SUI-TANG FOREIGN POLICY: FOUR CASE STUDIES

By

YIHONG PAN

Diploma, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing, China, 1978
M.A., University of International Business and Economics, Beijing, China, 1981

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

(Department of Asian Studies)

We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

September 1990

Yihong Pan, 1990
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Department of [Asian Studies]

The University of British Columbia
Vancouver, Canada

Date [Oct. 4, 1990]
ABSTRACT

The foreign policy of imperial China had two major aspects: 1) ideological purity, based on the Chinese cosmological view of the state, and emphasizing the all embracing rule of the Chinese Son of Heaven.

2) Practicality and flexibility, which provided imperial rulers the justification for conducting foreign relations on an equal footing with their neighbors, and allowed for retreat from claims of Chinese superiority, or even paying tribute to "barbarians."

These two aspects have been noted and studied previously. In this dissertation I examine the interplay of the twin aspects in Sui-Tang foreign policy decisions and their implementation, how they clashed with or accommodated each other both when China was strong and when it was weak.

Chapter I provides a survey of the tribute system, its roots in the pre-Qin period, its development in Han and the challenges it faced in the Period of Division.

The Sui-Tang policy of resettlement of the Turks who had submitted, is the theme of Chapter II. The chapter examines the Tang system of the "subordinated area commands and prefectures." The Sui-Tang settlement policy was intended to bring the "barbarians" under Chinese administration and to use the nomads as a military force against other "barbarians." It also drew a distinct line between the non-Chinese and the Chinese so that the "barbarians" would not disturb the Chinese and would undergo a gradual process of sinification. But the success of the policy depended basically on the balance of power.

The war policy of the Sui-Tang Chinese towards Koguryo, its motives and result are studied in Chapter III. For the better part of a century the Chinese made persistent efforts to establish their administration on the Korean peninsula through force. While there is a contrast between the pragmatism of Emperor Wen on the one hand, and the obsession with military glory of Emperor Yang and Taizong on the other, all three emperors insisted on Chinese superiority over the Koreans and all had
considerations for frontier security. The differences in their attitudes lay mainly in the extent to which China should claim the superiority. Eventually, the Chinese were quite happy to withdraw beyond the Yalu River and accept Korea as a peaceful tributary.

The alliance between Tang and the Uighur empire is the topic of Chapter IV. While before the outbreak of the An Lushan rebellion in 755 the Uighurs were at times subjects of Tang, the period after 755 saw the growth of the Uighur empire and the weakening of Tang superiority. In both periods their relations were characterized by an alliance based on common interests. In the latter period the Chinese had to treat the Uighurs as an equal power but the relationship was still maintained under the tribute system, which served to maintain the outward form of Chinese superiority.

The seven Tang-Tibetan treaties are discussed in Chapter V. Compared with Tang relations with other peoples, the Tang-Tibetan relationship was remarkably equal. This was shown both in diplomatic reciprocity and in the conclusion of treaties. Nevertheless, some Chinese officials still held strongly to the idea that the Tibetans were "barbarians," which hindered the maintenance of the treaties.

In the making of foreign policy in imperial China, the two major aspects, ideological purity and practicality, were reflected in two principles of Confucian doctrine: "the king leaves nothing and nobody outside his realm," and "having the various states of Xia within, and keeping the Yi and Di barbarians out." While the first principle represented the ideological purity and provided justification for Chinese expansion, the second stressed practicality, thus the two aspects achieved a balance.
## Contents

*Abstract* ................................................................. ii

*Explanatory Notes* ...................................................... viii

*List of Tables* ........................................................... ix

*List of Figures and Maps* .............................................. x

*Chinese Dynasties and Sui-Tang Emperors* ....................... xi

*Acknowledgement* ........................................................ xiii

**Introduction** .......................................................... 1

1. The Chinese Sources.................................................. 5

   The Chinese Sources.................................................. 5

2. The Sources of the Accounts of the Turks, Korea, the Uighurs and Tibet in the *Jiu Tangshu* ........................................ 13

3. The Non-Chinese Sources............................................. 16

4. Modern Collections of Original Sources........................... 18

**Chapter I. Historical Background: the Tribute System** ........ 20

1. The Ideological Background of the Tribute System................ 20

   The Late Shang Dynasty: An Embryonic Form of Tribute System ................................................................. 20

   The "Feudal System" (*fengjian*): A Hierarchical Social Order ................................................................. 22

   Competition for Supremacy........................................... 24

   The Tribute System in the Confucian Works ....................... 27

   Chinese versus "Barbarian": Sinocentrism.......................... 29

2. The Han Dynasty: Development of the Tribute System ............ 34

   The *Heqin* Policy in the Early Period ............................ 34

   Han Expansion....................................................... 37

   Practices under the Tribute System................................ 42

   Different Types of Relations under the Tribute System ......... 44

   Universal Empire through the Tribute System ..................... 52

3. The Period of Division: the Challenge to the Tribute System .... 57

   The Challenge to the Idea of Universal Kingship ................ 57

   The Legitimacy of the Sixteen Kingdoms........................... 58

   The Legitimacy of the Northern Dynasties........................ 60

   The Persistence of the Tribute System in Former Qin ............ 62

   The Tribute System in the Northern and Southern Dynasties .... 64
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Fifth Treaty in 767</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sixth Treaty in 783</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Alliance with Tibet</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The False Treaty of Pingliang in 787</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance with Nanzhao and the Uighurs against Tibet</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Seventh Treaty of 821/822</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Weizhou Incident</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chapter VI. Conclusion** .................................................. 339

**Works Cited** ................................................................. 353

- Abbreviations ............................................................... 353
- Traditional Chinese Works Listed by Titles ............... 355
- Modern Works Listed by Authors ...................................... 358

**Appendix** ................................................................. 375
Explanatory Notes

1. The *pinyin* system is used for the romanization of Chinese. In the quotations of English works, except titles of books and articles and names of authors, any kind of romanization is changed into *pinyin*.

2. A full reference to all the books and articles cited in this dissertation and abbreviated titles is given alphabetically in three sections of the "Works Cited" at the end of the paper. Section one is "Abbreviations." Section two is "Traditional Chinese Works Listed by Titles." And section three is "Modern Works Listed by Authors."

3. Chinese years are converted to the western calendar according to the year to which the greater part of the Chinese year corresponds. The conversion is based on Wan Guoding. 1978.


5. Transcription of Tibetan names: ń --ng; ň -- ny; ž -- zh; š -- s.

6. Chinese script for names, titles and terms are given in the text only the first time they appear.
## List of Tables

1. 1. Foreign tribute missions to Han ......................................................... 380
2. 1. The Turkish rulers ............................................................................. 385
2. 2. The Participation in Tang expeditions by the Eastern Turks and the Tiele (634-669) ................................................................. 387
2. 3. The *Jimi fu-zhou* of the Eastern Turks and the Tiele (630-663) 388
2. 4. The *Jimi fu-zhou* set up for the Turks in Xuanzong's Time ............ 390
3. 1. The Korean Rulers ........................................................................... 391
3. 2. Tribute missions of the three Korean kingdoms to Sui and Tang (from 581 to 712) ................................................................. 393
4. 1. The Uighur rulers ............................................................................. 395
5. 1. The Tibetan rulers ........................................................................... 397
List of Figures and Maps

Figure
1. The nine-zone system ................................................................. 398
2. Two models of empire ................................................................. 399

Maps
1. Western Han and its neighbors .................................................. 400
2. Korea at the height of Koguryō expansion in the 5th century ............. 401
3. Chen, Qi, Zhou and their neighbors (572) .................................... 402
4. Sui and its neighbors ................................................................... 403
5. The Protectorates (duhufu) of Anbei and Chanyu (669) .................... 404
6. Tang and its neighbors (741) ......................................................... 405
7. Tang and its neighbors (820) ......................................................... 406
THE CHINESE DYNASTIES

Late Shang (Yin): 1300 B.C.E. to 1028 B.C.E.
Zhou: 1027 B.C.E. to 256 B.C.E.
Qin: 221 B.C.E. to 207 B.C.E.
Han: 206 B.C.E. to 220 C.E.
   Former Han: 206 B.C.E. to 8 C.E.
   Wang Mang: 9 A.C. to 23 C.E.
   Emperor Gengshi: 23-25
   Later Han: 25-220

The Southern Dynasties
   Song: 420-479
   Qi: 479-502
   Liang: 502-557
   Chen: 557-589

The Northern Dynasties
   Northern Wei: 386-534
   Eastern Wei: 534-550
   Western Wei: 535-556
   Northern Qi: 550-577
   Northern Zhou: 557-581

Sui: 581 to 618
Tang: 618 to 907

THE SUI EMPERORS
Emperor	Reigned
Emperor Wen	581-604
Emperor Yang	605-617
Emperor Gong	617-618

THE TANG EMPERORS
Gaozu	618-626
Taizong	627-649
Gaozong	650-683
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emperor</th>
<th>Reign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zhongzong</td>
<td>684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wu-Zhou (Empress Wu)</td>
<td>684-705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhongzong</td>
<td>705-710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wen Wang</td>
<td>710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruizong</td>
<td>710-712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xuanzong</td>
<td>712-756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suzong</td>
<td>756-763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daizong</td>
<td>763-779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dezong</td>
<td>780-805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shunzong</td>
<td>805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xianzong</td>
<td>806-820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muzong</td>
<td>821-824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jingzong</td>
<td>825-827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wenzong</td>
<td>827-840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wuzong</td>
<td>841-846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xuanzong</td>
<td>847-860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yizong</td>
<td>860-874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xizong</td>
<td>874-888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhaozong</td>
<td>889-904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emperor Zhaoxuan</td>
<td>905-907</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acknowledgement

I would like to express my deep gratitude to Professor E. G. Pulleyblank, whose profound scholarship and penetrating insights have guided me throughout my academic work. His analytical criticism and kind advice have encouraged me in my study. I am very grateful to Professors Donald L. Baker and Jo-shui Chen, for their insightful and detailed comments and generous help. I would also like to thank Dr. Gareth Sparham, my friend, for his careful and painstaking efforts in editorial work on the dissertation. I am also grateful to Mr. Gonnami, of the Asian Studies Library at U. B. C. who has helped me with some problems in Japanese transcription.
Introduction

Any understanding of the foreign policy of imperial China must take into account two major aspects:

1) Ideological purity. By this I mean the established ideal pattern of relationships, from the Chinese point of view, that should obtain between China and other states. It was a pattern based on a particular cosmological view of the state and it emerged from, and evolved in, the particular environment of China, positing a hierarchical and fundamentally sinocentric order to the Chinese known world. It emphasized the all embracing rule of the Chinese emperor, the Son of Heaven, who was supposedly the only legitimate ruler of, not only China, but all-under-heaven, and it stressed the importance of the virtue and capability of the Son of Heaven. This pattern was reflected in ceremonial rituals under the tribute system.

2) Practicality and flexibility. This was a basic pragmatism which provided imperial rulers the scope, or the justification, for conducting foreign relations on an equal footing with their neighbors. It allowed for acceptance of the need to retreat from claims of Chinese superiority, or even to pay tribute to "barbarians." Such compromising measures could be carried out for as long as they were seen to be entirely for China's own security and stability.

There are two collections of essays in English, examining Chinese foreign policy during imperial times, taking these two aspects as their respective focuses. These are The Chinese World Order edited by J. K. Fairbank and China among Equals edited by M. Rossabi. While the former collection of essays revolves around the theme of ideological purity and examines the Chinese world order as it is mirrored in the long-lasting tribute system, the latter collection concentrates on the realism and

---

1 Fairbank, J. K. 1968; Rossabi, M. 1983.
pragmatism that lie behind certain imperial foreign policy decisions. It challenges the myth that, from the Han dynasty on, the Chinese uniformly and rigidly applied their system of foreign relations, that China lacked interest in foreign commerce and that China was ignorant of foreign lands.²

Each of these books analyzes the situation of a particular period. The former book is mainly concerned with the later imperial period in which the Chinese shocked the Westerners by their sense of superiority and sinocentrism, while the latter concentrates on the Song period when China was in fact in an inferior position in its relations with the Khitan-Liao and the Jurchen-Jin dynasties in the hierarchical international order.

In this dissertation I examine the interplay of the twin aspects of ideological purity and practicality in Sui and Tang foreign policy decisions and their implementation, how they clashed with or accommodated each other and how they were both included in the decision-making process either when China was strong or when it was weak. The dissertation attempts to show how both aspects must be taken into account to explain fully Chinese foreign policy.

The Tang dynasty, like the Han before it, was a universal empire which embraced and absorbed a wide spectrum of political, economic, military and cultural elements bequeathed to it by earlier dynasties and by foreign peoples. Unlike Han, though, whose only major organized rival was the Xiongnu empire, Tang faced an international situation hitherto unique for a Chinese empire. The situation was largely determined by a) the two consecutive nomadic empires, the Turks and Uighurs on the northern and northwestern frontiers, b) the three Korean kingdoms in the east which had gradually emerged as a force from the Later Han through the Period of Division, and c) Tibet, a newly emerged kingdom along the Chinese western frontier.

---
² See also the reviews of these two books by Pulleyblank, E. G. 1969, pp. 423-425, and Zurndorfer, H. T. 1988, pp. 141-143.
The dissertation is not intended to be a comprehensive study of all aspects of Tang foreign policy. That would require a much longer work. Following Chapter I, which provides a survey of the tribute system, its roots in ideas of the pre-Qin period, its development in the Han and the challenges it faced in the Period of Division, the dissertation restricts its scope to the four cases below, focusing on a particular type of policy in each.

1) The Sui-Tang policy of settlement of the Turks who had submitted is the theme of Chapter II. The chapter examines the Chinese attempt to incorporate the Turks who had submitted into their hegemonic empire and its result. Wolfram Eberhard, when defining some general patterns of historical development of the relationships between social groups, differentiates two types. One brings together two or more social groups into a new unit, and one is a breakdown of once-unified societies into smaller units. In the Sui-Tang policy of Turkish settlement, how did the policy fit into these types? How did the ideology of Chinese foreign relations lay a foundation and provide a theoretical justification as well as a cultural centripetal force for the tendency of unification?

2) The war policy of the Sui-Tang Chinese towards Koguryō, its motives and result are studied in Chapter III. K. J. Holsti in his book *International Politics* points out that regardless of historical and geographical context, policy makers of different types of political units, whether tribes, city-states, empires, or modern nations, have attempted to achieve objectives or defend their interests by fundamentally similar techniques, mainly the use of force and the construction of alliances. This can also be applied to the study of Chinese foreign policy measures and can be particularly well illustrated in the case of Koguryō.

---

3) The alliance between Tang and the Uighur empire is the topic of Chapter IV. The formation and maintenance of the alliance was an important feature in the relationship between the two states. Questions such as how and why the alliance could be achieved and maintained, and whether the Chinese adopted an attitude of equality in the alliance are dealt with.

4) The seven Tang-Tibetan treaties are discussed in Chapter V. Wang Gungwu holds that after the An Lushan rebellion Tang was struggling to survive as a military empire, but:

   it was probably unthinkable that the Tang court should have considered any dilution of their claims to superiority just because the imperial writ did not cover as large an area as it did at the height of the empire's power.\(^5\)

To what extent is this true? In the conclusion of treaties with Tibet, how did Tang rulers give up claims to superiority in exchange for peaceful relations?

Through the study of these four cases, I believe that one gets a deeper understanding of the methods by which foreign policy was conducted in traditional China.

Besides the question of foreign policy as such, there is the separate question of the making of foreign policy which relates to domestic politics and the competing interests and aspirations of groups within the country, rather than to external factors. It concerns the role of the policy makers, how their values, beliefs, education, understanding and assessment of reality influence the decision-making process, and deserves a separate and detailed study which I hope to make in the future. In the present dissertation I discuss it only briefly. Some general remarks on the subject that

can be illustrated from events referred to in the thesis are drawn together in the conclusion.

The Chinese Sources

This dissertation, which is concerned primarily with Chinese foreign policy, not the whole issue of the international relations of East and Central Asia in the Tang period, is based mainly on sources in Chinese. Traditional Chinese histories are centered around Chinese court politics. This feature makes them convenient for the study of Chinese foreign policy but at the same time places limitations on our view of foreign states. These histories usually only record those peoples that had direct contact with China and events that influenced its foreign relations in various ways. There are other defects in Chinese historical writings, such as the use of degrading language to describe non-Chinese. These features of Chinese histories have been discussed by previous authors and I will not discuss them further here.

The numerous Chinese historical records, in spite of such shortcomings, however, are invaluable to our study of the history of China's foreign policy. The official histories provide the main body of information but other materials supplement them in various ways. For the Sui-Tang period, the Chinese works that I use are as follows.

1) The dynastic histories

The *Suishu* (隋書), compiled in the Tang Bureau of Historiography (shiguan 簡）by Wei Zheng 魏徵, Yan Shigu 颜師古, Kong Yingda 孔穎達, Xu Jingzong 許敬宗 and others, from 629 to 636. The basic sources for the *Suishu* were: a) the "court journals" (*qijuzhu* 起居注) of Sui;
b) the *Suishu* compiled in the Sui period by Wang Shao 王劭; and c) other materials collected by the Tang historians.6

The *Beishi* 北史, compiled privately in Tang by Li Yanshou 李延寿 from 643 to 659. It was based on the manuscripts of Li’s father Li Dashi 李太師 and enriched by Li Yanshou's own research in the Tang Bureau of Historiography.7

The *Jiu Tangshu* 舊唐書 , compiled in Later Jin first under the leadership of the Grand Councilor Zhao Ying 趙誦 and then Liu Xu 劉昫, written by Zhang Zhiyuan 張致遠 and others, from 941 to 945. It was based on materials produced by the Tang Bureau of Historiography. For the period from 618 to 759, the "National Histories" (guoshi 國史), completed successively by Wei Shu 章述, Liu Fang 柳芳, Yu Xiulie 吳休烈 and Linghu Huan 令狐恒, were the basis of the *Jiu Tangshu* and the compilers took over bodily from the already prepared histories without much change. For the period from 759 to 847, materials were drawn largely from the "veritable records" (shilu 實録) of the various reigns, and for the last period of Tang, the "daily records" (rili 日曆) were the basis, since the veritable records were either lost or had never been completed. In addition the compilers consulted materials collected at the time of the project.8

The *Xin Tangshu* 新唐書 , compiled in the Song Bureau of Historiography by Ouyang Xiu 欧陽修 and others, from 1045 to 1061. The basic sources for the work included: a) the *Jiu Tangshu*; and b) other materials available in the Imperial Library in Northern Song.9

---

7 BS, v100, pp. 3343-45; Li Zongye. 1982, pp. 253-255.
creates a section of the "subordinated prefectures" (jimi zhou) in chapter 43B and has a chapter of "foreign generals" (Fan jiang), both of which make the study of foreign relations more systematic.

2) Other major historical works

The Da Tang Chuangye Qijuzhu, the court journal of Gaozu, compiled by Wen Daya covering the period from 617 to 626. As a chronological resume of the events concerning Li Yuan and his founding of the Tang dynasty from 615 up to the proclaiming of the new emperor, the book may be regarded as the first historical record of Tang.10

The Zhenguang Zhengyao, a record of Tang Taizong's discussions with his ministers, the memorials and suggestions from the ministers, and administrative measures of the period, collected and edited by Wu Jing. The book was completed around 720.11

The Tongdian, compiled by Du You from 766 to 801. It continued and enlarged the Zhengdian of Liu Zhi.12

The sections in the chapters on foreign countries were presumably taken from materials compiled in the Bureau of Historiography. It has the fullest account of the negotiation between Tang official Guo Yuanzhen and Tibetan general Mgar Khri 'bring in Empress Wu's time.13

The Tang Huiyao, compiled by Wang Pu and presented to the throne in 961 in early Song. It is a combination of the Huiyao of Su Mian presented to the throne in 804, and the Xu Huiyao presented in 853, with the addition of a very small

---

10 For a detailed study of the book, see Bingham, W. 1937, pp. 568-574.
13 TD, v190, pp. 1023-24; ZZZJ, v205, p. 6508.
amount of material for the period after 852. It has the most complete record about the discussions held early in Taizong's reign concerning the settlement of the Turks who had submitted.

The Cefu Yuangui, compiled by Wang Qinruo and Yang Yi and others in Song under an imperial commission from 1005 to 1013. The materials concerning the Tang period were from the veritable records and Tang histories. It contains therefore more original sources than the Jiu Tangshu and the Xin Tangshu and more complete versions of documents abridged in other sources.

With its organization of numerous materials under different topics, such as the section on "foreign vassals" (waichen bu), the Cefu Yuangui is particularly useful to my study. It records tributary missions from foreign countries which other histories have chosen not to mention. One example is in the case of the Turks. According to the Cefu Yuangui, during Tang Gaozu's reign, the Turks sent tributary missions to the Tang court almost every year. In the basic annals of Gaozu and the accounts of the Turks in the Jiu Tangshu and Xin Tangshu, on the other hand, it is reported that the Turks made incursions on Tang frontier almost every year, but records about the Turkish tributary missions are not complete. Some of the Turkish missions might have just arrived at the Chinese court to deliver messages, but the fact that they are still recorded as tributary missions implies that the foreigners had to conform to the rituals of the tribute system laid down by the Chinese in order to be accepted at the Chinese court.

The Zizhi Tongjian, compiled by a group of Song historians with Sima Guang as the chief editor from 1065 to 1084.
When compiling the Tang section (chapters 185 to 265), Sima Guang consulted all the materials available at the time, including the histories mentioned above with a great many additions. It is well recognized that the Zizhi Tongjian is superior to all other histories of the Tang period in terms of the amount of the material consulted, analysis of original sources and clarity of expression. The Zizhi Tongjian Kaoyi is a series of notes made by Sima Guang while editing his history which frequently quotes from books that are now lost and provides clues as to the sources for information in his history.

Here I shall discuss briefly some important works relevant to my dissertation that are referred to by the Zizhi Tongjian Kaoyi. Except for the veritable records, in the Tang part of the Zizhi Tongjian, there is no specific work mentioned concerning Korea. In the records referring to the Turks, only two works are mentioned by the Kaoyi: a) passages about the Turgish in the Jinglong Wenguan Ji compiled by Wu Pingyi, and b) a passage about the Eastern Turkish invasion of Chang'an in the Xiaoshuo of Liu Su. The Jinglong Wenguan Ji, ten chapters, compiled by Wu Pingyi, a scholar of the "literary institute" (wenguan) in the time of Zhongzong (705-710). It is a collection of essays, poems and biographies of some scholars in the institute. Some records in this work referred to a contemporary event that paralleled the veritable records. Fragments of the work can be found in the Shuofu collection.

The Xiaoshuo, three chapters, written by Liu Su, an official historiographer in the Tianbao period (742-755) and a son of the famous historian Liu Zhiji. The Zhizhai Shulu Jieti, a Song bibliographical work, mentions this work as of three chapters, but no further

---

18 Concerning these works, see XTS, v58, and bibliographical works compiled in the Song dynasty. They are Chongwen Zongmu Jishi, Junzhai Dushuzhi, Zhizhai Shulu Jieti, and Yuhai.
information can be found.\textsuperscript{19} Though the \textit{Kaoyi} quotes from the \textit{Xiaoshuo}, it considers the information unreliable.\textsuperscript{20} The work is no longer extant.

As for the Uighurs and Tibet, the \textit{Kaoyi} quotes many more works listed below.

The \textit{Fenyangwang Jiazhuang} （= \textit{Guogong Jiazhuang} 鄭公家傳）, eight chapters, a family biography of Guo Ziyi 郭子儀 (696-781) by Chen Hong 陳洄, a staff officer under Guo for some time. Guo Ziyi was a very important high-ranking military official involved in many battles in alliance with the Uighurs in the suppression of the An Lushan 安祿山 rebellion and in wars against the Tibetans. The \textit{Kaoyi} often refers to this work. It gave a lot of additional materials from eye-witness accounts, but was not entirely reliable. Regarding one matter with reference to the Uighurs, the work contained the only information and was used by the \textit{Tongjian}.\textsuperscript{21} Unfortunately the work does not exist any more.

The \textit{Yehou Jiazhuang} 鄭侯家傳, ten chapters, a family biography of the Grand Councilor Li Mi 李泌 (722-789), by his son Li Fan 李繁. Although in many places the work contains unreliable information since Li Fan intentionally glorified his father,\textsuperscript{22} in some occasions relative to the Uighurs and Tibet, the \textit{Kaoyi} refers to the work as an additional contemporary record. It is also an important source for the study of the militia (\textit{fubing} 府兵) system.\textsuperscript{23} The work does not exist integrally, but its fragments are included in the \textit{Shuofu} and other collective works.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{19} \textit{Zhizhai Shulu Jieli}, v11.
\item \textsuperscript{20} \textit{ZZTJ}, v191, p. 6020.
\item \textsuperscript{21} \textit{ZZTJ}, v225, p. 7236.
\item \textsuperscript{22} \textit{ZZTJ}, v231, p. 7456; \textit{Junzhai Dushuzhi}, v9; Mackerras, C. 1972, p. 3.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Pulleyblank, E. G. 1955, p. 142, note 9.
\end{itemize}
The *Bei Huang Junzhanglu* 北荒君長錄, three chapters, also written by Li Fan, referred to by the *Kaoyi* in one or two places. The work is lost but from the title, one can see that it was a historical record about the non-Chinese chieftains to the north of Tang.

The *Duan Xiushi Biezhuan* 段秀實別傳 ( = Duangong Jiazhuan 段公家傳), two chapters, a family biography of Duan Xiushi (718-783), compiled in the Bureau of Historiography by Ma Yu 姚, who was the Vice Director of the Imperial Library in the Yuanhe period (806-819). Duan Xiushi was also a high-ranking military official who was involved in frontier affairs particularly with the Tibetans. It is another case where the family biography provided additional information. The work does not exist any more.

The *Binzhir* 鳥志, two or three chapters, by Ling Zhun 靈貞, an account of the history of the local armies in Binzhou 靈州. The work covered Tang dealings with Tibet from 763 to 787 which involved Guo Ziyi. According to the *Kaoyi* Ling Zhun was unreliable because of his bias against Guo Ziyi. Yet as an independent source, the work was often referred to by the *Kaoyi* to clarify some events. Ling Zhun was involved in the group of Wang Shuwen 王叔文, the famous reformer in the early ninth century. The work does not exist any more.

The *Huichang Fapan Ji* 會昌伐叛記, one chapter, an account of the suppression of the Ze Lu 澤路 rebellion, the *Wenwu Liangchao Xianti Ji* 文武兩朝獻賢記, three chapters, a collection of memorials, and *Huichang Yipin Ji* 會昌品集, a collection of works including official letters and edicts written on behalf of the emperors, all by Li Deyu 李德裕 (786-849). The latter two still exist while the first one is lost. In his long official career Li Deyu occupied various posts such as Hanlin Academician (*Hanlin xueshi*).

---

24 *ZZIJ*, v223, p. 7156.
25 *XTS*, v168, p. 5127.
Military Commissioner and Grand Councilor. He played an important part in the court decision making process and was very much involved in external affairs, particularly during the time of the collapse of the Uighurs. His various writings constitute an important source of information.

The *Tang Tongji* 唐統記, compiled by Chen Yu 陳藏. It was a chronological account of the history from the beginning of Tang till 823 in one hundred chapters, but in Song there were only forty chapters left, ending at the time of Empress Wu. The *Kaoyi* refers to the work often. For one incident involving Tibet, the work was the only source and the *Tongjian* incorporates the information. Since the work is no longer extant and not much information can be found about the writer, we are unable to tell more about it.

The *Bu Guoshi* 补國史, six or ten chapters, compiled by Lin En 林恩, who was a "presented scholar" (*jinshi*) of the time of Xizong (874-888). The work does not exist any more but at the time when the *Zizhi Tongjian* was compiled, it was an important source for the later part of the Tang dynasty when few other materials were available. It had detailed accounts of events about Tibet at the end of Tibetan kingdom. Regarding one event involving Tibet, it provided the sole source and the *Tongjian* followed it.

3) Collected works of Tang individuals

These works include such government officials as Zhang Jiuling 张九龄, Lu Zhi 陆贽, Bai Juyi 白居易, and Li Deyu, who composed official documents on frontier affairs and relations with foreign countries, including official letters to foreign rulers on behalf of the emperors, and who wrote

---

27 ZZZT, v205, p. 6493.
28 ZZZT, v246, p. 7938.
memorials on foreign policy or otherwise referred to such matters in their private writings.

There is a considerable amount of material relative to Tang history among the documents discovered in Dunhuang and Turfan. I find that they do not have much relevance for the purpose of my study, so they are not referred to in the dissertation.

The Sources of the Accounts of the Turks, Korea, the Uighurs and Tibet in the Jiu Tangshu

In their contacts with foreign peoples, especially their close neighbors, the Chinese showed great interest in collecting information on their land, geographical conditions, customs, histories and their communications with China. Chinese envoys to these foreign places, frontier officials, military generals and offices in charge of receiving foreign envoys used opportunities provided by their posts to collect information and produced numerous works and maps about non-Chinese peoples.

In the monographs on bibliography in Chinese official histories, one finds many interesting titles of works concerning non-Chinese. Although most of them have unfortunately been lost in the course of time, nevertheless one can assume that they must have provided much information that was useful to contemporary Chinese governments in both diplomatic and military dealings with foreigners and for the compiling of official histories.

For example, during Tang Taizong's time, a military officer, Wei Hongji, went on an embassy to the Western Turks but he was trapped there for three years, during which time he wrote a book, the Xizheng Ji, about the various products and customs of the states on the route from Tang to the west. On Wei's return, Taizong inquired about foreign countries and when Wei
presented the book, Taizong was greatly pleased.29 Under Tang Gaozong the court sent special missions to the Western Regions to collect information, and, as a result, the Bureau of Historiography produced the Xiyu Guozhi 西域國志 with maps and, perhaps, other illustrations.30 The several geographical works compiled by Jia Dan 賈耽, a Grand Councilor of the Zhenyuan period (785-804), provided a detailed study of the communication routes between Tang and foreign countries.31

Based on such original sources the "Accounts of Foreign States" (waiguo zhuan 外國傳) in the Jiu Tangshu 舊唐書 embody a large amount of important information.

By comparing the Accounts of Gaoli 高麗 (Koguryo), Baiji 白樂 (Paekche) and Xinluo 新羅 (Silla) in chapter 81 of the Suishu Suishu with chapter 94 of the Beishi, one finds that they have similar records, which shows that the Suishu is the basic source for the Beishi. The passages concerning the three Korean kingdoms in the Tongdian and the Zizhi Tongjian also show that the compilers of these two histories used the Suishu.32 In the chapters on the Eastern and Western Tujue 突厥 and the Tiele 鐵勒 of the Sui period, the same is also true.33

Both the Tongdian, compiled earlier than the Jiu Tangshu, and the Tang Huiyao, most of which was compiled earlier than the Jiu Tangshu, have chapters on foreign states, and therefore deal with the same subjects as those in the Jiu Tangshu. By comparing these chapters, one can come to the conclusion that the three books rely basically on the same sources, that is, records from the Bureau of Historiography, and the editor of the Jiu Tangshu did not simply copy the other two, but rearranged and amplified a great deal based on other different documents and materials.

29 XTS, v100, p. 3944.
30 XTS, v58, p. 1506.
32 TD, v186, Gaoli; ZZTJ, v171-v183. In the TD, v185, sections of Baiji and Xinluo, the records concerning the Sui period are very brief.
33 SUIS, v84, the Accounts of Tujue, Western Tujue and Tiele; BS, v99, the Account of Tujue, Western Tujue and Tiele; TD, v197; v199; ZZTJ, v171-v183.
Chapter 194, the Account of the Tujue (Turks), in the *Jiu Tangshu* is similar to, or the same as, the Account of the Turks in chapters 197 to 199 in the *Tongdian* with some additions. It is therefore probable that both sections were based on a common source.

We can find few similar passages or fragments in chapter 199A, the Account of Koguryŏ, Paekche and Silla, of the *Jiu Tangshu* and chapters 185 and 186 of the *Tongdian*, and chapter 95 of the *Tang Huiyao*. It would appear therefore that the *Jiu Tangshu* compiled a new account in this case from different sources.

A few passages in chapter 195, the Account of the Huihe (Uighurs), of the *Jiu Tangshu* and in chapter 98 of the *Tang Huiyao* have similarities. The section on the Uighurs in the *Tongdian* is very brief. While the editor of the *Jiu Tangshu* may have drawn most of his material from the veritable records, he may also have had the text of the *Tang Huiyao* in front of him, which he abridged and rearranged, adding other material from different sources.

The same may also be true of the relationship between the chapter on Tibet in the *Jiu Tangshu* and related sections in the *Tongdian* and the *Tang Huiyao*.

In general, the accounts of foreign countries in the *Jiu Tangshu* are more precisely dated and in some cases more clearly written than those in the *Xin Tangshu*, but the latter does add more materials, as the compilers of the *Xin Tangshu* claimed. These added materials are drawn from the biographies in the *Jiu Tangshu*, from the Tang archives, and from other historical works still extant in the Song dynasty when the book was compiled.

Besides materials emanating from writings by Chinese officials, the chapters on the Eastern Turks in the *Suishu*, and on Paekche, Silla, and Tibet in the *Jiu Tangshu* contain a certain amount of correspondence sent to the Chinese emperor by foreign

---

rulers. Some of these letters demonstrate that the foreign rulers insisted on equality with China, such as the letter by the Turkish qaghan in 584, and some were written in accordance with the Chinese rhetoric, the most obvious case being when the foreign rulers refer to themselves as "vassals" (chen 夷).

To answer the question as to who wrote these letters, one speculation is that the foreign rulers had them written by Chinese who were living at their courts or by their own people who had learned Chinese. For example, in Taizong's reign following the marriage of Princess Wencheng to the Tibetan king, Tibet sent young people to Tang to study, and invited Chinese scholars to Tibet to compile official reports to the Tang emperor on behalf of Tibet. Korea adopted not only the Chinese bureaucratic system but also the Chinese script. In the Chinese court there were "official interpreters" (yiguan 译官 ). But due to lack of evidence it is difficult to say whether such Chinese officials translated foreign correspondence into proper Chinese both in language and in rhetoric.

The Non-Chinese Sources

Besides the traditional sources in Chinese, the historical writings of the non-Chinese states contain invaluable materials, which corroborate, differ from, or supplement the Chinese sources. These sources provide a non-Chinese perspective which one can not afford to neglect. Due to my lack of knowledge of the Turkish and Tibetan languages, I rely on translations. These works include:

1) Old Turkish inscriptions of the eighth century. In his Tujue Jishi 定厥集之, Cen Zhongmian has three inscriptions translated into

Chinese with annotation, the Tonyukuk, Kül Tigin and Bilgä inscriptions. Talat Tekin in his *A Grammar of Orkhon Turkic* has an English translation of these three inscriptions and two other inscriptions, those of Ongin and Küli Chor, but he does not have annotation.

2) In Korean traditional works written in Chinese script, the one that concerns my study the most is the *Samguk Sagi* 三國史記, compiled in the twelfth century by Kim Pu-sik 金富轼. 38 Kim Pu-sik adhered to orthodox Confucian standard of historiography. The *Samguk Yusa* 三國遺事 compiled by Iryŏn 伊然 towards the end of the thirteenth century is also an important history but it does not have an immediate bearing on my study and it includes more myth and other less believable tales than the *Samguk Sagi*.

3) Inscriptions of the Uighurs. The Shine-usu inscription in Old Turkish script records the account of Moyanchuo 莫延模 Qaghan (reign 747-759) and has a translation in Chinese and annotation by Wang Jingru 王靜如. The other important inscription was found in Karabalghasun. It has three parts, one in Chinese, one in Sogdian and one in Old Turkish, and was written in the ninth century. The Chinese part is best preserved. In my dissertation I use the annotated text in Haneda Tōru 漢田多, "Tōdai kaikotsushi no kenkyū" 通大開創史の研究.

4) The numerous Tibetan sources are in three forms: inscriptions, manuscripts, and wooden tablets. Those that are the most important to my study of Tang-Tibetan relations, especially the study of the treaties concluded by the two sides, are the 821/822 inscription in Tibetan and Chinese scripts, and the *Old Tibetan Annals* and the *Old Tibetan Chronicle*. For the inscription, I use mainly the translations and annotations by H. E. Richardson in *Ancient Historical edicts at Lhasa and the Mu*

Tsung/Khri Gtsug Lde Brtsan Treaty of A. D. 821-822, from the Inscription at Lhasa, and by Li Fang-kuei in "The inscription of the Sino-Tibetan treaty of 821-822." Richardson's book and Wang Yao's also discuss another important document, the "Ngan Lam Stag Sgra Klu Khong inscription."

Wang Yao has a translation of the two Tibetan historical works in his Dunhuang Gu Zangwen Lishi Wenshu, and a study of the wooden tablets of the Tibetan kingdom (early seventh to late eighth century) discovered in modern Xinjiang with the title Tufan Jiandu Zonglu. But these works do not have records about the treaties concluded between Tibet and the Tang court.

Modern Collections of Original Sources

Modern annotated collections of source materials and other critical studies that have been particularly useful in preparing this dissertation are the following.

1) The Turks: Cen Zhongmian, Xi Tujue Shiliao Buqueji Kaozheng, and Edouard Chavannes, Documents sur les Tou-Kiue [Turcs] Occidentaux. These works are comprehensive in their collection of materials and have detailed annotations.

2) Korea: The Chosen shi collected by Chosen shi henshu kai of Japan. It is a collection of highlights from all available materials in Chinese, Korean and Japanese traditional sources arranged in chronological order. The editor notes discrepancies when they occur but does not go into a detailed discussion.

3) The Uighurs: There has not been a comprehensive collection of traditional sources but important works with emphasis on annotation are: Haneda Tōru, "Tōdai

4) Tibet: Materials about Tang and Tibet are more abundant in both Chinese and Tibetan languages than about the above mentioned peoples. Collections of Chinese sources are: *Zangzu Shiliaoji 藏族史料集*, a collection of sources from the Chinese official histories; 39 *Tongjian Tufan Shiliao 通吉騰蕃史料*, 40 and *Cefu Yuangui Tufan Shiliao Jiaozheng 甘府尤巂騰蕃史料校正*, with brief annotation. 41

In his *Kodai Chibetto shi Kenkyū 古代チベット史研究*, Sato Hisashi 佐藤長 provides a detailed study of primary sources in both Chinese and Tibetan concerning the Tang period. The *Xin Tangshu Tufanzhuan Jianzheng 新唐書吐蕃傳校證* by Wang Zhong 王志 is an annotated work with references to Tibetan and other Chinese sources. Yamaguchi Zuihō 山口瑞鳳 in his *Toban Okoku Seiritsu shi no Kenkyū 吐蕃王國成立史の研究* has carried further the study of the sources about the history of early Tibet, and Beckwith in his *The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia* refers to sources in Tibetan, Arabic, Old Turkish, and Chinese.

---

Chapter I

Historical Background: the Tribute System

1. The Ideological Background of the Tribute System

The Late Shang Dynasty: An Embryonic Form of Tribute System

As early as the Shang period (ca. 1600-1028 B.C.E.), the Chinese were faced with problems of dealing with other peoples. Based on a detailed and systematic study of oracle-bone inscriptions, D. N. Keightley proposes a set of thirty-nine "criteria" from which we can delineate the Shang king's concept of state activity in Late Shang. Keightley's criteria also indicate the nature of the relationships between the royal group at the core of state power on the one hand, and the various groups related to it: Shang allies, dependencies or member-states, and adversaries. Together, they formed the Shang world.¹

The Zhou people, who were later to establish the Zhou dynasty (ca. 1027-256 B.C.E.), were, at least at one period, a member-state of the Shang. They received orders from the king and supported the king's affairs, sufficient reason to hold them to have been a member of the greater Shang state. One must mention, however, that in one inscription Zhou is referred to as Zhou-fang, fang 方 being a designation that applies to non-Shang groups or lands. Nevertheless, weighing all the evidence concerning Zhou in the Shang divinations Keightley comes to the conclusion "that ... the Zhou were one of the more distant groups that formed part of the Shang state and that Shang control over the Zhou was neither strong nor continual."² This is a conclusion that one can accept.

Amongst the other groups interacting with Shang, the adversaries, in general, refer to the non-Shang people occupying those places whose names had the postfix

---

¹ Keightley, D. N. 1979-80; 1983.
² Keightley, D. N. 1983, pp. 529-531.
In most cases the Shang king did not give orders to them, or ally with them, nor did Shang receive payments from them. One of the major activities organized by the Shang king was the military campaigns to attack those peoples, who were then often enslaved or killed as sacrifice after being captured.

In the Shang relations with its world, the way of regulation implied an embryonic form of tribute system. The king organized campaigns, performed rituals and displayed his power by frequent travel, hunting and inspecting along the pathways of his realm. The dependents came to have audiences with the king, they supported the king's affairs, joined campaigns and sent in tribute including turtle shells or scapulas, horses, dogs, bovids and captives. The Shijing says:

anciently there was Tang the Achiever; all from those Di and Qiang, there were none who dared not come and bring offerings; there were none who dared not come to audience; Shang will have them forever.

The inscriptions do not provide evidence to show that the Shang thought in terms of specific territorial units. "The polity seems to have been conceived in terms of personal power (who was in control) and kinship association (what relationship he had to the center) rather than land area (where he was in control)." But Late Shang rulers developed a sense of distinction between the inner and outer domains, a development which was to have an important impact on the later Chinese. The Shangshu says:

In the exterior domains, the leaders of the hou, dian, nan and wei states, and in the interior domain (i. e. the royal domain proper), all the functionaries and the many governors, the next-following officials, the
managers of affairs, the honored officers and all those [members of] the many noble clans who resided in the village...

There is not enough evidence to establish definitely a clear picture of the relationships at play amongst the different groups in the Shang world. There are differing opinions about who are to be included in the exterior domain: the hou and dian; or the hou, dian and nan; or the hou, dian, nan and wei. Whether the titles of the hou, dian etc. were conferred by Shang or were native to the leaders also remains an open question. One opinion holds that unlike in the future Zhou feudal system, those lords in the exterior domain possessed their own land and people, and were not enfeoffed by Shang.

The "Feudal System" (fengjian 封建): A Hierarchical Social Order

After the Zhou conquest of Late Shang, a new dynasty (ca. 1027-256 B.C.E.) was set up. The early Zhou rulers attempted to consolidate their power in several ways. They devised a political theory or doctrine based on their claim to possess the "Mandate of Heaven" (tianming 天命), a doctrine that was used to justify the Zhou take-over of the Shang, and the succession of Zhou rulers that followed. According to this doctrine the king, as the "Son of Heaven" (tianzi 天子), was conceived of as having received the Mandate of Heaven. He was in possession of all the land under heaven and was to rule "all-under-heaven" (tianxia 天下). It was he who bore the great responsibility of looking after the welfare of the people. Were he to fail in his responsibilities, he would lose the Mandate, thus the dynastic power.

---

10 For example, different opinions are mentioned in Keightley, D. N. 1979-80, p. 28; Yang Shengnan. 1983, pp. 128-172; Wang Guanying. 1984, p. 87.
theory appears to have produced a psychological change on the part of the conquered Shang people which led them more easily to accept Zhou rule. At the same time the theory acted as a central cohesive force strengthening the loyalty of the Zhou vassals and officials and binding the entire people under Zhou authority.\textsuperscript{12}

Based on their already existing clan structure, the Zhou established a \textit{fengjian} system, often translated as "feudal" system, though one should not understand, thereby, a feudal system identical with the Western model. It was "a system of government in which a ruler personally delegated limited sovereignty over portions of his territory to vassals."\textsuperscript{13} This system was not to divide up the Zhou realm into different kingdoms, but was to arrange feudal lords in the strategic regions with the aim of constituting "a fence and screen for Zhou."\textsuperscript{14} The Son of Heaven invested princes, members of the Zhou household, relatives linked by blood or marriage, and former military and civil officials with land and legitimacy. The conquered Shang people were also incorporated into the Zhou world as members in this system.

In this fashion the Zhou king was able to centralize his political power as the head of kindred liege lords. The feudal lords within the system were obliged to carry out military activities ordered by the monarch, and to provide revenue to the king. Most important of all, their presence was intended as a display of Zhou power and as a force to contribute to the stability of Zhou authority.

In order to ensure order in the feudal system and the unity of the Zhou house, a set of institutions, systems, stipulations, and ceremonial rules -- "the rules of propriety" (Zhou \textit{li}) -- were worked out. Propriety consisted in a set of ceremonial rituals designed to pay respect, and to offer sacrifice to, deities and ancestors. They were, in essence, religious rituals, but with a political dimension. The concept lying behind the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{12} Creel, H. G. 1970, pp. 81-100.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Creel, H. G. 1970, p. 320.
\item \textsuperscript{14} \textit{Zuozhuan} (Xi 24, quoting Fuchen), 189::192.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
ceremonial rituals was the concept of kindred, or extended family, based on which the
*fengjian* system was established and functioned. The authority of the Zhou king, as the
head of the clan, thus came to be combined with political power.\(^\text{15}\) These rules of
propriety served as the foundation for the hierarchical structure of the Zhou realm, a
structure which governed the relations of the extended family and regulated the relations
between rulers and nobles. Within this structure, everyone, in his or her position, was
to act in accordance with the rules of propriety so that harmony could be reached.\(^\text{16}\)

**Competition for Supremacy**

During the Chunqiu period (722-481 B.C.E.) Zhou feudal institutions
disintegrated as a result of the increasing power of the feudal states on the one hand,
and the decay in the political and military might of the Zhou monarchy on the other.
The authority of the Zhou monarch declined and with it the ability to enforce rules.
Zhou rules of propriety no longer served to bind all the states in a unity of peace and
harmony.

Some modern scholars hold that during the Chunqiu and Zhanguo (480-222
B.C.E.) periods the Chinese feudal states were independent of the Zhou king and dealt
with each other as sovereign equals regardless of their size. Even treaties made with
"barbarians" outside the Zhou feudal system were negotiated on a footing of equality
since the treaties allowed these "barbarians" to retain their independence.\(^\text{17}\)

The actual situation, however, was far more complex. While it is true that
forms of interaction between states were as if among sovereign equals, equal in the
sense that one state could not exert its power over others, in fact the predominant

\(^{15}\) Wang Guanying. 1987, pp. 75-83.

\(^{16}\) This ideal of harmony is stated in the *Zuozhuan* (Zhao 26, quoting Yanzi), 715:718-719.

attitude was never egalitarian. In the Chunqiu period the Chinese states still attempted, in practice, to maintain the old hierarchical order with the Zhou king as the highest. He was represented or supported by the strongest of the feudal lords, who, as "hegemon" (ba), retained the power to assemble other feudal lords in a "treaty league" or "covenant" (meng).

The dominant-subordinate form of relationship between the Zhou king and his feudal lords was still reflected in such a covenant. Small states were to pay respect and to serve the larger ones, who in turn would show benevolence to the smaller ones. The ba acted for the king and was in charge of collecting tribute for the royal house. The member states in the covenant were required to come to the court of the ba to pay respect regularly, just as they had been required to come to the Zhou court. Failing to do so they would be punished.

By the time of the Zhanguo period, as a result of wars, cunning diplomacy, and continuous annexations, only seven major powers survived. Small states had either been "swallowed up" by bigger ones or become dependents of them. These seven powers struggled among themselves for supremacy, trying to conquer the whole of the known world by force of arms. With the further decline of the Zhou house it was no longer deemed necessary to lay claim to supporting the Son of Heaven. They all assumed the title of "king" (wang), a title which had formerly belonged solely to the Zhou Son of Heaven. It was a sign of the more equal basis on which they dealt with each other. In 288 B.C.E. the kings of the states of Qin and Qi even called themselves "emperor" (di), of the west and of the east, respectively, attempting to divide China into two spheres of power. They soon abandoned this plan, however, because the time was clearly not ripe for such a revolutionary step.

18 Zuozhuan (Xi 7), 148::149.
19 Zuozhuan (Zhuang 17), 96::96; (Wen 1), 228::229.
there was even a suggestion, some two years later, that the king of Yan be made Northern Emperor, the king of Qin be Western Emperor, and the king of Zhao be Central Emperor.21

In spite of this new situation the idea of the absolute superiority of the Son of Heaven had become so deeply rooted that the concept of equality among sovereign states simply could not find much ground. The Chinese clung to the belief of a hierarchical order to their world and fought for supremacy. Among the various schools of political ideas, the Confucians, seeing how the wars for power caused people to suffer, were the most wholehearted in their insistence on the need to look back to the founders of Zhou to provide a model for the ideal pattern of relationships between the Son of Heaven and his subjects, both Chinese and non-Chinese. As a justification for their hierarchical social order, the Confucians developed a cosmological model, stressing that the order of society should be in accordance with the order of nature. Just as Heaven governs the universe, they argued, so the Son of Heaven rules the world. Confucius himself said:

He who exercises government by means of his virtue may be compared to the north polar star. It keeps its place and all the stars turn towards it.22

And as everything in the universe has its own place or path of movement, as heaven is high above and the earth is down below, every person in the society has his or her own place, with the ruler high and subjects low.

---

21 SJ, v69, p. 2270; Bodde, D. 1938, p. 128.
The Tribute System in the Confucian Works

Drawing on the Zhou fengjian system, Confucian scholars formulated detailed rules and regulations which supposedly existed in the early Zhou within a framework of a tribute system, adjusting relations between the Son of Heaven and his subjects including the non-Chinese. The practice under the tribute system can be summarized as follows.

1) The Son of Heaven enfeoffed feudal lords with titles and land. The feudal lords were required to send a minor mission to the court every year, and every three years a greater mission. Once in five years they had to appear there in person. Every five years the Son of Heaven made a tour of inspection of the fiefs.23 Visits made by the feudal lords to the Son of Heaven were called chao 朝 in spring, zong 宗 in summer, jin 陈 in autumn, and yu 逾 in winter.24

2) In the Zhouli one finds the names of officers in charge of the work and rituals related to the tribute system. There are various protocols and rules to regulate and coordinate relations a) between the Son of Heaven and the feudal lords, and b) among the feudal lords themselves. The officers determined the duties and tribute due to the Son of Heaven from the feudal lords,25 and provided for the proper reception of visiting feudal lords, foreign rulers, and their envoys.26

3) The "Da sima 大司馬 " and "Zhifang shi 職方氏 " sections of the Zhouli record a nine-zone system (see FIG. 1): outside of the "capital" (wangji 王畿) with 1,000 li on each side, there were nine zones. Each was 500 li in each direction and each was outside the other in concentric circles, as it were. The houfu 侯服 was outside the capital, then the dianfu 甸服, the nanfu 當服, the

---

25 For details see the sections of "Da zai," "Da zongbo," and "Da sima" in the Zhouli Zhushu.
26 For details see the sections of "Huaifang shi," "Da xingren," "Xiao xingren," and "Xiangxu" in the Zhouli Zhushu.
caifu, the weifu, the manfu, the yifu, the zhenfu, and the fanfu.  

In the "Da xingren" section one finds another design comprising six zones: houfu, dianfu, nanfu, caifu, weifu, and yaofu, all of which were inside the "nine regions" (jiuzhou), as opposed to the "barrier kingdoms or beyond" (fanguo). The feudal lords in the houfu were to come once a year to pay tribute, those in the dianfu, once every two years, those in the nanfu, once every three years, those in the caifu, once every four years, the weifu, once every five years, and the yaofu, once every six years. The lords of fanguo were to come once in a generation.

The Guoyu and the Xunzi have a description of a five-zone system: 1) the "royal domain" (dianfu), 2) the houfu; which included the Chinese states established by the king, 3) the binfu or suifu, which included the Chinese states conquered by the reigning dynasty, 4) the yaofu, which included Man and Yi, who were subject to Chinese control, and 5) the huangfu, which included Rong and Di who were non-Chinese and basically their own masters. Tribute and offerings from those zones were graded according to their distance to the Zhou capital. The Shangshu, "Yugong" attributes the five-zone system to a time as early as Yu, the legendary tamer of the flood who founded the Xia dynasty.

The five or nine-zone system reflects idealization, imagination or even fabrication rather than actual reality. Yü Ying-shih dismisses the nine-zone system as largely fictitious but nevertheless holds that the five-zone theory has the support of
historical realities, holding it to have been created based on a three-zone structure: namely, the royal domain, the lords' zone and the controlled zone. These three zones did exist during an early period in Chinese history, and the formation of the five-zone system, Yü argues, was under the influence of "Five Phases" (wuxing 五行) thought. If one considers the zone theory to embody the deeply held Chinese belief in an innate hierarchical and concentric structure governing correct political and strategic arrangement, one can see that the three-zone structure did provide at least a conceptual framework for China's external politics. But it is not clear why Yü would dismiss the nine-zone and accept the five-zone model. Both imply basically the same idea and both are idealizations of the actual reality of three zones.

Chinese versus "Barbarian": Sinocentrism

Although with the idea that "the king leaves nothing and nobody outside his realm" (wangzhe wuwai 王者無外), there also developed a pervasive idea of sinocentrism and mistrust of foreigners, that is, of "having the various states of Xia within, and keeping the Yi and Di barbarians out" (nei zhu-Xia er wai Yi-Di 内諸夏而外夷狄). Though the characters Hua 华 and Xia 夏, in the sense of "Chinese," do not occur in any of the Western Zhou bronze inscriptions, nor in the original text of the Yijing, Xia in this sense does occur twice in genuinely ancient parts of the Shujing and twice in the Shijing. The Western Zhou thus did have a clear sense of community. They identified themselves with the Xia people, a people who, according to the Chinese

31 Yü Ying-shih. 1986, pp. 380-381.
32 Gongyangzhuan, Yin 1/6; Huan 8/6; Xi 24/4; Cheng 12/1.
33 Gongyangzhuan, Cheng 15/12.
tradition, established the first dynasty. According to one theory the Xia and Zhou people originated from the people of Rong, and the Shang from the people of Yi. As a state member of the Late Shang, Zhou was familiar with Shang culture, and had inherited some Shang political ideas and institutions. Through the fengjian system Xia and Shang descendants, as well as the Zhou people, became more closely connected, culturally and economically. Gradually they merged into a "new" group of people who differentiated themselves from other Rong or Yi people. This group of people was referred to as Hua-Xia people. Hua in the sense of "Chinese" first occurs in the Zuozhuan. In the Zhou period by "Chinese" one means these Hua-Xia people.

As for the non-Hua-Xia people or non-Chinese, the Chinese did not have a single term for them. Instead several words were used, the most frequent and general ones being Man, Yi, Rong, and Di. In the Shang oracle-bone inscriptions we find the words Yi and Rong. Man and Di first appear later in bronze inscriptions. These non-Chinese lived amongst, and in areas surrounding, the Chinese states. Many wars took place between them. The Chinese looked down upon these people in the same way as the Hellenes looked down on the barbaroi. The word "barbarian" is therefore often used in English works referring to these Man, Yi, Rong, and Di people. It is used here, not in a normative sense, but because it has gained wide currency and probably adequately conveys the attitude of the Chinese of that time.

Several criteria were used by the Hua-Xia people to distinguish themselves from the "barbarians."

1. Language. The languages of non-Hua-Xia people were different from Chinese, although there are differing opinions about whether they were linguistically non-Chinese or linguistically closely related to Chinese. Pulleyblank holds the opinion

37 Zuozhuan (Xiang 14), 460-464.
that while the Hua-Xia people had the same written and spoken language -- Chinese, possibly the language of the Xia which was later accepted by the Shang and Zhou people, the non-Hua-Xia people used non-Chinese languages. This is shown by the fact that, though most of these people have eventually been sinicized, their remnants are still sizable even today, inhabiting, as minority ethnic groups with their own languages, the upland regions of southern, southwestern and western China.38

2. Material culture: clothing, food, style of hair, etc. To the Chinese, differences in clothing and hair style were not just matter of external appearances, but revealed differences in culture and the level of civilization. The Liji records:

Where the statutory measures and the [fashion of] clothes had been changed, it was held to be rebellion, and the disobedient ruler was banished.39

In 307 B.C.E. the king of the State of Zhao made a decision to adopt Hu (a nomadic non-Chinese people) dress which was convenient for horse-riding. He was strongly opposed in this by his uncle and officials who insisted that any change in Chinese clothing to that of other people would mean changing the old doctrine and the "Way" (dao), going against the will of the people, against the learned, and departing from the central states which referred to the Chinese states.40

3. The practice of the rules of Zhou propriety. Zhou rules of propriety embodied the myths underpinning the institutions of the Chinese states, their social organization and behavioral norms. They were not followed by the non-Chinese and, according to the traditional explanation, were not required of them since they did not qualify as civilized people. In the Chunqiu period, for example, when the State of Chu referred to itself as Man-Yi and called the ruler "king" (wang),41 and when the States of

40 SJ, v43, pp. 1806-08.
41 SJ, v40, p. 1692.
Wu and Yue also took the title 

To the Chinese their culture represented a higher level of civilization. It was, simply put, superior. It was not, on the other hand, confined to a certain group of people. The records from the Chunqiu and Zhanguo periods show that many tribes interspersed among the Chinese states became sinicized, mainly as the result of conquest by strong states. Seeing this reality, both Confucius and Mencius attempted to justify Chinese expansion with the argument that Chinese culture or the rules of propriety could convert other peoples to a more advanced civilization. Yet, it is clear that before they were transformed into, and accepted by, the Chinese these "barbarians" were considered as outsiders and inferior.

These attitudes were not simply the result of Chinese feelings of superiority, but arose in response to continued "barbarian" attacks on both the Zhou monarchy and the Chinese states. The "barbarian" presence was so threatening that after the Western Zhou capital, Hao, was invaded in 771 B.C.E. by a Rong people living quite close to Hao, and king You was killed in the turmoil, the succeeding king Ping had to move the capital east to Luo, near modern Luoyang in Henan province.\footnote{SJ, v4, p. 149.} Hostility towards "barbarians," therefore, prevailed among the Chinese, and harsh militant action was justified by excluding "barbarians" as outsiders or lower beings of whom virtue and propriety could not be expected.

This sinocentrism expressed itself clearly in political and geographical concepts, as well as in a deeper psychological attitude. In their world the Chinese considered themselves the center. The word "Middle Kingdoms" or "Central States" (Zhongguo 中國 ), was used to convey such an idea. In the bronze inscription dated the fifth year of King Cheng of the Zhou dynasty (ca. 1020) that word is first found referring to
the royal domain. In the *Shijing*, Zhongguo also refers to the royal domain. In the *Zuozhuan* it refers to the Chinese states as opposed to "barbarians." The word "Middle Land" or "Middle Plain" (*Zhongyuan* 中原), is also used in the *Zuozhuan* to refer to the Zhou realm. During the time of Chunqiu and Zhanguo, when the "barbarians," who had formerly been interspersed among the Chinese states gradually became sinicized or moved to the periphery, the idea that the Chinese were in the center surrounded by the non-Chinese seems to have gained more ground. The *Mozi* locates these non-Chinese as Di in the north, Rong in the west and Yi in the east. The *Liji* adds the Man in the south.

In the *Zhouli* we find the belief that Luoyang, the Eastern Zhou capital, is the center of the earth. It records that the "great director of the multitudes" (*da situ* 大司徒), using the gnomon shadow template, determined the distance of the earth below the sun, fixed the exact length of the sun's shadow, and thus found the center of the earth. The center of the earth was the place where the sun's shadow at the summer solstice was 1.5 Chinese feet (*chi* 尺). The observation of shadow lengths was used to determine latitude in fixing provincial and other territorial boundaries, and the exact center was said to be in Yangcheng, close to Luoyang.

The five or nine-zone system, fictitious as it was, demonstrates the Confucian conception of a world arranged in concentric circles, or squares, with the Son of Heaven in the center. Though without much geographical significance, as discussed earlier, the idea of a unified Chinese empire with the Chinese in the center and the non-Chinese constituting a defence line around it, was an extremely potent myth providing, amongst other things, an explanation and rationale for the tribute system.

44 *Zuozhuan* (Xi 23, quoting Chonger), 185:187.
47 *Zhouli Zhushu*, p. 363.
Scholars and philosophers of some non-Confucian schools held different ideas about society and the world. The Agricultural School (nong jia) believed that rulers of worth should cultivate the land, eat what they produced, and prepare their own meals while carrying on the affairs of government. Followers of this school even saw no need for Sage Kings. Asserting that both ruler and subject should plough together in the fields, they overthrew the order of upper and lower classes.48 Zou Yan 梓頴, the leading thinker of the School of Yin 阴 and Yang 阳 and of Five Phases, did not agree with the sinocentric idea. He maintained that there were "nine large continents" (da jiuzhou 大九州) in the world and each was divided into nine regions. What scholars called the "Middle Kingdom" (Zhongguo) was held to be but one part in eighty-one in the whole world.49 Hui Shi 謂施, the leading thinker of the School of the Dialecticians (ming jia), also talked about the center of the world, which, according to one interpretation, might suggest the idea that the earth is spherical, and according to another interpretation, may imply that there were vast regions beyond the bounds of contemporary geographical knowledge.50 In any case these ideas challenged sinocentrism. Zou Yan's ideas, however, had different influence on later Chinese, especially the Han, as will be discussed later.

2. The Han Dynasty (202 B.C.E.-220 C.E.): Development of the Tribute System

The Heqin 惠親 Policy in the Early Period

After the unification of Qin (221-207 B.C.E.), the First Emperor (Shi huangdi 始皇帝, re. 221-210 B.C.E.) lost no time in expanding his territory by a
series of military expeditions. Through his success in driving the northern nomads, the Xiongnu, beyond the Great Wall, and in bringing the surrounding areas under Chinese control, it seemed that the rule of Son of Heaven was indeed extended to all-under-heaven. However, the tribute system, which was an ideal order to govern Chinese relations with foreign peoples, did not assert itself spontaneously as a result of this success. There were many hindrances to its full implementation and it was some time before it was accepted as a normal state of affairs.

The frontier was unstable at the beginning of Han. The relations between the Chinese and their neighbors had undergone a drastic change from that of the Qin dynasty with the balance of power shifting toward the non-Chinese. The Chinese had lost control over the surrounding areas which they had established during the Qin period. Moreover the Xiongnu had grown into a formidable nomadic empire in the steppes north of the Great Wall. Under the rule of Modun, they "reached their peak of strength and size, subjugating all of the other barbarian tribes of the north and turning south to confront China as an enemy nation."\(^51\)

The Xiongnu, then, challenged Chinese superiority and authority as an equally great power. They made incursions over the Han border, and provided a refuge for dissident Chinese. In 200 B.C.E. the Xiongnu invaded Taiyuan 太原. Emperor Gao (re. 202-195 B.C.E.) led troops in the battle, but fell into a trap at Pingcheng 平城 (near modern Datong 代州 in Shanxi 山西).\(^52\)

The Xiongnu borrowed the Chinese political model and the concept of Son of Heaven. They named their chieftains "chanyu," short for "chengli gutu 擼犁孤塙 chanyu," meaning "great one, Son of Heaven,"\(^53\) and insisted on dealing with China as an equal. In his letter to Emperor Wen (re. 179-157), Modun

\(^{52}\) SJ, v8, pp. 384-385; v110, p. 2894; HS, v1B, p. 63; v94A, pp. 3753-54.
\(^{53}\) SJ, v110, pp. 2887-88; HS, v94A, p. 3751.
Chanyu referred to himself as "the great chanyu whom Heaven has set up," "the great chanyu of the Xiongnu, born of heaven and earth and ordained by the sun and moon."54

Faced with this threat, Han adopted a policy of appeasement, and concluded peace treaties with the Xiongnu. The original items of the treaties were:

1) A Chinese princess was to be married to the chanyu,
2) Chinese annual payments of silk, liquor, rice and other kinds of food were to be made to the Xiongnu,
3) the Han and Xiongnu were to be "brotherly" states, and
4) the Great Wall was to be the border between the Han and Xiongnu.55

This was the famous "marriage alliance" (heqin agreement), although the giving of a Chinese princess in marriage was usually not its only feature. As one can see from the agreement, it was the Chinese, in fact, who paid tribute to the nomadic Xiongnu empire. From Emperor Gao to the beginning of Emperor Wu's reign (140-87 B.C.E.), heqin continued to be the main policy in Chinese contacts with the Xiongnu. Under the heqin agreement, it seemed that both Han and the Xiongnu hoped for a peaceful coexistence. In 176 B.C.E. the chanyu sent a letter to Han, expressing his wish to stop wars in order that the border peoples might enjoy peace and comfort, generation after generation.56 Emperor Wen supported this aim in his letter to the chanyu in 162 B.C.E., hoping that the peoples of the two states might be joined together "like the sons of a single family."57

The heqin policy, however, was never enough to guarantee peace in their relations, in which the dominant factors were always self-interest and balance of power. The general attitude of both sides towards each other was one of suspicion and

hostility. During Empress Lü's reign (187-180 B.C.E.), upon receipt of an insulting letter from the Xiongnu, she wanted to launch a military campaign but had to give up the idea because Han could not afford it. Several years later, in Emperor Wen's reign, the court discussed whether it was feasible to attack the Xiongnu or whether to make peace. Again, because of Han's relative weakness, Han had to decide on keeping peace.58

The *heqin* policy was not only considered to be humiliating but also was a drain on the Chinese economy. Yet it did not prevent the Xiongnu from launching invasions, so as a policy it was severely criticized by a section of Chinese officials. The famous Han thinker Jia Yi, framing on Confucian theories of a hierarchical and sinocentric world order and Chinese superiority, expressed the view that the Son of Heaven was the head of the empire who possessed the power to command the "barbarian." The "barbarians," he said, were the "feet" of the empire whose duty was to present tribute to the Son of Heaven but each year Han was providing the Xiongnu with money, silk floss and fabrics. It was as if the feet were on the top and the head at the bottom. Hanging upside down, as it were, like this, was something beyond comprehension.59 Ban Gu also, in his *Hanshu*, commented that the *heqin* practice was a useless policy that cost a thousand jin of gold every year and put the Chinese in the inferior position of serving the Xiongnu.60

Han Expansion

Although the *heqin* policy did not prove to be very successful in preventing the Xiongnu from incursions, it did win time for Han to recover and to build up its

---

58 SJ, v110, pp. 2895-96; HS, v94A, pp. 3754-55; p. 3757.
60 HS, v94B, pp. 3830-31.
economic and military strength. By Emperor Wu's time Han enjoyed great prosperity, which enabled the emperor to engage in expansion on a grand scale. Military campaigns went on successfully in the south, southwest and east, resulting in a wide extension of Han political influence.

After an initial brief period of peace with the Xiongnu, Emperor Wu started an offensive. As a part of the strategy to conquer his rival he sent Zhang Qian 張騫 to the Western Regions (xiyu 西域 or Central Asia) in order to seek an alliance with the Yuezhi 楯氏, a former enemy of the Xiongnu. Though the mission did not realize its immediate goal, Zhang Qian's expedition discovered the Silk Road, the trade route across the Asian continent. Finally Han secured a marriage alliance with the Wusun 喀孫 in Central Asia, also an enemy of the Xiongnu. Now the heqin policy was again adopted, but this time as a positive means and for a different purpose, namely to obtain and retain military and political assistance from the "barbarians." In 72 B.C.E. the Wusun despatched 50,000 cavalry in a joint force with Han, inflicting a heavy blow on the Xiongnu.

During the prolonged wars between Han and the Xiongnu in Emperor Wu's reign, the Xiongnu were seriously weakened but Han also suffered great losses. When the Xiongnu asked for a peace treaty under the terms of a heqin arrangement, Han twice, around 119 B.C.E. and in 111 B.C.E., attempted to force them to submit and to acknowledge themselves Han subjects. Each time the Xiongnu resolutely refused, insisting on the marriage alliance, which implied equality. Not until the Emperor Xuan's reign (73-49 B.C.E.), when the Xiongnu were further weakened by internal struggles for the succession, and when Huhanxie 呼韓邪 Chanyu of the

61 For location, if it is not given in brackets see the list following Table 1.1.
62 HS, v94A, p. 3785; v96B, pp. 3903-05.
63 SJ, v110, pp. 2911-12; HS, v94A, pp. 3771-72.
Southern Xiongnu arrived in 51 B.C.E. in the Han court, did Han succeed in making the Xiongnu accept the status of a Han subject.

The "discovery of the West" by Zhang Qian and the consequent expansion of Han power enlarged Chinese contacts with other countries to cover almost all of Asia. Knowledge of foreign lands, via the transcontinental Silk Road and maritime trade route, broadened the Chinese view of the world. But this broadening of their horizons did not have much impact on the belief that China was the center to which other people should come, and that Chinese civilization was superior to all others. The expansion resulted, rather, in an extension of Chinese political influence and the further development of the tribute system, consolidating more the Chinese belief in their superiority. After Zhang Qian's mission to the Wusun in 119 B.C.E., states along the Silk Road as far distant as Anxi 安息 (Parthia) are recorded to have despatched envoys and paid tribute to the Han court. It seemed, at the time, that at last China could realize its hope of a full and unhindered tribute system. However, of the many missions which came from the Xiongnu during the period from Emperor Gao to Emperor Zhao (re. 86-74 B.C.E.), only one, in 100 B.C.E., is recorded in the *Hanshu* as having "sent a messenger to bring tribute."64 This was after the Han victory over Dayuan 大宛 (Sogdiana in Han), and when a new *chanyu* had just come to the throne.65 It was not until some fifty years later, when the Xiongnu *chanyu* came personally to the Han court in 51 B.C.E. that the full development of the tribute system can be said to have finally become a fixture of the Chinese political landscape.

Yü Ying-shih holds that, as Zou Yan's theory that China (Zhongguo) was just one part of a huge world gained currency in Han, and as the classical identification of China with "all-under-heaven" gradually gave way to a more realistic idea, the Han Chinese considered China as that which lay "within the seas" (*hainei* 海内). And

---

65 *HS*, v94A, p. 3777.
their sinocentrism was not a literal description of geography, but had politico-cultural overtones.\textsuperscript{66}

It is true that the Han Chinese did have a more extensive knowledge of the world than the Chinese of earlier times, but Yū's argument neglects some important facts. First, the term "all-under-heaven" (*tianxia*), in traditional usage and as well as in Zou Yan's theory, included not only the "Middle Kingdom(s)" but also areas inhabited by non-Chinese. But to the Chinese in those days, China was identified with Zhongguo, not all-under-heaven. The *Liji* commentary says:

All-under-heaven means extending outside to the four seas.\textsuperscript{67}

The *Erya* says:

[The world including] the nine Yi, eight Di, seven Rong and six Man are called four seas.\textsuperscript{68}

Second, the word "within the four seas" (*hainei*), is also an archaic term with the same meaning as "all-under-heaven," to refer to the Chinese known world. The *Zhanguo Ce* says:

Today, if you want to incorporate all-under-heaven, overawe countries with ten thousand chariots, reduce enemy countries to submission, control all within the four seas and make all men your children and [turn] feudal lords [into] your vassals, it will not work without arms.\textsuperscript{69}

The *Xunzi* also says:

\textsuperscript{66} Yū Ying-shí. 1986, pp. 377-379.
\textsuperscript{68} *Erya Zhushu*, "Shidi," p. 270.
To comprehend the essentials of all-under-heaven and govern the people within the four seas.\textsuperscript{70}

Third, as reflected in the famous discourses in 81 B.C.E. on the salt and iron monopoly policy, Zou Yan's theory was viewed by the Han Chinese in two ways. On one side, the Censor-in-chief (\textit{yushi dafu} 御史大夫) Sang Hongyang桑弘羊, an advocate of the state monopoly, praised Zou Yan's theory and claimed that it justified the Qin territorial expansion which was aimed at extending its power over to the "nine large continents" (\textit{da jiuzhou}). This shows that, far from leading those Han Chinese who were most involved in foreign policy to adopt a more modest estimate of the proper role of the Chinese emperor, Zou Yan's theory was simply incorporated into the old idea that the Chinese Son of Heaven had a god given authority over all lands.

On the other side, the literary scholars, disillusioned by the Qin and early Han expansions, rejected Zou Yan's theory as absurd and criticized the unbridled Qin ambition which had led to its finally losing even its own country.\textsuperscript{71} The scholars still insisted on a sinocentric idea in the geographical sense:

The frontier 'commanderies' (\textit{jun}) are in the mountains and valleys. \textit{Yin} and \textit{yang} are not well balanced. Cold splits the earth. Blasting wind whirls the alkaline soil. Sand and stones are piled up and accumulated. The situation of the land has nothing suitable in it. Zhongguo lies in the middle between heaven and earth. It is where \textit{yin} and \textit{yang} come together. The sun and moon run their course across its southern parts and the big dipper and pole star rise from its north. It embraces all the mild and harmonious airs and produces all kinds of products.\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{70} Xunzi Jijie, "Bugou," p. 30.
\textsuperscript{71} Yan Tie Lun Jiaozhu, "Lun Zou," pp. 331-332.
\textsuperscript{72} Yan Tie Lun Jiaozhu, "Qingzhong," p. 100.
The ideas of these traditional scholars were not simplistic. Their sinocentrism was not just the result of a naive and unquestioning belief in the superiority of all things Chinese. Rather they were stressing the importance of Han concentrating on its own affairs, avoiding any action that would purposely attract the "barbarians." On the other hand Sang Hongyang articulated clearly this very real and practical issue which China was faced with all the time: the government simply had to solve or alleviate the problem of "barbarian" invasion either by actively attacking the "barbarians" or by defence in order that China could enjoy stability and peace.

Practices under the Tribute System

The tribute system, which regulated Chinese relations with non-Chinese, was an extension of the hierarchical feudal system existing within China itself. In Han, princes and nobles were given titles and fiefs as their own states by the Son of Heaven. Ceremonial rituals and various laws were imposed to control them. They were to come to the court regularly to pay homage and tribute. Han "commanderies" (jun^f) were also expected to present tribute to the court in addition to regular taxes.

Practices under the tribute system as they pertained to Chinese relations with non-Chinese were as follows:

1) Rulers of non-Chinese states or their envoys came to the Han court to pay homage.

2) They presented symbolic tribute in the form of local products.

---

73 Zhang Weihua. 1980, pp. 185-244.
74 For example, in 196 B.C.E., an edict was issued saying "Henceforce the vassal kings and marquises shall regularly pay court and make offerings [to Us, the Emperor], in the tenth month, and each commandery shall [make an offering] in accordance with the total number of its people; each person per year [shall be taxed] sixty-three 'cash' (qian) in order to provide for the expense of making offerings [to the Emperor]." See HS, v1, p. 70; Dubs, H. H. 1938-55, 1., p. 130. In 37 C.E., an edict repeated an earlier order prohibiting the commanderies and kingdoms from offering unusual foodstuffs, but allowing the presentation of foodstuffs to the ancestral temples as before. HHS, v1, pp. 60-61.
3) The Chinese emperor gave them imperial gifts in return.

4) The emperor conferred on the foreign rulers titles of nobility -- "king" (wang), "marquis" (hou), "lord" (jun), and "chieftain" (zhang), an official title such as general (jiangjun), and bestowed seals on them and sometimes on their officials.

5) The foreign rulers sent their sons as hostages in return for Chinese protection from outside aggression.

The essential part of the practice consisted of items one, two, and three. Any state, so long as it sent missions with gifts to the court, is recorded as a tributary. The tribute system thus developed into a network embracing all foreign states which paid "official" visits to Han.

Compared with the tribute system as it operated inside Han borders, however, there was a distinct difference. The tribute required of the Chinese, according to Schafer and Wallacker, in Tang times, "was a putative gift rather than a tax due. Though required of the local officials, its presentation retained an air of voluntary display of fealty to the throne." What the tribute in Han should be is not as clearly indicated in the Han records as in those of Tang or Song, but it had the same function. Failure of the Chinese to present tribute, or failure to pay court-visits at regular intervals would imply an act of disobedience. For the non-Chinese, on the other hand, who were outer subjects, tribute was not compulsory. The Han administration would not have to launch a punitive attack if tribute was not regularly forthcoming though the absence of tribute payment could be, and was, used as a justification for Chinese aggression against non-Chinese people. The policy towards non-Chinese tributaries was based on the maxim of "not interfering in the administration of those who had not been influenced by the rules of proper conduct." This policy was shaped specifically as

75 Schafer, E. and Wallacker, B. 1957-58, p. 213.
a response to the Xiongnu on the eve of the arrival of Huhanxie Chanyu, but it became a general policy towards all non-Chinese in the Han period.

To the Chinese rulers, then, the tribute system structured an ideal pattern for their relations with other peoples since the tributary visit implied the acceptance of Chinese rule over a universal empire. Also, because the "acceptance of imperial rule" involved not only different levels of "acceptance," but also different categories of "rule," which varied from one group of people to another, different practices were applied to countries according to their distance from China and relative importance. So, although the Han world view was just like that in the concentric five or nine-zone system, Yü Ying-shih concludes that compared with the tribute system in pre-Han period, the institutionalization of tributary practices and their systematic application in the realm of foreign relations was a unique Han contribution.

Different Types of Relations under the Tribute System

The relations between the non-Chinese tributaries and Han saw many ups and downs, but, generally speaking, five types of relationship can be discerned, and for a general view of these areas, see Map 1.

Type One:

Non-Chinese, who were linked to Han most closely in terms of political rule, were those in the Han "commandery-distrier" (junxian), and "dependent state" (shuguo) systems. They were governed by Chinese officials, but in

76 HS, v8, p. 270.
77 Yü Ying-shih. 1967, p. 189.
78 Yü Ying-shih. 1986, p. 381.
79 For locations and diplomatic activities, see Map 1 "Han and its neighbors" and Table 1.1 "Foreign tribute missions to Han."
80 Yü Ying-shih, in his book Trade and Expansion in Han China, devotes a whole chapter to the analysis of Han China's general policy towards "barbarians," who having submited were ruled under the junxian and shuguo systems, as well as Han administrate apparatus of the two systems. See his book, ch. 4, pp. 65-91.
the accordance with their old customs. Some chiefs were granted the titles of king, marquis, lord, or chieftain by the Han emperors. Those under junxian administration were considered to be both outer and inner subjects. The shuguo system functioned as an administrative device to take care of the "barbarians" who had submitted to Han rule. It may be regarded as a sort of compromise between the tribute system and the junxian system.

The Qiang (in modern Qinghai and Tibet) were widely dispersed nomadic tribes with whom Han could not form a comprehensive tributary relationship. Different policies were adopted with different tribes, such as a) resettling them in Han territory under junxian or shuguo system, b) appointing Commandant Protecting the Qiang (hu Qiang jiaowei) to conduct relations with them, and c) suppressing them with military force.

Type Two:

In this category of non-Chinese peoples are Fuyu, Gaogouli (Koguryo), Weimo, and Han lands situated to the northeast of the Han territory. Compared with type one and type three peoples, they were not administered closely by the Chinese, nor was there as much attention paid to them to ensure border security. Called "Eastern barbarians" (dong Yi), they were considered by the Chinese to have a gentle nature and to be easy to control with teaching. Although Gaogouli and Weimo were administered under the junxian system, and other Eastern "barbarians" are recorded as asking to be attached to the Chinese commanderies of Lelang and Liaodong, they were much less closely supervised than the non-Chinese in the southwestern regions, who were under the Chinese commandery system and subject to a level of taxation in Later Han.

