COMMUNITY-POLICE PARTNERSHIPS:
COPRODUCING CRIME PREVENTION SERVICES -
A VANCOUVER CASE STUDY

by

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Abstract

Since the early 1990s, the Vancouver Police Department has embarked upon coproductive service arrangements with various geographic communities throughout the city of Vancouver. Through the vehicle of storefront crime prevention offices (CPOs), local communities and the police are working in partnership to problem-solve around local crime and safety issues. Three models of crime prevention offices have emerged: ethnic-specific, police-run, and community-run. This thesis focuses on a case study of the community-run model—community crime prevention offices (CCPOs).

Through participant observation, key informant interviews, analysis of policy documents and a review of the respective literatures on community policing and community crime prevention theory and practice, the present case study was examined. Key informants revealed basic partner expectations. The community expect the police to be accessible to the offices through their physical presence and by ongoing two-way communications regarding community crime-related concerns. The police, in return, expect the CCPOs to provide a conduit through which community needs and priorities can be communicated to them. Each partner brings to the office function different responsibilities. The community is responsible for maintaining adequate levels of community support for office programs and services. The police provide a set level of human and material resources to all crime prevention offices.

Much has been written on the rationale behind the “community-police partnership” era. However, less has been written about the effective implementation of such partnerships. While the main thrust behind the formation of CPOs has been occurring since 1994, there are still no clear guidelines set regarding partner roles and responsibilities. The future viability of CCPOs is predicated on the mutual accountability of both the community and the police. Future steps could be taken to ensure the responsibility of both partners in this process:

1) a partnership agreement should be implemented between the community and the police to clarify expectations and role contributions;
2) accountability measures should be in place to reflect partner expectations and roles;
3) the police, as public servants, should address the resource inequities which exist among CCPOs;
4) the community should ensure CCPO programming is responsive to broad-based community need; and
5) ongoing efforts should be made to enhance partner communication.

CCPOs have proven to be a vehicle of great promise. CCPOs are an interesting coproductive blend of community self-help and police re-organization along community policing lines. By first addressing their commitment to each other as partners, and attending to some of the weaknesses in this present partnership configuration, a more effective partnership will result. Such a partnership will better serve their mutual goals to enhance the safety and livability of Vancouver neighbourhoods.
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1.0 CHAPTER ONE: Thesis Context

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The Canadian political climate of the 1990s has necessitated an adjustment in fiscal policies surrounding public service provision. This adjustment has been required in the realm of public order maintenance. As a result of shrinking police budgets (Normandeau and Leighton, 1990), and public demand for more responsive service provision, (Chambers, 1997: 1), police departments feel they have to justify their practices to an ever more discerning polity (Murphy and Muir, 1985).

Mass society of the late twentieth century is characterized by mounting social problems signaled, in part, by increases in crime, if not in real terms, most certainly in terms of fear of crime. This perception has given rise to increased public demand that those employed to keep the urban peace indeed do so. The police are cognizant of the fact that change is in order. They are responding to public demands, but maintain that they cannot be held solely responsible for the maintenance of public order, and expect that the public share with them in this task.

The public has taken up the challenge the police have presented them. Citizens no longer wanting to remain "sitting ducks" are engaging in community crime prevention strategies in many forms and of varied intent (Podolefsky and Dubow, 1981). The police are joining the public in working to enhance the safety and livability of urban environments. Police departments all over North America are abuzz with the promise of such community partnerships. They look to the philosophy of community policing to lead the way in organizational reform. By reorienting their policing philosophies to be kinder, gentler, and
more inclusive, they hope to curb the tide of public discontent (Oppal, 1994), and to resolve organizational and operational deficiencies which have left crime rates at unacceptably high levels (Murphy, 1993).

This thesis explores the concept of coproducive service delivery, in its application to a case study of community-police partnerships. The unit of analysis in this case study is the storefront crime prevention office (CPO), and the specific case looked at is Vancouver, British Columbia. Specifically, this study seeks to determine the effect such offices and their operational partnerships have had on the communities they serve. Key informant interviews, with CPO office staff and Vancouver Police Department members responsible for guiding office functions, provide insight into the partnership implementation process. By describing the expectations of both partners in this process and their opinions of their roles and responsibilities vis à vis one another, and the broader community, a better understanding of the viability of this service delivery arrangement can be achieved.

1.2 RATIONALE

Given the current political and economic climate, increased devolution of service delivery seems inevitable. Senior levels of government are off-loading a wide range of services. This means local levels of government face increased responsibility to provide more services, albeit with increasingly limited fiscal resources.

Fiscal constraint is coupled with an increased public demand for more effective service delivery. Part of this public demand is for greater levels of involvement and participation in service delivery. Citizens are not asking government to “do it all” for them. Rather, many citizens are increasingly interested in helping to provide services that in the past have been
the exclusive domain of public agencies. Both government and the general citizenry are recognizing government's limited capacity to provide adequate social services in either scope or quality. More and more it is recognized that government cannot, and also that government should not be the sole provider of many social services. In response to this, government is entering into a variety of relationships with citizens, and is establishing partnerships to meet many of the service needs of communities.

The formation of such partnerships is seen as the foundation upon which this study rests. Taking the concept of coproductive partnerships as a starting point, this study seeks to understand what general conditions and characteristics increase the efficacy of such joint undertakings.

This study is significant for the field of planning as it examines the efficacy of coproductive service delivery arrangements. Such arrangements impact the spheres of public participation, social policy, and issues surrounding government-nonprofit relationships. Assessment of the viability of alternative service delivery strategies can benefit a variety of human service sectors. Crime prevention is seen as an area which crosses multi-sectoral boundaries. Similar to reforms which are occurring in both education and health, the underlying premise of crime prevention stresses holistic approaches to social problem-solving. Here, this problem-solving approach is entered into by concerned citizens, together with the police, and is seen as a proactive rather than a reactive response to issues. The ultimate goal is that through local problem-solving, social issues will be ameliorated and a healthier, more livable community will prevail. Through its emphasis on self-help, coproduction of crime prevention services calls for the increased role of citizens in program planning and implementation.
It has become almost commonplace to accept the presence of alternative service delivery strategies in the domain of policy options, with partnerships being one among many such strategies. However, little attention is given to the challenges inherent in the implementation process. In order to gain insight into such coproductive arrangements, it is also useful to consider the conditions which impact upon implementation.

1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT

The area of crime reduction and order maintenance is one particular area where coproductive service delivery innovations—in the form of community-police partnerships—is presently underway. Through the vehicle of storefront crime prevention offices, citizens and the police have embarked upon a coproductive relationship. This relationship has been established with the goal of addressing crime and disorder problems. Rather than either side working independently, the stakeholders involved feel that greater positive impacts will be achieved if both the community and the police engage in the joint attainment of complementary objectives. The ultimate goal of both partners is the creation of a safe and secure living environment. Implicit in this study is the notion that the partnership presently underway between the community and the police will provide more effective crime prevention services. While much has been written on the reasons why government is entering into coproductive relationships, there is a dearth of literature on the implementation processes necessary to make these partnerships work in practice. Taking the community-police partnership as a starting point, this study seeks to ascertain what partner expectations and roles and responsibilities have aided in Vancouver crime prevention offices’ viability. Because this community-police partnership is of relatively recent origin, it is timely to assess whether this current coproductive strategy is yielding the positive outcomes it had intended.
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTION

The overarching question of interest in this study is:

How have the partner roles and responsibilities of the community and the police affected the ability of community crime prevention offices (CCPOs) to serve Vancouver communities?

1.5 CASE STUDY OBJECTIVES

Overall

To determine whether Vancouver-based community crime prevention offices (CCPOs) provide a viable mechanism through which crime prevention programs and services are delivered.

Specific

1. How has the organizational capacity of CCPOs affected their ability to deliver services?

Such factors include:
   i. programming goals and prioritization;
   ii. program design;
   iii. monitoring and evaluation;
   iv. resources -human
       -financial
   v. leadership-Board of Directors
   vi. skill level-volunteers
       -staff

2. How has the police role impacted the CCPOs’ ability to deliver services?
1.6 METHODS

1.6.1 Case study

I have explored the above questions by examining a specific crime prevention strategy undertaken jointly by communities throughout Vancouver, and the Vancouver Police Department. My unit of analysis is the crime prevention office (CPO). The majority of my analysis centers around those offices—community crime prevention offices (CCPOs)—which have been opened by community members and are being operated as non-profit societies. It looks at the history behind the opening of such offices, the goals and objectives that they have sought to achieve, and how both partners have served in the functioning of these offices. Internal assessments of the crime prevention office environment, by office coordinators and police liaison personnel, have been sought regarding how their coproductive partnership has affected office service delivery outcomes.

1.6.2 Primary sources

1.6.2.1 participant observation

While I have employed various primary data collection techniques, most extensive has been my use of participant observation. My initial exposure to the crime prevention office environment began with my volunteer commitment to the Mount Pleasant Community Crime Prevention Office in June of 1995. I have had the benefit of extended periods of contractual employment, from March to September of 1996 and February to December of 1997, in three community crime prevention offices in east Vancouver (policing District Three)—Mount Pleasant, Broadway Station, and Joyce Street Community Crime Prevention Offices. Since my initial introduction to the office environment, I have maintained close contact with both
community and police key informants, who have helped keep me abreast of recent topical developments regarding the constant re-tooling of their partnership relationship, and its impact on the offices' function. Ongoing attendance at inter-office Coalition meetings, Board of Directors meetings at the three offices in which I was employed, and access to meeting minutes has kept me abreast of the changing dimensions of the partnership under investigation. As a result, my research is rich with anecdotal evidence. Over a three year period I have been able to directly assess the service delivery process through first-hand exposure.

There have been benefits and drawbacks to my close proximity to the case study at hand. As a result of this proximity, I benefitted from access to a wealth of information sources, have established a rapport with the key informants interviewed, and have had the ability to round out my perceptions of the process under investigation over an extended period of time. The drawbacks, however, concern the bias I have developed as a result of my involvement in the functioning of the offices. The personal relationships which I have developed make critiquing this working environment all the more challenging.

I feel, however, that my stake in the offices adds further depth to my analysis. I hope my analysis will help to determine both limitations and strengths in the current office configuration and in so doing, will better inform participants about future directions they might take to: 1) work more effectively as partners, and 2) deliver relevant services to their communities.
1.6.2.2 key informant interviews

I have conducted a host of key informant interviews (see Appendix I) with office staff, police personnel working in liaison capacities with the offices, and government officials at both the municipal and provincial levels.

crime prevention office staff

The main impressions of the process under investigation have come from the office staff who work in paid and unpaid positions in both the community- and police-run office models presented in this study. The bulk of my interviews with office coordinators dates back to November 1995 (see Appendix II for interview questionnaires). From these informants I hoped to become grounded in the history which surrounded CPO office formation. I wanted to understand how individual offices determined the need for a CPO, and, further, how they established program priorities. As well, I wanted to elicit their impressions of their partnership with police, and to ascertain how they felt this partnership was affecting their ability to provide services.

The information gained from CPO staff interviews has been supplemented by informal interviews (mostly, with the coordinators in the District Three CCPOs), because of the lapse in time from when the original interviews were conducted and the final writing of this thesis. As well, my research focus has changed since the original interviews were conducted. Initially, I was interested in conducting a program evaluation of crime prevention offices. However, it soon became apparent that this would prove difficult. Because of the newness of the Vancouver model, crime prevention offices lacked consistent baseline measures. Through increased familiarity with the topic over time, I became more interested in exploring the dimensions of the community-police partnership which affect the overall efficacy of the offices. Later interviews reflect this shift.
police personnel

I began my initial interviews with Vancouver Police Department (VPD) personnel in the fall of 1995 and completed my interviews in January 1998. Various personnel have been questioned regarding the VPD's relationship with the community through the vehicle of storefront crime prevention offices (see Appendix II for interview questionnaires). Firstly, through such interviews, I was interested in exploring whether the "on the ground" realities of the VPD's mandate were supporting the community policing principles set out in their policy documents. VPD policy documents outlined such community policing principles to include: 1) community partnerships; 2) problem-solving; and 3) communication. Secondly, I was interested in police assessments of the viability of the CPOs, and the community-police partnerships which accompany the offices.

government officials

I have talked with government officials at both the municipal and provincial levels (see Appendix II for interview questionnaires), because of their funding relationship with the offices. The offices have remained largely dependent upon government funds. The procurement of ongoing programming funds for the offices has been contingent upon meeting certain granting criteria. As a result, various government personnel have evaluated the offices and have been questioned about their assessments.

From these interviews I have gained first-hand knowledge regarding the operation of the offices under study and of the partnership which supports them.
1.6.3 Literature review

A review of a variety of literature sources has aided my analysis. Community policing, community crime prevention, community development, and coproduction literatures have rounded out my substantive knowledge of the subject matter, and have helped to shape my assessment of the case study presented. A literature review is utilized throughout the text. In Chapter Two it presents the reasons why the community and the police have come together as partners. Again, in Chapter Four, the literature is drawn upon to support my analysis of the Vancouver case.

1.6.4 Secondary sources

I have supplemented my primary data through the analysis of individual CPOs’ promotional literature and inter-office (Coalition) communications, police policy documents, City of Vancouver administrative reports and policy documents, and media articles. These sources have provided further elaboration on information obtained through participant observations and key informant interviews. I have engaged in a content analysis of CPO promotional documents to determine individual office’s governance and organizational structure, purpose, goals and program descriptions. VPD policy documents help to clarify their roles and responsibilities in this process.

All methods utilized support my evaluation of the efficacy of the community-police partnership under investigation.
1.7 OVERVIEW OF FOLLOWING CHAPTERS

This thesis comprises five chapters. This chapter has laid out the purpose, rationale and methods of the study.

The second chapter is a literature review. Through this review the context of the study will be established. First, from a policy perspective, the rationale for embarking upon coproducive relations is explored. Second, the merits of partnerships and the motivation of partnership formation are then outlined. Reviews of the respective literatures on community crime prevention and community policing highlight the conditions around which the community and the police have mobilized in this present course of action. The characteristics of general programmatic strategies are further identified, and are used as a basis for comparison in the remainder of the text.

Chapter three presents the case study findings. The information explored was gathered by key informant interviews, participant observation, and document analysis. The case study provides a description of the specific process undertaken to establish storefront crime prevention offices, how issues surrounding implementation have affected their intended goals, and what role their partnership arrangement has played in impacting their delivery of services.

The purpose of chapter four is to provide a general analysis of the case study findings presented in chapter three. The chapter examines the future viability of community crime prevention offices. Supported by issues brought out in the literature on community crime prevention and community policing, prescriptions for community-police partnerships are given. Such prescriptions detail both individual and joint partner benefits and
responsibilities, and also explore the areas where both partners are mutually accountable to the broader community.

The fifth and final chapter presents a summary of the issues addressed in this paper. It identifies the benefits accrued to the public through this coproductive endeavour. As well, it identifies the future implications of this partnership arrangement. Such lessons learned will hopefully resonate some degree of meaning to others looking to implement coproductive service delivery arrangements across human service sectors.

1.8 CONCLUDING COMMENTS

There are great merits in the establishment of community-police partnerships. They afford the community greater mechanisms by which to ensure police accountability, while simultaneously providing the police with the opportunity to get “back in touch” with the community—one of the primary tenets of community policing which all progressive police departments are advocating. Few would argue against the pursuit of the crime reduction goals which have fuelled this partnership. However, this partnership must prove to deliver in more than just rhetorical terms. Even though the Vancouver case is four years old, there are still key questions which have not been sufficiently addressed. It remains to be seen if suitable conditions exist to ensure CCPO longevity. It is concluded that both partners involved must recognize their responsibility in responding to the deficiencies addressed here, if they hope to effect the measure of change they have set out to. The recognition is needed from a variety of sectors, that the provision of crime prevention services, through the vehicle of storefront community crime prevention offices, is a valuable and necessary contribution to Vancouver neighbourhoods. The primary objective of this study is to address these issues.
2.0 CHAPTER TWO: Literature Review

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The endeavour to establish crime prevention offices represents a coproducutive effort—that between citizens forming institutional arrangements at the local level in partnership with the police. In recent decades the domain of crime prevention programming has traditionally fallen under the purview of the police function. The current move toward community self-help initiatives represents a reconfiguration of service delivery in this regard.

This chapter explores general notions of coproduction and the benefits of this type of service delivery arrangement. It outlines the historical ingredients which have brought both the community and the police together as partners. As well, the key characteristics of this partnership are presented. Finally, the programs and services typically offered in such a context are detailed. These are presented as the basis for comparison with the Vancouver case study which is described in Chapter Three and analyzed in Chapter Four.

2.2 COPRODUCTION

Urban scholars have recently identified an area much neglected in the citizen participation literature—that of the citizen role in service “coproduction.” Different from past studies which emphasized other participatory roles of citizens in local government, including affecting policymaking, selecting public officials, and consuming and/or evaluating public services, the coproduction role acknowledges that “citizens engage in productive behaviors that can enhance the level and quality of services provided by local service agencies” (Percy, 1984: 432).
Percy (1984) identifies public safety and security as one service area in which citizen coproductive involvement has been documented extensively. The formation of Block Watches, neighbourhood patrols, installation of door locks and window bars, and property engraving for police identification, are all examples of “productive inputs” which citizens undertake, not for mere service consumption, but which are intended to increase the level of public safety.

There have been varying definitions of the coproductive potential of citizens. For the purposes of this paper, a more narrow and focused definition best applies. A narrow definition of service coproduction describes it as the direct cooperative involvement by citizens and employees of service agencies in the production of services. Warren et al. present such a definition: “Coproduction is defined as those actions by citizens which are intended to augment or contribute to the actions of public agencies and involve conjoint behavior” (Warren et al. as cited in Percy, 1984: 434).

The coproductive relationship entered into between citizens and the police has been mutually beneficial. The police have met citizens’ demands for greater accessibility and joint problem-solving, while concerned citizens have aided the police in information-gathering by becoming their “eyes and ears”, and by taking greater ownership and responsibility over the protection of their person and property.

All levels of government have been receptive to greater citizen involvement in service delivery (Salamon, 1995; Seidle, 1995). The involvement of citizens in coproductive activity helps to temper their demands for increased public sector effectiveness and accountability. Citizen involvement fosters a fuller understanding and appreciation of the range of limitations faced by government service producers (Percy, 1984: 438). Greater citizen
understanding of the workings of government service provision is a worthy goal in its own right. More importantly, however, coproductive efforts are thought to improve both the quality and the quantity of services which can be provided (Whitaker, 1980; Seidle, 1995).

Citizens have a stake in affecting levels of crime, and in decreasing the level of fear it creates for themselves and their neighbours. Because of this, their collaboration in the prevention of crime makes sense. Public servants, too, have recognized the limitations of the present system of criminal justice—courts, cops, and corrections—in tackling this problem alone. There seems no sign that crime levels and a host of other arguably interrelated social problems will abate without devising alternative strategies to address them. This realization comes, however, with the concomitant understanding that service provision, generally, must operate in an environment of fiscal constraint. Political pressures to reduce our massive government debt, mean we all must learn “to do more with less.” Part of doing more with less involves citizens, through volunteerism and self-help efforts (Van Til, 1988; ICMA, 1989) in maintaining service standards in areas they deem important, but with less outlay of government monies (Normandeau and Leighton, 1990: 30). Crime prevention is one service area where citizens, in collaboration with police “public servants”, are taking up this challenge (Nuttall, 1989).

2.3 COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION

2.3.1 Where is the community in fighting crime?

While many think citizen involvement in crime prevention is of recent birth, it is not a new idea. On the contrary, it is only in the relatively recent past that the general citizenry has not been the main line of defense against crime and victimization (Lab, 1997: 15).
Throughout most of history, Lab (1997: 18) says, it was the individual’s responsibility, either voluntarily or through obligation, to deal with crime and offenders. It has only been in the last 150 years or so that society has handed this primary responsibility to the state-run criminal justice system.

Since the late 1960s there has been a growing movement toward bringing the citizenry back as active participants in crime prevention. Rather than seeing crime prevention as a new approach to crime control, it is simply a societal re-emphasis on traditional notions of individual responsibility (Lab, 1997: 18). Because crime-fighting measures by the state (primarily through the police) have largely failed in impacting crime and fear in any significant way, the state has been exhorting citizens to take increased ownership and responsibility in helping them face the challenges crime imposes upon neighbourhood life.

This re-emphasis on individual responsibility has been evidenced in citizen involvement in general areas of “locality development” and neighbourhood organizing (Rothman and Tropman, 1987: 3). It is through these mechanisms that community responses to social problems such as crime have been channeled (Cox, 1987: 157). Crime has been an issue which has had significant impact on the urban fabric. Community-initiated crime prevention programs, like many other social service-oriented ones, have been spawned to address the myriad social problems which have been manifest in criminal consequences. Through this means, organizing and developing community capacity is intended not only to ward off the ill effects of disorder and decay, but simultaneously to enhance the “health” and “quality of life” of urban neighbourhoods (Wiatrowski and Vardalis, 1994: 48).

Citizen involvement in crime prevention is often encouraged by the state. For example, citizen initiatives have been supported, and in some cases spearheaded by criminal justice experts who have noted that perhaps the best hope for curtailing crime is through the
cooperation and involvement of local residents (Lurigio, 1995: 55). The centrality of the welfare state’s role in service provision has been questioned in a number of areas (Skelly, 1996: 4; Salamon, 1995; Van Til, 1988; Gidron et al., 1992: 7). Macro-social engineering has fallen into disfavor. It has given way to locally-based, low-key, often piecemeal initiatives that generate program support from “below”, rather than having programs imposed upon communities from “above” (Graham, 1990: 116). Neighbourhood-based organizations are seen to be in a better position to deliver crime prevention programs than the state for a number of reasons. Bennett (1995: 72) and Skelly (1996: 15) feel neighbourhood-based groups are better at generating and sustaining citizen participation, can more effectively promote an understanding of the concepts behind crime prevention activities, develop programs that address broader social causes of crime, and can serve as the catalyst in forming strong partnerships with the police to fulfill these roles.

