THE CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY AND BRITISH COLUMBIA
1871 - 1886

by

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CHAPTER I
BRITISH COLUMBIA AND THE CONCEPTION OF THE CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY

One of the most remarkable aspects of the building of the Canadian Pacific Railway was that it reversed the relationship which a railway normally bears to population. Usually a commercial railway is built to centres of population, or failing this optimum, it is built where population is growing or flowing. The Canadian Pacific Railway was based on neither of these population requirements. It was constructed through the barren country north of Lake Superior and west across an almost uninhabited prairie to the Province of British Columbia which had, at the time the railway was conceived, a population of less than 10,000 white inhabitants. Unlike all the overland railways built in the United States of America, which sought centres of population on the Pacific such as San Francisco, Portland and Tacoma, the Canadian Pacific sought a narrow inlet where there was no city and very little settlement.

Since it was built for 2,000 miles through country which seemed to offer but very little traffic the Canadian Pacific Railway has always been considered a very bold enterprise; at the time of its conception the project was vociferously branded as foolhardy. The critics of the project --

1. The Northern Pacific and Great Northern Railways may be considered with the Canadian Pacific as outstanding exceptions.
and they were many -- could see nothing but bankruptcy and failure in the undertaking.

But the critics were proved wrong by the completion of the line and its subsequent prosperity. Their miscalculations were largely due to the fact that they placed too much emphasis on the barrenness of the prairies and the many mountains of British Columbia and underestimated the great potential wealth of the Canadian West. They failed to see that the possible development of the great resources of the North-West and British Columbia was ample justification for building a railway to the Pacific.

Fortunately for the Canadian Dominion the opponents of the Pacific railway project were of relatively little importance. The Railway was built, although after some years of delay, by those who had imagination and foresight enough to conjure a vision of a prosperous and populated Dominion from Atlantic to Pacific. The economic development of the Canadian West was to be an important factor in the success of the road, and the possibility of this valuable development was not unforeseen by those who conceived and built the Canadian Pacific Railway.

For this reason, British Columbia, though only a part of the western territory which the Canadian Pacific Railway was built to save and develop for the new Canadian nation of 1867, was of great importance in bringing the numerous projects and dreams of an all-British route across the North American continent to a final realization. Her history and development
before the beginning of the railway must be considered to understand why Canada and the Canadian Pacific Railway Company were willing to take the great risk of building a railway into an undeveloped country, and why it was an agreement between the new Canadian Federation and a poor and sparsely populated Pacific colony that began the difficult history of the Canadian Pacific Railway.

British Columbia first became of importance because of her great wealth in fur-bearing animals. The sea-otter and the beaver brought men half way round the world and across the American continent to her coast. From 1821 to 1858 the Hudson's Bay Company, taking up the work of the maritime and North West Fur Traders, laid the beginnings of a new British Colony on the Pacific. The Company's servants attracted attention not only to furs but also to the great resources of the country, minerals, fish and lumber. Agriculture became of some importance in maintaining the fur-posts; barrels of dried salmon were exported, and timbers cut by saw-mills built by the Company entered into the trade of the territory. These activities, however, were subsidiary to the fur-trade. They developed not from any deliberate effort to exploit the resources of the country but because they aided in the main-

In addition to pointing to the great wealth of the country, the Hudson's Bay Company developed the first system of communications in the territory, utilizing water transport wherever possible and supplementing it with pack trails and horse brigades. Before the fixing of the international boundary along the 49th parallel, by the Oregon treaty of 1846, the principal transport route was the Columbia river into the Okanagon and thence north by horse-brigade to Kamloops and New Caledonia. After 1846 the transport system was reorganized. Victoria on Vancouver Island was established as a depot in place of Fort Vancouver on the Columbia and a new route to the interior was developed up the Fraser to Hope and Yale and thence by trail and horse-brigade through the canyon of the Fraser and the Thompson to New Caledonia. The route along the Fraser river was to prove of great value in the development of the country. At first one of the routes followed by the fur-traders, it became a base for the development of gold mining which followed the discovery of gold in 1856. The same route was followed in 1862 by the builders of the Cariboo Road; and in 1880-1883 the builders of the Canadian Pacific Railway built along the same highway.

The Hudson's Bay Company failed, however, to supply the basis of a permanent economy. In the period of its privileged position in British Columbia there was very little settlement, apart from the fur-trade, on either Vancouver Island, which became a crown colony under the Company in 1849, or on the mainland. The lack of settlement was due partly to
the policy of the Company, which was opposed to settlement apart from the requirements of the fur-trade, and partly, and more fundamentally, to the fact that the Pacific North-West was far removed from Europe and the east of North America. It could be reached by sea only via Cape of Good Hope or Cape Horn. Between Canada and the Pacific coast stood the Rocky Mountains, a wide desolate prairie country and the barren country north of Lake Superior.

A more powerfully attractive force was required to people the isolated wilderness of British Columbia than furs and latent resources. Gold in 1858 accomplished what probably no other agent at that time could have done. It peopled British Columbia and gave a tremendous impetus to her economic and political development. The influx of gold-seeking men, principally from the gold fields of California, forced the Hudson's Bay Company from its privileged position west of the Rocky Mountains and led directly to the establishment of the Crown Colony of British Columbia in 1858; it kindled the interest of British North America and Great Britain in the Pacific coast; and it presented the new colony with economic problems which were largely responsible for the demand of its inhabitants for improved communications both within her own boundaries and with the outside world.

The gold of British Columbia in a very short time attracted thousands of men, principally from California where gold had long been becoming more difficult to find. The movement of these men up the Fraser to the gold fields produced a multiplicity of problems. Inevitably the migration of a
large body of men into the wilderness of the interior called for the formation of civil government, the enforcement of law and order, the raising and collection of revenue, the construction of roads, trails and bridges, and the exploration and development of the country. Great Britain immediately showed her interest in these new problems of the territory. The Colony of British Columbia was proclaimed with James Douglas as its first Governor. And to aid the new colony in preserving orderly government and executing necessary public works, such as road building, the Colonial Secretary despatched a detachment of the Royal Engineers to the new colony.

Probably the most difficult of the problems facing the new colony was the development of adequate means of transportation to the gold fields. Lines of communication were necessary to insure the maintenance of law and order and, more important, to insure the prosperity of the mining industry. Lack of transportation facilities meant high prices at the diggings, and high prices meant ruin for the miner who did not strike an extremely rich claim. At first the only important communications between the diggings was by way of the Fraser River. From Victoria the miner reached the head of navigation on the Fraser, Hope or Yale, by steamer or even by small skiffs or canoes. From Hope or Yale the miner made his way along the canyon of the Fraser by means of treacherous Indian and Hudson's Bay Company trails which were then the sole means of communication.

As the miner moved north up the Fraser from the bars below Yale to the district between Lytton and Lillooet and
then still further north into the Cariboo country the need for improved routes to the diggings became urgent. Douglas, who was not slow to realize that difficulty of transport formed the great impediment to the development of the colony's mineral resources, made the first improvement in 1858 by enlisting the aid of the miners to connect the water stretches between Harrison Lake and Lillooet by roads and trails. The opening of this new route to the Upper Fraser reduced the cost of transportation and the price of food and supplies on the bars in the vicinity of Lillooet. Yet even with this improvement prices remained exorbitantly high due to the still high cost of transport and the strength of demand and the great supplies of gold in the mining area.

With the object of making the gold fields still more accessible that they might become more profitable and extensive, Governor Douglas began in 1860 a great road building program. The Harrison-Lillooet trails were made into good waggon roads and stages were placed in operation over the whole route connecting with steamers plying on the lakes. In 1860 new gold fields were opened up in the Similkameen district and Governor Douglas launched out on the great project of building a road to these new fields. It is of interest that Douglas in opening up this new highway dreamed of it passing through one of the passes of the Rocky Mountains to connect with a road across the prairies from Fort Garry. In 1861 the discovery of very rich gold fields in the Cariboo encouraged Douglas to build a road north from Yale through the canyons of the Fraser to replace the treacherous trails. The road was
built by the Royal Engineers and several independent contractors. It was completed between Yale and Lillooet by August, 1863. The great need of the colony for this great road was witnessed in the fact that the miners took to the new route with great avidity. Soon long lines of pack animals, heavy freight waggons, six horse coaches and an army of men were seen passing along it going to and from the mines.

The opening of gold fields in the Kootenay and Big Bend country led to further improvements in the transportation system of the colony; and, it is worthy of notice, to surveys and explorations which were later of value to the builders of the Canadian Pacific Railway. This was the work of Governor Douglas' successor, Frederick Seymour, in 1864, and of Joseph W. Trutch, Commissioner of Lands and Works, in 1865. Trutch, like Douglas, dreamed of developing communications with the East. Following a successful exploratory expedition by Walter Moberly, whom he had despatched to find a route from the eastern end of Shuswap Lake to the Columbia, he wrote to the Colonial Secretary that further surveys of this district of country seemed to him most desirable as it would "certainly be of very great importance to have indubitable assurance of a route by which a continuous direct line of communication with British settlements, east of the Rocky Mountains, can be effected from the sea-board of British Columbia".

1. Vide infra p. 70.
2. Trutch to Colonial Secretary, Instructions, Reports and Journals relating to the Government Exploration of country lying between the Shuswap and Okanagon Lakes and the Rocky Mountains, New Westminster, 1866, p. 13.
Gold mining and the development of transportation routes to the various parts of the colony had an inevitable reaction on the economic life and industry. Food was needed to support the mining population and the experience of the Hudson's Bay Company in raising agricultural products around their trading posts was put to good use. During the boom days of placer mining agriculture was very profitable. Dairying flourished along with agriculture and ranching developed, particularly around Kamloops. Fishing based on the abundant resources of the coastal waters was greatly stimulated by the influx of the mining population, but it was limited in its development by the speed and efficiency of transportation to the British Columbia market and to the larger foreign markets. Fresh fish was too perishable to be shipped to any extent and there was a limited demand for smoked salmon. Lumbering developed with the needs of construction and mining in the interior of British Columbia. On the coast many large mills were built to supply a rapidly growing export trade. The market was world wide and transportation by water to foreign markets was easy. Vessels bringing in cargoes returned with lumber instead of in ballast. The development of the lumbering industry was accompanied by a rapid growth of coal mining on Vancouver Island. The accessibility of the coast mines to water transportation and the development of shipping following the gold rush were the main factors in this development.

The prosperity of the colonies of British Columbia and Vancouver Island depended solely on the productivity of the placer mines, however, and was short-lived. As long as
the mines were productive British Columbia enjoyed a certain amount of prosperity. But the productivity of placer mines was an unstable base for a healthy economy. By 1865 the placer mines were rapidly declining and with their decline the colony sank into financial difficulties and general economic depression.

The decline of the mining industry placed in prominent relief the chief economic ill of the colony, the difficulty and high cost of transportation. The pick of the claims were alone able to withstand the costs of transport and large numbers of miners were forced to leave almost as soon as they arrived. The mining population figures given by Macdonald although possibly inaccurate, are indicative of the movement of population from the colony almost as soon as it had arrived. The white population in 1858 is given at 17,000. In 1859, it is less than one-half, having dropped to 8,000. In 1860 it is 7,000 and in 1861, 5,000. There was a revival of immigration due to the rich findings of the Cariboo. But by 1871 the white population according to the most reliable authority was only 8,576. The decline of population was accompanied by a comparable decline in gold production. In 1863 the output of the mines was $3,900,000, while in 1871 it was only $1,400,000. The productivity of the mines undoubtedly would have been maintained and even increased had transportation costs not prohibited the development of lode mining which required

2. Dominion Sessional Papers, 1872, 10, p. 22.
large amounts of equipment and machinery and heavy transport for ores. Lode mining did not become a feature of British Columbian industry until after the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway.

The lesser industries of the colonies agriculture, fishing, lumbering and coal mining did not decline as precipitously as gold mining but they had scarcely developed beyond the stage of infant industries. Agriculture although stimulated by the mining population was largely confined to the New Westminster district, the Fraser River Delta and the southeastern peninsula of Vancouver Island. Fishing, lumbering and coal mining were saved from the depth of depression by their foreign export market. But in 1865 when gold mining was definitely on the decline no industry was sufficiently well established to insure the prosperity of the colonies.

The stagnation which followed the collapse of the mining boom was not due to any lack of enterprise. "The British Columbians of that day," R.E. Gosnell remarks, "invested freely, and in many instances to their cost, in anything that looked promising". The reason lay in over-expansion on the basis of a fictitious prosperity and, more fundamentally, on the lack of opportunity of outlet for production and inlet for productive enterprise.

Over-expansion left British Columbia with a public works system which "excited the astonishment of every stranger...

when the scanty population [was] considered'. The cost of road building was too great for the resources of the colony and by 1864 it was greatly in debt. Vancouver Island likewise boomed and fell with the prosperity of the mines and by 1864 she too was heavily in debt. In 1866 when the two colonies were united in an effort to reduce the costs of administration, the net indebtedness of Vancouver Island was $293,698 and that of British Columbia $1,002,983. Burdened with this debt the two colonies struggled along under a load of taxation which amounted to £19 a head. Moreover, the load of debt carried by the colony was not entirely fiscal. By 1865 British Columbia had an excellent system of roads but those who used the roads had to pay for their service in the form of tolls until confederation with Canada in 1871.

A more chronic problem than public debt was the isolation of British Columbia from world markets and centres of population. The inhabited regions of British North America were 2,000 miles away. A boat to or from Great Britain had to round Cape Horn or the Cape of Good Hope. The Surveyor-General of Vancouver Island, J.D. Pemberton, wrote in 1860 that "the only direct way to reach Vancouver Island and British Columbia at present is to take advantage of any vessel sailing from London or Liverpool that may offer. Exceeding 17,000 miles this passage is the longest that can be taken from England to

1. Dominion Sessional Papers, 1872, 10, p. 3.
any known port, rounding either Cape, unless it be to some
place in the neighbourhood of Sitka or Petrapoulouski,..."

This long sea voyage could be shortened after the completion
of a railway across the Isthmus of Darien in 1855. But even a
passage to British Columbia by this route meant a long crossing
of the Atlantic to New York, a journey by boat to Panama,
a railway journey across the isthmus, and a passage by steamer
to San Francisco and thence to Victoria and New Westminster.
This route though it cut down the time spent on the journey
from England to British Columbia could not be used profitably
for a shipment of goods because of the many transfers experi-
enced on the route, at New York, at each side of the Isthmus
and at San Francisco. Overland routes developed across the
United States from the eastern seaboard to San Francisco, but
these were long and tedious routes to follow and over them few
goods could be carried. There were no practicable routes
across British soil to the Pacific. Pemberton mentions among
routes to British Columbia and Vancouver Island "the trail via
Red River, North Sascatchewau, and the Punch-Bowl Pass in the
Rocky Mountains or other similar trails usually travelled by
the brigades of the Hudson's Bay Company". But these he dis-
misses as being useful and safe only for "hardy trappers
lightly equipped, and confident in their knowledge of the
passes of the country and its resources". Until the comple-

2. This condition existed until the completion of the Central Pacific Railway in 1869.
tion of the railway the crossing of the prairies and the Rockies was a difficult and perilous task. Few attempted the passage. Captain Palliser's well equipped and highly trained exploration party of 1857-1860 found its way to the Pacific after conducting exploration and surveys in the Rockies. Milton and Cheadle crossed Canada to the Pacific via Yellow Head Pass in 1862 while 'exploring a route across the continent through British territory'. But the only immigrants who came overland to British Columbia through the Canadian Rockies came in search of gold in 1862.

Those who remained in the colony did not accept their depression and economic stagnation passively. They sought solutions of their difficult problems. Communications with the East by waggon road or railway and confederation with the Canadian federation of 1867 became the most prominent solution advocated. Trutch continued to consider his project of a route to the East and in 1868 drew up a comprehensive minute in which he discussed the advantages of various routes and passes in the Rockies for a road. The paper bears much evidence that to Trutch a wagon road to the East was necessary for the colony's development. The routes he chose as the most practicable are of interest. His first choice fell upon the route up the Fraser from Yale, along the Thompson and through the Rockies by Yellow Head Pass. His second choice was given

to the route along the Fraser from Yale to the mouth of the Thompson, along the Thompson to Savonas and thence south-easterly through Moberly's Eagle Pass to the Columbia, round the bend of the Columbia to Blackberry River and through the Rockies by Howse Pass.

It was left not to Trutch but to Alfred Waddington, the author of *Fraser Mines Vindicated*, however, to outline the most comprehensive scheme for a Trans-Canada railway, and more important, to agitate in British Columbia, Canada and Great Britain for its construction. From 1861 to 1866 Waddington was engaged in an unsuccessful effort to build an alternative route to the Cariboo mines from the head of Bute Inlet, and while engaged on this project he conceived his plan for a railway from Canada to the Pacific at the head of Bute Inlet. Waddington, like Trutch, thought at first only in terms of a waggon road. This idea developed into a scheme for railways connecting the water stretches across Canada which could be used for transportation, and finally into a plan for an all-rail route from the East through the Rocky Mountains by way of Yellowhead Pass, along the Fraser River to Quesnelmouth (Quesnel) and thence across the Chilcotin plain to Bute Inlet.

In March, 1868, Waddington outlined his conception of the railway before a meeting of the Royal Geographical Society in London. He saw the railway as a means of building a prosperous nation from Atlantic to Pacific. "In a political point of view, and as a natural consequence of the late confederation it would contribute essentially to its prosperity; for so long as there is no overland route, any communication with British
Columbia must remain a myth and the Red River settlement continue isolated". He saw the railway as a means of offsetting the advantage which would be gained by the United States which at that time was building a transcontinental railway to San Francisco. "In the United States the Central Pacific Railway ...is progressing rapidly and the time is not far distant when it will be opened. ...it is calculated to divert a great part of the trade of China and Japan from the Old to the New World and if we do not wake up we shall bitterly regret the lost opportunity..." Waddington outlined his plans for the railway more carefully in a pamphlet entitled Overland Route through British North America, published in September, 1868. He emphasized again the national and imperial importance of the railway and enumerated the benefits which would come to British Columbia on its construction. A railway following the Yellowhead Pass - Chilcotin Plain - Bute Inlet route would offer "ready and easy communication for 280 miles by the Upper Fraser and its valley through a comparatively open and fertile tract of country; it would "open up the gold mines in and around Cariboo"; and it would "open up the Chilcotin Plain, the only one of any extent in British Columbia and which contains millions of acres fit for settlement".

It is not possible to estimate the value of Alfred

2. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p. 12.
Waddington's work in emphasising the value of a Trans-Canada railway to Great Britain, Canada and British Columbia. However his words were read and heard by many who were willing to read and hear them. In Canada the project of a transcontinental railway joining together all British North America was anything but new. Many "Fathers of Confederation" had avowed their desire to open up the west by communications and political federation and the Grand Trunk officials considered the extension of their road to the Pacific necessary to insure its prosperity. As early as November, 1860, Edward Watkin, an officer of the Company wrote that the only way to improve the property of the Grand Trunk lay "in extension of railway communication to the Pacific.... The result to this empire would be beyond calculation...." And British imperialists, few as they were, had dreamed of a British colony from Atlantic to Pacific connected by railway from the time Major Carmichael-Smyth wrote, in 1847, that a national highway from Atlantic to Pacific was the "great link required to unite in one chain the whole English race".

The nationalist and western expansionist feeling in Canada which developed rapidly with the consummation of union with Nova Scotia and New Brunswick came at an opportune time for British Columbia. It formed an encouraging response to

demands such as Alfred Waddington's for a transcontinental railway and to the desire which soon developed in the depressed colony to enter the Canadian federation. It developed at a time, moreover, when there was growing in British Columbia a feeling for annexation to the United States as a cure for the economic and political ills of the colony.

The annexationist movement was largely confined to the Victoria merchants and did not affect the mainland which became almost entirely confederationist, but it is of great interest in that it was a further manifestation of the troubles of the colony. The movement, as Dr. W.N. Sage writes, "was a counsel of despair. Existing economic conditions were unbearable. Britain could not or would not help. ...Confederation was a dream which only the construction of a railway could turn into a reality". Up to the moment that Confederation with Canada was decided by the British Columbia legislature, however, the movement claimed some strong adherents. Dr. John Sebastian Helmcken, one of the most influential men in the colony, favoured annexation, and Pemberton, who, in 1860, suggested a British immigrant route to British Columbia, turned to annexation as a means of salvaging British Columbia's economy. In a series of three letters to the British Colonist he pointed to the advantages of annexation. He attracted

attention to the fact that "an American transcontinental railway already exists [the Central Pacific] and another is being planned [the Northern Pacific] which will give access to Victoria through Puget Sound ports".

The only important effect of the annexationist movement was that it strengthened the confederationist feeling in British Columbia and the desire of Canada to embrace the Pacific colony in the Dominion before it was lost to the United States. Confederationist feeling seems to have appeared first in 1867. In that year Governor Seymour was asked by the Legislative Council to make tentative overtures to Great Britain concerning the admission of British Columbia into the new Dominion. The reply was disconcerting for the advocates of confederation -- and pleasing for the anti-confederationists who numbered the annexationists and the official government class (including Governor Seymour) which was by no means enthusiastic for a policy which would mean almost certainly the introduction of responsible government and the end of its own privileged and powerful position in the Colony. The Secretary of State for the Colonies took the ground that "whatever might be the advantages which in the course of time might result from the union of British North America under one government, it appears to me that the consideration of that question must at all events await the time when the intervening territory now under the control of the Hudson's Bay Company shall have

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1. Seymour to Carnarvon, March 18, 1867. Papers on the Union of British Columbia with the Dominion of Canada, 11.
been incorporated with the Confederation".

The control of the Hudson’s Bay Company over the North West was an obstacle in the way of the inclusion of British Columbia in the Dominion. But since the 'Fathers of Confederation' were anxious to include the West they took immediate steps to obtain the North West Territories from the Hudson’s Bay Company. Negotiations had begun before the completion of Confederation; one of the subjects entrusted to the delegation which went to London from Canada in the spring of 1865 was that of the "arrangements necessary for the settlement of the North-West Territory and Hudson's Bay Company claims". After Confederation the negotiations were resumed and brought to a successful conclusion in April, 1869, by an agreement whereby Rupert's Land was to be transferred to the Dominion of Canada. On July 15, 1870, Rupert's Land and the North West Territory were formally made part of the Dominion.

While the Dominion was negotiating to acquire the North-West Territories British Columbia continued to demand confederation. On January 29, 1868, a committee was appointed by a public meeting of the citizens of Victoria to draw up a memorial in favour of immediate confederation with Canada. The committee did its work well, reviewed the history and basis of the confederationist feeling in the colony and suggested conditions of union with the Dominion. Of the six conditions

1. Buckingham and Chandos to Seymour, Nov. 19, 1867, Papers on the Union of British Columbia with the Dominion of Canada, I.

have Anthony Musgrave, whom he had already chosen to succeed
Seymour, appointed Governor of British Columbia.

Musgrave, who arrived in Victoria in August, 1869, came with the express purpose of bringing British Columbia into the Dominion. He was firmly convinced that the idea of uniting British Columbia with Canada was eminently desirable. In that he was fully in accord with Sir John A. Macdonald and the confederationists of the colony. He recognized at once that the difficulties of the colony were primarily due to its isolated position on the Pacific seaboard. In October, 1869, he wrote:

Free commercial intercourse would be easier with Australia than with Canada; and the administration of official depart­ments could practically be conducted with equally great facility in London as in Ottawa.

For these reasons, the establishment of a line of communi­cation at least by a Waggon Road, if not by a Railway, as a condition of Union, will probably be brought forward in discussion.

Sir John A. Macdonald was just as strong in his opinion as Musgrave that transcontinental communications were necessary to save the Canadian west for the Dominion, although for somewhat different reasons. He was more concerned with the danger of losing the recently acquired Hudson's Bay territory and British Columbia to the United States than with the well-being of British Columbia. But this fear led him to the same conclusion as Musgrave. In January, 1870, he wrote a remarkable

letter to C.J. Brydges, the managing director of the Grand Trunk Railway.

It is quite evident... from advice from Washington that the United States' government are resolved to do all they can short of war to get possession of the western territory, and we must take immediate and vigorous steps to counteract them. One of the first things to be done is to show unmistakably our resolve to build the Pacific Railway...

Macdonald in showing such great eagerness for a transcontinental railway advocated what the Confederationists of British Columbia had not yet dared to suggest. At the Victoria and Yale meetings in 1868 they had not mentioned a railway; they merely suggested a transcontinental waggon-road. But the colonists moved quickly from waggon-road to railway following the arrival of Anthony Musgrave. When Musgrave met the Legislative Council in February, 1870, he made it quite clear that he was anxious to expedite confederation with Canada and presented a scheme of union which he had prepared for their consideration. His proposals were very similar to the proposals of the Confederation League but featured an advance in the matter of eastern communications in that they contained the first official proposal for a transcontinental railway. The railway condition read:

Inasmuch as no real Union can subsist between this Colony and Canada without the speedy establishment of communication across the Rocky Mountain by Coach Road and Railway, the Dominion shall within three years from the date of Union, construct and open for traffic such Coach Road from some point on the line of the Main Trunk Road of this colony to Fort Garry, ...and shall further engage to use all means in her power to complete such Railway communication at the earliest practicable date, and that surveys to determine the

proper line for such Railway shall be at once commenced;... Musgrave believed that the matter of communications was the crux of the whole confederation scheme. "If a railway could be promised," he wrote to the Secretary of State, "scarcely any other question would be allowed to be a difficulty".

On March 9, 1870, the Legislative Council began the debate on Musgrave's proposal of confederation. For ten days the terms proposed by Musgrave were debated and finally passed, with two exceptions, as submitted. The debate was introduced by the Attorney-General, H.P.P. Crease, who in short precise statements summed up the case for Confederation.

We are not prosperous. Population does not increase. Trade and commerce languish, coal mining does not advance; agriculture though progressive, does not go forward as it might. The settlement of the country, though increasing, yet falls short of just expectation. No public works for opening the country are on hand, and a general lack of progress... is everywhere apparent. And why is this? ...the chief reason of all is that policy of isolation which has left us aloof from the assistance and sympathy of a kindred race, and left us in the infant state of one of England's youngest colonies, to support the burdens and responsibilities of a thickly peopled and long settled land. Do Honourable Members ask what would Confederation do for us? It would at once relieve us from the most if not all the present ills from which we suffer, if properly arranged. For Confederation-in some sense means terms. It would assume our Public Debt. Greatly increase our Public Credit and thereby aid in the utilization of our varied resources. It would leave us a good balance in our Exchequer to carry on all local works and open out the country.

It would give us a Railroad across the Continent, and a quick and easy access to Ottawa, New York and London.

It would cement and strengthen, instead of weaken our connection with the Mother-land and ensure the protection of her

1. Dominion Sessional Papers, 1871, 18, p. 7.
2. Musgrave to Granville, April 5, 1870, Ottawa Archives.
Fleet and Army. It would attract population — ever tending in a continuous wave towards the West. It would promote the settlement of our Public Lands, and the development of Agriculture. Under it Trade and Commerce would take a fresh start...

Other supporters of Confederation followed the same theme. Robson declared that "after fifteen years hard struggle [British Columbia] finds herself worse off than she was at the beginning. Her progress has been like that of a crab — backwards....No man can conceal from himself...that the construction of the Railway alone would bring a very great increase to our labouring and productive population". Trutch declared that he believed the "depression [was] attributable to the isolated position of the colony, and to the cold shade thrown over us by the neighbourhood of the Territories of the United States....the railway is a means to an end, for we cannot have real confederation without a railway". As Musgrave had foreseen, the railway had aroused great interest and had become a sine qua non of union with the Dominion.

On Musgrave's proposal a delegation consisting of Trutch, Helmcken, and R.W.W. Carrall, an ardent confederationist, left for Ottawa to negotiate with the Dominion Government on the conditions of union adopted by the Legislative Council of the Colony. For the first time the confederationist feeling of British Columbia and the desire of the Dominion to gain the

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2. Ibid., p. 16.
3. Ibid., p. 19.
4. Musgrave to Young, April 12, 1870, *Dominion Sessional Papers*, 1871, 18, p. 10.
Pacific colony were brought in direct contact; the negotiations were a complete success, in fact so successful for British Columbia that even Musgrave was surprised. "The result is even more satisfying than I anticipated," he wrote. "The terms assented to by the Government of Canada are liberal towards this colony, and as they embrace an undertaking in respect to the Railway, as to the possibility of which I had some doubt, I have no hesitation in my belief that they will be accepted with cordiality by the community at large". The Dominion had agreed:

1. Musgrave to Granville, July 28, 1870, Ottawa Archives, G 365, 192.
2. Dominion Sessional Papers, 1871, 18, p. 27.
in any other way than under right of pre-emption, requiring actual residence of the pre-emptor or the land claimed by him.

In consideration of the land to be conveyed to the Dominion by British Columbia in aid of the construction of the railway, the Dominion Government agreed "to pay to British Columbia, from the date of the Union, the sum of 100,000 dollars per annum, in half yearly payments in advance".

Why the Dominion Government had been so liberal in its promises and voluntarily agreed to increase the obligations which British Columbia asked of her it is not possible to say. Perhaps it was because of over-anxiety for the future political status of British Columbia. Or perhaps the promise was made insincerely as it was later believed in British Columbia when the Dominion Government failed to fulfil its obligations to the Province.
CHAPTER II
RAILWAY DIFFICULTIES 1871 - 1881

As Governor Musgrave unhesitatingly predicted the terms of union were accepted in British Columbia "with cordiality by the community at large". Interest in the proposed railway was immediate and strong; long before the proposed surveys for the railway in British Columbia, and even before the union of British Columbia with the Dominion was finally consummated, 500 residents of Victoria petitioned the Governor-General of Canada urging that the terminus of the railway be fixed at Victoria or Esquimalt. Of the anticipated benefits to accrue to British Columbia from its becoming a part of the Dominion, the grand undertaking of Canada to construct within ten years a railway from the Pacific to connect with the railway system of the Confederacy was regarded as by far the greatest.