Among the five practices under the tribute system they were not required to send hostages, and no special offices were set up to mediate the contact with them.  

**Type Three:**

On the northern and northwestern frontiers were situated non-Chinese states which were considered to be outer subjects. They received close attention because of their strategic importance to Han. Han contacts with them brought out all five practices of tribute system into play, though sometimes they were treated in a special fashion in accordance with a particular situation. Han established administrative offices to run the military and political affairs which touched on their relations with these peoples, aiming thereby to maintain a "control by loose rein" (*jimi^J^*).

In type three are the following three peoples:

1) The Xiongnu. Chinese treatment of the Xiongnu, who continued to be a major threat, was characterized by the granting of favorable terms, both politically and materially. Before Huhanxie Chanyu came to the court, a conference was held to discuss the protocol to be accorded to him. One opinion held that a *chanyu* could not be treated as a guest by a universal king:

[According to] the rites and ceremonies, it is proper that he should acknowledge himself a subject like the vassal kings... and be ranked next below the vassal kings.  

**Xiao Wangzhi**, a Han official, did not agree, arguing that the Xiongnu were a state of rival status, and therefore their *chanyu* should not be treated as a subject and should be ranked above the vassal kings. In this way, said he, if later the *chanyu* showed any disobedience by not coming to court regularly, Han would not have to start any punitive actions.

---

82 Details see *HHS*, v85, pp. 2810-20.  
83 See Table 1. 1.  
84 *HS*, v8, p. 270.
Emperor Xuan adopted Xiao's opinion. An imperial edict was issued saying:

[We] have heard that the Five Lords and the three [dynasties of] Kings did not touch in their administration those who had not been influenced by the rules of proper conduct [i.e., the outer barbarians]. Now the Hun chanyu had styled himself [Our] feudatory at the northern frontier and [is coming to] pay court in the first month. We are inadequate and [Our] virtue is unable to cover [the earth] widely. Let [the chanyu] be treated according to the rites for a guest and [let] his rank be above that of the vassal kings.

When the chanyu arrived he was announced as a subject, but without the use of his personal name. An imperial seal and many gifts were conferred on him. This pragmatic attitude acknowledged that there were limits to Han capability to enforce strict adherence to the tribute system. Yet the Chinese still saved face by appealing to the example of the ancient "Sage Kings" (shengwang). Huhanxie Chanyu asked permission from Han to stay north of the Han frontiers as a safeguarding force, to which Han agreed. When he restored his own power under Han protection, however, he returned to the steppes. In 33 B.C.E. a palace woman, Wang Zhaojun, was sent to wed Huhanxie, who then offered to guard the Han frontiers from Shanggu to Dunhuang, and asked that Han remove the frontier barriers and troops. But the Chinese refused, obviously because they could not trust the Xiongnu who could only be treated as an outer subject.

In Later Han the former Southern Xiongnu were split again into southern and northern parts with the Southern Xiongnu having a pro-Han policy. In 49 C.E. the chanyu despatched an embassy to the Han court and asked for subject status. He presented expensive gifts, requested a Han commissioner for protection, offered to send hostages and sued for resumption of the former agreement. In the following year

---

Han permitted the Southern Xiongnu to move to Yunzhong and again to Meiji in Hexi commandery. Seven other Southern Xiongnu divisions were stationed in the Han frontier commanderies, each ruled by its own hereditary chief to watch for attacks from beyond the borders.\(^87\)

Han appointed special officials to take charge of relations with the Xiongnu. In Former Han an office was created with the title of Vice Commandant in Charge of the Xiongnu (\textit{shi Xiongnu fu jiaowei}), and in Later Han Leader of Court Gentlemen in Charge of the Xiongnu (\textit{shi Xiongnu zhonglang jiang}).\(^88\)

2) Oasis states in the Western Regions. These many agricultural states were situated along the important trade route into Central and South Asia, and since they were potential allies to both Han and the Xiongnu, both sides wanted to control them.

Some Chinese officials wanted to draw a clear line between Han and these states with the intention of having nothing to do with them at all. Ban Gu commented that the various states of the Western Regions each had their rulers and their chiefs. They were cut off from Han and the intervening distance was great. If Han took possession of them they brought no profit, and if Han abandoned them they constituted no loss.\(^89\)

In spite of this attitude and in spite of continuous debate about how Han should treat the Western Regions, many battles were fought for the control over the area. The Chinese could not afford to neglect the strategic importance of the region. From the beginning of Later Han to around 125 C.E., whenever Han lost control over the area and relations with the oasis states lapsed, the Xiongnu took control and used the area as a base for attacking the Chinese frontier. A real danger was that if the Xiongnu

\(^{87}\) \textit{HHS}, v89, pp. 2943-45.
occupied the whole area they might enter into an alliance with the Qiang, the hostile "barbarians" living to the south of the Western Regions, thereby posing a great threat to the four commanderies in the Hexi region (in modern Gansu and Qinghai), and that were they to fall it would be immeasurably costly for Han to rescue them. Having realized this, the court sent the general Ban Yong, Ban Gu's nephew, to the Western Regions. In 127 C.E. following Ban Yong's military conquest of Jushi and Yanqi, seventeen states in the Western Regions came to Han for court-visit.\textsuperscript{90}

Because of the necessity for close and peaceful relations Han had offices set up in the Western Regions, the most important of which was the Protectorate of the Western Regions (\textit{Xiyu duhu}) established in 60 or 59 B.C.E.\textsuperscript{91} In addition to the regular practices under the tribute system these states were to provide supplies to the Han troops in the Regions and to the envoys passing through, and to despatch their own troops when the Chinese required military assistance. As for Han side of the arrangement, the court conferred titles with official seals on the kings, whose rank was equal to the marquis inside China. Han performed the duty of a suzerain, protecting these states from invasion, settling disputes and punishing offenders.\textsuperscript{92}

3) The Wuhuan (a people at the southern end of the Greater Xing'an Mountains, southeast of the Liao River) and the Xianbei (a people in the area between the Mongolia steppes and east of the Greater Xing'an Mountains). Both of these peoples also occupied an important strategic place in Han frontier thinking. Like the states in the Western Regions they were sometimes subjects of, or allied with, the Xiongnu. But unlike the agricultural oasis states, they

\textsuperscript{90} HHS, v88, pp. 2909-12.
\textsuperscript{92} For further details on Han relations with the Western Regions see Ise Sentarô. 1968, pp. 37-89.
were nomads, more capable of frequent and quick incursions into Han regions. Compared with the Xiongnu their threat to the Chinese was not severe since they were loosely organized. And since hostilities sometimes existed among the Xiongnu, the Wuhuan and the Xianbei, there were opportunities for the Chinese to use one against the other and thereby create a buffer area between themselves and the Xiongnu.

In spite of the fact that conflicts with these two groups of people were frequent, China still tried to structure its relations with both people according to the tribute system. As for the Wuhuan and Xianbei, they too sought support from the Chinese. In Emperor Wu's reign in Former Han, the Chinese resettled the Wuhuan north of the Great Wall, outside five frontier commanderies (Shanggu, Yuyang, Youbeiping, Liaoxi, and Liaodong), in order that they could act as a sort of watchman over the Xiongnu. This was when the Commandant of the Wuhuan (Wuhuan jiaowei) was appointed. The same position was again restored in Later Han when the Wuhuan resumed their peaceful relations with the Chinese after a period of hostility. The responsibilities of this Wuhuan jiaowei included a) supervision of the Xianbei as well as the Wuhuan, b) arrangement of rewards to the Wuhuan and c) administration and maintenance of border markets.

Official relations between the Xianbei and Han started in 49 C.E. in Later Han. It is recorded that, till 87, they functioned as a defending force on the frontiers without causing any trouble. Following a period of disturbances, some of the Xianbei around 107 resumed peace with Han. Han settled them along Ningcheng in the commandery of Shanggu, where the Wuhuan jiaowei had his headquarters. A hundred and twenty tribes sent their hostages to Han.93

---

93 HHS, v90, pp. 2981-86.
Even though the states in this category were brought into the tribute system, and considered by the Chinese to be outer subjects of the Han Son of Heaven, in practical terms they were neither subjugated, nor, as in the case of the Xiongnu, did they ever really submit. Rebellions against Han occurred from time to time. They maintained their independent status and Han, limited in its resources and unable to exert a strict and direct rule either politically or militarily, was powerless to change this state of affair.

During his reign Wang Mang (9-23 C.E.) had attempted to make these non-Chinese peoples direct or "inner" subjects. He insisted that,

"Heaven has not two suns, nor has Earth two kings" -- this is the unchangeable way of all the kings. Some of the nobles of the Han clan were entitled Kings, and even the barbarians [beyond] the four [frontiers] followed [this practice]. It is contrary to the ancient institutions and absurd [in view of the principle that there is only] one sovereign [in the world].

Generals were despatched as messengers by him to the surrounding areas to change the titles of king, conferred on the "barbarian" chiefs by the emperors in Former Han, to that of marquis. This move caused resistance from these non-Chinese rulers, who immediately broke off relations with Han or rose in revolt. Emperor Gengshi (re. 23-25 C.E.) restored the title of king of the Xiongnu, and his successor Emperor Guangwu (re. 25-57 C.E.) restored the titles of the non-Chinese rulers in the surrounding regions. The step was a friendly gesture, intended to satisfy the imperative need to keep peace on the frontiers.

Type Four:

These were states in yet more remote regions, included in the outermost of the concentric circles of the tribute system, states whose tributary relations with Han

---

96 HS, v99B, p. 4115.
97 HS, v94B, p. 3829; v95, p. 3846; HHS, v85, p. 2814.
followed the first four of the five practices. They were not supervised under any kind of Chinese administrative device. Although the rulers received the titles of "king" or "marquis" from the Chinese emperors, because of their distant location they never had a great impact on Chinese frontier security, either as allies or as adversaries. These states were Wo 奄 (Wa or Yamata in Japanese. Modern Kyūshū, Japan) in the east, Shanguo 椙 (north Burma) in the southwest, small tribal states outside the Han southern frontiers, and Jibin 晃 (Kashmir) in the far west.98

**Type Five:**

The extreme outer regions, such as Tianzhu 北 (Northern India), Tiaozhi 沙枝 (Seleucia),99 Anxi (Parthia), and Daqin 人秦 (Rome). Missions from these places are also recorded as coming to pay tribute even though some envoys might, in fact, just have been merchants, simply coming for commercial benefit. They were, nonetheless, purposely recorded as tributaries in accord with the mythology that "barbarians" coming to the court proved the good government of the Chinese Son of Heaven.

**Universal Empire through the Tribute System**

Edward N. Luttwak in his book *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire* describes two models of empire, the "hegemonic" and the "territorial" (see FIG. 2). His model of the hegemonic empire is quite similar to the idea of the Chinese notion of concentric zones. The hegemonic empire is centered around a central zone of direct control, and includes a) an "inner zone of diplomatic control," consisted of a series of client states surrounding the central zone, and b) an "outer zone of influence."

---

98 See Table 1. 1.
99 This is according to a personal communication from E. G. Pulleyblank. Tiaozhi is commonly identified with an ancient place near Bushire on the Persian Gulf.
surrounding the inner zone. In the outer zone, client tribes defer to the power of the empire but are not under its direct control. The territorial empire, on the other hand, has a large territory under direct rule, around which are stationed imperial troops necessary for border defence and internal security. Client states in the hegemonic empire function as buffer states in the system of imperial security with their most important function, by virtue of their very existence, being to absorb the burden of providing peripheral security against border infiltration and other low-intensity threats.\footnote{Luttwak, E. N. 1976, pp. 19-30. Robert M. Somers gives a clear outline of these two models, see Somers, R. M. 1986, p. 988.}

The Chinese model of empire bears some similarities to this hegemonic system. Yet the Chinese model, organized around the tribute system, reflects the typical Chinese belief that "the king leaves nothing and nobody outside his realm," and that "having the various states of Xia within, and keeping the Yi and Di barbarians out." In general we can say that those non-Chinese in type one were in the marginal areas between the Chinese territorial and hegemonic empires. Those in types two and three who were under Chinese administration or Chinese military protection were within the hegemonic empire. As we have seen, the Chinese hegemonic empire had various categories within itself, with different levels of Chinese rule, and with each state having different responsibilities and connections to the Chinese suzerain. Some states in the Chinese hegemonic empire were expected to undertake military tasks in a frontier security system. The word fan, sometimes found in Han as fanguo or fanchen, which was used to refer to non-Chinese in the five or nine-zone system, means "fence", "screen", or "defence."

But the non-Chinese states in the sphere of the hegemonic empire did not only serve a military purpose. Since the legitimacy of the Son of Heaven within China was bound up with the fiction that he was a world ruler, the existence of the hegemonic
empire also served as a proof of his virtuous and capable rule and justified his legitimacy and possession of the Mandate of Heaven. Finally, the tribute system, as a concentric network, served to build a model of universal empire. It included countries of type four, on whose rulers the Chinese conferred titles, and type five which sent visitors to the Han court. Larger than Luttwak's hegemonic empire, this universal model embraced all kinds of states.

Fairbank presents us with an alternate model on which to build our understanding of Chinese dynastic history. He divides the peoples and countries which were included in the concentric hierarchy of "nations" in Chinese foreign relations into three zones: 1) the Sinic Zone, consisting of the most nearby and culturally similar tributaries, 2) the Inner Asian Zone, consisting of nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples, and 3) the Outer Zone, including peoples at a further distance over land or sea. These divisions based on cultural, economic and geographical criteria provide a convenient framework within which to sketch out a general picture of Chinese foreign relations.

The divisions utilized in this dissertation, however, which see the Chinese empire in terms of territorial, hegemonic and universal circles, are based on political and military criteria, criteria which reflected the extent to which the Chinese had dealings with a certain people, and which determined the policy the Chinese possessed relative to them. The Chinese government exercised direct control over the territorial zone, was always concerned with its security and defended its interests whenever necessary. In regard to the peoples in the hegemonic zone of the empire, however, the Chinese government just tried to keep a peaceful and friendly relationship with those who were considered subordinates or allies, and only assumed a "potential"

\cite{Fairbank1968} 

\footnote{Fairbank, J. K. 1968, p. 2.}
responsibility for their military protection. As to those in the outermost zone, forming a universal empire, the Chinese only had a diplomatic or trade relationship with them.

The payment of tribute meant, from the Chinese point of view, a recognition of subjection even though the tributaries might have different ideas and aims. After all, it was reasoned, it was always the non-Chinese rulers who went to the Han court, and foreign envoys had to conform the rituals laid down by the tribute system when they went to the Chinese court.

A tribute relationship, though anti-egalitarian, functioned to maintain a friendly or peaceful relationship or simply to facilitate diplomatic and commercial activities. A peaceful relationship was evidence of the virtuous and capable rule of the emperor, thus justifying his legitimacy and possession of the Mandate of Heaven, since the legitimacy of the Son of Heaven within China was bound up with the "fiction" that he was a world ruler. Having realized the importance of the system, or rather peace through the system, the Chinese had to maintain it even if it meant China had to bear a heavy burden in return.

A tributary relationship, from the point of view of the non-Chinese, could imply a friendly or peaceful relationship or simply normal diplomatic activity. Sometimes, since the so-called envoys could be merchants hoping to gain commercial benefit, their arrival at the Chinese court did not even amount to diplomatic activity. The acceptance of the system by the non-Chinese, then, clearly depended on various factors. Some people were brought into the system unwillingly through Chinese annexation, and some willingly since they could gain political and economic benefits through their contacts with China. Even this latter sort of people, if they wanted to have relations with China, generally were required to conform to the rules laid down by the system.

In a complex political organization, we can distinguish three types of power by which superiors attempt to establish or to extend their control over others: physical,
economic, and moral. Some non-Chinese rulers adopted a positive attitude towards their relations with China in order to seek Han support through the tribute system to enhance their own physical power, especially when they faced rivalries. They would do this even though it implied an inferior status.

Non-Chinese rulers also benefited economically from tribute and trade with China. The payment of tribute, and the return of Chinese imperial gifts, served the function of trade, and appeared more like "gift trade" to the non-Chinese. It was usually equal in an economic sense since the Chinese tried to return gifts of the same value, if not higher. Imperial gifts together with other financial support and the essential goods the non-Chinese obtained in this kind of "tribute trade" with the Chinese compensated for the less than exalted position they occupied in the tribute system. The Xiongnu *chanyu*'s constant demand for Han goods did not stem from any personal greed, as the Han Chinese thought. Rather it was the need to turn to the Chinese economy in order to obtain goods to reward tribal leaders and thereby maintain his nomadic state organizational structure intact. As nomads, the Xiongnu could maintain a subsistence standard of living, but with the economy based on a highly mobile pastoralism it was difficult to accumulate, or store, the wealth necessary to run a more complex and powerful state.

The official titles conferred on non-Chinese rulers by Han not only made the non-Chinese states nominal Han subjects but also strengthened the moral power of those states. In 29 C.E. the king of Suoju *Su* in the Western Regions, for instance, was established. He was given the title of Grand Chief Commandant of the Western Regions (*Xiyu da duwei* 夷域都尉) by Han. Fifty-five states of the Western Regions were placed under his control. In 41 C.E. Han gave him the seal of

---

102 Commons. 1924, pp. 47-64.
103 Rossabi, M. 1983, pp. 3-4.
104 Barfield, T. J. 1981.
Protector-general of the Western Regions (*Xiyu duhu*). Even though Han soon lowered his rank to General-in-chief (*da jiangjun* 大將軍), the king still continued to use the former title so as to make other states his subjects and to levy heavy taxes.\(^{105}\)

The prosperity of the tribute system depended mainly on the superior military and economic strength of the Chinese as well as on the relative weakness of the surrounding non-Chinese. Backed by the wealth of the nation, Emperor Wu strongly encouraged foreign peoples to come to China. Chinese missions were despatched to regions as far away as Parthia. By contrast, at the beginning of the Later Han period, Emperor Guangwu refused the request of the states of the Western Regions to establish tributary relations because China, then preoccupied with its internal problems, was unable to perform the duty of military protection as suzerain.\(^{106}\)

3. The Period of Division: the Challenge to the Tribute System

The Challenge to the Idea of Universal Kingship

During the three and half centuries of the Period of Division, from the collapse of the Han dynasty in 220 until 589, when the Sui dynasty again unified the whole of China, the Han empire was divided up under the rule of different Chinese and non-Chinese leaders. Initially three Chinese regimes, Wei, Shu, and Wu, fought for supremacy. Then five "barbarian" (*wu hu* 五胡) groups: Xiongnu, Jie, Xianbei, Di, and Qiang, who were looked down upon by the Chinese as "uncivilized," "savage," and "greedy," occupied the northern part of China, the so-called Zhongyuan, and established sixteen kingdoms at various times contrasting the Eastern Jin regime in the southern part. Referring to themselves as kings or emperors, the leaders of these "barbarian" groups took up the role of Son of Heaven, and ruled

\(^{105}\) *HHS*, v88, pp. 2923-24.

\(^{106}\) *HHS*, v88, p. 2909.
over the Chinese. Towards the end of the fourth century the Tuoba of the Xianbei people conquered all the other non-Chinese regimes and established a unified dynasty in the north. They competed with their counterpart in the Chinese Southern dynasties for the role of ruler of all-under-heaven.

The very idea of the Chinese world order, universal kingship, was faced with a challenge. In disunity, there was no single Son of Heaven to rule both the Chinese and non-Chinese. Within so many different regimes, historians during the Period of Division all claimed that their own dynastic regimes possessed the Mandate of Heaven, and were, therefore, legitimately at the center and top of the hierarchical world order. The ideas of universal kingship and unity were considered as the only acceptable condition for China to be in, and provided justification for the different rulers in their competition for legitimacy and their conquering others in order to establish a unified rule in China like that of the Qin and Han dynasties. The questions that concern us here are how the Chinese historians regarded the states organized by the non-Chinese, the so-called "five barbarians" and the Northern dynasties, who threatened the ideology of Chinese Son of Heaven ruling the world, and how these regimes utilized the tribute system to strengthen their legitimacy.

The Legitimacy of the Sixteen Kingdoms

The non-Chinese rulers were not completely confident about their own strength, even though they spared no effort to demonstrate their power over the Chinese and to maintain or enhance their own ethnic superiority. In the uprisings at the end of Western Jin, there were certainly anti-Jin feelings on the part of the non-Chinese, for the corruption and decay of the Jin Chinese on both central and local levels caused tremendous suffering to the people, particularly the non-Chinese who had settled inside China since the time of Later Han. However, to successfully rule an advanced
agricultural society, which differed greatly from their own nomadic ones, it was necessary for these non-Chinese rulers to utilize prevailing Chinese political theories to establish and cultivate a belief in the legitimacy of their rule in the minds of the population at large. To that extent they had to conform to Chinese tradition, to the Chinese orthodoxies, or approved norms. Without doing so it was impossible to maintain the stability of the political order.107

They were also bound to organize their governments on existing Chinese models, which meant, on the practical level, relying almost entirely on a Chinese bureaucracy to carry out their rule. Legends, prophecies and signs from the gods were fabricated in addition to their adoption of Chinese political theories.

Wittingly or unwittingly the non-Chinese regimes hastened the process of sinicization by their attempts to maintain their rule with the assistance of Chinese bureaucrats. Their official histories were compiled by Chinese traditional historians, who followed traditional rhetoric and patterns in court documents. Rulers and Chinese officials in the north, for example, claimed that, if the Son of Heaven failed in his responsibilities to guarantee the welfare of the people, whoever had virtue would have the Mandate of Heaven and could take over, thus using the most central and durable traditional Chinese ideology to justify their rule.

There is, however, an almost unanimous opinion in Tang historical writings that the non-Chinese ruling north China before the Tuoba Wei's unification were simply "barbarians" usurping the Chinese power. For them it was a period of foreign invasion. Such invasions were not without precedent in Chinese history. The Tang historian Fang Xuanling in the Jinshu adopts the form of the "records of illegitimate rulers" (zaiji) for the histories of these kingdoms. However, the Tang Chinese also acknowledged that the decay and lack of virtue of the

107 For a survey of the importance of legitimacy, see Wechsler, H. J. 1985, pp. 10-20.
Western Jin rulers had provided the chance for the "barbarians." They saw the invasions as a punishment from Heaven, but still held strongly to the belief that "barbarians" should not rule China.\(^{108}\)

The Legitimacy of the Northern Dynasties

As for the Northern dynasties, the Northern Qi historian, Wei Shou, a Han Chinese, readily accepted and assisted the Tuoba Wei, which unified the north and set up the Northern dynastic power, in their claim to legitimacy. His \textit{Weishu} adopts such a belief as its basic assumption. It begins with a myth about Changyì, the ancestor of Tuoba of the Xianbei tribe. He is said to have been a son of the Yellow Emperor who enfeoffed his sons with land, both inside the land of the various Hua (Chinese) and outside in the "outermost zone" (\textit{huangfu}). Changyì is said to have settled in the northern land, which had a mountain called Xianbei.\(^{109}\)

Taking Northern Wei as the legitimate power, Wei Shou records all the other rulers, Chinese and non-Chinese, as falsely assuming the title of emperor. The histories of these regimes were compiled in accordance with the calendar of Tuoba Wei. Not only did he show a strong bias against other non-Chinese rulers who, according to him, were undoubtedly "barbarians," but his bias against the Chinese rulers of the South was, if anything, even stronger.

Contrary to Wei Shou, Shen Yue and Xiao Zixian of the Southern dynasties, the compilers of the \textit{Songshu} and \textit{Nan Qishu}, respectively, took a clear stand on the side of the Southern dynasties. Shen Yue had been appointed to several high positions from the Song to Liang periods,

\(^{108}\) JS, v122, pp. 3072.
whereas Xiao Zixian came from the Qi and Liang royal family. Obviously, it was their obligation as well as in their political self-interest to defend the Southern dynasties as having received the Mandate of Heaven and to degrade the rulers of their Northern rivals as the "rope-head caitiffs" (suolu) or the Wei "caitiffs" (Weilu).

With the ascendancy of the Tang dynasty, the canon of "Standard Histories" for the Period of Division was filled in, partly by adopting existing histories including the Weishu, for the north, and the Songsu and Nan Qishu, for the south, and partly by compiling new histories, including the Jinshu (already discussed), the Bei Qishu, Zhoushu, Zhou's book and Suishu for the north and the Liangshu and Chenshu for the south. Except in the case of the Jinshu where there was no problem in adopting the view that the sixteen "barbarian" kingdoms of the north were illegitimate, the question of ascribing legitimacy only to southern or northern regimes was on the whole avoided. The Weishu, with its claim of legitimacy for the north, and the Songsu and Nan Qishu, which claimed legitimacy for the south, were both accepted. The later histories of both southern and northern dynasties were written from their own separate points of view.

Perhaps this recognition by Tang historians can best be explained by pointing to the fact that it was in their own political self-interest to do so. The Tang dynasty was established following Sui, whose founder, Yang Jian, was a Han Chinese official in the Northern Zhou. The royal house of Tang had close relations, through marriages, with the non-Chinese rulers of the Northern dynasties, and Tang officials came from various earlier different regimes. Tang unification of both north and south, and the consolidation of its rule, needed a unified legitimating theory acceptable to all.

But although Li Yanshou was very careful not to use degrading terms in his wording of the "History of the Northern dynasties" (Beishi) and the "History of the Southern Dynasties" (Nanshi), he used the word beng for the death of the emperors of the north, and the word cu for the death of the emperors of the south.
This may show that Li considered the southern rulers had a lower status, thus holding the Northern dynasties as legitimate.

Among the Chinese scholars in the Sui, Tang, and Song periods we find basically three different opinions concerning the legitimacy of the Northern dynasties:

1) Non-Chinese regimes were as legitimate as native ones as long as they cherished native Chinese culture and preserved it for prosperity.

2) The Tuoba Wei were "barbarians" who did not practice propriety and righteousness. Their rule was, therefore, illegitimate.

3) Legitimacy was always a variable depending on whether one did or did not rule over a unified empire. Any regime, be it Chinese or non-Chinese, which did not rule over the whole empire was illegitimate.\textsuperscript{110}

The Persistence of the Tribute System in Former Qin

In spite of continuous wars, turmoil, and the emergence and collapse of different regimes in the frequently changing situation, great importance was attached to the tribute system with its implications of hierarchical relationship of suzerain and subordinate. Both Chinese and non-Chinese rulers valued the tribute system as a basis for their dealing with other peoples, particularly because the smooth working of the system would enhance their prestige as Son of Heaven, enabling them to obtain considerable economic benefits through trade. Even though they might fail to impose one centralized government over China, the different regimes tried to develop the system within, and for the benefit of, their own territory.

After the non-Chinese had established their states, along with Chinese political institutions they also adopted the tribute system, particularly the practice of political

investiture and requests for tribute in their conduct with other peoples, who were in a weak position relative to them. One of the many examples is in the case the Former Qin state (351-394).

During his rule, Fu Jian of Former Qin adopted several measures learned from the Chinese in dealing with other non-Chinese. In 359 Weichen, the Wise King of the Left of the Southern Xiongnu, surrendered to Fu Jian, and asked for permission to occupy land in the interior of China. In agreeing, Fu Jian alluded to an incident in the Chunqiu period in which the Chinese state of Jin made an alliance with the Rong "barbarians" on its borders. This shows that he was deliberately adopting the role of a Chinese emperor, and treating the Southern Xiongnu as "barbarians."

After Fu Jian won control over Liangzhou in 376, Qin envoys were sent to the Western Regions and more than ten states came to pay tribute. The luxuries obtained from these tributaries were used to decorate Fu Jian's palace in order to show his power. Kings of Shanshan and Nearer Jushi went in person to the court to pay homage.

Around 382, kings of Nearer Jushi and Shanshan arrived again to pay homage to Fu Jian. They are recorded as having asked to send tribute annually. Fu Jian ordered them to pay tribute every three years and to appear in person every nine years. In the following year Qin sent troops to the Western Regions in order to bring all the oasis states under Qin's control. The campaign ended in the conquest of thirty-six states in the region and in the capture of a great amount of precious goods. The motivation of Fu Jian in the campaign may have been a combination of personal

---

111 *WS*, v95, p. 2055; *JS*, v113, p. 2887.
112 *JS*, v113, p. 2900.
113 *JS*, v113, p. 2904.
114 *JS*, v114, p. 2911.
116 *JS*, v114, p. 2923.
ambition and a sort of what Mather calls "benevolent imperialism" and various other factors,\(^{117}\) but among them there was certainly one of consolidating his legitimacy as a Chinese emperor.

**The Tribute System in the Northern and Southern Dynasties**

In the period of the Northern-Southern dynasties when both sides needed to win the support of the non-Chinese in their competition with each other for supremacy, it was particularly important to attract non-Chinese peoples into the tributary relationship, and to keep the system flourishing. Many embassies were despatched to foreign lands to establish peaceful relations. The system of investiture with titles of nobility and offices as part of the tribute system developed with more titles being provided to the non-Chinese rulers together with rich imperial gifts, since these political and economic benefits would entice them to come and enter into a symbolic position of subordination to the Son of Heaven. Moreover, the tribute system would also enable the suzerain to obtain actual military support from tributaries. For example, in 439 Emperor Wen of Song (re. 424-453) decided to attack Northern Wei. He ordered the Korean state of Koguryō (Gaogouli in Chinese), which was considered a tributary of Song, to send horses and eight hundred horses duly arrived.\(^{118}\)

The non-Chinese in turn were provided with opportunities to take advantage of the competition by playing off these two powers against each other. Some of them, such as Koguryō, Paekche (Baiji in Chinese, also a Korean state), Tuyuhun (in modern Qinghai), and states in the Western Regions, kept tributary relationships with both the Northern and Southern dynasties out of consideration for

\(^{117}\) Mather, R. B. 1959, pp. 2-6.
\(^{118}\) SS, v97, p. 2393.
their own interests, sending envoys continuously in order to obtain political and economic benefits.

Between the Northern and Southern dynasties, diplomatic activities continued while wars went on. The two regimes had their different views on these communications. In the accordance with the claim of legitimacy the Weishu records the missions from the Southern regimes as coming to pay tribute to Northern Wei. However, these communications are either not recorded or recorded in a different wording as equal diplomatic activities in the Songshu and Nan Qishu, which were compiled in the Southern dynasties.

For example, chapter 97, the Biography of Liu Yu 刘裕, the founder of the Song dynasty, in the Weishu records thirty-one tributary missions from Song during the fifty-nine years of the Song dynasty. Under the year 420 it says that Song requested peaceful communication several times, which Wei permitted. The following year Song despatched Shen Fan 沈范 and Suo Jisun 薛季孫 to pay a court-visit to Wei with tribute, chaogong 朝貢 in Chinese.119 Another record says that in 430 Song sent Tian Qi 田奇 to pay a court-visit with tribute.120

In contrast, in recording the mission of 421, the Songshu says that after Liu Yu's victory over Wei in 417, Wei sent envoys to seek peace. From then on communications were kept up annually. Song under Liu Yu despatched Shen Fan and Suo Jisun to "return the embassy" (baoshi 報使) to Wei.121 For the one in 430 the Songshu records that Song sent Tian Qi to deliver a message to Wei.122 Chapter 95, the Account of Suolu (i.e. Northern Wei), records the mutual communications between the South and North as between equals.123 However, in the basic annals of

119 WS, v97, p. 2134.
120 WS, v97, p. 2136.
121 SS, v95, p. 2322.
122 SS, v95, p. 2331.
123 SS, v95, p. 2334.
the *Songshu*, two missions from Wei of 469 and 471 are recorded as "Caitiff (suolu) despatched envoys to present (xian) local products," implying the payment of tribute.\(^{124}\) The *Weishu* does not record these two missions.

Tang historians' writing on the Northern and Southern dynasties did not use the word "to come to pay a court-visit with tribute" (chaogong) or other terms with the same meaning, as often as their predecessors. While in the basic annals of the *Weishu* twenty-eight missions from Song are recorded as having to come to pay tribute, Li Yanshou, in the basic annals of Wei in the *Beishi*, describes most of the missions as "the people of Song coming for a visit (Songren lai pin)." There are, however, two exceptions. One passage written in 433 says:

The people of Song came for a visit, 'presenting' (xian) a trained elephant.

The other in 450 says:

Envoys from Song Emperor Wen presented a hecatomb, offered (gong) local products, and requested a daughter in marriage for the Imperial Grandson in order to seek peace.\(^{125}\)

In describing other missions travelling between the North and South, Li Yanshou, in the basic annals of either the *Beishi* or *Nanshi*, uses the expression "people [of so and so] came for a visit."

Generally speaking, the word *chao* in the sense of paying a court-visit was used by traditional Chinese historians, 1) when feudal lords or foreign rulers went to the Son of Heaven in spring,\(^{126}\) and 2) when rulers of small states went to visit rulers of large ones.\(^{127}\) They also used the word *pin*, in the sense of inquiry or visit, in two

\(^{124}\) SS, v8, p. 165; p. 168.
\(^{125}\) BS, v2, p. 48; p. 61.
\(^{127}\) Zuozhuan (Cheng 12), 377::378; Zhouli Zhushu, "Daxingren," p. 1343; Guliangzhuan, Huan 9/4. A survey of the the Combined Concordances to Ch'un-Ch'iu, Kung-yang, Ku-liang and Tso-chuan in
different contexts: 1) when envoys were sent by feudal lords to visit the Son of Heaven, and 2) when feudal lords visited each other. Li Yanshou, in both Beishi and Nanshi, uses the word pin for both parties, intending thereby to avoid making one side superior to the other. But it remains a question as to why he retained the usage of "presenting" (xian) and "offering" (gong) in the above two cases. One possible reason for his describing the Song mission as xian in 450 might be because at the beginning of that year Song launched a major military campaign against Wei but suffered a heavy loss. Song therefore sent a peace-seeking mission to Wei, which considered that act a surrender.

Other Tang historians showed the same caution when dealing with the diplomatic activity between the South and North. The basic annals of the Liangshu and Chenshu compiled in Tang describe the envoys from the North to the South as "coming for a visit" (lai pin).

The Bei Qishu, compiled in Tang, record the missions from Liang as "paying tribute" (gong) but, since the tributary missions started in 550, this may simply reflect the fact that Liang was then undergoing an internal crisis caused mainly by an internal rebellion. Members of the royal family were struggling for support from outside by seeking to become dependents, or even subjects, of Qi. The Beishi and the Zhoushu, compiled in Tang, also record the Liang's missions to Qi and Zhou as "tributary." Their opinion seems to be based on the fact that Liang became a dependent of Qi and Zhou.

Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Index shows whenever chao is used to indicate a visit between feudal states, it is an envoy from the smaller state that is visiting the larger one.

130 See the basic annals of the BQS.
The Challenge of the Nomads to the Northern Dynasties

After the nomadic Xianbei people had settled down and established dynastic rule over the agricultural Chinese, they were gradually sinicized and lost the advantage their earlier nomadic life-style had given them in warfare. During their rule, the period of the Northern dynasties, the different rulers had to adopt the heqin policy when confronted with threatening nomadic rivals like the Rouran (or Ruru) and the Tujue Turks. Under the conditions of a heqin agreement, it was the Northern regimes which paid tribute to these nomads although it was delivered in the name of gifts.

At the beginning of the fifth century a nomadic people, the Rouran, rose as a vigorous power, extending their rule over the Mongolian steppes and Manchuria. Like the Xiongnu in the Han period, they became a fierce adversary of the Northern dynasties. The policy of the Northern dynasties towards them varied with the changing situation, but heqin remained a major means. In 429 Northern Wei launched a military campaign against the Rouran, who were defeated and weakened. In order to maintain peaceful relations as well as to consolidate the victory, Wei sent Princess Xihai in 434 to wed the qaghan of the Rouran while the emperor himself married the qaghan's younger sister. However, in 506 when the Rouran were further weakened and asked Wei for a peace agreement, Wei insisted that the Rouran could only expect to become Wei subjects and not expect to conclude a peace agreement.

In 524 when Wei faced the internal disorders caused by the rebellion of the Six Garrisons, the Rouran helped suppress the rebellion. To show gratitude, in 528 Wei issued an edict granting privileged treatment to the qaghan. His personal name was not to be used when he was announced at the court, and he personally was not expected to

refer to himself as "subject" when presenting documents. In 533 Wei permitted the marriage of Princess Langya to the qaghan's son.133

The marriage, however, did not take place because in 534 Northern Wei split into two: Eastern Wei and Western Wei. Enfeebled by their struggles with each other, both sides competed to conclude a marriage alliance with the Rouran so that they would be able to maintain peace on their borders as well as concentrate their efforts against each other and against their southern enemies.

Western Wei entered into two marriage alliances with the Rouran. In 535 Princess Huazheng went to wed the brother of Anagui Qaghan. Following the death of his empress, Emperor Wen of the Western Wei (re. 535-551) requested the Rouran for a marriage contract. Since at the time they were attempting to form an alliance with Eastern Wei, the Rouran initially did not show much interest in the request. Emperor Wen then sent another mission, this time with rich gifts, and finally secured a marriage with qaghan's daughter who became empress in 538.134

Eastern Wei concluded three marriages with the Rouran. In 541 a princess was sent to wed the qaghan's son. In 542 Anagui Qaghan asked to send his grand-daughter to wed the minister Gao Huan's son. Wei agreed.135 Apprehensive of the strong Rouran and their possible joint attacks with Western Wei, Gao Huan requested a Rouran princess for another son. But Anagui replied that it would only be permissible for Gao himself to wed his daughter. Gao Huan agreed after hesitation. The marriage proceeded in 545.136 These marriages succeeded in maintaining peace on the borders, and in posing some threat to Western Wei.

133 WS, v103, pp. 2302-03; BS, v98, p. 3263-64.
134 ZS, v33, p. 571; BS, v13, p. 507; v98, p. 3264.
135 WS, v103, p. 2303; BS, v8, p. 281; v98, p. 3265.
136 This is according to the BS, v9, p. 124; BS, v14, pp. 517-518. In the WS, v103 (p. 2303) and the BS, v98 (p. 3265), the marriage is only recorded as that in 546 Anagui asked to sent his favorable daughter to wed Gao Huan.
The competition between Northern Qi (formerly Eastern Wei) and Northern Zhou (formerly Western Wei) to win the support from the Tujue Turks is another example showing how these sinicized non-Chinese rulers would not insist on their claim to superiority when circumstances made it impossible. They tried to placate the Turks through alliances, both marital and military, and by acceding to their often unreasonable trading terms. Even though the various visits from the Turks are still recorded as tributary missions, a thinly veiled fiction by which the Turks were made to appear proper subjects, in reality, the Turks were speaking from a position of power, taking what they chose.\footnote{Moses, L. W. 1976, p. 66.}

The Tujue Turks became powerful in the mid-sixth century (see Map 3). Previously they are said to have been blacksmith slaves of the Rouran. Having broken away from the latter they turned to Western Wei for support. In 551 Western Wei consented to send a princess to wed Tumen \(\text{Tumen Tumen}\) (Bumin) Qaghan.\footnote{ZS, v50, p. 908; BS, v99, pp. 3286-87.} To Western Wei the marriage was viewed as a successful alliance with an enemy of the Rouran.

After 552 when the Turks won a crucial victory over the Rouran, they asked Western Wei to help execute all the Rouran refugees, a grisly task which Western Wei carried out. In the reign of Emperor Gong of Western Wei (554-556), Muhan Qaghan promised to marry his daughter to Yuwen Tai, who held the real power in the state at that time. Although the marriage did not take place because of Tai's death, the qaghan did agree to send another daughter to wed Tai's son Yuwen Yong. The marriage was again put off because Northern Qi also tried to conclude a marriage alliance with the Turks by offering more gifts, and the Turks then wanted to break their promise. The Western Wei did not, however, give up in their attempt to make the Turks an ally. In 561, when Yuwen Yong (re. 561-578) came to the throne
as emperor of Northern Zhou, he despatched several missions to the Turks. Finally he succeeded in securing a marriage alliance and getting the Turks to join in two military campaigns against Qi in the following years.\textsuperscript{139} In 568 the Turkish princess arrived to take up the position of empress of Yuwen Yong. In the following reigns of emperors she was shown great favor and given honorific titles.\textsuperscript{140}

The marriage arrangement between Zhou, the successor state to Western Wei, and nomads was severely criticized by the Tang historian Linghu Defen, who said that Zhou, abandoned those of their own kind and went to aliens, mixed barbarians with Chinese, abandoned the proper rules and order of marriage and sought external benefits from wolves. After a while those [of the Chinese] who paid [the bride-price] became wearied, but those who gave [the bride] were never satisfied. What was once called \textit{heqin} before long resulted in enmity.\textsuperscript{141}

Nevertheless, Northern Zhou made great efforts to maintain the alliance with the Turks, preventing them from invading by making an annual payment of silk products and by extending favorable treatment to their envoys in the Zhou capital. In 579 Zhou promised a princess in marriage to Tabo (Taspar) Qaghan of the Turks.\textsuperscript{142} The marriage alliance worked in so far as it freed Zhou from worrying about the security of the northern frontiers, and, as a strategy to gain Zhou time so that under its successors, the cause of unification was completed.

Northern Qi at first seemed to stick to the pro-Rouran policy against the Turks. It soon changed, however, as the situation deteriorated. In 552, defeated by the Turks, Anagui Qaghan of the Rouran committed suicide. His son Anluochen and his cousin led their followers in flight to Qi. The following year saw

\textsuperscript{139} ZS, v33, p. 571; v50, pp. 910-911; BS, v99, p. 3289.
\textsuperscript{140} ZS, v9, p. 144.
\textsuperscript{141} ZS, v9, p. 149.
\textsuperscript{142} ZS, v50, pp. 911-912; BS, v99, p. 3290.
Northern Qi launch a successful military attack against the Turks and Yanluochen was established as qaghan. Yanluochen soon turned against Qi, however, and Qi thereupon abandoned the attempt to ally itself to the Rouran.\textsuperscript{143}

Qi turned to the Turks and requested a marriage alliance around 555. Though Qi did not succeed, mainly because of interference from Zhou, communications with the Turks were established and this maintained a state of affairs, which posed a continuing threat to Zhou. Worried by the prospect of Turkish invasion, Qi also had to pay a heavy price for peace, "emptying their storehouses to supply the Turks."

Boasting of his power, Taspar Qaghan was quoted saying:

As long as my two sons in the south remain filial and obedient why should I be worried about lack of goods?\textsuperscript{144}

Like the early Han rulers, the Northern Qi and Zhou could only restrain their nomadic neighbors from making incursions, to a certain degree, by paying regular tribute which cost them a great deal, not only in economic terms but also in political dignity.

Conclusion

The tribute system, rooted in the Late Shang and Zhou political systems, was formulated and held as an ideal model in regulating relations between the Son of Heaven and his subjects, Chinese and non-Chinese, in such Confucian classics as the \textit{Zhouli} and \textit{Liji}. Two key principles can be distinguished as underlying the tribute system: "the king leaves nothing and nobody outside his realm" (\textit{wangzhe wuwei}), and "having the various states of Xia within, and keeping the Yi and Di barbarians out" (\textit{nei wu})

\textsuperscript{143} BS, v98, pp. 3266-67.
\textsuperscript{144} ZS, v50, p. 911; BS, v99, pp. 3289-90. Cen Zhongmian has the opinion that the word \textit{wu} (here translated as "goods") should refer to silk products. See Cen Zhongmian. 1958, pp. 8-9.
The first one represented the ideological purity of China's foreign policy and provided justification for Chinese expansion. The second one stressed practicality and flexibility and was utilized to emphasize border defence.

The Han dynasty contributed to the development of the tribute system through the institutionalization of tributary practices and their systematic application in foreign relations. Generally, Han established five types of relations with other states, which can be grouped into three concentric circles, with a zone of direct control at center, a zone of diplomatic control in the middle, and an outermost zone on the periphery free of any Chinese control. The concentric circles can also be seen as territorial, hegemonic and universal circles, embracing "all-under-heaven."

From the Chinese point of view, the working of the tribute system functioned to maintain a modicum of peace and security on the frontiers and to prove the benevolent rule of the emperor, thus justifying his legitimacy and possession of the Mandate of Heaven, since the legitimacy of the Son of Heaven within China was bound up with the fiction that he was a world ruler.

The non-Chinese, on the other hand, no doubt held a different point of view in regard to the tribute system. They accepted the practices laid down by the system basically because they could gain political, economic and military benefits from it and use them to enhance their own military, economic and moral power.

In the Period of Division, disunity challenged the idea of universal kingship, the basic conception in the Chinese world order. Different regimes competed with each other for legitimacy as the single ruler over China and all utilized the tribute system to strengthen their own legitimacy, thus making the tribute system sustain and play an important role.

Another severe challenge to the tribute system came from the nomadic powers of the Rouran and the Turks, who greatly threatened the security of the Northern dynasties. Policy measures towards them varied with the changing situation, but
"marriage alliance" (*heqin*) remained a major means. Under the conditions of *heqin* agreement, even though some of the visits from the nomads are still recorded as tributary missions, it was virtually the Northern regimes which paid tribute to these nomads.
Chapter II

Sui-Tang Relations with the Tujue Turks: the Policy of Settlement

In 581 Yang Jian, a Chinese official of Northern Zhou, received the abdication of the child Emperor Jing of the Northern Zhou, thus inaugurating the Sui dynasty. In 589, with the Sui conquest of Chen -- the Southern regime -- China was once again unified under a centralized state power and had to face the perennial problem of the nomadic threat from the north. In this chapter, we shall discuss how they faced this challenge from the Tujue Turks (hereafter referred to as Turks), especially the Chinese policy of settlement of the Turks who had submitted.

Traditional Chinese Measures to Deal with the Nomads

Even in early Zhou, "barbarian" invasions were a major headache for the Chinese. It was a perennial northern frontier problem throughout imperial times. The famous debate, in 81 B.C.E. during the Han dynasty, over the salt and iron monopoly policy reflected the dilemma China faced with regard to the nomadic Xiongnu people frequently raiding and devastating Chinese territory. The effort required to build up defences or to launch attacks exhausted the Chinese and imposed heavy strains on the economy. Even though these strains caused internal disturbances such measures were required or else the forays and depredations never ceased.\(^1\)

From early times, the Chinese discussed, argued about, and finally advocated various ways to treat the non-Chinese or "barbarians." They worked out different measures to prevent nomadic incursions, which have been surveyed comprehensively

---

\(^1\) Cf. *Yan Tie Lun Jiaozhu* and Gale, E. M. 1931.
by Lien-sheng Yang and Wang Gungwu. The salient points of these measures are as follows.

1) Aggressive military measures to defend or expand Chinese territory. Qin Shihuangdi and Emperor Wu of the Han carried out expansive military campaigns on these justifications: the Son of Heaven was to rule all-under-heaven, Chinese culture could convert other people to a higher civilization, and the Son of Heaven had to use military force to protect his people from disturbance and to consolidate centralized power. The Han Chinese openly expressed these ideas. In the debate on the Han salt and iron monopoly policy, Sang Hongyang, the Censor-in-chief (yushi dafu), who was a Legalist statesman, insisted:

When the Sage Ruler engages in expansion it is not for the sake of his private gains; when he uses military force it is just because he is enraged. They (expansion and military force) are the means by which he is to relieve disaster and avoid harm, thereby using farsighted thought on behalf of the common people.3

As well, frontier expansions could bring wealth, profit and goods China did not have, such as horses. The "censor" (yushi) in the debate said, as a result of the expansion of Emperor Wu, that

precious novelties and foreign articles fill the Inner Palace, and fleet-footed palfreys and chargers pack the Outer Stables. Every common man can ride a fine mount, and the people feast to satiety upon oranges and pumaloes. This shows what affluence the profit derived from the frontier commandeering has brought.4

2) The adoption of a defensive attitude in order to draw a distinguishing line between Chinese and non-Chinese. This is the policy of "having all the Chinese within

---

3 Yan Tie Lun Jiaozhu, v8, "Jiehe," p. 287.
and keeping all the barbarians out." The Han historian Ban Gu, an orthodox
Confucianist, expressed this attitude through his analyses of "barbarian" problems.
Discussing the issues within the framework of the five-zone system, he said that the
"barbarians" were outer people and therefore, "Sage Kings" (shengwang) of the ancient
time reared them like birds and beasts, neither making treaties with, nor attacking them.
Based on precedents, Ban concluded that if one made treaties with the non-Chinese one
would waste the gifts and be deceived; if one attacked them, one would weary one's
army and invite invasions. Since their land could not be ploughed and made to produce
food and since one could not keep their people as subjects, Sage Kings kept them at a
distance and did not enter into close relationships with them. Ban Gu concluded the
way the Sage Kings treated "barbarians" was thus: government and instructions did not
reach their people, and the correct calendar was not applied to their country. When the
"barbarians" came to invade, the Sage Rulers punished and resisted them and prepared
for and guarded against them when they left. If, attracted by China's civilization, they
came to offer tribute, the Sage Kings would treat them with courtesy and keep them
under loose rein without severing the relationship, so that the blame of being crooked
would always be on them.5

3) The attitude of appeasement. This was adopted in order to bring the non-
Chinese into a peaceful relationship. An alliance would then be forged with one party
against the other so as to divide and rule, i.e., to use "barbarians" against "barbarians."
Measures introduced under this broad category include diplomatic missions for the
maintenance and expansion of communications, peace agreements, political or
matrimonial alliances, establishment of kinship relationships, political investiture and,
finally, mutual trade under the framework of the tribute system and in border markets.
The Chinese sometimes actively adopted such means in order to attract non-Chinese

5 HS, v94B, p. 3834. Part of the translation is from Yang Lien-sheng. 1968, p. 23.
into an alliance or to bring them into the tribute system. Sometimes, however, when China was weak and the balance of power had tipped in favor of the nomads, such measures were forced upon the Chinese. There were even occasions when China was forced to pay tribute to the nomads in order to have peace on the frontiers.

4) Sinicization. The Chinese also attempted peaceful persuasion encouraging the spread of Chinese culture to their neighbors in order to convert them to Chinese ways. Whether conscious or not, this translated into a cultural expansion and incorporation of non-Chinese into the Chinese empire. The general spread of Chinese culture was seen not only in the implementation of the Chinese administrative system on the non-Chinese in the south, southwest and east where agriculture was a major way of life, but also in the resettlement of the submitted nomads on Chinese land. This resettlement policy was actively adopted in Later Han. It worked effectively, given the particular circumstances at that time, but later, in the view of Chinese historians in later imperial times, it led to a dark era, the catastrophe of the establishment of non-Chinese regimes inside China.

In Western Jin, Guo Qin, with foresight, urged the removal of the non-Chinese who had settled within the Great Wall since Han. He could see the danger of what soon actually happened when the non-Chinese rebelled and overthrew the Western Jin regime.6

Jiang Tong of the same period also expressed his concern and objections to the settlement of non-Chinese inside the Great Wall. In his essay "On the migration of the Rong" (Xi Rong Lun 從戎論) he argued that the Rong and Di (referring to the nomads) were the most greedy and ferocious among the four "barbarians," and that they submitted only when weak and rebelled when strong, so even the Sage Kings were unable to extend civilization to them and lead them to the

---

proper path. In later Zhou, he said, some Chinese states had invited the "barbarians" to enter China and had appeased them in order to use them. The result of this was that disasters had occurred. However, from Han to Wei (of the Three Kingdoms), the Chinese had resettled even more "barbarians" inside China in order to employ their military forces which caused even more troubles. He urged that the Jin emperor move the "barbarians" outside China before they could accumulate strength and rise in revolt. His advice, however, did not receive much attention.7

Jiang Tong was correct in realizing that, in Chinese relations with the nomads, there existed a constant pattern. When the nomads were strong they challenged Chinese superiority and threatened their security; when they were weak they submitted to China and requested Chinese assistance in order that they could recover and accumulate their strength. Chinese rulers, themselves caught in the weaving of this pattern, would accept the submission of the nomads with the aim of utilizing their considerable military force. But Jiang Tong failed to see another important aspect of the settlement policy. In fact it was often the case that the Chinese rulers could not afford to refuse the "submission" and subsequent resettlement, particularly when it was less costly than engaging in wars for the purpose of keeping peace on the frontiers. In that manner they could buy a period when internal order would prevail. Besides, the "submission" proved that that the rule of the Son of Heaven was benevolent and virtuous, a factor that served to strengthen the legitimacy of the Son of Heaven.

In Sui-Tang relations with the Turks, the Chinese adopted all the above measures designed to solve, or alleviate, frontier problems caused by the nomads, including the resettlement into the Chinese empire of Turks who had submitted. This policy is the focus of this chapter.

7 JS, v56, pp. 1529-34,
The Internal Conflicts among the Turks

The first Turkish empire started with Bumin Qaghan in 552 and split, in 583, into two qaghanates, the East and the West, both hostile to each other. In 581, with China entering a turning period in its history with the establishment of Sui, the Turks also faced their turning point: the death of Taspar Qaghan. His death set off a suicidal power struggle among the Turks which tipped the balance of power between the Chinese and the nomads in favor of the former.

The Turks inhabited an extensive territory covering the steppes on the Mongol Plateau, Central Asia and the oasis states. Centralized rule was, therefore, very difficult. In 552, Bumin established his rule as Yili Qaghan. His younger brother Shidianmi (Istami) ruled west of Altai as the chief of the western part of the empire from 562 to 576. The supreme ruling power was delegated peacefully, from 553 to 572, among the sons of Yili Qaghan. On the death of Taspar, however, conflict broke out.

The Turkish empire was at that time organized in a form of a feudal system. Shabolue (Ishbara) Shetu Qaghan, as supreme ruler, had his headquarters in the Ötükän Mountains. Anluo, the son of Taspar, was enfeoffed in the territory in the basin of Tula River, called the Second Qaghan. Daluobian the Abo Qaghan occupied the territory northwest of the Ötükän Mountains and east of Altai. His headquarters were known as the northern headquarters. Istâmi's son Dianjue, called Datou Qaghan, had his headquarters in what was formerly the land of the Wusun. East of the steppes lived the Xi, Xi and Khitan people, ruled by Ishbara's younger

---

8 Concerning the chronology of the Turkish rulers, see Table 2.1. "Turkish Rulers." For the location of some important places, see Map 4.
brother Chuluohou, called Tuli (Tölish) Qaghan. In addition, there were other minor qaghans. Each of them had his own military capability, a state of affairs which was the source of continual rivalry and competition for power. On the surface they maintained unity but beneath the surface there were suspicion and ill feelings. There was an additional element that led to instability: the various groups of people conquered and ruled by the Turks were living under heavy oppression and being nomads themselves, these people were quick to rise in revolt when the opportunity presented itself.

When Sui established its power, it soon made a correct assessment of the contemporary situation. This assessment concluded: 1) In the past both Northern Zhou and Northern Qi had been contending against each other and had divided north China between them. Both had communications with the Turks, not only because they feared a powerful enemy, but also because they hoped to decrease the burden of frontier defence on one of their borders by enlisting the support of the Turks. It was with that aim in mind that both had emptied their stores to supply the Turks. 2) The Turkish rulers were now competing among themselves. Their neighbors and their own subordinate tribes were all waiting for an opportunity to launch attacks or to rise in revolt. 3) Furthermore the Turks had themselves to face a series of natural disasters, which greatly weakened their power.

The Sui Victory over the Turks

In the light of this assessment the Sui dynasty departed in various ways from the manner in which the Northern dynasties had conducted their relations with the

---

Turks. The first major step was Emperor Wen's abolition of the payment of silk products to the Turks.

The change of attitude made Ishbara Qaghan feel humiliated. His wife, the Northern Zhou Princess Qianjin 青金, also resented Sui and wanted to use Turkish forces to take revenge for Sui usurpation of the throne from the Zhou house. In spite of their weakening power, however, the Turks still mounted constant incursions into Chinese territory.

Emperor Wen insisted on meeting these incursions with a firm defence. This new, more defiant attitude was demonstrated by the stiff military resistance to the Turkish invaders by Chinese troops. The emperor also implemented two other measures: a) He built up and re-enforced frontier defences. On three occasions, in 581, 586, and 587, Sui improved the defences along the Great Wall on the northern frontiers. And b) he took advantage of the conflicts among the Turks to implement a policy of divide and rule.

The major architect of the second policy was Zhangsun Cheng 長孫晟, who had stayed with the Turks for more than a year when he went on a mission to escort Princess Qianjin to the Turks at the end of Northern Zhou. At that time he had obtained first-hand information about the Turks' internal situation, a situation which suggested deep internal divisions. In 581 he suggested the policy of playing off the Turkish qaghans against each other. In accordance with the principle of making alliance with the far and attacking the near and abandoning the strong and joining the weak, he advised Emperor Wen to make Ishbara the striking target and to ally Sui with other qaghans.

---

12 _SUIS_, v84, pp. 1865-66; _BS_, v99, p. 3291; _ZZTJ_, v175, p. 5450.
13 _SUIS_, v1, p. 15; p. 23; p. 25; Cen Zhongmian. 1958, v2, p. 58.
14 _SUIS_, v51, pp. 1329-31; _ZZTJ_, v175, pp. 5450-51.
The policy was soon put into practice. Embassies were sent to the other qaghans,\(^{15}\) and some results were achieved. In 582, when Ishbara led a large army to attack and plunder the Sui frontier, his plans to penetrate further south were abandoned when Datou Qaghan refused to follow him and left. Zhangsun Cheng persuaded Tölish Qaghan to make a false report to Ishbara that Tiele and other tribes had revolted and were going to attack his headquarters. Anticipating trouble Ishbara retreated.\(^{16}\)

The year 583 saw a major Sui military campaign against the Turks. The aim, as stated in an edict, was not to incorporate the Turks, only to extend Sui control up to the frontiers, thereby building up firm defences and barriers on the border passes and stopping the Turks from coming down to the south.\(^{17}\) Zhangsun Cheng continued to work on the qaghans. He succeeded in persuading Abo, who had suffered several defeats in battles with Sui, to stop his incursions. Abo then sent an embassy to the Sui court.

When Ishbara heard of Abo's double-dealing he attacked Abo’s headquarters and killed his mother. With the assistance of Datou, Abo retaliated and recovered his territory. Tanhan Qaghan 貳汗, who had formerly had a peaceful relationship with Abo, was deprived of his position by Ishbara and took refuge at Datou's place. Ishbara's younger brother Diqincha 地勤察 also rebelled and went to Abo. Each of these qaghans, now being weakened, sent envoys to Sui, suing for peace and requesting Sui military assistance, but Emperor Wen refused.\(^{18}\) The Eastern and Western Turks became open rivals with the Eastern qaghanate headed by Ishbara and the Western qaghanate headed by Datou, Abo, Tanhan and Diqincha.\(^{19}\)

\(^{15}\) SUIS, v51, p. 1331; ZZTJ, v175, p. 5451.
\(^{16}\) SUIS, v51, p. 1331; ZZTJ, v175, pp. 5456-59.
\(^{17}\) SUIS, v84, pp. 1866-67; BS, v99, pp. 3291-92; ZZTJ, v175, pp. 5462-63.
\(^{18}\) SUIS, v51, pp. 1331-32; v84, pp. 1867-68; BS, v99, pp. 3292-93; TD, v197, p. 1068; ZZTJ, v175, pp. 5463-65.
\(^{19}\) Ma Changshou. 1957, pp. 26-27.
Ishbara Qaghan of the Eastern Turks under Sui Hegemonic Rule

With the two Turkish qaghanates in a state of open warfare, there came a turning point in Chinese relations with the Turks. In 584 Ishbara decided to make peace with Sui, and his wife Princess Qianjin asked to change her surname to Yang, the Sui royal family name, as a gesture of submission. Yang Guang (楊廣), the future Emperor Yang, proposed that Sui should seize the opportunity to attack the Turks, but Emperor Wen, ever cautious, followed his usual course in relations with the nomads and chose to assist Ishbara Qaghan. For an overview of the geographical locations of various places at that time, see Map 4.

Unlike the situation towards the end of Former Han, however, when Huhanxie Chanyu of the Xiongnu went in person to the Han court to make peace with the Chinese, thus marking the end of the period of constant incursions into Han territory, Ishbara Qaghan had never paid any court-visit. Sui for its part, not as strong as Han, had yet to accomplish the unification of China. Ishbara, therefore, in his request for a peace settlement in 584, insisted on an equal footing with the Chinese. In his words:

Our sheep and horses are the emperor’s domestic livestock, and your silk products are our property. There is no difference between you and us.

Nevertheless, the Sui envoy managed to demonstrate Chinese superiority by persuading the qaghan to perform the kowtow when he received the sealed letter from Emperor Wen, and to accept the status of vassal of the Chinese emperor.²⁰

Having accepted Ishbara as an outer subject under his hegemonic rule, Emperor Wen, as a suzerain, took on the responsibility of assisting Ishbara politically, economically and militarily. In exchange he was able to use the Eastern Turks for

---
frontier defence, particularly as a deterrent force against the Western Turks. Then, in 585, when Ishbara was faced with repeated incursions from Datou of the Western Turks and from the Khitan, he requested permission to emigrate to the south of the Gobi Desert, to Baidaochuan outside the Great Wall. Sui permitted this, and sent troops to assist him, providing food, and clothing, carriages, uniforms, and drums and flutes for military music.

Ishbara, now strengthened, launched a successful attack against Abo. When his people were attacked by the Apar (Apar) tribe, upon Ishbara's request Sui troops were sent in and inflicted a defeat upon the Apar.21

It was after this victory that Ishbara presented a letter formally abandoning equal status, recognizing himself as a Sui vassal and offering to send hostages and annual tribute to the Sui court. Still he expressed the wish to maintain his own culture, that is, not to change the Turkish dress, hairstyle and language. Greatly pleased at this turn of events, Emperor Wen, in his edict, claimed that China and the Turks were no longer two countries bound by a peace agreement but that the relationship was now one of unity between a ruler and subject. He ordered that the news be spread widely throughout the country and that a ceremony be held at the ancestral temple to announce the Turkish submission. The honorable treatment of not directly referring to his personal name in any official document was granted to Ishbara. Princess Qianjin was given the Yang surname and the title of Princess Dayi. The titles of the Pillar of State (zhuguo) and of Duke Who Pacifies the Country (anguogong) were conferred on Ishbara's son.22

In their relations with the Eastern Turks, the Chinese followed ceremonial practices under the tribute system. In 586 the Sui calendar was introduced to the

---

21 SUIS, v54, 1368; v84, p. 1869; BS, v99, p. 3294; ZJTJ, v176, p. 5482.
22 SUIS, v84, pp. 1869-70; BS, v99, pp. 3294-95; TD, v197, p. 1068; ZJTJ, v176, p. 5483. The SUIS and the BS record that the change of the name of Princess Qianjin was in 585 while the following sources record it as in 584. Cf. SUIS, v51, p. 1332; ZJTJ, v176, pp. 5475-76; CFYG, v974, p. 11440.
Turks, as a symbol of their acceptance of Chinese rule. In the following year, the Chinese agreed to Ishbara's request to hunt in the Heng and Dai commanderries. When Ishbara died in 587, the Sui court business was suspended for three days for mourning while an embassy was despatched to express condolences.

The Eastern Turks under Sui Hegemonic Rule during the Time of Emperor Wen

Ishbara's brother Chuluohou was established as qaghan, and Ishbara's son Yongyulü (Öngül) became yehu (= yabghu, vice qaghan). Emperor Wen sent Zhangsun Cheng as an envoy to bestow the title of Mohe (Bagha) Qaghan on Chuluohou, and the title of yehu on Öngül.

The Eastern Turks continued to act as a force against the Western Turks which was exactly what the Chinese had hoped for. Chuluohou went to battle under the Sui banner against Abo Qaghan, whose troops surrendered, thinking that the Eastern Turks had Sui military assistance on their side. After capturing Abo, Chuluohou requested Sui to decide on his treatment. Some ministers proposed that he be executed. This was opposed by Zhangsun Cheng and another minister, however, and Emperor Wen avoided making a decision, hoping thereby to "cause the people from far away to come."

---

23 SUIS, v1, p. 23; ZZTJ, v176, p. 5485.
26 SUIS, v51 (p. 1332) records that Sui invested the title "Yehu Qaghan" on Yongyulü. However, the word "qaghan" after Yehu is crept in according to the commentary in the BS, v99, p. 3308, note 31. According to the ZZTJ, v176 (p. 5490), Chuluohou was established as Mohe Qaghan and Yongyulü as yehu.
Chuluohou died in his western campaign in 588, and was succeeded by Dulan Qaghan who kept up a close tributary relationship with Sui. Border markets were set up at the Turks' request. Emperor Wen, at this time, still could not trust the Turks with the task of frontier defence. After the conquest of Chen in 589 there was a proposal that the Turkish qaghan should be appointed "watch guard" (houzheng 候正), a proposal which Emperor Wen rejected on the ground that the Turks were not familiar with the geographical conditions in the frontier regions.

Tributary relations entered a rocky period in 593 when a Chinese called Yang Qin 楊欽 fled to the Turks and told them the false story that Liu Chang 劉暹, with his wife who was a Zhou princess, was planning to rebel against Sui power. He asked Princess Dayi to assist by sending troops to attack the Sui borders. Dulan Qaghan, believing this, stopped sending tribute and began making forays across the border. Emperor Wen sent Zhangsun Cheng to the Turks twice and finally got hold of Yang Qin. The court now made plans to get rid of Princess Dayi.

Even though Sui was not very strong, since the situation of the Eastern Turks was not stable an opportunity for Sui arose when, in 593, Tölish Qaghan asked for a marriage with a Sui princess. He was Chuluohou's son, called Rangan 拔干 (Zamqan), and a potential rival to Dulan Qaghan. Sui laid out its conditions. If Tölish helped get rid of Princess Dayi, who had attempted to make an alliance with the Western Turks and had engaged in other anti-Sui activities, Sui would agree to the marriage. Tölish succeeded in persuading Dulan to kill Princess Dayi. Dulan then himself requested the hand of a Sui princess in marriage. Zhangsun Cheng favored granting Tölish's request rather than that of Dulan on the grounds that Dulan's

---

29 SUIS, v40, p. 1171; ZZTJ, v177, p. 5517.
30 This is according to the record in the SUIS, v51, pp. 1332-33; ZZTJ, v178, pp. 5542-43. The SUIS, v84 and BS, v99 have a different record which say that Yang Qin went to the Turks before 589 when Sui conquered Chen, and Dulan Qaghan caught Yang Qin and informed Sui of the incident.
31 SUIS, v51, p. 1333; TD, v197, p. 1069; ZZTJ, v178, p. 5543. The SUIS, v84 (p. 1872) says that Rangan was the son of Shetu. This is probably wrong, cf. Cen Zhongmian. 1958, v11, p. 512.
submission to Sui was simply because of his ill feelings toward the Western Turks, and
that, if the marriage with Dulan went ahead, Dulan would then make use of Sui power
to oppress other Turkish rulers who would eventually rebel against Sui. Zhangsun
Cheng suggested that Sui try to entice Tölish to move down to the south since Tölish
did not possess a strong force and was, therefore, easy to deal with. As well, Sui
could use him for defence against Dulan Qaghan. Emperor Wen agreed.32

A close relationship was established between Sui and Tölish. Following the
marriage between Tölish and Princess Anyi安義, which went ahead in 597,
Emperor Wen deliberately granted favorable treatment to Tölish with the intention of
further stirring up hostilities between Dulan and Tölish. Tölish and his people moved
south to the old headquarters of the Turks in the Ötükăn mountains. When this
happened Dulan suspended tributary relations with Sui.

Now with Tölish secure as a vassal, the Chinese were quick to use his people
as a ready force to watch over the frontiers and guard against Dulan's incursions.33 In
599 Dulan Qaghan was making ready to invade China at Datong in northern Shanxi.
This was reported by Tölish to the Chinese, who organized a military campaign.
Hearing this Dulan allied himself with the Western Turks to attack Tölish. When
Tölish suffered defeat at the hands of Dulan he considered taking refuge under the
Western Turks, but Zhangsun Cheng persuaded him to go back to Sui. Greatly
pleased, Emperor Wen conferred on Zhangsun Cheng the title of the Left Cavalry
General (zuo xunwei biaoci jiangjun左衛行驃騎將軍) commissioned with special power to protect the Turks.34

Emperor Wen then pursued the strategy of appeasing Tölish by conferring on
him the title of Yili zhendou Qimin意利珍豆啓民 Qaghan and the

5558; CFYG, v978, p. 11494;
34 SUIS, v51, pp. 1333-34; ZZTJ, v178, pp. 5563-64.
building of the town of Dali for the Turks in Shuozhou. After Princess Anyi died, Princess Yicheng was sent to wed Qimin, and 20,000 Chinese troops were stationed to help Qimin Qaghan guard against the Western Turks. Zhangsun Cheng proposed that the Turks under Qimin should be resettled in Wuyuan, between Xiazhou and Shengzhou with the Yellow River to the north, as a line of defence against the incursions of Dulan Qaghan. The area was turned over to Qimin and his people for pasture land. In 602 still more walled towns were built in Jinhe and Dingxiang for the Eastern Turks, and it appears that Qimin moved to this area.

Now the relationship between Sui and the Eastern Turks under Qimin Qaghan became even closer. Like the second Huhanxie Chanyu of the Southern Xiongnu in Later Han, Qimin and his people were settled on the Chinese frontiers under the supervision of Chinese officials with military troops. His title of qaghan was maintained. In 600, when Dulan was killed by his own men and a time of civil strife ensued among his people, Qimin's men were despatched to entice those Turks to Sui, and many more Turks submitted to Sui.

In the following years when Sui continued to battle against the Western Turks, Qimin Qaghan joined forces with the Sui military campaign of 601 against his Western rivals. After the Western Turks suffered a severe defeat Zhangsun Cheng advised Qimin to despatch his envoys to the Tiele and other tribes of the Turkish people who had been under the rule of the Western Turks in order to try to win them over. The envoys were successful and soon the Tiele and more than ten other tribes came to Sui.

---

40 SUIS, v51, p. 1334.
As a result Datou's rule of the Western Turks collapsed in 603 and he fled to Tuyuhun in modern Qinghai province. With the submitted nomads brought under his sway Qimin's power increased.41

Qimin Qaghan under Sui Hegemonic Rule during the Time of Emperor Yang

After Emperor Yang ascended the throne, he attempted to incorporate Koguryŏ, some part of the Western Regions, and Linyi (in present Vietnam) into the Chinese commandery-district system. But he drew a distinct line between Sui China on one hand and the nomadic Turks on the other, and intended to keep Qimin Qaghan and his people under loose administrative control as an outer subject within the greater Chinese hegemonic empire.

At the beginning of his reign, when the Khitan made incursions into Yingzhou, Emperor Yang ordered Wei Yunqi to lead 20,000 Turkish cavalry in a counter attack. The Khitan suffered a crushing defeat at their hands.42 Emperor Yang's intention of using those Turks who had submitted for frontier defence was shown more clearly when, in 607, Qimin Qaghan made repeated requests to be allowed to adopt Chinese dress and hair style. Even though his ministers suggested granting permission since it would be tantamount to a proof of successful sinicization, Emperor Yang refused and insisted on retaining the line between the Chinese and nomads, justifying his decision by the idea of different zones in the tribute system. In his letter to Qimin he explained his decision by saying that since the north of the Gobi Desert had not yet been made tranquil, expeditionary forces still had to be sent in from

42 JTS, v75, pp. 2631-32; ZZTJ, v180, pp. 5621-22.
time to time to quell disturbances. As long as Qimin was sincere and obedient, it was unnecessary to change dress.

To retain the good will of the Turks, Emperor Yang continued to grant Qimin the favor of not using his personal name while announcing him as a subject, and of giving him a rank above that of the Chinese princes. Emperor Yang also ordered the building of houses and a walled town for Qimin in Wanshoushu 氐寿成, between Jinhe and Dingxiang. 43

The balance of power between the Sui Chinese and the Turks changed gradually in favor of the latter during Qimin's later years, particularly with the incorporation of the Western Turks, the Tiele and other tribes into Qimin's sphere of power after the Western Turkish Datou Qaghan met his defeat in 603. 44 Some Chinese ministers began to express their worry. They were concerned that Qimin, now with inside knowledge about China, might cause troubles in the future, 45 and pointed out that it was not feasible for Sui to accept Qimin as subject, provide him with economic and military aid, and place the Turks inside the Great Wall. A suggestion was put forward that Sui should move the Turks outside of the Great Wall, and establish frontier garrisons so as to prevent a dangerous situation from developing. 46 But the emperor was not persuaded.

The Conflicts between the Turks and Sui

In 609 Qimin Qaghan died and was succeeded by his son Shita-^Qaghan. In accordance with the Turkish practice, Emperor Yang permitted his

44 SUIS, v84, pp. 1873-74; BS, v99, p. 3298; ZZTJ, v179, p. 5600.
45 SUIS, v41, p. 1184; ZZTJ, v180, pp. 5632-33.
marriage to Princess Yicheng who had formerly married to Qimin. Turkish power continued to grow to such an extent that minister Pei Ju suggested fomenting discord among Shibi’s people as a way of weakening his force. As a means to this end, the court offered a Chinese princess to Shibi’s younger brother and proposed to confer the title of southern qaghan on him, but he was afraid to accept. When news of the Chinese plan reached Shibi he quite naturally began to distrust Sui.

Pei Ju further suggested that the court should entice Shishu Huxi, a capable assistant to Shibi, to come to Mayi to trade with the Chinese. The Chinese circulated reports that whoever arrived first would get the best deal. Huxi and his men therefore hurried there without first informing Shibi, only to stumble into a Chinese ambush and get killed. When Sui tried to convince Shibi that Huxi was going to defect, and that since the Turks were Sui subjects, the Chinese had the right to punish whoever rebelled against the qaghan, Shibi saw through the subterfuge and suspended tributary relations with Sui.

This time not only did the chicanery of Pei Ju fail, but it also brought disaster on the Chinese. In 615, when Emperor Yang went on a hunting trip, Shibi led his troops, besieged Emperor Yang in Yanmen, and captured thirty-nine of forty-one walled towns in the commandery of Yanmen. Emperor Yang had to order the recruitment of rescue troops throughout the empire, and to announce the abandonment of the costly campaign against Koguryō, which had gone on for several years. To alleviate the situation Sui had to ask Princess Yicheng to give false information to Shibi. She told him that there was an emergency on the northern border, so Shibi finally withdrew his troops.

47 SUIS, v84, p. 1876; BS, v99, p. 3299; ZZTJ, v181, p. 5647; CFYG, v974, p. 11441. The CFYG, v999 (p. 11718) says that Qimin died in the tenth year of Daye (614), which might be wrong.
The Turkish attack was the final straw. Coming on the top of unsuccessful campaigns against Koguryō, and the turmoil inside the country caused by various internal uprisings, the Sui dynasty went into a steep decline and soon after met its end.

Sui and the Western Turks

After 583 the Western Turks, whose traditional territory was not so close to China as was that of the Eastern Turks, extended their sway over a large area in the Western Regions. In 585 Emperor Wen sent a mission to Abo Qaghan to appease this increasingly powerful neighbor who had joined the Western Turks. But wars continued between Sui and the Western Turks. Abo himself was defeated in 587 and Datou, the supreme leader of the Western Turks, was defeated in 603 under the joint forces of Sui and the Eastern Turks.

In Emperor Yang's time, the qaghanate was under Chuluo Qaghan whose lands were in the Ili Basin. His mother was a Chinese. After his father Nili Qaghan died she married Nili's younger brother, according to Turkish custom. Both went to pay a visit to the Sui court at the end of Emperor Wen's reign and remained there because of the turmoil in the qaghanate. At the beginning of Emperor Yang's reign Chuluo launched attacks on the Tiele and exacted heavy taxes from them after his success. The Tiele then rebelled and set themselves up as an independent entity.

Seeing that Chuluo was in a difficult situation, the ever scheming Pei Ju urged the court to seize the moment. Acting on his advice, in 608 Emperor Yang sent Cui Junsu as an envoy bearing an imperial letter to Chuluo. Cui pointed out to the Western Turks that the Eastern Turkish qaghanate had submitted to Sui in

49 SUIS, v1, p. 22; ZZTJ, v176, p. 5482.
50 SUIS, v84, pp. 1876-77; BS, v99, pp. 3299-3300; ZZTJ, v180, pp. 5622-23.
order to use Sui forces against the Western Turks. He warned the qaghan that allied
Chinese and Eastern Turkish forces were massed for an attack against the Western
Turks, but Chuluo's mother had begged the emperor to persuade Chuluo to submit. If
Chuluo accepted the status of vassal, Cui continued, his country would be at peace and
his mother would enjoy a long life. Otherwise Chuluo's mother would be executed and
the Sui-Qimin joint forces would eliminate the Western qaghanate. Faced with what
seemed to be an inescapable reality, Chuluo had no alternative. He performed the
kowtow and received Emperor Yang's letter on his knees. As well he agreed to join the
Chinese in an attack on the Tuyuhun and sent a tributary mission to Sui.51

But Chuluo had not actually fully accepted Chinese suzerainty. When Emperor
Yang, in his tour of 610 of inspection in the west, asked Chuluo to pay a visit to him in
Dadouba 大斗拔谷 valley, Chuluo refused to do so. Emperor Yang was furious
at this act of outright disobedience, but had no way to deal with the problem until a
timely falling-out among the Western Turks provided the Chinese with an opportunity
for attack. When, in 611, the tribal leader Shegui 射屋 of the Western Turks sent
an embassy to Sui requesting a marriage alliance Pei Ju pointed out to Emperor Yang
that Shegui was the grandson of Datou, but he now found himself in a subordinate
position to Chuluo. In all probability, Pei Ju argued, he would wish to ally himself
with Sui, so Pei suggested that Sui should give Shegui generous gifts and confer on
him the title of great qaghan. His scheme of divide and rule succeeded in making
Shegui launch attacks against Chuluo, which in turn made Chuluo come in person to
pay respect to Emperor Yang at the end of the year.52

The following year saw the incorporation of Chuluo's people into the Sui
hegemonic empire. They were divided into three groups: a) a group of more than

51 SUIS, v84, pp. 1877-78; BS, v99, pp. 3300-01; ZZTJ, v181, pp. 5636-37.
52 SUIS, 84, pp. 1878-79; BS, v99, pp. 3301-02; TD, v199, p. 1077; ZZTJ, v181, pp. 5654-55;
CFYG, v990, p. 11633.
10,000 physically weak people led by Chuluo's brother, who were settled in the commandery of Huining 雙 , b) some stronger forces who were stationed in Loufan 壁 for frontier defence, and c) Chuluo in command of 500 calvary men. This latter group escorted Emperor Yang on his tours of inspection, and joined in the military campaigns against Koguryō.53

In 614 Sui gave the hand of a princess to Chuluo in marriage agreement with imperial gifts of tens of thousands of pi 千  of silk. Sui also expressed its intention of helping him recover his territory, no doubt with the long-term aim of making Chuluo responsible for frontier defence. The plan aborted, however, with the collapse of Sui.54

A Period of Chinese Civil War

After the siege of Yanmen Sui was on the verge of total collapse. The Turks soon recovered their comparatively strong regional position and the Western Turks again expanded, incorporating the Tiele and the various oasis states, which in turn became tributaries of the Turks.55 The Eastern qaghanate under Shibi Qaghan also expanded to bring under its sphere of influence the Khitan, Shiwei 契 in the east and the Tuyuhun and Gaochang 胡 (Karakhoja) in the west. This revival of Turkish power was due mostly to Chinese decline. In the turbulence of civil war at the end of Sui, the Chinese, like the Turks, sought outside assistance. Many of the Chinese rebel leaders relied on Turkish forces to compete with one another. They were to all intents and purpose, subjects of the Turks even though some assumed the title of emperor of China.

