**LOYALTY AND COLLABORATIONIST THEORY:
AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW TO THE COLLABORATION THEORY'S
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF LOYALTY**

by

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ABSTRACT

Traditional theories of imperialism have tended to be defined almost exclusively in terms of European motives, as a simple projection of European state power. Collaboration theorists have challenged the Eurocentric perspective of the orthodox view of imperialism. According to Ronald Robinson, a more comprehensive theory would include an analysis of the most important mechanism of European management of the non-European world: the use of loyal, local collaborator groups as mediators between Europe and the indigenous political and economic system. This paper will examine the collaborationist's conceptualization of loyalty. It will be suggested that Robinson's formalistic approach, typical of the nation-building school, cannot account for the continued loyalty of Canadians to Great Britain. By following a functional approach, it can be seen that loyalty is a psychological phenomena unlimited in its scope. From this perspective, it can be seen how loyalty to the Empire provided the necessary psychological unity for Canadians as they assumed greater political sovereignty.

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INTRODUCTION

Loyalties of one sort or another have always been powerful causal forces in human history. It is individual and collective loyalties which today help to hold national and multi-national societies of the modern world together. As the essence of politics in the modern state is the conflict between groups which try to capture or maintain political power, the manifestation of support for any claim to power within the national or multi-national community, (the struggle over political power), involves the process of "loyalty building." All power seekers try to attract "loyalists" to their cause, or at least reduce the loyalty to other claimants.

This paper will seek to analyze the way in which the idea of loyalty has been used by collaboration theorists. I will argue that collaboration theorists share the "nation-building" school's view of loyalty, a view that is based on the belief that in order to strengthen the 'nation-state', loyalties to other large-scale communities must be weakened or destroyed. I propose to argue that the preservation or development of loyalties to non-national entities is a useful, if not indeed a necessary factor in creating and preserving national loyalty. Non-national

loyalties need not be of the jealous nature, nor need they be narrow. Thus, they need in no sense detract from a loyalty to the multi-nation state. Vigorous and sustained loyalties of the non-national sort encourage all individuals, whether they be new immigrants or "old-stock" citizens, to feel that there is something to attach themselves to, that by finding the roots of the community they might become genuinely part of it. This type of small-scale community loyalty is the first and natural step toward a national loyalty of a meaningful sort.

According to the collaboration thesis, the movement from formal to informal empire depended upon the successful cultivation of a group of loyal colonial collaborators. When colonial rulers had run out of indigenous collaborators, they either chose to leave or were compelled to go. Opponents of the 'loyal' collaborationist group sooner or later succeeded in detaching the indigenous political elements from the colonial regime until they eventually formed a united front of non-collaboration against it. Hence the inversion of collaboration into non-collaboration largely determined the timing of decolonization.

In order to identify political leaders as being among the loyal, one has to develop a criterion for interpreting behavior as loyal or disloyal. This paper will seek to show that there was no distinction among political parties in the

Province of Canada during the Union period concerning the commitment to preserve the imperial connection. Being British defined to them a global system within which they found their identity.[1] In the sense that they were committed to preserving the imperial tie, even if they disagreed about how best to do it, virtually all of the British emigrants and their immediate descendants were collaborators. Collaboration implies that there ought to have been a conflict in their minds between their loyalty to retaining the imperial tie - the desire to be British - and the defense of local interests - the desire to be Canadian. But such a dichotomy did not exist in their minds because they saw no contradiction in being both British and Canadian.

The alternative interpretation of loyalty that will be presented will bring into question the collaboration thesis as an explanation of the process of decolonization in terms of the growing ability of 'disloyal' nationalist movements in the colonies to disrupt the arrangements for collaboration. I will attempt to show that the collaboration thesis treats loyalty to the emerging Canadian national identity and to the imperial center as absolutes. The collaboration thesis exhibits the tendency to regard loyalty not as a relative thing, but as a unique form of devotion,

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[1] J.G.A. Pocock, "History and Sovereignty: The Historiographical Response to Europeanization in Two British Cultures," _Journal of British Studies_," 31 (1992): 382.

potentially antithetical to other forms of loyalty such as regional, religious, or imperial loyalties.

The institutional approach favoured by many proponents of the 'nation-building' school tends to pull in the direction of treating nationality as an absolute value rather than relative one. It inspires the social scientist to isolate national loyalty from, and place it in antithesis to, other forms of group loyalty, instead of keeping in view the fact that the psychological ingredients of nationalism are the same as for other forms of human identification with large groups.

Even the most cursory examination of life in the Province of Canada during the Union period would show that British North Americans belonged to a number of groups - churches, local communities, as well as the political state - and that each of these groups could potentially be the focus of loyalty. As Canadian society became more diverse and complex, the multiplicity of loyalties also increased.

As a result of this natural diversity, no ruling government or nonruling group in a democratic society could then, or now, possibly enjoy absolute loyalty. Each may still seek to engender and preserve loyalty among potential supporters, employing a multiplicity of means. This would suggest that a given loyalty was scarcely an absolute value.

My analysis will show that the collaboration thesis regards national loyalty as if it were exclusive, and inconsistent with other loyalties. The prevalence of multiple loyalties was so fundamental in Canada that it became one of the chief responsibilities of Canadian statesman from all political factions to prevent the clash of loyalties, as between church and state, or local and national communities. It will be suggested that students of 'nation-building' should recognize that groups exist within concentric circles, and the loyalties adhering to groups are rarely, if ever, absolute. The group elicits loyalties which are adjusted to and relative to other loyalties. The intensity of loyalties may increase or diminish. The question must continually be treated in terms of degree. The story of British North America in the pre-Confederation period is not the story of an absolute shift from complete British imperialism to complete Canadian nationalism, resulting in an inevitable decolonisation. It is more a matter of ebb and flow, not of one totally replacing another. This fact of multiple loyalties should serve as a basic element in the analysis of individuals and the groups to which they belong.

My analysis of the way in which loyalty has been conceptualized in terms of the collaboration thesis will follow the line of inquiry suggested by David Potter in his

seminal article on nationalism and loyalty, "The Historians Use of Nationalism and Vice Versa."[2] In this critique Potter drew a distinction between formalistic and functional approaches to the study of nationalism and group loyalties. He criticized the formalistic approach for its tendency to regard nationalism not as a relative thing, but as a "unique form of devotion, potentially antithetical to other forms of loyalty."[3] The formalistic approach prompts scholars to regard nationalism as "an absolute thing, existing in full or nothing at all"[4] and a nations' citizens are either "loyal" or "disloyal" depending on standard specifications. The formalistic, juristic approach regards the nation as if it were the sole group to which individuals belong, and regards nationalism as if it were the sole loyalty of the people.

Potter suggests that a functional analysis will remind us at once that individuals belong to a number of groups, and that each of these groups can become the focus of loyalty. The diversity of groups increases with the more complex social organization of modern times, and as it does, the multiplicity of loyalty also increases. This means that a given loyalty is seldom an absolute value.[5] Since Potter's

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[2] David Potter, "The Historians Use of Nationalism and Vice Versa," in History and American Society: Essays of David M. Potter, ed. Don E. Fehrenbacher (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 61-108.
[3] ibid., p.66, 73.
[4] ibid., p.66.
[5] This idea is also suggested by Hans Kohn in The Idea of Nationalism: A Study of its Origins and Background (New York: Macmillan,

analysis will serve as the model for my commentary of the collaboration thesis, the following passage from Potter's "The Historian's Use of Nationalism and Vice Versa" deserves to be quoted at length;

> Historians frequently write about national loyalty as if it were exclusive, and inconsistent with other loyalties, which are described as "competing' or "divided" and which are viewed as detracting from the primary loyalty to the nation. Yet it is self-evident that national loyalty flourishes not by challenging and overpowering all other loyalties, but by subsuming them all in a mutually supportive relation to one another. The strength of the whole is not enhanced by destroying the parts, but is made up of the sum of the parts. The only citizens who are capable of strong national loyalty are those who are capable of strong group loyalty, and such persons are likely to express this capacity in their devotion to their religion, their community, and their families, as well as in their love of country. The nationalism which will utilize this capacity most effectively, therefore, is not the one which overrides and destroys all other objects of loyalty, but the one which draws them all into one transcendent focus.[6]

It should be the responsibility of the students of nationalism to recognize that the group is never isolated, and the loyalties adhering to it are never absolute. These then are the two premises that I will adopt from Potter's essay; in the first place, that national loyalty should be regarded as a form of group loyalty, similar to other forms of group loyalty; secondly, students of nation building have tended to treat nationalism as a monolithic form of loyalty, in antithesis to other forms of loyalty, instead of recognizing that it is associated with, and even derived from those other loyalties. The group elicits loyalties

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1944) pp.10-20
[6] Potter, p. 75

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which are adjusted to and relative to other loyalties. The intensity of loyalties which it evokes may increase or diminish. The question must continually be treated in terms of degree.

The story of British North America in the pre-Confederation period is not the story of an absolute shift from complete British imperialism to complete Canadian nationalism, resulting in an inevitable decolonisation. It is more a matter of many loyalties usually complementing each other, but rarely conflicting. This fact of multiple loyalties is a basic element in the analysis of individuals and the groups to which they belong. Collaboration theorists have displayed the unfortunate tendency to ignore the fact that loyalty is fundamentally a character trait, a virtue that can be developed and nurtured, and thereby extended to the multi-national state, but not by attempting to suppress other loyalties.

The basic objective of this paper is to show how loyalty, which forms the basis for cohesion for normal life, functions and tends to bind men's allegiance to the national state. I will argue that the collaboration theorists' conceptualization of loyalty does not allow for multiple loyalties. I will further argue that by giving undue weight to an economic determinism, the collaboration theorists have failed to understand the nature of the colonists' loyalty to

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the Empire. I will also point out that Imperial loyalty displayed many of the characteristics of a 'national' loyalty, so much so that one may argue that the predominant nationalism in British North America among Canadians during the Union period was a 'British nationalism'. The loyalties to the emerging Canadian nationality, and to the sense of being British, were not antagonistic, but rather were mutually supportive.

Chapter One

Collaboration Theory and the Question of Colonial Loyalty

In this section I will examine how the concept of loyalty has been used by collaborationist theorists who have employed it to help explain the existence of the "informal empire" during the second half of the nineteenth century. Whether or not there was indeed a period of "free trade imperialism" has been vigorously debated among imperial historians,[7] but this question is beyond the scope of this paper. I will begin by giving a brief overview of the background of the collaboration thesis as a challenge to the orthodox historical view that, with the acceptance of free trade policies, the British had lost all interest in Empire. Next, I will outline the main tenets of the collaboration thesis, namely that the success of empire depended upon the loyal collaboration of a local elite, and that the timing of decolonization depended upon the ability of "disloyal" nationalists to dislodge the loyal collaborators from their place of power.

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[7] Among the many articles and books which have challenged the "free trade imperialism" thesis, see Eric Stokes, "Late Nineteenth-Century Colonial Expansion and the Attack on the Theory of Economic Imperialism: A Case of Mistaken Identity"? Historical Journal, XII (1969): 285; Stokes, "Uneconomic Imperialism," Historical Journal, XXVIII (1975): 409; Oliver Macdonagh, "The Anti-Imperialism of Free Trade," The Economic History Review, 2nd ser., XIV (1962): 101.

Background

Traditional theories of imperialism have tended to be defined almost exclusively in terms of European motives, as a simple projection of European state power, strategic rivalry and resource exploitation overseas.[8] Ronald Robinson, one of the two authors of the 'collaboration theory', was highly critical of the traditional, Eurocentric theories of imperialism. He believed that imperialism had to be redefined in theory against the background of how the imperial, economic, and strategic arms of European expansion were connected overseas. In his opinion, a more comprehensive theory would include an analysis of the most important mechanism of European management of the non-European world: the use of loyal, local collaborator groups - whether ruling elites or landlords or merchants - as mediators between Europe and the indigenous political and economic system. The notion of the collaborative mechanism was said to have two great advantages over the more orthodox theories of imperialism. It explained why Europe was able to rule large areas of the world so cheaply and with so few troops. It also provided an explanation of the process of decolonisation in terms of the growing ability of

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[8] For the following summary of the collaboration theory, I have relied upon Ronald Robinson's "Non-European Foundations of Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration," in Studies in the Theory of Imperialism, eds., Roger Owen & Bob Sutcliffe (London: Longman, 1972), pp. 117-141.

nationalist movements in the colonies to disrupt the arrangements for collaboration or to use them for their own ends.

Collaboration theory recognizes that imperialism was as much a function of white settlers' collaboration or non-collaboration – of their indigenous politics as it was of European expansion. Without the voluntary or enforced cooperation of the governing elites, economic resources could not be transferred, strategic interests protected, or nationalist resistance contained. The theory suggests that at every stage from external imperialism to decolonisation, the working of imperialism was determined by the indigenous collaborative systems connecting its British and British North American components. The terms of imperialism were as much and often more a function of Canadian politics than of British politics and economics.

To begin with, Robinson posited that imperialism depended on the absence or presence of effective indigenous collaborators. Secondly, the transition from one phase of imperialism to the next was governed by the need to reconstruct and uphold a collaborative system that was breaking down. The breakdown of indigenous collaboration in many instances necessitated the deeper imperial intervention that would lead to imperial takeover, or formal withdrawal. Thirdly, the choice of indigenous collaborators, more than

anything else, determined the organization and character of colonial rule; in other words, its administrative, constitutional, land and economic policies were largely the institutionalization of the indigenous, political alliances which upheld it. Fourthly, when colonial rulers had run out of indigenous collaborators, they either chose to leave or were compelled to go. Their national opponents in the modern elite sooner or later succeeded in detaching the indigenous political elements from the colonial regime until they eventually formed a united front of non-collaboration against it. Hence the inversions of collaboration into non-collaboration largely determined the timing of decolonisation.

Free Trade Imperialism

In 1953, John Gallagher's and Ronald Robinson's now celebrated article, "The Imperialism of Free Trade,"[9] was published. It called into question, and for the most part revolutionized, the previously accepted framework of British imperial history. Their manifesto challenged the conventional definitions of nineteenth-century imperialism. They turned the traditional interpretation of the mid-Victorian years on its head by including within their

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[9] John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade", Economic History Review, 2nd ser. VI (1953): 1.