In the East, however, the terms of union were not so cordially received. That Canada was far from unanimous in support of the Pacific railway became abundantly clear when the debate on the proposed union of British Columbia and the Dominion began in the House of Commons on March 28, 1871. The great majority of the Liberals denounced the railway project declaring that British Columbia had inflicted an impossible and ruinous condition upon the Dominion. The cost of the under-

taking seemed appalling. Sandford Fleming estimated that the initial outlay would be $100,000,000 and the annual expenditure in the neighbourhood of $8,000,000. This tremendous expenditure Alexander Mackenzie, leader of the Liberal opposition, declared meant that "in order to get some 10,000 people into the Union the people of Canada were actually agreeing to pay $10,000 a head on their account". Edward Blake, one of the strongest men in the Liberal party and who five years later was to dictate the railway policy of the Dominion protested vigorously. "We are to give our land and we are to construct the railway; but for their lands [British Columbia's] given in the same way, they are to receive $100,000 a year forever. We are to buy their lands, while we are to give our own, and build the railway besides". In the Senate Le Tellier de St. Just declared that "ruin and misery" were facing Canada if the railway scheme were adopted.

Canadian newspapers condemned the project as visionary, unjust and ruinous. In Le Franc Parleur Adolphe Ouimet wrote that "the experience of the past, the weakness of our resources and the enormity of the conditions all oblige us to condemn the project which we consider impossible under the circumstances". Le Canadien made the declaration that in the

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2. Ibid., March 31, 1871, p. 745.
3. Toronto Globe, April 28, 1871.
5. April 6, 1871. References to Eastern newspapers and to manuscripts in the Ottawa archives are from notes made by Margaret Ormsby, M.A. (Brit. Col.) for her Doctor's thesis (Bryn Mawr) on the Relations of Canada and British Columbia 1871 - 1885.
world's annals of parliamentary debates, there is nothing to equal the duplicity, monstrous extravagance and stupid submission of our federal ministers and those who supported them in proposing the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway to effect the annexation of British Columbia. The Montreal Herald denounced the project with an epigram: "hereafter British Columbia will belong to us, though we shall rather more belong to British Columbia".

The opponents of the railway were in a very strong position in point of fact. Clause II of the terms of union was an impossible agreement and it was rightly assumed in 1871 that the cost of the railway project would be too much for the Dominion. Sandford Fleming had reported on the proposed railway and dubbed it a "commercial absurdity". But in some respects the critics were grievously in error. It was not true, as they seemed to assume, that the railway was to be built for the especial benefit of British Columbia, and that since the railway was to be built through a sparsely populated country it would remain a perpetual burden on Canada. Macdonald's agreement with British Columbia was admittedly impossible and absurd but his firm faith in the value of the Pacific railway as a great national and imperial undertaking was unchallengeable.

Although Mackenzie, Blake, and their supporters underestimated the great value of the railway to the whole of Canada, Macdonald and the Conservatives were equally at fault in great-

1. April 14, 1871.
2. April 15, 1871.
ly underestimating the enormous difficulties involved in their vast undertaking. The answer of the Macdonald party to their critics was, on the whole, magnificent. To the assertion that British Columbia was a barren mountainous wilderness, Edward Langevin declared that this great western country was "worth the sacrifice we are making to get it and the railway which we shall be permitted to construct will be worth infinitely more than it cost". Macdonald defended his party's stand in a speech at Peterborough on July 9, 1872, declaring "that if the railway had not been promised, the bargain with British Columbia would have been delayed too long, and she would have fallen prey by her own consent to either the southern [American] or northern [Russian] power". But the Conservatives could find no facile answer to the charge that the building of the railway within ten years of the annexation of British Columbia would place a ruinous burden on Canada. In reply they first held up the prospect of a contribution from the Imperial Government since the project was one of both national and imperial interest. The prospect of imperial assistance in 1871, however, was little considered, and the

1. *Le Courier du Canada*, Nov. 8, 1871, quoting from Langevin's Quebec speech.
3. Miller declared in the Senate that "when the time came England would do her duty, and do it generously". *Parliamentary Debates*, April 3, 1871, 798. An arrangement for aid from the Imperial Government seems to have been made in 1872. On April 26, 1872, Cartier announced in the House of Commons that "everyone had learned with pleasure that the Imperial Government had consented to assist Canada in building the great railway...by an amount which was equivalent to a saving of two per cent on the whole outlay". *Parliamentary Debates*, 1872, 175.
Conservatives, to obtain ratification of the terms of union, defined a policy of building the railway from proceeds of the sale of public lands to be appropriated along the railway from British Columbia, the North West Territories and Ontario, supplemented by means of a cash subsidy from the Dominion treasury which would not necessitate an increase in the existing rate of taxation.

The proposal to build the railway by land sales and small cash subsidies without increasing the rate of taxation was, to say the least, quite incongruous, which, if interpreted literally meant that the Conservative policy was no more in harmony with the terms of union than that of Mackenzie's party. When the terms of union debate was introduced Mackenzie moved an amendment that "the House is of the opinion that Canada should not be pledged to do more than proceed at once with the necessary surveys, and, after the route is determined to prosecute the work at as early a period as the state of the finances will justify,... The amendment, which defined the attitude which Mackenzie was to consistently maintain towards the Railway was defeated by the Conservatives 67 - 94. But rather surprisingly the Conservatives a little later adopted a policy towards the Railway which had it been literally interpreted, would have forced them to follow the policy defined by Mackenzie.

That the policy of the Government was to build the railway by the aid of huge grants of land, much larger than the grant finally made to the Canadian Pacific Railway by the

2. Ibid., p. 730.
Statute of 1881, and by small cash subsidies without increasing the rate of taxation is apparent from statements made in Parliament at the time the terms of Union were under discussion. To say the least this optimistic attitude of the Conservative Government regarding the building of the railway was rather too visionary and foolish. None could say that the lands would produce sufficient revenue to carry the burden assisted by small Government subsidies. When the Railway was finally built land sales did not build it but Government subsidies did -- much larger than were intended. When the Conservatives after adopting the terms of Union embodied their railway policy in a resolution moved by Sir George Cartier, they unwittingly, or cunningly (it is difficult to say which) virtually placed themselves on all fours with the Liberal party and broke their promise to British Columbia before they had made any effort to fulfil it. Cartier's resolution was that

the Railway referred to in the Address to her Majesty concerning the Union of British Columbia with Canada, adopted by this House on Saturday the 1st April instant, should be constructed and worked by private enterprise, and not by the Dominion Government; and that the public aid to be given to secure that undertaking should consist of such liberal grants of land, and such subsidy of money, or other aid, not unduly pressing on the industry and resources of the Dominion, as the Parliament of Canada shall hereafter determine.  

This policy, incongruous as it was when considered with the terms of union, was embodied in the Canadian Pacific Railway Act assented to on June 14, 1872. The preamble to the Act recited clause 11 of the terms of union, and set forth

1. 44 Victoria chap. 1.
3. Ibid., 1871, p. 1027.
4. 35 Victoria chap. 71.
the fact that the House of Commons had resolved that the railway should be built by a private enterprise and not by the Government, and that the public aid to be given should consist of such liberal grants of land and such subsidy in money as the Parliament of Canada should thereafter determine, **not increasing the rate of taxation**. The Act then provided that the railway should be commenced within two years from the 20th day of July, 1871, the date that British Columbia became a province of Canada, and should be completed within ten years of the same date. For two very obvious reasons the Act was absurd. In one and the same document the Government solemnly promised British Columbia to build a transcontinental railway in ten years and then promised the people of Canada that this great undertaking would not mean an increase in taxation. The truth of the matter surely is that the Macdonald Government, fearing failure of their railway project, used the taxation proposal as a subterfuge - to which they did not intend to bind themselves - in order to gain the support of the whole Conservative party, some of whose members were at one with the Liberals in fearing the enormous cost of the Pacific railway. It is impossible to believe that the Government was sincere in promising to build the railway without cost to Canada. Secondly, the Act was absurd because even granting that there would be no financial difficulties, no one could say that the great engineering problems involved would make commencement of construction possible by July 20, 1873, and completion of construction possible by July 20, 1881. At the time the Act was passed surveys had been in progress in British Columbia for almost a
year, but they were far from complete. It was most improbable that the route would be fixed by July 20, 1873; actually it was not defined until July 13, 1878.

The whole railway policy of the Macdonald Government was riddled with deceit and inconsistencies, based on hypotheses in which only the most sanguine could possibly believe. Macdonald successfully hoodwinked his party and British Columbia, where he was extremely popular because it was he who promised the railway and promised to build it, but it would be interesting to know just how much of the trouble with British Columbia which Mackenzie experienced because of the delay in building the railway would have been avoided had Macdonald remained in office. This much can be said, his resolution promising no increase in taxation provided Mackenzie with a very strong weapon to use against British Columbia in the quarrel which later developed over the non-fulfilment of clause 11 of the terms of union.

Having secured adoption of the terms of union and passed the Canadian Pacific Railway Act Macdonald began the work of fulfilling his engagements to British Columbia. His first task was to charter a company to undertake the task of building the road with a land grant of not more than 50,000,000 acres and a subsidy of $30,000,000 as provided by the Act of 1872. After many difficulties the Government

1. The first survey party set out from Victoria on the day British Columbia entered the Dominion, July 20, 1871.
2. Vide Correspondence relative to the Canadian Pacific Railway, London, 1874.
chartered in February, 1873, the Canada Pacific Railway Company, a group of Canadian capitalists under the presidency of Sir Hugh Allan. It was at this juncture that Seth Huntingdon, Liberal member of the House of Commons for the county of Shefford, Quebec, made a sensational charge in the House. On April 10, 1873, he accused the Conservative party of fraud in the elections held in 1872, because Sir Hugh Allan had contributed generously to its campaign fund. The charges were subsequently proved to have been unfounded but this incident famous in Canadian History as the "Pacific Scandal" reflected on Sir Hugh Allan's credit in such a manner that he failed to raise the necessary capital for his undertaking, and was forced to surrender his charter. For Macdonald it meant defeat in the election in the autumn of 1873 and when Parliament met in February, 1874, Mackenzie was Prime Minister, the leader of a Liberal Government.

When the Liberals came to power the promise to begin construction of the railway two years from the date of union had already been broken; surveys in British Columbia had not discovered a practicable route and British Columbia had sent her first protest to the non-fulfilment of the terms of union to Ottawa. This situation placed Mackenzie face to face with most formidable difficulties. In the first place he and his party were regarded with great suspicion in British Columbia.

1. Charter for the Construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway, with papers and correspondence, Ottawa, 1873.
3. Trutch to Aikens, July 26, 1873, Dominion Sessional Paper 19, 1875, p. 2.
and the circumstances of Macdonald's fall from power on an issue involving clause 11 of the terms of union had augmented this suspicion. Secondly, there was no longer any company willing to undertake the construction of the railway under the Act of 1872. Nothing was more certain than that the promise of completion of the railway within ten years would not be kept. Thirdly, the Macdonald Government seemingly as part of its policy of expedient deceit with regard to its obligations to British Columbia had made unwise commitments about the western terminus of the railway which were to increase and complicate the difficulties of Mackenzie's position.

The proclamation of the Macdonald Government of June 7, 1873, "that Esquimalt in Vancouver Island be fixed as the terminus of the Canadian Pacific Railway and that a line of railway be located between the harbour of Esquimalt and Seymour Narrows on the said island" was as absurd as the Canadian Pacific Railway Act of 1872. In fact Macdonald seems to have been ready to go to any length of absurdity in his pretense of fulfilling the terms of union to the satisfaction of British Columbia. Having fixed the terminus at Esquimalt, in July, 1873, when the two years within which railway construction was to begin in British Columbia was about to lapse, he carried out the formality, which Amor de Cosmos denounced as a "disreputable farce", of having a gang of men clear a few hundred yards of the line and drive a few stakes at intervals

at Esquimalt. The work proceeded no further and within a week British Columbia made her first protest to the Dominion. The order-in-council fixing the terminus at Esquimalt was no less absurd than this empty formality. The terminus was fixed at Esquimalt without any definite knowledge of where the main line would run in British Columbia. Further the proclamation if interpreted liberally was predicated on the doubtful practicability of two difficult and costly engineering feats. At the time it was thought that the line would reach the Pacific when finally located at Burrard Inlet or at a more northerly point at Bute Inlet. The act of fixing the terminus at Esquimalt and providing for an island railway meant that the Macdonald Government, in order to satisfy the citizens of Vancouver Island, who were anxious to have the railway terminate on the Island, proposed to adopt Bute Inlet and carry the line to Vancouver Island by a series of spans resting on the Valdes Islands and across the Seymour Narrows. Bridging the Straits was, in Sandford Fleming's words a project "of a most formidable character" which would cost twenty million dollars. But this did not worry the Macdonald Government nor the citizens of Vancouver Island.

Not only was the terminus proclamation indefensible from an engineering point of view but it also unnecessarily increased the commitments to British Columbia beyond those made in clause 11 of the terms of union and further embarrassed

1. Vide supra p. 36.
Mackenzie since it gave Vancouver Island a more substantial ground upon which to base agitation for the railway than it had before possessed. It is necessary to understand that Vancouver Island was in wealth and population the dominant section of British Columbia. Clause 11 of the terms of union promising a railway only to the Pacific Coast threatened the dominance of the Island. Therefore if the line were carried to Esquimalt by means of a bridge between Mainland and Island its continued dominance would, it was thought, be assured. The Island consequently pressed Macdonald to fix the terminus on the Island and finally won from him the order-in-council of June 7, 1873. Having won this declaration from the Dominion it was more than ever anxious for the transcontinental railway and very annoyed when Mackenzie quite justly denounced the railway policy of Macdonald in his first public announcement on the Pacific railway at Sarnia late in November, 1873.

Mackenzie's definition of railway policy was somewhat vague, but he made it quite clear that he would attempt to obtain from British Columbia modification of clause 11 of the terms of union. "Such a bargain," [as that made with British Columbia] he declared, "was made to be broken". But not absolutely, for he announced his intention of keeping faith with the Province in spirit, if not to the letter. In his pre-election manifesto delivered to the electors of Lambton Mackenzie further defined his position.

1. Vide supra p. 28.  
2. Globe, Nov. 26, 1873.  
3. Ibid., Jan. 9, 1874.
We must meet the difficulties imposed upon Canada by the reckless arrangements of the late government with reference to the Pacific Railway.... That contract [clause 11] has now been broken. Over a million has been spent on surveys, but no part of the line has yet been located, and the bargain is, as we have always said it was, incapable of literal fulfilment. We must, therefore, endeavour to arrange with British Columbia for a relaxation of its terms as may give time for the completion of the surveys and the acquisition of the information necessary to an intelligent apprehension of the work, for its subsequent prosecution with some speed, and under such arrangements, as the resources of the country will permit without too largely increasing the burden of taxation on the people.

There is no denying the strength of Mackenzie's policy. It suffered from none of the pretense and deceits of Macdonald's; it was honest and sincere. Mackenzie sought a conciliatory policy because he felt the responsibility of answering the protests of British Columbia, and because he realized that the terms of union were a formal obligation which the Dominion government was honour bound to carry out or to secure its modification.

When the session opened in February, 1874, Mackenzie announced his intention of obtaining modification of the terms of union and of utilizing water stretches for transport across the continent wherever possible instead of building an all-rail route to the Pacific. This policy was embodied in the Canadian Pacific Railway Act of 1874 which repealed the Act of 1872. The Act was similar to the Act of 1872 in that it stated that the railway should be constructed by private enterprise and that the public aid to be given should consist of such liberal

1. Vide Dominion Sessional Paper 51, 1874, for report of A.H. Vaughan regarding the practicability of using water transport from Fort Garry to the Rocky Mountains.
2. 37 Victoria chap. 14
grants of land and such subsidy in money not increasing the rate of taxation as the Parliament of Canada should determine. But in one important respect it was different. The Governor-in-Council was given power to construct the railway, or any portion thereof, as a public work if it were found more advantageous to do so. Since the 'Pacific Scandal' had forced Sir Hugh Allan to give up his charter no Company had appeared to undertake the project, and it was very doubtful at the time the Act of 1874 was passed whether the Government would be successful in procuring the construction of the road by private enterprise.

While the Canadian Pacific Railway Act was being debated in the House, J.D. Edgar, a Toronto barrister whom Mackenzie had sent to British Columbia, was trying to arrange a modification of the terms of the union. Edgar, under instructions from Mackenzie, offered in place of clause 11 of the terms of union, to commence immediately a line of railway from Esquimalt to Nanaimo, to push the surveys on the mainland on with all possible speed and when the line was finally located to spend at least $1,500,000 annually on construction. In the meantime construction would begin on a transcontinental waggon road and telegraph line. The negotiations on these terms got nowhere and even ended in a quarrel for which Premier Walkem of British Columbia was to blame. This unsatisfactory result was not unexpected for with the increased suspicion of the Dominion government in British Columbia following Macdonald's

fall from power the British Columbia government was demanding a literal fulfilment of the terms of union. The failure of the negotiations, however, left Mackenzie in a much stronger position. They had failed because of the sharp practices of Walkem who had instigated a quarrel by refusing to recognize Edgar as a fully qualified representative of the Dominion Government. Walkem discussed railway difficulties with Edgar but refused to discuss anything regarding a new contract between the Dominion and British Columbia because he doubted Edgar's "official authority for appearing in the role of an agent contracting for the Dominion of Canada". Since Edgar enjoyed the complete confidence and support of Mackenzie the failure of the negotiations under these circumstances left British Columbia with the responsibility of reopening the discussion of the terms of union. Walkem had now, it appeared, to approach Mackenzie as a suppliant.

Walkem did not approach Mackenzie. He appealed directly to the Imperial Government for compensation for the grievances inflicted on his province by the Dominion. He was probably thinking of this line of action when he refused to discuss the

1. Hitherto British Columbia seemed not inclined to hold the Dominion to clause 11 as a hard and fast contract. Trutch on his mission to arrange the terms of union in 1870 had declared that "he had been accused of making a very Jewish bargain; but not even Shylock would have demanded his 'pound of flesh' if it had to be cut from his own body". Order-in-council July 8, 1874. Dominion Sessional Paper 19, 1875, p. 25.
2. Walkem to Edgar, May 18, 1874. Ibid., p. 24.
3. Trutch to Carnarvon, June 11, 1874 (received July 22) Correspondence re C.P.R. Act so far as regards British Columbia, London, 1875, p. 23.
terms offered by Edgar. Constitutionally the act of a provincial government appealing to the Imperial government for redress from the Dominion government may not have been a sound one, but it got Walkem out of a difficult position and annoyed and embarrassed Mackenzie. A happy coincidence from Walkem's point of view was the fact that Lord Carnarvon, Secretary of State for the Colonies, a strong imperialist and supporter of the Canadian Pacific Railway project, offered himself as arbitrator between the Dominion and British Columbia even before the petition of British Columbia had reached London. Mackenzie, who was loath to let control of his railway policy slip from Ottawa to London, refused to admit that British Columbia had any grievances to arbitrate. He was ready to build the Pacific railway as quickly as the resources of Canada would allow. He therefore rejected Carnarvon's offer of arbitration stating that there were "no differences to submit to arbitration". A month later under the persuasion of Lord Dufferin, the Governor-General, a very able man and one who did not hesitate to take a hand in shaping Government policy, Mackenzie grudgingly accepted Carnarvon's offer of arbitration. British Columbia accepted the offer a few days later.

Carnarvon absolved the Dominion Government from all

1. Carnarvon to Dufferin, June 18, 1874, Correspondence re the C.P.R. Act so far as regards British Columbia, p. 23.
2. These words were used in a telegram sent by H.C. Flecker, the governor-general's secretary, to the Colonial Office on June 18, Maxwell, J.A., Lord Dufferin and the Difficulties with British Columbia, 1874-7, Canadian Historical Review, v. 12, Toronto, 1931, note p. 369.
3. Order-in-Council, July 23, 1874, Correspondence re the C.P.R. Act so far as regards British Columbia, p. 72.
4. Trutch to Carnarvon, Aug. 5, 1874, ibid., p. 69.
blame in not fulfilling the terms of union -- as any sensible
man would have done -- and recommended terms which were not
unlike those already offered by Edgar. Carnarvon submitted his
conclusions to Dufferin on November 17, 1874. His recommenda-
tions, which became known as the Carnarvon Terms, were:

(1) That the railway from Esquimalt to Nanaimo shall be
commenced as soon as possible and completed with all prac-
ticable despatch.
(2) That the surveys on the mainland shall be pushed on with
the utmost vigour. On this point, after considering the rep-
resentations of your ministers, I feel that I have no
alternative but to reply, as I do most fully and readily,
upon their assurances that no legitimate effort or expense
will be spared, first to determine the best route for the
line, and secondly, to proceed with the details of the
engineering work....
(3) That the waggon road and telegraph line shall be
immediately constructed....
(4) That $2,000,000 a year and not $1,500,000 shall be the
minimum expenditure on railway works within the Province
from the date at which the surveys are sufficiently completed
to enable that amount to be expended on construction. In
naming this amount I understand that, it being alike the
interest and the wish of the Dominion Government to urge on
with all speed the completion of the works now to be under-
taken, the annual expenditure will be as much in excess of
the minimum of 2,000,000 dollars as in any year may be found
practicable.
(5) Lastly, that on or before the 31st December, 1890, the
railway shall be completed and open for traffic from the
Pacific seaboard to a point at the western end of Lake
Superior, at which it will fall into connection with existing
lines of railway through a portion of the United States, and
also with the navigation on Canadian waters. To proceed at
present with the remainder of the railway extending, by the
country northward of Lake Superior, to the existing Canadian
lines, ought not, in my opinion, to be required, and the
time for undertaking that work must be determined by the
development of settlement and the changing circumstances of
the country. The day is, I hope not very distant when a
continuous line of railway through Canadian territory will
be practicable, and I therefore look upon this portion of
the scheme as postponed rather than abandoned.

1. Carnarvon to Dufferin, Nov. 17, 1874, Correspondence re the
C.P.R. Act so far as regards British Columbia, p. 92.
2. The Dominion government maintained that the surveys were
"already being accomplished with the utmost despatch".
Order-in-Council, Sept. 17, 1874, ibid., p. 80.
In drafting these proposals Carnarvon declared that his conclusions upheld in the main the policy of the Mackenzie government. This was quite true. They differed with Edgar's proposals in only two respects: the amount to be spent annually on construction in British Columbia was increased from $1,500,000 to $2,000,000 and a date, December 31, 1890, (which the Dominion government was not anxious to accept) was set for the completion of the western section of the line from Lake Superior to the Pacific. However Walkem who had abruptly dismissed Edgar accepted the Carnarvon terms. The Dominion accepted the terms remarking that "the conclusion at which his Lordship has arrived 'upholds', as he remarks, in the main, and subject only to some modifications of detail the policy adopted by this Government on this most embarrassing question".

At this point it appeared that a concord had been reached between Canada and British Columbia. But Mackenzie's acceptance of the Carnarvon terms led to a political crisis in Canada which resulted in the repudiation of Carnarvon's work by the Dominion. The reason for this difficulty was that Mackenzie accepted the Carnarvon terms without the support of his whole party. Important men in the party, of whom Edward Blake was the leader, were hostile even to the obligations placed on the Dominion by Carnarvon. In March, 1875, when Mackenzie

1. For a discussion of Walkem's part in the railway dispute vide Gosnell, R.E., British Columbia, Sixty Years of Progress, Pt. 2, pp. 57-71.
2. Order-in-Council, Dec., 18, 1874, Correspondence re C.P.R. Act so far as regards British Columbia, p. 95.
introduced a Bill to provide for the immediate construction of the Esquimalt and Nanaimo railway he met with the opposition of this faction of his party. Blake declared that the Government had no constitutional authority to enter into a contract with British Columbia to build the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway which would be binding on the House of Commons by whom the necessary funds for carrying out the contract would have to be supplied. He went on to declare that

The engagement made at the time of union was ruinous to the people of Canada, and in order to obtain relief from the terms of that bargain he was willing to pay a reasonable price. He did not believe that the price proposed to be paid was a reasonable one.... It was a question whether this Parliament was not running a risk in assenting to the Carnarvon terms and breaking up the policy which was laid down last session that the burden of this country should not be further increased in constructing this railroad.

The Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill, in spite of the opposition, passed the House of Commons 101 to 62, most of the votes being cast against the Bill by the Conservatives who had in the first place promised the Island railway. In the Senate however two Liberals joined with 22 Conservatives to defeat the Bill 24 to 21.

The defeat of the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill in the Senate virtually marked the end of Mackenzie's conciliatory railway policy. Mackenzie still avowed to British Columbia his intention of carrying out "the letter and the spirit" of the Carnarvon terms. He seems to have had no doubt that the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill would be introduced again.

2. Ibid., p. 956.
in the House, but actually the Bill was dead for all time and with it the Carnarvon terms. The defeat of the Bill had been a victory for Edward Blake and his wing of the Liberal Party, and before long Blake and not Mackenzie was in control of the whole party.

Mackenzie soon realized that to insist on the fulfilment of the Carnarvon terms would lead to a serious disruption of his party. He chose to give way to Blake rather than to take the risk of breaking his party. This he was not altogether loath to do as a matter of policy, for, it must be remembered, he, like Blake, had attacked the terms of Union, and had accepted the Carnarvon terms grudgingly and largely because he felt the responsibility of pacifying British Columbia.

On May 19, 1875, Blake entered the Mackenzie government as Minister of Justice on the distinct understanding that the E. and N. Railway project should be dropped and that the fulfilment of the Carnarvon terms, at least those that remained, should not be construed to render it obligatory on Canada to raise the rate of taxation in order to fulfil them. This is apparent from a letter from Blake to Mackenzie on May 18, 1875.

The result of our discussion this morning is that I agree to join your Government on the understanding...that the Government should negotiate with Columbia for the payment of a cash subsidy in lieu of the agreement to construct the Vancouver Railway; that the Government shall propose to Parliament a measure for the carrying out of the old terms as modified, providing for the payment of the cash subsidy, in case that is agreed to; otherwise for the construction of

1. Dufferin in his speech at Victoria in 1876 said: "I very much doubt whether he (Mackenzie) could have succeeded in carrying it (the E. and N. Railway Bill) a second time even in the House of Commons". St. John, Molyneux, The Sea of Mountains, Hurst and Blackett, London, 1877, v. 2, p. 204.
the Vancouver railway, and providing that the obligations to secure an annual expenditure of two millions and to complete the line from the Pacific to Lake Superior by 1890 shall not be construed to render it obligatory on Canada further to raise the rate of taxation in order to their fulfilment.

The new railway policy inspired by Blake was made public on September 20, 1875, by an order-in-council which was to be the centre of the railway controversy for the next two years. As a fundamental statement of railway policy the order-in-council placed the Government firmly on the Conservative taxation resolution of 1871.

It must be borne in mind that every step in the negotiations were necessarily predicated upon and subject to the conditions of the Resolution of the House of Commons, passed in 1871 contemporaneously with the adoption of the Terms of Union with British Columbia, subsequently enacted in the Canadian Pacific Railway Act of 1872, and subsequently re-enacted (after a large addition had been made to the rate of taxation) in the Canadian Pacific Railway Act of 1874; that the public aid to be given to secure the accomplishment of the undertaking "should consist of such liberal grants of land and such subsidy in money or other aid, not increasing the existing rate of taxation, as the Parliament of Canada should thereafter determine".

Public opinion the order-in-council declared was in sympathy with this declaration and

it cannot be too clearly understood that any agreements as to the completion by a fixed time, must be subject to the condition thrice recorded in the Journals of Parliament, that no further increase of the rate of taxation shall be required in order to their fulfilment.

The Island railway was written off Dominion obligations to British Columbia. The Island railway the order-in-council declared -- quite correctly -- "was not a portion of the main line of the Pacific railway".

it was intended to benefit local interests, and was proposed as compensation for the disappointment experienced by the unavoidable delay in constructing the Railway across the Continent.

There were no "obvious reasons" why the Dominion should undertake to build the line. In place of the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway the order-in-council provided for a cash subsidy for any delays which might take place in the construction of the Pacific railway.

It would seem reasonable that the people of British Columbia should construct this work themselves, or (if they should think other local works more advantageous) should, in lieu of this, themselves undertake such other local public works, and that the compensation to be given them by Canada for any delays which may take place in the construction of the Pacific Railway should be in the form of a cash bonus to be applied towards the local Railway, or such other local works as the Legislature of British Columbia may undertake.

The cash bonus or compensation offered was $750,000.

On the receipt of this order-in-council in British Columbia the railway controversy began again with renewed vigour. Walkem sent back a reply "unhesitatingly but respectfully declining" the Dominion government's proposals. The British Columbia government maintained that the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway was a portion of the Canadian Pacific Railway and that the Dominion had hitherto considered it as part of the Pacific railway and not a compensation for the disappointment experienced because of the unavoidable delay in constructing the Railway across the Continent. Further it maintained that the taxation resolution so carefully paraded in the Dominion order-in-council had never been binding on British Columbia.

Columbia, and even if it had been, since the rate of taxation had been raised and since the Mackenzie government had changed the Dominion obligations to British Columbia, it no longer had any effect. The proposed bonus of $750,000 was regarded as "a proposed indemnity for a contemplated indefinite postponement of the construction" of the Pacific railway.

An acceptance of this proposed bonus would be equivalent to a surrender of these guarantees [the expenditure of $2,000,000 annually and the promise of completion by December 31, 1890] and an abandonment by British Columbia for all time to come of her right to protest against future delays, however protracted.

British Columbia also pointed out that the order-in-council made no mention of the waggon road and telegraph line promised in the Carnarvon terms, and that the waggon road, though promised 12 months ago had not been commenced, that work on the telegraph line though begun in the spring of 1875 had been abandoned indefinitely.