53 ZTZJ, v181, p. 5658.
54 SUIS, v84, p. 1879; BS, v99, p. 3302.
When China was relatively strong it could actively foment dissension amongst the Turks and make them dance to its tune. When it was in chaos, however, it was the turn of the Turkish rulers to try their hand at the same game. The situation of this period reflected this feature.

Li Yuan 李渊, the future first emperor of the Tang dynasty with the posthumous title of Gaozu, also had to collaborate with the Turks in order to prevent them from invading and from allying themselves with other rebel leaders, and to obtain their military assistance in the wars for the establishment of his own power. He adopted a very pragmatic, even humble, attitude in his dealings with these "barbarians." Some historical records show that he even accepted the status of vassal of the Turks and we read that after the defeat of the Eastern Turks, Tang Taizong remarked how ashamed and humiliated he had felt at Gaozu being a subject of the "barbarians."56

It remains, however, a moot point as to whether Li Yuan actually accepted such status. Li Shutong 李澍桐 does not believe that Gaozu did so.57 There is no clear record in the Da Tang Chuangye Qijuzhu, compiled by Wen Daya in Gaozu's time, that Gaozu accepted the status of subject of the Turks, nor is there any record of his being given any title by the Turks, or of his receiving the ritual symbol of a wolf-headed banner as did Liu Wuzhou 劉武周 and Liang Shidu 梁師都, both rebel leaders at the end of Sui. But it is possible that Wen Daya deliberately omitted information of this kind. It is equally possible that historians in Taizong's time made up such stories in order to contrast the glory, wisdom and success of Taizong. Whatever the case may have been, the existing evidence does show Gaozu to have at least adopted a very humble attitude when dealing with the Turks, even it remains an open question as to the extent he actually did yield to them.

In 617, after the Turks withdrew their invading troops from Taiyuan, where Li Yuan had his headquarters, he sent a letter to the ruler of the Eastern Turks, Shibi Qaghan. Li Yuan proposed two alternatives. Either the Turks should join forces with him to suppress the rebels and restore Sui, in which case the captured children, women and goods would all go to the Turks; or he and the Turks should simply make peace with each other, in which case Li Yuan would provide generous gifts so that the Turks would receive benefits without any effort. The letter was signed as qi, a term used by an inferior to a superior. When it was suggested that, since the Turks did not know Chinese script, Li Yuan should change the word qi into shu, a term used between equals, Li Yuan rejected the idea, saying that the Turks knew the rituals of the Chinese, and that:

Even if I show respect to them they will still not believe me. If there is neglect and rudeness, their suspicion will be even deeper. As the men of ancient times say 'To bend before one man and stand above ten thousand,' what can the barbarians beyond the frontiers be compared with? [They amount to] merely one ordinary person. Moreover, the word qi is not worth a thousand measures of gold. Even that I am willing to give away. Why should one worry about one word? 

By now, however, Shibi Qaghan completely distrusted the Sui rulers. He proposed that Li Yuan should declare himself emperor and that the Turks would then provide him with assistance. Li Yuan was still not capable of taking such a drastic step, but instead declared Emperor Yang a retired emperor, and backed Emperor Gong in his place. The red flag of Sui was changed to the color of crimson and white. Li Yuan did all this to make a show of eliminating Sui in order to satisfy the Turks and obtain their aid. He was very sensitive to the irony of his moves and referred to the whole charade as "covering one's ears when stealing a bell." But Shibi was satisfied.

\[58 \text{Da Tang Chuangye Qijuzhu, v1, p. 7.}\]
He despatched an envoy to Li Yuan with horses that were to be sold to the Chinese. Soon after Li Yuan made further requests, asking for Turkish troops and promising that if the Turks joined the Chinese the captured property would all go to the Turks. Shibi willingly met the request.\textsuperscript{59}

The Problems of the Turks in the Early Tang

In 618, when the Sui emperor abdicated, Li Yuan became the first emperor of the Tang dynasty. The new regime faced many difficulties in its first decade, during which its newly established power was challenged both by rival forces within China, and by the Turks without.

During these early years of the Tang dynasty large parts of China outside the Tang capital Chang’an were occupied by rival factions. Some of the factions in north China had close connections with the Turks, who not only supported anti-Tang forces inside China, but also took advantage of the chaotic situation to make inroads and demand exorbitant gifts from the Tang court. Their raids on the Tang borders were constant and they treated the Tang Chinese with disdain, imprisoning their envoys when they refused to kowtow at the Turkish court.\textsuperscript{60}

In 619 Shibi died and was succeeded by his younger brother, Chuluo, as the supreme qaghan of the Eastern Turks. In 620 Chuluo established Yang Zhengdao 楊政道, the grandson of Emperor Yang, as the king of Sui.\textsuperscript{61} It was an act to show hostility to Tang. Chuluo also died in that same year and was succeeded by another brother, Xieli 猛利 Qaghan. Whenever Xieli Qaghan made demands he


\textsuperscript{60} TD, v197, p. 1069; ZZTJ, v189, p. 5912.

\textsuperscript{61} TD, v197, p. 1069; JTS, v194A, p. 5154; XTS, v215A, p. 6029; ZZTJ, v188, p. 5878.
sent letters using the term "order" (chi^{fi}). All the prefectures along the frontiers bowed before his command.\textsuperscript{62}

In 624 both Xieli Qaghan and Tuli (Tölish) Qaghan (Shibi's son) invaded. Tang seemed incapable of mounting a counter attack. Li Shimin, the future Tang Taizong, devised a strategy to drive a wedge between the two qaghans, entering into a brotherly relationship with Tölish. The Turks retreated for a time but before long Xieli resumed his incursions.\textsuperscript{63} Under the threat of a Turkish invasion anxiety mounted to such an extent that Gaozu even considered abandoning Chang'an and moving the capital to a less exposed place. He gave up the plan only after strong and persistent objections from Li Shimin.\textsuperscript{64} In 626 the Turks were again pressing on the Tang capital with their troops. Tang had to enter into a covenant with Xieli Qaghan and promise rich gifts to the Turks before they finally agreed to withdraw.\textsuperscript{65}

During his reign, Gaozu was forced to treat the Turks as "an equal adversary" (diguo), and make them large payments in goods. In 619 Shibi requested Tang to kill Chuluo Qaghan, the Western Turkish leader who had submitted to Sui and been resettled in China. Gaozu did not at first agree to the request but later, when some ministers pointed out that if Tang refused, Chuluo himself might survive, but only at the expense of Tang incurring the hatred of the whole Eastern Turkish qaghanate, Gaozu yielded to the inevitable.\textsuperscript{66} Around 620 Tang abandoned Fengzhou.

\textsuperscript{62} JTS, v83, p. 2775; XTS, v11, pp. 4132-33.

The XTS, v215B (pp. 6056-57) records that it was the Western Turks that asked Tang to kill Chuluo. Hou Linbo holds that the XTS is correct with four arguments: 1) Shibi of the Eastern Turks had died before Chuluo was killed. If it was Shibi who made the request Tang did not have to feel the pressure to agree with it. 2) There is no evidence to show that Shibi and Chuluo had disputes but Chuluo had had disputes with Shegui of the Western Turks. 3) Shegui might have been afraid that Tang would
and conceded Wuyuan and Yulin to the Turks. Ten thousand Turkish families moved south of the Yellow River. In 624, after Xieli and Tolsish of the Eastern Turks withdrew their invading troops, Xieli despatched his uncle to pay a court-visit to Tang, proposing that the Tang emperor should rule the Middle Plain while the qaghan would occupy the territory north of the Gobi. Each would have jurisdiction over his own part and the Turks would not invade unless provoked by the Chinese. The envoy reportedly asked that "the Turks should be the outer subjects of Tang for all generations." This last request does not seem to be consistent with the rest of the proposal. It is not unlikely that it was added by the contemporary Chinese historians.

During this period of Gaozu's reign, up until 625, in all the letters from the Tang court to the Eastern Turks, the Chinese used the language suitable for an addressee on equal terms. The term shu, as used between equals, was applied constantly to the Turks. It was a usage dictated by the balance of power, and the court had to treat the Turks that way for fear of frontier incursions. The practice was given up in 625, when China was preparing to attack the Turks, and Gaozu ordered the use of the terms zhao or chi, "to order" or "an order" from the emperor to his subjects.

The situation here parallels the situation in the early Han when China actually had to appease or pay tribute to the Xiongnu in order to prevent them from causing trouble. Nevertheless all the apparently peaceful diplomatic activity Tang engaged in when dealing with the Turks, with the intention of appeasing the latter, did not mean that the Tang rulers in fact accepted a real equality among sovereign states.

support Chuluo to resume his power. 4) Tang agreed to kill Chuluo so that it could win over the Western Turks. Hou also concludes that Shegui's son made the request. Hou. 1976, pp. 37-39. In whichever case this event shows the humble and practical attitude of the Tang court.

67 This is according to Cen Zhongmian. 1958, v4, p. 133. See also XTS, v215A, p. 6029; CFYG, v990, p. 11633.
68 CFYG, v980, p. 11510.
The *Cefu Yuangui* records the Turkish missions coming to the court at this time of Tang as paying tribute. The Chinese in power at the time believed that all the measures were just to buy time, a temporary expedient to win some breathing space while the court waited for the opportunity to ally itself with the Western Turks, prepare for war, and retaliate against the Eastern Turks. In 622, following their invasion of Taiyuan, the Turks expressed interest in a peace settlement. Discussing this with his ministers, Gaozu decided to mobilize Tang forces for an attack and only make peace after a victory in spite of the fact that the majority suggested peace.70

In 620, when the envoy from the Western Turks arrived, Gaozu granted him favorable treatment with rich gifts in the hope of persuading the Western Turks to join attacks against the Eastern Turks. But when Xieli heard about the Western Turks' agreement to cooperate with Tang he soon made peace with his Western rivals and thereby stopped the latter from implementing their plan. Nevertheless, the Chinese did not completely abandon their efforts. When the Western Turks despatched an embassy to Tang requesting a marriage alliance in 625, Gaozu agreed to the request in the knowledge that it would be viewed in military terms by the Eastern Turks and serve as a deterrent.71

From the beginning of the Tang dynasty the Chinese continued to strengthen their frontier defences even while paying tribute to the Turks. In 625 Gaozu made plans to build ships for battles on the Yellow River, and to dig tunnels on the northern frontiers to block the invasions of the Turks.72 Also he decided to restore the Twelve Armies which had been disbanded in 623. Their reestablishment was ultimately aimed at defeating the Turks.73

70 JTS, v63, p. 2397; XTS, v100, p. 3930; ZZTJ, v190, p. 5954.
71 There is an ambiguity as to by whom and when the suggestion was made. Some say it was Feng Lun in 620, cf. JTS, v194B, pp. 5181-82; XTS, v215B, p. 6057; TD, v199, p. 1077. Some say it was Pei Ju in 625, cf. XTS, v100, p. 3934; ZZTJ, v191, p. 5995; THY, v94, p. 1693; CFYG, v987, p. 11495.
72 CFYG, v990, p. 11634.
73 ZZTJ, v191, p. 5995; CFYG, v990, p. 11635.
Tang Conquest of the Eastern Turks

Early in Taizong's reign major changes took place among the Turks. Within the Turkish regime, Xieli Qaghan relied mostly on non-Turks, including a Chinese adviser Zhao Deyan 赵德 año and various Hu (Sogdians). They introduced complicated rules and regulations into the Turkish administration and kept them constantly at war. Several years of famine as a result of bad weather forced Xieli to increase taxes in order to sustain enough revenue yields. The political and economic problems engendered by this aroused great resentment among the Turks themselves as well as among other tribes who were under Turkish rule.\footnote{TD, v197, p. 1070; JTS, v194A, p. 5159; XTS, v215A, p. 6034; ZZTJ, v192, p. 6037.} The year 628 found the Western qaghanate also in turmoil. Yi'nan 赖曼, the leader of the Xueyantuo 萧延陀, a Turkish speaking tribe, left the Western Turks and went over to the Eastern Turks. Realizing that the situation of the Eastern Turks was as precarious as that in the west, Yi'nan again turned against the Turks. The Uighurs, another Turkish group, joined the Xueyantuo.\footnote{JTS, v199A, p. 5344; XTS, v217B, p. 6134. The ZZTJ, v192 (p. 6045) records the event as in 627 based on the fact that the JTS, v194 (p. 5158) says that in 627, the Xueyantuo, the Uighurs, the Bayegu and others rebelled against the Eastern Turks. See also XTS, v215A, p. 6034. Ma Changshou is of the opinion that the Xueyantuo were in two major groups, being subject to the Eastern and Western Turks, respectively. Those in revolt in 627 were subjects of the Eastern Turks. See Ma Changshou. 1957, p. 53, note 1. Cen Zhongmian holds that the Xueyantuo went to Xieli Qaghan in the Gaozu's period and rebelled in 627. See Cen Zhongmian. 1964, pp. 50-51.}

Xieli Qaghan and his nephew Tölish Qaghan fell out amongst themselves. When the Xi people and other tribes, who were under the direct control of Tölish Qaghan, left him to submit to Tang because of the heavy and endless burden of taxation, Xieli held Tölish responsible. And when Tölish failed to suppress the Xueyantuo and Uighur uprisings he was again severely reprimanded by Xieli. As a
result, Tölish refused to obey the order to provide troops to Xieli, and began to make plans to submit to Tang authority.76

Taizong did not launch a major attack at first. He hesitated because a direct Tang attack would have constituted an abrogation of the peace agreement concluded with the Turks in 626. But observing the agreement would mean that the chance of defeating the Turks would be lost. The court ministers had differing opinions.77 Eventually Taizong chose to wait for the Turks themselves to breach the treaty.78 As skillful tactician, he outwardly displayed only righteous intentions towards the Turks, all the while waiting as their continuing decline brought closer and closer the right occasion to inflict a crushing defeat on them. In 628, when attacked by Xieli, Tölish asked for Tang military aid. Du Ruhui 杜如晦, the Minister of War, was of the opinion that Taizong should help Tölish and break the agreement with Xieli. Taizong agreed. He ordered a garrison in Taiyuan to prepare to assist Tölish,79 and without even considering defensive measures, seeing the troubles among the Turks, the court prepared for war.80

With the aim of going after his primary enemy Xieli, Taizong supported the Xueyantuo by investing Yi'nan with the title of qaghan. He recognized in him a potential rival of the Turks. Later in 629 when Yi'nan's brother came to pay respects, Taizong treated him favorably and bestowed a knife and a whip on him, symbols of the power to punish criminals in the Xueyantuo qaghanate.81

---

79 XTS, v215A, p. 6034; ZZTJ, v192, pp. 6049-50; CFYG, v991, pp. 11637-38. The CFYG's record has some confusion. See the study in Cen Zhongmian. 1958, v5, p. 176. The JTS, v194A (p. 5158) and the TD, v197 (p. 1070) do not record the discussion, but simply say that Taizong ordered Qin Wutong in command of the troops of Bingzhou to assist Tölish, and Zhou Fan to station in Taiyuan.
81 It is not clear when the investiture took place. It was either at the end of 628, see JTS, v199B, p. 5344; ZZTJ, v193, pp. 6061-62; THY, v94, p. 1689; v96, p. 1726; or it was in 629, see XTS, v217B, pp. 6134-35; CFYG, v964, p. 11337.
In 629 Taizong decided to mount a military campaign against the Eastern Turks despite Xieli Qaghan's offer to be Tang subject, and despite his request for a marriage contract. By the end of 629, Tölish came to Tang for refuge. In 630 Tang won a victory over the Turks and obtained the Sui empress and Yang Zhengdao, who were then sent to the capital. Xieli despatched an envoy to the Tang court, recognized his "guilt" and asked to "surrender as an inner subject together with his land." Nevertheless Xieli did not really have surrendered in his heart. When Tang troops penetrated his headquarters he tried to flee to the Tuyuhun. The Chinese troops captured him finally, thus ending the Eastern qaghanate.

The Conquest of the Xueyantuo

By 639 the Xueyantuo qaghanate had grown into a strong power in its own right, occupying the territories of the former Eastern Turkish qaghanate. The Xueyantuo had long ceased to function as a mere Tang ally in the latter's campaign to conquer the Eastern Turks. Aware of the potential threat they posed to Tang dominance, Tang once again relied on a divide and rule policy to weaken their power. In 638 Taizong despatched an embassy to confer the title of "minor qaghan" on the two sons of Yi'nan Qaghan, and gave them each drums and banners, "ostensibly to show favor but in reality to divide their power." The Tang decision to establish the Turkish

Cen Zhongmian prefers the second date. He argues that Yi'nan established himself as qaghan in 628. Taizong would not give the title to Yi'nan unless he had established himself first. See Cen Zhongmian. 1958, v5, p. 181; 1964, pp. 52-53. However, it is possible that Taizong invested the title in order to help Yi'nan establish his power, as the ZZTJ, v193 (pp. 6061-62) and the THY, v94 (p. 1689) say that Yi'nan was supported as qaghan, but he was afraid to take up the title. Taizong, planning to attack Xieli, therefore, sent an envoy to invest Yi'nan with the title.

85 Cen Zhongmian is of the opinion that Tang conferred on Yi'nan's two sons the titles of qaghan and yabgu, respectively. See his 1958, v5, pp. 216-217.
regime under the leadership of Simo 北平 to north of the Yellow River in 639 was also aimed at checking the Xueyantuo. In 641 the Xueyantuo attacked Simo. Tang sent in troops to the rescue and succeeded in forcing Yi'nan to make peace with Simo.86

In the following year Yi'nan proposed a marriage alliance with Tang. Since Tang had not yet fully settled its frontier problems, Taizong at first agreed to a marriage contract. Later, however, he changed his mind on the pretext of Yi'nan having not prepared enough betrothal gifts. The real reason, however, was that Taizong realized the weakness of the Xueyantuo, and saw no more necessity for such an arrangement. He could see that his refusal would further weaken Yi'nan and his ruling group, thus creating an opportunity to defeat the Xueyantuo. Qibi Heli 齊比赫力, the former Tiele chief who had submitted to Tang and become a general, pointed this out. Taizong was clear in his own mind that the policy of marriage alliance was to be used only as an expedient to further Chinese aims. The Xueyantuo ruler's being obsequious and meekly doing what the Chinese wanted was simply because he had recently become ruler of various tribes who were not his own clan and therefore wanted to borrow Chinese force to strengthen his own. If Tang stopped the marriage the various tribes would know that the Chinese had abandoned Yi'nan and would rebel against him.87

Sima Guang in his Zizhi Tongjian criticized Taizong's breach of promise saying that even though Taizong did destroy the Xueyantuo soon after, it was shameful to rely on one's force to break a promise.88 In Chinese history Tang Taizong is considered as one of the greatest rulers. But his achievements did not warrant his claim that,

88 ZZTJ, v197, pp. 6201-02.
[The emperors] from ancient times all attached great importance to the Chinese and depreciated barbarians. Only I care for them as equals, and therefore they look upon me as a parent.\(^89\)

His successes were rather the result of his pragmatism and insight into political affairs. He was an outstanding politician, a skillful military leader helped by a group of remarkable ministers, and he knew very well that policies based on peace and egalitarian principles simply did not work in most cases in international politics, where the decisive factor was the balance of power.

After Yi’nan’s death in 645 his son succeeded him as Duomi Qaghan. He made incursions into the Chinese frontier regions while Taizong was occupied with his Korean expeditions. A year later, when Duomi’s brutal rule provoked an uprising by the Uighur, Pugu and Tongluo tribes, Tang immediately seized the opportunity to despatch Chinese, Turkish and other non-Chinese troops to attack the Xueyantuo. Duomi was subsequently killed by the Uighurs, and finally Tang reduced the Xueyantuo and other Tiele tribes to submission.\(^90\) Taizong arrived at Lingzhou (in modern Ningxia) in 646 to acknowledge their submission and to receive tribute. Through their envoys, the chieftains of these tribes expressed the wish to be subjects of the Heavenly Qaghan (\(tian kehan\)), a title given to Taizong by the nomadic tribes after his conquest of the Eastern Turks in 630.\(^91\)

\(^{89}\) ZZZJ, v198, p. 6247.  
Victories over the Western Turks

Early in Taizong's reign, when the Western Turkish qaghanate was divided, each of the various rulers tried to obtain Tang assistance to strengthen themselves in their power struggles. Taizong saw what was going on and tried to keep the Western Turks subordinate to China within the tribute system by appeasement and investiture. He never entered into a marriage alliance with any of them even though the Turks raised their requests for such an alliance three times, in 628, 630 and 635. In 646 Taizong granted the request of Yibi Shegui Qaghan of the Western Turks for a marriage on the condition that the Turks concede as betrothal gifts the five oasis states: Qiuci (Kucha), Yutian (Khotan), Shule (Kashgar), Zhujubo (Karghalik) and Congling (Pamir), then under the Turkish control. The marriage, however, did not proceed as Taizong soon died. No marriage alliance was ever arranged between Tang and the Western Turks right up till the end of the qaghanate, in 659 in Gaozong's reign.

The Chinese competed with the Western Turks for the control over the Western Regions from early in the reign of Taizong. Following the conquest of Gaochang (Karakhoja, near Turfan) in 640, Taizong decided to establish the prefecture of Xizhou in spite of forceful opposition from Wei Zheng and Chu Suiliang, who objected that it would need a great number of Chinese troops and supplies to keep control there, and yet China would not gain any benefit. The king and aristocrats were moved inside China and the Protectorate of Anxi (Anxi duhu fu), the

---

92 In 628, both Sibi Qaghan and his rival Si-Yehu Qaghan asked to be allowed to marry a Chinese princess. Taizong refused with the excuse that the Turks were in disorder and ranks of ruler and subject were not decided, cf. TD, v199, pp. 1077-78; JTS, v194B, p. 5182; ZZTJ, v193, p. 6061. According to the XTS, in 630, Sibi Qaghan asked for a marriage alliance, which Taizong refused with the above excuse, cf. XTS, v215B, p. 6057. It is not clear whether Sibi requested twice in 628 and 630, respectively, or only once in either 628 or 630. The discrepancy in dating occurs perhaps because of the uncertainty as to when Tong-Yehu died, either in 628 or 630. In any case, the fact remains that soon after he died the two qaghans Sibi and Si-Yehu competed for power. For the request of 635 see JTS, v194B, p. 5183; XTS, v215B, p. 6058.
93 TD, v199, p. 1078; JTS, v194B, p. 5185; XTS, v215B, p. 6060; ZZTJ, v198, p. 6236; THY, v94, p. 1694. The THY records the request as in 645 whereas the ZZTJ as in 646.
first of a series of protectorates established during the Tang dynasty, was established at Jiaohe 交河 with more than 1,000 Chinese troops stationing there. At the same time the garrison of the Western Turks in Futu 墨国 town surrendered to Tang, and was made into Tingzhou 隘州 (in Jinman 金曼 county).94

Tang forcefully pressed westward, and in 642 the Chinese defeated Duolu 都路 Qaghan and his tribes.95 In 648 Ashina Helu 阿史那赫悉 , who had a high position under Duolu, came to submit, and Tang resettled his people in Tingzhou and made him the Area Commander-in-chief (dudu 部督) of Yaochi.96

In the following years until 658, Tang concentrated its efforts on defeating the Western Turks. In 651 Ashina Helu rose in revolt and led his people to the west, set up his regime, and began making incursions on Tingzhou. Using the Uighurs to assist the Chinese troops, Tang went to war, and finally, in 657, the Western Turks were brought under Chinese administrative control. In 659, when Zhenzhu 真珠 Qaghan was killed by Ashina Mishe 阿史那默薛, who had earlier submitted to Tang, the Western Turks were decisively defeated by the Chinese.97

Heavenly Qaghan and the Debate on the Policy of Resettlement

Following the conquest of the Eastern Turks in 630, the chiefs of the non-Chinese peoples in the northwest requested that Taizong assume the title of Heavenly Qaghan (tian kehan), which he did.98 Luo Xianglin 罗香林 speaks highly of the Heavenly Qaghan system as an international institution which maintained peace in

98 TD, v200, p. 1085; ZZTJ, v193, p. 6073; THY, v73, p. 1312.
the Chinese known world. He asserts that this system developed further in Gaozong's time, not collapsing until after the An Lushan rebellion. He concludes that, under that system, the Chinese emperor had the legitimacy to regulate relations among the participating states, to settle their disputes and conflicts, to organize military campaigns with troops from all the states to assist one of the states in an emergency, and to invest political titles on the rulers of other states.\(^99\)

It is, however, an open question whether such a political system actually existed.\(^100\) Also, the practices that Luo Xianglin mentions under the Heavenly Qaghan system were the practices under the tribute system, which had already existed even in the Han period. As discussed earlier in the case of Han relations with the oasis states in Central Asia, under the tribute system the Protector-general of the Western Regions was the Han representative assuming the responsibility of protecting subordinates, mediating disputes among them and attacking those who were not in accordance with Chinese moral ethics. In return for this the oasis states had to provide military and labor services to the Chinese, in addition to the payment of tribute. In the Tang dynasty, whenever the Chinese exercised their hegemonic power over small states, they still adopted these practices whether there was an effectively functioning system of Heavenly Qaghan or not. The title of Heavenly Qaghan did, however, establish a separate basis of legitimacy for rule beyond the Great Wall.\(^101\)

The victories over the Eastern Turks in 630 raised an immediate question as to how to resettle the 100,000 or so Turks who had surrendered. The court had heated discussions on the matter, which went on for several years. The available records about the discussion are very interesting because we see in them the clash between the two aspects of Chinese foreign policy, ideological purity and pragmatism. Of Chinese

\(^100\) Wechsler, H. J. 1979, p. 222.
historical sources the *Tang Huiyao* has the fullest account. Based on it three kinds of opinions can be discerned.

1) The opinion that the nomads should be sinicized. Many court officials were of the opinion that the court should scatter the Turks among the Chinese prefectures and counties, make them take up agriculture and change their customs so as to convert the formerly dangerous nomads into Chinese subjects. China would thereby increase its population while the region north of the Great Wall would become an empty land. This plan was aimed eventually at bringing the Turks into the Chinese territorial empire.

2) The opinion that the Turks should be settled outside China, that their power should be kept non-unified and that they should be kept under Chinese supervision. Upholding the principle of "having the various states of Xia within and keeping the Yi and Di barbarians out," Yan Shigu 颜师古 maintained that the "barbarians" had always been in the outermost zone and it was improper to change their customs. One ought to control them, he said, in accordance with their own customs. He suggested that the Turks and the Tiele should be settled north of the loop of the Yellow River, that different chiefs should be appointed separately for each tribe, from high to low, that all their territories should be separately delineated by the Chinese, and that separate administrations should be set up for each region.

Dou Jing 邓静 held that, since "barbarians" were like animals, they could neither be disciplined by rules nor taught by benevolence and righteousness. China, he said, would not benefit by gaining them, nor would it suffer by losing them. He proposed that in so far as the nomads had submitted, it was open to the court to grant them favors at its discretion, give them the title of "wise king" (*xian wang* 贤王, the nomads' own rank), and provide them wives from the imperial clan. He said that China should divide their land and split up the tribes in order to weaken their power, should control them, but with a loose rein, and should turn them into outer subjects defending Chinese frontiers.
Du Chuke observed that "barbarians" were difficult to hold by virtue but easy to control by force. If the court accepted their surrender, he said, and settled them south of the Yellow River, they would definitely cause troubles.

Li Baiyao recommended that the court take advantage of the Turks' being scattered. He said that it should set up chiefs for each separate group, insuring that no one group became subject to another so that each group had to continually protect itself and would have no time and strength to challenge China. China should establish a protectorate in Dingxiang town to supervise them.

The opinion expressed by Wei Zheng also belonged to this group. Their idea was to dissolve the Turkish organization and incorporate them into the Tang hegemonic empire.

3) The opinion that the Turks should be settled inside China, but that they should keep their organization and customs. Wen Yanbo was the advocate of this point of view. He suggested that, in order to pacify the Turks, the court should follow the practice of the Han dynasty, settling them south of the great loop of the Yellow River and keeping their tribes as a defending force for Tang without changing their customs. If this were done, the formerly empty land would become inhabited and Chinese good faith towards them would be demonstrated. He rejected the idea that the Turks should be scattered further inside China on the ground that it would go against their nature.

Wei Zheng strongly opposed Wen's idea. He urged that the Turks should be sent back to the steppes, arguing that nomads had human faces and "animal hearts." They plundered when they were strong and submitted when weak. They must not be settled inside China, he said, since they now numbered almost 100,000. Within a few years, their population would increase, and living close to the Tang capital, they would definitely cause trouble.
Wen Yanbo defended his own idea. He said that the Son of Heaven should care for all creatures, as heaven covers everything and the earth holds all. Now that the Turks were defeated and had come to surrender, he said, not to pity them but instead to discard them would be contrary to the way of heaven and earth. To settle them south of the Yellow River would provide them with means of livelihood, so they would not rebel.

Wei Zheng, in his argument against Wen, cited the sad lessons of early times when Western Jin had "barbarians" living inside China. Within a few years, he said, the "barbarians" had caused the collapse of the dynasty. Wen Yanbo, however, believed that the Chinese could make the settled Turks obey Chinese orders, and teach them righteousness and laws and that after a few years the court should select Turks into the Imperial Bodyguard, just like the Later Han's treatment of the Southern Xiongnu. He further argued that the cause of the earlier Turkish rebellion was to be traced to the restoration of the Turkish qaghanate by Sui Emperor Wen. Now, if the Chinese let the Turks settle at their own will, either south or north of the Yellow River, their tribes would be scattered and their power split. They could not possibly again become a menace.\(^\text{102}\)

Wen Yanbo's suggestion in fact implied a compromise between bringing the Turks into the territorial empire on the one hand, and incorporating them into the hegemonic empire on the other. He believed that, by settling them south of the Yellow River on Chinese territory and by allowing them to keep their own rulers and customs, the Turks would undergo a gradual process of sinicization. They would then form a buffer zone and function as a defence force for the Chinese. He did not pay much attention to the possibility that the Turks might rise in revolt against Chinese

administration and become a rival again in spite of the many historical precedents for such a turn of events. This was the danger that Wei Zheng clearly saw and pointed out. And it was not long before his apprehension proved to be not without basis.

The controversy between them presents us with a good example of how traditional Chinese views of the world order influenced foreign policy making. While Wen Yanbo stressed the hierarchical feature of the Chinese world order, emphasizing that the Son of Heaven was the ruler of all peoples, Chinese or non-Chinese, Wei Zheng reveals a strong sinocentrism. Keeping the "barbarians" out was not just a reflection of Chinese superiority, it was crucial for national security.

The final decision maker, Taizong himself, accepted Wen Yanbo's view. Pulleyblank holds that Taizong attempted to "incorporate Chinese and nomads into a true world empire, each having an equal share and neither dominating the other."\(^{103}\) In his arrangements to resettle non-Chinese such as the Turks and Koreans, Taizong does indeed reveal something of an ambition to be a world emperor. His assumption of the title Heavenly Qaghan boosted his confidence that such a reality was possible and buttressed his belief in the responsibilities of the Son of Heaven. Whether this ideal was realizable, however, and whether he did, in fact, persist in his belief in Chinese and non-Chinese having an equal share remains to be discussed in the following sections.

The Resettlement of the Turks

The first step in the policy of resettlement was to deprive the Turkish rulers of any real power. Taizong did not allow the rulers to retain their original title of qaghan, as the Han ruler had done with the Xiongnu chanyu, and the Sui with the Turkish

\(^{103}\) Pulleyblank, E. G. 1976, p. 37.
qaghan. Rather, he conferred on them Chinese official titles. Xieli was appointed Prefect (cishi 刺史) of Guozhou 郭州, an area inhabited by wild animals and was suitable for hunting. However, he did not want to go, and was therefore given the office of General-in-chief of the Right Guard (youwei da jiangjun 右衛大將軍) with houses and land in the Tang capital. He died in 634.  

Tölish was given a dual appointment as General-in-chief of the Right Guard, and Commandery Prince (jun wang 章王) of Beiping 北平 with an annual income from 700 households.  

When Taizong gave Tölish yet another title as Area Commander-in-chief of Shunzhou 淼州 in 630, he clearly stated to him what he intended by the arrangement:

Formerly, when your ancestor Qimin Qaghan lost his army, he surrendered to Sui. He was reestablished by Sui and so became strong and prosperous. He owed a debt of gratitude to Sui, which he never repaid. When your father Shibi came to the throne, he rebelled and caused trouble to Sui. From then onwards, there has never been a year when the Turks did not invade China. Heaven has repaid the wickedness with ill fortune and sent down disasters. Your people were scattered and disordered, and almost died completely. When your affairs came to an extremity, you came to surrender. The reason why I do not make you qaghan is just because of the example of Qimin. In changing the former way I wish to make China at peace permanently and to give your clan permanent security. I therefore make you an area commander-in-chief. You should follow our laws, discipline your people, and not invade and plunder each other at will. If disobedience occurs, [the offender] will be severely punished.  

105 TD, v197, p. 1070; JTS, v194A, p. 5161; XTS, v215A, p. 6038; ZZTJ, v193, p. 6073; CFYG, v964, p. 11337. The CFYG says that the income was from taxes of 1,000 households.  
The tribal leaders were all given the Chinese official titles of "generals" (jiangjun) and "commandants" (zhong langjiang 部將). There were more than a hundred whose ranks were above the fifth, and as many as a thousand families settled in Chang'an.\textsuperscript{107}

Records concerning the area commands set up to resettle the Turks are insufficient and too confusing for one to establish a clear picture. But generally it can be said that from 630 to 634, the Eastern Turks who had submitted were settled into seven area commands, namely, Shunzhou, Beining 北寧, Beifu 北撫, Beian 北安, Youzhou 榆州, Huazhou 化州 (i.e. Beikai), and Changzhou 長州. These were scattered south of the Yellow River in the area from Youzhou 榆州 to Lingzhou, and all were supervised by the Area Commands of Dingxiang and Yunzhong 雲中.\textsuperscript{108} This arrangement showed Taizong's intention of incorporating them into Chinese territory. Dou Jing was appointed Commissioner-in-chief (dashi 大使) of Ningshuo 寧朔 in charge of Turkish affairs.\textsuperscript{109}

The potential threat of the Turks was sensed by some Chinese officials right from the beginning. In spite of Taizong's decision, they still suggested that Tang found a Turkish state north of the Yellow River instead of settling the Turks inside China. Wen Yanbo insisted, however, that since Tang had already accepted them, it would be a pity to send them away without reason. Apparently Taizong accepted Wen's advice. The opposition did not stop, and the debate about the proper way to deal with the Turks and other non-Chinese who had surrendered went on.\textsuperscript{110}

\textsuperscript{107} ZGZY, v9, p. 20a; TD, v197, pp. 1070-71; JTS, v61, p. 2361; v194A, p. 5163; XTS, v215A, p. 6038; THY, v73, p. 1311. Some of the above records say that almost 10,000 families settled in Chang'an. The number seems incorrect.
\textsuperscript{108} Iwami Kiyohiro. 1987, pp. 510-516.
\textsuperscript{109} JTS, v61, p. 2370; XTS, v95, p. 3849.
\textsuperscript{110} JTS, v61, p. 2361.
To oppose the Tang policy of encouraging non-Chinese to submit, Li Daliang 李大亮, the Area Commander-in-chief of Liangzhou, in a memorial written around 630, reiterated a sinocentric analysis of the situation, saying that the Chinese people were like the roots of the empire but the "barbarians" were like branches and leaves, and that disturbing the root in an attempt to strengthen the branches and leaves had never been a successful basis on which to seek long term peace. He held that Sage Kings of ancient times transformed the Central Kingdom with good faith and controlled "barbarians" by expedient means. Tang should, therefore, stop encouraging the Turks to come, and instead should only bring the "barbarians" in Yiwu 芮吾, who requested to be subjects, under loose control by settling them outside the frontiers as outer subjects. He further objected to the settlement policy as it was carried out relative to the Eastern Turks, saying that even if the court was not going to scatter them further inside China and try to change their customs, still it was not a policy in the long-term interests of China to settle them with their own organizational structure so close to the capital. Some records state that Taizong accepted his analysis.\footnote{TD, v197, p. 1071; JTS, v62, pp. 2388-89; XTS, v99, pp. 3911-12; ZZTJ, v193, pp. 6081-82; THY, v73, pp. 1311-12. The THY and the TD do not say whether Taizong accepted it or not.}

The Zhenguang Zhengyao, on the other hand, says the opposite.\footnote{ZGZY, v9, pp. 20a-21b.} In view of the fact that in 630 Taizong established Xiyizhou 西州 in Yiwu, after the ruler came to submit,\footnote{XTS, v215A, p. 6036; ZZTJ, v193, pp. 6082.} it is evident that Taizong still wished to incorporate the non-Chinese into Tang territory.

In 647, after the conquest of the Xueyantuo, Taizong established six area commands and seven prefectures in the territories of the various Tiele tribes of the Turkish people.\footnote{See Table 2. 3. "The Jimi Fu-zhou of the Eastern Turks and the Tiele (630-663)."} Instead of moving the non-Chinese who had submitted inside the
frontier, Taizong established a Chinese administrative system in their own areas.\textsuperscript{115} In any case, it would have been really impossible to move so many of them within China, and after 639, when the Turks rebelled, there was no political will for such a radical policy to deal with the nomads. The posts of area Commander-in-chief and prefect were held by the tribal leaders. Each was given a fish tally as a credential. Sixty-six or sixty-eight post stations were set up along the route stretching from south of the Uighurs to the Protectorate of Yanran (Map 5). Annual payments in the form of marten pelts were made as tax. These institutions were under the administration of the Protectorate of Yanran with a Chinese, Li Suli 孫立, as Protector-general (duhu 都護).\textsuperscript{116} Even when the Uighurs were brought under an area command-prefecture system, they continued to use the title of qaghan. The Chinese were aware of this fact but did not do anything about it.\textsuperscript{117}

Towards the end of Taizong’s reign more Turkish area commands were set up in their own lands and in Gaozong’s time, after the conquest in 651 of Chebi 蔑麗 Qaghan, who had ruled the remnants of the Eastern Turks, Gaozong continued the practice.\textsuperscript{118} From 630 to 663 the Chinese established at least fifty-four area commands and prefectures and two protectorates for the Eastern Turks and the Tiele.\textsuperscript{119} With more and more non-Chinese coming under Chinese administration the lack of efficient Chinese supervision became more obvious. There was instability, and Tang had to reorganize its administration in order to better supervise the situation in those areas.

\textsuperscript{117} JTS, v195, p. 5196; XTS, v217A, p. 6113; ZZTJ, v198, p. 6245.
\textsuperscript{119} See Table 2.3. "The Jimi Fu-zhou of the Eastern Turks and the Tiele (630-663)."
The victory over the Western Turks, in 657, brought the Western Turks also under various area commands. Some were under the supervision of the Protectorates of Kunling and Mengchi, and all were under the Protectorate of Anxi. The Protectorate of Beiting was established in 702, to which the Protectorates of Kunling and Mengchi were attached. Unlike in Taizong's time, Tang now appointed two Turks, Ashina Mishe and Ashina Buzhen, who had submitted to Tang earlier during the reign of Taizong. They became the Protectors-general of Kunling and Mengchi instead of the Chinese. Moreover, the title of qaghan was conferred on both, an arrangement that Taizong had intentionally abandoned. Mishe was established as Xing Xiwang Qaghan and Buzhen as Ji Wangjue Qaghan. Both were entrusted, along with a Chinese minister Lu Chengqing, with the power to bestow Chinese official titles on the tribal chieftains in the protectorates. The change in Tang's attitude towards the settlement of the Turks was, in fact, the outcome of the series of Turkish uprisings against Tang, which will be discussed below in the section "The Setback in the Turkish Settlement."

With the establishment of the Protectorates of Mengchi and Kunling in 657, on the former territory of the Western Turks, the various states in Central Asia which had been formerly subjects of the Western Turks were also incorporated into the area command-prefecture system. At least 119 identifiable area commands and prefectures were set up. The vast area under this Tang administration covered Central Asia,
reaching as far as the borders of Persia.\textsuperscript{123} For a brief period, in Gaozong’s time, China covered more territory than at any other time during the Tang dynasty.\textsuperscript{124}

In contrast, this period was considered by the Turks as a time of national subjugation and humiliation. The Turkish inscriptions record:

Since the lords and peoples were not in accord, and the Chinese people were wily and deceitful, since they were tricky and created a rift between younger and elder brothers, and caused the lords and peoples to slander one another, the Turkish people caused their state which they had established to go to ruin, and their kagan (= qaghan) whom they had crowned collapse. Their sons worthy of becoming lords became slaves, and their daughters worthy of becoming ladies became servants to the Chinese people. The Turkish lords abandoned their Turkish titles. Those lords who were in China held the Chinese titles and obeyed the Chinese emperor and gave their services to him for fifty years. For the benefit of the Chinese, they went on campaigns up to (the land of) the Bükli kagan in the east, where the sun rises, and as far as the Iron Gate in the west. For the benefit of the Chinese emperor they conquered countries.\textsuperscript{125}

The inscriptions also describe the ways in which the Chinese lured the Turks into acceptance of Chinese loose control.

They (i. e., the Chinese people) give [us] gold, silver and silk in abundance. The words of the Chinese people have always been sweet and the materials of the Chinese people have always been soft. Deceiving by means of [their] sweet words and soft materials, the Chinese are said to cause the remote peoples to come close in this manner. After such a people have settled close to them, [the Chinese] are said to plan their ill will there. [The Chinese] do not let the real wise men and real brave men make progress. If a man commits an error, [the Chinese] do not give shelter to anybody [from his immediate family] to the families of his clan and tribe. Having been taken in by their sweet words and

\textsuperscript{123} This is according to Chavannes, E. 1969, pp. 55-58; pp. 192-202. See also Cen Zhongmian. 1958, Xi Tujue Shiliao Buque ji Kaozheng, pp. 139-153.
\textsuperscript{124} The number of jimi fu-zhou amounted to as many as 856 at its highest point in Xuanzong’s time according to XTS, v43B, p. 1120; THY, v70, p. 1232.
soft materials, you Turkish people, were killed in great numbers. O Turkish people, you will die! If you intend to settle at the Coyay mountains and on the Togultun plain in the south, O Turkish people, you will die! There the ill-willed persons made harmful suggestions as follows: 'If a people live afar [from them], they (i.e., the Chinese) give cheap materials [to them]; but, if a people live close to them, then [the Chinese] give them valuable materials.' Apparently such harmful suggestions made the ill-willed persons. Having heard these words, you unwise people went close to [the Chinese] and were [constantly] killed in great numbers.126

The Jimi Fu-zhou

Tang settlement of the Turks who had submitted brought into being the establishment of a system of "subordinated area commands and prefectures" (jimi fu-zhou). The practice of establishing a commandery-district system over the submitted non-Chinese either in their own former territories or where they were resettled inside, or along the Chinese frontiers, started as early as the Qin-Han period. Beginning in Tang, with the greater systematization of the institutions of the administrative apparatus, the Chinese gave the name "control by loose rein" (jimi) to the institutions under which the submitted non-Chinese were organized. Through this kind of arrangement, Tang administration of the non-Chinese expanded a great deal to cover more people and larger areas than in the Han dynasty. Like the Chinese, these non-Chinese were administered under "districts" (xian), "prefectures" (zhou) and "area commands" (dudu fu). In strategic areas, there might just be "subordinated area commands" (jimi fu) under the "protectorate" (duhu fu). Copying the Han institution of the Protectorate of the Western Regions (Xiyu duhu fu), more protectorates were founded in Tang. They combined civil and military

administration and employed Chinese civil officials backed by a standing army to supervise the non-Chinese prefectures and area commands. A protectorate was under the command of the Protector-general (duhu), usually a Chinese official, who was to

be in charge of the various barbarians, to pacify them, to take punitive actions, to keep record of their meritorious conduct, to punish their failings and to have overall control of the affairs of the protectorate.

The earliest attested usage of the word *jimi* in affairs concerning the non-Chinese is found in the essay written by the famous Han scholar, Sima Xiangru  李 襄如 in his works:

The proper relationship between Son of Heaven and barbarians is one of 'control by loose rein without severing' (*jimi wujue* 銜 肉勿 色). Most definitions of the concept of *jimi* were made in Han times. The Tang concept of the *jimi fu-zhou* is defined in the *Xin Tangshu* as follows:

After Taizong pacified the Tujue, the various Fan ('barbarians') in the northwest and Man and Yi gradually submitted. According to their tribes [the government] set up *zhou* and *xian*. The large ones were made into *dudu fu*. Their chieftains were made commanders-in-chief and prefects. [Their sons were] all allowed to inherit the posts. Even though there were registers of their tribute and taxation, they were mostly not sent up to the Ministry of Revenue (*hubu* 與 財 ). Wherever civilizing influence reached, they were all put under the control of *dudu* and *duhu* of the frontier prefectures, and were recorded in the Statutes and the Ordinances.

---

129 SJ, v117, p. 3049.
130 Yang Lien-sheng. 1968, pp. 31-32.
131 XTS, v43B, p. 1119. Hucker gives a brief definition of the *jimi fu-zhou*, which shows its basic nature: "Subordinated Prefecture, a category of administrative units into which submissive foreign and aboriginal groups were commonly organized to fit into the Chinese governmental hierarchy, usually
In his study on Tang resettlement of the non-Chinese, Zhang Qun holds that there are two criteria which determine whether a certain prefecture was a *jimi zhou* or not: 1) A *jimi zhou* had a non-Chinese qaghan whereas, in a non-*jimi zhou*, a non-Chinese chieftain was appointed area commander-in-chief, or that position was not occupied by the non-Chinese chieftain. 2) All *jimi zhou* were named after the original names of the submitted tribes. Based on these two criteria he comes to the conclusion that the prefectures (they were in fact area commands) set up for the Eastern Turks in 630 were not *jimi zhou* (or *fu*).\(^{132}\)

His conclusions do not, however, correspond to the actual reality. First, none of the *jimi fu-zhou* set up for the Turks from 630 retained the position of qaghan. And second, he neglects the definition of the *jimi fu-zhou* in the *Xin Tangshu*. In particular he fails to see that the *Xin Tangshu* also includes all the institutions set up in 630 for the Turks in the *jimi fu* section in its chapter 43B.\(^{133}\)

**Administration of the *Jimi Fu-zhou***

In addition to pacifying and eventually sinicizing the submitted non-Chinese, the *jimi fu-zhou* on the northwestern frontiers were set up with the purpose of "defending the frontiers."\(^{134}\) From 634 to 669, according to the extant records, the submitted Eastern Turks and the Tiele joined Tang military campaigns against the Tuyuhun, Gaochang, Koguryŏ, Qiuci (Kucha), Xueyantuo, Xi and Khitan, and the remnants of both Eastern and Western Turks.\(^{135}\) In Taizong and Gaozong's time the

head by hereditary native chiefs and subordinated to a Chinese Area Command (*iu-tu fu*)." See his 1985, p. 132.


\(^{133}\) *XTS*, v43B, p. 1125.

\(^{134}\) *JTS*, v121, p. 3477.

\(^{135}\) See Table 2.2. "The Participation in Tang Expeditions by the Eastern Turks and the Tiele (634-669)." One would assume that there would have been many more occasions when the nomads participated in Chinese military activities which are not recorded in the history.
nomadic area commands not only played an active role in the Tang campaigns, but also formed an important defence line as well, both as sentries and as buffer areas in the Tang frontier system.\(^{136}\)

The *jimi fu-zhou* were governed autonomously under their own non-Chinese leaders, even though theoretically, they were considered as under Chinese rule. The non-Chinese chieftains were appointed area commander-in-chief and prefect, offices in the Tang bureaucratic system. Those given noble titles such as "commandery prince" (*jun wang*) were given annual income from taxes of a fixed number of households. That the Chinese very often provided them with supplies of food is evident from Taizong's edict of 639 which says that the Chinese conferred offices on the Turks, chose fertile land and established commanderies and districts to settle them in, opened up granaries to relieve their hunger and cold and sent people around to inquire about their grievances.\(^{137}\)

As in the Han dynasty, the acceptance of "Chinese rule" by non-Chinese varied. Some prefectures changed their status from *jimi* to regular and vice versa. For example, Weizhou (in present Sichuan) was first set up in 618 for the submitted Qiang people, and then in 627 was abolished because of a Qiang rebellion. A year later, on the request of the Qiang chieftain, Weizhou was again set up and brought under the control of the Area Command of Maozhou as a *jimi* prefecture. In 665 it was promoted to a regular prefecture. After the suppression of the Qiang rebellion in 677 Weizhou again became a *jimi* prefecture until 687. Then it again became a regular prefecture.\(^{138}\)

Some *jimi fu-zhou*, such as the Area Command of Bosi, and those which were set up after the conquest of the Western Turks in 659, were just under

\(^{136}\) Kang Le. 1979, pp. 44-54.
\(^{137}\) *CFYG*, v964, pp. 11338-39.
\(^{138}\) *JTS*, v41, p. 1690; *XTS*, v42, p. 1085.
nominal Chinese control, a control soon weakened by competition from the Tibetans.\textsuperscript{139}

Tang also set up some prefectures in which non-Chinese were administered by Chinese officials. This kind of prefecture is usually not included in chapter 43B, \textit{jimi zhou}, of the Monograph of Configurations of the Land (\textit{dili zhi 地理志}) in the \textit{Xin Tangshu}. An example would be Xizhou. After 640, when Gaochang was conquered, Taizong decided to establish a prefecture, Xizhou, with a Chinese as prefect. In 642 Guo Xiaoke 郭孝恪 was appointed Prefect of Xizhou and Protector-general of Anxi.\textsuperscript{140} The decision drew strong opposition from, among others, Wei Zheng and Chu Suiliang, who insisted that Gaochang should be treated as an outer subject, maintaining its own state regime and ruler, rather than having a Chinese official in command. Wei Zheng pointed out that if Tang turned Gaochang into a prefecture, it would always have to recruit men to garrison the region. The cost of changing the guards and their supplies would exhaust Longyou 龍游 within ten years.\textsuperscript{141} Chu Suiliang held that it would not be unprecedented were Gaochang to be reconstituted with its own king and the kingdom made into an outer subject for Tang frontier defence.\textsuperscript{142} But Taizong disregarded their opinions. Gaochang occupied too important a place to be left under the control of non-Chinese.

In 651 Qu Zhichen 魯山臣 became the Protector-general of Anxi.\textsuperscript{143} By the time he died around 665, he was the Prefect of Xizhou.\textsuperscript{144} He was the brother of the former king of Gaochang. At the time of the conquest of Gaochang both of them had moved into China and had been invested with Chinese official titles and noble rank.

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{139} Chavannes, E. 1969, pp. 192-203.
\textsuperscript{140} \textit{JTS}, v83, p. 2774; \textit{ZZTJ}, v196, p.6177. The first Protector-general of Anxi was Qiao Shiwang, cf. Wu Yugu. 1987, pp. 78-79. It is possible that he was also the first prefect of Xizhou since these two posts were usually occupied by one person.
\textsuperscript{141} \textit{JTS}, v198, p. 5296; \textit{XTS}, v221A, pp. 6222-23; \textit{ZZTJ}, v195, pp. 6155-56; \textit{THY}, v95, p. 1702.
\textsuperscript{142} \textit{JTS}, v80, pp. 2736-37; \textit{XTS}, v105, p. 4028; v221A, pp. 6222-23; \textit{ZZTJ}, v196, p. 6178; \textit{THY}, v95, pp. 1702-03.
\textsuperscript{143} \textit{CFYG}, v991, p. 11641.
\textsuperscript{144} \textit{JTS}, v198, pp. 5296-97.
\end{footnotes}
The Tang court sent back Qu Zhichen, not as a native ruler but rather as a Chinese official. This post was not to be inherited by his son.\footnote{JTS, v198, pp. 5296-97; XTS, v221A, p. 6223.} After Qu's death, Pei Xingjian, a Chinese official, became the Protector-general of Anxi.\footnote{JTS, v84, pp. 2801-02; XTS, v108, p. 4086.}

Also, the six Hu (Sogdian) prefectures, Lu 領, Li 莉, Han 合, Sai 實, Yi 毛, and Qi 契, which were organized in 679 for the submitted non-Chinese, all had Chinese as prefects and are not included in the section of the *jimi zhou* of the *Xin Tangshu*.

Once they had submitted to the Chinese, non-Chinese were subject to taxation and payment of tribute just like the Chinese, but in a less regular and systematical way and at lower rates. In 644 the submitted Turks and people of Gaochang who were attached to the various Chinese prefectures were given tax exemption.\footnote{XTS, v2, p. 43.} In 647, when the Uighur and other Tiele tribes submitted to Tang and were brought into area commands and prefectures, an annual payment in the form of marten pelt was made as tax.\footnote{XTS, v217A, p. 6113; ZZTJ, v198, p. 6245; THY, v73, p. 1314; CFYG, v170, p. 2052.}

In the fragments of the Tang Taxation Statutes (*fuyi ling* 武役令) are articles concerning the non-Chinese, which are collected and translated in Twitchett's *Financial Administration under the T'ang Dynasty*. There we find the following articles:

**Art. 6.** All foreigners who have submitted and been registered should be divided into nine grades. Those of the fourth grade and above will become superior households (*shanghu* 上戸), those of the seventh grade and above secondary household (*cihu* 次戸) and those of the eighth grade and below inferior households (*xiahu* 下戸). In the superior households there shall be a tax on each adult (*dingshui* 丁税) of 10 silver coins, in secondary households one of 5 silver coins. Inferior households shall be
exempt. In the case of those who have already been registered for two or more years, in superior households each adult shall contribute two sheep, in secondary households one sheep. In inferior households three households together should jointly contribute one sheep.

[Commentary: In places where there are no sheep, the price may be converted into terms of goods of high price and small size, in accordance with the value of white sheep. If there is a military campaign and the [barbarian households] are ordered themselves to provide saddle-horses, if these are employed for thirty days or more, the current year's contribution of sheep will be remitted.]

Art. 7. In the various prefectures of Ling Nan, there shall be a levy of rice amounting to 1 shi on superior households, 8 dou on secondary households, and 6 dou on inferior households. If they are households of the Yi and Liao barbarians, each shall contribute a light tax at half of this rate.

Those Koreans from Koguryō and Pakche (i.e. Paekche) in the various prefectures who are liable for assignment to military service shall all be exempted from tax and labor service.

Art. 12. In all frontier and distant prefectures where there are places inhabited by various foreign tribes such as the Yi and Liao who should contribute taxes and labor services, these should be carefully estimated according to the circumstances, and need not be made identical with those of the Chinese themselves.

Art. 16. All those who have been held captive among the barbarians and succeed in returning shall be granted 3 years' exemption from tax if they have been held captive for more than 1 year, 4 years' remission if more than 2 years, and 5 years' remission if more than 3 years. Barbarians who seek to adopt civilization will be granted 10 years' remission.

Art. 17. Yi and Liao barbarians who are newly pacified and entered on the household registers shall be given tax exemption for 3 years.149

These items were applied to non-Chinese both in the jimī fu-zhou and in the regular prefectures. Even though some non-Chinese were not expected to pay tax they

had to pay tribute. For example, the prefectures and area commands in the Western Regions under the Protectorate of Anxi paid tribute without a break till 755 before the An Lushan rebellion.\textsuperscript{150}

Setback in the Turkish Settlement

The Turks, as a nomadic people, did not easily settle in with the agricultural Chinese. Very often they were mistreated by local Chinese officials. By moving close to the Chinese, they had hoped to obtain material goods, but gradually there emerged a strong sense of resentment against being used as military force and treated as slaves and servants as stated in the Turkish inscriptions.

The policy of resettling the Turks inside China met with its first setback in 639, nine years after it started. That year the younger brother of Tölish Qaghan, Jiesheshuai 貝赤訥, who had joined the Imperial Bodyguard after submitting to Tang, attempted a conspiracy against Taizong. He and his followers conspired with Tölish's son, who was the Commander-in-chief of Shunzhou after Tölish. Though it ended in failure, the incident aroused a universal opposition at court to the resettlement of the Turks south of the Yellow River. Taizong also voiced his deep regret that he had neglected Wei Zheng's warning. He reiterated that the Chinese were like roots while the "barbarians" were like leaves, and decided to move the Turks and the various other non-Chinese back to the steppes north of the Yellow River.\textsuperscript{151}

The decision, proclaimed in an edict, showed a changed attitude towards the Turks. Tang had restored the title of qaghan and abolished all the seven area

\textsuperscript{150} JTS, v40, p. 1650.
\textsuperscript{151} ZGY, v9, pp. 11b-12a; TD, v197, p. 1070; JTS, v3, p. 50; v194A, p. 5161; XTS, v215A, pp. 6039-40; ZZTJ, v195, p. 6147; THY, v73, p. 1314; v94, pp. 1689-90.
commands set up in 630. All the Turks formerly settled in those areas were moved north of the Yellow River with headquarters set up in Dingxiang. They were treated as outer subjects, in essence, a client state, responsible for the defence of the Chinese frontiers under Ashina Simo of the Turkish royal clan, the former Area Commander-in-chief of Huazhou. He was granted the royal surname, Li, and the title of qaghan. The titles of Wise King of the Left (zuò xiàn wàng) and Wise King of the Right (yòu xiàn wàng), which were titles used by the nomads, were conferred on Ashina Zhong 阿史那忠 and Ashina Nishu 阿史那泥孰, respectively.

Simo did not want to move as he feared an attack from the Xueyantuo, then still a powerful qaghanate north of the Gobi. Taizong had a sealed letter sent to the Xueyantuo stating that both the Xueyantuo and the Turks had received investiture from Tang, and that the Xueyantuo were to occupy the territory north of the Desert while the Turks should stay south of it. If the Xueyantuo started any incursions on the Turks, warned Taizong, Tang would launch punitive attacks. Simo moved out to the north of the Yellow River in 641. In 640 Tang again reestablished the position of the Commissioner-in-chief of Ningshuo, with responsibility for the Turkish affairs. The following year saw Tang launch a military campaign against the Xueyantuo when the latter attacked Simo.

The change in the resettlement did not mean that Taizong totally abandoned his ambition for expansion and his plan to incorporate the Turks into the territorial empire. In 644 Simo’s people asked to be allowed to move back to the area between Shengzhou

152 JTS, v38, pp. 1413-14; v39, p. 1483; XTS, v43B, p. 1125. The XTS, v43B, says that Shunzhou was maintained and other area commands were abolished, but this Shunzhou is not the one set up for the Turks. See Cen Zhongmian. 1958, v5, p. 198.
and Xiazhou south of the great loop of the Yellow River because Simo was unable to resist the attacks from the Xueyantuo, and could not maintain control over his people. Disregarding the objections of his ministers, Taizong again resettled them inside China, claiming that the "barbarians" should be treated as one member of the Chinese family. He then asked Chu Suiliang to record what he had said in the court diary.156

While it is true that Taizong indeed endeavored to incorporate the non-Chinese into the Chinese empire, both by military and peaceful means, and while it is true that there are famous statements such as the above, that attributed to him declarations of the equality of non-Chinese and Chinese, these were probably mainly for the sake of his place in history. It is hard to believe that he sincerely believed in, or tried to translate into reality, equality between Chinese and non-Chinese when one considers his remarks about the Chinese being like roots and the "barbarians" being like leaves, and when one considers his military campaigns against those non-Chinese who failed to show respect as tributaries to the Tang empire.

In 651, two years after he had submitted to Tang, Ashina Helu again rose in revolt and set up his headquarters in the Western Regions.157 From 660 to 663, the Uighurs, the Tongluo, Pugu and other Tiele people also rebelled, but all were suppressed.158 Chinese control over such people was vulnerable because it was sustained only by a small number of troops and depended mainly on the willingness or cooperation of the non-Chinese themselves. Indeed the continual round of submission and rebellion in these _jimi fu-zhou_ are so frequent that the Chinese records could not keep track of them.

The settlement policy was criticized by some Tang Chinese. In his memorial of 696 Xue Qianguang 蕭謙光 sets out the traditional view that Chinese should be separated from the non-Chinese. Referring to the string of disasters since Han caused by the settlement of non-Chinese inside or close to China, he pointed out that Chinese rulers, in order to seek empty names, had adopted the practice of letting non-Chinese settle close to China. Through these contacts, he argued, the non-Chinese had come to know the essentials of governing a country, gained insight into strategies and military affairs, and gained strategic geographical formation and intelligence about how the Chinese frontiers were guarded. Even though non-Chinese were nominally given Chinese official titles of general, there were few among them who did not make incursions into Chinese territory. He therefore suggested that the court should refuse any non-Chinese request to join the Imperial Bodyguard and that those who had come earlier should not be allowed to go back.\footnote{TD, v200, pp. 1085-86; CFYG, v544, p. 6522. Cen Zhongmian is of the opinion that Xue presented his memorial in 697. See his 1958, v8, pp. 337-338.}

Reviewing the policies of earlier periods, and stressing the need to follow the policy of frontier defence, Liu Kuang 劉闗, another Tang official, was sharply critical of the resettlement of non-Chinese inside China. He summed up succinctly the sad dilemma the policy caused: when the "barbarians" were strong China exhausted its manpower in attacking them. When they became submissive China then nourished them. In such a fashion the Chinese had been put to work by the "barbarians" for thousands of years.\footnote{TD, v200, pp. 1086-87; XTS, v215A, pp. 6023-24.}

Liu Kuang's insight pinpoints the negative side of the Chinese policy of the non-Chinese resettlement. The nomads, when finally brought under Chinese administrative control, would use the occasion to recover their strength, so that even though the Chinese aimed to use the submitted nomads as a military force to keep peace...
on the borders and reenforce the legitimacy of the Son of Heaven, in actual fact the
Chinese government was not strong enough to effectively control them. Once an
opportunity presented itself the nomads would again rebel. This was the state of affairs
that led to the breakdown of the jimi system over the Turks in Empress Wu's reign.

China and the Revival of the Second Turkish Empire

In 679 the Eastern Turks began a movement to restore their power. Almost all
the Turks who had formerly submitted joined it and the jimi fu-zhou administrative
structure broke down. The Chinese immediately despatched troops to put down the
rebellion which was suppressed in 681. But the following year saw yet stronger and
more forceful military attacks on Tang frontiers led by Guduolu (Qutlugh), who had assumed the title of qaghan. In 683, under his severe attack,
Fengzhou was in such danger that the court even considered abolishing the prefecture
in order to concentrate on the defence of Lingzhou and Xiazhou. It only gave up the
idea when it realized that abandoning Fengzhou would actually open up China even
wider to nomadic incursions.161

It is generally considered that the second Turkish empire began in 682.
Qutlugh's younger brother Mochuo (Bag Chor) Qaghan succeeded to the
throne in 691,162 and continued to strengthen the newly revived regime. The Turkish
inscriptions record a series of military campaigns waged to reestablish and consolidate
the second empire.163

---

161 JTS, v93, p. 2978; XTS, v111, p. 4149; ZZTJ, v203, p. 6414.
Empress Wu, who had started her Zhou dynasty in 690, continued to lead China into military confrontations with the Turks. Some Chinese sources record that in 695 Bäg Chor Qaghan despatched an embassy to ask to "surrender" or to sue for peace. The so-called "surrender" reflects more the Chinese official wording than actual fact. But Bäg Chor from this time on did try to make peace with China, probably with the aim of utilizing Chinese resources to consolidate his own power. Empress Wu, not uninterested in peace with the Turks, responded by conferring the title of the General-in-chief of the Left Guard and Duke Who Submits to the (Tang) State (guiguo gong) on Bäg Chor Qaghan.164

Between 696 and 698, when China was troubled with the incursions of the Khitan, Bäg Chor Qaghan proposed that he would attack the Khitan for China on the condition that China return the Turks who had formerly surrendered and had been resettled in the Hexi area.165 The attacks on the Khitan by the Turks won them more power as well as more concessions from Empress Wu. She conferred more titles on Bäg Chor, including the title of qaghan.166 It was an obvious recognition of the independent power of the Turks, even though, according to Chinese historical records, they were still within the tribute system.

Empress Wu sent two envoys, Yan Zhiwei and Tian Guidao, on a mission to the Turks. Their differing attitudes towards the Turks showed the vacillation of the Chinese in their treatment of their newly revived enemy. While Yan Zhiwei, at Bäg Chor's headquarters, performed a ritual dance to Bäg Chor, the etiquette due only to an emperor, and went so far as to kiss the tip of Bäg Chor's boots, Tian Guidao, on the other hand, still believed that the Turks should

164 JTS, v194A, p. 5168; ZZTJ, v205, p. 6503; THY, v94, p. 1691.
be subject. He did not kowtow to Bäg Chor Qaghan and made only a respectful bow.
Bäg Chor was furious and imprisoned him. He was even going to kill Tian, and was
only dissuaded by his ministers.\footnote{\textit{JTS}, v185A, pp. 4794-95; \textit{XTS}, v197, p. 5624; \textit{ZZTJ}, v205, p. 6503; v206, p. 6515.}

After attacking the Khitan Bäg Chor made further requests: 1) that he should
send his daughter to marry a Chinese prince; 2) that China return the surrendered Turks
who had settled inside six prefectures, and return the land under the Protectorate of
Chanyu;\footnote{There is ambiguity about which six prefectures Bäg Chor demanded. According to the "Biography of Tian Guidao" (\textit{JTS}, v185A, p. 4794; \textit{XTS}, v197, p. 5624), he requested the six Hu prefectures, which, as E. G. Pulleyblank concludes, refer to the prefectures of Lu, Li, Han, Sai, Yi and Qi. See Pulleyblank, E. G. 1952, p. 330, note 1, and Cen Zhongmian. 1964, pp. 123-124. Another opinion is that the six refer to the prefectures of Feng, Sheng, Ling, Xia, Shuo and Dai. See \textit{TD}, v198, p. 1073; \textit{JTS}, v194A, pp. 5168-69; \textit{XTS}, v215A, p. 6045; \textit{ZZTJ}, v206, p. 6516; \textit{THY}, v94, p. 1691; Zhang Qun. 1955, pp. 275-279. Hou Linbo. 1976, pp. 24-27. Zhang Qun also holds that the six prefectures were under the supervision of the Protectorate of Chanyu. See his 1955, pp. 327-328.} 3) that China provide farming tools and seed-grain and iron to the Turks.
The court wanted to refuse the requests and a bellicose response was proposed, but the
Turks forced the issue by arrogant language and by detaining the Chinese envoy.
Some court officials argued in favor of an agreement because the Khitan were still a
major force to contend with on the frontier. Empress Wu finally yielded to Bäg Chor's
requests and moved several thousand households of non-Chinese back to the steppe,
provided 40,000 \textit{hu} of seed grain, 50,000 \textit{duan} of silks, 3,000 farm tools,
40,000 \textit{jin} \frac{1}{4} of iron and agreed to conclude a marriage contract.\footnote{\textit{TD}, v198, p. 1073; \textit{JTS}, v194A, pp. 5168-69; \textit{XTS}, v215A, p. 6045; \textit{ZZTJ}, v206, p. 6516; \textit{THY}, v94, p. 1691. The sequence of the events in this period is quite confusing as different sources have different records. See Cen Zhongmian. 1958, v8, pp. 330-340; 1964, pp. 124-127.}

By now Bäg Chor had firmly reestablished the second Turkish empire. The
shift in the balance of power had given Bäg Chor the upper hand in the bargaining. He
made more demands which Empress Wu often had to satisfy. When Bäg Chor
requested a marriage between his daughter and a Chinese prince, an arrangement which
would give the Turks an equal, if not higher, position by virtue of Bäg Chor's
becoming the father-in-law of a Chinese prince,\textsuperscript{170} still Empress Wu had to agree. In 698 she sent her grand-nephew, Wu Yanxiu, to the Turks to receive the lady but Bäg Chor refused to recognize Wu Yanxiu as a member from the family of the Son of Heaven. He insisted that the daughter of a qaghan should marry a prince of the Son of Heaven, which amounted to an equal match. He also proclaimed his intention to help reestablish the Li house of the Tang dynasty. In his declaration of war, he further accused the Chinese of providing boiled seed grain, gold and silver utensils of bad quality, silk textiles which were loosely woven, and of taking away the red and purple Chinese official dress, which Bäg Chor had given to his ministers. He openly showed his contempt for the Wu family.\textsuperscript{171} The two sides soon entered into a period of continuous warfare which lasted until 703 when Bäg Chor Qaghan again asked for a marriage alliance. This time Empress Wu presented two princes of the Li house, the sons of Tang Zhongzong, for the Turks to choose from.\textsuperscript{172}

\textbf{The Change in Tang Frontier Defences}

One severe impact of the Turkish break away from the Tang \textit{jimi} system was that Tang could no longer use these nomads for frontier defence. Not only did the Chinese have to use more of their own forces, but they also had to reinforce the frontiers against formerly submissive nomads like the Turks. Since these nomads were now familiar with the frontier areas their incursions could be more effective. Faced with such a situation, Tang could no longer continue with an aggressive policy against

\textsuperscript{170}\textit{JTS}, v91, p. 2939; \textit{XTS}, v120, p. 4321; \textit{ZZTJ}, v206, p. 6530. The version in the \textit{XTS} that no Son of Heaven ever married a "barbarian" woman is probably wrong. The Zhou king married a non-Chinese. Also in this case it was not the emperor but a prince whom the Turks proposed for a marriage.


\textsuperscript{172}\textit{TD}, v198, p. 1074; \textit{JTS}, v194A, p. 5170; \textit{XTS}, v215A, p. 6047; \textit{CFYG}, v979, p. 11498. According to Cen Zhongmian, they were Chongfu and Chongjun, see Cen Zhongmian. 1958, v11, p. 546.
the nomads such as was carried out in Taizong and early Gaozong's time. It had to change to a more defensive policy based on the strengthening of frontier defences.

From the later part of the reign of Gaozong onwards, the Chinese had started to build up permanent and larger defensive units on the frontiers such as "armies" (jun 军) and "fortresses" (cheng 城). They were intended to be permanently ready to do the jobs formerly performed by expeditionary armies. This was a natural development in Chinese military strategy after the previous expansion since building up the frontier defences would allow the Chinese to maintain control. Moreover, the unavailability of the Eastern Turkish forces made the building of strong defences even more necessary.

When Bāg Chor resumed attacks on Tang in 706 Emperor Zhongzong broke off the marriage agreement with the Turks and announced that anyone who could kill Bāg Chor would be enfeoffed and given the rank of general-in-chief. When he asked his ministers to present advice as to how to deal with this formidable enemy, it was suggested that armies should be drilled and put in readiness, alliances should be made with other non-Chinese against the Turks, and people should be settled in frontier areas to be organized as permanent troops. In 708, following the advice of Zhang Renyuan, Zhongzong ordered the building of three walled towns called "Shouxiang Fortresses" (Shouxiang cheng 受降城) close to the great loop of the Yellow River, stretching from Shengzhou to Fengzhou, each occupying a strategic position to prevent Turkish attacks. These three heavily manned fortresses produced some effect in preventing the Turks from invading. Troops in the garrison at Shuofang were significantly reduced.

175 TD, v198, p. 1074; JTS, v194A, pp. 5170-72; ZTTJ, v208, p. 6609.
Reliance on non-Chinese organized into area commands for defence was risky. However, the Chinese continued their efforts to use the military strength of the non-Chinese whenever possible by recruiting non-Chinese into their armies as generals or soldiers, or by forming marriage and other alliances with non-Chinese regimes. The practice became even more prevalent during Xuanzong's reign, which saw many non-Chinese soldiers and generals such as An Lushan in the Chinese armies. In 714, when Xuanzong was preparing to assume personal command in a campaign against the Tibetans, there were 200,000 non-Chinese soldiers in his army. The Tiele people were also deployed as part of the military force.

The policy of reenforcing frontier defence continued, in Xuanzong's reign, to be the major means of guarding against the Turks. More armies were established; up to 742, altogether forty-seven are listed by name. Some, such as the Tianbing 天兵 Army were set up in Bingzhou 并州 in 717 and armies set up in Dingzhou 定州, Hengzhou 恆州, Mozhou 莫州, Yizhou 易州 and Cangzhou 漠州 in 726 were mainly for defence against the Turks. At the beginning of the Kaiyuan (713) the annual frontier expenditure was approximately 2,000,000 strings of "cash" (qian 钱). By the end of the reign period (741) it had already reached 10,000,000. By the end of Tianbao (755) it had again increased to 14 or 15 million. The system of appointing "military commissioners" (jiedu shi 郡督使) as permanent military governors in the frontier areas was also fully

---

178 For example, Tang tried to ally with the Türgishi of the Western Turks.
179 CFYG, v118, p. 1407.
180 For example, in a decree of 716, Chinese troops were organized with the Nine Surnames of the Tiele. See TDZLJ, v130, "Ming Xue Na deng beifa zhi," pp. 706-707; QTW, v253, pp. 3242-43.
181 Pulleyblank, E. G. 1955, p. 68.
developed. By the early 720's the northern and western frontiers had been organized into a series of nine major "command zones" (dao 道).184

The strengthening of the defence system also served to improve Chinese ability to suppress the Turks and other non-Chinese who had been settled along the Tang frontiers. In 715, when Bāg Chor was fighting to win back the rebellious Qarluq, Hulunwú 胡禄屋 and Shunishi 鼠尼施 tribes, Xuanzong ordered Chinese troops to the rescue. The establishment of the Tianbing Army of 80,000 troops in 717 was in response to the perceived need to properly supervise the Tiele Turks who had recently surrendered and were scattered north of Taiyuan.185

Within its heavy frontier defences, Tang seemed secure at last and able to enjoy some peace. But it was at the cost of a weakened domestic defence system for the capital. This was a factor contributing to the situation which led to the rebellion of An Lushan in 755.

Xuanzong and the Last Phase of the Second Turkish Empire

During Ruizong's reign, and early in Xuanzong's reign, the Turks asked several times for a marriage alliance, to which Tang agreed.186 Peaceful relations were not established, however, until 718.

---

186 Ruizong promised to send Princess Jinshan to marry Bāg Chor, but the marriage did not proceed because of Ruizong's abdication. See JTS, v194A, p. 5172; XTS, v215A, p. 6047; ZZTJ, v210, p. 6664; p. 6671; CFYG, v979, p. 11499. In 713, Bāg Chor Qaghan's son Yangwozhi came to request to join the Imperial Bodyguard and to marry a Chinese princess. Xuanzong agreed. See XTS, v215A, p. 6047; ZZTJ, v210, p. 6686; CFYG, v979, p. 11499. In 714, Bāg Chor twice asked for a marriage. Xuanzong agreed to send a princess the following year. In exchange he requested Bāg Chor to send a prince to join the Imperial Bodyguard. See ZZTJ, v211, p. 6699; p. 6706; CFYG, v979, p. 11499; QTW, v40, "Ci Tujue shu," p. 532.
In his expansion into the Western Regions, Bäg Chor attacked the Tang Protectorate of Beiting without much success.\(^{187}\) As he got older, his rule became more tyrannical and he taxed his people more and more heavily, as a result of which his power weakened, and from the beginning of Xuanzong's reign more and more of his subjects, including the Western Turks and the Tiele Turks, rebelled against him and submitted to Chinese rule. After a series of battles against internal rebels, Bäg Chor was killed by the Bayegu tribe in 716.\(^{188}\)

To settle the Turks who had submitted between 714 and 720, Xuanzong adopted several measures: 1) He invested the tribal leaders with Chinese official titles and let them reside in China or go back to their own territories. 2) He settled some Turks south of the great loop of the Yellow River. 3) He reorganized some of the *jimi fu-zhou* and set up area commands and prefectures in their own territories under Chinese supervision, and 4) he settled the Uighurs, Tongluo and other non-Chinese to the north of the Dawu Army (north of Daizhou).\(^{189}\) In spite of all that had happened previously, Xuanzong still could not keep the nomads away from China.

The situation at this time, however, differed from the situation during the period of the Taizong and Gaozong. Then the Turks had no state power of their own outside China. In the second Turkish empire, even though there was a time of instability after Bäg Chor's death, soon Bilgä Qaghan, the son of Qutluq, was set up by his older brother who had killed Bäg Chor's son, the successor of Bäg Chor. This empire greatly inspired the submitted Turks to leave China. Many of them rebelled against Tang and went to Bilgä Qaghan, who adopted a policy of winning them back.\(^{190}\)


\(^{188}\) Cen Zhongmian. 1958, v9, pp. 396-397.

\(^{189}\) For details, see Cen Zhongmian. 1958, v9, pp. 379-410; Table 2. 4. "The *Jimi Fu-zhou* set up for the Turks in Xuanzong's Time."

In view of the rebellions of the Turks, Wang Jun, the Administrator of the Area Command of Bingzhou, gave voice to the following worries in a memorial. He said that with many Turks settled in the frontier region Tang was bound to have troubles since these Turks could provide intelligence for, and cooperate with, the Turks under Bilgä Qaghan in attacking Tang. He suggested that the court move these nomads further inside China. It was a bad policy, he believed, to keep large numbers of mixed Chinese and non-Chinese troops on the frontiers for defence. Xuanzong did not, however, heed his opinion.¹⁹¹

Soon Wang Jun's warning of disaster proved to be true. In the winter of 716 the Tiele Axilan and Xietie tribes rose in revolt against Tang. The direct cause of the rebellion was that the Vice Protector-general Zhang Zhiyun had confiscated all their weapons when they came to submit. After complaining to the Patrolling Inspector, they got back their weapons, but soon they rebelled and captured Zhang Zhiyun. Tang fought with the Turks and recaptured Zhang who was then executed by the court. The Turks went over to Bilgä Qaghan.¹⁹² Xuanzong issued an edict which blamed Zhang Zhiyun for improper management of non-Chinese affairs, and stressed that local officials must show great concern for resettled non-Chinese.¹⁹³

It was a difficult job to keep the non-Chinese who settled on the frontiers under control. Zhang Zhiyun's intention in taking away the weapons of the submitted nomads may have been to lessen the potential danger they might pose to the Chinese, to make them docile and take up agriculture so that they would become peaceful settlers. Obviously such a measure would have encountered resistance from the nomads.

