ANGLO-FRENCH RELATIONS: 1898-1914

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INTRODUCTION

The period which this study covers, that of the years immediately preceding the World War, is one to which many historians have turned their attention. The diplomatic game of power-politics as it was played by governments in these years, the fundamental causes of the War, and the problem of war guilt have furnished subjects for thousands of volumes. The various questions which have arisen probably never will be solved to the satisfaction of all students of the period. But as Dr. P.W. Slosson reminds us, this should occasion no surprise, for there is quite as wide a diversity of opinion over the merits of the wars of Napoleon, or those of Rome and Carthage.[1] Nor does this fact of differing opinions imply that investigation and discussion of the period are of no practical value. At least two important points have been attained. As a result of historical research, and with the opening of the archives of belligerent Powers, scholars are in possession of most of the facts and written records which can contribute to more definite verdicts. Again, and more important, many of the extreme opinions widely held during the War, and in the years following, have been discredited and replaced by more moderate views.[2]

While research has made scholars already aware of most of the problems which the period presents, writers will for a

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1. Slosson, P.W., Europe Since 1870, (Boston, 1935), 332.
2. Ibid., 333.

long time to come undoubtedly differ over the significance of certain events and particular points, and will differently estimate the diplomatic blunders which prevented a peaceful settlement of the crisis of the summer of 1914. Most reliable authorities seem to agree, however, on this one point--that the catastrophe was the joint product of a number of underlying causes, some deeply rooted in Europe's past, others of more recent origin. These are usually fitted into a few general categories such as nationalism, imperialism, militarism and the press; the irresponsibility of diplomats to their own parliaments or peoples; and finally a system of secret alliances which divided Europe into two rival camps.

It is the purpose of this study to trace the significance of the rôle of the Anglo-French Entente in the diplomatic background of the War, and more especially to ascertain to what extent it was a factor in bringing Great Britain, so long an adherent of the policy of isolation from continental entanglements, into the conflict.

I wish to acknowledge here my profound indebtedness to Professor F. H. Soward, to whom I owe my interest in modern European history, and whose encouragement, suggestions and guidance have made this study possible. I must acknowledge also the kindness of the French Consul in Vancouver, B. C., without whose generous gift to the Library of the University of British Columbia of the valuable Documents Diplomatiques Français this study could not have been undertaken.

CHAPTER I

The Departure from Isolation

ANGLO-FRENCH RELATIONS

1898-1914.

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The Departure From Isolation.

There can be no intelligent understanding of the reasons for Britain's entry into the World War unless there is a definite knowledge of the nature and development of Anglo-French relations as they existed on June 28, 1914. It is true that Britain was engaged within the Entente in relationships with Russia, as well as with France, but the Anglo-Russian rapprochement was never as popular in England as the Anglo-French. Down to the outbreak of the War, England steadily viewed with disfavour the chief aim of Russian foreign policy - the seizure of the Straits and Constantinople. When the War broke out it was not as an ally of Russia that Britain took up the sword. Sir Edward Grey persistently refused to make a direct issue in England the Austro-Serbian dispute which had involved Russia so deeply with Austria. In his memoirs he states, "the notion of being involved in a war about a Balkan quarrel was repugnant....there was no sentiment urging us to go into a war on Serbia's behalf."[1] Even the chauvinistic Bottomley journal, "John Bull", published a leading article in the last days under the heading, "To Hell

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1. Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-five Years, (London, 1925), I, 335.

with Servia....once more to Hell with Servia."[1]

Nor did England enter the War primarily because of the invasion of Belgium by Germany, despite the manner in which propagandists used this breach of neutrality to justify the purity of Britain's motives in the eyes of the public. Grey had promised on August 2 to give France the protection of the British fleet in the event of the German fleet coming into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile action against the French coast or shipping. This assurance was given before Germany had presented her ultimatum to Belgium, news of which did not reach London until the morning of August 3.[2] Furthermore, Grey refused the proposal of the German ambassador to respect Belgian territory on condition that England remain neutral in the coming struggle.[3]

One of the main reasons why Britain was drawn into the War was because she was so closely bound to France by written and verbal promises, so bound by relationships which the Foreign Office had created, that Grey felt England must take part in any war in which French security was menaced by German aggression.[4]

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1. Cited in Barnes, H.E., The Genesis of the World War, (New York, 1927), 453. See Scott, J.F., Five Weeks, (New York, 1927), chapter IX, for a study of British public opinion and the press during the crisis of July, 1914.
2. Grey to Bertie, August 2,1914; Gooch & Temperley, British Documents on the Origins of the War, (cited hereafter as B.D.), (London, 1927), XI, No. 487, p.274. Fay, S.B., The Origins of the World War, (New York, 1932), II, 540.
3. Grey to Goschen, August 1, 1914, B.D., XI, No.448, p.261.
4. Loreburn, Earl, How the War Came, (London, 1919), 16.

In his memoirs Grey represents himself as regarding the obligation to aid France as resting more upon the conviction of the interests of England than upon the debt of honour to France.[1] Doubtless both factors played a part in his decision, but he felt the obligation to aid France so keenly that he has confessed that he would have resigned if he had not been able to bring England into the conflict.[2] Earl Loreburn, in his book, "How the War Came", expresses England's position in August, 1914, in this way:

> When the most momentous decision of our whole history had to be taken we were not free to decide. We entered upon a war to which we had been committed beforehand in the dark, and Parliament found itself at two hours notice unable, had it desired, to extricate us from this fearful predicament. We went to war unprepared in a Russian quarrel because we were tied to France.[3]

In the relationships between France and England as they existed in 1914 is to be found the key to the understanding of Britain's rôle in the drama of July and August of that year. The roots from which these relationships grew reach back into the years before 1914. It will be necessary to go back over these years to discover what they were.

Before the twentieth century England's traditional policy had for centuries been one of "splendid isolation." By maintaining a cool detachment to continental entanglements she hoped to enjoy the balance of power in Europe between the rival

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1. Grey, op. cit., II, 15, 33-35.
2. Ibid., I, 312.
3. Loreburn, op. cit., 17.

groups, and thus make her own influence in either scale decisive. It was only at times when some one power sought to become overwhelmingly strong, or threatened to endanger British control of the Channel, or her maritime or colonial supremacy, that England intervened actively and decisively in European affairs.[1] This was the basis for her participation in wars against Spain in the sixteenth century, against Louis XIV in the seventeenth century, and against France and Napoleon in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. At other times she had rigidly excluded herself from continental complications and taken a position of isolation. In the years following the Franco-Prussian War she still adhered to her traditional policy.

The forming of the Triple Alliance in 1882 between Germany, Austria and Italy, even though it destroyed to a greater degree than did the Treaty of Frankfort the European balance of power, did not lead England to depart from her established policy. She manifested little concern at the news of the great political combine erected by the Iron Chancellor. Although the Alliance further assured Germany of first place in Europe, England, her insular position secured by her invulnerable fleet, and primarily a maritime and colonial power, was in no way frightened. She believed herself safe from danger, especially since at that time Germany was showing no great interest in an overseas empire or in the building of a fleet. Bismarck could say truthfully:

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1. Headlam-Morley, James, Studies in Diplomatic History, (London, 1930), Chapter VI, part II, England and the Low Countries, 156 ff..

> As regards England we are in the happy situation of having no conflict of interests, except commercial rivalry and passing differences such as must always arise; but there is nothing that can bring about a war between two pacific and hard-working nations.[1]

But at the end of the nineteenth century Britain found it necessary to reconsider her relationships to the Continental Powers, and in the light of new factors in the international sphere, to reconsider also the fundamental principles of her foreign policy. Events of the previous years made such reconsideration a necessity. By the last decade of the century the forces of the Industrial Revolution which had come first to England had transformed the industrial, commercial, and financial life of the Continent. No longer were the other Great Powers content to leave British supremacy in the economic field unchallenged. Signs began to multiply of an imminent and widespread revolt against her hitherto unquestioned leadership. Since her supremacy was held to be largely due to the "favoured place in the sun" which she had won for herself in so many parts of the world, the revolt began to involve a fierce struggle for such "places in the sun" as were still left open to occupation. This had far-reaching effects on British foreign policy. Henceforth the field to be covered by diplomacy in the conduct of international affairs, instead of being confined as it had been since the Napoleonic Wars mainly to the Continent of Europe and the adjoining regions of Asia, extended rapidly to every part of the globe.

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1. Cited in Seymour, Charles, The Diplomatic Background of the War 1870-1914, (New Haven, 1916), 134, footnote.

However detached Britain might be from the internal politics of Europe, the protection of her imperial interests and trade routes brought her into contact and often into collision with the colonial aspirations of other Powers. International diplomacy still had its base in Europe, and it was still chiefly preoccupied with the maintenance of the old European equilibrium, but its outposts now stretched to the remotests parts of the earth, and every extension of European power beyond the seas was apt to react upon the delicate equipoise of power in Europe. As a result Britain became involved in dangerous controversies with France and Russia, and while she continued fairly friendly towards Germany there was sometimes inevitable friction with that Power also.

It was not until after the conclusion of the Triple Alliance, when he became thoroughly assured of the safety of Germany's position in Europe, that Bismarck consented to give his support to the demands of German industrialists for colonial possessions. The next few years saw the German colony of South West Africa established, German gains in the Cameroons, and German advance into East Africa. It is true that at times the German ambitions brought temporary clouds over Anglo-German relations, but generally speaking friendly settlement of disputes was carried out. Although public opinion in both countries was at times aroused over the clash of interests, the relations of the two governments remained almost invariably friendly. Both Gladstone and Salisbury were well disposed towards Berlin, and in 1890 the latter concluded the important settlement of African disputes which exchanged Heligoland for

Zanzibar. But after 1894 Anglo-German relations began to lose the friendliness of the days of Bismarck and of the opening years of William II. Further disputes over colonial and eastern questions arose to try the tempers of Downing Street and the Wilhelmstrasse. Britain took exception to the Franco-German treaty of March 1894 which dealt with French and German interests in the Niger and Congo regions. Similarly Germany took offense at the arrangements Britain concluded with King Leopold of Belgium over the Bahr-el-Ghazelle territory of the Upper Nile and over territory west of Lake Tanganyika.

With France relations became extremely strained over similar questions. Under Louis Philippe, Napoleon III and McMahon, France had taken over Asiatic and African territory of which Algeria was the most worthwhile. England had viewed these attempts at the reconstruction of a French empire with some alarm, but her opposition became still stronger after 1880. After 1878 French interests ceased to be merely national; she wished to make up for the disasters of 1870 in so far as possible by acquiring an overseas empire. Bismarck, anxious to turn her interests from Europe, had encouraged her at the Congress of Berlin. Jules Ferry, who became prime minister in 1883, carried out a vigorous policy of acquiring overseas possessions. This era of French colonial expansion opened up boundless vistas of Anglo-French controversies. In June, 1884, Lord Lyons wrote from France:

> Generally speaking I am very unhappy about the growing ill-will between France and England which exists on both sides of the Channel. It is not, I suppose, that France has any deliberate intention of going to

> war with us but the two nations come into contact in every part of the globe. In every part of it questions arise which, in the present state of feeling, excite mutual suspicion and irritation. Who can say when and where, in this state of things, some local events may not produce a serious quarrel, or some high-handed proceeding of some hot-headed officials occasion an actual collision.[1]

Africa was the main theatre of the struggle, but disputes took place in many other parts of the world. The tension which arose out of the dispute over Siam in 1893 brought the two countries to the verge of war.

Furthermore, the weak position of Britain in Egypt at the end of the century left her open to the opposition of the Continental Powers. Grey points out in this connection, when speaking of his first Foreign Office experiences in the years 1892-95, that

> as long as we assumed responsibility for the government of Egypt, the Capitulations were like a noose around our neck, which any Great Power, having rights under the Capitulations could tighten at will.[2]

Both Germany and France had used this "noose" to gain concessions from Britain; Germany in connection with railway concessions in Turkey, and France in connection with the Siam controversy.[3]

All the above factors combined to reveal how hollow was the phrase "splendid isolation." As Grey says, "it was not isolation, and it was far from splendid."[4] Thus isolation in

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1. Lyons to Granville, in Fitzmaurice, Lord Edmond, Life of Lord Granville, (London, 1905), II, 333.
2. Grey, op. cit., I, 11.
3. Ibid., 11.
4. Ibid., 11.

the opening half of the last decade of the century did not appear to be safe or comfortable. And with the passing of the years which brought the century to a close the main stream of international affairs, as it kept changing and eddying, became more turbulent for England.

The Franco-Russian alliance became an accomplished fact in 1894, and the Triple Alliance had been renewed for six years in 1891. Thus in 1895 Britain found herself outside the two groups. Furthermore, the actions of the impulsive Kaiser led to a widening rift in Anglo-German relationships. In the summer of 1895 he paid his annual visit to Cowes, on this occasion a most regrettable one. He annoyed the Committee of the Royal Yacht Squadron by criticizing their handicaps. He annoyed Lord Salisbury by scolding him for being late. He annoyed his uncle, the Prince of Wales, by his irritating familiarities and overbearing ways. By such undeft touches he antagonized just those circles in England which were politically and socially the most authoritative.[1] Not only did the actions of the Kaiser lead to hostility, but Germany's interest in the Transvaal at this time further loosened the bonds between the two nations and strained them almost to a breaking point. In 1894 Germany had shown a protective interest in the Transvaal. In 1895 this interest had been confirmed and advertised by a series of highly indiscreet speeches between President Kruger and the German consul at Praetoria.[2] On January 3, 1896, the Kaiser, though

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1. Nicolson, Harold, Lord Carnock, (London, 1930), 125.
2. Spender, J.A., Fifty Years of Europe, (London, 1933), 158.

he claims in his Memoirs that it was against his better judgment and that he was reluctantly persuaded to agree to it by his advisers, addressed the famous telegram to President Kruger to congratulate him upon the failure of the Jameson Raid.[1] The most profound indignation was aroused in Britain at this action. "The nation will never forget this telegram" wrote the "Morning Post."[2] When Count Hatzfeldt in London wrote to the German Foreign Office on January 4, he reported:

> All the English newspapers, with the exception of the "Daily News", describe the message as an act of unfriendliness towards England, and even the "Standard" speaks out sharply about it. This change is all the more striking, as, so far, the whole of the London press, with hardly an exception, decidedly blamed Dr. Jameson's action.[3]

On January 21 he wrote to tell Holstein of the English reaction in these words:

> It is not a question of annoyance on the part of the Government, but of a deep-seated bitterness of feeling among the public, which has shown itself in every way. I am assured that when the excitement was at its height, Germans in the City could hardly do any business with the English. In the best known large Clubs, such as the Turf, there was extreme bitterness; I myself,

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1. "I express my sincere congratulations that, supported by your people, without appealing for the help of friendly Powers, you have succeeded by your own energetic action against armed bands which invaded your country as disturbers of the Peace, and have thus been enabled to restore peace and safeguard the independence of the country against attacks from outside." (January 3, 1896).
   Cited in Spender, op. cit., 160, footnote.
2. Cited in Gooch, G. P., History of Modern Europe 1878-1919, (London, 1923), 220.
3. Hatzfeldt to German Foreign Office, January 4, 1896, Dugdale, E. T. S., German Diplomatic Documents, 1871-1914, (London, 1930), II, 389.

received many insulting and threatening letters. I have no doubt that the general feeling was such, that, if the Government had lost its head or had wished for war for any reason, it would have had the whole of public opinion behind it".[1]

The sending of the telegram was one of the most disastrous errors of the Kaiser's early reign. "The raid was folly," observed Salisbury to Eckardstein in 1899, "but the telegram was even more foolish."[2] And although the British and German governments were later to resume their friendly intercourse, the rash act was not forgotten in England, while the German people were angered by the fury which the action of their impulsive ruler provoked.[3]

Though Africa was the source of the most acute differences between Great Britain and Germany, there were other fields in which the policies of the two powers clashed. In the Cretan crisis of 1897 the support Germany gave to Turkey led to a further estrangement with England. That same year she seized Kiaochau in the Shantung peninsula, and the Kaiser's speech in connection with that seizure and his reference to the "mailed fist" added to the ill-feeling. It was during these years also that Germany began her naval programme which was to arouse later such grave fears in England. In June, 1897, Admiral Tirpitz was

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1. Hatzfeldt to Holstein, January 21, 1896, Dugdale, op. cit., II, 403-04.
2. Eckardstein, Baron von, Ten Years at the Court of St. James, (London, 1921), 85.
3. "The outbreak of hatred, envy and rage which the Kruger telegram let loose in England against Germany contributed more than anything else to open the eyes of large sections of the German people to an economic position and the necessity for a fleet."
Admiral Tirpitz in his Memoirs, cited in Spender, op. cit., 162.

appointed chief of the German Admiralty; in November of that year he introduced the first navy bill which created the High Seas Fleet.

Meanwhile relations with France were even more unfriendly. The French seizure of Tunis, the fortification of Biserta, the convict settlement in New Caledonia, the occupation of the New Hebrides, the rivalry in Nigeria, the coercion in Siam, the exclusion of British trade from Madagascar, the question of the Newfoundland fisheries, the British occupation of Dongola, and above all, the British occupation of Egypt--all these thorny problems were continually pricking the fingers of the diplomats in Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay, and causing anxiety to the friends of peace on both sides of the Channel.

The tension between the two governments and peoples reached a breaking-point over the Fashoda incident in the Upper Nile in 1898. Because it brought the two nations so very close to war, and yet marked a turning-point in their relations, it might be discussed in some detail. Ever since the evacuation of the Egyptian Sudan and the tragic death of Gordon in 1885, England had been awaiting an opportunity to retrieve that area. In 1896 an expedition for its recovery was sent out under Kitchener. The belief that control of the Sudan was essential to the stability of the British regime in Egypt, combined with the fear of French expansion in central Africa, had forced the government to action.[1] But British control of the area was not

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1. Giffen, M. B., Fashoda, (Chicago, 1930), 27-29.

to be uncontested, for a simultaneous attempt to reach the Upper Nile was being made by the French. Captain Marchand had crossed Africa from west to east with a small expedition and succeeded in reaching the Upper waters of the Nile in July. When Kitchener, after defeating the Mahdi at Omdurman, advanced further up the river, and arrived at Fashoda, he found the fort flying the French flag and occupied by Marchand and his small force. Neither of the two forces would retire; they neither fought nor gave way; they left the struggle to be fought out between London and Paris.

The diplomatic tension which resulted from this crisis was acute in the extreme. There seemed to be no possible compromise between the claims of the two powers. Such a clash over the Sudan had been foreseen by the statesmen of both lands some years before. Sir Edward Grey, when holding the post of Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs under Lord Rosebery, on being questioned in the House of Commons on March 28, 1905, about the rumoured advance of the French upon the Nile, had declared that a French advance into the Nile Valley "would be an unfriendly act and would be so viewed by England."[1] This unequivocal stand was endorsed by the succeeding Salisbury administration. The Grey declaration had aroused anger and resentment in the French Foreign Office - it was warning France off a vast district which belonged not to Great Britain, but to the Sultan of Turkey, and it was accompanying a British claim by what amounted to

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1. Grey, op. cit., I, 20.

a threat of war.[1]

The day after the declaration, as Grey says, "there was a row in Paris",[2] and in the negotiations which followed, the French government politely but firmly refused to recognize this new "Monroe Doctrine" in the Nile Valley. They proceeded on their way in equatorial Africa with the watchword "first come, first served."[3] Thus, the purpose of the Marchand expedition to link up French possessions in east and west Africa by control of the Upper Nile was in direct contravention of the Grey declaration. Though France had declined to admit the validity of the pronouncement of Grey,[4] she was well aware that she would have to reckon with the consequences of ignoring its veto. When the meeting of Kitchener and Marchand took place at Fashoda in 1898, a greater issue was at stake than the clash of interests in Central Africa alone. The danger was all the greater because France feared British ambitions in Morocco which adjoined Algeria, while in the Far East and in many parts of the world French and British rivalry had been becoming particularly acute during the years

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1. In his Memoirs, Grey states the British claim in the following words, "The Soudan was still in hands of the Khalifa. The claim of Egypt to it, however had never been abandoned, though since the overthrow of Egyptian rule by the Mahdi in 1886, it was clear that the Soudan would never be reconquered by Egypt again without British assistance, nor would the Soudanese again tolerate the purely Egyptian rule against which they had revolted. It was, at any rate, evident that no other power except Egypt, or someone acting on behalf of Egypt had any claim whatever to the Soudan and the Nile Valley." Grey, op. cit., I, 19.
2. Ibid., 20.
3. Gooch, op. cit., 277; Diplomaticus, Fashoda and Lord Salisbury's Vindication, Fortnightly Review, LXIV, new series, December, 1898.
4. Monson to Salisbury, September 18, 1898, B.D., I, No. 191, p.165.

immediately preceding. For a time it seemed highly probable that the whole question of French and British colonial antagonism and national bitterness would be settled by the sword.

A diplomatic contest began between the governments, while the press and public opinion in both countries grew more and more excited. Britain would admit the claim of no other nation to the Nile Valley; she had only one thing to say - the French must withdraw. On the other hand France did not admit the British claim; and it needed little effort on the part of the Paris press to convince the nation that the rights and honour of France had been outraged. The situation did not admit of compromise; one side or the other had to give way. Peace hung on a thread. Lord Rosebery in an address at Epsom stated that the question was of supreme gravity. He said,

> I hope this incident will be pacifically settled, but it must be understood that there can be no compromise of the rights of Egypt. Great Britain has been treated too much as a negligible quantity in recent years. Let other nations remember that cordiality can only rest on mutual respect for each other's rights, each other's territories, and each other's flag.[1]

An equally strong sentiment was expressed by Hicks-Beach, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in a speech at Tynemouth:

> It would be a great calamity that after a peace of eighty years, during which I had hoped that unfriendly feeling had practically disappeared, those friendly relations should be disturbed. But there are worse evils than war, and we shall not shrink from anything that may come.[2]

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1. Cited in Gooch, op. cit., 293.
2. Ibid., 293.

Such ominous utterances reveal the dangerous temper which the incident had evoked. During the negotiations the French Mediterranean fleet was ordered to Cherbourg, and at dead of night, with lights extinguished, passed Gibraltar unperceived by British authorities. The mayors of the Channel ports were instructed to requisition the churches for hospital work, and report on the beds and ambulance available to fit them for immediate service. A hundred million francs were spent in a few days in providing Cherbourg as a naval base with the necessary ammunition and stores. Orders to march were in all the commanding officers' hands, and everything was in readiness for mobilization, if the French Government should be confronted with an ultimatum.[1] English merchants in Paris held new orders in suspense, and standing orders were not executed. Business was almost at a standstill for a few days in September.[2] In Britain, too, there was a flurry of warlike preparation. The Mediterranean fleet was sent to Alexandria and Port Said to protect the Suez Canal and negative any idea of a French landing in Egypt, and at Portsmouth there was a ferment of activity.[3]

In vain the French protested the superior claims of the British. Their case was based principally on the fact that the country bordering on the White Nile, though it was formerly under the government of Egypt, had become "res nullius" by its abandonment on the part of the Egyptian government; and

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1. Barclay, Sir Thomas, Thirty Years Anglo-French Reminiscences, (London, 1914), 145-46.
2. Giffen, op. cit., 67.
3. Barclay, op. cit., 146.

that the French had a right to position on the Nile as much as the Germans or the Belgians. Furthermore, it was maintained that the French government, by the reserves which they had made when the subject was mentioned in previous years, had retained for themselves the right to occupy the banks of the Nile when they saw fit.[1]

In spite of French protests Salisbury and the British government made it clear that there could be no alternative to French surrender but war.

The French minister finally yielded. On November 4, Baron de Courcel informed Salisbury that Fashoda would be evacuated,[2] and on December 11 Marchand left his post. France was not in a position to risk a war - her fleet was weak and Britain might easily have taken the whole of her colonial empire. Furthermore, Russia had shown herself unwilling to support her ally's policy if it involved war with Britain, which fact was a dash to French hopes.[3] Then too, it was realized that to quarrel with Britain was to play into the hands of Germany, and to destroy any chances of ultimately recovering the Rhine provinces. As Delcassé told the French Chamber, "a conflict would have involved sacrifices disproportionate to the object."[4] Within the following months negotiations were carried on between the two governments to determine the limits of zones of influence in

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1. Salisbury to Monson, Oct. 6, 1898, B.D., I, No. 203, p.173.
2. Salisbury to Monson, Nov. 4, 1898, ibid., No. 227, p. 188.
3. Giffen, op. cit., 163.
4. Ibid., 101 ff.. Charmes, Francis, Chronique de la Quinzaine, Revue des Deux Mondes, November 14, 1898.

the Nile territories. As a result of these negotiations, by an agreement of March 21, 1899, a line was laid out from a point where the French-Congolese boundary meets the Nile-Congo watershed, northward along the crest of that watershed to 11° North Latitude; thence it was to follow in general the old boundary of 1802 between Wadai and Darfur. The French Government promised to acquire neither territory nor political influence east of that line; and the British government promised to acquire neither territory nor political influence west of it.[1] In this way the very difficult situation was finally settled. But a legacy of extreme bitterness was left on each side of the Channel, and Fashoda furnished one more evidence and warning that the persistence of ill-will between Britain and France would lead to indefinite multiplication of provoking incidents, and in the long run to war.[2]

The British victory in the Fashoda crisis did not tend to ameliorate relations with France. The latter very naturally smarted under defeat, while her bitter feelings were intensified by the anger aroused in England over the Dreyfus affair.[3] In France feelings of jealousy and hatred were constantly manifested; the French journals railed angrily at Great Britain, and the attacks sometimes degenerated into purposeless scurrility, going so far as to caricature Queen Victoria. One of the leading journals of Paris exclaimed, "we offered Lord Salisbury Fashoda

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1. Giffen, op. cit., 90.
2. Grey, op. cit., I, 41.
3. Barclay, op. cit., 162.

and our friendship, and he replied that he only wanted Fashoda."[1] In such a manner ill-will and anger were aroused on each side of the Channel--every old incident was raked up in order to fan the flame of irritation, every difference exaggerated to the utmost.

It happened, moreover, that early in 1899, and just before the settlement of the negotiations following the evacuation of Fashoda, there broke out another controversial squall between the two powers. This dispute, which was almost the Fashoda incident over again in miniature, was brought about by a concession which France gained from the Sultan of Muscat for a coaling-station on the Persian Gulf.[2] When the arrangement was made public in February, 1899, three British warships arrived on the scene to prevent the fulfilling of the concession and the hoisting of the French flag. Under the threat of bombardment the Sultan withdrew his concession to the French, and the French had no recourse but vain protest. Thus, once again, France had attempted to dispute a British territorial monopoly, and again her claims had been met by the solid fact of British predominance.

Thus at the end of the century relations between Great Britain and France could hardly have been worse, short of an actual conflict of war. "In England, France continued to be regarded as the national enemy, and the nineteenth century closed with Anglo-French relations strained to the limit, and with the hope of reconciliation apparently excluded from the realm of possibility."[3] The future was of course hidden from both

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1. Anon., "France, Russia, and the Nile," Contemporary Review, December, 1898, 761.
2. Giffen, op. cit., 187.
3. Seymour, op. cit., 122.

peoples, and probably both would have been incredulous over the idea of an entente within five years. Yet from these unpromising incidents of 1899 France and Great Britain were to advance steadily toward the convention of 1904.

The dangerous tension which had been developing over the period of years between Great Britain and the members of the Dual Alliance out of competing interests in Asia and Africa, and which had culminated in the incidents of Port Arthur and Fashoda, now gave a new direction to British foreign policy. Nor, in the light of events of the past few years, were relationships with Germany at all reassuring.

As early as April, 1898, the following words appeared in "The Contemporary Review" to express the writer's views on the failure of English foreign policy:

> We have not the goodwill of France and Russia, nor the alliance of any other powers, nor yet the degree of strength in isolation which would enable the government to vindicate our rights against any combination....from whatever point of view therefore we consider the foreign policy of the present government we find that is unreal in its suppositions, ruinous in its results, and absolutely unworthy of the respect and confidence of those who put the interests of the nation above the considerations of party.[1]

Another writer in the same review states, "the present international complications cannot well pass off without England having to make a momentous decision."[2]

If, however, there was any faith left in the hearts of

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1. Anon., The Failure of Our Foreign Policy, The Contemporary Review, April, 1898, 464-67.
2. Anon., The Arch-Enemy of England, The Contemporary Review, December, 1898, 908.

the people or their rulers in the myth of the splendour of isolation, this faith was rudely dispelled with the outbreak of the Boer War. In the words of Harold Nicolson,

> On October 11, 1899, Great Britain declared war upon the Transvaal. It was only then that the full effects of Lord Salisbury's policy of isolation could be guaged. Great Britain woke up infamous. British opinion was shocked to discover over-night how much we were disliked.[1]

During the War a wave of anti-British feeling swept over the continent; press campaigns of the utmost virulence were directed against Britain in almost every country. This was true of France especially, and when Kruger fled from his own country he was most enthusiastically received at Marseilles and Paris.

The isolated position of their country in a world wearing so harsh a face began now to impress itself on the minds of British statesmen. In view of the fact that Britain had been clashing with every Great Power in every part of the globe, they began to realize that there was nothing of real splendour in isolation; they began to doubt if it was safe, to feel that a continuation of such a policy might prove embarrassing and expensive, to question if could be longer maintained. The only escape from the discomforts of isolation was a policy of making friends.[2] And in choosing friends a choice had to be made between the Dual Alliance and the Triple Alliance. It is interesting to note that the path leading from isolation first chosen was not the path that was eventually pursued.

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1. Nicolson, op. cit., 128.
2. Hammond, J. L., C. P. Scott of the Manchester Guardian, (London, 1934), 135.

The story of England's foreign policy from this date onward is that of the effort to find security in the face of new world conditions. The rôle most congenial to her, and most in keeping with her past traditions was that of refraining from continental entanglements. But it was now realized that she was no longer free to play that rôle. The idea persisted in England that France and Russia were still the traditional rivals, if not enemies, as they had been all through the nineteenth century. Thus it was that British preference for an ally, if an alliance became necessary, was for Germany. However, in spite of this first preference, events were to arise which decided and impelled Britain to make common cause with her traditional rivals and supposed enemies against Germany. At the very moment when relations between Great Britain and France and Russia were most strained, British policy went through an extraordinary transformation, and as a result of that diplomatic revolution during the first years of the twentieth century a totally new direction was given to British foreign policy. The character and scope of that change, which brought England to conclude conventions with the implacable foe, France, after seeking the affections of Germany, forms the subject of the chapter which follows.

CHAPTER II

The Anglo-French Entente

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Having determined to abandon the policy of aloofness from continental affairs, the first choice of the British statesmen of an ally was Germany. The Kruger telegram was neither forgotten nor forgiven in England, but there had been no further attempt to interfere in South Africa. Moreover, the support by the Triple Alliance during the reconquest of the Sudan, and the Kaiser's telegram of congratulation on the British victory of Atbara had proven most welcome at a time when France and Russia were proving most hostile. During the Boer War, while public opinion and the press in Germany were undoubtedly most hostile to Britain, the German government took a stand of neutrality and declined to join Russia and France in a plan of intervention on behalf of the Boers.

Nor was the idea of an alliance with Germany altogether new at this time. During Bismarck's day various attempts at such an alliance had been prosecuted from time to time, but these had come to nothing.[1] And again, as early as 1898 Mr. Joseph Chamberlain had opened private negotiations with a similar purpose in view with Eckardstein, of the German embassy

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1. Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, (Cambridge, 1923), III, 144-47.

in London, and Count Hatzfeldt, the German ambassador. Meetings were held at the home of Alfred Rothschild or of Eckardstein two or three times a week where possibilities of an alliance were discussed.[1]

Count Hatzfeldt informed Bülow of these private negotiations with Chamberlain in a dispatch on March 29, 1898,[2] and the latter replied on March 30.[3] In his reply he thanked Chamberlain for his offers but pointed out what he considered to be the drawbacks to a German alliance with England. He felt that England wished the support of Germany so as to become stronger than her rivals, and thus remove her from fear of attack, but he was afraid that if Germany should be attacked, she could not count on English support. Moreover, he expressed a doubt that if the British government made an alliance it would not be maintained if that government went out of power - he spoke of the English Parliamentary system as a back door by which England could escape from fulfilling her treaty obligations. He considered the risks for Germany in such an alliance too great and thus offered to Chamberlain's proposals a polite refusal.

In spite of the failure of these negotiations to bring material results, Chamberlain, Hatzfeldt, and Eckardstein continued to work for good understanding between the two countries,

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1. J. L. Garvin in his "Life of Joseph Chamberlain," emphasizes the fact that the initiative came from the German side. Garvin, J. L., Life of Joseph Chamberlain, (London, 1934), III, 225.
2. Hatzfeldt to the German Foreign Office, March 29, 1898, Dugdale, op. cit., II, 21-23.
3. Bülow to Hatzfeldt, March 30, 1898, ibid., 23-24. Garvin, op. cit., III, 261-62.

trying to bring about agreements in lesser matters.[1] On his side Chamberlain continued to hope for an alliance and took the opportunity in speeches to educate public opinion along that line.[2]

In spite of Germany's failure to take advantage of the offers made in 1898, new overtures for the alliance were made in 1899. In November of that year the Kaiser paid a visit to Windsor. His visit was a complete success, and a reconciliation between the courts after the effects of the Kruger telegram was brought about. But the visit meant more than this. Bülow had accompanied the Kaiser, and Chamberlain, in conversation with the two, seized the opportunity to discuss with them the matter of an alliance.[3] In these conversations he seems to have gained the impression that they were favourable to the idea.[4] Then on November 30 he delivered a glowing speech at Leicester in which he stated:

> There is something that every farseeing English statesman must have long desired, and that is that we should not remain permanently isolated on the continent of Europe, and I think that the moment that aspiration was formed it must have appeared evident to everybody that the natural alliance is between ourselves and the Great German Empire.[5]

Chamberlain's speech aroused a storm of protest in Germany. German opinion at this time was decidedly pro-Boer

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1. Garvin, op. cit., III, 267 ff.
2. His speech at Birmingham, May 13, 1898; ibid., 282-83.
3. Ibid., 498-506.
4. Chamberlain's letter to Eckardstein; Eckardstein, op. cit., 130; Garvin, op. cit., III, 506, 510, 512, 514.
5. Garvin, op. cit., III, 506-08.

and anti-British, and the press denounced the idea of an association with Britain.[1] In view of this hostile public opinion, Bülow did not have the courage, when speaking in the Reichstag on December 11, to take up sympathetically Chamberlain's Leicester speech. Instead, he poured cold water on the proposal.[2] This was accepted as a rude rebuff in England, and Chamberlain naturally deeply resented such treatment.[3] Thus once more the efforts of the British statesmen were wrecked by the determination of Bülow and the Emperor to cling to their principle of a free hand.

It was, however, in 1901 that the two countries reached a crossroads, and the failure of the negotiations which opened early in that year and continued until December definitedly decided the separate paths that the two countries were to follow in the years ahead. In the middle of January, Baron Eckardstein was visiting at the home of the Duke of Devonshire at Chatsworth when Chamberlain was present. During this visit the Duke, Chamberlain, and Eckardstein discussed international questions and the future of Anglo-German relations. In a conversation after dinner on January 16, the Duke and Chamberlain formulated definitely their position on this latter question. Their statement was embodied in a dispatch to the German Chancellor by Eckardstein after consultation with Hatzfeldt, and in a more modified form in one to Holstein.[4] It was reported that the

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1. Garvin, op. cit., III, 508-09; Eckardstein, op. cit., 133.
2. Garvin, op. cit., III, 511.
3. Letter to Eckardstein, Eckardstein, op. cit., 151. Garvin, op. cit., III, 512-13.
4. Hatzfeldt to Bülow and to Holstein, January 18, 1901, Eckardstein, op. cit., 185-187.

English leaders now realized that they must seek an alliance and that the choice lay between the Triple and Dual Alliance. In spite of the inclinations for a Russian alliance on the part of some of the Cabinet, Chamberlain and his friends would work for an agreement with Germany. This, they expected, would be brought about gradually, and as a starting point they suggested an arrangement regarding Morocco. But should an alliance with Germany prove an impossibility they would turn to Russia.

In Holstein's reply to Eckardstein of January 21 the former frowned upon the possibility of a rapprochement. He claimed that Germany would run too great a risk in an alliance with England, and concluded that if Germany was to stand sponsor for the British Empire she must extract at least an equivalent price for her services. Moreover, he distrusted Salisbury and complained that Germany had been often mistreated by him.[1]

While these negotiations were being carried on, the Kaiser made a hurried visit to England to be present at the death bed of Queen Victoria. The warmth of feeling he displayed on this visit made a deep impression on the Royal Family and on the whole public opinion in England. On his arrival on January 20, Eckardstein told him of his recent conversation with Chamberlain, and the Kaiser expressed complete agreement with the idea of an alliance. Bülow, however, had urged caution in encouraging or discouraging the plan, fearing that eagerness on the part of Germany might diminish German gains. Thus, the

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1. Holstein to Eckardstein, January 21, 1901, Eckardstein, op. cit., 187.

Kaiser avoided committing his government to any definite agreement while he encouraged friendly relations.

During the next few months negotiations continued, but little progress was made. On April 13 Lansdowne wrote the following to Lascelles regarding the negotiations:

> I doubt whether much will come of the project. In principle the idea is good enough. But when each side comes, if ever it does, to formulate its terms, we shall break down; and I know Lord Salisbury regards the scheme, with to say the least, suspicion.[1]

Berlin insisted on the necessity of England joining the Triple Alliance, and of transferring negotiations to Vienna. London, however, was most unwilling to undertake obligations towards Austria and Italy, and was not sure that Parliament would sanction such a treaty.

Salisbury from the beginning showed little interest in the plan for an alliance. Time had not changed his belief that isolation was England's wisest policy. His memorandum of May 29, in which he criticized the draft of a proposed alliance, remains a classic on the subject of isolation, and of the special difficulties which beset a British government in departing from it.[2]

Negotiations, however, did not entirely lapse. In August, the Kaiser, in conversation with King Edward and Lascelles at Homburg, expressed disappointment that an alliance had not been concluded.[3] Later, in November and December the question was reopened. A memorandum of Lansdowne's of November 11

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1. Lansdowne to Lascelles, April 13, 1901. B.D., II, No. 81, p. 63.
2. Memorandum by Salisbury, May 29, 1901, B.D., II, No. 86, p. 68.
3. Lascelles to Lansdowne, August 25, 1901, ibid., No. 90, p. 73.

outlined the difficulties of an alliance but suggested that instead of dropping negotiations a general agreement might be formulated regarding policy in commercial interests.[1] Then on December 19, when Metternich, who had replaced Hatzfeldt as German ambassador, called on Lansdowne before leaving for Berlin for Christmas, the latter took the opportunity to refer to the negotiations which had been carried on throughout the year. He pointed out that England could not join the Triple Alliance, but he wished to preserve friendly relations with Germany, and suggested a general commercial understanding be formulated. Metternich was sure that this would not be acceptable in place of an alliance.[2] Lascelles relates a conversation with Bülow on December 28 in which he told the Chancellor of the above conversation. Metternich had not yet reported the interview to Bülow, and the latter was glad to hear Lansdowne's views. He expressed the hope that the question would not be dropped altogether.[3]

Thus the negotiations gradually faded out in platitudinous expressions of mutual goodwill and friendship. The last weeks were rather embittered when Mr. Chamberlain and Count Bülow exchanged angry words about the comparative humanity of British soldiers in the Boer War and the Prussian soldiers in the Franco-Prussian War.[4] In this manner the curtain was rung

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1. Memorandum by Lansdowne, November 11, 1901, B.D., II, No.78, pp. 76-79.
2. Lansdowne to Lascelles, December 19, 1901, ibid., No. 94, pp. 80-83.
3. Lascelles to Lansdowne, January 3, 1902, ibid., No. 95, pp. 83084.
4. Lee, Sir Sidney, King Edward VII, (London, 1927), II, 132-33,137.

down on the final effort to link the fortunes of Great Britain with those of Germany.

It was in this way that the wire, as Bismarck would have put it, was cut between London and Berlin, and events began to move with tragic inevitability towards a situation in which it could not be repaired. Germany had failed to take up the English offers. Bülow, Holstein, and the Kaiser had consistently taken the view that England needed Germany as an ally more than Germany needed England. The possibility, which Chamberlain had so often tendered, that England and Russia, or England and France might come to terms, was characterized as ridiculous, and was considered as a mere "bogey" used as a threat to win a German alliance. Thus they put their terms for a German agreement too high - a simple defensive alliance would not do - England must join the Triple Alliance - their policy was "all or nothing."[1] Brandenburg's simple summing-up of the whole situation strikes the correct note with a hint of tragedy when he says, "They had offered us their hand and had withdrawn it when we made the conditions of acceptance too onerous for fulfilment. They never came back to us. They went instead to our enemies."[2]

These Anglo-German negotiations at the opening of the twentieth century which have been outlined at some length are important as showing perhaps the chief reason why England chose an alliance with the members of the Dual Alliance in 1904 and 1907. British ministers had now been satisfied that if security

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1. Newton, Lord, Lord Lansdowne, (London, 1929), 208.
2. Brandenburg, Erich, From Bismarck to the World War, (London, 1927), 181.

could no longer be found in isolation it was least of all to be sought in an alliance with Germany. The rebuff which their overtures had received, the feelings of animosity engendered by events of the past few years, along with the growing Anglo-German naval rivalry, were all determining factors in causing England to cast her vote in favour of France and Russia against the Central Powers.

However, before Britain took the first step in this move by forming the Anglo-French Entente she found herself a friend, not in Europe, but in the farthest East. The island of Japan, since she had been forced to open her doors to western trade, had transformed herself in an astonishingly short time into a power of the western model, mechanized and efficient. In view of the unrest in the Far East which resulted from the state of disintegration in which China then found herself, and the scramble on the part of the Great Powers for concessions and territory, Lord Lansdowne, on succeeding Lord Salisbury as Foreign Minister in 1901, made it his policy to pool British interests with those of Japan. Negotiations for an alliance were concluded on January 30, 1902, when an agreement was signed in London. Lord Lansdowne described the agreement as "purely a measure of precaution, to be invoked should occasion arise, in defense of important British interests."[1] It covered British interests in China, and Japanese interests both in China and Korea. Only in the event of either party being attacked by more than one power did it engage the other to come to its assistance.

1. Lansdowne to MacDonald, January 30,1902,B.D.II, No.124, pp.113-114.

But one of the chief results of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was to show to the world that British isolation might not be so impenetrable as had been supposed. This thought became more and more fixed in the minds of the French statesman, who saw a further opportunity in the growing coolness between Germany and England.[1]

The idea of any bond uniting the common destinies of England and France at the opening of the new century might well have seemed fantastic when it is recalled how strained the relations between the two countries had been. But the Fashoda Incident has been called, and not unwisely, "the last cloud in an expiring storm." The Convention of March 21, 1899, had cleaned the slate so far as territorial claims of Britain and France in Central Africa were concerned. Not only that, but the smooth manner in which the negotiations had been carried out had brought into view, in French minds at least, wider possibilities of understanding and harmony. At the time when the March agreement was signed, M. Paul Cambon, who had succeeded the Baron de Courcel as French ambassador to London, suggested to Lord Salisbury that there were several other matters which might be settled in an equally friendly spirit. Salisbury, however, shook his head and smiled: "I have the greatest confidence in M. Delcassé," he said, "and also in your present government. But in a few months time they will probably be overturned, and their successors will do exactly the contrary. No, we must

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1. Cambon to Delcassé, March 13,1903, Documents Diplomatiques Français,(cited hereafter as D.D.F.),(Paris,1931),2e Série, tome,III,No.137,p.184.

wait a bit."[1] This period of waiting was to last until 1904, but in the interval many changes of great import bearing on the relationships of the two governments took place.

In the first place there was the widening of the gulf between England and Germany in spite of the attempts to bring the two into an agreement. And as these two drifted further apart, for various reasons warmer airs began to blow between England and France. The personalities of several new figures, who at this time appeared on the diplomatic stage in both countries, were of tremendous importance in determining the possibility of an Anglo-French reconciliation. So long as men like Hanotaux, a decided Anglophobe, and Salisbury, with his faith in isolation, were in control of the Foreign Offices, such reconciliation was out of the question. But with the coming to power of new figures a settlement of difficulties might be attempted. Delcassé's accession to power in the French Foreign Office in 1898 may be regarded as the first step in the formation of the Entente.

M. Delcassé took over his office, succeeding M. Hanotaux, immediately before the Fashoda Incident. Thus he was too late to avert that crisis, or to alleviate immediately the hard feelings which resulted. But the new direction which French foreign policy assumed under his guidance made Fashoda the last of the incidents to seriously endanger Franco-British relations. He had entered the Foreign Office with the deliberate policy of making friends with Britain. On first coming to power he had

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1. Cambon in an interview in the "Times," December 22,1920; cited in Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, III,305.

expressed this wish to a friend saying, "I do not wish to leave this place without having concluded an entente with England."[1] Through all the bitterness of anti-British rancour which seethed over France during the Fashoda crisis and in the succeeding years, and throughout those years when the English and German governments were in close association, M. Delcassé, who continued in office until 1905, held to his purpose and carried it through to splendid fulfilment.

The efforts of M. Delcassé were brilliantly seconded in England by the ambassador he sent to London three months after his own accession to office. M. Paul Cambon was eminently fitted for the task of seeking the friendship of a successful antagonist without forfeiting any of the dignity of his own country. Prudent and firm, pertinacious and adaptable, long-sighted yet tactful, and uniting charm of manner with strength of will, he soon acquired lasting prestige in England, and proved an ideal ambassador for carrying out the policy of his chief. Rebuffed by Salisbury in his first overtures, he persisted in advocating on all occasions his cause.[2]

On the English side of the Channel new personalities were coming into control also, who, because they were less bound than their predecessors by the traditional policies of the British Foreign Office, were to play important rôles in advancing

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1. Bérard, Victor, La Politique Française, La Revue de Paris, July 1, 1905, 217.
   Porter, C.W., The Career of Théophile Delcassé (Philadelphia 1936), 165.
2. Cambon to Delcassé, March 13, 1903, D.D.F., 2e Série, III, No. 137, p. 185.

friendship with France. In October, 1900, Lord Salisbury gave up the office of Foreign Secretary. For fifteen years, with the exception of one brief interval, he had conducted British foreign policy, and on the principle that France was Britain's national enemy. Now he was succeeded by Lord Lansdowne, who proved a ready listener to the advances of Delcassé and Cambon, and who after 1902, was encouraged in this by the new prime minister, Mr. Balfour.

In listing the names of those who prepared the way for the Entente a place of prime importance must be given to Edward VII. While his influence on British foreign policy during his reign has been greatly over estimated on the Continent, and in Germany especially, he did play a very happy part in advancing friendship with France. To him must go much of the credit for the successful termination of the negotiations which ended the old quarrels. Queen Victoria, who was noted for her German sympathies, and her inability to understand the French, was succeeded in 1901 by Edward VII. As the Prince of Wales he had travelled widely on the Continent; he had spent much time in Paris, and on the Riviera. He spoke French with perfect ease, had formed many warm attachments in France, and had a strong liking for the people.

No small part in the negotiations, when these actually began, was that taken by Lord Cromer, the British Agent and Consul-General in Egypt. Knowing from his long experience in Egyptian affairs the inconveniences and possible dangers of French opposition in Egypt, he gave his strongest backing to the proposed Entente, and was most urgent that the newly

afforded opportunity for settling points of difficulty should not be lost.[1] On July 24, 1907, on the occasion of Lord Cromer's retirement, Lord Lansdowne stated stated in the House of Lords that the Anglo-French Entente would hardly have been obtainable in its exiisting shape but for Lord Cromer's high authority among foreign representatives in Egypt.[2]

A writer in "the Nineteenth Century", looking back on the events which led to the successful termination of negotiations for the agreement arrived at in 1904, stated truthfully, "that it has been brought to a practical issue is owing largely to the tact of our sovereign, to the conciliatory spirit of Lord Lansdowne, to the statesmanship of Lord Cromer, to the diplomatic ability displayed by M. Delcassé and by the French ambassador in London."[3]

These men in positions of great authority were not alone in their desire for an Anglo-French understanding; they were warmly supported by a host of unofficial personages. The commercial interests gave support to their efforts. England was France's most valuable customer, and French production competed only to a slight degree with that of England. It was believed in commercial circles that Anglo-French friendship would be of benefit to the industry of both lands. After 1900 influential business men began a campaign for ameliorating the

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1. Cromer to Lansdowne, July 17,1903, B.D.,II,No.359,pp.298-301; also his letter to Lansdowne, November 1,1903, cited in Newton, op.cit., pp.283-84.
2. Lee, op.cit., II, 218.
3. Blennerhassett, Rowland, England and France, The Nineteenth Century, June, 1904, 935.

relations of the two countries. Among these unofficial ambassadors of goodwill was Mr. (afterwards Sir Thomas) Barclay. As President of the British Chamber of Commerce in Paris he was in a position to understand the advantages of an Anglo-French understanding. By long residence in Paris he had won for himself a distinct place in the life of the French capital, and in spite of the soreness created by Fashoda, the Dreyfus Affair, and the Boer War, he spared no effort to effect a reconciliation between France and England. It occurred to him that the cause would be helped if the British Chambers of Commerce were invited to meet in Paris in 1900. The approval of Salisbury and Delcassé was secured, and the meeting was arranged. It proved an encouraging success and paved the way for many English visitors to attend the great Paris Exposition which was held in that same year. These visits were followed by delegations of French Chambers of Commerce to England, and by exchanges of visits by members of Parliament and their wives. Though Kruger's visit to France followed shortly after, and though anti-English feeling by no means disappeared in France, the seeds of goodwill had been sown, and the gross caricatures of Queen Victoria in the French papers disappeared.[1]

It has been shown how as early as 1899 Cambon had suggested to Salisbury that the two governments might come to an understanding on matters over which they differed, and how he had been told to "wait a bit" on that occasion. No decisive advance was possible while Salisbury was in power and while

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1. Barclay, Sir Thomas, Thirty Years Anglo-French Reminiscenses, (London, 1914), for a full account of these early endeavours to sow the seeds of goodwill.

the Boer War was in progress. Delcassé was moved to remark on one occasion to Sir Thomas Barclay that it was hopeless to try to conciliate England.[1]

The British Documents do not begin the story of the negotiations for the Entente before May, 1903, but there is a hint of such negotiations in the German Documents many months earlier. On January 30, 1902, Count Metternich, the German ambassador in London, reported to the German Foreign Office that he had learned "in the strictest confidence that negotiations had been proceeding between Chamberlain and the French ambassador for the settlement of all outstanding differences between France and England on colonial questions."[2] On February 3, he wrote to inform the Foreign Office that Lansdowne had denied to him that there had been any agreement reached with France on colonial questions.[3] No doubt Lansdowne's denial was correct; and it may be true that he was unaware of the conversations which Chamberlain was holding with Cambon on this matter, for we have seen Chamberlain engaging in private negotiations with the German ambassador in his attempts to form an Anglo-German agreement. But it was soon evident that negotiations with France were under way.

There is another hint of this in an incident related by Eckardstein in which he tells of a conversation which took place between Chamberlain and Cambon. He tells of an official

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1. Barclay, op. cit., 210.
2. Metternich to the German Foreign Office, January 30, 1902, Dugdale, op. cit., III, 171.
3. Ibid., 172.

dinner on February 8, 1902, at Marlborough House which was attended by all the British and foreign ambassadors. After dinner he saw Chamberlain and Cambon go off into the billiard room. "I watched them," he relates, "and noted that they talked together for exactly twenty-eight minutes in the most animated manner. I could not of course catch what they said, and only heard two words, 'Morocco' and 'Egypt'."[1]

Further light is thrown upon the significance of this conversation by what Eckardstein tells of a conversation he himself had with Chamberlain immediately following that which the latter had held with Cambon. "As soon as the French Ambassador had left Chamberlain I entered into conversation with the latter. He complained very much of the bad behaviour of the German press towards England and himself. He also referred to the Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag and said: 'It is not the first time that Count Bülow has thrown me over in the Reichstag (referring to Bulow's public repudiation of the offer of alliance made in Chamberlain's Leicester sppech of November 30, 1899). Now I have had enough of such treatment and there can be no more question of an association between Great Britain and Germany.'" "From that moment," Eckardstein goes on to say, "I knew that Chamberlain was ready to adopt the alternative of an accession to the Dual Alliance which he had announced in our conversation of January, 1901, at Chatsworth, as being the consequence of a failure of an Anglo-German negotiation."[2]

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1. Eckardstein, op. cit., 228.
2. Ibid., 228-29: supra 27.

If any doubt remained in the mind of Eckardstein about the truth of the impression he gained from his conversation with Chamberlain, it was dispelled by a conversation he held later that same evening with King Edward. As the company was leaving, the King asked to see him in his study. "He was in excellent humor," the German tells us, and offered his guest a cigar and a whiskey and soda. After talking of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and of how it assured England's future in the Far East, he went on to say,

> Unfortunately I can't face the future with the same confidence as regards Anglo-German relations. You know of course what has happened of late.... The renewed abuse of England in the German press, and the unfriendly and sarcastic remarks of Bülow in the Reichstag have aroused so much resentment among my ministers and in public opinion that for a long time at least there can be no more question of Great Britain and Germany working together in any conceivable matter. We are being urged more strongly than ever by France to come to an agreement with her in all colonial disputes, and it will probably be best in the end to make such a settlement. (1)

The attitude of the British leaders to an Anglo-French understanding at this time is shown by conversations which Cambon held with Lansdowne, King Edward, and the Prince of Wales. Lansdowne was more ready for discussion of such a project than Salisbury had been. Three weeks after the incidents narrated above, Cambon mentioned to Lansdowne the conversation he had held with Salisbury in 1899, and enumerated the questions on which he would like to negotiate an agreement. "He asked," relates Cambon, "whether he might make a note of them, but I said he need not trouble as I would write him a personal letter

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1. Eckardstein, op. cit., 229-30.

enumerating them. This I did, and - foolishly - never kept a copy of it. Next evening (sometime early in 1902) there was a big dinner in Buckingham Palace. I was placed next to King Edward, who said, 'Lansdowne has shown me your letter. It is excellent. We must go on. I have told the Prince of Wales about it. You can discuss it also with him.' After dinner the Prince of Wales, later King George V, spoke to me eagerly of the letter and said: 'What a good thing it would be if we could have a general agreement.' He wanted to know when it would be concluded. I told him that we could not go quite so fast as he might wish, but that with patience and goodwill it ought to be possible."[1]

The efforts of the diplomats in negotiating the understanding between the two countries were greatly facilitated by the visit which King Edward paid to Paris in the spring of 1903, when he made his first European tour as King of England. The general plan of his tour was a Mediterranean cruise in his yacht, the "Victoria and Albert," with a visit to the King of Portugal, who had visited England previously at the time of Queen Victoria's funeral and again in November of 1902. He planned to pay a call of courtesy on the King of Italy on the return journey overland, and to bring his tour to a close with a few days stay at Paris. This tour he decided on and planned on his own initiative.[2]

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1. Cambon's interview in the "Times," December 22, 1902, cited in Lee, op. cit., II, 218.
2. Lee, op. cit., II, 221.

The ministry acquiesced in the King's arrangements, but evinced no enthusiasm for the visit to Paris, expressing doubt, in view of the continued display of hostility to England in the French press and among the French people, whether the King could count on a cordial or even respectful reception in the French capital.[1] When Sir Edward Monson, the British ambassador at Paris, was asked by Delcassé as to how the King wished to be received, the former, who was slightly pessimistic as to the wisdom of the proposed visit, at once telegraphed for instructions to King Edward who answered that he wished to be received "as officially as possible, and that the more honours that were paid to him, the better it would be."[2]

King Edward arrived at Paris on May 1. As the long procession drove from the Bois de Boulogne Station to the British Embassy, the crowd was by no means enthusiastic - for the most part it was sullenly respectful. Cries were heard of "Vivent les Boers," "Vive Marchand" and "Vive Fashoda," much to the discomfiture of the French officials accompanying the King. He, however, was determinedly good-natured, saluting to right and to left, smiling whenever he was cheered. His suite was especially booed.

After paying a visit to the President of the Republic, he returned to the Embassy, and there, in reply to a deputation from the British Chamber of Commerce in Paris, he delivered a speech which struck a personal note, and which, in its warmth

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1. Lee, op. cit., II, 223.
2. Ibid., 223.

of utterance, did much to win over the people of Paris. In his speech he said:

> It is scarcely necessary to tell you with what sincere pleasure I find myself once more in Paris, to which as you know, I have paid very frequent visits with ever increasing pleasure, and for which I feel an attachment fortified by so many happy and ineffaceable memories. The days of hostility between the two countries are, I am certain, happily at an end. I know of no two countries where prosperity is more interdependent. There may have been misunderstandings and causes of dissension in the past; but that is all happily over and forgotten. The friendship of the two countries is my constant preoccupation, and I count on you all, who enjoy French hospitality in their magnificent city, to aid me to reach this goal. (1).

In the evening the King attended the Théâtre Français. The house was full, but his reception was decidedly chilly. During the entr'acte he designedly left his loge to mix with the crowd, resolved to win it over. In the lobby by chance he met Mlle. Jeanne Granier, an artiste whom he had seen act in England. Holding out his hand, he said to her, "Mademoiselle, I remember how I applauded you in London. You personified there all the grace, all the esprit of France."[2] Again the King had found the right thing to say, and his bonhomie was beginning to make itself felt.

Next day there was a review at Vincennes, and a reception at the Hôtel de Ville. En route to Vincennes the cheering was stronger and warmer than on the day before. At the Hôtel de Ville the King spoke only briefly, but his words were most happily phrased and full of kindliness:

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1. Cited in Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, III, 307.
2. Lee, op. cit., II, 238.

"I shall never forget my visit to your charming city, and I can assure you it is with the greatest of pleasure that I return each time to Paris, where I am treated exactly as if I were at home." (1)

In the afternoon he drove out to Longchamp to attend a race meeting specially arranged by the Jockey Club. In the evening there was a state banquet at the Elysée where the President and King exchanged professions of steadily growing friendship on behalf of their respective countries. In reply to M. Loubet, His Majesty said:

"I am glad of this occasion, which will strengthen the bonds of friendship and contribute to the friendship of our two countries in their common interest. Our great desire is that we may march together in the paths of civilization and peace." (2)

A gala performance took place at the Opera that evening, and other functions were arranged for the next day. On May 4 the King prepared to depart. The route to the Gare des Invalides, from which he was to leave, was lined with an enthusiastic crowd, and whereas on his arrival there had been cries of "Vivent les Boers," there now was heard "Vive Notre Roi."

The success of the visit had exceeded all expectations, largely owing to the King's personal charm of speech and manner, and his cheerful readiness to play a full part in a heavy programme of functions. Each day of his stay he had won public feeling more and more in his favour. On every side were heard expressions of gratification that the King had renewed the ties of friendship which had bound him to France while he was yet

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1. Lee, op. cit., II, 239.
2. Ibid., p.239.

Prince of Wales. There can be no doubt that his visit did much to terminate the acute stage of estrangement between the two countries, to promote an atmosphere of goodwill between them, and to give a great impetus to the movement towards an Anglo-French rapprochement. By his visit King Edward secured honourable mention among the architects of the Entente Cordial."[1]

Yet another step forward towards the Entente was taken two months later when on July 6 President Loubet paid King Edward a return visit. This visit was marked by the greatest cordiality. At a state dinner at Buckingham Palace M. Loubet declared in speaking of his royal host, "France preserves a precious memory of the visit which you paid to Paris. I am sure that it will have the most happy results, and that it will greatly serve to maintain and bind still more closely the relations which exist between our two countries."[2] In return King Edward expressed the hope, "that the welcome you have received today has convinced you of the true friendship, indeed I will say the affection, which my country feels for France."[3] The toast of the Lord Mayor at the Guildhall the next day was no less cordial when he said: "Now we have shaken hands in the firm intention of letting no cloud obscure the path we have marked out, is it too much to hope that our statesmen will find means of removing forever the horrible possibility of a war between the two peoples who have so many common interests,

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1. Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, III, 308. Charmes, Francis, Chronique de la Quinzaine, Revue des Deux Mondes, May 15, 1903, 469-70.
2. Fay, op. cit., I, 154.
3. Lee, op. cit., II, 244.

and whose hopes and aspirations are the same?"[1]

The whole visit proved a spectacular success. On the President's departure, the King, in reply to his guest's farewell message, telegraphed the following reply which found a warm response on both sides of the Channel: "It is my most ardent wish that the rapprochement between the two countries may be lasting."[2] By this visit another step was taken along the path of amicable understanding between England and France.

M. Delcassé had accompanied the President on his visit to England and had held conversations with Lord Lansdowne in which the general outlines of a treaty of amity were sketched.[3] In August the complete problems were discussed in detail by M. Cambon and the British foreign minister. By the beginning of September the negotiations had gone far enough to justify Lord Lansdowne in drafting a confidential minute for the consideration of the Cabinet on the possibilities of reaching an understanding, with precise details as to how it might be reasonably achieved.

The first fruits of the seeds of goodwill sown by the official visits and by the negotiations which followed were gathered when a general treaty of arbitration was signed on October 14, 1903. This convention was primarily the work of Sir Thomas Barclay and the Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, both of whom had spared no effort in arousing public opinion

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1. Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, III, 308.
2. Fay, op. cit., I, 154.
3. Delcassé to Cambon, July 21, 1903, D.D.F., 2ᵉs, III, No.362, p.471; Newton, op. cit., 279.

on both sides of the Channel in its favour. In France, as a result of their efforts, the plan of such a convention was endorsed by the Chambers of Commerce of Bordeaux, Havre, Marseilles, Lille, Calais, Dunkirk, Toulouse, Lyons, Rouen, and other important business centres. Many municipal councils and peace societies had passed resolutions favourable to its conclusion. Eminent jurists and writers had expressed themselves at one with the plan, and many leading newspapers had given it hearty support. The proposal had also been taken up in an encouraging manner in England. Mr. Barclay had set forth the plan at a meeting of members of Parliament held in the House of Commons, and resolutions in its favour were passed by Chambers of Commerce all over the United Kingdom.[1]

In the agreement signed by the governments in October it was agreed to submit all differences of a juridical order, particularly those relating to difficulties of interpretation of treaties, provided that they did not affect the vital interests nor the honour of the contracting Parties, to the Hague Tribunal. This arbitration treaty connoted a perceptible improvement in the relations of the two countries, though it had merely a theoretic value. True, it removed no misunderstandings, but its adoption can be cited as an interim manifesto of goodwill. On its being concluded M. Cambon wrote to Mr. Barclay, thanking him for the part he had played in the making of the treaty. In his letter he said that the

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1. Barclay's Thirty Years Anglo-Reminiscences gives an excellent account of this work.

treaty was "calculated to cut short a quantity of daily difficulties and incidents of which one can never foresee the consequences."[1]

With the signing of this agreement, along with the negotiations which had already taken place, the atmosphere had now cleared to such an extent that real progress in the settlement of controversial issues could be made. The two foreign ministers, aided by M. Cambon, were busily engaged throughout the winter, and they proved that with goodwill on both sides even the thorniest problems could be solved.

