WATERFRONT DEVELOPMENT IN THE POST-INDUSTRIAL CITY: A PROFILE

By

STEPHEN NENAD MIKICICH

B.A., The University of British Columbia, 1985

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS (PLANNING)

in

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
(School of Community and Regional Planning)

We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

September 1990

© Stephen Nenad Mikicich, 1990
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

School

Department of Community & Regional Planning

The University of British Columbia
Vancouver, Canada

Date 11 October 1990
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the significance of waterfront redevelopment in the post-industrial city. The context for this analysis is the advent of post-industrial society - as evidenced by the economic, social and physical restructuring of cities. My objectives in undertaking this research are to gain a better understanding of planning issues in waterfront redevelopment; to examine the use of waterfront redevelopment as a policy tool for achieving community objectives; and to ascertain the broader implications of waterfront redevelopment in post-industrial society.

My research is based on an extensive literature review, several interviews, and more in-depth study of selected waterfront projects. The significance of urban waterfront redevelopment is studied from three different perspectives: (i) the physical restructuring of cities in the post-industrial period; (ii) the experiences of various waterfront communities; and (iii) the case study of New Westminster, British Columbia.

Waterfront redevelopment is significant in the post-industrial city as a public policy tool for achieving broader social and economic development objectives. Through the redevelopment of their waterfronts, communities have an opportunity to redress a range of social and economic issues. The social development potential is seldom realized, however, because redevelopment is primarily commercially-motivated.
In theory, the urban waterfront has been reclaimed for all residents of the post-industrial city. The notion of public access and the creation of public amenities are fundamental principles of waterfront development. In practice, however, the benefits of a revitalized waterfront are not shared equally. As the waterfront profiles demonstrate, the nature of the waterfront land-use mix is generally biased towards high-end commercial development and luxury housing.

The nature and form of new waterfront developments raises questions about elitism and equity in the post-industrial city. If some level of economic integration is not achieved, the waterfront will not have been reclaimed for all residents of the post-industrial city, but, rather - for the post-industrial urban élite.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .......................................................... ii
CONTENTS .............................................................. iv
LIST OF TABLES ...................................................... vi
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................... vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................. viii

INTRODUCTION ......................................................... 1

1.0 THE POST-INDUSTRIAL CITY ........................................ 6
  1.1 The New Urban Economy ........................................ 7
  1.2 Urban Social Structure ........................................ 11
  1.3 Livability: Reform Ideology to Economic Development Strategy ........................................ 16
  1.4 The Built Environment ........................................ 23

2.0 THE REDEVELOPMENT OF URBAN WATERFRONTS .................... 30
  2.1 The Evolution of the North American Urban Waterfront ........................................ 32
  2.2 Waterfront Development as a Catalyst for Economic Development ........................................ 36

3.0 WATERFRONT PROFILES .......................................... 43
  3.1 "Battery Park City," New York City ................................ 45
  3.2 Docklands Redevelopment, London, England .................. 61
  3.3 Central Waterfront & Railway Lands, Toronto .................. 75
  3.4 Smaller Waterfront Communities ................................ 91
4.0 CASE STUDY: HISTORICAL AND POLICY BACKGROUND
   4.1 Description .................................................. 99
   4.2 Historical and Policy Background ......................... 101
   4.3 Renaissance of the Royal City ............................ 107
   4.4 Summary .................................................... 117

5.0 CASE STUDY: NEW WESTMINSTER'S DOWNTOWN REVITALIZATION STRATEGY
   5.1 New Westminster's Downtown Revitalization Strategy (1977) ........................................ 119
   5.2 The Community Plan for Downtown New Westminster .................................................. 121
   5.3 An Improved Development Approval Process .......... 124
   5.4 First Capital City Development Company ............. 126
   5.5 Elements of the Revitalization Strategy .............. 134
     5.5.1 Institutional Anchors ................................. 135
     5.5.2 The Revitalized Waterfront ......................... 136
     5.5.3 Columbia Street Upgrading .......................... 138
   5.6 Summary .................................................... 141

6.0 CASE STUDY: AN EVALUATION OF "WESTMINSTER QUAY"
   6.1 Overview of Development ................................. 142
   6.2 The Image of the New Waterfront ....................... 145
   6.3 The Waterfront Catalyst ................................ 147
   6.4 A Comparison with Other Waterfront Projects ....... 149
   6.5 Negative Impacts of Waterfront Revitalization ..... 153
   6.6 Summary .................................................... 155

7.0 CONCLUSIONS .................................................. 156

BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................... 159
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Post-Industrial Forces Favouring the Redevelopment of Urban Industrial waterfronts</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Post-Industrial Forces Favouring Particular Attributes of New Waterfronts</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Common Objectives of Waterfront Redevelopment</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Characteristics of Waterfront Projects</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Characteristics of Waterfront Development in Smaller Communities</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>A Ranking of the &quot;Catalysts&quot;</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIGURE</td>
<td>DESCRIPTION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 -</td>
<td>Site Map of Battery Park City .................. 46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 -</td>
<td>World Financial Center at Battery Park City .. 53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 -</td>
<td>&quot;The Urban Room&quot; - public art, Battery Park City .................. 56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 -</td>
<td>Waterfront Esplanade, Battery Park City ...... 56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5 -</td>
<td>View of Canary Wharf ............................ 72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6 -</td>
<td>Site Map of Harbourfront .......................... 82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7 -</td>
<td>Corrigan, The Toronto Star, 19 June 1990 ..... 84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8 -</td>
<td>Historic Cannery Buildings, Steveston, B.C. ... 94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.9 -</td>
<td>&quot;Main Street&quot; Revitalization, Cobourg, Ont. .. 95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 -</td>
<td>New Westminster in the GVRD (Map) .............. 100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 -</td>
<td>Map of Downtown New Westminster ............... 100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3 -</td>
<td>Downtown Plan Boundaries .......................... 114</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4 -</td>
<td>Proposed Development Contract and Approval Process .................. 116</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1 -</td>
<td>The Inn at Westminster Quay ....................... 147</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis is dedicated to my parents - Peter and Nada Mikicich. The completion of this work is a testament to their undying love and support during seemingly endless months of research, writing and editing. For this, I am grateful.

I would like to thank Professor Brahm Wiesman for his kindness, patience and wisdom in supervising my thesis research. His enthusiastic support provided a much-needed source of encouragement. I would also like to thank Dr. David Ley for his valuable input in the early stages of research, and for serving as a second reader on my oral examination committee.

Finally, I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation for providing me with financial assistance during the 1988-1989 academic year.
The dawning of the post-industrial age has been marked by an economic, social and physical restructuring of the industrial city. For planners and policy-makers, this has brought about new development opportunities in the core areas of cities. In particular, the confluence of changing technologies, socioeconomic shifts, and public policy decisions since the mid-1960's, has made large tracts of waterfront land available for redevelopment. This has presented planners in many communities with an opportunity to reclaim the urban waterfront for public use, to introduce a new set of urban land-uses, and to guide the revitalization of blighted areas adjacent to the waterfront.

While some amount of waterfront redevelopment is ubiquitous across North America, and is well-advanced in many communities - there has been little academic inquiry into the significance of waterfront redevelopment in the post-industrial city. A work such as this is timely because it draws attention to the post-industrial waterfront, evaluates the significance of redevelopment activity, and, hopefully, generates interest in further study.

My objectives in undertaking this research are: to gain a better understanding of the planning issues involved in waterfront redevelopment; to measure the significance of the waterfront in the context of urban restructuring; to examine the use of waterfront redevelopment as a policy tool for achieving community objectives;
and to ascertain the broader implications of waterfront redevelopment in post-industrial society.

My research is based on a literature review on: (1) the post-industrial city, and (2) the general phenomenon of urban waterfront development. This has been supplemented by more in-depth study of selected waterfront projects, and interviews with planners and other professionals. My findings are presented in three sections: a general discussion on the post-industrial waterfront, profiles of selected waterfront projects, and a detailed case study of waterfront development in New Westminster, British Columbia.

It is anticipated that a case study of the New Westminster experience will identify the common issues that are dealt with by all waterfront planners, regardless of location. The case study will also demonstrate the use of waterfront development as a policy instrument in achieving broader public objectives. Redevelopment of the New Westminster waterfront is an ideal case study because it was envisioned as one of several catalysts for revitalizing the city's blighted downtown area, and transforming it into a "Regional Town Centre."\(^1\)

In Chapter One, the theory of post-industrial society, as advanced by Bell (1973), Perloff (1980), Ley (1980), Noyelle (1986), and others provides the appropriate context in which to analyze the

\(^1\)The Greater Vancouver Regional District's (GVRD's) Livable Region Plan (1975) called for the development of Regional Town Centres, or "downtowns," in suburban municipalities. The intent of the Plan was to channel population and employment growth into designated Town Centres, to promote a balance of jobs to population in each part of the region.
redevelopment of urban waterfronts. The transition from industrial to post-industrial society is essentially an urban phenomenon. The physical manifestations of structural change are evident in the built-form of the post-industrial city - and, in particular, in the physical characteristics of the waterfront.

The post-industrial city is characterized by a service-based economy, an occupational structure that favours professional and highly-skilled occupations, a new urban élite, a restructuring of the traditional land-use pattern, and a new ideology of livability. The political response to the rapid social and economic changes of the 1960's and early 1970's was the development of a "Livable City." Livability, in the political sense, means the implementation of policies to preserve and enhance desirable aspects of city life - such as the preservation of environmental quality and economic viability, and the enhancement of lifestyle.

Today, the notion of livability is a pervasive aspect of planning initiatives for the waterfront. This is evident in the requirements for public access to the waterfront, and the development of public amenities in the core areas of cities. The emphasis, however, is not so much on quality of life as it is on economic development. If cities are to survive in the post-industrial period, they must become more attractive to skilled workers, potential investors and new economic activities. In order to do this, cities are capitalizing on the amenity value of their waterfronts through significant public investment in new amenities,
infrastructure, and other catalysts for stimulating private investment.

Chapter Two addresses the general phenomenon of waterfront redevelopment. It begins with a discussion on the historic role of urban waterfronts, and their continuous adaptation to meet the contemporary needs of urban society. The discussion focuses on the use of waterfront redevelopment as an economic development tool, and poses the following questions: How can cities of different size, and with different social and economic circumstances, capitalize on a revitalized waterfront? What is the motivation behind waterfront development projects in various-sized communities? Who ultimately benefits from waterfront revitalization, and at what social cost?

These questions are addressed in Chapter Three, through profiles of selected waterfront projects in several communities. These include New York's "Battery Park City," London's "Docklands" developments, Toronto's "Harbourfront" and "Railway Lands," and a composite profile of smaller waterfront communities in Canada and the United States. Inherent in this profile method is a comparative analysis based on community size and location.

The intent in this chapter is to develop an analytical framework for understanding the broader implications of waterfront redevelopment. By developing an understanding of common planning issues, opportunities and constraints for waterfront development, and by recognizing the unique circumstances of different communities, I will be able to judge the wisdom of planning decisions made at New Westminster.
The next three chapters are dedicated to a case study of waterfront development at "Westminster Quay." Chapter Four provides a brief history of the city of New Westminster, and outlines municipal and senior government policies that have impacted on the city's downtown and waterfront areas. It concludes with a discussion on the role of a revitalized waterfront in the renaissance of New Westminster. Chapter Five outlines the revitalization strategy for downtown New Westminster, and evaluates the significance of its various elements. The focus is on the redeveloped waterfront and the catalytic role it was to play in the revitalization program. In Chapter Six, "Westminster Quay" is evaluated in light of existing development opportunities, and the expectations of planners, politicians and the public. Particular emphasis is placed on the waterfront's new image, and its effectiveness as an economic development tool.

My conclusions about waterfront development and the catalytic role of waterfront projects are presented in Chapter Seven. Two underlying themes are the notion of communities in "transition," and the question of equity in the post-industrial city.
1.0 THE POST-INDUSTRIAL CITY

In a paper entitled "Liberal Ideology and the Post-Industrial City," David Ley (1980) advances the post-industrial thesis in his examination of the Livable City ideology - which emerged in Vancouver in the late 1960's. Ley argues that "an understanding of the emerging urban landscape requires a prior grasp of wide-ranging processes of change in society itself."¹ This idea is echoed in the writings of Hardwick (1974), Mills (1986), Law (1988) and Tweedale (1988). Following this premise - the theory of post-industrial society is presented, in this chapter, as an appropriate context for the analysis of the redevelopment of urban waterfronts. The discussion will focus on the characteristics of a post-industrial city, the expression of post-industrial values in the built-form of the city, and the policy implications of the shift to a service-based economy.

Harvey S. Perloff (1980) states that the advent of the "services age" has placed cities and metropolitan regions in the forefront of a major national transformation.² For planners and policy-makers, the challenge in guiding the transformation of urban society is to anticipate and interpret structural change, and to respond with appropriate policy initiatives for restructuring the local economy, and accommodating new lifestyle and land-use


opportunities. The complexity of these tasks is apparent in the magnitude of the changes that are occurring. As Perloff argues, capturing the essence of a societal transformation in a label is not easy nor, in fact, is it a simple task to distinguish the essence from the derived characteristics. This phenomenon involves the way people make a living and use technology, the way they live and relate to each other and - even more important for cities - where they live and work.³

1.1 The New Urban Economy

The term "post-industrial" was coined by Daniel Bell in 1959, in a series of seminars on sectoral change. According to Bell, a post-industrial society is based on services. Hence, it is a game between persons. What counts is not raw muscle power, or energy, but information. The central person is the professional, for he is equipped, by his education and training, to provide the kinds of skill which are increasingly demanded in the post-industrial society. If an industrial society is defined by the quantity of goods as marking a standard of living, the post-industrial society is defined by the quality of life as measured by the services and amenities - health, education, recreation, and the arts - which are now deemed desirable and possible for everyone.⁴

The emergence of a post-industrial society does not signify a decline in industry in terms of output or value-added. However, it does point to a major transformation of the occupational structure. The introduction of new technologies to primary industries, such as agriculture and resource extraction, has made these activities less dependent on labour inputs. As Walter Hardwick (1984) argues, "the agriculture and extractive sectors have benefited tremendously from

³Harvey S. Perloff, 1980, p.15.
the substitution of technology for labour and posted productivity gains exceeding most industrial and service sectors." Similarly, technological advancement in manufacturing, transportation and shipping has led to a revolution in the way that goods are produced and distributed. As Thierry Noyelle (1986) suggests,

the metaphor for the transformation under way is what is happening in, say, automobile manufacturing. Instead of putting large numbers of blue-collar workers on assembly lines or in the shops of part suppliers, we are now replacing them with robots, leading in turn to increasing demand for engineers employed in product design and development, for systems analysts and programmers to develop software to run computer-aided manufacturing technologies, or for technicians and other skilled workers to program and manage the robots."

The extractive and manufacturing sectors have been declining in relative importance, in terms of employment, since the early part of the 20th century. In contrast, service-based industries have grown steadily as major sources of new employment. In 1911, the ratio of production to service employment in British Columbia was 73 percent to 27 percent. By 1941, the ratio was 58/42 and, by 1981, it fell to 31/69. Though the numbers vary between regions, the statistics for British Columbia are representative of Canada as a whole. In the United States, over 70 percent of nonagricultural jobs were

---


(Source: Statistics Canada, Census of Canada, 1911, 1941, 1981)
service-related by 1977, while less than 30 percent were goods-related - a reversal of the ratios in 1900.

Noyelle argues that the economic transformation of industrial society has been brought about by underlying structural changes - such as the rise of services, the advent of new technology, the emerging role of small firms, and the internationalization of the new economy. According to Noyelle, the rise of services reflects a "dual transformation" in what the economy produces and how it produces:

In terms of what the economy produces - that is, in terms of final output - there has been increasing demand for final services by consumers throughout the postwar period - principally in areas of education, health, and public services. This has been the result of the relative drop in price of manufactured goods, the growing wealth of the nation, and, hence, increasing discretionary spending for things that earlier may not have been considered part of the necessities of life.

...In terms of how the economy produces, the advent of services represents a fundamental transformation in the way final outputs - both goods and services - are produced. As such, it is marked by the formidable growth of intermediate service inputs that are purchased by firms at intermediate stages of production. These ...include transportation, communication, wholesaling, finance, as well as professional services such as accounting, legal counselling, management consulting, or even advertising.

Noyelle points to the emergence of small firms as a major source of new employment in the post-industrial period. Whereas the previous economic era is characterized by the large firm, mass production and vertical integration - the new era is becoming known


*Thierry Noyelle, November 1986, 10-11.
for specialization and flexible production (i.e., vertical disintegration). "Under vertical disintegration, firms tend to specialize in types and classes of production, rather than in the production of large quantities of specific outputs as in mass production."\textsuperscript{10}

Within the large firm, the majority of business transactions for intermediate goods and services take place internally - with few economic spinoffs for other businesses. The vertical disintegration of firms has led to the development of agglomeration economies.\textsuperscript{11} The more market-interdependent firms are becoming, the greater their need for proximity to one another. A case in point is the clustering of motion picture support services - e.g., talent agencies, recording studios, modeling and film schools, and post-production facilities - in Vancouver's Yaletown district.

Another characteristic of the new economy is its "footlooseness." Industries are becoming more international in character but, as Noyelle argues - the relocation of economic activity is not only guided by a search for lower operating costs, but also for a skilled labour force.\textsuperscript{12} Using the example of the motion picture industry - American production companies came to British Columbia, in the early 1980's, to take advantage of a favourable monetary exchange rate. Since that time, British

\textsuperscript{10}Thierry Noyelle, November 1986, 13.

\textsuperscript{11}"Agglomeration economies" are a geographic clustering of interdependent business establishments.

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid., November 1986, 13.
Columbia has developed a reputation for artistic talent, highly-skilled technicians, scenic locations, and excellent production facilities. Today, there are numerous motion picture support services located throughout the province. And, in addition to foreign film productions, British Columbia has been able to develop an indigenous film industry, based in the Lower Mainland.

1.2 Urban Social Structure

The introduction of new technologies and their impact on the occupational structure have brought about several socio-cultural changes. The first, and perhaps most obvious, is the growth of higher education. Limited opportunities for manual and unskilled labour, and a corresponding increase in the demand for skilled technicians and professionals has led to a general upskilling of the workforce.

Education and skill development are considered prerequisites for an economic livelihood in post-industrial society. However, access to higher education has traditionally been limited to households with sufficient financial means. If the children of modest-income families are not provided with adequate financial assistance to cover the costs of education, they may be denied the requisite skills to compete in the post-industrial job market.

For those people already in the workforce - employed as manual or unskilled workers - further education and job training will be required if they are to remain competitive. However, as Noyelle argues, studies in the United States have shown that, for many older
employees, the transition to a post-industrial service job is not an easy one:

Among older workers, retraining seems largely unsuccessful partly because of a lack of educational preparation - most older workers did not even graduate from high school - and partly for cultural reasons - the world of white-collar work is, culturally speaking, a world apart from that which they have known all their lives. Early retirement may often be the least painful way of dealing with many of them.¹²

These socio-economic trends are also reflected in Canadian immigration policies which are now biased in favour of highly-skilled or professional occupations, and wealthy entrepreneurs.¹³ There is no longer a demand for farmers and manual or unskilled labourers. Today, there is growing resentment against newcomers who possess the education, skills or financial means that are required in a post-industrial society - the attributes that many Canadians may be lacking.

While there has always been inequality in Canadian society, the dawning of a new economic era has exacerbated class distinctions, and has given rise to a new urban élite, dominated by highly-educated professionals. As David Ley points out, there is an important corollary to the numerical increase of senior white collar employees and professionals. These occupations enjoy the highest social prestige, whether the assessment is derived from the indicators of income and education or from perceived job rankings held by the public at large. …We might expect, therefore, that these professional occupations will contain a

¹²Thierry Noyelle, November 1986, 17.

¹³Based on Employment and Immigration Canada's point system for immigration application under the "Independent" category.
disproportionate share of a postindustrial state's
tastemakers and opinion leaders.\footnote{David Ley, 1980, 241.}

The ascendancy of a new urban élite is evidenced by the economic and political clout of the young urban professional - better known by the popular acronym, "yuppy." Post-industrial urban culture is essentially a yuppy culture or, as David Ley terms, a "culture of consumption."\footnote{Class Notes, \textit{Geography 457}, University of British Columbia, Spring 1985.} As a group, yuppies place considerable importance on self-fulfillment, socio-economic status, and lifestyle opportunities.

With a secure economic base, they represent the present day counterparts of Veblen's leisure class, displaying the canons of good taste, intent upon the aesthetic. Their lifestyle is commonly consumption and status oriented in the pursuit of self-actualization, while their prestige is considerable and in many ways they are national opinion leaders. They are sensitive to amenity and social cachet in the places they adopt; an industrial landscape is anathema to them.\footnote{David Ley, 1980, 243.}

Yuppies represent a powerful segment of the "baby boom" generation. Having grown up in a period of sustained economic growth and relative prosperity, they have had the advantages of higher education and new employment opportunities in professional, managerial, technical, and other service occupations. Given the economic clout of this segment of the population - it is not surprising that the yuppy lifestyle has had a considerable impact on the social and physical make-up of the post-industrial city.
By comparison, earlier generations were deprived of higher education and economic opportunity as a consequence of war and depression. Later generations, on the other hand, are facing an uncertain future in an increasingly competitive society. Higher education has become a basic necessity but it provides no guarantees of employment.

