A STUDY OF HARIBHADRA'S *ABHISAMAYĀLAṀKĀRĀLOKA*

*PRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀ-VYĀKHYĀ:*

By

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B.A., McGill University, 1970

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Department of **Asian Studies**

The University of British Columbia
Vancouver, Canada

Date **13 April 1989**
ABSTRACT

Haribhadra was an Indian Buddhist writing in about the year 800 during the reign of Dharma-pāla, the greatest of the Pāla kings who held sway over north-east India from the 8th to the 12th centuries. His works have been largely ignored, up until this point, by Western scholarship, even though they had a great influence on the course of later Indian and Tibetan scholastic Buddhism.

Haribhadra's major work is the *Abhisamayālaṁkārāloka* *Prajñā-pāramitā-vyākhyā, Commentary on the "Perfection of Wisdom" With the Light [Provided by Maitreya's] "Ornament for Clear Realization"* (abbreviated title AAA). It is not so much a single book as a composite of three: (a) the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñā-pāramitā, Perfection of Wisdom in 8,000 Lines* (A), considered to be a revelation, (b) the *Abhisamayālaṁkāra, Ornament for Clear Realization* (AA), an aphoristic codification, at least according to Haribhadra's point of view, of the topics in the revelation, and (c) the AAA itself, Haribhadra's explanatory sentences or commentary which links the A and AA together.

The A can be characterized as a mystic-religious work. It sets forth the doctrine of emptiness (*śūnyatā*) or no-self (*anātman*), also called lack of own-being, absence of *sva-bhāva*, a perfect wisdom which consists in complete detachment from all phenomena, such that all phenomena are seen to be illusory (*māyā*). Directed towards people who have an intuitive understanding of the value of altruistic endeavor the A says, paradoxically, that there ultimately are no living beings to be helped, no motivation to help them, and no state of perfection by means of which their needs are met.

The AA is a highly scholastic systematization concerned, first and foremost, with the delineation of the path (*mārga* = inner spiritual development) particularly at its higher levels. There is a striking contrast between the complete lack of systematization in the A and the detailed, step by step, delineation of the stages of the path, levels (*bhūmi*) and Buddha bodies (*kāya*) which one meets with in the AA.

The difference in the general tenor of the two texts is carried over into the AAA, which seeks to explain the former with the help of the latter. Those sections in the AAA directly explaining the sūtra which have no parallel in the AA are more religious in tone, more faith-oriented. Those sections in the AAA
detailing a topic of the AA, and explaining how that topic is found in the sūtra, are more scholastic and difficult to penetrate. These latter sections presuppose considerable familiarity with terminology and theories about the path and its structure.

When the topic of the AA naturally corresponds with a division in the A the structural tension that comes from trying to combine two different books together in a single unit is not apparent. Sometimes, however, there is no apparent correspondence. At such points in the text there is a structural tension and the thread, which Haribhadra, at least, felt kept the different parts of his work together as a coherent whole, may slip from the reader’s hand. To place this thread firmly in the reader’s hand the dissertation clarifies (a) the different layers of text which are embodied in the AAA and (b) issues concerning the path which Haribhadra’s comments are indirectly or directly addressing.

In regard to the latter, the language of discourse has two different vocabularies: (a) the terminology of Vasubandhu’s *Abhidharma-kośa* and (b) the terminology found in the AA.

There are considerable difficulties involved in attempting to systematically present the AAA, for the first time, in a Western language. These difficulties are mostly the result of the many layers of historical material merged together into the single text of the AAA, as well as of loss of some information and Haribhadra’s Sanskrit style.

To overcome the difficulty that results from the need to retain in a translation (a) the integrity of the book as a religious text, and (b) the historical reality that words, and particularly technical terms, often mean different things at different periods, the following strategies are employed: (i) The Sanskrit text of the translated portion (two-thirds of the first chapter or a little over 80 of the AAA’s nearly 1000 pages) has been presented in Devanāgarī based on a comparison of the earlier editions and the Tibetan translations. (ii) The text itself is presented, as far as possible, in an unbroken literal translation that lets Haribhadra speak for himself. (iii) By using modern technology the different layers of the text are consistently identified and separated by use of bold, italic, underline and quotation marks. (iv) The important historical issues the text raises, and the central concepts discussed in the three texts, are identified and discussed in a sufficiently detailed introduction.
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My indebtedness is also to Dr. J. Hopkins of the University of Virginia Department of Religious Studies. Dr. Hopkins, and his wife Dr. Elizabeth Napper, scholar in residence at the University of Virginia, have been tirelessly helpful to me. I would never have begun this dissertation, and once begun, would never have finished it, without their continual encouragement.

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The research on which this thesis is based was carried out under doctoral fellowships from the Norman Mackenzie Memorial Fund, the Killam Trust and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
The sections of the thesis are numbered consecutively in order to facilitate cross-referencing. A reference to a section of the thesis is indicated by numbers in parenthesis preceded by §, e.g., [§3.2.1].

In the translation all words not found in the text itself are enclosed in square brackets []. The only exception to this rule is the section heading in bold type preceded by a number. These headings, which usually reflect a natural break in the text, have been added to make the text easier to read.

The edition of the Skt text is basically a presentation of Wogihara’s (1973) version, with some changes based on Tucci (1932), Obermiller (1933-36), Vaidya (1960) and the Tibetan translations. Its primary function is to allow readers ready access to the original text and to obviate the need for the insertion of Skt into the body of the translation itself. It is presented in Devanāgarī, with hyphenation and some punctuation, designed to help, but not dictate, the probable correct reading. In both the translation and the Skt text the corresponding pages of Wogihara’s version are indicated by numbers preceded by W in smaller type, e.g., [w28.1]. Indented connected passages in italics indicate the Aṣṭa-sāhasrikā-prajñā-pāramitā, as do words and phrases in bold embedded in the text. Underlined words embodied in the text indicate the Abhisamayālaṃkāra. In order to avoid excessive clutter, paraphrases of, or direct quotation from, Ārya Vimuktisena’s Abhisamayālaṃkāra-vṛtti are indicated only occasionally in footnotes.

The symbol * indicates that the following word or title is the probable equivalent of a Tibetan translation. The symbol → indicates an acceptable emendation.
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<td>JIBS</td>
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<td>MAV</td>
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<td>MCB</td>
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PREFACE

Part one of the present work is a general introduction to the first chapter of Haribhadra’s *Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka* (AAA) and a specific discussion of the first chapter. Part two is an edition of the Sanskrit text and part three a translation.

Because of the sheer size of the text it has been necessary, for the present, to limit the scope of the work to a translation of two-thirds of the first chapter or a little over 80 of the AAA’s nearly 1000 pages. The translation covers the first six of the ten topics discussed in the first chapter of the AA. It breaks at the end of the exchange between the Buddha, Subhūti and Sāriputra, marked by the entry of Pūrṇa Maitrāyaṇī-putra. Since the last four topics of chapter one form a unit separate from the first six it is a convenient place to break the text.

For the sake of consistency, the introduction to the translation covers all the topics dealt with in the first chapter.

Haribhadra’s AAA is not so much a single book as a composite of three: the *Aṣṭa-sāhasrikā-prajñā-pāramitā* (A), a revelation, the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* (AA), an aphoristic codification of the topics in the revelation, and the AAA itself, a commentary which links the A and AA together.

There are considerable difficulties involved in translating Haribhadra. These difficulties are mostly the result of the many layers of historical material merged together into the single text of the AAA, as well as of loss of some information and Haribhadra’s Sanskrit style. The AA was probably written as much as three or four hundred years before the AAA, and the earlier portions of the A as much as five hundred years before that. Haribhadra, however, sets forth his explanation of the words and ideas of both earlier texts as an authentic (but claimed to be unoriginal) exposition of their original intent.

To overcome the difficulty that results from the need to retain in a translation (a) the integrity of the book as a religious text, and (b) the historical reality that words, and particularly technical terms, often mean different things at different periods I have used the following strategies: (i) The text itself is presented, as far as possible, in an unbroken literal translation that lets Haribhadra speak for himself. (ii) The different layers of the text are consistently identified and separated by use of bold, italic, underline and quotation marks. (iii) The
important historical issues the text raises, and the central concepts that are discussed in the three texts, are identified in the introduction that precedes the translation.

Though the translation into a modern Western language of a text the size and complexity of the AAA does present considerable difficulties the time has now come for an attempt to be made. The ground has been smoothed by earlier scholarship.

Preparation of an edition of the text close to what Haribhadra originally wrote presented few difficulties.¹ Much of the A and AA has already been made available in English by Obermiller and Conze.² Though it has been necessary to restore the parts of the A that Conze, in the interests of readability left out in his translation of the text, his work on the sūtra made the task of translating the AAA much easier. In regard to Conze’s translation of the AA, it was less helpful. Conze’s aim was simply to systematize the many lists and insert just enough glosses to make it intelligible. It has been necessary, therefore, to completely retranslate the text in a manner that allows the reader to recognize its original structure and language. Obermiller’s unfinished Analysis of the AA, which translates parts of the AAA, the AASphu and considerable Tib material has been less helpful for the present undertaking.³

¹ Editions of the A, AA, AAA and AAV by Tucci (1932), Obermiller (1933-36, 1970), Wogihara (1973), Pensa (1967) and Vaidya (1960) have been used.
³ Obermiller’s excellent work introduces much material from the later Tib scholastic tradition, particularly as found in the [Dga’ ldan->] Dge lugs sect. Although I have read the Tib material Obermüller consulted, besides Tib commentaries Obermüller did not consult, I have felt it better to try, as much as possible, to avoid reference to it in the interests of making less complicated an already complicated subject.
PART ONE:

INTRODUCTION
I THE AUTHOR

1.1 Haribhadra

Haribhadra (Seng ge bzang po)\(^1\) was writing in about the year 800 during the reign of Dharmapāla (rg. c. 770-810; Ruegg 1981:101, n. 320), the greatest of the Pāla kings. We know this from the colophon of the AAA (W994.15-22):

$$\begin{align*}
\text{I have written this fine } \text{panjika} \text{ (an exposition) which throws light on the truly real, having lived, with the support of the glorious Dharmapāla, in this excellent, glorious Trikatūka monastery, mine of all good qualities, which is rightly famed for virtue and ornamented by learned persons ... a distinguished place which has all prerequisites for happiness.}
\end{align*}$$

Through the power of those well-intentioned and generous souls who follow the view of Ārya Asaṅga, and also of [my] much learned and knowledgable good (bhadra) guru Vairocana, one called Hari the good (bhadra) got a little spark of intelligence and has, with devotion, composed this noble and sacred [commentary] in which the topics are totally clear.

We know little else about Vairocana, or for that matter Hari. According to Tāranātha and Bu ston, Haribhadra was from a royal family. His knowledge of

\(\text{Simha-bhadra was an earlier incorrect sanskritization of Seng ge bzang po.}\)
the PP was so great, according to Tāranātha, that he saw Ajita (=Maitreya, the author of the AA according to tradition) in a dream. He learned Madhyamaka from Śāntarakṣita and, perhaps as a younger disciple, studied alongside Kamalaśīla, a circumstance that would explain the quotations from, or paraphrases of, Kamalaśīla’s *Tattva-saṃgraha-pañjikā* (TSP) at W2.3 (Amano 1969), *Bhāvanā-krama* (BK) at W93.22, *Sarva-dharma-nīḥsvabhāva-siddhi* at W969ff (Moriyama 1984) and, possibly, *Sapta-śatika-prajñā-pāramitā-ṭīkā* at W5.16 in his work.

Haribhadra is not to be confused with the earlier Jaina writer Haribhadra Śūri (700-770), the author of, amongst other works, the *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya*, a compendium of Indian philosophies.

1.1.2 There is no record of any text on tantra by Haribhadra either in Skt or in the Tib *Bstan 'gyur*. This is surprising because he lived at a time when tantric Buddhism enjoyed royal patronage. During the reign of king Dharmapāla the *Guhya-saṃāja Tantra*, in particular, flourished and Haribhadra’s main disciple Buddha-jñāna was the originator of a major stream of explanation of tantra (Wayman 1983:25-6). Haribhadra was clearly familiar with tantric mythology.¹ But if he wrote any works on tantric Buddhism nothing survives. Anything he did write on tantra has been lost or was, possibly, published under a different name.

He wrote four texts on the PP: the AAA, AASphu,² a recast of the Pañca in eight chapters (*Le'u brgyad ma*) and Subodhini (*Bhagavad-ratna-guṇa-saṅcaya-gātā-pañjikā/Saṅcaya-gātā-vṛtti-subodhini*). Of these four books, which comprise the total known works of Haribhadra, only the AAA,

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¹ E.g., his description of Vajrapāṇi as Mahā-vajra-dhara (W5.6-10) or his exhortation to meditators in the Subodhini "to visualize their deity in the form of Vajradhara" (*ṛṣṇapīṭaka-bhakti-patitāḥ saṃdhi-vyākhyāna P5190:273.2.1).

² The Abhisamayālaṃkāra-nāma-prajñā-pāramitopadeśa-sāstra-vṛttiḥ *Sphutārthā* (P5191) or, Abhisamayālaṃkāra-kārikā-sāstra-vṛtti (Amano 1975), also known in Tib as ‘*grel cung* "Small Commentary" as distinct from ‘*grel chen* "Big Commentary (=AAA). The AASphu has the merit of expanding on the AA just enough, making it penetrable without again losing the reader in lists and subtopics. It is, unfortunately, at present only available in Tib translation and two Skt reconstructions (Amano 1975 and Tripāṭhi 1977). Unpublished fragments of a Skt manuscript of the AASphu are mentioned by Tucci (1932:v) and Amano (1975:1, n. 5).
Haribhadra’s most important work and the topic of this dissertation, is still definitely extant in Skt.

1.1.3 The AASphu is best understood as an abridgement of the AAA (Obermiller 1932-3, Amano 1975), and is smaller in scope. It omits detailed reference to the PP sūtras and, apart from some occasional expansion, supplies only the necessary framework for understanding the AA.

1.1.4 The translation of the recast Pañca is Haribhadra’s Le'u bṛgyad ma (‘Eight Chapters’). It gets its Tib name because the long and diverse discourses of the Pañca are organized along the lines of the eight abhisamayas, literally ‘clear realizations,’ but in this context ‘chapter’ (§8.1), set forth in the AA. It is not an original work, in the usual sense of the term, but a re-organization of the Sūtra. The topics listed in the AA are spelled out clearly after each section. For example, AA1.19-20 lists 22 analogies for "production of an [altruistic] mind [set on] enlightenment" (bodhi-cittotpāda). The first of these analogies is given as earth (prthivi). In Haribhadra’s recast version, the text of the Pañca (Dutt 1934:19.4-6) is followed by a few words indicating the corresponding part of the AA:

Furthermore, Sāriputra, a great Bodhisattva who wishes to completely come face to face with all dharmas should stand in perfect wisdom. [This is the bodhi-cittotpāda] exemplified by earth and accompanied by longing.

1.1.5 The Subodhini is an aid to understanding the oldest of the PP sūtras, the Ratna-guṇa-saṁcaya-gāthā (RGS, Conze 1960). Haribhadra employs the

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1 Listed as P5188. This Pañca-PP would be very similar to manuscript P1 in Dutt’s edition of the Pañca (1934), listed by Conze (1960:36) as Paris Bibl. Nat. Skt 68-70.

2 Unless ‘dharmas,’ in this context, refers only to living beings I do not know what this means.

3 The authorship of the Subodhini appears to be questioned by Conze (1960:55), apparently on the basis of an obscure passage in Tsongkha pa’s AAGser: 14.4-6: 預度慧見殊勝解脫 預度慧見殊勝解脫 預度慧見殊勝解脫 預度慧見殊勝解脫 預度慧見殊勝解脫 預度慧見殊勝解脫 預度慧見殊勝解脫
Finally Bu ston (Obermiller 1932:156-9) mentions, besides these four works, "also the PP-bhāvanā, etc." as being written by Haribhadra. There is no other record of these works.

1.2 The theme which runs through Haribhadra's writing is that the AA is equally a commentary on all the main PP sūtras (in particular, on the A, Pañca and Sata). This is a particular insight Haribhadra believes to have been vouchsafed to him by Maitreya, and is one of the primary reasons he wrote the books he did, as is apparent in the opening lines of his AASphu where he pays homage to the PP, "[wanting] to delineate the stanzas of the Ornament [=AA] as an ornament for all [the sūtras]." Dignāga, whose Prajñā-pāramitā-piṇḍārtha (PPPi:7, W12.7-8) Haribhadra quotes, had already made the point that the PP sūtras, though differing in length, embody the same teaching.

1. The text mentioned as "sloka-pratishūla-karika" by Haribhadra in his AASphu. The admittedly crucial gloss "all sūtras" is based on AAPser:24.6.
Thus this A is not short of any topics spoken about [in the longer PP sūtras]. It is asserted to be a condensed text. Its topics are just those that have been spoken of there.

And Ārya Vimuktisena, the most important influence on Haribhadra after Maitreya, had already used the A A to explain the Pañca. Haribhadra, however, relates the AA’s delineation of the path (mārga = inner spiritual development) directly to other PP sūtras like the A. He appears to have reasoned that if the shorter A includes the entire teaching on emptiness (śūnyatā) found in the longer sūtras, it must also include the teaching on the path which the AA sets forth in such careful detail. It is difficult to be certain about all the implications Haribhadra drew from this. Nevertheless, by stressing the intimate relationship between emptiness (the explicit topic of the sūtras) on the one hand, and the path (the hidden topic of the sūtras) on the other, Haribhadra does seem to be subtly adjusting the meaning of emptiness. His concern appears to be to ensure that emptiness, and the perfect wisdom that knows it, are defined in such a way that they do not lose the capacity to give rise to the entire range of mental states, starting from those of the religious neophyte, up to and including the state of a Buddha.

Still, Haribhadra’s contribution is found not so much in original thought. He was primarily an organizer of others’ work, and a master at setting the ideas of other writers in a helpful juxtaposition. One should not, however, on that account make light of his contribution. For, by linking together what were previously quite diverse strands of Buddhist religious thought, he brought PP study based on the AA into the mainstream, and initiated a tradition of commentarial literature that continues amongst Tibetans even until the present day.

1.2.2 The Pāla kings held sway over north-east India from the 8th to the 12th centuries, after the demise of the Gupta dynasty and before Muslim rule finally ended the extended classical period of Indian history. At the apogee of its power under king Dharmapāla, the Pāla dynasty controlled an area, centered around the triangle formed by the modern cities of Patnā, Varānasī and Gayā, that stretched as far west as present day Lucknow and south into the northern reaches of the Deccan (Basham 1954:70). To the north the Himalayan kingdom of Tibet
had reached the peak of its secular power under Khri srong lde btsan (742-794 or 804; Stein 1972:63-64). Some 30 years before Haribhadra composed his AAA, Tibetan cavalry had penetrated as far as the northern areas of the Gangetic plain and received tribute from the Pāla rulers. It was an important and fortuitous juxtaposition of events. The twilight of Indian Buddhism heralded the dawn of 1000 years of Tibetan Buddhist culture. Tibetan ecclesiastical civilization, with its strong emphasis on tantra and the PP, bears the unmistakable imprint of the Pāla dynasty, and the importance of Haribhadra’s contribution is fully appreciated only when his influence on later Tibetan scholasticism is fully realized.

This Buddhism, which gives retrospective importance to Haribhadra, reached its fullest development in Tibet, but it began to develop even before Haribhadra’s death. The scholastic study of the PP in large monastic universities like Nālandā and Vikramāśīla accorded Haribhadra considerable stature. There were a number of commentaries and summaries of his work (§4.12), many unfortunately now lost.
II HARIBHADRA’S TEXT

2.1 Here, the reader will find (a) a brief discussion of the AAA’s title, (b) a brief summary of the structure of the commentary and (c) a more detailed consideration of the structure and contents of the first chapter.

2.2 The title

The full title of the AAA is Abhisamayālaṁkārālōkā Prajñā-pāramitā-vyākhyā (Commentary on the "Perfection of Wisdom" With the Light [Provided by Maitreya’s] "Ornament for Clear Realization"). The different possible meanings of abhisamaya are discussed elsewhere (§8.1-8.10). Wogihara, Obermiller, Tucci and Conze usually cite the work as Ālokā, and though the title is sometimes emended to Abhisamayālaṁkārālōkā (short final, masculine gender) [Prajñā-pāramitā-vyākhyā] or Ālōka, under the influence of titles such as Dhvanyaloka or Madhyamakālōka, there is no manuscript evidence for this emendation. There is some evidence in the colophon, (W994.20-21) however, for a bahuvrihi compound (abhisamayālaṁkārasya ālokāḥ yasyām), with a feminine ending. In explaining the title, Haribhadra says योजकारोपितमभिमये तदालोक-प्रकाशिका | प्रज्ञा-पारमिता-व्याख्या समाप्तेऽयं शुभोदया, “This PP commentary which has a good future and which makes things clear with the light of the Alamkara ("Ornament") for clear realization [i.e., AA], is finished.” Here the compound tad-āloka-prakashikā is best construed as a genitive tattpuruṣa, but that does not mean that AAA should also be interpreted as a tat-puruṣa. In fact, tadāloka-prakāśikā suggests that the AA’s light is used in the AAA and hence the title AAA is intended as a bahuvrihi.

In the line (W994.19) तत्तालोक-विघायिनी विरितिता सत्य-प्रज्ञिके यया, "this fine pañjikā which throws light on ultimate reality has been written by me," which precedes the line just cited, āloka is used as in Dhvanyālōka or Madhyamakālōka, meaning ‘light on’ or ‘illumination of’ a particular topic or text. But Haribhadra does not appear to be specifically glossing his title at this point.

Hence the title should be taken as meaning, "Commentary on the ‘Perfection of Wisdom’ With the Light [Provided by Maitreya’s] ‘Ornament for Clear Realization.’" And this is exactly what we find the AAA to be.
2.3 The structure of the commentary

Haribhadra’s AAA is an explanation of the A based on the AA, an aphoristic codification of the seventy topics said to be hidden in the PP sūtras. The AAA is a long book, almost a 1000 pages in Wogihara’s 1932 edition. It incorporates both the A and AA.

In the opening verse of his smaller commentary, the AASphu, Haribhadra says that he wishes to demonstrate that the AA is not only an explanation of the longer PP sūtras (the Pañca and Śata), but equally an explanation of the A and other shorter PP sūtras as well. This aim seems to have determined the overall structure of his work.

How is this so? In the AAA, each word of the A, starting from the opening words evam mayā śrutam (‘Thus have I heard’) right up to the story of the Bodhisattva Sadā-prarudita and the final entrusting (pariñdana) of the sūtra to Ānanda are explained. A considerable portion of the AAA is devoted solely to this task. Based on this, one can divide the AAA along the lines of the thirty-two divisions (parivarta) of the A, a strategy that Wogihara partially follows.

The division of the AAA into thirty-two chapters is, however, somewhat superficial. Its deeper structure is given by the divisions of the AA, first into eight chapters (adhikāra) and then into the seventy sub-topics of these eight chapters (listed AA1.5-17). A summary of each of the eight chapters and of the first ten topics (which comprise are the sub-topics of the first chapter) is given below (§2.15, §7.1ff).

2.3.2 That his AAA was an authentic and unoriginal exposition of both the A and AA could have been questioned, in Haribhadra’s own time, only on sectarian grounds, i.e., on the grounds that his systematic did not reveal fully the breadth and profundity of the message contained in the earlier texts. Strictly philological observations about the proper reading of the earlier texts would have been admissible, but only insofar as they added to the purity of the earlier texts and thereby enhanced their authenticity. Remarks about the earlier texts from a historical perspective would have been quite inappropriate. Such historical remarks would have presupposed a lower status than Haribhadra, as a Mahāyāna Buddhist could have accepted. He would have had to accept that statements in the earlier texts could, possibly, be properly accounted for by
ordinary human limitations, limitations which the earlier authors, caught in their own time and intellectual climate could not transcend, but which later thinkers, aided by the passage of time and historical comparative methodology could discern. Such a historical perspective would not, in Haribhadra’s time at least, have been able to co-exist with traditional faith in the omniscience of a Buddha and would have obviated, from the start, the perceived need for a book like the AAA.

2.4 In general, the A can be characterized as a mystic-religious work and the AA as a highly scholastic commentary concerned, first and foremost, with the path particularly at its higher levels. This difference in the general tenor of the two texts is carried over into the AAA, which seeks to explain the former with the help of the latter. Those sections in the AAA directly explaining the sūtra which have no parallel in the AA are more religious in tone, more faith-oriented as it were (cf. W8-16). Those sections in the AAA detailing a topic of the AA, and explaining how that topic is found in the sūtra, are more scholastic and impenetrable (cf. W36.18ff). These latter sections presuppose considerable familiarity with terminology and theories about the path and its structure, some of which may be unfamiliar to the modern reader.

When the chapter of the AA naturally corresponds with a division in the A (as it does, e.g., in the case of the first parivarta which ends at W128) the structural tension that comes from trying to combine two different books together in a single unit is not apparent. Sometimes, however, there is no apparent correspondence, (as in the case of the fourth chapter of the AA, W445, which comes in the middle of the ninth parivarta). At such points in the text there is a structural tension and the modern reader, in particular, may come to feel overwhelmed by a mass of what seems to be unconnected information. The thread, which Haribhadra, at least, felt kept the different parts of the work together as a coherent whole may slip from the reader’s hand.

One of the aims of the first part of this dissertation is to place this thread firmly in the reader’s hand by clarifying (a) the different layers of text which are

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1 It scarcely needs mentioning that the absence of such a perspective, which is an ornament of modern scholarship, does not detract from the worth of the AAA.
embodied in the AAA and (b) issues concerning the path current at the time of Haribhadra, and which Haribhadra’s comments are indirectly or directly addressing.

In regard to the latter, as Obermiller, Tucci and Conze have all pointed out, the AA is primarily an exposition of the path, and the language of discourse employed by Haribhadra in his AAA is a language developed to explain and chart that path. There are two different vocabularies in that language: (a) the terminology already standardized by Vasubandhu in his AK and (b) a terminology unique to the AA. Both of these the reader will find explained and used in this introduction.

2.5 Besides the different layers of textual material in the AAA there is also the stylistic layering often seen in Skt commentaries. In each part of the text, whether based on the A or AA, Haribhadra usually first discusses the issue at hand from a general perspective. Then he turns to the specific words of the texts and explains them individually. Finally he makes use of the exegetical devices bequeathed to him by his cultural heritage, particularly codified rules of Skt grammar and the different strategies for giving an etymology to important words (for an example of this use see below §2.14.2–3).

2.6 Haribhadra calls the first chapter of the AAA, (i.e., W21-128), about "the thorough total knowledge of all things, in absolutely every aspect" a "Turn (parivarta) of the Activities of the State of Being a Knower of All Aspects." "Here," in this chapter, he says "just the state of being knower of all aspects associated with the Tathāgatas turns up (parivartate) again and again by way of [ten] cause and effect ‘activities,’ starting with production of an [altruistic] mind, which one has to put into practice" (W128.12-15: सर्वकारकार्त्तेऽवाचनुकृतभाषायिने चयर्याविच्छेदलावादिस्पेशेन हैतु-फलात्मकेन निषोषबाङ्कारत्तया समस्त-वस्तु-परिश्लामातु तथागतानां संबन्धानी पुनः-पुनः परिच्छेदनेत्रसौ प्रत्येक-परिच्छेदः सर्वकारकार्त्त-चयर्यां-परिच्छेदः ।).

Delving into Haribhadra’s first chapter one is struck by the amount borrowed from other writers. The body of Haribhadra’s ‘original’ work gets smaller and smaller the more one searches for it. This was perhaps, at least partially, the result of the only printing technology available for the transmission of ideas, the handwritten manuscript. Access to the compositions of earlier writers was extremely limited, and a writer knew that either he or she
included in the manuscript the entire passage from an earlier writer, or else most other readers would have no access to it. The composite text then served a double purpose: it became a sort of Readers Digest and also, perhaps, on the piggy-back principle, served as a vehicle to get one’s own work out to a larger audience.

Nearly a quarter of the first chapter (approximately 29 of 127 pages) comprises the text of the A;\(^1\) 56 verses are quoted from the AA; large excerpts from Ārya Vimuktisena’s Abhisamayālaṁkāra-vṛtti (AAV) are either directly incorporated (W79.9ff; 84.16ff; 95.1-97.5) or else function like a template, giving structure to Haribhadra’s discussion (W24.13ff, 76.21ff). There is a long recast of Kamalaśīla’s TSP (W2.3-3.24). A similar paraphrase of the BK occurs at W93.22-94.1 and Moriyama (1984) has pointed out the parallels in Kamalaśīla’s Sarva-dharma-niḥsvabhāva-siddhi. Although quoted explicitly only twice in the first chapter, there are many echos of Vasubandhu’s Abhidharma-kośa (AK), e.g., in the explanation of the twenty members of the Spiritual Community (W35-36). Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇa-vārttika (PV) is quoted (W44.25, 67.15) and the Mahāyāna-sūtrālāṁkāra (MSA) is quoted frequently, often marking the point of departure for an explanation (W27.10, W31.2, etc.). There are striking similarities between Haribhadra’s treatment of the Buddha bodies and the presentation in the Mahāyāna-samgraha (MS, Lamotte 1973:II, notes p. 49). Other Yogācāra texts like Dignāga’s PPPi (W23.10), the Madhyānta-vibhāga (MAV, W110.2) and Vasubandhu’s Vyākyā-yukti (W15.25) are also quoted, as are Mādhyamika texts: Nāgārjuna’s Ratnāvalī (W66.16), Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra (BCA, W24.8), Jñāna-garbha’s Satya-dvaya-vibhaṅga (W45.6)\(^2\) and Bhavya’s Madhyamaka-ḥṛdaya-kārikā (MHK, W40.13).

One can, therefore, as I have already suggested, best describe Haribhadra’s commentary as an insightful arrangement of earlier writing whose value lies not so much in a particular ‘original’ doctrine, as in providing a focus on the PP.

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\(^1\) Exactly what H included in his original manuscript is, of course, unknown. The text of the AAA, with the complete A embedded within it, is W’s creation.

\(^2\) See also Hisao Inagaki (1977).
2.7 A pattern found frequently in the first chapter and throughout the commentary, which weaves Buddhist texts representative of all four Buddhist schools (Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika) into an explanation of the PP, is a discussion of the AA based on Ārya Vimuktiṣena’s AAV (Madhyamaka), introduced by a quotation from a Yogācāra text, like the MSA, which locates the specific part of the path within a general framework. Particular words, which are part of the general Buddhist vocabulary, are then explained with the help of the AK, and problems in epistemology are dealt with based on the stream of Buddhist reasoning and epistemology originating from Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.

The perspective which lends coherence to the variety of different quoted material is the understanding that the AA is not only a commentary on the longer sūtras, but equally on the A. This is Haribhadra’s insight, mentioned earlier (§1.2).

Even though the relationship between the A and AA is by no means self evident and sections of commentary apparently unrelated to the A, and sections unrelated to the AA are frequent, Haribhadra always writes from the perspective of their being related, and, on the theoretical level at least, deals with both books simultaneously. This gives order to what would otherwise be a mass of detailed explanation about seemingly unrelated topics, and indeed, represents his real and lasting contribution.

2.7.2 Haribhadra’s discussion of the chapter’s first topic, production of an [altruistic] mind (W21.22-27.25), illustrates both this perspective and structure.

The order of the explanation is given by AA5a (चिच्छोट्यासनोज्जादश), which is further expanded upon in AA18-20. The corresponding section of the A (W21.22-22.10), which bears little apparent relation to the verses of the AA, says:

उत्तर: ज्ञात्व ज्ञानविधे सुभूति स्ववित्त्र ज्ञानविनित्ति स्म। प्रतिभावृते सुभूते ज्ञानविधे न हः-सत्त्वाः। प्रज्ञा-पारमिताय बाराध्य यथा ज्ञान-सत्त्वा महासत्त्वाः। प्रज्ञा-पारमिताय निर्यायिः इति

1 Eckel (1987) has identified this stream of reasoning and epistemology originating from Dignāga and Dharmakīrti as an influence on Jñāna-garbha, the teacher of H’s teacher Śāntarakṣita.
May it be apparent for you, Subhūti, how concerning the PP of great Bodhisattvas, the great Bodhisattvas progress in the PP.

Haribhadra explains each word in the A in an introductory passage, and then begins an apparently unconnected explanation of the AA which he declares to be an ‘expansion’ (vistarataḥ tu, W24.1) on the same, as yet unmentioned, first topic, production of an [altruistic] mind.

Haribhadra’s explanation of the AA is based on Ārya Vimuktisena’s AAV supplemented by a Yogācāra text, Maitreya’s MSA, and the work of a later Mādhyamika, Śāntideva.

At the end of the explanation, Haribhadra is left with the necessity of relating the section of the AA he has explained to the earlier section of the A. To do so he quotes the sections of the Pañca corresponding to the beginning of the A and cites Dignāga’s PPPi verse 7 (W27.24, quoted above §1.2) to justify the procedure:

The significance and importance of production of an altruistic mind is discussed below (§7.9.2).

2.8 A more detailed description of the first chapter

The introductory section of the AAA (W1-21.22) is clearly separate from the main body of Haribhadra’s text. It comprises four distinct segments:
a) a short verse homage to earlier gurus
b) a complicated highly scholastic discourse on the principles of book writing (anubandha-catuṣṭaya)
c) a detailed word by word explanation of the opening lines of the A supplemented by a description of the corresponding section in the Pañca
d) a brief expansion on AA3-17 listing the eight abhisamayas and seventy topics.

2.9 Wogihara mistakenly includes the homage of the AA (W1.7-10) amongst Haribhadra’s own five verses of homage. This verse of homage (discussed in more detail §7.3, §7.5) says:

या सर्वज्ञताया नयत्तुप्पाम शाल्केष्ण: श्रावकानु, या मार्गार्थया जगद्धित-कुलां लोकार्थ-संपादिको।
सर्वकार्मै इति विद्यन्ति मुनयो विश्वं यया संगतासु, तस्ये श्रावक-बोधिसत्त्व-गणिनो बुद्धस्य मात्रे नमः॥
Homage to the Mother [=PP] of the Buddha with an assembly of Śrāvakas and Bodhisattvas: which, as the state of being knower of all, leads Śrāvakas seeking peace to tranquility; which, as the state of being knower of the paths of those who work for the benefit of the world, is accomplisher of the aims of the masses; [and], perfectly endowed with which, the Sages give expression to this universe in all its aspects.

2.10 Turning to Haribhadra’s own verses of homage at the beginning of the AAA, we find that they chart the evolution of a stream in Indian Buddhism that Ruegg (1981) helpfully calls the Mādhyamika-Prajñāpāramitā synthesis. Haribhadra (W1.11-22) mentions five persons: Maitreya, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Ārya Vimuktiṣena and Bhadanta Vimuktiṣena as having preceded him:

The merciful Lord Maitreya composed an especially clear brief verse commentary (kārikāṭikā) [the AA] pertaining to guidance in the form of perfect wisdom, so that he himself could fully lead mortals, overwhelmed by the multitude of faults in the bowels of the world, to the supreme freedom of the yogins [and yoginīs] who know that all things are like forms of illusion.

The leader among the wise, Ārya Asaṅga, wrote a commentary (bhāṣya), the fame of which is especially glorious on account of the capability of its author, to ascertain the truly real.1 Towering on account of his pride because of a minute knowledge of views regarding the division of being and non-being, Ācārya Vasubandhu attained a [firm] position in the area of describing topics in [his] well-trodden path. 2

Great was the effort made in the form of the Vṛtti by one with good intelligence, Ārya Vimuktiṣena, who acquired extraordinary wisdom from the churning of yogic practice with the truly real in things. Concerned with his Vṛtti, another intelligent man is known in the world through the

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1 Or, following Bu ston, "a commentary called tattva-viniścaya."

2 Bu ston understood paddhati as the name of Vasubandhu’s commentary.
designation of Vimuktisena, who made, in his Vārttika, a treatise which quenched rival opinions, standing in extremes.

Of the writing of these five persons whom Haribhadra mentions as having preceded him, much has been lost. Only the AA of Maitreya and the AAV of Ārya Vimuktisena remain in Skt. The origins of the Mādhyamika-Prajñāpāramitā synthesis itself are traced back no further than Ārya Vimuktisena who is the first writer, so far as we know, to use the AA as a vehicle for explaining the PP sūtras. It is this utilization of the AA when setting out one’s views that defines the synthesis, not a particular Madhyamika or Yogācāra doctrine.

2.11 The first extant commentary on the AA is the AAV by Ārya Vimuktisena, relatively well known through the critical edition of the first abhisamaya prepared by Pensa (1967). The AAV relates the AA closely to the Pāñca and ignores the A as a separate work. It is also called Pañcālokā (Obermiller 1932-3) reflecting its brief Tib title Nyi khri snang ba.

A few details about the life and time of Ārya Vimuktisena are known from the Buddhist historiographers Bu ston and Tāranātha (Obermiller 1932:155, Ruegg 1968-69:305-7). The former reproduces the information contained in the colophon to the AAV where it says Ārya Vimuktisena was a student and relative of a certain Buddha-dāsa, and "belonged to the Kaurukulla branch of the Ārya-Sarmitiyas" (Conze 1960:112). Tāranātha records traditions which hold that Ārya Vimuktisena was a disciple of Vasubandhu or Dignāga and was a contemporary of Bhavya. The historical accuracy of these traditions is not as important as is the presence of early Tibetan doxographers recognizing a) that an extensive commentary on the AA was extant from an early period and b) that certain of Bhavya’s and Ārya Vimuktisena’s doctrines were similar.

Haribhadra, in his AASphu,1 describes Ārya Vimuktisena as a person "who delineated [the AA] with an awareness of abiding in the middle way." The Tibetan Dkon mchog 'jigs med dbang po (Hopkins and Sopa 1976:123) calls

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1 Amano(1975:3) भावधारिणिकृतस्य भुवयमानस्य यसौ निग्रहयोग्यस्य यसौ पुनःस्य सत्यस्य स्वरूपायमी तव शक्तिगुणायश्च भगवान्। भावधारिणिकृतस्य यसौ पुनःस्य सत्यस्य स्वरूपायमी तव शक्तिगुणायश्च भगवान्॥ Reconstructed by Tripathi (1977:3) भावधारिणिकृतस्य यसौ पुनःस्य सत्यस्य स्वरूपायमी तव शक्तिगुणायश्च भगवान्॥
him a Yogācāra-Svātantrika Mādhyamika, who, unlike Bhavya, accepted the Yogācāra denial of external existence. In the Tib tradition the views of Ārya Vimuktisena and Haribhadra are considered to be largely similar, and a sub-set of Svātantrika referred to as 'phags seng gi lungs ('the position of the Ārya and Lion') is sometimes mentioned. They are differentiated, however, in terms of whether they do, or do not, incline to the Yogācāra assertion of the satyākāra and alīkākāra (§8.2). These positions can be summarized, in brief, as accepting or denying "that an appearance of a gross object to a sense consciousness exists as it appears" (Hopkins and Sopa 1976:108, 123-124).

2.12 Little is known about the author of the Vārttika mentioned in W1.20-22. Haribhadra evidently has some reservations about the understanding of this person. These reservations are made even clearer in the AASphu:¹

After him, Vimuktisena, who abides on the faith level, did not discover all the śāstras and made an explanation concordant with his [incomplete discovery].

According to Tsongkha pa (AAGser:35.1ff), the faith level is the very lowest part of the Mahāyāna path, before correct realization is attained.

This author is usually called Bhadanta Vimuktisena based on two references (W51.4, W71.15-20). The Vārttika traditionally ascribed to Bhadanta Vimuktisena is now only extant in Tib (P5186). It is listed as 'phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa stong phrag nyi shu Inga pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi tshig le'ur byas pa'i rnam par 'grel ba and comes immediately after Ārya Vimuktisena’s AAV, and before Haribhadra’s Le’u brgyad ma (i.e., his recast version of the Pañca).

According to Bu-ston (Obermiller 1932:155) there is a tradition that Bhadanta was a disciple of Ārya Vimuktisena, and Ruegg (1968-69) says they were roughly contemporary.

¹ Amano(1975:3) निविष्कृत पद्मविष्कृत शास्त्र अविष्कृत पद्मविष्कृत शास्त्र पद्मविष्कृत शास्त्र पद्मविष्कृत शास्त्र पद्मविष्कृत शास्त्र। Reconstructed by Tripathi (1977:3) तली विनिकसितम् शास्त्राण्वप्रायं सबोभाषाभूमि-स्थितेनापि व्याख्यातास्मिनिषवा॥
The first reference to Bhadanta Vimuktisena in the AAA (WW51.4), "According to Bhadanta Vimuktisena, [Srenika] was a renunciate of worldly greed with a comprehension based on either the first or second concentration (dhyāna)," gives us no clue about the writer. The second reference (W71.7-9) is only slightly more helpful. There Bhadanta Vimuktisena relates each word of a passage in the A to a different stage of the path. The quotation comes immediately after a different interpretation of the same passage by Ārya Vimuktisena, and to that extent follows the order of the homage. Neither of these two passages are in the Tib text, however, a circumstance which led Tsongkha pa to speculate (AAGser:36.6) that the Tib translation of the Vārttika was either by another person with the same name, or else "by a Bhadanta known to be a student of Ārya Vimuktisena."

Finally, the text of the Haribhadra’s homage (W1.21-22) itself raises some questions. It is somewhat unusual for vimuktisena-vacasā to mean simply vimuktisena-nāmnā "called Vimuktisena," though Haribhadra’s use of vacasā in the sense of namnā ‘expression, designation’ is in fact confirmed by a similar usage four pages later in the compound śrota-vijñānānubhava-vacasā (W5.16). Similarly, vārttikah (emended to vārttike) is problematic. Perhaps it means simply "of whom there is a work associated with the Vṛtti," and refers to a student of Ārya Vimuktisena, a conjecture which goes well with the idea that the Bhadanta Vimuktisena quoted later in the AAA is a different person. W1.21-22 would then read "Another intelligent man known in the world by the designation of Vimuktisena, of whom there is a work associated with the Vṛtti, made a treatise which quenched rival opinions, standing in extremes."

2.13 The second part of Haribhadra’s introductory section (W2.1-5.4) is about the so-called ‘four principles of book writing’ (anubandha-catuṣṭaya). It is a sort of advertisement for the rest of the book. The four ‘principles’ or limbs are the abhidheya (‘subject matter’), prayojana (‘purpose’ or ‘aim’), prayojana-prayojana (‘purpose’s purpose’—final goal) and the connection (sambandha) which obtains between them. Haribhadra’s remarks, which he perhaps intended as a direct comment on the A are occasioned by AA1-2, which says:

1 Aklujkar was particularly helpful in clarifying the problems presented by this section of the text.
My purpose in beginning is so that those with awareness would wish to behold the path, (not touched by others), of the state of being knower of all aspects, which has been taught here [in the PP] by the Teacher; and by settling in recollection the sūtra’s meaning would wish to easily take to the practice of dharma which consists of the ten activities.

In doing so he employs the anubandha-catuṣṭaya, which, by his time was a standard way for writers of śāstra, especially commentaries, to begin their work. Haribhadra’s, however, is a particularly complicated piece of writing.

2.13.2 The origins of the anubandha-catuṣṭaya convention are not entirely clear.¹ The convention is associated in particular, however, with commentarial works of writers in the lineage of the Buddhist epistemologist Dignāga. In this respect it is noteworthy that Haribhadra’s explanation of the anubandha-catuṣṭaya, though based primarily on Kamala-śīla’s Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā, incorporates passages from both Viniṭa-deva’s and Dharmottara’s Šīls on Nyāya-bindu.1.1.

In brief, Haribhadra, drawing on Viniṭa-deva, says the purpose (prayojana) is just the immediate result of writing a text, i.e., the reader’s comprehension of what the author writes. As Haribhadra says (W4.16-20)

Hence easy understanding of all briefly stated topics, pertaining to the continuum of what is to be taught, is the uncommon [result] and is, therefore, the purpose resulting from the action [of expressing the PP].

The purpose’s purpose, or final goal, on the other hand, is what the writer intends the reader to finally attain. As Haribhadra says (W4.21.-30),

That one with accumulated merit due to giving, etc., who has devoted the mind to accomplishing one’s own and others’ many excellent purposes should, based on the surface level and ultimate truths, actualize the above-mentioned subject matter, the path of the knower of all aspects and so forth, in all its variety, by means of the gradual attainment of such [parts of the

¹ The formulation appears to be anticipated, though not clearly stated, by Patañjali in his Mahābhāṣya.
path] as the proximate penetration, etc., is the [purpose's] purpose, the result of the result of the action [of expressing]. It has a matching means.

Woven into Haribhadra’s discussion of the first of the four parts of the anubandha-catuṣṭaya, the subject matter, are the opening lines of Ārya Vimuktisena’s AAV (W3.25-4.15). There three wrong views about the subject matter of the PP sūtras are set forth and refuted. Here is not the place to go into later scholastic speculation about the three wrong views and their refutation. Suffice it to say that, initially, Ārya Vimuktisena was probably simply making a general statement about the PP sūtras and saying a) that they did not simply systematise everything that exists, b) that they did not simply deal with what removes kleśa; and c) that they did not simply list the various aspects of complete knowledge. Ārya Vimuktisena’s point was that the PP discussed, fully and conclusively, everything pertinent to the liberation seeker.

The link between the subject matter and what the reader comes to understand, and the further link between that understanding and gaining the final goal, is what is meant by the sambandha or connection.

2.14 The next part of Haribhadra’s introductory section (W5.6-15.23) is a detailed, word by word, explanation of the opening lines of the A. These lines are written in religious language often found in Mahāyāna sūtras, where profundities are buried beneath detailed descriptions, somewhat tedious for the non-believer, of place, retinue and the events occasioned by the Buddha’s presence and teaching.

Here the considerable body of Mahāyāna sūtras and earlier commentary on the sūtras is particularly evident, and, in the later part of the introduction summarizing the corresponding section in the Pañca and Śata, where the Buddha emanates light to summon the hosts of Bodhisattvas in other parts of the universe, one enters a miraculous world reminiscent of the Skt Epic and Purāṇic texts.¹

¹ Since I am concerned here with H’s thought and his delineation of the path a more detailed study of this section of the AAA must be left to a future occasion.
2.14.2 Here Haribhadra makes much use of the exegetical tools (mentioned earlier §2.5) supplied by Skt grammar and traditional etymology in this part of the introduction. He explains grammatical forms in the A according to Pāñinian grammar and his familiarity with the Aṣṭādhyāyī is evident (e.g., aphorism 3.2.111 at W8.12). Unlike his commentary on the RGS, where ‘mistakes’ in grammar are explained away as a method to cut attachment to literary style and to focus the reader’s mind on meaning, the AAA is written on the supposition that the grammatical forms employed in the A and AA are Pāñinian.

2.14.3 His use of traditional etymology is even more extensive. Unlike modern etymology with its concern for the historical, in this section, as in the rest of the text, etymology (derivation to draw out the essence of the word as the author sees it, would perhaps be a better description than etymology) is employed as one further didactic tool in exegesis. When Haribhadra gives the etymology of arhant, first as a participle derived from √varh ‘to be worthy’ (W9.8-9) and then again as a compound of ari ‘enemy’ and hata, (the past participle of √han ‘to kill, to destroy,’ W10.18), he does so, not because he is in doubt about which is historically correct, but because the two etymologies are a convenient vehicle to convey to the reader relevant information. The sources of his etymologies are still to be identified. His explanation of the word parvata (mountain) at W8.5 echoes Yāska’s Nirukta 1.20, but only faintly.

2.14.4 The importance of this introductory section of the AAA lies in the fact that it begins to point to the main theme mentioned earlier (§1.2): namely that the AA is equally a commentary on all PP sūtras. By attaching the description of the corresponding section in the Pañca, and by stressing that the difference between the sūtras is only the result of Buddha’s skill in means, not one of content, Haribhadra is saying that an explanation of one PP sūtra is a commentary on the others as well. The statement stands out in strong relief

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1 P5190:237.1.6-2.2, e.g., gives as one of the purposes of the RGS "the removal of attachment to refined and unrefined language (legs par sbyar ba = saṁskṛta)" विणुण्यात्मक यज्ञशास्त्रात् विणुण्यात्मक यज्ञशास्त्रात् विणुण्यात्मक यज्ञशास्त्रात् विणुण्यात्मक यज्ञशास्त्रात् विणुण्यात्मक यज्ञशास्त्रात् विणुण्यात्मक यज्ञशास्त्रात् विणुण्यात्मक यज्ञशास्त्रात् विणुण्यात्मक यज्ञशास्त्रात् विणुण्यात्मक यज्ञशास्त्रात् विणुण्यात्मक यज्ञशास्त्रात् विणुण्यात्मक यज्ञशास्त्रात् विणुण्यात्मक यज्ञशास्त्रात् विणुण्यात्मक यज्ञशास्त्रात् विणुण्यात्मक यज्ञशास्त्रात् विणुण्यात्मक यज्ञशास्त्रात् विणुण्यात्मक यज्ञशास्त्रात् विणुण्यात्मक यज्ञशास्त्रात् विणुण्यात्मक यज्ञशास्त्रात् विणुण्यात्मक यज्ञशास्त्रात् विणुण्यात्मक यज्ञशास्त्रात् विणुण्यात्मक यज्ञशास्त्रात् विणुण्यात्मक यज्ञशास्त्रात् विणुण्यात्मक यज्ञशास्त्रात् विणुण्यात्मक यज्ञशास्त्रात् विणुण्यात्मक यज्ञशास्त्रात् विणुण्यात्मक यज्ञशास्त्रात्

2 This has been suggested by Aklujkar.
because there is no obvious connection between the first 17 verses of the AA and the few lines at the beginning of the A.

2.14.5 In the final section of his introduction, Haribhadra expands briefly on the AA’s two introductory summaries: one under eight of the most general rubrics (AA3-4, W16.1-16) and a second more detailed summary by way of the so-called seventy topics (don bdun bcu; AA5-17, W16.17-21.14). This is Maitreya’s grand scheme of transcendental psychology. Different aspects of the same stage of yogic development are described from different vantage points, using a variety of technical terminology, drawn from the speculative metaphysics of Yogācāra theoreticians ($7.1ff, §7.9ff$).

2.15 The AAA is an explanation of Prajñā-pāramitā (‘perfect wisdom’). This perfect wisdom is described in terms of eight ‘clear realizations’ (see chart §9.1). The three ‘states of being knower’ (jñatā) form one group of clear realizations, the four ‘practices’ (pratipatti) another, and the resultant ‘body of truths’ (dharma-kāya) a third.

The three states of being knower are wisdom in its perfect form. They are taught in the first three chapters as a goal to be attained.

The four practices, taught in chapters four to seven, are the same three states of being knower as they are being learned. They are wisdom while it is still being acquired and becoming perfected.

The body of truths is the result of the four practices.

The eight clear realizations do not, then, each describe a different perfect wisdom, but rather describe the same perfect wisdom from different perspectives.

2.15.2 The scope of each clear realization is so vast that the meaning of the term is better conveyed, initially, by a word like culture.

The first chapter is about the Buddha or the Buddhas’s mind which is conceived as an over-arching principle defined by transcendent awareness and within which the knowledge of all cultures fit. There is no topic in the other seven chapters not discussed, at least implicitly, in this first chapter.

1 On the meaning of the word abhisamaya see §8.1.
The second chapter is about the Bodhisattva or Bodhisattva’s mind, again an over-arching principle since it embraces knowledge of every religious path. The idea is that one must have first hand, experiential knowledge of the states of mind and practices which others (of various capacities and in various stages of development) will need to pursue a satisfactory and beneficial life.

The ‘clear realization’ discussed in the third chapter is associated with the knowledge that leads Śrāvakas to nirvāṇa. But it is not exactly the same as the Śrāvaka attainment because Bodhisattvas, who are said to deny themselves personal nirvāṇa in order to save the world, attain it. Bodhisattva must practice the third clear realization in order to look after those disciples who are inclined to the Śrāvaka path. Just as Śākyamuni guided his early disciples, apparently by way of the Śrāvaka path to nirvāṇa, so too, future Bodhisattvas and Buddhas should be knowledgable in those same methods and practices.¹

The fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh chapters describe the same three states of being knower as they unfold in practice. They explain the four practices (pratipatti): of ‘all aspects’ sarvākārabhisamāṃbodha, ‘peaked’ mūrdhābhiṣamaya, ‘serial’ anupūrvābhisamāṃyayā and ‘in a single instant’ eka-kṣaṇābhisamāṃbodha.

The eighth chapter describes the Buddha bodies (kāya) from the point of view of the result of practice.

2.16. The first chapter of the AAA describes the sarvākāraṇātā (literally, ‘the state-of-being-a-knower-of-all-aspects’). This is the Buddha’s omniscience. The ten topics which figure in the description of the state of being a knower of all aspects are listed at AA5-6 (W17.7-11) जितोत्तमादोज्ज्वादश च निर्विद्धाः चतुर्विधम्। जातारः प्रतिपत्तेः च ध्येयाः धातु-स्वभावः। आलम्बनं समुदेऽः संनात-प्रसिद्धित-क्रिया। सम्भाराश्रय च सम्भाव्यम्। संस्कारायते मुने। (see chart §9.2). They are dealt with in greater detail below (§7.9-7.9.8).

The ten topics may be thought of in three groups:
- (a) the production of an altruistic mind, (b) preceptual advice and (c) proximate penetration.
- (d) lineage, (e) objective support and (f) aims

¹ The differences between the sarvajñatā of Śrāvakas and Bodhisattva is discussed in §7.4, §7.5.2.
- the four courses \textit{(pratipatti)} in (g) armor, (h) going forth, (i) accumulations and (j) emergences.

The internal logic to the order of these topics is as follows. Bodhisattvas (a) seek enlightenment to benefit others. They therefore request, and are given, (b) advice \textit{(avavāda)} about the path to attain it. The essence of that advice is that the Bodhisattvas should cultivate perfect wisdom \textit{(PP)}, in essence, understand emptiness. When that understanding is first properly cultivated (c) knowledge becomes proximate \textit{(nirvedha-bhāgiya)} to perfect wisdom.

The deep wisdom of the Bodhisattva itself is the focus of this wisdom. The lack of own-being that underpins this wisdom, both when it is proximate to, and when it directly witnesses, ultimate reality is (d) the substratum, basis, lineage or dharma-element. It is nothing but the absence of a substratum with an own-being. It is the Bodhisattva viewed from the angle of ultimate reality, and hence unfindable. It is the reality informing the surface world; a world which, in all its diversity, is (e) the objective support of the Bodhisattva's understanding because there is nothing, good or bad, which is not qualified by ultimate emptiness. Since emptiness is not something other than surface reality (as Subhūti will stress again to Śāriputra "in that state of no mind there neither exists, nor does one apprehend either a state of 'there is' or 'there is not'") the objective support and dharma-element are like different sides of one and the same coin.

What then is to be attained? It is realization of all these dharmas when one has attained the state of enlightenment. This is (f) the aim \textit{(samuddeśa)}. It draws the Bodhisattvas on; yet it is no other than the reality at hand, turned, by a Buddha's skill, into the means to work for the welfare of countless others.

The aim is achieved by the four courses \textit{(pratipatti)}. The metaphor is that of a warrior going forth to battle. The Bodhisatvas (g) arm themselves \textit{(sarhnāha)} with generosity, morality, patience, etc., (h) mount and go forth \textit{(prasthāna)} upon the horse of stabilized mind, and, (i) accompanied by a vast gathering \textit{(saṁbhāra)} of followers to help in the task, (j) emerge \textit{(niryāṇa)} victorious in battle onto the ground of enlightenment.

These ten topics, each of which includes within its scope the entire Mahāyāna path and result, illustrate the \textit{sarvākāraṇātā} because the explanation of them
could have originated only from a person with total knowledge of all aspects of reality.
3.1 Haribhadra’s most important work is the AAA. It includes within itself the A and AA. Each text was written by a different author (or authors) and each presents the reader with considerable problems. Since it is impossible to penetrate the AAA without first bringing to mind the A and AA, it will be necessary to digress, as it were, into a discussion of these two earlier texts. The intention, in so doing, is to give the reader a better position from which to appreciate the AAA as a work that successfully telescopes different components into a single coherent unit. If, while recollecting the earlier texts, one begins to lose sight of the central concern, that is, understanding the AAA, this is a difficulty the modern reader cannot avoid. The original readers of the AAA knew at least some of the PP sūtras by heart, and were learned in the whole range of yogic terminology presented in the AA. Haribhadra wrote his AAA on the presupposition of such familiarity and we, as modern readers, have therefore first to acquire that background knowledge.

3.2 The Aṣṭa-sāhasriṅka

The A is a PP sūtra. Our now considerable knowledge of the PP sūtras is due in large part to Conze, who, over a period of thirty years edited and translated much of the most important primary material.¹ The Śata-sāhasrikā (Śata), Pañca and A (PP sūtras in 100,000, 25,000 and 8,000 Lines) are the most important of the longer sūtras, and the Vajracchedikā (Diamond Cutter) and Hṛdaya-sūtra (Heart Sūtra) the most important of the shorter summaries.² The shortest PP sūtra is the *Ekāksari-mātā (according to Vaidya 1960:xii) or *Sarva-tathāgata-mātā ekāksara nāma [Single Letter Mother of All Tathāgatas],³ consisting of a short introduction describing the place and retinue, followed by the single letter अ ‘a.’ The longest is the Śata consisting of sixteen

¹ For a complete list of Conze’s publications on the PP literature see Conze (1960:127ff, 1977:indices) and Lancaster (1977:indices).
² For an exhaustive annotated bibliography of all known PP sūtras see Conze (1960:31-92).
³ Yig ge gcig ma is no. 32 in Conze’s list of tantric PP texts.
huge volumes. Between them the various PP sūtras are ranged in terms of length. All are anonymous and attributed to the Buddha.

3.2.2 From its earliest stages of development the PP became associated with a worship of the primordial Mother, through its being described metaphorically as the Mother of the Victorious Ones (jināṇa mātā or jina-janani). Perhaps this ensured a more universal appeal for what might otherwise have become merely a complex philosophical doctrine. For whatever the reason, the PP sūtras became the sacred literature of many cultures.

3.2.3 According to Conze (1960:1), the development of the PP sūtras as a genre spans a period of nearly seven hundred years, from the initial formulation, ca. 100 B.C.E., until "the period of tantric influence and of absorption into magic" starting ca. 500 C.E. As many as nine stages have been discerned in this evolution (Conze 1977:124ff), the first five of which describe an original creative period. There was then a period of Yogācāra influence and a recasting of the larger sūtras into smaller, more accessible versions, and finally a period of tantric and early Ch’an (Zen) influence.

3.3 The A is one of this group of Mahāyāna Buddhist texts called PP sūtras. It first came to the attention of modern scholarship in 1888 when R. Mitra published his Skt edition of the A in the Bibliotheca Indica series. Mitra’s text, re-edited by Wogihara, was republished alongside the AAA (Tokyo, 1932-35) and translated by Conze (1973). In its earliest form the A was probably of a piece with the RGS which summarized its contents in verse. Early Buddhist Mahāyāna sūtras often took this form: a prose section in near perfect classical Skt, and a summary written in hybrid, less grammatically correct, Skt verse. From there the PP sūtra developed into the largest branch, and most important part, of the Mahāyāna revelation.

3.3.2 In its earliest form the A was probably far shorter than the present version. It probably did little more than introduce what were to become key terms: a) great Bodhisattva, b) production of an [altruistic] mind [set on] enlightenment (bodhicittotpāda), c) the state of omniscience (sarvajñatā), a new goal surpassing the traditional goal of arhatship, and d) perfect wisdom. These terms are discussed in more detail elsewhere (§7.5, §7.9.2, §7.6.2, §7.16.2).
Soon after the appearance of the original sūtra, further elaboration on the original terms seems to have been added, as were passages designed to prove the authenticity of the revelation. As a counterbalance, as it were, to the original, world-denying doctrine of the lack of self in all dharmas (*dharma-nairatmya*), passages were added explaining at greater length how the doctrine did not obviate the need for good deeds, for nurturing the doctrine, for skillful means and for high religious accomplishment. Later still, a large body of speculative metaphysics (*abhidharma*) was incorporated, accounting for the phenomenal growth in the size of the texts. Finally stories about popular mythological religious figures like Aksobhya and Avalokiteśvara were added, popularizing the sūtras and making them more accessible to the faith of ordinary people. By 150 C.E. the A Sūtra was probably in much the same form as we now find it.

3.3.3 Lewis Lancaster (1968, 1975) identifies three stages in the later development of the A based on his analysis of the Chinese translations. The first is reflected in the three earliest Chinese translations beginning with Chih lu chia ch’an’s (=Lokakṣema’s) translation finished in about 179 C.E. He contrasts it with a second period of development, reflected in the translations of Kumārajīva and Hsüan Tsang, and a final period when the text is identical with the Tib and Skt versions reflected in Dānapāla’s translation of 985.

Two points emerge from his analysis:

First, the name of the text is not fixed. Chinese versions of the A have as many as seventeen different names given by what translators felt to be its distinctive doctrine or feature.

Second, and more important, key terms found in the later versions of the sūtra are missing from earlier versions. The terms *dharma-kāya* in the sense of an abstract Buddha body, *bhūta-koṭi* as a Mahāyāna term meaning something more than just nirvāṇa, *advaya* (‘non-dual’) and dharma-element are not found in the earlier versions.

3.3.4 Haribhadra’s word by word commentary on the first *abhisamaya* makes it clear that Mitra’s edition of the A, based on Pāla dynasty manuscripts dating to

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1 Other early translations were by Chih Ch’ien or An Hsüan 222-9 and by T’an-ma-pai (Dharma-priya) ca. 382 or Dharma-rakṣa 265-74.
ca. 1000 C.E., is nearly identical to the one he was working from. There are a few differences however. At W120.16, e.g., it reads *anuprāptā eva ayatnena* (‘obtained without effort’) instead of simply *anuprāptā eva*. Haribhadra mentions here, as at other places also, the different readings found in other mss.

3.4 The traditional explanation of the origin of the PP sūtras holds that the A, along with all the other PP sūtras, was taught in its entirety by the historical Buddha himself on Mount Gṛdhra-kūṭa in Rāja-grha in what is now the Indian state of Bihar. The variety of sūtras differing mainly, though not solely, in terms of length, is explained by the propensity of listeners, some of whom enjoyed extensive, others middling, and others brief exposition of the doctrine. The late appearance of the PP sūtras in our world is explained by the fact that the sūtras were transported, soon after the Buddha taught them, to the palace of the King of Dragons (*nāga=*mythical serpent-like creatures who recognize, and ferociously cling to, valuable property). There the sūtras adorned the crown of the Nāga king deep in the ocean, a mythical place midway between the human realm and the world of Buddhas, until Nāgārjuna plunged in and, understanding their meaning, out of his compassion restored them to the human realm.

Who, say traditional thinkers, if not an Enlightened One, could have written such excellent and profound books? Surely we would at least have heard of the author’s name were it not in fact the Buddha.

3.5 The opening chapter of the A (the major part of which is translated in Part III of this dissertation) contains at its core most of the original doctrines. It is presented somewhat like a play with a cast, as it were, consisting of four speaking people: the Lord (*bhagavat*), Subhūti, Śāriputra and Pūrṇa the son of Maitrāyanī. Their names are consistently prefixed by formulaic honorifics which give a grandeur to the proceedings. The opening few lines set the scene and describe the retinue. They are a standard literary convention in Mahāyāna sūtras, used to mark the sūtra as a Mahāyānist work (Rawlinson 1977:7, 13).

Then the Lord, who acts as moderator of the discussion, instructs Subhūti to teach the PP. Subhūti clearly has a good grasp of the (new?) doctrine and his discourse is an exercise in non-clinging. There is, he says, no Bodhisattva, no practice of perfect wisdom and no goal of all knowing. A Bodhisattva is not a person, in the usual sense of the word, because no person beyond "the five
appropriating aggregates’ (upādāna-skandha) is to be found. This much the older Buddhism asserted. But now a Bodhisattva is not even the substratum of the five grasping aggregates, not even the non-existence of a substratum. The word ‘Bodhisattva,’ we are told, is just a word, naming nothing real at all. The same is true of perfect wisdom, the state of being a knower of all and indeed, all phenomena. All are mere names. Even the Bodhisattva’s understanding of selflessness (anātman), a perfect wisdom which consists in complete detachment from all phenomena, such that all phenomena are seen to be illusory (māyā), is no understanding. Raising up his or her heart (cittotpāda) to embrace all living beings as his or her own person, the Bodhisattva is aware that even when the goal, the state of all-knowing (sarvajñatā) is attained, he or she will simply be like "a skillful magician [who] conjures up a great host of people at the intersection of two highways and then, having done so, may cause that very same great host of people to disappear" (W89.1-21). There are no living beings to be helped, no motivation to help them, and no state of perfection by means of which their needs are met.

If Subhūti has a clear grasp of the new doctrine Śāriputra has only an intuition. He tries to pin Subhūti down as to exactly what is meant by ‘no Bodhisattva,’ ‘no perfection of wisdom’ and ‘no attainment,’ but Subhūti parries his every question until Śāriputra, too, begins to use language, like Subhūti, merely as a tool to pry the mind from clinging.

Pūrṇa is a minor figure who speaks twice (W91.23, 108.19) and then only briefly. He voices his concern, first as the doctrine seems to be skirting dangerously close to the edges of nihilism, and, second, when he catches the hint of a Mahāyāna opposed to older Buddhism and conceived in sectarian terms.

3.6 There is a striking contrast between the complete lack of systematization in the A and the detailed, step by step, delineation of the stages of the path, levels (bhūmi) and Buddha bodies which one meets with in the AA. This contrast stands out in stark relief in, e.g., the section of the A which Haribhadra relates (W37-74) to the four proximate penetrations (nirvedha-bhāgīya; §6.10-13). In the AA, as we shall see, there is a careful analysis of the development of inner spiritual growth, carefully delineated divisions of the path and a name for each particular stage. In the A, on the other hand, technical terms are almost entirely
absent. Even such terms as "the meditative stabilization called 'not grabbed hold of as any dharma'" (sarva-dharmāparigrha nāma samādhir, W49.21) are rare. In the A the Bodhisattva's practice is described only in ordinary language with words like coursing, meditating and training. The technical vocabulary of later highly systematized Mahāyāna Buddhism is almost completely absent.

3.7 The Abhisamayālāṃkāra

The AA is an aphoristic, schematic summary of the PP sūtras. It also is called Abhisamayālāṃkāra-nāma prajñā-paramitopadeśa-śāstra, e.g., in the title of Haribhadra's smaller commentary the AASphu. It is possible that it is called an upadeśa-śāstra ('instructional treatise') because it is viewed as bringing out the doctrine implicit in the PP sūtras (la Vallée Poussin 1931-32).

Haribhadra considers it to be a codification of all the major PP sūtras, but it appears to follow the Pañca particularly closely, and the earliest extant commentary we have on the AA, Ārya Vimuktisena's AAV, relates it only to that sūtra. It was first introduced to Western scholarship by Stcherbatsky and his student Obermiller who together published the Skt text and Tib translation in the Bibliotheca Buddhica Series (1929). Tucci (1932:1-48) produced a helpful schema and indices, and Obermiller (1932-3) then produced a helpful summary of the text and an incomplete detailed analysis (1933-36). Wogihara included the complete text within his edition of the AAA, as did Vaidya (1960), and Wogihara translated the entire text into Japanese. Conze (1954) translated the text into English and added copious parenthetical material in an attempt to make it more intelligible.¹

3.7.2 As Stcherbatsky (1929:iv) and la Vallée Poussin (1931-2:404-406 n. 21) pointed out many years ago, this rather enigmatic text raises puzzling questions. The Indian and Tib traditions attribute it to Maitreya and list it amongst his five works (Tib byams gzhung sde lnga): MSA, MAV, Dharma-dharmatā-vibhāga, Uttara-tantra (also called Ratna-gotra-vibhāga) and AA. Amongst these five texts, four have commentaries by Asaṅga. A corresponding commentary by Asaṅga on the AA is missing. A possible reference (W1.15-18) to a

¹ An undated manuscript by J. Hopkins and Denma Lochö Rinpoche, "The Seventy Topics" contains a translation of the Tib version.
commentary (bhāsyā) by Asaṅga, as well as a commentary (paddhati) by Vasubandhu, in the homage to the lineage Gurus has been mentioned (§2.10), but not only are there no known Skt manuscripts of either text, there are also no Tib or Chinese translations. Moreover neither text seems to be quoted in either the commentary of Ārya Vimuktiśena, or in any of the works of Haribhadra. Also puzzling is the absence of any Chinese translation of the AA, particularly in view of the importance accorded to the PP sūtras and the reverence extended to everything associated with Maitreya and Asaṅga in the Chinese traditions. Obermiller (1933-6:4) has remarked in somewhat choppy English:

Indeed, how is it to be explained that the AA should have remained quite unknown to the Chinese? Suppose it would have been inexplicably strange if later on, at the time of the Yuan Dynasty, when the Tib Lama Lo-dö-gyal-tsen played such an important part at the court of the Emperor Khu-bilai setsen khan as an ardent propagator of Buddhist science, the AA, which was then doubtlessly regarded by the Tib tradition as one of the most sacred texts, should have not found any entrance into China.

3.7.3 Tucci (1956:28-9) has pointed out that there are in fact two streams of commentary on the PP, one following the seven topics set forth by Asaṅga in his verse summary of the Vajracchedikā and the other the eight topics of the AA. The former continued in India until the time of Haribhadra, but was then largely supplanted by the tradition based on the eight topics of the AA. In China direct explanation of the PP sūtras appears to have found favour. Possibly the existence of the Ta chiḥ tu lun (=Mppś), a direct commentary on the longer PP sūtra precluded any further interest in the scholastic speculations of the AA and its commentaries.

Nevertheless, the absence of a translation of the AA is surprising, all the more when one considers that some editions of the Pañca after Haribhadra (e.g., the Le'u bṛgyad ma mentioned above §1.1.4) actually incorporate the AA into the Sūtra itself. It would seem likely that the text did exist somewhere in an early

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1 Jeh-chang Shih, of Los Angeles California has brought to my attention a recent translation of the AA into Chinese (from the Tib?). Nagao (1980:131) believes the AA to have been written later than usually accepted.
3.8 Modern scholarship divides the five texts traditionally ascribed to Maitreya into three groups, finding close similarities between the MSA, MAV, Dharmadharmatā-vibhāga (which are thought to be by the same Yogācāra writer) and attributing the Uttara-tantra and AA to different authors. Ruegg (1969:39-70) has summarized earlier scholarship on the authorship issue and discussed at length the possible authors of these texts and the relation between them.

This authorship issue is not a particular interest of mine and I have, therefore, not attempted to definitively resolve it.