The task of reaching an agreement was in no way easy - the many latent causes of dispute between the two countries were world-wide. At every turn the question of "compensations" turned up, "compensations" which would justify each minister in the eyes of his government for the concessions and sacrifices he himself had to yield. But of all the problems the most formidable lay in Morocco and Egypt. France had never finally recognized the status of England in Egypt, and her refusal would have enabled her at any time to reopen the whole Egyptian question, and even manufacture possibly a "casus belli" whenever conditions might appear auspicious to an adventurous Cabinet. On the other hand, the Republic was known to have designs on Morocco to which England might, if it so suited her, take strong exception. The interests of the two powers in Siam likewise bristled with thorny points likely at any time to prick national tempers. The fishing rights which the French claimed in Newfoundland by virtue of terms laid down in the

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1. Barclay, op. cit., 235.

Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 was another stumbling block to neighbourly relations. These problems, along with questions of rights and interests in West Africa, Madagascar, and in the New Hebrides, had all caused friction in the past.

The negotiations conducted throughout the winter months[1] finally took practical shape on April 8, 1904, when an agreement was signed by the two governments. This agreement was made up of three separate conventions - the first dealt with Anglo-French interests in Newfoundland, and West and Central Africa, the second with those in Egypt and Morocco, while a third dealt with those in Siam, Madagascar and the New Hebrides.

The first agreement settled the old Newfoundland dispute. France now renounced her exclusive rights and privileges on the French Shore, and French fishermen were put on an equality with the British in taking fish. In compensation Britain relinquished certain territories in Western Africa. The frontier between the British colony of Gambia and the French Senegambia was modified to give France access to the river Gambia. The frontier between British and French Nigeria was modified so as to give France a more accessible route to Lake Chad. The Los Islands commanding the capital of French Guinea, Konakry,

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1. On January 8, 1904, Lord Lansdowne was given a shock when Monson reported from Paris that Delcassé had not consulted his colleagues in the Cabinet even on the general question of the proposed accord; Newton, op.cit., 287-88. Even as late as March 2, he had not taken the French Colonial Minister into his confidence. This almost incredible omission can be explained only by his extreme anxiety for secrecy, and for his desire to conduct the negotiations himself. So well entrenched in his office did he consider himself to be, he felt sure he could count on his personal prestige and influence to secure ratification; Newton, op. cit., 288-89; Porter, op.cit., 185.

were ceded to France.[1]

Of far greater importance was the Declaration respecting Egypt and Morocco.[2] Here again critical problems were solved satisfactorily by following the general principle underlying the whole agreement, of surrendering claims in one direction in return for compensation elsewhere. Both countries disclaimed any intention of altering the political status of either Egypt or Morocco. France undertook not to interfere in any way with British action in Egypt, nor to demand any time limit to British occupation, recognizing the paramount interests of Britain in that country. In return, Britain, recognizing the paramount interests of France in Morocco, gave France entire liberty to intervene there for the purpose of maintaining peace, and assisting the ruler to carry out necessary administrative, economic, financial and military reforms. Questions concerning the Egyptian debt were so settled as to give the Egyptian government a free hand in the disposal of the funds accumulated by the Caisse de la Dette so long as payment of interest on the debt was assured. French schools were to enjoy the same liberties as formerly, and all rights enjoyed by the French through treaties and customs were to be respected. Freedom of commerce was to be guaranteed for thirty years, and Great Britain promised to insure the freedom of the Suez Canal. In Morocco France agreed on freedom of commerce for thirty years,

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1. Convention between the United Kingdom and France respecting Newfoundland, West and Central Africa, April 8, 1904, B.D., II, 375-384.
2. Declaration between the United Kingdom and France respecting Egypt and Morocco, April 8, 1904, ibid., 385-92.

promised that there should be no fortifications on the northern coast opposite Gibraltar, and undertook to conclude an agreement with Spain whereby the Anglo-French agreement might be fulfilled without encroaching on Spanish interests. In conclusion the two governments agreed "to afford one another diplomatic support in order to obtain the execution of the clauses" of the Declaration.

In the third agreement the two signatories determined their respective zones of influence in Siam by mutual agreement. In Madagascar, Britain recognized the right of France to establish customs against which she had protested since 1896. Finally, the difficulties in the New Hebrides arising from disputes over land titles and the absence of jurisdiction over the natives were referred to a commission.[1]

Along with the articles set forth above, which were made public, Lord Lansdowne and M. Cambon signed secret articles which contemplated an eventual partition of Morocco between France and Spain[2] should the state of Morocco disintegrate. When Spain adhered to the Anglo-French Agreement on October 3, 1904, and declared herself "firmly attached to the integrity of the Moorish empire under the sovereignty of the Sultan," she signed a convention with France which frankly contemplated partition.[3] This latter pact was sent by Cambon to Lansdowne with the request that it be kept secret.[4] The secret articles

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1. Declaration between the United Kingdom and France concerning Siam, Madagascar, and the New Hebrides, April 8, 1904, B.D., II, 396-98.
2. Secret articles of the declaration respecting Egypt and Morocco, B.D., II, pp.392-95.
3. B.D., III, No.59, p.49.
4. Cambon to Lansdowne, October 6, 1904, ibid, No.58, p.48.

of these two treaties were not revealed to the public until 1911.[1]

The Agreement was received most cordially in England, the vast majority of the public and leaders hailing it as a great achievement. In the House of Commons opportunity was taken to express hearty satisfaction. Staunch imperialists criticized it, however, and their papers voiced some protest. But in the main it was regarded as a step to secure general peace by clearing away misunderstandings and differences with the traditional enemy. One of the few leaders to raise his voice against it was Lord Rosebery, who declared, "My mournful and supreme conviction is that this agreement is much more likely to lead to complications than to peace."[2]

In France the general sentiment was decidedly favourable, but there was some strong opposition. The protests came mainly from reactionaries and nationalists who felt that France had been worsted in the deal. It was maintained that France had given more than she had received - the concessions in Africa did not make up for the loss of rights in Newfoundland - England had her positon in Egypt while France had yet

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1. It has been asserted by a German historian, though without proof, that the German government in some official way speedily became informed of these secret articles, and saw in them an evidence of hostile feeling. Gooch endorses this assertion; Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, III, 340. Fay claims that there is no tangible proof that Germany was made aware of these secret dealings; op. cit., I, 164.
2. Cited in Churchill, W.S., The World Crisis, (New York, 1923), I, 15.

to win hers in Morocco. In spite of these protests, the Chamber and the Senate supported M. Delcassé and approved the agreement. One of the fairest estimates of the value of the Entente to the French is found in the Revue des Deux Mondes, May 1, 1904, and the writer's views might well be applied to the English case also. He states:

> "It is impossible for us indeed not to express some regrets with regard to Egypt, and some apprehensions on the subject of Morocco. But this does not alter our judgment on the totality of the arrangements concluded. How could such an agreement be worked out without reciprocal concessions? We have yielded on some points, and some of these are costly. England has yielded also .... Above all the entente is concluded. Nothing henceforth divides us; we can now enter in on a new era where doubtless we have much to forget, but in which we have also much to hope for." (1)

In the light of future events it might be well to note here the attitude of Germany in the matter of the Entente of 1904. As early as March 23, 1904, Delcassé had mentioned informally to Prince Radolin, of the German Embassy in Paris, the negotiations for the proposed Anglo-French agreement. Radolin had informed Bülow of this conversation,[2] the first definite knowledge which Bülow had received of the impending agreement. Aside from this informal notification, and the fact that the public articles were soon after printed in the newspapers, Germany was not officially notified of the text, nor formally consulted about the agreement, which involved in

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1. Charmes, Francis, Chronique de la Quinzaine, Revue des Deux Mondes, May 1, 1904, 239.
2. von Radolin to Bulow, March 23, 1904, Dugdale, op, cit., III, 188 - 90.

a real way her commercial and political interests in Morocco.[1] In spite of these facts the attitude of official Germany was at first friendly. In answer to a question on the subject in the Reichstag on April 12, Bülow cautiously stated that he could hardly say much because the English and French ministers had not explained it publicly. He went on to state:

> "I can only say that we have no cause to imagine that the Treaty has a point against any other Power. It seems to be an attempt to remove a number of differences by peaceful methods. We have nothing from the standpoint of German interests to object to in that. As to Morocco, the kernel of the Treaty, we are interested in the economic aspect. We have commercial interests, which we must and shall protect. We have, however, no ground to fear that they will be overlooked or infringed." (2)

The pan-German party felt Germany to be humiliated by the agreement and gave voice to its protests. The Kaiser, however, expressed no alarm, and on his visit to Kiel in June he informed King Edward that he had no objection to the Treaty, and that Morocco had never interested him.[3] But as events moved forward Germany was not to take just as lightly a view of the Agreement as was inferred in the Chancellor's speech. The next few months were to reveal a dramatic change of front at Berlin, and the forces which were set moving by this change of front were to make Morocco the storm centre of European politics, and this in turn was to react upon Anglo-French relations in a most significant manner.

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1. Fay, op. cit., I, 178.
2. Gooch, op. cit., 350.
3. Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, III, 338.

In this then lies the importance of the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 - England had plunged into the contentious affairs of the Continent. For years the casting vote of England had been the great prize sought by the European Powers, and how she would bestow it, and whether it would be bestowed at all, had been one of the great problems. Now it had been cast in favour of France. True, in the Agreement of 1904 Britain had promised only "diplomatic support" to France in certain specified problems, and there was nothing in the secret articles to enlarge or strengthen that promise. It may well have seemed to the British leaders that in pledging themselves to "diplomatic support" on certain colonial questions that England was paying a small price for ridding herself of the chronic trouble and friction with France. But if the forming of the Entente was an immense achievement, it was not an unalloyed gain. The price of partnership with a Great Power is entanglement in its feuds. The following chapter will show that the casting of the British vote on the side of France was to have serious implications in the future.

CHAPTER III

The Testing of the Entente

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The Anglo-French Agreement within a few short months brought Morocco, a country which hitherto had played a relatively unimportant part in world affairs, to the very forefront of international politics. It was now to rival Alsace-Lorraine as a point of discord between France and Germany, and to react in a very real way upon Anglo-German and Anglo-French relations. To find how this came about will involve a somewhat detailed following of the events of the years 1904, 1905 and 1906.

It has been charged against Germany that her sudden intervention in Moroccan affairs early in 1905 was due to her desire to break up the Dual Alliance, since at that time Russia was engaged in war with Japan, and that she was seeking a pretext to force a war on France, while the Republic would be without the aid of her ally.[1] From a military point of view that prospect was undoubtedly extraordinarily attractive. General von Schlieffen, the Chief of the German General Staff, declared to the Chancellor at this time that Russia could not possibly carry on two large wars, and at the same time added, "If the necessity of a war with France should present itself

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1. Newton, Lord, op. cit., 340. Spender, J.A., Fifty Years of Europe, (London, 1933), 241; Tardieu, André, France and the Alliances, (New York, 1908), 168f.

to us, the present moment would be undoubtedly favourable."[1] In spite of the many who uphold this view, and of circumstances which are pointed to in substantiation of it, there is no evidence in the German documents to prove that the German Government contemplated taking advantage of the situation.[2]

It has been frequently maintained also that Germany was influenced by a keen desire to weaken the Anglo-French Entente - that she was motivated by the desire to drive a wedge between England and France.[3] Just to what extent this influenced German action is not easy to decide. But this assumption also seems to have little foundation in fact.[4]

The real reason for the sudden intervention in Morocco would seem to have been largely one of prestige, combined with the desire to safeguard the interests of Germany in Morocco.[5] Fearing that France might, as in Tunis, take into her

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1. Schlieffen to Bülow, April 20, 1904, cited in Brandenburg, op. cit., 209.
2. Fay, op. cit., I, 185. Dickinson, G.L., The International Anarchy, (London, 1926), 125; Brandenburg, op. cit., 209.
3. Seymour, Charles, The Diplomatic Background of the Great War, (New York, 1916), 168-74; Grey, Sir Edward, Twenty-Five Years, (London,1925) I, 54; Lee, op.cit., II, 537. Spender, op. cit., 235.
4. Ewart, J.S., Roots and Causes of the War, (New York,1932), II, 751; Fabre-Luce, Alfred, La Victoire, (Paris,1924),118. Bourgeois, E., et Pagès, G., Les Origenes et les Responsabilités de la Grande Guerre, (Paris, 1922),307-09.
5. "Germany," Bülow had written on June 3, 1904," must object to the control over Morocco that France has in view, not only for material reasons, but even more for considerations of prestige." Note to Holstein, cited in Renouvin, P., How the War Came, Foreign Affairs, VII, April, 1929, p.387.

hands all the administrative machinery of the government and put Morocco under her political and economic domination, and this in spite of very real German interests, Germany decided to act. There can be no doubt that Germany had a good case for complaint against the French action, as shall be shown shortly. The difficulty was that in spite of her legal justification the policy which she adopted to defend her case lacked finesse. Her methods were blundering and her claims were asserted in a blustering and arrogant manner. Her crude diplomacy and the amount of violence she expended in the handling of her case aroused such resentment and fears that she defeated her own purpose.[1]

In claiming a voice in the settlement of Moroccan affairs in 1905, Germany could rightfully point to substantial economic interests there.[2] An equally important point, and one on which she based the legality of her claims, was that in 1880 she had been one of the Signatory Powers to the Madrid Convention. This Treaty had been signed by twelve of the Powers who met with the Sultan's representative to determine the rights of foreigners in Morocco. In 1890 she had signed a commercial treaty with Morocco in which it was declared "that the subjects of the two parties will have the same rights and advantages as those which exist, or may come to exist, as regards subjects of the most favoured nation."[3] Clearly Germany

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1. Trevelyan, G.M., Grey of Fallodon, (London, 1937), 125.
2. Ewart, op. cit., II, 755-57; Barclay, op. cit., 276.
3. Cited in Ewart, op. cit., II, 757.

had a strong case when she asked to be considered in Moroccan affairs.

From time to time after 1890 Germany had displayed her interest in Morocco. In 1899 the German ambassador and Lord Salisbury had exchanged views on the future of Morocco.[1] When the Kaiser made his visit to England in 1899 Chamberlain put forward the suggestion of a possible partition between England and Germany, but this came to nothing.[2] In 1900 Bülow had stated that Germany had interests in Morocco and that as a result she could not be indifferent to the future of that country.[3] Again, in 1901 when Chamberlain was proposing a possible agreement between England and Germany he favoured as a first step a secret agreement between the two countries with reference to Morocco.[4] Though nothing came of these proposals they do show that Morocco did have a place in German diplomacy.

In spite of these very real German interests France had chosen to disregard Germany in carrying out her Moroccan policy. As M. René Millet has said in criticizing this grave blunder in French policy, "With incredible blindness the Government took precautions with everybody except the only one of its neighbours whom it had serious cause to fear."[5]

1. B.D., II, No.307, pp.256-57.
2. Brandenburg, op. cit., 146.
3. Anderson, E.N., The First MoroccanCrisis,(Chicago, 1930)64.
4. Supra 27.
5. Cited in Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, op. cit.,III,340; Report of the Belgian Minister in London, June 8, 1905, Morel, E.D., Diplomacy Revealed, (London, 1921) 12.

By a treaty with Italy in 1900 France removed Italian opposition by promising to allow her a free hand in Tripoli.[1] Negotiations with Spain failed in 1902 owing to a change in the government, but after the success of the Anglo-French Entente of April 1904, which assured France of British support in Morocco, an accord was made with Spain, as has been shown, on October 3 of that year.[2] France did not attempt to assure herself of German support or acquiescence of her Moroccan plans, nor did she, according to diplomatic usage, give official notification to the German Government of the Franco-British Declaration referred to above.[3] She chose to ignore Germany, and assured of British, Italian, and Spanish support, proceeded to carry out her own plans.

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1. Ewart, op. cit., II, 761-62.
2. Supra. 51
3. Bülow to the German ambassador in Paris, May 1, 1905: "It was conformable to international usage that France after the conclusion of the Anglo-French Accord concerning Morocco, should communicate this Accord in the customary form to all the interested parties. M. Delcassé has declared, it is true, that this communication had become superfluous by the fact of the publication of the convention in the French Journal officiel. The Minister will not omit to notice however, that these two methods of notification possess a character essentially different. The direct communication is not a simple act of courtesy. The French Government, in deciding to make it, would have declared itself ready to enter into discussion with the persons to whom it is delivered with reference to their interests, in case they estimated them to be affected. Publication in a French official paper, on the contrary, places the other persons interested who have not been interrogated in the presence simply of an accomplished fact." (Cited in Ewart, op. cit., II, 770;).

The Chancellor's Reichstag speech on April 12, 1904, was only a temporary acquiescence in the Anglo-French Agreement, and an invitation to France and Britain to consult Germany over Morocco. The German Government in truth liked that Accord less than the German people, even though it knew nothing of the secret articles. Bülow, who publicly proclaimed that the agreement placed Germany in no actual danger, admitted that "doubtlessly both Powers (France and Great Britain) win in international influence and in freedom of movement by this accord and by their rapprochement, and that the drawing force of the Anglo-French Entente on Italy will also be strengthened."[1] The prospective loss of Morocco to Germany, and the general dissatisfaction in Germany over the conduct of foreign affairs, accentuated Bülow's ill-will towards the agreement.

To manifest its dissatisfaction at being excluded from the Moroccan settlement and to force M. Delcassé to come to an agreement with Germany on that question, the German Government first considered in April the project of dispatching a warship to Tangier, ostensibly to settle certain grievances which Germany held against Morocco at the time.[2] The proposal was not acted upon at the time however. On May 21, the German Foreign Office telegraphed to Mentzingen that "since a forceful action could be easily misunderstood and lead to erroneous

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1. Bülow to William II, April 20, 1904; cited in Anderson, op. cit., 143.
2. Dr. Genthe, a German resident in Morocco, had been recently murdered by natives; a native employee of a German firm had been illegally imprisoned; and certain indemnities from the Moroccan Government had to be collected. See also Dugdale, op. cit., III, 219.

conclusions about Germany policy" the ship would not be sent.[1] It is regretable that similar foresight was not adopted in the spring of 1905.

Bülow, however, had not made up his mind to relinquish German ambitions in Morocco; he was determined to share in the settlement of Moroccan affairs. In spite of the fact that the Kaiser himself had little interest in Morocco, and had disclaimed in a conversation with the King of Spain at Vigo on March 16, 1904, any interest in territorial acquisitions, but only in the maintainance of the "open door," Bülow held other views. It is only fair to say of the Kaiser that in these days he played no great part in determining German Moroccan policy; the motive force behind it was Bülow.

Late in April, 1904, Bülow seized the opportunity to intervene in Moroccan affairs through Spain, with whose Government France was then negotiating for the later agreement. He gave every encouragement to Spain in order that she might receive better terms from the more powerful France.[2] But it was soon seen that Germany could derive little profit from the Franco-Spanish negotiations.

German grievances against Morocco meanwhile remained unsettled. German trading firms were demanding protection against monopolistic actions of the French. In June France had practically gained control of the Sultan's finances.

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1. Anderson, op. cit., 148.
2. Ibid., 152-53; Lansdowne to Lascelles, June 1, 1904, B.D., III, No.61, p.53. Renouvin, Pierre, La Crise Européenne et la Grande Guerre, (Paris, 1934), 70.

Nor had M. Delcassé up to this time shown any inclination to open up negotiations with Germany.

Already disgruntled at the French foreign minister, the German Government now came to feel itself slighted and humiliated by this disregard. Its resistance towards his policy came to be concentrated upon the one grievance which could be best upheld in the eyes of the public, that France was infringing upon German economic interests in Morocco. It therefore began to adopt a more active policy.

On June 3, the Belgian minister at Berlin informed the German Foreign Office that he suspected that there were secret articles in the Anglo-French Accord concerning the Rhenish frontier. Count Metternich, although he believed the Agreement did contain secret articles concerning Egypt, doubted the suspicions of the Belgian minister, but mentioned the rumor to Lord Lansdowne on June 19. The latter assured him that the Accord contained no articles which concerned European complications.[1] Nevertheless, Bülow realized that any attempt of Germany to interfere in the Moroccan question would lead to far-reaching consequences, and would need caution; for this reason he sought to learn how the British Government regarded its obligations to France with respect to Morocco.

With this in mind, Metternich discussed the question of Morocco with Lord Lansdowne on August 15. Expressing fears of French monopolization in Morocco, he asked Lord Lansdowne, in view of the danger to German economic interests, how the British Government would interpret Article IV of the Anglo-French

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1. Anderson, op. cit., 155.

Agreement, which article stated that the concessions for roads, railways, ports, etc., were to be granted "only on such condition as will maintain intact the authority of the State over these great undertakings of public interest." He wished also to know how Article IX pledging Great Britain to lend diplomatic support to France would be interpreted.

Lord Lansdowne cautiously stated that he did not wish to express an opinion upon Article IX in a purely hypothetical case. He went on to say:

> "We made no attempt to dispose of the rights of other Powers, although we made certain concessions in respect of the rights and opportunities to which we were ourselves entitled. I could at any rate say that it was not at all probable that, if any Third Power were to have occasion to uphold its treaty rights, we should use our influence in derogation of them." (1)

Metternich inferred from this interview that the British Government would limit the scope of Article IX, and that in case Germany's actions did not infringe upon the Sultan's authority Germany would be quite safe in opposing France in Morocco. He reported, however, that Great Britain would oppose Germany seeking control of a harbour there, and warned his government that if a third Power should dispute politically the French position that both the English people and the government would support France. Within these limits Germany might carry out her Moroccan policy.[2]

Just previous to receiving this reply Bülow had proposed dispatching an ultimatum to the Sultan, demanding under threat of a naval demonstration that the outstanding

1. Lansdowne to Lascelles, August 15,1904,B.D., III, No.62.
2. Anderson, op. cit., 156-7.

German claims be satisfied within three months. The Emperor, who remained steadily opposed to active interference in the Sherifian Empire, refused his consent to the plan, and nothing was done.

But while no German action was taken during these months, feeling continued to smolder. The non-committal communications from the French Government with regard to the Franco-Spanish agreement in October, along within the repeated petitions from German firms for defense of their interests augmented the bitterness against France. By the end of the year the Morocco question was still very much alive. As the American vice-consul remarked to a leading Moor, "Germany has not yet spoken, and until then we cannot believe that anything definite has been decided."[1]

Soon afterwards Germany put to one side her grievances with the Sultan and his government, and began to assume an attitude of friendliness. She began to encourage the Sultan to resist the "Tunisification" programme which Delcassé and the French Government were believed to be forcing on Morocco. On February 11, 1905, the French chargé at Tangier reported to Delcassé an ominous communication received from Kuhlmann, the German ambassador, in which the latter stated,

> After the Anglo-French arrangement of 1904 we supposed the French Government was waiting for the Franco-Spanish agreement before putting us in possession of the new situation. But now that everything is settled, we see that we have been systematically kept aloof. The Chancellor tells me that the German Government

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1. Cited in Fay, op. cit., I, 181.

> was ignorant of all the agreements concerning Morocco, and does not acknowledge himself bound to them in any way. (1)

Delcassé complained to Berlin of this language, and reminded the German Government that he had answered Prince Radolin's enquiries of March 23, 1904, and stated that Berlin had asked for no explanations of the Agreement. The German Under-Secretary, von Muhlberg, who received the complaint, replied that he knew nothing of Kuhlmann's declaration, but added that Germany was not bound by the Anglo-French or the Franco-Spanish treaties.[2]

France meanwhile had been proceeding with her policies in Morocco. On January 11, 1905, the French minister at Tangier, M. Saint-René Taillandier, had been ordered to Fez, the Moroccan capital, to lay before the Sultan a programme of reforms consisting of a military programme and a list of rigorous demands dealing with finances, tariffs and concessions for public works, in all of which France was to act as a general adviser, instructor and regulator. It has been alleged that the French Ambassador, in carrying out his mission, sought to produce the impression that he was acting on behalf of all the Great Powers in reorganizing the military and civil government of Morocco.[3] Germany was now convinced that very soon her

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1. Gooch, G.P., History of Modern Europe, (London, 1923),351. Debidour, A., Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe,(Paris,1920), II,15. Paléologue, M., Un Grand Tournant de la Politique Mondiale,(Paris,1934), 238-39.
2. Gooch, op. cit., 351; Paléologue, op. cit., 242.
3. Delcassé denied this charge; Ewart, op. cit., II, 768. It was denied also by Taillandier, himself; Debidour, op. cit., II, 18; also in Bérard, Victor, Le Livre Jaune Sur Maroc, La Revue de Paris, January 1,1906, 210.

economic activities in Morocco would be at an end if the French obtained their demands.

Accordingly, Dr. Vassel was sent to Fez to inform the Sultan that Germany had not given her consent to the French programme. Bülow was careful to warn his agent, however, not to encourage the Sultan to expect German support in a war with France,[1] but yet the Sultan was to be encouraged to resist the French demands. The Sultan decided to call together an Assembly of Notables to examine what steps should be taken. Kuhlmann approved this step as a "skilful anti-French move."[2]

In order to strengthen his hand against France, Bülow sought to win the support of President Roosevelt in the Moroccan question. As Germany and United States had cooperated cordially in preserving the "open door" in China, Bülow endeavoured to extend this effort to Morocco, and to win the United States to his side against France and Britain. On February 25 he invited Roosevelt to unite with Germany in advising the Sultan that the calling of the Notables was a correct move in fortifying his government and in inaugurating reforms. Although not interested in Morocco, the President agreed to instruct the American representative in Tangier to keep in close touch with his German colleague. This answer satisfied the German Government, for they now felt assured of Roosevelt's moral support.[3]

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1. Fay, op. cit., I, 183.
2. Ibid., 182.
3. Anderson, op. cit., 185.

On March 10 a note was sent to the Sultan stating, that although the German Government realized that his country must be reorganized, Germany

> hopes that the rumours of a prospective change in existing conditions in Morocco - equal rights and freedom for all nations - are unfounded; Germany would disapprove of such a change. Germany and the United States are favourably inclined towards the maintenance of the present conditions ..... the attitude of the other Powers is not definitely known. (1)

Germany here showed her strong disapproval of the whole French action, and sought to augment Moroccan resistance without committing herself to any definite policy.

When speaking in the Reichstag on March 15, the Chancellor intimated that Germany intended taking steps to defend her Moroccan interests. He stated:

> I understand entirely the attitude which is given here to events in and around Morocco. I regard it as a duty of the German Government to see that .... our economic interests in Morocco are not injured. (2)

At this same time a most dramatic coup was being planned. Holstein has been charged as the moving spirit behind this,[3] but in his memoirs Bülow takes unto himself the full responsibility.[4] In the spring of 1905 the Kaiser was planning a trip in the Mediterranean, and it was now suggested that he use the opportunity to land at Tangier to visit the Sultan. The Kaiser, in keeping with his past policy with regard to

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1. Anderson, op. cit., 185.
2. Ibid., 186.
3. Brandenburg, op. cit., 220; Paléologue, op. cit., 289, Hamman, Otto, The World Policy of Germany, 1890-1912, (London, 1927), 149.
4. Bülow, Prince von, Memoirs,(London,1931),II,107. Debidour blames the Kaiser; op. cit., II, 17.

Morocco, had small inclination for this undertaking,[1] but was persuaded by Bülow to agree. In order to prevent the ruler changing his mind the Chancellor had the newspapers announce the forthcoming visit. In answer to objections of the Kaiser, he wrote the same day, "Your Majesty's visit to Tangier will embarrass M. Delcassé, traverse his schemes, and further our business interests in Morocco."[2] A few days later he wrote; "For apart from the fact that the systematic exclusion of all non-French merchants and promoters from Morocco according to the example of Tunis would signify an important economic loss for Germany, it is also a want of appreciation of our power when M. Delcassé has not considered it worth the effort to negotiate with Germany over his Moroccan plans. M. Delcassé has completely ignored us in this affair."[3]

The Emperor had agreed to the plan, but when he learned from the newspapers that the Tangier population was planning to exploit his visit against the French, he wrote to Bülow; "Telegraph at once to Tangier that it is most doubtful whether I land, and that I am only travelling incognito as a tourist; therefore no audiences, no receptions."[4] The Chancellor, however, pointed out that a public announcement of the visit had already been made, and if it was now given up it might appear that the plans had been changed owing to pressure from

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1. Bülow, op. cit., II, 106.
2. Bülow to the Emperor, March 20, 1905, Dugdale, op. cit., III, 223.
3. Cited in Anderson, op. cit., 187.
4. Cited in Fay, op. cit., I, 183.

France. William again consented, though at Lisbon, and even at the last moment in the harbour at Tangier, he hesitated once more.[1] But he finally yielded and carried out the programme others had arranged for him. It was on March 31 he landed to play his dramatic role. The object of the visit had been previously explained in the Reichstag by Bulow on March 29, when he declared:

> A year ago the Kaiser told the King of Spain that Germany does not strive for territory in Morocco. It is therefore useless to attribute to the Tangier visit any selfish purpose directed against its integrity or independence. No one who does not pursue an aggressive goal can find cause for apprehension. We have economic interests, and in Morocco, as in China, it is to our interests to keep the open door. (2)

On the Kaiser's arrival at Tangier there was a reception of the foreign diplomats at which the French chargé d'affaires unexpectedly made a speech as if he were welcoming the Kaiser to Morocco in the name of France, stating that his government had no thought of infringing upon the economic equality of other nations. The Kaiser replied somewhat brusquely that he would deal directly with the Sultan as a ruler of an independent country and would secure satisfaction for his own just claims, and expected that these would be respected also by France.[3]

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1. Schoen to the German Foreign Office, March 31,1905, Dugdale, op.cit.,III,224. Ludwig,op.cit.,286-87.
2. Cited in Gooch, op. cit., 352.
3. Brandenburg, op.cit.,221; Anderson,op.cit.,194. See also Newton, op. cit., 332-33, who relates a conversation which the Kaiser had with Prince Louis of Battenburg on April 1 in which he unbosomed himself freely on the subject of his visit in his well-known style. This conversation was later reported to Lansdowne by King Edward. The Kaiser said: "I went to Tangier for the

In an address to the German colony he said,

> "I am happy to salute the devoted pioneers of German industry and commerce who aid me in my task of maintaining the interests of the Fatherland in a free country. The Empire has great and growing interests in Morocco. Commerce can only progress if all the Powers are considered to have equal rights under the sovereignty of the Sultan, and compatible with the independence of the country. My visit is a recognition of this independence." (1)

The theme of this address was further developed in a speech delivered to the Sultan's uncle and Plenipotentiary.

> "My visit is to show my resolve to do all in my power to safeguard German interests in Morocco. Considering the Sultan as absolutely free, I wish to discuss with him the means to secure these interests. As for the reforms he contemplates it seems to me he should proceed with great caution." (2)

The Kaiser's visit and his speeches at Tangier created a sensation throughout Europe. What did Germany mean by this theatrical step? The real object of the visit was for the public at large shrouded in mystery, and this very naturally gave rise to the wildest of rumors. Bülow, himself, contributed to this by his instructions to the Foreign Office on March 24 to give out no explanations whatsoever to foreign diplomats should they make inquiries, but to "play the Sphinx."[3] It was most commonly held in Paris and in London that Germany

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express purpose of telling the French minister what my views were. I said, 'I know nothing of any agreement between France and Morocco. For me, the Sultan is an independent sovereign. I am determined not to have a repetition of what happened in Tunis .... When the minister tried to argue with me I said, "Good morning," and left him standing.'" Lee, op. cit., II, 340 - Paléologue mentions this conversation, 279.

1. Cited in Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, III, 339.
2. Ibid, 339.
3. Brandenburg, op. cit., 222.

was seeking a quarrel with France, or was endeavouring to destroy the Entente.[1]

As has been mentioned above, there is no evidence to show that Germany was seeking such ends. The purpose of the German leaders seems to have been to uphold German prestige, to show that Germany was not willing to be left out where her interests were concerned, to check French pentration in Morocco until Germany's consent had been obtained or bought by means of concessions elsewhere. The French press had spoken openly of setting up a second Tunis in Morocco,[2] and certainly French policy seemed to be tending in that direction. Germany believed, and not without reason, that unless she entered an emphatic protest, Morocco would be entirely lost to France. It is important to realize that Delcassé had not purchased Germany's assent to French policy. He had assured himself of the goodwill of Italy, Spain, and Great Britain, but he had totally disregarded Germany as a factor in Moroccan affairs, despite her great economic interests there and her signing of the Madrid Treaty, and despite the fact that of all Powers her pride was most sensitive.[3]

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1. Ewart, op. cit., 774, Supra. 57.
2. Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, op. cit., III, 339.
3. Mr. G.P. Gooch censures Great Britain for her part in disregarding German interests. He states: "It is regrettable that the British cabinet did not perceive - or at any rate did not help France to perceive - the wisdom of securing German consent by a "solatium." Though the Secret Treaties of 1904 reserved no share for Great Britain in the contingent partition of Morocco, and though it has been argued that it was reasonable for the contracting parties to make alternative arrangements in the event of Morocco collapsing from internal weakness, our share in a transaction which suggested double-dealing involves the British Government in partial responsibility for the crises of 1905 and 1911." Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, op. cit., III, 340.

Though the Tangier visit was to bring about many unexpected and unhappy results it did have the desired result for Germany of making France aware that she could no longer disregard the Empire in Morocco. On March 31, the day of the Kaiser's landing, Delcassé declared in the Senate:

> Nothing in our Moroccan policy, nothing in our execution of the accords of April 8, and October 3, 1904, can explain the movements of the German press .... You may legitemately hope that in the western basin of the Mediterranean .... France will succeed, without ignoring any right, without injuring any interest, in assuring her future. (1)

At the same time he instructed M. Saint-René Taillandier, who was still carrying on his negotiations with the Sultan, to warn the monarch against following the proposals put forward in the German press for an international conference to discuss Moroccan affairs.[2] He felt it was wise also to now open up negotiations with Berlin for an understanding with regard to Morocco, and he made efforts to approach indirectly the German Government with this end in view. On April 7 he stated publicly in the French Chamber that "France was ready to dissipate any misunderstandings which .... may still exist."[3] On April 13, while dining at the German Embassy, he repeated this offer to Prince Radolin, and discussed with him French policy in Morocco, pointing out that freedom of commerce for all nations was safeguarded in the agreements made with England and Spain.[4] Immediately after, the

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1. Cited in Anderson, op. cit., 198.
2. Ibid., 198.
3. Ibid., 199.
4. Ibid., 199; Paléologue, op. cit., 290-91.

British Government was asked "to help convince the Emperor that German interests were in no way threatened"[1] in Morocco.

M. Delcassé was greatly handicapped in carrying out his policies at this time because he did not have the loyal support of either the public or of his government.[2] The fear that he had blundered and aroused German enmity, the fear of complications with might result, along with political jealousy, aroused by his long tenure of office and a dislike of his secretiveness, all combined against him. He was attacked by all parties as well as his colleagues; hardly a voice was raised in his support. On April 22 he offered his resignation, but reconsidered it on the appeals of President Loubet[3] and Paul Cambon who was in Paris. M. Rouvier half-heartedly supported the foreign minister, but assured the Chamber that in future he would personally supervise foreign affairs.[4] Thus public opinion forced an almost complete surrender in the face of a German menace. It remained, however, to be seen how far France would yield before her desire for peace would conflict with her national honour.

If the Kaiser's dramatic assertions at Tangier had forced France to reconsider her Moroccan policy, they also forced

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1. Lansdowne to Lascelles, April 27,1905;B.D.,III,No.80,p.67, Note (1). See also No.90,p.73, editor's note.
2. Hale, O.J., Germany and the Diplomatic Revolution, (Philadelphia, 1931), Chapter V. Paléologue, op.cit., 293, 296; Porter,C.W.,The Career of Théophile Delcassé, (Philadelphia, 1936), 232-33.
3. Paléologue, op. cit., 300; Porter, op. cit., 239-40.
4. Porter, op. cit., 239.

Germany now to take positive action in that question. As Holstein said, "a retreat would stand on the same level with Olmutz and cause Fashoda to be forgotten."[1] Bülow had now decided on the following policy: to continue denying any territorial ambitions in Morocco, to demand economic equality for all nations, to insist upon an international conference like that at Madrid in 1880 to discuss the whole question of Moroccan reform.[2] No separate negotiations with France would be considered.

Had German policy with regard to Morocco not been so widely proclaimed to the world at Tangier, and in so theatrical a fashion, there is little doubt that the German Government could have obtained compensations from France and settled outstanding differences with the Republic. Delcassé was willing to settle such differences,[3] and Rouvier was later to offer proposals to this effect. Germany, however, insisted always on the conference as the best means of settling the question. Bulow did not doubt that the proposal for a conference would be accepted, and that the conference on meeting would refuse to turn Morocco over to France. Writing to the Kaiser on April 14, he said:

> In case a conference meets, we are already certain of the diplomatic support of America in favour of the open door .... Austria will not quarrel with us over Morocco .... Russia is busy with herself ....

1. Anderson, op. cit., 202.
2. Bülow to the Emperor, April 4, 1905, Dugdale, op.cit., III, 224.
3. Supra 73; Also, Lester to Lansdowne, April 21, 1905, B.D. III, No. 89, p.72; and Bertie to Lansdowne, April 27, 1905. Ibid, No.84, p.68. Renouvin, op.cit., 71.

> The English Government - between Roosevelt and those English groups which think as the "Morning Post," "Manchester Guardian" and Lord Rosebery(1) - will not stir. Spain is of no importance, and also has a strong party in favour of the status quo. We should certainly be able to hold Italy in order .... If France refuses the conference she will put herself in wrong towards all the Signatory Powers (2) and thereby will give England, Spain and Italy a probably welcome excuse to withdraw. (3)

On April 9 it was decided to send Count Tattenbach to Fez to combat the efforts of the French mission under Taillandier, and to win the Sultan's approval of a conference. At the same time, by messages to the Sultan, Bülow sought to prevent him from making any decisions before the Count arrived. Bülow realized that if the French succeeded in gaining the Sultan's acceptance of their proposals for reforms the entire German policy would be frustrated. On April 12, by means of a circular dispatch to the Signatory Powers of the Madrid Treaty, he explained Germany's stand and proposed the reference of the whole question to an international conference.[4]

Meanwhile what was the British reaction to this situation? Both the Government and the public believed that Germany was striking as much at Great Britain as at France in

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1. These three had criticized the Anglo-French accord.
2. Referring to those Powers which had signed the Treaty of Madrid in 1880.
3. Bülow to William II, April 4, 1905, cited in Anderson, op. cit., 203.
4. For this dispatch see Ewart, op. cit., II, 774-75.

in an effort to break the Entente. British feeling was well expressed by King Edward, who wrote indignantly on April 15 to Lord Lansdowne:

> The Tangier incident was the most mischievous and uncalled for event which the German Emperor has ever engaged in since he came to the throne. It was also a theatrical fiasco, and if he thinks he has done himself good in the eyes of the world he is very much mistaken. He is no more or less than a political "enfant terrible," and one can have no faith in any of his assurances. His own pleasure seems to wish to set every country by the ears. (1)

The criticism by Lord Lansdowne was no less severe. In a letter to Lascelles on April 9 he wrote:

> I am afraid that we can hardly regard this Tangier ebullition as an isolated incident. There can be no doubt that the Kaiser was much annoyed by the Anglo-French Agreement, and probably even more so by our refusal to vamp up some agreement of the same kind with Germany over the Egyptian question.
>
> We shall, I have little doubt, find that the Kaiser avails himself of every opportunity to put spokes in our wheels, and convince those who are watching the progress of the game that he means to take an important part in it.
>
> My impression is that the German Government have really no cause for complaint either of us or the French in regard to the Morocco part of the Agreement. We made no secret of its existence. It dealt exclusively with French and British interests in Morocco, and so far as the other Powers were concerned, it provided adequate security for their interests, and for the integrity of Morocco itself. What else does the Kaiser want? (2)

What was considered the threatening attitude of the Kaiser suggested to that ardent spirit, Admiral Fisher, a "golden opportunity" for making war on Germany. In a letter

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1. Lee, op. cit., II, 340.
2. Cited in Newton, op. cit., 334.

to Lord Lansdowne on April 22 he actually undertook that if it came about, "we could have the German Fleet, the Kiel Canal, and Schleswig-Holstein within a fortnight."[1]

The British Government feared for a time that Germany was seeking a port in Morocco, and was very anxious to check the realization of such an objective. On April 22 Lord Lansdowne wrote to Bertie in Paris with regard to this matter:

> It seems to me not unlikely that German Government may ask for a port on the Moorish coast.
>
> You are authorized to inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that we should be prepared to join French Government in offering strong opposition to such a proposal and to beg that if question is raised French Government will afford us a full opportunity of conferring with them as to steps which might be taken to meet it.
>
> German attitude in this dispute seems to me most unreasonable having regard to M. Delcassé's attitude, and we desire to give him all the support we can. (2)

On April 24 Bertie communicated these views of Lord Lansdowne to M. Delcassé, but in his draft of the communication he seems to have gone a little further than did his chief, giving greater emphasis to the offer of British support.

> The British Government finds that the conduct of Germany in the Moroccan question is most unreasonable in view of M. Delcassé's attitude, and it desires to give his Excellency all the support in its power. It seems not improbable that the German Government may ask for a port on the Moroccan coast. In that event the British Government would be willing to join the French Government in offering strong opposition to such a proposal, and it asks M. Delcassé, in case the question is raised, to give the British Government full opportunity to concert with the French Government upon the measures which might be taken to meet that demand. (3)

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1. Cited in Newton, op. cit., 334-5.
2. Lansdowne to Bertie, April 22, 1905, B.D.III,No.90,472-73.
3. Draft by Bertie, April 24,1905,Ibid,No.91,pp.73-74.

M. Delcassé was "very grateful"[1] for this offer of British support. He denied that Germany had made a request for a Moroccan port, but promised to communicate with the British Government if such a request should be made, and to warn the Sultan against making any concessions to Germany. By the offer of support from Britain Delcassé felt encouraged to hold to his policy in spite of Germany's opposition, and in spite of the lack of support from his own people.

He was not supported, however, by his premier, M. Rouvier, who as well as being premier, had assumed a general control over foreign policy since April.[2] M. Rouvier was much more cautious than the daring Delcassé; he was essentially a man of peace, and feared an open conflict with Germany. Offers of British support did little to quiet his fears, since he realized that the British navy "did not have wheels." He now intervened personally in the question to attempt a settlement with Germany. In conversations with Prince Radolin on April 26 and April 28 he stated that the idea of a conference was not acceptable to France. He suggested that if Berlin was willing, the purpose of the proposed conference might be served by sending a French circular note to all the Signatory Powers, and if the majority of those Powers were opposed to French action in Morocco, it would not be carried out. Again and again he endeavoured to learn what concessions Germany would ask for relinquishing her demand for a conference, and showed himself ready to enter into

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1. Bertie to Lansdowne, April 25, 1905, D.D., III, No. 92, p. 74
2. Supra. 74.

a general agreement concerning disputed colonial questions.[1] But since Germany had so widely proclaimed her disinterestedness in Morocco she was not in a position to negotiate for compensations. Moreover, it would have meant now sacrificing the Sultan to the French, after having encouraged him to resist them. Thus Germany was forced to continue travelling along the route on which she had set out.

Meanwhile the German Government had sought the aid of the United States in overcoming the resistance of France and Britain to the holding of the conference. It was felt that the attitude of Britain would be greatly influenced by that of the United States, and therefore Germany asked President Roosevelt on April 5 for his support.[2] On April 25 the German ambassador in Washington again wrote the President, saying that the Emperor would be most grateful if he (Roosevelt) would intimate to England that he would like to see England and

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1. Anderson, op. cit., 218-219; Hamman, op. cit., 166; Brandenburg, op. cit., 223. Ludwig, op. cit., 359. It is significant to note that Bülow and Holstein concealed from William II. M. Rouvier's offers of a direct Franco-German agreement. They doubtless felt that he, who was no very sound supporter of their Moroccan policy, might accept. In this interpretation of his probable attitude they were correct. Some years later when the Kaiser came to learn of M. Rouvier's offers and their rejection by Bülow, he wrote, "If I had been told about this, I should have gone into it thoroughly, and that idiotic conference would never have taken place." See Nicolson, op. cit., 166.
2. Bishop, J.B., Theodore Roosevelt and His Time, (New York, 1920), I, 468. Jusserand, J.J., What Me Befell, (London, 1933), 314-15. We might note in this connection that the United States had signed the Madrid Convention of 1880.

Germany in harmony in their dealing with Morocco."[1]

On May 13 another memorandum was sent to Roosevelt, insisting on the necessity of the conference and complaining of English opposition.[2] Again, on May 31 a third memorandum declared "that England is the only Power which opposes such a conference, though it seems she will drop her objections in case you should participate in the conference."[3]

Roosevelt's attitude can best be gathered from the letter he wrote to Taft, the acting Secretary of State. It contained the following:

> I do not feel that as a Government we should interfere in the Morocco matter. We have other fish to fry, and we have no real interest in Morocco. I do not care to take sides between France and Germany in the matter.
>
> At the same time if I can find out what Germany wants I shall be glad to oblige her if possible, and I am sincerely anxious to bring about a better state of feeling between England and Germany. Each nation is working itself up to a condition of desperate hatred of the other; each from sheer fear of the other. (4)

In a letter to the German ambassador on the same date he reiterated that the United States had no direct interest in Morocco, but offered to serve as a mediator between Germany and Great Britain - "to sound the British Government and find out what its views are."[5]

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1. Bishop, op. cit., I, 469.
2. Ibid., 469.
3. Ibid., 471.
4. Ibid., 472.
5. Ibid., 474.

The British Government proved most unwilling to accept the mediation of the President and assured him through their ambassador that there was no idea in England of attacking Germany or of anticipating a German attack on England.[1] The German Government, however, was encouraged by the attitude of Roosevelt, for it seemed to place the United States on the side of Germany.

Distressed by the German rejections of French offers, and fearful of war, M. Rouvier went a step farther to meet Germany by offering at the end of April to get rid of Delcassé, suggesting that it could be done over some domestic difficulty within the course of the next few weeks.[2] In spite of this offer Germany proved unwilling to effect a direct settlement.

Meanwhile, she was pressing Spain and Italy as well as the United States for support.[3] Then on May 13 Count Tattenbach arrived in Fez to persuade the Sultan to resist the French demands. A few days later he reported that M. Delcassé had instructed the French minister to issue a veiled threat of violence against Morocco should the Sultan agree to a conference.[4] Bulow thereupon warned M. Rouvier against M. Delcassé's "stormy and violent Moroccan policy." Pursuing

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1. Durand to Lansdowne, April 26, 1905, B.D. III, No.82, pp.67-68.
2. Brandenburg, op. cit., 223. Porter, op. cit., p.242. Anderson, op. cit., 219. Bülow to German Foreign Office, May 5, 1905; Dugdale, op. cit., III, 227.
3. Nicolson to Lansdowne, May 5, 1905, B.D., III, No.87, p.70. Egerton to Lansdowne, May 5, 1905. Ibid., No.88, p.71.
4. Anderson, op. cit., 223; Bourgeois et Pagès, op. cit., 309. The French minister, Saint René-Taillandier denies this charge - see his letter to Rouvier, June 15,1905, cited in "Le Livre Jaune Sur Maroc," by Victor Bérard, in the La Revue de Paris, January I, 1906, 212.

this matter still further, the Chancellor instructed Herr von Miquel, councilor in the German Embassy at Paris, to inform M. Rouvier amicably but firmly that Delcassé would have to go, and that Franco-German relations would not improve as long as he remained in office.[1]

On May 28 the Sultan rejected the French proposals and gave his approval to the holding of an international conference to discuss Moroccan affairs. Bulow then warned the French premier that since the Sultan had acquiesced in the matter of German policy Germany would "follow up the consequences if France continued the policy of intimidation and violence hitherto pursued by Delcassé."[2] In this way the German Government was attempting to force the dismissal of the French foreign minister.

But Delcassé, feeling sure of the support of Great Britain and of Russia, held out stubbornly against the proposed conference. To his colleagues, however, this policy seemed fraught with danger. The air was thick with rumours of a German ultimatum, and with talk of French unpreparedness for war. At a meeting of the cabinet on June 6, M. Delcassé,

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1. Anderson, op. cit., 224, Paléologue, op. cit., 350.
2. The "Gaulois" published articles on June 9 and 17, 1905, asserting that Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck had also been sent by the German Government to Paris about June 1 to warn Rouvier that Delcassé must be dismissed. See Bourgeois et Pagès, op. cit., 310; Debidour, op. cit., II, 21; Fabre-Luce, op. cit., 119. Authorities seem to differ greatly on this point. Some doubt the truth of the facts as published by the "Gaulois," and attribute the story to French journalistic imagination. See Fay, op. cit., I, 187, footnote; and Anderson, op. cit., 225, footnote. Hale claims that the words attributed to the Prince were merely opinions and rumours current in Paris from June 6 to 17; op.cit., chapter VI. On the other hand, Porter, the biographer of Delcassé, suggests that the Prince was sent as an

though aware of his isolation, stoutly defended his stand and his policy of the past few years. He claimed that in an exchange of notes with Great Britain he had recently received an assurance of armed support in the event of a German attack. Asserting the possibility of a formal alliance with Great Britain, he urged the acceptance of her offer and the refusal of the idea of a conference. M. Rouvier and his colleagues held, however, that the acceptance of the British offer would mean certain war with Germany, and felt that France should agree to the conference. Delcassé, after warning them that such a weak policy would only encourage German insolence, resigned.[1]

The "British offer," on the strength of which the foreign minister was prepared to risk a Franco-German war, has remained somewhat of a puzzle to historians. In October of 1905 the "Matin" published a series of revelations concerning the fall of Delcassé. These included the assertion, as coming from him, that he had been promised by the British Government, in case of a German attack, that the British fleet would be mobilized to seize the Kiel Canal, and would land one hundred thousand men in Schleswig-Holstein.[2] That such an offer was ever made by, or on behalf of, the British Government was denied at the time by the Foreign Office, and British leaders have always since denied that any offer of an alliance or of

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emissary of the Kaiser without the consent of the German Foreign Office; op. cit., 248-50.

1. Debidour, op. cit., II, 22-24. Paléologue, op. cit., 350-52; Porter, op. cit., 258-60.
2. Porter, op. cit., 262-63.

armed assistance was ever made to France.[1]

In the middle of May, 1905, M. Paul Cambon had complained to Lord Lansdowne of the attitude of the German Government. He stated that M. Delcassé regarded the situation not as "profoundly alarming," but as "sufficiently serious to occasion him much preoccupation." Lansdowne replied that the moral to him seemed to be that each government (of France and of England) should continue to treat the other with the most absolute mutual confidence, that each should keep the other fully informed of everything which came to its knowledge, and should, so far as possible, discuss in advance any contingencies by which in the course of events they should find themselves confronted.[2]

In an effort to avoid misunderstandings Lansdowne and Cambon exchanged notes to verify the above conversation. Cambon, in his note dated May 24, referred to Lansdowne as having said that

> .... if the circumstances demanded it, if for example we had serious reason to expect an unprovoked aggression on the part of a certain Power, the British Government would be ready to concert with the French Government on the measures to be taken. (3)

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1. Asquith, H.H., The Genesis of the War, (London, 1923), 90. See the written assertion of Lord Sanderson, August 17, 1922, in B.D.,III, No.105 (a), p.87, and the comment by Lord Lansdowne, April 4, 1927, No.105 (b), p.87. Lord Newton, the biographer of Lansdowne, states, "there are no traces of any such undertaking in Lord Lansdowne's private papers." op. cit., 343.
2. Lansdowne to Bertie, May 17, 1905, B.D., III, No.94, p.76. D.D.F., 2e s.,VI, No.443, pp.522-23.
3. D.D.F., 2e s, VI, No.455, pp.538-39.

Landsowne, in his note, dated May 25, sought to avoid such a broad commitment, and said it was the British desire

> that there should be full and confidential discussion between the two Governments, not so much in consequence of some acts of unprovoked aggression on the part of another Power, as in anticipation of any complications to be apprehended during the somewhat anxious period through which we are at present passing.[1]

In transmitting this note to Delcassé, Cambon remarked that the wording had been carefully studied by the British Government and had the approval of the Prime Minister, Arthur Balfour, and that it gave recognition of Lansdowne's willingness to discuss in advance measures to be taken in view of every contingency. According to the Ambassador's interpretation Lansdowne intended it to apply not only in the case of an unprovoked aggression, as in the French version, but to every possible contingency. This would mean if France accepted the British proposal, she might be led into a general entente which would be in reality an alliance.[2]

Delcassé and his advisers in the diplomatic service seem to have given this broad interpretation to Lansdowne's note.[3] Having received the British message and the comments of Cambon on May 30, Delcassé at once telegraphed to the latter:

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1. B.D.III, No.95, p.77; D.D.F. 2^{e}s.VI, No.465,pp.558-559.
2. D.D.F. 2^{e}s, VI,No.415, pp.557-558; Paléologue,op.cit.,p.346.
3. Maurois, op. cit., 176; Paléologue, op. cit., 352; Barrère, Camille, La Chute da Delcassé, Revue des Deux Mondes, August 1, 1932, 616.

> Say to Lord Lansdowne that I am also of the opinion that the two Governments should more than ever give each other their entire confidence and that I am ready to examine with him all aspects of a situation which does not fail to be a little disquieting." (1)

More than this had not been promised at the time. On June 12 however, Lascelles, in Berlin, informed Lord Lansdowne that Bulow had mentioned that the German Government had received information to the effect that Britain had made an offer of a defensive and offensive alliance to France. He reported to Lansdowne that he had told the Chancellor that he, personally, knew nothing of such an offer, and that he greatly doubted if any such offer had been made. To this, the Chancellor had replied, that although his information was not official, it was of such a nature that he could not doubt its accuracy.[2] On the same date, in another dispatch, Lascelles informed his chief that Holstein had mentioned the same matter to him.[3]

On receipt of this news Lansdowne sent for the German ambassador in London, Count Metternich, and told him that he could scarcely believe that the suggestion of such an alliance was seriously made, or that that the story was worth contradicting. If, however, he stated, the ambassador thought that a contradiction would serve a useful purpose, he was glad to assure him that no such an alliance had been offered or discussed by either

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1. D.D.F., 2 s., VI, No.470,pp.563-64; minute by Nicolson, April 15, 1912, B.D., VI, No.576, pp.747-48.
2. Lascelles to Lansdowne,June 12,1905, B.D.III,No.97,pp.79-80.
3. Ibid., No.98, pp.80-81.

England or France.[1]

Thus it would seem from the evidence outlined above that no alliance was contracted. But there can be little doubt that Delcassé seems to have been encouraged by the friendly British attitude. He seems to have erred in interpreting Lansdowne's friendly attitude as an assurance of a British alliance and armed support.[2] It has been suggested that his mistakenly wide interpretation in this matter may be explained by the probability that King Edward, while on a visit to Paris, intimated to him that in case of need Britain would intervene on the French side.[3] It has been offered also as an explanation that the suggestion of armed support came from Sir Francis Bertie, who was certainly strongly pro-French in his sympathies.[4] Mr. Fay suggests that the idea of landing one hundred thousand men in Schleswig-Holstein originated perhaps with Sir John Fisher, for it was the kind of strategy he had often urged and commended.[5] It is quite clear, however,

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1. Lansdowne to Lascelles, June 16, 1905, B.D. III, No.99, p.82
2. Swain, J.W., Beginning the Twentieth Century (New York, 1933), gives an interesting analysis of how Delcassé possibly made his error; 271.
3. Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, op. cit., III, 343, footnote. King Edward had visited Paris on April 29, and on April 30 and May 3 he talked with M. Delcassé. Lee, op. cit., II, 342; Paléologue, op. cit., 315.
4. Dickinson, op. cit., 229.
5. Fay, op. cit., I, 198. This view is supported also in Wingfield-Stratford, Esme, Victorian Aftermath, (London, 1933), 228.

that Delcassé greatly exaggerated the nature of Lansdowne's offers, whatever may have been the assurances received from other English proposals, in order to persuade his hesitating colleagues to stand firm against Germany.[1]

There was keen disappointment in England over the fall of the French foreign minister. Lord Lansdowne wrote to Bertie on June 12:

> Delcassé's resignation, has, as you may well suppose, produced a very painful impression here. What people say is that if one of our ministers had had a dead set made at him by a foreign Power, the country and the Government would not only have stood by him, but probably have supported him more vigorously than ever, whereas France has apparently thrown Delcassé overboard in a panic. Of course the result is that the Entente is quoted at a much lower price than it was a fortnight ago. (2)

In a letter to a friend he wrote in a similar vein when he said, "The fall of Delcassé is disgusting, and has sent the Entente down any number of points in the market."[3] Mr. Balfour, expressed the same view when writing to the King:

> Delcassé's dismissal or resignation under pressure from the German Government displayed a weakness on the part of France which indicated that she could not be counted on as an effective force in international politics. She could no longer be trusted not to yield to threats at the critical moment of a negotiation. (4)

As Lord Newton says, it was one of the most humiliating incidents that had occurred in France for many years,[5] and since it was commonly believed in England that France had suffered this humiliation for having ventured to make friends with England,

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1. Fay, op. cit., I, 199.
2. Lansdowne to Bertie, July 12,1905,B.D.,III,No.152,p.119; Newton, op. cit., 341.
3. Newton, op. cit., 341.
4. Maurois, André, King Edward and His Times,(London,1933),178.
5. Newton, op. cit., 342.

it was only to a lesser degree held to be a blow at England. Thus, while at the time the fall of Delcassé seemed a triumph for the German Government, the incident produced results quite unforeseen - it made the Anglo-French Agreement closer and deeper.

M. Delcassé's biographer has pointed out in this connection that it quickly became apparent that the important policies of the fallen minister were in no way materially affected by his resignation. The policy of the entente was sound, and rested upon the common interests of the Entente Powers, and this system was maintained. Furthermore, although Germany got rid of Delcassé, she did not get rid of the permanent staff of the Quai d'Orsay. Paléologue, a sincere admirer of Delcassé's diplomacy remained there, and the foreign diplomats who shared his views were not removed. M. Barrère said to his British colleague in Rome on June 13, 1905:

> .... that the leaders of French diplomacy, the two Cambons, Jusserand, and himself, were firmly united in sympathy for the policy of their late Chief and considered that there was no cause for alarm; the French position was a sound one in harmony with England and others. (1)

This was made particularly clear when Germany made the blunder of insisting that the humiliation of France should be complete. Had she been content to stop when the fall of Delcassé was brought about, and taken advantage of that moment to conciliate M. Rouvier, she might have arrested the development of the Entente at that point, and thus limited it to the friendly colonial agreement which its authors intended it to be. But

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1. Egerton to Lansdowne, June 13, 1905, B.D., III, No.122, p. 95.

the German diplomats wished to take all the tricks in the game; as in so many cases they failed to seize the favourable moment. Before the end of the year the continuance of German pressure and threats had thrown France and Great Britain closer together, and given the Entente the weight and significance it was to hold until the outbreak of the Great War.

The fall of Delcassé[1] might be taken to mark the close of the first stage of the Morocco Crisis of 1905-1906. Germany had thus far gained her objectives - the Sultan had accepted the plan of a Conference, and M. Delcassé's fall had been secured. But so many complications had been aroused that the crisis continued just as acutely after that event as before. M. Delcassé's resignation did not relieve the tension as M. Rouvier had hoped.[2] There followed weeks of difficult negotiations with Germany before the two governments could agree on a formula establishing a basis on which the conference should meet. On June 11 M. Rouvier explained his position to the German ambassador as follows:

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1. The views of Lord Bertie on the fall of Delcasse are of interest. He says, "Delcassé would have fallen even if Germany had not been menacing, but he might not have fallen so soon. His elimination from the Cabinet was in great part due to his treatment of his colleagues. He did not keep them informed of what he did and proposed to do. He had got to consider himself indispensable .... Several of his chers collègues disliked him and it ended in his being put aside. The German Government took advantage of the feeling that a scapegoat should be found. They spent money and spread about that Delcassé's mismanagement was the sole cause of the misunderstanding, and they so assisted in bringing about his fall." Bertie to Lansdowne, June 15,1905,Newton, op. cit., p.341.
2. Lansdowne to Bertie,July 12,1905,B.D.,III,No.152, p.119 Paléologue, op. cit., 359-360.