Other demographic factors have also played a role in shaping the post-industrial city. These include an aging population, a higher incidence of single-parent families, postponement of marriage and child-bearing among young adults, and the emergence of alternative lifestyles - all of which have contributed to a growing number of smaller households. Coupled with the consumption-oriented post-industrial lifestyle, these demographic trends have generated new demand for alternative housing forms such as apartments and townhomes.

Changes in the urban social structure are evident in cities across Canada, but - as Barton Reid (1988) points out - the social and economic forces that are shaping Canadian cities vary in nature, impact and magnitude, from one city to the next. Reid argues that the evolution of the new middle class is not automatic but (is) bound up in the particular time and place articulation of economic, social and political forces. ...When we talk about the new middle class we are talking about a complex social phenomena which does not therefore produce the same effects in every city.18

18Barton Reid, "The Story of a New Middle Class: The Birth and Evolution of a New Urban Middle Class in Canada," City Magazine, 10:1 (Spring 1988), 33.
The transition to a post-industrial city appears to be most advanced in Toronto and Vancouver - where the urban reform movement gained political control in the early 1970's. It is in these two cities that a powerful office economy has created a heated market for inner-city real estate. And, as a consequence of gentrification and redevelopment in inner-city neighbourhoods - there has been considerable displacement of lower-income households through a depletion of the existing stock of affordable housing.\textsuperscript{19}

Social and economic disparity in post-industrial society is perhaps most evident in the urban housing markets. In many Canadian cities - and, in particular, in the growth centres of Toronto and Vancouver - housing affordability has become a major issue facing planners and policy-makers. Of particular concern is the weakening of affordability for tenant households and first-time home buyers.\textsuperscript{20}

In general, there has been a lowering of expectations with respect to size, quality and location of housing units. Because of affordability problems, many potential first-time buyers are remaining in the rental market for an indefinite period of time - contributing to lower vacancy rates and upward pressure on rents.

\textsuperscript{19} Barton Reid, Spring 1988, 33-34.

\textsuperscript{20} "First-time buyers" are a household group in which the household maintainer is aged 25-34 years. They are regarded by the housing industry as a group of "temporary renters" who will eventually enter the home-ownership market through the purchase of a starter home (source: CMHC, \textit{Vancouver CMA Affordability Study}, December 1989).
1.3 Livability: Reform Ideology to Economic Development Strategy

The advent of post-industrial society marks a break with the past, in political as well as social and economic terms. The urban reform movement of the late 1960's and early 1970's was a reaction against decades of growth-oriented municipal policies that favoured business interests over those of inner-city residents. It raised public awareness about the physical environment of cities and the quality of urban life. And, it challenged the post-war emphasis on low-density suburban expansion, the massive redevelopment of city centres, and the proliferation of freeway proposals.

It was during this period that the central city was rediscovered as a potentially dynamic living environment. What reformers saw as valuable in the older neighbourhoods was a diversity of people, lifestyles and land-uses, and a true sense of place. The central city provided greater opportunities for interpersonal contact and a variety of urban cultural experiences.

The urban reform movement coincided with the enunciation of a "new liberalism" in Canada, and the emergence of a new urban elite. The underlying theme or ideology behind the movement was an emphasis on livability. As David Ley (1980) argues,

the emergence of a new professional, technical, and administrative élite has given expression to a heightened lifestyle of consumption, and a concern with the aesthetic and the realms of human sensibility. A set of values aspiring to a higher quality of life, a livable city, could not help but breed skepticism of traditional growth

---

22David Ley, 1980, 238.
boosterism, regarding it at best as banal, at worst as destructive.⁴²

In the city of Vancouver, the notion of a livable city found political expression through the establishment of a reform-minded political party - The Electors' Action Movement (TEAM) in 1968. In control of City Council from 1972 to 1976, TEAM's primary objective was to develop a more humane and aesthetic city, with particular emphasis on the downtown core and inner-city neighbourhoods.⁴³ Some of TEAM's major initiatives include the development of a downtown pedestrian-transit mall along Granville Street, the preservation and beautification of Gastown, the restoration and adaptive re-use of the Orpheum Theatre and the old courthouse, the "downzoning" of residential areas to stop high-rise development, the implementation of a tree-planting and landscaping program, the addition of new park space, and improved public access to the waterfront.

In short, public spaces were protected, animated and humanized; a more vital and even festive ambience was sought and to some extent achieved, most notable in a series of successful annual spring and summer festivals in the parks, beaches, and bays around (the) central city, whose sponsors included the city's social planning department. ...The quality of urban experience, the satisfaction of the 'higher needs' of human sensibility, became a daily preoccupation of city hall.⁴⁴

In the late 1960's, the pending expiration of many industrial leases pointed to the eventual redevelopment of the False Creek

⁴²David Ley, 1980, 247.
⁴³Ibid., 1980, 251.
⁴⁴Ibid., 1980, 251.
basin. While the NPA\textsuperscript{26} council pushed for continued industrial development, TEAM's development policy (1968) suggested an innovative mix of residential, commercial, recreational and compatible industrial uses. Through redevelopment, False Creek would become a microcosm of the livable city.\textsuperscript{26}

In designing the new False Creek community - architects, planners and politicians attempted to create diversity and vitality through innovative physical design, and a policy of social mix. It was believed that an appropriate mix of residents of varying age, ethnicity, lifestyle and income would contribute to a livable community:

Communities which offer little social and physical diversity are unhealthy. People living in them have limited access to the wide range of values, habits and beliefs which are the essential ingredients of urban living.\textsuperscript{27}

However, despite its emphasis on neighbourhood preservation, public amenities and social mix - the livable city ideology, as manifested in the development of False Creek, proved to be short-sighted and somewhat elitist. While False Creek was intended to house a diverse community of people, the unintended impacts of redevelopment have included the loss of affordable housing and the displacement of lower-income households in the adjacent

\textsuperscript{26}The Non-Partisan Association (NPA) is a civic political party with traditional ties to the business community.

\textsuperscript{26}David Ley, 1980, 253-254.

neighbourhood of Fairview Slopes. Caroline A. Mills (1986) argues that the transformation of Fairview Slopes is inextricably linked to the "changing positive and negative 'externalities' offered by the south shore of the Creek."  

Physical changes in Fairview Slopes have been accompanied by a major turnover in the population and a displacement of lower income groups. ...A study of revitalization in Vancouver between 1971 and 1981, based on occupation and education measures, shows that the tract encompassing False Creek and Fairview Slopes experienced the greatest increase in social status. 

...A shift in population characteristics ...between 1971 and 1981 is exemplified by the increase in the proportions with senior white-collar occupations. ...This profile fits the common image of gentrification as a process of class succession. 

The False Creek example demonstrates that the more livable a place is - the more people will want to live there. And, unless there is sufficient public control over the local housing market - increased consumer demand will bring about higher prices for land and housing, and will lead to further displacement of vulnerable household groups - which include young, elderly and disabled people, and a growing number of single-parent families. The erosion of social mix in gentrified neighbourhoods has resulted in greater homogeneity and, arguably - an erosion of livability. As David Ley argues, 

a livable city ideology and an ideology of equity are only coincidental in special cases where economic strength is assured, public intervention is active, and private interests are constrained. 

---

market conditions an urban strategy favouring a high level of consumption with style will only serve to attract the wealthy and penalize social groups with limited market power.30

In terms of public policy, "livability" is more than a quality of life issue; it also has significant consequences for urban economies. The enhancement of lifestyle opportunities through the development of public amenities has enabled cities to remain competitive in a post-industrial economy. By adopting an amenities strategy for economic development, cities are hoping to attract new service industries, build a "replacement" economy, and resurrect a positive public image.

The transition from industrial to post-industrial has not been an easy one; and, for many communities, the loss of a resource or manufacturing base has brought about economic and physical decline. In guiding the economic restructuring of cities, planners and policy-makers have had to undertake new and innovative development strategies. These include: the provision of economic and tax incentives for newly-locating firms, community image-building and promotion, public investment in education, amenities and "soft" infrastructure, and the formation of partnerships with the private and non-profit sectors to realize development objectives.

In most cases, building a post-industrial service economy has necessitated a major program of physical and economic revitalization. Physical improvements include civic beautification programs, heritage conservation, urban redevelopment and

infrastructure repair. And, in addition to financial incentives, economic revitalization has focussed on aggressive marketing and promotional campaigns.

The new economic era is characterized by vertical disintegration: the increasing importance of small firms, the rise of professional and skilled service occupations, and the footloose nature of capital. For many cities, it is the mobility of capital that has led to the relocation of industry and disinvestment in the local economy. For other cities, however, the mobility of capital has been viewed as an economic development opportunity. Because a growing number of economic activities are no longer tied to a particular geographic location, capital investment will flow to those communities that offer the best combination of economic, cultural, environmental, and other incentives. McNulty et al (1985) suggest that

today, to a much greater extent than in the past, jobs can follow people rather than the reverse. In the most rapidly growing sectors, in fact, the critical inputs are human intelligence and skill in the form of technical innovators and entrepreneurs. As a result, businesses are more likely to locate where these people want to live. The changes in the nation's economy, therefore, have made it much more important that cities link economic development and quality of life.\(^1\)

The rationale behind an amenities strategy for economic development is that livable places are more likely to attract a skilled workforce. And, following this argument - an available

talent pool will help to stimulate capital investment. While economic conditions may vary between different communities, and while the definition of "livability" may also vary - there is evidence that cities across North America have recognized the economic potential of amenities as part of a comprehensive development strategy.

From 1980 to 1984, Partners for Livable Places directed a program called "Economics of Amenity." The central purpose of this demonstration program was to evaluate the contributions that urban amenities can make to the vitality of a community. Urban amenities were defined as including such things as cultural facilities, urban parks and open spaces, natural and scenic resources, well-designed buildings, restored historic areas, and healthy civic institutions. Economic development programs in about forty different communities were studied. All of the case studies, with the exception of Vancouver, British Columbia, were drawn from the United States. Selected cities were seen as being "in transition" - i.e., faced with changes in their local economies, brought on by social trends and structural changes at the national level.

Partners for Livable Places discovered that cities of different size, type and location had embarked on ambitious economic development programs. Although the cities investigated varied in terms of demographic, social, economic and other characteristics - they shared a desire for economic growth that maintains and improves the quality of life for city residents; and, accordingly - urban

---

amenities played a central role in their overall development strategies.\textsuperscript{33}

1.4 The Built Environment

The transition to a service-based urban economy is evident in the built environment of the post-industrial city. The emerging social order and value set of post-industrial society are expressed through architectural design and a succession of urban land-uses.

In terms of the evolving land-use pattern, the most significant elements are the development of high-rise office buildings in the central business district, the suburbanization of industry and transportation facilities, the rezoning and redevelopment of former industrial lands, the introduction of new housing types, and the development of public amenities in the urban core. More recent trends include residential land-use intensification and the advent of mixed-use developments.

The forces that have brought about these land-use changes vary in nature and magnitude, from one city to the next - but changes in urban land-use are dependent on a city's political climate and the structure of the local economy. In Vancouver, the redevelopment of False Creek - from a polluted industrial enclave to an attractive mixed-use development - is perhaps the most dramatic example of the evolving post-industrial landscape.

Inherent in the built form of the post-industrial city are the

values of a "new middle class." Barton Reid (1988) points to the emergence of an office and professional class during the post-war economic expansion of the 1950's. However, it was not until the 1960's, with the rise of the counter culture, that the new middle class developed a cultural identity.

The counter culture produced a profound change in this formerly quiescent class, creating an unprecedented space and time reorientation of middle class values. The valuation of social and physical space was inverted. The inner city now became the promised land while the suburbs became places of exile, a place for the uncouth, and ill-cultured. Likewise, the same reverse polarization affected the social space of the city. Bohemian culture lost its marginality - integrated into the mainstream it became the basis for marketing lifestyles.

...Not only were middle class attitudes to physical and social space turned around, so too was their orientation to time. While the 50's and 60's were oriented primarily toward the future, the counter culture rebelled against these ideas. People started once more to appreciate the past. ...This consciousness of the past led to radical re-articulation of attitudes which eventually formed the basis for a new urban culture of the middle classes we now know as Post-modernism.

The Livable City ideology is rooted in the ideas advanced by the counter culture. The cultural imprint of the new middle class is evident in the return to an inner-city lifestyle, the emergence of new multi-family housing types, the new-found respect for heritage resources, and concern for the natural environment.

The motivation behind the urban reform movement was the preservation and enhancement of lifestyle opportunities in the inner-city. This brought about a major rethinking of federal urban

---

*Barton Reid, Spring 1988, 31.
policy - which, to this point, had been based on a philosophy of urban renewal. Federal policy for the inner-city, in the early 1970's, had three primary objectives: livability, affordability, and the efficient use of public services. Through the Residential Rehabilitation Assistance Program (RRAP) and the Neighbourhood Improvement Program (NIP), public funds were made available in Canada, for the physical upgrading of housing units and the enhancement of public property in designated inner-city neighbourhoods.

While public investment in the inner-city did enhance livability - it did so at the expense of affordability and efficiency objectives. Policies of neighbourhood preservation and amenity development have made inner-city neighbourhoods more livable and, hence, more desirable. Market forces have placed a high value on property in these neighbourhoods and - through a combination of gentrification and redevelopment - lower-income households have been displaced and excluded.

In recent years, planners and policy-makers have come to realize the shortcomings of the preservation approach and, in particular, the emphasis on lower densities. Livability remains a goal of planning initiatives for Canadian inner-cities; however, due to affordability considerations, and the demand for alternative housing forms - there is a growing acceptance of higher densities in the form of compatible infill development. As David Ley argues -

it is this impasse which has led to suggestions in the past few years for a new round of intensification in the inner city. However, if left to the private market, it is most likely (from past experience) that higher density redevelopment would seek out high amenity neighbourhoods, coinciding with those where gentrification has occurred and is occurring under the permitted uses of local area plans. Such intensification would be strongly resisted politically and could not expect support from ward politicians. Second, under market conditions, it is unlikely that the private sector would in any case be able to build affordable units on private land in the inner city. And, third, important gains in the creation of livable inner city environments would be severely compromised by a renewal of high density development.37

As Ley points out, residential land-use intensification does not, in itself, ensure affordability. This is especially true of infill developments in desirable residential areas, that are convenient to jobs, recreation and other amenities. There are, however, significant opportunities for housing and mixed-use development remaining in the inner-city areas of most Canadian cities. The relocation or phase-out of industry and transportation facilities, and the obsolescence of traditional port functions have made large tracts of inner-city real estate prime for redevelopment. In particular, there are various forces active in the post-industrial city that point to the redevelopment of urban industrial waterfronts. The following is a brief summary:

TABLE 1.1 - POST-INDUSTRIAL FORCES FAVOURING THE REDEVELOPMENT OF URBAN INDUSTRIAL WATERFRONTS

1. Obsolescence of traditional port facilities.
2. Suburbanization or phase-out of railways and industry.
3. Return to an inner-city lifestyle.
4. Environmental clean-up of urban waterways.
5. Public demands for an accessible waterfront and other urban amenities.
6. Objectives for improving the quality of urban life - i.e., creating a "livable city."
7. Demand for core-area housing.
8. Shortages of development sites elsewhere in the urban core.
9. Recognition of the waterfront's potential as an economic development tool.

In addition, there are other forces active in the post-industrial city that will influence the nature and form of new developments. These forces are largely the result of structural and demographic changes that have brought about new economic and lifestyle opportunities. Inherent in these changes are opposing forces related to economic viability and social equity. Table 1.2 provides a brief summary:
**TABLE 1.2 - POST-INDUSTRIAL FORCES FAVOURING PARTICULAR ATTRIBUTES OF NEW WATERFRONTS**

1. **Changes in the occupational structure**: Professional and skilled service occupations have displaced blue-collar jobs.

2. **An expanding service sector** - has generated new demand for office and retail space in the core area.

3. **Strong demand for core-area housing** - has placed upward pressure on house prices and rents, and has led to more "upscale" developments.

4. **Demographic changes** - favour smaller households and multi-family housing types.

5. **Proximity of waterfront development sites to the central business district and core-area amenities** - has made them ideal candidates for residential development.

6. **Culture of consumption**: More leisure time/higher disposable incomes have fueled a demand for urban amenities and experiential services.

7. **Economic significance of urban amenities**

8. **Livability objectives**

9. **Affordability objectives**
In the future, it would appear that a significant portion of new housing demand could be served through the redevelopment of traditionally non-residential lands. These development sites are somewhat of a "last frontier" for addressing the issue of affordable housing in the Canadian inner-city. Planners and policy-makers must be sensitive to the long-term housing situation in their communities and, if necessary, be willing to set aside some land for public housing.

In planning for the redevelopment of waterfront sites - planners and policy-makers are faced with competing visions as to how the post-industrial landscape should evolve. Given the demand for livability and affordability, the realities of the market place, and conflicting political viewpoints - the actual form of new urban development may be guided more by compromise or election results, than by a bold, creative vision. In the case of waterfront development, this is extremely unfortunate because the true social and economic potential of the waterfront may never be realized.
The relationship between a city and its waterfront is shaped over time by cultural, economic and political forces. This is a dynamic relationship in that the role of the urban waterfront is continually changing to meet the contemporary needs of urban society. In this, the post-industrial era, the urban waterfront is undergoing a major transformation - from a blighted industrial landscape to a compatible mix of new uses.

In a recent book about waterfront development in the United States, L. Azeo Torre (1989) argues that all development is cyclical in nature. He claims that the reclamation of urban waterfronts for non-industrial uses is another stage in the revitalization of the nation's downtowns - a process that began in earnest in the early 1970's. It is for this reason that the redevelopment of urban waterfronts cannot be viewed in isolation but, rather - as part of a broader restructuring of the post-industrial city.

To this perspective, I would add two other dimensions of waterfront change: the temporal and spatial. Since the urban waterfront is continually changing - there is, in most cities, a long history of redevelopment. As Desfor, Goldrick and Merrens (1988) argue, in their analysis of the Toronto waterfront - the current phase of redevelopment "represents only the most recent

manifestation of a constant and long-continued process of waterfront change."\(^2\)

In spatial terms, the urban waterfront is an integral part of the urban region in which it is located. Waterfront redevelopment cannot be understood in isolation from the city. Rather, "it can best be comprehended as a function of structural economic changes and processes at work in the larger metropolitan area."\(^3\)

To provide an appropriate temporal and spatial context for understanding changes on the urban waterfront, this chapter begins with an historical look at the evolution of the urban waterfront in North America, and the characteristic succession of land uses over time. This is followed by a discussion on the late 20th century phenomenon of urban waterfront redevelopment. Selected cities and projects will be profiled in the following chapter to identify the range of opportunities for waterfront redevelopment, to examine the motivation for development in various-sized communities, and to compare economic development strategies. While relevant aspects of the development process will be discussed - the focus of this research is on the use of waterfront revitalization as a social and


\(^3\) Ibid., 1988, p.94.
economic development tool, and not on the development process per se.  

2.1 The Evolution of the North American Urban Waterfront

Most of North America was settled during the industrial period, and, from the start - the urban waterfront was viewed as an economic development opportunity. Though the physical development of port cities differs between river, lake and coastal ports, the actual pattern of land-use succession and intensification has been quite similar.

The development of the urban-industrial waterfront in North America is perhaps typified by the Toronto experience. In Waterfront Precedents (1976), the City of Toronto's Central Waterfront Planning Committee employs a series of annotated sketches to depict the development of a typical North American port. ¹ What is clearly evident from these diagrams is the gradual alienation of the city and its inhabitants from the water's edge. The development and expansion of traditional port facilities, the encroachment of the railways, and the landfilling necessitated by both of these activities transformed the waterfronts of most cities into an industrial "no-man's land." Over time, public access to the waterfront became restricted and limited to port-related business.


² See: Central Waterfront Planning Committee, Waterfront Precedents, City of Toronto, 1976, pp.3-5.
Given the increasing dominance of port and railway operations over the entire waterfront area, higher-order commercial activities such as offices and retailing lost their economic viability. As these uses relocated, their sites were claimed by warehousing and other industrial and transportation activities. The industrial character of the North American urban waterfront was well entrenched by the early 1900's.

By the 1960's, however - significant advancements in transportation and port technologies dramatically altered the nature of the shipping industry. Port functions were affected by changes in the transportation system; and general cargo-handling innovations altered the physical and organizational aspects of ports.

Characterising the 1970's and 1980's has been the spectacular increase in the size and draught of ships, rendering many older ports unusable. During this period, furthermore, the methods of handling cargo have been drastically modified and new transportation concepts introduced. In particular, two interrelated concepts - containerization and intermodality - have greatly affected not only port operation and port structure, but also the traditional functions of ports.*

In spatial terms, the advent of containerized cargo and intermodal transportation has made traditional port facilities obsolete - both in terms of land-use and physical layout. Because of limited space for container storage, and traffic congestion in built-up areas, many traditional ports could not make the transition to a modern container port. As a consequence, there has been

substantial relocation of port facilities away from city centres. As Yehuda Hayuth (1988) argues,

the objective of intermodal transportation is to transfer goods in a continuous flow through the entire transport chain, from origin to final destination, in the most cost- and time-effective way. This is done by capitalizing on the relative advantages of a different transport mode for various segments of the cargo movement. Close co-operation and co-ordination among shipping lines, ports and all land-transportation modes are essential for effective multimodal transport operation.⁷

New port facilities require not only sufficient land area but, also, convenient access to regional transportation routes. This has given rise to suburban container ports and bulk-loading facilities in exurban locations. A case in point is the development of a huge container complex at Port Elizabeth, New Jersey - to replace the dilapidated finger-piers lining mid- and downtown Manhattan.