2.3.2 Who is the "community" in community crime prevention?

When talking about community crime prevention it is difficult to know what this term fully means. Who is the “community” in community crime prevention? It is necessary to operationalize this term from the outset in order to avoid confusion regarding its usage, and to get a clearer impression of who the agents involved in such a change effort are. The term “community” is fraught with ambiguous connotation (Wiatrowski and Vardalis, 1994: 46). The definition utilized depends on the end to which the “community” will be put. The goals of “community” in crime prevention parlance are twofold.
geographical conceptions of community

When crime prevention theorists and practitioners talk about the community who will serve as the means by which services will be delivered, and through which further participants will be mobilized, the term “community” has been most commonly seen to both connote and denote a geographical area (Murphy, 1993: 198; Schneider, 1997: 39). In the context of crime prevention, an urban area is usually implied, whereby people are identified by their “grouping” within a spatially-identified entity. Scholars have defined the term “community” by the use of larger or smaller geographic demarcations. These demarcations have been determined by means such as tracing boundaries along major traffic arteries, utilizing political census tracts, groupings of services (schools, healthcare, recreation, social services), or by municipal designations (Warheit et al., 1984: 41; Warren and Warren, 1984: 27).

sociological conceptions of community

Beyond identifying the physical boundaries from within which people are to be grouped, community must be defined, secondarily, in a normative and sociological sense. The success of crime prevention activities is premised on notions of reactivating social cohesion and informal social control in a community (Lurigio, 1995:68; Podolefsky and Dubow, 1981: 7). The realization of crime prevention's goal orientation, therefore, requires the understanding of “community” in a different, but complementary way. The geographical area from which crime prevention activities are generated must also find a “sense of community” to be necessarily present, or find the opportunity for it to be developed if it is not initially identified. Community, in this way, is construed to be a sense of shared values, responsibility and mutuality. Shared values may derive from people’s longing for a “sense of community”, or “attachment to place” as determined along geographical lines, but it could also be a community as defined by “a shared affiliation and affinity with others” that people are looking to rekindle.
It is, therefore, not a given that defining community in a physical sense will simultaneously define it in a psycho-social sense, as research into this area has found (Murphy, 1993: 199). Physical definitions of community or neighbourhood are often necessary starting points for the purposes of organizing people. However, notions of community may conjure up radically different conceptions for people (Wharf, 1997: 5). It is because of this potential discrepancy that both definitions are interwoven in crime prevention theory and practice.

2.3.3 Historical Antecedents of North American crime prevention programs

The philosophy behind community crime prevention rests on the assumption that effectively addressing crime must involve “proactive interventions of residents” (Lurigio, 1995: 55).

Over the years these interventions have translated into the implementation of a wide range of activities and strategies. The impetus for initiating crime prevention programs has come from both above and below. The United States has seen a variety of experimental approaches adopted by communities across the country since the early 1970s (Lab, 1997: 49). With the influence of the U.S. federal government's now defunct Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, many organizations were provided funding and technical assistance for setting up programs. Similarly, in Canada, a national governmental policy focus on crime prevention dates back to the early 1970s with the introduction of the Peace and Security package of legislation and programs (Leighton as cited in Saville, 1994).

Other programs have emerged from “below”, through citizen realizations that the formal criminal justice system was incapable of solving crime-related problems on its own. For a number of reasons, citizens have become involved in crime prevention. Some of them include a desire to increase the livability in their neighbourhoods, to educate themselves on
ways to protect against crime and to avoid victimization, and to address underlying reasons for criminality—all these reasons are underlying motivations for people to get involved in crime prevention activities. Regardless of the source of initiation, the centrality of community efforts in crime prevention has become a major aspect of crime prevention policy and programming in the 1990s (Lab, 1997).

2.3.4 Defining crime prevention

There are many strategies employed in the prevention of crime. In order to understand the efficacy of the various approaches adopted by citizens, organizations, and the police, it is necessary to summarize the range of activity which falls under the broad heading of crime prevention.

As Lab succinctly defines it, “crime prevention entails any action designed to reduce the actual level of crime and/or the perceived fear of crime” (Lab, 1997: 19). Crime prevention programs and projects address the problems of crime at different stages of development, and can focus on the potential or real victim, situation, or offender surrounding the crime (van Dijk and de Waard, 1991: 484).

Crime prevention, similar to the division found in public health models of disease prevention—primary, secondary, and tertiary—is concerned exclusively with the domain of the criminal justice system as it pertains to arrest, prosecution, incarceration, treatment, and rehabilitation of offenders. Because this study concentrates on joint citizen and police involvement in the process of crime prevention, it is beyond the scope of this present analysis and therefore not explored beyond its illustration in Table 2.1 and brief mention here.
Using a medical analogy, primary prevention refers to actions taken to avoid the initial development of the problem or disease in the general population. Secondary prevention moves beyond the general societal level, and zeroes in on individuals and situations that exhibit early signs of disease. Tertiary prevention rests at the point where the disease or problem has already manifest itself. Activities at this stage entail the elimination of the immediate problem and steps designed to inhibit a recurrence in the future. The various preventive approaches used in public health are directly analogous to Lab's (1997: 19-20) crime prevention model.

2.3.4.1 Primary prevention

Applying the notion of prevention to crime, definitions for the developmental stages of prevention are given by Brantingham and Faust (1976). Primary prevention is defined as the identification of "conditions of the physical and social environment that provide opportunities for or precipitate criminal acts." It encompasses all strategies that occur prior to the contemplation of committing a crime. It includes all efforts that strive to keep individuals from developing into criminal offenders, and therefore aims at the "root causes" of crime by attempting to affect the successful socialization of all members of society (Lavrakas, 1995: 88; Graham, 1990). There are a wide variety of approaches classified under this heading. Included among them are environmental design, neighbourhood watch, general deterrence, private security, and public education about crime. Primary prevention also includes dealing with broader social issues related to crime and deviance. Sometimes referred to as social problem-solving (Podolefsky and Dubow, 1981: 42), or crime prevention through social development (Pearcey, 1991: 9; CCSD, 1990), activities under this banner are aimed at alleviating discrepancies in employment, education, housing, leisure and recreation. Social problem-solving approaches hope to ameliorate the social inequalities which cause
deviant behavior to arise. These and many other primary prevention activities are implemented with the intent of avoiding initial, as well as continued crime and victimization, and may be instrumental in lowering the fear of crime (Lab, 1997: 20; Wiatrowski and Vardalis, 1994: 51; van Dijk and de Waard, 1991: 483; Lavrakas, 1995; Graham, 1990).

2.3.4.2 Secondary Prevention

Again, calling upon definitions by Brantingham and Faust (1976) secondary prevention “engages in early identification of potential offenders (and victims) and seeks to intervene” prior to commission of illegal activity. Implicit in secondary prevention is the ability of society and the criminal justice system to correctly identify “at risk” individuals and to predict criminogenic situations. The most common form of crime prevention—situational crime prevention—is subsumed under this approach. Akin to community policing’s problem-solving orientation, situational crime prevention identifies problems at the micro level in order to arrive at incident-specific solutions. Such solutions include physical design changes, altering social behaviours, or improving the surveillance of neighbourhoods.

Many secondary prevention efforts resemble activities listed under primary prevention. Lab (1997: 22) indicates, that the distinction rests upon whether the programs are aimed more at keeping problems that lead to criminal activities from arising (primary prevention) or if the efforts are focused on factors that already exist and are fostering deviant behaviour (secondary prevention).

Secondary prevention may deal with predelinquents or deviant behaviour that leads to criminal activity. For example, alcohol and drug use are highly related to other forms of deviance. Targeting drug use as an indicator of criminal propensity is a secondary prevention
approach. Much secondary prevention rests in the hands of parents, educators, and
neighbourhood leaders who have daily contact with the individuals and conditions leading to
deviance and fear (Lab, 1997: 22).

Further to the developmental stages of crime prevention outlined above, van Dijk and de
Waard breakdown this typology by specifying the target group (either individual and/or
situation) which is the focus of the intervention (see Table 2.1). This typology is utilized for
the purposes of classifying the various strategies which can be employed in crime prevention.
The purposes and goals of common primary and secondary programs are detailed in the next
section.

2.3.5 Strategies

2.3.5.1 Considering a neighbourhood's uniqueness

The successful implementation of varied approaches depends on devising a strategy which is
responsive to the unique needs of one’s neighbourhood. Under the primary and secondary
crime prevention approaches detailed above, various strategies are employed in addressing a
crime problem. The factors contributing to crime problems are complex, and the varied
characteristics of neighbourhoods in terms of demographics, ethnic and socioeconomic
composition, housing tenure, etc. can impact significantly upon the approaches adopted.
Therefore, many researchers identify the need for planning strategies based upon the unique
characteristics of a neighbourhood, and of utilizing a strategy with programming components
of flexible design (Pearcey, 1991; B.C. Ministry of Attorney General, 1993).

Individual citizens and neighbourhood-based organizations focusing on crime prevention
have utilized a variety of neighbourhood-specific approaches and activities. These
approaches are based on factors such as need, and are often contingent upon the ease of program delivery, and considerations of time and money.

Table 2.1
Crime Prevention Typology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>target groups</th>
<th>primary</th>
<th>secondary</th>
<th>tertiary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>victims</td>
<td>info campaigns</td>
<td>block/ neigbourhood watch</td>
<td>govt. compensation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>special advice for children (bike safety, &quot;street smarts&quot;)</td>
<td>citizen patrols</td>
<td>victim assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>block parents</td>
<td>rape crisis centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>situations</td>
<td>target hardening</td>
<td>redesigning high crime areas</td>
<td>hot spot identification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crime Prevention thru Environmental Design (CPTED)</td>
<td>private security</td>
<td>zones of prostitution enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>lighting</td>
<td>caretakers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>hot spot identification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>offenders</td>
<td>responsible parenting</td>
<td>streetcorner worker</td>
<td>rehabilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>civics classes in schools</td>
<td>youth clubs</td>
<td>probation supervision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>truancy prevention</td>
<td>training/ employment</td>
<td>training/ employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>info campaigns about substance abuse</td>
<td>foster parents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3.5.2 Victim-oriented prevention

Primary
An educational component of victim-oriented programs is information dissemination. Typically, information disseminated concerns precautions individuals can take to guard their person and property against crime. Special information about current frauds and scams (and their particular target population) or about the sexual abuse of children are some examples. The goal of such activities is to help the public at large better protect themselves against crime by increasing their awareness of potential risks, and their knowledge of simple techniques they can adopt to avoid victimization.

Secondary
Women and the elderly are two population groups who, for various reasons, are vulnerable to criminal victimization (Lab, 1997). Women, in occupations such as nursing, and who work late night shifts may be encouraged to take self-defence courses. People in high crime neighbourhoods may take collective measures and join a local Block Watch to improve their safety.

block watch
The philosophy behind Block Watch rests upon the role citizens can play in becoming information-gatherers for the local police. By becoming the “eyes and ears” of the police, citizens are encouraged to report suspicious incidents in their neighbourhood. Under this strategy, small groups of residents come together to share information about local crime problems through telephone trees, exchange crime prevention tips such as property engraving and lock upgrading, and engage in the surveillance of a designated area which usually includes the houses on the same city block as their own (Graham, 1990: 85; Schneider, 1997: 56-59; Podolefsky and Dubow, 1981: 42).
2.3.5.3 Situational prevention

Primary

The approaches subsumed here are often referred to as “opportunity reduction” as they seek to make crime more difficult to commit for the offender and to increase general feelings of neighbourhood safety through the design or redesign of the built environment (Lurigio, 1995: 56; Podolefsky and Dubow, 1981: 42). Residential and commercial buildings are protected against crime through locks, bars, lights, alarms, closed-circuit television, access control, and by increasing visibility by trimming shrubs around windows. Vehicles are protected by steering wheel “clubs” and alarms. All these technical measures are known as “target hardening.” Crime prevention specialists or police officers often provide residential or commercial “security audits” to make recommendations about what upgrading should be done.

Property engraving

A program often subsumed as a component of Block Watch, property engraving is aimed at deterring theft from occurring. The assumption is that engraved property will be less desirable to steal because such property is less easily “hawked”. If stolen, however, a personal identification number (usually a driver’s license number) can facilitate the return of the property if it is recovered by the police.

Secondary

Some neighbourhoods exhibit particularly high levels of crime in comparison to other parts of the city. While the identification of crime problems is usually initiated by the police, it ideally includes the involvement of local residents. Various strategies involve the restriction of vehicular access to neighbourhood streets through traffic-calming design measures, increased enforcement of criminal activity such as drug-dealing or prostitution, or the
increased surveillance of the neighbourhood by police and/or citizens through patrols. The goal of such strategies is to increase the formal and informal controls of neighbourhoods in hopes that crime levels will abate.

citizen patrols
Citizen patrols represent a form of surveillance. Different from the inconspicuous aspects of surveillance encouraged through Block Watch, the intent of patrols is to provide a physical presence on the streets, either by foot or by car. By being visible, the feeling is that people will be disinclined to commit crimes, if they feel there is a likelihood that they will be spotted and then apprehended.

2.3.5.4 Offender-oriented prevention

Although the causes of crime are the subject of debate, the majority of citizens blame society for its own crime rate (Podolefsky and Dubow, 1981: 38). Informed by this view, many citizens think unfavorable and inequitable social conditions breed criminals. Crime prevention activities must address an overlapping set of social problems in order to impact on crime. This emphasis on identifying and addressing “root” causes of crime is called the “social problem-solving” approach (Lurigio, 1995: 56). Broad areas that a social problem-solving approach might address concern issues of education, employment, health, recreation and housing.

Primary
Because in theory all citizens could be potential offenders, primary prevention programs under this heading seek to facilitate effective socialization processes through educational efforts focused on the family and the school system. The target ages to be educated through
this approach vary. It is widely believed, however, that impacting an individual and setting them on the "right course" should happen while they are still young. Courses in parenting skills, and "civics" lessons in elementary schools are examples of such programs. By promoting pro-social behaviour in children it is hoped they will become productive members of society in adulthood. Other programs targeted at children might address issues of bullying, anger management, self esteem, drug and alcohol addictions, gang and prostitution recruitment, or simply provide a "safe haven" through after-school programs for "latchkey" children with no place to go.

Secondary
Offender-oriented programs at this level are concerned with providing attention to individuals identified as potential problems. Programs usually focus on problem youths by providing them basic education related to life and employment skills development. The aim is to reintegrate at-risk youth into mainstream society. Educational activities for youth are usually coupled with recreational programs. Many people think delinquent behaviour results when bored youth lack the opportunity to engage in positive activities. Midnight basketball leagues or youth "drop-in" centres are two examples of recreational programs aimed at youth with "too much time on their hands."

employment
Much of the emphasis on employment continues to be centered on youth (Podolefsky and Dubow, 1981). The youth cohort is one faced with extremely high unemployment rates. Job training programs targeted principally at youth, but open to chronically unemployed people across all age groups, help by raising the marketable skill levels of participating individuals and by giving them advice on accessing jobs "in the system." In this way Lavrakas (1995: 88) states that an increasing number of people become qualified for non-criminal
employment. It is felt that enhancing participants’ marketable skills may go a long way in giving them a sense of purpose, self esteem and hope for the future.

Many crime prevention practitioners have stated that the various approaches detailed above should not be considered mutually exclusive, but work best in unison. Crime issues are best dealt with by adopting prevention approaches which address all stages of development. As identified earlier, because of a general lack of expertise and resources, most community crime prevention approaches only adopt programs based on the primary and secondary stages of development. Even when adopting these programs, it has become apparent that program success is largely dependent upon police cooperation.

2.3.6 Merging citizen efforts with those of the police

Both the community and the police have reached the conclusion that to successfully meet their mutual goals to reduce crime and the fear thereof, their efforts must be premised on a partnership between them.

Evaluations of citizen-initiated programs which have been established in the last two decades have come back to show that those that are “planned and implemented with substantial police involvement” realize greater impact and lasting success of programming efforts (Lurigio, 1995: 57).

The police have often played a major role in many community crime prevention activities and organizations (Lurigio, 1995: 55). In many instances, the police have been the initiators and/or leaders of such programs. Lab (1997: 53) feels neighbourhood-based crime prevention organizations should be established with the idea that they are not meant to
replace the police function. Instead, their intent it to supplement police activities. In this way, citizens’ roles are to provide the police with crime-related information by being their eyes and ears in reporting suspicious activities, and by bringing their perspective on neighbourhood issues and problems to the attention of the police.

The police, in return, make themselves more accessible to citizens and join with them in solving their neighbourhood problems. The ideas of increased contact between the police and the community, and decentralization of police personnel to the neighbourhood level is the police response to citizen demands for greater accessibility and involvement in policing functions. These ideas and other complementary themes are those which underpin the community policing philosophy which is outlined in the next section.

2.4 THE POLICE BRING THE COMMUNITY INTO THEIR POLICING FUNCTION—Changing the way they do business?

2.4.1 Community Policing’s Historical Underpinnings

The philosophy of Canadian policing as it emerged over the years was a combination of British and American ideas. Kelling (1991: 71) notes how originally the business of police was to keep the peace and to prevent crime—as Sir Robert Peel, founder, in 1829, of the first urban police force in England put it, their business was “keeping peace by peaceful means.” In this configuration, crime prevention was the primary police function. Public accountability and public involvement with the police were stressed. Constables patrolled on foot, knew who lived and worked in their neighbourhoods and counted on the public’s assistance in controlling local crime and order (Ministry of Solicitor General, 1991: 1).
Developments in transportation, telecommunications, and computer technology since the Second World War have allowed the police to replace what were thought to be cumbersome aspects of their work. With the adoption of new technologies, police operational goals shifted to emphasize rapid response to requests for their services. As a result, walking the beat in communities was replaced by patrolling in cars, informal information exchange with citizens was replaced with 9-1-1 calls for service, and clearance rates to service calls became the measure of police effectiveness. In Canada, organizational theories of centralized chain of command, narrow span of control and close supervision combined with the military background of most police leaders to become the basis for the “traditional” or “professional” model of police service (Ministry of the Solicitor General, 1991: 1; B.C. Ministry of Attorney General, 1993). All these innovations have served, however, to move the police constable further away from the community (Ministry of Solicitor General, 1991: 1).

The public order and crime prevention role of police as “peace” officers was eclipsed by a focus on “fighting crime.” Through this crime fighting model, police became the “front end of the criminal justice system,” aloof from the citizens and communities that they policed, and accountable not to citizens but to the principles of their profession. As a result, a “them and us” posture developed between the police and the community, alienating them from the community they were supposed to serve and protect (Kelling, 1996, 71; Murphy, 1993).

2.4.2 Failure of the traditional police model

The professional crime-fighting model of policing has failed. The failure has been so extensive in the United States that some police have become increasingly cynical and have all but given up on the idea that they can significantly affect crime (Kelling and Coles, 1996).
Academics, police professionals, and community representatives throughout North America concur that police reform in the shape of community policing is the order of the day (Goldstein, 1987: 6; Murphy 1993; Bursik and Gramsick, 1993: 174; Oppal, 1994; Normandeau and Leighton, 1990: 41). Massive increases in police personnel and equipment have not lessened either the amount or the seriousness of crime (Lewis, 1993: 269).

Within the political environment that the police now operate, fiscal restraint will perhaps be the largest issue they face. Police budgets, Murphy (1993) states, will correlate more directly with general reductions in government expenditures, and not, as in the past, with increasing crime, population growth and service demands. While many communities are demanding more of the police, the reality is that the police must learn to seek improvements without growth (B.C. Ministry of Attorney General, 1993: 3).

In order “to do more with less” the main operational components of traditional policing must be re-tooled. In particular, the main technology which drives police departments—9-1-1 systems—have been found to drain police resources from where they could be used more effectively to prevent crime. Past Superintendent of the Edmonton Police Service, and architect of one of the most successful community policing operations in Canada, Chris Braiden, estimates that only 5% of police calls for service are true emergencies and, therefore, in 95% of the cases police deal with, response time is not a critical factor (Braiden, 1990: 16). Other research (Lab, 1997: 182) has shown that only 20% of police time is taken up enforcing criminal codes and that the bulk of an officer’s time is spent providing service
functions. The focus on rapid response to calls for service has isolated the police from
neighbourhoods. In many areas of police service their prioritization of “hard” crime is not
consistent with citizen priorities nor responsive to citizen demands. While police may be
captured up in catching bad guys, research has shown that citizens are often more fearful of
issues of perceived disorder such as public drunkenness and graffiti (Wilson and Kelling,
1982). However, the police have become so far removed from the order maintenance aspects
of their jobs, that many view such activities as degrading (Kelling and Coles, 1996: 71).

There is clearly a discrepancy between community needs and the function of the police under
the “traditional” policing model. Since the 1980s, community policing has topped the police
reform agenda due to a number of distinct social, political, and economic factors: 1) 
expensive and expansive police services coupled with massive government debt and therefore
shrinking budgetary allowances for public services; 2) declining neighbourhood safety in
core urban areas; and 3) a convincing academic critique of police efficiency and
effectiveness. All have worked together to create public and political pressure for changes in
conventional police ideology and practice (Murphy, 1993: 14).

2.4.3 Community policing replaces the traditional model

In the U.S. the contemporary use of community policing strategies has been traced to the late
1970s and early 1980s. At that time it became increasingly clear that certain innovative
approaches to neighbourhood crime control, such as increasing the number of police in the
area and using random motorized patrols simply were not working (Bursik and Gramsick, 1993: 174).

Skogan (1990: 91) notes that community policing shifts the operational principles of police departments from a concern with crime fighting to a commitment to solving neighbourhood problems. Under a community policing philosophy, crime control is envisioned to be "coproduced" by citizens and the police (Lavrakas, 1985: 89); neighbourhoods are no longer expected to be the passive recipients of law enforcement efforts and the police are expected to help neighbourhoods help themselves (Skogan, 1990).

Defining community policing

There is no consensus around what community policing is in either form or substance. The term is presently being applied to almost any "new" police initiative irrespective of its design, intent or relationship to the community (Oppal, 1994: c3). Scholars and police practitioners do not agree about what the term means. As a result, there are problems around the implementation and evaluation of such a reorganizational concept. With this caveat stated, an attempt is nonetheless made here to define it utilizing some of community policing's common guiding principles.

Community-based policing is a philosophy or style of policing. While it may mean different things to different people, it essentially calls for a partnership between the police and the public in order to produce a peaceful and secure environment. It is proactive in nature as opposed to the present system, which is reactive. Community-based policing necessarily involves problem solving. This style of policing attempts to deal with some of the social,
economic, political and environmental causes of crime. Under this system, communities are to become more involved in establishing policing priorities (Oppal, 1994: c2).

2.4.4 Key Ingredients of Community Policing

Because this study is interested in exploring the dimensions of community policing which complement the coproductive capacity of community crime prevention initiatives, the three distinguishing characteristics of: 1) community partnership; 2) decentralization; and 3) problem-solving are focused upon here. These three characteristics are not meant to be exhaustive. However, they have been identified because I feel they illustrate the main reform goals of community policing.