> I dislike a conference, but if I accept there must be a preliminary understanding. Yet if that is secured a conference is needless. We have no interest in infringing the sovereignty or integrity of Morocco, but our common frontier of 1,200 kilometres makes us the party most concerned in law and order. You seem resolved to block all our proposals, and we cannot accept a conference where that would happen. We must therefore, first know how Germany regards reforms. (1)

Germany insisted on the other hand that she could discuss the programme only when France agreed to accept the conference.[2]

Meanwhile Britain supported the French stand most vigorously - Rouvier was assured of the entire support of the British Government. On June 16 Lansdowne remarked to Paul Cambon, who was leaving London for Paris to advise M. Rouvier, that he saw nothing to be gained

> by admitting the theoretical necessity of a Conference; except perhaps to enable Germany which had brought about M. Delcassé's downfall, to secure a further success. Our attitude must of course depend upon that of the French Government, but if they maintained their refusal, so most certainly should we. (3)

Without accepting or rejecting the idea of a conference M. Rouvier endeavoured to dissipate all misunderstandings with Germany, and invited the latter to negotiate further in order to make unnecessary the proposed gathering.[4] The German reaction was exceedingly hostile; the Government did not hesitate to use

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1. Cited in Gooch, op. cit., 357-58; Paléologue, op. cit.,359-60.
2. Paléologue, op. cit., 365
3. Lansdowne to Bertie, June 16, 1905, B.D.,III, No.124, p.97.
4. Gooch, op. cit., p.358. See Victor Bérard, Livre Jaune Sur Maroc, loc. cit., 213-214.

threats to bring France to terms. The French Ambassador in Berlin reported that in a conversation with the Chancellor on June 23 the latter emphasized "the necessity not to let this question mauvaise, très mauvaise, drag on, and not to linger on a road bordé de précipices et même d'abîmes."[1] At the same time the German representatives in Rome and Madrid were using violent language to win Italy and Spain to the German side.[2]

While these negotiations were being carried on, Germany was seeking also further support from President Roosevelt. In asking his mediation in the dispute it was proposed that he should suggest to Paris and London that the United States considered a conference the best means of bringing the Moroccan question to a peaceful solution.[3] Mr. Roosevelt did take up the task of mediation, and working through the French and German ambassadors in Washington, Jusserand and Sternburg, he played a valuable part in securing the assent of the French government to the holding of the proposed conference.[4]

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1. Debidour, op. cit., II, 27. Bérard, Livre Jaune Sur Maroc, loc. cit., 214.
2. Lansdowne to Bertie, June 21, 1905, B.D., III, No.126, p.97.
3. Memorandum from the Kaiser to Roosevelt sent through Baron Sternburg, June 11, 1905, Bishop, op. cit., I, 477. Jusserand, op. cit., 317.
4. Bishop, op. cit., I, 477-79; Jusserand, op. cit., 319-20. On securing the assent of the French government on June 23, Roosevelt endeavoured to persuade Germany she should be satisfied with this triumph, and not to raise questions of minor details. Roosevelt to Sternburg, June 25, 1905; Bishop, op. cit., I, 483-85. See also Paléologue, op. cit., 364-65.

M. Rouvier had by this time become more inclined to accept the plan of a conference, despairing of any other solution. On June 28 he justified this course to the British chargé d'affaires as follows:

> He (M. Rouvier) considered that under the conditions a conference was perhaps the best way of arriving at a satisfactory solution. The Emperor had made it a point of personal honour: France would go into it with the support of England, Spain and possibly Italy, whereas Germany would be alone; Germany was prepared to admit the preponderance of French interests on the Algerian frontier. It was absolutely necessary to arrive at some solution as the present situation was excessively dangerous. So long as the Conference was not accepted, Germany considered that she was entitled to a free hand in Morocco, and she was very active. (1)

The French assent now given, terms were then drawn up in an agreement to form a basis on which the conference might be held. These were signed on July 8.[2] France was assured that Germany would pursue no goal at the Conference which would compromise the legitimate interests of France in Morocco, or that would be contrary to the rights of France resulting from treaties or arrangements. Agreements reached were to be in harmony with the following principles: the sovereignty and independence of the Sultan; the integrity of his Empire; economic liberty without any inequality; the utility of police and financial reforms, the introduction of which would be regulated for a short time by means of an international agreement. It was further agreed that the

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1. Lister to Lansdowne, June 28, 1905, B.D., III, No.134, p.107.
2. Before these were signed France submitted them to London for approval, Approval was given by Lansdowne. Lansdowne to Bertie July 1, 1905, ibid., No.137, p.110.

special interests of France as a frontier neighbour in the maintenance of order throughout the whole of Morocco should be recognized. Finally the two governments agreed to work out a programme for the conference which was to be submitted to the Sultan for acceptance.[1]

An analysis of this agreement reveals clearly Germany's first reverse in her Moroccan campaign. It is true that the winning of the French assent to the plan of a conference, which the Republic had so vigorously opposed, might be taken as a diplomatic triumph, but the agreement of July 8 recognized the special interest of France in Morocco, and in no way nullified her accords with Britain and with Spain.[2] Germany had not weakened the Entente. Moreover, she had failed to make a colonial accord of her own with France, when she had refused the offers tendered by Delcassé and Rouvier. She had chosen rather to keep her promises to the Sultan, and to force a conference on an unwilling Europe, refusing offers of present colonial gain in the hope of winning these in the future. As Mr. Anderson puts it, "her virtue, not appreciated by any other Power, was greater than her common sense."[3]

What is still more important, however, than Germany's failure to make any appreciable gains by this agreement is that her government had embittered the French nation against

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1. These terms given in B.D., III, No.147, pp.115-116.
2. Fabre-Luce, op. cit., 120-121. Paléologue, op. cit.,381-82.
3. Anderson, op. cit., 256.

the Empire, and aroused it to the united defense of its national honour.[1] On July 11, M. Jusserand wrote to President Roosevelt:

> I leave greatly comforted by the news concerning Morocco. The agreement arrived at is one which we had considered, and the acceptance of which you did so very much to secure. Letters just received by me from Paris .... confirmed what I guessed was the case, that is, that there was a point where more yielding would have been impossible; everybody in France felt it, and people braced up silently in view of possible great events. (2)

Germany's actions had antagonized M. Rouvier and converted him solidly to the Entente. The British chargé d'affaires reported on June 28;

> His Majesty (The German Emperor) had expected a complete climb-down to follow upon the change of direction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but as His Excellency (M. Rouvier) said, there was no reason because he had parted with M. Delcassé that he should throw himself "dans les bras de l'Empereur, et sur son cou." (3)

M. Cambon had informed Lord Lansdowne:

> that after all that had happened M. Rouvier was more convinced than ever of the necessity of maintaining a close understanding with this country (Great Britain). It was, in his view, essential that the two governments should treat one another with the fullest confidence, and that no further steps should be taken without previous discussion between us. (4)

This policy, as expressed by the French leaders, met with Lord Lansdowne's entire approval, for it signified success in the

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1. Paléologue, op. cit., 386-87, Report of the Belgian Minister in Paris, October 24, 1905, Morel, op.cit.,22-23.
2. Bishop, op. cit., I, 488.
3. Lester to Lansdowne, June 28, 1905, B.D., III, No.134,p.108. Also Paléologue, op. cit., 387.
4. Lansdowne to Bertie, July 12, 1905, B.D., III, No.152,p.118.

efforts to maintain intact the Entente Cordiale. He assured M. Cambon that "we had no intentions of withdrawing our support."[1]

Yet another sign which further assured the strength of the Entente in the eyes of the world was the exchange of visits between the fleets of Great Britain and France which took place in July and August of 1905. The British Atlantic fleet was received at Brest in July with the greatest enthusiasm. "The feeling, openly expressed on all sides, was one of intense gratitude to the King and the British nation for the way in which they had stood by France in the recent Morocco incident. It was a public ratification of the Entente Cordiale."[2] This visit was returned by the French fleet in August, when it was received in England with enthusiastic demonstrations of English goodwill.[3] Germany's action had thus furthered the process which Germans have called her "encirclement" and isolation.

After the signing of the agreement of July 8 new and wearisome discussions began between the French and German governments to work out the formulae for deliberations at the forthcoming conference. It was not until September 28

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1. Lansdowne to Bertie, July 12, 1905, B.D. III, No.152,p.119.
2. Lee, op. cit., II, 345. Paléologue, op. cit., 387-88.
3. Paléologue, op. cit., 393-94.

that an agreement as to the programme was signed.[1] The conference was to be held, not at Tangier, to which the French had objections, but in Algeciras, in southern Spain. In the programme drawn up the subjects for consideration were defined in general terms as the police force, the suppression of the smuggling of arms, the reform of finances, the opening up of new sources of revenue, the Sultan's undertaking not to part with any branch of the public service for the benefit of private interests, and the allotment of contracts for public works. A few minor disputes of a local nature were also regulated. After some opposition the Sultan agreed to the programme on October 23.[2]

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1. A grave situation arose during these negotiations when news reached France that through Count Tattenbach a German firm had received from the Sultan a contract for building a mole in the harbour of Tangier, and also, that a loan had been arranged by German banks for 10,000,000 marks. France accused the German Government of double-dealing; and England and Spain joined her in protest. Bülow upheld the transactions, asserting that the negotiations for the mole contract had been going on for months, and that the loan was not a real "loan," but merely a "Temporary advance" which could be repaid at any time. See Anderson, op. cit., 264-67. Also, Bérard, LeLivre Jaune Sur Maroc, loc. cit., 217-22. Also, Francis Charmes, in his Chronique de la Quinzaine, in La Revue des Deux Mondes, September 15, 1905, 472.
2. After this agreement was signed Bülow expressed to France the willingness of the German Government to negotiate over other colonial matters, such as the frontiers of the Cameroons, and the Bagdad Railway. M. Rouvier coldly replied that he had previously offered to negotiate on such matters so as to avoid the holding of the forthcoming conference, and to settle the Morocco question in a friendly manner between France and Germany alone. They could not return to that now, he said, until it was seen how the conference turned out. Brandenburg, op. cit., 229.

The Conference was to open in January of 1906. Before that time, however, a new government came into power in England, when on December 4, 1905, the Conservative administration of Balfour was replaced by the Liberal government of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. Sir Edward Grey succeeded Lord Lansdowne as Foreign Secretary. It seemed of supreme importance to the French Government to ascertain the intentions of this new administration in the matter of foreign policy before the Conference opened. Would France be able to count on its support as it had in the past been able to count on the support of Lord Lansdowne and his colleagues? In a speech on December 22 at the Albert Hall the new Prime Minister pledged his government to continue the policy of his predecessors, and affirmed his adhesion to the policy of the Entente Cordiale. But the French Government felt it necessary to have Sir Edward Grey renew the assurances given formerly by Lord Lansdowne.

Colonel Repington, the military correspondent of the "Times," has related how on December 28 he met with Major Huguet, the French Military Attaché in London, who stated that his Government was seriously alarmed about the intentions of Germany and was worried over the failure of the new British Foreign Secretary to renew the assurances given by his predecessor.[1] "The French knew," records Colonel Repington, "that our sympathies were with them, but they wanted to know what we should do in case Germany confronted them with a crisis."[2] He immediately reported his conversation with Major Huguet to

1. Repington, Colonel, The First World War, (New York, 1921), I, 2-6. Callwell, C.E., Field-Marshall Sir Henry Wilson, (London, 1927), I, 89 ff.
2. Repington, op.cit., I, 1.

Sir Edward Grey, who was at the time electioneering in Northumberland. The latter replied on December 30, "I have not receded from anything that Lord Lansdowne said to the French, and have no hesitation in affirming it."[1]

Colonel Repington communicated his conversation with the French Military Attaché to Sir George Clarke, Secretary of the Defense Committee, and to Lord Esher, a member of that Committee. They agreed that in view of the German menace active steps towards cooperation with France should be taken.[2] "They thought it indispensable that something should be done, and as both Lord Esher and Sir George Clarke were serving in official capacities, and as Repington was a free lance, it was eventually agreed that he should sound the French Government through Major Huguet, and that when the French views were thus privately and unofficially ascertained that they should pass the matter on to the British Government which would be completely uncommitted and able to continue the conversations or to drop them as they pleased."[3]

The Colonel prepared a short list of questions which Major Huguet took to Paris on January 7. These were considered in Paris by M. Rouvier, the Prime Minister, M. Etienne, Minister of War, M. Thomson, Minister of Marine, and his naval staff, and by General Brun and General Brugère. On January 12 Major

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1. Repington, op. cit., I, 4.
2. Ibid., 5.
3. Ibid., 5-6.

Huguet again visited Colonel Repington, bringing a cordial reply from Paris and assuring him that everything possible would be done to make the necessary arrangements for cooperation. Colonel Repington then imparted this reply to the Defense Committee.

Meanwhile, on January 10 M. Cambon, who had discussed the matter with M. Rouvier,[1] approached Sir Edward Grey on the matter of a closer and more definite understanding between the two governments. Grey replied as follows:

> that at the present moment the Prime Minister was out of town, and the Cabinet were all dispersed seeing after the elections; that we were not as yet aware of the sentiments of the country as they would be expressed at the polls; and that it was impossible therefore for me, in the circumstances, to give a reply to his Excellency's question. I could only state as my personal opinion that, if France were to be attacked by Germany in consequence of a question arising out of the Agreement (of April 8, 1904) which our predecessor had recently concluded with the French Government, public opinion in England would be strongly moved in favour of France. (2)

When M. Cambon replied that "nothing would have a more pacific influence on the Emperor of Germany than the conviction, that if Germany attacked France, she would find England allied against her,"[3] Grey answered that he thought "the German Emperor did believe this, but that it was one thing that this opinion should be held in Germany and another that we should give a positive assurance to France on the subject."[4] He could give no assurance, he added, of which he was uncertain.

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1. Huguet, General, L'Intervention Militaire Britannique en 1914, cited in Anderson, op. cit., 337.
2. Grey to Bertie, January 10,1906,B.D.,III,No.210(a), p.170.
3. Ibid., 171.
4. Ibid., 171.

He "did not believe that any Minister could, in present circumstances, say more than I had done, and, however strong the sympathy of Great Britain might be with France in the case of a rupture with Germany, the expression which might be given to it and the action which might follow must depend largely upon the circumstances in which the rupture took place."[1]

Since a positive answer was thus postponed until after the elections M. Cambon replied that he would repeat his request at that time. But he asked that in the meantime "the unofficial communications" between the British Admiralty and War Office and the French Naval and Military Attachés "as to what action might advantageously be taken in case the two countries found themselves in alliance in such a war" might be permitted to continue. "They did not pledge either Government," he added, and Sir Edward "did not dissent from this view."[2]

The ministers of the Cabinet were scattered for the elections, but Grey sent a report of this conversation to the Prime Minister, and also to Lord Ripon, the senior minister available in London. On January 12, he met Mr. Haldane, Secretary of State for War, at Berwick, and discussed with him the question of the Military conversations.[3] He had learned that under the former government in the previous year such military and naval conversations had taken place, and that at

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1. Grey to Bertie, January 10, 1906, B.D.III, No.210 (a), p.171.
2. Ibid.
3. Spender, J.A., The Life of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, II (hereafter cited as Spender, Campbell-Bannerman), London, 1923) 251f.

the present time official conversations were going on between Admiral Sir John Fisher and the French Naval Attaché, while the military conversations were being held unofficially between the French Military Attaché and Colonel Repington.[1] When consulted on January 11, General Grierson, the Director of Military Operations, had stated "that if there is even a chance of our having to give armed assistance on land to France, or to take the field on her side in Belgium in consequence of a violation of Belgian territory by the Germans, we should have as soon as possible informal communication between the military authorities of France and/or in Belgium and the General staff."[2]

In agreeing that these conversations might be carried on officially neither Haldane nor Grey could see anything against such a policy. As Grey argues in his memoirs:

> I was quite clear that no Cabinet could undertake any obligation to go to war; but the Anglo-French Agreement was popular in Britain. It was certain that if Germany forced a quarrel on France upon the very matter of that Agreement, the pro-French feeling in Britain would be very strong, so strong probably as to justify a British Government in intervening on the side of France or even to insist on its doing so. We must, therefore, be free to go to the help of France as well as free to stand aside. But modern war may be an affair of days. If there were not military plans made beforehand we should be unable to come to the assistance of France in time, however strongly public opinion in Britain might desire it. We should in effect not have preserved our freedom to help France, but have cut ourselves off from the possibility of doing so, unless we had allowed the British and French staffs to concert plans for common action. (3)

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1. Grey, op. cit., I, 74-78.
2. Grierson to Sanderson, January 11,1906,B.D.,III,No.211,p.172
3. Grey, op. cit., I, 75, Also, Haldane, Viscount, Before the War, (New York, 1920), 44-49.

Such was the reasoning of the British officials who approved the conversations. In an interview with Cambon on January 15 Sir Edward Grey gave his consent. That interview was recorded in a dispatch to the British ambassador in Paris:

> I told M. Cambon today that I had communicated to the Prime Minister my account of his conversation with me on the 10th instant. I had heard from the Prime Minister that he could not be in London before the 25th January, and it would therefore not be possible for me to discuss things with him before then, and the Members of the Government would not assemble in London before the 29th; I could therefore give no further answer today on the question he had addressed to me. He had spoken to me on the 10th of communications passing between the French Naval Attaché and the Admiralty. I understood that these communications had been with Sir John Fisher. If that was so, it was not necessary for me to do any more; but, with regard to the communications between the French Military Attaché and the War Office, I understood from him that these had taken place through an intermediary. I had therefore taken the opportunity of speaking to Mr. Haldane, the Secretary of State for War, who had been taking part in my election contest in Northumberland on Friday, and he had authorized me to say that these communications might proceed between the French Military Attaché and General Grierson direct; but it must be understood that these communications did not commit either Government. M. Cambon said that the intermediary in question had been a retired colonel, the military correspondent of the "Times," who, he understood, had been sent from the War Office. (1)

The Prime Minister seems to have had some misgivings about the interpretation which might be put upon these "communications." "I do not like the stress laid upon joint preparations," he wrote to Lord Ripon on February 2, "It comes very close to an honorable undertaking; and it will be known on both sides of the Rhine. But let us hope for the best."[2] But he

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1. Grey to Bertie, January 15, 1906, B.D., III, No.215, p.177. Sanderson to Grierson, January 15, 1906, ibid, No.217 (a), pp.178-79.
2. Spender, Campbell-Bannerman, II, 257.

was cognizant of and a party to the steps taken in this policy; he had been made aware of all the circumstances, and had given his consent on the understanding that they were provisional and precautionary measures, and that the Government was not bound by their results. Thus limited, he regarded them as raising no new question of policy and therefore within the competence of the War Office.[1] It was definitely understood that these conversations did not bind the governments.[2]

On January 17 the conversations were begun between Major Huguet and General Grierson and continued uninterrupted between the general staffs until the outbreak of the War in 1914.[3]

The same line of reasoning which had led the British to enter upon these "communications" with France applied with equal force to Belgium, for both the British and French authorities expected Germany to violate Belgian neutrality should she wish to strike at France. On January 15, therefore, Sir Edward Grey instructed General Grierson to open conversations with the Belgian military authorities "as to the manner in which, in case of need, British assistance could be most effectually afforded to Belgium for the defense of her neutrality."[4] "Such communications must be solely provisional and non-committal."[5]

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1. Spender, Campbell-Bannerman, II, 253.
2. Repington, op. cit., I, 13, Grey, op. cit., I, 76.
3. Repington, op. cit., I, 14.
4. Sanderson to Grierson, January 15, 1906, B.D., III, No.214, pp.176-77.
5. Grierson to Barnardiston, January 16, 1905 ibid, No.217 (b) p.179.

Colonel Barnardiston, the British Military Attaché in Brussels, broached the subject to the Belgian Chief of Staff, General Ducarne, on January 18, telling him that the British Minister would take up the matter with the Belgian Foreign Minister. After consulting the Minister of War, General Ducarne agreed to the conversations.[1]

These conversations, both military and naval, were kept secret. The Anglo-Belgian negotiations were known to only a very few persons; the ones with France were not known to all the members of the British Cabinet.[2]

Now Sir Edward Grey had to again answer that larger request of the French ambassador, the request for a formal agreement between the two governments, which had been made on January 10, and the answer to which the Foreign Secretary had postponed until after the elections. After discussing the matter with the Prime Minister and Mr. Haldane, both of whom were in London after January 26, Sir Edward met M. Cambon on

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1. Barnardiston to Grierson, January 19, 1906, B.D. III, No.221 (C 1), p.187ff. Callwell, op. cit., I, 89.
2. Grey, op. cit., I, 93, Anderson, op. cit., 342. See Earl Loreburn and Lloyd George, both of whom were members of the Cabinet at this time. Loreburn, op. cit., 80-81. Lloyd George, War Memoirs, (London, 1933) I, 46-51. While Grey admits that he did not reveal these conversations to the cabinet at the time, he states in his memoirs, "they must subsequently have become known to those ministers who attended the committee of Imperial Defense;" op. cit., I, 93. Lord Sydenham, a member of that committee until September, 1907, writes, "This was not so. In my time the question never came to me officially, and I only heard quite informally what was going on .... Whether different arrangements, enabling the Committee of Imperial Defense to be cognizant of the negotiations, were made after the end of September (1907) when I left for India I do not know." Written statement by Lord Sydenham, July 19, 1927, B.D., III, No.221 (a),p.185.

the last day of the month. That interview was reported in a long dispatch to the British ambassador at Paris.

When M. Cambon again asked whether France would be able to count on the assistance of England in the event of an attack upon her by Germany, Grey submitted first of all a review of the relations between the two governments as they stood at that moment. Pointing to the military and naval communications, he stated that if a crisis arose no time would be lost for want of a formal engagement. Secondly, only a week previously he had informed Count Metternich, the German ambassador in London, that it was his personal opinion that "in the event of an attack upon France by Germany arising out of the Morocco Agreement, public opinion in England would be so strong that no British Government could remain neutral." In this way, he assured M. Cambon that what would be the moral effect upon Germany of a formal engagement between France and England had been already given effect. In the third place, he pointed out that the present relationship between England and France as a result of the Entente of 1904 left France a free hand in Morocco and gave her unreservedly Britain's diplomatic support. But, should this promise be extended beyond diplomatic support, and "should we take an engagement which might involve us in a war," he felt sure that Britain would demand consultation with regard to French policy in Morocco, and demand concessions or alterations in that policy which might seem desirable to avoid a war.[1]

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1. Grey to Bertie, January 31, 1906, B.D.,III, No.219, p.180.

In summing up his case, he asked M. Cambon "to weigh these considerations in his mind, and to consider whether the present situation as regards ourselves and France was not so satisfactory that it was unnecessary to alter it by a formal declaration as he desired."[1]

To this M. Cambon replied that a war might break out so quickly that if it were necessary for the British Government "to consult and wait for manifestations of English public opinion, it might be too late to be of use." To his repeated request for some form of verbal assurance Grey pointed out the main difficulties in giving what could be "nothing short of a solemn undertaking." "It was one which I could not give without submitting it to the Cabinet," and if this were done, he felt sure that they would say it was too serious a matter to be dealt with by a mere verbal engagement, but it would have to be in writing. Such a change as this, Grey maintained, would transform the "Entente" into a defensive alliance. He admitted that pressure of circumstances - the activity of Germany, for instance - "might eventually transform the "Entente" into a defensive alliance," but he did not think such a change was needed at the moment. To this he added, that a defensive alliance could not be kept from Parliament; "no British Government could commit the country to such a serious thing and keep the engagement secret." For Britain to support

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1. Grey to Bertie, January 31, 1906, B.D., III, No.219, p.181.

France in a war with Germany, "much would depend on the manner in which war broke out." The British would not be willing to fight in order to put France in possession of Morocco, but "if it appeared that war was forced upon France by Germany to break up the Anglo-French 'entente,' public opinion would undoubtedly be very strong on the side of France." He added, however, that British sentiment was much averse to war and that he could not be certain whether this aversion would be overcome by the desire to aid France. He informed M. Cambon that he was willing to reopen the conversation at any time in the future, but he did not think that the situation justified, such a radical change as had been suggested.[1] M. Cambon appeared to be satisfied with that answer.[2]

Thus Sir Edward Grey embarked upon the policy with France which he followed until the outbreak of the War. In his mind he was open and frank with both France and Germany. He had told the German ambassador of the probability of British intervention in favour of France in the event of a Franco-German war. To France he had pledged full diplomatic support, while permitting preparations for an emergency. He had refused her absolute assurance of aid in case of war, preferring to keep, as he believed he had kept, British hands free. By this apparently simple, but what was really to prove

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1. Grey to Bertie, B.D., III, No.219, p.182.
2. Memorandum by Sanderson, February 2, 1906, B.D. III, No.220 (b), p.185. Campbell-Bannerman to Lord Ripon, February 2, 1906, cited in Spender, Campbell-Bannerman, II, 257.

an intricate policy, he hoped to satisfy the needs of Britain's foreign policy.

He has justified this policy to what seems his own satisfaction in his speech in the House of Commons on August 3, 1914, and has further developed the justification in his Memoirs. He clings consistently to his contention that England was in no way bound to France, and that he had kept her hands completely free.[1] But it is difficult to understand how he could have deceived himself into this belief. It may be true, as he so often maintains, that the military and naval conversations, did not absolutely bind the two Powers, but it cannot be denied that they constituted an exceedingly powerful tie between them. It is impossible to escape the contention that at least a potent moral obligation to aid France had been created. In spite of Grey's protests such at least is the verdict of history.[2] As has been pointed out, these preparations continued down to the outbreak of war in 1914, and "inevitably came to involve England in increasingly binding obligations of honour to support France in case of a European War arising out of any question whatsoever - not merely one arising out of the Morocco question - provided that France did not appear to be the active aggressor."[3]

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1. Grey, op. cit., I, 76, 82, 85, 96, 251.
2. Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, op. cit., III, 508. Dickinson, op. cit., 398, 405, 470-71, 480. Ewart, op. cit., I, 115-131. Churchill, op. cit., 27. Loreburn, op. cit., 17, 225-26. Fay, op. cit., I, 208. Lutz, Hermann, Lord Grey and the World War, (London, 1928), 94-105. Renouvin, Pierre, The Part Played in International Relations by the Conversations between the General Staffs on the Eve of the World War, Studies in Anglo-French History, edited by Alfred Coville and Harold Temperley, (London, 1935), 170.
3. Fay, op. cit., I, 208.

And Grey stands condemned on this point out of his own mouth; as Gooch points out in speaking of the Foreign Secretary's speech of August 3, 1914, "His whole speech breathed the conviction that we should be forever disgraced if we left France in the lurch."[1]

A further weakness in this policy was that neither Sir Edward Grey's statement to M. Cambon, nor his approval of the naval and military conversations, was made with the knowledge and sanction of the Cabinet. The explanation, he offers, of his failure to consult with his colleagues in these matters is by no means convincing. He explains that the Ministers were scattered, seeing to the elections, and could not be summoned. It has been clearly shown that it would not have been impossible to summon the Cabinet at that time.[2] On January 21 the Prime Minister wrote to ask him if he wished to consult the Cabinet, and suggested January 30 and 31 and February 1 as dates for a meeting.[3] In his memoirs Grey states he has no recollection of his answer to that question.[4] He explains that the earliest date suggested by the Prime Minister was January 30 and that "the French had been kept long enough waiting for a reply."[5] But, this can hardly be

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1. Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, op. cit., III, 508.
2. Loreburn, op. cit., 80. Ewart, op. cit., I, 116.
3. Spender, Campbell-Bannerman, II, 253.
4. Grey, op. cit., I, 86.
5. Ibid., 86.

regarded as satisfactory since his interview with Cambon did not take place until the January 31, and moreover, since a Cabinet meeting was held on that very day.[1] It would therefore seem that he might easily have consulted his colleagues on such a grave matter before talking with Cambon, or at least immediately after. But he did not reveal his policy then, nor for a long time to come; it was not until 1912 that circumstances caused the matter of military and naval conversations to be revealed to the Cabinet, and not until his speech of August 3, 1914, that Parliament and the public were made aware of them.[2] In the light of what experience showed him in after years Grey admits in his memoirs that the Cabinet should have been consulted.[3]

The Conference of Algeciras opened formally on January 16, 1906. Twelve Powers in addition to Morocco were represented. The presidential chair was occupied by the Spanish Foreign Minister, the Duke of Almadovar. For almost three months the Conference swung from crisis to crisis. It would be superfluous to record here in any detail the discussions which took place since they bore mainly on technical points. But behind the whole question lay the essential problem of the balance of power, and it is in this aspect only that interest lies.

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1. Loreburn, op. cit., p.81. Trevelyan, op. cit., 130 and 138.
2. See Lloyd George, op.cit.,I, 46-51, on this question of the Cabinet and its participation in matters of foreign affairs.
3. Grey, op. cit., I, 86-99.

Agreement was soon reached on a number of minor problems.[1] The really troublesome questions were those of the organization of the police and the establishment of a state bank, since the solution reached on these questions would determine whether France or Germany should emerge victorious.

Germany's aim seems to have been to have the Moroccan police officered by the Minor Powers, or to permit the Sultan freely to choose his own police. She wished to prevent France from organizing them, and thus rejected France's demand for a police mandate, and later her revised proposal to share such a mandate with Spain. When the question of the State bank reached a deadlock a rupture in the Conference was expected. After much discussion, and after Roosevelt intervened on behalf of France, Austria put forward a plan of mediation that the Franco-Spanish police mandate be accepted under a Swiss Inspector-General. This was accepted at the end of March.[2] The bank question had meanwhile been settled on a basis of joint participation. The main difficulties having thus been overcome the Conference was hastily concluded and the final Act of Algeciras was signed on April 7.

While it is unnecessary to list all the details of the Act, the chief provisions might be noted to show how,

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1. Such problems as - the surveillance and repression of contrabrand of arms. - the better collection of taxes and creation of new revenues - regulations concerning customs duties - the question of public services and public works. Anderson, op. cit., 350-351.
2. Anderson, op. cit., 392; Gooch, op. cit., 364-365.

though Germany had won her point in securing the holding of the Conference, France had won in practical results. From two thousand to twenty-five hundred police were to be distributed among the eight Moroccan ports, with Spanish and French officers to act as instructors under a Swiss-Inspector General at Tangier. Thus, in this all important question of police France really triumphed, for she had secured the predominant share of the control and excluded Germany and her Allies altogether. In a backward and disturbed area such as Morocco the police control was likely to be the lever of power. In the matter of financial control and commercial opportunity Germany had more success. A State Bank practically under the control of the four Powers - France, England, Germany and Spain - was set up, with equal opportunities for each nation. But France and her satellite, Spain, made further gains in that the regulation of the Customs Act and of the traffic of arms on the Algerian frontier was to be carried out by France in conjunction with Morocco, and on the Riff frontier by Spain and Morocco.[1]

The effect of the Conference upon Morocco can be dispensed with in this study. To the Powers taking part Moroccan interests was not the issue. The conclusions reached "were determined by the exigencies of international relations and the interests of European Powers, not by the needs of

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1. Gooch, op. cit., 366-367.

Morocco."[1] The less interested Powers had aimed chiefly at preserving peace. France and Spain had been concerned with maintaining their interests in Morocco and with preventing any other Power from gaining a foothold there. Germany alone appeared to be the champion of Moroccan rights, but only because that policy had been in accord with her interests. Throughout the Conference France had been steadily and openly supported by her neighbour, Spain, her old ally, Russia, and her new friend, England.[2] She had received less open, but no less effective, support from Roosevelt, on behalf of the United States.[3] Germany, on the other hand, received only scanty support from her friends. Austria was determined not to quarrel with France, while Italy, already pledged in advance by her secret arrangement with France respecting Morocco and Tripoli, supported the Republic and not her ally.

Germany had established the theoretical principle that Morocco concerned all Powers equally, and the principle of the open-door. But France had practically safeguarded her individual action for the future. The French and Spanish military control assured those two Powers the main economic advantages. Both sides expressed satisfaction with the outcome, which according to official interpretation left neither victor nor vanquished. None the less, it was evident that Germany had

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1. Anderson, op. cit., 394.
2. Report of the Belgian Minister in Berlin, April 5, 1906, Morel, op. cit., 44-45.
3. Jusserand, op. cit., 322-25.

emerged the loser. She had been opposed by every Power, except Austria, and she had failed to obtain more than lip service to her demands. What is more significant, she had driven France and Great Britain into a closer intimacy and had strengthened the ties between them. When Grey wrote to President Roosevelt a year later in a confidential letter giving an account of his policy, he summed matters up in these words: "The long and the short of the matter is that, to secure peace, we must maintain the Entente with France, and attempts from outside to shake it will only make it stronger."[1]

It has been shown that Germany had an excellent case on which to base her interference in Morocco. But, as Nicolson points out, she had handled it badly.[2] By her menacing attitude and her policy of mystification, she had lost the confidence of Europe; she obtained no compensation, she had caused France, Spain, England and Russia to draw closer together. Above all else, she had given the Anglo-French Entente a new character; it now assumed a new meaning in international affairs. Not only had the two countries remained refractory to every effort made to disunite them, but in the play of events the Entente had changed its nature; after being originally signed for the purpose of liquidating past differences between the governments it had now become a principle of action.[3] As Tardieu says, "the Franco-English

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1. Grey to Roosevelt in a confidential letter, December, 1906, cited in Trevelyan, op. cit., 115.
2. Nicolson, op. cit., 198, Trevelyan, op. cit., 125.
3. Tardieu, op. cit., 204-205.

binomial had acquired weight. It had changed from the static to the dynamic state."[1]

The Morocco Crisis of 1905-1906 thus marked an important stage in the development of the Entente; from the test supplied by that Crisis it had emerged strengthened and confirmed. In 1901 Great Britain had offered an alliance to Germany; in 1904 she had settled her difficulties with France; in 1906 the two, brought more closely together, were discussing possible measures of war against Germany. The process which the Entente Powers like to call "insurance," and which the Germans describe as "encirclement," had begun.

It must be realized, moreover, that the forces which had caused this situation still obtained as before. Algeciras was merely a breathing space between the rounds. Prestige and national interests were at stake on both sides; neither side appreciated the other's point of view. Each accused the other of aiming at its defeat, of being a menace. Neither side had learned anything from the Crisis except to be more cautious; neither had changed its method. So events were moving. The road to Armageddon lay open.

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1. Tardieu, op. cit., 204.

CHAPTER IV

The Further "Encirclement" of Germany?

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It was not surprising that the reconciliation with France should raise the question of an agreement between England and Russia to remove the many sources of friction which existed between the two Powers. A rapprochement with Russia was, as Sir Edward Grey states, "the natural complement of the agreement with France."[1] There were numerous points of difference between the two in the Middle East, with Persia and the Indian frontier as particular danger points. And since Russia was an ally of France, Britain could not pursue at one and the same time a policy of agreement with the latter and a policy of hostility against the former. Moreover, now that Britain was definitely committed to European affairs, the assurance of Russian friendship in the face of the growing German menace, to which we shall turn shortly, would be most welcome.

Russia, too, was anxious for British friendship. She had suffered a spectacular humiliation in the Far East in

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1. Grey, op. cit., I, 153; The "Times" pointed out that such a rapprochement was "an inevitable corollary" to the Entente Cordiale; cited in Morel, op. cit., 68. See also Trevelyan, op. cit., 180-85.

in 1904-05, and a rapprochement with Britain added to her alliance with France would prove valuable in helping her regain her position as a Great Power. During the Morocco Crisis of 1906 Russia like England had cast her vote in favour of France against Germany, and friendly feelings had been thus fostered.

But there was no easy pathway to such an agreement; many obstacles new and old blocked the way. Russian despotism was repugnant to British ideals of liberalism, and the internal affairs of Russia, the Czar's suspension of the Duma in 1906, and the treatment of Jews and Poles, did much to alienate British opinion and to stir up indignation. Nevertheless, when negotiations were seriously undertaken it was found possible to reach an agreement. As far back as 1903 such an agreement had been considered in England, and a conversation between Chamberlain and Delcassé, when the latter visited London in July of that year, may be taken as the starting point of the discussions which later culminated in the final convention of 1907.[1] Delcassé and Cambon acted the rôle of mediators between the two in discussions during 1903, but differences over Tibet, Manchuria, Turkestan and Persia proved formidable difficulties.[2]

During the Russo-Japanese War, the position of Britain as an ally of Japan caused friction with Russia, although

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1. B.D., II, No.242, p.212. Gooch, G.P., Before the War, (London, 1936), I, 70.
2. D.D.F., 2e série, IV, No.44, No.56, No.58. Gooch, Before the War, I, 71-72.

during the opening phases of the war the relations between the two governments remained friendly enough.[1] A most critical point in Anglo-Russian relations was reached, however, during the War when a Russian squadron en route to the Far East fired on a Hull fishing fleet on the Dogger Bank. Fortunately both governments acted cooly while Delcassé pleaded in both capitals for moderation.[2] Thus the War had made necessary the postponment of negotiations for a general settlement. But the ending of the war removed the main obstacle to a rapprochement, and England's closer association with France in 1904 and 1905 made the prospects far more promising. Lansdowne went out of office with the change of government in 1905, but the same considerations which had induced him to enter into negotiations with Russia were not without influence on the new government. We have already seen the views of Sir Edward Grey in regard to this matter. In the following months the two sides drew nearer.

No useful purpose can be served here by entering into the details of the negotiations.[3] On August 31, 1907, a Convention was signed in Petrograd concluding arrangements concerning affairs in Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet. This Pact, though more limited in scope than the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904, had the same purpose of clearing off the slate the causes of antagonism between two historic rivals.

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1. Conversation between King Edward and Isvolsky, April, 1904; cited in Lee, op. cit., II, 284-87.
2. D.D.F., 2e série, V, 468-477; Gooch, Before the War, I, 77-8. Porter, op. cit., 186.
3. The negotiations are given in B.D., Vol.IV. For the part played by Sir Arthur Nicolson in these negotiations see Nicolson, Harold, Lord Carnock, (London, 1930), 203-57.

The contents of the Convention were all made public. It included no obligations of military or diplomatic support, and thus it did not at once lead to a closely-knit diplomatic partnership. But it did nevertheless complete the circle for a closer political cooperation betweeen Russia, France and England. The Anglo-French Entente and the Dual Alliance had as a result of the new treaty, broadened into the Triple Entente which now confronted the Triple Alliance on the chess board of European diplomacy. Though not definitely allied to France and Russia, and in theory still retaining liberty of action, England had chosen to throw in her lot with these Powers. The French made no secret of their satisfaction over the new Convention, or of their opinion that Britain had advanced a step further into their camp.[1]

The history of the next seven years is mainly that of the diplomatic conflict which led to the final struggle between the now established groups of Triple Alliance and Triple Entente. During these seven years all manner of seemingly unrelated subjects are seen gradually becoming classified into causes for which - irrespective of their merits - the two groups were committed to stand. There developed an increasing crystallization of opposition between the two camps. During the first four years it developed more slowly, then after 1911, with the French occupation of Fez, the German threat at Agadir, the Italian seizure of Tripoli,

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1. Spender, J.A., Fifty Years of Europe, (hereafter cited as Fifty Years), 266.

the growing menace of Anglo-German naval rivalry, the failure of the Haldane Mission, and the Balkan Wars, it proceeded more rapidly. This growing tension was reflected in events both large and small over widely-separated areas. To give a full account of all the factors which made for this crystallization of opposition would go far beyond the limits of this work. No attempt, therefore, is made to give a detailed analysis of the period. The aim, rather, is to bring to light those factors which tightened and strengthened the Anglo-French Entente.

The first serious crisis to affect the new balance of power was the Bosnian Crisis of 1908. The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 seemed to offer to Isvolsky of Russia and to Aehrenthal of Austria a favourable opportunity for a mutually advantageous bargain at the expense of Turkey. Isvolsky saw in it an opportunity of opening the Straits, and Aehrenthal an opportunity of converting Austria's occupation of Bosnia-Herzogovina, assigned to her for administration by the Treaty of Berlin 1878, into a full annexation. While Aehrenthal had long been considering the annexation,[1] the initiative in this bargain seems to have come from Isvolsky in a lengthy aide-mémoire dated July 2, 1908, which discussed Balkan railways, the entente of 1897, and Macedonian reforms.[2]

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1. Brandenburg, op. cit., 314.
2. Gooch, Before the War, I, 332, 394-95.

Aehrenthal was keen to accept the offer, and at the end of August gave his assent, although no definite agreement was made.[1] Following this reply, the two met as the guests of Count Berchtold at Buchlau on September 15 where the matter was discussed and further details were arranged. There were no witnesses to the discussions, and since no definite agreement was put in writing, violent controversy arose a few weeks later when the plans did not work out as Isvolsky had anticipated. He has claimed that the consent of the Powers was to be obtained in a Conference before the annexation took place; but the point of most bitter controversy was the date at which the changes were to be made. Whatever were the agreements reached, Isvolsky does not seem to have expected that Aehrenthal would act so precipitately, and he appears to have been taken by complete surprise when, on arriving at Paris on October 2, he received word that the annexation would take place within the next few days. It was carried out on October 5.[2]

The news of the sudden annexation produced an instant reverberation throughout Europe; surprise and indignation were voiced on all sides. Isvolsky felt he had been tricked. A

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1. Gooch, Before the War, I, for his reply.
2. The controversy is summed up in two articles in the Fortnightly Review of September and November of 1909 attributed to the two statesmen. Isvolsky's statement that he had been tricked over the date is hard to understand in view of his statement of September 25 to Herr von Schon at Berchtesgaden that the matter would be announced to the Delegations which were to meet on October 8. Gooch, Before the War, I, 400.

storm of indignation rose in Serbia, and there was talk of war. No warning of the change had been given to either the governments of France or of Britain. Turkey, very naturally, was most indignant, and in protest she organized a boycott of Austrian goods. In the eyes of Europe, presented with this "fait accompli," Turkey stood as a victim of Austrian aggression. It remained to be seen what stand the Powers would take.

Aehrenthal had anticipated that Germany would support her ally, Austria, although the Kaiser was furious that his government had not been warned when the annexation was to have taken place. The Austrian statesman felt that if Germany stood with Austria, Russia and France would submit. France, he knew, was only remotely interested in the Balkans, and Russia, after her recent defeat, was notoriously unprepared for war. But what stand would Britain take? If she were to take a strong stand her two associates might hold out with her, and in this event the situation might well become difficult.

Isvolsky was in a most painful position. He feared Aehrenthal was about to secure his part of the Buchlau agreement before he himself had obtained the assent of the Powers to his share. In Paris he found the French Government sympathetic but rather non-committal. The French were prepared to adhere to the Russian Alliance and give support to the Russian Government, but it was made clear that public opinion could not be converted to the notion that enough was at stake to risk a war. The French Government, moreover, disapproved of Russia's having come to an agreement with Austria without the knowledge of France.

In London he met with hardly little more success for his plans of opening the Straits. Grey admitted that the request for opening the Straits was "fair and reasonable" and not objectionable "in principle," but insisted they must be opened "on terms of equality to all." He refused to consider opening them to Russian warships while leaving them closed against those of other Powers. This of course was what Isvolsky wanted.[1] But though the Russian Minister had failed to win support for his main objective, his visit to London was not wholly in vain. Grey was not prepared to accept the sudden annexation of Bosnia by Austria as a "fait accompli." He felt that action was a blow to good faith and to treaty obligations and should be discussed at a Conference of the Powers. He maintained that the annexation was an untimely and unmerited blow at the Young Turks, who, as it appeared to him, were struggling to put their house in order, and for whom British sympathy was known to be strong. Accordingly, standing on principle, he called for a European Conference, and if then the annexation was approved, he felt Turkey must receive compensation.[2]

A visit to Berlin brought the unhappy Russian Minister no more comfort. Appeals to the German Government for discussion of the annexation at a Conference and for the

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1. Grey, op. cit., I, 177-179.
2. Ibid., 175-77; Trevelyan, op. cit., 224. Also, Spender, J. A., and Asquith, Cyril, Life of Lord Oxford and Asquith, (cited hereafter as Spender, Asquith), (London, 1932), I, 244-49.

opening of the Straits proved vain. He saw clearly that Germany was determined to stand by her ally.

Isvolsky saw his dreams fading; Britain would back him only in the matter of a Conference; and France was unwilling to give effective support in a matter in which she had not been consulted and in which she had little interest. Aehrenthal had the firm support of Germany, and with this support he refused to submit the question to a Conference unless it was agreed to beforehand that it would be held only to sanction the annexation and not to discuss it.

During the next few months no settlement was arrived at. Meanwhile the tension was increased by the excitement which was raging in Serbia, which country was putting forward loud claims for compensation. Encouraged by Russian sympathy, armed bands were massed along the Austrian frontier and agitators sent into Bosnia. To keep a check on this situation an Austrian army was mobilized and kept in readiness. Meanwhile the Austrian war party was suggesting that the time was now at hand for a final settlement with Serbia.

The situation became increasingly fraught with danger as the weeks rolled on. It was eased somewhat on February 26, 1909, by an offer of Austria to compensate Turkey for the loss of her shadowy rights over Bosnia-Herzogovina with two and a half million pounds. But Isvolsky was unwilling to agree that a direct understanding between Austria and Turkey excluded the necessity of submitting the whole question to a

Conference.[1] Isvolsky's failure, however, was a foregone conclusion. The Serbian claim had no legal justification, and it was clear neither England nor France would go to war over a Balkan question. Russia standing alone against Austria and Germany was unthinkable. In the weeks following Austria's settlement with Turkey the Great Powers made several attempts to reconcile Isvolsky's views with those of Aehrenthal. When no solution seemed possible the German Government on March 17 made a proposal of mediation to the Russian Minister which eventually relieved the tension.

The offer stated that the German Government would request Austria to invite the Powers to give their formal approval to the changes made by an exchange of notes, provided that Russia beforehand promised to give her sanction to the changes when invited by Austria to do so. Isvolsky, still clinging to the hope of a Conference, acknowledged the conciliatory purpose of the offer, but hesitated to give a definite answer.

A week later, when no answer had been received from Isvolsky, Germany renewed her offer of mediation, this time with greater emphasis, in a note of March 23, which has been interpreted as somewhat closely resembling an ultimatum. Before suggesting that Austria should approach the Powers, Germany wished definitely to know that Russia would accept the

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1. Isvolsky to the Russian Embassy at London, March 11, 1909, Siebert, B. de, Entente Diplomacy and the World, (New York, 1922), 248.

note, and Russia was informed "that a negative or even an evasive answer" on her part would result in Germany withdrawing and allowing "things to take their own course."[1]

Thus pinned down,[2] Isvolsky, after consulting the Czar, surrendered, and gave an affirmative reply. After Russia accepted the proposal, England, France and Italy agreed also, and the exchange of notes followed giving a belated sanction to the annexation. Serbia, too, yielded, deciding to place her hopes in the future. On March 31 she made an agreement with Vienna promising to live on good neighbourly terms with the Dual Monarchy.[3] The long crisis was over.

The results of this bloodless conflict on the chancelleries may not be passed over lightly. Its effects continued to be felt down the years until the time of the final conflict in 1914. In the phrase of Dr. Gooch, "it left deep scars on the body politic of Europe."[4] Austria had

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1. Isvolsky to Russian Embassies at Paris and London, March 23, 1909, Siebert, op. cit., 260.
2. The idea that this note was sent as an ultimatum grew up in later days. Mr. Fay claims that this idea was exploited in the Russian Press and used by Isvolsky deliberately to save his face before his critics. The idea that it was to be regarded as an ultimatum was spread in England by Sir Arthur Nicolson; Fay, op. cit., I, 391. Mr. Fay adds that it was not intended by the German Government as an ultimatum, but merely as an attempt to bridge the gulf between Russia and Austria, and to prevent war between Serbia and Austria. Mr. Gooch agrees with this view - Gooch, Before the War, I, 348. Mr. Spender appears to view the note as an ultimatum however; - Fifty Years, 310.
3. Fay, op. cit., I, 393.
4. Gooch, History of Modern Europe, (cited hereafter as Modern Europe), 422-23.

unquestionably secured a diplomatic victory, but a Pyrrhic victory; viewed in the light of later years it brought misfortune rather than success.[1] In the words of Mr. Dickinson, "Serbian irredentism had been provoked, and the formula she was constrained to sign was nothing but words".[2] She did not live up to her promise to "live in future on good neighbourly terms" with Austria - "she allowed her soil to be the hearth from which a subversive agitation was spread, encouraging disloyalty and treason among the Bosnians and other Slav subjects of the Hapsburg Monarchy."[3] And, as later events were to prove, this Serbian question threatened at every moment to involve Russia, and so Germany, France and Britain.

Furthermore, Aehrenthal had caused Europe to view with distrust Austrian diplomacy, and he incurred the odium attendant upon the unjustified breach of a solemn treaty. His ally, Germany, likewise, in giving her support to the Austrian action, incurred some of the suspicion which fell upon him; especially the suspicion among the Entente Powers. It was commonly held that the Imperial Government was an accomplice in the whole situation, approving of its ally's action. It has been shown how the attempt of Berlin to find a final solution which would sanction Austria's "fait accompli", and yet at the same time afford Isvolsky a dignified line of retreat from his most difficult position, was twisted into a "threat of force" or

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1. Churchill, op. cit., I, 31; Trevelyan, op. cit., 224.
2. Dickinson, op. cit., 181.
3. Fay, op. cit., I, 394.

"ultimatum." It was represented as a brutal German attempt to humiliate Russia and drive a wedge into the Triple Entente. It was set down as new evidence of the brutality of Germany's diplomatic methods.[1] It was used as further evidence to prove Germany's reputation of thirst for mastery and leadership, which was already obnoxious to France and the Western Powers.[2]

It was in Russia that the Bosnian Crisis left its most serious effects. In the press there was the most bitter resentment against a settlement which brought such deep humiliation and submission to the dictates of a foreign Power.[3] The Pan-Slav press was excited to a violent campaign against Germany, the tenor of which was that a war between Slavdom and Germanism was inevitable. To Isvolsky, personally, this diplomatic defeat was perhaps the most bitter experience of

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1. Fay, op. cit., 395-96.
2. Brandenburg, op. cit., 332. Confirmation seemed to be given to this feeling by Emperor William's vainglorious and tactless speech when on a visit to Vienna in 1910, he proclaimed to the world that he had stood by his ally "in shining armour" - Fay, op. cit., I, 396. Grey uses this speech against the Kaiser; op. cit., I, 186. It is interesting to note as Mr. Ewart, points out, that little notice has been taken of the fact that the British Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, by his speech at the Guildhall Banquet on November 9, 1908, plainly announced to the world that the United Kingdom was standing by her ally, France, and through France, by Russia. He said: "Nothing will induce us in this country to falter and fall short in any one of the special engagements which we have undertaken, to be disloyal or unfaithful even for a moment to the spirit of any existing friendship." Cited in Ewart, op. cit., I, 167-68.
3. Nicolson to Grey, March 29, 1909, Grey, op. cit., I, 188-89.

his life; the desire for revenge and for the recovery of lost personal prestige was never to leave him in the days which followed. The criticism levelled at him for his failure was one of the reasons for his leaving the Foreign Office for the Russian ambassadorship in Paris. There he was to work unceasingly for closer-knit bonds with France and England.[1]

In retirement Bülow stated with reference to the events of the years 1908-1909, "the group of Powers whose influence had been so much overestimated at Algeciras fell to pieces when faced with the tough problems of Continental policy."[2] Most certainly this is a sentiment of delusion, and not at all in accord with fact. If Austria and Germany had won a striking diplomatic victory, it was not at the expense of the Entente. The crisis in no way estranged the Three Powers. On the contrary, it had the completely opposite effect of consolidating and making much closer their relationship. In the face of what was interpreted as a Teutonic threat, the solidity of the Entente was considered even more of a necessity than previously, if German hegemony was to be checked. Mr. Churchill sums up the effects of the Crisis on France-Russian relations in these words:

> France, after her treatment in 1905, had begun a thorough military reorganization. Now Russia, in 1910 made an enormous increase in her already vast army; and both Russia and France, smarting under similar experiences, closed their ranks, cemented their alliances

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1. Fay, op. cit., I, p.397. Gooch, Before the War, I, 363.
2. Cited in Nicolson, op. cit., 309.

> and set to work to construct with Russian labour and French money, the new strategic railway systems of which Russia's western frontier stood in need. (1)

And the Russian Ambassador, writing from Paris on April 1, 1909, shows the result on all three Entente governments when he reported:

> In connection with this (the Crisis), German and Austrian journals have emphasized the success of Austrian diplomacy, and the predominant position of the Dual Monarchy in the Balkans. In consequence of this, public opinion in France as well as in England demands more and more a still greater rapprochement between Russia, France and England, as they have already acted in common during the Austrian-Serbian conflict. Foreseeing the further development of the European situation, many newspapers come to the conclusion that precisely as Germany and Austria have now achieved a brilliant victory, so must the two Western Powers, together with Russia, now pay their attention to the systematic development of their forces in order to be able, once they are in a position not to fear a challenge of the Triple Alliance - and in this case Italy would separate herself from the Triple Alliance - to set up on their part demands which would restore the political balance which has now been displaced in favour of Germany and Austria .... This is the direction which the Paris, and also apparently, the London cabinet wish to give to their policy. (2)

In another report of the same date he wrote:

> The cabinets of Paris and London have concluded from this that Russia, France and England must pay more attention than ever to action in common and must at the same time proceed to the necessary military measures in order to convince their opponents they are dealing with a political combination which knows how to make itself respected and to carry through its demands. (3)

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1. Churchill, op. cit., I, 31.
2. Russian Ambassador at Paris to Isvolsky, April 1, 1909, Siebert, op. cit., 266-67.
3. Ibid., 269-70.

The Czar expressed a similar view when he assured Nicolson on April 14 that the result of the crisis had been to strengthen the Entente. "We must," he said, "keep closer and closer together."[1]

Important as is the Crisis of 1908 as a factor in the consolidating the Triple Entente, in the matter of England's participation in the alignment of the Powers before 1914 there was an infinitely more important factor, namely, the naval rivalry with Germany. Among all the many problems making for rivalry this question stands out in the foreground. In the Navy Law of 1900 Germany had embarked on her plan for building her navy. Britain, having "ruled the waves" for a hundred years, felt that rivalry in battleships was not only a menace in the matter of a possible attack, but an unwarranted infringement upon her rightful prerogative. German rivalry in colonies, in industry, in trade, or in shipping, these might have been tolerated, but a rival in the matter of naval power - never. Official assurances by German leaders failed utterly to dispel anxiety roused by the appearance of a German navy, the completion of the Kiel Canal and the fortification of Heligoland. It

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1. Nicolson, op. cit., 313. The next year a misunderstanding arose between the Entente Powers in connection with the Czar's visit to the Kaiser at Potsdam on November 4, 1910. Sazonov, who accompanied the Czar, had interviews with the German Chancellor and Foreign Secretary. In the conversations during the visit Sazonov promised Germany a free hand, so far as Russia was concerned, in the completion of the Bagdad Railway. France feared that Germany was trying to weaken the Dual Alliance. It was feared in England that Russia was abandoning the Triple Entente. The German press paid glowing tributes to Russia on account of what was regarded as a blow to France and England. As a matter of fact none of these apprehensions or hppes, it transpired, were justified. Nicolson, op. cit.,336-38.

cannot be denied that Germany, in the words of Mr. Haldane, was within her "unfettered rights" in building up a fleet, if she chose to follow such a policy, but the fact remained, that in choosing such a course she rendered impossible friendly relations with England, and by persistently clinging to that policy, she raised an almost insurmountable barrier to English amity. The inevitable result followed - the maintenance of close cooperation with France and Russia "became the pivot of British foreign policy."[1]

The start of the rivalry goes back to the opening of the century when the first beginnings of the German navy resulted in the adoption by the British Government of the Cawdor programme calling for four new battleships a year. Sir John Fisher, who was appointed First Sea Lord in 1904, proceeded drastically to change the distribution and composition of the fleet. The Channel Squadron was greatly reinforced and a Home Fleet stationed in the North Sea. The harbour of Rosyth in Scotland was developed into a permanent base, and in 1905 the "Dreadnought," the first of a new type of ship, which far surpassed all previous types in fighting power, was laid down. On February 3, 1905, Mr. Arthur Lee, First Lord of the Admiralty, in a speech to his constitutents struck an ominous note when he declared that the British fleet should concentrate

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1. Ewart, op. cit., II, 683.

in the North Sea, and in anticipation of war, should "strike the first blow, before the other side found time to read in the newspapers that war had been declared."[1]

These events had inevitable repercussions in Germany. Tirpitz in a new Naval Bill of 1906 added six new cruisers to the German fleet which had been refused in 1900, and secured money to widen the Kiel Canal. Anglo-German naval rivalry had begun in earnest; a dangerous stage was thus reached in 1906 with the admiralties of each Power attributing aggressive designs to the other.

The Liberal Government which took office under Campbell-Bannerman in December, 1905, was opposed to increases in naval estimates. Pledged to inaugurate an extensive programme of social reforms there was need of economy in the matter of armaments.[2] As a result the naval estimates for 1906-08 showed a slight decrease. It was stated that one of of the four ships provided for in the Cawdor programme would be omitted, and the prime minister announced his intentions of proposing limitation of armaments at the second Hague Conference which had been called to meet in 1907. This intention was communicated to the other Powers. Any hope of the British for success in this plan was dispelled when the German Government announced that it could not take part in any such discussion

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1. Cited in Ewart, II, II, op. cit., 682.
2. Speech of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, December 21, 1905; Fay, op. cit., I, 237.
3. Belgian Minister in London, July 28, 1906, Morel, op. cit., 49.

since it was felt to be impractical, and insisted that the matter of limitation should not be raised at the Conference.[1] Despite this attitude of Germany, the subject was brought up at the fourth plenary session by the British delegate. The matter, however, was passed over almost without debate and nothing of value achieved. It was unfortunate Germany did not take up this offer. There is little reason to believe that discussion would have led to any valuable formulae which could have prevented the catastrophe of 1914, but her participation in such discussion would have lightened British suspicions of her peaceful intentions, and saved her from incurring the odium of having wrecked the proposals.[2]

The Kaiser's visit to Windsor in November, 1907, seemed to somewhat lessen the tension which had been growing up between the two countries. He was most cordially received, and friends of peace in both countries were filled with satisfaction.[3] The aspirations of peace and friendship expressed by press and leaders appeared to be fully realized. The visit had not been intended for political discussion, but the matter of the Bagdad Railway did arise.[4] Sir Edward Grey

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1. Russia and Austria were also opposed to its being discussed.
2. Fay, op. cit., I, 233; Brandenburg, op. cit., 277-78.
3. Lee, op. cit., II, 557-559.
4. Ibid., 559. The Kaiser spoke of it first of all to Mr. Haldane who took the matter up with Grey.

Sir Edward Grey insisted that in any settlement of this question France and Russia would have to be consulted, for their interests were involved.[1] Some weeks later the Berlin Government stated its readiness to discuss the Railway with the British Government but placed a veto on discussion with Russia and France. The matter ended there.[2]

This royal visit had brought a short period of reconciliation between the two countries. For a few weeks Anglo-German relations had breathed a cordiality they had not known for some years, and which they were not to know again for years to come. Under the influence of a warm royal welcome relationships had yielded to a revival of family associations, and a desire to resume the political intimacy of earlier years. But the good omens were soon to vanish, as darkening clouds filled the sky.[3]

With the opening of 1908 the atmosphere became charged with electricity. Germany was unwilling to admit the right of any foreign Power to dictate the extent of her naval armaments. While William II was on English soil a new German Naval Bill reduced the life of battleships from twenty-five to twenty years, and provided for the early replacement of old obsolete vessels by new ships of the new Dreadnought type. The construction of the new and replacement ships was to proceed at

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1. Note of conversation between Grey and Haldane, November 14, 1907, B.D., VI, No.62, pp.95-96.
2. Lee, op. cit., II, 559-561. Haldane, op.cit., 62-66.
3. Lee, op. cit., II, 563.

the rate of four a year from 1908 to 1911 and two a year from 1912 to 1917. It was this programme which seems to have brought home to the English ministers the full seriousness of the situation.[1]

The Press on both sides was whipping up national passions. Then, early in 1908 the Kaiser wrote his well-meant but injudicious letter to Lord Tweedsmouth, the First Lord of the British Admiralty.[2] This was a private letter, sent without the Imperial Chancellor's knowledge, in which the Emperor sought to produce a tranquillizing effect by emphasizing the fact that Germany was not thinking of challenging Britain's supremacy of the sea, and in which he endeavoured to justify the German naval programme.[3] Lord Tweedsmouth sent a courteous reply. But vague rumours of the exchange of letters leaked out to reach the public ear.[4] The Kaiser was suspected of attempting to influence a British minister to effect reductions in the naval budget. The matter came up in Parliament, where the English leaders defended their colleague, who had shown them the letter, and they maintained that the matter was one of a purely private exchange of letters. The matter was thus closed.[5] It was,however, a most imprudent act of the Kaiser's, well-intended no doubt, but tactless, and it brought untoward results

1. Fay, op. cit., I, 237. Brandenburg, op. cit., 278.
2. For this incident see B.D. VI, No.88, 89, 90, 91.
3. Lee, op. cit., II, 606.
4. The "Times," March 6, 1908; article by Colonel Repington.
5. Lee, op. cit., II, 607.

which added fuel to the flames of national feeling, and widened the gulf between the two countries.

The growing conviction in Germany that England was trying to put a check on her navy, and "encircle" her in other ways, was fostered to a still greater extent by numerous visits and interviews which Edward VII had with French and Russian rulers and ministers in the summer of 1908.[1] In May President Fallières was cordially received in London,[2] and given a dinner at the Foreign Office, to which the only person invited outside the French and English group, was the Russian Ambassador.[3] In June King Edward visited the Czar at Reval, accompanied by Admiral Fisher, Sir John French and Sir Charles Hardinge, who had long conversations with Isvolsky and the Russian Premier, Stolypin. There was no attempt to Reval to build up a closer Anglo-Russian combination, and assurances were offered to Germany that no unfriendly steps towards her were taken.[4] But the visit put the seal on the Anglo-Russian reconciliation, and rumours of agreements hostile to Germany increased the conviction that the Fatherland was being hemmed in.[5] When in

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1. Lee, op. cit., II, 596; Fay, op. cit., I, 240.
2. Lister to Grey, May 28, 1908, B.D.VI, No.95, pp.149-150. Lee, op. cit., II, 584-86.
3. Fay, op. cit., I, 240.
4. Grey to do Salis, June 15, 1908, B.D.VI, No.97, p.154.
5. The idea that King Edward was a busy intriguer using these visits for political ends, particularly for weakening the Triple Alliance and for "encircling" Germany became more deeply rooted in the German mind. Lee, op. cit., II, 596. Grey's comment on the years 1907-1908 are of interest. He says, "In looking through old papers, it is depressing to read of the distrust and suspicion with which Governments and peoples regarded each other in these years. The impression given is of an atmosphere so miserable and unwholesome that nothing healthy could live in it;

the course of his stay abroad in the summer of 1908 His Majesty visited the Austrian Emperor at Ischl, vague rumours arose that England was endeavouring to weaken the Triple Alliance by winning the support of Austria from Germany.[1]

No one recognized the Anglo-German tension more clearly, nor deplored it to a greater extent, that did Count Metternich in London, who accurately guaged the British feeling in this matter of naval armaments. He kept the German Government informed of British opinion, pointing out that while there was no real hostility to Germany there was a growing fear of her naval power, and that the increase of the German fleet prevented confidence. The Kaiser was incensed at the Ambassador's suggestion that English friendship could be obtained only at the cost of Germany's fleet. "If England only intends graciously to offer us her hand on condition that we reduce our fleet, that is an unparalleled impertinence, and a bitter insult to the German people and their Kaiser, which the Ambassador must reject."[2] He was of course strengthened in this attitude by the leading naval circles.