In river cities, port facilities have been relocated downstream of built-up areas - where sufficient port land could either be assembled, or created through reclamation. The relocation of port facilities from London's Docklands to the new terminal in Tilbury, and the seaward expansion of new terminals in the ports of Rotterdam and Antwerp are examples of major river-based ports that have adopted this strategy.⁸ In some coastal ports, additional back-up land has been created by reclaiming land from the sea. This has been done at various locations around the world - including Haifa, Israel; Kobe, Japan; and Seattle, Washington.

⁷Yehuda Hayuth, 1988, 53-54.

⁸Ibid., 1988, 55-56.
The economic viability of a port is directly related to the volume of cargo and commercial passengers that it can attract and accommodate. The relative advantage enjoyed by the port is also subject to change due to monetary exchange rates, trade and taxation policies, and a variety of other economic factors. If the port is able to remain competitive, shipping activity can be expected to increase, and port facilities will be expanded accordingly. If, on the other hand, the port loses its competitive advantage, declining cargo and passenger volumes will lead to disinvestment in the port area.

The economic dimension of port relocation was touched upon briefly in Chapter One - in the discussion on the post-industrial service economy and the emerging urban social structure. As a source of income-generation and employment opportunities, the port constitutes a major asset to the city and region in which it is located. Though it is beyond the scope of this thesis to measure the economic impact of a given port, it is important to note that there are both direct and indirect impacts in terms of employment and income generation. Jobs directly-related to the functioning of the port have been lost primarily through relocation and mechanization of port activities, and the changing competitive positions between ports.

Disinvestment in marginalized port areas is evidenced by physical and economic decline in areas adjacent to the waterfront. This is a scenario common to many waterfront cities - both large and small. However, the level of economic distress associated with port
decline has been more severe in smaller communities with a limited economic base. A case in point is the decline and eventual phase-out of port facilities in New Westminster, British Columbia - through the 1960's and 1970's. A weakening of the port's competitive position in the regional economy - due to limited opportunities for port expansion, and the development of modern facilities elsewhere in the Greater Vancouver region - was a contributing factor to economic decline in downtown New Westminster.

It is in smaller communities, such as New Westminster, that economic development strategies are being implemented to diversify the local economy, and to introduce new economic activities to replace those lost in declining sectors. However, while large metropolitan cities generally have a diverse economic base, and are somewhat more insulated from a severe economic downturn, their economies are also vulnerable to structural change. Therefore, all cities, regardless of size or location, must adapt to continuous social and economic change.

2.2 Waterfront Development as a Catalyst for Economic Development

The transition to a post-industrial service economy and the accompanying socio-economic shifts have brought renewed optimism for distressed waterfront communities. Planners and policy-makers have realized that the same forces that have brought about port decline and disinvestment can be harnessed to create a post-industrial replacement economy, and to revitalize both the waterfront and surrounding districts. As John Tunbridge (1988) argues,
the withdrawal of port functions provides an exceptional opportunity to restore the historic links between the populace and the waterfront, to reclaim a heritage resource, and to exploit a prime reserve of inner-city redevelopment land.\(^9\)

Over the past twenty years, waterfront redevelopment has emerged as "one of the mutually supportive strands of inner-city revitalization."\(^10\) And, given the traditional pattern of land-uses in the inner-city - waterfront development has been closely associated with the reclamation of railway lands, and the preservation of historic districts adjacent to the waterfront. The redevelopment of urban waterfronts has had far-reaching social and economic impacts beyond the immediate waterfront area.

The politicization of waterfront development projects is indicative of the waterfront's potential as a powerful economic development tool. Conflicts are inherent in the redevelopment process due to competition between various business and social interest groups, the vocal concerns of local area residents, and the involvement of various levels of government. All of the parties affected by redevelopment have a vested interest in what is eventually built on the waterfront.

Tunbridge has identified three primary sources of friction with respect to waterfront revitalization: conflicts between government agencies; social versus commercial motivation; and conservation


\(^10\)Ibid., 1988, p.68.
versus redevelopment.\textsuperscript{11} As will become evident in the waterfront profiles that follow - these are common areas of conflict, regardless of community size or location.

Redevelopment on the waterfront, and elsewhere in the inner-city, has been fueled by structural and demographic changes in urban society. But, as Tunbridge suggests - the "return to the waterfront" cannot be understood purely as a function of opportunity and latent demand. It has been facilitated, since the early 1970's - by international concern about the natural environment, and public commitment to a clean-up of urban waterways. Improvements have also been made with respect to atmospheric quality and the general urban environment - through pollution control measures, and the gradual replacement of "smokestack" industries by an expanding service sector. Service-based replacement economies have also generated demand for inner-city housing, commercial space, and public amenities - further stimulating clean-up and redevelopment of the waterfront.\textsuperscript{12}

Improvements to the waterfront environment have made redevelopment for other uses economically viable. Because of the improved image and desirability of waterfront sites, and the demographic characteristics of the post-industrial city, the urban waterfront has become a sought-after piece of downtown real estate. Today, there is evidence of considerable redevelopment activity on

\textsuperscript{11} John Tunbridge, 1988, p.67.

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 1988, pp.68-69.
waterfronts across North America. As Desfor, Goldrick and Merrens argue:

By the mid-1980's, some degree of redevelopment was ubiquitous on North American urban waterfronts, and the process was well-advanced in many of them. The popular media were full of news reports and feature stories about waterfront redevelopments in particular places, generally hailing them as renewal, revitalization, revival, or rejuvenation.¹³

The heightened profile of the urban waterfront is largely due to its high amenity value. Because a waterfront address now carries a certain level of prestige, there is considerable competition between potential land-users. A redeveloped waterfront will, by necessity, contain a mix of different land-uses. The nature of that mix will be determined by both the private land market and by public planning and development controls.

Private investment in waterfront development has generally followed on the heels of public investment in transportation and infrastructure, amenities, community image-building, and economic incentives for the development industry. Because of the high construction costs and financial risks associated with waterfront development - the public sector has had to "prime the pump" by creating a secure investment climate.

The common justification for public subsidization of private investment is that every dollar of public expenditure will generate a higher level of private investment. Iain Tweedale (1988) points to the "Atlantic Wharf" development in Cardiff, Wales - where a £9 million Urban Development Grant was made to a developer, whose cost

¹³Gene Desfor, Michael Goldrick and Roy Merrens, 1988, p.92.
estimates suggest a "respectable ratio of £4 of private money forthcoming for every £1 of public money." However, Tweedale suggests that the real level of public-sector investment is much greater than the Urban Development Grant - pointing to public investment in hard infrastructure, public amenities and other catalysts for development. As Tweedale argues, "a reassessment of the ratio of private to public money, taking these costings into account, shows that the private sector is investing only £1 for every £2 of public money."

The actual level of public investment in a waterfront redevelopment project will vary from one community and project to the next, as will the motivation behind redevelopment. In order to understand the real return on public investment, it is important to compare the planning objectives behind a given project with the actual results of redevelopment. The degree of fit between what is desired and what is achieved is a true measure of a project's success.

Given the economic constraints behind waterfront redevelopment, and the complex institutional framework governing the waterfront - it is not surprising that the public sector has played a major role in transforming the urban waterfront. That role has varied geographically, due to the involvement of different levels of

---


government, a multitude of public agencies, and the various public-private partnerships entered into by government. What is common to all publicly-sponsored waterfront developments, however, is the use of public development powers to achieve broader social and economic objectives. These include such things as business and tourism development, downtown revitalization, the provision of affordable housing opportunities, and job creation. Table 2.1 provides a summary of common planning objectives for waterfront redevelopment.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>COMMON OBJECTIVES OF WATERFRONT REDEVELOPMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>To exploit a prime reserve of inner-city redevelopment land.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>To restore the historic links between the populace and the waterfront.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>To enhance lifestyle opportunities through the development of public amenities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>To capitalize on the waterfront's amenity value in attracting private investment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>To revitalize the waterfront and adjacent commercial districts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>To create new opportunities for business development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>To satisfy the demand for core-area housing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>To maximize the return on public investment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>To address the issues of affordable and special-needs housing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>To improve the quality of the physical environment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
By comparing and contrasting the experiences of various waterfront communities, and by examining selected waterfront projects, I hope to establish a set of criteria for evaluating planning decisions made at "Westminster Quay." In this chapter, selected waterfront projects in several cities are profiled to illustrate how planners, policy-makers, and the private sector have responded to the development opportunities afforded by a waterfront location, and the challenges presented by redevelopment. The experiences of these communities in redeveloping their waterfronts are a valuable resource for other waterfront communities that are undergoing transition.

Given the limitations of a Master's thesis, the profile method has been selected as an efficient means of conveying both general information about waterfront development, and the particular set of circumstances surrounding selected projects. The first three profiles are of waterfront development projects in major metropolitan cities: New York, London and Toronto. The fourth profile is a composite view of smaller waterfront communities in Canada and the United States. A comparative analysis, based on community size and location, is inherent in this approach.

Through a literature review on waterfront development, I have assembled the following list of salient characteristics that distinguish waterfront projects. This provides a framework for analyzing various aspects of selected projects, and a basis for
making comparisons between them. In the upcoming waterfront profiles, Table 3.1 serves as a check-list for summarizing the main points about each project.

TABLE 3.1 - CHARACTERISTICS OF WATERFRONT PROJECTS

1. **Preconditions for redevelopment** - i.e., structural shifts in urban society, technological change, public policy initiatives, etc..

2. **Motivation for redevelopment** - i.e., social or commercial motivation?

3. **Role of the public sector**

4. **Political aspects of redevelopment** - i.e., the influence of changes in government, public policy, and the composition of development agencies.

5. **Potential for conflict** - i.e., between governments, development agencies and community organizations.

6. **Development concept**

7. **Land-use considerations**

8. **Social mix**

9. **Image of development**

10. **Market conditions** - i.e., the importance of "timing" with respect to marketing development sites to prospective developers, and selling the finished product to end-users.
3.1 "Battery Park City" - New York City

The development of Battery Park City, on lower Manhattan's Hudson River waterfront, has garnered substantial press in recent years. The project has been hailed as both a "miracle on the Hudson"\(^1\) and "a triumph of urban design."\(^2\) When I visited Battery Park City in July 1989, I was impressed by the project's urban design and site planning elements, which draw their inspiration from Manhattan's traditional urban fabric.

The most impressive aspect of Battery Park City is, perhaps, the waterfront esplanade - a 1.2-mile pedestrian walkway along the Hudson River. During my brief visit, I encountered hundreds of New Yorkers walking, jogging, sitting, and even fishing along its length. As an elderly woman pointed out to me, this is one of the few places in New York where one is able to come in contact with the water. This is quite ironic, given the 28 miles of waterfront on the island of Manhattan, and the 578 miles of waterfront in New York City.\(^3\)

While Battery Park City has only come to fruition in the 1980's, its development history spans some 25 years. As Frederick O.R. Hayes (1986) suggests, in a written account of the project's


Figure 3.1 - Site Map of Battery Park City
development history - the idea of a Hudson River landfill project

goes back to the early 1960's. New opportunities for redevelopment
and landfilling in lower Manhattan arose primarily from declining
port activity on the Manhattan waterfront. As Hayes suggests,

the maritime uses of the waterfront had declined to a
fraction of the peak activity of earlier years. The lower
Manhattan piers were underutilized. Many were dilapidated
and rapidly deteriorating. It was, under the
circumstances, not surprising that the possibility arose
of eliminating low value maritime uses of the waterfront
and creating, instead, high value land for development.*

The Hudson River landfill project was promoted by the City of
New York, the Downtown-Lower Manhattan Association (DLMA), and the
State of New York. In particular, the DLMA was instrumental in
spearheading the project as a means of revitalizing lower Manhattan.

The Association was organized by David Rockefeller in the
mid-fifties to advance the development and improvement of
lower Manhattan. Rockefeller, as chairman of the Chase-
Manhattan Bank, had in a real sense initiated the
revitalization of lower Manhattan with the construction of
the bank's new headquarters - ...the first major new
development in that area since before World War II.*

To further stimulate investment in Lower Manhattan, the DLMA
had recommended development of the World Trade Center by the Port
Authority. The Port Authority's decision to build the World Trade
Center on West Street made redevelopment of the adjacent Hudson
River pier area economically viable. In addition, excavation for
the World Trade Center was seen as an available source of fill
material.

*Frederick O.R. Hayes, Battery Park City Development History:

*Ibid., July 1986, p.3.
In April 1963, the New York City Department of Marine and Aviation put forward a development plan for the landfill site. The first phase would involve filling the pier area from the Battery to Chambers Street, to create a site of 65 acres. The program called for the development of 4.5 million square feet of office space (eight buildings), 4500 residential units (18 buildings), a 40-storey hotel, and six lateral commercial pier slips.  

The DLMA was supportive of the project in general, but was critical of the mixed-use nature of development. In particular, it was strongly opposed to the inclusion of commercial piers, and felt that there was limited demand for additional office space. The DLMA proposed that the site be developed exclusively for residential use:

An addition to the residential population near the downtown community will stimulate more shopping outlets, restaurants, places of entertainment and service facilities. This is highly desirable, and it would provide advantages for those who work in the area, too.  

In essence, the DLMA proposal was an economic development strategy for enhancing business activity in lower Manhattan. The development of housing and public amenities on the Hudson River site would make the established downtown business district more attractive, without introducing a competing commercial element.

Though nothing concrete came of either proposal, the debate over the course of development generated considerable interest in the idea of a landfill project. Two years later, in 1965, the City

---

*Frederick O.R. Hayes, July 1986, p.5.

Planning Commission hired a team of consultants to begin preparing a plan for Lower Manhattan. The *Lower Manhattan Plan* (1966) went considerably further than the initial Hudson River landfill proposal—calling for substantial residential development on 200 acres of fill, on both the Hudson and East River waterfronts. The consultants suggested that

the area could absorb a residential population equal to about one-sixth the number employed in lower Manhattan, ...This would indicate a residential population of about 80,000 in an area which then had, for all practical purposes, no housing. ...The population would have characteristics similar to those living in midtown—households consisting predominantly of childless husband-wife families and of unrelated individuals.¹

When the Plan was released to the public in the summer of 1966, it received both critical acclaim and the editorial backing of the *New York Times*. By the time of the Plan's release, however, Governor Nelson Rockefeller had announced a competing development vision. The State-sponsored plan—"Battery Park City," *New living space for New York: A proposal for creating a site for residential and business facilities in Lower Manhattan*, was made public in May 1966. It called for landfilling of the Hudson River site, and the construction of a two-level system of platforms, or podiums, on which the mixed-use project would be built. "A two-level design would place industry, parking and vehicular circulation on the ground level and all other facilities on a second level platform."²

---

¹Frederick O.R. Hayes, July 1986, p.8
The City was opposed to the Hudson River proposal because it meant the State takeover of a City project. Particular concern was expressed about the proposed land-use distribution within the site, and the fiscal and economic implications of the dedication of a large proportion of the site for subsidized housing. In addition, the design scheme was seen as incompatible with the concepts reflected in the Lower Manhattan Plan.

Negotiations between the City and the State of New York culminated in the announcement of a compromise plan in 1968. The Plan was formalized in 1969, with the adoption of a Master Lease Agreement and Master Development Plan. These would be administered by the Battery Park City Authority, which was established in 1968 by statute of the State of New York. As Hayes points out,

the Act included a legislative finding that the project area was blighted and 'no longer suitable or useful for piers or for facilities appurtenant to the loading and unloading of commercial cargo.' ...The Act declared the need for the redevelopment of the area as a 'mixed commercial and residential community.' The need for both middle and low income housing was recognized in the statement of purpose. ¹⁰

The effect of this legislation was to eliminate the possibility of the Hudson River waterfront returning to commercial port use. Instead, the landfill site was to accommodate a mix of new urban uses that reflected the emerging social and economic structure of lower Manhattan.

As part of its mandate, the Battery Park City Authority was responsible for site engineering and planning, financing, landfill

and infrastructure, as well as project marketing and development. Marketing the site was particularly challenging given an oversupply of office space in downtown Manhattan, and general uncertainties about the residential market.

For conventional or luxury housing, BPCA would have to sell an unconventional residential location in a market with limited absorption capacity. Subsidized housing, on the other hand, depended largely on non-market factors—the availability through the federal, state or city government of low interest financing, real property tax-abatement, and rent subsidies.¹¹

The development contracts that seemed imminent at the time of the 1972 bond sale were never realized. And, though subsequent marketing of the site was extensive— it met without much success. Battery Park City was plagued by problems— none the least of which was timing. The glut of commercial office space in 1972 persisted through the 1974-1975 recession, which was particularly severe in the metropolitan New York area. By 1979, construction activity had only begun to recover.

Changes in the Master Lease Agreement and Master Plan had been made in 1972, when the State expressed concern over competition from a City-sponsored landfill project on the East River. The net effect of the 1972 Amendments was to discard the 1969 plan and procedures, and replace them with a less demanding and more flexible plan. In addition, the City's role in the planning and approval process would be somewhat curtailed by the State. As Hayes argues, the basis for most of the amendments is quite clear:

¹¹Frederick O.R. Hayes, July 1986, p.47.
The highly detailed plan of 1969 and the extensive requirements for city reviews and approval had become, in the eyes of the Authority, a significant administrative burden and a serious barrier to expeditious development.\textsuperscript{12}

The composition of the Battery Park City Authority underwent a major shake-up in the late 1970's - following the election of Hugh Carey as Governor of New York in January 1975. The new governor was concerned about the Authority's moribund development record and initiated a call for the review of BPCA operations in 1978. This led to the resignation of BPCA Chairman Charles J. Urstadt, the election of a new chairman, and the assumption of control over BPCA operations by the state Urban Development Corporation.

The new BPCA management contracted the services of Alexander Cooper Associates to review the Master Development Plan and to provide suggestions for improving the project's marketability. The resulting Cooper report - \textit{Battery Park City: Draft Summary Report and 1979 Master Plan} - called for major changes in both the plan and the approach to development. Some of the problems identified by Cooper as impediments to development included: market uncertainty, an excessively rigid large-scale development format, overly-complicated controls, and worries about BPCA's financial stability. In addition, Cooper pointed to an overall negative perception of Battery Park City - stemming from political controversies, development delays, and uncertainty about the future market for housing and office space in Lower Manhattan.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{12}Frederick O.R. Hayes, July 1986, p.56.

\textsuperscript{13}Ibid., July 1986, pp.65-66.
Figure 3.2 - World Financial Center at Battery Park City
The market potential could not, in Cooper's view, be achieved without major changes in the plan and in control procedures. He recommended the abandonment of the 1969 megastructure design as far too expensive and complicated to be supported by the development. ...Under the Cooper proposal, the project area would be treated as an extension of the Manhattan street system with circulation, both pedestrian and vehicular, primarily at grade level.\textsuperscript{14}

The Cooper Report also recommended a series of economic and tax incentives to induce commercial development on the site. The State's Urban Development Corporation was empowered to exempt its projects and those of its subsidiaries from local zoning controls, and chose to exercise that power with respect to the commercial area of the site. Unhindered by planning constraints and a detailed approval process, the commercial development could thus proceed more quickly. Residential development would, however, remain subject to an amended Master Development Plan.

Cooper's recommendations for a less complex and more flexible design concept for Battery Park City were adopted by the City and State of New York, through their respective development agencies. As Hayes argues, "the favourable effects of the new approach were felt almost immediately. Together with an improving Manhattan real estate market, they made ...Battery Park City a viable and marketable site in 1980."\textsuperscript{15}

In July 1980, the Battery Park City Authority put out a proposal call for the office development. Conditional approval was

\textsuperscript{14}Frederick O.R. Hayes, July 1986, p.67.

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., July 1986, p.72.
later awarded to Toronto-based Olympia and York Developments, which had proposed to undertake the entire project - worth an estimated $1 billion.

Under the agreement, the Authority was required to install utilities and other "hard" infrastructure. This work was contracted to Olympia and York at a maximum cost to BPCA of $45 million.\textsuperscript{16} The specific plans for the site were announced by Olympia and York in May 1981, with the estimated completion date set for 1987. Olympia and York secured their first lease agreement with City Investing Corporation in November 1981, and ground-breaking took place the following month. Other anchor tenants include American Express (March 1982) and Merrill, Lynch (August 1984).

Construction of "Gateway Plaza" - the first residential project, began in June 1980. Developed prior to the adoption of the Cooper plan, this project is the only vestige of the 1960's superblock concept, as envisioned by Governor Rockefeller. It is also the only subsidized housing project in Battery Park City; but even this development is considered "a not inexpensive middle income housing project."\textsuperscript{17}

The second phase of residential development - "Rector Place," consists of 2200 units of conventionally-financed market housing - both condominium and rental. This project was seen as a test of both the Cooper Plan and the general market for housing in Battery Park City.

