MINORITY POLICY IN POST-MAO CHINA

by

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Abstract

One of the most potent political forces in the world today is ethnicity. Contrary to the predictions of the developmentalists, ethnicity has not disappeared. Likewise, contrary to the beliefs of the Marxists, a shedding of "false consciousness" to erode the power of ethnicity has not occurred. One of the important tasks of a state is to deal successfully with the challenges posed by the presence of ethnic cleavages. The possible strategies to be employed range on a spectrum from a multi-cultural accommodative approach, to the "melting pot", to an assimilationist approach.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the strategies employed by the government in post-Mao China to ensure the compliance of the ethnic minorities, who comprise 91 million people (8 percent) residing in over 64 percent of China’s territory, mostly along its borders.

The central questions of this thesis are as follows:

(1) What have been the strategies employed to ensure the compliance and/or secure the loyalty of the ethnic minorities?

(2) Have these strategies been consistent over time or have they varied, and why?

(3) Have these strategies been successful or not in securing compliance and/or promoting loyalty?

Two of the major approaches used to analyze policies in China - of cycles or alternations - will be used to analyze China’s post-Mao policies towards the ethnic minorities.

This thesis concludes that a liberal line on minority policy has re-emerged in post-
Mao China, which resembled the "velvet fist" of the former Soviet Union - tolerance and accommodation within certain parameters which did not challenge the integrity of the state. The results of these strategies have been mixed. For those ethnic minorities whose immediate concern is economic betterment, the current strategies have been successful in securing compliance and apparently in promoting loyalty. However, the prevailing accommodative approach has not been successful in ensuring the acquiescence, let alone compliance, of the minorities in certain areas, like Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia. Along with accommodative strategies, therefore, the Chinese government has employed coercive power to maintain order in these regions.
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# Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BR</td>
<td>Beijing Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-power</td>
<td>Coercive power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNA</td>
<td>China News Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPPCC</td>
<td>Chinese People’s Political Consultation Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>Communist Party of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMAR</td>
<td>Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>Kuomintang</td>
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<td>N-power</td>
<td>Normative power</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>National People’s Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-power</td>
<td>Renumerative power</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNAC</td>
<td>State Nationalities Affairs Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAR</td>
<td>Tibetan Autonomous Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>UFWD</td>
<td>United Front Work Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>XUAR</td>
<td>Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region</td>
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**Note:** Pinyin system of romanization will be adopted throughout the text. However, popularly accepted names and places will be given in their most widely known forms, for instances, Sun Yat-sen, and Chiang Kai-shek. Wherever necessary, the pinyin system will be provided in parentheses, especially in citations.
Acknowledgement

I wish to express my appreciation to Professor Chamberlain and Professor Mauzy in preparing this thesis. I came from a place where ethnicity seldom assumed priority in the government agenda. It was Professor Mauzy who first directed me to this field. Her support and inspiration made me decide to choose ethnicity as my thesis topic. Professor Chamberlain introduced me to the approaches of cycles and alternations to explain Chinese policy. His constant effort to sharpen my focus was very much appreciated. To both professors, who offered valuable comments and suggestions in refining my thesis, I extend my sincere gratitude.

Vancouver, 1994

KPI
Chapter One: Theoretical Framework

One of the most potent political forces in the world today is ethnicity. Contrary to the predictions of the developmentalists, ethnicity has not disappeared. Likewise, contrary to the beliefs of the Marxists, a shedding of "false consciousness" to erode the power of ethnicity has not occurred. The reason why ethnicity is so salient is that ethnic-type cleavages compete for ultimate loyalties and thus undermine the integrity of the political system (Glazer and Moynihan 1975:162).

Therefore, one of the important tasks of a state is to deal successfully with the challenges posed by the presence of ethnic cleavages. The possible strategies to be employed range on a spectrum from a multi-cultural or "unity in diversity" accommodative approach, to the "melting pot" (voluntary integration), to an assimilationist approach (forced integration). Forced integration is well-defined as "a process whereby units or elements of a society are brought into an active and coordinated compliance [emphasis added] with the ongoing activities and objectives of the dominant group in the society" (Schermerhorn 1970:14). This is distinguishable from voluntary integration, defined by June Dreyer (1976:1), as "the process whereby ethnic groups come to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities towards a new centre, whose institutions assume jurisdiction over, and responsibility for, said groups." The concepts of integration and compliance will be further discussed below.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the strategies employed by the government in post-Mao China to ensure the compliance of the ethnic minorities, who comprise 91 million people (8 percent) residing in over 64 percent of China's territory, mostly along its
The central questions of this thesis are as follows:

(1) What have been the strategies employed to ensure the compliance and/or secure the loyalty of the ethnic minorities?;

(2) Have these strategies been consistent over time or have they varied, and why?;

(3) Have these strategies been successful or not in securing compliance and/or promoting loyalty?

Among the major approaches used to analyze policies in China, the cyclical theory has assumed a dominant position. The leading exponents of this theory are G. William Skinner and Edwin A. Winckler (1969). Basically the theory predicts that state goals and policies towards peasants follow a cyclical pattern of "action-reaction," moving from ideological, to order, to economic goals, requiring normative, coercive or remunerative state action. A related approach that helps to explain shifts in policy posits that policy alternates back and forth between two lines, left and right. In Power and Policy in China, Parris Chang argues that policy shifts in China "tended to assume an alternating pattern between conservative and radical policies" (1975:176). Joseph Fewsmith (1994) portrays China's economic reforms between 1978 and 1989 as alternating between two lines, left (supported by the conservatives) and right (supported by the reformers). These oscillations are identified in Richard Baum's "fang-shou" approach (1993). Baum identifies three complete repetitions of the letting go (fang) and tightening up (shou) in the first decade of the economic reform (1979-89):

[A]n initial increase in the scope of economic or political reform (in the form, e.g., of price deregulation or intellectual liberalization), followed
by a rapid release of pent-up social demand (e.g., panic buying or student demonstrations); the resulting 'disorder' would set off a backlash among party traditionalists, who would then move to reassert control. A conservative retrenchment would follow, marked by an ideological assault on 'liberal' tendencies and an attempt to halt (or even to reverse) the initial reform. The ensuing freeze would serve, in turn, to exacerbate existing internal contradictions and stresses, leading to the generation of renewed pressures for relaxation and reform - and so on (1993:341).

While these two approaches - of cycles or alternations - explain Chinese policy as characterized by shifts, they differ considerably in their assumptions. The Skinner-Winckler model portrays the Chinese leadership as collectively "riding a tiger"; that is, the leadership is frequently, if not typically, reacting to strong socio-political imperatives beyond their control. The other approach assumes that "individual leaders have different visions" (Fewsmith 1994:7). According to this approach, there are different groups or factions within the Chinese leadership that must bargain and compromise on policy issues, leading to a see-saw struggle that results in policy oscillations, often in the form of left-right alternations.

These two related explanations, which will be discussed further below, will be used to analyze China's post-Mao policies towards the ethnic minorities. Some additional questions are thus suggested:

(1) Do policies towards the ethnic minorities specifically follow the general pattern of either a cycle or an alternation?

(2) Which of these approaches is more useful in understanding policy-making in China?

Integration: Compliance

Given their wide diversity, some ethnic groups are better integrated into their host society than others. According to Amitai Etzioni (1965:4), the level of integration is
determined by the extent to which the central government:

(a) has an effective control over the use of the means of violence [military dimension];

(b) has a centre of decision-making [administrative dimension] that is able to affect significantly the allocation of resources and rewards through the community [economic dimension]; and

(c) is the dominant focus of political identification for the large majority of politically aware citizens [identitive dimension].

Compliance, defined by Etzioni, is "a relation in which an actor behaves in accordance with a directive supported by another person’s power and to the orientation of the subject to the power applied" (1969:59). Etzioni distinguishes among three types of power: coercive, renumerative, and normative powers (61):

Coercive power (C-power) rests on "the application, or the threat of application, of physical sanctions such as infliction of pain, deformity, or death; generation of frustration through restriction of movements; or controlling through force the satisfaction of needs such as those for food, sex, comfort, and the like."

Renumерative power (R-power) is based on "the control over material resources and rewards through allocation of salaries and wages, commissions and contributions, fringe benefits, services and commodities."

Normative power (N-power) rests on "the allocation and manipulation of symbolic rewards and deprivations through employment of leaders, manipulation of mass media, allocation of esteem and prestige symbols, administration of ritual, and influence over the distribution of ‘acceptance’ and ‘positive response’."

Each type of power tends to generate a particular kind of reaction (Etzioni 1969:65). The exercise of N-power tends to be the least costly and least alienating. C-power tends to generate strong alienation. When two kinds of power are emphasized at the same time, over the same subject group, they tend to neutralize each other (Etzioni 1969:62). The
effectiveness of the power-mix applied depends, to a large extent, on the response elicited. When the orientation of the subject group is highly negative, R-power may not have the desired effect. This helps explain why the preferential policies were effective in most minority areas in China, but not in Tibet.

Emphasis given to a particular kind of power-mix varies over time. Moreover, the choice of the use of a particular kind of power may have some unintended consequences for ethnic identity. In cases of forced assimilation by C-power, ethnic minorities tend publicly to deny their ethnic identity for fear of being persecuted; for example, the Bai denied their ethnic identity during the Cultural Revolution decade (1966-76). However, if R-power is employed, many tend to switch their identity in order to benefit from the preferential treatment. The fact that many minorities have re-registered their ethnic identity in the past few years in China confirms this situational view of ethnicity, which refers to the strategic use of an ethnic identity to fit particular situations (Royce 1982:202), usually for pragmatic reasons.

**Cycles and Alternations**

Skinner and Winckler (1969) provide a model to explain the policy cycles in rural China. Based on Etzioni’s (1969) compliance theory, Skinner and Winckler (1969:412) distinguish among three goals:

**Ideological goals** involve getting people to understand or believe the right things, or to do the right things voluntarily and for the right reasons.

**Order goals** involve preventing people from doing the wrong things, more or less without regard to why they refrain from doing them, and without any expectation that they will make a positive contribution.