When the Xietie and Pugu tribes who had settled near Shouxiang Fortress were about to rise in rebellion with the assistance of the Turks outside the frontiers, in 720 the Chinese learned of their intention and killed almost 800 of them.\textsuperscript{194} The massacre aroused great fear and suspicion in the Tongluo and Bayegu tribes, and Zhang Yue 張誨, the Commissioner-in-chief of Tianbing (Tianbing jiedu dashi), had to go in person to console them so as to avoid further troubles.\textsuperscript{195} A year later, led by Kang Daibin 康待宾, the Sogdian people who had settled in the former six Hu prefectures of Lu, Li, Han, Sai, Yi and Qi in the Hequ 河曲 region (in present Qinghai) also rose in revolt. It took a year for Tang to suppress the rebellion. The remnants of the non-Chinese in the Hequ area, about 50,000 of them altogether, were moved to the areas of Xuzhou 萧州, Ruzhou 濮州, Tangzhou 唐州, Dengzhou 慈州, Xianzhou 仙州 and Yuzhou 溆州. The area south of the Yellow River in Shuofang became an empty land.\textsuperscript{196}

In 718 Bilgä Qaghan sued for peace with Tang. Xuanzong agreed to a peace settlement.\textsuperscript{197}

Almost immediately afterwards, Xuanzong issued a decree that the frontier defences should be reorganized and that a major military campaign against the Turks should be launched in cooperation with the submitted non-Chinese. However, the campaign does not seem to have taken place,\textsuperscript{198} probably because of the peace proposal. In 720 military encounters between Tang and the Turks still occurred, as a

\textsuperscript{194} JTS, v93, p. 2988; XTS, v111, pp. 4155-56; ZZTJ, v212, pp. 6740-41.
\textsuperscript{195} JTS, v97, p. 3052; XTS, v125, p. 4407; ZZTJ, v212, p. 6741.
\textsuperscript{196} For details about the rebellion, Tang suppression and the resettlement, see JTS, v8, p. 182; p. 184; v92, p. 2963; v93, pp. 2988-89; v97, pp. 3052-53; v103, p. 3190; XTS, v111, p. 4156; v125, pp. 4407-08; v133, p. 4545; ZZTJ, v212, p. 6745; pp. 6746-47; p. 6752.
\textsuperscript{198} ZZTJ, v212, p. 6732; Cen Zhongmian. 1958, v9, p. 405.
result of which Bilgä won back the Turkish people who had formerly been under Bāg Chor's, and then had been under Tang's control. 199

Peace finally prevailed between Tang and the Turks. In 721 Bilgä Qaghan sent an envoy to Tang to make peace, to establish a father-son relationship and form a marriage alliance. In response Xuanzong sent a letter to Bilgä Qaghan recalling the days when Tang and the Turks had been at peace, and when both had benefited from bilateral trade in Turkish horses and Chinese silk. The letter showed an attitude towards an equal adversary rather than towards tributary. As for the father-son relationship, it was set up in name, but no marriage was arranged. 200

The use of kinship terms to describe Chinese relations with their neighbors was quite common, such as brothers between Han and the Xiongnu, uncle and nephew between Tang and Tibet, father-in-law and son-in-law in marriage alliance and father-son between Tang and the Turks. While these ties "functioned in the international field on the basis of a tacitly accepted principle of equality," 201 to the Chinese, they implied a superior-inferior relationship and therefore would be justified in their world order.

From 723 till the death of Bilgä in 734, peace was kept by the two sides. About twenty-eight missions went to Tang from the Turks. About five hundred and nineteen titles were given to Turkish officials and tribal leaders. 202 Chinese official dress and silk products were also given to the Turks to induce them to remain peacefully under the tribute system. Seven letters were written by Zhang Jiuling 張九齡 on behalf of Xuanzong to the Turks between 734 and 736, which stressed a mutual commitment to the maintenance of peace and a harmonious father-son relationship and

201 Suzuki Chusei. 1968, p. 186.
202 The number is based on the record in Cen Zhongmian. 1958, v10, pp. 421-440.
showed that the Chinese were anxious to maintain the benefits of stable imperial control on frontiers and to extend the control through the tribute system to their neighbors.\(^{203}\)

In 727 the Turks refused to join forces with the Tibetans, who were planning to make an incursion into the Tang frontiers, and instead sent an embassy to the Tang court. Pleased by the friendly gesture, Xuanzong designated a border market in Shuofang for the Turks to trade with the Chinese. Tang sent several tens of thousand *pi* of silk to the Turks annually in exchange for horses.\(^{204}\)

Nevertheless there was still no marriage despite continuous requests from the Turks. Tang made the excuse that Bilgä had not sent an envoy of high enough rank to make the request, and had not prepared adequate betrothal gifts,\(^{205}\) or that Tang and the Turks had a father-son relationship, and therefore, could not enter into a father and son-in-law relationship.\(^{206}\) In 734 Xuanzong did finally agree to a marriage because of the persistence of the Turks,\(^{207}\) but with Bilgä's death the plan was permanently shelved.

Bilgä Qaghan was poisoned by one of his officials in 734.\(^{208}\) After his death constant internal power struggles seriously weakened the empire, and Tang, taking advantage of the situation, successfully enticed the Tiele people into an alliance and launched heavy attacks on the Turks.

In 738 the court set up Youzhou in the former six Hu prefectures in a move to encourage non-Chinese to relocate there from inside China.\(^{209}\) In 742 five thousand Turkish households including Abusi and Bâg Chor's grandson, Bilgä's daughter and other royal family members came to submit. Xuanzong settled them south of the Yellow River in Shuofang, provided them with

\(^{203}\) Herbert, P. A. 1978, p. 12. For these letters, see *Qujiang Zhang Xianshen Wenji*, v11.

\(^{204}\) *JTS*, v194A, p. 5177; *XTS*, v215B, p. 6053; *ZZTJ*, v213, p. 6779.

\(^{205}\) *ZZTJ*, v212, p. 6761; *CFYG*, v979, p. 11501.

\(^{206}\) *TD*, v198, p. 1075; *JTS*, v194A, pp. 5175-76; *XTS*, v215B, p. 6053; *ZZTJ*, v212, pp. 6764-65; *CFYG*, v979, p. 11501.

\(^{207}\) *XTS*, v215B, p. 6054; *CFYG*, v979, p. 11504.

\(^{208}\) *JTS*, v194A, p. 5177; *XTS*, v215B, p. 6054; *ZZTJ*, v214, p. 6809.

food and gave them 10,000 duan of silk every year. It would only be ten years later, however, that Abusi would again lead his people in a rebellion against Tang before the An Lushan rebellion.\textsuperscript{210}

The Turkish Baimei (Bolmis) Qaghan was killed by the Uighurs in 745. His head was sent to Chang'an. With this act came the end of the second Turkish empire and the beginning of the third Turkish empire established by another powerful nomadic people, the Uighurs.\textsuperscript{211}

**Tang and the Türgish of the Western Turks**

From the time of the establishment of the Protectorates of Kunling and Mengchi in 658, until Zhongzong's reign, the Chinese were confronted by the powerful Tibetans who challenged Chinese authority in the Western Regions. After the death of Ashina Mishe (in 662) and Ashina Buzhen (in 666 or 667), the Protectors-general of Kunling and Mengchi, respectively, the Chinese lost control over the Western Turks, and their strength in the Western Regions was unable to match the formidable Tibetan power. The Four Garrisons under the Protectorate of Anxi in the Tarim Basin were lost. Although the court strove to resume and keep control over the Western Turks by granting official titles whenever possible, and did in fact recover the Four Garrisons in 692, both the Chinese and the Western Turkish rulers were unable to exercise much power over the Turkish people, mostly because of the disturbances from the Eastern Turks as well as because of the general incompetence of Western Turkish rulers.\textsuperscript{212}

\textsuperscript{211} XTS, v215B, p. 6055; ZZTJ, v215, p. 6863.
\textsuperscript{212} JTS, v194B, pp. 5188-90; XTS, v215B, pp. 6064-66. See also Ise Sentarō. 1968, pp. 243-262; Wu Yuguì. 1987, pp. 87-94.
The Tūrgish, a tribe of Western Turks which had been organized into the Area Commands of Walu and Jieshan (or Xieshan) in 658, now grew into the dominant force in the region between the Issyk-Kul and Lake Balkash, attracting Western Turks formerly under the control of Ashina’s clan.

The Tūrgish, though surrounded by great powers such as China, Tibet, the second Turkish empire and the Arabs, maintained their independence by forging skillful alliances with one or two of the powers against the others. In its relations with the Tūrgish, Tang often sought an alliance. It never had to consider any settlement policy, since the Tūrgish maintained their independence.

Conclusion

In Sui-Tang relations with the nomads, there existed two constant patterns. On the part of the nomads, when they were strong they challenged Chinese superiority; when they were weak they submitted to China and requested Chinese assistance so that they could recover and build up their strength. The Chinese, for their part, would accept the submission of the nomads, since it was less costly than engaging in wars. Moreover, the submission enabled the Chinese rulers to make use of the nomadic military force for their own purposes, and proved that the rule of the Son of Heaven was benevolent and virtuous, a factor that served to strengthen the legitimacy of the Son of Heaven.

During the Sui dynasty, the Chinese rulers in their dealings with the Turks attempted to set one party against the other in a policy of "divide and rule." The policy partially succeeded in speeding up the split between the Eastern and Western Turks, and in bringing part of the Eastern and Western Turks into the Chinese hegemonic empire. In settling the Turks Emperor Yang intentionally let the Turks keep their
nomadic life-style and military forces in order to use the nomads against other "barbarians."

The successes of the policy of divide and rule, however, depended essentially on the strength of the Chinese and on the internal conflicts and weaknesses among the Turks themselves. Though the policy of settlement enabled the Chinese to make use of the nomadic military force and to show off the imperial power of the Son of Heaven, it also had a negative impact on China in that it helped the Turks recover their strength. When the Turks became strong and Sui declined, the Turks broke away from the Chinese and their attacks against Sui accelerated the collapse of dynastic power.

During the time of Tang Gaozu, under severe pressure from the Turks and constrained by a shifting of the balance of power, China had to accommodate endless demands from the Turks and abandon traditional Chinese claims to superiority. These actions were necessary in order to prevent the Turks from making even more incursions and from assisting the other anti-Tang forces.

Taking advantage of internal struggles among the Turks, Taizong conquered the Eastern Turks in 630 and the Xueyantuo in 646. In 659 of Gaozong's reign the Chinese defeated the Western Turks.

For fifty years, from 630 to 679, the Turks were incorporated into the Chinese hegemonic empire. As part of their process of systematizing administrative institutions, Tang organized the jimī fu-zhou to settle the Turks who had submitted. The institution drew a line between the nomads and the Chinese. Tang appointed non-Chinese chieftains as area commanders-in-chief and prefects, thus bringing non-Chinese into the bureaucratic system, but it allowed the nomads to keep their own life-style. The main purpose of this arrangement was to use the nomadic forces for frontier defences. When Taizong accepted Wen Yanbo's suggestion for resettling the Turks, it was also expected that the jimī fu-zhou would be a process of pacification and gradual assimilation. Compared with the Han dynasty, more protectorates were set up and
Chinese administration over the non-Chinese through the *jimi* system expanded to cover a larger area.

In her study on the Chinese minorities in modern times, June T. Dreyer concludes that the present Chinese system of autonomous areas was borrowed from the Soviet Union. The idea behind the institution is as follows:

It was hoped that allowing the relatively free expression of ethnic characteristics would lead to a gradual diminution of nationality tensions and result in more harmonious relations among ethnic groups. As trust among ethnic groups increased, the close connection between ethnic group forms and political loyalties would weaken, creating the basis for the emergence of a more homogeneous culture.\(^1\)

Such remarks are applicable to the practice of the *jimi fu-zhou* in the Tang dynasty. In fact the root of the modern autonomous regions in the People's Republic of China can be traced back to these particularly Chinese political institutions in Tang rather than to the practice of the Soviet Union.

As for the Turks themselves they retained their own culture, life-style, sense of independence, and most important of all, their military force based on horses. All were elements of instability to the Chinese. The Turks finally broke away from the Chinese hegemonic empire and restored their second empire in 682.

Following the Turkish restoration, Tang policy of strengthening their frontier defences became even more necessary. The policy was implemented with great efforts in the reign of Gaozong after a large scale expansion. When the military forces of the Turks who had submitted were not only unavailable to the Chinese but also constituted a real threat, the Chinese had to mobilize their own troops. In Xuanzong's period Tang attached great importance to building up frontier defences and at the same time still recruited non-Chinese into the armies. Eventually the internal defences, especially in

\(^1\) Dreyer, J. T. 1976, p. 262.
the capital region, suffered from a lack of resources and were weakened, thus contributing to the situation that finally led to the disaster of the An Lushan rebellion.

Though Xuanzong resumed the practice of establishing *jimi fu-zhou*, and resettled the submitted Turks south of the Yellow River, the Chinese had to continually cope with their rebellions. Especially when the Turks restored their second empire, this new state power acted as a magnet drawing more Turks away from China. From 722 Tang and the second Turkish empire had a peaceful relationship based on the tribute system. It ended when the Turkish empire fell into decline and the Chinese renewed their attacks. In 745 the last Tujue Turkish qaghan was killed by the Uighurs, ending the second empire.

Wolfram Eberhard, when defining some general patterns of historical development of the relationships between social groups, differentiates two types. One brings together two or more social groups into a new unit, and one is a breakdown of once-unified societies into smaller units. The geographical and cultural spread of Chinese civilization, absorbing more and more groups into itself, fits, to a large extent, into the first category. The settlement policy, particularly, reflects this tendency. The policy was in accordance with the Chinese model of hegemonic empire in which the Son of Heaven as a suzerain had the responsibilities of establishing political legitimacy and of providing economic and military assistance to their vassals in return for military service from some of them. On the part of the nomads, however, submission was mainly an expedient measure to gain political advantage. When the situation was appropriate for a stronger attitude or when Chinese rule was unbearable they would throw away the umbrella of the suzerain and start "making troubles" again, dealing with China on an equal footing.

---

The Chinese long ago realized that, among other things, the mobility of the nomads based on their horses was a vitally important strong point of the nomads for their incursions and their instability when under the Chinese rule. In the Sui dynasty, the Chinese built walled towns for the Turks, and in Tang they attempted to make the submitted nomads live close to them. As the Turkish inscriptions say, to attract the nomads the Chinese gave cheap goods to a people who lived afar, and valuable goods to a people who lived close to them. Then some of the people who went close to the Chinese were killed in great numbers.\textsuperscript{215} From the Chinese point of view the settlement policy also had the purpose of decreasing the mobility of the nomads.

Such a policy seems to have had some effect, but its success depended on many conditions and could not last very long. Horses and pasture always enabled the nomads to recover their forces no matter how often they were defeated. The fact is, in the words of D. Sinor:

\begin{quote}
Until firearms came to dominate warfare, a well-disciplined, well-led Inner Asian cavalry force -- provided it was sufficiently large and disposed of an important reserve of mounts -- was virtually invincible by armies of sedentary populations.\textsuperscript{216}
\end{quote}

The great steppes in Asia provided suitable pastures for horse raising. Once the nomads lost adequate pasture land, they would lose their formidable force.\textsuperscript{217} Beginning in the eighteenth century when the nomadic people of Central Asia were pressed from two sides by the Manchu empire and the Russian empire, which geographically as well as politically formed a circle around them, thus curtailing for the first time their freedom of movement, the nomads declined and finally ceased to be a great threat to the agricultural peoples.\textsuperscript{218}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{216} Sinor, D. 1972, p. 171.
\textsuperscript{217} Sinor, D. 1972, p. 181.
\textsuperscript{218} Jagchid Sechin and Hyer, P. 1979, pp. 294-295.
\end{footnotesize}
In his study on the various reasons for constant nomadic invasion into agricultural areas, Xiao Qiqing 肖金兵 has made a general survey of modern studies on the issue.\textsuperscript{219} They stress one important fact that there were sharp differences between nomadic and agricultural societies in aspects of geography and ecology which led to different political, economic and cultural structures. The nature of the two societies created their inevitable incompatibility as Lattimore concludes:

Something inherent in the society of China and something cardinal to the nature of steppe society prevented the fusion of the two in a compound, integrated order of extensive and intensive economy, dispersed and concentrated society. Neither could hold away from the other, and yet neither could absorb or even permanently subdue the other.

He further states that it was the penetration of all Asia by European and American industrialized order of society that made possible the integration of the two societies.\textsuperscript{220}

\textsuperscript{219} Xiao Qiqing. 1972, pp. 609-619.
\textsuperscript{220} Lattimore, O. 1951, pp. 511-512.
Chapter III
The Sui-Tang Wars with Koguryŏ

From the time of Emperor Wen of the Sui dynasty to the time of Gaozong of the Tang dynasty, the Chinese launched several massive and costly military expeditions against Koguryŏ. These wars provide us with examples of the Chinese actively engaging in aggressive expeditions. Although ultimately successful under Tang Gaozong in the sense that Koguryŏ was destroyed, the wars had questionable long-term benefit to China. In this chapter we will discuss these Korean wars and investigate Chinese motives and the policies they imposed.

Military force has always been the ultimate means to settle internal and external political conflicts. Chinese history is not exceptional in this respect. According to Confucianism military and peaceful means do not have to be contradictory but can be mutually complementary, parts of a single policy.¹ Military force is legitimate in that it is through the instrument of war that

The lawless are kept in awe, and accomplished virtue is displayed. Sages have risen to their eminence by means of them, and men of confusion have been removed.²

Military force compelled Korea to submit to the Han dynasty. As an instrument of foreign policy, it also played an important and active role in Tang foreign relations, especially before the An Lushan rebellion in 755.³

¹ Yang, Lien-sheng. 1968, pp. 24-26.
² Zuozhuan (Xiang 27), 531::534.
³ Pulleyblank, E. G. 1976, p. 35.
Opinions of Modern Scholars

Discussions about Sui-Tang Chinese motives in wars with Koguryo in modern works recognize the two imperatives governing Chinese foreign relations -- "ideological purity" in the sense that proper course of affairs should correspond to the theory of the Chinese world order, and "pragmatic considerations," a willingness to set aside theory when the exigencies of realpolitik demanded it.

In the Tang strategic consideration, Koguryo posed a potential threat of forming an alliance with the local powers of the Hebei region. In his study on the An Lushan rebellion of 755 Pulleyblank observes the presence of strong separatist sentiments in the Hebei region where An Lushan had his basis. He suggests that the Tang court at Chang'an felt threatened by close relations between Hebei and its neighbor, Koguryo, and therefore persisted in wars against Koguryo so as to maintain control over Hebei.4

From the point of view of geopolitics Somers points out that three regions of China -- Northwest China, the North China Plain, and the Lower Yangtze -- were the most important areas for dynastic consolidation. Any regime had to have a dominant control in these three regions to be able to claim any real unification of China. He thus considers Tang Taizong's campaigns into the border regions of the Northeast as a necessary step for the extension of imperial rule into the North China Plain and as an important coercive measure for the full consolidation of dynastic power.5

Wechsler concludes that Tang feared that Koguryo would unify the whole Korean peninsula, so it wanted to keep Korea divided and prevent its alliance with other non-Chinese in eastern Manchuria and in Japan. He suggests that Taizong, facing a crisis following the succession dispute of 643, simply wanted to be away from the court during this time. He also points out the dynastic ambition in Taizong who

---

justified his plan to attack Koguryō by saying that the territory of Koguryō had been a part of the Chinese empire under Han.  

Nishijima Sadao emphasizes more the theoretical or ideological pattern of the world order. According to him, the tribute system and the system of investiture regulating Chinese relations with the Korean states held together the East Asian world with China as suzerain at the center, forming an integrated international order. Sui and Tang mounted expeditions on Koguryō in order to punish the latter when it disturbed the system, and it was China's responsibility, as well as in its interest, to maintain the orderly working of the system so as to sustain peace within the East Asian world.  

Modern Korean works, reflecting an understandable sympathy for the Korean point of view, consider the Sui-Tang wars with Koguryō as an invasion, a stage in China's grand imperial design to achieve hegemony over all of East Asia. The wars are seen within the context of the competition for control over Southwest Manchuria and as a means to win over other non-Chinese peoples to the north and northeast of China.  

In his study on Sui frontier policies, Arthur Wright also touches on these two aspects which govern Chinese foreign relations. Pragmatism was reflected mainly in a strategic consideration. According to him, Koguryō was militarily strong, and its potential threat to China was further reinforced by its tendency to join forces with other non-Chinese -- the Eastern Turks in the steppes, the Tungusic tribes called Mohe, and the Khitan in the lower reaches of the Liao River. The Chinese also feared Koguryō's influence in the Hebei region where separatist sentiments had surfaced as

---

8 Lee Ki-baik. 1984, p. 48.  
early as the Northern Qi. The Tang invasion of Koguryŏ can be seen as a pragmatic strike to remove these threats. On the other hand there was also an ideological component, a need to fit or tailor events to the ideal of Chinese world order. This is reflected in the ruler's dynastic ambition, especially Emperor Yang, who was driven, in Wright's words,

by his conception of the majesty and cosmic centrality of the empire, his urge to restore the glory of the Han and his image of himself as destined to great victories against all who resisted the benevolent transforming influence of the Central Kingdom.

Jamieson has also drawn attention to the important role that Silla played in the Tang military campaigns on Koguryŏ. The three states on the Korean peninsula were often in a state of enmity with two sometimes forging an alliance against the third. During the early Tang period, tensions among the three grew more severe. Silla, which was the most distant of the three states from China, separated from China by sea and by Paekche and Koguryŏ on land, adopted a pro-Tang policy in its fierce competition with its rivals, taking the initiative to form an alliance with the Chinese and skillfully maneuvering Tang to assist it in its final unification of Korea in the latter half of the seventh century.

Much of what these earlier scholars have said is quite convincing, but there remains a need to see how the various factors influencing the decision making process of the Sui-Tang rulers evolved, the extent to which each factor was important at different stages, why and how certain policies were adopted, and what results derived from them.

---

Historical Relations before Sui-Tang

Legend has it that at the end of Shang, a Shang royal member Jizi 夏子 refused to accept Zhou rule and took refuge in Chosŏn (Chinese Chaoxian 高曦), where he was later enfeoffed by King Wu of the Zhou dynasty. He helped promote Chinese culture in that land, so the Yi people, it was said, were different from the other three kinds of "barbarian" the Man, Rong and Di. That is to say they were more "civilized" and less aggressively inclined towards China.

Both the State of Yan in the Zhanguo period and later the Qin dynasty established political administration over Chosŏn, a confederation of walled town states, known as Old Chosŏn, in the basin of the Liao and Datong 大同 (Korean Taedong) Rivers. At the end of the Qin, many Chinese fled to Old Chosŏn, and a Chinese known as Weiman 韓滿 succeeded in seizing power and forcing the king to flee southward. In 128 B.C.E. a chieftain, Nanlü 南陽, rebelled against Weiman and submitted to Han. Consequently, Emperor Wu set up Canghai 朝海 commandery in the area under Nanlü. The commandery was short-lived, however, and was abolished in 126 B.C.E. because of difficulties in administration.

In 109 B.C.E. Emperor Wu defeated Chosŏn in a military expedition, which had two major aims. From the strategic point of view the conquest was to "cut off the left arm of the Xiongnu," i.e., cut off any possible alliance between Chosŏn and the nomadic Xiongnu who were expanding into Manchuria. It also aimed at "punishing" King Ugo 呂業 (the grandson of Weiman), who was, according to the Chinese, hostile toward Han, had induced Han subjects to defect, had not paid the appropriate

---

14 Some Korean historians question whether Weiman was in fact a Chinese. See Lee Ki-baik, 1984, pp. 16-17.
15 SJ, v112, p. 2950; HS, v6, p. 169; p. 171; v58, p. 2619; HHS, v85, p. 2817.
16 HS, v73, p. 3162.
court-visits to the Chinese emperor and who had hindered the various tribes of that area from sending envoys to the Chinese capital. When Emperor Wu despatched an envoy, She He 锻, to deliver a rebuke to King Ugō and warn him to mend his ways, the king ignored the warning, whereupon She He started hostilities by killing some of the Korean chieftains. With this began the war between the two sides. As a result Chosŏn was incorporated into the Chinese "commandery-district" (jun xian) system under four commanderies, Lelang 樂浪, Zhenfan 韩, Lintun 靜屯 and Xuantu 燕, all north of the Han 漢 River. In 82 B.C.E. Zhenfan and Lintun were abolished, and were partly incorporated into Lelang and Xuantu. The Chinese commandery system ended at the beginning of the fourth century when Koguryŏ captured Lelang, and Paekche captured Daifang 印方 commandery. But the fact that there had been a commandery system, though now broken down, later led the Sui-Tang Chinese to believe that China had a legitimate claim over that part of the Korean peninsula.

In the fourth century the Korean peninsula entered a period when it was subdivided into three states: a) Koguryŏ, a semi-nomadic people with agricultural settlements in the land from Manchuria to the northern half of the Korean peninsula, b) Paekche in the southwestern part of the peninsula, and c) Silla in the southeast. Both these latter were populated by agrarian people with an economy close to that of the Chinese. During the Chinese Period of Division Koguryŏ had relations with regimes both in the north and south on the Chinese mainland and received official investiture several times, the first time from the Former Yan in 355.

17 SJ, v115, pp. 2986-87; HS, v95, p. 3864.
18 SJ, v115, p. 2989; HS, v6, p. 194; v95, p. 3867; HHS, v85, p. 2817. The HS, v28 (p. 1626) says that Xuantu commandery was set up in 107 B.C.E., which might not be correct according to other sources.
19 HS, v7, p. 223; HHS, v85, p. 2817.
20 Nishijima Sadao. 1983, p. 419. Daifang commandery was set up at the beginning of the third century C.E. in the western part of Lelang.
Paekche first appears in Chinese historical records in 372 when it sent a mission to the Eastern Jin and a Jin official title was conferred on its king. It, too, pursued an outward looking policy which brought it into contact with, and obtained for it political investiture from, both the northern and southern regimes in the following centuries.21

Silla sent its first official mission to a mainland regime, the Former Qin, in 377. It did not join the political investiture system till the sixth century. But in its development of state institutions, the Chinese influence is all the same obvious.22

Through the tribute system, particularly the system of investiture, these states entered into a vassal-suzerain relationship with the various regimes on the Chinese mainland. In the formation and development of state powers the three kingdoms all showed enthusiasm for the introduction of Chinese culture, which they appreciated. They looked upon China as a source of inspiration and fostered relations with China. They organized their administration on the Chinese model, adopted Chinese script, and utilized Chinese political ideas and institutions. Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism were introduced from China and readily accepted into their own cultures. Together with China, Japan, and Vietnam, they formed an East Asian world with China as the center. They shared the same culture and politics -- a culture based on the Chinese script, Confucianism, Buddhism, and a politics that utilized the Chinese bureaucratic system of government.23

Emperor Wen: A War of Deterrence

The context for Chinese-Koguryo relations at the beginning of the Sui period was the threat to China's northeastern frontiers. In 581 the former Northern Qi Prefect

of Yingzhou (in modern Liaoning), Gao Baoning, made an alliance with the Turks to attack Linyu Fortress. In the following year he attacked Pingzhou (in modern Hebei), and the Turks invaded, penetrating inside the Great Wall. Faced with tremendous internal and external difficulties, Emperor Wen adopted a cautious defence strategy and concentrated on improvement of the fortifications along the Great Wall. In 583 Sui drove Gao Baoning further north, but Gao used Khitan and Mohe troops to mount counterattacks. He was defeated in the end, but the Northeast nevertheless remained a sensitive area because of the danger posed by possible alliances among non-Chinese peoples, such as the Turks and the Koreans.

The relations between Sui and Koguryo began in a peaceful way. Soon after Emperor Wen came to the throne Koguryo sent a tributary mission to the court and King P'yôngwŏn (Chinese name Gao Tang or Gao Yang) was appointed Commandery Duke of Liaodong (Liaodong jun gong) and General-in-chief. Seven tributary missions were despatched to Sui during the four years from 581 to 584.

Koguryo, however, sent a mission to Chen, the enemy of Sui, in 585, which led to hostilities that increased after the Sui conquest of Chen in 589. Koguryo, in fear

---

24 *SUIS*, v1, p. 17; v51, p. 1330; v84, p. 1865; *BS*, v11, p. 406; v99, p. 3291; *ZZTJ*, v175, p. 5450, 5456.
25 *SUIS*, v1, p. 19; v39, p. 1148; *BS*, v11, p. 409; *ZZTJ*, v175, p. 5463.
26 There are discrepancies concerning the king's name. Some historical records have his name as Gao Tang, cf. *BQS*, v5, p. 75; *ZS*, v49, p. 885; *SUIS*, v81, p. 1814; *BS*, v7, p. 265; *ZZTJ*, v178, p. 5559; *CFYG*, v963, p. 11336, while some as Gao Yang, cf. *SUIS*, v1, p. 16, p. 35; *BS*, v11, p. 406; *SGSG*, v19, Koguryo 7, King P'yôngwŏn 1.
27 *SUIS*, v1, p. 16; *BS*, v11, p. 406; *CFYG*, v963, p. 11336. The *SUIS*, v84 (p. 1814) says that the titles of General-in-chief and that of King of Koguryo were conferred on him, see also *BS*, v82, p. 1814. The title of king might not be given at this time for after his death, his son inherited all his titles and requested Tang to confer on him the title of king, see below.
28 For the tribute missions from Korea, see Table 3.2. "Korean Tribute Missions to Sui-Tang."
29 *CS*, v6, p. 112.
of a Sui invasion, started preparations for war, and stopped its missions to Sui altogether between 585 and 590.\textsuperscript{30}

Although Paekche also sent tribute missions to Chen in 584 and 586,\textsuperscript{31} this did not seem to bother Sui at all. The reason for this is to be found in the fact that while an alliance of Chen and Koguryǒ would have posed a great threat to Sui, Paekche was separated by sea from the mainland so its relationship with Chen did not seem so threatening. The relationship with Paekche did not have much importance in Sui foreign affairs. In 589, when a Paekche envoy arrived at the Sui court to offer congratulations on the conquest of Chen, Emperor Wen issued an edict, saying that "from now on, do not send in tribute every year and we will not despatch envoys either."\textsuperscript{32}

In contrast to this attitude of leaving Paekche alone, Emperor Wen's policy towards Koguryǒ was severe. It was no doubt the potential threat of Koguryǒ that made Emperor Wen feel obliged to assert his suzerainty forcefully over what he considered a subject. In 590 he issued an edict declaring that, though King P'yǒngwǒn performed tributary duties, he was not sincere in his submission. The edict cited five instances of Koguryǒ's disobedience: 1) harassing the Mohe and preventing the Khitan from communicating with Sui, 2) smuggling in precious goods to bribe Chinese crossbow men in order to induce them to assist in secret military preparations, 3) isolating Sui envoys and prohibiting them from learning the true situation in Koguryǒ, 4) sending cavalry men to attack and kill people on the Sui borders, and 5) despatching envoys as spies to gain information about Sui. After reiterating the claim that all under heaven were subjects of the Chinese Son of Heaven, the edict ordered Koguryǒ to reform its conduct, abide by the duties of an outer subject and follow the rule of coming

\textsuperscript{30} See Table 3.2. "Korean Tribute Missions to Sui-Tang."
\textsuperscript{31} CS, v6, p. 111; p. 113.
\textsuperscript{32} SUIS, v81, p. 1819; BS, v94, p. 3121.
to the New Year's court. If Koguryo obeyed, said the edict, Sui would not mount a punitive attack. Otherwise, it said, since a strong power like Sui could eliminate Chen, it could easily do the same to Koguryo.

The warning seems to have had some effect because King P'yongwon was preparing to send "an acknowledgement of guilt" but he died before he could carry out his intention. His son succeeded to the throne as King Yongyang. Emperor Wen sent an embassy to appoint him Senior Commander Unequalled in Honor (shang kaifu yitong sansi 上聞府儀同三司), Commandery Duke of Liaodong, and upon his request conferred on him the title of king.33

In 598 King Yongyang led the Mohe in raids on Liaoxi. These became the direct catalyst for Emperor Wen's decision to launch a military expedition. He justified his action in terms of Chinese suzerainty over Koguryo. First he accused Koguryo of misbehaving and warned that he might have to deal out a punishment. Then when it began evident that there was a real danger on the borders he started to act. Thirty thousand troops were despatched, some by land and some by sea, and an edict was issued to deprive King Yongyang of his titles. Before they reached the Liao River, however, the Chinese were already suffering logistic difficulties and were devastated by a serious plague. Much of the navy was lost in violent storms. However Koguryo's forces were not strong enough to continue resistance, and King Yongyang finally sent an embassy offering "acknowledgement of guilt." He is recorded to have

33 SUIS, v81, pp. 1815-16; BS, v94, pp. 3116-17; ZZTJ, v178, pp. 5559-60. There are discrepancies concerning the dates of the edict and of King Pyongwon's death. Some historical sources record that the king died in 590 without mentioning the edict, cf. SUIS, v1, p. 35; BS, v11, 416. The SGSG records that the edict was issued in 590 and the king died in the same year, cf. SGSG, v19, Koguryo 7, King Pyongwon 32. The CFYG has contradictory records. While volume 963 (p. 11336) records that the king died in 590, volume 996 (p. 11695) records that in 597 Emperor Wen issued the edict to Gao Tang, King Pyongwon.
referred to himself as "your subject in Liaodong who is but excrement." Emperor Wen
was more than happy to then withdrew the Chinese troops.\(^{34}\)

All this was consistent with the basic attitude towards Koguryō in the edict of
590 which was that as long as Koguryō behaved as a nominal subject Sui would not
feel constrained to launch any punitive attacks. In 598, when the king of Paekche sent
a mission to offer assistance in the campaign, Emperor Wen issued an edict to Paekche
which further showed this attitude:

In the past because Koguryō did not perform tributary duties and did not follow
the rituals of the subject we ordered generals to punish them. But now Gao
Yuan 高元 (King Yŏngyang) and his ministers are afraid and have
submitted and acknowledged their guilt. We have pardoned them. You should
not attack them.\(^{35}\)

Emperor Wen appears to have made a realistic assessment of the situation in
terms of whether or not he could assert his claim of China's superiority. At that stage
the immediate objectives of Sui were to keep Koguryō in the tribute system, to prevent
it from making incursions on the borders, and to keep the frontier safe. There does not
seem to have been an intention of extending Chinese power into Korea.

Emperor Yang: Three Wars of Aggression

Arthur Wright holds that "there was no sharp break in the foreign policy of the
two Sui emperors."\(^{36}\) While this may be so in a general way, Emperor Yang certainly
had a more aggressive and expansive foreign policy than that of his father. By the end
of Emperor Wen's reign, with increased prosperity in China, talk of defeating Koguryō

\(^{34}\) SUI, v2, p. 43; v65, p. 1525; v81, p. 1816; BS, v11, p. 422; v94, p. 3117; TD, v186, p. 991;
was prevalent inside and outside the court. In 607, when Emperor Yang went on a tour of inspection to the residence of Qimin Qaghan of the Eastern Turks, he found that Koguryo had an embassy there. Such a liaison between China's potential enemies alarmed Sui, and Emperor Yang delivered an open warning to the envoy of Koguryo that if the king of Koguryo did not come to the Sui court, Sui would lead the Turks into the land of Koguryo.

Why did the Emperor present the King with such a peremptory demand? It might be argued that it was because of the real danger posed to China by Koguryo's contacts with the Turks. But this potential threat had been there since the reign of Emperor Wen and there was no obvious evidence for an increase in such a threat at the time when Emperor Yang made his demand. It is more likely that the demand was the result of his militant attitude, and of his ambition to expand the Chinese frontier and reestablish a hegemonic empire on the Han model. This ambition was further encouraged by Pei Ju, a court official, who had been an important advocate of an aggressive frontier policy in the time of Emperor Yang. He was the theoretician providing the Emperor with justifications for expansion, insisting that Koguryo had been an internal part of China from antiquity down to the time of the Han and Jin dynasties, but that now it was not conducting its affairs in a manner proper to a subject and was acting like an outer land. It was not proper, he said, that Sui allow this once "civilized" land to revert to "barbarians." It was Pei Ju who advised Emperor Yang to order the king to come and to make his threat that if the king did not obey, Sui would start an attack.

In addition, the situation on the Korean peninsula at this time seemed advantageous to the Sui Chinese. Both Paekche and Silla hoped that Sui would assist

---

37 *SUIS*, v75, p. 1721.
38 *SUIS*, v3, p. 70; v84, p. 1875; *BS*, v12, p. 450; v99, p. 3299; *ZZTJ*, v181, pp. 5652-53.
39 *SUIS*, v67, p. 1581; *ZZTJ*, v181, pp. 5652-53. See also *SUIS*, v67, "Biography of Pei Ju."
them in their wars against Koguryŏ, a situation which could have provided a convenient pretext for Sui aggression.

In 607 Paekche sent an envoy to Sui, repeating the request made earlier in Emperor Wen’s time that China join Paekche in attacking Koguryŏ. Emperor Wen steered clear of an actual alliance, but Emperor Yang asked Paekche to "watch over" Koguryŏ. In 611, before Emperor Yang launched the campaign against Koguryŏ, Paekche again despatched an envoy to ask for details of the plan and Emperor Yang sent an envoy to Paekche with the information. In the following year Paekche despatched troops to its border with Koguryŏ, ostensibly to provide assistance to the Chinese but in fact as a precaution against a Chinese invasion. Paekche still, in spite of its bellicose posturing, maintained basically friendly relations with Koguryŏ, trying to keep peace by maintaining a delicate balance between China and Koguryŏ.40

Silla, on the other hand, was under pressure from the expansive ambitions of both Koguryŏ and Paekche, the latter supported by Japan, and therefore felt more keenly the need for an alliance with the Chinese. In 608 the king of Silla wrote a letter to Sui, asking for troops to attack Koguryŏ, and in 611 a Silla envoy arrived at the Sui court requesting Chinese military assistance. Emperor Yang agreed.41

One should mention, however, that in both Korean and Chinese sources concerning the Sui period, there is no reference to Paekche or Silla joining the Chinese campaigns against Koguryŏ. The reason for this apparent omission is not quite clear.

Emperor Yang’s aggressive intentions towards Koguryŏ were part of a larger scheme of expansion in order to firmly establish the control of the emperor over China and over the surrounding areas. The early years of his reign had seen some improvements in China’s internal situation and external threats were less pressing. The country, recovering after the wars of reunification, was enjoying a period of prosperity.

---

40 SUIS, v81, p. 1819; BS, v94, p. 3122; ZZTI, v181, p. 5666.
41 SGSG, v4, Silla 4, King Chin’pyŏng 30, 33.
Some of the Turks had already been included in the greater Chinese hegemonic empire. Following the conquest of Linyi in 605, Sui established its administration there. Starting in 607, Emperor Yang despatched several groups of envoys to foreign lands: to the Liuqiu Islands in the east, Chitu (in modern Malaya) in the south, and to the Western Regions. Liuqiu was attacked since it had not shown a submissive attitude when the Sui envoys first arrived. The Khitan were also attacked by Sui in 607. In 609, on his tour of inspection in the west, Emperor Yang took personal command of attacks against the Tuyuhun (in modern Qinghai) and succeeded in incorporating the territory of the Tuyuhun into the Sui empire.

In all we see more tribute missions coming to Sui than during Emperor Wen's reign, and the series of military and diplomatic initiatives is evidence of Emperor Yang's intention to expand his power, as the Son of Heaven, over an ever larger sphere.

With all these achievements Emperor Yang certainly could not forget Koguryo's resistance to Sui suzerainty. Following the demand of 607 made by Emperor Yang, King Yöngyang did not go to the Sui court and only sent a tribute mission in 609. Emperor Yang's order, couched in such extreme language, may, in fact, have pushed Koguryo into the firmer resistance which Sui later encountered. In 611 Emperor Yang declared his intention of waging a war against Koguryo, and a year later he assumed personal command of the expedition. In an edict issued before the war, Emperor Yang began his statement by justifying the use of military force and claiming that Koguryo

---

42 SUIS, v31, p. 886. Sui first divided the area into three "regions" (zhou) which were later changed into the commanderies of Bijing, Haiyin, and Linyi. The three commanderies were lost during the turmoils at the end of Sui, and Linyi restored itself as a kingdom. Cf. ZZTJ, v190, p. 5965.
43 Cf. SUIS, v81, v82 and v83.
44 JTSS, v75, pp. 2631-32; ZZTJ, v180, pp. 5621-22.
45 Cf. SUIS, v81, v82 and v83.
46 SUIS, v3, pp. 75-76; BS, v12, p. 455.
had once been a "civilized" area which was now occupied by "barbarians." Then he accused Koguryō of the following.

1) The king of Koguryō had been unwilling to come in person to the Sui court.

2) Koguryō fomented troubles on the frontiers. In spite of Sui having both punished and pardoned Koguryō in the past, still it was not grateful and continued making troubles along with the Khitan and the Mohe.

3) Koguryō prevented other people from coming to the Sui court.

4) Koguryō imposed cruel laws and heavy taxes on its people. Powerful ministers and clans manipulated the government, on account of which the people suffered greatly.

The edict went on to declare that

"If Gao Yuan (the king) kowtows at the gate of the general and gives himself over to the minister of justice, we will release him from his bonds, burn the coffin we have prepared for him, and extend our grace to him."  

It is true that behind all these accusations lay the need to consider border security, though, one should add, security was always a ready excuse when expansion was an option. The questions, therefore, are whether Emperor Yang was indeed looking for excuses to attack Koguryō, and what the appropriate response was for the Chinese to eliminate or at least diminish the threat of Koguryō. Unlike Emperor Wen, who pursued a loose rein policy, Emperor Yang seemed obsessed with the idea that Koguryō could and should be brought into the Chinese territorial empire.

An unprecedentedly large force of 1,133,800 men was despatched in 612 both by land and sea, all aimed at P'yŏngyang, the capital of Koguryō. The attack, led by the Emperor himself on Liaodong city failed. One of the Chinese armies, which crossed the Salsu River and was poised to attack P'yŏngyang, was

also unable to press home its advantage. The Sui navy succeeded in fighting its way close to the capital, but had to retreat due to the lack of assistance from the other armies. The sole benefit of the expedition was the capture of Wuliluo, a fortress of Koguryō on the west side of the Liao River, where Sui immediately set up the commandery of Liaodong and Tongding. In 613 another expedition was launched and again the emperor went personally to Liaodong to take the command. This campaign failed again, mainly as a result of the Yang Xuangan rebellion, an internal disorder caused by external troubles. The campaign on Koguryō had imposed an extremely heavy burden on the people, causing popular resentment and leading to disturbances inside China. Taking advantage of the tense situation, Yang Xuangan, who was in charge of supplies for the campaign, rose in revolt, pressing the eastern capital Luoyang. The Chinese troops of the Koguryō expedition had to retreat back to China in order to suppress the rebellion. Husi Zheng, the Emperor's Vice Minister of War, who was implicated with Yang's clique, fled to Koguryō. Though it was finally suppressed, the rebellion was the beginning of a series of uprisings that finally led to the total collapse of the dynasty.

But Emperor Yang, who was oblivious to the danger inherent in the disturbed situation inside China, launched a third expedition against Koguryō in 614. It received so little support that during the discussion on the campaign, for several days, nobody dared to speak out. Such was the gap between the Emperor's perception and the ministers' foreboding. In the edict issued before the campaign Emperor Yang repeated his justification for the war and again demanded that King Yōnyang surrender and come before him to "acknowledge his guilt."

---

49 SUIS, v4, pp. 84-85; v24, pp. 687-88; v61, pp. 1466-67; v70, pp. 1616-19; 1622-23; v81, p. 1817; BS, v94, pp. 3117-18; ZZTJ, v182, pp. 5671-77.
Sui was now suffering from internal turbulence and many troops could not arrive at Liao River on time. But Koguryŏ was itself also greatly exhausted by this time. After Emperor Yang arrived at the Huaiyuan Fortress, and the Sui navy crossed the sea, ready to attack P'yŏngyang, King Yŏngyang finally sued for peace, sending an embassy in the seventh month of 614, offering to surrender and to hand over Husi Zheng. Sui accepted,50 but Emperor Yang still insisted on the king's coming to court personally. This was too much for the latter to accept so Emperor Yang prepared for a fourth expedition.51 The expedition soon collapsed on account of the rapidly deteriorating situation in all parts of China. In 615, on his inspection tour to the northern frontiers, Emperor Yang was caught in a siege laid by the Eastern Turks at Yanmen and had to formally abandon the campaign against Koguryŏ and commit the Chinese troops to the more pressing matter of his own rescue.52 The Turks' siege was finally broken but the dynasty was finished. Its collapse is an event which can be traced primarily to Emperor Yang's disastrous wars with Koguryŏ.

Tang Gaozu: Peaceful Communication

King Yŏngyang died in 618 and his brother succeeded him as King Yŏngnyu. With the establishment of the Tang dynasty as well as a new king in Koguryŏ, relations between the two countries took a turn for the better. Both sides were wearied by the wars and wished for peace. During the eight years of Tang Gaozu's reign, eight missions arrived at Tang from Koguryŏ, of which six were

52 SUIS, v63, p. 1492; ZZZJ, v182, pp. 5697-98.
tributary. The one in 624 was to request the Chinese calendar, a gesture implying acceptance of vassal status, and the one in 625 was to study Taoism and Buddhism.\(^{53}\)

Measures were taken by Tang to establish a peaceful relationship with Koguryô. In 622 Gaozu issued an edict to King Yōngnyu, expressing good will, and requesting an exchange of people displaced by the wars. Compared with the edicts issued during the Sui period the tone of his edict was quite different. While insisting on the mandate of the Chinese emperor it expressed the wish to maintain friendly relations, with each side defending its own borders. Gaozu ordered that all the people of Koguryô inside China should be gathered and sent back to their homeland. As a reciprocal gesture as many as ten thousand Sui Chinese were returned from Koguryô.\(^{54}\) In 624 Gaozu conferred on King Yōngnyu the titles of the Supreme Pillar of State (shang zhuguo 上臘囉 ), Commandery Prince of Liaodong (Liaodong jun wang), and King of Koguryô.

Paekche and Silla also established relations with Tang. The king of Paekche received the titles of Commandery Prince of Daifang and King of Paekche, and the king of Silla the titles of the Pillar of State (zhuguo), Commandery Prince of Lelang, and King of Silla.\(^{55}\) The Supreme Pillar of State was the highest honorific position in the Tang dynasty, and was equal to rank 2, upper class. The Pillar of State was the second highest and equal to rank 2, lower class. Their titles carried the names of commanderies in earlier times and were raised from the previous commandery duke to commandery prince, which was next to prince of a state.\(^{56}\)

Gaozu approached the whole business of investiture and the tribute system with clear-sighted pragmatism. He remarked to his ministers:


\(^{54}\) JTS, v199A, pp. 5320-21; XTS, v220, p. 6187; ZJTJ, v190, p. 5964.


\(^{56}\) Nishijima Sadao. 1983, p. 441.
Between name and reality there should be a concordance. Koguryŏ called itself subject (chen) of Sui, but in the end opposed Emperor Yang. What kind of subject was that? We respect all creatures and do not wish to be haughty and superior. We only occupy and possess the land, striving to bring peace to all the people. Why should we order Koguryŏ to be our subject in order to acquire for us greatness and honor? You should now make an edict to express this will of mine.

Two officials, Pei Ju and Wen Yanbo, were, however, strongly opposed to Gaozu's idea. They argued that

The land of Liaodong (under Koguryŏ) was the state of Jizi in the Zhou period, and the commandery of Xuantu during Han. Before the Wei-Jin [period], it was as close [to China] as within the territory of fiefs [granted by the Son of Heaven]. It cannot be allowed not to be subject. If we allow ourselves to be put on an equal footing with Gaoli (= Koguryŏ), how will the barbarians of the four directions look up to us? Moreover the Middle Kingdom is, for the barbarians, like the sun to all the stars. There is no reason to descend from superiority to be on the level of equality to those in the barrier zone.

In the face of such opposition Gaozu had to give up his idea.57

We are presented, here, with an interesting, if brief, exchange, reflecting the tension between China's claims to supremacy on the one hand, and the exigencies of political reality on the other. Gaozu not only saw no point in insisting on an empty adherence to traditional forms and titles supposedly buttressing superficial Chinese suzerainty but also saw clearly how much it had cost Sui in its attempt to make such claims stick. He neither wanted to advance such claims nor could he afford to do so, given the political situation in the early Tang.

Pei Ju and Wen Yanbo, on other hand, were more deeply influenced by Confucian ideals and could not accept Gaozu's idea. They reiterated the role of the Son

of Heaven as ruler over the people, both Chinese and non-Chinese. In hindsight we can see that, had Gaozu's ideas been accepted, it would, in fact, have saved the Tang Chinese from much of the subsequent trouble.

Tang policy towards Koguryŏ at that time was basically nonbelligerent. A neutral position was staked out vis-à-vis the continuous conflicts among the three Korean kingdoms, the Chinese simply trying to maintain a peaceful order. Towards the end of Gaozu's reign both Paekche and Silla sent envoys to Tang to accuse Koguryŏ of blocking their way to pay tribute to Tang and to ask for Tang help. A Chinese envoy was sent to mediate between them, upon which, it is recorded, all three sent in an "acknowledgement of guilt."\(^{58}\)

Tang Taizong: the Early Peace

Tang Taizong was an ambitious political ruler as well as an experienced military leader, skilled in strategy. He had the dream of building a vast hegemonic empire on the Han model that would include the non-Chinese. Several measures were implemented at different times in his ambitious attempt to realize this dream. As the situation changed and his consolidation of state power progressed, his attitude towards Koguryŏ underwent a change from one of prudence to open aggression, and his policy reflected that change.

Before 631 Taizong's policy towards Koguryŏ had mostly followed Gaozu's principle of maintaining peace. His major concern then had been problems inside China and problems on the northern and northwestern borders. Only a few weeks after Taizong ascended the throne the Eastern Turks had invaded along the northwestern frontier, aiming to attack Chang'an. Preoccupied with this menace, and concerned with

restoring the nation's economic and military strength, Taizong shied away from any ambitious expansion that would have exhausted his still weak power. In 627 he issued an edict to King Mu of Paekche, mediating the conflicts between Paekche and Silla, and expressing his hope that there would be peace in the Korean peninsula. In 630 when his ministers proposed an attack against Linyi because of the ruler's insubordinate language in his memorial to Tang, Taizong refused, claiming that war was an ill-omened instrument to be used only as a last resort. He pointed out that the repeated and unsuccessful efforts of Emperor Yang to conquer Koguryō had only resulted in stirring up his own people against him and in bringing about his own death. It was futile, said Taizong, to waste the efforts of a long expedition just to punish objectionable language. When, in the following year, Kangguo (Samarkand) wanted to submit to China, Taizong did not give it permission to do so, stating

the emperors of the former dynasties enjoyed the submission of other countries because they wanted to show off their powers. This was useless and made people suffer. If Kangguo was under Tang and was in danger, we would have to send troops a myriad li away to rescue it. I will not make our people suffer for the sake of vanity.

Taizong could see that if Kangguo's submission were accepted then Tang would have to come to the rescue when Kangguo was in danger. At this time he was not ready to make his people toil just for the gain of empty fame.

At the beginning of Taizong's reign some court ministers expressed the opinion that the ruler must be the sole authority and power. He should not delegate any authority to underlings, and should engage in aggressive wars designed to cow the "barbarians" into submission. Taizong, however, approved the opposite attitude,

---

60 ZGZY, v9, pp. 3b-4a; XTS, v222B, p. 6298; ZTJ, v193, pp. 6078-79.
61 ZTJ, v193, p. 6091.
relying instead upon the advice of Wei Zheng to "stop wars, promote the values of peace, spread virtue and extend kindness. If the Middle Kingdom was in peace, people from far away would submit willingly."\(^{62}\) Wei Zheng, an advocate of Confucian values designed to promote virtue in politics, was strongly critical of the Sui expeditions against Koguryō. In the *Suishu*, the compilation of which he supervised, the comment by the historian concludes that the fierce attacks on Koguryō launched by Emperor Yang had forced Koguryō into a desperate resistance, making it fight like a cornered animal. It was these wars, the commentary says, that caused the death of the emperor himself and the collapse of the Sui dynasty. Following the statement that "those who endeavor to extend virtue will prosper and those who endeavor to expand territory will perish," the comment in the *Suishu* continues with the observation that Liaodong had not been under the Chinese commandery-district system for a long time; that Emperor Yang had overestimated himself and started wars, and that he was bound to perish.\(^{63}\)

These Confucian ideas of Wei Zheng's did have an impact on Taizong during the early years of his reign. His embracing at least the spirit of such advice served him well later as he endeavored to cultivate the image of himself as a virtuous ruler.

The conquest of the Eastern Turks in 630 removed the great threat to Tang from the northern and northwestern borders. The conquest began the series of military campaigns in Taizong's grand plan to consolidate and expand his power. With the assumption of the title of Heavenly Qaghan (*tian kehan*) and the establishment of the *jimi* system over the Turks who had submitted, Taizong launched attacks on Tuyuhun and Gaochang. The latter was brought under the Chinese commandery-district system in 640.\(^{64}\) With these successes under his belt he turned his attention to Koguryō.

---

\(^{62}\) ZGZY, v5, pp. 38a-38b; JTS, v71, p. 2558.

\(^{63}\) SUIS, v81, pp. 1828-29. The statement quoted is from the *Bingzhi*, which has not been identified.

\(^{64}\) JTS, v198, pp. 5294-96; XTS, v221, pp. 6221-23; ZZTJ, v195, p. 6156.
The attitudes of Gaozu and Taizong towards Koguryo parallel, in many respects, the attitudes of the Sui Emperors Wen and Yang. The same pattern is repeated in both cases with the first emperor prudent and pragmatic and the successive one aggressive and intent on expansion. There is a certain inevitability in the course of events, since the economic, political and military situations during the Sui and early Tang in China were similar and both Emperor Yang and Taizong moved inexorably towards expansion as they completed the task of creating a unified dynasty to which they felt impelled.

There are differences, of course, since the two periods differed in certain respects, and the individual personalities involved responded to the roles of emperor in different ways. Besides their individual talents and shortcomings, the ideas they formed of the imperial mantle contributed to the policies which they adopted and carried out.

Decisions for Wars

Gradually, the attitude of Taizong towards Koguryo hardened. In 631 Taizong sent an envoy to Koguryo to bury the remains of the Sui soldiers. For this purpose the envoy destroyed the "triumphal mound" (jingguan) which had been built by Koguryo over the remains of the Sui soldiers in commemoration of the victory of Koguryo over Sui. This act alarmed King Yongnyu who then ordered the construction of a great wall from Fuyu (in modern Jilin) all the way to the sea. 65 From then, till the end of his reign in the eleventh month of 642, King Yongnyu sent only three tributary missions to Tang. Still, favorable treatment was granted to a

mission in 640 led by the crown prince of Koguryŏ, and Taizong did not make any overtly hostile move on Koguryŏ during this period.

From 641 Taizong's intention to wage war against Koguryŏ became clearer. An embassy led by Chen Dade 陳太德  returned from Koguryŏ that year. Its mission was ostensibly to return the visit of the prince of Koguryŏ, but in fact it was to look for weaknesses in that country. Chen Dade reported to Taizong that, on his arrival in Koguryŏ, King Yongnyu had made a great display of military might, but that on hearing that Gaochang had been destroyed by Tang, the king had become frightened and showed much more respect and favor to the Tang envoys. Pleased with this intelligence Taizong expressly stated his intention of undertaking a military action against Koguryŏ, justifying his decision with the argument that the territory of Koguryŏ had been under four Chinese commanderies in Han, and was thus part of China.

Taizong's plan was to despatch Chinese troops to attack Liaodong, which would attract all Koguryŏ's forces to go to the rescue. Tang would then send its naval force from Donglai (in modern Shandong) to attack P'yŏngyang and easily conquer Koguryŏ. The major factor preventing Taizong from actually implementing the plan immediately was that the Shandong region, an important base for a military expedition against Korea, had not yet returned to full economic health.

In the following years, up till 644, when Taizong finally declared war on Koguryŏ, two incidents occurred which provided additional pretexts to justify Taizong's bellicose attitude. The first one was the coup d'état in Koguryŏ in the eleventh month of 642. King Yongnyu was killed by his official Yŏn Kaesomun 蓋蘇文, who put the king's nephew on the throne and set himself up in the office of Makriji 萬離支, a position equal in status to the Chinese minister of

\[\text{XTS, v220, p. 6187; ZZTJ, v196, pp. 6169-70; CFYG, v142, p. 1723.}\]
war and secretariat director. Yŏn Kaesomun was in possession of the real power whereas the newly established King Pojang 萬藏 was little more than a puppet.

Relations between Tang and the new regime of Koguryŏ remained peaceful for a while. Upon the news of the king's death a mourning ceremony had been held in the Tang court and an embassy was sent with imperial gifts to Koguryŏ. In the first month of 643 Koguryŏ sent a tributary mission and Taizong conferred the titles of the Supreme Pillar of State, Commandery Prince of Liaodong and King of Koguryŏ on the new king.

The new situation in Koguryŏ prompted some officials to a display of sabre-rattling. The Prefect of Bozhou 壬州, Pei Xingzhuang 胡行莊, suggested a "punitive" attack. In 643 Deng Su 鄧騫, after returning from a trip as an envoy to Koguryŏ, requested an increase in the number of border troops stationed at Huaiyuan Fortress in order to exert pressure on Koguryŏ. Taizong's response at first was merely to make more menacing threats. He did not openly accept Pei's suggestion as a viable alternative on the grounds that it was not righteous to attack a state in mourning nor to burden the people since the economy of Shandong was still in bad shape. On the other hand, he believed that Tang had more than enough military force and political legitimacy to punish Yŏn Kaesomun, and therefore intended to use Mohe and Khitan troops to do so.

There was also a vocal faction at the court which prevented Taizong from implementing any immediate decision to attack. The minister Fang Xuanling repeated the traditional idea that the virtue of military power was to bring about a cessation of war, and the minister Zhangsun Wuji 長孫無忌 suggested a tolerant attitude until Yŏn Kaesomun manifested more overtly arrogant behavior. In this way

67 CFYG, v974, p. 11442.
69 ZZTJ, v196, pp. 6181-82; v197, p. 6198; CFYG, v46, p. 524; v142 (p. 1723) records the name of Pei Xingzhuang as Pei Sizhuang.
Tang could make sure that the blame for conflict would be with the latter so that Tang could legitimately punish him.\textsuperscript{70}

The second incident was Silla's request for Tang military assistance to defend against the joint incursions of Paekche and Koguryŏ aimed at destroying Silla. In 642 Paekche attacked some forty towns of Silla, and entered into a marriage alliance with Koguryŏ, planning another attack against Silla.\textsuperscript{71}

According to the \textit{Xin Tangshu} Taizong suggested three alternatives to the envoy from Silla for dealing with the situation: 1) Tang could send frontier troops together with the Khitan and Mohe troops to attack Liaodong which was part of Koguryŏ. This would temporarily relieve the threat. The drawback to this alternative was that all four countries would be disturbed and Silla would still not be ensured a long-term peace.\textsuperscript{72} 2) Tang could provide several thousand red uniforms and red flags to Silla. This would enable Silla to create the impression that there were Tang troops in Silla. This subterfuge would serve to dissuade the Paekche and Koguryŏ troops from mounting an attack. 3) Tang could send a naval force to attack Paekche which lacked a proper defence against attacks from the sea. Silla was vulnerable and easily bullied under a female ruler, so Tang could send a royal family member to be the ruler in Silla with a garrison of Chinese troops. When the country was at peace Silla could again restore its own ruler to govern the country. On hearing these plans the Silla envoy could not make up his mind which to choose.\textsuperscript{73}

One should mention in passing that the \textit{Cefu Yuangui} subdivides the third alternative. The attack on Paekche, and the sending of a Tang prince and troops to Silla, are listed as alternatives three and four, respectively. The \textit{Xin Tangshu} is probably correct in combining these alternatives into one because Taizong probably

\textsuperscript{70} \textit{XTS}, v220, p. 6188; \textit{ZZTJ}, v197, p. 6202; \textit{CFYG}, v991, p. 11639.
\textsuperscript{71} \textit{JTS}, v199A, p. 5330; \textit{XTS}, v220, p. 6199; \textit{THY}, v95, p. 1710.
\textsuperscript{72} It is not clear which four countries. They may refer to Tang, Koguryŏ, Khitan and Mohe.
\textsuperscript{73} \textit{XTS}, v220, p. 6188; \textit{CFYG}, v991, p. 11639.
planned to attack Paekche first, thus opening a route to Silla via Paekche so that Tang
could give Chinese assistance to Silla from the sea.

Inoue Hideo 评论 that these three alternatives reveal
the essentials of Tang policy towards Korea. In the first one sees the use of
"barbarians" against "barbarians." The upshot of the plan would have been to build up
an even more confrontational atmosphere between Silla and the other two Korean
kingdoms. As to the alliance with Khitan and Mohe, Silla could not expect it to be
permanent, since those two countries had little to gain from it. According to Inoue, the
second plan, by which Silla would just borrow some Tang uniforms and flags, could
not have been expected to produce much effective relief for Silla. And the third
alternative, which would have been the most effective for dealing with Koguryo and
Paekche, was fraught with danger for Silla itself. There was a real possibility that Silla
might suffer the same fate as the other two, that is, to be conquered by China. It was
only because the situation facing Silla was so severe that it had to give consideration to
this plan.74

Inoue's analysis of these three plans is correct. The envoy from Silla was
between a rock and a hard place. He probably saw that the first two plans were not
feasible and that the third was so severe that its acceptance would actually endanger
Silla's own independence. His failure to respond is therefore understandable.

As an interim measure, Taizong sent Xiangli Xuanjiang 肌里之
as an envoy charged with delivery of a sealed letter to Koguryo, in which was
contained a threat: if Koguryo continued incursions on Silla, a dutiful subject of Tang,
Tang would be forced to mount a punitive attack the following year against Koguryo.75
In the second month of 644 Xiangli Xuanjiang returned from his mission. He reported

74 Inoue Hideo. 1972, pp. 196-198.
back that Yŏn Kaesomun refused to stop incursions on Silla, insisting that he had to
attack Silla until the latter returned the land that it had taken away from Koguryŏ.

The refusal seemed to Taizong to provide a righteous excuse to send his own
forces against Koguryŏ. He stated that Tang could resort to a "punitive" attack
because, in his words,

to despatch punitive troops must have a stated reason. If we do it with the
reason that he [Yŏn Kaesomun] killed his king and was cruel to his subjects we
can defeat him easily.  

Taizong's bellicose attitude again encountered widespread opposition in the
court. Jiang Xingben 姜行本 presented a memorial arguing against any
military action. The minister Chu Suiliang worried that if Tang failed in the first
expedition it would not show awe-inspiring majesty to other "barbarians" and Taizong
would have to launch another attack, the result of which would be uncertain. The only
strong support for a war policy came from the Minister of War Li Shiji

, who cited an instance in 641 when Taizong had accepted Wei Zheng's advice not
to pursue attacks on Xueyantuo, thus losing the opportunity to defeat the Xueyantuo
completely and secure long-term peace on the borders.

Taizong finally came to the decision to launch a military expedition against
Koguryŏ and to assume personal command in the war. War preparations started. His
decision, however, was still objected to by his ministers. Yuchi Jingde 殷德
spoke clearly of the potential danger that with both the emperor and crown
prince leaving the eastern and western capitals and a major military force going to the
Liaodong front, there might be a rebellion like the one caused by Yang Xuangan in the
Emperor Yang's time. He did not think it necessary for Taizong to lead the campaign

77 JTS, v59, p. 2334; XTS, v91, p. 3792.
78 TD, v186, p. 992; JTS, v80, pp. 2733-34; XTS, v105, p. 4027; ZZTJ, v197, p. 6207; THY, v95,
p. 1705.
personally just for such a "small" state as Koguryŏ. Chu Suiliang with a similar concern stressed the importance of the emperor's staying in the capital. In order to persuade Taizong not to go to the war, he changed his tack. Instead of predicting the possible failure of the campaign the first time, he said that Koguryŏ would be easily brought under control simply by despatching several generals with a strong force.

Taizong was determined to assume the personal command in the expedition. His edicts and remarks to his ministers demonstrated his assessment of the situation as well as the urge to make a glorious achievement. He repeatedly emphasized as a moral justification for the expedition that Liaodong had formerly been part of China, that Yŏn Kaesomun had killed his king and was exerting a tyrannical rule, and that he had invaded Silla, refused Tang mediation and disobeyed the Son of Heaven's order to stop the incursions. Taizong stressed that if Tang failed to act forcefully against the rebellious subject, China itself could not be well disciplined. His expedition, as he claimed, had several aims: to punish Yŏn Kaesomun, to save the people of Koguryŏ from Yŏn's cruel rule, and to save Silla from the danger of invading enemies. Moreover, Taizong claimed that now all-under-heaven was at peace except Koguryŏ, which had not yet submitted. He intended to undertake the conquest of Koguryŏ personally so as not to leave troubles to his descendants.

As a skillful and experienced war leader, Taizong had some ideas of what was disadvantageous and advantageous for the campaign. He recognized that to carry out the campaign was a hard task. Yet he showed confidence and belief in an inevitable victory with the following claim: 1) Yŏn Kaesomun's vicious acts provided a heaven sent opportunity for a Tang expedition since Koguryŏ was in ruin under his rule; 2) compared with Emperor Yang who had failed in his campaign due to his cruelty, lack

79 JTS, v68, p. 2500; XTS, v89, p. 3755; ZZTJ, v197, pp. 6216-17.
80 JTS, v80, pp. 2734-35; XTS, v105, p. 4027; ZZTJ, v197, p. 6207.
of farsighted strategy, and mismanagement in the state affairs, Tang was in a completely different and better situation, with a sound economy; 3) Tang had defeated Tuyuhun and Gaochang as easily as picking up some seeds, which proved the irresistibility of Tang forces; 4) there were five reasons why Tang would definitely win: Tang was large while Koguryo was small; Tang adhered to morality while Koguryo acted immorally; Tang enjoyed stability while Koguryo suffered disorder; Tang was at ease while Koguryo was weary; Tang enjoyed a joyful state of mind while Koguryo had feelings of resentment.82

The expectation of possible assistance from other non-Chinese, especially from Paekche and Silla, also strengthened Taizong's confidence. In his edicts to Paekche and Silla, Taizong expressed appreciation for their offers to help and ordered the troops of the two Korean states to be under the command of Chinese generals. The edict to Silla demonstrated a full confidence in victory.83 In 644 Silla had 50,000 troops attacking Koguryo from the south and captured a town.84 In the seventh month of 644 before the major expedition began, the Chinese and Khitan, the Xi and Mohe attacked Koguryo in order to reconnoiter the situation.85 In 645 Taizong informed Xueyantuo of his military expedition against Koguryo and asked it to join the Tang force. Xueyantuo agreed though Taizong did not use the alliance. During the wars in 644 and 645, Koguryo attempted to bribe Xueyantuo into alliance but Xueyantuo did not dare to make any move.86

Behind these particular considerations was, of course, the fact that Taizong, like Emperor Yang before him, believed that Koguryo had formerly been under the Chinese

85 JTS, v83, p. 2776; XTS, v2, p. 43; v111, p. 4133; v220, p. 6189; ZZTJ, v197, p. 6209.
control, and he wished to follow the old tradition of the Qin-Han period and to assure
his imperial dominance in East Asia by incorporating Koguryŏ. Furthermore both
Tang and Koguryŏ wanted to have control over the Liaodong region. The issue was to
define what was part of China and what was not. Wars were simply a means of
establishing the outer limits of the direct control by the Chinese emperor. The question
to the Chinese was to what extent Koguryŏ could be brought under Chinese control.
Emperor Wen of Sui and Tang Gaozu were satisfied as long as Koguryŏ remained a
submissive outer subject while Emperor Yang attempted to bring Koguryŏ under the
Chinese commandery-prefecture system. Now Taizong seems to have decided to
follow suit, only with a more cautious attitude.

Three Wars of Expansion

In the winter of 644 various armies, including non-Chinese allies from the
northwest, were organized to attack Koguryŏ by land and sea. The Tang court ordered
Silla, Paekche, Xi, and Khitan to join the attacks. In a series of battles in 645 the
Tang troops claimed some victories and Taizong went as far as Anshi (south of modern Liaoyang, Liaoning province), where he met a humiliating failure to capture the town. The troops had to retreat in the ninth month of the year due
to the lack of supplies and the cold weather. The edict issued later presented an account
of Tang success: the fall of ten walled towns; capture of 60,000 households with a
population of 180,000; death of more than 40,000 soldiers of Koguryŏ; subduing of
two generals-in-chief, 3,500 aristocrats and officials, and capture of 50,000 horses and
oxen respectively.

---

87 JTS, v199A, pp. 5322-23; XTS, v220, p. 6189; ZZTJ, v197, pp. 6214-15; THY, v95, p. 1705;
CFYG, v117, pp. 1399-1400.
1400-06.
Taizong adopted several measures to incorporate the submitted people of Koguryo. In three captured towns, Tang set up three prefectures. Seventy thousand people from these areas were moved and resettled inside China. Taizong conferred titles on the two surrendered Korean generals and Chinese official titles were also conferred on the 3,500 aristocrats and officials, who were resettled in China.

The campaign in 645 actually ended in Tang's failure to capture Anshi. Taizong regretted his assumption of personal command, saying that if Wei Zheng were still alive he would have stopped him from going.

The year 646 saw Tang military activities concentrate on the Xueyantuo in the northwest. Tang claimed decisive victories, bringing the Xueyantuo and other Tiele tribes under the commandery-district system.

This success strengthened Taizong's belief in his ability. He wanted to reverse the Tang defeat by Koguryo. On the part of Koguryo, however, there is little evidence of a hostile attitude. From 642 to Taizong's death in 649 there were six tribute missions sent to Tang. In the ninth month of 644 before the Tang campaign started, Yön Kaesomun sent envoys to Tang presenting silver, and asking to send fifty officials to be Imperial Bodyguards. Taizong refused the present and imprisoned all the Korean officials.

In 646 King Pojang and Yön Kaesomun sent another embassy to Tang to "acknowledge guilt." Yet, unlike Emperor Wen, Taizong did not consider it enough for a sincere submission. Even though he thought himself or wanted to be thought of as an emperor who cared for both Chinese and non-Chinese as equals, and who was

---

89 *TD*, v186, p. 992; *JTS*, v199A, pp. 5323-24; *XTS*, v43B, p. 1128; *ZTTJ*, v197, p. 6221; p. 6223; *THY*, v95, pp. 1705-06; *CFYG*, v117, pp. 1400-06.
90 *ZTTJ*, v198, p. 6230; *THY*, v95, p. 1706.
91 *JTS*, v199A, p. 5325; *XTS*, v220, pp. 6192-93; *ZTTJ*, v198, p. 6226; *THY*, v95, pp. 1705-06; *CFYG*, v117, pp. 1400-06; v126, pp. 1514-15; v170, pp. 2050-51.
92 *XTS*, v97, p. 3881; *ZTTJ*, v198, p. 6230.
93 *JTS*, v80, pp. 2735-36; *XTS*, v105, pp. 4027-28; v220, p. 6189; *ZTTJ*, v197, p. 6212.
different from previous rulers, he did not decide to resume peaceful relations. An edict was issued, claiming that Tang would not accept tribute from Koguryō, which was a gesture of severing relations with the latter. The court planned another major expedition with the excuse that Yŏn Kaesomun had not shown proper gratitude on receiving Taizong's gifts of a bow and a suit of uniform. Instead he had become more arrogant. He had treated Tang envoys insolently, the language in his memorials was deceptive, and he had refused to obey Tang orders to stop incursions on Silla.95

Following a discussion with his ministers about strategy for the war in 647, Taizong decided on the following plan. Since Koguryō had its walled towns built against mountains and therefore could not be captured by just one heavy blow, Tang should make successive incursions in order to exhaust Koguryō. If Tang continuously harassed the areas north of the Yalu River, it was hoped that those parts would easily fall into the hands of the Chinese.96

Armies were despatched in 647 to carry out the incursions and Tang destroyed three towns. In spite of the fact that King Pojang sent his son to pay homage to Tang with an offer of "acknowledgement of guilt" at the end of 647,97 in the following year Tang again sent 30,000 troops to attack Koguryō. The troops retreated in the autumn without any decisive success.98 Taizong then decided to launch a major expedition the following year so as to crush Koguryō with one action. Twelve prefectures were involved in ship building for the war.99

Taizong believed that Koguryō had already been brought to a state of exhaustion, but what he failed to see was that China also had been disturbed by the wars. The Liao people in the southwest rose in revolt because the Chinese

officials imposed corvée on them for ship building for campaigns against Koguryŏ. People in Shu (modern Sichuan) also suffered hardships from the ship building. Hard pressed by the local officials some people had to sell their houses, land, and children in order to pay for the labour. The price of grain jumped greatly and disorders arose.\textsuperscript{100}

Seeing the troubled situation the senior minister Fang Xuanling was unable to keep silence, especially when he knew very well that few people dared to object openly to Taizong against the campaign. His approaching death gave him courage to urge the emperor to abandon the plan for war. He argued in his memorial that Taizong should stop any expansion since Tang had already achieved enough prestige and territory, that the people of Koguryŏ were but "barbarians" of low sort, neither worth being treated with benevolence and righteousness, nor able to be held responsible for their conduct, and that if Tang tried to wipe out their whole race they might fight like cornered animals. Fang insisted that supposing in the past Koguryŏ had failed to perform the duties of a subject, made incursions on the people, or posed long-term troubles to China, it would be proper that Tang eliminate them, but now these three factors did not exist and it was not worthwhile to distress China just to wipe out the shame of a former ruler within and take revenge for Silla without. Taizong was moved to tears by the advice of his dying minister but did not alter his course of action.\textsuperscript{101} However, he too died soon after and was unable to carry out his plan.\textsuperscript{102}

During this period the situation on the Korean peninsula became more severe for Silla. While Tang and Koguryŏ were engaged in wars, Paekche did not keep its

\textsuperscript{100} XTS, v220, p. 6195; ZZTJ, v199, pp. 6261-62.
\textsuperscript{101} TD, v186, pp. 992-993; JTS, v66, pp. 2464-66; XTS, v96, pp. 3855-56; ZZTJ, v199, p. 6260; THY, v95, pp. 1706-08.
promise to assist Tang against Koguryō. It captured seven or ten walled towns of Silla, and in 648, again took thirteen. Its tribute to Tang also stopped.103

While relations between Tang and Paekche became worse Silla made efforts to form an alliance with Tang. It was a crucial decision, carefully considered for the sake of Silla's own security. Silla had been constantly at war with Koguryō and Paekche from early Sui. Paekche usually posed a more immediate danger to Silla than Koguryō but the danger became even more pressing on occasions when Paekche joined forces with Koguryō. To deal with the threat from Paekche, Silla first tried unsuccessfully to obtain assistance from Koguryō104 and then turned to Tang. In the year of 648 alone, Silla sent three missions to Tang, the third of which was led by Kim Ch'unch'ú (future King Muyōl 武烈), hoping to obtain Tang military intervention.105 To strengthen their mutual relations Silla agreed to adopt Tang's reign title, and requested permission to adopt Chinese official dress, which Taizong gladly gave.106 Silla's efforts to secure Tang military aid no doubt provided an excuse for whoever at the Tang court was in favor of war against Koguryō.

Even in the last year of his life in 649 Taizong still tried to exert his power as the Son of Heaven to punish non-Chinese subjects by force in order to maintain Chinese supremacy. In the first month of 649 he despatched troops to attack the Turkish Qaghan Chebi for his failure to pay court-visit.107 However, on his death bed he left an edict abandoning the campaign against Koguryō,108 thus admitting his failure.

104 SGSG, v5, Silla 5, Queen Sŏndŏk 11; v41A, "Biography of Kim Yusin." For details see also Miike Yoshikazu. 1974, pp. 107-118.
According to the Nihon Shoki, in 648 Kim Ch'unch'ú from Silla went to Japan, and Jamieson has the opinion that the timing of the embassy is indication that its aim was surely strategic, cf. Nihon Shoki, v125, Kotoku Tenno, Taika 3; Jamieson, 1969, p. 38. But Miike Yoshikazu does not think the record of the Nihon Shoki is reliable, cf. Miike. 1974, pp. 112-116.
105 The Chinese sources record only two missions, see Table 3.2, whereas the Korean source records three, cf. SGSG, v5, Silla 5, Queen Chindŏk 2.
107 ZZTJ, v199, pp. 6265-66.
108 ZZTJ, v199, pp. 6267-68.
The Reasons for Failure

Both Emperor Yang and Taizong failed in their massive expeditions against Koguryŏ, even though they were experienced war leaders -- Emperor Yang had succeeded in the conquest of Chen, the last of the Southern dynasties, and Taizong had won countless battles in establishing and consolidating Tang political power. But Emperor Yang's expansion caused the collapse of the Sui dynasty whereas Taizong's campaigns finally contributed to the Tang conquest of Koguryŏ in Gaozong's time.

It is a complex issue to compare these two emperors in their wars against Koguryŏ. From the above studies, the main point that one can draw is that Emperor Yang persisted in his effort to conquer Koguryŏ time after time by taking personal command at the front in spite of the internal instability that it was causing and the tremendous cost and heavy burden on the people, while Taizong, a more experienced and skillful leader, was very conscious of the lessons to be learned from Emperor Yang's failure. After the first campaign in which Taizong assumed personal command, he became more cautious, and in his second and third campaigns, he just despatched some troops for continuous harassment in order to exhaust the Koreans rather than launching any large scale expedition to inflict a decisive strike. A second more minor point is that, while Emperor Yang was able to obtain assistance from the Tungusic Mohe and the Western Turks in his campaigns, Taizong was more successful in recruiting non-Chinese allies in his military adventures.

Concerning the reasons for the Sui failures, Arthur Wright provides several explanations: 1) the terrain and climate favored the defenders; 2) Koguryŏ strategists, knowing their terrain and having most of the year to prepare themselves, were

---

109 SUIS, v81, p. 1822; v84, p. 1879.
formidable in defence; 3) the distance of the campaign base from the capital of the Chinese empire was formidable, close to a thousand miles; 4) the Sui use of naval force was costly but inept, and Koguryo's coastal defences were good.110

While these factors functioned as direct causes, other factors should also be brought into consideration in order to have a comprehensive idea of Chinese relations with their neighbors.

In the first place, both Emperor Yang and Taizong failed in their assessment of their own strength. Their conception of the Chinese role made them attempt to achieve the goal of exerting the political administration throughout the known world. Since they had achieved their power by superior military force, they believed that this could also enable them to attain this goal and especially to crush such a small country as Koguryo. The functions of war are defined by Robert Park as a) to extend the area over which it is possible to maintain peace, and b) to create and organize within that area a political power capable of enforcing it.111 During Emperor Yang and Taizong's time China simply did not possess the strength, militarily and economically to expand so far.

Second, in the whole process of decision making Emperor Yang and Taizong each played a decisive personal role, and even when their ministers raised strong objections to the Korean wars neither emperor paid much attention. In 611 before Emperor Yang's expedition, Geng Xun 強行 strongly opposed the war and was almost put to death for his pains.112 Emperor Yang's despotic rule developed to such an extent that in 614 when he assembled his ministers for discussions about the war, for several days no one dared to say anything.113 Even when China was in great disorder and Sui was on the edge of collapse because of internal uprisings, he was still

111 Park, R. 1941, pp. 551-570. See also Pulleyblank, E.G. 1976, p. 34.
112 SUIS, v78, p. 1770; ZZTJ, v181, p. 5659. The ZZTJ records the event as in 612.
113 SUIS, v4, p. 86; ZZTJ, v182, p. 5689.
oblivious to the situation, and his minister Su Wei could only try to inform him indirectly while other officials tried to cover up the truth just to please him. For an emperor high at the top to have lost touch with reality, yet still be in control of the whole political power, made disaster inevitable.

