building (8.58%); the rest was distributed among three sectors: agriculture (1.45%), electricity and water (1.31%), and mining (0.05%).
for the students. It is in this context that we should understand why informal building and property activities, particularly within the kampung, are increasing in this city.

A brief description of family incomes and expenditures may help one to comprehend how the wong cilik live, in what many Indonesians call ‘kota murah,’ a city where everything is considered cheap and affordable. According to YUDP (1991), more than 53 per cent of the households in YUDP area have incomes below Rp. 200,000 per month.\textsuperscript{16} This is, of course, very low, as it equals only about $110 Canadian. But, with this city people can still rent a simple room for only Rp. 10,000 per month and buy a simple dinner for only Rp. 400, so outsiders may understand why Yogyakarta is called ‘kota murah.’ It is well known by Indonesians that students coming from poor families can live and enjoy the good educational programs offered in this city, while receiving monthly allowances of below Rp. 100,000. Backpackers also can enjoy visiting this city while spending below Rp.15,000 a day. In this city, some hostels still offer a simple but nice room for only Rp. 10,000, while many warung (small restaurants) and food vendors offer a dinner for only Rp.1,000, or even cheaper.

The description of Yogyakarta as ‘kota murah’, however, does not mean to neglect the fact that, particularly in the last five years, commercialization has also been increasing in this city. As national and international influences are more apparent,
including changes in lifestyles and the development of consumerism, people are
beginning to worry whether the poor and the students can continue to live in a relatively
cheap, but livable environment. The development of modern and expensive housing
complexes around the city, as well as the increasing number of luxury hotels,
supermarkets, and other modern elements such as golf courses, all indicate the rapid
transformation process that is occurring in this city. Such effects should be carefully
documented, as they will significantly influence the lives of the poor, the wong cilik.

4.4 The Socio-demographic Aspect: Kota Rakyat?

In terms of population growth, Yogyakarta is characterized by low population
growth in the center of the city and relatively high growth on its periphery. According
to YUDP (1994), the average population growth within the administrative boundaries of
Kotamadya was only 0.34 per cent per year, from 1980 to 1990. This figure contrasts
sharply with growth on the periphery, which amounted to 2.83 per cent within the
boundaries of kabupaten Sleman and 2.38 per cent in kabupaten Bantul, respectively.

As Table 4.1 indicates, the population density in the municipality of Yogyakarta
was already high in the early 1940s. By 1946, when the city became the capital city of
Indonesia, the population density had reached about 168 persons per hectare. This
density decreased after thousands of people moved back to the capital city of Jakarta,
but it again slightly increased after 1947. By 1995, the average population density of the
city had reached about 143 persons per hectare, but in several areas within the center of
the city, the population density is above 300 persons per hectare.
Besides the population growth discussed above, the socio-demographic aspect of the city is characterized by at least four important things. The first is that of the diversity of the population, in terms of their ethnic or sub-ethnic backgrounds. Although considered a center for Javanese culture, since the beginning, the city was already home to several ethnic groups: the Dutch, the Chinese, the Arabic, and other ethnic groups from all over Indonesia. Even within the kampung, the population comprised a variety of sub-ethnic groups. People distinguished among themselves those who were natives of Yogyakarta; those from regions to the north-east, such as Solo and Klaten; those from the north coast regions; and those from the more remote areas of East Java.

A second socio-demographic characteristic is related to the fact that the number of students in Yogyakarta is very large, at least 160,000 in 1994. As about 70 per cent of them (about 112,000) are from outside the region, this city could be seen as a melting pot, consisting of many young people from all over Indonesia. It is also important to note that, because almost all students coming from outside the city live together with kampung people, the economic and social implications of such a phenomenon are very significant. Approximately 60 per cent of the student’s total expenditure were spent within kampung, in the form of payments for accommodation and meals.17

17 It would be very interesting to study the socio-economic implications of this phenomenon, since it is well known by Indonesians that many new, fresh ideas and student movements are organized and initiated in this city; for example, during May, June and July 1996, at least one demonstration occurred each week, organized by students of Gajah Mada University, protesting a wide variety of government policies. The last big riot in Jakarta (27 July, 1996) which according to government officials and the military/ABRI caused at least 9 deaths and dozens of missing persons, was partly planned and organized by the Partai Rakyat Demokrasi/PRD (People’s Democracy Group), a newly-formed, but dynamic opposition group founded by students in kampung close to Gajah Mada University.
### Table 4.1
Population Growth within Kotamadya

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Javanesse/Ind.</th>
<th>Population Europeans</th>
<th>Chinese Total</th>
<th>Land (ha.)</th>
<th>Population Density (persons/ha.)</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1756</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>1,100</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1825</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>60,000</td>
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<td>54.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>27.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1845</td>
<td>43,385</td>
<td>1,355</td>
<td>1,063</td>
<td>46,855</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>42.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>1,480</td>
<td>47.29</td>
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<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>66,600</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>72,200</td>
<td>1,480</td>
<td>48.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>88,000</td>
<td>1,480</td>
<td>54.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>88,000</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>98,000</td>
<td>1,480</td>
<td>66.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>5,600</td>
<td>8,900</td>
<td>136,600</td>
<td>1,480</td>
<td>92.30</td>
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<tr>
<td>1942</td>
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<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>1,480</td>
<td>128.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>2,149</td>
<td>168.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
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<td>na</td>
<td>230,000</td>
<td>3,250</td>
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<td>1960</td>
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<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>327,025</td>
<td>3,250</td>
<td>100.62</td>
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<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>340,556</td>
<td>3,250</td>
<td>104.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>380,548</td>
<td>3,250</td>
<td>117.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>466,313</td>
<td>3,250</td>
<td>143.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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18 The significant number of Chinese in this city explains why there were at least six Chinese cemeteries around the city, comprising quite a large land area, of about 12 hectares. As will be discussed in the following chapter, these cemeteries became subject to illegal occupation by squatters.
A third characteristic of the population is the large number of government officials who live in this city. According to government records, government officials, including public servants, teachers and lecturers, military personnel, and people retired from government office, formed about 18 per cent of the total number of working residents in the city.\textsuperscript{19} It is interesting to explore further the socio-economic implications of such large numbers of government officials in the city; since many of these government officials have settled in the kampung, and some of them serve as kampung leaders, they may significantly influence the development of the kampung in general.

Lastly, an important aspect of the socio-demography of the city relates to the fact that many of its residents engage in the ‘informal sector’ economy, defined in general as all commercial enterprises that operate on an unregulated basis, outside government incentives and in competitive markets. According to the Bappeda Kotamadya (City Planning Board), the total number of informal sector workers in 1984 was 62,532, or 48.03 per cent of the total city labor force, which was 130,195.\textsuperscript{20} Within this context, housing and kampung issues in Yogyakarta cannot be discussed without a full awareness of the fact that so many people in this city are engaged in informal sector activities.

\textsuperscript{19} This large number of government officials in the city is perhaps caused by the fact that, besides the two governmental structures (the municipality and the provincial governments), this city also houses many state educational institutions. Today, there are five state universities in this city, all of which together employ a large number of government officers.

\textsuperscript{20} This is considered higher than the average percentage for the urban informal sector in Indonesian cities, with about 43 per cent or, in the capital city of Jakarta, 41.15 per cent. It is also higher than in several other cities in developing countries, such as those in Chile (39 per cent), or Caracas, Venezuela (40 per cent) (Sastrosasmita, 1988).
These four demographic characteristics of the city are very important, since they affect the way the city functions and grows. As many people in Yogyakarta commonly refer to this city as 'kota rakyat,' (city for people), their concern is how this city can continue to be a home for the poor, for students, for new migrants, for low-ranking government officials, and for informal sector workers. With relatively low living costs, many of the urban poor can still live in this city on minimum incomes, while enjoying such many traditional art performances, including the famous 'wayang kulit' (shadow puppets) that are still frequently performed for free. With the rapid urban development and commercialization that are now occurring, however, many questions arise about whether the poor can continue to enjoy living in this city.

4.5 The Socio-political Structure: the Kraton, the State, and the People

Having developed from such a rich historical background, the contemporary social and political structure of the city can be termed as complex and ambiguous. This is particularly clear in the case of the dualism between the 'formal' governmental structure imposed by the Indonesian state, on the one hand, and the 'traditional' structure (the Sultan and the Paku Alam), on the other hand. In this dualism, the 'formal' power structure of the authority consists of what, in the Indonesian political context is called 'tiga jalur' (three streams): (1) the military or ABRI (stream 'A'); (2) the bureaucrats (stream 'B'), which, in the case of Yogyakarta, means the provincial and municipal governments; and (3) the GOLKAR, or the ruling party (stream 'G'). As argued by many political analysts, this 'tiga jalur' has been very effective both in
enforcing the government’s ‘development’ ideology and in maintaining the ‘stability’ of the nation.

Beyond this formal power structure, however, exists another power structure, the ‘traditional’ authority, consisting of the Sultanate and the Pakualamate. As discussed earlier, since the late period of Dutch colonialism in Indonesia, the role of the nobility was intentionally limited or even abolished; their role was replaced by the new civil servants, which then became the core of the ‘new-modern’ Indonesian bureaucracy. However, because of Sultan HB IX’s important role during the Indonesian struggle for independence, the newly established Republic of Indonesia continued to acknowledge the importance of the kraton and the Sultan in the region. In this situation, it can be said that although the kraton institution lost its ‘formal’ power over the region, ‘informally’ it continues to be at the center of the region’s political structure.

The description above reflects a situation in which both the ‘traditional’ and the ‘modern’ political structures exist and interact each other in this city. It is well known among people in Yogyakarta that almost all important decisions regarding development of the city need to be approved by the formal government, the Sultan and the Paku Alam. People are confused by the fact that the power structures in the region are so complex, and they do not know where to turn to resolve their problems or ask for help and support. If traditionally people can depend solely upon their Sultan or Paku Alam as the sole patron to seek security, with the introduction of the new-formal government institutions, people are confused by the fact that so many local authorities or patrons sometimes conflict each other.
4.6 Contemporary Urban Problems: Housing and Land Issues

As Yogyakarta is now being transformed into a metropolitan city with a population of almost one million, urban problems in this city are also growing. These problems cover many areas, such as environmental problems, transportation, infrastructure, preservation of historic areas, and many problems related to waste disposal, pollution, reduction of productive agricultural land, traffic congestion, and lack of clean water supplies. The following discussion will focus on two problems that are directly related to the kampung issue: land and housing issues. It is important to note that the discussion of land and housing issues in this chapter covers Greater Yogyakarta – this means the whole Yogyakarta Urban Development Project or YUDP area, which covers an area of 288.07 square kilometers, or almost ten times the area of the municipality of Yogyakarta (see Figure 4.1).

4.6.1 Housing Issues

According to YUDP (1991), in 1990 the total housing stock in the YUDP area was 169,000 units; with the total number of households at 261,108, this means that the area had a housing shortage of 92,108 units. By the year 2012, when population growth is foreseen as declining from 1.63 per cent (during the 1980-1990 period) to 0.98 per cent, and with the average number of people in one household estimated at 3.78 persons, it is estimated that 370,000 new housing units should be built to meet the projected housing need. Further, if this number is converted into the land area needed for such
housing, at least 4,810 hectares of land will be needed.\textsuperscript{21} This is considered a huge amount of land (about 1.5 times the size of the current municipality area), particularly since this calculation does not include land for public facilities, such as roads, parks, open spaces, and other public services (schools, hospitals, shops, etc.).

From 1973 to 1995, the formal housing sector (Perumnas and about 32 private developers) built approximately 14,000 units, in 73 different locations. This means that, on average, the formal housing sector supplied only about 636 units per year; this is considered very small compared to the average housing need of about 6,000 units per year (YUDP, 1991, 1992). This small number of housing units developed by the formal sector could be divided into three categories: (1) small units (15, 21, and 36 m\textsuperscript{2} of housing), which formed about 49 per cent of the total housing built; (2) medium units (45 and 54 m\textsuperscript{2} of housing), about 31 per cent; and (3) large units (70 m\textsuperscript{2} and up), about 20 per cent.

From these figures, it can be said that the formal housing sector in the YUDP area has developed housing more for the middle and upper income strata than for the lower ones. In this situation, it is unfortunate that Perumnas, which traditionally built housing for the lower income strata, could not further expand their services in Yogyakarta after completion of their first project (1978 to 1982), due to the rapid increase of land prices in the city.

\textsuperscript{21} This rough calculation is based on the following assumptions: 1) the average use of floor space per capita is 21 m\textsuperscript{2} (this is the average size found in the YUDP area); 2) the average size of housing is then 21 times 3.78 (the average number of persons in one household), which is about 80 m\textsuperscript{2}; 3) the average building coverage standard for each housing unit is about 60 per cent; therefore, the land needed for each housing unit is about 130 m\textsuperscript{2} (YUDP, 1994)
Many factors contribute to the limited amount of housing provided by the formal sector, but in Yogyakarta three factors are most important. The first is related to difficulties in getting land at an affordable price. The second factor is related to the fact that the scattered pattern of housing development increases the costs for infrastructure and therefore also raises housing costs in general. The third factor is related to the fact that many developers in the area are not really professionals, which means that they do not have strong financial support nor the capability to conduct such business. In other words, many developers are adventurers, who make profits, not because of their ability to manage a property business, but because of their luck in land speculation.

Further, it is important to notice the environmental consequences of this formal housing sector. Due to lack of land management and land use planning in the city, about 73 small scale housing complexes are scattered throughout the YUDP area. These scattered housing complexes cause several negative consequences, such as inefficiency of infrastructure and other urban services (health, education, recreation etc.), increased travel costs for residents, and destruction of existing agricultural areas. Furthermore, this scattered pattern of development also creates a situation in which land prices increase simultaneously in many parts of the city. In many cases, all of the agricultural lands surrounding a housing project become objects for speculation. Many people buy and speculate on land around a project area, taking advantage of the infrastructure and facilities already developed (Setiawan and Purwanto, 1994).

The fact that the formal housing sector provides for only a small portion of the total housing need, and that most of this small portion is not affordable by most urban
residents, confirms the importance of the kampung in the city. In Kotamadya Yogyakarta, kampung account for about 60 per cent of the city’s area, and about 80 per cent of the city’s population (Sastrosasmito, 1988). Acknowledging the importance of kampung to the city, the government has initiated several programs to improve the kampung situation. The fair comment, however, might be that those efforts are still inadequate, compared with the magnitude of the housing problem.

KIP projects do exist in Yogyakarta, but they have never been carried out on a comprehensive city-wide level, as in Jakarta or Surabaya. During REPELITA 3rd (fiscal year 1979/1980 to 1983/1984) and REPELITA 4th (fiscal year 1984/1985 to 1988/1989), approximately 130 hectares kampung area were improved. It was planned that, during the fiscal years 1993/1994 to 1997/1998, KIP would improve about 58 hectares. However, as the total kampung area within the Kotamadya is about 1,950 hectares, KIP by itself could not solve the kampung problem. Since the kampung now cover more than 3,000 hectares within the YUDP area, the government’s ability to improve only about 16 hectares of kampung per year (through KIP projects), means that kampung issues are bound to become bigger and bigger.

As in other cities in Indonesia, the main reason commonly expressed by government officials for such limited coverage by KIP programs was lack of funds. As the YUDP (1994) has found, however, there may be a need to de-emphasize the role of government agencies as the prime movers of these programs. By giving more room for the beneficiaries (the kampung people) to become involved in the programs, perhaps more local funding could be generated. It is true that the municipality also initiated
several other projects that were designed directly for kampung; these include: MCK/latrine projects; housing improvement schemes; subsidies for solid waste management; and other extension services. Those projects, however, tend to be ad-hoc, partial in approach, and with no cost recovery. More fundamentally, the communities’ potential has never been fully explored and mobilized. Many programs continue to be ‘top-down’ in approach and do not involve communities in any real sense.

4.6.2. Land Issues

1) Kraton Land. As described by Selosoemardjan (1962), territorially, the structure of the Javanese state can be distinguished into four concentric circles: the kraton and beteng (court), the nagara (capital city), the nagaragung (the greater capital), and the mancanegara (outer lands). The governance and administration of the Javanese state, including control of land, were based upon this structure. In general, as also happened in the state’s administration of the population, the degree of the state’s involvement in land matters decreased from the inner to the outer circles.

In mancanegara, as the name itself indicates, almost all land is under the direct administration of the bupati. The Sultan did not allow his princes to maintain apanages in the mancanegara; he preferred to appoint an administrator, the bupati, to carry out his

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22 The center of the debate that developed over time about land rights in Java was whether ownership of the land resided with the sovereign (the king), or with a body of proprietors who collected revenues and determined land use, or with a corporate body such as a hamlet or village, or with the individual peasant cultivator. Additionally there were peripheral issues, such as whether Javanese land ownership was individual or communal. The conception of ‘domein claim’ was actually rejected by a prominent Dutch scholar, Van Vollenhoven; he believed that originally all land was owned by villages or desa, not the king. Further discussion of this issue can be found in VanNiel (1992).
orders there. Although it was no colony, the bupati directly administered the lands under his jurisdiction, with the duty of appearing before the Sultan three times each year to pay homage to him and to deliver taxes to the treasury. After the Java War, the Sultan lost all of the mancanegara land, and these lands were then annexed to the directly-ruled Netherlands East Indian Territory (Selosoemardjan, 1962).

Within the negaragung circle or area, all lands were under the apanage system, for the benefit of the princes and nobility; in this area were vested the material interests of the Sultan and princes. The lands in the negaragung were divided into separate apanages, districts of land and their populations, over which a prince, or occasionally a high-ranking priyayi, was granted the right to levy taxes in kind in the name of the Sultan; those who were granted these rights were called patuh. Each patuh appointed his agents, called bekel, to carry out his right to levy taxes in his kebekelan, the district over which a bekel was put in charge. Twice a year, after each rice harvest, the bekel had to deliver the collected taxes to the patuh; the latter forwarded these taxes to the Sultan’s treasury after retaining what was legally due to him. This system lasted until 1870, when the Netherlands Indies administration introduced an agrarian policy that abolished the apanage system and opened the opportunity for foreign capital to rent land on a long-term basis. It was in this period that efforts to liberalize land in the mancanegara were begun, but this brought no benefits to the peasants.

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23 As described by Van Vollenhoven, the appanage was an assigned region, where one had the right to profit from the land and the inhabitants, and from which the king could draw (taxes, services, incomes from domains), but which gave no right to the land itself (Van Vollenhoven, 1918, 1923, quoted by Moertono, 1968).
In 1918, under the pressure of what was commonly referred to as the 'ethical' policy, another important land reform was introduced in the mancanegara area. In this land reform, the Sultan delegated his land ownership rights to the village communities, represented by village councils. It was then followed by another Sultan's Decree in 1926, which marked another important shift, as legally it relieved the Kraton/Sultan of all land that was already in use by individuals and agencies. After the independence of the republic in 1945, the Yogyakarta kingdom (the Kasultanan and the Paku Alaman) was granted the status of Special Province of Yogyakarta (Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta/DIY) by the central government. This special status had important implications for land usage, as part of the limited autonomy given to the DIY was control over land matters (Law No.3 and 9 of 1950). It is important to note that, while the national government issued the new land system, the Basic Agrarian Law of 1960 (the BAL 60), it was not implemented in the Special Province of Yogyakarta until 1984. In 1984, under Presidential Decree No. 33, and with the approval of the Sultan HB IX, a transitional process from the previous traditional land law system to the new one, the BAL, began to be carried out.24

The brief historical background presented above clearly shows that the Kraton/Sultan incrementally lost their authority over the land in the mancanegara area. Most lands within the mancanegara area are now owned by people. The Sultan

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24 The fact that public debates, controversies or conflicts regarding this shift never appeared does not mean that this transition process happened smoothly or with no problems. As has been expressed by both the head of the land office of the Kraton (Kantor Panitikismo) and the head of BPN Kotamadya, many old problems were not resolved, while new problems are becoming bigger and bigger. All together, such problems are believed to be like a 'time bomb' and that it is just a matter of time before the problems will explode.
maintains ownership of some lands in the *mancanegara* area, but due to the ambiguity and confusion of land status and land administration in the region, there is no guarantee that the Sultan or *Kraton* would be able to claim or utilize them.25

If in the *mancanegara* area the Sultan ‘indirectly’ administered the land under the apanage system, within the *negara* (the capital city) and the *kraton* (court), the Sultan directly administered the *kraton* land. According to Notojudo (1975), within the *negara*, especially before the land reform took place in the *negara* in 1925, *kraton* land could be distinguished into two different categories. The first was ‘*tanah keprabon dalem*’, or land that was specifically for the use of the Kraton, the ownership of which should be preserved for an unlimited period of time, since it symbolized the very existence of the *Kraton* and the Sultan. The second category was ‘*tanah dede keprabon dalem*’, or *Kraton* land that can be used for other purposes under the grant of the Sultan. As can be seen in Table 4.2, these two categories can be further distinguished into at least eight sub-categories. These categories reflect the fact that, at least initially, there was a clear concept of the uses and administration of the *Kraton* land within the *negara* or city. This situation lasted until around 1926, when land administration within

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25 In 1975, under a situation of public debate concerning the implementation of the BAL in the Special Province of Yogyakarta, KPH Notoyudo, a prominent figure among the nobility, published a paper entitled: *Hak Sri Sultan Atas Tanah di Yogyakarta*, or The Sultan’s Rights to Land in Yogyakarta. The message that he clearly expressed was that, historically, all land in the region had belonged to the Sultan. The fact that now many individuals and agencies have legal rights over the land was because the Sultan/Kraton had intentionally granted the land to them. Notoyudo, stressed the importance of both the public and the government acknowledging this historical fact. A 1992/1993 survey, specifically conducted to inventory the Sultan/Kraton land, documented that, within the *mancanegara* area, about 3,595 hectares of land (larger than the size of the municipality of Yogyakarta) are considered as Sultan/Kraton land. Most of this land, however, is already in use or occupied by people, whether for rice-fields (*sawah*), dry-crops (*tegalan*), housing and yards (*pekarangan*), or other public facilities.
the city was reformed. Important to this reform was the fact that, within the negara boundaries, people now could ask the Sultan for rights to the land they occupied.\textsuperscript{26} Since 1926, most of land within the city was privately owned.\textsuperscript{27}

2) The Ngindung System. Another land issue in this city is related to the traditional system of land-use arrangements called 'ngindung.' This is an arrangement for the utilization of land based on a patronage system, in which the landowners, or cangkok, granted building rights as a form of social assistance to landless families whom they regarded as clients.\textsuperscript{28} In many cases, no regular payment was paid by the pengindung or client, although the pengindung was obligated occasionally to help the cangkok or the patron in maintaining or cleaning the compound. If a payment was agreed on between the cangkok and the pengindung, it was usually very low. As time passed and land became less available, a more explicit contract or agreement between the cangkok and pengindung was often set up.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{26} The fact that much kraton land is now under private ownership is also caused by the generosity of Sultan HB IX with kraton land. For Javanese, it is well known that Sultan HB IX was very sympathetic to people needing land. His generosity, unfortunately, was not supported by good land administration, and therefore became an object of manipulation by people both within and outside the kraton.

\textsuperscript{27} A survey that was specifically conducted to document kraton land in 1992/1993 found that within Kotamadya (excluding the kraton complex) there are about 80.05 hectares of land that are considered as kraton land. Most of this land, however, is already occupied (formally or informally) by individuals or government and non-government agencies (for offices or other public facilities).

\textsuperscript{28} This arrangement is actually not unique to Yogyakarta, as has been noted by Ter Haar (1962); this system has also been practiced in other parts of Indonesia with different names such as 'Maro' or 'Sewa.' In the BAL 1960, this practice is categorized as 'hak menumpang,' which is considered a form of temporary rights that should be gradually eliminated or abolished in Indonesia (Article 53-1). In practice, however, almost four decades after the enactment of the BAL 1960, there has still been no systematic and comprehensive effort to solve the problem.

\textsuperscript{29} The term ngindung is sometimes used interchangeably with another term, 'magersari' (Ter Haar, 1962). In Yogyakarta, however, people commonly refer to the ngindung as a contract between the ordinary landowner and the tenant, while the magersari refers to the same system, but with a different class of land owners. Magersari is commonly used when the landowner is the king or the aristocrats. Rent for land under the magersari arrangement is usually very low. In 1994, for about 50-60 m2 of land, the rent ranged from only Rp. 1,500 to Rp. 7,000 per year (Justisia, 1994).
In Yogyakarta, the ‘ngindung’ system can be found in almost all kampung; however, there is no detailed research on what percentage of land within each kampung is under this system. It seems that the situation varies among the kampung. In one kampung observed, it was found that almost half of the kampung area fell under the ngindung system, while in another kampung only about 5 per cent of the total households fell under the ngindung system. Regardless of how extensive this system may be, it is an important and interesting system of land arrangements that needs special attention. This ngindung system is crucial to any discussion of the formation and development of the kampung.

3) Land Inheritance. Other problems related to land in this city arise from traditional inheritance practices. Further study is needed to explore the means by which property rights passed to others when the original possessors die, but it is common in this city that the transfer of land within the family does not always follow formal-legal processes. Such practices are considered efficient as they avoid long bureaucratic procedures; other problems result, however, particularly regarding intergenerational claims related to land.

In brief, as the above description has indicated, the fact that land ownership and land transfer in this city are very ambiguous offers both opportunities and constraints for the people, the wong cilik, to have access to land. As will be discussed further in the following chapters, only those who understand this complexity and are able to manipulate it can gain benefits from it. It is with this situation in mind that kampung issues in this city should be discussed.
### Table 4.2
Kraton Land within the Negara (City): Sub-categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Sub-category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Keprabon Dalem</td>
<td>A.1 Kagungan Dalem/Maosan</td>
<td>Lands that were strictly used by the kraton &amp; which should be preserved, as they symbolized the existence of the kraton; Originally, they comprised all of the njeron beteng area (10 Ha), but now covered only the ‘core’ of the kraton complex, including the main square &amp; the big mosque; Most of the lands are now owned not only by the nobility, but by the common people as well; some are illegally occupied by squatters; some are used for public purposes such as schools, offices etc. Outside the negoro, this category includes land allocated for cemeteries for the sultan &amp; nobility &amp; land allocated to secure the Sultan a supply of rice, flowers, etc (Kebonan).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Dede Dalem</td>
<td>B.1 Gebruiksrecht/Hak Pakai/ Konsesi</td>
<td>Lands that were granted to the Dutch administration for public purposes, including: Vredeburg fort, Resident Palace, main train station, cemetery, public buildings (post office, banks, schools etc.) Some of lands are now under the category of state land, but some are still under the sultan land category; This category was administered under Western law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B.2 Eigendom or Opstal</td>
<td>Granted to individual Chinese or Europeans, mostly located in the most strategic areas within the city, such as along the main road; many of these lands are now under HGB rights, but some have already been transferred HM rights; this land was also under Western law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B.3 Tanah Golongan/ Kanayakan</td>
<td>Granted to the nayoko, professionals that served the Sultan; within this category were the quarters of occupational groups or military units; most of the lands are now owned privately and some are under the ‘magersari’ system; this land was directly administered by the kraton.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B.4 Tanah Kasentanan/ Kadipaten</td>
<td>Granted to the nobility (sentono dalem) &amp; princes; under the magersari system, some of these lands were then occupied by common people and formed the present kampung; Some lands under this category are now also owned privately.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B.5 Tanah Mutihan</td>
<td>Granted to priests (kyai) for religious activities; most of the lands are now owned by the priests or the priests’ family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B.6 Anganggo Magersari</td>
<td>Granted directly to people under the magersari system; after 1925 most of these lands were owned privately.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Compiled and classified by the author from several sources, notably: Selosoemardjan (1962), Notoyudo (1975), and Justisia (1994).
4.7 Planning for the City: The Adipura Award and Yogyakarta Berhati Nyaman

A lot has been said about the weakness of urban management in developing countries such as Indonesia; the lack of financial and technical capacities of urban governments are believed to hinder the effective management of urban environments, and therefore financial and technical support are believed to be necessary (Devas and Rakodi, 1993). Thus, supported by international agencies, many programs and projects are implemented throughout cities in developing countries, with the particular aim of increasing the technical capacities of urban governments. As has been noted by several observers, however, many obstacles are still found in almost all local governments in Indonesia—among other things, behavior, attitudes, and culture seem not to be conducive to decentralization (Devas and Rakodi, 1993).

While such programs may be effective in tackling certain urban issues, such as waste disposal, water supply, and sanitation, they seem to overlook the fact that urban issues are extremely complicated and go beyond such physical issues. Unrealistic spatial planning, building standards, and inefficiency in public infrastructure provision all indicate a lack of real understanding of local urban issues by city government.

In the case of Yogyakarta, as Winarso (1988) has explored, the general weakness of local governments in Indonesia is aggravated by the negative paternalistic and authoritarian attitudes which are still evident in this city. In other words, rather than the technical and financial constraints commonly argued as constituting barriers for better urban management and development, it seems that the more crucial problem lies in the fact that city governments lack any clear vision concerning city development. In the
case of Yogyakarta, the city’s slogan ‘Yogyakarta Berhati Nyaman’ and the Adipura Award story presented below may be used to illustrate the above statement.

Starting in 1986, as part of a national campaign to improve the physical and environmental conditions in Indonesian cities, the central government of Indonesia introduced an annual competition, called the ‘Adipura’ award. This award is given to the city government that is considered most successful in improving the cleanliness and beauty of its city; thus it represents the government’s ambition to modernize Indonesian cities. Annually, a team from several central government ministries visits all 27 provinces in Indonesia to evaluate every single city, using criteria developed in Jakarta. It is not really clear whether or not cities that continually win the award can really be considered to be livable cities, as the criteria used in evaluating cities tend to focus on cities’ physical qualities, but this Adipura award has become a source of great prestige, particularly among the mayors. As the ceremony for receiving this award is nationally broadcast, and is attended personally by the President, winning and receiving this award is very important for a mayor’s career.

Unfortunately Yogyakarta has been widely considered kota murah and kota rakyat, where informal sector workers freely erect their food stalls or kiosks along the main streets, where the poor have easily erected their shelter in almost all public land within the city, and where kendaraan rakyat (people’s transport vehicles) such as

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30 Three categories of award are given: (1) ‘The Adipura Certificate’, the lowest category, is given to cities that are considered ‘quite successful’ in improving city cleanliness; (2) ‘The Adipura Award’ is given to cities that are considered ‘very successful’ in improving city cleanliness; and (3) ‘The Adipura Kencana’ (Gold Adipura) is given to the city that has successfully won the Adipura award for four years running.
bicycles, *becak* (pedicab) and *andong* (horse carts) freely pick up and drop their passengers everywhere, have all prevented the city from winning the award. Although this was not really a concern for the Yogyanese, for the Major, however, it was considered shameful, particularly as a nearby city, Surakarta, had already won the Adipura Kencana in 1992, five years after the award was introduced by the central government.

Therefore, when Widagdo, a colonel from the ABRI, was appointed as the new Mayor in 1991, his first plan and ambition was to win the award. First, he developed a city slogan ‘*Yogyakarta BERHATI NYAMAN*’, meaning ‘Yogyakarta *BERsih* (clean), *seHAT* (healthy), *terTIp* (orderly), and *NYAMAN* (comfortable). As this slogan was legally enacted by local regulation (Perda No. 1, 1992), almost all development policies and projects in the city now refer to this slogan. Streets, as important elements in city beautification, were widened, unfortunately, this involved sacrificing many valuable trees in the city. Several small city parks, most containing an ugly artificial tree made from cement, were also developed; while many temporary dump sites for garbage were also constructed. In the eyes of the city government, all of these programs were completed quite successfully, with particularly enthusiastic support from the new office for city parks and cleanliness (DPK).

One thing that made things different for the city government, however, was the kampung issue; the kampung located along the Code River, in particular, gave a very bad image to the city environment. Since government officials considered kampung as slums (*kumuh*) and therefore as not contributing positively to the effort to improve the
city's image, these kampung were blamed as the reason the Adipura award was never given to the city. As the previous idea on kampung removal was strongly rejected by kampung people and the public at large, a kampung improvement program was then sought as a possible alternative. The result was a program called ‘proyek talud’, or the riverside dike project along the Code River.