**Economic goals** involve inducing people to produce and exchange goods
Skinner and Winckler (1969:411) suggest that the Communist Party of China (CPC) has repeatedly [emphasis added] shifted its primary reliance from exhortation to coercion and then to remuneration and repeatedly [emphasis added] the peasantry has passed from a tentative enthusiasm through disillusion to a calculative indifference. The analysis of Skinner and Winckler reveals a regular pattern in the interaction between the Party and the peasant from 1949 to 1968. Within these 19 years under study, Skinner and Winckler identify eight distinct cycles of mobilization and relaxation of agricultural policy. Each cycle lasts for two to three years. Within each cycle there are six phases¹ (1969:433-7). While the leaders could not afford to ignore completely any of the three goals, Skinner and Winckler suggest the priorities as follows: "when [the regime] achieved a satisfactory level of order it tried to maximize economic and ideological goals, favouring the latter whenever minimal attainment of the former permitted" (1969:414-5). To Skinner and Winckler, the policy cycle of mobilization and relaxation is the result of "sequential attention by the regime to ideological, order and economic goals; correspondingly differential emphasis over time on normative, coercive and remunerative power; and concomitant variation in the relative commitment, alienation and calculative involvement of the peasantry" (Winckler 1976:738).

The Skinner-Winckler framework does not consider the role played by leadership

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¹ The first phase is normalcy, in which the State and Party organizations inflict their lightest loads. During this phase, R-power is the predominant mode of strategy to secure compliance. The second phase is mobilization, a period of organizational expansion. Ideological objectives are revived, and N-power is applied to achieve economic ends. The third phase is high tide which finds the government organization at its maximal expansion. Ideological goals and ideological means are both at their peak. The fourth phase is deterioration, a phase of incipient contraction of organizational responsibilities and energies, and which culminate in the fifth phase, retrenchment. The sixth phase is demobilization, in which government organization contracts towards its minimal role in society.
conflict in policy change. This approach portrays the leadership as driven by the strong circumstantial imperatives often beyond their control and consequently, the leadership is forced to behave in a mechanical way. One of the scenarios is as follows: When the application of N-power reaches its point of diminishing returns, any additional input of N-power tends to drive the subordinates to ambivalence and even alienation, which will lead to low productivity and social disorder. In order to ameliorate the deteriorating situation, the leaders are forced to replace N-power with R-power. The subordinates will then drift back again to calculative indifference, thus completing a compliance cycle. In simple terms, the proponents of N-power being basically in a stronger position, are forced to accede to the proponents of R-power when economic performance and social order are seriously threatened. The cyclical theory predicts that when goals, power, and involvement are not congruent, there will be a decline in performance, creating costs for the leaders and thus a tendency for change towards congruence (Skinner and Winckler 1969:411).

The other explanation for policy oscillations is political in nature. This type of explanation suggests that there have been different groups within the Chinese leadership with different programs for China's development, and that policy swing is the outcome of the see-saw struggle between the contending groups (Nathan 1976:727). Similarly, Parris Chang argues that policy shifts in China have "tended to assume an alternating pattern between conservative and radical policies, following a change in the balance of power in the decision-making councils .... [W]hen the radical view prevailed in the party, the political pendulum would swing to the left .... When the conservative view gained an upper hand, however, the political pendulum would swing to the right ..." (1975:176).
A variety of concepts have been used to denote this left-right oscillation: radical-liberal, reformer-conservative, transformation-consolidation, mobilizational-bureaucratic, revolutionary-professional, idealistic-pragmatic, relaxing-tightening, or similar sets of paired opposite labels. While these concepts differ in terminology, they carry a similar connotation. The influence of the two-line struggle notion in the communist pronouncements is overwhelming. The following extract of Deng Xiaoping's talk during his 1992 visit to South China is a case in point:

At present, Rightist tendencies are affecting us, as are Leftist ones. But it is the Leftist tendencies that are deep-seated. Some theorists and politicians try to scare the public with political labels. That is not Rightist, but Leftist. Leftism carries a revolutionary colour, giving the impression that the more Left, the more revolutionary. Leftist tendencies led to dire consequences in the history of the Party. Some fine things were destroyed over-night. Rightism may ruin socialism, so can Leftism. China should maintain vigilance against the Right but should primarily guard against the Left. The Right exists as displayed in the turmoil. The Left also lives. To regard reform and opening as introducing and developing capitalism and to see the danger of peaceful evolution coming mainly from areas of the economy are Leftist tendencies (BR Feb. 7, 1994:13).

Andrew Nathan (1976:721) points out the divergent views in the chronologies offered by policy oscillations scholars:

Oscillations writers agree most readily in their interpretations of policy cycles of 1955-62. For the early 1950s, some writers see several cycles while others perceive a pre-cyclical mixture of policies. For the period since 1962, some scholars see two major cycles while others see a greater number of more subtle cycles, and still others consider cyclical patterns to have been superseded by secular patterns in either 1962 or 1965.

Nathan further adds that this sort of oscillations chronology is usually accompanied by two corollary concepts: policy dualism and policy interdependence. The first concept implies
a distinct "left" and "right" set of policy options within each policy area, and the second assumes linkages among policy areas such that a "left" line in one area requires a "left" line in other areas.

In contrast to the Skinner-Winckler assumptions, Joseph Fewsmith argues that individual leaders have their own policy preferences (1994:7). While tracing the main lines of economic debate between the "reformers" and "conservatives" in the decade between 1978 to 1989, Fewsmith analyzes the tensions among the Chinese leadership. Fewsmith elaborates how the effort of defining the political line, in the form of policy polemics, is always part of the struggle for power. The political line defines the policy direction preferred by the leader. Since the political line links policy to power, any criticisms of policy preferences associated with the leader are perceived as political assaults on the power of the leader. An attack on the recent reforms is to be equated with an attack on Deng Xiaoping's power (Saich 1992:1142). Fewsmith concludes that Chinese policy tended to lurch from one extreme to another because of the absence of institutionalized procedures among the top leadership. This approach argues that the incapacity of institutionalizing policy-making, the existence of opposing policy tendencies, and the unresolved leadership cleavages are responsible for the recurring swings in Chinese policy. Consequently, the left-right policy oscillations parallel the political fortunes of the contending groups within the Chinese leadership (Petrick 1981:102).

This thesis will explore the reliability of cycle or alternation patterns to explain the strategies employed by the government to secure the compliance and promote the loyalty of the minorities in post-Mao China.
Chapter Two: Setting and Background

This section provides an historical perspective of China’s ethnic relations. Both Marxist-Leninist theory and the experiences resulting from the direct encounter between the Chinese communist leaders and the minorities during the revolutionary years (1921-49) greatly influenced the formulation of integration strategies. The diversity of China’s minorities and their distinctive characteristics are highlighted.

The Setting

China is a multi-national state and "in itself a United Nations". Several of China’s minorities are much larger in terms of population and territory than some states in the United Nations. According to the 1990 census, the population of China’s minorities reached 91 million, amounting to slightly over 8 percent of the total population in China (Zhongguo Minzu Tongji 1992:53). Though China’s minorities are small in number when compared to the dominant nationality, the Han, they occupy 64.3 percent of the Chinese territory (Zhongguo Minzu Tongji 1992:10). There are 18 minority nationalities with a population of over one million (see appendix 3). The largest is Zhuang nationality with a population of more than 15.5 million, concentrating in the Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region in Guangxi Province. The Lhoba is the smallest nationality with a population of around 2,000, concentrated in the Tibet Autonomous Region.

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2Zhongguo Minzu Tongji (Statistics of China’s Nationalities) (1992) is jointly compiled by the Central Nationalities Affairs Commission and China’s Statistical Bureau. This volume, with almost 1000 pages, provides very informative data on various aspects of China’s nationalities. Some of the data are arranged in a longitudinal fashion which facilitates comparisons over time.
The areas inhabited by the minority peoples are typically rich in resources (see appendix 4). In his speech "On the Ten Major Relationships," Mao said: "We say China is a country vast in territory, rich in resources and large in population; as a matter of fact, it is the Han nationality whose population is large and the minority nationalities whose territory is vast and whose resources are rich" (1956:55). Chang Chih-i [Zhang Zhiyi] summarized aptly the richness of the minority areas, "These areas possess fabulous wealth in the form of coal, iron, petroleum, and nonferrous and other rare metals. China's chief livestock-producing areas, representing two-fifths of the total area of the country, are in the national minority areas; the forest reserves in the national minority areas are also exceptionally rich, amounting to one-sixth of the country's total forested area" (1956:32).

Furthermore, with very few exceptions, China's minorities are all located along its borders (see appendix 2). Prior to 1949, minority peoples in China were referred as the border nationalities (bianjiang minzu). The strategic significance of the minority areas is best summarized by Ulanhu,

Whether the relationship between nationalities is good or bad has always been an important factor affecting the political stability of our country, the tranquillity of the frontier areas, and the strength of our national defence. Eighty to ninety percent of China's vast frontier lands are inhabited by minority peoples.... The Mongolians and other nationalities in Inner Mongolia are defending the national border of the motherland; in Xinjiang the Uygurs and other nationalities are guarding the western gate; the Tibetans and other nationalities in Tibet are contributing to the defence of the motherland's Southwestern frontier; and the Zhuangs and

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3Chang Chih-i was deputy director of the United Front Work Department when he drafted this influential position paper on nationality policy in 1956.

4Ulanhu is a member of the Mongolian elite who joined the Communist Party of China in 1923. He was purged during the Cultural Revolution but rehabilitated in the early 1980s. He is one of the key high-ranking officials in charge of the nationality work.
other nationalities have been heroic in repulsing Vietnamese aggression (BR Nov. 4, 1981:17).

Besides the sensitive strategic locations and plentiful resources, another distinctive characteristic of China's minorities is the great disparity among their respective stages of socio-economic development. In 1949 most ethnic minorities were at a much lower level of socio-economic development than the Han. Fei Xiaotong, a leading Chinese sociologist, reports the uneven socio-economic development of minority peoples:

At the time of liberation [1949], serfdom held sway over an area with 4 million minority inhabitants, which included the Tibetans of Tibet, the Dais of Yunnan and parts of the Uygurs in Xinjiang. The Liangshan mountain region in Sichuan Province, populated by one million Yis, was in the slave-owning stage. Apart from these, about 600,000 people, mainly the Ewenkis and Oroqens, were principally engaged in hunting, while the Dulong [Drung], Nus, Was [Vas] and other minorities living in the border areas of Yunnan still retained vestiges of the primitive communal system and were doing slash and burn farming (1979:6).

Moreover, the majority of China's minorities (over 70 million) are adherents of one of the three major religions: Buddhism, Islam, or animism. "The seven minorities said to adhere to Buddhism are the Tibetans, Mongols, Koreans, Thai [Dai], Nasi [Naxi], Tu and Yugu [Yugur]. Ten minorities are listed as Muslim: the Hui, Uygur, Kazaks, Tunghsiang [Dongxiang], Kirghiz [Kirgiz], Salars, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Paoan [Bonan], and Tatars. The remaining thirty-seven minorities are believing in animism" (Schwarz 1979a:141). This makes the religion question an important aspect of the minority policy.