\textsuperscript{16} Frederick O.R. Hayes, July 1986, p.74.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., July 1986, p.80.
Figure 3.3 - "The Urban Room" - Public Art, Battery Park City

Figure 3.4 - Waterfront Esplanade, Battery Park City
A controversy stemming from the residential developments at Battery Park City is the justification for state involvement in what is essentially an upper-middle class project. Paul Goldberger, writing in the New York Times (August 31, 1986), argues that state involvement is warranted, "given the ability of the government to mandate urban design standards of a sort that the private sector is not going to initiate on its own." He points to a quality urban environment and the inclusion of public amenities as a "clear public benefit." Goldberger argues further that the economic success of Battery Park City will ensure funding for subsidized housing in areas of the city where it is most urgently needed - through the innovative Housing New York program:

On May 23, 1985, Mayor Koch and Governor Cuomo signed a memorandum of understanding agreeing to a program proposed by BPCA President Meyer Frucher to use excess future Authority revenues to support the issuance of bonds, the proceeds of which would be used to provide low and middle income housing not in Battery Park City but in other parts of New York City.

The shift in BPCA policy towards the development of purely market housing means that Battery Park City will become an enclave for upper-income households. Granted, there are a wide array of public amenities dispersed through the project - such as the waterfront esplanade, public parks and open space, public art, and educational and cultural institutions. However, what is the likelihood that these amenities will be enjoyed by a wide cross-

---

19 Frederick O.R. Hayes, July 1986, p.79.
section of the New York population? Those who will receive the greatest benefits from these amenities will undoubtedly be the residents of Battery Park City, office workers from the World Financial Center and, over time, a growing number of tourists.

On the other hand, future revenues from Battery Park City can go a long way to alleviate the critical shortage of affordable housing in other New York neighbourhoods. According to the Battery Park City Authority -

A 1986 law enabled the Housing New York Corporation to issue $400 million in bonds and notes, backed by Authority revenues, to finance the preservation, rehabilitation and construction of thousands of units of low and moderate income housing. Already 1,850 units are being renovated. More revenues are expected to yield another $600 million to provide affordable, subsidized housing in various neighbourhoods throughout New York City - without direct cost to State or City taxpayers.²⁰

Whether or not the amenities at Battery Park City are enjoyed by a wide spectrum of people is, perhaps, not as important as meeting the housing needs of a greater number of low-income households.

Whatever one's viewpoint with respect to the housing mix (or lack, thereof) at Battery Park City, there are some fundamental questions to consider: Do planners and policy-makers have a moral obligation to build socially-mixed communities? If one of the aims of urban redevelopment is to build livable places - should "livability" be achieved through exclusion or inclusion of economically disadvantaged

²⁰Battery Park City Authority, Battery Park City (promotional brochure), undated.
groups? These are questions perhaps best answered in the political arena; but, they will undoubtedly surface in the planning and development process for urban waterfronts.

While the events described in this brief account of the development of Battery Park City are unique to lower Manhattan, they are indicative of the experiences of planners and policy-makers in other waterfront communities. Some of the common planning issues, addressed in the redevelopment of urban waterfronts and reflected in Battery Park City, are summarized below:

Summary

1. Declining port activity brought about new opportunities for landfilling and urban development in lower Manhattan.

2. Battery Park City was originally promoted as a vehicle for economic revitalization in lower Manhattan.

3. Various public (local and state) and private development agencies were involved in the redevelopment process.

4. A shake-up of Battery Park City Authority personnel led to the adoption of a new development plan, a new design concept, and a more flexible development approval process.

5. Conflicts arose between local and senior governments with respect to the proposed land-use mix, and public jurisdiction over landfilling and redevelopment.
6. The development concept for Battery Park City went through several incarnations over its 25-year history - reflecting changes in local and state governments, and the composition of the Battery Park City Authority and other development agencies. The design scheme evolved from a 1960's superstructure plan to a more traditional, street-level plan, reflecting the existing urban fabric of New York City. This is in keeping with the urban reform emphasis on livability, heritage conservation and sympathetic, contextual urban design.

7. Through the planning and development process, the proposed land-use mix for Battery Park City was narrowed to reflect the emerging post-industrial make-up of lower Manhattan.

8. The opportunity of creating a socially-mixed community was given up to facilitate marketing of the site to predominantly childless, higher-income, professional households. However, excess revenues from Battery Park City are being used to build and renovate affordable housing units in other New York neighbourhoods. In this way, the project is fulfilling a social responsibility of the state and local governments.

9. Battery Park City illustrates the importance of "image" with respect to the marketing of waterfront projects. Urban design, site planning, architectural details and
landscaping played an important role in creating a favourable public image.

10. "Timing" was a critical element in the marketing of Battery Park City. Despite substantial developer interest in the early 1970's, the project never got off the ground until the early 1980's - due to the onslaught of recession, and an oversupply of commercial office space in Manhattan.

3.2 Docklands Redevelopment - London, England

Outside of North America, the redevelopment of urban waterfronts is most widespread in Great Britain - the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution. As in North America, technological advancements and structural economic changes have brought about the obsolescence of manufacturing and port facilities, and have led to physical decline in industrial, inner-city neighbourhoods in London, Manchester, Liverpool, Cardiff and other cities. As Nicholas Falk (1985) suggests, the economic impact of manufacturing decline has been most severe in the major industrial centers:

The long-term decline of British manufacturing industry, which some date back to 1880, has accelerated in the last couple of decades. A fall in manufacturing employment of 27 per cent in our major conurbations and 43 per cent in London over the period 1960-1978 has left a legacy of over three million unemployed and over 175 million square feet of empty industrial buildings.21

In the case of London, there has been an extremely rapid decline in the city's docklands - from a position of viability in the 1960's to one of redundancy in the 1970's. This has led to a contraction of the region's economic base, and a weakening of its diverse social make-up. The number of dock-related jobs dropped from 22,000 in 1969 to 7,000 in the late 1970's, prior to the final series of dock closures.22

A London Docklands study team was established in 1971 to consider a range of redevelopment options and to study the economic, political and legal constraints with respect to redevelopment. In March 1973, five of the 18 options put forward by the government-appointed study team were given serious consideration by the British government. As Stephen Page (1985) suggests, "the unifying features of the schemes were the emphasis on luxury homes, leisure facilities, marinas, offices and tourism."23 The intent of these proposals was to generate interest in Docklands within the private development community. However, they also raised opposition from area residents, local governments and the Labour-controlled Greater London Council (GLC) - on the grounds that the needs of the local population were not taken into account.

The question over who will benefit from the redevelopment of London's Docklands - i.e., private developers or local residents? - has been at the center of controversy surrounding the project.


23Ibid., (November 1985), 327.
Opposition to the 1973 proposals, and dissatisfaction with the unrepresentative and unaccountable nature of the study team led to its replacement by the Docklands Joint Committee (1974) - a public body composed of representatives from five London boroughs, the Port of London Authority, and members representing the local population through the support of the Docklands Forum.

In 1976, the Docklands Joint Committee (DJC) announced its Strategic Plan for the redevelopment of the derelict London Docklands. The primary intent of the Plan was to bring about social and economic stability to Docklands through an influx of new population, the creation of new jobs, and the provision of affordable housing. The aim was to accommodate economic growth while preserving the social character of local communities. This meant attracting new industrial enterprises, and maintaining a housing tenure mix which emphasized public housing.

Criticisms of slow progress were levelled against the Docklands Joint Committee in 1978, by the new Conservative-led GLC. In particular, the GLC pointed to the "severe problems of urban deprivation" that had hardly been touched upon. The DJC was superseded by the London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC) in January 1980. The LDDC was established as a single purpose planning agency with jurisdiction over the entire Docklands area - which comprises some 5,500 acres along the Thames River, from London Bridge in the west to Barking Creek, Beckton in the east. Sub-areas

---

within the Docklands include Wapping, the Isle of Dogs, the Royal Docks, Surrey Docks and the Enterprise Zone.\textsuperscript{23}

The LDDC is similar to a new town corporation in its ability to buy and sell land and provide hard infrastructure and other services. But, unlike a new town corporation, the LDDC could not act as a land developer; site development was left to the private sector, while the LDDC planned, promoted and monitored development activity.\textsuperscript{23}

The British Government provided LDDC with an operational budget of £250 million to plan the long-term future of the London Docklands. By 1985, the Corporation was facing mounting opposition and conflict over its role in redevelopment. Under the LDDC, planning for Docklands redevelopment has been a closed process, with few attempts at gaining the involvement of local residents. The major criticisms levelled against the LDDC are its primary emphasis on economic development and its blatant disregard for local communities.

The redevelopment of London's Docklands has become a highly politicized issue. Public and academic debate has led to a polarization of public attitudes with respect to the DJC and the LDDC, and their respective development policies. In a 1986 article in Public Administration, Paul Burton looks back at the track


\textsuperscript{23}Stephen Page, (November 1985), 327.
records of both of these planning agencies to identify their successes and failures, as well as the reasons behind them. As Burton suggests,

the LDDC is seen by many as an undemocratic and secretive body, concerned only with subsidising private investors and developers and paying little regard to the needs of existing residents. The DJC on the other hand is remembered as a paragon of democracy that put the interests of local people first in its strategy for redevelopment.\textsuperscript{27}

The DJC's \textit{London Docklands Strategic Plan} (1976) was to provide a framework for more detailed local area plans produced by the five London Boroughs of Newham, Southwark, Tower Hamlets, Greenwich and Lewisham. The overall objective of the Plan was to take advantage of redevelopment opportunities afforded by large tracts of available land to redress a range of social, economic and environmental deficiencies - which included high unemployment, poor housing conditions and a dilapidated physical environment. The Plan called for an ambitious program of public investment totalling over £1 billion by the year 2000. Investment was targeted in the areas of public housing (£286 million), an extension of the Fleet Street underground transit line (£185 million), and extensive site preparation and infrastructure development (£345 million).\textsuperscript{28}

The DJC fell substantially short of many of its strategic goals because of limited support from the central government - both financial and political. As a consequence, many of its ambitious plans were never realized. As Burton argues -

\textsuperscript{27}Paul Burton, (Autumn 1986), 349.

\textsuperscript{28}Ibid., (Autumn 1986), 350.
the Fleet line proposal was dropped and only one-third of the planned number of council houses was built. The DJC anticipated that industrial and commercial investment would result in the creation of over 10,000 new jobs by 1982 - and, although 800 were created, more than 8,500 were lost in the same period due to closures and relocations.\(^\text{29}\)

Burton also reconsidered the position of the DJC as a model of democracy. While public participation in the planning process was a high priority in the first two years of operation - in subsequent years, the DJC leadership chose to insulate itself from local political pressures through a restructuring of the organization, and an internal review of Strategic Plan objectives. Burton suggests that "the influence of the public at large and representatives of local groups was minimal," and that public input did not have a major influence on general policies or particular decisions.\(^\text{30}\)

The general election of 1979 paved the way for an extensive review of the DJC and its eventual replacement by the LDDC. In September 1979, the new Conservative government announced legislation that would enable it to establish urban development corporations in London and the Merseyside (Manchester). The enabling act was passed in 1980, but the LDDC was not created until the following year - to allow for the consideration of petitions from the GLC, the Boroughs of Newham, Southwark and Tower Hamlets, and a variety of other local groups.

The focus of the petitioners' arguments was the proposed transfer of the power to control development from the democratically elected borough councils to a non-elected

\(^{29}\)Paul Burton, (Autumn 1986), 350.

\(^{30}\)Ibid., (Autumn 1986), 350.
body. The Government's response was that the DJC was too parochial and the Secretary of State for the Environment, Michael Heseltine, went so far as to call it an exercise in 'pure prejudiced socialism.' In a more reasoned vein the Government recognized that no progress towards regeneration could be made without the injection of substantial amounts of public money, but considered the DJC and the boroughs to be 'unsuitable recipients' of such money. It argued that the LDDC would be a more suitable recipient because it would display a single-minded approach to regeneration and would involve the private sector to a much greater extent.31

The Select Committee stressed the importance of local involvement in a development corporation and believed that opposition would die down over time, when it was seen that the LDDC was amenable to local government and community involvement. The LDDC invited the leaders of three local boroughs to sit, in their personal capacities, on the LDDC Board of Directors.

The LDDC's mandate was to bring about lasting regeneration of Docklands through the maximum level of private investment, at the minimum level of public expenditure, and in the shortest amount of time. The most pressing objective of the LDDC's development strategy was to improve the image of Docklands, and create a secure climate for investors. As Burton argues -

this was to be achieved by acquiring as much development land as possible, reclaiming it and providing services where necessary and re-selling to the private sector for rapid redevelopment. Area development frameworks were produced to give an indication of preferred land uses and types of activity but these were to retain an essential element of flexibility; demand was not so strong that potential developers could be turned away if they failed to meet strict, fixed criteria.32

32Ibid., (Autumn 1986), 352.
The bulk of assembled properties in the Docklands were designated for residential development. The Corporation's primary aim with respect to housing was to promote the growth of owner-occupation. It proposed a tenure mix of 80 percent private housing to 20 percent public housing - a reversal of the tenure mix proposed by the DJC in 1976. As Page (1985) suggests - "this belies the LDDC philosophy to upgrade the social character of the area through housing redevelopment, by attracting young professional groups." As a consequence, much of the new housing in London's Docklands is priced beyond the reach of modest-income households. The construction of luxury housing amidst scenes of severe social deprivation has created friction between long-time residents and newcomers. The intensification of class distinctions is evident in urban graffiti and popular slogans that read: "docklands needs jobs not snobs!"

LDDC supporters point to the creation of an Enterprise Zone in the Isle of Dogs, and other initiatives for attracting high-technology industries, as long-term benefits for the docklands region. These are viewed as a "positive social and economic contribution" toward redevelopment. The Enterprise Zone was established in April 1983 to initiate revitalization on the Isle of Dogs - the most dilapidated area of Docklands, covering some 480

---

acres. The LDDC offered tax breaks and other economic incentives to high-technology firms wishing to locate in the Enterprise Zone. Critics, however, suggest that much of the new development occurring in the Enterprise Zone is not the result of new firms being established but, rather, is due to the relocation of existing firms from other parts of the city.36

The emphasis on high-technology industries places local residents at a disadvantage, in that well-paying jobs in these industries require a high level of specialized skills. Unemployed factory or dock workers would most likely require job retraining. And, if such programs were made readily available, it is likely that many of these people would lack the educational prerequisites to enable them to take part. As Burton argues, the bulk of new jobs in high-technology industries will be taken by people living outside of the local area:

The DJC was accused of paying too much regard to the needs and aspirations of local people and the LDDC was expected to be different. This it has been, especially in looking outside Docklands for new groups of people to provide a greater degree of social balance in the area, who also possess the skills required by the new commercial and industrial concerns. Although some provision has been made for training local people they have, by and large, been looked upon as a source of semi-skilled and part-time labour.37

New development in the Royal Docks, in the easternmost portion of Docklands has also proven controversial. The proposal to build a STOLport (short take-off and landing airport) in the King George V


dock generated strong local opposition in 1984. Concerns were expressed about aircraft noise levels and the safety hazards posed by locating an airport close to residential neighbourhoods. Resident appeals were overturned in April 1985 and the project went ahead. But, as Page (1985) asks - "why should the local population have to live with a potential hazard, designed primarily for the use of businessmen?" Page argues that the real needs of communities near the Royal Docks were grossly overlooked by the LDDC. The new STOLport has enhanced the attractiveness of the Enterprise Zone and provides a convenient service to the London business community. However, it provides few social or economic benefits for local residents. This is highly unfortunate, given a local unemployment rate ranging from 20 to 30 percent in 1985.

In terms of attracting residential and commercial development, the London Docklands is a major marketing success. In particular, it has been possible to promote Docklands for residential development on the strength of public investment in environmental clean-up, urban amenities, and transportation improvements. Karen Bradbury (1988) argues that

the sought-after environment for housing has been largely created: by opening up the waterfront, by re-discovering water where it had previously been filled in, by offering recreational opportunities, and by molding hills where the land had previously been flat. ...For the U.K. equivalent of the Yuppies (who markedly resemble their American

---

38Stephen Page, (November 1985), 328.
39Ibid., (November 1985), 328.
cousins), a townhouse in the Docklands is now the place to live.\textsuperscript{40}

Of all the projects planned for, or under development, in the London Docklands - the largest and most impressive is Olympia and York's "Canary Wharf." Currently under construction in the Isle of Dogs' Enterprise Zone, Canary Wharf is being promoted as an alternative business location to established districts in the City and West End of London.

At 12.5 million square feet, Canary Wharf is the world's largest single development. At 50 storeys, its centerpiece tower will be the tallest in the United Kingdom and surpassed in Europe by one planned for Frankfurt. ...At a cost of (US) $7.2 billion, it is a rarified financial stratosphere. Olympia and York's World Financial Center in Manhattan was merely eight million square feet, and built for a comparatively trifling $1.5 billion.\textsuperscript{41}

Canary Wharf will eventually form the commercial nucleus of the English equivalent to a "regional town centre."\textsuperscript{42} Its relation to the City of London is comparable to that of Burnaby Metrotown and downtown Vancouver in terms of spatial separation, relative size and function, and the importance of rapid transit in facilitating high-density suburban development.

If Canary Wharf is successful over the long term, it could mean an eastward shift in London's business community. The first phase of Canary Wharf has attracted some major international tenants -


\textsuperscript{42}See Chapter IV.
Figure 3.5 - View of Canary Wharf
including Credit Suisse First Boston, Morgan Stanley and Merrill Lynch. Texaco has also announced plans to consolidate its London offices and relocate to a new building in Canary Wharf's phase two development in 1992.43

The future success of Canary Wharf seems ensured, despite a present glut of commercial office space in London. The Docklands Light Railway, the London City Airport, and other infrastructural improvements have made Docklands an accessible and convenient location for commercial development. Another indicator of success is the involvement of Canada's Olympia and York Developments. With an enviable track record of success in major commercial projects, Olympia and York has gained an international reputation for sound investment practices. O & Y's interest in Canary Wharf is a signal to the global business community that there is a future in Docklands development.

Summary
1. Technological advancements and structural economic changes led to rapid physical and economic decline in the London Docklands.
2. The motivation for redevelopment was twofold: (i) to expand the region's economic base through the introduction of new economic activities; and (ii) to improve social conditions.
3. Docklands redevelopment was initiated by the senior government through preliminary studies of development options. The

subsequent creation of public development agencies to guide the redevelopment process has been marked by ideological conflict.

4. The accountability of government was put into question by the secretive operations of the LDDC, and projects designed to bring about economic development at the expense of local communities.

5. Conflict arose between the central and local governments with respect to: the overall land-use mix, the ratio of public-to-private housing units, appropriate roles for the public and private sectors, and the transfer of planning and development controls from elected local councils to a non-elected body.

6. A change in the Docklands development philosophy - from socially-oriented development policies to an emphasis on economic development and social "upgrading" - was brought on by a change in the senior government.

7. The land-use mix for "Canary Wharf" includes 929,000 m² of office space, plus a complete array of services and amenities for an expected white-collar workforce of about 60,000 people.

8. The influx of wealthy professionals into an economically-depressed, working-class area of London has intensified class conflict, and has given rise to resentment against newcomers. New residential developments are characterized by an inversion of the traditional tenure mix in favour of owner-occupied dwellings.

9. The image of the Docklands development is that of a new post-industrial London. Canary Wharf is viewed as a viable,
alternative business location, and Docklands housing units are among the most desirable in London.

10. The LDDC has been very successful in marketing an "in" residential location to the emerging professional class, and an attractive location for expanding service-based industries.

3.3 The Central Waterfront and Railway Lands - Toronto, Ontario

Toronto's waterfront has undergone successive waves of redevelopment since the early 19th century. With each change, the waterfront was transformed to facilitate commercial expansion, and to strengthen Toronto's economic base in the manufacturing and transshipment of consumer goods. Since 1945, however, manufacturing and port activities have been declining relative to other sectors of the Toronto economy. The most recent wave of waterfront redevelopment has been facilitated by the phase-out of industrial and port facilities.

The post-World War II years are characterized by the rapid suburbanization of population and employment, and the declining importance of industry and associated rail and water transportation within the central city. These development trends challenged the traditional dominance of the city of Toronto within the metropolitan region, and raised fears about dramatic inner-city decline - on a scale comparable to major U.S. cities.

To counter the threat of prolonged decline, the City embarked on a major planning program in the mid-1960's, which culminated in the adoption of a new Official Plan in 1969. As Desfor, Goldrick
and Merrens (1988) argue - "the plan was essentially an aggressive effort to promote more commercial development in the central city, along with residential accommodation for the anticipated middle- and upper-middle-class commercial labour force." The Plan called for massive inner-city redevelopment in the form of high-density residential, commercial and institutional uses, and the construction of new expressways.

Public opposition to this "urban renewal" format led to a voter revolt, and the election of a reform-minded majority to Toronto City Council in 1972. The urban reform council strived to create a livable urban environment through policies of controlled growth and preservation. To this end, it adopted a new Official Plan for the Central Area in 1978. According to the new plan, commercial expansion would be accommodated through intensification within the central area, and by redirecting growth to designated suburban centres. The aim of the Plan was to limit redevelopment and densification activity in established Toronto neighbourhoods, and to preserve industrial lands adjacent to the Central Area. Expansion of commercial activity was supported, but only at a level that could be accommodated by the existing transportation infrastructure.

The 1978 Central Area Plan largely ignored the redevelopment potential of the waterfront and railway lands, lying south of the central business district, by simply reaffirming their industrial

---

**Desfor, Goldrick and Merrens, 1988, p.99.**

designation. In the meantime, structural changes in the local and regional economies were gaining momentum:

By 1981, trade, finance, insurance, real estate, and community, business and personal services employed two-thirds of the Toronto Census Metropolitan Area labour force. Massive relocation of corporate headquarters to the central city area has centralized many of the functions that control corporate operations throughout the country. ...The occupational structure has also shifted dramatically toward clerical, managerial, scientific, technical, and service categories.  