As will be discussed further in the following chapters, this project, which resulted in the city winning the ‘Adipura Certificate’ in 1993, provides many benefits for people who had been living under the threat of floods for several decades. From the government side, however, the program's intention should be understood within a broader context, particularly the city government's desire to win the Adipura Award. In 1995, after the city had won the Adipura Award for two years in a row (1994 and 1995), an eight-meter tall statue, an enlarged replication of the award, was erected in a strategic location close to the Code kampung; its intention was to show the public clearly that the city government was successfully developing the city.

4.8 Toward the 21st Century: Yogyakarta at the Crossroads?

The city of Yogyakarta, that in the beginning was developed on the basis of a feudalistic society and mostly served the interests of the king and the aristocrats, has experienced several critical periods. During the 18th century, under the powerful sultan HB I, not only did the city come to symbolize the emergence of a new kingdom, Yogyakarta, but it was also able to show that some of the ideas of the Javanese city could be realized. In the 19th century, and continuing into the first decades on the 20th
century, Yogyakarta became the center of Javanese culture. Again, during the critical period of the Japanese occupation and nationalist movements, the city was able to play an important role in support of the newly established Republic of Indonesia. As Indonesia started its development efforts in the 1970s, Yogyakarta also performed an important role as the center for education in Indonesia. Further, with its rich historical background, this city also became the second most important tourist destination in Indonesia after Bali. On top of this, however, the city has been a nurturing place for the poor, for the powerless, for young people - *kota murah, kota rakyat*.

Entering the twenty-first century, however, no one in the city seems quite sure of what will happen: what direction should the city take? Will the city be able to continue her important role for the people and the nation? Will the city authorities be willing to support kampung people? As illustrated by the Adipura Award story and the city’s slogan, *Yogyakarta Berhati Nyaman,* it is unfortunate that, under the present urban government, Yogyakarta seems to be directed toward a very simple and pragmatic goal: becoming a beautiful and orderly city, which can attract national and international capital. For the Mayor, the development of a modern artificially beautiful city, is perhaps crucial, as it demonstrates the fruits of the developmentalist ideology of the Indonesian state. It is not certain, however, that the commoners, the *wong cilik,* would benefit from such an orientation. It is in the context of rapid transformation in this city and the specific-historical relationships between the authority and the people that the present study of kampung, both as spatial and as social phenomena, is framed.
CHAPTER 5
THE SETTING: KAMPUNG ALONG THE CODE RIVER: THE 'MARGINALITY' CONTROVERSY

One central but unresolved debate concerning informal settlements concerns the issue of 'marginality.' Defined in general as the peripheral position of a settlement and its community in relation to the wider urban, social, economic, political, and physical setting, such a marginal position can lead some settlements into a hopeless situation; it is then only a matter of time before these 'no hope' settlements disappear or are relocated. This chapter will further explore the marginality issue and argue that such concepts need to be re-examined, particularly when applied to settlements like the kampung along the Code River. By describing and analyzing the physical and social characteristics of the area, its development process, and its relation to the wider urban setting, this chapter shows how the kampung along the Code River have the potential to be transformed into more livable and prosperous settlements. It argues that, although the kampung along the Code River lack some basic services, that does not mean that they should be considered as slums and therefore be removed. This chapter will provide a broader context for the four case studies that will be described and analyzed in the following chapters.

5.1 The Spatial Setting: The Riverbank (Ledok) and the Riverflat (Wedi Kengser)

Perhaps it was not part of the initial vision of Prince Mangkubumi, the founder of this city, that his decision to locate his palace on the fertile soil between two rivers (the Code and the Winongo) would create both challenges and problems for the people
of Yogyakarta. Considered spatially 'unattractive,' as well as 'risky' due to their low-lying position compared with the average ground level of the city, and subject to regular flooding, but nonetheless 'central' due to their proximity to the city center, the banks of the Code River, together with the banks of the Winongo River in the west and the Gadjahwong River in the east, eventually became the home of about a quarter of Yogyakarta residents. Running about seven kilometers (from north to south) through the municipality of Yogyakarta, the Code riverbank\(^1\) covers about 210 hectares or about 6.50 per cent of the total area of the city (see Figure 5.1).

The river itself, the Code, is considered a small river, with an average width of about 15 meters in the upstream parts and of about 30 meters in the downstream parts; it is one among thirteen rivers running through the region. It originates at the foot of Mount Merapi, which is 3,500 meters high and is the most active volcano in Indonesia. The significance of these rivers for the people of Yogyakarta should be understood, as these rivers provide a continuous supply of water for the region, so that people can cultivate three rice crops per year. The region slopes down to the south from the mountain top and spreads its rice-field covered valleys further down to the Indian Ocean. The Code river water is used for irrigation, which is controlled through weirs and irrigation channels. There are nine weirs located along the river which, in total, serve about 988 hectares of agricultural land (PPLH-UGM, 1994).

\(^1\) The term riverbank used in this study refers to the 'flood plain' area, the part of the river basin that is available for settlement or farming, but risky due to the fluctuation of the river water level. In the case of the Code River, several studies indicate that the average width of this riverbank is about 300 meters (P4N-UGM, 1993; PPLH-UGM, 1994).
Figure 5.1
The Riverbank Area within the Municipality of Yogyakarta
The Code River and its riverbank, therefore, represent an example of an area with two spheres of interest commonly perceived as conflicting. It is considered an environmentally sensitive area, due to its function as a natural irrigation system for the region; yet its proximity to urban centers attracts people to settle along the bank of the river. Starting from its source in the foothills of Mount Merapi, within the administrative boundaries of Kabupaten Sleman, and passing through Kotamadya Yogyakarta, then down to the south in Kabupaten Bantul, the Code riverbank, about 80 Km. in length, is occupied by at least 137,909 people; population densities range from 25 people per hectare in the rural areas to 300 people per hectare in the urban areas (P4N-UGM, 1993).

The riverbank itself, called ‘ledok’ in Javanese, is an important consideration for discussing the ‘marginality’ of the area. Following the physical geography of the region, the riverbank is quite narrow in the north (about 100-200 meters), but becomes wider in the south (about 200-400 meters). Besides, the bank in the north has very steep slopes which grow less steep in the south. These two physical characteristics of the bank, its width and slope, are very important as they determine the availability of the riverbank land to be utilized. Thus, in the south, where the bank is wider and the slope is less steep, land use is more extensive than in the north.

Within the riverbank area itself, lies an area called ‘riverflat,’ or ‘sand bank,’ commonly called ‘wedhi kengser’ in Javanese. This is an area about 10 to 30 meters wide on both sides of the river, formed largely of sediment washed down by the river. It is considered that this riverflat should be kept vacant, as it always subject to annual flooding. This was actually done until the early 1970s, when new urban developments
forced the people who resided on the upper part of the bank to move down to the riverflat, and when the increasing population of the riverbank kampung forced people to extend their houses to the riverflat. The extent to which people began to occupy the riverflat area caused serious problems, since government officials then used that case as a basis for considering the whole kampung ‘illegal,’ a statement that is considered unfair by kampung people, as the riverflat represents an area of not more than ten per cent of the total area of the kampung.

5.2 The Riverbank Kampung: Between ‘Marginality’ and ‘Centrality’

To date, within the administrative boundaries of Yogyakarta Municipality (Kotamadya Yogyakarta) there are at least 29 kampung along the Code River (see Figure 5.2 and Table 5.1). These kampung are divided into 73 RW and 320 RT, and they house about 41,000 people, or almost 10 per cent of the city’s population. This is, of course, a significant number, especially considering that the area covers only about 6.5 per cent of the Kotamadya area. Kampung people along the Code River experience the effects of environmental pressures to a greater extent than do other urban dwellers of Yogyakarta, yet have the least resources to combat these problems.

The development of the riverbank kampung along the Code River was determined by both the development of the city in general, as well as by the urban activities located close to the river. Due to the pattern and direction of the city’s growth, the kampung along the Code River expanded north and south from the city center, and they can be categorized into three categories based upon their period of establishment.
The first category includes the oldest kampung, which were already established at the beginning of the city and which are located close to the urban center (the Malioboro district). Since in this district are located many important urban facilities (e.g. the central market, Pasar Beringharjo; the Vredenburg Fort; the Chinese stores; and the main train station), it was logical for people to build shelters and to settle around this area; most of the people who live in the kampung around the Malioboro district work in the area. Maps of the city dating from the early nineteenth century indicate that kampung such as Ratmakan, Cokrodirjan, Jagalan, Sayidan, Gemblakan and Macanan already existed at that time.

Starting in the 1920s, the development of many social organizations and educational institutions in the city attracted many people from other parts of Indonesia to come to the city. During and after the independence years in the mid-1940s, a time during which Yogyakarta became an important political arena, more Indonesians come to the city. This situation stimulated further the development of new kampung on the fringe of the city. Thus, the second category of riverbank kampung emerged, those which were established in the first half of the twentieth century, such as kampung Ledok Tukangan, Tegal Panggung, and Jogoyudan in the north, and Prawirodirjan, Bintaran, and Wirogunan in the south. At that time, these kampung were considered peripheral kampung, but due to the growth of the city, now they are considered as city-center kampung. These kampung already experienced high population densities by 1946-1949. At that time, when Yogyakarta became the capital of the Republic of Indonesia, thousands of civil servants and other government employees arrived in this city.
Darmosugito (1956) notes that during that time some kampung experienced overcrowding, as many houses were occupied by more than five families.

Beginning in the early 1970s, both state and private universities and colleges were developed on the outskirts of the city, particularly in the northern section. These institutions attracted large numbers of new commercial activities, directed at serving the students and university staffs. With about half of the total of sixty universities and colleges in greater Yogyakarta located in the northern part of the city, it could be expected that pressures on this area would increase very dramatically. This situation led both to further densification of the existing kampung and to the formation of new ones.

The third category of riverbank kampung then emerged: those which were established from the early 1970s to the early 1990s, such as Terbansari, Cokrokusuman and Blimbingsari in the north, and Keparakan, Sorosutan, and Bugisan in the south.

The general categorization based upon the historical development presented above, however, should not be used to determine the spatial and social characteristics of the kampung. In general, there is no clear distinction among them, in terms of either their spatial or their socio-economic characteristics; each kampung is always changing, reforming, and being redeveloped. Thus, kampung Ratmakan, for example, which was established since the beginning of the city, is still in the process of dynamic change and transformation. By observing only its physical appearance, without understanding its historical background, people would not able to distinguish whether a particular kampung was new or old.
Figure 5.2
Kampung along the Code River
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. East Side of the River</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Tegalrejo 1.1 Karangwaru</td>
<td>RW2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jetis/Petinggen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Jetis 2.1 Cokrodirjan</td>
<td>RW5; RW6; RW7; RW8; RW9; RW10; RW11</td>
<td>Jetisharjo/Pasiraman; Cokrookusman; Gondolayu Lor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RW10; RW11; RW12; RW13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gondolayu Kidul/ Jogoyudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Gowongan</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Danurejan 3.1 Suryatmajan</td>
<td>RW1; RW2</td>
<td>Ledok Macanan</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RW3; RW4</td>
<td>Gembakan Atas</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RW5; RW6</td>
<td>Gembakan Bawah</td>
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<td></td>
<td>RW7; RW8</td>
<td>Ledok Cokrodirjan</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Gondomanan 4.1 Ngupasan</td>
<td>RW7; RW8; RW9</td>
<td>Ledok Rattmakan</td>
<td>Case Study 1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RW14; RW15</td>
<td>Sayidan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RW 16; RW17; RW18</td>
<td>Prawirodirjan</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.2 Prawirodirjan</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Mergangsan 5.1 Keparakan</td>
<td>RW7; RW8</td>
<td>Keparakan Lor</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RW9; RW13</td>
<td>Keparakan Kidul</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5.2 Brontokusuman</td>
<td>RW14; RW16</td>
<td>Karanganyar</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RW17; RW18</td>
<td>Bugisan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5.3 Wirugunanan</td>
<td>RW2; RW3; RW5; RW6</td>
<td>Bintaran</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RW4; RW5; RW6</td>
<td>Wirugunan</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RW7; RW14; RW15</td>
<td>Surokarsan</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>RW16; RW17; RW22;</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mergangsan</td>
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<td><strong>B. West Side of the River</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Gondokusuman 6.1 Terban</td>
<td>RW1; RW4; RW5; RW6</td>
<td>Terban/Terbansari</td>
<td>Case Study 3,4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RW1; RW8</td>
<td>Kotabaru</td>
<td>Case Study 2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6.2 Kotabaru</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Danurejan 7.1 Tegalpanggung</td>
<td>RW1; RW2; RW3; RW4</td>
<td>Ledok Tukangan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RW11; RW12; RW13</td>
<td>Tegalpanggung</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RW14; RW15; RW16</td>
<td>Juminahan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Pakualaman 8.1 Purwokinanti</td>
<td>RW1; RW2</td>
<td>Jagalan/Ledoksari</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RW3; RW4; RW5; RW6</td>
<td>Purwokinanti; Beji</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Umbulharjo 9.1 Sorosutan</td>
<td>RW1; RW5; RW14; RW16</td>
<td>Sorosutan</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>14 Kelurahan</td>
<td>83 RW</td>
<td>29 RK</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The spatial characteristics of the riverbank kampung are something that needs to be discussed, as these characteristics become an important consideration in discussing the ‘marginality’ of the kampung. As described earlier, the sloping bank of the Code River creates several terraces on which, depending on the bank’s situation, housing could be erected. The spatial pattern of the Code kampung can thus be described as a row of housing units constructed along the sloping bank of the river, from the top of the bank, at the main street level of the city, down to the riverflat area. Further, the number of terraces, their width, and their distance from the main streets of the city, are all important, since these factors determine the accessibility of each terrace to public services provided by government; such services are usually only provided to areas along the main street. The farther an area is from the main street, the more likely it is that the area will not receive public services, since it is considered more ‘marginal.’

The boundaries among the terraces, which are mostly steep slopes ranging from 2 to 6 meters high, are important, as they divide the riverbank kampung into several sub-areas or blocks. One boundary, however, can be considered as the most important one. This is the boundary that marks the division between housing constructed along the main street (on-street housing) and that built behind the on-street housing down to the river (off-street housing). This boundary is crucial in discussing the riverbank kampung, as it reflects the sociological division between two different groups: ‘the on-street neighborhoods’ consist of rich people or ‘big’ people (the wong gede), and ‘the off-street neighborhoods’ consist mostly of the poor or ‘little’ people (the wong cilik).

As Guinness (1986) has documented, although the creation of urban administrative units (the RK system before 1989, or the RW after 1989) assumed that
these two entities (the on-street neighborhoods and the off-street neighborhoods) were one administrative unit, yet, sociologically and economically, they are two different entities. This distinction is very important, since it influences the way in which the kampung concept is defined and discussed. For Guinness, the actual kampung are defined sociologically as only the ‘off-street’ neighborhoods, and do not include the neighborhoods along the main street (on-street areas). People settled in off-street areas regard themselves as kampung people, while people settled in on-street areas do not regard themselves in this way.

5.3 The Housing Situation: Kampung as Slums?

In order to illustrate the housing situation of the kampung along the Code River, several physical aspects of the four case studies are presented and compared to the general housing situation in the Kotamadya. The first aspect is the average housing density, meaning the number of housing units per hectare; this indicates, in general, the environmental quality of the area. From field observations and secondary data, it was found that the housing density in the kampung along the Code River varies, ranging from 30 to 100 units per hectare. In some kampung, such as Ratmakan, the average housing density is quite low, at about 40 to 50 houses per hectare, which means, on average, each housing unit occupies about 200 to 250 square meters of land. In other kampung, such as Terbansari or Blimbingsari, however, the average housing density is higher, about 100 unit per hectare.

Further, it is important to note that there is a wide range of lot sizes and housing sizes within the kampung. In some kampung, it is quite common to find large housing
figure represents the level of accessibility to housing ownership or the level of housing shortage in an area. The higher the number of households per housing unit, the more difficult it is for households to own or to get access to housing, or the higher is the housing shortage in an area. In kampung along the Code River, the average number of households per housing unit varies from 1.2 to 1.6. This figure shows that there is a housing shortage in the area.

In Indonesia, building quality is always used by the government as one important criterion for classifying whether a kampung is a slum or not. Buildings are categorized into three types of construction: permanent, semi-permanent, and temporary. Permanent structures are those constructed entirely of brick. Semi-permanent structures are those constructed of a mixture of materials, including hardwood, bamboo and brick. The term ‘temporary’ refers to those structures built almost entirely of wood or bamboo. According to the city-planning standards developed by the Ministry of Public Works, kampung that consist mostly of housing units classified as temporary structures are considered to be poor kampung, or slums.

Along the Code River, it is true that about a third of the housing units in the area can be classified as temporary structures, but this actually reflects the general condition of kampung in the Kotamadya. Further, there is no sign that such temporary structures exhibit conditions that are environmentally negative. A unit’s building structure may be directly related to the economic status of the owners, but a temporary building, built entirely of bamboo or wood, cannot always be classified as marginal or unhealthy. In fact these temporary structures have their own merits, such as resistance to earthquakes.
Another aspect commonly used to evaluate the housing conditions of such kampung is the availability of public facilities in the area. In the case of the kampung along the Code River, the availability of public facilities is very high. As this river passes through the center of the city, almost all public facilities, such as schools, shops, markets, mosques, churches, offices, health centers, movies, are within walking distance for the kampung residents. As some of these facilities also function as workplaces for the kampung residents, it is difficult to say that, spatially, these kampung can be considered ‘marginal’ or peripheral.

Table 5.2
The Housing Situation along the Code River.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ratmakan</th>
<th>Kota Baru</th>
<th>Terban Baru</th>
<th>Blimbingsari</th>
<th>Yogyakarta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Housing Density (unit/hectare)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>20-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Household have less than 9 m² of floor space/capita</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>22.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households per Housing Unit</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing Structure:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) permanent</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) semi-permanent</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) temporary</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing with private MCK</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing with public water</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: As the housing type in Case Study 2 is a kind of communal housing/co-op housing, data on housing density and the number of households per housing unit are not available.
In brief, it can be said that most of the basic supports and conveniences for the Code River kampung are within easy reach or within a walking distance of less than one kilometer. Access between the Code River kampung and the surrounding communities is via internal settlement footpaths and streets and the surrounding urban road system. This is quite different to the situation in housing areas developed by the formal housing sector in this city. Observations of the spatial distribution of housing built by the formal housing sector in Yogyakarta show that almost all such housing complexes have poor access to even basic community facilities such as schools, offices, medical services and shops. As a consequence residents have to travel at least 5-10 kilometers away from their homes to reach such facilities. Not only is this time-consuming and economically costly, but it also could create a negative impact on the environment (YUDP, 1994).

In general, the riverbank kampung lack basic services, particularly clean water, toilets/bathrooms, and household sewage and garbage disposal. In the Code area, the government water services enterprise (PDAM) serves only about 30 per cent of the total households. Until the mid 1980s, the PDAM served only those who live close to the main street, but lately they serve also those who are considered by the government to be 'illegally' occupying government land in places like the riverflat or the Chinese cemetery, such as kampung Blimbingsari Baru (Case Study 4). Due to the limited capacity of the PDAM, however, many kampung residents still do not have access to clean water; they, therefore, have to depend on other sources of water supply, such as public hydrants, public wells, or springs that can be found along the river.

Field observations found that, on average, one public well is used by approximately five to ten households. Further, many households also do not have their
own private bathrooms and latrines. This is particularly true of those who reside close to the Code River. As a consequence therefore, many households have to depend on public bathrooms and latrines, commonly called MCK in Indonesia. The importance of these MCK for the residents is strongly expressed by kampung leaders and residents, particularly since the construction of a dike along the river not only destroyed many springs and public bathrooms in that area but also hindered people used to bathing and disposing waste in the river.

The public system of household sewage disposal is also limited in the Code area. Liquid wastes from kitchens are disposed of directly into the backyards of houses or into the street. In many kampung, sewage from toilets and washing facilities drains directly into the Code River. Considering the limited land available for such facilities, communities have tried to construct communal septic tanks under the narrow streets within kampung. Unfortunately, since draining the sewage directly into the river is considered much cheaper, such ideas have not been carried out by many kampung residents. Sanitation systems that are not only technologically appropriate but also economically affordable are clearly needed.

Garbage disposal is another issue in the Code kampung. Understanding the limitations of the government in managing garbage, many kampung residents have developed an efficient system of managing it. In this system, a small group of people in each kampung is formed, and they are responsible for collecting each household’s garbage.

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3 It is estimated that only 32 per cent of the solid waste generated in Kotamadya is collected by the government (YUDP, 1991). Government statistics indicate that 1142.57 cubic meters of garbage are collected each day, which, if the figure of 32 per cent is accurate, means that approximately 2,400 cubic meters of garbage each day goes uncollected in this city.
and then bringing it to the temporary garbage dump sites located outside the kampung.

This system is quite effective and efficient, since it manages about 60 per cent of all garbage disposal in the area at an affordable price. Further, this system also creates jobs for some kampung residents and encourages community participation in the area. Yet, two problems are identified by the kampung leaders: first, that the locations of the temporary dump sites provided by the government are too far from the kampung (in some kampung like Ratmakan, the closest dump site is located about 1 kilometer from the kampung); second, the fact that the number of small garbage dump sites within the kampung is also limited makes garbage collection within the kampung more difficult. This situation makes some kampung residents continue their habit of just throwing their garbage into the river.

Some of the limitations regarding basic infrastructure discussed above are not, however, only limited to the kampung along the Code River. As has been documented by the YUDP Project, the general housing situation in the YUDP area is marked by the limitation of basic infrastructure. Within the YUDP area, for example, only 79 percent of the YUDP population have their own private latrines; only about 18 percent of all household are served by PDAM; while only about 32 percent of solid waste disposal can be managed by the government (YUDP, 1991, 1994). This figure shows that any account that considers the Code kampung as 'kampung kumuh' or slums is questionable.

5.4 The Socio-Demographic Characteristics

As described earlier, the role of kampung along the Code River in providing shelter for the urban population is very significant. The area comprises only about 6.5
per cent of the total Kotamadya area, but it shelters about 10 per cent of the city’s population. It is important to note that, although in some kampung the population density has reached over 500 persons per hectare, the average population density of kampung along the Code River (154 persons per hectare) is, surprisingly, not much higher than the average population density of the city (about 140 persons per hectare).  

These data show that the common description of kampung as a variety of slum area which is always characterized by its high population density, is, particularly in the case of Yogyakarta, not true. The fact that the population density of kampung along the Code River is not as high as people usually think is very important, since government officials often use this issue to judge whether some of the kampung are to be considered slums.

Another important socio-demographic aspect of kampung that people commonly misunderstand are the social characteristics of their residents, particularly in terms of occupation. It is true that most kampung residents depend upon work in the informal sector. In the case of the kampung along the Code River, however, it is interesting that the percentage of kampung residents working as government employees—this category includes civil servants, the armed forces, teachers, the retired and the like—is quite high. As can be seen in Table 5.3, in Ratmakan, the percentage of kampung residents working as government employees is high, about a third of the total kampung residents; this figure is about 22 per cent in Terban Baru, and about 18 per

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4 It is interesting to note that the Master Plan for Yogyakarta stated that the average population density along the Code riverbank should not exceed more than 50 persons per hectare. This statement reflects the way that planners and decision makers still have a kind of 'utopian' thinking that was far removed from the reality that land is very limited and that it therefore should be used more efficiently.
cent for kampung Blimbingsari Baru. These figures are important, as they relate to kampung residents’ capacity to organize themselves and to develop contacts outside the community, particularly with the state. Although the income of such employees is not always larger than that of those working the informal sector, their income security is greater. This stability of income is very important, as it gives access to formal housing finance. Further, as most of the people working as government officials have more fixed schedules, they usually have more time to engage in community activities and take part in organizations.

### Table 5.3
**Primary Occupation of Kampung Dwellers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Occupation</th>
<th>Case 1 Ratmakan (%)</th>
<th>Case 2 Gondolayu (%)</th>
<th>Case 3 Terban Baru (%)</th>
<th>Case 4 Blimbingsari (%)</th>
<th>Yogyakarta (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government employees</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private employees</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurs</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petty traders/Inf.sector</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Based on documents published by Kotamadya (BPS Kotamadya, 1995) and P4N-UGM (1993)

Many have argued that one important role of popular settlements like kampung is that they provide a wide variety of housing for incoming migrants, who are not wealthy enough to buy and live in so-called ‘real estate’ housing. Kampung along the Code River have indeed significantly contributed to sheltering newly arrived migrants. The percentage of such migrants in each kampung varies, and it seems to correspond to the age of each kampung. Kampung that have been settled for a longer time, such as...
Ratmakan, have fewer migrants (about 60 percent of the total number of households); while in kampung Kotabaru/Gondolayu and Blimbingsari, which was established in the early 1980s, almost all household heads are considered migrants.

If we look at the origins of these migrants (Table 5.4), it is important to note the variety of their origins. Although the percentage who come from Yogyakarta city and Yogyakarta province is dominant, constituting more than 50 percent of the total number of migrants, in general, migrants come from many parts of Indonesia. The fact that kampung in Yogyakarta have become a home for many ethnic groups from all over Indonesia is not something strange, since the city itself, famous as the city of education, has become the place where many young Indonesians seek a better and affordable education. Observations in kampung Blimbingsari found that at least 40 per cent of its total residents are students.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Case 1 Ratmakan (%)</th>
<th>Case 2 Gondolayu (%)</th>
<th>Case 3 Terban Baru (%)</th>
<th>Case 4 Blimbingsari Baru (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yogyakarta City</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yogyakarta Province</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Java</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Java</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Based on documents published by Kotamadya (BPS Kotamadya, 1995) and P4N-UGM (1993)
5.5 The Social Units and the Working of the Kampung Community

As in other urban areas in Indonesia, the urban area of Yogyakarta is divided administratively into several wards or districts (kecamatan), as well as sub-districts (kelurahan). The kelurahan is considered as the lowest government administrative unit, as its head and staff are government officials and its operations are directly under government control. Below this kelurahan level, there are two important socio-administrative structures, called Rukun Warga/RW (community unit) and Rukun Tetangga/RT (neighborhood unit). Before 1989, in the Kotamadya, there were 29 kampung along the Code River. As at that time the names of the kampung was corresponded to the names of their administrative units (RK units), there were also 29 RK units. Each RK covered an area of about 20 hectares, with a population of about 2,300 people, on average. With its aim of a more efficient system of population administration, the government found that the previous RK system was not effective to deal with the increasing population in the city. Under government regulation No. 6 of 1988 then, each RK was divided into 2 to 4 RW.

As described in detail by Guinness (1986), and also by Sullivan (1992), the social structure of the kampung communities in Yogyakarta is firmly established within the RT and RW system, a Japanese-created system that was then recreated by the government of Indonesia as a way to administer the urban population. This system, however, also benefited the communities and has even been utilized as a means to defend community interests. As Guinness (1986) has argued, under the RT and RW system the kampung communities exhibit both the form and the spirit of rukun (social harmony) and gotong royong (sharing burdens). They provide important social welfare
services and develop valuable infrastructure at a low cost to the people. Under the notions of *rukun* and *gotong royong*, kampung residents are living in such a way that they are able to cope with various limiting factors in their environment.

*Rukun* and *gotong royong* in kampung are expressed through a wide variety of activities, from household rituals, house building and maintenance, public amenities development, common gatherings, shared food, utensils and television viewing, rotating credit associations, sports and artistic activities, to more generalized expressions of tolerance and sympathy among neighbors. *Gotong royong* and *rukun* are thus not only important ideological principles but also instruments whereby individuals pursue and maintain their interest, and integrate their individual interests with those of the group.

In kampung, *gotong royong* is organized by the RT and RW. Under the RW structure there are six sections, with responsibility for the affairs of women, youth, education, health, social welfare and security. The leaders of the RT and RW are elected; their respect is based on their social status, rather than on any official position. As will be discussed further in the following chapter, the role of the RT and RW and their leadership is crucial to the development process of kampung.

### 5.6 The Controversy: Flooding, Illegality, and City Beautification

In Indonesia, misconceptions of the kampung situation among the authorities have a long history, going back to the colonial era. Sullivan (1992) notes that, for most colonialists, the word ‘kampung’ connoted ‘native quarter’, an ambivalent perception embracing notions of urban squalor and benign rusticity. This misconception concerning kampung by colonialists is, unfortunately, still held by many Indonesian government...
officials, and is reflected in government policies and attitudes toward kampung. Many government officials in Indonesia continually under-estimate the potentials of kampung and overlook the fact that kampung are a prominent source of urban housing supply. They continue to view the kampung as ‘marginal’, and intentionally plan to remove kampung from the urban environment.

This kind of view, unfortunately, is also held by the government officials and bureaucrats of this ‘kota rakyat,’ a city that is popularly believed to be a home for the poor, for the powerless. In the early 1970s the government already intended to remove the kampung along the Code River. From the perspective of the government officials, the riverbank kampung are not suitable for living, and therefore the people there have to be relocated. This argument was based on Irrigation Law No. 11, 1974 (Undang-undang Pengairan, No.11, 1974) and Government Regulation Concerning Rivers No.35, 1991 (PP. Tentang Sungai No.35., 1991), which both stated that a flood plain area such as that along the Code River should be free of any development. Further, the government also blamed people for ‘illegally’ occupying government land and for constructing and extending housing in the riverflat area, so that the river became narrower.

Behind these ‘flooding’ and ‘illegality’ arguments, however, there was another, more important, reason that the government intended to remove the riverbank kampung. It was the perception held by government officials that such riverbank kampung do not contribute to efforts to modernize the city, and that they even represent the ‘negative’ side of the city. Kampung along the Code River were regarded as slums, in which there was no hope for further improvement and which therefore should be relocated. Further, not only were the riverbank kampung regarded by government officials as physically
deprived, they were also regarded as socially unhealthy environments, since many criminals, scavengers, beggars, and prostitutes lived in these areas. As several times stated by government officials, the riverbank area should be free of any development and converted into green space—an idea that clearly represents the 'elite's' notions of a modern city, but one which is not relevant in the context of the developing world.

The term 'marginal' implies a condition at, or close to a margin below which conditions are not acceptable, as measured against certain criteria. However, the problem is: whose and what criteria? In the case of developing countries, criteria regarding city and housing development have always been developed by the elite, and mostly for the elite's interests—the needs, interests, and aspirations of the populace as a whole are never accommodated within existing legal and institutional frameworks for urban development. Such criteria usually were developed on the basis of 'western' standards of town or city planning, originating from the ideas of the 'city beautiful movement' in the early 1900s. The fact that most of the housing units in the kampung along the banks of the Code River do not have building permits, but also do not show any signs of being physically deprived, suggests that there is something wrong with both the procedures and the substance of local building standards or regulations.

The description of physical and social characteristics presented in this chapter confirms that, contrary to the common perception held by government officials and the elite, kampung along the river exhibit dynamic vitality, and are far from the present definition of 'marginality.' It is true that the riverbank kampung lack some basic services, such as sanitation and a supply of clean water, but that does not mean that they should thus be considered 'kampung kumuh', or 'slum' areas. Kampung communities
along the river have acquired and developed ways of dealing with some of the physical limitations of the riverbank area, in the form of one or more of the following practices: (1) acceptance of substandard living spaces, including the arrangement of private and public spaces; (2) consensus on multi-purpose public spaces and practicing a high level of tolerance in using public spaces; (3) utilization of RT and RW to organize community activities. In brief, kampung communities have been able to maintain social order and provide basic services for their residents.

It is really unfair that the wong cilik, people who have been forced to settle along the banks of the river, must continually receive threats, even from the government which is supposed to protect them. The construction of a dike along the banks of the river shows that there has been an important change in government attitudes toward the kampung. It gives the kampung residents a feeling of security and confidence. It does not, however, guarantee the future long-term security of the kampung. Rather than trying to solve the fundamental housing problem and to help the poor, its main motive seems to have been for government officials to win the Adipura award. Although widely welcomed by kampung people, such projects hardly represent a long-term commitment by the government to social welfare. As will be discussed further in the following chapters, it is clear that the talud project has been ‘politicized’ by many actors and agencies both within and outside communities for their own purposes.
CHAPTER 6
CASE STUDIES: LOCAL DYNAMICS IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS OF KAMPUNG ALONG THE CODE RIVER

This chapter describes the development process of four kampung, purposely chosen to illustrate the variety of kampung along the Code River. Four aspects of their development will be described: 1) the historical background and the way in which each kampung formed and developed; 2) the stages important to this process; 3) the actors and agencies involved and their resources, interests, strategies and actions in relation to the process; and 4) the relationships among actors and agencies in the process. In brief, this chapter presents kampung development, the dynamics of the interactions among kampung people and of their relations to external agencies. It shows that, although the role of each community in kampung development is crucial, its success depends very much upon external agencies and resources; the links or networks between communities and external agencies, therefore, become critical for the kampung development process. This chapter discusses the process in a descriptive way, while a more analytical discussion will be presented in the following chapters.

