A DISTURBING PICTURE OF THE NEW WORLD ('I is seen'): TUPINAMBA CANNIBALISM, SIXTEENTH CENTURY PRINTED REPRESENTATION AND THE MARTYR

by

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Abstract

This is my body; this is my blood. The ritualistic words spoken by the absent body of Christ mark a sacrifice and crisis in the Christian community of meaning, and come to inflect another point of crisis, the West's historical encounter with the New World's indigenous body. My study intervenes in that encounter through a set of exceptional images which mediated the violent engagement of Amerindian alterity with occidental subjectivity. These first appeared in the third volume (1592) of the de Bry family's monumental publishing project that brought together previously published New World travel accounts with large-scale copper-plate coloured engravings. The incommensurability of New World cultural difference had confounded European modes of visual representation throughout the sixteenth century, leaving a pronounced lack of representation in its wake, within which were scattered relatively few schematically-conceived woodcut prints by various authors. And indeed, the rich and fantastic prints, images produced by the de Brys and thoroughly disseminated amongst the European populace, marked a significant turn in the graphic inscription of Amerindian alterity in the west. These prints, which for the first time in New World representation gain a prominence in relation to the accompanying text, are remarkable: within them, a technical apparatus and a theoretical operator seem to inscribe themselves in a confusion of mapped spaces, a congregation of murderous and cannibalistic bodies marked by difference, and within violent and sexual narratives of the demonic. The images emanate from a line of martyred bodies which attempt to transform Amerindian incommensurability, through the perceptory mechanism of vision and the practice of graphic inscription, into something meaningful to a European 'order'. Yet the other
eludes the incorporative grasp of the occidental subject and manifests itself as a perturbation within the syntax of the very visual discourse which tried to circumscribe it. My objectives are primarily, then, a matter of locating difference within identity, identifying a disturbance in the locus of enunciation, and, perhaps, delineating the resonance to this unsettling.
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Fig. 2, p. 133. Originally published in Theodor de Bry, *Historiae Americae*, part III (Frankfort: de Bry, 1592).

Originally published in de Bry, *Historiae Americae*.

Fig. 16, p. 147. Peter Brueghel, *Bay of Naples*.
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This is my body; this is my blood. The ritualistic words spoken by the absent body of Christ mark a sacrifice and crisis in the Christian community of meaning, and come to inflect another point of crisis, the West's historical encounter with the New World's indigenous body. I'm hoping that a particular series of printed visual images and texts published by the de Bry family between 1590 and 1634, and subsequently often translated and reprinted, will allow me to make an intervention into an historical crisis. At the turn of the seventeenth century, and even now, these ubiquitous images, published with text as interpretations of the major travel accounts of the New World, enjoy a privileged position in relation to an event. An event which disrupted what Western Christendom had thought to be a complete circumscription of the globe and its people - the encounter with the New World, a radical alterity. At this time it would have been difficult to imagine this new space in any terms other than the de Bry images, and this is not only due to their thorough dissemination amongst the European populace. The prints themselves, which for the first time in New World representation gain a prominence in relation to the accompanying text, are remarkable: within them, a technical apparatus, somewhat novel to New World representation, and a theoretical operator seem to inscribe themselves in a confusion of mapped spaces, a congregation of murderous bodies marked by difference, and within violent and sexual narratives. And it's ultimately these visual particularities that concern me as I attempt to trace several trajectories into this historical moment marked by crisis - a moment I'd like to configure schematically for the moment in terms of several spaces: the imaginary and symbolic spaces of occidental representation and subjectivity, and the social spaces of practice in the New World and Europe - spaces sewn together by the sinews of the body.
Sacrifice and the Martyr

Sacrifice, on two parallel planes and along a third mediating trajectory, seems to: designate the bodies, both practitioners and victims; distinguish and articulate the practices; locate the spaces; and delineate the paths traveled through places, which ultimately define the circulating economies and the parameters of my problem - a problem which I will have to set up, for the moment, in a schematic and detached way.

Western Christendom, as a community of meaning, is founded in a sacrificial deicide, and then must be structured in relation to the absence of the body of this deity, Christ. The bread and wine of the Eucharist are the body and blood of the absent Christ, or they re-present his matter and fluid. The theological debates around transubstantiation are a key polemical manifestation of the Occidental crisis in representation. Protestant denial that the sacraments are in actuality the body of Christ opened a rift between sign and signified, and thus representation conscious of itself as such. Official Catholic doctrine did not recognize this distinction and thus, ostensibly, collapses the gap defining referentiality. According to Max Weber, Protestant denial of the body, and asceticism in general, is a considerable factor in the founding of a nascent capitalist economy, and for Georges Bataille, such a denial founds the "order of things" where production anticipating a future result crowns duration as the ordering principle of a more general ontological economy. Adherence to a mimetic mode of representation branded Catholics as spiritual cannibals of excessive expenditure in the eyes of their reformist counterparts, and the representationalist debate, in general, was enough to excite such extreme vengeful affect in both sides that

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real material cannibalism would be the stigma(ta) left inscribed in the Christian body. After its humbling at the hands of representation in the Wars of Religion, the Christian macrocosm would be marked by an internal heterogeneity which Europe will be "obliged to forget."

This is my body; this is my blood. Again, the absence left by the body of Christ, the Martyr, marks a caesura in the verse of occidental representation which is formalized in the ritual of the Eucharist. Christianity, unlike Judaism, is founded on and structured by the absent body of Christ: it makes no pretense as to a signified, it is gone from the scene from the beginning. This gives speech ordered on a Christian principle the potential to realize an ethics through a confusion of signifiers which acknowledges the tenuous link between consciousness and what is signified to it as 'the real.' Ironically, for Western Christendom in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, this meant an identification between sign and signified. Many past and current writers have characterized the interpretive system of meaning in the early modern epoch as a framework structured according to the principles of mimesis under which all could be unified through one measured relation - Logos, the word of God. Under the assumptions of mimetic re-presentation one did not distinguish between "words and things", signifier and signified, and thus mimeticism took as its key trope the analogy between microcosm and macrocosm, making the human body a reduced but homologous form of the cosmos. This is the opening assertion in Michel Foucault's *The Order of Things* - that the sixteenth century system of representation was one of "resemblance."

I don't wish to reify this characterization of the Renaissance episteme, which has been a criticism and self-criticism of Foucault, but to suspend it as a working

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construct within which the key concepts were no doubt integral to the thought of this period, although perhaps not the only unifying essentials, only to investigate its dissolution in a crisis of representation. This crisis has been located in one particular historical juncture, but it may have been that it has reiterated itself incessantly since as the agitation necessary to a supplementary form of representation.

A two-part system of representation under which words and things became unhinged and signification became conscious of itself as such is evident in its nascent form in Luther and Zwingli in the first half of the sixteenth century, yet perhaps not fully realized until Calvin’s theorization of transubstantiation in the Eucharist.\(^3\) It would later be formalized in the Grammaire and Logique of the Port-Royal logicians.\(^4\) And, again, the point is not to reduce this form of representing and signifying, or the possible change to this new form, in a comprehensive, simultaneous, and unified epistemic shift. It was made manifest (if perhaps always there) in different fields of knowledge and in different practices at various moments in time, and immediately after each followed divergent paths in being bent, often violently, to different ends, often contradictory ends. The point is to recognize, at a very abstract level, some of the general principles which characterize the manifestation of a new way of representing in looking at a particular historical juncture named by crisis and ambiguity in the process of naming. It would be to recognize some of the principles identified by Foucault but then also their divergent itineraries, such as those delimited by Louis Marin in the realm of painted representation and de Certeau in the field of religious and social practices.\(^5\)

\(^3\)Redner’s need to locate a “real founder of Modernity” leads him to Calvin (A New Science, p. 229).
\(^4\)On the Port-Royal logicians see Foucault, The Order, pp. 95-124.
Not surprisingly, necessarily, at the heart of this antagonism infiltrating the juncture is a Christian doctrine and practice: the Sacrament and transubstantiation. For the monadic Christian system of resemblance centered around Logos, as carried through by the Thomistic-Aristotelian scholasticism in medieval and Renaissance theology, the bread and wine of the Eucharist are the body and blood of the absent Christ. This is corroborated by the 13th council of Trent in 1551 which upholds Aquinas' doctrine of transubstantiation as the only doctrine. Perfect metaphoric substitution, the restoration of presence.

Consequently, the pious soul who consumes the host consumes the martyr's body and hence may be designated a cannibal. Reformist theory instead rejected the notion of two entities which fused mutual essence in a third mediating relational term, instead recognizing the mutual exclusivity of sign and signified, and their mutual dependence on a perceiving subject and a superior figure authorizing the veridical nature of the relationship, God. The ramifications of this theoretical maneuver are diverse and complexly related, so I will necessarily be reductive in delineating some of the more prominent threads.

The model makes dubious the relation between sign and signified and allows things to exist distinctly in time and space. It transforms the position of knowledge from that which uncovers divine truth, the word of God, to that which articulates a language so well that it can be used as an instrument of analysis and combination in the deployment of nature in its space. This allows Bacon and then Descartes, Galileo, Kepler, etc. to move resemblance into comparison, and its constituents measurement and order. Most importantly, it allows an ordering principle to emerge with maximal and minimal absolutes,

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6 Redner, p. 233.
7 For a discussion of the new representational forms within the sciences, see Redner, pp. 226-238.
8 These are Foucault's terms, see pp. 50-58.
making each game a martial game. As Michel Serres has said: "The discourse on method is a science of war."⁹

Two crucial corollaries follow. The first: "representation is always perpendicular to itself," that is, simultaneously *indication*, a relation to an object (meaning that the sign points to a signified which is distinct from it); and *appearance*, a manifestation of the process which defines it (meaning that the sign is conscious of itself as representation and thus reveals the illusionistic devices which construct it).¹⁰ The second corollary: subjectivity constitutes itself through the representationalist process as the subject of truth and knowledge is crowned. It asserts: "I have the right to being as I can represent being to myself."¹¹ And these two corollaries will be crucial in delineating the inextricable relationship between the process of visually re-presenting and the formation of subjectivity in the early modern age. But the corollaries are not all of, or separable from, a theoretical nature, which itself is inextricably linked to practices.

Crucial to this study is the mark left in the historical moment in question: the dissolution of a monolithic Christian Logos, under which belief formed the frame of reference for practices, resulted in the emergence of many competing social domains where religious belief was relativized to the position of one-among-others. The splintering of the macrocosm produced an atmosphere of controversion and suspicion in which peoples "uprooted and seemingly wandering across social and symbolic frames are delivered up to witches'
hallucinations created by the absence."12 Previously all alterity had been subsumed under the name 'heresy', as the exterior to the unified Christian cosmos, but under crisis, it splinters into several "social heresies" within, as others internal to the socius emerge and wait to be ordered by a social ethic. And the great educational missionary campaigns of this age are aimed within at the countryside, the woman, the child, and abroad at the savage.

The visualized body of cultural alterity, or more specifically the seen body of the New World "Indian," seems to be one of the assailants responsible for the wound in the figure of occidental signification: it, along with others, seems to announce the crisis in representation in the west. Graphic enterprises documenting Europe's encounter with radical cultural difference in the New World—-a form of alterity--were surprisingly, or perhaps not, absent upon initial contact. In fact, there is a pronounced lack of representation of any kind in the several decades following the discovery of the New World.13 Evidently, the encounter with alterity had a profound effect upon a world whose cosmographers were becoming less willing to admit the open nature of the globe and their own humility in the face of exploration,14 and whose graphic representation managed racial alterity dichotomously as black and white.15

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13See Michael Alexander, "Introduction," in Discovering the New World, based on the works of Theodore de Bry, ed. M. Alexander (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), pp. 7-10. Also see John H. Elliot, "Renaissance Europe and America: A Blunted Impact," in First Images of the Americas. The Impact of the New World on the Old, vol. 1, eds. M. J. B. Allen and R. L. Benson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), pp. 11-23. For a catalogue of European images referencing early contact with the New World see William C. Sturtevant, "First Visual Images of Native America" in the same volume. Sturtevant notes, "the listing continues to 1590, the publication date of the first volume in the collection issued by Theodor de Bry and his family. Research on all subsequent illustrations of American Indians must take de Bry into account for he served for artist's source for at least two centuries" (p. 419).
15For instance as late as the mid-sixteenth century Durer stated that there were only "... two species of mankind, whites and negroes. ..." Quoted in Bernadette Bucher, Icon and Conquest. A Structural Analysis of the Illustrations of de Bry's Great Voyages, trans. Basia Miller Gulati (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 32.
Toward the middle and latter half of the sixteenth century occidental cultural practices began to grapple more frequently with the incommensurability of the New World body as the American travel account emerged, most often combining the first person narrative of the martyr, who "has seen", with a few woodcut print images, usually characterized as 'crudely' done and of an 'illustrative' nature. The narrative of Hans Staden was amongst these accounts and his woodcut images (fig. 1) would provide the de Bry project with the schematic compositional arrangements for the images in Historiae Americae's third volume which was composed of the accounts of Staden and the Calvinist minister Jean de Léry. It is, in fact, in his celebrated account, Histoire d'un Voyage Fait en la Terre du Bresil, that Jean de Léry hints at this visual incommensurability and asserts the necessity of martyrdom:

During that year or so when I lived in that country [Brazil], I took such care in observing all of them, great and small, that even now it seems to me that I have them before my eyes, and I will forever have the idea and image of them in my mind. But their gestures and expressions are so completely different from ours, that it is difficult, I confess, to represent them well by writing or by pictures. To have the pleasure of it, then, you will have to go see and visit them in their own country. "Yes," you will say, "but the plank is very long." That is true, and so if you do not have a sure foot and a steady eye, and are afraid of stumbling, do not venture down that path.16

Léry's statement points self-consciously at his own position as martyr. Traced to its Ancient Greek roots the martyr is a witness. Thus the early modern traveler plays on both notions of the martyr in the two aspects of his constitutive function: he sacrifices his body in the process of witnessing. The martyr of the early modern age was a 'simple' man of practice, and as such entrusted by intellectuals, wary of leaving the confines of the drawing room, to venture out into the nebulous spaces of the globe, only theorized by the ancients, in order to bring back a faithful account of the bizarre curiosities abroad. The martyr's means of returning this account rested primarily on his

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sight. He had seen or witnessed, and in this way, he was to be believed. But as the martyr is to be trusted on the merit of his vision, the audience must necessarily then verify their own truth by in turn seeing the man who has seen. They must see the body of the martyr in order to see that he has seen, witness the witness. The body of the martyr is in the service of a seeing; it is sacrificed in order that the immobile European viewer can see the New World. The martyr is then the bodily agent of a community of meaning founded in the ultimate martyrdom ascribed to the body of Christ.

But as Léry indicates, the martyr is faced with the daunting task of returning, through practice, an incommensurable alterity. Consequently he also notes that it would be preferable for one to view this alterity for oneself. Léry hints at an impossibility which will confound occidental representation. Something lurks beneath Léry's testament to the body as vision and sacrifice, though, and it surfaces in one of its polar aspects - pleasure - as a trace of this lurking absence. As Proust's protagonist in Sodom and Gomorrah concludes pleasure is never far from its ostensible other in constituting the "only thing as noisy as suffering." It is this pleasure and suffering which will infiltrate the west's representations.

Across the abstract oceanic space of the Atlantic, in the dark chaos that is the New World, a sacrifice analogous to the deicide inaugurating western Christendom takes place, and again the human victim stands in proxy for the deity, again martyrdom. The Brazilian coastline marked the continental American frontier in 1494 after Pope Alexander VI divided up the newly discovered portion of the globe under the Treaty of Tordesillas, and it is here

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among the tribes of the Tupinamba peoples where the sacrifice of an exalted external prisoner marks a kind of wasteful human expenditure. Such expenditure aspires to the realm which Bataille has juxtaposed, as mutually exclusive, to the "order of things:" the domain of "immanence", where desire in the moment governs with no foresight to a future moment when Being may be fulfilled. \(^1\) Here the penultimate expenditure of human life in ritual sacrifice and anthropophagy (cannibalism) will signify, not the unacceptable social heterogeneity it does in western representationalist debates, but the mark of a cohesion and homogeneity within social categories attained through exclusionary practices. In the New World, the cannibal's body, through a saying, guarantees social signification. But between this sacrifice of the cannibal, simultaneously on the edge of the New World and on the edge of immanence, (two spaces not necessarily coextensive), and the deicide which inaugurates representation through human sacrifice across the sea, is an intermediary sacrifice tangential to the other two, lying in the margins.

On the one side, Europe must define itself by excluding its own festive body, the disorderly Dionysian figure,\(^2\) in a homologous process to their exclusion of the festive Tupi body. This entails the burgeoning new metropolitan centre of production and utility exiling its idle and idolatrous to the margins of the countryside. Supposed demonic practice, the disciplinary measures enacted to counter it, and the expansive literature and readership engendered by demonology all reached an apogee at the turn of the seventeenth century, as the bodies of the sorcerer and the possessed were forced to confess from their position on the social margins. In a parallel way, on the other side, New World ritual sent an offshoot to the European margins as, paradoxically, the cannibal

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2\(^{\text{For discussions on the European festive tradition in the early modern period, see ibid., pp. 43-61; and Lyndal Roper, Oedipus and the Devil. Witchcraft, sexuality and religion in early modern Europe (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 145-167.}}\)
was designated a demonic idolater and a social heretic for the very practice which defined the dynamics of his allegiance to the Tupi socius and provided the syntax to its social language - cannibalism. Thus the European center of production essentially sacrificed the festive or chivalric body by deporting the demonic, seen as an inversion of normative assertions, to its margins; and by importing, while inverting, the Tupi cannibal to a homologous location on its margins. These two heretical forms would meet in the body of the sorcerer and the body of the possessed. The order of things thus constitutes itself by excluding its inverse, the festive. The festive, as an exclusion from social norms can only invoke desire for the prohibited, or the sacred--a liminal space which can never revert back to immanence (And it is with the sacred that Protestant epistemology will align the mimeticism, recognition of the bodily, and excessive expenditure they associated with Catholicism and other fringe/mystic sects). Through the festive, the subject only vicariously experiences the death and excess associated with the realm of immanence, yet, as perceived, the excessive may have had, what is for identity, very unsettling effects.

Before inserting the seeing body of the martyr into this schematic space of places, sacrificial bodies, practices and conceptual fields, a body which will attempt, through practice, to recoup and account for the absence left by sacrifice, let me redraw the lineaments of this space more succinctly.

In Europe, the deicide marks the absence of the body of the Martyr, Christ, and initiates a community of meaning founded in issues of representation and identity. In this way it might be said that the Martyr is a body in the service of signification, or referentiality. While in the New World, the cannibal body ensures its fidelity to speech in courageously acknowledging its own wasteful expenditure as the sacrificial victim in community ritual. It inaugurates a meaningful social dynamic. In this way the cannibal, as martyr, is a body in the

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21See Roper, pp. 171-198.
service of a saying, or meaning, or again, in an analogous way to Christ, a body in the service of representing. In between, on the margins, a sacrifice of the diabolical displaces an absent, yet lurking, festive body to the periphery where it provides the meaninglessness against which the center, productive of meaning, must be defined. Through these spaces and bodies, the social practices of cannibalism and demonism move and hide as the occidental symbolic practices of mimetic and representationalist re-presentation attempt to circumscribe them within the folds of its cultural fabric - a textile woven through the circulation of certain ontological economies. These economies demarcate the three realms of sacrifice: the productive order of things, the sacred or festive, and the domain of immanence or wasteful expenditure. But what bodies will navigate such tumultuous spaces, and through what means will they attempt to circumscribe certain topoi and what tangible marks will they leave, for us?

Not surprisingly, the centre sends out parallel pedagogical campaigns to the sight of dual sacrifice, in order to transform the idleness associated with the festive margins into something of utility, something productive, through an ethic of work. The magistrate moves into the countryside to witness the sorcerer's body manipulated painfully by the apparatus of torture in a mutually recognized game between practitioner and victim/patient, which reaches its conclusion when the participants coordinate a perceptible self-confessional from the body of the witch. Whereas with the possessed body (often a young nun in a rural convent), the exorcist or doctor must discern the demonic presence behind a visual and aural orchestra of bodily contortions, mutations, distensions, and unconscious ramblings so that he can pin down the uncanny through the process of nomination (signification). The result is an expansive literature of
demonology and a cultural homogenization in audience. But also a movement along a congruous trajectory.

The voyage to the American margins necessitates a different kind of body: still a religious body, yet also, and perhaps more significantly, a practical body, as the discovery of the New World had opened a material and epistemological space where the modern could exceed the ancient through practical modification of the theoretical. A relaxed sixteenth century cosmography allowed for distending cartographic borders, which tore at its inferiority, by glossing over the tears with conjecture, all the while admitting their tentative nature. The glosses would be corrected if need be by the practical man who would venture into the nebulous space and return his own visible body as confirmation of the missing empirical pieces needed to resuture cartographic space. The modern body of practice would have to inject itself into the abstract and theoretical space of the ocean, and, what had been until then, the conceptual void foreshadowing the Americas, delimiting a path and circumscription of what it could return to the same as use-full, something which could mean within the western symbolic. Movement at this time was seen on the one hand as a deviation from the source of truth, or, equivalently, meaning, and a biblical explanation for the Indian's assumed corrupted state; yet on the other hand, the ebb and flow of the martyr's movement from the center and back to the same ostensibly conquered space and time and was thus essentially colonial. Perhaps not surprisingly, the practical body's mode of operation, autopsy, was defined in anteriority to its self, "the martyr": its task was "to witness" and then corroborate this seeing through a physical presence - a body - which has been through practice, been "put to the test". The martyr's trip out then is configured

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23Lestringant, Mapping, p.7.  
24The operation of autopsy is discussed in Mason, Deconstructing America. Representations of the Other (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 176-182.
in: a practical transport through theoretical space; its perception, primarily visual, of the seen Tupi body; and thus the desire which necessarily guides the body through relationships of social practices and the modes through which we make these things meaningful in discursive representation - what one might call 'culture.'

The martyr must bring his self back, but also what his self has seen and heard through writing - visual and textual representation. The centre of the same demands a return which is productive, which transforms the perceived New World into something of utility, something which can be sewn into Europe's cultural language, something with familiar discursive topoi. Accordingly, the martyr tries to retrace his steps back to the same - to return in the same way - but as Pedro de Medina notes in his Arte de navegar, a nautical manual of the late sixteenth century used in most European ports, "it is a subtle and difficult thing, well considered by Solomon when he said that one of the most difficult things to find is the path of a ship at sea. For it follows no path, and leaves no signs."\(^{25}\)

The ocean leaves no points of reference by which to return so that the return is always a new and practical application through abstract space. What cannot be made meaningful—the residual which must be repressed and that which becomes the Other—is not simply left in the periphery; it returns with representation, yet not as a positivity or negativity, that is as a perceptible form or arrangement of forms, nor as a hole within the representation. Alterity returns in the perturbation which disturbs the syntax defining discourse.

This syntax constitutes what Homi Bhabha calls the "Third Space" of discourse: "... the disjuncture between the subject of a proposition (enonce) and the subject of enunciation, which is not represented in the statement, but which is the acknowledgment of its discursive embeddedness and address, its cultural

\(^{25}\)Quoted in Lestringant, p. 15
positionality, its reference to a present time and specific place." In the production of meaning, between the "T" of an enunciation and the "you" of an enonce, which together only define the statement of utterance, is the third space which indicates the statement's implication in a performative and institutional strategy of which it cannot in itself be aware. In Foucault's work, from which Bhabha derives, in part, his definition of this third space, "a sequence of linguistic elements is a statement only if it is immersed in an enunciative field, in which it then appears as a unique element." Generally,

Language always seems to be inhabited by the other, the elsewhere, the distant; it is hollowed by absence...its own existence seem(s) to be dissipated in this function. But if one wishes to describe the enunciative level, one must consider that existence itself; question language, not in the direction to which it refers, but in the dimension that gives it; ignores its power to designate, to name, to show, to reveal, to be the place of meaning or truth, and instead, turns one's attention to the moment - which is at once solidified, caught up in the play of the 'signifier' and the 'signified' - that determines its unique and limited existence.

It would then not be a matter of questioning certain instances of language according to established linguistic rules, to remain internal to the framework; it would instead be a matter of stepping outside the framework and questioning language itself, the postulates from which it makes proclamations. It would be a matter of interrogating its authority to signify and the subjective and institutional forces which buttress it.

And once returned home, although reordered, representation is shaped alternately by an artistic intervention, the application of a relatively new technical apparatus, and perhaps most importantly by that which occupies a position homologous to the represented Tupi body - the receiving audience. My objectives are primarily, then, a matter of locating difference within identity,
identifying a disturbance in the "topos of enunciation," and, perhaps, delineating the resonance to this unsettling.

Michel de Certeau has claimed the diabolical is "... a phenomenon parallel to the creation of theater in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. From medieval carnival we move to seventeenth century theater, at a time when society's image of itself is localized, objectified, and miniaturized by ceasing to be popular liturgy. On the reduced stage of possession a modification of epistemological, political, and religious structures of the period is acted out." In a statement that is not unrelated to this first he has said "travel literature has not yet been studied systematically as a great complement and displacement of demonology. Yet the same structures are common to both." This complementary relation of displacement seems to result from two initial dislocations, as both New World savagery and European sorcery are transported from their endemic orders into coterminous theaters of the spectacular festive body where the socius can reduce and manipulate its own structures. In this move the center transforms alterity into something of use, yet also opens a theater in which its audience is profoundly altered in the process of viewing, and it is these disturbing effects with which I'm ultimately concerned.