These inherent characteristics of the minority peoples, being so distinctive from the Han, exacerbated the problem of integration. An ethnic identification program, launched

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5The newest nationality Jinuo, being recognized in 1979, also believe in animism, making the number in this category to thirty-eight.
immediately after the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was inaugurated, was aimed at collecting more data on ethnic differences in order to pave the way for integration. Fei Xiaotong, who took part in organizing this program, explains why it was necessary,

> [H]ow could a People’s Congress allocate its seats to deputies from different nationalities without knowing what nationalities there were? And how could the nation effect regional autonomy for the nationalities without a clear idea of their geographical distribution (1979:29).

Between 1952 and 1956 the Soviet Union dispatched a number of experts to the Chinese Academy of Sciences to help out with the ethnic identification work. Stalin’s four criteria for defining a nationality (minzu), "a common language, a common territory, a common economic life, and a common psychological make-up manifested in common specific features of national culture" (1953:349), were used to ascertain ethnic claims in China.

Fei Xiaotong reports that over 400 names were submitted for registration by 1955. More than 260 names came from Yunnan Province, which is a home for many minorities. To date, the Chinese government has recognized 56 nationalities, including the Han. The Jinuo, China’s 56th nationality was recognized in 1979. The Jinuo people, numbering over 10,000, live in a compact community in the Jinuo Luoke People’s Commune of Jinghong County in Yunnan. According to the 1990 census, there were 15 groups waiting to be recognized. The number of people labelled as "unidentified ethnicity" was 752,347 (Zhongguo Minzu Tongji 1992:54).

Given the sensitive strategic locations and plentiful resources of the minority areas, minority integration in China has a crucial impact on its national security and economic performance. How to integrate these ethnic minorities into the Chinese political system has assumed paramount significance. The inherent enmity in Han-minority relations poses
serious challenges to this formidable task.

The Background

Marxist-Leninist theory postulates that the most fundamental social cleavages are along economic class lines. When the proletariat seizes power throughout the world, nationalism will disappear. According to this theory, it is legitimate for the minorities to claim national independence in capitalist states because "nations" are artificial units created by the capitalists. However, claiming the same in socialist states is counter-revolutionary. This theory has provided the ideological foundation for the Chinese communist leaders to repudiate any secessionist demand after 1949. The theory suggests that any minority still demanding independence in a socialist state (e.g. Tibet), "can only be an agent, witting or unwitting, of world imperialism and therefore an enemy of the people" (Moseley 1966:7). Besides the influence of Marxist-Leninist theory, the Chinese communist leaders' perspective on the national question was moulded, to a large extent, by their direct encounter with minority peoples during the revolutionary years.

The Communist Party of China (CPC) was born in the midst of warlord anarchism and social disintegration. The years from 1921 (when the CPC was inaugurated) to 1949 (when the CPC won supremacy over China) were marked by the Party's struggle for survival. Most of these years, the Party was locked in mortal conflict with the Kuomintang (KMT) led by Chiang Kai-shek, except two "honeymoon" periods, the First and Second United Fronts. The First United Front (1923-27) was proposed by the Comintern (Communist International), which was established by the Soviet Union to provide assistance to the communist revolutionaries. The mission of the United Front was to ally the CPC and
KMT to unify the country by destroying the warlords. This collaboration ended when Chiang initiated the Shanghai Massacre in 1927, which was followed by a severe purge of the communists. The year 1927 saw a drastic decrease of communist membership, from 58,900 to 10,000. The subsequent relentless extermination campaigns forced the communists to retreat inland. In order to break through Chiang’s extermination circle, the communists had to undertake the Long March (1934-35). During this journey, the communists passed many areas inhabited by the minority peoples. This marked the first direct encounter between the CPC leaders and many minorities, including the Miao, Yi, Tibetan and Hui in the Southwestern China. The survival of the CPC depended largely on the goodwill of the minority peoples and their logistical support. The Japanese invasion in China provided the CPC with some breathing time. The Second United Front (1937-45) was forged to fight the common external enemy. These years saw a tremendous growth of the CPC membership, from 40,000 in 1937 to 1.2 million in 1945. By the end of the Sino-Japanese war, the CPC was ready to strike its "strategic offence" against the Republican government led by Chiang.

The primary goal of the CPC’s minority policy during these revolutionary years was to win the support of the minorities in the continuing struggle for power. In the early years, the Party’s minority policy was similar to that of the Soviet Union. In the Manifesto of the Second Party Congress of 1922, it was proclaimed that separate republics would be formed for different peoples of China. The right of secession from China was made more explicit in the Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic of 1931, which clearly stated that "all national minorities within the confines of China shall have the right to national self-
determination, including secession from China and the formation of independent states.\textsuperscript{6} The provisions in the Chinese Soviet Constitution were much more favourable to the minority peoples than those included in the constitution of the Republic of China.

With the exception of the Manchu, Mongol, Hui, and Tibetan, Sun Yat-sen had made no reference to the other minorities in his public speeches. Though he recognized that these four mentioned nationalities were the great races of the Chinese nation, he argued that these great races should be "melted in the same furnace, to be assimilated within the Han nationality" (Deal 1984:25). His successor, Chiang Kai-shek, carried this assimilationist policy even further by declaring that "the five peoples [Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui, and Tibetan] designated in China are not due to differences in race or blood, but to religion and geographical environment" (1947:40). To Chiang, these four non-Han peoples were only the offspring of Han. The first national flag of the Republic of China was composed of five colours which denoted these five peoples. However, this flag was later discarded by Chiang. Chiang's assimilationist policy alienated many national minorities. Aware of the negative response to Chiang's minority policy, the CPC roundly denounced the assimilationist policy in order to enlist minority support. A statement appealing to the Mongols on December 20, 1935, clearly stated,

[T]he task of the Chinese people's revolution is not only to achieve the liberation of the entire Chinese people from imperialist and warlord oppression, but even more to struggle for the liberation of the 'small and weak peoples' within the country, ... if, not wishing to become stateless, you will really recognize the need for Mongol independence and decide to oppose Japanese imperialism as well as Chiang Kai-shek and other

\textsuperscript{6}"Resolution of the First All-China Congress of Soviets on the Question of National Minorities in China" adopted by the Congress at Ruijin, Kiangsi, in November 1931. See George Moseley, The Party and the National Question in China, appendix B.
Chinese warlords, then we, with good intentions, can extend real aid to you, regardless of whether your leaders are of the nobility or the common people (Chang 1956:50-52).

A similar statement was addressed to the Hui people on May 25, 1936.

However, the experiences of the direct encounter with the minority peoples during the Long March changed the Party line on the national question. The antagonistic attitudes of the Lolo in Yunnan, the Hui in Gansu, and the Tibetan in Eastern Tibet convinced the Chinese communist leaders that the minorities would probably choose not to join a unified Chinese state when given a choice (Dreyer 1976:69). A Caucasian missionary documented the dreadful experience of the Long Marchers in a minority area,

> When I travelled along portions of their [the communists’] route on the plateau three years after their attempted passage, I saw the record of those losses. The trail westward from Sung-pan was still plainly and unbrokenly marked by bones and skulls, white against the green grass. The upland meadows which they labelled empty and uninhabited normally support a good sized nomadic population, but the chiefs and warriors of those nomadic tribes told me how they shifted their camps by night and evaded every effort of the Chinese to make contact. Their evasion was successful enough to warrant the boast that they did not lose even a single sick sheep, while the Chinese starved in their camps and dropped along the trail (quoted in Dreyer 1976:69).

The dreadful experience and the hostile attitudes of the minorities made the Chinese leadership discard the right of secession as promised in the 1931 Soviet Constitution. Consequently, this right was dropped when Mao Zedong spoke at the Sixth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee in November 1938. Instead, all nationalities were promised the right to administer their own affairs under a unified state.

Another lesson learnt from the revolutionary years was the value of united front tactics. In the continuing struggle for power, the CPC could not afford to alienate any
segment of the minority peoples. The rationale behind the united front strategy was to broaden the Party's basis of support by uniting, not only with the peasants and workers, but also with the upper-strata personages. The special status of native leaders, including princes, feudal lords (tusu) and religious leaders, was recognized by the central government, and these people were co-opted into the Party and state structures. Through these upper-strata personages, the central government was able to penetrate into the societies of many minority peoples.
Chapter Three: Integration Strategies in Mao’s China

This section will examine the integration strategies employed in Mao’s China in terms of Etzioni’s (1969) three-fold classification of powers: coercive (C-power), normative (N-power) and remunerative (R-power). These three powers are ideal types and in practice inevitably there is a "mix" of them. R-power and N-power are difficult to differentiate at times. The mix of these two powers is found, for example, in united front tactics. Both material incentives (R-power) and symbolic awards (N-power) are extended to the co-opted minority elites. Moreover, many medical teams dispatched to the minority areas played dual roles: propagating the superiority of socialism (N-power) and granting medical benefits to the minorities (R-power). There is a similar problem in differentiating R-power and C-power. The chronological overview of the integration strategies in Mao’s China is useful because most of the post-Mao strategies are very similar to those employed during the years 1949 to 1956.

The 1949 - 1956 Period

The changed relationship between the CPC leaders and the minority peoples in post-1949 was a contributing factor to the change of integration strategies. During the revolutionary years, the CPC leaders depended heavily on the cooperation and support of the minorities. The latter’s attitude meant life or death to the CPC during its power struggle with the KMT. However, in the post-1949 years, the cooperative attitude of the minorities, though still important, was no longer a matter of life or death. This change of relationship was manifested in a cable from the Central Party Propaganda Office of the New China News Agency (NCNA) to its Northwestern branch office. The cable reads:
Today the question of each minority's self-determination should not be stressed any further. In the past, during the period of civil war, for the sake of strengthening the minorities' opposition to the Guomindang's [KMT] reactionary rule, we emphasized this slogan. This was correct at that time. But today the situation has fundamentally changed ... under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, the victory of China's people's democratic revolution mainly relied on the industry of the Han people (CASS 1980:407-8).

The relationship was changed from one of comrade-in-arms during the revolutionary years to that of subordinate position in post-revolutionary China. Moreover, the sensitive strategic locations and fabulous resources are two of the major reasons why the communist leadership desired a "better" integration, or tighter control of the minorities.

During the early years of the PRC, various laws were enacted to define the relationship between the central government and the national minorities. The official status of recognized minorities was set forth in the Common Program (1949), the General Program for the Implementation of Regional Autonomy for Nationalities in PRC (1952), the Electoral Law of 1953, and the 1954 Constitution. Article 51 of the Common Program states:

Regional autonomy should be exercised in areas where national minorities are concentrated and various kinds of autonomous organizations of the different nationalities shall be set up according to the size of the respective populations and regions.

