CLINGING TO POWER: THE SECURITY PREDICAMENTS OF THIRD WORLD STATES

by

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<u>Abstract</u>

It is within and between Third World states where we have seen the overwhelming prevalence of various forms of armed conflict since the end of the Second World War. In seeking to understand the nature of this conflict, it becomes necessary to examine the security concerns of these countries. Until the last decade, traditional Western security approaches conditioned the study of security in the Third World. However, by the early 1980s, some international relations scholars began to recognize that the differences between the security environments of First and Third World states led the developing countries to face security predicaments that are often markedly different from those found in the West. Since then, these and other scholars have been engaged in effforts to reconceptualize security as it pertains to the Third World and to utilize this knowledge in other areas of international relations such as crisis decision-making.

This thesis seeks to add to this body of knowledge on Third World security by first putting forward an expanded conception of security that incorporates the multi-facted nature of threats to Third World states. Security is viewed of as the absence of threats to three dimensions: 1) the territorial integrity of the state; 2) its political autonomy 3) the survival of the ruling regime and its system of governance. This last dimension is not considered in traditional Western security approaches; yet, it is a fundamental issue in most Third World and even Second World states.

While it is important to recognize the differences between the security contexts of First and Third World states, it is also necessary to examine the variations that are present within the Third World. Few efforts have been made to distinguish between the threats to and responses of various Southern states. This thesis undertakes a preliminary effort in this direction by outlining a framework that differentiates the security concerns and policies of Third World countries. Utilizing the expanded conception of security put forth, states are delineated according the nature of their external and internal/external

security concerns. Four broad categorizations are used. The Territorially-Coveted states primarily fear absorption by another state or the loss of signficant portions of their territory. The Ethnically-Threatened states reveal the linkage between internal and external threats as ethnic divisions within their societies can impact on all three security dimensions. The same can be said for the Ideologically-Divided states, although, in many cases, their internal ideological divisions do not impinge on their territorial integrity. The last category, the Politically-Threatened states, can face threats to all the dimensions but their primary concerns are the protection of the ruling regime and maintaining the political autonomy of their states.

It is from this framework that the security strategies that these states are most likely to follow are derived. Given the existence of the Cold War rivalry, the limited economic and military capabilities of Third World states, and the narrow support bases of ruling regimes, among other factors, alignment with an external power was the most prevalent security strategy. Other options included the promotion of an external enemy image and the use of regional organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS).

In the post-Cold War era, the security concerns of many Third World states are likely to intensify. The Ideologically-Divided states have benefitted the most from the demise of the American-Soviet rivalry and they will generally see a reduced level of conflict. For the Ethnically and Politically-Threatened and the Territorially-Coveted states, various factors, including a greater role by dominant regional powers, could increase their fears as the lifting of the Cold War veil has reduced great power attention to many Third World regions.

In the future, Third World states are likely to rely on a wider variety of strategies to secure their countries. Alignments with external powers will be limited but Southern countries could become more reliant on regional organizations and the promotion of external enemy images to reduce their insecurities.

The future for reducing the insecurities of Third World states does not appear hopeful. Various forms of armed conflict are likely to continue in most regions and that can only lead to more death and destruction and a worsening of the already dismal quality of life of most Third World citizens.

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Chapter 1 Introduction: Research Objectives and Approach

Since the end of the Second World War the overwhelming majority of armed conflict has occurred in the Third World.[1] According to one survey, of the approximately 170 major inter- and intra-state conflicts during this period, more than 160 have been in the developing world (Kende et al in Chubin, 1991:151). Another study notes that, one-third of all the countries in the Third World have been involved in wars and about half in insurrections, and, in the immediate post-colonial period (1945-1970), two-thirds of the approximately 120 conflicts that occurred were characterized by external intervention (Kennedy in Chubin, 1991:151).

The emergence of the post-Cold War era coupled with the diminishing possibilities of a great power war have generated hopes for a more peaceful era of relations in the North.[2] However, it is far from clear that these recent changes bode similar prospects for Southern states and their citizens; in fact, it is likely that the security concerns of some Third World citizens and their states will be further aggravated. A number of issues raise cause for concern. These include the extensive proliferation of conventional and nuclear capabilities among Third World states, the continuing use of these weapons by Third World regimes against their citizens to maintain themselves in power, the desires and attempts of regional countries to exercise a dominant role in their regions, and the ongoing efforts of various groups seeking to establish their own states.

In order to examine how issues such as these can and do impact on the security calculations of Third World states we have to first determine what security constitutes in the Third World context. It has become clear during the past decade that our traditional

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1. While accepting that there are significant differences among Third World countries, this thesis will utilize terms such as the Third World, developing countries, and the South as analytical categories. A number of reasons justify this approach. First, the majority of these countries share a common colonial heritage, most are economically and even militarily dependent on the North and their ruling elites and citizens perceive themselves as belonging to a separate category. These terms are used in a broad context to refer to all the areas excluding Europe (including the states of the former Soviet Union), North America, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. These excluded areas constitute the North.
2. See for example, Carl Kaysen (1990); John Mueller (1988); and Mark W. Zacher (1992).

Western notions of security and national security only partially explain the predicament of Southern states (Buzan, 1983; Azar and Moon, 1984). In this thesis, I first provide an expanded conception of security that seeks to take into account the particularities of the Third World context. This broadened notion of security is then utilized to develop a framework that allows for the systematic comparison of the security threats and strategies of Third World states. Along with characterizing countries according to the nature of their security concerns, it will be shown how these threats lead these countries to pursue specific security strategies.

The following chapter sets forth the case for an expanded notion of security. In doing so, the problems associated with and the limitations of both traditional and new conceptualizations of security are discussed. This thesis' conception of security as consisting of three dimensions will then be expanded upon. The first two dimensions incorporate the traditional notions of preserving the territorial integrity and political autonomy of states. The third dimension is the survival of the ruling regime and its system of governance (hereafter generally referred to as the survival of the regime) or what is described as regime security. Although it is an essential factor in the security concerns and strategies of Third World states, this dimension has been largely ignored or slighted in previous analyses.

Chapter 3 outlines the major factors that impact on these three security dimensions. The vast majority of the factors such as the narrow power bases of ruling regimes and the existence of the Cold War rivalry increase the insecurity of Third World states but there are a few like the promotion of international norms that support the territorial status quo that can serve to reduce their security threats.

Chapter 4 develops a preliminary framework that seeks to disaggregate the security concerns and strategies of Third World states in order to take into account the varying threats to and responses of these countries. In delineating this typology, the primary context is the Cold War period but the potential impacts of the post-Cold War

order will also be examined. Third World states are distinguished as to whether their security threats are primarily of an external or internal/external nature. Four broad categorizations are developed. The Territorially-Coveted and Politically-Threatened States (of which there are two types of countries in each category) reveal the largely external threat perception of these countries. The other two categories, Ethnically-Threatened (which also contains two types of states) and Ideologically-Divided States exhibit how internal and external factors combine to generate both of these types of threats.

This framework provides the basis for the discussion of the security strategies that these states are most likely to follow. Among the policies that will examined are: alignment with external powers; the promotion of foreign enemy images to forge domestic unity; the establishment and promotion of regional organizations to unite states against a common enemy; and the development of indigenous military capabilities. A greater understanding of how the security concerns of these states predispose them to pursue specific strategies could help to eliminate many of the stereotypes that characterize these states. As Brian Job elaborates, "[E]ither they are labelled as puppets, as 'irrational', and as weak and inefficient; or they are viewed as strong, 'rational' (albeit for perverse ends), efficient, and with complete control over the substantial coercive powers of the state" (1992:18).

The final chapter, along with summarizing the main points of this thesis, broadly explores the future prospects for security and conflict in the Third World.

Chapter 2 Reconceptualizing Third World Security

It has been over forty years since the concept of national security was introduced into Western academic and policy circles yet many ambiguities still surround this notion. It should therefore not be surprising that recent efforts to reconceptualize security with regard to the Third World context have also invoked limited agreement. However, what has been agreed upon by recent scholars of Third World security is that our traditional Western approaches are too narrowly-defined. The result, they argue, has been that many of the real and potential security concerns of Third World states have been ignored or downplayed. This chapter lends support to this position by arguing that an expanded notion of security is vital to understanding the security threats to Third World states. It proceeds to provide such a conception taking into account some of the issues raised by current debates among Third World security scholars. The chapter will organized as follows: traditional security approaches will be outlined; the Third World security environment will be described in order to highlight the limitations of our traditional conceptions; new approaches and debates regarding Third World security will be discussed; and finally this thesis' conception of security will be expanded upon.

2.1 Traditional Approaches to Security

Probably the most famous conception of the traditional Western approach to security is the classic realist statement of the security dilemma (Herz, 1950; Jervis, 1978). It posits that the anarchic nature of the international system leads unitary states to adopt self-help measures like military build-ups, alliances, and deterrence in order to protect themselves from external attacks. While these countries perceive their measures as defensive, they are viewed as offensive by other states who in turn respond with similar actions (Buzan, 1983:3). The result is a decrease in the security of not only the

state undertaking these policies but also of all the other countries in the international system.

Along with utilizing the device of the security dilemma, many other scholars focus their efforts on defining security. These definitions have sought to answer the twin questions of "security from what" and "security for whom". The two most cited definitions are those of Walter Lippmann and Arnold Wolfers. Lippmann states that "a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war" (in Buzan, 1991a:16). Referring to national security as an ambiguous symbol, Wolfers argues that "security, in any objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked" (in Buzan, 1991a:17).

The key assumptions that underlie these efforts to clarify Western security concerns include: 1) as states are unitary actors, the object to be secured is the nation-state; 2) threats to them stem from external military attacks; and 3) other states are the primary if not sole source of these threats.

Given the predominance of realism in international relations (and particularly strategic studies) following the Second World War, these conceptions of security naturally incorporated the key tenets of this school of thought. They also reflect the Eurocentric bias that is found in many areas of international relations. Our theories and concepts are predicated on the history and experiences of European states and, following the Second World War, on the United States. In some sense, this approach could be justified given the situation at the end of WWII with the onset of the Cold War and the resulting national security mentalities of the US and the USSR, the nuclear arms race, and the superpower control over spheres of influence (Job, 1992:7). However, even among Western circles, it became abundantly clear by the 1980s that this notion of security was too narrowly-

focused and that its assumptions needed to be revised in order to incorporate the various changes that had occurred since the late 1940s (Mathews, 1989; Ullman, 1983).

A number of key questions need to be reevaluated and clarified with regard to our traditional Western conceptions of security. This point has as much relevance for Western states and the newly-independent countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union as it does for the Third World. These questions include: What is the referent point for security? Are there any core values to be secured? Is war the only possible threat? The space constraints of this thesis and its emphasis on the Third World necessitate that these issues will be dealt with only in reference to the South although the current situation in Eastern Europe allows many parallels to be drawn.

2.2 The Third World Security Environment--Revisiting Traditional Security Approaches

As previously mentioned, to a large degree, conceptions of security reflect the histories and experiences of particular states. Clearly, there are marked differences between the experiences of countries in the international system. This issue is fundamentally important in reference to the Third World and yet its relevance to the security concerns and strategies of Southern states has only slowly been recognized by international security studies scholars (Ayoob, 1991, 1992: Buzan, 1983, 1991a; Job, 1992; Migdal, 1987, 1988). This section will discuss the applicability of traditional Western security approaches through a discussion of the Southern security environment. In particular the emphasis will be on the nature of the decolonization process and the efforts at state formation in the Third World.

Although Africa and Asia share a common colonial experience in comparison to the Latin American countries which have been independent for over a century, there are many similar characteristics among all these states.[3] These include: the existence of

3. With regard to Latin America, Mohammed Ayoob has argued, "[F]or a whole host of reasons, the predominant among which was the importation of the economic and political culture of preindustrial Iberia,

various ethnic[4] nations across territories often not coterminous with state boundaries; ill-defined borders; the implementation of foreign Western models of political systems with their institutions and ideologies, and distorted economies because of the imperative of extraction from the periphery.[5] It is significant to note though that Latin America probably suffers the least out of the various Third World areas in terms of the ethnic mixture of its various states. Although there are significant pockets of indigenous peoples often overlapping state boundaries (e.g. the Miskito in Honduras and Nicaragua), the borders of these countries generally incorporate a single or a few ethnic groups.

The same situation clearly does not exist in Africa and Asia as territorial borders in these areas were drawn largely for administrative reasons or culminated from intraimperial tradeoffs (Ayoob, 1991:271). The result was that many of these newly-independent states contained not only one or two main ethnic groups but rather as in the extreme case of Tanzania over one hundred different groups. Given the ethnic mishmash in these colonies, nationalist movements were unable to blunt ethnic loyalties by utilizing the rationale of a distinct nationality as the basis for independent status. Instead opposition to colonial rule provided the glue to bind these various forces together.[6]

In many cases, the reins of government were transferred from the colonial powers to the Western-educated elite that had led the state's nationalist struggles. These elites often sought to maintain the values and institutions of their colonizers as the

Latin American political development, including its tradition of state-making and nation-building remained fossilized well into the twentieth century" (1992:48).

4. As Rodolfo Stavenhagen (1991:118), among others, has pointed out the term ethnic is often rather loosely used and there is no general concensus regarding this concept. In this thesis, terms such as ethnic group and ethnic nation will be used to connote collectivities based on common elements such as religion, language, tribe, race, (or combinations of these) that share some feeling of common identity with other members of the group.

5. Economic forces significantly impact on all aspects of life in the Third World including security considerations. However, given the space constraints of this thesis and the existence of well documented research by the dependency theorists, this area will not be expanded upon. For examinations of the relationship between Third World security and economic dependency see Ball (1988), Barnett and Wendt (1992), Lopez and Stohl (1989), Mullins (1987), Thomas (1987), and Wendt and Barnett (1991) among others.

6. It is interesting to note that communally-based appeals for the creation of states were rarely successful; the Kurds and the Palestinians bear witness to this fact. The emergence of Pakistan appears to be an exception.

organizational basis for their newly-independent states. However, these transplanted values and institutions were generally not held in common among the population and these new Third World leaders became tainted because of their emulation of their former colonial masters. As well, as in many parts of Africa, the sudden and rapid movement toward independence resulted in power being transferred to regimes whose membership and support was drawn from a particular ethnic group with few or no arrangements made for the proper representation of the various other groups within society. As Colin Legum argues,

> Once the colonial rule was driven out, the interests of the different groups that formed the new government diverged. This resulted in the breakup of most independence movements, made for serious and often ethnically based conflict, and destabilized the new state. Therefore, the rapid shift of many African governments from the parliamentary system inherited from the colonial period to a single-party system is understandable. In many cases, however, this move was made not because of any serious danger to the state, but simply in order to entrench the power of a particular ruling group (1990:131).

It is within this context that Third World countries have undertaken their efforts at state formation.

Many initial efforts to understand and promote the state formation process in the Third World (such as the political development theories that highlighted the importance of modernization and institutionalization) promoted the emulation of the Western experience. It was assumed by these scholars that over time the developing countries would "develop" and become just like the states found in the North. Similar assumptions about the state formation process are also held by many scholars of Third World security (Ayoob, 1991, 1992; Buzan, 1983; 1991a). Although no agreement exists on what are the critical dimensions that characterize "weak states" (Job, 1992:9-12), this notion is utilized by these authors to describe Third World security problems that emanate from the state formation process. Barry Buzan's notion of "weak-strong states" (1983; 1988; 1991a) is perhaps the most-widely accepted conception. Although he conceives of states as consisting of three separate components (the physical base, institutional expression,

and idea of the state), Buzan defines a variable of socio-political cohesion as the key determinant of the nature of security threats to states in the international system (1991a:97).