Taizong, renowned as one of the greatest emperors in Chinese history, who adopted a more cautious attitude and was sometimes more willing to heed others' opinions, on this occasion persisted in his fixed idea and met his failure. In spite of the fact that the Minister of War Li Shiji was almost the only one in the court to support his decision Taizong insisted on the war nonetheless.

Taizong was also blamed for sometimes failing to listen to the advice of his generals during the actual conduct of the war. After his return to Chang'an from the campaign of 645 he asked Li Jing why Tang had been discomfited by such a small "barbarian" state even though it had all the people of the empire at its disposal. Li replied that at a certain point Taizong had lost a strategic opportunity by refusing the suggestion of another general to make a sudden attack on P'yŏngyang, and had therefore lost a strategic opportunity. On another occasion when Taizong was trying to capture Anshi, the surrendered Korean generals suggested attacking Wugu first and from there marching to P'yŏngyang. All officials agreed except his brother-in-law Zhangsun Wuji, who insisted that Taizong should avoid any risky actions for fear of failure. Taizong listened to him. It seems that at this stage of his career fear of losing reputation had made Taizong less willing to take risks than he had been as a young man and perhaps contributed to his failure to achieve his military goals.

Third, there was also a mis-assessment of the strength of Koguryŏ. The Sui and Tang rulers' perception that a small country like Koguryŏ could easily be

---

115 ZZTJ, v198, 6228-29.
eliminated was not just a vain idea born out of arrogance. It was based on the precedent of the Han conquest of that region. What the Sui-Tang rulers failed to see, however, was that the situation on the Korean peninsula was not the same as at the beginning of Han when there was only a loose confederation of walled towns. The peninsula had undergone tremendous changes from the end of Han throughout the Period of Division. While the different regimes on the mainland were preoccupied with fierce struggles for survival or expansion, three new states had emerged in Korea. They all showed enthusiasm for the introduction of Chinese culture and did not always object openly to the Chinese claim of supremacy, but they accepted it mainly for the purpose of obtaining Chinese support ideologically or militarily to strengthen themselves in the struggles against each other. Korea had a tradition of rule by a council of tribal leaders. Chinese support helped legitimate the notion of a king. Through the tribute system, particularly the system of investiture, their political, economic, and moral powers were reinforced.

Meanwhile the Koreans had a realistic understanding of what the situation in China was and what advantages and disadvantages, or rather, dangers China could present to their own interests. They tried to make use of the conflicts among the different regimes in the Period of Division to further their own interests. When China became a unified power in Sui and Tang these three states had adjusted their policies towards China accordingly.

Being the closest to China, Koguryŏ as a militarily strong power that was able to contend for supremacy on the field of battle with China was naturally suspicious and fearful of Chinese expansion, as well as conscious of China as standing in the way of its own expansion. At first King P'yŏngwŏn and King Yongyang offered submission after Emperor Wen exercised his power of deterrence. The submission may have reflected both their perception of Sui military power and their fear of Sui retaliation. However, the effect of a deterrent may depend on its not actually being used, since the
effectiveness of deterrence depends mostly on the threatened states' perception of it. When Emperor Wen actually launched his attack and failed, the Koreans saw that China was unable to mount an effective campaign. So the firm resistance they put up to Emperor Yang may have reflected a decrease in their fear of Sui ability to retaliate. Also Emperor Yang's excessive demands pushed Koguryo into the corner and resistance seemed to be the only way left.

In early Tang Koguryo's policy orientation was rather defensive, avoiding any direct conflicts with the Chinese. After Yön Kaesomun usurped power, however, Koguryo once again adopted an attitude of firm resistance. Yön Kaesomun established a centralized dictatorship, using such strong measures as the elimination of many aristocrats. He thus formed a more effective regime to strive for independence and to resist Tang aggression. Under his rule Koguryo also strengthened itself by forming an alliance with Paekche. Taizong could not understand why Tang could conquer Gaochang but not Koguryo. The fact is that there was simply no comparison between the two in military and political strength.

Tang Gaozong: the Conquest of Paekche

During the first four years of his reign, Tang Gaozong did not attempt any further attacks against Koguryo, neither did he show as strong an urge as Taizong for fame and glory. But, he was well aware of the importance of maintaining Chinese supremacy and he did not give up Taizong's attempts to establish and consolidate a hegemonic empire, particularly in the first half of his rule. His Korean policy and strategy at that time were based on the Tang-Silla alliance formed mainly at the initiative of Silla and directed against the other two Korean kingdoms.

Following its three embassies to the Tang court in 648, Silla made continuous efforts to strengthen its ties with the Chinese. The court of Silla started to wear Chinese official dress in 649 and in 650 adopted Tang Gaozong's reign title -- Yonghui.\(^{117}\) In 650 Queen Chindok 真德 and sent Kim Pommin 法敏 (future King Munmu 文武) as an envoy to report Silla's victory over Paekche, presenting an ode "In Praise of Peace" embroidered on brocade, which attributed the victory to the glory and majesty of Tang.\(^{118}\)

The first result of the Tang-Silla alliance was the Chinese conquest of Paekche, which turned out to be an essential step towards conquering Koguryŏ. In 651 Gaozong asked Paekche to make peace with Silla and made a threat that if Paekche refused Silla might launch attacks to settle old scores, and that if Koguryŏ assisted Paekche Tang would order the Khitan and other non-Chinese troops to attack.\(^{119}\)

Jamieson thinks that it was Silla that persuaded the Chinese that the first step for the conquest of Koguryŏ was to subdue Paekche. He concludes, "there is no mention of a plan to conquer Paekche in the Chinese sources during the whole of Taizong's reign."\(^{120}\) This does not seem to be quite accurate. As mentioned above, the third of the three plans that Taizong offered to Silla in 643 included an attack on Paekche. It is true that Paekche would not have attracted much attention from the Chinese as long as it kept a tributary relationship even in a nominal way. Paekche was not as important as Koguryŏ to the security of Tang northeastern border because of its long distance from China. But once it had joined its forces with Koguryŏ against Silla, thus increasing Koguryŏ's strength on the peninsula, Tang could no longer ignore Paekche.

In 655 King Muyol 武烈 (Kim Ch'unch'u) of Silla sent a request to Tang for assistance after Koguryŏ and Mohe had captured over 30 walled towns of Silla.

\(^{117}\) SGSG, v5, Silla 5, Queen Chindok 3-4.
\(^{118}\) JTS, v199A, p. 5336; XTS, v220, pp. 6203-04; THY, v95, p. 1711.
\(^{120}\) Jamieson, J. C. 1969, pp. 44-45.
Gaozong despatched troops in response. In 658 and 659 the Chinese launched more attacks against Koguryo with some success. In 660 based on the alliance with Silla, Gaozong actually followed the third plan designed by Taizong. He despatched an expedition with a huge navy of 100,000 across the Yellow Sea against Paekche. Silla sent troops to join the Chinese. The Chinese fought their way successfully through to Paekche's capital Sabi 桑泌. After efforts of resistance failed, King Ŭija 義慈 and the Crown Prince Yung 隆 finally surrendered.

Following the conquest, Gaozong adopted measures similar to, but more organized than, those of Taizong to consolidate the victory. Five area commands and a prefecture were established, under which were 37 commanderies with 200 walled towns and 760,000 households. The Commandant Liu Renyuan 劉仁愿 was ordered to guard Sabi, and Wang Wendu 王文度 was appointed Commander-in-chief of the Area Command of Xiongjin熊津 (Korean Ungjin). The pro-Tang local chieftains were appointed area commanders-in-chief, prefects and district magistrates. King Ŭija, Prince Yung and other members of the royal family, ministers and common men, altogether more than ten thousand people, were transferred to China as captives. King Ŭija soon died and an official title was conferred on Yung. These measures had the purpose of converting the rebellious "barbarians" into submissive subjects as in the case of the settlement of the Turks.

The Chinese soon resumed efforts to conquer Koguryo. Gaozong even decided to assume personal command in the expedition but was dissuaded by Empress Wu and his ministers. In 661 Tang armies penetrated as far as the capital P'yŏnnyang.

---

124 XTS, v220, pp. 6195-96; ZZTJ, v200, p. 6324; THY, v95, p. 1708.
which was an unprecedented success, but had to retreat without any result due to the severe winter weather there.125

Meanwhile a restoration movement arose in Paekche led by a former royal family member named Poksin 福信 and a monk Toch'im 道琛, who sent for Prince P'ung 崔 from Japan and established him as king.126 They were successful for a time. Gaozong then instructed Liu Rengui 劉仁執, the Acting Prefect of Daifangzhou 带方州, to retreat to Silla since the Tang army had withdrawn from P'yŏngyang, and to abandon the town of Ungjin which was the only one under Tang control in Paekche. Gaozong asked Liu to consult with King Munmu of Silla as to whether he should stay in Silla to set up a garrison or return to China. Liu Rengui made the decision on his own to stay, for he had a clear assessment of the situation: if Tang wanted to conquer Koguryŏ it should maintain a military post in Paekche. In 662 with the assistance of Silla, Liu Rengui captured Zhenxian town, thus opening up the supply route from Silla. Then a conflict broke out within the ruling group of Paekche between the king and Poksin, who had previously killed Toch'im. The king sent envoys to Koguryŏ and Japan asking for military assistance. Thereupon Tang also sent reinforcements across the sea. On their arrival the joint forces of Tang and Silla fought fiercely with the Japanese and won four major battles at the mouth of the Kūm 溶江 River.127 Paekche was finally destroyed.128

Liu Rengui's persistence in Paekche enforced Tang control in the area. He adopted measures to restore the local economy and, in a memorial to Gaozong, he stressed the importance of the Tang garrison in Paekche: if Koguryŏ was to be

126 Ikeuchi Hiroshi has a detailed study on the events, concerning the time and place. See his 1960, pp. 97-245.
127 Japan played an active role in the politics on the Korean peninsula and therefore had this encounter with the Chinese. Details see Yu Yousun. 1957.
destroyed Paekche should not be abandoned for Prince P'ung was in Koguryŏ, and another prince was in Japan. They would be a menace if Koguryŏ, Paekche and Japan made alliance. In 664 Gaozong appointed Yung, who was in Chang'an, as the Commandant of Xiongjin in order to appease the remnants of Paekche.

The Conquest of Koguryŏ

The second result of the alliance was the final conquest of Koguryŏ, which China had been striving for for a long time. After Tang's withdrawal from P'yŏngyang in 662, the Chinese did not make any further moves until 666 when Yŏn Kaesomun died. His death not only ended two decades of powerful military rule, but also caused dissension in the ruling group. His son Namsaeng succeeded to the throne, but the other son Namgŏn plotted against the new ruler. Namsaeng sent his son to Tang requesting assistance. Yŏn Kaesomun's brother offered to surrender to Silla. Taking advantage of this excellent opportunity, Tang launched an expedition. After a series of battles in which Koguryŏ was attacked both overland from China in the north, and from the southern part of the peninsula by Silla and Liu Rengui's troops, P'yŏngyang fell into the hands of the Chinese in the ninth month of 668. King Pojang and Namgŏn were captured.

The Korean nobles were transferred to Tang. King Pojang and others were given official titles while Namgŏn and the former Paekche Prince P'ung were exiled to

---

129 P'ung fled to Koguryŏ after the final conquest of Paekche, cf. ZZZT, v201, p. 6337.
130 JTS, v84, p. 2795.
131 JTS, v84, pp. 2792-95; v199A, p. 5333; XTS, v108, p. 4084; v220, p. 6201; CFYG, v366, pp. 4352-55. The ZZZTJ records that Yung was appointed "commandant" (duwei), instead of "commander-in-chief" (dudu), on the ground that Liu Rengui was the commander-in-chief, cf. ZZZT, v201, p. 6342. Ikuo Hiroshi has the opinion that Kaesomun died in 665. See his 1941, pp. 703-711.
132 XTS, v220, p. 6196. The XTS does not say clearly to whom he surrendered. The SGSG says he offered to Silla 12 towns, 763 households and 3,543 people to surrender, cf. SGSG, v6, Silla 6, King Munmu 6.
the extreme south of China. The Protectorate of Andong 安東 was set up in P'yŏngyang manned by 20,000 troops with Xue Rengui 薛仁貴, a Chinese general, as the Protector-general, supervising nine area commands, 42 prefectures, and 100 districts. Local chieftains were appointed as area commanders-in-chief, prefects and district magistrates to handle administration along with the Chinese officials. In 669 a large number of people were resettled inside China with only the poor and weak remaining. The arrangement was intended to dissolve the country as a whole and to eliminate the possibility of rebellion.

It is important to note that the area commands and prefectures set up for Koguryŏ also had Chinese in the administration. Also unlike the case of the Turks, where there were many objections to the idea of settling the nomads inside the country, the Chinese did not hesitate to resettle the Koreans inside China.

Tang Gaozong, though much less capable than Taizong, with almost no experience in military affairs, finally achieved the long cherished goal of the conquest of Koguryŏ. The reasons lay mainly in the suicidal power struggles in Koguryŏ and in the Chinese alliance with Silla. On the eve of Koguryŏ's defeat, the Tang official Jia Yanzhong 蔡延忠 commented that Emperor Yang had exercised too cruel a rule to win any victory, while Taizong's failure had been due to the lack of internal conflict within Koguryŏ. He predicted a victory for Gaozong, since Koguryŏ was in great disorder caused by its own struggles and the sufferings of famine.

In the decision making process, Gaozong permitted Liu Rengui's persistence in Paekche, which proved to be decisive in the final success.

---

135 JTS, v39, p. 1023; pp. 1526-27; v199A, p. 5327; XTS, v43, p. 1128; v220, p. 6197; ZZTJ, v201, pp. 6356-57; THY, v73, p. 1318. The XTS, v220 says that Fuyu Long (Korean Yung) was exiled. It should be Feng (Korean P'ung).
136 TD, v186, p. 993 which has the number 28,300 households; JTS, v5, p. 92: 28,200 households; XTS, v220, p. 6197: 30,000 people; ZZTJ, v201, p. 6359: 38,200 households; THY, v95, p. 1709: 28,000 households.
137 Hino Kaizaburō. 1955, pp. 21-22.
138 JTS, v190, p. 5027; XTS, v119, p. 4297; ZZTJ, v201, p. 6354; THY, v95, pp. 1708-09.
The alliance with Silla played an important and indispensable role. In Taizong’s reign Silla sent troops to assist the Chinese campaign, and in Gaozong’s reign Silla joined in all the major campaigns in conquering Paekche and Koguryo. It was also responsible for supplies of grain and clothing for Tang troops. This was essential to the Tang victory.

The Tang Abandonment of Conquest

Tang victories over the peninsula soon degenerated into a series of troubles which led to the end of Tang administration there. The first was a revolt in Koguryo in 670 led by Kömmojam. He installed the former king’s grandson Ansung as king. The most serious circumstance from the Chinese point of view was that Silla stopped being a Tang ally and supported the revolt. When Tang despatched troops to suppress the rebellion, Ansung took refuge in Silla. Only in 673 did the Chinese succeed in crushing the revolt.

Silla not only despatched troops to support Koguryo’s revolt and provided shelter to Ansung, but also conferred on him the title of king upon his arrival in 670. Eventually it established him in a dependent kingdom known as Minor Koguryo in the southwest of the peninsula, on the former territory of Paekche, in order to win the allegiance of the remnants of Koguryo. This was a measure by which Silla sought to pacify the people of Paekche and eventually to drive the Chinese out of the peninsula.

139 XTS, v220, p. 6203.
140 Details see SGSG, v5-6, Silla 5-6.
141 Details of the events, particularly about time and place, see Ikeuchi Hiroshi. 1960, pp. 267-393.
143 SGSG, v6, Silla 6, King Munmu 10. For details regarding the family background of Ansung and the establishment of Minor Koguryo, see Murakami Yoshio. 1974, pp. 153-184.
Silla now confronted the Chinese in a hard struggle to unify the peninsula and make it independent of Chinese control. Already after the conquest of Paekche, Silla had perceived both the danger that Tang control over the peninsula would eventually include itself, and the opportunity which was opening up for Silla to unify Korea itself. It saw the danger in the Chinese treatment of the defeated Paekche. Also in 663 Tang established the Superior Area Command of Jilin (Korean Kyerim) in Silla with King Munmu as the Superior Commander-in-chief, which amounted to treating Silla as a subject. Tang ordered the former prince of Paekche Yung, who had been sent back to former Paekche as the Commander-in-chief of Xiongjin, to make a covenant establishing a boundary with Silla in 665. Silla resented this, considering it as the restoration of its former enemy and a check on its expansion, which may, in fact, have been the intention of the Chinese. Yung was too timid to stay with such a strong neighbor as Silla and returned to Chang'an.

Korean sources have some detailed records which are not found in Chinese sources about the confrontations between Tang and Silla after the conquests of Paekche and Koguryŏ. The most interesting record is the exchange of two letters in 671. Jamieson has translated them and made a study of their contents. Here I shall only mention some points relevant to my discussion. One letter was from the Chinese Protector-general of Andong, Xue Rengui, to the king of Silla, demanding that Silla withdraw from Paekche and cease its protection of the remnants of Koguryŏ. The other is a reply from the king of Silla, which states: 1) On the occasion of Kim Ch’unch’u’s mission to Tang in 648 Taizong had promised that when Tang had subdued Koguryŏ and Paekche, the territory south of P’yŏngyang and the land of

---

144 JTS, v199A, p. 5336; ZZTJ, v201, p. 6335; THY, v95, p. 1711. The XTS records the establishment as in 661, which may be mistaken, cf. v220, 6204.
145 JTS, v199A, pp. 5333-34; XTS, v220, p. 6201; ZZTJ, v201, p. 6344; THY, v95, p. 1711; SGSG, v6, Silla 6, King Munmu 5.
Paekche would be given to Silla. 2) Silla had despatched troops in the Tang campaigns on Paekche and Koguryō, and had done its best to provide supplies of food and clothing to the Tang troops. But not only had Silla not been rewarded properly, Tang even had intended to punish Silla because of the late arrival of its assisting troops.\(^{147}\)

It is doubtful, however, that Taizong ever made the promise claimed in point one since it is not recorded till twenty years after the event, nor does such information appear in any other record. However, as a strong and virtually independent state, Silla would naturally struggle to expand and try to eliminate Chinese control of any kind on the peninsula. It had started its expansion into Paekche even before the attempted restoration in Koguryō.

Silla's aid to the Tang garrison came to an end.\(^{148}\) This vitally undermined Chinese administration on the peninsula. Its acceptance of refugees from Koguryō was considered by Tang as rebellion against Tang suzerainty. Gaozong dismissed King Munmu from his throne in 674, and sent his brother, who had been a hostage in Chang'an, to replace him. "Punitive" troops led by Liu Rengui were despatched and inflicted a severe defeat on Silla. In 675 King Munmu offered "an acknowledgement of guilt" as well as tribute. Gaozong then restored him to his post.\(^{149}\)

In spite of this victory, Tang administration in Korea soon weakened. In 676 Tang withdrew the seat of the Protectorate of Andong from P'yongyang back to Liaodong north of the Yalu River, a more secure place. All the Chinese officials formerly in Koguryō withdrew as well. The Area Command of Xiongjin was moved to Jian'an (in modern Liaoning). In 677 the Protectorate of Andong again was moved to Xincheng \(^{150}\).

\(^{147}\) SGS\(G\), v7, Silla 7, King Munmu 11.
\(^{148}\) SGS\(G\), v6, Silla 6, King Munmu 10; Jamieson. 1969, p. 61.
\(^{149}\) JTS, v5, p. 98; XTS, v220, p. 6204; ZZ\(T\)J, v202, p. 6372; p. 6375; THY, v95, p. 1711.
\(^{150}\) JTS, v5, pp. 101-102; v39, p. 1526; XTS, v39, p. 1023; ZZ\(T\)J, v202, pp. 6378-79; THY, v73, p. 1318; CFYG, v991, p. 11642. Hino Kaizaburō has a detailed study about the change of the Protectorate of Andong, see his 1954.
The immediate reasons for Tang withdrawal of the seat of Andong were: 1) the
Chinese preoccupation with more acute border problems caused by the Tibetans in the
west, the Turks in the north and Khitan and Xi peoples in the northeast prevented them
from being able to reinforce the small occupation army of 20,000 men after Silla turned
hostile; 2) it was impossible to supply a military colony in the peninsula when Silla
could not be relied upon as a logistic base.\footnote{Cen Zhongmian. 1957 (2), p. 127; see also Hino Kaizaburō. 1954, pp. 35-37.}

In 677 Gaozong conferred the titles of Commander-in-chief of Liaodong and
Commandery Prince of Chaoxian on the former King Pojang of Koguryō, who had
been in Chang’an. Prince Yung of Paekche was given the title of Commandery Prince
of Daifang, in addition to Commander-in-chief of Xiongjin. Both were sent back
together with the settlers of Koguryō and Paekche from inside China. It was probably
hoped that by placing these people under their former rulers they could be kept
submissive under Chinese administration and impose a check on Silla’s expansion.
However Yung was too much afraid of Silla to go back to the former territory of
Paekche and stayed in the north. Pojang went to Liaodong, but once he arrived there,
he made contact with the Mohe planning a revolt. He was recalled and sent into exile in
Qiongzhou \textit{珊瑚} in the southwest.\footnote{Some records say the title is Commandery Prince, see JTS, v5, p. 102; JTS, v199A, p. 5334; XTS, v220, p. 6198; p. 6201, while some say it is King of Chaoxian or King of Daifang, see JTS, v199A, p. 5328; ZZTJ, v202, p. 6379; pp. 6382-83; THY, v95, p. 1709.} Within a few years Silla had control of all
of Paekche and much of southern Koguryō,\footnote{XTS, v220, p. 6204; THY, v95, pp. 1711-12.} and established the first unified Korean
state.

In 678, seeing the expansion of Silla as a challenge to Chinese supremacy,
Gaozong planned another expedition but was dissuaded by the minister Zhang
Wenguan 張文瓘, who pointed out the immediate danger of Tibetan invasion
on the western border and suggested as a justifiable excuse for halting that, though Silla
had not been obedient, its troops had not invaded Chinese soil. He also pointed out
that Tang could not afford to fight two enemies at the same time.\textsuperscript{154}

During King Munmu's reign (661-681) no regular tribute missions were sent to
Tang from Silla, except on two occasions: one was in 665, when Silla sent officials to
Tang to join in the Feng enburg and Shan 鄴 ceremony;\textsuperscript{155} the other was the mission
of 675 mentioned above. His successor King Sinmun เกียบ (reign 681-692)
resumed peaceful contacts with Tang. In 692 Empress Wu sent an embassy to Silla,
requesting that the latter abandon King T'aejong 太宗 Muyŏl 志烈's title of
T'aejong, which means Taizong in Chinese. Even though Silla did not take any action
Empress Wu did not insist on the demand.\textsuperscript{156}

In 735 Xuanzong sent a letter to King Sŏngdŏk 聖德 of Silla acceding to
his request to establish garrisons on the Daedong River so as to meet the attacks of
Parhae 渤海, a state which had come into being at the end of the seventh century
in the northeast, and to co-operate with the Tang troops. In 732 Parhae had attacked
Dengzhou in the Shandong peninsula from the sea,\textsuperscript{157} perhaps supported by the
Turks.\textsuperscript{158} Xuanzong immediately started retaliation and sought an alliance with Silla
which was also worried about Parhae's expansion. This explains his willingness to
agree to Silla's request to build up garrisons on the Daedong River, thus giving up the
Tang claim to that territory.\textsuperscript{159} In 736 Silla sent envoys to express appreciation.\textsuperscript{160} It
is generally considered that this shows the Tang renunciation of its claim over the
peninsula.

\textsuperscript{154} JTS, v85, pp. 2815-16; XTS, v113, p. 4187; ZZTJ, v202, p. 6385.
\textsuperscript{155} JTS, v84, p. 2795; XTS, v108, p. 4084; ZZTJ, v201, p. 6344.
\textsuperscript{156} SGSG, v8, Silla 8, King Sinmun 12.
\textsuperscript{157} ZZTJ, v213, p. 6799.
\textsuperscript{158} Hino Kaizaburō. 1959, pp. 16-17.
\textsuperscript{159} ZZTJ, v213, p. 6800.
For the better part of a century the Chinese made persistent efforts to establish their administration on the Korean peninsula. After bloody battles at a cost of countless lives and economic resources they finally gave up the attempt. The final winner in this war was Silla, which established the first unified Korean state. China had to be satisfied with Korea as a tributary state, which acknowledged Chinese suzerainty, performed tributary duties but maintained its independence, ruling its own state without Chinese interference. Xuanzong's decision showed that in the end Tang foreign policy was capable of flexibility. It also showed the two characteristics of the tribute system: as a hierarchical system the Chinese Son of Heaven was the protector of all people, and therefore, had the authority to punish whoever disturbed the harmony of the system; as a sinocentric system, non-Chinese, who were "barbarians" in the outer zones, were unimportant as "leaves," whereas the Chinese were essential as "roots."

In Empress Wu's time the minister Di Renjie 氷諫 suggested the abolition of the Protectorate of Andong as well as the Four Garrisons in the Western Regions. He reiterated the argument that the Chinese should not exhaust their storehouse to struggle for unproductive land and for empty reputation as the First Emperor of Qin and Emperor Wu of Han had done.161 The Protectorate of Andong was abolished in 698, restored in 704 and finally abolished in 758.162

Tang and Parhae

Relations with Parhae (Chinese Bohai) showed a change from the reliance on military force that had earlier characterized Tang policy towards Korea to the use of peaceful diplomacy to deal with its non-Chinese neighbor.

162 Hino Kaizaburō. 1954, p. 45.
The Parhae kingdom, first called Zhen 周 (Korean Chin), was established by
Tae Choyong 大祚榮, who was of Mohe origin and became Koreanized at the
day of the seventh century.\textsuperscript{163} The state established relations with the second Turkish
empire and expanded to occupy a large area from modern Jilin to the 39th parallel on
the Korean peninsula.

Even though this state might seem to pose the same potential threat to China as
Koguryō in Sui and early Tang times, faced with the threat from the formidable
Tibetans in the west, on the one hand, and the Turks, on the other, who were
competing with Tang for control of other northeastern peoples, including the Khitan,
Xi and Mohe as well as Parhae, Tang did not attempt any aggressive wars to subjugate
Parhae, but merely tried to prevent it from making incursions and from forming an
alliance with the Turks. Chinese official titles were conferred on Choyong. His
territory was named Huhanzhou 互汗州 with the king as Commander-in-
chief.\textsuperscript{164} From 713 to 731 twenty-eight missions arrived in Tang from Parhae.\textsuperscript{165}

In 719 Choyong died and his son Muye 武藝 took the throne.\textsuperscript{166} He
adopted a more independent attitude towards Tang. He honored his father with the
posthumous title King Ko 哥, used his own reign title, and engaged in territorial
expansion. In 726 the Mohe of the Amur valley to the north of Parhae sent envoys to
Tang and the Chinese set up Heishuizhou 黑水州 with a Chinese administer to
supervise.\textsuperscript{167} Being afraid of joint attacks by the Chinese and Mohe, Muye decided to
strike first at the Mohe. However, his brother Munye 萬藝, who had been a
hostage in Chang’an, opposed this anti-Tang act. Dissension occurred in the ruling

\textsuperscript{163} This is according to Hino Kaizaburō. 1959, p. 18. It is controversial about the origin of Tae
Choyong and which ethnic group was the major people of Parhae, whether they were the Mohe, or
Koguryō, or composition of various peoples, see Sun Jinji. 1987, pp. 151-165.
Unless specified, for the source of the passage on Parhae, cf. JTS, v199B, pp. 5360-63; XTS, v219,
\textsuperscript{164} ZZTJ, v210, p. 6680.
\textsuperscript{165} Hino Kaizaburō. 1959, pp. 2-4.
\textsuperscript{166} ZZTJ, v212, p. 6735.
\textsuperscript{167} ZZTJ, v213, p. 6774.
group and Munye fled to Tang. Though the attack on the Mohe did not proceed, as mentioned above, in 732 Muye crossed the sea to attack Dengzhou in Shandong supported by the Turks.

In retaliation Xuanzong immediately sought an alliance with Silla. The two sides again joined forces in battles against Parhae but without much success. Silla for its own strategic interest competed with Parhae and actively tried to prevent its expansion. With the death of Bilgä Qaghan of the Turks in 734 and the defeat of Khitan by the Chinese, Parhae was left isolated in the anti-Tang alliance. Xuanzong therefore did not have to insist on any costly wars.

In 737 Muye died. His son Hummu succeeded him and changed to a pro-Tang policy but adopted his own reign title. In response to the new situation Parhae found it advantageous to change its policy in order to learn from Chinese culture and develop trade with Tang. In 762, after the An Lushan rebellion, an edict was issued recognizing Parhae as a state, and Hummu as the king.

In relations with united Silla and Parhae during the remainder of the Tang dynasty, the Chinese tried to maintain the tribute system. Relations with both countries were peaceful.

Conclusion

In the Qin-Han period, part of the Korean peninsula was organized under Chinese administration, and in the Period of Division, though the Chinese administration broke down, the Korean states kept tribute relations with the regimes on

---

168 ZZTJ, v213, pp. 6774-75.
169 ZZTJ, v213, p. 6799; Hino Kaizaburō. 1959, pp. 16-17.
170 ZZTJ, v213, p. 6800.
171 Considering the whole situation in East and North Asia, Furuhata Tôru has a detailed study on the conflicts between Tang and Parhae, see his 1986.
the mainland. After China was finally unified under Sui and Tang, the Chinese rulers launched formidable wars against Koguryŏ, partly because Koguryŏ was close to the North China Plain and posed a threat to the frontier, and partly because both Emperor Yang and Taizong endeavored to rebuild a grand empire in emulation of Han.

The first military action against Koguryŏ by Emperor Wen was primarily aimed at posing a deterrent so as to keep security on the frontier rather than at extending his territory. In justifying his action, however, he stressed that Koguryŏ was not fulfilling its duties as a subject of the Son of Heaven. Gaozu had very pragmatic ideas on the question of treating Koguryŏ as a subject and saw no need to pretend to be superior to the non-Chinese but when his opinion was refuted by his ministers he had to abandon it.

In their long series of military campaigns both Emperor Yang and Taizong were motivated by considerations of frontier security. At least in their imperial edicts, they used the importance of security as justification for their military campaigns. However, they seem to have been more interested in rebuilding a grand empire after the Han model. They insisted on their suzerainty and wished to reestablish Chinese administration in Korean territory but neither succeeded. While Emperor Yang's failure led to the collapse of the Sui dynasty, Taizong's failure did not cause as much harm since he was more cautious and experienced.

The Chinese finally succeeded in conquering Koguryŏ in Gaozong's time. The major factor that contributed to the victory was the Tang-Silla alliance. What made the alliance possible was their short-term common goal of the conquest of Koguryŏ and Paekche. The alliance could last as long as the interests of the two did not conflict, but it was bound to break down in the long run because the Chinese goal was to bring non-Chinese into submission no matter which "barbarian" state was involved, while for Silla, the goal at first was to defeat Paekche and later became one of expansion.
Without Silla’s crucial cooperation, Tang success was impossible. And the final winner in this costly war was Silla, whose hard struggles for unification pushed the Chinese back to the mainland and established the first unified Korean state in history. China then had to be satisfied with Korea as a tributary state which acknowledged Chinese suzerainty, performed tributary duties but maintained its independence, ruling its own state without Chinese interference.

After Parhae was founded at the end of the seventh century, even though this state posed a potential threat to China, the Chinese treated it pragmatically, maintained a tribute relationship and launched attacks only defensively. They were never as aggressive as in late Sui and early Tang. This might be the lesson that the Tang rulers learned from the Korean war.
Chapter IV.

The Sino-Uighur Alliance

Alliance: An Important Feature in the Sino-Uighur Relationship

The Uighur empire, known as the third Turkish empire, which lasted from 744 to 840, emerged when Guli Peiluo (Qulligh) Boila assumed the title of qaghan in 744. A year later, Baimei (Bolmís) Qaghan of the second Turkish empire was killed by the Uighurs, who had by then already expanded to occupy all the former Turkish territory north of Gobi Desert with their headquarters under the Ötükän Mountains. They immediately established relationships with Tang and Tang recognized this new power by conferring the title of Huairen Qaghan on Guli Peiluo.

In the eighth month of 756, not long after the outbreak of the An Lushan rebellion, the Uighur qaghan and the Tibetan btsan-po both despatched envoys to Tang, requesting marriage alliances and offering to assist the court in suppressing the rebels. Early in 757 the Tibetans made a second request. The Chinese had quite different attitudes towards the requests from the Uighurs and Tibet. While the court neither permitted a marriage nor even considered accepting Tibetan assistance, it immediately decided to form a marriage alliance with the Uighurs and to obtain military assistance from them as well as from the oasis states in the Western Regions and from the Arabs.

This difference illustrates an important continuing feature of the Sino-Uighur relations, namely the well-known fact that the Uighurs were often allied with the Chinese. Tang relations with the Uighurs were more peaceful than those between Tang

---

1 Hamilton, J. R. 1988, p. 139.
and the Tujue Turks or Tibet and they were seldom involved in any major battles against each other.

Studies on the Uighurs have suggested two kinds of explanation for this feature. 1) There were differences between the Tujue Turks and the Uighurs in their economic and social structures. Unlike the Turks, the Uighurs adopted a "civilized" life style relatively early and were willing to settle in urban areas. Tang economic aid, rewards and trade with the Uighurs became necessary to support the urban-based world of the later Uighurs. Because of this, the Uighurs were less resistant to compromising with the formalities of Chinese suzerainty than the Turks.

2) Political and economic necessities, mutual benefits and common interests kept relations between Tang and the Uighurs on friendly terms. On the part of the Chinese, the need for allies on the steppe and the need for horses for their own armies were constant problems. Very often, the Chinese had to have foreign assistance, particularly at the time of the An Lushan rebellion when the court was under the formidable threat of the militarily strong rebels. Alliance with the Uighurs who were territorially connected with Tang and Tibet, and had strong cavalry but were without territorial ambition, would enable Tang to resist the Tibetan incursions and prevent the Uighurs from allying with the provincial separatists inside China.

Either in a positive or a passive way, the Tang court adopted an appeasement policy towards the Uighurs by conferring political titles, concluding marriage alliance and engaging in horse-silk trade in order to maintain the alliance. Through trade, the court obtained horses which strengthened Tang military force.

On the Uighur side, studies concerning their motives for keeping the alliance with Tang come to the following conclusions: a) trade with Tang enabled the Uighur

---

5 Moses, L. 1976, p. 76; p. 82; p. 87.
6 Haneda Tōru. 1957, p. 194.
7 Jagchid Sechin. 1971, p. 22; Ma Junmin. 1984, p. 69.
8 Liu Yitang. 1974, p. 125; Ma Junmin. 1984, p. 68.
rulers to acquire necessary economic materials to sustain the stability of their political power.  

b) The Uighurs preferred to ally themselves with Tang rather than with Tibet. They understood that alliance with Tibet was not of much economic benefit to them. By assisting Tang, they could compel them to keep up the lucrative horse-silk trade, which ensured them of constant supplies of Chinese silk for their intermediary trade between east and west.

In her insightful article "Steppe und Stadt im Leben der ältesten Türken," von Gabain observes that in contrast to the Turks, especially the second Turkish empire, the Uighurs were not so dominated by the basic distrust that the Turks had formerly felt towards the city life-style of China. Relations with China had been generally good and to the advantage of the Uighurs from the beginning. To the fateful question of the Turks, steppe or city, the Uighurs made a vigorous answer: steppe and city. With the inflow of Chinese goods through marriage arrangements and payments as rewards of their military assistance, they carried on horse production and thereby increased their trade potential. City building became a necessity for the sake of storing their trade goods and for enjoying their wealth. In the end, under attacks by the Kirghiz (Xiajiasi in Chinese), the Uighurs did not move back north to the steppe, instead, they went south to agricultural areas and lost the steppe forever.

While these ideas are basically correct, we shall attempt in this chapter to study the matter in more detail, with reference to the earlier history of relations between Tang and the Uighurs before they established their empire. We shall discuss questions such as: what were the Chinese policies towards the Uighurs? What effect and influence did they have in the transformation of Uighur society? Did the Chinese intentionally design

---

11 von Gabain, A. 1949. Thanks to Dr. Pulleyblank, who kindly explained the content of this German article to me.
certain policies to turn the Uighurs into more peaceful people and to weaken their independence by providing material goods or did the Chinese simply act in response to situations when they arose? Was the horse-silk trade a successful policy in terms of peace keeping?

The Name of the Uighurs

The Uighurs were a people who spoke the same Turkish language as the Tujue. The name of those nomads from whom the Uighurs were descended first appears in the Chinese records as Dingling 靊 in the chapter on the Xiongnu in the Shiji. In the fourth century they were also called "Gaoche" 高車 (= high carts), Chile 救勒 or Tiele. In the seventh century the Uighurs emerged as one of the Nine Surnames, a confederacy of Tiele tribes. The Chinese term "Nine Surnames" (jiuxing 九姓) first appears in 630. It corresponds to the term "Toquzoghuz" in the Turkish inscriptions. Although there still remain questions about how and when the Nine Surname confederacy was formed, and what function it had, from extant materials one can see that the Nine Surnames had frequent contacts with the Chinese, and that the Uighurs had more regular communications and closer relations than the rest.

The Nine Surnames refer to nine Tiele tribes, including Huihe 魏纥 , later changed to Huihu 回鹘 , both Chinese transliterations of Uighur, Pugu 僕固, Hun 涇, Bayegu 拔曳(野)固, Tonglou 同羅, Sijie 布結, Qibi 契苾, Abusi 阿布思 , and Gulunwugu 命兜屋骨. The first seven appear in the Tang historical sources of the early period and the last two are seen from the Tianbao period (742-755). Pulleyblank adds to the list of the tribes which

12 ZZTU, v193, p. 6072.
13 Concerning the Nine Surnames, there are quite a few studies, among which see Pulleyblank, E. G. 1956, pp. 35-42; Haneda Tōru. 1957, pp. 325-394.
14 THY, v98, p. 1744.
belonged to the Nine Surnames several more people: Atie 艾跌 or Xietie 艾跌, Huxue 斜薛 or Husa 斜薩, Xijie 羯結, Xi 萨 and Duolange 斜览. He holds that the division into nine was a political rather than a purely ethnic division. The actual composition of the confederacy therefore would change in different political situations but the political structure did not change.\textsuperscript{15}

This may be accepted as an explanation why there were more than nine tribes that were considered to belong to the Nine Surname organization. These Tiele tribes composed the Uighur empire, which was established in the mid-eighth century and headed by the Uighurs. The Uighurs themselves were again a royal group composed of ten tribes. They were Yaoluoge 營羅葛, Huduoge 胡咄葛, Duoluowu 低羅勿, Mogexiqi 猛歌息乙, Awudi 阿勿啜, Gesa 葛薩, Huwasu 斜溫素, Yaowuge 華勿葛, and Xixiewu 祆邪勿, plus one more whose name is missing.\textsuperscript{16}

\textbf{Sui-Tang and the Tiele before 647: A Traditional Alliance}

To understand why the Chinese at the outbreak of the An Lushan rebellion chose to use the assistance of the Uighurs rather than that of the Tibetans, one has to know that there had been a traditional alliance between the Chinese and the Uighurs from the Sui dynasty onward. This tradition obviously paved the way for the future development of their mutual relationship and built up confidence and trust on the part of the Chinese.

Though often subjugated by or engaged in wars with other nomads, such as the Xiongnu and Rouran, as well as with the Tuoba Northern Wei regime, the Dingling, Gaoche or Tiele people had always maintained a tribal identity of their own. When the

\textsuperscript{15} Pulleyblank, E. G. 1956, p. 42.
\textsuperscript{16} XTS, v217A, p. 6114; Pulleyblank, E. G. 1956, pp. 35-42.
first Turkish empire was founded by the Ashina clan of the Tujue Turks in 552, the Tiele were also incorporated into the empire. In their complicated relationship with their overlords, the Tiele were a major military force for the Turks, and were heavily exploited with taxes by the Turkish rulers.

In 605 the Tiele established a qaghanate of their own for the first time. The chieftain of the Qibi tribe assumed the title of qaghan, with the Xueyantuo chief as minor qaghan. The power and influence of the Qaghan expanded over various oasis states including Yiwu, Gaochang and Yanqi. Then Tiele launched an attack on the Sui frontier in 607. After an encounter, the Tiele offered to make peace with Sui. Sui sent an envoy to the Tiele and succeeded in diverting them into battles with the Tuyuhun, an enemy of the Sui at that time. The victory of the Tiele over the Tuyuhun helped Sui to succeed in defeating the Tuyuhun and occupying their territory.

The Tiele qaghanate, however, dissolved after the revival of the Western Turks. The two Tiele qaghans gave up their own titles and became subject to the Western Turks by 619.17

In his Tujueren he Tujue Hanguo 突厥人和突厥汗國, Ma Changshou 馬長壽 has noted the importance of the Tiele people. In the balance of power between the Sui-Tang Chinese and the Turks, the various Tiele people and the Khitan had an important weight as a third force. Whichever side had their support would have the upper hand.18

This was illustrated at the beginning of Taizong's reign in the events that led to the collapse of the Eastern Turks. At the beginning of Tang, the Uighurs, who then inhabited an area along the Selenga River, were under the domination of the Turks together with other Tiele tribes. The first chief of the Uighurs mentioned in Chinese

---

sources was Tejian Irkin 特建斤. When his son Pusa 盪薩 succeeded him, the Uighurs became a power of importance. Around 627 they joined forces with the Xueyantuo and other Tiele tribes in revolt against their Turkish rulers. Their revolt crucially weakened the Eastern Turks. Seeing that the Xueyantuo were potential rivals of the Turks and had the support of other Tiele tribes, Taizong immediately granted the title of qaghan to the Xueyantuo.

The Eastern Turkish qaghanate collapsed in 630. The Xueyantuo ruled over other Tiele people including the Uighurs, Bayegu, Atie, Tongluo, and Pugu, and became a potential threat to Tang. Taizong adopted several measures to weaken the Xueyantuo, including a refusal to a marriage request in order to show the tribes in the qaghanate that the qaghan had lost the support of Tang. In 646 when the Uighur and other Tiele tribes rose in revolt against the tyrannical rule of the qaghan, Taizong launched an expedition against him. The Xueyantuo were defeated and dispersed.

The qaghan was killed, and the Uighurs occupied the land of the Xueyantuo.

The Chinese continued to send troops to the north of the Gobi to attack those who had refused to submit, and the Chinese generals involved in these expeditions also despatched envoys to pacify the Xueyantuo as well as the Uighurs and other Tiele people. Fully aware of the importance of preventing the rise of another nomadic power in place of the Xueyantuo, Taizong decided to go to Lingzhou himself in order to attract the Nine Surnames.

The Tiele people now decided to join the Chinese hegemonic empire. In the eighth month of 646, the Uighurs and other Tiele tribes sent envoys to pay tribute to Taizong when he was in Jingyang 晴陽 (in modern Shenxi), asking to submit to

19 Haneda Tōru. 1957, pp. 160-162. The chronology of the Uighur rulers in this paper follows that in Haneda Tōru. 1957, pp. 298-303. See Table 4.1 "The Uighur Rulers."
21 See Chapter II, "The Conquest of the Xueyantuo."
Tang and have offices established by the Chinese. Taizong conferred official titles on these envoys and sent sealed letters to the Tiele chiefs. When Taizong was in Lingzhou, the Tiele chiefs again sent envoys, as many as several thousand, to meet Taizong. They recognized Taizong as the Heavenly Qaghan, and asked him to establish the prefecture-district system in their territory. Towards the end of the same year, the chiefs of the Uighurs and other Tiele tribes paid court-visits to Tang.

647-679: the Tiele under the Chinese Administration

In 647 the Uighurs and other Tiele people were formally brought under the system of "subordinated area commands and prefectures" (jimi fu-zhou) within the Chinese hegemonic empire, thus the relationship between Tang and the Uighurs and other Tiele people entered a new phase.

In accordance with the usual practice of settling the nomads, six area commands and seven prefectures were organized for the Tiele people on their territory with their chieftains as area commanders-in-chief and prefects (Map 5). As in the Chinese bureaucratic system, the offices of administrator and assistant were also set up. All the thirteen institutions were under the supervision of the Protectorate of Yanran headed by a Chinese Protector-general. The Uighurs were brought into the Area Command of Hanhai, and their chief Tumidu was given the titles of General-in-chief of Huaihua, as well as the Area Commander-in-chief of Hanhai. Upon the request by the Uighurs, Tang opened up a route from south of the

---

22 The chronological order is according to the record in ZZJ, v198, pp. 6236-40. The THY, v94 (pp. 1696-97) and v96 (pp. 1725-26) have a similar order but v96 records the various events as in 647. The JTS, v199B (pp. 5347-48) has a different chronology. For these events, see also TD, v200, p. 1084; JTS, v3, pp. 58-59; v195, p. 5196; XTS, v2, p. 45; v217A, p. 6112; v217B, pp. 6138-39; CFYG, v997, p. 11480; v991, pp. 11640-41.


24 See Table 2. 3. "The jimi fu-zhou of the Eastern Turks and the Tiele (630-663)."
Uighurs to the Pittis Spring, and set up sixty-six or sixty-eight post stations along the route, to be responsible for such matters as storing supplies for envoys.25

Even though the Uighurs privately kept their own system of ranks, similar to that of the Turks, with Tumidu as qaghan,26 both in theory and in reality the Uighurs were within the Chinese hegemonic empire as subjects. To the Chinese the fact that a Chinese administrative system was established over the Tiele people signified their submission. An edict issued in 646 reflected such a belief, saying that the non-Chinese including the Qibi, Tiele and Uighurs had all offered themselves to become subjects of Tang and requested to be registered on the same basis as the rest of the population.27

The Chinese and the Nine Surnames performed reciprocal responsibilities as between the hegemonic suzerain and his subjects. The Uighurs were subject to an annual payment of marten pelts as tax.28 The Tiele also acted as an important military force in Tang frontier affairs. In 647 when the Chinese launched an expedition against Qiuci (Kucha), the Tiele and Turkish troops all took part.29

When the Uighur tribe was in danger of attack, the Chinese provided military and political assistance. In the sixth month of 648, 20,000 of the Xueyantuo remnants crossed the Selenga River, making incursions on the Area Commands of Hanhai, Jinwei and Youling where Tiele tribes were settled. They fought back and the Protector-general of Yanran led other people of the Nine Surnames to reenforce them.30

---

29 The JTS, v198 (p. 5303) records this event as in 646 while other sources record it as in 647, see XTS, v110, p. 4115; v221A, p. 6231; ZZTJ, v198, pp. 6250-51; CFYG, v973, p. 11432; v985, p. 11572.
In 634 and 639, the Qibi tribe of the Tiele took part in the Chinese expeditions against the Tuyuhun and Gaochang, see Table 2. 2. "The participation in Tang expeditions by the Eastern Turks and the Tiele (634-669)."
30 CFYG, v973, p. 11432; v985, p. 11573.
The year 648 saw an internal conflict among the Uighurs. Tumidu's nephew Wuhe and Juluobo, both sons-in-law of Chebi Qaghan, head of the remnants of the Eastern Turks, plotted to have Tumidu killed and planned to join the Turks. Vice Protector-general of Yanran Yuan Lichen made a false promise to Wuhe that Tang would establish him as the Area Commander-in-chief of Hanhai, but when Wuhe came to Yuan to express his thanks, Yuan executed him and reported the incident to the court. Fearful of the disintegration of the Uighurs, Taizong sent a pacification mission and detained Juluobo when he came to the Tang court. Tumidu's son Porun was appointed General-in-chief, great iltābār (da silifa) and Area Commander-in-chief of Hanhai, succeeding his father.31

The Chinese support for the Uighurs was the protection which a hegemonic power was supposed to render. Its primary aim from the Chinese point of view was to keep the Uighurs peaceful under the Chinese jimi fu-zhou system so that the court could use them as a military force in its frontier affairs. The Tang intervention in the Uighur internal dispute prevented Wuhe from leading the Uighurs to join Chebi Qaghan.

After their own crisis, the Uighurs joined several Tang frontier expeditions, suppressing a rebellion of the Eastern Turks in 649, and rebellions by the Western Turks in 651 and again in 656 and 657, and participating in the Tang military campaign against Koguryō in 661.32 In 658 after the leader of the Western Turks, Ashina Helu, was finally captured and the Western Turks were mortally defeated, Porun, the chief of the Uighurs, was given the title of General-in-chief.33

32 See Table 2. 2.
As is discussed in Chapter II, the *jimi fu-zhou* system had some basic elements of instability, and the continuous battles that the non-Chinese had to fight on behalf of the Chinese caused grievances. Starting in 659 the Tiele people, after being brought under the Chinese administration for a decade, rose in revolt. The rebellions were finally crushed in 663. Over two hundred chieftains were executed by the Chinese.\(^3\)

With the suppression of the Tiele rebellions, Tang adjusted its administration over these non-Chinese in order to exercise closer supervision. It set up Tianshan county under the Ötükän Mountains.\(^3\) In 663 the seat of the Protectorate of Yanran was moved to the north of the Gobi Desert where the Uighurs lived. The name of the protectorate was changed to the Protectorate of Hanhai, supervising all the area commands and prefectures north of the Gobi Desert. The former Protectorate of Hanhai, which had been established in 650 after the conquest of Chebi Qaghan, was moved to Yunzhong, with its name changed into the Protectorate of Yunzhong.\(^3\)

It seems that from then till around 681 the Uighurs remained quiet. The Chinese sources do not have any record about them although other Tiele people caused some problems.\(^3\)

---

679-744: the Tiele between Tang and the Second Turkish Empire

The restoration movement of the Turks started in 679 and succeeded in establishing the second Turkish empire which lasted till 745. In the competition between Tang and the Turks, the Uighurs and other Tiele people acted again as a third

\(^3\) *JTS*, v4, p. 84; v83, p. 2781; v109, p. 3293; v195, pp. 5197-98; *XTS*, v3, pp. 61-62; v110, pp. 4119-20; v111, p. 4141; v217B, p. 6140; *ZZTJ*, v200, p. 6319; p. 6322; 6326; pp. 6327-29; v201, p. 6333; *THY*, v96, p. 1726; *CFYG*, v986, p. 11578.

\(^3\) *JTS*, v195, pp. 5197-98; Cen Zhongmian. 1958, v7, p. 281.

\(^3\) *ZZTJ*, v198, p. 6246; v199, p. 6272; v201, p. 6333; *THY*, v73, p. 1315; Cen Zhongmian. 1958, v7, pp. 281-282; p. 1071. See also Table 2. 3.

\(^3\) *JTS*, v185A, p. 4791; *XTS*, v106, p. 4040.
force, contributing one of the major factors that brought about the final collapse of the second Turkish empire.

Records about the Uighurs appear again in the Chinese sources for this period. It is important to note that in a series of Turkish uprisings started by the formerly submitted Turks and in the wars between the Turks and Tang, no record has yet been discovered that the Uighurs engaged in any hostilities against the Chinese until 727.

Around 685 and 686, following the restoration movement of the Turks, the Pugu and Tongluo of the Tiele rose in revolt against Tang. Tang inflicted a crushing defeat and brought those who submitted under the supervision of the Protectorate of Anbei. ³⁸

The two memorials presented by Chen Zi'ang in 686 provide some information about the Nine Surnames. They record that the Nine Surnames had suffered a severe famine for three years, and many had come to Tang, all weak and exhausted. Since the chieftains of the Tongluo and Pugu had been executed for their rebellion, other rebels could not stir up more troubles. The Duoliege (Duolange) were fighting among themselves, and the Uighurs and the Pugu were also involved in internal struggles. Chen Zi'ang, therefore, suggested that the court should take the opportunity to attract these people as a way to solve the problem of nomadic invasion. ³⁹

The Turkish inscriptions have some valuable records about the Uighurs and the Nine Surnames (Toquzoghzuz), from which we see that after Guduolu (Qutlugh) founded the second Turkish empire, the Turks were surrounded by hostile peoples, among them, the Chinese in the south, the Khitan in the east, and the Toquzoghzuz in

³⁸ ZZTJ, v203, p. 6435.
the north headed by a certain Baz Qaghan. After a series of battles, the Toquzoghzuz were brought under the Turkish rule.\footnote{Cen Zhongmian. 1958, v16, pp. 857-926. For English translation of the inscriptions, see Tekin, Talat. 1968. For Baz Qaghan, see Cen Zhongmian. 1958, v16, p. 881; pp. 895-896; Tekin, Talat. 1968, p. 265, E14.}

After 686 some of the Uighurs and other Tiele tribes, the Qibi, the Sijie and the Hun, went to settle in Ganzhou and Liangzhou and were in communication with Tang, while some remained north of Gobi Desert as subjects of the Turks. The later qaghans of the Uighur empire were descendents from those in the Liangzhou region, who had been friendly with the Chinese.\footnote{The XTS, v217A (p. 6114) says that the Tiele were conquered during the reign of Bag Chor Qaghan (691-716). This is, however, different from the Turkish record and supporting evidence can not be found in other Chinese records, see JTS, v199B, p. 5349; THY, v98, p. 1743. Considering that the Tiele suffered chaos around 686, one may say that the Tiele were conquered not long after 686 by the Turks. See also Pulleyblank, E. G. 1956, pp. 37-38.}

At the beginning of Xuanzong's reign, the rule of Bag Chor Qaghan of the second Turkish empire was deteriorating. The Tiele under the Turkish rule either rebelled or left to submit to the Tang court. Some jimi fu-zhou were established for them around 713.\footnote{See Table 2. 4. "The jimi fu-zhou set up for the Turks in Xuanzong's time."}

As for those Uighurs and Tiele people, who had already moved to Liangzhou, they were again used as a ready military force in Xuanzong's time by the Chinese Chishui Army.\footnote{XTS, v217A, p. 6114; THY, v98, p. 1743.} Around 715 the Uighur chief Fudifu was appointed Vice Military Commissioner of Hexi and Commander of Chishui Army.\footnote{Cen Zhongmian dated the appointment as in 715, see his 1958, v9, p. 394.}

The second Turkish empire continued its decline partly due to its conflicts with the Tiele. Bag Chor Qaghan was killed by the Bayegu of the Nine Surnames in 716, and his head was sent to the Tang capital. Those Uighur and other Tiele tribes who had previously been under the Turks went to submit to Tang, and were settled north of the Dawu Army (north of Daizhou).\footnote{TD, v198, p. 1074; JTS, v8, p. 176; v194A, p. 5173; XTS, v5, p. 125; v124, p. 4394; v215A, pp. 6048-49; v217A, p. 6114; ZZTJ, v211, p. 6719; CFYG, v973, p. 11433. The Chinese sources}
The Chinese court made a series of arrangements to maintain Chinese control over the Nine Surnames who had submitted and to strengthen their position in their struggle with the Turks. In 717 the Tianbing Army with a strength of eighty thousand was established in Bingzhou to supervise the Nine Surnames, who were spread out north of Taiyuan. In the following year the Hengye Army of Weizhou were ordered to move to Daan Fortress in Weizhou, north of the Yan Mountains with 30,000 troops to assist the Nine Surnames. The Area Commanders-in-chief of the Tiele -- the Bayegu, Tongluo, Uighur and Pugu -- were appointed Commissioners for Punitive Attack of various armies. Another decree organized a military campaign against the Turks with the Chinese troops in cooperation with the Nine Surnames, altogether 300,000 of them. With the easing of the relations between the Turks and Tang, however, the campaign was abandoned.

While Tang and the Uighurs kept a peaceful relationship, other Nine Surnames had some problems with the Chinese. As mentioned in Chapter II after Bilgä Qaghan of the Turks established his rule the Tiele tribes Axilan and Xietie rose in revolt against Tang in the winter of 716, and in 720, the Xietie and Pugu tribes who had settled near Shouxiang Fortress were about to rise in rebellion with the assistance of the Turks under Bilgä Qaghan. But the Chinese learned of their intention and killed almost 800 of them. The slaughter aroused fear and suspicion in the Tongluo and Bayegu tribes. The Commissioner-in-chief Zhang Yue had to go in person to console them so as to avoid further troubles.

have different records about who killed Bāg Chor. I follow Cen Zhongmian's conclusion that it was the Bayegu who killed him, see his 1958, v9, p. 398.

47 CFYG, v992, pp. 11651-52.
48 ZZTJ, v212, p. 6732; CFYG, v976, pp. 11583-84.
50 JTS, v97, p. 3052; XTS, v125, p. 4407; ZZTJ, v212, p. 6741.
Conflicts between the Uighurs and the Chinese broke out in 727, mainly as a result of the mismanagement of a Chinese frontier general Wang Junchuo 王君超. Earlier, while holding a lower rank in the Liangzhou border area, Wang had not been treated with much respect by the Uighurs and the three other Tiele tribes in that region. After he had been promoted to the rank of Military Commissioner of Hexi, Wang adopted a high-handed policy towards these tribes and they sent secret envoys to the Tang court to complain. When he learned of this, Wang reported that these tribes intended to rebel. Xuanzong sent an imperial commissioner to investigate the matter. The Tiele were found guilty and Chengzong 駱宗, the Uighur chieftain and the chieftains of other three Tiele tribes were exiled. Tang still tried to maintain its control over the Uighurs by appointing Fudinan of the Uighurs as the Area Commander-in-chief of Hanhai.

The incident aroused further confrontations. Hushu 胡書, a distant nephew of the exiled Uighur chief, organized his people to take revenge on Wang Junchuo. They laid an ambush for him when he returned from an attack on the Tibetans. Wang and one of his assistants were killed, and the route from Anxi to Chang’an was blocked. Pursued by the Liangzhou troops, Hushu fled back to the north of the Gobi with his people.51

After 727 Hushu’s son Guli Boila succeeded as the leader of the Uighurs. Following the death of Bilgā Qaghan in 734, the Turkish empire began to decline due to chaotic internal power struggles, whereas the Uighurs gradually grew into an important power on the steppes. After a series of battles with the Turks, Guli Boila established himself as qaghan in 744. A year later, the Uighurs killed the Turkish Bolmīs Qaghan and sent his head to Chang’an, thus putting an end to the second Turkish empire. The

Uighurs expanded to occupy all the former Turkish territory north of the Gobi Desert with their headquarters under the Ötükän Mountains.\textsuperscript{52}

\textbf{744-755: the Founding of the Uighur Empire}

The year 744 marked the beginning of the Uighur empire, also known as the third Turkish empire.

As discussed earlier, the Tiele people had previously twice attempted to establish their own qaghan. The first time was in 605, which lasted about ten years, and the second time was when the Xueyantuo assumed the title of qaghan around 628 with the support of other Tiele people as well as Tang Taizong’s political investiture. This qaghanate lasted till 646 when the Xueyantuo were defeated by the Chinese.

Now for the third time the Tiele, headed by the Uighurs, established their qaghan and succeeded in founding a state power which lasted for a century. That the various Tiele tribes were loosely connected may have been the factor hindering them from becoming a strong state power. It was only through the stages of confederacy, the political organization of the Nine Surnames and the decline of Turkish power, that the Tiele people were able to organize a state with the Uighurs as the core. The name Tiele disappeared from history. Two other Turkish peoples, the Basmil and the Qarluq, who had co-operated with the Uighurs in overthrowing the Tujue Turks, were annexed by the Uighurs.

As discussed in Chapter I, in a complex political organization, we can distinguish three types of power by which superiors attempt to establish or to extend their control over others: physical, economic, and moral. The Uighur qaghan, like

other non-Chinese rulers, also eagerly sought Chinese recognition and support to strengthen, first of all, his moral power. From 742 the Uighurs kept up a close relationship with the Chinese by regularly sending envoys to Chang'an. As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, on his assumption of the title of qaghan, Guli Boila, who had previously received the title of Fengyi 皇 義 Prince, was formally invested as HuaiREN Qaghan by the Chinese emperor. After the killing of Bolmi's Qaghan, another Chinese official title, the Supernumerary General-in-chief of Left Courageous Guard (zuo xiaowei yuanwai da jiangjun 左 歷 限 威 員 外 大 將 军) was conferred on Guli Boila.53

The second qaghan of the Uighur empire, Moyanchuo 府延 (Bayan Chor?54), sent envoys to Tang almost every year during his reign.55 The close relations between the Uighurs and Tang during this period laid the foundation for the important role which the Uighurs played during the An Lushan rebellion and the new relationship that developed out of this.

Suzong: the Uighur Assistance and the Chinese Attitude

After the outbreak of the An Lushan rebellion and the fall of Chang'an to the rebels, Xuanzong was driven into exile in Sichuan and his son, Suzong, assumed the throne at Lingwu. Xuanzong abdicated in his favor. In the eighth month of 756, a month after Suzong succeeded the throne, the Uighurs offered their assistance against the rebels.56

---

54 Hamilton, J. R. 1988, p. 139.
55 Mackerras, C. 1969, p. 221.

In the table "Sino-Uighur diplomatic and trade contacts" of his article "Sino-Uighur diplomatic and trade contacts," Mackerras leaves out this Uighur request, see his 1969, pp. 221-222. In his book *The Uighur Empire*, Mackerras also fails to mention that it was the Uighurs who asked to assist Tang first.
It was a timely offer for the Chinese, who were too weak to suppress the An Lushan rebellion on their own. While An Lushan had in his command 100,000 to 200,000 troops with a secure base area around modern Beijing \( ^b^\) and had captured both Luoyang and Chang'an, the court by this time had no force under its direct control except the small detachments making up the palace guards, and some armies still loyal to the imperial house.\(^{57}\) A proposal to seek an alliance with the Uighurs had already been put forward to the future Suzong and agreed to after his arrival in Pingliang \( ^v^\) and before his accession to the throne.\(^{58}\) After he came to the throne, when both the Uighurs and the Tibetans volunteered their assistance, the new emperor Suzong immediately chose the Uighurs for an alliance.

It is not difficult to understand why the Chinese preferred to ally themselves with the Uighurs rather than the Tibetans when one considers the circumstances that the Chinese were facing. While there had been a traditional cooperative relationship between Tang and the Uighurs, Tibet, as a powerful rival state, had been in constant hostilities and wars with China even though there also had been times of peaceful communications. In fact, at the same time that the Tibetans volunteered to aid Tang in 756, they were also starting to make advances onto the Tang frontier forts.\(^{59}\) The Uighurs were perceived as less of a threat than Tibet because they were not interested in acquiring Chinese territory.

Compared with the previous time when the Uighurs were under the Chinese administrative system, so that they could be ordered to join Chinese troops in military campaigns, the Chinese now had to use different ways to gain the cooperation of the Uighurs, who had become an independent state power.

---

\(^{57}\) Pulleyblank, E. G. 1976, pp. 40-44.
\(^{58}\) XTS, v126, pp. 4422-23.
\(^{59}\) ZJTJ, v219, p. 7011.
In the ninth month of 756 Suzong made Prince Bin’s son Chengcai the Commandery Prince of Dunhuang, and sent him and General-in-chief Pugu Huaien to the Uighurs to cultivate friendship and ask for military assistance. The qaghan was pleased and adopted his sister-in-law as daughter and married her to Chengcai. Suzong gave the title of Princess Bilga to the Uighur princess in order to show his favorable treatment. The court sent Pugu Huaien for that mission because he was descended from the Pugu tribe which had come to be under the Area Command of Jinwei in Taizong’s time. Starting with his grandfather for three generations, his family had occupied the position of area commander-in-chief.

The motives of the Uighurs seem to have been to maintain a friendly relationship with Tang and thereby to retain Chinese political and economic support. Another motive may have been that they wanted to win back some of the Tiele people under An Lushan or to settle an old antagonism with the Turks through joint efforts with the Chinese. Before An Lushan rebelled he had included the Tongluo, a Tiele tribe, in his armies. He had also brought the Abusi people under his control. In 752 An Lushan requested of the court that Abusi, a Turk who had surrendered to Tang earlier and was then the Vice Military Commissioner of Shuofang, lead the Tongluo people to join him in an attack against the Khitan. In fear that An was intriguing against him, Abusi asked not to go, but his request was not granted by the court. Leading his own tribesmen, he then plundered the nearby Chinese storehouses and fled to north of the Gobi. There he and his people were attacked by the Uighurs. Abusi fled again to the Qarluq, who, under pressure from the Chinese, handed him over. He was executed and his people were brought under An Lushan’s control.

---

For three years the Uighurs sent their troops to the aid of Tang. Their first contribution was to assist the Tang general Guo Ziyi in the eleventh month of 756 in suppressing an anti-Tang uprising by some Tongluo tribesmen under the command of a Turkish general, Ashina Congli, who had been serving in An Lushan's army up to the time of the capture of Chang'an and had deserted him and moved northward to arouse the six Hu (Sogdian) prefectures in Shuofang to make attacks on the Chinese. The Xin Tangshu says that the Uighur qaghan personally led his troops on this occasion. But according to other records the qaghan sent his general for the campaign. While Mackerras believes that Moyanchuo Qaghan took part in the event, Haneda's conclusion is that it is not likely that the qaghan took personal command. Haneda's conclusion is based on several more references and is therefore more convincing.

At this time Suzong sent envoys promising rich rewards to entice the states in the Western Regions to come to the rescue. Ferghana, Khotan, and the Arabs all sent their troops. Nanzhao, a state with its capital in modern Yunnan, also sent troops to assist Tang.

In 757, upon the suggestion of Guo Ziyi, Suzong requested further assistance from the Uighurs. The qaghan Moyanchuo sent the heir apparent and general Dide and 4,000 crack troops who joined the Chinese and other non-Chinese troops from the Western Regions. Their contribution was of crucial importance in the recovery of first Chang'an and then the eastern capital Luoyang.

---

In 758 Moyanchuo again sent Guchuo Tele (tegin = prince) and Dide in command of 3,000 cavalry men to join the Chinese in battles against An Lushan's son, An Qingxu.

The Chinese paid a great price for the Uighur assistance. Just as Tang Gaozu had had to show a humble attitude towards the Turks when the newly established Tang was struggling to consolidate its power, the Chinese now, though maintaining their superiority on the surface, had to show favor and adopt a tolerant attitude towards the Uighurs in order to obtain their assistance. Among the measures they had to adopt were the following:

1) Formal conclusion of brotherly and marital relationships.

In 757 following the marriage of Chengcai to the Uighur princess and soon after the Uighur prince and his rescuing troops had arrived at Fengxiang, a brotherly relationship was established between the heir apparent of the Uighurs and Prince Guangping, the future Emperor Daizong.

In 758 after the Uighur assistance in recovering the two Tang capitals, at request of the Uighurs Suzong sent his own daughter Princess Ningguo to marry Moyanchuo. He also sent Prince Rong's daughter to accompany Ningguo as a secondary wife. After Moyanchuo Qaghan died, Princess Ningguo returned to Tang in 759 because she had not born a child to the qaghan, and the daughter of Prince Rong remained, and later became the wife of Yingyi Qaghan. She was called Younger Princess Ningguo. The marriage of Princess Ningguo to Moyanchuo

---

65 The word "tele," a transcription of a Turkish title, tegin, means prince, see Mackerras, C. 1972, p. 135, note 60.
was the first time in Chinese history that a Chinese emperor sent his own daughter, not just someone from the imperial clan, to marry a non-Chinese ruler. This shows that the court attached great importance to its relationship with the Uighurs. The Uighur qaghan Moyanchuo also asked to contract a marriage for his younger son. Suzong sent Pugu Huaien's daughter to him. He later became Mouyu (Bögü) Qaghan.

2) Conferment of noble and official titles and despatch of diplomatic missions to the Uighurs to show respect.

The title of Yingwu Weiyuan 貴武威遠 Bilgä Qaghan was conferred on Moyanchuo in 758. Chinese official titles were also given to the Uighur heir apparent after the recovery of the two Tang capitals in 757 and to Guchuo Prince of the Uighurs in 759 who had come to assist the Chinese against An Qingxu.

3) Provision of rich material goods.

The Uighur embassy was given a banquet and imperial gifts almost every time it arrived at the Tang court in Suzong's time. After the recovery of the two Tang capitals, in 757, the Uighur heir apparent was given the Chinese titles, as well as an annual payment of 20,000 pi of silk.

In addition to rewarding the Uighurs with direct gifts in this way, when the court asked the Uighurs for assistance in 757 it promised that once Chang'an was

---

70 Haneda Tōru. 1957, p. 203.
75 Mackerras, C. 1969, pp. 221-225.
recovered, the Uighurs would be allowed to plunder the city. When the city was taken the Uighurs were persuaded to spare it with the promise that they would be free to carry out their pillage after the capture of Luoyang. As soon as the Uighurs had retaken the city of Luoyang, they engaged in a savage plunder for three days. The treasure-houses were stripped bare. Prince Guangping was unable to prevent them from doing so and the people of the city had to provide heavy bribes before the robbery could be stopped.

4) Adoption of very tolerant or humble attitudes.

For example, after the recapture of Chang'an in order to persuade the Uighurs not to carry out the pillage that had been promised to them, Prince Guangping, the future Daizong, prostrated himself in front of the Uighur heir apparent, who was on horseback. The heir apparent returned the prostration and agreed not to plunder but to continue on the campaign against the rebels in Luoyang.

The measures adopted during Suzong's reign attracted the Uighurs into an alliance. The Uighurs kept regular peaceful communications with Tang and there were contacts every year except 761, either for joint military campaigns or for diplomatic purposes.

The peaceful relationship, however, did not only result from Tang's deliberate efforts to win the Uighurs' friendship. The Uighurs themselves in this period of expansion also needed to retain a stable relationship with the Chinese so as to make Tang accommodate their demands, such as a marriage alliance and material rewards. At the same time the qaghan was engaged in continuous fighting with other non-Chinese, such as the Qarluq and the Kirghiz, in strengthening his own power. This may partly

---

77 ZZTJ, v220, p. 7034.
79 ZZTJ, v220, pp. 7034-35.
81 Haneda Töru. 1957, pp. 197-200.
explain why Moyanchuo did not launch any aggression against the Chinese during his reign since he had not yet accumulated enough strength to challenge the Chinese, or rather, he found the alliance with China useful in his wars against other peoples.

A further important point was the development of the lucrative horse-silk trade. Details of this trade are discussed in the section of "The Horse-Silk Trade between the Uighurs and Tang" towards the end of this chapter.

Daizong: the Uighur Assistance and the Chinese Attitude

In Daizong's reign the court twice called on the Uighurs for assistance. The first time was in 762. Soon after he came to the throne, Daizong sent an imperial commissioner to the Uighurs to cultivate friendship, and to solicit military assistance against the rebels led by Shi Chaoyi. Only when the commissioner arrived at the court of the Uighurs, did the Chinese realize that the Uighurs under Bögu Qaghan, the successor of Moyanchuo Qaghan, had already been persuaded by Shi Chaoyi to take advantage of the hiatus created by Suzong's death and join him in plundering the Tang treasure houses. Their troops had already passed the three Shouxiang Fortresses in Shuofang.

The envoy immediately reported this to Daizong who sent Pugu Huaien, whose daughter had earlier married Bögu in Suzong's time and who was now in Taiyuan, to persuade Bögu to remain true to the former alliance with Tang. The Uighur qaghan was finally persuaded and assumed personal command of his troops to join the Chinese in retaking Luoyang, then under the occupation of the Shi Chaoyi rebels. Shi Chaoyi

---

fled and following a series of defeats committed suicide in early 763, thus officially ending the whole disastrous period of the An Lushan rebellion.\textsuperscript{83}

The second time the Uighurs fought on the Chinese side was in 765. Early in 764 Pugu Huaien rose in rebellion against the Tang court. The Uighurs had at first joined Pugu, and together they formed an alliance with the Tibetans and fought against Tang in the same year and again in 765, pressing on Chang'an. After Pugu, the leader of this alliance, died suddenly on the way to Chang'an, the Uighurs and the Tibetans disputed the leadership. Taking advantage of this conflict, the Chinese general Guo Ziyi persuaded the Uighurs to join the Chinese, inflicting a heavy defeat on the Tibetans in two battles. Thus the danger for Chang'an was relieved.\textsuperscript{84}

Again the Chinese paid an exorbitant price for the Uighur assistance. Larry W. Moses concludes that

Uighur alliance was proving to be an onerous burden, with few benefits for the Tang, other than protection from enemies such as the Tibetans and Kitan (Khitan) against whom the Uighur would have had to fight, with or without Chinese bribes.\textsuperscript{85}

It is not clear on what ground Moses bases his judgement. The Uighurs did fight with the Tibetans and the Khitan primarily for their own interest. But Moses seems to overlook that the immediate benefit, the major result of the policy of alliance with the Uighurs, was the suppression of the An Lushan rebellion. This policy also changed a potential enemy into an ally against the Tibetans, who were the most threatening rival of Tang at this period.


\textsuperscript{85} Moses, L. W. 1976, p. 79.
After the outbreak of the An Lushan rebellion, the court was obsessed with only one aim: to keep the dynasty in power. It would certainly have been ideal if the court could have relied on its own force to suppress the rebels but, as we have seen, the Tang court was so weak that it was desperate for help from any possible source, not only from the Uighurs, but also the Arabs, the Nanzhao kingdom, and the states in the Western Regions.

Examining all the brutal deeds that the Uighurs performed in Daizong's reign, Mackerras raises his doubts as to whether the Uighur alliance in Daizong's time was necessary:

The impact of the Uighur armies does not seem to have been nearly as decisive in the 762 battle for Luoyang as in those of 757 for the two capitals. Might not Chaoyi have been defeated without the Uighurs and a great deal of suffering and humiliation prevented?86

The fact is, however, that in Daizong's reign, the situation with which the court was faced was even more severe than in Suzong's time and the ruler was even less capable in leadership. Internally, the rebels still posed a great threat, while externally, the Tibetans occupied the He-Long region (modern Gansu province), and launched continuous attacks on Tang, pressing directly on the capital. In 763 they even took over Chang'an for fifteen days and established a puppet Chinese emperor.87

Moreover, the Uighurs under Bögu Qaghan became more powerful. In contrast to the policy of his father, which had ensured peace with Tang, Bögu Qaghan changed to an aggressive policy. As mentioned earlier, the Uighurs had already planned to plunder Tang in 762, and had joined Pugu Huaien's invasion before Tang finally persuaded them to change their minds.

86 Mackerras, C. 1972, p. 35.
87 For this incident, see Chapter V.
Even while agreeing to join Tang, Bögü showed arrogance towards the Chinese. In 762, after he had promised to provide assistance to Tang, he camped north of the Yellow River in Shanzhou and Prince Yong, the future Dezong, as the marshal of the campaign, went to meet him. A Uighur official insisted that Prince Yong should perform a ceremonial dance in front of the qaghan on the ground that the qaghan and the Tang emperor had concluded a brotherly relationship, so Prince Yong should pay respect to his uncle, the qaghan. Yao Zi'ang, a Tang official, made excuse for Prince Yong that he was in mourning for the late Xuanzong and Suzong so it was not proper for him to perform a ceremonial dance. Also, he argued, Prince Yong as the heir apparent, a future Son of Heaven, could not practise that rite in front of a foreign ruler. Upon this, the Uighur official did not persist in his request but took away four Chinese, Yao Zi'ang, Li Jin Wei Shaohua and Wei Ju, and each was given one hundred strokes of the rod. Wei Shaohua and Wei Ju died as a result. This insult made the Chinese officials furious, but Prince Yong stopped them from attempting to retaliate on the Uighurs since the rebels had not yet been destroyed and Tang still needed Uighur assistance.

During the campaign against Shi Chaoyi the Uighurs engaged in heavy plunder. When their troops camped at Heyang, people of the surrounding areas were robbed. After they had taken the eastern capital Luoyang, they pillaged the city and killed many people. At the court the Uighurs abused the Chinese officials, attacked the Hanguang Gate of the imperial city and broke into the Ministry of State Ceremonial (honglu si).
The weakness and the various problems within the Tang court also make it
impossible to believe that the Chinese could have relied only on their own force to cope
with the situation. The early part of the reign of Daizong continued the same pattern of
monopoly by eunuchs of court politics as in Suzong's time. Daizong came to the
throne with the help of a eunuch Cheng Yuanzhen, whose control of
the Imperial Guardsmen soon became a major influence in military and political affairs
of the government. He eliminated those who opposed him or threatened his position.
Though perhaps loyal personally to the emperor and though capable at manipulation in
power struggles, he certainly lacked ability in political leadership. Vice Marshal Guo
Ziyi was dismissed from his position by Cheng Yuanzhen's intrigue in 762. When
Daizong intended to appoint Guo Ziyi as Vice Marshal in the Tang-Uighur joint
campaign against the Shi Chaoyi rebels, Cheng opposed the idea. Pugu Huaien was
appointed to the position instead. By sending two daughters to marry the Uighurs,
Pugu had a special relationship with them. It may have been Cheng Yuanzhen's fear of
Chinese generals such as Guo Ziyi that made him use Pugu Huaien and the Uighurs for
the campaign.

Had the court not used Uighur forces and had it endeavored to rely on its own
efforts in suppressing the rebels in order not have to owe debt to the Uighurs, the
Uighurs, powerful as they were, could still have posed a threat to Tang. Tang could
not afford to make the Uighurs into another enemy. It had to pacify or ally itself with
the less threatening power in order to maintain the dynasty.

Being a ruler with limited ability of leadership, and faced with a weakening
state, Daizong continued all the measures of pacification adopted in Suzong's time.
The difference was that with their growing strength, the Uighurs hardened their

---

90 JTS, v120, pp. 3454-58; XTS, v137, pp. 4603-05; ZZTJ, v222, p. 7130.
91 ZZTJ, v222, p. 7132.
92 ZZTJ, v223, pp. 7148-49.
bargaining position in demanding more subsidies and equality from the Chinese, and
the Chinese adopted an even more tolerant attitude and paid a higher price to the
Uighurs to accommodate their demands. The measures adopted in Daizong's reign
included the following.