Freedom to develop minority languages and customs was guaranteed by Article 53 of the Common Program:

All national minorities shall have freedom to develop their dialects and languages, to preserve or reform their traditions, customs, and religious beliefs. The People's Government [central government] shall assist the

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masses of the people of all national minorities to develop their political, economic, cultural, and educational construction work.

The 1953 Electoral Law stipulated that every national minority, no matter how small in number, was to send at least one delegate to the National People's Congress (NPC). The ethnic minorities were given a proportionately greater political representation in the NPC (see appendix 5). All these rights were re-affirmed in the 1954 Constitution. By and large, most minorities had been linked administratively to the central government via the regional autonomy mechanism by the end of the first decade of communist rule.

Besides this legislative effort, a predominant R-power mix was employed to win the goodwill of the minorities, though the economic assets of the Chinese leaders were limited at that time. R-power was exercised under the slogan that "elder brother is helping younger brothers." Tax exemption was one of the various means employed to win the trust of minority peoples. Commodity taxes on certain articles which were particularly crucial to the minorities - for example, snuff and cotton oil sold in Northwestern minority areas - were exempted. No butchery tax was to be imposed on cattle slaughtered during the major Muslim religious festivals. Commodity tax on tea sold in Southwestern Sichuan, Xinjiang and Tibet was reduced from 25 percent to 5 percent. Other "good deeds" included building roads, highways, tele-communications, and other infrastructure. For instance, water conservation projects were carried out in Xinjiang. Consequently, between 1949 to 1953, Xinjiang was able to retain water to irrigate more than 5.1 million mou (one acre equals 6.6 mou) of agricultural land (Chang 1956:102). Disaster relief funds were extended to Guangxi Province, where floods and droughts affected 20 percent of the population living there. Medical teams and entertainment teams were dispatched to remote minorities areas.
Special subsidies were earmarked for development in the minority areas. Favourable treatment to minority students included relaxation of age limits, special holidays arranged in accordance with local minority customs, and priority for minority students in admission to regular schools at all levels (Lamontagne 1986:83).

As a measure of goodwill to the minorities, the central government in 1952 issued a directive to either change or remove all terms of address, place names, tablet inscriptions and scrolls demeaning to the national minorities. For example, the nationality name, Luoluo (meaning "dogs" in the Han language), was changed to Yi (which literally means "wine vessels"). As another example, the city name, Guisui (meaning "submission" in Mongolian), was changed to Hohhot ("green city"). A city in Xinjiang called Dihua (meaning "reform through education") was changed to Urumqi (meaning "charming pasture land" in Uygur).

While the CPC leaders believed that the goodwill of ordinary minorities could be easily won by such good deeds, towards the upper-strata personages united front tactics were used. The Party’s United Front Work Department (UFWD), formed in Yenan in 1944, was responsible for formulating minority policies to be implemented by the State Nationalities Affairs Commission (SNAC). The feudal titles of the upper-strata were recognized and most of them became chairmen of local people’s governments or delegates to NPC. They were sent on tours around the country and were treated as honourable guests by the state. Democratic reforms and land reforms, carried out in the Han areas, were not initially imposed in the minorities areas. The CPC leaders reiterated from time to time that "we should give the minority nationalities more time to consider and prepare for reform
among themselves and we must not be impetuous\(^2\). Traditional social institutions of the minority areas were kept almost intact during the first years in order not to alienate the existing power-holders. United front tactics enabled the Party to penetrate many minority societies from the top, and the policy of "doing good and making friends" allowed an expansion of the PRC's influence at the grassroots level (Dreyer 1976:120).

To what extent was minority integration achieved by the above mix of integrating powers in the early years of the PRC? The initial years witnessed a high level of administrative and military integration, and a low level of economic and identitive integration. The high level of military integration was the result of the leadership's primary concern with order at that time. Administrative integration was seen as a prerequisite of further integration. Most minority areas had been linked to the centre via the mechanism of regional autonomy in the first decade of communist rule. The low level of economic integration can be explained by the cautious attempts of the Party not to alienate the existing power-holders by keeping the socio-economic institutions in the minorities areas almost intact. The low level of identitive integration was partially due to the distinctive inherent characteristics of the minority peoples, and partially due to the "enmity and alienation inherited from the past" (Chang 1966:44).

The 1957 - 1976 Period

A predominant R-power mix of the initial years had achieved a modest level of integration with the least possible friction. However, the following two decades witnessed forced integration even at the cost of open confrontations. Many previous accommodative

\(^2\)Liu Shaoqi's speech delivered at the Second Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in June 1950.
strategies were under attack. C-power mix became the predominant mode of strategy to secure the compliance of the minorities.

During the Hundred Flowers Campaign of 1957, the public was invited by the central government to voice any discontent or grievances. However, many of these vocal dissenters were punished during the anti-rightist campaign launched a few months later. They were charged for criticizing the government and the socialist system. In the minorities areas, the anti-rightist campaign turned into a movement against local nationalism and many leading minority elites in charge of the nationality work were purged.

The Great Leap Forward (1958-60, hereafter, the Leap) increased the intensity and momentum of coercive integration. There was a movement to learn the Han culture and language. The mass media propagandized the "correct" attitude to be expressed by the national minorities towards their "decadent customs." Dreyer (1976:161) cited two examples. Tibetan women in Gansu were said to have discarded their traditional hairdressers after realizing that the weight of the latter slowed down their work in the fields. The Hui (Muslim Chinese) were reported to have joined the multi-national communes in whose mess halls they would be treated like anyone else. The long delayed land reforms and collectivization were carried out with very little variation in the minority areas, except Tibet proper.

The socio-economic dislocations resulting from the anti-rightist campaign and the Leap forced the CPC leadership to consider a more lenient and gradualist approach. Specific to minority policy, this meant paying due respect to the inherent ethnic characteristics. In February 1959 an article in Nationalities Unity (Minzu Tuanjian) asserted
that "the reform of nationalities' habits and customs should be done according to the free will of the masses" (quoted in Dreyer 1976:175). Mess halls were reorganized: the Hui were no longer required to dine with pork eaters, Mongols were given buckwheat, and Koreans were given a variety of rice (Dreyer 1976:179). Social transformation being carried out in some minorities areas was halted. On April 2, 1961, Lhasa Radio announced that socialist transformation would not be carried out in Tibet for the coming five years. In early 1962 several minority elites purged earlier were rehabilitated. United front tactics were again resumed. Minority integration as a long-term process was re-emphasized, as evident in the People’s Daily on June 3, 1962: "In this stage, each nationality still has all its national characteristics; it is necessary, therefore, to pay attention to these characteristics, recognizing the distinctiveness of nationalities and the long-term nature of these differences."

However, the interlude of "soft" approach did not last long. A growing impatience with China's socialist progress escalated and reached its peak during the Cultural Revolution. The regional autonomy mechanism was denounced as "creating splits," and many autonomous units were dissolved. Ethnic cultures and customs came under serious attack during the "smash the four olds" Campaign which started in August 1966. The impact of this campaign in the minority areas was even more far-reaching than it was in the Han areas. The policy of religious freedom was regarded as counter-revolutionary. Temples, churches, lamaseries and elaborate religious buildings were demolished or turned into other purposes. All religious practices were forbidden. Though it was a constitutional

3The four old things are: an old way of thinking, old customs, old culture, and old morals.
right (Article 77 of the 1954 Constitution) to use one's written and spoken language, this right was strictly curtailed. Only five minority written scripts were allowed, Mongolian, Tibetan, Uygur, Kazak, and Korean, but in restricted use. Most publications and media in minority languages were ceased. The number of the titles of textbooks in minority languages decreased from 787 in 1965 to 75 in 1970. The kinds of both magazines and newspapers in minority languages decreased from 36 in 1965 to 5 in 1970 (Zhongguo Minzu Tongji 1992:275). The Han language became the only permissible language in most minority regions. The denunciation of united front tactics led to a large-scale purge of minority cadres, including those in charge of the UFWD and SNAC.

The rationale behind these radical policies was aptly summarized in Jiang Qing's (Mao Zedong's wife) saying: "Why do we need national minorities anyway? National identity should be done away with!" (Gladney 1991:137). The available data do not give a complete picture of the magnitude of minority persecution during this time. In the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region (IMAR) alone, it was said that 346,000 persons were persecuted and 16,222 lives lost (Heberer 1989:27).

To sum up, except a few short intervals, minority policy in Mao's China after 1956 was characterized by an assimilationist approach. Regional autonomy, a cornerstone of China's nationality policy, was denounced by Lin Biao (then Mao Zedong's designate successor) and Jiang Qing as "creating splits" and detrimental to unity. Instead of paying due respect to the inherent characteristics of the minorities, the communist government sought to extirpate them. United front tactics were regarded as cowardly behaviour towards the class enemy. No distinction was made between the "national question" and the "class
question". Jiang Qing’s oft-quoted statement: "If you follow socialism, why worry about ethnicity (minzu)?" (Gladney 1991:203) had a negative impact on ethnic identity. During these two decades, ethnic identity became a crippling liability, a label for a potential class enemy.

As a result of forced integration, identitive integration reached its lowest level between 1957 and 1976. This was borne out by the facts that the Dalai Lama and about 50,000 Tibetan followers left for India, some 62,000 people fled Xinjiang, which ended in the Chinese closure of the border (McMillen 1979:123), and many of the Tai-speaking minorities fled to Southeast Asia. Economically, the various minority economies were brought more in line with the Han’s through collectivization and commune movements. A higher level of administrative integration was attained when the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) was established in 1965. The central government’s persistent effort to link the minority areas with China proper was facilitated through military integration. Paramilitary organizations under the auspices of the People’s Liberation Army - for instance, the Production and Construction Corporation - were set up to help develop the minority areas. This arrangement placed the minority areas, especially the frontier areas, under tighter military control.

The ascendancy of the "rightists" (proponents of a liberal political line) to the top leadership after Mao’s death in 1976 paved the way for policy change. Following the rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping at the Third Plenum of the Tenth Central Committee in July 1977, many veteran cadres, who had been labelled as "rightists" and purged during Mao’s regime were rehabilitated. The rehabilitation campaign of 1978 alone affected over
100,000 veteran cadres, many of whom were reinstated in their former offices. Deng Xiaoping, together with the returning veteran cadres, began to challenge the existing leadership, headed by Hua Guofeng, Mao's hand-picked successor.