An impasse had again been reached and 1876 ushered in another year of strained relations between Province and Dominion. Cries of secession were raised in the Province and the man in control of the Dominion government, Edward Blake, thought the Dominion would be well advised to let the Pacific province go. "If", he declared, "under all these circumstances, the Columbians were to say, 'You must go on and finish this railway according to the terms, or take the alternative of releasing us from Confederation,' I would take the alternative".

British Columbia again petitioned the Imperial Gover-
ment to intervene; Lord Carnarvon was asked "to cause the Dominion government to be immediately moved to carry out the terms of the settlement". Carnarvon again showed his willingness to arbitrate. That he was displeased by the course of events in the Dominion is clearly revealed by a letter he wrote to Lord Dufferin. "I should, of course, have great difficulty in believing," he wrote, "that a Government which only a year ago had undertaken specific obligations could contemplate any departure from...them". In answer Mackenzie, who was again opposed to subjecting the policy of his government to Carnarvon's arbitration declared that Carnarvon evidently "had failed to appreciate efforts we [the Government] had made to implement an impossible bargain". The policy of his Government as defined in the order-in-council of September, 1875, would not be altered. Because of Mackenzie's strong stand no decision was taken by Carnarvon to enforce his views on the Dominion. He decided to wait until after a projected visit of Lord Dufferin to British Columbia had been completed before making any specific suggestions.

Lord Dufferin arrived in British Columbia in August, 1876, at a time, as he well realized, when British Columbia was deeply discontented and annoyed with the Dominion Government. His visit was informal and connected with no official

1. Trutch to Carnarvon, Feb. 2, 1876, B.C. Sessional Papers, 1876, p. 637.
2. Carnarvon to Trutch, April 27, 1876, ibid., p. 737.
3. Carnarvon to Dufferin, May 4, 1876, Blake Papers 71, 11 Ottawa Archives.
business of the Dominion government, but it was generally known that it was inspired by the railway difficulties. His journey of goodwill has been described often and has been acclaimed for allaying the bitter feeling on the Island and Mainland and for creating a better spirit towards the Dominion, which made possible, once again, an amiable settlement of the railway controversy. He spent about two months in the Province visiting many points on the coast and even journeying into the interior as far as Kamloops. Wherever he went he found the railway question always to the front, and in Victoria he found a strong movement for secession from the Dominion. On his reception in the capital he was invited to pass under an arch bearing the bitter caption "Carnarvon Terms or Separation" -- which he diplomatically refused to do. In the same spirit he refused to accept a secession address which had been prepared for him; he chose to assure the citizens of Victoria of the goodwill of the Dominion government assuring them that the Carnarvon terms would be implemented or a satisfactory equivalent offered. He exposed the secession movement on Vancouver Island as an absurd act of political suicide. Great Britain would not allow the Island to go; and as a Pacific naval base it "would be ruled as Jamaica, Malta, Heligoland and Ascension are ruled, through the instrumentality of some naval or other officer".

1. Vide St John, The Sea of Mountains; Gosnell, British Columbia, Sixty Years of Progress, Howay and Scholefield, British Columbia.
2. St. John, op. cit., p. 155 et seq.
3. Ibid., p. 192 et seq.
4. Ibid., p. 217.
Lord Dufferin left the Province with the firm belief that the railway difficulties should be settled once and for all by appeal to Lord Carnarvon's arbitration. He feared that if the Dominion as the strongest party in the controversy should determine to settle the dispute as it chose, the Province, at least Vancouver Island, might implement its threat to secede. In any case, he wrote to Mackenzie, a discontented province was "an inconvenience and a scandal". The subject of the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway should be referred to Lord Carnarvon; in place of a bonus of $750,000 he might induce British Columbia to accept $1,000,000. Dufferin likewise wished Mackenzie to allow Carnarvon to settle the larger question of the mainline.

I think I see my way to an arrangement which might be reached if only it could be pressed on the Province from without, that is to say from England, and under which British Columbia might be brought to acquiesce in the indefinite postponement of the western section of the line without much trouble and without our fair fame being again assailed.

The Dominion had made two agreements with British Columbia and had broken both of them; Dufferin feared the consequences if such action were to continue. He could "not find language to express the shame and humiliation" which he should feel if he had to go back to England and say that a province had been lost under his administration.

Mackenzie, however, remained obdurate. He intended to do nothing more; the order-in-council of September, 1875, was final. Dufferin continued in his efforts, even stepping beyond

2. Ibid.
his constitutional privileges as Governor-General, but Mackenzie, supported by his Ministers, replied that Lord Carnarvon "should not have pressed his interference upon Canada and that he [Mackenzie] never would consent to make another mistake of the kind by again appearing before Lord Carnarvon as a judge..."

Mackenzie carried his point and Lord Carnarvon after a silence of seven months answered the petition of British Columbia urging them to have patience and accept for the time being the railway policy of the Dominion government. "No hasty action should be pressed upon the Canadian Government," he wrote, "whom, I need hardly say, I believe to be thoroughly sincere, in their desire to construct the mainline of railway with all the expedition of which the resources of the country and the engineering problems remaining yet unsolved will admit. It was unreasonable, he urged upon British Columbia, to expect commencement of the mainline of the railway when so much work had yet to be done in locating the route and western terminus. For this reason he urged the Province to await with patience the completion of the surveys.

Between the coming spring...and the spring of 1878 it may fairly be expected that many points now surrounded with doubt will have become more clearly defined, and I fully hope and believe that after the very limited delay of a single summer the Province of British Columbia will find that there is no longer any obstacle to the active prosecution of the undertaking....

2. Memorandum on Conversation with Lord Dufferin on British Columbia Affairs on Nov. 16 and 18, 1876, Mackenzie Papers II, 779, Ottawa Archives.
3. Carnarvon to Dufferin, Dec. 18, 1876, B.C. Sessional Papers 1877, p. 381.
Carnarvon diplomatically avoided a discussion of the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway and the proposed $750,000 cash bonus, stating that he was at the moment "unable to pronounce an opinion as to the course which should be taken, either with regard to the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway or with regard to the delays which have occurred, or which may yet occur, in the construction of the mainline". He did say however that it would "be a source of much satisfaction to [him] to learn that the Province were willing to accept the principle of a money equivalent for the line in question, the construction of which [he was] bound to say [did] not appear to [him] to be the most judicious expenditure of capital".

British Columbia was thus courteously but firmly rebuffed by Carnarvon, who clearly enough had gone back on his own terms. In March, 1877, British Columbia drafted her reply. They deeply regretted that His Lordship should have been unable to feel himself in a position to urge upon Canada the necessity of carrying into effect at once the terms of the agreement entered into in 1874," but they, however, felt "that they [were] bound to accept the recommendations of Lord Carnarvon to concede to the Dominion Government the short delay of another summer...." With regard to the Esquimalt and Nanaimo railway and the cash bonus no decision was made. The conclusion of the reply was bitter.

They [desired] particularly to report that the succession of failures on the part of the Dominion Government to fulfil the several Railway agreements, solemnly entered into with

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the Province, [had] produced a feeling of disappointment and distrust so widespread and intense, as to severely and injuriously affect the commercial and industrial interests, and seriously retard, the general prosperity of this portion of the Dominion.

In November, 1877, since the year of waiting proposed by Lord Carnarvon had practically elapsed and since railway construction had not commenced in British Columbia, the Provincial government again petitioned the Dominion government and Lord Carnarvon. The Dominion was asked for the result of the year's surveys in order that the Executive Council might lay before the Provincial Legislature definite information with reference to the intentions of the Dominion government to carry out its railway obligations to the Province under the Carnarvon terms of 1874. Lord Carnarvon was urged to be "careful to discountenance any further unnecessary delay in the commencement of railway construction within the Province".

The report of the Chief Engineer in charge of the surveys, Sandford Fleming, had been delayed longer than Mackenzie had anticipated and as a result the route in British Columbia had not been determined. The Dominion was therefore obliged to reply that

...the delay deemed necessary before advertising for tenders was consequent upon the manifest necessity of making a careful instrumental survey of the Fraser Valley route, upon which an exploratory survey only had been made in previous years. That, as early as the season [1877] permitted a large staff of engineers was sent to perform this work... That the field work was finished about the beginning of November, and in the course of that month the engineers returned to Ottawa, where they are now engaged plotting the results of the season's work.

That it will take some time to accomplish this and to report in such detail as will enable the Government to come to a decision as to the value of the route.¹

Because of these circumstances the government found it impossible to make a definite decision on the route to be followed. British Columbia would have to wait for definite assurances until the report of the engineers was complete.

For three months British Columbia waited. By March, 1878, no more information regarding the route and commencement of construction had been received from Ottawa and on March 18 British Columbia sent another dispatch to Ottawa asking if construction would be commenced in the Province as early as possible in the spring of 1878. The Province received little satisfaction. She was again informed that the engineers had not finished their work, but that as soon as this work were done the Government would endeavour to decide upon the best route to be taken through British Columbia, when tenders would be invited in accordance with the terms of the Railway Act of 1874.

Shortly after this exchange of notes between Province and Dominion the Dominion government reached a decision on the route to be followed in British Columbia. On May 23, 1878, the order-in-council of June 7, 1873, fixing Esquimalt as the western terminus of the railway was rescinded. And on May 29, 1878, British Columbia was informed that "Burrard Inlet would, in all probability, be adopted as the western terminus and that

² Order-in-Council, March 18, 1878, ibid., p. 33.
³ Scott to Richards, March 27, 1878, ibid.
⁴ Order-in-Council, May 23, 1878, ibid., p. 34.
in consequence of this it was deemed advisable

that a strip of land should be reserved for the conveyance to the Dominion Government, in accordance with the 11th paragraph of the terms of Union, along the said line of railway, beginning at English Bay or Burrard Inlet and following the River Fraser to Lytton, thence up the valley of the North Thompson, passing near to Lake Albreda and Cranberry to Tête Jaune Cache, thence up the valley of the Fraser River to the summit of Yellow Head, or boundary between British Columbia and the North-West Territories.

The choice of the Burrard Inlet-Fraser Valley-Yellowhead Pass route was confirmed by an order-in-council July 13, 1878, and on September 3, 1878 British Columbia was formally requested to convey to the Dominion the lands specified in clause 11 of the terms of union along the railway line in British Columbia.

The end of the acrimonious dispute between the Province and the Dominion, however, had not been reached. In June, 1878, the Hon. George A. Walkem again became Premier of British Columbia and with his return to power British Columbia renewed her attacks on the Dominion. The Elliott government which had been in power since January 25, 1876, had adopted a conciliatory policy on railway matters. Elliott had accepted Carnarvon's advice to await patiently the completion of the surveys in the Province. Walkem's policy, on the other hand, was to fight the Dominion. On July 29, he told the Legislative Assembly that the "railway question was still in a very unsatisfactory condition....I would remind you that the time has come when delay in construction of the work, both on the Mainland and Island can no longer be justified...." Drastic

2. Ibid., p. 36.
3. Ibid., p. 37.
action, Walkem believed, was necessary. On August 29 he moved a resolution that unless the Dominion began construction by May, 1879,

British Columbia shall thereafter have the right to exclusively collect and retain her customs and excise duties and to withdraw from the union; and shall also, in any event, be entitled to be compensated by the Dominion for losses sustained by reason of past delays and the failure of the Dominion Government to carry out their railway and other obligations to the Province.¹

The resolution was carried 14 to 9 and forwarded to the Secretary of State for Canada for transmission to London.

The secession resolution had no serious consequences, but it was a clumsy and ill-judged piece of statesmanship. At the time it was passed Mackenzie was making active preparation to begin construction. In 1874, in view of the Carnarvon terms and the proposed immediate construction of the Island railway he had obtained some 5,000 tons of rails and shipped them to Esquimalt and Nanaimo. In August, 1878, in preparation for work on the mainland he entered into a contract for their removal to Yale. He proposed to begin construction at Yale, and tenders were invited for the portion of the line from Yale to Kamloops Lake.

At this point in the history of the Canadian Pacific Railway Mackenzie fell from power as a result of the elections

¹ Journals, Legislative Assembly of British Columbia, 1878, p. 105.
² Ibid., p. 110.
³ Richards to Secretary of State for Canada Sept. 26, 1878, B.C. Sessional Papers, 1879, p. 251.
⁴ It was "lost" in Ottawa and did not reach London till March 1879, by which time a better feeling had arisen and no action was therefore taken. Howay and Scholefield, op. cit., v. 2, p. 396.
⁵ Island Railway Papers, compiled by Amor de Cosmos, p. 157.
⁶ Dominion Sessional Paper, 43 E, 1879.
of September 1878. The elections of Canada strongly endorsed Macdonald's "National Policy" and the Conservatives returned to power with a strong majority. The return of Macdonald resulted in a remarkable change of feeling in British Columbia. Secession was forgotten. Trutch wrote to Macdonald that 1878 marked the renewal of the "entente cordiale" between Province and Dominion. Victoria was particularly jubilant, for on September 17 when Kingston failed to elect Macdonald she held out her hand to him and elected him as one of her own representatives. Much good, it was thought, might be expected when the Prime Minister of Canada was the senior representative of the capital city of British Columbia.

Construction, however, was not begun immediately on the opening of the season of 1879. The new government was not satisfied with the Burrard Inlet-Fraser Valley route and decided on further surveys. On April 22, 1879, an order-in-council was adopted which stated that in the absence of satisfactory reasons having been given for cancelling the order-in-council of June 7, 1873, which named Esquimalt as the western terminus of the railway, it was decided that the order-in-council of May 23, 1878,

1. "National Policy" was principally the policy of high protective tariffs although other features such as opening up the west and developing canals and railways were coupled with it to give it the form of a great national program. The victory of a high tariff policy of course was due to the six gloomy years of depression which followed the panic of 1873.


3. Judge Gray to Macdonald, Oct. 26, 1878, Macdonald Papers, General Letters, 399, Ottawa Archives. "It seems providential Kingston should have thrown you over".
which annulled the order-in-council of June 7, 1873, should be annulled and the former one renewed. This action immediately produced a query from British Columbia. On November 5, 1878, the Provincial government, on the request of the Dominion, had fully reserved the lands lying in the railway belt from Burrard Inlet to Tête Jaune Cache. Should this reservation in view of the order-in-council of April 22, now be cancelled? In reply the Dominion Government informed British Columbia that the order-in-council of April 22 was simply to rescind the order-in-council of May 23, 1878, so as to leave the Government free to adopt whichever route might appear in the public interest the most eligible. There was no need "to release the reservation of land on any route" as it was felt that this would result in no serious inconvenience for the short period which would elapse before the location of the railway would be finally established. After further surveys the Macdonald Government finally endorsed the Burrard Inlet route defined by Mackenzie. Sandford Fleming had reported in favour of a northern route from Port Simpson through Peace River Pass, but Colonel R.C. Moody had sent in a strong recommendation of the Burrard Inlet

3. Order-in-Council, May 14, 1879, ibid., p. 44.
4. British Columbia had reserved a twenty mile strip of land along the east coast of Vancouver Island for the E. and N. Railway, B.C. Sessional Papers 1873-4, no paging. Macdonald probably was still considering the possibility of using the Island railway and bridging the straits to the mainland at Bute Inlet or some other point. Vide infra pp. 106-107.
route. On December 16, British Columbia was asked to convey to the Dominion Government the land for twenty miles on each side of the railway line as defined in the order-in-council of July 13, 1878.

The railway controversy, as far as the mainline was concerned, for the Esquimalt and Nanaimo line, with which we are not concerned, was to continue a thorny question in British Columbia and Dominion politics, was at a close. Two days before the Macdonald government fixed the route along the Fraser to Burrard Inlet Walkem had addressed a telegram to Ottawa stating that "delay in commencing Railway construction causes great dissatisfaction". Macdonald replied, "One hundred and twenty-seven (127) miles from Yale to Kamloops to be constructed forthwith. Tenders to be received till seventeenth (17th) November. Work to be vigorously prosecuted". Construction began at Yale May 15, 1880.

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5. Inland Sentinel, Sept. 23, 1880.
CHAPTER III

THE LOCATION OF THE MAIN LINE OF THE CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

Clause 11 of the terms of union between British Columbia and the Dominion of Canada has already been criticized; it placed a seemingly impossible financial burden on the Dominion; the time limit of ten years was an obvious mistake. Yet even if the Dominion had been so wealthy that the railway would not have embarrassed her, or even if she had been given an unlimited time to build the railway, the railway bargain with British Columbia would still have been a surprising obligation for the Dominion to assume, for in 1871 no one could say without fear of contradiction that a practicable line for a railway could be built through the mountains of British Columbia to the Pacific.

It is true that Alfred Waddington had defined what he considered a feasible route for a railway through British Columbia, that Walter Moberly and Joseph Trutch had discovered a good route, that Milton and Cheadle as a result of their transcontinental journey in 1863 had come to the conclusion "that a road might be constructed by the Yellow Head Pass," but the reputedly best opinion on railway communications in British Columbia had declared that to build a railway through the Rocky

1. Vide supra pp. 15-16.
Mountains to the Pacific was impracticable. This was the opinion of Captain Palliser, who was sent to Canada in 1857 by the Imperial Government to ascertain "whether one or more practicable passes [for a railway] exist over the Rocky Mountains within the British territory". Palliser did not say definitely that a railway could not be built across the Rockies, but he clearly intimated that the project would be impracticable and prohibitively costly. In 1863 in his report to the British Government he made the profound statement that

The knowledge of the country on the whole would never lead me to advise a line of communication from Canada across the continent to the Pacific exclusively through British territory. The time has for ever gone by for effecting such an object, and the unfortunate choice of an astronomical boundary line has completely isolated the central American possessions of Great Britain from Canada in the east, and also almost debarred them any eligible access from the Pacific coast on the west.  

Palliser was an eminent authority and his conclusions were naturally taken seriously. The best evidence we have of this is that Sandford Fleming, who was appointed Engineer-in-Chief of the Canadian Pacific Railway in 1871, has recorded that Palliser led him to believe it was needless to seek a route for the railway in British Columbia and that he consequently approached the task of locating a practicable line in British Columbia with the purpose of obtaining all the facts he could in order to prove Palliser wrong.

1. Instructions from the Secretary of State to Captain Palliser, Papers relative to the Exploration of Captain Palliser, London, 1859, p. 1.
On examining the geographic features of British Columbia -- or on travelling over the main line of the Canadian Pacific Railway in British Columbia as it exists today -- no one can wonder why Captain Palliser advised against building a railway across the Province, or why Sandford Fleming approached his task in 1871 with the heroic determination of disproving Palliser. At the time British Columbia entered the Union it was generally known in the East as a "Sea of Mountains". The description was only a little exaggerated. But far more important than the magnitude and extent of the mountains of British Columbia, from the point of view of east and west communications, is the unhappy physical fact that they run from north to south in two massive chains, the Coast Chain, and the Rocky Mountain Chain. Each chain is composed of several distinct mountain ranges not always continuous but very irregular and broken. The Coast Chain is an alpine region about 100 miles in width running parallel to the coast. North of the mouth of the Fraser River its slopes come sheer down to the waters of the Pacific. The Rocky Mountain Chain, apparently running parallel to the Coast Mountains but really converging towards the north till it forms with the Coast Chain one chain, consists of four distinct mountain ranges. The first and greatest range is the Rocky Mountain Range which forms the first great barrier to communications from the east, its mountains rising to massive heights -- some of its peaks reach 12,000

1. The Selkirk Range, which I have considered as part of the Rocky Mountain Chain, is geologically a separate chain of mountains being much older than the Rocky Mountains proper.
feet above the sea -- above the eastern prairie. Fortunately the Rocky Mountains are in places broken by great lateral spurs between which rivers of the great central plain of Canada take their rise. Through these gashes the builders of the Canadian Pacific Railway found practicable routes to the west. Immediately to the west of the Rocky Mountains, however, stand the three other great ranges of the Rocky Mountain Chain in British Columbia, the Selkirk, the Cariboo and Gold Mountains. They are separated from each other and the Rocky Mountains only by narrow valleys. Often they block the approaches to the Rocky Mountain passes from the west rendering it necessary to find routes over their summits or to take a circuitous route around their flanks.

Between the Coast and Rocky Mountain Chains there extends an elevated plateau averaging from a little under 3,000 to fully 4,000 feet above sea level. It is a remarkable irregular plateau; it is grooved by deep river channels, broken by rocky ridges and inferior mountain masses; it has many lakes occupying deep depressions in its surface; it is intersected in many directions by numerous broad sheltered and undulating valleys; in some quarters it is heavily timbered, in others scantily timbered; in some districts there is open prairie country.

On the western side of the Rocky Mountain Range in the Rocky Mountain "Trench" three great rivers of British Columbia take their rise, the Columbia, the Fraser and the Kootenay. The course of each is necessarily irregular as each has to find a course to avoid the massif barrier presented by
the Cariboo or Selkirk Mountains. The Columbia flows north round the Selkirk range then due south; the Fraser north round the Cariboo Mountains and then south. Both flow south for the greater part of their course then west to the sea. The Kootenay flows south from its source around the Selkirks and then north into Kootenay Lake whence it flows to join the Columbia. The big bends in these three rivers rendered it impracticable to follow their courses from the west side of the Rocky Mountains; ways had to be found through the mountain ranges. Moreover two of the great rivers, the Kootenay and the Columbia early found their way into the United States.

Other rivers of British Columbia take their rise in the great central plateau, the majority of which flow westward and southwest cutting their way through the Coast range to the sea. The Peace River, and far to the north, the Laird River, alone of the rivers which rise in British Columbia flow through the Rocky Mountains. Of those flowing westward the principal are the Naas, Skeena, and Bella Coola, which flow into Bentick Arm, and the Homathoo which flows into Bute Inlet.

Presumably these rivers flowing westward to the Pacific might be expected to offer a good route for a railway to the Pacific once it had surmounted the barrier of the Rocky Mountain Chain. But unfortunately they invariably possess objectionable physical features which makes construction of a railway in their valley of tremendous difficulty. Marcus Smith, the engineer in charge of the C.P.R. surveys in British Columbia, wrote in May, 1873:

Though the rivers (especially the Fraser) descend with tolerable uniformity, the valleys in British Columbia -- every-
where narrow -- do not leave much margin between the rivers and the foot of the slopes of the hills or high plains that bound them; and as the river rolls onward to the ocean, cutting deeper into the earth, this margin becomes more and more contracted till, on entering the foot hills of the Cascade Chain, it entirely disappears...

In passing through the mountain ranges the river sometimes rushes in a torrent for miles between perpendicular walls of solid rock, from twenty to thirty to several hundred feet in height....

The Rocky Mountain Chain was not the only, or, as it proved, the greatest obstacle to a practicable railway line in British Columbia. A feasible pass was found in the Rocky Mountains during the first year of the Canadian Pacific Railway surveys, but eight years were spent -- although not necessarily -- before a route across the Coast Mountains to the Pacific was adopted.

Knowledge of the topography of British Columbia when the Canadian Pacific Railway surveys began in July, 1871, was uncertain. Several passes were known to exist through the Rockies, but little was known of them with scientific precision. Alexander Mackenzie, in 1793, crossed the Rocky Mountains by way of the Peace River. David Thompson discovered the Howse Pass in 1807, and in 1810 he crossed the Rocky Mountains by the Athabasca Pass, which became the regular route between east and west for the North West and Hudson's Bay Company fur-traders.

The first recorded departure from this route was made in 1841 when Sir George Simpson on his journey round the world crossed the Rocky Mountains by Simpson Pass.

The knowledge of the mountains of British Columbia

supplied by the early explorers, fur-traders and travellers, was valuable, but scanty. Thus, in 1857, when Great Britain was considering the project of east to west communications across Canada, she was obliged to send Captain Palliser to explore the country west of Fort Garry and the passes of the Rocky Mountains. Palliser's adverse opinion on the practicability of constructing a railway across the Rocky Mountains we have already mentioned. Assisted by Dr. James Hector he examined six passes in the Rocky Mountains by the end of 1858. Two crossed the mountains from the South Saskatchewan to Kootenay River, the Kananaskis and Vermillion Passes; two crossed from the Kootenay to Columbia Rivers, Lake Pass and Beaver Foot Pass; one crossed from the South Branch of the Saskatchewan to the North Branch, the Little Fork Pass, and one from the south branch of the Saskatchewan to the Columbia, Kicking Horse Pass. Another member of Palliser's party, Captain Thomas Blakiston made independent explorations in the Rocky Mountains. His report dealt with eight passes across the Rocky Mountains -- the Leather (Yellow Head), Athabasca, Howse, Kicking Horse, Vermillion, Kananaskis, Crow's Nest and Kootenay. It is of interest that though three of the passes he mentioned are now used by railways, he concluded with the remark that "at present no pass in British territory is practicable for wheeled carriages".

Two years after Palliser had laid his report before

1. Palliser, Further Papers, p. 36.
2. Ibid., p. 61. The italics are Capt. Blakiston's.
the British Government, in 1863, Mr. Walter Moberly set out on his Columbia River Expedition. Moberly was sent out by Joseph Trutch, Chief Commissioner of Lands and Works of the Colony of British Columbia, "to lay out the best line for a Waggon Road from the Lower Fraser to the Columbia River". His "first main object" was to ascertain "the best route from the Eastern end of Shuswap Lake to the Columbia". On September 10, 1865, Moberly reported that he had discovered a practicable route across the Gold Mountain Range connecting the valley of the Fraser, Thompson and Shuswap waters with those of the Columbia River by means of a low pass, which he had named Eagle Pass. It was suitable, he reported, for either a waggon road or a railway.

Having discovered a route from Shuswap Lake across the Gold Range to the Columbia, Moberly was faced with the problem of finding a pass through the Selkirks if he were to avoid the long route round the bend of the Columbia to the Rocky Mountain passes, Howse or Vermillion. Accordingly in the autumn of 1865 Moberly commenced his explorations in the Selkirks. He, himself, proceeded up the valley of the Illecillewaet River; one of his assistants, Green, explored the valley of the Gold Creek; another assistant, Turnbull, entered the valley running east from the head of Upper Arrow Lake. Unfortunately owing to the lateness of the season and the impossibility of getting Indians to go far into the mountains

1. Instructions, Reports and Journals relating to the Government Exploration of country lying between the Shuswap and Okanagan Lakes and the Rocky Mountains, 1866, p. 1.
these explorations were not completed. Moberly, however, reported that
judging from the character of the mountains, on both sides of Gold Creek...and that of the Ille-cille-waut, that should further exploration of them result in the discovery of a pass at low level, I think it very problematical indeed if it would be advisable to adopt either of them as the line for the main thoroughfare to Vermillion pass in the Rocky Mountains, as the valleys in places are very narrow, and the mountains on both sides steep and subject to heavy avalanches...1

Moberly was not destined to discover the pass through the Sel-kirks which was to be used by the Canadian Pacific Railway. It was not till sixteen years later that Major A.B. Rogers acting on the suggestion contained in Moberly's report traced the Illecillewaet to its source in the Illecillewaet glacier, ascended Mount Avalanche and gazed down on the route through the Selkirks which the railway was to follow. But Moberly, by 1866, had mapped out generally the whole route of the Canadian

1. Instructions, Reports and Journals relating to the Government Exploration of the country lying between the Shuswap and Okanagan Lakes and the Rocky Mountains, p. 5.
2. Moberly claims that one of his assistants, Albert Perry, made an exploration of the Illecillewaet River and its southeasterly branch and Rogers Pass in 1866. (Moberly, W., Early History of the C. P. P. Road, Art, Historical and Scientific Association, Vancouver, B.C., p. 5). There is much disagreement on the question whether Perry or Rogers discovered Rogers Pass. The important point, however, is that Moberly in 1866 and later in 1871, was of the opinion that no practicable pass existed through the Selkirks. He states in his Early History of the C.P. R. Road (p. 5) that he considers the location of the C. P. R. in the Selkirks "a very serious mistake". It is interesting to note, however, that in 1885 Moberly wrote that he gave Major Rogers "the information that has led to the final adoption of the line for the railway by the route I so long and anxiously struggled for..." (Moberly, W., The Rocks and Rivers of British Columbia, London, H. Blacklock and Co., 1885, p. 100). The two statements are hardly reconcilable.
Pacific main line in British Columbia. In 1858 he had made an exploration through the canyons of the Fraser between Yale and Lytton, concluding that though this route presented great natural difficulties it presented in both directions and grades a good line for either waggon road or railway. So at the completion of his Columbia River explorations in 1866 "he was fully convinced that a remarkably good line for a railway could be obtained from Burrard Inlet via Eagle Pass, the valley of the Columbia River and the Howse Pass through the Rocky Mountains. When the route was finally fixed for the railway it didn't follow the Columbia but went over the Selkirks by Roger's Pass and over the Rocky Mountains by Kicking Horse Pass, but Moberly had fixed the route with admirable approximation and had made an important contribution to the solution of the problem of crossing the Selkirks. The work of one other British Columbia explorer is of interest in the story of the location of the Canadian Pacific Railway in British Columbia. Alfred Waddington, like Moberly, carried on explorations in British Columbia to discover a feasible route for a road or railway, and like Moberly, he chose to refute Captain Palliser by defining a

1. Possibly the earliest suggestion of the route across the mountains now followed by the C. P. R. is that made by a map "To illustrate a paper on the means of communication with the Pacific Ocean" by Capt. M.H. Synge R.E., drawn by John Arrowsmith and published for the Royal Geographical Society by John Murray in 1852. The route follows the Bow River, which is named, crosses the mountains and goes round the Big Bend of the Columbia, crossing the Gold Range north of Shuswap Lake and following down the Fraser. Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society, 1852, v. 22, p. 174.
3. Ibid., p. 6.
practicable route. The route he chose has been already described. It ran from Yellow Head Pass through the Cariboo country to Quesnel Mouth on the Fraser, thence over the Chilcotin Plain to Bute Inlet. This route was carefully examined by the Canadian Pacific survey parties, and had the difficulty of bridging the Seymour Narrows to connect the main line with an Island railway not been so great, and Bute Inlet offered a better harbour, it might have been selected.