The traditional conception of the European state-making experience emphasizes the existence of a distinct nationality as the basis for statehood and the peaceful development of these nation-states. However, reevaluations of this period such as Charles Tilly's seminal The Formation of National States in Western Europe (1975), have brought into question the whole nature of this process. Essentially, Tilly proves that, far from being a peaceful, planned endeavor, the emergence of the West European state in its current form is largely the by-product of the process of consolidating state control (1975:633). Tilly states that:

> ...the forms of government themselves resulted largely from the way the
> coercion and extraction was carried on; that most members of the
> populations over which the managers of states were trying to extend their
> control resisted the state-making efforts (often with sword and pitchfork);
> and that the major forms of political participation which westerners now
> complacently refer to as 'modern' are for the most part unintended
> outcomes of the efforts of European state-makers to build their armies,
> keep taxes coming in, form effective coalitions against their rivals...
> (1975:633).

These reinterpretations of the West European state experience have raised debates over the utility of comparisons between the state making process in Europe and that underway in the Third World. In undertaking an initial comparative study, Mohammed Ayoob (1992), for example, argues that the European experience is very relevant to understanding state and nation formation in the Third World and thus the nature of the security concerns of these states. Stein Rokkan, through his analysis of West European history, reaches the opposite conclusion. He states that "...the European sequence simply cannot be repeated in the newest nations; the new nation-builders have to start out from fundamentally different conditions, they face an entirely different world" (1975:600).

This author's position is that although the tasks confronting Third World countries are similar to those encountered by European state makers, the decolonization process,

the entry of these countries into a well-established system of states and the nature of relations between the great powers and the Third World states have ensured that the state building experiences of Southern countries are far different from the situation in Europe during the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries.

State making encompasses four primary tasks: (1) the initial state building process in which coalitions are formed among elites who gain control over the coercive (e.g. police) and extractive (e.g. taxation) apparatus of the state; (2) nation building through mass education and media to ensure identification with the total political system rather than with parochial groups; (3) the allowance of greater political participation by the masses through the extension of representative institutions; and (4) redistribution through the administrative expansion of the state and the provision of public welfare services (Rokkan, 1975:566-72). Yet, unlike most European states where these phases proceeded sequentially, Third World state makers have had to simultaneously confront all these tasks.

The initial phase of elite coalition building and centralized control over the coercive and extractive mechanisms is essential for the development of nation-states. But given the inability of Third World regimes to appeal to a common national identity for legitimacy and the telescoping of these state building processes (Ayoob, 1991:269), mass violence was liberally used to consolidate power within the state. In many cases, this process might have taken many more decades to complete, but readily available economic and military support from the great powers, by increasing the resources available to ruling coteries, has accelerated the general completion of this phase. As a result, many Third World rulers are now able to effectively exercise what Caroline Thomas (1989) refers to as despotic power.[7]

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7. Thomas has borrowed Michael Mann's distinctions between despotic and infrastructural power to characterize the nature of rule in Third World states. Despotic power concerns "...the range of actions which the elite is empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalized negotiation with civil society groups" whereas infrastructural power refers to "...the capacity of the state actually to penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm" (Mann, 1986:113). It must be noted that there are a minority of cases such as Lebanon and Sri Lanka in which even despotic power is

Third World states have however been far less effective in achieving the other phases of state formation. Efforts at nation-building have often generated fragmentary tendencies because rather than subordinating traditional forms of social organization, the new concepts of state, central government and citizenship created dual loyalties and built centrifugal forces into the system rather than effective civil societies (Sayigh, 1990:11). This point is corroborated by Joel Migdal who by adopting an interesting bottom-up approach to state-society relations seeks to determine the role that societies play in allowing the effective penetration of the state. He argues that, "[T]he major struggles in many societies, especially those with fairly new states, are struggles over who has the right and ability to make the countless rules that guide people's social behavior" (1987:397).

Divisions such as these within Third World states are indicative of the lack of domestic consensus as to what the state constitutes in its territorial form, how it should be governed, and who has the legitimate right to rule. These dissensions often result in protracted struggles as ethnic groups seek to establish separate states and confrontations develop and deepen over the ideology and institutional form of the state. Thus, analyzing the security of Third World states based on the assumption that these countries are nation-states obscures the true nature of the security concerns prevalent in these countries.[8] What is instead most often the case is that numerous nations co-exist uneasily within the territorial borders of one state and they also overlap across neighbouring countries. Notions such as national security lose their meaning when there is no idea of a nation associated with a state's borders.

In order to examine Third World security, the traditional assumptions that the referent point for security is the nation-state and that it is a unitary actor must be

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under contention. In Sri Lanka, for instance, the ethnic dispute between the majority Buddhist Sinhalese community and the minority Hindu Tamils, which erupted into mass violence in the early 1980s, has led to two contending power centers each with its own coercive and administrative apparatus.
8. Some significant exceptions include Taiwan, North and South Korea, and some Latin American states. This same point is also relevant for First World countries like Canada and Spain that face threats to their territorial existence from secessionist groups.

discarded. As the following section will discuss, there are a number of possible referent points for security and debates still continue as to what the appropriate level of analysis should be.

What is clear though is that internal factors are a significant aspect of Third World security concerns. For example, Third World regimes often perceive domestic dissent as directly threatening their ability to govern and in many cases these regimes can become solely preoccupied with their own survival such that rather than seeking to resolve these disputes they instead rely on coercive measures to stay in power. Internal fissures within developing countries can also increase the vulnerability of these countries to different types of external threats.

Along with the more traditional fear of an external military attack by another state, Third World countries are potentially open to a wide-range of actions that can be perceived as security threats.[9] The most prevalent threat is intervention in their internal affairs. Foreign governments, especially neighbouring states and the great powers are the most likely actors to utilize internal divisions as an avenue to actively interfere in these states. This is most commonly accomplished through the provision of security assistance (i.e. military and economic-related aid) to the opposing factions although the large-scale use of the interveners'' military forces cannot be ruled out. However, other actors such as international organizations (e.g. IMF and the World Bank), multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations, and ethnic groups outside a state's borders can also play a significant role in the internal affairs of Third World states (Korany, 1986:549; Azar and Moon, 1988:289).

The differences between the security environments of First and Third World states which are largely the result of the nature of the emergence of Southern states and their efforts at state formation necessitate an expansion of our traditional security approaches. The complexity of the Third World security environment with its various referent points

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9. This issue will be expanded upon in the next section.

for security and the varied nature of threats from a variety of sources means that conceptions such as the traditional security dilemma only partially incorporate the threats to these states. This traditional dilemma is perhaps most applicable to those Third World states as India and Pakistan and Israel and the Arab states where external, military attacks form the primary threats to these countries and their citizens. In order to outline how this thesis seeks to incorporate both traditional and new approaches to security, the following section examines the major debates that have emerged among scholars seeking to revise traditional security approaches and in so doing it seeks to clarify this paper's position.

2.3 New Approaches to Third World Security

As with the original efforts of Western scholars to define security, those reconceptualizing the situation in the Third World have also focussed their efforts on clarifying the fundamental issues of "security for whom" and "security from what". What follows is a representative sample of redefinitions of security and national security.[10]

Abdul-Monem M. Al-Mashat: "National security, then, is the capacity of a society to protect individuals, groups, and the nation from physical and socioeconomic dangers and from the threat of such dangers created by both systemic and attributional conditions. This capacity manifests itself in the ability of the society to control not only individual and specific incidents of violence, but also the grinding nature of violence (the severe, frightening, and perpetual nature of violence) on the society" (1985:xvii).

Muthiah Alagappa: "The above discussion shows that the core values to be protected under the label of 'national security' are not absolute but relative in nature. Thus determination of whether national security has been violated, with the exception of gross violations, is a subjective issue and very much dependent on the perceptions of the authoritative decision makers of the state. The relative nature of the core values also implies that there is a high level of tolerance in the degree or level of security considered acceptable or unacceptable" (1987:13).

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10. I have borrowed Barry Buzan's notion of outlining various definitions of national security and security from his second edition of People, States and Fear (1991:16-18). Despite the fact that Buzan is one of the first scholars to reexamine security in relation to the Third World, it is interesting to note that he does not provide any redefinitions of security like these in his list, choosing instead to utilize First World variants.

Mohammed Ayoob: "...it is preferable to define security in relation to vulnerabilities that threaten, or have the potential, to bring down or significantly weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional, as well as the regimes that preside over these structures and profess to represent them internationally....This is a definition that assumes the basic primacy of political variables in determining the degree of security that states and regimes enjoy" (1991:259).

Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon: "We have delineated four distinctive national values directly associated with national security concerns in the Third World: political and territorial survival, preservation of economic well-being and prosperity, organic survival of the national population and communal harmony. These values, however, are not automatically translated into security concerns. Such translation is a function largely of the patterns of threats directed against these national values, which are nurtured and shared contextually" (1988:283-84).

R. D. McLaurin: "We suggest that a threat to national security is any activity, phenomenon, or course of events that poses a danger to either the existence of a form of government or the welfare of the people of a sovereign state....Conceptually, national security must reflect the threat posed by economic and social problems, whether that threat is manifested, for example, in a purely internal erosion of legitimacy or, by contrast, in an external manipulation of social divisions or economic frustrations" (1988:260, 263).

Robert L. Rothstein: "Security is, of course, largely a subjective concept, a state of mind registering the presence or absence of a threat to central values. The need to 'feel' secure and to perceive the absence of a threat to central values has undermined most attempts at conceptualization....Most security decisions in the Third World must therefore be understood as the outcome of the interaction between external threat perception, elite interpretations of internal threats to regime stability, and certain factors that are likely to be unique to particular cases (1986:4, 9).

Yezid Sayigh: "...this concept [national security] consists of several 'national values'. These are safeguarding the political and territorial survival of the state, ensuring the organic (physical and collective) survival of the population, establishing the conditions for economic welfare and achieving and preserving inter-communal harmony. In general, the guiding principle in the following chapters is that economic and social factors are regarded as forming part of the definition of security, especially as they affect 'national values' or directly influence political and military decision-making in a given country or region" (1990:8).

Caroline Thomas: "A basic theme running through the book is that security in the context of the Third World states does not simply refer to the military dimension, as is often assumed in Western discussions of the concept, but to the whole range of dimensions of a state's existence which are already taken care of in the more-developed states, especially those of the West....[F]or example, the search for the internal security of the state through nation-building, the search for secure systems of food, health, money and trade, as well as the search for security through nuclear weapons" (in Ayoob, 1991:259)

In examining the first question of "security for whom" it is clear that there are a number of potential referent points including the state, the regime, nations, and individuals. However, as the last section discussed, notions of national security border on irrelevance in the Third World as clearly there are few such states which contain a single nation associated with the country's borders.[11] Those authors that utilize this term or focus on outlining core values do seem to implicitly recognize this point as they indicate that the values that they put forward, including political and territorial survival, economic well-being, and communal harmony are relative rather and absolute, and at best seem to provide a general guideline as to what ought to be desirably secured at the nation-state level. A more adequate concept that characterizes the situation in the Third World is that which focuses on the basic core values of all states: the protection of their territorial integrity and political autonomy.

However, beyond the protection of the state, the debate over referent points also raises an important issue about the role of individuals, regimes, and nations as contenders for and providers of security. The divisions in Third World states whether along ethnic, class, or ideological lines often result in contending centers of authority as various groups seek to maintain their authority and power vis-a-vis other groups and the ruling regime (Job, 1992:5). The security interests of these various factions within society are bound to conflict as each seeks to provide for its self-preservation. Clearly, in many cases, individuals and nations perceive the ruling coterie as the primary threat to their security; state repression of citizens at-large and groups promoting various causes such as secession represents the most visible, publicized, and immediate threat. But while accepting that differing perceptions of security exist within Third World societies, it is those who hold

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11. Alexander Johnston makes a similar point when he seeks to apply conceptualizations of national security to actual policy decisions. Following an examination of South Africa's Total Onslaught/Total Strategy approach to national security adopted by the P. W. Botha regime during the 1970s and 1980s, Johnston argues that the confusions of this strategy "...illustrate the bankruptcy of a policy using the idea of national security on any other basis than that of an undivided state with common citizenship, and a strongly held, widely diffused view of the identity and purpose of the state. These confusions include...uncertainty over the referent object of national security, with lines of national communities being drawn and redrawn to fit the requirements of the moment..." (1991:159-60).

the reins of power that largely define the threats to their states and the strategies that will be enacted to deal with them.

Security decisions in the Third World and to a lesser degree in the North remain the preserve of the ruling regime. There is little public debate in arenas such as the media (which is often an arm of the government) as to what constitutes a threat, what security policies a country should follow, and how these should be carried out. As well, these regimes, whether or not they are perceived of as legitimate by their populations, are with few exceptions (e.g. Kampuchea from 1979-1991) considered the legitimate representatives of their countries in international affairs. Therefore, it also becomes necessary to consider the particular threats that regimes perceive to their own survival when considering the security concerns of Third World states. The last section of this chapter will expand upon this idea and outline how it will be incorporated along with the protection of the basic core values of states to examine the security concerns and policies of Third World countries.

The other aspect of the security equation, "security from what" has also generated debates over how broadly the nature of threats to Third World states should be construed. Some consensus exists that security threats are not limited to military attacks but that political, economic, social, and environmental factors must also be taken into account.[12] Examples frequently cited to support this position include the pernicious effects of Southern economic dependence on the North, rising water levels and deforestation that threaten the populations of countries such as Bangladesh, and the political vulnerabilities of Third World states which render them unable to stop the penetration of their societies by various actors including the great powers and international organizations such as the IMF.

Opponents of broadening the notion of security such as Ayoob (1991:259) and Rothstein (1986:11-12) argue that such all-embracing conceptions are of little utility at

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12. See the definitions by Azar and Moon, Sayigh, and Thomas.

both the analytical and policy levels. Instead the two authors emphasize military and political factors as the main sources of threat to Third World states. In highlighting political threats, Ayoob notes that "[D]ifferent types of vulnerability, including those of the economic and ecological varieties, become integral components of this definition of security only if and when they become acute enough to take on overtly political dimensions and threaten state boundaries, state institutions, or regime survival" (1991:259). Rothstein, on the other hand, concedes that while such a broad notion of security might possibly make analytical sense, given the subjective nature of threat perceptions and the short-term interests of ruling elites, at the decision-making level they will be ignored by the vast majority of Third World regimes (1986:13).

While accepting that various economic, environmental, and social factors do impinge on the security concerns of Third World states and that their influence will likely increase in importance, integrating them into a comprehensive framework for security analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. Given the limited space constraints, this thesis will instead focus on outlining the military and political threats to Third World states. There are three main types of threats. First, there is the threat of cross-border invasions by foreign governments which have the potential to threaten the very existence of the state. The other two threats highlight the internal/external nature of Third World security concerns as they focus on the intrusive role that foreign forces can play in the internal affairs of these states. The second fear of Third World states is foreign intervention to assist domestic opponents of the ruling regime. The opposite of this is the third main threat which is foreign support for secessionist movements.