2.4.5 Characteristics of Community Policing

“Among the most elementary programs that come under the community policing umbrella are those that demonstrate, for the purposes of reducing fear and deterring crime, that the police have a presence in the community: that they are easily accessible, frequently visible, and caring in their relationships with citizens” (Goldstein, 1987: 9).

2.4.5.1 community as partner

There is extensive writing which characterizes community policing in terms of its relationship with the people it serves—the community (Oppal, 1994; Ministry of the Solicitor General, 1991; City of Vancouver, 1993; B.C. Ministry of Attorney General, 1993; Nancoo, 1993; Kennedy, 1993). The notion of a community partnership is said to be the core value behind community policing (Ministry of the Solicitor General, 1991: 8). The community is
seen as an “agent” and partner in promoting security and not a “passive audience” (Sparrow, 1988: 1). Such a relationship with the community is seen as a requisite foundation for enhancing the efficacy of the policing function. It is thought the interaction between the police and the community in jointly identifying neighbourhood problems and their solutions will more efficiently and effectively control crime, enhance public order, reduce crime fear, and increase neighbourhood safety and livability (Murphy, 1993: 13; Goldstein, 1988: 7; Lurigio, 1995: 65).

The police appear to be following the lead of other sectors such as health and education, which have incorporated public participatory mechanisms into their institutional structures. In line with this trend toward public participation, the police perspective views communication as the basis of community-police partnerships. “[S]uccessful community policing is the establishment of mechanisms for dialogue, information exchange and consultation between the community and the police” (Ministry of the Solicitor General, 1991: 13). Through this process the police are believed to become more accountable to the community. The involvement of the community in policing priorities comes through their joint undertakings in identifying community needs, problem-solving and decision-making. Police accountability is to be ensured through follow-up on activities requested of them by the community. Simply stated, “what the public expects and want the police to do is, by and large, similar to what the police should do” (Murphy, 1993: 8). The community, too, has a responsibility to the police in this arrangement. Mutual accountability is necessary between them, whereby measures are provided against which each can evaluate the other (Kelling et al., 1988: 4).

All the rhetoric surrounding the concept of community-police “partnerships” is not enough to ensure that they are partners in actuality. Some commentators feel more effort needs to be taken in order for the community to be fully empowered in the process (Normandeau and
Leighton, 1990: 49). The community must become a partner in more than just name; they must also become a partner in substance. To ensure this, steps must be taken to place the community on more equal footing with the police.

### 2.4.5.2 decentralization

Critical to community policing is the decentralization of the police operation. This typically means assigning officers to a specific neighbourhood in order to cultivate better relationships with the community (Goldstein, 1988: 7). The move toward decentralizing the police function must take into consideration a number of factors, with flexibility being the main one. Because there are many different strategies which may be employed in decentralization, deciding which strategy is best for a neighbourhood must be determined by looking at its unique characteristics and needs.

Decentralization can occur through a variety of means. Central among them is the establishment of neighbourhood stations, neighbourhood police officers, foot patrol, etc. Ideally, the assignment of officers to neighbourhoods is to be long-term, with the expectation that they will get to know the problems and the people of the community intimately. It is hoped decentralization will correct both the physical and psychological distance which has been created between officers and citizens as a result of centralized stations and patrol cars. By increasing the interaction with the community, officers become more attuned to the needs of citizens and the general problems of the neighbourhood. An anticipated benefit to the police is the goodwill created and the concomitant desire of citizens to involve themselves with the police (Lab, 1997: 173).
Truly effective decentralization means providing neighbourhoods with police officers who are committed in both body and mind. To ensure this, great care needs to be taken in selecting the officers to be assigned to neighbourhoods. Good interpersonal skills are a must, as is a keen desire to interact with the community, and to work with community members in a collaborative way. Finding officers with these traits is no small feat. Bridging the distance which has been created between the police and the community over time requires both willingness and sensitivity. Much has been written about the need for training in a whole gamut of "generalist" areas. Problem-oriented policing, facilitation, conflict resolution, leadership, community organizing and public speaking are just some skills which have been identified as prerequisites for a "community policing" officer (Seagrave, 1992; Kennedy, 1991; Meese III, 1988; B.C. Ministry of Attorney General, 1993).

decision-making authority
In order to do the problem-solving work upon which community policing is premised, lower rank officers must also be invested with more discretionary power and autonomy. The hierarchical, para-military structure of Canadian police departments has created a highly regulated, routinized and codified working environment (Braiden, 1990). Community policing’s philosophical orientation seeks to further empower the community by conferring increased decision-making power on the average citizen. Its proponents realize, however, this decision-making power can only be conferred if internal organizational shifts also empower front-line police officers with enough decision-making power to make the community-police relationship work.
2.4.5.3 problem-solving orientation

One of the central characteristics of community policing programs is that they utilize problem-oriented policing tactics that address crime and disorder problems as well as their underlying causes.

The main criticism laid against the traditional model of policing was that it was reactive in nature. As a result most police work happened after a crime was committed, with little focus on preventing crime in the first place. Traditionally, the police based their work performance upon efficiently responding to “calls”. A call was considered an isolated incident with no past or future, only the present moment. Police came, a report might be taken, an arrest made, but very little follow-up was ever initiated. In this system, there was no encouragement to address the underlying causes which lead to the crime, or which might have explained a recurring pattern of criminal behaviour. With police clambering to simply stay on top of their call loads, and with little reduction in crime ever evidenced, it was recognized there must be a better way to look at the main function of the police. In community policing the policing function is seen more holistically. Through it, police are still encouraged to react to emergency situations when it is necessary, but the remainder of their time is to be spent proactively tackling crime by looking for broader solutions to crime problems (Goldstein, 1988: 7; Normandeau and Leighton, 1990: 48).

The problem-solving function of community policing is to involve the community in problem identification. The police are no longer seen as solely responsible for addressing crime. Therefore, both the police and the community together need to take renewed ownership over the resolution of crime problems.
2.5 IMPLEMENTING CRIME PREVENTION GOALS

The goals of both citizens and police involved in crime prevention partnerships are to increase the vitality and livability of neighbourhoods by reducing crime and the fear thereof (Bayley, 1988: 9; Murphy, 1993: 13). However laudable these goals may seem, they are very challenging to realize for a variety of reasons. Much writing in the area of crime prevention has focused on descriptive presentations of successful programs, but little has been written on either program implementation or the evaluation of their substantive outcomes (Rosenbaum, 1986; Lurigio and Rosenbaum, 1986; Yin, 1986, Kennedy, 1991; Seagrave, 1992). Because there is a dearth of evaluative studies in this area, implementation of crime prevention programs should proceed with caution. In an area where the central concepts such of “community” and “partnership” have largely escaped full operationalization, it becomes critical to look at the process by which programs are conceptualized, designed, and delivered. More care needs to be taken in designing programs that can show they have affected relevant change. It is not enough that crime prevention programs set out to tackle social problems, programs should be set up so that it can be determined that they have done so.

2.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter has explored why citizens have become involved in enhancing the livability of their neighbourhoods through the coproduction of crime prevention programs, and why the police have partnered with them. It has presented descriptions of the various strategies employed by both citizens and the police to effect social change through the reduction of crime and fear, because the programs delivered through community crime prevention offices—the case study under investigation—fall under the range of strategies presented here. The remainder of this paper will explore the “on the ground” reality of a community policing partnership. A case study of community crime prevention offices in Vancouver, and the roles
of both the community and the police in its functioning, provides insight into the opportunities and constraints facing the coproductive service delivery of crime prevention. The effectiveness of these offices will be determined by exploring the implementation process of crime prevention programming. This exploration centres on the establishment of community-police partnerships, how services are implemented through them, and the benefits, limitations and future challenges of crime prevention service delivery undertaken in such an environment.
3.0 CHAPTER THREE: Case Study Findings

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Information for the case study presented here was gathered from a variety of sources. Participant observation in the community crime prevention office\(^1\) (CCPO) environment under investigation provided evidence of service delivery implementation processes, the opportunity to interact with key informants, and to gain access to information over time. Attendance at various meetings such as Block Watch and CPO training seminars, as well as CCPO coalition meetings rounded out my knowledge of substantive issues surrounding program delivery. Key informant interviews (see Appendix I for people interviewed and Appendix II for questionnaires used) with civilian and Vancouver Police Department (VPD) personnel connected with these offices provided comparative data on office goals and function. Lastly, analysis of policy documents surrounding community-based policing from provincial, municipal and VPD sources, as well as CPO promotional literature, lent insight into the various positions of the stakeholders involved.

The purpose of the case study is to provide a summary of the process by which crime prevention offices have been established, their purpose, and programs, and how their relationship with the VPD has influenced their program delivery. While the information gathered here relates directly to the coproduction of crime prevention services, the issues surrounding program delivery objectives and processes are relevant across various human

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\(^1\) Throughout the remainder of this document, storefront crime prevention offices will either be referred to as crime prevention offices (CPOs), which include both police-run and community-run offices, or community crime prevention offices (CCPOs), which is a term used exclusively by community-run offices, and differentiates the two. The latter part of this study focuses on the role of the CCPOs vis a vis the Vancouver Police Department, however reference is continually made to CPOs, when characteristics between the two office models are shared.
service fields in both the public and non-profit sector. Because of this, lessons learned in co-producing crime prevention services can be extrapolated to other settings.

The efficacy of CPOs in Vancouver is dependent upon a variety of micro and macro factors. Both micro considerations of CPO organizational capacity such as human and financial resources, as well as macro factors regarding CPO relationships with other institutional actors (including all three levels of government, the VPD, and other human service agencies) impact upon their long-term viability. Since the early 1990s, the establishment of localized, accessible service delivery has been an issue for citizens and service providers alike. Results from municipal planning exercises in Vancouver such as City Plan have shown that citizens want to be more involved in the provision of services, and want services to be locally-based and relevant to community need (City of Vancouver, 1995: 18). It has been serendipitous that police reforms calling for the decentralization of police services have coalesced with the move toward greater citizen involvement in service provision, in general, and crime prevention service delivery, in particular.

Through the vehicle of storefront offices the coproduction of crime prevention services in Vancouver has most notably been played out. Community volunteers, in partnership with the police, have begun providing services to geographic communities in hopes of reducing crime and thereby enhancing the livability of their respective neighbourhoods.

3.2 **THE VPD EMBRACES COMMUNITY POLICING**

The move toward community policing, and community crime prevention initiatives, began in earnest in British Columbia in the early 1990s. The conclusions of national studies into community policing (Normandeau and Leighton, 1990) were supported by similar studies at
the provincial and municipal level. Police departments, independent of government, were also exploring reorganizational options along community policing lines. This was evidenced in Vancouver and across British Columbia, respectively, with the VPD's strategic planning process of 1991, the City of Vancouver's *Safer City Task Force* in 1993, and the Oppal Commission's inquiry into policing in B.C. in 1994. The concept of community-based policing was fully endorsed in these studies. Beyond the support which was voiced for police reorganization and philosophical reorientation, these studies all came out in strong support of citizen participation in crime prevention. Not only did these reports encourage citizen involvement, their recommendations were prefaced on the necessary role of citizens in successful crime prevention programming outcomes.

While it has been recognized that there are many means of implementing and achieving community policing operational goals, the police have long felt decentralization to be a key strategy in this goal attainment. The deployment of bike and foot patrols are two examples of decentralized access to police personnel which the VPD has employed (VPD, 1993: 4). These strategies have been seen as beneficial, however they have only achieved partial effect because of their limited scope. More comprehensive strategies, such as storefront offices, had been identified by the VPD because of their ability to enhance opportunities for relationship-building between the police and the community.

Positive outcomes of applied projects (Walker, Walker and McDavid, 1992; Murphy, 1993; Edmonton Police Service, 1995; and Lavrakas, 1995) in other North American police departments—Houston, Texas; Newark, New Jersey; Flint, Michigan; Toronto; Victoria; and Edmonton—lent support to the VPD's undertaking. The VPD believed their department could also benefit from decentralized access through storefront offices. It was felt that storefront offices could provide optimal access to police services by allowing long-term,
consistent, two-way communication between the police and communities (VPD, 1993: 19; VPD, 1994: 2,4).

During strategic planning sessions in 1991, the VPD supported police decentralization through the concept of storefront offices, and to this end, considered four models from amongst those which had been implemented by other B.C. Lower Mainland municipalities:

1) **precinct** - where officers actually report to and work out of. Varying levels of accessible service may be offered to the public for all or part of a day;

2) **community police office** - where a variety of police/community activities occur. There is staffing (generally by civilian staff and volunteers) for a substantial portion of the day. Police officers call into the station on a regular basis and officers also carry out activities in the office. Crime prevention lectures are conducted from the office and officers attend to write reports or conduct follow-up interviews;

3) **storefront police office** - where a small office is set up in a mall area with limited office space and hours; and

4) **mobile police station** - where a mobile facility such as a trailer is used for a variety of roles. These roles include task force approaches to crime in a community, gaining access to the aged, or recruiting to the police department in ethnic communities (VPD, 1993: 19).

Of the four office models identified above, it was felt, “community police offices appear to have the most promise in terms of offering service to the community and providing access to police service at a community level” (VPD, 1993: 20).

From the beginning, the police took the position that once community need and support had been determined, they would come on board and lend their formal support to the formation of CPOs:

In a situation where there is community support and a need for a community police office, we feel that we should be entering into an arrangement to establish
the office. Community support would likely include the provision of space and volunteer staffing. Police involvement would likely include the provision of coordinators and participation from officers working in that community. It is conceivable that offices would be dynamic and as communities change the office location would be altered to fit the changing community" (20).

Many American studies have determined that community involvement in police decentralization efforts such as storefronts, is critical (Schneider, 1997). A common theme in anti-crime initiatives such as community policing is the “important role that community organizations and local institutions are hypothesized as playing in helping to conceptualize and implement local crime prevention efforts, in part, through their ability to mobilize the ‘voluntary potential’ of the local citizenry” (Lavrakas, 1995: 95). Because of the problems inherent in mobilizing residents, it has been increasingly felt that such efforts should be left to neighbourhood organizers, who enjoy closer ties to the community in terms of organizational networks, a better understanding of community needs, and the programs which should be delivered to meet those needs. These sentiments were echoed by two VPD middle managers who were instrumental in helping to establish several of the community-initiated CPOs. Their position was reiterated in the VPD’s community-based policing position paper, which stated that "community involvement is the key characteristic...[t]he driving force behind the creation and continued operation of the (crime prevention) office has been the people in the community” (VPD, 1994a: 6).

Vancouver’s history of formalized community involvement in crime prevention has resulted from a number of neighbourhood-specific crime problems. Many of the initial community-run offices were established in east Vancouver (police District Three), where the recorded incidence of crime, as well as the perception surrounding crime and fear of crime, were markedly higher than in other areas of the city. For example, in the neighbourhood of Renfrew-Collingwood (see Figure 3.2) the community mobilized around problems which were seen to stem from drug-dealing surrounding the Joyce ALRT (Advanced Light Rapid
Transit) “Skytrain” station. For the Mount Pleasant neighbourhood, the pressing crime issue was prostitution. In Cedar Cottage, residents organized because of the combined negative impacts of the Broadway Skytrain station and prostitution. Gang-related violence and the fear that accompanied a rash of drive-by shootings in Fraserview were issues that prompted citizens to take action. While each neighbourhood identified unique crime problems, they were all in consensus regarding the best solution to these problems—crime prevention offices were seen to be a promising avenue for addressing their concerns.

3.3 STOREFRONT CRIME PREVENTION OFFICES

When the first CPOs were established, the upper management of the VPD allowed their middle managers considerable latitude in determining the office structure which would best suit the crime prevention needs of the four policing districts. District managers then determined what role the police would play in office management. As a result, the VPD endorsed the emergence of both police-run and community-run offices throughout the city. In keeping with their organizational position, the VPD said they would support the establishment of an office if the need for an office was pre-determined by the community, and if office space and volunteer staffing had been secured. The police stated upfront that their assistance would come in “people support”, as they were not prepared to support the operating costs of the offices.

Storefront CPOs have been a strategy employed in Vancouver for a number of reasons. In the police-run offices, they have provided the police with decentralized access to the community, and a community-requested police presence. In community-initiated offices, storefronts are seen to be a good method to address crime issues. They are seen to provide a
vehicle through which the community and the police can collaborate on the identification of crime and safety issues and problem-solve around their resolution.

The establishment of storefront offices in Vancouver dates back to 1990 when the Vancouver Police and Native Liaison Society Storefront Project was opened. Its objective was "to provide a safe, community-based alternative resource for Native residents in the downtown core" (mimeo). A second office, the Chinatown Police Community Services Centre, opened in early 1992. Its purpose, as stated in a promotional brochure is "to strengthen the communication and cooperation between the Chinese and Vietnamese community and the Police Department." A police manager described the services provided by these first two offices as broader than the offices that followed in that "they have trained staff that provide counselling service and court advice and interpretation advice on all sorts of (criminal justice) matters." In short, these offices operate under a victims assistance model, and were established to specifically service the Native and Asian populations, respectively. Because of this ethnic exclusivity, they are much different than the offices that have opened since this time.

The service boundaries of the later offices have been determined, instead, along geographic lines, in correspondence with the four compass-point quadrants (districts) under which the Vancouver Police Department operate (see Figure 3.1), and further correspond to the 23 neighbourhood boundaries determined by the City of Vancouver (see Figure 3.2 for a map of Vancouver crime prevention offices). The two other office models employed since this time, which are detailed below, have been determined by the importance given to issues of community versus police management, rental versus rent-free office space, and the characteristics (resident and/or business) of the communities that they are set up to serve.
Figure 3.2
Vancouver Crime Prevention/Neighbourhood Safety Offices

Neighbourhood Safety Offices

May, 1998

Vancouver Police Department
Crime Analysis Unit
By October 1995\(^2\), the central business district (police District One), had established four community police offices. The “community” was represented by business interests in these four areas, as it was largely commercial crime prevention needs that the offices initially served\(^3\), and it was through corporate sponsorship that office space was provided for them. Three of four offices were storefront, while the fourth was housed in the West End Community Centre, and not a “storefront” space in the traditional sense. Waterfront and Yaletown offices had space provided by Marathon and Concord Pacific development corporations, respectively, and the Granville Street office had storefront space provided by the Granville Entertainment Group (owners of the Vogue Theatre, to which it is adjacent). The police officers assigned to these offices act as office managers, and while they have volunteers to assist them administratively, the police remain responsible for the office’s functioning. These offices were set up to be “community police offices”, and were expected to provide an experimental setting whereby police call-load referral could be transferred. District One’s management felt that the permanent assignment of an officer provided the community with “a full range of police services”, and made that police member committed and accountable to the community over time.

In a joint interview with the police constables in charge of the District One CPOs, they explained how the range of services they offer are different than those of the community-run offices:

[The] downtown core offices are community police offices...Crime prevention is just one of the things that we do in our offices. We take police reports, we interview people. We provide a full range of police services. We have police officers that are in the community as problem-solvers. The offices are basically there to facilitate our jobs, not the other way around. We (are) neighbourhood patrol officers that are responsible for that particular area and we have offices to work out of. The understanding from management is that if the offices were closed we would

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2 In addition to these offices, the Davie Street Neighbourhood Patrol Office opened in 1997.
3 The West End office has always served the residential high-rise community (largely seniors). As Yaletown has developed, more residential programming has been undertaken there, as well.
still be doing the same jobs, we just wouldn't have a base to go to. We would probably run it out of the police station but still be involved within these areas, doing problem-solving. So, that's where the difference lies between the two kinds of offices.

In District Two, the Strathcona community centre\(^4\) (1994) and the Britannia community centre\(^5\) (May 1995) were the first facilities to house crime prevention offices. These offices, like the West End office detailed above, were not storefronts in the true sense of the word, as they were both tucked away inside community centres. They did provide public access to police and crime prevention services, but office hours were limited to those of the community centre where they were located. The Gastown Business Improvement Association was the next to come on board (May 1995) and provided a space-sharing arrangement for the Gastown Neighbourhood Police Office. The Downtown Eastside, under the auspices of the Downtown Eastside Residents Association (DERA), was the first in District Two to open a community-run office (Sept 1995). The last of the offices in this district, Hastings North Neighbourhood Safety Office, opened in 1997. Including the Native Liaison and Chinatown offices, District Two has several offices within very close physical proximity. In this office sampling, the “community” need for their establishment has been determined more in terms of demographic characteristics, and less in terms of geographic demarcations.\(^6\)

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\(^4\) The Strathcona Neighbourhood Police Office originally served both the Strathcona and Hastings-Sunrise neighbourhoods until mid-1997 when the Hastings North Neighbourhood Safety Office opened.

\(^5\) The Britannia Neighbourhood Police Office is listed here as a police-initiated office, because it has always had a police officer assigned to it. However, from the beginning, a half-time civilian coordinator was seconded from the Vancouver-Richmond Health Board to manage the office. This individual felt her office had more in common with the community-run offices than the police-run offices. Because she was a key player in the establishment of the Coalition of community-run offices, this office has always been seen as community-driven.

\(^6\) The Downtown Eastside Neighbourhood Safety Office had difficulty receiving start-up funds from the City of Vancouver because there was a concern that too many offices had proliferated within the same neighbourhood boundaries. The office was finally granted their money, after they justified the need for their office based on the concentrated number of a high-risk demographic cohort in the Downtown Eastside.
With the exceptions of the Downtown Eastside Neighbourhood Safety Office and the Brittania Community Police Office in District Two, it has been the offices in District Three and Four which have developed out of a unique pattern (see Table 3.1 for a full listing of the community crime prevention offices). VPD management in these two districts supported a more grassroots approach to office formation, and felt their long-term success would be predicated upon a high level of community involvement. This model of storefront office was identified by the VPD in their September 27, 1994 report to Vancouver City Council as the prototype to follow in the establishment of any future offices (VPD, 1994a: 6). The Joyce Street Community Crime Prevention Office, opened in April 1994, was the first storefront community crime prevention office (CCPO) to be truly spearheaded by the community, with true community ownership over its function. It was set up to run as a non-profit society, governed by a volunteer Board of Directors, and staffed by one paid coordinator and community volunteers. The police were involved in an advisory capacity, and provided liaison personnel. However, ultimate governing and decision-making power rested with the office Board and staff; the police were not to dictate in any area of program planning, implementation, or evaluation.