Hua's major claim to legitimacy was based on Mao's oft-quoted statement: "With you [Hua] in charge, I'm at ease." Since Hua derived his legitimacy from Mao's blessing, it was important for him to uphold the supremacy of Mao Zedong Thought. In order to perpetuate Mao's legacy, Hua adopted the "two-whatever" as party guideline for all policies: "Whatever policy Chairman Mao decided upon, we shall resolutely defend; whatever directives Chairman Mao issued, we shall steadfastly obey." Being the beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution, members of the "two-whatever" faction were reluctant to refute the policy line of Mao's regime, especially the left line of the Cultural Revolution. Hua's ambitious Ten-Year Plan (1976-85), known as Hua's "great leap," mimicked the Leap under Mao. Moreover, Hua's agricultural policies were moulded on the previous left line: greater egalitarianism, brigade as the basic accounting unit, and no private plots allowed.

Based on Mao's old slogan: "seeking truth from facts," Deng and his followers put forward a new slogan: "practice is the sole criterion for testing truth." The new slogan was aimed at attacking Hua's ideological claim to power. Deng, in a speech to a political work conference in June 1978, reasserted: "How can we be true to Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought if we are against seeking truth from facts ...? Where would that lead us? Obviously ... to the failure of our work and of our revolution" (MacFarquhar 1993:318). Elite opinion was mobilized to support this new slogan through the press. An article
entitled "Practice is the sole criterion for testing truth" first appeared in the **Guangming Daily** on May 11, 1978, and was quickly republished in the **People's Daily** and the **Liberation Army News**.

Apart from attacking Hua's ideological claim to power, Deng and his followers also aimed at denouncing Hua's policy line. The rehabilitation of a large number of victims of the Cultural Revolution initiated a large-scale debate on the errors of the Cultural Revolution, first in the press, then in the party meetings. For example, a central work conference of November 1978 was turned into a full-scale debate on the radical policies of the Cultural Revolution. At the Third Plenum of 1978, Hua's ambitious agricultural and industrial plans were replaced with a more balanced economic policy. The inability of Hua to protect his policy line signified his decline in power. Eventually, the Politburo meeting of November 1980 resolved that Hua "lacks the political and organizational ability to be the Chairman of the Party" (MacFarquhar 1993:327). Formally, Hua was ousted from the top leadership when the Twelfth Party Congress was convened in September 1982.

With an increasing number of the "rightist" veteran cadres joining the top leadership, many post-Mao issues were re-defined to justify policy change. With the return of Ulanhu (one of the many victims of the Cultural Revolution) to the nationality work, many minority issues were re-defined, which will be discussed below, to pave the way for policy change.
Chapter Four: Integration Strategies in Post-Mao China

This section will examine the integration strategies employed in post-Mao China to see (1) if these strategies have been consistent over time or if they have varied, and (2) whether these strategies have been successful or not in securing compliance and/or promoting loyalty.

The analysis of the first question - whether the post-Mao integration strategies have been consistent over time or not - is primarily based on the PRC’s official weekly press summary, *Beijing Review* [hereafter, BR]. Since this magazine is closely controlled by the communist leadership, change in any aspect of the official minority policy will be quickly reflected in its content. The uninterrupted publication of BR during the period under study enables us to see if there are policy variations over time and whether such variations follow either a cycle or an alternation pattern. Being a mouth-piece of the central government, BR is not a very satisfactory source to assess the *effectiveness* of the strategies. Therefore, to address the second question, we will examine the responses of the minorities towards these strategies.

The possible integration strategies range on a spectrum from an accommodative approach to an assimilationist approach. Four related aspects, comprising the core of China’s minority policy, are selected as indicative of an accommodative or assimilationist approach to deal with the challenges posed by the presence of ethnic cleavages. These four aspects are: (a) the national question, (b) preferential policies towards the minorities, (c) united front tactics; and (d) the respect of minority cultures. These four aspects are not mutually exclusive. However, they will be examined individually for the sake of analytical
clarity. Conditions will be specified for deciding whether the dominant emphasis of the period should be classified as indicative of accommodative or assimilationist approach.

Though Mao died in 1976, many important policy guidelines that characterized the post-Mao period came out only after the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CPC [hereafter, the Third Plenum] held in December 1978. Therefore, the time span of this analysis mainly starts from the end of 1978.

The National Question

How one defines the nature of the national question significantly affects Han-minority relations. Throughout the history of the PRC, the debate over the nature of the national question has been centred around whether or not to treat the national question as a class question. If the policy line reflects the position taken by Mao, namely, that "in the final analysis, the question of the minority nationalities is no more than one aspect of the class struggle" (CNA 1989:3), it is indicative of an assimilationist approach. Under this approach, class struggle taking place in the Han areas will also be applied to the minority areas. Minority peoples are looked down upon as backward peoples. National unity assumes top priority of the leadership. On the contrary, an accommodative approach emphasizes equality and interdependence among nationalities. Minority peoples are looked upon as equal partners in socialist modernization. The contribution of the minorities towards building socialism is recognized.

In the Communique of the Third Plenum, adopted in December 1978, the whole Party, the whole Army and the people of all our nationalities [emphasis added] were called on to work with one heart and one mind. Not only the Party and the Army, but also the
minority peoples were invited to make "China a modern, powerful socialist country before
the end of this century" (BR Dec. 29, 1978:11). A few months later, the first enlarged
conference of the SNAC urged the Party and government organizations at all levels to pay
attention to minority areas construction and respect their rights of equality and autonomy
(BR June 22 1979:5). In a republished speech of Zhou Enlai (former Premier of the State
Council), it was reiterated that China's minority policy "is a policy of prosperity for all
nationalities. In this respect, all nationalities are equal, there can be no discrimination
whatsoever" (BR Mar. 10, 1980:19).

Moreover, in late 1981 the position that "the problem of nationality is a problem of
class" was directly refuted. On November 16, 1981, BR stated that the confused distinction
between the national question and the class question had inappropriately led to a movement
against local nationalism. This movement was wrongly treated as a "contradiction between
the people and the enemy." The same article argued that local nationalism should be treated
as a "contradiction among the people." In the same issue, BR referred to an article written
by Ulanhu (vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of NPC), which raised the question
of interdependence among nationalities. Ulanhu said: "The modernization drive in the
minority nationality areas has state financial and technical help from the Han areas while
modernization of the Han nationality areas depends on resources from the minority
nationality localities" (17).

The interdependence among nationalities was reiterated by Yang Jingren (then the
minister in charge of the SNAC) in an interview with a correspondent of BR in June 1983:
"the Hans are inseparable from the minority peoples and vice versa" (BR Oct. 31, 1983:16).
In this interview Yang acknowledged the contribution of the ethnic minorities to China’s long history and splendid culture. The significant role of the minority peoples in China’s modernization was also recognized, as Yang said: "Our modernization badly needs the support and participation of the national minorities in tapping and utilizing their resources. Nationwide modernization is impossible without the minority peoples or minority regions" (17). The problems in the Han-minority relations were treated as the outcome of the difference in customs and habits, psychosocial and religious beliefs, and "will not affect the unity and the people if they are properly handled" (BR Nov. 4, 1983:4).

From 1984 onwards, national unity has received increasing government attention, which suggests a shift towards an assimilationist approach. When the CPC leaders visited the minority areas, unity among nationalities became the main thrust of their speeches. In February 1990, Ismail Amat (the minister in charge of the SNAC) stressed that "the entire nation’s stability depends on the close unity [emphasis added] of all nationalities and on stability in ethnic minority areas" (BR Feb. 19, 1990:11). In the first national conference on nationality affairs in early 1992, which was dedicated to strengthening national unity, Party leader Jiang Zemin reiterated that no separatist activities would be tolerated (BR Jan. 27, 1992:9).

A discernable shift from emphasis on "equality and interdependence" to emphasis on "unity" suggests a more assimilationist approach has been used to secure compliance of the ethnic minorities. This changing emphasis was in response to the growing unrest in certain minority areas, which will be further discussed below.

**Preferential Policies towards the Minorities**
An accommodative approach is one that takes into consideration the ethnic characteristics, especially the socio-economic institutions of the minority peoples, when formulating policies. This may result in separate development plans for the Han and minority regions. Regional Autonomy is applied to any area where a minority live in a compact community. These regional autonomous areas are given the flexibility to adopt policies suitable to their specific conditions. Some policies enforced in the Han areas might not be implemented in minority areas (e.g. one-child policy). Moreover, preferential policies are designed to help develop the backward economies of the minorities. On the other hand, proponents of an assimilationist approach advocate a quicker pace of social transformation, and they believe that continued tolerance of the special characteristics of the minority peoples will delay the realization of socialism. A "cut all with the same knife" approach is applied regardless of the differential levels of socio-economic development. There is pressure to bring the socio-economic institutions of the minorities more in line with those in the rest of the country. Consequently, no preferential treatment is to be given to the minorities.

It was reported in BR on February 9, 1979 that the regional autonomous areas may in the light of the political, economic and cultural characteristics of the nationality make adaptations to rules and regulations. One of a six-point program for Tibetans, concluded during the highly publicized visit by Hu Yaobang (then the General Secretary of the Party) to Tibet in 1980, is that: "Anything that is not suitable to Tibet's conditions should be rejected or modified" (People's Daily May 31, 1980). Similar concessions were later extended to other national minorities.
Moreover, the differences among the nationalities were clearly acknowledged. Ulanhu said:

There are vast differences in the characteristics of China’s various nationalities .... To help these nationalities at different stages of social development embark on the common socialist road, we must not view the successful experiences in the Han and other nationality areas as universally applicable, much less should we use a big stick to drive others into the paradise .... They must be allowed to adopt methods and steps suited to their own conditions (BR July 2, 1981:18).

The spirit of Ulanhu’s quotation was translated into many preferential policies. While there is no single document that specifies the preferential policies to be extended to the minority peoples, in general, these policies cover the following aspects, with certain territorial variations.

Tax privileges enjoyed by the minorities were widely reported in BR. Tibetan farmers were reported to have the right to use and manage the land independently and were exempt from agricultural and livestock taxes. In addition, Tibet retained all foreign exchange earnings and enjoyed a tax rate on import and export goods that was much lower than in other parts (BR May 18, 1991:10). Special state funds were earmarked for economic development including tapping local raw material. Local minority peoples were given preference in employment in the state-owned enterprises set up in their areas. Goods sold to poverty-stricken minorities areas - for example, motor vehicles - were offered at preferential prices (BR Dec. 24, 1989:37).

Politically, the ethnic minorities have been given a greater political representation in the NPC. No matter how small the population, each nationality has at least one deputy in the NPC. Lhoba, the smallest nationality, with a population of 2,322 (Zhongguo Minzu
Tongji 1992:54), has a representative in the NPC, though each NPC delegate is supposed to represent at least 200,000 people.