2.4 An Expanded Conception of Security

In this paper, security for Third World states is conceived of as the absence of military and political threats to three dimensions. These three dimensions are: 1) the

territorial integrity of the state; 2) its political autonomy; and 3) the survival of the regime and its system of governance. The first two dimensions embody the basic core values of all states in the international system whereas the third is generally referred to as regime security.

There are a number of reasons for examining security in relation to these three dimensions. First, as stated earlier, the lack of nation-states in the Third World belies the use of concepts such as national security to analyze the security concerns of these countries. Rather, the lack of congruence between nations and states often means that nations pose a significant, if not the primary, threat to the territorial integrity of these states. Furthermore, the internal divisions generated due to the efforts of groups seeking secession or changes in the organization of the government increase the permeability of these states to foreign interference and control, thereby threatening the state's political autonomy. The possession of territorial and political sovereignty are the attributes that define statehood and qualify countries for membership in the international system. Threats to these dimensions have the potential to severely curtail the territorial area of the state and the ability of its leaders to govern over their society, and in the extreme the very existence of the state could be at stake.

Clearly, all states in the international system are concerned with protecting their territorial integrity and political autonomy. The third dimension, the survival of the regime and its system of governance, is perhaps most relevant to those states in the Third and Second Worlds. Leaders in First World countries are also concerned and often preoccupied with maintaining their power but generally switchovers in the top personnel of these states are conducted through regularized procedures such as elections and these changeovers in leadership do not usually entail fundamental alterations in the way these states are governed. Through the centuries, the governing institutions and procedures in Western states have developed such that they are perceived of as legitimate by their

citizens and therefore issues such as succession usually do not lead to major crises within these states.[13]

In the Third World, on the other hand, regime concerns over maintaining their power and system of governance play a significant if not overarching role in defining the security threats to many of these states. Mohammed Ayoob, for example, has put forward a similar position in stating that:

> In the absence of a consensus on fundamental issues and in the absence of open political debate and contest, many of these states are ruled by regimes with narrow support bases -- both politically and socially -- ...Since it is these regimes...who define the threats to the security of their respective states, it is no wonder that they define it primarily in terms of regime security rather than the security of the society as a whole (in Acharya, 1992:4).

Our commonly-accepted ideas of regime security invoke images of military or authoritarian dictators grasping to maintain power through widespread repression, death squads, and other paramilitary measures. While the highly publicized cases of the Manuel Noriegas, Baby Doc Duvaliers, and Saddam Husseins do nothing to alter this image, the notion of regime security is really a much broader concept. As Amitav Acharya argues:

> ...regime security is basically a question of the ability of the government of the day, the ruling group or elite to successfully manage and overcome the problems of governance while maintaining the continuity of its authority and hold on power....Crises of legitimacy and domestic vulnerability need not be the case only with those regimes which come to power through coups or who resort to corrupt means and repression to ensure their self-preservation...it is important to bear in mind that there are many examples of Third World leaders who despite being genuinely committed to the goal of national development and equity, and enjoying considerable mass support, still do not escape serious challenges to their hold on power because of the lack of indigenous institutions to cope with the political consequences of modernisation and development (1992:4).

Although regime security concerns are a critical component of the security calculations of Third World states, they have either been downplayed or ignored by most

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13. Of course, as Charles Tilly (1975) has pointed out, during the early state formation process in Western Europe, rulers were primarily concerned with consolidating their own power vis-a-vis potential rivals, be they aspiring leaders or the population at-large.

international security scholars.[14] Perhaps this has to do with the negative connotations that have been associated with the notion of regime security or with desires to black-box the domestic processes in these states. But the internal/external nature of Third World security concerns (of course, many of these states also face significant external threats), means that ignoring regime security concerns provides only a partial understanding of the threats to Third World states. Furthermore, potential threats to Third World regimes and their systems of government impact the nature of security strategies and actions chosen by Third World states. For example, as Bahgat Korany points out, Iraq's attack on Iran in 1980 stemmed primarily from its regime's fear that Iran's Shi'a dominated revolution was encouraging its own Shi'a majority to revolt and topple its Sunni dominated state elite (in Acharya, 1992:8).

There are a variety of external actors ranging from states, international organizations, and multinational corporations to fellow ethnic kin that can impinge on the security concerns of Third World states; this thesis will emphasize the role of foreign (both Northern and Southern) governments and where possible allude to the actions of these other actors.

2.5 Conclusion

The foregoing has made it clear that our traditional security approaches are lacking in their ability to explain the security threats to Third World states. The debates over potential referent points for security and the varied nature of threats to these countries cannot be incorporated within this Western, Eurocentric framework. Rather, our conceptions of security need to be expanded to take into account the internal, internal/external, and external threats to Third World states. The nature of the

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14. Mohammed Ayoob (1986), Amitav Acharya (1992) and Barry Buzan (1988) are some significant exceptions.

decolonization process and the state formation efforts of Third World states have broadly set the context for an alternative approach to security in the South.

By putting forward a notion of security as entailing the absence of military and political threats to three dimensions (the territorial integrity and political autonomy of the state and the survival of its regime), this thesis is attempting to provide a conception that more accurately reflects the situation in the Third World. The following chapter will delve in greater detail as to why and how Third World states are vulnerable to threats to their three security dimensions.

Chapter 3 Factors that Influence the Security Concerns of Third World States

In the previous chapter, the Third World security environment was briefly outlined in order to contrast it with that found in the North and to bring forth the case for a broadened notion of security for the Third World. The purpose of this chapter is to expand upon the predicament of Third World states by explicitly outlining the various factors that both positively and adversely affect the three dimensions of security (the territorial integrity of the state, its political autonomy, and the survival of the regime and its system of governance). Clearly, these factors do not exist in isolation in Third World states as many of these countries exhibit most if not all of these factors and often they interact to lead these states to face peculiar security predicaments. As well, these factors do differentially impact on the three components with some, for instance, reducing the threats to one dimension at the cost of increasing the risks to another. Some Third World states face threats to all three security dimensions, in others a tradeoff is made between the various dimensions, or their primary threats impact on only one dimension.

The majority of this chapter will discuss how seven main factors can adversely impinge on the security concerns of Third World states. These are: 1) the narrow support bases of Third World regimes; 2) the existence of fissures over the nature of governance in these countries; 3) the ethnic composition of Third World states; 4) the overlap of ethnic groups across state boundaries; 5) the existence of opposing historical territorial claims; 6) the military and economic capabilities of Third World states; and 7) the presence of the superpower Cold War rivalry. Many of these factors were alluded to during the previous chapter's discussion of the decolonization and state formation processes, but given their central role in generating both internal and external security threats to Third World states, it is necessary to expand upon them in order to show how they can differentially impact on the three security dimensions.

In the latter section of this chapter, the other side of the equation will be examined to show how two main factors, the existence of some notion of national identity with the territorial borders of states and the norms of the international system, serve to reduce or limit threats to these dimensions.

3.1 Factors Which Threaten These Dimensions

Most Third World states can be characterized as authoritarian whether they are based on civilian or military rule or a combination of the two. The regimes in these countries generally govern through the support of narrow segments of their population and more often than not they rely on a variety of coercive measures to ensure the compliance of their populations. These actions are undertaken by not only those regimes that are primarily concerned with power and greed but also those that are seeking to enact widespread social and economic programs. Attempts to move beyond the exercise of despotic power have met with limited success in the Third World as there are only a few countries like India, Singapore, Cuba, and Taiwan where some effective penetration of society has occurred. For the majority, the inability of their regimes to generate widespread support for their rule and systems of governance increases the insecurity that these states face.

Limited support for Third World regimes not only raises the chances of domestic opposition to their rule but it also increases the permeability of their state to external interference. Foreign governments can and do utilize these internal opposition movements as an avenue to actively intervene in the affairs of Third World states. However, the political autonomy of these countries is threatened whether the external power seeks to support the opposition forces or the ruling regime. In many cases, what occurs is a tradeoff between the security of the regime and securing the political autonomy of the state.

In the short-term, foreign support, by shoring up these regimes, provides these ruling coteries with the resources to maintain their hold on power. This aid usually consists of military hardware ostensibly for the protection of the state against external threats but more often than not it is utilized by the regime against its domestic opponents. In the extreme, regimes such as those of Baby Doc Duvalier in Haiti and Jose Napoleon Duarte in El Salvador develop their personal paramilitary forces which often conflict with both the citizens at-large and the state's military forces.[15] The outcome is an increasingly armed general populace with widespread, random violence becoming a way of life. In the long run, then, this reliance on external assistance becomes a source of insecurity for the regime and its state. For as Mohammed Ayoob argues:

> This paradox of massive political and military investment (the latter largely in the form of arms transfers and military advisors) in insecure regimes on the part of the superpowers, which nevertheless stops short of a final commitment to save them when the chips are down, adds substantially to the problems of insecurity that many Third World regimes face; for it makes those regimes more reckless, more repressive and less flexible on the mistaken notion that they would be bailed out by their superpower patrons when in dire straits (1984:49).

In examining the internal divisions within Third World states that most often generate external involvement, two main types can be pointed out: firstly there are those that center on the nature of governance in these countries and secondly those that often arise as ethnic conflicts that can also involve the territorial integrity of the state. It must noted though that these disputes are often fuelled by a variety of other issues such as the clash between traditional and modern forms of social organization and growing gaps between the haves and have nots within society.

In this first type of internal division, these concerns over the organization of the state in terms of the nature of its governmental institutions and the distribution of power usually reflect competing ideological visions of the state. In the majority of these cases,

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15. For further details see Joel Migdal who refers to this development of military forces based on personal loyalty to rulers as the building of a praetorian guard (1987:413-14).

the opposing views have either broadly reflected or been perceived to mirror the global rivalry between communism and capitalism (e.g. Nicaragua, El Salvador, Angola, and Mozambique among others). Increasingly though, as Islam appears to be gaining force as an organizing ideology for many Third World states (e.g. Algeria, Iran, Pakistan), conflicts are likely to increase over the degree of Islamicization of these societies.

Generally, these ideological divisions within Third World societies adversely affect two of the three security dimensions, i.e. the survival of the regime and the political autonomy of Third World states, although in extreme cases the state's territorial integrity could also be at stake. At the domestic level, groups that promote ideologies different from that of the governing regime represent an alternative pole for the loyalty and support of citizens. Fearing that these groups will gain broad-based support within their societies, regimes seek to protect their power through the most easily available means, the widespread repression of these groups and their supporters. Often though these regimes are unable to quell these movements and instead their societies become increasingly polarized as both sides rely more heavily on armed force as the avenue by which to obtain their goals.

The divisiveness of their societies also makes it difficult for these Third World states to stop the penetration of their societies. The Cold War rivalry has probably impacted the most on these states given the important role that ideology has played in debates over how their societies should be governed.[16] The degree and nature of intervention has varied from the provision of military aid (e.g. American support for the UNITA rebels in Angola) to covert operations (e.g. CIA operations that led to the overthrow of Allende in Chile in 1973) and the large-scale use of the superpowers' own forces (e.g. the presence of over 50,000 Soviet forces in Afghanistan from 1979-89) depending on how strategic these Third World countries were determined to be. But for

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16. The general impact of the Cold War rivalry on the security of Third World states will be discussed later in this section.

these developing states, the internationalization of their civil conflicts have led to prolonged and intensified battles. The protracted nature of these disputes leads the opposing factions to become increasingly dependent on foreign assistance which subsequently decreases the political autonomy of their state.

The second type of internal division that generates external threats to Third World states primarily revolves around the ethnic composition of these countries. The ethnic nature of Third World states varies considerably from the highly homogeneous countries like North and South Korea to states such as Sri Lanka that contain two main ethnic groups and those like India which encompass over twenty different ethnic collectivities. But in the vast majority of these states, their multi-ethnic nature has led to threats against the three dimensions of security as divisions and conflicts have arisen over what territory the state should encompass, how it should be governed, and who should rule.

Firstly, there are a significant number of states such as South Africa, the Sudan, and Lebanon where ethnicity has fragmented these states leading to internal/external conflicts centering on the nature of governance in the country. In other cases, ethnic disputes have intensified to the point that struggles have arisen as nations have become unwilling to accept the territorial boundaries imposed on their groups largely as a result of the decolonization process. Most of these secession struggles are found in Asia, Africa, and to a lesser degree the Middle East although even Northern states like Spain and Canada are not immune to such pressures. Some notable examples include the Karens and Shan in Burma, the Sikhs, Assamese, and Kashmiris in India, the Tamils in Sri Lanka, the Ibo in Nigeria, the Eritreans and Tigrans in Ethiopia, and the Kurds in Iran, Iraq and Turkey.

Clearly where secession is an issue, the territorial integrity of the state is threatened as these groups hope to obtain control over various portions of existing states. The loss of territory can be perceived of as threatening because the area might contain significant resources or it could be located in a strategically-important area such as on a

vital transportation route. Furthermore, as is particularly relevant in Africa, the fear of a successful secessionist claim opening up a Pandora's Box has even led to a domino theory of secessions.

> In its more popular form it postulates that a successful secession anywhere in Africa would create a demonstration effect that would bring with it the disintegration of existing states and complete balkanisation of the continent. The corollary of this hypothesis is that the suppression of secession in one territory would have a deterrent effect on potential separatist movements elsewhere (Kamanu, 1974:366).

But whether or not they become manifested in secessionist struggles, ethnic struggles within Third World states lead to threats against both the survival of the ruling regimes and the political autonomy of their states. The reliance of these ruling coteries on a narrow support base, usually that of its fellow ethnic kin (e.g. the Punjabis in Pakistan, the Alawite in Syria), means that demands for greater representation and a restructuring of the organization of the state directly threaten the continued power of these regimes and also their ethnic supporters. Being unwilling or unable to restructure ethnic relations within their societies, Third World regimes generally choose instead to utilize a variety of economic and military measures to quell these disturbances. But what most often results is that these conflicts become protracted, violent battles between the governing regime and the various ethnic groups and this dissension increases the permeability of Third World states to external interference and intervention, thereby lessening their autonomy over their internal and external affairs.

There are a variety of foreign actors that can potentially intervene in these ethnic struggles. The superpowers have become involved in these disputes to the extent that they also contained an ideological cleavage along with the ethnic division. For example, before Menguistu's Marxist regime deposed Ethiopia's pro-American Emperor Haile Selaisse in 1974, the Soviet Union was among the primary supporters of the Eritrean liberation movement which broadly defined itself as socialist/Marxist leaning. When Menguistu took over power, the Soviet Union then switched its allegiance to the

governing regime and provided it with substantial military and economic assistance to crush the Eritrean secessionist movement.

Along with the great powers, consideration of the third factor, the overlap of ethnic groups across state boundaries, brings in neighbouring states and other ethnic kin as potential interveners in these disputes. As Suhrke and Noble state:

> ...an ethnic group may demand that its own government support embattled kin elsewhere; if unsuccessful in influencing government policy, it may render unofficial assistance....The government's actions will likely be influenced by its own ethnic composition and by that of the state. If its dominant majority is the protesting (or persecuted) minority in the other state, it may offer to help facilitate a peaceful settlement; if the states share minorities, the 'outside' state may supply arms to the other government (1977:7).