Preparations for the Canadian Pacific Railway surveys in British Columbia began soon after the drafting of the terms of union between Canada and British Columbia. In the spring of 1871, Sandford Fleming, who was serving at the time as Engineer-in-Chief of the Intercolonial Railway, was appointed Engineer-in-Chief of the Canadian Pacific Railway in charge of surveys and construction, with the simple instructions to fulfil the railway clause of the terms of union with British Columbia. No instructions were given him regarding in what general location the Government wished the railway to run. "No point on the whole of the intended line was fixed -- not even the termini," Fleming testified before the C. P. R. Royal Commission in 1882. His task was simply to find the most feasible route and begin construction in British Columbia by July 20, 1873.

The first survey parties set out from Victoria on July 20, 1871, the day that British Columbia entered the Dominion -- at least one section of clause 11 of the terms of union

2. Ibid., p. 1638.
was fulfilled by the Dominion. Walter Moberly, who, because of his explorations in British Columbia, had been summoned to Ottawa to advise the Dominion Government and Fleming on the route to be followed in the Province, was in charge of two parties to survey a suitable line from Kamloops to Howse Pass. Two parties were placed in charge of Roderick McLennan to survey a line from Kamloops via the North Thompson River and Albreda and Cranberry Lakes to Tête Jaune Cache and Yellow Head Pass. Two other parties, under John Trutch, were given the task of making an instrumental survey of the Fraser River from Lytton to New Westminster and of the Thompson River from Lytton to Kamloops.

The results of the work of these survey parties in 1871 was gratifying — so much so that the Canadian Pacific Railway could have been located, had it been necessary, without further surveys other than the necessary location surveys to find the exact line for the railway. McLennan reported that the route from the Yellow Head Pass crossing Canoe River by Albreda Lake, thence along the valley of the north Thompson River, is singularly favourable for the construction of a line of railway, of easy gradients and moderate curves, and in addition comparatively light work. On this line no grade will exceed fifty feet per mile, and for great distances will range from fifteen to twenty feet per mile. Trutch declared that the result of his work might be considered satisfactory since it had established that an easy grade could be obtained from the Pacific Ocean to the mouth of Eagle Pass. Hence, putting the work of McLennan and Trutch together a line

of easy grades had been discovered from Yellow Head Pass to Burrard Inlet. Trutch's report, however, contained important qualifications. Although the section by the Fraser and Thompson River valleys showed a very easy grade, and large portions of the country were favourable for a railway, particularly from Spence's Bridge to Shuswap Lake, serious difficulties would be encountered in the Fraser Canon between Lytton and Spence's Bridge. The first twenty-one miles from Yale, Trutch reported, was "one continuous succession of precipitous rocky points and side hills..."

Moberly, going over much of the country he had already explored sent in a favourable report of his work. His examination of Howse Pass was not completed, but he had found the route from Kamloops via Eagle Pass, the Columbia and Howse Pass, entirely feasible. He did "not think that a shorter practicable line could be found than that via Eagle Pass the Columbia and Howse Pass". Moberly, however, had failed again to find a practicable pass over the Selkirks. After abandoning work in Howse Pass because of the arrival of winter weather, he returned on his way to Victoria directly over the Selkirks in his last effort to find a way through them for the railway. His crossing, which was north of Rogers Pass, was the first recorded crossing of the Selkirks, but was without practicable results: "I found", he reported to Fleming, "there was no practicable pass through the Selkirk Range..."

2. Ibid., p. 37.
3. Ibid., p. 34.
On the result of the surveys of Moberly, McLennan and Trutch, the Dominion Government on April 2, 1872, adopted the Yellow Head Pass "as the gate to British Columbia from the east." McLennan had found a line of easy grades from Yellow Head Pass to Kamloops, and because of this fortunate discovery Yellow Head was adopted and all further work on the route via Howse Pass to Kamloops was abandoned. No pass had been discovered over the Selkirks to avoid the bend of the Columbia. The ascents to Howse Pass had proved to be more precipitous than those of the Yellow Head Pass. The distance from Kamloops to a common point near Edmonton House via Yellow Head, moreover, was found to be no greater than by the Howse Pass and a very much better and less costly line could be had by the former than by the latter route.

The adoption of the Yellow Head Pass in April, 1872, greatly simplified the survey work in British Columbia. The first object had been attained: a good pass had been found over the Rocky Mountains from Edmonton. Henceforth the task of the survey parties was to discover the most feasible route from Yellow Head Pass to the Pacific. From the Pass, itself, only two courses were open for the railway line. One ran in a northwesterly direction by the valley of the Fraser; the other, which was surveyed in 1871 by McLennan's party, ran due south by the Albreda and Thompson Rivers. Both these routes flanked the lofty Cariboo Mountains which barred the way to a direct westerly course from Yellow Head Pass to the Pacific. Several

2. Ibid.
3. Both these courses were followed by the Grand Trunk Pacific.
efforts were to be made to find a direct route through the Cariboo Mountains -- one of McLennan's parties in 1871 tried to locate a direct line from Quesnel Mouth through the Cariboo country to Tete Jaune Cache -- but no attempt was successful.

One feasible route to the Pacific from Yellow Head Pass was located in 1871, as we have noted, but Fleming did not consider the route by the Fraser and Thompson River valleys to the Pacific altogether practicable if a better one could be found. Trutch pointed to great difficulties in construction along this route and Fleming in his report in April, 1872, echoed Trutch's warning.

The question of the terminus on the Pacific had also to be carefully considered in projecting a route to the Pacific from Yellow Head Pass. In 1871, Burrard Inlet and Esquimalt on Vancouver Island were the most talked of places for the terminus. The citizens of Vancouver Island were particularly anxious to have the terminus at Esquimalt while the citizens of the Lower Mainland were equally anxious to have the road terminate at Burrard Inlet. Vancouver Island early got the better of the argument for the Macdonald government soon favoured Esquimalt. In March, 1872, for example, the Hon. H.L. Langevin, Dominion Minister of Public Works, in a report on British Columbia stated that only "if it were found impracticable for the Railway to cross from the mainland to Vancouver Island" should the railway terminate at Burrard Inlet.

2. Vide supra p. 28.
Fleming, as the Macdonald Government, or probably because of the Macdonald Government, gave his ear principally to the Island. Yellow Head Pass was selected by Fleming partly because it gave more direct access than Howse Pass to Bute Inlet, where it was proposed that the railway should terminate on the mainland and thence be carried by bridges to Vancouver Island in the neighbourhood of Valdes Island, and in his report in April, 1872, he laid down that it was necessary to find out the practicability of bridging the straits and to ascertain how Bute Inlet could easiest be reached from Tête Jaune Cache.

Besides Burrard Inlet and Esquimalt other harbours accessible from the Pacific had been spoken of for the terminus. Of these two were on the Island, Alberni, at the head of Barclay Sound, and the harbour of Nootka Sound. The adoption of either of these harbours, like the adoption of Esquimalt, would necessitate running the line to Bute Inlet and bridging the Straits of Georgia at Seymour Narrows. On the Mainland, Bentinck Arm and Port Essington, or some harbour at the mouth of the Skeena River, were considered. In 1872, however, little or nothing was known of these harbours or their accessibility from Tête Jaune Cache.

The seasons of 1872 and 1873 were spent in surveying several projected routes to the Pacific from Tête Jaune Cache. These operations were under the charge of Marcus Smith, C.E., who was appointed Chief Resident Engineer in British Columbia.

by Sandord Fleming on March 30, 1872. The general objective of all explorations and surveys was to reach the Pacific Coast at some eligible harbour, south of the 53rd parallel of latitude, the latitude of Yellow Head Pass. To take the railway north of this latitude would perceptibly lengthen it. By the end of the 1873 season seven routes, of which four were surveyed, had been projected to the Pacific, although they all didn't reach the Pacific south of the 53rd parallel, and it may be questioned if all reached eligible harbours.

The routes were numbered in the Report of 1874 from 1 to 7, not in the order they were surveyed, but according to their location from south to north in the Province.

Route No. 1 began at Burrard Inlet, near New Westminster, followed the Lower Fraser to Hope, passed across the Coast Mountains up the valley of the Coquihalla, and thence reached Kamloops by way of Nicola Lake. From Kamloops it reached the Yellow Head Pass via the North Thompson, Albreda and Cranberry Lakes. This route had been suggested by John Trutch in his report to Fleming in March, 1872, because of the heavy work which he found on the Fraser valley route. The difficulties to be met on the Coquihalla route, however, were found to be greater than those in the Fraser valley. It suffered from the further disadvantage of having much steeper grades than the Fraser

1. Moberly left the service shortly after Smith's appointment. He had fallen out of favour with Fleming over an alleged costly mistake he made in shipping supplies to the Howse Pass country after surveys in that region had been abandoned. Royal Commission Report, 1882, p. 1682.
River line.

Route No. 2 was the route surveyed by Trutch and McLennan in 1871. Starting at Burrard Inlet it followed the Fraser to Lytton, the Thompson to Kamloops, and thence reached Yellow Head Pass by the same route as Route No. 1.

Route No. 3 began at Howe Sound, crossed the Coast Mountains by Anderson and Seton Lakes to the Fraser at Lillooet; thence it crossed the central plateau by the Marble Canyon and Bonaparte Valley to the North Thompson, near the mouth of the Clearwater River, and followed routes No's. 1 and 2 to Tête Jaune Cache. From Howe Sound to the North Thompson, a distance of 284 miles, it passed over four main summits ranging in elevation from 1,610 to 3,847 feet.

Route No. 4 commenced at Waddington Harbour at the head of Bute Inlet, ascended the valley of the Homathco through the Coast Chain to Lake Tatla, thence it passed over the Chilcotin plains to the River Fraser. It crossed the Fraser about 16 miles below Soda Creek and continued easterly to Lac la Hache and Lake Canin to the Thompson near the mouth of the River Clearwater. From that point it followed Routes No's. 1, 2, and 3 to Tête Jaune Cache. From Bute Inlet to the North Thompson the distance by this route was 378 miles. In that distance three summits were passed over, all of which were over three thousand feet, and one, on the Chilcotin Plain was about 3700

1. The Coquihalla Pass is now used by the Kettle Valley branch of the C. P. R. It has been none too successful.
2. This route was followed by the Pacific Great Eastern Railway to Lillooet.
feet. There were long stretches on this route where the work would be light but in some sections it would be very heavy. Ascending the Homathco for a distance of 15 miles a continuous uniform gradient of 110 feet per mile would be required involving work of an increasingly heavy character.

Route No. 5 was a projected modification of route No. 4. The proposed change lay between the Chilcotin Plain and the Thompson valley above Blue River. It was based on an exploration made in 1873. Surveys of the whole route had not been made but it was confidently expected that a line involving lighter work and easier gradients would be obtained.

Route No. 6 began also at Bute Inlet. It was destined to become the most prominently considered of all the routes projected to Bute Inlet. It crossed the Chilcotin Plain to Fort George and thence followed the Upper Fraser Valley to Tête Jaune Cache. The route was not surveyed by 1874 but it was expected that in crossing from Bute Inlet to Fort George a higher elevation than Yellow Head Pass (3760 feet) would be obtained, but from Fort George to Tête Jaune Cache there was no doubt that a favourable line could be had. This route, Fleming suggested might be shortened by using the Smoky River Pass through the Rocky Mountains north of Yellow Head Pass.

Route No. 7 passed from Yellow Head Pass down the valley of the Upper Fraser to Fort George, and thence to the Pacific by the valley of the Skeena River. Very little was known of this route, or of the value of the Skeena mouth as a

1. The route followed by the Grand Trunk Pacific to Prince Rupert.
harbour. What information was compiled was generally adverse. The Report stated that "all parties who have visited the River Skeena...seem to unite in an adverse opinion respecting the eligibility of the River Skeena as a route to the seaboard".

To cross the Coast Chain to the Pacific via the Skeena it appeared from all information that it would be necessary to ascend a height some 600 feet greater than the elevation of Yellow Head Pass. In spite of these disadvantages, however, this route was prominently considered when the selection of the route in British Columbia was made in 1878 and 1879.

An eighth route was projected, but not surveyed or explored, on the results of an exploration made by Lieut. H.S. Palmer, R.E., in 1862, in the country at the head of Bentinck Arm. Palmer discovered a route up the Bella Coola through the Coast Mountains and on the basis of his report, Fleming proposed a route starting at the head of Bentinck Arm crossing the Coast Mountains by the Bella Coola to the Fraser and thence by the Giscome Portage and Fort McLeod to the Peace River. This route was approximately that followed by Alexander Mackenzie on his journey to the Pacific in 1793. Fleming recognized this and included extracts from Mackenzie's Journal in his report of 1874.

On the whole Fleming commented with greatest favour on Route No. 5 to Bute Inlet. The route to Bute Inlet was naturally considered of primary importance for the Dominion Government.

2. Ibid., appendix L, p. 218.
3. Ibid., appendix M, p. 231.
at that time, for the Dominion, as we have already related, adopted Esquimalt as the western terminus of the railway by order-in-council on June 7, 1873. If that order-in-council was to have any effect a feasible line had to be found to Bute Inlet, as it appeared to be the only point on the mainland which could be connected with the Island by bridging the Straits of Georgia. Fleming's comment on the Bute Inlet route was therefore of some importance.

This route (No. 5) commands attention. Although a very heavy expenditure will undoubtedly be required the railway for the first forty-four miles easterly from the Pacific Coast it is thought that the average cost per mile, through the whole of the Mountain Region, with this exception will be moderate. It will be quite possible, if present expectations be realized to obtain a line, east of the great Canyon, for the railway, on this route, with as favourable gradients as those which obtain on the existing railways in the Eastern Provinces.

The project of taking the line to Esquimalt however broke down over the problem of bridging the Straits of Georgia. A survey was carried out in 1873 along the northwesterly shore of Bute Inlet across Valdes Island and Seymour Narrows to the Island. The results were almost discouraging enough to prove the utter impracticability of carrying the line from Waddington Harbour to the Island. Along the shore of Bute Inlet excessively heavy work would be required involving a great number of tunnels and unusually sharp curvature. To bridge the Straits by Valdes Island and Seymour Narrows seven spans would be required, six of which would be from 1100 to 1350 feet long and

1. C. P. R. Progress Report, 1874, p. 20. Actually Fleming's expectations of Route No. 5 to Bute Inlet were not fulfilled. It was abandoned in 1875 (vide infra p. ) and Fleming's preference of the three Bute Inlet routes shifted to the route via Fort George.
the seventh 640 feet. The channels to be bridged, moreover, were found to be of great depth and the tide flowed through them from four to nine knots. "Taking everything into consideration," Fleming wrote, "the works of construction, on these eighty miles lying between Waddington Harbour and Vancouver Island would be of a most formidable character". It was a project, he considered, which would best not be undertaken "until the traffic be to some extent developed and the prospect justify the outlay...." In the meantime if the railway had to be carried to the Island "a steam ferry, suitable for railway traffic [could be] established between Vancouver Island and the terminus on the main shore...."

As a result of the surveys in British Columbia up to January, 1874, Fleming, on January 1, 1874 -- just a few weeks before he submitted his Survey report (January 26, 1874) -- sent a confidential memorandum to the Dominion Government advising them to take no hasty action but to await the results of further surveys in British Columbia. The memorandum is of great interest for its recommendations dovetailed completely with Mackenzie's cautious policy, and, indeed, strengthened Mackenzie's position. Fleming wrote:

In British Columbia a great deal has been done, and a vast amount of information has been accumulated, but the field of inquiry is so exceptionally difficult that the subject, is not, as yet, by any means fully understood. True, a favourable passage through the Rocky Mountains has been discovered, by which a Railway can be carried from the North Saskatchewan to the central plateau of British Columbia, with gradients as light as those on Railways in Ontario, and

1. C. P. R. Progress Report, 1874, p. 23.
with works of construction scarcely heavier than on the Inter-
colonial Line; we are thus enabled to project a satisfactory
route from the Railway system of the Atlantic Provinces to a
point within two hundred miles of the Pacific tide water;
but the great "Cascade [Coast] range" of mountains inter-
venes and presents formidable obstacles. It must not be
understood that the difficulties met with are insuperable,
but they will without doubt prove costly to overcome. The
Cascade Mountains have indeed been pierced by four lines of
surveys extending from the central plateau to the coast,
showing that at least two lines within the limits of practic-
ability have been found, but the question of construction on
either of these lines is one which will involve such an
enormous outlay that more exhaustive surveys should undoubt-
edly be made, before anything more is done. The undersigned
could not advise a hasty decision. The most recent explora-
tions we have been able to make indicate that a large expend-
iture, even a considerable length of time in the final com-
pletion of the Railway may be saved, by postponing a selec-
tion of the route and the commencement of construction,
through the Cascade range, until more information of a def-
ine character has been obtained, and the difficult problem
more satisfactorily solved.¹

The Mackenzie government of course was not unwilling
to adopt the cautious policy advised by Fleming. Surveys in
British Columbia continued in 1874 while the Dominion Govern-
ment sought to obtain a modification of the terms of union
from British Columbia. Efforts were made to improve routes
already defined and to discover new ones, generally in the
country north of Yellow Head Pass and Bute Inlet.

An examination was made of the country between the
Clearwater and Thompson Rivers in the general direction of the
Blue River in order to test the practicability of Route No. 5,
upon which Fleming had commented so favourably in January. The

¹. Fleming, Confidential Memorandum, pp. 6-7. Judging by this
Memorandum Fleming appears to have inspired the Edgar pro-
posals of 1874. He warned the government that it would be
inadvisable to push on the work of construction more rapid-
ly than expenditure could advantageously be made. Secondly
he proposed the construction of the transcontinental waggon
road and telegraph line pending construction of the railway;
both these projects were embodied in the Edgar proposals
and later in the Carnarvon terms.
exploration proved the route to be unsatisfactory. A line was found to be possible but with gradients so unfavourable and with works of construction so heavy, that any further expenditure on this section of the country was considered inadvisable.

Another attempt was made to solve the important problem of crossing the Cariboo mountains due west from Yellow Head Pass, but without success. "The information obtained from this exploration set positively at rest the question of a direct practicable route across the Cariboo range from the Yellow Head Pass to the coast".

Further to the south a re-examination was made of the line between Kamloops and Hope by the Coquihalla Pass, and an attempt was made to find a new route across the Coast Mountains to the south of the Coquihalla via the Similkameen valley. On the Coquihalla route first judgements were confirmed; gradients would be severe and works of construction heavy. The exploration in the Similkameen valley resulted in a failure. No practicable route was found. Following this failure a final effort was made to find a route through this section of the Coast Mountains by a branch of the Coquihalla and the valley of the River Tulameen. This course proved still unsatisfactory, the way being completely barred by mountains.

The failure of all attempts to find a direct westerly course across the Cariboo Mountains to the coast and the unsat-

2. Ibid., Appendix F, p. 107.
3. Ibid., p. 21.
4. Ibid., Appendix E, p. 105.
5. Ibid., p. 22.
isfactory character of the lines already surveyed to Burrard Inlet, Howe Sound and Bute Inlet, led to an instrumental survey of the route from Tête Jaune Cache down the valley of the Fraser to Fort George, and thence across the country to the line previously surveyed to Bute Inlet -- Route 6 projected by Fleming in his 1874 report. Fifty to sixty miles of the route remained unexplored by the end of the season, but the knowledge acquired gave promise that a practicable line with favourable gradients and light work could be obtained.

Because of the difficulties already experienced in crossing the Coast Mountains it was considered advisable to extend the explorations and surveys in a northerly direction. Scarcely anything was known of the country between Bute Inlet and the Skeena River. The coast had been explored and mapped by Captain Vancouver but inland from the coast for some 200 miles was virtually a blank on the map. The various inlets on the coast were examined and the country inland from them explored, some knowledge of its general features being obtained.

This examination, Fleming reported, "furnished information which justified the expense of a survey the year following from Fort George to Dean Channel, and gave foundation for the impression, that, with the exception of difficulties on the extreme western section of twenty miles, a favourable line might be secured to Gardner Inlet from the northern bend of the River Fraser near Fort George".

2. Ibid., Appendix G, p. 137.
The work of the 1875 season was largely confined to the northern country explored in 1874. Exploratory surveys, as Fleming suggested, were carried out from Dean Channel and Gardner Inlet to intersect with the line from Bute Inlet to Fort George. The work on the Dean Channel line up the valley of the Salmon River gave promise of a comparatively favourable line some 50 miles shorter than the line to Bute Inlet. The work on the line to Gardner Inlet, however, gave unsatisfactory results.

The movement of operations northward resulted in an effort to find a practicable pass through the Rocky Mountains north of the Yellow Head Pass. Three such passes were reported to exist, Smoky River, Pine River and Peace River. Early in 1875 -- in mid-winter -- a party was sent due east from Fort George to cross the Rocky Mountains by Smoky River Pass. By this exploration it was found that a railway might be carried through the Smoky River Pass. However, Fleming concluded "that no object would be accomplished" by using it "which could not be more easily and better attained by the Yellow Head Pass."

An exploration was likewise made of the Pine River Pass which was reported by Indians to exist some 50 to 60 miles south of the Peace River. It was found to be of no great altitude "and of sufficient importance to justify further examination". The Pine River Pass received great prominence in later surveys.

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., Appendix H, p. 145.
The major operation of the 1875 season was a trial location of the route from Yellow Head Pass to Fort George and across country by the Nazco valley to the Homathco River and Bute Inlet. The surveys on this route (No. 6) in 1874 had greatly pleased Fleming. The result of this work upon which five parties were engaged fulfilled all Fleming's expectations.

With several routes projected and surveyed to several harbours on the coast, the majority of which were little known, work in 1876 began with a winter survey of the coastal waters and harbours by steamer. It was considered especially important to obtain some conception of climatic conditions in the northern inlets during the winter. A harbour which was ice bound during the winter would be of little value as a terminus. The 1876 winter was unusually severe and much ice was encountered in Gardner Inlet. Dean Inlet was found to be frozen for a short time, but no ice had formed in Bute Inlet.

Work of the survey parties during 1876 was again largely confined to the north. Fleming considered that the south of the Province had been pretty well exhausted as a field of survey. An unsuccessful effort was made to cross the Coast Mountains from Dean Inlet up the River Kitlope. The trial location of the Yellow Head - Fort George - Bute Inlet route, which had been left incomplete in 1875, was completed. A further trial location was made of the line from Dean Channel by the Salmon, Blackwater and Iscultaesli Rivers to a point of intersection with Bute Inlet route to Fort George. The Dean

2. Ibid., Appendix V, p. 177 ff.
Inlet line cut 55 miles from the route to Yellow Head Pass via Fort George, but gradients and works of construction were found to be much heavier than on the Bute Inlet route. During the same season an exploratory survey was made of an alternative route from Dean Inlet to Fort George. It left the Salmon River about 45 miles from tide water and crossed a "divide" to follow a north-easterly course by the Rivers Euchu, Nechaco and Stewart, to a point near Fort George. With some exceptions the gradients and works of construction were found to be easy but the line was 15 miles longer than the more southern route to Dean Inlet.

On the completion of the surveys in 1876, Fleming was able to report that "the information was tolerably complete as regards the greater part of the country between the southern boundary of British Columbia and the 56th parallel.... The only portion respecting which our information is deficient is the district bordering on and drained by the River Skeena and its tributaries". Six passes through the Rocky Mountains had been examined, the Peace River, the Pine River, the Smoky River, the Yellow Head, the Athabasca and the Howse. Of these the Yellow Head was considered by Fleming as the best.

The advantages of the Yellow Head Pass -- every consideration being taken into account, -- outweigh those of any of the other passes; ... the opening at that point offers superior facilities for carrying the line of railway through the main range of the great mountain chain; ... the Yellow Head Pass, better than any other opens the way to every harbour on the coast from the Straits of Juan de Fuca to the latitude of Dean Inlet.

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p. 30.
It was still possible, however, that the Pine or Peace River passes would be better for routes to the northern harbours -- if the terminus were selected at Gardner Inlet or Port Essington further examination of these passes would be necessary. But,

While the question of the Pine River and Peace River passes in connection with the lines to the two most northern harbours is yet undecided, it is undoubtedly established that the main Rocky Mountain Chain can be crossed with ease by the Yellow Head Pass. The major problem is accordingly satisfactorily solved, and it remains to consider how the minor ranges of mountains, and the other physical obstacles which present themselves, may be surmounted or avoided.

Fleming offered several solutions to this problem. From Yellow Head Pass he reported that eleven different routes had been surveyed. These he divided into three main groups, geographically, the Southern, the Central, and the Northern:

**SOUTHERN GROUP**

Route No. 1....From Yellow Head Pass, via Lake Albreda, River Thompson, Lake Nicola and Coquihalla Valley to Burrard Inlet.

Route No. 2....From Yellow Head Pass, via Lake Albreda, River Thompson and Lower River Fraser to Burrard Inlet.

Route No. 3....From Yellow Head Pass, via Lake Albreda, River Thompson, Bonaparte and Lillooet and Lake Anderson to Howe Sound.

**CENTRAL GROUP**

Route No. 4....From Yellow Head Pass, via Lake Albreda, River Thompson, River Clearwater, Lac-la-Hache, River Chillicotin, and East branch of River Homathco to Waddington Harbour.

Route No. 5....Alternative route to No. 4. Discussed in former progress reports but now abandoned.

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2. Ibid., pp. 33-34.
Route No. 6.....From Yellow Head Pass, via River Fraser, Fort George, River Chilacoh, River Nazco, and East Branch of River Homathco to Waddington Harbour.

NORTHERN GROUP

Route No. 7.....From Yellow Head Pass, via River Fraser, Fort George, River Chilacoh and Bella Coola, to North Bentinck Arm.

Route No. 8.....From Yellow Head Pass, via River Fraser, Fort George, River Chilacoh, River Blackwater and Salmon River to Dean Inlet.

Route No. 9.....From Yellow Head Pass, via River Fraser, Fort George, River Nechaco, River Blackwater and Salmon River to Dean Inlet.

Route No. 10....From Yellow Head Pass, via River Fraser, Fort George, River Stewart, River Nechaco and Kemano, to Gardner Inlet.

Route No. 11....From Yellow Head Pass, via River Fraser, Fort George, River Stewart and River Skeena, to Fort Essington.

The two last routes on the list (No's. 10 and 11) were but imperfectly known, but enough knowledge had been obtained of them to justify the belief that further and more accurate surveys would result in obtaining feasible railway lines.

To these eleven routes, (reduced to ten by the abandonment of No. 5 in 1875) which terminated at the coast at seven distinct harbours, Fleming stated, might be added two more running west from the two most northern passes, Peace River and Pine River, to Port Essington and the Skeena Mouth.

In making a choice of the route to be followed across British Columbia, Fleming intended to be guided by the engineering features and probable cost of each line and the potential traffic which each would offer when the railway was constructed. The best line would be the shortest, the least difficult to construct, the least costly to maintain and operate;
it would offer the greatest facilities for cheap transportation. It would be the line which would offer the most traffic in the future. That traffic would depend on the local resources and population and industry of the country through which the line ran; it would depend on the facilities of the terminal harbour and the opportunities of obtaining "through traffic" from the Orient.

With regard to length of the ten lines running from Yellow Head Pass, the one terminating at Port Moody on Burrard Inlet via the Coquihalla River (Route No. 1) was the shortest -- 461 miles. The Fraser Valley route to Port Moody (No. 2) was 493 miles long. Routes 4 and 6 to Bute Inlet were 550 and 546 miles respectively. Routes 8, 9, and 10 to Bentinck Arm and Dean Inlet were 480, 488, and 506 miles respectively. The route to Gardner Inlet (No. 10) was estimated at 560 miles, and the length of route 11 to Port Essington was unknown.

In 1877 data for estimating the cost of construction of every route was not sufficient but Fleming ventured estimates on the most important of the ten routes. The cost of a railway by route No. 2, following the Fraser to Port Moody, was estimated at $35,000,000; by the Howe Sound Route (No. 3) at $39,000,000; by route No. 4 to Bute Inlet at $38,000,000; by route No. 6 to Bute Inlet, $33,000,000, and by route No. 8 to Kamsquot, Dean Inlet, $29,000,000. Of the two routes to Bute Inlet it should be noticed that route No. 6, via Fort George, was not only shorter by 4 miles than route No. 4, but

2. Ibid., p. 62.
was estimated the less costly by $5,000,000.

Considering costs of maintenance and operation the Fraser valley route to Burrard Inlet, as it offered the easiest gradients and a permanently solid road bed, was easily the cheapest. The two routes to Dean Inlet came next in line, followed by the two routes to Bute Inlet -- No. 6 again being superior to No. 4 -- the Coquihalla route to Burrard, and last the Howe Sound route. The other routes, No's. 10 and 11 could not be classified as they were not sufficiently known.

Considering local advantages and resources the route terminating furthest to the south (at Burrard Inlet) would give the greatest satisfaction to the existing population in 1877, which was small and concentrated in the south. However, Fleming considered that existing population and industry should not unduly influence the choice of the route. It was more important to consider where industries were most likely to develop in the future. To ascertain with reasonable probability where industry and population would best develop, the Dominion Geological survey had been instructed to examine different sections of the Province, noting their mineral wealth and value for agriculture and stock-raising.

The question of a terminal harbour was of first class importance in the problem of choosing a route. Not only had the facilities and climatic conditions of the harbour itself to be considered but also its position in relation to commercial shipping. A favourable line for construction and mainten-

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2. ibid., Appendix R, p. 218 ff.
ance might lead to a harbour deficient in facilities and location. On the other hand a desirable harbour might not be accessible except by a line so unfavourable as to render its selection inexpedient.

To obtain reliable information of the terminal harbours at which Fleming's several lines reached the Pacific, application was made through the Colonial Office to the Admiralty for whatever information they possessed, on the harbours of British Columbia. In applying for this information Fleming stressed the importance of the consideration of "through traffic", not to best serve the existing population in British Columbia, but to obtain "such a route and western terminus as would afford the greatest possibilities for successfully competing with foreign routes for ocean-borne traffic". No harbour on the Island was considered, as Fleming evidently considered that the project of taking the railway to the Island had died with his report on bridging the Straits in 1874. The Mainland harbours were considered from the point of view of their proximity to the Orient, the approach to them from the Pacific, the length of towage for sailing vessels required, their general harbour and anchorage facilities and their strategic position.