_Historiae Americae_, part III and Another project: vision and the travel narrative

The parameters of my study extend to circumscribe what may be the most celebrated of the books in the _Historiae_, part III published in 1592; in particular, I will focus on the images which interpellate this book's second narrative and

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29Bhabha, p. 162.
30De Certeau, _The Writing_, p. 246; and Ibid. p. 242, endnote no.-52.
which document Jean de Léry's stay with the Tupinamba peoples of the
Brazilian coast, in what is now the Bay of Rio. The book is somewhat unique in
being the only volume headed by the elder de Bry to allow the images to float
freely within the text of the narrative, rather than appending the group of
images in a separate section after the text of the narrative, each image with its
own distinct caption in an attempt to pin down meaning and close off
signification (fig. 2). Hence it would seem that the actual physical layout of the
third volume may provide it with a more open semiotic play within the space of
the book and the two travel narratives it contains. The opening text, in the third
volume, an autobiographical account of Hans Staden's nine month captivity
amongst the Tupinikin tribe of the Tupinamba, was originally published in 1557
upon Staden's return to Europe, and included several roughly engraved
woodcut prints which de Bry used to provide the rough schematic compositions
to which he would insert detail and depth as the mark left by the artistic body.
The suspenseful narrative of Staden's captivity, throughout which he is faced
with what seems to be his impending death in the cannibal ritual, concludes
with his rescue. While the following section of the text gives an ethnographic
account of the Tupinamba socius. Jean de Lery traveled to Fort Coligny on the
Brazilian coast in 1557 as its governor, Nicolas Durand de Villegagnon, had
requested Calvinist ministers for the Fort in an effort to instill a morality in what
was intended to be a utopic space outside the heterogeneity marked within
Europe by the religious in-fighting. But soon after their arrival, Lery and others
took up residence with the Tupinamba after theological disputes with
Villegagnon, focused in the Eucharist, ironically reproduced the conflicts in
representation going on within Europe. Pertinently, Léry's relation to the
Tupinamba inverted that of Staden as he was welcomed as a guest, rather than
being tormented with the thought that his own flesh would be consumed in the
cannibal's ritual.
Léry’s *Histoire d’un Voyage fait en la Terre du Bresil* has been one of the most discussed works in all of anthropological literature, and often heralded as the birth of ethnography. It has been the subject of many contemporary critical analyses, from: Levi-Strauss, in his well known “Lecon d’écriture” of *Tristes Tropiques* 31 to the subsequent studies of Derrida and Barthes and then de Certeau.32 And it seems to have been just as influential in its own time: Léry has been cited as one of the most important influences in Montaigne’s famous "Of Cannibals" (1580) and a prominent reference point for seventeenth century writers—from the collections of folkways by Johann Boemus to the early French Canadian history by Marc Lescarbot.33 Léry’s account, in keeping with the mandate of the practical martyr, is intended for the "ordinary literate person" and thus avoids the "fine flowers of rhetoric"34 in founding an ethnography suspicious of rhetoric’s play.35 And perhaps ethnography, a discipline which demands the splitting of its enunciative subject, is suspicious as rhetoric transcends what is said, what is meant, and reveals the desire which enacts this splitting in the ethnographer. It is the desire produced within the ethnographer through his impossible relation to the other—that which is the object of his study, the indigenous. I am that. He desires to identify with the object (the Other), yet he must remain a subject and grasp it as a thing, as an *it*.

Léry’s narrative commences with the beautiful natural body and follows it "all the way to the grave."36 De Certeau’s analysis of Léry’s text in *The Writing of*
History essentially segments the narrative into four sections. The opening and closing accounts of the voyage across the Atlantic posit a break between the "over there" and "over here:" the move out from the center unhinging language and the productive return to the same which seemingly mends the symbolic. In each of these bracketing sub-narratives a western subject of historical action moves through a narrative and allows time to elapse; in the mediating sections time stands still as ethnological objects of extension are manipulated in space by the subject. The initial mediating section portrays the exotic universe of nature's diversity in the Tupi flora and fauna, and the second delineates an ethical utopia whose ordering principle is the cannibal ritual. The two bracketing sections are separated from the intermediary ones by two mediating subsections—a theological discussion of representational issues in relation to Villegagnon which marks the complete detachment of language from any referential function, and a Tupi-French Colloquy which attempts to restabilize language, through the act of translation before its return home as something useful, a knowledge. Léry's original publication includes several woodcut engravings within the text, while the third volume of the Historiae Americae includes de Bry's translation of Léry's text, the images engraved for this translation, as well as some of the images which initially appear with Staden's narrative in the opening section of the book.

Several studies, particularly de Certeau's analyses, have recognized the profound effects of the catastrophic encounter with pronounced cultural difference, as manifested in the chaos of the New World, for Western textual discourse, but few have acknowledged those in the visual realm, let alone their

37For instance: the studies by M. de Certeau on the writing of J. de Léry (The Writing of History, pp. 209-243) and Michel de Montaigne (Heterologies, pp. 67-79), and the works already cited by Pagden and Mason.
inextricable complicity with that very text. The analyses of these complementary modes of writing, image and script, cannot be divorced, or better, the analysis is generated from their interface--their contradictions and reinforcements. As well, representation must be set within the relations of desire that the enunciative field forms in aiming at what can be a formidable target, the interpreting audience. For obvious reasons, and others I'd like to elaborate, the graphic image is integral to this framework, not only in an analogous position to textual representation, that is, bound between the expansive binarism of New World alterity (the sight and sound of the Indian) and European audience, but also as bound to its parallel, and sometimes hostile neighbor, the text.

In order to frame the parameters of my own analysis I'd like to first sketch several structures as implied by the martyr's movement in space. Once in the chaos of the New World, the martyr encounters its alterity through sensory perception, in particular he perceives the indigenous body through the structures of vision. In order that the European viewer vicariously experience the vision of the martyr, that is through his body, this vision must be translated through the practice of writing, both scriptural and figural. But between the experience of cultural alterity in the New World and the European experience of viewing it lies the vast and ambiguous expanse of an ocean. These are the spaces I'd like to open in framing my discussion: the structures of vision, the structures ordering the practice of writing, and the structures of the ocean.

The Blank Page

From the order of things the man of practice, the martyr, must immerse himself in the abstract and theoretical space of the ocean and conquer it in order

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38Two works which do focus on the images of the de Bry series are Bucher's *Icon and Conquest* and *L'Amerique de Theodore de Bry. Une collection de voyages protestante du XVI siècle*, ed. Michele Duchet (Paris: Meudon-Bellevue, 1987).
to reach the chaos of the New World. In the realm of cosmography and global exploration, the 'modern' of the sixteenth century made an intervention, into the theoretical spaces set in place by the ancients, through autopsy in the empirical. In 1494 the Treaty of Tordesillas, through its spatially simplistic and reductive apportioning of newly found global areas of influence between Spain and Portugal, contributed to a certain privilege held by oceanic space. The ocean, devoid of differentiation in colour, disseminated in a dynamic topography continuously in motion thus lacking points of reference, and without parameters or itineraries, was a blank theoretical page to the modern. Distrusted since antiquity, the sea provided the martyr with a forum for the projection of the conceptual lines of the heavens onto an abstract and uniform space, through practice. In such a way, modern practice could be seen as conquering the theoretical spaces associated with the ancients.39 In this mathematical, yet capricious, space, where homogeneity is generated by perpetual heterogeneity, the world was reduced to its bare rudiments and thus made potentially comprehensible - it could be made to mean in the centre of production. But it also yielded potentially unsettling effects on the body, and thus identity, of the martyr through a movement in space.

Following popular opinion and the monogenetic theory of cultural generation, Theodor de Bry linked the American savage's genealogy through Scripture to the sons of Noah, while Léry specified the origin of their descent in Noah's son Ham.40 Their degeneracy is thus seen as stemming from man's second corruption as documented in the Old Testament, Cain's wandering from the 'source of truth' which marked the beginnings of a breakdown in communication, and hence alludes to the complete dissolution of language at Babel. The savage is seen as lacking the ability to retain things in their purity, as

39 For the role of the oceanic space in sixteenth century cosmography see Lestringant, pp. 14,15.
40 Bucher, pp. 53-55.
a result of this wandering from truth, whereas those within the center of knowledge possess the tools to venture out into the exterior and return it ostensibly unadulterated. Inverting the perspective, some indigenous Americans saw the Europeans' wanderings about the globe as a nomadacy generated through an inability to continually cultivate one fixed area of land and hence an inability to nourish oneself. This cultural reversal relates to another interesting inversion in ethnological perspective.

Léry relates an anecdote in which the Tupinamba, awed by his ability to communicate with his fellow Europeans without seeing or hearing them, take his writing to be an act of sorcery.\(^{41}\) Whereas for the European, Tupi orality's inability to retain anything in its purity is a symptom of its diabolical source. It is western writing, alone, which can overcome the corrupting effects of movement, and return things seemingly unchanged to the same. For Léry, "while they (the Tupinamba) can communicate nothing except by spoken word, we, on the other hand, have this advantage, that without budging from our place, by means of writing and the letters that we send, we can declare our secrets to whomever we choose, even to the ends of the earth."\(^{42}\)

Before the martyr can write the Tupi body and send it home unaltered, he must first perceive it through his sensory apparatus, and as discussed, his visual faculty may be given a sort of primacy in relation to the phenomenological contract he enters into with the stationary European viewer: he who has seen, must be seen. There are other historical reasons, as well, for focusing on the visual, and these bring into play questions of occidental subjectivity and identity.

**What is Seen/Scene**

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\(^{41}\) Léry, pp. 134-135.

\(^{42}\) Ibid, p. 135.
The martyr is accepted back into the source of truth through an operation by the body - vision - and through the body itself. He acts as the only relay between the visual Tupi body and the vision of a European viewing subject: he must see the wonder of the New World and then offer up the body which has seen to be seen, in confirmation. The western viewer can believe, that is the martyr can be made to mean, through the perceptive apparatus of the visual: as the martyr's sight is entrusted with fidelity, the viewer must also privilege his own visual capacities in verifying this martyr's body and its representation, in making meaning. It is clear that at the particular historical moment in question-the age of discovery—and within the discursive form of the travel narrative (both visual and textual), that vision and the visual had a prominent role in the production, or more importantly here, the disruption, of meaning—the process of signification. Not surprisingly, the visual was the key perceptive operation in the self-constitution of subjectivity in the early modern, and also, from a theoretical viewpoint, the visual offers distinct possibilities for the metaphoric disruption of language, both graphic and textual, from those invoked by orality-two notions that will be developed below. My aim here is not to claim the primacy of the visual, but only to recognize that sight and sound (and other perceptive mechanisms) together work to disturb discursive representation, or writing—considered here to be primarily the interaction of the graphic (pictorial) and the textual (scriptural).

Vision and the visual image are integral to conceptions of subjectivity and its formation at the turn of the seventeenth century as physicalist explanations are giving way to models which delineate the separation of the sign and signified: the subject perceives sensation emanating from the object, but these perceptions are open to subjective distortions which do not allow them to be mimetic reproductions of the things themselves; in addition Descartes admits that a residual of exorbitant sensation must be suppressed in order for the imagination
and reason to fashion a visual image to be offered up to the mind, which simultaneously banks the graphic as memory; judgment then makes an assertion as to the certainty of the relation between sign (the image) and signified (the object). And this relation is now expressed in degrees of probability and inserted within an order, rather than it being collapsed in sameness—no relation and all relation under the sign of mimesis. Again, what is crucial to, definitive of, the subject of truth and knowledge is that it represent to itself its ability to represent, in the form of a visual image, being; and then make an assertion. In this way, the subject both constitutes itself as Being and appropriates being, in the form of an object, for itself. Although subordinated to reason in the early modern schemata of perception, the visual is prior, or simultaneous to it, and integral to the process. In this way it possesses that being and being itself - a constitution and a gain. Yet Descartes admits a certain suppression of residual sensation, even under 'normal' conditions of perception; not to mention an excess.

Leo Bersani has posited through a rereading of ambiguities in Freud, and I'll have to be grossly reductive here, that when the body's normal range of sensation is exceeded the sensations or affective processes upset the psychic organization of the self, and that this experience is, the sexual, or synonymously, the violent and cruel, and cruelty in its most heightened form, the masochistic. This disorder is shattering for the structured self and cannot be contained within the symbolic, within language, cannot be said. We have what Bersani aptly calls "a nonreferential version of sexualized thought." The alogon creeps up
underneath the consciousness of the interpretive system and disorders it, producing a confusion of signifiers. But it re-solves, tries to resolve itself.

Bersani maintains that the subject's "tactic" is to replace desire, the desire always produced in relation to the Other, with consciousness of desire—a perception of the relations among consciousness' own terms—and that this provides a provisional structuring to consciousness. The sexual would then be the attempted replication of a shattering experience by consciousness, and the irony, that consciousness finds tentative solace from the shattering blow of an epic exterior force by attempting to replicate the shattering through a repetition of the process in which it constitutes itself as an ordering amongst its own constituents, within. The key point for the subject is that the aesthetic would be the "continuously menaced activity by which an eroticized consciousness is provisionally structured by a perception of the relations among its terms."46

I would posit then that the formation of subjectivity, as theorized at the turn of the seventeenth century, is profoundly altered by an experience which offered up an excess of sensation or affective processes, a contiguity with radical alterity, the sexual, the violent. Something must be suppressed for 'clear and distinct' ideas to be formed or, equivalently, consciousness must provisionally structure itself through a perception of its own terms, but in a parallel way we have already said that subjectivity constitutes itself at this time by a perception of its ability to re-present as a visual image. This is a perception of its own terms. It may be that representation conscious of itself as such emerges at this time, in part, as a tactic of a profoundly altered subjectivity in reformulating itself. A nexus is located for the visual image as representation, and the formation of occidental subjectivity through consciousness, and its absurd other, in the construction of meaning in the early modern age: the subject is constituted simultaneously by, on the one hand, consciousness and the visual image, and on the other, by

46Ibid., 38.
passion, violence and the visual image - the nexus of the nexus is the visual image. The European oscillates wildly between being a subject of truth and knowledge, and a subject of desire. Savage speech endlessly whispers: "desire may be the underside of the law." 47

Vision, or seeing at a distance, speaks an endlessly deferred promise of presence in that the sensory apparatus of the visual is defined through its function of re-presenting within consciousness. It produces an image, not a presence, for the mind. And it is perhaps not surprising that the visual, as endless deferral, has been located between a prohibition and a pleasure. The Law and desire. In the postcolonial criticism of Homi Bhabha to exist is to be called up into being in relation to an otherness, its look or locus. It is a demand that reaches outward to an external object and it is this relation of the demand to the place of the object which becomes the basis for identification; and in turn, identification "...is always the production of an image of identity and the transformation of the subject in assuming that image." 48 Existence would then be constituted primarily through image and alienation, and identity in what Lacan calls "the mirror stage" is formed according to just these principles. 49 They order the truth in the subject’s lie: "I am that". This truth asserts that the Other always institutes the subject by alienating its vision, despite the western subject’s conviction that it constitutes itself through visually representing, and in the process, appropriating, its others. The truth in the lie provides the ordering principle of "speech as comedy," 50 and the disordering principle of the subject.

48 Bhabha, pp. 44-45, my emphasis.
49 The mirror stage, according to Lacan, coheres the dispersed bodily experiences of the infant (six to eighteen months old). From the mirror the child obtains a n image of her/him which makes her/him a single unified entity—a nascent form of the self. Yet this coherence is gained only through the alienating realization that (s)he identifies with what is other than her/himself—a speculary image. And Lacan reminds us that the movement from "speculary self" to "social self", by way of language, complexifies this model but leaves its structure in tact. See Lacan, "The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience," Ecrits: A Selection, Trans. Alan Sheridan (New York, 1977), pp. 1-7.
50 This is the name which de Certeau gives to the Lacanian principle in Heterologies, p. 51.
Lacan's concept of speech as comedy, as interpreted by de Certeau, is central to my analysis so I will sketch its structuring principles. "I am that," as a linguistic statement, is a lie. It is self-contradictory according to accepted rules of grammar and ontology. It dislocates the subject from its own 'reality,' yet this dislocation reveals a truth about the subject's desire in relation to the Other. This is the desire produced in the subject by its being deprived of the Other; always there, yet inaccessible. This desire marks the distance, the difference, between the subject and what is other to it, the object. The difference is the distance of a vision between subject and object, and thus marks the displacement between the sign and signified. Hence, the "signifiers are all the more understood in insofar as there is misunderstanding about what they designate." Again, it marks the incongruity of the subject with its own reality. Speech as comedy, first and foremost, speaks a truth about the subject's desire in relation to an impossible object—a truth which escapes the grasp of the grammatical rules policing linguistic meaning. It goes beyond linguistic meaning into discourse's third space.

Lacanian practice derives speech as comedy from the literary. "If the literary text displays the stirrings of the enunciative act in a system of statements, it also exhibits the procedures which articulate these two terms, that is, the diverse circuits which alter the statements by imprinting on them what the speaking subject wants of the other. At issue here is rhetoric... It is... the logic of "displacements" and of "distortions" which the relationship to the other produces in language." Rhetoric, a way of practice or style, allows one entrance into discourse's third space and opens up desire between subjects. Rhetoric delineates a truth, through the lie.

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51 My sketch follows from de Certeau's analysis of Lacanian concepts in "Lacan: An Ethics of Speech," in Heterologies, pp. 47-64.
52 Ibid., p. 50.
53 Ibid., p. 53.
From this relationship to the impossible Lacan, and de Certeau, derive an *ethic*. Ethics would then be a belief which recognizes the impossibility of a guarantee to the real, and would insert into language (a language of some form) the desire produced in the subject's relation to this absence. And it may be that the visual is a language particularly suited to the elucidation of speech as comedy.

**That Which is Witt(ten)**

The fundamental event of the modern age is the conquest of the world as a picture.

Martin Heidegger

The eye in the sixteenth century serves an encyclopedic curiosity enraptured by the bizarre and singular; this results in a furious accumulation of visual signifiers amassed horizontally in their simultaneity—a process which runs analogously to the visual apperception of the world itself. Amongst these visual rarities was the visible body of the Tupinamba, and its accoutrements. One just has to look to Jean de Léry's *Histoire*, particularly the chapters documenting the Brazilian flora and fauna, for an ethnographic stockpiling of an array of dazzling Brazilian signifiers: the "monstrous beasts," "strange vermin," "exquisite fruits" which cause Léry to exclaim, "every time that the image of this new world which God has let me see presents itself before my eyes, and I consider the serenity of the air, the diversity of the animals, the variety of the birds, the beauty of the trees and plants, the excellence of the fruits, and in short, the riches that adorn this land of Brazil, the exclamation of the Prophet in Psalm 104 comes to my mind." Yet in order to be deemed one of the riches, things would have be judged as to their usefulness to man in a utilitarian realm where

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55p. 111, my emphasis.
wasteful expenditure is anathema, and it was edibility which would provide Léry and the order of things with its mechanism of transformation in returning things to the same. It is the task of western writing—graphic or scriptural—to corral these singularities within the source of truth; and "truthfulness has but one constant characteristic—it means, it has the sense of a meaning."  

The order of things demands only that which can be made useful—that which can mean—return to the same. Writing is thus synonymous with production. But, as in the process of visually perceiving that which must be written, where an excess upsets the dynamic, the relay between perception and writing may also evince a disruption.

When de Certeau claims that "generally speaking, voice itself would have a metaphorical - a delinearizing and altering - function to the degree that it cuts across the metonymical schema of sight" he is speaking of two different processes of perception - voice and sight - in relation to written representation, yet writing only in its textual mode. My aim here is not to refute this assertion, although I suspect that the simultaneity of the visual image may have a potential to disperse the linearities of text neglected by de Certeau, but to extend the process of perception to the graphic mode of written representation as well, given the historical importance placed on the visual in this epoch and the inclusion of visual images in the discourse on New World discovery. De Certeau continues, referencing Lacan, "If as 'derision of the signifier, 'metaphor' is placed at the exact point where meaning is produced in non-meaning, it would be in effect the movement by which one signifier is replaced by its other: 'one word for another,' but also the very ruse that subverts the word." In relation to graphic representation, it would then be, by de Certeau's very argument, sight which holds the metaphorical relationship: "one image for...

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56 Julia Kristeva, quoted in de Certeau The Writing, p. 236.
57 Ibid.
58 Lacan within de Certeau, ibid.
another." To remain consistent with the logic of the argument it would have to be posited that voice would then hold a metonymical relationship to visual discourse, but, again, I might suggest that *what is heard in conjunction with what is seen* may potentially produce metaphorical disruption within the pictorial representation. But this point of contention is not central to my aims. Right now, it is enough to say that the privilege accorded the audible for metaphorical disruption of scriptural reproduction, can be extended to the visible in relation to graphic reproduction through the very same generative logic.

To recapitulate, the three vertices on which my preponderance with the visual rest, within this particular historical moment and in relation to this particular genre of representation—that is print reproduction referencing New World encounter—are: one, the contract between martyr and viewer - "I have seen and you must see in me, you must see me see;" two, the relationship that the visual holds with the constitution of subjectivity at this moment; and three, the potential for metaphorical disruption between what is seen and what is graphically configured.

Sovereignty is NOTHING, and I have tried to say how clumsy (but inevitable) it was to make a *thing* of it. I refer now to the opening of Art, which always lies but without deceiving those whom it seduces.\footnote{Bataille, *The Accursed Share*, vol. III (New York: Zone Books), p. 256.}

According to Bataille, it is *Art* that paradoxically aligns itself with "speech as comedy" - a meaningless confusion of signifiers signifying meaning itself, a truthful lie, "I am that." What is at stake here is power; not power given in explicit terms but a power implicitly more political. This is power made manifest in the identity effects of the signification process, and in the desire engendered in the confusion of signification. And it would seem, for various historical and theoretical reasons, that the visual in the early modern age is a
particularly important factor in the dissemination of power as initiated in the signification process.

**Split in the I**

Here, as it also hinges on a mode of representation, I should make explicit reference to the assumed complexity of the historical moment in question and thus the complexity, necessarily reduced, which I'm trying to evoke through this present representation—complexities hopefully hinted at in my overly schematic and reductive overview. Working from the Nietzschean assumption that the complexity of the historical can only be grasped by the subject's limited structures of consciousness through a reductive process, I admit the necessarily simplified form of this study, yet I also obviously aim at reformulating the greatest degree of complexity allowed by this constrained form and the limits of consciousness. The (my) analysis manifests itself in a linear text accompanied by the historical images, produced on a two-dimensional plane, which ostensibly form the *object* on which this analytic process operates. Or is this limiting the images?

In structuring the analysis to follow, and that which has already preceded this, I am from the outset wrestling with a prospective receiver/reader/viewer: how to represent, through several limited modes, a form closed enough that my point is made, and the complexity I perceive is evoked; yet a form open enough that the historical ambiguities always present are not glossed, and that at vertices of ambivalence the receiver may continue the narrative of meaning in productive directions unforeseen by myself and the linearity of the text? But this is precisely the object of my study: the relationships between theoretical subjects of *production* and *reception* in the evocation and disintegration of meaning. The subjects, operations and relationships which form the *object* of a study never exist solely as objectified, but always make a return in operating on
the analyzing subject, and thus the analysis itself. In such a way the research and writing process enact a division within the subject of discourse, making it both subject and object simultaneously, blurring the distinction which founds the subject of knowledge. In this way, 'I', a self-divisive "I", am practicing ethnography as described by Levi-Strauss in his *Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss*.  

Ethnography demands that its subject, the ethnographer, become part of the field which he observes, thus that he place himself within the object of his study; yet at the same time it demands that the ethnographer appropriate his observation as a thing, as a perceiving subject appropriates its object. In this contradictory move, the subject must circumscribe as an object, his observation, yet this observation subsumes the subject, and his subjective understanding of the indigenous, within it. In a similar way this study divides its subject, 'I', taking some of me for itself, while leaving some for an assumed reader. The ethnographer's mandate of self-objectification confounds the subject-object distinction which founds the order of things.

**Distinguishing Between 'Things': The de Bry publishing project**

He (Theodor de Bry) has spent the whole of his past life with these objects always before his eyes—the promotion of literature by his studies and the increase of the public good by his infinite labours, combining pleasing entertainment with useful instruction. In all this I would not know whether we should admire most his art, his genius, or his diligence. For there is nothing done by him in which accurate industry and ingenious invention are not apparent; whereby not only does he feed the minds of his readers, but delights the eyes of those who gaze on his work.

Jean-Jacques Boissard  

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61 Quoted in Alexander, p. 10. Boissard was a French antiquary and friend of de Bry.
In 1590, Theodor de Bry and family (and others) began a monumental project from their goldsmith and engraving shop in Frankfort. "Monumental," if we understand "monument" in its various manifestations, as: a plaque erected to perpetuate the memory of a peoples, an event (as crisis), or historical period (proto-colonialism); a tombstone (marking the sacrifice); a work of art having an enduring value (resonance in the present); a permanent mark to indicate a boundary (perhaps).

De Bry, a native of Liege, and Protestant, was forced into exile in 1570 when the Duke of Alva and his Spanish troops were occupying the Netherlands. He fled to the Protestant sanctuary of Strasbourg where he plied his trade as a goldsmith and engraver, finally settling in Frankfort where he began his family's monumental publishing project, *Grands Voyages - Historiae Americae*, which would eventually be comprised of fourteen folio volumes of large copper-plate engraved prints and text. Published from 1590-1634 the series re-presented thirty five travel narratives, not necessarily republished in the chronological order in which the expeditions occurred, which were dispersed amongst over two hundred-fifty copper-plate engraved prints. The first two volumes were published in High German, Latin, French, and English, and there afterwards only in the former two languages. The project's location in Frankfort would have been integral to the *Historiae's* intensive dissemination amongst other European booksellers.