The nature of the decolonization process resulted in the division of many ethnic groups like the Kurds and Somalis among different states but it also left the status of other collectivities like the Palestinians and the Kashmiris in an indeterminate status (Ayoob, 1991:272). Tensions over the treatment of ethnic kin have generated interstate conflicts such as those between Rwanda and Burundi and Honduras and El Salvador and led states such as India to militarily intervene in neighbouring countries like Sri Lanka to protect their fellow ethnic kin (In this case there were significant ties between the Tamils that dominate southern India and those that occupy northern Sri Lanka).

Support from ethnic groups for their fellow kin extends beyond an intra-Third World issue to also encompass North-South relations. Immigrant communities residing in the North can become actively involved in the struggles of their ethnic kin in the Third World. For instance, the Sikhs in Canada, the United States and Britain have not only provided military and economic aid to the Sikh secessionists in India's Punjab province but they have also allegedly been linked to many terrorist acts in the North including the bombing of an Air India flight in 1985. Clearly then the overlap of ethnic groups across state boundaries can lead to threats against the three security dimensions as external intervention by these groups can threaten the survival of the regime, the territorial

integrity of the state if secession is an issue, and its political autonomy as these foreign actors can potentially exert an influential role in the internal affairs of the state.

The overlap of ethnic groups across state boundaries has also been a significant issue in generating a number of competing interstate historical territorial claims. Efforts to (re)unite ethnic kin under a single territorial homeland can impinge on the territorial integrity of a number of states, threatening them with the loss of significant portions of territory or in the extreme their complete absorption. For example, since its independence in 1960 Somalia has laid claim to the Ogaden area of Ethiopia and portions of the north-east of Kenya (both of which are inhabited by ethnic Somalis) arguing that they comprise part of a single Somali political system that existed before the colonial divisions on the continent (Day, 1987:126). Along with numerous border incursions, skirmishes, and the promotion of armed insurrections in these areas, the Somalis have gone to war against these countries in order to obtain control over these disputed territories.

The motivations behind these and other historical territorial claims also include considerations of national prestige, and desires to control or maintain access to resources and strategic transportation routes, acquire control over historically-important areas or regain territories lost during wars or invasions. There are currently some eighty contested boundaries and territorial claims on the international agenda, many if not most of which are between the developing countries (Day, 1987:ix). Some notable examples include Iraq's claim over Kuwait, Syria and Israel over the Golan Heights, Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians regarding the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, India and China vis-a-vis the Askai Chin area, China and Vietnam regarding the oil-rich Spratly Islands, Morocco and Mauritania over the resource-laden Western Sahara, and North and South Korea over each other's territory. Those instances that reflect North-South divisions include Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands, France and Madagascar over a number of small islands off the coast of Madagascar, Cuba and the United States over the

American base at Guantanomo, and the various claims of First and Third World countries over Antarctica (Day, 1987).

Along with threatening the territorial dimension of the security of Third World states, as with the previous factors, these opposing claims can also lead to threats to regime survival and the political autonomy of their countries. For example, in the cases of North and South Korea the protection of the territorial integrity of the state has become infused with the protection of the regime as notions of national/state security as utilized by these regimes to ensure their self-protection (Azar and Moon, 1988:83-84). Their fears of absorption by each other mean that the political autonomy of their states is also at risk through the territorial challenges to their states. However, even in other cases such as that of Israel, successive regimes, including the current rule of Yitzak Shamir, have promoted continued Israeli control over the Occupied Territories as a platform to ensure their survival in power. As well, the recent Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is perhaps the best example of how opposing territorial claims threaten all three dimensions of security in the Third World.

Traditional discussions of power emphasize the military and secondarily the economic capabilities of states, and it is within this category where there are marked differences among both Third World states and between Northern and Southern countries. Michael Klare (1990) notes that there are at least eighteen highly-militarized Third World states that have consciously sought to increase their conventional and nuclear weapons capabilities in order to provide for their own military security. Included are states such as India, Pakistan, Iraq, Brazil, South Africa, Taiwan, Syria, Argentina, Iran, Egypt, Libya, North Korea, and South Korea. However, to a large degree, these states still rely on Northern sources for the weapons, spare parts, training, and technology needed to sustain their military machines. Although their military dependence on the Northern countries is less than that of most Third World states, this asymmetrical relationship

means that Southern countries are often unable to protect themselves against interference and intervention by the economically and militarily more powerful Northern states.

Within the Third World, there are a significant number of countries such as the micro-states and many in sub-saharan Africa that either lack the resources, are small in size, or are unable to obtain foreign patronage in order to gain the physical power to protect themselves against external and/or internal threats (Azar and Moon, 1988:278). Some of these countries have sought to contract out their security problems as Sri Lanka did during 1987 when it accepted the presence of 50,000 Indian Peacekeeping troops in its northern Tamil-dominated areas (Holsti, 1992:28). Others such as Nepal and Lesotho have acquiesced to the dominance and protection of larger and more militarily powerful neighbours (in these cases India and South Africa respectively).

The limited economic capabilities of most Third World states not only impact on the military potential of their countries but they are also an important factor in increasing their permeability to external intervention. The various economic problems that these countries face have been well-documented and include the impact of modernization on traditional modes of economic organization, the reliance of many economies on the export of a few commodities, the lack of basic infrastructure for industrialization, and the general dependence of Southern economies on the Northern-dominated world economy.[17] In highlighting their role in generating security threats, Mohammed Ayoob argues:

> This 'asymmetrical interdependence' between the global North and the global South, produced by a combination of economic and technological weakness with military and political inferiority on the part of the Third World, not only adds to the psychological insecurity of the Third World state elites it makes Third World state structures and regimes highly permeable to a large number of external actors ranging from international institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (which is dominated by the industrialized capitalist states) through the advanced industrialized states to the multinational corporations which also

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4. For broad overviews of these topics see Robert Gilpin (1987) and Joan Edelman Spero (1990). There are, of course, numerous works that examin   are, of course, numerous works that examine Third World

have their headquarters securely located in the industrialized North. Such
permeability detracts from the autonomy of the Third World state and
makes it very vulnerable to external pressures and influences thus adding to
its insecurity and increasing the saliency of its security predicament
(1992:35).

Third World regimes are acutely aware of how economic problems often generate

domestic unrest that can threaten the survival of their rule. With pervasive

underdevelopment, continual population growth, chronic poverty, unemployment, and

deteriorating conditions of life, for many Third World citizens economic issues are not a

concern over more or less; they are a life or death matter (Azar and Moon, 1988:281).

The ruling coteries of the economic success stories of the Third World, the new

industrializing countries, have consciously engaged in rapid industrialization programs

based on export-led strategies in order to justify their authoritarian systems of governance

(Acharya, 1992:20-4). But most other Third World countries have not been able to

repeat this pattern and thus economic welfare concerns play a role in generating

opposition against the ruling regime and they can even fuel efforts to establish separate

states.

The final factor that will be examined as negatively impinging on the security

dimensions of Third World states concerns the presence of the global rivalry between the

United States and the Soviet Union. With the exception of the Latin American states, the

overwhelming majority of the developing countries emerged with their new-found

independence in the midst of the Cold War. With the nuclear standoff in Europe and the

division of the North into Eastern and Western blocs, the costs and risks of battle in this

area were perceived of as too high (Ayoob, 1991:258). The South, on the hand,

provided the perfect arena for competition: the existence of a vast array of uncommitted

and militarily and economically inferior states would allow for superpower intervention

and conflict without the dangers that were associated with direct conflict between the

states of the two blocs (Litwak and Wells Jr., 1988:x; MacFarlane, 1990:1,

Soedjatmoko, 1987:292-3). The utilization of the Third World as the superpower

battleground meant that the security concerns of these states would be peripheral to the security of the international system (Alagappa, 1987:12; Ayoob, 1991:264). This could only increase the insecurity of Third World regimes for as Mohammed Ayoob argues they now suffer from a "...feeling of dual impotence. First they are unable to prevent superpower rivalries and conflicts from penetrating their polities and regions, and second, they are equally unable to affect, except marginally and in selected cases, the global political and military equation between the two superpowers and their respective alliances" (1991:273).

Generally, the superpowers have not been a direct cause of Third World conflicts, but their various interventionist measures, especially, the provision of security assistance, have greatly prolonged and intensified these struggles, resulting in an increasing loss of lives and destruction of property. The role of superpower intervention in domestic conflicts and its impact on the security concerns of these states has already been previously discussed; therefore, the focus here will be on how interstate relations have been affected.

In general, superpower intervention in Third World regions has mirrored the existing interstate rivalries and thereby served to deepen the security threats that these countries perceive vis-a-vis each other (Buzan, 1986:19). In South Asia, for example, American support for Pakistan and Soviet aid to India has allowed the continuance of their regional rivalry which has resulted in three wars and numerous border skirmishes along with an escalating arms race, with the current efforts centered on the development and projection of a nuclear weapons capability.[18] In the Middle East, while the roots of the Arab-Israeli dispute are locally generated, the deeply-held American commitment to Israel coupled with Soviet support for the various Arab states including Iraq, Syria, and

18. It is interesting to conjecture what would have occurred had superpower aid not been provided to India or Pakistan. Given India's size, and its military and economic superiority, it is possible that India could have struck a decisive blow to Pakistan and in the extreme case incorporated its territory into a broader Indian union. For Pakistan, American aid has been vital in allowing it to maintain some semblance of a balance of power with India.

Jordan has contributed to the intractability of the conflict which has already led to three previous regional wars.

The nature of superpower support of Third World clients also differed markedly from that which was accorded to their Northern alliance partners and this clearly brings out the peripheral role that the security of the developing states plays in the global security equation. Not only did the superpowers suddenly switch clients as the Soviets did from Somalia to Ethiopia in the mid-1970s, but they often utilized their military aid as a weapon to ensure the compliance of their allies. The often unpredictable nature of American and Soviet support could only increase the security concerns of these Third World states for they had to constantly be on guard against the possibility of somehow being left in the cold and required to suddenly fend for themselves (Bobrow and Chan, 1988:57).

3.2 Factors Which Support These Dimensions

This first factor relates to the state formation process in the Third World and focuses on the degree to which Southern countries have achieved some notion of national identity associated with the territorial borders of their states. As the last section indicated, most Third World states suffer from the existence of numerous nations within their borders and ethnic divisions have generated domestic and internationalized civil disputes. There are however, a fair number of developing countries that do not have to contend with these internally-generated threats to their territory. These states are usually highly homogeneous or while they possess ethnic minorities, often at their borders, they also have a dominant ethnic group around which the identity of the state has been formed (Ayoob and Samudavanija, 1989:270). Many of the Latin American countries would fit into this category along with the Southeast Asian states of North and South Korea, Thailand, Vietnam, Brunei, and others such as Saudi Arabia and Bangladesh.

The lack of internal threats to their territorial integrity reduces the potential domestic sources that can impinge on the security of these states and also removes an often-used avenue for external intervention. Domestic dissension that opens up the possibility of external intervention does still often arise but this generally focuses on the nature of governance within these countries and thereby raises threats to only the two security dimensions concerning regime survival and the political autonomy of the state. Clearly, though this does not mean that these countries do not face externally-generated territorial threats as some Latin American states are embroiled in border disputes with their neighbours or the great powers (e.g. Argentina and Great Britain vis-a-vis the Falkland Islands and Ecuador and Peru over portions of the Amazon Basin) and in the extreme case of North and South Korea, both states have sought to incorporate each other's territory into a single country.

The maintenance of the territorial integrity of Third World states has also been supported by the second factor, the norms of the international system. Of particular relevance are those pertaining to the preservation of the territorial status quo, the non-recognition of secessionist claims, and the maintenance of the juridical sovereignty of states. Some scholars (Ayoob, 1992:36-9; Jackson and Rosberg, 1982:1) argue that these norms serve to increase the security threats to Third World countries by preventing the demise of politically unviable states and precluding territorial realignments that more accurately reflect the coincidence of nations with state boundaries. While not disagreeing with many aspects of their arguments, the case for including this factor as one that positively impacts on the security of Third World states rests on the strong adherence that these norms have generated in ensuring the territorial integrity dimension of the security of Southern countries. For example, as Jeffrey Herbst states, "Even in Africa, the continent seemingly destined for war given the colonially-imposed boundaries and weak political authorities, there has not been one involuntary boundary change since the dawn of the independence era in the late 1950s..." (1990:123). The non-recognition of

secessionist claims has also proven remarkably effective; to date the only successful secession in the Third World is the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971 and it required the military intervention of neighbouring India.[19]

In various regional forums such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the developing countries have also internalized these norms relating to the territorial sanctity of colonially-inherited boundaries. The desire for resources, access to vital waterways, and a sufficient population base along with the fear of opening Pandora's Box and unveiling disorder within the country and even the region provide part of the rationale. But states have also been able to utilize the existence of secessionist claims in order to gain international support and legitimacy for their governments and its measures to control any domestic strife. In this sense, the survival of the regime dimension for some states has also been positively affected. For instance, the Nigerian government during the Biafra secession movement in the late 1960s was able to enlist the military backing of great powers such as Britain as well as diplomatic support from the UN and the OAU.

Furthermore, while the great and regional powers have often aggravated secessionist struggles through the provision of military and economic aid to these groups, these states have not been willing to help ensure that these various secessionists achieve their goals. Many of these regional states face similar secession problems and would find it difficult to wholly support this cause in another state while simultaneously seeking to quell their own internal separatist movements. India is a good case in point. Although it did militarily intervene in 1971 to ensure the emergence of Bangladesh, the rise and intensification of secession movements in its Punjab, Assam, and Kashmir provinces during the 1980s has made Indian ruling regimes extremely cautious of the extent of support accorded to such movements in other countries. Commenting on the question of

19. It must be noted though that it is very likely that Eritrea will receive its "independence" in the next couple of years.

Indian support for the Tamil secessionists in Sri Lanka, M. J. Akbar states:

> Open, then, the Indian Pandora Box. What reply would you then have to
> Khalistan, and the call for another Pakistan, and to a hundred other stans in
> the name of the same oppression by a majority on the mainland (1988:24)?

3.3 Conclusion

The first seven factors that were outlined have increased the threats that Southern
countries encounter to the three dimensions of security. Although they do differentially
impinge on the security dimensions, in most cases, they increase the vulnerabilities of
Third World regimes and decrease the political autonomy of their states. Factors that
relate to the ethnicity of Third World states and regions along with competing historical
territorial claims more specifically impinge on the territorial integrity of these countries.

It is with regard to the territorial integrity dimension where two main factors have
positively impacted on the security concerns of Southern states. The existence of some
notion of national identity associated with the state's borders and the norms of the
international system have supported the efforts of countries to maintain their territorial
integrity, and as in the case of secession struggles, the regimes in these countries have
also benefitted as external aid has sometimes been provided to quell these movements.

Chapter 4 Disaggregating the Third World Security Predicament: A Typology of Third World States, Their Security Concerns and Strategies

To date, much of the work surrounding Third World security has been either at the level of broad generalizations or alternatively more narrowly-focused single and comparative case studies. Few efforts have been undertaken to systematically disaggregate the Third World in order to compare and contrast the security threats and strategies of these states.[20] This chapter hopes to add to our body of knowledge in this area by undertaking some preliminary efforts at mapping out the different security threats to Third World states and then outlining how these threats predispose these countries toward specific security strategies. Firstly, a typology of Third World states will be developed according to the primary threats that these countries face. This framework will then be utilized to describe the security strategies that Third World states have taken or are likely to undertake to reduce or eliminate their security concerns. In doing so, this chapter will focus on both the Cold War and post-Cold War periods.