3.9 The view that Asaṅga had a teacher Maitreya (either a real human being or mysterious divine creature) who taught him at least some of the five texts is accepted by both traditional and most modern scholarship. The position that I take here, that Maitreya or Maitreya-nātha is the author of the AA, reflects that fact. It also accords with the opinion of Haribhadra, as evidenced in his mention of "a verse commentary (ṭīkā) composed by the merciful Lord Maitreya" (§2.10), and his comments (W75.17-22) at the end of the discussion of proximate penetration:

Even though the master Asaṅga had attained to the realization and had knowledge of the revelation's entire meaning, he did not recognize (in non-repetitious teaching as well) the precise signification of individual words, because of the profundity, and because there is so much repetition. So he could not figure out the PP’s meaning and became depressed. Hence, with him in view, Maitreya the Lord explained the PP Sūtras and composed the Abhisamayālaṁkāra-kārikā-sastra. Having listened to that it was explained again by the master Asaṅga and by the master Vasubandhu and others.
3.9.2 In passing, mention should be made of a particularly interesting Indian (tantric?) tradition, predating Haribhadra, which connects the AA with Ārya Maitreya, one of eight Bodhisattvas in the direct circle of the Buddha. This tradition is recorded in Abhayākaragupta’s Marma-kaumudi (P5202:111.2.1ff). According to Abhaya, immediately after the Saṅgītikara Vajrapāni compiled the sūtras, the Bodhisattva Maitreya wrote the AA, not later at the request of Asaṅga. Both Bu ston and Tsongkha pa reject Abhaya’s presentation, however, on the ground that the weight of tradition goes too strongly against such a point of view (Ruegg 1969:44).

3.9.3 The traditional view is explained in greater detail by Bu ston (Obermiller 1932:137-139) who says that Asaṅga, after meditating for eleven years in solitude, met Maitreya in the refined space between the ordinary world of common appearance and the celestial pure realm of the Buddhas. Miraculously he was transported to a divine realm where, in just a few days, he received the transmission of all five texts, and, out of his compassion, returned to this vale of tears to write them down for the benefit of mankind.

3.10 The contents of the AA are presented in eight chapters (adhikāra) which are again broken down into seventy topics (Tib don bdun bcu). Each chapter describes an abhisamaya (‘clear realization’). These have been already been mentioned in the context of the AAA (§2.15), and are discussed in detail below (§7.4ff).

3.11 Finally, a comment about the emphasis the author of the AA places on a delineation of the particular stages of the Mahāyāna path.

3.11.2 Considering, for the moment, only the first chapter, when one compares the lines devoted to particular topics in the AA with the corresponding sections in the A and Pañca one is struck by Maitreya’s particular concern to delineate clearly these stages, and particularly the ten levels (bhūmis). Of the 56 stanzas elaborating the ten topics of the first abhisamaya (AA18-73), 23 (AA48-70) are given over to a detailed presentation of these levels. This is surprising given the conception of Maitreya’s work as a whole. For in the schema of the first chapter the levels are just one of the seventeen subdivisions of the ninth topic, the course in accumulation (sambhāra-pratipatti). Even accepting the historically most
defensible position, that the AA was originally a commentary only on the Pañca, one finds that the corresponding section in that work is only eleven pages long (Pañca:214-224), out of a total of 252 pages. In the A the contrast is even starker: the corresponding section is only four lines (W98.7-11).

3.11.3 The other topic in the first chapter which Maitreya deals with at some length, the proximate penetration (AA25-36), is similar to the levels in that it is a further detailed breakdown of a particular section of the Bodhisattva’s path. Maitreya, in his explanation of the proximate penetration, as in his detailed description of the levels, stresses the difference between the Śrāvaka-yāna and Bodhisattva-yāna, and the superiority of the latter path.

Why, amongst the inner divisions of the Mahāyāna path, particular aspects are given emphasis in the AA remains to be determined.
IV INDIAN LITERARY GENRES AND THE AAA

4.1 We have seen that the AAA, a late eighth century example of commentarial literature of the PP school, incorporates within itself three distinct texts: the A, AA and an exegetical portion explaining those two texts. In this, the AAA conforms to a general pattern found in Indian religious literature, a pattern which incorporates revelation, aphoristic summary and commentary within one text, and, macrocosmically as it were, within each system of thought.

Specifically, in regard to the PP tradition itself, the revelation is contained in the PP (§3.2-3.4), a section of Mahāyāna sūtras. The AA is the aphoristic summary (śūtra) for the PP school concerned with Mahāyāna metaphysics. The commentarial tradition associated with this school begins with the AAV of Ārya Vimuktiśena, continues through the works of Haribhadra and ends, in India, with the works of the late Pāla dynasty writers Ratnakara-sānti (Śāntipa) and Abhayākara-gupta (Abhaya).

4.1.2 This pattern of revelation, śūtra and commentary reflects a deep trend in Indian literary development. It is a pattern that influenced not only the way writers like Haribhadra structured their texts, but also the way they approached the ideas of earlier writers. An investigation of this pattern in detail will provide the wider context for the AAA (incorporating as it does the A and AA) within the general frame of Buddhist religious literature, a literature which spans a period of about 1600 years on the Indian subcontinent. It will also illustrate how the revelation, śūtra, commentary structure, which up until now has been mainly noticed in Brahmancial systems, is equally applicable to Buddhist systems as well.

Following this investigation there is also a brief summary of the PP literature in India and Tibet after the time of Haribhadra.

4.2 The structure of Buddhist religious literature parallels what is found in the Brahmanical tradition, and it has even been argued that there was a conscious attempt, on the part of Buddhists, to model an alternative revelation and revelatory language in a sort of viable opposition to the Vedic Brahmancial one

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1 For Tibet see §4.12
In both Brahmanical and Buddhist traditions there is evident a similar pattern of literary development. Fundamental is the unquestioned revelation, Brahmanical śruti ('act or result of hearing' by extraordinary individuals) or buddha-vacana (literally that spoken by an Enlightened One), which combines popular elements together with theological and philosophical speculation. Although the centrality of this literature is never doubted, it is an open question how much actual importance it had for the systematic philosophers beyond endowing their works with the requisite orthodoxy. Then, crucial in the development of each system, is the aphoristic summary, the sūtra. In no case can a later author go beyond the aphoristic statements except insofar as he or she can somehow interpret the words to mean what he or she wants. And finally there are the vṛttis, vārttikas, bhāṣyas and tīkās explaining the meanings, words and concepts of the sūtra (and where necessary the actual śruti or buddha-vacana itself), frequently increasing in size as they incorporate more and more of the material from earlier writers.

At the heart of each orthodox system there is a hierarchy of revelations expressed through persons free from any blemish or shortcoming, who lost importance as persons. The ṛṣis (Seers) who transmitted the Veda, or the Buddha who taught the truth, were subsumed into the general tenor of the revelation, a circumstance which led to delightful conclusions: ages making Methuselah look as if he died young, and capacities which make God's creation of the world in seven days a mere minor miracle. In the Indian context the human dimension is down-played (Ingalls 1965) and the individuality of the wellspring is always lost either in the concern with cyclic origination or in the multiplication of forms of the divinity.

Both Brahmanical and Buddhist traditions accepted a certain body of literature as authentic utterance coterminous with a perfect ultimate source. One must express it thus, and not say 'from an omniscient god' because the Mīmāṁsakās -- Vedic hermeneuticists concerned with the rules for achieving correct interpretations of apparently contradictory or layered Vedic utterances -- never understood the Vedic revelation as the utterance of a person, but rather as
an unoriginated reality heard by ṛṣis. These ṛṣis transmitted the revelation, through many lineages, to a spiritually capable section of humanity. Unlike the Mīmāṁsakās, the Buddhists (specifically the later Buddhists) understood their revelation in a more usual way, as having originated from an omniscient being. Yet Buddhists, who always considered special those works said to have been uttered by the Buddha Śākya-muni, continually incorporated so many texts into the body of their revelatory literature one must question exactly what they had in mind by the word ‘Buddha.’

4.3.2 It might seem preposterous to question the existence of an historical Buddha or Tathāgata Śākya-muni, but based on the evidence we now have it is perhaps not unreasonable to do so in a certain sense. Just as with an historical Jesus, we have no documents which can conclusively be shown to have been transmitted or written by such a being, and even those ideas most commonly associated with the name of a Buddha, the four noble truths and the eightfold noble path, have parallels and perhaps even precursors in popular, Sāṃkhya and Upaniṣadic texts. Furthermore, the earliest Buddhist texts we now possess are layered both linguistically and stylistically. They contain traces of earlier linguistic forms and parallel, in their descriptions of the life of the founder, standard life stories of other religious leaders such as the Mahāvīra.

4.3.3 Snellgrove (1987:8) points out, correctly, that "the notion of ‘the Buddha,’ as though there were only one, just as there is traditionally only one Christ is entirely a modern nineteenth century Western idea;" and, (43) that it is "impossible to conceive of Śākya-muni in any traditional religious sense as the founder of his religion in the way in which Jesus Christ is certainly the founder of Christianity and Mohammed of Islam." He also says (149) that "the Mahāyāna sūtras ... increased to infinity the number of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas."

4.3.4 That there are spontaneous appearances of the godhead, be it Brahman or Buddha, in forms appropriate to the believer’s understanding, was probably closer to the prevailing Indian concept, certainly by the time of the rise of Mahāyāna. The notion of a body of emanations (nirmāṇa-kāya), which becomes prevalent in later Mahāyāna as a partial description of Buddha, is an example of
this psychological perspective. Throughout Indian religious literature one finds the forms of the omniscient described as a variable of individual human capacities, and the multiplicity of Buddhas, each capable of expressing authentic revelation, fits into this pattern.

4.3.5 The structure of Brahmanical revelation is in general more complex than that of the Buddhist, most probably because of the longer time frame within which it evolved and, perhaps, also because of its application to a wider spectrum of social groupings. At the pinnacle of the revelation, in an extremely rarified sphere almost beyond the mythical, as it were, are the ancient collections of hymns (mantra or saṃhitā). Even at a very early period of Indian history the four Vedas (with the Arthava being the last to gain complete acceptance) were firmly entrenched in a position of mystical glory proximate to or even one with the original source or godhead. These Saṃhitās in their various recensions form the solid undisputed śruti. Gradually the Brāhmaṇas, primarily direct and indirect explanations of rituals, associated with the Saṃhitās achieved a more respectable status as the glory of the original rubbed off on them. In the Āraṇyakas (a body of literature reflecting the changing concerns of a less socially-oriented social group) the largely exoteric, though occasionally ritualistically esoteric, language of the Brāhmaṇas begins to take on more and more of an esoteric significance. This 'forest literature,' and in particular the intimate instruction of guru to disciple found in the early Upaniṣads, also attained the mystical status of śruti, partially by the same process as the Brāhmaṇas and partially because they contained unmistakably, in seed form, the sublime insights which were to be worked out in the later systems of Indian philosophy of the Classical period.

At the apex of the Brahmanical revelation, then, and covered loosely by the term Veda are the Saṃhitās, Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads. Apart from some hesitation on the part of the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā to invest full authority in the Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads, this literature is undisputed śruti or revelation.1

1 Among non-revealed Brahmanical religious texts, the smṛti enjoys a status almost equivalent to the highest Vedic revelation, and, on the practical level, is more influential in shaping the religious
4.4 In regard to the corresponding Buddhist revelatory literature, the *buddha-vacana*, there are, it seems to me, four parts. These parts overlap like concentric circles spreading out from a common core or center:\footnote{1}

a) In the middle, the point around which the outer parts revolve, are early doctrines and rules: a core literature. This is a recent concept of *buddha-vacana* suggested by history.

b) In the first concentric circle (including within itself all the literature of the core) is early Buddhist canonical literature, the *Hinayāna* sūtras.

c) In the second concentric circle are syncretic *Māhāyāna* sūtras.

d) In the final outer, possibly unbounded, circle are Buddhist tantras.

4.4.2 It is probably meaningless to search for an original Buddhism beyond the ideas current in Indian society about 500 B.C.E. (Snellgrove 1987:20, Nakamura 1980:60). The notion of a core section of *buddha-vacana* comes,

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\footnote{1} The syncretistic views of the Tib writer Tsongkha pa (1357-1410), particularly as found in his explanation of the sources for the *Lam rim* literature (*Lam rim chen mo* 8b-14b2, Napper 1985:27-31), are the basis for this quasi-historical explanation of *buddha-vacana*. He asserts:

1. that no one teaching of Buddha contradicts any other
2. that all Buddhist doctrine is personal instruction, and
3. that denying revelatory status to certain Buddhist doctrines is tantamount to abandoning the doctrine in its entirety. His views, influenced as they were by the exigencies of late fourteenth century Tib society, nevertheless have the merit of dealing exhaustively with works accepted by Buddhists as Buddhist revelation and, in a manner to which, in all probability, the author of the AAA would have assented. The roots of Tsongkha pa's views are to be found in the *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka*, Kamalaśīla's BK and, in particular, Dīpaṅkāra Śrījñāna Atśa's *Prajñā-prādīpa* (Thurman 1985). Napper (1985:27) sums up Tsongkha pa's contribution in the following words. "Applying standards of reasoning and consistency, Dzong-ka-ba analyzed the vast corpus of Buddhist literature and derived an ordered system that attempts to uphold the validity of all the Buddha's diverse teachings within reconciling seeming contradictions between them."
primarily, from scholars influenced by the methods which New Testament scholars like R. Bultmann employed in the search for an historical Jesus.¹

4.4.2.2 The largest collection of Buddhist sacred scripture extant in an Indian language is the Pāli Tripiṭaka: the Sūtra (Pāli Sutta), Vinaya and Abhidharma (Pāli Abhidhamma) baskets (piṭaka). Discourses attributed to Śākyamuni are included in Sūtra. Kerygma-like passages, from which are derived the rules of the Buddhist Order, are included in the Vinaya. Metaphysical speculations, primarily element-lists and their definitions, are included in the Abhidharma.

4.4.2.3 One traditional view is that Pāli, the language of the canon of the Sthavira-vāda (= Theravāda) school, was the language of an original Buddhism, the word of the Buddha himself, and what he said is enshrined in the Pāli canon. This traditional view, while defensible as a method to generate a positive attitude to the canonical works, does not appear to be historically defensible. Śākyamuni's own language, given that a question framed in such terms is meaningful, remains unidentified and therefore cannot be a criterion for determining original core documents. Nevertheless, some pre-canonical Buddhist language is known, and can help us determine which parts of the vast canonical literature are earlier and which later (Lamotte 1967:617-656).

4.4.2.4 Of the collections (nikāya) in the Sūtra basket, the Mahā-vagga, Aṭṭhaka-vagga and Pārāyāna sections of the Sutta-nipāta, itself a part of the Khuddaka-nikāya, are the oldest. At least some of this section of the Sutta-nipāta would seem to contain the earliest Buddhist doctrines. In particular, the doctrine of misery, its cause and cessation found in the last part of the Mahā-vagga (the Dvatānupassana-sutta), the stress on internal righteousness rather than external factors being the arbiter of religious status (a doctrine which appears again and again throughout the Sutta-nipāta and Dhammapada), and an unswerving rejection of the social world (renunciation) appear to be original core doctrines. One can determine this on metrical and linguistic grounds, by tracing quotation of earlier parts of the canon in later parts, and by comparing common passages in the different versions of the canon.

¹ For an introduction to the voluminous historical scholarship concerning itself with early Christianity see, Perrin and Duling (1982).
4.4.2.5 Scholars like Frauwallner (1956) have also tried to identify a core Vinaya text, the ur-text of the various Vinayas of the later Buddhist sects, by comparing the different redactions in the various canons. But as P.S. Jaini (1977) has pointed out, the Vinaya is of less importance to Buddhists as revelation since its differences, touching on social conventions as distinct from metaphysical issues, do not reflect on questions which touch the heart of orthodox Buddhist beliefs. Most of the central Buddhist beliefs are located in texts placed in the Abhidharma basket. They are all historically much later works.

4.4.3 The notion that early Buddhist canonical literature is the Hīnayāna sūtras is the outcome of a complex manoeuvre in hermeneutics. Later Indian writers (Mahāyāna Buddhists) re-interpreted words like ‘Buddha’ and buddha-vacana, and described what earlier Buddhist believers had considered to be the exhaustive, authentic, revelation as ‘deficient’ or ‘lacking’ (hīna).

They applied the designation ‘deficient’
- to the persons toward whom the older doctrines were directed,
- to the breadth of philosophical inquiry,
- to the fruit and
- to a religious practice.

The persons were deficient because they lacked the confidence to strive for a goal the Mahāyānists considered higher than nirvāṇa. The breadth of inquiry was deficient because the earlier sūtras dealt only with the absence of a soul as a distinct entity within the constituent elements (skandha) and not with general emptiness (śūnyatā). The fruit was deficient since only personal liberation resulted from following the practices taught in those sūtras, not universally beneficial enlightenment. And the religious practice was deficient because it included only the Śrāvaka-yāna and Pratyeka-buddha-yāna as distinct from the Bodhisattva-yāna.

A yāna is a vehicle or journey. The internalized revelation is a vehicle (yāna) taking the adept to the goal. The earlier internalized revelation was a hīnayāna (‘deficient vehicle’) since it was a practice which carried only one person to nirvāṇa, unlike the mahāyāna (‘grand vehicle’) which transported the totality of beings to salvation.
4.4.4 From the death of the founder until about one hundred years C.E., a series of splits on account of ethical, doctrinal and geographical differences led to a situation in which there were many separate Buddhist sects. The earlier Mahāyāna sūtras probably evolved out of the speculations of the different and by now practically autonomous Buddhist communities.

4.4.4.2 Among Mahāyāna sūtras most central and influential are the PP sūtras. Other important branches of the Mahāyāna revelation are the Saddharma-puṇḍarīka, Ratna-kūṭa and Avatāraśaka collections, Lāṅkāvatāra, Vimala-kīrti-nirdeśa and the Saṃdhī-nirmocana-sūtra, to name only some. The Mahāyāna revelation became as extensive as the earlier "Hīnayāna" revelation and eventually grew to astronomical proportions with the incorporation of apparently contradictory teachings and doctrines. A helpful list of the main "Mahāyānist canonical sources of the Madhyamaka school" compiled from the works of Nāgārjuna and his later disciple Candrakīrti is given by Ruegg (1981:7). Each generated a commentarial tradition.

4.4.4.3 During the Classical period, even though one invariably finds a sort of pro-forma genuflection to the accepted revelation, and its source, in both the Brahmanical and Buddhist texts there is a tendency to debunk accepted truths. This scepticism was the outcome, partly of the liberal environment which allowed free exchange of even ‘culturally subversive’ ideas, and partly of a drift in Indian speculative thinking over many centuries towards questioning the reality of appearances. This willingness to detract from even the most central and important parts of the ordinary person’s religious sensibilities, which we see in Nāgārjuna’s removing special status from Buddhist doctrines as central as the four noble truths, and in Śaṅkara’s gentle devaluation of the karma kāṇḍa, was there in pre-classical times also. Kṛṣṇa, in the Bhagavad-gītā, e.g., first devalues the ‘flowery recitations’ of the orthodox ritualist and then even the religious philosophizing (sāṃkhya) of the monk. And in the earliest Buddhist literature there are uncompromising attacks on religious institutions and accepted beliefs. These religious, or perhaps one should say anti-religious, speculations are most often associated with an intellectual elite or with cults cut off, to a greater or lesser extent, from the mainstream society and living in monastic type communities. They are an important element in the Mahāyāna sūtra literature.
4.4.4 Another characteristic of the Mahāyāna sūtras is their magical or supernatural component. They are positively caked in the paraphernalia of omniscience with every speaker and listener a part of a pervasive theophany and every utterance loaded with significance and power.

4.4.5 The Mahāyāna sūtras are the works attributed to Śākyamuni which earlier Buddhists rejected as spurious, but which later Mahāyānists believed to be authentic. Mahāyānists did not consider them better, or more profound, than the revelation in the Hinayāna sūtras, merely no less authentic. Hence the Mahāyāna writers were not exclusive in their designs but syncretistic, and from their own point of view, all the sūtras were equally revelation, equally directed to persons at various stages of development and capacity, and equally the spontaneous utterances of an enlightened being. From their vantage point in the ocean, as it were, Mahāyāna writers could afford to be tolerant. Every doctrine and teaching had become a method to direct Buddhists of different propensities and capacities along different tributaries.

4.4.5 In the tantras, the notion of revelation is expanded to include the sayings and worship of vast numbers of celestial and quasi-demonic ‘Buddhas.’ Esoteric practices and beliefs are integrated with fundamental Buddhist doctrines. These are then set forth as original and authentic sayings of one or other of a variety of Buddhas described as manifestations of a primordial Buddha Vajrapāṇi or Vajradhara (Snellgrove1987:134). The time and place of the greatest spread of Buddhist tantra was during the Pāla dynasty in north east India between the ninth and twelfth centuries.

Although there is no record of H having written a tantric work, the time he lived was a time of tantra. Reference to tantric figures in his writing (e.g., Vajra-dhara at W5.6-8) have already been mentioned.

I mention the tantric ‘revelation,’ at some length, even though the context is a study of the AAA, to give the modern reader enough material to construct something of the interior world of Haribhadra. It is surely impossible to understand a commentary like the AAA without an informed understanding of how Haribhadra approached a revealed text like the PP sūtra. One must try to construct, as far as possible, from a knowledge of the historical period and Haribhadra’s own statements, a notion of buddha-vacana like the author’s own.
4.4.5.2 Small sūtra-like texts, ritual formulae and mantras called mūla (‘root’) tantras, together with explanatory tantras, were ascribed revelatory status (i.e., were written or said by the Buddha). The vast commentaries on the various mūlas, attributed to adepts with names like Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Candrákīrti were said to be the work of people possessing incredible powers and capacity.

4.4.5.3 If it seems out of place to include such texts in a description of Buddhist revelation, this is due, probably, more to the fact that the study of tantra has been hindered by preconception and prejudice about what religion in general, and Buddhism in particular, should say, than because of any dispassionate scholarly judgement. Winternitz (1934:3-4), e.g., whose considerable contribution to Western knowledge of Indian classical literature should not be belittled, nevertheless writes:

I cannot find much wisdom in the gibberish of most of the Tantras... in regard to the strange and filthy language... is it not, to say the least, highly dangerous to use? ... On the whole we find in it [the Guhya-samāja-tantra] the same unsavory mixture of mysticism, occult pseudo-science, magic and erotics as in most of the other Buddhist Tantras.

It is not that Winternitz’s description is wrong, just that it makes it difficult for the reader to understand that this ‘gibberish’ is as much buddha-vacana as is the Dhammapada.¹

4.4.5.4 According to Tāranātha the earliest Buddhist tantras are contained in the two lowest tantra sets.² Benyotosh Bhattacharyya (1931) and Wayman (1973:15-19) have held that the Guhya-samāja-tantra was written by Asaṅga and dates back to the fourth century. In his discussion of the historical evolution of tantric Buddhism, from earlier Buddhist and Brahmanical traditions, Snellgrove (1987:117-128) places the emergence of most of the tantras in about

¹ Snellgrove (1987) has discussed the earlier opinions of Buddhist Tantra and gives the most researched and dispassionate presentation of this branch of Buddhist revelation.
² The standard division of the tantras according to Tibetan sources is into kriyā, caryā, yoga and anuttara-yoga.
the eighth century, when the earliest Tib and Chinese translations begin to appear.

4.4.6 Of the earlier, traditional, discussions of the Buddhist equivalent of Brahmanical śruti the most important, within the context of the study of a Yogācāra/Mādhyamika writer like Haribhadra, is the so-called three turnings of the wheel of doctrine (dharma-cakra). The theory is found in the Sarīdhī-nirmocana-sūtra (Lamotte 1935) and presents a new hermeneutics based on the presupposition that in seeking the true middle way between eternalism and nihilism the Buddha finally revealed the three natures (tri-svabhāva, §5.4-4.5). The different sorts of emptinesses, of three different sorts of characteristic marks (laksana), become a definitive statement around which are ordered the other statements (a) directed towards the eternalistically inclined Hīnayānist and (b) directed towards the nihilistically inclined Mahāyānist. In the first turning of the wheel of doctrine (based, apparently, on the historical first turning accepted by ‘Hīnayāna’ schools) all dharmas were said by the Buddha to exist inherently (sva-bhāvena). In the second turning (this, according to the Sarīdhī-nirmocana-sūtra, is the teaching that seems to be found in the PP sūtras) all dharmas were said to lack inherent existence. In the third, and definitive, turning of the wheel of the dharma the intention (dgongs pa =abhipraya) behind Buddha’s two apparently contradictory statements is investigated and set forth as the three natures (parikalpita-, paratantra- and pariniṣpanna-svabhāva).

The theory of the three turnings seems to be a-historical and is primarily important as a contribution to the rich field of Indian hermeneutics. Nevertheless, as Snellgrove (1978:103) says, "the three turnings of the Wheel of the Doctrine represent a perfectly valid historical development of Buddhist teachings," in the sense that there were in India, to some extent, three stages in the understanding of the Buddhist teachings and the theory of the three turnings mirrors that reality to some extent.

4.8 All Buddhist religious literature can be called śāstra.¹ Nevertheless, there is a clear separation of those texts attributed to Buddha. Only they can be called

¹ Panchen bsod nams grags pa (AAPdon:81-84), however, considers bstan bcos (=śāstra) and sangs rgyas kyi bka' (=buddha-vacana) to be mutually exclusive categories.
sūtras, i.e., actual revelation. Texts written by a later saint or scholar are subsumed under the catch-all rubric of śāstra. Amongst these śāstras, however, as with the Brahmanical systems, there is a tendency, albeit less systematized, to propel one aphoristic text to a position of prominence.

4.9 In the strict Brahmanical usage of the term, sūtra includes only that body of distinctively Indian aphoristic literature which seeks to assemble in a coherent chain the seminal ideas of a particular system.¹

In Buddhist Skt the word sūtra is used to refer to what Buddha said. It describes texts which are very often the exact opposite of what sūtra means in the Brahmanical tradition; e.g., the Śata-sāhasrikā-prajñā-pāramitā, possibly the wordiest book ever written, can take one hundred pages to say what is condensed into one hundred lines in the A. One informed speculation is that the Pāli word sutta, used to describe the discourses attributed to Buddha, is derived from sūkta (well-spoken) and quite unrelated to the Skt word sūtra. As Skt became a more important Buddhist language, and classical writers coined Skt words to express the ideas originally found in Pāli and other now lost vernaculars, sūtra came to stand for sutta. The Prakrit equivalent of both sūkta and sūtra would be sutta. Alternatively, the early Indian Buddhists may have used the word to express their belief that no word of the Buddha was superfluous.

4.9.2 In general a sūtra is even more compressed than the corresponding metric form which we find in the AA, the kārikā. It is reflection on the sūtra and its extreme parsimony with words that a verse kārikā such as the AA, with its occasional verse fillers to meet metric requirements, is considered relatively wordy.

4.9.3 Each of the well-known six Brahmanical schools of philosophy (darśanas) of the Classical period had at its source a sūtra or a set of aphorisms.

¹ The etymology from root so -- cognate with the English word sew' and the tra suffix of means, i.e., 'a thread' -- clearly shows that the Brahmanical usage reflects the original meaning.
These sūtras are the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṁsā, Brahma/Vedānta, and Yoga sūtras.\(^1\)

In much the same fashion Nāgājuna’s MMK is a ‘sūtra,’ as it were, for the entire Mādhyamika school; the Madhyamakāvatāra-kārikās of Candrakīrti (according to Tib descriptions of Indian Buddhism) for the Prāsaṅgika sub-school of Mādhyamika; Dharmakīrti’s PV (commenting on Dignāga’s Pramāṇa-samuccaya) is the ‘sūtra’ for the Buddhist equivalent to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the AA is the ‘sūtra’ for the PP school concerned with Mahāyāna metaphysics. The MSA, MAV and other smaller works of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, as a group, are a sort of composite ‘sūtra’ for the Yogācāra school. Vasubandhu’s AK also clearly attained a special, sūtra-like, significance in later times, particularly in China and Tibet.

4.9.5 Both the Brahmanical and Buddhist sūtra (i.e., aphoristic summary) present a certain difficulty, a difficulty met with when considering the style of the AA which is clearly a work of the sūtra genre. On the one hand they seem to be the original text providing the impetus and basis for the later commentatorial system. On the other hand, the level of codification and speculation presupposed by the sūtra would surely require a long previous history.

4.10 From each of these ‘sūtras,’ as in the Brahmanical tradition and in some cases directly parallel to it, (e.g., the history of the debate between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the school of Dignāga between the fifth and twelfth centuries, approximately) a body of commentarial literature arose in which each subsequent commentary incorporated the ideas of the earlier writers, either as direct quotation, or, by adapting what they wrote, in such a way that criticisms leveled by other schools would be deflected or absorbed without damage.

4.11 What is the source of the Buddhist revelation’s authority? Why, specifically, in both the AA and AAA, is the authority of the A unquestioned?

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\(^1\) There is no record of Īśvaraśrṅa’s Sāṁkhya-kārikā, or any other Sāṁkhya text, having attained to sūtra status in its own time. Nevertheless, perhaps because of the lack of other authentic texts from the period, there is a tendency to treat the Sāṁkhya-kārikā as a sūtra for the Sāṁkhya school as a whole.
4.11.2 Lamotte (1949:80 n. 2, 1983-84:4-15) identifies four stages in the development of the idea of authority (prāmāṇya/pramāṇatva) in Buddhist revelation.

(1) In the first stage, when a text was set forth as being (a) Buddha's, (b) the Sarīgha's, (c) a group of elders' or (d) very ancient, it had to be checked that it was in the Vinaya and Sūtra baskets. Already a slightly less restricted version of this criterion for authenticity is found in the Chinese versions of the Dīrghāgama where it also says buddha-vacana will not contradict reality.

(2) In the second stage, the idea of the person, Buddha, having authority is removed. "Rely not on the person but on what he taught." "Avec le développement de la littérature bouddhique, le critère d'autorité perd sa force. De plus en plus c'est la valeur intrinsèque d'un texte qui décidera s'il doit être accepté ou rejeté" (Lamotte 1949:80 n. 1, 536-540).

(3) In this stage subjectivity becomes a criterion for revelation. The mention of a work as being by Buddha is no longer relevant. The question becomes only "is it beneficial and useful?" The idea of subhāṣīta, that "all Buddha said is said well" (Suttanipāta 3.3) becomes "all that is said well is said by Buddha."

(4) Lastly, when confronted with there being no authority for their Mahāyāna revelation, the Mahāyānists say: "It is Buddha's word because it leads one to enlightenment."

4.11.3 The stance of the Brahmanical writer is that a fundamentally authorless (apaureṣeya) primordial statement of truths which is at the heart of the Brahmanical conception of śruti does not require, and is indeed quite beyond, validation by even the most profound human religious experience. The śruti is a revelation similar to the Judeo-Christian or Islamic conception of the word of God that does not require further validation beyond that imparted to it by being revealed word (śabda) itself. Just as it would be blasphemous even to entertain the thought that God's word might require further authorization or validation, similarly, Brahmanical systems, at least in theory, considered śruti to be itself a separate authority (śabda-pramāṇa), answerable, as it were, only to itself.

4.11.4 Later Buddhist thinkers (e.g., Dharmakīrti, PV Svārthānumāna 225-231) rejected the Veda because they considered its conclusions, whether ethico-soteriological or philosophical, to be invalidated by direct personal experience.
(pratyakṣa) or by inference (anumāna). Nevertheless, they believed the Tathāgata’s statements to be authoritative, and justified the apparent double standard by saying that his word (śabda), though not itself self-evidently authoritative (pramāṇa), was nevertheless always in accord with the truth. It derived its power and authority, not from being the Tathāgatha’s word, but from not contradicting the nature of things. This is also the position set forth in MSA:1.11 where the characterization is बुद्धवचनम् च न विभेदयति (§4.11.2), and, perhaps, what Haribhadra has in mind when he refers (W34.16) to scriptural authority (āgama-pramāṇa).

4.11.4 According to the Buddhists, then, the real domain of the Tathāgata’s authority was his explanation of the way to nirvāṇa (e.g., PV Pramāṇa-siddhi 34-38). An early canonical passage (Dhammapada 276) says "You yourself must make an effort. The Tathāgatas are only preachers." Hence disciples were expected to validate the doctrine by deepening their own religious insights through study and introspection. As Carpenter (1985:186) has said, Buddhist revelation is "based upon a personal religious experience." This is probably the underlying reason why Buddhist sacred scripture is so difficult to delimit.

4.12 The commentarial tradition after Haribhadra

The Mādhyamika/Prajñā-pāramitā synthesis up until the time of Haribhadra has already been discussed (§1.1-1.1.5, §2.10-2.14). After Bhadanta Vimuktiṣena there is a gap of perhaps two hundred years until the time of Haribhadra, whose four commentaries (§1.1.2) gave great impetus to the later PP tradition.

4.12.2 Soon after Haribhadra, the PP tradition was divided into two theoretically complementary streams. The first mention of these two streams is found in the Abhisamayālamkāra-bhagavati-prajñā-pāramitopadeśa-śāstra-ṭikā Prasphuta-padā (AAPras) of Dharmamitra, a commentary on the AASphu of Haribhadra. There it refers to "Ārya Nāgārjuna elucidating the essential meaning of the PP sūtras in his MMK, etc." This essential meaning is characterized as profound or clearly taught (gsal bar bstan). In the same place it says Maitreya elucidates the topic of the abhisamayās in a vast (rab tu rgyas pa) discourse (རི་སོགས་རང་བཞི་བོད་པར་བཞི་དེ་བོད་པས་ཁྱད་ཅིག་བཤད་པ་གཤེགས་པ་དང་གིས་).
These two lineages, the Profound (zab mo =gambhīra) and Vast (rgya che ba =vistara), are both said to explain the meaning of the PP sūtras. The former, traced back through the Mādhyamika commentarial tradition to the MMK, does so by explicating their direct teaching of śūnyatā, and the latter, traced back through the lineage of syncretic PP commentaries mentioned in Haribhadra’s homage to Maitreya’s AA (§2.10), by setting out in systematic and clear language the concealed teaching of the paths, levels and other metaphysical components subsumed under the general rubric of the eight abhisamayas.

4.12.3 This description of two lineages parallels the Brahmanical, post-Advaita accommodative view of the Mīmāṃsā tradition, which divides Mīmāṃsā into Earlier (pūrva) and Higher (uttara), though there is no evidence of any direct borrowing. According to this view, in the karma-kāṇḍa, or the texts of the pūrva-mīmāṃsā, the activities of the religious person, prerequisite to penetration to the ultimate truth of brahman are set forth, while in the jñāna-kāṇḍa, the texts of the uttara-mīmāṃsā, one finds a description of the ultimate truth of the Vedic revelation. The uttara-mīmāṃsā, with its concern for the ultimate, parallels the profound tradition which deals with the ultimate truth of śūnyatā, the dominating concern of Nagarjuna and his followers Āryadeva, Buddhapālita, Bhavya and Candrakīrti. The pūrva-mīmāṃsā, which delineates, in scholastic detail, the specifics of correct action and the principles of the science of interpretation, parallels the vast tradition, with its concern for systematization and detail as it deals with the conventional realities of the practices and mental development of the Bodhisattva on the religious path. Just as both the uttara and pūrva-mīmāṃsā are understood by latter syncretists to set out necessary and non-contradictory parts of the Vedic revelation, similarly, the traditions of the Profound and the Vast are said (particularly by Tibetan scholastics) to set out the two (ultimate and conventional) realities in the PP sūtras, both of which are necessary and non-contradictory.

4.12.4 None of the Indian commentaries based on the AA written after Haribhadra, most now lost in the original and known only through Tib translations, is a direct commentary on the AAA. They are not, however, on that
account irrelevant to a deeper understanding of Haribhadra’s text. Some are explanations of the shorter AASphu which is itself an abridgement of the AAA. All are important for an understanding of the later Tib commentaries, where they are quoted and referred to by a set of abbreviations. Access to this later Tib PP tradition, which anyone seriously interested in the Indian PP tradition must gain, requires at least a familiarity with the names.

4.12.5 The most definitive bibliography of PP so far is Conze (1978). He lists forty sub-commentaries on the AA and gives, as well, a careful list of the various sūtras and the commentaries connected to them.

4.12.6 A helpful scheme for considering the most important of the later commentaries is proposed by Tsongkha pa (AAGser:12.1ff) and followed by Obermiller (1932-3). Tsongkha pa proposes two general divisions of commentary: (a) those which attempt to connect the AA directly to a PP sūtra and (b) those which do not.

He places in the former category twelve texts, of which Ārya Vimuktisena’s AAV, Bhadanta Vimuktisena’s Vārttika and Haribhadra’s Le’u bryad ma connect the AA with the Pañca. In this category is also the commentary, by the Cittamātrin Ratnākara-sānti (Śāntipa), called Śuddhamati or Śuddhimati (Jaini 1979:3). Besides the AAA, connecting the AA to the A is another commentary, by the same Śāntipa, called Sāratamā (corrected in some catalogues to Sarottamā), a major part of which has recently been edited by P.S. Jaini (1979). Ruegg (1969:65, 139) first mentions Śāntipa as interpreting the AA in accord with Cittamātra doctrine, and later mentions the opinion of Nya dbon kun dga’ dpal (a teacher of Tsongkha pa), that one finds in the works of Śāntipa a Cittamātra-Mādhyamika synthesis (dbu ma chen po). According to Bu ston (Obermiller 1932:31) and Tāranātha (299-300) Śāntipa was a disciple of the tantric adept Nāropa and a teacher of the celebrated Dipaṅkāra-śrījñāna Atiśa who died in Tibet in 1053. The Sāratamā is written from the Yogācāra point of view.

Also connecting the AA with the A is the Marma-kaumudī by Abhāyākaragupta, now extant only in Tib translation. Tāranātha (313-14) accords Abhāya, along with Śāntipa, generous praise as most important of all the Buddhist writers after the ‘Six Jewels’ (Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Asaṅga,
Vasubandhu, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti) because they passed on the doctrine to later times.

Besides these seven commentaries connecting the AA to the Pañca and A, there are four texts connecting the AA to other PP sūtras.

Dharmaśrī’s Sata-sāhasrikā-vivaraṇa connects the topics of the AA to the Śata. No mention of this Dharmaśrī is found in either Tāranātha or Bu ston but in the Blue Annals (Roerich 1949:859) reference is made to “the Kashmiri Dharmaśrī called the ‘one-eyed,’” the author of a commentary on the Śata-sāhasrikā and of the Kośa-tāla. Tsongkha pa (AAGser:13.4-14.4) doubts this Vivaraṇa is an authentic Indian commentary.

Srāvaṇa-kīrti’s Samānārthaśāṭābhisamaya-sāasanā connects the eight abhisamayas to the Śata, Pañca, and the Aṣṭādaśa-prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra, carrying Haribhadra’s insight that the AA is an explanation of all the PP sūtras to its logical conclusion. Wayman (1983:31-32), following Roerich (1949:60), places his activities in eastern Tibet where he was known for propagating the Mañjuśrī-nāma-saṃgīti. Tsongkha pa (AAGser:14.4) again doubts the authorship of the Tib version of this commentary on the grounds that Srāvaṇa-kīrti was a learned scholar and the Tib version of the commentary is weak and full of simple errors.

Connecting the AA with the RSG are Haribhadra’s Subodhini, the small text by Dharmaśrī mentioned above called Kośa-tāla and lastly Buddha-jñāna’s (also called Buddha-jñāna-pāda and Buddha-srī-jñāna; Tāranātha:260) Prajñā-pāramitā-paññikā.

4.12.6.2 The nine ‘unconnected’ commentaries, which do not attempt to apply the AA categories directly to any of the sūtras, are (1-3) Haribhadra’s AASphu, and its two major commentaries, Dharmamitra’s AAPras, and Dharma-

kīrti[śrī]’s Durbodhālokā. Of Dharmamitra, Tāranātha says only that he should not be confused with another Dharmamitra who was a disciple of the Mūla-

sarvāstivādin writer Guṇa-prabha, writer of the Vinaya-sūtra and contemporary with Ārya Vimuktisena. Dharma-kīrti[śrī] seems to be the name of the guru of

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1 This should not be confused with the Brhatīkās on the Śata and the Śata-pañca-aṣṭādaśa in the Bstan 'gyur attributed to Daṇḍīṣrṣena (Conze 1960:33-34) which are important texts for the Cittamātra-Mādhyamika synthesis (dbu ma chen po) in Tibet.

There are also three summaries of Haribhadra’s AASphu: Prajñākaramatī’s *Vṛtti-piṇḍārtha, Ratnakirti’s *Vṛtti-kirti-kalā and Buddha-jñāna’s *Vṛtti-pradīpāvalī.

The *Prajñā-pāramitā-piṇḍārtha attributed to Dīpaṅkāra-śrījñāna Atiśa and Kumara-śrī[-bhadra]’s work by the same name are both summaries of the AA itself. The last work mentioned by Tsongkha pa, Abhāyākara-gupta’s *Muni-matālaṁkāra, is a long treatise, the last three chapters of which deal specifically with the subjects of the AA.

4.12.7 Brief mention of the Tibetan tradition of interpretation of the PP would not be out of place here. According to the *Blue Annals (Roerich 1949:330) there are two main sources:
(a) the exposition by Shes rab ’bar of ’Bre (usually called, simply, the ’Bre tradition), the best of the disciples of the famous translator Ngog blo ldan shes rab, whose teaching followed the tradition of the PP as taught during the period of the early spread of the doctrine, i.e., up until the time of Rin chen bzang po (958-1055),
(b) the exposition by Byang chub ye shes of Ar (the Ar tradition).

In Tibet, Haribhadra had a particularly strong influence on writers of the Sa skya and the [Dga’ ldan-]Dge lugs sects. The Sa skya sect was founded by Dkon mchog rgyal po in 1073 and the [Dga’ ldan-]Dge lugs sect founded by Tsongkha pa 1357-1419. Bu ston (a Sa skya), writing in his *Lung gi nye ma, an important 13th century commentary on the AASphu, mentions that there were already too many Tib commentaries on the AA and AASphu to merit mention. This state of affairs in no way inhibited later [Dga’ ldan-]Dge lugs monks, however, who wrote even longer and more minutely detailed commentaries on Haribhadra’s work. Most important of these are Tsongkha pa’s AAGser, Rgyal tshab’s AARgyan and the scholastic manuals (*yig ca) written by Rje btsun pa, Paṇ chan bsod nams grags pa and ‘Jam byangs bzhad pa. The largest of the Dge
lugs pa monasteries, containing nearly 20,000 monks,\(^1\) based seven years of monastic study on Haribhadra's work. It was not unusual for industrious monks to memorize the AASphu and even today the views of Haribhadra on the PP are taken to be authoritative. The writing of PP commentaries has gone on apace, even until the present, amongst the few Tibetans in exile in India.

\(^1\) Dga' ldan, Se ra, and 'bras spung near Lhasa (central Tibet) are estimated (Stein 1960) to have had 20,000 monks at the turn of the century; Khra shi khyil perhaps 6,000 monks. At Bkra shis lhun po, the seat of the Pan chen blamas, Dharmakīrti's PV replaced H as the focus of early study.
5.1 Haribhadra’s major contribution to Indian religious philosophy is as an arranger of others’ work. But he was also a thinker and religious philosopher in his own right. Tibetan doxographers, attempting to include under one, somewhat unwieldy term, all the diverse elements in Haribhadra’s thought categorized his views as those of a Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika.

5.1.2 Generally speaking, Haribhadra is characterized as a Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika, for the following reasons. First, he is a Mādhyamika because he asserts, without reservation, that the selflessness (nairātmya) taught in the PP sūtras is an uncompromising emptiness qualifying every phenomena. Unlike Yogācāra writers such as Dignāga, who accept the PP sūtras to be a definitive presentation of the Buddha’s deepest thought (nītārtha), but nevertheless feel constrained to reinterpret its apparent negativism in a less nihilistic fashion, Haribhadra, as a Mādhyamika, considers it a definitive literal presentation.

5.1.3 Second, Haribhadra is a Svātantrika-Mādhyamika because, in his understanding of the doctrine of two truths, there is a balance between dependent origination (pratītya-samutpāda) and uncompromising emptiness such that each dharma retains its individual inherent discreteness (sva-lakṣaṇa). In this he is influenced as much by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, as by the style and thought of Bhavya, to whom the origins of Svātantrika are usually traced. The Tibetan doxographers gave the name Svātantrika (‘Those using independent syllogisms’) to the school of Mādhyamika they took as originating from Bhavya based on what they perceived as a common concern for correct syllogism and reasoning, in order to penetrate the ultimate. This too could as well be associated with the epistemological tradition associated with Dignāga and Dharmakīrti (traditionally considered Yogācāra writers).1

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1 Tibetan writers like Tsongkha pa continually stressed the contrast, which they perceived to have existed, between a Svātantrika’s inability to remove the very last vestige of inherent existence (rang bzhiṅ gyi sgrub pa) and a Prāśahgika’s ability to do so. They defined a Svātantrika in terms of that last vestige of inherent existence, which the yogin or yogini, based on their philosophy, was unable to overcome.
5.1.4 And third, Haribhadra is a Yogācāra-Svātantrika because Yogācāra ideas and terminology modify his Mādhyamika views. In particular, the Yogācāra notion of mere awareness (where apparently external objects are shown to lack distance from the mind which knows them), and the Mādhyamika notion of non-findability (anupalambha), where every dharma, without exception, lacks own-being are brought together in a new vision of the ultimate truth. This ultimate truth, consisting of mere awareness and the lack of own-being that qualifies it (not the same, nor yet different from each other) underpins the surface level of reality and enables its functioning. Such a vision of the ultimate truth is anticipated by the author of the AA, by Ārya Vimuktisena, Jñāna-garbha, Śānta-rakṣita and Kamala-śīla, all Mādhyamikas who started the tradition of Yogācāra-Madhyamaka accomodation, within which Haribhadra can be squarely located.

5.1.5 Svātantrika-Madhyamaka or Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka are Tibetan categories that are very helpful for obtaining a preliminary impression of Haribhadra's own ideas. But the clear lines delineating such schools of thought were drawn, as far as our present evidence goes, not between actual Indian religious philosophies as they developed in India, but in the minds of later Tibetan scholastics trying to make sense out of the vast range of ideas they encountered in the works of early Indian writers. The diversity of Indian Buddhist ideas is necessarily somewhat reduced by such categories, which reflect the interests of the later Tibetan writers, and stress certain doctrines at the expense of others, introducing order by down-playing difference.

5.1.6 In regard to a highly syncretistic writer such as Haribhadra, who combines the ideas of both "Yogācāra" and "Madhyamaka," in such a manner that the distinction between them begins to blur or even break down completely, one should, perhaps, ask if, in the final analysis, he does not at least partially confirm a recent trend of Western scholarly opinion (Eckel 1987), that argues that such hard and fast divisions between the different Buddhist systems of tenets may have only a limited value and may even hinder, rather than help us to see the actual reality as it took place.

Since the reasons, in the intellectual and social history of Tibet, which account for the Tibetan division of Indian Mādhyamika thinkers even, e.g., into
Prasāṅgika and Svātantrika, are still to be fully researched, it can be cogently argued that it is still somewhat premature to utilize such terms as Svātantrika, etc., to describe Indian writers.

Certainly much work still remains to be done. We still cannot say, with certainty, that this much is found in the ideas of the Indian thinkers themselves, and this much is the unique addition or reformulation of ideas by Tibetan thinkers, in a Tibetan environment. But, as Ruegg has shown in his recent historical survey of the Mādhyamika school (1981), used with care, such Tibetan categories are helpful for gaining a better understanding of the Indian Buddhist intellectual scene. On the practical level, they are the best tools presently available.

5.2 Turning now to a more detailed explanation of the different components of Haribhadra’s thought, first it will first be necessary to delineate the ground of Haribhadra’s philosophical inquiry, and then to investigate the emptiness which qualifies this ground. This will lead us to a somewhat clearer understanding of what the Mādhyamika component of Haribhadra’s thought entails.

5.2.1 Domain of Haribhadra’s philosophical enquiry

In the AAA the ground or domain of philosophical inquiry is all that exists. It may be argued immediately that ‘there is’ and ‘there is not’ are explicitly set forth as extremes in the older PP sūtras, and by the famous exegete Nāgārjuna. How, then, could a Mādhyamika like Haribhadra take all that exists to be the ground of philosophical inquiry? To answer: The central question of extremes cannot be intelligently discussed before first identifying the ground of inquiry about which extreme views are held. And if at the outset, Haribhadra’s philosophy suspended the law of an excluded middle how could it be a coherent philosophical system at all? That Haribhadra was aware of the law of an excluded middle is evident in his echo of Sāntarakṣita at W535.23-536.4.

The ground, then, of Haribhadra’s philosophical enquiry, and the central focus for philosophical questioning in the AAA, is all that exists.

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1 Mimaki (1982) has carefully charted the literary history of the terms.
5.2.2 In passing we might note that Haribhadra is not unique in this regard. Other Indian speculative literature, and particularly Vedānta, has the same scope. Brahmanical writers, e.g., differentiated their own, and the systems of the non-believers, across a spectrum ranging from nihilism to naive and unsophisticated belief with a discussion of different *khyātis* (theories of error). And Buddhists preceding Haribhadra used the notion of *samāropa* or *adhyāropa* (superimposition) and *apavāda* (denying). Both presuppose a concern for what actually is as distinct from what we superimpose or make up.

5.2.3 The Buddhist Skt word for ‘what is,’ in this context is dharma (Stcherbatsky 1927), or that which holds (*dhr*) its own discreteness. In regard to such dharmas there are, according to Haribhadra, who follows Vasubandhu (AK1.4-5a) in this, contaminated (*āsrava*) and non-contaminated (*anāsrava*) ones. By contaminated is meant, primarily, all creation except authentic, unmediated religious insight; and by uncontaminated is meant, primarily, the uncreated and the ultimately real. These categories are further subdivided to describe in ever more detail the myriad of individual existing things. All such things ‘are.’ The question ‘what is’ is construed to mean ‘what is what,’ and the answer describes all individuals exhaustively under a series of ever more exclusive headings.

5.2.4 The ground of philosophical inquiry, ‘what is,’ is also formulated by Haribhadra, not in descriptive terms, but in terms of balance or measure. ‘Valid knowledge’ (*pramāṇa*), sometimes translated as ‘valid knowledge instrument’ (Nagatomi 1957) to stress its being the means whereby knowledge arises, is the standard against which an object is measured (*ma*) in order to determine its claim to being. In this sense, ‘being’ is *prameya* or more exactly *pramāṇa-siddha*, literally, established by *pramāṇa*.

5.2.5 Along with different discrete entities, in the AAA there are also categories of fundamental elements out of which the entities are built. These are the psycho-physical constituent heaps (*skandhas*), entrances (*āyatanas*) and elements (*dhātus*) of early pre-Mahāyāna Buddhist texts. These categories of fundamental elements are shared in common by the six Brahmanical
philosophical schools (darśana) and four Buddhist systems of tenets (siddhānta), merely given different names in different systems.

The ontological content of the element list is 1) a set of corresponding inner and outer elements (in essence, the sense faculties indriya and sense objects viṣaya) and 2) a notion of atoms, in the sense of a set of the smallest, different, individual elements out of which grosser objects are constructed.

The standard Buddhist presentation of five skandhas found in the AAA was originally, in the earliest Buddhist texts, a microcosmic explanation, an explanation of each individual's experience of the world. For Haribhadra, however, the skandhas, etc., are a set of categories to explain cosmology on the grandest scale. This list of elements is referred to by a short-hand ‘form, etc.’ (rūpādī), where ‘form’ refers to the first of the five skandhas, to be followed by the āyatanas, dhatus and the variety of other metaphysical entities, including the stages of yogic advance and attainments of an enlightened being, on the pattern found already standardized in the AK and AS.

These elements do not have any special philosophical importance, as do the elements like oxygen and hydrogen familiar to a modern reader, which carry a whiff of absolute reality backed up by the seal of scientific reality. Their importance is primarily psychological. By ordering reality, within their minds, in elemental categories such as five skandhas, etc., readers come to re-order the relation that obtains between themselves and ultimate reality, and on account of that, to modify their behaviour (karma). By modifying their behaviour, Haribhadra and other such writers believed, they would liberate themselves.

5.3 Two of the most important systematic religious philosophies of eighth and ninth century north India, Vedānta and Mādhyamika, are similar in that both stress that this entire ground of philosophical inquiry (in the case of Vedānta the ātman is excluded) is to be given only a mere superficial or illusory reality. The view of the ultimate truth which led the two philosophies to this assertion, however, differed.

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1 The five skandhas, dealt with at length at the beginning of the AK, are the rūpa-, vedanā-, saṁjñā-, sarūskāra- and vijnāna-skandhas.
5.3.2 If the Brahmanical and Buddhist schools of Haribhadra’s period differed little in their understanding of the basis of philosophical inquiry, particularly in their categorization of basic elements, they disagreed, or at least felt they disagreed, fundamentally, over the conclusions to which the inquiry led. Their disagreement was over the ātman (= ‘soul,’ ‘ego,’ ‘inherent existence’) which the Brahmanical schools of philosophy without question asserted and which the Buddhist system of tenets denied. Haribhadra aligned himself squarely with the Buddhist position on this issue, and as a Mādhyamika, his explanation of selflessness (anātman) lies at the center of his philosophy. His understanding of selflessness was not restricted to individual persons (as in pre-Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy), but extended to all phenomena, to the entire range of dharmas set forth as comprising the ground of philosophical inquiry (§4.2.1.-4.2.4).

5.3.3 In general, there are as many descriptions of the ātman in Upaniṣadic texts, and of śūnyatā in Mahāyāna sūtras, as there are later commentators seeking scriptural authority and justification for their often quite opposite views. And since the revelatory statements are rarely, if ever, couched in the careful language of a systematic philosopher, it is difficult, from the revelatory statements alone to decide whether there is any real and philosophically significant difference between the two concepts.

5.3.4 Certainly the proponents of the ātman and anātman doctrines influenced each other, and, to a greater or lesser extent, were attempting to answer the same problems. But with Haribhadra as with almost all other later commentators, it is an undeniable historical reality that, orthodox or heterodox, they did not formulate a synthesis wherein the two doctrines became non-exclusive of each other (the Grammarian philosophers can perhaps be excluded from this generalization). That is to say a writer like Haribhadra did not, at one and the same time, assert the ātman and śūnyatā. He, and other Indian writers, almost without exception, appear to have felt that to assert the one was to deny the other.

5.3.5 It is one of the important contributions of T.R.V. Murti to the modern study of classical Indian philosophy that he stresses this difference between the ātman and anātman doctrines. Speaking of the Mādhyamika and Advaita
Vedānta, superficially the most similar in their assertions about śūnyatā and the ātman, respectively, he says (1973:10-11)

[There is] no comingling or compromise of positions on either side to any appreciable extent.

The merit of Murti’s (traditional) view is that it stresses the fundamental difference between a substance view of reality (Vedānta) and a rejection view of reality entailed by a rigorously non-absolutist system like Mādhyamika. Put simply, the Brahmanical philosophers and Haribhadra differed as to how real reality must be.

5.3.6 A further generalization about the philosophical significance of the ātman and anātman doctrines, a generalization which holds true across the entire spectrum of orthodox schools of philosophy on the one hand and heterodox systems of tenets on the other, is that the ātman doctrine emphasizes unity (and unification) while the anātman doctrine retains, and even promotes, diversity. Although Murti, e.g., does suggest, and in one place (1955:35) actually identify, unity and difference as particular characteristics of these two traditions this dimension of the two doctrines has not received the stress it deserves.

5.3.7 To argue that the doctrine of anātman (and more pointedly, that even the doctrine of śūnyatā) promotes diversity is not to fundamentally disagree with the conclusions of earlier scholarship, but to change the focus, or emphasis, away from oneness, or universality, away from the Vedāntic aspect that Āryadeva, e.g., stresses when he says (Catuḥśataka 8.16),

An insight into one thing is said to be an insight into all. The emptiness of one is the emptiness of all.

to another aspect, that of śūnyatā as a mode of being which retains the surface level of individual identity.

5.3.8 This aspect of the doctrine of śūnyatā, which takes emptiness to be, not just a devaluation of a superimposed reality, but a mode of being which retains the surface level, cannot be stressed too greatly. It is at the heart of Haribhadra’s thought, defining him as a Mādhyamika thinker. For one is inexorably led to ask
how, in the face of a complete absence of individual, inherent discreteness (the sva-bhāva of the PP sūtras), could there be any viable mode for individual existence? How, if when ultimate reality is realized, there is a complete and utter absence of any objective support, could individual identity and diversity be retained, except as a complete fabrication? Haribhadra’s answer (W96.7, etc.), equating dependent origination (pratītya-samutpāda) with emptiness is the answer of Nāgārjuna, the founder of the Mādhyamika school. It asserts that (a) coming into being in dependence, and (b) emptiness of an own-being are coterminous and leave one with the complete absence of fundamental absolute reality, with only the variety of the conventional in which truth (or the absence of it) inheres. Each individual unique entity is what it is, because it lacks an own-being, not because it has one (Streng1973:27-39).

5.3.9 Haribhadra thus does not conceive of the surface level of truth (the pratītya-samutpāda) and the ultimate level (śūnyatā) as a detached truth, floating about in the thinker’s mind like a sun or a moon. They are attributes (dharma) of a locus of investigation (dharmin). This presupposition, on the saṁvṛti level, of a dharmin in the discussion of emptiness allows the reader to make sense of Haribhadra’s divisions of emptiness, e.g., into twenty sorts in correspondence with stages of ascending mental development (W95-96, based on the AAV). These different emptinesses are, according to Mādhyamika, the ultimate truth of each individual discreteness, each individual reality that is differentiable from all others. They are not two different meanings to be grasped, but a single mode which is equally applicable to all dharmas, and which describes their way of being, such that what is ultimately true (paramārtha) fits in with what seems to be (saṁvṛti).1 As a pair, dependent origination and emptiness are set forth heuristically, to teach more easily a middle between the extreme of anihilation on the one hand and over reification on the other. They are the Mahāyāna philosopher Haribhadra’s explanation (cf. W55.5ff) of what being entails, a balance, with just enough ‘it is’ (pratītya-samutpāda) and just enough ‘it is not’ (śūnyatā). Looking at an entity from the point of view of its

1 Cf. Candrakīrti’s statement that all dharmas have two natures, (Madhyamakāvatāra 6.23; the Skt. is found in the BCAPañjikā:174.26-29) सम्यक्षुः-यथा-दर्जन-लब्ध-भावं रूप-दृष्टं बिह्रति। सर्व-भावं: सम्यक- 

dृष्टं यो विश्वं। स तत्त्वं दृष्टं-दृष्टं संस्कृत-सत्सम् उक्तम्॥
dependent origination prevents an over-denial and fall into an absolute ‘it is not.’¹ Looking at that same entity from the point of view of its emptiness supplies the balance which prevents a fall into the extreme of over reification.² This is the same as Nāgārjuna’s statement (MMK:24.18) that the middle way is founded in pratīyā-samutpāda and śūnyatā.

5.3.10 Though there is only one ultimate truth for Haribhadra, as in heterodox philosophies like Vedānta, he, as a Mādhyamika defines it so negatively that it has no function except to support, and ultimately deny, the conventionalities which lead to it. This is the crux of the doctrine that all that exists (bhāva) have two truths: a transactional or conventional one (what they seem to be in the day-to-day world) and an ultimate one. If this latter truth were to be anything positive it would preclude the diversity of the sārmārti level: the insight of Sankara, who retained the truth of the one and denied the reality of all else.

5.3.11 Learned modern Indologists like Frauwallner³ and Conze (at least in his earlier writings), however, found little of significant philosophical difference between the ātman and anātman doctrines. The insight behind their position is that earlier and later works of the Indian tradition, which have yielded to modern historical analysis a complex fabric of shared and syncretistic opinion and belief, can only be properly understood within the context of the influence of the socially current ideas of those who preceded them, not in a vacuum.

5.3.12 Frauwallner understood the ātman and anātman doctrines as fundamentally monistic or unifying theories which dissolve the diversity of the phenomenal world within an all-embracing unifying principle. For him the Brahmanical ātman and the Buddhist śūnyatā are, to use a modern idiom, simply

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¹ This is the mistake of the so-called over-pervasionist (khyab bhyed ba mra ba). Wayman’s helpful translation of this section of Tsong Khapa’s Lam rim chen mo where the term is found would be clearer if it stressed more the anihilationist sense of khyab byed ba mra ba. He instead stresses the over-reified reality mode which underpins the mistaken belief. ‘Over-pervasion,’ means to go beyond what can be thrown away, and hence refers to the excessive denial of reality, not the clinging to too much (under-pervasionist).

² This is the view of the under-pervasionist (khyab cung ba mra ba), the person described in the A as fearful when the doctrine of emptiness is taught, who denies too little.

³ This opinion is based only on a reading of the works of E. Frauwallner available in English.
words for the same transcendent ‘God,’ whose one, single identity negates by its ontological weight, as it were, the seeming reality of the rest of the phenomenal world. According to these writers petty squabbles over whether ‘God’ should be described positively or negatively are not philosophically important.

5.3.13 In one sense they are right. Catch-all doctrines like ātman and anātman can be nothing more than convenient slogans, much like ‘capitalist’ and ‘communist,’ which evoke passionate adherence on the part of believers but include such a diversity of opinion as to become mere newspaper terms, no longer useful categories for one seeking a refined understanding of things as they are.

Given their profound differences of opinion, it does become difficult to identify any fundamental idea having identifiable philosophical significance that is equally asserted by philosophers as different as Īśvara-kṛṣṇa and Praśastapāda, or even Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. And the difference in doctrines amongst those who assert anātman range from Vaibhāṣika naïve realism on the one hand, to thorough Yogācāra idealism on the other. Even between two Mādhyamikas like Bhavya and Candrakīrti, it is perhaps easier to identify the differences separating them than any philosophically significant shared idea of anātman which brings them together.

5.3.14 Yet, setting aside Haribhadra for the moment, even a committed syncretist like Vācaspati Miśra could not bring himself to find any common ground with Buddhist writers who denied ātman. Vācaspati wrote commentaries on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāmkhya-Yoga and Vedānta-Mīmāṃsā but it is inconceivable that he would have considered writing a commentary on, e.g., Nāgārjuna’s Kārikās. And Mādhyamika encyclopedists like Bhavya, though beginning to show a tendency towards lumping all other schools of thought, non-Buddhist or Buddhist, into a single category based on an eternalist superimposition, still retain the old categories of ātman/anātman as a meaningful demarcation between two fundamentally different points of view.¹

In this regard, it is interesting to note that in the later Buddhist synthesis where presentation and refutation of each ‘lower’ system of tenets becomes the

¹ See, however, Bhavya’s praise of the ātman at MHK:3,8; Gokhale (1963:271-275).
stepping stone to realization of the ‘higher’ (the standard pedagogical device employed in the Tibetan Grub mtha’ literature) the orthodox schools of philosophy are never included. Some Indian thinkers, like the tantric writer Kṛṣṇa-pāda seemed to contemplate the final step in the synthesis (so common in popular literature nowadays, and perhaps anticipated in part by the Grammarian philosophers) which holds all orthodox and heterodox views as either spokes on a wheel leading into, or steps on a ladder leading up to, a single transcendent ultimate.

5.3.15 Perhaps the tendency to reduce the atman and anātman doctrines to different ways of presenting the same basic truth is to be explained by the power of theories which favour syncretist analyses. Amongst these theories the linguistic relativism of the Grammarian philosopher Bhartrhari and the hermeneutics of the Saṁdhi-nirmocana-sūtra immediately spring to mind. Based on such writing, a synthesis of the various schools of philosophy and yogic practices came to take place, and the different speculations of earlier individual writers were ordered within different or graduated paths leading to a supreme realization. Such a synthesis seems to be implicit in the Upaniṣads, or even earlier, from the time of the Puruṣa-sukta in the Rg-veda. Each philosophical system and each yogic text seems to be part of a greater plan designed to point the reader inexorably towards the realization of ultimate truth, described either in terms of the atman of the Brahmanical schools or in terms of the anātman and enlightenment by Buddhists. It is true that syncretistic tendencies are evident in Brahmanism from an early period (e.g., the Gītā with its reconciliation of karma, jñāna and bhakti or the resolution of the exoteric religion of the Veda and the esoteric insights of the forest-dwelling yogins in the Brhad-āranyakopaniṣad) and that the extreme tolerance of early Buddhism seems to embrace many disparate views by its rejection of their final importance. But the distinctive hierarchical and graduated approach both to words and meaning, and amongst meanings to superficial ‘truth’ (saṁvṛti-satya in Buddhism, māyā in Brahmanism) and to the ultimate truth or ‘reality,’ is a later development which took many centuries to develop. The fully worked out hermeneutics and epistemologies of Vācaspāti, e.g., or of the later Buddhist syncretist Śrījñāna Dīpaṁkāra Atiśa, which orders difference, not in an
opposition but in a complementary sequential mode, and in particular, the ordering of ideas according to a person's capacity for penetration into the more profound, what one might call the stepping stone theory, are the result, not the cause of the earlier philosophical systems. Syncretism, in the sense of a dynamic requiring that differences be understood within a more embracing and finally non-divisive unity, was always present in Indian thinking but only as one of many forces. Only later did it become the dominant tendency. This is perhaps self-evident and requires no emphasis. In the context of Indian ideas, however, the sophistication of the later syncretistic systems is so great it tends to 'convert' the reader, without one noticing, to the new intellectual order.

5.4 The theory of two truths, and the way in which dependent origination and emptiness converge, is the central doctrine in Haribhadra's philosophy, and what defines him as a Mādhyamika. But his ability to arrange the diverse opinions of earlier writers led him naturally to accommodate Yogācāra ideas and terminology. His fundamentally Mādhyamika philosophy undergoes considerable modification as it responds to and utilizes these ideas. Haribhadra does not fully embrace the Yogācāra doctrinal point of view, however, and all the while takes care not to write from an identifiable Yogācāra perspective.

5.4.2 To proceed in a further investigation of the Yogācāra content in Haribhadra's thought, two central Yogācāra doctrines that appear in the AAA in the form of modified Mādhyamika views will be considered. These are the tri-svabhāva ('three-nature') theory and the vijñāna-parināma ('consciousness-transformation') doctrine. Both are associated, to a greater or lesser extent, with the name of the great Yogācāra religious philosopher Vasubandhu. The genesis of these Yogācāra doctrines, and whether the earliest formulation of them was by a Yogācārin or writer associated with another school goes beyond the scope of the present undertaking. It is enough that by the time of Haribhadra they were well known, distinctly Yogācāra points of view.

5.5.1 The three-nature doctrine

The three-nature doctrine appears directly in Haribhadra's frequent use in his AAA, (e.g., W39.10-13) of the Maitreya-pariprcchā ('Question of Maitreya Chapter') three-form or nature (tri-rūpa) terminology. These three natures are:
a) kalpita-rūpa ‘imaginary form’
b) vikalpita-rūpa ‘a notion of form’
c) dharmatā-rūpa. ‘form in reality’.1

They are set forth in the AAA (W39.10-13) as follows:

This form is, moreover, threefold: a [completely] imaginary form on account of imagination in the form of the subject-object bifurcation; a conceptualized form on account of there being conceptuality because, through the fabrication of what is not real, just consciousness itself appears like that; and form in ultimate reality, just no-form from the point of view of the truly real; this because of the final outcome being in the form of emptiness. This applies equally to feeling, etc.

5.5.2 To understand what Haribhadra intends one must turn to the distinctly Yogācāra formulation of three natures (tri-lakṣaṇa/tri-svabhāva) first found in the "Question of Paramārtha-samudgata Chapter" (don dam yang dag ’phags zhu pa’i le’u) of the Samādhi-nirmocana-sūtra (Lamotte 1935, Nagao 1964:37-49). As the work of earlier scholars (Iida 1966, Conze and Iida 1968, Hakamaya 1975) has shown, the author of the Samādhi-nirmocana-sūtra probably took over, from the Maitreya-paripṛcchā, the three-nature terminology and then formulated it into the well-known doctrine associated with the Yogācāra school.

5.5.3 In Yogācāra, the three-nature doctrine is an attempt to save the ultimate reality of mind or consciousness in the face of the PP sutra doctrine of all-pervasive niḥsvabhāvatā. In the A, as in all PP sūtras, there is an insistence that all dharmas lack an own-being, that everything is totally empty. Subhūti (W39.10-13) answers the Bhagavān’s call to explain how altruistic persons

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1 In regard to these compounds with the word rūpa, literally, ‘form;’ they are equivalent in meaning to the bahuvṛhi compounds (parikalpita-svabhāva, etc.) with sva-bhāva ‘nature.’ It seems to me, however, that the earlier use of rūpa in the Maitreya-paripṛcchā may be accounted for by the fact that the rūpa-skandha is always first in the long list of real things (vastu) denied own-being in the PP sūtras. This list (rūpādi) is such that anything which holds true of the first in the list is understood to be true of all other real things as well. By talking of ‘form,’ therefore, one is, implicitly, talking of all dharmas.
cultivate profound understanding by denying the ultimate existence of a person, of a profound understanding, even of a speaker or a listener.

एवम् उक्ते, आयुष्मान्न्त सुभूतिर् आयुष्मान्ते शारिरपुज्म् एतद् अवोच्चत् । किं पूर्त्र आयुष्मान्तर्शारिरपुज्म् याचित्तात् तत्राचित्तात्यायम् अस्तित्वा वा नास्तित्वा वा विभच्छ विभक्त्यते वा? शारिरपुज्माह! । न हि एतद् आयुष्मान्न्त सुभूति ।

Friend Śāriputra, in that state of no mind does there either exist, or does one find, either a state of ‘there is’ or ‘there is not’ which is a state of no mind?

Śāriputra replied, No friend Subhūti, one does not.

Unlike the Mādhyamika two-nature theory that, as we have seen, stresses the emptiness of all dharmas, the Yogācāra theory of three natures clarifies that the own-being or self-nature denied in the A, etc., is not one and the same in every case. According to Yogācāra writers there are three sorts of nature:

a) parikalpita-svabhāva ‘quite imaginary nature’

b) para-tantra-svabhāva ‘nature continuing in dependence on other [causes and conditions]’

c) parinispanna-svabhāva ‘nature which is the final outcome [of investigation]’

These three natures apply individually to each and every dharma.

5.5.4 To explain: According to the Yogācāra understanding, all externally appearing objects of untutored perception are (a) of an imaginary nature. The manifestation of an indivisible tri-partite mental transformation consisting of object, perception and perception of perception is (b) the nature continuing in dependence on other causes and conditions. The non-existence of the externally appearing object of perception, in the manifestation of an indivisible tri-partite mental transformation, is (c) the final outcome of investigation.

5.5.5 Let us take a dream elephant as an analogy. According to Haribhadra’s view, (a) externally appearing objects are like a dream elephant because they seem to be there, distant from the viewer, but in fact are not. (b) Mental transformation is like the mental nature that lies behind the appearance of a dream elephant because it is the conventional reality that lies hidden to the dreamer, behind the play of imagination in which the dreamer believes and is
caught up. And (c) just as a search for an elephant in the dream appearance would lead at one and the same time to a realization of its non-existence, and to the mind of the dreamer wherein it appeared, similarly, a search for external objects in mental transformation leads to a realization that they are not there, and that there is only mind, appearing as itself, like the waves on an ocean.