Michel de Certeau has noted that the literatures constituting both travel narrative and demonology brought about a cultural homogenization in its European audience within which the commoner, theologian, magistrate and doctor all read the material in several forms ranging from the large elaborate folio volumes of the drawing room to the sensationalizing posted or hand-held flyer in the street.\(^{62}\) And this kind of diffuse dissemination of print is what the

de Bry family's publishing project circulated within. The fact that the volumes were profusely imbued with what were some of the first large-scale, precisely incised, colour images of Amerindian culture would have only enhanced the diverse range of loci in which these images could have been perused. From the urban street corner to the rural itinerant fairs to the high courts of the European aristocracy, a heterogeneous swathe was cut through a European audience captivated by a newly discovered land across the globe inhabited by peoples immediately designated demonic, sexually deviant, and cannibalistic.63 As Bernadette Bucher notes in her study of the *Historiae*, "The description of the communication network through which the Amerindian pictures were created thus leads us to discover a whole range of economic, political, and religious relations among quite diverse cultural and social groups."64

The *Historiae* was the first attempt to offer a comprehensive recapitulation of the exploration/exploitation of the Americas through an interpretation of the major travel accounts published to date; but more importantly, was the first to give the graphic image a prominent, if not superior, position in these first narratives on New World alterity, in terms of size, number, and technical innovation.

The de Brys, who had become publishers and booksellers as well by the time of the publication of the third volume (1592), produced one of the earliest comprehensive sets of copper-plate engravings of New World alterity,65 and, through the greater precision and clarity they admitted, literally brought New World alterity into focus, or rather brought Western representation's fumblings towards Amerindian incommensurability into focus - a paradox. The copper-

64 Bucher, p. 12.
65 See footnote no. 16.
plate process, as well, necessitated the separation of text and image in the printing of the material, and allowed for longer print runs hence a wider dissemination of materials, both intriguing points, in terms of production and reception. And it is between the production and reception of representation where a technical mechanism insinuates itself into the inextricable and mutually reflexive relationship between cultural representation and social practice, into discourse. And I'll return to this.

In this historical juncture, marked by ambivalence in its social and symbolic spaces, three different aspects of a new technical mechanism heighten the ambivalence of these images as they insert themselves in discourse. First, the separation of text and image in the technical production of the book destabilizes their mutually supportive relationship, as assumed by authorial intention in the conception of the work. The very fact that the text and image would have been physically separated in production must operate on the producers' conceptions of the piece, perhaps too the knowing viewer, opening, to some extent, the degree of closure attained in the production of meaning. If an amiable relationship between text and image is initially intended in its conception (or reception), it is quickly agitated by an analogously divisive technical operator. Under a representationalist system, conscious of the rift between the sign and referent, signifiers pull themselves out of the density of mimetic grids and enjoy the novelty of existing distinctly, in space.66

Second, the inscribed metal surface of the copper plate allowed for greatly extended pressings and consequently a more penetrating dissemination of print. In one volume of the Les Grands Voyages, the first series in the Historiae and the one which documents New World discovery, the author even uses this capacity for an extensive circulation as a kind of advertisement to induce prospective

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66 See Foucault, The Order, p.60-61.
readers, as though the process of dissemination was self-perpetuating. Under the assumptions of mimetic representation, this allowed representation-as-presence an endless reiteration which in turn allowed representation to claim itself better than presence, presence repeated, amplified. Yet inversely, it also points to the endless deferral of a signified, promised but never seen. The repetition of one that is never the one. It foreshadows the cleavage of the "word" and "thing" under a representationalist framework of re-presenting. But perhaps most of all, metallic print is an inscription and, and its negative.

As inscription in a metal surface, authorized by the inscription in indigenous flesh, the copper plate engraving connotes permanence; it carries within its own matter, its body, the mark of presence. Yet its complement, the printed material that it produces negatively, is in fact its negative, its inverse. According to Antoine Rascas de Bagarris, metallurgical adviser to Louis XIV:

The said books, no more than all other monuments except medals, cannot be exempted from vice or error, whether in effect, or because one has suspicion or opinion, or even because one would like to claim for pretext only, that they have been altered or corrupted by the copyists or printers, whether accidentally or by design and fraud: vices completely contrary to the soul of history, which is truth.  

The copper plate print is both the medal, and the print: it sits between the absolute truth of history and the suspicion of print's corruption, a suspicion, whether valid or not, invoking ambivalence in the viewer. As inscribed me(t/d)al, the copper plate is the mimesis of presence; as dubious ink, its referentiality to a signified enters a relation of probability, it's a representation, in the representationalist sense. Perhaps this is why the printed material must proliferate itself so ferociously, to try and answer its critics, clear its name of suspicion.

\[67\] See M. Duchet, L'Amerique de Theodore de Bry, p. 11.

The technical innovation of copper-plate printing is nebulous: as it clarifies the delineation of the image's content - its represented space - through a precision gained on the printer's plate - the surface of representation, it, paradoxically, continues to inject ambivalence at the point of the image's reception. The copper-plate engraving finds itself torn by two contesting modes of representation: a mimeticism facilitated by the illusionistic qualities of the represented space as heightened by the clarity of line, and a representationalism which admits the constructed nature of its surface of representation.

Michel Duchet has noted that within the Historiae Americae there are shifts in the Latin words used by the de Brys to describe the images they've engraved to accompany the previously published narratives. The primary images done in the New World by the martyr are designated by the word eicones, and are described as drawings done "on the spot" by an eye-witness, the martyr. 69 Theodor de Bry enters into the contract between martyrs who trust the former's vision through their own: his primary and explicit concern is with fidelity to his model, that done through the martyr's initial seeing, as he notes himself a preference for the inimitable taste of that which is done "pris sur le vif." 70

For the elder de Bry, who headed the production of the first six volumes of the series until his death in 1598, both technique, and the artistic consciousness it facilitates, introduce themselves subtly in figurae which are conscious of themselves as reformulated, elaborated images enriched by the engraver. 71 The use of the term 'figurae' introduces representation, conscious of itself as such, or as Duchet states, as "a mediate 'representation' characteristic of art," 72 which marks its distance from the immediate images by unfolding a 'supplementary'

69 Duchet, p. 9-46.
70 Ibid., p.19.
71 Ibid., pp. 9-15.
separation within itself. It is aware of the gap between sign and signified and as such potentially reveals its constructed nature to the viewer.

The Latin terms which the de Brys use to designate the images in the series mark a dis-placement: despite acknowledging the importance of fidelity to the martyr's view through *eicones* they posture a printed *figurae* conscious of itself as the product of a technical operation which delights the viewer through the virtuosity of its surface effects. And I think what is important here is that the de Bry images consciously distance themselves from the quick documentary woodcuts done previously, and set themselves up as artistic and technical products to be perused and enjoyed. However, the large folio albums they appeared in, also, would have encouraged a close examination of the prints and continued re-examination. This kind of permanency would have been buttressed by the images' implicit alliances to certain modes of engraving in Northern Europe which claimed a kind of universality in relation to certain epistemological fields. The prints were part of a new accumulation of scientific knowledge produced through this same technical and visual mode. All of this is enough, I think, to suggest that these images were looked at closely for extended periods of time by their viewership, and that a close analysis of the representational and optic structures which constitute them may be useful in their interpretation. But despite the prints' associations with notions of permanence in the name of knowledge, what is significant to me is that their aspirations are not fully realized.

Duchet identifies just where the de Bry producers enter into the eicones and transform them into *figurae*:

> Ready to seize the scene or the picturesque detail which will give depth [relief] to his engravings, he [de Bry] enters each of them into a vast composition evocative of a world whose borders are receding incessantly. For this, he must find his inspiration in his models and not copy them - he must also surpass them, not in accuracy (which is all relative anyway) but in the art itself. While
his precursors work with figures or objects on empty backgrounds, de Bry fabricates extraordinary decors for a history of the New World. . . .

De Bry makes his artistic intervention through the addition of imagistic detail leading to depth, and thus perspective. He leaves the mark of his own martyred body in a series of such marks: beginning with the analogous martyred bodies of the cannibal and the deity, to the practical explorer, through the artist, to the viewer. They are all bodies in the service of a seeing, and necessarily then, in the service of being seen (by the next). And as it turns out, the far-reaching implications of depth and perspective exceed the represented space, pierce the space of representation, extend out into the subject of enunciation and thus into the density of discursive relations: perspective as depth posits both a theoretical subject of representation—the artist—and its receptive subject—the viewer—who occupy homologous positions. I will have to return to this.

Utility and the Theater of the Demonic

I see now that you Mairs (that is, Frenchman) are great fools; must you labor so hard to cross the sea, on which (as you told us) you endured so many hardships, just to amass riches for your children or for those who will survive you? Will not the earth that nourishes you suffice to nourish them? We have kinsmen and children, whom, as you see, we love and cherish; but because we are certain that after our death the earth which has nourished us will nourish them, we rest easy and do not trouble ourselves further about it.

Tupinamba Elder quoted in Léry's Histoire d'un Voyage

. . . having determined stable and simple things which it is possible to make, men situated on the same plane where the things appeared . . . elements that were [distinct] and nonetheless remained continuous with the world, such as animals, plants, other men, and finally, the subject determining itself. This means in other words that we do not know ourselves distinctly and clearly until the day we see ourselves from the outside as another. Moreover, this will depend on our first having distinguished the other on the plane where manufactured things have appeared to us distinctly.

Georges Bataille

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73Ibid., p. 19.
74p. 102.
75Theory, pp. 30-31, my emphasis.
Bataille's statement has particular relevance to the visual constitution of subjectivity in alterity, as defined in the early modern age, but as the final sentence asserts this process necessarily follows our initially having established a level on which constructed things are perceived by us in distinction, and where what is other appears to exist. The result of this process is that all appearances perceived by the subject may potentially be seen as from within, that is as continuous with respect to the perceiving subject - as subjects themselves - and from without, that is as objects amongst other things. This latter apperception sanctions the "order of things," where objects are produced in contradistinction, thus requiring a judgment, or assertion, by the perceiving subject in distinguishing distinct objects. This process is tantamount to the attachment of meaning to each discrete objective entity thus distinguished through judgment: to determine things as distinct from one another is to make each mean. And so the order of things or production is configured in the act of making meaning - the process of signification. As long as the appearances are perceived as separate from the perceiving subject, as objects, there is always the potential for a rift in signification between the signified (appearing as the object) and the signifier (the appearance perceived by the detached subject). This is the rift at the center of the semiotic debates between mimeticism and representationalism which define the early modern symbolic. Conversely, appearances perceived in continuity, that is as subjects, give the potential for a collapse in referentiality (the sign-signified relationship). Yet the order of manufactured things also opens a rift in time.

The interaction of subjects mutually perceived in continuity is decided in the moment, instantaneously, whereas the production of objects always looks ahead to the subsequent results of operations. Thus production is defined in work

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76 My discussion of the order of things follows from Bataille's analysis of this historical conjuncture in The Accused Share, v. 1, esp. pp. 55-61, 115-142. Bataille had converted to Catholicism in 1914, considered entering the priesthood, then renounced his faith in 1920. In 1922 he became a librarian at
which anticipates a future end and constitutes the subject as an entity which anticipates a future moment when Being will be fulfilled. The order of things is first an order of duration, and consequently finds its primary threat in death. It is not surprising that, in the early modern period, the executioner and his family are the ultimate social outcasts, forced to inbreed and live on the community’s margins, despite their fulfilling a recognized function in the community.78 For Bataille, the "general economy," or what I have called an ontological economy, is determined, not by the formal treatises on it, nor by real practice, but in the understanding the society has of wealth and expenditure.79

Economy is defined as the mode of consumption of the resources available beyond subsistence. The order of production and things, which anticipates the future results of operations, prefers an increase in wealth to its immediate expenditure and, for reasons delineated by Bataille and Weber, Protestantism, through the theories of Luther and Calvin, has been linked to the emergence of such an economy out of the wasteful expenditure associated with medieval religiosity.80 Through the condemnation of idleness and excess or luxury, and the recognition of the value of industry, a Protestant work ethic is born: man is solely committed to labour, and the designation of resources to the escalation of the production apparatus. To the Tupinamba elder this sober and retentive process is ludicrous. Eventually, with the dissolution of the Christian macrocosm, autonomous economic laws would supersede the moral dominion of religion in the realm of production.81

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78 Roper, p. 205.  
79 Accursed Share, I, p. 120.  
80 Ibid., p. 124.  
81 Ibid., p. 125.
The order of things, then, is determined by its ability to transform entities into things of use, to produce, and as defined above, to make an object meaningful. This is the incorporative operation of the same. In the theater of the demonic, where the socius is miniaturized and its problems manipulated, doctrinal discourse can give sorcery and possession a social meaning, thus transform alterity into something of use. At the same time, it can exclude the residue which can't be made to mean, and thus provide a festive body in which the European can vicariously experience excess through a staged transgression - though this repression may have more subtle unsettling effects for the subjects of its audience. And this theater of sorcery stands in contraposition to the theater of religious representational debates around the Eucharist: as theologians argue whether the sacraments are, or are not, the body of the absent Christ, sorcerers are ostensibly redefining the sacraments by material bodily desire - semen and menstrual blood would be used in the preparation of the wine and bread which, as the host, would then be inserted into the vagina and anus, urinated and defecated upon, smeared with semen, and finally consumed in a diabolical ritual.82

A pedagogical campaign promoting a "work ethic" went out to the countryside to relocate the sorcerer,83 branded as ignorant and idle due to a diabolical knowledge which was characterized as oral and nocturnal, and as such situated outside of socially useful knowledge--predominantly written and diurnal. In the several decades prior to the publication of the first volume of the Historiae, Europe was in the process of inverting its disbelief in the diabolical. During this period prominent skeptics of demonism such as Johannis Weyer were refuted by avid new demonologists like Thomas Erastus and Jean Bodin,84

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and there was a resumption in the printing of the *Malleus Maleficarum.* The *Malleus* was a manual for witch-hunters approved by the papacy and published first in 1498, yet not widely disseminated throughout Europe until the late sixteenth century. It was a book later read "with ardor" by Freud. An assertion on the opening page perhaps characterizes the prevailing perspective on the demonic at the time: "To disbelieve in witchcraft is the greatest heresy of them all." So, worse than the deviant practice of witchcraft was ignorance of it: the persecution of so-called witches in the early modern period was a question of consciousness and belief, not actual practice (other than the very real practices of torture and execution), and as such invalidates the myriad debates over its "real" existence. In the years after 1580, and in particular between 1590 and 1610, an incessant stream of books, broadsheets, and pamphlets on the demonic, in Europe and the New World, circulated through the populace, as the accumulation of demonologies created the impression that a comprehensive alternative religion was in place next to Christianity. In 1595 Nicolas Remy's *Daemonolatria* was published as the first instance in which 'mania' metamorphosed into 'latria,' and in the process the supreme worship accredited only to God was bent to a diabolical end and spoken univocally in the name of Satan. And this profuse discourse on the demonic is characterized, as its treatment of the sacraments of the Eucharist suggests, by the bodily and its transgression.

The witch's sabbath was ostensibly a nocturnal orgiastic meeting where, besides the scatological desecration of the sacraments, the festive and excessive

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85De Certeau, *The Writing of History,* p. 244.
body celebrated in what amounted to activities which blurred gender and sexual distinctions: cannibalistic infanticide; naked lewd dancing; the ingestion of nauseous objects; fornication with the devil, who may have appeared in gaseous illusions, possessed human bodies, often cadavers, or bestial forms, all of which might transmute their gendered incarnation in mid-practice; various sexual practices - incest, bestiality, mutual masturbation, group sex or necrophilia in a heterosexual, homosexual, anal, and/or oral mode - between men, women, children, and beast; extispicium (divining by means of palpitating entrails); necrophagy (eating of corpses); necrosadism (the mutilation of corpses), amongst other corporal practices.  

Bodily transgression, by means of fluids, substances, visions, and odors seen as venomous and unable to be contained by the sorcerer, also integral to the sabbath as R.E.L. Masters notes, "men sometimes were obliged to perform cunnilingus on their succubi, tonguing at gaping and clammy apertures from which exuded dung, urine, and other awful juices and stenches." As well, the practice of magic made use of the material parts implicated in bodily transgression: fingernails and hair gathered in female hygienic practices like scratching, delousing, and manicuring; cauls, navel chords, afterbirth, and dead infants procured in the birthing process; and the coveted bits of criminals - the penis, big toe, colon. Finally, the effects of this magic were also manifested in the body of the victim: sores containing evil fluids, dehydrated skin, prostrate bodies, and in an inversion of maternal nourishment. The victims, in fact, were often likened to the devotional images of martyrs, and sorcery, in general, with its propensity for the somatic, was linked by reformists to the ritualism of the Catholicism.

Catholic mimeticism essentially collapsed the spiritual and the physical within the body, and thus identity: the host is the body of Christ. Catholicism's

89 For a detailed account of these practices see Masters, Eros and Evil.
90 Ibid., p. 25.
91 See Roper, pp. 180-184.
collection and worship of relics could then be seen as analogous to the sorcerer's preponderance with bodily parts, but it is the inversion of the relic which provides a nexus for Catholicism and sorcery.

As the sacred is contained and manifest in the bodily, so too is the diabolical, and so the Catholic exorcist meets the demonic in the theater of the possessed female. Usually housed in the skin of a chaste maid, the diabolical takes on the transgressive aspects of the male body - drinking, hunting, whoring, swearing, etc. - and is thus doubly transgressive in also crossing gender distinction. And it is the interior fluids, again, which are seen as the physical manifestation of evil leaving the body as signs which can be seen, felt, heard, smelt, and tasted by a witness: liquids transgressing orifices, pungent stenches, screams, profuse sweating, fecal dejecta, and bodily contortions, distensions, and shows of inordinate strength. Again, the witness, or martyr, is crucial to the process of exorcism in a parallel manner to the martyr traveling to the New World - a man de Certeau sees as homologous to the exorcist. Not surprisingly, the possessed was comforted through practices of touch while enduring the physical pain indissociable from exorcism; while an allowance was made so that other bodies could stand in proxy for those wishing salvation through exorcism, as the body was of utmost importance in ritualism, not which body. For Protestant asceticism, this sacralizing of the somatic was sacrilegious as the gulf between the sacred, or the diabolical, and the bodily was as large as that between Christ and the host, sign and signified. And it is not by chance that the sorcerer and the possessed take a female form.

The *Malleus* portrays the female as "feebler in both mind and body" and "intellectually like children", thus they were "more credulous" and "naturally more impressionable." They had "slippery tongues," and were rapacious and

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92 For a more detailed discussion of the body in relation to the ritual of exorcism see Roper, pp. 174-180.
93 *The Writing*, p. 233, 249.
94 Roper, pp. 174-176.
deceptive, making it hard to "hold and preserve the faith." The female was a defective creature in whom an insatiable bestial lust could not be contained, making her an eager partner of the devil. She was "more bitter than death" and "a wheedling and secret enemy" who in isolation conspired evil. And through the female bodily form, either in the guise of the old and physically decomposing witch or the pubescent virgin, the demonic, which had breached the occidental symbolic as the excess to meaning, must be made to confess so that it can be used in mending the breach, that is, made useful, made to mean amongst the order of things.

The sado-masochistic game of torture, revelation and concealment between the one accused of sorcery, her torturer, and the official council aimed at flaying and stripping away the disingenuous guise which cloaked the diabolical in order to locate truth, or meaning, in the body. The executioner was a technician of the body: he thoroughly probed and examined the vagina, anus, teats and other corporal orifices of the accused in search of the diabolical mark; used the intimate knowledge gained to determine the victim's bodily strength and stamina as parameters in applying precisely the correct gradations of pain for each step in the torture so that the truth could be laid bare; and after each stage bandaged and cared for the body of the accused, as it was a precious entity until it bore the confession and sutured the final tear in social language, at which time it could be destroyed. And de Certeau has shown how on the stage of the tortured demonic sorcerer "a debate over society's frames of reference" was miniaturized and manipulated, similarly so in the case of diabolic possession.

96Roper, p. 205.
97The Writing, pp. 245,246.
The rupture in the cultural skin of the possessed body entails a similar game to the tortured sorcerer's play between the physics of the body and of language. In the ritual of exorcism, the priest or doctor, through corporal signs or unconscious ramblings, must attach a speaking subject to its social signifier, a proper name. The incomprehensible bodily gestures of the possessed which initially rupture language must be made to mean within this very structure in order to rehabilitate it. Once the diabolical presence has been pinned to a single name within language an enunciation has been connected to a statement and language has been resutured. But in being satisfied with the repair of linguistic syntax western representation misses the profound altering effects of the madwoman's speech within the very discursive syntax it rests upon. The repairs were superficial.

And like in the order of things, where the irrationality of diabolism necessitates confessions and sacrifices on two planes in order for the system to try and incorporate disorder in the process of inaugurating a new community of meaning, a body standing in for heterogeneity must be purged on at least two levels within the diabolism of New World idolatry. The Indian body is sacrificed under real practices initiated surreptitiously in the dark of the New World chaos, witnessed only by the few, the initiated, and sacrificed in representation at home in front of a viewing audience. The Indian is the new Christ, but not only is the body absent, it was never there. It is always-only in

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98 In concentrating his analysis on the rhetorical games of the possessed, her way of speaking, de Certeau maps a play between proper names which disturbs the topos of discourse. Discourse is not settled until it has brought the deviant within its folds by attaching her to a proper name. Thus, his analysis allows for a politics of resistance to be ascribed to the position of the other and hence to a locus defined inside, yet contrary to, the rationality associated with the dominant discourse. It is interesting to note that in focusing his analysis on what is spoken by the sorcerer (as recorded by the official discourse), rather than a way of speaking, Robert Rowland, in his thorough study ("Fantastical and Devilishe Persons: European Witch-beliefs in Comparative Perspective," in Centres and Peripheries, pp. 161-190), only identifies the homogenizing effects of the dominant discourse leaving no interstices of resistance. The difference between the two is proportional to that between form and content.
representation, sacrificed in representation, for occidental subjectivity which is constituted in visual representation.

The de Bry images and texts ostensibly take as their direct referent New World practices of both the various indigenous peoples and their various colonizers, but in both content and form their connotations for a reader/viewer would have spilled out into the tumultuous social and symbolic spaces of a Europe "transverted" as contiguous to radical alterity - despite the ostensibly unitary intentions of their author(s). From a 'new' technical mechanism, to the particular visual rhetoric it enabled, and to the social heresies these both delimited in the substance of the image, all aspects of the visual representations had resonance within the disrupted barbaric Europe of the vast readership.

And as always, desire and representation manifest force and power. Not surprisingly, at this time the European subject differentiates itself from animality by, not only, its ability to reason but in its capacity for unbridled violence in the service of absolute desire-force.99

Pascal provides a historically relevant theorization of force, power and justice which Louis Marin has interpreted in relation to representation, which in turn provides me with a point of departure in the forced bodily confessional of the New World sorcerer.100 Tyranny, the force of absolute desire and no justice, aspires to the destruction of all heterogeneity, as it wants to conquer all domains not proper to it. In order for the unjust to usurp the seat of the just it must engage three modalities simultaneously, in one single blow: it must make one violent strike and two nominations. It must make a show of physical force, name the just as unjust, and itself as just. After this crucial juncture, in which force, despite its appearances, is afraid--afraid because if it fails it does so under the threat of death (its own threat to the just)—force must become insidious

100Marin, Portrait, pp. 13-36.
about its deployment, its sledgehammer tactics lack endurance. But first it is the crucial blow which must be struck, like the mallet of the Tupi executioner splitting the skull of the valiant warrior.

Included in the Laws of Burgos of 1512 was the provision "no one may beat or whip or call an Indian a dog or any other name unless it is his proper name." The law takes as its ordering principles physical torture and nomination. Ironically this text says too much: to state that his proper name was to be used is enough—it is a generality; but it redundantly points out that you mustn't call him a dog—a particularity. The Indian should not be named a dog, yet he is readily thrown to the dogs. I'm interested in this legal representation because it illuminates the mutually bound relationship of nomination and social practice.

In relation to, and subversion of, this legality there stood the practice of the reading of the Catholic Requirement which asked the Indian to admit her inferior nature in relation to the Western subject, as manifested in her diabolic ways. If she did so she could be enslaved and preached to; if not she would have her subservience inscribed in her body so as to ensure that she took it to the grave, possibly shortly after. And despite the Law of Burgos, Inquisitional torture under the threat of death was widely practiced in the New World until the 1540s at least, and legally until 1571 when The Council of the Indies officially exempted the Indian from Inquisitional practices in the New World. So the initial blow of physical force is struck, and the Indian is made to confess under torturous conditions in a manner analogous to the sorcerer in Europe - the body is made to testify against itself - but simultaneously two nominations.

The unjust must name the just as unjust, rottenness. De Certeau has configured a model articulating nomination and torture in relation to 17th C

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Christian mysticism and psychoanalysis,\textsuperscript{103} and I'd like to modify it here in relation to cultural difference, a cultural difference contemporaneous to this mysticism. The European Institution, which attempts to instill an official discourse, an outward theoretical manifestation, does so not do so by forcing its adversaries to reiterate this official speech, but to admit their own putrescence - rottenness - through torturous practices. The Indian is given the legal status of a proper name, yet in practice the Requirement makes the Indian admit her own putrescence (subservience) under the pain of death. This admission must be both heard within the confines of the mysterious New World, in order to create a sense of belonging in the new adherents, "you too are a pile of shit"; and simultaneously repressed, whispered "in secret so it does not compromise the image upon which the Institution's power of assuring its adherents the privilege of being recognized is based."\textsuperscript{104} It must only be whispered back at home, in representation.