College enrolment is another area where minorities have been given preferential treatment. College admission scores were lowered for the members of the minorities. "Minority applicants in areas where national minorities live in compact communities have been granted entrance with scores or college entrance examinations 10 to 20 points lower than the Han students and they can answer the examination questions in their own languages" (BR Nov. 18, 1980:8). A minimum quota for minority students in the higher learning institutions was also set. For instance, in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, where Mongolians accounted for 11 percent of the population, a minimum 25 percent quota for minority students was fixed (BR Nov. 18, 1980:8). In 1981 a special department for minority education was set up under the Ministry of Education (BR Dec. 14, 1981:30). By the end of 1982, nearly 2,000 boarding schools had been established in pastoral and mountainous areas to enable the children of nomadic minorities to attend schools.

The state's continual preferential treatment towards minorities was re-affirmed in Premier Li Peng's Government Report delivered at the First Session of the Eighth NPC in March 1993: "We should continue the state's preferential policies towards minority nationalities and their regions and increase investment in these regions.... We must abide by the Law of Regional National Autonomy, protecting the autonomy of the minority nationality regions and the equal rights of their inhabitants" (BR Apr. 12, 1993).

Motivated by the prospect of gaining preferential privileges, many minorities have reclaimed their ethnic identity, which will be further elaborated below. Giving up one's
minority status in post-Mao China would be to relinquish one of the few avenues available for improving one's living standard (Harrell 1990:543).

United Front Tactics

Under an accommodative approach, minority elites are looked upon as legitimate representatives of their own peoples. Minority cadres are promoted to leading positions in various regional autonomous areas where most minorities dwell. However, if united front tactics is seen as cowardly behaviour towards the class enemy, it is indicative of an assimilationist approach. Under this approach, the Party is looked upon as representative of the minority peoples. The upper-strata minority elite is suspected due to their class origin.

The republication of Zhou Enlai's 1957 speech in 1980 made it very clear to the upper-strata minorities that if they favoured reform, their future would be secured, despite their class background. Zhou had said: "China, which is a big family of minorities seeks happiness for all, including genuine happiness for the members of the upper-strata of fraternal nationalities" (BR Mar. 20, 1980:20).

The importance of united front tactics was emphasized in the speeches of various Party leaders in the post-Mao period. In his opening speech at the Second Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference's (CPPCC) Fifth National Committee, Deng Xiaoping said: "The goal of this session is to further mobilize and unite the people of various nationalities and all patriotic forces in our country so as to promote the development of socialist modernization" (BR June 16, 1979:14). Moreover, Hu Yaobang reiterated that the Party would stick to the policy of "long-term co-existence and mutual
supervision among all nationalities" (BR June 16, 1986:29). Recently, in a national conference on the united front work in November 1993, Jiang Zemin urged the upholding of united front tactics to unite all workers and patriotic people supporting socialism and the reunification of China, so as to make more friends and promote political stability (BR Nov. 22, 1993:7).

Most post-Mao BR articles dealing with united front tactics are concerned with the Tibetans. The release of the last group of Tibetan prisoners who took part in the 1959 rebellion was highly publicized. This group of 376 prisoners was set free "as an expression of leniency by the judicial organ of the TAR" (BR Mar. 30, 1979:6). The same article also appealed to the Tibetan exiles by stressing that the Party would not hold them accountable for their past mistakes and would welcome their return.

Moreover, in early 1979, BR reported the establishment of a Reception Committee for returning or visiting Tibetan compatriots. The government promised to repair those houses which had collapsed during their owners' absence. For those who chose to leave again, the government would provide all necessary facilities (BR Jan. 19, 1979:3). It was reiterated that the Dalai Lama and his followers were welcome to return and make contributions to the unity of the motherland. It was emphasized again and again that "appropriate political and personal arrangements" would be made for them upon their return (BR Nov. 15, 1982:3). The return of the pro-independence Tibetan activist Alo Chhonzed, who fled from China in 1959, was highly publicized. He was appointed as member of the CPPCC upon his return to Beijing in May 1983. His return to the motherland was praised by BR for having made the best use of the Chinese government's "let bygones be bygones"
policy (June 18, 1984:20). It was declared that, "Tibetans living abroad are welcome to send their children to study in Lhasa with tuition and living expenses covered by the government. After graduation they are free to stay in Lhasa or to go abroad" (BR Sept. 10, 1984:9).

Some of the BR articles were addressed directly to the Dalai Lama, promising that if he returned to Tibet he would receive the same political status and living conditions he enjoyed before his exile in 1959 (BR Dec. 3, 1984:8). The Chinese government also made use of the co-opted Tibetan elite to convey the same message to the Dalai. Bainqen Erdini Gyaincain, vice-chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, reiterated that "whenever he [the Dalai] feels his misgivings are gone he could come back" (BR Apr. 21, 1986:9).

At a rhetorical level, united front tactics have won the blessing of the post-Mao paramount leaders. However, if the unity of the motherland was threatened, repressive measures would replace united front tactics as the predominant mode of strategy to secure compliance, as shown in the crackdown of anti-government riots in certain minority areas, which will be discussed below.

The Respect of Minority Cultures

An accommodative approach will protect and encourage the development of minority cultures. Arrangements are to be provided to facilitate the minorities to follow their customs, practice their religions and use their languages. These arrangements will include: special counters selling "nationality goods," holidays for the minorities to observe their traditional festivals, and translation services whenever needed, etc. However, an assimilationist approach tends to extirpate minority cultures. The desirability of minority
cultures is measured against their effect on building socialism. The Han language is adopted as the common language for all. Religion is declared as "unhealthy" custom.

The post-Mao BR material on minority cultures is mainly of two kinds. One kind of material deals with the central government’s effort to institutionalize the protection of minority cultures through legislation. Another kind of material deals with the central government’s effort to revive the ethnic pride of the minorities.

The post-Mao government has enacted various laws to protect the minority cultures. Article 147 of the Penal Code (1979) states: "If any worker of the government unlawfully deprives the citizens of their rights of lawful religious freedom, or violates the customs and practices of any minority nationality, he may be sentenced to imprisonment or compulsory labour for up to two years" (Information China 1989:1305). Ethnic features are recognized and protected under the current Constitution (1982): "All nationalities have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written languages and to preserve or reform their own customs and ways" (Article 4). The spoken and written language commonly used by the nationality in a given area will be employed as official language in the government organs (Article 123).

Moreover, a more open attitude towards religion is affirmed:

Freedom of religion is a fundamental policy in China and Chinese citizens are free to believe or not to believe in this or that religion. Non-believers can become believers and believers can give up believing. All citizens are allowed to believe in religion in as much as they are free to propagate atheism. There is no predominant religion and it is forbidden for one religion to assume a dominant position over other religions in China. All religions are equal and none is discriminated against (BR Dec. 21, 1979:51).

It was emphasized that the government would not use administrative measures to ban
Besides, enormous amounts of state resources were channelled into activities aimed at promoting ethnic pride by reviving or re-interpreting the minority cultures and customs. Special counters were set up in state-run department stores to sell "nationality goods" which are in special demand from the national minorities. Deliberate efforts were made to compile and publish minority literature and studies. The first nation-wide periodical devoted to minority literature, entitled Literature of the Minority Nationalities, was published by the Nationality Press in Beijing in February 1981. The first issue contained works of 33 different nationalities (BR Mar. 23, 1981:30). Publishing houses were specifically set up to print textbooks in minority languages (BR Dec. 14, 1981:30). In 1991, 1,828 new titles of textbooks in minority languages were printed, compared to 808 in 1980 (Zhongguo Minzu Tongji 1992:275). It was reported that more than 4,250 manuscripts and classic literature in Uygur, Kazak, Mongolian, Tibetan and many other minority languages were collected and classified. The two monumental 11th century works in ancient Uygur, Great Turkic Dictionary and Good Fortune and Wisdom, have been published in modern Uygur (BR Feb. 23, 1984:33). Smaller nationalities have also received due attention. Folk Tales of the Lisu Nationality and The Literacy History of the Bouwei Nationality were published in 1985.

Various exhibits of folk cultures were displayed in the Cultural Palace of Nationalities. A show of minority musical instruments was put on for the first time at the Cultural Place of Nationalities in Beijing in 1987 (BR Mar. 16, 1987:30). The central government also dispatched ethnologists to collect artifacts of the minorities. "Mongolian
passengers, the train is about to leave! Wish you a pleasant journey" (BR July 15, 1985:22). Such a broadcast in Mongolian over the loudspeaker at the Beijing Railway Station contrasted sharply with the language policy of the previous decade.

The post-Mao toleration of minority cultures has followed an accommodative approach, which is reflected in the central government’s conscious effort to protect and revive the cultures of many minorities. However, the government has warned against any attempts to make use of nationality and religious issues to create turmoil (BR July 18-24, 1994:6).

Basically, the avowed official line of the post-Mao minority policy has followed an accommodative approach except on the fundamental issue of China’s unity. Throughout its history, the PRC has not made the slightest concession on this issue. The unyielding attitude of the government towards secessionist demands has shown clearly that accommodative strategies should not contradict the ultimate goal - territorial integrity.

Have post-Mao integration strategies been successful in ensuring compliance and/or promoting loyalty? One way of measuring identitive integration - the extent to which the central government is the dominant focus of political identification (Etzioni 1965:4) - is by examining inter-marriage between the dominant group and the ethnic minorities. It seems that inter-marriage between the Han and the minorities is not common: "The Chinese and the minorities form two different worlds. They rarely inter-marry" (CNA 1982:2). The personal experience of Wei Jingsheng, China’s well-known dissenter, also supports the saying that inter-marriage between Han-minority is uncommon in China. The parents of Wei (Han nationality) have strongly opposed his marrying a Tibetan girl (Wei 1994:19).
There are no available data on Han-minority inter-marriage. Minority Party membership is not a reliable indicator either. This is because Party membership is a prerequisite of political career advancement in China. In the absence of objective indicators of identitive integration, the effectiveness of the post-Mao strategies will be analyzed by examining the responses of the minorities towards these strategies.

The post-Mao accommodative approach has encouraged many minorities to reclaim their ethnic identity. During the Cultural Revolution, "an assertion of minority ethnicity was a cause for persecution" (Wu 1990:6). The Bai have changed their identity in the course of some 50 years - from denying their minority status and assimilating to the Han to reclaiming their minority status (Wu 1990:1). About five million Chinese in the past decade have applied to have their nationality re-registered (BR Aug. 27-Sept. 2, 1990:10). Many nationality re-registration applications came from the Manchu. Pu Jie, brother of China’s last emperor, said that after the 1911 Revolution (when the Manchu rule ended in China), many Manchus changed their names and adopted Han nationality in order to avoid discrimination and oppression (BR June 25, 1984:20).