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survey what they referred to as the 'informal empire'.[10] The orthodox analysis held that the old colonial system was overthrown and the empire ceased to be of value in an age of free trade.[11] This new work, which came to be referred to as the "continuity theory of imperialism" turned out to be one of the more original and controversial contributions to the historiography of modern imperialism.

Gallagher and Robinson argued that the traditional interpretations of imperialism had exaggerated the power of imperialism, and suffered from a Eurocentric bias. According to the previously accepted hypothesis, the middle decades of the nineteenth century were dominated by an aversion or an indifference to empire.[12] It was during this period that the doctrine of free trade, the Manchester School and ideas of Richard Cobden held sway.[13] These were the years when many leading British statesmen, colonial officials, and economists, voiced their growing dissatisfaction over the Empire. Pressure mounted for freer trade and an economic system emancipated from government interference.

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[10] For a general background to the literature on the 'informal' Empire, please see Robin W. Winks, "On Decolonization and Informal Empire", American Historical Review 81 (1976): 540-56.

[11] Wm. Roger Louis' The Robinson and Gallagher Controversy (New York: New Viewpoints, 1976) chronicles the imperialism/free trade debate.

[12] Lewis Feuer, Imperialism and the Anti-Imperialist Mind (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1986).

[13] Wendy Hinde, Richard Cobden : a Victorian Outsider (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987)

The Manchester School, and Cobden in particular, were at the centre of the free trade movement. Cobden stood against all imperialism, formal and informal. The free trade movement represented a force of Victorian society in perpetual conflict with the aristocracy and those principles associated with the aristocracy: unnecessary governmental expenditures, bellicosity, war as a solution to problems of colonial and international relations. The free trade movement was more than a movement concerned with mere trade: it espoused moral principles and the ideas of a society that would regulate itself free from government interference. Not least it was a movement for peace, including support of international arbitration and disarmament. The free trade movement represented a force in Victorian society in conflict with those who profited from needless governmental spending and imperialistic wars as a solution to problems of colonial and international relations. In light of Britain's manufacturing supremacy and the primacy of its navy and merchant shipping, exclusivity and monopolistic trade restraints were less important than, and often detrimental to, the need for ever expanding world markets. The transformation of the old colonial and mercantilist commercial system was thus said to be completed by the end of the 1840's. Free trade had made empire obsolete.[14]

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[14] Bernard Semmel, The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism: Classical Political Economy, the Empire of Free Trade and Imperialism, 1750-1850

In the British North American context during this period, revolutionary changes were taking place. In light of these changes, it became apparent that some of the old methods of imperialism were becoming quickly antiquated.[15] Over the next thirty years, British North America passed through what was undoubtedly its most critical transitional period. Supporters of the free-trade school of decolonization pointed out that political nationalism and industrial capitalism were remaking the modern world, and the northern colonies were subject to ominous pressures from Great Britain and the United States. Great Britain, which was apparently far more interested in the conquest of world markets than in the retention of its territorial empire, was anxious to reduce its American political commitments and to withdraw its troops from the new continent. The United States, which was rapidly becoming a great military and industrial power in its own right, was using the techniques of railway and the free homestead system for the exploitation of a continent. The colonies, flung suddenly out of what now appeared to have been the peaceful security of mercantilism and political dependence, had to discover an answer to the one central question into which all their

(Cambridge: University Press, 1970).

[15] Ged Martin, The Durham report and British Policy: A Critical Essay (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). See also Peter Burroughs, "The Determinants of Self-Government," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 6 (1978): 317-319; John M. Ward, Colonial Self-Government: The British Experience, 1759-1856 (London: Macmillan, 1976) pp. 248-250.

perplexities were compacted. What was the best substitute for a political and economic connection with Great Britain that was under pressure to change?

Some British North Americans believed that the answer was to be found in the union of the provinces among themselves, fewer still argued for the closer association with the United States. It had always been the conviction of Canadian Conservatives that the St. Lawrence must remain British, certainly in allegiance if not wholly in language and race,[16] and Reformers were no less eager to lose the tie to the British centre.

In summary, Gallagher and Robinson took a second look at this 'orthodox' theory of imperialism in the nineteenth century and asked why so many new colonies were acquired and new spheres of influence established in an alleged age of indifference?[17] The two Cambridge scholars rejected the existence of an age of anti-imperialism in the mid-Victorian years. Their research showed that there was a continuity of policy which the conventional interpretations had missed.

The Collaboration Model

According to their depiction of the collaborative mechanism, during the nineteenth century "British

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[16] Chester Martin, "The United States and Canadian Nationality," Canadian Historical Review, XVIII, (March, 1937): 1.
[17] Gallagher and Robinson, p.3

governments worked to establish and maintain British paramountcy by whatever means best suited the circumstances of their diverse regions of interest."[18] Gallagher and Robinson's theory pointed to the importance of local conditions to imperial expansion. The loyalty of a 'collaborating class' was a principle element of the political strategy of 'indirect' rule. It was the collective bargains with the indigenous ruling structure that were crucial. By recognizing the importance of native collaboration, the Cambridge scholars were clearly at odds with the older, Anglo-centric theories. Gallagher and Robinson pointed out that the orthodox hypothesis of imperialism relied upon an excessive concentration on formal methods of control. Local circumstance in colonial societies, whether the success of collaboration or the crisis of resistance, was the neglected factor which they called into play, since it governed much of the timing and character of imperial interventions and withdrawals. Their theory embraced the idea of informal empire, its breakdown, the onset of colonial rule and the manner in which it was sustained. It also explained the reason why, once collaboration turned into non-cooperation, it ended in decolonisation. They underlined the importance to British

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[18] Gallagher and Robinson, p.12

economic interests abroad of the political collaboration of the local elite.

With these issues in mind, the collaborative model attempted to broaden the perspective of previous notions bringing this previously neglected extra-European factor into play. It assumed, first, that the imperialists were not in the business of exporting surplus wealth and power out of Great Britain. Imperialism was a question of deploying quantities of resources, comparatively insignificant in European terms, to places where they would result in maximum returns at the least risk and cost. By investing a little, they expected their colonies to contribute much. First, by following this principle, the metropolitan power to be deployed would suffice to manipulate, but not to abolish, the indigenous politics of other countries. Secondly, to be worthwhile, empire of any kind had to be 'on the cheap'. The costs and benefits of imperial policy were calculated on input-output ratios. Thirdly, empires had to be founded, to a greater or lesser extent, on indigenous resources in the countries imperialized. Finally, enough of their leaders had to be attracted or conscripted into transferring the necessary resources and allegiances, if such feats were to be accomplished profitably. Unless a significant element of the local elite could be cajoled to cooperate, or at least

acquiesce, trade could not be promoted, the empire could not be upheld or nationalist sentiments could not be contained cheaply. Imperial cost-benefits depended on finding local intermediaries who would be pliable without being ineffective, and this depended, in turn, on the nature of their social organization and its ability to undergo change without foreign control.

Loyal Collaborating Elites

In Africa and the Victorians,[19] Robinson and Gallagher defined imperial expansion as a set of bargains between officials in the metropolis and their indigenous allies and opponents, who were primarily concerned to defend or improve their position inside their own societies. The colonial system of rule depended upon understandings between rulers and subjects. Imperial rule had drawn its force more from the collaboration of its subjects than from exported power. Contrary to the traditional view made popular by successive generations of Whig historians, local and indigenous factors outside Europe had indeed largely determined the parameters of imperial intervention.

The colonial power sustained itself by shifting the basis of its rule from time to time, dropping one set of collaborators and taking another. The choice of local

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[19] John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961).

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collaborators determined the organization, depth and character of colonial rule. Collaborators governed the speed and direction of economic growth in ways that complemented the needs of the British financial markets, and influenced their domestic politics in favour of political collaborators with London.

Robinson and Gallagher highlighted the importance of local collaborators as mediators between the metropolitan centre and the indigenous political and economic system. In the later article which outlined the collaborative thesis in more detail, Robinson wrote that "imperialism was as much a function of its *victims'* collaboration or non-collaboration - of their indigenous politics, as it was of European expansion."[20] The notion of the collaborative mechanism has been used to explain the obvious question of how the European powers were able to rule successfully over their geographically dispersed empires without incurring great expense and without the frequent use of military force. It suggests that an integral part of imperial rule was the ability of European powers to strike "various arrangements for mutual collaboration, through which the external European and the internal non-European components cooperated at the point of imperial impart."[21] It challenged the belief that imperialism relied solely upon "the exertion of

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[20] Ronald Robinson, "Non-European Foundations," p. 118.
[21] ibid., p.118

power and the transfer of economic resources."[22] It is Robinson's contention that,

> No society, however dominant, can man-handle arcane, densely-peopled civilizations or *white colonies in other continents* simply by projecting its own main force upon them. Domination is only practicable in so far as alien power is translated into terms of indigenous political economy.[23]

Therefore, the "controlling mechanism" successfully employed by the European powers was "made up of relationships between the agents of external expansion and their internal 'collaborators' in non-European political economics."[24] The cooperation of the governing elites was essential to the success of Imperial rule. The loyalty of a collaborating elite was the linchpin of the informal empire in British North America.

Intrinsic to the concept as a whole was the notion that each local society would create a collaboration class out of its own culture, thus the need to explain the rise of a mediating elite within a specific colonial setting. Robinson noted that the term "collaboration" was in no way employed in a pejorative sense, even though it was often used in such a way in contemporary politics in terms of criticizing 'corrupted' politicians. From the standpoint of the collaborators, the imperial power imported a source of wealth and power which could be exploited in order to

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[22] ibid., p.119
[23] ibid., p.119
[24] ibid., p.120

preserve or improve the standing of the indigenous elites within their own political order. But by definition the 'bargains' of collaboration could not be too one-sided, or they would cease to be effective.

Collaborators had to mediate with the metropolis on behalf of their local constituents, and concessions which were perceived to be overly drastic would undermine the basis of their authority. Even if the bargains were unequal they had to recognize mutual interests and interdependence if the bargains were to be kept. When mediators were left without sufficient political resources, their authority waned, crisis followed, and the imperial power had to choose between scrapping its interests or intervening to promote them directly.

To sum up, Robinson identified "two inter-connecting sets of linkages" which made up the collaborative mechanism: "one consisting of arrangements between agents of industrial society and the indigenous elites drawn into cooperation with them; and the other connecting these elites to the rigidities of local interests and institutions."[25] Collaborators had to perform one set of functions in the external sector yet be able to have them accepted by the indigenous society.[26] The turnover of allies in a crisis

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[25] ibid., p.122
[26] ibid., p.122

could often be swift and provocative.[27] Robinson also

pointed to the fact that collaborators "naturally attached

more importance to their traditional, than to their

mediatory role."[28]

The British North American Colonist: The Ideal Prefabricated Collaborator

While all systems of influence which called for holding

territory depended upon political quiescence among the

colonial populations and on controlling political

development in the colony, in the British settlement

colonies this was especially so. According to Robinson, the

white colonist in British North America proved to be the

"ideal, prefabricated collaborator."[29] Although cultural

affiliation may have played a role, Robinson argued that

political collaboration stemmed largely from economic

dependence. For the greater part of the century Britain was

the main source of capital, export markets, and production.

The dominant export-import sector consequently shaped

colonial politics in favour of commercial and political

collaboration with London. Thus, collaborative bargains

proved easy to make and keep when these commercial

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[27] Francis Hinks, one of the boldest provocateurs during the battles over the control of political patronage during the 1840's, came to be a rewarded with postings in foreign outposts of the Empire.
[28] Robinson, "Non-European Foundations..." , p.122
[29] ibid., p. 124.

partnerships were mutually profitable and colonists were permitted to manage their own internal affairs.

Robinson's argument is in large part based upon the belief that colonists would give their backing to colonial politicians who supported the arrangements which kept export markets open, and capital flowing in. The specter of rejection at the polls which went along with breaking the collaborative bargains thus made direct imperial control over local affairs unnecessary. The collaboration model suggests that the continuing economic and political collaboration among British North Americans stemmed essentially from their growing and mutually profitable business connections with the United Kingdom. Even if it was contemplated, direct intervention in the political activities of British North America was a positive disadvantage for it risked provoking violent nationalist reaction.

The collaborative mechanism of commercial partnership in white colonies converted external economic power into internal political cooperation. It worked constructively so eventually these colonies would go through peaceful and gradual decolonisation. As soon as the economies of the British settlement communities diversified, the ties of political collaboration with Britain would abate, and economic dependence would diminish. As the export-import

sector shrank in importance relative to their domestic economy, the collaborating elites associated with them would have to adjust their political foundations or risk losing influence to populist national movements. Robinson was concerned with the manner in which large investments of capital produced certain political effects, for instance, the emergence of new groups of potential collaborators.