5.5.6 In both Mādhyamika and Yogācāra texts there are references to the two levels of truth and to the three-nature theory. Both are different ways to present the doctrine of dharma-nairātmya (selflessness of dharmas). The difference between them comes down to the emphasis given to the status of consciousness. The Yogācāra doctrine of three natures retains a higher ontological status for it than does the Mādhyamika two-nature theory which, first and foremost, insists on a devaluation of the truth value in each and every dharma.

5.6.1 Why Haribhadra refrained from using the clearly Yogācāra terminology (if indeed he was consciously aware of choosing between the Yogācāra formulation of the three natures, tri-svabhāva, as distinct from its formulation as three forms, tri-rūpa, in the Maitreya-paripṛcchā) is unclear. Since his AAA is a commentary on the PP it would be appropriate for Haribhadra to utilize a sūtra like the Maitreya-paripṛcchā. Yet one senses that Haribhadra, who was familiar with the Yogācāra doctrine of three natures, as his explanation of the Maitreya-paripṛcchā three natures, and his quotations from the MSA, MAV and MSam make clear, was avoiding partisan Yogācāra terminology.

5.6.2 This speculation that Haribhadra was consciously avoiding a Yogācāra position gains some credence when one investigates his direct quotation from openly Yogācāra texts like Dignāga’s PPpi or Maitreyā’s MAV and MSA. When he quotes from such texts, as he does frequently, Haribhadra uses the quotations to justify general assertions about the PP (e.g. W23.10, 67.14) or to make a general comment about a part of the Mahāyāna path (e.g. W27.10, 31.2). He generally avoids passages which have a partisan, or anti-Mādhyamaka slant. And when he does utilize a distinctly Yogācāra doctrine (W77.15-20, 79.11), he is careful to turn it clearly to a Mādhyamika purpose.

5.6.3 One possible reason for Haribhadra’s arm’s length approach to the Yogācāra might lie in the influence of the Mādhyamika Bhavya, who is quoted
at W40.13-14: न हि संवृति-सोपानम् अन्तरेण तत्त-प्रासाद-शिखरारोहण विपक्षित इति "The wise
do not mount atop the rooftop balcony of true reality except by the ladder of
conventionality." Bhavya accepted the tri-rūpa doctrine of the Maitreyapaiprccchā (lida 1966), for example, but strongly objected to Yogācāra doctrines (MHK:5). It is possible that Haribhadra’s description of Ācārya Vasubandhu as "towering on account of his pride (abhimaṇa) because of a
minute knowledge" echoes Bhavya’s denigration of Yogācāra in his MHK (W1.17; MHK:5.1, Eckel 1987:8 n. 40). And Ārya Vimuktisena, to whom
Haribhadra openly acknowledges an intellectual debt, is also traditionally held
to be a disciple of Bhavya (Obermiller 1932:155, Ruegg 1968-9).

5.7 On the other hand, as one investigates different statements in the AAA, like
the above explanation of the three natures, one finds that Haribhadra
unquestioningly accepts a considerable portion of the Yogācāra doctrine of
mere awareness. In particular he is comfortable with the language denying
reality to externally existing objects. This is very clear, e.g., in his summary
(W63.23-64.9) of the first part of his explanation of the four proximate
penetrations. Echoing both the MSA and MSam he says:

When, with a little of the illuminating light of gnosis that comes from not
settling on separate things, they behold just mere thinking mind, then for
them there is the warmed stage (ūṣmagata) ... When ... a middling amount of
the illuminating light of gnosis occurs, then there is the peaked stage
(mūrdhagata) ... When, being stationed in mind only, there arises the
brilliant light of a gnosis free from settling on outer objects, then there is
the forbearance stage (kṣānti) ... And when there is the final outcome of the
light of gnosis, now free from the distracting appearance of apprehender of
objects, then there is the stage of the worldly supreme dharma (laukikāgra-
dharma).

These stages of the path will be discussed in more detail later (§5.10-5.12).

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1 MHK:3.12. For different readings see note to Skt text.
5.8.1 The consciousness-transformation doctrine

The influence of the *vijñāna-parināma* ('consciousness-transformation') doctrine on Haribhadra’s thought becomes evident in his explanation of the lineage (*gotra*) and the objective support (*ālambana*). What is meant by both terms will become clearer in the following explanation, but for the present it will suffice to characterize them as different aspects of an ultimate substratum, a substratum that for the Yogācārā is mere awareness and for Mādhyamika is emptiness, or as Haribhadra says (W97.7), the emptiness of all dharmas.

5.8.2 The context for this discussion in the AAA is AA5cd-6a (आधार: प्रतिपत्तिः ज धर्म-धातुः स्वभावः। आलम्बनम् "the substratum of the progress achiever, the own-being of which (=substratum) is the dharma-element, and the objective support"). The first part of this is expanded upon in AA39:

धर्म-धातौरुपसंवेदात् गोष्ठे-भेदो न यथयते। आधेय-धर्म-भेदात् तु तद्भेदो परिणयते॥

Difference in lineages based on difference in the dharma-element is not tenable. Because of the difference in qualities based on it, however, its division is proclaimed.

5.8.3 Readers unfamiliar with the classical Indian Buddhist idiom will find the concept of *gotra* impenetrable. It is, however, an important and widely used term that, as Ruegg (1969) has shown, presupposes some central Mahāyāna concepts.

5.8.4 Literally, *gotra* means ‘that which pens in’ (Snellgrove 1987) and hence leads to the notion of a caste or family. Members of the Brahmin caste, for instance, classified themselves as belonging to particular groupings based on a *gotra* which they traced back to a rṣi (‘seer’) ancestor. This has led some scholars to render the term as ‘lineage.’

In early Buddhism (as in the AK), where the term is not particularly important, the *gotra* was defined not by an ancestor but by a person’s adherence to religious ideals of (a) renunciation, (b) few desires and (c) meditation practice. These defined the person as part of a religious group, not specifically defined as, but implicitly, Buddhist.

In Mahāyāna the term is retained and becomes very important. As the result of an intellectual exchange between the Mādhyamika and Yogācāra schools,
however, it loses its earlier meaning as a delimiter of particular groups, and becomes used instead to refer to that element (*dhātu*) possessed by all living beings such that they can all be included in a single group. This single group is now known as the Buddha family and possession of the *gotra* signifies that all persons are capable of Mahāyāna religious practice and, ultimately, of enlightenment. The *gotra* element is, paradoxically, what "delimit" this non-exclusive group.

5.8.5 For Yogācāra thinkers (at least those following the works of Asaṅga), the ultimate substratum is mere awareness (*vijñapti-mātratā*). This substratum is not itself a *gotra*, but the seeds or propensities embedded, as it were, in this substratum are. There is not one *gotra* or grouping, but as many as five (cf. W77.15-20), originating from personality traits deeply ingrained in the fabric of mind. In their various lineages, religious and non-religious persons work out their destinies and finally achieve their various goals. The different religious paths which trace the unfolding genealogy of the lineage, as it were, are called *yānas* or vehicles. There are three quite different paths and they lead to three, quite different, attainments: nirvāṇa for Śrāvakas, nirvāṇa for Pratyekabuddhas, and enlightenment (*bodhi*) for Bodhisattvas.

5.8.6 According to the interpretation of both Ārya Vimuktisena and Haribhadra the verse from the AA quoted above (§5.8.2) encapsulates a reservation a Yogācāra thinker holding such a point of view might have with the Mādhyamika understanding of *gotra*. In essence, Mādhyamika holds the *gotra* to be the non-exclusive dharma element which pervades all living creatures and entitles them to inclusion in the Buddha family. The verse also gives the Mādhyamika’s reply.

Haribhadra, who like Ārya Vimuktisena, takes AA39ab as setting forth a Yogācāra objection and the second line (AA39cd) as answering it from a Mādhyamika perspective, explains (W77.15-27) as follows:

[Question:] If just dharma-element is cause for the realization of the noble dharmas, and hence, if the Bodhisattva who consists of that, is the naturally abiding lineage of the supreme Buddha qualities called ultimate reality, then, since the dharma-element is the common essential nature [of
the Bodhisattva and of all other beings likewise], a division of lineage would not be possible...

[Response:] To the extent that it will be support when there is realization in the Śrāvaka-yāna, etc., to that extent the dharma-element is posited as being a cause for the realization of the noble dharmas, and hence is mentioned as lineage. Thus it is the satisfaction [of the questioner] settled. Alternatively, just as a substratum such as a pot, and so forth, made out of one and the same clay substance and fired in one and the same fire, differs as the container of different things such as honey and sugar which it holds, similarly, a variety of substrata are mentioned relative to the variety of the dharmas to be based on it—these being included in the three vehicles as what is to be attained. Thus there is no fault.

5.9.1 For Yogācāra thinkers the objective support (ālambana) of the practice, like the gotra or ultimate substratum, is mere awareness since mere awareness pervades all the transformation (parināma) of mind. Just as dream images which delight or terrify the dreamer are projections of the dreamer's mind, so too, the reality of the waking world is nothing but a projection of mind. For the Mādhyamika, however, even this consciousness is pervaded by emptiness.

5.9.2 Haribhadra's awareness of the Yogācāra understanding of the objective support, and reformulation of that view in the form of a Mādhyamika doctrine, is evident in his careful gloss of Ārya Vimuktisena's final remarks on this topic.¹ The underlined parts are Haribhadra's glosses.

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¹ W79.9-21 is based on AAV:79.19-80.12 which reads as follows:

"ये तु धर्म-धातुम् एवालम्बनं मन्यते तैर आलम्बनोपत्तिज्ञ-शुद्धिनिर्वेष-गमनं कथम् इति वक्तव्यम्।
"अभवतु-कन्नकाक्ष-शुद्धिव्यवस्थितः द्यम्यत" इति चेतु। एवं च तैर विषय-प्रतिफल-विकल्प-प्रहाणाभावात्
प्रादेशिक-शुद्धि-प्रसः। ननु लक्ष-पक्षाचि। "सुविकारस्तत्या: सयूतेभाव आलम्बनः" इत्यालम्बनस्य विशुद्धिभिः
निर्देशः न मानवीतीत। किं कारणम्। धर्माणां प्रातिनिर्मात्राः। कथयति हि, "द्रव्यं सुभूते भावः। आलम्बनः
भावः" इति। "द्रव्यं च किम् अन्यं भवेदु अन्यंतो भावते" इति। जिति च तहनिष्ठोऽहि द्यम्य-व्यक्तिः। ततथा
गान्धा-गान्धाक-स्पौनिवावनन्तरं इति भावते। भावु। एवं च चूक्ता। प्रकृतिप्रमाणं गोत्रं। विकृतिप्रमाणम्
आलम्बनम्। उच्च यथप्रतिप्रतिपद्धते इत्यालम्बनालम्बिष्योऽस्मात् सत्य-मेतेति। आलम्बनशुद्धिगमनं चौपनं
भवति। अत एवं। "सर्व-धर्माणां हि सुभूते बोधिसत्त्वनासात्मतायाम् अस्य-भूतायां निर्मितिव्यम्" इति।
कथयति। प्रकृतिन्युत्कर्षित-विकृतित् आलम्बनम। न विकृति-मात्राः। इति। "भव्य-वयोगेन च सर्व-धर्मं
अवबोध्यवां: कल्पनाम् अवकल्पनां चौपादार्यवति। तत्र द्यम्। गान्धा-गान्धाके। भविष्यमेच्यातम-व्यवस्थाम्
इत्यं प्रसङ्गः।"
Arya Vimuktisena [writes]: Those who think that the objective support is just the dharma-element, the continually pure non-dual gnosis, should explain how one attains specific purities that are increasingly superior since the dharma-element is always in a state of purity.

If [they say, quoting MAV:1.16] "Like the purification of the water element, gold and sky, purification of this [dharma-element] is asserted," then, there would be settling on the antidote as [i.e., in the form of the awareness] "the knowledge of reality is pure," and, by implication, there would be settling on what is to be shunned. Therefore, since the conceptualizations of antidote and what is to be shunned would not have been removed, there would be, as unwelcome consequence, only partial purity.

Obermiller (1933-6:98-99) identifies the protagonists as Yogācārans, and the quotation from the MAV supports this view. Haribhadra spells out the Yogācāra understanding of the dharma-element "the continually pure non-dual gnosis" and spells out the objection to holding it as the ultimate, namely, that one would settle on a dharma, albeit a pure one.

5.9.3 Haribhadra then replies to the objection that the Mādhyamika view is nihilistic.

If [they] ask: How is there a basis of an objective support in your system as [the Pañca:164.14ff paraphrase] "Subhūti, non-being is the objective support of the state of being a knower of all aspects," [indicates]?

[The response is:] There is no flaw since [in the Mādhyamika position], with the consideration that "there is no being that stands logical analysis [i.e., is logically defensible], non-being is called [is regarded as] a proper convention[al truth]. And the gradual realization of the illusion-like

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1 Vijñapti-mātrins according to Obermiller (1933-6:98-99).
2 I.e., there would be the belief that there is no bifurcation into object and subject and, therefore, that transcendental understanding and the pure reality, which is its object, "unite with one another like two particles of water," Obermiller 1933-6:98.
3 Still the Vijñapti-mātrins according to Obermiller (1933-6:98-99).
nature of that [proper conventional truth] which covers the truly real over is purification.

Using a concept associated with Bhavya, ‘proper convention[al truth,’ tathya *samvṛti, MHK:3:6, 12), he says that while the ultimate truth, lack of own-being, is not an absolute, nevertheless it does have a conventional or surface level existence. The covering level of reality is like an illusion, the ultimate nature of which is a lack of own-being. This is what Haribhadra has in mind when he describes the emptiness of emptiness (W95.14-15 based on AAV:95.11-14).

There is an emptiness, the nature of which is a gnosis observing internal emptiness, etc. Because of the emptiness of all dharmas there is an emptiness even of this: the emptiness of emptiness. The emptiness of all dharmas is in the sense of the mere gnosis of the emptiness of all dharmas. And since the conceptualization of an apprehender, relative to that, is removed, therefore [even this gnosis, or] emptiness is empty.

5.9.4 For Haribhadra, then, the gotra is emptiness itself. This is the dharma-element, an element that inheres, as it were, in all phenomena. This is the reality behind the phenomenal world, a world which, in all its diversity, is the objective support of the Bodhisattva’s understanding because there is nothing, good or bad, which is not qualified by emptiness. Since emptiness is not something other than surface or covering reality (as Subhūti will stress again to Śāriputra “in that state of no mind there neither exists, nor does one apprehend either a state of ‘there is’ or ‘there is not’”) the objective support and dharma-element are like different sides of one and the same coin. The same passage, quoted from the AAV, concludes:

Looked at in this manner, then, lineage is that in which fundamental reality is predominant, and the objective support that in which transformations [of fundamental reality] are predominant. Since neither is denied in respect of either, there is a difference of characteristics in the substratum and the objective support.
5.10.1 The influence of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti

The stream of Buddhist reasoning and epistemology originating from Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, and its influence on Haribhadra has already been mentioned (§2.7). In one sense, the influence of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on later writers like Haribhadra can properly be characterized as a Yogācāra influence, since a careful reading of both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti shows that their epistemological contributions, particularly their explanation of pramāṇa and apoha (‘differentiation theory’), were initially conceived of simply as new methods to arrive at old Yogācāra truths. From another point of view, however, their concern with inherent discreteness (sva-lākṣaṇa), at least on the surface level, and their stress on correct syllogism and logical argument characterizes what later Tibetan writers came to define as Svātantrika. It will be convenient, therefore, to identify it as exclusively neither, but a separate school of thought.

5.10.2 The strong influence of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, who brought about an epistemological turn in subsequent Indian religious philosophy, has until recently has not received the attention it deserves. In the AAA, the influence is not so much evident in direct quotations from the works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti which, though frequent, deal with the PP or general matters, as it is in the structure of logical analysis and in what Eckel (1987:52) calls "the tendency to define key terms in a way that emphasizes their epistemological dimension."

5.10.3 Haribhadra’s further remarks on the meaning of objective support (ālambana), found at the end of his discussion of twenty sorts of emptinesses (W97.6-25), illustrate the influence of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. They show his use of the systematic epistemology associated with these two Buddhist logicians, and also provide a further example of the distinctive combination of Yogācāra and Mādhyamika ideas which characterizes his thought.

5.10.4 The context for these remarks within the AAA is rather complicated. There are seventeen subdivisions of the ninth of the ten topics of the first chapter of the AAA. This ninth topic is called the course in accumulation (saṃbhāra-pratipatti) and is set forth in the commentary on AA1.46-47. The explanation of the fifteenth of seventeen subdivision, the accumulation of gnosis (jñāna-
$sam\bar{b}\var{h}r\bar{a}$), occasions a discussion of twenty sorts of emptiness based on Pañca:195-98. These are the emptinesses mentioned above (§5.9.3).

5.10.5 Haribhadra’s comments are closely modelled on Ārya Vimuktiśena’s AAV.  
Ārya Vimuktiśena’s presentation of the objective support of the profound understanding of the ultimate truth calls to mind similar dense passages in the writing of Bhavya (cf. MHK:5). He refers to different interpretations amongst Mādhyamika thinkers. What one finds in Haribhadra,
explaining the passage some two hundred years later, is a more fully systematized epistemology utilizing the work of Dharmakīrti.

What, then, is the objective support of this non-conceptual gnosis? One opinion holds it to be [complete] emptiness. Others hold that the emptiness which is the own-being of all dharmanas is its objective support.

Just this [latter] is correct. From the point of view of the truly real, any gnosis always has emptiness, the own-being of all dharmanas, as its objective support, e.g., like in a dream, where the objective support is the emptiness which is the own-being of the [dream] horses, etc. [Similarly], this non-conceptual thinking mind, which has become the locus of the debate [between Ārya Vimuktisena’s three protagonists], is also gnosis. The reason is from own-being (sva-bhāva-hetu).

Since [Phamakirti] says, "Where the objective support is not directly perceivable it is not proved that the object is seen." the reason is not unproven. It is not viruddha (‘opposed to what it seeks to prove’) because it [only] exists in the concordant instances. And it is also not indefinite since an absolute own-being will be refuted later in the case of all dharmanas.

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1 Pramāṇa-viniścaya 1.55, Vetter (1966:96-7). The first part of the verse reads सद्रोपतम्भ-नियमाद् अभीनो नील-तद्दिधिः: "Since they are definitely a simultaneous objective support, blue and the awareness of it are not different." The context in the PVin is a defense of the idea that the knowing perception and the object known are simultaneously the objective support. The line quoted by H specifically answers the objection of a Vaibhāṣika, who holds that an external object, preceding its perception by one instant, is the objective support cause of the subsequent perception that knows it.

Here the subject is "non-conceptual thinking mind." It is sahopalambha with the emptiness that it knows. The reason establishing it to be a gnosis is "because emptiness, the own-being of all dharmanas, is its objective support."

2 This is the positive inclusion (anvaya), i.e., wherever one has emptiness, the own-being of all dharmanas, as objective support it will always be included within gnosis.

3 The fault of anaikāntika would be incurred if the hetu were to be found in the dgag bya’i chos (=pratīṣedha-dharma), i.e., if a something which is not gnosis had emptiness, the own-being of all dharmanas, as objective support. The gnosis which understands an absolute own-being (tattvika-svabhāva) of all dharmanas might be such an example. Such an absolute being is, however, refuted by the above statement "because every composite and non-composite dharma category is mutually dependent and, therefore, in the final outcome has no own-being."

4 H has in mind the order of emptinesses number 4 and 13. The absolute nature of the former "emptiness, the own-being of which is a gnosis observing internal emptiness," is refuted by the
5.10.6 Haribhadra’s discussion of Ārya Vimuktisena’s logic is based on the three-limbed syllogism, set forth in its final form by Dharmakīrti in PV Svarthanumāṇa 1 प्राच्य-मर्मेश तदद्विषेक व्यासो ह्येतुक्र विभेष रः: (translated by Mookerjee and Nagasaki 1964:6). This three-limbed syllogism is fundamentally the same as the five limbs (pañcāvayava) formulation set out in the first paragraph of the above quotation (W/97.8-10) common to both non-Buddhists (e.g., as set forth in later primers like Annapāraṇa’s Tarka-samgraha 45-46) and Buddhists.

The difference between the three- and five-limbed syllogism lies in the presentation of each of the three limbs as a qualification of the reason (hetu). The three faults, asiddha, viruddha and anaikāntika, (these are explained below) which the syllogism is shown to avoid, are Dignāga’s three faults, expanded upon by Dharmakīrti PV Svarthanumāṇa 15 ह्येतुक्र विश्लेषण स्पष्ट निःश्रेयस्व देन वर्णितः। बसिद्विपरीतार्थ-व्यविचारे-विभक्तिः।

5.10.7 The reason (hetu) would be asiddha (not-established) if it were not the first of the three limbs, namely, an attribute of the subject (pakṣa-dharma = pakṣo dharmi; see Autocommentary, Svarthanumāṇa:1, Mookerjee and Nagasaki 1964:6). This is often called the major term. To wit: All non-conceptual minds have emptiness, which is the own-being of all dharmas, as objective support.

5.10.8 The reason would prove the opposite (viruddha), or be indefinite (anaikāntika), if it failed to fulfill the second and third of the three limbs,¹ the positive inclusion (anvaya) and negative exclusion (vyatireka). This is the so-called minor term. To wit: Whatever has emptiness, which is the own-being of all dharmas as its objective support, is also gnosis.

5.10.9 The fault of anaikāntika (‘not definitely one or the other’) would be incurred if the hetu were to be found in the dgag bya’i chos (=pratisedha-dharma), i.e., if something which is not gnosis had emptiness, which is the own-

"emptiness of all dharmas ... because every composite and non-composite dharma category is mutually dependent and, therefore, in the final outcome has no own-being."

¹ Mookerjee and Nagasaki (1964:46) define the two terms as ‘existence of the probans in the homologue’ and ‘absence of the probans in the heterologue’ which is exactly what Dharmakīrti seems to have had in mind.
being of all dharmas, as objective support. The understanding of an absolute own-being (tāttvika-svabhāva) of all dharmas would be an example of such an hypothetical ‘gnosis.’ Such an absolute being is, however, refuted.

5.10.10 Of the three sorts of hetu Dharmaśīra mentions, Haribhadra says the syllogism is ‘a reason from own-being’ (svabhāva-hetuh). Steinkellner (1974:126-7) translates sva-bhāva ‘essential property’ and takes the word to refer to the actual hetu. Rgyal tshab, in his commentary on the PV Thar lam gsal byed (73ff) interprets rang bzhin (=sva-bhāva) to mean that both the rtags (=hetu) and the bsgrub bya'i chos (=pratijñā-dharma) share the same nature (rang bzhin), in a somewhat common-sensical fashion. Whichever way one understands the word, Haribhadra clearly had Dharmaśīra’s threefold division of reasons in mind, and restructures Ārya Vimuktisena’s whole argument within the clear cut categories bequeathed to him by Dharmaśīra.

5.11 Why did a writer like Haribhadra meld Mādhyamika and Yogācāra ideas together? Setting aside, for the moment, any actual historical reality that, were we able to know it with any certainty, would explain the genesis of Haribhadra’s thought, and looking at the AAA, for the moment, through the eyes of a modern reader aided only by the glasses of many centuries of Tibetan religious writing, it seems that, even without being aware of it, Haribhadra, and other Indian Svātantrika-Mādhyamika thinkers sought to retain the advantages of two different doctrines: a) of a doctrine that devalues the objects of greed and hatred while avoiding nihilism and b) of a non-doctrine, as it were, that removes a philosopher’s greatest hindrance, wishful thinking. The Yogācāra mental transformation, a doctrine going back, perhaps, as far as early Sāṅkhya and embodying one of the great contributions of Indian philosophy accomplished the former, and the Mādhyamika ‘doctrine’ of emptiness accomplished the latter.

5.12 In conclusion it can be said that the most striking result of the melding together of the Yogācāra and Mādhyamika doctrines is Haribhadra’s modification of the ultimate level of the two truths.
As described by Haribhadra the ultimate is the Yogācāra mere awareness itself qualified by a lack of own-being. Having this in mind, in his concluding remarks on the divisions of emptiness, Haribhadra says (W97.20-22):

... where emptiness [un-connected with gnosis] is the objective support, the gnosis would range over [a complete] lack of own-being. Then, because gnosis, which is a bhāva [and exists], and its emptiness which is a non-bhāva [and does not exist] would be different and non-different from each other, respectively, emptiness would, in consequence, become a composite.

Mere awareness is pervasive, and unmarked as this or that, like space. But the lack of own-being which qualifies it is somehow even more pervasive. It is not the same, nor yet exactly different. It is the objective support of mere awareness, what mere awareness, ultimately, knows, and yet is not distant at all from it. If it were the same then emptiness would be made up of two components and would be composite. If it were different then it would not be awareness’s ultimate reality.
6.1 In a text setting forth a classical yoga system, be it the system of Patañjali or of Buddhist writers like Maitreya and Haribhadra, religio-philosophical theorizing and apparently straightforward descriptive passages dealing with praxis are inseparable. What distinguishes classical yoga texts, and what makes them so interesting, is, in fact, this melding together, in them, of theory and practice and the way in which refinement of theory reveals itself in the fine-tuning of the perceived process of development on higher yogic stages.

Ruegg (1981:88), in his survey of the Mādhyamikas with whom Haribhadra is associated, says

On their side the Yogācāra-(Svātantrika-)Mādhyamikas appear to have continued earlier trends of thought when they undertook to complement the Madhyamaka theory of the pure paramārtha both with a system of metaphysics, epistemology and logic providing an elaborated philosophical construction and analysis of sarvāyāti and with a system of ethico-spiritual praxis.

Specific details about the stages in this system, many at levels of refinement far beyond the experience of any but the most dedicated saint, comprise most of the explanation found in the AA and AAA. Maitreya, whose "purpose in beginning [the AA] is so that those with awareness would wish to behold the path (not touched by others) of being the knower of all aspects which has been taught here [in the PP] by the Teacher," (AA1-2, W5.2-5) already saw in the Pañca considerable systematization. Haribhadra considered the same level of systematization to exist in the A itself. And Haribhadra's student Dharmamitra, (AAPras:65.2.8-66.3.2, §4.12.2), stated explicitly that the various stages of the path were hidden (Tib sbed pa) in the A, and other PP sūtras, beneath the direct teaching that all dharmas lack own-being.

The extent to which a system of ethico-spiritual praxis is, or is not, found in the Pañca and other longer PP sūtras is difficult to ascertain. In the A such a system cannot be identified and, even if it is there, can be safely declared as beyond authentic reconstruction. In the Pañca, there is more evidence of a
system, but this was perhaps imposed on the text by Haribhadra when he recast the śūtra in accord with the topics of the AA. In both the AA and AAA, however, the system is presented in a relatively straightforward fashion.

6.2 Presuppositions

Behind the systematically presented path of the AA and AAA there are evident certain basic, almost cultural, presuppositions about spiritual practice and the mechanics of spiritual attainment. These presuppositions no doubt appeared self-evident to the classical Indian thinker, but to the modern Western mind they appear foreign, and, in some respects, diametrically opposed to present-day beliefs. I shall therefore try to identify the most important of them.

6.3 In general, yoga means joining. And though there are countless legitimate uses of the term, in the AAA, where the term pratipatti (literally, ‘progressing up to,’ §8.3) is preferred to the term yoga, as in most Classical texts dealing with religious philosophy, it means the joining of the mind or soul afflicted by the pains of mortality, etc., to a perfect state of immortality and bliss. Such joining is generally, in the Indian tradition thought to be not so much an addition, but rather a taking away. That is to say, unlike the Judeo-Christian concept of liberation where the soul (person) attains to a state beyond, in the Indian way of thinking it is rather that one realizes one’s own inner nature which has all along, unknown to oneself, been in a state of purity and perfection. According to this notion, the nature of God and the nature of the person are not fundamentally different and one’s original nature does not change to something quite other.¹

This lies behind the fundamental assumption of yoga, found as much in the AAA as it is in Patañjali’s Yoga-sūtra, that the human being works on him or herself, by way of his or her own physical, verbal and mental activity, to effect a personal transition to a state of freedom. There is an underlying assumption that the recipient of the benefit, or harm of an action must, in some fashion, be its initiator. Brahmanical and Buddhist writers, even the most ‘nihilistic’ Mādhyamika, seem to accept this as a maxim. For the yogic philosopher one senses that only individual physical, verbal and mental actions which modify the

¹ Rudolf Otto (1923), on the contrary, discerns a (Christian?) idea of God in the religions of the Indian sub-continent: a vaguely terrifying, and always thoroughly other, presence.
central clearing house of the personality are vectors for change. Since change, for the yogin or yoginī, is intimately connected with the glasses through which events in the outer world are viewed, and since the glasses of knowledge and awareness originate in, and have their focus defined by, the state of an individual personality, activity is directed inward. External change -- change in the world we live in\(^1\) -- is caused by changing the internal world, the hermetically sealed internal world which is the final ground of an individual personality. Nothing except one's own personal physical, verbal and mental actions can reach into, influence and change this inner world.

6.4 The centrality of human activity in Indian yogic thought leads to a corresponding devaluation of the role of God and social institutions. The actions of Isvara, who manifests himself in manifold ways ranging from human guru to stupendous deity, are for many writers, an independent vector of change, but his actions are always tightly circumscribed by karma, or complex cause and effect. The Judeo-Christian God fought a long and hard rearguard action against encroachment on his domain by personal freewill, but Isvara, in the Indian context, long ago saw the futility of attempting to oust karma and rule independently. Caught up inexorably within the web of Indian cultural presupposition about karma, he appears, at times, resigned to the status of a mere titular head of state.\(^2\)

Similarly with social activity, in the usual sense of pastoral or political work in the community to alleviate perceived injustice or distress, and social institutions which developed as the vehicle for its expression. They were, in classical India, by and large considered to be irrelevant as agents of change, except as they changed the inner individual. There is even a tendency to consider such action and institutions a hindrance in the quest for meaningful freedom. Using outer work, directly on outer reality, was meaningless, part of the transitory world, a sophisticated trap, caught within which, foolish persons

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\(^1\) The bhājana-loka as distinct from the sattva-loka (AA4.61).

\(^2\) The Nyāya-vaiśeṣika understanding of Isvara (Chemparathy 1972) and Dignāga's concept of pramāṇa-bhūta (explained by Dharmakīrti, PV Pramāṇasiddhi 1-33) differ little in this respect.
spend precious time in misguided fruitless physical actions, like a flailing fox trying desperately to free its paw from a steel trap.

The concern with larger social institutions which is so characteristic of Judeo-Christian and Muslim religious language is conspicuous by its absence as an element figuring in personality change or spiritual progress in pre-European India, even if the attitudes which lie behind the concern are found plentifully in Buddhism and in the _Mahābhārata_. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries an attempt was made to find in classical and pre-classical Indian texts exhortations to the sort of social awareness and social activities held in high esteem by the European educationalists. One senses an apologetic in the task, an unstated assumption that the texts would be less noble were they found not to contain such religious statements. The concern appears to reflect the pressing reality that such ideas were backed by the economic and political clout of British missionaries and administrators.

The important Indian religious social institutions: Brahmins, as a group, and the Buddhist saṅgha, perhaps functioned, through their ritual activity as catalysts of, and even agents for, real or imagined change. But the perception and description of these institutions by theoreticians of religious praxis (and yogic texts are, finally, descriptions of religious activity and the changes it occasions) differ greatly from the perception of a social benefit (or even lack of it) in Western culture by Western theoreticians or theologians. The Indian theoretician of religious praxis understood their value in terms of their possession of salvific efficiency. By praying to, or supporting Brahmins or the saṅgha, one would, because of the power of the institution as a field of merit, change the state of one's inner world and thus attain a better future rebirth. Rules to govern the outer interaction of members of religious institutions are found, but they are, at least in post-Upaniṣadic texts, relatively few.

6.5 In regard to the mechanics of liberation, the restraint and absence of hatred (_dveṣa_), one of the three basic Buddhist harmful emotional states (_kleśa_), will serve as a convenient point of departure to explore the shared psychological perspective that lies behind the mechanics of most Classical yoga systems. The removal of hatred (or its equivalents) is an integral part of liberation in all schools and tenet systems.
In the AAA, a syncretistic text attempting the reconciliation of earlier points of view within a non-exclusive framework, three sorts of spiritual practice related to hatred are presupposed. Each is called forbearance (क्षांति).

The first, forbearance of the 'grin-and-bear it' sort, restrains anger but does not affect its ontological status. It diminishes the force of hatred while the hatred is still present in the person's mind, but only by suppressing or restraining it from manifesting itself in physical and verbal actions. A second, more profound, sort of forbearance replaces feelings of hatred with feelings of affection. The feelings of affection replace hatred since both cannot manifest themselves in a single mental continuum simultaneously. Like hot and cold, one replaces the other, and for as long as it remains, denies the other access.

Neither of these two sorts of absence is considered to be a real absence, because, when conditions change the hatred can again manifest itself. In earlier, philosophically less sophisticated systems, these sorts of suppression can be considered real and lasting (cf., e.g., the apratisāṁkhyā-nirodha, literally, 'non-analytic cessation' of the Sarvāstivāda).

A third sort of forbearance removes hatred by removing its ground. This explains the conceptual frame behind the use of the word क्षांति to describe the active part of direct witness to the ultimate (दर्शनमार्ग, §6.15), the part of the path that begins the removal of hindrances to real spiritual development. On the axiom that something which exists cannot become non-existent, a ground which really is cannot be removed. There is no place, outside the sphere of being, whither it could be moved.

If the एलांबाना -- in this context the fulcrum or locus standi -- of hatred is untrue, however, then, though itself a real emotion, hatred can be extirpated. Haribhadra, in the context of explaining the Bodhisattva's practice, quotes (W67.15) a famous verse of Dharmakīrti describing the process through which hatred and other क्लेशas arise.

When I exist there is the idea of other. From the self-and-other division comes clinging and hate. Based in these two all क्लेशas arise.

According to this psychological analysis, the ground of hatred is the innate belief that I (अत्मन) exist. If the objective support of that belief, the 'I,' is real then it can never be removed. The harmful mental states would be grounded in
reality itself, and the individual saddled with an original 'sin' that could never be removed. According to nearly every classical Indian philosopher, and Haribhadra is amongst them, there is, in fact, no basis for the innate belief in 'I,' at least in the sense of an unquestioned worldly personality. The belief does not accord with the way things, when analysed, are. What the person takes to be real is made up, superimposed, a mere figment of imagination. And since knowledge of what is true, the absence of such an I, is knowledge based in reality, it cannot be dislodged. This is like the mistaken imagination that a rope coiled up in the corner of a dimly lit room is a cobra. People peering in, imagining the coiled-up rope to be a snake, are scared of being bitten and their fears will not die down until they discover that what they believe to be real is, in fact, untrue. When the basis of their fears, the imaginary snake, is seen for what it really is, a figment of imagination, their fears die down naturally, and the earlier mistaken notion does not have the power to replace the realization based on fact. Similarly, the ground of the innate belief that 'I exist' does not stand up to scrutiny and does not have the power to replace a realization based on the truth. In this general sense, in the context of a general description of the mechanics of spiritual development, this realization of 'truth' could be either the understanding arrived at by way of the "You are that" (tat tvam asi) formula of the Vedānta or an understanding of the Buddhist selflessness (anātman).

The power of an understanding based in reality to remove all hindrance derives, in the AAA from the prabhāsvara 'clear illumination' (W38.23-36; cf. PV Pratyakṣa 210) nature of the mind. When mind abides within itself, the understanding of reality is unshakeable because the nature of the mind clearly reflects reality and does not distort it.

When hatred, or any other hindrance to religious attainment, is removed by understanding and contemplating the truth in this way, the removal is real and lasting because, not only the manifest state of the harmful emotion has been extirpated, but the potential, latency or predisposition (bīja,vāsanā, anuśaya) for the same unbalancing mental force to again arise in the future has been extirpated as well.

Such an extirpation is a complete cessation based in a thorough investigation of truth (pratisamkhya-nirodha; cf., La Vallée Poussin 1923-31:1.8-10; MSA:20.57) because, even when conditions change, the hatred can never again
manifest itself. It is an absence (śūnyatā) of the potentials and is ultimate reality (dharmatā) itself. "The truth of stopping," as Haribhadra (W32; Conze 1977:159) succinctly puts it, "means that cessation is really emptiness itself."

6.7 Paths

Turning, now, to the spiritual path as it unfolds specifically in the AA and AAA, Conze (1957:21-35) says,

The AA treats the contents of the PP as statements of spiritual experiences ... The spiritual world is an essentially hierarchical structure, and the Absolute must appear different on different levels of attainment. Buddhist tradition had, by 350 A.D. evolved a clear and detailed picture of the Path which a Buddhist Saint has to traverse through countless aeons, and to each meditation it finds in the PP the AA assigns its appropriate place on that path. The reader of the AA must constantly bear in mind the position from which events are observed. What at first sight seems to be a dry and scholastic treatise does then become a fascinating contribution to transcendental psychology.

As Obermiller (1932-3:15) has ably demonstrated, the broad outline of Maitreya's grand scheme of "transcendental psychology" is a path which has fifteen stages: a) a path of accumulation (sambhāra), b) preparation (prayoga), c) seeing (darśana), d) meditation (bhāvanā) and e) where learning is finished (aśaikṣa), associated with each of the a) Śrāvaka, b) Pratyeka-buddha and c) Bodhisattva, respectively. This outline one can demonstrate to be taught in the AA itself. It remains constant in the later commentaries. Some terminology favoured by Maitreya perhaps falls a little from favour and the boundaries between the stages of the path are perhaps set forth with a precision that is missing from the earlier text, but the basic path remains the same.

In the following study of the path there are two parts:

First the path is described from the point of view of these fifteen paths of accumulation, preparation, seeing, meditation and where learning is finished. This is done first because these terms are the most widely known and used in descriptions of the Buddhist path in late Mahāyāna literature.
Second, the same path is again described, this time using the special terminology developed by the author of the AA. Although this terminology is used throughout the AAA to describe the path it rarely appears in the literature of the other Buddhist schools, and to that extent is less important.

In both parts of the study I have taken the liberty of digressing into detailed classification and analysis of specific parts of the path. Readers unfamiliar with the language of the path, or for whom a discussion about scholastic detail holds little delight can skip over those parts without great loss.

6.8 In the AA and AAA the lowest entry level onto the path, the first stage of practice, is called proximate liberation (mokṣa-bhāgiya). The equivalent term, found in the AS, is path of accumulation (saṁbhāra-mārga, Rahula 1971, 104, Obermiller: 1932-33:15). This latter term, which was favored by Tib writers as more descriptive of the practice, refers to the accumulating of merit (puṇya) and wisdom (jñāna) which is the primary focus at this stage.

The second stage is called proximate penetration (nirvedha-bhāgiya). It is also called the path of preparation (prayoga-mārga).

The word bhāgiya, at the end of the two compounds means these two stages of the path are connected with (mw:751), or are a part of, liberation and penetration, respectively. Tibetans rendered bhāgiya as cha mthun ‘partial concordance.’ Conze renders it as ‘aid to.’ The idea is that the forces which structure nirvāṇa and penetration to the ultimate truth, respectively, are cultivated on these two levels. They aid their attainment, as rehearsals, as it were, of them.¹

Of the five paths, the proximate liberation and penetration are described as ‘a level of performance based on belief’ (adhimukti-caryā-bhūmi).² The implicit contrast is with direct witness to the highest reality that takes place on the path of seeing, since after direct witness, belief is no longer the motivating factor, it is actual knowing (adhigama) itself.

¹ Other compounds with bhāgiya (cf. AK8.17-18) are explained by Rahula (1980:105, n.4).
6.8.2 In the AA only AA4.32-34 (W648): अनिविन्त-प्रवाहायितः-समुदायम्-कौशलम् । सर्वाकाराविवेजस्मिन्न भोज-भागीप्यम् इत्यते॥ बुद्धाचालाभन्त भजत भीर्य दानादिगोविषयम् । स्मृतिर्भ आशयस्मति: समाधिर्भ अविभेयना॥ धर्मेण सर्वो याकारार्ध ज्ञाते प्रजेति पञ्चाः। deals directly with proximate liberation, where it is defined in terms of faith, enthusiastic perseverance in giving, etc., mindfulness, stabilization and wisdom. It is also covered in the first two of the first abhisamaya’s ten topics, however, as Haribhadra’s opening comments (W36.14-25) on the third topic, proximate penetration, make clear.

Then, with the collection of merit amassed, the thoughtful ones with fixed intention, whose mindstreams are governed by virtuous dharmas like faith, etc., with a firm clairvoyance that is the outcome of countless eons [of practice], enter, through the preceptual advice, into the level of performance in order to accomplish their collection of wisdom.

Based on this, in order to purify the level of belief-based performance, on top of the root of virtue characterized by faith and so forth (which is the proximate liberation attained at the finalization of hearing, etc.), the four proximate penetrations (ordinary meditative states concordant with the penetration of the four noble truths) should be explained.

The characterization of proximate liberation as a stage of the path attained at the completion of hearing echoes AK6.25, where it is linked with the stages of wisdom arisen from hearing and arisen from thought (§8.5). Its description as a stage of the path when "the accumulation of merit has been completed" anticipates the term sambhāra-mārga.

6.8.3 One of the factors which differentiates between the Śrāvaka and Bodhisattva proximate liberations is the length of time needed for accumulating the merit and wisdom required to attain their respective goals. As will be clear from the enumeration of the Ārya Sarīgha (§7.9.3), the Śrāvaka’s journey can be completed much more quickly. The Bodhisattva’s journey takes three countless eons (differing theories as to the length of time are summarized by Obermiller 1932-33:60). According to Haribhadra, the completion of the first of these countless eons demarcates the boundary between proximate liberation and penetration.
6.8.4 A Bodhisattva’s proximate liberation spans the period up to the attainment of an authoritative understanding of *dharma-nairātmya* (selflessness of dharmas) and beyond to the beginning of the unified path of calm abiding and insight (*samatha-vipaśyanā-yuga-naddha*, AA46bc). Its production is coterminous with the lower boundary of the *sārvākārābhisambodha* (Obermiller 1933-6:7-9, Hopkins and Rinpochay:165, 242-246). The Bodhisattva stage begins with the presence of authentic production of an [altruistic] mind and is further subdivided into soft, middling and great. According to Haribhadra (W25.14-21) the first three of the twenty-two examples of production of an altruistic mind (§7.9.2) correspond to these three stages. He seems to be following a long tradition in this, because, of the twenty two examples, the first, earth, naturally exemplifies the foundation of practice, and the second, gold, the stage when practice becomes immutable (see Lamotte 1962:405).

What this means is that altruism is the basis of the path (like earth). Until that altruism is grounded in an understanding of the ultimate truth, however, it can be affected by a sense of defeatism brought on by reflecting on the distance to the goal.

The Śrāvaka proximate liberation, on the other hand, begins when the first sort of Śrāvaka meditation begins to effect a revulsion for worldly life.

6.9 In regard to production of an [altruistic] mind and the sense of revulsion with worldly life, both are understood as methods (*upāya*) that are a necessary complement to wisdom, where method means, basically, a motivating thought. The two methods are discussed below (§7.5.3-5).

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1 This is set forth clearly in Kamalaśīla’s BK (Tucci 1956:523.9-15) which H was possibly following in his AAA:

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See also Obermiller (1932-33:16-17). On the unified path of calm abiding and insight see §6.27.2, §7.7-7.7.4

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6.10 The nirvedha-bhāgīya ('proximate penetration') is a term that describes an intermediate section of the path, divided into four sections, at the end of which the mind of the meditator merges with the object known, the ultimate, like water being poured into water. The name nirvedha-bhāgīya and the names of its four divisions -- warmed stage (ūśmagata), peaked stage (mūrdhagata), forbearance stage (kṣānti) and stage of the worldly supreme dharma (laukikāgra-dharma) are identical to those found in earlier Buddhism (AK6.17-60, Poussin 1923-31:163-175). These were set out earlier in §5.7, in a quotation from MSA:14.23-26 or MSam:3.12, when discussing the influence of the Yogācāra on Haribhadra. Maitreya and Haribhadra go to great lengths in an attempt to show that the stages of Mahāyāna proximate penetration are 'superior' (viśiṣṭatā) to the Hinayāna equivalents. They are discussed frequently (AA1.25-36, 2.3-5, 2.9-10, 4.35-37 etc.).

6.11 The first explanation of the superiority of the four Mahāyāna proximate penetrations (W42.15-48.13) comprises a discussion of the third of the ten topics of the first abhisamaya. The outline for this explanation is given in (AA25-26, W37.12-15):

अभिशिष्टसाधनां भवति तयानि किं देशतां संपर्कविशेषता ।
चतुर्विष्कल्पं संयोगवषयम् भजतां भस्मै तताद्॥

On account of objective support, mode of meditation, cause and mentor, the soft, middling and great Protector Bodhisattva warmed, etc., [proximate penetrations], divided up as each having, individually, one of the four conceptualizations, are superior to the Śrāvaka, as well as Rhino[-like Pratyeka-buddha, paths].

The "Protector Bodhisattva" is the four proximate penetrations, each of which has a subdivision into soft, middling and great. According to AAV:53.7-14 these proximate penetrations are superior to the corresponding Śrāvaka warmed path and so forth, because of four factors. In the AAA (W36.25-37.10) five or six factors are set forth:

1. because of being special in terms of objective support
2. because of being special in terms of mode of meditation
3. because of being special in terms of causing realization of all three paths
(4) because of being special in terms of mentor, i.e., a spiritual friend characterized by skillful means

(5 and 6) because of having divisions correlated with the stages of suppressing conceptualizations of apprehended object and apprehender.

6.11.2 Ārya Vimuktiśena and Haribhadra differ a little in their explanation of the difference between the Śrāvaka and Bodhisattva proximate penetrations. I shall briefly investigate this difference.

Both agree on the first four reasons. They say Śrāvaka proximate penetration is inferior because the objective support of the Śrāvaka path is only the four noble truths and because it is only an antidote to belief in a soul/self. This is because the Śrāvakas contemplate the four noble truths by way of meditating on impermanence, etc., alone.

They say Mahāyāna proximate penetration is superior because it has all dhammas as objective support and it is an antidote to the opinion that dhammas exist by way of their own being. This is because Bodhisattvas contemplate the four noble truths and all other dhammas with the mode of meditation that is free from 'settling' (abhinivēsa) etc., i.e., with a mode which knows emptiness fully.

In other words, the essence of the difference between the two paths is that the Bodhisattva meditates on dharma-nairatmya and the Śrāvaka only on pudgala-nairatmya. These first two reasons simply restate the profundity of the new insight of the PP sūtras (§3.5).

6.11.3 The third and fourth reasons why the Mahāyāna proximate penetration is superior are as follows: Since a Bodhisattva's wisdom consists in experiential knowledge of all paths, the paths of the Śrāvakas, Rhinos and Bodhisattvas, it is the cause of all paths. Since the Bodhisattvas' wisdom is not transcendental wisdom with a different objective content which will bring about a personal attainment, but a learning which "accomplishes the aims of the world," Bodhisattvas need someone to help them in order to attain this. This guide, or one who takes full care of them, is, externally, a Mahāyāna teacher and internally, the inner altruistic mind (bodhicitta). With these two as mentor (saṁparighāra, literally, "who fully accompanies or embraces"), Bodhisattvas learn all the paths to guide others. (These are explained in more detail in the discussion of the state of being a knower of paths, §7.5.)
6.11.4 There is little substantial difference between Haribhadra and Arya Vimuktisena as regards Haribhadra’s fifth reason. It is merely a case of making clear the distinction, which both admit, between suppression and stopping (apratisaṅkhya-nirodha and pratisaṅkhya-nirodha). Haribhadra intimates that suppressing conceptualizations of apprehended object and apprehender makes the Mahāyāna superior since that is a necessary precursor to stopping these conceptualizations on the paths of seeing and meditation. Arya Vimuktisena, on the other hand, stresses that at the stage of proximate penetration the status of the conceptualizations has not been affected. They are fundamentally as much there for the Bodhisattva as they are for a Śrāvaka since nothing is stopped until it is extirpated, by directly witnessing the ultimate, on the paths of seeing and meditation (§6.6, AAV:53.11). This Mahāyāna assertion stands in opposition to the position of certain Śrāvakas, e.g., as set forth in the commentary on AK2.55cd, which admits of suppression as a real soteriological factor.

Arya Vimuktisena connects the division of the four proximate penetrations, into soft, middling and great, with the divisions of the four conceptualizations, and this is probably what Maitreya had in mind. Haribhadra agrees, but takes the process a step further and states that the divisions are a reason for superiority. This is a helpful and important clarification insofar as it highlights a major difference in the unfolding of the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna paths, the structure of the Mahāyāna proximate penetrations.

6.12 How, exactly do the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna proximate penetrations differ? It is not as clear in the explanation found in the AAA as one might wish. The following remarks are intended to clarify the distinction Haribhadra was attempting to draw.

6.12.2 According to the Hīnayāna system set forth in AK6, the Śrāvaka’s meditation proceeds as follows. First gross mental distraction (vikṣepa) is pacified by contemplating the horrid and suffering nature of life (AK6.10ab). This is done by meditating on a small piece of one’s skull, in the center of one’s forehead, as if visible through a small rectangular window cut in the skin. One slowly imagines peeling all the skin off one’s skeleton and then expands on the idea until one imagines the entire world as filled with bones, filling up the
continents right up to the edges of the oceans. Then one retracts the meditation, as it were, imagining the bones retracting until one is again focused on a particular part of one’s own skull. One pacifies the less gross mental disturbances by meditating on the inhalation and exhalation of breath (AK6.12-13) and attains a mind in a state of calm abiding (śamatha). Having attained this clear and stable mind, one pays close attention (smṛtyupasthāna) to the body, feelings, ideas and dharmas (AK14cd). This close attention is wisdom, and by learning, thinking about and contemplating the body, etc., it passes through the hearing and thinking stages and becomes meditative (bhāvanāmayī AK6.15). When wisdom developed to this level pays close attention to dharmas, the last of the four objects of close attention, the yogin or yoginī passes from the stage of proximate liberation to warmed proximate penetration.

Now, the focus of attention, dharma, is described as the sixteen aspects of the four noble truths (AK6.16, §7.4). The warmed and peaked proximate penetrations, each subdivided into soft, middling and great, pay close attention to the sixteen aspects as do the first two of the three subdivisions (i.e., small, middling and great) of the forbearance proximate penetration (AK6.17-18). The third subdivision, the great forbearance, however, which is only a single moment in duration, engages solely in the second sort of Śrāvaka meditation on the suffering of the desire realm (kāma-dhātu, i.e., the part of the universe where sense objects are primary, AK6.18ab). The supreme dharma proximate penetration is, similarly, only one instant in duration and it, too, engages only in meditation on the suffering of the desire realm. It is the last instant of the proximate penetration. The third instant is the first instant of the path of seeing, the beginning of direct witness to the truth of suffering.

6.12.3 The logic of the apparently arbitrary Śrāvaka model found in the AK is based on the insight that one must first go over all sixteen aspects of the four noble truths, in each of the three realms (kāma, rūpa, ārūpya, §6.26.2), by reflecting on their particular and general characteristics. One must do so because, unlike in the Mahāyāna, truth is not one, but is multiple (see below §6.15, §6.20). Having done so serially, in a manner not unlike that described in the ānupūrvika meditation of AA6 (§7.7.5), it is then necessary to focus on just one aspect of the truth because the concentrated insight at the path of seeing is an
absorption into what is beheld, not a discursive consideration of it. And it must be on the suffering of this world because only that personal experience will motivate the meditator to penetrate the last hindrance and obscuration to direct witnessing of the truth.

6.12.4 The Bodhisattva's proximate penetration differs from the Hinayana in that it is an aid to penetrating, not merely a set of truths, but a single truth that qualifies all dharmas. The unfolding of this process, outlined above in the passage, found with only minor differences in both the AAA and BK (§5.7), setting forth the names of the four subdivisions of proximate penetration, revolves about the gradual removal of the subject-object bifurcation. In the AA this bifurcation is mentioned in brief (AA1.34-35), and then discussed again at length (AA5.5-17) in the context of the actual stopping of the four conceptualizations on the paths of seeing and meditation.

On the warmed and peaked stages there is suppression of the conceptualization of good and bad apprehended object, respectively. On the forbearance and supreme dharma stages, there is suppression of the conceptualization of a substantially existing and a merely designated apprehender, respectively. The last of the subdivisions of the supreme dharma is only a single instant (kṣaṇa) but its objective support is not one aspect of the four noble truths. It is all dharmas.

6.13 The start of the proximate penetration marks the beginning of peaked full awakening (mūrdhābhisaṃbodha; §7.7-7.7.4; Obermiller 1933-6:7-9; Hopkins and Rimpochay:165, 242-246). The last moment marks the highest stage of an ordinary person (prthag-jana). Immediately afterwards one becomes an Ārya ('Saint' or 'Superior;' Ruegg 1968-9:305 n. 7).

6.14 After the proximate penetration the meditator comes face to face with reality, i.e., has penetrated to the bedrock (or lack of it) of existence. This is the visionary experience, called darśana-mārga 'path of seeing' in the AA and AAA. The model of this section of the yogic path seeks to explain the extirpation of all opinion (drṣṭi) that does not accord with truth. 'Seeing' therefore is unmediated; it is a coming face to face with truth in such a manner that doubt, and all wrong opinion about truth, no longer have any basis.
6.15 ‘Truth’ in the system of the AK has sixteen facets (anityādi). Here in the AA and AAA, as in the AS (Rahula 1971:108), it is one (satyānām ekābhisamayāt, W98.27). In both systems, however, the basic model remains the same.

The path of seeing has sixteen instants. By understanding the model as it functions vis-a-vis the first noble truth of suffering (duḥkha) it will be clear how it functions in the other three noble truths as well.

6.15.2 The path vis-a-vis suffering has four instants called (1) duḥkhe dharma-kṣānti (2) duḥkhe dharma-jñāna (3) duḥkhe 'nvaya-kṣānti (4) duḥkhe 'nvaya-jñāna. (cf. AK6.25-26, la Vallée Poussin:179-83). These can be translated as ‘forbearance and knowledge, and subsequent forbearance and knowledge, in the face of beholding the facts as they pertain to suffering.’ In the AK6.28ab (काल्चिवनन्यानामस्वरूपम् भवाक्रमम्) the forbearances are antidotes to bad propensities (anuṣayas, i.e., wrong opinions and emotional disturbances occasioned by those wrong opinions; §6.17). The knowledges correspond to deliverance from these bad propensities.

6.15.3 There are two stages to the path of seeing, meditative equipoise (samāhita-jñāna) and post-equipoise state (prśṭha-labdha-jñāna). These roughly correspond, in the AK, to realization of the paramārtha and saṁvṛti levels of reality, respectively (AK7ab). In the Mahāyāna they correspond to a period of quasi-enlightenment and a subsequent period when conventional realities, resembling illusions, appear (Obermiller 1932-33:40-41). It is only a quasi-enlightenment because the presence of obscuration to knowledge (jñeyāvaraṇa) means that it is not an unbroken state, but actualized only when in meditative absorption. These two stages are similar to the paths of meditation set forth in AA2.18-24 and 2.25ff.

6.15.4 The last instant of proximate penetration leads, wiithout break, into the sky-like meditative equipoise where the knower and known absorb into each other like water into water. This equipoise is sub-divided into two, (cf. AK6.28ab) called unhindered path (ānantarya-mārga) and path of deliverance (vimukti-mārga). In AA1.37b these are called antidote (pratipakṣa) and remover (prahāṇa) [of conceptualization] and Haribhadra explains the
difference between them as being "like pushing out a thief and slamming the door" (V76.26). With the attainment of the path of deliverance comes an actual stopping (pratisamkhya-nirodha) of the bad propensities or, as they are called in the AA, conceptualizations.

6.15.5 According to the AK, the sixteen instants of the path of seeing are produced one after the other, i.e., after the subsequent knowledge in the face of beholding the facts as they pertain to suffering (duḥkhe 'nvaya-jñāna), there is forbearance in the face of beholding the facts as they pertain to the origin of suffering (samudaye dharma-kṣānti), etc. The last instant (mārge 'nvaya-jñāna) is the first instant of the path of meditation. The dharma-kṣāntis and dharma-jñānas are directed towards suffering, etc., in the kāma-dhātu while the anvaya-kṣāntis and anvaya-jñānas to suffering, etc., in the two higher realms (rūpa and ārūpya).

6.16 In the AA, as in the AS (Rahula 1921:107-8, Schmithausen 1983), the sixteen-instant model of the path of seeing is adapted to explain the removal of the four conceptualizations. The antidotes to the two conceptualizations of apprehended object, relative to each of the four noble truths are the dharma-kṣāntis, while the dharma-jñānas give deliverance from them. The antidotes to, and deliverers from, the two conceptualizations of apprehender are the anvaya-kṣāntis and anvaya-jñānas, respectively.

Obermiller (1932-3:39-40) says that, according to Haribhadra's model of the path of seeing, the conceptualizations of apprehended object are first completely stopped, after which the antidotes to the conceptualizations of apprehender come into force. He says there are no antidotes to the conceptualizations of apprehender until after the stopping of the conceptualizations of apprehended object.

Maitreya's discussions of the path of seeing usually simply list the many sorts of 'settling' (abhinivesa) which are removed at this stage. These are dealt with at length (AA5.5-22) in terms of the four conceptualizations, each subdivided into nine, which the path of seeing stops. He describes the experience of this stage of the path when he says (§6.5.6) "there is nothing to be taken away and there is nothing to be put there. One should see the real from the point of view of reality. One who sees reality is liberated." In the same place
(AA6.21, W888.11-12 समाधि क समाप्त तत्: सिद्ध-विजुम्भिततम्। अनुलोभं विलोभं च प्रतीत्योपत्तादम्
ईत्यते॥), he speaks of the yogin or yogini "then surveying dependent origination
in unfolding and reverse order," perhaps intimating thereby a post-equipoise
state which contemplates the samvṛti level.

It is not clear whether Haribhadra accepts such a post equipoise state on the
path of seeing. As Obermiller (1933-36:146 n. 4) remarks, Haribhadra’s
statement that "the first instant of the ‘joyous level’ (pramuditā) is the path of
seeing and from the second instant begins the path of meditation" (W99.1-2) is
confusing because it seems to imply there is no common locus for the post-
equipoise state and the path of seeing. The likely explanation is that instant of
time (kṣaṇa) refers, here, to a compound unit of time long enough to complete an
action (Tib bya mdzog ma’i skad cig ma). Such a compound unit is called a
kṣaṇa because in order to die out no further cause beyond what produced it is
necessary. The second ‘instant,’ referred to by Haribhadra would be the next
compound instant when another meditation on the ultimate begins again. That
compound instant would be the path of meditation.

6.17 Associated with, and further explaining, the path of seeing are the bad
propensities (anuśayas), wrong opinions and emotional disturbances
occasioned by those wrong opinions. They are basically the same as the kleśas
‘afflictive emotions.’ In the AA, though the term anuśaya is used (AA4.42), it is
less prominent than the term conceptualization (vikalpa). In the first chapter of
the AAA, however, the anuśayas are given prominence in explaining both the
paths of seeing and meditation.

It is necessary to be familiar with the anuśayas, kleśas and vikalpas because
they are often the means whereby the stages of the path, which remove them, are
delineated. The way in which the anuśayas, kleśas and vikalpas are classified is
complex. Nevertheless I have decided to explain it by way of a comparision
with the system found in the AK. I do so for two reasons: (a) because
Haribhadra’s way of classifying the anuśayas, etc., in his AAA is very similar to
the classifications found in the AK, and (b) because the AK is well known to

1 See a helpful explanation of kṣaṇas by Ngag dbang dpal ldan in his Grub mtha’ mchan ’grel (Mngon
smra ba), p. 87.
those Western scholars with an interest in the Buddhist mārga through the edition of that text prepared in the 1920s by La Vallée Poussin.

6.17.2. The word bad propensities means a latency which will bring forth an evil result (cf. La Vallée Poussin 1923-31:5.78 n. 1). Six are listed in AK5.1-3 (३२७ भवस्यानुत्तया: नः राग: प्रतिष्ठू तथा । मानोविद्या च दृष्टिवृत्ति च विचिनिक्ष्या च तेषु न: ॥ दृष्टयः पश्चः सत्काय-मिष्यात्त्वाहृ-दृष्टयः । दृष्टिः-शील-ज्ञ-परामर्शाति इति पुनः दश ॥). These six deadly sins, which together are the root of all painful existence, are desire, enmity, pride, ignorance, doubt and view or opinion (द्रष्टि). The first five are non-view anuśayas (Tib lta min lnga). The five view anuśayas (Tib lta ba lnga) are a subdivision of the sixth bad propensity. These are (a) view that there is a true body, (b) wrong view, (c) [view] grasping an extreme, (d) judging as best one’s own wrong view and (e) judging as best one’s foolish ethics and vows.

6.17.3 Complex indeed are the ways to divide up and connect the bad propensities with the sixteen instants of the path of seeing, but it is necessary to investigate this complexity to understand Haribhadra’s statement (W98.26):

In total, one should destroy the 112 kleśas that are to be removed by [the path of] seeing with a single realization of the truths.

In the AK, where the path unfolds gradually, the bad propensities of the desire realm are removed first, and only then the bad propensities of the two upper realms (AK5.4 दशोऽलि सर्षण्यास्ती विद्रष्टिविचित्रिता: । यथा-क्रमे प्राच्ययन्ते कामें दुःखादि- दर्शने: ॥). "In the desire realm, relative to understanding the four noble truths, respectively, there are ten, seven, seven and eight bad propensities removed by the path of seeing." The logic is as follows. The bad propensities are primarily left by wrong opinions. The first truth is primarily the skandhas (i.e., physical and mental constituents of the personality). The first bad propensity is [left by] desire (रागा), and relative to this first truth, it is understood as being a narcissistic love for the constituents occasioned by a wrong opinion about ego. Now, since (a) view of the true body, (b) the extreme view that the constituents are eternal or completely annihilated, and (c) judging [as best one’s foolish] ethics and vows concerning extreme physical austerities and fasting are (by definition) directed towards the constituents, they arise relative to the first noble truth alone. The foolish judgement about austerities can also arise about the path because it is a
view which takes what is not the path to liberation to be so. It is exactly the same in regard to the two upper realms, except there is no anger (pratigha) in those more settled mental realms, so one has only nine, six, six and seven bad propensities, respectively.

6.17.4 According to Haribhadra, then, there are 112 bad propensities removed by the path of seeing. He says that there are all ten bad propensities vis-a-vis each truth in the desire realm and all, except anger, in the two higher realms. This is because he believes there is only a single profound realization, of emptiness, which destroys all wrong opinion and it must be understood equally of all the four truths.

6.18 Since the non-mediated (nirvikalpaka) understanding of the emptiness of one dharma is also a realization that all dharmas are empty (this is probably the significance of Haribhadra’s reference to the indivisibility of the dharma-dhātu and the echo of the MAV at W98.20), in the Mahāyāna all eight forbearances are produced simultaneously. The dharma-kṣānti and anvaya-kṣānti are differentiated, not in terms of the different realms, but in terms of the Yogācāra object-subject bifurcation, the AA’s conceptualizations. Similarly, the eight jñānas arise together and the liberation from all bad propensities is produced simultaneously. The path of meditation is attained only when the Bodhisattva returns, subsequently, to cultivate the same non-mediated understanding at a later time.

6.19 The earliest formulations of the Buddhist path are accessible to modern scholarship through two sorts of earlier canonical literature: quasi-autobiographical accounts of the Śākyamuni’s personal quest for, and attainment of, bodhi; and what Schmithausen, has called a "stereotyped, detailed description" (1981:204) of the path to liberation (set forth repeatedly in the Śīlakkhandha-vagga section of the Dīgha Nikāya, e.g., and in the Cūḷa-hatthipadopama-sutta and Kandaraka-sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya). That the earliest formulation comprised three basic stages or segments: morality (śīla), meditative stabilization (samādhi), and wisdom (jñāna; Schmithausen 1976, Sponberg 1988), is well known.
6.19.2 In these early accounts there is no clear delineation of a path of seeing and a path of meditation. This led earlier western scholarship (La Vallée Poussin 1936-37) to posit two forces, the mystical and the rational, to explain the later bifurcation. The mystical force, or bent, in early Buddhism (whether one is referring here to actual yogic practitioners or theoreticians is unclear), led some writers and schools, so the theory goes, to emphasize the single religious visionary experience. The rational force, or bent, led others to concentrate on plotting the linear development of a coherently structured meditational path. For the former, the path was complete when the visionary experience was attained. The experience was itself an awakening or enlightenment (abhisaṁbodha). For the latter, a long process of meditation was still necessary before the goal of full enlightenment (samyak sambodhi) could be attained.

6.19.3 Already in early Buddhism one can discern a school of thought which understands the content of the ultimate visionary experience as a single truth (or, in its earlier versions, as a single unified state undiffracted by thought and feeling). It was this school of thought, perhaps, that first came up with the innovation of juxtaposing the doctrine of four truths with the doctrine of dependent origination (pratītya-samutpāda) in the twelve-linked version, which traces all suffering to ignorance. At any rate, the anātman doctrine, enshrined at some point in the doctrine of the four truths as the fourth aspect of suffering, became the total content of Mahāyāna "Liberating Insight," the one realization which could remove hindrances, be they bad propensities, kleśas, contaminations (āsravas), obscurations to omniscience (jñeyāvaraṇas) or whatever, by removing the ignorance (the first of the twelve links of dependent origination) which lay at their root.

6.20 In the AA and AAA "Liberating Insight" (modifying the term to mean the Mahāyāna path of seeing, §6.15) is a direct experience of the single, all-pervasive, ultimate truth of nairatmya alone. To that extent the model is of the mystical variety. Closer analysis of the textual material, however, reveals considerable complexity and a concern with the specifics of the path, especially the higher levels of the path which come about after the initial visionary experience. This led to an extensive explanation of the path of meditation. Partially, no doubt, this focus on levels of yogic practice above and beyond mere
liberating insight was the result of a kind of academism entering religion, and
the outcome of an ongoing attempt to prove the superiority of the Mahāyāna
path. More fundamental, however, is the different understanding of how the
mechanics of spiritual advancement and mental purification work to remove
defilement at the higher levels.

6.20.2 If the Buddhist model of the path of seeing explains how the basis of
doubt, and all wrong opinion about truth, are removed by coming face to face
with reality, the model of the path of meditation explains the gradual reversal of
bad mental habits. The process is not the startling witness of the path of seeing
(like realizing that a rope is not a poisonous snake), but like washing clothes.
First the gross stains are removed and only at the very end of the process the last
lingering traces of any stain. As in Patañjali’s Yogasūtras (2.34), the stains, and
the paths of meditation which remove them, are characterised as great, middling
and soft. The greatest (i.e., grossest) stain is the first to be removed. Its antidote
is the softest, i.e., least powerful, path of meditation. The last stain to be removed
is the softest (i.e., most subtle), lingering stain. It is the one ingrained most
deeply in the mind and is removed by the greatest path of meditation. The
greatest path of meditation is the last instant before enlightenment, in the
scheme of the AA, the full awakening to all aspects in a single instant (eka-
kṣaṇābhisambodha, §7.7.7) or diamond-like meditative stabilization
(vajropama-samādhi).

6.20.3 Based on this model, the AA champions a reasoned, gradualistic
approach which would enable the yogin or yoginī to complete a sea change in
the mind by slowly washing out all the deeply ingrained propensities left by
previous bad deeds. It implies a corresponding rejection of those Buddhist
soteriologies which stressed the enlightenment experience as a sort of one time
vision of truth, and, to that extent, is determined by the so-called rational force
(la Vallée Poussin 1936).

6.21 In the AA there are a variety of apparently synonymous terms for the
fourth stage of the path, e.g., bhāvanā-patha (1.9) bhāvanā-vartman (1.15)
bhāvanā-mārga (1.22) abhyāsa-mārga (1.71). In the interest of readability all
are rendered ‘path of meditation’ though it is possible that the terms were used
by Maitreya with slightly differing nuances of meaning. The term *abhyaśa-mārga* (‘path of repetitive learning’) is particularly descriptive of the activity at this stage, which essentially entails repeatedly going over what has already been learned. A slight difference between *bhāvanā* and *abhyaśa* is possible.

6.22 The different terms may reflect the earlier stage in the history of the development of path theory mentioned above (§6.19-6.19.3) when the concept of a separate path of meditation after the path of seeing was not yet fully systematized. Or they may, on the other hand, be an anticipation (cf. AA4.53) of the difference between *bhāvanā* (‘meditation’) and *bhāvanāmaya* (‘meditative state of mind’) which Kamalāśīla, in particular, was to stress in his BK.

6.23 The fourth stage, the path of meditation\(^1\) is dealt with explicitly in the AAA in three places:

a) in the last seven of the eleven topics of the second *abhisamaya* (AA2.17-31) where the path of meditation is described from the point of view of its being a cultivation of both the *samvṛti* and *paramārtha* levels of understanding,

b) in the fourth *abhisamaya* (AA4.52-58, W698-720) where it is explained how it removes defilement, and is subdivided into soft, middling and great,

c) and in the fifth *abhisamaya* (AA5.24-34) where the four conceptualizations (each subdivided into nine) which it stops are identified.

Of these three discussions, the second (explicating AA4.52-58, W698.25-720.18) is the most important. It sets forth what is understood by meditation, its divisions (here the same as the Śrāvaka-yāna division into soft, middling and great), and the way in which the path of meditation removes defilement. Maitreya employs the simile of a flame burning its wick to explain how, from a Mādhyamika point of view, obscuration is removed and enlightenment obtained.

[The attainment of full] enlightenment is not joined to the mind which [produced] the first [thought of enlightenment] nor to [the one which produces] the last one. The true nature of dharmas [should be understood]

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\(^1\) AA4.52-53, W698.25-699.14: गम्भीरो भावना-मार्गः, गम्भीरं श्रुत्यातिकृतम्। समारोपणवाचार्य-मुक्तता सा गम्भीरता॥ किल्ला-दुलन-निध्यान्यथीद्वम् भावना-प्रथः। निवृद्धाज्ञेयं दूरं-मार्गं भावना-मार्गं एव\। च॥ See also W22.20-23.1.
in accordance with the simile of a lamp [the wick has not been burned by
the first incidence of the flame, or by the last one, and it is also not burned
without them, and yet the wick has been burned up]. (Translation by Conze
1954a:72.)

6.24 There is also a division of the bad propensities (anusayas) relative to the
path of meditation. Haribhadra’s explanation differs only slightly from that
found at AK5.5 (जल्वारे भावना-देयासु त प्राप्तिष्ठा: पुनः । रूप-धातृ सत्याःत्य इत्यञ्जजनितं मतं: ।
). Vasubandhu says that in the desire realm there are only four bad propensities
that are bhāvanā-heyas (‘to be removed by meditation’) because all [wrong]
opinions and doubt have already been removed by the path of seeing. And in the
upper realms there are only three because, as before, there is also no anger. In
total, therefore, there are ten.