Motivated by the recent prospect of gaining preferential privileges, many minorities now regard their ethnic identity as a useful badge, not a social stigma. Even being affiliated with minorities was found to be useful. Gladney (1991:242) reports how the Han production teams wanted to benefit by close alignment with a minority administrative unit. In Na Homestead, for example, three Han production teams voluntarily rejoined the Hui autonomous village when the commune system was dismantled in 1982, hoping to benefit from the special treatment granted to the Hui. Under the current accommodative approach,
while most ethnic minorities may agree with Gladney’s (1991:337) conclusion: "In China people now want to be ethnic, or at least member of a minority," those in certain areas like Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia may think otherwise. The chronic ethnic unrest in these regions has shown that the post-Mao strategies have not been successful in securing the acquiescence, let alone the compliance, of these areas.

Tibet

The enduring Tibetan question, lasting for more than four decades, reflects the deep ethnic cleavage between the Han and Tibetan. Tibet’s continuing open resistance to Han domination has made it China’s best-known minority area to the outside world. The Tibetan government-in-exile headed by the Dalai Lama has used every effort to internationalize the Tibetan question. As a result, the chronic unrest in Tibet has received much wider coverage in the international media than have the troubles among other Chinese minorities.

The Chinese government has employed both the R-power mix and the C-power mix in dealing with the challenges posed by ethnic cleavages in Tibet. The Party, hoping to enhance its legitimacy in the Tibetan society, has acted as a principal agent of economic modernization in Tibet. However, a predominant R-power mix in the form of extensive economic programs has not generated the desired results. Most Tibetans have viewed the large-scale economic programs with mixed feelings. They are afraid that economic development will lead to increased immigration of Han Chinese, thus threatening traditional Tibetan culture. Many Tibetans are now comparing their economic benefits with Han Chinese in other parts of China. They have started to question: who are the beneficiaries of the economic programs, the Han or Tibetan, and in what proportions? Consequently,
economic development in Tibet has taken on an ethnic dimension. As Etzioni's (1969) compliance theory predicts, the application of R-power is ineffective if it is used to secure compliance of a highly alienated subject.

Most Tibetan lamaseries and temples have become the focal points of political protest, "since religious identity and Tibetan national identity are irretrievably intermingled" (Bray 1990:222). The Tibetans repeatedly have held that their distinctive religion, customs, culture and language amply sustain a claim to independence. However, the Chinese government has reiterated time and again that "of Tibet there could be no independence, nor semi-independence, nor independence in disguise" (China's Tibet 1992:3).

Some of the anti-government riots have led to the imposition of martial law. In September 1987, the monks from Drepung demonstrated against the execution of two Tibetans. Very soon this demonstration became a riot and spread to Lhasa. Further riots in Lhasa in March 1988 and March 1989, during the annual Monlam festival, forced the Chinese government to impose martial law between March 1989 and April 1990. The strong reaction of the central government towards the 1989 Lhasa riot was reflected in the official announcement over Lhasa Radio: "The small number of separatists are the cause of this earthquake and a cancer cell in society. If we appease and indulge them in a weak fashion, this will leave a serious hidden danger" (quoted in Bray 1990:222).

Even peaceful attempts to promote the cause of independence had been suppressed. According to the list of Political Prisoners in Tibet (1992:1), "the vast majority of prison terms were imposed for non-violent protest such as displaying the outlawed Tibetan flag, writing slogans on stones and walls, publishing and distributing leaflets, compiling
Despite the central government's repressive measures, pro-independence unrest has continued. The most recent incident happened in Lhasa on June 14, 1994 when five nuns from the nearby Shar Bumpa nunnery took to the streets. The crackdown took place three days after this demonstration. Police raided the nunnery and the adjacent monks' quarters, resulting in fighting between the police and the monks. On June 27, Gyautain Norbu, chairman of the TAR, told a Hongkong based newspaper, Wen Wei Po, that "we will adopt decisive measures in accordance with the law to deal with separatists, particularly groups backing them" (Asian Bulletin 1994a:28). Consequently, the five advocates of Tibetan independence were sentenced to up to fifteen years of imprisonment. Norbu further added that though the situation in Tibet had been stabilized after the crackdown, the TAR government would remain on "high alert" against any separatist movement. Beijing has responded to Tibet's secessionist tendencies by deploying heavy military and police in the region (Asian Bulletin 1994b:28).

Xinjiang

Historically, most of Central Asia was known as Turkestan, stretching from the Caspian Sea in the west to the Gobi Desert in the east. Western Turkestan now consists of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Eastern Turkestan now consists of most part of Xinjiang.

Xinjiang, China's largest administrative unit, is home to a great number of ethnic groups. Its area is about three times the size of France, and its population is around 16 million, consisting mostly of Turkic-speaking Muslims. The Uygurs are the largest ethnic
group in Xinjiang, comprising almost half of the region’s population. Han migration since 1949 raised the proportion of Han Chinese in Xinjiang from about six percent to 38 percent. Kazak and Kirgiz pastoralists are the next largest groups. Many minority groups in Xinjiang have ethnic ties on both sides of the border.

Like the lamaseries and temples in Tibet, many mosques in Xinjiang were destroyed during the Cultural Revolution. Religious leaders were publicly slandered, and religious services were banned. In the 1970s, many minority cadres in Xinjiang suspected of being pro-Soviet or pro-separatism were purged. In the post-Mao period, over 100 mosques have been rebuilt in Kashgar, and 8,600 mosques have been re-established in the entire region. The total number of mosques in the XUAR nowadays is approximately 24,000. The Koran, was re-printed in Arabic and Uygur languages in 1982.

Despite the post-Mao moderate policies, Xinjiang has not been free from ethnic unrest. To name but a few anti-government riots in the 1980s: in 1981, hundreds of Uygurs demonstrated in Kashgar after the killing of a Uygur by a Han; in 1982, Muslim peasants raided an army station near Kashgar; in 1986, Uygur students in Urumqi (capital of Xinjiang) demonstrated against nuclear testing; and in 1988, some 600 Uygur university students in Urumqi protested against having to share dormitories with Han students. Apparently, these incidents of ethnic unrest have not been secessionist in nature.

However, some of the anti-government riots in the 1990s have taken on a secessionist tendency. The riot on April 5 and 6, 1990 in the village of Baren near Kashgar was a case in point. Demonstrators attacked the local government offices and called for the

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1The information of this paragraph comes from Robert Delfs, 1988b.
establishment of a Republic of Eastern Turkestan. Twenty-two people were killed during the suppression.

The 1991 breakup of the former Soviet republics of Central Asia undoubtedly raised hopes among some active separatists in Xinjiang. The most recent pro-independence riot took place in June 1994. In this incident a small bridge in Aksu, in southern Xinjiang, was bombed by Muslims advocating an independent state. Brochures demanding the establishment of an independent "Eastern Turkestan" were distributed by the separatists to promote their cause. Cui Jianrong, deputy secretary-general of the Minority Religious Affairs Commission in Kashgar, declared that the Chinese customs at the border had seized some Eastern Turkestan magazines and handbills published by separatists abroad. Some Muslims who live abroad also send money home to finance the separatist movement. In response to these secessionist demands, the central government has maintained heavy police and para-military forces in the major cities of the region.

**Inner Mongolia**

The demand of Mongols in Inner Mongolia to unite with the People’s Republic of Mongolia (Outer Mongolia) has been the major cause of anti-government riots in the region. An "Inner Mongolian Autonomy Committee" and an "Asian Mongolian Freedom Front" have been set up illegally to promote this cause. In February 1990, over eight thousand Inner Mongolians demonstrated in favour of democracy and independence. During his visit to the region in May 1990, Qiao Shi, the Politburo Standing Committee member in charge of security, declared that a campaign would soon be launched to suppress those who disrupted the "cohesion of Mongolia’s nationalities." Over forty thousand people
protested in the streets of Hohhot (capital of Inner Mongolia) against this repressive campaign. It was reported that during this protest over 200 were injured and several killed.

Two months later, another leading Politburo member, Song Ping, visited the region and reiterated the Party's emphasis on the "unity of all nationalities." Song's visit was followed by the visit of Jiang Zemin (September 23-30). During his visit, Jiang also underscored the importance of national unity. The frequent visits by the top leaders have reflected the Party's growing concern over the secessionist tendencies in the region.

The results of post-Mao strategies are mixed. For those ethnic minorities whose immediate concern is economic betterment, the current strategies have been successful in securing compliance and apparently in promoting loyalty. However, for others, whose concern is secessionist in nature, the prevailing strategies have not been successful in ensuring the acquiescence, not to mention compliance, of the minorities in certain areas. Post-Mao integration strategies have been carried out within certain parameters, that is, no strategy should contradict China's ultimate goal - national unity. The fact that post-Mao integration strategies have been quite consistent may indicate some reasonable success with the minorities.
Chapter Five: Conclusions

Post-Mao integration strategies are to a large extent quite similar to those of the pre-1956 period. The resemblance of the current policy line to the Party's position paper on nationality work of 1956 is indeed striking\(^1\). This position paper appeared to have been written to provide a basis for discussion within the Party leadership (Moseley 1966:23). The following extracts of the position paper (Chang 1956) illustrate its resemblance with the current avowed policy line:

We must respect the traditional customs and religious beliefs of the national minorities; the Chinese Communist Party and the Central People's Government insist upon freedom of religion (112).

Language is one of the most important attributes of a nation, and the use of its own spoken language (and the written language of those nationalities which possess one) is one of the rights of national regional autonomy (90).

\[P\]eaceful means must be adopted for carrying out the socialist transformation (and democratic reform in those areas where it has not yet been carried out) in national minority areas .... In taking this approach of truly peaceful reform, we must whole-heartedly respect the sensibilities of the national minority people and the peculiarities of nationality areas (122-23).

\[T\]he method of peaceful transformation comprises two lines of approach: one is persuasive education ... The other is that of buying off vis-a-vis the upper-level personages in which ... the state organs take the necessary measures to ensure not only that their positions of authority are left intact but also that their working offices are appropriately arranged and that their standard of living suffers no deterioration (125).