'Loyal' and 'Disloyal' White Settlers

As outlined by Robinson, the collaboration model suggests that the continuing economic and political collaboration of the British North American colonies stemmed essentially from their growing and mutually profitable business connections with the United Kingdom. After the initial stage of colonization under Imperial rule, the Canadian colonies enjoyed self-government under democratic constitutions. Robinson regarded these colonial governments as "notably nationalistic, and anti-imperialist politically, yet, normally they cooperated loyally within the empire." Robinson wrote that "At first sight, it is not easy to see why these virtually autonomous states, with their democratically elected ministries and parliaments, should have remained loyal to the empire."[31] He discounted cultural

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[30] Ronald Robinson, "Imperial Theory and the Question of Imperialism after Empire," _Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History_ XII, 2 (1984):45-46
[31] Ronald Robinson, "Conclusion: Railways and Informal Empire," in _Railway Imperialism_ ed., Ronald Robinson, (Westport: Greenwood Press,

ties between British North America and Great Britain, preferring to see only "proto-nationalist politicians" needing financial guarantees to ensure their loyalty. Robinson wrote that,

> Depending almost entirely on the United Kingdom for their export market and on London for their long-run capital, they were bound up with empire in tacit alliance of free trade and free institutions. It is not surprising that the wheat merchants of Toronto and Montreal...took their loyalist politics from the imperial export-import sector; what is surprising is that nationalistic colonial politicians and their parochial-minded constituents did much the same.[32]

Robinson made much of the threat to colonial allegiance from a possible annexation to the United States. Robinson's description of the 1846-1849 period is summed up as follows;

> After Britain repealed its Corn Laws in 1846 and thereby ended its preferential treatment of grain and flour shipped through Montreal via St. Lawrence water route, the Montreal mercantile class became bankrupt - and its *loyalty* became almost universally disaffected. Something had to be done to reestablish prosperity for this group and for colonial merchants generally, not only because they had started to clamor for annexation to the United States, but also because colonial governments were dependent on their import-export sectors for revenue.[33]

The annexation movement was a short-lived phenomena, as was the Montreal Tory protest against their dual losses of power at home with the granting of responsible government in 1848, and from their loss of preferential access to the British markets after the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1849. This is confirmed by all of the major scholarship on the movement which highlights the fact that it was a fleeting

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1991) p. 175.
[32] ibid., p. 176.
[33] Robinson, "Railway," p. 133.

development, and involved no major political leaders of the time.[34] In fact, after the events of 1849, expressions of loyalty for the Empire increased as Montreal Tories felt the need to dispel any appearance of disloyalty.[35] Nevertheless, Robinson argues that the British government used collaborative bargains to strengthen colonial allegiance whenever 'annexation threatened', thus binding up "the fraying imperial connection."[36] Financial guarantees for the Grand Trunk railway were offered "chiefly to confirm the loyalty of the colonies against the internal challenge from the Annexationists."[37] Robinson concludes that it is not surprising, therefore, that colonial politics were largely railway politics.

According to Robinson, railway imperialism was an example of how British capital attracted colonial businessmen and politicians into commercial, financial, and hence political collaboration with the expansion of British interests to uphold the imperial connection. This

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[34] See Cephas D. Allin and George M. Jones, Annexation, Preferential Trade and Reciprocity, (London: Mason Book, Co., 1912); J.I. Little, "The Short Life of a Local Protest Movement: The Annexation Crisis of 1849-1850 in the Eastern Townships," Journal of the Canadian Historical Association, 3 (1992): 45; Peter Way, "The Canadian Tory rebellion of 1849 and the Demise of Street Politics in Toronto," British Journal of Canadian Studies 10 (1995): 10; Gerald A. Hallowell, "The Reaction of the Upper Canadian Tories to the Adversity of 1849: Annexation and the British American League," Ontario Historical Association Papers (1970): 41.

[35] A.W. Rasporich, "Imperial Sentiment in the Province of Canada during the Crimean War, 1854-1856," in The Shield of Achilles: Aspects of Canada in the Victorian Age ed., W.L. Morton, (Montreal: McClelland and Stewart Ltd.,1968) p. 140.

[36] Robinson, "Railways," p. 176.

[37] ibid., p. 178.

relationship "assumed that the stronger the economic connection between the colonies and the mother country, the easier it would be to contain *anti-imperial* political movements and to persuade the colonies to comply with imperial wishes"[38](italics added).

Robinson's analysis of the railway politics of the period led him to conclude that the colonists' financial dependence on London for public works and patronage was crucial to the strength of the imperial connection. In return, London bankers insisted on the "'loyalty' to the empire" as a necessary security for past and future loans.[39] Railway politics showed the extent to which the Colonial Office attempted, and succeeded or failed, to mobilize the power of the City of London to influence colonial politics in favour of the imperial connection. Because the negotiations involved most of the central problems in the imperial relationship in British North America in the mid-nineteenth century, Robinson viewed them as a standpoint for studying the development of additional ways of perpetuating the imperial tie. Railway politics thus focuses on the granting of imperial financial guarantees so as to consolidate the loyalty of British North America to the empire.

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[38] ibid., p. 22.
[39] ibid., p. 22.

Robinson's interpretation of Canadian politics during
the Union period pitted Reform "annexationists and radical
anti-imperialists" against moderate "empire loyalists," men
like John A. Macdonald, Georges Cartier and Alexander
Galt.[40]   These   empire-loyalists   were   in   fact
"proto-nationalists" themselves, but in light of Robinson's
views, loyalty was something that could be bought on the
open market, and Liberal-Conservatives were bought
politicians.

The policy of imperial aid to railway expansion
provided colonial politicians with "a bonanza of
patronage."[41] In this way, railway politics dominated the
political agenda.[42] Robinson wrote that

> Every community wanted the benefits of a railway connection;
> and railway patronage and pork-barrelling became
> increasingly important in colonial politics. Each side also
> realized that railways would greatly change the economic and
> political strength of various interest groups within the
> colonies. Traditional political bonds of language, culture,
> and religion became less important as new alliances were
> formed in pursuit of railway wealth.[43]

Domestic politics therefore demanded that colonial
politicians adopt imperial railway policies that promised
prosperity. Robinson posited that "loyalist colonial
politicians" firmly retained their hold on office by

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[40] Alexander Galt had in fact been one of the leading members of the
British North America league, the group which for a short time floated
the annexation idea. See A.A. Den Otter, "Alexander Galt, the 1859
Tariff, and Canadian Economic Nationalism," Canadian Historical Review
LXIII (1982): 160.
  [41] Robinson, "Railways," p. 177.
  [42] Robinson, "Imperial Theory," p. 46.
  [43] Robinson, "Railways," p. 12.

converting the flow of capital into vote-winning railways and political patronage.[44] At election time railway platforms became the political stage, and more often than not, it was the empire loyalists who succeeded.[45] Railway contracts offered patronage for politicians, markets for farmers, profits for land speculators, fees for lawyers and convenient travel for the general public. The attraction of spoils proved to be so great that "whatever their anti-imperial rhetoric, populist politicians and their radical followings were as susceptible to the allure of the imperial connection as capitalists."[46] It was for this reason politics to a greater extent became 'railway politics'. The politicians who promised to bring lines through the most constituencies tended to win most popular support, though they could expect to lose it again when the flow of railway capital dried up.

As colonial prosperity was revived, Robinson argues the 'annexationists' and 'radical anti-imperialists' gave way in ministers and assemblies to moderate conservatives like John A. Macdonald, Georges Etienne Cartier, and Alexander Galt. They could be relied upon to keep the

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[44] ibid., p.14
[45] The Liberal-Conservative coalition, which inherited power from the pro-development Hinksite Reformers, controlled the provincial legislature during the second half of the Union period for all but a short time in 1863. See Paul G. Cornell, The Alignment of Political Groups in Canada, 1841-1867 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962).
[46] Robinson, "The Excentric Idea..." p. 275.

inflow of capital coming. Their coalitions, combining railway benefits with appeals to religious and ethnic communities, converged on loyalist Canadian principles. The railway contracts were characteristic of the collaborative bargains of informal imperialism. If the Grand Trunk was allowed to sink and its lines shut down, the responsible loyalist politicians would certainly sink with them.

The export-import sectors and a growing reliance on railway transportation tended to influence domestic politics in favour of political collaboration with London. Economic inputs were sufficient to establish imperial affiliations and so British economic expansion was translated into local cooperation, in spite of the withdrawal of formal imperial rule in exchange for responsible government. The loans which came from the British private sectors went to colonial governments and so supplied the patronage which often won elections, staving off the "populist national movements"[47] which would bring about the demise of the collaborative structure.

In time, when "nationalists succeeded in detaching enough mediators from colonial regimes into a united front of non-cooperation," the British colonial office would be compelled to withdraw,[48] unless it could bring about the replacement of the "disloyal" government officials, and in

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[47] Robinson, "Non-European Foundations..." p. 126.
[48] Robinson, "The Excentric Idea..." p. 272.

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the case of British North America, *elected* officials, by its more collaborative opponents. Robinson identifies the struggle between the John Sandfield Macdonald Reformers and the Liberal Conservatives as such a case when the Imperial Government "exerted imperial influence unofficially and improperly in Canada's domestic politics" so as to protect the Grand Trunk railway. Thus, the classical theory of imperialism[49] is challenged by Robinson's formula of a rising colonial nationalism forcing imperial policy makers into collaborative bargains in order to maintain the Empire. Disloyalty is here seen as a rejection of "orthodoxy" with regard to colonial policies.

Peter Baskerville elaborated on the collaboration thesis by examining the conflict between the Imperial government's agenda for the Province of Canada, and the aspirations of the John Sandfield Macdonald Reform government of 1862 to 1864.[50] Baskerville offers a much richer, sensitive, and more textured portrait of Canadian

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[49] Robinson places his theory in the historical context of imperial historiography in R. Robinson, "Oxford in Imperial Historiography," in Oxford and the Idea of Commonwealth, eds., F. Madden and D.K. Feildhouse (London: Croom Helm, 1982) pp. 30-48.

[50] Peter Baskerville, "Imperial Agendas and 'Disloyal' Collaborators: Decolonization and the John Sandfield Macdonald Ministries, 1862-1864," in Old Ontario: Essays in Honour of J.M.S. Careless, eds. David Keane and Colin Read, (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1990) pp. 234. See also Baskerville, "The Pet Bank, the Local State and the Imperial Center, 1850-1864," Journal of Canadian Studies 20 (1985): 22-46, and Michael Piva, "Financing the Union: The Upper Canadian Debt and Financial Administration in the Canadas, 1837-45," ibid., 25 (1990-91): 82-98.

politics during this period than does Robinson, consistent with his exceptional scholarship in other areas.[51]

Baskerville adopts Robinson's interpretation of the state of loyalty in the colonies at the dawn of Great Britain's free trade era. With the repeal of the Corn Laws and the granting of Responsible Government, the Imperial government was forced to find "new mechanisms for the cultivation of loyalty."[52] Instead of direct administrative action, private investment from the City would be used to "maintain imperial loyalty."[53] By enticing local politicians into collaborative bargains, the loyalty of the colony would be ensured, as long as British capital was available for development of the colony's transportation infrastructure, and for patronage which kept colonial collaborators like John A. Macdonald and Georges Etienne Cartier 'loyal'.

Baskerville chronicles the attempts of the Sandfield Macdonald ministries to grasp greater powers for "independent" political action. This pursuit of local political control led them "somewhat naturally, to adopt a more independent or even nationalist stance *vis a vis* imperial dictates."[54] According to Baskerville, Sandfield Macdonald and his finance minister Luther Holton were

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[51] Peter Baskerville, "Transportation, Social Change, and State Formation, Upper Canada, 1841-1864," in _Colonial Leviathan; State Formation in the Mid-Nineteenth-Century_ eds., Allan Greer and Ian Radforth (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), pp. 230-256.
[52] Baskerville, "Imperial Agendas...," p. 236.
[53] ibid., p. 236.
[54] ibid., p. 250.

determined to disentangle the colonial government from the unequal economic and financial relations with British capitalists. Baskerville notes that "this fiscal disengagement represented the sine qua non of decolonisation. It logically preceded all other forms of independence."[55] Baskerville sees the policies of the reform ministry as an "early example of Canadian fiscal and economic nationalism."[56]

The reaction of the Imperial government was, according to Baskerville, to question the loyalty of the colonial ministry. Baskerville believes that the Imperial government would not countenance any displays of independent political volition by the Reformers. The imperial-colonial agenda could not be tampered with. Therefore, the Imperial government expected the Sandfield Macdonald government to "complete existing plans concerning the Grand Trunk, militia and the tariff. Anything else would be disloyal."[57]

The response of the Imperial government quite naturally conformed to the collaboration model. Having found the existing mediators "disloyal", the Imperial centre took action to replace them with the "loyal" opposition, the Liberal Conservatives. According to Baskerville, the "John Sandfield Macdonald ministries forced the imperial

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[55] ibid., p. 248.
[56] ibid., p. 248.
[57] ibid., p. 241.

government to intervene and up the ante in order to ensure that political control would devolve into the hands of loyal Canadian leaders."[58]

Synopsis of Collaboration Theory in British North America

The working of railway imperialism in British North America is intended to show how British capital attracted the loyalty of colonial businessmen and politicians into commercial, financial and political collaboration with the expansion of British interests to uphold the imperial connection. Government intervention in the London capital market played a key role in attracting investment to the colonies. Financial assistance to the railways "served as powerful levers for influencing the direction of colonial politics. They were used systematically to strengthen 'loyal' parties, and through them, to reinforce the imperial connection..."[59] The support for the Intercolonial railway was exploited just for this purpose "between 1849 and 1852 and between 1862 and 1864 to help bring about the downfall of a 'disloyal' and the accession of a loyal ministry."[60] The imperial guarantee was but one of the many devices that the British Government exercised to influence colonial

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[58] ibid., p. 251.
[59] Robinson, "Railway Imperialism," p. 18.
[60] ibid., p. 18.

politics and policies. It was employed in conjunction with the manipulation of imperial mail and shipping subsidies, land grants, the official and unofficial influence of governors, colonial dependence for Britain for defense, imperial control of intercolonial relations, relations with the United States, and the expansion into western lands.

The collaboration theory heretofore defined assumes that the stronger the economic connection between the colonies and the mother country, the easier it would be to contain anti-imperial political movements and to persuade the colonies to comply with the imperial will. Britain's decisions to supply support for the Intercolonial railway was motivated by their desire to consolidate the loyalty of British North America to the empire.[61]

Therefore, in a very specific sense, the colonies received investment capital for material development in order to delay the nationalist subversion of imperial rule Robinson theorized was inevitable. It was the goal of the Imperial Office that Canada's inevitable departure from empire would be in a more orderly manner than the way in which the American colonies had departed. Robinson wrote that "After previous experience with American rebels, the Imperial Government took care to avoid the folly of coercing [British North Americans] at the expense of a defeated

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[61] ibid., p. 10.

reconquest.[62] The British regarded it necessary that loyalty of the colonies be either coerced or bought in order that the inevitable decolonization would take place according the Colonial Offices timetable. Robinson argued his revised theory of imperialism incorporated a theory of the colonial state with a theory of colonial nationalism, and so accounts for the coming of independence.