Port Essington and the other northern harbours, Gard-

1. Fleming to the Colonial Office, London, Nov. 29, 1876, C.P.R Report on Surveys, 1877, Appendix J, p. 282. Fleming was criticized by the C. P. R. Royal Commission of 1882 for not securing information from the Admiralty regarding the harbours of the British Columbia coast before surveying his several routes. "No expense should have been incurred in running lines to those points which from their nature were impossible as termini". C. P. R. Royal Commission Report, v.3, Conclusions, p. 86.
ner Inlet, Dean Inlet and Bella Coola, were found to be some three to six hundred miles closer to Yokohama in Japan than the southern harbours, Bute Inlet, Howe Sound and Burrard Inlet. Waddington Harbour, Bute Inlet, was at the greatest disadvantage in this respect. Port Essington was also found to be the most favourable harbour with regard to the length of towage needed for sailing vessels — 49 miles. English Bay, Burrard Inlet, demanded 70 miles of towage. Waddington Harbour was again at the greatest disadvantage requiring 156 miles of towage.

The evidence submitted by the naval authorities, however, did not favour Port Essington or any northern harbour. Opinion was generally most favourable to an extreme southern harbour at Burrard Inlet. Of the seven officers who answered Fleming's queries regarding the harbours of British Columbia four expressed a preference for Burrard Inlet. Burrard Inlet offered a deep, clear entrance and fair anchorage. It was near the coal of Nanaimo and it was free from adverse climatic conditions. Burrard Inlet as a terminal harbour, however, was found to suffer from two disadvantages. Staff Commander Pender was of the opinion that "the risks attending navigation with large steamships, amongst the islands lying between Juan de Fuca and the Strait of Georgia are very great," and all were agreed that vessels on their course to Burrard Inlet — Howe Sound and Bute Inlet suffered from this disadvantage too —

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., pp. 68-70.
4. Ibid., p. 69.
would be exposed to the guns of the United States in the event of hostilities and that the navigation of the channel would greatly depend on the force of the United States in the locality.

Since Burrard Inlet was objectionable because of the vulnerability of the route from the Pacific via Juan de Fuca, and since none of the other coast harbours were deemed practicable by the naval authorities, Fleming reached the conclusion that the railway might best terminate at an harbour on the west coast of Vancouver Island.

An unbroken line of railway from the railways of the eastern Provinces of the Dominion, to one of these harbours on the outer coast of Vancouver Island, would be exceedingly desirable. All the difficulties of navigation to be encountered in reaching the mainland from the ocean would be avoided.

The surveys, however, had proved that bridging the Straits was impracticable — although the exigencies of the future might render a continuous line of railway to the outer shores of Vancouver Island indispensable at whatever cost. Fleming therefore proposed that the connection between Mainland and Island could be made by steam ferry running from Bute Inlet to Elk Bay on Vancouver Island, a distance of 64 miles, or from Frederick Arm (51 miles from Waddington Harbour) through Nodales Channel to Otter Cove. From Elk Bay or Otter Cove the railway

1. Langevin objected to Burrard Inlet for this reason in 1872. Dominion Sessional Paper 10, 1872, p. 49.
2. Captain Caton approved of Waddington Harbour, but the approach to it was also via Juan de Fuca. The route round the north end of Vancouver Island through Seymour Narrows to Bute Inlet (Howe Sound and Burrard Inlet) was considered impracticable. C. P. R. Report on Surveys, 1877, p. 69.
3. Ibid., p. 71.
could be carried to Esquimalt or to Alberni, Nootka or Quatsino Sound, on the west coast.

Fleming in 1877 did not advise the adoption of any one route. By a process of elimination on the basis of the information he had compiled he reduced the number of possible routes to be followed to three, of which one was imperfectly known and would require further surveys. He selected Route No. 2, the route via the Fraser to Burrard Inlet; No. 6, the route via Fort George to Bute Inlet and No. 11, the route via Fort George to Port Essington, which was not well known. Route No. 6 would have to be chosen if it were considered of paramount importance to carry an unbroken line of railway to one of the western harbours of Vancouver Island or to Esquimalt. If, on the other hand, the object was to reach the navigable waters of the Pacific simply by the most eligible line leading to a good terminal harbour the Bute Inlet route would have to give way to the Fraser Valley - Burrard Inlet route, as Washington Harbour had all the disadvantages of Burrard Inlet in addition to many more. Moreover if the railway followed the Fraser valley route, although costly, it would undoubtedly be less costly to operate. It offered better gradients, a firmer road bed, and it was 53 miles shorter. The only serious objection to the Burrard Inlet route -- in addition to the vulnerability of Juan de Fuca -- was that for some 60 miles it ran close to the American boundary, leaving it open to the risk of being impeded on occasions of hostilities with the United

2. Ibid., p. 74.
States. In this opinion he was supported by Major-General
2 Selby Smyth. Smyth, however, pointed out that this strategic
weakness should not be allowed to outweigh the general excell­
ence of Burrard Inlet as a harbour. If the necessity arose the
route could probably be well defended.

Fleming also suggested in favour of Burrard Inlet
that if necessity arose Juan de Fuca could be avoided by runn­
ing a steam ferry to Nanaimo (23 miles) to connect with an
Island railway to the west coast. Burrard Inlet was thus in­
vested with all the advantages of Waddington Harbour as well
as its own excellence as a terminal harbour.

With regard to Route 11 and Port Essington Fleming
expressed no opinion. It possessed the advantage of being far
enough from the United States to be quite invulnerable, and
Port Essington was several hundred miles closer to the Orient
3 than Burrard Inlet and Waddington Harbour. The naval authori­
ties, however, had commented unfavourably on Port Essington
and little was known of the route via the River Skeena to
Prince George. He considered this route, however, worthy of
further surveys, and these surveys were accordingly carried

1. C. P. R. Report on Surveys, 1877, p. 75.
2. Ibid., Appendix W, p. 312.
3. It is of interest that Fleming in searching for the harbour
which offered the best location for commercial shipping
only considered the Orient. No reference is made to traffic
from Europe or from the west coast of the United States nor
to the possibility of carrying freight east for United
States consumption. In 1877 there was no Panama Canal. Trade
round the Horn or Good Hope and with the United States was
small. Had the circumstances been those which followed the
opening of the Panama Canal in 1914 Burrard Inlet would
probably have been chosen as the western terminus without
any hesitation.
out in 1877.

The exploration of the Skeena River route to Prince George was not very satisfactory. Gradients and works of construction were heavy; climatic conditions were unfavourable. Moreover the only practicable line discovered made the distance from the coast to Yellow Head Pass 690 miles. Fort Essington was found to be a poor harbour but Port Simpson at the northern end of Tsimpean Peninsula was found to "answer all the requirements of a terminal harbour".

A route explored through the Rocky Mountains by the Pine River Pass to Fort George, thence to Bute Inlet in 1878 was given a great deal of prominence in the report of Marcus Smith to the Government in 1878. In 1877 Marcus Smith was Acting Engineer-in-Chief of the Railway, as Sandford Fleming was in England on leave of absence. Smith therefore wrote the report of the surveys for 1877. He reported that the exploration of the Pine River Pass to Fort George had proved very favourable. The gradients were generally easy; the works of construction light. Moreover -- and this seemed very important to Smith -- the route passed through the great fertile country of the Peace River district and through the great mineral districts of Omineca and Cariboo. To Smith this route was prefer-

1. Canadian Pacific Railway, Reports and Documents in reference to the Location of the Line and a Western Terminal Harbour, Ottawa, 1878, appendix C, p. 38.
2. Ibid., appendix A, p. 17.
3. In the 1870's the Omineca and Cassiar districts were prominent as placer mining districts. Vide Trueman, A.S., Placer Gold Mining in Northern British Columbia, 1860 to 1880, M. A. thesis, Library of the University of British Columbia, 1935.
able to any projected by Fleming.

Smith's preference for the Pine River Pass route to Bute Inlet did not please Mackenzie, who seems by this time to have picked out the Burrard Inlet route. Fleming was sent for from London to submit a report. His report ignored Smith's preference for the Pine River route and recommended the adoption of the Burrard Inlet route.

Fleming arrived with a great deal of difficulty to his conclusion that the Fraser River - Burrard Inlet route should be adopted. In April, 1877, the Dominion government had applied for further information from the Admiralty regarding the harbours of British Columbia, particularly the harbours about the mouth of the Skeena. In December, Fleming received an answer from the Colonial Office in the form of a report by Admiral De Horsey respecting the Pacific Terminus, based on all information that was available and a personal inspection of the British Columbia coastal waters. De Horsey based his conclusions on three major considerations: the engineering character-

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1. Smith testified before the C.P.R. Royal Commission in 1882 that "it appeared to him that the route chosen by the Yellow Head Pass was altogether wrong". C.P.R. Royal Commission Report, p. 1596.
2. Vide Marcus Smith's testimony before the C.P.R. Royal Commission of 1882. "On his (Fleming's) arrival here (Ottawa from London) he says, "You have written a report". I said, "Yes". "Well," he says, "the Minister has asked me to write a report". Smith stated that Fleming refused to use all the information he had acquired in 1877. He was satisfied with what he had. He also stated that he had accompanied his report with a map of his Pine River route detailing the resources and character of the soil along it which evidently was suppressed as it did not appear in the published report. C.P.R. Royal Commission Report, v. 2, p. 1594. Cf. Smith to Tupper, Apr. 12, 1879, Dominion Sessional Paper 19 Q.,1880,p. 5.
istics of the route to the terminus, as described in Fleming's reports, the suitability of the line and terminus to the interest of the populated parts of British Columbia, and lastly, the ability of the terminus to command commercial shipping from Australia, China and Japan. He rejected the mouth of the Skeena because of "fog ice and other climatic causes" incident to a high latitude and narrowed the choice to Burrard Inlet and some port on Vancouver Island. He then condemned Burrard Inlet. The approach to it from the sea via Juan de Fuca was dangerous to navigate, and it would be vulnerable in time of war with the United States. Burrard Inlet itself, although possessing a safe port in Coal Harbour and a good anchorage in English Bay, was objectionable because the narrow entrance to Coal Harbour through the First Narrows was hardly safe for large steamers and because English Bay, although affording a good anchorage, was not smooth enough during north-westerly gales for ships to lie at wharves.

Having condemned Burrard Inlet, De Horsey concluded that the railway should be carried to Vancouver Island either by steam ferry from Burrard Inlet to Nanaimo, by bridging Seymour Narrows, or by steam ferry from Frederick Arm to Otter Cove. He recommended the latter course. Having carried the line to the Island it should terminate, he thought, at Esquimalt, Quatsino Sound or Barclay Sound.

Fleming did not allow himself to be much influenced by De Horsey's strongly expressed opinions. The rejection of the northern terminus by De Horsey particularly displeased him. In February, 1877, Commander Perry had expressed a
favourable opinion of Port Simpson and surveys in 1877 had substantiated this opinion. "A terminus at Port Simpson," Fleming thought, "would have the advantage of possibly the best harbour on the mainland". Of all the mainland harbours it was most conveniently situated for the Asiatic trade. The route terminating at Port Simpson, however, had still not been thoroughly surveyed. If this northern route were to be seriously considered it would be indispensable that a thorough survey be made of it. Fleming was in favour of this course, and if the Government entertained this view he suggested that during the 1878 season continuous explorations should be carried out between Port Simpson and a point as far east as Lake Winnepegosis.

If the Government however deemed it essential to arrive at an immediate decision the northern route could not be considered. In this contingency the line would have to follow the Bute Inlet route via Fort George, or the Burrard Inlet route via the Lower Fraser. Burrard Inlet, Fleming considered, not so eligible a terminal point as Esquimalt. It could not be approached directly from the ocean and it was, as the Admiralty pointed out, strategically weak. Fleming, since he was finally to come to a decision in favour of Burrard Inlet, answered these two objections for himself. The first objection he answered by pointing to the fact that other harbours in the world, with an enormous amount of commerce, had entrances where

2. Vide supra p. 100.
3. C. P. R. Report, 1878, p. 11.
4. Ibid., pp. 11-12.
shipping was not entirely free from delays and risks -- New York, Glasgow, Montreal. The second objection seemed to him a forcible one, but others -- he was probably thinking of Major-General Selby Smyth -- had made light of it. Fleming finally came to a decision in favour of Burrard Inlet because the route to the east from Burrard Inlet via Yellow Head Pass was 150 miles shorter than by the Esquimalt - Bute Inlet and Yellow Head Pass route -- and 200 miles shorter if the Pine River Pass were adopted, as Smith had suggested, for the Bute Inlet route. Even if the wide channels at Valdes Island were bridged and the Railway carried to Esquimalt ordinary passengers would lose in time and money and a great loss would be sustained in carrying freight. The cost of extending the Railway to Esquimalt even without bridging the Straits would add 15 to 20 million dollars to the cost of the line. The cost of maintenance would be greater, and the annual loss (which would be realized on any route for some years) would be much greater. These same arguments applied not only to Esquimalt but to any harbour on Vancouver Island.

In concluding his report, Fleming stated:

The line located from Lake Superior to Burrard Inlet commands generally more than ordinarily favourable gradients. If the railway be constructed on this route in the manner which I have recommended, cheapness of transportation will be assured and advantages will accrue in the future of the most important kind.  

On this recommendation the Mackenzie Government adopted the Burrard Inlet - Fraser valley - Yellow Head Pass route by

2. Ibid., p. 15.
order-in-council July 13, 1878 and in August advertised for
tenders for the construction of that portion of the line be­
tween Emory's Bar, a few miles below Yale on the Fraser, and
Savona's Ferry on Kamloops Lake.

The location of the line, however, was not finally
settled. The adoption of the Burrard Inlet route, as Sandford
Fleming remarked in 1879, did not give "general satisfaction
in British Columbia". The citizens of the Lower Mainland were
naturally very pleased, but Vancouver Island was greatly disa­
ppointed that Esquimalt was not selected as the terminus and
the line carried from Bute Inlet, if not by bridges, at least
by steam ferry, to connect with an Island railway from Seymour
Narrows to Esquimalt. An acrimonious dispute had been carried
on over the terminus between Lower Mainland and Island from
the time the railway was first projected in 1870. To pacify
the Island, Macdonald in June, 1873, as we have noted, fixed
Esquimalt as the terminus. When he returned to power in Sept­
ember, 1878, he again decided to pacify the Island, and re­
established Esquimalt as the terminus of the railway, in order,

1. Order-in-Council, July 13, 1878, Dominion Sessional Paper
21, 1881, p. 35.
2. Report in reference to the Canadian Pacific Railway, Ottawa,
1879, p. 18.
3. The nature of the dispute may be witnessed by reference to
Victoria newspapers, particularly the Victoria Standard, ed­
ited by Amor de Cosmos and the New Westminster British Col­
umbian. E.g., in January, 1877, a letter appeared in the
Victoria Times written by a 'Mainlander' who signed himself
"Old Settler" praising the "magnificent harbour of Burrard
Inlet". The letter immediately provoked a reply from an
'Islander,' which was also published in the Times, who stated
that it was necessary to bring the line to Esquimalt to
"effectually promote immigration to that beautiful, salub­
rious, far spreading and fertile land British Columbia."

as he explained to the British Columbia government, to leave his
government free to choose whichever route it considered best.

Macdonald's reasons for taking this action can hardly
be explained. Fleming was asked to state his views on the term-
inus question in the House of Commons. He repeated the reco-
mmendation contained in his report of 1878 that further sur-
veys should be made in the north to ascertain the absolute
feasibility of a route to Port Simpson, if postponement of
construction for this further examination could be admitted.
In April, 1878, the Macdonald Government decided to postpone
construction in British Columbia to admit of these further
surveys recommended by Fleming.

The northern line projected by Fleming was to run
from Port Simpson along the Skeena and across Northern British
Columbia to Peace River or Pine River Pass. Fleming, himself,
seems to have been anxious to find a feasible line for the
railway along this route. The fact that Port Simpson was a good
harbour and about 500 miles closer to Japan than Burrard Inlet
were important considerations. The ability of Port Simpson to
command traffic from the Orient could not be doubted. Moreover
the line across northern British Columbia passed through the
rich Peace River district and a wealthy mineral district. The
examination of this route in 1879, in Fleming's estimation
"really involved the determination of the problem whether the
choice of the Burrard Inlet route should be sustained or aban-
donned; and if construction should be immediately commenced on

1. Vide supra p. 61.
the southern or on a northern line. However, the Macdonald Government can hardly have considered the surveys of the northern route in 1879 in the same way. Esquimalt, which they fixed as the terminus, had no place in either the Burrard Inlet route or the northern route to Port Simpson. It is possible that Macdonald may have used the extra surveys as an excuse to delay construction for another year, in order to give himself time to charter successfully a company to build the railway, which could take over construction right across Canada. In any case the surveys of 1879 disclosed three practicable routes from Port Simpson: one leaving the Province by the Peace River; one by Pine River, and one by Yellow Head Pass. Sandford Fleming received information regarding these routes on September 24, 1879, by telegram from Hay Lake, near Edmonton, and on September 30, he advised the Government to adopt the route from Port Simpson through the Peace River country to Edmonton. "I have no hesitation in saying," he wrote to Tupper, "that, considered apart from the question of climate, the route to Port Simpson presents itself with so many advantages that, to my mind, it opens up an excellent prospect of securing the most eligible route from the prairie region to the Pacific coast". The line by the northern route was from 160 to 190 miles longer, but Fleming believed that this disadvantage was more than offset by the fact that the northern line would pass through and accommodate the Peace River country. On the same day that

3. Ibid., p. 16.
Fleming submitted his report, however, the Government received from Colonel R.C. Moody a strongly worded recommendation of the Burrard Inlet route. The Burrard Inlet route, as we have noted, was considered objectionable mainly because it was feared to be open to attack from the United States. Colonel Moody pointed out that because it was near the south this route would be most valuable in defense of the Province. The northern route was so far north that it would be of comparatively small avail in defence of the Province. Further, the northern route was just as vulnerable to attack from the United States as the Burrard Inlet route, since Port Simpson adjoined Alaska. Moody, unlike Fleming, in choosing Burrard Inlet also considered the United States from a commercial point of view. Because Burrard Inlet was close to the United States some addition to overland traffic might be gained from the United States' side of the frontier. The Government followed Moody's advice, rejected the northern route, the Bute Inlet – Esquimalt route, and by order-in-council, October 4, 1879, ratified the adoption of the route by Yellow Head Pass to Burrard Inlet. Fleming was direct-

1. Order-in-Council, Oct. 4, 1879, Dominion Sessional Paper 21, 1881, p. 46. Fleming's comment on the abandonment of the northern route is of interest. "Should it be desirable to construct a branch to Peace River from some point on the main line, east or west of Edmonton, the late examinations (of 1879) have established that such a line is perfectly feasible". A line now runs from the Canadian National Railway mainline from Edmonton by the Peace River into the Peace River district. The northern line had made ardent supporters. Two pamphlets appeared in 1880 criticizing the Government for abandoning it. Horetzky, C., Some Startling Facts Relating to the Canadian Pacific Railway and the North-West Lands, also a Brief Discussion regarding the Route, the Western Terminus and the Lands Available for Settlement, Ottawa, 1880, and Hewson, General M. Butt, The Canadian Pacific Railway, Toronto, Patrick Boyle, 1880.
ed to take steps for immediately placing under contract the 127 miles of the most difficult portion of the line -- the same portion for which Mackenzie had sought tenders in August, 1878 -- Emory's Bar to Savona's Ferry.

Nine years and over $3,000,000 of Dominion money was spent on the surveys in British Columbia. Strangely enough the route which was finally selected by both the Mackenzie and Macdonald governments was established as practicable in the first year of the surveys. In the succeeding years the survey was merely a hunt to discover a route which would offer an easier and less costly line to construct and terminate at a more feasible harbour. For six years this search was based on the entrance to British Columbia from Edmonton via Yellow Head Pass. In 1878 and 1879 the search went northward to the Pine River and Peace River Passes. When all was over the route surveyed by McLennan and John Trutch's parties in 1871 was adopted. The long years of surveys however cannot be considered as a waste of time or money -- though they were lacking in practicable results. Fleming was right in concluding that if a better route than the Fraser valley route could be found it was his job to find it. No one could say in 1871 that he would not be successful.

The great shock to all Fleming's work in British Columbia came three years after the adoption of the Yellow Head Pass - Burrard Inlet route by the Macdonald Government. In 1883 the Yellow Head Pass which had been the basis for practically all Fleming's work was abandoned. Edmonton was abandoned, and the line carried south to Calgary and into British Columbia by
Kicking Horse Pass, thence across the Selkirk and Gold Mountains to Kamloops. Only Fleming's work on the Thompson and Fraser valleys to Port Moody on Burrard Inlet was maintained. The story of this reversal by the Canadian Pacific Railway Company chartered by Macdonald in 1881 must be left for another chapter. At this point the Yellow Head - Fraser River route is of greatest importance, for on this route at Yale the Dominion began construction of the Railway in British Columbia.
CHAPTER IV

GOVERNMENT CONSTRUCTION -- PORT MOODY TO SAVONA'S FERRY

On the day before the Order-in-Council of October 4, 1879, adopting the Yellow Head Pass -- Fraser valley route to Port Moody at the head of Burrard Inlet, the Dominion Govern­ment advertised for tenders for the construction of the Can­adian Pacific Railway in British Columbia from Emory's Bar to Savona's Ferry, on Kamloops Lake. On the advice of Sandford Fleming, this 127 miles of the line was divided into four sec­tions: Emory's Bar to Boston Bar, Section "A", (29 miles) Bos­ton Bar to Lytton, Section "B", (29 miles) Lytton to Junction Flat, Section "C", (28½ miles) and Junction Flat to Savona's Ferry, Section "D", (40½ miles) and individual tenders were invited for each section to be received by noon November 17, 1879. The whole line from Emory's Bar to Savona's Ferry was justly considered by Fleming to be a very heavy piece of work. He consequently feared that few contractors would submit tend­ers for the whole undertaking and advised the division of the line into four sections to obtain greater competition among the contractors and lower tenders. Contracts were to be given to the lowest bidder for each section.

For Section "A", Emory's Bar to Boston Bar, 16 tenders were received, of which the lowest, $2,727,300, was submitted.

2. Ibid., p. 1297.
3. This figure did not include the cost of rails, fish plates and spikes, which were supplied by the Government.
by Duncan Macdonald and Co. They were notified that the contract, which called for completion by December 31, 1883, had been awarded to them on November 25. Duncan Macdonald and Co. also submitted the lowest tender, $2,056,950, for the section between Lytton and Junction Flat, Section "C", and were likewise awarded the contract for this section. The contract called for completion of the line by December 31, 1884. For Section "B", between Boston Bar and Lytton, 14 tenders were received, the lowest being that of P. Purcell and Co., for $2,573,640. They were duly awarded the contract, which was to be completed by June 30, 1884. The contract for Section "D", from Junction Flat to Savona's Ferry, which called for completion by June 30, 1885, was awarded to Messrs. T. and M. Kavanagh. They submitted a tender of $1,809,150, the lowest of the 11 received by the Government.

Fortunately the three contracting firms who received the contracts for the railway in British Columbia from Emory's Bar to Savona's Ferry were not destined to fulfil their contracts. The nature of the country along the railway line along the Fraser and Thompson River valleys was such that it would have been practically impossible for the contractors to do their work simultaneously in a profitable and expeditious manner. The

4. *Ibid*.
line would have to be laid from Emory's Bar, which was accessible by steamer up the Lower Fraser River, to Boston Bar, before the section from Boston Bar could profitably be constructed. Similarly, the line along the Thompson River could not well be constructed without the aid of the railway between Emory's Bar and Lytton. The difficulties of transport for the heavy railway supplies by other means than rail would have been enormous. Moreover, the construction of the line would require great supplies of skilled and unskilled labour; and labour in British Columbia, where the population was small, was very scarce. A competition for labour among the three contracting companies would have inevitably resulted in difficulties. Labour costs would undoubtedly have risen and possibly forced the weakest contractor to abandon his contract. The scene of construction was isolated, and the work to be done excessively heavy. Construction supplies would have to be transported long distances either from Great Britain or across the United States to San Francisco. Others — those which could — would have to be manufactured by the contractor himself on the scene of construction. Large works and plants would be required for this work, which could only prove profitable on a large undertaking. Taking all things into account the construction of the line from Emory's Bar to Savona's Ferry could most efficiently — and perhaps, only — be carried out as one complete work in the hands of a financially strong and able contractor. This fact was well recognized by Sandford Fleming and Charles Tupper, who filled the new and important office of Minister of Railways and Canals in Macdonald's government. They were very
pleased when the three contracting firms, to whom they had awarded the contracts, asked to have their contracts transferred to Andrew Onderdonk, a contractor whom they had good reason to believe had unlimited financial resources and great ability.

Andrew Onderdonk, an American contractor and engineer, as representative of a powerful American syndicate consisting of himself, Darius O. Mills, a millionaire banker of New York and San Francisco, H.B. Laidlaw, banker of New York, M.P. Morton of the New York banking house of Morton Bliss and Co. and S.G. Reed, vice-president of the Oregon Railway and Navigation Co., Portland, Oregon, had submitted tenders for each of the four sections of the line in British Columbia, but his tenders were among the highest submitted. Onderdonk, however, had come to Ottawa to obtain the contracts for the whole line from Emory's Bar to Savona's Ferry, and with the aid of his great financial resources he proceeded to buy the contracts from the successful bidders. To Duncan Macdonald and Co. he paid $100,000

2. Vide Report of the C. P. R. Royal Commission, 1882, Evidence v. 2, p. 1297. D.O. Mills: "Mr Onderdonk, as an engineer, presented this work to a few of his friends of which I was one; and having full confidence in Mr. Onderdonk as an engineer, an able worker, and practical man to carry out the works, we consented to go in and form what we called a syndicate to avoid the name of partners. We formed a syndicate and Mr. Onderdonk came to Canada to procure those contracts. ...At the same time we instructed him that we did not think it was desirable to have one of them; that it was important all these contracts should go into the hands of one party, and if that should prove impracticable, why we did not think it so desirable to have anything to do with the work".
for the contracts for sections "A" and "C"; to P. Purcell and Co. he paid $100,000 for the contract for section "D". He also bought out Messrs. Kavanagh, but the price he paid has not been revealed. Each of these three contracting firms requested the Government to transfer their contracts to Onderdonk. The Government, since they realized that the work could be more expeditiously executed by one contractor than by three, and since they had received ample evidence that Onderdonk was an able and reliable engineer and contractor, gladly complied in their request. By Order-in-Council, March 17, 1880, the contracts for sections "A", "C" and "D" were assigned to Andrew Onderdonk and D.O. Mills, and, on the advice of Fleming and Trutch the contract for section "B" was likewise assigned to Onderdonk and Mills.

The Dominion Government gained by these several transactions. Onderdonk took over all the contracts at the lowest

2. Ibid., p. 1009.
4. On introducing himself to Tupper in Ottawa Onderdonk brought with him a letter from the Bank of Montreal stating that he was a gentleman of the highest respectability and considerable means. He also brought letters of recommendation from A.N. Towne, Superintendent of the Central Pacific R. R., H. Schuisler, Chief Engineer of the Spring Valley Water Works, San Francisco, and the Harbour Commissioners of San Francisco. Ibid., pp. 150-151.
5. Ibid., pp. 190-191.
6. I have been unable to find the order-in-council awarding section "B" to Onderdonk. It was awarded subsequent to the other three sections for the reason that one member of the firm of P. Purcell and Co. held out against selling to Onderdonk. Report of the C. P. R. Royal Commission, 1882, Evidence, v. 1, p. 953. Trudeau testified that Section "B" was awarded by order-in-council in June, 1880, but does not give the exact date. Ibid., Evidence, v. 2, p. 1205.
price tendered for each of the four sections. The Government was thus to have the line constructed at the lowest possible price by an able and solidly backed contractor. Sir Charles Tupper stated, in 1882, that by placing the whole work in the hands of Onderdonk who, besides being an able man, had command of great resources, it was thought the work would be executed in a more satisfactory manner and probably at less cost to the country than it would have been if the original contractors, whose means were not very large, had themselves undertaken the work. The Report of the Royal Commission of 1882 supported Tupper's judgment: "The evidence leaves no doubt that the arrangement by which the work on these four sections was placed in the hands of one firm of contractors was a very desirable one in the public interest, and that it was secured without paying an extra price on that account".

Although in point of time the contract for the section of the railway between Emory's Bar and Port Moody was not let until some two years after the original four contracts in British Columbia, it may well be mentioned at this point, since it also was to be assigned to Andrew Onderdonk. The Government advertised for tenders for this section of 85 miles on October 24, 1881, mainly on the advice of Collingwood Schreiber, Fleming's successor as Engineer-in-Chief, who believed that the completion and putting under traffic of the section between

Emory's Bar and Savona's Ferry would not be of the same benefit towards the development of the resources of the country, as if the whole line from tide-water to Kamloops Lake was in a condition to be operated. Further, the construction of the section east of Kamloops through the Rocky Mountains could not be conducted with the same advantage without rail communication with the sea coast. Schreiber advised the Government to let the work as a whole in one contract, for three reasons: first, because the rails and fastenings would have to be transported over the line from Port Moody; second, because such a course would very largely reduce the competition for labour, and third, because the work was of such a character that it would necessitate the employment of a large amount of plant and rolling stock which only a large contract could justify. Tupper concurred in the views of the Chief Engineer and recommended the Government to give authority for the calling of tenders -- the work to be let in one contract and upon the "Lump sum" system. The Government accordingly, by order-in-council, October 19, 1881, authorized the advertisement for tenders for the construction of the railway between Emory's Bar and Port Moody.