A positive refusal to discuss limitation was put forward by the Kaiser when Hardinge broached the subject to him on the occasion of King Edward's visit to Cronberg in August

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op.cit.,I,143. Again, speaking of the royal visits he states, "An even more fertile source of suspicion were royal visits. These visits were matters of civility and courtesy; as such their effect was good; they made a friendly atmosphere. But they caused me the greatest trouble;" (ibid., 149-151.

1. Gooch, Modern Europe, 439. Grey, op.cit., I, 150.
2. Cited in Brandenburg, op. cit., 284.

of 1908.[1] Hardinge explained the uneasiness of the British leaders and pointed out the dangers of naval competition. He insisted on the necessity of limiting such rivalry; "You must stop or build more slowly." The discussion became rather heated; and the Kaiser replied rather brusquely, "Then we shall fight, for it is a question of national honour and dignity."[2] It was the last time that the British Government officially suggested an agreed limitation. In the following months English alarm steadily increased, and the tide of excited feeling rose higher.

In October, 1908, further antagonism between the two countries was caused by the publication of the "Daily Telegraph" interview.[3] A conversation the Kaiser had held with a private citizen, Colonel Stuart-Wortley, whose guest the Emperor had been in 1907, was published with his approval in October 28, 1908. The interview was undoubtedly meant as a sincere gesture of friendship and as a contribution to friendly relations. But it produced the opposite result. The dominant note of the reported interview was the Kaiser's avowed friendship for Great Britain, as evinced both openly and secretly during the years of the Boer War, and since steadily maintained, though neither shared by his own people nor recognized by the British. He declared that although Germany was expanding her navy, the sole aim of her fleet was the protection of her

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1. Lee, op. cit., II, 618.
2. Fay, op. cit., I, 242; Brandenburg, op. cit., 243. The long memorandum of Sir Charles Hardinge, August 16,1908, B.D. VII, No.117, pp.184-90.
3. For this incident see B.D. VI, pp.201ff.

increasing trade, the maintenance of German interests in the Far East. He posed throughout his reported words as one who was completely misunderstood in Great Britain.[1]

The gesture was another pathetic example of the Kaiser's ineptitude. However well-intentioned, it increased the "malaise" it was intended to dispel.[2] His protestation of friendship was jeered in England; his sincerity was doubted, and the idea that his advice had been of service against the Boers was resented. But his admission that the German public was hostile to Britain was noted, and thus further colour was added to the British mind of Germany as an Anglophobe nation. The publication of the interview caused a storm of newspaper attacks on both sides of the Channel. In Germany the action was regarded as most ill-considered, and attacks were made on the personal rule of the Kaiser by the Liberals and Socialists.[3]

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1. Lee, op. cit., II, 621.
2. Grey wrote in this connection, "The German Emperor is ageing me; he is like a battleship with steam up and screws going, but with no rudder, and he will run into something some day and cause a catastrophe." Grey to Ella Pease, November 8, 1908, cited in Trevelyan, op. cit., 154.
3. Before the interview was published the Kaiser had sent the manuscript to the Foreign Office for approval. It was forwarded to Bülow who was taking a cure at Norderney. He unfortunately omitted to read it. Minor officials did not venture on any criticisms, supposing it had Bülow's approval; it was allowed to go out, and was published October 28, 1908. As a result of the storm raised by this mistake Bülow offered his resignation, which was declined. In the debate which followed in the Reichstag the Kaiser felt the Chancellor did not adequately defend him and this incident led to a growing coolness between them. Brandenburg, op. cit., 291.

In 1908 belief in England that the German "menace" was a reality was growing stronger. Powerful voices were striking this note, and the danger was portrayed in such a manner as to catch popular imagination. From the opening of the century the "National Review" had preached Germany as "the enemy." Lord Cromer in a speech in the House of Lords in July, 1908, urged the Government to make provision for a coming conflict. On November 23 Lord Roberts in the same place made a stirring appeal for compulsory military service. Sir John Fisher had talked to King Edward of the wisdom of "Copenhagening" the German Fleet.[1] In France also similar feelings were growing. During his cure at Marienbad in August of 1908 King Edward received a visit from Clemenceau, the French Premier, who urged upon England the creation of a national army.[2] To what extent these views represented public opinion is uncertain, but as long as the question of naval armaments remained unsolved, normal relations between Germany and England were an impossibility. The United Kingdom would not permit encroachment upon her ocean-predominance.

As has been shown above Metternich in London was greatly perturbed over the growing tension; he saw the two countries drifing into misunderstandings and recriminations which might soon lead to war. "It is not the economic development of Germany which makes our relations to England

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1. Lee, op. cit., II, 604.
2. Goschen to Grey, August 29, 1908; B.D., VI, No.109, pp.157-58; Lee, op. cit., II, 628.

worse from year to year, but the rapid increase of our fleet."[1] He suggested the desirability of slowing down the German programme of construction from four to three ships annually, and of trying to arrive at some understanding with England. Bülow personally favoured such a policy, and stirred by the Ambassador's repeated warnings, he took up the matter with Tirpitz. The Admiral's answer was a decided negative; he disagreed absolutely with the Ambassador's diagnosis of the situation. There must be no slowing down of pace, but rather the pressing forward of the programme with iron energy. If such alterations in the naval programme were insisted upon, as Bülow suggested, he would resign. The correspondence between the Chancellor and Tirpitz ended with Bülow giving way; they came to no agreement, and Bülow virtually abandoned Metternich's suggestion for the time at least.

In February of 1909 there arose a new opportunity for coming to some agreement with England, but it came to nothing. The visit of the English King and Queen to Berlin produced a momentary détente.[2] Lord Crewe who accompanied their Majesties touched upon the question of naval competition in conversation with Bülow, but while the conversations were friendly enough, and while cordial assurances were given, they were without significance.[3]

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1. Metternich to Bülow, cited in Gooch, Before the War, I, 269.
2. Lee, op. cit., II, 673-77.
3. Gooch, Before the War, I, 272.

Metternich reported at this time that the British Government believed Germany to be secretly accelerating her programme, that they were secretly alarmed, but had not asked for an explanation. Bülow replied that no acceleration was planned. This statement produced little effect, however, since the British leaders preferred the information of the British Admiralty. Grey unofficially suggested an occasional exchange of information, but Bülow replied that since precise declarations were not believed such a plan would be of no use. When, however, Asquith and Grey suggested inspection by the respective Naval Attachés, the Chancellor advised the acceptance of the proposal as a means of calming opinion in England. Tirpitz was also in favour of this within certain limits, but the Kaiser refused his consent.[1]

In England the suspicion grew that Germany was building at a faster rate than prescribed by law. The effect of the rivalry of the past few years came to a climax in the spring of 1909 in the form of the "German naval scare." As a result of the increasing British agitation, Mr. McKenna, First Lord of the Admiralty, in his speech of March 16, 1909, proposed that for three years England should lay down six Dreadnoughts. To aid his argument he hinted that Germany, by concealing her building activities, had almost reached equality in naval power with Britain. His words crystallized the

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1. Gooch, op. cit., 272-73; Brandenburg, op. cit., 294-95.

general feeling of uneasiness which existed in England. This speech was followed by an Opposition attack led by Mr. Balfour which increased the prevailing fear. He pictured most vividly "the alarming circumstances in which this country finds itself," and declared that "the programme as presented by the Government is utterly insufficient." By 1910, he said, Germany would be ahead of Britain with thirteen Dreadnoughts to Britain's ten. By 1912 Germany would have twenty-five. His figures, time was to prove, were unbelievably fantastic - in 1912 Germany had only twelve. But the British were in a mood to believe the wildest prophesying. "There was no limit to the stupidity of the stories which filled the newspapers, and the conversation of the readers."[1] The demand arose over all England, "we want eight and we won't wait," and in response to this cry, fantastic though it was, and based upon nothing more than suspicion, dislike and apprehension, the eight were voted.[2] Although Mr. McKenna later admitted his statements to have been incorrect, they had done their damage in further increasing Anglo-German antagonism.[3]

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1. Ewart, op. cit., II, 690. Reports of the Belgian Minister in Berlin, March 22 and 31, 1909, Morel, op. cit., 151-53.
2. Spender, Asquith, I, 253.
3. Fay, op. cit., I, 298. Mr. Winston Churchill, who succeeded Mr. McKenna as First Lord of the Admiralty, has the following to say of this "naval scare;" "I was still a sceptic about the danger of the European situation, and not convinced by the Admiralty case. In conjunction with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, I proceeded at once to canvass this scheme and to examine the reasons by which it was supported. The conclusions which we both reached were that a programme of four ships would sufficiently meet our needs .... I could not agree with the Admiralty contention that a dangerous situation would be reached in the year 1912. I found the Admiralty figures on this subject

In July of 1909 Bethman-Hollweg succeeded von Bülow as Imperial Chancellor, and Kinderlen-Wachter entered the German foreign office. The former was powerless to alter the course which had been set in the past few years, but he agreed with Metternich as to the need for coming to some agreement over the naval question with England. His views were shared by the new Foreign Secretary. Thus a more accomodating spirit entered into the Wilhelmstrasse. The new Chancellor was determined on a frank exchange of views, and with this in mind he opened negotiations with the British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Edward Goschen, in August 1909.[1] The discussions thus begun, and which lasted during the next few months, took much the same course as the later ones of 1912. The Germans insisted, that desirable as any building truce might be in itself, it must be conditional upon a political agreement.[2] In the eyes of the British, however, there was little hope of a political agreement unless the tension was first relaxed by a substantial naval reduction.[3]

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were exaggerated .... The gloomy Admiralty anticipations were in no respect fulfilled in the year 1912. The British margin was found to be ample in that year. There were no secret German Dreadnoughts, nor had Admiral von Tirpitz made any untrue statement in respect of major construction. The Admiralty had demanded six ships; the economists offered four; and we finally compromised on eight." op. cit., I, 32-33.

1. Goschen to Grey, August 21, 1909, B.D., VI, No.186, p.283; No.187, p.284.
2. Ibid., pp.283-84.
3. Nicolson to Grey, September 22, 1909; B.D., VI, No.198, p.291. Goschen to Grey, October 15, 1909, ibid., No.200, pp.293-96.

There was little room for compromise. The German Government could not agree to any departure from their building programme, (since it was claimed this would not be supported in the Reichstag), but they were willing to discuss "retarding the rate" of building new ships.[1] The draft political agreement that was suggested proposed that in the event of an attack made on either Party by a third Power or group of Powers the Party not attacked should remain neutral.[2] The signing of such an agreement by the British would prevent them from supporting France or Russia and from taking a part in future Continental affairs in which they might be greatly interested.[3] Neither in 1909, nor in 1912, was Britain willing to pledge neutrality. It is not surprising therefore that the proposal was turned down. Politically it was open to the gravest objections, and on the naval side it offered no substantial reduction.[4]

The negotiations were taken up several times in the next year but led to no result.[5] The British suggested the plan of instituting periodical reports by the naval attachés on both sides as to the progress of building new vessels, and

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1. Goschen to Grey, November 4, 1909, B.D.VI, No.204, p.305.
2. Ibid.
3. Grey to Goschen, May 5, 1910; ibid., No.361, p.479.
4. Nicolson to Goschen, February 6, 1911, Nicolson, op. cit., 339.
5. Memorandum of Sir Edward Grey, B.D., VI, July 29, 1910, enclosure in No.387, pp.501-502.

the inspection of shipyards in both countries, in order to remove the suspicion of the English that Germany was building more ships than was officially admitted.[1] But these came to nothing.[2] During 1909 and 1910 English domestic politics was disturbed by the acute constitutional struggle waged by the two Houses over finances. There were two general elections. These circumstances interfered with negotiations with Germany so that by the end of 1910 no progress had been made.[3]

Despite the failure to mitigate the rivalry, the Anglo-German tension seemed less acute by 1911. The death of King Edward seemed to bring about a slight détente.[4] The Kaiser had come to London for the funeral in May, 1910, and his manifest sympathy was warmly appreciated.[5] In May, 1911, he accepted King George's invitation to attend the unveiling of a statue of Queen Victoria. His reception in London was most cordial. Shortly afterwards the Crown Prince attended the coronation of King George. But just at this time, when the tension seemed eased, a new crisis broke out in Morocco, the Crisis of Agadir, which put to an end the political dead calm.

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1. Memorandum of Sir Edward Grey, July 29, 1910, B.D., VI, No.387, pp.501-2, and statement handed to Tirpitz by Captain Watson, August 24, 1910. B.D., VI, enclosure 3 in No.397, pp.517-18.
2. Brandenburg, op. cit., 368-369.
3. The negotiations outlined in the previous pages were summarised for the Cabinet Committee in a memorandum of May 24, 1911 by Sir Edward Grey, given in B.D., VI, No. 468, pp.631-35.
4. Gooch, Modern Europe, 457.
5. Brandenburg, op. cit., 359.

Thus, up to 1911, attempts to solve the rivalry in naval armaments had failed. It is difficult to see how there could have been any result but failure. During all the discussions the fundamental issues had not been touched. Was it possible to reconcile the interests of two powerful states - the one of which desired to prevent change, the other of which was bent on changing a ratio of power which it felt to be unjust? Each side approached the question from its own point of view only. Each could make out a good case for itself; each had grounds for fear; each changed and magnified the objective of the other. Underlying this fundamental issue there were two significant problems - Britain was unwilling to make any political agreement with Germany which would in any respect limit her existing relationship with France - and Germany was unwilling to make any reduction in her naval programme which would satisfy Britain. While this question of naval rivalry remained no nearer solution, adhesion to the Triple Entente seemed more than ever a necessity to Britain.

CHAPTER V

The Agadir Crisis, 1911

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On July 1, 1911, the diplomatic world was startled and alarmed by an announcement on the part of the German Government that a gunboat, the "Panther," had been dispatched to Agadir. Agadir was an Atlantic port in the extreme south of Morocco, some five hundred miles south of Tangier. It was claimed that German firms established in the south of Morocco had been alarmed by unrest among the local tribesmen and had applied to the home government for protection. The gunboat had been sent to their assistance, and to watch over German interests, which were said to be considerable in that area. As soon as normal tranquillity had been restored the ship would leave.[1] The news of this action on the part of the German Government, for which no warning had been given, aroused indignation and surprise in the chancelleries of Europe.[2] What did it mean? To find an answer it will be necessary to review the course of Moroccan affairs after the Conference of Algeciras.

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1. B.D., VII, No.338, p.322. Aide-mémoire communicated by Count Metternich, July 1, 1911; No.339, pp.322-23, minute by Sir Arthur Nicolson.
2. Agadir was a closed port, and not open to trade. It was doubted if there were German residents or merchants in the vicinity.

The Conference of 1906 had produced no truly satisfactory conditions in Morocco; it was followed by neither improvement in the internal conditions, nor by improvement in the relations between France and Germany. The French found themselves busily engaged in the onerous and thankless task of enforcing economic and administrative reforms. The Sultan's brother, Mulai Hafid, gained a strong following among the chieftains, who resented French and Spanish intrusion, and with this backing he revolted. In the disorders which arose in 1907 the murder of a doctor gave the French occasion to occupy Oudja, near the Algerian border, and further outrages led to the landing of troops in Casablanca and to the placing of French police in seaports on the west coast. In the struggle Mulai Hafid proved strong enough to depose his brother.[1]

While negotiations were being carried on with regard to the recognition of the new Sultan, an incident at Casablanca threatened to cause a serious breach in Franco-German relations. Six deserters from the French Foreign Legion had been assisted by the German Consul at Casablanca in an attempt to escape aboard a German ship in September, 1908. French soldiers attempted to arrest them, and in the struggle which followed two German officials were maltreated. Over this incident a bitter dispute arose between the two governments. In spite of the excitement which flared in the press good sense prevailed

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1. Ewart, op. cit., II, 806-13. For a criticism of French policy in Morocco during these years see the reports of the Belgian Minister in Berlin given in Morel, op. cit., p.68-70, 71-72, 117-18, 118-20, 121-22, 181.

among the leaders, for fault existed on both sides. The matter was referred to the Hague Tribunal for arbitration which declared both parties must share the blame. The incident itself was not important, but minor episode though it was, it proved painful and dangerous, and precipitated almost a crisis in the whole Moroccan Question and in the relations between France and Germany.[1]

The Incident is important also in that it reveals clearly, as did the affairs of 1905 and 1906, how the British and French Entente policy might have become operative. In November, before the affair was settled, the French Government, through Sir Francis Bertie, asked whether France could count on the support of Britain in resisting what they chose to term ''the unjustifiable demands'' of the German Government.[2] This request obviously contemplated for certain eventualities military support. Grey placed the following minute on Bertie's dispatch: ''The line, if the question becomes acute, will have to be decided by the Cabinet.''[3] This reply or comment, which presumably would be conveyed to the French Government, was certainly not a refusal to consider giving support, and as Professor Mowat suggests, it would not, according to the normal

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1. Gooch, Before the War, I, 275; B.D., VII, pp.109-131. The fears of the British officials that the incident might lead to grave results - minutes to No.129, p.118. Also, see Nicolson to Grey, November 5, 1908, No.130, p.118, for the alarm of the Russian Government.
2. Bertie to Grey, November 4, 1908, B.D., VII, No.129, p.117.
3. Ibid., p.118.

interpretation of diplomatic language, be considered discouraging.[1]

France, however, had no need at this time to ask further for the contemplated support. But there was little doubt that the increasing activity of the French in Morocco would inevitably result in the establishment of a preponderating political influence there. No one saw this more clearly than the Kaiser, and it is to his credit that he displayed much wisdom in favouring a policy of friendly conciliation. He had never favoured the Bülow-Holstein Moroccan policy, and he now came to the conclusion that it was impossible to check the extension of French control in Morocco without resort to force. On October 4, 1908, he informed his Foreign Office that so far as was practicable Germany should withdraw with dignity from Moroccan affairs, and come to an understanding with France.[2]

Bülow was by this time also in favour of liquidating this question, and he thus intimated to France that Germany would be willing to negotiate a settlement. Pichon, the French premier, was anxious to avoid friction with Germany and favoured a "détente."[3] After short negotiations an agreement was signed on February 9, 1909. "To facilitate the execution of the Act of Algeciras," France, professing still to respect the independence and integrity of Morocco, promised equality

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1. Mowat, R.B., New Light on the Agadir Crisis, the Contemporary Review, Vol.141, June, 1932, 709.
2. Fay, op. cit., I, 247-48.
3. Gooch, Before the War, I, 276.

of economic opportunity to the Germans; and Germany, promising to pursue only economic aims, recognized the special political interests of France in preserving peace and order, and promised not to interfere with them.[1]

The conciliatory attitude of Germany was warmly welcomed in France as putting an end to a long standing source of irritation between the two nations. The British Government, too, was delighted, and expressed pleasure that a question which had occasioned such anxiety to England, and over which England was bound to give France support, was now settled.[2] It was welcomed as well in most of the European capitals, more especially at this particular time, since Europe was entangled in the Bosnian Crisis.

But unfortunately for the peace of Europe this pact of 1909 proved only a breathing-space and not a solution of Moroccan problems. For a short time it did bring about more cordial relations between France and Germany, but it did not bring to fruition all the happy results expected of it. The proposed economic partnership served as a basis for friendly relations during the next two years, and cooperation in the economic field was begun hopefully. But every one of the schemes embarked upon proved failures, whatever may have been the intentions of the parties. This was seen in plans made with regard to mines, railways, and other public works. At every

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1. Fay, op. cit., I, 248.
2. Grey to Goschen, February 9, 1909, B.D., VII, No.152, p.136, and Grey to Bertie, February 9, 1909, No.153, pp.136-37.

point, in every region, arrangements broke down.[1] The Germans, not unnaturally, were angry and mistrustful. And as a result of the failure of the Agreement to reconcile the economic interests of the two Powers political crises continued to occur.

At the same time, while the Pact of 1909 was failing to bring forth the results for which it had been arranged, further disorders in Morocco were furnishing the French with a pretext for a steady extension of their police and military control. It can be easily understood that in the eyes of Germany the stipulated basis of the agreement, "the maintenance of the independence and integrity of the Shereefian Empire," was becoming more and more of a myth.[2] "It became clearer and clearer that with this extension of French influence the equality of economic opportunity contemplated in the 1909 Agreement, and the idea of an independent Sultan at the head of a well-regulated government, were both fictions in contradiction with the actual trend of events."[3]

It was while events were passing thus in Morocco that Sir Edward Grey was asked in the House of Commons, in March of 1911, a question with regard to England's obligations to support France. Both his reply to this question, and the attitude of

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1. Dickinson, op. cit., 189; Ewart, op. cit., II, 815-17. For a criticism of French policy in this regard see Fabre-Luce, op. cit., 123, and Halévy, Elie, World Crisis, 1914-1918, (London, 1930), 24.
2. Brandenburg, op. cit., 370.
3. Fay, op. cit., I, 278. For the way in which France continued to extend financial and military control over the Sultan, see Ewart, op. cit., II, 808-24 and The Belgian Minister in Berlin, April 21, 1911, Morel, op. cit., 177-78, and May 1, 1911, ibid., 181.

the French Foreign Minister to that reply are of interest, to say the least. Did there exist at the time he entered into office, Sir Edward was asked, any understanding, "expressed or implied, in virtue of which Great Britain would be under obligations to France to send troops, in certain eventualities, to assist the operations of the French army?" Grey replied, "The extent of the obligations to which Great Britain was committed was that expressed or implied in the Anglo-French Convention laid before Parliament. There was no other engagement bearing on the subject."[1] This answer, of course, gave no hint of the secret articles of the 1904 Agreement which were unknown to Parliament at this time,[2] nor of the military and naval "conversations" which began in 1906.

When M. Cruppi, the French Foreign Minister, heard of Sir Edward's answer he complained to Sir Francis Bertie in Paris that Grey's statement was rather regrettably positive in its denial of the existence of an obligation to support France. "He regretted that you had found it necessary to repudiate so strongly the existence of any unknown Agreement between England and France, for your repudiation has had a regrettable effect in certain Parliamentary circles. He (M. Cruppi) knew what had passed between the Departments of the two Governments for he had seen the dossier. He would have preferred that there should have been a suspicion that an

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1. B.D., VII, No.197, p.182.
2. Supra.

understanding did exist for possible eventualities."[1]

Meanwhile trouble was rising in Morocco. The new Sultan had roused native discontent, as had his predecessor, by his subservience to the French. This discontent came to a head in March, 1911, when a revolt broke out in Fez. This was the situation when the French sent out alarming reports that the Europeans in Fez were in danger. On April 5, Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador in Berlin, informed the German Government that a French expedition was to be dispatched to Fez to relieve the Sultan and to ensure the safety of the Europeans there. The troops started early in April, and arrived in Fez on May 21.

The expedition was not dispatched before warning had been sent to the various Powers; and not before Kiderlen, who directed Germany's policy at this time, and the Chancellor had offered repeated warnings that such action might reopen the whole Moroccan Question. They warned Cambon that the occupation of Fez might be considered as a further step in the annulling of the Act of Algeciras, and that it would entitle Germany to resume complete liberty of action. They expressed the hope that the action would be delayed as long as possible, and that France and Germany might work out a satisfactory compromise on Moroccan affairs. This was a hint at compensation for Germany. It was pointed out that it was much easier to occupy a city than to leave it, and that once

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1. Bertie to Grey, April 9, 1911, B.D., VII, No.205, pp.188-89.

Fez was in French possession public opinion on both sides would be roused, and a compromise would be difficult. They did not give an approval, nor did they lodge a protest, but contented themselves with warnings, preferring to wait on events.[1] The French insisted that the action was only due to extreme necessity, and would be expressed in accordance with the spirit of the Act of Algeciras. The troops would restore order and then retire.

Sir Edward Grey accepted the assurances of the French Government without question, and in pursuance of treaty promises to give France diplomatic support in Morocco, approved the expedition. Some English leaders at first shared the German feelings as to the difficulty of withdrawal once French troops had undertaken occupation. Sir Arthur Nicolson, the Foreign Under-Secretary, reports the Russian Ambassador in London, "did not conceal from me the fact that the Morocco question is disquieting the London Cabinet.... The experience of all European states, beginning with England, shows that it is easier to occupy a city than to withdraw again.[2]

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1. Bertie to Grey, April 25, 1911, B.D., VII, No.216, p.199. Goschen to Grey, April 28, 1911, ibid., No.227, p.206 and No.229, p.207. Minute by Sir Arthur Nicolson, April 28, 1911, ibid., No.230, p.209. Ewart, op. cit., II, 829-831; Fay, op. cit., I, 278-79. Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to Sazonov, April 13, and April 28, 1911, Siebert, op. cit., 578-80.
2. Russian Ambassador at London to Neratov, May 9, 1911 and May 23, 1911; Siebert, op. cit., 581. The question has been raised - were Europeans in real danger? On this point there is much conflict of evidence. How true the French reports were, to what extent they were exaggerated as a pretext for their actions, it is difficult to say. Fay, op. cit., I, 280; Dickinson, op. cit., 194;

It is important to note at this stage that Delcassé, who had been forced from office over the Moroccan problem in 1905, had again become a member of the French Cabinet in March, 1911. He had not charge of foreign affairs, but held only the naval portfolio. The Prime Minister, Monis, had told the German Ambassador that he had taken Delcassé into his cabinet on account of his notable work in the navy, and because of his great technical knowledge. He further assured the Ambassador that "Delcassé has firmly promised not to mix in foreign policy; anyway his views today differ from those of some years ago."[1] But with the memories of 1905-06 unforgotten, it was natural that the German press should suspect Delcassé of taking a leading part in the directing of France's Moroccan policy of 1911.[2] The Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, writing to Sazonov on April 28, informed him that "in some of the German papers, Delcassé is regarded as the true originator of French Moroccan policy."[3] M. Cruppi was Foreign Minister, but he was

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Ewart, op. cit., II, 834. Apparently neither the British nor German Governments had any apprehensions for the safety of their nationals. See questions asked in the House of Commons, April 25, 1911, with reference to the danger to British interests and Europeans at Fez; B.D., VII, No.129, pp.201-02. A fortnight after the arrival of the French occupation of Fez Spain had landed troops at Larache and El-Kasar, which action, in imitation of the French precedent, was explained by the necessity of preserving order, and accompanied by the assurance that the occupation would be only temporary.

1. Cited in Fay, op. cit., I, 280.
2. Report of the Belgian Minister in Berlin, March 3, 1911, Morel, op. cit., 170-72.
3. Siebert, op. cit., 580.

rather weak, and without experience in foreign affairs. There was every good reason to suspect that the forceful, and energetic Delcassé with the experience of 1905 behind him, would influence the work of Cruppi and the Cabinet. Such was the assumption generally held in Europe.[1] Mr. Porter, his biographer, claims that he "occupied a very influential position in this ministry," and that he "completely overshadowed M. Cruppi."[2]

The German policy remained somewhat of a puzzle to the French when the expedition to Fez was first suggested, but Kiderden's policy is clearly revealed in a memorandum he drew up on May 3.[3] When Fez would be occupied by the French he would ask how long they intended to remain there. If they did not adhere to the time limit announced, Germany would then declare the Act of Algeciras annulled by the French action and demand compensation. As protests alone would prove useless Germany should send a warship to Agadir, claiming justification for this action by revealing it as a measure to protect the life and property of German subjects. The ship would be stationed there, and developments awaited to see if France would offer suitable compensation. In this way he felt past failures might be made up for, and a good effect would be provided on the impending Reichstag elections.[4]

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1. Belgian Minister in Paris, March 4,1911, Morel, op. cit., 173. Russian Ambassador at Paris to Sazonov, March 14, 1911, Siebert, op. cit., 559.
2. Porter, op. cit., 284.
3. Given in Dugdale, op. cit., IV, p.204.
4. Fay, op. cit., I, 281-82. Brandenburg, op. cit., 371.

The German Minister does not seem to have looked through carefully to the possible results his policy might have brought about. He did not consider, apparently, what effect his plan might produce on France and the outside world. What was to happen should France, in spite of his action, refuse compensation, or inadequate compensation? Would Agadir then be occupied indefinitely? These questions seemingly did not present themselves to his mind. He seems to have expected with rather extraordinary simplicity that his gesture of sending the ship would immediately bring forth offers of compensation from France. The Chancellor was in favour of this plan, and the Kaiser gave his approval to the principle of seeking compensation, although at this time he did not definitely authorize the dispatch of a gun-boat.[1]

On May 21 the French occupied Fez. Kiderlen waited. On June 11 Cambon dropped a guarded hint to the Imperial Chancellor that France was prepared to discuss compensation for Germany, and mentioned concessions in the Congo. Kiderlen now saw his policy working out as he planned. He met Cambon at Kissengen on June 19 to discuss the matter of compensation. It was agreed on principle that compensation for Germany could be found in the Congo. Cambon returned to Paris to arrange matters with his Government, but not before Kiderlen warned him Germany must receive "a decent mouthful." During the next several days no offer was made from Paris. Kiderlen then

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1. Brandenburg, op. cit., 372, and footnote (3)

decided to act. By occupying Agadir he hoped to force France to surrender suitable compensation; in negotiating with her he wished his hand strengthened by a "fait accompli." On June 26 he visited the Kaiser who was at Kiel, described to him the situation as it existed, and secured his consent to dispatch a warship.[1] Accordingly, the gunboat "Panther," which was returning from southern Africa, and which was the only vessel near enough to the North African coast to be of use in the plan, was ordered to drop anchor at Agadir on July 1. At the same time a note was sent to the Great Powers explaining the German action.[2] In spite of the explanation so offered, the real motive undoubtedly was to bring the French to the point of making a generous offer of compensation.

The French Government was deeply stirred by this sudden action. Germany had given no warning of the step taken, whereas, France had given a preliminary notification of her march to Fez.[3] The news was received with consternation in Downing Street, for it raised great fears that Germany was planning the setting up of a naval base in Morocco.[4]

On July 3 Sir Edward Grey informed the German Ambassador that "we regard the situation as so important that it must be discussed at a Cabinet."[5] On July 4, after

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1. Dugdale, op. cit., IV, 6.
2. Supra.151.
3. Belgian Minister in Paris, July 2, 1911, Morel, op. cit.,190.
4. Belgian Minister in London, July 5, 1911, ibid., 191-92.
5. Grey to de Salis, July 3, 1911, B.D., VII, No.347, p.328.

consultation in the Cabinet, he told him that the British attitude could not be disinterested in view of British interests in Morocco, and of Britain's treaty obligations to France;".... a new situation had been created by the dispatch of a German ship to Agadir. Future developments might affect British interests more directly than they had hitherto been affected, and therefore we could not recognize any new arrangements that might be come to without us."[1]

In a note of July 2, after announcing to the Powers the dispatch of the "Panther," the German Government issued the following notice: "The German Government is quite ready to enter upon an amicable exchange of views in order to obtain a solution of the Moroccan question satisfactory to all Powers," and "it is altogether disposed to examine in a friendly spirit every proposition made by the French Government."[2] In pursuance of this statement negotiations between Jules Cambon and Kiderlen began, negotiations which were to prove most difficult, and which were to be extended over the next four months.[3]

Sir Edward Grey seems to have expected information from Berlin in the matter of German policy after his conversation with the German Ambassador on July 4;[4] but Kiderlen disregarded

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1. Grey to de Salis, July 4, 1911, B.D., VII, No.356, p.334. Mr. Asquith expressed the same view in almost identical words in answer to a question on Moroccan affairs in the House of Commons on July 6, 1911; cited in ibid., No.364, p.342.
2. Cited in Ewart, op. cit., II, 839-40.
3. Only a few days before the dispatch of the "Panther" to Agadir M. Monis had been succeeded in the French premiership by M. Caillaux, and M. Cruppi as Foreign Secretary by M. de Selves.
4. Grey, op. cit., I, 223.

the very obvious hint given in that conversation that England wished to be consulted. This failure to give reassurances to Grey was to prove a great mistake; but the German Government appears to have felt it unnecessary, and gave the British Government no assurances until three weeks later. Grey would certainly have been less disturbed had he known that Germany's objective was compensation outside Morocco, and not a naval base on the coast. Kiderlen seemingly felt quite safe in disregarding Britain because he was not seeking Moroccan territory. He had as a matter of fact mentioned to Cambon at the commencement of the negotiations that the conversations must be confined to the two Powers - that it would be impossible to admit a third Party, without bringing in all the signatories of the Act of Algeciras.[1] To this negotiation "à deux" M. Cambon agreed, but made it quite clear that France "meant to remain absolutely faithful to her understandings with Great Britain" and to "keep His Majesty's Government informed of any conversations which might take place on the above or any other basis."[2]

There can be no value for the purpose of this study in here recording the Franco-German negotiation in any detail. It is sufficient to point out only their extremely thorny and difficult nature. On July 15, after a previous meeting in which each side was reluctant to commit itself to anything

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1. Goschen to Grey, July 10, 1911, B.D., VII, No.367, p.345. Bertie to Grey, July 11, 1911, ibid., No.369, p.347.
2. Goschen to Grey, July 10, 1911, ibid., No.367, p.345.

definite, Kiderlen asked for all the French Congo for Germany. The French Ambassador appeared shocked at such a demand. He replied that while French public opinion might consent to compensation for Germany, the ceding of a whole colony was unthinkable.[1] He stated, however, that part of the Congo might be ceded if Germany on her part was willing to yield to France territory in Togoland and the Cameroons. The negotiations reached a point of extreme tension at this stage, and the interview between Cambon and Kiderlen on July 20, following that of the 15, was rather bitter.[2]

It was at this point, when the negotiations seemed to be making little progress, that England intervened. When Kiderlen demanded the French Congo the French and British Foreign Offices exchanged views as to the possible outcome. On July 20 the possibility of holding an international conference in the event of a breakdown of the negotiations was discussed by Sir Francis Bertie and the French Foreign Minister. The latter replied that the negotiations had reached a critical stage and although they had not as yet broken down, they would likely continue for some long time, but should they fail France would not object to Britain inviting a conference as had been suggested.[3] It will be noted from these communications that the British and the French were considering together

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1. Bethmann's report of this meeting to the Kaiser is given in Dugdale, op. cit., IV, 11-12.
2. Bertie to Grey, July 18, 1911, B.D., VII, pp.371-72, and minutes added, especially minute by Nicolson, p.373.
3. Grey to Bertie, July 19, 1911, B.D., VII, No.397, pp.376-77. Bertie to Grey, July 20, 1911, ibid., No.401, pp.378-79.

eventualities in this crisis. It must be noted also that in anticipation of a possible outbreak of war, the "conversations" between the General Military Staffs, which had been inaugurated during the first Morocco Crisis of 1905-1906, were now being pressed.[1]

Thus, by July 20 something of a crisis had been reached. Negotiations were on the point of rupture, and there were feelings of strain, uncertainty and apprehension. Sir Edward Grey seems to have shared these feelings. He, therefore, asked the German Ambassador to come to see him on July 21. In his speech in the House of Commons, on November 27, 1911, he tells of the conversation which took place. After stating to the Ambassador that he understood that there was danger of the negotiations ending in failure, he went on to say:

> I wished it to be understood that our silence in the absence of any communication from the German Government - our silence since the Cabinet communication of July 4, and since the Prime Minister's statement of July 7 in this House - our silence since then must not be interpreted as meaning that we were not taking, in the Moroccan question, the interest which had been indicated by our statement of the 4th of that month. .... We thought it possible that a settlement might be come between Germany and France .... without affecting British interests. We would be very glad if this happened, and in the hope that it would happen at a later stage we had hitherto put it aside .... I heard that negotiations were still proceeding, and I still hoped they might lead to a satisfactory result, but it must be understood that if they were unsuccessful, a very embarrassing situation would arise. I pointed out to the German Ambassador that the Germans were in

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1. Infra. 178; Ewart, op. cit., II, 849; Grey, op. cit., I, 242. Mr. Lloyd George in a speech in Toronto, October 10, 1923, made reference to these military conversations.

> the closed port of Agadir.... which was the most suitable port on that coast for a naval base.... We could not say to what extent the situation might be altered to our disadvantage, and if the negotiations with France came to nothing we should be obliged to watch over British interests and to become a party to discussion of the matter.... I wished to say all this now while we were still waiting in hope that the negotiations with France would succeed, for if I did not say this now, it would cause resentment later on if the German Government had been led to suppose by our previous silence - our silence since July 4 - that we did not take an interest in the matter."

The Foreign Secretary explained to the House, "I made that statement on July 21 because I was getting anxious, because the situation seemed to me to be developing unfavourably, and the German Ambassador was still not in a position to make a communication to me from the German Government."[1]

Count Metternich's report of this conversation reached Berlin the next day, and the German Government gave a reassuring answer as to their intentions on July 23. It would have been well had Downing Street waited for that reply before taking their next step, or had Germany given her guarantee of good faith earlier, for a few hours after the interview between Grey and Metternich a new element of danger

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1. This speech of November 27, 1911, is cited in Knaplund, Paul, Speeches on Foreign Affairs, (London, 1931),145-71. The content of the conversation with Metternich is given also in a dispatch from Grey to Goschen, July 21, 1911, B.D., VII, No.411, p.390. An extract from Metternich's report of the conversation is given in Dugdale, op. cit., IV, 13.
With regard to Grey's statement of British policy to Metternich on July 4, and to which Grey complains the German Government gave no answer, Professor R.B.Mowat says, "This statement did not call for any answer; it was just a declaration of policy. It could not even be formally acknowledged by the German Government, for

had been introduced into the already delicate situation.

In the evening of July 21, and thus before the German reply had been received, Mr. Lloyd George, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, made a resounding declaration of British policy. In a public address at the Mansion House he reviewed the general situation and stated

> that Britain should at all hazards maintain her place and her prestige among the Great Powers of the world.... If a situation were to be forced on us in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the Great and beneficent position Britain has won by centuries of heroism and achievement, by allowing Britain to be treated, where her interests were vitally affected, as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure. (1)

This speech coming from a Minister who was supposed to belong to the most pacific section of the Cabinet created an immense sensation in Germany, where it was interpreted as a threat on the part of the British Government, and as an act of unwarranted interference in the Franco-German negotiations. It greatly increased the already existing tension between Germany and England growing out of the naval competition. It might indeed in the existing state of affairs have led to war

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Grey appears to have sent no Note, but passed on the statement in his conversation with Metternich. There was, therefore, nothing to alarm the Cabinet in the fact that no reply came." New Light on the Agadir Crisis, loc. cit., 712.

1. Lloyd George gives an account of his action in volume I of his "War Memoirs," p.41-45. Both Sir Edward Grey and the Prime Minister had been consulted before this speech was given and approved it. Grey, op. cit., I, 225; Churchill also approved it; Churchill, op. cit., 43.

had not the Kaiser and Bethmann been determined not to allow the Moroccan question to cause an actual conflict. The reply of the German Government to Sir Edward's questions in the interview of July 21 had been dispatched before the text of the Chancellor's speech had reached Berlin. The German answer to those questions was given by Metternich on July 24.[1] On the following day he again saw Grey, and on this occasion he presented a strong protest against the Mansion House speech. Grey, however, remained determined in his defense of the British stand,[2] and conversations between the two on July 26 and 27 were more courteous.[3] On July 27 the British Prime Minister made a reassuring speech in the House of Commons in which he made it clear that while Britain had no desire to participate in the negotiations then being carried on between France and Germany, and while it was the British hope that these might issue in a settlement satisfactory to both Parties, in the event of a rupture, however, Britain would be obliged to watch over her interests, and become an active Party in the discussion of the situation. "That would be our right as a Signatory of the Treaty of Algeciras; it might be our obligation under the terms of our agreement of 1904 with France."[4]

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1. Grey to Goschen, July 24, 1911; B.D., VII, No.417, pp.394-96.
2. Grey to Goschen, July 25, 1911; ibid., No.419, pp.397-99. Also Russian ambassador in London to Neratov, August 1, 1911, Siebert, op. cit., pp. 594-95.
3. Brandenburg, op. cit., 380-81.
4. Asquith, The Genesis of the War, 149; B.D., VII, No.426, p.406.

The British stand at this time had an immediate effect on the situation which had been arrived at in the past weeks. It greatly increased Anglo-German tension, but it simplified the difficulties which had arisen over Morocco. The British had accurately defined their attitude to this problem, displayed what their interests were, denied all hostile intention, expressed the hope for a peaceful solution, yet made it clear to Germany that Great Britain would be on the side of France if war was forced upon the Republic. Germany now adopted a more conciliatory attitude towards France; she did not immediately recede from her policy of demanding concessions, but she was careful to avoid acts of provocation, and her future conduct of the negotiations tended to open in directions of accommodation and retreat.[1]

The immediate danger of a rupture in July was thus passed; but the core of the question remained unaltered. Kiderlen and Cambon were unable to carry their negotiations to a satisfactory settlement for some time. The discussion lasted for another three months, with compensations proposed, rejected and proposed anew. Several times the situation became so acute that a breakdown was threatened. A particularly critical stage was arrived at in September. A solution was finally reached however. On October 11 an agreement was signed over Morocco, and on November 3 a settlement over the Congo. On the following

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1. Churchill, op. cit., 47; Fay, op. cit., I, 289-90. Russian Ambassador in London to Neratov, August 1, 1911, Siebert, op. cit., 596.

day a joint treaty was drawn up. By these agreements Germany agreed that the French might establish virtually a protectorate over Morocco, while, on her part, France ceded to Germany more than one hundred thousand miles of the French Congo. The Agadir Crisis had come peacefully to an end.

But, although it had ended in a peaceful solution, the Crisis had created reverberations in Europe which were to be felt down to 1914. Much more had been at stake than merely the question of whether France should obtain Morocco, or Germany territory in the Congo. In this crisis there was displayed once again a clash between the two opposing camps in the field of power politics. As in 1906 over Morocco, and as in 1908 through their friendship with Russia, so again in 1911, France and England stood together to oppose Germany. And, as in the former instances, this latest crisis led to a tightening of the bonds between the two Entente Powers.

The action of Germany had given rise to increased suspicion in the minds of leaders in both France and Britain of the Imperial Government's war-like intention. We know today from facts obtainable that there was no intention on the part of Germany to go as far as war in this matter, but the manner in which her policy was conducted did little to reassure the English and French leaders. Her action was regarded as further evidence of her war-like tendencies, and as another instance of her brutal tactics in diplomatic sabre-rattling. Sir Edward Grey certainly shared this view.

In his memoirs he states that the Agadir Crisis convinced the Entente Powers of the dangerous reality of German militarism, and made them more anxious to act together. "The Agadir Crisis was intended to end either in the diplomatic humiliation of France or in war."[1] Winston Churchill was only one of a number of others who concurred in this interpretation. "It (the Agadir Crisis) had terminated in the diplomatic rebuff of Germany. Once more she had disturbed all Europe by a sudden and menacing gesture."[2]

The importance of these suspicions of German intentions, which now further coloured the minds of British and French leaders, may not be minimized, but it was as a clash between the two diplomatic groups of Powers that Agadir takes on significance in the play of forces before 1914. The Entente Cordiale was given deeper meaning; during the days of tension resulting from the "coup" of Agadir it had grown in cohesion and strength. Nicolson was expressing the feeling of many in England and in France when he wrote on July 24, 1911, to Sir Edward Goschen,

> There is no disguising the fact that the situation is a serious and delicate one, and it is not simply a question as to whether the French will give such and such concessions to Germany, or whether the establishment of

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1. Grey, op. cit., I, 240.
2. Churchill, op.cit., I, 65. For similar expressions of this view - Nicolson, op.cit., 350-51; memorandum of Sir Eyre Crowe, January 14,1912,B.D.,VII, Appendix III,p.284; memorandum by Mr. H.A. Gwynne, editor of the "Morning Post," July 25,1912, B.D.,VII,p.795; Poincaré, Raymond, Memoirs, (London, 1926), I, 37-41.

> Germany in such and such ports of Morocco is or is not a vital question for us. The whole question is whether we intend to maintain the Triple Entente, and I think that it is upon this broad ground that the situation should be viewed. (1)

Whether the English leaders, and especially Sir Edward Grey, who has made such protestations to the contrary, would admit it or not, the Entente was being hardened into an alliance. In his speech of August 3, 1914, when discussing the Crisis of 1911, he explained "that he took precisely the same line that had been taken in 1906,"[2] at which time, "in my view public opinion in this country would have rallied to the material support of France."[3] France was to be supported diplomatically, and, if necessary, by arms. As Mr. Ewart points out, "the great significance of this attitude was, and, is, that (as in 1914) the merits of the quarrel were immaterial."[4] Whether France or Germany was right, the British Government was determined to support France. Even before the French troops had arrived at Fez, on May 18, 1911, when talking with Count Metternich, Grey maintained, in the words of the Russian Ambassador, who reported this conversation on May 23, that France "was not only justified, but obliged to protect

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1. Nicolson to Goschen, July 24, 1911, Nicolson, op. cit., 350.
2. Speech by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons, August 3, 1914; Grey, op.cit., II, appendix D, 297.
3. Ibid., 296.
4. Ewart, op. cit., II, 853.

the interests of the French, English and other foreigners in the capital of Morocco." He made it clear to Metternich "that the Agreements between England and France imposed on England the obligation to support France." The German Ambassador did not oppose these arguments; he expressed thoroughly friendly sentiments, but pressed the contingency that the French occupation of Fez might be of "considerable duration." In that case the hands of the Powers would be freed. Sir Edward replied "that even in this case, the English standpoint would remain unchanged."[1] In his own report of this conversation sent to Sir Edward Goschen on May 18, Grey states that he told Metternich, "the question of Morocco was one in regard to which some of us were bound by Treaty engagements, which would of course come into operation if difficulties arose. It was not like a general question in which there were no special engagements."[2] Relating further details of this conversation, the Russian Ambassador reports, (and these he gained from Sir Edward himself), "Count Metternich had asked what the consequences would be if the Morocco Government came under French influence, and the Algeciras Act were violated. Sir Edward replied, that, in the event of entanglements, all English obligations would become 'operative.'"[3] After the Mansion House speech, the

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1. Russian ambassador to London to Neratov, May 23, 1911, Siebert, op. cit., 583.
2. Grey to Goschen, May 18, 1911, B.D., VII, No.278, p.256.
3. Siebert, op. cit., 584.

Ambassador reported that "there is no use concealing the fact - one step further, and a war between England and Germany might have broken out as a result of the Franco-German dispute."[1] On August 16 the same Ambassador reported a conversation with Grey in which the latter stated, "in the event of war between Germany and France, England would have to participate."[2] To preserve the Entente with France, England had been drawn to the verge of war, and had the need arisen, would have plunged into war itself.

With respect to this latter and very much more important step, it must be noted that England was prepared to mobilize not only her entire Fleet but also her Expeditionary Army against Germany.[3] The preparations made in anticipation of a conflict were far more advanced than was realized by British public opinion. Mr. Churchill tells how on July 25 Sir Edward Grey, after his interview with Count Metternich, stated to him, "I have just received a communication from the German Ambassador so stiff that the Fleet might be attacked at any moment. I have just sent for McKenna (head of the Admiralty) to warn him." The warning orders were then sent to the Fleet.[4]

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1. Russian Ambassador to London to Neratov, August 1, 1911, ibid., 595.
2. Ibid., 598.
3. Callwell, C.E., Field-Marshall Sir Henry Wilson, (London, 1927), I, 96ff. Wilson was Director of Military Operations.
4. Churchill, op. cit., I, 44. B.D., VII, Editor's Note to No. 637, p. 625.

As has been shown the Crisis was not settled until November. During the tense days of September Grey felt the danger, and on September 17 wrote to Nicolson:

> The negotiations with Germany may at any moment take an unfavourable turn, and if they do so, the Germans may act very quickly, even suddenly. The admiralty should remain prepared for this. It is what I have always said to McKenna. Our fleets should, therefore, always be in such a condition and position that they would welcome a German attack, if the Germans should decide on that suddenly. We should, of course, give the Admiralty news immediately of any unfavourable turn in the Franco-German negotiations. (1)

It was not commonly known that from September 8 to September 22, in constant expectation of hostilities, the tunnels and bridges on the South-Eastern Railway were being patrolled day and night. And Nicolson's biographer tells us, "it was not until the morning of September 22, om the receipt of news from Berlin that Herr von Kiderlen was weakening, that Nicolson was able to give the word that a state of 'war preparedness' might be relaxed."[2] The extent of the preparedness which had been maintained can be guaged from the letter Nicolson wrote to Lord Hardinge on September 14:

> I spent a week at Balmoral last week, but nothing very important occured during my visit. I was glad to find that the King is perfectly sound as regards foreign affairs. I have had some talks since my return with Haldane, Lloyd George, and Winston Churchill; I am glad to find that all three are perfectly ready - I might almost say eager - to face all possible eventualities, and most careful preparations have been made to meet any contingencies that may arise. These three have thoroughly grasped the point that it is not merely Morocco which is at stake. It really amounts to a question of whether we ought to submit to any dictation by Germany, whenever she considers it necessary to raise her voice. I may tell you in confidence that preparations for landing four or

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1. Cited in Nicolson, op. cit., 346; also in B.D., VII, No.647, p.638.
2. Nicolson, op. cit., 346-47.

> six divisions on the Continent have been worked out to the minutest detail. On the other hand, reports which we have received from our various military informants all point to the fact that the French army has never been in a better state of equipment, organization and armament, or been inspired by so strong a feeling of perfect confidence and unity.... (1)

These preparations in both England and France were being carried out along lines laid down by the General Staffs of the two countries cooperating the one with the other. The military and naval conversations begun in 1906 had been carried on down to the present Crisis. On July 20, after Kiderlen's demands proved unacceptable to the French, and the day before Lloyd George's Mansion House Speech, there took place at the French Ministry of War a Conference between General Wilson, the Head of the Department for Military Operations of the English General Staff, and General Dubail, the French Chief of Staff. The purpose of their meeting was "to determine the new

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1. Nicolson, op. cit., p.347. Lord Haldane tells how he was prepared to mobilize the Expeditionary Force "to send it straight off to the Continent;" Autobiography, (London,1929), 224-25. The details of military and naval preparations undertaken at this time are given in a memorandum by Brigadier-General Sir G.N. Nicolson drawn up on November 6, 1911. It is given in B.D., VII, No.639, pp.626-629. It is headed "action taken by the General Staff since 1906 in preparing a plan for rendering military assistance to France in the event of an unprovoked attack on that Power by Germany." Further light is given in Churchill's account, op. cit., I, 49-64. He gives a full account of the meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defense held on August 23, showing the difference between the military and naval points of view expressed there. See also Spender, Fifty Years of Europe, 337-38.
   In the matter of French preparations, Nicolson's summary given above is borne out in dispatches of Colonel Fairholme, the British Military Attaché in Paris, given to Bertie and passed on to Grey. See B.D., VII, No.641, August 25, 1911, pp.632-34; No.643, September 2, 1911, pp.634-635; No.644, September 8, 1911, pp.635-37.

conditions for the participation of an English army in the operations of the French armies in the North-East in case of a war with Germany." It was definitely stated, as was usual in the earlier conversations, "that these conversations, devoid of all official character, cannot bind either Government in any way", and were aimed merely at planning for certain indispensable preparatory measures.[1] Six weeks after this meeting, according to Mr. Fay, General Dubail stated to the Russians, as if there were no doubt in the matter, that the French army was ready to take the offensive against Germany "with the aid of the English army on its left wing."[2] Members of Parliament were totally unaware of these preparations, preparations for dispatching men to the Continent, or of the orders given to the Fleet.[3]

The events set forth in the pages of this chapter must have made clear the manner in which the entente was being gradually transformed into what amounted to a virtual military

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1. A memorandum of this matter is given in B.D., VII, No.640, pp.629-632. See also Fay, op. cit., I, 291-92. Asquith himself expressed fear that the French might come to rely too much on English support. He wrote to Grey on September 5, 1911 as follows: "Conversations such as that between General Joffre and Colonel Fairholme seems to me rather dangerous, especially the part which refers to possible British assistance. The French ought not to be encouraged, in present circumstances, to make their plans on any assumptions of this kind." Grey's answer is of interest, written on September 8. He replied, "It would create consternation if we forbade our military experts to converse with the French. No doubt these conversations and our speeches have given an expectation of support. I do not see how it can be helped." Grey, op. cit., I, 95.
2. Fay, op. cit., I, 292. Lutz, Hermann, Lord Grey and the World War, (London, 1928), 90.
3. Conwell-Evans, T.P., Foreign Policy from a Back Bench, (London, 1932), 56.

alliance; how a gradual transition had taken place from the static to the dynamic state. It had become an alliance in almost everything but name. Britain, with Sir Edward Grey directing foreign affairs, was following a policy of which he was seemingly unaware, a policy which seems not to have been clear to him, a policy he partially concealed and which he frequently repudiated, but yet nevertheless which he rigidly pursued. Great Britain had entered into entente relations with France. When disputes arose between that Power and Germany, Britain supported her diplomatically, and had it been demanded by the occasion, would have lent military assistance. Growing tension between England and Germany, along with her new friendship with Russia, the ally of France, made this entente policy of greater importance to Britain and even of greater necessity. Britain was definitely committed to that policy at the end of 1911, and Sir Edward was determined to continue in that path. In his speech to the House of Commons on November 27 he stated he was willing to enter into new friendships, but these must not be to the detriment of those already existing. He said:

> One does not make new friendships worth having by deserting old ones. New friendships by all means let us make, but not at the expense of the ones we have. I desire to do all I can to improve the relations with Germany, as I shall presently show. But the friendships we have have lasted now for some years, and it must be a cardinal point of improved relations with Germany that we do not sacrifice one of these.... We keep our friendships. We intend to retain them unimpaired, and the more we can do, so long as we can preserve that

position, so much the better, and we shall endeavour to do it." (1)

He felt it was England's paramount duty to hold fast to the Entente. And this he continued to do during the last days before Armageddon.

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1. B.D., VI, No.721, p.733.

CHAPTER VI

The Tightening of the Entente Cordiale, 1912-1913

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The preceding chapter has shown how the Agadir Crisis was to prove a most important episode in the play of events which was preparing the way for the tremendous conflict soon to array in combat the nations of Europe. The Agreement concluded on November 4, 1911, between France and Germany can by no means be regarded as a reconciliation. France did not forgive Germany for what she chose to interpret as the Imperial Power's policy of intimidation. Germany, on her side, resented the fact that France had proved less pliable in the negotiations than she had counted on. But her resentment was vented more particularly upon Britain for having intervened in a Franco-German dispute, and for having forced on Germany a diplomatic defeat. It was held that but for the British interference Germany could more easily have come to a settlement with France, and a settlement less damaging to German dignity and prestige.

In England, despite the assurances and explanations of British policy during the Crisis which Sir Edward Grey offered in the House of Commons on November 27, there were many expressions of dissatisfaction from a public eager for peace; dissatisfaction which was aimed at the Government

when it was realized how close to the abyss of war the nation had been led.

When first the Entente with France had been concluded the country as a whole had supported the new policy, rejoicing in the hope that it meant the end of dangerous quarrels with the Republic. But after Agadir it was realized that in some mysterious way the nature of the Entente had changed, and that it was bringing new dangers to peace and making relations with Germany more difficult. Mr. J.L. Hammond, in his life of C.P. Scott of the "Manchester Guardian," points out how at this time many Liberals turned against Grey's conduct of the Entente policy, suspecting that it was being transformed into "something sinister."[1] Three main objections were stressed by those who were protesting against the direction in which British foreign policy was pointing; England was seemingly being tied dangerously to French ambition, the resulting tension with Germany was leading to a great naval expenditure, and the rights of weaker peoples, like those of Morocco and Persia, were being disregarded. Whether or not these objections were valid, or whether or not those who put them forward understood fully the difficulties of the international situation which faced the Foreign Office and which had led those in charge there to lean so heavily in favour of the Entente, cannot be discussed here. Whatever might be argued in this regard,

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1. Hammond, J.L., C.P. Scott of the "Manchester Guardian," (London, 1934), 149ff.

nevertheless the objections to Grey's policy were vigorously set forth in the press, and especially in the Liberal journals. The "Manchester Guardian" was most outspoken in its criticism, but it was by no means alone in the views it expressed. Mr. Hammond states:

> Seldom, indeed, has a Government or Minister encountered such skilled and such severe criticism from political opponents as Grey encountered from his political friends .... The Liberal Foreign Secretary found himself depending almost entirely on Conservative support, a support often embarrassing and misleading, for among Liberal writers his only steady advocate was Mr. J.A. Spender, the able and experienced editor of the "Westminster Gazette." (1)

Some measure of the extent of the opposition in the House of Commons to the foreign policy of the Government is revealed in the papers of Mr. Noel-Buxton, in 1911 a private member of the House, and later a cabinet minister. He reveals how a number of the Liberal Party, alarmed by the Agadir Crisis, were roused to consider ways and means of effecting some control, however slight, over the policy which Grey, Asquith and Haldane were developing, a policy with which, it was felt, Parliament was not kept sufficiently in touch. Accordingly, Mr. Noel-Buxton and Mr. Arthur Ponsonby)later Lord Ponsonby) organized a Foreign Affairs Group of the Liberal Party, the aims of which were to establish a more effective contact with the policy of the Foreign Office, and especially, to improve Anglo-German

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1. Hammond, J.L., op. cit., 150-51. Ensor, R.C.K., England, 1870-1914, (London, 1936), Appendix C, 572-74, gives an interesting study of Grey's relationship to the Liberals.

relations.[1] The first resolution of the group read:

> This meeting of the Liberal Foreign Affairs Group views with great concern the relations of Great Britain and Germany, regards with disapproval any policy which might seek to oppose the legitimate aspirations of Germany, and urges upon H.M. Government the necessity of taking action with a view to reaching an understanding.[2]

This opposition was not sufficiently serious to threaten the position of the Government, but Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey perceived that the only way to satisfy public opinion was to do everything possible to appease relations with Germany, if this could be done without endangering either the Anglo-French Entente or British naval supremacy. The Ministers hoped that with the settlement of the Agadir question a new chapter would be opened. It was felt that efforts should be made to heal the smarts from which Germany might be suffering, and to arrive at a common understanding on the matter of naval strength.[3]

This task was to be made easier by the fact that certain members of the German Government entertained similar

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1. Conwell-Evans, T.P., Foreign Policy From a Back Bench, 1904-1918, (London, 1932), 81. This study is based on the papers of Lord Noel Buxton.
2. Ibid., 82-83. Meetings of the Group continued at frequent intervals. Mr. Phillip Morrel became Chairman in 1913, and Mr. Ponsonby in 1914. The outbreak of the War brought the organization to an end. The Committee, says Mr. Conwell-Evans, failed in its purpose. "Few of the members exerted themselves with sufficient vigour. They were in general too easily satisfied and lulled into tranquillity by the soothing speeches of the Foreign Secretary, and by the misleading assurances of the Prime Minister." 84.
3. Spender, Asquith, II, 64. Churchill, op. cit., 95. Halévy, E., A History of the English People, 1895-1915, (London, 1934), II, 557. Russian Ambassador in London to Neratov, February 28, 1912, Siebert, op. cit., 614-18. Kuhlman, in London, to the Chancellor, January 8, 1912, Dugdale, op. cit., IV, 56.

sentiments. It has been shown how Bethmann-Hollweg, impressed by the persistence with which Count Metternich urged from London a policy of caution on his government in the matter of the naval programme, had favoured a rapprochement. A previous chapter revealed how negotiations had been opened in 1909 and had continued until they were broken off at the time of the Agadir Crisis.[1] The Emperor now consented to the reopening of these negotiations, though he had little faith in their resulting in success.

The negotiations which took place in the first half of 1912 were opened by two business men, Albert Ballin, the head of the Hamburg-American Line, and Sir Ernest Cassel, a rich and influential London banker, each of whom was "persona grata" with his own Government, and each anxious to bring about better understanding between the two nations. These two constituted themselves unofficial diplomats early in 1912, and their work paved the way for the Haldane Mission.

Ballin suggested that Mr. Winston Churchill, who had succeeded Mr. McKenna as First Lord of the Admiralty, should come to Berlin. Mr. Churchill answered on January 7, 1912, that it would be inexpedient for him to make a special journey.[2] Mr. Churchill referred the matter to Sir Edward Grey and Lloyd George, and with the concurrence of the Prime Minister, it was agreed to send Cassel to Berlin with a special memorandum.

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1. Supra 147-49.
2. Churchill to Cassell, January 7, 1912, B.D.,VI,No.492, p.666.

Sir Ernest, through Ballin, saw the Kaiser and the Chancellor,[1] and returned home bringing a cordial letter, and a statement from Bethmann-Hollweg of the newly proposed German Navy Law. It was suggested that Sir Edward Grey should visit Berlin as the most effectual way of bringing negotiations to a successful conclusion.[2]

Sir Edward replied to the German offer through Cassel that if the German naval expenditure could be so arranged by a modification of the rate of construction, or in some other way so as to render unnecessary any serious increase of British naval expenditures, "the British Government will be prepared at once to pursue negotiations, on the understanding, that the point of naval expenditure is open to discussion and that there is a fair prospect of settling it favourably." If this understanding proved acceptable to Germany, a British Minister would go to Berlin. Bethmann replied that this was acceptable, provided England gave adequate guarantees of a friendly orientation of her general policy. "The Agreement would have to give expression to a statement that both Powers agreed to participate in no plans, combinations or warlike engagements directed against either Power."[3]

Grey was unwilling to accept the invitation for himself to go to Berlin, and it was arranged that Mr. Haldane,

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1. Memorandum by the Chancellor, January 29, 1912, Dugdale, op. cit., IV, 71.
2. Grey to Goschen, February 7, 1912; B.D., VI, No.497, pp.668-69.
3. Fay, op. cit., I, 301-02; Churchill, op. cit., 96-100.

the Minister of War, should undertake the mission.[1] Mr. Haldane arrived in Berlin on February 8, 1912.