Much of the information used in this chapter is taken from my own direct observation of the development process of kampung along the Code River (particularly case studies 3 and 4) and from interviews with various actors involved in the process. In addition, secondary data related to the study areas were also utilized, including government reports, planning documents related to the study area, and reports from newspapers, representing public discussions concerning the study area.
Figure 6.1
Map of The Case Study Areas

Case Study 4: Blimbingsari Baru
Case Study 3: Terban Baru
Case Study 2: Gondolayu/Kota Baru
Code River
Case Study 1: Ratmakan
6.1 Case 1: *Ratmakan, A Government Supported Kampung.*

Considered as one of the oldest kampung along the Code River, Ratmakan kampung is located on land bounded by the Code river and three main streets in the heart of Yogyakarta city. Covering an area of about 7.28 hectares and housing about 2,000 people, Ratmakan is a typical old urban kampung that has existed since the beginning of the city, yet is still treated by government as ‘marginal,’ especially because the fact that a number of houses have been informally constructed in the riverflat area. As an effect of a reorganization in 1991, the former *rukon kampung* of Ratmakan (RK Ratmakan) was divided into three *rukon warga* (RW 7, 8, and 9).

The establishment of Ratmakan kampung was closely related to the development of the Dutch fort, Vredenburg, and its nearby Dutch quarter, Loji Kecil, to the west of the kampung. Some people in Ratmakan worked for the Dutch soldiers as rifle repairmen. From the beginning, however, Ratmakan was already a ‘heterogeneous’ kampung—Chinese merchants, retired Dutch soldiers, as well as Javanese *priyayi,* all settled in this kampung, particularly along the main street. Besides, the development of many urban activities in the Malioboro district, particularly the Beringharjo market—the central market for the region, located just one block west of the kampung—also triggered the establishment of this kampung. With about four thousand traders in the market, visited by thousands of visitors every day, it could be expected that the activities of this market would influence several nearby kampung, including Ratmakan. Some of the people in Ratmakan work as small traders in this market.
Figure 6.2
Map and Pictures of Case Study 1: Kampung Ratmakan
In the early 1970s, in response to the development of the city in general and the Malioboro district in particular, two main streets that bounded Ratmakan; the Suryotomo on the west and the Senopati on the south, were widened. Accordingly, several new commercial activities developed along the main street that later on created more pressure on the kampung. Some buildings along the main street were enlarged and thereby encroached upon ‘off-street’ housing, while new migrants contributed to further population density. In the early 1990s, as part of efforts to develop the city, a new bridge was constructed by the government to the north part of the kampung, and this forced 31 households to be relocated outside the city.

Originally, the riverflat area on both sides of the river, called wedi kengser (sand banks), was vacant and used as a playground for children. With the increasing population of the kampung, substantial housing accretion on this area took place in the early 1970s. By the mid-1980s, almost all riverflat areas were already occupied; some by local residents wishing to have extra space and some by new kampung residents. In 1981, a flood totally destroyed 7 houses, and partially damaged 51 others. A bigger flood in 1984 destroyed 30 houses and partially damaged 156 (Kedaulatan Rakyat, 1984). Although flooding is considered an annual event, which kampung people are used to\(^1\), the later flood really shocked the kampung people, as at least 339 households in the kampung were affected directly by the flooding. Since then there have been heated public debates about whether or not this settlement should be removed, due to its

\(^1\) Some people in this kampung still practice the traditional ways in dealing with annual flooding in this area. They construct a ‘pogo’ a special space erected under the ceiling to store their belongings during the flood while they, themselves, temporarily move to a higher place. Due to the geographical characteristics of the region and the river pattern, flooding in this river usually happens very quickly, the water running as fast as a flush in the toilet.
‘risky’ location. The city authority called for the relocation of the riverflat residents to barracks out of town, or to resettlement areas in Kalimantan or Sumatera. The government also proposed that at least 30 meters of land on both sides of the river should be free of any housing (Kedaulatan Rakyat, 1984). Yet, in a survey conducted to find out people’s attitude toward flooding, just six months after the flood, most people (75%) preferred not to move from the area; most people believe that, if a dike were constructed along the river, the threat of flooding would be resolved (Geo Citra, 1985).

The justification based on ‘flooding’ that was used in the government proposal to remove the kampung was not the real reason, since, at the same time, another development scheme for the area was also proposed. This was a proposal to redevelop the kampung; its plan was that, except for the ‘on-street’ houses along the main street, all ‘off-street’ houses in the kampung would be torn down and replaced by modern, four-storey apartment blocks (Citra Cipta, 1986). Although not legally binding, the plan clearly represented elite ideas in preference to interests of the kampung people; the proposal offered no clear explanation of whether the kampung residents would get subsidies or priority on moving into the new housing. The entire affair shows the government’s intention to have a modern housing complex to replace the traditional kampung which it considers as backward slums, in an effort at city ‘beautification.’

While the public controversies regarding the existence of the kampung along the Code River were still not resolved, in 1988, a faculty member from Gajah Mada

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2 This proposal included an economic feasibility study of the ‘modern’ housing project, which calculated that by tearing down all of the off-street housing, about 27 modern apartment units could be developed and would accommodate about 372 households, a considerably smaller number than the size of the existing kampung, which was around 400 households (Citra Cipta, 1986).
University conducted an intensive six-month participant observation in Ratmakan (Haryadi, 1989). As his focus was on the residents' strategies for coping with environmental pressures, flooding was one of the issues he discussed with the community. Although at that time the idea of constructing a dike was not a new idea, it was through its discussions with him that the community felt more confident about proposing a dike as a solution for the flooding problem.

Thus starting in 1989, the community, lead by a respected kampung leader (the head of the RK Ratmakan at that time), began to propose a riverside dike project, or proyek talud. With the extensive social networks gained from his previous job positions, including personal relations with the head of the Directorate for Human Settlement of the Ministry of Public Works in Jakarta and the head of the Kodam (military regional office) in Semarang, the kampung leader of Ratmakan, a native resident, was able to convince the government that constructing a riverside dike was much more reasonable solution than tearing down the whole kampung. As discussed in the previous chapter, this riverside dike proposal, fortunately agreed with the local government's intention to improve the kampung along the river for the 'Adipura' reason. Thus, in 1990, six years after the last big flood in 1984, the riverside dike project was agreed on by the government agencies as a viable solution that met both the community interests in defending the kampung from flooding and the local governments (Kotamadya) interests in beautifying the city environment.

Aware of the possibility of incurring social protests or conflicts during the plan's implementation (due to the fact that the dike plan also included the removal of several
housing units along the river), the government asked ABRI to execute the project.\(^3\) Starting in 1991, it thus was ABRI which actively organized the project and nicely called it the *Manunggal Karya Bakti* (*MKB-ABRI*) freely translated as: ‘the project where ABRI and the people merge and work together.’\(^4\) In this MKB-ABRI, the Public Works Agency (PU Kotamadya) provided the budget, as well as the engineering design and supervision during the construction. The military personnel (ABRI) organized and managed the day-to-day work, including the regular supply of materials, the recruitment of the professional construction workers (the *tukang*) who did the actual construction of the dike, and (together with kampung leaders) the mobilization of free labor by kampung residents. The community was therefore responsible for mobilizing free labor, providing meals for ABRI, the *tukang*, and the kampung people involved.

Thus, each day for four months, from May to August 1991, about ten *tukang*, thirty ABRI personnel, and another thirty kampung residents practiced ‘*gotong royong,*’ cooperating to construct about 250 meters of riverside dike in Ratmakan kampung. This is not to mention the ten or so women, organized by the women’s group, or PKK, who worked every day to prepare meals for about seventy people in total (In this project, meals are served three times a day: breakfast at around 9.30; lunch at around 12; and supper at around 4.30). As the budget provided by the government was limited--only enough for buying materials such as cement, stones, and sand--the kampung people

\(^3\) For ABRI, of course, this project was not seen as merely a ‘free treat’ as ABRI had also broader socio-political goals. ABRI saw it as a challenge and opportunity to conduct their ‘social-political’ program, called *Abri Masuk Desa* (AMD). In this program, the army went to villages and worked with people on village projects; it previously had been conducted only in rural areas.

\(^4\) The AMD program is a very interesting phenomenon in the Indonesian socio-political discussions. It was developed for the purpose of emphasizing the idea of the ‘dual role’ of the army and to legitimating and strengthening ABRI involvement in all aspects of Indonesian lives. Thus, it is a program meant to lift the image of ABRI by involving them in community development work.
were asked to contribute money, for the completion of the project. Thus the kampung agreed that each family would contribute a minimum of Rp. 4,000 for the project.

As the Major in charge had his own interest in the success of the project, he also mobilized other government agencies within the municipality to become involved in the talud project. Thus the social welfare office (Dinas Sosial) was asked to provide rice (about 200 kilos of rice was distributed to the women’s group or PKK during the project); the village development office (Bangdes) was asked to help the kampung improve public bathroom (MCK) destroyed by the dike; while the city’s park office (DPK) was asked to provide the kampung with trees and a garbage dump site. Further, other non-state parties were also approached to become involved and to contribute to the project; so that the Sultan subsidized the street lamps, and some members of the private sector contributed money for the bridge and other improvements, while several religious groups also lent money to the kampung. This was considered the biggest project ever conducted in the kampung, and it cost about 75 million rupiah from the government side, not including another 17.5 million rupiah for housing improvements projects such as new public bath, night watch shelter, and street lights. This mechanism was then used by other kampung along the Code River. As of 1995, at least half of the kampung along the Code River have used this mechanism (Kotamadya, 1995).

In Ratmakan itself, the result was very surprising. Although sacrificing at least six housing units and two public MCK, with another eleven housing units partly destroyed for the dike’s site, a totally different kampung environment was created. Along the river flat area, a concrete dike structure, about one and half meters above the water level, with a one meter wide footpath, became new features of the kampung. This
dike served not only as a flood defense for the kampung but also as an important element in beautifying the riverside environment. Kampung people also decorated the riverside environment further, by constructing pots for flowers and adding street lighting, as well as other elements such as a kampung gate, small parks, shelters for the night watch or *gardu ronda*, and announcement boards. From being a neglected 'backyard,' where kampung people threw their waste, and which at night became a place where kampung people were afraid to pass, the river flat area is now becoming a 'front yard' for the kampung, where children hang around in the afternoon, and where at night, under street lighting, people can chat and get together.

With an increased feeling of confidence brought about by these improvements, kampung people began to consolidate their housing and their settlement, which had been stagnant for several decades. Some residents renovated their buildings and were thereby able to have extra rooms to rent. Field observations in July-August 1996 documented that 38 out of a total of 44 houses located along the dike (about 86 per cent) were already improved, and that 10 of them have been transformed into two-storey units. The housing improvement and consolidation that were conducted in this kampung seem to be coincidentally happened with the development that took place in the Malioboro area. As described earlier, in the early 1990s, in accordance with the increasing commercial activity in the city, many hotels and shopping malls were constructed in the area. This new activity has, in effect, brought economic opportunities for the kampung people, as the incoming shopkeepers and hotel workers need

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5 This is more the result of a sense of security or confidence as perceived by kampung people, rather than greater legal security. Some households are still unsure of their actual land ownership status in this kampung.
affordable accommodation; that need was seized on by kampung people, who constructed extra rooms for rent.

Since that time, the kampung along the Code River have received more attention from outsiders. In 1994, following the celebration of the Adipura award, given by the central government to the municipality, a huge poster that pictured kampung along Code River was erected, to show how successful the government program for improving the kampung had been; the same picture was also used for the 1993’ calendar published and distributed by the municipal government. In 1995, under the student services program called *Kuliah Kerja Nyata* (KKN), Gadjah Mada University sent students to the kampung along the Code River. Previously held only in rural areas, this program involved hundreds of students working directly with people in the kampung.

**Table 6.1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Projects</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Volume</th>
<th>Appr. Budget</th>
<th>External Agency Involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Housing renovation</td>
<td>June-Dec.1991</td>
<td>17 units</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Paving along the dike</td>
<td>Aug.-Oct. 1991</td>
<td>250 m.</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>Bangdes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Flower pots along the dike</td>
<td>Oct.-Jan. 1991</td>
<td>20 pieces</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>DKP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Street lights along the dike</td>
<td>Jan.-Mar. 1992</td>
<td>20 pieces</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>Sultan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Public MCK</td>
<td>Jan. 92-Sept.96</td>
<td>4 locations</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td>Bangdes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Parks</td>
<td>1993-1994</td>
<td>20 m2.</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>DKP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Bridge</td>
<td>1994-1995</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>Melia Hotel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Night watch shelter</td>
<td>Jan. 1992-1994</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Badminton field</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Announcement board</td>
<td>May-June 1996</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>Students/UGM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Mosque (renovation)</td>
<td>1992-1995</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20,000,000</td>
<td>Islamic groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1995, when a competition among *kelurahan* (*lomba desa*) was held by the government, Ratmakan was selected by the *lurah* as the best example of the *kelurahan* efforts to improve kampung. In 1996, an annual meeting of the Indonesian Institute of Architects (IAI), held in Bali, gave another award for the success of the *talud* project along the Code River: The Mayor (Widagdo) himself attended and received the award.

It can be said that the construction of the dike along the river has totally improved the kampung’s situation. Not only have many physical improvements have been made in this kampung, but more important is that government and other parties begin to recognize the existence of this kampung. Since the construction of the riverside dike people perceived that the future of this kampung is more secure. People view that the government is now more supportive to them.

As the riverside dike project does not cover land title improvement, however, land tenure problems still remain unresolved, and this might create other problems in the near future. Further, the fact that land commercialization is also increasing in this kampung suggests that what is commonly referred to as ‘gentrification’ could possibly happen in this kampung. Field observations in 1995 and 1996 documented that some ‘on-street’ buildings have already been enlarged and are encroaching upon the river flat area, while land prices have gone up quite dramatically.\(^6\) Thus, although the kampung has been physically improved, another new threat seems to be coming; this is an economic threat caused by increasing land values in the kampung and by increasing numbers of private companies seeking strategic land within the city. Since a five-star

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\(^6\) As some people recalled, in the early 1980s, people needed only Rp. 200,000 to secure 50 square meters of land within the riverflat area. In 1995, however, many people from outside the kampung were willing to pay 4-6 million rupiah for the same land, an increase of 20-30 times the original price.
hotel was constructed near the Ratmakan kampung after the dike project was finished, it may be that, in the near future, investors would like to develop another five-star hotel along the river. Ironically, a better kampung environment may create another threat, since it makes the location all that much more acceptable to commercial uses.

This case shows an important change in the government’s attitude, from seeing kampung as a problem to recognizing them as a solution. This shift of attitude is very interesting as it shows how personal interests of government officials can determine the process. While the project was certainly a response to the expectations of the kampung people, it was not planned only for their benefit. Since the beginning, the interests of many government officials and agencies shaped the project to a great extent. In this case, one could argue that the Adipura award is an indirect process to influence policy. It was thus considered as ‘a blessing in disguise’ for the community and other government agencies and officials. This shows the way in which the political-ideological and pragmatic interests of the state can fit with the pragmatic interests of kampung people.

The way the project itself was conducted is very interesting, as it shows how such community mobilization can be conducted very successfully in an urban area. Such a project might appear to be an ideal example of community development, in which people are directly involved from the beginning of the project and control the whole process. In fact, as we have seen, its execution was quite ‘top-down,’ and the dominant planning and construction roles were still in the hands of government institutions. This issue will be discussed further in the next chapter.
6.2 Case 2: Gondolavu/Kota Baru, An Architect-designed Kampung

Located on the very steep slope of the bank of the Code River, under a bridge called Gondolayu, this small settlement lies behind about 100 meters of illegal row shelters, used by about 20 informal-sector workers as small tire-repair shops. Administratively under the kelurahan Kota Baru, the area includes about 3,000 square meters of steep slopes, but its close proximity to urban centers enables its inhabitants, about 50 households, mostly employed in informal-sector activities, to manage their businesses and their family lives effectively. Initially, the area was the site of dozens of shacks, occupied by scavengers, pickpockets, thieves, and prostitutes. Further, the fact that the city garbage dump is just 100 meters south of this kampung has completely shaped the 'marginal' status of this kampung.

Like other kampung located along the bank of the Code River, this settlement was subject to removal by the government. It was even considered by the government as the first priority for removal for three main reasons: first, although very small, its appearance was so obvious that it did not create a very good impression on visitors arriving in the city; second, it was entirely occupied by very 'marginalized' urban dwellers—scavengers, beggars, prostitutes, and other criminals—and therefore was considered as 'socially unhealthy' to the city environment in general; and finally, as most of these 'marginal' people did not have identity cards or Kartu Tanda Penduduk (KTP), they were classified as 'vagrants,' or gelandangan, who were not supposed to form a settlement or community within the city. This government attitude was made clear by the fact that, several times in the late 1970s, the government organized the periodic razing of vagrant shacks in this area (Guiness, 1986).
Figure 6.3
Map and Pictures of Case Study 2: Kampung Gondolayu/Kota Baru

Photo source: Adri Duivesteijn and Harmen van de Wal (1994)
In 1983, while the controversial issue concerning the removal of kampung along the Code was still unresolved, Fr. Romo Mangunwijaya (popularly known as Romo Mangun), a Catholic priest but more famous as a social worker, novelist and architect, came and lived with people in this area. His idea was to utilize and maintain land on the steep riverbank, in order to provide housing for these ‘homeless people,’ while empowering these ‘marginalized’ urban dwellers. He was able to gain strong local support, and, with funding from the Catholic church, designed and constructed a totally new settlement. Arguing that the steep banks would otherwise deteriorate, he designed a system of embankments and a complex of buildings made of inexpensive materials.

As can be seen in Figure 6.3, the structure itself is marvelous; it is a group of several 2 and 3-storey dormitories, erected firmly on a very steep slope (about 45%), yet looking like a temporary building. Romo Mangun, who once studied architecture in Aachen, German, used temporary but attractive architecture. One structure is especially interesting, a two-storey bamboo unit that uses a concrete drainage way as its foundation; it serves as community meeting hall and community library. Storm water simply runs under the house into the river. This shows the way Romo Mangun has been able to creatively utilize an ‘unused’ area for housing about 250 people.

Considered a famous figure with a national reputation, Romo Mangun was also involved in defending peoples’ rights over their land in a bigger and more sensitive case, the Kedung Ombo dam project. His ‘humanistic’ approach toward development, as represented in his writings and activities, received wide recognition. Before he became involved in this kampung, he had already helped kampung people in the nearby kampung, Kampung Terban. It should be noted, however, that the role of Catholic Churches were also important, since it is from them that Romo Mangun obtains legitimacy as well as funding. Further information about Romo Mangun can be found in Mendidik Manusia Merdeka: Romo Mangunwijaya 65 tahun, edited by Th.Sumartana (1995).
For Romo Mangun, part of a kampung’s role is to accommodate temporarily people who come from villages and try to improve their life in the city. Thus, each household was assigned one small single room of about eight meters square, so that, in total, about 50 households could be accommodated in this kampung. To run the kampung, each household contributes about Rp.1,500-Rp.2,000, every month; this money is managed by the RT leader to pay costs such as those for electricity, public water services, etc. Besides its single room, household members also enjoy several public facilities that were developed for this kampung; these include: a public meeting hall, which is also used as a community library; a meeting hall for the kampung youth; two public MCK; a small open space; and a shelter for the night watch (gardu ronda).

More important than these physical facilities, however, was what Romo Mangun did psychologically, socially, and politically to defend the presence of these scavengers, prostitutes, and even beggars, and to help them to improve their lives. Learning from his previous experience working with kampung people in a nearby kampung (Kampung Terban), Romo Mangun considered that those people, trapped within the imbalanced social and economic structures of urban society, should be empowered. With strong local support from the people, and assisted by students from local universities, Romo Mangun initiated various small-scale programs, with special emphasis on younger groups, non-formal education, income earning, arts and drama. Thus, what he did was to work together with people to improve their lives—something that was accused by some local Moslems to be a part of the ‘kristenisasi,’ a term used to denote a systematic
program by the Catholic or Protestant churches to convert Moslems in Indonesia.\(^8\) Mangun’s activities included negotiating with the local government officials to issue KTP, or identity cards, giving the kampung residents formal rights as urban residents. After living and working with the residents for about four years, Romo Mangun left this settlement, and his role was taken by students who had previously worked with him. Romo Mangun’s efforts seem to have been recognized by the government, as in 1988 an RT was formed and formally incorporated into kelurahan Kota Baru.

In 1991, several months before the national election, to show the GOLKAR’s commitment to the poor people, GOLKAR built a public water hydrant for the kampung, with a plaque clearly stating: ‘Bantuan GOLKAR, 1991’ (Funded by GOLKAR, 1991). In 1992, considered as an example of excellent efforts in community development, the Aga Khan Architecture Award was given to Romo Mangun and the community. Since then, visits by government officials, housing researchers and observers from many parts of the world have become usual for the kampung people. Some kampung dwellers express the fact that they welcome all of these visits, as they give them a feeling of confidence and security. They hope that, if more national and international groups recognize their existence, the local government will then become more supportive of them.

In 1995, as happened also in Ratmakan kampung, when a competition among the kelurahan was held by the government, kelurahan Kotabaru was one of the nominees.

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\(^8\) Around the 1980s, this ‘kristenisasi’ issue became a very sensitive issue in Indonesia. Some Moslems considered that efforts to spread Christianity by both the Catholic and Protestant churches were too aggressive and ethically unacceptable. Efforts such as those of Romo Mangun were considered a part of ‘kristenisasi’, as it was perceived that they helped the poor with the hope that they would then convert to Christianity.
This kampung was selected as the ‘best example’ project in this competition. In 1996, as part of the KKN program conducted in kampung along the Code River, students from local universities worked with local people to execute several projects, including: public MCK, public hydrants, and announcement boards.

The case described is a rare case, in which one famous figure with a national reputation transformed a few dozen of shacks and a group of ‘vagrants’ into a kampung community. This kampung could perhaps be called ‘planned’ and ‘organized’ squatter settlement, as its development process, including designing, funding, constructing, and managing the settlement, was entirely under the authority of Romo Mangun.

This case shows that the local government was quite reluctant to create conflicts with a relatively famous national figure. Further study is needed to find out whether or not the kampung’s role as a ‘transitional’ home for new migrants is functioning. Field observations in 1994 (almost ten years after its development) found that most of the kampung residents were the same residents who had resided there ten years earlier, and that only three households had been able to find better and more secure housing outside this area. This indicates that, for the residents, ‘transition’ seems not to mean five or ten years, but possibly twenty years or even one generation. Since by residing in this kampung they can save their transportation and housing budgets, and then use such money to send their children to school, ‘transitional’ may mean the one or two decades that it takes to enable them really to escape from this poverty trap.

This settlement, with its colorful painted buildings and well-designed structure, is now becoming an attraction for tourists’ cameras. However, the long-term future of this settlement is uncertain. Unlike the first case, which was also built on government
land along the same river, Gondolayu kampung is not apt to be the recipient of government improvement programs. Because of its small size and transitory nature, it is not likely that it will survive for a long time. In summer 1996, a 300 meter long riverside dike was constructed south of this kampung, but rumors circulated among the kampung people that a similar dike would not be constructed in this kampung unless the residents showed their loyalty to the government by voting for GOLKAR in the next election, scheduled for May 1997.

It may be that this case cannot be considered an ideal example of community development, since the role of Romo Mangun was so strong; it is, however, an excellent example of the way in which, no matter how small and transitory its nature, hundreds of marginal people can be helped to survive and improve their lives. As does Case Study 1, this case also shows the inconsistency and ambiguity of the government's attitudes and policies in relation to kampung. As will be further discussed in the next chapter, this case shows that the government will only become involved in such projects if it can get direct benefits from such involvement.
6.3 Case 3: Kampung Terban Baru, A Community Organized Kampung

Also located on the sloping bank of the Code River, about 2 kilometers north of the city center, this kampung was established in the early 1980s and is therefore still considered to be new. Administratively under the kelurahan Terban, its development was closely related to the development that took place around the main street, called Terban, and around the Gajah Mada University campus, just 200 meters to the north. Maps from the 1920s show that the area was mostly vacant at that time, while some parts of it were used as a Chinese cemetery. The land itself is considered as belonging to the Kraton, but as there is no clear land administration, its status remains unclear. By the 1970s, it was well known to the people in the city that vast, abandoned Chinese cemeteries like the one in kelurahan Terban had become ideal places for criminals (pickpockets, thieves, etc.) and vagrants to escape from police raids.

Starting in the late 1970s, much activity began to take place along the Terban street, mainly in response to the rapid development of the campus and its surrounding area. With about 30,000 students, it was clear that the Gajah Mada campus would become the driving force for development in this area. As stores, offices, and other commercial buildings were constructed only along the main street, the 'left over' area behind was then filled in with housing and formed a new kampung. Until the late 1970s, some land behind the commercial buildings along the Terban street and down to

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9 When asked about the land's status in 1995, the head of the kraton land office (Paniti Kismo) answered boldly that the land belongs to the kraton. However, he could not tell the exact boundaries of the kraton land in this area. As already explained in the previous chapter, all land used as Chinese cemeteries are owned by the kraton, and they were leased to the Chinese community for an indeterminate period. But, as the boundary of this Chinese cemetery is unclear, the Kraton, the government, and the community are all confused concerning which parts of the land belong to the kraton and which do not.
Figure 6.4
Map and Pictures of Case Study 3: Terban Baru

Terban Baru kampung from the air

Public Hall

Footpath within kampung
the bank of the Code River had been occupied by the kampung, but a large part of the area still remained vacant. Kampung Terban already existed at that time, but only in the eastern and southern-western parts. At that time, there were about 200 households in this kampung, grouped into 10 RT.

In 1981, a big flood forced people residing in the riverflat area to move. Facing this uneasy situation, the kampung people then went to the RK leader to ask for help; they proposed to occupy the higher ground close to the street. Clearly understanding that these people must be sheltered, or otherwise they would create a bigger social problem, the head of the RK at that time, a native who holds a bachelor degree in political science, agreed to the proposal, with one condition: that the ‘invasion’ process should be coordinated directly by the RK. Thus, a special team, named ‘team VII’ was formed with the main task to mobilize people in need of shelter. In 1982, the actual land invasion process was conducted with the direct assistance of the RK leader and his staff; about 60 parcels of land were distributed among these people, quickly followed by the construction of individual housing.

Two years later, however, these people had to be relocated when the government developed a market and a gas station in the area they occupied. Thus, another team, called ‘Team Nonong,’ was formed and assigned to relocate all of the people who had been forced to move because of the development of a market. This team was able to secure and distribute about 80 parcels of land for kampung people.

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10 It should be noted that at that time Fr. Romo Mangunwijaya had already helped kampung people in this area. Although he did not become directly involved in the process (as he did in Case Study 2, described earlier), he worked closely with the head of the RK in this kampung. His role in this development, therefore, should not be neglected.
At the same time, a bridge was constructed by the government in the northern part of the settlement, and this triggered another invasion. Another team, called ‘Team Klinting,’ was formed; again, it was able to allocate about 74 parcels of land to the kampung people. Thus, in late 1984, a total of about 254 parcels of land were distributed to the kampung people and benefited at least 1,500 people.11

The new kampung itself is marvelous, since the land development process was organized by the RK; it has an orderly pattern, with a grid system supported by a system of footpaths and ditches. The average land parcel that was distributed is about 60 meters square, comparable to the size of the smallest type of housing produced by Perumnas. Served with electricity, piped water and a drainage system, the new kampung was then called Terban Baru (New Terban). Further, several public facilities (a mosque, a church, a library, a meeting hall, a gardu ronda or shelter for the night watch) were also constructed, so that people are able to conduct many social activities. In 1989, following the reorganization of the RT and RW system in the city, the areas previously designed as RT 140 and RT 147 were reorganized into seven new RT (RT 9, 10, 11, 19, 20, 23, and 24). Despite their lack of formal security, particularly related to land tenure, the kampung people interviewed in July 1995 and August 1996 expressed their satisfaction about what they have accomplished so far. By constructing two-storey buildings some residents have been able to earn an additional income, by renting their extra rooms.

11 Quite interestingly, before the invasion by the people, the government had actually planned that this land would be distributed to the local government officials. The government, or at least the government officials, however, were not totally the losers in this game, as the Public Works Agency (PU) was able to secure about 2,500 square meters of land close to the new bridge for an office building, while the head of the agency itself was able to secure 500 square meters of land for his own private house.
Table 6.2
List of Community Projects Conducted in Terban Baru (1985-1992)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Projects</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Volume</th>
<th>Appr. Budget</th>
<th>External Agency Involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Footpath</td>
<td>1984-85</td>
<td>300 m.</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Drainage system</td>
<td>1984-85</td>
<td>300 m.</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>Public works</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Public MCK</td>
<td>1985-86</td>
<td>2 locations</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Library &amp; Art Center</td>
<td>1989-90</td>
<td>80 m2.</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Community Hall</td>
<td>1990-91</td>
<td>70 m2.</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. RW Office</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>20 m2.</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Mosque</td>
<td>1991-93</td>
<td>100 m2.</td>
<td>20,000,000</td>
<td>Various Islamic Organizations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


However, unlike some of the people who occupied land along the main street, who were able to secure the right of building or ‘hak guna bangunan,’ the efforts of this community to secure formal rights over their land have been rejected by the government, particularly since there has been no approval from the kraton. The head of the Paniti Kismo expressed his regret that what kampung leaders did was considered unacceptable, since they never asked approval from the kraton prior to the invasion. He even regarded them as ‘land robbers,’ who organized an invasion of kraton land and took individual advantage of it, by selling some parcels of land for their own profit.\(^{12}\)

This ambiguous status of the land, however, does not hinder people from selling and buying land in the area. Although initially kampung members agreed that the organized land invasion was merely done for the sake of those who really needed land

\(^{12}\) In an interview with RW leader of Terban Baru (August, 1995) he denied the allegation made by the kraton official. He explained that what the kampung leaders did in Terban Baru was truly based on social considerations. He mentioned that although kampung leaders also got the land, they got the same size of land that was distributed to the ordinary kampung dwellers.
and shelter and therefore that selling and buying the land should be prohibited, nevertheless many people took advantage of the unexpected opportunity for their own interests—they either sold their own land and squatted on another vacant parcel or bought another parcel of land from a neighbor and resold it for two to four times the original price. One resident interviewed in August 1996 said that he bought his 60 square meters of land for only Rp 400,000 in 1987, and was able to sell it for Rp 6,000,000 in 1995.

The case under discussion may be termed 'illegal,' because the land belongs to the Kraton, while the buildings were erected without building permits. But, it was a 'planned' and 'organized' invasion, since the process was initiated, planned and organized by local leaders (RT and RW). The roles of RT and RK (both leaders and staff) were, in particular, very important, as they directly organized the invasion process. This was considered exceptional, as it went beyond their traditional role of maintaining social order. As some RT and RK leaders also benefited by securing land for their own use, some might argue that these leaders acted for their own benefit; still, since the process ended up sheltering hundreds of home seekers, it can be considered as a successful community or collective action.

Despite the fact that land status in this kampung is uncertain, it is interesting that kampung people seem very confident about their futures; they continue to consolidate and improve their houses in order to have more rooms to rent. Many kampung people expressed their desire to improve their land status, at least in the form of 'magersari' agreement. The head of Panitikismo expressed his regret, however, that there is no indication that the kraton is likely to give 'magersari' status to the people. The careful
approach of other kampung in the city to the kraton has resulted in his granting ‘right of building’ or ‘hak guna bangunan’ rights for whole kampung; perhaps the same approach could be attempted by the people in this new kampung.