1) Conferment of titles. In 763 Daizong extended official ranks and
enfeoffment to all the generals in the campaign against Shi Chaoyi. The Uighurs were
also included. Not only the qaghan but also his wife the qatun were given honorific
titles. Other high Uighur officials were given the titles of prince and duke of state.
Together they received a total tax income of 20,000 households.93

2) Provision of material goods. In 765 to reward the Uighurs for joining Tang
against the Tibetans under the persuasion of Guo Ziyi, as well as to pay for Uighur
horses, the court gave as much as 100,000 pi of silk. As a result,

the treasuries were empty, so the court officials went without their salaries. In
the following months, the emperor gave them shouli ’’money (the
money derived from the exemption taxes), calling it exemption taxation money
(zike qian 資課錢 ). He taxed the court officials' [income from this
form of] taxation for the intercalary tenth, eleventh and twelfth months in order
to supply [the Uighurs].94

According to the Xin Tangshu, in Daizong's time the Uighurs yearly sent 100,000
horses, for which they were paid with over a million pi of silk. China's financial
resources were exhausted and were in arrears every year.95

---

93 The Qaghan's title was Yingyi Jiangong meaning "brave and righteous, building up service." The
Qanun's title was Guangqin Lihua meaning "bright and loving, beautiful and glorious." Mackerras, C.
CFYG, v962, p. 11318; v965, p. 11350; v967, p.11373.
The JTS, v195 says that the tax income is of 2,000 households but the XTS, v217A and the CFYG,
v965 record the number as of 20,000. Other sources do not give the number.
94 JTS, v195, pp. 5206-07; Mackerras, 1972, p. 84. See also ZZTJ, v223, p. 7184.
3) Marriage conclusion. In 769 upon the request of the Uighurs, Daizong bestowed the title of Princess Chonghui on the daughter of Pugu Huaien and married her to the qaghan as his second wife. Twenty thousand pi of silk were given. Because of his lack of financial resources, Daizong taxed some mules and camels from the dukes and court ministers and gave them to Princess Chonghui for her transport.\footnote{JTS, v11, p. 293; v145, p. 3935; XTS, v217A, p. 6120; ZZTJ, v224, p. 7208; TDZLJ, v42, p. 207.}

4) Granting favorable treatment. In 772, when a Uighur prince who had been in the Tang Imperial Guard was about to die, he was given the title of Commandery Prince of Tianshui and the royal surname Li. The cost of his funeral was borne by the Tang court.\footnote{JTS, v11, p. 299; CFYG, v976, p. 11461.} In 777 the wife of a Uighur chief minister was rewarded with the posthumous title of Consort of the Min State (minguo furen).\footnote{CFYG, v976, p. 11462.}

In spite of showing such favor to the Uighurs, Tang still could not avoid difficulties, especially in the horse-silk trade. Even though Tang could not afford to pay for all the horses brought to China, the Uighurs continued sending them in great numbers. Many of their envoys stayed in the Ministry of State Ceremonial in Chang'an, waiting for payment. In 771 or 772 they came out of the Ministry of State Ceremonial without permission into the market places, kidnapped children and beat the Chinese officials who tried to stop them. Three hundred Uighur cavalry men even attacked the gates of the imperial city. Again in 772 they came out of the Ministry of State Ceremonial, performed brutal deeds in the market place and abused the magistrate of Chang'an.\footnote{JTS, v195, p. 5207; XTS, v217A, p. 6120; ZZTJ, v224, p. 7218; p. 7219; CFYG, v997, p. 11704.}

Daizong decided to buy all the horses probably with the purpose of making the Uighur envoys leave. A hundred and forty or a hundred and forty-eight Uighurs
returned home with over 1,000 chariots of goods from Tang. But the Uighur envoy Chixin again brought in 10,000 horses for trade. The officer in charge suggested that the court buy 1,000 only. Guo Ziyi was afraid that this would offend the Uighurs and offered to donate one year's salary to pay for all the horses. Daizong did not agree and decided to purchase 6,000.100

The Uighurs did not, however, diminish their violent behavior. In 774 the Uighur envoys in Chang'an again came out of the Ministry of State Ceremonial and killed some Chinese civilians. They were arrested by the Chinese officers but Daizong set them free without any punishment.101 Next year they again came out, killing some Chinese. After they were imprisoned the Uighur officer Chixin broke into the jail and rescued them. Daizong once more ignored the incident.102

In 775 the Uighurs made an incursion on Xiazhou,103 and in 778 they raided Taiyuan, plundering Chinese livestock.104 Though the Chinese at first suffered a severe defeat, the Uighurs were driven back. Daizong did not question the Uighurs about the invasion. Outwardly he continued the same treatment towards them as before, he strengthened his frontier defences against them and gave a secret order to Zhang Guangcheng, the Commander of the Zhenwu Army, to work out a plan to ward them off.105

100 JTS, v120, p. 3464; v195, p. 5207; XTS, v137, p. 4607; v217A, pp. 6120-21; ZZTJ, v224, p. 7221; p. 7224; THY, v72, p. 1303; CFYG, v170, p. 2055; p. 2056; v999, p. 11727.
103 ZZTJ, v225, p. 7236.
105 JTS, v127, p. 3573.
Dezong: An Anti-Uighur Policy and Its Abandonment

When he came to the throne in 779, Dezong hardened his attitude towards the Uighurs. Among his series of reform measures to correct the malpractice of the previous reign, he ordered that all the envoys who had remained in Chang'an and lived on Tang supplies should be sent back, and that all the Uighurs and various Hu (referring mostly to the Sogdians) who were at the capital should wear their own costumes and should not dress as Chinese.¹⁰⁶

Dezong still remembered keenly the terrible humiliation he had suffered in Shanzhou in 762, and harbored strong resentment against the Uighurs. He decided to change Tang foreign policy by making an alliance with the Tibetans. He took the initiative to cultivate friendship with Tibet, which eased the frontier situation and brought about the conclusion of a sworn treaty between Tang and Tibet in 783.¹⁰⁷

Political changes also took place within the Uighur empire. Soon after the death of Daizong in 779, the Sogdians, who were very influential in Uighur state politics, persuaded Bögü Qaghan to take advantage of the situation when China was in mourning, and to launch a military invasion. The qaghan mobilized all his nation for an expedition. But he was opposed firmly by his chief minister Dun Mohe Dagan 冼莫贺達干 (Ton? Bagha Tarqan¹⁰⁸). Failing to dissuade the qaghan from the campaign, Bagha Tarqan staged a coup d'état, killed the qaghan and two or three thousand of his followers including many Sogdians, and established himself as qaghan. Seeking recognition by the Chinese, he sent an embassy to Tang with the Tang envoy who had previously arrived to inform the Uighurs of the death of Daizong. In 780 Dezong decided to send Yuan Xiu 原休 as a commissioner to give the

¹⁰⁶ ZZTJ, v225, p. 7264; p. 7265.
¹⁰⁷ For details, see Chapter V.
An incident occurred which made the relationship more complex. In 780 when the Uighur envoys, who had previously been in Chang'an, were on their way back, they stopped at the border post of the Zhenwu Army for several months, where they caused some trouble in the area and laid a heavy economic burden on the local Chinese government. It was also discovered that the Uighurs had secretly taken with them Chinese women. These Uighurs were headed by Tudong, who was Bagha Tarqun's uncle. When they heard of the coup d'état, the Sogdians among them did not want to go back to the new qaghan. But under the close watch of Tudong, they could not flee. They tried to persuade Zhang Guangcheng, the Commander of the Zhenwu Army, to attack Tudong and his followers. Being aware of Dezong's hatred for the Uighurs, Zhang presented three memorials, suggesting that since the Uighur rulers could not maintain control over their people without material goods from the Chinese, Tang should take advantage of the situation and eliminate the Uighurs. In spite of Dezong's disagreement to his proposal, Zhang went ahead, making an attack against the Uighurs in the eighth month of 780. As a result, Tudong and his people, 900 in all, were killed. Under the pressure from the Uighurs, Dezong recalled Zhang Guangcheng and reduced his position as punishment.\footnote{\textit{Wuyi Chenggong} means "warlike, righteous and achieving merit." Mackerras, C. 1972, p. 153, note 149.}

Dezong's reaction to the changed situation in the Uighur ruling group and this incident was somewhat vague, probably because at that time he was not quite sure yet whether his policy of a Tibetan alliance could succeed. He punished Zhang for his act. But soon after the incident he intended to cut off relations with the Uighurs. When Yuan Xiu, the commissioner to bestow the diploma of the title of investment on Bagha


\footnote{\textit{JTS, v}11, 326; \textit{v}127, pp. 3573-74; \textit{XTS, v}217A, pp. 6120-21; \textit{ZZTJ, v}226, pp. 7287-88.}
Tarqan, arrived in Zhenwu, he was called back to Taiyuan. But in the following year 781, he was again ordered to go to the Uighurs in order to return the coffins of Tudong and three others. When he got to the Uighurs, he was made to stand in the snow in front of the tent of the chief minister and was reprimanded for the Tudong incident.

In spite of others’ urging to take revenge on the Chinese, Bagha Tarqan was not willing to start any direct confrontation with Tang. As compensation, he requested that Tang should pay its debt in the horse-silk trade of 180,000 pi of silk immediately. He sent an envoy who arrived at the Tang court in 782. Dezong ordered the payment of 100,000 pi of silk, and 100,000 liang of gold and silver for the Uighur horses.

The Chinese records do not say whether Yuan Xiu delivered the diploma for the title on the qaghan. But they say that in 781 or 782, Li Han was appointed the Commissioner for Condolence and Enfeoffment to the Uighurs.

In the first month of 783 Tang and Tibet concluded their sworn treaty, which seems to have made Dezong determined to sever relations with the Uighurs. From 783 to 786, there was only one official contact between the two states. It was in 784 when general Zhou Hao was appointed Commissioner for Pacifying the Uighurs.

During this time the Uighurs had been involved with anti-Tang forces inside China. They were enticed into an alliance by the Military Commissioner of Youzhou, Zhu Tao, who rebelled against the Tang court in 782. Zhu Tao had married a Uighur lady and the

111 JTS, v127, p. 3575; XTS, v217A, p. 6122; ZZTI, v227, pp. 7330-31. Concerning the year Yuan Xiu arrived at the Uighurs, see Mackerras, C. 1972, p. 154, note 155. Mackerras translates that the qaghan demanded the Tang payment of 180,000 ligatures. See his 1972, p. 93. However, the JTS, v127 clearly says that the measurement of 180,000 was 180,000 pi of silk. The XTS, v217A does not give the measurement.
112 JTS, v12, p. 333; THY, v98, p. 1746.
113 CFYG, v980, p. 11514.
In the "Table of Uighur Contacts" of his Huihu Shi, Li Futong lists that in 784, the Uighur envoy asked for a marriage, and 785 the Uighurs asked to change their name Huihe to Huihu. He bases his record on the XTS, which is different from the records in other sources. It is not clear why he relies on the XTS rather than others, such as the THY or the ZZTI, both of which date the event in 787.
Uighurs helped Zhu Tao in several battles presumably with the primary purpose of seizing material gains. Zhu Tao came to terms with the court in 784.\textsuperscript{114}

Dezong sought military assistance from Tibet in suppressing the rebellion started in 783 by Zhu Ci 祝泚, who was Zhu Tao's brother and had occupied Chang'an, assuming the title of emperor. The alliance with Tibet, however, did not result in much Tibetan assistance. Instead, since Tang did not turn over the land it had promised as a reward for Tibetan assistance, Tibet turned against the Chinese. In 787, when some Chinese officials went to conclude a treaty with Tibet in Pingliang in on the border between Tang and Tibet, they were kidnapped by the Tibetans. This was the disaster of the "False Treaty of Pingliang."\textsuperscript{115} The previous policy of Uighur alliance, though causing China a lot of trouble, achieved some positive results, while the alliance with Tibet made China suffer many more losses without much gain.

In 787 after the "False Treaty of Pingliang," Tang decided to return to the policy of allying with the Uighurs. The change of policy was suggested by Grand Councilor Li Mi 李泌. The strategy was to ally with the Uighurs as well as with the Nanzhao Kingdom, the Arabs and India against Tibet. At first Dezong refused the idea of an alliance with the Uighurs because of his continuing resentment for the humiliation of 762. Li Mi had fifteen discussions with Dezong, urging him to consider the possibility since the Uighurs were at that time eager to contract a marriage with a Chinese princess. Li Mi suggested that the court should raise five conditions to the Uighurs for their request: 1) the Uighurs should call themselves subjects of Tang; 2)


Mackerras raises the question why the Uighurs involved themselves in the Zhu Tao rebellion. He conjectures that the leader of the Uighur troops was probably related to Zhu Tao's Uighur concubine or he belonged to the faction which wanted to avenge Zhang Guangcheng's massacre, and that tribal allegiances was at the root of this curious case of Uighur assistance. This leader probably did it behind Dun Mohe Qaghan's back. Mackerras' conjecture has some validity since there were often conflicts between a nomadic ruler and his officers in their attitudes towards China.

\textsuperscript{115} For details, see Chapter V.
the qaghan should be in a position of a son to the Tang emperor; 3) each Uighur embassy should not exceed 200 people; 4) the horses sent to Tang for trade should not exceed 1,000 annually; 5) the Uighurs should not take Chinese and foreign merchants outside the Tang frontiers.

Dezong expressed his doubts of the possibility of Uighur acceptance on the grounds that Tang had been on bad terms with the Uighurs, and that when the Uighurs heard about the "False Treaty of Pingliang," they could very well refuse the Tang request for peace. If they did, Dezong was worried that Tang would be laughed at by the "barbarians." He could not believe that having previously been a brother state of Tang, the Uighurs would want to accept a vassal status. Li Mi seems to have known much better how much the Uighurs desired a peace agreement. Finally Dezong was persuaded. It was indeed a delightful surprise to Dezong when he heard that the qaghan had agreed to all the five conditions. Dezong thereupon promised to send his own daughter, Princess Xian'an, to marry the qaghan and paid 50,000 pi of silk for the Uighur horses.\footnote{JTS, v195, p. 5208; XTS, v217A, pp. 6122-23; ZZTJ, v233, pp. 7501-06; THY, v6, p. 76; CFYG, v978, p. 11505.}

The alliance was resumed. The Uighurs showed enthusiasm for the change. In 788 the qaghan sent an embassy of a thousand to Tang to receive the Chinese princess. During their stop in Zhenwu, when the Xi and Shiwei attacked Zhenwu, the Uighurs helped Tang in a counter-attack. At the Tang court their envoys presented the qaghan's memorial, expressing his wish to help Tang to defeat the Tibetans. He requested to change the name of the Uighurs in Chinese characters from Huihe to Huihu, since the character hu meant swift birds of prey, like falcons. Along with other officials who were sent to escort Princess Xian'an to the Uighurs, a court
minister was sent to bestow honorary titles on Bagha Tarqan and on Princess Xian'an as his qatun.\textsuperscript{117}

### 788 to 840: A Period of Peace

The year 788, when the marriage alliance was made between the Chinese and the Uighurs, was a significant turning point in the Tang relations with the Uighur empire. From then till 840, when the Uighur empire collapsed under the attacks of the Kirghiz, there was no conflict or military confrontation between the two states. The Uighurs stayed peacefully within the tribute system.

The Uighurs, however, only accepted vassal status in a nominal way. Just like the Xiongnu and the Turks, they had their own ideological perspective of their position vis-à-vis the Chinese. The Shine-usu inscription begins: "The wise qaghan, born from heaven to govern the people."\textsuperscript{118} The Chinese part of the Karabalghasun inscription also refers to the Uighur ruler as "Heavenly Qaghan" (\textit{tian kehan}),\textsuperscript{119} the title Tang Taizong once assumed.

It seems that even the Chinese themselves recognized the Uighur assumption of such a title. The imperial edict written by Bai Juyi on behalf of Muzong in 821 says:

> Though you honor yourself as the favored son of Heaven, it does not yet match up to the fullness of your merit. Though you honor yourself as Heavenly Qaghan, it does not yet fully express your excellence. It is right that we bestow

\begin{flushleft}
\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{117} The Qaghan was given the title \textit{Changshou Tianqin} meaning "long-lived and beloved by Heaven." The Qatun was given the title \textit{Zhihui Duanzheng Changshou Xiaoshun} meaning "wise, graceful, upright, long-lived, filial and obedient." Mackerras, C. 1972, p. 160, note 179.


\textsuperscript{119} Haneda Tōru. 1957, pp. 308-309.
\end{flushleft}
on you a splendid title in order that you can boast your fame to later

generations."\textsuperscript{120}

The letter not only recognized the title of Heavenly Qaghan, but also tried to woo the

Uighurs and make them believe that only the Chinese conferment could enhance their

prestige. The Chinese used political titles to make non-Chinese rulers attach themselves
to China and they wanted the Uighurs to value the title given by the emperor. The letter
does not insist on a Chinese claim to superiority, which shows a tremendous difference

in the Chinese attitude towards the Uighurs between Taizong's time and the later Tang

period.

Why did the relations take such a turn? Was it because of the success of the Tang policy? Were there differences in Tang policies towards the Uighurs and other non-Chinese? Was it because the Uighurs themselves preferred peace and took the initiative to keep the peaceful relationship? Or was it because of the weakened situation of Tang as well as the power of the Uighur empire?

On the part of the Chinese, the six emperors who succeeded one another during this period, including Dezong, Shunzong, Xianzong, Muzong, Jingzong and Wenzong, adopted the usual measures of previous times in their conduct of Uighur relations and kept the horse-silk trade throughout, even at an exorbitant price. These measures certainly had some effect in soothing the aggressive Uighurs.

Proper rituals were observed in the tribute system. Favorable political and ritual treatment was adopted towards the Uighurs. Between 789 and 848, there were twelve Uighur rulers on the throne. Eight received the routine appointment of the title qaghan from the Chinese. The four exceptions were Zhongzhen Qaghan's younger brother, who staged a coup d'état in 790 and stayed in power for only a month, and the last three Uighur qaghans, Kesa, Wujie（Ögä）\textsuperscript{121} and Enian.

\textsuperscript{120} Baishi Changqing Ji, v33, "Ce Huihu kehan jiahaowen."

\textsuperscript{121} Drompp, M. R. 1986, p. 12.
on the throne consecutively from 839 to 848 when the empire had virtually
dissolved.\textsuperscript{122} Very often when a qaghan died, the Chinese court observed the rite of
suspending court business for three days. Civil and military officials ranking third
level and above went to the Ministry of State Ceremonial to mourn the deceased
qaghan.\textsuperscript{123} Diplomatic embassies went back and forth frequently.\textsuperscript{124} In 821 in
Muzong's reign, another marriage was arranged. This time the daughter of the late
Xianzong, Princess Taihe was married to the Uighur Chongde Qaghan.\textsuperscript{125} The amount of silk that was paid as a price for the Uighur horses from 780
to 829 was over 2,012,000 \textit{pi},\textsuperscript{126} which was another factor contributing to the peace.

From 763 when the Uighurs adopted Manicheism, this Persian religion also
spread inside China and more Manichean temples were built after 768 in China upon
Uighurs' request.\textsuperscript{127} It was the military power of the Uighurs that persuaded the
Chinese emperors to tolerate Manicheism, the national religion of the Uighur empire.\textsuperscript{128}

In spite of all these measures, the Chinese were still distrustful, suspicious and
cautious in their attitude towards the Uighurs, a neighbor which could be formidably
threatening. In a court discussion with Xianzong in 809 the minister Li Jiang opposed a bellicose policy towards the Hebei separatist Wang Chengzong for fear that the Uighurs and the Tibetans would take advantage of the situation and launch attacks while Tang troops were fighting in Hebei and China would be in great danger. In 810 Bai Juyi made the same argument in a memorial.\textsuperscript{129}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[122] For details of the history of this period, see Haneda Tōru. 1957, pp. 213-238; Mackerras, C. 1972, pp. 42-47.
\item[123] \textit{CFYG}, v976, pp. 11462-66.
\item[124] Mackerras, C. 1969, pp. 231-238.
\item[126] Mackerras, C. 1969, pp. 238-239.
\item[128] Mackerras, C. 1972, pp. 43-44.
\item[129] \textit{Baishi Changqing Ji}, v42, "Qing babing dierzhuang;" \textit{ZZTJ}, v238, p. 7664; p. 7673.
\end{footnotes}
The marriage of the Princess Taihe to Chongde Qaghan in 821 was concluded only after protracted negotiations. The first request was made by the Uighurs in 813 but Xianzong did not agree at that time. In the winter of 813 the Uighurs attacked the Tibetans in Liugu and several thousand Uighur cavalry men reached Piti Spring, near West Shouxiang Fortress. In alarm the court ordered troops to be on guard, sending fifty additional cavalrmen to the East Shouxiang Fortress to prepare against the Uighurs, even though the Uighur expedition was intended more against the Tibetans. In 814 the Chinese restored Youzhou and stationed an army of 9,000 troops there with the purpose of preparing against the Uighurs.

In the same year Li Jiang proposed to make an agreement with the Uighurs for a marriage, expressing his worry that the Uighurs for two years had not traded their horses with Tang, which might be a sign that the Uighurs, who were familiar with the frontier conditions, would start an invasion, or would form an alliance with the Tibetans. Moreover, according to Li Jiang, there were several problems in the Tang frontier defence system that weakened Tang defence ability. Peace therefore was much preferable to hostility and a marriage alliance would have three advantages: 1) it would bring peace to the frontier and therefore the troops there could build up more strength; 2) with peace on the frontier, the court could divert its attention to deal with internal rebel forces; and 3) an alliance with the Uighurs would stir up more distrust and hatred between the Uighurs and Tibet, of which Tang could take advantage. However, Xianzong still did not adopt his proposal, for the marriage would cost as many as five million strings of cash. Li Jiang insisted that Tang should use tax revenues for the marriage, which would cost less than if Tang started a war with the Uighurs. In 820

---

130 Haneda considers that the Uighur arrival at Pidi Spring was to press Tang to agree with the marriage, see his 1957, pp. 221-222. Beckwith, however, maintains that this demonstration was intended more for the benefit of the Tibetans than for the Chinese. It was a response to an event four years earlier when the Tibetans went via Pidi Spring to plunder a Uighur embassy in the Dashi valley. Beckwith, C. I. 1987, pp. 164-166. When we see the war and peace situation as a whole of the three states China, Uighur, and Tibet, Beckwith's opinion is more credible.

131 ZZTJ, v239, p. 7704.
towards the end of his reign, when China's internal situation had become calm and Tibet was making continuous attacks, Xianzong finally changed his mind and permitted the marriage, which was concluded in Muzong's reign.\textsuperscript{132}

Between the latter half of 821 and early 822, the Uighurs offered to assist Tang in suppressing the internal rebels. The court discussed the matter and decided to refuse any help, recalling with bitter feelings how on previous occasions the Uighurs had offered help and then demanded expensive compensation afterwards. Emperor Muzong sent an envoy to stop the Uighurs, who had already reached Fengzhou and did not wish to return. Only when Tang gave them 70,000 \textit{pi} of silk, did they leave.\textsuperscript{133} The court in the end decided to come to terms with the rebellious separatists.

Though frontier peace was maintained between Tang and the Uighurs, it was a rather shaky peace. At that time whenever the Uighurs passed the Tang frontiers on their way to the Chinese capital or to engage in trade with Tang, the Chinese were afraid of their causing disturbances. They always met the Uighurs and sent them off under surveillance of strong military escorts.\textsuperscript{134} When the Uighurs made raids on their way, only a few Chinese frontier officials were able to stop the violence.\textsuperscript{135}

The Horse-Silk Trade between the Uighurs and Tang

One of the explanations that is offered for the perennial problem of nomadic raids on the Chinese frontier is that the nomads needed to trade with the agrarian Chinese. When the Chinese prevented the trade or when they failed to develop a workable arrangement for mutual trade the nomads would have to plunder to obtain

\textsuperscript{134} \textit{ZZTJ}, v244, p. 7870.
\textsuperscript{135} \textit{JTS}, v180, p. 4675; \textit{XTS}, v212, p. 5978; \textit{ZZTJ}, v244, p. 7885.
what they needed and to force Chinese into trade. The Tang-Uighur trade to a certain extent provides support for this explanation from a different angle. That is, since Tang kept up this trade even at an exorbitant price, peace was achieved.

The nomads were always interested in trade with China in order to obtain economic benefits. This was not only for the sake of improving their standard of living but also because trade was needed as a means of maintaining their state power. In his article "The Hsiung-nu imperial confederacy: organization and foreign policy," Barfield has provided insights into this question. He observes that in order to deal with their larger and more highly organized sedentary neighbors, the nomads had to develop their own peculiar form of state organization, which was more complex than one with responsibilities only to handle livestock problems and political disputes within a nomadic society. But since the nomadic economy was insufficient to support this state hierarchy, rulers of successful states had to develop a more secure economic basis outside the steppe, which could be found conveniently in the adjacent agricultural society. It was by exploiting China's economy that the nomadic state maintained itself. In its relationship with China, Barfield observes, the Xiongnu state established a deliberately predatory policy and cultivated a particularly violent reputation in order to maximize its bargaining position with the Han government.

Barfield goes on to point out that this policy was implemented in the outer frontier strategy of the Xiongnu state, which took full advantage of the nomads' ability to strike suddenly deep into China and then retreat before the Chinese had time to retaliate. The strategy had three major elements: violent raiding used to terrify the Han court; the alternation of war and peace to increase the amount of subsidies and trade

---

136 Xia Qiqing. 1972, p. 4; Jagchid Sechin and Hyer, P. 1979, pp. 300-301.
privilege granted by the Chinese; and deliberate refusal to occupy Chinese agricultural land even after great victories.\textsuperscript{139}

While the Turks in the time of their first and second empires continued all these strategies, the Uighurs did not resort to war as often as either the Xiongnu or the Turks. Through their assistance to the Chinese, they demonstrated their military superiority so that they could draw Tang into the horse-silk trade, which developed on a much more stable basis than that in the Xiongnu and Turkish times.

In the times of the Turks there had been horse-silk trade. In 721 Xuanzong sent a letter to the Turkish Bilgä Qaghan which recalled the days when Tang and the Turks were at peace, and both had benefited from the trade of Turkish horses and Chinese silk.\textsuperscript{140} In 727 when the Turks refused to join the Tibetans in making an incursion on Guazhou, and sent Tang the letter the qaghan received from the Tibetans, as a reward, Xuanzong allowed the Turks to trade with the Chinese in West Shouxiang Fortress. Every year the Chinese would use several tens of thousand pi of silk to buy horses from the Turks.\textsuperscript{141}

Soon the horse-silk trade increased so rapidly that it became a burden to the Chinese. In 736 three letters written by Zhang Jiuling on behalf of Xuanzong were sent to the Turks discussing the matter. In these letters Zhang complained that in the previous two years the Turks had sent several times as many horses as the regular quota (3,000 to 4,000) that had been adhered to under the previous qaghan and that some horses were old, weak, sick or too small. Zhang held that Tang did the Turks a favor in buying so many horses.\textsuperscript{142}

\textsuperscript{139} Barfield, T. J. 1981, p. 54.
\textsuperscript{141} ZZTJ, v213, p. 6779. The XTS, v50 (p. 1338) has a similar passage but does not say clearly which year Xuanzong promised this trade.
\textsuperscript{142} Qujiang Zhang Xiansheng Wenji, v11, three "Chi Tujue kehan shu." For the date of the letters, see Cen Zhongmian. 1958, v10, pp. 450-51; p. 452.
Starting from the Qianyuan period (758-760) of Suzong's reign, the Uighurs, backed up by their service to China in the suppression of the An Lushan rebellion, frequently sent embassies with horses to trade at an agreed price for Chinese silk.\textsuperscript{143}

The Chinese considered the horse-silk trade as a favor that the court extended to the Uighurs, while the Uighurs had a different perspective. They believed that the Chinese owed them a debt for military assistance so China had to repay it by buying horses. After the Tibetans took over the He-Long region following the An Lushan rebellion, Tang lost some good pastures and the need for horses was keen. But when the Uighurs sent in horses, Tang could not afford to buy them all. It was generally considered a burden for Tang to keep up the trade. In Daizong's time, the Uighurs yearly sent in 100,000 horses, for which they were paid with over a million \textit{pi} of silk. China's financial resources were exhausted and Tang was in arrears every year.\textsuperscript{144}

Disputes over the trade often occurred, reflecting the different perspectives the two sides held. In 768 when the Uighur qaghan died, Tang sent Xiao Xin, a court official, to the Uighurs to express condolences. The newly established Uighur qaghan complained to Xiao,

\textit{We performed great services for Tang. How can Tang go back on its words, and when buying our horses, not pay the price on time?}

Xiao Xin replied:

\textit{The services of the Uighurs, Tang has already repaid. When Pugu rebelled, the Uighurs assisted him, and joined forces with the Tibetans to invade and to press

\textsuperscript{143} JTS, v195, p. 5207; XTS, v50, p. 1339; v217A, p. 6120; CFYG, v999, p. 11727.  
\textsuperscript{144} XTS, v51, p. 1348.
on the suburb [of our capital]. After Pugu died and the Tibetans fled, the Uighurs then were afraid and asked for peace. Our Tang dynasty did not forget your former services. We extended grace and forgave you. If not, not the price of a single horse would have been returned. It is the Uighurs who go back on the treaty. How can you say that Tang was not true to its word?\(^{145}\)

In the following year when the minister Li Han and his assistant Dong Jin went to escort Princess Chonghui to the Uighurs, the Uighurs again pressed for payment for their horses. Li Han did not even dare to reply. Dong Jin argued:

It is not because we do not have horses that we buy them from you. What we have bestowed on you, is it not a great deal already? Your horses come every year, and we count the skins and repay the price. Our frontier officials ask us to object. The Son of Heaven remembers your meritorious services and has therefore ordered that there shall be no attacks against you. All the barbarians are afraid because our great state is your ally and do not dare to compete with you. Among your fathers and sons there is peace and you rear your horses in great number, who but we have brought this about?\(^{146}\)

Since Tang could not afford to pay for all the horses sent to China, many of the Uighurs envoys, therefore, stayed in the Ministry of State Ceremonial in Chang'an, waiting for the payment. In Daizong's reign, they caused the Chinese a great deal of trouble in Chang'an as discussed earlier.

The amount of silk that was paid as a price for the Uighur horses from 780 to 829 was as high as 2,012,000 \(pi\).\(^{147}\) And in the decade 820 to 830 when the Uighurs were declining, the silk paid from China exceeded the amount during the time when the Uighurs were strong. In answer to the question why the Chinese should pay so much silk during that decade, Mackerras holds that the difference in the amount of trade for

\(^{145}\) ZZTJ, v224, p. 7201. See also JTS, v146, p. 3962; XTS, v159, p. 4951; CFYG, v980, p. 11513.

\(^{146}\) ZZTJ, v224, p. 7208. See also XTS, v151, p. 4819.

\(^{147}\) Mackerras, C. 1969, pp. 238-239.
that period and other periods might not be so great as the sources indicate. Records for other periods might not be sufficient. Also the Chinese paid for unwanted horses out of their fear of the Uighurs. Moses suggests that it was the ignorance of the Uighur situation and fear of the Uighurs that made the Chinese continuously send them enormous amounts of silk.

These explanations are given from the point of view that China did not want so many horses and it did not have the ability to pay. A letter written by Bai Juyi on behalf of Xianzong to the Uighur qaghan in about 809 supports this interpretation. It says that according to the document sent by the Uighurs, they were to send 6,500 horses, but the horses that had arrived and had been branded amounted to 20,000 and were worth 50,000 pi of silk. However, China could only pay 25,000 pi of silk for these 20,000 horses. The letter also expresses the wish of having a fixed agreement concerning the horse-silk trade so as to keep a good relationship.

One should not forget, however, that China always needed horses, especially after losing its good pastures in the Longyou region to Tibet as a result of the An Lushan rebellion. Purchase seems to have been the major solution. The questions we need to ask are how many Tang needed, and whether it could afford to buy as many as it wanted. In 787 when Tang decided to change the pro-Tibetan policy to an alliance with the Uighurs, one of the considerations was that China was in need of horses. Li Mi, the advocate of the pro-Uighur policy, said that if Tang adopted the policy of the Uighur alliance, the price of horses inside China would decrease by ten times (90 per cent) within several years.

149 Moses, L. W. 1976, p. 82.
150 Baishi Changqing Ji, v40, "Yu Huihu kehan shu."
151 ZZTJ, v233, p. 7501.
In 815 and 816, according to the Chinese records, a large quantity of silk was given to the Uighurs as the price for horses. While recognizing that this may indicate that the flow of horses had started again, Mackerras holds that it is more likely that this silk was payment for horses brought in much earlier, for which the court deemed it wise to pay as a means of discouraging the feared invasion.\textsuperscript{152}

But the fact was that the court in 816 did decide to buy horses for a military suppression of an internal rebellion started by a military commissioner. It sent eunuch envoys to purchase horses in the Hequ region with 20,000 \textit{pi} of silk. Upon the arrival of Uighur horses, the court paid 60,000 \textit{pi} of silk.\textsuperscript{153} Even after the Uighur empire collapsed the Chinese still wanted to purchase horses for defence.\textsuperscript{154} China kept the horse-silk trade not only because the trade would make the Uighurs a peaceful neighbor but also because China itself did need horses though it often could not afford to purchase a great number of them.

The Changes and Their Impact in the Uighur Empire

Once they established their own empire the Uighurs took over many features of early Turkish rulers in their state organization. They even faced the same traditional enemies of the Turks, such as the Kirghiz, a Turkish people to the north of the Uighurs. On the other hand the relationship with China was good from the beginning. The Uighurs felt secure in their own identity and seriously took the lessons of settled culture to heart. Their frequent contacts with China and marriages with Chinese princesses as well as their trading activities let them adopt an urban life-style. City

\textsuperscript{152} Mackerras, C. 1969, p. 219.
\textsuperscript{153} XTS, v50, p. 1339; THY, v72, p. 1304.
\textsuperscript{154} \textit{Li Wenrao Wenji}, v14, "Qing shi Fan-ma zhuang."
building became a necessity for them in order to store goods. From 763 Manicheism began to spread gradually among the Uighurs.\textsuperscript{155} The period "witnessed a partial transfer from the totally nomadic existence of their ancestors to a more settled and sophisticated livelihood in which cities, commerce and agriculture played an important role."\textsuperscript{156} This transformation was a major or an essential factor in the Uighurs' decision to keep a peaceful relationship with Tang.

When discussing the impact of the changes in this period, Grousset conjectures: "in the process of acquiring civilization, the Uighur must have grown weaker." He observes that this resulted in the overthrown of the empire by the Kirghiz, who remained in a more "savage" state.\textsuperscript{157} While this conjecture has a certain validity, it might be too simplistic to arrive at such a conclusion without a careful examination of the historical evidence. The Uighurs only became weak towards the end of their imperial period. During the first eight decades, they in fact demonstrated great power in their fierce competition with other peoples over the control of the Western Regions. They involved themselves in frequent struggles with Tibet and others, competing persistently for commercial interest. This competition not only made it necessary for them to keep a peaceful relationship with Tang, but also enabled China to benefit, to an important extent, from a situation which set "barbarians against barbarians."

In 758 the Uighurs defeated 50,000 Kirghiz troops, occupied some of their territory and cut off Kirghiz communication with Tang. This pushed the Kirghiz into seeking alliances with the Qarluq of the Turks, Tibetans and Arabs in pursuit of international trade and communications.\textsuperscript{158}

\textsuperscript{156} Mackerras, C. 1972, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{157} Grousset, R. 1970, pp. 120-125.
\textsuperscript{158} Li Futong. 1963, pp. 60-61; Beckwith, C. I. 1987, pp. 147-148.
Direct clashes between the Uighurs and Tibetans started in 789. After the An Lushan rebellion, Tang lost the He-Long region to the Tibetans, thus communication between the Western Regions and Tang was seriously hindered. In 781\textsuperscript{159} Li Yuanzhong 李元忠, the Military Commissioner of Yixi and Beiting, which were still in the hands of the Chinese, sent messengers to arrive at Chang'an via the Uighur territory. The Uighur route broke through the Tibetan stoppage of the Silk Road to Chang'an, the east-west communication highway. It also provided the Uighurs with an opportunity to exercise actual control over both Beiting and communication between the Western Regions and Tang. The Uighurs imposed exorbitant fees on the merchants engaged in this trade. The Shatuo 畏鞨 people, who were of the Turkish origin and had been dependents of Beiting, and the three tribes of the Qarluq and the white-clothed Turks, who had been subjects of the Uighurs, bore strong resentment against the Uighur rule. They secretly submitted to the Tibetans.

In the winter of 789 the Tibetans with the Shatuo attacked Beiting which, as a result, came under the control of Tibet. In the autumn of 790 the Uighurs mobilized the whole nation and then joined by the Chinese commanded by Yang Xigu 杨希古, the Protector-general of Beiting, launched an expedition to recover Beiting, but it ended in a disastrous failure. For some unknown reason, Yang Xigu was murdered by the Uighur general later. In 791 the Uighurs succeeded in driving back the Tibetan invasion of Lingzhou and in retaking Beiting.\textsuperscript{160} Beiting was a strategically important place on the Silk Road, and whoever occupied the city would obtain economic benefits.

Several wars between the Uighurs and Tibetans took place between 808 and 821. The situation certainly eased the Chinese problems with Tibet and may have made

\textsuperscript{159} ZZTJ, v227, p. 7303. The XTS, v217A (p. 6124) records the year as 786, which is wrong, see Mackerras, C. 1972, p. 163, note 199.

the Tibetans decide to conclude the peace treaty with Tang in 821, which led to a long period of peace. The first two decades of the ninth century were a time of prosperity for the Uighur empire under Baoyi 巴義 Qaghan. The empire expanded to its greatest east-west extent and cities like Beiting, Xizhou, Kucha and Karashar were dependencies of the Uighurs. All of these cities were important posts on the Silk Road.

The Tibetans, following their sworn treaty with China in 821, made a peace agreement with the Uighurs and with the Nanzhao kingdom as well. From then on hostilities between the Uighurs and Tibet seem to have lessened.

The important changes that the Uighur empire itself underwent influenced its position in the balance of power versus Tang. The Chinese realized that provision of material goods to the nomads would lessen their threat. As we have seen, the immediate motive for the Tang Chinese in contracting marriages with the Uighurs and supplying them with material goods was to purchase military assistance and peace in the frontier regions rather than deliberately trying to change the nature of the nomads. In the long run, though, these measures did have such an effect.

In his study of the Xiongnu empire, Barfield points out the success of the Xiongnu's China policy, which was aimed at exploiting the Han state from a distance, and also set up a model for the later nomadic empires, the Turkish and Uighur. He also correctly concludes: "Without the Chinese economy to exploit, there could have been no great Xiongnu state."

There is, however, one important inherent weakness in this policy that Barfield does not mention. That is, as Pulleyblank observes,

---

161 He is known as Ai tängridä qut bulmish alp bilgä Qaghan in the inscription of Karabalghasun. Hamilton, J. R. 1988, p. 141.
Chinese goods could also represent a dangerous seduction which could destroy the basis of Xiongnu military superiority.

He further states that the attraction of Chinese goods did lead to changes within the Xiongnu economy and society, reflected in city-building and a limited practice of agriculture. Moreover,

the possibility of obtaining even larger subsidies from the Chinese court as vassals than under the *heqin* (marriage alliance) system, was no doubt an important factor in inducing the Xiongnu under Huhanxie Chanyu to make peace and submit.\(^\text{165}\)

The seduction of Chinese goods was well recognized by both the Chinese and non-Chinese from early Han onward. Zhonghang Yue, a Han Chinese, who had defected to the Xiongnu, once gave the reasons for the advantage of the nomads over the agricultural Chinese. He noted that the Xiongnu people did not amount to a single commandery of Han, yet they could coerce the Chinese because their food and clothing were different, and they needed nothing from the Chinese. He warned that if the *chanyu* changed his customs and liked Chinese goods, the Chinese could make the Xiongnu submit without burdensome expenditure.\(^\text{166}\) The Han Chinese, for their part, believed that they could use Chinese goods to seduce the nomads and weaken their power, and therefore Jia Yi, the famous Han thinker, suggested the policy of "five baits," namely to provide material goods and buildings to the Xiongnu in order to corrupt them.\(^\text{167}\) The Han Chinese also well realized that the nomads were difficult to deal with because of their high mobility. Thus the remarks:

*Inside, the Xiongnu have no houses to defend; outside, they have no agricultural accumulations. They drive their flocks in search of good pastures*

\(^{165}\) Pulleyblank, E. G. Forthcoming.
\(^{166}\) *SJ*, v110, p. 2899; *HS*, v94A, p. 3759.
\(^{167}\) *HS*, v48, p. 2265; Yü Ying-shi. 1967, p. 36-37.
and sweet water. Even while they carry on their normal way of life, China is disturbed and harassed by them. They gather like winds and disperse like clouds. If you go towards them, they disappear. If you attack them, they scatter. They cannot be got rid of in one generation.\textsuperscript{168}

As we have already noted in Chapter II, the seductive effect that Chinese goods could have on the nomads is graphically described in one of the Old Turkish inscriptions. They realized that they should keep distance from the Chinese.\textsuperscript{169}

The Turks intentionally kept their mobility. When Bilgä Qaghan of the second Turkish empire wanted to build walled towns, his minister Tonyuguq rejected the idea firmly on the ground that the Turkish population was small, not equal to one percent of the Tang Chinese, but they could constantly resist Tang precisely because they moved about, and therefore, when they were strong they could advance their forces and plunder, and when they were weak they could hide away in the mountains and forests. Though the Tang had large armies, they had no way to employ them. He warned that if the Turks built towns, settled down and changed their old customs, once they suffered a defeat, they would be certainly swallowed up by the Chinese.\textsuperscript{170}

In the case of the Uighurs, von Gabain points out in her article "Steppe und Stadt im Leben der ältesten Türken," that the Uighurs were confident in their power and willing to combine a nomadic and city life-style. From their imperial period onward, the Uighurs built palaces and towns.\textsuperscript{171} Villages and agricultural production also developed.\textsuperscript{172} These were noted by the Arabic traveler Tamim ibn Bahr, who visited the capital of the Uighurs and saw that

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{168} Yan Tie Lun Jiaozhu, v7, "Bei Hu," p. 264.
\bibitem{170} TD, v198, p. 1075; JTS, v194A, p. 5174; XTS, v215B, p. 6052; ZZTJ, v211, p. 6722.
\bibitem{171} von Gabain, A. 1949.
\bibitem{172} For details concerning the changes the Uighur empire underwent, see Feng Jiasheng and others. 1981, pp. 23-31.
\end{thebibliography}
This is a great town, rich in agriculture and ... full of cultivation and villages lying close together. The town has twelve iron gates of huge size. The town is populated and thickly crowded and has markets and various trades. Among its population the Zindiq religion prevails.173

The Zizhi Tongjian concludes that it was because of the rich rewards from the Chinese that the qaghan began to build palaces and the Uighur customs deteriorated due to the luxurious life-style.174 City building must have gradually resulted in a lack of mobility, thus weakening the basic advantage of the nomads.

The influence of the Sogdians was also a very important factor in the process of transition. The Sogdians were famous for their activities in international trade on the Silk Road in Asia. Their role as intermediary merchants can be traced far back to the Han dynasty. Such intermediary commerce was a way of life for the Sogdians. In the period of the Turkish empire the Sogdians exerted important influence both economically and politically on the Turkish rulers. In the Uighur empire their role continued and became even more profound and penetrating, evidence of which can be found in quite a few historical sources.175 The Sogdians greatly stimulated the Uighur interest in trade with China. The large quantities of silk that the Uighurs received through trade with China obviously could not be consumed all within the empire. The silk products must have been re-exported to other states, or even sold to the Chinese frontier troops.176

When the economy and state power depended more and more on trade with China, the Uighurs would naturally prefer peace rather than war. The Chinese, on the other hand, were also interested in keeping a trading relation with the Uighurs. One

174 ZZTJ, v226, p. 7282.
can say that it was due to their common interest that the horse-silk trade continued to prosper.

The End of the Uighur Empire

In 779 and 790 there were succession crises among the Uighur rulers but the empire survived and regained its strength. The succession crises between 832 and 840, however, vitally weakened the empire and brought about its final end. In 840 a Uighur general led 100,000 cavalry from the Kirghiz to attack the Uighur qaghan. The empire had already suffered a natural disaster, and this crushing blow caused its final collapse. The Uighurs dispersed. One branch moved westward to the Hexi region, Kucha and the Qarluq area.177

Two other groups decided to go south towards China. One of them headed by the qaghan's brother Wamosi (Ormizt) arrived at Tiande in the autumn of 840 and asked to submit to Tang.178 Another set up a new ruler Ögä Qaghan in 841 and crossed the Gobi Desert to arrive at the Tiande on the Tang frontier. The Chinese Princess Taihe who had gone to marry the Uighur qaghan in 821 asked the Tang court to invest Ögä as qaghan and Ögä also sent a request to settle in Tiande.179

Though there was such a chaotic situation among the Uighurs the Chinese could not launch a immediate and decisive military campaign against the Uighurs as Tang Taizong had done to the Eastern Turks, since they were in a weakened state themselves. The Grand Councilor Li Deyu played an important role in the decision making process during this period, and on behalf of Wuzong, he drafted many

important orders and letters pertaining to the various affairs with the non-Chinese.\textsuperscript{180} A detailed textual study was done by Haneda Tōru on relations between Tang and Ögā Qaghan from 840 to the end of Tang.\textsuperscript{181} The following discussion focuses on the Chinese side of the relationship.

With the strategy of "divide and rule," the Chinese weakened the Ormīzt group.\textsuperscript{182} Then, the court decided to accept Ormīzt's submission. He was given official titles.\textsuperscript{183} His troops were organized as the Guiyi Army. The Li surname was bestowed on him and his brothers.\textsuperscript{184} Ormīzt, now named Li Sizhong, was appointed Uighur Bandit-Suppression Commissioner of Southwest Direction (Huihu xinanmian zhaotao shì 西南面討討使).\textsuperscript{185} In 843 he asked to return to the Tang capital from the frontiers, and his troops, the Guiyi Army, were ordered to dissolve.\textsuperscript{186} But the army refused to obey and therefore being considered as rebellious, many of them were executed.\textsuperscript{187}

Compared with Ormīzt, Ögā Qaghan posed a longer and more severe problem. In his weakness Ögā Qaghan repeatedly asked for supplies of food, to be allowed to stay on the Tang frontier, and for support to recover his state power. To these requests Tang only agreed to provide some grain. By this time Tibet had ceased to impose any threat on Tang, so there was no military need to keep the alliance with the Uighurs. As a dynasty in decline the Tang court had neither the ambition nor the ability it had had in early Tang to build up its prestige as a hegemonic empire by accepting the Uighurs into

\textsuperscript{180} JTS, v174, p. 4527; Drompp, M. has a Ph.D. dissertation entitled "The writings of Li Te-yü as sources for the history of Tang-Inner Asian relations," discussing the role played by Li and providing a translation of Li's works including letters, memorials and edicts concerning the Uighurs and the Kirghiz.

\textsuperscript{181} Haneda Tōru. 1957, pp. 249-264.

\textsuperscript{182} ZZTJ, v246, pp. 7959-63; Haneda Tōru. 1957, pp. 243-248.


\textsuperscript{184} ZZTJ, v246, p. 7965.

\textsuperscript{185} ZZTJ, v246, p. 7966.

\textsuperscript{186} ZZTJ, v247, p. 7973.

\textsuperscript{187} ZZTJ, v247, p. 7976.
the frontiers. Its primary aim now seemed to be to drive Ögä and his people away from the frontier so that it would not have to have any dealings with these non-Chinese.

In the third month of 842 Miao Zhen 范縉 was sent to deliver a diploma of appointment of qaghan to Ögä, but he was ordered to proceed at a leisurely pace and to wait till Ögä had firmly established his power before completing his mission. However, Ögä made constant raids on the Chinese frontiers. Miao Zhen eventually did not go to the Uighurs.\textsuperscript{188}

When they were refused permission to stay on the Tang frontier, Ögä's people engaged in continuous raids on the Chinese border areas. The constant raids by the Uighurs at this time, however, were made more because they needed food supplies to survive than to threaten Tang into agreeing to their demands.

Having realized the weakness of the Uighurs, the Tang court adopted a hostile attitude. In an imperial letter written by Li Deyu in 842, Tang urged the Uighurs to stop raiding and threatened military action.\textsuperscript{189} In a court discussion held in the eighth month of 842, Li Deyu insisted on an aggressive action in opposition to Niu Sengru 車僧略 who favored a defensive policy. Wuzong agreed with Li. An army was organized made up of Chinese and non-Chinese troops. Li Sizhong (Ormízt) was put in command of the Qibi, Shatuo and Tuyuhun tribesmen.\textsuperscript{190}

Early in 843 the Chinese inflicted a vital blow on the Uighurs. Ögä Qaghan fled northeast to the Heichezi 黑驕王 Shiwei. Princess Taihe returned to Tang and 20,000 Uighurs submitted to China. After this victory Tang ordered that all the properties of the Uighurs and of the Manichean temples inside China should be confiscated.\textsuperscript{191}

---

\textsuperscript{188} ZZTJ, v246, p. 7959.
\textsuperscript{189} Li Wenrao Wenji, v5; ZZTJ, v246, p. 7962; pp. 7965-66.
Though defeated and relying on the Heichezi Shiwei, Ögä Qaghan was still a major concern of the Chinese. Fortunately for the Chinese, at this time the Kirghiz were seeking political support, wishing to obtain conferment of the title of qaghan from Tang and to move to the former Uighur territory. As on many previous occasions, the situation provided an opportunity for the Chinese to adopt the policy of "using barbarians against barbarians." They now attempted to form an alliance with the Kirghiz but with great caution.

By 842 the Kirghiz had already exerted their control over Beiting, Anxi and five tribes of Tatar after their victory over the Uighurs in 840. In 843 after Ögä had fled to the Heichezi, the Kirghiz sent an embassy to the Tang court.

Li Deyu suggested a friendly policy towards the Kirghiz so that Tang could use their force to defeat the Uighurs and the Heichezi. After some discussions in the court, finally in 847, the court sent a mission to the Kirghiz, conferring the title of qaghan on their ruler. This move was perhaps intended to encourage the Kirghiz to defeat the Uighurs, since only a month before the departure of the mission, Tibet had joined the Uighurs in making an incursion on Hexi.

The Kirghiz from then on kept up a peaceful relationship. Unlike other nomadic peoples, such as the Turks, the Uighurs or the Khitan, who exploited the Chinese support to sustain their state power, the Kirghiz never developed a state with a high level of political organization and never posed much threat to China. The reason may lie in the fact that their political center was geographically distant from China, so that they did not develop a secondary state on the periphery of China. They were not quite interested in, or familiar with, the techniques of dealing with an agricultural society.

---

192 ZZTJ, v246, p. 7968.
195 XTS, v8, p. 247; v172, p. 5204; ZZTJ, v248, p. 8030.
Ögä Qaghan died around 847, either at the hands of his chief minister or of the Heichezi, who had initially provided him with refuge and then had fallen out with him.

Other Uighurs who had migrated to the west settled down in cities, engaging in agriculture as well as pastoralism and trade. No longer steppe nomads, their threat to the agricultural society of China backed up by military force also disappeared.

Conclusion

In international politics, "whenever interests and objectives are inconsistent or incompatible, conflictful relationships will arise; whenever they are compatible, they are likely to lead to collaborative transactions." The Tiele people, of whom the Uighurs were one, were an important weight in the balance of power between the Chinese and the Turks. The Sui Chinese encouraged their revolt against the Turks, and used their force against the Tuyuhun.

The Tang Chinese made even greater efforts to ally themselves with the Tiele. Tang helped the establishment of the Xueyantuo qaghanate and together with the Xueyantuo, the Uighurs and other Tiele people, the Chinese succeeded in defeating the Eastern Turks, their common enemy, in 630. Then taking advantage of the opportunity provided by the rebellion of the Uighurs and other Nine Surnames against the Xueyantuo, Tang joined with them in the conquest of the Xueyantuo in 646. From 647 to 679, like the submitted Turks, the thirteen Tiele tribes including the Nine Surnames were brought under the Chinese jimi fu-zhou system. Though there were rebellions, the Nine Surnames, especially the Uighurs maintained a good relationship with Tang most of the time and played an important role in Tang frontier campaigns as a supporting force.

---

When the Turks started their restoration movement in 679 and finally succeeded in breaking away from the Chinese hegemonic empire, part of the Nine Surnames headed by the Uighurs were resentful of Turkish rule and moved from north of the Gobi Desert to the Chinese Ganzhou and Liangzhou areas, while another part of the Tiele remained north of the Gobi within the Turkish empire. Those Tiele finally killed the Turkish Qaghan Bāg Chor in 716. In 744 Guli Boila of the Uighurs established himself as qaghan. By killing Bolmi Qaghan of the Turks the Uighurs founded their own state.

As soon as the Uighur empire was established, the qaghan immediately sought the recognition of the Chinese. The Uighurs also despatched troops to assist Tang in both Suzong's and Daizong's reigns to suppress the An Lushan rebellion. In these events they demonstrated their strong military force. Faced with severe internal problems and an external threat from Tibet, the Chinese could not afford to make the Uighurs an enemy, and had to pay an exorbitant price in order to maintain the alliance. The court, with a very tolerant attitude, adopted several measures including political investiture and payment of material goods to attract the Uighurs into alliance. Three times the Tang court sent true daughters of emperors to marry Uighur qaghans (Princesses Ningguo, Xian'an and Taihe), the first time this had occurred in Chinese history. Also, in spite of the great strain on the economy the Chinese kept up the horse-silk trade.

These measures were adopted rather for the purpose of purchasing military assistance and peace in the frontier regions than with the deliberate intention of changing the nature of the nomads. But they played an important role in the economic and social transition of the Uighur empire and made the Uighurs rely more on Chinese economy than any previous nomadic power.

The Uighurs, in their competition with Tibet and other peoples over the commercial interests in the Western Regions, needed to have a peaceful relationship
with Tang and to make Tang a stable supplier of silk, which provided them with much profit in the trade between east and west. In their struggle with Tibet, the Uighurs again shared a common enemy with Tang.

Although disagreements and violent conflicts occurred quite often between Tang and the Uighurs before 788, from 788 till the end of the Uighur empire in 840, peace prevailed, with the Chinese paying a very dear price. When the Uighur empire finally collapsed under the attacks of their traditional enemy, the Kirghiz, however, Tang was anxious to dispose of the burden as quickly as possible. Tang firmly refused Uighur requests for help and kept up relations with the Kirghiz who finally helped Tang to crush the Uighurs once and for all.

The relations between Tang and the Uighurs were based on common interests, politically and economically, whether during the period when the Uighurs were under the jimi system or when they had an independent imperial power. The Chinese accepted the Uighur empire as an equal power, since it had to purchase peace and military assistance from the Uighurs. But the tribute system remained, which was important to the Tang emperors. The constant political investiture of the Uighur rulers by the Chinese emperors and the regular tributary delegations from the Uighurs served to maintain the outward form of Chinese superiority. They also served to provide an economic basis for the survival of the Uighur empire.
Chapter V.

The Tang-Tibetan Treaties

Tibet, the English name for Tufan 羅 in the Chinese sources, rose as a unified and powerful kingdom under the Yarlung dynasty around the end of the sixth century and the beginning of the seventh. The Yarlung dynasty had existed previously for a number of generations as chiefs of a smaller tribal state. At that period the main power lying between China and what became Tibet was the Tuyuhun kingdom in present Qinghai province. In his study on the establishment of the Tufan kingdom, Yamaguchi Zuihō 亀 亀describe how the hostile policy of the Chinese towards the Tuyuhun during the Sui and Tang periods not only provided the Yarlung dynasty with the opportunity of expanding and evolving into the Tufan kingdom, but also planted in the minds of its rulers the desire to replace the Tuyuhun as an international power, with the result that Tufan, learning from the Tuyuhun, was able to absorb the latter and eventually surpass it.1

The history of Tibet before the Tufan period is not a history to which any dates can be assigned earlier than the sixth century of our era.2 Some scholars have attempted to reconstruct an earlier history,3 but it seems clear that there is no record to show the existence of any powerful political organizations in Tibet before the formation of the Tufan kingdom which attracted attention from China or played a role in its foreign policy.

---

1 Yamaguchi Zuihō. 1983.
Different Problems

The famous btsan-po or king of Tibet Srong btsan sgam-po came to the throne at about the same time as the inauguration of the Tang dynasty in 618. Thereafter the Tibetan kingdom appeared on the Tang frontier as a new type of threatening force. Its sudden rise and its equally sudden decline after a little more than two centuries as a great power is a remarkable phenomenon which must have involved many factors yet to be studied. In this chapter, however, we shall only be concerned with Tang policies towards Tibet, especially the seven treaties completed between the two powers.

While the rise of nomadic powers on the northern frontier was a perennial problem for China from Han until Ming, the rise of a powerful kingdom in Tibet was a one-time success. Nevertheless, it posed severe problems to the Chinese, challenging more severely than all other non-Chinese states in the Tang period Chinese security and sense of superiority, and raising types of problems for the Chinese different from those raised by other peoples, either nomadic or sedentary.

Being territorially ambitious, the Tibetans expanded in all directions, confronting the Chinese in the Qinghai region where the Tuyuhun had their kingdom and in the Western Regions, in addition to their constant incursions on the Chinese frontiers. During the An Lushan rebellion when the Chinese northwestern frontier troops were called back into the interior to suppress the rebels, the Tibetan forces that had previously pressed on the frontiers were carried on into the vacuum by their momentum and without much effort expanded into the Chinese He-Long region. In their occupation of the area for almost nine decades, the Tibetans posed a direct threat to the Tang capital. During their fifteen days in Chang'an after their invasion in 763 they were even able to establish temporarily a puppet Chinese emperor, whose sister Princess Jincheng 奥城 married a Tibetan btsan-po.

---

4 Chronology of Tibet in this paper follows the "Table of Rulers" in Beckwith, C. I. 1987. See Table 5.1.
Having compared the Tibetans with other nomadic people, Ise Sentarō comes to the conclusion that Tibet had a better organized military and political system than that of the Xiongnu or Turks. His ideas are as follows. The Tibetan rulers, like those of the nomads, had absolute power but, their power did not rely mostly on their personal qualities of military leadership like that of the Chanyu and Qaghan, rather it was based on an effective centralized system bound up by laws and covenants. Economically, Tibet had a different structure from that of the Turks or Uighurs whose economy was based on unstable nomadism, vulnerable to military defeat and natural disaster. The nomads, therefore, were more easily affected by Chinese influence, and through contacts with China they would gradually lose their advantage as a nomadic people. Tibet, on the other hand, had a more solid economic structure which was based on three aspects: 1) agriculture, animal husbandry, and mining; 2) foreign trade and taxation applied both internally and to subordinate countries; 3) pillage of people, animal and grains mostly from the Tang Chinese. Culturally, Tibet absorbed elements from the Chinese, Indians, and Western Turks and developed a strong sense of independence. No other country in Asia during the Tang dynasty competed with China for equality as openly and as persistently as Tibet.5

Ise's comparison, however, needs to be supplemented by other considerations. In the aspect of economic structure, the nomadic empires also had agriculture, engaged in mostly by captured Chinese and people in their agricultural subjects in the Western Regions. They imposed a taxation system on the subjects of the nomadic empire and conducted very active trading activities between east and west.6 According to Owen Lattimore:

5 Ise Sentarō. 1968, pp. 373-418.
The power of a tribe or group of tribes, if it grew at all, was bound sooner or later to acquire a fringe that was not wholly nomadic but only semi-nomadic.7

The difference between the economic structure of the Tibetan kingdom and that of a nomadic empire may have been a matter of degree, which was determined primarily by their different ecological environment. The Tibetans with less pasture and more arable land than the nomads who occupied large steppes could develop more extensive and solid agriculture. Their more balanced semi-agricultural and semi-nomadic economy thus enabled them to be more independent than the nomads.

Based on the study of the Xiongnu, a typical nomadic empire, Barfield comes to the conclusion,

The nomadic state maintained itself by exploiting China's economy, and not by exploiting the production of scattered shepherders who were effectively organized by the nomadic state to make this extortion possible.8

The nomads could rely self-sufficiently on their own economy only to maintain a basic living standard. Once established as a complex state, however, the state power needed a disposable surplus of goods for which it had to rely to a large extent on the Chinese agricultural economy. This was the reason why they carried out continuous raids on the Chinese, plundering them, raising endless demands for large Chinese subsidies and engaged in active trading activities with China.

The Sui-Tang Chinese were clearly aware that the nomads they had to deal with, the Turks and Uighurs, did not have much interest in obtaining agricultural land since they were not familiar with the knowledge and skills of running an agricultural society. For them it was much easier and more beneficial just to rely on their military power to obtain goods directly from China either through trade or raids.

7 Lattimore, O. 1951, p. 519.
The Tibetans, by contrast, were not so dependent on Chinese goods but had a strong interest in expanding into Chinese territory. Once in 822 a Tibetan marshal asked a Tang envoy Liu Yuanding 为什么 Tang treated the Uighurs more favorably than Tibet even though the Uighurs were a smaller country than Tibet and could be defeated very easily. Liu answered:

The Uighurs have the merit of having rescued the country (China) in times of danger. Also they have never invaded and stolen even an inch of our territory. Why should we not treat them favorably?9

For Tibet, expansion into agricultural land as well as pasture was a natural process. Collection of taxes in occupied areas was just an extension of state power, a reflection of the nature of the state.

In his book Kōdai Chibetto shi Kenkyū 佐藤義長 comes to the following conclusion about the social system of Tibet:

According to the records concerning Nam ri srong btsan, he made grants of land and people to his subalterns, who thus appear to have stood in the position of his feudal retainers. These persons controlled the agricultural peasantry, who in turn supplied them with the major part of their foodstuffs. The ruling classes, however, including the btsan-po himself and the noble families, in actual fact led a nomadic life, pitching their tents near water and constantly moving about according to the changes of the seasons. While the upper classes enjoyed this nomadic existence, agricultural production was entrusted to the peasantry, who served not only to supply agricultural income to their masters but also as a latent source of military power.10

In contrast to the steppe nomads whose way of life made every adult male a natural soldier, the Tibetans had to recruit and train armies. The foundation of the

---

Tibetan military organization was a conscription system based on regional quotas established by the "Great Conscription and Requisition System," which was brought to completion after Srong btsan sgam-po's death.\(^\text{11}\)

The Chinese could not easily use their products to buy peace from the Tibetans or to attract them to move and settle close to the frontiers under Chinese supervision. Nor could they use effectively the political investiture system to persuade the Tibetans to sue for peace. In fact, throughout the history of Tang-Tibet relations the conferment of political titles only took place once on the Tibetan minister in 641 and once on the Tibetan btsan-po in 649 whereas Tang gave political titles many times to the rulers of other non-Chinese peoples, nomadic or sedentary.

Even though the Tibetans showed enthusiasm in adopting certain aspects of Chinese civilization -- the bureaucratic system, religion, architecture and production skills, unlike the Koreans to whom China was the sole source of foreign inspiration of civilization as well as of political and military assistance, Tibet also enriched its culture and reenforced its military strength through contacts with other cultures, primarily India. Tibetan written script, the most important element of culture, was from India. Tibet could not therefore be easily brought into such a close tributary relationship as existed between the Chinese and the Koreans.

The Tang dynasty, either waging wars or carrying on diplomatic activities, had to treat Tibet more as an equal adversary than as a vassal state in the tribute system, even though Tibetan envoys to Tang were invariably recorded as coming to pay tribute. From 706 to 822 Tang and Tibet concluded seven sworn treaties, which give us valuable insights into the conflicting attitudes of the two parties towards their proper relationship and show how China was reluctantly forced to abandon its traditional superiority and treat Tibet on an equal basis.

\(^{11}\) Yamaguchi Zuihō has a detailed study of the system, see his 1983, part III, ch. 7, pp. 822-905.
The treaty of 821/822 has attracted most attention in the past. However, a detailed study of the six treaties which preceded it and the Chinese attitude in the pre-treaty period will help to put the last treaty in proper perspective and to see it as the end stage in a process of development.

The First Encounter and the Marriage of Princess Wencheng

Official contact between Tibet and Tang started in 634 when the Tibetan btsan-po, Srong btsan sgam-po, despatched a mission to the Tang court. The Chinese returned the visit by sending an envoy to Tibet. When Srong btsan sgam-po heard that both the Turks and Tuyuhun had concluded marriage alliances with Tang, he sent an embassy to Tang, raising a marriage proposal, but Taizong turned it down. The Tibetan envoy reported to Srong btsan sgam-po that Tang at first had promised the marriage but later changed its decision after the Tuyuhun qaghan arrived at the Tang court and fomented discord.

The change of Tang attitude was due to Taizong's consideration for relations with the Tuyuhun. In 634 when Tang and the Tuyuhun were at war, Taizong would have welcomed an alliance with Tibet so as to check the Tuyuhun from the rear. However, from 634 to 636 the situation in the Tuyuhun kingdom had changed drastically with the establishment of a pro-Tang regime headed first by Murong Shun and then by his son and successor, Nuo-he-bo, both of whom were supported by the Chinese. When Nuo-he-bo realized the great danger implied by a Tang-Tibetan marriage alliance, he endeavored to stop it. He came in person to Tang in 636 to show his loyalty and asked for a marriage alliance. Once the

---

13 The XTS says that the envoy made a false report, see v216A, p. 6073, while other sources do not. See JTS, v196A, p. 5221; ZZTJ, v195, p. 6139; CFYG, v978, p. 11495.
situation among the Tuyuhun became peaceful under a pro-Tang regime, the necessity to ally with Tibet against the Tuyuhun disappeared. The Tibetan envoy in 636 in the Tang court saw the Tuyuhun's interference and upon his return to Tibet the following year, he reported it to the Tibetan btsan-po.¹⁴

Srong btsan sgam-po pressed his request for a marriage alliance by military force. He launched a campaign against the Tuyuhun, which was soon defeated. Srong btsan sgam-po continued to expand his power pressing to the Chinese borders and finally stationed more than 200,000 troops on the western border of Songzhou (in modern Songpan, Sichuan) of Tang, despatching again an embassy to the Chinese court claiming the hand of the Tang princess. A Tibetan source records that Srong btsan sgam-po sent a letter to Taizong, claiming that if Tang did not permit the marriage request, he would lead 50,000 troops to capture Tang, kill the emperor and obtain a princess.¹⁵

The year 638 saw the Tibetans mount continuous attacks on Songzhou and subjugate two Tang jimi prefectures. Finally, as a result of Tang counterattacks, Srong btsan sgam-po withdrew his troops. He petitioned again for a marriage alliance in 640. Even though Tang claimed a victory over the Tibetans, it had to accommodate the Tibetan request so as to prevent Tibet from launching further attacks on the Tuyuhun.¹⁶

The Chinese princess, Wencheng,¹⁷ left for Tibet in 641, marking the beginning of a period of peaceful and frequent communication between the two states that lasted

---

Beckwith questions the record of Tuyuhun's interference. He conjectures that "Taizong made a private agreement with the Tibetans to conclude a marriage alliance if they would finish off the still-troublesome 'Azha (Tuyuhun)." See his 1987, p. 23, note 53. The fact that Tang and Tibet soon engaged in hostilities following Tibetans' victorious war with the Tuyuhun, however, does not support this conjecture.

¹⁵ Wang Zhong. 1958, p. 29, quoting rgyal-rab-me-lon.g

¹⁶ Sato Hisashi. 1958, p. 267.

¹⁷ The story of Princess Wencheng's marriage has been well worked out by Yamaguchi in his comprehensive study of Tibetan history in the early period of the Tufan kingdom. He rejects the traditional view that Princess Wencheng was married from the outset to Srong btsan sgam-po. He concludes, instead, that Princess Wencheng first married King Gung slon mang rtsan who was the ruler at that time, bore him a son, Mang slon mang rtsan, and only after the king's death, did she marry
until 660 in Gaozong's reign. The Tibetan Chief Minister Lu-dong-zan (Mgar Stong rtsan) was given the title of General-in-chief of Right Guard (youwei da jiangjun). During this period, thirteen Tibetan missions arrived at the Tang court, eleven of them being tribute missions, according to the record in the Cefu Yuangui.

The period of Srong btsan sgam-po was for Tibet a time of consolidating state power by a series of measures, which included in external relations cultivating friendship with Tang and learning from Chinese culture. Tibet sent young people from aristocratic families to Tang to study Confucian classics and doctrines, and Chinese scholars were invited to Tibet to compile official reports to the Tang emperor on behalf of Tibet. The marriage of a Chinese princess allowed the Tibetan btsan-po to demonstrate to his own people the extent of his power, to increase his prestige and reinforce his position versus the nobles, who were another power group, posing a potential threat to the royal family.

During this time, Tibet assisted Tang in two wars. The first campaign was in 647 when Tang launched a "punitive" attack on Kucha. The second time was in 648 when the Tang envoy Wang Xuance was attacked while on a mission to northern India and the Tibetans sent troops to rescue him and defeated the Indian attackers. Considering that Tibet was still in its expansionary period, one can see that it was also in their own interest that the Tibetans joined the Chinese.

---

Srong btsan sgam-po when he re-ascended the throne. Yamaguchi Zuiho. 1987, pp. 547-562. See also Shakabpa, W. D. 1967, p. 27.


The Tibetan sources say that after the confrontation between Tibet and the Chinese in 638, Tang and the Tuyuhun came to Tibet to pay tribute. However, the Chinese records show that Tibet at this time did not object to vassal status in the tribute system at least not openly to the Chinese. In 646 the Tibetan Chief Minister Mgar Stong rtsan sent to Tang the btsan-po's memorial to congratulate Taizong on his return from the Koguryō campaign, saying that the Son of Heaven had conquered all four corners of the world and that all countries under the sun and the moon had become his subjects, and that Koguryō relying on its being far away had neglected the rituals due from a subject, so the Son of Heaven in person had led a million troops, crossed the Liao River to bring punishment upon them, destroyed their cities, defeated their armies and returned victorious in a short time. In 649 at the beginning of Gaozong's throne, Tang conferred on the king the titles of Commandant-escort (fuma duwei 勇馬副將), which was a usual title for an imperial son-in-law, Commandery Prince of Xihai (xihai junwang 面海郡王) and Precious King (baowang 宝). This was the only time throughout the history of Tang-Tibetan relations when the Tibetan king received Chinese political investiture.

A Period of Competition

In 660 Tibet launched an expedition against the Tuyuhun to punish the latter's pro-Tang policy, thus beginning a period of fierce competition with the Chinese over

---

Concerning the last title, all the above sources say that the title is binwang or zongwang instead of baowang. But Wang Zhong suspects that they are mistaken for baowang, see his 1958, p. 35.
27 ZZ77, v200, p. 6321.
the control of the Tuyuhun and the Western Regions. Tibet also engaged in continuous incursions on Tang borders from 663 to 699.

After the death of Srong btsan sgam-po, his grandson succeeded him. The real state ruler however was the competent minister Mgar Stong rtsan. Taking in hand the full control of the already consolidated kingdom, Mgar Stong rtsan continued the expansion which had started in Srong btsan sgam-po's time.

Although not as skillful a military leader or as ambitious to build a vast empire as his father had been, Gaozong fortunately inherited the strong military force left by Tang Taizong. Tang was therefore carried by the momentum of its frontier expansion to the conquest of the Western Turks in 659, Paekche in 660 and Koguryo in 668, and was able to adopt a firm attitude of resistance to Tibet when this new state became an aggressive rival. Tibet in the eyes of the Chinese at that time should only be a vassal, not an equal adversary.

The request from Tibet to contract a marriage with Tang in 658 produced no result.28 When at war with each other in 663, both Tibet and the Tuyuhun sent in requests for Chinese military intervention. Gaozong refused. However, when Tibet allied itself with the Tuyuhun's pro-Tibet faction, inflicting a disastrous defeat on the pro-Tang Tuyuhun qaghan, and forcing him to flee with his people to Liangzhou, Gaozong decided to adopt the policy of supporting the weak against the strong, ordered the stationing of troops in Liangzhou and Shanzhou as a defence against Tibet, and placed Su Dingfang in command of various troops to assist the Tuyuhun. When Mgar Stong rtsan with his troops in the occupied territory of the Tuyuhun sent an embassy to Tang, making accusations against the Tuyuhun and petitioning for a marriage contract, Gaozong not only refused but also sent an envoy to

Tibet to deliver a sealed letter blaming the Tibetans for their aggression. In this way he undertook the role of the Son of Heaven maintaining order in the world.

In 665 another Tibetan mission arrived at the Tang court, this time with the purpose of restoring peace with the Tuyuhun. It requested the land of Chishui in Tuyuhun territory, for raising livestock. Gaozong again refused. The demand of the Tibetans for Chishui may indicate that the area had not yet been subjugated, or that the Tibetans wished to assuage Chinese fears and anger by requesting Tang recognition of the new de facto situation.

From 663 to 665 Mgar Stong rtsan remained in the territory of the Tuyuhun. He sent Tibetan troops into the Western Regions and by allying with other non-Chinese in the area, competed with the Tang Chinese there. Not only did the Tibetans try to expand their territory, but they also challenged Chinese superiority by asking the Tang envoy Chen Xingyan to perform the kowtow at their court. Chen refused and was, as a consequence, detained in Tibet for over ten years, where he finally died.

In 669 a court discussion was held to consider a plan for settling the Tuyuhun south of Liangzhou. The general Qibi Heli suggested waging war on Tibet rather than assisting the Tuyuhun. One minister argued that China had suffered a severe famine the year before, and therefore the country was not strong enough for war. Another minister urged an aid package so that the Tuyuhun would be able to remain as a buffer state. However, no decision was reached and the resettlement of the Tuyuhun was not implemented.

---

30 XTS, v216A, p. 6075; ZZTJ, v201, p. 6343; CIFYG, v999, p. 11721.
31 Beckwith, C. I. 1987, p. 32.
Wang Zhong has the opinion that this happened around 665. See his 1958, p. 50.
34 XTS, v216A, p. 6075; ZZTJ, v201, p. 6359; CIFYG, v991, p. 11642.
The inferiority of Chinese military strength was soon proved in the next year's encounter between the two states. In 670 Tibet captured 18 jimīzhou in the Tarim Basin. Soon after, with the assistance of Khotan, Tibet captured the Kuchean fortified city of Aksu. By this time the Chinese had to abandon all the Four Garrisons in the Tarim Basin. When the Chinese mounted a campaign against the Tibetans with the purpose of restoring the Tuyuhun as a state, Tang lost almost its entire army in battles at Dafeichuan near Qinghai (Koko Nor). All the territory of the Tuyuhun was brought under the control of Tibet.\(^{35}\)

The weakness of Tang as compared with Tibet did not only lie in its military force but also stemmed from internal factors such as the inability of leaders and inefficiency of the bureaucratic system and the conflicts and disputes among Chinese generals. In this regard, Wei Yuanzhong, when a student from the National University (taixue), in his sealed memorial pointed to the problems: 1) bureaucrats in the civil service did not know planning, 2) those in military service did not know strategy, and 3) from the time of the Korean wars, the court had not observed the rule of reward and punishment. He suggested that Tang should organize cavalry, whose cost should not be borne by the imperial store but by revenues from taxation levied all over the country, and that the court should abolish the order of forbidding people from raising horses. People should be also allowed to buy horses from the nomads, so that the nomads would be weakened.\(^{36}\)

In contrast Tibet had a well organized army and an efficient leadership. The Chief Minister Mgar Ston btsan was well-known for his talent and skill in leadership. After his death the Mgar family continued to be in actual control of the political and military power of Tibet, insuring, to some extent, the stability of the state. They were


directly responsible for the series of expansions from the beginning till 699.37 The ruling group enjoyed stability.38 In 679 Gaozong appointed Pei Xingjian as pacification commissioner and asked him to seek opportunities to attack the Tibetans, but Pei considered the situation not suitable for there was unity in the ruling group. Tang did not have much chance for success.39

Despite the weakness of Tang, Gaozong insisted on a firm attitude toward the Tibetans. He refused the latter's request for peace in 675 and for resuming relations with those Tuyuhun who had submitted to Tang and had been organized under Anlezhou and Lingzhou.40 Moreover, Gaozong planned a military campaign against Tibet in 676. Although the campaign was not undertaken in that year, in 677 an edict was issued, announcing a recruitment of soldiers, and a declaration of war on Tibet was formerly announced.41 In 678, 180,000 troops were despatched to wage battles with the Tibetans at Koko Nor. Again Tang was defeated.42 In the same year or around 680, with the capture of the Anrong Fortress on the western border, Tibetan expansion reached its peak.43

It was clear that the war policy had not alleviated the problems caused by Tibet. In a court discussion, a war policy was rejected, but when some Chinese ministers suggested making peace with Tibet by concluding a marriage, the majority, including the emperor himself, did not agree. Gaozong commented:

37 Sato Hisashi. 1958, pp. 300-361.
40 XTS, v216A, p. 6076; ZZTJ, v202, p. 6368; p. 6375; CFYG, v980, p. 11512. In the passage of the CFYG, Suzong should be Gaozong.
41 JTS, v5, p. 103; ZZTJ, v202, p. 6384; CFYG, v991, pp. 11642-43.
42 TD, v190, p. 1023; JTS, v196A, pp. 5223-24; XTS, v216A, pp. 6076-77; ZZTJ, v202, pp. 6384-86; THY, 97, p. 1731. The passage in the THY records the year as "the second year of Shangyuan," which is wrong.
These bandits are arrogant and ferocious. They do not understand our benevolence and majesty, and ought to be captured right away. Peace-making is obviously impossible.  

The Chinese were caught in a difficult situation: if they attacked the invading Tibetans on the frontiers, they would simply waste their resources without solving the problems. On the other hand they were not capable of penetrating into Tibetan areas to root out the source of the problems. The only choice was to strengthen defences until China had accumulated enough force to crush the Tibetans. This defensive policy was considered by most people as the best.

In 679 Tang recovered the Four Garrisons from the Tibetans but the success could not secure Tang control over the Western Regions where anti-Tang force was still very strong. In the same year Princess Wencheng despatched an embassy to inform Tang of the death of the btsan-po and to request the conclusion of a marriage alliance, but again Gaozong refused.

War and peace alternated during Empress Wu's reign (684-705). In 688 Empress Wu attempted to open up a route in Yazhou (in Sichuan) in order to attack the Qiang people and then the Tibetans. The plan was not carried out since it was strongly opposed by Chen Zi'ang, a native of Sichuan, on the grounds that to attack the Qiang would definitely cause their resentment which would in turn lead to rebellion and the Tibetans would receive the rebelled Qiang and use them as guide to attack Sichuan. Moreover, since the Shandong and Guan-Long areas were suffering famine, it was not time to start wars.

---

44 CFYG, v991, p. 11643.
Empress Wu, however, was eager for a military campaign, probably with the hope of thereby showing off the extent of her power. After several attempts the Chinese recovered the Four Garrisons in 692 which Empress Wu had abandoned early in her reign. Thirty thousand Chinese troops, according to existing records the highest number of troops ever stationed under the Protectorate of Anxi, enhanced Chinese control over the Western Regions and intensified the competition with Tibet.49

The court insisted on keeping the Four Garrisons even though the heavy cost disturbed the people and called forth objections from its ministers, such as Di Renjie, who urged pull-back.50 The importance of the garrisons was stated clearly by Cui Rong that if China abandoned the Four Garrisons, the Tibetans would definitely impose their rule over the oasis states and the Qiang, which would in turn expose the Chinese Hexi area to danger and would in the long run cost China more when the time came for the rescue.51 The Western Regions did possess great military and economic significance for any imperial power. Either China or other peoples in north Asia would desire to control the area. Just as in the Han dynasty, the Chinese control over the Western Regions decreased the military threat of the Xiongnu.