According to Haribhadra (W99.5), however, the path of meditation removes
sixteen bad propensities. There are six in the desire [realm]: attachment, hatred,
pride, ignorance, view of a true body, and view grasping at an extreme. And
there are ten in the form and formless realms: the same ones minus hatred.

6.25 Seven attentions and three realms

The nature of the bhāvanā-mārga in the AAA is difficult to ascertain because
already by the time of Haribhadra different classifications were combined
together into a new, integrated system. It is not, at present, possible to separate
out all the earlier classifications. Two classifications, in particular, are, however,
clear. These are the classification of three realms (dhātu) and the classification
of seven attentions (manaskāras). Both of these, in the AAA, are based on a
particular conception of samatha (‘calm abiding’). These will now be briefly
discussed.

6.26 The three realms is a distinctly Buddhist cosmology that incorporates
the regions of the universe in a way clearly intended to lead the reader,
 inexorably, to the Buddhists’ soteriological conclusions. It explicitly devalues
the yogic attainments of Brahmanical systems, situating the mokṣa of the
Upaniṣads, e.g., (now termed Brahmā-type, brahma-kāyika) at a level that must
be transcended in the attainment of nirvāṇa.
6.26.2 The three realms are the kāma-dhatu, rūpa-dhatu and ārūpya-dhatu. They correspond, roughly
(a) to a region where experience of the five senses dominate
(b) to a region where, after withdrawing from sense experiences, discursive thought (vicāra) and mental pleasure and delight subside into a feeling of balanced calm (AK8.2ab) and
(c) where there is an uninterrupted focus on either space, bare awareness, vacuity or the vacuity of even that vacuity.

There are six celestial paradises above the human realm in the kāma-dhatu. The rūpa-dhatu is sub-divided into four concentrations (dhyāna) and the ārūpya-dhatu into four absorptions (samāpatti). The rūpa-dhatu is again sub-divided into seventeen celestial paradises.\(^1\) The last five of these seventeen regions are called pure areas (suddhāvāsa) and are populated only by Buddhist saints (see chart §9.3).

The borders between the realms are mental, not geographical, and mental yoga practice is the vehicle which journeys across them.

6.27 Application of the techniques of calm abiding or quietude meditation (cf. §7.7ff) comprises the first part of the practice which carries one from realm to realm. As with the theory of three realms, śamatha meditation (a practice underpinning the theory of the seven attentions, manaskāra), is defined in a way that implicitly relegates Brahmanical mokṣa to the status of a mere common heritage and unspectacular yogic feat.

6.27.2 In the practice of śamatha, one cultivates a meditative state of mind by restraining discursive thought and tying the mind to a single object of contemplation, leading to a state where the mind rests in an effortless clear contemplation of its object. The ninefold process is mentioned briefly in the AS (Rahula 1971:126) and summarized clearly in MSA: 14.11-16:

[1] Having fastened the mind on an objective support, one should not waver in penetrating it. [2] When wavering is noticed one should immediately draw back to that objective support again. A wise person

\(^1\) AS (Rahula 1971:112, n.4) and AK3.2 (la Vallée Poussin 1923-31:3.2).
should [3] withdraw the mind more and more within itself. Then, seeing the virtue in samādhi, one should [4] tame one’s mind. Seeing the faults in distraction one should [5] quell dislike for this practice of samādhi. Similarly one should [6] quell longing, displeasure and so forth as they arise. Then the restrained one should obtain [7] free-flowing samādhi in his or her mind through volitional effort, and then, by repeated habituation to that, [8] without volitional effort. Then, having attained a modicum of physical and mental pliancy, one should be aware that one is attentive. Increasing this, by developing it for a long period of time, one attains [9] a fundamental stability.

6.27.3 When "fundamental stability," i.e., samatha, is finally attained one is located in the rūpa-dhatu, just over the border, as it were, from the kāma-dhatu. From here begins each of the journeys to each of the higher regions. That is to say, one begins from a state of fundamental mental stability, passes through waves of potential mental disturbance, and then recaptures the same fundamental mental stability at a ‘geographically’ higher level. The waves are stirred up when, in the practice of cultivating insight (vipaśyanā), one brings to mind the horrors and delights of progressively inferior and superior regions, respectively.

6.28 This secondary practice of paying attention to the grossness (literally, ‘to do with the stomach’ audarika) and delights (literally, ‘peaceful’ śānta) aspects is located in a region associated with, or neighbouring on (sāmantaka) the concentration itself. Each of the fundamental (maula) eight concentrations (dhyāna) and absorptions (samāpatti) has such an associated preparatory region (AK8.22).

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On the journey from the first attainment of \textit{samatha} to, e.g., the 'center' of the (i.e., \textit{maula}) first concentration one pays attention (\textit{manaskāra}) to the \textit{kleśas} and general sufferings of the \textit{kāma-dhātu}, on the one hand, and the paradisaical qualities of the first concentration, on the other.

According to the \textit{Śrāvaka-bhūmi} (quoted and translated by Hopkins et al. 1983:148), the journey from the border to the regained fundamental stability at the center of each concentration, or absorption, passes through seven stages, each called an attention (\textit{manaskāra}). These stages are summarized in the AS (Rahula 1971:112)


The seventh \textit{manaskāra} is the resultant fundamental concentration itself (AAPdon:151ab, Hopkins 1983:150-52). All seven are preceded by \textit{samatha} which, in this context in the \textit{Śrāvaka-bhūmi} (Shukla 1973:284), is called \textit{manaskārādi-karmika}, i.e., when one initially pays attention.

6.28.2 In the course of these seven stages one removes nine \textit{bhāvanā-heyas}, which, in the practice of the first concentration, e.g., are, in essence, the craving for sense gratification that causes birth in the \textit{kāma-dhātu}. There is therefore a ninefold division of this path (see chart §9.5). Each of the nine divisions corresponds to the removal of one of the \textit{bhāvanā-heyas}. To distinguish it from both the Mahāyāna and the Hinayāna paths of meditation Tibetan scholastics call this an ordinary path of meditation (‘jig rten gyi sgom lam).

The sub-division of the Buddhist path of meditation into nine first begins to appear in the \textit{Śrāvaka-bhūmi}'s idea of seven attentions (\textit{manaskāras}, Shukla

109
1973:439), then (as in the AK) in juxtaposition with the nine levels (i.e., the kāma-dhātu, four dhyānas and four samāpattis) of the three realms and, finally, in the AA and AAA in juxtaposition with the nine conceptualizations.

6.28.3 Both Maitreya (e.g., in his identification of the twenty Ārya Saṃgha AA1.23-4), and Haribhadra (W99.5, etc.) presuppose, on the part of their readers, a familiarity with this ordinary path of meditation and the process which gradually removes its nine bhāvanā-heyas. The process, which is similar to that outlined above in regard to the proximate liberation and penetration (§6.10-11) is as follows.

Within the attainment of śamatha, the mind first turns to the work of attaining a higher concentration or absorption (the ādikarmika stage). The knowledge that pays attention to the general and then the more specific, characteristic (lakṣaṇa) faults and virtues of the lower and higher levels, respectively, first causes waves of mental disturbance. This knowledge gradually transforms from being a cause of disturbance into an intensely sharpened and focused stable insight (vipāśyanā). While this insight is still at the hearing (śrutamayī) and thinking (cintāmayī) stage, one has yet to reach the stage of ādhimokṣika, i.e., meditative (bhāvanāmayī) wisdom that comes from learning and contemplation (adhimokṣa, ‘belief’ refers, in this context, to śrūta and cintāmayī wisdoms; cf. La Vallée Poussin 1923-31:2.325, §8.5). The completed wisdom is a unified śamatha and insight (śamatha-vipāśyanā-yuganaddha) capable of blocking the first three of the nine bhāvanā-heyas which cause birth in, e.g., the kāma-dhātu.

The prāvivikta-manaskāra stops the first three bhāvanā-heyas. It is therefore called "an attentive state separated from [the bhāvanā-heyas. which cause birth, e.g., in the kāma-dhātu]" (Hopkins 1983:102). Similarly, the sort of attention that stops the middle three bhāvanā-heyas is called rati-saṅgrāhaka. A Tibetan explanation (Hopkins and Lati Rinbochay 1983:92-115), possibly based on an oral tradition originating in India, understands the compound as a dvandva: ‘an attentive state of joy and withdrawal.’ ‘Withdrawal’ is said to refers to the stage of the unhindered path (ānantarya-mārga) which blocks the bhāvanā-heya. ‘Joy’ refers to the path of deliverance (vimukti-mārga, §6.12) that gives freedom from them.
At this stage the yogin or yogini mistakenly feels that all bhāvanā-heyas have been removed (compare the comment on the forbearance stage of the proximate penetration). On investigation (by being a mīmāṃsaka) he or she finds that three subtle bhāvanā-heyas remain to be removed. The final practice (prayoga-niṣṭha) removes these three, leading to the result of the final practice (prayoga-niṣṭha-phala) the resultant fundamental (maula) concentration itself.

6.29 There is both a similarity and difference between the nine bhāvanā-heyas removed by the practice of the seven manaskāras, and the nine bhāvanā-heyas removed by the Hīnayāna path of meditation. A conflation of the two seems to have occurred.

6.29.2 In the system set forth in the AK, although the cultivation of a special, uniquely Buddhist insight into the four truths is required to stop the final bhāvanā-heya (the soft soft) associated with the highest absorption, Śrāvakas (depending on personality type) can suppress all the bhāvanā-heyas, up to and including the middling soft, by applying the quietude and insight meditation technique set forth in the teaching of the seven manaskāras. That this can be done even before attaining the path of seeing is clear from the description of the Śrāvaka Non-returner (anāgāmin, AA23-24, §7.9.3).

6.29.3 One understanding of the bhāvanā-heyas (AK5.5-6) is as follows: The first bhāvanā-heya removed by the Hīnayāna path of meditation is equal to all nine bhāvanā-heyas removed by the practice of the seven manaskāras of the first concentration. The second is equal to the nine bhāvanā-heyas removed by the practice of the seven manaskāras of the second concentration, and so on (see chart §9.4).

Associated with each of the nine levels of the three realms, then, is a bhāvanā-heya. Each of these nine is again sub-divided into nine (the nine bhāvanā-heyas associated with the seven attentions) for a total of eighty-one.

6.30 A second understanding, however, focuses on the final bhāvanā-heya (the soft soft) associated with the highest absorption, the Summit of Existence (bhavāgra). It is sub-divided into nine in the usual fashion. These nine subdivisions prevent the Śrāvaka from transcending the world and, when removed, give release from saṁsāra. Since it cannot be transcended by the practice of the
seven attentions, and is seen to prevent the Śrāvaka from transcending the world, it is identified as the bhāvanā-heya removed by the Hīnayāna path of meditation. The meditative technique to remove these most subtle of all hindrances to the highest religious goal appears, in the AK, to be the same horror and delight technique associated with the seven manaskāras. The meditator considers the grossness of the first two of the four noble truths (suffering and its cause) and the peacefulness of the last two (cessation and the path which attains it).

The last of the ninefold sub-division of the soft soft can be totally extirpated only by the the diamond-like meditative stabilization (vajropama-samādhi).

6.30.2 The practice of the seven manaskāras consists in paying attention to the shortcomings of, e.g., (a) the kāma-dhātu or (b) first noble truths on the one hand, and (a) the excellence of the higher concentration or (b) nirvāṇa, on the other. Gradually one’s attraction to the lower slackens and attraction to the higher increases. Since it is a fundamental tenet of Buddhism that all three realms are equally unattractive, and in the nature of suffering (sarva-saṁskāra duḥkhāḥ), this practice is already in the AK somewhat disparaged and associated with persons whose intellects are soft (mrdvindriya). The aim of the Buddhist yogin or yoginī should be liberation, not from rebirth in a lower realm of existence, but from saṁsāra in its entirety. To effect this, one must meditate on a single, all embracing truth.

It is also apparent that based on this practice of the seven manaskāras alone one would be unable to transcend the highest ordinary level, the Summit of Existence, and would have to rely on a superior (ārya) path of meditation to do so.

6.30.3 In the AK, there is some ambiguity. The process of understanding the four truths is not entirely unlike the process of paying attention to gross and peaceful aspects of the lower and higher realms, respectively, and there is still scope for gradual removal of stains associated with different realms.¹

¹ Cf. Schmithausen (1981:218, 222), whose comments on an earlier stratum of Buddhist literature perhaps partially explain this ambiguity.
6.30.4 In Mahāyāna texts like the AA and AAA, however, all stains are removed simultaneously. The sub-divisions of the bhāvanā-heyas lose all connection with the three realms and are connected with the conceptualizations. According to the Mahāyāna explanation found in both the AA and AAA (AA4.54, W701.22-708) the Bodhisattva’s path of meditation, in the first instant, removes the cycle of ‘great-great stains’ (adhimātrādhimātra-mala/vikalpa) across the whole spectrum of existence, in every realm. It is an antidote to the ‘great-great’ (adhimātrādhimātra) bhāvanā-heya of the desire realm, of each of the four concentrations and of the four absorptions.

This explanation, perhaps the reformulation of an earlier system, is an outcome of the new Mahāyāna understanding of dharma-nairatmya which both equalizes, and devalues somewhat, all religious attainments.

6.31 The extensive explanation of the Bodhisattva levels (AA1.48-70) is an expansion on the paths of seeing and meditation (see chart §9.6). Its importance in the first chapter of the AA has already been mentioned (§3.11.2).

The first level and the path of seeing are coterminous. In a different scheme of the levels the earlier stages of the path, i.e., proximate liberation and penetration, can also be located on a level (the adhimukti-caryā-bhūmi, §6.8) but neither Maitreya nor Haribhadra refer to it at this point.

6.32 The levels

The context for Maitreya’s long discussion is the sixteenth of the seventeen subdivisions of the course in accumulations (§7.9.8). The course in accumulations, it will be recalled, is the ninth of the ten topics which figure in the explanation of the knower of all aspects. Maitreya does not name each of the levels, as Haribhadra does, but lumps the first nine levels together as the Bodhisattva level and gives only the tenth Bodhisattva level a special name, ‘Buddha level’ (AA70).

Having passed through nine levels, that wisdom which establishes [the Bodhisattva] on the Buddha level is to be known as the Bodhisattva’s tenth level.

In Pañca:225.15 (cf. AAV:107.3-13), there is a list of ten levels with names borrowed from the Hīnayāna. ‘Bodhisattva level’ and ‘Buddha level’ are the
last two in this list. It is possible that Maitreya had in mind these ten Pañca levels when he set forth the long lists of purifications (parikarma), and that the names are used, like the names for the Ārya Saṃgha (AA23-24), to exemplify corresponding Bodhisattva levels. Lamotte (Mpps:2377, 2379-81) relates the names in the Pañca to the following stages of the Mahāyāna path:

*gotra-bhūmi* 'lineage level' = the sixth Bodhisattva level
*astamaka-bhūmi* 'level of the eighth' = the seventh Bodhisattva level
*darsana-bhūmi* 'level of seeing' = the eighth Bodhisattva level
*tanū-bhūmi* 'weak level' = the eighth and ninth Bodhisattva levels
*vītarāga-bhūmi* 'level free of desire' = the ninth Bodhisattva level
*kṛtāvi-bhūmi* 'level of the realized' = tenth Bodhisattva level
*pratyeka-buddha-bhūmi* = the level of one who planted the seed for enlightenment in the previous life and attains enlightenment in this life
*bodhisattva-bhūmi* = all ten Bodhisattva levels
*buddha-bhūmi* = state of being knower of all aspects.

6.32.2 Haribhadra does not interpret them in that manner, however (W104.3-11). He relates the ten levels with the ten perfections (pāramitā), i.e., the six perfections and a further four perfections understood as a subdivision of the sixth perfection of wisdom (W25.24-26.7, W99.11-104.16, see chart §9.7).

According to Haribhadra (W98.12-13) the levels "are stages (avasthā) of realization by [a Bodhisattva] who has [accumulated powers of] retention insofar as they are the basis of ever higher attainment, and foundation for the qualities that they engender." Each higher level is reached by means of purifications (parikarma). Until the purifications of any one level are completed, it is that level. When the purifications for a level are complete one passes to the next level. Both Maitreya and Haribhadra stress that these parikarmas "are a purification when they do not rest on own-being as an objective support" (AA1.48-50). In other words, when Bodhisattvas have cultivated on the surface level, and also learned not to settle on, having "an equal thought in respect to all beings, abandoning [a sense of mine], serving spiritual friends, seeking the support of the good dharma, always having a renounced mind, etc.,," they reach the first level. Its attainment is simultaneous with the attainment of the path of seeing. When they have cultivated on the surface level,
and also learned not to settle on, "morality, gratitude, forbearance, joy, great compassion, respect, attentiveness to one's gurus, and enthusiasm for giving, etc." (AA1.51) they reach the second level and the path of meditation.

The last three Bodhisattva levels form a group which Haribhadra usually refers to by the collective name višeṣa-mārga (‘special path’). They are also called ‘pure levels’ (Tib dag pa'i sa gsum). The special qualification of these levels is the complete absence of all klesas. There remain only the obscurations to knowledge (jñeyāvaraṇa) which are to be removed (Obermiller 1932-33:57).

6.33 The diamond-like meditative stabilization, on the tenth Bodhisattva level, removes the final hindrances to the attainment of the state of being a knower of all aspects. When that state is finally achieved, the yogin or yoginī is on the fifth and final path, the path where learning is finished (aśāikṣa-mārga). Altruistic activity issues forth spontaneously from a state of natural liberation, and the spiritual path is complete.
7.1 Here the uncommon terminology used in the AAA to describe the stages in the development of the path is set forth and explained. This terminology describes eight ‘clear realizations’ (abhisamayas) each of which is then subdivided to give a further seventy topics. This terminology was first standardized in the AA. Though used in works of the later PP commentarial tradition (§4.12), and in texts on the PP written in Tibetan (§4.12.7), it did not gain as wide a circulation as did the terminology for describing stages on the path set forth in the previous chapter (§6.7ff).

A brief description of the eight clear realizations (abhisamayas) has already been given (§2.15). In this chapter they are set forth in greater detail. Following that there is an explanation of the first ten of the seventy topics, i.e., those topics explained in the first chapter of the AAA. Two issues are taken up for a more detailed discussion: (a) the eighth clear realization, the dharma-kāya (‘body of truths’) and (b) the third topic, the members of the Ārya Sarīghha. I have discussed the dharma-kāya in more detail because an investigation of the ways Ārya Vimuktisena and Haribhadra approach the topic sheds light on their understanding of the relationship between the ultimate and surface levels of truth. The Ārya Sarīghha is discussed in more detail because, without such detail, readers will not be able to understand Haribhadra’s brief explanation.

7.2 First, in regard to the eight clear realizations, the different meanings of the term are discussed elsewhere (§8.1). The disagreement about whether there are seven or eight clear realizations taught in the AA is merely about whether Maitreya emphasizes a particular aspect of the Buddha kāya in AA8, not a disagreement about whether he teaches Buddha kāyas in general, so discussion of it can be left until later (§7.8.5, §8.1.5).

7.3 Unlike the text itself, the AA homage begins, not with the Buddha’s state of being knower of all aspects, but with the perfect wisdom that leads Śrāvakas to nirvāṇa. This is the first of the three states of being knower, the sarvajñatā (‘state of omniscience’ ‘state of being knower of all’), which Maitreya praises as one dimension of the Mother PP in the opening lines of the AA.
Homage to the Mother ... which, as the state of being knower of all, leads Śrāvakas seeking peace to tranquility.

The Śrāvakas (‘Hearers’), born of the state of being knower of all, are the followers of Śākya-muni who, according to Mahāyāna writers, are incapable of following the Bodhisattvas’ path. By characterizing them as ‘seeking peace’ there is an oblique reference to the Rhinos (khadga; AA1.7, 1.26, 1.67), Maitreya’s name for Pratyeka-buddhas, who, rhinocerous-like, shun company and seek solitude.

7.3.2 Śrāvakas and Rhinos are only slightly differentiated (AA2.6-8, W156-165). परोपदेश-वैयर्थ्यं स्वयं-वैधातु स्वयं-पुर्वोऽ || सम्प्रेक्षणां च श्राण प्रकारणामु० संसारिको || चुरूस्वातः यवः यशायां यस्त यद यथा यथा। संस्कृत्य: ब्याघ्रणुपीपि तस्य तस्य तथा तथा। प्राधुर्य-क्लप्पना-ह्यानातृ ग्राहकस्मातः || माहाराजाः च विश्वेषं ब्यूङ्ग-मानस्य संग्रहः। || They thus differ in three ways: (a) Rhinos do not need a teacher nearby when they attain nirvāṇa, (b) they are able to communicate without words, and, (c) most important, "they forsake the construction, in thought, of objective entities but do not forsake the [belief in a] subject" (Conze 1954a:33).

7.4 The third chapter of the AA and AAA explains the state of being knower of all actualized by Bodhisattvas. This, Haribhadra explains, is perfect wisdom that understands the four noble truths:¹ the truth of suffering, of its cause, its cessation and the path to gaining its cessation.

A distinction must be drawn between the state of being knower of all mentioned first in the homage (§2.9, §7.3) and the state of being knower of all which is the subject of chapter three. The former is not the omniscience that defines a Buddha, but merely the wisdom that leads Śrāvakas to nirvāṇa. The third chapter is given over to making clear the difference between the Śrāvaka’s state of being knower of all and the particular practice of the state of being knower of all that is part of the Bodhisattva’s path.

Describing the difference between the Bodhisattva’s understanding of the four truths and the Śrāvakas understanding, Haribhadra says (W18.25-26),

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¹ AA4.1-2 (translated by Conze 1956:49) बस्तु-स्नान-प्रकारणावर्ग भालारण इति लक्षणम् || स्वपत्तांहृ तेन भृविधार्थते एव ते मतः। ॥ कस्तोधारारूप सारस्य यावद् निन्दलतिकृति। ॥ जलारः प्रति-सत्यं ते मार्ग पवित्रं स्नृतं: ||
"[The Bodhisattva] state of being knower of all is not stationed in [worldly] existence because of [its special] wisdom, nor in tranquility because of [its special] compassion," and (AA3.1-2, W413-15) "the [Bodhisattva’s] PP is not on the further shore [of nirvāṇa], nor on this [shore of saṁsāra] ... It remains distant [from the Śrāvakas] because of [the Śrāvakas’] lack of method" (Conze1954a:44). ¹

The practice of the state of being knower of all comprises sixteen aspects (ākāra) corresponding to sixteen ways to contemplate the four noble truths. Each aspect is the opposite of a mistaken opinion (AARgyan:251-3, Obermiller 1933-6:323-4 n.1).

The first four mistaken opinions about the truth of suffering believe that the aggregates are a) permanent, b) well, c) clean and d) possessed by a real person. The four sorts of meditation, which are antidotes to these, cultivate the understanding that the aggregates are a) impermanent (AA4.2a), b) painful, c) horrid and d) selfless. There are an additional four sorts of meditation for each of the other three truths. Each of these sorts of meditation is cultivated until it replaces the mistaken opinion. When a meditation is perfected, the state of being a state of being knower of all ensues.

7.4.2 In the detailed presentation of the practice of the state of being knower of all (AA4.2d) fifteen additional aspects of the fourth noble truth, the truth of the path, are mentioned, for a total of twenty-seven. The fifteen aspects are only an expansion, however, on the four basic sorts of meditation on the truth of the path. ‘Impermanence, etc.’ (anityādi), a frequent abbreviation in the AA (e.g., 1.27a and 1.28d) is expanded, as Obermiller (1932-33:18) and la Vallée Poussin (1923-31:7.31-33 explaining AK7.13a) show, only to the sixteen ākāras.

7.5 The second clear realization is the state of being knower of paths. It is praised in the homage as:

the Mother ... which, as the state of being knower of the paths of those who work for the benefit of the world, is accomplisher of the aims of the masses.

¹ नर्मदे न परे तीरे (नान्तराले तयोः) स्थिता । अध्ययनं सम्बन्ध-वातानं प्रवाह-पारितम् मद्या ॥ अनुपावेन दूरं सा [स-निमित्तोपल्म्बत: । उपाय-कौशलेनास्या: सम्प्रयु-अस्यन्तोदिता ॥]
This is the same state of being knower of paths described in the second chapter. Those who "work for the benefit of the world" are Bodhisattvas. The word Bodhisattva refers to a deep substratum of mind, or even absence of mind, in a person practicing the PP. This deep substratum, or absence, is the locus of the person, and to that extent also, the person himself or herself. In the AA the Bodhisattva is more tangible than the amorphous and unfindable Bodhisattva of the A.¹

7.5.2 The difference between Bodhisattvas and Šrāvakas is that the former cultivate (or are) the wisdom which "accomplishes the aims of the world," while the latter are content with attaining nirvāna.

The Bodhisattva’s wisdom consists in experiential knowledge of all paths: the paths of the Šrāvakas, Rhinos and Bodhisattvas. It is not, however, necessarily a state of transcendental wisdom with an objective content different from the state of being knower of all. The state of being knower of paths also understands the four noble truths. Indeed, it must know them, but not as the Šrāvakas do.

The state of being knower of paths is explained by showing how the Bodhisattva’s great compassion (mahā-krpa) and understanding of emptiness develop on the higher and higher stages of the path.² First the necessary psychological state for the presence of altruism, the defining characteristic of a Mahāyāna path, is set forth in terms of five factors. Then the proximate penetrations (nirvedha-bhāgiya, §6.10) of the Šrāvakas and Pratyeka-buddhas, which the Bodhisattva has to learn, and the Bodhisattva’s own path of seeing

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¹ Maitreya glosses Bodhisattva by protector (tāyin), e.g., at AA1.25, but the Bodhisattva is still strangely non-existent. In the A (W75.23-28) we read:

"When this had been said, friend Subhūti addressed the Lord: Lord, you say, "These, Subhūti, are to be known as the spiritual friends of a great Bodhisattva who is armed with the great armour, gone forth to the Mahāyāna and mounted upon the Mahāyāna." And you speak of "a great Bodhisattva," Lord. There, what is the meaning of the word "Bodhisattva?""

When this had been said the Lord replied to friend Subhūti: Subhūti, the meaning of the word "Bodhisattva" is nothing."

² For a detailed explanation of the five stages of the path: the sanbhāra-, prayoga-, darśana-, bhāvanā- and asaikṣa-mārga see §6.8ff.
The difference between the two sorts of understanding is explained in terms of the presence or absence of a special understanding (prajñā) and method (upāya). The Bodhisattvas’ method, to keep themselves from being led by the state of being knower of all (sarvajñata) into Hīnayāna nirvāṇa, is production of an [altruistic] mind (cittotpāda). This is a deeply felt wish to attain the state of a Buddha in order to help all others attain liberation (§7.9.2). The Bodhisattva’s wisdom is understanding that all dharmas lack own-being (dharma-nairātmya).

The Śrāvaka method, on the other hand, (or lack of it, from the point of view of Mahāyāna) is a mere revulsion for worldly life. This revulsion, like the Bodhisattvas’ production of an altruistic mind, is what motivates the Śrāvaka to undertake the austerities and yogic practices which lead to personal liberation.

The Śrāvaka sense of revulsion (nirveda, niḥsaraṇa, udvega) is first met with, in early Mahāyāna sūtras like the Lalita-vistara, in a quasi-mythological form as the Buddha’s "great renunciation."

This sense of renunciation is well known through its iconographic representation as the handsome Prince Siddhārtha, accompanied only by his servant, glancing back as he leaves his young wife and only son to seek the path to enlightenment. To what extent Indian writers incorporated this sense of revulsion, in a technical sense, into the path structure is unclear since it was for them, no doubt, one of the presuppositions bequeathed by a long tradition of forest-dwelling asceticism. Statements like that by Ārya-deva in his Catuhṣatakā, however, that one who does not shudder at the world has no interest in the religious activity which removes one from it would nevertheless suggest that considerable thought was given, at least to the psychological implications of such a state of mind.

1 Skt cited by Lang p. 609: उद्वेगो यथाय नास्तीतः भक्तिः तत्रय तुलयातां हि शिवे।
7.5.5 Tibetan disciples of Atiśa, and particularly the Bka' gdam pa and their spiritual heir Tsongkha pa, assigned a distinctly technical meaning to this sense of revulsion. They explained the many canonical passages in the Nikāyas setting forth, at length, the miseries of the world, the uselessness of worldly pleasure, the pointlessness of attaining celestial states, rottenness of the body, etc., as specific meditative instruction related to this initial practice which they called nges 'byung sems 'the thought which is the means whereby one emerges [from sorrow].' They defined it as an intense wish for personal freedom and identified it as the method (thabs, upāya) of the Śrāvaka path. It was similar in conception to the production of an altruistic mind (cittotpāda), the Bodhisattva's motivation, with the priviso that the former only motivated the yogin or yoginī to achieve a personal deliverance, while the latter motivated the Bodhisattva to save the entire world.

7.5.6 According to Maitreya (A4.3, W449.23-452.13), the practice of the Bodhisattvas' state of being knower of paths, motivated by the altruistic thought to save the entire world, comprises 36 modes of meditation: तेहो मार्ग च दुःखे च निरोधे च यथाज्ञाम्। भक्ति ते सप्त प्रकृतियोऽवेदित च कीर्तिता:। Each of these a) focuses on the four noble truths, b) is an antidote to an obscuration (āvaraṇa), and c) is, in essence, a meditation on emptiness. Each sort of meditation equally understands that all dharmas lack own-being (dharma-nairatmya), and each surpasses the fourth of the sixteen sorts of Śrāvaka meditation, on the selfless aggregate (pudgala-nairatmya). Unlike the Śrāvaka sort of meditation, which has the capacity only to remove harmful obscuration (klesāvaraṇa), the sorts of meditation a Bodhisattva engages in can also remove obstructions to omniscience (jñeyāvaraṇa). And yet even this, the Bodhisattva understands, is all mental construct and ultimately false. As it says in one of the finer passages of the AA:

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1 See, e.g., Tsongkha pa's Lam gso rnam gsum, where nges 'byung sems is described as the first of the three principal religious practices.

2 AA5.18-21, W879.29-885.18. The translation is based on Conze (1954a:85-86); also see AARgyan:495ff. The reading jātaṁ 18d is based on Tib rnam rtog rigs. A verse almost identical to AA5.21 is found in Uttaratantra 4.20; see Ruegg (1969:333-4), Lindner (1981:176 n.58).
Knowledge of the extinction and non-production of defilements is called enlightenment. But one should understand these two through the non-existence of extinction and production, respectively. Given that there is no cessation of fundamental nature, how can a false discrimination type be extinguished by something called the path of seeing, or how could it come to be unproduced? I am amazed that others should say of dharmas that they exist, and of the Teacher [Buddha], that obscurations to knowledge have been exinquished. For there is nothing to be taken away and there is nothing to be put there. One should see the real from the point of view of reality. One who sees reality is liberated.

7.6 Wisdom which is perfect in every respect is *sarvākāraṇajñata* (‘state of being a knower of all aspects’). It is wisdom unique to a Buddha. Practice of it (AA4.4-5) comprises 110 sorts of meditation and, like the Bodhisattva’s wisdom, it does not differ in terms of objective content. It also knows the four noble truths and their emptinesses. This wisdom differs from the Śrāvaka’s and Bodhisattva’s wisdoms, however, insofar as its knowledge of any one *ākāra* is equally the knowledge of all others (AA7.1-5). This is because understanding is not blocked by either of the two obscurations (AA5.18). And the state of being knower of all aspects is alone the wisdom that lies behind the vast Buddha revelation. To that extent it is the Mother of all Ārya beings: the Śrāvakas, Bodhisattvas and Buddhas, and it alone is the foremost object of Maitreya’s homage (quoted §2.9; also see note to Skt text W1.7-10).

The *sarvākāraṇajñata* described in the first chapter of the AAA is the same as the omniscience praised as the foremost Mother in the homage. The ten topics which figure in the description of this state of being a knower of all aspects are dealt with in detail below (§7.9-7.9.8).

7.6.2 The term *sarvajñata* is not found in the A. Instead one finds there *sarvajñata* with a meaning different from the AA and AAA. In the systematized later texts we have seen that this latter term refers to the restricted knowledge of
Sravaka and Pratyeka-buddhas, but in the A it refers to the omniscient Buddha-mind itself. The term sarvākārajñatā, the term for omniscient Buddha-mind in the AA, is a product of the later systematization introduced into the PP by the Yogācāra school (Mano 1970). In the A, this later term is conspicuous by its absence. In the Mahā-prajñā-pāramitā-sāstra (=Ta chih tu lun) an early encyclopedic commentary on PP, much of which has been translated by Lamotte (Mpps 1949-1980), the difference between the sarvajñatā and sarvākārajñatā is understood in terms of rough and subtle knowledge, the former "an all-inclusive understanding which is rough and gross" (Ramanan 1966:288-299). The sarvākārajñatā was synonymous, at a relatively early stage in its development, with knowledge of things as they are (yathārtha-jñāna), exemplified by the merging of the different knowledges into a single all-embracing knowledge, like rivers into the sea (Ramanan 1966:290). Even this is missing from the A. The ten topics which figure in the description of the state of being a knower of all aspects are dealt with in detail below (§7.9).

7.7 The four practices

The full awakening to all aspects (sarvākārābhisaṃbodha) and peaked clear realization (mūrdhābhisaṃaya) are the first two of the four practices (pratipatti). They are taught in the fourth and fifth chapters, respectively. The practice of awakening to all aspects, taught in the fourth abhisamaya, begins at a less advanced stage of the path. It is described, initially, by way of 173 aspects (these have been given in brief outline by Obermiller 1933-6:321-26, and Conze 1954a:49). Then the hindrances to practicing the PP, the defining characteristics (laksana) of the practice of the PP, the form of its practice on higher and higher stages on the path and the sorts of Bodhisattva who are practicing the PP are set forth.

In regard to the 173 aspects (ākāra) of the practice. These are the 27 sorts of meditation leading to the state of being knower of all, 36 sorts of meditation leading to the state of being knower of paths and 110 sorts of meditation leading to the state of being knower of all aspects. These aspects have been given in a helpful brief outline by Obermiller (1933-6:321-26) and Conze (1954a:49). Each has a surface dimension (sāṃvyṛtī) and an ultimate vacuity. The practices
include those done by Śrāvakas, those done by Pratyeka-buddhas and those which are unique to the Bodhisattva and attainment of perfect enlightenment.

7.7.2 Initially yogins or yoginīs, whether Bodhisattvas or Śrāvakas, attain a proper understanding of impermanence from listening to an explanation from a qualified teacher. Their understanding is at the stage of being arisen from hearing (śrutamaya, for a separate explanation of these terms see §8.5). Second, by research and discussion, they broaden and deepen their understanding to the point where it becomes authoritative (pramāṇa). Their understanding now reaches the stage of being arisen from thinking (cintāmaya). Third, by application of the techniques of calm abiding or quietude meditation (śamatha, §6.27) they cultivate a state of deep introspection that is intimately familiar with all dimensions of mortality and change. At this stage their understanding, which is spontaneous and natural, has reached the stage of being arisen from meditation (bhāvanāmaya). This completes the first of two parts of the practice: the realization of the surface dimension. It takes place at a low level of the path.

The second, and from the point of view of explanation in the fourth and fifth chapters of the AAA, more important part of the practice, is the penetration to the emptiness of the realization. This again unfolds in the same three stages; first, based on listening to a qualified teacher, the yogins or yoginīs gain an understanding of the fact that mortality is no more than a mental construct and hence empty of any ultimate truth. This is the stage of a hearing realization of emptiness focused on impermanence. They again research and investigate their understanding, and, when it becomes authoritative, it is at the stage of being arisen from thinking. Then, again applying the techniques of quietude meditation, they cultivate a state of deep introspection which brings their understanding of the emptiness of impermanence to the stage of being arisen from meditation. This practice is similar to the practice of the seven attentions (manaskāra, §6.28).

7.7.3 The difference between the first and second practices described in the AAA, between full awakening to all aspects and peaked clear realization (i.e., 'practice which has attained the summits'), is just this. When the surface dimension of impermanence is fully realized, and the emptiness of that realization cultivated to the stage of being arisen from meditation
(bhāvanāmaya), the deepest inner point, or culmination of the meditation has been reached. The meditation converges, as it were, on meditation on the ultimate.

7.7.4 The practice of awakening to all aspects, taught in the fourth chapter, begins at a less advanced stage of the path but does not necessarily exclude the practice of the peaked clear realization taught in the fifth chapter. Even after the attainment of a meditative state understanding the emptiness of one aspect, e.g., impermanence, the meditations on other aspects may be at a lower level of completion. When cultivating the realization of the emptiness of impermanence, a practice would be defined as peaked. But, if realization of the emptiness of, e.g., anātman was still not at the bhāvanāmaya stage, when cultivating that understanding a practice would be defined as full awakening to all aspects.

In describing the mūrdhābhisamaya, therefore, Haribhadra again describes the practice at the same higher and higher stages of the path. Particular emphasis is placed on the fourth stage, the path of meditation, and the removal of the four sorts of vikalpa (‘bad conceptualizations’) which are the primary obscuring factors discussed in the AAA.

7.7.5 The final aim of the AA’s four practices is the attainment of the state of being knower of all aspects. At the stage of practice, knowledge of the various sorts of meditation is fragmented. When the surface dimension of impermanence is in focus, the non-external existence of objects within the subject-object bifurcation is not; when the emptiness of the person is realized, the surface dimension of a person disappears. In order to overcome the deep propensity in the mind, which causes this distortion and limitation of the cognitive faculties, the yogin or yogini must engage in a serial (ānupūrvika) and interlinking¹ practice wherein a greater and greater facility to enter a state of mind, and leave it for another, is cultivated side by side with the ability to alternate between surface levels of reality and the deeper ultimate level. This practice, called ānupūrvikābhisamaya (‘serial clear realization’), is the topic of the sixth

¹ Tib spel ma sgom = miśraka-bhāvanā which seems to be the meaning of sirha-vijrmbhta at AA5.23-25 (W888-889); cf. Pañca:70-71.
chapter. It describes the work of the Bodhisattva from its very inception (though initially it would be very coarse and hardly recognizable as such a practice) and it continues until the penultimate moment, just before final complete enlightenment.

7.7.6 The very last moment before complete enlightenment, just the moment itself, is the *ekakṣaṇābhisairbodha* ('full awakening in a single instant'). It is the practice described in the very short seventh chapter\(^1\) and is the substantial cause of the state of being knower of all aspects and the eliminator of the final distorting propensity. After it, the mind will no longer be prevented from beholding, at one and the same time, like a huge reflecting mirror, all of surface reality and all the ultimate emptiness that lies behind. Maitreya himself (AA7.2, W909.26-910.1) describes the AA’s highest practice as follows:

\[\text{मरप्रू पैका पदिका पूर्वेिता। सन्दूि सब चतुर्विंत स्नान्यो एक-क्षणे तथा॥}
\]

Just as, when a machine for raising water\(^2\) from a well is driven along by a person at just one point, it is simultaneously moved along in its totality; so also all gnosis [is activated by this awakening] in one single instant.

(Translation based on Conze 1954a:94.)

7.7.7 By having linked all the 173 meditations together in the converging meditation on the ultimate, and by having cultivated a mind which is perfectly flexible and pliant, the yogin or yoginī attains, at this last moment of the path, a state where just bringing any topic to mind stirs the deepest reaches of his or her soul in an awakening to all aspects of reality. After this the practitioner never again arises from a meditation to some less exalted state of awareness, but remains in a natural state of omniscience. This state of all-knowing is described as a body of truths (*dharma-kāya*). It is the result of the four practices and the topic of the last chapter.

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\(^1\) The *ekakṣaṇābhisairbodha* reminds one of the ‘deliverer’ (*taraka*) *samādhi* (*Yoga-sūtra* 3.54) which immediately precedes *kaivalya* in Patanjalī’s system. It too has all things and all times for its object and is without sequence (Woods 1966:xl).

\(^2\) Galloway (1988:143, n.16) says that an *arghaṭṭa* is probably a rope with pots attached at different lengths and lowered into a well to draw out water. He conjectures that *padikā* means ‘pedal.’
7.8 The dharma-kāya

The dharma-kāya is the eighth clear realization according to Haribhadra. It is the rubric under which Maitreya discusses the fruit of the Mahāyāna path, and he does so in terms of Buddha kāyas (‘collections’, ‘bodies’ or ‘substrata’).

7.8.2 In earlier Buddhist canonical literature, there is a distinction only between the physical body of a Buddha (rūpa-kāya) and the body of the doctrines (dharma-kāya). The term dharma-kāya was also used for the collection (kāya) of virtuous dharmas, a sort of internalized body of doctrine (cf. the unidentified verse Haribhadra quotes at W14.13). Mention is also made, in earlier texts, of temporary mental bodies (manomaya, la Vallée Poussin 1913, Dutt 1978:137-153).

In early PP sūtras like the A (W268 et passim) mention is made only of the dharma (=dharmatā) and rūpa kāyas. The Pañca and Šata describe at length a miraculous Buddha body emitting rays of light (summarized W12.9-15.11) and in a later PP sūtra, the recast version of the Pañca (quoted Dutt 1978:161), one finds the terms saṁbhoga-kāya and nirmāṇa-kāya.

7.8.3 The development and systematization of the Mahāyāna concept of three, four or even five bodies is closely associated with Yogacāra works. The presentation in the AA (which teaches either three or four bodies) echoes MSA9.59-66. It reflects a stage of development perhaps just prior to the final Yogacāra systematization. A further division (by Hsüan-tsang) of the saṁbhoga-kāya into a body ‘for personal enjoyment’ (=sва-saṁbhoga) and a body ‘for the enjoyment of others’ (=para-saṁbhoga) is implicit in the AA although the terms are not explicitly used. The division of own-being into ‘naturally pure own-being’ (*svabhāva-suddha-svabhāva-kāya) and ‘own-

1 AA17 echoes MSA9.60 (Bagchi 1970:47-8) स्वाभाविकोष संशोधनः कायो नैमाण्डिकोपरः। कायः भेदात हि बुद्धानां परमसूतं तु त्रिविविधः।। त्रिविविधः कायो बुद्धानां ... स्वाभाविको धर्म-काय आत्म-परावृत्तिलक्षणः।

2 See Dutt (1978:137, 154). The terms ‘for personal enjoyment’ (=sва-saṁbhoga) and ‘for the enjoyment of others’ (=para-saṁbhoga) appear to be reconstructions from the the Chinese of Hsüan-tsang, much as ‘naturally pure own-being’ (=*svabhāva-suddha-svabhāva-kāya) and ‘own-being purified of temporary defilement’ (=*āgantuka-māla-suddha-svabhāva-kāya), appear to be Skt reconstructions from Tib.
being purified of temporary defilement' (*āgantuka-mala-śuddha-svabhāva-kāya),¹ though implicit, e.g., at W914.10-15, appears to be a later Tib formulation (cf. Obermiller 1934:45-46).

7.8.4 AA17 says that the discussion of the dharma-kāya is "proclaimed fourfold." Of this much the reader can be certain. What, however, Maitreya and his commentators intended the reader to understand as the four sub-topics of his explanation of the dharma-kāya is less clear. He says:

स्वाभाविकः स-संभोगो नैमण्डिकोपरस् तथा । धर्मकाय: स-कारित्रक चतुर्गीत समुदीर्थः ॥

There is [a body] of own-being together with one of enjoyment and, similarly, another, of emanation; together with activity the dharma body is proclaimed fourfold.

Conze (1954:6), apparently following Haribhadra’s explanation, takes the four subdivisions as follows: "1. The Substantial body, 2. the Dharma-body, (5) with its activity, 3. the enjoyment-body, 4. the apparitional body." He adds the dharma-kāya’s activity (kārita) as a sort of fifth sub-topic in parenthesis.

A thorough investigation of all the problems associated with the presentation of the Buddha bodies in the AA and its commentaries would go well beyond the scope of the present study. Here the explanation is limited to setting out some problems and suggesting solutions proposed by Ārya Vimuktisena and Haribhadra.

7.8.5 The first problem is to determine what Maitreya had in mind by the eighth padārtha, the dharma-kāya (AA4d, see also §8.1.4). It will be recalled that in the Tib version of the Vārttika only seven clear realizations (abhisamaya) are mentioned, because the eighth padārtha, the dharma-kāya, was not considered a clear realization by the author and hence not gnosis. The author of the Vārttika, not unlike Ārya Vimuktisena, evidently considered the dharma-kāya to be a general category subsuming own-being. Since own-being is the substratum even of omniscience itself, i.e., is a lack of own-being which characterizes every dharma, (dharma-nairātmya), it is not mental in nature even though not expressible as different from mind. Haribhadra’s explicit statement that the

¹ Tib rang bzhin nam dag ngo no nyid sku and glo bur gyi dri mas dag pa'i ngo no nyid sku
eighth topic is *dharma-kāyābhisamābodha* (W20.21, 913.24, 914.9) is to deny the validity of this position.

Ārya Vimuktisena holds (P5185:92.4.6) that the AA teaches only three bodies (of own-being, enjoyment and emanation). He appears to equate own-being (*svabhāva*) and ultimate reality (*dharmata*), and to consider Maitreya’s term *dharma-kāya* to mean *dharmatā-kāya*. Furthermore, because of his particular understanding of gnosis as neither the same as, nor different from, ultimate reality he considers it didactically advantageous to refer to the Buddha’s gnosis, and to discuss the Buddha’s gnosis as the body of own-being, or the body of ultimate reality. He interprets "proclaimed fourfold" (*caturdhā samudāritaḥ* AA17d) and "thus is set forth the *dharma-kāya*" (*iti dharma-kāyo 'bhiddhyate* AA8.6d) at the end of the list of twenty-one sorts of wisdom in the light of this understanding.

To enumerate separately a *kāya* of own-being beyond the Buddha’s gnosis (i.e., beyond what Hsüan-tsang understands by the *sva-saṃbhoga-kāya* or by Haribhadra the *jñāna-dharma-kāya*) and beyond the *saṃbhoga* and *nirmāna kāyas* would reveal a mistaken understanding of the relation between mind and ultimate reality. This is the import of Ārya Vimuktisena’s statement (P5185:92.5.7) that own-being is only designated as a body.

For Ārya Vimuktisena, then, the subject of the verb *samudāritaḥ* (AA17d) is the *dharma-kāya* of AA17c. It is "proclaimed fourfold" because there are the three bodies of AA17ab together with its activity (*kārita*). The *dharma-kāya* itself means the *dharmatā-kāya* and it is not listed separately. It is not clear what Ārya Vimuktisena understands precisely by *dharma-kāya* at AA4d but it would appear that his understanding anticipates the position of the author of the *Vārttika*.

7.8.6 For Haribhadra, the Buddha *kāya* in general is what is being divided and it has four divisions (AAGser [tsa]:172.4-173.1): these are
(a) own-being, a naturally pure sphere (*dhātu*) purified of all temporary (*āgantuka*) defilement;
(b) the enjoyment body and
(c) the emanation body. Just as the enjoyment body and own-being are two bodies, i.e., just as they are ultimately not one or different, yet on the
The conventional level can be thought of as two, similarly with another (aparas tathā, AA17b) body, the emanation body. Though it also is, ultimately, not one with, or different from own-being, on the conventional level it is different.

(d) The fourth body is the knowledge truth body (jñāna-dharma-kāya), which Haribhadra calls simply dharma-kāya. The term conveys Maitreya's datum of AA4d, AA17c and AA8.6d. It is an abhisamaya and abhisambodha, i.e., it is gnosis which is defined in terms of twenty-one sorts of wisdom (AA8.2-6). When, through the cultivation of the path, the defiled mind undergoes a fundamental sea-change (āśraya-parāvṛtti) this gnosis shines forth (W20.29).1

According to Dharmamitra this is a particular teaching Haribhadra received from his PP guru Bhadra Vairocana.2 Lamotte (1973:II Notes 49) has also remarked on the similarity between the AAA at this point and MSam10.

According to Haribhadra's original interpretation of AA17, then, buttressed in part by Maitreya's statement (AA8.6) that the twenty-one forms of knowledge are "what is called the dharma-kāya," the subject of the verb samudīritaḥ is the eighth clear realization. It is "proclaimed fourfold" as the bodies of own-being, enjoyment, emanation and dharma.

7.8.7 Both Ārya Vimuktisena's and Haribhadra's explanation are similar to the explanation of three bodies in MSA:9.60, where two āśrayas (bases) are referred to. They understand the sa-saṁbhoga and sa-kārita of AA17 also to imply two bases, though with a subtle change in meaning from the Yogācāra position set forth in the MSA.3 The enjoyment and emanation bodies are posited 'together with' own-being (their basis). And the activities are posited 'together with' the dharma[tā]-kāya, their basis. Now the enjoyment and emanation bodies, in brief the appearance and activities of a Buddha which are experienced by Bodhisattvas and Śrāvakas, respectively, are not expressible as being either the same as, or different from, the own-being which is their final nature. And the

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1 Cf. MS (Lamotte 1973:II.260) "La révolution de ce support consiste en ce que la nature dépendante, quand son contrecarrant est né, expulse sa partie souillure et se réduit à sa partie pureté."

2 AAPras P5194:108.2.3-4.

3 The word sa ('together with') is used as a simple equivalent to ca ('and') in many verses of the AA (eg., AA1.12-13, 1.26, etc.). In the context of AA1.17, however, sa seems to retain its own particular meaning.
activities, in brief the inner thoughts and emotions (*caitta*) of a Buddha, experienced by that Buddha alone, are not expressible as being either the same as, or different from, that Buddha's own mind in its naturally pure state freed from temporary defilements. To this extent the Mādhyamikas Ārya Vimuktisena and Haribhadra are in agreement with the MSA explanation. They diverge from the Yogācāra conception of ultimate reality, however, in their presentation of a more radically negative concept of *śūnyatā* as the ultimate reality even of mind.

By activity (*kārita*) both mean the motivations, understandings and emotions which result in the twenty-seven sorts of work (AA8.34-40) largely carried out by the body of emanations. This is good work inspired or governed by the *dharma-kāya*.

### 7.9 Ten topics figuring in the description of the state of being knower of all aspects

The ten topics (see chart §9.2) have been discussed briefly above (§2.16.2). With the expansion on these ten topics (AA18ff) begins the detailed explanation of the Buddha-mind, the "state of being knower of all aspects."

#### 7.9.2 Production of an [altruistic] mind (*cittotpāda*)

Production of an [altruistic] mind (*cittotpāda*) is an abbreviation for production of an [altruistic] mind [set on] enlightenment (*bodhicittotpāda*). The first part of the compound is a tat-puruṣa meaning "mind to enlightenment," as in the English, "I am of a mind to go." Conze (1954a:9) renders the term, "thought of enlightenment" which captures that sense. Maitreya's definition of the term (AA18, W25.12-13) चित्तोत्पादः परायणः सम्मुक्त-सम्बोधि-कामता \ समास-यथासतः सा न यथासूतः च चौप्यते \ as "desire for perfect, complete enlightenment for the sake of others" makes his meaning clear. It is the Bodhisattva's altruistic motivation, the method (*upāya*) which carries him or her near to, and bears him or her along in, the great vehicle (Lamotte 1962:405).

The passage in the A on which this concept of production of an [altruistic] mind is based, is near the end of the first *parivarta*. It is a fine piece of religious prose that deserves to be quoted in full.

When this had been said, friend Subhūti addressed friend Śāriputra thus: Friend Śāriputra, I do not recognize great Bodhisattvas engaging in

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onerous acts. Nor is one who acts with the idea something is onerous a great Bodhisattva. And why? Because, friend Śāriputra, if the idea of something being onerous comes up they are incapable of working the weal of immeasurable, innumerable living beings. Instead, the great Bodhisattvas form the idea it is easy, they form the idea about all living beings, that they are their mother, father, son and daughter; they form that same idea about men and women and engage in the Bodhisattva deeds... As I myself want to be free from suffering in any way, from any [suffering] at all, so too all living beings ought to be free from suffering in any way, any [suffering] at all... Thus great Bodhisattvas should produce their mind (cittam utpādayitavyam; W118.13). If they course with such a mind, they will not be those who engage in deeds with the idea that they are onerous, or those who course with the idea that it is onerous.

The AA makes no particular connection between this part of the A and production of an [altruistic] mind. In the AAA it is connected to the seventh part of the tenth topic, the course in emergences.¹

That this passage does in fact teach production of an [altruistic] mind as a sort of meditation is evident from two facts. First from the language itself (e.g., W117.23 एवं च सर्वस्वेषु संज्ञोत्पादित्वा), and, second, by reference to exactly the same meditation in a later Indian commentary,² where it is called a meditation on production of an altruistic mind.

7.9.2.2 Both Ārya Vimuktisena and Haribhadra noticed that the AA’s order of explanation did not reflect the order in the sūtra (as found, e.g., in the MSA where discussion of production of an altruistic mind is preceded by chapters devoted to establishing the Mahāyāna, and explaining Mahāyāna lineage). Haribhadra says (W78.1-5 based on AAV:78.2):

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¹ Of the eight subdivisions of this course in emergences (AA72-73), the seventh is the practice of emerging into the state of being knower of all aspects.
² Bodhicaryāvatāra 8.89-90: एवमादिभिः बालार्दे विवेक-शुष्ण-भावनात्। उपशान्त-विद्या: सन्तर्बोधिशिल्तन्ते तु भावयेद्। परास्म-समताम् बाद्वृ भाववेद्य एवम् बादरात्। सम-दुःख-सुखा: सवे मालनीया मयात्मनत्।
[Question]: Surely lineage should have been mentioned right at the start [as in the MSA] because of its being something which precedes production of an [altruistic] mind and the proximate liberation and penetrations as well. How can it be spoken of thus [i.e., as it is in the AA where it comes after those topics]?

True, [what you have stated just now] is the order of things [as they occur]. But this sequence [followed here], where having stated the result then the cause is mentioned afterwards, is one of statement [for pedagogical purposes]. Hence, there is no fault.

The pedagogical purpose referred to is making clear the importance of production of an [altruistic] mind. In later Mahāyāna texts (e.g., Śāntideva's BCA, which is, in essence, an extended praise and explanation of the term) it came to have a greater and greater significance. The centrality given to production of an [altruistic] mind in the AA, and the fact that AA18 perfectly encapsulates its essential meaning, contributed to the wider currency and importance the term came to receive.

7.9.2.3 The twenty-two examples of production of an altruistic mind (AA19-20), perhaps originally taken from the Aksayamati-nirdesa-sūtra (Conze 1954a:10) correspond to the entire path, together with its result. Maitreya quotes them, it seems, in order to make the point that not mere wisdom, but perfect wisdom united with production of an altruistic mind, is always the arbiter of authentic Mahāyāna activity.

7.9.3 The second topic discussed is preceptual advice. Motivated to seek enlightenment, it is natural that the Bodhisattva then turns for advice about how to attain it. The topic has ten sub-divisions (AA22, W35.10-13):

About the practice, the truths, the Three Jewels, Buddha, etc., non-attachment, not tiring, fully adhering to the path, the five [special] eyes, the six qualities of clairvoyance, the path of seeing and what is called meditation: preceptual advice should be understood through the ten.

The third part of the third topic (22b), the Ārya Saṅgha, occasions a short, but complex discursus which I shall attempt to explain.
7.9.3.2 The Spiritual Community

The second of the ten topics discussed in the first chapter, preceptual advice, comprises a discussion of the psychological basis of Buddhist practice. This psychological basis is the ‘Three Jewels of Refuge’ *(tri-ratna)*: Buddha, Dharma and Saṅgha. The last, the Saṅgha (‘Spiritual Community’), Maitreya discusses separately in a detailed, though highly elliptical, excursus (AA23-24).

Those of dull and sharp faculties, attaining by faith and view, [going] from family to family; those having a single interruption, in the intermediate state, at birth, with work, without work, proceeding to Akanistha, the three ascenders; one intent on the Summit of existence, destroyer of attachment to form,\(^1\) for whom there is peace in this life (*drṣṭa-dharma*), who witnesses with a body and the Rhino: these are the twenty.

Based on the syntax of the AA the list of the twenty-member Saṅgha described here has been given by Conze (1954:13-14) as follows:

- AA23ab teaches six in three dvandva compounds: those of dull and sharp faculties (1-2); those attaining by faith and view (3-4); those [going] from family to family (5-6)
- AA23cd teaches six in a long compound: one with a single interruption (7), [one who gets nirvāṇa] in the intermediate state (8), having been born (9), with work (10), without work, (11) [after] proceeding to Akanistha (12)
- AA24ab teaches five: the three ascenders (13-15); one intent on the Summit of Existence (16), destroyer of attachment to form (17)
- AA24cd teaches three: one for whom there is peace in this life (18), one who witnesses [nirvāṇa] in a body (19) and the Rhino (20).

This appears, on face value, to be a straightforward way to arrive at a total of twenty Saṅgha, but it is unlikely that it reflects Maitreya’s original intention. Neither Arya Vimuktiṣena nor Haribhadra give an explanation in accord with this, and the passage corresponding most closely to AA23-24 in the recast version of the Paṅca (Dutt 1934:60-72) also does not accord with such a list.

\(^1\) Paṅca:69.9 has *rūpa-vita-rāga*.
This Pañca speaks of perhaps twenty-five Bodhisattvas beginning with a Stream-enterer (*srota-āpanna*). The A has no corresponding section.

7.9.3.3 Maitreya is clearly using the so-called eight Ārya Śrāvakas here to exemplify the assembly of irreversible Ārya Bodhisattvas. Before further discussion of this passage it will therefore be helpful to recall these Ārya Śrāvakas to mind.

7.9.3.4 The eight Ārya Śrāvakas are four pairs of saintly persons defined in terms of their being candidates for (*pratipannaka*), or recipients of (*phalastha*), four different results, respectively (cf. AK6.29-45, Rahula 1971:145, Dutt 1978). The lowest, or first result (confusingly called ‘the eighth’) is *srota-āpanna* (‘Stream-enterer’), the second *sakṛd-āgāmin* (‘Once-returner’), the third *anāgāmin* (‘Non-returner’) and the fourth and last Arhant. The eight persons, then, are:

8. candidate for Stream-enterer (*srota-āpanna-pratipannaka*)
7. recipient of the result of Stream-enterer (*srota-āpanna-phalastha*)
6. candidate for Once-returner (*sakṛdāgāmi-pratipannaka*)
5. recipient of the result of Once-returner (*sakṛdāgāmi-phalastha*)
4. candidate for Non-returner (*anāgāmi-pratipannaka*)
3. recipient of the result of Non-returner (*anāgāmi-phalastha*)
2. candidate for Arhant (*arhat-pratipannaka*)
1. recipient of the result of Arhant (*arhat-phalastha*)

These eight sorts of person can have either a trusting or a sceptical sort of personality (cf. AK6.29). Trusting yogins or yoginis are "those with soft faculties" (*mṛdvindriya*). They begin to practice even before they have investigated if the result (in this instance, liberation) can, in fact, be achieved. The latter sort of person are "those with sharp faculties" (*tikṣṇendriya*). In general, they first fully investigate the process, and ascertain the possibility of gaining a result, before attempting to attain it. The trusting sort of person enters the path quickly, but proceeds at a slower pace, while the sceptical sort enters later but moves along more quickly.

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1 A ninth Ārya, the *pratyeka-buddha* should be added to these.
Using the better known locations of these Ārya Śrāvakas (with the exception of the arhat-phalastha who has already been dealt with at AA21b in preceptual advice about Buddha) as examples, Maitreya indirectly locates Bodhisattvas on particular stages of the paths, or levels, identifying them by analogy.

7.9.3.5 Ārya Vimuktiṣena’s explanation (see chart §9.8), which follows closely the Pañca, helps to clarify Maitreya’s original intention. It reflects Vasubandhu’s delineation of the Śrāvaka Saṅgha in his AK (AAGser:331.6-332.1).¹

In the AK, the eight Śrāvaka beings are considered from two points of view: a) whether, previous to their attainment of the path of seeing, they have removed the bhāvanā-heyas (‘something to be removed by [the path of] meditation’) of the mundane path of meditation or b) whether they have not (la Vallée Poussin 1923-31:2.135, 6.198). Those who have removed seven or all nine of these bhāvanā-heyas are categorized as vītarāga-pūrvin,² those who have not are categorized as ānupūrvin.³

According to Ārya Vimuktiṣena, Maitreya had the former in mind in AA23ab. He says that AA23ab ("those of dull and sharp faculties, attaining by faith and view"), explicitly teaches the two candidates for the result of Once-returner and Non-returner, respectively, with soft and sharp faculties who are vītarāga-pūrvin. He says, cogently, that the soft and sharp candidates for the result of Stream-enterer, the first Bodhisattva mentioned in the Pañca, is, therefore, understood implicitly. The recipients of the fruit of Once-returner and Non-returner are taught explicitly by the second dvandva. Similarly, Ārya-vimuktiṣena says "the two going from family to family" (AA23b) and "one with a single hindrance" (AA23c) implicitly teach the two candidates for the result of Once-returner and Non-returner, respectively, who are ānupūrvin. The arhat-pratipannaka is implicit in the eightfold division of the recipient of the result of

¹ AAGser331.6-332. 2 Tib chags bral sngon song ‘free of attachment previous [to the path of seeing].’
² Tib mthargyis pa ‘[removing these bhāvanā-heyas] serially.’
³ Tib mthargyis pa ‘[removing these bhāvanā-heyas] serially.’

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Non-returer who, when they turn to remove the last set of bhāvana-heyas associated with the Summit of existence are known by that name (AAGser:315.5-6).

Ārya Vimuktisena perhaps departs from Maitreya’s intention when he introduces the term ārdhvam-srota (‘up-streamer’) to describe, as a single category amongst the twenty, those "proceeding to Akaniṣṭha, the three ascenders, one intent on the Summit of existence" (AA23d-24b). He says "srota means goer" and that "one who is going up is someone who does not get nirvāṇa in the place where he is born" (AAV:42). The analogy is between the Śrāvaka, taking birth in different concentrations and absorptions on the one hand, and the Bodhisattva taking birth after birth in different places to benefit living beings, on the other.

Maitreya probably did not consider all five as a single unit (see chart §9.8) but intended at least some to be listed as individual Saṅgha members. Ārya Vimuktisena’s explanation is perhaps influenced, at this point, more by the version of the PP sūtra he was following than by the text of the AA.

7.9.3.6 Haribhadra, who bases his interpretation not on the AK but on Asaṅga’s AS, differs from Ārya-vimuktisena (see chart §9.9) in that he categorizes all the Saṅgha members from the point of view of their being ānupūrvins (Those free of attachment previous [to the path of seeing]).

In his interpretation of AA23ab, therefore, he takes the first dvandva to explicitly teach each of soft and sharp candidates for the result of Stream-enterer and, implicitly, the recipient of the result of Stream-enterer. He understands the second dvandva to teach the candidates for, and recipients of, the results of sakṛd-āgāmin and anāgāmin, respectively. This interpretation has the virtue of consistency though it is hard to explain why Maitreya would list each of the soft and sharp candidates for the result of Stream-enterer separately, yet combine together the candidates for sakṛd-āgāmin and anāgāmin.

A more important difference is found in Haribhadra’s interpretation of AA23d-24c. He understands the three srotas ('Streamers') as a subdivision of the Bodhisattva intent on Akaniṣṭha, and he takes the one for whom there is

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1 ākaniṣṭha-ga, pluta, ardha-pluta, sarva-sthāna-cyuta and bhavāgra-parama.
peace in this life (*drśta-dharma-śama*) and the one who witnesses with a body (*kāya-sākṣin*) as a subdivision of the Bodhisattva intent on the Summit of existence. In Haribhadra’s interpretation, therefore, the Destroyer of attachment to form (*rūpa-rāga-hā*, AA24b) is taken together with *bhavasyāgra-parama*, not as a separate Bodhisattva as it is in Ārya Vimuktiśena’s explanation. It is difficult to decide which reading Maitreya intended.

Haribhadra thus says (W36.12-13) that Maitreya only teaches three members of the Saṅgha implicitly.

And thus [AA24-25], without [explicitly] including Recipients of the first and second results [i.e., *srota-āpanna-phalastha* and *sakṛd-āgāmi-phalastha*] and candidates for the fourth result [i.e., *arhat-pratipannaka*] because they are easy to understand, says...

7.9.3.7 There can be no doubt that in the AA, as in the Pañca, the assembly of irreversible Bodhisattvas is the intended Saṅgha Jewel. Besides being a Mahāyāna text, the corresponding passage in the PP sūtra speaks only of Bodhisattvas. The division of the eight Śrāvaka Āryas is simply a vehicle to describe them and their conduct. And while the scholastic intricacies of the earlier Abhidharma, presupposed in the explanations of the PP sūtra, are certainly not without their own intellectual charm, the less systematized concepts behind the Ārya Bodhisattvas point to a set of particularly noble values. Any conclusions about these Bodhisattvas must, however, remain largely speculative, since they are taught only by analogy. In the following some possible lines of analogy are tentatively suggested.

7.9.3.8 Ārya Vimuktiśena, amongst the Indian commentators, is most helpful for gaining an understanding of the Bodhisattva Saṅgha.1 He makes the general observation that "the Bodhisattva’s tolerance (*kṣānti*) is [akin to] what

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1 Additional comments on the Bodhisattva Saṅgha, particularly in Ratnākaraśānti’s *Suddhamati* and Abhayākaragupta’s *Marma-kaumudī* and *Munimatālaṅkāra* are summarized by Tsongkha pa in a survey (AAGser:317.6-331.5). The later commententors perhaps restrict overly the meaning of the original by seeking to fit the Bodhisattvas into too rigid a metaphysical framework. Dutt (1934:xiv-xvii) also has a short essay in which he deals with the topic of the Bodhisattva Saṅgha, from amongst all the AA’s topics, "as an illustrative instance showing how the PPs devised their Bodhisattva practices on the lines of Hināyāna."
[Srāvakas] starting from Stream-enterer right up to Pratyeka-buddhas know and what they remove.”

1 Tolerance, here, refers both to the willingness of Bodhisattvas to endure, for the sake of living beings, the sufferings from which the Srāvaka seeks deliverance, and to their enlightened forbearance in the face of the doctrine of universal emptiness.

In regard to the ‘stream’ (srotas) entered into by the Stream-enterer. In the Mahāyāna it comes to mean when a Bodhisattva attains the Mahāyāna path of seeing, yet, reflecting perhaps the doctrine of emptiness and its function of removing superstitious fabrications clouding over the reality of a religious path, is nothing beyond beneficial human life itself. There the Bodhisattva is carried along without settling on any religious attainment.

As with the Srāvakas, soft and sharp faculties are distinguished in terms of whether a Bodhisattva’s religious endeavors are motivated by belief or knowledge (śraddhayā ... prajñayā tan-mārgānusaraṇāt, AAV39; cf. AK6.29). The soft Bodhisattva takes birth again and again as a human before becoming irreversible from enlightenment, while the sharp Bodhisattva descends to this human life and immediately becomes irreversible from enlightenment. Again, paradoxically, the path of seeing and ordinary human life seem to be equated.

The bhāvanā-heyas removed by the mundane path of meditation become an analogy for the obscurations to omniscience (jñeyāvaraṇa) removed by the Bodhisattva’s path of meditation. These block the attainment of higher levels (bhūmi). A Bodhisattva who has removed six, seven or eight of those bhāvanā-heyas, i.e., is on the seventh to ninth level, is the Bodhisattva who is the Once-returner. Whereas, however, in the Srāvaka understanding, the fruit is attained on the sixteenth instant of the path of seeing, here it is attained later, through great effort on the path of meditation. If all nine bhāvanā-heyas have been removed, then the third fruit, of Non-returner, is attained, i.e., the tenth and highest Bodhisattva level. These two are not analogies for an Arhat-pratipannaka because Buddhahood cannot be obtained prior to passing through the bhāvanā-mārga which removes attachment to the Summit of existence.

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1 Quoted from Pañca 72.7 at AAV:35 वच्च्रोत-आपनजय यावत् प्रत्येक-पुद्दरय शानं च [प्रकाशम् Pañca-] प्रहारं च सा बौधज-सत्तरय क्षािि ।
A curious, if yet understandable, line of analogy.

In most instances the different regions where Śrāvaka Āryas take birth on their progress to nirvāṇa serve as analogies for the compassionate appearances of Bodhisattvas who, by skillful means, attempt to teach living beings. Never returning also appears to widen in meaning to include the absorption into a full realization of śūnyatā.

Since the basic qualification of the Non-returner is that they have removed the ninth bhāvanā-heya of the mundane path of meditation they are analogous to the tenth level Bodhisattva. There is only one final goal to attain.

According to Tsongkha pa (AAGser:336.4), the ‘one who gets nirvāṇa in the intermediate state (antarā-parinirvāyin)’ analogy is understood in terms of the sūtra statement that the Bodhisattva gets enlightened in the rūpa-dhātu, the intermediate of the three realms analogous to a state between death and the future birth.

Another interpretation focuses on the statement that the Bodhisattva "having attained enlightenment in a celestial realm [and therefore in a more ethereal realm like the intermediate state] then demonstrates enlightenment [as an exemplary deed to benefit living beings] in this human realm" (quoted AAK:41). The human realm, being less ethereal, is analogous to the human birth which comes after the intermediate state.

In regard to the one who gets nirvāṇa having been born (upapadya-parinirvāyin), again Tsongkha pa (AAGser:327.1), quoting the Śuddhamati, says the analogy is with the Bodhisattva who sits beneath the bodhi tree and attains enlightenment, since that Bodhisattva experiences nirvāṇa while within a human body (sopadhi-śeṣa-nirvāṇa).

Ārya Vimuktisena says laconically that such a Bodhisattva carries forth the burden of religious practice (abhiprayukta-mārga-vāhin), perhaps intimating that getting enlightenment is no burden, but the activity after enlightenment, teaching for an eon or what is left of the eon (Pañca:66.7) is.

The one who gets nirvāṇa with work (abhisamāṅskāra-parinirvāyin) "goes from world to world" and "is always girded up for the sake of living beings" (Pañca:66.11). According to the AAK and the Munimatālāṁkāra, the
anabhisamśkāra-parinirvāyin\textsuperscript{1} is analogous to the Bodhisattva who realizes the PP without effort.

Just like the Śrāvaka who takes birth in any combination of places in the three realms, a Bodhisattva goes to all horrid realms to teach the dharma to living beings and brings them to enlightenment in every Buddha paradise.

Finally, the Pratyeka-buddha is the Bodhisattva who takes birth in places devoid of Arhants and Buddhas in order to teach and deliver living beings.

\textbf{7.9.4} Based on preceptual advice, a Bodhisattva then comes to focus on emptiness, in particular the emptiness of the inner mind (the A’s ‘Bodhisattva’). The development of the practice, when that focus has been achieved, marks the beginning of the Bodhisattva’s approach to the ultimate. This level of development (§6.10) is called proximate penetration (nirvedha-bhāgiya). It is proximate to direct witness to the ultimate which comes about when the path of seeing (\textit{darsana-mārga}) is attained.

\textbf{7.9.5} Lineage (\textit{gotra}, literally ‘that which pens in,’ i.e., the factor or factors which delineate a particular religious or cultural group), the fourth topic has already been discussed at some length (§5.8.1-6). It is the ‘cause’ of enlightenment in the sense of being what makes enlightenment possible for all persons.