At the moment, however, despite the success of kampung people in physically shaping their new kampung, the status of this kampung remains uncertain. No one can guarantee the future of this kampung, since it depends very much upon how successful in the future kampung people could ‘negotiate’ with the supra-local structures, i.e. the kraton, the Sultan, and the government. It is unfortunate that, so far, such ‘negotiation’ initiated by people in this kampung has been rejected by both the kraton and government.
6.4 Case 4: Kampung Blimbingsari Baru, A Spontaneous, Unorganized Kampung

Located at the fringe of the city, in an area that is already undergoing rapid development, this settlement is just 200 meters from the largest university in Indonesia, if not in the region, Gajah Mada University. It is immediately adjacent to kampung Blimbingsari, a small kampung of about 1.5 hectare that was already established in the late 1960s. The site is accessible to public transport, but not attractive for commercial purposes; it is located behind the university family housing. The previous use of the land was for a Chinese cemetery, called Bong Cino\(^\text{13}\) by the Javanese. The cemetery itself, covering an area of about 3.29 hectares, took shape in the early twentieth century; an examination of headstones reveals that the most recent burial occurred in 1992. After 1965, however, as the political situation at that time was not very conducive for many of the Chinese to continue to live in Indonesia,\(^\text{14}\) some migrated to mainland China and took with them the ashes of their family members which had been buried in Chinese cemeteries like Blimbingsari. As a result, some of the graves were empty and abandoned.

Like other Chinese cemeteries in this city, the Chinese cemetery in Blimbingsari is under the control of the Chinese burial association called Perkumpulan Usaha Kematian Yogyakarta (PUKY) (freely translated as ‘organization to assist the dead.’). In day-to-day practice, however, it is the juru kunci, or caretakers, who maintain and look

\(^{13}\) The term itself implies hostility toward the Chinese in Indonesia. Cina and its derivative, Cino, are powerful racial epithets. Cina remains at least a word used by indigenous Indonesians to express their dislike of Chinese in Indonesia. Although the word Cina has been in use for centuries, it is considered to be derogatory by the Chinese community.

\(^{14}\) As explained by Suryadinata (1978), the social tension between the Chinese and the native Indonesians (the pribumi) has a long historical background; the Communist coup d'etat that failed in 1965, however, brought another dimension to it as some Indonesians accused the Chinese in general of favoring, if not directly supporting, the Communist Party.
after the area—they are Javanese who reside close to the area and are informally employed to look after the cemetery. As these caretakers are not paid regularly, they make their livings by receiving 'tips' from the Chinese who visit the cemetery, or by cultivating crops planted in the vacant land left between the graves. Therefore, as their livings depend upon the area, these caretakers strictly control it. In the 1970s, gamblers from the nearby kampung were occasionally able to run illegal 'cock fights' in this area; some thieves also used this area to escape from police raids; while children stole bananas or papayas planted by the caretakers; but, in general, the caretakers were able to control the area.

Starting in 1982, when one of the toughest among the three caretakers, a retired policeman, died, this Chinese cemetery, particularly its southern part, was left uncontrolled and unused. Some people already residing near the boundary between kampung Blimbingsari and the cemetery began to extend their houses or their yards toward the cemetery area—something that was considered impossible before the death of the caretaker. The beginning of the 'real invasion,' however, did not happen until 1984, when the head of the RK granted an 'informal' permit to his friends to construct houses in this cemetery. Only three houses were constructed, in May 1984, yet this was enough to trigger another invasion into the cemetery. Thus, from June to October 1984, 8 housing units were constructed in the cemetery, mostly by the pengindung from the adjacent kampung, Blimbingsari. 15

15 Kampung Blimbingsari itself was characterized by the high number of 'pengindung.' From about 31 housing in this kampung, more than half of them were in 'ngindung' status. This condition explains why the squatting process in the nearby Chinese cemetery was first initiated by people from this kampung.
Figure 6.5
Map and Pictures of Case Study 4: Blimbingsari Baru
By that time, however, the news regarding this invasion had spread among several kampung in the area, and had even reached the city; as an effect of this, a building spurt of thirty additional units followed, between November 1984 and December 1985. It was during this time that a chaotic situation appeared, a situation in which too many people were engaged in claiming and invading the area. It was also during this time that conflicts among squatters occurred, since often one parcel of land was claimed by more than one squatter; these conflicts became so intense that they sometimes resulted in physical fights.\footnote{\label{ftn:16}This situation was worsened by the fact that the RK leader of kampung Blimbingsari, unlike the leader in Terban, was not willing to take any initiative nor do anything to control the process (Setiawan, 1987).} This process continued for the next four years, with twenty-four houses constructed between August 1987 and August 1991. At this point the pace accelerated, with twelve units built over the ensuing sixteen months (September 1991 to January 1993). In 1992, in order to demarcate that further squatting to the north would not be permitted, a three meter high cinder-block wall was constructed by PUKY. This was able to block further invasion to the north, yet the squatters who already occupied land to the south were made to feel more secure, as the wall was considered by them to represent an acknowledgment by the PUKY of their previous invasion. This is reflected by the fact that, after the construction of the wall, squatters became more eager to improve their houses further. Some squatters residing near the wall even extended their

\footnote{It is important to note, however, that, while squatters in general squat individually, some squatters reserve some parcels of land for their relatives; in this way they can acquire a kin-based social organization. It was found from field observations that some squatters from the same village resided close to each other.}
houses to the wall and used it as the outer wall of their houses. Another thirteen new houses were constructed during February 1992 to August 1995.

By August 1995, a total of ninety-four houses had been built over a period of about ten years. Residents have improved and consolidated their houses and have also secured modest levels of public water and electricity service. In 1987, field observations documented that only 13 out of 46 housing units were in the form of permanent structures; by July 1996, however, most of the houses were semi-permanent or permanent structures, meaning that some part of the housing is constructed with brick or concrete materials. Since the first invasion in 1984, about half of the total cemetery area has been converted into housing.

Table 6.3
Rate of Individual Housing Construction in Blimbingsari Baru

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before May 1984</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June - October 1984</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1984 - December 1985</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1986 - July 1987</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1987 - August 1991</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1991 - Jan. 1993</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In 1987, outsiders passing this new kampung, Blimbingsari Baru or New Blimbingsari, could still easily see several grave sites in between the houses, but today, with no previous information concerning its development process, outsiders would
consider Blimbingsari Baru to be an ordinary kampung, with no connection with the Chinese cemetery concealed behind the three meter high concrete wall to the north.

Unlike Case Study 3, however, in which the invasion process was organized and planned, the physical appearance of this kampung, particularly in regard to its street and building layout, cannot be said to be orderly; not only are there no regular lot or building sizes, but also there are no clear pathways or building patterns, and this made a drainage system difficult to develop. However, although not as advanced as kampung Terbansari Baru (Case Study 3) this kampung is also provided with several public facilities, such as a musholla (a prayer house), a gardu ronda, and a public MCK. In 1990, considering that the settlement was big enough to form one single RT, the head of RW and the kelurahan agreed to form a new RT, RT 14.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Projects</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Volume</th>
<th>Appr. Budget</th>
<th>Agencies Involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Paving</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>100 m.</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Public MCK</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1 unit</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Gardu ronda</td>
<td>1990-1992</td>
<td>2 units</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Volley ball field</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1 unit</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Interviews with RT leader; Field observations (1995, 1996)

The evidence from Blimbingsari Baru shows several important aspects. The first is the fact that the squatting process happened only after the strong and influential caretaker died in 1982. Since before his death most parts of the cemetery were under his control, and nobody was brave enough to initiate an invasion, this shows how
important the role of the ‘local personal authority’ can be in the development process. In other words, squatting on public land, such as Blimbingsari Baru, seems to be determined by whether or not there is someone who has the local authority to control the land; a situation of neglect on such public land could trigger the invasion process.

Secondly, unlike Case Study 3, the process in Blimbingsari Baru happened without assistance or support from the local kampung leader. As the kampung leader in Blimbingsari is well known as a wealthy landowner in the area, his unwillingness to organize or to control the invasion process can be understood—he himself would not have received any benefit from such an invasion. This lack of leadership created a situation in which people invaded the land individually, which sometimes created disputes. The implications of such a lack of coordination are clear, as the selling, buying and renting of land were frequent. Some residents claimed two, three, or more parcels of land and sold them for commercial purposes. A survey in 1987 revealed that about 30 percent of the squatters already had a house before squatting in this area. This does not, of course, represent an ideal conception of gotong royong and rukun; instead, it shows another aspect of Javanese culture: ‘rebutan’ or ‘rayahan,’ i.e. grabbing in very competitive ways. As one resident observed, “investment in this area is a kind of gambling and a function of bravery.”

Thirdly, it is interesting that, despite the uncertainty regarding land status, the rate of housing consolidation in this area was very rapid. As has discussed by Garr (1996) this evidence is related to the whole issue of tenure security and housing consolidation. The peculiarity that the Blimbingsari Baru case shows, however, is the way in which the element of ethnicity, i.e. the relations between the Javanese squatters,
the Chinese community, and the Kraton, had a significant influence on the development process. The social dimension of the process in this case is interesting, particularly the uneasy interaction between the squatters and the families of the deceased. This is shown in the pattern of removal of the remains from grave sites, either as a prerequisite for settlement, or as a response to squatting. The squatters are willing to invest in a house because the land in this Chinese cemetery legally belongs to the Sultan, and he is known to be very sympathetic to squatters. One resident noted the lack of action by the Chinese, attributing it to the fact that “the community squats freely” (Garr and Setiawan, 1993). As Garr (1996) has commented, although tragic for the Chinese, the invasion of the Chinese cemetery described above represents a logical action for squatters, who require a central location at a time when vacant riverflat sites have been exhausted.

17 The dilemma of overseas Chinese is Southeast Asia is well-known. It has been observed that “almost every individual of Chinese descent in the country has to cope with general predicament to some degree in his/her daily life, either as petty discrimination or as personal tragedy” (Coppel, 1983 quoted by Garr, 1996).

18 This explains an interesting question regarding the source of authority in land disputes. As Leaf (1994) argues, “in order to be effectual, every legal system, informal or formal, must rely upon some form of authority whose legitimacy is recognized by those who are within the system.” For many people in Yogyakarta, the authority regarding land is the Sultan, not the government.
6.5 The Government Intervention: The ‘Riverside Dike’ Project (Proyek Talud)

As described earlier, the riverside dike project was first proposed by the people in Ratmakan. Previously rejected by the government, it was finally approved, since the government thought it could gain several benefits from the project. This talud project, therefore, could be seen as a ‘merging’ of the practical need of the community to protect its kampung from flooding and the ideological-political interest of ABRI to gain popular support, along with the pragmatic interest of the Mayor to win the Adipura award. First implemented in Ratmakan in 1991, this project is still continuing now and has become an annual project for the government and ABRI. As has been shown, this project has had a significant impact, as it generated the further consolidation of the whole kampung.

In the context of kampung development in general, this project can be seen as a form of government support toward kampung. At first glance, it looks like KIP; in fact, it is totally different, since a complex of socio-political relationships was involved in this project. Further detailed description and evaluation, therefore, are needed, as many lessons can be learned from this project. While the background of the project has been described in Chapter Five, the following discussion will deal with three aspects: the project’s physical dimensions, the management of the project, and its implications for the kampung along the Code River. The broader socio-political aspects of the project will be discussed in the following chapters.

6.5.1 The Riverside Dike: A Temporary or a Permanent Solution?

The riverside dike itself is a concrete structure, about one meter wide and two meters high, constructed on both sides of the river, to protect the kampung from
flooding during the rainy season. Its foundation is a concrete cylinder, buried about one meter deep, which is then filled up with stone. Above this foundation is the dike itself; it replaced the original natural barrier, which was a cluster of bamboo trees along the river. The result is a totally different environment: from a natural riverflat environment—a sand bank area with a cluster of bamboo trees and with springs among them—into an artificial, man-made canal with a concrete dike along the canal (see Figure 6.6).

Since the government, ABRI, and the community were very pleased with the results of the first project in Ratmakan, a plan was then proposed to extend the dike to cover the whole riverside within the city. Thus, in 1992, the project was continued in Ratmakan and a nearby kampung, Jagalan, with about 450 meters of dike constructed. Since then, the riverside dike or talud project has become an annual project; by 1995, a total of 2,832 meters of dike had been constructed, covering about half of the total length or the Code River in the Kotamadya area. This is, of course, a remarkable achievement, one which for two decades people could only dream about. It should be noted, however, that many kampung people also had to make sacrifices; as can be seen in Table 6.5, about 89 housing units, or almost a third of the total housing located along the river, had to be partly demolished due to the dike construction.

As some engineers have argued, since there has been no detailed and comprehensive study of the nature of the flooding on this river, there is no guarantee that the present dike will permanently solve the flooding problem. In other words, the physical structure of the dike itself may not be strong enough to defend the kampung from any big flood that might eventually happen. The dike's foundation, especially, is considered too shallow and too weak; in a heavy rainy season, strong water currents in
Figure 6.6
The Riverside Dike Project along the Code River

BEFORE THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE DIKE

AFTER THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE DIKE

Before and after the construction of the dike
this river would quickly destroy it, and the whole structure of the dike would break down. At the moment, however, as all parties involved have already gained their own benefits and satisfied their own interests, this dike seems not to worry them.

Table 6.5
The Riverside Dike (Talud) Project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Vol. (m³)</th>
<th>Gov.’ Budget (rupiah)</th>
<th>Estimated free labor mobilized (person-days)</th>
<th>No. of housing units sacrificed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Ratmakan</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>75,000,000</td>
<td>3,150</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Ratmakan &amp; Jagalan</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>155,408,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Juminahan, Gemblakan, &amp; Tegalpanggung</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>152,900,000</td>
<td>6,750</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Gemblakan, Macanan, Tegalpanggung, Sayidan Bintaran, &amp; Wirogunan</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>409,277,000</td>
<td>8,600</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Macanan, Tukangan, &amp; Wirogunan</td>
<td>712</td>
<td>347,500,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


6.5.2 The Project Execution: Labor Mobilization and ABRI

As described earlier, although first initiated and proposed by the kampung people of Ratmakan, due to the political process beyond the kampung level, the talud project was considered to be the government’s project. Despite the fact that the main project funding was from the Public Works Agency (PU Kotamadya), with many other government agencies also involved in the project, it is now known as the MKB-ABRI project. Most kampung people even consider that the project was mainly initiated and
funded by ABRI; if other government agencies were involved, they were mainly helping ABRI. Further, people also believe that only ABRI could have successfully executed this quite sensitive project, especially since some houses had to be relocated, while many others had to be partly destroyed because of the dike’s construction.

The way the project itself was managed and executed is interesting, as it represents a genuine example of the state (the local government and ABRI) utilizing the ‘gotong royong’ ideas. First, the project was introduced as mainly for the benefit of the kampung people; it was because the community asked for it that the government became involved. However, as the government’s budget was limited, it was then proposed that kampung people should participate actively in the project—something which the kampung people responded to enthusiastically.

Thus, every year in April and May, after a precise budget for the dike project has been allocated (through PU Kotamadya), and the kampung or areas for the project have been designated, several meetings between kampung people, ABRI, and the government agencies involved in the project are conducted. In these meetings, kampung people are informed about the details of the project, and are asked to conduct preparations. These preparations include: the formation of special committees at the kelurahan and RW levels, which are responsible for mobilizing kampung resources; the site preparations, which include cutting down all bamboo tree along the riverbank, filling in the springs and public MCK located along the river, relocating or demolishing houses constructed on the area designated for the dike; and detailed preparations for labor mobilization. Although a committee is also formed at the kelurahan level, it is the one at the RW level that directly manages the actual preparations for the project and
its execution. This includes collecting contributions from each household (ranging from Rp.4,000 to Rp.10,000 per household) and from other contributors, as well as managing kerja bakti, or duty work for site preparations.

In June or July, when all preparations were complete, the actual construction of the dike started. Since then, for the duration of three to four months, every day, six days a week for ABRI and seven days a week for the kampung people, at least sixty to eighty people (half are ABRI personnel and half are kampung people) engage in kerja bakti, along the river. As ABRI and the kampung people do not have enough skill to handle more technical matters, about ten construction workers are hired; they are responsible for the actual construction of the dike. ABRI personnel and the kampung people serve as tenaga kasar (hard labor), digging the soil, bringing materials down to the river, etc. Women, of course, are not absent in this kerja bakti, as they have to prepare meals three times a day for the tukang, the ABRI, and the kampung people. As can be seen in Table 6.5, it is estimated that within a period of five years, at least 33,500 man-days of free labor was mobilized; this labor was organized by 30 RW located along the river.

The construction of the dike itself usually finishes around August, to be ready for the rainy season that usually starts in September. ABRI personnel finish their job and go back to their barracks, but the kampung people are left with many chores to do. These include: paving the pathways along the dike; the placement of flower pots and street lighting along the dike; the construction or reconstruction of public MCK, gardu ronda,

19 It is important to note that such contributions could be from various parties; they could be from individual Chinese or rich people who run stores close to the kampung, private enterprises, social and religious groups, and even from individuals who previously lived in the kampung. In one kampung observed, the RW leader was able to contact the 'alumni' of the kampung, who now reside in different parts of the city, and was able to collect about 2 million rupiah from them.
and the houses that were demolished for the dike; and other necessary elements to beautify their ‘new’ kampung. As the government’s budget for the talud project covers only the provision of materials and pays for the tukang and ‘management fees’ for ABRI, kampung people thus have to explore other sources of funding for these projects. Depending on the networks that kampung people are able to develop, such funds could be from many possible sources, both state and non-state agencies. It is from this ‘post-dike’ period (not during the dike construction) that the success of a kampung people can be measured. The range of projects that are conducted after the construction of the dike vary among different kampung/RW; but, in general, these local initiative projects show the way kampung people are able to conduct significant improvements. As will be discussed below, the riverside dike project has really brought significant improvements to the kampung people and to their environment.

6.5.3 Implications for the Kampung

There are several important implications of the riverside dike project for the kampung; each will be described below. The first, and perhaps the most important implication of the project, is that it gives a greater feeling of security to kampung people. This feeling is not only because their settlements will be safer from flooding; more important is the fact that, from the people’s point of view, the government has now recognized their existence. This is something that, in reality, is still quite uncertain, as the government may have different attitudes in the future. For now, however, it really provides what people need. Since until 1990 the government still considered kampung removal as a possible alternative, the realization of the riverside dike project
really gives the people the impression that the government is committed to their problems.

It is very important to continue to document whether this feeling of security continues to increase, and what factors may contribute to decreasing this feeling, but, as will be discussed below, this feeling of security gives rise to the second important implication for the kampung. This is the remarkable improvements that have been made to their communities by kampung people, acting both as a group and as individuals. As can be seen in Table 6.6, after the dike construction kampung people along the Code River have been able to carry out many community projects. All of these improvements are of great significance, considering that, for several decades, kampung along the Code River can be said to have been in a stagnant condition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>MCK (unit)</th>
<th>Well (unit)</th>
<th>Gardu ronda (unit)</th>
<th>Pathway Street lighting (m')</th>
<th>RW hall (unit)</th>
<th>Flower­pot (unit)</th>
<th>Housing Improvement (unit)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ratmakan &amp; Jagalan</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juminahan, &amp; Gemblakan</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>35 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macanan, Tukangan &amp; Tegalpanggung</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>20 84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayidan, Bintaran &amp; Wirodirjan, &amp; Wirogunan</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40 84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Field observations and interviews with RW leaders, 1995, 1996.
While before the dike construction the physical appearance of the kampung was not considered to be attractive, now they have been transformed and have a totally new appearance. Most of the houses along the river are now permanent concrete structures; some even have two storeys. Pathways are now paved; new and cleaner public MCK and *gardu ronda* have also been constructed. All these new elements make the riverbank kampung more attractive, perhaps more modern, and cleaner. Further, as all housing units located along the river now face the river, the river itself is now considered a ‘front-yard.’ This seems to be another positive implication, since people’s attitudes toward the river may then also change. As mentioned by many RW leaders, kampung people are now quite hesitant to throw waste into the river—something that was common before the dike existed. They now really want to have a cleaner river. This is of great benefit for the national government’s ‘Clean River Campaign’ (PROKASIH) that is now being implemented in many parts of Indonesia.

The fact that the kampung along the Code now have an improved appearance does not, however, mean that they are free from threats. As already described in the case of kampung Ratmakan, the kampung along the Code River are now experiencing a new stage in their development: i.e. the increase of land commercialization within kampung. As the kampung in general are now improved, and many people have also improved their land’s status, it could be expected than land prices will also increase. As will be discussed further in the next chapters, this is something that is not always positive; in general, it could hinder the access of the poor to land.
6.6 Summary: Local Dynamics in the Development Process of Kampung

In summary, it is clear from the above description of the four case studies that the process of settlement formation and consolidation varies, depending on the local dynamics of each settlement. Developed along the same river, but with different means or strategies of development, each kampung thus had different results (see Table 6.7). In general, it can be said that kampung Ratmakan has achieved greater success than the other three kampung studied. Although all four kampung have exhibited a remarkable degree of physical improvement, only Ratmakan has the potential for achieving a degree of consolidation that can allow the kampung to become more integrated into the urban fabric. Further, and this is more important, Ratmakan has been able to gain a greater degree of recognition and acknowledgment from the authorities. It is true that some people in this kampung still do not have formal or legal rights over their land. However, it remains more important that government officials and agencies recognize and support the existence of this kampung. Such recognition may not always guarantee the long-term security of a kampung, but nevertheless it allows the kampung people in Ratmakan to feel more confident and more secure.

In contrast, the other three kampung can be considered to have unclear prospects; while the residents have been able to improve their kampung physically, they continue to live with uncertainty. The level of threats of eviction in these three kampung is higher than in Ratmakan. There is no indication that the government will formally recognize their existence. The level of perceived security held by the kampung people in these three kampung is, therefore, not as high as that in Ratmakan. Further, kampung leaders in these three kampung have relatively weak bargaining positions in representing the
interests of the kampung people to the government. Kampung people in these three kampung have not been able to manipulate the formal legal system imposed by the government. Therefore, they are more vulnerable in relation to external threats.

Several important factors contributed to the success of kampung Ratmakan, such as the social characteristics of kampung members, which can be considered as being more stable, more prosperous and more cohesive than in the other kampung, along with the kampung’s strategic location compared with the others. However, two factors seem to be crucial. The first is related to the ability of the kampung people in Ratmakan to develop relations with external agencies, particularly with the state. As this chapter has shown, kampung members and leaders in Ratmakan were able to develop more linkages with both state and non-state agencies, and therefore were able to increase their access to resources or gain external support. The second factor is related to the strategy that the kampung people used. As is clear from the four case studies observed in this research, within a hierarchical-paternalistic social structure such as that in Indonesia, a non-confrontational type of relations seems to have a greater likelihood of gaining recognition by the authorities. This issue will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters.
# Table 6.7
Comparative Analysis of the Development Process of the Four Case Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Case Study 1 Ratmakan</th>
<th>Case Study 2 Kota Baru/Gondolayu</th>
<th>Case Study 3 Terban Baru</th>
<th>Case Study 4 Blimbingsari Baru</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Development Process</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- land invasion process</td>
<td>gradual, individual</td>
<td>mobilized by external agent</td>
<td>planned, organized by community</td>
<td>spontaneous unorganized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- state attitude and response to the process</td>
<td>clear; from rejection to full support</td>
<td>unclear/inconsistent; no sign of recognition</td>
<td>unclear; either rejection nor recognition</td>
<td>unclear; rejection, but no action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- community attitude to state</td>
<td>resistance, then co-operation</td>
<td>resistance, then ignorance</td>
<td>ignorance, then attempts to cooperate</td>
<td>ignorance, then attempts to cooperate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- government control</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Physical Consolidation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- individual housing improvement</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- infrastructure (roads, water, garbage, etc.)</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- public facilities</td>
<td>good</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C. Social Development</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- community organization (RT/RW)</td>
<td>strong/active</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>strong/active</td>
<td>weak/passive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- participation by kampung members</td>
<td>very active</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>active</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- linkages with external agencies</td>
<td>broad/extensive</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- role of kampung leaders</td>
<td>high/active</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>high/active</td>
<td>low/passive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D. Problems &amp; Challenges</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- land commercialization/speculation</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- future threats/pressures</td>
<td>gentrification</td>
<td>eviction</td>
<td>gentrification and eviction</td>
<td>gentrification and eviction moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- level of perceived security</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>unclear; continue to be temporary in nature</td>
<td>unclear; stagnant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- prospect</td>
<td>become better integrated into urban setting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>uncertain; stagnant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 7
KAMPUNG DEVELOPMENT AS A NEGOTIATION PROCESS: COLLECTIVE EFFORTS, NETWORKS, AND ACCESS TO RESOURCES

In Chapter Two, it was proposed that successful informal settlement development is determined not only by the internal dynamics of community but as well by networks between communities and external agencies. Only communities that can develop extensive and beneficial relations with external agencies are likely to succeed, because it is only by engaging in such relations that access to urban resources and the decision-making process can be obtained. This chapter describes the nature of relations between kampung people and external agencies and examines how such relations hinder or support the development processes of kampung. It shows how kampung people should strategically and simultaneously engage in both formal and informal networks, in order to mediate between two worlds: the ‘modern’ bureaucratic state based on rule of law and ‘traditional’ ways of doing things based on personalism.

7.1 Kampung Development: Between Collective and Individual Actions

7.1.1 The Process: From Land Invasion, Consolidation and Stagnation, to Urban Maturity

There are several ways to analyze the settlement development process. Alsayyad (1993:33) proposes that the process can be broken down into four basic phases: (1) land invasion; (2) social formation; (3) physical consolidation; and (4) urban maturity. He mentions that the ‘social formation’ phase is crucial in the process; it determines
whether or not people can organize collective actions for the benefit of the community. Settlement development cannot reach the final stage, urban maturity, unless the residents are able to form a solid and strong community group.

The four kampung observed in this study, however, show that social formation can happen prior to the land invasion phase or during the physical consolidation phase. Besides, after physical consolidation, settlements can also experience a stagnation phase for quite a long time before they reach the final phase, urban maturity. Differing slightly from Alsayyad's classification, this study proposes that the settlement development process can be broken down into four phases: (1) settlement formation; (2) settlement consolidation; (3) stagnation; and (4) integration, or urban maturity. A summary of these phases is presented in Table 7.1, while a description and interpretation of each case study in terms of these phases immediately follows.

1) Settlement formation: gradual, spontaneous, communal, or mobilized invasion. The settlement formation phase can be defined as an initial stage, in which house seekers or settlers are able to secure land and to construct simple housing, so that they can start to reside in the new settlement. It includes two crucial processes: land invasion and individual housing construction. Land invasion itself can take four different forms: it may be gradual, communal, spontaneous, or mobilized. 'Gradual or incremental land invasion' is the result of individual acts by settlers, and takes place by incremental accretion on publicly owned land (e.g. Ratmakan, Case Study 1). Like gradual land invasion, 'spontaneous land invasion' is also the result of individual acts by settlers, but it happens spontaneously in a relatively short period, with many
individuals taking part (e.g. Blimbingsari Baru, Case Study 4). 'Communal land invasion,' in contrast, results from an organized act, by settlers who plan and manage the process collectively. Differing from gradual and spontaneous land invasions, therefore, in communal land invasion a social group is formed prior to the land invasion process (e.g. Terban Baru, Case Study 3). 'Mobilized land invasion,' on the other hand, is the result of a collective invasion initiated and organized by political parties, or individuals with broader socio-political intentions (e.g. Gondolayu, Case Study 2).

Each of these forms of land invasion brings different opportunities and problems, but gradual land invasion seems to have fewer risks, as it does not involve direct confrontations among settlers or between settlers and the authorities. Further, gradual invasion also has a greater chance of being ignored by the authorities, particularly if the land being invaded is relatively unattractive to commercial developers. More important, gradual land invasion also provides a greater chance for individuals to secure land tenure, as it offers more opportunities for settlers and officials in the land agency office to manipulate the land registration process.

Individual land invasion, as happened in Blimbingsari Baru (Case Study 4), however, created a situation in which the community was unable to secure land for community facilities. Further, individual land invasion can also create tensions or conflicts among settlers regarding land claims and this also facilitates land speculation. In contrast, collective land invasion can reduce potential conflicts among settlers, particularly because land parcels are distributed more equally and because the boundaries between land parcels are clear. Further, collective land invasion also has another benefit, since people can lay out the new settlement better, with special areas
allocated for public uses, such as pathways, drainage systems, open spaces, and other community facilities.

The second crucial process in this formation phase is individual construction of housing, usually in the form of ‘core’ or ‘unfinished’ structures—these are very simple and small houses with no inner partitions to divide the rooms. Settlers use this core housing unit mainly for sleeping; other activities, such as cooking and bathing, are done outside the home. Household income is a significant factor influencing the level and pace of housing construction, but a feeling of security is also significant in determining housing construction. In general, settlers often have difficulties raising initial investment sums; therefore, housing construction is usually done incrementally, in accordance with their irregular incomes. Some people in kampung use housing materials brought from their rural place of origin and hire construction workers from there as well, to limit the cost of paying the increasingly highly-paid urban construction workers.

Depending on both internal and external factors, each kampung experiences this phase at a different rate. It took about six years in Case Study 4, about four years in Case Study 3, and about two years in Case Study 2. Because the land invasion process in Case Study 1 happened incrementally, no specific time period for this phase can be indicated, but it took longer than the other three case studies. Since economically, psychologically, and socially, this phase is the most difficult one for the settlers, the shorter this period, the better it is for the settlers.

2) Settlement consolidation: social formation and collective efforts. This is the phase when settlers start to organize collective efforts for common interests, particularly to provide their kampung with several basic services and public facilities. Physically,
this period is marked by the incremental improvement of individual housing units and the construction of some basic community facilities, such as public MCK, pathways, and drainage systems.

More important than these physical developments, however, this phase is marked by social formation, the establishment of community groups and leadership. As settlers start to consider that individual efforts are inadequate to develop their kampung further, they start to form informal community groups and to appoint kampung leaders; this is then followed by the establishment of a new RT or RW by the local authorities (Kelurahan and Kecamatan). The establishment of this ‘quasi-formal’ community group is very crucial as only through RT and RW that kampung people can then develop formal channels with various agencies outside their community and begin to organize collective efforts.

Leaders are usually selected from among those who are considered to be of higher social and economic status than the others, and who have some kind of capability to organize the community. In Ratmakan, the leader is a retired person from a private company; in Gondolayu, it is a private security guard; in Terban Baru Kampung, the leader is a person working at the kelurahan office; and in Blimbingsari Baru, it is a long-time resident of the adjacent kampung.

Ratmakan Kampung already completed this phase a long time ago; Gondolayu Kampung has also passed through this phase; Terban Baru Kampung passed through

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1 The establishment of RT or RW is usually started by registering settlers and giving them new identity cards or Kartu Tanda Penduduk (KTP). As most settlers still hold KTP from their original villages or other areas within the city, they are asked to apply for a new KTP from the kelurahan where they now reside. In general, there is no problem with applying for a new KTP, but ‘tips’ have to be given to the kelurahan staff, if settlers wish to speed up the long, complicated bureaucratic process.
this phase around 1992; while Blimbingsari Baru can be said to be now at the end of
this phase. In Blimbingsari Baru, although some housing units are already finished,
many more are still in the process of completion. In this kampung, a new RT was
established in 1991 and was able to organize several community projects, but it has not
been able to establish channels with agencies outside the kampung.

3) Settlement stagnation: the importance of external intervention. This is the
phase when kampung have been consolidated physically and socially, but have not
received full legal and formal recognition by the authorities. This situation forces
kampung people to conduct regular improvements themselves, to keep the kampung
from decaying. Two key elements of the kampung usually hinder full legal recognition
by the authorities: land status and building status.

Physically, this phase is marked by gradual improvements of housing units by
individuals and of community facilities by the community. For individual housing
improvements, economic and land status both determine the level of improvement; the
higher the economic status of the owner and the better the legal status of the land, the
more advanced are the improvements that can be made. Socially, this period is marked
by a more stable community group, when RT or RW are able to initiate a greater variety
of community activities. In general, however, the role of leadership is crucial in this
phase. Although a kampung may be occupied by relatively wealthy residents, with poor
leadership that kampung may still not be able to conduct community projects and
activities. On the contrary, a kampung with limited internal resources, but with strong
leadership and better links to external resources can conduct many community projects.
In many cases, as in Ratmakan, after a kampung has experienced a stagnation phase for quite a long time, an external intervention is necessary to stimulate kampung people to conduct fundamental improvements. This external intervention is particularly needed when a kampung faces structural problems that go beyond the capacity of kampung people to solve. In Ratmakan, this structural problem was flooding. Once this structural problem was solved, the community could start to carry out other important improvements by themselves; this led the kampung into the next phase, that of urban maturity. It is likely that Gondolayu, Terban Baru, and Blimbingsari Baru will experience this stagnation phase for quite a long time, since there is no sign that the authorities will legalize the status of land in these three kampung in the near future.