Following the military encounters with Tibet in 694 and 695, Chinese troops led by Wang Xiaojie and Lou Shide suffered a severe defeat in 696 in the Suluohan mountain.52

On the strength of the victory the Tibetan Chief Minister Qin-ling (Mgar Khri 'bring, Mgar Stong rtsan's son53), who became the Chief Minister in 685,

53 Wang Zhong holds that Mgar Khri 'bring was the grandson of Mgar Stong rtsan, based on the Inscription of Commandery Prince Bachuan, who was Mgar Khri 'bring's son and submitted to China in Empress Wu's time. The script of the inscription was written by Zhang Yue and is reserved in
sent an embassy in 696 to the Chinese court with a peace proposal. In contrast to the
government under Gaozong's reign, which had refused all three requests for peace
from the Tibetans, Empress Wu considered the possibility and sent Guo Yuanzhen to
the Tibetan minister to conduct negotiations.

When Mgar Khri 'bring met Guo Yuanzhen, he demanded that Tang should
abandon the Four Garrisons and let each state of the Tarim and the Western Turks have
their own rule so that they would be subject neither to Tang nor to Tibet. Guo
Yuanzhen refused on the grounds that the Four Garrisons were there to ensure peace in
the Western Regions, and that the Western Turks had been made subjects to Tang. He
pointed out that the Tibetan request was intended to establish their own control over the
Western Regions.

Mgar Khri 'bring argued that his demands were based on two considerations: 1) the
Chinese frontier generals in the Western Regions often started offensives to further
their own interests, so their withdrawal would bring about peace; 2) the Western Turks
were a major worry to Tibet for they were separated from Tibet only by a desert, thus
being in the position to make quick raids. Denying any intention of acquiring territory
Mgar Khri 'bring said that if he wanted Chinese territory and Chinese goods, he would
make trouble in the Ganzhou and Liangzhou areas in China itself, and not contend for
the Turks so far away. He insisted that it was China that wanted to extend its
territory. 54 Mgar Khri 'bring in fact was threatening that Tibet could make constant
incursions on Tang frontiers in Ganzhou and Liangzhou so as to force Tang to give up
control over the Western Regions.

Zhang Yuezhi Wenji, v17, see Wang Zhong. 1958, p. 30. However, Tibetan and other Chinese
sources do not have evidence to support this supposition. They indicate that Mgar Stong rtsan died in
670. His son Btsan snga Idom bu became the Chief Minister and died in 685 when Btsan snga Idom
bu's brother Khri 'bring succeeded the position. Khri 'bring had been a general before then. See Sato

54 TD, v190, pp. 1023-24; ZZTJ, v205, p. 6508.
Upon his return, Guo Yuanzhen presented to Empress Wu a memorial, suggesting that Ganzhou and Liangzhou were more important to China than the Western Regions and therefore particular efforts should be made to guarantee stability there. China should reply to Tibet that if Tibet did not have any territorial ambitions, it should return to China the Koko Nor lands and the Tuyuhun people. In return, China would give up the five Nushibi tribes of the Western Turks. In another memorial, he further suggested that the Tibetan people were exhausted by the constant wars. If Tang pressed peace proposals every year and Mgar Khri 'bring refused, the people would reject him.55

No peace agreement was concluded in the end. Soon internal conflicts broke out in Tibet. From late 698 to early 699 the Tibetan bsan-po Khri 'Dus srong, now a grown man, supported by the minister Lun Yan (Mang nyen bzhi-brtsan56) and other ministers, staged a successful purge of the Mgar clan.57 Mgar Khri 'bing committed suicide and his younger brother Zanpo with a thousand people fled to China. Khri 'bing's son Gongren with 7,000 households of the Tuyuhun who were under his control also went over to China. Empress Wu immediately ordered her officials to receive them and conferred on Zanpo and Gongren official titles. Zanpo was sent to Hongyuangu (in Gansu) in command of his own troops guarding the Chinese frontiers.58 Lou Shide as Vice Commander-in-chief of the Tianbing Army and Commissioner of the various armies of Longyou was in charge specially of the affairs of the submitted Tibetans.59

56 Identified by Beckwith, C. I. 1987, p. 60, note 34.
58 TD, v190, p. 1024; JTS, v196A, pp. 5225-26; XTS, v216A, p. 6080; ZZ77, v206, pp. 6539-42; CFGY, v655, p. 7848; Wang Zhong. 1958, pp. 55-56; Beckwith, C. I. 1987, pp. 6061. In the records of the JTS, XTS and CFGY only the name Mangbuzhi is mentioned and he was given the titles of General-in-chief of the Left Forest of Plumes Army and Duke who pacifies the State.
59 ZZ77, v206, p. 6540. Lou Shide died in the same year or in 699, see ZZ77, v206, p. 6541. There is no mention though whether someone was appointed to be in charge of the Tibetan affairs after him.
In spite of their weakened power, the Tibetans continued to wage war. In 700 an attack was made on Hongyuangu where Zanpo stationed his troops. This was probably with the purpose of punishing the submitted Tibetans. However, the Tibetan troops were newly organized, which showed the weakness of the military force after the Mgar brothers were purged. They went to six battles with the Chinese and lost all. Meanwhile, they sought peace with Tang. In 702 a Tibetan mission arrived at the Chinese court to request a peace settlement. In 703 another mission arrived with a thousand horses and 1,000 liang of gold for a marriage alliance. Empress Wu agreed.

Following a series of campaigns against Tang and other neighboring countries, Khri Dus srong died in the war to subjugate the Black Mywa in the winter of 704-705. The Tibetan royal family and nobilities engaged in a fierce struggle over the succession until 712 when Khri lde gtsug brtsan ascended the throne. During this period while his grandmother was in actual control, the Chinese frontier problems with Tibet seemed less pressing.

The First Treaty in 706

According to the historical records so far available, the first Sino-Tibetan treaty was concluded in 706 when Tibet was weakened. The previous year the Emperor Zhongzong had just restored the rule of the Li royal family, following Empress Wu's reign. He gave priority, among all the frontier issues facing the new government, to

---

60 JTS, v93, p. 2979; v196A, p. 5226; XTS, v111, p. 4149; v216A, p. 6080; ZZTJ, v207, p. 6549; CFYG, v428, p. 5103; Wang Zhong. 1958, p. 56. It is not clear when Zanpo died. The biography of Tufan in both JTS and XTS say that he died soon after submission to China. In the record of the encounter of Hongyuangu, there is no mention of him.


halting the Turkish incursions and decided on a peaceful policy towards Tibet by giving the hand of Princess Jincheng to the Tibetan btsan-po in 707, which Tibet had requested in 703, and by the conclusion of a peace treaty in 706.

Details of the peace treaty are not available but, from existing information, one can conclude that the essential point of the treaty was the demarcation of the boundary between the two states. There are two major records in the Chinese sources.

Tibet sent the following memorial to Xuanzong in 718:

During the time when Emperor Xiaohe (Zhongzong) was on the throne, the boundaries of the countries were settled in accordance with convenience and the two sides concluded a sworn covenant. The Chinese grand councilors who participated in the oath taking were Vice Director Doulu Qinwang Wei Yuanzhong, Secretariat Director Li Qiao, Director of the Chancellery Ji Chuna, Xiao Zhizhong, Vice Director Li Huixiu, Minister Zong Chuke, Wei Anshi, and Yang Ju, altogether ten people. The Tibetans chief minister also took part in the oath taking, after which the Princess was received in Tibet, and both sides were at peace.

The Cefu Yuangui records: in 714, the Tibetan Chief Minister Ben-da-yan delivered a letter to the Chinese chief ministers, which expressed the wish to decide the boundaries between the two states and to set up a treaty. In reply to 'Bon-da-rgyal, Chief Ministers Wei Zhigu, Yao Chong, and Lu Huaishen sent him a letter, saying:

66 CFYG, v981, p. 11526; QTW, v999, "Qi-di-suo-zan qing xiuhao biao," pp. 13078-79. XTS, v216A (p. 6082) says that there were 22 Chinese officials participating and the Tibetan king and ministers swore an oath. The XTS's record is incorrect since in 706, the king of Tibet was just an infant, and the number of 22 Chinese participants also do not seem right, see Tan Liren. 1988, p. 130.
67 Thomas, F. W. v. 3, 1955, p. 163. He was the king of Tuyuhun and married Khri ma lod's daughter. He was in actual control of state power in Tibet. Wang Zhong. 1958, pp. 62-63.
The ruler and ministers of your country have always shown good faith and proper conduct, and moreover have concluded a covenant and contracted a marriage alliance ... As for what you say about demarcations, there has been a treaty text before. Now we despatch Left Policy Adviser Xie Wan to Heyuan to negotiate the matter with you.68

Both the Xin Tangshu and Cefu Yuangui say that Xie Wan as an envoy went to Heyuan to negotiate, bearing with him the treaty with Tibet of the second year of Shenlong (706). The treaty and marriage mentioned in the above letter should refer to the treaty of 706 and the marriage of Princess Jincheng. Wang Qinruo, the editor of the Cefu Yuangui, comments that that there are no records in the histories about the conclusion of this treaty.69

Zhongzong's wish to establish a peace relationship or alliance with Tibet was also shown in the management of the affairs of the Turgish, a tribe of the Western Turks. Under the Turgish Suoge's rule, there occurred disputes between Suoge and Ashina Zhongjie, a general. In the Tang court, there were different opinions about how to deal with or how to utilize these disputes. Guo Yuanzhen suggested that the court include Zhongjie into the Imperial Bodyguard and settle his people in Guazhou and Shazhou, to which Zhongzong agreed. However, under the advice of a Chinese general, Zhongjie sent heavy bribes to the powerful ministers Zong Chuke and Ji Chuna. They promised to obtain Tibetan force to assist Zhongjie to eliminate Suoge. Zhongzong changed his mind to follow this device but, before Tang allied with Tibet, Suoge had launched a series of attacks on Tang and finally, Zhongzong had to recognize Suoge's rule as qaghan. Guo Yuanzhen, throughout the whole event, opposed strongly the device of allying Tibet to support Ashina Zhongjie on the grounds that the Tibetans had contended about the

69 CFYG, v981, p. 11526.
Western Turks and the Four Garrisons before. That they appeared peaceful now was simply because the country was in great disorders. He warned that if Zhongjie borrowed Tibetan force he would fall under their control and be unable to be of service to Tang, and the Tibetans would make territorial demands if they performed any meritorious service for Tang.\textsuperscript{70}

It was hoped that the marriage alliance and the peace treaty with Tibet would help bring about peace on the frontiers, but the policy was not adhered to in a coordinated way even by the Chinese themselves. In 710 of Emperor Ruizong's time, only four years after the first peace treaty, there was a breach by the Chinese. In the southwest, Li Zhigu, Acting Investigating Censor, obtained Ruizong's permission to attack the "barbarians" in Yaozhou, who had formerly been subjects of Tibet. After bringing them into submission, Li Zhigu further asked to build walled-towns, prefectures and districts there and to impose heavy taxes on the local people. His cruel plan of killing the rich non-Chinese and making slaves of the people finally caused the local chieftains to obtain assistance from Tibet. They killed Li Zhigu and cut up his corpse to sacrifice to Heaven. The route from Yaozhou to Xizhou was cut off.

Another incident occurred in the west, when Zhang Xuanbiao, Protector-general of Anxi, plundered the northern borders of Tibet. Though furious, the Tibetans did not immediately retaliate. They first asked for the land in the Jiuqu area of Hexi (near modern Xining, Qinghai province) as a bathing place for Princess Jincheng through Yang Ju, who had escorted Princess Jincheng to Tibet. Having accepted bribes from Tibet, Yang Ju suggested that the court give permission, and the emperor agreed to the request. Tibet soon built fortresses

south of the Yellow River and a bridge over the Yellow River, thus securing a convenient base for plundering Tang.\textsuperscript{71}

A Peace Settlement in 716

During the period from 712 to 732 when the second treaty was concluded, there had been two attempts to make a peace treaty. But, the one in 714 was abortive and the one in 716 produced a peace agreement with no new treaty text, because when the Tibetans repeatedly requested a new sworn treaty with the signature of the Chinese emperor, Xuanzong would only agree to make a peace settlement in accordance with the former treaty but without his personal signature. At a time of reviving strength, Xuanzong made efforts to maintain Chinese superiority.

In 712 and again in 713 Tibetan missions arrived at the Tang court, the second time with a peace proposal.\textsuperscript{72}

As mentioned earlier, in 714 the Tibetan Chief Minister 'Bon-da-rgyal delivered a letter to the Chinese ministers, asking to decide the borders on each side and to conclude a sworn covenant. In response to his request, Xie Wan went to Heyuan to negotiate, taking with him the treaty agreement of 706.\textsuperscript{73} Before Xie Wan left he had suggested that the court organize 100,000 troops in Qinzhou \textsuperscript{74} and Weizhou \textsuperscript{74} in preparation for Tibetan incursions. This proved to be necessary. Even though a Tibetan minister arrived with a treaty text,\textsuperscript{74} before any peace agreement was confirmed, 'Bon-da-rgyal had launched attacks on the Chinese Lintao.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{71} JTS, v196A, p. 5228; XTS, v4, p. 112; v216A, p. 6081; ZZTJ, v210, p. 6661; v211, pp. 6705-06; THY, v97, p. 1732; CFYG, v992, p. 11650. Sato Hisashi has the opinion that the incidents of Li Zhigu and Zhang Xuanbiao occurred in 707, see his 1958, pp. 427-431. If it is correct, it means the treaty was hardly kept for a year.

\textsuperscript{72} CFYG, v971, p. 11405; v980, p. 11510.

\textsuperscript{73} XTS, v216A, p. 6081; CFYG, v981, p. 11526.

\textsuperscript{74} JTS, v100, p. 3113; v196, p. 5228; XTS, v130, p. 4501; v216A, p. 6081-82; ZZTJ, v211, pp. 6699-6700; p. 6701; THY, v97, p. 1732; CFYG, v981, p. 11526.
Army, and on Lanzhou 蘭州 and Weiyuan 渭源 in Weizhou, plundering Chinese livestock. Hearing this Yang Ju took his life, for he felt responsible or perhaps was made a scapegoat by the court for allowing the Tibetans to have the land of Jiuqu, providing an easy access to Tang. Xuanzong immediately ordered a counter-attack. In the tenth month of 714 Xuanzong declared his intention of assuming personal command of a major campaign against the Tibetans with over 100,000 troops including 20,000 non-Chinese. The plan was not carried out for soon Chinese troops claimed major victories in battles with Tibet.

After the war was over Tang sent an envoy to Tibet to console Princess Jincheng. When a Tibetan chief minister was sent to the Tao River to mourn the Tibetan soldiers and then to the Tang borders asking for peace, Xuanzong refused. The Zizhi Tongjian gives as the reason for the refusal that the Tibetans "used the protocol of an enemy country" when asking for peace, and the Xin Tangshu says that the Tibetans "relying on their power, asked to be on equal terms with the Son of Heaven and used arrogant language." This was an open challenge to Chinese superiority. To the Chinese the Tibetans could only be an outer subject. In the words of the edict of 714:

The Tibetans are petty bandits, living in the corner of the great wilds. The former regimes of the dynasty pacified outside and allowed them to submit.

79 XTS, v216A, p. 6082; ZZTJ, v211, p. 6706. Wang Zhong holds that this reason does not seem right since being recently defeated the Tibetans should not use arrogant language when asking for peace, and also the JTS, v196A (pp. 5228-29) has a different version that the Tibetans' request for equal terms was raised several years after the peace proposal. Wang Zhong assumes that the reason for the refusal may lie in the fact that the Tibetans made incursions even after they proposed a treaty agreement. Wang Zhong. 1958, p. 64.
They are tied with an alliance of friendship and favored with rituals due to an outer subject.\textsuperscript{80} Official letters from Tang to Tibet before 780 reflected this belief.\textsuperscript{81}

Competition in the Western Regions and clashes on the borders continued until 716, when Xuanzong agreed to the requests for a peace settlement raised by Tibet. He also gave imperial gifts of silk and other products to the btsan-po and Princess Jincheng.\textsuperscript{82}

While the rulers of both countries agreed on a peace settlement, frontier generals still engaged in hostilities. Early in 716 the Tibetans raided Songzhou and were defeated by the Chinese.\textsuperscript{83} In the next two years Military Commissioner Guo Zhiyun fought battles with Tibet and achieved victories.\textsuperscript{84} Military officials as a group, conditioned by their beliefs, background and interests, tended to adopt a hard-line attitude in spite of the fact that the rulers in each of their capitals, far away from the frontiers, had agreed upon peace.

Early in 717 the Tibetan btsan-po again sent a request for a peace treaty, which was mainly a request for the personal signature of Xuanzong on the agreement. It was a Tibetan custom to have signatures on a treaty.\textsuperscript{85} Princess Jincheng presented a memorial urging a signed treaty:

The chief ministers here have told me that the btsan-po very much wants a peace treaty, and it is also proper that the emperor should personally sign the sworn treaty text. In the past you did not agree to do so personally. When I came to wed it was for friendship. But now, there are disturbances. The situation is

\textsuperscript{80} CFYG, v135, p. 1627.  
\textsuperscript{81} Kaneko Shūichi. 1974; 1988.  
\textsuperscript{82} XTS, v5, p. 125; ZZTJ, v211, p. 6720; CFYG, v979, p. 11500.  
\textsuperscript{83} XTS, v5, p. 125; ZZTJ, v211, p. 6716; CFYG, v358, p. 4244.  
\textsuperscript{84} ZZTJ, v211, p. 6728, which says that in 717, Guo Zhiyun crushed the Tibetans in the Jiuqu area, and the CFYG says that their captives were sent to settle in various prefectures as registered households, see v42, p. 479; v434, p. 5158. In 718, Guo Zhiyun again launched an attack on the Tibetans and went to the Jiuqu area capturing weapons and livestock. See JTS, v103, p. 3190; XTS, v133, p. 4545; CFYG, v358, p. 4243; v384, p. 4571.  
\textsuperscript{85} Li Fang-kuei. 1955, pp. 11-12; Wang Yao. 1982, p. 48.
becoming uneasy. Please show pity on me far away in another country. Your personal signature will not establish a regular practice. It will achieve the long-term friendship of the two countries.  

In the history of marriage alliances between China and other countries, some Chinese princesses personally played a very important role in consolidating the mutual relations. Some acted as mediators in reconciliation of various disputes. Princess Jincheng was an example. Here she was acting as an advocate on behalf of her husband, pleading with Xuanzong to follow the practice of Tibet.

In 718 the Tibetan btsan-po sent a letter to Xuanzong, pressing further his demand for a new sworn treaty with the emperor's signature. The letter made the following points:

1) Tibet and Tang should have the treaty of 706 renewed. The emperor and the btsan-po should personally sign the treaty and the ministers should swear an oath as before since the grand councilors who had participated in the ceremony of 706 had died and the new ones were not familiar with the essentials of the treaty of 706.

2) Tibet had sent envoys to Tang seven times, repeatedly discussing the question of the Tang emperor's personally signing the treaty, and sending grand councilors to conclude a sworn covenant. But Tang had declined to reply.

3) Zhang Xuanbiao and Li Zhigu had led their troops to attack the Tibetan people. It was because of this act of violating the treaty and of losing good faith that Tibet had despatched troops.

4) As for the allegation in Tang's letter that Qi-li-xu 貝力雄 (Khri-gzigs87) had assembled troops there, it was a replacement of old troops and horses with new ones. It was not true that Tibet had assembled additional troops.

---

87 Identified by Thomas, F. W. 1951, p. 5.
5) In the past when the demarcation was discussed, it had been decided that from Baishui towards Tibet, the land should be empty. But Tang General Guo had built a fort last autumn in Baishui. Tibet had therefore also built a fort in Baishui.

6) Neither Tang nor Tibet should communicate with the Turks.\(^{88}\)

Obviously, Tang did not agree to set up another treaty, for in 719 Tibet made yet another request. In reply, Xuanzong insisted that the treaty agreement had been decided. If the agreement did not come from sincerity, there was no use to take oaths repeatedly.\(^{89}\) As a result, no new treaty was worked out.

In this negotiation for a new treaty, the signature of Xuanzong seems to have been the real sticking point. To the Chinese a signature from the emperor and a treaty agreement may not have been so important as it was to the Tibetans. Also for the Chinese emperor to sign an agreement was demeaning. In all the following Tang-Tibetan treaties, the Chinese emperor never signed his name, and in the last one (the treaty of 821/822) that the ministers of both sides participating in the oath taking ceremony had their signatures on the treaty may have been a compromise on both sides: the Chinese ministers signed their names but not the emperor, and the Tibetans did not insist on the Chinese emperor's signature.

From 719 to 724 the Hexi areas and Tang southwestern borders were peaceful but competition continued in the Western Regions, especially over Little Balur, which was on the passage way from Tibet to the Tarim Basin. Tang had a father-son relationship with its king and established the Suiyuan Army there. It was an obstacle to the Tibetans, who for several times remarked to Little Balur's king that "It is not that we want your country. We just want to pass through to attack the Four


\(^{89}\) ZZTJ, v212, p. 6736; CFYG, v980, p. 11511.
Garrisons." With the uncertainties of politics, Princess Jincheng in Tibet was under pressure. In 724 Tegin, the king of Zabulistan, sent an envoy to Tang bearing a report that, in 723 Princess Jincheng had sent a secret letter to the king of Kashmir, asking for asylum. The king had gladly promised but was afraid of Tibetans' attacks, and therefore had asked for military assistance from Tegin. Tegin consented and sent the envoy to Tang for advice. Xuanzong expressed appreciation and awarded him 100 pi of silk.

In 724 clashes with Tibet again broke out on the borders. Wang Junchuo, the Military Commissioner of Hexi and Longyou and Commander-in-chief of Liangzhou, reported success in battles with Tibet and presented captives to the court. Supported by Wang Junchuo, who was an advocate of a strong-handed policy towards the non-Chinese, Xuanzong became more interested in a bellicose policy even though other officials such as Zhang Yue had objection. In the winter of 726-727, following a Tibetan raid on Ganzhou, Wang Junchuo led Tang troops into Tibetan territory and fought successfully west of Koko Nor. About the same time the Türgish, allied with the Tibetans, plundered the Four Garrisons and besieged the headquarters of the Protectorate of Anxi in Kucha. Acting Protector-general Zhao Yizhen was defeated. Only the city of Kucha was kept by Tang. The following period from the ninth month of 727 to the summer of 729 saw a series of encounters between Tang and Tibet.

---

91 ZZTJ, v212, p. 6762; CFYG, v979, p. 11501.
92 CFYG, v42, p. 480; v133, p. 1599. The CFYG records Wang as the Commander-in-chief of Shanzhou but according to the ZZTJ and Wang's biography, he was the Commander-in-chief of Liangzhou. See ZZTJ, v213, p. 6776; JTS, v103; XTS, v133.
The Second Treaty in 732

Wars exhausted both sides. In 729 Tang launched an attack on the Tibetan Datong Army and claimed a victory. The Chinese also retook Shibao town (in modern Huangyuan county, Qinghai province) from the Tibetans and established the Zhenwu Army there. In 730 Tibet delivered a letter on the Tang border, suggesting a peace agreement. Xuanzong was going to refuse the request, the reason being Tibet's previous use of arrogant language. Huangfu Weiming tried to persuade the emperor to agree to the peace request, blaming the Tibetan frontier generals, who had sought to gain merit through military success for the arrogant attitude. He pointed out the great losses Tang had suffered in constant wars and suggested that Tang send envoys to comfort Princess Jincheng and discuss peace with Tibet. This may have been an attempt to use Princess Jincheng to intercede. Xuanzong then despatched him to Tibet.  

According to the Chinese sources, the Tibetan btsan-po was very pleased to see the Chinese envoys and showed all the letters of Tang from Taizong's time. He sent a high-ranking official Lun Ming-xi-lie (Blon Mye-slebs) to go to Tang with Huangfu. Mye-slebs had a good command of the Chinese language, which shows that the Tibetans had people who were accomplished in Chinese and therefore they must have been aware of the sensitivities of the Chinese emperor. In the tenth month of 730 Mye-slebs arrived at the Tang court with a letter from the btsan-po to Xuanzong, which was carefully worded in accordance with the proper rhetoric that the Chinese had established and stated the following points.

---

95 It is not clear when Tibet raised the peace request and Huangfu Weiming went to Tibet. JTS, v196A (p. 5230) and THY, v97 (p. 1733) record the year as 729, while ZZTJ, v213 (p. 6789; pp. 6790-91) records it as 730. The XTS, v216A (p. 6084) gives no specific time. According to Tibetan source, in 729 there were Tang envoys to Tibet and in 730, Zhang Yuanfang came to Tibet, see Wang Zhong. 1958, pp. 72-73.

96 Francke, A. H. 1914, p. 39.
1) Tibet and Tang had had an uncle-nephew relationship in Zhongzong's time. The marriage of Princess Jincheng had made the two countries one family and all the people under heaven had enjoyed peace. But Zhang Xuanbiao and Li Zhigu had raided Tibet, which had caused the border generals to engage in attacks on each other up to the present time and had created a rift between the two countries.

2) Because of the marriages of Princess Wencheng and Princess Jincheng, the btsan-po, as nephew, understood the relationship between the superior and the inferior, and did not dare to fail in proper respect. The btsan-po was young and had been made an unwilling accomplice in the disorders stirred up by the border generals, so that he had incurred the emperor's blame. The emperor should investigate the circumstances.

3) The btsan-po had sent envoys to Tang several times but they had been obstructed by the border generals so the btsan-po did not dare to send any messages.

4) The btsan-po had already ordered the border generals not to make incursions and to return any Chinese who defected to Tibet. Tibet would not violate the agreement first.97

Tibet also presented some gifts. In reply Xuanzong gave Mye-slebs favorable treatment and offered him Chinese official dress. Xuanzong despatched a prestigious and competent minister Cui Lin to pay a visit to Tibet in confirmation of the peace agreement. Cui Lin left in early 731, bringing with him letters from Xuanzong to the btsan-po and to Princess Jincheng, imperial gifts and Confucian classics and literary works, the Shijing, Chunqiu Zuozhuan, Liji, and Wenxuan. These works had earlier been requested by Princess Jincheng. When the request was first received, Yu Xiulie objected, saying that Tang could give the "barbarians" large quantities of material goods but should not give the classics for fear that the Tibetans would learn from them tactics and military stratagems in military affairs and so increase their

---

knowledge. But Grand Councilor Pei Guangting 裴廣庭 and other ministers argued that these works would also teach loyalty, faith, proper conduct and righteousness and would gradually civilize the Tibetans. Chinese civilization would spread without any limit. Xuanzong agreed with Pei.98

In 731 a Tibetan mission arrived at the court. Tang agreed to the Tibetan request to set up a border market in Chiling (the Riyue Mountain in Qinghai).99 In the first month of 733 Li Hao 李 Hao, Minister of Works, was sent on a mission to Tibet. Through him, Princess Jincheng requested that on the first day of the ninth month the two sides should establish a stone stele in Chiling 邻 境 to mark the demarcation line.100 In the same year a Tibetan mission arrived at the Tang court with a letter from the btsan-po to Xuanzong. The gist of it was that China and Tibet were both big countries. Now the two had made peace, the maintenance of which was their long term policy. For fear that the border generals should provoke trouble, both sides should despatch envoys to inform them of the peace agreement.101

On the day when the stone stele was erected, both sides had officials present, with Zhang Shougui 張守珪 and Li Xingyi 李行袆 on the Chinese side and Mang-bu-zhi 芒布之 (Mang po-rje, = "great lord")102 on Tibetan side. Afterwards the three went to Jiannan 尽南 and Hexi to inform the various

98 JTS, v8, p. 196; v196A, pp. 5230-31; XTS, v5, p. 135; v104, p. 4007; v216A, pp. 6084-85; ZZTJ, v213, pp. 6790-91; p. 6794; THY, v97, p. 1733; CFYG, v320, p. 3787; v979, pp. 11502-03. 99 JTS, v8, p. 197; XTS, v5, p. 135; ZZTJ, v213, p. 6796; CFYG, v971, p. 11409. The XTS, v216A (p. 6085) says that the Tibetans asked to jiaoma, or exchange horses at Chiling and set up a border market in Gansongling. Pei Guangting suggested that the market be set up in Chiling. Jiaoma means that when an envoy enters the other country, that country should provide horses for the transportation of the envoy, see Wang Zhong. 1958, p. 74.

100 The JTS, v8 (p. 199) records Li Hao's name as Li Song. But according to his biography, the name is Li Hao. See JTS, v112, p. 3336; XTS, v78, p. 3531; THY, v6, p. 76; v97, p. 1733; ZZTJ, v213, p. 6800; CFYG, v653, p. 7825; v979, p. 11503.


border prefectures that "the two countries are at peace. You must not attack each other," and they went on to the territory of Tibet to proclaim the peace.\textsuperscript{103}

The Chinese text of the agreement on the stele is still extant.\textsuperscript{104} There are several questions about the treaty.

The text starts "In the twenty-first year of Kaiyuan, in the renshen $^\cdot$ year, the uncle and nephew have restored their old friendship and become one family."

The twenty-first year of Kaiyuan was the guiyou $^\cdot$ year which was 733, and the twentieth year was renshen which was 732. In his study of the treaty, Tan Liren holds that it should be 732 when the treaty was concluded. His opinion, which seems correct, is based on the grounds that A) Princess Jincheng asked in 733 to establish a stone stele when Li Hao went to Tibet early that year. The treaty therefore should have been concluded before Li Hao's embassy; B) the word "first" of twenty-first in the treaty text might be redundant whereas it is not likely that the word renshen is mistaken for guiyou; C) according to the context of a letter written by Zhang Jiuling on behalf of Xuanzong in 736, 732 should be the year of the treaty conclusion.\textsuperscript{105}

It is important to note that the treaty text says: "We shall establish a calendar" and "The law upholds the principle of having a single calendar, and does not recognize the ritual of two beginnings of the year." This may imply a Chinese attempt to impose the superiority of the Son of Heaven on Tibet by the introduction of their calendar to Tibet, which made the treaty more like a declaration of incorporation from the Chinese

\textsuperscript{103} JTS, v112, p. 3336; THY, v6, p. 76; v97, p. 1733; CFYG, v653, p. 7825; v979, p. 11503. In regards to these events, the two Tang biographies have different record: in 734 Xuanzong sent Li Quan, General of the Left Imperial Insignia Guard to erect the stele in Chiling. See JTS, v8, p. 201; v196A, p. 5233. And the XTS, v216A (p. 6085) says that following the erection of the stele, Zhang Shougui, Li Xingyi and Mang-bu-zhi went to make known the agreement. Tan Liren has the conjecture that, whether the stele was erected in 733 or in 734, Zhang Shougui was not present, since in 733, he left his post in Longyou and went to Hebei and was involved in battles with the Khitans there. He concludes that Xuanzong ordered that Zhang Shougui and Li Xingyi go to erect the stele in 733 but what in fact happened thereafter is not clear, see Tan Liren. 1988, pp. 132-133.

\textsuperscript{104} CFYG, v979, p. 11503; QTW, v990, "Ding Fan-Han liangjie bei," pp. 12962-63. For translation, see Appendix I.

\textsuperscript{105} Tan Liren. 1988, p. 132.
point of view rather than a mutual agreement between equals, because in the Chinese hierarchic political system only the Son of Heaven had the right to decide the calendar. It reflects the relations between Heaven and the Son of Heaven, who was to rule the world on behalf of the Heaven, and between the Son of Heaven and various feudal lords, who were his subjects. The *Zhouli* says that at the end of each year, the Son of Heaven "distributes calendar to the feudal states." The commentator, Zheng Xuan 張騫, explains that

The Son of Heaven distributes the calendar to the various feudal lords. They store it in their ancestral temples. On the first day of each month, they hold court in the temple, announce it to the temple, receive the calendar and carry it out.\(^{106}\)

Silla adopted Tang Gaozong's reign title Yonghui in 650.\(^{107}\) Also, Nanzhao in 794, after concluding a sworn covenant with Tang, in which Nanzhao swore to be a vassal, received the Tang calendar for the tenth year of Zhenyuan (794).\(^{108}\)

Tibet also set up its own stone stele. This was the usual Chinese type of treaty which consisted of two parallel unilateral declarations.\(^{109}\) Some Chinese records say that "At Chiling, each side erected a stele of demarcation."\(^{110}\) In 822 when Tang envoy Liu Yuanding passed Chiling on his embassy to (or from) Tibet, he saw that the stele set up by Tibet in 733 was still there while the one set up by the Chinese had already been destroyed.\(^{111}\) It is possible that each side had its own treaty text as in the covenant of 783 when both Tang and Tibet had treaty texts, and that of 821/822, when there were three texts of different wordings including one sworn text in Chinese written

---

107 *SGSG*, v5, Silla, Queen Chindök, 3-4.
110 *JTS*, v196, p. 5231; *THY*, v97, p. 1733; *CFYG*, v981, p. 11527.
111 *XTS*, v216B, p. 6103.
records, one Tibetan text on the stele, and one joint text in both Tibetan and Chinese languages on the same stele.

From 729 peace was preserved by the two states until 737 when conflicts broke out again, which lasted till the end of Xuanzong’s reign. Early in 737 Cui Xiyi, Military Commissioner of Hexi, went into Tibetan territory, mounting an offensive against the Tibetans west of the Qinghai and killing over 2,000.

Before the attack two events had happened which were the prelude to this clash. In 736 the Tibetans attacked Little Balur, whose king immediately sent for Tang intervention. Tang asked Tibet to stop the incursion but without success. This provided Tang with a legitimate reason for action. In one of the letters from Tang to Tibet the Chinese insisted that Little Balur was a Tang subject. The incursion on Little Balur was a sign of violation of the peace treaty.

The other incident occurred not long after the peace agreement of 732, when Cui Xiyi suggested to the Tibetan border general Qi-li-xu (Khri-gzigs) that since the two countries were at peace the tree-palisade and defence patrols should be moved away in order not to hinder people from ploughing. In spite of Khri-gzigs’ objection, Cui insisted. Consequently the two concluded a local covenant by sacrifice of a white dog, and removed the palisade and guarding troops. The Tibetan livestock covered the border fields.

After the Tibetan attack on Little Balur, Sun Hui, a retainer of Cui Xiyi, on a mission to the court, proposed to make a sudden attack on Tibet, taking

112 The CFYG records that in 733 the Tibetans made an incursion but were defeated by Wang Zhongsi, who was then promoted as General of the Left Imperial Insignia Guard. See CFYG, v358, p. 4245; v396, p. 4699. But the ZZTJ records Wang’s promotion as in 738 after battles with Tibet under the command of Du Xiwang, which is more likely to be true. ZZTJ, v214, p. 6835. See also JTS, v103, p. 3198; XTS, v133, p. 4552; CFYG, v384, p. 4571.
115 Qujiang Zhang Xiansheng Wenji, v11, "Chi Tufan Zanpu shu."
advantage of its unpreparedness. Xuanzong despatched Zhao Huizong 趙惠, a eunuch Ceremonial Secretary, to the frontiers with Sun Hui to observe the situation. Upon his arrival in Liangzhou, Zhao Huizong forged a decree ordering an attack on the Tibetans. Cui Xiyi then had to carry out the offensive into the Tibetan land early in 737.

The fact that Zhao Huizong and Sun Hui were generously rewarded by Xuanzong after the Tang victory showed Xuanzong's approval of the attack. The Chinese violation of the peace treaty put an end to the peace between the two countries which had been shaky from the start. It is recorded, however, that Cui Xiyi became morose because he had broken the covenant and was removed to another post. He and Zhao Huizong both saw a bad luck omen -- a white dog, which was the sacrificial animal with which Cui had made his covenant with the Tibetans. They died soon after. Sun Hui is said to have been executed for some other unspecified crime.\textsuperscript{116} It seems that it is the Chinese historian who is drawing a moral by implying that the three deserved to die. The breaking of the treaty does not, however, seem to have been an accidental event that occurred on some officials' own initiative, rather it must have been intended by the court. After the Tibetans had taken control of Little Balur, Tang felt it necessary to attack the Tibetans on their eastern borders in order to prevent a possible Tibetan alliance with the Türgish in the west.\textsuperscript{117}

In 738 the Military Commissioners of Hexi, Longyou and Jiannan were ordered to begin a general offensive against Tibet. The stele with the Chinese sworn treaty of 732 was destroyed.\textsuperscript{118} From then till the end of Xuanzong's reign, the Tibetan frontier remained a principal focus of Tang concern. In the continuous wars there were gains and losses on each side but Tang gradually got the upper hand. The military expedition

\textsuperscript{117} Beckwith, C. I. 1987, pp. 114-115.
\textsuperscript{118} JTS, v196A, pp. 5233-34; XTS, v216A, p. 6086; ZZTJ, v214, p. 6833.
of 746 led by Gao Xianzhi 高仙芝 into the Western Regions not only resulted in Tang taking over the control of Little Balur from the pro-Tibetan regime, but also in reestablishing Tang influence in the Western Regions, and by obtaining the strategic fortresses of Anrong and Shibao in 749, and recovering the area of Jiuqu in 753, Tang reinforced its strength.119

In 741 when the Tibetans sent in a request for a peace settlement after the death of Princess Jincheng in 739, Xuanzong did not agree.120 Obviously, he was in a position to adopt a strong attitude. Meanwhile Tang encouraged the unification of the Nanzhao kingdom located in modern Yunnan in order to have a buffer state between Tang and Tibet. In 738 Xuanzong conferred the title of king of Yunnan on Pi-luo-ge 皮羅閣 of Nanzhao with the purpose of making his country an ally against Tibetan incursions in the southwest.121 Later this well-thought out policy was abandoned when Yang Guozhong 杨国忠 sought to strengthen his position vis-à-vis An Lushan by achieving a military success in this area. In 751 Xianyu Zhongtong 鉅于仲通, Military Commissioner of Jiannan, started an offensive against Nanzhao, pushing the latter into an alliance with the Tibetans and in 752 Yang Guozhong launched a further campaign on Nanzhao which ended in disaster for Tang.122

The Third Treaty in 762 and Tibetan Invasion on Chang'an

After the outbreak of the An Lushan rebellion and the fall of Chang'an to the rebels, Xuanzong was driven into exile in Sichuan and his son, Suzong, assumed the

---

121 JTS, v197, p. 5280; XTS, v222A, p. 6270; ZZTJ, v214, pp. 6835-36.
throne at Lingwu. Xuanzong abdicated in his favor. In Tibet a new btsan-po Khri srong lde btsan began his reign. In 756 and 757 the btsan-po volunteered to provide assistance to Tang in suppressing the rebels and asked to contract a marriage. While Tang immediately made a matrimonial and military alliance with the Uighurs, Suzong merely expressed his appreciation to the Tibetans and sent a mission to them in 757.

It is doubtful that Tibet would have stopped incursions even if Tang had adopted timely actions in response to the Tibetans’ request. The Tang northwestern frontiers were left vulnerable and exposed when all the major troops under the Military Commissioners of Shuofang, Longyou and Hexi had been withdrawn in order to suppress the rebellion. The Tibetans could hardly resist the opportunity for expansion. It seemed that overnight Tang had lost all the advantage to Tibet. In 756 Tibet captured several army stations and towns in the Tang northwestern frontiers, and within a few years, Tibet allied itself with Nanzhao in capturing Xizhou, and annexed all the land under the administration of Military Commissioners of Hexi and Longyou.

A third treaty was formally concluded in 762, but it had little effect. In 762 a Tibetan embassy arrived at the Tang court for a peace settlement. Suzong ordered the Grand Councilors Guo Ziyi, Xiao Hua and Pei Zunqing to hold a banquet in the Secretariat and to go to the Guangzhai Temple to conclude a sworn covenant. The Tibetan envoy insisted that according to the Tibetan custom, if a sworn treaty was made by getting blood from the three victims and smearing it on one’s lips it should not be done in a Buddhist temple. He asked to have

---

126 ZZTJ, 218, p. 7011.
Cen Zhongmian in Sui-Tang Shi has a table of when the Chinese prefectures were lost to Tibet, see his 1957 (2), pp. 275-276.
the ceremony performed again next day in the Court of State Ceremonial in order to complete the rituals of Tibet. Suzong agreed with the hope of appeasing the "barbarians." Even though the Chinese accepted the Tibetan request, there was deep distrust and hostility. Well aware of the Tibetan threat, Guo Ziyi repeatedly warned the court of the necessity of preparing for war.

No sooner had the oath been taken than the Tibetans launched a formidable offensive. In 763 they detained two Chinese envoys of high rank, Li Zhifang and Cui Lun. They were not allowed to leave until two years later. In the seventh month the Tibetans captured the Dazhen Pass on the borders of Longyou Circuit and Jingji Circuit. The Tang emperor Daizong, who succeeded Suzong in 762, had to flee to Shanzhou before he could organize any resistance. A Tang general Wang Xianzhong rebelled, attempting to establish Prince Feng, Li Gong (Xuanzong's son), as emperor and to surrender to the Tibetans. The plan failed. Gong was sent to Daizong and was executed. In the tenth month the Tibetans guided by the surrendered Prefect of Jingzhou, Gao Hui, entered Chang'an. Gao Hui and the Tibetan general Ma-chong-ying established Li Chenghong, Princess Jincheng's brother, as emperor, started a new reign title, and appointed grand councilors and other court officials. During their occupation of fifteen days, the city was heavily plundered and houses were

---

128 Previously scholars have misread the texts at this point and have taken them as evidence that blood sacrifice was a Tibetan custom. Stein, R. A. (1988, pp. 134-135) argues convincingly that the animal sacrifices carried out by the Tibetans on the occasion of treaties with the Chinese were performed in order to conform to Chinese custom and were not a relic of native Tibetan practice from pre-Buddhist times. I follow his reading, with fu 'again' as in the CFYG, instead of xu 'must', as in the JTS. JTS, v196A, pp. 5236-37; XTS, v216A, p. 6087; CFYG, v981, p. 11528.

129 ZZTJ, v222, p. 7143.


132 Li Fang-Kuei had the conjecture that Ma-chong-ying was Ngan Lam Stag Sgra Klu Khong. See his 1956, pp. 1-8.
burned down. Before leaving, the Tibetans were going to take with them Chinese officials, women and artisans, but the plan failed when they had to withdraw in haste fearing a Tang counterattack led by Vice Marshal Guo Ziyi.\textsuperscript{133} Chenghong was exiled to Huazhou \textasciitilde{\textit{Hu}} and died there.\textsuperscript{134}

Throughout the Tang dynasty no other "barbarians" caused such a disaster and humiliation to the Chinese. Not only did the Tibetans encroach upon Tang territories, but they even occupied the capital and briefly set up a new regime.

The Tibetan Ngan Lam Stag Sgra Klu Khong inscription records the military campaigns that Tibet carried out against China from 758 to 761, saying:

The Chinese King He-hu Hki Wang Te and his ministers were terrified. They offered a perpetual yearly tribute of fifty thousand rolls of silk. China was compelled to pay tribute. After this, the Chinese King, the father, He-u Hki Wang Te died and the Chinese King, the son, Wang Peng Wang, having succeeded to the throne, was not able to pay tribute to Tibet. When the King (of Tibet) was grieved by this, Ngan Lam Klu Khong took the principal lead in counsels for the launching of war by Tibet against the center of China.\textsuperscript{135}

The Tibetan invasion of Chang'an exposed the weakness of the Tang government, which was in the hands of the powerful eunuch Cheng Yuanzhen. Backed by his control of the Imperial Guardsmen, Cheng eliminated those who

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{133} The sequence of the events follows the records in the \textit{ZZTJ}, v223, pp. 7150-54. The \textit{ZZTJ} says that Chenghong was the grandson of Prince Bin, Li Shouli. See also \textit{CFYG}, v39, p. 439; v358, p. 4248. But this may be wrong because according to the following sources, Chenghong was the son of Shouli. See \textit{JTS}, v86, p. 2834; v196A, p. 5237; \textit{XTS}, v81, p. 3592. The following sources record the events but do not mention Li Chenghong's relation with Prince Bin. \textit{JTS}, v11, pp. 273-274; \textit{XTS}, v6, p. 169; v216A, pp. 6087-88.
\item \textsuperscript{134} The \textit{JTS}, v86 (p. 2834) records that the place where he was exiled was Guozhou, while the \textit{XTS}, v81, p. 3592 and \textit{ZZTJ}, v223, p. 7158 record the place as Huazhou.
\item \textsuperscript{135} Translation by Richardson, H. E. 1952, p. 21. Richardson does not explain the transcription of He-hu Hki Wang Te but he identifies him and Wang Peng Wang as Suzong and Daizong in his notes on page 25.
\end{itemize}

Wang Yao identifies He-hu Hki Wang Te as Xiao Gan Huangdi, i. e. Suzong, and Wang Peng Wang as Guangping Wang, i. e. Prince Guangping, the future Daizong, respectively. However, he says that the annual payment of fifty thousand rolls of silk was agreed by the Chinese in order to obtain Tibetan assistance to suppress the Zhu Ci rebellion. See his, 1982, pp. 91-92. This is impossible because the rebellion took place between 786 and 787 of Dezong's time, and according to the inscription the payment was made before the Tibetan invasion of Chang'an in 763.
opposed him or threatened his position and kept the emperor from learning the immediate danger of the Tibetan invasion. When Daizong sent orders to the various armies to come to rescue the court from the danger of the Tibetan invasions of Chang'an, the general Li Guangbi 未言 did not come because of his resentment against Cheng Yuanzhen. Another general Guo Ziyi was dismissed from his position by Cheng Yuanzhen's intrigue in 762. Though he was appointed again in the crisis of the Tibetan invasion, he did not, at that time, possess more than twenty cavalrymen.

The critical situation the court was facing and the urgency for reform was explicitly stated in the memorial of Liu Kang 柳伉, a court official. He urged Daizong to execute Cheng Yuanzhen, drive all the eunuchs out of the court and issue an edict of self blame so as to summon rescuing troops. Pressed by the situation Daizong dismissed Cheng Yuanzhen from all his posts. In 764 Guo Ziyi was entrusted with the post of Vice Marshal of Guannei 内 and Hedong 河東, Surveillance Military Commissioner of Hezhong 河中, Superior Commander-in-chief of Yunzhou and Protector-general of Chanyu and Zhenbei 燕北. With Yuan Zai 元載 as Grand Councilor and Guo Ziyi back in command of the army, Tang endeavored to put up defences. Walled towns were built and troops were stationed at strategic points in preparation against the Tibetans.

In 764 a Tang general Pugu Huaien rose in revolt and formed an alliance with Tibet, posing an imminent threat to Chang'an. The Tang troops claimed some victories

---

137 *JTS*, v120, pp. 3454-58; *XTS*, v137, pp. 4603-05; *ZZTJ*, v223, pp. 7150-51.
138 *ZZTJ*, v223, pp. 7155-56.
140 *ZZTJ*, v223, p. 7158.
over the Tibetans on the southwestern borders and in checking the invading enemies. When Pugu's armies were also driven back, the danger was alleviated temporarily.\textsuperscript{141}

The Fourth Treaty in 765

The fourth sworn covenant was concluded in 765. The Chinese historical sources have a very brief record of the event. They only say that in the third month of 765 a Tibetan embassy arrived with a request for a peace settlement. Daizong ordered Grand Councilors Yuan Zai and Du Hongjian to conclude a sworn covenant in the Xing Tang Temple.\textsuperscript{142} When Daizong asked what Guo Ziyi thought of the covenant, Guo said that the Tibetans would take advantage of Tang unpreparedness. If they came when Tang was unprepared, the state could not be defended. Troops were therefore despatched to Fengtian and watch guards were placed on duty in Jingyuan.\textsuperscript{143}

Like the previous one, this treaty was not effective in guaranteeing peace. It was an irresistible temptation to the Tibetans to have the rebellious Tang general Pugu Huaien as their ally guiding them to penetrate into China. They soon joined Pugu in the ninth month of 765 together with the Uighurs, Tangut, and Nula Turks in a formidable expedition aimed at Chang'an. The Tibetans marched from the north to Fengtian. The Tangut came from the east to Tongzhou. The Tuyuhun and Nula came from the west to Zhouzhi, followed by the Uighurs and Pugu Huaien who was in command of the rebellious Shuofang armies. Fortunately for the Chinese Pugu died of a sudden illness on the way.

\textsuperscript{142} JTS, v11, p. 279; v196A, p. 5239; XTS, v6, p. 171; v216A, p. 6088; ZZTJ, v223, p. 7174; CFYG, v980, p. 11512; v981, p. 11528; v998, p. 11712.
\textsuperscript{143} ZZTJ, v223, p. 7174.
When the Tibetans got to Binzhou and met the Uighur troops, the two armies decided to continue the invasion. While besieging Jingyang, they heard of the death of Pugu and started to contend for the leadership. Guo Ziyi immediately took advantage of the situation, and succeeded in persuading the Uighurs into an alliance against the Tibetans. Guo and the brother of the Uighur qaghan took an oath and joined their troops inflicting a heavy blow on the Tibetans. The urgent situation was relieved.\textsuperscript{144}

The Fifth Treaty in 767

Early in 766 Tibet sent an envoy bearing "tribute" to Tang while Daizong despatched Yang Ji on a mission to Tibet to "restore the former friendship." With Yang's return, a mission of over a hundred people arrived from Tibet at the Tang court.\textsuperscript{145} It seemed that the two countries had suffered great losses in battles and therefore preferred peace.

In 767 Daizong again sent a mission to Tibet. In the fourth month the Chinese Grand Councilor and the eunuch Yu Chaoen concluded a covenant with a Tibetan envoy in the Xing Tang Temple.\textsuperscript{146} This was the third time within five years that the two sides held an oath taking ceremony, which for the third time failed to maintain any lasting peace. Following the raids on Lingzhou in the ninth month, a Tibetan mission arrived at Tang court with Xue Jingxian, the Chinese

\textsuperscript{144} It is not clear whether the joint troops of the Tibetans and Uighurs pressed Jingyang or Fengtian. For the records of attacking Jingyang, see JTS, v120, pp. 3461-63; XTS, v137, pp. 4606-07; ZZTJ, v223, pp. 7176-84. For the records of attacking Fengtian, see JTS, v11, pp. 279-280; v196A, pp. 5239-41; XTS, v6, pp. 171-172; v216A, pp. 6088-89; CFYG, v987, p. 11588. The CFYG, v973 (p. 11435) does not say where the attack took place.

\textsuperscript{145} JTS, v11, p. 284; v196B, p. 5243; XTS, v6, p. 172; ZZTJ, v224, p. 7190; CFYG, v980, p. 11512. The CFYG records the year as in 767 when Yang Ji went to Tibet, which may be wrong.

\textsuperscript{146} JTS, v11, pp. 286-87; v196B, p. 5243; XTS, v216B, p. 6091; ZZTJ, v224, p. 7195; CFYG, v980, p. 11512; v981, p. 11528.
envoy to Tibet, through whom the btsan-po requested to make a demarcation of the border at Fenglin Pass, but Daizong did not give any reply.\textsuperscript{147}

From then till 778 shortly before the end of Daizong's reign, several peace missions were exchanged. In 769, 772 and 774, Tibet sent missions "to come to pay a court-visit" to Tang. In 771 Tibet asked for a peace agreement, and Tang sent an embassy to Tibet.\textsuperscript{148} However, except in 771 and 774, Tibet made border incursions every year, mostly in autumn during the Chinese harvest season and when the Tibetan horses were well fed. It seems that the Tibetan court had a peaceful intention whereas the Tibetan frontier generals preferred constant raids. This conflict of interests caused a big headache to Tang. According to Daizong's edict in 774 "no sooner have the ritual gifts of Tibet reached the court than the beacon fires are lit right up to the suburbs of the capital."\textsuperscript{149}

While the Chinese tried hard to keep the Uighurs peaceful on their northern border by political investiture and exchange of silk and horses, they concentrated their major forces in coping with the Tibetan incursions. In addition to building up walled towns and fortresses, troops were restationed in order to strengthen the defences. In 773 Yuan Zai suggested that Tang build walled towns in Yuanzhou while the Tibetans were away at Koko Nor for summer pasture. After the Tibetans took over the land of Hexi and Longyou, they did not have many people or troops settled there. The area was virtually empty and therefore Yuan Zai's suggestion was not without reason or too aggressive. He also repeatedly suggested the removal of capital to

\textsuperscript{147} JTS, v196B, p. 5243; XTS, v216B, p. 6091; CFYG, v997, p. 11704.
\textsuperscript{148} JTS, v122, p. 3502; XTS, v143, p. 4690; v216B, p. 6092; ZZTJ, v224, p. 7217; v225, p. 7225; CFYG, v662, p. 7927; v972, p. 11415; p. 11416; v976, p. 11461. The XTS, v216B (p. 6092) says that Wu Sun went to Tibet in 774, while according to the ZZTJ, Wu went to Tibet in 771 and died there in 774. Wang Zhong holds that the XTS's record is not correct, see Wang. 1958, p. 94.
\textsuperscript{149} CFYG, v992, p. 11656.
Hezhong (Yongji in southern Shanxi), all for a better defence, but both suggestions were not adopted.\(^{150}\)

The Chinese claimed some victories in battles with Tibet during this period and in 776, Tang probably obtained Nanzhao's assistance in crushing the Tibetans in Wanghan Fortress.\(^{151}\) But the Chinese on the whole were in a passive defensive position. Their military force was far less than that of the Tibetans. In 774 when discussing with Daizong, Guo Ziyi talked about the Tibetan problems and the constant wars with them with tears running down his cheeks. He even offered to resign his military post for he felt that he could not take up the task of defence.\(^{152}\)

The Sixth Treaty in 783

Dezong ascended the throne in the middle of 779. Determined to restore the authority and effectiveness of the central government, he adopted a series of measures to curb the growing tendency towards decentralization at the provincial level, and made a drastic change in the policy towards Tibet. Instead of just passively defending the borders he took the initiative to make peace with Tibet by sending Wei Lun as an envoy, by ordering the frontier troops not to make provocative attacks on Tibet, and by returning eight groups of Tibetan envoys who had come to Tang during Daizong's time and had been detained by the court due to the constant hostilities and wars between the two sides. As well, more than 500 Tibetan captives who had been settled in Jiangnan and Lingnan were returned.\(^{153}\)


\(^{151}\) XTS, v216B, p. 6092; CFYG, v434, p. 5160. Charles Backus considers that the Nanzhao's assistance to Tang at this time was impossible and the record must be wrong. See his, 1981, p. 82.

\(^{152}\) JTS, v120, pp. 3464-65; XTS, v137, pp. 4607-08; ZZTJ, v225, p. 7226; CFYG, v366, p. 4361.

The change of policy may have resulted from two considerations. To Dezong, the Uighurs were a worse enemy than the Tibetans. He held a personal grudge against the former because in 762 as Prince Yong, he had suffered a great humiliation at their hands (see Chapter IV). Another consideration was that peace with Tibet would alleviate the severe situation on the frontier so that the Chinese troops could be redeployed to suppress internal rebellions staged by provincial governors.

Before Wei Lun arrived, however, the Tibetans had already made an alliance with Nanzhao and gone on a major offensive on the Tang southwestern border. In the following battles, Tang won a major victory, which helped the later conclusion of a peace treaty.

The peace proposal put forward by Tang received a positive response and produced an immediate result in the Tibetans' refusal to assist Liu Wenxi, a rebel against Tang. In 780 Grand Councilor Yang Yan decided to build walled-towns in Yuanzhou in order to recover Qinzhou and Yuanzhou from Tibetan occupation. He appointed Li Huaiguang, Military Commissioner of Jingyuan and ordered the troops of Jingzhou to move to Yuanzhou for the construction. The troops however strongly resented this order, and the officers were afraid because of Li Huaiguang's severe style. Led by Liu Wenxi, the Administrative Aide, they rose in revolt in Jingzhou. Liu Wenxi sent his son to Tibet as a hostage in order to obtain military assistance, but the btsan-po did not take any action because of his agreement to make peace with Tang. Liu's rebellion was suppressed, and the construction of walled-towns in Yuanzhou was not carried out.

In 780 the Tibetan captives from the incursion of 779 were also returned.\textsuperscript{158} To strengthen peace or perhaps being under some pressure from Tibet, Wei Lun asked the emperor himself to compose a treaty text to be concluded with Tibet. But Yang Yan objected because he considered that the two sides should not be on equal terms. He asked that he and Guo Ziyi compose the document and report it and let the emperor just write his approval on it. Dezong agreed.\textsuperscript{159}

When Wei Lun returned to Tang from his second mission at the end of 780, a Tibetan mission of 55 people accompanied him.\textsuperscript{160} In 781 Cui Hanheng was despatched as an envoy to Tibet.\textsuperscript{161}

Through Cui Hanheng, the Tibetans put forward their demand for equal treatment. They made the following points: 1) Tibet and Tang had a nephew-uncle relationship, so Tibet should not be treated as a subject. Tibet strongly rejected the Tang usage of degrading terms in its letter to Tibet which said:

the goods you presented as tribute have been received; now I bestow on my nephew some small tokens. When they arrive you should receive them.

2) West of Lingzhou, the Helan Mountain should be the demarcation line.

3) In concluding the covenant, one should follow the rules that were stipulated in the decree of 708 of the Tang emperor:

When Tang envoy arrives there, the nephew (the Tibetan \textit{btsan-po}) shall first swear an oath with the Tang envoy. When Tibetan envoy arrives here, the uncle (the Chinese emperor) shall personally conclude the covenant.\textsuperscript{162}

\textsuperscript{158} ZNZI, v226, pp. 7279-80; CFYG, v980, p. 11513.
\textsuperscript{159} ZNZI, v226, p. 7280.
\textsuperscript{161} ZNZI, v226, p. 7298; THY, v97, p. 1734; CFYG, v980, p. 11513.
\textsuperscript{162} JTS, v196B, p. 5246.
In reply, Dezong changed the wording in the imperial letter from "to present tribute" (gongxian) to "to offer" (jin), from "to bestow" (ci) to "to send" (ji), and from "to receive and obtain" (lingqu) to "to receive them" (lingzhi). Dezong put the blame for the wording on Yang Yan, who had already been relieved of his post, claiming that "the former Grand Councilor Yang Yan did not follow the previous regulations and therefore caused such mistakes." The request for the border demarcation in the Helan Mountain was also agreed to by Dezong.

In his studies of the official letters of the Tang rulers to the Tibetans, Kaneko Shūichi points out that this change of wording shows that from the Kaiyuan period on, the Tibetans requested that Tang China treat them as a rival power but Tang agreement came only in Jianzhong 2 (781).

The Tibetans, in addition to their defeat in the Sichuan campaign in 779, also had some internal troubles which made a peace agreement with Tang desirable, as peace could preserve their military strength. By this time news had reached Tang that the Chief Minister Shang Jie-xi (Zhang rGyal-zigs) had wanted to retaliate for the defeat in Sichuan and had been opposed to making peace while minister Shang Jie-zan (Zhang rGyal tshan) had maintained that Tibet should decide a demarcation line with Tang and make peace. The btsan-po had agreed with Zhang rGyal tshan and replaced Zhang rGyal-zigs with Zhang rGyal tshan.

---

163 The difference between these two words lingqu and lingzhi which seem to be synonyms is not clear. But in the context it seems lingqu represents a humbler status than lingzhi. Kaneko Shūichi translates lingqu as "accept" and lingzhi as "take," see his 1988, p. 97. But I do not quite agree with his translation. To "take" is too strong a word in this situation.


As agreed upon, in the tenth month of 782, Cui Hanheng arrived at the Tang-Tibetan border to make a demarcation line and a covenant. But the Tibetans failed to reach an agreement among themselves. A new date was therefore set on the fifteenth day of the first month of the following year.\textsuperscript{168}

There were three meetings held in concluding the sixth treaty. The first one was held on the decided date in 783 in Qingshui 清水 (in modern Gansu province). Both sides despatched two thousand people to the ceremony with seven high ranking officials on each side participating in the oath taking. The Chinese participants were Military Commissioner of Fengxiang 凤翔 and Longyou, Vice Director of Secretariat Zhang Yi 張逸, his Administrative Assistant Qi Ying 齊映, Investigating Censor Qi Kang 齊抗, Minister of Court of State Ceremonial, Censor-in-chief, and Treaty Commissioner Cui Hanheng, Vice Censor-in-chief Fan Ze 扇翼, Investigating Censor, Administrative Assistant of Commissioner to Tibet Chang Lu 常魯, and Investigating Censor, Administrative Assistant of Commissioner to Tibet Yu Di 于第, while the Tibetans were Zhang rGyal tshan, Lun Xi-jia-zang 論悉贊 (Blon Srid-rgyal-bzang\textsuperscript{169}), Lun Zang-re 論藏熱 (Blon Gcang-bzher\textsuperscript{170}), Lun Li-tuo 論利施, Si-guan-zhe 斯官者, and Lun Li-xu 論力徐.\textsuperscript{171}

It is recorded in the Chinese sources that Zhang Yi felt ashamed of having to make a treaty with Tibet. He tried to diminish the significance of the ceremony by suggesting that instead of Chinese using an ox and Tibetans using a horse as formerly

\textsuperscript{168} JTS, v122, pp. 3502-03; v196, p. 5246; CFYG, v981, p. 11528.
\textsuperscript{169} Pelliot, P. 1961, p. 145.
\textsuperscript{170} Pelliot, P. 1961, p. 145.
\textsuperscript{171} JTS, v125, pp. 3547-48; v196B, p. 5247; XTS, v216B, pp. 6093-94; CFYG, v981, p. 11529. The Chinese records say that there were seven Tibetan officials but give on the punctuation of the text has some problems. According to the Zhonghua Shuju edition of the JTS, there are only six names of Tibetan officials. Some studies punctuate the last three names as Lun Lituosi, and guanzhe or "official" Lun Lixu. See Lee, Don Y. 1981, p. 95; Su Jinren and Xiao Lianzi. 1981, p. 215. Bushell punctuated them as four names, thus, Lun Li, Tuo-si, Guan-zhe and Lun Li-xu in order to make seven. See Bushell. 1880, p. 488. Pelliot punctuated them as Lun Li-tuo-si-guan-zhe and Lun Li-xu. See Pelliot. 1961, p. 43.
decided, they should use a sheep, pig and dog as sacrifice because ox was the most prestigious sacrificing animal. He made the excuse that the Chinese could not plough without oxen and the Tibetans could not go anywhere without horses. Zhang rGyal tshan agreed. As a result the Chinese used a dog and a white sheep and since no pig could be found there, Tibet used a wild ram.\footnote{172}

In addition to the Chinese treaty text, Zhang rGyal tshan also produced a text, but its content and relationship to the Chinese text is not clear. After the blood sacrifice was carried out according to Chinese custom, Zhang rGyal tshan asked Zhang Yi to enter a tent at the southwest corner of the altar and burn incense to a Buddhist image and again swear an oath solemnizing the treaty.

The Chinese treaty text claimed that

The [Chinese] state, in striving to give rest to the people in the border areas, will renounce its former territory, abandon profit and pursue the course of public good and make firm the covenant and follow the treaty.

The treaty also made a demarcation line, established a neutral territory, and stipulated that the places that theretofore had not had troops should not have new garrisons, nor should there be walled-towns and fortifications built, nor should there be ploughing and sowing.\footnote{173}

The treaty recognized the already existing situation, that is, the Tibetan occupation of the former Tang territory, but it shows also that Tang pushed a bit further west in the negotiation.\footnote{174}

The second ceremony was held in Chang'an. The Chinese participants were Grand Councilors Li Zhongchen 隋志臣, Lu Qi 郁杞, and Guan Bo

Censor-in-chief Yu Qi, Chief Minister of the Court of the Imperial Treasury Zhang Xiangong, Chief Minister of the Court of the National Granaries Duan Xiushi, Director for Imperial Manufactories Li Changkui, Metropolitan Governor Wang Hong, and General-in-chief of Imperial Insignia Guard Hun Jian. Tibet had the Chief Minister Qu-jia-zan (rGyal-bcan) present.

At first, rGyal-bcan did not agree to hold the ceremony on the grounds that the boundary lines in the Qingshui treaty had not yet been established. Hearing this, Dezong decided to despatch Cui Hanheng to Tibet to obtain a decision from the btsan-po. Two months later Yu Di, a Chinese envoy to Tibet, and a Tibetan envoy arrived at Tang, reporting the establishment of the borders. It seems that Cui did not go on his mission. In the seventh month of 783, the ceremony was held west of Chang'an.176

After the ceremony, Minister of Rites Li Kui went with rGyal-bcan to Tibet as treaty commissioner for another ceremony.177

Tan Liren holds the opinion that the treaty text which was read at the Qingshui ceremony was in fact the swearing text for the Chang'an and Lhasa meetings, whereas the Qingshui meeting was held only for the purpose of restating the old treaty and agreeing on a truce, because before the Chang'an ceremony was held, the Tibetan Chief Minister rGyal-bcan had refused to participate in the ceremony giving as a reason that "the boundary lines in the Qingshui treaty have not yet been established." Tan also supports his opinion with arguments such as the following:

1) The Chinese participants in the Chang'an meeting were of higher ranking than those at Qingshui, and the Treaty Commissioner performed purification rites and

175 Pelliot, P. 1961, p. 146.
there was an announcement to the ancestral temple, which shows that the Chang'an meeting was given more importance.

2) The treaty text says:

Now the generals and grand councilors of the two countries have received a commission to meet, and they, having undergone purification rites in preparation for the ceremony,...

The record about the Chang'an meeting in the Jiu Tangshu also says:

Two days before the treaty ceremony, the emperor ordered the officials in charge to announce it to the ancestral temple and the officials involved in the ceremony to carry out purification rites.

As for the Qingshui meeting, there is no record about the purification rites, which further implies that the treaty text was for the Chang'an meeting and not the one at Qingshui.178

Tan Liren's arguments seem convincing, but there are still questions unexplained. First, why could not the Qingshui and Chang'an meetings have had the same swearing text? According to the Tang Huiyao, when Cui Hanheng, the Chinese official in charge for negotiation, returned from Tibet, the two sides had already decided the boundaries and the date for the Qingshui ceremony, and planned to establish stele.179 It is possible that the swearing treaty text stipulated what the demarcation should be and was read at the Qingshui meeting, but the actual demarcation had to be carried out on the ground or there remained other points that had to be decided by the Tibetan btsan-po before the Chang'an meeting was held.

179 THY, v97, p. 1734.
Second, the Chinese records say that the rituals of the Chang'an ceremony were the same as those of the Qingshui,\textsuperscript{180} which means that the Chang'an ceremony was not necessarily given more importance.

**The Alliance with Tibet**

The peace treaty of 783 stabilized the frontier situation and made it possible for the Tang court to utilize the frontier troops and imperial armies, which previously had been engaged in defending against the Tibetans, to suppress internal rebellions staged by ambitious provincial governors. The transfer of a large number of troops, however, not only placed an extremely heavy burden on the finances of the capital, but also put the capital in an exposed position to the threat of foreign invasion. In his memorial of 783, Hanlin Academician Lu Zhi\textsuperscript{181}, based on the examples of the previous period of the Tang dynasty, stressed the importance of stationing large numbers of troops in Guanzhong in order to maintain an effective control over the empire. He expressed his worry that with the Shuofang and Taiyuan troops far away from the frontier and the imperial armies continuously leaving the capital region to suppress the internal rebellions, if the Tibetans or some rebellious generals took advantage of the situation to threaten the capital, the court would have no means of protection. He suggested that Dezong bring the imperial armies back to the capital but Dezong did not adopt his opinion.\textsuperscript{181}

As Lu Zhi expected, the capital soon was in danger facing the attack of rebellious troops under Zhu Ci. Dezong fled to Fengtian in a great haste. After occupying Chang'an, Zhu Ci assumed the title "Emperor of Great Qin" and laid siege to

\textsuperscript{180} JTS, v196B, p. 5248; XTS, v216B, p. 6094; CFYG, v981, p. 11529.
\textsuperscript{181} ZZTJ, v228, pp. 7348-50.
Fengtian in 783. Though the Fengtian crisis was later relieved, internal wars did not end till 786.

Faced with the critical situation, Dezong decided to ask for military assistance from Tibet, especially at this time when Tang relations with its traditional alliance -- the Uighurs had deteriorated. Dezong several times refused Uighur requests for a marriage alliance, not only because the Uighurs often raised excessive demands and stirred up troubles, but also because Dezong still had ill feelings towards the Uighurs for the humiliation he had suffered when dealing with the Uighurs as prince in 762. Moreover, from 782 to 784, the Uighurs also allied with Tang rebel, Zhu Tao, and promised to assist Zhu Ci, Zhu Tao's brother.\textsuperscript{182}

In the tenth month of 783 an envoy was sent seeking military assistance from the Tibetans.\textsuperscript{183} In early 784 two more envoys were despatched on missions to Tibet requesting assistance.\textsuperscript{184} An agreement was reached that if the Tibetans sent troops to help Tang recover Chang'an, Tang would cede the territory of Yizhou \(^{185}\), Xizhou \(^{185}\) and Beiting to Tibet.\textsuperscript{185} In addition to the land Dezong promised to provide Tibet with 10,000 \(pi\) of silk annually.\textsuperscript{186}

Zhang rGyal tshan also insisted that according to Tibetan custom, the mobilization of an army rested on the minister commanding the army. But since the Tang edict did not have the signature of Li Huaiguang, who was then Military

\textsuperscript{182} ZZTJ, v228-v231.
\textsuperscript{183} JTS, v140, p. 3821; XTS, v158, p. 4934; ZZTJ, v228, pp. 7367-68; CFYG, v686, p. 8179.
\textsuperscript{184} JTS, v12, p. 341; v196B, p. 5249; XTS, v216B, p. 6094; ZZTJ, v229, p. 7399; CFYG, v980, p. 11514.
\textsuperscript{185} This is according to the record in the the ZZTJ, v231, p. 7442. The JTS, v196B (p. 5252) says that the concession of land included Jingzhou and Lingzhou, and the XTS, v216B (p. 6094) says that it included four prefectures including Jingzhou and Lingzhou. According to the following text in the ZZTJ v231 (p. 7442) and the decree to the generals and soldiers in the Four Garrisons in Beiting, Tang would give up the land in Beiting. See Lu Xiangong Hanyuanji, v10, "Lu Zhi weiwen Sizheng Beiting jiangli chishu." Beiting and Anxi were under the Chinese control even after the Tibetans' occupation of Hexi and Longyou. The Tang court did not realize this until 781 when the envoys of Military Commissioner of Beiting Li Yuanzhong finally got to the court via the Uighurs. See ZZTJ, v227, p. 7303.
Commissioner of Shuofang in command of the army to rescue the emperor, the Tibetans would not start to advance. When Dezong asked Lu Zhi to persuade Li Huaiguang to sign his name on the letter, Li refused, expressing his doubts about forming an alliance with Tibet. Li Huaiguang at that time had already shown signs of intention to rebel but his opinions were not groundless.\textsuperscript{187} Realizing the danger that Li Huaiguang would revolt, Dezong fled to Liangzhou 螃蟹 (modern Nanzheng 南鄭, Shenxi). Soon Li Huaiguang did rebel.

The Tibetans led by Zhang rGyal tshan were already staying in Binzhou with Cui Hanheng, who had previously been despatched to Tibet to obtain their assistance. Cui forged a letter from Hun Jian, the Vice Marshal, asking the Tibetans to act. After some hesitation, Zhang rGyal tshan despatched his troops to join Tang force in recovering Wugong 萬功 and crushed Zhu Ci's general Han Min 韓旻. Tang troops now were able to march on Chang'an.\textsuperscript{188}

The False Treaty of Pingliang in 787

Before the court recovered Chang'an from rebel occupation, the Tibetan troops had withdrawn from China. They were suffering from plague and had been bribed by Zhu Ci.\textsuperscript{189}

Soon after Zhu Ci's rebellion was suppressed, the Tibetans asked Tang to fulfil its promise to cede territory. Dezong was going to withdraw Tang administrative offices from the Tarim Basin, but Li Mi raised strong objections on the ground that withdrawal would endanger the Guanzhong area while remaining in the west would

\textsuperscript{187} JTS, v121, p. 3493; XTS, v224A, p. 6377; ZZTJ, v230, p. 7403.
\textsuperscript{188} JTS, v12, p. 341; v134, p. 3707; v196B, p. 5249; XTS, v155, p. 4894; v216B, p. 6094; ZZTJ, v230, p. 7422.
\textsuperscript{189} ZZTJ, v231, p. 7429.
divide Tibetan forces. Dezong therefore promised only to provide a great amount of silk to Tibet.

On Tang's refusal to cede territory, the Tibetans resumed hostilities in 786 under the command of Zhang rGyal tshan. Chang'an was on alert for a time. After his invasion Zhang rGyal tshan stayed in Mingsha in Lingzhou. Under the pressure of lack of supplies and the threat of large-scale attack by Tang, he asked for a peace settlement and, through heavy bribes and humble language, persuaded Ma Sui into the belief that the Tibetans would resume the agreement of Qingshui and return the land of Yanzhou and Xiazhou captured in 786. Ma Sui presented several memorials advocating peace with Tibet.

Some officials insisted on a bellicose policy. Arguing that the internal situation was calm after the rebellion, Grand Councilor Han Huang held that the Tibetans were now weakened with pressures from the Arabs in the west and the Uighurs in the north and had to take precautions against Nanzhao in the south, which was not a very reliable ally with Tibet. Their troops were scattered and in their occupied areas in He-Long, there were only fifty to sixty thousand troops. With 100,000 troops Tang could build fortresses in Yuanzhou, Shanzhou, Taozhou and Weizhou and station 20,000 troops in each fortress. Thus the He-Long area would be recovered. He would be responsible for supplying the necessary expenses. Dezong was persuaded.

In 787, however, Ma Sui accompanied a Tibetan general to the court, urging a peace agreement. Grand Councilor Zhang Yanshang supported the peace policy. This, together with Han Huang's death, helped get the peace policy approved by the indecisive emperor, who was weary of constant wars, suspicious that

---

190 XTS, v139, pp. 4634-35; v216B, p. 6094; ZZTJ, v231, p. 7442.
191 Lu Xuangong Hanyuanji, v10, "Ci Tufan jiang shu."
the military generals wanted to achieve merit through war, and still inclined for an alliance with Tibet rather than with the Uighurs.\textsuperscript{192}

The Tibetan peace proposal turned out to be an intrigue purposely designed to weaken Tang resistance. But the Tang court had not been quite aware of it before the disaster happened. In 787 an envoy Cui Huan\textsuperscript{192} (or Han 支) was sent to Tibet. Zhang rGyal tshan told him that the demarcation stele had been destroyed, so Tibet wished for a new peace agreement. He had sent Tibetan troops into Tang territory only in order to obtain the promised reward for their assistance. He promised to return the captured cities of Yanzhou and Xiazhou when the peace agreement had been concluded. Also he argued that the Qingshui agreement could not be maintained because there had not been enough participants in the oath taking ceremony. The Tibetans this time would have 21 people including ministers and generals, and the Tang court should send Hun Jian, Du Xiquan and Li Guan for the oath taking ceremony. As the Chinese realized later, this was part of a plan to capture those three frontier commanders, so that Tibet could launch a major attack on Chang'an.\textsuperscript{193}

When Cui Huan went to Tibet he obtained some information about the military forces of Tibet through bribing the local people, and was told that the Tibetans had only 30,000 troops available for battle. This must have made the court less suspicious of the Tibetan motives for peace. But Li Cheng insisted that Tang take full military preparations to guard against the Tibetans at the conclusion ceremony. Zhang Yanshang again objected. Dezong urged Li Cheng not to express his suspicions, but the court, nonetheless, took some precautions. It did not send Du Xiquan to the ceremony, perhaps because his post was too important to leave. Neither did it send Li


Guan, as he had already left his post. Hun Jian was appointed commissioner for the treaty conclusion. Dezong also asked Tibet to return Yanzhou and Xiaozhou first.

When Zhang rGyal tshan requested that the ceremony be held in Tulishu 處支樹 instead of Qingshui, a general Ma Youlin 馬有麟 warned that Tulishu was in a dangerous geographical location. It might be used by the Tibetans to lay an ambush. At his suggestion, it was decided that the place for the ceremony would be in Pingliangchuan 庆川 (in modern Gansu). Military Commissioners Luo Yuanguang 罗元光 and Han Yougui 韩游瑰 were ordered to station their troops in Panyuan 祁原 and Luoke 洛口 respectively to assist Hun Jian, and both actually moved close to the place of the ceremony to be ready in case of emergency.

On the day of the ceremony in the intercalary fifth month of 787, report reached to the court that the Tibetans had laid an ambush. Dezong was so frightened that he was preparing to flee from Chang'an, and was only dissuaded by his ministers. The Chinese suffered great losses in what turned out to be the "False Treaty of Pingliang" with more than 60 officials kidnapped. Hun Jian escaped thanks to Luo Yuanguang's assistance.194

When Zhang rGyal tshan met the captured Cui Hanheng and other Chinese officials, he acknowledged that the ambush had been set with the intention of capturing Hun Jian, and that if Ma Sui had attacked when he and his troops were staying in Mingsha, the Tibetans would have been defeated. They survived thanks to Ma Sui. Hearing this Dezong relieved Ma Sui of his post of vice marshal and military commissioner.195

Hostilities became severe between the two states. Dezong sent an envoy bearing a letter to Zhang rGyal tshan but he was refused at the Tibetan borders. When the Tibetans returned Cui Hanheng and asked for peace, the Chinese also turned down their envoys at the border. Suffering from lack of supplies and from illness, the Tibetans withdrew from Yanzhou and Xiazhou, but in the eighth month of 787 they launched attacks. Chang'an was once again seized with a panic. From then on, the Tibetans often went back and forth plundering the area of Jingzhou and Binzhou.

Alliance with Nanzhao and the Uighurs against Tibet

The policy of alliance with Tibet proved to be a failure. Soon after the Pingliang disaster Grand Councilor Li Mi suggested changing to a policy of alliance with the Uighurs, Nanzhao, the Arabs and India. Dezong at first refused for he still felt resentment against the Uighurs over the humiliation of 762. Li Mi had fifteen discussions with Dezong urging him to reconsider. Finally he was persuaded and a decision was reached to form a marriage alliance with the Uighurs, whose newly established qaghan was eager to renew relationships with China.