The two main thrusts of the collaboration thesis are that the motive force of the imperial connection was economic, and that the entire cast of thought upon which it rested was completely antithetical to Canadian nationalism. In locating the mainspring of imperialism in economic conditions, collaboration theorists are applying a line of argument originally established by the English anti-imperialist, John Hobson who contended that the most important factor behind British interest in empire was financial capital.[63] It may be argued that immigrants who came to British North America were inspired simply by the prospect of making a better living Canada. It may have been as true then as it is today, that business people are not as a rule patriots. The settlement and development of Canada was the meeting and the solving of material problems. The growing national loyalty may have been due in large part to

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[62] ibid., p. 175.
[63] John Allett, New Liberalism : the Political Economy of J.A. Hobson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981).

the material advantage of the country and the pecuniary benefits of the inhabitants.

The question of responsible government that so agitated the 1830's and 1840's, and which dominated historical writings of the early part of this century, was not just a question of political destiny. At the bottom of the movement for responsible government was a ruthless preoccupation with jobs and salaries, and to whom they should go.[64] No doubt there were high-minded Canadians, like Robert Baldwin, whose income precluded any question of his own personal aggrandizement; but possessed too good a political sense not to be aware that jobs were vital to his party. The administration of the country could not simply be carried on other than through devoted partisans. No adequate appreciation of Canadian politics is possible unless it is remembered that most people could not afford to be in politics without regard to their pockets. This made politics a seamy business, which it was, even before the railways came along to make it even more generous. Nevertheless, by contracting the imperial relationship to a simplistic economic model, Robinson and Baskerville consciously neglect the non-economic factors which underpinned the colonial commitment to the empire.

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[64] Gordon T. Stewart, The Origins of Canadian Politics: A Comparative Approach (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1986); Stewart, "John A. Macdonald's Greatest Triumph," Canadian Historical Review LXIII, 1 (1982): 3.

Collaboration Thesis and Historical Methodology

The collaboration theorists have considered the subject
of national loyalty from a formalistic approach, leading
them to treat the concept of national loyalty as an absolute
value, placing it in antithesis to other forms or group
loyalty. The formalistic approach renders a stark
contradistinction between loyalty and disloyalty. This has
resulted in Robinson underestimating the importance to
British North Americans that loyalty to Britain, and the
idea of being British, was to the identities of British
North Americans.

The formalistic approach, utilized by Robinson, deals
with the question of loyalty in bleak polarities. The
categorical nature of this approach compels the social
scientist to deal with loyalty as an absolute entity. While
a survey of the literature may show that national loyalty
was but one form of group loyalty, the methodology motivates
the social scientist to consider it an unique form of
devotion, potentially antonymous to other forms of loyalty
such as regional or other national loyalties. The
formalistic approach inspires one to treat national loyalty
as a matter of standard, fixed specifications (i.e., the
citizen is either loyal or disloyal).

The reliance upon a formalistic approach tends to reduce the whole analysis of loyalty in a British settlement community to a set of oversimplified antitheses or polarities which obscure more than they illuminate. Robinson's collaboration thesis reduces the complex loyalties of the pre-Confederation period to simplicity in order to come up with contradistinction which neatly fits in to the dualism of nationalism and imperialism. This antithesis is in a very real sense a caricature, perhaps accurately singling out some distinctive feature, but grossly distorting in the emphasis which Robinson gives it.

The main difficulty presented by such antitheses arises not from its oversimplification or exaggeration of differences, but from its attribution of mutual exclusiveness to the phenomena of loyalties which naturally coexisted and overlapped in the Union period, and in the way in which national and provincial loyalties exist today. It is false to assume that nationalism is a matter of homogeneity and therefore to conclude that loyalty to an emerging Canadian identity was intrinsically inconsistent with a loyalty to a greater British community. Once the mistaken assumption of mutual exclusiveness is accepted, the false conclusion follows that loyalty to a Canadian nationalism may serve as an index of disloyalty to the British Empire.

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Part of Robinson's dilemma in dealing with the issue of multiple loyalties is again tied to his approach to the topic. Robinson exhibits the social scientist's tendency to search for coherence in thought which is not really there, a trait indicative of the formalistic approach. According to Quentin Skinner, the assumption is too often made that the thought of a person, or a group of persons, is something of a "closed system."[65] Robinson displays this tendency, and succumbs to what Boyd Shafer has called the "either or" fallacy.[66] He seeks to ascertain an individual's loyalty or disloyalty without due regard for conceptualization. His approach disregards the functionalist's dictum that there are many gradations and too many values involved to make these kind of distinctions without clearly defining one's terms.

The pattern of loyalties in British North America during the Union period was more intricate than the stark antithesis of nationalism and imperialism would imply. The historical process is far too complex to be handled in terms of the simple dualisms of empire versus nation, or nation versus region.

Nationalism and Patriotism

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[65] Quentin Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," History and Theory, vol. VIII, 1 (1969): 3.
[66] Boyd C. Shafer, "If We Only Knew More About Nationalism," Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism, 7, No. 2 (Autumn, 1980): 201.

Robinson and Baskerville may have avoided some conceptual confusion if they had described the Reform government's policies as the result of a traditional British North American patriotism. The issue of conceptualization could have been greatly aided by a distinction between the conception of "nation" (and "nationalism") and "state" (and "patriotism").[67] With these conceptual distinctions in mind, what was Robinson actually describing in his story of conflict between colonists and the Colonial Office?

Robinson's offered criteria for evidence of an emerging nationalism could better be described as patriotism. Patriotism is a loyalty, not to an aggregate of people, but to a political state and the geographic territory circumscribed by that state. It expresses itself in affection for the state, its geography, and a loyalty to its institutions. To the extent that it divides a people at all, it does so upon political and geographical lines, upon criteria of citizenship and domicile, not upon ethnic qualities such as language, culture, and race. Karl Deutsch describes the distinction as follows:

> Strictly speaking, patriotism is an effort or readiness to promote the interests of all those persons born or living within the same *patria*, i.e. country, whereas nationalism aims at promoting the interests of all those of the same *natio*, i.e., literally a group of common descent and upbringing, or rather, ...culture... Patriotism appeals to all residents of a country, regardless of their ethnic

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[67] Walker Connor, "A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a...." Ethnic and Racial Studies, 1 (1978): 379-88.

background. Nationalism appeals to all members of an ethnic group, regardless of their country of residence.[68]

Patriotism in this context would include the constitutional development towards increased autonomy, culminating in independence and the acquisition of most of the symbols of sovereignty.[69] This movement for responsible or self-government should not be considered a call for the creation of an psychologically differentiated nation.[70] Its aim was the erection of an autonomous, self-governing state.

British North American politicians, Reformers and Liberal Conservatives alike, were simply asking for self-government, using the inherited rhetoric of British Whig and liberal ideals and their status as British subjects.[71] Their successors in the expansion of the limits of self-government - those later Canadians who have been labeled as "nationalists" - were not trying to create a new nation psychologically distinct from the British nation.[72]

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[68] K.W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966), pp. 40, 288; for similar, though not always identical usages of the conceptions, see also Carlton J.H. Hayes, Essays on Nationalism (New York: New York, Macmillan, 1931) ch. 1; Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1993), especially pp. 73-74.

[69] George Heiman, "The 19th Century Legacy: Nationalism or Patriotism?," in Nationalism in Canada, ed., Peter Russell (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1966), pp. 323-40. Despite Heiman's persuasive argument that much of the conceptual confusion surrounding state loyalty could be cleared up by adopting the concept of patriotism, the idea remains distinctly un-Canadian.

[70] J.M.S. Careless, The Union of the Canadas; the Growth of Canadian Institutions, 1841-1857 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967).

[71] Philip Buckner, "The Transition to Responsible Government; Some Revisions in Need of Revising." in C.C. Eldrige, ed., From Rebellion to Patriation; Canada and Britain in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Wales, Studies in Wales Group, 1989,) pp. 1-25.

[72] Carol Wilton, "British to the Core; Responsible Government in Canada West," in Carol Wilton, ed., Change and Continuity; a Reader on

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Their appeal for increased autonomy was a state-circumscribed call for self-government. The drive to Canadian statehood was exclusively political and legal, directed toward the creation of a complete Canadian *state*, pursuing its own self-interest, and possessing the symbols of sovereignty. This was a Canadian patriotism.

Summary

To summarize, the collaborationist's account of loyalty, derived from the perspective of an interest in the dynamics of imperial administration and 'nation-building', does not account for the continued loyalty of British North Americans as the Province of Canada was attaining the features of independent nationhood. By contracting the imperial relationship to a simplistic economic model, collaboration theorists have consciously neglected the non-economic factors which sustained the colonial commitment to the empire. An approach that relies too greatly upon economic determinism cannot account for the "sense of belonging" that was integral to the colonial-imperial relationship. The formalistic approach employed by Robinson depicts a stark contradistinction between loyalty and disloyalty. The categorical nature of this approach leads

pre-Confederation Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1992) p. 290.

Robinson to deal with loyalty as an absolute entity. The methodology employed motivates him to consider loyalty to an emerging Canadian nation as an unique form of devotion, potentially antonymous to other forms of loyalty. Robinson thereby underestimates the importance to British North Americans that loyalty to Britain, and the idea of being British, was to their sense of identity.

Chapter Two

From 'Colony to Nation' to 'Limited Identities'

From the beginning of the twentieth century onwards, the dominant version of Canadian history emphasized the political achievement of independent status from Great Britain. Arthur Lower wrote a book called Colony to Nation,[73] and the title became an aphorism describing the Whig School of Canadian history.[74] According to the Whigs, the heroes of the country's past were men who strove for independence from Empire, while the villains were those who remained sympathetic to the British tie. The first group were the nationalists; the others were not - they were imperialists. And there was, without question, a difference.

Most monographs written on Canada's political development prior to 1967 focused on the particular preoccupation with this progress towards national autonomy. The study of past politics was infused with the spirit of a uniquely Canadian form of nation-building, an attitude consonant with Herbert Butterfield's description of the Whig interpretation of history. Butterfield defined Whiggery in the context of British history as "...the tendency in many historians to write on the side of Protestants and Whigs, to

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[73] Arthur Lower, Colony to Nation (Toronto: Longmans, Green & Co. 1946).

[74] Terry Copp, "The Whig Interpretation of Canadian History," Canadian Dimension, vol. 6 (April-May, 1969): 23.

praise revolutions provided they have been successful, to emphasize certain principles of progress in the past and to produce a story which is the ratification if not the glorification of the present." [75] The history of Canada's political structures and identity were viewed through the prism of history as the contemplation of freedom broadening down from precedent to precedent towards an agreeable present.[76]

Canada, like other nations which had emerged from colonialism, had, as the main theme of its development, a great, basic, archetypal plot. Lower's general history of Canada, states this plot with classic simplicity. Canada, in short, was the outcome of an encounter between the two forces of nationality and imperialism; and the Canadian history was the record of the noble struggle by which Canadians had ascended from the lowly status of dependent colonialism to the serene heights of autonomous nationhood. Great Britain had always been the real opponent of Canadian nationalism. The only real serious struggle which Canada had to wage had been the struggle to win autonomy inside the British Empire.

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[75] Herbert Butterfield, <u>The Whig Interpretation of History</u> (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1965)

[76] Please see Carl Berger, <u>Approaches to Canadian History</u> (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967). For a critique of Berger's approach, in which the author charges Berger with sharing many of the whiggish assumption he criticizes, please see Graham Carr, "Imperialism and Nationalism in Revisionist Historiography: A Critique of Some Recent Trends," <u>Journal of Canadian Studies</u> 17, No. 2 (Summer, 1982): 91-99.

The development of Canada's national autonomy was identified almost exclusively with the process of emancipation from British control. The process of emancipation itself has been represented, all too often, as a continuous struggle between legitimate colonial demand and obscurantist imperial resistance. Canada, according to this Whig version of the emergence of the Canadian nation, was the outcome of an encounter between the forces of nationality and British imperialism. The progress of national development could thus be identified simply and exclusively with emancipation from British control.

The Whig interpretation of 'nation-building' resulted in a vast oversimplification of Canadian political and social development. This in large part was due to the over-emphasis on the 'struggle' for responsible government, almost to the exclusion of other vital and intriguing areas.[77] It personified the strict dualistic nature of the formalistic approach to historical inquiry.

When J.M.S. Careless popularised 'limited identities' in 1969, he released Canadian academics from the thrall of grand interpretations of their past, sanctioning and accentuating the growing study of such neglected themes such

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[77] In her presidential address to the Canadian Historical Association in 1992, Gail Cuthbert Brandt addressed the problem of integrating previously omitted subjects, such as race, ethnicity, and especially women's' history, into political studies previously dominated by white males. Please see "National Unity and the Politics of Political History," CHA Historical Papers (1992): 3-11.

as region, class, locality, and gender. The paradigmatic
shift symbolized by Ramsay Cook and Careless's call for
attention to 'limited identities' grew out of an impatience
with a self-congratulatory national history that seemed
ill-fitted to the rapidly changing reality of the Canada of
the Quiet Revolution, and the resurgence of working class
and feminist militancy.[78] A history attuned to centennial
celebrations and Expo '67 proved increasingly unacceptable
to many Canadian scholars. Cook in particular called upon
students of Canadian history, politics and economics to
forsake the futile search for an elusive Canadian identity
and devote themselves to the study of other, more particular
identities. Cook questioned the assumption that colored the
mammoth undertaking of trying to bring forth the type of
work touched upon in W.L. Morton's 1964 published lectures
on "The Canadian Identity."[79] He suggested that perhaps the
search for a national identity was doomed from the start,
and instead of looking for a national identity that might
not exist, we should study "the regional, ethnic and class
identities that we do have."[80]

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[78] G.R. Cook, "Centennial Celebrations," International Journal, 22
(1967): 48 ; J.M.S. Careless, "Limited Identities in Canada," Canadian
Historical Review 50, 1 (March 1969): 1. In 1946 W.L. Morton anticipated
this growing revolt against a centralist bias in Canadian scholarship,
but his call for a greater attention to a wider scope of themes went
relatively unheeded. Please see W.L. Morton, "Clio in Canada: The
Interpretation of Canadian History," in Approaches to Canadian History,
ed. Carl Berger (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967).
[79] W.L. Morton, The Canadian Identity (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1968).
[80] Cook, (1967) p.663

The pluralistic endorsement of attention to class, ethnicity and region and the attack on the 'colony to nation' outlook of the past led to a shift in scholarly priorities. In the excitement of this gold rush towards new fields of research, the old political topics seemed tiresome and irrelevant. Academics were quick to cast aside what had become the dominant teleological cast which was obsessed with the evolution of Canadian autonomy and the composition of a national identity.