4) Integration and urban maturity: new threats and challenges. The next phase of kampung development might be called the integration stage, or that of urban maturity, in which physically, socially, and economically a kampung becomes better-integrated into the urban system.

Physically, this phase is marked by the appearance of many good-quality housing units, as well as many good-quality public facilities and similar infrastructure. More important than this physical achievement, however, is the kampung’s recognition by the government, which makes the kampung people feel more secure. Further, in this phase more land has also been legalized, which makes the kampung in general more secure. In some cases, however, as the physical condition of the kampung has been improved and the kampung obtains more services from government, community organizations become less active and less cohesive. At this point, no more efforts are felt to be needed to improve the kampung.
Table 7.1
Summary of the Kampung Development Process along the Code River

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phases/Periods</th>
<th>Physical</th>
<th>Social</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Formation:</strong></td>
<td>Individual housing construction is dominant (in the form of ‘core’ or simple housing); No clear settlement layout; No/limited basic public facilities</td>
<td>Focus more on individual efforts; Conflicts among individuals possible; No formal/established community groups or leadership; No/limited collective actions or networks with external agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Residents start to secure public facilities (water, electricity etc.); Housing consolidation/expansion; Construction of basic community facilities (mosques, gardu ronda);</td>
<td>Residents form social groups (RT/RW); Community leadership emerges; More networks/interactions with external agencies; More community projects and activities conducted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Consolidation:</strong></td>
<td>Some infrastructure decaying and needing improvement; More public facilities needed &amp; developed.</td>
<td>More stable social groups; Better linkage with external sources; External intervention needed to stimulate further community projects and activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most buildings are high-quality; Better kampung infrastructure and public facilities; Gradual encroachment of commercial buildings upon housing areas;</td>
<td>Community groups may become less active; Community could become fragmented; Residents are more integrated into a wider urban community and pay less attention to kampung issues/problems.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Presently, Ratmakan Kampung can be said to be entering this phase. Following wide recognition of its success in constructing the riverside dike, and significant improvements to the kampung itself, this kampung has become more attractive and better integrated into the urban system. Once kampung enter this phase, however, this does not mean that they are then free from threats. It is in this phase that another threat will appear—a large-scale kampung relocation. As urban growth continues and more
land is needed for new commercial purposes, attractive kampung such as Ratmakan could become targets for relocation. So far, an extensive, large-scale kampung removal such as that in Jakarta has not yet occurred in Yogyakarta, but no one can guarantee what will happen in the future. As urban development in this city begins to involve larger investments, kampung people have to be aware of this possibility.

7.1.2 Kampung Development: The Importance of Collective Efforts

There are three important things we can learn from the development process of the four kampung observed in this study. The first is a better understanding that kampung development is really a dynamic process, in which, unlike the development of the modern real estate housing, the builders or settlers are never sure when the process will end. There are so many factors determining the process that are beyond the settlers’ power or control.

Second, that social formation by means of establishing community groups is crucially important, as it determines the level of collective efforts that can be organized by settlers. The earlier social groups can be established, and the stronger they are, the faster and better can settlers secure and mobilize resources for community purposes. Once community groups develop, they can then establish complex networks of relations with agencies outside the community, particularly with the state. In the four case studies, the formation of RT and RW became crucial, as this helped the communities develop networks with the ‘formal’ institutions, particularly with government agencies. It is at this point that the ‘formalisation’ process of originally ‘informal’ settlements actually starts.
Third, studying the development process makes it clear that two different kinds of actions are carried out in settlement development: individual and collective. Both are important, but the crucial point seems to be how to link those two actions properly. It is clear from the example of Blimbingsari Baru Kampung that individual actions by themselves are inadequate to create a better kampung environment. Not only are kampung people in this situation unable to secure public facilities and basic services, but conflicts among kampung people also tend to occur. In contrast, collective efforts or actions tend to create more opportunities for a new settlement, particularly in terms of securing basic services and of creating more orderly settlement patterns. Further, from the perspective of community development, collective actions are also to be preferred, as they increase the capability of communities to mobilize resources. The only problem with collective action is that it may create conflicts with authorities, particularly if special approaches to the authorities are not conducted by the community.

7.2 Networks of Interactions between Kampung People and External Agencies

Many actors and agencies were involved in the development process of the four kampung observed in this study. The role of each actor and agency is very complicated, due to the informality and complexity of their relationships. The general involvement of each actor in each case study may be appreciated through their representation in Table 7.2 and the following discussion. Two broad categories of actors and agencies can be distinguished: (1) actors and agencies within communities; and (2) actors and agencies outside communities, or external agencies.
### Table 7.2
Actors and Agencies Involved in the Development Process of Four Case Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors/Agencies</th>
<th>Case 1 (Ratmakan)</th>
<th>Case 2 (Gondolaya/Kotabaru)</th>
<th>Case 3 (Terban Baru)</th>
<th>Case 4 (Blimbing-Sari Baru)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individuals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>within community</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land owners</td>
<td>v</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land speculators</td>
<td>v</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>vvv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House seekers</td>
<td>vvv</td>
<td>vv</td>
<td>vvv</td>
<td>vvv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal developers</td>
<td>v</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>v</td>
<td>vvv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community groups</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>vvv</td>
<td>vv</td>
<td>vvv</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State agencies</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kelurahan</td>
<td>v</td>
<td>v</td>
<td>v</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPN</td>
<td>v</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDAM</td>
<td>v</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>v</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLN</td>
<td>v</td>
<td>v</td>
<td>v</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Works (PU)</td>
<td>vvv</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Bureau</td>
<td>vvv</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bappeda</td>
<td>vvv</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditako/City Planning</td>
<td>v</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangdes/Village Dev.</td>
<td>v</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>v</td>
<td>v</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABRI (army)</td>
<td>vvv</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-state agencies</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or Universities/students</td>
<td>vvv</td>
<td>vvv</td>
<td>v</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or</td>
<td>v</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or <strong>Intermediary</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or agencies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or Sultan/Kraton</td>
<td>vvv</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or Private sectors</td>
<td>v</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Community</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>vvv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other voluntary groups</td>
<td>v</td>
<td>v</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
- **vvv** high degree of involvement
- **vv** moderate degree of involvement
- **v** limited involvement
- **-** no involvement

2 The degree of involvement in this table is the author's interpretation based on field observation and interviews with actors and agencies involved in the process.
1) **Actors and agencies within communities.** Within communities, two groups of actors can be distinguished: individuals and community groups. There are four main classes of individuals within communities which are involved in the development process. The first are the landowners, those who directly open the access to land for settlement, or those who were granted land by the Sultan. In Ratmakan (Case Study 1), landowners played a moderate role. By selling or renting their land to new migrants, or by giving permits for them to construct housing under the traditional *ngindung* system, landowners helped to open access to land for new migrants. In Case Studies 2, 3, and 4, since all of the land involved belonged to the government or the Sultan, there were no local landowners involved in the process.

The second group of actors within communities is the land speculators, those who secure land not for their own uses, but for commercial purposes. Their involvement varies, from a limited role in Case Study 2, moderate roles in Cases 1 and 3, to a major role in Case Study 4. In Case Study 2, since Romo Mangun controlled the whole process of settlement development, there was no chance for land speculators to play a role in the process. In Case 3, because the invasion process was organized by RT and RW, there was little chance for land speculators to become involved. In contrast, land speculators played a major role in Case Study 4. In this kampung, land speculators claimed, bought, sold, or rented several parcels of lands for commercial purposes.

The third group of actors within communities are the settlers, people who secure land and construct housing for their own uses. They played a major role in Case Studies 1, 3, and 4; there they directly carried out land invasion and housing construction. In Case Study 2, settlers did not directly plan and carry out land invasion and housing
construction; this was done under the control of Romo Mangun. In Case Study 3, settlers worked together with RT and RW to plan and carry out land invasion and land distribution, but they conducted the housing construction themselves.

The fourth group of actors within communities are the informal developers, those who construct housing units for commercial purposes, whether selling or renting them. Informal developers are different compared to land speculators in that the latter do not construct housing and therefore do not contribute to the increasing housing stock in the kampung. Informal developers played a limited role in Case Studies 1 and 3. In Case Study 4, they played a major role; almost half of the total housing units constructed here were for commercial purposes.

The role of community groups, particularly the RT and RW is crucial. In Ratmakan Kampung, the role of RT and RW was very important in organizing funding and labor for the construction of the riverside dike. Having been able to develop linkages and cooperation with many external agencies (both governmental and non-governmental), RT and RW leaders in Ratmakan kampung were able to mobilize both internal and external resources. As a result, the de facto status of this kampung has become stronger, and this gives a feeling of security and confidence to people so that they can further consolidate their settlement. Other community groups such as a women group (PKK) and youth groups played important roles in all cases, but they all work under the coordination of the RT and RW.

In Gondolayu Kampung, the RT and RW played moderate roles. Although they were not directly involved in the whole process of settlement formation, they helped Romo Mangun to manage the kampung by maintaining several public facilities (public
MCK, community meeting halls, etc.) and by conducting several community activities. In Terban Baru, the RT and RW played very significant roles, and might even be considered ‘progressive’ in the Indonesian context. In this case, RT and RW actively planned, initiated, and organized the land invasion and established the new kampung. Aware of the potential of ‘marginal’ or unused land in the area, and understanding the ambiguity of government attitudes toward this kind of land, the RT and RW were able to distribute more than 200 parcels of land to house seekers. In Blimbingsari Baru (Case Study 4), the RT and RW played a limited role. Faced with the same opportunities as in Terban Baru Kampung, the RT and RW in Blimbingsari were unable or unwilling to organize a land invasion collectively—a fact that resulted in quite a chaotic process of invasion, where speculation and confrontations among settlers occurred.

2) External actors and agencies. The second category of actors involved in the kampung development process is the external actors or agencies, which can be grouped into two separate sub-categories: state and non-state agencies. The state agencies include the three main components of Indonesian authority mentioned in Chapter 4: the government bureaucracy, the army (ABRI), and the ruling party (Golkar). With varying degrees of involvement, these state agencies played significant roles in the whole process of kampung development observed in this study. Particularly in the case of the dike project along the bank of the Code River (Case Study 1), the involvement of the government agencies (particularly from the Kotamadya), ABRI, and Golkar was very important.

It is important to note that the degree of involvement in the process by such government agencies varied and their involvement did not always correspond to their
formally-assigned tasks. Thus, the city planning agency (*Dinas Tata Kota*), for example, which actually has the principal task of controlling the whole urban development process, did not become involved in the case studies observed. The same was true of the municipal planning board (Bappeda), and the land agency office (BPN); they were involved only in Case 1, and even their involvement was limited. In contrast, the public works agency (PU) was involved very significantly in Case 1. The government electric enterprise (PLN) and the government water enterprise (PDAM) played important roles in all cases, by providing all four kampung with electricity and piped water, disregarding the 'illegal' aspects of these kampung.

The fact that the involvement of state agencies varied in each case study shows three important things. First, it shows the ambiguity and inconsistency of the government toward the whole process of kampung development along the Code riverbank. Second, it shows how patron-client relations exist between government officials and agencies and kampung people. The government officials and agencies would give assistance to kampung people only if they also gain benefits from such assistance. In other words, some reciprocities exist between the government and kampung people. Third, it shows how important interpersonal and informal networks or relations are in the kampung development process.

The non-state agencies involved in the process include: NGOs, religious groups, students, the private sector, the Kraton or Sultan, and other voluntary organizations. The Church organization played an important role in Case 2; it channeled funding for the construction of all the housing built in this kampung. Students and universities played adequate roles in Case Studies 1 and 2. The KKN or the student extension program in
kampung was welcomed and widely praised by kampung people. In Case Study 2, some students offered voluntary help to Romo Mangun, by staying and working with the kampung people. One NGO, called the Girli Group, also was involved in Case Study 2; it helped young people in the kampung to engage in small home industries, particularly crafts.

The private sector was involved only in Case Study 1. Hotels and stores located close to Ratmakan Kampung contributed money for the construction of several public facilities in the kampung. Several other social-voluntary organizations, such as the Rotary Club and the HKSN (a charity group based in Jakarta), were also involved. Their role, however, was limited to providing the community with a certain amount of money. The Sultan and Kraton played important roles in Case Study 1, but only limited roles in Case Studies 2, 3, and 4.

In brief, it can be said that the roles that these non-state agencies played, although they varied, were very important in terms of mediation between kampung people and the state. Materially, the support they provided to kampung people was relatively small, but psychologically and socially they helped to make kampung people more confident and enabled them to mobilize both internal and external resources. This issue will be discussed further in the next chapter.
Figure 7.1
Pattern of Interactions between Kampung People and External Agencies

**A. State Agencies**
- Kelurahan
- BPN
- PDAM
- PLN
- Public Works
- Social Bureau
- Bappeda
- Ditako
- Bangdes
- Golkar
- ABRI

**Non-state Agencies**
- Religious groups
- Universities
- Private sector
- Chinese community
- Other NGOs

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Kampung people/community (RT/RW)

Case 1
Ratmakan

Case 2
Gondolayu

Case 3
Terban Baru

Case 4
Blimbingsari Baru
As can be seen in Figure 7.1, observation of the four case studies shows that each kampung has a different scope of networks with external agencies. Ratmakan Kampung can be said to have more extensive networks then the other three and therefore more resources were drawn to this kampung. Many factors contribute to this, but as will be discussed further in the next chapter, the role of kampung leaders seems to be the most crucial one. By developing informal, interpersonal networks with top decision makers in the city, kampung leaders in Ratmakan were able to influence the decision making process related to their kampung.

7.3 Access to Resources: Between Accessibility and Availability

In informal settlement development, because people will be accorded the opportunity to meet their housing requirements according to their own priorities and resources, it is very important to evaluate access to several basic resources in housing development. From both field observations and interviews with kampung people, three components of basic resources are considered crucial and need further attention. These three are: (1) land; (2) infrastructure; and (3) finance. Each of these components will be discussed below, while the summary of this assessment is presented in Table 7.3.

7.3.1 Access to Land

In the case of the four kampung observed in this study, it can be said that access to land was quite open to kampung people, particularly until the late 1980s. Whether through illegal land invasion, ngindung or magersari arrangements, renting, inheritance, or informal sub-division (none of which were followed by formal, administrative
registration at BPN (the land agency office) people could choose from a variety of mechanisms suited to their needs and resources. In Case Study 1, at least before the construction of the riverside dike, people could easily extend their housing units or construct new ones on the riverflat area; under the ngindung arrangement, people could also have access to land for a relatively cheap price. In Case Studies 3 and 4, people occupied land, bought 60 square meters of land for only Rp. 200,000, or leased it at a relatively low rate.

Starting in the early 1990s, however, when both urban development and kampung improvement triggered land commercialization, both within the city and the kampung, access to land for kampung people became limited. In Case Study 1, this happened especially after the construction of the riverside dike in 1991, which made the area more attractive and more secure. Since then, many people, both from outside the area and outside town, decided to reside in this kampung permanently. Therefore, once land demand increased, land prices also increased quite dramatically.

Field surveys and interviews with kampung dwellers in July-August 1995 and August 1996 found that people have to pay from three to four million rupiah for one parcel of land (about 50 square meters), which means about Rp. 60,000 to Rp. 80,000 per square meter. This is more than ten times the price of land before the construction of the riverside dike, a really significant increase. Further, as reported by some kampung residents, the 'informal-illegal' costs for improving the legal status of land also increased dramatically. One person reported that he had had to spend two million rupiah for improving 100 square meters of riverflat land (wedi kengser) to 'right to use' status (hak pakai); in another case, people had to spend six million rupiah for 300
square meters of land. It is clear that individuals within the BPN office have seized the opportunity created by land commercialization in this area for their own profit. Some people settled under the *ngindung* arrangement did not mention increasing land rent; they pay the same price as before the construction of the dike, only about Rp. 2,000 per month. In other cases, however, it was found that the *ngindung* arrangement is now being replaced by a financial arrangement whereby tenants pay an annual sum determined by market forces.

In Terban Baru Kampung (Case 3), land prices increased, especially after the consolidation period ended in early 1990. If prior to the consolidation stage people could still buy a parcel of land for only Rp.200,000, by early 1990, people had to spend about Rp.2,000,000 for the same amount of land, a cost about ten times higher. Field surveys and interviews with kampung dwellers in August 1996 found that one parcel of land (about 60 square meters) with a simple, semi-permanent building was sold for Rp.10,000,000. In Case Study 4, many plots of land were transferred three or four times, and each time the price increased significantly. If in the mid 1980s, people paid only Rp.100,000 for a parcel of land, by the early 1990s, people had to pay about Rp.2,000,000 for the same parcel of land. Field observations in August 1995 found that some people were willing to pay Rp.6,000,000 for about 60 square meters of land.

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3 For a comparison, the price for RSS or 'core housing' developed by the private sector in Yogyakarta was Rp.8,000,000 in 1991. This is a simple, 21 square meters house on 60 square meters of land, located about 15 km. from the central city and therefore far from many public facilities.

4 For a comparison, the standard land price within kampung set up by the government was only Rp. 30,000 per square meter (1995); this standard is used by the government to assess land tax.
Table 7.3
Incidence of Land Commercialization in Kampung along the Code River

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Distance Description</th>
<th>Land Price Fluctuation (thousand rupiah per m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>from city center (Km)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Study 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. case 1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. case 2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Study 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. case 1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. case 2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Study 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. case 1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. case 2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparative case from other locations in the city</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. case a</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. case b</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. case c</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. case d</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The evidence presented above shows the direct relation between settlement improvement and land commercialization and questions the possibility of gentrification. This issue also relates to another issue concerning the overall availability and affordability of land in an informal land market, particularly in a rapidly growing city such as Yogyakarta. The present study did not observe the city's entire situation, but along the Code River it appears that only a few parcels of land are left for poor incoming migrants. After the construction of the riverside dike, there is now no riverflat area left that can be occupied by new migrants. Much of the land located on the banks of the Code River in the southern part of the city has been 'squatted' formally by developers and government officials. In the last five years, at least five housing projects
or real estate developments have been built along the bank of the river, converting about 6 hectares of the riverbank and riverflat land into a modern housing complex. In the future incoming migrants may face greater challenges than their previous counterparts.

Recent literature on informal sector urban housing has revealed that major changes are taking place; of these changes the commercialization of previously community-based initiatives is perhaps the most significant (Fitzwilliam Memorandum, 1991; Jones and Ward, 1994). This situation seems to be happening in Yogyakarta, as well. In this city, traditional local land tenure arrangements, such as the ngindung system, that were based on social considerations and have benefited the poor, are now in question. Many people residing under the ngindung are now under serious threat, particularly in kampung located strategically for commercial uses, since land values are increasing very rapidly. In the past ten years, there have been at least ten cases in which groups of people under the ngindung arrangement have been relocated, because landowners sold the land to developers.  

The same thing happened with the land tenure arrangement under the magersari system. As before the 1980s kraton land was quite extensive, illegal occupation of the land did not bother kraton officials. In many cases, the kraton even permitted people to register the land at the BPN. Starting in the early 1990s, however, since there was only

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5 As explained by the head of BPN Kotamadya, initially there were many conflicts between pengindung and landowners. Most pengindung complained about the selling of the land they occupied, but since many of the cases were brought to court and the winners were the landowners, pengindung then usually only asked for uang pindah or compensation, for removing their housing. This uang pindah, however, was sometimes quite large. In one kampung close to Case 3, about 15 pengindung received a really big settlement; depending on the size of their land, some pengindung got 20 to 30 million rupiah as compensation. Interviews with pengindung in summer 1996 found that about half of them actually had already a second house before the removal of their house under the ngindung system. They then perceived the compensation money as 'uang untung', or lucky money, considering that they had lived on the land for several years without rent and still received compensation after that.
a small amount of kraton land left, and since the kraton, the sultan's family, and the kraton officials all also needed land for their own purposes, occupation of kraton land was not as easy as before. In Case Studies 3 and 4, about ten years after people occupied the kraton land, there is still no indication that the kraton is willing to allow a magersari status to these people. This is quite different to what happened in kampung Badran, about 400 meters east of Case Study 2, where kampung people received approval from the kraton/sultan to use the land under 'right to use', or 'hak pakai' rights. With increasing land commercialization in this city, it is possible that conflicts over land between the kraton and the people will become more frequent in the future.6

The present study did not observe the whole situation of the land markets in the city, particularly the relation between the formal and informal land markets and how it affects the poor. However, as the situation of the formal land market in Yogyakarta seems no better than the informal one, it seems that the poor will continue to depend upon the informal land market.7 The problem with this informal land market is that it does not guarantee long-term security of land ownership. This issue will be discussed further in the following chapter. The observation of the land situation in this study confirms the argument presented in Chapter 3 that there is not enough attention paid by the government to the problem of land access for the poor. Rather than finding ways of increasing land access for the poor, the national land policy and program tends to be

6 Considering that much of the kraton land now has a very high economic value, in the early 1990s, the kraton established a new enterprise, with the specific aim of developing kraton land. After identifying kraton lands that are considered 'ripe' or 'strategic' for commercial purposes, this enterprise then further developed the land, whether for hotels, malls, or other commercial buildings.

7 In Yogyakarta, due to the rapid increase of land prices and the long and costly bureaucratic process in getting formal requirements to develop new housing complexes, many developers including Perumnas are not able continue their services to provide housing for low income people (YUDP, 1994).
developed and implemented to favor the already wealthy segment of society, and even to increase land speculation and monopolization.

7.3.2 Access to Basic Infrastructure

In general, it can be said that access to basic infrastructure for kampung communities is limited. In terms of water, the most important basic need, only about 50 per cent of households have access to the clean water provided by the government (PDAM); the rest, therefore, have to provide for themselves. The city government can manage only about 30 per cent of the total solid wastes produced by the kampung; the kampung people, therefore, have to manage the larger part. Further, there is no sanitation system developed by the government in the kampung (YUDP, 1994). Most infrastructures and public facilities in the kampung, therefore, have been provided by communities themselves. These include: paved pathways, public MCK, public wells, sanitation systems, community halls, shelters for the night watch, or gardu ronda, and other community services.

Within this context, the existence and quality of the kampung infrastructure, therefore, depends upon efforts managed by the kampung people; these are done by actively mobilizing both internal as well as external resources. The more active kampung people are, the better the kampung can provide its residents with infrastructure and public facilities. Although, in general, kampung communities show their degree of vitality and community dynamics in providing public facilities and infrastructure for their kampung, some kampung such as Ratmakan are able to provide better infrastructure for their residents particularly because they have more extensive relations
with external agencies (refers back to Table 6.1, 6.2, and 6.5). Much external assistance from both the state and non-state agencies comes because of informal personal relations between kampung leaders or members and government officials or individuals. This explains why located along the same river, each kampung have different degree of achievement in developing infrastructures.

7.3.3 Access to Finance

It was found from interviews that most kampung residents in the case studies do not have access to formal financial institutions to obtain loans for constructing or improving their housing. They therefore depend very much upon informal financial support, especially household savings. Some households obtain their funds from their extended families. This is not considered as a loan, but has the implicit obligation to assist other family members in a similar way at a later date.

This situation is actually not unique to Yogyakarta; in other parts of Indonesia, credit for home improvements is also difficult to obtain. Banks and individuals are not likely to lend funds to kampung people because of their lack of security of land title. Housing developers have been given incentives and credit facilities to subdivide land and build housing that can be bought on credit from the bank. However, such facilities can be used only by people who can show evidence of an ability to repay the loans. This, of course, can hardly be done by people working in the informal sector, who are not guaranteed of steady income.

The present study did not observe in detail how informal financial support for housing construction works, but it is clear that there are no formal financial institutions
available for all kampung people. In other words, only those who have personal relations to informal financial sources are those who can improve their housing. This explains why there is a wide range of housing size and quality within kampung. From the perspective of the community development, some form of financial institution should be developed, which is supportive for all kampung people. In some kampung in Yogyakarta, people have tried to initiate what they call ‘arisan perumahan’ (rotating saving clubs for housing improvement), the ‘winnings’ of which could provide an important infusion of cash into a household’s domestic budget. With further assistance from formal financial institutions, this system, which is managed under the RW, might contribute positively toward the development of kampung.

Table 7.4
Assessment of Access to Resources in the Kampung Development Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Components/Elements</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Land</td>
<td>Accessible at a cheap price until late 1980, but there is a tendency of increasing land commercialization within kampung; Now only little ‘public land’ is available for squatters within the city; Developers and government agencies also begin to occupy ‘marginal’ land; Some kampung on the urban fringe be able to absorb new migrants, but prices could increase dramatically; No/limited Kraton land left that can be used under magersari system; Fewer land owners who are willing to grant their land under ngindung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Infrastructure</td>
<td>Relatively limited; only few kampung have access to basic infrastructures; Many kampung have to provide infrastructure by themselves; Costs for basic services (water and electricity) are still affordable; The quantity and quality of provision is mostly determined by the nature of community organizations/RT and RW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Finance</td>
<td>No access to formal financial institutions; Depends very much on individual savings, family borrowing.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.3.4 Summary of Access to Resources: The Importance of ‘Informal’ Networks

In summary, two important points can be made regarding access to basic resources for kampung development. First, among several basic elements in kampung development, land is the most crucial one. There is a tendency that access to land for the poor is becoming more limited. Second, it can be concluded from the discussion above that, within the current formal legal framework that does not guarantee their access to basic resources for housing development, kampung people have to engage in ‘informal’ mechanisms in order to obtain such resources. The fact that the four kampung studied, located on the same riverbank, have different degrees of access to resources suggests that only the kampung that can develop better networks with external agencies are able to achieve better access. As shown in the case of Ratmakan Kampung, relations with various external agencies brought with them very positive implications, as more resources were thus provided to this kampung. In Ratmakan, the kampung leader has been able to act as a ‘broker’ who maintains a personal relationship with the government officials who control limited resources required by the kampung people.

7.4 Access to the Decision Making Process

Access to the decision-making process is crucial in settlement development, as it indicates the degree to which kampung people can determine the process (Turner, 1988; Skinner, Taylor and Wegelin, 1987). In this study, two levels of the decision-making process will be discussed: first, the decision-making process within communities; second, the decision-making process as it takes place beyond the communities themselves.
7.4.1 The Decision-Making Process within Communities: *Musyawarah-mufakat*

Here the decision-making process within communities is defined as a process by which communities (in this case kampung people) carry on public discussions in order to reach a decision or consensus regarding particular community issues. This process is crucial in informal settlement development, as it represents the ability of communities to consolidate and mobilize internal resources. A community that has a fair and efficient decision-making process has a greater chance of success, because such a process means that most members of the community have the same concerns and agree on certain actions and strategies.

In the four kampung observed in this study, the decision-making process within the communities was exercised through traditional consensus building, which is called *musyawarah-mufakat*. As described by Koentjaraningrat (1967) *musyawarah-mufakat* is the traditional decision-making process which has grown out of a cooperative spirit which underlies the village sense of community in most Indonesia cultures. The concept involves the processes that develop general agreement through discussion (*musyawarah*) that leads to the unanimous decision (*mufakat*), therefore differing from simple majority rule decision-making. The basic assumption is that there is a common interest in society—rather than competing interests—which all parties will learn to recognize through discussion. In other words, there are no ‘losers’ in this form of decision-making because it ideally results in the good of the whole community rather than the good of the greater members of community (Logsdon, 1978).  

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8 Detailed discussion on the way in which the *musyawarah-mufakat* is conducted can be found in several writings, notably by Koentjaraningrat (1967), by Logsdon (1978), or by Sullivan (1992).
Based on my experience in living in and observing the kampung in Yogyakarta, I found that the *musyawarah-mufakat* mechanism is exercised in most RT and RW and is able to facilitate many decisions made by communities. In the four kampung observed in this study, this process is exercised through community meetings conducted monthly by both the RT and RW, in which each household is represented by one member (commonly the male household head). In these meetings, kampung problems are seriously discussed and solutions are proposed. Once an agreement is reached, all kampung members are then obligated to follow the agreement. Thus, when an agreement to construct the riverside dike was reached in Ratmakan Kampung, for example, all kampung members were then obligated to participate actively in the project—this included all the consequences and implications of the project, from money and labor contributions, to the sacrifice of land and housing by some kampung members.

As expressed by many of the kampung leaders and members interviewed in this study, in general the kampung people are able to manage the decision-making process within the kampung through this *musyawarah-mufakat* mechanism. Particularly when discussions relate to a problem faced by all the kampung members, such as the flood problem or infrastructure problems, commonly a consensus is easy to reach. In other words, as far as a 'common interest' exists, and kampung members consider it can only be realized through collective efforts, consensus is usually easy to reach. The following table (Table 7.5) shows examples of the decisions made by kampung people through the *musyawarah-mufakat* mechanism.
### Table 7.5
Examples of Decisions Made through *Musyawarah-mufakat*
in Four Case Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case studies</th>
<th>Examples of decisions made through <em>musyawarah-mufakat</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Case study 1 (Ratmakan)</td>
<td>• decision on proposing the riverside dike project to the government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• decision on the amount of money and labor contributed to the project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• decision on which buildings should be sacrificed to make room for the riverside dike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• decision on developing a community rotating credit fund (<em>arisan</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• decision on the most suitable location for the new public washroom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• decision on appointing new RT leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case study 2 (Kotabaru/Gondolayu)</td>
<td>• decision on the amount of money to be contributed for community purposes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• decision on appointing new RT leader and staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• decision on not receiving new migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• decision on constructing the new public washroom and renovating the public hall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case study 3 (Terban Baru)</td>
<td>• decision on conducting collective land invasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• decision on the amount of land distributed to kampung members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• decision on constructing a community hall first (instead of a prayer house)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• decision on sending delegation to the <em>Kraton</em>, asking for <em>magersari</em> status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• decision on buying a set of <em>gamelan</em> instruments (traditional Javanese music)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case study 4 (Blimbingsari Baru)</td>
<td>• decision on appointing new RT leader and staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• decision on constructing a new public washroom and <em>agardu ronda</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In other cases, however, when a common interest does not exist, or when conflicts among the kampung members occur, this *musyawarah-mufakat* mechanism does not work. In Blimbingsari Baru Kampung (Case Study 4), a kampung leader expressed the difficulty of solving conflicts related to land claims among the settlers. Further, although a common agreement was reached concerning the need for public
facilities, kampung members were reluctant to give part of their land for this common purpose. In this type of situation, as some kampung leaders mentioned, intervention by external actors or agencies is sometimes needed. External actors or agencies that are considered by kampung people to have a higher social, economic, and political status can help kampung people in consensus building.

7.4.2 The Decision-making Process beyond the Community: Formal and Informal

Here the decision-making process beyond the community means the process by which communities and external agencies reach a decision or a consensus on a matter that affects the communities. In the case of the kampung, it means the way in which kampung people as communities negotiate their interests with external agencies, particularly with the state. In Indonesia, this process is supposed to be accommodated through a formal planning process, called Rakorbang. As will be discussed below, however, communities cannot depend solely upon this process, particularly as it is considered ineffective and does not really represent a ‘bottom up’ mechanism. Two processes of decision-making beyond the community will be discussed below: the formal process, through Rakorbang, included the role of kelurahan; and the informal process, through personal-patronage relations with various external agencies.

1) The ‘Formal’ Process: the Rakorbang and the Role of Kelurahan. In Indonesia, the way the government manages the whole development process in the country starts with the formulation of what is formally called Pola Dasar Pembangunan (Poldas), or Basic Guidance for Development. This Poldas is formulated every five years, and is used by government officials as a guide for developing a more
detailed five-year development planning guideline, called the REPELITA. Based on this REPELITA, the annual government development programs are then proposed and implemented. This process takes place both at the national, provincial, and municipal levels. Thus, based on this REPELITA, each year in March, a municipality like Yogyakarta, has to conduct a meeting to discuss what programs will be implemented in the following year. This meeting is called a development coordination meeting, or *Rapat Koordinasi Pembangunan (Rakorbang)*. It is through this *Rakorbang* that a top-down and bottom-up planning process is supposed to merge. In this meeting, development proposals from all *kelurahan* within the municipality are discussed.