An objection may be raised here: that the Indian standing in radical cultural difference cannot rationalize in its own terms, that is, speak to, and against, the European Institution which is completely exterior to her - that she cannot utter the conscious adversarial speech of the rebel-proper. But this is irrelevant to the Institution: the Indian's speech, as idolatrous, does stand contrary to their official discourse of Christian conversion, and from this perspective occupies the place of adversarial speech, conscious or not. In fact this is all irrelevant to the Institution; it happens to form a convenient front for the real game, the deadly game. The Institution does not concern itself with extracting a faithful espousal of its own discourse: Indians are baptized en masse without any sort of catechism in a litany of empty words.\textsuperscript{105} It aims instead to invert adversarial speech, to get the rebel, or the one who stands in the place of the rebel, to

\textsuperscript{103}"The Institution of Rot," in Heterologies, pp. 35-46.
\textsuperscript{104}ibid., p. 41.
\textsuperscript{105}De Alva, pp. 15-16.
declare her own filthiness; the Indian admits she is a dog, calls herself a dog, although ironically and legally she can't do this to herself. In inverting adversarial speech, the Institution leaves the rebel with no firm ground to resist from, whereas if it coerces a faithful and uniform espousal of its official doctrine it may consolidate the otherwise heterogeneous ground from which resistance speaks and provide it with the potential for an effective unified coalition from which to resist. The Institution names the Indian as rot and, under the threat of death, inscribes this name in her skin for her to read aloud, quietly, and act out, behave. This is the confession her body makes. In this, way the Institution consolidates itself through fear: suturing the Indian within the cultural language she has torn, yet ensuring that the screams won't be heard at home, where a hushed scream will circulate later.

But the unjust must also name itself the just now—both a fitting move, as the unjust commits another unjust act, and an obvious contradiction. As always, force and its gluttonous desire seep out into domains other than their own, and the postulates that they lay down are necessarily arbitrary in relation to this alien space. The unjust must name itself just out of fear and cowardice of the violent moment of victory ever repeating itself, as in this instant they are under the threat of death. If they don't win, they lose. Things must proceed to their liking, not in violent revolution where potential power is risked. As Pascal wrote, "they order the force that is in their hands succeed as pleases them" an arbitrary order. Now that the Indian has been reduced to a pile of shit, an order can be set in place with little resistance.

Jorge Klor de Alva has effectively shown how New World disciplinary strategies moved from the inscription of torture on the Indian body to more insidious means through the 1540s. A comprehensive and intensive

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106Marin, *Portrait*, p.35.  
107De Alva, pp. 3-22.
pedagogical campaign through the New World, coupled with the establishment of the confessional as an institution, were to instill self-disciplining surveillance mechanisms and allow the dissemination of a ubiquitous and monolithic Christian dogma. It was as though, after its dissolution in Europe, the mimetic system of Christian Logos attempted to resolve itself in exteriority. This pedagogical campaign was the counterpart to the one spread throughout the European countryside in search of the demonic and espousing a work ethic disdainful of the pleasurable and idle body of the festive. After the sacrifice of the heterogeneous body of the festive savage had been made an order could then be laid down, but the sacrifice had to be imported to the western margins within representational practices, and a new order founded therein. After power makes its startling debut, it reserves potential force in an imaginary system of signs which lie in wait.

Immanence and the Theater of Cannibalism.

The distinction (between the object and ourselves) requires a positing of the object as such. There does not exist any discernible difference if the object has not been posited. The animal that another animal eats is not yet given as an object. Between the animal that is eaten and the one that eats, there is no relation of subordination, like that connecting an object, a thing to man, who refuses to be viewed as a thing. For the animal, nothing is given through time. It is insofar as we are human that the object exists in time where its duration is perceptible. But the animal eaten by another exists this side of duration; it is consumed, destroyed, and this is only a disappearance in a world where nothing is posited beyond the present.

Georges Bataille\textsuperscript{108}

Desire is everything that exists before the opposition between subject and object, before representation and production.

Felix Guattari\textsuperscript{109}

\textsuperscript{108}Theory, p. 18.

As configured by Bataille, anterior to, and exclusive of, the order of things is the domain of animality or immanence, defined by desire set against desire in the moment, rather than by production anticipating a future result.\textsuperscript{110}

Immanence exists prior to the separation of the subject and object, prior to the distinction of things, and thus prior to the production of meaning as concomitant to the distinction of things - the process of signification. Immanence exists within the poetical movements which circulate within a confusion of signifiers, or one might say a confusion of signifieds, as there is no distinction made - referentiality is deflated, never was inflated. As Jean de Léry says of the Tupinamba, "they know nothing of writing, either sacred or secular; indeed, they have no kinds of characters that signify anything at all."\textsuperscript{111}

Animality is instead defined through continuity, rather than distinction, thus in the confusion of meaning, and in the wasteful expenditure satisfying desire in the moment. The space of immanence fails to distinguish between subjects and objects; as such, the only way in which to characterize it is through the continuity which existed previous to the separation of things. There are no objects, only the movements between the loci which later may define objective entities, and thus the movements which exist between what subsequently will define points of meaning. Prior to an order constituted through the formulation of meaning, an order of things, is an order configured in the displacement of all meanings, the "dislocation of meaning."\textsuperscript{112} Consequently, any overt description of such movement must be poetic, in that poetry conveys only that which moves toward meaninglessness, that which erupts from metaphoric disruption. Metaphor allows us to "designate realities that do not have their own terms," and hence, "to break the barriers of language, and to state what is

\textsuperscript{110}My discussion of immanence follows Bataille's in Theory of Religion (see esp. pp. 17-42).
\textsuperscript{111}History, p.134
\textsuperscript{112}Bataille, Theory, p. 22.
unspeakable." And it seems to be the dynamics within the simultaneity and confusion of the visual image, rather than the linearity of scriptural reproduction, which most aptly evokes the poetic movements within immanence.

Within immanence, within the moment, consumption of the object cannot be separated from an uncontainable bodily desire: continuity is defined in desire and the wasteful expenditure it demands. Animality is measured not in a thing's use value, its function within the apparatus of production, but in the excess which is the complement to this function--its absurdity or uselessness. It only "appears relative to the form against which it contrasts and of which it is deficient." It is the "surplus of a being over its finality" or the excess to meaning, what the discourse of production can't re-present, signify, utilize. And Tupinamba society, as portrayed by Léry, speaks to this excessive expenditure.

The exorbitant consumption of the festive cahouinages, the resplendent spectacle of the warrior in battle, the effusive rituals of the women in mourning or greeting, the plumed display of male ritual dance, the assertion of individual privilege through wasteful expenditure, and most of all, the ritual of sacrifice and cannibalism: each of these practices finds its ordering principle in excess. Animality's definitive act--the consumption of one animal by another induced by desire in the moment--is epitomized by the Brazilian cannibal's sacrifice and consumption of his enemy as dictated by an extreme sense of vengeance, that is, an insurmountable desire to avenge one's kinsmen.

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114 Bataille notes that the order in which things are distinguished, minus man's gaze, implies the reduction of the exact sciences--an observation de Certeau makes in relation to occidental, and particularly Jean de Léry's, scriptural reproduction at this time. This order would then contrast the realm of animality which implies the poetic. (Bataille, *Theory of Religion*, p. 22; de Certeau *The Writing*, 234, 235).
But these barbarians do not wage war to win countries and lands from each other, for each has more than he needs; even less do the conquerors aim to get rich from the spoils, ransoms, and arms of the vanquished: that is not what drives them. For, as they themselves confess, they are impelled by no other passion than that of avenging, each for his own side, his own kinsmen and friends who in the past have been seized and eaten...and they pursue each other so relentlessly that whoever falls into the hands of his enemy must expect to be treated, without any compromise, in the same manner: that is, to be slain and eaten. Furthermore, from the time that war has been declared among any of these nations, everyone claims that since an enemy who has received an injury will resent it forever, one would be remiss to let him escape when he is at one's mercy: their hatred is so inveterate that they can never be reconciled.\textsuperscript{116}

As Léry indicates, the Tupinamba do not wage war to accumulate \textit{things}, as would be the mandate of the production apparatus, but only demand from their prisoners, what Montaigne calls, "the confession and acknowledgment of being vanquished."\textsuperscript{117} The \textit{useless} confession marks the excess to the prisoner's \textit{useful} servile body which would have been sacrificed in a show of wasteful expenditure and eaten out of a vehement desire - vengeance. But as the captors menace their prisoner through taunts of his impending demise in hope of extorting "some weak or submissive word from him,"\textsuperscript{118} instead what they receive is the defiant and heroic poem of the captive who retains the savage ethic to the grave: "these muscles, this flesh and these veins, are your own, poor fools that you are; you little think that the substance of the limbs of your ancestors is here yet; relish them well, and you will find in them the taste of your own flesh."\textsuperscript{119} Thus the excessive demand for wasteful expenditure in the cannibal ritual is answered not by the object of the demand, but by its complement - an economical, and poetic, speech which cuts no slack. The defiant poem of the valiant victim testifies to the efficiency of the cannibal

\textsuperscript{116}Léry, p. 112.

\textsuperscript{117}Michel de Montaigne, "Of Cannibals," p. 186. Léry and Montaigne were perhaps two of the most influential European writers on New World savagery, and it is usually assumed that Léry, who published his account before Montaigne, was a primary source for the latter, who never traveled to the Americas nor referenced such sources as Léry. It is not surprising then that the two writers represent Tupi cannibalism and the social cohesion it generates in parallel ways. For these reasons, I will also draw from the text of Montaigne in configuring the cannibal ritual as perceived by many European readers/viewers.

\textsuperscript{118}Ibid., p. 187.

\textsuperscript{119}Ibid., p. 188.
practice in the recycling and perpetuation of lineages. Not surprisingly, the animalistic act is culminated in poetry.

Tupi cannibalism, through the play of excessive expenditure and economical speech, maintains an extreme social cohesion within tribes as they "live and deal with each other in such peace and tranquillity" according to Léry; while for Montaigne it provides the basis to "their whole ethical science." Savage warfare is portrayed as hinging not on the excessive demand of the dominant in the cannibal ritual, but on the resolute speech of the victim who maintains his valour and loyalty in the loss of his body. The cannibal's body, in a manner analogous to the martyr whose body has been through and has seen, "is a body in the service of saying. It is the verifiable, palpable exemplum which realizes before our eyes an ethic of speech." The cannibal body marks the ultimate loss of self in remaining faithful to speech: the Tupi body marks the equation between 'a saying' and 'a doing.' The heroic poem is a speech-act: the two are inseparable, speech and practice, representation and social agency, hence there is no rift across which to convey, it is not about re-presenting.

The speech-act cannot be severed from a particular place, from a hostile summons by the enemy, or from a bodily loss which fills it. And, as it is in the defiant prisoner where we find the crucial link which attests to the faithfulness of speech, it is in his heroic poem that we find the first instance of speech which is no longer of the order of the discursive statement, that which can be transplanted from place to place and is disingenuous. The speech-act of the heroic victim is of the order of enunciation, a deed founded in the courage of a saying which is veracious by virtue of this relation alone. Tupi cannibalism, as perceived through widely disseminated European accounts, collapses the gap between sign and signified, or better, is prior to the extension which constitutes

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120 Léry, p. 158; Montaigne, p. 184.
121 De Certeau, Heterologies, p. 75. My analysis of Tupi cannibalism is motivated by de Certeau's study (Ibid., pp. 67-79).
this gap, and thus defines representation. It is prior to the subject-object distinction as it exists in the continuity of immanence. Tupi social cohesion is generated through an economy of speech motivated by unbridled desire; in terms of a material economy, the ingested warrior returns the flesh and energy of the avenged ancestors to the avenging kinsmen in perfect conservation of the social body.

A Dislocation Providing an Entrance, but also a Reminder of what must be Forgotten

Tupi cannibalism is not synonymous with immanence, though; it exists at one remove through a slight dislocation, enough of a dislocation to allow a European foot in the door. The sacrifice of an external prisoner to the tribe, rather than an internal member, represents a softening in the wasteful expenditure.\textsuperscript{122} His capture necessarily reduces him to thinghood and this demands a release from servility before he can be consumed through an excessive mode. It is in order to destroy his ties to the realm of things and allow him to gravitate back toward immanence that the Tupi prisoner is first exalted through months of festive activity before his sacrifice and consumption. And it is in this softening of the excess, through the taking of a prisoner external to the tribe to which it will be sacrificed, that the European can make Tupi cannibalism mean, give it significance. For Léry and Montaigne,\textsuperscript{123} Tupi cannibalism, as an exclusionary practice between tribes, maintains a superior social coherency within a given tribe in a manner analogous to the way in which the European center defines itself through how and what it excludes. As the cannibal remains

\textsuperscript{122}For his analysis of this phenomenon amongst the Aztec, see Bataille, \textit{The Accursed Share}, v. I, pp. 45-61. This is not to conflate Tupinamba and Aztec culture as the two were obviously very distinct, only to apply a similar analysis to a homologous operation within Tupi social practice. It is interesting to note though that Bataille was introduced to ethnology by Alfred Métraux whose ethnographic studies of the Tupinamba peoples still have currency today.

\textsuperscript{123}For descriptions of this cohesion see Léry, pp. 158-171; and Montaigne, 186-190.
faithful to his saying in giving up of his body he asserts a ferocious allegiance to his own social domain (the tribe) in a violent denial of the opposing social group which will eat him. In their consumption of the victim, this group reciprocates the denial. The cannibal ritual maintains a social system of communication - a social language - by reinforcing friend/enemy boundaries: one social group constitutes its own integrity and fortitude (internal coherence) through the violent assertion of enemy status on the body of the prisoner from an oppositional group. Thus the anthropophagy of the Tupinamba becomes a socially comprehensible act for the European as it maintains a rigorous homogeneity within social categories through the pronouncement of radical heterogeneity between categories: intra-homogeneity through inter-heterogeneity. And as the savage ritual can be made to mean, it is returned to the same by this very act, but within the same it takes on a paradoxical relationship: it returns as it becomes a socially interpretable act within the Tupi socius, yet upon its return it points to an absence in the European origin which exceeds signification.

The meaningful cannibalism which Lery returns with is everywhere juxtaposed to its antithetical counterpart—the meaningless European cannibalism which signifies nothing but signifyinglessness. The juxtaposition becomes apparent upon his arrival at Fort Coligny on the Brazilian coast, where Nicolas Durand de Villegagnon was to erect what would ostensibly be a French utopia away from the strife of the religious wars and the debates over representation. But it would be Villegagnon himself who would call up, for Lery, the anthropophagic metaphor at the center of the religious debates over transubstantiation. In fact it is through Villegagnon and the Ouetaca, the fiercest of all Tupinamba cannibal tribes, that Lery will link American anthropophagy to the cannibalism implied by the Catholic view of representation in the Eucharist, and thus to the hermeneutical heterogeneity of
the atrocities of the religious wars. According to Lery, Villegagnon "wanted to eat the flesh of Jesus Christ raw." 124 It is on the return voyage home that Lery inverts the Tupi cannibal ritual in relation to Europe. Wandering through a venomous and stagnant sea, Lery and his crewmates are pushed to the "limits of civility" 125 as they are forced to deliberate over the possibility of the cannibalistic act as a means, perhaps the only means, to survival. It is here that the Tupi practice of cannibalism, which maintains social coherence "over there," is inverted and from then on European abstinence from the practice maintains group cohesion in the midst of the altering effects of starvation on individual and communal identity. For Lery, being pushed to the limits of civility, where it meets with cannibalism, and abstaining from the anthropophagic marks a "benediction." 126 Cannibalism within Europe, pitted neighbor against neighbor instead of enemy upon enemy, inverting the New World practice: it would mark extreme heterogeneity within social categories and the impossibility of meaning. Whether, in the daily mutilation and consumption of corpses in the Religious Wars where hearts and fat are sold to the highest bidders in the street, or in the vehement desire propelling Catholic bodies on Huguenot cadavers during the St. Bartholomew's Night Massacre of 1572 (forcing Lery to flee La Charite-sur-Loire to Sancerre), or the next year in Sancerre when Catholics laid siege to the town and forced the Protestant stronghold to again straddle the limits of civility and cannibalism, the practice of anthropophagy inscribed chaos within social categories. It destroys the distinctions which structure the order of things, keeping things separate and each linked to a definitive meaning. It therefore dissolves social meaning. For the kingdom of utility to be founded as such, this anthropophagy stirred up in religious fervor is the "minus in the

124 Léry, p. 41.
126 Ibid., p. 400.
origin" which must be repressed as it proceeds antithetically to the production of meaning. It is the dissolution of meaning, the deconstitution of signification.

E. Renan has posited: "every French citizen has to have forgotten (is obliged to have forgotten) Saint Bartholomew's Night Massacre. . . ." Homi Bhabha notes the complexity of this form of forgetting which for him signifies a "minus in the origin" and the strange temporality of the "performative." For Bhabha, the space of the nation's people is divided into: the "pedagogical" which is characterized by homogeneity, cultural holism, consensus, and synchrony, and posits its people as an "a priori historical presence", that is as pedagogical objects; and into the performative which is constituted in the arbitrary, contingent, accidental acts of the everyday which are incommensurable with the former space, and thus agitating. The performative locates performing subjects of heterogeneous contending discourses grounded in an enunciatory present, and thus positions difference within the unified national identity posited by the pedagogical; again it agitates the time of the holistic nation. Once this division within the nation has been established the threat of cultural difference is no longer a problem of 'other' people outside the boundary, but of the otherness of the people-as-one within. And upon Léry's return, it is not cultural difference in its exteriority - the cannibalism of the Tupinamba - which poses the threat to European order, but the heterogeneity within which this exteriority signifies - the rabid cannibalism marking religious debates in issues of representation.

Bhabha aligns the play between the pedagogical and the performative with Derrida's notion of supplementary representation as a subaltern instance: "somewhere something can be filled up of itself...only by allowing itself to be

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127Renan quoted in Bhabha, p. 160. For Bhabha's discussion of the performative in relation to the nation-space see "DissemiNation. Time, narrative, and the margins of the modern nation", ibid., pp. 139-170.
128Ibid., p. 150.
filled through sign and proxy."\textsuperscript{129} This supplementary instance is thus conscious of itself as representation as it points to an anterior absence, in contrast to the homogenous representations of the pedagogical which fail to recognize the rift in signification in asserting presence. The supplementary representation thus seems to promise presence through a metaphorical substitution, or paradigmatic shift, but also points to a lack metonymically: the performative and adjunct instance perpetually unhinges the seemingly homogenous space of given presence. In this way the emergence of the performative and the pedagogical nation-spaces can be aligned with the emergence of signification in the west as mimesis and representation.\textsuperscript{130} The horizontal, mimetic space of pedagogical representation is incessantly agitated by the reiterative performative acts which admit the absence which founds them - the minus in the origin. For the French nation, as Renan indicates, the cannibalism of the Saint Bartholomew Night's Massacre is an instance of the incommensurability of the lived everyday experience which incessantly restarts the homogeneous nation in manifesting internal difference. The obligation of "forgetting to remember" instantiates the odd time of the performative which "adds to" without "adding up,"\textsuperscript{130} disturbing consensus. Discursive representations of Tupi cannibalism, the only form this act can take within a Europe where the Tupinamba exists only in spectacle, are supplementary in relation to the minus in the origin: they both admit the absence opened by European cannibalism, and gloss it by projecting the practice into the New World through an inversion of its social mechanics.

\textquote{The aim of cultural difference is to rearticulate the sum of knowledge from the perspective of the signifying position of the minority that resists totalization - the repetition that will not return as the same, the minus-in-origin that results...}

\textsuperscript{129}Derrida quoted in Bhabha, p. 154. 
\textsuperscript{130}Ibid., p. 161.
in political and discursive strategies where adding to does not add up but serves to disturb the calculation of power and knowledge, producing other spaces of subaltern signification."\textsuperscript{131} The subaltern instance indicates a repressed residue which the translation of cultural difference always misses in its attention to content, yet always makes manifest as disturbance of form - a discursive disturbance. As Benjamin notes, "the language of translation envelops its content like a royal robe with ample folds... (it) signifies a more exalted language than its own and thus remains unsuited to its content, overpowering and alien."

Benjamin designates this incommensurability the "foreignness of languages."\textsuperscript{132} As Walter it initiates the agitating effects of the performative which disjoin signification, the analytic of cultural difference changes the topos of enunciation; and as the subject of discourse (enunciation) is constituted through the locus of the Other, it must also interrupt forms of identity. Thus denominations of cultural difference disturb the unified nation from top to bottom: as a national space, at the discursive plane, and within the constitution of subjectivity.

Bhabha writes that "the postcolonial centre is now 'supplementary' to the metropolitan centre; it stands in a subaltern adjunct relation that doesn't aggrandize the presence of the West but redraws its frontiers in the menacing agonistic boundary of cultural difference that never quite adds up, always less than one nation and double."\textsuperscript{133} In an age when the colonial space is just beginning to be defined it enacts the same interaction with the centre, yet at a distance: it necessitates a movement by the martyr out and a return of cultural difference transformed into a discursive form made to mean, sewn into the homogenous fabric of the pedagogical culture, yet, unbeknownst to the centre, also as supplementary representation which refers to a minus in the origin and thus incessantly reorders the weave of the cultural fabric.

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid., p. 162.
\textsuperscript{132} Benjamin quoted in Bhabha, p. 163.
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid., p. 168.
To recapitulate, The Tupinamba savage, in the eyes of the European, is first and foremost a heretic, and so aligned with sorcery and possession. In Europe the diabolical and pleasurable body was being exported to the festive margins from within and imported to the margins from without (the New World); and in both instances met by a pedagogical campaign attempting to instill a work ethic which was to transform the idle into something of use, and make it confess, restitch the cultural fabric. Yet what the doctrinal discourse is unable to transform - the performative acts of the sorcerer's and possessed's bodies - return and disturb. Due to her corrupted state, the Tupinamba practices the abominable act of cannibalism, yet it is this ambivalent practice which also signifies to the occident an ideal state of social harmony generated through exclusionary practices. For many like Léry and Montaigne the cannibal ritual is the sign of a state prerequisite state to signification in which cultural representation and social practice are synonymous—a saying = a doing. The deceptive statement in this way is given cultural positionality-a place—and thus transformed into enunciation. Yet, Tupi cannibalism is also an explicit, if supplemental, reference, for many to a minus in the European origin which one is obliged to forget. It is as if representations of this anthropophagy enact a strange play between a pedagogical view of the Tupinamba nation-space as harmonious—a transformation by the order of production to make things mean—and the performative acts of everyday atrocity during the Wars of Religion which the images implicitly reference. In this self-reflexive move the images appear as lack - a lack of social coherence, a heterogeneity in social language. It is as if the collapse in Tupi representation - the cannibal's saying—opens the rift in the representations which portray it—occidental mimesis and representation.

134 For Léry's comparison of the atrocities of European cannibalism during the religious wars to Tupi cannibalism see esp. pp. 131-133; and for Montaigne's discussion of the same see esp. pp. 185-186.
Consequently, the subject, the discursive representations, and perhaps the nascent nation are marked by a perturbation.
Transfiguration: an incorporative move from the west through the symbolics of the visual

All of the aforementioned spaces and practices would remain discrete, and perhaps inconsequential, entities if not connected through the concomitancy of bodies linked, as in the form of, or bound by, the chain(s) of desire. The chain begins as the cannibal sacrifices his body in testimony to his desire, an unbound vengeance in the service of his ancestry.

The cannibal ethic, as manifested in bodily loss, is verifed in the west by the martyr who has ventured into the unknown and seen, thus legitimized, the cannibal body in ritualistic practice. The martyr's body which, through social practice, perceives, and through cultural practice, depicts, the cannibal body, must travel. The disjuncture between things and immanence, roughly the abstract space of an ocean, necessitates a body of practice which can bring home alterity faithfully. The martyr of exploration, again, has seen and must be seen, and claims to be in the service of a truthful saying. But truth is a relative issue in the service of meaning, thus signification, and thus his discursive representations which take the place of his body as evidence, which actually re-present his body, are configured in relation to western systems of meaning. But the complementary truth to this, the truth relative to Tupi symbolic systems, the excess repressed, also returns with the unwitting martyr as the disordering of that which sustains discourse.

The artist who transverts the original representation, the position of de Bry, functions as martyr as well: he must maintain a respect for the martyr's vision through a certain fidelity to the original representations done on the spot and through the inclusion of the martyr's bodily representation within his transversion; but he must also leave the mark of his own body in (between) the
representation, and these discursive inscriptions are the hands of representation which point to itself, and rise, in giving itself up.

The cannibal, the martyr and the artist through a mutual contract - "I have seen, and must be seen" - all reach the European viewer in spectacle, in representation. This is not to position the viewer as a finality: in a homologous position to the savage body, he, paired with this counterpart, guide the discourse from the outset. It was Montaigne, who, at Rouen, met with what were ostensibly 'real' Tupinamba, yet only simulacra within the spectacle which staged their re-presentation, and said in reference to this meeting: "I talked a long time with one of them, but I had an interpreter who followed my meaning so badly and who was so hindered by his stupidity in grasping my ideas that I could hardly get any satisfaction from him."\textsuperscript{135} In this passage, Montaigne calls up his own position (in translating "foreign languages") as interpreter in relation to the incommensurable yet also the way in which a consciousness of the interpreter of his own discourse, the reader or viewer, in fact shapes that very representation. Again, the ethnographer, pinned between his object and his audience, splits himself in an initial self-divisive moment.