The details of the discussions which followed his arrival need not be set forth in this study.[2] Haldane has given a full account of what took place in his book, "Before the War."[3] He was cordially received in Berlin, where he held conversations with the Kaiser, Bethmann and Tirpitz. After the general field of Anglo-German relations was surveyed, colonial and marine problems were discussed. The Kaiser declared himself ready, if a political agreement could be reached, to renounce the building of a new ship in 1912, and to delay the three new ships Germany proposed building in 1912, 1914 and 1916, until 1913, 1916 and 1919. The British Minister welcomed this suggestion and attempted to work out

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1. His reasons are given in Grey, op. cit., I, 250-52; Grey to Goschen, February 7, 1912, B.D., VI, No.497, pp.668-69. This dispatch tells why Mr. Haldane was chosen. It was convenient for Mr. Haldane to undertake the mission. He was Chairman of a University Committee on scientific education, and was at this time planning to go to Berlin with his brother, Professor Haldane, to make some studies on that subject. It was felt he could at the same time enter upon a frank exchange of views with the German Chancellor to discover if there was a favourable prospect for negotiations to improve the relations of the two countries.
2. Grey informed the French and Russian ambassadors of the undertaking and also of what took place at Berlin. In the negotiations which followed Haldane's return the Russian and French Governments were kept informed of developments. From the British and French documents we learn that the French Government was most uneasy at the prospect of an Anglo-German understanding.
3. Also, Diary of Lord Haldane's visit to Berlin, B.D., VI, No.506, pp.676-684; Reports of the conversations by William II and the Chancellor are given in Dugdale, op. cit., IV, 74-76. See also Bethmann-Hollweg, Th.von, Reflections on the World War, (London,1920),47ff.

with the Chancellor the formula for a political agreement. The Chancellor, however, wanted a promise of benevolent neutrality from England, and of help in localizing a conflict in the event of one of the Parties being involved in a war with one or several opponents. Such a proposal, Haldane saw, was too far-reaching for his Government. It would preclude England from coming to the assistance of France should Germany attack her and aim at getting possession of such ports as Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne.[1] Furthermore, such a formula might hamper England in discharging her treaty obligations to Belgium, Portugal and Japan. He offered, instead of the German proposal, a much more modified formula - that neither of the contracting Parties should make an unprovoked attack on the other, nor join any coalitions designed against the other. This did not satisfy the Chancellor. A new formula had to be formed.

In colonial matters it was easier to come to a tentative agreement, which, however, was not to be regarded as binding on either. In the matter of the Portuguese colonies Germany was to get Angola, and England Timor; Germany might buy the Belgian Congo, in return for granting a right of way to the Cape-to-Cairo Railway. It was further indicated that England might cede to Germany Zanzibar and Pemba in the event of a satisfactory arrangement being arrived at in the matter of the final sector of the Bagdad Railway.

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1. Asquith, The Genesis of the War, 56-57.

Haldane returned to London bringing with him the drafts for a political and colonial agreement. The Kaiser had given him as well the draft of the new German Naval Law to show privately to his colleagues, although its contents had not yet been revealed to the Reichstag.

When the British leaders studied the new Naval Law they found it much less to their liking than they had anticipated it would be. It provided not only for three new capital ships, but at the same time there was to be a greater increase in personnel and in the number of minor craft. To meet this new programme would involve England in tremendous expenditures during the next few years. It was agreed by the Cabinet that Grey should inform Count Metternich of the grave difficulties which these naval proposals put in the way of the desired rapprochement, and point out that for any political agreement to be made at a time when both countries were making increased naval expenditures was an impossibility.[1] There were difficulties also in the matter of a colonial agreement. The settlement reached in this problem would depend on the settlement of the naval estimates. Hence Grey suggested the latter point should be discussed first.[2]

The Kaiser and Chancellor felt that Grey was now changing the basis for negotiations agreed upon in Berlin with Haldane; he was, they felt, shifting from the neutrality

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1. Memorandum by Grey, February 22, 1912, B.D.,VI, No.523, pp.696-97.
2. Brandenburg, op. cit., 408; Fay, op. cit., I, 309.

agreement, and giving priority to a criticism of the Naval Law.[1] Meanwhile, negotiations continued in London through Metternich. But there was little chance of success. The problems of the neutrality agreement and naval limitation proved stumbling blocks. On March 29 Grey informed Metternich that the English Government could not accept the German neutrality formula. The British were offering in its place a more restricted formula, which Germany, in her turn, rejected, feeling that it gave no satisfactory security against war with England.[2]

To avoid severing communications altogether, the proposal was revived as to the possibility of a periodical exchange of information on the progress of ships under construction; and the discussion of colonial questions[3] - the African colonies, the Bagdad Railway, Persia - was continued in the hope that an understanding on special points might prepare the ground for a compromise agreement later on. The negotiations for a treaty of neutrality and for a reduction of the fleets was considered to have failed. On April 15 the German Naval Law was submitted to the Reichstag where it was accepted on

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1. Memorandum communicated by Metternich, March 6, 1912, B.D., VI, No.529, pp.704-06.
2. Grey to Goschen, March 29, 1912, B.D., VI, No.557, p.730; also March 15, 1912, No.539, pp.714-15. Fay, op. cit., I, 311, Brandenburg, op. cit., 413.
3. In this less difficult field mutually satisfactory agreements were worked out, and were complete for signatures on the eve of the War.

May 14.[1]

The Haldane Mission had proven a failure - neither of the two great questions which loomed so large in the minds of the Governments had been solved - the two questions which constituted the essence of the negotiations. Britain had failed to achieve a slackening in the pace of German naval construction, and Germany had failed to obtain her objective, a promise of English neutrality. Britain might claim in accounting for the failure that Germany's terms were too onerous. In reply, Germany could answer that England was asking of her too great a sacrifice in demanding that she regulate her fleet, not in accordance with the standard she regarded as necessary to protect her commerce and uphold her prestige, but by the standard prescribed by the security and prestige of a foreign power.[2]

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1. On March 18, Mr. Churchill had laid before the British Parliament the Navy Estimates, providing for two keels to every additional German one, and for the other greatly increased naval expenditures which he had threatened as England's reply to the expected German Naval Law. The Atlantic Fleet would be moved from Gibraltar to Home Waters and replaced at Gibraltar by the Mediterranean ships which had hitherto had their base at Malta. He indicated, however, that if Germany made no increase neither would England. He did not make this proposal officially to Germany however. Churchill, op. cit., 107ff; Fay, op. cit., I, 311. A year later, on March 26, 1913 Mr. Churchill made an appeal to Germany for a "naval holiday," a cessation of new construction for twelve months, but this evoked no response. Asquith, op. cit., 102.
2. Halévy, op. cit., II, 572.

But in this particular study, the great importance of the failure of the Mission is that it reveals, among other facts, the solidarity with which Britain was clinging to her Entente policy. Poincaré's boast, as reported by Isvolsky, that he had wrecked the negotiations by bringing pressure to bear on Sir Edward Grey, seems to be a gross exaggeration.[1] But there can be no doubt that Grey's rejection of Germany's proposals of neutrality was based upon French feeling. He was quite definite in his opinion that the friendship of France was too high a price to pay for German friendship. On May 26, 1911, when invited by the Prime Minister to give before a meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defense to which Dominion delegates to the Imperial Conference were invited, "an exposition, comprehensive and strictly confidential," of the international situation,[2] he had stated as an important point in his policy:

> We must make it a cardinal condition in all our negotiations with Germany that if we come to any understanding with Germany of a public kind which puts us on good relations with Germany, it must be an understanding which must not put us back into the old bad relations with France and Russia. That means to say that if we publicly make friendship with Germany, it must be a friendship in which we take our existing friends in Europe with us. (3)

From a report of the German Ambassador in London, of March 17, 1912, we learn:

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1. Infra 201 and note 5.
2. Asquith, op. cit., 121.
3. Extract from the Minutes of the Committee of Imperial Defense at a Meeting of May 26, 1911, B.D., VI, Appendix V, p.783.

> The Minister (Sir Edward Grey) said he would frankly tell me why the British Government objected to incorporating the word "neutral" or "neutrality" in the treaty. With regard to the proposal for a treaty, Sir Edward Grey said he must consider not only relations with Germany, but also those with other countries. The British Government must reckon with the facts of Germany's growing naval power, which would be considerably increased by the projected Navy Bill. Therefore Great Britain could not jeopardize her existing friendships. A direct neutrality treaty would most certainly irritate French sensibility, which the British Government must avoid. Sir Edward Grey could not go so far as to imperil the friendship with France. (1)

That the maintenance of cordial entente relations with France was the pivotal factor in the conduct of British foreign policy is further emphasized by Grey's Memoirs, where he states in telling of the plans for the Haldane Mission:

> I always felt that the pro-German element here had a right to demand that our foreign policy should go to the utmost point that it could to be friendly to Germany. That point would be passed only when something was proposed that would tie us to Germany and break the Entente with France. (2)

These previous paragraphs prove beyond doubt that Britain's membership in the Entente contributed very largely to the failure of the negotiations begun by the visit of Haldane to Berlin. But what is of infinitely greater importance,

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1. Cited in Ewart, op. cit., I, 174.
2. Grey, op. cit., I, 252. For further evidence that the British Foreign Office was determined to make no political understanding or neutrality agreement with Germany which would in any way limit England's freedom to aid France, see Grey to Goschen, May 5, 1911, B.D., VI, No.361, p.479; Nicolson to Hardinge, April 11, 1911, No.461, p.621; the minute of Sir Eyre Crowe, March 3, 1912, pp.702-03; and after the failure of the Haldane Mission, Goschen to Nicolson, April 20, 1912, No.579, p.750, and Grey to Nicolson, April 21, 1912, No.580, p.751.

the failure of the negotiations reacted in turn upon Britain's Entente policy, reacted in such a manner, that she made further decisions in favour of the Entente, which gave more rigid form and more solid substance to its rather nebulous relationship.

After the negotiations had admittedly broken down, when speaking in the House of Commons on July 10, 1912, the Foreign Secretary took the occasion to reaffirm his attachment to the Entente. He said:

> The starting point of any new development in European foreign policy is the maintenance of our friendship with France and Russia. Taking that as our starting point, let us have the best possible relations with other countries. (1)

During the same debate, Mr. Bonar Law, leader of the Opposition, made a statement in this regard, worthy of note:

> The right honourable Gentleman said tonight that the Triple Entente - the good understanding with France and Russia - should be the starting point of our foreign policy. I prefer to say that it is the keynote of our foreign policy .... The strength of this particular part of our foreign policy is this: It is not the policy of that Government, it was not the policy of their predecessors; or it was equally the policy of their predecessors. What is far more important, it is the policy which is necessitated by the facts of the situation. It is the national policy of this country. It was really for the purpose of saying this that I have taken part in the debate. It is the policy of country, and if the party to which I belong is ever returned to power, it will equally be the policy of that party. (2)

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1. Cited in Ewart, op. cit., I, 175.
2. Ibid., 176.

The feeling that Britain was now attached more definitely than ever to the Entente was also keenly felt in Berlin. On June 7, 1912, the Russian Chargé there telegraphed to his Foreign Office:

> Not the fact of the conclusion of an alliance between England and France makes itself felt, but rather the circumstance that the Germans have been finally convinced that England is now turning away from the possibility of a rapprochement with Germany - a rapprochement which Germany in truth passionately desired. (1)

Although the Haldane conversations, and the negotiations which followed had failed to establish an Anglo-German agreement, and although the French had been kept informed of what was transpiring while the negotiations were in progress,[2] and given every assurance that no action prejudicial to the Entente would be considered,[3] the negotiations had caused great uneasiness in Paris. This was especially true in the case of Mr. Raymond Poincaré. He had come to power in the French Government immediately after the Agadir Crisis at the head of a Nationalist Ministry. Although Britain had supported France during the Crisis of 1911, he was most anxious to tighten relations between the two nations.[4]

The actions of Germany in Moroccan affairs in 1905 and 1911, her support of Austria in the Bosnian Crisis of 1908, and the bellicose gestures of the Kaiser had aroused in a small

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1. Siebert, op. cit., 644.
2. Poincaré, op. cit., I, 80-82. Grey, op. cit., I, 251.
3. B.D., VI, Numbers, 498,499,504,505,509,513,514,525,540, 550,556,558,559,564, and D.D.F. 3e série, II, Numbers 9, 4,12,30,35,105,119.
4. Poincaré, op. cit., I, 71.

group of French leaders a new national spirit.[1] The feeling had been created by 1911 that France had suffered long enough from the German "menace." There had grown up a determination that in the future, if Germany should make a new threat of force, it would be better to risk a war than accept a new humiliation. The desire for "revanche," and the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine had been revived anew. This new national spirit of determination and self-confidence had been fostered also by the assurance of English friendship, and the conviction that in the event of a Franco-German conflict the support of Britain could be counted upon. It was not that these French leaders wanted war, any more than did the mass of the French people, but if Germany in her desire for the hegemony of Europe, should attempt again to use the "mailed fist" it was felt it would be better to fight than to yield. And the long-felt suspicion of Germany had led French leaders to feel sure that Germany, in line with what was interpreted as her aggressive designs of the past, would most certainly attempt some new threat in the future.[2] This, then, created the feeling that war was "inevitable." France would have to fight; France must prepare for such a day by increasing her army and navy at home, and by further cementing her friendships with Great Britain and Russia.[3]

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1. Schmitt, B.E., Triple Alliance and Triple Entente (New York, 1934), 94.
2. Ibid., 93.
3. Fay, op. cit., I, 312-16.

This new feeling was personified in M. Poincaré, and the small group with which he was associated. He was not only the embodiment of the "réveil national," but by his determination, firmness and ability, he, more than any other man, did most to strengthen and stimulate it. One of the first tasks to which he gave himself was the establishment of closer relationships with England.[1]

While Poincaré was anxious to strengthen the Entente, his feeling was shared by a good many people in England, who, with the failure of the Haldane negotiations, began to make themselves articulate in this view, and to express the opinion that the bonds with France should be drawn still more closely. Previous pages have shown how anxious the Government was to preserve the Entente, and if there were many who desired better relations with Germany, there was this most active group which desired even closer relations with the Republic. The "Morning Post," the "Daily Express," the "Spectator," the "Daily Graphic," the "Observer," and the "Pall Mall Gazette" conducted a campaign to transform the Entente into an alliance.[2]

On May 31, 1912 the Russian Ambassador wrote from London in this connection:

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1. Poincaré, op.cit.,I,71. For a year Poincaré directed French foreign policy as prime minister. He was then elected President of the Republic, in which office he continued to exert a powerful influence on foreign affairs as well as on domestic policies.
2. Halévy,op.cit.,II,565; M.Fleuriau, Chargé d'Affaires of France in London to Poincaré, May 30,1912, D.D.F., 3e série, III, No.56, pp.76-77, and No.57, pp.78-79.

> I have sent you lately various newspaper articles, dealing with a question which is very important in itself, but which, as far as I know, has so far been discussed only by the Press - i.e., the question of an alliance between England and France. I think that this press campaign has been the indirect result of various articles published in the "Times" and written by its military correspondent, Colonel Repington, who is himself one of the most convinced adherents of the Entente of England with France and Russia. These articles referred to England's military position in the Mediterranean, which has been rather weakened since the withdrawal of the British Squadron,(1) and which is not, in the belief of a considerable part of the British public, sufficiently secured by substituting a French squadron, as long as the relations of the two countries are based upon an entente and not an alliance. (2)

In his report of June 2, 1912, the same official wrote:

> I should not like to assert, that the majority of the nation has already been won for an alliance with France. Things do not move so fast in England, but, roused by a certain part of the British public, which from various, undefined, and not always patriotic reasons, begins to incline towards Germany, this majority is beginning to feel a certain anxiety, and believes that a policy based exclusively on ententes is not wholly satisfactory. (3)

Sir Francis Bertie, the British Ambassador in Paris, seems to have shared these views. On March 27, 1912, he had taken a rather curious step. Although no concessions had been made to Germany, and although the negotiations at that date had virtually broken down, he appears to have been alarmed, and evidently fearing that Sir Edward Grey might be influenced

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1. Incident to the growth of the German navy which had made necessary the strengthening of the British Home Fleet. Supra.
2. Siebert, op. cit., 640-42. Sir Henry Wilson favoured an Alliance; Callwell, op. cit., 112-13.
3. Siebert, op. cit., 642-43.

by members of the Cabinet such as Loreburn, Harcourt and others, who were more eager for an understanding with Germany, and who might make trouble if they learned of the Anglo-French military and naval conversations of which they had not as yet been made aware, he called on M. Poincaré, quite privately and unofficially, and asked leave to speak "as though he were not an ambassador."[1] He suggested to M. Poincaré that he would do well to point out firmly to Sir Edward Grey the dangers involved in any neutrality agreement with Germany. "It is essential," he declared, "that Cambon express his dissatisfaction. If you will only employ firm language in London, the false step I dread will not be taken."[2]

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1. Poincaré, op. cit.,I, 85. Wolff, Theodor, The Eve of 1914, (New York, 1936), 109-110, suggests that Bertie's action might have been inspired by Nicolson, or by "other opponents of the Liberal pacifists at home."
2. Poincaré to Cambon, March 28, 1912, D.D.F., 3e série, II, No. 269, pp.264-65; Poincaré, op. cit.,I, 86. A dispatch from Bertie to Grey giving an account of an interview he held with Poincaré on March 27 contains no hint of this conversation; B.D., VI, No.564, pp. 736-37. Bertie, pro-French as he was, was suspicious of, and opposed to, the Haldane Mission from the beginning of the undertaking. On February 11, 1912, he wrote to Nicolson; "I think that the Haldane Mission, which it was absurd and of no use to surround with mystery, is a foolish move, intended I suppose to satisfy the Grey-must-go radicals. It certainly creates suspicion here, not with Poincaré and perhaps not with those of the Ministry who are in his confidence, but with many political people. We ought to bear in mind, that in any territorial arrangements or exchanges which we may make with the Germans we may injure the interests of our friends if not our own. The French consulted us in the course of their negotiations with the Germans whether we would have any objection to certain cessions of territory including islands. We ought to act similarly in regard to the French if there be questions of cessions of British territories to Germany.

   It is evident that the German Government whatever they may pretend to us will not abate their intention to compete with us at sea. The more dignified course for

Poincaré welcomed this suggestion of Sir Francis; it was entirely in accord with his own views. Accordingly, he at once sent an energetic dispatch to Cambon to the effect proposed.[1] Cambon presented the substance of this dispatch to Grey on March 29.[2] This happened to be the very date on which the British Cabinet finally decided to give a negative answer to the German Chancellor's neutrality formula.[3] Although Cambon's interview with Grey preceded the Cabinet meeting of that day,[4] it was not his interview which had the decisive effect on the Cabinet decision.[5] That decision had already been arrived at.[6] In view of the very evident determination of the British leaders from the outset not to concede to any neutrality agreement which would limit British freedom in taking sides with France,[7] and in view of the fact that even before March 29 negotiations had virtually broken down, it is not true

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us would be not to waste words, but to go on in increasing ratio to construct against the German building programmes. Any undertaking given to us by the German Government would not be observed in the spirit as would any engagements entered into by us. We have many examples of this...." B.D., op. cit., VI, No.509, pp.687-88.

1. Poincaré to Cambon, March 28, 1912, D.D.F., 3e sérieII, No. 269, p. 265.
2. Cambon to Poincaré, March 29, 1912, D.D.F., 3e série, II, No. 271, pp.266-67; B.D. VI, No. 559, p. 731.
3. Grey to Goschen, March 29, 1912, B.D., VI, No. 559, p. 730.
4. Cambon to Poincaré, March 29, 1912, D.D.F., 3e série II, No. 271, p. 267.
5. According to Isvolsky, Poincaré boasted of having wrecked the negotiations with Germany by bringing pressure to bear on the British leaders: Un Livre Noir (Paris, 1922), I, 365-66; op. cit., 133-34, 394-95.
6. Cambon to Poincaré, March 29, 1912, D.D.F., 3e série, No. 271, p. 267. Grey to Bertie, March 29, 1912, B.D., VI, No.559, p.731. Woodward, E.L., Great Britain and the German Navy, (London, 1935), 360.
7. Supra 190-91.

to say that this interview did weigh heavily in determining the British policy.[1]

M. Poincaré was now impelled to endeavour to secure from England a binding statement in writing. The plan of Mr. Churchill to with draw British ships from the Mediterranean for a stronger concentration of the fleet in home waters against Germany, which was fore-shadowed in his speech on March 18, had aroused lively discussion not only in the British, but also in the French press.[2] It was seen that if Britain withdrew her forces from the Mediterranean and protected the north coast of France against the possibility of a German attack, France could, in return for this protection, withdraw her fleet from Brest, and look after British interests, as well as her own, in the Mediterranean.[3] It was in this connection that many British papers were urging that the Entente should be extended into a defensive alliance.[4]

The French Government felt the time was now ripe to attempt to work out a more precise agreement.[5] In reviewing the situation M. Paul Cambon was summoned from London to

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1. Mr. Barnes believes that it was the influence of Poincare which led to the British refusal; op. cit., 133-34, 394-95.
2. Supra 198-99; Poincaré, op. cit., I, 111; Fay, op. cit., I, 318.
3. Schmitt, Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 96.
4. "The only alternative to the constant menace of war is a new system of precise alliance," in the "London Daily Express," May 27, 1912, cited in Fay, op. cit., I, 319.
5. Poincaré, op. cit., I, 87-88.

attend their deliberations. He returned to London on April 14, and on the following day visited Sir Arthur Nicolson at the Foreign Office.[1] Nicolson has recorded their conversation in a minute of some length.[2] M. Cambon first reviewed Anglo-French relations as far back as 1905, pointing out the main developments in the forming of the Entente. In reviewing the situation of the moment he stressed the danger in the Agadir Crisis and French fears of future relations with Germany. His Government, he said, was not sure, "as to how far France could count upon British support in the event of any difficulties with Germany." He went on to say:

> In these circumstances, M. Poincaré considered that it was necessary to take stock of the position of France, and to see on what outside assistance she could rely when the moment arrived. It was evident that the attitude of England was a very important factor, and the recent endeavours of Germany to neutralize her clearly indicated that England was regarded as the Power which held largely the balance for or against peace. Were Germany assured that England would remain neutral, her hands would be free for dealing with France. Were she in doubt, she would hesitate. But it was of great importance to France also to be assured what would be the attitude of England, and if she could count on her. M. Poincaré was anxious to be clear in his mind on that point, and the very recent assurances and communications which he had received from H.M. Government had not been sufficiently clear and precise thoroughly to satisfy and enlighten him. (3)

Nicolson answered that, in a question of such importance, he naturally could give only his personal opinion. He assured the French Ambassador, that he, personally, was a

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1. Cambon to Poincaré, April 18,1912,D.D.F., 3e II,No.362, pp.369-71; Nicolson, op.cit., 267.
2. Minute by Sir Arthur Nicolson April 15,1912, B.D., VI, No.576, pp.747-49; Nicolson, op.cit., 267-69.
3. Nicolson, op. cit., 268-69.

warm adherent of the understanding with France, and that "no one would be better pleased than himself if it were strengthened." But there were many factors which had to be taken into consideration. He first of all doubted if the British Government would be at all disposed to tie their hands in any possible contingency. "They would," he felt sure, "desire to preserve complete liberty of action." Then, it must be remembered, among large sections of the community there was a strong feeling, which was shared possibly by some members of the Government, that an understanding should be arrived at with Germany. In view of these circumstances, Nicolson said:

> If, at this moment, France were to come forward with proposals so to reshape our understanding, as to give it more or less the character of an alliance, I felt pretty sure that neither the Government as a whole nor large sections of British public opinion would be disposed to welcome such proposals, which would be regarded by many as offering umbrage and a challenge to Germany. It would be far wiser to leave matters as they were; and not to strain an understanding which was at present generally popular, and did not by itself afford the slightest reason to any other country to resent or to demur to it. [1]

This important minute, which analyses so lucidly the British policy of that time, was sent to the Prime Minister and to the Foreign Secretary. That Nicolson had correctly interpreted the policy of his Government is revealed by the answers received from Asquith and Grey. The former replied on

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1. Nicolson, op.cit.,269. For some reason the French and English kept Russia in the dark in the matter of these negotiations. Denials that negotiations were undertaken were made to the Russian ambassadors in London and Paris by Nicolson and Poincaré. Siebert, op. cit., 641 and 644.

April 18, "I entirely approve the language used by Sir Arthur Nicolson."[1] Sir Edward wrote on April 21:

> You could have taken no other line with Cambon except what you did take. I shall have to say the same; I shall however, impress upon him that although we cannot bind ourselves under all circumstances to go to war with France against Germany, we shall also not bind ourselves to Germany not to assist France. (2)

Thus, the endeavour of the French to ascertain to just what extent they could rely on British assistance was checked by the refusal of the British Government to commit themselves in advance to any binding engagement.[3] The attempt was to be renewed again in the fall.

But although the British had rejected the French overtures in the spring of 1912, a few weeks after their rejection, circumstances arose which led the Cabinet to make certain dispositions and arrangements in the fleet which in effect committed Great Britain to intervention in any war between France and Germany. Mr. Spender, in his "Fifty Years of Europe," referring to these naval arrangements, emphasizes

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1. Minute to No.577, B.D., VI, p.749.
2. Grey to Nicolson, April 21,1912, B.D.VI,No.580, p.751.
3. M. Poincaré's answer to Cambon's summary of the conversation with Nicolson is of interest. He wrote: "The conversation you had with the Under-Secretary will have certainly enlightened the British Government as to the price we attach to the Entente Cordiale, and which we would wish to see affirmed in writing so that its existence could not be doubted. I am glad to learn that Mr. Nicolson shares personally in this opinion." Poincaré to Cambon, April 30, 1912, D.D.F., 3e série, II, No.396, p.414.

their importance when he says, "If there is one link in the long chain of fate or circumstances compelling Britain and France to stand together upon which we can lay our finger and say that here the decision was taken, it is this."[1] What was this important move?

In May, 1912, Mr. Churchill, accompanied by Mr. Asquith, had visited Malta to confer with General Kitchener as to the situation in Egypt and the British position in the Mediterranean. Upon their return, Churchill announced more definitely in Parliament on July 22, when introducing a Supplementary Naval Estimate, the plan of the Admiralty for withdrawing ships from the Mediterranean for concentration in the North Sea, which act had been foreshadowed in his earlier speech of March 18.[2] At the same time he proposed to the French Naval Attaché a draft plan for the cooperation of British and French fleets.[3] The French, however, hesitated to accept this plan, because Churchill had drafted with it a cautious preamble, stating that the plan was in no way to affect the liberty of action of either Party - a statement, in the eyes of the French, which robbed the proposed concert of action of its value.[4]

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1. Spender, Fifty Years, 384.
2. Supra.
3. French Naval Attaché in London to Delcassé, July 18,1912, D.D.F., 3e série, III, No.207, pp.270-72. Renouvin, P., Conversations Between the General Staffs on the Eve of War, Studies in Anglo-French History, Coville and Temperley, editors,164; Poincaré, op.cit.,I, 110-111; Porter, op.cit.,303.
4. Cambon to Poincaré, September 21,1912,D.D.F., 3e série,III, No.431,p.524,No.448,p.544. Poincaré, op.cit., I, 111.

Consistently adhering to their policy of making sure that their hands would be free, the British were exceedingly anxious to avoid a binding written agreement. But, even though there was no written agreement, of which they were so afraid, an arrangement by which Britain would withdraw her Mediterranean fleet to the North Sea, while the French would shift their fleet from Brest to Toulon, was most dangerous; in fact it would contain all the elements of limiting British freedom of action, in so far as it would of necessity create an obligation on the part of Britain to protect the northern coast of France in the case of that country being engaged in a war.[1] Mr. Churchill, himself, was keenly aware of the obligation which would thus be created. He perceived that the French would be encouraged to count upon British assistance, which fact would virtually create the obligation upon England, and thus limit England's freedom of action.[2]

Despite the dangers inherent in such a policy, the Cabinet decided in August that naval conversations should take place between the French and British admiralties, conversations similar to those which had been held since 1906 between the General Staffs.[3] Mr. Harold Nicolson, in his father's biography, states that few of the Cabinet realized the vital importance of the move at the time.[4] But when the step was decided upon

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1. Trevelyan, op. cit., 217.
2. Churchill, op. cit., 114-16.
3. Ibid., 115.
4. Nicolson, op. cit., 271.

it was not without warnings from Mr. Churchill. In his "World Crisis" he tells how he fully realized that "the moral claims which France could make upon Great Britain if attacked by Germany, whatever we had stipulated to the contrary, were enormously extended."[1] He set forth the dangers of such a policy in a minute of August 23 to Sir Edward Grey and the Prime Minister.[2] He tells how difficult the negotiations were; but adds, "We did our utmost to safeguard ourselves."[3]

> The technical naval discussions could only be conducted on the basis that the French Fleet should be concentrated in the Mediterranean, and that in case of a war in which both countries took part, it would fall to the British fleet to defend the Northern and Western coasts of France. The French, as I had foreseen, naturally raised the point that if Great Britain did not take part in the war, their Northern and Western coasts would be completely exposed. We, however, while recognizing the difficulty steadfastly declined to allow the naval arrangements to bind us in any political sense. It was eventually agreed that if there was any menace of war, the two Governments should consult together and concert beforehand what common action, if any, they should take. The French were obliged to accept this position, and to affirm definitely that the naval conversations did not involve any obligation of common action. This was the best we could do for ourselves and for them. (4)

While these negotiations were still under consideration, but before any decision had been reached, it was announced prematurely, through an error of French Admiralty officials, when M. Delcassé was absent in his constituency, that the Brest Fleet was to be transferred to the Mediterranean.[5]

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1. Churchill, op. cit., 115.
2. Ibid., 115.
3. " c 115.
4. " 116.
5. D.D.F., 3e série, III, No.431, p.523, and footnote on p.523; Poincaré, op. cit., I, 112; Porter, op. cit.,304.

This news caused great excitement in the Press of both countries, and was interpreted as a certain sign that an Anglo-French naval agreement had been definitely concluded.[1]

France was thus assuming before the whole world the task of protecting against possible attack Britain's route to India between Gibraltar and Port Said now stripped of British capital ships, and Britain was making herself responsible for the defense of the French coast on the North Sea, the Channel and even the Atlantic. As the negotiations continued, the draft agreement drawn up in July[2] was discussed and amended several times until it finally took shape in February, 1913.[3] On April 4 the French Naval Attaché in London reported that the Admiralty considered "the agreement" as "definitely concluded."[4] His reference is to three conventions which laid the foundation for Franco-British naval cooperation in the Mediterranean, Western Channel and the Straits of Dover. The text of these agreements is given in the French Documents.[5]

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1. Poincaré, op.cit., I, 112. Woodward,op.cit.,380-81.
2. Supra.
3. Delcassé to Poincaré, September 17,1912, letter enclosing a preliminary draft of a naval convention with notes; D.D.F., 3e série,III, No.420,pp.506ff; Cambon, to Poincaré, September 19,1912, ibid., No.431, pp.523ff. Poincaré to Cambon, September 20, 1912, ibid., No.436,p.530. Captain de frégate Le Gouz-de-Saint-Seine to Vice-Admiral Aubert, September 21,1912, ibid. No.449, p.546. See also, Halévey, op.cit., II, pp.603-04; Renouvin, Pierre, Conversations between the General Staffs on the Eve of the War; loc. cit., 164.
4. Le Commandant de Saint-Seine to Vice-Admiral Aubert, D.D. F., 3e série, VI, No.198, p.247.
5. Ibid., V, No.397, p.483-490.

At the same time cooperation was provided for in the Far East.[1] As Mr. Churchill tells us,[2] these technical agreements were merely provisional, binding the contracting parties only to take the necessary steps for cooperation in the Mediterranean or elsewhere "in the event of a war in which Great Britain and France are allied against the Triple Alliance," and to defend the Straits of Dover and the Channel "in the event of being allied with the French Government in a war with Germany."

M. Poincaré tells in his Memoirs how unsatisfactory this arrangement was to the French. They could not remain satisfied with so loose an arrangement.[3] Accordingly there was once more urged upon Sir Edward Grey the necessity of a written agreement. M. Cambon in London pressed the matter in the fall of 1912. "How could we," he asked, "expose our Channel and Atlantic coasts to the insult of a German fleet without knowing how far we could rely on England?" When the Foreign Secretary explained that no engagement could be entered upon without referring it to Parliament for its consent, M. Cambon replied:

> It is no question of an agreement here and now; we only want some assurance as to the defence of our coast. Could we not revert to Lord Lansdowne's proposal, and agree that in the event of a threatening situation we would put our heads together, and decide how best mutually to protect ourselves from the dangers of war? In a word, if in presence of such danger we should consider an alliance or a military convention our best way out, we should resort to this. If our opinions differed, and then either of us refused to go to war, each party would take its own

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1. D.D.F., 3e série, V, No. 303, p.385; ibid, VI, No.198, p.247.
2. Supra 208. Porter, op. cit., 305.
3. Poincaré, op. cit., I, 112.

precautions; France could not police the Mediterranean without agreement in other respects. (1)

When the French insisted on the matter, Sir Edward Grey took it up with Mr. Asquith. The Prime Minister saw the same difficulties as his Foreign Secretary. It was finally agreed, however, that an exchange of letters might take place between the two Powers, it being first clearly understood that these letters must not be ranked as diplomatic documents, but merely as a personal correspondence between a Secretary of State and an Ambassador, and secondly that the wording must be approved by the Cabinet.[2] The British Cabinet discussed the matter on October 30, and it was at this meeting that all its members were at last informed of the Anglo-French "conversations" which had been conducted steadily since 1906.[3] The British letter was drawn up and approved, and according to the plan, an exchange of letters took place with Cambon on November 22 and 23.

So important is this exchange of letters, they must be given here. Grey's letter, courteously expressed, read as follows:

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1. Cambon to Poincaré, September 21, 1912, D.D.F., 3e série, II, No.448, p.545. Poincaré, op.cit., I, 113.
2. Cambon to Poincaré, October 31,1912, D.D.F. 3e série, IV, No.301, pp.318-20; Poincaré, op.cit., I, 113; Grey, op. cit., I, 96-97.
3. Grey, op. cit., I, pp.96-97. Lloyd George tells that when the Cabinet heard of these, most of them for the first time, "The majority of its Members were aghast. Hostility barely represents the strength of the sentiment which the revelation aroused; it was more akin to consternation." Grey and Asquith endeavoured to allay apprehensions by "emphatic assurances" that Britain was not bound by the conversations. op.cit., 50.

Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London.

Foreign Office,

November 22, 1912.

My Dear Ambassador, - From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to cooperate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power it might become essential to know whether it could, in that event, depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the general staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

Yours, etc.,

E. Grey.

The letter which M. Cambon gave in exchange for that of Sir Edward's reads:

M. Cambon to Sir Edward Grey
(Translation)

French Embassy, London,

November 23, 1912.

Dear Sir Edward, - You reminded me in your letter of yesterday, November 22, that during the last few years the

military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time to time; that it had always been understood that these consultations should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their armed forces; that, on either side, these consultations between experts were not, and should not be, considered as engagements binding our Governments to take action in certain eventualities; that, however, I had remarked to you that, if one or the other of the two Governments had grave reason to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third Power, it would become essential to know whether it could count on the armed support of the other.

Your letter answers that point, and I am authorized to state that, in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reason to fear either an act of aggression from a third Power, or some event threatening the general peace, that Government would immediately examine with the other the question whether both Governments should act together in order to prevent the act of aggression or preserve peace. If so, the two Governments would deliberate as to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common; if those measures involved action, the two Governments would take into immediate consideration the plans of their General Staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans.

Yours, etc.,

Paul Cambon.[1]

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1. These letters cited in Grey, op. cit., I, 97-98. Mr. B.E. Schmitt in his article, "Triple Alliance and Triple Entente," American Historical Review, April, 1924, asks us to compare the concluding paragraph of each of the letters with the political clauses of the Franco-Russian Alliance. These latter read: "The two Governments declare that they will take counsel together upon every question of a nature to jeopardize the general peace; in case that peace should be actually in danger, and especially if one of the two parties should be threatened with an aggression, the two parties undertake to reach an understanding on the measures whose immediate and simultaneous adoption would be imposed upon the two Governments by the realization of this eventuality...." Mr. Schmitt points out that it is difficult to make any distinction between the engagements contracted in each case.

These letters, exchanged in November, 1912, fixed the relations between the British and French Cabinets down to the outbreak of the Great War so far as any written statements were concerned. Actually the only engagement undertaken in them was to make a joint study of the situation should a crisis arise. France had received a promise that there should be a conferring in the face of danger, and with this, a hypothetical acceptance of the plans drawn up by the General Staffs. Thus, literally, there was no alliance, no definite promise that armed help would be given. In actual wording the letters left the hands of the British Government free, and that freedom was to be frequently solemnly reiterated in later months by the Prime Minister and Sir Edward Grey.[1] And theoretically the British hands were free. But as Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman had pointed out in 1906,[2] and as Mr. Asquith had himself pointed out in 1911,[3] the military conversations were dangerous in the

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1. On March 10, 1913, the following question was put to the Prime Minister in the House of Commons: "There is a general belief that this country is under an obligation, not a treaty obligation, but an obligation arising out of an assurance given by the Ministry, in the course of diplomatic negotiations, to send a very large armed force out of this country to operate in Europe. That is the general belief." Mr. Asquith replied, "I ought to say that is not true." On March 24, 1913, two weeks later, he went even further to say, "As has been repeatedly stated, this country is not under any obligation, not public and known to Parliament, which compels it to take part in a war. In other words, if war, arises between European Powers, there are no unpublished agreements which will restrict or hamper the freedom of the Government or Parliament to decide whether or not Great Britain should participate in a war." Cited in Ewart, op. cit., I, 128.
2. Supra. 104.
3. Supra. 179 (note 1).

encouragement they gave the French. Mr. Churchill had expressed warnings in 1912 that the new arrangements for the British and French fleets tied England and France in a dangerous manner, creating, as they did, an inescapable moral obligation to protect the coast of France in the events of a Franco-German war - that is to participate on the French side, no matter how the war arose. In the words of Mr. Nicolson, the British had "committed themselves to a guarantee which would involve England either in a breach of faith or a war with Germany."[1] And now, in November of 1912, in the Grey-Cambon letters, the conversations, military and naval, assumed a new character and significance, in however a guarded form it might be, in the form of a written agreement.

It is necessary to examine only briefly England's diplomatic relationship with France to see how very closely her fate was in reality bound up with that of France by the end of 1912. By her departure from isolation at the start of the century, and by the very act of entering into the Continental system, however anxious she might be to think herself free, she was forced to accept obligations and invite risks. Her Agreement with France in 1904 had been based on a common policy with regard to Morocco, and it had virtually insured the solidarity of the two Powers in case of a war arising over Morocco. But, as Mr. Fabre-Luce points out, the Agreement of 1912 prepared

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1. Nicolson, op. cit., 272

the way for concerted action on a much more widely extended basis. Coming at a time when the question of Morocco was settled, and the Agreement of 1904 consequently no longer need apply, the new agreement "meant in fact that Franco-British solidarity would now be extended to all other problems in which the Entente might have common interest."[1] And, what is more important, the technical supplements to the Entente defined this attitude more clearly. The cautious correspondence of Grey and Cambon was backed by conversations between the military and naval experts which decided on possible methods of common action, and by an intimacy between them which prepared the way for such action, and which anticipated it.

In the eyes of the British Cabinet the letters were intended to put on record the fact that the British were still free to act as they thought best in a time of crisis; from this view, they were interpreted as an admission on the part of the French of Britain's freedom. But, the French saw in them a quite different interpretation, or at least, a quite different emphasis; to them the letters were an admission on the part of the British to France's claim for support. There can be little doubt that M. Poincaré took from them this assurance. On February 27, 1913, Isvolsky wrote to Sazonov, reporting a conversation with Poincaré:

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1. Fabre-Luce, op. cit., 154; Lutz, op. cit., 88.

> England is not bound to France by any definite political engagement, but the tone and nature of the assurances given by the Cabinet of London allow the French Government, in the existing political conjunctures, to count upon the armed support of England in case of conflict with Germany. (1)

The British leaders were sure their hands were free, and did not hesitate to tell the people that this was so. The French meanwhile were fully prepared to gamble, as on a sure certainty, on British participation in a war which might break out.[2]

There was a further element of danger in this relationship of 1912. The indefinite nature of the Entente at this time did not give the British any right to exercise any measure of control over French policy. It merely gave the latter, in their minds at least, as has been shown, increased hopes for victory should the threat of war come, without enabling the former to exert any effective influence in the direction of peace. Mr. Churchill has written no truer words than those he penned when he described the situation, "Everyone must feel, who knows the facts, that we have the obligations of an alliance, without its advantages, and above all without its precise definitions."[3]

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1. Un Livre Noir, II, 32-33; Schmitt, Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, loc. cit., 461.
2. The French authorities in drawing up Plan XVII, upon which their plan of campaign in 1914 was based, counted definitely on British naval assistance. They were not entirely sure of military aid on land, but stated that, "on sea, however, we can count without risk upon the effective support of the British fleet." Porter, op. cit., 307; Fay, op. cit., I, 324.
3. Churchill, op. cit., 116, 217. Chamberlain, Austen, Down the Years, (London, 1935), 66.

The exchange of letters in 1912, following upon the consistent diplomatic support which England had given France throughout the Morocco Crisis of 1911, had thus established a wider basis of mutual confidence between the two Governments. After 1912 England was brought still further within the orbit of French policy by her closer relationship with Russia. Just as her friendship with France before 1907 was a factor in aiding England to negotiate the Anglo-Russian Convention of that year, the closer friendship in 1912 was an important factor in drawing tighter the bonds with Russia in 1913 and 1914.

It is true that British relations with Russia never reached the same degree of intimacy as those with France. This is accounted for in part by the fact that British public opinion did not regard questions of the Near East, which were of such vital concern to Russia, as falling within the scope of British interests which might be worth fighting for, and in part by the fact that Russian activity in Persia caused considerable concern to Great Britain, and often seemed not in harmony with the Convention of 1907.[1] During the Balkan Crisis of 1912-13 British efforts were directed to mediate between Russian and Austrian claims, and Grey refused to commit himself on the question of whether Great Britain would take part in a war arising out of the Balkans. Likewise, in the winter of 1913-14, when the Russian Government became greatly aroused over the sending of a German military mission to Turkey, the

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1. Grey, op. cit., I, 166-170.

the Liman von Sanders Mission, Sir Edward Grey, did not give whole-hearted support to the Russian protests.[1]

In the spring of 1914, however, a new turn was given to Anglo-Russian relations, brought about, in part at least, through the closer relationship each of the two Powers had cemented with France during 1912, for not only England during that year, but Russia, also, had come into closer friendship with the Republic. Closely connected with the Anglo-French Naval Agreement was a Franco-Russian Naval Convention of July, 1912. Negotiations for such an agreement had started in the spring to arrange a naval convention analogous to the military convention of 1894. The result was the secret naval convention signed on July 16, 1912, by the admirals and naval ministers, and confirmed by an exchange of notes between Sazonov and Poincaré when the latter visited Russia a month later.[2]

On this visit one of the main topics of conversation was the closer cooperation of the naval forces of the Triple Entente. Poincaré confided to Sazonov, according to the latter's report to the Czar, that "although there does not exist between France and England any written treaty, the Army and Navy Staffs of the two countries have nevertheless been in close contact. This constant exchange of views has resulted in the conclusion between the French and English Governments of a verbal agreement,

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1. Fay, op. cit., I, 498-524.
2. Poincaré, op. cit., I, 204, 212, 225; Porter, op. cit., 301-02.

by virtue of which England has declared herself ready to aid France with her military and naval forces in case of an attack by Germany."[1] He begged the Russian Minister to "preserve the most absolute secrecy in regard to the information," and not to give the English themselves any reason to suspect that he had been told of it. He urged him to take advantage of his coming visit to England to discuss the question of a possible Anglo-Russian naval agreement, which would thus complete the naval cooperation of the three Entente Powers in case of war with Germany.

Sazonov followed this suggestion. On his visit to England, which took place in September, he informed Grey of the substance of the Franco-Russian Naval Convention and asked whether England would safeguard Russia in the north by keeping the German fleet out of the Baltic.[2] According to Sazonov's report of this interview, Grey declared that in the case of a war with Germany, England would make every effort to cripple the German fleet, but explained that, in the view of the naval authorities, British entrance into the Baltic would be risky since Germany might succeed in gaining control of Denmark and thus close the exit from that sea. "Accordingly, Great Britain would have to confine her operations to the North Sea." But Grey went on to inform Sazonov, "on his own initiative," so the latter reports, of what Poincaré had made him already aware -

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1. Sazonov to the Czar, August 4, 1912, Un Livre Noir, op. cit., II, 339.
2. Ibid., 347.

of the agreement which existed between France and Britain, "under which in the event of war with Germany, Great Britain has accepted the obligation of bringing assistance to France not only on the sea but on land, by landing troops on the Continent."[1]

Whether Sazonov reported correctly what Poincaré and Grey had said is very doubtful.[2] But, the fact that he made such statements to the Czar would indicate how much the French and Russians were encouraged by the existence of the Anglo-French military and naval "conversations," and inclined to interpret them as a promise of British support in the case of a European War.[3]

Although the Balkan Wars closed without breeding wider conflict, serious tension remained. Having good reason for apprehension, when the Liman von Sanders affair created

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1. Sazonov to the Czar, op. cit., 347. In his Memoirs Grey has something to say with regard to this report of Sazonov to the Czar, "That I (Grey) made a promise to Russia going far beyond anything promised to France in communication with the French Government." He says, that if Sazonov's report to the Czar was made "without giving the Czar clearly to understand that Britain could make no promise and come under no obligation, it was in effect an untrue report." "The record of our conversation which I made at the time is quite clear on this point." - he gives the record at this point. He goes on to say, "To construe these words as a declaration of an intention to go to war with Germany, and still more as an obligation to do so, would have been unpardonable. Sazonov never for a moment understood them in this sense; neither he nor Beckendorf nor anyone ever suggested such a construction to me afterwards." Grey, op. cit., I, 298-99.
2. Fay, op. cit., I, 328; Schmitt, Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, loc. cit., 460 (note 75).
3. Lloyd George, op. cit., I, 49.

further uneasiness, Sazonov, on February 12, 1914, suggested to the Russian Ambassador in London that Grey be sounded on a proposal of having representatives of the three entente powers meet to "establish the community of their views."[1] Grey raised no objection to this proposal,[2] and since a visit to Paris by George V, who was to be accompanied by Sir Edward Grey, had been arranged for the near future, Sazonov telegraphed to his ambassador there on April 2, proposing "a further reinforcement and development of the so-called Triple Entente, and, if possible, its transformation into a new Triple Alliance."[3] The Ambassador in his reply informed Sazonov that he had taken the matter up with the French leaders, and that M. Doumergue, the French Foreign Minister, would speak to Grey when he was in Paris.[4] "He believes that it will prove very easy to bring forth convincing arguments in favour of this thought, for it is very obvious that, France, having military and naval conventions with Russia and England, the system ought to be co-ordinated and completed by a corresponding accord between Russia and England."[5]

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1. Siebert, op. cit., 712-13.
2. Ibid., 713.
3. Ibid., 714.
4. Ibid., 715.
5. Ibid., 715.

Sir Edward Grey accompanied His Majesty to Paris in a visit from April 21 to 24 and during the visit found time to meet with Doumergue and Isvolsky. The question of Anglo-Russian relations was brought up for discussion. Grey was of the opinion that the political situation in England would not permit the conversion of the Triple Entente into a formal alliance. But, at the wish of the French, he agreed to communicate to the Russian Government the notes which had been exchanged between Great Britain and France in November of 1912, and he consented also that conversations should be carried on between the Russian and British admiralties analogous to those between the British and French naval experts. These offers were subject to Grey obtaining the concurrence of Mr. Asquith and the other members of his Government.[1] Asquith saw no difficulties in the carrying out of the plan, and on May 23 the Russian Ambassador reported that Grey had informed him that "the English Minister's Council had approved of the answer which he (Grey) gave to Doumergue in Paris in his own name."[2] As Grey tells us in his own words:

> I could see little if any strategic necessity or value in the suggestion. To my lay mind it seemed that in a war against Germany, the Russian Fleet would not get out of the Baltic and the British Fleet would not get into it; but the difficulty of refusing was obvious. To refuse would offend Russia by giving the impression that she was not treated on equal terms with France; it might even

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1. Grey, op. cit., I, 283-85; Un Livre Noire, op.cit.,II, 261.
2. Siebert, op. cit., 538; Grey, op. cit., I, 285.

give her the impression that, since we first agreed to military conversations with France, we had closed our minds against participation in a war. To give this impression might have unsettling consequences, as well as being untrue. On the other hand, it was unthinkable that we should incur an obligation to Russia which we had refused to France. It was as impossible as ever to give any pledge that Britain would take part in a continental war. The fact that we remained unpledged must be made quite clear. On this understanding we agreed to let the British and Russian naval authorities communicate as the French asked. (1)

Thus through her close relationship with France, England was brought into closer friendship with Russia before July, 1914. Mr. Sazonov was exceedingly happy over this fact. On May 28, 1914, he wrote to his Ambassador in London:

The readiness of the British Government to begin, without delay, negotiations, regarding the conclusion of an agreement between Russia and England, which would concern joint operations of our naval forces in the event of a common military action, has been received on our part with a feeling of greatest satisfaction. Quite apart from the fact, that such an agreement is desirable from a special military standpoint, we attach great importance to it in a general political sense. In the conclusion of such an agreement, we see an important step towards bringing England into closer union with the Franco-Russian alliance. (2)

Sazonov saw that the Triple Entente was being tightened and took joy in that prospect. True, the Entente was not a definite alliance, but it was being conducted as if it were one in effect. The words which Grey himself used in describing the Entente to the German Ambassador on June 24, 1914, reveal how close to an alliance it had become. He summed up the

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1. Grey, op. cit., I, 284-85.
2. Siebert, op. cit., 724-

situation most admirably when he said, "Though we (Britain) are not bound by engagement (to France and Russia) as Allies, we did from time to time talk as intimately as Allies."[1]

Meanwhile, the nation as a whole knew almost next to nothing of the policy the British Government was following. It has been shown how Grey had kept secret from most of his colleagues important facts of Britain's relations with France before 1911, and that it was only after 1911 that the whole cabinet became aware of what had been and was being done. But these facts were not revealed to the whole nation until the eve of the war. Whether Grey actually believed that Britain was absolutely free from entanglements, as he so often avowed, will perhaps never be known. The important point is that he kept reiterating this fact until war came.

The situation became difficult when the German Government learned of these Anglo-Russian naval conversations.[2] Suspicion was immediately kindled in Germany that hostile measures were being prepared against the Empire. Reports

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1. Grey, op. cit.,I, 304, Schmitt, Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 99.
2. Jagow to Ballin, July 15, 1914, Dugdale, op. cit., IV, No. 640, pp. 375-77; Ballin to Jagow, July 24, 1914, No.643, pp. 377-78, Bethmann-Hollweg, op.cit.,64. See Wolff, op. cit., 379-86. Theodor Wolff was editor of the "Berliner Tageblatt" which first published details of the Anglo-Russian conversations in Germany. He reveals how the German Diplomatic Service was kept secretly in touch with the Russian Embassy in London through M. de Siebert, and how news of the project of the Anglo-Russian naval conversations reached Germany through this source. Copies of the Russian diplomatic telegrams and letters were supplied by de Siebert, 380-81, 357-60.

appeared in the Press, and thus fuel was added to the flames of bitterness and suspicion already brightly ablaze.[1] This led to questions about military arrangements arising in the House of Commons. Similar questions asked on previous occasions of Grey and the Prime Minister had been answered emphatically in the negative.[2] Once again, on June 11, 1914, and this was within two months of the outbreak of the war, Sir Edward was asked if there was any naval engagement with Russia. His reply follows:

> The Honourable Member for North Somerset asked a similar question last year with regard to military forces, and the Honourable Member for North Salford asked a similar question also on the same day as he has again done today. The Prime Minister then replied that, if war arose between European Powers, there were no unpublished agreements which would restrict or hamper the freedom of the Government, or of Parliament, to decide whether or not Great Britain should participate in a war. That answer covers both the questions on the paper. It remains as true today as it was a year ago. No negotiations have since been concluded with any Power that would make the statement less true. No such negotiations are in progress, and none are likely to be entered upon, as far as I can judge. But, if any agreement were to be concluded, that made it necessary to withdraw or modify the Prime Minister's statement of last year, which I have quoted, it ought in my opinion, to be, and I suppose that it would be, laid before Parliament. (3)

It is obvious that this answer, to offer the most kindly criticism of it, is an evasion of the question that was asked. Grey admits in his Memoirs that he did not answer the question.[4] But in defense of his evasion he goes on to

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1. Brandenburg, op. cit., 469; Grey, op. cit., I, 288-89.
2. Supra. 214.
3. Grey, op. cit., I, 289. Wolff, op.cit., 383-84.
4. Grey, op. cit., I, 289, Trevelyan, op. cit., 241.

explain in his most disarming and naive style that while "Parliament has an unqualified right to know of any agreements or arrangements that bind the country to action or restrain its freedom it cannot be told of military and naval measures to meet possible contingencies."[1] His faith, openly avowed and proclaimed to the nation, that the hands of the Government were still unfettered in the matter of continental entanglements was at this late date apparently unshaken. Events which followed were not to justify that faith.

From this account of how the Entente had been strengthened it might be wise to turn briefly to a review of the international situation in Europe on the eve of the war to see what was the likelihood of England having to plunge into war either on her own account, or to aid her friends.

It must be noted first of all, that while the Powers of the Triple Entente were more closely united in July of 1914 than at any previous time, the same was true of the Triple Alliance. During the Balkan Crisis of 1912-13 Germany had resolutely supported Austria-Hungary in preventing Serbia secure an outlet on the Adriatic. It is true that Germany had in July, 1913, counselled moderation and vetoed her ally's wish to save Bulgaria by action against Serbia. But in October of that year William II had promised Conrad,

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1. Grey, op. cit., 289-90. The German Foreign Office was of course not deceived by Grey's answer, since the truth was known in Berlin through the work of de Siebert; Wolff, op. cit., 386.

the Austrian Chief of Staff, that if Austria marched against Serbia, "I'll go with you," and to Berchold, the Foreign Minister he had said, "I stand behind you, and am ready to draw the sabre if ever your action makes it necessary."[1] The Austrians were surely justified in thinking that they had only to seize the first opportunity offered for a reckoning with Serbia.

The Balkan Wars had also had the effect of bringing Italy back into the Triple Alliance more securely. The Alliance was formally renewed by the three Powers in December, 1912, a year and a half before its expiration. During the Balkan Crisis Italy had stood with Austria in opposing Serbian claims on the Adriatic. Although these two members of the Alliance continued to be suspicious of each other over Albania, a naval convention was signed by all three members providing for naval cooperation in the Mediterranean. This convention went into effect on November 1, 1913. Furthermore, in March, 1914, an agreement was reached between Germany and Italy by which the latter pledged herself to send three army corps and two cavalry divisions to the German army in the event of war with France. Moltke felt that Italy could be counted on as a faithful member, and endeavoured to convince his sceptical Austrian colleagues of this. He wrote in this connection, "All these agreements were made so clear and so binding that a doubt of Italy's loyalty to the alliance could hardly arise."[2]

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1. Cited in Schmitt, Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 100.
2. Ibid., 101.

Whether the Austrian and German Foreign Offices were equally optimistic may be open to doubt; but the fact remains that in 1914 the military and naval arrangements of the Triple Alliance, as well as those of the Triple Entente, were more complete and extensive than they had ever been before.[1]

In 1914 then, the two rivals diplomatic groups stood face to face. Was there any immediate prospect of war between them? It would seem not, beyond the general feeling of insecurity of the past few years. Europe had successfully weathered the storms raised by the Morocco crisis of 1906, by Bosnia-Herzogovia in 1909, by Agadir in 1911, and perhaps the most difficult of all, the Balkan Wars of 1912-13; and these were infinitely worse problems than any that appeared above the horizon in the spring and early summer of 1914.[2] And of all the Powers, England perhaps had the least concern as to the coming of war. Her relations with Germany had at this date reached a more cordial state than at any time since the Boer War. One cannot say that the naval rivalry had subsided, but the calmer temper in which the leaders now discussed their problems was in marked contrast to the feverish excitement which had previously attended upon this vexed problem.[3] So greatly had the tension been appeased that in June, 1914, a British squadron visited Kiel, where the intercourse between

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1. Cited in Schmitt, Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 101.
2. Grey, op. cit., I, 302.
3. Schmitt, B.E., England and Germany, 1740-1914, (Princeton, 1916), 192 and 194.

the officers and crews of the two countries proved most friendly.[1] The two Governments had cooperated during the Balkan Wars in working for peace, restraining respectively, Russia and Austria. Most important of all, they had negotiated successfully agreements to liquidate their differences in Africa and with respect to the Bagdad Railway. These agreements had not been formally signed when war came, but for all practical purposes they had been sealed when the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia ushered in the final crisis.[2] It would seem then, that by the summer of 1914 England and Germany were well on the way to "clean the slate."[3] The collapse of these auspicious efforts is one of the most tragic features of the crisis of July, 1914.

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1. Rumbold to Grey, July 2, 1914, B.D., XI, No.6, pp.6-7. Captain Henderson to Rumbold, enclosure in No.7, pp.8-11.
2. Brandenburg, op. cit., 465-68.
3. Grey, op. cit., I, 303; Trevelyan, op. cit., 242.

CHAPTER VII

The Last Days of Peace

CHAPTER VII

The Last Days of Peace

On June 28, 1914, with the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife, was struck the spark which set fire to the pile of combustible material which the diplomatic clashes of the previous decade had heaped up. The murderous act was carried out by Bosnian nationalists in Sarajevo, the capital of the provinces of Bosnia-Herzogovina, which had been administered by Austria-Hungary since 1908. Many details of the plot have not yet been revealed, but enough has come to light to prove that Serbian officials were to some extent implicated or at least had some knowledge of the plot.[1] The Austrian government was not aware of these facts in 1914, but investigation at the time gave rise to strong suspicions that Serbian officials shared the guilt.

The Archduke was not at all well-known in England, and it is true to say that few Englishmen could have located

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1. Dr. R.W. Seton-Watson, one of the leading authorities on South Slav affairs and history, declares Serbia to be innocent. In his study, "Sarajevo," (London, 1926), he champions the Serb case and condemns the policy of Berchtold and the complicity of Germany. Miss Edith M. Durham has presented the case against Serbia; "The Sarajevo Crime," (London,1925). In this study she summarizes evidence to show that the Serbian government was aware of the plot and did nothing to warn Austria or to prevent its being carried out. "Austria was right when stating that the threads of the crime reached Belgrade." (p.200).

Sarajevo on the map, yet such was the diplomatic net in which the European Powers were caught, and in which England had now become entangled, that within a few short weeks after the assassination British soldiers were meeting death on the continent.

The news of the assassination had no audible effect in Downing Street. In the early summer of 1914, before the tragedy, and during the days immediately following it, British leaders were far more concerned with events which were passing in Ireland than in those in the Balkans. The news of the murders reached London at the height of the Irish Crisis and of the feminist agitation, and in the turmoil created by these problems little significance was attached to the Sarajevo incident. There appeared to be no reason why the European situation should be seriously disturbed.

The attention and the time of the Cabinet were largely absorbed by the acute domestic problems, and it was not until some days later that Sir Edward Grey expressed a feeling of anxiety as to the European situation which was then arising as a result of the murders. Mr. Churchill records that it was as late as Friday, July 24, that Sir Edward asked the Cabinet to remain for a few moments after a session which had met to discuss the Irish Crisis. It was then he told the members for the first time of the grave situation developing on the continent.[1] Preoccupied with the Irish situation, the

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1. Churchill, op. cit., 204; Lloyd George, op. cit., I, 54.

Cabinet had left foreign affairs to the Foreign Minister. He now announced to the members the note which Austria had delivered to Serbia, and expressed the hope "that the conversations which were proceeding between Austria and Russia might lead to a pacific settlement."[1] The Cabinet separated on that assurance. Grey states in his Memoirs, "that things were not yet so critical that it was unsafe to be out of town,"[2] and he passed the weekend at his fishing lodge in Hampshire leaving Nicolson in charge of the Foreign Office.[3] Lloyd George records that "all other Ministers followed his example and left town."[4] It was quite evident that no one doubted but that the crisis would pass, and that an Austro-Serbian quarrel was of no direct concern to Britain.

Perhaps the best reason for the rise of this feeling in Britain was that the European crisis developed only very slowly in the first few weeks after June 28. It is quite evident today that the Austrian Government saw immediately in the assassinations a pretext for the long contemplated move against Serbia. On June 29 Berchtold declared to Conrad von Hotzendorf that the time had come to settle the Serbian question once and for all, and he announced to Count Tisza "his intention of taking advantage of the crime at Sarajevo to square his account with Serbia."[5] But though the chief of staff was eager

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1. Lloyd George, op. cit., 54.
2. Grey, op. cit., I, 315.
3. Ibid., 315, Nicolson, op. cit., 413.
4. Lloyd George, op. cit., I, 54.
5. Renouvin, The Immediate Origins of the War, (London,1928),36.

for immediate mobilization, Berchtold wished to be sure of German support in the event of European complications arising, and he had to win over to his view point the Emperor and Count Tisza. These necessary preliminaries took time, and thus for some days the Austrian action was delayed, and the European capitals were unaware of Austria's intentions.