In 1970, a book appeared which substantially challenged the traditional Whig doctrine of nation-building. Carl Berger's Sense of Power,[81] was a major work of revision, and was rightly hailed as "an event of the first magnitude."[82] This brilliant book examined in detail a select number of men - Canadian imperialists - and pursued a specific theme; the relationship between imperialism and nationalism in the first half-century after Confederation. Concluding that this imperialism was in fact one variant of nationalism,[83] not its antithesis, Berger severely undermined the "imperialist

[81] Carl Berger, The Sense of Power: Studies In The Ideas of Canadian Imperialism, 1867-1914, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970).

[82] Robert Page, "Carl Berger and the Intellectual Origins of Canadian Imperialist Thought, 1867 - 1914," Journal of Canadian Studies, V (August, 1970) pp. 39-43.

[83] Berger, Sense of Power, p.259. Others who also view Imperialism and Canadian nationalism as virtually synonymous include Norman Penlington, Canada and Imperialism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), p. 11, 66; Donald Creighton, Canada's First Century (Toronto: Macmillan, 1970) pp. 91-92; Allan Smith, "Metaphor and Nationality in North America," Canadian Historical Review, LI, (September, 1970): 255-256.

versus nationalist" dualism of a generation or more of Canadian scholarship.

Berger showed that the nineteenth century English-Canadian sense of self was a much more complex phenomena than previous generations had led one to expect. He challenged the Whig doctrine that there had existed a conflict between nationalism and imperialism. The pursuit of the meaning of the "sense of power" experienced by Canadian imperialists revealed universal themes such as commitment to tradition and ideas of national character and destiny. Taking as his theme the ideas which lay behind the imperial enthusiasm of certain Canadians in the half century following Confederation, and concentrating upon George Monro Grant, George Parkin and George Taylor Denison, Berger uncovered many strands in the fabric of Canadian imperialist thought. The imperial idea was interwoven with a providential sense of mission, historical consciousness, the Loyalist legend, racialism, and a maturing conception of a Canadian national consciousness.[84] Berger ably demonstrated that

> Canadian imperialism had in common with all nationalist ideologies a definite conception of what the national character encompassed, and what its destiny would be. According to this view, Canadians were British in their historical associations, political ideals, their preference for law and order, and their capacity for self-government.[85]

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[84] ibid., p. 258.
[85] ibid., p. 152.

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Berger demonstrated that many Canadians had a composite civic identity. Their Canadian identity shaded comfortably into a Britishness that had definite imperial connotations. British Canadians were linked by a common loyalty to the Empire's other "white dominions." According to Alexander Brady, democracy in Canada was the product of "transplanted Britons" and reflected the "ascendency of British liberal ideas" in a congenial environment.[86] English-speaking Canadians could look to their culturally diverse society and see a unity comparable to that of Great Britain itself.[87]

Through all the various strands, one unifying thread is emphasized again and again by Berger: Canadian imperialists were nationalists, and imperialism in Canada was one variety of Canadian nationalism. Berger's thesis demonstrated that contrary to the nation-building school of political development, British North Americans did not feel the need to abandon one loyalty for another because they saw no incompatibility between their multiple loyalties. What is thus required is an alternative conception of loyalty to that offered by the formalistic approach.

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[86] Alexander Brady, <u>Democracy in the Dominions: A Comparative Study of Institutions</u>, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1952) p. 7.
[87] Allan Smith, "Metaphor and Nationality in North America," in <u>Canada - An American Nation? Essays on Continentalism, Identity, and the Canadian Frame of Mind</u>, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994) p. 142.

Chapter Three

Loyalty as a Psychological Phenomena

In this section, I will elaborate on the topic of "loyalty" in greater detail in order to provide a conceptual framework for a more circumscribed investigation of the topic in the context of multiple loyalties and the collaboration thesis. In the first place I will offer a brief survey of how some theorists have conceptualized loyalty. I will then present a concise account of loyalty as it will be applied in this paper, emphasizing how loyalty should be viewed as a psychological phenomena. This chapter will endeavor to establish that multiple loyalties do indeed exist, and to provide a more suitable explanation for the resilience of these loyalties. I see this theme as a significant feature in the discussion of the collaboration thesis.

Next, I will describe how loyalty functions, thereby showing why it is a vital component of political society. I will describe how loyalty provides a pattern through which individuals may organize their lives, making their existence more intelligible and empowering people to make life-choices with some reference to a known framework. As part of this account, it will be emphasized that loyalties exist in abundance, and the impact of multiple loyalties will be

addressed as part of the section concerning loyalty to the nation.

Loyalty as a Concept

Each academic tradition over years of practise generates a peculiar vocabulary. "State," "sovereignty," "nationalism," "rights," "patriotism," these are but some of the terms of special significance to political scientists. This vocabulary demarcates the political scientists' intellectual world and helps distinguish his discourse from that of other writers.

Where does "loyalty" belong among this idiom? Loyalty has many faces, and here only some are described. It is odd that, despite the important role loyalty has played in the religious, moral and political life of men over the centuries, so few philosophers have given this topic the attention it deserves. John Ladd explains that the scant attention given to the subject of loyalty can be explained by its "historical association with an obsolete metaphysics (idealism) and with such odious political movements as the extreme nationalism of Nazism. However," Ladd continued," the supposed implications suggested by these disreputable associations are ill-founded. On the contrary, loyalty is an essential ingredient in any civilized and humane system of morals."[88] Only philosopher Josiah Royce, in The Philosophy

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[88] John Ladd, "Loyalty," 5 Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1967): 97-98.

of Loyalty, has given the concept serious and sustained study. Royce saw in loyalty "The heart of all virtues, the central duty amongst all duties." He made "loyalty to loyalty" his categorical imperative for society, "the central spirit of the moral and reasonable life of man."[89]

Royce defined loyalty loosely as the "willing and practical and thorogoing devotion of a person to a cause."[90] He recognized that there may be loyalty to an evil cause, and also that an individual's loyalties may conflict. The principle of 'loyalty to loyalty' provided a solution, according to Royce: in choosing a cause an individual should choose one that will further, rather than frustrate, the loyalties of other men, as well as his or her own multiple loyalties.

In The Concept of Our Changing Loyalties, Herbert Bloch pointed out additional factors which cast Royce's conception into a fuller and more precise form and brought to view other aspects of loyalty:

> Man in society finds himself the focal point of innumerable loyalties....Each one of these represents some special aspect of his nature which seeks outlet in association with others of similar interest. A loyalty, then, would appear to be the identification of one's own interest with that of a group. It implies the associated necessity of furthering both the larger purpose which the group fosters and the integral unity of the individual himself with the group and the group purpose.[91]

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[89] Josiah Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty, (New York: Macmillan, 1908) p. 108.
[90] ibid., p.16-17.
[91] Herbert Aaron Bloch, The Concept of Our Changing Loyalties (New York: Columbia University Press, 1934), p. 36.

Bloch highlights the way in which loyalty serves the interests of both the individual and the group. He envisaged the individual as the focal point of innumerable loyalties and points out that each loyalty serves a particular aspect of one's nature.

In the midst of the "Red Scare" in the United States during the post World War II era, much was written on the topic of loyalty, and much more on "disloyalty." The effect of all of this was probably more negative than positive, as it sterilized rational and philosophical discussion by stigmatizing it with its connection to the controversy over "loyalty oaths." Perhaps the most perceptive observation from this period was the contribution of Henry Steele Commager, who wrote that the new concept of loyalty that he saw as "conformity" was a false one. Commager wrote that

> The effort to equate loyalty with conformity is misguided
> because it assumes that there is a fixed content to loyalty
> and that this can be determined and defined. But loyalty is
> a principle, and eludes definition except on its own terms.
> It is a devotion to the best interests of the commonwealth,
> and may require hostility to the particular policies which
> the government pursues, the particular policies which the
> economy undertakes, the particular institutions society
> maintains...True loyalty may require, in fact, what appears
> to the naive to be disloyalty.[92]

Continuing this general theme of imprecision, which perhaps given the environment in which the discussion takes place is inevitable, Milton Konvitz tries to offer an all-econmpassing definition by stating that loyalty is the

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[92] Henry Steele Commager, "Who Is Loyal To America," Harper's Magazine 195 (September, 1947): 96

virtue, state or quality of being faithful to one's commitments, duties, relations, associations, or values. It is fidelity to a principle, a cause, an idea, an ideal, a religion or an ideology, a nation or government, a party or leader, one's family or friends, a region, one's race - anyone or anything to which one's heart can be attached or devoted....In modern times the term has been chiefly used in association with patriotism, in the sense of political allegiance and attachments, involving the obligations, formal and informal, of a citizen to his country, its government and its institutions."[93]

The danger of basing an analysis of any specificity on such a definition as this is that by describing all the relationships Konvitz mentions as involving loyalty, one runs the danger of draining the term of meaning or stretching it beyond plausibility. In terms of this discussion, loyalties that have the potential to be politicized are important. Loyalties to large-scale communities and political institutions may conflict, resulting in disruptive social divisions, while loyalties to small associations and family relations do not have that same potential. The collaboration theory's understanding of decolonisation is based upon the belief that loyalties to large-scale communities naturally conflict. In a colonial setting, this leads to an inevitable political separation.

To help illuminate the discussion of "what is loyalty" further, I propose to discuss two distinct approaches that may be used when describing an individual as being loyal. The first approach is based upon a description of a certain

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[93] Milton R. Konvitz, "Loyalty," 3 Dictionary of the History of Ideas 108.

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character trait. The alternative method is derived from a more normative sense of the subject, and is subscribed to by those who favour a more formalistic approach, including collaborationist theorists.

First, there is the case where an individual is described as having a certain disposition of character, much as we might say that he or she is altruistic, charitable or diligent. In other words, we may be describing a certain personality or character trait. Briefly stated, character traits may be described as habits of behaviour, or propensities to act in certain sorts of ways. If an individual's behavior, over a long period of time, exhibits a certain pattern, we may attribute, for instance, altruism or charity to that individual.

How shall we describe the character trait called "loyalty"? First of all, a loyal person is loyal to something. The proper object of loyalty is either another person, a group or persons, or an institution. The loyal individual will certainly come to the aid of the object of his loyalty when he perceives his interests are threatened.[94] The loyal individual takes pride in his object and expresses solidarity with it through ritual acts which evoke and reinforce his emotional identification with it.

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[94] For a discussion of loyalty as vicarious satisfaction through identification, see Harold Guetzkow, Multiple Loyalties: Theoretical Approach to a Problem in International Organization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), pp. 19-22.

Frequently he focuses his feelings through symbols such as an anthem, a flag or a monarchical figure.

In a second sense an individual may be judged as being loyal or disloyal as a result of a legal determination, or by the obedience or contravention of some political or philosophical principles. The notion of legal status is "ascriptive" in nature. Loyalty is a status to be ascribed by the decision of a legal or quasi-legal body. According to this interpretation, to say that an individual is loyal is to say that he is legally a citizen in good standing, and fully possessed of the rights of citizenship as defined by law. To call someone disloyal is to assert that he had been judged disloyal by an appropriate tribunal. Loyalty, in this sense is precisely what the law says it is.

Loyalty may also mean "orthodoxy" with regard to some set of political or philosophical principles. Labeling an individual disloyal can be a way of saying that he has dissented from dogma or perhaps merely that he has failed to profess it with sufficient frequency and vigor. Disloyalty is thus assimilated to heresy or treachery. Collaboration historians have interpreted the failure of the Reform ministries to support Imperial railway policies as evidence of 'disloyalty'. Collaboration theorists use evidence of support for imperial policies as an index of loyalty. The reaction of the Imperial government to signs of opposition

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to Imperial railway policies was, according to Baskerville, to question the loyalty of the John Sandfield Macdonald ministry. Baskerville believes that the Imperial government would not countenance any displays of independent political inclination on the part of the Reformers. The imperial-colonial agenda could not be adjusted to meet the requirements of the duly elected Canadian government. The Imperial government expected the Sandfield Macdonald government to complete the existing plans concerning the Grand Trunk, militia and the tariff that had been negotiated with the previous collaborating elite. Anything else would be regarded as disloyal.

Thus we have now distinguished two distinct senses of the term "loyal", one of which lends itself to a functional approach, the other resembles a more formalistic one. The pluralistic method lends itself to the interpretation of loyalty as a character trait. Loyalty thus interpreted is essentially a personality characteristic fostered and sustained by certain social relationships and institutional settings. Loyalty is conceived as being habit patterns which organize and orient human relationships. As such, they are indispensable elements in the formation and maintenance of personality.

Loyalty is an attitude of identification with some group of persons from whom one seeks gratifications, either

material or psychological. Loyalty to the state is built up out of the interlocking of loyalties to primary and intermediate groups as individuals come to see themselves "in a set of intersecting circles of loyal commitment."[95] Individuals become accustomed to pledging their loyalty which satisfies both their economic and spiritual requirements, the most important being a "sense of belonging."[96]

Function of Loyalties

It is a contradiction in terms to speak of an individual without loyalties. The qualities that differentiate human beings from other species are the product of their social life. Any society rests upon loyalties; upon systems of mutual rights and duties, common beliefs, and reciprocal obligations.