However, a few months after its publication, a left political line was dominant within the top leadership at that time. A radical line on minority policy was set at a

\(^1\)This position paper, entitled "A Discussion of the National Question in the Chinese Revolution and of Actual Nationalities Policy (Draft)," was drafted by Chang Chih-i [Zhang Zhiyi], then the deputy director of the UFWD.
nationality work conference in Qingtao in 1957 with little or no reference to this position paper (Moseley 1966:23). This radical line created real and potential socio-economic dislocations and state-building problems for the following two decades (1957-78). The Uygurs in Xinjiang were reported to have repeatedly said: "What difference does it make to us if the Russians come. They'll cut off the heads of the Han, not ours" (Heberer 1989:42). The Chinese government was forced to close the border after about 62,000 minority peoples had fled Xinjiang. Many Tai-speaking minorities also crossed the border and fled to the neighbouring Southeast Asian states. The situation was aggravated by the radical economic policies which brought the Chinese economy to the verge of collapse. Li Xiannian (then vice-premier of the State Council) reported that 10 percent of the people did not have enough to eat, factory workers received a grain ration of only thirty-one pounds a month, and 20 million urban residents were unemployed (Liu 1986:297). The production of some 200 counties (about ten percent of China’s total) remained at the same level as that of 1949 (Fewsmith 1994:22). Chen Yun (then vice-premier of the State Council) warned that if the economic situation was not alleviated, the peasants would enter the cities to demand food (Fewsmith 1994:22).

After a break of about two decades, a liberal line on minority policy has re-emerged in post-Mao China again. Accommodative strategies have been employed to deal with the challenges posed by the presence of ethnic cleavages. However, the government has made it very clear that these strategies should not contradict China’s ultimate goal - national unity. As Li Ruihuan, a top Chinese leader, said: "the interests of various nationalities should coincide with the overall interests of the Chinese nation, and the respect for the
characteristics of minority nationalities should coincide with the maintenance of China's unity" (BR July 18-24, 1994:6).

This liberal line resembled the "velvet fist" of the former Soviet Union - tolerance and accommodation within certain parameters which did not challenge the integrity of the state. The results of these strategies have been mixed. For those ethnic minorities whose immediate concern is economic betterment, the current strategies have been successful in securing compliance and apparently in promoting loyalty. This is borne out by the fact that many minorities have reclaimed their ethnic identity. Ethnic identity is no longer a crippling label in the post-Mao period. However, the prevailing accommodative approach has not been successful in ensuring the acquiescence, let alone compliance, of the minorities in certain areas. The chronic ethnic unrest in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia, as discussed above, has shown that the predominant R-power mix of the post-Mao strategies has not generated the desired results. Along with the accommodative strategies, therefore, the Chinese government has employed C-power mix to maintain order in these regions. The fact that post-Mao integration strategies have been quite consistent may indicate some reasonable success with the minorities.

How can one explain the reversal of strategies in post-Mao China? Both approaches - of cycles or alternations - explain Chinese policy as characterized by shifts. The cyclical approach predicts that the state goals and policies follow a cyclical pattern of "action-reaction," moving from ideological, to order, to economic goals, requiring normative, coercive or remunerative state action. This approach portrays the leadership as largely

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2This is the contraction between a "velvet glove" and a "mailed fist."
reactive in the face of strong socio-political imperatives often beyond their control. While this approach may explain the occurrence of the "soft" interludes for expedient reasons during the two radical decades (1957-78), it is not adequate to describe the dynamics of policy change in post-Mao China. The existence of "uncontrollable" socio-economic imperatives (a core element of the cyclical approach) can be a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for policy change. It fails to explain why a policy swing happened under Deng Xiaoping but not Hua Guofeng, when both leaders were faced with similar pressures from the socio-economic environment. Though the socio-economic reality has been vital in the selection of policy options, without the support of paramount leaders, policy change may not have been possible.

A related approach that explains policy oscillations is more political in nature. This approach posits that policy alternates back and forth between two lines, left and right. Policy swings are the outcome of the see-saw struggle between the contending groups within the leadership. The ascendancy of the "rightists" (proponents of a liberal line) to replace the "leftists" (proponents of a radical line) within the top leadership is seen as the major cause of post-Mao policy change. The changing emphasis of post-Mao minority policy was the outcome of leadership struggle between Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng. With an increasing number of the "rightist" veteran cadres joining the top leadership, many post-Mao issues were re-defined to justify policy change.

In the process of analyzing post-Mao minority policy, I have some observations. The integration strategies of the PRC have alternated between left (an assimilationist approach) and right (an accommodative approach) depending on which political line was dominant.
at any particular time within the top leadership. Throughout the PRC history, though the integration strategies have oscillated between left and right, there has been no concession on the fundamental issue of China's unity. The unyielding attitude of the government towards secessionist demands has been consistent over all these years.

The left-right oscillations concept appears to accurately describe China's minority policy: from liberal (pre-1956) to radical (1957-78, with a few fluctuations), and back to liberal (post-1978) again. However, the chronology of the post-Mao minority policy follows neither a cycle nor an alternation pattern. Baum's (1993) three "fang-shou" cycles in the first decade of the economic reform (1979-89) do not repeat themselves in minority policy of the same period. I do not argue that the policy cycle does not exist in the post-Mao period. It seems that some policies respond more readily to the "vibrations" of the policy pendulum (e.g. price regulation) than others (e.g. minority policy). Though the concept of policy interdependence assumes linkages among policy areas such that a "left" line in one area requires a "left" line in other areas (Nathan 1976:722), this study suggests that the magnitude of change may not be the same across all policy areas. It is useful to distinguish between policies that are subject to policy swings but in varying degrees.

In tracing the main lines of economic debate from 1978 to 1989 in great detail, Fewsmith (1994) suggests that a careful study of policy debate will give a better understanding of how the policy-making process is driven by the political needs of individual leaders. Since the legitimacy of the post-Mao leaders depends on their ability to deliver economic goods, debates over economic policies are thus linked to power. Rival factions can challenge each other's power by offering better economic alternatives.
However, other policies less linked to factional politics have received little attention in policy debate. Therefore, it is not possible for this study to focus on policy debate to have a better understanding of Chinese policy. The fact that post-Mao minority policy has far less fluctuation than economic policy may suggest that if a policy is less linked to factional politics, it is less affected by the ebbs and flows of the see-saw struggle between the two lines, left and right.

The fact that post-Mao integration strategies have been quite consistent and have followed neither a cycle nor an alternation, has raised some queries about the reliability of these approaches to explain Chinese policy. With the post-Mao emphasis on economic development, the cyclical approach that predicts the state goals moving from ideological, to order, to economic, may not be an accurate description of the post-Mao situation. While the post-Mao leaders are united on two fundamental points: reform and opening up, differences within the leadership are much narrower than they were under Mao’s China. The alternation approach that assumes opposing policy tendencies and leadership polarization may not be a valid description of the post-Mao leadership.
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Appendix 1: Administrative Division of China
Appendix 2: Geographical Distribution of China’s Minorities
### Appendix 3: Population and Major Geographical Distribution of China’s Minorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Major geographical distribution</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Achang</td>
<td>27,718</td>
<td>Yunnan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bai</td>
<td>1,598,052</td>
<td>Yunnan, Hunan, Guizhou</td>
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<td>Bulang</td>
<td>82,398</td>
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<td>Bonan</td>
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<td>Guizhou, Yunnan</td>
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<td>Yunnan</td>
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<td>Heilongjiang</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hui</td>
<td>8,612,001</td>
<td>Ningxia, Gansu, Henan, Xinjiang, Qinghai, Yunnan, Hebei, Shandong, Anhui, Liaoning, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Shannxi, Guizhou, Tianjin, Jiangsu, Sichuan, Beijing</td>
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<td>Manchu</td>
<td>9,846,776</td>
<td>Liaoning, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Jilin, Inner Mongolia, Beijing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maonan</td>
<td>72,370</td>
<td>Guangxi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miao</td>
<td>7,383,622</td>
<td>Guizhou, Hunan, Yunnan, Sichuan, Guangxi, Hubei, Hainan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moinba</td>
<td>7,498</td>
<td>Tibet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolian</td>
<td>4,802,407</td>
<td>Inner Mongolia, Liaoning, Jilin, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Xinjiang, Gansu, Yunnan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mulam</td>
<td>438,192</td>
<td>Guangxi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naxi</td>
<td>277,750</td>
<td>Yunnan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nu</td>
<td>27,190</td>
<td>Yunnan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

65
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oroqen</td>
<td>7,004</td>
<td>Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pumi</td>
<td>29,721</td>
<td>Yunnan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qiang</td>
<td>198,303</td>
<td>Sichuan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>13,500</td>
<td>Xinjiang, Heilongjiang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salar</td>
<td>87,546</td>
<td>Qinghai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>She</td>
<td>634,700</td>
<td>Fujian, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Guangdong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shui</td>
<td>347,116</td>
<td>Guizhou, Guangxi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajik</td>
<td>33,223</td>
<td>Xinjiang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatar</td>
<td>5,064</td>
<td>Xinjiang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tibetan</td>
<td>4,593,072</td>
<td>Tibet, Sichuan, Qinghai, Gansu, Yunnan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu</td>
<td>192,568</td>
<td>Qinghai, Gansu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tujia</td>
<td>5,725,049</td>
<td>Hunan, Hubei, Sichuan, Guizhou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbek</td>
<td>14,763</td>
<td>Xinjiang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uygur</td>
<td>7,207,024</td>
<td>Xinjiang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Va</td>
<td>351,980</td>
<td>Yunnan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xibe</td>
<td>172,932</td>
<td>Liaoning, Xinjiang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yao</td>
<td>2,137,033</td>
<td>Guangxi, Hunan, Yunnan, Guangdong, Guizhou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yi</td>
<td>6,578,524</td>
<td>Yunnan, Sichuan, Guizhou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugur</td>
<td>12,293</td>
<td>Gansu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhuang</td>
<td>15,555,820</td>
<td>Guangxi, Yunnan, Guangdong</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** 91,323,090

Note: China’s total population in 1990 was 1,130,510,638 and the Han population was 1,039,187,548, amounting to 91.92 percent.

## Appendix 4: Major Natural Resources of China's Minority Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>% to total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total surface area</td>
<td>10,000 sq.m.</td>
<td>91.19</td>
<td>64.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pastoral area</td>
<td>10,000 hectares</td>
<td>30,000.00</td>
<td>94.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest area</td>
<td>10,000 hectares</td>
<td>4,787.00</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest growing stock</td>
<td>100 million cu.m.</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydropower resources</td>
<td>10,000 kw.</td>
<td>35,000.00</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix 5: Number of Minority Deputies of the National People’s Congress in Mao’s China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total deputies</th>
<th>Minority deputies</th>
<th>% to total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st NPC (1954)</td>
<td>1,226</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd NPC (1959)</td>
<td>1,226</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd NPC (1964)</td>
<td>3,040</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th NPC (1975)</td>
<td>2,885</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>