An upper-level manager of the VPD justified the department’s blanket support for the different storefront models which had emerged by stating that different communities have different needs, therefore no two office structures need be alike. In discussion with one constable in charge of a police-run office in the Central Business District (police District One), he felt that whether police or community-run, it is the community, and not the police, who should be dictating the programming priorities of CPOs.

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7 Since the summer of 1997 a Neighbourhood Police Officer has been routinely assigned to all new offices. Two new offices opened in District Four in 1997 - The Granville Island Community Police Office and the Musqueam Neighbourhood Safety Office. They did not have to meet needs assessment criteria before opening, and do not fall under the CCPO model.
Table 3.1
Community Crime Prevention Offices (CCPOs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office Name</th>
<th>Date Opened</th>
<th>Geographic Neighbourhood</th>
<th>Police District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joyce Street CCPO</td>
<td>April 1994</td>
<td>Renfrew-Collingwood</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Pleasant CCPO</td>
<td>Feb 1995</td>
<td>Mount Pleasant</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britannia Community Police Office</td>
<td>May 1995</td>
<td>Grandview-Woodlands</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downtown Eastside</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood Safety Office</td>
<td>Sept 1995</td>
<td>Downtown Eastside</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little Mountain/Riley Park CCPO</td>
<td>Oct 1995</td>
<td>Little Mountain-Riley Park</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitsilano CCPO</td>
<td>Fall 1995</td>
<td>Kitsilano</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadway Station CCPO</td>
<td>Dec 1995</td>
<td>Cedar Cottage</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraser Street CCPO</td>
<td>Sept 1996</td>
<td>Sunset/Victoria-Fraserview/Killarney</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since early 1998 the following offices have changed their names: The Joyce Street Community Crime Prevention Office (CCPO) is now the Collingwood Neighbourhood Safety Office, the Britannia Community Police Office is now the Grandview-Woodlands Community Police Office, and Kitsilano CCPO is now the Kitsilano Community Police Office.
Different office models were inevitable, he said, because:

It's supposed to be a community office, so the community has to be dictating what the needs of that office are. It can't be the police department telling you again, like they've done in the past—this is your problem—this is your solution. The community has to have the input on it. Each community has different problems.

The differences among the various office models established has and continues to be a point of contention. There are varied opinions about the efficacy of the different models on the basis of their management, programming, and operating costs. In discussions with the police about the differences between the police- and community-run office models, they have often pointed to the cost efficiency of the police-run offices, which enjoy the benefits of free office space, and operate mostly without any paid civilian staff. The community-run offices, on the other hand, justify their expenditures on staff and rent costs because they feel their offices would not operate effectively without either the expertise of a full-time civilian coordinator, who advocates for their respective communities' interests vis a vis the police, or the accessible, storefront space, that only rental office space affords them in their neighbourhoods. While most civilian coordinators would gladly be situated in rent-free space, they feel maintaining a central, visible presence in their communities is an important part of their function. They feel it is imperative to maintain storefront access, to serve the community in an appropriate venue.

It is important to note the differences in office structure which exist, as the distinctions between community or police-run offices are seen as fundamental to the stakeholders
involved. A volunteer from a community-run office was upset by a media article's lumping together of the police- and community-run CPOs. She responded in a newspaper editorial by giving her perceptions of the differences between office models:

A community police office is just that—a satellite police office staffed by police and funded by police departments. Its mandate is to police neighbourhoods....A (community) crime prevention office is staffed by community volunteers and funded by grants and donations. Its mandate is to address the broad safety concerns of the neighbourhood in which it is located....While this may include working with the police...a crime prevention office also addresses broader “quality of life issues” such as garbage-strewn alleys and streets, unsafe traffic situations and just plain “neighbourliness” (Pavitt, The Vancouver Sun: March 16, 1996).

There is a clear discrepancy between the VPD’s position and the community’s position regarding the role of paid community members in CCPOs. This is cogently illustrated through a public statement by the Police Chief in early 1998. At a public meeting in the Mount Pleasant neighbourhood the Chief responded to audience queries about the police commitment to their neighbourhood’s CCPO by saying he feels all CPOs could be run effectively with only volunteers. The staff and Board members of the community-run offices that I have spoken to about his position, respond to this comment in disbelief. They feel that the Chief doesn’t understand the role of the community in the CCPO environment.

3.4 COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION OFFICES

From this point on, this study focuses on community-initiated crime prevention offices, as opposed to police-initiated, or police-run offices, and charts the process by which these offices have been established and continue to function. Comparisons have and will be made between the community- and police-run office models throughout all four of the policing
districts in Vancouver. These comparisons are made to highlight the differences in leadership structures, and program delivery activities and strategies based on the office model employed.

The significant difference of the community-run model is that these offices have been set up at the direction of the community, and not by different levels of government, or through the auspices of the Vancouver Police Department. It has been through the community’s initiative that such offices came into being, and through community involvement that the community crime prevention offices (CCPOs) continue to provide crime prevention services.

The fact that CCPOs have been established by the community, but in cooperation with the police, is a novel departure from the usual delivery of crime prevention services. While the literature review in chapter two highlights examples in which communities have been involved in crime prevention activities, it did not specify if residents have actually been the catalyst in establishing these services. This is because it was found that much of the literature focuses on the role played by the police in mobilizing the community to participate in crime prevention efforts. Locally, in parts of Vancouver, the community has mobilized, in the words of one coordinator, “to help people help themselves”, and has sought police assistance in their self-help endeavours.

In the Vancouver model, storefront CCPOs are seen as a focal point for safety-related concerns in the communities in which they are situated. Discussions with office managers across community-run offices made apparent the clear consensus which exists surrounding the importance of public education and awareness campaigns in galvanizing the self-help capacities of their respective communities. One way in which offices increase public awareness for their services is by being easily accessible, in a highly visible location. Much like the maxim “if you build it, they will come,” it is felt that central, visible access is an
important determinant of client usage, and therefore, "if they see it, they will come," became an operational imperative for many Board members and staff in determining where offices would be situated. Central locations in neighbourhoods (in most cases this has been determined by the locus of criminal activity), having offices located along major transportation corridors, and an office design which allows entry to people with disabilities are all accessibility issues which CCPOs felt were critical in garnering broad-based community usage and support.

3.4.1 CCPO Purpose

The definition of a community crime prevention office, as put forth in a CCPO Coalition draft document "is a place where citizens work in conjunction with members of the Vancouver Police Department to address crime, disorder and public safety issues in their community" (CCPO Coalition, mimeo, n.d).

Their purpose is to complement regular public safety services by:

• developing and delivering needed crime prevention programs;
• serving as a vehicle for increased communication between community members and their police to build trust and understanding;
• working closely with the police and the community in formulating strategies to alleviate identified crime and disorder problems; and
• encouraging citizens to take action needed to help make their communities safer.

As indicated in their purpose above, a minimum of 50% (two points out of four) of their formalized mandate relate to their liaison function between the communities they serve and

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9 The role of the CCPO Coalition is detailed in Section 3.5.
the police. However, most key informants have indicated that, over time, their offices have come to function in much broader terms.

3.4.2 Establishing Programming Priorities

While the community has been responsible for determining a need for and support of a community crime prevention office, they have also solicited the advice and resources of the police to a large extent in determining programming priorities and design.

The coordinator of the first community-initiated office has indicated that the police were involved from the office’s initial planning stages, and it was largely because of their organization’s established relationship with the police that a local developer agreed to donate office space to them. Further, the VPD assigned a full-time police officer to the office in its first five weeks of operation, who helped to draft a procedures manual, outlining the relationship of the community and the VPD in the office’s functioning. This office has been seen as a prototype to follow, and was called upon by subsequent offices for assistance in program planning and design. Therefore, the VPD’s impact has both directly and indirectly affected programming directions across offices.

3.4.3 Programs

The range and scope of programs which the offices have offered has evolved over time. Crime prevention programs and service provision have been the raison d'être of the CCPOs. Generally, the programs that CCPOs deliver are seen to meet the needs of their communities, by complementing the formal social control activities of the police.
A promotional letter written by the CCPO Coalition summarized their range of services: “[C]CPOs provide a bridge between the community and the police department. We supply area crime statistics and community alerts, take non-emergency reports, gather information for police and dispense community resource contact numbers.” Through these activities, Coalition members feel they are having a positive effect on their communities. “The CPOs are proving that information and intelligence sharing are making a difference in the incidence of property crimes, prostitution and drug related offenses.” By so doing, they add, offices are helping to increase the effectiveness of the police force through closer contact with the community.

Beyond the intelligence gathering role of the offices, they also provide a range of crime prevention and safety programs. Based on neighbourhood demographics, some offices have chosen to tailor their programs to different target populations. Seniors safety videos, women’s self defence, robbery prevention for local businesses, children’s bike safety, or youth career development are all examples of different programs which offices have undertaken. While the administration of the Block Watch program serves as the backbone for programming efforts in most community-run offices, there are many other neighbourhood specific projects that offices have initiated based on perceptions of community need.

For many CCPO staff, crime prevention service provision is seen in broader terms than mere information gathering and liaison with the police. For example, one coordinator sees her role as more of a community developer, and feels that the reduction of crime is better achieved through “community building”, by promoting activities that “celebrate” the positive attributes

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10 The Downtown Eastside NSO is the only CCPO which does not administer the Block Watch program. Their coordinator is adamant that such a program appeals to the interests of middle class property owners and is not relevant to the needs of the lower income tenants of “Single Room Occupancy” (SRO) hotels in her local area.
of her neighbourhood. Activities such as festivals and fairs to promote multiculturalism, intergenerational understanding, or general neighbourhood pride, are seen by several offices, to be just as important as giving advice on the best lock for one’s front door, or taking yet another citizen’s break and enter report. Graffiti and garbage clean-ups have also been implemented in several communities, because enhancing the physical image of the community is something most offices feel helps to deter crime. In support of these clean-ups, many key informants cite research (Wilson and Kelling, 1982) conducted throughout major cities in the United States showing a correlation between neighbourhood decay and crime.

More generalized services are found to a greater or lesser degree across most CCPOs. Located in offices, are maps which chart local crime statistics, brochures on a multitude of safety-related topics from protecting your home and/or car through target hardening techniques, “street-smarts” for children, to topics related to domestic violence. Property engraving equipment is available for residents who have often, unfortunately, been victims of property crime and want to deter another occurrence. The offices provide temporary “safe haven” for children, women, and other victims of crime. They also provide a community referral function beyond crime specific concerns. Space is made available for local inter-agency meetings, and for staff, volunteers or residents to meet with police personnel to talk about ongoing crime-related issues.

A large percentage of volunteer time is taken up providing referrals to other service agencies, or to government services at both the municipal and provincial levels such as City engineering (garbage concerns), by-laws (abandoned vehicles), fire or public health (problem premises) or to the landlord-tenancy branch (tenant rights), etc. One coordinator noted that helping people “negotiate the system” is a major service of the office, because, “the average person on the street doesn’t know how to access government. Part of the function of the office (through referrals) is to help people do that.” Another coordinator adds, many people
“have a lack of knowledge of systems and resources of both the government and the police.” It is felt that referral services are an important way that offices “help people to help themselves”, and by so doing, people become better integrated into their local communities.

The CCPOs’ services have evolved over time, by adjusting to changing perceptions of community need. This evolution has resulted in the provision of services that are more broad-based, and not limited to strict crime prevention. For example, the Broadway Station Community Crime Prevention Office, which serves the Cedar Cottage neighbourhood in east Vancouver, underwent a series of strategic planning sessions in the summer of 1997 to update their operating goals and objectives. During those sessions, the Board determined their operating goals:

- to liaise with the community and various other agencies (including but not limited to: the VPD, assorted city agencies, provincial and federal government branches, other neighbourhood groups and the public);

- to raise awareness and promote participation in crime prevention programs and projects (such as Block Watch, clean-ups, beautification projects, community events and safety programs);

- to educate the community and community stakeholders via information gathering, processing and dissemination;

- to maintain financial responsibility to ensure continued independent non-profit status; and

- to create a safer, more livable neighbourhood thus stimulating a healthier sense of community (Broadway Station CCPO, mimeo, 1997).

The goal statements of this particular office illustrate a trend that has become evident across many community-run offices. General community development goals have proven to
become a large component of several offices' formal mandate. By disseminating information through public education, outreach, and referral these offices hope to not only decrease crime, but to enhance the social cohesiveness of their local communities by generating interest in issues of local concern and increasing their community's participation in a broad range of office programs.

3.5 COLLABORATION THROUGH COALITION FORMATION

1995 was to be a growth year for CPOs in Vancouver. In that year the number of city-wide offices rose from 5 to 17. Since March 1995, the staff members from the established CPOs, as well as neighbourhood representatives who were trying to get offices started, began meeting as the CCPO Coalition “to share ideas, work out solutions and support each other in all endeavours” (CCPO Coalition, mimeo, 1995).

Early on it was understood by the community stakeholders involved that they would fare far better working collaboratively on fundraising and public relations endeavours, than by working at cross-purposes and in competition. For these reasons, crime prevention office coordinators began meeting on a monthly basis to discuss issues of common concern. While coordinators from both the community-run and the police-run offices were originally invited to participate in the Coalition, it became apparent early on that the priorities of the offices were vastly different. Because the agendas of Coalition meetings largely reflected the preoccupations of the community-run offices, the Coalition became the de facto lobby for the community offices' collective interests. Procuring financial resources, office evaluative criteria, needs assessment, and solidifying the working relationship between the offices and the VPD were the issues that topped meeting agendas month after month. Primarily, the Coalition aided the individual CCPOs in gaining greater support in both their local and
political communities. It was hoped that a greater awareness of the utility of and need for CCPOs would translate into increased community support (through financial contributions and participation), and thus ensure their long-term viability.

3.5.1 Finances

Since their inception, financial viability has been a top-priority for CPO staff. All CPOs had been set up with the help of start-up grants from both the provincial and municipal governments. These grants were to be “one-time” only, and both levels of government stated, from the beginning, that offices were to prove self-sufficiency. A strong measure of community support, funders stated, was to be evidenced through the financial contributions of both local businesses and residents.

Because of this, the majority of the Coalition’s meeting time was consumed discussing both collective and individual strategies to maintain long-term financial sustainability. The Coalition feels they provide a necessary service because the prevention of crime seems a public good which everyone—politicians, public servants, businesses, and residents—supports in principle. Therefore, CPOs feel they should be eligible for core funding for their offices, and have lobbied all levels of government to that end. Initially, they had hoped to gain access to money from traffic fine monies as well as monies from proceeds of crime. When the provincial Ministry of Attorney General came back to them saying this was not possible, another round of negotiation began. By the Fall of 1996, ongoing negotiations with the province and the city had brought them some measure of financial relief. In October 1996 City Council approved the establishment of a joint City of Vancouver and Ministry of Attorney General Community Safety funding program. The purpose of this program, as a grant application states, “is to assist communities and volunteer agencies to develop or
enhance crime prevention and community safety programs in cooperation with the Vancouver Police Department." While this would provide the offices with some funds for programming costs, it did not provide funding for operating costs. Therefore, for the offices that paid rent or had civilian staff, the grant program did little to alleviate their financial short-falls.

3.5.2 Criteria

The enthusiasm to establish crime prevention offices spread city-wide, and there were concerns by all stakeholders involved in the process as to whether or not CPOs were to become the answer to all Vancouver neighbourhoods' crime problems. The CPOs, in some regards, became victims of their own success. Coalition members were worried that an increased number of offices would decrease the amount of government funds available per office, the police were concerned about whether they had the resources to assist more offices, and the City wondered about whether this type of office could truly serve the needs of all communities. As a result, the City put a moratorium, of sorts, on additional CPO start-up funding. The "green light" for new offices would not be given until the VPD, together with the Coalition, and in consultation with City staff, drafted a set of criteria to which any future communities wishing to establish a CPO would have to adhere:

"Given the lack of research addressing the supply elasticity of community police stations and a growing concern about their proliferation," a research analyst for the VPD stated, "the viability of future and existing offices would be assessed against the following criteria....

A crime prevention office (CPO):

- should have broad-based community support;
• should be logically placed in relation to communities and neighbourhoods, and its location should be readily accessible and available to the public and address the safety issues of user groups and staff;

• should be established in a neighbourhood that has empirical public safety and crime related problems which the presence of an office would likely help address;

• should have a consultative board that is reasonably representative of the neighbourhood/community and includes the local police manager or designate;

• should exercise fiscal control and follow accepted business practices and the requirements of the Societies Act;

• should have participants subject to screening by the Vancouver Police Department; and

• should have baseline measurements in place against which effectiveness will be determined” (VPD, 1995: mimeo).

The Coalition supported the establishment of these criteria, as it was felt they presented them with useful self-assessment tools. In order to maintain their legitimacy, and to garner long-term public or private support, it was recognized that the CCPOs needed to be doing more to evaluate themselves, and, in so doing, needed to have defined standards in which to measure themselves against.

3.5.3 Program effectiveness

3.5.3.1 assessing need

At one Coalition meeting in the fall of 1995, a coordinator presented an article from an American newspaper regarding the economic soul-searching necessary for non-profit
organizations. The article talked about the need for non-profits to prove their utility, in order to compete for either public or private sector funding, in an era of fiscal constraint. The author of the article went on to say, non-profits must assess the need for their services by asking themselves some tough questions:

1) Are non-profits serving the need they were created to serve, and does that need still exist?
2) Is there someone else delivering the same service(s) and doing it better? What “value added” does your non-profit bring to the (client) that someone else does not?
3) Is the non-profit doing enough outreach to those parts of the community that it hasn’t touched before? (Dennis, 1995: D2).

This article is excerpted here, because the points it raises are those that have preoccupied CCPO staff and Boards since their inception. Self-evaluation is something that CCPO coordinators have long identified as necessary to “justify their existence”, so as to maintain community participation for their programming endeavours, and to attract long-term public and private funding.

3.5.3.2 program evaluation

When asking about the ways that offices have measured program impacts, most coordinators have indicated that their assessment has been largely qualitative. While all offices, at a minimum, measure client usage through log-books that record the monthly level of phone-in and walk-in traffic, many rely on anecdotal evidence when gauging participation in or satisfaction with their basic services. Often, a “headcount” of participants at, for example, a self defence seminar, and/or verbal feedback on the content presented, is an adequate measure of service efficacy. Several coordinators have pointed to the difficulty in quantitatively measuring reductions in crime, and further determining whether their programs were causally related to this reduction. A Deputy Chief involved with the CPOs also
questioned the relevance of determining whether or not offices reduce crime in quantitative terms. He felt it was probably more relevant to point to the office's impact on levels of community involvement, which could arguably point to levels of community cohesion. The existence of community cohesion is a variable often cited in crime prevention theory and applied projects to have a positive correlation with crime reduction (Podolefsky and Dubow, 1981). Because of this, crime prevention program outcomes more often attempt to determine changes in levels of community involvement than to directly measure levels of crime reduction.

The need for program planning, design and monitoring, as reflected through clearly defined CCPO office purposes, implementation strategies and evaluative measures has been examined in great detail by CCPO staff and their funders. Because of their financial precariousness, CCPO organizational purposes, goals and program outcomes have been thoroughly scrutinized by public funding agencies. In any field of human services, questions about the whys, whats, and hows of service provision are relevant and necessary. In coproductive endeavours such as this one, where questions surrounding service provision relate to a shift in service production from the state to the community, program evaluation takes on an increasingly complex political hue. The police have been traditionally responsible for crime prevention service provision. Shifting the responsibility for this service production to the community level, through CCPOs, raises all sorts of questions about what reasonable expectations can be placed upon the community, who lack the resource base in both human (expertise) and financial terms to maintain the accountability standards set out for them by government. While these are issues which plague the non-profit sector generally, they become specifically pertinent in areas of public-private coproduction. The state is increasingly downloading the responsibility for service production to the public, all in the name of "empowering" the community. However, the question is what accountability does
the state have in ensuring that communities are equipped to effectively provide the services being downloaded?

3.6 HOW THE COMMUNITY AND THE POLICE HAVE WORKED TOGETHER TO PROVIDE SERVICES

By far the largest determinant affecting the service provision of crime prevention offices has been the nature of their relationship with their coproducers—the Vancouver Police Department. Both the community and the police set out in good faith as “partners” to coproduce crime prevention services through the vehicle of CPOs. Since their inception, however, both partners have struggled with the very nature of their partnership and their roles and responsibilities for maintaining it.

3.6.1 Community Expectations of the Police

3.6.1.1 police resources

From the beginning, the “partnership” between the community and the police has been a central determinant of the quantity and quality of CPO service provision. The relationship between the offices and the police department has significantly affected the day-to-day functioning of the CPOs. The community-run offices have remained largely reliant on the police in order to effectively provide services. From issues of volunteer screening and training, the provision of Block Watch newsletters, the supply of pamphlets on various crime prevention topics, attendance at public seminars, follow-up on citizen incident reports, advice on implementation of programs that CCPOs offer, joint involvement in problem-solving
activities, to priority response to calls for police service, the police provide the offices with a wide range of valuable resources.

Initially, the resources that the VPD provided to CCPOs were acquired in an ad hoc fashion, through individual requests communicated to police managers who acted in an office liaison capacity. At the time that office criteria were being drafted in the summer of 1995, the VPD clarified their resource contribution to the office function. The resources provided were listed as follows:

- 2 phone lines (telephone and fax);
- personnel (at discretion of police manager);
- crime and statistical data;
- training for volunteers;
- assistance in program delivery (e.g. Block Watch);
- representation on consultative board;
- crime prevention literature & material, and training (VPD, 1995: mimeo).

This list of resource commitments served to clarify the basic standard of VPD resource provision to be applied across CPOs. In practice, however, there has been inconsistent application of these standards. By far, the largest issue to affect the CCPOs has concerned their lack of consistent access to police personnel.

3.6.1.2 problem-solving and communication

Joint problem-solving is identified as one of the main principles behind effective community-police partnerships. Many coordinators indicated that one of the key ingredients to effective problem-solving is communication. When one coordinator was asked to comment on her perceptions of the CCPOs’ partnership with the police she responded by saying, “half our
problem is communication.” In order for the community and the police to work on the joint problem-solving of local problems and concerns, both sides must have access to information surrounding the issue, and be privy to actions each side is responsible for taking to ensure its resolution.

To this end, the enhancement of communication channels between the community and the police has been an ongoing concern. These channels have vastly improved over time. Where before action on specific problems was left to the Inspector in charge of the police district, now standardized incident report forms have cut down on case by case enquiries.