Most Third World states face both internal and external threats that can arise in almost endless combinations. Given this multitude of threats and the space constraints of this thesis, this typology is defined by reference to the primary external and internal/external threats to Third World states. Four broad categories are used, of which two (Territorially-Coveted and Politically-Threatened states) emphasize the external orientation of the state's security concerns whereas the other two (Ethnically-Threatened and Ideologically-Divided states) bring forth how internal factors generate external threats to these countries.

To date, very little systematic research has been undertaken on why Third World states pursue the strategies that they do to ensure their security (Job, 1992:18). There have been a plethora of studies outlining arms transfers to Third World states, their

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20. Among these exceptions are Bobrow and Chan (1988), Buzan (1983, 1991a) although he concentrates primarily on the security concerns of Third World states and Kolodziej and Harkavy (1982) who emphasize the security policies of the developing countries.

efforts toward establishing indigenous arms industries, and the spread of chemical,

biological, and nuclear weapons (Ibid.). Iraq's near acquisition of a nuclear weapons

capability coupled with fears over its possible use of chemical weapons during the Persian

Gulf War again raises the issue of the military potential of Southern states. Arms

transfers have been significantly highlighted; yet, an overemphasis on this aspect detracts

attention from the nature of Southern militarization, especially in terms of its

dependent/independent orientation.[21] Along with touching on these issues, other policies

through which Third World states seek to secure themselves will be examined. These

include the promotion of an external enemy image to forgo domestic unity, an appeal to

international norms for support for Third World states, and the use of regional

organizations to strengthen the security of neighbouring states.[22]

4.1 Territorially-Coveted States

Within this classification, there are two types of states that can be defined

according to the nature of threats to their territorial integrity. There are firstly the

Wholly Coveted States in which the primary fear is of absorption by another state. The

second, or Partially Coveted States, encompasses those countries that stand to lose

significant portions of their territory. Following a discussion of each of these types, the

security strategies they are likely to pursue will be outlined.

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21. For more information see Wendt and Barnett (1991) and Barnett and Wendt (1992).
22 Given this thesis' focus on external and internal/external threats, the strategies that Third World states
undertake to primarily secure themselves domestically will not be probed. These include the promotion of
rapid economic development, suppression of the population, security through political development,
security through socio-cultural development, and the building of a praetorian guard. For more details see
Amitav Acharya (1992), Muthiah Alagappa (1987), Cynthia Enloe (1980), and Joel Migdal (1987) among
others.

4.2 Wholly Coveted States

These countries, more so than the others that will be outlined, suffer from acute threats to their very existence as states in the international system. Their primary threats arise from neighbouring or great power states that are seeking to forcibly incorporate their territory. These Wholly Coveted states are often small in size and population and they are either surrounded by or have hostile relations with at least one other state in their region. Threats to their territorial existence mean that the survival of the regime and the political autonomy of the state are also at stake and in many cases their conceptions of security blur the distinctions between the protection of the ruling regime and the protection of the state.

Some examples of Wholly Coveted states include: Kuwait, with the threat emanating from Iraq, Taiwan vis-a-vis China, Chad with Libya posing the primary threat, Israel vis-a-vis the Arab states (1948-1967), and North and South Korea who want to incorporate each other's territory. The territories of these states are coveted for a wide variety of reasons such as their possession of significant resources (Kuwait and oil), and desires to reunify ethnic nations (North and South Korea) or fulfill historical claims (Israel and the Arab states).

The peculiarities of the Israeli situation perhaps make its security predicament unique in comparison to that faced by other Wholly Coveted states, but it provides an interesting example of the severity of threats to these countries. Until the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Israel's primary threats centered on an external military attack from its Arab neighbours, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq. But following Israel's victory in the Six-Day War and its annexation of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai peninsula and the Golan Heights, its security threats began to also take on a domestic dimension as both the Arab states and the Palestinians (as generally represented by the PLO) have

sought to throw off Israeli rule in the Occupied Territories. It was during the 1948-1967 period when Israel most closely resembled a Wholly Coveted state as since then its security predicament has become more complicated with its internal/external linkages stemming from the Israeli refusal to relinquish control over the Occupied Territories and secondly the Golan Heights. As Michael Manndelbaum has stated in reference to the outcome of the 1967 war, "The return of the territories offered Israel the prospect of peace, an end to the dangerous round of wars, and the chance to build the Jewish state without constant threat of attack. Muting the hostility of its Arab neighbors, which had dominated Israeli national life since the founding of the state, would mean achieving a supreme national goal" (1988:358).

The refusal of the Arab states to recognize the existence of a Jewish state and their subsequent professions to ensure its destruction have dominated Israeli security concerns about the protection of their state. For Israelis, this threat has become intertwined with the historical fate of the Jewish people for as Bernard Reich states, "[T]he Arab threat is not perceived as an aberration of history, but rather as its latest manifestation -- the most recent phase of thousands of years of persecution and conquest" (1988:2). Israel's smaller size and resource base relative to its Arab neighbours, the existence of hostile states on all its borders and its relative diplomatic isolation have all imposed constraints on its ability to defend itself. The Arab states have begun two wars (1948, 1973) to regain their territories and ensure the destruction of Israel. But Israeli' insecurities about the growing military capabilities of the Arab states and fears of an Arab strike have also resulted in its launching two wars against the Arab states (1956, 1967) coupled with two invasions of Lebanon and numerous raids on its southern area.

Israeli fears about the absorption of their state vividly demonstrate the acute nature of threats to Wholly Coveted states. Protecting their territorial integrity becomes the overarching concern as threats to this dimension also encompass the survival of the regime and the political autonomy of the state. For the Partially Coveted states, their

existence per se is not in question but threats to their territory also impinge on the other two security dimensions.

<u>4.3 Partially-Coveted States</u>

For many of these countries, their main security concerns are a legacy of the decolonization process as the creation of multi-ethnic units with overlapping ethnic ties and undefined status for other nations resulted in irredentist claims throughout the Third World. For other states in this category, the control of and access to resources, historically-based claims, and desires for territorial aggrandizement are motivations that increase external threats to their territorial integrity. Usually, what is under dispute is a significant portion of a state's territory and in some cases foreign efforts to forcibly incorporate these lands are supported by significant segments of the populace that reside there.

Threats to these states usually arise from neighbouring countries and ethnic groups within their states. Some examples of Partially Coveted states include Kenya and Ethiopia (in terms of Somalia's efforts to create a greater Somali homeland that would encompass the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and the northeast of Kenya), Iran, Iraq, and Turkey which all contain significant Kurdish populations that are seeking to create a separate Kurdistan state, India vis-a-vis Pakistan's desire to acquire Kashmir, and Venezuela's historical claim to over half of Guyana's territory.

These irredentist pressures are a constant concern as they not only threaten to destroy the territorial integrity of these states but they also provide a source of support and loyalty for citizens which increases the difficulties of forging a national identity. Ruling regimes can come under threat because they have to generate significant resources or rely on foreign aid to ensure the protection of these disputed areas and this can create domestic discontent. Furthermore, some regimes seek to gain legitimacy by promoting

themselves as the only leaders capable of protecting their states from these external threats. The political autonomy of the state undoubtedly declines as these countries become increasingly reliant on external support to counter threats to their territorial integrity.

Prior to the early 1980s and the intensification of secessionist violence in its Punjab, Assam, and Kashmir provinces, India's primary security concerns centered on maintaining its control over Kashmir and its northern areas that border China. At a broad level, India has perceived great power interference in South Asia as a long-term threat to its security interests, but more directly Pakistan and China have been its main external threats. Throughout its forty-seven year history, concerns over maintaining control over Kashmir have dominated its actions and relations with regional and great power states. The India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir encompasses not only the territorial dimension but for both countries control over this area is seen as critical to the legitimating ideologies of two countries. Pakistan's raison d'etre resides in its provision of a safe homeland for Indian Muslims. This is directly threatened by India's secular ideology, the presence of a significant Muslim population in India, and Indian control over the overwhelming Muslim province of Kashmir (Rizvi, 1986b:121).

These two countries have already engaged in two wars (1948 and 1965) and countless border skirmishes over control of Kashmir and although for a time it appeared that both states were willing to accept the cease-fire line as the de facto boundary between the Indian and Pakistani-controlled portions of Kashmir (Rivzi, 1986b:122), the reemergence of this conflict in 1990, coupled with the reported nuclear weapons capability of both countries raises the possibility that a conventional war between the two states could become nuclear (Desmond, 1992:17). As India is the larger and more militarily powerful state in the region, it is clearly within its defence capabilities to thwart a Pakistani effort to seize Kashmir (Thomas, 1982:125). But Indian security concerns over Kashmir have also been adversely affected because of the prospect that international

diplomatic pressure through forums such as the United Nations might force it to give up control over the area (Thomas, 1982:125).

The Indian claim to Kashmir is open to question on a number of fronts including its continual refusal to hold a plebiscite over the future of the area that it had agreed to in 1949. However, even though controlling Kashmir might not be in India's self-interest, its potential loss is seen as not only a prestige issue but also one that could have adverse consequences for India's multi-ethnic society and its promotion of a secular ideology. For India, then, as with other Partially Coveted states, threats to significant portions of their territory have broader ramifications that can decrease the security of their states. The next section will discuss how these two types of coveted states have and do seek to protect their territorial integrity.

4.4 The Security Strategies of Territorially-Coveted States

As with the other states in the Third World, the Territorially-Coveted States are constrained in their ability to provide for their security. For the majority of Third World states, their limited economic and military capabilities constrain their ability to respond to both external and internal/external threats. Also, the limited support bases for these and other Third World regimes can generate security threats to their states along with limiting the resources that can be generated to combat external threats. For Territorially-Coveted states, the threats to their territorial integrity, if not resulting from the nature of their independence, arise soon thereafter, and thus reflect long-standing considerations that occupy their security concerns.

During the Cold War era, there are three main strategies that these states pursued to ensure their security: 1) alignment with an external state, usually a great power, in order to obtain security assistance; 2) promoting an external enemy image in order to combat both internal/external threats; 3) appealing to international norms in order to

obtain support from other states in the international system. Following a discussion of each of these policies, the implications of the end of the Cold War and the future strategies these states could pursue will be described.

Given the protracted nature of threats to the territorial integrity of these countries, Coveted States seek to secure themselves through reducing their vulnerabilities to an external, military attack that could result in the dismemberment or absorption of their state. As they are solely unable to sustain the economic and military capabilities required to protect their territories, these states often solicit external security assistance. For some states, their former colonizers were more than willing to provide such aid in order to retain close ties with their former colonies.[23] For other countries, the existence of the Cold War generally ensured that, providing these states professed ideological affinity with a superpower or were perceived to be important for geopolitical interests, they states would receive ample support.

The nature of alignments with the Americans or Soviets varied; the deep American commitment to the continued existence of Israel can be contrasted to the non-aligned stance that India chose until the early 1970s when it signed a 20 year Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union. The Korean War which led to the bifurcation of that state has resulted in a standoff between, on the one hand, South Korea and its American allies which maintain over 40,00 American troops in control of approximately 250 tactical nuclear weapons and, on the other, North Korea with its Chinese and Soviet support (Cumings, 1988:105). In any case, the zero-sum nature of the global superpower rivalry in the Third World meant that most of these states could either seek or expect the Cold War dynamics to be imposed on their own regional rivalries. Continual external support has generated the development of dependent militarization in these countries. This occurs

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23. For example, the British provided 6000 troops to its former colony, the newly independent state of Kuwait, when it faced a mobilization of Iraqi troops at its border shortly after its independence in June 1961. Iraq has laid a historical claim to the entire territory of Kuwait and following the country's independence it appeared to be willing to utilize military force to incorporate this area. The British presence and its subsequent replacement by a 3300 member force of the Arab League forestalled this effort (Zacher, 1979:241).

when the state relies substantially on imported arms and arms technology and/or military training (Barnett and Wendt, 1992:9).[24] External support has in some cases exacerbated the territorial threats that these countries face; however, for some states like Israel and South Korea, such aid has been critical to maintaining their territorial existence.

It is these states that suffer from threats to their very existence that also actively promote external enemy images as avenues to coalesce domestic support in opposition to external threats. As Jeffrey Herbst states:

> ...the South Korean and Taiwanese states have been able to extract so many resources from their societies in part because the demands to be constantly vigilant provoked the state into developing efficient mechanisms for collecting resources and controlling dissident groups. A highly extractive state also could cloak demands for greater resources in appeals for national unity in the face of a determined enemy (1990:121).

The same can also be said for Israel, for as previously stated, the Arab threat is viewed as the most recent manifestation of the historical persecution and conquest of the Jewish peoples. And as Bernard Reich argues, "[T]his central concern dominates, directly or indirectly, all aspects of Israeli life, and it has prevailed since 1948 when its declaration of independence was greeted by an invasion of hostile Arab armies dedicated to the destruction of the fledgling state" (1982:203).

The other policy that Territorially-Coveted states invoke to promote their security is appealing to the norms of the international community to support the existence of the territorial status quo of their states. These norms promoting the sanctity of colonially-inherited boundaries, the maintenance of the juridical sovereignty of states, and the non-support for secession movements provide these countries with a strong international basis through which to appeal for external support and legitimation of their efforts to maintain their territorial integrity. Foreign powers, although they might take opposing sides in the regional rivalries among these states, do not generally support the territorial

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24. Of course, there are significant exceptions among these states including India and Israel which have actively embarked on efforts at independent militarization. This not only includes the development of indigenous arms industries but also local production of a ballistic missile and nuclear weapons capability. For more details see, Brzoska and Ohlson (1987), Klare (1990), Mehta (1985), Mintz and Stevenson (1991), Neuman (1984), among others.

dismemberment of these states. As Jackson and Rosberg state, "[W]hen external powers have intervened in Africa, they have usually respected existing state jurisdictions: most such interventions were in response to solicitations by African governments or revolutionary movements fighting against colonial rule or white minority regimes" (1982:20).

The end of the Cold War, the liberalization of Eastern Europe, and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union are raising numerous questions for the future security of all states in the international system. These changes will and have impacted on the security concerns and strategies of all Third World states.[25] The existence of one superpower and a number of great powers has and will probably change the nature of external intervention in their affairs. Given its own deeply-entrenched political, social, and economic problems, Russia, as the inheritor of the Soviet Union, is unlikely to play a role of any importance in the Third World for some time. The role of the remaining superpower, the United States, is more unclear at present. While debates have arisen in the United States advocating opposing viewpoints from an isolationist American posture vis-a-vis the Third World to a more active, interventionist role,[26] this author's discussions of security strategies for Third World states during the post-Cold War are predicated on the assumption that the United States will not seek to broaden its involvement in the Third World. Rather, an active or even quasi-hegemonic American role is most likely in areas that it perceives to be of vital interest, i.e., Latin America, the Middle East, and to a lesser extent Northeast Asia (Ayoob, 1991:281-2, MacFarlane, 1992:210-11)). Furthermore, other great powers such as Great Britain and France or a united European Community will probably not become more actively involved in Third World regions as their primary focus is on ensuring a stable security order within Europe.

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25. This discussion is meant to set the general context for outlining the security concerns and strategies of all the types of Third World states to be delineated below.
26. See for example, Steven R. David (1989), Charles William Maynes (1988), Michael C. Desch (1989) and Stephen van Evera (1990).