\textbf{Imaging the stereotype and its inversion}

From one perspective, the content of the \textit{Historiae Americae} is marked by heterogeneity. In the collection there is "a real syncretism of ethnic, cultural, zoological, mythological, and biblical forms" which construct a fantastic ethnography.\textsuperscript{136} As well, the sequence in which the series is published does not duplicate the chronological sequence in which the actual voyages took place,

\textsuperscript{135}Montaigne, p. 190, my emphasis. De Certeau refers to the same incident in discussing the problems of the interpreter (\textit{Heterologies}, pp. 78-79).
\textsuperscript{136}Bucher, p. 21.
thus it confuses the temporal order. Simultaneously, the textual accounts contained claim the truth value of real history, despite its eclectic collection of primary writers and the varied discursive forms their writing takes shape in. Thus the *Historiae* claims to be "the most true, the most exact" but also "the most surprising [astonishing]"\(^{137}\) - a chaos of cultural and temporal spaces.

The heterogeneity and confusion suggested seems to be gathered in under the sign of a homogeneous and universalizing visual rhetoric and a familiarity of figures, motifs and geographical spaces. The collection homogeneously disperses a classicizing nude form for the Indian body throughout. It puts into play a similar rhetoric of well-formed, proportioned and articulated bodies of firm posture and musculature - an indigenous armature - which even under laceration and segmentation still maintains perfect form. Again, this is the bodily form configured in certain scientific anatomical studies and so reaffirms the image's aspirations to the universality and permanence connoted by such discourses. What is also interesting here is that physical deformation, rather than constancy, is being used as an instrument of critique within visual print culture at this time, certainly by Northern Protestant interests.\(^{138}\)

This homogeneity and permanence seems to speak *fixity*, or the appearance of fixity. The *stereotype*, as fixity, generates itself by fastening the irrecognizable to a familiar form and then nervously speaks permanence through an anxious repetition of the image. It vacillates between a recognition of cultural difference, and its disavowal through attachment to the familiar and the repetitious. As a result the stereotype oscillates between horror and delight, and as Bhabha has shown, functions analogously to the fetish. As with fetishism, the stereotype restarts and reiterates the primal fantasy of a pure origin, anterior to difference. It is produced out of fear that disorder and heterogeneity are in fact primary.

\(^{137}\)Quoted in Duchet (trans. E. Bowman), p. 11.
\(^{138}\)Rose Marie San Juan pointed out this interesting inversion to me during discussions of this text.
And the *Historiae* begins with an image of Adam and Eve at the crucial moment of the Fall, when the point of a pure origin is moot, and thus frames the series in the current debates around the monogenetic theory, and the issue of corruption.

Fixity, as the stereotype, may attempt to provide the provisional structuring of consciousness after the self-shattering encounter with complete cultural difference. Here the incommensurable Indian body is circulated within a homogenizing and universalizing visual rhetoric, in a familiar set of well-contained forms, and anxiously disseminated by a new mode of print geared toward a much more thorough permeation of the socius. But the provisional structuring of consciousness can never be wholly successful. In the case of the stereotype, it always points to a lack metonymically, and it is the vertices where the structuring fails—its erasures of form—which mark the shattering experience.

Although, because of Adam's disobedience, man was stripped of the gifts he had received at the creation, as we shall see in the following narrative on the life of the savage tribes he kept enough knowledge to be able to provide for his wants and to make all he needed for life and health, excepting only the health of his soul.  

De Bry's passage accompanies the image of Adam and Eve which appears as one of the inaugurating visual images of the *Historiae* and then once again in the series—conspicuously within the third volume, at the beginning of the section devoted to Léry's narrative (fig. 3). The image of the Garden assumes a position rooted in the monogenetic theory of cultural diversity, widely acknowledged in the early modern period, and in contemporaneous Protestant theology. In depicting the scene of temptation de Bry postulates the same pure origin for all of humanity, as posited by the monogenetic theory, while Léry's text glosses racial diversity by explaining gradations in skin pigmentation from a primary white according to one's exposure to the sun. From the originary cultural

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139 Theodor de Bry quoted in Bucher, p. 53.
140 For a discussion of the monogenetic theory within anthropological debates of the time see Hodgen, pp. 207-253.
141 Léry, p. 57.
homogeneity of the Garden, the Fall represents the first breach of the homogeneity through an expulsion from the centre. The second breach was to occur as Cain, the archetypal man of excess in European discourse, exiled east of Eden, brings about the first peopling of the world through his wicked wanderings. In this way, movement in space and the transmission of traits from one people to another were linked to notions of corruption and degeneracy. For Cain's evil, God rewound this initial populating process by blanketing the globe in a great deluge necessitating a second peopling of the world. This sequence leads to a second image, connoted by the first through Old Testament scripture, which appears in the introduction to the second book in the Historiae and is the only other explicitly biblical image in the series, the scene of Noah and his people beginning the second self-generation of the world's populace after the Flood (fig. 4). This third breach of cultural homogeneity as delineated in the Old Testament, is not depicted, but implied, by the previous two images and lurking beneath the writing, both graphic and textual, of the entire series—God's heterogenization of a unified system of language at the Tower of Babel in order to punish man's presumptuousness. The Other institutes the subject of cultural language by shattering that language and the subject-positions within it. In this way the implied image of Babel serves as a metaphor for occidental discourse's humbling in the face of the New World savage.

This savage, portrayed by Lery and others as a descendant of Ham - victim of his father Noah's sodomitical incest, was thus issued forth from the same origin as the European. Yet the savage was assumed to occupy a furthered state of degeneracy through an inability to communicate with the source of truth/meaning, thus the Tupinamba's inability to maintain purity in their orality. But through a shared origin and common ancestors the savage maintained a relation with the European past.
For example, after the image of the Fall in the initial volume the next visual images (figs. 5,6) depict tattooed Ancient Britons and Pictes" to show how", the caption reads, "that the Inhabitants of the great Bretainne have bin in times past as sauvage as those of Virginia", and reminds the reader that as late as the fourth century "a valiant tribe of Caledonia, the Attacotti, are accused by an eyewitness of delighting in the taste of human flesh" so that in hunting "they attacked the sheperd rather than his flock..." 142 This passage is interesting in several respects, in that it refers to the martyr who is in the service of visually witnessing a cannibalistic scene buried deep in the western origins, as a minus, but I'll continue with the images of the two European ancestors for now and return to these notions. The accompanying text permits these images to stand in comparison, and distinction, to the New World savages in an interpretive system which holds signifiers in metonymic contiguity. Yet without this ability of text, the comparison collapses into substitution, metonymy into metaphor, and the figures of the Ancients show up, on the scene, in later volumes 'filling in' for the Indians. 143 Mimesis and re-presentation battle within the represented space itself, and this ambiguity allows native bodies to substitute for different native bodies irrespective of cultural difference in the same manner that the difference between Pictes and Alogonquians can be effaced. Through a representational slippage the cannibalism of Europe's past and of the New World savage's present are melded to reinforce the notion of a common origin.

The feminine demonic figure of the youthful serpent, contained within the same classicizing armature used to maintain the New World anatomy and exhibiting the pendulous breasts which will distinguish the old Tupinamba female, wraps itself in the trunks of the tree of forbidden fruit, between Adam and Eve (fig. 3). This figure marks man's deviation from a pure Christian origin

142De Bry quoted in Alexander, p. 89.
143Bucher also discusses this slippage, pp. 335-337.
due to a feminine temptation which acquaints him with his nakedness. It is unusual within western visual discourse at this time for both the tempted and tempter to take on feminine attributes, and perhaps here this takes on significance. They may signify the initial deviation which would mark (wo)man's corruption and lead to paths extending into diabolic places such as the New World which were often branded inherently feminine. The Noachian image marks the Indian, in particular, as the wandering son of a sodomite. It is perhaps not surprising that upon entry into a newly found community it was common practice for the European to designate the native a cannibal, a sodomite and a heretic, the outward manifestation of these designations being nakedness, and to demand the indigenous abandon their idolatrous, thus diabolical, ways. The practice of cannibalism became the preeminent sign of the Tupi's demoniac pursuits while the sodomitical act was incorporated into the cannibal's ritual sorcery. But the European couldn't efface the common origin he shares with the savage, it is in fact celebrated in the monogenetic theory of cultural diversity, and thus his past comes back to haunt his present. Through the images of the ancient Britons and Pictes, cannibalism becomes an ambivalent sign: indicative of an ethical utopia of social coherence in the Tupi space, yet the diabolical act referencing an extreme heterogeneity within European social categories which doesn't allow things to mean, and must be forgotten. The diabolical manifests itself in physical form in the center of the image, its pendulous breasts a motif explicitly associated with the maleficient female, vampire, witch, or demon and the incarnation of Envy, Lust, Death, Famine, or Heresy in Europe, and the musculature encasing its frame a reference to an ancient Greco-Roman mode of visualizing and containing.

A Borrowed Indigenous Style

144Bucher, p. 38.
The same classicizing body adorns the frontispiece (fig. 7), which asserts de Bry's artistic intervention at the onset of the third volume - the insertion of detail and depth into the printed visualization of the New World travel narrative. While the classicizing architecture of the portal echoes the traditional visual references made in the statuesque bodies, its symmetric plasticity bursts forth from the page in the same movement that de Bry enters into the image. The depth, created through artistic attention to detail, allows a linear perspective to emerge which permits the function of the portal: to separate an "over here" from an "over there," the distance from a European visual tradition to the possibility of another perspective through the aperture created by the arch. And what the self sees through the aperture is the Other—the cannibal—or what must be repressed within itself—the minus in the origin. The aperture opening onto cultural difference is necessarily a mirror, and in it the subject is constituted in a self-divisive moment of recognition and repulsion, horror and desire: "I am that." It is a mirror mirrored on the portal itself, on the threshold between an "over here" and an "over there," between a saying and a doing.

From the western perspective, the arch is surmounted by the idolatry which engenders the anthropophagy exhibited by the Tupinamba couple below. On the left of the portal is the Tupi executioner with the best known Tupi icons: the plumed display of the enduapo, worn on the buttocks, and the headdress; the iwera pemme which delivers the terminal blow to the skull of the sacrificial victim of the cannibal ritual; and the scarification which inscribes in the body the revered marks of immanence for he who releases another from thinghood back into continuity. On the right of the arch is the female, apparent mother to a child manifesting demoniac associations, who copulates with the victim, prepares him mentally and physically for the crucial moment in the sacrificial ritual through certain behaviors and practices, and then is the first to throw
herself on the body in the ritual of dismemberment and consumption. And, in keeping with the visual idiom, the classicized bodily figures evince a measured controposto in greeting the occidental subject.

The plague in the centre of the portal containing the scriptural text proposes an interesting juxtaposition to the surrounding visual imagery of the arch. Scriptural reproduction is central and most emphatically flat (two-dimensional) as the graphic forms which circumscribe it are configured in a plasticity which seems to project out from the page along the line of perspective; the scriptural certainly belongs to the two-dimensional of the page as plane, while the pictorial seems to transcend the very material form which is its support. The demonic figure draped over the female leads one back to the image of the Garden and initiates a substitution in the origin inscribing a minus there. The cannibal pair and serpentine figure seem to adopt the positions of Adam, Eve and the diabolic, while human flesh substitutes for the apple in a confusion of transgressive acts—a transgression of the body of knowledge replaced by a transgression of the body. This paradigmatic shift further accentuates the notion of a common origin for both the western and New World subjects, as put forth in the monogenetic theory, and crucially marks cannibalism as the minus carved into that origin, recalling the Anciente Britons who prey on the sheperd rather than his flock. And this lust after a primal origin leads one, not only back through history, but inward, into the body and the circuitous paths of desire.

Visual Rhetoric as Fixity and Fixity as Rhetorical Device

inter faeces ei urinam nascimur
(we are born between feces and urine)

St. Augustine

affection and hostility in the treatment of the fetish - which run parallel with the disavowal and acknowledgment of castration--are mixed in unequal

proportions in different cases, so that the one or the other is more clearly recognizable.

Sigmund Freud

I have already referred to the play enacted by the process of representing, always supplementary from the beginning, and in particular the process of visually representing: a vacillating movement between the ostensible metaphoristic substitution for presence and the adjunct instance of signification which registers lack metonymically, the desire for a there is and the horror that there in fact is not. But perhaps I should have started from the beginning in the ostensible origin, or more precisely within the inscribed creviss of the minus which taints the origin, prior to the instantaneous appearance of signification "all at once" which is initiated by the minus.

In the Historiae, cultural difference is masked to gloss a primal origin through its attachment to the fixity of a visual mode of representing which is positioned as a primal origin to visual representation at this time - the Greco-Roman rhetoric of classical antiquity. Nothing could be more familiar to Renaissance modes of representation than the classicized musculature and controposto of the statuesque nude. And Léry's description of Tupi life begins with the "beautiful natural body" which is not taller, or smaller in stature than we Europeans are; their bodies are neither monstrous or prodigious with respect to ours. In fact, they are stronger, more robust and well-filled out, more nimble, less subject to disease; there are almost none among them who are lame, one-eyed, deformed, or disfigured.148

And of their nudity he says, in relation to representationalist debates and the play of simulacra,

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146Quoted in Bhabha, pp. 78-79
147Levi-Strauss claims "language can only have arisen all at once. Things cannot have begun to signify gradually." (Quoted in Bhabha, p. 159, Bhabha's emphasis). Bhabha uses this quote in reference to the abrupt beginning of the strange time of the nation-space which is always agitated by the supplementary form of the performative.
148p. 56.
the infinity of trifles with which the women and girls over here disguise themselves and of which they never have enough, are beyond comparison the cause of more ills than the ordinary nakedness of the savage women - whose natural beauty is by no means inferior to that of the others. 149

Although a certain desire may underlie his comments, as they are directly preceded by his promotion of the pleasure of viewing the Tupinamba body for oneself, (as cited earlier), and in that he does allow "ample cause to judge that, beyond the immodesty of it, seeing these women naked would serve as a predictable enticement to concupiscence." 150 In allowing that the natural beauty of the savage women is "by no means inferior" to that of the European, Léry permits de Bry and the viewer a foothold from which to transform cultural difference into familiarity - the deceptive operation of the stereotype and a productive practice of use to the order of things.

St. Augustine's remark implies that our birth through the vagina is necessarily tied to material bodily transgressions, which in turn implies two denials: the denial of the lack of a penis in the birthing entity (the Mother) and the denial of our body's liminality and excesses. Bhabha has delineated theoretical links, both functional and structural, between the operation of the fetish and that of the cultural stereotype, and I would like to make these connective lineaments manifest in a particular historical body—a body constrained by the accompanying denial of somatic excess as linked to a particular visual rhetoric (the visual already being inscribed in the vacillation which also orders the movement of the stereotype). The fetish, too, is produced in the vacillation between the metaphoric and the metonymic, as the absence of the signifier—the penis—is contiguously registered by the substitution of the fetish for the missing signifier swallowed up in the absence that is the vagina.

Sexual difference is thus simultaneously recognized, in the instance

149 p. 67.
150 Roper, p. 67. Roper discusses how the discourse lauding bodily excess may have infiltrated the prohibitive discourse on the bodily through the latter's borrowing of certain rhetorical devices from the former so that the two became in some instances indissociable (see ibid., pp. 145-167). Léry's text may serve as one of these instances.
supplementary to signification—the metonymic lack; and *disavowed* in the seemingly holistic replacement of the signifier (fetish) for the missing penis—the metaphoric substitution. The recognition of sexual difference is thus the mechanism which initiates the alternating sequence of absence and presence, that is signification, in the symbolic. The disavowal effectively masks difference by attaching it to the familiar, the recognizable. It attempts to efface the shattering experience of the sexual/violent by replacing it with consciousness of its own terms—something recognizable. In the movement between the poles of oscillation, the fetish inaugurates signification and articulates the fantasy of a pure origin—a monogenetic theory.

The monogenetic theory of cultural diversity as espoused at the turn of the seventeenth century effectively distends the primal scene of the fetish, in constituting individual subjectivity, into the universal stage of anthropological origins. And Bhabha has theorized this homology between the operation of the fetish and that of the cultural stereotype: the latter attempts to disavow or mask cultural difference through its attachment to stereotyped representation—that which is culturally recognizable. And the stereotype multiplies this familiarizing function at a rate proportional to its own magnitude, as it must incessantly reiterate the type in a nervous repetition which furiously attempts to fulfill the metaphoric substitution disingenuously guaranteeing presence. The stereotype is thus ambivalent as it connotes both rigidity and order through the familiar—what is known—and disorder and heterogeneity through a demoniac repetition which metonymically indicates the lack (the minus in the origin) constituting cultural difference. In this particular epoch, the monogenetic theory seems to guarantee the fantasy of a pure origin for humanity as all, even the heretical savage, originated in Adamic culture, and thus in original sin. But first the minus in the origin must be masked by the movement of the stereotype in order that the origin appear pure, and it perhaps is not surprising that the
stereotype takes the visual, which also operates between metaphoric substitution and metonymic lack, as its ordering principle.

A Labyrinth Configured in Horror and Desire

The natural beauty of the savage is portrayed through European conceptions of beauty deeply imbricated in its genealogy of representation. The key issues here are that the visual vocabulary which constructs this figure, both beautiful and horrible, carries connotations of universality and permanence which contribute to the fixity required by the stereotype, and that the form itself carries a rigidity in its very materiality—it is a hard body—which also works to affix cultural difference in the relation it maintains with an historical and prohibitive discourse on bodily containment. In de Bry's images the metaphoric substitution crucial to the fixity of the stereotype and the masking of lack behind the visual signifier is accomplished through the consistent adherence throughout the volume, and the series, to a visual rhetoric rudimentary to graphic representation, and its proliferation through the technical apparatus of copper plate print. It is a mode of print which facilitates the action of the stereotype, not only in its reiterative aspect, but through its sharpening of the visual rhetoric in a precision of line unseen in the earlier woodcuts—a clarity integral to the incisive molding of the classical armature. In Léry's description, the Indian, who is merely a bodily container, as he cannot care for his soul, has his materiality accentuated in becoming an invincible bodily form, bordering on the threshold of the superhuman; and this allows de Bry to inject the savage into the sculpted sinews of the statuesque classical hero who attains superhumanity.

Léry's description unhinges the New World body from the monstrous forms engendered in antiquity by the likes of Herodotus and perpetuated through the work of Pliny the Elder, amongst others; and allows it to swing half-circle to the
normative position of the European body ("their bodies are neither monstrous or prodigious with respect to ours"). But then the description permits it to finish the cycle coming full-circle back to a superhuman form accessed again, ironically, through antiquity yet this time in its pantheon of gods rather than monstrosities. And this antique armature maintains its rigidity throughout the third volume (except for one key instance), and the entire series, even under its posthumous segmentation in the cannibal ritual (fig. 8). The stereotyped form is nervously reiterated in hopes of affixing permanence. This classicized visual rhetoric employed by de Bry taps into the thoroughly established semanticized space of Greco-Latin antiquity which, at this time, is at the core of the occident’s visual symbolic—it provides the syntax to a cultural language. As well, within this space the figures evoke particular semantic links to notions of permanence and universality, further grounding the discourse in an unwavering base and thus establishing the fixity of the stereotype. The visual idiom of the stereotype also links horizontally to contemporaneous discourses like anatomy which are grounding themselves in the truth, thus rigidity, of a scientific knowledge.

This well-recognized visual mode is a strong signifier. It attaches horrifying alterity to something antithetical—a very familiar visual vocabulary, a universalizing mode of picturing—in order to make it mean something within occidental optics. It mends the tear with which cultural difference introduces itself: it attaches cultural difference to a name within the cultural language of the west and allows it to mean, circumscribes it within nomination, makes it a sign under the signification process. This is the effective operation definitive of the order of things: to make things meaningful, attach meaning to objects perceived as distinct from ourselves, is to make something use-full, to establish it as a thing. This is productive: it returns the other to the same and represses the excess which cannot be made to mean as the residue which constitutes the Other. Through "a way of imaging"—a mode—cultural difference is masked in its being
fastened to the cultural fabric, in its affixture to a name. (But this a superficial mending) And in this way, de Bry's practice is homologous to the exorcist's, despite his inversion of the sequence. Whereas the exorcist attempts to get the possessed, whose diabolism is measured in her refusal to affix herself to the name of one demonic entity, to finally station herself on one name, on one linguistic locus, which thereby contains her within language and rehabilitates the symbolic; de Bry attaches the savage body to one particular name (not surprisingly often through the female nude) from the outset to initiate the movement and the fixity of the stereotype in order that its orchestrated deviation from that one standard may evoke a self-confessional from the diabolical Tupi body. It was an admission of guilt evoked in the same manner as the self-confessionals instituted in social practice by the missionaries in the New World, as described earlier, and the manner in which the witch and the possessed had their bodies turned back on themselves in confessions evinced by somatic signs. But in order to look at this manipulated deviation from the stereotype, its relationship to what has been a thoroughly referenced historical discourse has to be established.

The classicized Indian nude is, in its materiality, first and foremost a hard body. Its armature effectively maintains somatic boundaries, and in this way it enters into a whole prohibitive discourse on bodily containment as imbricated in the constitution of a social self, which has been the subject of the work of Norbert Elias. This work has subsequently been itself the subject of much discussion, particularly in relation to issues of sorcery during the great purge of diabolism in the early modern. The discourse on bodily containment is an historical instance signifying that in being born between feces and urine, through the vagina and next to the anus, it is not only castration which we often deny but the bloody mess from which we issue forth, the liminality between flesh and its decomposition.
Through the Renaissance, the body, and what it contained, stood as a microcosm of the cosmos rooted in the ancient Greek principle of melothesia and evinced in the divinatory pseudo-science of somatomacy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Under a taxonomy a system of interrelationships linked the various temporal cycles of nature—the zodiac, seasons, ages of life, etc.—to a topography—the four elements, cardinal points, etc.—which in turn corresponded to a structuration of physical qualities—hot, cold, dry and wet—and densities—liquid, gas, dense and solid—and a categorization of man's humours—blood, bile and phlegm—and temperaments—sanguine, choleric, melancholic and phlegmatic.\(^{151}\) In this way, the body was integral to the constitution of subjectivity, in a parallel manner to the visual, and its proper containment of the volatile fluids which it housed crucial to morality. In the early modern age, the subject learns to regulate its natural functions through the density of etiquette, while "society is gradually beginning to suppress the positive pleasure component in certain functions more and more strongly by the arousal of anxiety."\(^{152}\) And it has been shown that this disciplinary discourse on bodily containment, which posits physical musculature as the agent of moral fortitude, freely borrowed from the rhetoric of a contending discourse reveling in bodily transgression, which found pleasure and release in the crossing of corporal boundaries and thus eroticized the body's orifices.\(^{153}\) This may be evident in Léry's ravished speech and it is surely a borrowing made by de Bry in manipulating a deviation from the stereotype, and thus bodily containment, in having the Indian body testify against its diabolical self.

The Amerindian is anomalous for the European: he is with a soul and mind but without God, law, and breeches; she can maintain most effectively her physical self but she cannot maintain her soul, and as such the superior physical

\(^{151}\) Bucher, pp. 55-56.
\(^{152}\) Elias quoted in Roper, p. 6.
\(^{153}\) See no. 149 above.
form of the stereotyped armature is ironically all the more powerful reminder of her spiritual lack, thus her physical fitness and demonism increase in direct proportion. It is as if the heretical Indian body is an inversion of the Christian body which must be punished in order to address its internal and inherent corrupt state.\textsuperscript{154} Perhaps not surprisingly then, the stereotype is the condition of possibility of its deviation which will mark the cannibal as "truly" diabolical. As described earlier in relation to sorcery, the female body was seen as a particularly permeable surface due to its insatiable sexual appetite and a particularly volatile anatomical form which may thrust out its inverted masculine genitalia in a heated instant according to meldings of medical discourse and popular account.\textsuperscript{155} As well, the usually impermeable boundary of the male form could also lapse in allowing transgressive substances across its threshold in the delirium brought on by excessive drinking.\textsuperscript{156} But these transgressive bodies first need a stage to stand on.

\textbf{Theatrical Representation and the Subject}

... the drama that developed in the late sixteenth century fostered a vicarious participation and identification that made the spectators, in an imaginary but potent sense, the object of their own gaze. ... The power of the stage was precisely the power of fiction: the power to induce an audience to view themselves, and those around them... as actors in their own lives, as artificially and artfully manipulated constructions... constituted... by larger forces of cultural determination.

Steve Mullaney\textsuperscript{157}

\textsuperscript{154}Rose Marie San Juan suggested this intriguing complementary relationship between bodily forms during discussions of my text.


\textsuperscript{156}See Roper, p.145-167.

Mulaney's comment alludes to the fact that the theatrical (mode of) representation was particularly conducive to the process by which the occidental subject constituted itself through the sensory apparatus of vision—always both a transitive and self-reflexive movement locating difference within the substantive. And this stage of self-constitution serves as a particularly illuminating nexus of social and cultural vectors of relevance to de Bry's staging of the spectacle of New World alterity. The first Elizabethan playhouse was built in London in 1576 and as indicative of the new modes of theatrical representation emerging within Europe it significantly expanded the occidental symbolic economy.\textsuperscript{158} Theater, as such, was a novel and protean domain whose implications were difficult to delimit and contain within prohibitive ordinances, and as a result blurred the distinctions between several social categories. The transgression of gender roles evoked an anxiety, as Rabbi Zeal-of-the-Land says to the puppets in Jonson's \textit{Bartholomew's Fair}, "my maine argument against you is, that you are an abomination: for the Male, among you putteth on the apparel of the Female, and the Female of the Male."\textsuperscript{159} And this is an anxiety Stephen Orgel has shown to be imbricated in the heteroerotic and homoerotic desire evoked in the viewing and self-constituting audience members\textsuperscript{160}, whose observation of artificial others "requires and induces enhanced powers of observation and identification" necessarily blurring the boundary between the observing subject and the dramatic subject.\textsuperscript{161} It is also at the witch's sabbath, which encases "the moment when distinctions between oneself and others seem to elide, when the shape of the body seems to blur and utter helplessness and terror result."\textsuperscript{162} It is

\begin{footnotes}
\item[158]See ibid., p. 85.
\item[161]Mullaney, p.86.
\item[162]Roper, p. 25.
\end{footnotes}
perhaps not surprising, then, that theatrical staging, bodily dissolution in relation to the diabolical, and identificatory modes of viewing all meet in between the images of de Bry and the self-divisive image the viewer maintains of himself, that is, within the constitution of the subject of enunciation/utterance. That is, within the Other.