While incident reports have increased the efficiency of joint problem-solving initiatives, another coordinator found her community was frustrated by the lack of follow-up on the information her office reports to the police. Whether it came from members of the police-sanctioned Block Watch program, or concerned residents who come in to the office to make a counter complaint, people were concerned about the lack of police follow-up. Not only was it found that follow-up is important to them, it is also indicative of whether they would report issues in the future. Another coordinator found that, in principle, the police recognize the need for accountability to the community. However, one police manager told her that she was the only coordinator in his district who had approached him about the need to demonstrate this accountability through follow-up on police actions. These are just two examples among many which relate to communication concerns. What they point to is that communication is an important process issue for both sides, and that both have an obligation to seek some measure of improvement in this regard.
Although the upper management of the VPD has enthusiastically touted the virtues of community policing, the line officers responsible for carrying it out on the ground have been somewhat resistant. Many police constables patrolling the streets are uninterested in changing from their reactive way of working. A middle manager, asked about the department’s general attitude toward establishing community policing principles as part of their operational mandate had this to say about officer resistance:

I think that there’s a lot of enthusiasm over the principles of community policing. I think that’s tempered by the reality of the call load and the fact that calls are responded to virtually all the time. Most units are tied up most of the time answering calls. So one of the challenges of community policing will be to change that, so that time is provided to work on problems and work in (crime prevention) offices.

It was originally thought that patrol constables would be dropping in and out of the offices on a rather regular basis, and that problem-solving would happen either on an ad hoc basis, or through informal information exchange between office staff and the police who were coming and going. However, the amount that constables dropped in to CCPOs varied from office to office. This inconsistency points to the degree to which coordinators felt personality dynamics between office staff and the police played a larger role in the degree of police presence that an office received than did police standards around the basic services they would provide to the offices. One coordinator, for example, felt it was necessary to “woo” police officers into her office, and went so far as to create a picture-board (seen as an enticement through a recognition of their “celebrity” status) of the officers who came and went.
When CCPOs were first established, the level of accessibility to the police, through their coming and going in the offices, was thought to be a “given” of the VPD’s basic commitment to their partnership with the community. This has clearly not transpired to the degree to which it was originally expected. There have not been clear expectations and directives handed down by VPD’s upper management that police presence is a commitment that the department has made to the community, through the vehicle of storefront offices, even though this is clearly a community expectation of the police role vis a vis the offices.

Both informal discussions and formal interviews with CCPO coordinators have shown a clear consensus around basic community expectations of the police partnership role. The basic partner expectations of the VPD, as voiced by CCPO coordinators, surround the need for the VPD to provide: 1) a clearer understanding of the VPD’s resource commitment, both in terms of human resources and material provisions (training, information, and equipment); 2) enhanced communication linkages on joint problem-solving endeavours, with accountability evidenced through follow-up; and 3) more consistent physical police access for all CPOs. These issues have been articulated by several community key informants who feel there has been inconsistent commitment by the VPD in meeting these expectations to various offices, at different points of time.

3.6.2 The VPD Sees the Need for Standardization Across CPOs

As time has worn on, the police-run and community-run models of CPOs have been constantly held up against each other in comparison. More and more, comparisons were being made between the “have and have not” offices, in terms of their perceived access to financial and police resources. In order to address CCPOs’ perceptions of their inequitable access to the VPD, and to enhance inter-office communication between all CPOs and the
police, the VPD decided standardization across both police- and community-run offices was necessary.

To facilitate the task of standardization, a sergeant was assigned as the Community Policing Coordinator (CPC). When he was asked why the VPD felt there was a need for standardization, he responded that:

During the period 1994-1997 while offices were being established there were no set standards across offices. There were different advisory and management structures. This posed a problem for the VPD, and because of this, the CPO concept was not well received within the department.

The uniqueness among offices, which had once been their virtue, had now become their vice. In order to standardize offices, several changes were made over the summer of 1997. After the VPD’s Community Policing Coordinator (CPC) had met with all of the CPO Boards/Advisory Committees, police officers, in the role of Neighbourhood Police Officers (NPOs), were permanently assigned to every office. The assignment of police officers to community-run offices, has proved most controversial. From the communities’ perspective, there has been apprehension about the power dynamics behind this move. To some CCPOs, it has appeared that the police were “taking over”, by trying to make all offices the same in terms of their policing function; many worried the VPD would use this as an argument to squeeze civilian staff out of office management. When asked why this was done, the CPC responded that, through his discussions with all the CPOs, he understood that this was what all offices wanted. He feels, “the police are seen as catalysts in the community, especially in communities without strong support of their population base, the community looks to the police to organize this.” By having NPOs permanently assigned to the office, the VPD saw a means to provide better “customer-oriented service.” The CPC went on to state, “Before offices without police assigned had to deal with the managerial level for action on police-
related issues, and there was not real ‘buy in’ from the patrol members who should’ve been using the offices.”

By assigning police personnel to all CPOs, the NPOs were to become the office “link” to the VPD. From a police perspective, this action was supposed to improve communication, and make problem-solving more efficient. However, in reality, it has overloaded the tasks and responsibilities of one officer, which had previously been delegated to several officers across patrol and specialized squads. The two NPOs that I spoke to about their job responsibilities felt very overwhelmed with their workload. They are now responsible for dealing with all the policing issues being channelled through the offices and are unable to keep up with the volume of police-related requests.

With standardized police access a fait accompli, the CPC next chose to address the VPD’s position on CPO financial viability. To this end, he met with government funders of the joint municipal/provincial grant program, to discuss changes that the VPD was making to enhance their relationship with all CPOs. As a result of these discussions, an “office study” process was initiated by a representative of the Ministry of Attorney General’s department and a seconded police officer, to evaluate, the CPC stated, “how well offices were linked within their communities and how they were proving to be accountable to them.” He felt that through this evaluative process, it would be determined which offices were meeting the expectations of the police. The concern, from the VPD’s perspective, was that it is not enough for the offices to just be there for public relations purposes. They must also be providing a problem-solving and social order function.

For the CPOs, the “office study” process served as an interim evaluation. However, there was confusion around the role that the VPD played in this process. Because, up until this point, the VPD’s position regarding office funding had always been “hands off”, some of the
CCPO representatives that I talked to felt the police role in an evaluative process was unwarranted, and to one coordinator, it was in direct conflict with the VPD’s interests in the potential outcome.

### 3.6.3 Defining Partner Roles and Responsibilities

As is evidenced from the comments above, there has and continues to be a fair amount of confusion surrounding notions of partnership roles and responsibilities. This has been communicated by both police and community representatives. It has been so basic a concern, that all parties have seen a need to clarify a working definition of what this “partnership” should ideally be.

For example, in their terms of reference, the joint municipal/provincial Community Safety Funding Program of 1997 saw fit to include a definition of “partnership” and utilized the following definition:

> Partnership is the relationship of two or more entities that have voluntarily entered a legal or moral contract. Partnership building involves bringing together equal parties in an arrangement to undertake joint action (e.g. implementation of programs and projects), sharing benefits and responsibilities\(^{11}\).

Both the joint municipal/provincial funding program and the VPD have recently clarified partner roles. This is evident in:

1) recommendations from the “office study” evaluation process of CPOs, and which were attached to the 1998 grant recommendations to Vancouver City Council:

In the coming year we hope to formalize the partnership between VPD and Community/Neighbourhood Safety Offices by having a *partnership agreement* (italics mine) signed outlying (sic) both parties' responsibilities and expectations....The criteria adopted by Council in 1996 clearly defines the necessity of such a partnership: ‘the program funds assist communities and volunteer agencies to develop or enhance crime prevention and community safety programs in cooperation with the Vancouver Police Department’ (City of Vancouver, Administrative Report, Jan. 28, 1998: 4); and

2) a document drafted by the VPD detailing their position on Neighbourhood Safety Offices:

Our partnerships with the Neighbourhood Safety Offices must be clearly defined and agreed upon in order for each of the partners to understand each other fully....The NSOs should receive clear direction from the VPD as to our roles and responsibilities, and expectations of the office, its volunteers, and the community. Likewise, we require the same information from the offices and their communities. The offices, as we are, must be accountable to the community. This accountability can be achieved through the offices' maintenance of operational integrity (VPD, 1998: 14).

One CCPO coordinator I spoke with about the recommended “partnership agreement” thought it was a wonderful idea, and one which was long overdue. However, as with many decisions regarding the standardization and future direction of CPOs, she was concerned that this process was determined in a “dictatorial” rather than a “consultative” way. Because these recommendations came through an evaluative process spearheaded by the office funders, and sanctioned by the VPD, it appeared to her that the VPD and the CPO funders were trying to dictate what the “community” role would be vis a vis the office function. On top of this, the whole process of VPD standardization across offices has called into question the notion of equality behind this community-police partnership.

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12 The VPD have sought to standardize the name used to refer to all crime prevention offices, and have adopted the name “Neighbourhood Safety Office (NSO)” for this purpose.
3.6.4 Police Expectations of the Community

When asked their perceptions, various police personnel, from front-line constables involved in the day-to-day running of CCPOs, to the Chief of Police, recognized the importance of the communication link the offices provide to the police on community-identified problems. While one police manager spoke of the role that CCPOs play in creating awareness of and providing local access to police-sanctioned crime prevention programs such as Block Watch, or in advertising other police-run volunteer programs, police personnel generally believe that because CCPOs are run by community members, the offices provide the community with a more informal and approachable means of communicating crime-related concerns to the police. This is seen as a valuable function, as many police personnel who were interviewed identified the communication barrier which exists between the community and the police as problematic. They understand that many people are intimidated by the notion of directly dealing with the police. The CCPOs help to address this, by providing a bridge between the community and the police. One NPO assigned to a CCPO sees the role of the office as advocating a community perspective on policing priorities. "Without community involvement we would just have a precinct office and take counter complaints...Community issues won't be addressed." From a police perspective he sometimes thinks, "what's the big deal," but he understands that, "it's different from a community perspective."

In reference to the community role in all CPOs, one past Deputy Chief remarked, "Storefronts build community...to know how to deal with City Hall...from crime prevention to neighbourhood improvement...(they) get the VPD working with other city departments...the (whole) result is bigger than the sum of its parts."

More specific to local problem-solving, the Police Chief indicated in an interview that the community’s partnership role should be “to develop close links with the community and have
a group that will work in a cooperative manner (with the VPD) to define problems, arrive at solutions, implement, and then evaluate (them).”

From discussions with police personnel across all ranks of the VPD there is a general consensus that the CCPOs provide a conduit through which community needs and priorities can be communicated to the police.

3.7 FACTORS AFFECTING CCPOs LONG-TERM VIABILITY

To this point, this case study has focused on the “who, why, what, and how” behind CCPO service delivery. It has described how community crime prevention offices came into being, the people involved in their formation, the programs and services the offices provide, and the role of the community and the police in the function of service delivery. However, it has yet to discuss the “where”—the future direction of CCPOs—the equally relevant issue of stakeholder impressions regarding this service delivery model’s long term viability.

A list of factors seen to affect the long-term viability of CCPOs was generated from key informant interviews with CCPO coordinators as well as with police personnel involved with the offices. These factors are seen to result from conditions surrounding both the organizational capacity of the offices and the office relationship to its external environment. Organizational capacity is evident in issues of office goals and strategies/programs, staffing (volunteers and/or coordinator) and governance (through Board of Directors), and allocation of financial resources (including whether offices have paid or unpaid staff, are in rent-free or high-rent space, and whether or not their location is highly visible). The office’s relationship to its external environment is seen through the support of institutional stakeholders—community support, police support, government support, and interagency collaboration.
Both these micro and macro factors are seen to affect the offices’ ability to effectively offer relevant service.

When asked the question, “What are the factors necessary for the operation of (this) office?”, the “top of the head” responses of CCPO past and present coordinators were interestingly diverse. Table 3.2 below lists a summary of their top five responses to this question.

**Table 3.2**

**CCPO coordinator opinions regarding the necessary factors for CCPO viability**

n = 10

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>#1</th>
<th>#2</th>
<th>#3</th>
<th>#4</th>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community need</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective governance and staffing (active Board of Directors; skilled and/or well paid staff member(s))</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committed volunteers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community support</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police support</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government support (most notably municipal, but secondly, provincial)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(local) Inter-agency cooperation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As Table 3.2 indicates, there was no clear consensus on which factors are the most important determinants of successful office functioning. The most significant findings relate to the total number of responses listed for a factor, not the rank order number they received. The strongest consensus amongst coordinators surrounds the issue of community need, as 40% of the sample (4 out of 10) rated community need as the number one factor. However, it is more telling that 80% (8 out of 10) rated committed volunteers as one of the top three factors. As well, 80% listed the need for strong police support as an important determinant in their office's effective operation. On the matter of funding, while 60% identified funding as a definite factor, the reasons for listing this were varied. For example, one coordinator listed funding as the number one factor in effective office functioning, but indicated that an office needed to prove financial self-sufficiency, and should not be dependent on government funds. Others who listed this as a concern, did so because they are and will remain dependent on government funding, as a result of the lack of financial support from their local areas. While government funders and VPD personnel have always equated community need for an office with community support and financial self-sufficiency, coordinators and Board members of the financially strapped offices continue to argue that a need for a CCPO and community and financial support are not, and should not, be considered synonymous criteria.

Two police officers, one, an office manager of a police-run office, the other, a sergeant with long time involvement in crime prevention programming, were interviewed in November 1995 and October 1996, respectively, and asked to rank the same factors as the CCPO coordinators. They both felt three main factors would affect CPOs’ long-term viability:

1) sufficient levels of funds;
2) community commitment as shown by:
   i) both the local residential and business community, and
   ii) local political support from city councillors; and
3) police commitment beyond verbal support; police commitment needs to be shown by:
   i) following up on problem-solving issues brought forward by the community; and
   ii) through standard access to personnel across CPOs.

Another police manager identified the connection between strong community involvement and police commitment as the most important determinants of long-term viability. He felt community involvement should be evident in “large numbers of people involved (in the office) and through representation from the diverse community...bringing forward issues and problems....(And) that community interest and community need (are) matched with a strong police commitment to communicate and develop a relationship there.”

The conclusions that can be drawn from both community and police opinion on the matter of long-term viability are that the pragmatics of funding are of most import. Also inferred, is the joint commitment necessary of both the community and the police to make the offices work. The next chapter will address issues of community and police accountability in ensuring that CPO viability is maintained.

3.8 CONCLUSION

This chapter has presented the case study findings of the crime prevention office environment in Vancouver. It describes the way in which three models of crime prevention offices have been established. The main differences are seen between police-initiated and community-initiated office types. Whether CPOs operate under police or community management, and whether they are housed in rent-free or rental space are what set police and community-run offices apart.
The majority of this case study has focused upon the unique coproductive relationship which has developed between the community-initiated offices (CCPOs) and the Vancouver Police Department (VPD). In the CCPO model, offices have been established at the community's initiative, and the VPD has been involved in office functioning in a liaison capacity. The relationship of the CCPOs and the VPD has changed over time. An ongoing debate surrounds the need for both sides to clarify partner roles and responsibilities.

Discussions with community key informants have illuminated some general expectations of the police role in the CCPO environment. Generally, CCPOs want police assurance that a minimum standard of resource contributions in both a personnel and material sense can be reasonably expected. The police, on the other hand, expect CCPOs to provide a communication link with the community to help the police determine local policing issues and priorities. From these expectations, it is clear that CCPOs can mutually benefit both the community and the police. This case study has focused upon the expectations of what one partner brings to another, because much of the debate has revolved around these issues. Some steps have been taken to reconcile this, as the proposal to set up “partnership agreement” workshops at some point in the coming year illustrate. Once the clarification of partner expectations, roles and responsibilities has been achieved it will provide a framework whereby mutual partner accountability can be measured.

Through the assignment of Neighbourhood Police Officers, the VPD has addressed CCPO concerns of equitable access to police resources across both community- and police-run CPOs. The assignment of a permanent police officer to community-run offices has been a mixed blessing. While it has addressed community concerns regarding access to police resources, it has also raised concerns about what the standardization of the police function across all CPOs means in terms of office governance and management. What these
community concerns point to is that expectations by both the community and the police regarding partner roles and responsibilities have yet to be definitively “ironed out.”

This chapter has described the coproducive process through which CCPOs have set out to provide crime prevention services. The following chapter analyses how community and police role contributions have impacted the CCPOs’ ability to provide services. Specifically, it identifies the individual responsibilities both partners have in ensuring the viability of CCPOs.
4.0 CHAPTER FOUR: Analysis of Partner Responsibilities

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The case study findings presented in Chapter Three focused on the roles the police and the community have played in establishing community crime prevention offices (CCPOs). From the description of the process to establish CCPOs, it has become clear that the roles of the community and the police, are distinct, but complementary. The community is responsible for governing the office function, determining the crime prevention programming priorities of their respective neighbourhoods, and providing a communication link to the police by alerting them to local priorities around policing issues. CCPOs further attempt to complement the formal social control function of the police, by encouraging their local communities to “watch out” for each other through participation in informal social control activities such as Block Watch, citizen patrols, or neighbourhood clean-ups.

The police, for their part, are to be accessible to the CCPOs, and by extension, to the broader community, in both a physical sense and through channels of communication. This accessibility works in tandem with the problem-solving role the police are to play through the offices. Beyond the venue which the offices provide for the decentralization efforts of the police, the police bring access to resources, both in terms of information on crime prevention techniques, but also knowledge of the “true” crime picture. Through information dissemination, the police can aid in the alleviation of local fears, wherever possible.

While Chapter Three explored community and police partnership expectations, this chapter evaluates their individual partner contributions, and provides a normative prescription of their mutual accountability in ensuring the viability of CCPOs.
The community and the police impact the CCPOs at both the internal and external level. Both play distinct roles and have clear responsibilities around issues of organizational capacity. Beyond their impact on factors internal to the office, both the community and the police affect the offices' relationships with a host of institutional actors in their external environment. This chapter will mainly concentrate on the impact that their roles have on the internal environment, but will also touch upon the necessary role both partners must play in their relationships to government, and other agency stakeholders.

4.2 **CCPOs' ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY**

The greatest determinants of CCPOs' effective service delivery are found in their internal, organizational environment.

In establishing *community* crime prevention offices (CCPOs), the community has taken on ownership of crime prevention programming at the local level. This leadership role has benefitted them in terms of the community advocacy role it allows them to play, but it has also placed clear responsibilities upon them. A government funding application clearly articulates some of these responsibilities: “The Board/Advisory Committee is held responsible for the effectiveness of services provided and financial accountability for funds received from all sources” (City of Vancouver and Ministry of Attorney General, 1996).

By virtue of their non-profit status, CCPOs are ultimately accountable for the effective delivery of services provided to the public, and for the financial viability of the offices. A review of the literature provides a glimpse at some of the organizational factors which impact upon neighbourhood-based non-profit organizations, generally (Schneider, 1997; Clague,
1993; Knauf et al., 1991). These factors are also applicable to the CCPO environment. All factors affect an organization's long-term viability, and are ultimately interrelated.

Generally, Clague (1993) talks about a planning framework which should necessarily be adhered to by any neighbourhood organization engaged in social change efforts. Clague feels such organizations need to have a “formal process for identifying community needs and aspirations, for setting objectives, allocating resources and for taking action on clearly defined priorities” (27).

Particular to neighbourhood-based non-profits dealing with crime prevention programming, Schneider (1997: 82) identifies a list of organizational factors which may influence levels of community support for community crime prevention activities: leadership; communication; planning and organization; levels of resources; police support; citizen involvement in priority setting; the organization's mandate, goals and strategies, the breadth of focus of the organization; and its values and ideologies.

Knauf et al. polled a number of non-profits to identify common characteristics of nonprofit organizational effectiveness. Through their findings, the authors summarized four "hallmarks" of nonprofit excellence:

1) A clearly articulated sense of mission that serves as the focal point of commitment for Board and staff and is the guidepost by which the organization judges its success and makes adjustments in course over time;

2) An individual who truly leads the organization and creates a culture that enables and motivates the organization to fulfill its mission;
3) An involved and committed volunteer Board that relates dynamically with the chief staff officer and provides a bridge to the larger community; and

4) An ongoing capacity to attract sufficient financial and human resources (Knauft et al., 1991: 1).

The above factors identified by Schneider, Clague, and Knauft et al. are all pertinent to the CCPO environment.

The “office study” evaluation process undertaken by the Ministry of Attorney General and VPD in the fall of 1997, identified several “common training needs” among CPO Boards, staff and volunteers. These included improved skills in: “how to design (and) implement community surveys; community problem solving; community capacity building; training and recruiting multilingual volunteers; fundraising strategies; record keeping; bookkeeping procedures...etc.” (City of Vancouver, 1998: 3).

Similarly, a VPD position paper (VPD, 1998) on the future direction of NSO/CPOs, identifies issues of organizational capacity (or lack thereof) which police management feel need to be addressed.

“The (NSOs/CPOs)...must be accountable to the community. This accountability can be achieved through the offices’ maintenance of operational integrity” (14). Summarized below are the main elements of operational integrity outlined by the VPD:

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1 As presented in Chapter Three, NSO (Neighbourhood Safety Office) is the umbrella term adopted by the Vancouver Police Department when collectively referring to the city-wide sample of crime prevention offices. I have utilized the term CPO (Crime Prevention Office), a term which predates the NSO term, for this purpose.
Basic Elements of Operational Integrity of Office Structure

1) office resources (human and material) are used efficiently and effectively;
2) the office provides a minimum city-wide level of service;
3) the office advisory body reflects all aspects of the community;
4) the office has broad-based community support, demonstrates strong community links, and makes partnerships with other agencies or organizations;
5) the office is responding to a true need for crime prevention, public disorder, or public safety services within the community;
6) the office continually evolves to respect (sic) the changing needs of the community;
7) the office is operated in accordance with applicable government regulations, partner expectations, and its own internal operating standard; and
8) each partner develops and fosters mutual respect in order to work towards common goals.

The document goes on to affirm the VPD’s joint responsibility in helping NSOs to maintain these accountability standards:

Operational integrity is the responsibility of each partner. These basic elements would form the framework for our partnerships with the offices. These partnerships must be reflected through a written partnership agreement with each of the offices. The process would involve negotiations with each individual office to establish each collaborator’s roles, responsibilities and expectations (VPD, 1998: 14).

The accountability of the community and police in maintaining operational integrity is separately presented in the sections that follow.