\textbf{7.9.6} The fifth topic (§5.9.1) is the objective support (\textit{ālambana}). It is all dharmas. Bodhisattvas settle on no dharma, worldly or otherwise, and, having extended their meditation to include all conventional objects reflect on their utter lack of own-being.

\textbf{7.9.7} The aims (\textit{samuddeśa}) are "three greatnesses which are foremost for all living beings" (AA42). This state is not constructed by religious work, but a natural state described as being the goal of "Self-originated Ones," i.e., those who have removed both sorts of defilement. The removal is the first greatness. Unobstructed realization and altruism are the other two greatnesses

\textsuperscript{1} For AAV:42.8 \textit{abhiyoga-vāhi-mārga} read anabhiyoga (\textit{mgon par 'du byed pa med par}, P18.1.9-2.1).
The four courses (on the use of the word ‘course’ to translate *pratipatti* in this context see §8.3) are no more than convenient rubrics to give some sort of order to long and diverse sections of the Pañca. Each describes the entire practice from different points of view. The first, the course in armor, describes how a Bodhisattva practicing any one of the six perfections (giving, morality, patience, effort, concentration and wisdom) is at the same time practicing the other five. The second, the course on going forth, is a general description of how progress is made on the journey in the Great Vehicle.

There are seventeen subdivisions to the third course, in accumulations. The first fifteen and the seventeenth are no more than topics in a general description of the entire practice and are simply listed (AA46-47, W86.30-87.2) द्वारा दानासिद्धिकः बहुकार्य सत्सागराः स्त्री-विद्याधरः। युग-नद्दन्तः च यो मार्गं उपायेः यज्ञः च कृत्यलम्।। शान्तै पुष्पं च मार्गंशन च धारणी भूमियो दशा। प्रतिपक्षः च विशेषः संभार-प्रतिपक्षः।। The sixteenth accumulation, which deals with the Bodhisattva levels, is expanded on, in the AA, at great length (§3.11.2).

The last course, in emergences, is again a general rubric and its eight subdivisions are again merely listed. The corresponding section of the PP, part of which was quoted above (§7.9.2) is, however, as Conze has remarked (1977:162) "the very core of [the] teaching" and one of the finest sections in the Sūtra.
8.1 The meaning of the term *abhisamaya*

In regard to the word *abhisamaya* (‘clear realization’), found in the title of the AA, it is used in the A, the AA and in the AAA with different meanings.

The word *abhisamaya* is formed from *abhi* ‘towards, facing’ + *sam* ‘together’ + root *i* ‘to go.’ ‘Clear realization’ is a translation suggested by, amongst others, Hopkins (1982:61).

8.1.2 In the A, where the word appears to be a late introduction into the text (Mano 1969:914), *abhisamaya* occurs rarely (e.g., W120.26, 412.14, 612.19) and always follows *prāpti* ‘attainment.’ “I do not accept, friend Sāriputra, the attainment of an unproduced dharma, nor of an abhisamaya” (W120.26). Whether this clear realization is gradual or sudden is not specified. It is not a term with any particular or specific signification that can be conclusively determined.

8.1.3 In the AA, *abhisamaya* is used in the title and consistently as qualified by the fifth, ‘peaked’ (*mūrdhābhisamaya*), and sixth, ‘serial’ (*anupūrvābhisamaya*) practices, respectively (§7.7, §7.7.5). There is some distinction between *abhisambodha* and *abhisamaya*, the former term being used for the fourth (*sarvākārabhisambodha*) and seventh (*eka-ksanābhisambodha*) practices only (§7.7, §7.7.6). Unlike Haribhadra, Maitreya uses the word *padārtha*, not *abhisamaya*, to refer to the eight major sections of the sūtra.

8.1.4 There are eight categories (*padārtha*) within which the AA presents its description of the PP sūtra. In later commentaries each of these eight categories is called an *abhisamaya*.

It is unlikely that the word *abhisamaya* in Maitreya’s title is being used in this technical sense it later came to possess.¹ There is no evidence in the AA of the usage one finds in Ārya Vimuktisena’s AAV (written perhaps 150 years after the AA) where the three *jñatās* are described as covering all the *abhisamayas*

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¹ The word *abhisamaya* is used in a general sense as understanding or realization at AS3.2 (Rahula160), but there are so many sorts of realization discussed there it becomes nothing more than a general rubric.
And even Hari-bhadra, who uses the word in a clearly technical sense when he describes "the path which is ... ordered in eight abhisamayas starting with the state of being knower of all aspects" (W4.12-13), uses the word abhisamaya in the singular, not the plural, when glossing the title directly (मोजाकरोपिषमये, W994.20).

8.1.5 It should also be noted that in the Vārttika ascribed to Bhadanta Vimuktisena (P5186:105.5.8; §2.12), there is a distinction drawn between the eight padārthas (Tib dngos po brgyad) and seven abhisamayas.¹

Question: What exactly is this PP when [AA1] says, referring to the PP, "Homage to the Mother of the Buddha with an assembly of Śrāvakas and Bodhisattvas?"

[Response]: "The ‘PP’ is the seven abhisamayas."

The author of the Vārttika evidently considered that the eighth padārtha, the body of truths (dharma-kāya), was not an abhisamaya, because it was not a gnosis.

8.1.6 It is possible that the word abhisamaya, in the title of the AA, can be traced to the usage of the same word to describe some chapters of Pāli texts, like the Kathā-vatthu and the Visuddhi-magga. Although there is no record of any PP chapter or text called an abhisamaya, it is possible that the abhisamaya in Abhisamayālaṅkāra is based on what the author of the AA saw his text as accomplishing. Like both the Kathā-vattu and the Visuddhi-magga, the AA systematizes a non-technical, ordinary-language text-mass. The meaning of the term perhaps passed through the following stages: ‘coming face to face

¹ The final couplet (= प्रज्ञा-पारमिता नाम स्वाभिसमानत्तका ?) appears to be an alternative reading of AA3ab. According to the Prajñā-pāramitā-piṇḍārtha-pradīpa (attributed to Dīpankāra-śrī-jñāna Atiśa; P92:103.3.8), Śāntipa and Ser ling pa (=Dharmaśrī) also assert only seven abhisamayas.
with ‘explication’—‘systematization and explanation,’ and it is in the latter sense that it is being used in the title.¹

8.1.7 The Tib writer Rgyal tshab (1364-1432) explains the title with a simile (AARgyan:6-7). A naturally beautiful woman, ornamented with golden ornaments is viewed reflected in a mirror. The PP sūtras are the naturally beautiful woman. The systematization of eight abhisamayas and seventy topics the golden ornaments, and the AA the mirror through which she can be viewed. When the reader studies the AA and understands its meaning he or she glimpses the beautiful Prajñā-pāramitā, her beauty highlighted by the eight chapters and seventy topics.

According to this explanation, the abhisamaya which Maitreya’s text ornaments is the Mother of all Buddhas, the PP itself. Sylvan Levi voices much the same idea when he writes (1927:126): "L’AA est une explication de l’abhisamaya, c’est-à-dire, du proces qui aboutit a l’intelligence de la vérité, en d’autres termes, comme l’entend Stcherbatsky, du mārga ou chemin ..."

8.1.8 Conze appears to have understood the samaya in abhisamaya as meaning ‘a compact, a coming together, or a uniting,’ and rendered the term in English with the phrase ‘re-union with the absolute’ (Conze 1954).

8.1.9 The original meanings of the twin terms abhisamaya and abhisambodha are unclear.² If there was any distinction it appears to have been lost by the time of Ārya Vimuktiṣena who substitutes, without any reason or explanation, the word eka-kṣaṇābhīṣamaya for eka-kṣaṇābhīṣambodha (AAV14.19).³ Later, Tib translators, usually careful in such matters, retained no difference between the terms and consistently rendered both by the same word (mngon rtogs).

It is possible that the terms reflect the difference between gradual and sudden awakening. According to the Sarvāstī-vāda doctrine recorded in the AK (6.2cd,

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¹ This line of thought was stimulated by Aklujkar.
² For example, la Vallée Poussin (1923-31:vi.122): "Quel est le sense du mot abhisamaya?--Ce mot signifie abhisambodha, compréhension. La racine i signifie comprendre."
³ Whether this is a single occurrence of a conflation of the terms in the AAV (and therefore possibly a textual corruption caused by the common abhisam) or whether there are other instances must await the publication of an edition of the rest of the Skt text.
6.27ab) the meditator comes face to face with each of the sixteen aspects of the truth (§6.15) one after the other. In the Yogācāra doctrine recorded in the AS (Rahula 1971:107-8, Tatia 1976:76-77), on the other hand, the truth of all sixteen aspects is beheld simultaneously. Calling the seventh padārtha, (‘full awakening to all aspects in a single instant,’ eka-ksaṇābhisaṃbodha) ‘a full awakening’ (abhisāṃbodha), and the sixth, anupūrvika (‘serial’) ‘a clear realization’ (abhisamaya), would possibly support this conjecture.

Nevertheless there is still a conflation of the two terms. In the AA one can give no satisfactory reason why the first practice ‘the full awakening to all aspects’ (sarvakarabhisambodha) should be called only abhisambodha and not abhisamaya.

The sudden and gradual awakening theories are discussed in more detail elsewhere (§6.15, §6.19-20).

8.1.10 We have a much clearer idea of what Haribhadra intended. His usage of abhisamaya in a technical sense, to refer without distinction to the three states of being knower (jñatā), four practices and the dharma-kāya (W4.12-13), has already been mentioned (§8.1.4).

He uses the word abhisamaya in a more general fashion in his summary (W452.29-453.9) of the thirty-seven modes of meditation mentioned at AA4.4-5 (Conze 1954a:49). The meaning ‘face to face-clear realization’ is spelled out there with great clarity:

"Warmed, peaked, forbearance, and highest dharma preparations" are the subdivisions of proximate penetration (nirvedha-bhāgīya, §6.10). Here abhisamaya is equivalent to the path of seeing (darśana-mārga, §6.14) a term which Haribhadra understands in the sense of non-conceptual gnosis.
The path of seeing, by Haribhadra’s time, was a precisely delineated section of the path when one first attains a yogic, direct perception of the fact that all dharmas lack an own-being (see also §6.12-14).

8.2 The meaning of the term ākāra

The term ākāra is used in the AA and AAA with at least three different meanings. The first of these three meanings is not technical, and is best rendered by the English word ‘aspect,’ attested in phrases such as "knowing all aspects of a problem." In this sense it is most frequently found as the sixteen aspects (ākāras) of the four noble truths, starting with impermanence and ending with delivering (nairyāṇika), i.e., the objective content of the Śrāvaka knower of all (§7.4-7.4.2).

8.2.2 Two further, technical, meanings of ākāra must, however, be distinguished if one is to avoid confusing Maitreya’s and Haribhadra’s intentions. These two different meanings of ākāra are best conveyed by rendering the term a) ‘mode’ or ‘sort [of meditation],’ and b) the ‘image,’ or ‘form [in which an object appears to knowledge].’

8.2.3 The explanation of the superiority of the four Mahāyāna proximate penetrations (AA1.25ff, §6.11) occasions an extended use of the term ākāra meaning ‘mode of meditation.’ The elliptical language in the AA at this point, where each of the twelve divisions of the proximate penetration has a corresponding mode of meditation identified only by a single word or phrase, tends to make Maitreya’s meaning obscure. It is particularly confusing because Haribhadra uses the term ākāra, with different meanings, as, e.g., at W62.9-15, in the same sentence:

Having anticipated the question "How, though, is something being meditated not able to be shown forth" with why is that, with it is because, etc., [the A] gives the answer by way of teaching the mode of meditation (ākāra). Since the supreme method is non-conceptualization of the meditative stabilization, in line with the fact that all dharmas are non-findable, when the objective support is [viewed] in terms of such a mode of meditation on ultimate reality (dharmatā-mukhena ākāreṇa)
[Bodhisattvas] do not know that meditative stabilization with non-imaging thought (nirākāreṇa cetasā). This is because there is no immediately proximate cause [for such bare perception]. And they do not fully understand with imaging [thought] (sākāreṇa) since there is [such thought] in dreams, etc., without any real entity [behind it].

In regard to the first meaning of ākāra, 'mode of meditation:' According to Obermiller (1933-6:323-4 n.1) "the principal meaning of ākāra here is the subjective aspect, the aspect of cognition which acts as an antidote against realistic views." Rgyal Tshab (AARgyan:251-3) says that this means, not just the antidote to the false belief in a soul (ātman), but the antidotes to each of the 173 mistaken opinions starting with the belief that the constituents of a personality are permanent.

Hence mode of meditation here refers, primarily, to an understanding, in accord with objective realities, which one must cultivate. It is explained, at some length, as the first of the eleven topics in chapter four, the logical place to do so, since Maitreya has just turned from an explanation of the three states of being knower (jnata) to a discussion of their actual practice (AA4.1, W415.18-19).

The defining characteristic [of the PP] is the ākāras of ('sorts of meditation on') particular understandings of objective reality. They are three because the omnisciences are thought to be three.

This same sense of ākāra, as 'mode of meditation,' is found in Maitreya’s ‘state of being knower of all aspects’ (sarvākārajñatā) and ‘full awakening to all aspects’ (sarvākārabhisambodha). In these, ākāra is no longer simply ‘aspect,’ as in the above sixteen aspects of the state of being a knower of all, but is specifically the 173 sorts of meditation set forth in AA4.

Where Maitreya uses ākāra in the sense of mode of meditation, two further implications of the term can be discerned: a) the cultivation of the understanding of an objective reality, e.g., understanding emptiness (sūnyatā-jñāna, and b) the cultivation of an emotional state based on objective reality, e.g., compassion (karuṇā). In the former case an image or form of objective reality is continually brought to mind until one penetrates to actual, unmeditated, reality
itself. In the latter, the image of objective reality is secondary to an aspect of mind thinking, e.g., "may all living creatures be free from their suffering."

8.2.4 The second meaning of ākāra lies behind Haribhadra’s terms ‘imaging (sākāra)’ and ‘non-imaging (nirākāra) thought.’ There ākāra refers to the form in which objective reality appears to the consciousness knowing it. The history of the term (originally ākṛti, as at AA1.27) in this sense stretches back at least to Patañjali’s grammar, and the beginnings of linguistic philosophy, where it first referred to the structure of the object named by a word (Biardeau: 43ff, 162ff). Dignāga, in his discussion of self-referential knowledge (sva-saṁveda) and the non-dual pramāṇa as fruit (phala; Pramāṇa-samuccaya Hatori 1968 appendix F-H) initiated a more particularly Buddhist usage, setting forth in a flurry of terminology¹ a) the image of an object appearing to the knowing mind, and b) a knowing mind in the form of an image. He felt both were necessary in order to explain later rememberances of past experience.

Ruegg (1981:92) in a paraphrase of the Madhyamakāloka 46-60 of Śāntarakṣita, where probably for the first time the views of sākāra and nirākāra-vādins are systematically presented, says, in regard to those who do not assert an externally real object, that they differ among themselves "as to whether the non-dual vijñāna contains an objective image or not; and they accordingly are divided into the two schools of the Satyākāra-vāda (or Sākāra-vāda) which accepts that it does and the the Alikākāra-vāda (or Anākāra-vāda) which holds that it does not."

A thorough investigation of Haribhadra’s understanding of nirākāra-jñāna-vāda and sākāra-jñāna-vāda would go beyond the scope of this dissertation since it would require a careful analysis of later sections of the AAA, particularly W531-536 and W969-976.

In the first abhisamaya Haribhadra uses the terms, as in the passage at W62.9-15, quoted above, simply as one of a set of devices to give meaning to repetition in the A.

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¹ One notices, in particular, the terms: svābhāsa, grāhākāra, viśayābhāsa, viśayākāra, arthābhāsa and arthasyākāra.
8.2.5 As terms to differentiate two schools of Vijñapti-mātrins, the terms sākāra and nirākāra should be understood to refer, on the one hand to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti’s formulation of citta-mātratā, by way of a focus on epistemological concerns, and on the other hand to Vasubandhu’s formulation of citta-mātratā, by way of the theory of parināma, or transformations of consciousness. Roughly speaking, it seems to me that the former school came to be called sākāra because of the stress it gives to the assertion that the nature of mind (citta) is clear illumination (prabhāsvara), and defilements are only extrinsic (āgantuka). Vasubandhu’s formulation (e.g., in his Trīṃśikā), came to be called nirākāra because of its stress on the ultimate non-existence of transformations of consciousness as anything beyond consciousness itself. Since the reasons for the two terms are quite different, the two points of view are not mutually exclusive. This is corroborated by Haribhadra’s willingness to defend both points of view on the surface level (W531-536) and to refute both from the point of view of ultimate reality (W969-976).

8.2.6 Ruegg (1982:102), quoting 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, mentions that Haribhadra belongs to the "Nirmala-Alīkākāra-vādin branch of the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka." This is also mentioned by Dkon mchog 'jigs med dbang po. This further division of the sākāra or satyākāra-vādins into nirmala (dri med) and samala (dri bcas), probably Tibetan in origin, is based on whether the writer asserts the form or image (ākāra) which appears to perception is, or is not itself, real. Probably these terms are best understood as merely different names for the same sākāra and nirākāra distinction.

8.3 The meaning of the term pratipatti

The preferred term for spiritual path in both the AA and AAA is pratipatti (‘practice, course, progress achiever’) used in the sense of the complex, or individual parts of the complex, which can lead to a desired result. The prefix prati means ‘coming up to’ or ‘taking to.’ The steps (pad) leading to enlightenment are intended. In essence the term means ‘taking to/following [the prescribed path or course].’ Obermiller usually renders pratipatti as ‘activity’ and Conze as ‘progress,’ though the connotation of progress is somewhat incidental.
8.3.2. The term *pratipatti* has at least two different meanings. a) At W35.10 (AA1.21), e.g., it is synonymous with the total practice. b) At W85.10 (AA1.43) it is a general rubric for the last four topics (§7.7-7.7.6) of chapter one. The Tib translators noticed this difficulty. Bu ston (AALung:151) discusses the apparent repetition involved in explaining *pratipatti* as the first subdivision of the second topic (§7.9.3), preceptual advice, and then again, later, as topics seven to ten. In order to help clarify this confusing usage Tib translators consistently used *grub pa* ‘achiever’ in the first, and *sbyor ba* ‘application’ in the latter context. Here, when the term is being used in the former sense it is rendered ‘progress achiever’ and when in the second, ‘course.’

As with the term *jñatā* which, literally, means ‘the state of being one who, or that which, knows,’ similarly, the unwieldy translation ‘progress achiever’ is used not in the sense of a person, but in the sense of the subjective or mental component of spiritual practice. This is done, (even though it will no doubt lead the unsuspecting, and no doubt often infuriated! reader to again and again mistakenly construe a person), in the belief that English-speaking readers will only get to the authentic meaning of a term like *pratipatti* by changing the focus from an individual person whenever an agent noun referring to knowing or spiritual endeavor is used, to an awareness which the individual possesses. The *pratipatti* is not a person. It is a development of the person’s conscious element, as it were, that is mistakenly taken to be the person. This is similar to the *bodhisattva*, which, for better or worse, has now entered popular usage and does not require translation. It is most unlikely that the term *bodhisattva* stressed the individual person, as it is now taken to do. Like *jñatā* and *pratipatti* it stressed the ‘spirit,’ or, to use a less loaded term ‘consciousness,’ which can become awakened.

8.3.3. There is yet a further complication which Obermiller (1933-36:103. n. 2) has pointed out, and this is that "the order ... of the *pratipattis* ... one of those extraordinary complicated schemes ... must be put in connection with the four *abhisambodhis*" What this means is that the fourth to seventh *abhisamayas*, the four ‘practices’ (explained §7.7ff), are also referred to, in Tib commentaries, by the Tib word *sbyor ba*. In this dissertation the term is rendered ‘practice’ in such contexts.
8.4 Haribhadra’s use of the term prajñā-pāramitā

In the AAA the term prajñā-pāramitā (‘the other shore of wisdom’/‘perfect wisdom’) is used inclusively for the entire eight clear realizations. These have been discussed elsewhere (§2.15, §7.2ff).

Haribhadra does, however, make some general remarks about prajñā-pāramitā based on a definition by Dignāga (PPPi:1):

The perfection of wisdom is non-dual wisdom. It is the Tathāgata, and is to be accomplished. Because its [i.e., the Tathāgatha’s] meaning applies [to them], the treatises and path have that name.

In explaining, Haribhadra says a Bodhisattva attains perfect wisdom (tathāgata) by first accumulating vast stores of merit. By merit is meant the outcome of virtuous actions. Then the Bodhisattva enters meditation and investigates the "the mode of the PP revealing the selflessness of all dharmas" (W22.20), i.e., investigates the meaning of emptiness which is the central topic taught in the PP sūtras. The Bodhisattva "investigates the meaning of the PP by way of four sorts of meditation (ākāra): (a) enumerating (gaṇanā) by grasping numerically in terms of the different stages of the eight clear realizations; (b) gauging (tulana) by ascertaining the individual nature of each clear realization; (c) interpreting (mīmāṁsā) by avoiding both superimposition and over-negation; and (d) making decisions (pratyavekṣaṇatā) by justifying with valid non-conceptual (pratyakṣa) and inferential (anumāna) cognitions (pramāṇa)" (W20.22-4). Through this knowledge caused by hearing, thinking and meditation the Bodhisattva attains the state of being knower of all aspects and attains prajñā-pāramitā.

8.5 The terms śrutamayī, cintāmayaī, and bhāvanāmayaī prajñā

The terms śrutamayī, cintāmayaī, and bhāvanāmayaī prajñā (‘wisdom at the stage of being arisen from hearing, thinking and meditation’) are known from Vasubandhu’s AK6.5.
One abiding properly, who has listened and reflected, will be capable of entering into meditation. The wisdoms which come from what has been heard, etc., have for their objects names, [a combination of] both [name and thing], and thing, respectively.

The *maya* suffix indicates the cause, as explained in Pāṇini’s aphorism 5.4.21: *tat-prakṛta-vacane* mayaḥ, i.e., "la prajñā śrutamayī est la prajñā qui a pour cause (hetu) la śruti, c'est-à-dire la parole d'une personne qualifiée (āpta-vacana," la Vallée Poussin 1923-31:144). Similarly, *cintāmayī* prajñā means ‘wisdom which comes from reflection’ and *bhāvanāmayī* prajñā ‘wisdom which comes from meditation.’ They are not specifically Buddhist terms, but were used particularly frequently by Buddhist writers like Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra.

The three terms occur repeatedly in the AAA. In essence they refer to three stages:

(a) when, based on listening to a qualified teacher, one gains understanding
(b) when, by research and investigation, one’s understanding becomes authoritative, and
(c) when one cultivates a state of deep introspection which integrates this authoritative understanding so that it becomes a spontaneous and direct perception (*pratyakṣa*).

8.5.2. In a recent article, Lindtner (1984:151, n.7) refers to certain "innovations in Buddhist epistemology," amongst which he mentions the description of "yogi-jiñāna as a particular form of *pratyakṣa*." This innovation, the earlier history of which Lindtner tentatively traces back through Dignāga to the "śrutamayī bhūmiḥ Section (X) of the Yogācāra-bhūmi" informs Haribhadra’s understanding of the three sorts of wisdom, an understanding which is better known through the writing of Kamalaśīla whom Haribhadra appears to quote at some length in the first chapter of his AAA (W93.22-94.1).

According to Dignāga, yogic *pratyakṣa* is a special pure consciousness. Ultimate reality impresses itself as forcefully upon this consciousness as an ordinary phenomenon impresses itself on common sense perception. Yet this special pure consciousness is arrived at only gradually through a learning process rooted in the medium of words and ideas. In other words, the non-
mediated quality of sense perception is applied to a special, meditative awareness rooted, initially, in listening and conceptuality, but developed into a heightened non-conceptual gnosis.

8.5.3 Dharmakīrti, building on the work of his predecessor Dignāga, and responding to the pressures of the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika philosophers, was the first to specifically associate the stages of understanding based on language and inference that precede such a pure yogic pratyakṣa with the wisdoms arisen from hearing, thinking. He understood the stage when wisdom is arisen from hearing to begin when the person hears a truth correctly described, and assumes it to be true. Then, based on the insight that knowledge of a truth is not real knowledge until it has been researched, Dharmakīrti said that from that point, up until the stage of valid inferential cognition (anumiti or anumāna-pramāṇa), i.e., up until, based on a process of consequences (prasāṅga) and proper reasons (hetu) a fully researched knowledge comes about, the persons understanding of the subject at hand is characterized as arisen from hearing. When a researched knowledge is attained the understanding is described as arisen from thinking. Understanding remains at the stage of thinking until the process of meditation, described above in terms of the first of the 173 aspects, is achieved. At that point it becomes a wisdom arisen from meditation (bhāvanāmayī), or, to use Dignāga’s new descriptive term, yogi-pratyakṣa.
9.1 The eight basic categories (padārtha)

**THREE STATES OF BEING KNOWER (-jñatā)**

1 state of being knower of all aspects 2 state of being knower of paths 3 state of being knower of all

sārvākārajñatā mārgajñatā sarvajñatā

**FOUR PRACTICES**

4 full awakening to all aspects 5 peaked clear realization 6 serial clear realization in a single instant

sarvākāraḥbhisaṁbodha mūrdhābhisaṁmaya anupūrvābhisaṁmaya ekāṣaṅābhisaṁbodha

**RESULT**

8 body of truths
dharma-kāya

9.2 Ten topics figuring in a description of the sarvākārajñatā

1 production of an [altruistic] mind

2 preceptual advice

3 four proximate penetrations

4 basis of the practice
gotra

5 objective support

6 aims

7 course in armor

8 going forth

9 collections

10 emergences

sarāṁśāha- prasthāna- saṁbhāra- niryāṇa-pratipatti

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1 Tib *rnam mkhyen mtshon byed kyi chos bcu.*
9.3 Three realms (dhātu)

**DESIRE REALM**  
kāma-dhātu

**FORM REALM**  
rūpa-dhātu

First Concentration  
dhyāna

Brahmā-type  
brahmakāyika

In front of Brahmā  
brhma-purohita

Great Brahmā  
maha-brahmāṇa

Second Concentration

Limited light  
paritābhā

Measureless light  
apramāṇābhā

Fine light  
ābhāsvara

Third Concentration

Limited benefit  
parīta-Subha

Measureless benefit  
apramāṇa-Subha

Complete benefit  
Subha-krtsna

Fourth Concentration

Cloudless  
anabhraka

Merit-producing  
punya-prasava

Great fruit  
bṛhat-phala

Not great  
abhyat

Without austerity  
atapas

Good sight  
sudṛśa

Pleasant  
sudurṣanā

Beneath none  
akāniṣṭha

**FORMLESS REALM**  
arūpya-dhātu

Endless space  
ākāśānanta

Endless consciousness  
vijñānānanta

The state of nothing at all  
ākāścanyāyatana

The state of neither discrimination nor even of non-discrimination  
naiva-sarṣja-anāsarṣja-āyatana also called Summit of existence  
bhavagra

---

1 The six heavens in the kāma-dhātu are called 1) cātur-mahā-rāja-kāyika, 2) trayas-triśa, 3) yāma, 4) tuṣita, 5) nirmāṇa-rati, 6) para-nirmita-vaśa-vartin.
9.4 The path of meditation (*bhāvanā-mārga*) according to the AK and its correspondence with the three realms

<table>
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<th>Realm</th>
<th>Sub-division of Realm</th>
<th>bhāvanā-heya</th>
</tr>
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<td>human and six</td>
<td>great great</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>kāma-dhātu</em></td>
<td>celestial realms</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>form</td>
<td>first concentration (<em>dhyāna</em>)</td>
<td>middling great</td>
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<td><em>rūpa-dhātu</em></td>
<td>second concentration</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>fourth concentration</td>
<td>mid- middling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>formless</td>
<td>first absorption (<em>samāpatti</em>)</td>
<td>soft middling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>ārūpya-dhātu</em></td>
<td>second absorption</td>
<td>great soft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>third absorption</td>
<td>middling soft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>fourth absorption</td>
<td>soft soft</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9.5 Seven attentions (manaskāra) and ninefold division of the path of meditation (bhāvanā-mārga)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>bhāvanā-heya</th>
<th>manaskāra</th>
<th>bhāvanā-mārga</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 manaskārādi-karmika</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(=samatha)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 lakṣaṇa-pratisamvedin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 ādimokṣika</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>great great</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>middling great</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>soft great</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 prāvivikta</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>great soft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>middling soft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>soft middling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>middling middling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>great middling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 rati-samgrāhaka</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>middling middling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>soft middling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>soft middling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>soft middling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>soft middling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 mīmāṁsaka</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>great soft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>middling soft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>soft soft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 prayoga-nīṣṭha</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>great great</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>middling great</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>great great</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 prayoga-nīṣṭhā-phala</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(= maula-samāpatti)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9.6 Correspondence between the levels (*bhūmi*) and paths of meditation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><em>bhāvanā-mārga</em></th>
<th>Bodhisattva level</th>
<th><em>bhāvanā-heya</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>soft soft</td>
<td>second</td>
<td>great great</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>middling soft</td>
<td>third</td>
<td>middling great</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>great soft</td>
<td>fourth</td>
<td>soft great</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>soft middling</td>
<td>fifth</td>
<td>great middling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>middling middling</td>
<td>sixth</td>
<td>middling middling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>great middling</td>
<td>seventh</td>
<td>soft middling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>soft great</td>
<td>eighth</td>
<td>great soft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>middling great</td>
<td>ninth</td>
<td>middling soft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>great great</td>
<td>tenth</td>
<td>soft soft</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9.7 Correspondence between the levels (*bhūmi*) and ten perfections (*pāramitā*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bodhisattva level</th>
<th>Perfection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 joyful <em>pramuditā</em></td>
<td>giving <em>dāna</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 stainless <em>vimalā</em></td>
<td>morality <em>śīla</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 light-maker <em>prabhākari</em></td>
<td>patience <em>kṣānti</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 radiant <em>arciṣmati</em></td>
<td>effort <em>vīrya</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 extremely hard to conquer <em>sudurjayā</em></td>
<td>concentration <em>dhyāna</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 manifest <em>abhimukhi</em></td>
<td>wisdom <em>prajñā</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 far gone <em>dūraṅgamā</em></td>
<td>skill in means <em>upāya-kauśala</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 immovable <em>acalā</em></td>
<td>aspiration <em>praṇidhāna</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 possessing excellence <em>sādhumati</em></td>
<td>power <em>bala</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 cloud of dharma <em>dharma-meghā</em></td>
<td>gnosis <em>jñāna</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1 The original meaning was probably ‘possessing excellence’ (Conze’s ‘eminent’) however, Tib *legs pa’i blo gros*, ‘good mind’
9.8 List of twenty samgha members in AA23-24 according to Arya Vimuktisena

1. srota-āpanna-pratipannaka (aṣṭamaṇaka) (implicit in 23a) on path of seeing with soft and sharp faculties (vītarāga-pūrvin)
2. sakṛd-āgāmi-pratipannaka and anāgāmi-pratipannaka on path of seeing with soft faculties (23a) (vītarāga-pūrvin)
3. sakṛd-āgāmi-pratipannaka and anāgāmi-pratipannaka on path of seeing with sharp faculties (23a) (vītarāga-pūrvin)
4. sakṛd-āgāmi-phalastha and anāgāmi-phalastha with soft faculties (23ab) (vītarāga-pūrvin)
5. sakṛd-āgāmi-phalastha and anāgāmi-phalastha with sharp faculties (23ab) (vītarāga-pūrvin)
6. srota-āpanna-phalastha taking human birth after birth (23b) (ānupūrvin)
7. srota-āpanna-phalastha taking celestial birth after birth (23b) (ānupūrvin)
8. sakṛd-āgāmi-pratipannaka (23b) (implicit) (ānupūrvin)
9. eka-vici-sakṛd-āgāmin (23c)
10. anāgāmi-phalastha (23c) (implicit) (ānupūrvin)
11. antara-parinirvāyaṁ
12. upapadya-parinirvāyaṁ
13. abhisamāskāra-parinirvāyaṁ
14. anabhisamāskāra-parinirvāyaṁ

akaniṣṭha-parama (ga)
pluta

15. ūrdhva(m)-srota
ardha-pluta
sarva-sthāna-cyuta
bhavāgra-parama

16. rūpa-vīta-rāga (rūpa-rāga-han)
drṣṭa-dharma-saṁ
18. kāya-sāksin
19. arhat-pratipannaka (implicit in 23d-24c)
20. pratyeka-buddha (24d)
9.9 List of twenty *samgha* members in AA23-24 according to Haribhadra

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>srota-āpanna-pratipannaka of soft faculties (23a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>srota-āpanna-pratipannaka of sharp faculties (23a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>srota-āpanna-phalastha (implicit in 23a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>srota-āpanna-phalastha taking birth in human families (23b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>srota-āpanna-phalastha taking birth in celestial realms (23b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>sakṛd-āgāmi-pratipannaka of soft and sharp faculties (23ab)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>eka-vṛci-sakṛd-āgāmin (23c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>sakṛd-āgāmi-phalastha (implicit in 23b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>anāgāmi-pratipannaka of soft and sharp faculties (23ab)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>antarā-parinirvāyin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>upapadya-parinirvāyin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>abhisāmāskāra-parinirvāyin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>anabhisaṃskāra-parinirvāyin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td><em>pluta</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td><em>ardha-pluta</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td><em>sarva-sthāna-cyuta</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td><em>dṛṣṭa-dharma-śama</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>kāya-sākṣin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>arhat-pratipannaka (implicit in 23d-24c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>pratyeka-buddha (24d)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These three are *ardha-pluta* and *sarva-sthāna-cyuta* and *dṛṣṭa-dharma-śama*.

These two are *bhavāgra-parama* and *rūpa-rāga-han* (24ad).
PART TWO

SANSKRIT TEXT
I PRELIMINARY REMARKS

[10.1 Homage; W1.1]

One would, perhaps, expect *sāntaisanān* (cf. *eśanā* in Upaniṣads) "whose seeking of worldly values is over" or *sāntyेशanān* "whose search is for peace." However, *sāntaisin* from *sānta* + *eśā* + *in*, as in *maṇiśā*, is possible. The Tib लिप्तक उपुस्तिकारक clearly understands a compound meaning "whose search is for peace."

Although Wogihara seems to take this verse to be H’s own original composition, there can be no doubt that H himself considered these lines as part of the AA because in his AASphu (Amano 1975:5; reconstructed by Tripathi 1976:4) commenting directly on these lines, he says, अर्यानिस: "Arya Maitreya, showing that he himself is in accord with the deeds of good persons, makes a preliminary homage first of all to the Mother, exactly expressing her qualities."

This change, which reflects common usage, is made throughout and not subsequently noted.

Discussed §6.9.
1. Koṣo-koṣari Tu.

2. TSP:2.5 This īhi is shaded. Its meaning is unclear.

3. The translation is based on the reading in Tu which is corroborated by P; cf., however, TSP:2.9-10 where the word is interpreted differently in both manuscripts.

4. The Skt text, which suggests a possible verse quote in nāsikādī-śayana has not been emended.

5. TSP:10.1-4 The context indicates that the word may be understood in its general meaning.

6. TSP:10.5-10 (Tib trans P203.1.7-203.2.2) The context indicates that the word may be understood in its general meaning.
सुनें च विशिष्टार्थ-प्रतिपादन-परं वचनम् उच्यते, नामित्येव-मातं, नापि शब्द-मात्रम्
अर्थ-प्रतिपादन-सामयिक-शून्यम्। अतो नामित्येवादि-गतम् अभिधेययम्। न च क्रिया-स्वप
प्रयोजनम्। तथा हि। सर्व-वाक्यानां स्वाभिमिवेत्र-प्रतिपादन-लक्षणा क्रिया साधारणी।
सा च नातिप्रतीततया प्रयोजनत्वनोपदानम् अह्वित, तस्या शास्त्रस्य व्यभिचाराभावात्.
अनन्यित्येवाशक्षा-युद्धार्थम् उपदशनीयेति चेतु? न। अभिधेय-कथनादु एव
tदाशशाख्या व्युदततात्। नामित्येव-विशेष-प्रतिपादिपदिष्यम् तदुपादानम्,
अभिधेय-विशेष-प्रतिपादनादु एव तस्या: प्रतिपादितत्त्वात्।

तस्य च क्रिया-कल्याणं [प्रयोजन-]प्रयोजनमू उपदशनीयं, तेन विना च क्रिया-
[W3.1]फल-मात्रेण प्रवृत्तयोगतात्। तथा हि। अभिमत-प्रधान-फलार्थी वेदांवांसु तदुपाये
प्रतितित। कारणम् अन्तरेण कार्यसाध्यायात्। अविकलरार्य-रामाणुष्टाननोरीय-प्रतितितू 
उपायो ज्ञातोभ्यस्मान:। व्यापेय-फल-दायक इत्यपायावमाय॥ सूत्रे प्रवृत्तत्।
तस्तस्तू प्रवृत्त्युप-प्रादाय-योनि प्रयोग-प्रयोजनमू एवावश्य-दशानीयम्। ततु
चोपाय-भूत-संबंधार्ध-शच्येन प्रयोग-नन्दनार्थम् दशियतमू इति सूत्रस्य प्रयोजन-प्रयोजनोपायम्
संबंधार्ध-कथनम्।

तत्त्व च प्रयोजन-प्रयोजनं

संबंधानुगृहोपायं पुष्णार्थपिभिधायकम्।

परिवाधकृतं वाक्यम्। अतोपनिधकृतं परम्॥ [PV Srāthānumāna 215]

इति न्यायात् संबंधानुगृहोपायम् उपदशनीयम्। न पुनरु अशक्यं तदुपायानुष्टानम्।
अन्यथा ज्वर-हर-हरक-बुझ-रत्नलक्षार्थम् इव न प्रवृत्तं कर्षितं। अनवस्यापि
नेवम्॥ तथा हि। अभिमतार्थ-परिसमाप्ता पुष्णस्याक्षा-विज्ञेदात्। अतो नापरम्
अर्थ-प्रयोजनं मूः गोम्। इति।

1 TSP;10.20-11.1 तत्र सर्व-वाक्यानां स्वाभिमिवे-प्रतिपादन-कवणा क्रिया साधारणा।।
सा चात्विप्रतीततया न प्रयोजनत्वनोपदानीयम्। तस्य शास्त्रस्य व्यभिचाराभावात्।
अनन्यित्येवाशक्षा-युद्धार्थम् उपदशनीयेति चेतु? न। अभिधेय-कथनादु एव
tदाशशाख्या व्युदततात्। नामित्येव-विशेष-प्रतिपादिपदिष्यम् तदुपादानम्। अभिधेय-विशेष-प्रतिपादनादु एव [तस्य-]
तस्या: प्रतिपादितत्त्वात्।
2 विना Tu इपि बौधेः प्र. ।
3 विकालवृत्ता-बलवान Tu इपि वृत्तक्रियाकेः प्र. ।
4 कृतिक-कथनम् Tu; TSP;2.12ff प्राधान्येन तु प्रयोजनम् एव प्रवृत्तप्रस्तरितप्राधान्येन शाश्चेनु शोभु-जनस्य
प्रवृत्तत्:। तात्त्विकालवृत्ता-वृत्तक्रियाकेष्यम् संपादियतुम् इति शास्त्रस्य प्रयोजनोपायम्-संबंधार्धम्
अभिधेय-कथनम्। न पुनरु अशक्यं तदुपायानुष्टानम्। अन्यथा विष-हर-हरक-बुझ-रत्नलक्षार्थदेश-शास्त्रविद्
सत्पर्व प्रयोजने तदु-साधानानुगृहोपायम् मल्ल न प्रवृत्तेष्व प्रेक्षावानु॥
5 नैव-नैवम् Tu.


Dvītīyē sarvā-pradipakaś-saṃgha eva kṣayiśau viṣkap-bhūtuśaṃbhāvanātu "pradipākātīyanā bhāvanāmāyaṇā" ityābhāvāneñiyo n jātē ca kṣay pradipakātīyaḥ pradipākātīyaḥ pradipakātīyaḥ prābhāvaṃ pradipākātīyaḥ-dvēryā.


2 Jha (1937-39:13) changes abhumāy-nt:āntātā "because it would be endless" but the Tib supports W’s reading which is retained.


4 śāstraśē abhumāy-śāstraśē bhātvā Tu, Amano.
Jaini, in the introduction to his edition of the *Sāratamā* (1972:274), says that the AAA, unlike the *Sāratamā* does not give a word to word commentary on the AA. As this sections shows that is only partially true. Here and elsewhere, e.g., W:37.28-29, 47.20-21, etc., the verses are woven into H’s text, albeit in a loose fashion.

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2. संस्कृत-संस्कृतित:-?

3. At this point some words have, perhaps, been lost through haplography.

4. "हितमु इति Tu is syntactically strained; W is supported by P and appears contextually the correct reading.

5. On the absence of reduplication in desideratives, see Edgerton:98.
तथागत-गुह्य-निदेशाधिकारण सर्भधा भाषाकल्पक-सर्व-सत्याग्नातान रूप-काय-सत्त्वकर्त-रक्तका कृताधिकार्ताविद्वान वज्र-पाण्यभिषेकादित्रि प्रत्यपित-शासनत्तचाच चार्येण विशेष-वचनाभावादु अकलकति-निवासी दश-भूमिभ्रो भण्ड-वज्रधरः सर्व-लोकानुग्रहाय प्रजा-पारिपत्र-सुत्र-रत्न-संगीति प्रत्यवीष्टवत्र्मु भार्य-मैत्रेयादि-महा-बोधिसत्त्व-गणमु एवमु इत्यादाहेति पुरव्यंचायः।

अन्यं तत्तब्र परीन्दन-परिबर्तं "यथेऽ जन्मद्वमप्रेष प्रजा-पारिपत्र-प्रचारिष्यति" इत्यादिना प्रत्यपित-प्रजा-पारिपत्रत्वादु आयान्तवः संगीतिकार इति मन्यते।

तत्तब्र्मु इति निद्रणार्थभिधायिनास्वनुसर-जानावधारित-नितिनिर-सूत्रार्थस्य उपदेशन-परेशामु एतदु इत्यविपरीतवल्मु भाह।

मंदेित्यात्व-वाचकेन भगवतः सकाशतु साक्षात्वत्रणमु।

श्रुतमू इति भोज-विशालनामादु-वचसा च तथागतादु कृतेज्यस्येवंभूत-समस्त-धर्मामिनाम-सामथ्य-वैकल्यादु अधिगमाभावत्वमु।

एतथु च पद-नयं भगवदु-वचनादु एव सुवर्ममु निद्रिष्यमु। तथा हि। "भगवति परिनिति, नानार्थविधिमुक्त-प्रभावितवादु दुर्लभो-भुद्वा-वचन-वैकल्य-धिमामात्रे कार्य कैस्कितु संगीति: क्रियत।" इति विनेय-जन-संदेहात्मकारिनस्य तथागताधारितापि: भावकारिति: "भगवन्ननागते काले धर्मः संगात्त्व।" इति पृथवेन भगवता "कृताधिकार-साक्षात्त्वर्गानागर्थिनार्थपि: धर्मं-संगीती विषमाणाय न दोष" इत्यभिप्रार्थिणां धर्मं-संगीतिः-सुत्रेः, "एवं मया श्रुतमु इति कृत्त्तमु मिसिना मम धर्मं: संगीतिः" इति। तथा "संवादानुपूर्णी प्रतिपादाय" इत्यादि। अतौपि वचनादु देश-कालादि-वचनं तथा "शक्रो देवानामु इन्द्रो भगवतमु एतदु अवोच्चदु" इत्यादि-वचनं च भगवदु-अत्तज्यव संगीतिः-कृत्तमु: कृत्त्तमु इति नाभुदु-वचनत्व-प्रसखः। [W6.1] तथा च "भुदु-भुद्वानंदु-वचन्त्व प्रकृतिसम्म" इत्यमु अपि दोषो दूरत एव कृतावकाशः। अतशु च यथेऽ भुदु तदेव संगीतिः इत्युपपन्नमु।

एवं च कृत्ता यतु कैश्चु "एवं मम देशितमु" इति वर्जनये कस्मादु एवं मया श्रुतमु इत्यभिहितमु इति चोऽऽ कृत्ता "भगवदु-देशानुपत्तरेः" इत्यादि-युक्तन्तरं वर्गितं तन्त्र नितरां न राजत इति प्रतिपादित्तमु।

1 भादे-जाददी based on Tu, supported by P.
2 रत्त्त is supplied based on Tu and supported by P.
3 नानार्थविधिमुक्त-प्रभावितवादु based on Tu, which is supported by P.
ननु चार्यनन्दनेनोकं प्रदेशान्तरे। "सन्ति भगवता सुस्राणि मतु-समधि भाषितानि, सन्ति देव-लोकं भाषितानि, सन्ति परमप्रायान्तरानि यानि मयौं-श्रुतिकथयोजुर्गृहीतानि"।

तंति च सर्वस्यपूज्यकृत्। "ब्रूहि लं दि महा-प्रजा, ब्रूहि लं महान सुगमात्मज। धर्म-चक्र-वर्तनं सूत्रं भगवता कुञ्ज भाषिलम्।" इति महाकृष्णप-वननावनासानं बुध-शृणुनुमसरण-द्रवीकृत-चित्र

-संतानं: साधु-दुर्दिन-वदनं व्यापिना स्वरूपनायन्त्र एवं मया श्रुतम् इतवाह तत् कथं मयेयात्म-वाचकेन साक्षात्रुपप्रेणम् इति।

नैष दौष:। यदृस्त तथागताधिशान-देशायां तदृ-देशानवतु तत्र-साम्येऽन्नयतः: श्रवणेपि भगवतं एव सकाशाञ्चवरणम्। अन्यतो वा शुन्ता धर्मज्ञरागतवादु अर्थ-निर्णयं

प्रति भगवानं तेन पुष्टं। अन्तोज्ज-निर्णयं-वशादु भगवतं एव सकाशादु श्रुतम् इति कृत्वा भगवत्याः। यदृ उँचं "यन्त-न्वल्ल सर्वं एवं-श्रुतिकथयोहेश्यम्" इति तदृ गृहस्य अधिकृते यति न दौष:।

एवम् उपोइानं कृत्वेदनानि कदा¹ कुत:। कुत: के: सहैं सुर-रत्नं लया श्रुतम् इति प्रभानु

आत्म-प्रामाण्य-प्रतिपदनाय विसर्जयनु। "देश-काल-पपदु-देशिकः² सामग्री हि देशायाः: कारणम्।" इति निदानम् आहुएकसममु समय इति। श्रुतम् एकसममु काल इति पूर्वं

संबंधः। एति सर्वकालमु एवं-विध-किंत्रा-रत्न-राज-सम-सूत्रोपपपमाकावातु कार्यविक्कोलपदशिनं दुलभावमु अस्याख्यातम्।

यदृ बैकसिनम् कालोः सहें सुर-रत्नं श्रुतम् अन्यदानायु इति ब्रह्मका श्रव-गतं

बाहुश्रुत्यं सच्चारं प्रति कारणकृ-बैह-राज-न्यायोनानं संगीतिकारः।

[W7.1] अत बैकसिनम् क्षणं सर्वं श्रुतम् इतयं। स्वने देशादाधिपत्याय अल्पीयापि

कालेन वर्ष-शाताकुपल्लेश्वरु भगवदाधिपत्यानु निखिल-सूत्रार्थविभासिन: समन्ततर-प्रत्यय-मनो-विज्ञान-प्रभव-श्रोत्र-विज्ञानयायकसिनं क्षणं समुदावातु। अनेनात्म: प्रमाण-

पुरुषं भाष, यत् किंचिन् मम भोज्यं तत् सर्वं एकसममु क्षणं मया श्रुतेः चित्तं-चित्तं-विमोह-मुख-लोकविभासिन्। । च विस्मयं इति। अत एव संगीतिकारस्व पञ्चात्र कृमीयेन प्रत्ययादनां देशायाम् अन्य-विनेय-जन-वागाः प्रकाशाम् अन्तरा सदा-समाधानासंभवेन कथं चित्रु अन्यायाकृत्य विशेषान्तरालवलिमन्त्र चेतसः। संभेषिते नाविको शृंगः संगीतितुरु

उत्तर-काले विभृयं, तथागताधिपत्येन संपूर्ण-निर्भरसः: प्रत्ययस्यादावु एवोपात्तावतु। पुनस् तस्य श्रुतीश्वृत्तया धर्म-श्रुतम् मुनेर रसेन।

परिक्रियाएङ्गि विनेय-राजोः। किमु एवं न भवतिति चेतु? भवत्येव सागर-नाग-राज-

परिपृण्डशुद्धनारेन परिषुद्ध-बोधितसत-गणस्य, न तु सर्वं, विशिष्ट-भक्तता-बैकलुणेन

तथा-विकार-धारण-शक्त्याभावातु। कथं पुनर्ज्ञ अयम् एकत्र देशायां विभाग इति चेतु?

1 कदा supplied from Tu, supported by P.
2 देशिक-पदेशिक based on Tu, which is supported by P.
3 The punctuation has been changed from "त्यात्। न-त्यान् न based on Tu."
देशनाहीयं संबृत्यं बर्ण-पद-निर्भरितं-ज्ञानात्मकं। सा यथा-बलं सकृतं क्रमेण वा जयतं
इति न दोषः। अथ वा

dेशान्तर-विनेयार्थं तत्-स्थानं तर्पणायैं च
श्रावकानेक-वासर्षिर्मु आनासङ्केतं च दश्निः।

dेशानां चैत्य-भावार्थं पुण्यार्थं चैव देहिनामुः
ईर्यादिः-समनार्थं च बुद्धशु चरितं चारिकामुः॥

इति पर-हित-प्रवण-मलित्वेशकसिन्मु समये गुण-कूटे विहरितं स्मेत्युतरेण पदेन
संबच्छयते, अन्यदायंत्र विहरितात्।

क्रेश-कर्मं तथा जनम क्रेश-क्रेयावृत्ती तथा।

eyen वैधानिका भग्नासं तेनेह भगवानु स्मृत॥

इत्यार्थानं नैश्क-विधानेन क्रेषादिकं भगवानु इति भगवानु। अथ वा

ऐध्यात्मां समग्रां सुपत्य यशाः: भ्रमः।

ज्ञानस्यायं प्रयत्नायं भूणां भग इति भूणिः॥ [Buddha-bhūmi-sāstra]

[8.1] सोपस्यात्मकति समप्रेययदिमान्। भगवानु विहरितं स्मेतं संबन्धः।

राज-मृहस्यत्वं संहं क्रेश-स्थानं-विशेषं यसु तथागतेऽरु जिन-जनिने-देशां
प्रत्यक्षभिसंबोधिः स्थानवत् बोधिसत्वादि-महा-संतिपाद-भृद्वनासांसर्वविद्या-देशात्वेन
अभकासितो नाना-सत्त्वात् यथा ततो তন্ত্রিতাদिका বাণিজ্যালামাত্র পশ্চাদঃ।

tat विहरितं स्म। नाना-अक्षारश्रु-प्रातिहार्येण लोकातिकान्ताः।
क्रुद-धर्मं-दर्शनातु आवज्यदिशनां-प्रातिहार्यायामशाख-परिश्रानातु

dिपाध्यायुसानासंप्रदायिणेयायायायामभेद-विशेषेण
स्मरणादिः-कारणां मोचनाद्व अभिन्नं अर्थं
कुर्वासं चतुर्भ्रमं ईर्यादिः-देशाना-समापतित्रातिश्राद्वय-ि।

ि। कायाभ-वाक-धर्मं-सत्त्वालम्बनं-मन-स्मृतावेव एवं विहरितानु।

ि। क्रुद्धानोधी-परोक्षी कार्या लतं स्म-शब्द-योगे विहितं। न चात्र कालं संगीती-कारसं परोक्षः।

ि। क्रुद्ध विहरितं स्मेत्य प्रयोगः? सत्यं। ति। न तदनंतरम् "अपरोक्ष वे" न्यायासं शाखातक्तम।

ि। यदि वा पूर्व-याकारणानुसारदृश्यो अन्य-जनार्द्धः वा परोक्षमाप्पोषणद्वारः अदोषः।

 tanggalन्त्रयं तं स्मेत्यादि वाच्यम्।

1 तत्-स्थानांश्रेष्ठं तत्-तर्पणाय based on Tu. P says: देशानां ।

2 W amends देशाना-वादेशाना on the basis of mvp:16.2. Edgerton:392 says "rddhi-pratihārya = miracle

of magic performance, (i.e., indra-jāla multiplication of figures), ādeśanā-pratihārya = mind reading,

anuśasani-pratihārya = miracle of admonition."
Bhikṣu means all those who have overcome klesa: those one cannot posit [as receiving admission to the order] by way of the four actions beginning with a request or alternatively those [immediate disciples] who were fully ordained by [Sākyamuni] saying ‘Come here.’

1. The reading is problematic. P reads: अमप्रभुवस्थितातिशिक्षणस्यसप्ततिः। अद्द्वियोद्विप्रविधालेखयेष्ठाहस्मरणस्यसप्ततिः। The Tibreads: "Bhikṣu means all those who have overcome klesa: those one cannot posit [as receiving admission to the order] by way of the four actions beginning with a request or alternatively those [immediate disciples] who were fully ordained by [Sākyamuni] saying ‘Come here.’"
ते वशीभूता: । तुष्णाविचार-पक्ष-सर्व-कृषोपक्रेष-प्रहाणातु समाधिः-समापत्तयश्च चेतो-विमुक्तिः। अर्ह्मानां ज्ञानं प्रज्ञ-विमुक्तिः इति कृत्या तुष्णाविचार-पक्षानाम् अभवेन यथा-क्रमं राग-विरागाद् अविचार-विरागाच् चेतो-प्रज्ञ-विमुक्तिः। अतस्य तस्याभातु समापतिः-कृषावरण-विमुक्त्या सर्वयोग्य-भाग-विमुक्ता: सुविमुक्त-चित्ता: सुविमुक्त-प्रज्ञा:। शोक-परिदशादि-भयानाम् आभानावादः-परानुवाद-दुर्गत्यजीविका-दण्डाशोक-मरण-भयानां लाभालाभायश-लोक-धार्मिकं-भयस्य स्वाधिगम-परिपम्यान्वितात-धन्य-संयोग्य-मिघ्य-ज्ञान-भयानां चाचाभादु यथा-क्रमं दुः-भय-लोक-धर्मानामात्राणाविगमानु निर्भयतेनाजानेयः:। चेतविधातिचित्रण-धार्मिकगम-योगानु महा-प्रहाण-भावेन महा-नागा:। शीत-सामाधि-प्रज्ञा-परिपूर्णं कृत्यं अवश्य-कर्मं सर्व-दुः-भय-प्रमोदादि कृत्यं कृतं चानुष्ठितं कर्मं स्वेच्छा-प्रतिच्छेद्व-कृतिः हृद-गुणादिकं करणीं [W10.1] ये: ते कृत-कृत्यं:। कृत-करणीया:। दुः-खाद्यार्थ-सत्त्व-चुत-सुष्मिकाधिगमादु यथा-वं परिज्ञान-प्रहार्त्य-सात्त्विक-कर्म-भावितसमानाम् अभावेनः प्रहार:। शास्त्रायनतीता: स्तम्भ-क्रेश-प्रतिभोग-भारा धृते तेजपूर्व-प्रकाशाः। भवन्त: पश्चाद् पनुषासे हिताहित-प्रासि-परिहार-लक्षणोऽदिव-विधिः स्वाभाजनिन्धिहित-प्राशायणाः धृते तेजपूर्व-प्रकाशाः। परि समन्त: यथा-संबन्धर आर्य-मार्गन चौराणिः भवेन सह पुरुष-संयोजनातु अधिविधातिनव-संयोजनानि येषां ते परिष्कर्ष-प्रब-संयोजनाः। सम्पूर्ण अविपरिलोक्ता भा समन्तां मार्गां भाषा, तत्त्वाभिप्रदोष्ट, तया सुहो विमुक्तं सर्व-बन्धन-विभंगे चित्रं येषां ते सम्पण्याः-सुविमुक्त-चित्ता: । सर्वं चैतिति नवानुपूर्वी-विहार-समापतिः-लक्षणोऽस्तान्याद् विभिन्नाः: ते च च ते परम-पारयं स्थ-गोत्र-प्रकृत-परसंप-गतिः प्राप्ताः चैतिति सर्व-चेतो-विष-परम-पारम-प्राप्ताः। अतस्य तेत्रैव रविभूति चित्रशु-शतैरू:। इति ततैयतेतन सर्व-संबद्ध: कायः।

सद्वैहीन्तः कृताः। शीणास्यवलातु । शीणाशवा नित्येशतावतु । एवं यावत सम्पण्याः-सुविमुक्त-चित्ता:। सर्व-चेतो-विष-परम-पारम-प्राप्ताः। एवं पूर्व-पुरुषस्योत्तरोऽतर कारणम्। अत: सर्व-पुरुषार्थ-परिसमापत्तवान् नापेन विशेषं वाच्यम् इति यद्येके।

हारित्वाद् अहीन्तः। प्रहाण-कृषावरणात्वाद् शीणाशवा:। पुनरू सासिक-क्षर-प्रयासलक्ष-कृषाभावान् नित्येश:।

तदृ हेमस्य एव:। पद्धरत्यानु-प्रहाण-लक्षणम् गुणाम् अभियादेतान्ति प्रतिवक-लक्षणम् गुणं बलींसूदृश् इत्यदिनां।। अभिज्ञाद्वैशेषिक-पुणामिन्हरामायम् अशेष-शामस्य-विशेषायप्रम् योगातु त्रैलोक्यसूदृश-समतत्न सत्तार्थ-प्रख्यां नियुक्ता भगवता वशीभूता:। सर्व-प्रकार-शून्य-वृहत-अध्यान-विनोभादु यथा-क्रमं सुविमुक्त-चित्ता:।

1 [आत्मा] प्रति (अप्रति?): Tib རྣས་ means ‘to denigrate or criticize.’

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संग्राम-विजित्वित्वानु महा-नागादः। पुनरू अेतव्याभावातू कृत-कृत्यः। युक्त-स्पष्टकृत्यः कार्यसंपादनात् कृत-करणीयः। पीभावैविक-दु:खानुपायान्तु अपहृत-भारः। 
नित्यान-साक्षात्-करणात् अप्रभास-स्वकारामः। भवेहेतु-समुदायत्तु परिश्री-भव संयोजनः। 
दर्शन-भावना-भार्या-निलोकपर्यंत सम्प्रदाया-सुविनोक्त-चिन्ता। [W11.1] 

eैवेशिकाधिबासिद्ध-गुण-विशिष्ट-स्व-गोत्रोक्ष-गमनादु सर्व-चेतो-बल-परम-पारिमिता। इति तयैव संबन्धः। 
पूर्ण-पुर्वपीयाफलोत्तरं कारणम्। विशेषण-निदानाभिवाने च न पुनरू विशेषणं वाच्यम्। अति नामयवमान-दोष इति वानिककरः।

धर्मधराप्रलुत्वः यथोक-संस्थान्न्यतीिर्दिपिनेिव-सुद-युक्त इतताहु एक्तायां। निःत्य प्रत्ययां-कारण-लक्षण-वाच्य-वाच्य-भावानुपपत्। ? शुभाशुभ-वासनाभः तूर्तादित्यतः। 
तदनुसन्तां गति लाति गुणः। तैसर-विधारम्भानु अवनन्तस्वपुनाः। यहूदु-शद्दो निपात उपदर्शन-परः। 
आकाशिनायुः भवतु इतयुयुमानाः। हित-सुख-पूजा-वाचकः।

वर्गाम-धारण-बुद्धोपस्यानेन प्राप्त-प्रकल्पाद्यादृश्यान्त्व भानंदः। 

tदृ उकम्भू एक आयुयुमानाः। आप्नन्दो देशनाकाले स्वत-आप्नन्तवें यथोक-गुणाः। 

वैकल्यारू मेवस्य एक्य-पुदलं स्पायतित्वा परिव्ययेति। 

परिसार-कार्यकलेन स्व-हितीश्चत्यात्त्यागाधिकारे सर्वसंपत्तेषु च

पञ्चािनव-ैवक्त्यारत्व-रागाधिभूतः। 

लाभाद्धदृश्या-प्रीतयानेतुनकम्-सुख-गौरस्वे। 

कौतुहलादृश्यमापवया रत्न-कारणातृज्ञाद्यादृश्यान्त्व च भिध्यशृष्टिवर्त हरिपरिवर्तिणां। [Kṣudrāgama]

इति पञ्च-दश-चारिका-करण-वैकल्यारू स्वयं न कवचिदृमं क्षयित। कैवल्य कृत्तता-धार्मि- 

gोरवादिभिक्रृ भवत्ति अनुपन्तानिके सदा विहारवानिति निजलवातु स्वेत्वमेवः महा-भावकपर्यं उकाः।

गमिरामाति-सुत्रान्त-रत्न-अवस्था-तृणम्। 

लोक-धार्तुत्ततनेत्र भ्रमित्वृ कृत्तिनो यत्। 

तदृ योहक्तुशाषणाद् एक बहुस्वसू ते समागताः।

1 Some text is probably lost through haplography here. One expects वानिककरः। ... संबन्धः।

2 W's compound कार्य-कारण-लक्षण-वाच्य-वाच्य-भाव is attested in Kapila's Sāṃkhya-pravacana (mw:937, but likely in a very different context) and possibly by the Tib and is retained; however पञ्चािनव-ैवक्त्यारत्व-रागाधिभूतः suggests वानिककरः। (Tu) in the present context. Cf. MS:2.13.

3 Tib कौतुहलादृश्यमापवया रत्न-कारणातृज्ञाद्यादृश्यान्त्व च भिध्यशृष्टिवर्त हरिपरिवर्तिणां। [Kṣudrāgama] suggests a reading different to both W and Tu.

4 Tib divides the compound पञ्चािनव-ैवक्त्यारत्व-रागाधिभूतः च भ्रमित्वृ कृत्तिनो यत्। "love for a relative and respect for the guru."

5 सेतुव-स्वेत्वमेव (emend to स्वेत्वमेव?) Tu, सेतुवपु.
1. The scene and retinue according to the longer Sūtras

Based on Tu. P reads: अर्जुणाःपुरुषोऽभिषित.

2. दृष्ट्यमभ्रम usually means "visible world; the here and now," and has a negative connotation in Buddhist Skt. The corresponding section in the Śata (quoted Mpps:232), however, says पत्र-मात्रे: भिषुयणु-शर्तः... दृष्ट्यमभ्रम: so धर्म evidently = आर्यम-सच.

3. साभोग-नितित-विहारिणोज्जाभोग-नितित-साभोममित-विहारिणोज्जाभोगनितित based on Tu and supported by P; cf. AA23d.

4. स्फारित-स्फूर्ति This is the reading preferred by Tu and V.
Following P, and Tu who adds (in parenthesis).