The possibility also remains that with these recent fundamental changes, the Third World might suffer less from intrusive penetration of their states than neglect by the international system. As Richard Barnett states with regard to Africa:

> ...most of the traditional hardheaded commercial and military reasons for pouring money into Africa's poor countries -- keeping communism out of the Third World, making poor countries safe for economic penetration and resource exploitation -- have begun to sound old-fashioned or off point. The Soviets are busy at home. Resources turn out to be well distributed around the globe, and increasingly, synthetics can be substituted. Cheap labor is available almost anywhere. Poor people do not make good customers, and not very many of them get rich (1990:44).

It must be noted that some Third World states will find it increasingly difficult to obtain foreign military and economic aid as they will no longer be able to appeal to ideological and perhaps even strategic rationales for the provision of such assistance. But overall, despite the current focus on the rehabilitation and integration of Eastern Europe and the republics of the former Soviet Union, the Third World is unlikely to become the forgotten area.

Just as unlikely is a great power condominium to reduce or mediate Third World conflicts. The coalition that was mounted against Iraq's invasion of Kuwait does not appear to set a precedent for future multilateral efforts that are primary presided over by the United States. There were several unique factors to this situation including a general distaste for the Saddam Hussein regime among Northern and some Southern states, the Kuwaiti possession of significant oil resources, and the American perception of the Middle East as a strategic region. The general economic constraints on the United Nations coupled with the disinterest of the Security Council members in many areas of the Third World makes it improbable that the UN will extensively utilize its peacekeeping forces to mediate Southern conflicts. The recent UN pull-out from Somalia and its reluctance to intervene in the civil war in Mogadishu is a case in point.

What is more conceivable is that Third World states that are dominant regional powers or aspire to such status will play a greater role in the security concerns of states in

their areas. Such states include India, Nigeria, Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, China, Iran, Iraq, among others.[27] Not only are these countries among the most militarily capable but their regional rivalries are rooted in local dynamics that are not significantly affected by the end of the Cold War. As Barry Buzan states, the subsequent "lowering of great power concern and engagement will by definition give more leverage to local powers to reshape the political environment of their regions" (1991b:11).

This last point is especially relevant to Territorially-Coveted States. For many of these countries, their security concerns are embedded in the regional dynamics of their regions and thus it is improbable that the end of the American-Soviet rivalry will result in a significant reduction of threats to their territorial integrity. But for others where the superpower rivalry had heavily infused their regions (e.g. the Middle East and the Korean peninsula), the end of this contest could potentially alleviate their fears of outside intervention in their affairs. This is especially relevant to states like Israel and South Korea that no longer have to concentrate on threats from their opponent's patron, the Soviet Union. On the other hand, North Korea and the Arab states might become more fearful of the United States as they cannot rely on the Soviet Union to act as a balancing force. These various factors are bound to impact on the security strategies that these states have relied on to protect their territory.

Probably the major change is and will be the nature of external alignments that these countries undertake to in order to obtain military and economic assistance. Russia or the other republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States are unable or unwilling to continue their patronage to Third World clients. This has potentially serious ramifications for states like India, North Korea, and Iraq who have relied on the former Soviet Union to provide them with such aid. But even American allies are no longer automatically assured of widescale support.

27. For more information on regional powers see Rodney Jones and Steven A. Hildreth (1986) and the Autumn 1991 issue of International Journal which is devoted to this issue. As well, Barry Buzan (1991a:chap 5) has emphasized that the end of the Cold War will result in a reemergence of regional security complexes along with further efforts by dominant states to increase their power.

South Korea and Israel can, to a large degree, rely on American aid (albeit at a reduced level) to help provide them with the military and economic resources they perceive as requisite to protecting their territory. But for other countries like Kenya, the end of the Cold War has reduced their geopolitical importance to the United States and subsequent aid, if given, is likely to be on a contingency basis dependent on factors such as the improvement of human rights in that country. Thus, reduced foreign aid could increase the insecurity of some of these states and make them more likely to engage in further suppression of their populations and/or lead them to undertake more risky policies such as preemptive attacks on their main enemies for fear that they can no longer protect themselves.

The promotion of external enemy images will likely continue and might even intensify were these states to lose the patronage of their great powers. But while domestic unity might be forged for a temporary period, it is improbable that this could be utilized as a long-term strategy to ensure the security of Territorially-Coveted states.

The role of international norms in supporting the territorial status quo of Third World states is open to debate. Scholars such as Jeffrey Herbst (1990:123), Kal Holsti (1991:310) and Mark Zacher (1992:7) assert that not only has the acquisition of territory declined in its strategic or economic value but that boundaries have achieved a legitimacy that they never had in the past and they point to constraints such as the OAU norm against the revision of territorially inherited boundaries. Holsti (1991:308-9) even asserts that vast territories might be a source of weakness for Southern states as greater administrative controls are required and that larger areas would likely include more distinct ethnic groups which would increase the possibility of secessionist attempts, thereby decreasing the security of these states.

On the other side, authors such as Lincoln P. Bloomfield (1989), Barry Buzan (1991b), Jose Thiago Cintra (1989), Edward A. Kolodziej and Robert E. Harkavy (1982), and Richard Ullman (1983) posit that territorial issues are not passe in generating

interstate wars in the Third World and thus they could increase the security concerns of these states. For example, although he states that there is no clearly observable link between the Cold War and the attempt to fix boundaries, Barry Buzan (1991b:8-9) argues that the end of the East-West conflict has opened up the issue of boundaries in a major way. He states that "[I]f the territorial jigsaw can be extensively reshaped in the first and second worlds, it will become harder to resist the pressures to try to find more sensible and congenial territorial arrangements in the third world" (1991b:9).

The lack of a recent international uproar because of the changes in Ethiopia and the likely independence of Eritrea are initial signals that support those who are less sanguine about the inviolability of territorial boundaries in the Third World. But whatever might transpire, the recent territorial changes in Europe are reducing the strength of these norms and thus it is questionable if appealing for international support on these grounds will remain a viable security strategy for these states for much longer. This point is also especially pertinent to the next category of Third World states that will be examined.

4.5 Ethnically-Threatened States

Again, there are two main types of states that can be distinguished within this category: first, there are the Ethnically-Divided states where threats center on the nature of governance in these societies and second, the Ethnically-Fragmented states in which these divisions lead to threats against their territorial integrity.

4.6 Ethnically-Divided States

The ethnic composition of these countries compounds the problems of governance as debates and violent struggles become manifested in ethnic struggles over the

distribution of power and nature of governmental authority. These internally-rooted disputes, though, do not remain within the confines of their states as their very existence promotes external interference and intervention to the extent that they often become characterized as internationalized civil wars. The multi-ethnic nature of states is not a sole guarantee for the existence of such strife. Rather ethnicity often combines with economic issues, clashes between traditional and modern forms of social organization, and the ethnic composition of ruling regimes to become a security threat to these states.

The territorial integrity of these states is generally not at issue as the ethnic groups do not seek secession but rather a greater share of the benefits and control of the governmental apparatus. Some examples of Ethnically-Divided states include the Sudan, Lebanon, Chad, South Africa, Rwanda, Burundi, and Israel (after 1967).

Realizing the importance of adequately distributing decision-making power among its various ethnic groups, upon its independence in 1943, Lebanese officials established the National Pact between the dominant Muslim (Sunni, Shi'ite, and Druze) and Christian (Maronite, Greek Orthodox, and Greek Catholic) communities. Along with maintaining a Muslim-Christian balance in representation in the Chamber of Deputies and the appointment of government positions, the Pact committed the two groups to upholding the territorial integrity and political autonomy of their state (Meo, 1977:96). The factors that unhinged this compromise agreement and plunged the country into civil war in 1975 include migration from the rural areas to the cities which brought together separate religious communities, demographic changes that increased the proportion of Shi'ite Muslims to Maronite Christians, and new radical ideologies that made groups believe they might be able to seize control of the whole country (Rubin, 1990:54).

Lebanon's civil war has also been compounded because of external intervention that has sought to promote the dominance of specific factions (the Druze, Shi'ite, Sunni, and Maronites). Since 1976, the Syrians have maintained an active troop presence in northern and eastern Lebanon and the Israelis, along with conducting continual raids into

southern Lebanon to destroy the Palestinian bases located there, invaded the country for a second time in 1982 to help install the Maronites in power (Rubin, 1990:55-6). At this time, a Multi-National Force, predominantly composed of American troops, was deployed in Beirut to impose some stability and provide support to the Maronite government. But numerous attacks on these forces, most notably the suicide bombing that killed 241 American Marines, led the majority of the force to withdraw by early 1984 (Brogan, 1990, 312-13).

The situation throughout the 1980s continued to deteriorate such that it led one commentator to declare that "[T]here is no Lebanese state, no government, no common citizenship, or sense of national solidarity between the factions. There is no Lebanon, only ruins" (Brogan, 1990:318). Late in 1991, the Syrians and the factions that they support were able to consolidate control over much of Lebanon and this has raised the prospect of peace more than any time in the previous fifteen years.

4.7 Ethnically-Fragmented States

Threats to these states impinge on all three security dimensions as ethnic fragmentation within their states manifests in secession movements that can impact on the survival of the ruling regime and the territorial integrity and political autonomy of the state. Secessionist claims result from various sources including historical claims to independent status, desires to incorporate single nations within the territorial boundaries of a state, and dissatisfaction with the existing distribution of power within these multiethnic countries. The internal/external nature of these threats arises because neighbouring states, fellow ethnic kin, and even great powers either actively exploit or become drawn into these conflicts.

Cross-border ethnic ties, for example, can result in the provision of aid to either the ruling regime or the secessionist group. While ethnic groups residing in other states

are generally willing to assist their fellow ethnic kin, most neighbouring states are cautious about their support as they often face similar ethnic disturbances. Where such aid has been accorded by regional states, often this has been due to broader strategic reasons or because of the domestic political importance of the common ethnic group. Great power intervention in secessionist struggles usually occurs because of geopolitical considerations rather than being based on promoting the struggles of specific ethnic groups.

Threats to the territorial integrity of these states in the form of secession struggles can adversely impact on the power of their regimes. Attempts to establish separate states signify a rejection of the current territorial and governmental organization of the state and ruling coteries fear that a successful claim could result in the balkanization of their country with the attendant loss of potentially strategic territory. As well, the protracted nature of these struggles, which is largely the result of external assistance, requires that regimes expend considerable portions of their limited military and economic resources to maintain control of these areas and in order to obtain this aid they become increasingly reliant on external sources which can then reduce the state's political autonomy.

Since receiving their independence during the post-WWII period, the security concerns of a significant number of Third World states revolve around secessionist threats to their states. Some examples include Nigeria (the Biafran struggle), Ethiopia (the Eritreans and Tigrayans), the Congo (the Katanga dispute), Pakistan (the Bangladesh crisis), Burma (the struggles of the Shans and Karens among others), the Iraq (the Kurds), Sri Lanka (the Tamils), and India from the early 1980s (the Sikhs, Assamese, and recently the Kashmiris).

In Sri Lanka, for example, the dispute between the predominant Buddhist Sinhalese community and the minority Hindu Tamils erupted into widescale violence and the emergence of calls for an independent Tamil state during the early 1980s. Although the two ethnic collectivities have generally peacefully coexisted on the island state for

hundreds of years, from the 1950s onward, successive regimes in Sri Lanka chose to obtain support for their rule through the enactment of what the Tamils perceived as chauvinistic Sinhalese policies. These included laws making Sinhala the country's only official language and Buddhism its official religion. For the minority Tamil community, these various policies not only limited their employment opportunities and thus economic survival but they also threatened their very survival as radical Sinhalese banded together into revolutionary movements such as the JVP which deliberately sought to terrorize the Tamils in order to make them leave the island.[28]

Throughout the centuries, the minority Tamils have maintained close links with their fellow ethnic kin in Tamil Nadu, the southern state of neighbouring India. The massive riots in 1983 which resulted in the deaths of thousands of Tamils and widespread destruction of their property resulted in the provision of active military and economic support for the Tamil secessionists from their fellow kin in neighbouring Tamil Nadu. The security concerns of Sri Lanka were heightened as throughout the 1980s this aid continued through the active support and compliance of the Indian government. Finally in 1987, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi actively intervened to protect the Tamils by signing an Indo-Lankan accord that called for an Indian Peacekeeping Force to disarm the Tamil secessionists on the understanding that the Tamil-dominated areas would receive greater autonomy (Premdas and Samarasinghe, 1988). Given India's military strength and its approval from the superpowers to act as a regional policeman in this conflict, Sri Lanka was unable to counter Indian intervention in its affairs despite its various efforts to obtain foreign assistance to combat India (Hennayake, 1989:408).

The Sri Lankan situation reveals how neighbouring states and common ethnic groups can play a significant role in increasing the secessionist threats to Ethnically-Fragmented states. How Sri Lanka and similarly-positioned states seek to reduce these internal/external threats to their states will be examined below.

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28. For further information see Robert N. Kearney (1985) and James Manor and Gerald Segal (1985).

4.8 The Security Strategies of Ethnically-Threatened States

As with the Territorially-Coveted states, these countries have pursued the same three strategies in order to reduce or eliminate the threats they encounter from ethnic divisions within their states that can become manifested in secessionist struggles. Therefore, rather than outlining these policies again, this section will focus on the post-Cold War security concerns and strategies of these states.

While external intervention has exacerbated these internal ethnic divisions and secessionist conflicts through increasing their length and the level of death and destruction, the end of the Cold War era is unlikely to lead to a subsiding of these disputes. In fact, they might even intensify as many of the significant interveners have not been the superpowers but rather neighbouring states which either seek to protect fellow ethnic kin or exercise dominance within the region. As well, the causes of ethnic strife and secessionist claims are primarily located within the internal dynamics of these states and unless accommodations can be reached, where possible, these struggles are likely to continue, even without the provision of outside aid.

Among possible strategies for the post-Cold War era, alignment with an external power remains a viable option only for those countries that are perceived to be important by the United States and less so by Britain and France. The alternative is to reduce their reliance on dependent militarization by engaging in efforts to become more independent of foreign support for their military potential. But the economic and technical limitations of most Third World countries makes this option possible for only a few of the more industrialized states. There are countries though such as Pakistan, India, Iraq, and Nigeria that are undertaking significant efforts to develop indigenous arms capabilities and for many of these states, this local development will help cushion the decline of superpower assistance. Furthermore, the legal and illegal international arms markets are

a ready source of the latest military hardware and this is a potential avenue through which these states can maintain and build their military capabilities. In fact, the quality and availability of arms on the international market has probably gained a boost with the end of the Cold War as Northern manufacturers (often with their government's support) are turning to Third World clients in order to generate sufficient revenue. Therefore, although some of these countries may no longer be able to rely on external alignments, they can still obtain (often the same) military hardware through the international arms trade.

Promoting external enemy images to generate support from the population against threats to the territorial integrity of their state (and the regime) might still retain their utility as ethnic stereotypes and scapegoating of specific ethnic groups can easily become grounded in the minds of the population (Suhrke and Noble, 1977:11). For example, in Sri Lanka, the protracted struggle for independent statehood by the Tamils coupled with the endemic violence within the country has hardened stereotypes about the opposing ethnic groups leading to widespread attitudes about the irreconcilable nature of their differences. Therefore, while these policies might temporarily appear to increase the security of the state, in the long run they are difficult to sustain and the result can be a further intensification of the conflict.