Fourteen tenders were received, of which the lowest was submitted by D. McDonald and A. Charlebois of Montreal. The price named was $2,277,000, several hundred thousand dollars below the Government estimate of the cost of the line made in

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 3.
4. Ibid., p. 30.
December, 1880, of $3,306,000. The McDonald and Charlebois tender, however, was denounced as irregular, since the required cheque for $20,000 which accompanied it was mistakenly marked "good for 2 days only" by the Bank of Montreal. The next lowest tender, $2,486,000, submitted by Onderdonk, was declared to be the lowest tender in conformity with the regulations, and Onderdonk was awarded the contract. McDonald and Charlebois protested vigorously, stating that the "good for 2 days only" mark on their cheque was a mistake of the Bank of Montreal and could have been easily corrected -- which was quite true -- but the Government made no change in their decision. Actually they had seized upon the little irregularity in McDonald and Charlebois's tender as an excuse to award the contract to Onderdonk, whom Tupper had recommended as "having the necessary skill and resources to carry out the undertaking". Onderdonk thus became the builder of the C. P. R. in British Columbia from Port Moody to Savona's Ferry. A few years later, even before he finished this section of the line for the Government, he became contractor for the Canadian Pacific Railway Company and constructed the line from Savona's Ferry to Craigellachie where he met the steel from the East on November 7, 1885.

There can be no question that Andrew Onderdonk was a brilliant young engineer and contractor at the time he was awarded the Canadian Pacific Railway contracts in British Columbia. He took out his original four contracts to construct,
personally, the railway through the difficult Fraser and Thompson river valleys -- a work which was generally believed to be as heavy as could be found anywhere -- at the age of 31. But his youthfulness, considering the great works he was to undertake, was no doubt a great asset. He was a man of great courage and ability, and though young when he entered on the railway project in British Columbia, he was not without a great deal of experience in work which involved heavy construction and the command of engineers and labouring men.

Very little information is available concerning his life. Only a bare outline of some of the important events in his career is available. He was born in New York City on August 30, 1848. His father's name was John Remsen and his mother's, Sarah Trask. On his father's side he was a direct descendent of Adrian van der Donk, who came from Holland and settled in the United States in 1672, and from whom Onderdonk evidently derived his curious name. On his mother's side his ancestry was pure English. From both sides of his family Onderdonk inherited a fine tradition of culture and ability. Fourteen members of his family held Columbia University degrees; some had distinguished careers in the diplomatic service; several were bishops; some were doctors.

Onderdonk received his education at the Troy Institute of Technology at Troy, New York. On graduating he went to work

1. Letter of Mrs. Gladys Onderdonk (Bradford G.) Weekes to Dr. W. Kaye Lamb, Provincial Librarian and Archivist, Victoria, B.C., March 5, 1935; and Gibbon, John Murray, Steel of Empire, Toronto, McLelland and Stewart, 1935, p. 186 ff. Gibbon draws most of his information from Mrs. Weekes' letter to Dr. Lamb.
as a surveyor and civil engineer on the New Jersey Central Railroad, building roads and laying out townsites.

On May 10, 1871, he married Sarah Delia Helman, of Plainfield, New Jersey. Mrs. Onderdonk was to become well-known as a gracious hostess at Yale during railway construction days. From his position with the New Jersey railway Onderdonk went west to become general manager of contracts financed by Darius Ogden Mills, the millionaire banker of California who was to head the syndicate which financed Onderdonk's contracts on the Canadian Pacific Railway in British Columbia. He spent three years in San Francisco building ferry ships and sea walls for San Francisco harbour, "completing all his contracts in time in spite of fierce opposition from Dennis Carney, the notorious labour agitator of the Pacific coast". By 1880 he was a well established contractor of San Francisco. A.N. Towne, the Superintendent of the Central Pacific Railway, described him as one of the largest contractors on the Pacific Coast, "thoroughly competent to perform whatever he might feel disposed to undertake as a contractor". To point to Onderdonk's success in British Columbia is ample comment on Towne's warm praise.

3. On the completion of his work in British Columbia Onderdonk went East, where he was engaged on several large construction works. Among other great works, he built the Entre Rios Railroad on the West Coast of South America, nine miles of tunnel of the Chicago water-works, the double track railroad tunnel for T.H. and B.R.R. in Hamilton, Ontario, the Northwestern Elevated road in Chicago and parts of the Trent and Soulange Canals. He became half owner of the Union Bridge Company. He died at Oscawana-on-the-Hudson, N.Y., on June 21, 1905. He is buried in the Episcopal Church Cemetery at Mount Rose, N.Y. Mrs. Onderdonk died December 10, 1931. Onderdonk had five children: Sherly, Eva, Percy, Arthur and Gladys. Sherly, Percy and Arthur are dead. Eva, Mrs. Henry T. Prudy of San Jose, Costa Rica, and Gladys, Mrs. Bradford G. Weekes of Oyster Bay, Long Island, survive.
To Mrs. F.W. Vincent of Victoria, who knew both Mr. and Mrs. Onderdonk while they were in British Columbia, we are indebted for this short sketch:

Mr. Onderdonk was tall, fair and very good-looking, was probably of Dutch-American origin, very steady and clear-headed, but not of much polish. Mrs. Onderdonk was also fair, but short and very pleasant-looking. They were in a way a happy-go-lucky couple, very fond of enjoying themselves and used to entertain a good deal. Mr. Onderdonk always dressed like a city man even in the small uncivilized place that Yale was during 1881 - 84.

Mrs. Vincent and Onderdonk's daughter, Mrs. Weekes, are agreed that Onderdonk enjoyed life in British Columbia. In her letter to Dr. Lamb, Mrs. Weekes writes: "I know my parents entertained many distinguished people at their headquarters at Yale, British Columbia, that they had many adventures and loved their lives in British Columbia; in fact I am sure they were the happiest years of their existence".

Preparation for the commencement of construction in British Columbia began soon after the letting of the contracts in Ottawa. Early in January the Dominion Government made inquiries in Victoria to ascertain the capacity of British Columbia to furnish supplies for the railway construction, and in March the Government warned all those who possessed lands which the railway would have to cross, that they would have to sell them to the Dominion at prices irrespective of their enhanced value due to the construction of the railway. On April 2, a party of Government engineers arrived in Victoria en route to the scene of construction. The party consisted of several

1. Onderdonk file, Provincial Archives, Victoria, B.C.
2. Colonist, Jan. 11, 1880.
3. Ibid., March 2, 1880.
4. Ibid., April 3, 1880.
men who were to play important parts in the construction of the railway in British Columbia -- H.J. Cambie, G.A. Keefer, L.B. Hamlin, T.H. White, G.C. Carmon, W.C. Mitchell, Melchior Eberts, J.P. Howe, J.W. Heckman and H.B. Smith. Ten days later they were joined in Victoria by Onderdonk, and on the 16th, Engineers and Onderdonk, accompanied by the Hon. Joseph Trutch, whom the Government had appointed as their confidential agent in British Columbia to aid in the administration of the railway lands, proceeded to Yale to make preparations for the commencement of construction.

At 1 o'clock, Saturday, May 15, 1880, the firing of the first blast at the first tunnel above Yale marked the beginning of construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway in British Columbia. The event was well described by one of those present in the Montreal Gazette.

The memorable day was showery, which did not interfere with the gathering of interested spectators. After some congratulatory remarks for the Conservative Government and the Pacific Province by persons present, Mr. Onderdonk, at the request of Hon. J.W. Trutch, ordered the foreman to light the fuse -- a grand success; the loud noise resounded in the Fraser Valley some distance, besides causing a downpour of rain....

After the blast Captain John Irving, of Fraser and Thompson River fame used the whistle of his sternwheel river boat, the 'Enterprise' to add to the ceremony. Again after the blasted rock was removed from the waggon road, close to the railway line in the tunnel, Mr. Stephen Tingley, memorable for his mountain road driving with the mail and special up-country coaches, appeared with covered special, holding the reins of six lively horses, and with the consent of the tunnel foreman was allowed to go up the road.3

2. Colonist, April 16, 1880.
3. Quoted by Gibbon, op. cit., p. 189. Gibbon gives the date of the event as May 14, 1880, but the Inland Sentinel, Sept. 23, 1880, and the Colonist, May 16, 1880, are agreed on May 15.
Although Emory's Bar was chosen as the western terminus of Onderdonk's line, because of the riffle in the Fraser River at that point which impeded navigation to Yale at certain seasons of the year, Onderdonk fixed his headquarters at Yale. In a very short time Yale became one of the most active towns in British Columbia. Hotels and boarding houses, which had remained almost idle from the days of the gold rush, suddenly acquired a lively business as men moved up the river to work on the railway. "This time," wrote the editor of the Inland Sentinel (the former Cariboo Sentinel) M. Haggan, who opened his office at Emory on June 10, 1880, "surpasses the best mining days of '58 - 9 etc." The centre of greatest activity — after the saloons and hotels — was probably Onderdonk's house, which he used both as a home for his family and his principal assistants and for storage and office space. Apart from his headquarters in Yale, Onderdonk erected a hospital to take care of those injured on the works of construction. Dr. E.B.C. Honnington was appointed to administer the hospital, assisted by Dr. A.H. Sheldon. Dr. Hannington and his staff were to lead a very busy life during the four years from 1880 to 1885, and if the Inland Sentinel and Colonist can be believed, at times they were quite inadequate to give proper

1. Actually the terminus was fixed by Schreiber and Cambie one mile below Emory's Bar. Colonist, July 28, 1880.
2. The Inland Sentinel was published at Yale, June 10, 1880 to May 15, 1884. It renewed publication at Kamloops July 31, 1884.
3. Inland Sentinel, June 17, 1880.
4. Dr. Hannington was succeeded in April, 1885, by Dr. H.E. Langis, who at present resides in Vancouver, B.C.
5. Inland Sentinel, June 17, 1880.
attention to the many injured who came to them for relief.

Life in Yale during construction days defies description. While work in the Fraser Canyon and below Yale to Port Moody was in progress Yale was thronged with labouring men of almost every nationality. Chinese, French Canadians, and English, Scotch and Irish, who came principally from the United States, were most prominent. Over this motley crowd very little effective restraint was exercised. The Editor of the Inland Sentinel complained on more than one occasion that the police force, one man, was inadequate, and the Colonist reported in May, 1881, that "the condition of affairs at Yale [was] critical. A feeling of insecurity [pervaded] all classes". Pay day in Yale, which came on the 10th of each month, seems to have been invariably accompanied by drunken brawls. Sunday was also a popular day for celebration. One who was there in 1880 describes a Sunday in Yale with vivid brutality in the Inland Sentinel of May 29, 1905.

The town of Yale was en fete that day, in a 'wild and woolly' sense, and the one long main business street, fronting on the river, presented a scene and sounds at once animated and grotesque, bizarre and risque. The shell like shacks of saloons, whereof every third building, nearly, was one, fairly buzzed and bulged like Brobdignagian wasps' nests, whose inmates, in a continual state of flux, ever and anon hurled in and out, in twos and threes, or tangled wrangling masses. Painted and bedizened women lent a garish colour to the scene. On the hot and dusty road-side, or around timbers, rails, and other construction debris, men in advanced stages of intoxication rolled and fought, or snored in bestial oblivion.

Judge F.W. Howay, who quotes this passage, believes from personal experience that this picture of a Yale Sunday is uncoloured.

1. Vide Inland Sentinel, Oct. 7, 1880; Aug. 16, 1883; Colonist, May 18, 1881; May 28, 1881.
2. Colonist, May 18, 1881.
On July 27, 1880, Yale suffered a temporary setback when the whole town was consumed by fire. Onderdonk lost his fine house despite a water tank he had erected to protect it. The town, however, was soon rebuilt. Onderdonk built a new building for his headquarters, this time at the west end of Front Street (which ran parallel to the river) isolated and comparatively free from fire. This building served Onderdonk throughout his work in the Province. It still stands at Yale, having escaped the ravages of an even greater fire than that of July 27, 1880, which destroyed Yale on August 18, 1881.

At Emory's Bar a town sprang up which has been characterized by Judge F.W. Howay as 'ephemeral'. Emory, as the western terminus of the line on the Lower Fraser, became the point of trans-shipment of railway supplies from the river steamers to the railway. At Emory also disembarked the men en route to the works of construction. The Inland Sentinel reported, on September 23, 1880, that Emory was "a booming". "Three steamers to-day -- Hotel crowded, railroad tents all around -- work at the bridge and grading in earnest -- parties after choice lots, etc."

Naturally the major business of Yale and Emory centered around the production and handling of construction supplies for the railway. At Emory Onderdonk built a dock to receive construction supplies -- rails, fish plates, spikes, provisions, timbers (and occasionally a locomotive) -- whence they were

1. Inland Sentinel, July 29, 1880.
2. Ibid., August 5, 1880.
3. Ibid., August 25, 1881.
transported by rail or road to the rail-head and camps above Yale. Rails, fish plates and spikes were brought to New Westminster by sailing ships from England. Here they were unloaded and trans-shipped to the river steamer for Emory's Bar -- or if they were intended for use on the Port Moody -- Emory's Bar line they were carried to convenient points along the Fraser, Port Haney, St Mary's Mission, Harrison River, Mariaville and the Indian village opposite Hope. When the line from Port Moody to Yale was completed supplies were shipped to Port Moody and thence by rail up the line above Yale.

Onderdonk established his warehouses at Yale and Emory. At Yale he built machine shops, for servicing the locomotives which he imported from San Francisco, and for the manufacture of railway cars. The *Inland Sentinel* reported on April 21, 1881, that the Railway Machine Shop was in full operation under the operation of Mr. Henry McGowan, and that it had one of the finest lathes in the province. Close by the Machine Shop Onderdonk erected, early in 1882, his car shop which by May, 1883, was turning out a flat car a day. An Engine House was built, complete with turn-table, to house three locomotives at a time.

Besides building his own flat cars Onderdonk manufactured at Yale, at Emory, and along the line, whatever he could of value in the works of construction. His principal operations were the manufacture of explosives, great quantities of which were required to blast a line through the rocks of

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the Fraser and Thompson River canyons, and the cutting of railway ties and bridge timbers. He erected his explosives plant at Yale. After an expenditure of $20,000 the plant was ready by January, 1881, for the manufacture of 2,000 lbs of Dean's Safety Nitro-Glycerine daily. At Texas Lake, a few miles below Emory, Onderdonk operated a steam saw-mill, day and night, cutting ties and bridge timbers. Two more mills were operated further up the line.

Onderdonk was never able to cut all the ties and timbers he needed. He purchased great quantities of ties and bridge timbers from the saw-mills of New Westminster and Burrard Inlet. On April 5, 1882, for example, he advertised for tenders for 232,000 cross ties for the line from Emory's Bar to Port Moody, with the result that ties for the railway were soon drawn from Pitt River, Harrison Lake, Boundary Bay and Salt Spring Island, and the saw-mills of New Westminster and Burrard Inlet, as the Columbian remarked, enjoyed a 'boom'.

The problem of transport for construction supplies and provisions was a continual source of trouble to Onderdonk. Transport for the heaviest of the railway supplies -- rails and ties -- was easily arranged, for once the track was laid they were merely carried to the rail-head over the finished line. But transport for the supplies of food, tools and explosives, which had to go beyond the rail-head to the gangs engaged on the grade, was often difficult, and always very costly. The Cariboo

2. Inland Sentinel, April 5, 1883.
road, of course, was the only means of transport up the Fraser valley above Yale, and along this road many of Onderdonk's supplies were carried. The construction of the railway, however, often impeded traffic along the road, for often the railway crossed or followed the road. Delays occurred while the road was repaired or built in another location. But the main difficulty of transport, as far as Onderdonk was concerned, was the cost. "In addition to other transportation charges," Chittenden observed, "Mr. Onderdonk pays $10.00 for every ton of his freight passing over the Yale—Cariboo Wagon Road, excepting for the production of the Province".

As construction advanced further and further up the river transportation costs became heavier, and Onderdonk finally decided to build a small river steamer to be used on the navigable stretches of the Fraser above Yale. Construction of the little steamer began in December, 1881, on the river 15 miles above Yale near the "Big Tunnel", and was completed early in May, 1882. It was launched on Tuesday, May 9th, an account of the event appearing in the *Inland Sentinel* on May 11th.

The time was fixed at 11 a.m., and a little before Mr. and Mrs. Onderdonk, Mrs. Bacon, and some others arrived by the cars. Mr. Dalton gave orders to remove the blocks, and five minutes before time away the boat slipped into the water, receiving her name, we believe from Mrs. Onderdonk, "The Skuzzy" (the name of a little stream above the Big Tunnel).

Having successfully launched the "Skuzzy" fifteen miles above Yale the next difficulty to meet was getting the little steamer up the river through the treacherous Hell Gate to Boston.

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1. Chittenden, *op. cit.*, p. 35
2. *Inland Sentinel*, Dec. 8, 1881.
Bar, whence she was to ply to Lytton with supplies in advance of the rail. Chittenden has left this interesting account of the Skuzzy's treacherous journey to Boston Bar.

Then came the difficulty of finding a captain able and willing to take her through. One after another went up and looked at the little boat, then at the awful canyon, the rushing river and the swift foaming rapids, and turned back, either pronouncing the ascent impossible or refusing to undertake it. Finally Captains S.R. and David Smith, brothers, were sent for, both well known for their remarkable feats of steamboating on the upper waters of the Columbia. The former ran the steamer Shoshone 1,000 miles down the Snake River through the Blue Mountains -- the only boat which ever did, or probably ever will, make the perilous passage. He also ran a steamer safely over the falls of Willamette at Oregon City. He said he could take the Skuzzy up, and provided with a crew of seventeen men, including J.W. Burse, a skilful engineer, with a steam winch and capstan and several great hawsers, began the ascent. At the end of seven days I found them just below Hell Gate, having lined safely through the roaring Black Canyon, through which pent-up waters rush like a millrace at 20 miles an hour. Returning from my journey to the interior, I had the pleasure of congratulating the captain upon the successful accomplishment of the undertaking, and of seeing the Skuzzy start from Boston Bar with her first load of freight. Captain Smith said the hardest tug of war was at China Riffle, where, in addition to the engines, the steam winch, and 15 men at the capstan, a force of 150 Chinamen upon a third line was required to pull her over! The captains received $2,250 for their work.  

The Skuzzy was a strongly built craft of 120 tons, with dimensions, 120 feet length, 24 foot beam, and four and a half feet depth of hold. She was propelled by two horizontal engines in addition to which she had a steam winch placed in her bows "for the purpose of working through the chutes and rapids" which ever recurred along the route from Boston Bar to Lytton. Her hull was adapted to meet the many perils of navigation on the Fraser. It was divided into upwards of twenty compartments each partitioned off from the other by watertight bulkheads. Half her bottom could be torn out -- as actually did happen -- without

1. Chittenden, op. cit., p. 36
sinking her.

The Skuzzy had a short but adventuresome and useful career, carrying supplies and provisions up the river between Boston Bar and Lytton. The effect of the little boat on the freight carrying along the Cariboo road was immediate. On the opening of the spring season in 1883 the Inland Sentinel remarked that Cariboo wagon road freighting was light and that it was feared the big trams would not pay. "The cars and 'Skuzzy' do a large share of the Railway freight carrying". By the end of 1883, however, her usefulness was complete as the grade to Lytton had almost reached completion. She was tied up above Boston Bar where she remained until 1884, when her machinery was removed, taken to Savona, and placed in a newly built Skuzzy, number two. The new Skuzzy was used below and above Kamloops for transport and as a "floating hotel" for the track-layers, moving along with them as they proceeded along the grade.

An even more difficult problem than cheap transportation was the problem of obtaining adequate supplies of skilled and unskilled labour. Labour in British Columbia was scarce and as a result labour had to be imported from Eastern Canada, the United States, particularly from California, and from China. Even the Indians of the province were occasionally employed.

Onderdonk brought most of his skilled and professional help with him from San Francisco, including E.G. Tilton, his

1. The Resources of British Columbia, Victoria, Oct. 1, 1883.
2. Inland Sentinel, May 17, 1883.
Chief Engineer and General Superintendent, and George F. Kyle, Tilton's assistant. But he was never able to obtain all the skilled help he needed. As late as April, 1884, when work had been in progress for almost four years, he complained that he needed good, practical railroad men, bosses and sub-contractors and could employ a large number of this class. Onderdonk's chief difficulty, however, was to find enough unskilled labourers to do clearing, grading, track-laying and ballasting work. In 1882, D.O. Mills, representing the Onderdonk syndicate before the C. P. R. Royal Commission testified that only the scarcity of the supply of labour would render completion of the line by the requested date, June 30, 1885, impossible. In October, 1881, Tupper called attention to the same difficulty. "The question of labour," he told the Toronto Mail, "has been a very serious one, both in British Columbia and on the works between Thunder Bay and Red River". Onderdonk was continually advertising for labour and on several occasions he left the Province to recruit workers in San Francisco.

Work began at Yale in May, 1880, with 500 men employed; by the middle of June 1,000 were at work; and by September the force had increased to 1,600 men. By 1881, Onderdonk was in need of 4,000 men, and for some time work was retarded owing to the shortage of white men — 'Onderdonk's Lambs; as they

1. Vide B. C. Directory 1882/83, for Onderdonk's staff.
2. Interview with the Portland Evening Telegram, April 12, 1884. Quoted by Inland Sentinel, April 14, 1884.
5. Ibid., May 29, 1880.
6. Ibid., June 23, 1880.
7. Ibid., Sept. 11, 1880.
8. Inland Sentinel, March 10, 1881.
became known. At this time Onderdonk began employing large numbers of Chinese on his works — Chinese who had come to British Columbia from 1876 to 1880 direct from China and from San Francisco, where they had been employed on the construction of the Central Pacific and Southern Pacific Railways.

The employment of Chinese immediately produced protests from the white inhabitants of the province, but Onderdonk was very careful to explain that he employed Chinese only as a matter of necessity and that he preferred white labour.

On February 11, 1881, he wrote to the Editor of the *Inland Sentinel*:

There appears to be an impression abroad that we propose to work Chinese on our railroad contracts, to the exclusion of white labour. This impression is working us an injury, as many who might otherwise apply for work are discouraged from doing so. As it is imperative to work a very large force of men the coming season, we shall employ both classes of labour, and shall furnish employment for 3,000 white men, at our current rates for that class of labor, on application, provided they are handy and industrious.

In March, Onderdonk left Yale for San Francisco in search of labour, and soon hundreds of men were on their way by steamer up the Fraser to Yale, white and Chinese. Every boat brought men for the railway. On April 7, the *Inland Sentinel* remarked that the last arrival of railway workmen from California appeared to be able-bodied and remarkably quiet. The next issue of the paper, April 14, reported that the William Irving had arrived in the morning bringing 216 white men and some

Chinamen for the railway work. On April 12, the Colonist stated that Onderdonk was still in California forwarding men to Yale, and that he anticipated no difficulty in securing 6,000 men to work on the line. Onderdonk did secure a large number of white labourers in California, and also some French Canadians engaged in Quebec, but the 6,000 men whom Onderdonk was to secure were made up of large numbers of Chinese imported direct from Hong Kong, China.

Over half the 16,000 Chinese who came to British Columbia from 1876 to September, 1884; (the date of the Report of the Royal Commission on Chinese Immigration) came in the years 1882 and 1883, when the demand for labour for the construction of the railway was at its height. Although no direct evidence is available on the subject it seems that Onderdonk made arrangements with the Dominion and Imperial Governments to have Chinese shipped directly to British Columbia for railway construction. At least the New Westminster British Columbian stated in January, 1882, that there was good authority for stating that the C.P.R. contractor had four ships under charter to convey five thousand Chinese direct from China to the railway works in this province." It is not possible to say exactly how many Chinese were employed by Onderdonk. In 1884 the Royal Commission on Chinese Immigration gave the figure at 2,900 but estimates as high as 6,000 have been made. White labour seems to have exceeded Chinese, generally, but on the

1. Over 27,000 whites came in the same period.
3. Ibid., p. 364.
section from Emory's Bar to Port Moody Chinese easily predominated. The contract for this section of the line was not let until two years after the original four contracts and as a result when Onderdonk came to begin construction here his available labour supply was engaged on the Emory — Savona line. He was forced to fall back upon Chinese. In November, 1882, for 100 whites working at Maple Ridge there were 500 Chinese. By January, 1883, there were 900 Chinese. At Port Moody in January, 1883, there were 550 Chinese, but only 100 white workers. The Chinese made excellent railway navvies -- as they had on the Central Pacific and Southern Pacific -- and worked for lower wages, but they were useful only for the most menial and unskilled labour. Onderdonk was thus particularly hard pressed for white labour for the line from Emory to Port Moody -- the supply never satisfied his demands.

Onderdonk employed Indian labour on the Emory — Port Moody line and at Lytton in 1882. They worked well and gave satisfaction, receiving the current rate of wages paid to white workers. It is of interest, however, that the editor of the Columbian objected to the employment of Indians on the railway since it would seriously interfere with the fishing industry. "The employment of so many of the Lower Fraser Indians on the railway works at $2 a day is sure to exert a more or less injurious influence upon the fishing industry. The labor question is a most serious one, affecting every industry in the country,

2. Ibid., Jan. 20, 1883.
3. Ibid., Jan. 24, 1883.
4. Inland Sentinel, April 27, 1882.
and the sooner a satisfactory solution can be found the better”.¹

Actually there was no solution for the labour problem which would satisfy everyone. British Columbia had experienced a great boom on the commencement of the railway and although about 45,000 immigrants came to British Columbia in the years between 1876 and 1885, the supply of labour still seemed inadequate. Onderdonk's remedy was Chinese labour; but the employment of Chinese on the railway was bitterly attacked. The Port Moody Gazette boldly declared that there was "no affinity between [the White and Chinese races] in spite of all that is preached about the universal brotherhood of man," and lamented the fact that "the greater part of the millions to be expended on railway construction will go to China". To all critics, Onderdonk replied that he preferred white labour, but since he could not obtain enough of it he had to employ Chinese in order to complete his contracts. In this opinion he was supported by Sir John A. Macdonald. At a meeting in Toronto, Macdonald stated that he was "opposed to Chinese labor in America", for he did not think it was for our interest "to bring in semi-barbarians to work out and supersede white labor". But he was "pledged to build the great Pacific Railroad in five years and if [he could

¹ Columbian, May 27, 1882.
² Port Moody Gazette, April 12, 1884.
³ Ibid., April 5, 1884.
⁴ The Columbian, June 10, 1882, states that Onderdonk offered to contribute $250,000 towards a scheme for introducing the right kind of labor into British Columbia but his proposal was not entertained by the Government. I have found no substantiation of this statement. In Onderdonk's favour it must be mentioned that on two occasions he raised the wage rates for white labour. Vide Inland Sentinel, June 10, 1880, and Aug. 25, 1881, and Colonist, April 13, 1882.
not] obtain white labor, [he] must employ other".

That the Chinese were of great value in the development of British Columbia could not be denied, but the great prejudice against the Chinese, who were generally looked upon as a great moral and social evil, outweighed all other considerations. In January, 1883, the Provincial Government drew attention of the Dominion Government "to the immense influx of Chinese into this Province, consequent upon the Railway Contractor importing large numbers from Asia," and asked for legislation for the purpose of preventing immigration of Chinese into the Province. On July 4, 1884, the Dominion Government appointed a Royal Commission to inquire into the question of Chinese immigration into Canada. The Commission was chiefly impressed by the great aid Chinese labour had given to the development of industry and the construction of railway in British Columbia and completely exonerated Onderdonk. "It admits of no question," their report stated, "that without their labour, the construction and completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway would have been indefinitely postponed".

Whenever possible Onderdonk used machinery on the grading work -- steam shovels for excavation and steam and compressed air drills for tunnel and rock-cutting work -- and had it not been for these mechanical aids his labour problems would have been even greater. It seems that steam shovels were not

used, however, until the summer of 1883. Two were placed on excavation work above Yale, and a third was used on the Port Moody section near Maple Ridge. Work with the steam shovel began on August 20, at Maple Ridge. The editor of the Columbia wrote with delight that this was "bad news for the Chinamen whose services are not now required". Steam-drills arrived from San Francisco in July, 1880, for work on the tunnels above Yale, the first being used on the "Big Tunnel" (No. 6, above Yale) on August 5. Later steam drills were replaced by compressed air drills, which were found to be more efficient.

On the whole, Onderdonk had little trouble with his huge labour force. The white labourers were constantly coming and going, and this turnover, no doubt, caused serious difficulties. The Chinese, on the other hand, were steady and reliable. The main difficulty seems to have been to keep the white and Chinese labourers working amicably together. Mixed gangs were not used but white foremen were almost invariably placed over the Chinese gangs. Occasionally differences arose between foremen and Chinese which resulted in rather serious, and on occasions, fatal accidents. In February, 1883, several rows took place between the Chinese gangs at Maple Ridge and the white foremen. In some cases either the foremen or the Chinese received serious injuries. On May 10, of the same year, at Lytton a Chinese gang assaulted the foreman. During the

2. Ibid., August 22, 1883.
3. Inland Sentinel, July 1, 1880.
4. Ibid., Aug. 5, 1880.
following night several of the white workers attacked the Chinese camp, burned it to the ground and injured several of the Chinese, one, so seriously, that he died. Riots of this sort however were not common, and of very little consequence.

Onderdonk was rarely troubled by strikes. He paid good wages and regularly, and although there were many who complained of their bosses and board supplied in the camps, others praised conditions along the line. A Chinese strike took place above Yale in May, 1881, and there was a strike among the white laborers along the Port Moody line in February, 1884, but no strike of any importance troubled Onderdonk.

Onderdonk pushed his great works through to completion with all possible despatch. There were no serious delays during the whole four years he was engaged on the line from Port Moody to Savona's Ferry. Work was carried on throughout the whole of each year, although naturally it was briskest during the spring, summer and autumn months, and somewhat retarded during the winter season. No time was lost in commencing the work at Yale in the spring of 1880 and no time was lost in rushing it to completion. Work was carried on at night as well as by day, and Sunday labour, although forbidden by the contracts, was almost a rule.