Prājñā-Abhidhrst Tu. Tib བྱི་ཁྲུ་ is equivalent to प्रभृम "the lack of any physical or mental hardship when engaging in virtuous activity; pliancy" (AS1.1, Rahula:8).
तदनु "संक्रिय-लोक-धातुत्तपादात् संभवतःप्रजादि-प्रकृतिलाचू च सर्व-बुद्धे न समानोपयं भवानु।" इति सर्वार्त-जगन्धर-करण्याय मन्न-धी-जनाच्याखु अधूरकृताय समान-प्रस्थान-संभार-परिपूर्ण-बोधिसत्वाणां प्रति-बुद्ध-क्षेत्रम् अनुत्तर-सम्पुर्ण-संबोधि-संभवात् सर्व-बुद्धे सह "संभव-धर्म-कार्यम् जगत् चार्यम्। समता सर्व-बुद्धानां नायुर-जातिप्रामाणय।" इत्यादिनासु तुल्यां कथयसु, तथा नाना-लोक-धातुरंपुर-कृत-प्रणिधान-स्व-विवेक-बोधि-सत्तनाम् अशृंगार-समस्त-अवधान-रत्न-सुन्दर देशानाय संभार-परिपूर्णापोषयोपदेशानां तथा सिमतमु अकरोदं भगवान् येनान्योष्यं सर्व-लोक-धातुस्थ-स्थानं नामोत्सुति-संसार-बीजः स-पर्षेषु-समुस्फुर् इतरेतर-लोक-धातवीय-बुद्धानु भवतं समुपलक्ष्य तुल्यां तत्रिपन्।।

तथा महावभासादिनिमितोपलभ-पूर्वकं गुरुयित्तयतं न सहसा गमनं युक्तम इति तदर्थः दश-दिश-लोक-धातवीय-जिनात्रः तानु स्व-स्व-तथागतानु उपस्तम्भम पादभिवंदन-पुर-वरा एव "भगवन् कस्यायम् अनुभाव।" इति प्रस्तुत विसर्जनान्तरं प्रशंसा-वाक्य-अवशेषं विदितव्याहितिभद्रासायाः "तादृशु-विवेक-समपरिवर्ध-भगवद्-दर्शनाद्य गमिनामो वयं भगवन्नितव्यारोज्य गृहीत-स्वाधिनयत्रधर्म-गौरव-प्रेषित-पूजार्थ्य-नाना-रत्न-पव-वार्त-संदेशायामानवातिदि-परिपूर्णा-वचनाः पदः कथयोस्तवद्वादृंत अस्य लोक-धातरूर अप्रामाद-विशारिणो भविष्येत्तमुशास्नी प्रतिभूतांतरावति-बुद्धानां पूजामु अभिनवीन्त्वतन्त्रोपरिभिमित-परिवारः: [W15.1] समायमानुक्षित-पाद-वन्दन्य-पूर्वक-पूजा-प्रसरा: स्व-स्व-स्थानिभय कथित-स्व-स्व-तथागत-वार्ता-वचना: प्रापिनिगीतितकतः, इति द्वि-विधं धमावभासन-अतिरिहार्यम्।

तदनु भगवानं तानि पदान्यपरिश्रुद्ध-लोक-धातुत्तपादेशिष्ठ तद्-दोषानुपलेप-जापाय सद्भर-प्रजायं प्रहितान्तित कृत्यः, स्व-स्व-दिशनु प्रक्षयते तेषु च पदेशु तथागताधिधारिण-पूर्वकं जिन-जननी-देशानुपल्यमासम्यक्कं संबोधिसर्वस्त्रात्तुत्तरीयकु तु सद्भर-पूजायां उपनामं, समगर-यथा-भव्य-महा-बोधिसत्वादि-संस्थापत्म अगम्यादि-मध्यान्त्र-कल्याणविद्यकं प्रजापारमिता देशानवान्। इति विनेदानं प्रतिपत्तिव्यम्। अत्र तूद्विटितसंख्यों मच्छ-सत्तमुप्रार्थ-देशानाधिकारानु नैतसम्।।

तदृः [एतद्] उक्ते, यदा भगवान् राज-गृहे महान-गरे गृह्-कृते पवित्र यथोक्त-पर्षेण परिवृतो धर्मं देशयन् बिज्ञाहर, तदा भगवत: सकाशात् ततैव स्थापने तथा पर्षेण सार्थम् एवं मया सूत्र-रत्नं श्रेष्ठम् इति।

1 युपान्यासप्रेमादेशाय-पूर्णोपपोषप्रेमेशाय based on Tu and supported by P.
2 This has been omitted from P.
3 P एक एक = निदानम्
4 Perhaps part of the preceding sentence?
सर्वरूप अपेक्षे लोक-व्यवहारानुसन्तानात्मक संजीवनीय-देशादिभिः संगीतिकारणात्मकान्ती-प्रामाण्य-प्रतिपादनाधीन विनेतानां सादर-क्रिया-विनादिकामः उक्तम्। तथा चाचार्य-दिग्नानाः।

श्रद्धावत् प्रवृत्त्यः शास्त्रा पर्यथा च साक्षाय:।

dेश-काली च निदर्शी स्व-प्रामाण्य-प्रस्तुतम्॥

संगीतिकारणात्मकान्ती-प्रतिपादनाधीन निदर्शी।

स-साधनां वदनु बक्ता प्रामाण्यम् अधिगच्छति॥ [PPP:3-4] इति।

[10.6 The contents in brief]

तद्र

प्रमोक्षन स-पिन्डार्थ पदार्थोः सानुसंधिक:।

s-चोध-परिवर्तनस्य च वाच्य: सूत्रविद्य-वादिभिः॥ [Vyākhya-yukti]

इति प्रश्नमिच्छ वाकारे: सूत्रं व्याख्यात्वमं इति व्याख्या-युक्तौ निर्णयं इत्यमिच्छितम्

एव प्रयोजनम्। अतः श्रीरु-जन-सुख-प्रतिपादने कृत्व-विभागायित्र च शास्त्रेषु सुकरं

व्याख्यान्तुष्णा व्याख्यानम् इति समास-निदर्शन पिन्दार्थस्य तावद् अभिधीयते।

[VI6.1, 10.6.2] तत्र बुद्धवाचार्यानि बोधि-सत्त्वस्य चित्तोत्पादातिद्वाराकार-परिवर्तनात्।

फल-निदर्शन सर्वकारः कथिता। सा न विना श्रीवक-वाग्रार्थिद्वारा-परिवर्तनेनेति, तदनु भागितम्। सापि न सर्व-वेदुरु-परिवर्तनम् अन्तर्गतिततवदनतंत्र कर्तव्यम्।

tतत्: सर्वथे व द्रव्य-त्रि-सर्वत्र-विषतार्थाः पुनः सर्वकार-मार्ग-वेदु-ज्ञान-

प्रकार-संग्रहः त्रि-सर्वत्र-भावनयाधिकारस्य सर्वकाराभिमानस्यैः। विशेष-मार्गमन्यं पर्वताधिकार-संग्रहः

लभान् सूत्रविश्वसनम् भाष्याय:। व्यस्त-समस्त-मैदेन भविष्यरित्य अथात्

प्रायुक्तिकृत्य, निश्चयाय साक्षात् कर्तव्यिति विद्विधानुपासनसंबधम्, पुनः अपि

स्वभावस्तीकरणात् विभावितकृत-क्षणाभिमानसंबधानातर्थ द्वितीयः कणे धर्म-काय्यभिमानसंबधोः

सम्यगु अधिगच्छति सामास्तोक्तस्यभिमानस्य: प्रज्ञ-परामितायां पिन्दार्थ:। तथा

चोधकः [AA3-4]।

प्रज्ञा-परामिताभाद्भिः पदार्थं समुदारिता।

सर्वकारः मार्गिताः सर्वविधानं तत्:॥

सर्वकाराभिमानसंबोधोऽहर्ष-प्राप्तोज्ज्वलितः॥

एक-क्षणाभिमानसंबोधो धर्म-काय्यशः च तेषाम्॥

—is परिवर्तनातू बाधी?
[10.6.3]

समास-निर्दिष्टस्य व्यासतश्च चाध्यायात्म स्वाख्यातन्त्रम् इति पुनः अर्थ व्यासतः
पिण्डायशिष्ठियेते।

तत्र सम्मक्ष-संवोधिम् अधिगतु-कामेनादृश्यता-करणा-गम्भीर बोधि-विद्वते प्रणिधिद्ध्रु
स्वाभाविक हिं-विधीम् उत्तरायणि चित्रोत्तादि-ददाकंप्त-धम्म-निष्ठावे संप्राग-मुण
-परिपालनार्थिनामिभविष्यते दुःस्मित्या ध्रुवादि-प्रकर्ष-प्रा-प्रमोक्षालीय-श्रद्धादि-लक्षण-कुशल-मूलावं उद्धरं, चतुः-सत्य-प्रतिवेदानुवृत्तं चतुरिधीये
निर्देशितानि लोकिकं भावामयं निर्देशितयं, प्रतिपति ततो यथोंत्न-निर्देशितानि अन्यन्त
अर्थ दर्शन-मार्गिकम् इति प्रतिपत्तिः आधारित धर्म-धात्व-स्वाभावात्म बोधि-सत्त्वन हर्ष-
धमुल्लान-पूर्वकं सर्व-सत्त्वाप्रव-विव-महत्त्वं प्रहार-महत्त्वम् अधिगम-महत्त्वं
चाधिुक्त्व प्रतिपति: प्रवति इत्यभद्रपथ-स्थायीत्व मिन्ध: समुद्रेऽहों धेरे। तदनु
तत्वा विचारस्रं-विषये सामान्येन शुक्ल-धमिभिष्टाना सवर्धिरकल्लमूर्तीदृष्टे
चतुरिधीये समस्तं प्रत्येकु परि धारितनिधीया अनुभवात् च क्रिया [W17.1] प्रतिपतिः,
इत्यं यावं प्रयोग-दर्शन-भावना-विशेष-मार्ग-स्वाभावान संताहा-दिप्रतिपत्तीं
मध्ये नौर्स्तपथमण्यः संनाह-प्ररिपतया संनाह्द्रस्य-प्ररिपतया समस्त-महायण-धमिभिष्टाने-स्वर्द-परिपतिः संभूत-संहारण नियाण-परिपतिः
अधिगतवेदेये सुदुर्वालहार-धमिभिष्टानकम् मण्येण प्रकाशनात् तथागतानां इति प्रथम-
परिवर्तेः संगृहीता सवर्धिरकल्ता। तथा चोक्त अपस्त् [AAS-6]।

चित्रोत्तादिका-विचारश्च स निविधां चतुरिधीम्।
आधारः प्रतिपतेऽव धर्म-धातु-स्वाभावकः।
आलंबनं समुद्रं वनस्य प्रतिहिन्तिः-क्रिये।
संभाराश्च च स-नियाणाः: सवर्धिरकल्ता मुने। इति।

[10.6.4]

तदनु सवर्धिरकल्तेऽधिमिमो न विना सव-मार्ग-परिजनानेति मार्गानि दर्शियें, सव-
प्रकृति-प्रभासि देवदीनें वैपाकिक-प्रभाया मलिनीकरणो लोक-पाल्लाबभिमान-
निराकरणादं, बकोक्तिता निहत-मान-संतान एव पुढ़लोधिमेस्या भव्य इत्याधार-
कथानानन्तरं, धिष्य-प्रतिनिधिकम् अभिधारय, "मार्गिकारने सव-मार्गः: परिश्रानितम् इति धारक-प्रत्येक-बुद्ध-मार्ग-प्रतिपत्तान-पूर्वकम्, ऐहतौ किकिकादि-मूर्तैः
उपती महानृत् बोधि-सत्त्वान दर्शन-मार्गों भावताभिन्नः।

ततोन्नतं भावना-मार्गिकाकावो सतिः, सव-बक-वत्त्वत् फल-निमित्तेन च विनेय-
प्रबोद्धेऽति तथा कारत्रम् आदि निर्देशिः, साध्वानाध्यायः लेखं हिं-विधो भावना-मार्गः
इत्यभद्रिक-परिश्रमानानमोनमा कन्साकानन-चिक्को विवध-सात्त्व-भावना-मार्ग-मध्ये,
काज्ञ-पिण्डम् इव धातुद्ध:। पुष्पम् अम्बि-सकरोतीयात्राभिहितस्मृतिक-मन्स्कारम् उक्ता,
तद्भावक-बोधि-सत्त्वोत्साहनाये "चम् अधिमुक्तरू बुधादिभि: स्तुत्यादय: क्रियता"

इत्युत्सर्यरामिन्नन-स्त: स्तुत्सत्तोमित-शिष्यिता: कथिता: ।

तदनुः सम्यक्-संस्कृयस्य तत् पुष्यम् उपकारी-करोति सुवर्णकार इवाभरणम् इति
परिणामस्य-मनस्कार-पूर्वकः स्त-पर-पुष्य-क्रिया-समता-प्रतिलाभायम् अनुमोदना-
मनस्कारम् अभिधाय: प्रयोग-विशुद्धि-मेधेन द्विविधोत्सर्यास्वभा भावना-गार्ग इति प्रयोगम्
अभिनिर्मित-पदार्थां प्रतिपादः द्वितीयोः [W18.1] थ्यतै-विशुद्धि-तुल्को देशित, इति
द्वितीय-परिवर्तमाण आरध्य यावदू अष्टम-परिवर्त ई एवम् अस्य: बोधि-सत्त्वय
भगवन्वासो इयम् अस्य प्रजा-पारमिता। भगवान् आहु: अरियत्व-विशुद्धित्वातुः
सूमत" इत्येवत्-पर्यत्नोत्काता बोधि-सत्त्वानां मार्गिता। तथा चोक्तम् [AA7-9] ।

ध्यामीकरणातोदिनि शिष्य-खड़ग-पथी च यौः।
महानुःश्च दूः-मार्गै भैरिकामुक्ति-गुणे: ॥
कारितयु अधिमुक्तियु च स्तुत्सत्तमित-शिष्यिता:।
परिणामेषुपदेन च मनस्कारात्मकाः ॥

निर्मित: शुद्धि: अरियत्वम् इत्यं भावना-पथाः।

विजानां बोधि-सत्त्वानाम् इति मार्गितातिदिता ॥ इति ।

[10.6.5]

ततः "सर्व-वस्तु-परिश्रमा विना न मार्ग-परिश्रमान सम्यग्" इति सर्वत्राः दर्शियतुः प्रजया
संसारार्द्धव-दशनिन कुप्या च सत्त्वार्थ-करण-पारतन्येयता बोधि-सत्त्वानां भवान-भावनेन भावनाः
प्रयोग-विशुद्धि-निधनेन नैः भावक-प्रत्येकबुधानाम् इति निर्देश-पूर्वकः
ततः-सम्यकायमूः प्रागत्व-न्यूतस्नायु निमित्तानिमित-प्रहणाः, जिन-जनाः
निमित्त्व-न्यूत-बाहुनिपत्तमानसुपल्ल्याया विपक्ष-प्रतिपक्षी निदेशिः, तयोः
विभावनाः पुनर्भावय-मुखवेन बोधि-सत्त्वानां प्रयोग-कथयाः अततः ततः-समताः
प्रतिपादन-पूर्वकः हेतौ दर्शन-मार्गितामिति:। इत्येवत्-परिवर्त भायुमानू सुवृत्तिरु
भावम्यार्थम् यावदू नवम-परिवर्ते नापि कस्यपदु धर्मस्य प्रवर्तन्ति वा निबिर्तन्ति वा।
पुष्यम् ईयं सुभूते बोधि-सत्त्वस्य महा-सत्त्वस्य प्रजा-पारमितेवेतत्पर्यत्नोत्काता
भावक-प्रत्येकबुधाः सर्वत्राः। तथा चोक्तम् [AA10-11] ।

प्रजया न भवे स्वाभः कुप्या न शमे स्थिति:।
अनुपालने दूः-प्रत्येकमु उपासनेविदूः।
विपक्ष-प्रतिपक्षी च प्रयोगः समवास्य: च।

दूः-मार्गोः भावकार्दिनाम् इति सर्वत्राः। इति ।

1 W adds स on basis of Tib न।
10.6.6

तदनन्तर "प्रत्याग-त्रि-श्रवण-स्थिति पुनः सर्वकार-मार्ग-स्वतः-ज्ञान-प्रकार-संप्रहेण त्रिमण्डल: भावयति"ति [W19.1] सर्वकारार्थ: संबंधों दर्शितितेम, आकार विशिष्ट-
प्रयोगः भाविचित्रण: यथा-संबंध: पुनः-दोषादान-त्यागेणः लक्षण:-ज्ञान-पुर्वकमुः उपयुक्त-
मौख-भाषी-कुशल मूल्येकारकारादीनः तिरिदय, विचित्रित: मौख-भाषी-स्वयंस्वयंसिद्धिनो
निकृष्ठ-भाषी-धारितितेगम-चारे: प्राप्त:-शैक्षित्व-विकार:-बोध-सत्त्व: मण्ड-प्रमाणा बुद्धत्व-
निमित्त-संसार-निर्वाण-समत्त-भावना-पूर्वकम् निषुक्त: स्व-बुद्ध-कुशल-विश्वासः उपाय-
कौशले यथा-भव्यतानाबोधादुः बुद्ध-कुशल स्वतंत्रता इति निकृष्ठ-भाषीयादवो देशिताः
इति नवम-परिवर्त एवम् उक्त आयुष्मानुः सुभूतिः भगवन्तम् एतद् अभोजनः।
ष्ट्र-पारमाण्यं इत्यार्थ: यावः विशिष्टसम्पर्काः ते ते बोध-सत्त्वा
बर्षाहायः: स-देव-मानुषास्वरूपः लोकेन्येष्यत्त्-पर्यायनोक्तो बुद्धादीनः यथा-संभवं
सर्वकारार्थ: संबंधोऽः। तथा चोक्तम् [AA12-13]।

आकारा: स-प्रयोगाश् च गुणा दोषाः: स-लक्षणाः।
भोक-निर्विश्व-भागीयं शैलवैवतिको गणः।
समताः भव-शाल्योऽः स्वश्रृंख्ल: अनुतरा।
सर्वकारार्थ: संबंधोऽः एव सौष्ठव-कौशलः।

10.6.7

तदनन्तर प्राप्त:-सर्वकारार्थ: संबंधोऽः विशेष:-मार्गाः प्रक्ष-पर्यात्ता-धारितिः इति
मूर्तिभस्ममय: दर्शितं यथा-संख्यम् उपायार्तः-चुस्तिभवः-निकृष्ठ-भाषी-स्वभाव-लिख:-
निकृष्ठ-निर्देश-चित्र-मिच्छिताः-संरक्षिताः-प्रतिपाद-पूर्वकः "प्रकृति:-चित्रेत:-पक्षाधिशासनाः व्रव्य-
प्राप्त-सत-पुष्पाधिशासनाः यथा-कूण्डः ही ही प्राप्त:-प्राइम:-विविधाः।" इति प्रहेतयतः
चुतिविधि विपक्षः तत्-प्राणात्मक: विशेषः चोपादेयतयः चुतिविधि प्रतिपाद-पूर्वकः दर्शन:-
भावना-मार्गाः निर्दिषयः बुद्धत्व:-प्राप्ते अवधायनानन्तर-समाधिः उप्याय-
सत्याचित:पाधः निराकरणीय-विप्रभताः सहृ देशित इति विशिष्टसम्पर्काः "सचेत्ति बोध-सत्त्व: महा-सत्त्व: स्वपननतर-गतोऽपि।"यावः एको:-निर्विश्व-सत: ते ते
"कुशल:-कुशल:-धर्म:-परिपरिप्रमाणात्त् प्राप्त:-पारमाण्यात्त्-सन्दुः। तथा चोक्तम् [AA14-16a]।

[1] दूर्बिद्धत्वत् केन् प्रमाणाः।
2 देशित:-देशिताः based on Tu.
3 भागीयं शैलोऽः शैलोऽ based on Tu, Stcherbatsky and Obermiller (1929).
चतुर्द्वीर च विकल्पस्य प्रतिपक्षश्च चतुर्विधः
प्रत्येकं दर्शनाभ्यं च भावनाभ्यं च विचरि
अन्तर्यां समाधिण्यं च सह विप्रतिपतिभि
मूर्तिभिः... इति।

[10.6.8]
तदन्तु प्राप्त-मूर्तिभिःसमयो व्यस्त-समस्तत्तत्तनाधिगतानु अर्थानु अनुपूर्वीकृत्य स्फोरी-करणां विभावयतीति सर्व-धर्मंस्त्राहक-दानादि-नृयोदयं-प्रकारणेंकोनत्रस्ततम-परिवर्तेत् "सिङ्ग-नाद-नन्दनत्यं प्रज्ञा-पारभिता-नन्दनतांगत्यं"तथेनेव पदेन सकारणेनकोनतनुपूर्विभिःसमयं। तथा चोक्तम् [AA16b]

त्रिधा दशाधा चानुविविकः... इति।

[10.6.9]
तदन्त्तं विभाववित्तानुपूर्विभिःसमयस्य व्यस्त्यतिकरणां तेषां एवाधिगतां धर्मानां अन्तर्गतानांस्रवै-धर्म्यक-क्षण-वाक्षणिक-चतुर्विधाभेदाभानां एकानेत्
क्षणेनाभिमुखीकरणम् हि इति तत्रेव परिवर्तेत् सर्व-धर्मोपपत्तयं प्रज्ञा-पारभिताकोप्यतयांगत्यं इत्येनेव पदेन सकारणेनकोन-ध्यामारिण्यो देशितं। तथा
चोक्तम् [AA16c]

एक-क्षणाभिभिःसंबंधो लक्षणेन चतुर्विधः... इति।

[10.6.10]
तदन्तु विभाववित्तक-क्षणाभिभिःसंबंधो द्वितीये क्षणे धर्मकायाभिभिःसंबंधो इति त्रिविधम्
अन्तरत्त्वभिःसंबंधो बोधि-सत्त्वां निर्दिष्टो परिशिष्ट-काय-त्रं तथ्यसंवृत्तया
प्रतिभासात्त्वोऽर्थार्यसंवृत्तुरुपचततोधर्म्य-संवृत्तुरुपयाभिण्यो यथादिधिङ्क्
भावाविन्दोसंवृत्तुरुपं भवति कथनाय।

विविधाविवितरैं कतं विशेषस्य यतो सयम् [Laṅkāvatāra]
इति न्यायालं तद्व अन्यतिरैंविद्यो दोषेऽव लोकोत्तरेण मार्गेण प्राप्तेत्, न तु क्रयत
इत्यकथितायान्ति। मायोपमाध्याद्य-ज्ञान-सर्व-धर्म-प्रतिपक्षविधिण: स्वाभाविकः काय इति
तत्त-कथन-पुनर्वके, अवयवम् एवामुपपात्तयो योगि-संवृत्तया विशिष्टार्थ-प्रतिभास-ज्ञान-द्वारे
णाश्रयं-परवृत्तम् परवृत्तम् [W21] धर्म-दशाधार-क्रिया-कारिणोध्याया चित्राचैतं: सर्वकारास्य तथा
गतानाम एव गोचरो ज्ञान-संभार: स-व्यापारे धर्म-काय।

1 -अमर्शेन?
2 भाषय-भाषय based on Tu.
इत्यभिधानान्तरं, नाना-सूत्र-रत्न-अवांशिलाषिभिर्\nदश-भूमि-प्रविष्ट-महा-\nबोधिसत्वः: सहं परमानवं-महायान-धर्म-संस्थो-प्रीति-सुखोप्रसोगाद्
अप्रमेय-पुण्य-\nसंभार-संभूत-लक्षणानुवयन्त्त्रि-विराजित-गात्रं
सामीभोगिक-कायं प्रतिपादः, \nयथा-
भव्यतयाणिः-जगद्ध-क्रियाकारी सविदा आः\nभवाराधः अनुपरत-प्रब्रम्धं: शाक्य-मूलिः-
तथा-गणान-स्थत्त्रो निर्माण-कायं: पुण्य-ज्ञान-संभोगराणण
tवाकामुच्यलम्ब-योगो देशितं, \nइत्येकोननिर्देश-स्थल-परिवर्त "एवं हि सुभूते \nबोधि-सत्त्वेन महा-सत्त्वेन [प्रजा-\nपारमितानुगत्वे]"तयारथ्या यावद् \"अनुतरणो च बुद्ध-धर्माणं परिपुरौ"\nइति \nपरिवर्त-पथवेसानेनोक्तो बुद्धान्त भगवातं \nधर्म-कायाभिसंबोधः: \nतथा चोंकतम् [AA17]।

स्वाभाविक: स-साम्रोगो नैर्माणिकोपरस् तथा।
धर्मकाय्य: स-कारित्रशु चतुर्घा समुदेशितिः इति।

[10.6.11]
तदन्तरं "सदा-प्रशुदित-बोधि-सत्त्वत् प्रतिपतिः: कार्यंति विनय-जन-बोधनाय
tद-पूर्वोम्यं कथा-मुखेन काल्याण-भित्रारागण-पूर्वक-प्रजा-पारमिता-योगानुवत्तां
संदेशगीतिम् उपसंहार-द्रवेण मध्यम-प्रतिपत्तिः\nयथोक्ताभिसमय-क्रम-प्रतिपदन-परम्
एव परिवर्ते-त्रयं देशितम्।\nतत् पुनः सुगमतिवाद अभिसमायांकार-कारिवीय न संमृद्धितम्
इत्यपर-प्रकार-द्रवेण समुदायत्व-स्पर्धाभिधाप्यमानत्तवादै एकस्य तावत् समुदायाः।

1 This is added from Tu. P reads: ईक्यादेशैः ईक्यथाय श्रवण।
2 ध (probably a printing error in W)-भ supported by Tu.
3 प्रतिपत्तिः = P गृहान्यं श्रवणे[व] श्रवणं?
II PERFECT WISDOM

[11.1]

तत्र खलु भगवानु आयुष्यताः सुभूतिः स्वविरमः आनन्दयन्ति स्मः

इवानी पदार्थादिभयायने सत्तायामिष्ठायते, तत्रेत्यादि।

tतत्तेति वाथ्योपनवसे । खलु-शब्दो वाक्यालंकारे । शोभनारणा-विहारिणां मध्येऽग्रा भूतिः चेतसः संप्तिः स्यथ स सुभूति� । स-देवके लोके जुशादिभि: स्माविर्य-प्राप्तावात् स्वविर: ।

इह कविचित तथागतानां काय-व्यापारात्मक-पाण्याधिकारायने देखना । तदृ यथा

dश-भुमकाद: सत्कृ देखना। कविचित कलागिरिणाने। [W22.1] तदृ यथाजात-शुद्ध-शोक-

विनोदनू-सूत्रादः । कविचित मनोधिधिणाने। तदृ यथा समन्त-भंड-चर्या-निर्देश-सूत्रादेः ।

इत्यङ्गामु-समुन्नयिष्ठेमु-नामामु अनुग्रह-परीक्षान्त्यायां सत्यकृ-परिश्रावंडी-क्रमेण महायाने

विनयालु । सन्न्यासात्मामु अचिन्तयो वा तथागतानामु उपास-जौशाल-प्रभावो

स्वातु सर्वेषाश्रेष्ठापि कस्यत इति प्रभाव-संदर्भां विनेयानामु अनुग्रहं मु नया-पारमिता-भाष्यां प्रति वागधिधान्यान्यां-सुभूतिः अन्य-मनसं कङ्कु सत्यमणस्करणां

भगवानु आनन्दयते स्माविर्यतनवान् ।

प्रतिभातु के समुद्रे बोधि-सत्त्वानां महा-सत्त्वानां प्रजा-पारमितामु आर्थ्य यथा बोधि-

सत्त्वा महा-सत्त्वा: प्रजा-पारमितामु नियुक्तिः इति ।

कथमु इतयाहु प्रतिभातित्वत्तियः। धर्म-देशनाधिकारादु विचारावतेषां हेः सुभूते

बिशिष्टाः धर्मिन्त-निर्वक-प्रतिभानु-प्रतिसंबबु त्वथा तै वामभिमुखी-स्वच्छु। बोधि तव- धर्मसंकल्पानां स्वार्थ-संपदान सत्त्वामु अभिप्रायो येषामु ते बोधि-सत्त्वा । आवका अपि

स्वयं एवुम इत्याहु महा-सत्त्वा इति। महत्त्वां परार्थ-संपदान सत्त्वां येषां ते महा-

सत्त्वाः। महा-सत्त्वां चाचिन्तामु तीर्थ्स-साधु-जनवरु स्यादु इति बोधि-सत्त्व-प्रहणमु ।

अतस् तेषां बोधि-सत्त्वानां महा-सत्त्वानां प्रजा-पारमितामु भाष्येति।

प्रथम-कल्पादयोध-नियोवधिमुखिः चाँ विवधयन्तु संमूर्त-पुणय-संभारे बोधि-

सत्त्वः: गुणे देशे पर्यायमु आयुष्याः, बुद्ध-बोधिसत्त्वालम्बन-पूर्वकं प्रजा-पारमितानाम सवर्त- धर्म-नैरात्म्य-धोतंकं मूल-विनेशन नामात: सामूलम्, तस्येव पद-प्रभेद-परिवर्तार्मे-मेधादु अनुचार-चितेन निर्मितेन । तत्तोदाभिष्ममयाशया-भेदेन संख्याः-प्रहणादु गणनाय, प्रत्यभिसमग्र न्व-रूप-निशयायाः तुलनाय, अध्यायोपापवाचारवानु मीमांसाय, प्रत्यादानामु-प्रयोगोपपन्नत्वात् प्रत्येकासंत्पत्येवें प्रजा-पारमितां चतुर्भीरु आकारेऽ

व्यवहारः च व्यस्त-समस्तानि यथा-कङ्कृ निरसंसारः-सत्येवेमु आकाराभयां विचारणाः-

1 वैभद्यः-वैभद्यः the reading in both Tu and V.
2 वीत्त-वीत्तदन based on Tu.
Even allowing for H's style this sentence is not syntactically complete. It seems possible that a small portion has been lost. The sentence has been omitted from the Tib translation.
तत्त्रादृशै गोत्राः सामाध्यास्तु कुपा-ब्रज-प्रवोधतः।
प्रमोदगायता-संपत्ता बोधि-विचारते-परिप्रेषः।

इति न्यायदृशै गोत्रादिसामध्ये बोधिसत्तां संवर्ण-सामादानादिना श्रव्या-कथणा-गम्भीर
बोधि-विचारम् उत्पादिते, "सम्यक-संबुद्धो भूता यथा-भव्यतया पुरार्थे प्रति निषयान-धर्मं-
देशानिधिभौ यतं कृतं" इति प्रणिधानं कृतं "प्रतिपत्त्वा संपातयेद्" इति
परार्थितिन्मयः स-हेतु-फलः सम्यक-संबोध्यधिमग्न-कामता-लक्षणः।

गन्तु-कामस्य गन्तुशु च यथा भेदः प्रतीतये।
तथा भेदोन्योर् जेनो यथा-संख्येन पपित्ते। [[BCA:1.16]

इति प्रणिधि-प्रस्थान-स्वभावेः द्व-विध्यश्च चितोपादः। ननु,

महोत्सुभा महार्थमा महाभारती महोदया।
चेतना बोधि-सत्तवां द्रामणाः चित्त-संभवः। [[MSA:4.1]

इति वचनावु चेतना-संप्रयुक्तं चितं विशिष्ट-विष्णु-प्रतिभासं उत्पद्यान्तं चितोपादः।
सम्यक-संबोध्य-कामता च ततु-प्रार्थना मुखों धर्म-जन्मं चैतसिक इति कथं सा
चितोपादं भवेतुः?

सत्यम् एवेलतु। कं तु दुःखार्थ-निमन्तं जगद अत्राणम् अभिमीमक्ष तदु
उदरणामिनाः, कुशल-धर्म-जन्म-लक्षणाः प्रार्थनाः सत्याः, बुद्धताय चित्तमु
उत्पद्यतीति कारणिनां कार्यं निरदेशम्। एवं-जन्म-प्रार्थनस्य बोधि-सत्त्वस्य सवः
कुशला धर्मं वृद्ध यानीति ज्ञापनायोपचारः: समाधिशृंग इत्यदेशः।

प्रणिधानं वा प्रार्थना सम्यक-संबोध्य-कामता। ततु-सह-चरितशुं चितोपादः:
प्रार्थनातिरिदिष्ट्ये, प्रार्थना-प्राधिना हि चितोपादावस्येति कृतं। एवं च प्रणिधान-सह-
गतं ततूचित्तमु उत्पदेते बोधि-सत्तवानाम् इत्युपपन्नं भवति।

अथ केवल सम्यक-संबोधि, कशं च परार्थे यत्र-कामतत्त्वम् यथार्थं च चितोपाद
इति चेतु, उच्यते यथार्थ-पश्चिमाति-साहसिक-सत्तमः। तत्र सम्यक-संबोधे: समास-
निदेशो यदृ यथं । "सर्वाराणां शारिपुर्ण [W23.1] सर्व-धर्मान्तु अबिमोद्य-कामेन बोधि-
सत्तवेन प्रजा-पारमितायां योग: करणियं" इति। तत्राः तस्या व्यास-निदेशो यदृ यथं
शारिपुर्ण बोधि-सत्तवायाः सम्यक-पारमितायां तथापन दान-पारमिता
परिपूर्णित्वं देय-दायक-प्रतिरूढःकानुपलब्धम् उपाधार इत्यर्थ।

तत्र परार्थ्य समास-निदेशो यदृ यथं । "दशस्य दिशु शयनकस गजाननी-वालकोपसेषु
लोक-धातुः ये तताः: तान् सर्वं अनुतिष्ठिते निवारण-धातो परिवर्तिनितः-कामेन

1 Corrected from स्याबो। W.
[11.3 Divisions of bodhicitta]

तत्राय तत्स्य प्रभेदः। तत्र प्रथमश् चित्तोत्पाद्यु च भोदि-सत्त्वानं पूणिवी-सम् सर्वकार-सर्व-धर्मीप्रभोधयं संबंध-प्रसव-प्रतिष्ठा-भूतस्तवः। द्वितीय आशयः-सह-गतः कल्याण-सुवर्णिपः। बुद्ध-पारमिता-संगृहीतस्य हिं-सुखाश्यस्यायतित-तदावयोरः। विकार-वजनादः। आ सम्यक-संबोधिः। शाय आशय इति कृत्यः।

तुतीयोऽद्याशयः-सह-गतः। शुक्ल-पदा-नव-चन्द्रोपः। सर्व-शुक्ल-पदा-धर्मीप्रभरोत्तरः। विवृद्धि-गमनेनाधिक आशयोऽद्याशयः। इति कृत्यः। एते च तत्स्य मूढः-मध्याधिकात्मवदे। किंक-संभार-भूमिकृतिः।

चतुर्थः। प्रयोग-सह-गतो ज्युलानायपमः। विवृद्धि-प्रयोगस्यन्यात्तरः। विवेषिणेऽद्याशयः।

पशुभ्रोग द्वै-सह-गतो। महानिधानोपमः। सर्वदानिधारणाम्य-सत्त्व-संतपेणपरयवदायतः।

वष्टः। शेष-पारमिता-सह-गतो। रक्ताकरोपः। सर्व-पुणः-रत्नादायः। आशयः।

सस्मवः। कंप्ति-पारमिता-सह-गतो। महानिधानोपमः।

अष्टमो। वर्त-पारमिता-सह-गतो। बुद्धीपः। संप्रत्यय- दाधिनाभेदतः।

वनमो। ध्यान-पारमिता-सह-गतः। पक्तोपः। सर्वदान्यभव-विवृद्धि- निष्क्रमतः।

दशम। प्रक्र-पारमिता-सह-गतो। महाभृोजयोपमः। [W26.1] वर्ष्कृमेलो-शेषारण-प्रायिक-प्रशमनादायः।

एकादश। उपयो-कौशल-पारमिता-सह-गतः। कल्याण- मिश्रोपः। सर्ववृत्त-सत्यारापरित्यागादायः।

द्वादश। िश्रिष्णाधिन-पारमिता-सह-गतशु िश्रिष्णाधिन-पारमिता-सह-गतशु िश्रिष्णाधिन-पारमिता-सह-गतशु िश्रिष्णाधिन-पारमिता-सह-गतशु िश्रिष्णाधिन-पारमिता-सह-गतशु िश्रिष्णाधिन-पारमिता-सह-गतशु िश्रिष्णाधिन-पारमिता-सह-गतशु।

पशुभ्रोग द्वै-सह-गतो। महानिधानोपयवदे।

षोडश। पुणम-ज्ञान-संभार-सह-गतः। कोषागारोपमो बुद्ध-पुणम-ज्ञान-संभार-कोश-स्थानलात्।

1 विकार-वजनाद - विकार-वजनाद based on Tu, which makes more sense.

2 अवर्जन-वर-अवर्जन-कर based on Tu, supported by P.
सातदशो बोधि-प्रव-धर्म-सह-गतो महा-मारापमः सर्वर्य-पुदल-यानानुभावतः।
ावदशः शमथ-विपश्यना-सह-गतो यानोपयो युग-नद-वाहितावलं संसार-निर्वाणायन्तरापतेन सुख-संबन्धीत।
एकोविशिष्टतिमो धारणी-प्रतिभान-सह-गतः प्रस्वरण्योपः सर्वप्रेक्ष-धरारणायकोऽद्व-साधनयों शुद्धशृवः-धर्म-धारणामु अपवानः१-
देशतोऽद्व-दत्तावतः।

बिशिष्टिमो धर्माद्व-दत्तावलं सह-गतां आनन्द-शंक्रोपमो मोक्ष-कामानं विनेयानं प्रिय-श्रावकातः।
अयम् च बुद्ध-भूमि-प्रवेश-प्रयोग-मार्ग-संगृहीतो बोधिसत्त्व-भूमि-प्रतिबद्धः।
एकविशिष्टिम् एकायन-मार्ग-सह-गतो नवी-स्रोतः-सदृशो जान-जेवयोः।
समस्तात्मको-कृत्यं-प्रजोपयतयसंभिन्न-पर-कार्य-क्रियातात।
अयम् च बुद्ध-भूमि-संगृहीतो भोलास्या-प्रासः।

इत्यविद्यानिकः भूमि मारयय याचव बुद्ध-भूमि: संगृहीता॥
इत्यतोपाधिगमानुक्रमेन येषाः नृप-पति-तथा नवीनिक्ततेषां तदथीत।
अयम् अपि निविवलिक-तथागताधिष्ठत-पृथवतिस्निमणाञ्चुपलोकेरु तथे परिकल्पित-शुद्ध-लौकिक-कालः॥

वृत्त-कृत्यः ज्ञान-व्ययः गृहन्तः चित्ताधिष्ठत-प्रतिष्ठा।
अयम् अवश्यः न्यूनः-जन-बोधि-सत्त्व-तथागत-भूमि-भेदेन हेतु-फलात्मकः प्रभेडः केवः।
तथा हि। सूत्रार्थार्थः

विचित्रोद्धृतिकोशोऽसौ शुद्धाध्यायिकोपरः।
वेदांको भूमिष्ठ मतः, तथावरण-विरः।
कणः-मूलः इत्यथा सदा-सत्त्व-हितायः।

[MSA:2-3b]

इति वचनादेतु-फलात्मकः एव चित्तोद्वाद उपाधः कथितः।

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1 अपवानः-अपवानः based on Tu.
2 Supplied from P अपे-स्रेष्ठ-जान।
3 संगृहीततः-ता इति based on V.
1 P takes as a dvandva रावण्यम् (युक्त-युक्तिः) दातुःप्रदेशम् however, in AK6.38cd (la Vallée Poussin 1923-31:91 n. 2) युक्त (Tib युक्तिः युक्तिः="without a stutter")-युक्तिभावम्, युक्त would mean speaking logically and मुक्त would mean speaking swiftly.
अथ खल्वायुभान्तु सुभृति: बुद्धानुभावेनकुशमः करिपुत्रस्य इमम् एवं-रूपं चेत-चेत-चेत-चेत-चेत-परिविठकम् आजायुभावेनकुशम् करिपुत्रस्य एतद् अवोच्चः। यद्य फिंचीद्र आयुभान्तु शरीरिज्ज्ब भगवतः अभावन्ते देशयतुपदिशन्त्युपदीरयति प्रकाशयति संप्रकाशयति संप्रकाशयति संप्रकाशयति संप्रकाशयति संप्रकाशयति संप्रकाशयति संप्रकाशयति तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा तथा

मूढीनिव्वत्या न सहस्यापूर्ण-ज्ञाताविकं करुः शत्येदिपिन्ययोथपासद-भावेनीषभ्य पाथशाल्यम् एव विकल्पं दर्शनानां अभेत्यादि। आवकारां [W29.1] समन्वायित्य पर-वित्त-ज्ञातां नान्यवेदित बुद्धानुभाव-चकनेनासमवाहर-ज्ञातम् उक्तम्। इमम् अन्तररक्षम्। एवं-रूपं योजेत-विकल्प-त्रय-स्मार्थाम्। चेतनां वा निन्त्रित्य प्रजां वा पार्श्वको मनो-जल्यः। सा च चिन्तस्योदारिकेति [परिविठ्ठिः। चेतसा संबूत्या तदु-स्मानुकारिणा जाता वस्मायकमक्षुः एवदुः उक्तावान्। तदु एवाहं यदु फिंचिचु इत्यादि।

"सून-नेवं व्यक्तारण गायोदानकावादाकम्। इति-वृत्तकं निवादनं बैंपुल्यं च स-जातकम्।।

उपदेशादुति धर्मी द्रादशाज्ञाम् इदं वचः।। तत्र भावन्ते बुद्धमय-ज्ञातोतादादु बोधि-वीजायकोर्यायां यथो ग्रन्थम् उद्दिरयति। देशयति चित्तास्य-ज्ञातोतादावात् परिपाचनायं यथो यो प्रकाशयति। उपदिशनि भावनामय-ज्ञातोतादाल् परिमोचनायं यथो ग्रन्थम्-विन्योगतात्। संप्रकाशयति। तदु एवम् उद्दीरयन्तीयादिपद-रूपं भावन्तं इत्यादिः यथा-कर्म व्याख्यानम्।

पुरुषकारोधिकानाम्। तदेलुक्तवात् स सर्वो भाषणादिदु पुनरावश दृश्यकार-शते-नोतकः।

तदु कर्म हेतौः।

तनु शारवेव अपि स्वाधिगम-धर्मो सासातुः कुत। ततु कस्मान् न स्व-शक्तेवो सर्वो भाषणादिदस्य इति रूपम् एव भवः कुतः। परेः किमाणे औरसकल्लमि-दोषोदयादु इत्येके। तदन्तनां कथा-विचित्र-दोष-परिवारां शार्दूलः प्रश्नम् आशकाश्चल्यम् अनुग्रहायुम्, एकाश्री-कृत-चेतसा वचनेयन्यपि-भेदाद्वे विशेष-दोष-परिवारां बोधीपेरे।

यदो हि तथागतेन धर्मी देशीति तद्र धर्मी-देशनां शश्वायासायस्य ते तां धर्मीं साक्षातु-कूचित्वा धारितं। तां धर्मीं साक्षातु-कृत्य धारित्वा, यदु यदु एव धारित्वे यदु यदु एव देशयति यदु यदु एव देशयति यदु यदु एव देशयति यदु यदु एव संप्रकाशयति सर्वो तदु धर्मीयाविश्वसम्। तथागत-धर्म-देशनायम् [W30.1] एवायुभान्तु शरीरावै निन्द्वन्ते यदु ते कुल-पुत्रा उपदिशतल्लाँ तां धर्मीं धर्मीया न विरोधयति।

1 Corrected from प्रमाणम् W.
यो हि इत्यादितरम्। तत्र धर्मोभिमये निर्विभ-भागीयात्माधिगम-द्वारेन धर्म- 
शेषनायां सत्यां शिष्यमाणा दर्शन-मार्गाधिगमनं वामु अधिगम-धर्मत्तं साक्षात्- 
कुविन्त। भावना-मार्गाधिगमनं धारणसृज। सर्वं तदृश्च अधिगत्तार्थी-विषयं देशना-धर्म- 
मुनार्थी धर्मविधियाधिगमनांग्रीः, तदविशेष्यः धर्मशास्त्र-काश्यः। तस्मात्। तथागत-धर्म- 
देशनाया एवोपचार-निर्विभ-पुष्कार-स्वभावाय। एष सदृशः स्यन्त: लिप्यन्त्ससा 
तदानुमयं फलसमृ। यदृ सूक्तार्थिः तै: श्रावका उपविशिष्टस्य वामु आग्न-धर्मवामसम् 
अधिगम- 
धर्मत्ता क रिविरोधयन्ति। उपविशिष्ट इति चोपलक्षणाद। भाष्माणा देशवन्त 
इत्यपि ग्रहां तथा प्रकृतत्वान्। 
अनेनेतद् आह, नित्य-समाधानोपाय-कौशल-बैकल्यां अधिगतार्थी-विषयम् अपि धर्म 
स्वाधिकाविद्वेष्यं भाषितमु असमध्यं। प्रसु एवाधिगतार्थी-विषयम्। अतो बुद्धमृभाव 
अव द्वि:दष्ट्यः। तथा, 
किवद् वा शक्यमु हनेम् स्व-तर्कम् अनुवादता। 
परोशपेय-तदेवलोसु तदाद्यनयां हि धुसरसम्। ॥
इति न्यायान् नाप्श्यूहहै देशयितु शक्यत इति। प्रस्स्रागान्त निवेद्य, 
अय खल्वायुममा संभुवतिः बुद्धमृभावेन भगवतस्म ऐतद् अवोद्धः। यदृ भगवन्वेम् 
आह, "प्रतिभातुं ते सुभूते बोधि-सत्तवान् महा-सत्तवान् प्रज्ञा-पारमिताम् आरम्भय यथा 
बोधि-सत्त्व महा-सत्त्ववः प्रज्ञा-पारमितायां नियायुर्द्व इति" बोधि-सत्त्वो बोधि-सत्त्व 
इति यदृ इत भगवन्वेम् कतमस्वैतृत् भगवनु धर्मसाधधिकर्षण: युद्द बोधि-सत्त्व 
इति। नाहं भगवनस् ऐं धर्म सुमन्त्यायाय मूडः बोधि-सत्त्व इति। 
इदानीम् उत्सेदित-प्रश्नार्थ-बोधि-चित्रो यथा। काल मः [W31.1] बोधि-सत्त्रोगस्यां दानादिक- 
कृशल-धर्मभवसेन पूणसंभारस्म: उपार्जयस्य। 
ध्यानेभिष्जां मन्ननिहिन्नालू लोक-धातृस्म स गच्छति। 
पूजार्थम् अप्रमेयाणां बुद्धानां ब्रवणय च। 
अप्रमेयाणु उपस्थातृसो बुद्धान कर्पोव अमेयसि। 
कर्मण्यां परामृ एति चेतससु तदुपासनाद। [MSA:14.17-18]
इति चित्त-कर्मण्यता-बलेन स्थित: समाधाय

1 तस्मात्र-तस्मात्। This is probably the original reading, supported by Tu and the Tib.
2 Padas ab=Vākyapādiya 2.469cdd; paddas cd =PV Pramāṇa-siddhi 134; cf. W81.13.
3 ध्यानेभिष्जा-ध्यानेः भिष्जा based on Tu and supported by MSA:14.17a (Levi:1907).
[11.5 Ten topics of preceptual advice]

पुंढ़े बुढ़-बोध्योर एक-लक्षालेनु  बुढ़-करक-धर्म-लक्षण-सर्वकारकाला अनुपलमभे रुपाश्योजनेनाल्मथालंबक-समता-जानामृति, धर्म त्रि-सर्वजन-संगीतीत-समस्त-वसु-प्रतिपक्षकार-संग्रह: सर्व-धर्मां संगीतीतानां नि:स्वभावात्तति, संघे बुढ़-रत्नालमृतविषोनान्धु-व्यवह फलस्य-प्रतिपत्तनक-भेदेन समस्त महा-पृथेवे प्रत्येक-बुढ़ेन सहायत्या मृुदन्तियादिभेदेन विशिष्ट-संख्याविज्ञान्वयावैतिक-बोधिनस्थ-शेषेश्यूनुत्तरयतया प्रवृत्ति: इतिपुष्टो वेद-वायस्वावन:।

आर्य-बीवीया यथोकायनुशान्ति प्रति कायादिक-सुखपक्तेन कस्मविद्ध अभिनवेष: स्यादु इतसकृति [W3.1] कायावीनामृ अस्वभावतया देशानास्थव:। चितर-कालाभ्यासेनापि समखिताध्यानिनिष्ठातुवनमन-जातीयस्य विशेषः स्यादु इत्यपरिश्रान्ति स्यादुः यावतू सम्यक-तथथोरै अभिनवतया देशानास्थवः। दश-दिगवसिष्यत-भुर्वदिश्यः प्रत्यर्थ-मारपिदेय सुहामाणे चिताल्लीनता स्यादुः इति प्रतिपत्ति-संपरीणहें धर्मां प्रकृत्यसामन्त्यन शिक्षामयू अववादः। मांस-बैज्ञानिक-दिव्य-प्रत्या-धर्म-बुढ़-चक्षुया यथा-संख्य प्रतिनिधित्व-बसु-सर्व-सत्य-च्युतयुपपति-सर्वधर्मविकल्पन-समर्थ-पुदलाधिकम-सर्वकार-सर्वधर्मिमल्लसोध-विषयाणां तथतैतीकलेन प्रतिपत्तिः इति शिक्षां पश्च-चुरस्ववः। भृद्दि-दिव्य-श्रोत-पर-चित्त-जाण-पुर्व-निवासात्मस्यभिमसंस्कारक-दिव्य-चक्षुसार-स्य-जानाबिज्ञानां पृथिवी-कम्पनादिक-सर्व-लोक-धातुस्य-सूक्ष्मर:। शब्द-अव्य-सराजुपिदि-पर-चित्त-परिश्रान-स्य-पर-पूवनिक-जात्यनुसरण-सर्व-रुप-दर्शन-क्रियेवार-प्रहासं-कारिताकामृ। आदि-शालात्यूनाववाद इति देशाना षड्भिजावन:। चतुः-दृष्य-संगीती-बोध्योर-श्च-स्य-स्यामार्ग धर्मान्त्य-जान-शाल्य-नित्यानामसंकर सर्व-धर्म-निःस्वभाव-बोधेन मायाकार इव सर्वशानामभिमनस्य-सूक्ष्मति ततः-प्रहासव्य-स्य-प्रतिपत्ति: देशाना दर्शन-मागावन:।

1 सूक्तात्संस्कृतयोरू एक-रस्मेन परस्मष्यु अश्य-व्यतिरेकालम्बनादृ दर्शन-भावनायोर अपृश-भव इति न लाभ्यकं भावना-मार्ग-व्यस्तान्तमृ, अथ च स ततः-प्रहासव्य-स्य-प्रतिपत्ति: विभावने प्रतित्य-समृत्य-दर्शनोप: श्रावना-मागावन:।

1 सूक्तात्संस्कृतयोरू एक-रस्मेन परस्मष्यु अश्य-व्यतिरेकालम्बनादृ दर्शन-भावनायोर अपृश-भव इति न लाभ्यकं भावना-मार्ग-व्यस्तान्तमृ, अथ च स ततः-प्रहासव्य-स्य-प्रतिपत्ति: विभावने प्रतित्य-समृत्य-दर्शनोप: श्रावना-मागावन:।

Both fit the context but it is hard to conceive of anyone changing the text from W's to Tu's reading.
इत्यें दश-विहोजवादो ग्रन्थ-संकेतप्रयोगप्रेषकत्रात् प्रजा-पारमिता-शबदेनोऽः। तथा हि। पद्ध-विश्विति-साहित्यिकायां प्रत्यवादं स्पष्ट एव ग्रन्थी निर्देशः। झाकल्लेन च विस्तर-भयानु न लिखयते।

अथ तु खलु पुनर्भगवन् सचेदु एवं भाष्यमाणे देयस्यमाण उपदिस्यमाने, बोधि-सत्त्वस्य चित्तं नावलीयते, न संलीयते, न विशीदिति, न विषादमु आप्यते, नास्य विपृद्धि-भवति मानसं, न भग-पृढ़ी-भवति, नोत्रस्त्वति, न संतत्स्तिति, न [W34.1] संतत्स्तमु आप्यत एव एव बोधि-सत्त्वोऽऽ महासत्त्व: प्रजा-पारमितायामु अनुशासनीयः। एष्याश्च बोधि-सत्त्वस्य महासत्त्व प्रजा-पारमिता बेदित्वाः। एष्यावाद्य: प्रजा-पारमितायामु।

तदु एवमु अन्वयादेन किभूतो बोधि-सत्त्वोजवादनीय इत्यादापि तु खलु पुनर्भ।

सचेदु इति निपातो यथार्थः। एवमु इति बोधिसत्त्व-प्रजा-पारमितानुपलमभेनवादवाद-विषये दश-प्रकरे भाष्यमाणे चित्तं नावलीयते न संकोचायताः। यतो न विशीदिति न मृहति। अत एव शाश्वत्त्व धर्मं-भजनाद्व आदो नोत्रस्त्वत्यस्थानाश्च। देयस्यमाणे न संलीयते नालस्यायते, यतो न विषादमु आप्यते न कातर-भावं याति। अत एव शाश्वत्त्व तत्त्व-वेदिनां गवते न संतत्स्तिति संतत्स्त-श्रायेः। उपदिस्यमाणे नास्य विपृद्धि-भवति न विप्रतिसारीभवति। यत एव मानसमु। यतो न भग-पृढ़ी-भवति न पृढ़े चित्तं भगं भवति। अत एव श्रादा-प्राचायं योगातु पर्यवसाने न संतत्स्तमु आप्यते सर्वायनिश्चय-श्राये।

अथ वा झाणाधिकाले यथा-कर्सं ग्रन्थार्थविभायवधारणानु नावलीयते न संलीयते न विशीदिति। कुतः? यस्मातु प्रत्यक्षानु मानांगम-प्रमाणे श्रविश्व-विषयार्थ-परिप्रेक्ष्यानु न विषादमु आप्यते नास्य विपृद्धि-भवति मानसं न भग-पृढ़ी-भवति। अत एवादाध-विषयवादाने नोत्रस्त्वि न संतत्स्ति न संतत्स्तमु आप्यत इति चोज्यमु।

एष्येवेति यो बोधि-सत्त्व: संबन्ध-परमार्थ-विभाग-कौशल्याद् यथोकावादो चित्तावलीन्त्वादिविभागः। स एवेत्याः।

एष्येवेति लक्षणमु अनुस्म्रत्, कमं प्रजा-पारमिता प्रत्यवमृष्टम इति चेतु? उच्चतेः।

यस्यार्थं भाषणादो चित्तावलीन्त्वादि न करोधि सोश्च: प्रजा-पारमिता प्रतिपत्तिसाधित-दश-प्रकरा कण्ठे-विद्याधिकृत-परमर्शणाः अवदेष इति।

सचेदु एवं तिथियेवस्यास्यवादानुशासनी।

1 ब्रजनानु-बेदितामु based on Tu.
[11.6 Discursus on the twenty membered Arya Samgha]

From the twenty membered Arya Saṅgha

...
परमश च। तृत्तकनिःपरम: प्लुतार्थ्-प्लुत-स्वर्ग-व्यवनात्तकनिः प्रवेशस्। त्रि-विधः। भवाय: परमशः। च रूप-वीत-रागो हृद-धर्मेः शमः। काय-सायित्ति द्वि-विधः। ततो भावायिकाष्टम-कृष्ण-प्रकाशानां प्रहाणादु महंस्व-फल-प्रतिपन्नकः। तत: श्राष्ट्र-पितकम् एवालम्य स्व-मार्गेः संमुखिकते करणादु अबुद्धोत्पादे प्रत्येक-बुद्ध इति विशिष्टः॥

तथा च पशु-विशिष्ट-सहिष्णुकायः अयम् अर्थाः विस्तरणेऽकाः। अवैधात्ति-चक्र-सूत्रे तु बोधि-सत्तं श्रद्धा सुधारिणम्। अरम्भं यावृत् बोधिसत्तव-प्रत्येकबुद्ध इति पुदल-व्यवस्थानं स्पष्टतरायं भगवतोक्तम्। इति तत्त्रवालोकनीयम्। अतः लस्मापिर्द्द्विस्तरण नोपन्यसः किं पिष्टो पिष्म इति॥

तथा च प्रथम-द्वितीय-फलस्य चतुर्थ-फल-प्रतिपन्नकः। च पुदले सुगमत्वेनासंगृहि-क्रमम् [AA23-24]॥

मृदु-तीव्रग्रन्थियौ। श्रद्धा-दृष्टि-प्राप्तौ। कुलं-कुलो॥
एक-विष्णुन्तरत्वम् काराकुरकशिष्ठः॥
प्लुताः। वयो भवस्याम्र-परमो। रूप-रागः॥
दृष्टि-धर्मेः। शमः। काय-सायित्ति। खंडः॥। इति॥

1 In place of च Tu has पु and प। P clearly construes रूपवीतराग as an epithet of भवायपरम。
2 धर्मेः-शमः। धर्मेः-शमं। Based on Tu. H is explaining the AA’s compound.
III APPROACHING ULTIMATE REALITY

[12.1] Labhavādasyāvamū ādīkāmikāsya

संपूर्ण-पूण्य-संभारसृ ततो धीमान दृष्टाशयः ।
श्रवाद्यैः कुशलेऽधर्ममेषः परिबावित-संततिः ॥
झान-संभार-सिद्धवर्यं कल्पासंध्येष-निर्गमातुः ।
स्यरामिज्ञोवदेन चर्या-भूमी प्रवतते ॥

इति कृत्वाधिमुक्ति-चर्या-भूमि-परिशोधनार्थ भ्रुतादि-प्रकर्ष-प्राप्त-मोक्ष-भागीय-श्रवादि-लक्षण-कुशल-मूलाद् उत्तरं चतुरू-सत्य-प्रतिधायानुकूलानि चतुरू-निर्विभ-भागीयानि लौकिक-भावानामानि वक्तव्यानि। भावकाद्वृत्तादिभ्यूः चेषाम् अनित्यादि-लक्षण-वस्त्रालम्बन-विशेषाद्, धर्म-दर्शन-प्रतिपक्षलेखनानिविष्याचारक-विशेषाद्, यान-न्यायिगम-हेतुल-विशेषाद्, उपाय-कौशल-कल्याण-मित्र-लक्षण-संपरिश्रु-विशेषाद् विशेषो वक्तव्यः। तथा संक्रेश-वस्त्रालम्बन: प्रतिपक्ष-वस्त्रालम्बनः चेति द्र्द-विधो, ग्राह्य-विकल्पः, द्र्द्य-सतृ-पुश्चालितः: प्रज्ञित-सत-पुश्चालितः निर्विभ-भागीयानी वक्तव्यम्। तथा यथोऽ-विकल्प-संयोगम् च भज्यान सतान प्रत्येकम् एषा मूदु-मध्याधिमात्र-मेदेन विशिष्टता च वक्तव्येऽति पश्चात-विधो विषेषः। भावकाद्वृत्तान्तूण्मादिने-चतुरू-विभ-कुशल-मूलं सूपणादि-लक्षण-वस्त्रालम्बन-चतुरू-सत्यालम्बनम् आत्म-दर्शन-प्रतिपक्षलेखनानित्यादिभिः भावकारे: स्व-यानादिगम-हेतु-भूतं संपरिश्रु-रहितं, "स्व-बोध-परिपन्य-भूतेष चतुरू-विधो विकल्पो न भवती" तत् कृत्य तेन संसूष्टम् अप्यसंसूष्टम् उत्पदत । इति व्यवस्थाप्यते, यतः। तथा चोकम् [AA25-26] ॥

आलम्बनत भावकाद्वृत्तादितृत्वादू संपरिश्रुहात् ।
चतुरू-विकल्प-संयोगा यथा-स्वः भज्यान सतान् ॥
श्रवाद्यैः: स-खर्त्येभूमि बोधि-सत्वस्य तापिन् ।
मूदु-मध्याधिमात्रानां उम्मादीनां विशिष्टता ॥

[12.2 Warmed proximate penetration]

1 Evidently glossing AA25cd.
2 Supplied from Tib ཤིང་ཐུབ་བོད་སངས་སྙིང་ཤེས་.
पुनरु अपरं भगवन् बोधि-सत्चेन महा-सत्चेन प्रजा-पारमितायां चरता प्रजा-पारमितायां भावयता

tत्रै मुदुनोभ-गत-कुशल-मुलस्वालम्बननार्थम् आह पुनरू इत्यादि। पुनरू अपरम् इति प्रकारान्तरेण प्रजा-पारमितापदेश-सूत्रनम्। प्रजा-पारमितायाम् इति सामान्य-श्रुतावपनतियत्यादि-वस्त्रालम्बन-लक्षणायाम् इतयथः। तथा हि प्रदेषातन्त्रे। "भगवताभिषिक्त सूत्र, भिष्ठवः, सूतान्तरात्मकाः व्याख्यात्यथम्" इति; ब्रज-विष्णवलिखित-साहित्याङ्काः च मुदुमालालम्बनं अधिकुक्त्रयोक्तम्। "हद्युषमञ्जरिपुत्र बोधि-सत्त्वो रूपम् अनित्यम्" इति "रूपं दुःखम्" इति "रूपं शून्यम्" इति "रूपम् अतात्मेयादि। एततावसू तत्र विशेषो यदुत संक्षेप-निदेशः, तत्र पुनः प्रत्यक्षं सत्यम् अधिकृत्य विस्तर-निदेश इति न संदेहः कार्यः। ¹ चरतेतसमाहितेन ज्ञानेन, भाववदेति समाहितेन। एतद् उक्तम्, अनित्यादि-पोषिकाः करुःकार्द-चतुः-सत्याः वस्त्रालम्बनं इति।

[W38.1] एवं शिष्यविवेणिः व्याससौ शिखरमाणसु तेनापि बोधि-चित्रि न मनयेत।

तत्तु केनाकारेणलाम्बनीयम् इत्याह एभु इत्यादि कदम्बाण-क्रमेण। तेनापीत्यादि न केवलं, जेयस्यालं-परोक्षवादु, आलमनं न मनयेत, येनायपाकारेनाभिमिनेव-निशेषायास्त्केन बोधवाक्ष-कान-स्वपेनालम्बेत तेनापि न मनयेताभिमितेः न कुर्याद् इतयथः। धर्मी-तुक्षेनाभिमिशेषायाकारं यावतु।

इत्यं उकं बचतिः। आवको रूपान्तिदलक्षणं वस्त्रालम्बते। तस्यनित्यतायाद्य आकाराः भवन्त्यात्म-दर्शन-प्रतिपक्षलतात। बोधि-सत्त्व: पुनरू अनित्यादिदलक्षणं वस्त्रालम्बते। तस्यानित्यविशेषायाद्य आकाराः बचति धर्मं-दर्शन-प्रतिपक्षादृश: इति।

नन्तु यथाभिमिशेषाभावोज्जनेिभिमिनेशः, एवं सत्यभाववातु प्रतिपक्षो न पुजयेत्। अथ यन्त् नाभिमिनेत्ः, ततं चक्षुरात्मकः प्रस्तुतं इति चेतु? उच्चये। यथा वपक्षस्याभिमिशेषः।

यथा प्रतिपक्षसू तथानित्यभिमिनेशः। कथं च विपक्षः? यथा सत्यार्थ-परिकल्पना-समुच्चिताविवेशः नारित-प्रार्थी। कथं च प्रतिपक्षः? यथा तत्योरु भावः। कथं च तत्योरु भावः? यदि तौत तत्वतो न तत् इति ज्ञाति भवतः। तथा वानन्तरं कदम्बिः सरौव आयुषमञ्जरिपुत्र तत्त्राचित्तियामाः इत्यादि।

तत्तु कस्य हेतु? ¹

नन्तु प्रमाणोपन्न्यज्जनिनित्यावाकारं कथं प्रेक्षावतो नाभिमिनेश इत्याह ततु कस्य हेतुतरु इति, ततु कस्माद्वेतोः।

¹ कार्यः: is supplied from Tu, supported by P.
² आलम्बनं-आलम्बनम् Syntactically a better reading, supported by Tu.
अथ वा यद्य प्रायोजनमेवशाकरण तत्तु कर्मार्थ्यस्य हेतोऽपयोजनादृ इत्यस्य:।

तथा हि।तच्च चित्र्मू अचित्त्व प्रकृतिः चित्र्मू प्रभास्वरा।

उत्तरामु आह तथा हीत्यादि। यस्मादू एकामेव-स्वभाव-वैद्युक्तः चित्र्मू प्रकृतिः स्वभावोन्नतादता प्रभास्वरा विधिमित-सवैस्तु-कल्पनान्यकाराः, अतीषधिमितेशाङ्कार्यविशिष्टिरिकृ चित्त्व तत्ततोचित्र्मू। एवं मन्यते, चित्र्मू नेः स्वभावायुः तदव्यतिरिक्तोनमितिवेशाङ्काराः। [W39.1] कथं तत्ततोगितिवेश-स्थानीय इतिः।

अथ खल्वाुमानः शारिपुत्र आयुष्मानं सुभूतिम् एवदं अवोच्चु। किं पुनरं आयुष्मानं सुभूते अस्ति तच्च चित्त्व यर्थ चित्र्मू अचित्त्वाः?

पयादसंप्य प्रसुभे वाचित्र्मू इति नाद: प्रयोगेष्पि सदस्य-मात्र-मननानुबंधेन विधिमितेशाङ्कार्यविशिष्टिरिकृ पश्यनाहार्शित तच्च चित्त्व यर्थ चित्र्मू अचित्त्वाः इति। चित्र्मू अनामितेशाङ्कार्यविशिष्टिरिकृ तच्च चित्त्व तत्ततोचित्र्मू इति यदू उन्ध्यते, तत्तु किम् अचित्मू अस्ति संबन्धन्यायम्। न्यायेन वस्तुमृतस्वत्वाः न पुरुषार्धे नाना: प्रयोगाः। अपि तु प्रसुभे।

एवम् उनकें आयुष्मानं सुभूतिः आयुष्मानं शारिपुत्रम् एवदं अवोच्चु। किं पुनरं आयुष्मानं शारिपुत्रा याचित्राः तताविशिष्टायायाम् अस्तिता वा नास्तिता वा विचित्रे बोपलभ्यते वा? शारिपुत्र आह। न हृदंद्वं आयुष्मानं सुभूते।

तत्रापि सदस्य-मात्र-प्रजिः अपि नास्तीयविभिन्नायायां सुभूतिस्तु तेनेव परिहारं प्रतित-पादहितु-कामं: प्रतिप्रक्रियाया शारिपुत्रम् आहं किं पुनरं इत्यादिना। चित्रास्व-मात्रम् अचित्मू। तद-भाऽय याचित्राः तताविशिष्टायाम् किम् अस्तिता वा विचित्रे बानुपलिन्ध-लक्षण-प्रासा। अतोपलभ्ये बोपलिन्ध-लक्षण-प्रासा। एवं नास्तिता वैति योज्यम्। पूर्वाः वा-शब्दं उत्तरार्थस्योत्तरणं च पूर्वपिन्यायं जेयम्।

अजातस्य स्वभावेन शास्त्रवत्त्वेद्या अनिमितं कुलं।

स्वभावे हि विकल्प्याण्ते धर्मं-भेदे-विकल्पना:।

पत्ते-लेखादिविन्यासं केनचिदं व्योमिनि शक्यते।

कथू नेव, तथाजाते धर्मं-भेदे-विकल्पना:।।।

इत्यभिमितिवास्य आह। न हृदंद्वं इत्यन्तरोदकमु उभयम्।

1 The antara-ślokas between Satya-dvaya-vibhaṅga 36-37.
सुभूमिति आहँ। सचेदेव आयुष्मनः शारिपुत्र तत्त्वाचिततायामस् अस्तिता वा नास्तिता वा चिवि व नोपलम्भये वा। अपि नू तै युक्त एष पर्यन्त्योगो भवति यदृ आयुष्मनः शारिपुत्र एवम् [W40.1] आहार्यति तत्च चिवि यत्च चिन्तम अचित्तमुः।

इदानीं तद्व-वचनम् एव परिहारे योजयनाहां सचेदेव इत्यादि। अपि नू-शब्दः क्षेपे, नैवेद्यः। पर्यन्त्योगाशः चोभम्। तमु एवाह यदृ आयुष्मनः इत्यादिना। एवं मन्यते, यद्चित्तायामस् अस्तिता वा नास्तिता वा न विचि वा नोपलम्भये वा ततः कथं तवेष्य पर्यन्त्योगाशस्त्रशस्त्रशस्त्रशस्त्रशस्त्रशस्त्रशस्त्रशस्त्रशस्त्रशस्त्रशस्त्रशस्त्रशस्त्रशस्त्रशस्त्रशस्त्रशस्त्रशस्त्रशस्त्रशस्त्रशस्त्रशस्त्रशस्त्रशस्त्रशस्त्रशस्त्रशस्त्रशस्त्रशस्त्रशस्त्रशस्त्रशस्त्र

चित्त्य धर्मिणोरस्वते निर्विषयस्य नन्योप्रयोगादि अचित्तापि नास्तित्याहां का पुनः एष इत्यादि।

सुभूमिति आहः। अविकारायुष्मनः शारिप्रायुष्मनं सुभूमितं एतदु अवोचत्। का पुनः एयायुष्मन् स्मृत्ते अचित्ति।

चत्त्य धर्मिणोरस्वते निर्विषयस्य नन्योप्रयोगादि अचित्तापि नास्तित्याहां का पुनः एष इत्यादि।

सुभूमिति आहः। अविकारायुष्मनः शारिप्रायुष्मनं सुभूमितं एतदु अवोचत्। का पुनः एयायुष्मन् स्मृत्ते अचित्ति।

न हृ संबूति-सोपानमु अन्तरेण तत्च-प्रासाद-शिक्षारोहणं प्रितकत्रः। इति योगी-संबूत्या प्रतिनिधित्वम् आहार्यकार्यतादि। पारम्पर्यंविचित्तायामस्यमना बुद्ध-भूमाविकार-परिनिष्पयति प्रति हेतुत्वाद अविकारा। अविपयस-परिनिष्पयति हेतुत्वाद चाविकल्पा।

अथ खल्वायुष्मनः शारिपुत्र आयुष्मते सुभूते साधु कार्यम् अदातु। साधु साधवायुष्मन् स्मृत्ते। यथापि नाम तं भगवतारणा-विहारिणाम् अग्रतायां निर्दिष्टे निर्दिष्टसि।

एवं चाधिन्मािविन्दम् उक्तम् इत्याहेवेयतादि। साधु साधित्विः संभवे द्विरू अभिधानम्। यथा येन प्रकारएर। अपि-नाम-शब्दः पृज्ञा-वाचकः। अरण्याः यस्य समाधे: प्रभावतु परेण संताने स्व-पर-व्याबधानायणं रणयतीति रणा: क्रेशा न जायते सोशो-समाधिे:। तद-विहारिणां [W41.1] मध्येप्रत्यायां निर्दिष्टे: सन्न निर्दिष्टस्यचित्तायां इति विभक्ति-विप्रयणामेन योजयम्।

नन्तु च बुद्धविधानात् सोपाय-कौशलाम् अपि प्रजापारमितां निर्दिष्टे: कोशितशयो यतस्म तद-विदृष्टोषस्य शारिप्रायुष्मस् सुभूति प्रति साधुकारां: साधुः स्मातृश्रतं कृपः। किं तु

1 MHK:3.12. Ejima (1975:270) reads: तत्क्ष-प्रासाद-शिक्षारोहणं न हि युज्यते। तत्प्रेतसंबूति-सोपानस्
अन्तरेण यतस्म तत्तः। H quotes the same verse at W169.19-20 but in pada d यतस्म तत्तः-विप्रशित:।

200
तयोर् विनेवानाम् अनुग्रहाय भागात्म-योतनादू अनागत-विनेय-संदेह-पनन्याय
तथागताधिष्ठानादू एव वासवद-पूर्वः साधुकार इत्यदेशः।

अतथू च बोधि-सत्त्वो महा-सत्त्वोऽविनिवर्तनीयोऽज्ञातः। चार्धित्यां च बोधि-सत्त्वो महा-सत्त्वः प्रजा-पारमितायाः सैदित्यः।

भागात्म्यम् एवाचेतत्तथाय दर्शनम् किरङ्कु क्षत्रप-लोकस्थपि भौतिकोऽग्राहाय निवेद-भागीयावस्थायम् अभ्यक्त-विवेशारु अववर्तितक्षे नियत इत्यादू अतथू
चेत्तायार्। यतथू तेनापि बोधि-चित्तैन न सन्तेष्कोऽज्ञाविवेशादाशानारात्। भागात्मां अनंतरस्व-महत्-क्षण-वस्तुकल्मनातु। उपपरीक्षितयो निष्क्रियः।
अष्ट्र्या तु भूमी
सर्वेध्यम् एव नियतत्वेनाववर्तितकल-व्यवस्थानम् इत्यदेशः। अतिरिक्तमु चापरिहारणी-
योगात् प्रजा-पारमितायाः निर्विवेद-भागीय-रूपाया वैदित्यः। न केवलम्
अविनिवर्तनीय उपपरीक्षितव्य इति च-कारः।

शाक्त-भूमाविपि निशितु-कामेनयम् एव प्रजा-पारमिता शोत्वयोऽग्रहितन्या
धारायित्या वाच्यित्या पर्यावरणा प्रवृत्तित्या। इत्यौ प्रजा-पारमितायां
शिष्ठयम् योगम् आपत्त्वम्। प्रत्यक्ष-वृद्ध-भूमाविपि शिष्ठितु-कामेनयम् एव प्रजा-
पारमिता शोत्वयोऽग्रहितन्या धारायित्या वाच्यित्या पर्यावरणा प्रवृत्तित्या।
इत्यौ प्रजा-पारमितायां शिष्ठितयम् योगम् आपत्त्वम्। भीतिवस्त्र-भूमाविपि शिष्ठितु-
कामेनयम् एव प्रजा-पारमिता शोत्वयोऽग्रहितन्या धारायित्या वाच्यित्या
पर्यावरणा प्रवृत्तित्या। इत्यौ प्रजा-पारमितायाम् उपाय-कौशल्यम्।

समम्बात्तेन सर्व-बोधिसत्त्व-धर्म-सामुदायनां योगम्: तथापि:।

एवम् आलम्बनाकाराविभधाय मूल-भूम्यो हेतुज-विशेषार्थ्यम् आहू शाक्त-
भूमाविपियार्थः। निशितावस्थास्वरूपम् एव सांव भूमी।\n
प्रत्येक-भूमाविपि निशितावस्थास्वरूपम् एव प्रजा-पारमिता शोत्वयोऽग्रहितन्या
धारायित्या वाच्यित्या पर्यावरणा प्रवृत्तित्या। इत्यौ प्रजा-पारमितायां
शिष्ठयम् योगम् आपत्त्वम्। भीतिवस्त्र-भूमाविपि शिष्ठितावस्थास्वरूपम् एव प्रजा-
पारमिता शोत्वयोऽग्रहितन्या धारायित्या वाच्यित्या पर्यावरणा प्रवृत्तित्या।
इत्यौ प्रजा-पारमितायां शिष्ठितयम् योगम् आपत्त्वम्। भीतिवस्त्र-भूमाविपि शिष्ठितु-
कामेयम् एव प्रजा-पारमिता शोत्वयोऽग्रहितन्या धारायित्या वाच्यित्या
पर्यावरणा प्रवृत्तित्या। इत्यौ प्रजा-पारमितायाम् उपाय-कौशल्यम्।

समम्बात्तेन सर्व-बोधिसत्त्व-धर्म-सामुदायनां योगम्: तथापि:।

पूर्ये बृह-धम्येनां सत्वानां परिपाणे।
किंग्राप्राप्ती त्रिया-संधी वशस्त्राण्येन च कौशलम्।
उपायो बोधि-सत्वानाम् असमं। सर्व-भूमिषु ।
यतौ कौशलं समाधित्य सवर्षाकानु साधयति तेः [MSA:18.69-70]

इति वचनात् यथोकारणी-परिप्रेक्षणः 2 सम्बंदित-परमायुक्तिः। वैते-विशेष एव उपायो-कौशलम् ।
तेन समन्वयात्तेन युक्तेन सर्व-बोधिसत्व-धर्मन्य-समुदायामं यथार्थं।
बोधि-सत्वानाम् एव धर्मः। भावाभासाधारणः। माण्डल-लक्षणः।

tेनः समुदायामां प्रतिलिप्यं योगः। समाधिः। करणीयः।

कचिन्तु तु सर्ब-बुद्ध-धर्मन्य-समुदायामेवः पाठः। स चायुकः।
यत्तंतत्तरम् एव वक्ष्यति सर्वं बोधिसत्व-धर्मां इत्यादि ।

ततृ तम्य हेतुः।

नन्तु भावक-यान अपि बोधिसत्व-धर्मां दानादयो निर्दिष्टा एवेत्याचार्यः चतु तस्य हेतुः तु ।

इहैव हि प्रजा-पारमितायं विस्तरेन सर्व-बोधिसत्व-धर्मां उपदिष्टः। यत्र बोधी-सत्तनेन महा�-सत्तनेन [W43.1] शिखितव्यं योगम् आपत्तिव्यम्।
अनुतंत्तरायम् अपि समयुक-संबोधी शिखितु-कामनेयम् एव प्रजा-पारमिता भौतिकसूत्रहीनत्वा धार्मिकतम्या वाच्यतम्या पर्यावरणाय प्रवृत्तिव्यम्।
इहैव प्रजा-पारमितायाम् उपयो-कौशलय-समन्वयात्तेन सर्व-बुद्ध-धर्मन्य-समुदायाम माण्डलः। करणीयः।

इहैव मीत्याचार्यः। हि-शन्त्रो यथार्थः। यथेति येषु बोधिसत्व-धर्मेषु। एवं मन्यते भावकारीदाधार्मिसं सत्तनेन पिटके विस्तरेयाभिधितः। बोधिसत्व-धर्मासु। तु प्रसज्ञातु।
इहैव पुनः। बोधिसत्व-धर्मां एव विस्तरेन निर्दिष्टः। भावक-धर्मः। प्रसज्ञातु ।

अनुतंत्तरायम् समयुक-संबोधीविन्नतां नास्तु पर्यायां यथाः। सानुत्तरं।
समयुक्तप्रशिक्षणोऽविशेषतः सर्वकारारीभविषोऽध्यायः।
समयुक-संबोधितः। बुद्ध-भूमिः। इति यावत्।

सर्व-बुद्ध-धर्मन्य-समुदायामेति सर्वां बुद्धधर्मां सवर्जने यथार्थतत्त्वात् एवेत्याचार्यः अधिगमायम्।

tततृ कस्य हेतुः।

भावक-यान अपि बुद्ध-धर्मां निर्दिष्टा इत्याचार्यः ततृ कस्य हेतुः।

इहैव हि प्रजा-पारमितायं विस्तरेन सर्व-बुद्ध-धर्मां उपदिष्टः। यत्र बोधी-सत्तनेन महा�-सत्तनेन शिखितव्यं योगम् आपत्तिव्यम्।

1 उपायो बोधि-सत्वानाम् असमं-उपायो बोधि-सत्वानाम् असमं, cf. MSA:18.70ab.
2 परिप्रेक्षण-कः based on Tu.
तवेदोत्तरार्थमु आहु, इत्वैव श्रील्यावदि। श्रावक-भूमावशीत्यार्थम् यावदु अन्त्ते
योगमु बाप्तत्वमु इत्यनेत्रैदु उकं, यान-वियहितम्म-व्राह्ये मृदुभगाणि कुशालं हेतुरु
इति। अयं च हेतु-भाव। सर्वास्यम् एवोभ्यादीनां वेदित्वय:।

अथ खल्वायुभानु सुभृतिरु भगवन्त्वम् एतदु अवोच्चदु। योहं भगवन्येत्रै एव
बोधिसत्व-नाम-धेर्यं न वेदिः नोपलभे न समनुपश्यामि:।

[12.3; W44.1]

मद्यस्मालम्बनार्थमु आहि योहं भगवन्यत्वादि। बोधिसत्व-नाम-धेर्यमु इति
पूर्व यस्तार्थम् बोधि-सत्त्व इति नाम तस्यानुपत्तमभो नाइहू भगवंसु तं धर्मं
समनुपश्यामीत्वादिनयोः। साध्यं

नाम-मात्रमु इदं सर्व संज्ञा-मात्रे व्रतिष्ठितमु:।

नामिष्यानातु पृथ्व-भूमतु अभिषेषयं प्रकल्पते:॥

इति कृत्वा यदू एतदु बोधि-सत्त्व इति नाम-स्वरूपमु अवबन्दनीयं तस्यानुपत्तमभो
देशिि इति विषेष:। न वेदीत्वादि व्यायातमु:। अथ वातोंत न वेदिः, वर्तमाना
नोपलभे, अनागतं न समनुपश्यामि, तत्त्व-शून्यस्तवातु सर्व-धर्माणासु इति योभ्यम्।

श्री-पारमितामु अपि न वेदिः, नोपलभे, न समनुपश्यामि। सोहं भगवन्येत्रै एव
बोधिसत्व-नाम-धेर्यमु अविन्दनन्त्यनुपत्तमभानोसमनुपश्यनु कताम् बोধि-सत्त्वं
कतास्यामु श्री-पारमितामामु अविकविन्यामुन्याशिष्ठार्थमु। एतदु एव भवस्तु
कौक्षत्यं स्यातु योहं वस्तविन्दनन्त्यनुपत्तमभानोसमनुपश्यनु नाम-धेर्य-मात्रेणाय-व्ययं
कुमारं यदुतु बोधि-सत्त्व इति।

अववाद-विषयं नाम तदुस्तीत्वाहु श्री-पारमितामु अपीि। नाम-मात्रामु
इत्यभिप्रायः। बोधि-सत्त्वमु इति नाम-स्वभावं नाम-धेर्यप्रकृतत्वातं। कौक्षत्यमु
इति संबेदन-निष्ठातुं विषय-स्थितेऽु अनुपत्तमभादु एतदु कौक्षत्यमु तेससो
विप्रतिसारिता। तदु एवाह योहं इत्यादिना। आय-व्ययमु इति विधिः आय:,
व्ययो निषेधः।

विधानं प्रतिदेषं च मुक्त्वा शन्दोपस्तिः नापारो। व्यवहार [PV4.225]

इति कृत्वा पद-द्रव्येऽन सर्व-सङ्ग्रहादु इति तावव-मात्रकमु उकमु। एतदु उकं, तत्त्वनाय-व्यय-विनिर्मुक्तं-विशिष्टं स्पाहालम्बनमु [W45.1] इति।

1 In place of संज्ञा-मात्रे प्रतिष्ठितमु Acintya-stava 35b (Lindtner 1982:152-153) reads इत्युभ्येऽु भाषितं
ल्या; for padas cd see Lankāvatāra 3.78.
अथ तु खलु पुनः भगवंसः तदृश्व अष्टि नाम-खेर्यं न स्थितं नास्तिं न विस्थितं नाविस्मितम्।

ततू कैलाकरेनालम्बनीयम् इत्याहापि तिथियादि। तदृश्व अष्टि नाम-खेर्यम् आलम्बनं न स्थितं प्रबन्ध-स्पतेऽ॥

निषेधयाभावत्: सप्तं न निषेधोऽस्ति तत्त्वं।
न च निरिष्य: साधुः प्रयोगो विचारे नजः।
विकल्पाध्ययं वा सञ्जुः: स्पातू न तद्विचकः। [SDV: 9cd-10d]

इति न्यायानु नास्तिनम् न विस्थितं प्रबन्ध-विस्मृतश्च। तथेऽव नाविस्मितम्।

ततू कस्य हेतुः? अधिगमानलवन्ति तर्य नाम-खेर्यसः।

सन्योग्या निरिवासमान-नाम-खेर्यसः कर्थ प्रबन्ध-तदृ-वैस्तुरयानुपपतिरु। इति ततू
कस्य हेतौ इत्यावश्यः अधिकारानाथेऽव। तत्त्वत इति शष्यः। सन्योग्या न दोष
इत्यभिमायः।

एवं ततू नाम-खेर्यं न स्थितं नास्तिं न विस्थितं नाविस्मितम्।

उपसेहरनात्थ एवं तदृश्व इत्यादि। एतदृ उक्तं, धर्मता-मुखेन प्रबन्ध-तदृ-वैस्तुरयानं
तत्सम् आकारं इति।

[12.4]

सचेदू बोधि-सर्वस्य महा-सर्वस्यैवं गम्भीरायां प्रज्ञा-पारमितायां भाष्यमाणायां देश्यमाणायां उपदेश्यमाणायां चित्तं नावलचात्रं न संलियते न विस्मृत्ति न विविधति न विवादम्
आपचते नास्ति विपृण्याभावं मानसं न मन्न-पृण्य भावं नोत्तरयति न संशयसम् आपचते। अधिमूच्यत् अध्यायनेताविरहितो बोधि-सर्वस्य महा-सर्वस्य: प्रज्ञा-
पारमिताया वेदित्यं: स्थितोऽविविधविर्यायां बोधिसत्त्र-भूमि सु-स्थितोऽव स्थान
योगेन।

अधिमात्रत्स्यालम्बनर्थम् आहू सचेदू इत्यादि। एवं गम्भीरायाम् [W46.1] इति
नाम-मात्रल्येन प्रज्ञा-मात्र-स्वभावायाम् अन्त्य-तीर्थयं: श्रेणुः चानिष्य-भीषिष्य अल्पश-
गाधायाम्। एतदृ उक्तं, प्रज्ञा-मात्र-विविषां पु-वाक्यं-सत्यम् आलम्बनम् इति।

ततू कैलाकरेनालम्बनीयम् इत्याह अधिमूच्यति इत्यादि। सा प्रज्ञि न केन्कित
कुशलादिना धर्मम् वाच्योपधिमूच्यतं अध्यायलम्ब्यं।

आयतो विपुलो दृष्टि उपामार-परो महान्।
कल्याणश् चैत्याधिधिक्यादू आशयोच्यायाय: सताम्॥

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व्याख्यातं वेदवादि: प्रजा-पारम्परियो भाषात: 

12.5 Peaked proximate penetration

punru upapu bhagvan bodhi-satcchena mahaa-satcchena prajna-parimatiyay charta prajna-parimatiyay bhavayata na rupe sthayam, na vedaanyaya, na samsaya, na sancharayu, na vibhajane sthayanyayu.


tatu punathu vri-vibhida roopam. kalpyantam rupam pragaha-prabha-hupam kalpytatvaat, vibalkiptam rupe ascd-puta-pariklethna sanamu eva vato pratiibhatah iti vibalkiptatvaat, dhritya-rupe tattvatoorupam eva shunyata-rope parinimuktvaat. eva vedaadooropam vibhava:

... yathocharik-samskeha-bhajnacharya-dhauto || [AK1.22cd]

rupadinam erya eva antakram: tatra rupado tattvatoorupta varstuulama-yogana na sthayamy chetas: pratishthan na karyamu iti yatau.