Appealing to international norms regarding the preservation of the territorial status quo in order to gain foreign support is unlikely to increase the security of these states. As previously discussed, the realignments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union do not set a good precedent for the Third World. For many of these states, it will be difficult to justify the suppression of secessionist movements in order to obtain foreign aid. What is more probable is that these countries will be increasingly pressured to reach some accommodation with these groups short of their secession. This can only increase the insecurity of these regimes as they can no longer rely on foreign aid to help them

maintain their power; however, the political autonomy of their states might increase with their reduced reliance on foreign assistance.

4.9 Ideologically-Divided States

These countries are really the Cold War states as their security concerns have often become so intertwined with the global American-Soviet rivalry that the indigenous factors that generated these conflicts are either significantly downplayed or forgotten.[29] As with the Ethnically-Divided states, threats to these countries are internally generated and they arise from debates over how these societies should be governed. The threat is not to the territorial integrity of the state as in most of these countries there is some notion of national identity associated with the territorial borders of the state. Rather, domestic divisions lead to threats to the survival of the regime and the political autonomy of the state.

Internal fissures result from clashes such as those between traditional and modern forms of social organization, economic differentiations within the state that result in significant gaps between the haves and the have nots, and urban versus rural cleavages. These factions often coalesce around opposing visions of the state and during the Cold War period these have primarily emerged or been externally perceived as contests between the ideologies of capitalism and communism. States that have exhibited such characteristics include Angola, Mozambique, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, China, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Afghanistan.

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29. In lending support to the role of this perceptual dimension of the Cold War, S. Neil MacFarlane points to the limited Soviet support to the communist-dominated insurgency in 1948 that led to the articulation of the Truman doctrine. Furthermore he notes that "The major decisions leading to the invasion of South Korea in 1950 were taken by the North Koreans themselves. The Chinese communist victory resulted principally from the strength of the movement and the weakness of its domestic adversary -- that is to say, from indigenous rather than external factors. Again, Soviet assistance was late and rather insubstantial. In this sense, the United States was reacting more to leadership perceptions of a global Soviet-dominated communist challenge than to the objective reality of that challenge" (1992:212).

Superpower penetration of these states has perhaps been the most severe given the ideological or perceived ideological divisions within these countries. The zero-sum nature of the American-Soviet contest in the Third World meant that almost any state or their opposing groups that professed ideological affinity were accorded aid. But also any regimes that took power professing ideologies that were perceived to be detrimental to either superpower were often threatened as the Americans or Soviets generated or encouraged opposition to their rule.

Unable to stop this intervention in their societies, ruling regimes remained insecure about both their hold on power and maintaining the political autonomy of their states. For as Bobrow and Chan state, "...the military capabilities of Third World countries are such that they cannot hope to counter the threat from a determined superpower no matter what they do in domestic armament. The best they can do in deterring and balancing this threat is by recruiting help from the other superpower" (1988:57). One domestic possibility though for countering this threat is through mass mobilization as occurred in Vietnam but the divisive nature of these countries makes such efforts extremely difficult if not impossible (Buzan, 1988:35).

In El Salvador, the internationalized civil warfare that has raged since the early 1980s has already claimed over 60,000 lives along with the internal displacement of over 450,000 Salvadorans (Brogan, 1990:414). While domestic dissent has been visible since the early 1970s, it was in 1980, following the Nicaraguan revolution, that the various groups banded together to form the Marxist-leaning Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). With the military and economic support of Cuba and the Soviet Union, the FMLN has waged a continual armed campaign to gain control of the state from successive right-wing authoritarian regimes that have been propped up by American aid.

The internal divisions within El Salvador that are the result of debates over the distribution of power and the nature of governance threaten the survival of the ruling regimes and the political autonomy of their state. Although El Salvador has been a

consistent recipient of American aid, following the Sandinista takeover in Nicaragua in 1979, the Reagan administration chose El Salvador as the battlefield in which to stop what it perceived as Soviet expansionism in the Third World (Gettleman et al, 1982:14). American military and economic aid, that stopped short of an active troop presence, has allowed successive Salvadoran regimes to maintain their power without having to undertake measures to gain greater support from their citizens. By promoting themselves as ardent anti-Communists, these regimes have sought to secure themselves at the cost of reducing the political autonomy of their state. Furthermore, easily available American aid has also been instrumental in the emergence of various death squads. These death squads are reported to have links with the various branches of the state's military and they are believed to have been the creation of Roberto D'Aubuisson, the current head of the ruling ARENA party who is widely perceived as the de facto ruler of the state (the President Alfredo Cristiani is seen as the figurehead) (van Evera, 1990:78).

El Salvador is a vivid example of how external intervention, because of the Cold War contest between the Americans and the Soviets, can exacerbate internal divisions and lead to protracted internationalized civil wars. The beginnning of this year has brought positive signs of a breakthrough in the civil war. Through the auspicies of the United Nations, the Salvadoran government and the FMLN have agreed to a cease-fire and negotiations for a settlement of the dispute have raised hopes for an end to the violence that has plagued the country for over a decade.

4.10 The Security Strategies of Ideologically-Divided States

During the Cold War, the two main strategies that these states employed to increase their security were alignment with a superpower and the establishment and/or support of regional organizations. While the ideological contest between the Soviets and the Americans increased the threats to these states, it also provided an avenue through

which these regimes could obtain substantial military and economic aid. Faced with internal divisions over the nature of governance in their countries, ruling coteries such as the Duarte regime in El Salvador often wrapped themselves in ideological garb, portrayed their domestic opponents as externally-generated ideological threats and/or exaggerated their ideological basis in order to obtain this assistance which was then most often used to quell these domestic disputes. For other states like Angola, which do encounter primarily externally-supported insurgency movements (in this case the UNITA rebels that are supplied by the Americans and South Africans), alignment with the opposing superpower became a necessity to maintain their regimes and systems of governance.

The nature of superpower alignment and commitment to these states did vary depending on how strategically-important these countries were perceived to be but as S. Neil MacFarlane argues:

> Both the Soviet Union and the United States proved deeply sensitive to questions of credibility. In conditions of universal ideological, political, and strategic rivalry, each setback was seen to reflect the current of history. Losses emboldened the adversary while weakening the commitment of allies. As such, every stake, no matter how small, became significant (1992:211).

This meant that these Ideologically-Divided states, potentially more so than the other Third World countries, could seek and exploit superpower concerns about their credibility in order to ensure the continuing patronage of their foreign supporters. Their dependent militarization increased the security of ruling regimes but most often this has been at the cost of further reducing the political autonomy of their states. This is the case even for those states that were faced with no option but to rely on superpower backing to combat externally-supplied domestic opposition groups.

There are significant differences between the security and conflict prevention and resolution roles of Third World regional organizations. For example, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Arab League contain collective defense aspects as part of their formal agenda of cooperation; the same can be said for the subregional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Gulf Cooperation

Council (GCC) (Acharya, 1922:11-16). The Organization of African Unity (OAU), on

the other hand, is primarily centered on ensuring the pacific settlement of disputes

(Acharya, 1992:12) while other organizations like the South Asian Association for

Regional Cooperation (SAARC) have to date been limited to coordinating economic

relations.

The OAS is probably the most successful of these regional organizations in terms

of putting forward a common front against external intervention in their affairs (i.e.

against the Soviet threat) but its success can largely be attributed to the predominant

American role in the organization. Nevertheless, membership and active participation in

these organizations can increase the security of these states as they serve to unite these

countries against a common enemy and also provide a source of diplomatic and even

military support to counter foreign intervention in their affairs. As Mohammed Ayoob

argues:

> ...narrowly-based and insecure Third World regimes, particularly those
> under increasing challenge domestically and regionally, use the idea of
> regional security to form co-operative arrangements with similar regimes
> in their regions to defend themselves as well as to justify their strategic and
> political links with external powers whose interests converge with the
> interests of these regimes (1986:20).

The end of the Cold War has removed the ideological imperative behind the

intrusive penetration of Ideologically-Divided states with the immediate consequence of

lowering the value of these countries as either ideological spoils or strategic assets in

great power rivalry (Buzan, 1991b:7). As well, Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika, the

subsequent demise of the Soviet Union, and the efforts of other socialist-oriented states to

reorganize their economies along market principles have discredited Marxism as an

organizing state ideology. This has already impacted on Marxist-leaning Third World

movements as foreign support for their causes has been severely curtailed. The

governments of Ideologically-Divided states are also finding it difficult to maintain their

foreign patronage as they are no longer able to exploit the superpower rivalry to justify

the provision of such aid (e.g. Angola and Vietnam).

Clearly though, while intervention will decrease in some of these states, others that are perceived to be of strategic importance such as the Latin American countries like El Salvador and Nicaragua could potentially encounter stronger American interference for as S. Neil MacFarlane notes, "...the end of the superpower bipolar competition may merely pave the way for quasi-hegemonic activism on the part of the United States in areas where it perceives its interests to be at stake" (1992:222-23). This could potentially increase the security concerns of these states as they are unable to utilize the Soviet Union as a balancing force. American preoccupations with stability in its spheres of influence have often led it to ignore the practices of the ruling regimes in these states and should this continue, the survival of these regimes will not be the issue as much as the reduction in the political autonomy of their states.

But for the other states that are not seen as vital to American interests, the demise of the global rivalry will likely augment their security. Although the divisions within their societies are often locally-generated, the removal or significant reduction of interference in their affairs raises to possibility that these disputes will be reduced in scale and intensity and might even disappear over time. As well, there is a greater potential for negotiated settlements as both sides cannot rely on external sources to support their struggles. A recent example that holds out much hope is the negotiated settlement in El Salvador between the ruling regime and the FMLN.

Potential security strategies that these states are likely to pursue include alignment with powers such as the United States, an intensification of domestic repression, and an increasing reliance on regional organizations. Alignments with the great powers appear to be an alternative for those states that are seen as strategically-important or who successfully portray themselves as valuable allies or offer significant economic benefits. For the other countries that are unable to reap such aid, more sustained suppression of the population might offer a temporary solution to threats to regime survival. But the ability

of ruling coteries to sustain such measures is highly dependent on their ability to obtain or afford the requisite military hardware.

The future role of regional organizations is unclear at the moment but it is possible that as in the case of ASEAN and the GCC, these organizations will become more oriented to the protection of their states from domestically-generated threats (Acharya, 1992). As common fears of external intervention would be replaced by a common internal enemy, these countries could undertake a broad range of security-relevant measures to protect the survival of their regimes and even the political autonomy of their states. With regard to the GCC and ASEAN, Amitav Acharya asserts that:

> In both cases, regime security concerns were a major factor in shaping the
> nature and agenda of security cooperation undertaken by members of both
> the regional organisations. Joint internal security measures, including
> intelligence exchanges, political extradition and joint operations against
> subversive elements, were a marked feature of bilateral and multilateral
> collaboration among the members of the regional groups (1992:41).

4.11 Politically-Threatened States

Two types of states can be distinguished: the Client states that have and continue to be subordinate to external powers and the Potential Client states that are objects of such status. Both of these will be outlined below.

4.12 Client States

As the term indicates, to some degree or another, these countries have lost significant control over their political autonomy as they have either been forcibly or voluntary incorporated into the sphere of influence of an external power. While threats to their territorial existence cannot be ruled out, their main security concerns center on the political autonomy of their states and the survival of their regimes. Some examples include Nepal, the Maldives, Bhutan, Botswana, Lesotho, Gambia, Tibet, Cuba, the

Philippines, Iran during the reign of the Shah, and most of the Latin American states during the post-WWII period.[30]

Many of these states are significantly small in relation to other countries in the international system; they possess limited economic and military resources; and they are often landlocked which furthers their reliance on their external patrons. The Latin American countries are a significant exception but since the articulation of the Munroe Doctrine, the Americans have considered this area as one that is vital to their security interests. The main threats to these states are from their external patrons as any attempts to exercise independent control over their affairs can be met with retaliatory measures. This can especially threaten the ruling regimes in these countries as they largely remain in power due to their professed allegiance to their external supporters.

In South Asia, for instance, the de facto dominant power, India, has generally maintained strict control over the foreign relations and even internal affairs of Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives. In fact, India's assertion of its regional dominance has been explicitly stated in its version of the Munroe Doctrine, which is titled the Indira Doctrine after that country's former Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi. It states that:

> India will neither intervene in the domestic affairs of any states in the region, unless requested to do, nor tolerate such intervention by an outside power; if extreme assistance is needed to meet an internal crisis, states should first look within the region for help (R.V.R.C. Rao in P.V. Rao, 1988:422).

India's preoccuption with maintaining control over Nepal and Bhutan is because of the strategic location that these states occupy as buffer zones between India and its neighbouring rival, China. Bhutan has generally conceded to Indian dominance over its external affairs for it is tiny, lacking in resources, landlocked, dependent on neighbours for access to the outside world and since the Chinese annexation of Tibet, it is fearful of suffering a similar fate (Rizvi, 1986c:147).

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30. The Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe from the Second World War until 1989 is a similar example in the Second World.

Nepal, on the other hand, resents India's control over its political, economic, and military affairs. But its close ethnic ties with India and its deep dependence on that country for its economic survival have limited Nepalese efforts to project a more independent stance. The threat that India poses to the survival of Nepal's regime and the state's political autonomy is clearly evident through its reactions to periodic efforts by the tiny kingdom to assert its autonomy. The most recent incident, in 1989, arose over Nepal's purchase of arms from China which clearly violates the Indo-Nepalese Friendship Treaty that obliges Nepal to first seek assistance from India before importing arms and equipment from another country (Rivzi, 1986c:144). As India controls most of Nepal's access to trading routes, it retaliated by not renewing its Trade and Transit Treaties with that country which effectively imposed a year-long economic blockade that reduced Nepal's trade to a mere trickle and resulted in severe shortages of basic commodities like fuel (Singh, 1989). While the blockade was subsequently lifted, the resulting economic upheaval in Nepal was a clear indication of the dominant role that its neighbour plays in its affairs.

4.13 Potential Client States

The primary security concern of these countries is that they will become Client states. Their main threats arise because they are potential objects of control or domination by outside powers. For the majority, their preoccupation is more with dominant or potentially-dominant regional states than with the great powers. Within every region of the Third World, there are countries that have either achieved a predominant status or are actively pursuing such a role including India in South Asia, South Africa and Nigeria in Africa, Indonesia, Vietnam and China in Northeast and Southeast Asia, Brazil in Latin America, and Iran and Iraq in the Middle East.

The targets of these dominant countries, that is Potential Client states, include Pakistan and Bangladesh in South Asia, Singapore and Malaysia in Asia, Argentina in Latin America, the Front Line States and Liberia among others in Africa and the Gulf states in the Middle East. Most often Potential Clients are those that are engaged in regional rivalries with the dominant or aspiring dominant states and these countries represent the greatest challenges to the power and position of pseudo-hegemonic countries. For these Politically-Threatened states, outside powers can threaten all three of their security dimensions although in most cases these dominant powers generally seek to obtain control over their foreign and internal policies without forcibly incorporating these states into their own countries.