Tang's previous alliance with the Uighurs, though causing a lot of trouble, had achieved some positive results while the alliance with Tibet made China suffer losses without much gain. The renewed strategy of allying with Nanzhao and the Uighurs achieved remarkable results, particularly the alliance with the Nanzhao kingdom. Nanzhao's relations with Tibet had deteriorated after their joint invasion of Tang in 779 at the beginning of Dezong's reign. In 779 Yi-mou-xun became the

198 ZZTJ, v232, p. 7495; v233, pp. 7501-06. See also Backus, C. 1981, pp. 87-90, and Chapter 4 of this dissertation.
king of Nanzhao. Under the strong influence of his Chinese tutor, Zheng Hui, Yi-mou-xun had a pro-Tang tendency and felt growing resentment against the Tibetans, whose excessive financial and military demands had become exorbitant and unbearable. Around 785 Wei Gao was appointed Military Commissioner of Xichuan. He successfully endeavored to manipulate the disputes between Nanzhao and Tibet and secured an alliance with Nanzhao which greatly weakened Tibet and stabilized the situation on southwestern border. Tang was able to launch several effective attacks on Tibet from this sector and divert the Tibetans from their attacks on Tang's northwestern frontiers.199

The alliance with the Uighurs, though not as effective, also weakened Tibet. Following the marriage of Princess Xian'an to the Qaghan in 788, the Uighurs despatched troops in the winter of 789-790 to contend with Tibet for the control of Beiting. Tibet was at first successful but in 791 the Uighurs retook Beiting, and succeeded in driving back the Tibetan invasion of Lingzhou in 791, all of which served to cripple the Tibetans to a certain extent.200

There is no evidence that the Tang Chinese at this time formed an alliance with any part of India, though there had been diplomatic contacts with Tang at least throughout the 750s.201 The Arabs had frequent contacts with Tang in Dezong's time, and sometime after 786, "a long war between the Arabs and Tibetans began. It thus appears indisputable that the alliance advocated by Li Mi, whether formal or informal, was indeed concluded."202

From 787 to 804 wars continued between Tang and Tibet. Tibet, weakened by the Tang-Nanzhao and Tang-Uighur alliances and the death of Zhang rGyal tshan in

199 For details see Backus, C. 1981, pp. 86-100.
796, was trying to make peace. In 797 Tibetan btsan-po Khri srong lde brtsan died and his son succeeded to the throne. He sent an envoy to Tang, asking for a peace settlement, but Dezong refused because of his deep distrust of Tibet.

The Seventh Treaty of 821/822

In 803, towards the end of Dezong's reign, Tang and Tibet exchanged envoys, ending the long period of military conflict. Peace finally prevailed for most of the time till 815.

In 809, when Tibet again asked for a peace settlement, Lu Sui 路فريق whose father, Lu Mi 路فريق, had been kidnapped at the "False Treaty of Pingliang," presented five memorials, pleading with the emperor for an agreement. Some court ministers also tried to persuade Xianzong, who then gave his permission and sent an envoy to Tibet.

In 809 and 810 two letters written by Bai Juyi on behalf of Emperor Xianzong were delivered, one to the Buddhist monk Chief Minister Bo Chan-bu 鈔鶴布 (dPal chen-po) and the other to Chief Minister Shang Qi-xin-er 尚綸心兎 (Zhang Khri sum rje), stating the conditions for a peace settlement: if friendship was to be cultivated, mutual invasions should be forbidden, and if a peace treaty was to be concluded, boundaries should be decided. Specifically Tibet should return the three Chinese prefectures, Qinzhou, Yuanzhou and Anlezhou. Envoys should be exchanged to discuss important matters. The letter of 809 also asked for the return of Chinese

---

officials who had been captured in the "False Treaty of Pingliang" incident in 787. In reply, the Tibetans returned the coffins of Lu Mi and Zheng Shuju, together with 13 Chinese officials, who were still alive, all of whom had been kidnapped at the Pingliang ceremony. This Tibetan mission also agreed to the return to Tang of Qinzhou, Yuanzhou and Anlezhou.

The situation, however, was not stable. The Chinese did not succeed in recovering the three prefectures until 849 when Tibetan power finally dissolved. In 812 the Tibetans made an incursion on Jingzhou, and in 813, they succeeded in building a bridge on the Yellow River in Huizhou posing a threat to Shuofang. The building of the bridge was their long cherished plan. They succeeded in carrying it out by bribing Wang Bi, Military Commissioner of Shuofang and Lingyan. In 815 the court permitted the Tibetans' request to have a border market in Longzhou.

The year 815 saw the beginning of the rule of Khri gtsug lde brtsan as the new btsan-po of Tibet and the end of peace between Tibet and Tang. After more than a decade of involvement in wars with the Arabs in the Western Central Asia, Tibet under the new btsan-po again started aggression against Tang. From 818 to 820 there were incursions every year. The incursions in 818 started even before a mission that had been sent to cultivate friendship left Tang.

---

207 Baishi Changqing Ji, v39, "Yu Tufan zaixiang Bo Chan-bu chishu;" "Yu Tufan zaixiang Shang Qixin-er deng shu." Between 808 and 810, Bai Juyi wrote at least four letters to the Tibetans on behalf of the Chinese central and local authorities. For the study of these documents, see Kolmas, J. 1966, pp. 375-410.


210 ZTZJ, v239, p. 7698.


In the general amnesty after Muzong's accession of the throne in the first month of 820, the Tibetan captives were allowed to return. But the Tibetans started incursions twice in that same year. Meanwhile the two states exchanged envoys and negotiation was held for a peace agreement.

In the ninth month of 821 Muzong agreed to the request from Tibet to conclude a peace treaty. This was the last treaty between Tang and Tibet. There are several important features about this treaty as compared with the previous ones.

1) For this treaty there was no ceremony of announcement to the ancestral temple as there had been in the case of the treaty of 783. Before the ceremony, some Chinese ministers had asked that it be announced to the ancestral temple in order to add more gravity to the occasion, but the officials of the Ritual Academy did not agree, saying that according to the precedent in Suzong and Daizong's time, there was no announcement to the ancestral temple when concluding a treaty with Tibet. Only in Dezong's reign (for the ceremony in Chang'an in 783), in order to impress the importance of keeping good faith, announcement to the ancestral temple was specially performed. This was an affair only for a single occasion, and no text could be found in the books of rituals for such a practice.

2) The oath taking ceremony was performed twice, once in 821 in the western suburb of Chang'an and once in 822 in Migu, the Tibetan summer capital, east of Lhasa, and a stone stele was erected in Lhasa in 823. At the Chang'an ceremony both sides followed the Chinese ritual by smearing blood on the lips. In Tibet, in addition to the blood smearing ceremony, both sides performed the Buddhist

---

215 CFYG, v90, p. 1073.
rituals of Tibet. The delegates bowed before the image of Buddha and had a monk recite a text as a sworn oath. After they had drunk water perfumed with saffron, the Chinese delegates were led holding sticks of burning incense in a procession around the image of Buddha.220

3) For the 821/822 treaty, there are four important documents: (a) a Chinese treaty swearing text preserved in the Chinese written sources; (b) a Tibetan treaty text preserved on the east side of the Lhasa stele; (c) a joint text of both rulers with versions in both Chinese and Tibetan languages on the west side of the stele; (d) a bilingual version of the names of the Chinese and Tibetan officials who participated in the conclusion of the treaty with the Tibetan names on the northern side and the Chinese on the southern side of the stele.221

The joint text in addition to the two individual texts certainly enhanced the solemnity of the treaty, and it was a significant innovation, since the earlier treaties do not seem to have had a joint text. Such a joint treaty does not seem to have existed in the Song period either.222

4) The number of participants was larger than those at any other ceremony. At the ceremony in Chang'an, there were seventeen Chinese officials according to the Chinese written sources. However, the inscription of Lhasa provides a list of both Chinese and Tibetan officials with their ranks, who participated in the conclusion of the treaty, with 18 on the Chinese side and 17 on the Tibetan. The officials on both sides were divided into two classes: the ministers of state (i.e. grand councilors) and the common officials. On the inscription, there are five of the first class on the Chinese side and nine on the Tibetan side. But in the Chinese written records the number of the first class Chinese officials is only three. The highest ranking minister, the Vice-

---

220 CFYG, v981, pp. 11531-33; Stein, 1988, p. 129.
221 For the translations of (a), see Appendix III. For (b), (c), and (d), see Li Fang-kuei. 1955; Richardson, H. E. 1952.
President of the Imperial Chancellery (i.e. Vice Director of the Chancellery) is not listed in the Chinese written records and his name cannot be read in the inscription though the title is listed first on the stele.

Li Fang-kuei had the opinion that this first title referred to Xiao Mian, who was the Vice-President of the Imperial Chancellery during the negotiation of the treaty. When the treaty was concluded Xiao Mian was the President of the Board of War (i.e. Minister of War), which position was not considered by the Chinese as a Minister of the State. However, since the Tibetans insisted on the importance of the signatures of the minister, a compromise was reached. The position of the Vice-president of the Imperial Chancellery was on the list but left vacant, and Xiao Mian's name was put among the first class of the five ministers of the state in the Tibetan inscription, but only with the position of the president of the Board of War in the Chinese version. That is to say Xiao's position is counted twice and therefore there were in fact 17 instead of 18 Chinese participants. Zhang Keqiang and Wang Yao, however, have a different opinion. They assume that there were 18 Chinese officials at the ceremony. Xiao Mian was included in the first class since he was in that position during the negotiation of the treaty, although he had been relieved of that position when the treaty was concluded. And the first minister of state refers to Li Fengji. Considering the fact that Tibet had seventeen officials, one should think that Tang also had seventeen. Li Fang-kuei's explanation may be more convincing.

5) While the treaty of 783 starts with the declaration that

Tang possesses all-under-heaven, wherever are the footprints of Yu, and as far as boats and chariots can go there is no one that does not obey it,

225 JTS, v196B, p. 5247. For translation, see Appendix II.
each treaty text by China and Tibet this time recognizes the other as equal. The Chinese
text, though starting with the claim:

Tang has received the mandate from Heaven to govern the eight directions, and
wherever its imperial instruction reaches, none does not come,

also declares:

As for the whole control of China, Tang is the sovereign, and as for the whole
region of the western frontiers, Great Tibet is the ruler.\textsuperscript{226}

The Tibetan text says:

In the east was China who was the ruler to the east of the great ocean. [She]
was not like Nepal on the south and others. As her religion was good and her
knowledge great, she was an ally rival even with Tibet.\textsuperscript{227}

The bilingual version of the joint edict states:

The two countries, Tibet and China, guard the land and the frontier now in their
possession. All to the east of that (frontier) is the land of Great China, and all
to the west is indeed the land of Great Tibet. Thereafter both sides shall not
struggle like enemies, shall not lead armies into war, and shall not invade and
seize each other's territory. If there is any suspected person, after having seized
the person and made an investigation, and [if innocent] having provided him
[with food, clothing, etc.], one shall send him back.\textsuperscript{228}

6) The Chinese sworn text says that Tibet had sent a treaty text to Tang before
the Chang'an ceremony, the important articles of which were quoted in the above
paragraph, and the Chinese agreed that all without any revision should be included in
their own text.\textsuperscript{229}

\textsuperscript{226} JTS, v196B, pp. 5264-65. For translation, see Appendix III.
\textsuperscript{227} Li Fang-kuei. 1955, p. 63. See also Richardson, H. E. 1952, p. 60.
\textsuperscript{228} Li Fang-kuei. 1955, p. 56. See also Richardson, H. E. 1952, p. 71.
\textsuperscript{229} JTS, v196B, p. 5265; XTS, v216B, p. 6102.
7) It is important to note that the joint text has an item recognizing the legitimacy of retaliation, which does not exist in any other treaties. It states:

If one does not act according to, or violates, this treaty, it does not matter whether it is Tibet or China who first threatens to commit an offence, any trick and treachery may even be resorted to in retaliation. It (retaliation) is not a participation in violating the treaty.230

8) The treaty text does not contain any items regarding the boundary demarcation. The basis of the boundary may have remained essentially the same as in the treaty of 783.231 But at the beginning of 822, a Tibetan mission of fifteen people arrived in Tang to decide the demarcation line.232

9) The Chinese participants in Chang'an all signed their names on the treaty, and through the Chinese envoy to Tibet for the Lhasa ceremony, the Chinese emperor Muzong requested that the Tibetans also sign their names.233 It was a Tibetan custom to have signatures on a treaty. As discussed earlier, in Xuanzong's time the Tibetans asked several times for the Chinese emperor's signature on a peace agreement but Xuanzong refused. The signatures on this treaty show Chinese compromise.

10) As in 732, at which time the peace had been publicly proclaimed to people on both sides after the conclusion of the treaty, this peace treaty was also proclaimed to the Tibetan troops by the Tibetan marshal Shang Ta-zang (Zhang Ita-bzan234). On his way back, Liu Yuanding passed Hezhou, where Zhang Ita-bzan provided him with accommodation, and assembled Tibetan officials to show them the treaty and announced it on a platform.235

230 Li Fang-kuei. 1955, p. 57; Richardson, H. E. 1952, p. 72.
231 Li Fang-kuei. 1955, pp. 6-8.
Even after the treaty was concluded, border conflicts still occurred in 821 and 822.\textsuperscript{236} Peace, however, prevailed most of the time from 822 to 847. Frequent diplomatic communications went on, with Tibet sending at least fifteen missions to Tang and Tang ten missions to Tibet.\textsuperscript{237}

It is a question though whether this period of peace was maintained solely as a result of the 821/822 treaty. It is likely that it was also because of the pacific attitude of the Buddhist ruler of Tibet, Khri gtsug lde brtsan (reign 815-838) and his ministers.\textsuperscript{238} Following their sworn treaty with China in 821, the Tibetans also made peace agreements with the Uighurs and with the Nanzhao kingdom.\textsuperscript{239}

**The Weizhou Incident**

In the ninth month of 831, Xi-da-mou 西大漠, the Tibetan Vice Commissioner of Weizhou (in modern Sichuan), asked to submit to Tang. Weizhou had strategic importance to China. A route of 3,000 li extended from there without much geographical hindrance to the Tibetan capital. The Chinese recovery of the city would force Tibet to station a large force in that area thus alleviating the pressure on other Chinese frontiers. The Military Commissioner of Xichuan, Li Deyu, despatched troops to occupy the town of Weizhou and requested permission from the court to send 3,000 Qiang troops to penetrate into Tibet. Though the majority of the court officials agreed, Niu Sengru raised an objection stressing that Tibet had a large territory and losing Weizhou would not be a serious matter. He held that if China violated the peace agreement by taking Weizhou, the Tibetans could easily invade from the northwest posing a threat to the Tang capital, and that even if China took a hundred Weizhou in

\textsuperscript{236} JTS, v196B, p. 5265; ZZTJ, v242, p. 7802; p. 7818; CFYG, v987, p. 11591.
\textsuperscript{237} This is according to the CFYG, see Su Jinren and Xiao Lianzi. 1981, pp. 370-372.
\textsuperscript{238} Li Fang-kuei's study shows the peaceful intention of the Tibetan ruler. See his 1955, pp. 20-24.
\textsuperscript{239} Li Fang-kuei. 1956, pp. 22-23; Beckwith, C. I. 1987, p. 167.
the southwest, it would be of no use. Violating the treaty, he warned, would cause great harm without any benefit. Emperor Wenzong agreed with Niu Sengru and ordered the return of Weizhou. Xi-da-mou and his followers were executed by the Tibetan court when they reached the border.240

In 843 Li Deyu, reviewing the Weizhou incident, pointed out that in 830 the Tibetans had invaded Luzhou, thus breaking the peace agreement.241 The attack of 830 had certainly provided the Chinese with an excuse to discard the treaty.

On the surface this argument between Niu and Li reflects the conflict between Confucian moralistic ideology and pragmatic considerations in Chinese foreign relations which is discussed in the introduction to this thesis. It is, however, a more complex question. Whether Niu Sengru's insistence on keeping good faith in the agreement was because he believed in it or because he would have objected to any proposal by Li Deyu, using Confucianism against Li's Legalist strategy, is controversial, since Niu and Li were engaged in factional strife, the notorious "Niu-Li factional strife." Wenzong, though persuaded by Niu Sengru at the time, soon regretted his decision when some officials pointed out that the return of the submitted Tibetans would prevent future defections, and when the Li group insisted that Niu's objection was simply intended to harm Li Deyu.242

In 847 taking advantage of Tang's being in mourning at the emperor Wuzong's death, the Tibetans in alliance with the Tangut and Uighurs, made an incursion.243 However, by this time Tibet was in chaos. When Khri gtsug lde brtsan was in power, he devoted himself to promoting Buddhism. In 842 his successor Khri 'U'i-dum brtsan or Glang Dar-me, who opposed Buddhism and promoted the Bon religion, was

241 Li Wenrao Wenji, v12, "Lun Taihe wunian bayue jiang gu Weizhou cheng guixiang zhunzhao que zhisong ben Fan jiuluren Tufan cheng fushi Xi-da-mou zhuang."
242 JTS, v174, p. 4519; XTS, v180, pp. 5332-33; ZZTJ, v244, p. 7880.
243 ZZTJ, v248, p. 8030.
assassinated by a Buddhist hermit. The central authority rapidly dissolved in the later struggles for the succession. Tibet suffered the disaster of internal wars between two generals Blon Gung bzher and Shang Bei-bei ཉི་བྱ་བྲེ་, which lasted at least till 850 when Shang Bei-bei left Shang-sstream and disappeared from Chinese historical records.244

One after another the formerly Tang prefectures under Tibetan occupation fell or surrendered to the Chinese. From then on, Tibet ceased to be a power threatening Chinese frontiers while the Tang dynasty deteriorated and finally collapsed after a series of political crises inside country, ending this period of history in 907.

Conclusion

Throughout the Tang dynasty the Chinese and the Tibetans concluded seven sworn treaties. The practice of concluding treaties was not new to the Chinese. As early as the Chunqiu period, there were sworn covenants between the Son of Heaven and his feudal lords, between him and the non-Chinese,245 between the Chinese states and non-Chinese, and very often, among the various Chinese states. In the Zhouli there is an "official in charge of solemn oaths" (simeng གྲེང་གི།), who "is in charge of the law of texts of oath," and "when there are doubts between the feudal states, the feudal lords assemble. He then is in charge of texts of oaths and ritual formalities."246

The Liji says:

245 For example, see Zuozhuan (Xiang 10, quoting Xiaqin), 445::449: "When King Ping removed here to the east, there were seven families of us, who followed him and on whom he was dependent for the victims which he used. He made a covenant with them over [the flesh of] a red bull, saying that from generation to generation they should hold their offices." Zuozhuan (Zhao 4, quoting Jiaoju), 593::597: "You of Zhou made the covenant of Taishi, and the Rong and Di revolted from him."
When there is a binding to mutual faith, it is called "a solemn declaration" (shi 祭). When they use a victim, it is called "a covenant" (meng).\textsuperscript{247}

Some of the covenants in the Chunqiu period implied equality, equal in the sense that one state could not exert its power over the others. Other covenants may just imply a declaration of allegiance to the supreme power or a treaty of incorporation from the point of view of the superior. In the Tang dynasty the sworn covenants with the Turks in the time of Gaozu and the early part of Taizong's reign, for which we have no treaty texts, may have been of the first nature,\textsuperscript{248} whereas the covenant of 794 between Tang and Nanzhao, when Nanzhao swore to be subject to Tang, was of the second kind.\textsuperscript{249}

In their treaties with Tibet the Tang rulers tried hard to maintain Chinese superiority. This can be seen in the Chinese sworn treaty of 732, which was rather a declaration of incorporation. However, the attitude changed after the An Lushan rebellion with the changing circumstances in the balance of power. The revision of the wording in the official letter from Tang to Tibet in 781 and the sworn treaty of 783 demonstrated that the Chinese at that time had to recognize that Tibet was an equal adversary. The 821/822 covenant which had a joint treaty text and texts in both Chinese and Tibetan languages made this attitude even more apparent. As R. A. Stein points out, the double practice of both the Chinese and Tibetan rituals at the ceremonies in 762, 783 and 821/822 implied reciprocity and equality.\textsuperscript{250} Some of the articles in the treaties of 783 and 821/822 resemble the characteristics of a modern treaty concluded between sovereign equals.

\textsuperscript{247} Liji, "Quli," BK. I., p. 112, No. 12.
\textsuperscript{249} For the treaty text, see QTW, v999, pp. 13081-82. For the conclusion, see Manshu Jiaozhu, v3, pp. 77-78; JTS, v197, p. 5282; XTS, v222A, p. 6274; ZZTJ, v234, p. 7552; Backus, C. 1981, pp. 95-96.
\textsuperscript{250} Stein, R. A. 1988, pp. 127-128.
The reason why the Chinese concluded treaties in a serious way with Tibet with signatures lies in the fact that the Tibetans rather than the Chinese insisted on such a practice. It was also the custom of Tibet to establish a sworn covenant to ensure stability. The Chinese records say that the Tibetan btsan-po had a minor covenant with his ministers every year and a major one every three years.\textsuperscript{251} In the traditional Tibetan sources, especially the *Old Tibetan Annals* and the *Old Tibetan Chronology*, there are records of conclusion of sworn treaties among the Tibetans themselves.\textsuperscript{252} However, there is no record of the Tang-Tibetan treaties. It is not clear why.

Before the An Lushan rebellion, there had been two treaties, the treaties of 706 and 732, and each time it was the Chinese who violated the treaty first, while after the rebellion, the Chinese were in a weakened position as compared to the Tibetans, five were concluded and each was broken off by the Tibetans first.

The sworn covenants had some limited impact on the maintenance of peace between the two states. The first (706) and second (732) treaties ensured peace for about four and five years respectively, while the following three (763, 765, and 767) had little bearing on maintaining the peace. After the sixth (783) treaty there was a period of peace for three years. The treaty of 821/822 was followed by peace for over twenty years, interrupted by a Tibetan incursion in 830 and by the Weizhou incident. To a large extent, however, this peace was a result of the pacific attitude of the Tibetan ruler and the weakened position of his country.

In his *International Politics* Holsti observes:

The necessary, although not sufficient, condition for the success of any negotiation, however, is a common interest on the part of the opponents to avoid violence, or if that has already occurred, to put an end to it. Without this

\textsuperscript{251} *TD*, v190, p. 1023; *JTS*, v196A, p. 5220; *XTS*, v216A, p. 6073; *THY*, v97, p. 1730.

\textsuperscript{252} For example, in the *Old Tibetan Annals*, from 650 to 763, there are 66 years when the Tibetans held covenants among themselves, see Wang Yao, 1979, pp. 1-29. According to the Dunhuang documents (P. 2287, S. 2674), when the Tibetans occupied Shazhou they also had sworn treaties with the local Chinese, see Ma De, 1987, p. 59.
minimal common interest, there can be no compromise. If negotiations are undertaken when such a common interest does not exist, the purpose can only be to deceive the opponent, to play for time, or to make propaganda. It should not be assumed therefore, that all negotiations have the purpose of reaching some agreement.\textsuperscript{253}

Holsti also points out that compromises or successful negotiations are more likely to result if:

1. The issues or objectives under contention are specific and carefully defined rather than vague or symbolic.
2. The parties avoid use of threats.
3. In their general relationships, the states in conflict have many other common interests.
4. The issues are defined in such a way that payoffs can be arranged for both sides, or that the rewards for both parties will increase through cooperation.
5. In disarmament negotiations, at least, the parties are equal militarily.
6. Similar negotiations have led to compromise outcomes previously.\textsuperscript{254}

Holsti's ideas, though designed to analyze modern international politics, can also be applied to help explain why the Tang-Tibetan treaties could be reached and could last as long as they did. Conditions three and four and, to a certain extent, five were almost absent in Tang-Tibetan negotiations, which as a result made it difficult for the two to maintain a long term peace.

Also there remained the incompatibility of ideas hindering mutual relations. The conclusion of a sworn covenant, to some Chinese, reflected a situation of instability. On the day when the treaty with Tibet, the "False Treaty of Pingliang" in 787, was concluded, Ma Sui said:

The sworn treaty established today ensures that there will be no troubles made by the barbarians for a hundred years.

\textsuperscript{253} Holsti, K. J. 1983, pp. 414-415.
\textsuperscript{254} Holsti, K. J. 1983, p. 415.
A minister Liu Hun, however, worried about the treaty on the ground that:

The five ancient emperors did not have 'Announcements' (gao) and 'solemn Declarations' (shi), and the three ancient kings did not have 'sworn treaties' (mengzu). That must mean that all the appearance of sworn covenants happened in later days [of a dynasty]. Now, we have a dynasty of full brilliance, yet on the contrary, we are carrying out the practice that only occurs in later times [of a dynasty] towards the barbarians.255

Among the Chinese, there was an idea that Confucian norms could be applied only to the insiders, the inner group, that is, to the Chinese, but not to the outsiders, the non-Chinese, particularly the nomads. For example, in Gaozong's time Liu Yizhi said:

From olden times, the wise kings and sage rulers were all worried about barbarians. The Tibetans frequently disturb the frontiers. They are like birds and beasts. If we obtain their land, we can not live there. If we suffer insults from them, it is not worth being ashamed of.256

Liu Kuang of Xuanzong's time said:

Courtesy and deference are only used in communications between gentlemen. They are not the means for dealing with barbarians who are like birds and beasts.257

Zhang Jiuling held:

255 XTS, v142, p. 4673. See also JTS, v125, p. 3555; ZZTJ, v232, p. 7487. Liu Hun's idea goes back to the Han dynasty. The Guliangzhuo says: "Announcements and solemn Declaration do not go back to the time of the five ancient emperors. Sworn covenants do not go back to the time of the three kings. Exchange of hostages do not go back to the time of the two ba, or presidents." Guliangzhuo, Yin 8/6.
256 JTS, v87, pp. 2847-48. See also XTS, v117, p. 4251.
257 XTS, v215A, p. 6025.
The barbarians do not have righteousness and are not even equal to birds and beasts. They can only be overawed with military strength. How can we discuss them in terms of human affairs?\textsuperscript{258}

Moreover, long roads and rough natural conditions made communications difficult and slow. A lack of skillful diplomatic envoys added to the problems caused by the incompatible social and political values of China and its neighbors. Among the policy makers, there were often conflicts of interests. Sometimes even when the rulers of both courts wanted to have peace, the frontier generals intended to wage wars in order to establish their own merits.

In all the treaty agreements only one (that of 821/822) has an item concerning punishment of violation. Most of the time, the treaties were used rather as a tool to accuse or bind the other party.

There was a lack of mutually accepted standards of international behavior. Both sides regarded force as a legitimate instrument for achieving or defending state objectives, and there was no institutionalized mechanism for arbitration of disputes, or for supervision of the implementation of the treaties.

\textsuperscript{258} Qujiang Zhang Xiansheng Wenji, v8, "Chi Hexi Jiedushi Niu Xianke shu."
Chapter VI

Conclusion

As stated in the Introduction, the foreign policy of imperial China had two major aspects: 1) ideological purity, based on the Chinese cosmological view of the state, and emphasizing the all embracing rule of the Chinese Son of Heaven. 2) Practicality and flexibility, which provided imperial rulers the justification for conducting foreign relations on an equal footing with their neighbors, and allowed for retreat from claims of Chinese superiority, or even paying tribute to "barbarians." But for such a long history as that of China one has to look into details for each period and different cases to have a comprehensive picture of Chinese foreign policy.

Chapter I provides the necessary historical background by surveying the tribute system, its roots in the pre-Qin period, its development in Han and the challenges it faced in the Period of Division. The tribute system, rooted in the Late Shang and Zhou political systems, was held as an ideal model in regulating relations between the Son of Heaven and his subjects, Chinese and non-Chinese. It was sinocentric and hierarchical but it was by no means a rigid and stiff system. This can be seen in the working of Han tribute system which developed out of it. Following the two key principles that "the king leaves nothing and nobody outside his realm," and "having the various states of Xia within, and keeping the Yi and Di barbarians out," the tribute system stressed the ideological purity of China's foreign policy, which provided justification for Chinese expansion, and at the same time, drew a distinct line between the Chinese and non-Chinese. It had a practical and flexible aspect in that it recognized that the non-Chinese acceptance of Chinese rule could have different levels. Generally speaking, in Han political relations with foreign countries one can distinguish five degrees of closeness, which can be grouped into three concentric circles, with a zone of direct Chinese control at center, a zone of diplomatic control in the middle, and an outermost
zone on the periphery free of any Chinese control. The first two concentric circles can also be compared to what have been called the territorial and hegemonic empires of Rome, while the third amounts to a universal circle, embracing "all-under-heaven." This is the unique feature of the Chinese conception.

In the Period of Division, disunity within China challenged the idea of universal kingship, the basic conception in the Chinese world order. Different regimes competed with each other for legitimacy as the single ruler over China and all utilized the tribute system to strengthen their own legitimacy thus, making the tribute system sustain and play an important role. Another severe challenge to the tribute system came from the nomadic powers of the Rouran and the Turks. Policy measures towards them varied with the changing situation, but "marriage alliance" remained a major means. Under the conditions of *heqin* agreement, it was virtually the Northern regimes which paid tribute to these nomads.

In discussing the relationship between Sui-Tang and the Turks Chapter II examines all the policy measures that China adopted towards the Turks, including war, divide and rule, using "barbarians" against "barbarians," political investiture, marriage alliance, establishment of kinship relations, and mutual trade. The Sui-Tang policy of resettlement of the Turks who had submitted is, however, especially emphasized.

It is interesting to see that even though the history of Western Jin had shown that settling non-Chinese, especially the nomads, close to or within Chinese territory, would cause disasters to China, and even though there were constant objections to such a settlement policy, the Sui-Tang rulers insisted on this policy. To them it seemed to be the best arrangement at the time. In fact they were caught in the constant patterns of Chinese relations with the nomads. On the part of the nomads, when they were strong they challenged Chinese superiority; when they were weak they submitted to China and requested Chinese assistance so that they could recover and build up their strength. In the words of Barfield, the nomads "exchang[ed] submission to China for protection
and aid against rival tribal leaders."¹ The Chinese, for their part, would want to accept
the submission of the nomads. It was less costly than engaging in wars. The Sui
settlement policy and Tang system of the "subordinated area commands and
prefectures" set up from 630 enabled China to use the nomadic forces for frontier
defence. It was also expected that the measure would bring about gradual sinicization.
The Chinese would extend their administration over the Turks, with the non-Chinese
chieftains given Chinese official titles, thus bringing them into the bureaucratic system.
At the same time, this arrangement drew a distinct line between the nomads and the
Chinese; both Sui and Tang allowed the nomads to keep their own life-style and
military forces under their own chieftains. Moreover, the arrangement proved that the
rule of the Son of Heaven was benevolent and virtuous, a factor that served to
strengthen the legitimacy of the Son of Heaven.

The success of the policy, however, depended basically on the balance of
power. Since the Turks retained their own culture, sense of independence, and most
important of all, their military force based on horses, all being elements of instability to
the Chinese, they could rise in rebellion, which were exactly what happened in Sui and
Tang. The Turks finally broke away from the Chinese hegemonic empire and restored
their second empire in 682. Although the Tang court in Xuanzong's time continued the
settlement policy whenever it could, it had to continually cope with the rebellions of the
Turks.

Chapter III deals with the war policy of Sui-Tang towards Koguryo, its motives
and result. For the better part of a century Sui and Tang made persistent efforts to
establish their administration on the Korean peninsula through force. The military
action against Koguryo by the Sui Emperor Wen was primarily aimed at posing a
deterrent so as to keep security on the frontier rather than at extending his territory. In

¹ Barfield, T. J. 1989, p. 137.
justifying his action, however, he accused Koguryŏ of not fulfilling its duties as a subject of the Son of Heaven. The Tang emperor Gaozu personally had even more pragmatic ideas on the question of treating Koguryŏ as a subject and saw no need to pretend to be superior to the non-Chinese but when his opinion was refuted by his ministers he had to abandon it.

In their long series of military campaigns both the Sui Emperor Yang and Tang Taizong were also motivated partly by considerations of frontier security. However, they were more interested in rebuilding a grand empire after the Han model and wished to reestablish Chinese administration in Korean territory but neither succeeded since the situation had radically changed since Han times and Sui and Tang did not possess strong enough force to expand as far as they hoped.

The Chinese finally succeeded in conquering Koguryŏ in Gaozong's time due mostly to the internal struggle in Koguryŏ, and to the alliance with another Korean state, Silla, an enemy of Koguryŏ. Tang set up its administration in modern P'yŏngyang. But when the assistance of Silla was no longer available, Tang had to withdraw since it was unable to maintain its political power there. The final winner in this costly war was Silla, which established the first unified Korean state in history. China then had to be satisfied with Silla as a tributary state which acknowledged Chinese suzerainty and performed tributary duties but maintained its independence, ruling its own state without Chinese interference.

Chapter IV discusses the relations between Tang and the Uighurs, with the emphasis on the alliance between them, which was conspicuous as compared with Tang relations with other peoples. The Uighurs played an active role in the Tang conquest of the Turks primarily because they and Tang both considered the Turks their enemy. From 647 to 679 the Uighurs were under the Tang administration. As subjects of Tang they provided their overlords with ready military force.
After the founding of the Uighur empire in 744 the Uighurs continued to provide military assistance to the Tang court in suppressing the An Lushan rebellion and in battles with Tibet. The relations between Tang and the Uighurs were based on common interests, politically and economically. Like any previous nomadic empire the Uighurs exploited China's economy to sustain their state power. But they obtained Chinese goods and subsidies often through military assistance rather than constant border raids. The Chinese, on their part, tried hard to maintain the friendly relationship. Faced with severe internal problems and an external threat from Tibet during this period, the Chinese could not afford to make the Uighurs an enemy, and had to pay an exorbitant price in order to maintain the alliance. The court, with a very tolerant attitude, adopted several measures including political investiture and payment of material goods to attract the Uighurs into alliance. Three times the Tang court sent true daughters of emperors to marry Uighur qaghans. Also, in spite of the great strain on the economy the Chinese kept up the horse-silk trade.

These measures were adopted rather for the purpose of purchasing military assistance and peace in the frontier regions than with the deliberate intention of changing the nature of the nomads. But they played an important role in the economic and social transition of the Uighur empire from a mobile and nomadic society to a settled semi-agricultural society, and made the Uighurs rely more on Chinese economy than any previous nomadic power so that the Uighurs found it necessary to maintain peace with Tang.

As they ran up against hard reality after the An Lushan rebellion, the Chinese accepted the Uighur empire as an equal power, since it was no longer as powerful as before the rebellion. The court had to purchase peace and military assistance from the Uighurs and keep up the expensive horse-silk trade. But we must bear in mind that during this period the tribute system still remained as a major form of interaction between the two states, which was important to the Tang emperors. The constant
political investiture of the Uighur rulers by the Chinese emperors and the regular tributary delegations from the Uighurs served to maintain the outward form of Chinese superiority. They also served to provide an economic basis for the survival of the Uighur empire.

The seven Tang-Tibetan treaties are discussed in Chapter V. Being different from the nomadic people, the Tibetans were territorially ambitious. This was mainly because the Tibetan kingdom had a more balanced semi-agricultural and semi-nomadic economy and did not have to exploit Chinese economy to sustain its state power. Tibet expanded in all directions, confronted the Chinese in the Qinghai region, in the Western Regions and occupied Chinese land after the An Lushan rebellion, in addition to its constant incursions on the Chinese frontiers. The Chinese could not simply use the usual measures such as political investiture, mutual trade and marriage alliance to appease Tibet. It concluded seven sworn covenants with Tibet. Throughout Chinese history till the early Qing dynasty, the Chinese often made treaties with foreign peoples, but they had more treaties with the Tibetans than any other peoples.

Before the An Lushan rebellion, there were two treaties between Tang and Tibet, the treaties of 706 and 732, and each time it was the Chinese who violated the treaty first, while after the rebellion, when the Chinese were in a weakened position as compared to the Tibetans, five were concluded and each was broken off by the Tibetans first.

The first six treaties did not function to keep peace for any considerable period of time. On the part of the Tibetans, the treaties were often used as propaganda or means of deception, whereas in their treaties with Tibet the Tang rulers tried hard to maintain Chinese superiority. This can be seen in Xuanzong's refusal to have his signature on the treaty in the 710s and in the Chinese oath text of 732, which was rather a declaration of incorporation. However, the attitude changed after the An Lushan rebellion with the changing circumstances in the balance of power. The revision of the
wordings in the official letter from Tang to Tibet in 781 and the sworn treaty of 783 demonstrated that the Chinese at that time had to recognize that Tibet was an equal adversary. The 821/822 covenant which had joint treaty text and texts in both Chinese and Tibetan languages made this attitude even more apparent. The double practice of both the Chinese and Tibetan rituals at the ceremonies in 762, 783 and 821/822 implied reciprocity and equality. Some of the articles in the treaties of 783 and 821/822 resemble the characteristics of a modern treaty concluded between sovereign equals.

Nevertheless, in contrast to the Tibetan attitude which believed that the treaty should be between equals some Chinese officials held the traditional idea that treaty conclusion showed the abnormality, a sign of weakness and deterioration of the dynastic power, and that the Tibetans were "barbarians," and thus could not be treated with Chinese principles of morality.

Although each of the four case studies in the dissertation highlights a special issue and the particular measures adopted by the Chinese to deal with this issue, one can see that in their overall foreign policy, the Chinese had fundamentally the same objectives---security and expansion---as any other people at any time, and adopted the same techniques --- the use of force and the forming of alliances. What interests us the most is that the emphasis and means changed in accordance with circumstances and were subject to continuous adjustment. For example, the alliance with Silla was for aggression against Koguryo, while the alliance with the Uighurs was more for defence. The attempt to incorporate the non-Chinese into jimi institution was a vigorous policy at the beginning of Tang but such a policy was rejected in later Tang when the court refused to let the Uighurs settle close to China.

The Chinese always had to adjust and coordinate their policies towards their various surrounding neighbors in order to concentrate on whatever frontier problem was the most important at the time and to avoid carrying on wars on more than one front. For example, in 676, owing to their limited military strength, the Chinese had to
withdraw the seat of the Protectorate of Andong from P'yŏngyang to Liaodong since they were preoccupied with more acute border problems caused by the Tibetans in the west, the Turks in the north and the Khitan and Xi peoples in the northeast. In Dejong's time when the emperor refused to ally Tang with the Uighurs, he had to establish a good relationship with Tibet in order to obtain some assistance in suppressing external revolts. Limits on economic resources were also always an important factor in the Chinese decision making on foreign policy.

In their foreign policy measures, the Sui-Tang Chinese attempted to incorporate the neighboring peoples in a more systematic way than their Han predecessors, but they could also be more pragmatic and flexible in conformity with the actual circumstances. Tang concluded more marriage alliances, used more non-Chinese forces in its military campaigns, and showed less compunction in doing so than Han. The Xin Tangshu has a chapter on "Various Yi and Fan Generals" (zhu Yi-Fan jiang), which shows the importance of the role played by non-Chinese generals in serving the Tang empire. The history of Tang also shows in a more obvious and direct way than earlier periods that in utilizing non-Chinese military forces, China itself had to have a strong army and to be able to provide the leadership necessary to ensure Chinese dominance. If China was weak and relied mostly on the non-Chinese, the non-Chinese would become masters of the situation as happened at the end of Sui and the beginning of Tang. Or the non-Chinese would become equal adversaries as in the case of Tang relations with the Uighurs. In spite of all the pragmatic policies that Tang adopted, one still cannot say that the idea of equality was accepted by most Chinese officials.

The Chinese decision making process involved many people in several different capacities, the emperors, the civil and military officials at both central and local levels, special groups such as the eunuchs, secretariats outside the regular bureaucracy, and special commissioners. Through court conference and memorials, officials could make their opinions known to the throne. The Jiu Tangshu remarks that while Confucian
civil officials talked about marriage alliances, military generals only wanted to conquer by force of arms. This may be somewhat oversimplified since, in Tang, there was not always a distinct line between civil and military officials and the same persons often acted in both capacities at different stages of their careers, and even among civil officials there were different points of view. Nevertheless, when we examine the attitudes of policy makers, we can still discern different attitudes among three broad categories: a) civil officials, b) local officials in frontier regions and military officials, both on the central and local levels, particularly those, who specialized exclusively in the military profession and served on the frontiers, and c) emperors. Each of them usually acted according to their beliefs, background, and special interests.

It was usually the first category who advocated the peaceful settlement of conflicts, such as concluding treaties, permitting marriages, or building up defences instead of launching military campaigns. However, this does not necessarily mean that they tended to treat foreign countries as equals. To them, these were simply a means to purchase peace, a temporary device to gain time, to regain the initiative, to help outmanoeuvre the enemy, and eventually to restore Chinese superiority. Some Chinese officials described this attitude with the blunt slogan, "to rule China by good faith and to govern barbarians by expediency." 

The Chinese Confucian scholars drew a clear line between the "civilized" Chinese and the "savage barbarians," and insisted that the Chinese were the roots of all-under-heaven while the "barbarians" were merely like leaves and branches. To disturb the roots in order to strengthen the leaves and branches was not the way to achieve permanent peace. Du You in his Towdian still upheld the sinocentric idea even in a geographical sense.

---

2 *JTS*, v196B, p. 5267.
3 *ZGZY*, v9, p. 276; *XTS*, v215B, p. 6061.
4 *TD*, v185, p. 985.
The civil officials did not usually favour a policy of expansion, and often criticized Qin-Han military adventures. Wei Zheng, in his comments in the *Suishu*, expressed the opinion that a wise ruler should maintain good order inside China and not attack foreign states since China should not be disturbed by "barbarians." In 640, when Taizong planned to establish direct control over Gaochang (Karakhojo), an oasis state near modern Turfan, Wei Zheng and Chu Suiliang objected to the extension; it would need a great number of Chinese troops and supplies to keep control there, and yet China would not gain any benefit. In Empress Wu's time Di Renjie proposed that Tang give up the newly recovered Four Garrisons of Anxi and abandon the Protectorate of Andong on the Korean peninsula, for it was senseless to exhaust Chinese resources to gain the desert lands of "barbarians."

Being unfamiliar with the real situation on the boundary some court officials sometimes advocated an impractically passive or inner-looking approach. For instance, the Four Garrisons of Anxi in Tarim region were vital to Chinese strategy. They guaranteed control of that section of the trans-continental Silk Road, and protected the Hexi region. The court therefore did not follow Di Renjie's opinion.

Among civil officials, however, we see different points of view. In contrast to the inward-looking view, which drew a clear line between the Chinese and non-Chinese, some officials had a pragmatic view, as shown in the debates on salt and iron monopolies in 81 B.C.E. of the Han dynasty, and on how to settle the Turks who had submitted in the Tang dynasty. Some even supported an expansive attitude in order to exert the rule of the Son of Heaven. Pei Ju, who had a military as well as a civil background, is an example. He provided the Sui Emperor Yang with ideological

---

5 *SUIS*, v 83, p. 1896.
6 *JTS*, v 198, p. 5296.
7 *JTS*, v 89, pp. 2889-91; *XTS*, v 115, pp. 4210-11; *THY*, v 73, pp. 1326-29.
justification for expansion, and he rejected Tang Gaozu's idea that China should not impose superiority over Koguryō.

The second category of advisors was mainly composed of military officials, both on the central and local levels, and border officials. They often promoted military actions against neighboring states. Military action was their duty, and promotion for them depended on their military success. In Taizong's time, Minister of War Li Shiji was a strong supporter to the war against Koguryō, and in Xuanzong's time, the emperor was encouraged by military commissioners such as Wang Junchuo to become more interested in military adventures. Du You remarked in the Tongdian that in the Kaiyuan and Tianbao periods of Xuanzong's reign, generals such as Geshu Han, An Lushan, and Gao Xianzhi, who won glory on the frontier, strove to expand Chinese territory in order to please the emperor and to establish a reputation for military prowess. However, the wars on the borders or in foreign lands, Du pointed out, claimed the lives of tens of thousand of Chinese soldiers.

In the history of contacts between Tang and Tibet before the An Lushan rebellion, it was Protector-general of Anxi, Zhang Xuanbiao, who broke the treaty of 706, and Cui Xiyi, Military Commissioner of Hexi, who insisted on removing the defensive barriers on the Tang-Tibetan border, thus providing an opening for Tang to break the treaty of 732. In their location on the frontier the officials understood that to drive the Tibetans away from the Chinese border would not stop their incursions altogether. They had to find ways to weaken Tibetan power, and force seemed the best.

Local officials in the frontier regions were in close contacts with foreign states. Their actions and opinions, therefore, usually had an important effect on Chinese foreign policy. In Ruizong's time the Area Commander-in-chief of Shanzhou, Yang

---

8 ZZTJ, v213, pp. 6776-77.
9 TD, v185, p. 985.
Ju, pleaded with the emperor to grant the land of Jiuqu, a fertile area, to Tibet as he had been heavily bribed by the Tibetans. The latter were given the land, and they used it as a convenient base for plundering Tang.\textsuperscript{10}

Caught between these two attitudes was the court. The emperors were influenced by several considerations. Politically, they required neighboring countries to recognize their possession of the Mandate of Heaven, and their right to rule all-under-heaven. Therefore, their primary objective was to maintain internal and external order, so as to ensure the stability and security of the whole nation. In economic terms, they were attracted by exotic products, and other nomadic specialties such as horses, possession of which not only satisfied their material desires and the needs of national defence, but also demonstrated their power. However, when the situation was unfavorable, they generally inclined to pragmatism and compromise. When Taizong first came to the throne his objective was to stabilize the borders, to revive the weak national economy and to consolidate Tang authority. His major concern was not expansion. When in 631 a central Asian kingdom Kangguo (Samarkand) asked to be a Tang vassal, Taizong refused. He could see that if Kangguo's submission were accepted Tang would have to come to the rescue when Kangguo was in danger. At this time he was not ready to make his people toil just for the gain of empty fame.\textsuperscript{11}

Later, Taizong became more and more confident and ambitious, since the Eastern Turks had been defeated, the economy was sound, and the power of the dynasty was stable. Then, he aimed at establishing hegemony over the states in the surrounding areas and expanding Tang territory. Despite strong objections from his ministers, Taizong mounted repeated campaigns against Koguryō, hoping to succeed where Emperor Yang of Sui had failed, and to restore what had once been Chinese territory to imperial control.

\textsuperscript{10} \textit{JTS}, v196A, p. 5228.
\textsuperscript{11} \textit{ZGZY}, v9, p. 4b; \textit{XTS}, v221B, p. 6244; \textit{ZZTJ}, v193, p. 6091.
In the latter half of Tang, when China was relatively weak, the emperors could no longer afford to be aggressive. When the Tibetans insisted that Tang use equal terms instead of degrading terms in state correspondence, Dezong ordered the change, and put the blame on a former minister Yang Yan, who had written the offending letter.\(^\text{12}\)

The Chinese world order emphasized the all-embracing rule of the Chinese emperor, the Son of Heaven, who was supposedly the only legitimate ruler of not only China but "all-under-heaven" (tianxia), or the Chinese known world. B. I. Schwartz points out that the notion of universal kingship in the Chinese perception of world order was shared by other high civilizations of the ancient world, in Mesopotamian, Egyptian, Indian, and Central American cultures. Something like a tribute system can be found in all the ancient universal monarchies. The more specifically Chinese aspect, he concludes, was the linkage of the concept of universal kingship and tianxia with concretely Confucian criteria of higher culture.\(^\text{13}\) In addition a specifically Chinese aspect of universal kingship was its penetration into the Chinese state theory, which justified the expansive tendency in Chinese foreign policy.

The Chinese policy makers, however, were not invariably rigid in maintaining the hierarchical order in the international system. This flexibility makes one wonder why the old ideal managed to last as long as it did, until the very end of the imperial age. C.P. Fitzgerald in his book *The Chinese View of their Place in the World* expressed the opinion that the absence of any rival center of civilization was the factor that contributed most powerfully to maintaining the traditional theories.\(^\text{14}\) Although by Tang the Chinese realized that there were other civilizations in India and West Asia, this never had much impact on the Chinese view of their superiority. Confucian state

\(^{12}\) JTS, v196B, pp. 5245-46.
\(^{13}\) Schwartz B. I. 1968, p. 277.
\(^{14}\) Fitzgerald, C.P. 1964, p. 7.
theory was deeply rooted in the Chinese political structure and the political outlook it shaped. Only in the nineteenth century when Western power came to China, did the Chinese world order break up, and Chinese view of their superiority undergo a fundamental change. Chinese policy makers came to accept the modern concept of the nation-state, and of equality of sovereign states.
Works Cited

Abbreviations


Traditional Chinese Works Listed by Titles

**Baishi Changqing Ji** 白氏長慶集 . [Tang] Bai Juyi  白居易 .
Included in *Sibu Congkan* edition.

**Chen Boyu Wenji** 陳抱玉文集 . [Tang] Chen Zi'ang 陳子昂.
Included in *Sibu Congkan* edition.


**Erya Zhushu** 尙雅詮疏. Included in *Shisan Jing Zhushu*. Reprint Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, no date.

**Gongyangzhuan** 公羊傳 . Included in *Combined Concordances to Ch'un-Ch'iu, Kung-yang, Ku-liang and Tso-chuan*. Reprinted Taipei: Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Index Series, Supplement No. 11, 1966. In the footnote, the year is followed by the number of the sentence.


**Li Wenrao Wenji** 李文齋文集 . [Tang] Li Deyu 李德裕. Included in *Sibu Congkan* edition.


Modern Works Listed by Authors


Furuhata Tôru. 1986. "Tô Botsu funso no tenkai to kokusai jôsei" 等伯紳士の展開と國際情勢. *Shukan To-yö-gaku* 東洋學, 55, pp. 16-34.


Kang Le 姜樂 1979. Tangdai Qianqi de Bianfang 唐代前期的邊防. Taipei: Taiwan University.


1951. Part II.

1955. Part III.


Wechsler, Howard J. 1979. "T'ai-tsung (reign 626-49) the consolidator." In D.


Yang Lien-sheng. 1968. "Historical notes on the Chinese world order." In J. K.

Yu Yousun 余文森. 1957. "Baijiang kou zhi zhan" 白江口之战. Dalu Zazhi (Talu Tsachih), 15:10, pp. 5-12 (pp. 317-324).


APPENDIX
Translations of the Tang-Tibetan Treaties

I. The treaty of 732

In the twenty-first year of Kaiyuan, in the renshen year, the uncle and nephew have restored their old friendship and become one family. In the past in the tenth year of Zhenguan (636), the friendship was first established, [we] sent Princess Wencheng far away to Tibet. Later, in the second year of Jinglong (708), another marriage was concluded whereby Princess Jincheng went to Tibet. Since then everything has been quiet and settled. Recently, frontier officials have not been cautious and have made mutual incursions. In the remote wilderness, therefore, we two have suffered estrangement.

Now we are conforming to our long-standing relationship and in all respects we are making a renewal with one another. God's pattern is laid down and its meaning should not be violated. Accordingly, in order to show the border that was established beyond Chiling, agreeing in every respect with what was previously settled, we shall set up frontier defence posts, station scouts, and open up passes and bridges.

Oh how great it is! Heaven is not partial. The sages arose and regulated. To go contrary to the sage is rebellious. It is that for which Heaven sends down the awe of thunder and lightning. To follow the sage is obedient. It is that for which Heaven spreads the bounty of clouds and rain. That good and bad fortune results from obedience and disobedience is as clear as this.

In the past the former emperor was generous and his favored daughter went in marriage. It was the means by which he showed uniform respect towards the inner and the outer, and equal regard to Chinese and barbarians, opened up the way for the coming and going of court-visits and achieved good relations between uncle and nephew, and so the virtue of our former emperor must not be forgotten.

For the recent battle of Guazhou, the reason we have pardoned you without punishing is because we forgive your previous errors and restore you to our nurture and protection. If one relies on security one becomes lax. If one becomes lax, one abandons proper rules of conduct and in turn forgets good faith. In those who forget good faith, the mind of violence and destruction will arise. So in the regulations in the

---

1 For the Chinese text, see CFYG, v979, p. 11503; QTW, v990, "Ding Fan-Han liangjie bei," pp. 12962-63.
Chunqiu period, for those who forgot their oath they used the phrases like "let it be as the sun [shall punish]" (you ru ri) and "let be as the river [shall punish] (you ru he)." Now in our own day we draw on ancient precedents. As for the remote barbarian vassals and chieftains, they must take warning, in no way at all to turn their backs on purity and virtue, practice evil and destructive things, invade and disturb our He-Huang region, and peer into our defences. Let them not in any way throw off restraint, and start disturbances, steal our cattle and horses, and trample our crops.

The Chinese generals also should not invade you with troops. Our people also will not make surprise attacks on your towns and defence fortresses, overturn your troops, block up your roads, and destroy your tribes. We will not rely on the strength of troops to harm righteousness. We will not abandon good faith for getting profits. We will not deceive you and you will not deceive us. That is good faith.

All the gods who watch over oaths and treaties and who are in charge of various sacrifices will observe this. We will establish a calender, thereby it will be right that a hundred blessings accompany your fate. How great the mind of benevolence and longevity. Splendid! The law upholds the principle of having a single calender, and does not recognize the ritual of two beginnings of the year.

You should cultivate friendship generation after generation, make it last forever. If you are loyal towards man, you will receive good faith from the gods, and enable our Tang dynasty to enjoy unlimited blessings.

If you also maintain a long term plan, we will thereby cherish your distant people but not value your distant things. It is the benevolence of prefect sagehood.

The inscription says:

In regards of the former friendship, let righteousness not be changed. Let the roads not be blocked and let beacon fires be extinguished. Pointing to the River we make an oath: may our descendants be numerous. If one alters his sincerity, may the gods destroy him.

II The Treaty of 783

---

2 The expression you ru occurs frequently in oaths in the Zuozhuan. For a discussion of its meaning see Qian Zongwu. 1988, pp. 311-312.

Tang possesses all-under-heaven, wherever the footprints of Yu extend, as far as boats and chariots can go, there is no one that does not obey. Under the renewed brilliance of successive sovereigns, it continues year after year to all eternity, throwing luster on the great kingly inheritance, and spreading holy teachings within the four seas. With the Tibetan btsan-po it has made matrimonial alliance generation after generation. It has firmly bound itself in the neighborly friendship, forming a common body in peace or danger, and forming nephew-and-uncle countries for nearly two hundred years. From time to time because of petty annoyances, [the two countries] have abandoned magnanimity and become enemies. The frontier territories have been troubled without having even a year of peace.

The emperor, on his succession to the throne, took pity on the black-haired people. He caused the enslaved prisoners to be released to return to the Tibetan tribes. The Tibetan nation has displayed courtesy and in the same way has shown desire for harmony. Envoys have gone and returned, announcing in succession the orders of their sovereigns. This makes it impossible that deceptive plots should arise and chariots of war should be used. Tibet, furthermore, for the sake of what is essential to the two countries and of seeking to make it permanent, now requests to put into practice the anciently established practice of concluding a covenant.

The [Chinese] state, in striving to give rest to the people in the border areas, will renounce its former territory, abandon profit and pursue the course of public good, make firm the covenant and follow the treaty.

Now the frontiers that the Chinese state holds to the west of Jingzhou as far as the western mouth of the Tanzheng strait; west of Longzhou as far as Qingshui county; west of Fengzhou as far as Tonggu county, and on to the Western Mountains of Jiannan and the eastern banks of the Tadu River shall be the Han territory.

The garrisons which the Tibetan nation holds in [the prefectures of] Lan, Wei, Yuan and Hui; west as far as Lintao, and east to Chengzhou, reaching the Mosuo and various Man on the western frontiers of Jiannan and the southwest of the Tadu River, shall be the Tibetan territory.

As for the places garrisoned by troops, the people who presently live in prefectures and counties, and the Man tribes on both sides of the frontiers who are presently subject to Han, according to the present distribution of their lands, all are to remain as heretofore.

On the north of the Yellow River from the former Xinquan Army, directly north as far as the Great Desert, and directly south as far as the Luotuoling
of the Helan Mountains, shall be the border, and in between shall be neutral territory.

With regard to the places not recorded in the covenant text, wherever Tibet has troops stationed, Tibet shall keep; wherever Han has troops stationed, Han shall keep. Both shall retain what they presently hold and shall not encroach on the other.

The places that heretofore have not had troops, shall not have new garrisons established, nor shall there be walled-towns and fortifications built, nor shall there be ploughing and sowing.

Now the generals and grand councilors of the two countries have received a commission to meet, and they, having undergone purification rites in preparation for the ceremony, announce it to the gods of heaven and earth, of the mountains and rivers, and made the gods be witness that there should be no violation. The text of the covenant shall be preserved in the ancestral temple, with a copy in the appropriate office. What the two countries have completed may they preserve forever.

III. The Treaty of 821 in the Jiu Tangshu

Tang has received the mandate from Heaven to govern the eight directions, and wherever its imperial instruction reaches, there is no [people] that does not come [to court]. With caution and anxiety, fearing lest [the mandate] should slip and fall, it has continued its military and civil tradition, piled up glory, redoubled brilliance and has been able to show perspicacious wisdom without casting shame on the glorious inheritance for twelve reigns in the course of two hundred and four years. All this is because our Founding Ancestor issued enlightened commands and established an unshakable foundation. He spread far and wide a glorious name and passed it down to all eternity. In sacrificing to the supreme god in order to repay his favorable response, and in making offerings to the spirits of the imperial ancestors in order to repay their splendid bounty, has there been any negligence?

Now having reached the year guichou 戊午, in the winter, in the tenth month and on the day guiyou 戊丙 (10th), Emperor Wenwu Xiaode decreed that the grand councilors, subject Zhi 拯, subject Bo 泊, and subject Yuanying 元印 and others should conclude a sworn treaty with the General-in-chief, the Tibetan envoy, Minister of the Board of Rites Lun Na-luo 论 劳 and others at the capital. An altar has been built to the west of the capital and a pit dug on the north side of the altar. All the rituals of reading the oaths, sacrificing the victims, applying the text to the victim, covering them with earth, ascending and descending the altar and circling
around have been performed without fault, for they are the means of bringing about a laying down of arms and of giving rest to the people, of honoring the matrimonial alliance and continuing friendship, and of striving to establish a far-reaching policy and planning to extend long-term benefits.

As the vault of heaven looks down from above and the yellow earth god supports from below, the swarming multitude of men must rely on officials to be their stewards and ministers. If there were no regular succession of rulers, they would destroy each other. As for what is presently under control of China, Tang is the sovereign, and as for the whole region of the western frontiers, Great Tibet is the ruler.

From this time henceforward, we shall abolish arms and do away with all the ancient anger and old hatred, and return to the honored kinship of uncle and nephew and the bonds of mutual aid of former times. The alarms of the frontier posts shall be done away with, and the beacon fires shall cover up their smoke. We shall show mutual compassion in danger and in difficulty and we shall not engage in violence and plunder. The border outposts will cease mutual harassment. Strategic places and posts of defence shall be carefully kept as before. That side shall not deceive this side and this side shall not plot against that side.

Ah! To love the people is benevolence; to protect the territory is good faith; to be in awe of Heaven is wisdom, and to serve the gods is correct behavior. If any one of these duties be neglected, it will bring down misfortune upon oneself. The frontier mountains are lofty. The River flows on unceasingly. On a propitious day and under a favorable star, we have fixed the two frontiers. To the west is Great Tibet and to the east is Mighty Tang. The ministers, holding up the sworn treaty, proclaim it afar to the autumn (west) direction.

The btsan-po of Great Tibet, the grand councilors Bo Chan-bu (dPal chen-po) and Shang Qi-xin-er (Zhang Khri sum rje) and others, had sent the treaty beforehand, the important articles of which were:

The two countries, Tibet and Han, shall preserve the borders which each one now rules. Neither shall fight with nor attack the other. They shall not struggle like enemies and shall not invade and seize each other's territory. If there is any suspected person, or if it is necessary to arrest some one to inquire about some matters, then he shall be given clothes and food [after the inquiry] and sent back.

Now we have followed this in every particular. There shall be neither addition nor change.
Table 1.1. Foreign Tribute Missions to Han
(Sources: Basic Annals and Biographies of Foreign Countries in the SJ, HS, and HHS. "Ruler"=foreign rulers who came to Han personally; "Tribute"=foreign envoys came to pay tribute; "Titles"=titles conferred by Han; "Hostages"=foreign hostages to Han.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Ruler</th>
<th>Tribute</th>
<th>Titles</th>
<th>Hostages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>179 BCE</td>
<td>Nanyue</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>156-141</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After 119</td>
<td>Wusun</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anxi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Huanqian</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dayi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gushi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wumi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Suxie</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jibin</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wuhuan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108</td>
<td>Loulan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>Dayuan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Small states of the Xiyu</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After 101</td>
<td>Wumi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>Xiongnu</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>Quli and other 5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>Loulan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>Qiuci</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Xiongnu</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>S. Xiongnu</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>N. Xiongnu</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>S. Xiongnu</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>N. Xiongnu</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48-33</td>
<td>Suoju</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>S. Xiongnu</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32-7</td>
<td>Kangju</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>S. Xiongnu</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 CE</td>
<td>Wusun</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Yueshang</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Huangzhi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Wusun</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Content</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>S. Xiongnu</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>S. Xiongnu</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Wei</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Gaogouli</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>S. Xiongnu</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Shanshan</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Han</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Shanshan, Jushi, Yanqi</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and 14 or16 others in the Xiyu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>S. Xiongnu</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wuhuan</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fuyu</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>S. Xiongnu</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>N. Xiongnu</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Xianbei</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>N. Xiongnu</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Wo</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>Barbarians in the Southwestern Regions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73-74</td>
<td>States in the Xiyu</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>Barbarians outside of Rinan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>Yuezhi</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>Anxi</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>N. Xiongnu</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89-105</td>
<td>Tianzhu</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>Jushi</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td>50 states in the Xiyu</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anxi, Tiaozhi</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Barbarians outside of Yongchang</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97</td>
<td>Shanguo</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mengqi, Doule</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>Shaodang Qiang</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>Anxi</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104</td>
<td>N. Xiongnu</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107</td>
<td>Wo</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107-113</td>
<td>Xianbei</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>Gaogouli</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>Fuyu</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120-121</td>
<td>Xianbei</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td>Fuyu</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124</td>
<td>Barbarians outside</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Names</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anxi</td>
<td>Parthia</td>
<td>Hulsewé 1979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daqin</td>
<td>Rome</td>
<td>Feng Chengjun 1980</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dayi</td>
<td>Dahae, in Dihistan</td>
<td>Pulleyblank 1963: 90</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dayuan</td>
<td>Sogdiana (in the Han period)</td>
<td>Pulleyblank 1966: 22-24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doule</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuyu</td>
<td>Jilin, China</td>
<td>Tan Qixiang 1982: 40-41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaogouli</td>
<td>the basin of the Yalu and Hun Rivers</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gushi</td>
<td>Turfan</td>
<td>Hulsewé 1979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jushi</td>
<td>south Korea</td>
<td>Tan Qixiang 1982: 40-41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han</td>
<td>south Korea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huangzhi</td>
<td>Conjeveram, India</td>
<td>Feng Chengjun 1962: 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place Name</td>
<td>Location/Note</td>
<td>Source/Year</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huanqian</td>
<td>Khwarezm</td>
<td>Pelliot 1938-39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jibin</td>
<td>Kashmir</td>
<td>Hulsewé 1979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jushi</td>
<td>Turfan</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kangju</td>
<td>Tashkend (in the Han period)</td>
<td>Pulleyblank 1963: 247</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loulan</td>
<td>Cherchen</td>
<td>Hulsewé 1979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanshan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mengqi</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tan Qixiang 1982: 3-4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nanyue</td>
<td>Guangdong and Guangxi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qiuci</td>
<td>Kucha</td>
<td>Hulsewé 1979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quli</td>
<td>southeast of Kucha</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rinan</td>
<td>a Han commandery</td>
<td>Feng Chengjun 1962: 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shangguo</td>
<td>north Burma</td>
<td>Hulsewé 1979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanshan</td>
<td>Cherchen</td>
<td>Tan Qixiang 1982: 40-41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaodang</td>
<td>Qinghai</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qiang</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shule</td>
<td>Kashgar</td>
<td>Hulsewé 1979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suoju</td>
<td>Yarkand</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suxie</td>
<td>Kesh</td>
<td>Feng Chengjun 1980</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tianzhu</td>
<td>Northern India</td>
<td>Hulsewé 1979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiaozhi</td>
<td>the Seleucid empire</td>
<td>see footnote 68</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wei</td>
<td>northeast Korea</td>
<td>Tan Qixiang 1982: 40-41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weili</td>
<td>Korla</td>
<td>Hulsewé 1979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weixu</td>
<td>W of Lake Bostang, N of Karashahr</td>
<td>Ibid.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wo</td>
<td>Kyūshū, Japan</td>
<td>Tan Qixiang 1982: 40-41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wumi</td>
<td>Khema, a city-state of khotan</td>
<td>Pulleyblank 1963: 88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
<td>Additional Information</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yumi=Jumi</td>
<td>未文</td>
<td>the Ili-valley, extending up to the Issyk-kul</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wusun 乌孫</td>
<td>未文</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yanqi 焉耆</td>
<td>未文</td>
<td>Karashahr</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yetiao 蔗调</td>
<td>未文</td>
<td>Java</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yongchang 永昌</td>
<td>未文</td>
<td>a Han commandery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuezhi 月氏</td>
<td>未文</td>
<td>1) upper Syr-darya, 2) Bactria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yueshang 越裳</td>
<td>未文</td>
<td>in present Vietnam?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yutian 于闐</td>
<td>未文</td>
<td>Khotan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chavannes 1907: 558
Hulsewé 1979
Feng Chengjun 1963: 6
Hulsewé 1979
Hulsewé 1979
Table 2. 1. The Turkish Rulers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rulers</th>
<th>Reign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Tumen (Bumin) Yili</td>
<td>552-553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Yixiji (Ishig?), son of Yili</td>
<td>553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Muhan, son of Yili</td>
<td>553-572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Tabo (Taspar), son of Yili</td>
<td>572-581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Anluo, son of Tabo</td>
<td>581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Shabolue Shetu (ishbara), son of Yixiji</td>
<td>581-587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Mohe (Bagha), son of Yixiji</td>
<td>587-588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Dulan, son of Shabolue</td>
<td>588-599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) Tuli (Tolish), son of Mohe</td>
<td>?-609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) Shibi, son of Qimin</td>
<td>609-619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11) Chuluo, son of Qimin</td>
<td>619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12) Xieli, son of Qimin</td>
<td>619-630</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Second Turkish Empire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rulers</th>
<th>Reign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Guduolu (Qutlug)</td>
<td>682-691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Mochuo (Bäg-chur), brother of Guduolu</td>
<td>691-716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Bijia (Bilgä), son of Guduolu</td>
<td>716-734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Yiran, son of Bijia</td>
<td>734-741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) ?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) ?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Guduo Yabghu</td>
<td>?-742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Wusumish (Ozmish), Yiran's cousin</td>
<td>742-744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) Baimei (Bolmis), Wusumish's brother</td>
<td>744-745</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Western Turks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ruler</th>
<th>Reign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Shidianmi (Istami)</td>
<td>?-576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Datou, son of Shidianmi</td>
<td>576-603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Nili, grand-son of Datou</td>
<td>603-?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Chuluo, son of Nili</td>
<td>?-611</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5) Shegui, brother of Nili

6) Tong Yabghu, brother of Nili

7) The Western Turkish qaghanate was split into two parts, with one under Cibi, son of Datou, and the other under Ci Yabghu, son of Tong Yabghu. Soon the qaghanate was unified under Ci Yabghu.

8) Duolu, son of Moheshe, who was brother of Nili, grand-son of Datou. Duolu succeeded Ci Yabghu.

9) Zhilishi, brother of Duolu

   In 638 the qaghanate was again split into two parts with one under Zhilishi and the other under Yibi Duolu.

10) Yiqulishi Yibi, son of Zhilishi

11) Yabghu (re. 640-641), grand-son of Moheshe. He was killed by Yibi Duolu.

12) In 642 Tang established Yibi Shegui, son of Yiqulishi Yibi. Yibi Duolu fled and died in 659.

13) Helu, grand-son of Moheshe
Table 2.2. The Participation in Tang Expeditions by the Eastern Turks and the Tiele (634-669)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Expeditions</th>
<th>Those Participating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>634</td>
<td>Tuyuhun</td>
<td>Tujue, Qibi1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>639</td>
<td>Gaochang</td>
<td>**2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>644</td>
<td>Koguryo</td>
<td>Non-Chinese in Lanzhou and Hezhou3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>645</td>
<td>Xueyantuo</td>
<td>Tujue4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>646</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>Tujue5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>647</td>
<td>Kucha</td>
<td>Tiele, Tujue6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>648</td>
<td>Xueyantuo</td>
<td>Tiele7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>649</td>
<td>Chebi Qaghan</td>
<td>Huihe, Pugu8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>651</td>
<td>Western Turks (Helu)</td>
<td>Huihe9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>656-657</td>
<td>Western Turks</td>
<td>**10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>660</td>
<td>Xi, Khitan</td>
<td>Tujue, Xueyantuo11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>661</td>
<td>Koguryo</td>
<td>Huihe12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>668</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>669</td>
<td>Xueyantuo</td>
<td>Tujue14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. JTS, v198, p. 5298; XTS, v221A, p. 6225; ZZTJ, v194, p. 6108.
3. CFYG, v117, p. 1398.
6. The JTS, v198 (p. 5303) records this event as in 646 while other sources record it as in 647, see XTS, v110, p. 4115; v221A, p. 6231; ZZTJ, v198, pp. 6250-51; CFYG, v973, p. 11432; v985, p. 11572.
12. JTS, v195 (p. 5197) says that the campaign was in 655 but Tang did not launch any campaign that year. XTS, v217A, p. 6113; ZZTJ, v200, p. 6323; CFYG, v986, p. 11578.
13. JTS, v109, pp. 3293-94.
Table 2. 3. The *Jimi Fu-zhou* of the Eastern Turks and the Tiele (630-663)\(^1\)
(According to Cen Zhongmian. 1958, pp. 1066-73.)

### A. The Protectorate of Anbei

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year(^2)</th>
<th>Tribe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yanran A.C. 3</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>Duolange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanhai A.C.</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>Huihe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jinwei A.C.</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>Pugu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youling A.C.</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>Bayegu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guolin A.C.</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>Tongluo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lushan A.C.</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>Tongluo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaolan A.C.</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>Tongluo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuxizhou</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>Tongluo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaoquezhou</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>Tongluo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jitianzhou</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>Tongluo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiluzhou</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>Tongluo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dailinzhou</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>Tongluo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tianyanzhou</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>Tongluo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xuanquezhou</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>Tongluo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiankun A.C.</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>Tongluo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhulongzhou</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>Tongluo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juyanzhou</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>Tongluo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xinli A.C.</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>Tongluo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiluozhou</td>
<td>before or in 650</td>
<td>Tongluo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xian'ezhou</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>Tongluo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langshan A.C.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Geluolu branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunhezhou</td>
<td></td>
<td>Geluolu branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junjizhou</td>
<td></td>
<td>Geluolu branch</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### B. The Superior Protectorate of Chanyu

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Yunzhong A.C.</th>
<th>630</th>
<th>Xieli</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shelizhou</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>Shelituli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashinazhou</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>Ashina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuozhou</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>Chuo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sibizhou</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Nulai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baidengzhou</td>
<td>before 649</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B. Dingxiang A.C.</th>
<th>630</th>
<th>Xieli</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sunongzhoud</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>Sunong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashidezhoud</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>Ashide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhishizhou</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>Zhishi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayanzhou</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Bayan Ashide</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1 This table does not include the seven area commands set up in 630 for the Eastern Turks. They were Shunzhou, Huazhou (i.e. Beikai), Changzhou, Youzhou, Beining, Beifu and Beian.
2 Year of establishment.
3 A. C. = Area Command
C. Huyan A. C.

1. Heluzhou
2. Geluozhou

D. Sangqian A. C.

1. Yushezhou
2. Yishizhou
3. Beishizhou
4. Chiluezhou

The fu-zhou not under the above two Protectorates

1. Qilianzhou
2. West Gaolanzhou
3. Xitanzhou
4. Jinshuizhou
5. Weizhou

The Evolution of the Protectorates over the Eastern Turks and the Tiele

(According to Cen Zhongmian. 1958, p. 1071.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Protectorate of Anbei</th>
<th>Protectorate of Chanyu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>647</td>
<td>Yanran</td>
<td>Hanhai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>650</td>
<td>Yanran</td>
<td>Yunzhong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>663</td>
<td>Yida</td>
<td>Hanhai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>664</td>
<td>Wu-tu-han-da-gan</td>
<td>Hanhai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>669</td>
<td>Yanran</td>
<td>Hanhai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Superior</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Part of those previously under Yusheshi, Duodi Yishi, Beishi.

*Not under the two Protectorates.*
Table 2.4. The Jiimi Fu-zhou Set up for the Turks in Xuanzong’s Time
(According to Cen Zhongmian. 1958, pp. 1070-73)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tribe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. East Gaolanzhou</td>
<td>About 713</td>
<td>Tiele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Yanranzhou</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Jitianzhou</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Jiluzhou</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Zhulongzhou</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Yanshanzhou</td>
<td>714(?)</td>
<td>Tujue¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Xietiezhou</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>Xietie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Dahun dudufu</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>Xueyantuo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Pugu dudufu</td>
<td>716</td>
<td>Pugu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ These six prefectures from one to six were newly restored at that time.
Table 3. 1. The Korean Rulers

Koguryŏ (559-668)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rulers</th>
<th>Reign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. P'yŏngwŏn Wang (King Pingyuan)</td>
<td>559-590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Yŏngyang Wang (King Yingyang)</td>
<td>590-618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Yŏngnyu Wang (King Rongliu)</td>
<td>618-642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Pojang Wang (King Baozang)</td>
<td>642-668</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Paekche (554-660)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rulers</th>
<th>Reign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Widŏk Wang (King Weide)</td>
<td>554-598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Hye Wang (King Hui)</td>
<td>598-599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Pŏp Wang (King Fa)</td>
<td>599-600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Mu Wang (King Wu)</td>
<td>600-641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Úija Wang (King Yici)</td>
<td>641-660</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Silla (576-765)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rulers</th>
<th>Reign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Chinji Wang (King Zhenzhi)</td>
<td>576-579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Chinp'yŏng Wang (King Zhenping)</td>
<td>579-632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Sŏndŏk Yŏwang (Queen Shande)</td>
<td>632-647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Chindŏk Yŏwang (Queen Zhende)</td>
<td>647-654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. T'aejong Muyol Wang (King Taizong Wulie)</td>
<td>654-661</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Lee Ki-baik. 1984, pp. 388-391. Chinese names of the kings are in brackets.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>King Name</th>
<th>Reign Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Munmu Wang (King Wenwu)</td>
<td>661-681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Sinmun Wang (King Shenwen)</td>
<td>681-692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Hyoso Wang (King Xiaozhao)</td>
<td>692-702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Sŏngdŏk Wang (King Shengde)</td>
<td>702-737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Hyosŏng Wang (King Xiaocheng)</td>
<td>737-742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Kyŏngdŏk Wang (King Jingde)</td>
<td>742-765</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.2. Tribute Missions of the Three Korean Kingdoms to Sui and Tang (from 581 to 712)

(Sources: *SUIS, BS, JTS, XTS, CFYG.* )

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Koguryö</th>
<th>Paekche</th>
<th>Silla</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>581</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>582</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>583</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>584</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>588</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>591</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>592</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>594</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>597</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>598</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>600</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>607</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>608</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>609</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>611</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>614</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>615</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Tang**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Koguryö</th>
<th>Paekche</th>
<th>Silla</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>619</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>621</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>622</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>623</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>624</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>625</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>626</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>627</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>628</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>629</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>631</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>632</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>635</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>636</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>637</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>638</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>639</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>640</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>642</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>643</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>644</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>646</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>648</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>650</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>651</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>652</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>653</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>656</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>665</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>675</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>686</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>699</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>703</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>705</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>707</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>709</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>710</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>711</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>712</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4. 1. The Uighur Rulers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rulers</th>
<th>Reign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Tejian Irken</td>
<td>618-626?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Pusa, 627-one of the years between 630 and 646</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Tumidu, after the death of Pusa-648</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Porun</td>
<td>648-661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Bisudu</td>
<td>661-680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Dujiezhi</td>
<td>680-695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Fudifu</td>
<td>695-719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Chengzong</td>
<td>719-727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Fudinan</td>
<td>727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Guli Peiluo (Quilgh? Boila), Huaiyen Qaghan</td>
<td>after 727 to 747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Moyanchuo (Bayan Chor?), Yingwu weiyuan Qaghan</td>
<td>747-759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Yidijian Mouyu (Idikän Bögü?), Yingyi jiangong Qaghan</td>
<td>759-779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Dun Mohe Dagan (Ton? Bagha Tarqan)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wuyi chenggong Qaghan, Changshou tianqin Qaghan</td>
<td>779-789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Duoluosi (Talas?), Zhongzhen Qaghan</td>
<td>789-790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. The younger brother of Duoluosi</td>
<td>790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Achuo, Fengcheng Qaghan</td>
<td>790-795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Guduolu, (Qutlugh), Huaiyen Qaghan</td>
<td>795-805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Julu bijia (Küüilg bilgä)</td>
<td>805-808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Chongde Qaghan</td>
<td>821-824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Hesa Teqin (Xazar? Tegin), Zhaoli Qaghan</td>
<td>824-832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Hu Teqin (Hu Tegin), Zhangxin Qaghan</td>
<td>832-839</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

23. Kesa Qagahn  廬駒  839-840
24. Wujie Qaghan, (Ögä Qaghan), 841-any year between 844 and 847  鳥介
25. Enian Qaghan, after the death of Wujie-848  邈撲
Table 5. 1. The Tibetan Rulers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rulers</th>
<th>Reign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Khri srong brtsan (Srong btsan sgam-po)</td>
<td>618-641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Gung srong gung brtsan</td>
<td>641-646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. *Khri srong brtsan</td>
<td>646-649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Mang srong mang brtsan</td>
<td>649-677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Khri 'Dus srong</td>
<td>677-704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Lha</td>
<td>704-705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Khri ma lod</td>
<td>705-712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Khri lde gtsug brtsan (Mes ag tshoms)</td>
<td>712-755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Khri srong lde brtsan</td>
<td>756-797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Mu ne btsanpo</td>
<td>797-799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Khri lde srong brtsan</td>
<td>799-815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Khri gtsug lde brtsan</td>
<td>815-838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Khri 'U'i dum brtsan</td>
<td>828-842</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIG. 1 the Nine-zone system
FIG. 2 Two models of empire

HEGEMONIC EMPIRE

LEGEND

--- PROVINCIAL TERRITORY

--- CLIENT STATE BOUNDARIES

--- CLIENT TRIBE BOUNDARIES

--- COMBINED TASK FORCES OF LEGION AND AUXILIA.

--- DISPOSABLE AND CONCENTRATED IMPERIAL FORCES AVAILABLE FOR WARS OF CONQUEST AND INTIMIDATION OF CLIENTS.

--- CLIENTS RESPONSIBLE FOR LOCAL DEFENSE AND INTERNAL SECURITY

--- CLIENTS ANNEXED OR ABANDONED

--- ALL IMPERIAL FORCES DEPLOYED FOR FRONTIER DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE. NO "DISPOSABLE" FORCES FOR OFFENSE OR DEFENSE.

--- TERRITORIAL EMPIRE

LEGEND

--- GUARDED OR FORTIFIED FRONTIER PERIMETER

--- PROVINCIAL BOUNDARY

--- LEGIONS AND AUXILIARY UNITS DISTRIBUTED FOR FRONTIER DEFENSE

--- TOTALITY OF EMPIRE UNDER DIRECT RULE

--- IMPERIAL FORCES DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR PERIMETER DEFENSE AND INTERNAL SECURITY

--- ALL CLIENTS ANNEXED OR ABANDONED

Map 2

Korea at the height of Koguryo Expansion in the 5th century


Kaya was annexed by Silla in the 6th century.
Map 6
Tang and Its Neighbors (741)