Germany's pledge to support her ally was obtained on July 5, when Count Hoyos was sent to Berlin with a "memorandum," part of which had been prepared before the crime, accompanied by a personal letter from the Emperor. The letter stated in part that "the efforts of my government must in future be directed toward the isolation and diminution of Serbia," and declared that the murders had made it necessary for the Monarchy "to destroy with a determined hand the net which its enemies are attempting to throw about its head."[1] The Kaiser declared that Austria might count on the "whole-hearted support of Germany," and expressed the opinion that she should act without delay. The Chancellor was more restrained in his assurances of support, but promised that his government would "faithfully" stand by Austria, "as is required by the obligations of their alliance and their ancient friendship."[2] This was the fateful "blank cheque" which Germany gave to Austria, and which the latter proceeded at once to cash with such dire results for all the world.

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1. Renouvin, op. cit., 38-40.
2. Ibid., 53-55.

Assured of German support the choice of methods now lay entirely with the Ballpatz. While energetic and immediate action seemed called for, further preliminary measures dragged on for some eighteen days. In a Crown Council meeting of July 7, Tisza raised strong objections to war against Serbia in view of the danger of European complications. It was not until July 14 that his opposition was overcome, and agreement was reached on the conditions to be demanded of Serbia.[1] The draft of the ultimatum was not completed until July 19,[2] nor approved by the Emperor until July 21.[3] It was not handed to the Serbian Government with its brief time-limit until July 23. Thus, almost four weeks had passed since the crime had taken place at Sarajevo, and more than two weeks since Germany's promise of support had been secured. It was on July 28 that war was declared against Serbia, and July 30 that the bombardment of Belgrade began.

Aside from the fact that Sir Edward's time and attention were largely absorbed during these earlier days with Parliamentary affairs and the acute Irish situation, there was no reason why he should have felt serious alarm for the peace of Europe. It was generally felt in England that Austria would be justified in taking some action against Serbia to prevent the recurrence of similar outrages, and with few

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1. Renouvin, op. cit., 53-55.
2. Ibid., 56.
3. Ibid., 57.

exceptions the entire British press reflected this view.[1] As the days passed and the Austrian Government took no apparent action at Belgrade, reports from Vienna, though containing notes of strong action to be taken, were for the most part reassuring.[2]

Grey's failure to realize grave danger was shared by his subordinates in the Foreign Office. On July 6 Nicolson expressed the opinion that apart from the Albanian problem "we have no very urgent and pressing question to preoccupy us in the rest of Europe."[3] On July 9 he wrote, "I have my doubts as to whether Austria will take any action of a serious character, and I expect the storm will blow over."[4] The German ambassador noted the same day that Grey was equally optimistic. He was "in a thoroughly confident mood," Lichnowsky wrote, "and declared in cheerful tones that he saw no reason for taking a pessimistic view of the situation."[5] As late as

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1. Scott, J.F., Five Weeks, (New York, 1927), 208ff. for a study of British Press. B.D., XI, No.58, p.46, contains an extract from the "Westminster Gazette, dated July 17, 1914, which contains the following: "In such circumstances the (Austrian) Government cannot be expected to remain inactive; and Servia will be well-advised if she realizes the reasonableness of her great neighbour's anxiety, and does whatever is in her power to allay it, without waiting for a pressure which might involve what Count Tisza calls "warlike complications."
2. Sir M. de Bunsen to Grey, Numbers, 46,50,55,56,59,65, dated prior to July 23, B.D., XI, pp.37ff.
3. Nicolson to de Bunsen, July 6, 1914, ibid., No.33, p.25-26.
4. Minute to de Bunsen's telegram to Grey, ibid., No.40, p.33.
5. Lichnowsky to the Chancellor, July 9, 1914, German Documents on the Outbreak of the World War, collected by Kautsky, (cited hereafter as K.D.), (New York, 1924), No.30, p.95.

As late as July 17 Lloyd George, in delivering a speech at Mansion House, passed lightly over questions concerning peace abroad, reminding his listeners that the international situation had been more serious in 1913, and added that if there were still clouds on the horizon it was because "you never get a perfectly blue sky in foreign affairs."[1] From a report of Lichnowsky we learn that on July 20 Sir Edward was "still viewing the Austro-Serbian quarrel optimistically," and that he "believed that a peaceful solution would be reached. He said that he had received no information that would indicate anything to the contrary."[2] Lichnowsky himself at this time regarded the situation as "very uncomfortable."[3] He assured Grey that although he had no news of what Austria planned to do, she was "certainly going to take some step" with regard to Serbia.

After July 20 Grey saw that the situation was not just as hopeful as he had previously viewed it. De Bunsen's warning from Vienna on July 16 that Austria was contemplating strong measures[4] he now saw to be worthy of attention. On July 18 Sir George Buchanan had reported to Grey "the great uneasiness which Austria's attitude to Serbia" was causing in Russia, and gave warning that "anything in the nature of an Austrian ultimatum at Belgrade could not leave Russia indifferent."[5]

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1. Cited in Halévy, II, op. cit., 647.
2. K.D., No.92, pp.144-45.
3. Grey to Rumbold, July 20, 1914, B.D., XI, No.68, p.54.
4. De Bunsen to Grey, July 16, 1914, ibid., No.50, p.39.
5. Buchanan to Grey, July 18, 1914, ibid., No.60, p.47.

The change in Grey's attitude is reflected in the warning notice which he sent to Buchanan on July 20, suggesting direct conversations between Russia and Austria as a solution of difficulties "if occasion seems to require it."[1] Two days later he set forth this idea more definitely to the Russian ambassador in London, Count Beckendorff, who did not see that it was at all feasible.[2] The suggestion had undoubted merit, but it met with an instant and emphatic condemnation from Poincaré when Buchanan proposed it during the latter's visit to St. Petersburg after July 20. "His Excellency," wrote Buchanan, "expressed opinion that a conversation à deux between Austria and Russia would be dangerous at the present moment, and seemed favourable to moderating counsels by France and England at Vienna."[3] To Count Mensdorff, the Austrian ambassador, who interviewed him on July 23, to give notice of the ultimatum to be delivered to Serbia, Grey spoke gravely of the "awful consequences involved in the situation," and warned him that any influence Britain might be expected to use in restraint of Russia "would depend on how reasonable were the Austrian demands and how strong the justification that Austria might have discovered for making her demands."[4]

In turning down Grey's proposal of "direct conversations" between Austria and Russia, Poincaré had suggested

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1. Grey to Buchanan, July 20,1914, B.D.,XI, No.67, p.54.
2. Grey to Buchanan, July 22,1914, ibid., No.79, p.64.
3. Buchanan to Grey, July 22,1914, ibid., No.76, p.62.
4. Grey to de Bunsen, July 23,1914, ibid., No.86, p.70.

that the ambassadors of the Triple Entente should make a joint representation to the Austrian Government.[1] In line with his past policy the French President was reiterating his desire to have the Entente Powers concert together their line of action. The Russian Government approved this plan, and their ambassador in Vienna was instructed to act with his French and British colleagues "with a view to giving friendly counsels of moderation."[2] This proposal, however, was not approved in London[3] since it ran contrary to the policy which the Foreign Office had consistently pursued for the past two years, never to oppose to each other the two diplomatic groups of the Triple Entente and Triple Alliance. It is difficult to believe that Sir Edward's proposal of "direct conversations" would have succeeded, in view of Austria's determination to carry through her humiliation of Serbia, but it was the opposition of the French and Russians which prevented its adoption.

But, while unwilling to fall in line with the French and Russian proposals Grey at the same time refused to link himself with German policy. In conversation with Lichnowsky, the latter had urged England to exercise restraint upon Russia.[4] Committed since July 5 to support Austria, Germany was most anxious to localize the crisis, and desired that

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1. Buchanan to Grey, July 22,1914, B.D.XI, No.76, p.62.
2. Buchanan to Grey, July 23,1914, ibid., No.84, p.69, and note (3); de Bunsen to Grey, July 23, 1914, No.90, p.73.
3. Minutes to No.84, ibid., p.69.
4. Grey to Rumbold, July 6, 1914, ibid., No.32, p.64.

British activity should be directed to holding back Russia. Sir Edward answered cautiously that the situation would depend upon what measures Austria might take, and hinted that "the more Austria could keep her demand within reasonable limits, and the stronger the justification she could produce for making any demand, the more chance there would be of smoothing things over."[1]

Grey was thus endeavouring to steer a middle course - to avoid offending Germany by siding too definitely with Russia and France in exercising pressure on Vienna, and to avoid arousing the ill-will of Russia by concurring in the policy of Germany. This was consistent with his policy of the past years, a policy of keeping in with the Entente Powers, yet attempting also to remain on good terms with Germany, and of giving her no reason for offense.

If events had moved rather slowly up to this point, they now moved with startling and breath-taking rapidity with the dispatch of the ultimatum to Serbia on July 23. Grey says of the ultimatum, it was "unexpectedly severe; harsher in tone and more humiliating in its terms than any communication of which we had recollection addressed by one independent Government to another."[2] It was in such terms that no independent Power could accept it. Sazonov tersely described it, "c'est la guerre européenne."[3] On July 25 Serbia gave her answer -

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1. Grey to Rumbold, July 20, 1914, B.D., XI, No.68, p.54.
2. Grey, op. cit., I, 310.
3. How the War Began in 1914, Diary of the Russian Foreign Office, (London, 1925), 28.

a reply of a contrite and conciliatory nature. As Grey says, "The Serbian answer went further than we had ventured to hope in the way of submission."[1] Nevertheless, it was immediately rejected by the Austrian Government, who instructed their representative to leave Belgrade. At the same time mobilization against Serbia was begun.

The excessively harsh terms of the ultimatum and the summary rejection of the reply made it plainly evident that Austria would be content with no ordinary reparation, but had fully determined on crushing Serbia. Again, to use words of Grey, "from that moment, things went from bad to worse."[2]

The crisis now entered upon a second stage; it could no longer be regarded as a purely Austro-Serbian quarrel. Russian support of Serbia in the event of an Austrian attack was regarded as a certainty. Thus, the crisis was widening into one between Austria and Russia, with Germany and France bound by the terms of their alliances to support their respective allies. A memorandum of Sir Eyre Crowe, dated July 25, reveals the situation as it then was, charged with danger:

> It is clear that France and Russia are decided to accept the challenge thrown out to them. Whatever we may think of the merits of the Austrian charges against Serbia, France and Russia consider that these are the pretexts, and that the bigger cause of Triple Alliance versus Triple Entente is definitely engaged. (3)

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1. Grey, op. cit., I, 311.
2. Ibid., 311.
3. Minute by Sir Eyre Crowe, July 25, B.D., XI, pp.81-82.

What policy would England follow now that it seemed that Austria was determined to move against Serbia? Would Sir Edward Grey join with Russia and France to bring pressure on Vienna, or would he, as the Central Powers hoped, stand to one side, concurring in the view that the whole matter should be regarded merely as an Austro-Serb quarrel? Sir Edward inclined as yet to neither of these policies; he chose still a third path. Though seriously alarmed by July 23, he continued to place his faith in mediation, and to seek a formula which might preserve the honour and prestige of the Powers and thus maintain the peace. He showed himself most ready to take the lead in such a policy.

It is not easy to see at this stage that he could have chosen any wiser, or for that matter, any alternative policy. Public opinion was not yet truly aware of the real gravity of the situation, and had been concerned thus far, as has been pointed out, with the Irish struggle. Nor had the Cabinet yet considered the matter. Thus, Sir Edward could only wait upon developments, working all the while to guide them, in so far as he could, in the direction of peace. Those who criticize his failure to take a determined stand in the crisis at this stage on either one side or the other apparently have no understanding of the situation as it obtained in England at this moment.

On July 24 Count Mensdorff called on Sir Edward to communicate the text of the Austrian note. Sir Edward commented adversely on the time limit, and declared that point

five "would hardly be consistent with maintenance of the independent sovereignty of Serbia." Though admitting that many of the demands were justified, he "refused to discuss the merits of the dispute" or listen to Count Berchtold's complaints against the Serbian Government. He was, he said, concerned "solely from the point of view of the peace of Europe" and he expressed "great apprehension." He stated that he would enter into an exchange of views with the other Powers to see what could be done to mitigate difficulties.[1]

On the same date, July 24, the German ambassadors in the Entente capitals delivered notes to the governments, defending the Austrian action. "The course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as equitable and moderate," but since Serbia might refuse these demands and allow herself "to be carried away into a provocative attitude toward Austria-Hungary," the latter "would then have no choice but to obtain the fulfilment of their demands from the Serbian Government by strong pressure, and, if necessary, by using military measures." The notes went on to state:

> The Imperial Government want to emphasize their opinion that in the present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and that the Great Powers ought seriously to endeavour to reserve it to those two immediately concerned. The Imperial Government desire urgently the localization of the conflict, because every interference of another Power would, owing to the different treaty obligations, be followed by incalculable consequences. (2)

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1. Grey to de Bunsen, July 24, 1914, B.D., XI, No.91, pp.73-74.
2. Communication by the German Ambassador, July 24, B.D., XI, No. 100, p. 79.

This was most assuredly "very strong support,"[1] on behalf of Austria, and revealed clearly the line Germany was prepared to take. The interference of other Powers was warned off by a threat of what might follow if the system of alliances was invoked. War was to be the alternative to acceptance of the Austrian policy.

Grey had met with Paul Cambon on the afternoon of July 24, previous to a meeting with Lichnowsky, to discuss the question of mediation. A divergence of views arose between the two when Cambon favoured mediation between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, while Grey was considering mediation between Austro-Hungary and Russia.[2] In meeting with Lichnowsky to hear the German stand, Grey replied that if the ultimatum did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia "he had no concern with it." But he was apprehensive of the stand Russia might take. "In view of the extraordinary stiff character of the Austrian note, the shortness of the time allowed, and the wide scope of the demands upon Serbia, I felt quite helpless as far as Russia was concerned, and I did not believe any Power could exercise influence alone."[3] He then proposed a plan of mediation adding to it Cambon's proposal for restraining Austria.

> The only chance I could see of mediating or moderating influence being effective was that the four Powers, Germany, Italy, France and ourselves, should work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favour of moderation in the event of the relations between Austria and Russia becoming threatening.

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1. Minute to No.100, B.D., XI, p.79.
2. Grey to Bertie, July 24, 1914, ibid., No.98, pp.77-78. Cambon to Bienvenu-Martin, D.D.F. 3e série, XI, No.23, pp.22-23.
3. Grey to Rumbold, July 24, 1914, B.D., XI, No.99, p.78. Lichnowsky to German Foreign Office, July 24, 1914, K.D., No.157, pp.183-84.

> The immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria might march into Serbia and Russian Slav opinion demand that Russia should march to help Serbia; it would be very desirable to get Austria not to precipitate military action and so to gain more time. But none of us could influence Austria in this direction unless Germany would propose and participate in such action at Vienna. (1)

Grey was thus refusing to join in the German plan of mere localization. More than that, he was appealing to Germany to abandon the position set forth in her note and to join the Powers in restraint of Austria. He would not promise to restrain Russia, but rather was asking Germany to put pressure on Vienna to prevent war from starting.

The next day, July 25, having received news that Russia was likely to make alarming moves,[2] Sir Edward telegraphed his proposal of mediation to Buchanan in St. Petersburg[3] and to Bertie in Paris, and discussed the proposal with Beckendorff in London.[4] It is of interest to note the attitude of the Powers to this proposal. Germany quite approved the plan at this date.[5] The proposal was one of mediation, it must be pointed out, between Austria and Russia - there was no question of intervening between Austria and Serbia, and Germany was thus quite satisfied. But Russia and France took a definitely negative attitude. Beckendorff objected to it, being "very apprehensive that what (Grey) had said would give Germany the

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1. Grey to Rumbold, July 24, 1914, B.D., XI, No.99, p.78.
2. Buchanan to Grey, July 25, 1914, ibid., No.101, pp.80-81.
3. Grey to Buchanan, July 25, 1914, ibid., No.112, pp.86-87.
4. Grey to Buchanan, July 25, [illegible] Ibid., No.132, pp.97-98.
5. Lichnowsky to Grey, July 26, 1914, ibid., No.145, (postscript) p.103.

impression that France and England were detached from Russia."[1] Cambon, likewise, was opposed to mediating between Austria and Russia, as he had earlier represented to Grey, since he favoured mediation between Austria and Serbia.[2] He was absent from London on the twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth, and the known documents record no further attempt on the part of the French Government to exert any influence at this time upon London. The reply of the French Government to the proposal, which had been sent to Paris on the twenty-fifth,[3] was handed to Sir Francis Bertie only on the twenty-seventh,[4] along with a reply to a later proposal of Grey for a conference.[5] While the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs expressed itself in favour of common action toward Austria and Russia on the part of the Powers, the view was expressed that "it would be dangerous for Entente Ambassadors to speak at Vienna until it is known that the Germans have done so with some success."[6]

Meanwhile a proposal Grey had made on the twenty-fourth that Vienna extend the time-limit of the ultimatum had met with

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1. Grey to Buchanan, July 25, B.D., XI, No.132, p.97. It should be noted that this dispatch was omitted from the British Blue Book of 1914, ibid., p.98 (note).
2. Cf. supra. 244.
3. D.D.F. 3e série, XI, No.48, p.49. It was not delivered until 11 o'clock, July 26.
4. Ibid., No.164, p.135.
5. This was the proposal made on July 26; ibid., No.107, p.91.
6. Bertie to Grey, July 27, 1914, B.D., XI, No.183, p.127.

no success. He had requested the German Ambassador to communicate this proposal to Berlin where it arrived at ten o'clock on the morning of the twenty-fifth.[1] The German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs did not reply until the early afternoon, when he gave a negative reply to the proposal in which he said, "as the ultimatum expires today, and Count Berchtold, according to newspaper reports, is at Ischl, I believe that a prolongation of the time limit will no longer be possible."[2] It is now evident that von Jagow did not communicate this suggestion to Vienna until four o'clock that afternoon, only two hours before the time limit was to expire, and in his communication at that late hour, he indicated that he had already made a reply to the British.[3] It is difficult to believe that this action was the result of mere chance.

Grey's first peace proposals had thus failed of the results desired, but he was nevertheless still unprepared to align his Government definitely with either of the two diplomatic groups, in spite of the views expressed by his subordinates, Sir Eyre Crowe and Sir Arthur Nicolson, who felt strongly that a declaration of British solidarity with France and Russia was

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1. Rumbold to Grey, July 25,1914, ibid., No.122,p.91. Renouvin, says one o'clock; op. cit., 91.
2. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Lichnowsky, K.D., No.164,p.190; Rumbold to Grey, July 25,1914, B.D., op. cit.,XI, No.122, p.91.
3. Jagow to Ambassador at Vienna, July 25, 1914, K.D., No.171; p.195. Renouvin, op. cit., 91-92; Schmitt,B.E., The Coming of the War, (New York, 1930), I, 521-22.

the only effective means of preventing war.[1] The Foreign Minister continued still to work for mediation.

Sir Edward could feel that on the twenty-fifth war was probable, but not entirely certain. However, by the late evening news of ominous events began to reach London. Austria had broken off diplomatic relations with Serbia.[2] From St. Petersburg came news that Russia was ready to mobilize 1,100,000 men, that "necessary preliminary preparations would be begun at once," and that "secure of support of France, Russia will face all the risks of war."[3] With this menacing news, Buchanan appealed for British support for Russia; "for ourselves position is a most perilous one, and we shall have to choose between giving Russia our active support or renouncing her friendship. If we fail her now we cannot hope to maintain that friendly cooperation with her in Asia that is of such importance to us."[4] Still more ominous was the news received the following morning; from Vienna came word from the Ambassador, "war is thought to be imminent."[5] Alarming notes came also from Norway; according to Norwegian papers the German fleet had "received orders to concentrate during last night at

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1. Minutes by Crowe and Nicolson, July 24, 1914, to No.101, B.D., XI, pp.81-82.
2. Crackanthorpe to Grey, July 25,1914, ibid., No.131, p.97.
3. Buchanan to Grey, July 25,1914, ibid., No.125, p.94.
4. Ibid.
5. De Bunsen to Grey, July 25,1914, ibid., No.135, p.99; received 8 A.M., July 26.

predetermined point off the Norwegian coast,"[1] and the Kaiser had given up his northern cruise to return to Kiel.[2]

It was at this point in the crisis that the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, with the approval of Mr. Churchill, who, though he had gone to the seaside, was in constant touch with the Admiralty, decided that the situation justified holding together at Portsmouth the British fleet which was about to disperse after manoeuvres.[3] Mr. Churchill returned to London on the evening of the twenty-sixth to inform Grey of this precautionary measure. He writes:

> Grey viewed the situation gravely. He said there was a great deal yet to be done before a really dangerous crisis was reached, but that he did not at all like the way in which this business had begun. I asked whether it would be helpful or the reverse if we stated in public that we were keeping the Fleet together. Both he and Tyrrell (Grey's secretary) were most insistent that we should proclaim it at the earliest possible moment; it might have the effect of sobering the Central Powers and steadying Europe.

Accordingly, Mr. Churchill sent the press a notice of the step taken which appeared in the papers on Monday, July 27.[4]

On this same date, while the Admiralty was thus preparing for any eventuality, the Foreign Office also took a definite step in a further endeavour to preserve the peace. It should be noted that while Beckendorff, the Russian Ambassador, had frowned upon Grey's earlier suggestion of "mediation à

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1. Findlay to Grey, July 26, 1914, B.D.XI, No.137, p.100.
2. Findlay to Grey, July 26, 1914, ibid., No.138, p.100.
3. Churchill, op. cit., 209.
4. Ibid., 210.

quatre," his chief, Sazonov, in the Russian Foreign Office, had expressed himself in favour of such a proposal to Buchanan on July 25. "Were Serbia to appeal to the Powers," he stated, "Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Italy and Germany."[1] Noting this suggestion, Sir Arthur Nicolson, in charge of the Foreign Office in the absence of Sir Edward, who had gone to the country, wrote to his superior:

> I think that the only hope of avoiding a general conflict would be for us to take advantage at once of the suggestion thrown out by Sazonov in the second paragraph of Buchanan's telegram No.169, (2) which you will receive this morning, and that you should telegraph to Berlin, Paris, Rome, asking that they shall authorize their Ambassadors here to join you in a Conference to endeavour to find an issue to prevent complications and that abstention on all sides from active military operations should be requested of Vienna, Serbia, and St. Petersburg pending results of Conference. (3)

Grey at once telegraphed his approval,[4] and the proposal for a Conference of Ambassadors in London was communicated that afternoon[5] to the British representatives in Paris, Rome and Berlin. It was repeated also to the representatives in St. Petersburg, Nish and Vienna, with instructions to endeavour to prevent active military operations pending the results of the

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1. Buchanan to Grey, July 25, B.D., op. cit., XI, No.125, p.93. De Fleuriau to Bienvenu-Martin, July 27, 1914, D.D.F., 3e série, XI, No.115, p.99.
2. Supra.
3. Nicolson to Grey, July 26, B.D., op. cit., XI, No.139 (a) p.100.
4. Ibid., No.139, (b), p.100.
5. Note de l'ambassade de Grande Bretagne, D.D.F., 3e série, XI, No.107, pp.91-92.

Conference.[1]

This proposal most assuredly marks an undeniable change in the mind of Sir Edward Grey. His mediation proposal of two days before called for mediation between Austria and Russia. Though the draft of the new proposal sent out on the twenty-sixth did not expressly state the fact, it could only mean intervention between Austria and Serbia in order to prevent Austria from invading Serbian territory.[2] The main points in the Serbian reply were now known in London, and the intransigency of Austria was clearly revealed. The rupture of diplomatic relations might at any moment lead to war and Russian intervention was imminent. The Austro-Serbian conflict had to be settled by immediate intervention, and the local crisis there prevented from spreading. The general situation had become much more serious since July 24, and with the crisis taking on such a menacing aspect an altogether new policy was needed. The Conference plan was felt to answer this need. With what success did the proposal meet?

Italy gave unqualified approval the same day.[3] The French Government accepted on the twenty-seventh, although the view was expressed that there could be little hope of success unless the German Government was disposed to place restraint

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1. B.D., op. cit., XI, No.140, p.101.
2. Renouvin, op. cit., 107; Fay, op. cit., II, 383; Schmitt, op. cit., II, 46.
3. Rodd to Grey, July 26, 1914, B.D., op. cit., XI, No.154, p.107.

on the policy of Austria.[1] The reply of Sazonov was also favourable, though he stated that he would prefer direct conversations with Vienna. If these, however, could not be realized he was ready to accept the British proposal.[2] Germany, however, answered with an absolute refusal. Lichnowsky in London personally favoured the plan,[3] but Bethmann telegraphed to him on July 27, "We could not take part in such a conference, as we should not be able to summon Austria before a European court of justice in her case with Serbia."[4] To the ambassador in Paris he wired, "We must hold fast to the contention that the Austro-Serbian conflict concerns those two nations alone. Therefore we cannot mediate in the conflict between Austria and Serbia but possibly between Austria and Russia."[5] Jagow's answer given to Sir Edward Goschen in Berlin was in a similar vein: "Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that the conference you suggest would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not in his opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia."[6] As Mr. Fay

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1. Bienvenu-Martin to de Fleuriau; July 27,1914, D.DF., 3e série XI, No.123, pp.107-108; Bertie to Grey, July 27, B.D.XI,No.183, p.127.
2. Buchanan to Grey, July 27, 1914, B.D., op. cit., XI, No.198, p.139. Communication by the Russian Ambassador, July 28, ibid., No.206, p.142.
3. Lichnowsky to Foreign Office, July 26,1914, K.D., No.235, pp.230-31; also No.258, No.265, No.266.
4. Bethmann to Lichnowsky, ibid., No.248, p.237.
5. Bethmann to Ambassador in Paris, July 27, K.D., No.247,p.237.
6. Goschen to Grey, July 27, 1914, B.D., XI, No.185, p.128. J. Cambon to Bienvenu-Martin, July 27, 1914, D.DF., 3e série, XI, No.148, pp.123-24.

points out, there may have been good reasons for Germany's opposition to the holding of the conference, but her absolute rejection of the proposal was nothing short of a grave blunder.[1] The suspicion was now strengthened among the Entente Powers that Germany was not sincere in her protestations that she wished peace, and they were led to doubt the good faith of Germany's later desperate efforts to avert the catastrophe.

The suspicion was steadily growing in the British Foreign Office that Germany was determined to stay with Austria whatever happened; and that the issue of peace or war now depended on what action Germany might take.[2] "So far as we know," wrote Crowe on the dispatch which brought notice of Germany's refusal to take part in the Conference, "the German Government has up to now said not a single word at Vienna in the direction of restraint or moderation.... The inference is not reassuring as to Germany's goodwill."[3] And Sir Arthur Nicolson complained bitterly to Buchanan, "Lichnowsky says he is so pleased that Anglo-German cooperation seems likely to be successful. His interpretation of the word "cooperation" must be totally different from that which is usually accepted."[4]

Grey's own feelings of pessimism at this stage of the crisis are recorded in his Memoirs. The effect of the

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1. Fay, op. cit., II, 385-86.
2. Minute to No.174 by Nicolson, July 27,1914, B.D., XI, p.123; Minute to No.175 by Crowe, July 27, ibid., p.124.
3. Minute by Crowe to No.185 July 28, 1914, ibid., p.129.
4. Nicolson to Buchanan, (private) July 28, 1914, B.D., XI, No.239, p.157.

German reply, he states, was "not only depressing" but "exasperating." He felt "angry" with Bethmann-Hollweg and von Jagow. "I remember well the impulse to say that, as Germany forbade a conference, I could do no more, and that it was on Germany that the responsibility must rest if war came." But this impulse was set aside. "To have acted on it," he says, "would have been to give up hopes of peace and to make it the object of diplomatic action to throw the blame for war on Germany in advance. That would mean not only ceasing to work for peace, but making war certain." He was, therefore, "still ready to cooperate in any other way for peace that von Bethmann-Hollweg could devise and preferred."[1]

Sir Edward was still at this late date unable to take a definite stand in the crisis. His personal view was that British policy should be tied to that of France, not because of any existing committments necessarily, but rather from the point of view of British interests.[2] The other members of the Foreign Office agreed with him, feeling that war was inevitable and that Britain could not afford to stand aside.[3] But if the Foreign Office was decided as to what course should be taken, the Cabinet was not. The crisis had first been brought to its attention on July 24,[4] but after the

1. Grey, op. cit., I, 321-22.
2. Ibid., 336-37.
3. Minute by Crowe, July 27, 1914, to No.170, B.D., XI, pp.120-21; Nicolson to Buchanan, July 28, 1914, ibid., No.239, (private), pp.156-57.
232 4. Supra. 232.

twenty-seventh it was discussed at length daily. "Every day," records Churchill, "there were long cabinets from eleven onwards."[1] Though the Foreign Minister sought to secure from his colleagues a clear line of action, he found this impossible. On July 27 he communicated to them Buchanan's telegram of July 24 which indicated that Russia and France were prepared "to make a strong stand," and which carried an appeal from Sazonov for a promise of British solidarity with them. Grey then clearly stated his own view:

> The time had come when the Cabinet was bound to make up its mind plainly whether we were to take an active part with the other two Powers of the Entente, or to stand aside in the general European question, and preserve an absolute neutrality.
>
> We could no longer defer decision. Things were moving very rapidly. We could no longer wait on accident and postpone. If the Cabinet was for neutrality, he did not think he was the man to carry out such a policy. (2)

This placed the Cabinet face to face with the situation. But no decision was taken, divided as the members were in their views. "We rambled," says Lord Morley, "as even the best Cabinets are apt to do.... I could not, on the instant, gather with any certainty in which direction opinion was inclining."[3] War had not yet broken out, and there was still hope that it might be averted. The result - Grey could only cast about for a possible plan of preventing war from starting on the continent.

Churchill, meanwhile, was determined not to allow the diplomatic situation to develop dangerously before the

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1. Churchill, op. cit., 212.
2. Morley, Viscount John, Memorandum on Resignation, (London), (1928), 1-2.
3. Ibid., 2.

British Fleet was prepared for action, and he wished to be sure that the Grand Fleet would be in its War Station before war came. It has been shown that some preparatory measures were taken on July 27. That same night a secret telegram was sent to all foreign stations stating that war was "by no means impossible," and that preparations should be made to shadow "possible hostile men of war" of the Central Powers. On July 28 orders were given that the ships were to complete full crews and take all precautions against surprise. At five P.M. the First Fleet, stationed at Portland, was ordered to proceed during the night at high speed and with lights out through the Straits of Dover to Scapa Flow, its fighting base. This order was not brought before the Cabinet; Mr. Churchill had informed only Mr. Asquith, who at once gave his approval. Mr. Churchill says in regard to these moves, "We were now in a position, whatever happened, to control events."[1]

Sir Edward Grey, now that his Conference proposal had been rejected by Germany, decided before making another move to await the outcome of the direct negotiations, which had begun between Austria and Russia.[2] These negotiations, however, in which the Russians hoped the Serbian reply might serve as a basis for discussion, came to nothing owing to the

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1. Churchill, op. cit., 226.
2. Grey to Goschen, July 28, 1914, B.D., op. cit., XI, No.223, p.150. The credit for the starting of these negotiations was due largely to the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Count Pourtales. Buchanan to Grey, July 29, 1914, ibid., No.271, p.175.

uncompromising attitude of Berchtold. "No one in Austria, he wrote, "could understand or approve negotiations bearing on the terms of the Serbian reply, at the very moment when we have declared it to be unacceptable." He clinched this rejection with a final argument, "It would be still less possible now, because of the way in which feeling has been rising both in Austria and in Hungary, and, furthermore, war, has actually been declared today upon Serbia."[1] Grey had supported this plan of conversations between Russia and Austria, seeing in them a prospect of peace, but that prospect was thwarted by Austria's refusal to consent to any modification of her demands, and by a declaration of war to forestall any kind of mediation which might prevent her action against Serbia.

This decision on the part of Berchtold to prevent further measures of conciliation by means of a "fait accompli" had thus brought to nought yet another of Grey's endeavours to find a solution to the crisis. The previous day, July 27, while he had been at the time unaware of how Berlin had reacted to his proposal of a Conference, he had received the full text of Serbia's reply to the Serbian note. He felt that "Serbia had agreed to the Austrian demands to an extent he would never have believed possible." Sir Eyre Crowe wrote in a minute that "the answer is reasonable. If Austria demands absolute compliance with her ultimatum it can only mean that she wants war."[2] The Kaiser expressed a somewhat similar

1. De Bunsen to Grey, July 28, 1914, B.D., XI, No.248, p.163.
2. Minute by Crowe, July 28, 1914 to No.171, ibid., XI, p.121.

sentiment when he said, "With it every reason for war drops away."[1] Should Austria reject the answer as a foundation for negotiations, or occupy Belgrade, said Grey to Lichnowsky, "Russia could not regard such action with equanimity, and would have to regard it as a direction challenge. The result would be the most frightful war Europe had ever seen." Communicating these views to the German ambassador, Grey urged Germany to use her influence to have Vienna accept the Serbian reply either as satisfactory or as the basis for a conference for peaceful negotiations.[2] Lichnowsky added in his report:

> I found the Minister irritated for the first time. He spoke with great seriousness and seemed absolutely to expect that we should successfully make use of our influence to settle the matter .... I am convinced that in case it should come to war after all, we should no longer be able to count on British sympathy or British support, as every evidence of ill-will would be seen in Austria's procedure. Also, everybody here is convinced.... that the key to the situation is to be found in Berlin. (3)

The way in which the situation had developed by July 27, and this report of Lichnowsky's, along with equally alarming telegrams from St. Petersburg and Rome, somewhat shook the confidence of Bethmann in the wisdom of the policy his Government had hitherto pursued. He decided now to accede to Grey's request, "to press the button" for peace, and to accept for the first time the rôle of mediator. He telegraphed

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1. Note by the Kaiser, July 27,1914, K.D., No.271, p.254; Also his letter to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, July 28,1914, No.293, p.273.
2. Grey to Goschen, July 27,1914, B.D.,XI, No.176, p.124. Lichnowsky to the German Foreign Office, July 27, 1914, K.D., No.138, pp.243-44.
3. K.D., No.138, p.244.

Lichnowsky's warning telegram to his ambassador at Vienna, with the British proposal that the Serbian answer be accepted as a basis for settlement. He pointed out that it would be impossible to reject this new suggestion on the part of Britain. "By refusing every proposition for mediation, we should be held responsible for the conflagration by the whole world, and be set forth as the original instigators of the war."[1] At the same time he notified Lichnowsky in London, "We have at once inaugurated a move for mediation at Vienna along the lines desired by Sir Edward Grey."[2]

Doubt has been expressed as to the sincerity of the German Chancellor in thus accepting his new rôle of mediator. That he should consent at all to counsel moderation at Vienna was a significant change in German policy, and a reversal in attitude. It is pointed out in questioning his sincerity that while he did submit the British proposal for consideration at Vienna, he did not urge its adoption, although he knew at the time that Berchtold was going to declare war on Serbia the next morning, for a telegram giving this information had reached Berlin on July 27 at 4:30 P.M.[3] The essential fact in the British proposal was that there should be no military action taken whatsoever, yet Bethmann made no effort, other than the mere sending of the proposal, to restrain Austrian

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1. Bethmann to Ambassador at Vienna, July 27, 1914, K.D., No.277, pp.255-56.
2. Bethmann to Lichnowsky, July 27,1914, ibid.,No.278, p.257.
3. Ibid., No.257, p.243. "They have decided to send out the declaration of war tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow, at the latest, chiefly to frustrate any attempt at intervention." Bethmann did not send his dispatch to Vienna until 11:50 P.M.

action. It is further charged that he merely wanted to give some tangible evidence of pacific intentions to Britain.[1] There are students of the crisis, however, who credit the Chancellor with sincerity and good faith.[2]

Whatever were the motives behind the change of policy, it was barren of good results. Berchtold had earlier won from the Emperor permission to declare war. When Tschirschky presented Bethmann's communication, the Foreign Minister, according to the report of the ambassador,

> thanks your Excellency most kindly for the communication of the English mediation proposal and will very soon forward a reply to the Imperial Government. The Minister states now, however, that since the opening of hostilities on the part of Serbia (3) and the ensuing declaration of war, he thinks that England's move was made too late. (4)

On July 29 Austria drew up a definite refusal. "To her great regret" the British suggestion could not be accepted since "the Serbian reply had been superceded already by other events."[5]

Thus, by July 29 the situation had assumed a most menacing aspect. Austria-Hungary had declared war; Berchtold had refused negotiations with Russia; and M. Sazonov, when the

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1. Renouvin, op. cit., 124-25. Nicolson wrote to Buchanan, July 28, 1914. "She (Germany) contented herself with simply passing on our proposal as our proposal, which of course was not what we desired or requested." B.D., No.239, p.157.
2. Mr. Fay is of this opinion; op. cit., II, 416.
3. It was said in Vienna that Serbian troops had fired first on Austrian outposts.
4. Ambassador at Vienna to German Foreign Office, July 28, 1914, K.D., No.313, p.283.
5. Ibid., No.400, p.348.

declaration of war became known, abandoned his previously conciliatory manner. With regard to Austrian assurances à propos of Serbia's independence and integrity, the Russian minister had declared that no engagements that Austria might take on these two points would satisfy Russia, and that on the day Austria crossed the Serbian frontier the order for mobilization against Austria would be issued.[1] A European war seemed almost inevitable. "What is the use of exchanging views at this juncture," asked Sir Arthur Nicolson, on July 29, "I am of opinion that the resources of diplomacy are, for the present, exhausted."[2] He agreed with a suggestion made by Sir Eyre Crowe, that "We should not, in present circumstances, issue the otherwise usual declaration of neutrality" between Austria and Serbia.[3]

Sir Edward Grey was impelled now to a firmer policy than that of the days preceding; he decided to give Germany a more definite warning, as both Russia and France had been urging. But he was most careful to point out to Cambon in London, to whom he explained what he intended to say to Lichnowsky, that his warning to Germany would not mean that England had as yet decided what policy she would follow in the event of Germany and France being involved in war. England was "free from engagements," he pointed out, and would have to

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1. Buchanan to Grey, July 28,1914, B.D.,XI,No.247, p.162.
2. Nicolson, in a minute, July 29,1914, to No.252,B.D. XI,p.166.
3. Minutes, July 29,1914, to No.250, ibid., p.165.

decide what British interests required."[1]

News had arrived in the British Foreign Office that Russia had decided to mobilize four southern districts, and that she felt "mediation by the Cabinet of London with a view to stopping military operations against Serbia was a matter of extreme urgency."[2] Russia had quite evidently not waited for Austrian troops to enter Serbia. Grey now told Lichnowsky of the Russian decision and of the request for mediation. Accordingly he suggested a new peace proposal - that it might be

> a suitable basis for mediation, if Austria, after occupying Belgrade for example, or other places, should announce her conditions. Should your Excellency (Bethmann), however, undertake mediation.... this would of course suit him (Grey) equally well. But mediation seemed now to him to be urgently necessary, if a European catastrophe were not to result. (3)

This new suggestion of the British Foreign Minister was almost identical with the "halt in Belgrade" proposal which the German Chancellor had already recommended to Vienna on July 28, although at this time London was quite unaware of the Berlin suggestion.[4] Grey then went on to give Lichnowsky in a "friendly and private communication" a warning that as

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1. Grey to Bertie, July 29, B.D.XI, No.283, p.180; Cambon to Viviani, July 29, 1914, D.D.F., 3e série, XI, No.266, p.220, and No.281, pp.228-29.
2. Beckendorff to Nicolson, July 29, 1914, B.D., XI, No.258, p.168.
3. Lichnowsky to German Foreign Office July 29, 1914, K.D., No.368, p.321. Grey to Goschen, July 29, 1914, B.D., XI, No.285, p.182.
4. Fay, op. cit., II, 424-25; Renouvin, op. cit., 129-30. Schmitt, op. cit., II, 155.

long as the conflict remained confined to Austria and Russia, England could stand aside, but if Germany and France should be involved, the situation would be immediately altered, and the British Government would in that event be forced to rapid decisions.[1] He expressed the hope that the friendly tone of Anglo-German conversations would continue, but

> if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it involved practically every European interest, I did not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that we should not take action, and to the reproach that, if they had not been so misled, the course of things might have been different. (2)

This pronouncement on the part of Grey of British policy surely marks a new stage in its evolution. He was warning Germany now that the possibility of British participation in a European war, should such a war arise from the crisis, and particularly should France be involved, must not be set aside. A more frank avowal of the British position at that time could hardly have been possible; and it is difficult in view of this exposition to see how Sir Edward's critics can maintain that he was guilty of not letting Germany know just where Britain stood in the crisis. The last sentence of the quotation given above rather strikingly anticipates the charges of many of his most bitter critics in the post-war years.

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1. Lichnowsky to German Foreign Office, July 29, 1914, K.D., No.368, pp.321-22. Grey to Goschen, July 29, 1914, B.D., XI, No.286, pp.182-83.
2. Grey to Goschen, ibid., pp.182-83.

While the Cabinet had not even at this late date, July 29, been able to come to any decision on British policy, further steps of preparedness were taken by the naval and military departments of the government, which, had they been known, would have convinced Germany that British intervention was a factor which might possibly have to be reckoned with in a European conflict. On the afternoon of July 29, a "warning telegram" was sent from the Admiralty to the ships of the navy throughout the world, and "precautionary measures" arranged by the General Staff "to meet an immediate prospect of war" were put into force by the Army.[1]

The "pledge plan," or the idea of "a halt in Belgrade," which had originated in Berlin and which was endorsed by London, was the basis of the diplomatic negotiations in Berlin and in Vienna after July 28. In spite of urging on the part of Bethmann, who had by now made an almost complete "reversal of policy" to restrain his ally,[2] Berchtold would not hear of any concession. He evaded giving an answer until the thirty-first, and then he answered in the negative. It would be impossible to discontinue hostilities against Serbia, he claimed, and negotiation with the other Powers would be possible only

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1. Churchill, op. cit., 220.
2. On July 29 the Chancellor sent three telegrams to Vienna urging the "halt in Belgrade" proposal be accepted. In the third he directed the Ambassador to inform Berchtold "with all impressiveness and great seriousness" that he refused to allow Germany "to be drawn wantonly into a world conflagration by Vienna, without having any regard paid to our counsel." K.D., No.396, pp.345-46.

after Russia had countermanded her mobilization. This attitude of the Austrian Government did not conform in any way with the proposals made. The stubbornness of Berchtold and the intransigence of the Austrian Government were primary and fundamental factors overshadowing all else during these days. But if prospects of peace were shattered by the Austrian answer on July 31, they were made finally impossible when news of Russia's mobilization reached Berlin on that day. Control then passed into the hands of the military leaders, and the diplomats were quickly pushed into the background.

It is of exceeding importance that attention be directed at this point to the events which had transpired in St. Petersburg following the Sarajevo murders, and which had led up the Russian decision to mobilize. Was that decision encouraged by assurances of support from Paris and London? To what extent can the other two partners in the Entente be held responsible for the fateful step? In how far did French and Russian policy coincide with each other and with the efforts which Sir Edward Grey exerted to preserve peace? Had Paris or London given their approval in advance to the Russian action, assuring the Czarist Government of their support?

The first reaction in Russia, especially in those circles in which the monarchical principle was strong, was one of horror at the crime and sympathy with the House of Hapsburg. "The assassination at Sarajevo," reported the German Ambassador at the Czar's Court on July 13, "has it seems, made a deep impression here also, and condemnation of the shameless deed

was expressed far and wide at the earliest moment."[1] But in the days following, in the wide circles of the Pan-Slav party Russian nationalism resented the possibilities of Austrian action against Serbia, and in this set, where Russia was held to be the natural and traditional protector of the Balkan Slavs, lack of sympathy for the Austrian Government became quickly noticeable. Anti-Austrian feeling early found cause for complaint against the Dual Monarchy in the anti-Serbian demonstrations and riots that followed the assassinations. The German Ambassador became gravely impressed during July with the bitterness of this feeling against Austria. "The deep hatred of Austria-Hungary that is felt here," he wrote, "very soon began to assert itself, even during this sad event, and the indignation at the revenge exercised against the Serbs in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy superseded within a few days all expressions of sympathy for the aged Emperor Francis Joseph and his realm." Grey, in London, was well aware of the danger inherent in this situation, and warned the Austrian Ambassador, Count Mensdorff, against any action on the part of his Government which might inflame feeling in Russia.[3] As early as July 6 M. Sazonov had warned the Austrian attaché that Russia would oppose any violence on the part of Austria against Serbia. On July 21 Pourtales reported; "Russia would not be able to permit Austria-Hungary to make any threats

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1. The Ambassador at St. Petersburgh to the Chancellor, July 13, 1914, K.D., No.53, p.115.
2. Ibid.
3. Grey to de Bunsen, July 23,1914, B.D., XI, No.86, p.70.

against Serbia or to take military measures.... 'La politique de la Russie est pacifique, mais pas passive.'"[1]

How was this Russian policy conditioned, if at all, by the visit of President Poincaré and Prime Minister Viviani of France, who arrived in St. Petersburg on July 20, for a visit which had been planned some months before?[2] Apparently no official records have been preserved, if any were made, of the Franco-Russian conversations which took place on this visit, for the only documents given in the Russian collection are the toasts exchanged between Poincaré and Nicholas II at the state banquets which have long been known for some time.[3] But if no official records were kept, we do know from a variety of sources that the visit revealed the closest relations existed between the two Governments, and that on numerous occasions at various functions the leaders gave repeated expressions of their governments' mutual friendliness. The three days visit was "more than a round of ceremonial banquets and undoubtedly strengthened the bonds of the Franco-Russian Alliance."[4]

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1. The Ambassador at St. Petersburgh to the Chancellor, July 21, 1914, K.D., No.120, p.162.
2. M. Viviani was also Minister of Foreign Affairs. The absence of Poincaré and Viviani from Paris in these days as the crisis developed made the situation much more difficult for the French Government.
3. Schmitt, B.E., Russia and the War, reprinted from Foreign Affairs, October, 1934, 17.
4. Soward, F.H., The Outbreak of the World War, off print from Queen's Quarterly, 1929, 10.

On the afternoon of July 21, when meeting with the Diplomatic Corps, Poincaré spoke in friendly manner to all except the Austrian ambassador. The latter he questioned on Austrian intentions in Serbia, warning him that

> With a little good will, this Serbian affair is easy to settle. But it is easy also for it to become envenomed. Serbia has very warm friends in the Russian people. And Russia has an ally, France. What complications are to be feared there. (1)

He remarked later to Paléologue on this conversation, "that interview has left an unfavourable impression. Szarpary, (the Austrian ambassador) was undoubtedly concealing something. Austria is preparing some sudden stroke. Sazonov must be firm and we must support him."[2]

A more definite step in the line of cooperation was taken on the morning of July 23, when Sazonov dispatched to his representative in Vienna a warning telegram:

> According to rumours which we have heard, the Austrian Government appears to be on the point of making certain demands at Belgrade with regard to the event at Sarajevo. Draw the attention of the Minister for Foreign Affairs in a friendly but energetic way to the dangerous consequences of such action, in case this action is incompatible with the dignity of Serbia. From my conversation with the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, it seems that France is also following with great interest the relations between Austria and Serbia, and is not disposed to tolerate any(3) humiliation which is not justified by the circumstances.

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1. Paléologue, M., La Russie des Tsars Pendant la Grande Guerre, (Paris,1921), I, 10.
2. Ibid., 10.
3. Cited in Renouvin, op. cit., 82-83. The telegram is dated July 22 and Renouvin accepts this date. Mr. Fay explains this error, Fay op. cit., II, 284, footnote. It did not reach Vienna until 3 P.M. on July 23. Even then the Ambassador did not see the Foreign Minister until the morning of July 24. Renouvin, op. cit., 82, footnote.

Poincaré had approved this warning, and the French Ambassador also was instructed to give counsels of moderation at Vienna.[1]

The British Foreign Office, however, saw danger in a veiled threat of this kind. Sir Eyre Crowe noted, "Any such communication at Vienna would be likely to produce intense irritation, without any beneficial other effect." Nicolson was afraid it was not a "judicious" move, while Grey decided to postpone action in this regard until the next day.[2]

This Franco-Russian warning came to nothing, however, for before it could be acted upon by the representatives in Vienna the Austrian ultimatum had been presented to Belgrade, at 6 P.M., on July 23rd.

The sending of the ultimatum had been so timed that Poincaré and Viviani, who were scheduled to leave St. Petersburg on the evening of July 23, would be at sea when news of the delivery of the note arrived at the Russian capital.[3] Thus it was that the final festivities of the President's visit took place in ignorance of the fact that Austria had presented her demands at Belgrade, and that the Franco-Russian step to prevent such a measure was to prove futile. The visit came to an end with the President and Czar exchanging warm words of the high regard in which each held the other's Government, and by

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1. Buchanan to Grey, July 23, 1914, B.D., XI, No.84, p.69. Viviani to Bienvenu-Martin, July 24,1914, D.D.F., 3e série, XI, No.1, p.1.
2. Minutes to Buchanan's telegram to Grey, July 23,1914,B.D.XI. No.84, p.69. De Bunsen to Grey, July 23,1914, ibid., No.90, p.73.
3. Wolff, op. cit., 535.

expressions of mutual cordiality which placed a seal on the Franco-Russian Accord.[1]

There can be no doubt that the visit did have a marked effect on Russian policy in the days which followed. According to Buchanan, who refers to statements made to him by Sazonov and Paléologue, agreement had been arrived at on the following points:

1. Perfect community of views on the various problems with which the Powers are confronted as regards the maintenance of general peace and balance of power in Europe, more especially in the East.

2. Decision to take action at Vienna with a view to the prevention of a demand for explanations or any summons equivalent to an intervention in the internal affairs of Serbia which the latter would be justified in regarding as an attack on her sovereignty and independence.

3. Solemn affirmation of obligations imposed by the alliance of the two countries.[2]

It would seem as if the Russian Government had thus obtained at the very outset of the crisis, and before either knew of the Austrian ultimatum, assurance that the French could be depended upon to live up to the terms of the alliance. And we know for a fact that the war party in Russia, headed by the Grand Dukes, was to a great extent encouraged. The wife of one of the Grand Dukes said to Paléologue at a state dinner on July 22 "War is going to break out. Nothing will be left of Austria. You will get back Alsace-Lorraine. Our armies will

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1. Paléologue, La Russie des Tsars, I, 19-21.
2. Buchanan to Grey, July 24,1914, B.D., XI, No.101, p.80. Paléologue to Bienvenu-Martin, July 24,1914, D.D.F. 3e série, XI, No.19, p.18.

meet in Berlin. Germany will be annihilated."[1]

Whatever might be the assurances of French support given to Russia on this visit, these were confirmed again and again as the crisis developed. On July 25, according to Buchanan, Paléologue stated to Sazanov that "he was in a position to give his Excellency (Sazonov) assurance that France placed herself unreservedly on Russia's side."[2] On July 27 M. Isvolsky wrote from Paris:

> I was struck with the degree to which the Minister of Justice and his assistants understood the whole situation and had calmly but firmly decided to give us their wholehearted support, and to avoid the least appearance of a divergence in point of view. (3)

On the same day M. Viviani sent instructions to M. Paléologue from on board the "France;"

> Please tell M. Sazonov that France, appreciating as does Russia the great importance of the two countries affirming their entire accord in the face of other Powers and of neglecting no effort in the solution of the crisis, is entirely ready to second, in the interests of the general peace, the action of the Imperial Government.[4]

In carrying out these instructions the Ambassador gave a formal promise to Sazonov that France would live up to the obligations of the alliance, but he begged the Minister to be prudent. "I beg you not to take any measures on the German front, and to be very careful on the Austrian front, as long as Germany has not uncovered her real game. The least imprudence

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1. Paléologue, La Russie des Tsars, I, 15. Fay, op.cit.,II,283.
2. Buchanan to Grey, July 25,1914,B.D., XI, No.125, p.94.
3. Cited in Renouvin, op.cit., 64.
4. Viviani to Paléologue, July 27, 1914, D.D.F., 3e série, XI, No.138 p.118. Paléologue to Bienvenu-Martin, July 29, 1914, ibid., No.248, p.210.

on your part would cost us the help of England."[1]

It is difficult to state how much weight was attached to the note of prudence in this communication, but the Russian Government noted with satisfaction the offer of support. On July 29 the Russian Ambassador in Paris "was instructed to sincerely thank the French Government for the declaration made in its name by the French Ambassador that we can count on the entire allied support of France."[2]

According to Mr. Schmitt the Russian documents reveal clearly the attitude of French military circles in support of their ally. On July 28 Ignatiev, Russian Military Attaché in Paris, reported that the French Minister of War and the Chief of Staff had expressed "complete and enthusiastic readiness to fulfil truly the obligations of the alliance," and on July 29 he stated that "everything possible had been done in France, and the ministry is quietly waiting on events."[3]

This assurance of support from the French military leaders appears to have played an important part in the final decision of the Russians to carry out general mobilization. The French Government received a communication from Isvolsky at 3 A.M. on July 30 that the Russian Government had decided to "speed up" its armaments.[4] M. Poincaré, after interviewing M. Messimy, Minister of War, sent instructions to Paléologue

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1. Paléologue, op. cit., I, 33-34.
2. D.D.F., 3e série, XI, No.301, p.258; Diary of the Russian Foreign Office, 50.
3. Schmitt, Russia and the War, loc. cit., 21.
4. Viviani to French Ambassadors, July 30,1914, D.D.F., 3e série, No.305, p.261.

and renewed the declaration that "France is resolved to fulfil all the obligations of her alliance."[1] Then he went on to caution M. Sazonov to avoid any act which might give Germany the opportunity for retaliatory measures:

> I therefore think it would be well that, in taking any precautionary measures of defense which Russia thinks must go on, she should not immediately take any step which may offer to Germany a pretext for a total or partial mobilization of her forces. (2)

When M. Isvolsky communicated the contents of these instructions to his Government he reported at the same time, however, two conversations, the one with M. de Margerie, Director of the French Foreign Office, and the other with M. Messimy, Minister of War, which when coupled with the directions of Viviani, were of interest, to say the least. De Margerie had told him that the French Government did not wish to interfere with Russia's military preparations, but that they "would consider it most desirable on account of the still continuing negotiations for the preservation of the peace, if these preparations were carried on in the least open, least provocative manner possible." M. Messimy had told Count Ignatiev that Russia might declare that she was "willing to slow down" for the time being her preparations, but that she might nevertheless "continue and even accelerate" these preparations, only avoiding so far as possible "the transportation of troops on a larger scale."[3] In a written

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1. Viviani to French Ambassadors, July 30,1914, D.D.F., 3e série, No. 305, p.262.
2. Ibid., p. 262.
3. D.D.F., 3e série, XI, (Note), p.262; Un Livre Noir, op.cit.,II, 290-91; Renouvin, op. cit., 206; Fabre-Luce, op.cit., 211-12.

report of the same date, according to Mr. Schmitt, who is here reporting on his study of the Russian documents, Ignatiev explained that the reservations were not to be interpreted as a tendency on the part of France "to draw back at the last minute," and that they "had no effect on the normal course of France's preparations for War." "No importance," he reported, was being attached to the demonstrations against war, which were restricted to the boulevards, and the tone of the press caused "general satisfaction."[1]

M. Renouvin does his utmost to minimize the importance of these facts, and to emphasize the moderating influence of the French,[2] but they would seem to be undeniable facts of French encouragement, and it is impossible to explain them away. Counsels of moderation may have been given, but no real restraint was exercised, and it is plainly evident that the Russians had every reason to feel sure that their ally would march with them. This confidence can not be minimized as a factor in the Russian decision to mobilize, just as it was the assurance of German support which caused Austria to refuse all suggestions of compromise and mediation.

To what extent did British policy at St. Petersburg correspond with that of the French? From the Russian view England was throughout the crisis something of an enigma. On July 24, in a meeting with Paléologue and Buchanan, Sazonov strongly urged the latter to obtain from his Government a

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1. Schmitt, loc. cit., 21.
2. Renouvin, op. cit., 206-09.

statement of its solidarity with France and Russia. He vehemently criticised Austrian policy, and told the British ambassador of the agreement of views established by the French and Russians during the visit of Poincaré.[1] To this Paléologue added that "France would not only give Russia strong diplomatic support, but would, if necessary, fulfil all the obligations imposed on her by the alliance." It was then urged upon Buchanan that if England did not take sides "from the very start," she would thus encourage the Central Powers, and make war "more probable." To this Buchanan answered that he could not speak for his Government, but promised that he would telegraph to London all that had been said. But he held out little hope for a British declaration of solidarity with France and Russia, stating that "we had no direct interests in Serbia," and that "public opinion would never sanction a war on her behalf."[2] Sir Edward readily endorsed the ambassador's declaration,[3] and Sazonov was notified to this effect on July 26.[4]

On July 27 Sir Edward gave Beckendorff in London some little hope when he stated that it should not be taken for granted that Britain would keep out of war, under all circumstances, if a conflict broke out; but he was careful to add that this assurance must not be interpreted as a promise to undertake anything more than diplomatic action.[5] The Russian Government

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270 1. Supra. 270.
2. Buchanan to Grey, July 24,1914, B.D., XI, No.101, p.80.
3. Grey to Buchanan, July 25,1914, ibid., No.112, p.86.
4. Buchanan to Grey, July 27,1914, ibid., No.170, p.120.
5. Grey to Buchanan, July 27,1914, ibid., No.177, p.125.

could thus notice at least a favourable tendency in London in spite of the guarded statements of the Foreign Minister.

Russia had proceeded with partial mobilization measures after July 25, and while the British Foreign Office was unaware of the extent of these measures, it was felt that some such preparations were justified. As early as July 25 Grey informed Buchanan that Russian mobilization would be an inevitable result of the Austrian note.[1] The day before he had expressed a similar viewpoint to Lichnowsky.[2] On July 26 Buchanan urged Sazonov to delay mobilization orders "as long as possible,"[3] but to his report Sir Eyre Crowe noted on July 27, "Austria is already mobilizing .... Russia cannot be expected to delay her own mobilization, which, as it is, can only become effective in something like double the time required by Austria and by Germany."[4] But while there was the feeling of justification for Russia, when on July 28 Buchanan learned of the imminence of partial mobilization, he cautioned Sazonov against taking "any military measures which might be considered as a challenge by Germany."[5]

It has been charged that Grey's expression of sympathy for the Russian position did much to minimize the effect of his refusal to pledge his Government to aid the Dual Alliance. He has been bitterly criticised for not exercising greater

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1. Grey to Buchanan, July 27, 1914, B.D., XI, No.112, p.87.
2. Supra. 244.
3. Buchanan to Grey, July 26, 1914, B.D., XI, No.170, p.120.
4. Minute by Sir Eyre Crowe, July 27, 1914, ibid., No.170, p.120.
5. Paléologue, La Russie des Tsars, I, 32.

restraint upon Russia in this matter of mobilization.[1] But it would appear, on analysing the situation, that it would have been most difficult, if not impossible, for the British Government to take any firmer policy towards restraining Russia while it neither wished nor was able to promise her eventual support in case she were attacked.[2] Grey could promise nothing, could take no definite stand, as has been pointed out, because he was not sure of public opinion or of the support of the whole Cabinet.

In summing up the situation at St. Petersburg it would then appear that while England gave Russia no such strong assurance of support as did France, she did not definitely urge M. Sazonov to not mobilize. Nor does it appear at all certain that either London or Paris gave their approval in advance to any definite step on the part of Russia. The French Government did not know definitely until the evening of July 31 that Russia had ordered general mobilization.[3] Russia felt that she could not allow Austrian action against Serbia, and when the former declared war on July 28, and began the bombardment of Belgrade, feeling sure of the support of France, and knowing that England would not oppose her action, she ordered her mobilization. But for this action it might have been possible for diplomacy to arrange a compromise. The military time-tables of all the Great Powers were now primary considerations and control passed into the hands of the military.

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1. Barnes, op. cit., 371.
2. Grey, op. cit., I, 313.
3. Infra. 287 (note 1).

The news of Russia's mobilization did not reach the other capitals until Friday, July 31; and the Austrian move to mobilize was not known, except to Berlin, until Saturday, August 1.[1] It has been earlier shown that Austria had delayed in rejecting Sir Edward's last peace suggestion,[2] consequently, on July 30 he was still hoping for a peaceful solution of the growing danger. But on July 30 he received news from Sir Edward Goschen in Berlin that convinced him and the Foreign Office that Germany had practically determined on war, the violation of Belgian neutrality, and on the crushing of France.

On the previous evening Bethmann had sent for Goschen and made "a strong bid for British neutrality in the event of war." Provided that Britain remained neutral, he said, Germany was prepared to give every assurance that she aimed at no territorial gains at the expense of France in Europe, though she could give no such assurances concerning French colonies. Germany would respect the neutrality of Holland, but as regards Belgium, he "could not tell to what operations Germany might be forced by the action of France," but he could state that, "provided Belgium did not take sides against Germany, her integrity would be respected after the conclusion of the war."[3]

This move on the part of Bethmann created a disastrous impression of German intentions in London. "I read it through

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1. Schmitt, op. cit., II, 257.
2. Supra. 264.
3. Goschen to Grey, July 29, 1914, B.D., XI, No.293, pp.185-86. Received July 30, 1914, at 9 A.M.

with a feeling of despair," says Grey. "The document made clear that Bethmann-Hollweg now thought war was probable. We were henceforth to discuss upon how we should conduct ourselves in war, no longer how war could be avoided.... The proposal made to us meant everlasting disgrace if we accepted it."[1] Sir Eyre Crowe had this to say, "The only comment that need be made on these astounding proposals is that they reflect discredit on the statesman who makes them.... Incidentally it is of interest to note that Germany practically admits the intention to violate Belgian neutrality.... It is clear that Germany is practically determined to go to war."[2]

The reply which Grey returned to Goschen was approved by Mr. Asquith, but was not shown to the Cabinet which did not meet until the afternoon.[3] The Ambassador was to inform the Chancellor that his proposal could not "for a moment be entertained."

> He asks us in effect to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.
>
> From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy without further territory in Europe being taken from her.
>
> But apart from that, for us to make this bargain at the expense of France would be a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.
>
> The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away

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1. Grey, op. cit., I, 326.
2. Minute by Sir Eyre Crowe, July 30, 1914, B.D., XI, No.293, p.186.
3. Grey, op. cit., I, 329.

whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.