Since the violent partition on the Indian subcontinent that resulted in Pakistan's emergence in 1947, it has been constantly plagued with fears that it will either be subsumed within the larger Indian union or made dominant to the dictates of that country. As with many of the other states that confront these threats, Pakistan's security concerns vis-a-vis India are further intensified by its own domestic problems which leave it open to Indian interference in its affairs. As Gowher Rizvi notes, internally, Pakistan faces three main problems: a narrow and weakly defined purpose of Pakistan in terms of the concept of Islamic states, the absence of consensus on the evolution of national institutions, and the heterogeneous nature of the state (1986a:63).

In order to promote its Islamic nature and to solidify its claim as a safe homeland for Muslims, the ruling regimes of Pakistan have periodically engaged in efforts to entrench Islamic law and beliefs as the ruling ideology of their states. Furthermore, its intensive propaganda campaign against India generally seeks to discredit India's promotion of its secular ideology and attempts to highlight Hindu-Muslim clashes. For Pakistan, its consistent fear of Indian dominance is reflected in its efforts to maintain some semblance of military parity with its larger and more militarily powerful neighbour. Additionally, it has projected itself as an example for the other South Asian states to

provoke resistance to India's dominant claims and it has often also sought to establish formal ties and provide security assistance to those countries that either fear or are threatened by Indian involvement in their affairs. The following section will elaborate upon the strategies that Pakistan and other Politically-Threatened states invoke and can utilize to protect their states.

4.14 The Security Strategies of Politically-Threatened States

More than in the other categories outlined, the security strategies that these countries have followed diverge depending on whether these states are actual Client or Potential Client states. Generally, Client states seek to protect the survival of their regimes and the limited political autonomy that they retain through consenting to foreign control over their external and even internal affairs. However, they periodically appeal or endeavor to obtain external ties and assistance to reduce the dominance of their foreign patrons. With regard to the Potential Clients, soliciting external alignments has been integral along with the development of their indigenous military capabilities.

For many of the Client states, fears of forcible incorporation, further reductions in their political autonomy, or threats to ruling regimes have led these states to regard congenial relations with their overseers as the best possible route to promoting the security of their states. The rationale for this strategy centers on their general inability to generate external assistance either because their countries are not seen as strategically-important or because great powers have declined from active interference in the region in order to placate the dominant regional powers. But as Bhutan clearly demonstrates, while such a policy has ensured the continued existence of the state, it has been at the cost of subordinate status. Furthermore, ruling regimes that fear domestic threats to their power are willing to tradeoff support for the continuance of their rule with maintaining some

measure of political autonomy. The tenure of the Shah of Iran exemplifies such a strategy.

Where these states have successfully obtained external assistance from other sources, their dependence might have been temporarily reduced but most often the outcome has been to deepen the threats to these states from their external patrons. Nepal's periodic efforts are a clear demonstration. But for other countries like Grenada, efforts to increase their own authority, as seen in the emergence of the Marxist-oriented regime in 1983, were perceived threatening enough to generate the active intervention of their foreign patron, the United States.

Potential Client states have been less restricted in the policies that they enact to protect themselves from dominant states. External alignments and even formal alliance relationships are actively undertaken to provide these countries with a balancing force in their relations with their more powerful neighbouring states. As well, these countries have generally been careful not to heavily rely on a single foreign ally but rather they have sought to establish broad-based ties with as many states as possible. Pakistan, for example, has received substantial aid from the United States, China, and several of its fellow Islamic states in the Middle East (Rivzi, 1986b:122). The intrusion of foreign states into various regions can reduce the maneuverability of quasi-hegemons as they have to contend with the support that these various actors provide to the states they seek to subordinate.

The other avenue through which Potential Client states seek to secure themselves is by developing an indigenous arms industry. As Bobrow and Chan (1988:67) state, this not only lays the foundation for military autonomy but it also allows these states to play a spoiler role vis-a-vis the power aspirations of their main external enemies. For many of these and other Third World states, their dependence on external military support has often reduced their maneuverability as the great powers have used their aid as "weapons" to control their allies (e.g. through arms embargoes). For example, Pakistan's

undeclared nuclear weapons status allows it to maintain some semblance of a balance of power with India while reducing its reliance on foreign supporters.

Rather than alleviating the security threats to these two types of states, the recent changes in the international system are likely to intensity their fears about external domination. Cuba is the most extreme example as its loss of Soviet patronage coupled with American desires to remove its Communist regime leave it open to American interference and intervention without the possibility of support from other states. As well, for the Latin American states more so than those in the Middle East, a more interventionist United States could increase their insecurity as the demise of the Soviet Union has reduced their ability to draw in a balancing force. The American invasion of Panama to remove the Manuel Noriega regime could be a precedent for future actions against these states.

The end of the Cold War and the subsequent reduction in great power interest in many Third World regions also opens the path for a greater role by regional powers.[31] No longer as fearful of great power interest and interference in their regions, these countries could attempt to exert greater control over their neighbouring states. For instance, aspirations for dominant status were a significant motivating factor in the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. For Client states, such a scenario does not leave much hope for a lessening of their external domination and for the Potential Clients, the prospects point to an increase in their security threats.

The security strategies that these states can follow during the post-Cold War period include: accepting the domination of their external patrons; searching for other sources of outside support; seeking to strengthen their states through forging greater domestic unity; and pursuing an independent military capability.

For the smaller and economic and militarily inferior Client states, maintaining a harmonious relationship with their external overseers appears to be the most viable

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31. For further details, see, for example, Mohammed Ayoob (1991), Barry Buzan (1991a;1991b) and S. Neil MacFarlane (1992).

strategy to retain their limited autonomy and ensure the survival of their regimes. These states are unlikely to generate outside support from other countries unless they are somehow able to increase their attractiveness through mechanisms such as preferential access to strategic resources. These and other Client states like those in Latin America could also concentrate on domestic measures that can serve to limit and reduce their patron's interference in their societies while simultaneously increasing the security of their regimes. Such methods include strengthening the national identity of the state, reducing domestic dissent through economic redistribution measures and promoting compromises between various political factions.

This policy of domestic consolidation is also an avenue that some Potential Client states might follow (e.g. the Front Line States) as they find it more difficult to obtain external assistance. Those countries that are seen as important to great power interests (e.g. Singapore) will continue to receive aid but this does not apply to the majority of these countries. However, if the great powers were to perceive dominant regional powers as becoming capable of threatening their interests, they would be more likely to assist these countries.

The latest military hardware is readily available on the international arms market but given their economic constraints, these states are generally unable to rely on this route as more than a temporary measure. Instead, where possible, these countries will initiate or expand their indigenous military industries. The unbreakable link between industrialization and the ability to make weapons and the dual-use nature of most technology makes it increasingly likely that these states will be able to manufacture their own weaponry ranging from combat aircraft to chemical weapons (Buzan, 1991b:13). Among others, Pakistan, Argentina, and Indonesia already have significant local industries and their expansion could provide other Third World countries with an alternative supply source that can reduce their reliance on the traditional Northern suppliers.

4.15 Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to provide a preliminary framework that disaggregates the security concerns and strategies of Third World states. In order to incorporate both the external and internal/external nature of their security concerns, four broad categorizations have been outlined. The Territorially-Coveted and Politically-Threatened states are primarily vulnerable to external threats. For Territorially-Coveted states, foreign countries are either seeking to absorb their countries or to annex significant portions of their territory. On the other hand, the political autonomy of their countries is the primary issue for the Politically-Threatened states. The other two categories, Ideologically-Divided and Ethnically-Threatened states, highlight the linkage between internal and external factors and how these combine to generate both types of threats to these countries.

During the Cold War, the most prevalent security strategy pursued by Third World states has been some form of alignment with an external power, usually the United States or the Soviet Union. This has led most countries to engage in dependent militarization which generally reduces the political autonomy of their states. However, other policies such as promoting and establishing regional organizations and appealing to the norms of the international system have proven fairly successful in reducing the insecurities of these states.

The emergence of the post-Cold War period appears to be a mixed blessing for Third World states. The Ideologically-Divided states, more so than the others, will see a diminution in their security threats as it is in these countries where the Cold War rivalry was most intense. The prospects are mixed for the Territorially-Coveted states but generally the Ethnically and Politically-Threatened states will see an intensification of their security concerns.

The decline in external assistance to many Third World states is significantly influencing the strategies that they follow. Although some of these countries will retain their foreign support, others appear likely to pursue policies such as developing or increasing their indigenous military capabilities and promoting external enemy images to forge domestic consensus.

Chapter 5 Conclusion

The purpose of this thesis has been twofold: 1). to present an expanded notion of security that incorporates the the multi-faceted nature of threats to Third World states; and 2) to utilize this notion in order to provide a preliminary framework for the characterization of the security concerns and strategies of Southern countries.

Security is conceived of as consisting of the absence of threats to three dimensions: the territorial integrity of Third World states, their political autonomy, and the survival of their regimes and systems of governance. These first two dimensions are the basic core values of states in the international system and they are embodied in traditional Western approaches to security. The survival of the regime, or otherwise referred to as regime security, is particularly relevant to states in the Second and Third Worlds. However, it has generally been ignored or downplayed in previous scholarly analyses despite the fact that threats to this dimension significantly impinge on the security perceptions and policies of Third World states.

Third World states are vulnerable to a vast array of internal, internal/external and external threats to their three security dimensions. Although external states play a significant role in generating these threats, fellow ethnic kin located in other states, multinational corporations and various international organizations can also impinge on the security concerns of Third World states.

In developing the framework that was outlined in the previous chapter, the criterion that was used for distinguishing Third World states is the nature of their primary security concerns. Of the four broad categories, the Territorially-Coveted and Politically-Threatened states mainly encounter external threats whereas in the Ethnically-Threatened and Ideologically-Divided states, internal factors intermingle with external ones to generate a mixture of internal/external threats.

Although many of the threats to these states are internally-generated or rooted in regional dynamics, during the Cold War period, the overlay of the American-Soviet rivalry on these various regions resulted in an intensification and prolongation of various conflicts that could only deepen the insecurities of these states (Buzan, 1991a:chap 5). Superpower intrusion into the internal affairs of countries was most extreme in the case of the Ideologically-Divided states as their domestic divisions either mirrored or were perceived to reflect the broader communism-capitalism debate. For countries in the other three categories, their primary threats emanated from both regional states and the superpowers. It must be noted though that where neighbouring states constituted the chief security concern, superpower intervention, by mirroring these regional rivalries, deepened the insecurity of both states.

During the Cold War, the primary mechanism through which Third World states sought to secure themselves was by aligning with an external power. Given the economic, technological, and even military limitations of most Southern countries, they are unable to rely on their own resources to promote their security. Furthermore, the problems associated with state formation in the South mean that not only do domestic disputes often create internal security threats but they limit the ability of ruling regimes to extract resources from their population or coalesce support in opposition to an external threat. External alignment was a readily-available option for a significant number of Third World states as they were able to exploit the American-Soviet contest by professing ideological support with a superpower patron and appealing for security assistance because they purportedly confronted threats from the opposing ideological camp.

The end of the Cold War, the demise of the Soviet Union, and the potential of a quasi-hegemonic role for the United States, among other factors, have greatly complicated the security concerns and potential responses of Third World states. For the Territorially-Coveted states, their primary fears of absorption or the loss of significant portions of their territory revolve around threats from neighbouring countries. As such,

the end of the American-Soviet competition will not alleviate their security concerns. Though for specific countries like Israel and South Korea, the reduction or even elimination of Soviet support to their rivals could more narrowly-focus their attention on their specific regions.

The Ethnically and Politically-Threatened states are generally likely to see an intensification of their security threats as many of their concerns emanate from domestic divisions that are exacerbated by regional states (or ethnic kin located within them). As well, the aspirations of regional states to dominant power status is an important factor that must be taken into account. For those areas that are perceived as strategic to American interests, including Latin America and the Middle East, the elimination of the Soviet Union has reduced their ability to draw in a balancing force to American hegemonic efforts and these countries will find it increasingly difficult to counter American interference in their internal and external affairs.

Of the Third World countries, the Ideologically-Divided states are the most likely benefactors from the end of the Cold War as there is no longer any rationale for competitive intervention in their affairs. While domestic struggles within their states will still continue, the fear of external penetration and the subsequent reduction of aid to the opposing factions could lead to more limited conflicts and greater prospects for negotiated settlements between the various groups.

In the post-Cold War era, Third World countries will probably have to rely on a broader variety of security strategies to protect their states. While many of these countries will continue to seek external security assistance, it is not likely to be forthcoming for most unless they are seen as particularly important to their potential patrons. Other policies that could be enacted include the development of indigenous military capabilites, increased domestic repression, and a greater reliance on collective measures through regional organizations.

Given these various security concerns and potential strategies, one can attempt to broadly outline what the outlook is for the continuation of armed conflict in the Third World. Overall, the level of violence in the Third World is unlikely to decrease and in the short-term we might even see an intensification of armed conflict. Much of this violent strife will be what is described as internal wars as continued economic problems deepen clashes between traditional and modern forms of social organization, rural versus urban cleavages, and divisions between ethnic groups. Furthermore, these domestic struggles will fester, albeit at a lower level of intensity, because of reduced great power attention to many of these countries. This might lead ruling regimes to undertake and further domestic repression as these divisions reveal the low legitimacy that these regimes maintain. These points are especially pertinant to the Ideologically-Divided and Ethnically-Threatened states given the internal/external nature of their security threats. Many of these problems are indicative of the state formation process in the Third World and not only it is questionable that Southern countries will achieve nation-state status as generally found in the West but even should this occur this process could conceivably take many more decades.

While the heyday of internationalized civil wars has probably passed with the end of the Cold War, this type of armed conflict will continue as regional powers, in many instances, replace the superpowers as the interveners in these civil disputes. Already countries like Syria, Libya, Nigeria, South Africa, India, and Israel has actively intervened in their neighbouring states to promote their dominant power status or to support the opposing factions within these states. Reduced great power concern for and attention to various Third World regions might be seen a signal for countries such as these to assert their dominance. For the Ethnically and even some Politically-Threatened states, this prospect can only deepen their insecurities about combatting threats to their countries.

The potential for interstate wars has perhaps been increased with the lifting of the superpower overlay over Third World regions but it is not clear yet as to how significant a role they will play in generating armed conflict. Numerous regional rivalries exist including India and Pakistan, and Israel and the Arab states and the contentions that exist in the Third World over territorial disputes, ethnic differences, and desires for dominant power status can easily result in interstate wars. As well, for some countries that cover all four of the categories, the reduction or elimination of foreign aid might lead these states to undertake risky, desperate measures for fear that they have no remaining options. This point becomes increasingly important as various Third World countries obtain a greater conventional weapons capability or become undeclared nuclear powers. Interstate wars could possibly be avoided through great power efforts to mediate their rivalries and the realization by these states of the costs that their countries could incur. India and Pakistan provide an interesting case as although the two countries have previously fought three wars, the latest escalation in 1990 over the status of Kashmir did not escalate to the level of interstate war largely because of the reported possession of nuclear weapons by both countries.

The continuance of various forms of armed conflict in the Third World requires a reevaluation of the domestic and regional sources of threats to these countries. During the Cold War, Third World security concerns were largely dismissed as peripheral to the rivalry between the Americans and the Soviets, but the increasing conventional and nuclear capabilites of Third World states require that greater attention must be paid to the security concerns and strategies of Southern states as the North is not likely to be unaffected by these issues. Furthermore, it is only through obtaining a greater understanding that adequate policy measures can be undertaken by both Northern and Southern states to reduce the level of conflict in the Third World which could then lead to an improvement in the often desperate living conditions of the majority of the world's population.

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