The rhetoric of New World representation facilitates theater's commentary on contemporary politics: Shakespeare, in *The Tempest*, references, almost verbatim, Montaigne's "Of Cannibals" and by extension then Léry. In turn, Léry, through de Bry, references Shakespeare through his use of contemporary Elizabethan and Italian modes of theatrical set design. The Renaissance stage was circumscribed on three sides by houses or arcades forming a half-hexagon or the better portion of a pentagon: de Bry uses this arrangement of the Tupi *malocas*, long houses with vaulted ceilings composed of palm fronds, in the images which focus on the activities which take place within the Tupi social space (fig. 9). It is this theatrical staging which sets up certain viewing perspectives and allows for the transgressions of body and identity which occur in the activities bounded by the theatrical set and through these viewing perspectives.

### A Diabolical Pair: the skeleton and the flesh

One image of the cannibal ritual as performed on the stage of the Tupi theater which appears in the third volume (fig. 10) is the first of very few instances in the *Historiae*, and the only instance in the third volume, when the savage body deviates from the fixity of the stereotype. The discourse on bodily containment sees the practical manifestation of the evil bodily fluids in certain transgressive behaviors such as fighting, fornicating, blaspheming and gluttony.

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163 Bucher makes this connection between Renaissance theatre and de Bry's configuration of Tupi social space, pp. 27-28.
Gluttony in particular, a sin which exceeded acceptable appetites through frequency, quantity, quality of substances ingested, and through the manner in which they are ingested, was linked to lust and led to incontinence of the eyes and ears according to scholastic theology. The cannibal was guilty of gluttony on all accounts, particularly the old female cannibal linked to the European archetype of the old female sorcerer through certain visual signs. The old women are given a particularly perfidious part in the play of cannibalism as their greed is antithetical to the generally controlled and ordered ritual. The old women,

more covetous of eating human flesh than the young ones, importune all those who have prisoners to dispatch them quickly...(They) are all assembled beside it (the cooking flesh) to receive the fat that drips off along the posts of the big, high wooden grills, and exhort the men to do what it takes to provide them always, with such meat...Licking their fingers, they say, "Yguatou:" that is, "It is good."  

It is the old woman, as imaged in three instances on the left hand side of the grill, alone who defies the cannibal ethic in her avidity as she furiously ingests all that she can, including the body's 'excremental' juices of blood and fat, in order that she satisfy her own appetites; rather than seeking the selfless vengeance of her dead ancestors as would be in accord with the economy of cannibal speech, where a saying is tantamount to a doing. The cannibal ritual, at one remove from immanence, is the one topos in the Tupi landscape where the European can find a socially interpretable act which redeems the diabolical native cosmos, and in fact marks the Tupi social body as superior due to its achieved level of social coherence through exclusionary practice. As I remarked earlier, this slight dislocation from immanence is all the order of things needs to exhume social signifiers and produce cultural meaning. And it is here, in her deviance from the cannibal ritual, that de Bry grasps the old woman as the

164 Bucher, p. 51.
165 Léry, p. 126.
166 Bucher, p. 51.
visual deviance from the stereotype which stands as a synecdoche for the entire diabolical cosmos of the Tupinamba. The aged and rapacious cannibal appears, not in the armature of the stereotype, but in its inversion, as a decomposing carcass which covets the transgressive bodily liquids referenced by Protestant poets in the cannibalism of the religious wars as indicative of the coming apocalypse prophesized in Deuteronomy. She appears in the liminal form which reminds one of the bodily transgression which is one's birth (or death). She aligns herself with the "object of horror" as described by Bataille: "a fetid, sticky object without boundaries, which teems with life and yet is the sign of death. It is nature at the point where its effervescence closely joins life and death, where it is death gorging life with decomposed substance." She is also associated with: the body parts ostensibly used by the old European sorcerer, the entrails and intestinal dejecta associated with the sabbath (fig. 11), the sodomy of the sabbath (fig. 12), and the cooking at the sabbath done through transgressions of the bodily (fig. 13), amongst other diabolical materials and practices (fig. 2). The old woman reminds one through somatic excesses that the savage is, first and foremost, suffering in the soul and thus depraved, despite the cannibal's ethic of speech. As Bernadette Bucher has concluded through a structural analysis of this visual anomaly within the de Bry images—an analysis rooted in the anthropology of Levi-Strauss and the subsequent work on bodily transgression by Mary Douglas in her much noted Purity and Danger—the dissolution of the bodily, manifested in the old woman, is directly linked to the entropy of the Tupi cosmos through the relationship between microcosm and macrocosm—body and universe.

Bucher concludes her study of the Historiae's third volume by remarking:

It is scarcely surprising to see cannibalism, condemned by society and thus belonging to the area of strictest taboos, conceived by part of European society

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167See Bucher, pp. 97-102.
168Accursed Share, II, p. 95.
of the sixteenth century as the motor of a regressive process moving against the order of the universe and dragging it toward a progressive and ineluctable destruction.\textsuperscript{169}

In finding the inversion of the stereotype simply a condemnation of Tupi cannibalism, Bucher reglosses an historical gloss over a minus in the origin so disturbing that in order for one to be of the nation's people one is obliged to have forgotten it--to remember to forget, the uncanny time of the performative. Cannibalism is not just an inversion of the axis of occidental stereometry: it works on a perpendicular axis, or perhaps on another plane entirely: cannibalism is the wound in the European social body oozing bile through the garment of the cultural fabric worn, yet also the practice definitive of a social ethic lauded as antithetical to the western cannibalism and the heterogeneity it proliferates. Responses to it are necessarily as complex as the phenomenon itself.

The image of the old hag as aging sorcerer, who makes her initial appearance in the \textit{Historiae}'s third volume, and only several others throughout the entire series, juxtaposes the image of the youthful natural beauty of the diabolical female parading around the island in a naked frenzy. This juxtaposition acts as a counterpart to the pubescent possessed female in Europe who succeeds the aging sorcerer as the object of the pedagogical campaign sent out to the margins. And it is in two images of the youthful Tupi woman's ritualized dance in preparation of the prisoner for the cannibal ritual--his release from thinghood--which evoke her perceived disorderly and festive nature (figs. 14,15).\textsuperscript{170} Léry describes the delirium, "chaotic noises and howls" of their ritual dance, again with something lurking below his speech:

> the women... let out such cries, for more than a quarter of an hour, that as we watched them we were utterly disconcerted. Not only did they howl, but also,

\textsuperscript{169}p. 63.
\textsuperscript{170}These images appear prior to the Léry text yet are implied, and thus recalled, as prerequisites to the images of the cannibal ritual itself.
leaping violently into the air, they made their breasts shake and they foamed at
the mouth - in fact, some, like those who have the falling-sickness over here,
fell in a dead faint; I can only believe that the devil entered their body and that
they fell into a fit of madness.\textsuperscript{171}

Léry's account reminds one of early seventeenth century descriptions of
possession. From the 1585 edition of the \textit{Histoire} on, through subsequent
editions, at this point in the text Léry includes a description of the witch's
sabbath from Jean Bodin's widely read \textit{De la demonomanie des sorciers} appended
by the comment, "I have concluded that they have the same master: that is the
Brazilian women and the witches over here were guided by the same spirit of
Satan . . ."\textsuperscript{172}

The scenes take place, again, within the Tupi theater and the construction of
such a theatrical set is really a transformation enacted by the order of things to
make things mean, to be productive, through the use of western geometrical
compositional arrangements culled from its own visual semantics and
playhouses. It is an effort to \textit{make sense} of Tupi social space. In the first scene
this geometrical ordering contrasts and contains the chaos of the women's
movements and vocalizations within a collapsed temporal sequence as the
prisoner, Staden, is lead by his yoke and then seated to have his eyebrows shorn
off in the beginnings of the festival under which the transgressive body of the
young possessed female is made manifest in the realm of practice through her
fornication with the prisoner. And in this chaotic performance on the Tupi
stage, the drama is located in a game--a game of nomination akin to the
reiterative 'hide and seek' of the possessed woman on the European stage of the
diabolical. As the text states she addresses her mate by exclaiming, "This day
before sunset your flesh will be my roast meat," and "Now I am come to avenge
the death of my friends:" the two statements implying that the prisoner's body

\textsuperscript{171}p. 141.
\textsuperscript{172}p. 248, endnote no. 14.
will become the signifier that binds the cannibal ethic; he is named as such and will make himself such. The act of nomination (that is, signification) is authorized by nothing, it authorizes signification. It compels belief. And the prisoner confirms, he is compelled to confirm, that he will 'grow into' the signifier: "I, your food, have come," he replies. And the case of Staden parallels that of Daniel Paul Schreber, as analyzed by Freud, in which Schreber, compelled by the name, reduces his body to an oscillation between decomposition and slut in order that he may fulfill the signifier: he gives himself over in the manner of a female harlot. Staden will be told by the Tupinamba that his god is "filth," that is the one who initiates signification through an absence of his body, Jesus Christ, has been reduced to rot; and this process by which the body is necessarily reduced to filth in becoming the signifier takes on significance as the narrative progresses.

In the second scene (fig. 14), the chaos of the female's movement has ostensibly been circumscribed by western writing's geometric ordering of the women in a circle, an ordering reinforced by the expanded view of the geometricity of the Tupi theater now including the rectilinear fencing of the inner defense system and the circularity of the outer fence. The concentric geometric arrangements close in on the central locus of the image where Staden, the exalted victim leaving thinghood, dances on the spot he is to die. This locus forms the key place within a morbid topography: the prisoner is continually shown the locus where he is to die and even built a temporary abode on the spot, as such this geographical topos takes on social significance. In the surrounding circle the practice of circumscription is not wholly successful: the women still manage to deviate from the ordered arrangement through their individual movements. Within the discipline of bodily containment and the

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173 De Certeau, Heterologies, p. 39.
174 See ibid, pp. 37-40.
rhetoric of Renaissance dance, which intermingled with the rhetoric of art criticism, the dance of the lithe nude Tupi women would have been considered lascivious, and thus inappropriate: in early modern descriptions of dance "it is made clear that bending of the body and extensions of the limbs were considered highly seductive"—even more so in the theater of the erotic. Any overt display of artifice in a woman's dance was anathema to her ostensible naturalness, her lack of constructedness, and as such opens the rift in signification between a given presence and its re-presentation. In this way the young female's dance, no less chaotic in the ordered arrangement of the circle than in the apparent disarray of the preceding scene, is antithetical to the cannibal ethic in an analogous manner to the old hag. In a superficial way her saying is equal to a doing, like in the savage ethic, as her saying is actually a practice—dance—thus the gap between representation and practice is seemingly collapsed; but this cursory collapse is as seductive as the dance itself. The lewd dance beguiles the viewer in arousal—the very response which marked the theater as potentially subversive—and is thus deceptive, all simulacra. It runs perpendicular to the honesty of the savage's saying; it contradicts the ethic. And it is perhaps not so surprising that the physically oppositional young beauty and old hag occupy homologous functions in relation to the cannibal ritual: they are the flipsides to one coin which runs counter to the flow of currency in the savage economy.

In the early modern period a discourse reveling in bodily excess, a discourse in some instances indissociable from its ostensible other—the discourse on bodily containment, fervently delineates the paths by which beauty could lead

to a "desire for defilement" and destruction. These are the paths which link the young Tupi beauty to the old decrepit woman, or analogously, across the Atlantic, the pubescent possessed virgin to the aging and decomposing sorcerer, as the routes which run perpendicular to the established paths in their respective domains; but the relationship between these relationships is paradoxical. The Tupi pair deviate from the cannibal ethic, the key locus where the European order can locate a social meaning; in a similar fashion, the diabolical twins of Europe breach the language of culture—yet the mediating link is twisted. The cannibal practice which orders social meaning amongst the Tupinamba is for Europe a minus in its origin which indicates the impossibility of meaning, the heterogeneity beneath signification. But first, the inseparability of the twins.

Veronique Nahoum-Grappe, in an incisive paper, has shown, through a rereading of Alexander Baumgarten's original definition of the word 'aesthetic,' how a woman's beauty may be given a social efficacy. Baumgarten writes:

"The more distinctive signs a perception includes, the stronger the impression it makes. That is why an obscure perception that includes more distinctive signs than a clear perception makes a stronger impression; the same for a confused perception that includes more distinctive signs than a distinct perception."

It follows that a woman's beauty—or as easily, in my estimation, her ugliness—would create a distinctive sign which would distract attention from the other signs within the (obscure) perception, thus it could redirect erotic desire or horror from its sexual goal to the social goal which is composed by the other less-noticed contextual signs in the perception. In the case of the Tupi pair, both the beauty and the ugly hag create distinctive signs which focus

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177See no. 150 above.
178Quoted in Nahoum-Grappe, p. 93.
179Nahoun-Grappe stresses beauty as a distinctive sign, yet its twin polarity, ugliness, necessarily would have served a homologous function.
180Ibid., p. 94.
attention on the stereotype (the beauty) and its complement (the hag), diverting attention from the contextual signs of the cannibalism from which these women deviate. Thus the erotic desire evoked by the stereotyped pair can be rechanneled toward the social goal aimed at by the contextual signs of cannibalism, and this is really what is at issue—the conflicting relationships the social practice of cannibalism holds with the European order and the Tupinamba socius. It is not surprising that the inevitable feminine couple, beauty juxtaposed to death and decay, appeared often in sixteenth century iconography or that the anatomical discourse of flayed bodies and skeletons, which the Historiae references in its visual mode, and gains authority through as a truthful knowledge, was enmeshed in a moral discourse on human fragility and the inevitability of death.\(^{181}\) And for Bataille, "The smoothness, the tumescence, the milky flow of feminine nudity anticipate a sensation of liquid outpour, which itself opens onto death like a window onto a courtyard."\(^{182}\)

The covetous old Tupi woman can in no way be seen as threatening to the metaphorical masking of the stereotype, hardly; they are co-conspirators. The older twin is an inversion of the younger stereotype, yet, as inversions leave structure in tact, she is homologous to the stereotype, integral to it. She allows the European to manage any possible opposition to the stereotype as simply its inversion, thus resistance is managed reductively. She is not the supplemental lack registered by the stereotype metonymically, but a tertiary attempt to mask the masking of it. As the viewer oscillates between the twin poles of Tupi femininity—youthful beauty and aging decomposition—she reenacts the movement of the stereotype between the erotic binarism 'desire-horror,' and this is where the con takes place. The horror evoked by the inversion of the stereotype is not the same horror, at all, as that evoked by the theoretical

\(^{181}\) Lestringant, p. 78.

\(^{182}\) Accursed Share, II, pp. 152-153, my emphasis.
movement of the stereotype—its metonymic indexing of lack in the origin. The former is an innocuous horror—an impostor—which stands in proxy for the latter real horror, and allows the viewer, on one level, to experience horror painlessly, as the real psychical disturbance associated with the latter horror reverberates through deeper structures. The stereotype, theoretically, is a masking of metonymic lack through metaphoric substitution; its inversion, the complement to the stereotype, is only another paradigmatic substitution for the horror evoked for the original lack. The stereotype masks a lack in the origin and the inversion masks a lack in the stereotype, thus the inversion masks the mask. The pertinent issue then is the original lack masked by the stereotype and the disturbance it sends through the enunciative subject, and thus through discourse.

Preparing Difference

The crucial historical determinant in the identificatory process is that the newly crowned subject of truth and knowledge constitutes himself through visual re-presentation, and hence always formulates himself through the scopic drive and the locus of the other. The colonial subject looks into the cultural mirror of the stereotype and returns to a point of total identification in the narcissism of the imaginary, and like in the imaginary, where the fullness of identification is always menaced by lack, the integrity of the stereotype is always threatened by the heterogeneity behind it. This necessitates the incessant and nervous reiteration of the stereotype, aided by the printing process, that gives it both its fixity and its uncanny quality, as it is continuously agitated by lack, in the manner that the pedagogical is perpetually unsettled by the performative. Discriminatory practices must continually presence their object of difference in order to naturalize it, make it seem self-evident, and this

183 See Bhabha, pp. 76-79, for the narcissism of the imaginary in the vascillation of the stereotype.
is the repetition known to the stereotype. The ubiquity of the Tupinamba's visible difference--its body's excessive humanity revealed in a quintessential materiality, its armature "human, all too human"--naturalizes it as an a priori. What this effectively does is to repress the "preconstruction or working up of difference" and it is the hope of the executor of discriminatory discourse that he can remain unscarred by the discourse to the extent that he successfully carries out this repression.\textsuperscript{184} But the subject is never cleansed of discourse despite his having washed his hands of it: he and the discourse are marked by an ambivalence at the point of identification --the stereotype. Bhabha concludes, "The role of fetishistic identification, in the construction of discriminatory knowledges that depend on the 'presence of difference,' is to provide a process of splitting and multiple/contradictory belief at the point of enunciation and subjectification." It is at this point between the "I" which enunciates a saying (a representation) and the "you" who receives it in the process of self-subjectification, that the disturbance is registered as "the recognition and disavowal of difference is always disturbed by the question of its re-presentation or construction."\textsuperscript{185}

Transmutation: the Other's disarranging move within the discourse of the same

Facts are falsified when it is said that the subject I is the determination of the verb to think. \textit{Ca} thinks, but that \textit{ca} can surely be this old and illustrious \textit{I} is, if we cast it in moderate terms, only a hypothesis, an allegation." \textsuperscript{186}Friedrich Nietzsche

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item \textsuperscript{184}Ibid., p. 80
  \item \textsuperscript{185}Ibid., p. 81
  \item \textsuperscript{186}Ibid., p. 267, endnote no. 8 (de Certeau's translation from German).
\end{itemize}
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Alterity marks an affliction in the symbolic, and the Symbolic misdiagnoses this affliction as being manifest in a simple wound - a tear in the cultural flesh; it thus believes that the affliction can be remedied through a suturing which reformulates the integrity of the body. Perhaps it is not coincidental that within the visual narrative of Theodor de Bry this procedure leads to the dissemination of the stereotype - a well contained body, an armature free of any wounds. This classicized shell not only repairs the cultural body but rejoins the flesh and sinews in a superior manner: it fastens the visible difference, alterity, to a strongly semanticized signifier - the classical visual rhetoric rooted in a Greco-Latin tradition germane to early modern visual representation. As in the case of Schreber, the Indian body is "a body 'remade' for and by the name": it is authorized by that which is authorized by nothing, that which is authorization, signification, nomination. In the same manner, but in a counter direction, the Tupi body is made into the signifier within the cannibal cosmos, as the body which solely bears witness to the cannibal ethic: it is the loss one endures to maintain the synonymity of a saying and a doing. And it is this collapse between the cultural and the social in the Tupi realm which will funnily upset the same relation, between social practice and its representation, in occidental space.

At first in the west, amongst the vacuity left by a pronounced lack of New World representation, the Tupi body is a silent entity of bodily gestures which are unspeakable --despite its orality it is silent; but the order of production cannot tolerate such silence beyond signification as it constitutes itself in making things mean, in being productive, in creating a plane--the Symbolic--on which objects can be distinguished and fastened to a meaning . If the Tupi body wants to be heard--although this is in fact the desire of the occidental body--it must slip into a stereotyped garment of classical thread, or coerced in, then it can be heard.

\[187\text{De Certeau, } Heterologies, \text{ p. 39.}\]
Not only heard, but heard so clearly that it is audible before it speaks, due to an overly familiar visual rhetoric, a strong signifier. It has been pushed past the threshold of meaning, the proper name, which Levi-Strauss describes as representing "the quanta of signification below which one does no longer anything but point."188 It has then been attached to a social signifier, a proper topos, within the visual topography of the west.

And it is this link which is crucial for western symbolics, as the rift which representation opened within mimesis, between a word and a thing, marks an anxiety in the subject: he must constitute himself over and above the rift in his mastery over the representational process—in re-presenting an object as an image to his mind he appropriates the object and constitutes himself. He formulates himself by connecting a word (representation) and a thing (object), thus it is crucial to him as an "I," an interlocutor, to be well-connected to his proper social signifier, a name. This is the link which allows the Tupi body to enter the west's cultural language, but the subject of discourse doesn't realize that in making this connection, and in constituting himself in the other, his link to a name is always partial and unstable. He believes that in connecting the other to a familiar form— the operation of the stereotype--he has processed it in its entirety, made it useful, and constituted himself in full; but he misses the excess, the residue, which cannot be made to mean, and which lingers disturbingly within the subject's constitution between the "I" and its name, marking a minus within the subject. The lack glossed by the stereotype. This is the mark which never allows the perpetrator of discriminatory discourse to remain untouched by his very discourse. It signifies the working up of difference.

"I am/is seen"

188Quoted in The Writing, p. 261.
I am that.  
Jacques Lacan\textsuperscript{189} 

I is an other. Too bad for the wood that happens to be a violin.  
Arthur Rimbaud\textsuperscript{190} 

Rimbaud claims, "Je est un autre" (I is an other), just as the subject of discourse, who always constitutes himself partially in the mirror of the other and through the stereotype should announce himself, \textit{I is that}. And from this statement Rimbaud can go on to say, "It is false to say: I think. We ought to say, \textit{I am thought}."\textsuperscript{191} And this is precisely the issue within the Tupi body, which should say \textit{I am seen}, in inverting the oath of the martyr, "I have seen." The Tupi body's statement begs the question, "by whom?", which in turn redirects the gaze of the subject of discourse back on itself and back to where the disturbance really lies. The whole game of circumscription and disturbance, the adequation of a self and a name, circulates within the space defined by the linguistic shifters "I" and "you", rather than "he" and "she," which according to Benveniste "exist only insofar as they are actualized in the instance of discourse where, each through their own instances, \textit{they mark the speaker's process of appropriation}."\textsuperscript{192} The caesuras opened by the Tupi body occur in the topography of symbolic appropriation, where the subject latches onto discourse, in enunciative modalities, after all the subject of truth and knowledge constitutes himself in representation through appropriation of the \textit{seen} object. The space of linguistic shifters is configured between an enunciation and a statement, and in the possibility of their linkage—the very space which cannibal practice collapses. This is the third space of discourse, as sketched by Bhabha and Foucault, defined in the desire between subjects—the intersubjective realm of discourse.

\textsuperscript{189}See no. 49 above.  
\textsuperscript{190}Quoted in \textit{The Writing}, p. 257.  
\textsuperscript{191}Ibid., p. 257.  
\textsuperscript{192}Ibid., p. 258
This third space is always constituted, not in what has been said, but in a mode, or way, of saying: this is why Foucault's concern is not with linguistics but with discursive syntax. Western discourse misses the point: it manages, attempts to manage, alterity in its bodily form—the stereotype—but it is the way of the body which upsets it. It is not the materiality of the Tupi female's body itself which menaces the prisoner; it is in the way which that body conducts itself, in her mode of practice: she parades her body around the prisoner in a lascivious manner poking, jeering, mocking him while exclaiming, "Cursed be you my meat", "Today I will cut your head off", "Now I am come to avenge the death of my friends" and "This day before sunset your flesh will be my roast meat." It is the way in which the valiant prisoner of war remains defiant right up to his final moment, when his brains are dashed out, and it is he who is victorious through the act of challenge. It is the way in which his body dies. It is the gesture of the Tupi body which is unspeakable in the west. It is the excess which the order of things can't circumscribe and make mean, the absurd share which defines the realm of immanence in a movement (a way) between loci (words and bodies), not in the loci themselves.

Occidental discourse tries to manage the unsettling effects of cultural difference in the stuff of its images, in the bodily form of the stereotype and in the compositional arrangements interrelating the forms as the content of the image, and so misses the unsettling effects within subjectivity and between subjects in the third space of discourse. It mistakes a formal transgression—the old hag—for the more incisive discursive transgression which takes place within and between subjects—producers and receivers. Alterity doesn't open a hole in the official discourse through which we could see a discourse of the other, in the manner that the portal of the frontispiece does. The other's discourse is not some corpse buried beneath official discourse which must be exhumed and

193 See Alexander, p. 108.
exposed as the Tupi-French colloquy in Lery assumes. The other's discourse is within official discourse and can only be delineated in tracing the reordering it makes of this official discourse. By allowing the Tupi body into official discourse so it could be heard, through the stereotype, western representation provided the conduit through which the Tupi body could inject itself within discursive and manifest itself in an alteration. The discourse of the other is constituted in the affiliation that a perturbing image maintains with a syntactical designation. The discourse of the other is configured in the vectors traced out in the third space of discourse by the movement of desire between subjects constituting themselves through such movements.

Ways of Looking: fixed, mobile and ambivalent perspectives in visualizing space

Landscape is nothing but Deceptive visions, a kind of cousning or cheating your owne Eyes, by our owne consent and assistance, and by a plot of your owne contriving.

Norgate

De Bry makes his artistic intervention, leaves the mark of the martyr's body to be seen by the next, through the addition of imagistic detail leading to depth and thus perspective. And as it turns out the far-reaching implications of depth exceed the represented space, pierce the space of representation, extend out into the subject of enunciation and thus into the density of discursive relations: perspective as depth posits both a theoretical subject of representation—the artist—and its receptive subject—the viewer, who occupy homologous positions.