4.2.1 How the community role impacts service delivery outcomes

Because of their governance role as the initiators of the non-profit societies which house community crime prevention program functions, the community must take a lead role in leadership, resource allocation, and program development and implementation.
4.2.1.1 community leadership

The office's ability to effectively function is greatly affected by the degree to which leadership functions are jointly undertaken between the Board of Directors and office staff. Several office coordinators voiced their frustration over their Board's low level of commitment and lack of vision. Two coordinators cited the fact that Board members are not present in the offices during regular office hours, and because of this, they do not have a full understanding or appreciation of the varied tasks which the staff must undertake in the day-to-day office environment. As a result, these coordinators feel, their Boards do not have a realistic sense of the policy direction that the offices should take. Because clarifications of partnership roles between the police and office staff have been ongoing concerns, it has been especially difficult for some Boards to understand the ever-present political nuances of the offices' function vis a vis the VPD.

Through the office study process it was identified that broad-based community representation on Boards was an organizational weakness in many of the CPOs. When Boards are comprised of individuals who do not reflect the broader values of the community, there is a risk that program responsiveness will become skewed to reflect only the interests of those "who sit at the table." While recruiting from a representative cross-section of community members becomes challenging at the best of times, it is especially so in heterogeneous neighbourhoods. It is, however, important to make concerted efforts to do so in order that the "voice" of more marginalized community members is heard.
4.2.1.2 goal setting and strategic planning

Half the sample of CCPO coordinators I spoke with\(^2\) indicated that their office does not have clearly articulated operational goals or strategic plans. Without the benefit of a guiding conceptual framework which planning documents provide, it has made the task of program implementation and monitoring difficult for office staff and volunteers in many offices. The submission of a 3 year strategic plan was initially a prerequisite for the joint municipal/provincial funding grant in 1997. Several CCPO Boards argued they were not in a position to supply such a document when much of their Boards' time was consumed with "just keeping the office doors open." As a result, the requirement was pulled from the funding application. While it is true that many volunteer Boards operate under severe time constraints, by resorting to "crisis management" approaches, many CCPO Boards have hampered the scope and comprehensiveness of their office's programming efforts.

4.2.1.3 resources

Sufficient resources are the first prerequisite to effective programming efforts. No matter how strong an organization's desire, or how clear its vision, without money and materials they have little means to achieve their goals. Resource mobilization literature emphasizes that "a simple desire for change is not enough...a central consideration must be made of the amount and nature of resources (personal, organizational, and financial) that are available to the group that desires change" (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993: 157). What this means for

\(^2\) These comments have come through informal discussions since their original interviews in 1995-6.
CCPOs is that if they are not utilizing resources in their private, parochial, or public networks they can expect a limited degree of success.

Difficult decisions regarding resource allocation are issues which any non-profit organization must address. Because CCPO Boards are ultimately responsible for the viability of the offices, they must make wise decisions about where best to allocate their scarce financial resources. As mentioned previously, two principal trade-offs have been the operating costs allocated to rent and staff salaries. CCPO Boards have had to make tough decisions about whether to locate in rental space, and about the amount of money allocated to the wages of either a part- or full-time coordinator. The difference between the police-run and community-run office models is that in the former they have located their offices in rent-free space, and do not pay staff, other than the salary of the police officer who manages the office. However, the general consensus of those who advocate for the importance of the community-run model, is that the CCPOs are community offices by virtue of the civilian staff member working out of them, advocating for their respective community’s interests. Without the presence of a paid staff person, (whom many community stakeholders feel is underpaid, in market-terms for the job required of them) the community “voice” in the community-police partnership would be severely hampered, if not altogether lost.

A Board member from one of the community-run offices recognized the many challenges volunteer Boards face. She spoke to the levels of expertise required on a non-profit Board, and the difficulty in recruiting new Board members to fill “skill deficits.” Lack of fundraising savvy was the single most important issue she identified as having negatively impacted upon her Board’s effectiveness.

Although Boards maintain overall responsibility for financial viability, it is usually the paid staff who carry out fundraising activities. Lack of resources, both human and material, affect
all CCPOs to greater or lesser degrees. All the coordinators I spoke with about their office duties mentioned over and over again the inordinate amount of energy consumed with fundraising. Whether it has been in politicking, organizing events, or writing grant applications, coordinators state that a great deal of their time is spent chasing dollars to keep their offices financially afloat.

financial/legal
As nonprofit societies, CCPOs are legally, financially, and administratively responsible for the office’s functioning. Like nonprofits in other service sectors, meeting these responsibilities has proven to be quite challenging. From the beginning, the police had indicated they were not in a position to fund CPOs’ overhead costs. The municipal and provincial levels of government had also stated they would only provide start-up costs for one year. However, negotiations since this time have established a joint municipal/provincial grant fund for three years, beginning in 1997 and ending in 1999. This fund allows offices to apply for programming funds, only, at a maximum of $30,000 per office. It remains unclear whether the municipal government and the B.C. Ministry of Attorney General will continue to fund the offices after 1999.

Some offices are in better financial stead than others, as a result of their access to parochial in-kind and financial contributions. For example, within the community-run model, at least half of the offices were established in rent-free space. However, all offices pay to staff a coordinator on either a part- or full-time basis. Membership drives and small-scale fundraising activities such as jail n’ bails, walk-a-thons, garage sales, charity balls, or roasts are means by which offices have attempted to defray their operating costs. As time-consuming as these events are, they have provided “small change” in the offices’ overall funding picture. The offices have all garnered some degree of in-kind contribution in the
form of office furniture and equipment, and often materials (printing for newsletters, paint for
murals and graffiti paint-outs) for their programming efforts.

Many have tried to gain financial self-sufficiency, independent of government. However, it
is still government monies, through charity casinos, and the grants they have received from
both the municipal and provincial levels which keep these offices afloat. Some offices feel
they would still find other means to survive if government (money) sources dried up. Other
offices know that this would signal their deathnell. The three offices in the sample which
face the severest funding crunches are located in east Vancouver—Mount Pleasant,
Downtown Eastside and Cedar Cottage—all in high-crime, ethnically heterogeneous, and
lower socioeconomic status neighbourhoods. Research has shown that crime prevention
programming efforts are hardest to sustain in neighbourhoods such as these; those that
logically need them the most (DuBow and Emmons, 1981: 175; Skogan, 1988; Lab, 1997:
66). This raises the question as to whether community support for crime prevention
programming and need for it should be considered synonymous?

At the very least, program priorities are different for these areas. Staff of offices in high-
crime, heterogeneous neighbourhoods need to spend more time in generating community
support through “capacity building.” In other more homogeneous neighbourhoods, adequate
levels of social cohesion are pre-existing whereby community support (volunteer time,
membership numbers and dollars, and financial support from local businesses) can be more
easily attained.

human resources
CCPOs are highly dependent upon the quantity and quality of their human resources. In
addition to the governance role which the voluntary Board of Directors plays, CCPOs require
paid staff who can demonstrate competence in a wide variety of tasks. CCPO coordinators
are responsible for the day-to-day running of the offices. Therefore, all the administrative
tasks required to run the office effectively, necessarily fall in their laps. Volunteer staff
complement the activities of paid staff. However, several coordinators that I interviewed
voiced their frustrations in maintaining both sufficient numbers of volunteers over time, and
in the lack of availability of volunteers who are interested in taking responsibility over
complex programming tasks. All coordinators recognize the necessary contribution their
volunteers make. As “community-run” offices, CCPOs are premised on the centrality of
volunteer role contributions. However, the “referral and problem-solving” nature of the
CCPO environment places severe time constraints upon paid staff members across offices.
What this means for CCPO coordinators is that they feel they are always juggling their
responsibilities “to keep volunteers busy with tasks that are meaningful to them” and “putting
out fires,” by dealing with “whatever issues come through the door.” As with many work
environments, there are “just not enough hours in the day” to deal with all that needs to be
done. While many offices are operating with one paid staff member on either a part- or full-
time, there is a general feeling that the job requires more than one person to do it efficiently
and effectively. Many coordinators feel they are not being adequately remunerated for both
the tasks they are expected to perform in the job and the long hours they are expected to put
in.

4.2.1.4 garnering broad-based community support

Some researchers have laid blame squarely on the shoulders of local crime prevention groups
and the programs they implement for the lack of community support for their efforts
(Rosenbaum, 1988; Skogan, 1988).
Programming efforts in CCPOs have been premised upon the universality of the services they provide to their local communities. The office criteria which CCPOs jointly established with the VPD were premised upon “broad-based community support for the safety office.” As well, ongoing government funding has been contingent upon the ability of individual CCPOs to demonstrate that their “service delivery can meet the needs of the diverse population in the neighbourhood” (City of Vancouver and Ministry of Attorney General, 1996).

Engaging the broad-based support of the community in crime prevention programming, just like many other neighbourhood issues, is not an easy task. One Vancouver researcher noted community participation rates are generally below 5 percent for most community activities (Dobson, 1995: 29). Greater participation is generally seen in neighbourhoods which are predominantly ethnically homogeneous, commercially stable, enjoy greater stability in housing tenure, and have resident bases of higher socioeconomic status (Seagrave, 1996). However, even in these neighbourhoods, participation levels in crime prevention activities are not high. Schneider (1997: 77) states, that “research findings have consistently shown that participation in different neighbourhood crime prevention activities is only between 10 and 30 percent of the targeted population.” Research undertaken by Schneider in Vancouver’s Mount Pleasant neighbourhood corroborated past research by showing that people who are likely to get involved in crime prevention are those who have the proclivity to get involved in neighbourhood issues, generally. These people, by and large, tend to be middle-class, well educated property owners, who have a long-term attachment to their neighbourhood (Schneider, 1997: 86). This raises the question as to whether or not programs “implemented” fit the needs of the community, or, if given the low participation rates in all

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1 A full listing of the criteria is outlined in Section 3.5.2 of Chapter Three.
neighbourhood activities, crime prevention programs can only reasonably expect modest turnouts?

As a case in point, the Block Watch program has been subjected to extensive evaluation in the United States. Because it is a program which has been implemented across 7/8s of the community-run CPO sample, these program evaluations are particularly pertinent. Findings have demonstrated that not only does Block Watch appeal primarily to property owners, who feel they have investments (in their home, directly, and neighbourhood, indirectly) to protect, but even their participation is difficult to sustain over any significant period of time (Rosenbaum et al., 1986). One CCPO coordinator I talked with about the Block Watch program can see why the present program format has had modest results. Originally, Block Watch was a program conceived of and implemented by police departments across North America. Its main purpose is to organize neighbours around the 9-1-1 reporting of suspicious activities to the police. In addition to this reporting function, it provides participants with “target hardening” tips on how to upgrade door locks and secure windows. The passive participation which the program is premised upon is not extremely motivating. Block Watch captains and co-captains who do their part in reporting suspicious activities are frustrated by never knowing what police action has resulted from the phone calls they make. The original program format also proves counterproductive to addressing participants’ fear of crime. It promotes “suspicion” of outsiders, and therefore can serve to maintain fear levels, which may have been the reason for the participant’s initial interest in “doing something about crime.” Some coordinators are trying to address the implementation failures of Block Watch, by “giving something back” to Block Watch participants, and are using the program as a springboard for organizing people around broader neighbourhood activities such as local area planning and emergency preparedness.
outreach
While attaining broad-based participation in crime prevention programming is a challenging task, CCPO coordinators have made concerted efforts in trying to increase program participation. Many have found that the best way to appeal to hard-to-reach segments of the population is through outreach activities, which seek to meet people “on their own turf.” Gaining community support is, to a great extent, dependent on the community’s awareness of and interest in the programs being offered.

It is a given that people will not participate in crime prevention activities if they are unaware that a CCPO exists. To this end, a great amount of time and effort needs to constantly be spent getting the word out to the community, through as many means possible. Many CCPOs (5 of 8) put out monthly or quarterly newsletters to promote existing programs, disseminate crime prevention tips, and alert the community to upcoming events. Other offices advertise activities and events in community newspapers. Still, implementing effective outreach strategies continues to be an issue most offices grapple with. Are hard-to-reach populations hard to reach because the message has not gotten out to them, or because the message does not appeal and/or apply to them? At a city-wide CPO workshop session in the spring of 1997, discussions were initiated around strategies for office promotion and outreach. A representative from the provincial Ministry of Attorney General pointed to the need to ensure that both the medium and the message are appropriate to the target audience. Outreach to hard-to-reach populations was an agenda item for a Coalition meeting in the summer of 1997. Due to time constraints (so the meeting minutes stated), however, discussion on the topic was tabled.
4.2.1.5 addressing community need?

Many evaluations of community crime prevention programs conducted have found them to have had limited impact (Lurigio and Rosenbaum, 1986). Questions have been raised as to whether these findings are indicative of program implementation failures, or, more seriously, whether they call into question the theoretical assumptions upon which community crime prevention is based.

concern with crime as motivation to participate

General assumptions surrounding people’s motivations to participate in crime prevention usually centre around peoples’ perceptions of crime as a social issue of concern, and/or their past criminal victimization. However, past studies have shown that people’s motivations to participate or not in crime prevention programs are not as simply determined. “There is little systematic evidence that an individual’s attitude toward crime is associated with participation in collective responses or that social interaction is related to the prevention of crime” (Lewis and Salem as cited in Schneider, 1997: 84).

When talking about the basic goals of crime prevention programs, many laypeople make immediate connections between the goal to reduce crime levels and the concomitant alleviation of fear of crime. Research into the phenomenon of fear of crime, shows that fear often has impacts separate from and greater than real crime levels. Further, for many people, the fear of crime often remains long after local crime levels may have abated (Norris and Kaniasty, 1992). There has been much research into the causal linkages between perceptions of neighbourhood disorder and the fear of crime (Moore and Trojanowicz, 1988).
Neighbourhood clean-ups, which seek to improve the physical image of neighbourhood public space can often do more in positive crime prevention terms than activities such as Block Watch or Citizen Patrols, which are premised upon keeping people vigilant and “on guard.”

What this means for crime prevention programs is that they must look at the means by which they address crime. A program, for example, might seek to reduce crime in real terms by promoting individualistic victim-oriented “target hardening” such as property engraving. Individualistic crime prevention measures can sometimes prove to be fear instilling rather than fear alleviating, however, so should often be complemented with other collective programming efforts. Some programs may seek to reduce fear of crime in its own right, by educating people about true crime risks. The information presented in Chapter Two shows that various crime prevention activities seek to address crime at different levels and either target the victim or the offender. While some efforts have been made by CCPOs to address social-problem oriented issues through women’s job shadowing and youth employment programs, most of the crime prevention programming which the CCPOs conduct centres around victim-oriented, opportunity-reduction approaches. As was mentioned in Chapter Two, the most effective approaches to crime prevention, seek to combine opportunity reduction measures with social-problem solving goals (Graham, 1990).

addressing crime through its impact on multi-issues

The presence of neighbourhood-based organizations such as CCPOs is a necessary prerequisite in facilitating the broader community’s mobilization around crime prevention goals (Schneider, 1997). Because, crime is a “no win” situation, crime prevention programs have the greatest likelihood for success if they are integrated into the activities of more general, multi-issue neighbourhood organizations (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993: 154; Podolefsky and Dubow, 1981). The impact of crime prevention programs may be limited, as
“crime prevention programs alone are not able to generate a sense of community necessary for informal social control where none exists” (Graham, 1990: 111). Because “crime” is seen as a single issue, the local perceptions around the salience of crime may wax and wane. In order to maintain interest and participation levels all city-wide crime prevention offices should follow the lead of the CCPOs who are rounding out their efforts by engaging in broad-based community development goals. Wherever possible efforts should be made to look at crime causation more holistically. Therefore, CCPOs should look at how their programs impact crime and its root causes.

In prioritizing their programming goals, CCPOs, however well-intentioned, must remain cognizant of the cross-purposes which may result from their programming outcomes. Many victim-oriented approaches to crime prevention remain reactive in nature. They only attempt to reduce the likelihood of victimization (or re-victimization), and possibly serve to displace crime to other geographic areas (Lab, 1997). They do not seek to address the root causes of crime. The causal factors of crime are multi-faceted and complex. Any neighbourhood organization dealing with crime prevention should ethically deal with both the victims and offenders of their communities. By only dealing with neighbourhood victims, such efforts can serve to exacerbate conflicts between groups, by creating a “them” and “us” posture, which is antithetical to true “community building.”

CCPOs need to concentrate more energy around goal conceptualization and program implementation strategies. As was illustrated above, programs created to reduce crime will not implicitly reduce crime fear. When dealing with a complex social issue such as crime, program outcomes can have many potential ramifications. Program monitoring must determine whether the outcomes achieved were positive; negative consequences, however unintended, may have resulted instead.
Many participants in crime prevention programs may only be concerned with how crime impacts upon them directly in its "Not in my Back Yard" (NIMBY) aspects. However, crime prevention practitioners must look beyond parochial concerns to the broader picture. The lack of resources evident in the CCPO environment means their ability to address the "root causes" of crime is limited. CCPOs need to determine how their programs link, however modestly, to the big picture. They should look at both crime and its causation. Much like the inter-agency collaboration the Police Chief supports in his Vision document (Chambers, 1997: 17), CCPOs should work, to the greatest degree possible, with other social agencies in addressing macro issues of health, housing, employment, and education.

Until this point, the main emphasis has been placed upon the community role in maintenance of the office’s operational integrity. The police, too, as partners in this endeavour have clear roles and responsibilities and accountability in the office’s viability. What seems at first glance to be a clear demarcation between community and police roles, and responsibilities has become blurred over time. The next section looks at the independent accountability of the police.

4.3 HOW DO THE POLICE AFFECT PROGRAM OUTCOMES?

While much has been said about the responsibilities which the Board and staff of CCPOs have in ensuring their viability, one must not preclude police responsibility in this regard. This point is reinforced by reiterating the “language” used in the partnership definition presented in Chapter Three (see 3.6.3):

“Partnership building involves bringing together equal parties in an arrangement to undertake joint action...sharing benefits and responsibilities.”
4.3.1 Transferring Crime Prevention Resources

The formation of CCPOs has allowed a vehicle through which the VPD's community-policing decentralization efforts could be implemented. The VPD's community-policing goals emphasize community input as a necessary ingredient in the Department's move toward more responsive and proactive policing. The CCPOs provide a mechanism for this community input.

4.3.1.1 police as sources of knowledge and information

Because the police have traditionally been looked to as society's response to "crime-fighting", they have also, by extension, taken on the traditional responsibility for preventing crime. Historically, the police became the "experts" in crime-fighting and crime preventing. Empirical evidence has shown that while fighting crime and preventing crime are complementary objectives, they are two distinct activities. The former crime-fighting role should be left primarily to the police, while the latter crime preventing role can and should engage the cooperative efforts of both the police and the public (Lurigio, 1995). When it was realized that the police were limited in their ability to either fight or prevent crime, they began to look at ways to engage the public in individual and collective crime prevention measures. Community involvement in the coproduction of crime prevention has been well established throughout the United States since the 1970s.

As with many social policy shifts, Canada has been roughly a decade behind the U.S. in this regard. Shifts in public service provision have meant that government is moving away from the direct production of services and moving more toward ensuring an adequate supply of necessary services through policy making (Skelly, 1996: 4).
Similar to shifts which are occurring across service sectors, the emphasis on total government service provision in crime prevention programming is partially shifting from government (the police as public servants) to the community (CCPOs). The “pass off” of responsibility for some crime prevention programs has occurred, however, without due consideration to the “transitional” responsibilities of the police (i.e. ensuring communities have the appropriate resources to deliver the service).

In their time as the traditional providers of crime prevention services, the police have amassed great amounts of knowledge and information. They have become experts on Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED), have been the administrators of Neighbourhood/Block Watch programs, and are the front-line responders to crime. By knowing how crimes are committed, they have firsthand experience in recommending ways to prevent crime reoccurrences.

However, crimes are committed in the community—by and against community members. This is why the coproduction of crime prevention programs makes sense. Coproductive efforts are particularly appropriate in instances when services seek to modify peoples’ behaviour (Whitaker, 1980: 246). Since crime prevention goals are premised upon the community—watching out for suspicious circumstances, changing routes to walk through one’s neighbourhood, remembering to lock one’s door or leave the lights on, for example—who better to spearhead the process than the people directly affected? Crime prevention is not rocket science. A great deal of crime prevention is just plain common sense. Because the implementation of crime prevention programming is not difficult, it seems reasonable that the community has been apportioned some responsibility in crime prevention programming. While it may not be conceptually difficult to implement crime prevention programs, it is, however, difficult to effectively do so without adequate resources.
Many of the lessons learned in crime prevention program implementation have come to us from the United States. The greatest lesson learned, through the failure of a large-scale federal grant program in the U.S., was that the provision of adequate technical assistance proved to be a more important determinant in the success of community-based crime prevention initiatives than money. Moreover, it was found that technical assistance needed to be provided in a way that “gave local organizations the information needed to make decisions about how best to combat crime, while allowing them to gain ownership over the process” (Lavrakas, 1995: 97).

This illustration shows the subtle but crucial difference between what the VPD readily provides, and what could best improve the VPD’s accountability to CCPO program outcomes. CCPOs need to have more ready access to the VPD’s technical expertise (crime statistics tailored to CCPO-identified crime problems, crime profiling, their “expert” role represented at some public meetings). Put in simple terms, CCPOs need more of the VPD’s help in their day-to-day community-based problem-solving endeavours, and less of their input on how to run the offices.

4.3.1.2 training

The CCPOs are playing “catch-up” and are dependent on the police to provide them with basic levels of crime prevention training to bring them up to speed. The training that has been offered to CCPOs has been that which is specific to the crime prevention programs which they have adopted from the police (e.g. Block Watch). The police also provide ongoing training to new CPO volunteers introducing them to the basic workings of the VPD. In their NSO/CPO position paper the VPD indicated their future commitments to provide training to CPO Board of Directors and staff. While the VPD have and are continuing to
commit to a basic level of training for the offices, there continues to be a gap in the content provided in training sessions, and what would be most relevant to the role of the office volunteers.

In addition to the “introductory” training sessions the police are committed to providing, CCPO representatives I have spoken with feel the police can aid them with more useful technical information which will help them in their jobs. For example, many residents come into CCPOs for advice on all sorts of legal matters (e.g. suspicions of theft, by one apartment building tenant to another). In training, volunteers are given basic examples of the difference between civil and criminal law, and are told that the police will not intervene in civil matters. The only recourse a resident might have would be to contact a lawyer, go to Legal Aid, or to file their complaint in Small Claims court.