.... We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require. (1)

But while declining this German suggestion that his Government should promise to stand aside, Grey at the same time continued to resist pressure from the Entente Powers that he should align his country with them. On July 30 M. Cambon came to remind him of the terms of the letters exchanged in November, 1912, which provided for discussion between the governments of France and Britain if the peace of Europe was threatened; such a threat now existed, claimed M. Cambon.[2] Instead of responding to this appeal the Foreign Minister evaded an answer until the following afternoon,[3] wishing to avoid taking any irrevocable stand and placing hope still in peaceful negotiations.

In spite of the growing danger, Sir Edward felt, even at this late date, that there was still a basis for discussion among the Powers. Sazonov had offered a formula according to which he would engage to stop all military preparations in Russia if Austria would agree to eliminate from her ultimatum all points which violated Serbian sovereignty.[4] Besides this there was the British suggestion of the Austrian occupation of

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1. Grey to Goschen, July 30,1914, B.D.,XI, No.303, p.193.
2. Cambon to Viviani, July 30,1914, D.D.F., 3e série, XI, No.363, p.301; Grey to Bertie, July 30,B.D.XI,No.319,p.201.
3. Ibid.
4. Buchanan to Grey, July 30,1914, B.D., XI, No.302 (A) and (B), pp.191-92.

of Belgrade to be followed by negotiation which the German Government was to support in Vienna, and to which no answer had at this date been received. Late on July 30 Sir Edward offered a new proposal, a combination of these two plans.

> If Austria, having occupied Belgrade and neighbouring Serbian territory, declares herself ready, in the interest of European peace, to discuss how a complete settlement can be arrived at, I hope that Russia would also consent to discussion and suspension of further military preparations, provided that other Powers did the same.(1)

This was, he recognized, "a slender chance of preserving peace," but it was an appeal to Russia to stay her hand, the first of its kind, and made at this date because now Germany seemed at last willing to cooperate. The offer was communicated to Paris, the French Government was asked to support it at St. Petersburg,[2] and a copy was given to Lichnowsky to be sent on to Berlin.[3] This last effort to save the situation, however, was immediately destroyed by the events of the following day.

On the morning of July 31 news reached Berlin of Russia's mobilization. The military party in the German capital now pressed for immediate action, and in the face of the Russian move, its hand was immeasurably strengthened. At one P.M. the Government proclaimed a "state of danger of war" which set in motion a number of precautionary measures preparatory to actual mobilization. It was taken for granted that the order for

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1. Grey to Buchanan, July 30, B.D., XI, No.309, pp.196-97.
2. Grey to Bertie, July 30, 1914, ibid., No.310, p.197, D.D.F., 3e série, XI, No.389, pp.327-29.
3. Lichnowsky to German Foreign Office, July 30, 1914, K.D., No.460, p.385.

general mobilization would follow within forty-eight hours.[1]

Now that mobilization was being undertaken in three capitals considerations of military necessity tended to far out-weigh diplomatic considerations. Such a statement is almost axiomatic for any country facing such a crisis as was presented on July 31, but it was more particularly true for Berlin. In a war with Russia supported by France the German plan of campaign called for a sudden and decisive drive to the west to crush France, and then a turning on Russia where forces would be mobilized more slowly. Speed was the essential factor in the German plan to make up for inferiority of numbers. To the military leaders, to answer mobilization by countermobilization, and then to stand on the defensive waiting for diplomatic developments would mean losing the advantage which quick action would bring.

Thus the German plan of campaign impelled the Imperial Government to its next step, the step which actually precipitated war. It was decided to force the situation, and not to wait on developments. Peaceful negotiations which were pending had completely broken down, for at 2:45 P.M. Austria gave an absolute refusal to the last Anglo-German proposal to negotiate.[2] And since Austria declined to negotiate it was to be expected that Russia might attack forthwith. At 3:30 P.M. a double ultimatum was therefore dispatched in the form of instructions

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1. Renouvin, op. cit., 222; Fay, op. cit., II, 523; Schmitt, op. cit., II, 266.
2. Emperor of Austria to William II, July 31, 1914, K.D., No.482, p.400.

to the German ambassadors in St. Petersburg and Paris, to be presented to the respective governments.[1]

The message to Russia announced the "threatening danger of war," and declared that "mobilization must follow in case Russia does not suspend every war measure against Austria-Hungary and ourselves within twelve hours and make us a distinct declaration to that effect." France was asked for a declaration of neutrality in a Russo-German war, her answer to be given within eighteen hours. While it was not expected that France would offer such a declaration, if she should declare for neutrality, the Ambassador was ordered to demand as a pledge of good faith that the fortresses of Toul and Verdun be turned over to Germany to be returned after the war.[2]

While these military considerations were dragging Europe closer and closer to the abyss, the British Foreign Minister in London made one more effort to stave off the catastrophe. He did not know by July 31, how the idea of the "halt in Belgrade" proposal had been received in Vienna, and during the morning Lichnowsky had informed him that Austria was willing to renew direct relations with Russia, "to give explanations about the Austrian note," and to discuss "any questions that affect Austro-Russian relations."[3] Grey at once

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1. Imperial Chancellor to the Ambassador in St. Petersburg, July 31,1914, K.D., No.490,p.404; to the Ambassador in Paris, ibid., No.491, p.405.
2. This provisional clause in the ultimatum was not used at the time since France rejected the German question. It was published only in 1918. Schoen,F.,von, The Memoirs of an Ambassador,(London,1922), 194-95.
3. Jagow to Lichnowsky,July 30,1914,K.D.,No.444,p.374. Grey to Buchanan,July 31,1914,B.D.,XI, No.335, p.213.

formulated a new proposal. He telegraphed to St. Petersburg and to Paris, that he "earnestly" hoped that M. Sazonov would encourage the conversations.[1] As to military preparations, he told Lichnowsky that "he could not see how Russia could be urged to suspend them unless Austria would put some limit to her advance into Serbia."[2]

It was "suspicion", he said, which was blocking a solution of the difficulties. Could not the four disinterested Powers, England, France, Germany and Italy assure Austria that Serbia would give her "full satisfaction," and assure Russia that Serbian sovereignty and integrity would not be impaired. In addition, of course, "all Powers would suspend further military operations or preparations." He then went on to say:

> If Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris and go to the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences; but otherwise .... if France became involved we shall be drawn in. (3)

Most certainly this was going much farther than he had gone at any time previously; he was actually stating that Britain would, under certain circumstances, abandon the Entente. The proposal, however, was not a practicable one in the existing circumstances. Russia had earlier made it clear that she would not be satisfied with Austrian assurances, and Austria had given

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1. B.D., op. cit., XI, No.335, p.213.
2. Ibid., p.213.
3. Grey to Goschen July 31, 1914, ibid., No.340, pp.215-16.

every indication that she would agree to nothing less than the fulfilment of all her demands on Serbia.

Sir Edward Goschen discussed the project with von Jagow in Berlin, on the evening of July 31, "urging him most earnestly" to act upon it. While the latter "expressed himself very sympathetically" toward the proposal, and "appreciated the continued efforts to maintain peace," he declared that "it was impossible for the Imperial Government to consider any proposal until they had received an answer from Russia to their communication of today," that is to the ultimatum. "Russia's mobilization has spoilt everything," he added.[1]

On August 1 Goschen again met with Jagow to communicate another memorandum from Grey, stating that it would be possible still to maintain peace "if only a little respite in time can be gained before any Great Power begins war."[2] To this Jagow replied that Russia "had the weight of numbers on her side;" that speed was essential to Germany, and that "the safety of the German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide dominions." Russia had sent no answer to the German note; "Germany had therefore ordered mobilization." The Russian refusal to "demobilize must be regarded as creating "a state of war."[3] The Berlin Government was refusing to reconsider or

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1. Goschen to Grey, July 31,1914, B.D., XI, No.385, p.236.
2. Grey to Goschen, August 1,1914, ibid., No.411, p.246.
3. Goschen to Grey, August 1,1914, ibid., No.458, p.265.

to wait. Military arguments were in absolute control of the situation. A declaration of war was dispatched to be presented in St. Petersburg at 5 P.M. if at that time the German ambassador had not received a satisfactory reply to the ultimatum.[1]

The answer of the French Government to the ultimatum was to be given by 1 P.M. on August 1.[2] The Government had been taking measures of military precaution since the evening of July 25,[3] and from July 30 had been pressing the British Government to discover what course it would follow. When covering troops were ordered to their places on the frontiers on July 30 the famous decision to keep back ten kilometres[4] was given in order to influence British opinion favourably.[5] The French did not know definitely of the Russian mobilization

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1. Jagow to German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, August 1, 1914, K.D., No.542, pp.432-33.
2. D.D.F., 3e série, XI, No.417, p.347.
3. Joffre, Marshall, Memoirs, (London, 1932), I, 115-16.
4. D.D.F., 3e série, XI, No.333, pp.281-82; No.390, p.329.
5. This order did a great deal to convince the outside world of the peaceful intentions of France but it did little to impede her preparations. In many places the line designated in the order was only four or five kilometres from the frontier, and generals admitted later that the order was not obeyed in absolute strictness. Marshall Joffre has written, "In regard to the ten kilometre limit, I made little objection recognizing the strength of the motive dictating it and realizing moreover, that this measure would in no way compromise our mobilization or our later operations, op. cit., I, 123.

until the evening of July 31, since Paléologue's telegram did not arrive until 8:30 P.M.,[1] but Joffre had been pressing for complete mobilization in Paris since the afternoon of that date, when news of the German proclamation of the "state of threatening danger of war" reached Paris.[2] At a cabinet meeting in the morning of August 1 Joffre's demand for mobilization was granted,[3] and the order was issued at 3:45 P.M. When Baron Schoen called at the Foreign Office at one o'clock for the answer to Germany's ultimatum he was told briefly that "France will act in accordance with her interests,"[4] a formula agreed upon by Poincaré and Viviani, which made it sufficiently clear that France would fight.

Shortly after the ultimatum was sent to France on July 31, the draft of a declaration of war was drawn up, but it was not sent until August 3. Bethmann hesitated to declare war against the Republic. Inclined to emphasize legal formulae, he knew that although a formal declaration of war might have little real significance, it would loom large in the public mind. He therefore waited for a pretext to satisfy his own scruples and public opinion. There was some hope held that public opinion in France might force the Government in Paris to commit acts of war. But besides these reasons, Admiral von

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1. D.D.F., 3e série, XI, No.432, p.356. According to French evidence Paleologué had dispatched this telegram at 10:25 A.M. It thus took ten hours to reach Paris. This delay has never been satisfactorily explained. It may have been due to the confusion arising from the military occupation of the central telegraph office. It was sent by way of Scandinavia and did not reach Paris until 8:30 P.M. However, the news of Russia's mobilization had arrived in Paris by indirect means.
2. Joffre, op. cit., I, 126.
3. Viviania to Paul Cambon, August 1, 1914, D.D.F., 3e série, XI, No.523, pp.418-19. Joffre, op.cit., I, 127-28.
4. D.D.F., 3e série, XI, No.430, pp.360-61.

Tirpitz had raised another problem. He stressed the problem of the Navy, and requested that the declaration of war upon France might be made as late as possible, so that the Fleet might have time to complete its preparations. And according to the German plan of campaign French soil would not have to be invaded for a few days. Thus the declaration of war was held up; Bethmann sent the following note to the Emperor on the morning of August 2:

> In accordance with understanding with Ministry of War and General Staff, presentation of declaration of war to France not necessary today for any military reasons. Consequently it will not be done, in the hope that French will attack us. (1)

But once the German military machine was in motion Luxemburg had to be occupied, and then Belgium. On the morning of August 2 troops moved into Luxemburg, the German Government expressing regret that such a step was necessary and promising compensation after the war. On the evening of the same day the German minister in Brussels was ordered to deliver an ultimatum to Belgium. "The Imperial Government," read the note, "is in receipt of reliable information in relation to the proposed advance of French armed forces along the Meuse, route Givet-Namur. This information leaves no doubt as to France's intention to advance against Germany through Belgian territory."[2] As Belgium was not in a position to assure her neutrality, Germany was thus forced to send troops into the country to defend her

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1. The Chancellor to the Emperor, August 2, 1914, K.D., No.629, p.478.
2. The text of this ultimatum had been sent to the German minister in a sealed envelope on July 29.

own territory. The note went on to assure Belgium that the German Government contemplated no hostile measures against her, that recompense for damages would be given, and that the territory would be later evacuated. But, should Belgium refuse passage to the troops she would be treated as an enemy. A reply was demanded within twelve hours. The Belgian cabinet decided to answer the German demands in the negative. The next morning the Powers were notified of the ultimatum and its rejection; no military aid was asked for, though King Albert asked King George for diplomatic action. The Germans were given the answer in the afternoon, and they accordingly instructed their minister to give notice at six o'clock the following morning, that Germany was "going to act by force of arms."

On August 3 Germany declared war on France. Large movements of troops had been going on for two days in both countries, and violations of the frontier had been reported by each side; reports of which were printed in the papers. One such report announced that French airmen had dropped bombs at Nuremberg - a report later proven to be false. When the German Government drew up the declaration of war for presentation at Paris, hostilities were justified by these reported frontier violations and by the Nuremberg bombs. Schoen received the declaration late in the afternoon in a badly mutilated telegram, the text having been "jumbled," as he reports, during its transmission. Taking what he could decode of the message he

presented it as a declaration of war to Viviani at 6:45 P.M.[1]

At this point end the long negotiations to preserve peace which had begun some weeks before. The last stays which had restrained the launching of the Powers upon a European war had been now knocked away. It remains to be seen how Great Britain was dragged into the catastrophe, and this is the theme of the chapter which follows.

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1. Schoen, op. cit., 200-01. Schoen to Viviani, August 3, 1914, D.D.F., 3e série XI, No.678, p.509; Note du Département, August 4, 1914, ibid., No.725, p.537. Wolff, op. cit., 579-81.

Chapter VIII

How Britain Entered the War

CHAPTER VIII

HOW BRITAIN ENTERED THE WAR

The previous pages show clearly how anxiously Sir Edward Grey had worked for peace, how he had tried plan after plan to save Europe from war, how in his desire to avert a conflict he had made a variety of suggestions, and given his support to those which had arisen from other sources. It has been revealed how ready he was to take the lead in impartial mediation to settle the crisis which threatened Europe, and that while there remained any possible hope that the crisis might pass he had refused firmly to give his support to either of the diplomatic groups, always fearful that the pledging of the support of Britain to one side or the other might precipitate the catastrophe he dreaded. It now remains to be seen, how, when war came in spite of his efforts, Britain became involved.

Careful analysis makes plainly evident the fact that Britain's entry was finally determined by three mixed motives - to protect her own material interests, to fulfill her obligations to France, and to preserve the neutrality of Belgium.[1] In various works each of these three has been put forward as the

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1. Fay, S.B., New Light in the Origins of the War, III, American Historical Review, vol. XXVI, No.2, January 1921, p. 254.

single determining factor; but it was all three together which brought about her decision to go to war. In 1914 the last of the three was "played up" by the Government as the all important reason for the decision, but to any one with a clear understanding of the situation it was, if anything, of least importance. Before Belgium was invaded Asquith and Grey had resolved on support of France, and the violation of Belgian neutrality made no vital difference to that resolve. Where its real importance lay was in the fact that it preserved the unity of the Cabinet, except for two members, and of the country as a whole, and enlisted the support of the entire nation behind the Government.

In his momentous speech of August 3 the question of Belgian neutrality was put forward very skilfully by the Foreign Minister, very skilfully, and most prominently. He was convinced at the time that England must take part in the conflict, that she must not stand aside, and his appeal for support of this policy was made chiefly as an appeal to save Belgium, because no other appeal, he knew, would so clearly and so powerfully move Parliament and the British public. He wished for intervention regardless of the Belgian question, but he saw in the fate of that little country a powerful lever with which to move Parliament and the country to his side. No great idealism could be woven about British interests; the obligation to France, concealed for years from the House, he repudiated as being a deciding factor in the situation, though in truth it was just such a factor; but the fate of Belgium served as a most powerful appeal,

clothed in noble idealism, a righteous cause, which won Parliament and the public to the side of intervention. It gave the nation enthusiasm for the crusade against the Central Powers. The Belgian issue thus gave a splendid excuse for a decision already arrived at on the issues of British interests and British obligations to France. If, then, as is here maintained, the Belgian issue was not the deciding factor, to what extent did the obligations to France weigh in favour of the decision for intervention?

It has been shown that there was little question of England being involved until late in the crisis. There was wide spread criticism of Serbia after Serajevo, and as the crisis developed, a decided disinclination to support Russia and France in a war arising out of an Austro-Serbian quarrel. Austria's intransient policy, culminating in her declaration of war on Serbia, did a great deal to alienate English sympathy, it is true, but there was little enthusiasm for helping Serbia against Austria, and very little more for assisting Russia.[1]

Grey, we have seen, made no move to take part in negotiations until July 20; he had not referred to the crisis in the Cabinet until July 24. On July 25 when King George said to Prince Henry of Prussia, "We shall try all we can to keep out of this and shall remain neutral," he was without doubt expressing an opinion shared by the majority of the English

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1. Scott, J.F., Five-Weeks, chapter IX, for a study of British press and public opinion.
2. Cited in Renouvin, op. cit., 270.

people at the time. As M. Charles-Roux, speaking from the French viewpoint says, "England had a long way to come before she was to take an active part in any continental conflict, so far that one wondered whether she would ever do so, or whether she would not do so when it was too late."[1]

Reference has been made to the personal opinion Grey held that should war come, Great Britain must support France, and to the strong feeling of his associates in the Foreign Office in this same regard.[2] Reference too has been made to the secret preparatory measures taken after July 27 by the Admiralty and the General Staff.[3] But since the Cabinet was divided in its opinion,[4] and could come to no decision as to what stand England should take, Grey could only continue to work for mediation, preserving "our full freedom," as he told the German Government in refusing their "bid" for British neutrality on July 30.[5] Yet he did not fail to warn the Germans that Britain might be forced to come in.[6] Mr. Churchill has

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1. Charles-Roux, F., Veillée d'Armes à Londres, 22 juin-4août, 1914, Revue des Deux Mondes, August 15, 1926, 727.
2. Supra. 253-54.
3. Supra. 256
4. Lord Riddell states that as late as August 2 there were four parties in the Cabinet; (1) the party headed by Asquith and Grey, who thought it vital to support France; (2) the "Peace Party," headed by Sir John Simon, who would not have war at any price; (3) a party headed by Lloyd George in favour of intervention in certain circumstances; and (4) a party headed by Mackinnon Wood and Masterman which was endeavouring to compose the differences between the other three parties with a view to avoiding a split in the Government. Lord Riddell's Diary, (London, 1933), 3.
5. Supra. 279-80.
6. Supra. 263 and 284.

aptly stated the situation in which Grey found himself when he says, "We had to let the Germans know that we were a force to be reckoned with, without letting the French and Russians think that they had us safely in their pockets."[1]

Sir Arthur Nicolson, in writing to Buchanan on July 28, outlined the British political system which made matters so difficult for the Foreign Minister, believing as he did personally that British intervention was inevitable should war come, yet knowing that that opinion was not at the time shared generally in political circles or by public opinion at large. Nicolson wrote:

> We, of course, living under such conditions as we do here, when no Government practically can take any decided line without feeling that public opinion amply supports them, are unable to give any decided engagements as to what we should or should not do in any future emergencies.[2]

According to Mr. Churchill three-quarters of the Cabinet members were anxious "not to allow themselves to be drawn into a European quarrel, unless Great Britain herself were attacked.[3] Lloyd George agrees that "the Cabinet was hopelessly divided - fully one third, if not one-half, being opposed to our entry.[4] Moreover, the Liberal press was almost unanimously advocating neutrality.[5] Professor G.M. Trevelyan says that if

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1. Churchill, op. cit., 212. Trevelyan, op. cit., 251-57.
2. Nicolson to Buchanan, July 28,1914, B.D.,XI, No.239,p.157. He had expressed similar words to M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires in London, on July 27,D.D.F., 3e série, XI, No.117, p.100.
3. Churchill, op. cit., 211.
4. Lloyd George, op. cit., I, 66.
5. Hammond, op. cit., 215-56 passim. C.P. Scott sent a wire to Lloyd George to state that any Liberal who supported war would never be allowed by Liberals to enter another Liberal Cabinet. Riddell, op. cit., 5.

Grey in the last week of July had announced that Britain would join France in war,

> Most of the Cabinet would have repudiated him, most of the Liberals in the country and all the Labour Party, and a large section of opinion in the City and the Conservative business class. He could not speak that word for England. (1)

On Friday, July 31, Lloyd George told Lord Riddell that he was "fighting for peace." He said, "All the bankers and commercial people are begging us not to intervene. The Governor of the Bank of England (Lord Cunliffe) said to me with tears in his eyes, 'Keep us out of it. We shall all be ruined if we are dragged in.'"[2]

The hands of the Foreign Secretary were thus most effectively tied. He has said, himself, recalling those days:

> It was clear to me that no authority would be obtained from the Cabinet to give the pledge for which France pressed more and more urgently, and that to press the Cabinet for a pledge would be fatal; it would result in the resignation of one group or the other, and the consequent breakup of the Cabinet altogether.... There was also more than the division of opinion in the Cabinet to be taken into account. There was division in Parliament and in the country. (3)

Elsewhere in his Memoirs he says in this connection:

> One danger I saw so hideous that it must be avoided and guarded against at every word. It was that France and Russia might face the ordeal of war with Germany, relying upon our support; that this support might not be forthcoming, and that we might then, when too late, be held responsible by them for having let them in for a disastrous war. (4)

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1. Trevelyan, G.M., op. cit., p.251.
2. Riddell, op. cit., 2.
3. Grey, op. cit., I, 334-35.
4. Ibid., 313.

The attitude of reserve on the part of the Foreign Office was therefore not the result of any deliberate wish, nor of any preconceived plan, but it arose of necessity from circumstances linked with domestic politics and the British political system. And Grey took advantage of this detached position of his Government to negotiate a compromise among the Powers to avert war.

The Foreign Minister's position was not an easy one. The French were pressing him for an assurance of active support on behalf of his country, because of past assurances and the conversations of the General Staffs. Grey firmly believed that England would in the end be forced to intervene along side France, but the Cabinet was divided, and he found himself hindered by the assurances he had given Parliament that England was under no obligations to any country to give support. He could only wait on events.

On July 29 when he gave the warning to the German ambassador that England might be forced to come in,[1] he endeavoured to minimize the significance of this warning to M. Cambon, lest the latter should count too surely on British support. The situation, he informed the Ambassador, was different from that of the Morocco Crisis of 1911.

> The dispute between Austria and Serbia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand. Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it.... If Germany became involved and France became involved, we have not made up

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1. Supra. 263.

> our minds what we should do; it was a case we should have to consider. France would then have been drawn into a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her honour and interests obliged her to engage. We were free from engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do.(1)

Grey could go no further than this when on July 30 M. Cambon reminded him of the letters exchanged between the two Governments in 1912. Sir Edward evaded an answer, and stated that "the Cabinet was to meet tomorrow morning," and that he "would see him again tomorrow afternoon."[2]

On the evening of July 30 the President of France made a further appeal for support, through Mr. Bertie in Paris. According to the report of the latter, M. Poincaré

> is convinced that preservation of peace between the Powers is in the hands of England, for if his Majesty's Government announce that, in the event of conflict between Germany and France, resulting from present differences between Austria and Serbia, England would come to the aid of France, there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude. (3)

Bertie replied that it would be very difficult for the British Government to make any such announcement as was sought by the French, and held out little hope. Poincaré then answered that if a general war resulted England would inevitably be involved.[4]

When the Cabinet met on July 31 no decision to support France was forthcoming. The interview between Sir

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1. Grey to Bertie, July 29, 1914, B.D.XI, No.283,p.180.
   Cambon to Viviani, July 29,1914, D.D.F., 3e série,XI,No.281, p.229.
2. Grey to Bertie, July 30,1914,B.D.XI,No.319,p.201.
   Cambon to Viviani,July 30,1914,D.D.F.,3esérie,XI,No.363,p.301
3. Bertie to Grey, July 30, 1914, B.D.XI, No.318, p.200.
4. Bertie to Grey, July 30,1914, B.D.,XI, No.318,p.200.
   Bertie's answer was approved by Grey; No.352, p.220.

Edward and Cambon was accordingly "rather painful," as the former told Mr. Asquith.[1] When Cambon referred to a telegram from his brother in Berlin stating that "it was the uncertainty with regard to whether we (Britain) should intervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin," Grey denied this, claiming, "it was quite wrong to suppose we had left Germany under the impression that we should not intervene." On the main topic of the interview, the French appeal for a promise of support, he could offer nothing new. "We could not give any pledge at the present time." He stressed the commercial and financial situation, which was, he claimed, a grave consideration; England's standing aside might be "the only means of preventing a complete collapse of European credit." But, he added, though no pledge could at this moment be given, "further developments might alter the situation, and cause the Government and Parliament to take the view that intervention was justified."[2]

Sir Edward did not say what the new development might be which would alter the decision of the British Government, but the question of Belgian neutrality was mentioned in this connection.[3] He went on to say he would ask the French and German Governments if they were "prepared to undertake an engagement" to respect the neutrality of Belgium. This question

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1. Asquith, H.H., Memories and Reflections, (Boston,1928), (cited hereafter as Memories),II, 7.
2. Grey to Bertie, July 31,1914, B.D.,XI, No.367,pp.226-27. Cambon to Viviani, July 31,1914, D.D.F., 3e série, XI, No.459, pp.375-76.
3. Ibid.

might be an "important" though not a "decisive" factor in the Cabinet's decision.[1]

Mr. Cambon expressed "great disappointment" over the Foreign Minister's communication. He asked that the whole question be submitted to the Cabinet again. Sir Edward replied that the Cabinet "would certainly be summoned as soon as there was some new development."

New developments were not slow in arising. That afternoon the German Embassy informed the Foreign Office of the Russian general mobilization, and of the German intention to mobilize if Russia did not within twelve hours countermand her order.[2] As the German plan of campaign in the event of war against the Dual Alliance was believed to involve the invasion of Belgium, Grey now raised this question at Berlin and Paris, as he had hinted to Cambon he might do.

The question of Belgian neutrality had been discussed in the Cabinet that morning,[3] and had arisen at earlier meetings.[4]

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1. Grey to Bertie, July 31, 1914, B.D.,XI, No.367, p.227. Cambon to Viviani, July 31, 1914, D.D.F., 3e série,XI, No.459, p. 376.
2. B.D., XI, No.344, p.217. Buchanan's telegram reporting Russian mobilization was not received in London until 5:20 P.M. The Foreign Office received its first information through reports from Berlin; note to No.347, p.218 in B.D., XI.
3. Asquith, Memories, II, 7.
4. Morley, op. cit., 3.

It was a question which involved both British interests and obligations. It was certainly to the interest of Britain to prevent the crushing of France by Germany, and in line with British policy to keep any strong continental Power from gaining possession of the Channel ports. Germany must therefore be kept from entering France by the most strategic route, through Belgium. In addition to this matter of British interests, there was also the question of legal obligation under the Treaty of 1839 to defend Belgian neutrality.[1] It was a case then, in which honour, obligation and interests coincided. Thus, it was of great convenience for Sir Edward Grey to be able to urge British intervention in case Belgian neutrality should be violated. And as Mr. Schmitt says, "It cannot be made a reproach to him that he exploited the legal advantage which the situation offered him."[2]

At 5:30 P.M. Grey addressed to the German and French Governments a request asking each for an assurance that it would respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violated it.[3] The Belgian Government was informed of this step, and to the Brussels communication was added, "I assume that Belgium will to the utmost of her power maintain neutrality, and desire and expect other Powers to observe and

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1. The question has been widely discussed whether the Treaty of 1839 imposed on Britain the obligation to do more than respect the neutrality of Belgium; that is, whether she was obligated to make another Power respect it. This latter view obtained in the Foreign Office in 1914.
2. Schmitt, op. cit., II, 291.
3. Grey to Bertie and Goschen, July 31,1914, B.D.,XI, No.348, p.218.

uphold it."[1] The French and German Governments were asked for an early reply.

France at once gave an unqualified assurance in the affirmative.[2] In Berlin, however, vom Jagow told Goschen he must consult the Chancellor and the Emperor. "He rather doubted whether they could answer at all, as any reply they might give could not fail, in the event of war, to have the undesirable effect of disclosing to a certain extent part of their plan of campaign."[3]

Although Sir Edward had put off the French Ambassador in London, in the evening of July 31 the French Government prepared a new appeal for support. The President of the Republic, with the approval of his Government, made a personal appeal to the King by means of an autograph letter which was sent by special messenger and presented to His Majesty late the same evening.[4] After outlining the military preparations which Germany was pushing forward "especially in the immediate neighbourhood of the French frontier," Poincare pointed out the dangers in further delay on the part of Britain:

> From all the information which reaches us it would seem that war would be inevitable if Germany were convinced that the British Government would not intervene in a conflict in which France might be engaged; if, on the other hand, Germany were convinced that the Entente Cordiale would

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1. Grey to Villiers, July 31, 1914, B.D.XI, No.35, p.220.
2. Bertie to Grey, August 1,1914,B.D.,XI,No.382,p.284.
3. Goschen to Grey, August 1,1914,ibid.,No.383,pp.234-35.
4. Communication from the French Embassy, ibid.,No.366,p.226.

> be affirmed in case of need, even to the extent of taking the field side by side, there would be the greatest chance that peace would remain unbroken. (1)

Admitting that the military and naval arrangements and the letters of 1912 left "complete liberty to Your Majesty's Government," he appealed to the dangers of the moment; "it is, I consider, on the language and the action of the British Government that henceforward the last chances of a peaceful settlement depend."

When this new appeal was presented to the Cabinet the next morning, the European crisis had been advanced another stage. Germany had sent her double ultimatum to St. Petersburg and Paris, and had refused to reply to the question regarding Belgian neutrality. But the Cabinet was not yet prepared to come to a decision.

Sir Arthur Nicolson and Sir Eyre Crowe were again urging a definite alignment with France and Russia. Crowe had emphatically expressed the view on July 31:

> The whole policy of the Entente can have no meaning if it does not signify that in a just quarrel England would stand by her friends. This honourable expectation has been raised. We cannot repudiate it without exposing our good name to grave criticism. (2)

Sir Arthur Nicolson urged the immediate mobilization of the army; "it is useless to shut our eyes to the fact that possibly within the next twenty-four hours Germany will be moving across the French frontier.[3]

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1. M. Poincaré to His Majesty, King George V, July 31,1914, D.D.F., 3e série XI, No.457, pp.372-73. Poincaré, op. cit., II, 244.
2. Crowe's memorandum, July 31,1914,B.D.,XI,No.369, p.229.
3. Nicolson to Grey, July 31,1914, ibid., No.368, p.227.

But Grey was not yet in the position, however much these views coincided with his own, to determine policy along these lines. The Cabinet was still opposed to intervention, and the prospect of its changing its opinion was as yet slight. His Majesty's reply to M. Poincaré, prepared at the Foreign Office, thus evaded the issue raised, and offered little to satisfy the French. Great admiration for the French attitude during the crisis was expressed, an attitude, it was said, which could in no way be interpreted as provocative; reference was made to British efforts to preserve peace, and it was promised these would be continued; but, "as for the attitude of my country," wrote the King,"events are changing so rapidly that it is impossible to foretell what their future development will be."[1]

This was August 1, and the Cabinet could not yet decide on intervention. After a lively discussion Mr. Churchill's request that the total mobilization of the Fleet be ordered was also refused.[2] Thus, when Sir Edward saw M. Cambon after the meeting he had still to reaffirm the view already expressed, that the crisis of 1914 differed entirely from those created by the Morocco incidents.

Now, the position was that Germany would agree not to attack France if France remained neutral in the event of war between Russia and Germany. If France could not take

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1. His Majesty King George V to M. Poincaré, August 1,1914, D.D.F., 3e série XI, No.550,p.434. Poincaré,op.cit.,II,276.
2. This order was to affect only the oldest units, since the others were already at their war bases.

> advantage of this position, it was because she was bound by an alliance to which we were not parties, and of which we did not know the terms.

But though there was this difference, Grey did add, "This did not mean that under no circumstances would we assist France, but it did mean that France must make her own decision at this moment without reckoning on an assistance that we were not now in a position to promise."[1]

Cambon answered in dismay that he could not transmit this reply to his Government, and asked to be authorized to answer that the Cabinet had not yet come to any decision.[2] To this Sir Edward replied, "We had come to a decision: that we could not propose to Parliament at this moment to send an expeditionary force to the continent."[3]

The Ambassador then objected that as a consequence of the Anglo-French naval agreements the French coasts were defenseless. "Will you allow Cherbourg and Brest to be bombarded," he asked, "seeing that it was in agreement with you, to serve your interests as much as ours, that we have concentrated all our ships far from there."[4] When the question of support was put in this way Grey could hardly evade an answer. He insisted, however, that Britain was bound by no obligation to help France, or to enter into a war because of French obligations to Russia. Cambon admitted there was no

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1. Grey to Bertie, August 1, 1914, B.D. XI, No. 426, p.253.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Cited in Schmitt, op.cit., II,p.355;D.D.F. 3e série,XI, No. 532, p.424; B.D.,XI, No.426,p.253.

obligation "of this kind," but asked pointedly,

> In default of a formal alliance, is there not a moral obligation for you to help us, at least to lend us the support of your fleet, since it was on your advice that we moved ours away. (1)

Grey could not but see the force of this argument, and promised Cambon to ask the Cabinet on this point. Meanwhile the Ambassador could report to his Government that the Cabinet had not yet taken any decision.[2]

Harold Nicolson relates how Cambon[3] was much upset when he left Grey to visit Sir Arthur Nicolson. "Ils vont nous lâcher," was all he could say. Nicolson went to Grey's room and found him also much disturbed, pacing up and down, and biting his lip. Grey gave no answer, but made only a geature of despair when Nicolson asked if it was true that Britain really refused to support France at this moment of her greatest danger. "You will render us a by-word among nations," declared Nicolson angrily, and returned to M. Cambon. The latter declared that he would now be compelled to produce the agreement of 1912, to make known how France, relying on British help, had deprived her northern coasts of defence. Nicolson advised against publication, and himself sent a letter to Grey recommending that the Cabinet should now be reminded of the Agreement.[4] Grey replied that he would look after the matter, and he spoke to Mr. Asquith to have this particular point

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1. Cited in Schmitt, op. cit., II, 355.
2. B.D., XI, No.426, p.253. D.D.F. 3e série, XI, No.532, p.424.
3. Nicolson, op. cit., 419-20.
4. B.D., XI, No.424, p.252.

settled by the Cabinet the next day.[1]

The British now began to move more rapidly towards that decision so eagerly awaited by the French. Late that evening the word arrived in London that Germany had declared war on Russia.[2] This news was carried to Churchill at the Admiralty, where he was entertaining some friends. He immediately excused himself, and left to meet Grey and the Prime Minister.[3] When Grey saw Churchill the former said, "You should know that I have just done a very important thing. I have told Cambon that we should not allow the German fleet to come into the Channel."[4] It would seem that the Prime Minister had sanctioned such a step without waiting for the decision of the Cabinet. It was a step with which Mr. Churchill "was in

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1. B.D., XI, No.424, p.252. Shortly after this visit with Nicolson, Cambon, on returning to the French Embassy was visited by Mr. Wickham Steed, the foreign editor of the "Times." The latter asked the Ambassador what he was going to do. "I am waiting," replied Cambon, "to learn whether the word 'honour' has been struck out of the English vocabulary." Steed, Wickham, Through Thirty Years, (London,1924), II, 14. Cambon expressed similar words to Mr. George Lloyd; "Il vous reste de l'honneur dans votre pays?" Complaining of Grey's stand, he said, "He (Grey) seems to forget that it was on your advice, and under your guarantee, that we moved all our ships to the south and our munitions to Toulon. Si vous restex neutres, nos côtes sont livrées aux Allemands." Cited in Colvin, D., The Life of Lord Carson,(London,1936) 14-15.
2. This news from Buchanan arrived at 11:15 P.M., B.D.,XI, No.445, p.259.
3. Beaverbrook, Lord, Politicians and the War, 1914-1916, (London,1928), I, 34-36; Churchill, op.cit., I, 230-31.
4. Churchill, op.cit.,I, 231. There is no record of this conversation in the published British or French documents. Mr. Temperley gives it as his opinion that Churchill may have misunderstood Grey. As we know, Grey had on August 1 discussed only "possibilities" with Cambon, and there is no evidence of assurances as stated by Churchill. See Temperley, The Coming of the War,Foreign Affairs,January, 1931, 334-35.

entire accord." He returned at once to the Admiralty and gave forthwith the order to mobilize the navy, although this step was not yet authorized by the Cabinet.[1]

Meanwhile the German Ambassador had taken a step in an endeavour to discover what position England was going to adopt, and in which was clearly revealed Grey's determination to support France, and what is more, his refusal to promise neutrality even when in a position to make his own terms. Lichnowsky on August 1 had come to discuss the German reply to the British question on Belgian neutrality. Grey informed him that the evasive reply of the German Government "was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling" in England. Lichnowsky then pressed Grey to formulate the conditions in return for which England would promise to remain neutral. Sir Edward refused to make any promise, insisting still on keeping Britain free. When the Ambassador asked if Britain would remain neutral if Germany promised not to violate Belgian neutrality, he refused definitely any such promise.[2]

It was on August 2 that the Cabinet took its first important decision, a decision which virtually brought Britain into the war which had broken out. Before the Cabinet met at 11 A.M. both Lichnowsky and Cambon met Grey to urge their respective cases, the one for British neutrality, the other for

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1. Churchill, op. cit., I, 231.
2. Grey to Goschen, August 1, 1914, B.D., XI, No.448, pp.260-61.

intervention.[1] Cambon had received news from France of the violation of French territory by German troops and of the invasion of Luxemburg,[2] and he pointed out to Grey that this latter indicated for a certainty that Belgium would be invaded. Grey promised to see him after the Cabinet meeting.

The Cabinet sat almost all day. It was at the start of the meeting still too uncertain of British opinion and too divided among its own members to come to a decision. For a time there was danger that a number would resign and thus greatly weaken the Government at a most critical time.[3] The news of the violation of Luxemburg did not of itself bring a decisive change. That all important change was made possible to a very great extent by the arrival of a letter from Mr. Bonar Law, leader of the Unionist Party, which assured the Cabinet of the support of his party in Parliament.[4] The letter read:

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1. Schmitt, op. cit.,II, 357-58.Cambon to Viviani, August 2, 1914, D.D.F., 3e série, XI, No.579, pp.452-53.
2. D.D.F., 3e série, XI, No.578, p.452.B.D.,XI, No.473, p.270.
3. Asquith, Memories, II, 8; Churchill, op.cit.,I, 232.
4. The initiative in this move to get action from the Opposition leaders appears to have been taken by Mr. Leo Maxse of the "National Review," and Sir Henry Wilson. Maxse has told in his "Retrospect and Reminiscence" in the "National Review," August, 1918, how a small group of determined interventionists, including Wickham Steed, Mr. Amery, Mr. George Lloyd, Lord Lovat, and Lord Edmund Talbot, got in touch with the Conservative leaders, Lord Lansdowne, Bonar Law and Austen Chamberlain, who were out of town. A meeting was held at Lansdowne House at 11 P.M. Saturday, August 1, and there was further conferring in the morning of August 2 between Lansdowne, Bonar Law and Chamberlain, when the letter was drafted and sent by special messenger to Asquith shortly before noon. See also, Chamberlain, Austen, Down the Years, (London, 1935), 92-99; Callwell, op.cit.,I, 153-55; Colvin, op.cit.,III 13-21. Newton, op.cit.,439. Lord Newton is mistaken when he states that the first meeting took place on Sunday, August 2.

August 2, 1914.

Dear Mr. Asquith:

> Lord Lansdowne and I feel it our duty to inform you that, in our opinion, as well as in that of all our colleagues whom we have been able to consult, it would be fatal to the honour and security of the United Kingdom to hesitate in supporting France and Russia at the present juncture; and we offer our unhesitating support to the Government in any measures that they consider necessary for that object. (1)

It should be noted that the letter said nothing of Belgium; the offer was an unconditional offer to support any decision taken on behalf of the Entente Powers. The significance of the letter lay in this; whereas there had been division in the Cabinet, and doubt if the Government could rally a majority of the Liberal Party in favour of intervention, now the support of the Conservatives would make it possible to obtain that majority. But even after the receipt of the offer, it was only "with some difficulty," states Mr. Asquith,[2] that the Cabinet agreed that Grey should be authorized to give to Cambon the assurance concerning the coasts of France which the latter had sought the day before:

> If the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping the British fleet will give all the protection in its power. (3)

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1. Newton, op.cit., 439-40; Chamberlain, op.cit.,99. Mr. Churchill notes that he received a similar assurance of support from the Unionist leaders through Mr.F.E.Smith, later Lord Birkenhead, on July 31, of which he informed Mr. Asquith on August 1. op.cit., I,229-30. Grey questions the influence of the letter of August 2 as a deciding factor in the Cabinet's decision; op.cit.,II, 11. But in the opinion of such authorities on the crisis of 1914 as Schmitt, Fay and Renouvin it was most decisive.Schmitt,op.cit.,II, 539; Renouvin, op.cit.,293.
2. Asquith, Memories, II, 8.
3. B.D.,XI, No.487,p.274. Cambon to Viviani,August 2,1914, D.D.F. 3e série,XI, No.612,p.469.

This assurance was, however, still subject to approval by Parliament, and did not mean that England would send troops to the Continent.

Grey states in his Memoirs, "the promise to defend these coasts was given to France. The German Government were informed. They promised not to attack these coasts, of course on the understanding that we remained neutral,[1] and this naval point ceased to have any direct influence on the decision of the British Government."[2] Despite the slight importance which Grey would here seem to attach to this assurance to France, it was a step of exceeding import. It gave much comfort to the French; in the opinion of M. Cambon it was a decisive guarantee which would lead sooner or later to full intervention. He wrote later, "I was convinced (on August 2nd) that the game was won. A Great Power does not wage war half and half. From the moment it decides to carry it on water it has no choice but to wage it on land."[3] Marshall Joffre has expressed a similar view: "When I received this important news I no longer felt any doubts as to the British giving us on land as well as on sea the support we so greatly desired; for it seemed to me quite impossible that in a conflict of this magnitude a country like England would make war in any half-hearted fashion. The matter was of the highest importance for us."[4] And M. Viviani

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1. The German Government gave this assurance to the British about noon on August 3. B.D.,XI,No.531, p.291.
2. Grey, op.cit.,II, 3.
3. Cited in Henderson,F.E.,The Superficial Grey, The Nation (New York), October 28, 1925, 491.
4. Joffre, op. cit., I, 134-35.

wrote to Cambon on receipt of the news, "We have obtained from Great Britain a first assistance which is most valuable to us."[1] Nor did the Germans view this step as of no importance. "That is the help of an ally," wrote the Kaiser, on hearing the news.[2] Lord Loreburn too is of a similar opinion. He writes in "How the War Came:"

> This Memorandum of 2nd August fixes the date at which Great Britain became definitely and irrevocably committed to war with Germany. War between France and Germany was then certain and was declared next day. It prohibited Germany from using her Fleet against French coasts or shipping, without a corresponding prohibition of the use of the French Fleet against German coasts or shipping. (3)

It must be pointed out that this step had been taken before Germany presented her ultimatum to Belgium, news of which did not reach London until the morning of the next day, August 3. The step was definitely in line with the determination of Grey and Asquith to support France at all costs. In this connection an extract from Asquith's own record of the Cabinet meeting of August 2 contains the following:

> There is a strong party against any kind of intervention in any event. Grey, of course, will never consent to this, and I shall not separate myself from him. (4)

Several members had assented to the declaration to defend the French coasts with only the greatest reluctance. When the Cabinet met in the evening, Mr. John Burns, who regarded

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1. Viviani to Cambon, August 2, 1914, D.D.F., 3e série, XI, No.621, p.474.
2. Annotation by the Kaiser, K.D., No.661, p.492.
3. Loreburn, op.cit., 211-12.
4. Asquith, Memories, II, 8.

it as a declaration of war resigned. Lord Morley also tendered his resignation, and although he accepted the Prime Minister's appeal to defer a final decision till the morrow, he resigned the next day. It was feared that four others might also resign, Lord Beauchamp, Sir John Simon, Mr. Harcourt, and Mr. Masterman.

Belgium had hitherto played a secondary part in the discussions of the Cabinet; up to this point it had been kept in a secondary place. But now that the Germans had occupied Luxemburg, and their Foreign Office had refused to give an assurance that Belgian neutrality would be respected, the question became the principal card of the interventionists. Grey, Churchill, and the others saw in it the means of beating the non-interventionists, of overcoming their opposition, and of winning over public opinion.

When Sir Edward was giving the assurance of naval support to M. Cambon on the morning of August 2, he stated in referring to Belgium, "We were considering what statement we should make in Parliament tomorrow - in effect whether we should declare the violation of Belgian neutrality to be a casus belli."[1] At the Cabinet meeting that evening a definite decision was made on this point.[2] In Lord Crewe's report of the meeting to the King we read:

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1. B.D., XI, No.487, p.275.
2. Ensor, op. cit., 493.

> It was agreed without any attempts to state a formula, that it should be made evident that a substantial violation of the neutrality of that country would place us in the situation contemplated by Mr. Gladstone in 1870, when interference with Belgian independence was held to compel us to take action. (1)

Monday, August 3, was the fateful day for England. The Cabinet met that morning at 11 o'clock in a mood quite different from that of the previous morning when, in Mr. Churchill's opinion, it had "looked as if the majority would resign." Just before noon the important news came through of the German ultimatum to Belgium, and that it had been rejected.[2] The Cabinet at once consented to the immediate mobilization of the army, and it was agreed that Britain had no option but to defend Belgium by arms. No decision, however, was yet taken to send an ultimatum to Germany, or to send an army to France. These decisions were reached in the face of later events. But general approval to the statement which Sir Edward was to make before the House during the afternoon was given. None of the doubtful members of the previous day resigned; for them Belgium had proved a deciding factor.

At 3 P.M. Grey went to the House of Commons to give public utterance to his opinion, and as it had now become, the opinion of the great majority of the Cabinet, of what policy England ought to follow. What the House and the country would

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1. Lord Crewe to the King, August 2, 1914, Spender, Oxford and Asquith, II, 82.
2. Villiers to Grey, August 3,1914, 9:31 A.M., received 10:55 A.M., B.D., XI, No.521, p.288. The actual text of the ultimatum, which had been presented at 7 P.M. on August 2nd, was not known in London until the afternoon of August 3rd.

think had yet to be discovered. The House was crowded to the roof and tense with doubt and dreadful expectation as it had seldom been in its long history. Many have paid tribute to the great dignity, the simple eloquence, and the tragic seriousness with which the Foreign Minister presented the most memorable speech of his career. Avoiding all the effects of an orator and all appeals to passion in the tones of his voice, in the choice of his words, and in the selection of his facts, he informed the House of the situation in which England now found herself in international affairs.[1]

He began first with a discussion of the question whether or not Britain was under any binding engagement to support France. The story of the Entente, the Military Conversations, the exchange of notes in 1912; the distribution of the two fleets since 1912, and the previous day's pledge to France was fully told, giving the House on many of these points its first knowledge. He insisted, however, that "whatever took place between the military and naval experts, they were not binding engagements upon the Government."[2] "We do not construe anything which has previously taken place in our diplomatic relations with other Powers in this matter as restricting the freedom of the Government to decide what attitude they should now take, or restrict the freedom of the House of Commons to decide what their attitude should be."[3] Summing up - was England

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1. The text of the Speech is given in Grey, op.cit.,II, Appendix D, p.294-309. Also in Speeches on Foreign Affairs, 1904-1914, by Sir Edward Grey, selected by Paul Knaplund, (London,1931), 292ff.
2. Grey, op. cit., II, 297.
3. ibid., 298.

committed to France? - technically, he said, not at all. But whether morally - "let every man look into his own heart, and his own feelings, and construe the extent of the obligation for himself." He did not "wish to urge upon anyone else more than their feelings dictate as to what they should feel about the obligation."[1]

Whatever view one takes of this revelation to the Commons, one must admit that it makes strange reading beside the statement made by the same speaker earlier in that same year to the effect that "there were no unpublished agreements which would restrict or hamper the freedom of the Government, or Parliament, to decide whether or not Great Britain should participate in a war."[2] He was pointing out that in the written records of the negotiations and understandings with France full freedom of action had been reserved, yet he was admitting that some sort of obligation existed. Its extent he was leaving to the consciences of men who were now hearing of these matters for the first time, who were being asked to make a decision in a time of acute crisis, and who were in truth having no choice left them. He was telling the Members they were free to make a choice whether or not France should be supported, but he was also making it clear - and he was the one man who knew all about the promises, exchanges, assurances, conversations or whatever they might be called - that he construed these as

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1. Grey, op. cit., II, 299.
2. Supra. 226.

binding upon England to aid France, and furthermore, he would have resigned had Parliament construed them otherwise. That is surely the amazing and perplexing note in his address - if he who directed the secret negotiations felt that England was in honour bound to aid France, how then he could truly say that England was unpledged and free?[1]

He turned from this question to discuss the matter of Belgium, "a more serious consideration," he termed it, "becoming more serious every hour."[2] He cited the committments of 1839 and 1870 by which Britain bound herself to guarantee Belgium, and referred to Germany's refusal to give an unequivocal promise to respect Belgian neutrality. He told of the German ultimatum, of its rejection, and of an appeal which King Albert had made for "diplomatic intervention." He pictured for his listeners how British interests as well as British honour were involved in the fate of Belgium - for if Belgium lost her

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1. In reading to the House the letter given to Cambon in the exchange of notes in November, 1912, Grey omitted to read the last sentence. (Supra 212). His critics have made this a strong point in establishing their case against him. (Lutz, op.cit.,100). In defense he states that the omission must have been quite unintentional. He claims he was not aware of having omitted the sentence until he was charged with having done so as late as 1923. He adds that the omission was perhaps the result of a question about the date of the letter which interrupted the reading, or perhaps "I thought the last sentence unimportant." He cannot explain it in any other way. Grey, op.cit., II, 16. Whatever one might think of the first explanation offered, it is difficult to believe that Grey, or any one else, could regard the sentence as unimportant.
2. Grey, op.cit, II, 301.

independence, then Holland and perhaps Denmark might lose theirs, and if France was beaten and lost her position as a Great Power, England would be faced by "the unmeasured aggrandizement" of Germany. "If, in a crisis like this, we run away from those obligations of honour and interest as regards the Belgian treaty, I doubt whether, whatever material force we might have at the end, it would be of very much value in face of the respect that we should have lost."[1]

Although he was maintaining that it was up to Parliament now to decide Britain's policy, he was in reality leaving Parliament no choice. "There is but one way in which the Government could make certain at the present moment of keeping outside this war," he said, "and that would be that it should immediately issue a proclamation of unconditional neutrality." But to this he added, "We cannot do that. We have made the commitment to France (of August 2nd) that I have read to the House which prevents us from doing that. We have got the consideration of Belgium which prevents us also from an unconditional neutrality, and without those conditions absolutely satisfied, and satisfactory, we are bound not to shrink from proceeding to the use of all the forces in our power."[2]

He was not asking the House for a definite endorsement of any precise measures. He was informing them of what had been

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1. Grey, op.cit., II, 305.
2. Ibid., 307.

done up to this date, assuring them that Britain's hands were still free, a fact which it is hard to believe from his own words, and that it was for Parliament to decide. At the same time he was placing before the House in a most decided and persuasive manner his own conviction that England ought not, almost could not, stand aside. He ended with a passionate declaration that the country would be disgraced if it did not declare war. The tenor of the whole speech was that England must support France.

The speech was received most enthusiastically by the House; the applause with which it was greeted left no doubt that Parliament would support him. The news that "they have cheered him" when carried to the Foreign Office, gave inexpressible relief to Sir Arthur Nicolson.[1]

Out side the House Grey told Churchill, "Now we shall send them (Germany) an ultimatum to stop the invasion of Belgium within twenty-four hours."[2] The Cabinet met in the evening, and after the session Sir Edward confided to Cambon that it had been decided to send instructions the next morning to the Ambassador in Berlin to demand that the German ultimatum to Belgium be withdrawn. "If they refuse," he added, "there will be war."[3]

At 9:30 A.M. on August 4 a stiff note was sent to Berlin stating that Belgium had appealed to Britain for

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1. Nicolson, op. cit., 422.
2. Churchill, op. cit., I, 235.
3. Cambon to Doumergue, August 4,1914, D.D.F., 3e série, XI, No.712, pp.531-32.

diplomatic intervention against the German demands. The note stated:

> His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made on Belgium will not be proceeded with, and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. (1)

The Berlin Government was asked for an "immediate reply." At the same time the Belgian Government was informed that Britain would help in resisting Germany if the latter should "exert pressure to make her give up her neutrality."[2]

By this time German troops were already in Belgian territory. During the afternoon Lichnowsky informed Sir Edward, in accord with instructions, that Germany had no intention of annexing Belgian territory, but that the invasion of the small Power was for Germany a vital matter:

> Impress upon Sir Edward Grey that the German Army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance. (3)

This communication was in no way satisfactory to London, and accordingly at 2 P.M., the British ultimatum was dispatched. It referred to the ultimatum to Belgium and the report that Belgian territory had been violated. "In these

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1. Grey to Goschen, August 4,1914,B.D.,XI,No.573, p.306.
2. Grey to Villiers, August 4,1914, ibid., No.580, p.309.
3. Jagow to Lichnowsky, Communicated by the German Ambassador, August, 4, 1914, at noon, B.D.,XI, No.587, p.312.

circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same assurances respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request," the request was repeated, and a satisfactory reply asked for in London by midnight. Failing such a reply, Sir Edward Goschen was to ask for his passports.[1]

No satisfactory reply was expected in London, nor was one received. Accordingly, at 11 P.M. (midnight by Central European time) the Foreign Office delivered to Lichnowsky the formal declaration of war.[2] The sands of peace had now run out; Britain too had been dragged over the abyss - the nation, which had so long enjoyed its insular security.

Sir Edward Grey might well have congratulated himself on his success in having brought Britain as a united nation into the War to aid France. But he took little satisfaction in this success at the time; for in his first and greatest aim, that of preserving the peace of Europe, he had failed - failed in spite of all his efforts. And this failure he felt most bitterly. "I hate war! I hate war!" he had exclaimed when Nicolson came to congratulate him on his speech which had won over the House of Commons.[3] His biographer points out that no pacifist realized more clearly than he the irreparable damage to civilization that must ensue from war under modern conditions.[4]

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1. Grey to Goschen, August 4, 1914, B.D.,XI, No.594, p.314.
2. B.D. XI, No.643, p.330.
3. Nicolson, op. cit., 422.
4. Trevelyan, op. cit., 266.

Late in the evening of August 3 he stood with a friend at a window in his room at the Foreign Office looking out into the summer dusk, and as the first lights began to appear, he said, "The lamps are going out all over Europe, and we shall not see them lit again in our life-time."[1]

In conclusion, looking for the prime factor which had decided Britain's entry into the war, one must agree with Mr. John Ewart that this is found in the determination to conserve British interests.[2] Even had Britain stood aside at the outset of hostilities, she must, as Grey stated on August 3, surely have intervened during the course of the war in order to avoid the consequences of a German victory. But, back of this, lies the fact that Britain had been brought into opposition to Germany through her "entente" policy with France and Russia; her interests pointed a course in opposition to Germany very largely because she was linked with France and the Slavic Power. Her entry into the conflict in 1914 in support of France was the logical outcome and the inevitable sequel of the policy pursued since 1904.

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1. The friend to whom Grey addressed these words was Mr. J.A. Spender of the "Westminster Gazette." Spender mentions the occasion in his Life, Journalism and Politics, (London, 1927), II, 14. Grey mentions this incident in his Memoirs. II, 20.
2. Ewart, op. cit., I, Chapter V, and conclusions, 198. See also Grey's letter to Mr. Barclay (Manchester, Mass.), dated August 4, 1914, in which he defines the Chief issue for Britain in these words. "The issue for us was that, if Germany won, she would dominate France; the independence of Belgium, Holland, Denmark and perhaps Norway and Sweden, would be a mere shadow: their separate existence as nations would really be a fiction; all their harbours would be at Germany's disposal; she would dominate the whole of Western Europe; and this would make our position quite impossible. We could not exist as a first class State under such circumstances." B.D., XI, No.638, p.328.

After years of close cooperation with France, Britain could not, because of her interests and the moral obligation involved, desert the Republic in the hour of crisis. The assurances given so emphatically by the Foreign Secretary on August 3 that Britain was free and unpledged were formally correct, but inaccurate in substance. By her interests and her honour Britain was bound not to leave France unprotected; she was tied to France inextricably by countless threads which had been woven down through the years. The conversations, diplomatic, military and naval, were commitments deeply rooted in honour, if not in formal documents, which gradually, but formidably and inevitably bound Britain to support the Republic. If Britain had literally preserved her freedom of action, she had bound herself morally to France as closely as if there had been a written alliance.

Sir Edward's speech made manifest how deeply he felt that England must not fail the obligation which his words showed to be founded equally on honour as well as on considerations of British safety. The question of British entry was settled for the most of the public on the issue of the violation of Belgian neutrality; Grey, however, though he felt the weight of this point, never pretended or felt that it was the only or deciding factor.[1] He saw Britain's policy linked with that of France; facing the assumption of Britain standing aside, he

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1. Schmitt, op. cit., II, 401.

pictured a crushed France, and a victorious Germany in possession of the Channel ports turning next to settle accounts with a Britain left without a friend or ally.

How is it possible to explain, however, the position in which the Government had to face the fact, whether it was admitted or not, that it was not free to act with detachment, that British hands were tied, in spite of the assurances of the Foreign Minister. This was unquestionably the result of the policy which Grey had followed throughout the previous decade, a policy which was at no time clear-cut, a policy which he hoped always, and at all times maintained, would leave his Government midway between the two continental diplomatic camps, but which in reality bound it to France and Russia.

It must be made clear that the British Foreign Office was during these years pervaded by a persistent and an ever-increasing fear of a conflict with Germany. That fear was basic in British policy. Grey had entered into office, as his Memoirs make clear, with a deep prejudice against Germany, a prejudice shared and nourished by his associates in the Foreign Office, as well as by events which followed his entry there. Sir Eyre Crowe and Sir Arthur Nicolson had an almost morbid suspicion of Germany, of her dishonesty, her hostility, and of her determination to seize the hegemony of the world. Their comments on dispatches published in the British Documents make this fear abundantly evident, and these most assuredly influenced

Grey and other officials who read them.[1] Dominated by this fear, and continually in the grip of this bogey, Grey was anti-German against his will.

His very real desire to effect a rapprochement with the Teutonic Power was thus nullified, and he was driven to seek closer relations with France and Russia. This does not mean that he had no reason to be suspicious of Germany. Germany, in the pre-war years - under the tactless and outspoken Kaiser, who was supported by the noisy propagandists demanding a "place in the sun," and who was determined to build up a navy for which the British could see little justification, and governed by officials who lacked finesse in the conduct of foreign affairs, and whose conduct of foreign affairs was exasperating and often inexcusably inept - would have taxed the patience and the resources of any Foreign Secretary who sought a happy understanding. There was then, admittedly good reason at times to be suspicious of Germany, and this added materially to the deep-rooted fears in the Foreign Office. The rise of the new Germany after 1870, the blundering policies of the German diplomats in the post-Bismarckian era, and the suspicions of her intentions, were primary factors in turning Britain to seek and close the friendship with France.[2]

But in fairness to Germany, to admit the above facts is not to imply as an absolute truth that European peace would

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1. Crowe's long memorandum of January 1,1907,which Grey marked as most valuable and helpful as a guide to policy and which he gave to the Cabinet;B.D.,III, Appendix A; pp.397-420.
2. See Grey's confidential letter to President Roosevelt written after the Algeciras Conference, cited in Trevelyan, op.cit., 114-16.

have been assured could Germany or any other single Power have been eliminated as a factor in international affairs. Europe was living unquestionably before 1914 under a system of "international anarchy," of which all the Powers were ready at any time to take advantage to push forward their particular interests. Blind to the dangers of this "international anarchy" the leaders of the Powers were stumbling along the road to ruin. Nevertheless, under this system, for Britain it was Germany which dominated the international stage, and shaped the issues for the British leaders.

The importance of the British reaction in this respect has been well summarized by the eminent Austrian scholar, Professor Pribram:

> It was quite obvious to British statesmen, during the decades that preceded the World War, that England must retain her supremacy at sea; that she could not permit any Continental Power to establish a hegemony in Europe and by so doing upset the European Balance of Power in a sense contrary to British interests; and finally, that she could not allow Belgium to pass into the hands of the strongest Continental Power. Since the "fear" that Germany entertained such plans increased from year to year, British statesmen held it to be their duty to defeat such plans if Germany should one day seek to put them into operation. Hence the increase in naval armaments, the successive agreements with their allies, and hence also their endeavours to win for England new friends. (1)

Mr. Ensor, in passing judgment on these words, declares, "the reason for the Ententes could not be better stated."[2]

This analysis of the British attitude towards the Entente is no less true for France. The French were if anything

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1. Pribram, A.F., England and the International Policy of the European Great Powers, 1871-1914, (London, 1931), p.149.
2. Ensor, op. cit., 496.

more deeply motivated by that fear of the new Germany after 1870, and their most subtle diplomacy was directed towards gaining friends for the Republic, to leave behind that isolation in which Bismarck's policy had placed her. To regain for France her former rank in Europe French leaders played the game of power-politics with peculiar skill, ready to seize any opening leading to the improvement of their position, and as they would claim, of French security. Mr. Spender pays tribute to the French leaders when he writes, "It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the French were the cleverest, the most clear-sighted and the wisest in their generation of all the diplomatists of this period."[1] The Russian Alliance was the cornerstone of French security, and to have with this an intimate friendship with England, with her great sea power, was a consideration of tremendous weight. To keep that friendship, to draw it closer when possible, was the policy of the French under Delcassé, Millerand, Pichon and Poincaré, a policy definitely conceived, unified and continuous in its execution. Britain's declaration for war on August 4 marked the triumph of this program in national defense and foreign affairs.