The bottom-up planning process is assumed to be conducted in each *kelurahan*, as proposals from the *kelurahan* should be developed on the basis of consultation between the *kelurahan* and the community councils, or LKMD. The LKMD is the highest coordinating committee for the planning and implementation of government programs and local initiations at the *kelurahan* level. All of the LKMD’s proposal and plans must be discussed at the *kelurahan* meeting (*musyawarah LKMD*). Thus, if people who reside along the banks of the Code River need a dike to protect their kampung from flooding, they could propose the idea to the LKMD. The LKMD would then discuss the proposal with the *kecamatan*, and finally the *kecamatan* would submit the proposal to the *Rakorbang* at the kotamadya level. Theoretically, if the proposal is considered to be in accordance with the development policy stated in REPELITA and Poldas, and if government funding is available, this proposal can then be then funded and implemented in the following year.
As implied in the previous discussions presented in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, however, the process by which the riverside dike project was approved, and implemented was totally different from the formal procedure described above. It was first initiated by the kampung people, but instead of being proposed through the LKMD, it was proposed directly to some senior government officials. As the Mayor and ABRI saw that the proposal would also benefited for them, they then directly incorporated the proposal into their development program. In brief, as discussed previously, the riverside dike project was a kind of ‘blessing in disguise,’ which was not approved and implemented on the basis of any formal planning procedure. Instead, it was developed through interpersonal networks among decision makers in Kotamadya.

It can be concluded from the above discussion that, although theoretically the existing planning and development procedure have been created by the government to accommodate bottom-up mechanism, in practice, however, inconsistencies tend to appear. Many political, cultural, and technical factors contribute to this ineffectiveness of the process, but one critical factor seems to be the gap between communities and the state. Theoretically, this gap is supposed to be filled in by the kelurahan, as it is considered the lowest governmental agency, working directly with communities or kampung people. The kelurahan, however, seems to be unable to fill this gap. In other words, it is unable to mediate effectively between the state and the community. Further, rather than acting on behalf of the community, the kelurahan tends to work mostly for the state and to neglect community interests.

As stated in the National Law Concerning Village Government (UU No.5/1979), the kelurahan is the lowest governmental agency in Indonesia. Unlike the situation in
rural villages, however, where the head of the village, or desa, is elected directly by the people, the head of the kelurahan, or Lurah, is appointed by the government. The three main tasks of the Lurah/kelurahan can be distinguished. The first is the ‘developmental role,’ or pembangunan; projects like the riverside dike are considered under this aspect. The second is the ‘administrative role,’ or pemerintahan; administering the population, issuing KTP, or developing kelurahan’s data base are examples of activities under this aspect. The third is the ‘social role,’ or kemasyarakatan; maintaining social order, and assisting the police to prevent crime are examples of activities under the social aspect.

In practice, however, while delegating most of this third role (maintaining social order, etc.) to the RT and RW organs, the kelurahan seems to be very busy with its administrative role. It therefore does not pay enough attention to its first role, the developmental role. If it becomes involved in development activities, these are limited to administering what are commonly referred to as ‘Inpres Desa,’ or village grants, an annual 5.5 million rupiah grant from the central government, distributed to all kelurahan or desa throughout Indonesia. As the amounts of these grants are small, they cannot be used to solve major kampung problems, such as the flooding, faced by the kampung along the Code River.

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9 It is important to note that unlike in a rural context, the kelurahan in an urban context is only of limited relevance to the population. Most important facilities are situated elsewhere and access to these need not be obtained via mediation by the local administration. Some people of a higher socio-economic status do not need the local administration as an intermediary. They have their own connections and access to the higher echelons of the bureaucracy.  
10 This grant is to support various development projects in each kelurahan. As the amount is limited, however, it is considered as an ‘incentive’ or ‘stimulus,’ by which larger funding from the community could be generated. In the case of the kampung along the Code River, this village grant is far too little to be able to solve the flooding problems. Thus for several years this grant has been used only for ‘minor’ kampung improvements, such as paving, constructing gardu ronda, and public MCK.
Further, the *kelurahan* itself seems to be designed more for its administrative and social roles, rather than for its ‘developmental’ role. The formal development planning mechanism through the *Rakorbang* and LKMD does not include direct local participation in decision making, but only in implementation. The government agencies at the local level, the *kelurahan*, are primarily used to pass on directives from above. As a representative of the state, the *lurah* can make legitimate claims on the population; however, these claims seldom converge with local demands. It is within this situation, then, that communities have to bypass the formal process by developing informal, interpersonal relations with external agencies, both state and non-state agencies.

2) The ‘Informal’ and ‘Interpersonal’ Process: The Importance of ‘*konekti*’.

Theoretically, there are two ways in which the relations between the kampung people and external agencies can be initiated and developed. First, the community or kampung leader can initiate and, perhaps, determine such relations. Second, the external agencies can come to the community, offer assistance, and, perhaps, determine such relations. From the perspective of community development, the first possibility is better and healthier because it indicates community initiative and leadership. The second, although the results of such relations can be positive, shows that the community is relatively passive, letting such relations be guided and determined from the beginning by external agencies. In other words, in this case, decisions are made by the external agencies, not by the community.

In the case of the kampung along the Code River, with the exception of Case Study 1, it is unfortunate that many of the relations with external agencies were initiated by the external agencies, rather than by the communities. The government agencies,
ABRI, GOLKAR, religious groups, universities, and individuals come and help kampung people, not because they were invited by them, but simply because they were willing to help. In Kampung Ratmakan, it was the kampung leader who initiated such contacts with various external agencies. This case, however, was quite exceptional, and such things rarely happen in other kampung. As revealed from interviews with kampung leaders, most mentioned that they had never initiated an attempt to develop networks with external agencies.

This situation seems to reflect the ‘inferior’ status of kampung people or wong cilik, which has been rooted in Indonesian society for quite a long time. Developing within a very feudalistic and hierarchical social structure, the wong cilik in Indonesia seem never to have been liberated. For every action that they wish to initiate, they have to ask approval, or ‘restu,’ from the wong gede, the authorities. As expressed by some kampung residents, the fact that many external agencies, or wong gede, support the kampung shows that they are now ‘diuwongke,’ or considered to be humanized. In other words, kampung people have always needed a patron to provide security and support.

The general pattern of formal and informal relations between the kampung people and external agencies is presented in Figure 7.2. It shows the way in which the formal linkages from the kelurahan, kecamatan, to the municipality through the Rakorbang and LKMD mechanisms are ineffective; they have not generated major benefits for kampung people. In contrast, informal, personal linkages are more effective, because kampung people can express their interests directly to the important decision-makers in this way. Especially in conducting community projects that are considered
beyond the capacity of kampung people to realize, it is very important for kampung people to develop direct and personal relations with external agencies.

_Lurah_ and _Camat_ are usually unwilling to initiate or to accept community proposals which they consider to be beyond their standard tasks. The _lurah_ is not armed with either the capability or the authority to be able to play a role as intermediary, or provide a link between the community and the higher government agencies. It is in this situation that the non-state agencies can play the role of expressing and channeling community interests to high-level governmental agencies and officials.

As expressed by many kampung leaders, to be successful in kampung improvement, the most important resource is _koneksi_ or connections to patrons or brokers who can influence someone in government or in the private sector to provide a service or assistance. During interviews with the kampung leader of Ratmakan, several times he mentioned the importance of _koneksi_; he proudly mentioned that only because he has so many _koneksi_ with government officials and individuals outside the kampung that Ratmakan got so much support and attention. How important is this _koneksi_ in kampung development is also observed by Cohen (1985). In his study of a kampung in Jakarta, he describes how without _koneksi_, kampung people have difficulties in gaining government support or assistance.

The problem with such _koneksi_ or informal-personal linkages, however, is that only a few kampung leaders have the ability to initiate such linkages. In other words, such processes can be considered unfair because only few kampung that benefit from such processes. As found from interviews with kampung leaders, most do not have enough knowledge of the way in which external agencies could or should be contacted.
Thus, it is only when these external agencies come and offer them help that they start to have such linkages. Further, most linkages or networks are usually limited to the donation of a specific project and thus last for only a relatively short period. In other words, kampung people are unable to develop more comprehensive and long-term linkages with these external agencies.

### Figure 7.2
**Relations between Communities and External Agencies: Formal and Informal**

![Diagram of Relations between Communities and External Agencies]

**Notes:**

- Formal (through LKMD, Rakorbang): procedural, ineffective
- Informal (through personal connections): effective

### 7.5 Summary: Kampung Development as A Negotiation Process

In summary, this chapter shows that the whole development process of kampung is not always free from outside influence and intervention. From the four case studies it can be learned that, although the role of each community is crucial, the success of kampung development relies on the networks and negotiations which exist between that
community and the external forces of society, particularly the state. Kampung people have little control over many elements important for kampung development, particularly land, infrastructure and regulations.

The formal development planning mechanism through the Rakorbang and LKMD does not effectively facilitate direct local participation in decision-making, but only in policy implementation. This situation confirms what Warren (1993) has argued, that from the government’s perspective popular participation in Indonesia is conceived of in terms of self-support and local contributions to state programs, not in terms of public inclusion in decision making. The government agencies, the kelurahan, cannot function as intermediary agencies to communicate communities’ interests to the state. Because the primary orientation of the lurah and camat is to supra-village authorities, popular participation in local decision making will tend to be neglected.

It is within this situation that patron-client relations between government officials and agencies and kampung people are most important, both in determining the level of services and support that kampung people can get, as well as the degree of government recognition of kampung. This is particularly clear in the case of the riverside dike project; in this project, reciprocity existed between the government agencies involved and kampung people. The government agencies provided security, funding, and technical assistance, in exchange for participation by kampung people (in the form of free labor). In other words, the government agencies and officials developed relations with kampung people and supported them only if they also got benefits from such relations. Such a mechanism is considered unfair, because only a few particular kampung have the ability to take advantage of it.
The fact that the process of kampung development is not free from external influences raises an important question regarding the definition of 'self-help' and 'community autonomy.' As Turner (1976) has advocated, the fundamental notion of 'self-help' housing relies on the idea of 'user-control' or 'local autonomy,' not only in managing resources, but, more importantly, in the decision-making process. The four case studies described above show that 'total autonomy' or 'freedom to build' is something which is very relative. To survive, a community needs to develop networks with other parties, and therefore it is never free from outside influences or intervention.

From the perspective of community autonomy, it is to be hoped that communities can be strong, led by powerful and skillful leaders, so that they can develop many beneficial linkages with external forces. The stronger the community, the more chance it has of defending its interests and attracting external support. This study found, however, that only a few kampung leaders have this kind of knowledge and ability. It is within this context that the role of intermediary agencies, such as NGOs, religious groups, universities, and other voluntary organizations becomes crucial, in order to mediate between kampung people and those who control power and resources in the various government agencies. From this, more complicated networks among all the parties can then be developed. The following chapter will discuss this issue; it will assess the role of each of the parties in settlement development and evaluate the consequences of such networks.
The development process of the kampung along the Code River in Yogyakarta represents the result of the interaction of four factors or elements in the city: (1) the community and its development strategy; (2) the structure and operation of state agencies, and their ambiguous attitudes toward kampung; (3) the involvement of non-state institutions as intermediary agencies; and (4) the failure of the formal, legal mechanisms and, conversely, the effectiveness of the patronage structure of interpersonal relations in Indonesian society. These four factors or elements interact dynamically in a complicated network. In general, however, the state plays a dominant role in the process, because it controls all resources and the decision making process related to urban and housing development.

This chapter discusses how each of these four factors works. It will show, among other things, that, although communities have some degree of autonomy over the process of kampung development, the state, in whatever form and by whatever means, has been a constant source of security and material progress. This chapter argues that the whole process of kampung development in Yogyakarta, while it indeed brought about a significant improvement in the physical and material aspects of the kampung, nevertheless continued and even fostered the dependency of the community on the state, the wong cilik on the wong gede, the subject on the ruler; it created rukun (social harmony), but at the same time it also reinforced stagnation.
8.1 The Kampung Community and the Operation of Collective Efforts

Although the level of community involvement in the four case studies is high, there are variants in the degree and modes of community involvement in the development process. This gives rise to several important questions: What accounts for variations in the role of the local community groups (the RT and RW)? How are collective efforts organized in the kampung? How is gotong royong practiced in the kampung? And what are the roles of leadership in the kampung? The following sections will discuss these questions.

8.1.1 Has gotong royong Withered Away?

Based on previous work done by Koentjaraningrat (1967), Bowen (1986:547) proposes that gotong royong practice in Indonesia can be categorized into three types. The first is ‘labor exchange,’ a process of labor-sharing in community tasks which require major collective efforts over short periods of time. In this type of gotong royong, the amount of work required of each participant is calculated before the work commences. The second is ‘generalized reciprocity,’ the most evocative metaphor for gotong royong as such, in which assistance is given and received without apparent calculation or hesitation, notably in times of hardship or joy. The third is ‘labor mobilization’ which is emphasized more as a means of social control. This is the type of gotong royong commonly employed by government or the authorities, to mobilize unpaid labor for public work or government projects. In the four kampung observed in this study, communities practice these three types of gotong royong with different degrees of emphasis, depending on the nature of the task or the goal involved.
In Ratmakan, although the first and second types of gotong royong are sometimes exercised, the third type seems to be dominant. This is clear particularly from the way in which ABRI mobilized unpaid labor (kampung residents) in the construction of the riverside dike. The number of unpaid laborers that could be mobilized by ABRI for the project was remarkable. Within a period of five years, from 1991 to 1995, at least 33,500 person-days were mobilized. The first type of gotong royong, labor exchange, was also practiced in Ratmakan. People in this kampung helped each other in renovating or reconstructing buildings, particularly those which were sacrificed to make room for the riverside dike. The second type of gotong royong, generalized reciprocity, was also practiced in Ratmakan, particularly to build many of the community facilities (public MCK, gardu ronda, community meeting halls, etc.) that were constructed after the completion of the riverside dike.

In Gondolayu, the whole process of housing construction was designed and managed directly by Romo Mangun. Settlers were asked to contribute their labor and to work under Romo Mangun's supervision, but this was considered by settlers as voluntary rather than labor mobilization. In this kampung, labor exchange was also practiced, when households, organized by the community, helped each other to improve their housing. Generalized reciprocity is also practiced on a day-to-day basis. In this kampung, residents help each other in both economic and social activities.

In Terban Baru, labor exchange can be said to have been very dominant. Under the coordination of the RT and RK, the community collectively squatted the land for settlement, for the benefit of all. In this process, after each household was assigned a specific plot or parcel of land, community members helped each other to construct
individual housing units. In this process, some people practiced what is commonly called sambatan (building a house by communal efforts). In this sambatan mechanism, several households make an agreement to help each other in constructing their houses. Generalized reciprocity is practiced quite extensively in this kampung, particularly in conducting many community projects and activities.

In Blimbingsari Baru, since the squatting process was not organized, labor mobilization was not employed. Labor exchange, however, was practiced in the form of the sambatan mechanism. Generalized reciprocity is also practiced, but not as actively as in Ratmakan and Terban Baru.

In general, it can be said that the gotong royong spirit is still widely practiced in the four kampung observed. Not only this gotong royong spirit able to maintain social order and provide many basic services for kampung residents, it is also able to mobilize community resources effectively, in order to make significant improvements in the kampung. The number of community projects that were realized in the four kampung is remarkable. Utilizing the gotong royong spirit, kampung people, organized by RT and RW, have been able to organize collective efforts effectively for the benefit of their communities.

8.1.2 Gotong Royong: Reciprocity or Exploitation?

Although gotong royong is still practiced widely in kampung, several notes should be made in this regard. First, that gotong royong spirit can become effective only if the goals of a project are clear and accepted by the majority of kampung members, or when most kampung members feel they will benefit from it. In other words, once a
common interest is shared among kampung members, attempts to organize collective efforts can be carried out easily. This fact raises an important question regarding 'common interest' in the whole issue of community development. In the four kampung observed in this study, since the common interest (to have adequate and affordable shelter) was clear, collective efforts were relatively easy to organize. On the contrary, once kampung members have different or conflicting interests (e.g. those which existed between land speculators and house seekers in Blimbingsari Baru Kampung), collective efforts are not always easy to organize. With the increasing pressures on kampung (e.g. in the form of land commercialization), there are many possible factors through which the cohesiveness of a community can come under serious threat. As Leaf (1994) has argued, it is very important to be aware of the effect of market forces on communities. Under conditions of rapidly increasing land prices (like those in Case Studies 1, 3, and 4) the cohesion of a community can be threatened by the value put on their land.\footnote{While internal conflicts within communities regarding land disputes have been reported repeatedly in the mega-city of Jakarta, the same situation is already happening in Yogyakarta. In Sosrokusuman Kampung, just one block from Ratmakan Kampung, under the high pressure of urban development, the community is facing an internal conflict regarding the future development of their kampung. Selected as the area for an urban renewal project by the government, the community in this kampung has been divided into three totally different and conflicting interest groups: one third favor selling their land to developers, another third favor staying in the kampung and reject the idea of urban renewal in their kampung, while another group is interested in the idea of land sharing (with developers). This controversy started in 1992, and no agreement has been reached until now.}

Second, the gotong royong spirit seems to be more powerful if it is supported or reinforced by external agents. The involvement of government agencies, ABRI, the Sultan, the universities, voluntary organizations and individuals clearly fostered the gotong royong practices in the four kampung under discussion. Most of the kampung leaders interviewed agreed that many community projects would have been difficult to
realize without the involvement of external agents. In the case of the riverside dike project, some people expressed the opinion that ABRI had been a large burden on the community, because the soldiers had to be fed and they did very little work. In general, however, most of the kampung members and kampung leaders interviewed agreed that, without ABRI involvement, such a project could not have been realized—it would have been very difficult to force many people to sacrifice their lands and buildings to make room for the dike. This confirms Jackson’s (1978) argument that local participation in Indonesia tends to be organized through traditional-hierarchical authority and patronage relations rather than through groups based on similar social attributes such as class.

Third, *gotong royong* seems to be effectively mobilized when some kinds of ‘stimulants’ or ‘incentives’ are provided to a community (whether by the government or by other agencies). Most of the kampung leaders interviewed expressed the opinion that kampung members are more willing to contribute their money and labor for community projects if there is already some support or stimulant from such external agents (however little that support may be). Thus, for example, the government distributed one hundred kilograms of rice to each women’s groups (the PKK) in the kampung during the dike construction; it was with this ‘stimulant’ that the women’s groups were enabled to obtain contributions from each household and thus were able to feed at least sixty people every day for a duration of three months. For the dike project itself, the ‘stimulant’ was building materials (cement, sand, stones, etc.) provided by the government; starting with these supplies, the community had to mobilize the other resources needed for constructing the dike. In other kampung, such as Terban Baru, the government provided ‘pit-latrines’ as a stimulant, and the communities were then asked
to complete the construction of the public MCK, including wells, shelters and other facilities (pumps, etc.).

Finally, the *gotong royong* spirit seems to be effective only for short-term projects, mostly those with clear physical goals. It does not work for broader, long-term goals such as cooperative economic activities. It seems that, once kampung people face economic opportunities and challenges, kampung communities lose their co-operative spirit. Broader community cooperation in the field of economic activities is not found in the four case studies.

Sullivan (1992:181) describes how the political ideology of the state influences the practice of *gotong royong* in Indonesia to a great extent. He argues that the practice of *gotong royong* which is continually endorsed by the state, is very much directed at being a means of social control, in order to mobilize unpaid labor for the benefit of the state. It can, therefore, be seen as an example of the state’s reliance on community values, in order to fulfill state interests. In support of this idea, this study also found that *gotong royong* in kampung cannot be seen merely in terms of a genuine community co-operative spirit and practice, as it not always free from external influences, particularly by the state. At the same time, however, the practice itself also benefits communities. In other words, some kinds of genuine reciprocity do exist in the process.

From the perspective of community development it is suggested that communities should master the art of maximizing the benefits to be gained from such practices, rather than totally rejecting the practices because they are subject to manipulation. Within this context, the role of the kampung leadership is crucial. It is to
be hoped that kampung leaders will play an important role in maximizing the benefits gained from such practices and minimizing their distortion for ideological purposes.

8.1.3 Leadership in Kampung: Motives and Capacity

Gilbert and Ward (1985:222) propose that two aspects are important in analyzing the leadership in a community. The first is the source of power (whether it is gained and maintained through force, charisma, personal ability, or imposed from outside). The second is the nature of the community’s link to outsiders (how influential can they be on behalf on the community in the wider urban arena, and what is the nature of their relationship to supra-local authorities?). In the case of rural Indonesia, Van Heck (1989) argues that local elite, when functioning as leaders of self-help groups fighting poverty, can become a ‘self-serving leadership,’ and are frequently tempted to use such organizations and resources for their personal benefit (Van Heck, in Bongartz, 1989). As described in Chapter Two, such a situation may best be termed as a ‘patron-client’ structure, in which the patron or leader, who is in a position to give security, inducements or both, gains benefits from his personal followers, who contribute their loyalty and assist the patron’s designs.

In terms of the evidence derived from the four kampung observed in this study, however, leadership in kampung is ambiguous, for it rarely brings material rewards; neither does it represent significant power or influence, particularly in relation to the

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2 In their study of Manila, Viloria and Williams (1987) found that many community leaders (the Barangay leaders) were accused and found guilty of corruption, and that they were in their positions only because they were hand-picked by local politicians to further their own interests. The same thing happened in Guayaquil, Ecuador (see Salmen, 1987).
wider society. Leadership in the kampung is mainly volunteer, and it is thus conceived of as a responsibility rather than as a privilege. Thus, people do not hold leadership positions because of their personal followings, but on the basis of their perceived ability. In other words, the RT and RW leaders are mere facilitators and function neither as patrons nor brokers for their constituencies.

Kampung leaders may receive some compensation for administrative services, but this is generally not enough to make their task attractive. Interviews with twenty kampung leaders along the Code River gave an impression that volunteerism and a sense of social responsibility are the main motives for their leadership. Most leaders are usually clearly aware that they were elected because of their ‘special’ status or abilities. Thus, although a particular person might not be interested in taking this position, he perceives his nomination as a ‘social duty’ (see Table 8.1). All the kampung leaders who were interviewed expressed the opinion that the position was very time and labor consuming, and that that is why not many kampung members are interested in this position. Due to a lack of successors, many kampung leaders have to serve for two or three consecutive terms.

What, then, does a kampung leader get from what may be a very time-consuming and difficult job? And how does one kampung end up with a good leader, while others do not? Two factors appear to be of importance: the personal background

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3. Kampung leaders are elected by kampung members through the *musyawarah* and *mufakat* mechanism. At the RT level, elections involve the representatives of households in the respective RT; at the RW level, leaders are elected by RT leaders. According to the Mayor Decree No. 4.1995 (*Instruksi Walikota Kotamadya Yogyakarta No.4/1995*), to be eligible for election, the RT and RW candidate must meet the following requirements: He/she must have lived in the RT/RW for at least six months; be literate; have neither a criminal record nor a politically suspect background; be physically as well as psychologically healthy; have a reputation for good conduct, honesty, and be respected by kampung members; believe in God; and be loyal to the state and government.
and motives of the leader, and the kampung situation. Thus, in one case, a kampung may be lucky enough to find a motivated and influential leader, who can contribute significantly to the kampung progress, but, in other cases, kampung may have difficulties in finding strong and influential leaders, so that these kampung may not be able to make so much progress. It seems that, the more prosperous the kampung, the more chances for it to have a capable kampung leader.

In Ratmakan and Terban Baru, for example, kampung people were lucky enough to be able to elect kampung leaders of a relatively higher social and economic status than the average kampung members. In these two kampung, therefore, leaders have shown their best leadership qualities and have been able to mobilize people to conduct community projects in a way which is considered to be beyond the usual or traditional leadership role. In Ratmakan, the RW chairman with his wide personal networks, took the initiative of contacting some important decision makers among the city authorities, thus getting a head start in the process of community development. Several times he mentioned that he can directly phone the Mayor or other senior government officials regarding kampung issues—something that is considered unusual or exceptional. In Terban Baru Kampung, although the kampung leader does not have such a wide social network as the leader in Ratmakan, his educational background in political science and his good knowledge of the local situation (he is a native of the kampung) allowed him to organize the communal land invasion effectively, which benefited at least 250 households. Thus, in these two kampung, the leaders seem to be clearly aware of their positions and their roles; it is the public confirmation of a leader’s prestige or the respect already accorded him that repays him for his time and energy.
In Gondolayu and Blimbingsari Baru, however, kampung people have not been lucky enough to find motivated and influential leaders. Considered to be socially and economically not as prosperous as Ratmakan and Terban Baru Kampung, the people in Gondolayu and Blimbingsari have difficulties finding higher social and economic status kampung leaders. In Gondolayu Kampung, after Romo Mangun left the kampung, a local leader was elected. He was able to maintain social order in the kampung, but he seems not to have capacity to make further progress. His personal background as a private security guard may be respected by kampung members, but he does not have enough skill and knowledge to develop networks with external agencies effectively. The existence of this kampung still depends on support from external agents. In Blimbingsari Baru, the RT leader expressed his feeling that he is actually quite reluctant to remain in the position; he accepted the position only because no one else was willing to be the RT leader. He does not have specific plans for the kampung, and hopes that soon someone else will replace him.

This study concludes that, although the role of kampung leaders is so crucial, there are many reasons not to be very optimistic about their role. One main reason for this is that, practically speaking, it is very difficult to find strong and influential leaders. Many kampung members may have the same, or even better, knowledge and skill as the kampung leaders in Ratmakan and Terban Baru, but they may not have the same community spirit and concern with leading their kampung. With the future potential of differences in goals and interests among kampung members, kampung leaders' roles will become more difficult and problematic; fewer people may therefore be willing to fill the position. Further, with increasing external pressures on kampung, the RT and
RW leaders will also have to be able to play a ‘buffering role,’ in order to defend kampung from external threats. Playing such roles seems to be very difficult, as leaders lack an effective power base and sufficient authority to enable them to establish and institutionalize linkages between the community and the bureaucracy.

Table 8.1
Leadership within Kampung along the Code River

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Motives:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Social duty (pengabdian masyarakat)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Enjoyment (senang)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Perceived roles of RT/RW:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Community and social services</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Maintain social order and guiding people</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C. Problems commonly faced:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Sometimes difficult to mobilize people for community projects</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Many ideas, but no/limited funding</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. People not always aware of kampung problems</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D. Costs and benefits of becoming kampung leader:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Costs:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Time and labor consuming</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Sometimes must spend personal money for community (nombok)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Benefits:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Wider and better social networks and relations</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Public recognized</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Psychological and spiritual satisfaction</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. More influence in kampung community</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interviews with kampung leaders, August-Sept. 1996

8.1.4 The RT and RW: Co-operative or Confrontational?

In Chapter Three, it has been presented that according to Sullivan (1992) the RT and RW institutions were created by the government for the government’s purposes. Contrary to common perception, they are not the results of an ancient co-operative
communal tradition, but are rather a relatively recent social-political practice. The Indonesian state has deliberately and skillfully fostered gotong royong communalism as an integral part of urban administration. The RT and RW roles have been limited to servicing basic needs and maintaining social order within communities, under the government-sponsored ideology of social harmony and stability (rukun and tentrem). RT and RW, therefore, were created with a clear aim, as an instrument of social control.

Faced with pressures on their communities, however, some RT and RW have begun to reinterpret their roles. In Ratmakan and Terban Baru Kampung, for example, although the two kampung have totally different strategies and means, the overall role of RT and RW can be considered to be progressive and to go beyond their traditional role of maintaining social order. From the perspective of community development, here RT and RW have been able to perform their function of organizing collective action for the benefit of the community. In Gondolayu and Blimbingsari Baru, although not as progressively as in Ratmakan and Terban Baru, the RT and RW have been able to organize collective action and realize several community projects that benefit kampung people. It can be said in general that the RT and RW in the four kampung observed have been able to foster kampung members’ sense of community, to provide important social welfare, and to develop valuable infrastructure at a low cost to the people.

These findings are very important, as they lead us to the more fundamental question concerning the kampung’s role in the future urban development of Indonesia. Logsdon (1974) argues that in the future the RT and RW system will become a device for making effective demands, under the leadership of the RT/RW chairperson as a community leader. Perhaps this is possible, but it depends very much a number of...
factors, notably including kampung history, the nature of kampung members, and the quality of kampung leaders. Particularly in the case of the poorer kampung, where kampung members have little or no time to contribute to community projects, and where kampung leaders do not have the capacity to organize collective effort, RT and RW will continue to play a limited role.

The development strategy that a kampung chooses, however, is of the greatest importance. In Ratmakan, the ability of kampung leaders to develop 'co-operative' relations with various external agencies, particularly with the state, enabled kampung people to receive both material and political support. In Terban Baru Kampung, the lack of relations with external agencies hindered the kampung from getting their support.\(^4\) Further, the 'confrontational' character of the land invasion, which was not followed by more careful co-operative approaches to the authorities and the Kraton, resulted in a situation in which 'recognition' was not given to this kampung by the authorities. It seems that confrontational tactics, including formal litigation, are generally counterproductive in cultures that depend on patronage-interpersonal relations. Flexibility and the ability to locate the focus of decision-making power (which is not always based in formal or official structures), along with a willingness to cultivate personal ties, are likely to be important characteristics for success.

This study argues that, although in some cases the RT and RW could become effective devices for demand-making, currently they are mere facilitators. The extent to

\(^4\) It is very important to note that, despite the fact that the RT and RW play significant roles in kampung development, it appears that networks and collaboration among RT and RW are very limited. Interviews with kampung leaders showed that networks and collaboration with other RW were limited to those nearby, or to RW that had previously been under the same RK.
which RT and RW are able to influence decision-making and bargaining depends upon the extent to which community leaders and community organizations empower themselves, and the modes by which they express and exercise power. Three important things are clear from this study: first, attempts to organize collective action are unlikely to succeed, unless all community interests are accounted for, and large numbers of community members are involved; second, the RT and RW provide an important link to both formal and informal agents outside community; third, confrontational tactics are generally counterproductive in cultures such as Indonesia that depend on patronage and interpersonal relations to a large extent.

8.2 The Government and its Ambiguous Attitude toward Kampung

As implied by the previous discussion, the way the government has responded to the development process of the kampung can be termed as ambiguous, uncertain, and inconsistent. This section will further discuss this issue, focusing on two aspects: the operation of the government and the government's motives. It will show how the 'state' in Indonesia is an extremely complex set of institutions and agencies, with overlapping, contradictory, and inconsistent functions, motives, and activities.

8.2.1 The Operations of the Government: Fragmentation or Mismanagement?

As described earlier, there are many government agencies involved in the development process of kampung in Yogyakarta. At first glance, it seems that these government agencies are strongly coordinated with each other. Particularly in relation to the riverside dike project, the coordination among ABRI, PU, Bangdes, DKP, and Dinas
Sosial, seems to have been very good. PU prepared the budget and designed the engineering plans, while ABRI managed the day-to-day activities in the field. Further, several other government agencies were also involved in different projects in support of the riverside dike project: the Bangdes provided the budget for housing improvement and the Dinas Sosial provided rice for meals in support of gotong royong activities. A more detailed observation of the process, however, shows that, far from being unified or coordinated, government agencies tended to be fragmented, and each government agency tended to focus on its own interests. There are three items of evidence to support this conclusion.

The first item derives from the fact that the three main government agencies most responsible for urban planning (Bappeda II, Ditako, and BPN) were not fully involved in the talud project. For the Bappeda II and Ditako, the reason was clear; these two government agencies consider the project as not in accordance with the master plan for the city that they had developed. As in the master plan, the Code area was planned to be a green zone, involvement in the project would have meant that they did not follow the plans that they had created themselves. The head of BPN explained that the reason the office did not become involved was because PU and ABRI did not ask his office to participate. The fact that, six years after the project’s implementation, coordination between PU and ABRI on the one side, and Bappeda II, Ditako, and BPN, on the other side, has not developed, shows that the talud project is still not accepted officially by all government agencies within the municipality.

Further, despite their hesitation about the project, it is interesting that both Ditako and BPN nevertheless continued to process individual applications for building
permits and land certificates in the area. As found from field observations, many people occupying land along the dike were able to secure land certificates from BPN, and building permits from *Ditako*. This evidence shows another inconsistency between the official policy of not becoming involved in the talud project and the practice of giving building permits to individual applicants from the area. It is possible that the head of *Ditako* did not know that his staff was processing building permits applications in the Code area, but this further shows that there was no coordination, even within the *Ditako* itself.