The rapid rise of services and the concurrent decline of industry in the Central Area challenged the existing land-use mix and, especially, the industrial designation of parcels adjacent to the Central Area. Because downtown residential neighbourhoods were protected against densification and redevelopment, the growing demand for inner-city housing had to be satisfied in different ways: Firstly, the existing housing stock in protected neighbourhoods has been upgraded through gentrification. This, of course, has meant the depletion of the affordable housing stock, and the displacement of lower-income households. Secondly, new condominium apartment units have been constructed in the Central Area. And, thirdly - new housing and commercial space are being made available through redevelopment of the central waterfront and railway lands.

As Desfor, Goldrick and Merrins suggest, "the essentially unsealed, southern side of the Central Area represented a wide-open frontier, providing developers with a golden opportunity to build for the emerging high-income housing market."  

---

demographic changes occurring in the Toronto region made the declining waterfront and railway lands prime for redevelopment.

While several major institutions were responsible for mediating waterfront redevelopment, three of them: the Toronto Harbour Commission, the national railways, and Harbourfront Corporation controlled most of the land along the central waterfront. The first two were faced with the decline side of structural change - that is, the obsolescence of the port, railways and waterfront industries. The latter institution was created by the federal government in 1972, to ensure protection of the waterfront from commercial exploitation.

The Toronto experience in waterfront development is highlighted by a series of development campaigns, led by various public- and private-sector agencies. Prominent in this experience are conflicts between government agencies, and social versus commercial motivation for redevelopment. The following section will briefly outline the involvement of the Toronto Harbour Commission, Harbourfront Corporation and the national railways in the redevelopment of Toronto's central waterfront.

**Toronto Harbour Commission**

Since its establishment in 1911, the Toronto Harbour Commission has been responsible for port operations and land development on the Toronto waterfront. Its revenue has traditionally been derived from the lease or sale of waterfront lands primarily for industrial purposes. By the mid-1960's, however, income derived from the
Commission's industrial land base was not sufficient to cover operating expenses, and a sizable debt began to accumulate.

The debt originated from a number of the Commission's capital-investment decisions and it was enlarged by declining shipping revenue and mounting interest charges. Port tonnage more than halved between 1969 and 1974, despite the Commission's long-range capital development programme in the late 1960's. Furthermore, industry migrated to new locations or simply closed down, reducing the value of the Commission's industrial lands.48

Faced with a difficult financial situation, the Harbour Commission had to reconsider its development strategy. Instead of a continued emphasis on industrial development, the Commission began to promote commercial and residential development on its land holdings adjacent to the central business district. The first land sale and redevelopment agreement was finalized in 1964, after complicated negotiations between the Commission, the City and a private developer. Since that time, the site has been developed with a hotel and a number of high-rise residential buildings under the name "Harbour Square." Additional residential and commercial towers are either under development or in the approval process.

The most ambitious of the Harbour Commission's projects is the World Trade Centre, on which construction started in 1988. When complete, the project will contain three 26-storey office buildings, two residential towers at 25 and 32 storeys, respectively, and several low-rise connecting buildings. Other projects currently under development are located at the eastern and western ends of the central waterfront.

48Desfor, Goldrick and Merrens, 1988, p.103.
Harbourfront Corporation

The Harbourfront lands are located in the westerly portion of the Toronto Bayfront, between Stadium Road (on Bathurst Quay) and York Street. Almost all of the properties in this district (about 33 hectares) were acquired by the federal government between 1972 and 1975. Harbourfront was charged with administering these lands as an urban park on behalf of the government. While critics of the project viewed the park as an election gift from the federal Liberals, the government argued that its motive was to avert the threat of high-rise development along the waterfront, as symbolized by Harbour Square.

The first several years of redevelopment efforts on the Harbourfront lands were marked by indecision and strained relations between various levels of government. To enable Harbourfront to operate more effectively as a development agency, it was made a federal Crown Corporation in 1976. In 1978, Harbourfront Corporation made an about-face from its initial emphasis on public park space, and put forward a new plan which called for a mix of residential, commercial and recreational uses.

The success of Harbourfront's 1978 Development Framework rested on the Corporation's ability to become financially self-sufficient. By the late 1970's, the high costs of site development,

---

49 See Figure 3.6.
50 City of Toronto Planning and Development Department, The Central Waterfront: Proposals, April 1982, p.31.
51 Desfor, Goldrick and Merrens, 1988, p.104.
infrastructure, and cultural programs put the feasibility of the project in question.

Clearance of the site's industrial buildings and the reconstruction of the wharves were expected to be costly. More expensive, though, was the provision of roads, piped services, and other infrastructure to support the development contemplated in the mixed-use plan. Furthermore, Harbourfront had created and was expected to maintain its extensive arts and recreational programmes, which by then enjoyed considerable public support.²²

By 1980, the Corporation had put into place a new strategy for achieving self-sufficiency. The new Development Plan, which followed in 1984, called for 65,000 square meters of residential, office and retail space - with about 60 percent of this floorspace being allocated for residential development.

The economics of the situation ensured that in order to generate the required revenue, development would take the form of high-density residential schemes, luxury condominium projects, and expensive commercial and retail space.²³

Most of Harbourfront's low and moderate cost housing - some 500 units, or 30 percent of the total residential component - was designated for the westernmost parcels of property on Bathurst Quay. However, it was feared that the planned number of subsidized housing units would not materialize without an increase in federal funding.²⁴

²²Desfor, Goldrick and Merrens, 1988, p.105.
²³Ibid., 1988, p.106.
Figure 3.6 - Site Map of Harbourfront
By 1986, there was growing public controversy over the nature and form of development taking place at Harbourfront. "While the chairperson of Harbourfront insisted that there was still too much green at the site, critics deplored what they perceived to be a quayside concrete curtain." Diana Birchall, an area planner with the City of Toronto, identifies the following issues as major sources of friction: the scale and density of development, the height of buildings, the ratio of market to non-market housing, and the amount of land dedicated to park space. In 1987, a moratorium was placed on further development at Harbourfront, while several governmental reviews were conducted.

The City of Toronto had no jurisdiction over Harbourfront and, therefore, the project was not subject to the regular development approval process. Some contempt for Harbourfront is detectable in discussions with City planning staff. Birchall, for example, argues that the true potential of the waterfront has not been achieved - and she cites the absence of an overall plan as the major reason.

Development at Harbourfront was loosely governed by a flexible Development Framework, and a set of policies for each sub-area of the site. As a result, Harbourfront has largely evolved on a quay-by-quay basis. There were few design guidelines, and height restrictions were imposed only on certain portions of the site.

Desfor, Goldrick and Merrens, 1988, p.106.

Interview with Diana Birchall, Area Planner, Waterfront and Railway Lands Section, City of Toronto Planning and Development Department, 13 July 1989.

Ibid., 13 July 1989.
Figure 3.7 - Corrigan, *The Toronto Star*, 19 June 1989.
The buildings and other facilities at Harbourfront appear somewhat haphazard in their arrangement and incompatible with one another in terms of design.

In February 1989, Harbourfront Corporation entered into negotiations with the City of Toronto to "resolve the numerous and vexing issues" which had plagued their relationship. The resulting agreement between Harbourfront and the City forms the basis of an official plan for the Harbourfront lands. However, as Diana Birchall argues - "this is after the fact. Much of the damage has already been done; and many development opportunities have been lost."

Douglas Wrenn (1983), on the other hand, points to Harbourfront's flexible Development Framework as one of the project's chief advantages:

The guidelines articulate the basic principles underlying the development program - mixed-use, public access, cultural programming, financial independence, and so forth - without specifying the exact spatial configuration or development details. Approval of this document allowed general planning and predevelopment work to move forward while specific development alternatives were being considered. The development proposals for individual parcels within Harbourfront were and undoubtedly will continue to be tailored to respond to changing needs and circumstances.

---

59Richard E. Shibley, Memorandum of Terms of an Intended Agreement Between the City of Toronto and Harbourfront Corporation, 14 June 1989.

59Interview with Diana Birchall, 13 July 1989.

Wrenn cites the recognition of Toronto's seasonal climatic extremes as a case in point. The flexibility of the Development Framework allowed for the strategic placement and modification of buildings to mitigate against the effects of cold, wind and rain.

Wrenn downplays the importance of Harbourfront as a catalyst for downtown revitalization by pointing to Toronto as a growing, thriving, metropolitan city with a healthy downtown core. He views the project simply as an effort to make better use of an underutilized section of urban waterfront. On the contrary, waterfront development in Toronto is very much a catalyst for economic development in the Central Area. While Toronto is, by no means, a city in decline - the development of Harbourfront and the adjacent Railway Lands will strengthen Toronto's position of dominance in the regional and national economies, by attracting additional commercial and mixed-use development.

**Canadian Pacific and Canadian National Railways**

In most North American cities, and particularly in Canadian cities, the redevelopment of urban industrial waterfronts has involved some relocation of railway facilities, and redevelopment of lands formerly occupied by the railways. The extent to which waterfront redevelopment includes adjacent railway lands will vary between cities due to various factors. In Toronto, the Railway Lands constitute a massive parcel of land, strategically situated between the central business district and the central waterfront.

Redevelopment of the Railway Lands will have a great impact on the waterfront, and vice versa. It is unfortunate that the city of Toronto has missed out on a great opportunity to plan for comprehensive development of both the waterfront and Railway Lands, and to enhance existing development in the Central Area. This is due, in large part, to divided jurisdiction over development on these lands, and conflicts between various public agencies, at all three levels of government.

Between them, Canada's two national railway companies - Canadian Pacific and Canadian National - controlled about 80 hectares of rail yards lying between the Central Area and Harbourfront. Because the value of these lands for rail purposes had declined substantially, the railways were considering a range of redevelopment options, including the introduction of residential and commercial uses.

The first major redevelopment scheme for the Railway Lands was put forward in 1968. The grandiose scheme, known as "Metro Centre," was to replace the existing marshalling yards with a mixture of new urban land uses. Major components of the project included a multi-mode transportation terminal, a commercial precinct to accommodate 60,000 workers, an area devoted to communications industries, as well as a large residential component. While the scheme received Council endorsement in 1971, it did not survive rising interest rates, nor the urban reform policies of the mid-1970's, and was finally abandoned in 1975.  

---

In the early 1980's, a second proposal was put forward by the railway companies, working in conjunction with City of Toronto planning staff. At a price tag of two billion dollars, the project was the largest redevelopment scheme ever proposed in North America at that time. The proposed development conflicted with the deconcentration policies of the 1978 Central Area Plan. However, the project did not face the same level of hostility as the earlier Metro Centre proposal. This is due, in part, to pro-development forces returning to City Council and to the growing complacency of the urban reform generation.

The reformers had fought successfully to protect their neighbourhoods from redevelopment and, subsequently, were not as active in civic politics. As Barton Reid (Spring 1989) suggests, they have forged a peculiar bond with the development industry by compromising their views on density - in exchange for public amenities and greater aesthetic control.

In the 1980's a curious mutation has arisen between developers and reformers which has clouded the once clear antipathy between them. ...A new common ground of mutual self-interest has been created, where once opposing parties now dance a perverse political duet in their new reconstruction of the corporate city. ...Here the implicit rules are that the middle class will compromise on density rights in the commercial downtown so long as they receive new amenities for their acquiescence (and, of course, so long as the sanctity of the preservation of residential neighbourhoods adjacent to the downtown is recognized as their own speculative preserve).63

The Railway Lands proposal did not have a resident population to mobilize against the scheme. Nevertheless, there was

considerable public opposition building against the project. In particular, critics were concerned about the excessive amount of commercial space (1.4 million square meters - equal to one half of the existing commercial space in the Central Area), and the insufficient amount of housing. Of the housing that was proposed, none would be affordable to moderate income groups.⁶⁴

Sensitive to public opposition, and hoping to avoid a repeat of the Metro Centre experience, the railway companies struck a bargain with the City to bail out the troubled "Skydome" stadium project, in exchange for expeditious approval of the entire Railway Lands development. As Desfor et al suggest, the strategy was quite successful. "Undoubtedly, a favourable political climate in the city council, and a public uninterested in the Railway Lands proposal as a whole, increased the odds of the proposal gaining planning approval."⁶⁵

Summary
1. The current wave of redevelopment activity on the Toronto waterfront was facilitated by structural changes in the national and regional economies. Manufacturing, railway and port operations have declined relative to other sectors of the economy, and the sites occupied by these uses have been made available for redevelopment.

2. The adoption of a new Official Community Plan in 1969 was the first in a series of public policy initiatives for restoring the city of Toronto's dominant position in the regional economy.

3. While several major institutions were responsible for mediating waterfront redevelopment, three of them: the Toronto Harbour Commission, the national railways, and Harbourfront Corporation controlled most of the land along the central waterfront.

4. The politicization of the redevelopment process for both Harbourfront and the Railway Lands is evident in the controversies surrounding these projects. The most blatant example of political manipulation is Canadian National's use of SkyDome as a bargaining tool to gain expeditious City approval of the entire unamended Railway Lands proposal.

5. Principal areas of conflict on the waterfront have included: the scale and density of development, the height and massing of buildings, the ratio of market to non-market housing, and the proportion of site area allocated for public open space.

6. The original concept for Harbourfront was the creation of a major urban park. Because of financial considerations, this was subsequently changed to include a mix of residential, commercial and recreational uses.

7. The 1984 Development Plan for Harbourfront called for 65,000 m² of residential, office and retail space - with about 60 percent of the total floorspace allocated for residential use.
8. Of the total residential component, 30 percent (500 units) was designated as low- to moderate-income housing. In theory, the project is "socially-mixed." But, rather than being integrated into the development as a whole, the non-market units have been concentrated at the western end of the site - directly across from the Islands Airport.

9. The image of both Harbourfront and the proposed Railway Lands development is one of "upscale" residential and commercial projects. Given the amenity opportunities afforded by the lakeshore, and the development of major attractions such as the CN Tower and SkyDome - the central waterfront is quickly becoming a recreational playground for the resident urban élite, and the growing tourist industry.

10. The importance of "timing" in urban development is best illustrated by the record of railway lands redevelopment - i.e., the ill-fated "Metro Centre" proposal, and the recently-approved Railway Lands project. The earlier proposal was hampered by high interest rates and public opposition, and was eventually defeated by a reform council.

3.4 **Smaller Waterfront Communities**

The redevelopment of urban waterfronts across North America is a function of the physical and economic restructuring of communities in the post-industrial era. While some form of redevelopment is evident in both large and small communities, the waterfronts of smaller communities present a different kind and scale of
redevelopment opportunity. As Robert Goodwin (1987) points out - local markets rarely materialize in smaller communities for major hotel, retail and office uses on the waterfront, in part because their economies are both smaller and simpler than those of a metropolis.\textsuperscript{66}

Goodwin argues further that the economy of a small waterfront community may be dominated by a single manufacturing or resource-based industry, and is thus vulnerable to national and global economic shifts. In a fishing or lumber town, for example - a poor salmon harvest or a slump in demand for building materials could devastate the local economy.\textsuperscript{67}

For planners and policy-makers in smaller communities, the challenge in building a post-industrial economy is to diversify the economic base while, at the same time, preserving the unique character and desirable aspects of the community. To this end, tourism promotion is seen as a logical development strategy because it capitalizes on a community's existing assets: a waterfront location, a stock of heritage resources, small-town character, and a reputation for livability.

In Steveston, British Columbia - tourism and commercial development have been promoted by both the public and private sectors as an economic supplement to the fishing industry. Over the


\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., 1987, p.vii.
years, most revitalization plans for Steveston's business centre and waterfront have recognized the importance of the fishing industry, and have incorporated commercial fishing as both a major economic activity and urban design theme. In the future, however, it appears that fishing may decline in importance, relative to other economic activities, particularly tourism.

The existing image of Steveston is one of marginal economic activity geared to very local and fishing needs. ...The major changes which will alter Steveston include a shift in the fishing fleet, and a dramatic increase in the surrounding population base of tourist and community residential. ...Faced with these pressures, Steveston seems to have two options for future image - a tourist town, or a fishing town. A choice between these is essential since there are differing physical and planning principles needed for direction.68

The "tourist town" option would take advantage of new and existing amenity opportunities in Steveston. There would be no commitment to fishing except to use its historic reference to develop a theme village, and to treat fishing on an equal basis with tourism. In their wisdom, municipal planners, working in conjunction with the Steveston community, have dismissed the notion of a tourist town on the grounds that it would destroy not only the true character of Steveston, but also, an historic and viable way of life.

The development approach adopted for Steveston recognizes the importance of the fishing industry as both an extractive industry and a source of tourism revenue. While tourism is being promoted as an economic activity, the main attraction for tourists is the

68 Corporation of the Township of Richmond, B.C., Steveston Area Plan, Richmond, B.C., April 1985 (Amended to June 1989), p.114.
fishing industry - i.e., fishermen, fishing boats, floating fish markets, historic cannery buildings and seafood restaurants.

Structural and demographic changes in recent years have made tourism a major growth industry. And, with the growth of tourism, there has come a heightened understanding and appreciation of heritage resources. The waterfronts of smaller resource or manufacturing communities are littered with an array of interesting structures such as docks, warehouses, canneries, sawmills, and other structures in various states of use and repair. An innovative development scheme could incorporate many of these features, through adaptive re-use, to accommodate a variety of new activities in a unique waterfront environment.

Figure 3.8 - Historic Cannery Buildings, Steveston, B.C.
In both Canada and the United States, the public sector has played a major role in the redevelopment of small-town waterfronts. In particular, public funds have been used to support downtown revitalization, heritage conservation, port redevelopment, and a variety of other programs. The role of various public agencies - such as Parks Canada, Heritage Canada, and their U.S. equivalents - is particularly noteworthy with regard to heritage conservation.

Figure 3.9 - "Main Street" Revitalization, Cobourg, Ontario.
Because of the perceived threat to the physical heritage of small communities, Heritage Canada created its own "Main Street" assistance program, following the example of the U.S. National Trust. This encourages small communities to utilize their innate resources and provincial assistance so as to capitalize most effectively upon the heritage resource, emphasizing physical rehabilitation, economic promotion and social involvement. In Canada particularly, many of the beneficiaries are waterfront communities, and a boost to "Main Street" activity is generating a positive spinoff to waterfront revitalization (or vice versa).  

In many smaller communities, there is a symbiotic relationship between "Main Street" revitalization and waterfront development. The feasibility of waterfront redevelopment is both supported and enhanced by commercial activity in established business districts, adjacent to the waterfront. And, waterfront revitalization is commonly advocated by the local business community as a means of stimulating tourism development, and enhancing commercial prospects in the downtown.

A case in point is Wilmington, North Carolina — where, since the 1960’s, downtown revitalization strategies have focussed on waterfront redevelopment and heritage conservation. The success of two mixed-use developments at opposite ends of the Wilmington waterfront — i.e., "Chandler's Wharf" and the "Cotton Exchange" — highlighted the potential of the waterfront to support a wide array of commercial land-uses, including attractions for the emerging tourism industry.

---

69 John Tunbridge, 1988, pp.84-85.

70 Ibid., 1988, p.84.
The existing stock of heritage buildings in downtown Wilmington has provided an obvious theme for revitalization. In terms of physical improvements, the City is encouraging merchants and property owners to renovate their buildings, and is preparing design standards for renovations. The City has also joined forces with the private sector to promote investment in the downtown through the establishment of an economic development agency.

Summary

The waterfronts of smaller communities present a different range of redevelopment opportunities from those available in larger cities. While the motivation for redevelopment may be similar, the primary difference is in terms of scale. Smaller waterfront communities are subject to the same structural changes that are reshaping metropolitan regions. However, there is a peculiar set of circumstances that is unique to these communities. Table 3.2 provides a list of salient characteristics that distinguish waterfront redevelopment in smaller communities:

---

TABLE 3.2 - CHARACTERISTICS OF WATERFRONT REDEVELOPMENT IN SMALLER COMMUNITIES

1. **Preconditions for redevelopment** -
   Stagnation or deterioration of the local economic base.

2. **Actors involved in waterfront redevelopment** -
   Redevelopment is generally initiated by local business organizations and local councils, with the support of senior government programs.

3. **Motivation for redevelopment** -
   To diversify and enhance the local economy.

4. **Conflict potential** -
   The primary source of conflict is the notion of conservation versus redevelopment - as it applies to heritage resources and the intrinsic character of a community.

5. **Development concept** -
   Predominantly, tourist-oriented commercial and recreational uses. Typical waterfront projects are amenity-oriented, and are meant to enhance the commercial viability of established business districts.

6. **Image of development** -
   Projects typically capitalize on a community's "small-town" character, livability, heritage streetscapes, and unique characteristics.
4.0 CASE STUDY: HISTORICAL AND POLICY BACKGROUND

This chapter provides an introduction to the case study. It includes a brief description and history of the city of New Westminster, and outlines the city's political and economic role in the development of the Greater Vancouver region. This historical information is valuable in that it establishes an appropriate context for studying the New Westminster waterfront. It helps to build an understanding of the circumstances existing in the downtown and waterfront areas, prior to redevelopment in the 1980's.