The police train volunteers and office staff that a crime prevention office’s role is not to give advice, as this could make the office liable if a person decided to sue the office based on a client’s (mis)perception of the advice being given out. Because the amount of legal information conveyed in training is of such a cursory nature, many volunteers feel ill-equipped to deal with any referrals where there is any “grey” area around the legal nature of the complaint. The police could easily provide more in-depth legal training to volunteers. In many situations this would make volunteers more comfortable in simply dispensing referral information (e.g. the name of a lawyer or information on the process at Small Claims court). What this example shows, is that CCPO staff and volunteers can greatly benefit by having a clearer understanding of what the police actually can and cannot do in their duties. Beyond relaying knowledge on the legal system, the police have amassed a great deal of information on the subject of crime prevention theory and practice, that CCPOs look in good faith to them to regularly provide.
Questions of inter-office equity have arisen due to the fact that CPOs have been established across the city with different access to parochial resources. The police, by virtue of their partnership relationship with CPOs, have been asked some tough questions about their stance on the resource equity issue.

CPOs have benefitted from corporate sponsorship in both large and small ways. Some offices have benefitted long-term through the provision of free office space by major development corporations such as Marathon (CBD), Concord Pacific (Yaletown), and Greystone (Renfrew-Collingwood). Others, such as Kitsilano, have received donations from banks and/or local businesses for the purchase of police bikes (The Kitsilano News: Aug.30, 1995).

Questions have surfaced in the local media regarding equity in the distribution of police resources. When 3 bikes were purchased for the Kitsilano Community Crime Prevention Society by the TD and CIBC banks and CMHC, Vancouver Sun’s columnist, Elizabeth Aird, raised some pointed questions (Aird, The Vancouver Sun: Oct.2, 1995). The police officers she interviewed conceded that while buying bikes for the police does not buy more police, it does change the ability to utilize different policing methods in certain areas. While the police made no specific promises to the donors, the inference was that the police do feel obligated to use the bikes in the geographic area from which they were donated. More broadly, Aird questioned the ethics of corporate sponsorship of public services. Does private influence serve to direct public service provision and, by so doing, create resource inequities? Can neighbourhoods with greater access to resources pay for additional police services? These are tough questions. However, they are questions which the police, more so than the community, need to address.
With inequitable levels of parochial resources evidenced across Vancouver neighbourhoods, what message is this sending? Only the strong survive? Again, the question of whether community need and community support are synonymous comes full circle. The partner who must be responsible for addressing questions of equity is the police. Local communities are self-interested by nature. Localism often assumes a certain amount of NIMBY value orientation. The checks and balances should come, instead, from the police department, who must ensure universal access to police resources on a broader scale. The police believe that office equity can be achieved through their pursuit of corporate sponsorships.

The VPD sees nothing ethically wrong with the corporate sponsorship of CPOs. It is they who are encouraging CPOs to more actively pursue avenues of corporate sponsorship. In addressing the issue of office sustainability, the VPD’s position paper (1998: 19) stated:

Many of the offices have become too reliant on public or casino dollars for funding. Neither of these fundraising activities is guaranteed....In order for the office(s) to survive they must have support from the community they serve. This support does not only come in the form of dollars, but also comes as in-kind service, volunteer hours and donation of equipment and supplies. Programs should be marketed towards corporate sponsors and partnerships which will enhance the community.

Out of this position, came two recommendations which both implicitly and explicitly infer the pursuit of alternate funding strategies along corporate sponsorship lines:

1) That Neighbourhood Safety Offices be established without depending on public dollars; and
2) That the Neighbourhood Safety Office governing bodies, the Vancouver Police Department and the City of Vancouver develop a corporate sponsorship policy for the Neighbourhood Safety Offices (VPD, 1998: 19).
4.3.2 Communication

Communication is by far the most challenging issue facing the community-police partnership. The establishment of community-police partnerships in Vancouver has been an evolutionary process, and there has been much need for a range of skills in order for both sides to communicate their expectations around this emergent relationship. Their partnership roles and expectations have been defined and redefined by advocating, clarifying, cajoling, facilitating, mediating, and negotiating at various points in time.

changing perceptions

While the community may be sharing in the task of crime prevention, the police still see themselves as taking a leadership role in this field (Nuttall, 1989: 479). Much of the literature, on either community policing or community crime prevention talks about the police role as “organizers” and “catalysts” in mobilizing the “latent” social control tendencies of the public. As the fourth of five key community policing principles in the VPD’s restructuring document, the police role is seen “to support, educate, co-ordinate and animate the dormant self-policing capacities of the community” (Chambers, 1997: 10; Murphy, 1993: 8).

With particular respect to their role in the CCPO environment, this leadership image has appeared at odds with the self-help goals of several communities. While there is recognition of the valuable resources the police have brought and continue to bring to community crime prevention efforts, many communities are eager to do more for themselves. No longer wanting solutions handed down to them, communities are wanting to tailor solutions to their own local needs. Communities recognize the crucial police role in this process. They are dependent on police to relay to them the knowledge gained through their traditional experience as crime prevention practitioners. In order for the police to be accountable to the
community, they must help the community to help themselves. The police must provide the community with access to sufficient informational resources relating to crime prevention programming goals. A transitional process is necessary to ensure this knowledge has been imparted to the community from the police. Beyond the transference of an initial knowledge base, there are ongoing informational resource commitments which the police should necessarily bring to the CCPOs.

police should address unequal power dynamic

Sampson (1988) talks about the need to address the power differential between the police and non-governmental organizations who are embarking upon community-police partnerships. If increasing communities’ self-help capacities is one of community policing’s goals (Nuttall, 1989: 484), the police must recognize the role that information sharing and exchange play in this regard.

There is great power conferred upon the police role in society, by virtue of their unique mandate to enforce the law. The police have privileged access to information to which the average citizen does not. It is understood that there are some private aspects to police work. However, greater steps need to be taken to demystify the aura of secrecy which surrounds most aspects of the police role. The police need to educate the community about where their legal constraints require them to “draw the lines of communication.” Many of their activities are mundane, and many police actions do not require that they operate in secrecy. The police must recognize the informational void that is created because of this.

This recognition is especially crucial in the joint problem-solving role between Neighbourhood Police Officers and CCPO coordinators. One coordinator voiced her frustration in having to remind the NPO stationed in her office of the importance in communicating to her any police follow-up activity on citizen crime complaints. Because the
normal process is to channel complaints through her, it was important to her that the communication process come full circle, by having the NPO inform her of the outcome of the complaint. She said she has to constantly remind the NPO that “they are in it together”, and it is not necessary or appropriate for the NPO to say “I’ll take it from here.”

The police need to inform the community of their limitations, and what information they can and cannot share with them, and then maintain accountability to these “information sharing parameters.” The community also needs to recognize that the community role in policing is new to many police officers. One NPO interviewed said, “the community has to be patient with us. They have to realize that this (community policing) is a different way of working for us.” There is a process of mutual learning going on. Although police officers probably do not intend to “horde” information, that is what has often happened. The police should not always have to be reminded about sharing pertinent information with the community; it should flow freely. This is one area where police need to become more accountable to the community.

The VPD has acted unilaterally on actions which have either directly or indirectly affected their partnership relations with CPOs. For example, in Chapter Three I summarized the standardization process undertaken by the police in relation to CPOs. The move to place NPOs in offices received mixed reviews from many CCPO coordinators. Where on the one hand, such an action served to address office concerns for physical accessibility and consistent communication around problem-solving with the police, it was also felt to be an indirect way in which the VPD were trying to exert more authority over the office’s function. The VPD has tried to reassure those CCPOs feeling threatened this was not a case of co-optation, and that the Police Department was not interested in “taking over” the community-run offices. All the suspicion which these NPO assignments have created could well have been alleviated if the process was more open and collaborative.
4.3.3 Addressing Police Organizational Obstacles to Community Policing

One city official I interviewed about the “community-police” partnership under study said the hierarchical organizational structure of the police is not conducive to engendering equal working relationships with them. Moreover, they are simply not used to having to work in a “consultative way.”

What becomes confusing in all of this is that the police, themselves, have used language in formal policy and informal usage that communicates the message that they are eager to enter a “community partnership” era. Not only that, they describe these partnerships as necessarily “equal.”

The community values that VPD management may rhetorically promote, and the “on the ground” organizational acceptance of the same, appear to be quite different. In much of community policing literature there has been recognition that implementation of community-policing requires a radical reshaping of police culture and organizational structures.

To this end, community policing requires a police management committed to overseeing its implementation as the first requisite. However, this management philosophy must also find realization in tangible departmental incentives, such as training surrounding the implementation of the community policing concept, granting decentralized authority to frontline officers, and shifting reward structures to recognize the importance of community policing goals.

A VPD deputy chief wrote an article on the organizational change necessary in police departments trying to implement “community policing”:

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Community policing must become embedded in police officers’ values and attitudes; and that is facilitated by changing the organizational or corporate structure....Community policing has gone too far down the road to be just another management fashion that will soon pass. It is supported by trends elsewhere in the public and private sectors, including ‘total quality management’....The principles of community policing are found in other areas of the service-delivery sector: client satisfaction, shared decision-making, workplace democracy, empowerment of the front line, decentralization, openness, inclusiveness, accountability....The implementation of community policing is a generational-change process because it takes that much time to change the values, attitudes and corporate culture or organizational subculture of policing....Management of the Vancouver police department is committed to overcoming these challenges and nurturing community policing in our city (McGuinness, The Vancouver Sun: Sep.20, 1996).

In the implementation of community policing, a large part of the change process must occur through the communication of pro-community values within the VPD and to the broader community. The VPD admits that they need to become better communicators. In a strategic planning exercise (VPD, 1996) both internal and external methods of communication were recognized as organizational weaknesses. These weaknesses are well recognized by the police and community representatives interviewed for this study. In reference to CCPOs, there have been attempts to rectify the situation.

The placement of NPO officers in all CPOs was seen as a way to standardize communication channels. NPOs have become the de facto VPD representative in community offices. The assignment of NPOs has served to address CCPO concerns for consistent police accessibility. However, as was mentioned in Chapter Three, because of insufficient back-up from other police officers, the NPOs assigned to CCPOs have become overloaded in dealing with the number of police issues being channelled through the offices. As a result of their placement in offices, VPD switchboard operators are now encouraging citizens with non-emergency police concerns to go to the storefront officers to deal with them. NPOs have tried to broach the issue of work overload at city-wide CPO meetings. Management may or may not have got the message, as patrol officers have often not responded to NPOs’ need for back-up.
4.3.4 Evaluating community policing

The police, too, are accountable to demonstrate how they are measuring up with their side of the partnership. Kennedy (1991: 287) undertook to evaluate the implementation of community policing strategies in 10 police departments across Canada:

A comparative study...identified a strong commitment to the philosophy of community policing but little evaluation of it....The ongoing monitoring of the new initiative is virtually non-existent, although there is a stated intention in all police agencies to fully monitor these (programs) when they are incorporated throughout the system. A major impediment to this is the lack of resources within the police organization to be used for the evaluation process.

As institutions which have far more access to the financial and human resources necessary to conduct proper evaluations than non-profit societies, it is curious why such stringent program evaluation standards are being placed upon CPOs?

CPOs have accepted that part of proving their programs’ efficacy means being accountable to the communities they serve. The VPD, also, has recognized the need for accountability. Performance standards have been clearly imposed upon the community, by having offices meet evaluative criteria, and ensuring “operational integrity.” Much less has been detailed about the mechanisms through which the police will ensure their accountability to the community. The VPD support provided in resource commitments is arguably part of their accountability (for a detailed list see Section 3.6.1.1 in Chapter Three.) However, community representatives are much more interested in determining the mechanisms by which the community’s “voice” in police decision-making will be heard.

As this paper is being written, the Vancouver Police Department is undergoing a massive organizational restructuring. The “Vision” document written by the Chief of Police in
October 1997 was to represent a “blueprint for the future (that) allows the police and the community, as partners, to shape a preferred destiny for policing in Vancouver.” The VPD is to adopt this blueprint by recognizing five key community policing principles:

1) The importance of the community in police decision making;
2) The objectives of policing are broad and community defined;
3) The diverse functions the police perform are seen as legitimate elements of the police role;
4) Community-based policing is based on a shared responsibility between the police and the community; and
5) Community-based policing advocates pro-active involvement with the community (Chambers, 1997: 10).

Based on the 5 key principles detailed above, the centrality of the community role in police decision-making is clearly stated. The CPOs represent a concrete manifestation of a community-police partnership. Even as supposed partners, CPO Boards and staff still remain unclear as to how the police will create consultative mechanisms which will make them accountable to community input. The VPD’s position paper on CPO/NSOs talks of the Board of Directors/Advisory Committees’ role in “assisting with evaluating (the VPD’s) performance in the community” (VPD, 1998: 15). Clear terms of reference need to be established to determine how this assistance will be measured (its form, time frame, etc.). The police must move away from the ad hoc nature of their communication with the community. It is not enough, for example, for the police to say their attendance at public meetings is “consultative.” Publicly documented follow-up on community concerns must be demonstrated. The assurance that the police are actually responding to community input should be the VPD’s largest measure of accountability. The police say they are committed in principle. However, they need to show they are accountable in concrete terms by
determining who the community is; what the community want them to do; how they are going to respond; and to show that they have done so.

4.4 FUNDING - THE POLITICS OF CPO SUSTAINABILITY

In their dealings in the political arena, the community and the police have sometimes proved to be acting at cross-purposes. Interviews determined that police officials, at all levels, recognize the precarious financial position the community-run CPOs are in. A few VPD middle managers have even been so bold as to say that if the VPD were truly committed to “community policing”, they should look to ways to fund the operating costs of all CPOs. All the VPD managers interviewed stated, however, that they do not have the money in their current budget to do so.

The VPD’s position on office funding remains most perplexing. From the initial position they took when offices were first established in 1994, stating they would be unprepared to fund the offices, the VPD has come full circle in making a political statement about the public monies which they presently receive. The inference I take from this statement is that the VPD feels government monies for non-profit services are somewhat precarious, in terms of funding availability and strings attached (program evaluation criteria). Granted, they are. But, by then stating offices should pursue corporate sponsorship options (as determined through VPD and City of Vancouver policy) seems to imply such sponsorships are the preferred option. Are corporate sponsorships any less precarious than public ones? And, should the VPD be dictating the offices’ funding alignments, anyway?
It is the community, and not the VPD, who need to make their own assessments concerning the costs and benefits of the various sources of funding (government versus corporate and shades in between). In the past, CCPOs unsuccessfully lobbied both the municipal and provincial levels of government for core funding. The public program funding gains that CPOs have made are the result of concerted efforts on the part of the CCPO Coalition in lobbying all three levels of government. The inference drawn here is that the community feels the benefits of government funding outweigh the costs of fundraising activities, which up to this point, have yielded minimal returns.

By stepping into the funding quagmire, a number of questions are raised about the VPD’s role in financial sustainability. As the VPD position has shifted over time, from non-involvement, to direct policy orchestration, in all fairness, so might the offices’ expectations of them on this front. Is it possibly time for the VPD to “put their money where their mouths are?” The VPD clearly state the central role the offices play in their community policing strategy, “to accomplish and implement these (community policing) objectives, a strong presence in the community is warranted. The Neighbourhood Safety Office is the ideal centre for these activities” (VPD, 1998: 9). If NSOs/CPOs prove all that the VPD are arguing they should, and are to become the manifestation of the VPD’s community policing commitment to Vancouver neighbourhoods, why aren’t they allocating any direct financial resources to them? Instead of dissuading offices in their reliance on government monies, why are they not instead helping to lobby government regarding the offices’ utility? Because part of the CCPOs’ political clout may well come from their coproductive alignment with the police, it is especially important for the VPD to recognize the negative ramifications which might result from their policy positions regarding office funding.
An important question is raised from the office funding debate:

If the prevention of crime is both a widely espoused political goal, and a pragmatic ideal, why is it so difficult to sustain political support?

4.4.1 "Crime Prevention" as Policy Space

More and more of the discussions around the types of programs and services which crime prevention offices provide, surround their role in public safety. The VPD’s rationale in standardizing the name of CPOs to Neighbourhood Safety Offices is because it is thought “safety” has broader connotations than does “crime prevention.” In considering the offices to be providing public safety service, it is thought there is more room to expand their programming scope, and the term “safety” will also appeal to a broader range of public and corporate sponsors.

4.5 REFRAMING THE COMMUNITY-POLICE PARTNERSHIP

Research has shown (Yin, 1986: 307; Lurigio, 1995: 57) that in order to achieve success, community and police crime reduction efforts should act in interdependent fashion. In Vancouver, CCPOs represent an example of how such interdependence is achieved in practice.

A great deal of time and attention has been taken up articulating the roles, expectations, and responsibilities of the other partner in this process. By looking at what each side brings to the partnership, and being accountable to their own separate “pieces”, more future energy can be placed on ironing out role discrepancies in good faith.
Community crime prevention offices represent a significant community-police coproductive undertaking. By detailing the future benefits and responsibilities which face them (see Table 4.1) in their partnership undertaking, a better understanding of the future viability of CCPOs will be achieved.

4.5.1 Community Benefits and Responsibilities

As non-profit societies, CCPOs benefit from their autonomy in decision-making around crime prevention programming decisions and resource allocations. However, because of their governance role, they also maintain responsibility for the efficacy of the offices’ overall functioning. CCPO Board of Directors must ensure that adequate skill sets exist amongst themselves, their staff and volunteers. Primarily, Boards and staff need to hone their skills in areas of strategic planning, program design, monitoring and evaluation. In order to ensure programs are responsive to broad-based community need, CCPOs must ensure adequate community representation on their Boards. Where they are unable to attain this, CCPOs should devise outreach strategies which can solicit community “voice” on the “fit” of their programming endeavours. Because crime is a multi-faceted social problem, it is often difficult to ascertain that crime prevention programs are causally related to crime reductions. Instead of addressing crime reduction in real terms, program monitoring and evaluation should look at how CCPO programs address crime and its root causes, and how they link to community-identified crime problems and livability concerns.

Maintaining interest in crime prevention activities is difficult. However, CCPO staff must ensure adequate levels of community support for their activities. Research has shown that neighbourhood-based organizations concerned with crime can best address it through broader
community development goals which focus on multiple issues. For example, fear of crime is better addressed by promoting activities which celebrate the positive aspects of one's community, encourage community interaction, and instill in residents a sense of pride in their neighbourhoods. This is appropriate because crime prevention's end goal is the increased livability of neighbourhoods in which the people of the community feel more connected to each other and the places they live.

4.5.2 Joint Benefits and Responsibilities

CCPOs are aided by the police in many of their tasks. In turn, the offices act as a conduit between the broader community and the police. Much of the information CCPOs gather requires police follow-up attention. The police then act to assist the community in resolving local problems of a crime-related nature. Beyond the tangible benefits the police provide in human and material resources, police cooperation and involvement also provides a sense of legitimacy for many activities undertaken in the offices. Many citizens want to interact with the police, and seek out the authority of their opinions on certain crime problems. It is standard, for example, that a police member attend an initial Block Watch meeting to give advice on home security measures, and to answer any questions the group may have regarding the local crime picture. While these are topics which can be addressed by CCPO staff, many citizens want to hear from the police on issues to which they have first-hand knowledge.

Up until this point, much of their joint problem-solving efforts have occurred on a case by case basis. Because of this ad hoc nature, confusion remains about what will happen to information as it makes its way from an individual CCPO through the maze of the VPD. In order to enhance the channels of communication around problem-solving efforts,
both the community and the police need to spend more time clarifying their roles and responsibilities surrounding their inputs to the office function, generally, and specifically, around the level of information-sharing which needs to occur in order for problems to be effectively resolved.

4.5.3 Police Benefits and Responsibilities

CCPOs have proven to be useful information-gatherers for the VPD on all sorts of crime-related issues. As part of their commitment to the broader community (through the CCPO), the VPD need to become more accountable to the community input they have been receiving. Formalized follow-up mechanisms should be in place to ensure this accountability.

The police greatly benefit from the public relations role the offices play. Both formally and informally, the offices educate the public about how to access the police, and about what the police can and cannot do. In order to educate the public effectively, CCPO staff and volunteers need to be properly trained. While the introductory training that the VPD gives to CCPOs is seen as beneficial, some CCPO representatives feel they require additional technical information to better do their jobs. As well as training CCPO staff, the VPD should provide more training to its own members regarding the role of CCPOs and how they fit into the VPD's community policing mandate.

Because the VPD have identified decentralization as a main operational component of their current Departmental reorganization, and because CPOs/NSOs have been identified as the logical site for this reorganization to occur, it behooves the police to look at issues of resource equity among CPOs. The police, as public servants, must ensure there is universal access to levels of police service city-wide. As well, funding issues remain the crux of
CPOs’ long-term viability. Therefore, the police, as CPO partners should help to promote the utility of CPOs in the broader political arena.

CCPOs help communities help themselves, and help the police to more effectively do their jobs. The offices mutually benefit both the community and the police, by providing a vehicle to collaboratively address local crime and safety needs. Both the community and the police have joint responsibilities in ensuring the viability of CCPOs. While they may play independent partnership roles in this regard, they are jointly responsible for partnership outcomes.
Table 4.1
Partner Benefits and Responsibilities in the future viability of CCPOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Benefits</th>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Governance over local crime prevention programming</td>
<td>-Board of Directors which is representative of community</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-&quot;Skill sets&quot; among Board and staff (e.g. strategic planning, program design,</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>monitoring and evaluation)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-Control over resource allocation</td>
<td>-Levels of community support (membership, volunteer numbers, fundraising)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-CCPO used as community development tool</td>
<td>-Program responsiveness determined by broad-based community need</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Holistic crime prevention programming (e.g. root causes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>-Local Problem-solving</td>
<td>-Communication regarding mutual roles and responsibilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community and Police</td>
<td></td>
<td>-Accountability to information-sharing parameters</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>-Decentralized access to local communities</td>
<td>-Resource equity issue between neighbourhoods</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-CCPO as Public Relations tool (educator/promoter of police role)</td>
<td>-CPO funding</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-CCPO as information-gatherers</td>
<td>-Training of both CCPO staff and police regarding office role in community policing</td>
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4.6 CONCLUSION

As non-profit societies, community members remain ultimately responsible for the viability of CCPOs. Community accountability is maintained through office governance, resource
allocation, and programming. While sympathetic to the constraints placed on volunteer
Boards, especially in the resource-deficient environment of CCPOs, I strongly feel that
Boards need to be clearly committed to maintaining CCPO viability and/or clearly delegating
the responsibility to their paid staff and front-line volunteers. In the field of crime
prevention, crime reduction is often difficult to positively correlate to program interventions.
Because of this, it is sometimes difficult to see that one’s efforts have resulted in any
significant measure of change. With a great deal expected from CCPO Board members and
staff, and not a great deal of tangible reward, it is understandable that a degree of Board and
staff “burn-out” happens over time. Boards must be aware of their own life-cycles and
mortality. Continual Board renewal, through recruitment of new members can bring the
infusions of new ideas and energy which must sustain Boards over time.