Finally, all case studies showed that there is little coordination between PDAM and PLN, on one side, and PU, BPN, and *Ditako*, on the other. No matter what the legal status of a kampung, its housing or land may have been, the PDAM and the PLN continued to provide their services to whoever needed them and was able to pay the costs. Thus, even though it was clear that they had occupied the land illegally, the people in case studies 2, 3, and 4 were able to get access to electricity from the PLN and to piped water from PDAM. Such practices clearly create more confusion regarding the legal status of kampung.

Lack of management skills and of detailed knowledge of the laws and regulations may be an explanation for the low level of coordination among government agencies. But it can be hardly be denied that the same agencies show a high degree of effectiveness in other tasks, as well as cleverness in cashing-in on the many administrative steps. This study argues that fragmentation among government offices is something that goes beyond merely technical problems; it seems that individual and groups within government agencies need to maintain such uncoordinated performance
or discretionary power, in order to insure their own survival. In other words, such actors may able to work more effectively, but since this would mean that that they would lose their political and financial benefits, they are not willing to do so. Thus, the BPN, for example has frequently been accused of creating and maintaining complicated procedures for the procurement of land documents. Further, they have been also accused of manipulating land status, for the sake of petty ‘tips.’ Some kampung people reported that, by giving ‘tips’ to the officials in BPN, they are able to improve their land status from ‘riverflat,’ with no status, to ‘right to use’ status (HGB).5

For community development to be effective, therefore, it is important to consider the presence of individuals as well as institutional interests. When new community initiatives seem harmful to individual or institutional interests of the state agencies, those connected with those interests may delay, modify or reject them. The riverside dike project has clearly shown that, because the project met the institutional and individual interest of some state agencies (ABRI, the Major, PU, and others), those agencies then supported the project and contributed their resources to it.

8.2.2 The Government Response: Social Welfare or Social Control?

Gilbert and Ward (1985:242) propose that three models of the state can be used to understand state responses to settlement upgrading: the liberal state, the instrumentalist state, and the structuralist state. The liberal perspective views the state as a liberal entity, the interest of which lies in developing a form of welfare society.

5 A detailed observation on corruption in urban planning and management in Indonesia is presented by Server (1996). He argues that corruption is impeding the development of innovative and creative solutions to urban problems is undermining the full realization of potential resources of the city.
Therefore, developing specific programs and interventions related to the process of settlement formation or upgrading is part of the state’s function, in spreading the benefits of economic growth. The instrumentalist perspective argues that the state is the tool of the dominant class in society, and the state ensures that the interests of that class are maintained and extended. In contrast, the structuralist perspective shows that the state frequently acts against the clearly defined interests of dominant groups. From this perspective, the capitalist class and the state are separable, the latter enjoying ‘relative autonomy’ from the later.

The evidence from the four case studies in Yogyakarta, however, shows that there is no clear pattern of relations among the state, the dominant class in society, and the community. In other words, the state’s attitude toward the kampung is unclear, inconsistent, and unpredictable.

In Ratmakan, there was a total shift of the state’s attitude concerning the existence of the kampung, from rejection to recognition, and even to a supportive program to improve the kampung. In Gondolayu, although initially the state strongly rejected Romo Mangun’s ideas for such a ‘transitionary’ kampung, finally (after the kampung received the Agha Khan award) the state leaned toward recognizing the kampung. Not only was a new RT for the kampung established to integrate the new kampung into the administrative system of urban society, but the kelurahan even used the kampung as an example of ‘the best practice’ in a village competition. In addition, it is also important to note that Golkar supported the kampung directly, by constructing a public well and MCK. This kind of supportive attitude toward Ratmakan and Gondolayu kampung was not given to Terban Baru and Blimbingsari Baru kampung. It
is true that these new kampung were integrated into the RT and RW system, and that some government offices helped the kampung with basic services (electricity and piped water), but formal recognition in the form of government programs and land tenure improvement was not given.

What then governs the responses of state agencies, in terms of supporting or not supporting the process of settlement formation and consolidation? Does it depend upon the individual attitudes and ideologies of state officials?; or does it depend more on practical reasons, such as the availability of budget, personnel etc.? In the light of problems faced by popular settlements, it is very important to understand the motives of state agencies and to account for the ways in which they handle community issues.

In the case of Latin America, Gilbert and Ward (1985:243) conclude that state intervention on behalf of the poor is mainly done for political purposes, especially when the poor have raised a serious threat to social stability. In other words, social and political control has been the main motive for state to support the poor in this region. In Indonesia, as Warren (1993) argues, the state’s emphasis on the provision of basic needs (e.g. kampung improvement programs) was meant to further promote the identification of national development policy with local interests. Thus, the provision of basic needs such as education, health care, family planning, and other infrastructure is intended and used as an instrument of social control. This study argues that, while social control is still the intention of the state in its response to kampung problems, the evidence in Yogyakarta shows another important factor. This is the pragmatic, uncoordinated actions by individuals and institutions, acting within the state agencies for their own interests—an attribute of systemic personalism.
As Chapter Two has argued that understanding the political dimensions of settlement development has often assumed that the 'state' is a monolithic homogeneous body. This assumption, according to Doebele (1994:45-46), can be very misleading. Governmental agencies of all countries, however hierarchical they may appear on organization charts, in fact often promote policies that are far from consistent, either with each other, or in effectively advancing the interests of any single dominant class. This fact is important, as it provides challenges for communities and their leaders in trying to determine the settlement development process. In a situation where state policies on kampung are inconsistently implemented and where the state agencies are fragmented, there is enough room for community to influence state action. The community can thus maximize the benefits of its relations with the state.

8.3 The Role of Intermediary Agencies: Advocating or Mediating?

Turner (1988) suggested that there are three key roles played by NGOs or intermediary agencies in relation to governments and people in settlement development: (1) as 'enablers' (to help people to organize, to articulate their demands and to assess their own resources); (2) as 'mediators,' or advocates, between the people and the authorities; and (3) as 'advisers,' or consultants, to the controlling authorities on ways and means of changing the decision-making structures to increase local access to resources. The discussion below evaluates the role that these intermediary agents played in the development process of four case studies.

There are at least four groups of intermediary agencies involved in the development process of kampung. The first is the religious groups, Catholic and
Muslim. The Catholic Church was represented in particular by Romo Mangun. Islam was represented by several organizations and individuals who helped kampung people financially, in order to build mosques. The role of Romo Mangun was very influential; not only did he live and work together with kampung people, but he also wrote several articles in the local newspaper, arguing that support should be given to kampung. In other words, his role was influential in developing positive public opinion about kampung. Romo Mangun showed the public that such marginal people could be empowered and that such wasteland could be developed into a lively kampung.

The second intermediary agent is the Kraton and the Sultan. The Sultan’s role was also very important. The amount of money that he donated to kampung people was not very large compared to the total funding from the government, but its effect should not be minimized. Socially and politically, it was very significant in increasing people’s confidence about their status and struggle. Many kampung residents believed that once the Sultan became involved in kampung matters and in helping kampung people, no one would likely remove the kampung.

The third group of intermediary agencies includes universities and students. Their role was particularly important in assuring government officials that improving the kampung was a much more realistic solution than removing them. Further, sending students to work together with kampung people (through the KKN program) helped to increase people’s feeling of security.

The fourth group of intermediary agencies involved in the development process of the kampung were the NGOs and other ‘charity’ organizations, such as the Rotary Club and HKSN. Their role, however, was very limited in terms of providing financial
or material support. Further, unlike the religious groups, these groups also tend to work for short-term period and focus more on physical targets.

As can be seen in Table 8.2, the role of intermediary agencies in the kampung development process is important in five areas: (1) to help communities to consolidate and mobilize their resources and to increase public awareness of kampung problems; (2) to help kampung people with financial or other forms of assistance; (3) to develop public opinion in support of kampung development; (4) to help kampung people to develop networks with other intermediary agencies; and (5) to enhance kampung residents' feeling of security.

**Table 8.2**

**Summary of the Role of Intermediary Agencies in Kampung Development**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agencies</th>
<th>Motives</th>
<th>Forms of Relations</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Religious groups</td>
<td>social-religious</td>
<td>financial/material &amp; moral supports</td>
<td>very important to enhance feeling of security and social harmony.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Kraton/Sultan</td>
<td>social-cultural</td>
<td>acknowledgment, ‘formal’ status over land</td>
<td>very important in terms of moral support, feeling of security; acknowledgment of kampung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Universities</td>
<td>social-academic</td>
<td>short-training; mediation with other external agencies</td>
<td>very important; effective in giving feeling of security/moral support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students &amp; faculty members</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>no political motives; short-term basis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. NGOs and 'Charity' groups</td>
<td>social</td>
<td>financial/material support</td>
<td>important only on a short-term basis; no comprehensive plan and approach; unable to sustain capacity building.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It can be said in general that, although not as Turner suggested, these intermediary agencies have significantly facilitated the development process of the kampung. Although they rarely influence the state’s responses to kampung in any direct and fundamental way, these agencies acted as enablers and mediators, to help kampung people to organize their own resources and to increase kampung people’s feeling of security. However, several problems were also found with regard to the involvement of such agencies in kampung development.

The first is the fact that these intermediary agencies become involved in kampung issues without comprehensive plans and approaches. Except for Romo Mangun, whose help for the kampung was based on a clear and broad concept of community empowerment, most intermediary agencies helped kampung on the basis of conventional charity principles. As is typical of such charity approaches, they operated on the basis of compassion and the myth of a caring society, seeing their target group as helpless objects. This principle clearly has several weaknesses, particularly as it requires endless donations of resources from the ‘haves’ to be redistributed to the ‘have-nots’ and fundamentally disempowers them.

The second problem concerning the intermediary agencies involved in the kampung development process was that they tended to work on a short-term basis, focusing on physical targets. None of the NGOs or other voluntary organizations worked with kampung people on longer-term, broader, socio-economic activities. Most projects finished within a period of 2-3 weeks or so, and were rarely followed up by further activities or co-operation.
Lastly, most support or assistance tended to be in the form of material or financial support. Assistance in the form of ideas and skills was given by the university students, but this was not followed up by action. Training that can increase the capacity of kampung communities to manage their kampung seems necessary. This could include basic knowledge of environmental health, small scale business administration, building standards and regulations, and management skills. Unfortunately, no such training was provided.

The above discussion on the role of intermediary agencies questions previously propositions about the role of NGOs in urban development. This study shows that it is important for NGOs to maintain their role as intermediaries, rather than becoming advocates (especially in encouraging the community to reject the state’s programs). This means that NGOs should take a ‘neutral’ position in order to maintain a ‘healthy’ relationship with the state. As Clark (1991) has suggested, it is important that the NGOs move from a ‘supply side’ approach concentrating on project delivery, to a ‘demand side’ emphasis helping communities articulate their concerns.

8.4 The Failures of the Formal, Legal Mechanisms

Within the context of community development it would be ideal if there were a legal system that could guarantee open, equal and reciprocal relations between communities and external agencies. Any consideration of the role of law and formal regulations in Indonesia, however, must go beyond a simple description of law as a neutral mechanism that guides relations and conflicts within society. For community development to be effective in such situations, therefore, an understanding of the socio-
political complexity of the legal system is necessary, and this includes extra-legal elements based on personal and hierarchical networks and exchanges, in which legal structures and procedures are manipulated by the various actors involved. This section will discuss this issue, divided into four aspects: the ambiguity and inconsistency of the illegality issue; the failure of the formal mechanisms; the perceived security; and the overall costs and benefits of illegality.

8.4.1 The Illegality of Kampung: Some Ambiguities and Inconsistencies

Burgess (1985b) points out that at least three laws are important in determining the legal status of a settlement: (1) laws regulating the ownership of land; (2) laws regulating the transfer of land; and (3) laws regulating land development. Some settlements are categorized as illegal because they do not conform with formal procedures and standards concerning land and building aspects; some settlements are identified as being legal in respect to the laws regulating rights to ownership of land and its transference, but are illegal in respect to the laws regulating land development (i.e. zoning and building codes). Settlements are usually categorized as squatter, as the land for the settlements was invaded illegally and does not legally belong to the residents. Further, such settlements are also considered to be sub-standard or classified as slum if they do not follow the building standards imposed by the government.

In the case of the kampung in Indonesia, however, some ambiguities and inconsistencies exist concerning this issue. The first of these concerns the land issue. As described in Chapter 4, the problem in Yogyakarta is that land tenure is complicated by the fact that both the modern and the traditional systems are operating together...
simultaneously. In the kampung, the situation is further complicated by the fact that the *ngindung* system is still widely practiced, as well as the fact that the inheritance of land does not usually follow a legal or formal procedure.\(^6\)

It therefore becomes very difficult to state clearly whether a kampung should be considered legal or illegal with respect to land tenure. In the four kampung observed in this study, two different types of kampung can be distinguished. The first is kampung that are developed on public land without permission or legalization, such as case studies 2, 3, and 4. They can be categorized as squatter settlements, since people invaded the land illegally and built on it without building permits. The second type of kampung is more complicated, as it contains both legal and illegal elements. Ratmakan Kampung is an example of this type. In this kampung, some people clearly occupied the riverflat area without legal or formal permission from the government, and therefore could be considered illegal. However, most of the land in this kampung is legally owned by kampung people. Some plots of land may not be registered, some may be under dispute, and some may be held under the *ngindung* arrangement, but this does not mean that the kampung people do not have a right to their land. There are many reasons why people just do not want to register or formally legalize their land (this issue will be discussed further in the next sections).

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\(^6\) Although not always brought to court, land disputes among family members is believed to be increasing in the kampung. As explained by the head of BPN Kotamadya, many such conflicts are caused by factors such as: the lack of a formal certificate which defines the legal owner of the land, the lack of a formal letter stating that the land has been given to the owner's children, and the lack of clear boundaries between land sub-divisions. As suggested by Doebele (1994:51), since the inheritance system of land in developing countries is significantly influences the informal land market, further inquiry into this system is necessary for developing a more appropriate land policy.
The second ambiguity concerning the illegality of the kampung relates to the building standards imposed by the government, or the building permit procedure (IMB). The IMB in Yogyakarta is based on Local Regulation No. 5, 1988 (Perda 5/1988). It is stated in article 2 of this regulation that all individuals and agencies should have an IMB before they can start construction; buildings without such permits can therefore be considered as illegal. In Yogyakarta, however, only about 30 per cent of the total number of buildings were constructed with IMB (Ditako, 1995). Such a situation, of course, creates ambiguity and difficulties, since the majority of buildings in the city can technically be classified as illegal.

Further, another ambiguity concerning the illegality of kampung can be seen from the city planning perspective. As described earlier, the controversy that occurred regarding the existence of the kampung along the Code River focused on the question of whether such a ‘marginal’ area is habitable. On the one hand, the government officials held that such an area was not suitable for living, and therefore should be free of any development. On the other hand, the community and Romo Mangun held that, since means could be developed to protect the area from flooding, there was no reason why the kampung should be removed. This kind of controversy represents the ambiguity that exists concerning land use planning in the city. As in other Indonesian cities, the municipality of Yogyakarta has developed a very rigid land use plan. This plan strictly designates areas within the city for specific purposes. Such an ‘ideal’ city plan was inspired by Western planning concepts. However, the fact that the city itself is formed largely by kampung shows how unrealistic such a plan is.
Finally, there is the ambiguity of kampung status related to the socio-administrative issue, particularly the establishment of RT or RW. Although some kampung were developed 'illegally' on government land, the government continued to facilitate the establishment of RT or RW for these new kampung. Socially and politically, this process is very important, as it gives settlers a feeling of security. Further, the establishment of the RT or RW also facilitates the development of a sense of community, as these structures enable the mobilization of internal resources for community projects. From the formal, legal perspective, however, the establishment of RT and RW reveals another ambiguity concerning the legal circumstances of kampung. Even though the kampung are illegal in terms of land occupation and building standards, still the RT or RW themselves are established by the government and recognized as legal community organizations.

In brief, the legality or illegality of a kampung is difficult to define clearly, as it is related to several dimensions which are not always quantifiable. One thing is clear, however, that the government itself also contributes to and takes benefits from this situation.

8.4.2 Why do People not Obey Laws and Regulations?

The above discussion concerning the ambiguous status of the kampung leads to another important question concerning the reasons why people obey or do not obey laws and regulations, i.e. why is it that the kampung have almost always been developed in conditions of some degree of illegality? As learned from the four case studies, five reasons appear to be significant in this regard.
The first, and perhaps the main reason, why people do not obey the laws and regulations is that it is only through illegal mechanisms that they can have access to resources, particularly land. Since the formal land market in Yogyakarta does not work very well, and land prices and land speculation tend to be uncontrolled, there is only a limited chance for the urban poor to get access to land through this formal market. In this situation, it is clear that the only alternative for them is to violate the law by the illegal invasion of public land.

The second reason why people do not obey laws and regulations is because the laws and regulations themselves are excessively complex, and are therefore beyond people’s comprehension. Not only do people not understand the extreme land development standards imposed by the government, but also the long and complicated procedures create many burdens for them. The requirements for applying for the IMB, for example, are very complicated as well as time and money-consuming. Such building permits should theoretically be issued within a week, but in practice the procedure of organizing necessary back-up documentation and the actual issuing of the building permit takes several months. In brief, such administrative steps and the ‘illegal’ levies imposed by corrupt officials have discouraged people from obtaining formal titles for land and IMB.

The third reason why people are reluctant to follow laws and regulations concerning land and housing development is that, without having formal or legal certificates, people can still have access to some basic services, particularly piped water and electricity. Thus, no matter what the legal status of the land and buildings in a kampung may be, the PDAM and the PLN will provide their services, as long as people
can pay the costs for such services. In other words, there is no practical benefit to having legal title to land and IMB, since basic services are provided by some government agencies regardless of the legal status of land and buildings.

The fourth reason why only a few people follow the formal, legal mechanisms is because sanctions are rarely applied to those who do not obey laws and regulations. In other words, since the cost of not obeying laws and regulations is smaller than obeying them, people choose the former. As explained by the head of Ditako, it is only in a case when people need a legal certificate for a bank guarantee that they then follow such laws and regulations.

The last reason why people choose not to obey laws and regulations concerning land and building standards, is that having legal tenure over land and IMB are not necessarily a guarantee of long term security for their housing and property. The fact that, in many cases, housing units that are categorized as legal (meaning that the owner has legal certificates for both the land and buildings) can still be relocated by the government, makes people more pessimistic about the importance of having legal title over their land and buildings. As stated under the Basic Agrarian Law (the BAL 1960), the government of Indonesia enjoys a status of what is called ‘hak menguasai negara,’ or ‘right of control by the state,’ in all matters related to land. This principle, which is stated in the Indonesian constitution of 1945, gives the state much greater power in land matters than is generally the case in the West. As has been discussed by several scholars of Indonesia, this situation creates fundamental questions concerning how society can control such power or ensure that the state really exercises this absolute authority for the benefit of society (Struyk, et. al. 1990; Wignjosoebroto, 1994).
As argued by Gray (1991), Indonesians perceive access to courts or other formal means for enforcement and dispute resolution to be expensive, along with being time-consuming; they believe decisions to be unpredictable, the power needed to enforce decisions to be lacking, and corruption to be prevalent. This study confirms Gray's argument. Kampung people continue to depend upon informal or illegal mechanisms, since following the formal, legal mechanisms means creating more burdens for themselves.

8.4.3 Legal Land Tenure and the Sources of ‘Perceived Security’

As has been discussed in Chapter Two, improved land tenure security through land regulations is commonly assumed to be the basis for the long-term establishment of a settlement. However, as this study indicates, housing improvement is more a function of residents’ perceptions of a benign future wherein threats are absent. What sources or factors, then, give kampung people a feeling of security?

From the four kampung observed in this study, it seems that there are at least three main perceived sources of security. The first source of perceived security comes from the ambiguity and inconsistency of the government's attitude toward kampung. Continuing to provide kampung with some basic services; helping to improve kampung; issuing identity cards or KTP for squatters and establishing the RT and RW; and receiving land taxes and building taxes from kampung all make kampung people feel that, despite the government's reluctance to acknowledge their kampung formally, in reality the government actually recognizes their existence. For the government, this is, of course, quite problematic. On the one hand, kampung exhibit some forms of illegality
or informality, which the government would not like to see perpetuated. On the other hand, it is now impossible for the government totally to ‘wipe out’ the kampung from the city. Kampung people seem to understand this situation quite well, and that is why they feel secure regardless of the illegal status of their land.

The second source of security derives from the Kraton’s or Sultan’s involvement in kampung issues. Particularly since the Sultan gave direct support to the riverside dike project, people feel that the Sultan recognizes their existence. People in Blimbingsari Kampung also believe that although their request for ‘magersari’ status from the Kraton is still pending, someday in the future the Sultan will give them that status.

On top of that, however, the most important source of perceived security is recognition from the public at large. There are at least four sources of public recognition that make kampung people feel more secure about their status: 1) the international and national communities; 2) the university and students; 3) the voluntary groups or NGOs; and 4) the mass media or the press. As described earlier, international and national awards were given to the kampung along the Code River, in recognition of their success in improving their kampung. These awards were really appreciated by the kampung people, as endorsements of their efforts to further improve their kampung. Particularly for the kampung leaders, who hold their positions on a voluntary basis, these awards really bolstered their dedication and increased their contribution to their respective kampung.

Further, the involvement of the university and students also became an important source of security. Most of the kampung leaders interviewed expressed their great appreciation for the decision made by Gajah Mada University to conduct the KKN
program in their kampung. University involvement in kampung issues gave people more confidence that they are not alone in their struggle to defend and improve their kampung. The involvement of various voluntary organizations, particularly religious groups, was also important. With the direct involvement of a national figure like Romo Mangun, kampung people felt that the public at large was concerned about their problems. The mass media, especially the local newspaper, were very influential in developing positive public opinion about kampung. By regularly reporting on the progress of development in the kampung along the Code River, the mass media were able to encourage both the public and, more important, the government, to continue their support of kampung.  

It can be concluded from the above discussion that the relationship between land tenure and housing improvement is not simple, and that granting legal tenure by itself is not sufficient to generate settlement consolidation. The level of security perceived by a settlement’s residents is not always in accordance with the degree of formality or legality of the settlement, as defined by its conforming to the state’s laws or regulations. In other words, it may be true that security leads to improvement, but, as has also been argued by several writers, it is not always true that ‘legalization’ is necessary for improvement (Angel, 1983:137; Baross, 1990). Evidence from the four case studies confirms that a feeling of security can come from many different sources; 

7 Clippings from one local newspaper (the Kedaulatan Rakyat) show that, since the first dike project in Ratmakan in 1991, this daily newspaper continually reported the progress of the riverside dike project. Besides, many articles in this newspaper also mentioned the positive aspects of kampung improvement along the Code River. All such information was important as it helped to develop public awareness of kampung issues or problems.

8 This finding confirms what has already been found by many researchers in other developing countries (Angel, 1983; Varley, 1987; Baross and Van der Linden, 1990; Fitzwilliam Memorandum, 1991; Jones and Ward, 1994).
and the main source was not always the government, but the public at large. The following discussion will summarize the costs and benefits of legalization or formalisation of kampung.


From the perspective of urban productivity, incorporating laws and regulations into the informal settlements is primarily directed at enhancing the efficiency of the process and increasing the economic value of such settlements. It is assumed that, by providing formal and secure tenure to a informal settlement, particularly to the land component, people will be more willing to invest their resources in the form of housing improvements. Further, land and housing with legal tenure can be taxed by the government, thereby conferring more economic exchange value on them.

In the case of the kampung in Yogyakarta, however, formal or secure tenure does not directly increase the willingness of kampung residents to improve their housing and kampung. Much more crucial for them is recognition of the whole kampung as a legitimate urban community. Besides, formal tenure can also have a negative impact on housing affordability in general, as it increases housing costs to a significant degree and therefore limits the poors’ access to housing. In other words, as formal titles increase the land’s marketability, they eviscerate its ability to accommodate the poor.

In contrast, preserving some form of illegality within kampung enables the poor to bypass the costs of formal procedures, and therefore makes it easier for them to have affordable housing. The illegality of a kampung also enables its residents to practice a
system of land inheritance which is quite complicated and which probably could not be
accommodated by the existing formal land regulations. Another benefit of the illegality
of kampung is that it enables kampung residents to improve incrementally their
individual housing units, as well as their kampung. In addition, this incremental process
of housing improvement also enables informal developers and individual construction
workers to become involved in the process and to make their livings from it. Besides, by
renting out part of their houses or using part of their houses for producing commodities
(foods, handicrafts, clothes, etc.) or as small warung, or shops, kampung residents can
get extra income, or even provide their main income source.

Further maintaining some elements of the illegality or informality of the
kampung also provides some benefits for the government. First, by leaving a kampung
in its illegal status, the government can avoid their responsibility to help the kampung.
As the availability of government funding for urban services is limited, the illegality of
the kampung can be used by the government as a justification for not providing the
kampung with enough services. In other words, kampung illegality has been used by the
government as a means of rationing urban services. Second, maintaining the illegality of
the kampung also enables the government to supply the need of the private sector for
strategic land within the urban center at a relatively low price. In other words, illegality

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9 In their analysis of popular settlements in Latin America, Baken and Van Der Linden (1992)
have concluded that there are six reasons why illegal settlement is tolerated: (1) the government has no
alternative or cannot, for political reasons, afford to frustrate such an important source of land supply for
the poor; (2) the system provides land and creates large groups of small land owners, who thus have a
stake in the existing social system; (3) illegal settlement is a source of patronage; (4) it provides
opportunities for commercial and industrial companies, and so supports the economic system; (5) this
form of housing is relatively cheap, so that labor and service costs remain within certain limits; and (6) the
system is no burden to the state.
can give the government flexibility in managing urban development.\textsuperscript{10} Third, maintaining the illegality of the kampung also enables the government officials to take advantage of the situation for their own profit.\textsuperscript{11}

Finally, for the government, maintaining the illegality of the kampung also means maintaining social stability in general. In other words, the illegality of the kampung may be tolerated, as it is relatively unimportant to the working of society in general;\textsuperscript{12} illegality is tolerated because illegal settlements serve as a safety valve against broader social tensions.

Despite many benefits gained by maintaining the illegality of the kampung, however, there are many disadvantages faced by both the kampung people and the government. For kampung people, the illegality of their kampung means that the long-term security of their kampung is doubtful. In addition, having no legal certificate legitimizing their land and housing also hinders kampung people from using their property as bank guarantees.

\textsuperscript{10} Many urban redevelopment projects in Yogyakarta, such as the development of malls, supermarkets, hotels, and other public services (public markets, gas stations, and bridges), were developed on land that was previously kampung land. As some land within the kampung was not registered, or considered to be public land, the compensation for the kampung residents was usually low. Besides, the position of kampung people in the land transfer process is relatively weak since the process does not facilitate them to directly negotiate with the buyers. Kampung people are represented in such transactions by government officials from the \textit{kelurahan} or \textit{kecamatan}.

\textsuperscript{11} This can be done in several ways, such as by buying cheap unregistered land within kampung and then selling it for ten times the original price after improving the land tenure, or by collecting bribes from kampung residents wishing to improve their land tenure.

\textsuperscript{12} Sullivan (1992:196) uses the term ‘selective blindness’ to refer to the way in which the state selectively enforces legal laws or regulations within society for the sake of its general stability. According to him, in general, the state is marginally more tolerant in matters of basic needs such as establishing squatter settlements on public land, but less tolerant (or zero-tolerant) with regard to political offenses, such as establishing unofficial trade unions.
On the government side, this illegality also brings some costs or problems. First, the illegality of kampung results in the perpetuation of bad records of land registration, as well as building registration, especially for the BPN and the Ditako offices. Second, bad records of land registration and building permits also mean that local government revenue that can be collected through these two mechanisms is also very limited. With increasing pressure on local governments in Indonesia to raise their own revenue or income the demand for possible local income, including that from establishing a proper land registration and building permit system, is expected to increase. Finally, maintaining the informality of the kampung means violating some sound and necessary planning principles.

8.5. Kampung and the Persistence of ‘Informality’ or ‘Illegality’

In summary, as can be seen in Table 8.3, maintaining the illegality or informality of kampung brings both costs and benefits for the community as well as for the state. It is, of course, very difficult if not impossible to quantify such costs and benefits. However, the fact that almost 80 per cent of the urban residents in Yogyakarta depend upon this illegality suggests that, for now at least, this illegality or informality works for the benefit of the majority. In other words, in a situation where most urban residents already survive in an ‘unregulated’ manner, or as Abrams (1966:37) calls it, “order without law”, we should consider very carefully the possibly regressive outcomes that regulation and efficient management of land delivery systems may have for the poorer economic groups.
As Leaf (1994:12, 1993b) argues, in Indonesia, the formal and informal land delivery systems are both components of a single, integrated system, which has worked for the benefit of both the government and civil society. Thus, we must question the effectiveness of the current efforts to upgrade the legal status of urban land. Attempts at regulation may expose the poor to costs that they did not have to face before.

The above discussion, of course, is not a rejection of the legalization policy completely, nor does it discount the possibility that, in certain circumstances in the future, legalization of land tenure and popular settlements can contribute positively to urban management and to development in general. In other words, further consideration of the costs and benefits of legalization is required.

Table 8.3
Summary of Costs and Benefits of Illegality of the Kampung

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>For the Kampung People</th>
<th>For the Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Costs</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- no long term guarantee for the kampung</td>
<td>- bad records of land registration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- vulnerable to eviction</td>
<td>- bad records of building registration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- cannot use property for bank guarantees</td>
<td>- small revenues for BPN and Ditako</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- weakens the kampung’s position when conflicts with external agencies occur</td>
<td>- violates sound and necessary planning principles; lower housing standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- creates more dependency on the state</td>
<td>- limits the availability of public land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- negative efforts to implement ‘the rule of law’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Benefits</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- makes housing supply efficient-affordable</td>
<td>- covers the weakness of the government in redistributing resources/rationing services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- keeps land and housing prices low</td>
<td>- enables the gov. to change land use planning/enables the gov. to implement urban redevelopment programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- makes possible the traditional system of land arrangements (<em>ngindung</em>)</td>
<td>- enables government officials to make extra income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- makes possible inheritance system of land</td>
<td>- reduces potential social conflicts and maintains social stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- enables residents to exercise incremental improvements to housing and kampung</td>
<td>- provides job opportunities for informal contractors &amp; construction workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- provides job opportunities for informal contractors &amp; construction workers</td>
<td>- enables kampung residents to make extra income</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This final chapter concludes the discussion presented in the previous chapters, considers policy and theoretical implications, and suggests an agenda for further research.

9.1 Kampung Development: Process, Factors and Implications

9.1.1 Process and Factors

Having reviewed the dynamics of the development process of kampung along the Code River, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, this study has been able to enrich our understanding of the socio-political factors that support or hinder communities' abilities to determine their housing process—the main objective of this research. Several important findings can be summarized as follows:

First, this study has found that, although kampung people have exhibited a remarkable degree of effort and have been able to provide their own settlements, their position continues to be very weak, and they are still very much dependent upon the assistance of the state and other external agencies. Kampung people have little control over many elements which are important for kampung development, particularly land and infrastructure. Furthermore, the current legal framework for urban and housing development is not accessible for the majority of kampung people, and therefore it cannot guarantee the long-term security of kampung. In such a situation, kampung people have been able to form and improve their settlements but continue to live under threat; the long-term security of their kampung remains uncertain.
Second, the nature of policy formulation and implementation in relation to kampung is characterized by a fluid and reciprocal series of interrelationships among many individuals and agencies, both within and outside government. Patron-client relations exist between government officials and agencies and kampung people, and this determines the level of government support which kampung receive. Such relations continue to survive, particularly because of the persistence of imbalances in control over resources and power between the government and the kampung communities. The government agencies support kampung people only if they also get advantages, in terms of both the individual, pragmatic interests of government officials and agencies, as well as in terms of the state's interests in general (i.e. maintaining social stability or legitimizing the state's authority). Such a process can be considered unfair, because only a few particular kampung have the ability to take part in the process. Moreover, it is also unhealthy for effective community empowerment, because it reinforces the status quo and the reliance of communities on the state.