Loyalties are a part of every individual's life because they serve his basic needs and functions. They are a part of his indispensable habit pattern. Loyalties provide him with a portion of that framework through which he organizes his existence. Charles Taylor has described the preconditions of what he designates as 'emancipated humanism' in the following terms;

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[95] George P. Fletcher, Loyalty: An Essay on the Morality of Relationships (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) p. 155.
[96] Boyd C. Shafer, Nationalism and Internationalism; Belonging in Human Experience, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1984)

> For each man to discover in himself what his humanity
> consists in, he needs a horizon of meaning, which can only
> be by some allegiance, group membership, cultural tradition.
> He needs in the broadest sense a language in which to ask
> and answer the question of ultimate significance.[97]

In the absence of such a framework, an individual could establish no easy, habitual responses. He or she would be faced with the endless and hopelessly complicated task of making fresh decisions at each moment of life.

The propensity of an individual to organize the structure of his or her activities is apparent in every phase of his or her being. Perceptions and reactions to events are determined in large measure by pre-disposing frameworks. This "structuring" of life's range of possibilities begins from the very first years of life, when the malleability of individuals is great, and the family is the dominant molding agency. Later, schools, churches, occupations and social class, all take important, sometimes parallel, sometimes conflicting, roles in shaping an individual's career, attitudes, and personality. Will Kymlicka has stated that,

> People are bound, in an important way, to their own cultural
> community. We just can't transplant people from one culture
> to another, even if we provide the opportunity to learn the
> other language and history. Our upbringing isn't something
> that can just be erased - it is, and always remains, a
> constitutive part of who we are. Cultural membership affects
> our very sense of personal identity and capacity.[98]

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[97] Charles Taylor, "Why Do Nations Have to Become States?" in Guy Laforest, ed., Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994), p. 46.
      [98] Will Kymlicka, "Liberalism, Individualism, and Minority Rights," in The Law and the Community (Toronto: Carswell, 1989) p. 193.

These groups that so crucially affect existence are the groups that demand and receive loyalty. They become the kaleidoscope through which a person views his life and its relation to society. Loyalty to the British nation was a major part of the lives of British North Americans because it served a basic need of providing a sense of being in a new land. Robinson's theory of imperial-colonial relations does not give due consideration to the fact that British North Americans existed within a *British* cultural community. This cultural membership was essential to their sense of being. The emerging Canadian sense of cultural identity was in large part a derivative of this larger pan-British cultural community.

Loyalties are thus the source of great personal gratification. They protect the individual, reducing the area of his uncertainty and anxiety. They allow the individual to move in established patterns of interpersonal relations with confidence in the action expected of him and of responses that his actions will evoke. By serving the group to which the individual is loyal, he serves himself; what threatens the group, threatens the self. It is this notion which can account for loyalty to a large-scale community such as the British nation, even as Canada was assuming the administrative and political characteristics of nationhood.

Complete identification between individual and group does not often exist. Totalitarian governments attempt to accomplish this end by destroying all intermediary loyalties, or by fusing the activities of all other groups with those of the state. In democracies, such as one that was developing in the Province of Canada during the Union period, the case is different. Except in periods of extreme crisis, freedom to form and maintain group ties is cherished and encouraged, and individuals preserve strong loyalties to numerous national and non-national groups. These loyalties are given to family, church, ethnic group, class, region, and to a host of other institutions and groups. They may bring the individual into personal contact with others who share his views and situation or not. The relative strength and weakness of these numerous loyalties change with age, with shifts in life situations, and when under the stress of crisis. They may change as old relationships no longer serve the initial need or as they no longer supply satisfaction and security to the individual in the total network of his social existence.

From this view, a *generalized* national loyalty is a misnomer. Loyalties are directed to specific groups, specific goals, and specific programs of actions. Populations are loyal to the nation only because the nation is believed to symbolize and sustain these values. To say

that loyalty is dependent upon the achievement of life satisfaction means that the individual's own definition of satisfaction is of crucial importance. A subtle tool to measure these satisfactions would be an index of the discrepancy, if any, between life expectancy and life achievements, as defined by the individual. Where the spread is a large one, deprivations are experienced and loyalty to the nation is presumably less strong than where expectations are actually or approximately achieved.

By now, hopefully the outlines of the process of loyalty formation, expression, and change has been made more legible. I have outlined two possible conceptions of the phenomena, and have suggested that a functional approach would favour exploring the topic of the continued loyalty of British North Americans to Great Britain from a sociological perspective rather the formalistic approach favoured by the collaborationist theorists.

An important part of defining the concept is that by describing how it actually functions, it will bring forth the form's true meaning. The word itself has many shades of meaning, and the phenomena it signifies are not simple. Loyalty is a norm connecting the properties ascribed to it by Royce and Bloch, and resting upon the familiar processes of attitude formation and change. The roots of loyalty are to be found in social interaction. Expressed briefly, shared

activities evoke shared sentiments of sympathy. As the group
lives together as a social unit, members experience mutual
debts of gratitude, mutual likes and dislikes, and shared
interests which may bind them together. This culminates in
the simply stated and profoundly felt emotion of owing much
to each other, and to the group as a whole.

An individual's loyalties perform the supremely
important tasks of providing self-definition and
interpreting experience. Shared loyalties facilitate
communication among members of a social group and provide
the cement of unity. Once formed, loyalties are not easily
changed, not only because they receive social support but
also because individuals build up vested interests in them,
and because established loyalties predispose those who hold
them to perceive their environment selectively.

Political Loyalty

To see multiple loyalties as a general phenomenon of
human existence is a first step toward the fuller view of
political loyalty which is the object of this essay.
Political loyalty is a devoted attachment to the political
ideals and institutions established in a community. In most
of its manifestations political loyalty is a complex mixture
of tradition and sentiment, choice and reason. Most of our
loyalties are acquired in the course of social conditioning.

They are integrated into our character structure without conscious thought, though some loyalties may be products of choice, preferences which may be based on rational calculations of interest or on emotional considerations.

Since political loyalty is a devoted attachment to the established political institutions of a community, it is itself a foremost component of community. Andrew Cecil has written that,

> Loyalty to the nation, to the community where we live, to our family and friends is an integral part of our democratic institutions and the foundation of civil society. It provides the basis for the confidence that should subsist between those who are connected by the bonds of nationality, of common community, of family and of friendship – the dearest relationships of life. A steadfast loyalty cultivated in our social order enlightens our world by preserving the dignity of the individual, by giving him a sense of self-worth and a serenity of soul, combined with a recognition that his duties are a corollary to his rights. It is the solace of human existence.[99]

Through political institutions, policies and ends binding on the whole social order are prescribed.[100] Therefore, popular attachment to these institutions, together with agreement upon the ideals they embody form one of the essential elements of group unity. It is loyalty that defines the community and preserves its integrity in the face of changing conditions. The political community, or to be more specific, the nation-state, "exists only as a concept held in common by many men. It is the emotional

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[99] Andrew R. Cecil, Equality, Tolerance and Loyalty: Virtues Serving the Common Purpose of Democracy, (Dallas: University of Texas Press, 1990), p. 217.

[100] David Easton, The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science (New York: Knopf, 1953), p. 125.

loyalty of men to this always changing concept, the nation, that constitutes nationalism. Without the concept, the loyalty could not exist."[101] Shared loyalty to the political ideas and institutions gives to members of a group faith and confidence in their fellows which lubricates social relations and makes consensus in other projects possible.[102]

These ideas, of course, are merely elaborations on the standard argument that "agreement upon the fundamentals" is a precondition of successful community. Lord Balfour, in his Introduction to Walter Bagehot's English Constitution, gave this proposition a more classical political rendering. Referring to the British system, Balfour wrote:

> Our alternating Cabinets, though belonging to different Parties, have never differed about the fundamentals of society. And it is evident that our whole political machinery presupposes a people so fundamentally at one that they can safely afford to bicker; and so sure of their own moderation that they are not dangerously disturbed by the never-ending din of political conflict.[103]

The nation is not the only focal point for mass loyalties. Just as loyalty to the nation contends with loyalty to family, occupation and friends, so it must compete with loyalty of religion, race and with class. The nation's advantage is based not only on the psychological processes described before: to some degree those energies

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[101] Max Savelle, "Nationalism and Other Loyalties in The American Revolution," The American Historical Review 67 (July, 1962): 902

[102] Alan Barth, The Loyalty of Free Men (New York: Viking, 1951), p. 6.

[103] Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution, introduction by Lord Balfour (London: Oxford University Press, 1928) p. xxiv.

are also available to other causes. The strength of
national, rather than other, loyalties is also partly the
result of objective facts: common language, common
historical traditions, a definable territory. The world is
organized territorially, and to some extent functionally,
into national units. This very organization permits a
complex flow of simple emotions to be woven into the
sentiment of national loyalty. Nation-states and the
institutions within them conspire to promote and to sustain
this loyalty.[104]

In democracies the major impact of state activities is
an indirect one: it strengthens national loyalties by
strengthening the numerous sub-national groups through which
so much of the life and the politics of democratic people is
organized and directed. Sub-national groups, in turn,
direct the emotions of group members toward the nation. In
this circular fashion, virtually all groups contribute to
national loyalty. Their members minimize or efface any
antagonism between their own group and the nation. They
identify group and national welfare.

Citizens possess multiple loyalties which may
complement each other or may conflict with each other. The
reinforcement of loyalties may be accomplished in a number
of ways. The object of one loyalty may be dependent upon

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[104] Walker Connor, "The Nature of the Ethnonational Bond," Ethnic and
Racial Studies 16 (July, 1993): 387.

the survival of the object of another loyalty, so that loyalty to the latter involves support to the former. This is clearly the case in British North America prior to Confederation, where being British in large part help preserve the new Canadian nation from becoming assimilated by the Americans to the South. Reinforcement of loyalties by each other also is found in this very fundamental process: individuals develop loyalty habit patterns, so that training in loyalty to one object is generalized and may be transferred in their reaction to other objects of loyalty. Contrary to the interpretation given by the collaboration theorists, loyalty is not a single entity - once used up, then exhausted. Rather, it is an expandable quantity which can be generated in increasing amounts toward a variety of objects.

A psychological conceptualization of loyalty encapsulates both the emotional and material aspects of interests. It rejects the notion that human behavior is based on self-interest, narrowly conceived.[105] Loyalty is the state of being faithful to one's commitments, duties, associations and values, as well as self-interests. Loyalty can be a fidelity to a cause, an idea, a religion or an ideology, matters beyond the scope of self-interest narrowly

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[105] Jane J. Mansbridge, <u>Beyond Self-Interest</u> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) p. ix.

defined.[106] A functional approach recognizes the complex

view of both individual behavior and social organization, a

view that takes into account duty, altruism and a concern

for a shared "sense of belonging." This combination of

loyalties was recognized by the American Founding Fathers,

who framed their Constitution around the twin pillars of

virtue and self-interest. During the revolutionary war

George Washington said the following:

> I do not mean to exclude altogether the Idea of Patriotism.
> I know it exists, and I know it has done much in the present
> Contest. But I will venture to assert, that a great and
> lasting War can never be supported on this principle alone.
> It must be aided by a prospect of Interest or some reward.
> For a time, it may, of itself push Men to Action; to bear
> much, to encounter difficulties; but it will not endure
> unassisted by Interest.[107]

James Madison's Tenth Federalist was based upon a

realistic assumptions regarding human motivation.[108] Like his

contemporaries, Madison recognized and tried to set to work

the power of both self-interested and non-self-interested

motivation. In designing the American Constitution, Madison

tried to work the power of both self-interested and

non-self-interested motivation.

Loyalty is a great good from the standpoint of

community. It is equally a good from the standpoint of the

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[106] Konovitz, p. 108.
[107] Cited in John P. Diggins, The Lost Soul of American Politics: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Foundations of Liberalism, (New York: Basic Books, 1984) p. 23
[108] Gordon Wood, "Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution," in Richard Beeman et al., eds., Beyond Confederation, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987) p. 92.

individual as it gives him an ease of communications of his fellows and a set of goals which help impart purpose to his life. Through loyalty one becomes related to something outside of and larger than himself. And, through this connection, life acquires meaning and direction. Royce announces this theme early and returns to it repeatedly in his treatise on loyalty.

> Loyalty, again, tends to unify life, to give it center, fixity, stability. Now, a loyal man is one who has found, and who sees some social cause so rich, so well knit, and to him, so fascinating, and withal so kindly in its appeal to his natural self-will, that he says to his cause: "Thy will is mine and mine is thine. In thee I do not lose but find myself, living intensely in proposition as I live for thee. "Wherever loyalty is, there is selfhood, personality, individual purpose embodied in a life.[109]

In summary, loyalty is a good for the individual in that through it he learns to orient his life toward the achievement of ideal projects. And the impulse to identify with a person, a cause, an ideal, possesses nearly everyone at one or another time, with greater or lesser intensity. It is through shared loyalties that men can break through the shell isolating the individual from his or her compatriots, enabling the individual to become a vital part of the ongoing collective process. Through a common loyalty to Britain, English-speaking British North Americans were part of an organic social entity. A common loyalty to their ancestral homelands was an essential part of the cement that bound the colonists together. They shared a sense of a

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[109] Royce, *op cit.*, pp. 22, 43, 171.

common history, language, and culture. In many ways they sought to replicate the world they had known in the United Kingdom in the Province of Canada, as can be seen in the political ideas, labels and institutions they chose to maintain and develop. Loyalty to Great Britain was the direct result of the colonists desire to relate to something outside of and larger than the settler community in which they found themselves. They received both material gratification from their imperial loyalty, as the collaboration theorists have abundantly pointed out, but they also derived an emotional gratification from the maintenance of the imperial tie, which Robinson and Baskerville have underestimated to the point of distorting the true essence of loyalty. Loyalties adhering to groups, be they national or sub-national, are rarely absolute. Group loyalties are adjusted to and relative to other loyalties. The intensity of loyalties may increase or diminish. The story of British North America in the pre-Confederation period is not the story of an absolute shift from complete British imperialism to complete Canadian nationalism, resulting in an inevitable decolonisation. It is more a matter of ebb and flow, not of one totally replacing another.