4.1 Description

Founded in 1859, New Westminster is the oldest city in western Canada. The city is located on the Fraser River - approximately 19 kilometers southeast of downtown Vancouver. New Westminster is situated at the geographic center of the Greater Vancouver metropolitan area. It is a compact city covering 1839 hectares, or about 19 square kilometers. The population of New Westminster is expected to reach 42,000 by the end of 1990.²

New Westminster's waterfront stretches along the north bank of the Fraser River, between Burnaby and Coquitlam, and around the eastern tip of Lulu Island. The subject of this case study is the central waterfront area, adjacent to downtown New Westminster, and bounded by the railway bridge on the west, and Elliot Street on the

²Source: City of New Westminster Planning Department.
east. This portion of the waterfront is the site of "Westminster Quay."

Figure 4.1 - New Westminster in the GVRD.

Figure 4.2 - Map of Downtown New Westminster
4.2 Historical and Policy Background

The City of New Westminster was incorporated on July 17th, 1860, and, as the capital of the new colony of British Columbia, it served as the mainland's major supply centre. When the separate colonies of Vancouver Island and British Columbia were united in 1866, their administrative functions were subsequently consolidated in Victoria. The loss of the capital city function meant that New Westminster would lose out on significant public investment - e.g., the expansion of administrative offices and the construction of major public buildings.

The advent of the railways brought renewed optimism for prosperity in New Westminster. The promise of a trans-continental railway enticed British Columbia to join Canadian confederation in 1871. A railway, it was argued, would be a major engine of economic growth. It would facilitate large-scale extraction of western Canadian resources and would open up eastern and European markets.

As had been promised, survey work on the railway started at once but the determination of the route proved to be more difficult than anyone had anticipated. Apart from the hazards of crossing the unexplored mountains, there was intense rivalry in British Columbia as to where the line would go. ...After a great deal of squabbling, a choice was made - the southerly Fraser River route would be adopted.²

The first passenger train arrived from the east at Port Moody on July 4th, 1886. Port Moody was the unofficial terminus of the Canadian Pacific Railway and, had it remained the terminus - New Westminster might have developed as the dominant business centre in

the region. However, the CPR was in search of a deep sea port for its Pacific steamship trade and had every intention of extending the line to Coal Harbour. The CPR mainline was completed in May 1887.

The CPR extended a 9-mile branch line from Port Moody to New Westminster, also in 1887. The Great Northern Railway (forerunner of Burlington Northern) entered the city in 1891, giving New Westminster direct rail access to the United States. In 1892, New Westminster was linked to Vancouver by an electric interurban railway system. The city's first public market opened the same year to serve as a marketing centre for Fraser Valley produce.

By the turn of the century, New Westminster was home to both the provincial penitentiary and insane asylum. Major public institutions, such as these, were regarded as symbols of distinction during the Victorian era. They were also a major source of income for communities in which they were located.

The city of New Westminster continued to grow as a centre of business activity and, by the 1890's, had established a firm industrial base. As Scott (1985) argues,

New Westminster was the natural centre for the vast hinterland which lay beyond it. ...The two industries, sawmills and canneries, which were the making of New Westminster, began to evolve. In the seventies, four large mills were built and the salmon-packing industry was carried on by 13 canneries in operation on the river in the vicinity of the city. The railways also helped, with additional activity during construction and increased trade after. The opening of the branch to the main line at Port Moody enabled trade, which had previously gone the sea route by way of Victoria, to move eastward through the

---

port. It was a time of general prosperity on the lower mainland and New Westminster had its share.4

The years preceding World War I were a period of continued economic growth throughout the province. New Westminster was a home base for the growth industries of fish processing and forest products, and was the commercial service centre for the Fraser Valley. Columbia Street, the city's principal thoroughfare, evolved as a retail district of regional importance.

It was also in this period that port facilities were developed to handle the transshipment of general cargo. As Scott (1985) argues, it was the establishment of the New Westminster Harbour Commission, in 1913, and the opening of the Panama Canal the following year, that raised the status of the city to that of an international fresh-water port.5

The city and its port fared relatively well during the interwar years though, like all B.C. communities, always subject to the periodic boom and bust cycles that are characteristic of a resource-based economy. Columbia Street did a booming business through the 1940's and became known as the "Golden Mile."6

Transportation has always played a significant role in the economic development of New Westminster. It was the construction of roads and railways that made New Westminster accessible for industrial development. The addition of port facilities stimulated

---

5Ibid., 1985, p.16.
6Eleanor Catherine Sleath, 1984, p.27.
the growth of warehousing and related activities. Similarly, the advent of interurban tram services enabled travel between Vancouver, New Westminster and the Fraser Valley (1910). The opening of the Patullo Bridge in 1937 expanded New Westminster's market area to the south and southeast. This bridge replaced an earlier low-level span (1904) as the principal transportation link to Surrey.

In the mid-1960's, planners in New Westminster argued that the city's future prosperity and its relative position in the metropolitan region would be determined by transportation patterns over the longer term.7 This was particularly true for downtown New Westminster and its principal thoroughfare - Columbia Street.

The realignment of regional traffic patterns through the construction of new highways and bridges gave suburban communities improved access to downtown Vancouver, and made housing development more feasible in places like Richmond, Surrey and Coquitlam. To facilitate easier access between downtown Vancouver and the growing suburbs, the trans Canada highway and other routes out of Vancouver have tended to bypass congested areas like Columbia Street. The resulting loss of through-traffic has contributed to the stagnation of retail activity in downtown New Westminster.

Residential development in the outer suburbs has been accompanied by a proliferation of suburban shopping centres. The accessibility and comfort of these centres, along with abundant

---

parking and a superior variety of goods and services, have added to their popularity - at the expense of older retail districts.

Within the city of New Westminster, the bulk of new residential and commercial construction, through the 1960's and 1970's, was concentrated in the city's uptown shopping district, at Sixth Street and Sixth Avenue. The development of this second "downtown" further diminished the vitality of Columbia Street and the whole waterfront area.

Columbia and Front Streets are characterized by their turn-of-the-century commercial buildings. These structures have been identified as having heritage merit, but their present condition is generally poor. Part of the reason for this area's decline may be the age and poor condition of buildings, limited opportunities for redevelopment due to topographic and siting constraints, and the area's close association with the declining port. Derelict buildings, docks and other structures along the waterfront, and the ever-present railway have not contributed to a pleasant shopping experience.

In Part One of the City of New Westminster's Urban Renewal Study (1965), planners argued that port activity in New Westminster should continue into the foreseeable future, given a healthy provincial economy and increasing trade with Pacific Rim countries. However, they cautioned that opportunities for port expansion were severely limited, due to a short supply of back-up land.

---

Much of the potential dockage area of the City is already in use or contemplated for early development and thus careful study will be needed to assess the future opportunities for additional development.\footnote{Corporation of the City of New Westminster, B.C., December 1965, p.44.}

By the 1970's, the move towards larger ships and containerized cargo had rendered the city's port facilities obsolete. The volume of cargo handled by the port declined as newer container and bulk-loading facilities were developed in Burrard Inlet, Roberts' Bank, and the Surrey side of the Fraser River. As Walter Hardwick (1974) argues,\footnote{Walter Hardwick, \textit{Vancouver}, (Don Mills: Collier-Macmillan Canada, Ltd., 1974), pp.160-161.}

the trend toward lumber bulk carriers has necessitated new centralized port facilities. ...The larger ships create problems for traditional ports because of increased draft, beam, and turning radii. This was noted several years ago at Fraser Mills, upriver from New Westminster, a mill from which all exports were loaded at millside. Even with improvements to the Fraser, more and more lumber has been shipped to Vancouver Harbour Lynn Terminals by scow for loading. ...Recent announcement of new facilities in Vancouver Harbour gives credence to Robinson's claim in 1970 that New Westminster would suffer relatively.

The long-term future of the waterfront pointed to a relocation or phase-out of port activities, and eventual redevelopment for other uses. For the time being, the port would remain in operation while civic attention became focussed on urban renewal programs for the downtown and other parts of the city.
4.3 Renaissance of the "Royal City"

Amendments to the National Housing Act in 1964 made federal funds available to provinces and municipalities wishing to undertake comprehensive urban renewal and housing programs. The City of New Westminster made an application for federal assistance and initiated an Urban Renewal Study in 1965. The study showed that, while there were numerous problems in New Westminster, they were not concentrated in any one area. Instead, there was widespread evidence of physical and economic decline.

In selecting a pilot urban renewal area, planners identified problem areas within the city and ranked them in terms of "priority need." The West End South area of the city, west of downtown and uphill from waterfront industries, was given highest priority.

...This area, bounded generally by Sixth Avenue on the north, Twentieth Street on the west, Eighth Street on the east and River Drive, Stewardson Way and Columbia Street on the south, contains a substantial number of dilapidated residential buildings, boarding houses and tenements, mixed randomly with industrial and commercial uses; all prime targets for redevelopment measures. Considerable private renewal has occurred below Sixth Avenue between Eighth and Twelfth Streets. This activity, mainly new apartment construction, will be stimulated throughout the area with the advent of public renewal. Good quality development will be maintained by rehabilitation and conservation techniques. It is recommended that this area be given high priority for urban renewal action.11

The City of New Westminster's Planning Department prepared an urban renewal scheme for Area 4 (West End South) in 1968. The plan was not implemented, however, because a federal government freeze on

urban renewal projects went into effect across Canada, that same year.\textsuperscript{12} The urban reform movement had shattered public faith in the philosophy of urban renewal, and the program was eventually halted. In subsequent years, federal urban policy shifted towards neighbourhood improvement and rehabilitation programs, as viable alternatives to urban renewal.

Beyond an emphasis on physical improvements, and despite public controversy — urban renewal in New Westminster is significant because it ushered in an era of municipal planning. The urban renewal process required the formal establishment of a planning department to secure and administer federal funding, and to carry out the renewal program. In addition, federal legislation required that an urban renewal scheme be developed in accordance or in harmony with an official community plan.\textsuperscript{13}

Planners argued that the absence of a community plan had contributed to New Westminster's decline:

The City of New Westminster, now over 100 years old, did not just happen. Each building or other structure, each public improvement throughout the city, exists to-day as the direct result of a specific plan or decision made by an individual or by a group of individuals. Thus it may be said that New Westminster is not an unplanned city. It is, however, a city without a plan and most of the thousands of individual plans and decisions made by residents and businessmen during the city's development were made without the guidance and direction of overall


\textsuperscript{13}Corporation of the City of New Westminster, B.C., November 1966, p.18.
development policies and programs; that is, without a comprehensive community plan.\textsuperscript{2,4}

The start of municipal planning and the preparation of a community plan mark the turning point for New Westminster, for it is in this formative period of the mid-1960's that the groundwork for future planning decisions was laid. The urban renewal process focussed attention on the city's problems and provided a vehicle for public participation through the various planning stages.

The City formalized its planning function in 1965, through the appointment of a City Planner and the gradual establishment of a planning department. While early planning activity focussed on urban renewal, and was limited to an inventory of physical and economic conditions in the city, it was apparent from the start that the city had to be viewed in a regional context.

...It is extremely difficult to forecast the City's future role in the expanding region because of the multitude of forces and factors involved, many of which are beyond the City's control. It is clear, however, that if the citizens of New Westminster wish to create a better community much of the choice is theirs alone. Either the City slips back into the role of a Valley Town, with reduced function in the urban area, or the citizens, through their elected representatives, strive to retain for the City its present role as the major sub-centre of the eastern part of the Metropolitan Region. But in order to retain its present relative position in the Region the City will be required to "run." To "stand still" will be to fall behind.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{2,4}Corporation of the City of New Westminster, B.C., \textit{Urban Renewal Study, Part Two: Selection of Urban Renewal Areas}, May 1966, p.11.

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., December 1965, p. 59.
During the late 1960's and early 1970's, planners and policy-makers began to address more complex regional issues related to transportation and urban sprawl. The urban reform movement had brought about a questioning of development policies that advocated growth at any cost. Efforts were made to control regional population growth, and the notion of livability became a pervasive aspect of regional planning initiatives.

The Livable Region Plan (1975) is perhaps the most significant planning and policy document in the history of Greater Vancouver. The Livable Region strategy called for the development of Regional Town Centres, or "downtowns," in suburban municipalities. It was felt that nodal development of high-density office, retail and residential uses, as well as cultural and recreational facilities, would provide not only a physical and social focus for suburban communities but, also - a major source of new employment. For the City of New Westminster - official designation of its downtown and waterfront areas as a Regional Town Centre, in 1975, provided the necessary impetus for a program of revitalization.

The City of New Westminster and the GVRD studied several alternative locations in the city with regard to their suitability for commercial development. Possible sites for the Regional Town Centre included downtown New Westminster, the uptown shopping district at Sixth Street and Sixth Avenue, and the B.C. Penitentiary grounds. Of these, the downtown was considered to be the finest location, given an existing inventory of commercial floorspace, and
opportunities for significant redevelopment. As argued in the GVRD's 1975 Policy Report on Regional Town Centres -

the area to the north-west of the downtown is a declining industrial-commercial area with good potential transit access and close enough to the downtown core and the waterfront to revitalize both if developed as a Regional Town Centre.\footnote{J. Douglas Spaeth, \textit{Regional Town Centres: A Policy Report}, (Vancouver: Greater Vancouver Regional District, November 1975), p.28.}

In June 1976, a Joint Review Committee was established to prepare an "Action Program" for building the New Westminster Regional Town Centre. The Committee was made up of representatives from the City of New Westminster, the GVRD, and the British Columbia Development Corporation (BCDC). The Committee's \textit{Action Program Report} was presented to City Council and the GVRD Board for their consideration in September 1977.

The Report puts forward a set of basic policies for the Downtown and recommends that these be adopted as the basis for an Official Community Plan. Some of the key policies of the Downtown Plan are as follows:\footnote{Joint Review Committee, \textit{A Regional Town Centre for New Westminster: Action Program Report}, (New Westminster, B.C.: GVRD and City of New Westminster, September 1977), pp.4-7.}

- Revitalization of Columbia Street as a principal shopping district;
- Providing a connection between uptown and downtown;
- Making downtown a place for people;
- Integrating housing into the downtown;
- Improving access to the downtown; and
- Opening up the downtown to the river.
The most significant of these basic policies - for the purposes of this discussion - is the notion of opening up downtown New Westminster to the Fraser River. New Westminster's waterfront is described in the Action Program Report as a "major opportunity for public action." It is argued in the Report that a revitalized waterfront, in conjunction with other opportunities, will provide the necessary impetus to begin development of a Regional Town Centre:

There is an exciting opportunity for New Westminster to make its waterfront the focus of a number of urban activities. There can be residential facilities with views, access to waterfront, boat moorage and retail development at the wharf edge to form a waterfront pedestrian street. Water oriented recreation, retail, such as boat sales, an in-the-water boat show, boat demonstrations and a marina are possible. There are attractive locations for offices on the waterfront. These residential, commercial and recreational developments can be integrated to create an exciting new urban waterfront.

Transportation is identified in the Report as a key determinant of the city's future: "If Downtown New Westminster is going to be a major business and civic centre for communities in the eastern part of the Region, it must be more accessible." Improved public transit, major street improvements, better pedestrian circulation, additional parking and improved signage are recommended actions. Particular emphasis is given to a light rapid transit route - between Downtown Vancouver, New Westminster, Surrey and the

---

19 Ibid., September 1977, p.10.
20 Ibid., September 1977, p.11.
Northeast Sector - as a stimulus to development over the longer term.

The Report also stresses that, if the Regional Town Centre is to be an "interesting place," the provision of certain amenities will be essential. These include the development of urban parks in the Downtown and a new waterfront location for the farmers' market.

Downtown needs park-like places to sit, stroll and enjoy the scenery. There are several places where parks can be created by closing or landscaping streets. ...A tree-planting program will help to "green" the Downtown and make it a more attractive place for people. ...A new central location for the farmers' market, restaurants and shops ...will provide an interesting and strategically located opening to the waterfront.\(^{21}\)

The Joint Review Committee identified three elements of the Action Program as being essential for Town Centre development: an Official Community Plan for Downtown New Westminster; an improved development approval process; and a "vehicle" for stimulating development. The first of these elements, The Community Plan for Downtown New Westminster, was adopted by City Council in 1978. The boundaries of the Plan area are Royal Avenue between Fourth and Twelfth Streets, south to the waterfront; and Carnarvon Street, between Fourth Street and Albert Crescent, south to the waterfront (see Figure 4.3).

The objectives of the Downtown Plan encompass the necessary steps for establishing a Regional Town Centre. To build on the city's existing potential, the Plan identifies several elements that are to act as "catalysts" in the redevelopment process. The most

Figure 4.3 - Downtown Plan Boundaries
significant of these catalysts are the establishment of institutional "anchors," development of a rapid transit system, and revitalization of the waterfront.

The development of new housing, parks and public open space, cultural facilities, hotels and commercial space are all identified as important elements of a Regional Town Centre. The Action Program for New Westminster suggests that the bulk of these activities will take place on or adjacent to the waterfront. The revitalization of the New Westminster waterfront is seen as an opportunity to showcase the city's potential as a Regional Town Centre.

While an official community plan would serve as a guide for redevelopment in downtown New Westminster, it would not necessarily encourage development. In order to attract developer interest in the Downtown, the City had to eliminate uncertainty in the development approval process. As the Joint Review Committee argues:

After a developer applies to the City for approval to build in the Downtown, there is a period of uncertainty when the developer spends time and money holding the land and designing his building without knowing whether the City will grant a building permit. New Westminster will attract more private investment to the Downtown if the City minimizes uncertainty by processing applications for development according to a prompt and established schedule.\(^{22}\)

The second element of the Action Program is a proposed ten-step development approval process, based on a binding agreement between developers and the City. The agreement would cover the basic elements of a given project - e.g., proposed use, zoning, height, massing, design considerations, etc. - as well as the services that

\(^{22}\)Joint Review Committee, September 1977, p.8.
the City would provide. By the fifth step in the process, after a relatively short period of time, the developer would know whether or not he could proceed with the project (see Figure 4.4).

Figure 4.4 - Proposed Development Contract & Approval Process

The third and final element of the Action Program is the creation of a public development company to implement the Downtown Plan and to oversee the development process. First Capital City Development Company Limited (FCC) was formed in 1977, as a cooperative enterprise of the City of New Westminster and the British Columbia Development Corporation. The chief role of First Capital City was to

redirect and package a combination of public projects currently being planned with a municipal financing program, and to offer lands assembled from the public and private sectors through syndication to developers on attractive lease terms.\(^2^4\)

The urban redevelopment program for Downtown New Westminster was to be achieved through the introduction of economic "catalysts." A program of public investment in the Downtown was used to attract private sector investment. For example, FCC played a role in encouraging Douglas College to locate its new campus at Eighth Street and Royal Avenue. It was also instrumental in finalizing arrangements for the construction of new Law Courts at Lorne and Carnarvon Streets.

4.4 Summary

- Transportation has always played a significant role in New Westminster's economic and social development.
- The realignment of regional traffic patterns in the 1950's and

1960's weakened downtown New Westminster's competitive position in the regional economy.

- Downtown decline in New Westminster is largely attributable to suburbanization. Although New Westminster is effectively a suburb of Vancouver - it is an old urban community, and bears many similarities to declining inner-city districts.

- The development of a second "downtown" at Sixth Street and Sixth Avenue undermined the commercial viability of Columbia Street.

- Impending port closure - due to technological change, and the development of new facilities elsewhere in the region - became evident by the 1970's.

- The urban renewal application process was significant in New Westminster because it helped to identify problem areas in the city, and it required the formal establishment of a municipal planning department.

- The designation of downtown New Westminster as a Regional Town Centre focussed attention on the downtown and waterfront, and was the first significant step towards the revitalization of both areas.

The next chapter will examine various components of the City of New Westminster's downtown revitalization strategy: the objectives of the Downtown Plan, the role of FCC and other development agencies, and the use of public "catalysts" in attracting private investment. The focus will be on the redeveloped waterfront, and the catalytic role it was to play in the revitalization process.
5.0 CASE STUDY: NEW WESTMINSTER'S DOWNTOWN REVITALIZATION STRATEGY

As was demonstrated in the waterfront profiles in Chapter Three, the redevelopment of urban waterfronts is a powerful policy instrument for achieving broader development objectives. In the case of New Westminster, British Columbia - redevelopment of the waterfront was part of a comprehensive strategy for revitalizing the downtown and stimulating development of a Regional Town Centre.

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the City of New Westminster's downtown revitalization strategy, and to evaluate its various components. It outlines Community Plan objectives for the downtown, and analyzes the role of First Capital City Development Company in stimulating redevelopment.

5.1 New Westminster's Downtown Revitalization Strategy (1977)

In April 1978, the British Columbia Development Corporation (BCDC) announced that it had acquired an option to purchase 30 acres of waterfront property in New Westminster from Pacific Coast Terminals (PCT) Ltd.. The terms of the option agreement included a purchase price of $4.75 million, and were conditional on BCDC being successful in getting the property rezoned from industrial to residential and commercial uses.¹

Redevelopment of the PCT property was to be part of a larger reconstruction scheme for downtown New Westminster. A redeveloped

waterfront - in conjunction with public investment in a new courthouse, a new campus for Douglas College, and physical upgrading of Columbia Street - would play a catalytic role in stimulating a private-sector revitalization of downtown New Westminster.