1 tattvato rupam-uttattvatoorupam based on Tu which is more likely in this context.
एतद्व उकस, यस्मात् स्वभाव-शून्यता रूपादीनां रूपादि-स्वभावनापगत-स्वभावता, तस्मात् अस्थानान्त्व-विशिष्ट रूपालग्वालम्बनम् इति।

तत् कस्य हेतृत:। सचेद्रू रूपे तिष्ठति, रूपाभिसंस्कारे, चरति न चरति प्रज्ञा-पारमितायम्। एवं सचेद्र वेदनायां संज्ञायां संस्कारेषु सचेद्र विज्ञाने तिष्ठति, विज्ञानाभिसंस्कारे चरति, न चरति प्रज्ञा-पारमितायम्।

कस्मात् एवम् आलम्बनम् इति तद् कस्य हेतौरूप इत्यासंकुच्याकारं व्यतिरेकं-मुखेनाह। सचेद्रू सप्त इत्यादिना। एवं भोज्ये। आलम्बन-प्राप्त-प्रकार एवैयाकारः। संविन-निष्ठा च विषय-स्थितिः इत्याकारानूपस्मृतं एवालम्बं ग्राह्यम्। अतो यदि स्त्रैं नित्यादिकसु आकारसु तिष्ठति तदा रूपाभिसंस्कारे रूपाभोग-विकल्पे चरति। एवं च न चरति प्रज्ञा-पारमितायां मुख्यते मूद-मूर्ध्र-स्वभावायम्। एवं बेदनादिकसु योजयम्।

एतद्व उकस, धर्मता-मुखेनाकार एवं-विद्यो ग्राह्य:। यदृ परमार्थेन रूपादि-सर्व-धर्म-शून्यतयो: परस्परमुएक-सप्तस्मृतं इति। तत्र शून्यतायाम् अनित्यविदायनाम् अभावेन रूपादृ न नित्यादिकसु आकारेः: स्थानं विधेयस्मृतं इति।

तथा हि। मूद-मूर्ध्रकारसं अधिकृत्य पद्ध-विशिष्ट-साहित्याकारं व्याख्यातं "सप्तस्मृत शून्यता, शून्यतेऽव सप्तस्मृत"। एवं यावत् "या च भगवन्नित्यतयाः शून्यता न सानित्यतेत्यादि।

तत्र कस्य हेतृतो? न एव भिसंस्कारे चरस्त्र प्रज्ञा-पारमितायां परिगृहाति, नापि प्रज्ञा-पारमितायां योगस्मृत आपतेत, नापि प्रज्ञा-पारमितायां परिपूर्यः, अपरिपूर्यः: प्रज्ञा-पारमितायां न नियमिताय सर्वज्ञतायाम् अपरिगृहीतिः तरिक्तन हि।

अभिसंस्कारसं अन्तरेण भावानुवृत्ते: कथं पुनर् अभिसंस्कारे चरस्त्र न चरतीत् तत्र कस्य हेतौ: इत्यासंकुच्याह न ह्याहादि। एवं भोज्ये। विकल्पोदिकसु। प्रज्ञा-पारमिताच निर्विकल्पा। तत्तवः कथं विकल्पे तत्वाविभिन्नेन चरस्त्र प्रज्ञा-पारमितायां चरति? केवलं माया-पुष्के चरित्वादम् इति।

न परिगृहाति, नापि योगस्मृत आपतेत, नापि परिपूर्यः इति पद्म-प्रायं यथा-संस्कं प्रायोग-मौल-पृष्ठाकारशः द्रत्यम्। प्रज्ञा-पारमितायाम् इति मुख्यतो मूद-मूर्ध्र-स्वभावायम्। न नियमितात्त्वादि, अपरिगृहीतिः अप्राप्तसिंहिमू अभिसंस्कारे परिगृहितुन तक्कारो न नियमिताय सर्वज्ञतायाम् इति योजयम्। सर्वकारकाता चात्र अव-सर्वज्ञतासमानयात्सर्व-[W48.1] शृणौ-वापनीका। यथा-संभवम् एव्यान्यनापि।

1 न-ष: as in V.
तत् कस्य हेतुः?

रूपं ह्यापिरृग्ह्त्रं प्रज्ञ-पारमितायाम्। एवं बेदना-संज्ञा-संस्कार-

विदां ह्यापिरृग्ह्त्रं प्रज्ञ-पारमितायाम्। यथु च रूपयापिरृग्ह्त्रो न तत् रूपम्। एवं यो

बेदनाया: संज्ञा: संस्काराणां यो विज्ञानस्यपरिग्रहो न तत् विज्ञानम्।

कथम् अत्रहृदय भिमसंस्कार िति चेतः?

तत् कस्य हेतुः? इत्याशंकः च रूपं

हीत्यादि। एवं मन्यते । अभिसंस्कार-विषय-स्वभावा रूपादयो 

न्यायोक्ति-सत्वपरिग्रहिता: प्रज्ञ-पारमितायाम्। अतः तदू-विषयोऽभिसंस्कारी 

विद्य-प्रतिभासितानु न ग्राह्य इति। ततू एव दर्शयन्ति यथु च रूपस्यपरिग्रहो न 

तदू रूपम् इत्यादि। विष-प्रतिशोधयोऽभिन्न-विषयवत्तादु इति भावः।

सापि प्रज्ञ-पारमितायाम्।

प्रज्ञ-पारमितायाम् अपि तत्त्वभिन्निवेशो न कार्ये, विपयति-प्रसाङ्खा इत्याह 

सापीत्यादि।

एवं ह्यात्र बोधि-सत्त्वेन महा-सत्त्वेन प्रज्ञ-पारमितायां चरित्यम्।

उपसंहरनान्त: एवं हीत्यादि । हि-शाब्दोऽधारणे। एवम् एवेत्यथः।

अं च बोधि-सत्त्यम् महा-सत्त्यम् सवध्यमपरीरृग्हितो नाम समाधिरु विपुलः 

पुरस्कृतोऽप्रमाण-नियतोऽसाधारण: सवध्यात्रक-प्रत्येकः-वद्धः।

एवम् आलम्बनानार-नियताम् मूढ-मूढः-गतं समाधिम् आह अत्यादिना। सवध्यम 

सवध्यम रूपमपरिभाषा अपरीरृग्हितो यः समाधिरु अन्तर्य-संज्ञकः स तथोकः। विपुलो धर्म 

धातु-बैपूपलन्तु पुरस्कृतोऽ [W50.1] यथोक्तालम्बनाकार-विशेषायम्यं चेतस: पुरस्तो वर्तनादु 

इत्यार्यविमुक्तेः। अतं एव कचिच्छ अपुरस्कृत इति पाठो न ग्राह्यः। अभिमाण-नियतः 

सवध्यात्रक-सत्त्यम्-प्रतिशोधितमात्। उस्क-कश्यम्-सत्त्यम्-प्रोक्ताः-सवध्यात्रक-नियतः। अभिमाण-नियतः। असाधारणोपयोज्येष्ठोग्याः 

यथोक्तालम्बनादिप्रत्येकः-विध-वैशिष्ट्यात्।

[12.6]

सापि सवध्यात्रक-परीरृग्हिता। न हि निमित्तोऽग्रहीत्यवः।

मध्यस्मालम्बनार्यम् आह सापि सवध्यात्रति। अपि-शाब्दादु अनित्यतादिशृण्यतानां 

परिग्रहः। अपरीरृग्हिता कृतं इत्यादि न हीत्यादि। निमित्ताम् असाधारणे रूपम्।

तत्त्वान्वित्युप्तम् एक-स्पष्टवान् नास्त्यतो ग्रहणमूः इति यावत्।

1 The sanndhi is not observed in either W and V who read पुरस्कृत: अप्र

2 अतो प्रहणम्-अतोप्रहणम् based on Tu and supported by P.
एतदु उक्तं, धर्म-धातु-स्पर्शस्यनित्यादिसत्वार्थकारजता-शून्यताः स्व-स्व-भावेन नित्यभावालाप्त परस्परम् एषाम् ऐकात्म्यनानिश्चितत्त-विशिष्ट ि प्रायाचाल्म्बनम् इति।

सचेत्त निमित्तो ग्रहीतवभाविन्यन्तृ व चेह श्रेणिक: परिभ्रमक: श्रद्धाम् अनपस्यत।

अत्र हि श्रेणिक: परिभ्रमक: सर्वं-आणेजनु-निमित्तम् भ्रद्यातुसारी व्यावहितेन ज्ञानेनावतीणः। सोञ्जर्जर्णविन्यमं न रूपं परिगुह्यते। एवम् न वेदनां न संस्कारानुव न विज्ञानं परिगुह्यते। नापि तत्र प्रीति-सुखेन तजु-ज्ञानं समनुपस्यति।

निमित्त-प्रेरे को दोष इत्यादि समेदृ इत्यादि। यदि निमित्तो ग्रहीतवभ भौतके तदाद स्व-शासने निमित्त-प्रेरे दीर्घ-काले मुक्तिम् अपेक्षयन् निर्विश्वम्: सत् नैव इत्य शास्त्रे श्रेणिक-संज्ञक: परिभ्रमकसः तपस्यनिमित्त-योगेन श्रद्धाम् अभिसंस्कर्तायं प्रतिविशेष।

निमित्त-श्रृम्प पुत्राववादादृ इति भावः। तदु एव कथयना अथ श्रीत्वादि। अत्रानिमित्ते तथागतालाववाहकलेन सर्वं-आणेजनु-निमित्त्यम् भ्रिमुण्याधिको-मनःस्कारं कृत्वा, मुद्रिस्त्रितयन्तु श्रद्या मारपुसरणान्त्रादुसारी श्रेष्ठविदेशनेन पुनः-परात्मय-ज्ञानेनावतीणः। सोज्वतीयता-कालं न रूपादि निमित्तो [W51.1] मनसिकरोति।

नापि त्रायानिमित्त-भावान्तम् उपस्थेन प्रीति-सुखेन तदु-भावकं ज्ञानं निमित्तत: समनुपस्यति। तत्र प्रीति: सोभनस्य चैतसिकं, सुखं प्राधिक्ष: कायिकी। स हि लोकिक-वीराग: प्रथम-द्वितीय-ध्यानात्यता-सन्निहितेनावतीणः इति भदन्त-विविधुकितेन।

नाध्यालम् रूपम् तजु-ज्ञानं समनुपस्यति। न बहिर्भिर्भिर्भि रूपम् तजु-ज्ञानं समनुपस्यति।

नाध्यालम्-बहिर्भिर्भि रूपम् तजु-ज्ञानं समनुपस्यति। नाध्यान्त: रूपाति तजु-ज्ञानं समनुपस्यति। एवं नाध्यालम् वेदनाया: संस्काराः। संस्काराणि नाध्यालम् विज्ञानस्य तजु-ज्ञानं समनुपस्यति। न बहिर्भिर्भि विज्ञानस्य तजु-ज्ञानं समनुपस्यति। नाध्यालम्-बहिर्भिर्भि विज्ञानस्य तज्ज्ञानस्य समनुपस्यति। नाध्यान्त: विज्ञानान्ति तजु-ज्ञानं समनुपस्यति।

अत्र पद-प्रयोग: श्रेणिक: परिभ्रमकोधित्वम्: सोज्व सर्वं श्रद्धातुसारी सर्वं-ज्ञाने धमानं प्रमाणीकृत्य एवम् अधिमुक इति तेन न कष्ट्विध्य: परिगुह्यते, नापि स कष्ट्विध्य: धर्मं य उपलब्धो, यं स गृहीतायाः, मुक्तेद्वा वा, स निविष्कितम् अपि न मन्यते।

केनाकारणालम्बनः शुभं इत्यादि नाध्यालाम् इत्यादि। अध्यात्मस्य रूपस्यपात-भूत-भौतिक-प्राक्यालिकात्यस्य तदु-भावकं ज्ञानं अध्यात्म-शून्यताः न समनुपस्यति। निमित्तविन्यमं इति शेषः। बहिर्भि रूपस्यपात-भूत-भौतिकाव्र बाह्यायतनस्य बहिर्भि-शून्यताः, नाध्यालाम-बहिर्भि रूपस्य तदुभवतः शारीरयोग-शून्यताः। रूपादु अन्यत्र ताहै पश्यतीत्याह नाध्यान्यन्त्रे। एवं धर्म:-

1 तत्र-अन्त्र cf. W50.25.
भावनाभिनिविष्टः। कथम् असी कवच इत्याह ब्रेत्याछ। तत्राहिनम् पद-परायण योग-स्थान-विशेषदिधिमुक्त-चयन-भूमी स्थः। श्रेणिकोधिमुक्त इति वेदितव्यो। नामित इति यत्: श्रेणिकोधिमुक्त भविष्यवाच्यम् तत्त्वाधिकारी तत्त्वाधिकारीत्व: सर्वनाशीत्वस्मात् भविष्यवाच्यम् श्रेणिकोधिमुक्त इति। [W52.1] तु हेद्यादीर्थी भवतीत्यभिप्रायः।

कर्म पुनः मुद्दिन्दोप्येवाभिमुक्त इत्याह धर्मं धर्मानामः। पूवविध-वलातु प्रज्ञा-पारमिता-धर्मानामः अधिकारिणीकृताभिमुक्त अनित्वाप्नाहिनी इति। तस्मात् तेन न कह्रिः। धर्मं धर्मास्व: ध्यायोपतां परिगुण्यो नापी विद्मानान्वेयोपलवः। यथा धर्मं उपादेयवेचन स गुणीवात् स्वरूपात्मक नृपे व वेष्यवेचन। आस्तां ताब्रवो अन्यत्व: निरापदम् अष्टि न तस मन्यते तत्त्वो त बुध्यते।

एतद् उक्तं स्वभाव-प्रतिभेदनास्त्रिकारो रुपादों धर्मं-मुक्तानामकाऽ इति। तत् श्रेणिकोदाहरणं तस्य श्रेणिक-संबंधनम् समाधेऽरु प्रयत्त्वास्त्रियऽपि धर्मानामः।

हयमृ अष्टि भगवन् बोधी-सत्तस्य महा-सत्तस्य प्रज्ञा-पारमिता वेदितव्या यदू रूपं न परिगुण्यो। एवं यदू वेदन संज्ञाय संस्कारानु यथू विज्ञानं न्यथू विज्ञानं न परिगुण्यो। न चात्त्वरा परिवर्तितं अपरिवर्त्यं दशानिष्ठु तथागत-ब्राह्मण चुलभिषु तथागत-वैशार्थवै अभादासिषु वाचविग्रंतिरु कुद्र-धर्मम्।

[12.7]

अधिमात्रश्चाल्मधीनार्थम् आहा हयमृ इत्यादि। हयमृ इति कथ्यमाणा। न केवलं पूवविधविभिः-शब्दः। तदू एव दशायनां यथू रूपम् इत्यादि। यथू इति यस्मादम् भविष्यवाच्यम्। अयापवतु तद्धुपर्युप्लमभेण सर्व-निरोधे बोधी-सत्तो निरवियादू इत्याह न चेत्यादि।

ब-शब्दोद्वाराणः।

असंलीनेन कायेन बेदनाम् अधिवासयन्। प्रथोत्स्वेव निराण्य विमोक्षश् तस्य चेतस:।

1. धर्म-भावनाभिनिविष्टः: धर्म-भावनाभिनिविष्टः: भिनिविष्टः भावनां भिनिविष्ट:।
2. The punctuation is supported by P वेयूंृःपूःपूः।
3. W, Tu both punctuuate: उक्तवः। श्रेणिकोदाहरणे। However P reads: श्रेणिकोदाहरणे।
तस्माद् इयमृ अपि भगवन् बोधि-सत्त्वस् महा-सत्त्वस् प्रजा-पारमिता वैदित्वया ।

tasmaadhi evam apid bhagavan bodhi-sattvah mahasattvah prajaparamimitah vaidityaya.

तस्माद् इत्यादुपुरंसहारः। एतद् उक्तं, स्वभावाभावतयाव नीलाजी-निमित्तादर्शीन-बिखितं तत्ततो रूपायालभन्तम् इति ।

tasmaadhi ityayadupuransahah. etad uktam svabhavaabhavatayav nilejadi-nimittadarsin-bikhitam tattato rupayyalambham iti.

पुनरू अपरं भगवन् बोधि-सत्त्वो महा-सत्त्वो प्रजा-पारमितायां चरता प्रजा-पारमितायां भाव्यवैत्तमयो उपपरिवक्षत्वम् एवम् उपनिवधातव्यम् । कतमेष्टि प्रजा-पारमिता? कस्य चैत्य प्रजा-पारमिता? किं यो धर्मं न विचयं नोपखितं सा प्रजा-पारमितितेषि?


sahey vr upaparivakshan evam upanividhayato nabanijyate, na sanyate, na vishdevyate, na vishyadha aapaabhate, naa tavyam visujshibhavati mainasa, na bhagam-priyshibhavati natsaptvati, na sansaptvati, na santmasam aapalatvisharyihii bodehi-satvyah mahasatvah prajaparamita vaiditya.


rupaadyasamjyate teeyo tato bhavanevam-bhavata.

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तयोर् भिष: स्वभावतः तदनितित्वसंस्थिति: ।
तासं तद्व-भाव-शून्यतं भिष: स्वभावायम् एतयोऽ: ॥
अनुदश्चो यो धर्माणां तत् निमित्तासमीक्षणम् ।
परिदशा च व्रज्याः: सर्वस्यानुपलब्धत: ॥

[12.8 Forbearance proximate penetration]

अथ खल्वायुभास् शारिपुत्र आयुभासं सुभूतिम् एतद् अवोच्च। किं कारणम् आयुभासं
सुभूतेविरहिष्ठो बोधि-सत्त्वो महा-सत्त्व: प्रज्ञा-पारमित्या वेदित्यो यदा रूपम् एव
विरहिष्ठं रूप-स्वभावेन। एवं यदा बदेनेव संज्ञेय संस्कार एवं यदा विज्ञानम् एवं विरहिष्ठं
विज्ञान-स्वभावेन यदा प्रज्ञा-पारमितेव विरहिष्ठं प्रज्ञा-पारमिता-स्वभावेन यदा
सर्वज्ञेय विरहिष्ठा सर्वज्ञ-स्वभावेन?

मूर्धन्नतरम् इदानी मुदन: क्षान्ति-गत-कृशलस्यालम्बनार्थं प्रज्ञ-पूर्वकम् आहादिं किं
कारणम् इत्यादिः । रूप-स्वभावेनिति वेदान्तत्त्व इति शेषः । एतद् उक्तम् । यदा
रूपादिके विरहिष्ठं रूपादि-स्वभावेनालम्बन्ये तदा किं कारणं प्रज्ञा-पारमित्या
मुख्यंतो मूर्ध-क्षान्ति-स्वभावया । विरहिष्ठो वेदित्यं इति।

एवम् उक्ते, आयुभासं सुभूतिर्गुणां शारिपुत्रम् एतद् अवोच्च। एवम् एतद्
आयुभासं शारिपुत्रक्षेत्रम् एतद् । रूपम् एव आयुभासं शारिपुत्रविरहिष्ठं रूप-स्वभावेन । एवं
[WSS.1] बदेनेव संज्ञेय संस्कार एवं, विज्ञानम् एवं विरहिष्ठं विज्ञान-स्वभावेन। प्रज्ञा-
पारमितेवा आयुभासं शारिपुत्रविरहिष्ठं प्रज्ञा-पारमिता-स्वभावेन। सर्वज्ञेतावायुभासं
शारिपुत्रविरहि विरहिष्ठा सर्वज्ञ-स्वभावेन।

प्रतीत्य-समुच्चाद-ध्यितं यदुतां"स्मिन् सतो भवति"व्यभिचारणं रूपम् एव बतायते
रूपं आविद्यनि:। अथ्या यदा रूपम् एव विरहिष्ठं रूप-स्वभावेन इति प्रज्ञे रूपम् एव
विरहिष्ठं रूप-स्वभावेनेत्युतं न युक्त स्थात्त।

प्रज्ञा-पारमिता-लक्षण्यानापि प्रज्ञा-पारमिता विरहिष्ठा। लक्षण-स्वभावेन लक्षणं
विरहिष्ठं। लक्षण-स्वभावेन लक्षणं विरहिष्ठं। लक्षण-स्वभावेन लक्षणं
विरहिष्ठं। स्वभाव-लक्षण्यापि स्वभावे विरहिष्ठ:।

कथं पुनर्द स्वभावेन विरहिष्ठं रूपादित्वाशिकृतः, प्रज्ञा-पारमिताया: स्वभाव-
विरहिष्ठत्व-वितिपादनेत्यायेष्यं स्वभाव-विरहिष्ठवं प्रतिपादित्तम् इति तदर्थ्यं आह्।
प्रज्ञा-पारमिता-लक्षणं साध्यसंपेत् 2 विरहिष्ठा प्रज्ञा-पारमिता। विशेष-

1 W adds भिषमाद् which is not in Tu, V or rendered in Tib.
2 Cf. AAV:62.13-14 लक्षणं साध्यसंपेत्, स्वभावोऽपि विशेषः। तयोर् इतरेतर-स्वभावं-प्रकृतीं सत्यं नैव
किंचिद् कस्यसनात्न लक्षणं स्यद्।

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निरापम्या-स्तवा। निरापम्या-स्तवा। ।

रूपेणापि लक्षणेन इत्यपि-शब्दः। विपर्यस-विनिवृत्ति-फलतावु देशनाया लक्ष्य-लक्षणं

tह्रीस्तीतिवाहुः लक्षण-स्वभावेनेतयादि। लक्षणं सामान्यम्। लक्ष्यो विशेषः। तत्योस्तु तर्कं

स्वभावोस्तीतिवाहुः स्वभाव-लक्षणेनेति।

लक्ष्य-लक्षण-निर्मितं कायुदाहार-वजितम्।

tतत्रां प्राज्ञास्की युक्ता लक्ष्य-लक्षण-संस्करितं॥

इति भावः। एतदु उक्तम्। शून्यतया लक्ष्य-लक्षणोरूपं एकतेनात्रस्वभावत्च-विशिष्टं

स्पाणधालम्बनम् इति।

एवमु उक्तेः, आयुष्मानं शारिपुत्रं आयुष्मानं सुभूतिम् एतदु अबोधात्। किं पुनर्य आयुष्मानं

सुभूते यो बोधि-सत्त्वो महा-सत्त्वोत्र शिक्षित्वात् स नियास्यति संबिज्ञायाम्।

[व56.1] केनाकारेणालम्बनीयम् इति प्रश्रु-पूर्वकम् आकारार्थम् आह्वं किं पुनर्य

इत्यादिं। ब्रजस्मिनं आलम्बने संदुःश्च यं शिक्षित्वात् स किं नियास्यति

सविज्ञायाम्। तन्न-निनिम्त्म-मूदु-शान्ति-गत-कुशल-लाभणेनेति भावः।

आयुष्मानं सुभूतिर आहः। एवमु एतदु आयुष्मानं शारिपुत्रैवम् एतदु। यो बोधि-सत्त्वो

महा-सत्त्वोत्र शिक्षित्वात् स नियास्यति सविज्ञायाम्।

धर्मिताविविधा एवोक्त इत्वभुयुगमार्थम् आह। एवमु एतदु इत्यादिं। नियास्यतिति

स्पाणदीनाम् अभाव एव स्व-भावता संबूति-परमार्थ-मुखेनाकारः। तस्य भाववैधेति यावदु।

[12.9]

तत्त् कस्य हेतोः? अजाता हृदायितां हा आयुष्मानं शारिपुत्र सव-धर्माः।

कथं पुनर्य मूदु-शान्ति-गत-कुशलं शिक्षामाणं। सविकारार्थतायं गमित्तिति तद्भक्षय

हेतोत्रु इत्याश्रितः। मध्यस्यालम्बनार्थम् आह। अजाता हृदायिताः। उत्तरोत्तरालम्बन-

विषेषादिरं मध्यम-विशेषेऽनयेन यास्यति भावः। आची हिः-शंसोदधारणं।

अजाता एवेत्यथाः। कुतः? यस्मात् शणिकानित्यत्या जातिधर्मः निरोधनानितिः न निविषणं गताः। सव-धर्माः

इति। प्रकृतिस्वभावत्वेनानुपातानिरोध-विशिष्टं

स्पाणधालम्बनम् इति यावदु।

1 Niraupamyā-stava. Cf. MMK:5.5 तस्मानं न विचारं लक्ष्यं लक्षणं नेव विचारं। लक्ष्य-लक्षण-निर्मित्तं नेव

भावोपि विचारं॥

2 W supported by ह प र आ च । इ स ग , बुत स ह ग र स W56.16 छोटे ह ओडिओ, कोरिंग तो द Conze's (1973) "do not go forth."
एवं चरत आयुष्मनः शारिपुत्र बोधि-सत्त्व महा-सत्त्व सर्वज्ञानीभवति। यथा
यथा सर्वज्ञानीभवति तथा तथा सत्त्व-परिपात्याय चाम-प्रिनियुपुरुष लक्षण-
परिशुद्धिर बुद्ध-क्षेत्र-शुद्धिः बुद्धेश्वर च समवधाने भवति।

केनाकारेणलम्बनीयम् इत्याह एवं चरत हिरण्डिद। एदम् अनंतरोक-न्यायेन
चरते भावनः, सर्व गत्यायो बोधार्थ इति कृता। बासनीभवतीः श्रीप्रागिम-प्रासेः निकत-वर्तीनि स्फुत। सत्त्व-परिपात्यायेति कुशल-धर्म-नियोजनातु सत्त्व-
परिपात्याय। कायेतयाति, सर्व-धर्म-स्व-रूपाविशेषे [W57.1] कायादीनां सर्वकार-
विशुद्धिः इति विशुद्धिः हेतु-मुखेनाभ्यस्यनातु काय-परिशुद्धिः भवति परिशुद्धि विनिधम काय-कर्मः, निधित-परिशुद्धिः। परिशुद्धि निधितम मानः-कर्मः। स्थानाभेदात्-पूर्णितं निपतेतु प्रात्रिष्णु-महा-पुरुष-लक्षण-परिशुद्धिः।
सत्त्व-भाजनयो: परिशुद्धता बुद्ध-क्षेत्र-शुद्धिः। निधिक-भागीयायस्याः सर्वभास्मवत्
किन्यु-मात्रेणे भावः।

एवं च पुनर् आयुष्मनः शारिपुत्र बोधि-सत्त्व महा-सत्त्व: प्रजा-पारिष्ठायां चरन्
सर्वमात्या आसनीभवति।

एदम् इत्यादिपरस्परः।

[12.10]
पुनर् अपरस्व आयुष्मान सुमृतिः बोधि-सत्त्व महा-सत्त्व आरभ्यवेस्म भाह। सचेद् रूपे
चरति निमित्ते चरति। सचेद् रूप-निमित्ते चरति निमित्ते चरति। सचेद् रूप-निमित्तम्
इति चरति निमित्ते चरति। सचेद् रूपस्योत्पादे चरति निमित्ते चरति। सचेद् रूपये
निरोधे चरति निमित्ते चरति। सचेद् रूपस्य विनाशं चरति निमित्ते चरति। सचेद् रूपे
शून्यम् इति चरति निमित्ते चरति। अहं चरांति चरति निमित्ते चरति। अहं बोधि-
सत्त्व इति चरति निमित्ते चरति। अहं बोधि-सत्त्व इति हृदयमभव एव संरक्षित।

एवं सचेद् वेदनायां संज्ञायां संसारिकं सचेद् विज्ञाने चरति निमित्ते चरति। सचेद्
विज्ञान-निमित्ते चरति निमित्ते चरति। सचेद् विज्ञानं निमित्तम् इति चरति निमित्ते
चरति। सचेद् विज्ञानोपादे चरति निमित्ते चरति। सचेद् विज्ञानये निरोधे चरति
निमित्ते चरति। सचेद् विज्ञानये विनाशं चरति निमित्ते चरति। सचेद् विज्ञानं शून्यम्

1 इति omit ted by W, probably as a printing error.
2 Akliujkar points out that the इति following सर्वकार-विशुद्धिः (which I render, conjecturally, "complete purity [of body, etc.] Because...") seems to be indicating a gloss on the A. If so, H's version of the A must have differed from W at this point. This conjecture is further supported by the fact that H does not gloss बुद्धेश्वर च समवधानाः as one would expect.
लोकत चरिते निमित्ते चरिते। अहं चरायणिते चरिते निमित्ते चरिते। अहं बोधि-सत्त्व इति चरिते निमित्ते चरिते। अहं बोधि-सत्त्व इति हुअल्म्भ एव च चरिते।

सचेद्व पुनः अस्यैवं भवति। य एवं चरिते स प्रजा- [W58.1] पारमितायां चरिते स प्रजा-पारमितायां भावयतीति निमित्ते एव च चरिते। अयं बोधि-सत्त्वोजनुन्याय-कुशलो वेदित्ययः।

अधिमात्रास्यालम्बनायथम् आह सचेद्व रूप इत्यादिः। एवं मन्यते, यावदु अभिनवेश-योगो निमित्त-प्रहादः चरिते, तावन् "निमित्त-कृष्णा बोधि-सच्छा" इति वचनाद्व उपलम्भ-मूले। संसार-कृष्णो प्रतिति।

तत्र रूपं कार्य-भूतम्। रूप-निमित्तम् सहकारिकारणम्। रूपं निमित्तम् उपादान-कारणम्। उत्तरम्। विनाम्: कशिकानित्यतया, विनाम्: प्रबन्धानित्यतया, शून्यम् उभयोर् भावः। अनुपाय-कुशलो वियायस-प्रृत्तावाद्व वेदित्ययः।

अथ बल्यायुमानः शारिरपु आयुष्मानं सुभूतिम् एव अवोच्च। कथम् पुनः आयुष्मानं सुभूते चरन् बोधि-सत्त्वो महा-सच्छं चरिते प्रजा-पारमितायाम्?

एवम् उक्ते, आयुष्मानं सुभूतिम् आयुष्मानं शारिरपु एव अवोच्च। सचेद्व आयुष्मानं शारिरपु बोधि-सत्त्वो महा-सच्छः: न रूपं चरिते, न रूप-निमित्ते चरिते, न रूपं निमित्तम् इति चरिते, न रूपस्यतथा चरिते, न रूपस्य निरोधे चरिते, न रूपस्य विनाशे चरिते, न रूपं शून्यम् इति चरिते, नाहं चरायणिते चरिते, नाहं बोधि-सत्त्व इति चरिते। एवं सचेद्व न वेदनायाम् संस्कार्येऽसचेद्व विज्ञाने चरिते, न विज्ञान-निमित्ते चरिते, न विज्ञानं निमित्तम् इति चरिते, न विज्ञानस्यतथा चरिते, न विज्ञानस्य निरोधेऽ चरिते, न विज्ञानस्य विनाशे चरिते, न विज्ञानं शून्यम् इति चरिते, नाहं चरायणिते चरिते, नाहं बोधि-सत्त्व इति चरिते। सचेद्व पुनः नास्यैवं भवति, य एवं चरिते स प्रजा-पारमितायां चरिते, स प्रजा-पारमितायां भावयतीति।

व्यतिरेक-मुखेन निदिशिय अन्य-मुखेनाह कथम् इत्यादिः।

[W59.1] एवं चरन्ते बोधि-सत्त्वो महासच्छं चरिते प्रजा-पारमितायाम्।

एवं चरन्ते इतािमुपसेवाः:। स्व-सामान्य-लक्षणानुपपत्तया सर्व-धर्ममानम् अनिमित्तत्व-विशिष्ट स्पादालम्बनम् इत्येवं चरन्ते बोधि-सच्छं चरिते प्रजा-पारमितायाम् अधिमात्राक्षणितस्वभावयाम्।

1 Tib ‘केश्यश्कधिष्ट्यपुष’ suggests उपलम्भ-प्रपात ‘over the waterfall/cliff of the findable.’
2 उत्तरम्-उत्तादे based on Tu and supported by P.
3 कशिकानित्यतया and the following प्रबन्धानित्यतया are to be taken as genitive tat-puruṣas.
स हि चरंसू चरामीति नोपेति। न चरामीति नोपेति। चरामि च न चरामि चेति
नोपेति। नैव चरामि न न चरामीति नोपेति। चरिष्यामीति नोपेति। न चरिष्यामीति
नोपेति। चरिष्यामि च न चरिष्यामि चेति नोपेति। नैव चरिष्यामि न न चरिष्यामीति
नोपेति।
केनाकारेणालम्बनीयम् इत्याद श हि चरनित्यादि।

विधानं प्रतिषेधं च ततेव सहितौ पुनः।
प्रतिषेधं तयोरे एव सर्वं नायगच्छति॥ इति ्भावः।

ततो कस्य हेतुवो नोपेति? सर्व-धर्मा ह्याणुपयता अनुपाताः।

कथं पुनरं अनवमं भावनेति ततो कस्य हेतुवो नोपेति तावः अंकूतः अनुपाताः।

यस्मात् प्रकृतिवै रूपादिनिमित्तानाम। आश्रय-रहितस्थिताधिमोक्ष-
मनस्काराधिमोक्ष-तत्त्व-मनस्काराधिप्रज्ञानम् इति धर्मस-मुखनाकारेणालम्बनादृ
अधिमोक्षप्राप्तकृत्वा अनुपयतासु तत्त्व-मनस्कारो चावहेरित्तवादु अनुपाताः।

इत्यालम्बनकारेरवदृ अपायाभावेनाधिमात्र-धर्म-क्षमानातु
क्षन्ति-गतं जी-विधम्।

तथा चौकम् [AA31-32ab]

रूपादेरू अस्वभावतः, तदभव्य-स्वभावतः।

तदज्जातिः, अनिधयायं, शुद्धिः, तदनिमित्तता।

तन्निमित्तानाधिप्रज्ञानादृ अधिमुक्तिः असंज्ञा॥

[12.11 Supreme dharma proximate penetration]

अयमु उच्यते सर्व-धर्मानिप्पदानो नाम समाधिः बोधि-सत्वस्य महा-सत्वस्य चिपुः
पुरस्कृतोप्रमण-नियतोसाधारणं: सर्व-शास्त्र-प्रत्येक-बुद्धः।

1 Cf. PVin:2.17-25.
2 निमित्तानाधिप्रज्ञानातु अधिः W note 4; cf. Tib ते'जिन्तर्यादिः निमित्तानातु अधिः
क्षान्त्यन्तरस्वः इदानी मूलुनार्य-धर्म-गत-कुशल-मूलस्वामनार्यस्वः आह अयम्
इत्यादिः। सर्व-धर्मं नोपादितयते येन समाधिना स सर्व-धर्मविधानानो नाम
समाधिः। तत्त्वतः समाधिस्वरूपं स्थागालम्बनम्। अयं विपुल इत्यादिभिः उच्यत
इति संबंधः।

अनेनेव समाधिना विहरनु बोधि-सत्चो महा-सत्वः किर्मम् अनुतारां सम्यक-संबोधिम्
अभिसंबुध्यते।

केनाकारेणालम्बनीयम् इत्याह अनेनेवत्यादि। स्व-प्रणिधिघुण-ज्ञान-धर्म-धातु-
बलनानाभोगात् सर्व-लोक-धातुपुः यथा-भवत्या समाधेरू व्यापारः प्रवर्तत इति कार्य-
मुखेनकारेणालम्बनात् किर्मम् अनुतारां सम्यक-संबोधिम् अभिसंबुध्यते।

बुद्धानुभावनुपुष्मानुः सुनृतति: स्थविर एवम् आह। व्याकूतोपध्य भगवन् बोधि-सत्चो
महा-सत्वः पुर्विकसु तथागतसः अहंद्रः सम्यक-संबुधृः अनुतारायं सम्यक-संबोध्योः,
योगेन समाधिना विहरति। नामः मध्यस्वालम्बनार्यस्वः आह।

मध्यस्वालम्बनार्यस्वः आहु बुद्धानुभावनेवत्यादि। बुद्धानुभाव-प्रक्रमोपध्य पुनस् तदु-
चवनं प्रतिभान-विशेषार्थभिभोत्नार्यस्वः। अथ वा [W61.1] विनेवानं तदृ-समरण-
दृढीभावार्यस्वः। व्याकूतोपध्य इति ध्वनितेषा सम्यक-प्रतिपन्न-समाधेर् योगिनो बुद्धृ
व्याकरणं कियतं इति व्याकरण-हेतुत्व-विशिष्ट-स्थागालम्बनात्। तथागतसः इत्यादि।
सर्वासराविपरीत-धर्म-दैविकलेन परार्थ-संपदा तथा गता:। सवासन-कृष-जैवारणं-
प्रहाण-योगात् स्वार्थ-संपदाह्यं।। सम्यक-संपदृ-द्यायावहः-मानोधिगमात् सम्यक-सं-
संबुधः। अनेनेति मध्यस्वाल-धर्मः गतेन।

स तमृ अपि समाधिः न समुत्पादित। "न च तेन समाधिना मन्यते, अहं समाहितः। अहं
समाधिः समापत्त्ये, अहं समाधिः समापचे, अहं समाधिः समापनः।" इतवेवः तस्य सर्वेऽः
सर्वसर्वेऽ सर्वं न विचित्रते।

केनाकारेणालम्बनीयस्वः इत्याह स तमृ बपीतादि। न समुनपपप्यति निर्विकल्पन
चेतसा। न च तेन मन्यते निर्विकल्पेन तत्वतोस्तत्तात्। अहं समाहितं इति लघु-
समाधिकः। समापत्त्य इत्यादयः प्रयोग-मौल-पृथभाविनो विकल्पः। काल-त्रय-भाविनो वा।
सर्वेणीत्यादि। देः हृदेऽ सवेऽ कस्तु-सर्वतालकार-सवेऽ चेति कचनात्
सर्वांतातदिः-कस्तु-भेदेन, सर्वं स्वार्थादिः-निषयं विकल्प-जातं कस्तु। तर्कं मूल-
मुधािपिप्रकारेण सर्वं सवासन-सर्व-प्रकारं न संविचाते सर्व-विकल्पानुपपत्त्या, विविधा-
समाधिः-स्वरूपस्य बोधि-सत्चयां समाहित इत्यादिजानानुपपत्त्या धर्मता-
मुखेनकारेणालम्बनार्यस्वान्। न संभवति।
एवम् उले, आयुष्मान् शारिपुत्र आयुष्मान्तं सुभूतिम् एतद् अवचत्। येनायुष्मान् सुभूते समाधिना बिहरूः बोधि-सत्त्वो महा-सत्त्वस् तथागातैः। अहंकारः सम्यक्ष-संबु त्रेः व्याक्रियं तदन्तरां सम्यक्ष-संबोधिैै शक्यं: स समाधिर् दर्शितुम्।

अधिमानस्य अहं येनायुष्मान् सुभूते समाधिन्तयादि। अधिमानस्य धर्मं-गतेऽ शक्यं: स समाधिर् दर्शितुम्। इति। कुक्तां तु कलेनेति पाठः। तत्र [W62.1] शास्त्रः स समाधिर् दर्शितुम्। इति तस्येव प्रश्रयं तुर् वचनम् असक्तम्। इति चिन्तयम्।

सुभूतिर् आह। नो हीदम्। आयुष्मान्। शारिपुत्र।

नो हीदम्। इत्यादितम्। धर्मं या समाधिशोध्य-सत्त्व-प्रजा-पारिषदितायां-न्रयस्य परस्पराम् सुन्नों इत्याशक्यं-पृथक-रूप-दर्शन-विस्मयु-श्वादलब्धिनानु नेवायन्यः।

तत्व कस्य हेतो?: तमु अर्थ हिं स कुल-पुछः। समाधिं न जानाति, न संज्ञानीति।

कथं पुनर्भाव्यामानोदि दर्शितुम्। अशक्यं। इति। तत्तु कस्य हेतोऽ इत्याशक्यं। वा अभिव्यायिदा। सवृंद्र-धर्मविचारे मानवे समाधेरूं। अविकल्पं परमपाय इति। धर्मता-मुखेनाकारेणामुनम्भनातूं तं समाधिं न जानाति। निराकरेण। चेतसा। प्रत्यासित-निवन्धनाभावात्। न संज्ञानीते। साकारेण। वस्तु-भावम्। अन्तरेण स्वप्रादी। भावात्। न केवलम्। आकारम्। इत्यपि-शब्दः। इदन्त्या दशनस्य। विकल्पाधीनत्वाः। इति भावः।

आयुष्मान्। शारिपुत्र आह। न जानाति। न संज्ञानीतै। इत्यादिनु। सुभूते। वदसि।

सार्वाणुपवल्लभो भाव्य-भावक-भावनानुप्पत्तिरू। इत्यभिव्यायो शारिपुत्रानो न जानातीतयावाह।

आयुष्मान्। सुभूतिर्। आह। न जानाति। न संज्ञानीते। इत्यादिनु। शारिपुत्र वदामिः। तत्तु कस्य हेतोऽ? न जानाति। न संज्ञानीते। अविभावकै। तस्य। समाधेसु। तं समाधिं न जानाति। न संज्ञानीते।

संबूत्या। न दोष। इति। मल्या सुभूतिर्। आह। न जानातीतयावाह। तमु एवाभिव्यायं तत्तु। कस्य हेतोऽ। इत्याशक्यायाः। अविभावकै। इति। [W63.1] शेषः।

प्रयोगादियाः। तु माया-पुरुषस्य मूर्तिविन्ध-वशाः। इत्यादि। व्याकृतम्।

1 W’s reading is retained. However, Tib अशक्य=इति भावः:
अथ खलु भगवन्तः आयुष्मते सुभूतये साधुकरसम् अदातु । साधु साधु सुमृते । एवम् एतद् सुभूत एवम् एतद् । यथाध्यानं नाम तथागतानुभावेन ते प्रतिभाति तथागताधिशांनोपदिशसि ।

धर्मसाधनाच्याचतुरुपादतूः साधुकरसम् आह साधवित्यादि । प्रतिभाति ते तव वन-निभारिः-जानोदयेन । उपदिशाः परेऽऽऽत तदालम्बन-कथनातु ।

एवं चात्र बोधि-सत्चेन महा-सत्चेन शिक्षितसनम् ।

एवं चात्रेत्यायुपस्वहारः । च-शब्दोज्वधारणे । एवम् एवात्र निर्धार-भागीय इत्ययः।

ततु कस्य हेतुः? एवं हि शिक्षामणि बोधि-सत्चे महा-सत्चः प्राण-पारसमितायां शिष्याः ।

कथं पुनरूः अनेन क्रमेण शिक्षितसनम् इति ततु कस्य हेतुः इत्यायाश्तः चाहु प्राण- पारसमितायां निर्धार-भागीय-व्यभावायां ।

इत्यालम्बनकारवलः लौँकिक-सर्व-धर्मंविलावः अय-धर्मादिन्त्र-विधेयः । तथा चोकम्

[AA32ced-33]

सामाधिसु तस्य कारिन्त्र व्याकृतिः मनना-खःः ।

मिस्यसु विकस्य स्वाभाव्यू समाधिः अविकल्पना ।

इति निर्धार-भागीय मूर्त-मधयाधिमात्रतः ॥

एतद् उक्तम् । एवं कृत-धर्म-प्रवशयः समाहित-चित्तश्रृः च सर्व-धर्मं-नैरात्म्यं भावबन्तः

क्रमेण यदा पूणं-भूतार्यत्विनिवेशाभावाओ ईतु-स्पष्ट-ज्ञानालोकेन मनो-मात्रम् एव

पश्चाति तदास्योऽभिवतवया । स एवात्रात्रिको लोको नाम सामाधिः उच्चते महायाने।

यदा तस्य पर्यं धर्माकर्त्ते बृहदगच्छ नैरात्म्यभावानां वीरारम्भेन मध्य-स्पष्टो [W64.1]

ज्ञानालोको भवति, तदा मूर्तिविवस्तः । स एव बृहदालोको नाम सामाधिः । यदा तु चित्त-मात्रात्म्यनात्र ईतु-स्पष्ट्यर बाह्यार्थिवनिवेशाभावो ज्ञानालोको जायते, तदा अन्तःते

वस्तः । प्राणाकाराभावानुवेशात हस्ताक्षर-देश-प्रवश्यम् नाम सामाधिः । यदा पुनरूः

अर्थ-प्राणक-विकस्यानायां ज्ञानालोको निपर्यते, तदा लौँकिक-धर्मसनम् । स

एवान्त्यां नाम सामाधिः । सार्वभूहः अवस्तः दृश्यामुक्तिविश्वः श्रीमुक्तत्व-यर्य-भूमिः

उच्चते । अस्यं च भूमौ अत्यधितामो बोधि-सत्चः पूणं-जनोपियं सर्व-बाल-विशुभिः

समतिस्तंत्रसंस्कृत्य-समाधिः-धारणी-विमोक्षाभिनिभिः-गुणानितो रत्न-मेघे पठते ।

[12.12 Four conceptualizations]

अथ खल्लायुष्मानु शारिरपोऽभिवन्त्यम् एतद् अवोच्चतः । एवं शिक्षामणि भगवं बोधि-

सत्चो महा-सत्चः प्राण-पारसमितायां शिष्याः ।

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इति निर्विद्ध-भागीयानाम् आलम्बनाकर्ते-हेतुत्व-विशेषानाम् निरदेशय, चतुर्विकल्पा-संयोगार्थां द्व्यर्वस्तवधिद्वान् प्रथमं ग्राह्य-विकल्पम् आहू एवं शिक्षामण इत्यादिना।
किम् इति भावः।

एवम् उक्ते, भगवान् आयुष्मानं शारिपुरुषम् एतद् अवोच्चः। एवं शिक्षामणः शारिपुरुषम् बोधि-सत्त्वो महा-सत्त्वः प्रजा-परामितायां शिक्यते।

उद्भावना-संबूत्या शिक्षत इत्यभिप्रायेणाहु एवं शिक्षामण इत्यादि।

एवम् उक्ते, आयुष्मान् शारिपुरुषो भगवत्स्म एतद् अवोच्चः। एवं शिक्षामणो भगवन् बोधि-सत्त्वो महा-सत्त्वः कतर्मिनम् धर्मं शिक्यते?

अविदित-भगवदमिरायः: शारिपुरुष: पृष्ठति तत्लेन कतर्मिनम् धर्मं शिक्यति इति।

एवम् उक्ते, भगवान् आयुष्मानं शारिपुरुषं एतद् अवोच्चः। [W65.1] एवं शिक्षामणः: शारिपुरुषम् बोधि-सत्त्वो महा-सत्त्वः न कस्मिनं धर्मं शिक्यते।

तत्र वस्तु-मात्राधिधार्य-विकल्पेन विपयसानुष्ठात् परमार्थितो न कचिद् इत्याह भगवान् न कस्मिनं धर्मं शिक्यति इति।

तत् कस्य हेतुः? न हि शारिपुरुष धर्मस्य तथा संविधानं यथा बाल-पृथवी-जना अनुसूचनातोभिषिव्वा।

शिक्षामणोपि कथं न शिष्यति इति तत् कस्य हेतुः इत्यासाधुः न हेतुः। सांन्योऽस्मधर्म-योगाः। बाला: वैयवदा-िर-धर्मं-विरहस्त्वः पूर्णः-जना:। तत् एव वैयव-िर-धर्माधिमुक्ति-बालसत्य-विगमाः। अनुसूचित:। एवं नस्ते। यथाविद्या-विकल्प-बलाः। विद्यामानकारणप्राप्तम्। अभिनिविष्टाः। तथा न संविधानते। अतः संवृत्त्या शिक्षामणाचिन तत्तवचो न शिष्यति इति।

आयुष्मानं शारिपुरुषं आहू। कथं तत्र्ति ते भगवन् संविधानः?

यदि तथा न संविधानः अथवः तद्भावः विद्याः। तथा च भाव-प्रहादे दोष इत्यभिप्रायेणाहु कथं वद्धितालि।

भगवान् आहू। यथा शारिपुरुष न संविधानं तथा संविधानः।

प्रदूृत-विपयसस-निराकरणाः। यथाभिनिविष्टाः। तथा न संविधानं इति। यदि नाम एवम् उक्ते तथापि तत्त्वो न सत्त्वातान्य स्वरूपाः। यथा न्यायतो न संविधानः। तथाविचारनिर्नयस्य स्वृत्त्या विद्याः। अविद्यामानात्वे विद्यामानतेति पावतः।
एवम् अविविद्या तेनोज्यन्तेविविद्यति।

एवम् इत्यादिपुसंहारः। एवम् अविविद्या यत्सु तैन कारणेन नैस्क-विधानातुच्छत्त्वया सिपित-जानाम् अजानाम् अविविद्या इत्युच्च्चते। इत्यनेनाविद्या-
[W66.1]विकल्पोभिहितः।

तात् बाल-पृथ्व-जना अधुरुवन्तोभिनिविष्टा। तैरू असंविद्यामाना: सर्व-ध्रमादः कल्पिता।

स्पादिक-कविक्षप्ययु: आह तात् इत्यादि। वस्तु-मात्राथिधिनानन [विकल्पन] संवेदने तत्-अतिविद्या विकल्पः संबंधः। इति इत्यपिंतु पूर्वेण संबंधः कल्पितः। एवम् उत्तर रत्नापि वेयम्। कथम् अभिनिविष्टा इत्याह तैरू इत्यादि। तत्त्वानां संविद्यामाना: सर्व-ध्रमादः स्पादि-स्कन्धयासु तद्द-विकल्पयामयाभूत-परिक्षपादम् अध्यारोपिता: कल्पिता।

तेततात् कल्पिताम् द्रूयोरं अन्त्सो: सकासु तात् धमानः न जानन्ति, न पश्यन्ति। तस्मात् तेसंविद्यामानसु सर्व-ध्रमादः कल्पयति।

नाम-स्पादिक्षन्तेव-विकर्षणः आह तेततात् कल्पयत्वत्यादि। शाश्वतोत्ष्टेधयोर्भाः पछतत्तेयम् अभिनिविष्टा तानुः नाम-स्पादीनः धर्मा: तद्भनिविष्टेव-विकर्षणः निर्यथार्थ-क्रिया-विरहातु संवृत्ताक्षितया एवेति लोकिकेन शुद्धादिमथेजः जानेन न जानन्ति।

अज्ञानात् कल्पितं वृद्धं पश्यति तत्त्वार्थ-निश्चयः। यदा न लभते भावम् अवाभावं तदा कुन्त:। [Rāmāvāli 1.98]

इति भावनया न पश्यन्ति लोकोत्तरे। तस्मात् तत्त्वानां संविद्यामानानु नाम-स्पादीन सर्व-ध्रमान: तद्भनिविष्टेव-वालात् कल्पयति।

कल्पितः द्रूवान्ताविनिविष्टेः।

अन्त्-द्रूव-सन्तिक-विकल्पार्थमु आहु कल्पिताः द्रूवान्ताविनिविष्टेः। इति। तत्सन्तिक-विकल्पादृ इति भावः।

अभिनिविष्टय ततन्त्रानु उपलम्य निहित्यातीतताम् धर्मानः कल्पयति। अनागतानु धर्मानः कल्पयति। प्रत्युत्तपानात् धर्मानः कल्पयति।

1 संबंध-संबंधः based on Tu, supported by P.
2 पूर्ण-पर्वात-पूर्णम् 9° which is the reading in Tu, and chosen by Hahn (1982:38).
[W67.1] संक्षेप-व्यवदानात्मक-विकल्पार्थ्यम् आहू अभिनिविष्येर्यादि। अभिनिवेश-
hेतु तन्निमित्तम् उपलब्धं निमित्तं निमित्तकृत्य सांक्षेपिक-व्यवदानिक-धर्म-
स्वप्नात्मक-विकल्प-भलेनात्मकान् यावत् प्रत्युपन्नान् धर्मानि कल्पयन्ति।

tे कल्पितच्या नाम-रूपे अभिनिविष्या।

आर्य-मायाप्रतिष्ठान-विकल्पार्थ्यम् आहू ते कल्पितच्या नामस्थऽप्रभूतबद्ध: इति।

dर्शनादि-मायाप्रतिष्ठान-भिन्भिनवेशाद् इति भाव:। तत्र नाम वेदनादयोऽरुप्यः: स्कन्धः।

रूपं रूप-स्थलः।

tे असंविधानमाणाः सर्व-धर्माः कल्पितता:।

उपलब्ध-विकल्पार्थ्यम् आहू ते असंविधानमाणाः सर्व-धर्माः कल्पिता: इति।

tदुपलम् भिन्भिनवेशाद् इति भाव:।

tे तानू असंविधानमाणाः सर्व-धर्मानि कल्पयन्ते। यथा-भूतं मार्गम् न जानन्ति, न पश्यन्ति।

आत्मादिक-विकल्पार्थ्यम् आहू ते तानू असंविधानमाणाः इत्यादि।

आत्मानि सति पर-संज्ञा: स्व-पर-विभागां परियुत-दृष्टीः।

अनाह्योः संप्रभवतद्: सर्वं कृष्णेऽः प्रज्ञान्ते।। [PV Pramāṇasiddhi 221]

इत्यात्मादिक-भिनवेशाद् अविपरीतं धर्म-पुत्र-नेत्रात्म-लक्षणं यथा-भूतं मार्गम्

dर्शनादिकं पूर्ववत् न जानन्ति, न पश्यन्ति।

यथा-भूतं मार्गम् अवज्ञातोपशयन्ते न नियन्ति श्रैवात्सुकान् न बुध्यन्ते भूत-कोटिम्।

tे ते बाला इति संख्यां गच्छन्ति।

विशुद्धचुता-विकल्पार्थ्यम् आहू यथा-भूतं मार्गम् अवज्ञातं इत्यादि। न

नियन्ति न निर्गच्छन्ति श्रैवात्सुकान् कं संसारात्, यथो न बुध्यन्ते

विशुद्धचुता-विकल्पार्थ्यमिति भूत-कोटिम् अप्रयोगं तत्त्वम्। तेन कारणे बाला इति

व्यपदें संख्यां गच्छन्ति प्रतिलभन्ते। [W68.1]

ते सत्यं धर्मं न अद्यति।

प्रतिपक्ष-वस्तवधिकताः द्वितीयं प्राण-विकल्पार्थ्यम् आहू ते सत्यं धर्मं न

अद्यत्तितयादिना। अविपरीतत्तयं सत्यं धर्मं प्रतिपक्ष-लक्षणम्। तद्भिनवेश-विकल्प-

योगेन विपरीत-प्रतिपक्षा स्वप्नात्मकस्वाभावः न अद्यति नाधिमुखेषु।

1 मार्गस्य-मार्गस्य Tu. The context is conceptualization of the afflicted, not pure, dharmas.
Conceptualization of an apprehender

Aklujkar observes that portions in the above passage appear to be a citation from a work similar in content to the AA composed in an ārya-like metre. Therefore पूर्ण-पादकः may mean "The first quarter/half [of a verse] slightly shortened." Then the next line would be a gloss on the following line and not a repetition. यस्य प्रथमो ग्राह्य-विकल्पः (14 moras) द्वितीयोपिंि स।।। (7 moras). "प्रथमो ग्राह्य-विकल्पः: स्पादू (14 moras) द्वितीय एव न प्रथमः (13 moras, 1 missing ?).”
[W69.1] पुदल-द्रव्याधिष्ठानं प्रथमं ग्राहक-विकल्पम् आह् एवम् इत्यादिना। एवम् अनन्तरोकः लमेण ग्राहाः-विकल्प-द्रव्यम् अकृत्वा शिष्यते। किम्। प्रथमं ग्राहक-विकल्पनेति भावः।

भगवान् आह। एवं शिष्याणः: शायप्रथु बोधि-सत्त्वो महा-सत्त्वं सर्वत्रतायाम् उप न शिष्यते। एवं शिष्याणः: शायप्रथु बोधि-सत्त्वो महा-सत्त्वं सर्वं-धर्मम् शिष्यते। एवं शिष्याणः: शायप्रथु बोधि-सत्त्वो महा-सत्त्वं सर्वत्रताया शिष्यते सर्वत्रताया आसन्नीभवति सर्वत्रताया नियास्यति।

विकल्पावरणस्य तुल्यत्वाद् इति भगवान् आह, न शिष्यत इति। तत्रेनेति शेष:, संवृत्या ल्यादिकर्मिन्स्यें शिष्या, अन्यायानुपपत्ते इत्याह एवं शिष्याणः इत्यादि।

स कैथं विषय-मेदानं नव-प्रकारो भवति। तद्व मया, स्वत:नः-विकल्पं:। एकात्म-विकल्पं:। कारणात्म-विकल्पं:। इत्याद्वात्म-विकल्पं:। संकेताणातम-विकल्पं:।

'बैराग्याधिकारी-विकल्पं:। दर्शिन्-मांगिधारातम-विकल्पं:। भावना-मांगिधारातम-विकल्पं:। कृतायाधिकारी-विकल्पं इति।

अथ खल्पुमान्तं सुभृत्तत् भगवानमः एतत् अवोच्चत। यो भगवन्तें परिपृङ्ख्ज्ञेत। किम्। अथ मया-पुरुषं: सर्वत्रताया शिष्यंते सर्वत्रताया आसन्नीभवति सर्वत्रताया नियास्यतिति। तत्स्य भगवन्तें परिपृङ्ख्ज्ञ: कथं निर्देश्यत्वं स्यात्?

प्राज्ञिक-पुरुषाधिष्ठानं द्विते प्रथमं ग्राहक-विकल्पं तस्मान् विकल्पे कुचोद-परिहार-द्वारेणाः। यो भगवन्तितदशनम्। प्राज्ञिक एव पुरुषो ग्राहकं इत्यासमन्तें नितिय-प्रख्यातिः-स्वप्लतान्म मया-स्वभावं: पुरुषो मया-पुरुषं: प्राज्ञिक एवेति तस्यापि शिष्या प्रासा। न चैवम् अचेतन: नग्न्तान्तति। [W70.1] अपरिमाणेऽपि शिष्यायं सुवेषों शिष्या-प्रासेरु युक्तं अयत्न-सिद्देत्यभिप्रायेण्य इत्यादि। वदत्सु तत्स्य कथं निर्देश्यत्वं उत्तरं भवेद् इत्यतः।

एवम् उक्ते भगवान् आयुष्मान्तं सुभृत्तम एतत् अवोच्चत्। तेन हि सुभृते त्वाम् एवात्र प्रतिव्यथामि। यथा ते क्षमते तथा व्याकुपरः।

चित्त: चित्त: रूपं समानं स्पौदीदायम्। अतो गत्यन्तराभावान् "मया-पुरुषेषो शिष्यः न चायत्न-सिद्ध: मुक्तिः।" इत्यभिप्रायवान् भगवान् आहं तेन वन्य्यादिन्।

1 शिष्यान्ति किम् प्रथमं ग्राहकं is the reading in W and Tu and supported by P; शिष्यानं। किम् प्रथमं ग्राहकं is V's reading. One expects V's reading but see note to the translation.