Chapter Four

Loyalty and the Nation

In this section, I will proceed from the general examination of loyalty in the preceding chapter to discuss how loyalty is related to the concept of 'nation'. In order to come to grips with the issue of "national" loyalty during the Union period, I will employ the functional approach as proposed by David Potter.[110] Potter views the formation of large scale political communities as a process that must be explained in terms of *process* rather than as component parts. He rejects the constituent ingredient theory of nationalism - the idea that when certain elements are brought into association, they automatically fuse to generate a spirit of nationalism, and thus set in motion the establishment of a nation. These elements or ingredients usually include common descent, common language, common traditions and customs, common territory, and they tend to manifest themselves in a common political entity. In short, the constituent ingredient theory tends to conceal the fact that the formation of a nation or of a nationality is a process of the creation of conditions of commonality, and that as a process it cannot be explained by the presence of

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[110] David Potter, "The Historian's Use of Nationalism and Vice Versa," op cit.

a fixed set of ingredients said to be used by nation-builders.

By approaching the subject from a functional perspective, one may answer the question of what is a nation by observing the degree to which a group has achieved cohesiveness or group unity. Here the question is primarily descriptive or observational, and it can be answered in qualified or relative terms, with fine distinctions and gradations.[111] Such a question may concern the psychological attitudes of the group, an approach which is wholly conducive to the view of loyalty focused upon in the previous chapter. Thus, for example, Hans Kohn affirms that "nationalism is first and foremost a state of mind, an act of consciousness."[112]

The psychological character of this approach to nationalism deserves to be stressed because it possesses certain important assumptions. In the first place, since nationalism is a form of group loyalty, it is not generically different from other forms of group loyalty. From this it would follow that national loyalty is not an absolute condition as the collaboration theorists posit. Loyalty to large-scale communities is relative one, for loyalty evolves gradually by imperceptible degrees, both in

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[111] Potter, p. 63.
[112] Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, p. 10.

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the individual and the group, and it is often altered by circumstances.

If nationalism is a relative manifestation, this fact would also imply that national groups must vary in the degree of completeness or intensity of their nationality, and further that various elements of the population within the nationality group must differ in the extent to which they share the sense of group identity and the commitment to group purpose. This, in turn, would mean that loyalty to the nation must exist in the individual not as an unique or exclusive allegiance, but as an attachment concurrent with other forms of group loyalty - to family, to church, and to an individual's ancestral homeland.

The most vital characteristic of a nation from the functional perspective is the "sense of belonging" that exists among its members,[113] a psychological awareness of fraternity that is not restricted to any strict ethnological limitations. Walker Connor has written that

> Any nation can, of course, be described in terms of its particular amalgam of tangible characteristics, for example, in terms of the number of its members, their physical location, their religious and linguistic composition, and so forth. But one can so describe any human grouping, even such an unimportant categorization as the New Englander. By intuitively valuing that which they have in common with other Americans more than that which makes them unique, the New Englanders have self-relegated themselves to the status of a sub-national element. By contrast, the Ibos clearly place greater importance on being Ibo than being Nigerian. It is therefore, the self-view of one's group, rather than

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[113] Boyd Shafer, <u>Nationalism and Internationalism; Belonging in Human Experience</u> (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1984)

the tangible characteristics, that is the essence in determining the existence or non-existence of a nation.[114]

The most popular definition of what constitutes a nation probably belongs to the French critic, Ernest Renan, who wrote that

> A nation is a grand solidarity constituted by the sentiment of sacrifices which one has made and those that one is to make again. It supposes a past, it renews itself especially in the present by a tangible deed; approval, the desire, clearly expressed, to continue the communal life. The existence of a nation is an everyday plebiscite.[115]

The prime cause of political disunity is the absence of a single psychological focus shared by all segments of the population. The nature of that loyalty and its source remains shadowy and elusive, and the consequent difficulty of defining a nation is usually acknowledged by those who attempt the task. Thus a popular dictionary of International Relations defines a nation as follows:

> A social group which shares a common ideology, common institutions and customs, and a *sense* of homogeneity. 'Nation' is difficult to define so precisely as to differentiate the term from such other groups as religious sects, which exhibit some of the same characteristics. In the nation, however, there is also present a strong group *sense* of belonging associated with a particular territory considered to be peculiarly its own.[116] (italics added)

Whereas the key word in this particular definition is *sense*, other authorities may substitute *feeling* or *intuition*, but proper appreciation of the abstract essence of the nation is customary in definitions.

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[114] Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" World Politics (1971) 337.

[115] Ernest Renan, "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?," quoted from Hutchinson and Smith, *op. cit.* p. 16.

[116] Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, The International Relations Dictionary (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969) p. 199

After focusing attention upon that essential psychological bond, typically little probing of its nature follows. Indeed, having defined the nation as an essentially psychological phenomenon authorities then have a tendency to treat it as fully synonymous with the very different and totally tangible concept of the state. With the concepts of the nation and the state thus hopelessly confused, it is perhaps not too surprising that nationalism should come to mean identification with the state rather than loyalty to the nation.

A functional approach to the topic of what is a nation encourages the student of nationalism to abandon the older view of national identity as a *natural* development which to be complete must obliterate all other loyalties. All national identities are, to a considerable extent, *artificially* constructed, for nationalism is at all times based upon the sense of belonging to what Benedict Anderson has called an imagined community.[117]

Throughout history people have belonged to a variety of groups, such as family, village, tribe, caste, church, as well as nation and more recently the nation-state. People have chosen to express their loyalty to these human groupings in return for the fulfillment of their emotional and psychological needs, for their security, and for their

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[117] Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York: Verso, 1991).

own economic, social and political existence. Loyalty to the nation indicates an identification with a human grouping that may or may not be coterminous with a state. It is based upon a self-conception, self-awareness, and self-assertion of a delimited group of people. Nationalism is a relationship between individuals, expressing itself in cultural and philosophic terms, calling upon sociology and anthropology.

With very few exceptions, authorities have shied away from describing the nation as a kinship group and have usually explicitly denied that the nation of shared blood is a factor.[118] Such denials are supported by data illustrating that most groups claiming nationhood do in fact incorporate several ancestral strains.[119] Most nations exist as a composite group, the United Kingdom being a prime example.

But such an approach ignores the notion that when analyzing sociopolitical situations, what ultimately matters is not *what is* but *what people believe is.* Since the nation is a self-defined rather than other-defined grouping, the broadly held conviction concerning the group's singular origin need not and seldom will accord with factual data. A subconscious belief in the group's separate origin and evolution is an important ingredient of national psychology.

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[118] Joseph Levitt, "Race and Nation in Canadian Anglophone Historiography," Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism 8 (1981): 1.
[119] Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" p. 320.

When one avers that he is British, he is identifying himself not just with the British people and culture of today, but with British people and their activities throughout time.[120] It is the recognition of this dimension of the nation that has caused numerous writers of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to employ race as a synonym for nation, references to an English or German race being quite common.[121]

British North Americans and Nationalism

Just as it is not the case that most Canadians have seen a conflict between a sense of national identity and their local, provincial or regional loyalties, a developing awareness of a Canadian national identity,[122] or Canadian nationalism, did not extinguish other older loyalties during the mid-nineteenth century. On the contrary, for a long period after Confederation a sense of being British defined to them a global system within which they found their identity.[123] Loyalty to the British nation provided the psychological focus that was shared by all segments of the

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[120] For an example of the importance of tradition and history to a sense of nation and nationalism, see Iain Hampsher Monk, The Political Philosophy of Edmund Burke (New York : Longman, 1987).

[121] For a discussion on the importance of "race" for the sense of unity among Imperialists during the late nineteenth century, see Douglas L. Cole, "Canada's 'Nationalistic' Imperialists," Journal of Canadian Studies V, 3 (August, 1970): 44.

[122] A.W. Rasporich, "The National Awakening: Canada at Mid-Century," in J. M. Bumsted, ed., Documentary Problems in Canadian History (Georgetown: Irwin Dorsey, 1969.) 229-251.

[123] Pocock, "History and Sovereignty," 381-82.

English-speaking Canadian population. This loyalty had many of the traits commonly identified with nationalism, so much so that it can be said that British North Americans exhibited both a British and a Canadian nationalism. The collaboration theory does not consider the fact that loyalty to Great Britain consisted of a devoted attachment to the political ideals and institutions established over centuries, and to a historic cultural community. This loyalty was a complex mixture of tradition and sentiment, choice and reason. As I discussed in the chapter on the theory of loyalty, these loyalties were acquired in the course of social conditioning. This conditioning took place in Great Britain before emigration, and in the colonies themselves. Habits, customs and beliefs were integrated into the character structure of British North Americans without conscious thought. Loyalty was not determined economic factors alone.

Their loyalty to Great Britain provided a pattern through which British colonists could organize their lives in a new setting, making their existence more intelligible and empowering people to make life-choices with some reference to a known framework. It was a sense of being an extension of the British nation that bound English-speaking British North Americans together in the nineteenth century. It furnished them with a shared inventory of ideas, images

and myths from which to draw. In his study of Central Canadian newspapers during the Union period, J.M.S. Careless found that there was a constant reference to British ideas. He went on to state that,

> These newspapers felt very strongly the sense of belonging to a British intellectual community, no less than of belonging to a physical British empire. They were in a stream of ideas emanating from Britain at the height of her power and prestige.[124]

Much of Careless's scholarship has concentrated on George Brown and the Globe, and S.F. Wise was undoubtedly right to issue his corrective to what he saw as Careless's too "George Brown-centered" view. Not all British North Americans shared the Globe's particular form of liberalism. In Britain there were conservatives, liberals and even radicals, and representatives of all three came to the colonies and contributed to the political diversity of the societies they created. Any attempt to view the whole body of immigrants during this period as possessing a singular political outlook is surely misguided.[125] But Careless was correct to insist that despite political divisions, British Canadians conducted their political disputes within the same general framework of ideas, and that "this framework of ideas" was dominant throughout the Anglo-American world, on

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[124] J.M.S Careless, "Mid-Victorian Liberalism in Central Canadian Newspapers," <u>Canadian Historical Review</u> v.31(3) (June 1950): 221.
[125] Gad Horowitz, "Liberalism, Conservatism and Socialism in Canada: An Interpretation," <u>Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science</u> 32 (1966): 18.

both sides of the Atlantic.[126] The Macdonald Conservatives and Brown Liberals, despite their political warfare, were in fundamental agreement in their attitudes toward their British and Canadian identities, in their belief in the superior merits of the British constitution.[127]

Thus, Canadian society was profoundly influenced by the large scale movement of men and ideas from Britain to British North America. These immigrants, many of whom obtained positions of influence and importance in the colony,[128] brought with them their intellectual property.[129] S.F. Wise expands on this theme by stating that

> British North America was never isolated from Europe; it was never free to develop fully according to its own inner impulsions. It was not simply the continuing fact of the imperial presence, an imposing force in itself in the relatively small and weak colonial societies. Even more important was the continuing transmission to British North America of the political and social ideas of the Old World.[130]

Wise points out that the influence of what he called the "official culture" upon the political nation was substantial. It delimited the roles, set the standards and established the norms of the political leadership which

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[126] Careless, "Mid-Victorian Liberalism in Central Canadian Newspapers," 223, 233.

[127] W.L. Morton, "Victorian Canada," in The Shield of Achilles; Aspects of Canada in the Victorian Age ed. Morton, (Montreal: McClelland and Stewart, 1968) 317.

[128] J.K. Johnson, Becoming Prominent : Regional Leadership in Upper Canada, 1791-1841 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988).

[129] Laurence Fallis, "The Idea of Progress in the Province of Canada: A Study in the History of Ideas," in The Shield of Achilles; Aspects of Canada in the Victorian Age ed., (Montreal: McClelland and Stewart, 1968) p. 169.

[130] S.F. Wise, "Liberal Consensus or Ideological Battleground: Some Reflections on the Hartz Thesis", CHA Historical Papers (1974): 6.

directed the colonial administration, and helped shape the attitudes and behavior of those who aspired to a place in the structure. This official culture also defined the limits for those figures who occupied places in the political opposition. The official outline was tied to London, the imperial metropolis, and received constantly from it a flow of political, social and economic ideas and values. So great was this influence that George Sheppard, the pro-American editor of Brown's Globe during the period to which some historians point to show the Liberal leaders pro-republican leanings, left Canada in disgust because "to his chagrin, he found the communities of Upper Canada little more than microcosms of English society."[131]

British Americans not only shared a common pool of ideas with other members of the British nation, they also possessed a deep ethnic sense, a strong consciousness of nationality. Their ethnic identity was by no stretch of the imagination *Canadian,* rather it was emphatically and intensely British.[132] This ethnic component was a matter of self-definition. At this point in time and in this place British North Americans chose to identify themselves as being British. British North Americans demonstrated all the

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[131] M.H. Lewis, "A Reappraisal of George Sheppard's Contribution to the Press of North America," <u>Ontario History</u>, LXII (1969): 178.
[132] For an illustration of an attempt to create a distinctly Canadian ethnic myth, see Carl Berger, "The True North Strong and Free," in Russell, <u>Nationalism in Canada</u>, p.3-26.

usual nationalist characteristics of consciousness of common descent, cultural commonality, and a sense of mission. They possessed a pan-national creed that reached beyond geographical boundaries. There was yet little consciousness of Canadians as a nation as defined by its separateness by language, descent, myths or traditions.

In a very real sense, the psychological unity British North Americans felt with the British was not simply a sentimental attachment to the mother country, nor can the loyalty to Empire be reduced to a crude calculation of economic self-interest as the collaboration theorists would have its readers believe. The loyalty British North Americans expressed possessed all the characteristics of a national loyalty. They were loyal to the British nation because it symbolized and sustained deeply-held values. When John A. Macdonald declared for partisan purposes in 1891 "A British subject I was born - a British subject I will die",[133] he was expressing a desire widely held, even by a substantial majority of those who would vote against him in the election that would follow.[134]

While a sense of being Canadian did grow during the nineteenth century, for the majority their sense of being

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[133] Cited in Donald Creighton, John A. Macdonald: The Old Chieftain, (Toronto: Macmillan Co., 1955), 553.
[134] For a survey of the importance of the British connection during the turn of the century, see Carl Berger, The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism, 1867-1914 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970).