According to Maurice Merleau-Ponty:

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194 Léry, 178-195.
All men accept without any speculation the equivalence of depth and breadth; this equivalence is part and parcel of the self-evidence of an intersubjective world, which is what makes philosophers as forgetful as anyone else of the originality of depth.\textsuperscript{196}

It is precisely depth's originality which marks a theoretical subject of enunciation in relation to a receiving subject: depth is "the juxtaposition of simultaneous points in one direction which is that of my gaze"\textsuperscript{197} - but one woman's depth is another man's breadth - a man off to the side. In order for the viewer of the image to experience the breadth as depth she must become ubiquitous, or at least mobile: she must trans-порт herself from the position of the receptive subject of an image, positioned by enunciative modalities in the real world of practice, off to the side as the spectator of representation freed of "cultural positionality." Breadth replaces the relation of the subject to the intersubjective world before him - depth - with a relation among 'things' where a perceiving subject is not implied. Once again, the subject is constituted in alienation: subjectivity is formalized in representing the visual other to the self, yet it must do so while denouncing its own worldly positionality, re-presenting things off to the side, in alienation. The Other inaugurates the subject through the disordering of visual representation and whispers "desire may be the underside of the Law." But this lateralization has yet further resonance, a further unsettling effect.

As always, the spatial and the temporal are \textit{c}o\textit{x}e\textit{t}ensive, but more appropriately for this corollary, are \textit{sim}ult\textit{a}ne\textit{ous}: to see an object in the distance is to see an object which is contemporaneous to you as a subject, contiguity implies contemporaneity. Depth positions a present moment within \textit{history}. Breadth undoes this historicity and alienates the historical subject: it is a\textit{historical}. And my point here is not that lateralization had never been a part of representationalist space before, but that it shows up at a very particular historical moment which locates breadth as a certain functional component.

\textsuperscript{196}Quoted in Marin, \textit{To Destroy}, p. 61.\textsuperscript{197}Ibid.
within a historical constitution of occidental subjectivity through the visual image. A constitution undone and redone in a violent encounter with radical alterity.

De Bry's artistic coup within the graphic representation of the New World—the inscribed proliferation of detail filling out a perceived depth—is interesting in that it offers two new possibilities for the representation's grounding in an enunciative field. While depth positions a fixed subject in front of the image in the density of discursive relations, the detail which constitutes it calls the subject's attention—now that it had been gained as the subject was fixed in space—to the luxurious surface of representation where the particularity of sharply incised lines flow in the push and pull of various pleasurable tides and currents. In calling attention to the utterative marks of the author, his artifice, the representation points to its own constructedness self-consciously and gives itself up, it reveals its surface of representation as supportive of an enunciative field.

The European attempts to return alterity to the same, not only in the stereotype, but also through the compositional arrangements in which the stereotype wanders, in the geometrically configured space of the Tupi theater and the linear perspective it creates. Ptolemy was the first to explain linear perspective through geometry and visual optics, as seen in the configuration of the Ancient Greek theatrical set, and his system depended on the quantifying eye of the human viewer who was free to gaze at the world in a detached manner, as if looking at it on a stage. And this recalls the subject's self-constitution through the viewing of theatrical representation, as occidental representation resurrected the concept of the image as a stage with certain mechanisms, such as illusionistic architectural proscenium framing the scenes,

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198 Sam Edgerton Jr., "From Mental Matrix to Mappamundi to Christian Empire: The Heritage of Ptolemaic Cartography in the Renaissance" in Art and Cartography, p. 38.
inducing the viewer to position himself in front of the representation and view the events as taking place beyond the surface within the theatrical set. This Renaissance visual trope, the creation of linear perspective and thus *depth*, provided the theoretical apparatus with which Theodor de Bry was to make his intervention into the visual discourse on New World encounter. As well, these inherited optics of viewing, and their manifestation in the symmetricality and orthogonality of the ideal cityscape, were linked to notions of moral rectitude through the scholastic theologians. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that the two loci through which western discourse attempted to return alterity to the same—in the bodily containment of the stereotype and in compositional arrangement—were both key sites for the erection of normative ethical positions amongst European moralists. The two key configurations in the ideal cityscape were the modular grid and the graph of concentric circles, and many New World utopias for Christian communities were imagined in this way. In de Bry's images the Tupi social space, which contains what for Léry and others is a kind of ethical utopia, appears as the integration of these two plans making it the quintessential community plan (fig. 9). In this form it could be made to mean within western visual representation, could be of use to the production apparatus. But the perspectival apparatus is ambivalent.

Insofar as it creates a stage on which the events of the drama seemingly unfold as if through their own locomotion, disengaged from any theoretical subject position, the perspectival apparatus posits the surface of representation as transparent and thus negates the apparatus of production and its concomitant theoretical subject position. Insofar as it locates a singular positioned subject through one particular point of view and actually distorts the sensory process of visual perception, the perspectival apparatus posits the very theoretical subject position that it ostensibly negated in its complementary aspects. In the

199See Edgerton, p. 46.
determination of a singular viewpoint linear perspective recognizes the
originality of depth for the subject of discourse and thus gives it cultural
positionality in enunciative modalities. Beyond this, the perspectival apparatus
distorts visual perception as it negates the spherical character of the visual
spectrum and the convex structure of the retinal picture. According to Marin,
following and quoting Erwin Panofsky, the image

... constructed according to the laws of legitimate perspective makes us see
what we never see, which we may say in passing, is a perfect definition of a
model. Such [n image] realizes in its representation of space, something of
which immediate experience has no knowledge, namely, homogeneity and
infinity. As it designates and makes them visible, allowing them to be
experienced, it "transforms psychophysiological space into (geometrical and)
mathematical space."

In this way, the image, formulated according to the dictates of legitimate
perspective, insofar as it opens a disjunction between its represented space and
'real' perceived space in the empirical world, points to its own constructed and
illusionistic nature and thus the position of a subject of production. In its
indeterminate relationship to a theoretical subject position, as both positing and
then negating a subject position, the perspectival mechanism initiates the
ambivalence generated in the oscillation constitutive of the process of
denegation. But the linear perspectival apparatus does not order all of the
images in the Historiae's third volume.

The Ptolemaic tradition inherited by the early modern and the concomitant
Greek notion of ekphrasis --description through verbal or written rhetorical
means --were adopted by painters to assert that their graphic work equaled the
description of the written word. Yet Ptolemy's use of the term grapho also linked
the creation of an image to graphic, rather than written, description, just as the
martyr, who sees and must be seen, necessitated a graphic description in the

200 To Destroy Painting, p. 128.
201 Ibid.
202 For a discussion of Freud's process of denegation and its evocation in the painting's of Poussin and
Caravaggio see ibid., esp. pp. 45-65.
tradition of travel accounts. Svetlana Alpers has identified a relationship between this graphic description and Northern modes of map and picture making which contrasts the link between written description and Southern modes of painting employing the linear mode of perspective. Both seem to be evident in the images of de Bry.

The Northern tradition instead utilized Ptolemy's 'distant point perspective' which conceived of the image as a flat unbound surface onto which the world could be inscribed, as opposed to a stage for significant human actions. The divergence with the linear perspectival image is "not in geometry but in pictorial conception," but the implications of this divergence are extensive. Perhaps most importantly, with the use of distant point perspective the viewer's position, or positions, are included within the domain he is surveying, thus unfastening the single located viewing position integral to linear perspective and (recalling Marin and Merleau-Ponty) upsetting enunciative modalities. Images conceived in this fashion did not include a positioned viewer, the pictorial frame (closure), or the notion of the representational surface as a window through which an external viewer perceived events, as did perspectival images: it is as if they are viewed from nowhere, and are not to be looked through, as the opacity of the representational apparatus is recognized. Interestingly, this perspective incorporating a more graphic mode of description, due to its conception, could include within it sections of the domain seen in the opposing linear perspective. Conversely, images formulated through linear perspective, due to its conception, could not admit contending perspectives. The result being that images conceived in distant point perspective could contain contradictory points of view within one image (although the notion of one

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203 For a more detailed discussion of what I will only outline here, see "The Mapping Impulse in Dutch Art," pp. 51-95.
204 Ibid., p. 70.
205 Ibid., p. 71.
image is not appropriate to such an open mode of representing), and as such, are playful. These images emphasize surface and extent over volume and plasticity: they readily give up the surface of representation, they are representations conscious of themselves as such, at the expense of the artist's illusionistic creation of depth, as the tricks of illusion are revealed in the surface.

The spaces imaged in this way are looked at from what is often called the 'bird's-eye-view' which is not the view seen from a real viewer's or artist's position but more a description of the way in which the surface of the earth was transmuted onto the two-dimensional surface of representation. As implied in its name, it does not assume a positioned viewer but one engaged in flight. In this cumulative manner of connecting space no one gaze dominates, allowing the image to be innovative and "even playful, and as such they are conscious of their craft." Also the conception of the image allows the subject to wander into the represented space and as such it posits no break between the process of vision and what is visualized—the act through which the subject constitutes himself and the object he appropriates through this process. Again, the self splits into subject and object positions.

One trajectory within this Northern tradition of pictorial conception is found in certain topographical city views, and Alpers locates the rudimentary framework for this mode in the series of cityscapes done by Braum and Hogenberg between 1572 and 1618, slightly before and during the de Bry project, and carried on in Brueghel (fig. 16) and others. This is the compositional arrangement de Bry seems to use as the ordering principle to several of the initial images in each of the narratives of the third volume which mark the departure from an "over here," the voyage across the disorienting abstract space of the ocean, and arrival at the coast "over there." In the opening image to Léry's narrative (fig. 17) a late sixteenth century port is referenced,

206 ibid., pp. 91-92.
making the image contemporaneous to the years of its production in the de Bry workshop rather than the actual historical event of Léry’s departure which took place in 1557. It is as if the recognition of place in space is given primacy over the temporal order which it confuses, as if space must be seen and recognized in order for time to begin. "As in the realm of natural knowledge, the new testimony of the eye challenged the traditional authority of history," Alpers remarks. And the image further confuses the temporal order in relation to Staden’s narrative.

The image which ends Staden’s narrative as a return home to a European port, and which also began his narrative, is reused as an indication of Léry’s voyage out to an over there. It thus appears 'consecutively' in the volume, at the end of Staden and the beginning of Léry, reinforcing the process constitutive of the order of things: a return to the same. The image, exemplary of the Dutch genre of cityscapes and hence formulated according to the pretexts of distant point perspective, is marked by an interesting dichotomy permitted by the compositional arrangement. As noted, the distant point perspective allows contradictory views to be contained within one discrete represented space, and here this innovation in pictorial conception permits a theoretical mechanism to engage the social practice which partially comprises the image’s content. The city’s urban plan projecting at an angle to the image’s right border marks the emerging bourgeois city, defined in the process of production: it is a synecdoche of the order of things which must transform entities into things of use value, to make them mean. It is constituted in the productive social practices of utility seen in the economic activity of the port: appropriately, the cityscape is defined according to the laws of linear perspective as it is the one of the theoretical mechanisms which the west employs in order to transform space into something meaning-full within visual discourse. Within the cultural language the

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207 Ibid., pp. 90-91.
perspectival apparatus as a cultural practice serves the same function as the economic activities of social practice within the socius: they transform according to principles of utility and make things mean, they mark a return to the same. Although, as evinced in the ambivalence of the perspectival mechanism, it should never be assumed that these practices are ever wholly efficacious. The social practices along the perspectival line of the dock also mark a border, or threshold.

The order of things injects its practical man of autopsy—the martyr—into the abstract theoretical space of the ocean, which swallows up the heterogeneity associated with its flux in the homogeneity of a theoretical space permitting no points of reference, thus no linear perspective. It dislocates the positioned subject of perspectivalism and lets him experience the disorienting effects associated with the oceanic voyage within identity; as connoted by the fantastic nature of the following image (fig. 18), whose surfacing fish and airborne birds seem to coalesce in chimerical flying amphibious creatures amongst several cosmographical elements. But perhaps the self-contradictory nature of distant point perspective is best seen in the several images which mark the cross-Atlantic border between the oceanic expanse and the heterogeneity of the Brazilian jungle of immanence—images which are implied by these two as they follow them in the Staden narrative.

These images, as hybrids of maps and pictures, reference the Dutch genre which works within the distant point framework as they combine: the rigidly demarcated mapped edge of the Brazilian coast—the interface between the American frontier and the abstraction of the ocean; the flora and fauna of the land; the maritime activities of the martyr, who it is assumed has entered into the surveyed space as the perspectival framework allows this; the activities and spaces of the Tupi socius; European forts contemporaneous to the historical event; and future European towns modeled in linear perspective (whose actual
existence would have postdated even the image's production). The activities of
the figures in the images serve to interconnect the disjunctive perspectives used
for the various spaces and thus underline their incongruency. For instance in
one image (fig. 19), the crew which is escaping shipwreck near the island of St.
Vincent in the oceanic space moves onto the landed space established on the
shore of the bay, and are transformed into giants as they tower over the town,
seen in linear perspective, and even the trees which dwarf the edifices. And the
disjunctions are not just of a spatial nature: they juxtapose contradictory
temporal moments.

Temporal dislocations are also evident between consecutive images. The
shipwreck scene and the image which follows it (figs. 19, 20) depict the fort of
Brikioka in two contrasting stages of architectural development, although the
two images reference contemporaneous events; as well each image collapses
several temporal moments within the one instant and, again, several spatial
perspectives within one scene. In the second image (fig. 20), the martyr, Staden,
has now explicitly entered the scene in the crucial moments which surround his
coerced disrobing during his capture by the Tupinikin tribe. He appears twice
in the same image: once clothed and then again naked. From the bird's-eye-
view of distant point perspective the surveyed space is inscribed onto the
unbounded surface of representation whose two-dimensional composition is
fully admitted and thus the mobile position of the theoretical subject can enter
into the surveyed space and even occupy several positions within it, as
evidenced by the several appearances made by Staden in each scene. And the
movement of the martyr through the surface of representation, which is his
representational apparatus, into the represented space has extensive
implications.

The contract of the martyr states that he is to be believed (that is seen),
because he has seen, he is a body in the service of a seeing, which therefore
necessitates that the viewer *see him in the process of seeing the Tupi body*. He must 'be seen to be believed.' This splits the theoretical position of the martyr who must produce the image, yet he must enter into it and be seen in the process of seeing if he is to be believed by the viewer. The conceptual framework of distant point perspective, which posits a theoretical subject who is nowhere, yet everywhere, is thus crucial to the practice of the martyr in his return to the same in this particular historical juncture. The martyr's entry into, and movement throughout, the represented space through a malleable perspectivalism is a nebulous itinerary: it blurs the distinction between the subject's practice of self-constitution through seeing and the appropriated object of that seeing. The self becomes both the constituted subject and the object appropriated in its own constitution. And, as Bataille has said, we do not really know ourselves until we have seen ourselves both from within as subjects, and from without as objects.

The itinerary is ambivalent: it both unhinges an enunciating subject from his position within discourse, from his cultural positionality, and also calls attention to the surface of representation, and thus the image's constructedness as representation, through the inclusion of contiguous and contradictory viewpoints and the opacity of the representational apparatus—cartographic place names, *Brikioka, Inlulae S. Vincetti, S. Maro, Uwattibi*, hover above the represented space on the surface of representation as the utterative scars of discourse (fig. 19). Again the oscillation between a theoretical subject position being posited--the relationship between a producer and a receiver—in enunciation, and the negation of such a determined position, traces the movement of denegation within the third space of discourse. The sign of a disturbance within the circulation of official discourse. The effects of the distant point mechanism extend outside their domain though, as the unhinged subject position moves through this perspectival apparatus and through the linearity of perspectivalism and into the theater of Tupi cannibalism. The theoretical
position of the European subject becomes immersed in the space defined through a cannibal ethic, a space in which one must wage one's own body in order to enter.

Rhetoric of Being: a perturbing Tupi movement within European discursive space

... there is no discourse of the other, only an alteration of the same. 

Michel de Certeau

The images of the activities associated with the cannibal ritual take as their ordering principle the savage ethic and as their primary agent, the body in the service of this ethic—both multivocal propositions. The Tupi body reiterates itself and becomes both the signifier for cultural difference within the official western discourse, the stereotype (and its inversion), and in practice it makes itself into the signifier central to the Tupi socius: it is the signifier occupying the rift between a word and a thing "over here" and constituting the equation between a saying and a doing "over there." The cannibal practice is both what must be forgotten by the occidental subject as the sign of New World immanence/excess and as a minus in the European origin; and also what could be exalted as the sign of an ethical utopia of social cohesion. The images, partially constituted as scenes of cannibalism in the represented space, are no less ambivalent in relation to the contiguous third space of discourse in which they are also partially constituted, defined between and within subjects of production and reception.

Release of the Prisoner and Viewer in Festivity

In order that the victim/hero of the cannibal ritual be released from thinghood back into immanence he is made the exalted central figure to festivities of excess, such as the cahouinage where the women prepare the

208 Ibid., p. 265.
alcoholic beverage to be ingested exorbitantly by the men (fig. 13). And the
guest of honour, identified by the rope around his neck, does in fact occupy the
central locus in the composition. The image references, in establishing three
horizontal registers of activity, European ties to ancient pagan festivity and
contemporaneous tropes of the ubiquitous daemonological discourse as
juxtaposed to a Rabelaisian literature of bodily excess: the foreground register
delineates the lineaments to the preparation of the cahouin through the woman's
mastication of a root, a process in which the transgressive fluids of her body
allowed to work on the bulb through the orifice of the mouth; in the middle
register, where the men embossed in their plumed display, which Léry will
mockingly refer to as their "full papal splendor,"209 ingest the liquor which will
later transgress their bodily boundaries as urine and vomit expelled on the spot;
and in the background register, where the idolatrous male dancers perform
what is usually a rigidly ordered movement but here a libation of the
transgressive male body in the drunken (and murderous) state associated with
the archetype Cain. Despite their being no signs of the usually-present
architectural circumscription of the events, a viewer, the viewer, is aware that he
is within the Tupi theater of diabolical excess.

But the viewer is compelled not just by the forms within the represented
space or the compositional configuration of them as definitive of this space, but
perhaps more importantly in the relation he, as a subject of discourse, maintains
with the represented space through the surface of representation, which always
refers to the subject of production. That is, he is constituted, not simply through
the relationships within the discursive object, the formal grammar of visual
language, but in the links which bind the discursive object, that which actually
demarcates the object, to real subjects of production and reception through the
manipulation of theoretical positions of viewpoint. And in this historical

209p. 64.
The three horizontal registers have been lateralized: for any one register, the axis of narrative events has been rotated 90 degrees from an orientation in which the viewer sees the narrative axis in depth, from front to back; or just as easily a positioned viewer has been unhinged and allowed to float somewhere off on the left out of the scene, yet within the represented space, behind the surface of representation which divides illusion from 'real' space. If each narrative axis has a 0-point in which the story begins, seen as the front in depth, and a vanishing point in which the story ends, seen as the back according to the perspectival viewpoint, then the focal point of the story, occurring in the middle of the narrative axis, under the rotation becomes the old vanishing point seen in depth. This is perhaps best seen in the background register where the focal point of the register, the only bare-chested man among them, now occupies what had been the vanishing point of the image under the perspectival apparatus; or in the middle register with the figure whose body testifies to the cannibal ethic. In short, the vanishing point of the story becomes the focal point where the story seems to tell itself as the theoretical subject position has been unhinged and thus there is no telling subject present. The narrative ostensibly slips out of its bonds to the discursive third space unscathed (if we remember what Merleau-Ponty had to say about the originality of depth and the detached nature of laterality).

As the subject becomes a ubiquitous and abstracted eye, a deity, it quits being a perceiving entity in the empirical world, "flesh that is both closed and

\[\text{210} \text{Marin, To Destroy, p. 58.}\]
open, a gaze that can both see and be seen." And here we are reminded of both the martyr and Bataille's subject as perceived by itself, as both subject and object. Identity, as body constituted in the worldly, frees itself to become the seer of an image. Depth implies a relationship between the viewing subject and the things which he views, thus between a subject and his process of self-constitution and appropriation, but breadth implies only a relationship amongst things as if detached from a subject, as though the ends of the production apparatus - things, objects - could be divorced from the producing subject. But depth seen through perspective is not only a matter of space.

Just as space can only be understood from the subjective position in the continuity produced through the synthesis of gradations of depth, time too must be understood as the accumulative function of gathering and interlocking instants, temporal bits: Space and Time are concomitant: an object seen in the distance in depth by the subject does not exist out of time, the subject and object are contemporaneous.

The image of the cannibal ritual's festivity exists through a series of three lateralizations: in this way, the reiteration of the stereotype throughout the image (and others) is matched by the reiteration of subject positions 'off to the left.' The lateralizations posit unhinged subjects existing (out of the scene, but) in the represented space of the Tupi ritual: a 'Tupi' viewer. But in order that the ritual be seen and read, and thus understood or comprehended, by the viewer, he must integrate the registers as gradations of depth seen through the perspectival apparatus which finds its focal point in that of the ritual—the prisoner, or better the victorious victim. The viewer is also pinned by the contemporaneity of the image: seen in depth the represented space is the subject's contemporary, yet it is a detached Tupi space, what is actually contemporary to the subject is the image as integrated—a surface of representation. Again, the image and viewer

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211Ibid., p. 61, my emphasis.
vacillate in denegation: between free floating subject positions from which the story tells itself in utterance, seemingly free of discursive stigma - the blood left from the wounds endured by the subject of discourse in having hands and feet nailed to his cross of representation; and a position grounded in enunciative modalities which synthesizes the narrative of the image and recognizes its constructedness in the contemporaneity of the present moment.

A Mediating Axis of Style

The image of the instant just prior to the crucial moment in the drama of the cannibal ritual (fig. 21) offers the viewer a privileged seat in the theater of the diabolical, not the elevated position (which most of the images locate) as might be found in the balcony, but the only position which puts the viewer on an even plane with the events. This is the only image in the volume which establishes so distinctly such an immediate position. The familiar fencing and pentagonal arrangement of huts in the background once again serves the needs of a linear perspectival apparatus which isolates a line of sight opening in the doorway to the central hut between the taunting females, through the central locus of the image (the bound hero), and through the fire to the positioned viewer. And it is a viewer who, for the first time, finds himself on the Tupi ground, or stage, which supports the events—a stage littered with the refuse thrown by the victim during his final defiant moments in establishing the behavior appropriate, a way of practice, to a social ethic. For the first time the viewer is brought right up to the represented Tupi space yet he still does not enter it: the martyr does not enter and appear in the represented space, it is solely a Tupinamba ritual - and the fire burning immediately before the viewer prohibits this entry by the subject. It also helps to delineate a western line of sight defined through the perspectival apparatus (as mentioned) which is accentuated through the two angled lines created by the borders of the two Tupi groups.
These two groups defining the social body are bound, literally, by the rope which maintains the position of the victim. This creates a horizontal axis joining the Tupi socius which runs perpendicular to the western line of sight, the two axes inter-secting in the interstice that is the position of the prisoner--the central locus to the compositional arrangement and the cannibal ritual. This is the place where the sacrificial victim is to die, as mentioned before a key geographical topos in the ritual, and this overly determined nexus is once more graphed onto the semanticized space of occidental discourse in being the point of intersection not only determined by the previous two axes, but also an axis which splits the other two on a 45 degree trajectory.

This mediating axis, running through the revered club of the executioner and the executioner himself, the key locus of the victim, and back to the mocking dance of the Tupi female with hand raised, is defined by the sequential moments in the key event to the cannibal ritual: the arc traced out by the club as the geometrically designed inscription on its head comes around to meet its counterpart inscribed on the head of the victim in a movement which signifies the oath of honour between slayer and victim - both heroes in the realm of immanence; and then in a reciprocal and antithetical movement anticipated as the Tupi female prepares to be the first to dive on the fresh carcass. As a movement contrary to the cannibal ethic, the female's gluttoness lunge onto the corpse initiates the stereotype. And this mediating axis constitutes the key moment in the ritual and in the social space: the warrior and enemy, separated by practices of exclusion and lines of social taxonomy, rejoin in immanence in this moment forming a line of dislocation along which the European subject teeters between his self and his Other, a line along which he is constituted and subsequently never leaves as it provides the fault line along which discourse ruptures.

Along the two perpendicular axes the central figure is seen in two opposing modes: from the western perspective the figure of cultural difference is
contained within the armature and controposto of a classical idiom generating
the demonic repetition of the stereotype; while from the lateralized Tupi
perspective he is the key figure - both body and trope - engaged in a style of
practice which maintains an ethic, provides the *is* between *a saying* and *a doing*.
The way in which he delivers his defiant poem constitutes the poetics proper to
immanence. From a located and fixed viewing position, the European can
accept the cannibal practice as the key exclusionary practice which maintains an
exemplary social coherence *one remove from immanence*. From the perpendicular
line of sight, the practice is defined in the desire between two animals in a
moment, and in the death, which rejoins the continuity of immanence—the
excess which the European can't make to mean, the excess of the Tupinamba
which will be repressed to form the Other. But this is also the excess within the
European himself, as defined on St. Bartholomew's Night, as heterogeneous to
meaning, and also as what must be repressed as his Other, himself. The "I is
that" locating difference within identity. What on is obliged to forget.

And through the image's focal point, the viewer keys on the practice and the
body constituting an ethic which unravels signification and leaves it bare: a
saying equals a doing. It is not that it collapses the rift between a practice and
its representation; it is the synonymity of the two prior to a rift being opened—
the coextensivity of sign and signified. It does not matter if the European
understands whether this is due to exclusionary practices or to the laws of
immanence; all that matters is that he does understand it to be the key act and
body in maintaining a social ethic which exists as primary to the process of
signification.