The revitalization strategy for the downtown area was based on the GVRD's Action Program for developing a Regional Town Centre. The strategy was to use public funds to create a secure climate for private investment, and to invest in a series of "catalysts" for economic development in the downtown. According to FCC literature, the redevelopment program was to be self-supporting, with public expenditure being defrayed by profits from land sales to the private sector:

(The program) hinges on a revolutionary scheme to pay for redevelopment by converting underutilized land to higher uses, reselling land parcels to private-sector developers, and using these sales revenues to defray all of the costs incurred in implementing the program.²

As stated in Chapter Four - the Action Program Report (1977) identified three essential elements for the development of a Regional Town Centre. These are: an Official Community Plan for downtown New Westminster, an improved development approval process, and a "vehicle" for stimulating development. These are discussed in more detail below.

The Community Plan for Downtown New Westminster

The Community Plan for Downtown New Westminster was adopted by City Council in 1978. The primary objective of the Plan was to establish the broad social, economic and environmental goals towards which the City's development and redevelopment would be directed. Since the Plan's adoption, there has been considerable development activity in both the downtown and waterfront areas, and in other parts of the city. Major transportation developments, such as SkyTrain and the Alex Fraser Bridge - both of which opened in 1986 - have dramatically altered New Westminster's competitive position in the regional economy through improved accessibility.

In 1986, the Downtown Plan underwent a public review process which culminated in the adoption of a revised Plan in the following year. The 1987 Plan is basically a reaffirmation of the objectives set out in 1978, but was developed with the benefit of hindsight and additional public input. The 1987 Plan is reflective of the progress made during the previous eight years, and is somewhat more articulate in its policy statements.

The Plan's "social" objectives are aimed at making the downtown more amenable to a range of different activities. These objectives include: image-building and promotion of the downtown as an important commercial and cultural centre; improving the pedestrian environment, and ensuring that development is maintained at a human scale; providing public access to the waterfront; and utilizing the downtown's locational, physical and heritage resources to stimulate development of a regional town centre.
The Plan's economic objectives are intended to increase the City's tax base by making downtown New Westminster a more attractive location for commercial investment. One notable objective is to find "viable and positive alternative uses for the City's port and waterfront." What is significant about this objective is the recognition of development opportunities afforded by declining port activity, and the connection made between waterfront development and downtown revitalization.

Another objective is to promote "economical use and adaptive reuse of the buildings of heritage significance in the plan area to stimulate tourism." This was articulated in the 1987 Plan, following an extensive inventory of the City's heritage resources in the mid-1980's. It recognizes the built heritage of downtown New Westminster as a ready-made revitalization theme, and a potential source of tourism revenue.

The Plan's environmental objectives do not pertain to the "natural" environment but, rather, to the urban environment of downtown New Westminster. These objectives are essentially concerned with land-use, pedestrian and vehicular circulation, parking, and heritage conservation, as well as reducing the negative impacts of the railway, improving the quality of the urban environment through design guidelines, and working with the area's

---


4 Ibid., 1987, p.5.
geographical attributes - such as topography, views and southern exposure - to enhance the urban environment.

In summary, the social, economic and environmental objectives are complementary and somewhat indistinguishable from one another. The 1987 plan update could have gone further in streamlining this list of objectives to create a more articulate statement of purpose.

But, as stated in the 1978 Plan -

the overall objective is to bring to fruition as many of the proposals contained within the various parts of the Community Plan as economic, political and social circumstances from time to time render possible and desirable.\(^5\)

Major elements of the Downtown Plan include: the development of "institutional anchors" in the core area, the construction of new housing in the downtown and waterfront, new commercial and hotel construction, additional cultural facilities, and improvements to the transportation infrastructure. The institutional anchors - i.e., a new downtown campus for Douglas College and a new Law Courts building - and new housing and commercial developments would draw more people into the downtown, providing an expanded market area for downtown businesses, and a stronger tax base for the City.

The design guidelines for downtown New Westminster include: the protection of views from, of, and within the downtown; maintenance of a human scale of development; an emphasis on landscaping; appropriate treatment of rooftops to enhance views from uphill areas; limits on site coverage to ensure light, air and privacy; density controls to regulate activity levels and bulk of buildings;

appropriate signage for different character areas; and recognition of the city's heritage resources as a basis for developing an image or theme for the downtown.

5.3 An Improved Development Approval Process

Under the New Westminster Redevelopment Act (1979), First Capital City Development Company (FCC) was given broad and unique development powers over properties in the Downtown Plan area - including the power to expropriate. The Act placed limitations on the City's discretionary control over development approvals. Under a mandatory development permit system, the City was required to grant development permits if projects "complied factually with special development guidelines for the downtown."6

The Downtown Plan area was treated as a special development district, in that neither the City's Advisory Planning Commission nor the Development Permit Committee had jurisdiction in the downtown. Instead, development was regulated by a three-member Development Approval Group - comprised of one appointee each from the City and FCC, and a jointly-appointed chairman. This body would examine development proposals and advise the City on whether they complied with planning objectives and area design guidelines.

The purpose of these procedural changes was to eliminate some of the "red tape" associated with development approvals, and to reduce the likelihood of City staff turning proposals down on

---

subjective issues." In addition, FCC acted as a liaison between developers and City staff by guiding developers through the approval process, step by step.

When asked if these modifications were successful in attracting developer interest, Barry Goodwin, former FCC Project Manager, says that "the proof of the pudding is in the eating - obviously the thing worked!" The streamlined process did help in building a more secure investment climate but, as Goodwin would agree - the revitalization program required more powerful catalysts to get it under way.

Ken Cameron, former New Westminster City Planner, argues that the problem in New Westminster was not one of excessive development controls but, rather, the absence of a market for downtown development. Cameron attributes this to a complacent City Council, and a local business community not interested in self-promotion. Over the years, local business and political leaders had become complacent about the City's economic position and did not see the need to actively promote new development.

The city's economy remained stable through the mid-1960's, but signs of economic decline were already evident. Imminent port closure, contraction of industrial activity, and the diminished

---

7Interview with Barry Goodwin, 17 August 1990.

8Ibid., 17 August 1990.

9Interview with Ken Cameron, Director, Development Services, Greater Vancouver Regional District, Burnaby, B.C., 14 August 1990.
market area for downtown businesses necessitated some form of affirmative action to halt a downward economic spiral.

Ken Cameron saw his role in New Westminster as that of a promoter; he had to "let people know that New Westminster was open for business." In a speech to the New Westminster Chamber of Commerce, Cameron stressed the importance of community image-building and promotion to ensure future economic development. As he reiterates, in an August 1990 interview: "There's nothing wrong with New Westminster that more people living, working, shopping and investing here won't fix!" He points to the adoption of an official community plan for downtown New Westminster, and the creation of First Capital City Development Company as two major steps towards this end.

5.4 The First Capital City Development Company

The First Capital City Development Company (FCC) was cooperatively formed in 1977 by the City of New Westminster and the British Columbia Development Corporation (BCDC). The FCC Board of Directors was made up of representatives from BCDC, the City of New Westminster, City-appointed members of the local business community, and officers of the company. FCC's life-span was tied to the completion of its mandate; once the revitalization program had been realized, FCC would be dissolved.

10 Interview with Ken Cameron, 14 August 1990.

11 Ibid., 14 August 1990.
As both Ken Cameron and Barry Goodwin argue - the creation of FCC was a political decision of the Provincial Government to appease the City after its loss of the proposed ICBC\(^\text{12}\) headquarters to Lonsdale Quay, in the City of North Vancouver. FCC's sole purpose was to implement the City's revitalization program - i.e., "to redevelop New Westminster's downtown core and waterfront in accordance with the objectives of New Westminster's Official Community Plan."\(^\text{13}\)

FCC had, what Barry Goodwin calls, a "double mandate." Firstly, FCC was to develop the waterfront as a real estate project. As chief developer, it would oversee the entire project while individual components would be built by private developers. Secondly, FCC was to "facilitate action in the area of downtown revitalization."\(^\text{14}\) According to the terms of the Provincial enabling legislation, and FCC's Agreement with the City - FCC was given the mandate to assemble land in the designated Downtown Plan area; to service, subdivide and market that land; to coordinate redevelopment; and to construct key public improvements.

It was initially intended that FCC assemble private properties in the downtown area, and sell them to developers in syndicated parcels. The proceeds of these land sales would be split up amongst the owners. As it turned out, the notion of syndication never worked out, and FCC did not acquire any commercial properties in the

\(^{12}\)Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (ICBC).

\(^{13}\)First Capital City Development Company, 1982, p.13.

\(^{14}\)Interview with Barry Goodwin, 17 August 1990.
downtown. FCC purchased the waterfront property of Pacific Coast Terminals (PCT), took possession of publicly-owned waterfront parcels, and completed the City's assembly of properties for the new Douglas College campus.

Throughout the revitalization process, FCC played a vital role in attracting private investment in downtown New Westminster. This was not an easy task, given the poor image and limited growth potential of the city's core area. An important early step in the complex redevelopment program was the introduction of publicly-financed "catalysts." FCC encouraged senior governments to support Town Centre development by concentrating public investment in downtown New Westminster. FCC worked with Douglas College and the Ministry of Education to encourage the college to build its new campus at Eighth Street and Royal Avenue. The $39 million campus would draw up to 3,800 full- and part-time students and a staff of 335 to the downtown area.

This new educational and administrative facility will have significant economic and social effects on the community. Its students and staff will enhance business activities in the downtown and it will give New Westminster one of the most extensive and flexible community education/recreation resources in Canada - running continuous education programs for 4,000 non-credit students in addition to the College's credit complement.¹⁵

The obsolescence of the city's historic Court House provided the development opportunity for another "institutional anchor." FCC worked with the Provincial government in finalizing arrangements for the construction of a new $17 million Law Courts building at Lorne

¹⁵First Capital City Development Company, 1982, pp.5 and 7.
and Carnarvon Streets. And, adjacent to the Law Courts - FCC and the City built an attractive urban plaza, which was named Begbie Square in honour of British Columbia's first Chief Justice, Sir Matthew Begbie.¹⁶

Public improvements proposed by the Official Community Plan included returning the waterfront to public use through the creation of a landscaped esplanade and several access points over the railway tracks. FCC was given the responsibility for transforming the waterfront into a mix of residential, commercial and recreational uses.

In fulfilling its mandate, FCC was hit with two setbacks in the early 1980's. The first of these, the "King Neptune crisis," arose out of a dispute between FCC and restauranteur Denis Almas regarding the fate of the landmark King Neptune restaurant. The restaurant's 15-year lease on a prime waterfront site was due to expire, and FCC was not going to renew the lease because it wanted to begin site preparation and construction on this key parcel.

FCC had invited the King Neptune to join in the new commercial development as an anchor tenant. However, Almas would be required to close and relocate the restaurant for a period of two years, to allow for construction. He was not willing to relocate, and insisted that development take place around the King Neptune. This was unacceptable to FCC, so Almas agreed to move provided that FCC assist him in finding a new site. FCC architects and planners

undertook feasibility studies which yielded two options - neither of which was acceptable to Almas.\textsuperscript{17}

According to Barry Goodwin, Almas utilized considerable public support to wage a media battle against FCC. Given the history of false starts in New Westminster's revitalization, Almas argued that he would hate to move only to find that the site lay dormant for several years. The restaurant was relocated in February 1982 to a storage site on the Vancouver waterfront. As it turned out, the restaurant could have remained on the site for another year or two, because redevelopment was delayed by the onslaught of recession. However, the bitterness of the dispute led to a breakdown of trust between both parties, and the possibility of a short-term lease was out of the question.\textsuperscript{18}

The King Neptune affair was a "crisis" for FCC because it came at a very bad moment. FCC had started out as a public-minded development agency, with significant opportunities for public input. However, as the development concept became finalized, FCC began to neglect its role as a "bridging" agency between the public and private sectors.\textsuperscript{19} As a consequence, there was growing mistrust of FCC within the community. The controversy surrounding the King Neptune restaurant further damaged FCC's image and credibility as a development agency.

\textsuperscript{17}Interview with Barry Goodwin, 17 August 1990.

\textsuperscript{18}Ibid., 17 August 1990.

\textsuperscript{19}Ibid., 17 August 1990.
The economic recession of 1982 was a major setback for FCC, and its ambitious plans for the waterfront. All of FCC's development costs were to be recovered through profits from land sales, and, were it not for the recession, the scheme might have worked. Plummeting land values and growing interest on borrowed money, during two years of inactivity, put into question the objective of financial self-sufficiency. The first sign of difficulty was the collapsed sale of a large residential site to a now bankrupt developer.

In response to the difficult economic situation, FCC had to revise its development strategy. Firstly, FCC broke up the waterfront property into a series of smaller development sites to attract a broader range of developers. Secondly, FCC invested heavily in hard infrastructure, such as extensive soils preparation (particularly for seismic purposes), and construction of an overpass to provide pedestrian and vehicular access over the railway tracks.

Thirdly, FCC devised an innovative marketing scheme to initiate development of the residential component. Knowing that there was little development interest in condominium sites, particularly in New Westminster, FCC put out an invitational proposal call for a two-site development package. The package contained a condominium site and a non-profit co-op site. The appeal to developers was that a CMHC-insured co-op was a guaranteed sale, and this would defray any risk involved in the market
The successful bidder on these two sites was Burnaby's Bosa Bros. Ltd.

A second development package, with both a market and non-market component, was put together immediately west of the Bosa project. The remaining residential sites were made available on the open market, without developer incentives. When the first units came on the market in January 1986, they sold out very quickly. This demonstrated the market value of the New Westminster waterfront and paved the way for rapid development of the remaining parcels.

However, it was difficult to market the commercial component of the waterfront to prospective developers, due to the poor image of downtown New Westminster and, later, due to the recession. The development concept called for a mix of office, hotel and retail uses to be developed near the foot of Eighth Street. As the concept evolved further, the retail portion became the public market.

With no developer interest in the public market, FCC took the initiative and hired an architectural firm to undertake conceptual design work. This demonstrated FCC's commitment to the project, and helped to reduce uncertainty surrounding commercial development on the waterfront. Midway through the design process, Laing Properties bought a half interest in the public market project, as well as an option to buy out FCC at a later date. Westminster Quay Public Market opened in 1986, with 6,500 square meters of retail, restaurant and market space. Laing Properties also purchased an

---

Interview with Barry Goodwin, 17 August 1990.
adjacent site, to the east of Eighth Street, for future market expansion.\textsuperscript{21}

The market development marks a turning point for Westminster Quay because its completion was the start of a true mixed-use development. The market is also seen as a catalyst in stimulating development of the remaining commercial sites. The Westwater Group has followed on the heels of FCC and Laing Properties by constructing the 126-room Inn at Westminster Quay, and the first phase (5,575 m\textsuperscript{2}) of the First Capital Place office complex. Two high-rise office towers are to be added at a later date, for a total office component of about 28,000 m\textsuperscript{2}.

When asked to rate the performance of FCC as a development agency, Barry Goodwin gave it high marks because, in his opinion, it accomplished what it set out to do. "Not only are the buildings in place, but Westminster Quay is a pretty good place to live. ...There is also a significant public amenity. One of the objectives of the waterfront development was to re-open the waterfront to the public, and this has been done in an excellent way."\textsuperscript{22} Goodwin attributes the significantly improved image of downtown New Westminster to the revitalized waterfront and the role of FCC as chief developer.

Ken Cameron sees the principal benefit of FCC as giving politicians a platform for making announcements. FCC gave Provincial Government officials a reason to come to New Westminster,

\textsuperscript{21}Interview with Barry Goodwin, 17 August 1990.

\textsuperscript{22}Ibid., 17 August 1990.
and it raised the profile of the city in the eyes of senior governments.23

5.5 Elements of the Revitalization Strategy - The "Catalysts"

In this section, the principal elements of New Westminster's downtown revitalization strategy - i.e., the institutional anchors, the revitalized waterfront, SkyTrain, and an upgraded Columbia Street - are evaluated in terms of their role in economic development. Inherent in this approach is a critique of the revitalization strategy.

A quantitative analysis of these "catalysts" is hampered by the unavailability of data. While economic impact studies of each project would assist in the evaluation of the City's revitalization strategy, there is no statistical data that could be used to compare the impact of one catalyst over another. Furthermore, as New Westminster City planning staff point out, the various public agencies that have invested in the downtown - such as BC Transit, Douglas College and FCC - would probably attribute much of the success of the program to their particular projects.

It may also be premature, at this point, to undertake such a study because the City has only recently initiated the final phase of downtown revitalization - i.e., the physical upgrading of Columbia Street. It is, however, possible to evaluate the catalysts in qualitative terms; and, inferences about their economic impact can be drawn from the data that is available.

23Interview with Ken Cameron, 14 August 1990.
As a researcher, one of my objectives was to rank the various catalysts in terms of their overall impact on downtown revitalization. Because of data limitations, and the complexities of the revitalization strategy, the catalysts are loosely evaluated on the basis of their perceived economic, social and symbolic contributions.

5.5.1 Institutional Anchors

The "institutional anchors" were intended to be a catalyst of activity in the downtown, and a demonstration of the Provincial Government's commitment to New Westminster. While the true economic impact of Douglas College is not known, preliminary studies indicate that students do not make many purchases in the downtown. 24 Douglas College - like other educational institutions - has internalized many of its service requirements, such that books, school supplies, food, clothing and personal services may be purchased on campus. In addition, the college is supplied with various materials by major contractors from outside the local community. 25

While Douglas College has yet to prove itself as an economic catalyst for the downtown, it is significant as a social development tool. Douglas College offers university transfer and diploma programs, and a broad range of credit and non-credit courses. In this capacity, the college is a "bridging" institution between the

24Interview with Barry Goodwin, 17 August 1990.

25Interview with Steve Scheving, Planner, City of New Westminster, 22 August 1990.
local school system and the two local universities. And, for the working population, it provides opportunities for job retraining within the community.

The Law Courts and Land Registry are important employers and procurers of services - e.g., legal, secretarial, translation services, etc.. Together with Douglas College, the Law Courts complex is an important generator of activity in downtown New Westminster. In symbolic terms, the institutional anchors give the public sector a high profile in New Westminster. And, the attractive buildings, landscaping, and open space are an important public amenity in the downtown.

Since the downtown revitalization program is still ongoing, it will probably be some time before the true economic impacts of these institutions can be measured. Perhaps the students, faculty, staff and other users of these institutions will spend more time and money on Columbia Street once the physical upgrading and business development projects are completed. In the case of downtown New Westminster, the market area has been restored, but the quality of the product has yet to improve.

5.5.2 The Revitalized Waterfront

The development concept for the New Westminster waterfront was modelled upon successful projects in Boston, Baltimore and other cities. Redevelopment for high-density residential and commercial uses was advanced by the British Columbia Development Corporation
(BCDC) as a catalyst for achieving broader development objectives for downtown New Westminster.

There is general agreement that waterfront redevelopment was an important catalyst in the overall revitalization strategy. There is some disagreement, however, as to which was more significant - the waterfront or SkyTrain? Barry Goodwin sees the waterfront and SkyTrain as a "combined catalyst" in that, together, they have played a powerful catalytic role. If only one of the two projects had been feasible, Goodwin believes that the waterfront would have brought more benefit to the city. The revitalized waterfront provides a major public amenity, and is a "nice place to live and work." With SkyTrain alone, people could move through the city but would have little reason to venture into the downtown.²⁶

Ken Cameron points to the rediscovery of the waterfront as a unique amenity for the city of New Westminster - i.e., an attractive urban environment, unlike any other in the Lower Mainland. Cameron states that the Downtown Plan and the overall revitalization strategy have taken full advantage of the waterfront's amenity value. However, he considers the waterfront to be a "secondary" catalyst because it provided FCC with a means of supporting and marketing the opportunities afforded by SkyTrain - i.e., the "principal" catalyst, from the viewpoint of the marketplace.²⁷

According to Graham Farstad, New Westminster City Planner - "the new waterfront says that New Westminster is a redeveloping

²⁶ Interview with Barry Goodwin, 17 August 1990.
²⁷ Interview with Ken Cameron, 14 August 1990.
community, rather than a community in decline."²⁸ Farstad credits the participation of the Provincial Government, through the First Capital City Development Company (FCC) - and not the waterfront, per se - as the major catalyst after SkyTrain. He sees FCC's role on the waterfront as being more significant than either Douglas College or the Law Courts in stimulating developer interest in the downtown.

5.5.3 Columbia Street Upgrading

While the physical and commercial upgrading of Columbia Street has only recently been initiated - it is worthy of discussion, at this point, because many of the revitalization initiatives have already shown promising results.

It had long been acknowledged that something had to be done about Columbia Street if the downtown was ever to make a comeback. However, there were many obstacles to upgrading the street - the largest being what Ken Cameron calls, "nitty gritty problems of ownership, public attitude and image."²⁹

The first step towards revitalization was to change the complacent attitudes of politicians, property owners and business people. Critical in this endeavour was the involvement of key individuals who lobbied politicians, and made presentations to property owners, merchants and the general public about the need for revitalization. The next step was to improve the public image of

²⁸Interview with Graham Farstad, City Planner, City of New Westminster, 22 August 1990.

²⁹Interview with Ken Cameron, 14 August 1990.
the downtown - both within the city and throughout the Lower Mainland. Several development agencies were involved in promoting the downtown in the early- and mid-1980's. Prominent among these are the New Westminster Economic Development Association (NWEDA) and the Downtown New Westminster Association (DNWA).

The DNWA retained the services of Urbanics Consultants to prepare a development strategy for downtown New Westminster. The objectives of the DNWA were to improve the physical environment of the downtown, and to encourage a better retail mix - with an emphasis on uniqueness, variety and quality. The strategy proposed by Urbanics is a comprehensive approach to downtown revitalization which incorporates street beautification, heritage preservation, and collective marketing and management techniques. Each component of this strategy is supported by Provincial legislation and some form of public assistance (financial or administrative).