The work which began with the first blast at No. 1 Tunnel, above Yale, progressed rapidly under the supervision of Onderdonk and his engineers, superintendents and riding bosses, and the Government engineers. E.G. Tilton was an efficient (and

2. Inland Sentinel, May 19, 1881.
popular) construction superintendent and he was succeeded in 1882 by a man equally able, M.J. Haney. Onderdonk's 'riding bosses' one of whom was placed over each section of the line knew well how to keep their men at work -- and some were very popular. Superintendent James Leamy who was over the section from Emory to Boston Bar was characterized by one of his workers as "as fine a man as e'er I met". For the Government, Marcus Smith became Deputy Engineer in Chief in British Columbia, and was placed in charge of the line from Port Moody to Emory's Bar. H.J. Cambie had charge of the line from Emory's Bar to Boston Bar. George A. Keefer had charge from Boston Bar to Lytton, H.A.F. Macleod from Lytton to Junction Flat and L.B. Hamlin, from Junction Flat to Savona's Ferry.

The work of preparing the grade from Emory's Bar to Savona's Ferry proceeded on each of the four sections simultaneously, in order that there would be no delay in track-laying which proceeded progressively up the river valley from Emory's Bar. The heaviest work occurred on the section between Yale and Boston Bar. On this section 13 tunnels had to be constructed including the largest on the whole line, the "Big Tunnel", which was 1,600 feet long. Fortunately, this heavy section was readily accessible from the head of navigation on the Fraser. The lightest work occurred from Junction Flat to Savona's Ferry, except

1. The China Herder's Lament, Gazette, July 5, 1884. M.J. Haney, in this amusing poem, however, is named "the meanest man on all the road".
for the large rocky bluff which ran sheer down to the Thompson River near Savona's Ferry.

On Thursday noon, September 23, 1880, the first tunnel, No. 2 tunnel, 3½ miles above Yale, was completed. The occasion was celebrated, according to the Inland Sentinel "by Mr. Onderdonk supplying a barrel of beer". No. 1 tunnel was put through by November 18, 1880. By March, 1881, four tunnels were completed and work was proceeding, although hampered by a shortage of men, on tunnels No's. 5 and 6 (the 'Big Tunnel'). The 'Big Tunnel' was completed and ready for track laying on October 19, 1881, Mr. Onderdonk again supplying a barrel of beer to celebrate the occasion. While these works were undertaken above Yale, work on the grade was proceeding far up the river and between Yale and Emory. All along the Cariboo road there was great activity, "freighters and pack trains in motion -- Whites, Chinamen and Indians -- horses, mules and ponies in great variety".

Track-laying began at Emory's Bar in April, 1881, and by July 4, of the same year, sufficient track had been laid to celebrate American Independence Day with an excursion between Yale and Emory. The first locomotive, appropriately named the "Yale", had arrived at Emory towards the end of April from the Joseph Enright Works, San Jose, California, accompanied by several cars. The account of the first railway excursion ever held

1. Inland Sentinel, Sept. 30, 1880.
2. Ibid., Nov. 18, 1880.
3. Ibid., Oct. 20, 1881.
4. Ibid., April 28, 1881.
5. Ibid., March 31, 1881.
6. Ibid., April 28, 1881.
in British Columbia which appeared in the *Inland Sentinel*, July 7, 1881, is of interest:

The cars stood upon the track near the head of Albert street; they were six in number, all well seated with new lumber from the Emory Mill....Shortly after 9 o'clock the New Westminster Brass Band, that had arrived with the 'Wm Irving' Excursion, the afternoon previous, made its appearance, and were provided with seats upon the third car. Now the pleasure seekers began to rush on board and take seats....the word was given and the shrill whistle of the engine gave warning and the Band striking up 'Hail Columbia' away the first Excursion train upon the C. P. R. in British Columbia went, apparently to the satisfaction of the people....In passing Mr. Onderdonk's villa the Band played with spirit 'Star Spangled Banner'. The train moved pleasantly along at a speed far beyond the expectation of the masses.

The work of ballasting the track began soon after the rails were laid, and the "Yale" when not hauling rails, ties, and bridge timbers to the rail-head was engaged hauling gravel for the Chinese and white section gangs who were engaged tamping the ties. By August, the track had been laid some six miles above Yale, and the work of transporting steel timbers and gravel was becoming too much for one locomotive. A second locomotive -- so small and old that the editor of the *Inland Sentinel* was very disappointed in it. -- arrived at the end of October. A third engine, named the "New Westminster" was unloaded at Emory in July, 1882.

Work on the section from Emory's Bar to Port Moody began in April, 1882, when Indians were put to work clearing a right of way for the grade. Soon work began along the line -- at Port Moody, Maple Ridge, Emory's Bar -- on the grade. The beginning of work at Port Moody brought a new town into being.

1. *Inland Sentinel*, Nov. 3, 1881.
P.S. Hamilton, the editor of the Port Moody Gazette, wrote of the beginnings of the western terminus of the Canadian Pacific Railway.

Until the summer [of 1882], the shores of Port Moody presented to view an unbroken line of heavily timbered forests. The first break made in these wild surroundings, towards the close of the summer of that year, was in commencing the construction of a railway terminal wharf. Simultaneously with this work the work of felling and removing the timbers from the railway track was also commenced. About the end of October, gangs of men were set to grading the track. In the month of May [1883] the fine iron ship "Duke of Abercorn" arrived out as the first of a squadron loaded with steel rails for the Canadian Pacific, and was discharged at the railway wharf. This ship was, during the summer and autumn followed by seven others making eight in all down to the month of October, and of the burthen of from 1190 to 1800 tons, similarly loaded with steel rails, plates, spikes, etc.

Port Moody looked forward to the future with confidence. "Imagination," wrote P.S. Hamilton, "is tasked to conceive how great, and prosperous, and brilliant, its future must be".

Port Haney also came to life as a railway construction centre. Here many supplies were brought from New Westminster for use along the line. A correspondent of the Columbian wrote in December, 1882, that a 'boom' had commenced at Port Haney. "On Saturday the steamers Reliance, Gem, Lily, Wm. Irving, and Myra (late Pacific Slope) were all here. The Irving and Myra were landing cargoes of Chinamen and Chinese wares. On Sunday evening the Irving came alongside again and landed freight... The Royal City will have to look to her laurels".

Port Haney's good fortune was short, however, for soon Onderdonk moved the depot on the Fraser a few miles down the line to

2. Ibid.
Port Hammond, which also became an active centre.

Onderdonk pushed the Port Moody — Emory's Bar line to completion as quickly as possible, as he wished to use it to transport supplies to the rail-head above Yale. The line between Emory and Hope was particularly rushed to completion in order to avoid the dangers to navigation on the Fraser above Hope to Emory's Bar. Men were moved from work on the grade near Port Haney in order to complete this portion of the line. The track was laid to the Indian village opposite Hope from Emory's Bar by June 14, 1883, and Hope then replaced Emory's Bar as the point of trans-shipment from river steamer to flat car. Track-laying commenced at Port Moody July 19, 1883, and at Maple Ridge towards Pitt River, July 17, 1883.

The work of laying the track proceeded night and day. By August 23, 1883, the track had been laid 3½ miles from Port Moody, where it was delayed awaiting the completion of a bridge across a ravine at that point. Further up the line, track had been laid from Port Haney to Pitt River. From Emory, rails had been laid fourteen miles to Ruby Creek. By January 22, 1884, the line had been completed from Port Moody to Emory's Bar, although the contract had not called for completion until June 30, 1885.

On January 25, the first through train left Port Moody with steel for the line above Yale, along which the track

1. Inland Sentinel, June 14, 1883.
2. Columbian, July 21, 1883.
3. Ibid., Aug. 23, 1883.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., Jan. 23, 1884.
had been laid within a few miles of the Fraser River crossing at Cisco, five miles below Lytton. Not only was the line used to transport railway supplies but almost immediately it was used to carry mails to and from the interior, and for carrying cattle to Port Moody. On February 6, 1884, for the first time the Cariboo mail came down by rail to Port Moody. "On the novel fact becoming known," the Port Moody Gazette reported, "some of our citizens, after the example of Henry Ward Beecher, on witnessing a certain victory of the Northern Arms in the late U.S. Civil War, exclaimed -- 'Bully Hallelujah!'" On February 15, the first train load of cattle came down the line, and thereafter they came by almost every train.

The principal reason for rushing the Port Moody -- Emory's Bar line to completion was to have it ready before the track on the upper section reached the Cisco Bridge crossing, so that the parts of the heavy steel cantilever bridge which was to cross the river at this point could be carried by rail directly from Port Moody. Onderdonk accomplished his object in good time. The steel reached the bridge crossing by February 9, about two weeks following the joining of the rails between Emory and Port Moody.

The contract for the construction of the Cisco bridge had not been let with the original contracts for the construction of the railway in British Columbia, but Onderdonk, on February 22, 1882, entered into an agreement with the Dominion

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2. Ibid., Feb. 9, 1884.
3. Ibid., Feb. 16, 1884.
4. Ibid., Feb. 9, 1884.
Government to place the bridge, which was manufactured in England, across the Fraser. The Cisco bridge, which, excepting the Big Tunnel above Yale, was the largest single engineering work on the whole of Onderdonk's contract, was so large and fine a structure that it was carefully described by the Newcastle Chronicle while it was being made by Hawkes, Crawshay and Co. of Newcastle, England. Manufactured in England, the bridge was brought in parts around Cape Horn by the barque Stormy Petrel to Port Moody. It arrived on December 14, 1883. With the completion of the line between Emory and Port Moody and to the bridge crossing, the parts were taken up the line by rail, the first train load leaving Port Moody on February 6, 1884. There was a delay of some four months in track laying while the bridge was being placed across the Fraser -- the only delay of any length which Onderdonk experienced in his work -- but by June 6, 1884, the track was laid across the bridge, and on June 18, 1884, the "Iron Horse" bounded into Lytton. Twelve days later on June 30, 1880, the time for the completion of the contract for the section between Boston Bar and Lytton expired.

With the approach of the steel towards Lytton another town in British Columbia sprang into prominence; while further down the line, Yale, though still the scene of Onderdonk's headquarters, was sinking into depression. In April, 1883, a witty observer wrote the editor of the Inland Sentinel:

3. Ibid., Feb. 9, 1884.
4. Ibid., June 7, 1884.
5. Ibid., June 21, 1884.
Our little town is looking now more prosperous than it has for many a long day; all the hotels are full to overflowing and at the door of each the "garcon" can be seen smiling and courteous. Among them, that prince of Lytton landlords, Mr. Geo. Baillie, seems to be as happy as 'a clam at high water'. With him it is not a question of boarders but how to find room for them. Those of our citizens, who have teams, are getting them in from the various ranches and with the use of buckskin and wire are making speedy preparations for the coming freight season. All our saloons (and their number is legion) are doing a flourishing business; some of them in fact evidently are poor calculators, for they have found it necessary to lengthen out their winter's supply of "fire water" by a liberal recourse to "chuck" much to the disgust of all good lovers of the 'flowing bowl'....So you see Mr. Editor that the "fickle goddess" has awakened Lytton from her "Van Winkle doze".

While Lytton was rejoicing in her prosperity, Yale was beginning to bemoan the signs of decline. The ever frank editor of the Inland Sentinel wrote in March, 1884, that "no longer does any doubt exist as to the blow about to be struck at this town". In July he noted that "times in Yale are getting pretty quiet and some are picking up their traps to start for another location". He, himself, had moved from Yale; he wrote this comment for the first issue of his paper published in Kamloops, July 31, 1884. Kamloops, like Lytton, with the approach of the railway experienced a great boom.

With the track laid to Lytton and the grade practically completed along the line to Savona's Ferry, it was very few months before Onderdonk completed his contracts by reaching Savona's Ferry on Kamloops Lake. The 29 miles of track to Junction Flat (Spence's Bridge) were laid by September 11, 1884. By the end of the year the steel had been laid within three

1. Inland Sentinel, April 5, 1883.
2. Ibid., March 6, 1884.
3. July 31, 1884.
4. Inland Sentinel, Sept. 11, 1884.
miles of Savona's Ferry. It reached Savona's Ferry on January 3, 1885. The completion of the line by the required date, June 30, 1885, was confidently expected. In October, 1885, Schreiber reported that the line from Port Moody to Savona's Ferry "may almost be said to be completed, being so far advanced that it may shortly be accepted by the Government. It is in fine running condition."

Onderdonk's construction activities did not end at Savona's Ferry. Some time before the completion of the Government line to Savona's Ferry, Onderdonk received contracts from the Canadian Pacific Railway Company to build the line beyond Savona's Ferry to Kamloops and on past Kamloops across the Gold Mountains through Eagle Pass to meet the Company line coming over the Rocky and Selkirk Mountains from Calgary. Work on the first seventy-five miles of the line beyond Savona's Ferry began early in 1884, and when Onderdonk reached Savona's Ferry with steel for the Government he proceeded straight along the grade laying steel for the Company. But the story of this section of the line must be left for the following chapter as it forms part of the story of the Canadian Pacific Railway Company construction in British Columbia.

2. Colonist, April 1, 1885.
4. I have been unable to find exactly when or under what circumstances and conditions Onderdonk received contracts from the Company. The Colonist, April 1, 1884, states that Onderdonk received the contracts in February, 1884.
CHAPTER V

THE CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, THE CHANGE OF
ROUTE AND CONSTRUCTION IN THE MOUNTAINS

In June, 1880, Sir John A. Macdonald, after some months of silence and difficult negotiations, announced that the Dominion government had secured the co-operation of a group of capitalists to build the Canadian Pacific Railway, and on October 21, 1880, a contract for the construction of the road, excluding those sections which were under government construction, was signed at Ottawa by Sir Charles Tupper and several Canadian, American, English and French capitalists. Montreal capital was well represented; George Stephen, President of the Bank of Montreal, R.B. Angus, Manager of the same bank, and Duncan McIntyre, Manager of the Canada Central Railway, signed the contract. James J. Hill and J.S. Kennedy represented American capital. The English banking house of Morton, Rose and Company, whose American branch, Morton, Bliss and Company, formed part of the Onderdonk syndicate, brought English capital into the project. French capital was enlisted by Kohn, Reinach and Company. Other important members of the syndicate, although their names did not appear on the contract, were Donald A. Smith, who had obtained a controlling interest in the Hudson's Bay Company, J. Cochran, a wealthy Quebec cattle breeder, and the Société Générale of France. The contract was ratified and the members of the syndicate incorporated as the Canadian Pacific

1. 44 Vic., c. 1.

By the terms of the contract, the Company agreed to build some nineteen hundred miles of railway between Callender, near the end of Lake Nipissing, and Savona's Ferry by May 1, 1891, and to operate the Canadian Pacific Railway, when completed, forever. The Government, in return, agreed to complete and hand over to the Company the section of the line under Government construction in the east and in British Columbia between Port Moody and Savona's Ferry, which cost on completion $37,785,320. In addition, the Company was to receive a cash subsidy of $25,000,000 and 25,000,000 acres of land along the line in Manitoba and the North West Territory. The materials required for the construction of the line, and the capital stock of the Company, was exempted from taxation forever. The land grant was exempted from taxation for a period of 20 years. Much to the personal benefit of J.J. Hill, George Stephen and R.B. Angus, who were owners of the St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway, material for construction was to be admitted into Canada free of duty. Another important feature of the contract was that it prohibited the construction of any line south, or southwest, within 15 miles of the 49th parallel, of the Canadian Pacific Railway, within 20 years, thus giving the Company a virtual monopoly of railway transport in western Canada.

The contract called for commencement of construction

1. 44 Vic., c. 1; House of Commons Debates, 1880 - 1, v. 1, and Journals of the House of Commons 1880 - 1.
2. Innis, op. cit., p. 98.
in the east by July 1, 1881. Preparations for the work began immediately. The first and most difficult task was to engage sufficient capital to build the remaining 1900 miles of the main line, to build or purchase branch lines and extensions, and to provide equipment. The financing of the company -- an interesting story in itself -- however, cannot be discussed here. It has been carefully described by Professor H.A. Innis in his *History of the Canadian Pacific Railway*. A simple but useful account can be found in Dr. O.D. Skelton's volume in the *Chronicles of Canada* series, *The Railway Builders*. While the difficult task of financing the Company was tackled, plans were being rapidly made to commence construction. The Company established its construction headquarters at Winnipeg, where A.B. Stickney was placed in charge as Construction Superintendent, assisted by General Rosser as Engineer-in-Chief. The Government had contracted for the completion of the line from Selkirk to Thunder Bay in 1882, thus giving the Company rail and water transport from Winnipeg to Sault Ste. Marie. The Company immediately made plans to connect Sault Ste. Marie with the Canada Central Railway, in order to obtain a direct rail and water route from Winnipeg to Montreal as quickly as possible. Plans were likewise made for the construction of the line north

3. Winnipeg was connected to Selkirk by the Selkirk - Pembina Railway built by the Dominion Government and completed in December, 1878.
of Lake Superior, and westward from Winnipeg across the prairies.

Under the contract of October, 1880, and the Act of 1881, the Canadian Pacific Railway Company were to build the railway along the route fixed by the Government in October, 1879, -- west to Edmonton and through Yellow Head Pass into British Columbia to Kamloops and Port Moody. But the C. P. R. Syndicate, even before the contract was signed, seem to have decided to change the route and adopt a more southerly location west of Winnipeg to the Pacific at Burrard Inlet. There is no positive information available of when this decision was made or what inspired it. The question of a more southerly route, however, was being generally discussed by the end of the year, 1880, and in the spring of 1881, survey parties set out from Winnipeg and Victoria, the latter under Major A.B. Rogers, to locate a more southerly route across the prairies and through the Rocky and Selkirk mountains of British Columbia to Kamloops.

The question of the location of the line was unquestionably the major consideration of the C.P.R. Syndicate in

1. The construction of the line north of Lake Superior was opposed by J.J. Hill and George Stephen, who were owners of the St. Paul Minneapolis and Manitoba railway, which had been connected in December, 1878, with the Selkirk and Pembina Railway constructed by the Dominion Government. Hill opposed the Lake Superior line since it would take traffic from the St. Paul Minneapolis and Manitoba railway. The Dominion Government insisted on an all-Canadian route across Canada, and Hill realizing that his American and Canadian railways could not be operated together withdrew in 1883 from the Canadian Pacific directorate. Stephen and Angus shortly afterwards withdrew from the St. Paul, Minneapolis and Manitoba Railway.

2. The Victoria Colonist, Dec. 28, 1880, featured an editorial on the respective merits of the Howse and Yellow Head Passes. Consideration of a more southerly route by Howse Pass, the editorial stated was at that moment occupying the attention of the Government and Syndicate at Ottawa.

3. Innis, op. cit., p. 103; Colonist, Dec. 25, 1881, and Inland Sentinel, April 21, 1881.
deciding on a more southerly route for the railway, although the advantages of a more southerly location were never discussed in any of the Company's reports to the Dominion Government, or in any of the debates on the change of route which took place in the Dominion House of Commons. James J. Hill, as his biographer, J.G. Pyle, states, no doubt had control of construction and location of the line during the three years he was a member of the Canadian Pacific directorate. Hill, most probably, was responsible for the decision to change the location of the line west of Winnipeg. He undoubtedly saw the advantage of having the Canadian Pacific Railway run as closely as possible to Jay Cooke's Northern Pacific Railway, which at the time was in course of construction. A southern location for the Canadian Pacific was essential to prevent the Northern Pacific from commanding the bulk of the traffic of the southern prairies and British Columbia. A southern line would have the further advantage of being able to capture not only the traffic of the south but also the traffic of the north, since there would be no alternative railway for the people of that region to patronize. Hill, who had extensive fuel interests, also had reports on the coal-bearing areas in Southern Alberta, or what is now southern Alberta, which prior to 1880 were not available. If the line were carried south, paying traffic would thus be secured from the beginning. The extent of Hill's interest in a more southerly

route for the Canadian Pacific Railway is witnessed in the fact that it was he who engaged Major A.B. Rogers to conduct the explorations for the new route in British Columbia.

The advocates of the southern route -- the C. P. R. Syndicate and the Dominion Government -- advanced other reasons than the question of location and the Northern Pacific for changing the location of the line. They argued that if the line were carried south it would pass through country more likely to afford good traffic for the line than the country along the Yellow Head Pass route. For a long time it had been mistakenly believed that the southern prairies was a barren desert country and that the country to the north was infinitely superior -- Fleming thought so -- but in 1879 and 1880 this myth was exploded by Professor John Macoun and Dr. G.M. Dawson. The former reported that the southern prairie country was admirably suited for farming and ranching; the latter that the Bow and Belly river regions were rich in deposits of coal. Macoun and Dawson thus cleared away one obstacle to the adoption of a southern route. Moreover, it was well recognized that although a railway across the Rocky and Selkirk Mountains would run through valueless country, it would, since it crossed the Columbia, give easy access to the valuable Kootenay country of southern British Columbia. The C. P. R. Syndicate emphasized the fact

2. House of Commons Debates, 1882, p. 852. Tupper: "It would enable us to go through a much better country in the Province of British Columbia than we otherwise could go through!"
4. Vide supra p. 152, n. 2.
that a southern line would tap the valuable southern Alberta and Kootenay regions when they applied to the Dominion government for permission to take the line further to the south in 1882.

The principal reason, however, put forward by the Syndicate for adopting a more southerly route was that the route they proposed to adopt was about 100 miles shorter than the Yellow Head Pass route. If a practicable line could be found through one of the southern passes of the Rocky Mountains and across the Selkirk Mountains they argued that the line would be considerably shortened, operating costs decreased and a great advantage gained in attracting transcontinental traffic. It is impossible to believe, however, that 100 miles distance, or the 79 miles distance which was actually saved by the new route, was the primary reason of the Syndicate for advocating the change. What would be saved in distance they must have realized would be offset by greatly increased grades and costlier construction. The main object of the Syndicate was to get the line as close as possible to the international boundary line. There is even a possibility that had the Government not already commenced construction between Emory's Bar and Savona's Ferry, when the Canadian Pacific Railway Company was chartered, Kamloops would have been abandoned and the line in British Columbia deflected still further towards the south. In fact, in November, 1882, the Victoria Colonist reported a rumour that construction along the Fraser valley would cease and the

line would be carried by the Nicola valley to Eagle Pass. Marcus Smith and the Hon. J.W. Trutch were at that time making an examination of the Nicola River valley.

In British Columbia the question of getting the line further to the south was of great importance, for the rich Kootenay and Okanagan districts could easily be tapped from the United States by way of the Columbia and Kootenay River valleys. The Columbia river was the natural route into southeastern British Columbia. Practical recognition of this fact was made in 1883 when a Bill was introduced and passed in the British Columbia Legislature to incorporate the Columbia and Kootenay Railway and Transportation Company for the purpose of running a line of steamers from a point on Kootenay River, at the United States boundary, through Kootenay Lake to its outlet, constructing and operating a line of railway from the outlet of Kootenay Lake to the Columbia River, and thence running another line of steamers to the head of navigation on the Columbia. This transport system would be of great benefit to the Canadian Pacific Railway as it would establish a sort of branch line into the Kootenay district. But here is the significant point. The "Kootenay Bill", as it became known, immediately called forth a protest from the Northern Pacific Railway. An agent of the Northern Pacific appeared in Victoria in April, 1883, and attempted by handsome bribes to cause the defeat of the Kootenay Bill in the Legislature. Here was the beginning of the rivalry between the Canadian Pacific and Northern Pacif-
ic Railways in British Columbia -- a beginning which dates before the completion of either line. If the Canadian Pacific Railway had been located by the Yellow Head Pass it would have been at a serious disadvantage in the struggle which ensued with the Northern Pacific Railway. As it was, the Canadian Pacific Railway Company had to spend large sums of money and take over a line running close to the boundary (the Kettle Valley line) to capture the traffic of southern British Columbia.

On April 13, 1882, Sir Charles Tupper, in anticipation of an application from the C. P. R. Syndicate for the Government's permission to carry the line by a more southerly route to Kamloops, introduced a Bill in the House of Commons, which was subsequently enacted on May 15, to place within the power of the Governor-in-Council, if they should think the interest of the country to be thereby promoted, the right to authorize the location of the Canadian Pacific Railway through a pass south of the Yellow Head Pass, but not within 100 miles of the American boundary. In introducing the Bill Tupper stated:

I entertain strong doubts, from the best information I can obtain, as to the practicability of going through the Kicking Horse Pass, although I know the Canadian Pacific Railway Company are somewhat sanguine that they will be able to effect that object. If that object be effected -- which I regard as, in fact, very doubtful -- it will no doubt involve a great expenditure, probably greater than that involved by

2. *45 Vic.*, c. 53. I have been unable to find any direct evidence regarding the stipulation that the Rocky Mountain pass had to be 100 miles from the American boundary. It was most probably a military precaution. The Government evidently feared that if the line were too close to the boundary it would be vulnerable in times of hostility with the United States.
following the line by the Yellow Head Pass, but it would be of great importance to the country to shorten the line of the road by something like 100 miles, and enable us to go through a much better country in the Province of British Columbia than we otherwise could go through.¹

Tupper also showed that he recognized that the change of route involved another problem besides the discovery of a feasible route through British Columbia. Where was the railway across the prairie from Winnipeg to be located while the route in British Columbia was being determined? In April, 1882, Tupper had an easy answer to this question. The Government, he stated, had approved of the route only as far as Moose Jaw Creek, from which point it could easily be diverged to the Yellow Head Pass; and they were determined to settle the route no further than Moose Jaw Creek until the location of the line in British Columbia had been fixed. A year later, however, as we shall see, the road was being built across the prairies towards Kicking Horse Pass, before the line in British Columbia had been conclusively proved practicable.

The line which the C. P. R. Syndicate proposed to adopt was outlined by Major A.B. Rogers in the summer of 1881. Four surveying parties were engaged in 1881, in making examinations of the Rocky Mountain passes south of Yellow Head Pass, and Major Roger's made an exploration in the Selkirk Mountains. Four passes were examined in the Rocky Mountains, the Howse, Vermillion, Kicking Horse and Kananaskis. No report on these surveys is available but it seems that as a result of them

¹ House of Commons Debates, 1882, p. 852.
² Ibid., p. 853.
³ Colonist, Jan. 29, 1882.
Major Rogers picked out Kicking Horse Pass as the most practicable. The Vermillion and Kananaskis passes were not seriously considered owing to their steepness, and to the distance which would have to be traversed along the Columbia from their western outlet before reaching the crossing which Major Rogers, as a result of his exploration, believed was available over the Selkirks by the Beaver and Illecillewaet rivers. The Howse Pass had lighter gradients than the Kicking Horse Pass, and would have rendered construction easier than the Kicking Horse Pass. The Kicking Horse Pass was chosen, however, since its length from a common starting point in the Bow River valley, where the Company intended to direct the railway, to Rogers' Selkirk crossing was about 30 miles less than the Howse Pass.

On April 15, 1882, Tupper received word of Rogers' work from the Engineer-in-Chief at the Company's Headquarters in Montreal.

From the results of the surveys as far as made Mr. Rogers is sanguine that the descent from the Kicking Horse summit to the Columbia River will not exceed eighty feet per mile, and that the gradients from Bow River to the summit will not be raised.

Mr. Rogers also made a reconnaissance from Kamloops easterly to the summit of the Selkirk Range, and from general observation and barometer readings he states that gradients will be obtained not exceeding sixty-six feet per mile between Kamloops and the north fork of the Illecille West River, and from thence to the summit of the Selkirk Range the gradient will not exceed eighty feet to the mile.

In consequence of difficulties which beset Mr. Rogers, arriving from a shortage of supplies, he was unable to specially examine the country between the summit of the Selkirk Range and the East Branch of the Columbia River, a distance of about thirty miles.

Before leaving the summit, however, he ascended the "Divide" and while seeing generally a very broken country to the eastward, he observed that one of the ravines led in the desired direction.

1. Smellie to Tupper, April 15, 1882, House of Commons Debates, 1882, p. 954.
direction for a distance of quite ten miles. There is also on the west side of the Columbia a large stream, Beaver Creek, which has its source in the vicinity of this broken country. From these observations Mr. Rogers feels assured that the distance in which difficulties may be expected in crossing the Selkirk Range will be reduced to ten or twelve miles.

As a result of the work of 1881 Rogers was able to project a new route for the railway in British Columbia east of Kamloops. It crossed the Gold Range by Moberly's Eagle Pass, the Selkirks by the Illecillewaet and Beaver rivers, and the Rockies by Kicking Horse Pass.

Van Horne's comments on Rogers' work, which were also forwarded to Tupper on April 17, the day on which his Rocky Mountain Construction Bill came up for second reading, clearly showed that the Company was anxious to prove the practicability of this new route, almost regardless of cost.

Major Rogers reports that there is no question about feasibility of good line with easy grades through Kicking Horse Pass although work will be very expensive. The crossing of the Selkirk Range is the only thing in doubt, but explorations have progressed sufficiently to justify belief that they can be crossed by use of some long tunnels. The worst that can happen in case of failure to cross Selkirk is that

1. For a description of Major Rogers' exploration in the Selkirks vide Rogers, A.L., Major A.B. Rogers' First Expedition up the Illecillewaet Valley, in 1881, accompanied by his Nephew, A.L. Rogers, Wheeler, op. cit., appendix E. Rogers tried the Illecillewaet valley on the suggestion of Walter Moberly, who had first entered the Illecillewaet in 1865, and who claims that one of his assistants, Albert Perry, followed the south-east branch of the Illecillewaet and Rogers' Pass in 1866. Vide supra pp. 70 - 71. Moberly's claim is probably correct and the pass over the Selkirks which now bears Rogers' name should probably bear that of Perry. Mr. T.C. Young of Vancouver states that the late Mr. Tom Wilson of Banff, who went with Rogers, in 1881, as guide, told him that while on that trip they would have perished had they not stumbled on one of Perry's cabins that had been erected in 1866 when Perry was exploring the Pass for Moberly. Mr. O. Wilkie of New Westminster states that a short time before his death Moberly told him of Wilson and Rogers finding one of Perry's camps after being lost.
the line may be forced round the great bend of the Columbia, which would considerably increase distance; but to save this distance work will be undertaken that would ordinarily be considered impracticable on account of expense.