British did not weaken.[135] In fact, this sense probably became stronger during the middle and later decades of the nineteenth century. Even while Canada was exercising an increasing control over political, economic, and administrative processes, the British loyalty was becoming more, rather than less intense. Loyalty for the monarchy, to the British political traditions, and to the Empire was escalating to greater heights.[136] There was little difference in this feeling among moderate Reformers, Liberal Conservatives or High Tories.[137] As Careless stated, ideas were

> channeled from Britain by steamship and telegraph, or carried with the immigrants, who so influenced their community that it kept looking to the center of the British world for the source of its thought. This is not merely to be called dependence. Feeling a unity with Britain, English-speaking Canadians accepted a bulk of her ideas as their own...Canada, perhaps, never before or since [had] been so British.[138]

The traditional loyalties to Britain and things British provided the necessary psychological unifying force during

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[135] F.H. Underhill, "Canada's Relations with the Empire, as Seen by the Toronto Globe, 1857-67," Canadian Historical Review, X (1929): 106; J.M.S. Careless, "The Political Ideas of George Brown," Canadian Forum 36 (February, 1957): 247, 249; Donald Creighton, "Sir John MacDonald and Canadian Historians," Canadian Historical Review v.29(1) (March 1948): 1.

[136] Robert Page, "Canada and the Imperial Idea in the Boer War Years," Journal of Canadian Studies V, 1 (February, 1970) 33; Carman Miller, Painting the Map Red; Canada and the South African War, 1899-1902 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993).

[137] A.W. Rasporich, "Imperial Sentiment in the Province of Canada during the Crimean War, 1854-1856," in W.L. Morton, ed., The Shield of Achilles; Aspects of Canada in the Victorian Age (Montreal: McClelland and Stewart, 1968) p. 139. See also George W. Brown, "The Grit Party and the Great Reform Convention of 1859," Canadian Historical Review XVI (1935): 245.

[138] Careless, "Mid-Victorian Liberalism in Central Canadian Newspapers," 235, 234.

the early years of Union. For many British North Americans the heritage of the whole British Isles became their heritage.[139] In time this loyalty to a British nation would erode, a casualty of Britain's decline in the twentieth century and the dismantling of the Empire, of the increasingly irrelevance of British traditions to a growing number of native-born Canadians, of increased integration with the United States and of the changing pattern of immigration. This development was given a poignant resonance by W.L. Morton when he wrote that the British world he had known,

> the world in which I had been reared, the world by whose standards I had fitfully but not disloyally lived, the world I had bothered with and had tried to keep in order repair, that world no longer existed. It was no longer there - it had vanished. I was like a man alone in the Arctic waste, in twilight and with no landmark.[140]

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[139] Donald Smiley, "Federalism, Nationalism and the Scope Of Public Activity in Canada," in Peter Russell, ed., Nationalism in Canada. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill of Canada, 1966), p. 100.
[140] W.L. Morton, "The Dualism of Culture and the Federalism of Power," in A New Concept Of Confederation? (Canadian Union of Students, 1964) p. 128.

CONCLUSION

This paper has analyzed the way in which the idea of loyalty has been used in relation to the 'collaboration thesis'. I have argued that collaboration theorists share the "nation-building" school's view of loyalty, a view that is based on the belief that in order to strengthen the 'nation-state', loyalties to other large-scale communities must be weakened or destroyed. I have also argued that an alternative conception of loyalty is necessary. This alternative conception would have to explain the vitality of multiple loyalties.

The theoretical research done on the subject of loyalty posits that the preservation or development loyalties to non-national entities is a useful, if not indeed a necessary factor in creating and preserving national loyalty. Loyalty provides a pattern through which individuals may organize their lives, making their existence more intelligible and empowering people to make life-choices with some reference to a known framework.

Loyalties need not be of the jealous nature, nor need they be narrow. Thus, a loyalty to an ancestral homeland need in no sense detract from a loyalty to another national group. Vigorous and sustained loyalties of all sorts encourage all individuals, whether they be new immigrants or

"old-stock" citizens, to feel that there is something to attach themselves to, that by finding the roots of the community they might become genuinely part of it. The acceptance of multiple loyalties is a necessary first and natural step towards a national loyalty of a meaningful sort.

Robinson's collaboration thesis is based upon a conceptualization of loyalty that cannot be reconciled with the historical fact of multiple loyalties in the period before Confederation, and for several decades afterwards. By contracting the imperial relationship to a simplistic economic model, collaboration theorists consciously neglected the non-economic factors which underpinned the colonial commitment to the empire. The collaboration theory regards loyalty as a finite phenomena, and regards that transference of primary loyalties to a nation-state as a natural occurrence. The collaboration theorists have considered the subject of national loyalty from a formalistic approach, leading them to treat the concept of national loyalty as an absolute value, placing it in antithesis to other forms or group loyalty. The formalistic approach renders a stark contradistinction between loyalty and disloyalty. This has resulted in Robinson underestimating the importance to British North Americans

that loyalty to Britain, and the idea of being British, was to the identities of British North Americans.

The view of loyalty presented by Robinson is untenable if examined using a functional approach. It is through shared loyalties that enabled British North Americans to feel part of an ongoing collective process. Through a common loyalty to Britain, English-speaking British North Americans were part of an organic social entity. A common loyalty to their ancestral homelands was an essential part of the cement that bound the colonists together. They shared a sense of a common history, language, and culture. In many ways they sought to replicate the world they had known in the United Kingdom in the Province of Canada, as can be seen in the political ideas, labels and institutions they chose to maintain and develop. Loyalty to Great Britain was the direct result of the colonists desire to relate to something outside of and larger than the settler community in which they found themselves. British North Americans derived an emotional gratification from the maintenance of the imperial tie, which Robinson and Baskerville have underestimated. The story of British North America in the pre-Confederation period is not the story of an absolute shift from complete British imperialism to complete Canadian nationalism, resulting in an inevitable decolonisation. Multiple loyalties are not a matter of one totally replacing another.

Loyalty is not a matter of 'either-or'; rather, it is a question of ebb and flow. The example of British North America as a British settlement community demonstrates that national development is not dependent on the destruction of older loyalties. On the contrary, the experience of multiple loyalties created an atmosphere of heightened pluralism. The political nationality embraced French and English, Scots and Irish.[141] If loyalty is viewed from a psychological perspective, multiple loyalties will be seen to be the norm, a healthy part of a pluralistic, democratic, society. Multiple loyalties to large scale communities are an integral part of a *federal* society.

"Canadian federalism," Pierre Trudeau wrote," is a brilliant prototype for the molding of tomorrow's civilization."[142] Canada was the kind of society in which different communities could live within the same state, and such a combination was "as necessary a condition of civilized life as the combination of men in society."[143]

Intrinsic to the whole question of a federal form of government is the federal nature of the society itself. An obvious fact about any society is that it consists of a

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[141] Allan Smith, "Metaphor and Nationality in North America," in Canada - An American Nation? Essays on Continentalism, Identity, and the Canadian Frame of Mind, (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994) p. 134.
    [142] Pierre Trudeau, Federalism and the French Canadians (Toronto: Macmillan, 1968), p. 179.
    [143] Lord Acton, Essays on Freedom and Power (New York: Meridian, 1955), p. 160.

plurality of groups, each enjoying the loyalty of citizens. Federalism is the attempt to reconcile the multiple loyalties and multiple identities. As David Elkins and Richard Simeon have written, Canadians have strong ties to their local communities and equally strong ties to the national community. They want freedom of action for their provincial communities as well as a centre that can speak for all of Canada. "The imaginative feat," Elkins and Simeon state, "is to find a way to reconcile and harmonize what may on the surface appear to be irreconcilable images."[144]

Behind Canadian federalism is the idea of a Canadian political nationality predicated on the existence of multiple loyalties. Georges Etienne Cartier has been credited with articulating the first conception of a distinct Canadian nationality that was not tied to the idea of assimilationist nationalism.[145] I would argue that while the French-English duality had a substantial impact on the manner with which federal politics has been conducted at the elite level, the experience of Canada as a British settlement community had an equally significant influence on

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[144] David Elkins and Richard Simeon, <u>Small World</u> (Toronto: Methuen, 1980), p. 282.
[145] See P.B. Waite, ed., <u>The Confederation Debates,</u> (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963), pp. 50-51. See also Donald Smiley, "Reflections on Cultural Nationhood and Political Community in Canada," in Ken Carty and Peter Ward eds., <u>Entering the Eighties: Canada in Crisis</u> (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 27.

the way English speaking Canadians have conceptualized the idea of loyalty.[146]

Canada was borne a country of many loyalties - to French Canada, to Ireland, to Great Britain, and so on. The question of multiple loyalties is frequently seen as a product of the French-English relationship. In Canada's formative years, loyalties to Great Britain were equally as strong as those to Upper and Lower Canada, and to the new Canadian nation. W.L. Morton was perhaps the last Canadian scholar who truly appreciated Canada's Imperial legacy. Morton conceived of "political nationality" as a matter of allegiance rather than something based upon cultural or linguistic distinctions.[147] In Morton's view, allegiance to the monarchy represented a rejection of majoritarian democracy which demanded conformity. Canadian political nationality required only political allegiance.

While more nationalist minded Canadians may bemoan the fact, it is worth remembering that loyalties to ancestral homelands have had a long tradition in Canada. As Careless pointed out many years ago, Canada is a country of "limited

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[146] Alan Cairns has argued that this composite national-imperial identity "could not be shared by French Canadians," with the result that "psychologically the two European founding peoples lived in different constitutional worlds and had different constitutional identities." See Alan Cairns, "The Constitutional World We Have Lost," in C.E.S. Franks et. al. eds., Canada's Century: Governance in a Maturing Society (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995) p. 57.

[147] W.L. Morton, The Canadian Identity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972). For a recent commentary of Morton's importance to the contemporary debate, see Ramsay Cook, "Nation, Identity, Rights: reflections on W.L. Morton's Canadian Identity," Journal of Canadian Studies, 29 (Summer, 1994): 5.

identities,"[148] a country based upon multiple loyalties. The recognition that loyalties to one community do not necessarily detract from another is the foundational value that unites English-speaking Canadians. Desmond Morton has written that this conception of Canada, a country of citizens with "a variety of allegiances," is a "recurrent source of frustration to those of his professional colleagues in search of devout and single-minded nation-builders." Canadian citizenship often comes with "hyphens attached," and "has had to coexist with loyalties to old homelands, newer provinces or nations within and protected by the federal state, specifically la nation Canadian francaise."[149]

By acknowledging the fundamental importance of multiple loyalties, Canadian political nationalism is compatible with pluralism. To borrow a phrase from W.L. Morton, Canada has always been a community of allegiances. Within this political sphere, the Canadian political tradition has provided room for multiple loyalties and identities. From the Reform and Liberal Conservative politicians who brought about Confederation, through to the Canadian Imperialists Carl Berger so ably wrote about, Canadians who have

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[148] J.M.S. Careless, "'Limited Identities,' in Canada," Canadian Historical Review vol. L, 1 (March, 1969) 1.
[149] Desmond Morton, "Divided Loyalties? Divided Country? in William Kaplan, ed., Belonging : The Meaning and Future of Canadian Citizenship (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993) p. 51.

emphasized the British connection have been at the same time Canadian nationalists. Within his or her own structure of political commitments each Canadian has had the opportunity to fashion his or her own array of provincial, national and international loyalties. This Canadian political nationalism not only permits, but assumes, multiple loyalties.

In practice, men and women often have double, triple, or even quadruple loyalties, "mentally locating themselves, according to the circumstances, in a particular community, region, and even in one or two countries."[150] It is quite possible for individuals to see themselves as being, at one and the same time, a citizen of Montreal, a Quebecer, and an Irishman.

Lord Acton wrote that

> If we take the establishment of liberty for the realization of moral duties to be the end of civil society, we must conclude that those states are substantially the most perfect which, like the British and Austrian empire, include various distinct nationalities without oppressing them.[151]

Canada's unique experience as a community of multiple loyalties has come close to Acton's ideal. The common experience of immigrants created a common psychology, a psychology that encouraged the preservation of loyalties in the face of the assimilative policies of nation-builders.[152]

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[150] Linda Colley, "Britishness and Otherness: An Argument," Journal of British Studies 31 (October, 1992) 315.
[151] Cited in Daniel Matthew, Acton; the Formative Years (London, Eyre & Spottiswood, 1946), p. 180.
[152] W.L. Morton, "The Historical Phenomenon of Minorities: The Canadian Experience," Canadian Ethnic Studies, XIII, 3 (1981): 1.

English-speaking Canadians have relentlessly refused to exchange their heterogeneous pluralism for a sterile set of 'national' values created in order to break down deeply felt loyalties.

Political nationality is thus a matter of multiple loyalties. Each individual is enmeshed in a matrix of associations, each performing specific and limited functions. Under the best of all circumstances the person's institutional loyalties are complementary rather than competitive. The English Canadian tradition of political nationality rejects the notion that in any sense political loyalties to certain institutions override all other affiliations. I would contend that what makes the form of nationalism favoured by English-speaking Canadians distinct is that it is a product of a British settlement legacy in which multiple loyalties were taken for granted.

Robinson's collaboration thesis treats national loyalty as if it were exclusive, and inconsistent with other loyalties. The situation of Canada in the nineteenth century would indicate that national loyalty flourished not by challenging or overpowering all other loyalties, but by subsuming them all in a mutually supportive relation to one another. The strength of the whole was not enhanced by destroying the parts, but was fortified by the sum of the parts. As David Potter has said,

The only citizens who are capable of strong national loyalty are those who are capable of strong group loyalty. Individuals are most likely to express this capacity in their devotion to their religion, to the community, to their province, as well as to their country. The nationalism which will utilize this capacity most effectively, therefore, is not the one which attempts to override and destroy all other objects of loyalty, but the one which draws them into one transcendent focus.[153]

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[153] David Potter, "The Historian's Use of Nationalism," p. 75.

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