The police, as coproduc tive partners, are also accountable to the community in helping to
ensure office viability. To this end, the police are responsible to provide CCPOs with
productive inputs such as human and material resources (e.g. training, information on
problem-solving). A significant part of their productive input to CCPOs comes through
information-sharing. The police should be ever cognizant of the methods in which they
communicate both internally, within their Department, and externally, to CCPOs and the
public at large. Follow-up, for example, is one measure of accountability to community input
which the VPD should attempt to improve upon.
Because the services which the offices provide mutually benefit the crime prevention goals of both community and police partners, they have mutual responsibilities in ensuring that the services delivered effectively respond to community need. By being responsible to their separate “pieces,” the community and the police can continue to effect change in their problem-solving and programming endeavours through CCPOs.
5.0 CHAPTER FIVE: Summation and Implications

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Since the early 1990s, The Vancouver Police Department and various geographic communities city-wide have entered into coproductive service arrangements through the vehicle of store-front crime prevention offices (CPOs).

Three basic models of CPOs have emerged. The first model serves specific ethnic communities. There are two offices of this type. The second model is police-run. There are ten (10) offices of this type.

This study has focused its attention on the third, community-run model. Community crime prevention offices (CCPOs), are different than the two preceding models in that have been established at the impetus of the community, but in cooperation with the police. There are eight (8) offices of this type.

CCPOs provide crime prevention services and programs to geographic neighbourhoods. They have been established to provide coproductive inputs by both the community and the police. As non-profit agencies, community members are responsible for the governance and management of CCPOs. The police, on the other hand, are accountable to programming outcomes of the offices through their ongoing commitments of material and human resources. Because the establishment of CCPOs remains a novel undertaking for both the community and the police, a great degree of trial and error has been necessary in program implementation.
5.2 VPD'S CHANGING PARTNERSHIP POSITION

A crucial component in the VPD’s partnership with the community comes through police management support of CCPO undertakings. In the course of the offices’ establishment, the VPD has seen a steady turnover of upper management personnel who have acted in liaison capacities with the CPOs. As a result, the VPD position vis a vis CPOs has gone from an initial position of ad hoc support for them, to present attempts to standardize police support across offices city-wide.

While the current standardization process has served to clarify the role contributions of the police, it has done so at the expense of community input. The police have made many unilateral decisions in relation to their partnership position on CPOs. The action taken to assign police personnel to community offices is one case in point. While the VPD maintain that this move was in response to community requests for consistency in terms of police accessibility, communication, and resource contributions, many community-run offices fear they are being co-opted as a result.

There are ongoing arguments about the operating costs necessary to effectively run CPOs. The main trade-offs are seen in relation to storefront accessibility and rental office space, and of the necessity for paid civilian staff. At present, there remain only a couple of CCPOs in which rent remains a concern. The issue of office staffing has yet to be fully resolved. While community-run offices feel paid staff members are an integral component of their offices’ advocacy function, the Police Chief, himself, has publicly stated he believes the offices could be staffed with only volunteers. The discrepancy between the community and the police position regarding the community role is indicative of the need for further refinement of partner roles and expectations.
5.3  FUTURE DIRECTION OF CCPOs

Several future steps should be taken to ensure partner accountability to the viability of CCPOs:

1) a partnership agreement could be implemented to clarify expectations and role contributions;
2) accountability measures should be in place to reflect partner expectations and roles;
3) the police, as public servants, should address issues of inter-office resource inequity;
4) the community need to ensure CCPO programming is responsive to community need; and
5) ongoing efforts need to be made to enhance partner communication.

5.3.1 Clarifying Partner Roles and Responsibilities—the Partnership Agreement

The single factor which has most greatly affected the community-police partnership, and its impact upon CCPO service delivery outcomes has been the discrepancy in partner roles. In the next few months the VPD and individual CPOs city-wide, will be committed to establishing a "partnership agreement" whereby both sides will be able to clarify partner expectations and role contributions. It is hoped this process will also produce accountability mechanisms which can ensure that both sides are meeting the expectations and responsibilities agreed upon.

5.3.2 Accountability

The community are accountable to the police in providing "broad-based" community input and representation on local crime and safety concerns as they relate to police priority-setting.
As coproducers of crime prevention, the police also have an obligation to provide adequate technical assistance to ensure effective program outcomes.

The police maintain that their accountability to the community lies in their provision of police resources, both human and material (technical information), around joint problem-solving activities. This accountability must extend to issues of community consultation. Mechanisms must be established that measure: 1) community input (who, what, when); and 2) police actions taken on community-identified concerns.

5.3.3 Police to Address Inter-office Resource Inequity

Because CPOs represent the decentralization of some aspects of an existing public service—policing—the VPD should make every attempt to address equity issues as they arise across neighbourhoods with unequal access to parochial resources. As the VPD’s re-structuring vision unfolds, they are committed to place Neighbourhood Police Officers (NPOs) in all 23 city defined neighbourhoods. The need for and duties of an NPO in the high income, ethnically homogeneous neighbourhood of Shaughnessy is vastly different from the need for one in the crime-ridden milieu of the Downtown Eastside. The way things now stand, police support for offices comes after community need and support have been determined. Both the police and the community need to give attention to the type of mechanisms by which community need and support are initially determined.

5.3.4 Community Support does not Equal Community Need

Issues of community “need” and “support” must be more fully operationalized. The evaluative criteria established by CPOs has specified that the “neighbourhood should have
empirical public safety and crime related problems.” However, no attempt has been made to place parameters on what types of public safety and/or crime problems “the presence of an office would likely help address.” Through this conceptualization process it could be better determined which neighbourhoods need crime prevention programming interventions the most. From that point, a balance could be struck by determining what ratio of public and private financial support could be reasonably expected in “high risk” neighbourhoods. The present community need = community support calculation is untenable. It ensures that inequities remain unaddressed, and may also force the demise of offices without adequate local resource bases, with “only the financially fit surviving.”

5.3.5 Defining Community Need

Community need and support of crime prevention programming efforts are not synonymous. Because crime prevention covers a vast array of activities and ideologies, it is most pertinent that local service providers make every attempt to deliver programs that are responsive to the diverse needs of their communities. Responsiveness must ensure a “matching” of programs to the appropriate “publics” (Lauffer, 1987:319).

Communities, for their part, can only ensure the long-term viability of CPOs by cultivating community support for their programming endeavours. This support comes in many forms and facets. Primarily, they need to ensure this support through adequate membership numbers, organizational expertise, local in-kind and financial contributions, and volunteer staffing. Some CPOs have proven better at ensuring these conditions than others. However, when looking at possible organizational deficiencies consideration should also be given to the macro factors that militate against equitable access to parochial resources. The demographic make-ups of geographical neighbourhoods are vastly different. There are a
number of macroeconomic factors which influence the spatial distribution of resources in society (Schneider, 1997). Some neighbourhoods, for these reasons, are unable to garner the same level of local support as are others. When the viability of neighbourhood-based organizations is determined along lines of "support", read in "resource" terms, it becomes another example of victim-blaming writ large if their success or failure is determined along these lines.

The police, and government more broadly, as providers of "public goods" should ensure that questions of resource equity are addressed. It is important for the police to recognize these resource disparities, and to aid the "have not" offices in providing the technical supports necessary (e.g. training) to put them at par with other neighbourhoods with local resource advantages. If anything, neighbourhoods which presently lack the sufficient support (membership, volunteers, in-kind and financial contributions from local businesses) should be given time to "build" the support which may already be present in other more homogeneous communities. CPOs city-wide cannot be realistically evaluated against each other without placing this resource inequity issue into the equation.

5.3.6 Communication

Greater attention needs to be given to the role of communication in the effective implementation of community-police partnerships. The police, for their part, could learn to act in a more consultative fashion, and provide mechanisms whereby their accountability to community input can be measured. For example, the information shared in follow-up to joint problem-solving efforts must be more consistently applied. This communication goes both ways. The community, on the other hand, needs to clearly articulate their expectations of the police vis a vis the community crime prevention office's functioning. The community should
recognize the bureaucratic limitations of the police and appreciate the efforts they are making to change "the way they do business." The VPD's reorganization along community-policing lines will take time and patience. The community should appreciate the degree of credibility which police partnership brings to their crime prevention programming. The police, in turn, should recognize the legitimacy which community involvement gives them.

The community and the police, as partners, have accomplished much more together than either could alone.

5.4 MACRO IMPLICATIONS

From this case study, a number of issues surrounding coproducive endeavours have surfaced:

1) in order for an effective transition in service delivery to occur from public sector to non-profit service providers (here, the police to neighbourhood-based crime prevention offices) proper technical supports need to be in place;

2) realistic non-profit program evaluation measures should be utilized that reflect reasonable expectations concerning the outlay of financial resources, the timeframe under which evaluations are to be conducted, and the level of expertise necessary for their implementation;

3) coproducive partnerships must be sensitive to the power dynamics between the partners involved. Where there is unequal access to resources (human, technical, and/or financial), there needs to be realistic determination of the appropriate weighting of partner responsibilities through provision of service inputs and accountability to service outputs; and
4) there needs to be greater attention paid to communication (modes and messages). In a coproductive process, well thought out channels of communication are critical. Information-sharing needs to occur in an appropriate form and in a timely manner.

5.5 THE FUTURE OF COMMUNITY-POLICE COPRODUCTIVE EFFORTS?

CPOs have proven to be a vehicle of great promise. They have allowed greater citizen “voice” on issues of local concern, and have provided a means whereby decentralized access to police resources has allowed the police to become more responsive to citizens as “customers.” The offices are an interesting coproductive blend of community self-help and police re-organization along community policing lines.

This has been a process of mutual learning for both sides. The plans to enter into a “partnership agreement” process in the coming months will help to resolve some of the tensions which have resulted due to a lack of role clarification and unmet expectations up until this point. CCPOs are at a cross-roads. Both the community and the police have much future benefit from this partnership.

The community and the police “are in this together.” While the community is ultimately responsible for the functioning of the CCPOs, they remain largely dependent on police resource contributions to do so effectively. Because the VPD has gained many benefits from the establishment of community crime prevention offices, they should also share in the responsibility of ensuring their viability. By jointly addressing public safety concerns, both partners are in a better position to impact the livability of Vancouver neighbourhoods. Here, like in many other human endeavours, “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.” By
continuing to work in good faith, to improve their partnership relationship, CCPOs will pass on the benefits to the broader communities they serve.
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Appendix I

Key Informants Interviewed

CPO Staff

* indicates Vancouver Police Officers

*Cst. Ron Bieg - (past) West End Community Police Resource Centre
Mary Lynn Burke - (past) Britannia Community Police Office
Deborah Dolly-Entwistle - (past) Mount Pleasant CCPO
Kathy George - (past) Broadway Station CCPO
Susan Gould - (past) Little Mountain/Riley Park CCPO
*Cst. Ralph Hutton - (past) Granville/Downtown South Community Police Office
*Cst. Tracy Jones - (past) Waterfront Police Community Services Centre
Dawn Kelly - Little Mountain/Riley Park CCPO
Charlie Kirkley - Kitsilano CCPO
Patrick Kwok - Chinatown Police Community Services Centre
Deborah Mearns - Downtown Eastside Neighbourhood Safety Office
Native Liaison Society Storefront Project
Debbie Plett - Gastown Neighbourhood Police Office
*Cst. Sean Trowski - (past) Yaletown Community Police Office
Michelle Seveigny - (past) Fraser Street CCPO
Megan Stuart-Stubbs - (past) Mount Pleasant CCPO
Chris Taulu - Joyce Street CCPO
Barbara Wright - Broadway Station CCPO

Vancouver Police Department

Paul Battershill, (past) Inspector - District Three
Terry Blythe, Deputy Chief - Patrol
Cst. Gerry Burke, Neighbourhood Police Officer - Cedar Cottage
Cst. Steve Callender, Neighbourhood Police Officer - Mt. Pleasant
Bruce Chambers, Chief Constable
Zack Fleming, (past) Planning and Research
Sgt. Kash Heed, Community Policing Coordinator
Esko Kajander, Inspector - District Three
Don MacPherson, (past) Sergeant - Community Services
Brian McGuinness, (past) Deputy Chief - Patrol
Rick Stevens, (past) Deputy Chief - Human Resources
Municipal Officials

Wendy Au - Social Planning - City of Vancouver
Judy Rogers, Deputy City Manager - City of Vancouver

Provincial Officials

Norm Brown - (past) Community Programs Division - B.C. Ministry of Attorney General

Other Informants

Loraine Elliot - (past) Vice President - Mount Pleasant Safer Community Society
Cst. Pat Hudson - (past) VPD District Three
Cst. Gord Pirrie - (past) VPD District Three
Cst. Ken Nixon - VPD District Three
Joyce Nermann - (past) Mount Pleasant CCPO volunteer
Appendix II

Key Informant Interview Questionnaires

Questionnaire One
CPO Staff

[Most interviews (see Appendix One for complete listing) were conducted in November 1995 with the exception of: Deborah Dolly-Entwistle, November 1996; Dawn Kelly, November 1996; Michelle Seveigny, January 1998; and Barbara Wright, October 1996].

1. When did this office open?

2. a.) What is the purpose of this office?
    b.) What community need does its establishment address?

3. What are your responsibilities/duties as office coordinator?

4. What was the process which brought about this office opening? i.e.) Who were the key people involved?

5. a.) Does your office have a mission statement?
    b.) What are the goals of this office?
    c.) Do you have any written documentation of your goals and objectives?

6. Can you list/describe to me some of the service/programs your office offers?

7. How do you measure the impact of your services/programs?

8. a.) How many volunteers does this office have?
    b.) What are their roles/responsibilities?
    c.) Why do you think people volunteer to work in this office? i.e.) What satisfaction/personal need do you see volunteers fulfill by working in this office?

9. What is your perception of the general attitude within the VPD towards the establishment of community policing principles within its operational mandate?

10. What is your perception of the general attitude within the VPD towards the establishment of storefront crime prevention offices?

11. How would you describe the relationship between the police responsible for this office and the office users/clientele?
12. Can you comment on how the police are utilizing and incorporating the specific community policing principles of partnership, problem-solving and communication in relation to the functioning of this office?

13. What are the characteristics of your clientele in terms of: age, gender, ethnicity, and income?

14. a.) How is your office funded?
   b.) Through what sources will future funding be accessed?

15. What are the advantages and disadvantages of this crime prevention office?

16. Who are the people who benefit from this office?

17. What factors are necessary for the operation of this office?

**Questionnaire Two**

**VPD Management Personnel**

[This questionnaire was used during the period October 1995 and January 1997 to interview the following key informants: Paul Battershill, Terry Blythe, Zack Fleming*, Esko Kajander, Don MacPherson, Brian McGuinness, and Rick Stevens].

*Zack Fleming was asked questions 3,4,5,6,7,9&10

1. What is community policing?

2.a.) What is the purpose of storefront crime prevention offices (CPOs)?
    b.) How do such offices fit under the operational strategy of the VPD?
    c.) What characteristics differentiate existing CPOs?

3. Can you outline what ways you see storefront CPOs:
   i.) meet the needs (safety and otherwise) of their communities?
   ii.) reduce the fear of crime?
   iii.) reduce crime in real terms?
   iv.) promote general “livability” and/or community development?

4. What is your perception of the VPD’s general attitude towards the establishment of community policing principles within its operational mandate?

5. What is your perception of the VPD’s general attitude towards the establishment of storefront crime prevention offices?
6. What measures do you see the VPD taking to ensure the longevity of (non-profit/community-initiated AND police-initiated) crime prevention offices?

7. What is your general impression of the VPD’s progress in implementing community policing strategies as outlined in their September 27, 1994 report to Vancouver City Council?

8. Can you comment on what programs and services crime prevention offices provide, and on the importance of such service delivery?

9. Can you comment on how the VPD is utilizing and incorporating the specific community policing principles of partnership, problem-solving, and communication in relation to the functioning of crime prevention offices?

10. What factors are necessary for the operation of crime prevention offices?

11. Can you comment on how you feel funding arrangements should be determined for crime prevention offices?

Questionnaire Three
Chief Constable

[Interview conducted January 1998].

1. In your “Vision” document you talk about the need for the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) to fully embrace the concept of community policing. How would you summarize the key ingredients necessary in moving toward such a department-wide community policing strategy?

2. Where do you see the VPD presently sits with respect to operating under such a community policing philosophy?

3. Further, in your “Vision” document, you talk about partnerships with the community. What types of community partnerships do you see as important? i.) how do such partnerships serve to inform police policy? ii.) what are the mechanisms under which such partnerships operate?

4. Do you see the current relationship between the VPD and crime prevention offices (CPOs) as one such partnership?

5. In reference to the CPOs, and specifically, with respect to the community-run offices, how do you see such partnerships are now being implemented? i.) what is the decision-making/informational capacity of such a partnership?
6. How do you see the need for CPOs is determined? e.g.) what criteria do (future) offices need to meet in order to be established?

7. I hear there are plans for a maximum number of offices city-wide. How will the geographic spacing of such (future) offices be determined?

6. What characteristics do you see are necessary for the effective working relationship between the VPD and the community crime prevention offices (CCPOs)?

7. What are the roles and responsibilities of each side of such a partnership?

8. How do you see your re-structuring plans aid in the evolution of such a partnership? e.g.) the deployment of speciality squads to geographic areas?

**Questionnaire Four**

**Community Policing Coordinator**

[Interview conducted October 1997].

1. How is it that your present position as “community policing coordinator” was created?
   b.) What are your responsibilities vis a vis the storefront crime prevention offices (CPOs)?

2. How would you define community policing?

3. Is such a (community policing) philosophy being presently utilized by the VPD? If so, how?

4. Are all levels of the organization “on side” with community policing? If not, why?

5. Again, thinking in community policing terms, what do you see is the role of the CPOs? b.) What community need do they address?

6. Does the work of the CPOs affect the work of the VPD either positively or negatively? e.g.) does it complement? increase the VPD’s workload? If so, how? (Please give examples)

7. What differences do you see in the different storefronts operating throughout Vancouver? e.g.) between District 1 and District 3 offices?

8. What is the purpose of the Neighbourhood Police Officer (NFO) placement in every CPO? How were officers selected for placement?

9. What factors do you feel are necessary for the successful running of the offices?
10. With the new “Vision” document just being released by the Chief of Police, how do you see CPOs fit into this vision?

11. What are the key factors in establishing an effective police-community partnership?

Questionnaire Five
Neighbourhood Policing Officers

[This questionnaire was used to interview the following key informants: Gerry Burke, December 1997 and Steve Callendar, January 1998].

1. How would you define community policing?

2. What do you see as the role of the community crime prevention offices (CCPOs)?

3. What are your job responsibilities as Neighbourhood Police Officer (NPO) within this (CCPO) structure?

4. How would you compare your current job with that of your previous job in the department?
   i.) with respect to your relationship to the community?
   ii.) differences and/or similarities?
   iii.) positive and/or negative aspects?

5. Referring back to Question 2, does the role of the CCPO fit with the VPD’s community policing mandate?
   If so, how?

6. What restructuring changes will affect this role either positively or negatively?

7. What do you see are the necessary ingredients in a community-police partnership?

8. With respect to this partnership, would you say these factors are present in terms of the relationship between the VPD and CCPOs?

9. Who initiated this partnership? e.g.) the community or police?

10. What do you see are the roles and responsibilities of the police and the community with respect to “partnering”? e.g.) what does each partner bring to the table in order to work together?
Questionnaire Six
City of Vancouver, Deputy City Manager

[Interview conducted September 1995].

1. How do you feel the VPD's move toward community-policing strategies has affected police service delivery?

2. How is the City lending institutional support to the implementation of community-policing principles?
   i.) what steps has the City taken in support/promotion of community policing?
   ii.) what support has the City lent, specifically, in reference to the establishment of storefront crime prevention offices (CPOs)?

3. How do CPOs fit into the City's move toward integrated service delivery?

4. How effective are CPOs in terms of:
   i.) meeting the needs (safety and otherwise) of their communities?
   ii.) with specific reference to the diverse characteristics of Vancouver neighbourhoods in terms of: ethnic composition and socio-economic status?
   iii.) reduce crime in real terms
   iv.) reduce the fear of crime
   v.) promote general livability and community development?

5. What do you see is the City's role in ensuring the longevity of CPOs?
   i.) what measures have been taken to do so?

6. How is the City aiding in the funding of these offices?

7. What is your general perception of the VPD's progress in implementing strategies identified in their September 27, 1994 report to City Council?

8. What is your general perception of the VPD's progress in implementing the 3 community policing goals of problem-solving, communication, and partnerships outlined in the above mentioned report?

9. What is your perception of the different Vancouver neighbourhoods' responses to the creation of CPOs?
Questionnaire Seven
City of Vancouver-Social Planning Department
[Interview conducted January 1998].

1. Can you comment on the City’s position in regard to crime prevention offices, generally? e.g.) support (political, financial)?

2. What need do you see such offices fulfill?

3. What services do you see such offices provide?

4. Do you see these offices as an example of a community-police partnership?
   Why or why not?

5. What are the roles and responsibilities of both sides of a community-police partnership?
   i.) what factors are necessary for an effective partnership?
   ii.) are they present in the current relationship? Why or why not?

6. What factors do you think are necessary for the effective running of the offices?

7. What criteria (needs assessment) are in place to determine the establishment of future offices?

8. What internal (self) and external evaluation do you feel is necessary for these offices? e.g.) what criteria is such evaluation measuring?

9. Do you feel that (all levels of) government has any responsibility in ensuring the viability of such offices?
   If so, what? And, how?

Questionnaire Eight
B.C. Ministry of Attorney General - Community Programs
[Interview conducted November 1996].

1. How and when did your Ministry get involved in the process to fund storefront CPOs?

2. How would you gauge the effectiveness of CPOs in meeting the needs of their communities?

3. Can you comment on the establishment of storefronts in terms of their police-community partnership?

4. Do you feel the storefronts are viable in the long-term?

5. What factors are necessary to ensure CPO viability?