Not only does Van Horne state the willingness of the Company to adopt a more costly line and a more difficult line, but he also suggests that distance alone was not the sole consideration of the Company. If a pass could not be found over the Selkirks, then they could go round the big bend of the Columbia -- which would give them a line possibly 10 miles longer than the Yellow Head Pass line.

Rogers returned in 1882 to the Selkirks to explore the approach to the summit of the range up the Beaver Creek from the east. His report was again favourable, although he made no accurate instrumental surveys.

From the first crossing of the Columbia the line enters the Selkirk range by way of Beaver Creek, which it follows in a south easterly direction about 16 miles, and thence runs westerly up a branch of the same creek, between four and five miles, and thence, south-westerly over the divide, three miles to the east fork of the Ille-cille-want (sic), thence down the east fork of the Ille-cille-want to the main stream, which it follows to the second crossing of the Columbia opposite Eagle Pass.... Owing to the shortness of the season, the difficulties and delays encountered in reaching the work, and to high water in the mountain streams, and the enormous amount of labor involved in cutting trails, no instrumental survey of the line across the Selkirk Range has yet been possible.3 I have, however, thoroughly examined the line and ascertained the altitudes by repeated barometric observations, which have been carefully checked, and I feel entirely safe in

1. Van Horne to Drinkwater, April 17, 1882, House of Commons Debates, p. 1120.
2. The new route when finally located was 79 miles shorter than Fleming's Yellow Head Pass route. The distance across the Selkirks through Rogers Pass is 63 miles. The distance around the big bend of the Columbia measured from the eastern and western outlets of Rogers Pass on the Columbia River is 150 miles.
3. The italics are mine.
reporting a practicable line through the range, and with maximum gradients of 105.6 feet per mile, but, in this case also, I would recommend the use of gradients of 116 feet per mile, in order to avoid some points where dangerous snow slides are to be feared.

It is interesting to note that Rogers as a result of his work in 1882 had increased the maximum gradients to be encountered in the Selkirks from 80 to 116 feet per mile. He had also increased the gradients to be used on the western descent of Kicking Horse Pass from 80 to 116 feet per mile. Nevertheless the C. P. R. Syndicate seized on Rogers' assurance that a line could be located by the Kicking Horse Pass and over the Selkirks to Kamloops, and followed the precarious course of applying to the Dominion Government in September, 1882, for approval of the new route, before they had conclusive evidence that the Kicking Horse Pass and the route across the Selkirks by the Beaver and Illecillewaet Rivers was practicable, and, indeed, before any man had passed directly over the Selkirks by the route Rogers advocated.

The Government, however, complied with the Syndicate's request, and location of the line past Moose Jaw Creek proceeded. The track followed closely behind location. By June 30,

1. Rogers had made a further examination of the Kicking Horse Pass and recommended gradients of 116 feet per mile on certain sections in another part of this report.
4. I have been unable to find the order-in-council -- if there was one -- adopting the Kicking Horse Pass route -- nor any reference to it. Probably there was no order-in-council adopting the Kicking Horse Pass route as a whole. The location of the line was adopted in sections from time to time. Dominion Sessional Papers, 27, 1883; 31, 1884; 25, 1885; and 35, 1886.
1883, steel had been laid 960 miles west of Winnipeg. The Company had built the line to the foothills of the Rockies, and still no instrumental survey had been made of the Selkirk pass. The C. P. R. Syndicate, and along with it the Dominion Government was 'living dangerously'. The success of the whole line depended on the simple exploratory surveys made by Rogers in the Selkirks and in the Kicking Horse Pass in 1881 and 1882. The line, as Van Horne had pointed out, could go round the Columbia if the Selkirk crossing proved impracticable, but this would certainly have defeated the avowed object of the new route of decreasing the length of the line. Moreover, as we shall see, they were not even sure of Kicking Horse Pass.

The precarious situation which existed in the summer of 1883 may best be realized by reference to Sandford Fleming's account of his journey across Canada, by the proposed new route, in the late summer of that year. Fleming was sent for from London by the Company and the Government to go over the new route by Kicking Horse Pass and Rogers' Pass over the Selkirks. Evidently, at this time, when the steel had reached the Rockies, neither the Company nor the Government were wholly assured of the practicability of the new route -- and justifiably, for all they had to reassure them was Rogers' sketchy reports. Fleming reached Calgary by train on August 24, and careful engineer that he was, as we have amply witnessed in his conduct of the surveys in British Columbia, he was "surprised" to hear

3. Ibid., p. 141.
that no one had crossed the Selkirk Range. Rogers had made
several attempts to do so but he had only so far succeeded to
reach the summit from the east and west. He had not penetrated
entirely through the mountains on a connected line. Fleming,
who it must be remembered, was making an examination of the
line for the Company, and thus had all the information that was
available, writes, on learning this discouraging fact:

I must confess that this information was unwelcome to me. I
was not without experience in crossing mountains, but expec­
ted in this instance that our route would be over known
ground, and that, whatever difficulties lay before us, we had
only to persevere to overcome them. From what I now heard all
seemed uncertain before me. It was possible that we might
have to walk our toilsome way onwards for many days, sudden­
ly to find it was impossible to proceed.  

Fleming had left Ottawa prepared for difficulties but not for a
shock as great as this. A little earlier he records that when
he left Ottawa "it was yet a question if it was possible to
cross the Selkirk Range to the Columbia; and it was not a matt­
er of certainty that either Kicking Horse or Eagle Pass could
be followed".

There must have been much anxiety among the C. P. R.
Syndicate and the Dominion government at this time, when the
line had reached the Rockies and still so little was known of
the route in British Columbia to Kamloops. The responsibility
which the Company had taken upon itself was well recognized by
Collingwood Schreiber. On September 26, 1882, Schreiber sub­
mitted his annual report to Sir Charles Tupper in which he
clearly shows that long before the steel reached the Rockies he

1 Fleming, op. cit., p. 229.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., p. 220.
recognized the great chance the Company was taking.

From Moose Jaw Creek to Fort Calgary a distance of about 454 miles, the Company, I am informed, have made a location with a view to passing through the Kicking Horse Pass. This location has not yet been approved, but the Company apparently have great faith in the existence of a feasible way through the mountains in the direction indicated, having constructed a line on this location from Moose Jaw Creek to a point near Old Wives' Lake, about 455 miles west of Red River; completed the work of grading for about 60 miles in advance of that point. The grading is also in a forward state for a further distance of about 70 miles.... I presume they have assumed this responsibility not desiring to check their unprecedentedly rapid construction and feeling assured by information obtained from their engineers that they will succeed in finding a favourable passage via the Kicking Horse Pass. 2

Schreiber, obviously, did not feel as sure as the Company that the new route would prove practicable. However, Fleming, on his overland journey cleared up the situation a little and relieved the Company and the Government of some of their anxiety. He passed through Kicking Horse Pass, Rogers' Pass and Eagle Pass to Kamloops, and pronounced himself quite satisfied with the projected location. According to John Murray Gibbon at Kamloops "a telegram was sent reassuring the directors who had staked their fortunes on Rogers Pass that they had won their gamble". Yet the game was still in doubt.

Abandonment of the new route was considered at a time when the steel had reached the summit of Kicking Horse Pass. On November 23, 1883, James Ross, Manager of Construction for the C. P. R. Syndicate in the Mountains of British Columbia, reported that the track by the end of November would reach the

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2. The italics are mine.
summit of the Rockies. During the year when the track was being laid up the eastern slope of Kicking Horse Pass, Ross also reported, that he had considered it advisable not only to send an engineer to re-examine Rogers Pass, but "to feel perfectly assured" that the line down the western slope of Kicking Horse Pass would be practicable, he had made further surveys of the line, and in case these surveys proved unfavourable he had "other surveys made through the Bow River and Howse Passes to determine whether we could get a line, which though evidently longer than the Kicking Horse, would present such features as would compensate for the increased distance". As a result of these surveys Ross was glad -- one might add, fortunate -- to say that they could commence work in the spring of 1884 feeling quite satisfied that they had secured beyond doubt the best line through the mountains.

Construction of the railway in British Columbia by the Canadian Pacific Railway Company proceeded both westerly from Calgary and the Bow River through Kicking Horse Pass, and easterly from Savona's Ferry. When construction began under Andrew Onderdonk from Savona's Ferry in 1884, the steel from the East, as we have seen from Ross' report to Van Horne of November, 1883, had reached the summit of the Rockies. At this time the line had not been finally located. It was to be located by the Canadian Pacific Railway engineers, and adopted by the Dominion Government, as the line across the prairies had been, in small sections from time to time as the work of location

progressed. As a result construction of the grade followed closely behind location. The last section from the summit of the Selkirks to a point eighteen miles west in the Illecillewaet valley was not located and adopted by the Dominion government until July 25, 1885. In the case of this section, as with others, construction of the grade actually preceded the adoption of the location by the Dominion government.

The line which Onderdonk was to build from Savona's Ferry to Griffin Lake in the Eagle Pass, a distance of 140 miles, ran due west from Savona's Ferry along the Thompson River and south of Kamloops Lake to Kamloops. From Kamloops it followed the south bank of the South Thompson to Shuswap Lake and ran along the south shore of Shuswap Lake to Sicamous Narrows, where it entered the Gold Range by Eagle Pass. The line from the east followed the valley of the Bow River from Calgary and entered the Rockies by Kicking Horse Pass. It emerged from the mountains at the present site of the town of Golden, and thence followed the Columbia to the first Columbia River crossing at Donald. Having crossed the Columbia it followed the Columbia River still further north to the mouth of Beaver Creek, and entered the Selkirk Range by way of the Beaver valley. Emerging from the Selkirks by the valley of the Illecillewaet it crossed the Columbia River for the second time at Farwell (now Revelstoke), and entered the Gold Range by Eagle Pass. In Eagle Pass about 25 miles from Farwell it met Onderdonk's line from the west.

The work on Onderdonk's line proceeded rapidly. It was not hampered by any serious delays, although in the spring of 1885 snow and rain held up work in Eagle Pass. Major Rogers arrived early in 1884 to make the final location of the line east of Savona's Ferry, and by the end of July location had proceeded several miles past Kamloops. With the commencement of the work of construction, H.J. Cambie arrived in Kamloops to act as chief resident engineer on the western division for the C. P. R. Syndicate.

Supplies for Onderdonk's line came up the track from Port Moody to the end of steel, and thence were carried by the Cariboo waggon road, which extended as far as Kamloops, to the grading parties. Steamers, the new Skuzzy and the Peerless, were used on Kamloops Lake and along the South Thompson for transport. Beyond Shuswap Lake through Eagle Pass the problem of transportation would have been somewhat difficult had the British Columbia Government not made provision for the construction of a road from Shuswap Lake through Eagle Pass to the Columbia River crossing at Farwell, in May, 1883. The road was completed to Farwell in October, 1884. It was of great service in transportation of supplies not only on the western division from Shuswap Lake to the end of line at Griffin Lake, but also on the eastern division from Farwell to Griffin Lake.

The work of grading Onderdonk's line was sub-let in

1. Inland Sentinel, March 5, 1885.
3. Inland Sentinel, July 31, 1884.
4. Ibid.
5. 46 Vic., c. 35.
small sections to several small contractors. West of Savona's Ferry for a distance of seven miles the work was under the direction of T.E. Sinclair. The work on this section was very light. J.R. Onderdonk and E.A. Cunningham had the next four miles, which were also very light. On the next three miles, under contract to J.G. Ferguson, much heavy work was required -- six tunnels and everywhere difficult rockwork. The Colonist reported that Ferguson made an excellent job of it and also considerable money, some $40,000. The following three miles along Kamloops Lake also consisted of heavy rockwork. The grade along this section was built by Onderdonk's popular superintendent, James Leamy. J.B. Harrison of Victoria had the next two miles of a slightly rocky nature. Messrs. Troup and Fumecon constructed the grade for the following six miles, bringing the line to Kamloops.

From Kamloops for 35 miles to the Little Shuswap Lake the road was built along the South Thompson River through virtually prairie country. This section was contracted for by Hugh F. Keefer. T.E. Sinclair built the 30 miles of line from Little Shuswap Lake to Salmon River, which was of a light character. Messrs. Bacon and McMillan built the next twelve miles, and W.C. Mitchell the following twelve miles, bringing the line to Sicamous Narrows. On these two contracts much rock cutting was necessary, and other work of a heavy character. G.F. Kyle, who was Onderdonk's assistant superintendent on the Government line,

1. Inland Sentinel, July 31, 1884.
2. Colonist, Nov. 21, 1885.
3. Ibid.
built a light section of 19 miles from Sicamous Narrows. G.B. Wright, the builder of the Eagle Pass waggon road, and James Leamy built the last nine miles on Onderdonk's contract to Griffin Lake.

By January, 1885, work was going on over the whole line and track-laying, following the laying of steel to Savona's Ferry on the Government line, had begun. On July 11, the track reached Kamloops. On reaching Kamloops, the supply of rails forthcoming from Port Moody ceased and track-laying was delayed for almost two weeks, awaiting the arrival of the rail fleet from England. On July 26 rails came up the line from Port Moody and on the following day track-laying commenced again, and proceeded with all possible speed. By September, the track had reached Sicamous Narrows, and on September 26, Onderdonk laid his last rail in Eagle Pass, nine miles from the end of his contract at Griffin Lake. His supply of rails was exhausted. At that time the steel from the East was coming down the valley of the Illecillewaet, 15 miles from Parwell.

On September 26 Onderdonk served notice of discharge on his employees: "As our last rail from the Pacific has been laid in Eagle Pass to-day, and the balance of work undertaken by the Canadian Pacific Railway Company between Savona and point of junction in Eagle Pass will be completed for the season on Wednesday, all employees will be discharged on the

1. Colonist, July 14, 1885.
2. Inland Sentinel, July 23, 1885. On this occasion the rail ships were late. Their late arrival caused so much anxiety in Port Moody that it was generally believed they had been captured by the Russians. Port Moody Gazette, June 6, 1885.
4. Inland Sentinel, Oct. 8, 1885.
evening of September thirtieth. Soon several thousand men left the scenes of railway construction. Yale which was gradually sinking into her former lethargy was awakened over-night. "Saloons and streets are full of intoxicated men," a Yale correspondent of the Victoria Colonist wrote, October 3, "Residents of the town are obliged to bar the door of their dwellings in order to keep the howling throng from forcing an entrance. Such excitement has not been seen since 1860. The saloons are reaping a rich harvest".

The howling, intoxicated throng did not remain long at Yale. Soon all was quiet there again. About the middle of October, Yale also lost some of her most prized and valuable possessions. Onderdonk moved his railway construction plant, including the machinery for repairing cars at Yale, sawmills at Texas Lake, steam shovels, and surplus rolling stock, to Port Moody, where it was stored, to be taken over later by the Canadian Pacific Railway Company.

With the superb, boundless energy of William Van Horne pushing construction of the line to rapid completion, the railway was built with reckless speed across the prairies from Winnipeg, and, as we have seen, by the end of the season, 1883, the track had reached the summit of Kicking Horse Pass. From that point to the end of Onderdonk's line the work of necessity proceeded more slowly, but considering the difficulties which had to be met, and the fact that before the line was

1. Inland Sentinel, Oct. 1, 1885.
2. Colonist, Oct. 4, 1885.
completed the practicability of the new route was severely tested, at a remarkably fast pace. The great works of construction were in charge of James Ross, Construction Manager for the Syndicate in the Mountains. He was assisted by H.S. Holt, now well-known as Canada's premier financier, Sir Herbert Holt, who acted as Ross' chief engineer.

Before the work on the grade could proceed beyond the summit of the Kicking Horse Pass, a road -- a very rough one -- had to be constructed to provide a means of transport for the supplies which were brought to the end of steel from the East. The construction of this road, which was known as the 'Tote' road, commenced in the spring of 1884. It followed the line of the railway down the western slope of the Kicking Horse Pass to the Columbia. Along this road supplies were carried by horses and mules to depot stores, which the Company established at intervals along the line, and from which the small contractors purchased food, forage and construction materials, which they hauled by their own teams to their contracts. As the work proceeded in 1884 and 1885 the road was extended along the Columbia and across the Selkirks through Rogers Pass to Farwell, where it met the Eagle Pass waggon road. One who often travelled along the Tote road has left this description of one part of it:

The Tote road was exceptionally rough. On the right bank of the Columbia it was cut out of the solid rock for several miles, some hundreds of feet above the river, and, except at the Kicking Horse Flats near the Beavermouth Pass, where the stream spreads out into several fordable channels, it was not

1. Steele, S.B., Forty Years in Canada, Toronto, McClelland, Goodchild and Stewart Ltd., 1915, p. 188.
of sufficient width to admit of teams passing. Beyond the end of the Tote road a treacherous trail was used for transport, along which only pack animals could be used. Often it clung to the side of a mountain several hundred feet above the foaming waters of the Columbia.

The great bulk of the supplies, and all the steel, was brought along the completed line from the East, but as the work on the grade approached Farwell, at the second crossing of the Columbia, supplies were brought up the Columbia by the steamer Kootenay from the Northern Pacific south of the boundary line. In September, 1885, the Kootenay with powder for the railway works ran upon rocks in the Columbia south of the boundary, where she was forced to remain until the spring of 1886. This unfortunate accident caused considerable delay just when the line was approaching completion. In the emergency supplies were brought in from the west along the Eagle Pass waggon road.

In July, 1884, James Ross had about 4,000 men working on the line through Kicking Horse Pass. By the end of the year he probably had a force of five or six thousand men at work. All James Ross' labour was White. The majority of the men came from eastern Canada and from all parts of the United States. Following the completion of the Northern Pacific in 1884, men came up the Columbia from Sand Point, fresh from the Northern Pacific works to work upon the Canadian Pacific.

Other men came to the scenes of construction in the

1. Steele, op. cit., p. 188.
2. Inland Sentinel, Sept. 24, 1885 and Oct. 8, 1885.
Mountains who did not work for James Ross. There were saloon proprietors, gamblers and whiskey men, whose business it was to prey upon the railway navvies and add to the cruelty and unlawfulness of life along the line. Col. S.B. Steele, who was sent in April, 1884, with a detachment of the North West Mounted Police to act as special Dominion police along the railway under construction in the mountains of British Columbia, has left an interesting account of life in the construction camps along the line. Arriving at Laggan, or Holt City, at the summit of Kicking Horse Pass in April, 1884, Steele records that he found large numbers of gamblers, whiskey men, in fact almost every description of criminal, who had been plying their trade on the Northern Pacific Railway and had come to the Rockies from Sand Point to establish their dens "on every little creek along the line". It is surprising that only one homicide is recorded to have taken place amongst this strange crowd of men. And the one case recorded was an act of self-defence -- a brakeman shot a negro barber to save his conductor friend from the slash of a razor. But if they did not commit murder the "toughs" gave the police much trouble in other ways. Liquor was plentiful, most of it being brought in from the United States. In August a correspondent of the Colonist wrote from Farwell that "enormous quantities of liquor, brandy, whiskey, beer, etc., etc., are being brought up from Colville. Three boats brought $4,000 worth last week". Col. Steele and his police, however, were eminently successful in maintaining order,

2. Ibid., p. 192.
3. Colonist, Aug. 21, 1885.
but it is of interest to note that Col. Steele claims his work would have been much easier had the Provincial government not insisted on licensing any saloon keeper who came along in order to add to the revenues of the Province.

Ross, unlike Onderdonk, was troubled by a serious strike, which took place in April, 1885. For several months the men along the line had received no pay for their work. It was a time of financial difficulties for the Company; they were, in fact, facing ruin unless assisted by a loan from the Dominion Government, which fortunately came in July, 1885. That a strike was imminent came to the attention of Col. Steele in February and March, when increasing numbers of men complained to him that they had not been paid. Steele warned Ross and Sir John A. Macdonald that serious trouble might result if the men were not satisfied. The situation, Steele thought, so serious, considering the large element of 'toughs' with whom he had to deal, that when the Lieutenant-Governor of Manitoba wired him to withdraw his police force from the Mountains, owing to the outbreak of the second Riel Rebellion, he refused. The strike broke on April 1, and for some time things were difficult. Three hundred armed men threatened the camp at Beavermouth, but were fortunately held back by a strong show of force by eight Mounted Police. The majority of the men soon went back to work on a promise from Ross that they would receive their wages, but several hundred, encouraged by the 'toughs', remained on strike.

2. Colonist, April 14, 1885.
and attempted to intimidate those who had returned to work. The arrival of the pay car on April 7, put an end to all difficulties, and Steele left for Manitoba to face Riel and his rebel army.

The most difficult works of construction were encountered on the western descent of Kicking Horse Pass and along Rogers Pass in the Selkirks. On the western descent of the Kicking Horse Pass the line followed the turbulent Kicking Horse River, which fell, near the summit of the Rockies, 1,100 feet in three and one half miles. To construct the line over this section, without exceeding the grades of 116 feet per mile which Rogers had stated would be necessary, a tunnel 1800 feet long would have to be constructed. This work, it was estimated 1 would delay the construction of the line fully a year. To avoid the long tunnel the C. P. R. Syndicate applied to the Dominion government for permission to build a temporary line, over nine miles in length, and along which a heavy gradient of 232 feet per mile for four miles would be necessary.

Van Horne's letter of application for permission to build this temporary line is of great interest since it provides further evidence of the fact that the C. P. R. Syndicate decided on the new route through Kicking Horse Pass without adequate knowledge of the new location. Van Horne frankly states that a considerable number of engineers had examined the line through Kicking Horse Pass, and while agreeing on the feasibil-

2. Van Horne to Tupper, May 19, 1884, ibid., p. 11.
ity of the pass for the railway they "differed widely as to what should be done at particular points". He also states that "some years might be necessary to determine the disputed questions regarding the permanent line".

The Syndicate received the consent of the government to construct the temporary line by Order-in-Council, May 30, 1884. A few weeks before the Company had received a loan from the Dominion of $22,500,000, on condition that they complete the line by May, 1886. To delay the work a year to build a tunnel in the Rocky Mountains would have rendered the fulfilment of this agreement impossible.

The work along the Columbia River to Beavermouth, where the line entered the Beaver Creek valley on its way across the Selkirks, was very heavy, but no serious difficulties were encountered on this section of the line. But much trouble was met in constructing the grade across the Selkirks. By the end of the year, 1884, some 2,000 men were engaged in the Selkirks between the first and second crossings of the Columbia. But soon work in the Selkirks was at a standstill; and the feasibility of Rogers Pass for the railway was again in doubt. Avalanches of snow and ice began to roar down the mountain sides in February, 1885. The blasting was no doubt responsible for many of the slides. Steele records:

Glaciers which had never left their rocky beds above the clouds under the shocks of the blasting operations broke away and came crashing down, cutting pathways from a quarter to half a mile wide through the forest below. One avalanche,

2. 47 Vic., c. 1.
which came at the summit of the pass 20 miles from the Beaver camp, descended 5,000 feet with such velocity that it went across the valley and up on the opposite side for 800 feet. 1

Good fortune, however, again blessed the C. P. R. Syndicate. The work was retarded, but the location of the line had to be abandoned in only one place to avoid the snow slides. This one change in location can not be clearly described. Some conception of the work, however, may be obtained from Collingwood Schreiber's report of October 10, 1885.

This [the snow slides] somewhat retarded the work of construction as it was considered advisable to abandon the location already made upon the side of the mountain preparatory to construction, and to devise some means of crossing the valley and reaching the lower levels before approaching the snow slides which it was desired to avoid, without increasing the severity of the grade. Mr. James Ross, an able engineer and manager of the company's works of construction, set vigorously to work to solve the problem; and, by a clever piece of engineering, succeeded in gaining the necessary distance by taking advantage of the general contour of the country to form, as it were, a double loop, thus touching the bottom lands clear of the most formidable snow slides, and without increasing the severity of the grades; and although this resulted in an increase of 3 miles to the length of the section, the general alignment outside the loop was much improved.

The traveller who to-day crosses the Selkirks in a luxurious carriage of the Canadian Pacific Railway and enjoys some of the most magnificent mountain scenery in the world, may well wonder at and admire the ingenuity and courage of the men who

1. Steele, op. cit., p. 195. The danger to the line from snow slides was the reason for much protest against the new location of the railway. E.g. Philo Veritas, Canadian Pacific Railway, an Appeal to Public Opinion against the Railway being carried across the Selkirk Range, That Route being Objectionable from the Danger of Falls, from Glaciers and from Avalanches, also, generally on other Matters, Montreal, Wm. Drysdale and Co., 1885. Snow slides in the Selkirks still cause the C. P. R. occasional trouble, although the line has been well protected by an elaborate chain of snow sheds.

built the railway line along which he is so comfortably carried.

With the grade completed across the Selkirks the works of construction were completed without much difficulty. The grade from Farwell to Griffin Lake, the end of Onderdonk's contract in Eagle Pass, was readily constructed. Track-laying progressed at a rapid pace from the east once the grade was prepared. By the end of the season, 1884, the steel had crossed the Columbia at Donald, which soon became Ross' construction headquarters and "the most populous town met since leaving Calgary". When Onderdonk laid his last rail in Eagle Pass on September 26, the track from the east, as we have already noted, was about 15 miles from Farwell. On October 16, the steel was laid across the Columbia River bridge at Farwell, leaving only 29 miles of track to be laid to complete the line. By November 5, the gap had been reduced to seven miles, the steel having been laid about two miles west of Griffin Lake. On November 7, the steel from the east met the steel from the west. On the same day, Donald A. Smith, who had arrived with an official party from Winnipeg, drove the last spike, which on the insistence of Van Horne was "just as good an iron one as there is between Montreal and Vancouver" at Craigellachie.

Following the ceremony at Craigellachie, the official

1. Colonist, Aug. 15, 1885.
2. Ibid., Oct. 23, 1885.
3. Inland Sentinel, Nov. 5, 1885.
5. The ceremony of the driving of the last spike has often been told, perhaps most vividly and most carefully by John Murray Gibbon in Steel of Empire, pp. 294-302.
party from the east, which included Van Horne, Smith, Sandford Fleming, G.H. Harris, a director of the Company, J.M. Egan, general superintendent of the western division, J.H. McTavish, Chief Lands Commissioner for the Company, and H. Abbott, manager of construction, accompanied by M.J. Haney, Colonel Steele, J.H. Dickie, Dominion Government Engineer, H.J. Cambie, James Ross and Major Rogers, passed over the completed line to Port Moody. British Columbia had received the transcontinental railway which she had demanded in 1870 as a necessary condition of her union with the Dominion of Canada.

The road in November, 1885, however, was not ready for traffic. Much work had still to be done on the mountain section, including the building of snow sheds in the Selkirks, before the line could be put to commercial use as a transcontinental railway. It was not till June 28, 1886, that the first transcontinental train left Montreal for the Pacific.

The arrival of the first transcontinental passenger train at Port Moody, on July 4, 1886, was the occasion of much celebration in British Columbia. Several hundred citizens of Victoria, including the Mayor and the Hon. Wm. Smithe, Premier of the Province, came over on the steamer Yosemite to witness the historic event. The steamer Amelia brought 250 more from Nanaimo. The late Mrs. Mary Edith Angus, who was one of those who came over on the Yosemite from Victoria has left an interesting account of the arrival of the first through train at Port Moody. The train was scheduled to arrive at noon, --

1. Colonist, Nov. 10, 1885.
We were not kept long. First a whistle was heard, and then the old familiar curl of smoke we had so often watched for in the Old Country was to be seen rising from among the pines; then came the harsh, clang, clang, of the engine bell, and the train steamed slowly up the line and was greeted by cheer after cheer from the 500 or 600 people who were awaiting her. The train that had crossed a continent was only one minute late. A journey of 2,907 miles had been accomplished in 136 hours and one minute.

Addresses of congratulation were presented to the directors of the C.P.R. Company by the Hon. Wm. Smithe, Premier of the Province, and by the Mayors of Vancouver and Victoria, to which Mr. Abbott, the Superintendent of this western division of the line, responded on behalf of the Company. These formal proceedings were interesting but the supreme moment for us was when we saw the smoke curling above the pines.

The arrival of the first through train at Port Moody on July 4, 1886, marked the final fulfilment of the Terms of Union between British Columbia and the Dominion of Canada. The Dominion, through the agency of the Canadian Pacific Railway Company, had built a transcontinental railway to tide water on the Pacific and had put it to commercial use. July 4, 1886, also may be said to mark the fulfilment of the Canadian Pacific Railway Company's contract of 1880. The railway was completed from Callender to Port Moody and under operation. The Company had now to operate the line forever. At this point we must leave the history of the Canadian Pacific Railway and British Columbia, although for one very good reason it is not a particularly happy place to close the story. By the statute of February 15, 1881, Port Moody still remains the western terminus of the Canadian Pacific Railway, but actually it

1. Excerpt from printed book, in the possession of Professor H.F. Angus, University of British Columbia, of writings of his mother, Mrs. Mary Edith Angus. Mrs. Angus' account of the arrival of the first train at Port Moody was also published in the Manchester Guardian.
remained the terminus for the brief period of eighteen months. The line in 1886 and 1887 was extended from Port Moody along the south shore of Burrard Inlet to the new city of Vancouver, which had sprung into existence as a result of the decision of the Canadian Pacific Railway Company to extend their line to Coal Harbour and English Bay. We, therefore, leave the story of the construction of the actual mainline -- not the statutory mainline -- of the Canadian Pacific Railway in British Columbia incomplete. The extension of the line to Vancouver, which forms a large chapter in the difficult early history of Vancouver, must be left, however, for a further study. We have seen the fulfilment of the railway clause of the Terms of Union and the contract of 1880. We have seen British Columbia rejoice on receiving the transcontinental railway for which she had waited for sixteen long years.

1. Vancouver was incorporated April 6, 1886. Statutes of British Columbia, 49 Vict., chap.
map in SpCol Map Cabinet 10
under call # of this book.
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