The physical upgrading of Columbia Street, between Fourth and Eighth Streets, was completed in June 1990. Roadwork improvements were jointly-funded by the City and Province, on a 50/50 basis. Under the Downtown Revitalization Program (DRP), the costs of "beautification" - i.e., decorative street lamps, sidewalk pavers, street banners, furniture and landscaping - are shared by the City (Province) and property owners, on a 50/50 basis.

---

Through a Heritage Area Revitalization Program (HARP) designation, owners of heritage buildings will be able to undertake facade improvements and have a portion of their costs reimbursed by the Province - provided that renovations are in accordance with approved design guidelines. The City is administering the HARP program in downtown New Westminster, and will disburse up to $300,000 in Provincial funds over a period of three years (1990-1992).

In December 1989, City Council approved the establishment of a Business Improvement Area (BIA) in the downtown. Under the BIA program, downtown business and property owners can organize and finance effective marketing, promotional and revitalization programs. The BIA is funded through a special levy on commercial properties within the BIA boundaries. This tax is collected by the City and is provided annually to the BIA Board of Management, which administers the various BIA projects. Major projects include the preparation of a commercial space inventory, a data base on downtown New Westminster, and a promotional video which will highlight the waterfront, SkyTrain and other amenities in the downtown.31

The sharing of office space between the staff of the BIA, HARP and Tourism Development programs will ensure a well-coordinated revitalization effort. Given the proven success of BIA programs in Ontario and other parts of Canada - the New Westminster BIA, in

31Interview with Nettie Tam, Coordinator, Downtown New Westminster Business Improvement Society, New Westminster, B.C., 22 August 1990.
conjunction with HARP and DRP projects, has a tremendous potential for revitalizing the downtown area.

5.6 Summary

Based on discussions with interviewees, the following list is an attempt at ranking the various "catalysts" in terms of their overall contribution towards downtown revitalization and the development of a Regional Town Centre. They are ranked numerically, from most to least significant. Those catalysts indicated by a letter of the alphabet are considered to be contributing elements, without which the principal catalysts would not be possible.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 5.1 - A RANKING OF THE &quot;CATALYSTS&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. SkyTrain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Revitalized Waterfront</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. First Capital City Development Company (FCC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. The Community Plan for Downtown New Westminster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. The Mandatory Development Permit System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Columbia Street Upgrading(^{22})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Business Improvement Area (BIA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Downtown Revitalization Program (DRP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Heritage Area Revitalization Program (HARP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Douglas College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The Law Courts Complex</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{22}\)Expected ranking when revitalization is complete.
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate "Westminster Quay" in light of existing development opportunities and the expectations of planners, politicians, and the general public. It begins with an overview of what has materialized on the New Westminster waterfront since the mid-1980's. The "new" waterfront is assessed in terms of image and design, its relationship to the existing urban fabric, and the fulfillment of planning and development objectives. This assessment is based, in part, on a comparison with other waterfront development projects.

6.1 Overview of Development

The development potential of the New Westminster waterfront was realized by the British Columbia Development Corporation, which put forward the idea of redeveloping the waterfront for a mix of residential, commercial and recreational land-uses, and using the redeveloped waterfront as a catalyst for downtown revitalization. This was not a new concept; it was modelled upon successful projects in the United States. However, the New Westminster project is unique in terms of planning and policy initiatives, and the cooperation of various levels of government. At the local level, it was part of a strategy to revitalize the downtown core; at the regional level, it was necessary to support the development of a Regional Town Centre; and, at the provincial level - it provided the government with an opportunity to showcase Provincial development
policies, and demonstrate its commitment to the people of New Westminster.

The major issues addressed in planning for redevelopment include: opening up the waterfront for public use, and creating a major public amenity; encouraging a wide range of complementary land-uses and activities; reducing the negative impacts of the railway; and improving the quality of the urban environment.

The first phase of "Westminster Quay" is nearing completion on an 18.2 hectare site, situated between Eighth Street and the Lulu Island Railway Bridge. When completed, the project will include 1,200 residential units, a 126-room hotel, 6,500 m² of retail space, 2,800 m² of office space, a 1.8 km pedestrian esplanade, and 6.5 hectares of public open space (36 percent of the total site area).

The second phase of development at Westminster Quay is taking place on the eastern portion of the site, between Eighth and Elliot Streets. This project is known as "Westminster Pier," and will be built in four stages, beginning in the Fall of 1990, by Toronto-based Graywood Developments Ltd.. The development proposal calls for eight 110-unit residential towers - for a total 880 condominium apartments.

Because of the narrowness of the Westminster Pier site, and its proximity to truck and railway traffic, the unsightly Front Street parkade, and derelict Front Street buildings - the project has been designed to make the most of these shortcomings. Firstly, since a significant portion of the property lies beneath the Fraser River, the pedestrian esplanade and other structures will be built on
pilings and will extend out over the water. Secondly, the buildings will be built above a multi-level parking garage, such that ground floor units will rise about five-storeys above Front Street. And, thirdly - the project will be served by an elevated roadway, and will be connected to Columbia Street by a level overpass. All units will be oriented to a river and/or mountain view, and are priced $200,000 and up.¹

To the west of Westminster Quay, the Molnar Group is developing "The Renaissance" and other projects at "Westminster Quay II." This development will add a further 1400 condominium apartments and townhomes to the waterfront - for a grand total of about 3500 units. Plans for the site include a one-kilometer extension of the pedestrian esplanade, and the introduction of lagoons and waterways to enhance the public open spaces, and to provide internal units with a waterfront outlook.

While the Molnar project is based on a Venetian theme, and is quite distinct, it should be compatible with earlier projects. The 1989 amendments to the New Westminster Redevelopment Act expanded the Downtown Plan boundaries to include the Molnar site. In this way, the project is governed by the same design guidelines as well as the mandatory development permit process.

¹Source: Graywood Developments' promotional brochure for "Westminster Pier."
6.2 The Image of the New Waterfront

Prior to redevelopment of the waterfront, New Westminster had a very negative image. It was seen as "the armpit of the Lower Mainland; ...a terrible place that was going nowhere." The new waterfront has turned this image around to one of progress and prosperity - an image that has spilled over into other parts of the city.

Through redevelopment, the waterfront has brought new enthusiasm to the Royal City. In particular, it has highlighted the unique public amenity afforded by the Fraser River, and other features of the city that contribute to a livable environment - such as a high level of public services and amenities.

Though the waterfront has improved the image of the city as a whole, it remains somewhat separate from the city. The waterfront is physically separated from the downtown by a stretch of railway tracks and a busy arterial roadway. While each phase of redevelopment has included pedestrian and vehicular overpasses to connect the waterfront with the city, these have not been a strong enough link. The waterfront remains an "island" of luxury condominiums, adjacent to the as yet unimproved downtown.

The psychological separation is perhaps due to this physical barrier, but also to the nature of development taking place on the waterfront. The housing and commercial developments have catered to a population segment that is quite different from that of the downtown area. Whereas the city has traditionally been a working-

---

2Interview with Barry Goodwin, 17 August 1990.
class community, the waterfront is home to a largely affluent population of young professionals and "empty-nesters." There is little association between downtown and waterfront residents. And, at present, there are few businesses on Columbia Street that cater to this new market.

In terms of physical design, there are few stylistic connections between the waterfront and the downtown. This is due to a conscious effort on the part of planners, designers and policy-makers not to draw upon the historical character of the downtown, but, rather - to build a new waterfront in striking contrast to the heritage streetscape. In part, this was perhaps intended to shed the downtown's declining image, and to convey a feeling of livability and progress.

Design guidelines were put in place to ensure the protection of views from uphill locations, to maintain a human scale of development, and to capitalize on the amenity opportunities afforded by a southern-exposed waterfront location. In this regard, the guidelines have preserved the traditional sense of scale in New Westminster, without replicating the local history.

Overall, the buildings on the waterfront appear somewhat generic. The public market, for example, is very similar in style to the "Harbourplace" pavilions in Baltimore, and to festival marketplaces in other cities. It seems that architects and developers have generally adopted proven and marketable designs for their waterfront projects. Some notable exceptions are: the

---

3 Interview with Barry Goodwin, 17 August 1990.
curvilinear, glass-clad towers of Westminster Pier; the Inn at Westminster Quay, which juts out into the river like an ocean-liner; and the Molnar Group's recreation of Venice, at Westminster Quay II.

Figure 6.1 - The Inn at Westminster Quay

6.3 The Waterfront Catalyst

It appears that municipal and regional planning objectives for the New Westminster waterfront have largely been achieved. The waterfront has been opened up for public use, and is an attractive and desirable place to live. Furthermore, the redeveloped
waterfront has proven to be a strong catalyst for economic
development, as evidenced by the city's unprecedented development
boom. As of June 1990, there were 48 residential, commercial and
mixed-use projects under construction in the city, or in the
development approval process - with a combined value of over $1
billion.4

Westminster Quay has played a catalytic role in changing the
city's negative image, showcasing its development potential, and
stimulating developer interest in the downtown. However, it is
difficult to quantify this contribution due to the influence of
other catalysts. Barry Goodwin was quite correct when he called the
waterfront and SkyTrain a "combined catalyst," because, as others
will agree - the Downtown Plan has capitalized on both the amenity
value of the waterfront, and improved accessibility through
SkyTrain, in supporting the City's downtown revitalization program.

The success of Westminster Quay as an economic development tool
is evident in the spinoff developments occurring on the waterfront -
i.e., the Molnar Group's "Westminster Quay II," and MacMillan
Bloedel's and Bosa Bros' "Port Royal" proposal for the Queensborough
waterfront. Port Royal is currently in the development approval
process. The proposal calls for a residential development of about
1170 units - comprised of 200 single-detached houses, and 970
apartment units in both high-rise and low-rise structures. This
project was made feasible by major transportation improvements -
such as the Alex Fraser Bridge and highway system, and SkyTrain -

4Source: City of New Westminster Planning Department, June 1990.
and by the proven marketability of waterfront housing in New Westminster.

6.4 A Comparison With Other Waterfront Projects

The cities and projects profiled in Chapter Three were selected to demonstrate the following:

1. The range of development opportunities available to communities of different size and location;
2. The complexity of the planning and development process for waterfront development;
3. The use of waterfront development as a catalyst for broader development objectives; and
4. The politicization of waterfront projects due to conflicts between various development agencies, governments and community groups.

Common to most waterfront development projects are: development opportunities afforded by declining industrial and port facilities; public and private initiatives for building a post-industrial service economy; and the notion of reclaiming the waterfront for public use. Given this common starting point, and the successful development of landmark projects in Boston, Baltimore and other cities - it is not surprising that waterfront developments have taken on a similar and somewhat generic appearance - both in terms of land-use and design. Where projects obviously differ is in terms of scale. The profiles showed a wide range of development
opportunities - from a revitalized fishing village in Steveston, B.C., to the development of a new city in the London Docklands.

New Westminster is an interesting case study because it is a relatively small city, bearing many of the characteristics of resource towns in the B.C. Interior - i.e., a limited economic base, a close-knit blue-collar community, a "Main Street" commercial core, etc.. On the other hand, it is located in the Greater Vancouver metropolitan area - and, as a suburb of Vancouver, it shares some of the characteristics of a large city - i.e., a decidedly urban character, relatively high densities, and a broader range of services and public amenities.

In evaluating the New Westminster waterfront, it is worthwhile to recall the waterfront profiles to see if Westminster Quay is typical of contemporary waterfront developments:

Westminster Quay is similar to Battery Park City in terms of its river location, public esplanade, land-use mix, and upscale developments. Other common elements are the use of waterfront development to strengthen the viability of the downtown area, and the role of a public development agency in implementing the project.

Westminster Quay and the London Docklands development were both intended to stem economic decline, and to "upgrade" the social character of their respective environs through an influx of affluent households. In the London Docklands, redevelopment has led to gentrification in adjacent boroughs, and has intensified class distinctions and conflicts between old and new residents. While the polarization between income groups is not as pronounced in New
Westminster - there has been some displacement of vulnerable households due to redevelopment activity. For the most part, however, new development in New Westminster is taking place on underutilized commercial and industrial properties, and there have been few residential units lost through demolition. However, as the Vancouver example demonstrates - further displacement can be expected through gentrification of uphill neighbourhoods.

The London Docklands provide another parallel with New Westminster with respect to rapid transit and its catalytic role in stimulating development outside of the metropolitan core. The Docklands population is served by the Docklands Light Railway, which provides direct access to the City of London. In addition, there is an extensive commuter ferry system in operation along the Thames River.

The Toronto and New Westminster waterfronts are similar in terms of the conditions prior to redevelopment. Both waterfronts were effectively severed from their downtowns by a transportation corridor - i.e., arterial roads and railways. The decline of port facilities and related industry, and the advent of suburban commercial development weakened the relative position of the downtown within the larger region. In both cases, the motivation for waterfront redevelopment was to reverse the cycle of economic decline, and to strengthen the commercial base in the downtown.

---

Interview with Graham Farstad, City Planner, City of New Westminster, New Westminster, B.C., 22 August 1990.
The two cities differ considerably in their development approach. In Toronto, there was little intergovernmental cooperation and no comprehensive planning for "Harbourfront." As a result, the project has evolved on a quay-by-quay basis, without the benefit of an overall plan. Furthermore, the City, having no jurisdiction over Harbourfront, missed out on a great opportunity to plan for integrated development of the combined waterfront and railway lands.

The development of Westminster Quay, on the other hand, was part of a comprehensive plan to revitalize downtown New Westminster, and to support the development of a Regional Town Centre. It was not an isolated project but, rather - one of several catalysts for achieving broader development objectives for the city.

Based on this comparison, it would appear that a comprehensive plan is an essential ingredient for successful waterfront development. An area plan for the waterfront should outline community objectives for waterfront land-uses, in the context of broader objectives for the city as a whole. It is important to view the waterfront as part of a larger urban area, in order to capitalize on its amenity value for economic development.

This is particularly true in smaller communities, where the importance of the waterfront as an economic development tool is heightened by a declining economic base, and limited opportunities for industrial development. Economic development strategies in smaller communities have utilized the waterfront's amenity value in stimulating new activities such as tourism. The biggest challenge
in this regard is balancing much-needed economic development with the preservation of desirable aspects of community life - i.e., cultural heritage, livability and character.

6.5 Negative Impacts of Waterfront Revitalization

Given the successful marketing of the New Westminster waterfront as a desirable residential location, it is important to note any negative impacts the project may have had on the city as a whole. Two obvious considerations are: redevelopment pressures on heritage resources, and the depletion of the affordable housing stock.

In guiding the revitalization of its downtown - the City of New Westminster will have to strike a balance between redevelopment and restoration. One of the city's greatest assets is its impressive stock of heritage resources. The city's heritage character is perhaps most evident along Columbia Street - which is currently being upgraded through street beautification, business development programs, and facade improvements. Given an allowable floor-space ratio (fsr) of 5.2, under the present zoning, it would appear that future "upgrading" will take the form of redevelopment. While it may be profitable to restore larger buildings, more modest structures will likely be demolished as their sites are put to more intensive use. It is quite feasible that Columbia Street will lose its historic character in the near future - especially if the current development boom continues.

*Interview with Graham Farstad, 22 August 1990.*
New Westminster has long been one of the most affordable areas in the inner metropolitan region. The current development boom has put upward pressure on land and housing prices, and has contributed to a very low rental vacancy rate. At this point in time, it may be advisable to introduce some social legislation at the municipal level to ensure future affordability — i.e., by requiring developers of major projects to set aside a proportion of allowable units for social housing, as is done in Toronto and Vancouver. However, there does not appear to be any political will towards this end in New Westminster. There is a widely held belief that "New Westminster is carrying its fair share of the regional social housing burden." And, given the fact that affordability has not really been a problem up until now, some people would argue that there is too much social housing in the city — both public and private — and that the existing housing stock needs to be upgraded through more upscale development.

Economic integration, or "social mix," was never an objective of planners and policy-makers in downtown New Westminster. Instead, a conscious effort was made to "upgrade" the downtown population through the construction of luxury apartment and townhouse units. The first phase of Westminster Quay does include two housing co-

7While average apartment rents in New Westminster remained below the metropolitan average in April 1990 — New Westminster's apartment vacancy rate stood at 0.1 percent, compared to 0.9 percent for the CMA. (Source: CMHC's Rental Market Survey, April 1990).

8Interview with Ken Cameron, 14 August 1990.

9"Private" social housing refers to single-room occupancy hotels, and other privately-owned low-rent accommodation.
operatives, but, as stated in Chapter Five - the non-market component was used as an incentive for developers; the co-op projects were a guaranteed sale and could offset some of the uncertainty surrounding the sale of market units. Subsequent projects in Westminster Quay II are considerably more upscale, and are being targeted to the "empty-nester" market.

6.6 Summary

Westminster Quay has helped to build a positive image for the city of New Westminster, and has attracted significant private investment. Overall, these positive contributions outweigh the potentially negative impacts of waterfront redevelopment. The latter are also more difficult to ascertain because of limited data on displacement, and the subjective aspects of heritage conservation. Redevelopment of the waterfront has provided the city with a major public amenity, and has raised the livability level through an improved quality of life, and greater economic opportunities.
7.0 CONCLUSIONS

An underlying theme of this thesis is the notion of "transition." The advent of the services age has forced urban communities into a period of transition as they undergo economic, social and physical restructuring. These changes are necessary if communities are to adapt and survive in the post-industrial era.

The redevelopment of urban industrial waterfronts is perhaps the most dramatic evidence of physical restructuring in the post-industrial city. It has been brought about by a variety of different factors: the obsolescence of traditional port facilities, the relocation of industry, the clean-up of urban waterways, a return to inner-city living, and public demands for an accessible waterfront and a quality urban environment.

Waterfront redevelopment is significant in the post-industrial city as a public policy tool for achieving broader social and economic development objectives. A social motivation for redevelopment stems from the waterfront's potential for accommodating new urban land-uses, amenities and community services. In particular, the redevelopment of urban waterfronts has provided new opportunities for affordable housing in the core areas of cities.

As part of an amenities strategy for economic development, waterfront redevelopment is promoted as a "catalyst" for economic restructuring. By capitalizing on the amenity value of their
waterfronts, cities are hoping to become more attractive to a skilled workforce, potential investors, and new economic activities.

The nature and form of waterfront developments is shaped by structural and demographic forces, general economic conditions, public planning and land-use controls, and the motivation behind redevelopment. The politicization of waterfront development projects is indicative of the waterfront's potential as a powerful economic development tool. Conflicts are inherent in the redevelopment process due to competition between various business and social interest groups, the vocal concerns of local area residents, and the involvement of various levels of government.

In theory, the urban waterfront has been reclaimed for all residents of the post-industrial city. The notion of public access and the creation of public amenities are fundamental principles of waterfront development. In practice, however, the benefits of a revitalized waterfront are not shared equally. As the waterfront profiles have shown, the nature of the waterfront land-use mix is generally biased towards high-end commercial development and luxury housing.

Through the redevelopment of their waterfronts, communities have an opportunity to redress a range of social and economic issues. The social development potential is seldom realized, however, because redevelopment is primarily commercially-motivated.

The nature of redevelopment activity taking place on the urban waterfront raises questions about elitism and equity in the post-industrial city. The education and skill requirements of the post-
industrial job market form the basis for class distinctions in urban society. As a consequence of inequality in access to education and economic opportunity, many individuals are effectively barred from enjoying the lifestyle opportunities of the "livable" post-industrial city.

With continued technological advancement - people and capital will be even more mobile in the future than they are today, and will seek out those locations that offer the best combination of economic and lifestyle opportunities. With greater amounts of leisure time - made possible through increased automation and improved telecommunications - there will be greater demands for recreational opportunities and public amenities. As such, the waterfront amenity will increase in value, and competition between potential land-users will lead to more upscale development.

It is hoped that, with greater awareness of social and environmental issues, some steps will be taken to redress the issue of equity in the post-industrial city. If some level of economic integration is not achieved, the waterfront will not have been reclaimed for all residents but, rather, for the post-industrial élite.
I. The Post-Industrial City


II. **Urban Waterfront Development - General**


III. Urban Waterfront Development - Selected Cities

New York, N.Y.


London, England


Toronto, Ontario


Vancouver, British Columbia


Leiren, Hall. "Relocate Industry So People Can Move In." The Vancouver Sun, 3 July 1973, page unknown.


Steveston (Richmond), British Columbia


Other Canadian Cities


Other U.S. Cities


Ivy, Robert A.. "New Orleans: Its Fair was Financial Disaster but a Boon to the Waterfront." Architecture, (July 1986), 48-54.


IV. Case Study - Westminster Quay, New Westminster, B.C.

Planning Reports and other Government Publications


Corporation of the City of New Westminster, B.C. Urban Renewal Study.


Part Three: The Urban Renewal Program, November 1966.


Local Newspaper Accounts


Wilson, Mark. "End of an Era for Oldest Port." *The Province*, 13 September 1978, p.18

Other Sources


V. Interviews

Birchall, Diana. Area Planner, City of Toronto Planning and Development Department, Toronto, Ontario. Interview, 13 July 1989.

Cameron, Ken. Director, Development Services, Greater Vancouver Regional District, Burnaby, B.C.. Interview, 14 August 1990.


Jamieson, Alex. Planner, Corporation of the Township of Richmond, Richmond, B.C.. Interview, 20 July 1990.