Third, in relation to this second finding, the role of laws and regulations is secondary, since by many criteria informal and personal mechanisms work more effectively than such formal means and benefit both the state and the society. As this study has shown, legal structures and procedures (e.g. land occupation and certification, the building permit process) are manipulated by the various actors involved, and this creates an unhealthy situation, because only those who have patronage ties with government agencies or officials are able to gain benefits. Kampung people are therefore forced to continue to depend upon informal or illegal mechanisms, since following the formal, legal mechanisms means creating burdens for themselves. Further,
within the existing legal framework, there is no mechanism that enables individuals and communities to control any deviations by the state officials or institutions. In brief, the implementation of the current legal framework for urban development benefits only the state and the few others that can manipulate such frameworks effectively.

Fourth, although in general the state controls power and resources, the state is not always a unified body that has clear and consistent policies and attitudes toward kampung. Instead, it is also fragmented and uncoordinated. This study has shown that the interests of the various components of the state (e.g. ABRI, government agencies and officials) can sometimes be contradictory and conflictual in relation to kampung development. Each government agency tends to work in relation to its own standards and interests; several government agencies will work together only if they gain direct benefit from a particular project or program.

Finally, because state policies and attitudes toward kampung are inconsistent, or vaguely developed and implemented, there remains enough room for the people of a kampung and its leaders to influence state action. A kampung community can thus maximize the benefits of its relationships with the state and non-state agencies, in order to achieve its own ends. In other words, despite the several external problems described above and the increasing internal conflicts within communities (e.g. land disputes among kampung members, differences of opinion concerning the future of their kampung) kampung communities have much potential by which, with some appropriate assistance, they would be enabled to play a more active role in the dynamic process of urban development. Under strong and skillful kampung leaders, the positive values of gotong royong and musyawarah-mufakat can be strategically mobilized for the benefit
of kampung people. In this context, the role of voluntary agencies such as NGOs should be maximized and directed at mediating between the kampung communities and external parties. At present, their role in this area is limited; most voluntary organizations work with no comprehensive strategy, on a short-term basis, focusing on physical targets, and are therefore unable to enhance and sustain the capacity building of the communities with which they deal.

9.1.2 Implications: Social Harmony or Status Quo?

From a broader perspective, housing development or settlement upgrading could be evaluated by several basic criteria or variables. Gilbert and Ward (1985:174-176) propose that four aspects or variables are important in assessing housing-development or settlement-upgrading processes. These four are: (1) raising levels of material improvement to communities, (2) raising levels of community activity and participation, (3) the relationship of a community to the state, and (4) the effects on society. From their studies of settlement improvement processes in Latin America, Gilbert and Ward found that in that region there is little community participation, little collective activity and few material improvements to communities. Further, rather than community involvement leading to changes in the values or structure of society, in Latin American contexts the major influences originate with the state. In general, these mechanisms have resulted in decreased community autonomy and reduced community participation.

Compared to such findings on Latin America, the process of community action in the four case studies in Yogyakarta had a different outcome. The level of community participation and material improvement in the four case studies was high. In all four
case studies, the ability of communities to mobilize labor, time and money was remarkable. Utilizing the existing community organizations, the RT and RW, and the gotong royong spirit, supported by both state and non-state agencies, the communities were able to organize collective actions for the benefit of kampung people. In brief, kampung people have shown a remarkable degree of success in providing their own housing.

At the same time, however, the process itself maintains or even reinforces each community’s reliance on the state. Particularly in the case of the riverside dike project, it is clear that community action was integrated into the wider framework of state power and interests. Further, by integrating all the kampung into quasi-formal administrative units (RT and RW), social control has been achieved over all kampung. Such a process may promote ‘harmony,’ or rukun, but it does not promote equality and freedom from exploitation. In other words, such a process is socially stable, but implicitly stagnant.

9.2 Lessons for Policy and Planning

9.2.2 International Context: Market Enabling or Community Enabling?

As is widely recognized, the idea of the ‘enabling strategy’ was adopted as the main strategy proposed in the agenda of The Global Strategy for Shelter to the Year 2000 (GSS) in 1987. The GSS aims at achieving adequate and affordable shelter for all, regardless of income, gender, age, and physical capacity. From a review of the literature concerning the strategy, however, it is apparent that there has been little critical discussion of the strategy since it was proposed, and the idea of enablement remains
ambiguous. Particularly important in this context is that the strategy does not fully consider the broader socio-political realities in which it is to be implemented.

In general, such strategies mean the reduction of direct government intervention in the housing development process; further elaboration of these strategies, however, tends to lead in two different directions. The first emphasizes the enablement of the market to supply housing (market enabling approach/MEA) while the second emphasizes enabling the community (community enabling approach/CEA) to control its own housing process. As these two tendencies have very different philosophical backgrounds and orientations, it is important that planners and decision makers in developing countries clearly understand the implications of favoring or not favoring a particular approach (Jones and Ward, 1994; Leaf, 1993a; Pugh, 1994).

Basically developed from neo-classical economic theories, the MEA analysis housing markets in terms of supply and demand. It is assumed that, as market economies in developing countries are growing, a market-based solution to urban problems, including that of housing, is justified. This approach views housing problems as arising primarily from an imbalance between housing supply and demand. In other words, this approach implies that if the bottlenecks which hinder the free market of housing production by the private sector can be cleared, the market can work more effectively to deliver needed housing. In brief, increasing the efficiency of the housing production process as a whole will allow developers to go ‘down market’ and provide affordable housing for the poor (Mayo et al., 1986; World Bank, 1991, 1993).
Such an approach fits well with the idea of ‘urban productivity,’ as proposed by the World Bank. As can be seen in several of the World Bank’s documents concerning urban development, particularly “Urban Policy and Economic Development: An Agenda for the 1990s” (World Bank, 1991), and “Housing: Enabling Markets to Work” (World Bank, 1993), the World Bank considers land and housing issues within the context of the urban economy; this view moves beyond housing and residential infrastructure and emphasizes the productivity of the urban economy and the need to remove constraints on productivity (World Bank, 1991, 1993).

As argued by Jones and Ward (1992:17) and also by Baken and van der Linden (1993), the World Bank thus favors a formal housing industry, developed by the private sector, rather than a process of incremental-informal housing development conducted by the popular sector. In other words, the Bank is focused on the MEA, as a means of increasing urban efficiency and productivity. Rather than examining and exploring ways in which communities can be enabled to develop and improve their shelter, the World Bank’s focus is upon ways in which markets can be enabled to increase the productivity of cities—such a view does not address the housing needs and strategies of the poor.

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1 As many have been aware, the influence of the World Bank on urban and housing policies in developing countries should not be understated. Pugh (1994:159) argued that, since it entered the field of low-income housing projects in 1972, the Bank has exerted a powerful influence on the development of housing theory and policy. It should be noted, however, that expenditures by international aid and finance organizations are quite low. Only 1 per cent of the United Nations total grant-financed expenditures in 1988 went on human settlement. In 1991, loans from the World Bank and the International Development Association for urban development and water supply and sewerage amounted to only about 5.5 per cent of their total lending (Sitarz, 1994).

2 Further detailed evaluations and criticisms concerning the World Bank agenda on urban productivity can be seen in writings by Baken and van der Linden (1992, 1993), Pugh (1994), Jones and Ward (1994); while replies are presented by Malpezzi (1994); Cohen and Leitmann (1994); Wegelin (1994); and Lee, B.K. (1994).
While it is certain that the market enabling approach (MEA) addresses the inefficiencies in housing markets, it ignores the socio-political aspects of such markets, accepting as a given the large inequalities of capitalism. In other words, under this policy there are no guarantees that special attention (or support) would be given directly to the problems of informal settlement—something that characterized previous World Bank involvement in site and services schemes and upgrading programs (Pugh, 1994:160-162). Further, Baken and van der Linden (1992:75-77) believe that a self-correcting market has never been achieved in reality; there are many factors that contribute to the imperfect and irrational nature of markets, so that a market approach in itself would not guarantee access to affordable housing for the poor.

As this study has shown, the tendency of governments in developing countries such as Indonesia to adopt only the market enabling approach could have detrimental effects on the popular housing sector. Within the market enabling approach, for example, there is no need to call specifically for the state’s direct intervention, in order to ensure that the poor will have access to affordable and adequate housing. Further, with the tendency of governments always to be on the side of capital, the struggle of the poor for urban resources, particularly for land, becomes more and more difficult.

In brief, if there is one most important lesson to be gained from this study, it is the idea that promoting the community enabling approach is not only useful but necessary. It is necessary in order to counterbalance the global trends which favor the market enabling approach, and which thereby neglect the needs of the poor for adequate and affordable shelter. In other words, the reasons for advocating a community enabling approach (CEA) are many, but the most fundamental reason is based on the ethical
consideration that, in the context of increasing modernization and the developing global market, the interests and the needs of poor communities have increasingly been neglected.

As implied by this study, however, the main goal of CEA should not be the achievement of absolute autonomy and control, but rather an increased and, ideally, a balanced control over resources and the decision making process related to urban and housing development. Further, it is also important to stress that CEA does not suggest a total rejection of the role of the state. Instead, it stresses the need to make the state more transparent, more open to public scrutiny, and more responsive to societal concerns. In its operational form, therefore, CEA involves assisting communities to consolidate their resources, to negotiate with external agencies, and to express and achieve their interests and concerns. It should be clear to communities that they will gain resources and security only if they are effectively able to organize collective actions and to act politically. This, in turn, requires extensive interactions with external agencies as well as capacity building within communities.

9.2.2 The Indonesian Context: Rule of Law and Community Empowerment

Comprised largely of informal settlements or kampung, but undergoing rapid changes and developmental pressures, Indonesian cities pose a dilemma for planners and decision-makers. In what direction should urban and housing development strategy be developed and implemented? The policy of Indonesia's government toward the kampung has, for several decades, been one which has accepted their de facto status. This policy has enabled kampung to provide about eighty per cent of Indonesian urban
housing (Struyk et al., 1990). With increasing development and commercialization in Indonesian cities, and a growing interest among international agencies and bureaucrats in fostering the economic functions of these cities, however, the future of Indonesia’s kampung is uncertain. There is some doubt that the current status quo policy will be able to serve the future objectives of urban development in terms of efficiency and productivity. On the other hand, there is no clear answer to the question of whether a more formalized process of urban development is likely to reduce existing economic and social inequalities. In this context, I will now suggest several policy and planning recommendations for Indonesia.

1) General Housing Policy. The first lesson derived from this study is that the government of Indonesia should give more attention to the effectiveness of the informal settlement or kampung, which continue to provide serviceable and affordable shelter for the majority of urban residents. The tendency toward favoring the market enabling approach should be carefully reevaluated, as it does not properly address the social considerations necessary for housing policy. From the perspective of community enablement, programs such as KIP should be reformulated to include much more comprehensive community development programs (human and economic development), as well as stronger and more meaningful community participation.

2) Developing a fair, transparent urban development mechanism. The second important lesson is that the Indonesian government should direct its efforts at developing fairer, more transparent and democratic processes for urban and housing development. Urban development is based upon more than an economic rationale, and involves many complex socio-political factors. This suggests that more transparent and
fairer urban development mechanisms, which guarantee the involvement of all parties, including kampung people, are not only important but necessary. As this study has shown, it is true that the formal legal framework alone cannot address the complexity of informal mechanisms in urban and housing development. This observation, however, is not a total rejection of the idea that, in certain circumstances in the future, the formal legal framework can contribute positively to the creation of more democratic and fairer urban development processes. From this perspective the following recommendation emphasizes the need for reformation of the formal legal framework for urban and housing development, both at the philosophical and at the practical levels.

3) Careful reformation of the formal legal framework for urban and housing development. With respect to the second lesson, the third lesson for policy is concerned with efforts to reformulate the legal framework, the laws and regulations concerning urban and housing development. The fact that regulations concerning housing and land development are unable to solve present problems suggests that we should carefully re-examine both the philosophical basis, as well as the implementation of these laws and regulations. In this context, it is crucial that efforts to formalize and legalize urban and housing development mechanisms should be carefully conducted, in accordance with the social, cultural, and political contexts of Indonesian society.

4) Reorienting planning theory and practice. The fourth lesson we can gain from this study is that planners in Indonesia should clearly understand that urban and housing development is basically a socio-political process. The role of planners, therefore, should go beyond merely mapping out the physical layout of the city, working for the
state and articulating the state's interests. They must deal with broader socio-political issues of urban development, and act to further values of equity, justice and democracy.

5) Community empowerment. Finally, and most importantly, the communities themselves should learn and clearly understand that they have to empower themselves. As urban growth continues and requires even more land for commercial purposes, the kampung, which now comprise the major part of urban areas, will become the main victims or targets of urban development. With increasing external and internal pressures on kampung, kampung communities should be aware that their future very much depends on their ability to establish solidarity among their members and to negotiate with external agencies. In other words, it is very important to maintain and strengthen the solidarity of kampung communities, since they safeguard the interests of the majority of the urban poor. Equally important, each kampung community should clearly understand the outside, external socio-political realities, and this includes an understanding of both the strengths and weaknesses of the state.

In this context, two practical efforts that are necessary to strengthen the capacity of communities include: (1) providing training for community leaders, particularly in terms of their capacity to develop networks both within and outside communities, and (2) developing mechanisms that can facilitate networks or collaborations among communities/RW. These are two activities in which NGOs can play significant roles.

9.3 Theoretical Implications and Suggestions for Further Research

Housing theories and studies have traditionally been concerned with the physical aspects of housing or settlement patterns. In general, such housing theories and studies
were directed at developing housing standards, and took the perspective that housing was defined merely as ‘shelter’ and should conform to some sort of physical and architectural standards. This tradition altered quite fundamentally when, in the 1960s, Turner promoted the idea of housing as a verb or process, and argued the importance of considering the social aspects of housing. However, studies following from Turner’s thesis, however, commonly neglect the relationship between housing and broader social issues, such as social welfare, power relations, equity and social change. It has been argued, therefore, that the concept of self-help as individual effort tends to reinforce the status quo and works against social change or progress (Ward, 1982; Mathey, 1992).

Challenged by this situation, Castells (1977, 1983) and Burgess (1978, 1982, 1985a) proposed Marxist perspectives for analyzing and theorizing about housing (and urban) issues; they argued that housing studies and housing policy should be framed within the context of power relations. Burgess argues that the practice of self-help may improve the physical standards of a settlement, but that it cannot guarantee any raising of people’s political consciousness. He interprets self-help housing as ‘double exploitation,’ because it forces the poor to rely upon their own efforts to shelter themselves. In other words, this situation allows the government to escape responsibility for the welfare of society. The main attack in Marxist writings concerning housing problems is usually directed at the state, which, according to the Marxist view, fails to serve public interests, particularly those of the poor, and tends to be the agent of capital.

From this perspective, Castells proposes that new strategies in urban social movements should be directed, not only at making economic demands on collective consumption (in the case of settlement upgrading this is the demand for physical
improvements); instead, such strategies must represent something more: that is, a call for meaningful social change. These Marxist approaches, however, have been criticized for their failure to provide solutions for the problems which they raise.

Starting in the 1980s, with the development of the so-called ‘global market’ and the adoption of ‘structural adjustments’ supported by many international agencies, the housing issue has been viewed mainly as an economic issue. The World Bank’s policy on urban and housing development, for example, clearly advocates integrating housing into the wider urban economy, and developing both the housing sector and the urban economy as vehicles for promoting general economic growth and productivity. From this perspective, housing studies and policies have therefore focused on the economic aspects of housing; they assume the existence of a perfectly competitive housing market, in which supply will respond to demand unless there are particular constraints. This trend, referred to here as the market enabling approach, has been criticized by many scholars for neglecting the sociological and political dimensions of housing.

This study is framed within the context of the historical development of housing studies and theories briefly discussed above. It argues that housing issues are basically complex, involving not only economic but also socio-political factors. Efficiency in housing production, as promoted by the market enabling approach (MEA) is, of course, important. At the same time, however, social considerations in the formulation of housing policies should not be neglected. It is from this perspective that the community enabling approach (CEA) for the popular housing sector should be determined; however limited its results, it should be implemented as part of a broader agenda of social equity.
Acknowledging the importance of the socio-political dimensions of the CEA may also provide an alternative which bridges the gap between the ‘social’ aspects of self-help or informal settlement advocated by Turner and the ‘political’ aspects of self-help advocated by Burgess and Castells. The use of the term ‘socio-political aspects’ in this study reflects the imperative to view the politics of informal settlement, not in terms of class structure, but in terms of complex societal relationships, such as the patron-client relations that exist widely in the developing world. The interpretation of CEA proposed in this dissertation retains the emancipatory spirit of a ‘social movement;’ however, it does not conceive of power relations solely in terms of class struggle. Instead, it concentrates on the promise of individual and community emancipation—the basis of what Friedman (1992) calls ‘community empowerment.’

It is undeniable that, since the growth of urbanization is inevitable, we must find solutions for sheltering millions of the urban poor will be sheltered in the future; however, it is equally important (if not more so) to create urban environments which could become places for nurturing and developing better, more peaceful, and more democratic societies. In other words, besides obtaining access to land and services, and increasing their influence on public decision making and resource allocation through settlement upgrading, the poor can also obtain access to political power, as well as to economic and social opportunities. In brief, I would argue that the scope of housing theories and studies should be broadened, not only to understand the pragmatic aspects of housing problems but also to comprehend other problems in society.

Bringing this perspective into the Indonesian context, I would argue that two main agendas for urban and housing studies in Indonesia are particularly important. The
first agenda is related to the question of developing a more open, fair, and democratic urban development mechanisms. Crucial to this agenda is further exploration of the future role of laws and regulations in urban and housing development. The present study has shown that 'illegality' and 'informality' can serve to benefit both the state and society. This is, however, not to suggest that the legal framework of regulation should be disregarded totally. In other words, what Indonesia needs is a better and more appropriate legal framework, that could bridge the gap between formal and informal procedures, between legal and illegal mechanisms. With the trend toward increasing variants in interests both within and outside communities, it is very important to study further whether Indonesian society will, over time, come to place more reliance on legal process in solving conflicts or disputes related to urban and housing development or, alternatively, whether the age-old reliance upon informal interpersonal mechanisms will continue to persist.

The second agenda for urban and housing studies in Indonesia is related to the question of what the future form and nature of urban communities in Indonesia will be and what roles community-based organizations such as RT and RW will play. The present study has shown that, in the case of marginalized kampung such as those located along the Code River, kampung communities and their local institutions (RT and RW) are still relevant for mobilizing collective efforts for the benefit of kampung people. Further, the values of gotong royong and musyawarah-mufakat are also still relevant, particularly in providing kampung with basic infrastructure and social or community activities. As urbanization continues and Indonesian cities are transformed, several fundamental questions beg to be answered: How will such particular community forms
and values change? Can the increasing tension and the variety of internal conflicts among kampung members be solved through the *rukun* concept and the *musyawarah-mufakat* mechanism? Will RT and RW remain relevant for making effective demands?

An even more fundamental question is this: will the idea of an urban community based on locality or spatiality, still be relevant in the future of Indonesian society?

Under the two broad research agendas above, the following sub-themes could be further explored:

1) **An examination of the nature of the existing legal framework for urban planning and management in Indonesia, to evaluate in particular its relevance for addressing the complexity of urban phenomena.** In this context, as Cotterrell (1992) has suggested, an examination of the legal framework should critically address the socio-political origins and effects of law, the conditions for change in the character of legal regulation, and the socio-political consequences of legal ideas and institutions.

2) **A study of the economic and socio-political effects of regulating or formalizing housing and land development.** The present study has shown the general costs and benefits of formalisation and regulation in kampung development, but further detailed studies are needed, which cover a broader urban environment beyond the kampung boundaries. Particularly important in this regard is the relation between formal and informal housing development mechanisms, as well as between housing and other economic sectors.

3) **An exploration of appropriate mechanisms that can guarantee the rights of communities to become fully involved in the urban development process.** The current Indonesian Law on Spatial Planning (UUPR No.24, Th. 1990) states briefly that people
have the right to participate in the urban planning and development process. So far, however, there is no clear and detailed guidance on how such participation can be facilitated. There is no clear answer, for example, concerning whether local community institutions such as RT and RW have the formal or legal right to represent kampung communities in situations of conflict or dispute with other parties.

4) Comparative studies on the role of community-based organizations (CBOs) in different types of kampung and in other real estate housing complexes. So far, most studies on urban communities have focused on marginalized kampung, such as those observed in this study. It would be very important to explore further whether CBOs are still active and relevant in better situated kampung or in modern housing complexes.

5) In relation to the above sub-themes, the role of NGOs in urban areas is also a very important area for further study. So far, most NGOs in Indonesia have worked in rural areas and have focused on rural issues. The fact that within the next few decades most of the population in Indonesia will live in urban areas suggests that NGOs should also direct their attention to urban issues. Important in this context is the question of what strategies NGOs should adopt, in order to help the urban poor more effectively.


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UU. No.9/1979. *Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 9 Tahun 1979 tentang Pemerintahan Desa.*


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<tr>
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<th>summer 1996</th>
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<td>2. Land Agency/BPN I</td>
<td>Goeritno (land registration - head)</td>
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<td>3. Public Works/PU I</td>
<td>Nanik Linggawati (P4HT project - head)</td>
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<td>4. Governance Office</td>
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<td>5. Governance Office</td>
<td>Patrem Murdianto (staff)</td>
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<td><strong>B. Municipal Government</strong></td>
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<td>3. Public Works/PU</td>
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<td>6. Governance Office</td>
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<td><strong>D. Indonesian Army/ABRI</strong></td>
<td>Bambang (staff)</td>
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<td><strong>E. Yogyakarta Sultanate/Kraton</strong></td>
<td>Sutopo (staff)</td>
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<td>8. Park Office/DKP</td>
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<td>9. Kelurahan Office</td>
<td>Frans Sarono (Ngupasan - head)</td>
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<td>2. Urban Forum</td>
<td>Dambung P. (members)</td>
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<td>3. Islamic organization</td>
<td>Haji Misbach (Imam/religious leader in Blimbingsari)</td>
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Appendix 1 (continued)

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<td>1. RW Leaders</td>
<td>Karman Soekarno (RW 08, Ratmakan) v v</td>
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<td>Moelyono (RW 7, Terban Baru) v v</td>
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<td>Hardiyat (RW 3, Blimbingsari) v v</td>
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<td>Arif (RW 1, Ledoksari) v v</td>
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<td>Djawal (RW 1, Tukangan) v -</td>
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<td>Soebroto (RW 7, Wirogunan) v -</td>
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<td>Ledjar Soebroto (RW 4, Perwakilan) v v</td>
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<td>Taryoto (RW 07, Ratmakan) v v</td>
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<td>Paryo (RW 13, Jogoyudan) v -</td>
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<td>Soeharjono (RW 1, Suryatmajan) v v</td>
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<td>Soeroto (RW 13, Suryatmajan) v v</td>
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<td>Hadi Suyono (RW 15, Suryatmajan) v v</td>
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<td>Budi Raharjo (RW 3, Tukangan) v v</td>
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<td>Hariyanto (RW 13, Tegal Panggung) v v</td>
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<td>2. RT Leaders</td>
<td>Mulyono (RT 03, Blimbingsari Baru) v v</td>
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<td>Altope (RT 15, Ratmakan) v v</td>
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<td>Aminun (RT 6, Perwakilan) v v</td>
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<td>Adi Prayitno (RT 01, Kotabaru) v v</td>
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<td>Ibu Tri Hartono (RT 02, Terban) v v</td>
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<td>Soekardi (RT 01, Terban) v -</td>
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<td>3. Kampung residents</td>
<td>8-10 persons in each of four kampung observed in this study (random sampling) v v</td>
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<tr>
<td>H. Individuals/Academics</td>
<td>Haryadi (Environmental Studies, UGM) - v</td>
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<td>Soedaryono (Planning Department, UGM) - v</td>
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<td>Dambung (YUDP) - v</td>
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<td>Poniman (Museum Sono Budaya) v -</td>
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<td>Bambang Soenaryo (Political Science, UGM) v -</td>
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## APPENDIX 2
Guidelines for Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups of Actors/agencies</th>
<th>Purposes of Interviews</th>
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| State Agencies            | • to obtain detailed insights into the way the state agencies work  
                            • to assess their motives, attitudes, and strategies in dealing with kampung issues  
                            • to assess the way in which state agencies coordinate their work  
                            • to assess their performance in general |
| Intermediary Agencies/NGOs| • to obtain detailed insights into the way in which these agencies work and help kampung people  
                            • to assess their plans and strategies in helping kampung people  
                            • to assess their relations to kampung people and state agencies  
                            • to assess their performance and role in kampung development |
| Kraton                    | • to obtain an understanding about kraton's policy toward its r land  
                            • to obtain an understanding about kraton's attitudes toward kampung issues  
                            • to assess the roles of kraton in kampung development |
| Kampung Leaders           | • to obtain detailed insights into the process by which kampung have been developed and improved  
                            • to obtain detailed insights into the way kampung leaders work, particularly the way they mobilize internal resources and develop relations with external agencies  
                            • to understand their socio-economic backgrounds and motives  
                            • to assess the role and capacity of kampung leaders  
                            • to assess problems and challenges faced by kampung leaders |
| Kampung members           | • to obtain detailed insights into the process by which kampung have been developed and improved  
                            • to obtain detailed insights into kampung dwellers' view of government policies and programs in relation to kampung  
                            • to assess the problems and challenges faced by kampung dwellers  
                            • to assess their views concerning the role of RT/RW and their leaders |
| Academics                 | • to obtain their views concerning kampung and urban issues  
                            • to obtain their opinions concerning government's policies and programs in relation to kampung  
                            • to obtain their ideas on how to support kampung development or improve government policies and programs |
APPENDIX 3
Topic for Discussion/Interviews

A. Provincial Government

1. Planning Board (Bappeda I)
   - What is the most important kampung problem, and in what ways is it important?
   - How does Bappeda I involve in several planing instruments such as: location permit, building permit, KIP, urban redevelopment, and other infrastructure development?
   - Does the provincial government develop a special policy toward kampung?
   - In your opinion, do you think that the current legal framework for urban planning and management in Indonesia adequate enough to address urban and housing issues?
   - In your opinion, what is the weakest part of the mechanism?

2. Land Agency (BPN I)
   - What were the problems faced when the BAL was implemented in Yogyakarta in 1980s?
   - Does BPN I has special policy and program related to Kraton land?
   - What are the main problem of land management in this region?
   - In your opinion, do you think that the current legal framework for urban planning and management in Indonesia adequate enough to address urban and housing issues?
   - In your opinion, what is the weakest part of the mechanism?

3. Public Works (PU I)
   - To what extent have the PU I could interfere urban planning and management at the Kotamadya level?
   - How does PU I involve in several planing instruments such as: location permit, building permit, KIP, urban redevelopment, and other infrastructure developments?
   - Does PU I develop a special policy toward kampung?
   - In your opinion, do you think that the current legal framework for urban planning and management in Indonesia adequate enough to address urban and housing issues?
   - In your opinion, what is the weakest part of the mechanism?

B. Municipal Government

1. Planning Board (Bappeda II)
   - What is the most important kampung problem, and in what ways is it important?
   - Does Bappeda II has a comprehensive policy and plan toward kampung?
   - How does the current urban plan address kampung issues in this city?
   - What are the current policy on kampung along the three rivers in this city?
   - Why the Bappeda II was not involved in the riverside dike project?
   - How does the Rakorbang mechanism conducted?
How far RT and RW involve in the mechanism?
In your opinion, do you think that the current legal framework provide opportunities for people and community to participate in plan making and implementation?
In your opinion, do you think that the current legal framework for urban planning and management in Indonesia adequate enough to address urban and housing issues?
In your opinion, what is the weakest part of the mechanism?

2. City Planning (Ditako)
- What is the most important kampung problem, and in what ways is it important?
- Why the riverside dike project is implemented only in kampung along Code River?
- Why the Ditako was not involved in the riverside dike project?
- What are problems faced by this office in managing building permit system (IMB)?
- Does special criteria and procedure for IMB are developed for kampung?
- What are problems commonly faced by people when applying for IMB?
- In your opinion, do you think that the current legal framework for urban planning and management in Indonesia adequate enough to address urban and housing issues?
- In your opinion, what is the weakest part of the mechanism?

3. Public Works (PU II)
- How does the current IUIDP project address kampung issues?
- What are problems found in the implementation of KIP?
- How far does kampung people involve in the KIP?
- How does PU II manage the riverside dike project?
- Why does ABRI involved in the project? What are the costs and benefits of involving ABRI in the project?

4. Land Agency (BPN II)
- Does BPN II has special policy and program related to Kraton land?
- Does BPN II has special records on Kraton Land?
- In your opinion, do you think that the current legal framework for urban planning and management in Indonesia adequate enough to address urban and housing issues?
- In your opinion, what is the weakest part of the mechanism?
- How does BPN II involve in the riverside project?

5. Village Section (Bangdes)
- What is the most important kampung problem, and in what ways is it important?
- Does Bangdes has special program on kampung?
- What kind of assistance that Bangdes give to kampung people?
- How does Bangdes manage the annual village contest (lomba desa)?

6. Law Section (Seksi Hukum)
- In your opinion, do you think that the current legal framework for urban planning and management in Indonesia adequate enough to address urban and housing issues?
- In your opinion, what is the weakest part of the mechanism?
7. Environmental Section
- What is the most important kampung problem, and in what ways is it important?
- Does this office have a special program on kampung?
- In your opinion, what are the most serious environmental problems faced by kampung people?

8. Park Office (DKP)
- What is the most important kampung problem, and in what ways is it important?
- Does DKP have a special program on kampung?
- What kind of assistance do DKP give to kampung people?
- How does the DKP involve in the riverside project?

9. Kelurahan Office
- What is the most important kampung problem, and in what ways is it important?
- How does kelurahan manage the Inpres fund?
- How does kelurahan manage the LKMD process?
- How frequent are meetings among RW in this kelurahan conducted?
- How does kelurahan manage the annual village contest (lomba desa)?
- In your opinion, does the RT/RW effective enough to solve kampung problems?

D. Indonesian Army (ABRI)
- What are the reasons for ABRI to involve in kampung issues?
- What is the main role of ABRI in the riverside dike project?
- How does ABRI mobilize their resources in relation to the riverside dike project?
- What are problems and challenges by ABRI in managing the riverside dike project?

E. Yogyakarta Sultanate (Kraton)
- What is the most important kampung problem, and in what ways is it important?
- What is kraton policy and plan toward the kraton land?
- How do people could gain a magersari status over kraton land?
- What criteria are used by kraton to give magersari status to people?

F. NGOs Leaders
- What is the most important kampung problem, and in what ways is it important?
- What are the interest of this organization in kampung issues?
- Does this organization develop a specific strategy in dealing with kampung issues?
- What is the main role of this organization in kampung development?
- Do you coordinate with other agencies involved in kampung issues?
- Do you think that the government has addressed kampung issues properly?
- Do you think that the current legal framework for urban planning provides opportunities for kampung people to actively participate?
G. Community Groups

1. RW and RT Leaders

- What is the most important kampung problem, and in what ways is it important?
- Does this RT/RW develop a specific strategy or program to develop kampung?
- Do you think that the gotong royong and musyawarah-mufakat still relevant for kampung development?
- What are obstacles to the participation of kampung members in kampung development and improvement?
- How much kampung improvement take place through community participation and community organization?
- What are the external agencies involved and helped kampung people?
- How did you come into contact with this external agencies?
- Has the involvement of this external agent been helpful? In What ways?
- In your opinion, does the government addressed kampung issues properly?
- In your opinion, what is the most important role of kampung leader?

2. Kampung Members

- What is the most important kampung problem, and in what ways is it important?
- Would you explain the process by which you have access to this land?
- Have you ever heard the procedure and requirements for obtaining legal/formal title over the land and building?
- How do you perceive the role of RT and RW in this kampung?
- Do you think that the RT and RW represent your interests?
- In your opinion, what is the most important role of kampung leader?
- Do you think that the gotong royong and musyawarah-mufakat still relevant for kampung development?
- What are obstacles to the participation of kampung members in kampung development and improvement?
- In your opinion, what are the biggest problems faced by this kampung?

H. Individuals/Academics

- What is the most important kampung problem, and in what ways is it important?
- What is the most important obstacle to kampung development and improvement?
- In your opinion, does the government addressed kampung issues properly or adequately?
- In your opinion, do you think that the current legal framework for urban and housing development is adequate enough to address kampung issues?
- In your opinion, does the current legal framework provides opportunities for kampung people to participate in plan making and implementation?
- What is your suggestion to improve the situation?