The cannibal ethic is generated and maintained through an honesty (the
equation of a saying and a doing) and Janet Whatley notes in her translation to
Léry's *Histoire* that his "word to characterize them is *rondeur*; it is glossed as
'frankness,' but it inescapably connotes integrity and wholeness." It is a veracity which for the European maintains an integrity and wholeness of the social body. And this frankness of the Tupinamba is appropriate to the ontological entity Emmanuel Levinas calls *the face*:

The first instance of signification is produced in the face. Not that the face would receive a signification *by relation* to something, the face signifies by itself. . . A meaningful behavior arises in its light. . . One does not have to explain it, for every explanation begins with it. . . the face (is) the origin of exteriority. The primary phenomenon of signification coincides with exteriority; exteriority is signifyingness itself. . . the face is not resplendent as a form clothing a content, as an *image*, but as the nudity of the principle, behind which there is nothing further.

Elsewhere he notes, "[the face] is by itself and not by reference to a system." The face is exposed in the first instance of the synonymity of the sign and its signified, a saying and a doing, and signifies itself without reference to a deeper primary structure. *It* is signification: nothing authorizes it, *it* authorizes, it makes the body into a signifier. The frankness of the cannibal face is the authorization for which the cannibal body makes itself into the signifier. Before the frankness of the savage ethic there is no meaning. In seeing the cannibal ritual, the European sees the signification process laid bare. He in fact sees what authorizes him as a subject of truth and knowledge, what authorizes him as a subject constituted in the process of signification itself and through the other. In seeing the cannibal ritual the European sees the face of the generative mother (the signification process) and the face of the illegitimate father (the Tupi Other).

*The Subject Sees what Allows it to See*

To this point, I have tried to trace the movement of a theoretical operation—the vacillation necessary to the stereotype—generated through reference to a well—grounded and connected visual semanticization of bodily form—the classicization of the statuesque armature—through the insertion of depth in the

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212 p. xxxvii.
214 Ibid., p. 75.
perspectival apparatus, and through a novel technical apparatus—the copper-plate engraving process. And this reiteration in print creates the demonic repetition necessary to the stereotype, and the evocation of the uncanny, in the social practices of demonism and cannibalism as they were represented at the turn of the seventeenth century. The exposure of the face to western perception is a crucial juncture in this itinerary and finds its underpinnings in conceptual frameworks already familiar to this study: Hobbes seventeenth century theorization of the constitution of the self and sovereign power in the spectacle of theater and in demonic apparition as an effect of sensory perception; early modern theories of visual optics; and contemporary psychoanalytic theory. Christopher Pye, in a remarkable article titled "The Sovereign, the Theater, and the Kingdome of Darknesse: Hobbes and the Spectacle of Power," has related these diverse trajectories in conceptualizing the construction of monarchical power and self in the early modern, and I would like to adapt this structure to my own needs, substituting the power of the spectacle of cultural alterity for sovereign power in the relation it keeps with the constitution of the subject.

According to Hobbes, theater vacillates between being, on the one hand, a stage for the presentation of a force (here, cultural difference) which makes the viewer the author of its transforming effects, reinforcing the divide which separates the viewer from this staged presence; and, on the other hand, the force's ability to evoke awe and terror in the viewer when the fabricated figure of "Artificial Man" supersedes the power of the viewer who first authorized this figure. In this process the subject becomes the astonished spectator to his own construction. In Hobbes' theory of sense perception, demonic dread arose in the face of the apparition generated by the Pagan's mistaking lingering inward pressures which had arisen from sensory perception for the external pressures.

215Representations 8, (Fall) 1984, pp. 84-106.
216I'm following Pye's analysis of Hobbes here.
of objects distinct from him. The result is that the pagan feels immeasurable dread in being confronted by what seems to be an originless phantasm from outward, imaginary forces, just as the terror evoked by the demonic repetition of the stereotype emanates from what seems a castrated origin, or in other words, no origin at all. Yet the demonic apparition also seems, to "the Pagan," to be a mirroring of himself due to the internal pressures conjured by perception; similarly, in the stereotype the subject realizes his own partial constitution through the locus of the Other and thus self-recognition in the seemingly external apparition. And it seems the process by which the demonic may be generated through sensory perception, an operation in which the subject constitutes himself, may be congruous to the process by which the demonic may be generated through the repetition of the stereotype, another movement in which the subject constitutes himself. Pye concludes,

> Because the demonic presence is itself merely the lingering sign of the exclusion which constitutes him as a subject, the pagan cannot expel it without repeating an original self-division and dispossession; precisely in his effort to comprehend it objectively, the subject revives the fantasm as an inappropriately marginal form. The fantasm remains perpetually unmasterable, then, because it is an effect, not an object, of the act of perception which would make it signifiable.217

Cultural difference is unmasterable–unsignifiable–then as long as the subject attempts to objectify it in the form of the stereotype: in trying to squeeze the armature of the stereotype over the inappropriably marginal form the subject invariably leaves a residue as the effects of another subjectivity within one's own cannot be made into an object. And it is 'the face' of the cannibal ritual and its effects within occidental subjectivity which exceed the objectified form of the stereotype.

Two aspects of the cannibal face bring about the demonic loss of distinction between the object of perception and its effects within subjectivity. First, the excess which the cannibal face opens onto, the realm of immanence, is infinite to

217"The Sovereign . . .," p. 95.
the order of things, it is the surplus of a being over its finality, what Levinas calls *absurdity* or *infinity.* The objective manifestation of the face is incomprehensible, uncircumscribable, despite the repetitive attempts of the stereotype. Second, the effects of the cannibal face manifest themselves in the subjects who see it: not only in the pressures activated by the act of perceiving within the subject, but also in his outwardly oriented practice, such as the cannibalism found on St. Bartholomew’s Night and throughout the religious wars. The key to this process is the terror the self is subjected to in confronting an entity— the cannibal face— which "represents his power and agency in a fundamentally alien and derivative form."  

Pye draws on the complex optical and pictorial structure of the Cartesian moment of self-recognizance in delineating the path by which the gaze of the spectator falls on the sovereign power which empowers that gaze. I would suggest that the power of the face of alterity may be even more dazzling in this instant as the source, not of juridical and governmental empowerment, but a power implicitly more political. The empowerment of the signifying process. In the cannibal face the subject *sees* the power which enables him to *see:* as described, the face is what authorizes signification and that which is authorized by nothing else—it is authorization. In it the subject sees, that is signifies to himself, what authorizes his ability to signify and thus what authorizes him as a subject. Yet there is a paradox here: in seeing this source he puts it through the signifying process and thus objectifies it, he signifies (i.e. makes an object of) that which authorizes this very signification—a circular movement. In fact, he *objectifies* the process (signification) which allows him to *objectify,* and by which he constitutes himself as a subject. In the cannibal face "sight sees itself completely, lays itself bare, and therefore sees itself as something completely  

218See *Totality and Infinity.*  
219Pye, p. 101, my emphasis.
other than itself—as the blind and implacable eye of spectacle." In reducing the presence of alterity to an object of his gaze, the subject sees the alterity as an effect of the powers he already possesses; yet this objectification is also the realization that the source of those powers lie in a form completely alien to him—in order to see, the self must see that he sees. Cultural difference, as seen in the face of cannibalism, has the capacity to undermine the gaze as it exposes these two movements as a single, self-dividing moment of origin. In the cannibal, "the subject conjures his seeing presence as the presence he has excluded from sight in order to see." In short, agency must negate its very source in order to expose its own inner workings and in the process expose its own constitution as a necessarily "divided, derivative, and irreducibly theatrical phenomenon."

In the face of immanence, opened up in the flaying of the cannibal body, the order of things reveals its own castrated origin through the practice definitive to it—objectification.

Yet the face, by definition, is the exterior to something behind it.

Levinas describes an "erotic nudity" proper to the realm of immanence:

it designates the exhibitionistic nudity of an exorbitant presence coming as though from farther than the frankness of the face, already profaning and wholly profaned, as it had forced the interdiction of a secret. The essentially hidden throws itself toward the light without becoming signification. Not nothingness—but what is not yet. This unreality at the threshold of the real does not offer itself as a possible to be grasped: the clandestinity does not describe a gnoseological accident that occurs to a being. . . . The simultaneity of the clandestine (hidden) and the exposed precisely defines profanation. It appears in equivocation. Bit it is profanation that permits equivocation—essentially erotic—and not the reverse. . . . The mode in which erotic nudity is produced (is presented and is) delineates the original phenomena of immodesty and profanation. The moral perspectives they open are situated already in the singular dimension opened by this exorbitant exhibitionism, which is a product of being.

Profanation permits equivocation, essentially erotic: behind the erotic equivocation between the desire for metaphorical presence and the horror at

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220 Ibid., p. 103.
221 p. 104.
222 Ibid.
lack registered metonymically, the equivocation proper to representation—the fetish, the image, and particularly the stereotype—is the profanation of an erotic nudity. The face of cannibalism opens onto the erotic nudity of two beings which define themselves in the continuity maintained through an adherence to desire in the moment. One eats another with no thought as to an anticipated future result. Tupi cannibalism lays the signification process bare, is the signification process, and as such it finds the non-signifyingness of erotic nudity behind it evading the ties of referentiality, evading meaning.

Foucault has shown that with the emergence of representationalist representation in this epoch the signifier must come before, or simultaneously to, the signified.↑223 The face is the only process which opens onto erotic nudity: it is the only possible signifier for this absurdity. Yet the face cannot serve as a signifier for erotic nudity, as it is the signification process itself. In this way, the signification process (the face) cannot serve as a signifier for what precedes it (erotic nudity) as this precedent exists prior to the signification process being established in the face. In fact, the process of signification laid bare cannot serve as the signifier for anything, as anything which is prior to it is necessarily prior to signification itself. Thus erotic nudity is found in the poetic movement between the loci which establish only potential subjects: immanence is prior to the subject object distinction which is signification (the face). Thus erotic nudity can only be described in poetic terms, that is, in the description of a way of practice: the subject is continually frustrated in his attempts to circumscribe cultural difference in bodily form, in the stereotype, as it is in the way of the Tupi body that the subject feels its disturbing effects within.

Erotic nudity says the inexpressible, but the inexpressible is not separable from this saying. . . . The mode of "saying" or of "manifesting" itself hides while uncovering. . . . The "saying" and not only the said is equivocal. . . .↑224

↑223See The Order, pp. 58-63.
↑224Levinas, p. 260, my emphasis.
The inexpressibility of the seen Tupi body and the heard Tupi speech, which ravish Léry, is the excess of the Tupinamba which is incommensurable, beyond what can be made to signify, and emanates from a Tupi style of practice. It is in the way which the Tupi body moves and practices, not in the body itself. The way of the body in war, the way of the executioner, the games of rhetoric of the taunting women, the way in which the defiant hero loses his body in a saying which remains true to the cannibal ethic. This is the line of rhetorical gestures which defines the mediating axis in the image which reveals the Tupi face (fig. 21).

Between the vertical axis of depth established from the fixed position of a subject seeing through the western perspectival apparatus—the axis of meaning—and the perpendicular horizontal axis established by the Tupi social body and an unhinged viewing subject off to them left in the represented space, is the possibility of an intermediate delineation. An axis determined by a style of poetic movement offers a path into the nonsignifyingness of erotic desire: a line of sight which posits a viewing position mediating that of the fixed viewer positioned in discourse and the unhinged viewer within the represented space. It seems to posit a theoretical subject position on the intersecting plane between the represented space and the real space of the fixed viewer: on the surface of representation which opens up onto both. In an image of a subsequent moment in the cannibal ritual, appearing in both the Staden and Léry narratives, and in which the inversion of the stereotype (the old hag) appears for the only time, we find a similar compositional arrangement and the entry of the martyr into the scene.

The theatrical staging and its perspectival viewing apparatus remain in the image of the *boucan* (fig. 10), the wooden grill used in the preparation of body parts for consumption in the cannibal ritual, while the mediating viewing axis is maintained by the *boucan* itself which runs at an angle to the fixed line of sight.
delineated by the perspectival apparatus. The image is crucial to the viewing of the cannibal ritual as for the first time the viewer engages the martyr in his contract: the viewer sees (witnesses) the martyr (witness, seer) in the process of seeing (witnessing) the process of signification laid bare. The viewer through an identification with the position of the martyr established through the contract sees the face and is thus opened onto erotic nudity. The disturbing effects within the subject of discourse and between the subject positions established in the third space are made manifest. The viewer retains the fixed position established by the perspectival apparatus, but the martyr has entered into the scene and seems to exist on the liminal plane (the surface of representation) established by the mediating axis—he enters into the represented space of the Tupi in order to be seen, yet he remains an outraged marginal form to the event itself. He cannot enter into the represented scene fully as he is an alien component imported from the real space of discursive production, and does not wish to become integral to a scene recalling the minus within his own origin; but he must be seen, so as such he inserts himself on the contesting margins. Between the real discursive space of production in which the viewer finds himself, and the definitive event of the represented space, the martyr finds himself existing on the surface of representation, both literally and conceptually: he is an effect of the engraving on the surface of the copper or paper, and he also exists between represented and 'real' space. The subject finds himself in a self-divisive moment, and this moment is further problematized by the question of the martyr's identity. As the image is reused from the Staden narrative, it is Staden who appears in the scene and not Léry, the actual author of the narrative, fragmenting the theoretical position of the martyr as subject. And the question of a subject position is complicated even further by the insertion of de Bry's role as the producer responsible for the addition of depth, and thus potential viewing positions, in the first place.
"I stood there transported with delight"

It is in the movement between meaning and the impossibility of meaning:

The equivocal does not play between two meanings of speech, but between the signifyingness (significance) of language and the non-signifyingness of the lustful...225

Tupi cannibalism, in collapsing the gap between a saying and a doing, moves between the social significance attributed to the face, cannibalism as the mechanism productive of social coherence, and the non-signifyingness of erotic nudity, the excessive nature of the animal in immanence made manifest at home in the social heterogeneity of the cannibalism of the religious wars—the minus in the origin which must be forgotten in order for things to begin to mean.

The penultimate image in the third volume, the Tupi male ritual dance (fig. 22), perhaps best gives itself over to erotic excess. This image is conjured by the visual's poetic movement of signifiers which comprise what Lacan calls a "comedy of speech," here perhaps co-opted as a "comedy of sight." The image corresponds to a key juncture in Léry's narrative, under his description of "what one might call religion," in which he is "transported with delight"226 by the sights and sounds of the men's dance, which serve as somewhat of an inversion to the chaotic sounds and heterogeneous visions of the female's sabbath.

Typical of his denunciation of Tupi idolatry is his reference to Catholic modes of representation as he compares the Tupi rattle-shakers to "the bell-ringers that accompany those impostors who, exploiting the credulity of our simple folk over here, carry from place to place the reliquaries of Saint Anthony or Saint Bernard, and other such instruments of idolatry."227 Yet Léry is touched by something above and beyond, something which the order of things must transform into something of use, and particularly as it relates to the poor gullible

225Ibid.
226Léry, p. 144.
227p. 142.
margins, "our simple folk." And it is those folk who must be shielded from the heretical abuses of representation, from Catholics and witches alike, in a pedagogical campaign sent out to disseminate a work ethic on the periphery. There is an excess which in fact is a reduction: the collapse of language, or representation, which maintains the division between discrete objects determined by their fastening to a meaning, and a return, not to the same, but to a movement between signifying bodies which is prior to their signifyingness and signification. A movement caught between the hidden and the exposed: the profane. A moment defined in a desire not a reason. The continuity prior to a truth-false distinction. The repressed residual confuses western circumscription not in evading its sweep but in reordering its movement, sending tremors through the topoi defined by the pronominal shifters "I" and "you" within the topography of occidental discourse. They are evident in the locus constituted by Léry, from which he withdraws to "drink in the scene:"

> those who have not heard them would never believe that they could make such harmony. At the beginning of this witches' sabbath, when I was in the women's house, I had been somewhat afraid; now I received in recompense such joy, hearing the measured harmonies of such a multitude... I stood there transported with delight. Whenever I remember it, my heart trembles, and it seems their voices are still in my ears.228

The repressed returns in the ear of the same. But the west feels as though it has managed the transgressive nature of Tupi orality, here manifested as oral bodily transgression at the conclusion to the dance ("each of them struck his right foot against the earth more vehemently than before, and spat in front of him; then all of them with one voice uttered hoarsely two or three times the words He, hua, hua, hua, and then ceased")229, as the Tupi ritual chant is transformed, through the interpreter, into scripture, something which means. For Léry, the ravishing song is returned to the same as merely a corrupted version, due to its oral transmission, of the Great Deluge story ("And, indeed, it

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228p. 144.
229Ibid.
is likely that from father to son they have heard something of the universal flood that occurred in the time of Noah\textsuperscript{230}. But for the martyr, who's entire body bears witness to \textit{a seeing}, the ravishment transgresses other sensory loci, perhaps most importantly \textit{the eye}.

After the "somewhat frightening" experience of the witches' sabbath, Léry describes his approach to the men's ritual:

Thus approaching the place where I heard this singing, as the natives' houses are either very long or are built in a round fashion and (as we might say to the pergolas in our gardens over here) are covered with grasses all the way from the ground to the roof: \textit{in order better to see at my pleasure, with my hands I fashioned a little aperture through the covering}. There pointing my finger at two Frenchmen who were looking at me—themselves having been emboldened by my example and having approached with neither obstacle nor difficulty—all three of us went into the house. Hence seeing that the primitives were not at all startled (as the interpreter had expected), but rather, on the contrary, held their rank and order in an admirable fashion, and continued to sing their songs, we withdrew quietly to a corner where \textit{we contemplated them at our delight}.\textsuperscript{231}

What Léry sees through the little aperture, and later from within the enclosure, is the ravishing sight of the festive Tupi body of pleasure seemingly maintained and disciplined in the order of ritualized dance. He describes a rhetoric of the body, a way of moving, the "solemn poses and gestures that they used here. They stood close to each other, without holding hands or stirring from their place, but arranged in a circle, bending forward, keeping their bodies slightly stiff, moving only the right leg and foot, with the right hand placed on the buttocks, and the left hand and arm hanging: in that posture they sang and danced."\textsuperscript{232} In contrast to the women's dance, the men's follows the dictates of Renaissance courtly dance in the proper bodily comportment indicating moral rectitude and containment. The excessive plumed display of idolatrous pleasure is seemingly tamed under the geometricized and regimented ordering of the stereotyped body in a circular arrangement configured through the

\textsuperscript{230}ibid.
\textsuperscript{231}Quoted in de Certeau, \textit{The Writing}, p. 229, my emphasis.
\textsuperscript{232}Léry, p. 142.
perspectival apparatus. Once again, western graphical writing attempts to return alterity to the same, to make it mean, through the containment of form, the structural relationships between these forms, and through the viewing apparatus opening onto this compositional arrangement of forms. The fixed viewing position determined by the perspectival apparatus focuses the gaze on the image's central locus, in which three "false prophets that they call caraibes" ( likened to "popish indulgence-bearers") look out onto the circle of dancers in an emanation of gazes which trisect the circle (divide it into roughly equal 120 degree sectors). The fixed viewer sees the circle in depth, but a circle is seen in the same depth from any line of sight; it is in the geometrical definition of a circle: an array of points all equidistant from a fixed central locus. Thus the depth would be seen as the same by a lateraled viewer off in the left or the right of the represented space or in the viewing positions corresponding to all the gradations in between. As such, the circle is equally impermeable from any angle. And in fact the trisecting gazes of the caraibes return the gaze of a theoretical viewer who traverses the circumference of the circle externally and makes three corresponding viewing stops in his itinerary. The fixed viewer in real discursive space gazes into the focus of the circle and has his gaze returned by the caraibe who is not blowing the smoke of the dried herb petun from a wooden cane as the others do. In the upper right hand corner of the image we see Jean de Léry and his companions who have entered the enclosure in order to view the dancers at their delight. Léry now occupies the liminal position Staden had in the previous image: he is between the represented space and real space, on the surface of representation. But this intermediary position has now been split as well; it divides within itself in order that Theodor de Bry have his place.

In the upper right corner of the surface of representation, on the physical enclosure which circumscribes the represented space, one finds the what is

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233Léry, p. 140.
really the key locus to this image. The aperture opened by Léry in determining a viewpoint is the physical trace of a movement in which de Bry injects himself into the scene through that *imagistic orifice*. The aperture, and perhaps the spying eye of Léry, would have been enough for us to discern that the martyr, this time the martyr proper to the narrative, had seen the scene and in doing so determined this other line of sight coterminous with the caraibe seen on the left. But here de Bry enters into the contract between martyr and viewer: the martyr is a body in the service of seeing: his body, which bears witness, must be seen in the act of seeing. Behind the aperture, the martyr is in the liminal viewing position yet hasn't quite crossed the threshold of the represented space and thus the fixed viewer's vision: Lery must transgress the material boundary marking an outside from an inside in order that the viewer see the body in the process of seeing. Léry moves over so that de Bry can move in. Through the aperture, we see de Bry in the expanse of discursive space defined in its exteriority to this represented space. De Bry's move reveals the staged nature of this illusion and thus constitutes a representation conscious of itself as such, he says: from the aperture Jean de Léry sees the scene as configured here, yet I will move him to another viewing position, from which he sees the scene (the circle) no differently, in order that you, the viewer, may see him in the act of seeing. I leave the aperture imaged as the physical trace of my intervention into the scene and the locus on the surface of representation in which the representational apparatus is exposed.

In this image of a Tupi way of moving, the western production apparatus is ravished and as such confounds itself. The formal arrangement of stereotyped form creates an impenetrable circle which fixes a theoretical subject then shatters it, sending the shards cycling around its circumference through various viewing positions, homologous in relation to the geometrical arrangement of the figures yet heterologous in relation to the spaces of representation in which each
is located in the topography of discourse. The topos of an "I" is constituted in the space occupied by Léry, the martyr, which hangs between the illusionistic represented space determined by the dancers and the surface of representation determined by the aperture through which he has moved. He is in the represented space but excluded from the represented event; yet he also exists on the surface of representation as far as his represented countenance constitutes a mark of authorial inscription on discourse. But also we are reminded by the aperture he leaves that he is not in fact the author of the image. The fragmented subject position of Léry as martyr is shattered in the confusion between it and Staden, who occupies this very same position in the previous image (fig. 10).

The located viewing position fixed in an enunciative present and real discursive space constitutes the topos of a "you" which the "I" extends out to in the density and desire of discourse's third space. Within this third space exists the topos which is defined in the fragmentation of the previous two positions, an "I"/"you" locus which de Bry nervously vacillates within. In between the discursive space from which he works and the surface of representation on which he opens up the aperture, de Bry reveals representation's illusionistic tricks, its constructedness, and thus finally grounds the ambivalent vacillating image in an enunciation; it is given cultural positionality.

Occidental discourse misses the mark: it attempts to contain and return alterity within physical form and its various arrangements—the images content, yet it is in between real viewing and producing subjects—within desire—that alterity injects disturbance. It is in the relationships which the visual image's represented space and surface of representation configure between themselves and theoretical subject positions in real discursive space—in the image's form. In effect, the confusion of signifiers, of the signifier--the body made into the signifier--constituting vision as comedy is found between the various fragmented and scattered subject positions in discourse's third space. A space
which takes desire, rather than the law, as its ordering principle. And it is through this visual confusion, provoked by the Other, that western tropes of visual discourse, which attempt to provide that provisional structuring of consciousness as a perception of its own constituent parts, are upset and revealed in an enunciation.

As stated earlier, dominance, after emerging victorious from the initial moment of violence, attempts to structure the power it has obtained succeed in a way conducive to its perpetuation. It must make what is always an arbitrary order seem natural to those who must exist within its dictates: it reserves potential force in a system of signs, enlists the signification process. First, the constellation of signs attempt to make the order seem a priori, naturalize it, that is, make the people mistake the imaginary for the real. The de Bry images attach New World alterity to a strong signifier deeply rooted in the occident's visual symbolics at this historical conjuncture—the classical visual rhetoric of the Greco-Latin tradition. The Tupinamba is given a statuesque armature. This reference to a classical visual idiom marks a concerted effort to naturalize the image. The arrangement of these figures in geometrical configurations and through the linear perspectival apparatus amplifies this effort. Once seemingly naturalized in this way, the figure of the savage is free to be manipulated so as to provide certain calculated deviations from this ordained norm as the means to a critique. The old and decomposing Tupinamba female inverts the form of her stereotypical statuesque kinspeople and betrays the cannibal ethic ostensibly as the sign of a degenerate Tupi cosmos. The lewd dance of the young Tupi women seems to inject chaos into the ordered geometrical arrangement of their figural forms. They seem possessed. In naturalizing the sign of New World alterity a critique is produced.

Second, the reservation of force in signs allows for a proliferation of these signs in order that power propagate its capillary network at a rate proportional
to its own size. The classical armature of the Tupi body is multiplied throughout the volume (and all other volumes) in the reiteration proper to the stereotype. This process is then amplified extensively in the subsequent reiteration provided by the technical apparatus of print. Thus the proliferation of the sign provides the homogeneity desired by the dominant through the mechanism of the stereotype and establishes the norm against which the previously mentioned critical deviation can be made. The dominant aspires to the reduction of all heterogeneity as homogeneity is easily managed as the pedagogical. Yet this ideological process is never wholly successful.

Both the sign and the Other elicit desire in the viewing subject, desire for what seems to be there, yet isn't--presence. The subject constitutes himself in this desire, through the signification process, in the image of the other. In centering themselves on the cannibal ritual which is both a sign of Tupi social cohesion and a reminder of the minus in the European origin; through certain artistic and technical mechanisms; and in structuring engagement with viewership in certain modes; the images of the third volume in Historiae Americae strip the signification process bare and in doing so reveal to the subject its own constructedness. The Other and the image reveal to the subject the desire in which it is constituted and that which determines the topos of enunciation in the intersubjective realm. The enunciative divide in representation is the ambivalence which disturbs the homogenizing forces of pedagogical discourse and as such opens interstices of resistance.
Fig. 16
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