The preceding chapters have shown how the Anglo-French Entente did not stop as it began - with merely cordial offers on the part of the Governments to support the other's colonial

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1. Spender, Fifty Years, 372.

ambitions in Morocco and Egypt - it led to naval and military conversations - staffs met - preparations for war were considered as suspicion of German intentions deepened - and conversations of this nature, like growing armaments, stimulated belief in the greater possibility of war, and thus faith in the necessity of an even closer Entente. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, it has been pointed out, was afraid that the conversations might create at least "an honourable understanding,"[1] and Mr. Asquith in 1911 hinted that they might be "rather dangerous."[2] But once embarked upon they could not easily be dropped. And too much evidence has been revealed in earlier pages to doubt that they did create on the part of France an expectation that British support in the event of war could be counted upon. It is not clear, however, despite the fears expressed by Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith, that the liabilities which might result from the Entente as it developed were ever fully realized by the British leaders who initiated the policy, or fully appreciated by the Liberal Cabinet when the measures taken were finally revealed to them. They were, of course, kept quite deliberately from the knowledge of the House of Commons, and on numerous occasions hints of them absolutely denied.

One must agree with Lord Loreburn in censuring Sir Edward Grey and his associates for thus involving England in secret understandings with France of which members of the Cabinet

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1. Supra, 104.
2. Supra, 179 (Note 1).

and Parliament were unaware. As Mr. Fay points out, "This was not in accord with what was understood to be the constitutional practice in England."[1] Grey claims in defense of his policy, and perhaps with some element of justice, that Parliament could not be told of military and naval measures taken to meet possible contingencies.[2] But at times the difficulties and the dangers in his position must have been clear to him, whether or not he would admit them, and though he clung insistently to his faith that his policy was the wiser one. Time after time Nicolson, Crowe, Goschen and Bertie sought to have the Entente converted into an alliance, an alliance in fact if not in name, believing as they did that Anglo-French solidarity should be patent and proclaimed. The question arises at this point - did Grey in his heart agree with this view, and was he forced to content himself with the difficult half-measures and evasions because he feared his colleagues in the Cabinet and Parliament might repudiate him?[3]

It must be understood, as Mr. Ensor makes clear, that whatever be thought on other grounds of Sir Edward Grey's Entente policy, one of its greatest weaknesses was that the bulk of the Liberal Party neither understood nor liked it.[4] In the years before 1914, and even on the brink of the catastrophe

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1. Fay, loc. cit., 253.
2. Grey, op. cit., I, 289-90.
3. Nicolson, op. cit., 329-34, for an admirable summary of the divergent views in the Foreign Office.
4. Ensor, op. cit., Appendix C. 3, 572. Trevelyan, op.cit.,112.

of the War, most Liberals were pro-German in their sympathies, and anti-French. Opposition to the Entente policy of close friendship with France had arisen after Agadir Crisis, and the policy at that time had been under fire by the Liberal Press.[1] The leading Liberals, and chief among these, C.P. Scott, of the "Manchester Guardian," were opposed not only to the details of Grey's policy, but to his whole plan, and were in reality isolationists,[2] wishing to see Britain adopt an attitude of impartiality among the Powers. Others in the party, according to Mr. Ensor, "the less intelligent rank and file," when they thought of foreign affairs at all, did so in terms of traditional prejudice against the French people and the Russian Empire. Had Grey been less aloof by nature, his critics would certainly have judged his policy less severely, for they greatly underestimated his difficulties; the obstacles which Germany offered to friendship were not truly understood, nor the lengths to which he, despite his anti-German predilections, went to overcome them.

His difficulties were thus enormously augmented. How did he seek to deal with this hostility? In general he sought to evade it; he did not face up to it, preferring rather to side-step it; with the result that this defect in his policy continued. For the most part he made no attempt to settle it;

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1. Supra, 182-85.
2. Hammond, op. cit., 152; Ensor, op. cit., 572. Trevelyan op.cit.,200. Trevelyan speaks of Scott as "the most well-informed and intelligent of Grey's critics," and adds that "his reasoned attacks on the entente policy rendered the division of opinion in the Liberal Party all the more difficult for the Foreign Secretary."

and on occasion when a serious breach threatened, or when pointed questions were asked, by a speech of tact and moderation, or even of evasion, he silenced criticism. Because of the prestige he enjoyed in public life, and by reason of the high regard in which his character and integrity were generally held, he restored confidence.[1] One of the chief criticisms that can be laid against his conduct of British foreign affairs is that he never really instructed his party nor the House in the realities of the international situation. And to no lesser degree he failed to educate public opinion as a whole through the press. He made no provision for keeping what should have been the friendly press informed.[2] Among the Liberal publicists Mr. J.A. Spender of the "Westminster Gazette," an influential paper but with only a small circulation, was his only steady advocate, and the only one in which he or Asquith ever ordinarily confided.[3]

In the debate in the House of Commons on August 3, a member made this terrible reproach to Grey as Foreign Secretary:

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1. Mr. Conwell-Evans, in discussing why the Government was able to ignore the attitude of those who were not in agreement with its policies, points out that these latter were greatly at fault too in that while they were not in accord their criticism was "neither sustained and constant, nor whole-hearted and vigorous." Those who were filled with forebodings of a coming war with Germany "greatly erred," he says, "in not coming out into the open, addressing themselves to the people, and conducting a widespread campaign of protest and alarm throughout the land." op.cit., 84-85.
2. Ensor, op. cit., 574.
3. Hammond, op. cit., 151; Trevelyan, op. cit., 201.

> I regret very much that at the end of eight years the best you can say of the policy that has been pursued - of the Triple Entente - is that it should have landed us in a war like this. (1)

It is possible to argue in this vein - that while the object of the Entente may have been to secure peace in Europe it did not prevent war. It is possible to reason along the line of thought - that the development of close relations between Britain and France, and thus between Britain and Russia, carrying support in diplomacy and plans for cooperation in the event of war - that this could hardly fail to breed apprehension in a state like Germany, and thus involve Britain in the conflict the precipitation of which she was presumably seeking to avert. But it is also possible to argue, as in fact Sir Edward Grey contends, that whether or not Britain was bound to France, no matter what her relations in the Entente might be, Britain could not in any case have stood aside in 1914 and have refused to join in the war when the conflict came, that she could not have stood aside and have seen France crushed.

After the outbreak of the War, as Grey tells us, his mind often reverted to the question whether the catastrophe could have been averted by anything he had omitted to do in the carrying out of British foreign affairs throughout the pre-war years.[2] He arrives at a conclusion in his Memoirs, which sets his doubts at rest.[3] But before dismissing this question a

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1. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 1914, vol.LXV, 1836-37.
2. Grey, op. cit., II, p.47.
3. Ibid., p.47 et seq.

further problem in the matter of the Anglo-French Entente must be raised - was the secrecy in which the relations were carried out really wise - if there was fault, in how far does it lie in the secret manner in which the negotiations were conducted?

Grey's claim that Parliament could not have been told of the measures taken to meet possible dangers must bear examination. Perhaps members could not have been told of the details of those measures, perhaps they need not have been told of the details. But was it wise to withhold from Parliament the knowledge of the fact that their did exist communications of a nature which might lead France, though this was not intended, to count on help in case of war. And when it is realized that the existence of these conversations, though kept from Parliament, were suspected in Germany, which Power Grey admits, "may thereby have been led to think that British relations with France and Russia had an aggressive character,"[1] one wonders whether a frank and open statement on the subject would not have lessened suspicion on all sides. These no doubt are difficult questions on which historians will continue to speculate indefinitely.

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tome 3, 1931 (11 mai-30 septembre, 1912).
tome 4, 1932 (1e octobre-4 decembre, 1912).
tome 5, 1933 (5 décembre, 1912-14 mars, 1913).
tome 6, 1933 (15 mars-30 mai, 1913).
tome 7, 1934 (31 mai-10 août, 1913).
tome 8, 1935 (11 août-31 décembre, 1913).
tome 11,1936 (23 juillet-4 août, 1914).

Unlike the British documents which are grouped in sections dealing with particular issues, the French documents are published in a strictly chronological order. While this is open to serious objection, force of criticism is lessened somewhat by the inclusion in each volume of a topical guide which classifies the documents according to subject. The editors have included useful notes.

German Diplomatic Documents, 1871-1914, selected and translated by E. T. S. Dugdale, London, Methuen and Co.

Vol. III. (1930): The Growing Antagonism, 1898-1910.
Vol. IV. (1931): The Descent to the Abyss, 1911-1914.

These documents are selected from the German publication, "Die Grosse Politik der Europäeschen Mächte, 1871-1914." Explanatory and reference notes connect and explain the selection. Doubtless many useful and interesting documents have been omitted, but the collection is most helpful.

The Outbreak of the World War, German Documents collected by Karl Kautsky, edited by Max Montgelas and Walther Schücking, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, Oxford University Press, 1924.

These are the documents first published when the Republican Government opened the German archives soon after taking office in 1918. The collection furnishes valuable source material for the crisis of July and August, 1914.

Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War, London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1915.

A collection of the documents published by the various European Powers on the outbreak of war in 1914. Contains the British Diplomatic Correspondence, the French Yellow Book, the Russian Orange Book, the Belgian Grey Book, the Serbian Blue Book, the German White Book, and the Austro-Hungarian Red Book.

Cooke, W.H. and Stickney, Edith, P., (editors), Readings in European International Relations since 1879, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1931.

Contains extracts from important treaties, official reports, dispatches, and memoirs, with brief explanations to give each extract its setting in point of time. A useful collection.

How the War Began in 1914, Diary of the Russian Foreign Office, July, 1914, London, Allen & Unwin Co.,1925.

The diary of Baron Schilling of events from July 16 to August 2, 1914, with a foreword by Sazonov. A useful addition to the knowledge of Russian policy on the eve of the War.

Siebert, B. de, Entente Diplomacy and the World, 1909-1914, New York, the Knickerbocker Press, 1921.

A collection of the dispatches exchanged between London and St. Petersburgh during the years 1909-1914. Siebert was secretary to the Russian Embassy in London during these years. It is now known that he was wont to forward important dispatches to Berlin. The volume furnishes important documentary material on the diplomacy of the Entente Powers.

Un Livre Noir, Diplomatie d'Avant Guerre d'Après les Documents des Archives Russes, novembre 1910-juillet 1914; 2 vols.; edited and translated by René Marchand, Paris, Libraire de Travail, 1922.

Contains the correspondence of Isvolsky from Paris, where he was ambassador after 1910. Volume I covers the years 1911 and 1912, volume II the period from 1913 to the outbreak of war. Most valuable for its revelations of Isvolsky's part in the diplomacy of the period.

Memoirs.

Asquith, H.H., Memories and Reflections, 2 vols.

Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1928.

The memoirs of the British Prime Minister of the decade before the War. There are no revelations of great importance, although extracts from the author's diary of the days of July and August, 1914, are useful.

Asquith, H.H., The Genesis of the War.

London, Cassell and Co., 1923

A defense of the pacific aims of British policy by the Prime Minister. Contains little that is of outstanding value to the student of the crisis of 1914.

Barclay, Sir Thomas, Thirty Years Anglo-French Reminiscences.

London, Constable and Company Ltd., 1914.

The author's account of Anglo-French relations during the period 1876-1906, and of the part he himself took establishing friendlier feelings between the two nations which led to the entente.

Bertie, Lord, The Diary of Lord Bertie.

London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1924.

The diary of the British Ambassador to Paris. It is interesting to note how early in the crisis he was bitter in his denunciation of Russian policy and of Isvolsky. When war comes, however, he turns to denounce Germany.

Bethmann Hollweg, von Th., Reflections on the World War.

London, Thornton Butterworth, Ltd., 1920.

The memoirs of the German Chancellor. Reveal

his own love of peace, but also his helplessness in critical days. Places the blame for the outbreak of war on the Entente Powers. Contributes very little to our knowledge.

Bülow, Prince Bernhardt von, Imperial Germany.

London, Cassell and Co., 1914.

The former chancellor's account of the rise of the German Empire--written in an extremely patriotic and imperialistic vein. Is interesting as a revelation of the character of the author.

Bülow, Prince Bernhardt von, Memoirs, 3 vols.

London, Putnam and Sons, 1932.

The memoirs of the former Chancellor, in which he gives freely his opinions on the events of the pre-war years. He is the hero of the story he has to tell. He can see little that was wrong with Germany or with von Bülow.

Chamberlain, Austen, Down the Years.

London, Cassell and Co. Ltd., 1935.

A series of sketches of the writer's experiences over a long period of life in public affairs. Valuable recollections of incidents. A particularly useful account of the actions of the opposition leaders on the eve of the outbreak of the War which shows how serious was the confusion at that time. Tells how the letter to Asquith on August 2 comes to be written.

Chamberlain, Austen, Politics from Inside, 1906-1914.

London, Cassell and Company, 1936.

Letters of Austen Chamberlain to members of his family, interesting for the comments on public matters and for the views expressed on foreign affairs.

Churchill, Winston, The World Crisis, vol. I.

New York, Charles Scribners Sons, 1923.

A work of prime importance. While it deals for the most part with the author's work at the Admiralty from 1911 to 1915, it throws a good deal of light on European diplomacy before 1914. Written in an extremely dramatic style.

Eckardstein, Hermann, Ten Years at the Court of St. James, 1895-1905. London, T. Butterworth Ltd., 1921.

Gives a full, but not an entirely objective account of the Anglo-German negotiations of 1898-1901. Throws much light on these, but not always accurate; inclined to exaggerate his own rôle in the negotiations. Inclined to sympathize with the British side.

Grey, Sir Edward, Twenty-five Years, 2 vols. London, Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., 1925.

The classic exposition of British policy. Written in a charming style, most disarming, and seemingly so judicial one finds it almost impossible to disagree. Does not go into details nor deal with controversial points. While the author does not falsify, he often skims over difficulties. Most valuable for its revelation of Grey's personality. Does reveal his distrust of Germany while he held office.

Haldane, R. B., An Autobiography. London, Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., 1929.

Gives useful information on Britain's military preparations, valuable accounts of his visits to Germany.

Haldane, R. B., Before the War. London, Cassell and Co. Ltd., 1920.

The apologia of the former Minister of War. Not a detailed work but useful for his information on his visits to Germany, especially his mission of 1912. He is inclined to blame Germany, but is never bitter.

House, Colonel, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House.

Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1926.

The papers of the trusted adviser of President Wilson who served often as his personal representative. Arranged as a narrative by Professor Charles Seymour. Gives an illuminating picture of House's mission to Europe in 1914 on the eve of the War, when he talked with German and British leaders in the hope of accomplishing something to check the armament race.

Joffre, Marshal, Memoirs, 2 vols.

London, G. Bles, 1932.

Contains the military record of the French High Command from 1914 to 1916. The author gives a little information of some value on the actions of the French Government in the days immediately preceding the outbreak of war.

Jusserand, J.J., What Me Befell.

London, Constable and Co. Ltd., 1933.

The reminiscences of the French ambassador to Washington after 1903. Contains useful information on the part President Roosevelt played in the Morocco Crisis of 1905-06.

Lichnowsky, K.M., Heading for the Abyss.

New York, Payson and Clark Ltd., 1928.

The reminiscences of the German ambassador to London from 1912 to 1914. Bitter in his criticism of German policy before the War. One cannot but be impressed with his sincerity and the validity of many of his criticisms of German policy.

Lloyd George, David, War Memoirs, vol. I.

London, Nicholson and Watson, 1933.

This volume dealing with the year 1914 has only a little to say on the events leading up to the War. It does offer a bitter attack on Grey's handling of foreign affairs. The writer finds little to Grey's credit as Foreign Secretary. Explains also his own part in the Agadir Crisis of 1911.

Morley, John, Memorandum on Resignation.

New York, Macmillan Company, 1928.

Valuable for its information on the British Cabinet discussions on the eve of the War. Presents the views of minority group, those who felt Britain should keep free from continental entanglements. Not wholly reliable since the writer is vague in his memory of dates and sequences.

Paléologue, Maurice, La Russie des Tsars Pendant La Grande Guerre, I.

Paris, Libraire Plon, 1921.

This volume is the journal of the French Ambassador to St. Petersburgh for the period July 20, 1914, to June 2, 1915. Interesting and valuable entries for the visit of Poincaré to St. Petersburgh and for the last days of peace in the Russian capital. But much of what could have been told is not recorded. According to Paléologue the enemies of peace were all in Berlin.

Paléologue, Maurice, Un Grand Tournant de la Politique Mondiale, 1904-06.

Paris, Libraire Plon, 1934.

A portion of the writers journal for the years 1904-1906. Is decidedly anti-German and offers a complete justification of Delcassé's policy.

Poincaré, Raymond, Memoirs, 2 vols.

London, W. Heinemann Ltd., 1926.

The English edition of the more voluminous original, "Au Service de la France." Furnishes Poincaré's defense against his critics' charges that he fomented the War. Of importance to students for its exposition of French policy after 1912 when the writer took office. As one might expect there is a decided personal bias.

Poincaré, Raymond, The Origins of the War.

London, Cassell and Company, 1922.

The French President's account of the War's origins, being a reprint of six lectures delivered in 1921. The first three lectures

give an account of French policy after 1871, while others deal with the events after June 28, 1914.

Repington, C. à Court, The First World War, 1914-1918, vol. I.

New York, Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1921.

The personal experiences of the author, who was Military Correspondent of the "Times". Of great importance for the details he gives of how the military conversations of 1905 and 1906 between England and France began.

Riddell, Lord, War Diary.

London, Ivor Nicholson and Watson Ltd., 1933.

The early pages give a very useful account of the division in the British Cabinet on the eve of the War.

Sazonov, Serge, Fateful Years.

New York, F.A. Stokes Co., 1928.

The recollections of the Russian Foreign Minister, being a justification of Russian policy. Useful as an exposition of the Russian point of view.

Schoen, Freiherr von, The Memoirs of an Ambassador.

London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1922.

The author served as the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from 1907 to 1910, and from then until the outbreak of the War he was Ambassador in Paris. His memoirs throw light on many events of those years.

Steed, Wickham, Through Thirty Years, 2 vols.

New York, Doubleday, Page and Co.,1924.

The interesting reminiscences of the Vienna correspondent and later the foreign editor of the "Times." Contains useful and interesting material on many points, though the writer's judgment may often be open to question - for example his contention that the German leaders willed the War.

William II, The Kaiser's Memoirs.

London, Harper and Brothers, 1922.

The Kaiser's justification of himself and his government. Not at all reliable as history, but interesting as a revelation of personality. He transfers responsibility for the unfortunate episodes of his reign to others.

Secondary Sources.

Albin,Pierre, Le "Coup" d'Agadir.

Paris, Libraire Felix Alcan, 1912.

A detailed narrative account of the Agadir Crisis of 1911 written from the French point of view.

Anderson, E.N., The First Moroccan Crisis, 1904-06.

Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1930.

A detailed and scholarly study of the subject showing a thorough investigation of a wide range of sources. A notable contribution to an important subject. Written in best historical spirit, revealing impartiality in the views expressed.

Archer, William, The Thirteen Days, July 23-August 4, 1914.

London, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1915.

A study of the crisis of 1914 as it developed day by day in the different capitals. In need of revision in the light of the revelations of recent years.

Barnes, H.E., The Genesis of the World War.

New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1927.

Written from the extreme revisionist view point, upholding the thesis of Franco-Russian war-guilt. Is anything but dispassionate or objective; is rather the case of an emotional advocate. An impassioned protest against all Germany's responsibility for the outbreak of war. Is open to serious criticism in its interpretations.

Beard, Charles A., Cross Currents in Europe Today.

London, George G. Harrop and Co. Ltd., 1922.

Contains an interesting and valuable chapter on the British and French military conversations.

Beaverbrook, Lord, Politicians and the War, 1914-1916, vol.I.

London, Thornton, Butterworth Ltd., 1928.

Contains an useful chapter on the way in which the British Cabinet was divided in August, 1914, over the question of intervention. Is rather vague on the meeting of the Conservative leaders on August 1 and 2, when they decided to support a policy of intervention on behalf of France.

Beazley, Raymond, The Road to Ruin in Europe, 1890-1914.

London, J.M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1932.

A brief survey of pre-war diplomacy, written from the revisionist point of view. A strong indictment of the policies of the Entente Powers. Contains little that is new.

Benson, E. F., The Outbreak of the War, 1914.

New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1934.

A graphic account of the last days of peace from the view point of the ordinary citizen. The author skilfully pictures the dramatic days of July and August as Europe slipped over the precipice into war.

Birkenhead, Earl of, Contemporary Personalities.

London, Cassel and Co. Ltd., 1924.

Contains an interesting sketch of Sir Edward Grey, distinctly favourable to the Foreign Secretary.

Bishop, J.B., Theodore Roosevelt and His Time, vol. I.

New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920.

Contains anaccount of the part Roosevelt took in mediating between the opposing Powers in the Morocco Crisis of 1905-06. The author is inclined to overestimate the influence the President exercised.

Bloch, Camille, The Causes of the World War.

London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1935.

Written by the Director of the French War Library-Museum, a narrative of the events of July, 1914, from which is drawn the conclusion of the guilt of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Decidedly biased in interpretations.

Bourgeois, E, et Pagès, G., Les Origines et les Responsabilités de la Grande Guerre.

Paris, Libraire Hachette, 1922.

An authoritative but conventional interpretation, rather lacking in judicial temper. One of the most important French works, and a useful study of Franco-German relations before 1914.

Brandenburg, Erich, From Bismarck to the World War.

London, Oxford University Press, 1927.

The accepted authoritative account of German policy before the War. Especially noted for its scholarly impartiality. The author has made a full use of German documents. Truly an invaluable work.

Callwell, C.E., Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, vol. I.

London, Cassell and Co. Ltd., 1927.

A biography of Sir Henry Wilson who was Director of Military Operations at the War Office after 1910. Praises him as a great soldier, an able administrator, possessed of vision and devotion to his country. Reveals how he prepared the Expeditionary Force, giving little credit to Haldane, its creator, and how he cooperated with the French General Staff after 1910. Reveals also the close contact he maintained with the officials in the Foreign Office.

Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, vol. III, A.W. Ward and G. P. Gooch, editors.

Cambridge, University Press, 1922.

This history of British diplomacy in the pre-

war years is written by G. P. Gooch--written in narrative style, simple and clear. Useful as an outline of British policy.

Cecil, Algernon, British Foreign Secretaries, 1807-1916.

London, G. Bell and Sons, 1927.

Gives in condensed form sketches of international issues and biographies of British foreign ministers.

Chirol, Valentine, Sir, Fifty Years in a Changing World.

London, J. Cape, 1927.

The reminiscences of the foreign editor of the London "Times," particularly interesting in the matter of Anglo-German relations before 1914 in the chapter "On the Road to Armageddon."

Colvin, Ian. The Life of Lord Carson, III.

London, Victor Gollanez, Ltd., 1936.

Gives a most interesting account which is of great value of the meeting of the Conservative leaders on the weekend of August 1 and 2, when the decision was taken to support the Cabinet on the questions of intervention in the War on behalf of France.

Conwell-Evans, T.P., Foreign Policy from a Back Bench, 1904-1918.

London, Oxford University Press, 1932.

A valuable contribution to the study of British policy based on the papers of Lord Noel-Buxton. Especially valuable for its revelation of the opposition among the Liberals to Grey's entente policy.

Coville, Alfred and Temperley, Harold, (editors), Studies in Anglo-French History during the Eighteenth, Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries.

Cambridge, The University Press, 1935.

A number of studies the result of historical conferences held in London in 1933 and in Paris in 1934. Contains a valuable study by Pierre Renouvin

on the agreements and conversations worked out by the chiefs of staff seeking to answer to what extent the governments approved these or were engaged by them.

Crewe, Marquess of, Lord Rosebery, 2 vols.

London, J. Murray, 1931.

A disappointing work; contains little of real importance in the matter of foreign policy.

Debidour, A., Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe, 2 vols.

Paris, Libraire Felix Alcan, 1919-1920.

A narrative account of European international affairs from 1878 to 1914. Volume I covers the period to 1904, and volume II the decade before the War. The work suffers from a decided anti-German bias and reveals German leaders, and the Kaiser in particular, as working for war.

Denis, Ernest., La Guerre.

Paris, Libraire Delagrave, 1915.

An attempt at a psychological approach to the study of the causes of the War, by a professor of the University of Paris. Tries to be fair, but offers the traditional French view of the guilty Germany.

Dickinson, G. Lowes, The International Anarchy.

London, Geo. Allen and Unwin Co., 1926.

A scholarly study of pre-war diplomacy written from the pacifist viewpoint, showing the war not as the result of the policies of individual nations, but as the result of the system or rather the lack of system by which European affairs were conducted. Admirable historical writing showing wide reading.

Dugdale, Blanche, E.C., Arthur James Balfour, 2 vols.

London, Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., 1936.

The biography of Balfour written by his niece.

Contains brief references to foreign affairs and reveals his attitude to the entente policy which began when he was prime minister. Tells of his part in the rôle played by the opposition leaders on the eve of the outbreak of the War.

Durham, Edith, M., The Sarajevo Crime.

London, George Allen and Unwin, 1925.

Presents the case against the Serbian government. The writer reveals the Serbian provocations of Austria, the conspiracies of the "Black Hand Plotters," and summarizes the evidence to show that the Serbian government was aware of the plot but did nothing to prevent it or warn the Austrian government.

Ensor, R.C.K., England, 1870-1914.

Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1936.

A notable work, covering nearly all aspects of English history from 1870 to 1914 in an accurate and scholarly manner, and giving a careful and adequate recital of the change in British foreign policy and of events which led to the War. The writer tends towards a rather conservative view of the causes of the War leaning in favour of the view of Germany's guilt. Gives a splendid analysis of the attitude of the Liberal Party towards the international situation.

Ewart, John S., The Roots and Causes of the Wars, 1914-1918, 2 vols.

New York, George H. Doran Co., 1925.

A notably thorough analysis of the causes of the War by the eminent Canadian jurist. The author distinguishes between the roots and the causes which precipitated conflict. He treats the conflict not as one war but as a number of wars, and analyses the reasons for the entrance into war of each of the belligerents. Of high value to students of the period.

Fabre-Luce, A., La Victoire.

Paris, La Nouvelle Revue Française, 1924.

Written from the revisionist point of view offering

a strong criticism of the policies of the Entente Powers. Concludes that the Central Powers by their actions made the War possible, but the Entente Powers made it certain.

Farrer, J.A., England,Under Edward VII.

London, G. Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1922.

Reveals the part played by Edward VII in international affairs, attributing to him a large rôle, claiming he was his own foreign minister.

Fay, S.B., The Origins of the World War,2 vols. in one. (2d. ed.,revised).
New York, the Macmillan Company, 1932.

Ranks as one of the finest works in its field. Noted for its comprehensive scope, its authoritative and impartial views, and its sound research. Volume I is a review of European diplomacy to 1914. Volume II is devoted to the crisis of 1914.

Fisher, H.A.L. A History of Europe, vol. III.

London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1935.

The third and final volume of a series the author has written on the history of Europe from early times - one of the most valuable general histories that has yet appeared. The work reveals an encyclopedic knowledge, skilful condensation, scholarly judgment, and great literary skill.

Gardiner, A.G., Portraits and Portents.

New York, Harper and Brothers, 1926.

A series of sketches by the editor of the London "Daily News" in which he presents salient aspects of post-war English life in the terms of leading personalities. There is an interesting sketch of Sir Edward Grey in which the author commends his character and his sincerity, but finds fault with his understanding and methods.

Garvin, J.L. The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, vol.III.

London, Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1934.

This third volume of Chamberlain's biography dealing with the years 1895-1900 reveals his part in the Anglo-German negotiations after 1898. The writer's admiration for Chamberlain is very evident.

Giffen, M.B., Fashoda, the Incident and Its Setting.

Chicago, the University of Chicago Press, 1930.

A concise and interpretative study of the crisis of 1898 tracing with skill and clarity the policies of Britain and France towards the Sudan. A valuable contribution to the field of international diplomacy.

Gooch, G.P. Before the War, vol. I.

London, Longmans Green and Co. 1936.

The author is one of the closest students of pre-war diplomacy as well as a master in the art of historical justice. This work offers a series of sketches in which he gives vivid pictures of five of the foreign ministers who were charged with the conduct of diplomacy in the pre-war years.-- Delcassé, Lansdowne, Bulow, Isvolsky and Aehrenthal. Based on the documents and latest material, it is a valuable addition to the author's many splendid works in this field. Students will look forward to the volume he promises, to contain studies of Grey, Poincaré, Bethmann-Hollweg, Sazonov and Berchtold.

Gooch, G.P. History of Modern Europe, 1878-1919.

London, Cassell and Company Ltd., 1923.

A scholarly and objective narrative account of the events of the pre-war years with frequent quotations from documents. There is little discussion of controversial questions or interpretation of policies. A useful aid to students of the period.

Gooch, G.P. Recent Revelations of European Diplomacy.

London, Longmans, Green and Co. 1930.

A masterly discussion of the literature dealing with the Great War. Possibly no better bibliography in moderate compass has been published. The salient points of each book are discussed briefly, brief quotations given, and the personality and point of view of the authors revealed. An invaluable guide to students of the period.

Gooch, G.P., Studies in Modern History.

London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1931.

Contains an interesting study of Holstein who played such an important part in shaping German policy after the fall of Bismarck until his own forced retirement in 1906.

Grey, Sir Edward, Speeches on Foreign Affairs, selected with an introduction by Paul Knaplund.

London, G. Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1931.

An excellent collection of Grey's speeches and a useful contribution to the study of the pre-war period.

Hale, O.J. Germany and the Diplomatic Revolution.

Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1931

An excellent study of diplomacy and the press in the years 1904-06. Sheds valuable light on the Morocco Crisis, and is a useful guide for the opinions of the press of England, France, and Germany.

Halévy, Elie, A History of the English People, 1895-1915, 2 vols.
London, T. Fisher Unwin Ltd., 1929-1934.

A brilliant history of these years in England, giving a full account of the period, and revealing an amazingly detailed knowledge. Deals only to a slight extent with foreign affairs, but the views expressed are of value.

Halévy, Elie, The World Crisis of 1914-1918.

Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1930.

Contains the Rhodes Memorial Lectures delivered in 1929. There is a chapter on the causes of the War--an interesting interpretation of nationalism as one of the chief factors.

Hamman, Otto, The World Policy of Germany, 1890-1912.

London, G. Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1927.

A readable and instructive account of German policy, written with understanding, generosity and tolerance, based on personal recollections and documents. The author was the former head of the Press Division of the German Foreign Office.

Hammond, J.L., C.P. Scott of the "Manchester Guardian."

London, G. Bell and Sons Ltd., 1934.

A biography of Scott who was for more than fifty years editor of the great Liberal newspaper, written by his friend and associate. Gives a splendid insight into Scott's public life, his policies, his political beliefs. There are two excellent chapters on his views on foreign affairs, which reveal his opposition to the Entente policy and how he opposed British intervention on the eve of the War.

Headlam-Morley, James, Studies in Diplomatic History.

London, Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1930.

A collection of eight essays on diplomatic subjects written during the time the author was Historical Adviser to the Foreign Office. The problem of Egypt is discussed and the position of England as a European state and as head of an overseas empire.

Hearnshaw, F.J.C. (editor) Edwardian England.

London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1933.

A series of lectures delivered at King's College, University of London, which attempt to interpret the Edwardian decade. There is an interesting study of King Edward VII by the editor, and a valuable study of foreign affairs by R.W. Seton-Watson.

Hendrick, B.J., The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page, vol. I.
New York, Doubleday, Page and Co., 1922.

The life of the American ambassador to London at the time of the outbreak of the War. Gives an interesting account of Page's reaction to the international situation. Very favourable to Sir Edward Grey.

Hoffman, Ross, J.S., Great Britain and the German Trade Rivalry, 1875-1914.
Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1933.

A study of the inroads made by Germany into Great Britain's trade, the British nation's reaction to this rivalry, and the influence of these factors upon the shaping of British policy toward Germany. Shows that while the British Government did not declare war on Germany for the ends of trade, nevertheless, the anti-German orientation of the British mind did arise from the competition in trade.

Hubert, Lucien, Politique Extérieure.

Paris, Libraire Felix Alcan, 1911.

A volume of sketches and speeches on international problems by a member of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the French Chamber of Deputies. The speeches on"France and Morocco"are of special interest.

Kennedy, A.L., Old Diplomacy and New, 1876-1922.

London, J. Murray, 1922.

An exposition and critique of British foreign policy after the time of Disraeli. A slight work of minor importance.

Langer, W.L., The Diplomacy of Imperialism, vol. II.

New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1935.

This volume covers the years 1890-1902. It is an exhaustive account of international relations from the fall of Bismarck to the forming of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. A scholarly work of

outstanding merit revealing painstaking research and sound critical judgment.

Lee, Sir Sidney, King Edward VII, 2 vols.

New York, the Macmillan Co., 1925-27.

The standard biography of Edward VII, based largely on his personal papers. Should correct the mistaken yet popular idea that he directed British foreign policy. It does show his interest in state matters, how extensive was his general acquaintance with the problems and personalities of Europe, and how his personal charm and reputation aided the conduct of foreign policy.

Lémonon, Ernest, L'Europe et la Politique Britannique

Paris, F. Alcan, 1912.

A useful study of Britain's relationships with the European powers from 1882 up to 1911, showing how she turned from friendship with the Triple Alliance to form the Entente with France and Russia.

Loreburn, Earl, How the War Came.

London, Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1919.

Is notable for its bitter condemnation of secret diplomacy. The author, who was in the Cabinet as Lord Chancellor until 1912, attacks the secrecy in which Grey authorized the conversations which were carried on between the British and French General Staffs after 1906.

Ludwig, Emil, July '14.

New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1929.

Though it purports to be a historical study of the immediate origins of the War, it is drama rather than history. As such is a brilliant and successful work. The author has pictured in an excellent manner the tense atmosphere of the crisis of 1914. Exculpates the peoples of Europe and blames the kings and statesmen.

Ludwig, Emil, Kaiser Wilhelm II.

London, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1927.

A splendid study of the complex and difficult character of the Kaiser, written in a dramatic style, and showing real insight, striking on a note of tragedy.

Lutz, Hermann, Lord Grey and the World War.

London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1928

A scathing criticism, with careful references to authorities, of the narrative Grey has given in his "Twenty-five Years." A careful study of Grey's policy, valuable for its shrewd judgments. The author is an outstanding German critic who regards Grey as well-meaning but altogether incompetent as foreign secretary.

Maurois, André, King Edward VII and His Times.

London, Cassell and Co. Ltd., 1933.

A lively and entertaining account of British leaders, politics and foreign policy woven around King Edward as the centre. Useful for its account of the forming of the Entente Cordiale.

Meech, T.C., This Generation, vol. I.

London, Chatto and Windus, 1927.

This first volume of a two volume history of Great Britain and Ireland in the first quarter of the twentieth century covers the years from 1900 to 1914. While it deals mainly with political affairs some attention is given to foreign policy. Is written in journalistic style.

Montgelas, Max, British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey.

New York, A.A. Knopf, 1928.

A searching criticism of Grey's policy by a well-known German writer on the question of war-guilt.

Morel, E.D., Diplomacy Revealed.

London, National Labour Press, 1921.

A denunciation of the secret diplomacy of the pre-war years. Contains dispatches from the Belgian diplomats in Paris, London, and Berlin accompanied by interesting notes.

Morhardt, M., Les Preuves.

Paris, Libraire du Travail, 1924.

A study of the crisis of 1914, from the revisionist viewpoint. Places the responsibility for the outbreak of war on Russia because of her mobilization. Condemns the French government, and Poincaré in particular, for not restraining Russia.

Mowat, R,B., The Concert of Europe.

London, Macmillan Company, 1930.

A survey of European international relations after 1870, which utilizes the idea of the Concert of Europe as a continuous thread throughout, showing how it was accepted in settling problems before 1914, but how the division of Europe into two diplomatic groups made the functioning of the Concert more difficult, and how in 1914 the Concert was destroyed. By no means impartial, inclined to favor the Entente Powers.

Mowat, R.B., A History of European Diplomacy.

New York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1928.

A scholarly and substantial work which gives an excellent survey of the field of European diplomacy.

Murray, Gilbert, The Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey.

Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1915.

A defense of Sir Edward Grey's conduct of British foreign affairs written in answer to criticism of his work as foreign secretary.

Newton, Lord, Lord Lansdowne.

London, Macmillan and Co., 1929.

The authorized biography of Lord Lansdowne. Expresses admiration for him as a man and official. Readable, but disappointing, in that it throws little light on Lansdowne's policies apart from what we already know.

Nicolson, Harold, Sir Arthur Nicolson, First Lord Carnock,

London, Constable and Co. Ltd., 1930.

A brilliant story of one of the leading diplomats of the period, written by his son. A remarkable delineation of character, revealing Nicolson as the "type" of pre-war diplomat, and giving a clever account of how diplomacy was conducted before 1914.

Nowak, K.F., Germany's Road to Ruin.

London, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1932.

Valuable as a reference for its excellent character sketches of the German leaders. Written in defense of the Kaiser, very critical of Bülow. But is often inaccurate and prejudiced.

Pinon, R., France et Allemagne.

Paris, Perrin, 1913.

A study of Franco-German relations after 1870. While critical of German policy, the author reveals also errors made in the conduct of French foreign affairs. Offers an interesting analysis of the place of Morocco in Franco-German relations.

Politicus, Viscount Grey of Fallodon.

London, Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1934.

A defense of Grey's work as foreign secretary written in answer to Lloyd George's bitter attack in Volume I of his War Memoirs.

Porter, C.W., The Career of Théophile Delcassé.

Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1936.

A scholarly study of the career of the French statesman who gave the new orientation to French foreign policy. The work is extremely valuable for the new light it sheds on many points of Delcassé's work.

Pribram, A.F., England and the International Policy of the European Great Powers, 1871-1914.

Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1931.

A concise work, with little detail, but in its brief scope a clear, impartial study of British continental policy before 1914, by the foremost Austrian authority on pre-war diplomacy.

Renouvin, Pierre, La Crise Européenne et la Grande Guerre.

Paris, F. Alcan, 1934.

A study of the War.preceded by a survey of the decade of crises which culminated in its outbreak. The first third of the book is devoted to the internal problems and the diplomatic struggle of the Powers. Whether or not one subscribes to the author's theory of the guilt of the Central Powers one must admit that his survey of Europe before 1914 is brilliant.

Renouvin, Pierre, The Immediate Origins of the War.

London, Oxford University Press, 1928.

The author is the leading French writer on pre-war diplomacy and this is the best French work on the subject of the origins of the War. A comprehensive treatment, revealing a wide range of knowledge on the part of the author, fairness of temper and a critical technique. Though the author absolves Germany from the charge of conspiring to bring about the War, nevertheless he finds her more guilty than the other Powers for its outbreak.

Reynald, Georges, La Diplomatie Française,

Paris, Librairie Militaire Berger-Levrault, 1915.

A brief study of the work of Delcassé in his various offices as foreign minister, minister of marine and ambassador to Russia. Extremely laudatory.

Russell, Bertrand, Freedom and Organization, 1814-1914.

London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd.,1934.

A volume of essays which trace the main causes of political change in the hundred years from 1814 to 1914 - economic forces, political theories, and important individuals. There is an interesting essay on the leaders of the Great Powers in 1914.

Schmitt, B.E., Coming of the War, 2 vols.

New York, Charles Scribners Sons, 1930.

Important as one of the major works on the outbreak of the War. An immensely detailed work, showing careful study of a mass of source material, accompanied by voluminous references and extensive footnotes. Suffers somewhat from a decided bias - the author is inclined to view favourably the Entente Powers and blame the Central Powers for the coming of the War.

Schmitt, B.E., England and Germany, 1740-1914.

Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1916.

A study of Anglo-German relations showing how the pre-war rivalry developed from the rise of Germany as a new Power, whose commercial advance, colonial aspirations, and naval ambitions were interpreted in England as a threat to the safety of the Empire. The author maintains that while there may have been wrong on both sides, the greater blame for the tragic ending of the rivalry must rest with Germany.

Schmitt, B.E., Triple Alliance and Triple Entente.

New York, H. Holt and Co., 1934.

A small work which traces in brief compass the origins and development of the system of alliances. The presentation is clear and attractive, though brief. Rather pro-entente.

Scott J.F., Five Weeks.

New York, John Day Company, 1927.

The writer contends that the fundamental explanation for the disastrous outcome of the crisis of 1914 is to be found in the influence of public opinion. He bases his thesis on a study of the press of the various European nations from June 28 to August 4, 1914. The work shows careful research, is free of bias and is extremely readable.

Seton-Watson, R.W., Sarajevo.

London, Hutchinson and Co., 1926.

A careful study of the Sarajevo murders which exculpates Serbia and condemns the actions of Austria and the policy of Germany. The author's statements are supported by references to documents and private conversations with Jugo-Slav friends.

Seymour, Charles, The Diplomatic Background of the War, 1870-1914.

New Haven, Yale University Press, 1916.

A useful study, considering the time of its writing, which shows the historical development of the factors which were making for war after 1870.

Slosson, P.W., Europe Since 1870.

New York, Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1935.

A useful text on the political history of Europe after the Franco-Prussian War.

Somervell, D.C., The Reign of King George the Fifth.

London, Faber and Faber Limited, 1935.

A narrative of the outstanding events of the reign of King George V. Only slight reference is made to foreign affairs. The Agadir Crisis, Anglo-German naval rivalry and the outbreak of the War are treated lightly.

Spender, J.A., Fifty Years of Europe.

London, Cassell and Company, 1933.

A masterly study of the pre-war period based on a mass of official documents. The author was one of the leading Liberal publicists of the day, in close touch with Liberal leaders, and with Grey and Asquith in particular. He gives an illuminating picture of the international situation before 1914 and shows how the German navy and fear of Germany shaped British policy.

Spender, J.A., Great Britain, Empire and Commonwealth, 1886-1935.

London, Cassell and Company, 1935.

A summary of the most important events of the period, with adequate reference to foreign affairs, made valuable by the great knowledge and experience of the writer.

Spender, J.A., Life, Journalism and Politics, 2 vols.

London, Cassell and Company, Ltd., 1927.

The record of the writer's career, of great value for the keen insight it gives of the politics of the day. There is a valuable chapter on "The Men of 1906" which gives an interesting study of the leading personalities of the Liberal party. The writer holds them in high esteem and pays high tribute throughout the two volumes to his friend, Grey.

Spender, J.A., The Life of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. 2 vols

London, Hodder and Stoughton Limited, 1923

The official biography of the Liberal Prime Minister. Is especially interesting for the revelation it makes of the fact that Campbell-Bannerman was aware of and approved the steps taken to carry on the military conversations with France in 1906.

Spender, J.A., and Asquith, Cyril, The Life of Henry Herbert Asquith, 2 vols

London, Hutchinson and Company, 1932.

The standard life of Asquith who was prime

minister during the pre-war decade. The early chapters are written by his son, while Mr. Spender records his public life. A readable work, and an important contribution to the history of the period.

Sontag, R.J., European Diplomatic History, 1871-1932.

New York, The Century Company, 1933.

The author approaches his subject through a study of personalities, and gives not so much a narrative account of what took place, as a penetrating interpretation of what leaders desired, and the technique used in their attempts. A useful survey.

Stieve, Friedrich, Isvolsky and the World War.

London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1926.

The author, who was an official in the German Foreign Office, reveals Isvolsky's rôle in pre-war diplomacy basing the work on the latter's letters and telegrams. He reveals Isvolsky as a guilty accomplice of Poincaré.

Swain, J.W., Beginning the Twentieth Century.

New York, Norton, 1933.

A well-informed, and well written text on European affairs from 1900 to the close of the War.

Tardieu, A., France and the Alliances.

New York, Macmillan and Company, 1908.

A useful study of the rôle played by France in the diplomatic drama after 1870. Traces the part played by the Republic in the Franco-Russian alliance, the formation of the Anglo-French Entente, and the conflict of the alliances. The author was at the time of writing a high official in the French diplomatic service, and he writes in favour of the French case.

Trevelyan, G.M., Grey of Fallodon.

London, Longmans, Green and Co.,1937.

A brief biography of Grey by his friend, the eminent Liberal historian. Recreates splendidly Grey's personality, picturing him in the dual rôle of statesman and naturalist. Praises Grey as a man and as foreign minister, and defends him against the ruthless criticism to which he has been subjected. Offers little new evidence on questions of the period. An important work but cannot be accepted as an impartial study.

Wilson, H.W., The War Guilt.

London, Sampson Low, Marston and Co. Ltd.,1928.

A study of European international affairs after 1870 to determine the question of the war guilt. It is written from the conservative view and is coloured by a decided anti-German bias.

Wingfield-Stratford, E.C., The Victorian Sunset.

London, G. Routledge and Sons Ltd., 1932.

The second volume in a trilogy on the Victorian era carrying the story to the end of the century and the passing of the Queen. A brilliantly written social history of the last three decades of the Victorian age, ironical in style.

Wingfield-Stratford, E.C., The Victorian Aftermath.

London, G. Routledge and Sons Ltd., 1933.

The last volume of the Victorian trilogy, being a study of the end of the Victorian age and of the Edwardian period. A great deal of political and social history is woven into an interesting narrative. It is full of irony and humour. The whole period is viewed with a pessimistic sense of impending disaster.

Wolff, Theodor, The Eve of 1914.

New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1936.

An attempt at a psychological approach to the problem of war responsibility, by the editor of the "Berliner Tageblatt," which paper was known for its independence of comment on foreign affairs. The author knew personally many of the politicians and diplomats whom he carefully analyses and vividly portrays. He shows how peaceful populations in all the nations were turned into supporters of war. The book is a literary masterpiece, interesting for its interpretations, but does not add greatly to our knowledge of the origins of the War.

Woodward, E.L., Great Britain and the German Navy.

Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1935.

A detailed study of the naval rivalry before 1914, based on the documents for the period. A useful synthesis of material, but reveals little that is new. Rather indulgent towards the English part in the naval race, showing little understanding of the German view. Heavy in style.

Zetland, Marquis of, Lord Cromer.

London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1932.

The authorized life of Lord Cromer. Contains an interesting account of the part he played in the rapprochement between Britain and France after 1903.

Articles, Essays, Reviews.

Anon., Edouard VII, La Revue de Paris, May 15, 1904.

Anon., France, Russia, and the Nile, The Contemporary Review, vol. LXXIV, December, 1898.

Anon., La Mission Marchand, La Revue de Paris, June 1, 1899.

Anon., Our Foreign Policy and Its Reform, The Contemporary Review, vol. CI, April, 1912.

Presents the case of the Liberal Radicals who were opposed to Grey's conduct of foreign affairs. Points out the dangers in the way in which the entente was being transformed into an alliance and makes a plea for a better understanding with Germany.

Anon., Paul Cambon et les Préliminaires de l'Entente Cordiale, Revue de Paris, vol. 44, No. 7, April 1, 1937.

Anon., The Agreement With France, The Living Age, vol. 241, May 14, 1904.

Anon., The Arch-Enemy of England, The Contemporary Review, vol. LXXIV, December, 1898.

An attempt to picture the Kaiser and the German government as desirous of raising a Continental Alliance against England and of seizing the hegemony of the world. Claims England's policy had been weak and vacillating and calls on the government to take action to safeguard British interests.

Anon., The Crux of Foreign Policy, the Fortnightly Review, vol. LXVIII (new series), July, 1900.

Anon., The Failure of Our Foreign Policy, The Contemporary Review, vol. LXXIII, April, 1898.

Anon., The International Ferment, The Quarterly Review, vol. 188, July, 1898.

Anon., Vingt-huit Ans de Politique Etrangère, La Revue de Paris, November 1, 1898.

Barclay, Thomas,
A General Treaty of Arbitration Between Great Britain and France, The Fortnightly Review, vol. LXIX (new series), June, 1901.

Presents the writer's plan for a general arbitration treaty for which he worked after the Fashoda Crisis, and finally saw signed in 1903.

Barclay, Thomas,
A Lance for the French, The Fortnightly Review, vol. LXVII (new series), February, 1900.

Sets forth the desire of the writer to promote kindlier relations on both sides of the Channel after the bitterness roused by the Fashoda Crisis.

Barker, J. Ellis,
Anglo-German Relations and Sir Edward Grey, The Fortnightly Review, vol. XCI (new series), March, 1912.

Barnes, H.E.,
Assessing the Blame for the World War, Current History, vol. XX, No. 2, May, 1924.

Barnes, H.E.,
Poincaré's Guilt in the War, The Nation (New York), vol. 121, No. 3144, October 7, 1925.

Barrère, Camille,
La Chute de Delcassé (I & II), Revue des Deux Mondes, vol. X, August 1, 1932, vol. XIII, January 1, 1933.

A study of the crisis of 1905 which resulted in the fall of Delcassé. Distinctly favourable to Delcassé's handling of French policy, and critical of his associates who let him down in the force of what is interpreted as a German threat to break the Entente.

Bashford, J.L.,
Germany in the Mediterranean, The Fortnightly Review, vol. LXXVII (new series), June, 1905.

Beard, C.A.,
Viscount Grey on War Guilt, The New Republic, vol. XLIV, No. 566, October 7, 1925.

Bérard, Victor,
France et Maroc, La Revue de Paris, January 15, 1906.

Bérard, Victor,
La France et Guillaume II, La Revue de Paris, May 15, 1905.

Bérard, Victor,
Le Livre Jaune Sur Le Maroc, La Revue de Paris, January 1, 1906.

Bérard, Victor,
Les Accords Anglo-Français (I & II), La Revue de Paris, June 15, 1904, and July 1, 1904.

Bickford, J.D. and
Johnson, E.N.
The Contemplated Anglo-German Alliance, 1890-1901, The Political Science Quarterly, vol. 42, March, 1927.

A careful account of the attempts to negotiate an Anglo-German alliance at the end of the nineteenth century. Drawn mainly from the German documents. Places the responsibility for the failure of the negotiations on the German leaders.

Blennerhassett, Rowland,
England and France, The Nineteenth Century, vol. LV, June, 1904.

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German Foreign Policy, The Fortnightly Review, vol. LXXVII (new series), May, 1905.

Blennerhassett, Rowland,
German Policy in Morocco, The Fortnightly Review, vol. LXXXIV (new series), October, 1908.

Boulger, D.C.,
Fashoda and the Upper Nile, The Contemporary Review, vol. LXXIV, November, 1898.

Brailsford, H.N.,
The Last of the English Liberals, Foreign Affairs, vol. XI, No. 4, July, 1933.

An interesting review of "The Life of Henry Herbert Asquith" written by J.A. Spender and Cyril Asquith. Offers shrewd comments on foreign policy as conducted by Asquith's government.

Buxton, Noel,
Diplomacy and Parliament, The Nineteenth Century, vol. LXXI, April, 1912.

A plea for a larger measure of parliamentary control over foreign affairs, written after the Crisis of Agadir when it was realized how close to war the country had been brought.

Charles-Roux, M.F.,
Veillée d'Armes à Londres (22 juin--4 août, 1914). Revue des Deux Mondes, vol. XXIV, August 15, 1926.

A dramatic presentation of the events which took place in London in the last days of peace, written from the French viewpoint.

Charmes, Francis,
Chronique de la Quinzaine; Histoire Politique, Revue des Deux Mondes, January, 1898 - August, 1914. (passim).

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Germany, and the Question of Morocco, The Fortnightly Review, vol. LXXVII (new series), May, 1905.

Chirol, Valentine,
The Origins of the Present War, The Quarterly Review, vol. 221, October, 1914.

Coubertin, Pierre de,
M. Delcassé. A Character Sketch, The Living Age, vol. 232, March 8, 1902.

An illuminating sketch of Delcassé - of his character and his work. Acclaims him as one of the most accomplished statesmen of the Third Republic.

Daniels, Harriet, M.E.,
Anglo-German Relations, 1898-1914.

A Thesis submitted for the Degree of Master of Arts, University of British Columbia, April,1932.

Dawson, W.H.,
The Anglo-German Alliance Proposals, The Contemporary Review, vol. CXXVI, November, 1924.

Decle, Lionel,
The Fashoda Question, The Fortnightly Review, vol. LXIV (new series), November, 1898.

Delafosse, Jules,
The Foreign Policy of France, The National Review, vol. XLVI, September, 1905.

Déroulède, Paul,
Franc-Parler, The National Review, vol. XLVI, October, 1905.

Did Germany Incite Austria in 1914?
Current History, vol. XXVIII, No. 4, July, 1928.

A symposium on the questions of how far Austria-Hungary was justified in making war on Serbia after the Sarajevo murders and to what extent did Germany encourage or incite Austria in her action against Serbia. Contributions are made by H. E. Barnes, Count Berchtold, who was Austrian foreign secretary in 1914, Count Hoyos, Chief of the Cabinet of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry in 1914, Dr. Friederich von Weisner, Legal Counsellor of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry and Official Investigator for Austria for the Sarajevo Assassination, Von Jagow, the former German Foreign Minister, Alfred Zimmerman, former German Under-Secretary of State, and M.T. Florinsky of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Dillon E.J.,
The Anglo-French Convention, The Contemporary Review, vol. LXXXV, May, 1904.

Diplomaticus,
Fashoda and Lord Salisbury's Vindication, The Fortnightly Review, vol. LXIV (new series), December, 1898.

Diplomaticus,
Sir Edward Grey's Stewardship, The Fortnightly Review, vol. CX (new series), December, 1911.

Presents a case against Sir Edward Grey's conduct of foreign affairs since he first took office. Appeals for a better understanding with Germany.

Doumer, Paul,
The Anglo-French Agreement,
The Living Age, vol. 242, July 16, 1904.

Ewart, J.S.,
The Russian Order for General Mobilization.
Current History, vol. XXII, No. 2, May, 1925.

Fay, S.B.,
Grey: A Tragic Blunderer.
Current History, vol. XXXIX, No. 2, November, 1933.

A study of Grey as foreign secretary written after his death in September, 1933. Commends his honesty and his devotion but regards him as falling short as a statesman, lacking in foresight and in ability to make decisions.

Fay, S.B.,
New Light on the Origins of the War.
The American Historical Review, vol. XXV, Number 4, July, 1920; vol. XXVI, Number 1, October, 1920; vol. XXVI , Number 2, January, 1921.

Fay, S.B.,
Pre-War Diplomacy and the European Press.
Current History, vol. XXXIII, No. 2, November, 1930.

Fay, S.B.,
The Black Hand Plot that Led to the World War.
Current History, vol. XXIII, No. 2, November, 1925.

A careful study of the plot which led to the murder of the Austrian Archduke. Well-substantiated by a wide range of evidence. Gives the conclusion that while Serbian officials were involved in the plot, Austria was not justified in going to war with Serbia in 1914.

Fay, S.B.,
The Coming of the War; 1914.
The Journal of Modern History, vol. III, No. I, March, 1931.

A review of Schmitt's book, "The Coming of the War: 1914." Is critical of some of the aauthor's conclusions, and reveals him as inclined to favour the Entente Powers.

Glazebrook, George, de T.,
The End of British Isolation.
Queen's Quarterly, vol. XXXVIII, Autumn, 1931.

Gooch, G.P.,
Baron von Holstein.
The Cambridge Historical Journal, vol. I, No. 1, 1923.

Gooch, G.P.,
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The Contemporary Review, vol. CXXIII, April, 1923.

Gooch, G,P.,
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The Cambridge Historical Journal, vol. V, No.2, 1936.

Henderson, E.F.,
The Superficial Grey.
The Nation (New York), vol. CXXI, October 28, 1925.

A review of Sir Edward Grey's "Twenty-five Years." Takes him severely to task for skimming over difficult points. States that while Grey does not directly falsify, he comes as near it as possible.

Harris, Walter, B.,
The Morocco Crisis.
Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, vol. 178, August, 1905.

Harrison, A.F.,
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The Nineteenth Century, vol. LVIII, July, 1905.

Hart, A.B.,
Assessing the Blame for the World War.
A dissent from the Conclusions of Professor Barnes.
Current History, vol. XX, No. 2, May, 1924.

A brief article which questions the findings of Dr. Barnes in an article in the same review.

Herrick, F.H.,
The Abandonment of "Splendid Isolation."
British Politics and the Foreign Office at the close of the Nineteenth Century.
Proceedings of the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association, 1920.

An interesting study of the workings of the British foreign office before the War, showing the great importance of the permanent officials and how they influenced policy. It is claimed that the office was more important in determining policy than the temporary political head.

Ignotus.,
The German Emperor's Crusade Against the Entente Cordiale.
The National Review, vol. XLVI, February, 1906.

Langer, W.L.,
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Foreign Affairs, Vol. VII, No. 4, July, 1929.

Lascelles, the Rt. Hon. Sir Frank,
Thoughts on the Anglo-German Problem.
The Contemporary Review, vol. CI, January, 1912.

Lavisse, Ernest,
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La Revue de Paris, February 1, 1899.

Lees, Frederic,
Some Promoters of Anglo-French Amity.
The Fortnightly Review, vol. LXXIV (new series), July, 1903

Describes the attempts of a number of officials, journalists and writers who were working for an Anglo-French rapprochement. Gives great credit to Delcassé, Paul-Cambon, and Sir Thomas Barclay in particular.

Lewis, S.E.,
Anglo-German Diplomatic Relations, 1898-1902.
Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, vol. IX, 1931-32.

Lingelbach, W.E.,
Belgian Neutrality: Its Origin and Interpretation.
The American Historical Review, vol. XXXIX, Number 1, October, 1933.

Low, Sidney,
The Foreign Office Autocracy.
The Fortnightly Review, vol. XCI, (new series), January, 1912.

Very critical of the secret manner in which the Foreign Secretary and Cabinet conduct foreign policy, and of the apparent lack of responsibility in this matter to the House of Commons. The article was inspired by the danger revealed in the Agadir Crisis. Suggests the setting up of a Foreign Affairs Committee to discuss with the Minister, general outlines of policy.

Lutz, H.,
Lord Grey's Responsibility for Russia's Mobilization.
Current History, vol. XXII, No. 2, May, 1925.

Mallet, Sir Charles,
Lord Grey and the Peace of Europe.
The Contemporary Review, vol. CXXVIII, November, 1925.

A careful review of Lord Grey's "Twenty-five Years." Raises some of the interesting questions which Grey has passed over too lightly in his book.

Marx, Wilhelm,
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Foreign Affairs, vol. IV, No. 2, January, 1926.

Maxse, L.J.,
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The National Review, vol. LXXXI, August, 1918.

A scathing criticism of British policy before 1914 as being too yielding to Germany. Violently anti-German. Gives interesting and valuable details of the meeting of the Unionist leaders who wrote the important letter of August 2 to the Cabinet. An important contribution to our knowledge of the events in London on the eve of the War.

Millet, Philippe,
The Truth About the Franco-German Crisis of 1911.
The Nineteenth Century, vol. LXXI, June, 1912.

Millet René,
La Lutte Pacifique Entre La France et L'Angleterre.
Revue des Deux Mondes, vol. 21, June 15, 1904.

Morel, E.D.,
The National Interest in the Franco-German Dispute.
The Nineteenth Century, vol. LXX, November, 1911.

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The Nineteenth Century, vol. LXXI, February, 1912.

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The "Truth" About the Franco-German Crisis.
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Mortimer, Raymond,
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The New Statesman and Nation, vol. XIII, No. 316 (new series), March 13, 1937.

A review of G. M. Trevelyan's "Grey of Fallodon." Criticizes the author in so far as he has not adequately answered or stated the case against Grey.

Mowat, R.B.,
Great Britain and Germany in the Early Twentieth Century.
The English Historical Review, vol. 46, July, 1931.

Mowat, R.B.,
New Light on the Agadir Crisis.
The Contemporary Review, vol. CXLI, June, 1932.

An interesting review of volume VII of the British Documents on the Origins of the War, which deals with the Agadir Crisis. The reviewer is sceptical as to the wisdom of Anglo-French policy in the crisis and sees little justification for Lloyd George's Mansion House speech.

Murray, Lt. Col. the Hon. Arthur,
Lord Grey of Fallodon.
The Quarterly Review, vol. 262, No. 519, January, 1934.

A staunch defense of Grey as a man and as foreign secretary, written in answer to the criticism made by Lloyd George in volume I of his "War Memoirs."

Poincaré, Raymond,
The Responsibility for the War.
Foreign Affairs, vol. IV, No. I, October, 1925.

Poincaré's answer to his critics who place the guilt for the outbreak of the War on France and Russia. He places all the blame on Germany.

Pratt, E.J.,
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Revue Historique, tome CLXXVIII, Septembre-Octobre, 1936.

Based on volumes V-VIII of the Documents Diplomatiques Français, showing how the Balkan Wars were a prelude to the Great War. Shows the change which took place in French foreign policy after 1912, - how Poincaré and his group, while perhaps not wanting war, were resolved on a firmer policy.

Pressensé, Francis de,
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The Contemporary Review, vol. LXXV, February, 1899.

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The Nineteenth Century, vol. XLIII, April, 1898.

Pressensé, Francis de,
France, Morocco, and Europe.
The Contemporary Review, vol. XCII, December, 1907.

Pressensé, Francis de,
The Fall of M. Delcassé.
The Nineteenth Century, vol. LVIII, July, 1905.

An attempt to show that the French Government in letting Delcassé go was not yielding to the threats of Germany, nor abandoning the entente with England, but rather, that Delcassé fell through his own mistaken policies.

Quorem Pars Fui,
The Balance of Power.
The Contemporary Review, vol. LXXIII, April, 1898.

Renouvin, Pierre,
How the War Came.
Foreign Affairs, vol. VII, No. 3, April, 1929.

A careful review of Fay's "The Origins of the World War", by the leading French student of the War. Criticizes Professor Fay for leaning in favour of Germany and for loading a preponderance of responsibility upon the Russian government.

Schmitt, B.E.,
France and the Outbreak of the World War.
Foreign Affairs, vol. 15, No. 3, April, 1937.

A review of volume XI of Documents Diplomatiques Français which contains the French documents for the events of the crisis of 1914 after July 24.

The reviewer reveals how in comparison with these documents the French Yellow Book of 1914 was falsified.

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