2 Perhaps aha or iti (W70 n.1) should be supplied here.
यस्मात् त्वमु एवं पृष्ठसि तस्मात् त्वालू एवात्र प्रश्ने प्रतिप्रक्ष्यामि द्वितिप्रक्षण करिष्यामि।

साधु भगवन्नित्यायुस्मात् सृष्टि: भगवत् प्रत्यक्षिष्ठैत।

साधितप्यादि साधवेयं भगवन्नित्यायुस्मात् कृतेत्येवं भगवत्: सकाशाद्र
अश्रौष्टतू श्रूतवान्।

भगवान् ऐतेन अवोचतु। ततु किं मन्यसे सुभूतेत्या सा मायान्यतू तदुः रूपस्, अन्या सा मायान्या सा वेदनान्या सा संस्कारा अन्या सा मायान्यतू तदुः विज्ञानम्।

कथम् एवं श्रूतवान् इत्याह भगवान् इत्यादिः।

सृष्टिराहू न ह्येतदुः भगवन् न हि भगवन्नाया सा मायान्यतू तदुः रूपस्। रूपस् एव भगवन् माया मायौपरी रूपाः। न हि भगवन्नाया सा मायान्या सा वेदनान्या सा संस्कारा:। वेदना-संज्ञा-संस्कारा एव भगवन् माया, मायौपरी वेदना-संज्ञा-संस्कारा।।

[W71.1] न हि भगवन्नाया सा मायान्यतू तदुः विज्ञानम्। विज्ञानम् एव भगवन् माया, मायौपरी विज्ञानम्।

विसर्जितान्नाह न होतायादि। नैव तस्मातः भगवन् यस्मात् नाया सा माया, नायातू तदुः स्पादिः, स्पादिः माया, मायौपरी स्पादिः। एकानेक-स्वभाव-वैधुर्यात्

तत्त्वतोन्यायोऽ निःस्वभावस्य वित्त-प्रक्ष्यामति-रूपम् समामु इति भावः।

भगवान् आहृ। ततु किं मन्यसे सुभूतेत्या संज्ञा समजात् प्रजाधि-व्यवहारः पश्चसूपादान-स्थन्येषु यदुः बोधि-सत्त्व इति।

माया-स्पादिः एकत्र-प्रतिपादसे सति माया-पृष्ठेष्येव शिक्षितवर्यम् इति

प्रतिपादनायाह ततु किं मन्यस इत्यादिः। भगवाः पश्चसूपादान-स्थन्येषु मायौपमे।

"बोধि-सत्त्व इति संज्ञा निमित्तेद्वृहारणम्। वस्तु-समेतम्भूमि इति जान समजः।

क्षेत्र-जानेऽयोऽ ग्राह्य-ग्राहक-प्रकाराभिनिवेश-विज्ञानं प्रजाधि:। विविध-परोपात्तापाल-वस्तु-संवर्ण्य-व्यवहरणं क्यव्यवहारं इत्यादिः-विमुक्तिः।

"गोत्रावस्यायं बोधि-सत्त्व इति संज्ञा दंशेव केवल। विद्वदादंवस्त्रयाः सं-हातीति हे, समं हे [समजः], समजः चिंतनी प्रकृति-निमित्तं यथा बोधि-सत्त्व इति

समजाः। संमर्थस्य सत्त्व-सम-जान-निमित्ता। समस्त प्रयोग-भृमिषु सर्वे-धर्मे-1

1 There are syntactical problems at this point. The intended sense is, however, clear. W reads जानातीतिः समजाः (W’s conjecture to account for Tib ‘gyur-las-pa) समजः-चिंतनी प्रकृति।

2 संज्ञाः—समजाः This emendation has the virtue of making it unnecessary to presuppose text loss.
प्रजाति-मात्रता-प्रतिवेद्यातु प्रजाति: । अढ़म्यादि निर्मितिमानोभोग-मार्ग-लाभाद् व्यवहार- मात्रेणाभिलाभाद् व्यवहार" इति भदन्त-भिमुक्तिसेनः ।

एवम् उक्तोऽ आयुष्मानुः सुभूतिः भगवनस् एतद् अवचचाद् । एवम् एतद् भगवनम् एवम् एतद् सुगतः ।

सपादिः-व्यतिरिक्त-बोधि-सत्त्वानुपपत्याय पुरुषायम् आह एवम् पुत्राद् इत्यादि ।

संभवे हिन्द्रुः अभिशापम् ।

[W72.1] तेन हि भगवन् बोधि-सत्त्वानुपपत्याय यथा परमिताः शिष्माणेण मायाय- पुरुषायेव शिक्षितव्यर्थ भव्यव्युत्तरायाः सम्यक्-संबोधोः।

तेन हि प्रतिज्ञा-संसारः। यथार्थो येन कारणे गत्यन्त्रभावाद् यथा कर्म-मायाजनः: संसारस् तथा लोकोत्तरा अपि धर्माः ज्ञान-माया-जनिता इत्यन्तिज्ञिवेश। योगान् मायाय-पुरुषायेव नुत्तरायाः सम्यक्-संबोधोः शिक्षितव्यम् इत्युपपत्तम्। न चावल-सिद्धा मुक्तिः, पत्रो ज्ञातम् एव तत्सं मोक्षावाहिः, नाविजाताम् इति भावः।

तत्तु कस्य हेतुः? स एव हि भगवन् मायाय-पुरुषोऽधारित्यथो यदुत पशोपाद्यान- स्तन्यः।

मायाय-पुरुषेऽ संक्षेपः-व्यवस्त्र्य-व्यवस्त्र्य कथम् इति तत्तु कस्य हेतुः।

इत्याशक् भाव स एव हि प्रतिज्ञा। पशोपाद्यान-स्तन्य: सास्त्राः स्पष्टाः। अनास्त्र-पश्चात-स्तन्य-परिष्कार: "पश्च स्तन्याः च" इत्यथाहृदयम्। यथा-वर्तनसम् एव संक्षेपः-व्यवस्त्र्य-व्यवस्त्र्य मायाय-पुरुषेऽपैति भावः।

तत्तु कस्य हेतुः? तथा हि। भगवन् मायोपम रूपमुः उक्तं भगवता। यथा च रूपं तत्तु पद्ग्रिभयम्। ते पश्च स्तन्यः। तथा हि। भगवन् मायोपमी वेदना-संज्ञा-संस्कारा उक्तसृ।

तथा हि। भगवन् मायोपमः विजजामुः उक्तं भगवता। यथा च विजजामु तत्तु पद्ग्रिभयम्। ते पश्च स्तन्यः।

कच्चं पुनं मायोपमतिम् इति तत्तु कस्य हेतुः। इत्याशक्यायत्वम् तथा हि प्रतिज्ञा।

उक्तोऽपि यस्मात् अनुप्रसरणाय श्रीमानो न पुनः उक्तं इति पुनर्लक्ष-जोशो नोश्वराचार्यः।

एवं भगवतेऽवः पशोपाद्यान-स्तन्यः बोधि-सत्त्वेऽवः इति संज्ञादिव-वचनादृ अन्तरमुः एव मायोपमः रूपादिकमुः उक्तं भगवता। यथो इतिविद्य चतुरादिः। "स-विजजान-विशयम्" इति शोषः। यथो ज्ञातां कस्यति, ते पश्च स्तन्यः इति। यथो विजजानं तत्तु पंडितिः ज्ञानस्यं त्वदाकारणं प्रतिभासनातु। [W73.1] यथो इतिविद्य च पूर्वबिद् श्राह्यम्।
वधु अर्थात् कृत्यस्य प्रेक्षाधिकारं ग्रहणं विकल्पं प्रतिपादितः।
स केवल विषय-भेदानु नव-प्रकारो भएति। तथा यथा, स्वन्ध-प्रज्ञासिन-विकल्पः।
आयतन-प्रज्ञासिन-विकल्पः। धातु-प्रज्ञासिन-विकल्पः।
प्रतीत्य-समुच्चार-प्रज्ञासिन-विकल्पः। व्यवहार-प्रज्ञासिन-विकल्पः। दशेन-मार्ग-प्रज्ञासिन-विकल्पः।
भावना-मार्ग-प्रज्ञासिन-विकल्पः। विशेष-मार्ग-प्रज्ञासिन-विकल्पः। अर्शेक-मार्ग-प्रज्ञासिन-विकल्पं इति।
तथा प्रज्ञासिनीधियानो द्व-निवधे प्राणको मतः।
स्वतंत्र-तापादिन-रुपेन स्वन्धाधिकारास्यतसः।

[12.14 Mentor]

सा भगवन् नव-यन्त्र-संप्रस्थिता बोधि-सत्त्वा महा-सत्त्वा इवं निदेशं श्रृत्वोत्त्रसिः।
संत्रसिः। संत्रसासृं आप्रयत्ने।

भगवन् आह। यदि सुमृष्टे नव-यन्त्र-संप्रस्थिता बोधि-सत्त्वा महा-सत्त्वा: पाप-मित्र-हस्त-गता भविष्यतुपुजयिश्विनि संत्रसिन्नै संत्रसासृं आप्रयत्ने।

अथ चेतु सुभूते नव-यन्त्र-संप्रस्थिता बोधि-सत्त्वा महा-सत्त्वा: कल्याण-मित्र-हस्त-गता
भविष्यति, नोत्त्रसिन्नै न संत्रसिन्नै संत्रसासृं आप्रयत्ने।

[व74.1] व्यतिरेिक-मुखन कथितोष्यः त्वय-मुखन कथमानः। सूक्तो भवतीत्वाहु
कल्याण-मित्र-हस्त-गता इति। विचारवलीनमवल् तासातिदिनोपाय-कृतिणोऽगः
यथाशं कथितोष्-राज्य-मार्ग-निवेदन-न्यायेन मात्स्यंदिध-धर्म-विवुकः। समस्त-वस्तु-नेत्रात्मापिद: देशकः।
सुगति-फलादि-आपकान्ते कल्याण-मित्रम्। तस्य हस्त-गता
इत्यादि पूर्वव्युः।

1 निर्वधि-निर्दशिक? This is the equivalent for प्रक्षे!कोऽर्धनारिकुः (lc:1048).
2 प्रक्षे!कोऽर्धनारिकुः suggests सूक्तके for सहस्वेत्.
एवम् उक्ते, आयुष्मानु सुभूतिः भगवन्तः एतद् अवोचतो। कानि पुत्रः भगवनः बोधि-सत्त्वस्य महा-सत्त्वस्य कल्याणः-मित्राणः वैदित्वायानि?  
कानित्यादिना कल्याणः-भिन्न-स्वरूपः ।  
भगवान् आहै। य सप्तार्तस्ववदत्तनुशासनाति। येषस्य मार-कमाण्यपदिशन्ति। “एवं मार-दोषाः बोद्धयाः, इसमें मार-दोषाः। एवं मार-कमाणि बोद्धयानि, इमानि मार-कमाणि। तानि त्वा बुद्धा विश्वविजित्वायानि”ति।  
उत्तरम् आहै य एवम् इत्यादिः। में पुलला देवदत्तादिकम्। एव्य पुललं दानादि-पारमितासु संबृति-परमर्थ-सत्यानतिक्रमेन हित-प्राप्त्या पूर्ववर्त अवबद्धनुशासनाति। में चास्य। देव-दत्तादिकायाहित-परिवर्त्याः मार-कमाण्यपदिशन्ति। कथम् इत्याह एवम् इत्यादि। एवं मार-दोषाः मारस्यांतरायाः, बुद्ध-वेश्योपसंक्रम्य किं तेजुतरया बोध्येत्यनागताः-विवेचनाता। इसमें मार-दोषाः इति तथेऽ, किं ते प्रजा-पारमिताया लिखनायसि। ज्ञानायां विवेचनाता। तद्विवश्चन्द्रनां-बलेन यथा-कर्म स्वीकृत-यथाकाल-कमाण्यम् आहै एवं मार-कमाणीत्यादिः। बुद्धा च यत् कार्यं तद् आहै तानिः त्वेद्यादिना।  
इमानि सुपुरूते बोधि-सत्त्वस्य महा-सत्त्वस्य महा-सन्नाह-सन्नद्धस्य महायान-संस्कृतस्य महायान-समारूढस्य कल्याणः-मित्राणः वैदित्वायानि।  
इमानीत्यादिप्रसंहाः। महा-सन्नाह-सन्नद्धस्येति। [W75.1] सन्नाह-प्रतिपत्या वक्ष्यमाणया युक्त्यस्य, महायान-संस्कृतस्येति प्रस्त्यान-प्रतिपत्या तथेऽवन्वितस्य, महायान-समारूढस्येति तथेऽ। महायानम् उत्कलितस्य। तथा है। आदौ तथा संस्कृताः प्रक्षाद्य आर्लू इत्यते। तथा चोकम् [AA36]।  
चित्तानविनिवलिद नैस्यभावायादिदेशकः।  
तद्विपक्ष-परिवर्तः सर्वथा संपरिश्रुः। ।
“सुन्त युक्त्यांतरालुसारेण य्वाहायातथम्” इति भगवद्-वचनाद्। एव पद्ध-पिंश्याति- 
साहित्यकाराः युक्त्याः। सुन्त युक्त्यां-कृष्टि-य्वाहायातथम्। अभिव्याहितसमयालंकार- 
कार्तिकानुभूत्यनेण भायायायाराधिपद-कृत्यः। तथा यान्त्रय-शब्दस्यापि प्रक्रियाविवर्तित- 
बलेन विशेषे वर्तनाद्। विवेक-प्रतिलिपिलेण यथोक्ते। प्रक्रियाविवर्तिते शब्दानां वर्तनातु, 
तद्विपक्ष-वचनाभावेन च कार्योऽपि प्रत्ययन्त्यमात्रै पद्य य्वाहायातथम् इदंदू। आत: "कथम्

1 Something like च कथनाद्, W conjecture for Tib चक्रसु च seems needed.
2 यमुक्तर्मण-पद्य व75 n.5.
अनुष्ठानमेण एवं व्याख्यानमू" इति न मन्तव्यम्। अन्यथा यद्यां न्यायो नामिते तदा 
प्रवचन-व्याख्यातं न स्यात्, शब्दान्त शास्त्रीयके वाक्यंकाृतौ भाविनियतार्थं-परिवर्त्ते 
संदेहाः। किं चायसिंह-प्रभृतिचिर्मुद्र एवंदेव व्याख्यान्त लिखितं इति प्रमाणीकृतव्यम्। तथा 
हि। भूयते विद्यत-समस्त-प्रवचनार्थम् लब्धाधिगमोपयायसिः। पुनर्स्वयम्मपुनर्स्वयम्- 
प्रदेशोपि प्रत्येकं पदं-व्यवच्छेदादशनं गाम्भीर्याचें च प्रज्ञ-पारमितायथम् उन्नेतुम् 
अशक्तो दौर्मनस्यम् अनुप्राप्त:। ततस्व तमू उद्विधं मैत्रेयं भगवतं प्रज्ञ-पारमिता-सूत्रं 
व्याख्यातम् अभिसमवालंकार-कारिका-शास्त्रं च कृतम्। तत्चूर्व्वा पुनर् 
आयसिङ्गेनाचार्य-वसुबन्धु-प्रभृतिभिषु च व्याख्यातम् इतयं प्रसज्जेन ।
IV LINEAGE OBJECTIVE SUPPORT AND AIMS

[13.1 Lineage]

एवम् उक्ते, आयुष्मान सुभूतिर भगवन्तस् एतद् अवोचतु। यदृ भगवान् एवम् आहं,
"इसानि सुभूते बोधि-सत्त्वस् महा-सत्त्वस् महा-संनाह-संनद्वस् महायान- संप्रभृतिस्तम्भ महायान-समालोचनस् कल्याण-निमाणिः बैविव्यानीति। यच च बोधि-
सत्त्वो महा-सत्त्व इति भगवनुन्म्यते तत्र बोधि-सत्त्व इति भगवन् कः: पदार्थः?

[W76.1] निरविध-भागविन्नम्तटरू प्रतिपत्तिमतो यशोक-निरविध-भागविन्नम् ["याद्?"] अन्यदेव
अपि दर्शन-माणिक्यकम्य इति प्रतिपत्ते अधारां धर्म-धातु-स्वभावकम् आवेदननाहृ यदृ
भगवन्नेवम् इत्यादि।

एतद् उक्तं, यदृ भगवान् एवम् आहं बोधि-सत्त्वस् महा-सत्त्वस्यादित्यादि। यचौ
च सूत्त्वान्तरूपूः बोधि-सत्त्वो महा-सत्त्व इत्युप्यते तत्र पूर्वके वाक्ये तेषु च सूत्त्वान्तरूपू
धर्म-धातु-स्वभावक्ते बुद्ध-धर्मणां कः: प्रतिष्ठायं पदार्थाः बोधि-सत्त्व इति।

एवम् उक्ते, भगवान् आयुष्मानस् सुभूतिम् एतद् अवोचतु। अपदार्थः सुभूते बोधि-सत्त्व-
pदार्थः।

उत्तरं ककुम आहं अपदार्थे इत्यादि। बोधि-सत्त्वो बुद्ध-धर्मणां पदार्थाः बोधि-सत्त्व-
pदार्थाः यः स तत्त्वोपदार्थाः प्रतिष्ठायाः गोत्रम् इति यावत्।

तत् कस्य हेतुः? सर्व-धर्मणां हि सुभूते बोधि-सत्त्वो महा-सत्त्वोसक्तायाः शिक्षते।

अधिगमम् अन्तरेण मुक्तिगुप्तपते, अधिगच्छन् बुद्ध-धर्मनि, कथम् अपदार्थः बोधि-
सत्त्व इति तत् कस्य हेतुः इतियान्तकाय सर्व-धर्मणाम् हेतुः। यस्मात् सर्व-धर्मणाः
कस्तु-तनु-निर्मिताभिनिवेशाभावेनास्वक्ताः सत्याम् अन्यायाधिकाः नुपद्या बुद्ध-धर्मिणिगमाय माया-पुरुष इति
शिक्षते तस्मात् कथं तत्वं: प्रतिष्ठायं इति भावः।

संवृत्ता पुनः प्रतिष्ठात-धर्ममालास्तन्तर-भेदेन धर्म-धातु-स्वभावा एव बुद्ध-धर्मिणारो
बोधि-सत्त्वस् त्रयोदश-दिवस गोत्रम् इति निर्दिष्टोऽ।

तत्रात्री ताक्षुचिच चुतु-विध-लोकिक-निरविध-भागविन्नम् उत्पादनायाः। ततो
लोकोत्तर-र्वहन्न-भवणा-मार्गोः, ततसु तदुत्त्त्ति-बलेन चौर्य-निष्ठासन-कपाल-
पिधानन्तु सम-कालं समस-प्रतिपलोक्त्याद-विपक्ष-निरोधयोऽ, ततसु तदनुपलब्ध्या तयोऽ
विपक्ष-प्रतिपलयोऽ निरोधताद-पृथु-विकल्पागमस्य, ततः पूर्व-प्रतिद्वार-दानात्य-कोशताबयी ख्यात-बलेन संसार-। [W77.1] निर्विधानबिन्दुविधानभाविन्नम्, ततो यथायम् अवतारणाय भिन्निमणि-ढ्वारेण यहन-तय-}
{prativaapatunakamam, tatot yadvu aasanam nirnimitanabhowag-pr-kary}
जानस्य चाधारः: तत्सू वैभव्य अधिगमानुकमादिद इयम् आनुपूर्वः। अनया च सधिमगमः
धर्म-संग्रहादिद इयानां एव निर्देशो, न नूमो, नामधिकः।
तथा संबूत्यागांस-धर्मतत्त्वादव अयं सवि धार त्र प्रभा-पारमितायामां अज्ञिं
एकार्यान्तन्त्रय्यम्। पर्यक्षतत-सहिष्मितां च प्रत्ययम्यु आधारम् अधिक्षत्य निदिष्टो
ग्रन्थो नेह जापकलेन प्राचुयर-भयालु लिखवते। तथा चौकम् [AA37-38]

प्रथाधिगम-धर्मस्य प्रतिपक्ष-प्रतहारः।
तयोः पर्युपयोगस्य प्रश्नाया: कपया सहः।।
शिष्यासाधारणस्य पराधानुक्रमस्य च।
शास्त्रायल-बृत्तेशृः च प्रतिष्ठा गोत्रम् उच्यते।

यदि धर्म-धातोर्य एवायथ-धर्माधिगमाय हेतु-त्वातु तदात्मको बोधि-सत्त्वः प्रकृतिस्थःम्
अनुत्तर-बुध-धर्मांगां गोत्रं धर्मत-संज्ञा, तदा धर्म-धातो: सामाय-वर्त्तिल्काः। इदं
प्रकृतिस्य गोत्रम् अनादि-कालायतं धर्मत-प्रतिपक्षिधमः, इदं समुपालीतं पूर्व-कुलसा-
मूलाध्यास-प्रतिलब्धम्। इदं निस्ते आधार-क्रये-पदध-धर्म-गोत्रम् महृदुरा अपि प्रत्ययेर्
अहार्यिल्वाः, इदम् अनिितं गोत्रं साध्यकोऽयं प्रत्ययेर् हार्यिल्वाः इति गोत्र-भेदो न युक्ते।
यथा आधार-मानुषाधिगम-केमेनालम्यैत तथायथ-धर्माधिगमाय धर्म-धातोर्य हेतु-भावेन
व्यवस्थापनादु गोत्रतलेन व्यपेशि इति समाधिः। अथ वा ययैक-मूकृ-द्रव्याभिंतरूपैक:-
तेजः-परिपाठाधार-धाटदेराः आधेय-कौश-शक्तिराद-भाजन्तत्तेन भेदस्, तद्वत् यान-धर्म-
सुगृहिताधिगमस्यधीमध्य-नानालेनाराय-नानात्त्वन्तिदिष्ट्यम् इति न दोषः।। तथा
चौकम् [AA39]

धर्म-धातोर्य असंभेदात् गोत्र-भेदो न युक्ते।
आधेय-धर्म-भेदात् तु तद-भेदः भयानः।

निशसं को गणोत्तरार्थिनं धर्म-धातुत्र गोत्रम्। तस्मादित् ते गुणा रोहित्त प्रभवनतीतवर्यः।
[W78.1] एवं च कृत्ब्रज्यो, असंस्कृत-प्रभवति: सवर्य-पुदला इति।
ननु चार्येव गोत्रं बलव तदुपर्यवक्ताचु चित्तोपतादस्य मोक्ष-निवेद्य-भागीयानां
चेति कथम् एवमु उक्तम्? सत्यम्, अर्थानुवृत्त्या। इयं तु प्रतिपादनानुपूर्वः, यत् कार्योऽ
प्रतिपाद शकार्य कारण निर्दिष्टत्य इत्यदेशः।

[13.2 Objective support]
सर्व-धर्माङ्गारं हि स्मृते बोधि-सत्त्वो महा-सत्त्वोन्नवृद्धनार्जनायामां अनुत्तरां
सम्मक-सवीकृत्य अपिस्वद्धत्ये। बोधिस्थितम् तु समृते बोधि-सत्त्वो महा-सत्त्व इत्युज्ञ्ये।
आधारान्तरं यथेक्ष-प्रतिपाठाधारस्य बोधि-सत्त्वस्य किमु आलम्बनम्
इत्यालम्बनायमां आहु सर्व-धर्माङ्गाम् इत्यादि। यस्मात् सर्व-धर्माङ्गाम् एवालम्बन-
Contexually this seems to be needed. Also a different explanation of Bodhisattva has already been
given at W22.13-14.

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2
नन्तु च त्वृ-पक्षे "सर्वकारजिताय: सुभूतोभावानम्" इत्यालम्बन-निष्ठा कथम
dिति चेतु। अर्द्धः... यतो न्यायानुपययी भावो नातीत्यभवसि तत्यसंवृत्तिः उच्चेदे।
tस्याशु च प्रक्षादित-तत्त्व-स्पर्शः: क्रमेण मायोपपतित-प्रतीतिः विशुद्धः। एवं च कृत्य
प्रकृति-प्रधानं गोत्रं, विकृति-प्रधानम् आलम्बनः। उभयं तूर्यत्वःप्रतिषिद्धम्
इत्यादिरात्मान-व्यवस्थानम् इत्यलं प्रस्तज्ञेतयायाः-विमुक्तिः।

[13.3 Aims]

सुभूतद्वाहः। यदू पुनः भगवानः एवम् आह बोधि-सत्त्वो महा-सत्त्व इति केन कारणे
भगवनः। बोधि-सत्त्वो महा-सत्त्व इत्युच्यते।

आलम्बनानन्तरम् एवालम्बनः। प्रतिलोको बोधि-सत्त्वम् कः समुद्धेशः इति समुद्धेश्यायम्
आह यदू पुनः इत्यादि। केन कारणे केन प्रयोजने बोधि-सत्त्वः सन् महा-सत्त्व
इत्युच्यते।

[व.80.1] भगवानः आहः। महतः। सत्त्व-राशिः महतः। सत्त्व-निकायस्यायतः कारविष्णुतीति
तेनार्थे बोधि-सत्त्वो महा-सत्त्व इत्युच्यते।

उत्तरम् अभिधातुम् आहः। महतः। इत्यादि। महतः। सत्त्व-राशिः। इत्यपरिमितस्य
सत्त्व-समहुस्य सामान्यनामाभिधानम्। एकोपयादिः। संसार-प्रृवृति-महत्वन महानः। भवेदु
इति राशिप्रहणम्। सत्त्व-निकायस्येऽति प्रतिपन्नक-फलस्य-निकायेदि-भेदान
विजातीय-व्यावृत्या सत्त्व-सामान्यातू सत्त्व-सभाग-सम्मद्धितस्य विशेषेश्योभिधानम्।
अथर्यं कारविषण्यतीति सर्वसत्त्वायाः। चित्र-महत्वं तदुद्देशे प्रवृत्तत्वादू अधिगमण्यः।
पश्चात् ततः-प्राप्त-कामानां सर्वनामस् बहुतां धर्म-दशानादिन निष्कादिप्रक्षणतिः।
तेनार्थः। तेन कारणे। बोधि-सत्त्वो महूः सत्त्वं चित्रम् अस्येति महा-सत्त्व इति।

अथ खल्वायुब्रह्मां शारिरस्त्रो भगवन्तः एतद् अवोचत। ममपि भगवनः। प्रतिमणि
तेनार्थे बोधि-सत्त्वो महा-सत्त्व इत्युच्यते।

चित्र-महत्वे सति प्रहणम् महूः इति प्रहण-महत्व-प्रतिपादनम्। गुर्वार्यतत्त्वानुबाहा-
मार्गं प्रत्यादश शारिरस्त्रो ममपि काहः। तोप्पो मम भगवनः। प्रतिपादते तेनार्थेन
बोधि-सत्त्वः सन् महा-सत्त्व इत्युच्यत। इति वाच्याः। न केवलं भगवत् इत्यपि-
शब्दः।

भगवानः। प्रतिभातुः। तेन शारिरस्त्र यस्येवानां कांलं मन्यसे।

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1 एवम् आलम्बन-एवं based on Tu.
तत्रापेक्ष-विशे चित्रे महायथं चाक्षुशाःकोणामनभिनिधिष्टोपयथंश्चित्तम्।

सुताराम अन्यन्त्रस्यांशनं।

तत्र कस्य हेतुः? तथा हि। तत्र सर्वज्ञता-चित्तम् अनाज्ञवम् अयपयप्यनम्।

अनभिनिधिष्टात्मस्य च भावानुपपत्ते: कथं द्रष्यम् एतदा इति तत्त्र कस्य हेतौः
इत्यायानुनुपुष्थि तथा हृत्याधि। यस्मात् तत्र अनन्तरेऽत्त शरिपुत्र-चित्रे-सर्वम-चित्तोपयथम्-परं सक्ति-प्रतिपक्ष-भूतम् अनाज्ञवम्,
सिद्ध-प्रतिपक्ष-भूतम् अयपयप्यनम्।

तस्मात् मायापुश्च स्वभावनिन्दनि भावः।

तत्र यद्य अपि तत्र सर्वज्ञता-चित्तम् अनाज्ञवम् अयपयप्यनम् तत्रापि चित्तेश्वरकोष
पयथः। तेनार्थान: बोधि-सत्त्वो महासत्त्वं इति संख्याय गच्छति।

तत्र यद्य अपि विद्ययादि निगमम्।

अथ खल्वायुम्भन् शारिपुत्र आयुम्भनं सुभूतिम् एतदु अवोच्च। केन कारणेनायुम्भन्
सुभूते [W33.1] तत्रापि चित्तेश्वरकोषपयथः।

अनाज्ञावतेश्वे वस्तु-दुः-भावाद अनभिनिधिष्टाणि अयुक्त इत्याह केन
कारणेत्थादि।

सुभूतर् आह। अभित्तवत्व आयुम्भन् शारिपुत्र तत्रापि चित्तेश्वरकोषपयथः।

उत्तराः आह। बोधित्वादु इति तत्त्रेनानुपपत्तत्वाथ।

शारिपुत्र आह। किं पुनर्भा आयुम्भन सुभूतेस्ति तत्र चितं यद्य चितः अभित्तम्?
सुभूतर् आह। किं पुनर्भा आयुम्भन शारिपुत्र तत्राविच्छिन्ति अस्तित्वा न नासित्वा
वा चिते वेषभयं वा।

शारिपुत्र आह। नो हीद्यम् आयुम्भन सुभूते।

सुभूतर् आह। तत् वदि आयुम्भन शारिपुत्र तत्राविच्छिन्ति अस्तित्वा न नासित्वा
वा न विद्वेद्वा वा नोपलभयो वा तत् कस्य आयुम्भन शारिपुत्र एवम् आह। अस्तित तत्
चितं तथ्य चितः अभित्तम् इति।

शारिपुत्र आह। साधु साधु आयुम्भन सुभूते। यथापि तम भगवतरणाय-
विहारिणाम् अयपयप्य निदित्ते निदित्तिः।

शारिपुत्र आहेत्ययाब्य यवदु भवतायां निदित्ते निदित्तिः भवोदित्तिः व्याख्यातम्।
अयपयप्य-नमोंनानत्वादु पुनर्वक-रोपो न भवति। तथा चाहार्यां-दिनागः।

अथ वायूः पुनर्भा अथान्तरायाश्रित। इति [PPPi:57cd].

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ಅನುಜಾತಾಂಧ್ಯ ಆತ್ತ ಪ್ರತಿಭಾಪ್ರತಿಯಾದಿ. ವ್ಯಾಪಕ ಕಥನಯೆಡನಿ ಸಾಂಪ್ರದಾಯ ಅವಸರ ಕಾಲ್ನ ಮನಸೆ ಸೂಚಿ: ಪ್ರತಿಭಾತು ಸಮ್ಮೂ ಅಭಿಮಂಜೈತು.


तत्रापेव-विधे चित्ते महारथवातु पश्च-पाताठीसकोजन्मिनिविहोपययिन्नोदस्थितः
इत्यनेनाधिगम-महत्ममु आवेदितमु । सुतरामु अन्येरेवपिश-शब्दः ।

तत् कस्य हेतुः? तथा हि । ततु सर्वज्ञता-चित्मृ अनास्रवम् अपायपितम् ।

अनभिनिविद्यास्थिता च भवनानुपपत्ते: कथं द्रव्यम् एतददान दत्त ततु कस्य हेतुः
इत्यादयहाराय तथा दीवीन्दिदः । यस्माद्वदू अनन्तरोदं सर्वज्ञता-चित्ते पूर्वक-सर्वके
चित्तोपलक्षण-परं सक्ति-प्रतिपक्ष-भूतम् अनास्रवम्, सिद्धि-प्रतिपक्ष-भूतम् अपायपितम्
तस्मात् माया-पुष्पस्येव भावनेति भावः ।

तद् यद् अथ ततु सर्वज्ञता-चित्मृ अनास्रवम् अपायपितम् तत्रापि चित्तेरसको
पर्ययिन्नः । तेनार्थेन ऋषिसङ्क्तेऽहा-सत्त्वो महा-सत्त्व इति संख्या गच्छति ।

तद् यद् बपीत्वादि निगमननुः ।

अथ खल्पायुम्मनु शारिपुरु आयुष्मन्तं सुभूतममु एतददान अनोच्चत् । केन कारणेनायुम्मन्
सुभूते [W83.1] त्रापि चित्तेरसकोपययिन्नः ।

अनास्रवक्लेपि कस्तु-सद्व-भावादृ अनभिनिवेशार्थिरु अयुक्त इत्याहृ केन
कारणेनेवतादि ।

सुभूतिरु आहृ । अचित्तावादृ आयुम्मनु शारिपुरु तत्रापि चित्तेरसकोपययिन्नः ।

उत्तरार्थमु आहृ अचित्तावादृ इति तस्मादनागुणन्तवातुः ।

शारिपुरु आहृ । किं पुनरु आयुम्मनु सुभूतोतसित तच्छ चित्त्व यत्र चित्त्व अचित्मत्?
सुभूतिरु आहृ । किं पुनरु आयुम्मनु शारिपुरु तत्राचित्तायामु अस्तित्वा वा नास्तित्वा
वा विचििे भोपलभ्यते वा?

शारिपुरु आहृ । नाहृ भूतद आयुम्मनु सुभूते ।

सुभूतिरु आहृ । तदृ यद्य आयुम्मनु शारिपुरु तत्राचित्तायामु अस्तित्वा वा नास्तित्वा
वा न विचििे वा नोपल्भ्यते वा तदु कस्य आयुम्मनु शारिपुरु एवमु आहृ । अस्तित तच्छ
चित्त्व यत्र चित्मत् अचित्मत् इति ।

शारिपुरु आहृ । सादु सादु आयुम्मनु सुभूते । यथापि नाम त्वं भगवतारणाय-विहारिणामु
अप्रत्यायां निर्दिशो निर्दिशसि ।

शारिपुरु भाहेत्यारस्य ाद्व भगवतायां निर्दिशो निर्दिशसीति व्याख्यातमत् ।
अर्थाद्व-प्रस्तुतेनागतात्वातु पुनरक्ष-दोषो न भवति । तथा चाहार्याद्य-दिनागः ।

आवतित स एवार्थः पुनरु अर्थानिरार्थितः । इति [PPPi:57cd].

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तद् एवम् जयवदेश-साध्यायनं त्रिविधं: प्रतिपच्युदेशः वोधि-सत्त्वस्य निर्दिष्टो वेदितम्।

आलम्बनादू उदेशस्य को विशेषः। तादालिकम्
मालम्बनं समीप-बृहि। आमुत्रिक-
विप्रकृतस् तूदेशः। शर-संधान-लक्ष्य-एक्ष-साध्येणेत्यायि। [W84.1] विप्रकृतिः। तथा
चोकलम् [AA42]।

सर्ब-सत्त्वाध्य-चित्र-प्रहाणाधिकम-त्रये।
त्रिभिर् महत्त्वैरु उदेशो विशेषः यस्येष्ययम् स्वयंभराम्॥

\[1\] H glosses Arya Vimuktisena’s secondary derivative तादालिकम् (rendered "pertains to the present time") by समीप-बृहि "is close at hand." The Tib देविं रे ज्ञानम् ज्ञानम् supports the reading.
PART THREE

TRANSLATION
10.1 Homage

Homage [§7.3, §7.5] to the Mother [=PP] of the Buddha with an assembly of Śrāvakas and Bodhisattvas: which, as the state of being knower of all, leads Śrāvakas seeking peace to tranquility; which, as the state of being knower of the paths of those who work for the benefit of the world, is accomplisher of the aims of the masses; [and], perfectly endowed with which, the Sages give expression to this universe in all its aspects. [AAi-ii]

The merciful Lord Maitreya composed a very clear verse text in the form of a commentary [the AA] on the interpretation of perfect wisdom so that he himself could fully lead mortals, overwhelmed by the multitude of faults in the world, to the supreme freedom of yogins who know that all things are like forms of illusion.

The leader among the wise, glorified as Ārya Asaṅga, wrote a commentary (bhāṣya), the fame of which is especially glorious on account of the capability of its author, to ascertain the truly real.¹ Towering on account of his pride because of a minute knowledge of views regarding the division of being and non-being,² Ācārya Vasubandhu attained a [firm] position in the area of describing topics in [his] well-trodden path.³

Great was the effort made on account of the Vṛtti by one with good intelligence, Ārya Vimuktisena, who acquired extraordinary wisdom from the churning of the truly real in things with yogic practice. Concerned with [his] Vṛtti, another intelligent man is known in the world through the

¹ Or, "devoted to determining the truth" (=the true meaning of Maitreya's āvikā). W, following Bston, takes tattva-viniścaya as the name of the commentary.
² Eckel (1987) discerns a possible echo of Bhavya.
³ Again, following Bston, W takes paddhati as the name of Vasubandhu's commentary.
designation of Vimuktisena, who made, in his Vārttika, a treatise which quenched rival opinions, standing in extremes.

There is nothing unsaid earlier which someone feeble-minded like me could say in regard to this. There could be nothing [here] that is not in the daily conversation of the supremely intelligent ones. It is [just] that I have come to love the subject of the true reality of these phenomena which gives rise to gnosis, so I have set about composing this additional commentary which takes supreme reality (sad-artha) for its subject.

10.2 Anubandha-catuṣṭaya

[W2.1] Thus have I heard. At a certain time the Lord was coursing at Rāja-grha on Mount Gṛdhra-kūṭa.

[Explanation of] Thus have I heard, etc.

Since in all cases there will [initially] be doubt tending towards the fact, everyone becomes involved with [a text] after determining the connection, subject matter, purpose and the purposes's purpose; therefore the connection and so forth must be stated here in the case of the PP.

To explain. "Were its connection and subject matter not presented, then, with the apprehension that it is as disconnected and absurd as the rambling of a lunatic or whoever, no discerning person would even take the initiative to listen to it." Hence, the connection and subject matter should definitely be spoken about in the case of this [PP].

Similarly, even when there is such a connection and subject matter, nevertheless, there is a maxim that "a means of accomplishment resulting in nothing special, when the work involved in its activity is over, transgresses the guideline set down for means of accomplishment." [If the text at hand were such a means] then even those inspired by faith would not feel moved merely to listen to this jewel of a sūtra, the PP, since it would be devoid of a purpose, in the sense that there would be no special factor making one want to use it, since other sūtras

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1 §2.13; AA1-2; W2.3-5.5; P65.2.7-66.3.5; AAV:11.18-12.6; TSP:2.5-12.20, translated by G. Jha (1937-39); Vinitadeva's and Dharmottara's Ṭīkā on Nyāyabindu 1.1, translated Stcherbatsky (1930:1-11); cf. also AASphu:5-15; Amano (1969).
covered its ground. Therefore, at the outset, in order to get those wishing to make use of the sūtra to do so, a unique outcome of the activity [of studying the PP sūtra], pertaining to that sūtra alone, should be mentioned as the purpose, not something pertaining to something else. Otherwise the subject matter would be unconnected [i.e., X would be recommended for study, but what Y produces would have been given as the result]. The purpose is set forth at the opening of the sūtra in order to cause another to make use of a sūtra, not through force of habit.

And how is it that one becomes involved with a text through the imparting of the purpose-statement?¹ If the purpose is set forth as associated with that [text] alone, and not with some other. Nobody comes to use [text-] X when the purpose of [text-] Y is set forth.

A sūtra is said to be a statement which is intended to convey a specific meaning, not just mere subject matter, nor [is it said to be] mere words devoid of the capability of delivering meaning. So that to be conveyed which is found in [the list "subject matter, purpose," etc., [i.e., the subject matter] is not the purpose.²

Nor does purpose have the form of the activity [of expressing]. To explain: The activity of putting across its own subject matter is activity common to all sentences. It is not suitable to be set forth as purpose since it is obvious because there is no deviation from it on the part of a text.

Should not [the activity] be taught in order to remove the suspicion that there is nothing to be conveyed? No, since just giving voice to the subject matter itself removes that suspicion regarding it. Nor can there be a taking [as purpose] of that [process of expressing] with a desire to state that there is a specific meaning

¹ H gloss of Kamalaśīla's prayojana (TSP:10.5) with vākya, shows that he has in mind the statement of the anubandha-catuṣṭaya itself.
² A similar passage is found at TSP:10.10. There Kamalaśīla's intention is to say that the purpose associated with the subject matter, etc., is not to be set forth as the purpose of the entire treatise. This interpretation is also found in AAGser:102ff, based on Dharmamitra's AAPras which says that the purpose of the statement of the anubandha-catuṣṭaya is not at issue, the purpose of the whole text is.
to convey, for as soon as the specific meaning is stated it is also conveyed [that there is a process of expressing].

Furthermore, the result of the result of that [signification] process should be [W3.1] set forth as the [final] purpose\(^2\) since without that [result of the result, i.e.,] with just the result of the [signification] process, one would not become involved with the sūtra. To explain. A discerning individual seeking the principal result he [or she] wants to get turns to its means, for, without the cause there is no achieving the result. "Just as good health is obtained by implementing a non-deficient means of accomplishing it, similarly a means, when known and repeatedly employed, gives the result to be had through it." To know the means one therefore turns to the sūtra. Therefore it is just the purpose's purpose\(^3\) that should definitely be put forth as the main factor in one's turning to [the sūtra].

It cannot be shown by a text devoid of connection, etc., which are the means [showing it]. Hence one speaks of the connection, etc., to make it abundantly clear that the sūtra functions as means to attain the purpose's purpose.

Further, according to [Dharmakīrti's] maxim [PV Svārthānumāna 215] that:

Only that statement is certified for examination [i.e., should be thought about carefully] which contains a means in keeping with the connection and which gives expression to a goal of human life. Any [statement] different from this is uncertified.\(^4\)

that purpose's purpose should be demonstrated to be one, the means of which is favorable to connection [i.e., the subject matter should be a means to attaining the purpose]. Moreover the means of attaining it [taught in the subject matter] should not be impossible to put into practice. Otherwise, like the crown

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1 Alternatively, the passage may be construed, "And it is not taught out of the wish to demonstrate a special feature in the subject matter either, since just by setting forth the special feature in the subject matter that is set out."

2 The passage echoes the terminology of TSP:10.15-20.

3 That is, the result of the result = the result of the practice enjoined by the text.

4 Also quoted TSP:2.18-19.
ornament of Takṣaka which removes fevers, [and thus serves a great purpose but is unattainable], no one will turn to it. And thus there is no infinite regress [in the sense that the purpose leads to a higher purpose and that purpose to a still higher one, etc.]. This is because the continuum of a person’s expectancy is severed when there is complete attainment of the intended purpose and there is no other higher purpose to be sought.

What is the connection, etc., for this [text]? In response we say: As for the connection, it does not need to be taught separately from the purpose since it would be fruitless [to do so]. Something which is not known, even when something else is set out, deserves to be taken up separately. For example, if one sets out one of the [list of] things beginning with the subject matter, etc., [i.e., subject matter, purpose, purpose’s purpose], knowledge of the other does not come about. It is impossible, however, not to have set out the connection [between the treatise and purpose] if the purpose has been set out. To clarify: it [the connection] should be pointed out as the means-and-goal relation between the instruction and purpose shown by the PP [and] not as one characterized by such things as the activity of guru festivals, etc., since that [latter sort of connection] does not figure in the turning toward [a treatise] on the part of

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1 TSP2.16 mentions a Viṣa-haraka-takṣaka-cudā-ratnālaṅkāra-upadeśa-sūtra "Instructional Treatise On the Crown Ornament of Takṣaka Which Removes Poison." The legend is found in the Mahābhārata.

2 Dharmamitra (AAPras:P5194,74.3.7) says: "... ‘a connection for this [text]’ means this: The AA is the expressor (rjod byed = abhidhana); i.e., is that which causes understanding, and the Mother of the Jinas [i.e., perfect wisdom] is the subject matter (brjod bya = abhidhēya ‘what is to be expressed’). Hence, expressor and what is to be expressed are cause and effect, are object understood and understander. So, though not dealt with in particular, since, by extension, there is an inexorable connection, it ‘holds between them.’"

3 A particular sādhanā-sādhyā relation other than ordinary cause-and-effect is mentioned by Dharmakirti (PVin:1.34, Vetter 1966:78).

The compound guru-parva-kriyā is obscure. Probably ‘saint’s day’ activity, as it were, and the resulting benefit is being contrasted with the relation between the content of the PP and the purpose indicated by it. G. Jha, (1937-39:13) renders it "tracing of the Tutorial Tradition" (the latter part of the phrase is supported by Tib bla ma'i brgyud pa'i rim pa). According to Aklujkar guru-parva-krama is used by Kūmarila in his Śloka-vārttika. Pratijñā-sūtra section, verse 23. On this Sucarita-miśra comments in his Kāśikā pārthiva-vṛttadā: गुर्खार्द्व श्रवणी गुर्भ-पार्शन । गुर्भ-पार्ष्णिर्क्रमो गुर्भ-वर्ष-क्रम इति विनाशः । Trivandrum Skt. Series ed. of the Śloka-vārttika and Sucarita-miśra’s Kāśikā commentary thereto, p. 9.
seekers. And that means-and-goal relation has been shown just by saying what the purpose is. To wit: by pointing out that Y is the purpose of X, one points out that X is its means. If X does not bring about Y, Y does not become the purpose of X otherwise there would be over-extension [i.e., total lack of predictable relationships]. Therefore, on account of being understood implicitly, this [connection] is not set out separately from the statement of purpose.

One opinion is that a compilation of all real things (vastu) should be expressed for the purpose of ascertaining dharmas,¹ another that all antidotes should be pointed out in order to eliminate what is to be opposed (vipakṣa); and yet another that every aspect is to be conveyed for complete understanding of all objects of knowledge.

All three of these are unfounded.

To explain. In the first position where [the subject matter] is a compilation of all real things: There would be the fault of [useless] repetition since there is no new class of real things here in the PP that is not included in the Abhidharma Piṭaka, etc., through the mention of aggregates, elements and entrances (āyatana). [W4.1]

In the second [opinion], there would be a compilation only of all antidotal things because of the non-compilation [under that alternative] of anything which is to be opposed. Then, even if it is said that one should meditate, as an antidote, on the Sravaka path, etc., one would not understand what the antidotes were opposed to. There would be no realization of definite antidotes and things to be opposed, respectively, and hence the fault of non-realization would occur.

In the third [opinion] as well, where all aspects are compiled, there are two options: 1) that the aspect does not differ from the real thing and 2) that it differs.

¹ A paraphrase of AAV:11.18-12.6. "One should, however, explain whether this AA ornaments [the PP] through compiling real things, compiling the antidotes, or through compiling aspects. Now then, if the first position [is taken] the effort would be meaningless. There is no real thing here in the Sūtra which is not listed in the lakṣaṇa-śāstras. In the second instance it would be a compilation of the purification things and hence afflicted things would not be compiled. One would not, therefore, get at what the antidote was opposed to. And in the third case as well, since just aspects, devoid of any real thing, would be compiled nothing would be said since there would be no realization of an objective content." AAGser:79.6 says: "If one agrees with the AAA it is clear there actually were ... such assertions ... and evidently they were [assertions] about the sūtras."
If the former, in that just the real thing would be brought in under the guise of the aspect, there would befall the fault [of useless repetition] which is [incurred] in [the first opinion, viz., subject matter being just] a compilation of real things.

If the latter, then just aspects generated by mental construction devoid of any real thing would be compiled. Then one would not even gradually become involved with a real thing, as a result of which an aspect, even though cultivated, would not be used for any human goal. No subject matter relevant to a person's goal would be taught and the fault of non-disclosure [of anything helpful] would ensue.

Therefore, by taking together the three things [vastu, pratipakṣa and ākāra] as specified [and] by not giving ground to the faults obtaining in each of them, the entire path that comprises the understandings of the Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, Bodhisattvas and Tathāgatas, that is unmistaken, that has the sequence consisting of eight stages of clear realization starting with the state of being knower of all aspects, and that brings attainment of high status and definite good has been taught in the PP by the highly compassionate Lord, teacher of all creatures, through a variety of magical emanations.

The Lord taught the revered Aṣṭa-sahasrīṣūrī so that all the beings who like a brief formulation would easily, i.e., in a brief formulation, come to understand the above-mentioned subject matter, which is the content of the Ārya-satasahasrī-prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra, etc., which has the form of a progressive achievement of an [altruistic] mind [set on] enlightenment, preceptual advice,

1 Traditionally four goals are mentioned: dharma, artha (wealth), kāma (pleasure) and mokṣa (liberation).

2 AAGser:83.3ff: "Although our own [i.e., H's] position and that of the opponents is similar in asserting [that the subject matter] is a compilation of real things, antidotes and aspects it differs in respect to the purpose and mode of teaching. The opponents' assertions are as has been set out earlier, while our position is as follows. The inclusion of real things, antidotes and aspects by both the Sūtra and its Ornament are in order that the three exalted wisdoms [i.e., sarva-, mārga- and sarvākāraṇa-sādhanā], respectively, will be understood. For it teaches the [knowledge of the Śrāvakas] as what is to be gone beyond (gol sa), [the knowledge of the Bodhisattvas] as cause, and [the knowledge of the Buddhas] as attainment, respectively. Hence, not differentiating for what purposes, and the way in which, real things, antidotes and aspects are taught, and basing one's hopes in argument on applying the word 'only' to each of the three [assertions] will not provide an explanation even until the end of the age."

3 Listed AA1.3.
etc., and which is divided in eight different phases. Hence easy understanding of all briefly stated topics, pertaining to the continuum of what is to be taught, is the uncommon [result] and is, therefore, the purpose resulting from the action [of expressing the PP].

That one with accumulated merit due to giving, etc., who has devoted the mind to accomplishing one’s own and others’ many excellent purposes should, based on the surface level and ultimate truths, actualize the above-mentioned subject matter, the path of the state of being knower of all aspects and so forth, in all its variety, by means of the gradual attainment of such [parts of the path] as the proximate penetration, etc., is the [purpose’s] purpose, the result of the result of the action [of expressing]. It has a matching means.

[This subject matter mentioned here] is not realized by Hari, Hara and Hiraṇya-garbhas, etc., whose bases are spoiled by the poison of settling on [over-reified] being, (a [settling] that comes about in beginningless births), and who have not cultivated familiarity with the selflessness of all things.

[The one with accumulated merit, etc., spoken of above], having easily comprehended [this subject matter] with wisdom arisen from hearing by listening to the PP; having ascertained [what the subject matter is] with [wisdom] arisen from reflection after superimposing [it] on a rememberance cognition that arises from a latency engendered by experiences of a sharper sort, becomes habituated to it through meditative wisdom. This is in accordance with [Dharmakīrti’s] maxim [PVin:1.31]

Therefore whatever real or unreal thing is meditated on, when the meditation is complete it comes to have a clear, non-conceptual awareness as its result.

[W5.1] Accordingly [AA1-2] says,

My purpose in beginning is so that those with awareness would wish to behold the path (not touched by others) of the state of being knower of all

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1 The seventy topics which are the sub-divisions of the eight abhisamayas listed AA1.6-18.
2 These are names of Brahmanical gods.
3 For a discussion of these wisdoms see §8.5.
aspects\(^1\) which has been taught here [in the PP] by the Teacher; and by settling in recollection the sūtra’s meaning would wish to easily take to the practice of dharma which consists of the ten activities.\(^2\)

10.3 Setting the scene

Earlier scholars\(^3\) say: It is the lord of the tenth level, the Mahā-vajra-dhara who resides in Aḍakavatī,\(^4\) who begins by saying, for the sake of the whole world, thus, etc., to the group of great Bodhisattvas like Ārya Maitreya who had properly requested him to compile the PP sūtra jewel. This is because, according to the Tathāgata-guhyā-nirdeśa\(^5\) this [Mahā-vajra-dhara] is completely in charge of taking care of the bodies and corpus of excellent teachings of all Tathāgatas\(^6\) who belong to this auspicious period; because in the Vajra-pāṇyabhiṣeka, etc, the teaching is entrusted to him and because there is no [such] special mention in the case of other [persons].\(^7\)

Others, however, think the compiler is Ārya Ānanda since in this very [A], in the Parīndanā-parivarta, he has been entrusted with the PP [W989-9] "[for as long as] this PP will endure in this Jambū-dvīpa, etc."

Here thus, as a conjunction expressing the meaning ‘certainty’ and intended to point out that all the topics in the sūtra have been comprehended by an

\(^1\) jña (like pa in nṛpa, etc.) is a root noun and jñatā an abstract noun that means ‘the state of being one who, or that which, knows.’ The cumbersome translation ‘state of being knower’ (in preference to ‘state of knowing’ or ‘knowledge’) is retained to avoid a potentially misleading ambiguity between what is known (jñeya) and what knows (jña).

\(^2\) AAGser.120.3 mentions ten kinds of activities in relation to sūtras set out at MVB:5.9cd-10 (Nagao 1964:63; Wogihara Collected Works:724-736): 1) copying 2) worship 3) giving to others 4) listening 5) reading 6) accepting 7) teaching 8) chanting 9) pondering 10) meditation, but says, as does AARGyan:55, that dharma-caryām daśātmikām could refer either to the ten pāramitās or to the ten topics, beginning with bodhi-cittotpāda, set out in AA1.5-6.

\(^3\) This view is mentioned in the Mpps and by Bhavya in his Tarka-jvālā (Lamotte 1954:759, 383).

\(^4\) Vajrapāṇi is asserted by Mahāyānists to be the compiler of the Mahāyāna sūtras and in Tantra his maṇḍala is said to be on the north side of Meru (Lamotte 1958:762-3).

\(^5\) Vaidya (1960:578) equates Aḍakavatī with Alakā, the capital of the Yakṣas.

\(^6\) See 6.10.1 for H’s own explanation of the Buddha kāyas.

\(^7\) Ārya-vajrapāṇyabhiṣeka-mahā-tantra P30,130-35?
understanding befitting him[ self, Ānanda] makes the incontrovertible [statement], "It is like this." I, as a word for [the speaker] himself, [implies] hearing directly in the presence of the Buddha. And heard, as a word for experience by an ear-sense consciousness, [implies] a state lacking [non-conceptual] realization because none except Tathāgatas are able to realize all dhammas as they are.\(^1\)

These three words are taught at the beginning of a sūtra only when it is a revelation of the Lord. To explain: Certain Śrāvakas, etc., who dispelled the doubts of people to be trained and who were living at the place of residence of the Tathāgata wondered how, when the Lord has passed into nirvāṇa, the compilation [of the revelation] would be done by those who do not have an understanding of the meaning of the stream of the Sugata’s doctrines about what carries one to buddhahood—a difficult thing to comprehend because of a propensity for interest in different things. So they asked, "Lord, how in a future time is the doctrine to be compiled?" The Lord, reflecting on the fact that when someone with incontrovertible direct hearing compiles the doctrine there is no fault, even if they have not realized its meaning, said, as in the Dharma-saṁgīti-sūtra "Monks! After saying ‘Thus have I heard’ you may compile my doctrine." Similarly, [the Lord said] that the contexts and sequences should be set forth, etc. Even from this statement it follows that there is no predicament of their being utterances of someone other than the Buddha in the case of passages about place and time, etc., or [in the case of passages] such as "Śakra, lord of the gods, said this to the Lord ..." The compilers composed them with the permission of the Lord himself.\(^2\) \footnote{Cf. Kamalaśīla’s Ţīkā on the Sapta-satika-praṇā-pāramitā-sūtra (P206.3.2).} Similarly, this completely removes the fault that things not said by the Buddha have been interpolated into what the Buddha did say. It is justifiable, therefore, [to say] only what was heard has been compiled.

Some have engaged in the following scholarly exchange: Opponent: "Why did Ānanda say ‘Thus have I heard’ when he should have said ‘Thus I have been

\(^1\) Cf. Kamalaśīla’s Ţīkā on the Sapta-satika-praṇā-pāramitā-sūtra (P206.3.2).

\(^2\) AASDon:82 sets forth three types of buddha-vacana: 1) anuṭṭhāya ‘permitted;’ 2) adhisṭhānena ‘authorized;’ and buddhena bhāṣita (Tib zhal las byung ba'i bka) ‘actual.’ In the PP-hṛdaya-sūtra, "Then Śāriputra said to Avalokiteśvara" is the first, explanation of doctrine by Avalokiteśvara is the second, and the Buddha’s few words of praise after Avalokiteśvara finishes speaking are the third.

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taught?" Proponent: "Because it is not logically justifiable to hold that the Buddha teaches." This exchange, it should be known from what has been pointed out so far, is not at all becoming.

But elsewhere Ārya Ananda has said: "There are sūtras spoken in my presence by the Lord, there are sūtras spoken in the celestial realms and there are sūtras which came down from one person to another which I have picked up and memorized in the "thus-heard" manner." After Mahākāśyapa, referring to all of these, had said to him,

You of great wisdom, speak! You who are the Sugata's child, speak. Where did the Lord expound the Dharma-cakra-pravartana-sūtra?

then Ārya Ananda, with his mindstream moistened through recollection of Buddha's qualities and his face streaming with tears, said, in a pervading voice, "Thus have I heard." So how is direct hearing referred to with the expression "by me?"

This is no fault. Just as a teaching authorized by the Tathāgata is his teaching, similarly, though heard from another, it is heard directly from [the Tathāgata]. Alternatively, although heard from somebody else, he [the compiler] checked with the Lord as supreme doctrine-holder, in order to ascertain its meaning. Hence, in view of the fact that he ascertained its meaning, it was heard directly from the Lord himself and based on that he says, I [heard]. As for [Ānanda's] statement "I shall list all as thus-heard," that statement pertains to the book [emerging out of the Samgiti; it does not mean he is claiming that he heard all sūtras directly]. Hence there is no fault [of discrepancy].

Having made an introduction in this manner, now, putting to rest questions as to when, from whom, where, and together with whom he heard the sūtra jewel, in order to demonstrate his [or her] authority [the compiler] gives expression to the occasion with the words at one time, because the collectivity formed by the place, time, retinue and teacher are the cause of the act of teaching. The phrase "At one time" is to be connected to "heard." With this [phrasing] it is made clear that this [PP] sūtra is difficult to obtain, because [the phrasing] points out [the PP sūtra's] quality of being available only once in a while since such a sūtra, like the best, wish-fulfilling, precious gem, cannot be had at all times.
Alternatively, by saying, "On one occasion I heard this precious sūtra and on another occasion a different one," the compiler implies he [or she] has become learned for the sake of other beings, like a kindly doctor-king.¹

[W7.1] Alternatively, [the sentence "Thus have I heard"] means that he [or she] heard everything in one instant. For just as, through the power of deities and so forth, when we dream it is as if one hundred years, etc., is observed in a mere twinkling, similarly, through the power of the Buddha, in a single instant the entire meaning of the sūtra dawns on an ear consciousness. This [consciousness] has as its immediately preceding condition mental consciousness.² Through this [meaning of the remark the compiler] is saying that he [or she] is a person of authority; that "I hear in a single instant everything which should be heard and do not forget it because I have attained the inestimable doors to liberation."³ Therefore, when later the compiler begins to teach in a sequence, even if, on account of being unable to remain always in a state of equipoise for the sake of other groups of trainees, he [or she] somehow becomes distracted by another topic and has an indeterminate thought this does not prevent him [or her] from making a complete compilation of the sūtra at a later time. This is because, right at the start, the power of the Tathāgata had furnished him [or her] with an understanding of complete clarity. Furthermore, he [or she] continues to listen insatiably because of the nectarous flavor of hearing dharma.

¹ The same simile is found in Kamalaśīla's Tīkā on the Saptasatika-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra (P206.3.6). To comfort a sick patient a kindly doctor conveys how much he has studied and how many lives he has saved.

² Ordinarily, hearing has as the condition for its arising a sound. In this case a clairvoyance is the condition, on account of which the entire discourse is heard in one single, unbroken act.

³ Lamotte (Mpps:1213-1215) has a clear introductory note explaining the three or eight doors to liberation. Here H is probably referring to the three doors, in essence a realization of an ultimate truth which unifies diversity on the basis of its common emptiness.

Brough (1950:420) renders na ca vismaryate "and hence all is not readily forgotten." He takes the original meaning of ekasmin samaye to have been deśanā-samaye "the time when Śākyamuni was teaching" as distinct from an earlier time (before his enlightenment) when he was still a Bodhisattva.
Why does this not happen to the rest of the retinue of [Buddha’s] trainees? According to the *Sāgara-nāga-rāja-paripṛcchā* it does indeed happen in the case of the group of very pure Bodhisattvas, not everyone, since those [who are not the very pure Bodhisattvas] lack that special ability to retain [dharma] which [in turn] is due to a certain deficiency in their spiritual progress.

And how can a discourse which happened all at once be divided? On the surface level, this teaching consists of an understanding in which letters and words are reflected. Since it takes place either at once or gradually, depending on one’s capabilities, there is no flaw.

Alternatively, since

The Buddha journeys about for the sake of disciples in other regions, to satisfy those dwelling there, to [provide] many residences for Śrāvakas, because of non-attachment to seeing [a particular area], to turn regions into holy monuments, to let living beings acquire merits and to get rid of calamities, etc.

one can connect it to the following words: Being intent on helping others, at one time the Lord was coursing on Mount Grdhrakūṭa and at other times resided elsewhere.

One who has destroyed [bhagna, from root *bhañj*] all of what is to be opposed, i.e., afflictive emotion, action, birth and afflictive obscuration and obscuration of knowledge as well, is considered to be the Bhagavān (=Lord).

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1. Probably H had *Sāgara-nāga-rāja-paripṛcchā* (P820:96.2.8-96.4.2) in mind. There it says that ultimately the doctrine is beyond words.

2. Cf. *Sāgara-nāga-rāja-paripṛcchā*, chapter 3 where the *sāṁvṛti* level is discussed.

3. There are six sorts of "calamities" (*ādi*), such as plague, etc., referred to.

In accordance with this statement of a Seer,\textsuperscript{1} [one gets] through an etymological procedure: Bhagavān means one who has destroyed (bhagnavan) afflicutive emotion, etc. Or,

\textit{bhaga} ("good fortune") is the word (śruti) that refers to six things: total lordliness, form, fame, glory, wisdom and perseverance.\textsuperscript{2}

\textbf{[W8.1]} One who has this [bhaga], that, one having the magnificent accumulation of lordliness and so forth is a Bhagavān (Lord). [This word Lord] is connected to \textbf{was coursing}.

At Rāja-grha, an aptly-named, particular, well-known place, is Gṛdhra-kūṭa, which is an outcrop of various precious stones, similar to the place of complete enlightenment, desired by the Tathāgatas to teach the Mother of the Jinas [i.e., the PP] because other places could not sustain the burden of a great congregation of Bodhisattvas, etc. A \textit{parvata} (mount), according to the etymologists' statement [is derived from \textit{parvan} and \textit{tan}] because, on auspicious days (\textit{parva}) such as the eighth day of the lunar month, it extends itself forth (\textit{tanoti}) for the parade of gods, etc., desirous of merit.\textsuperscript{3}

\textbf{[The Lord] was coursing.} [Coursing means that the Lord] carried himself variously (\textit{vihṛtavān}) in the sense that: He wins them over by demonstrating amazing superhuman phenomena with his miraculous power to display himself (\textit{rddhi-prātihārya}) in various ways; He brings them to maturity [i.e., teaches every person what is individually necessary] with his miraculous power of instruction (\textit{ādeśana-prātihārya}). On account of thoroughly understanding their aspirations and propensities he brings about the intended

\textsuperscript{1} W's \textit{ārśokti} = \textit{buddha-vacana}; see also Mpps (114 n. 1, 115-116).

\textsuperscript{2} \textit{Buddha-bhūmi-śāstra}, Taisho XXVI, 1530:292a according to W. The same verse, with minor variations, appears in Brahmanical texts.

\textsuperscript{3} Yaska's \textit{Nirukta} 1.20 (Sarup 1966:20 n. 5) says "\textit{parvata} is so called because it has joints (\textit{parva}). But \textit{parva} is derived from root \textit{pr} (‘to fill’) or from root \textit{prī} (‘to propitiate’). Here, during the period of a fortnight they propitiate the gods. It (mountain) is (so called) on account of the similarity of the joints to the nature of the other period." According to Durga[siṃha] a mountain has joints in the form of stone slabs and a period has joints in the form of time with its various divisions. Wogihara (Collected Works) gives the meaning of root \textit{tan} as ‘to perform’ and translates "gods perform religious ceremonies parading around."
purpose by liberating those to be trained in the three vehicles, eligible to be especially kept in mind [by the Lord on account of the interest they displayed in instruction], by liberating them with his post-pedagogical miraculous power (anusāsanī-prātiḥārya) through four sorts of deportment (vihāra): a) while moving about, b) while teaching, c) in meditative absorption and d) in retreat; in essence, by way of his physical and verbal activity and by way of a mind observing reality and living creatures.

[A grammatical discussion]: Is not a construction with the particle sma [used in viharati sma he was coursing] used for an imperfect, unobserved past tense? Yet here the time is not unwitnessed by the compiler. How, then, is viharati sma appropriate? Good point. However, since immediately after [grammarians] say "And [sma is used] also for what is not unwitnessed" it is a proper [usage]. An alternative [explanation is to say] there is no fault because it is an earlier grammar followed here or because it signifies the unobserved relative to some other person. The same explanation applies to such expressions as āmantrayate sma (‘he addressed’), etc.

10.4 Retinue

...together with a great community of monks: a thousand two hundred and fifty of the monks, all of them, moreover, except one person, to wit, friend Ānanda, Arhants, those for whom contamination is finished, from whom afflicting emotion is gone, beings who are in control, whose minds are well liberated and whose wisdom is well liberated, Thoroughbreds, Bull Elephants, those by whom the task has been done, by whom the work has been done, by whom the burden has been thrown down, who have attained their own goal, in whose case the links to existence have been completely severed, whose minds are fully liberated by proper comprehensive understanding, and who have the ultimate perfection and who have control over their whole mind.

1 When the particle sma is used, the present tense endings (lañ) are enjoined in one’s reference to a time that is past, not an earlier part of today (i.e., the day of the usage), and is unwitnessed.

2 Āṣṭādhyāyī3.2.111 जनपदनि जट्; 3.2.118 जट स्मे.
The Lord was coursing together with the Saṁgha. The explanations of individual expressions are: by a great means by one having great dignity, because of its great size and great qualities, community, gathering, of monks of those who have broken afflicting emotion, that are fully ordained a) by taking refuge three times, b) by way of the four part ceremony beginning with request, or c) by the "Come here!" the Buddha said to the five original disciples.

A saṁgha is called a saṁgha [a word derived from sam + han meaning "struck or hammered together"] since it, like the Buddha and Dharma, cannot be divided even by 100 ten million Māras. Here, the immensity of number is expressed by 1,250, etc. The literal meaning is easy to understand. A number is given a) so that one will grasp the amount out of a limitless Śrāvaka retinue, b) so that one will easily comprehend, from an all-inclusive number which will not be forgotten, the multitude [of individuals], c) so that those apprehensive of listening to and grasping much will lend their ears, or d) it can be [simply] to let someone know exactly how many.

With the words beginning with all of them the greatness in qualities is set forth. Everyone of them is an Arhant ['Worthy One' from root arh 'to be worthy'] since they are worthy of worship, religious donations and being assembled together in a group, etc. They are those for whom contamination is finished (kṣināsrava) since for them the three

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1 Perhaps suggesting a derivation of bhikṣu from bhid 'to break' and kleśa 'afflictive emotion.'
2 The different readings of this passage have been discussed in the note to the Skt text of W8.24-6. For ordination according to the Mūla-sarvāsti-vādin Vinaya see Eimer (1983:129 et seq) and Banerjee (1957, chapter 7) which is an analysis and partial translation. For ehi-bhikkhu-upasaṁpadā and ordination by way of the utterance of the three refuges (Pāli sarana-gamana) according to the Theravāda, see Mahāvagga 1.1-1.29, translated by Rhys Davids and Oldenberg (1881:73 et seq), and for ordination by way of the āttha-caturtha = jñāpti-caturthā, i.e., a four-part ceremony beginning with the request and then the threefold repetition of an announcement, see Mahāvagga 1.28.3-6 (Rhys Davids and Oldenberg 1881:69-70).
3 Verse 33 of the Tri-saraṇa-gamana-saptati (found in Tib translation P5366, 5478; ed. by P.K. Sorensen). This work is, according to Ruegg (1981:105), by the same Tāntrika Candrakīrti who wrote the Guhya-samāja commentary Pradīpoddyotana.
4 Literally, "thirteen-minus-a-half centuries of monks."
contaminants (āsrava), so called because they contaminate (sravanti) all saṁsara right up to (ā) the Bhavāgra,¹ are finished. The three contaminants are desire, becoming and ignorance which are removed by having heaps of uncontaminated ethics, [meditative stabilization, and wisdom], the antidotes to each of them, respectively. **Those from whom kleśa is gone** are those from whom kleśa: the thoroughly afflictive emotion, action and birth, is absent.

Having been liberated from bad conduct, craving, bad ideas and the bonds of existence by the proper complete attainment of the aggregates of ethics, meditative stabilization, wisdom and emancipation, respectively; and, through the attainment of perfect good conduct, clairvoyance, the enjoyments and dwellings of gods and Ārya beings, in due order bringing themselves, worldliness, the world and the mind under control,² they are themselves loosed from all bonds and become independent. Hence, these beings who have become controllers (vaśin) are **beings who are in control.**

From the removal of all afflictive emotion and secondary afflictive emotion categorized under craving and ignorance, respectively, there is 1) meditative stabilization and the absorptions [§6.26.2] which we take to be the liberation of mind and 2) knowledge of the Arhant’s way which we take to be the liberation of wisdom. Where there is no sort of craving or ignorance comes liberation of mind and wisdom, respectively, from the absence of desire and ignorance. Liberated, then, by this attainment of those [two liberations] from obscurations both to absorption and of the afflictive sort they are completely freed in both respects and hence are those **whose minds are well liberated and whose wisdom is well liberated.**

[Explanation of the word] **Thoroughbred.** It is on account of being fearless. They do not fear 1) pain, lamentation, etc., 2) self-criticism, criticism from another,³ bad rebirth, penury, chastisement, no epitaph (asloka) or death, ²

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¹ The ‘Summit of existence,’ is the highest saṁsāric heaven in the Buddhist cosmology. See §6.26.2, §9.3.
² Although the wording is problematic, the contrast seems to be between release from being under the control of the world, and having control over it.
³ Alternatively, atmanuvāda-parānuvāda may be rendered "not repeating oneself or what another has said unnecessarily."
3) beings tainted with the eight worldly dharmas such as attaining and not attaining, etc.,¹ and 4) ignorance, doubt, and wrong understanding which block personal realization. They are, therefore, free from 1) misery, 2) fear, 3) worldly dharmas and 4) uncertainty because of not knowing, respectively.

They are Bull Elephants on account of their magnificent bearing which comes from understanding the dharma in the way peculiar to those with the three knowledges,² etc.

They are those by whom the task has been done, by whom the work has been done. The task is what has to be done, i.e., being liberated from all misery, etc. It has been done by fully completing ethical conduct, meditative stabilization and wisdom. The work which comes along in the wake of this is the purity, etc., the existence of which is tied to one’s own will, and which should be done. It has been done as well.³

[W10.1] They are those by whom the burden has been thrown down. They have thrown it down, i.e., removed it completely, because they have nothing to understand, abandon, actualize and meditate on since they have realized the four noble truths such as misery and so on individually as [these activities such as understanding pertain to each truth. §7.4].⁴ The burden is the aggregates, afflactive emotion, commitments and exertion.

They are those who have attained their own goal. They have attained their own goal which is twofold: attainment of the beneficial and removal of the non-beneficial, following the Lord, by means of attainment of knowledge and removal of ignorance. They are those in whose case the

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¹ An activity becomes one of the eight loka-dharmas (listed in the Abhidharma-saṅgīti-paryāya-pāda-sāstra, Taishō XXVI, No. 1537:442c according to W) when it is motivated by the wish to attain or avoid gain and loss, fame and disgrace, praise and blame or pleasure and pain, respectively.

² Of impermanence, misery and selflessness (in Pāli texts), or of past and future existences and of the destruction of contamination (Edgerton:260); corresponding to what is, in Brahmanism, knowledge of, or knowledge of the essence of, the three main Vedas.

³ Mahāvagga 4.36 and 6.38 (trans Fausbol 1881:95) "Birth has been destroyed, a religious life had been led, what was to be done had been done, there was nothing else (to be done) for this existence."

⁴ Here duḥkha (= immediate reality) is to be understood as such, samudaya (its cause) is to be abandoned, nirodha (its cessation = nirvāṇa) is to be actualized and mārga (the path to nirvāṇa = PP) is to be meditated on.
links to existence have been completely severed. For them the nine links, beginning with anger, etc., [so-called] because they link a person with existence are completely, from all sides as much as possible, severed by the Ārya path. They are those whose minds are fully liberated by proper comprehensive understanding. Proper, unmistakable comprehensive understanding, knowledge from all sides is awakening to true reality. With this, their mind is well liberated, freed from all bonds. They have control, in the sense of mastery, over their whole mind defined serially as the nine stages of absorption [§6.26.2],¹ and they have the ultimate perfection, the final destination of their lineage as well, so they are those who have the ultimate perfection and those who have control over their whole mind.

Thus the connection of all [these adjectives] is to be effected with [the expression bhikṣu-sataih] ending in the instrumental case termination [in the form tair evam-bhūtaire bhikṣu-sataih] 'with hundreds of monks of that sort.'

Some explain as follows: Why are they all Arhants? Because they are those for whom contamination is finished. They have finished with contamination because they are those from whom kleśa is gone and so on up until, they are those whose minds are fully liberated by proper comprehensive understanding because they are those who have the ultimate perfection and those who have control over their whole mind. They thus take each later [quality] as the cause of each earlier one and say that since every goal of persons is completely accounted for, no further qualification needs be mentioned.

¹ The nine samāpattis are the four dhyānas, four āyatanas of the ārūpya-dhātu together with the nirodha-samāpatti (see §9.3).
The author of the *Vārttika* [§2.12] says they are *Arhants* [= Foe Destroyer *arihan*] because they have destroyed the foe. They are those for whom contamination is finished because they have removed obscuration in the form of afflictive emotion. And they are those from whom afflictive emotion is gone because the hardship (*kleśa*) of striving to finish contamination is over. Having thus set forth, with these three words, the quality marked by the complete removal of faults, starting from by those who are in control... [the PP] speaks of a quality that is an antidote [to faults, i.e., something positive].

They are in control because, equipped with the calm abiding and special insight of the erudite[2] which make manifest special qualities like clairvoyance, etc.,[3] they have the patience to care for the triple world and are therefore tenured in the work of looking after living creatures by the Lord. Since they are liberated, totally, from the bonds of craving and opinion, respectively, their minds and intellects are well liberated. They are Thoroughbreds on account of having gone the whole course by means of the straight path, unswervingly. They are Bull Elephants because of winning the battle over afflictive emotion. Since there is nothing left for them to overcome they are those by whom the task has been done. Since they have completed the appropriate work they are those whose work has been done. They are those by whom the burden has been thrown down since they have not stored up the misery of a future existence. They have attained their own goal because they have actualized nirvāṇa. They are the ones whose links to existence have been completely severed by completely obliterating the

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1 Tucci understands only the last sentence of the section ("since the finest qualities have been set forth no further quality need be mentioned, and there is, therefore, no fault of going on endlessly") to have been said by the Vārttikakāra. The Tib understands the entire preceding section to be his point of view which seems, contextually, to be more likely.

This Vārttikakāra does not appear to be Bhadanta Vimuktisena. At least, there is no explanation of the immediate retinue of the Lord in the Tib translation of the Vārttika ascribed to Bhadanta Vimuktisena. These issues have been discussed at §2.12.

2 According to Obermiller (1932-3:15-16, 26, 43) *asaikṣa-samatha-vipaśyanā* is coterminous with the attainment of nirvāṇa.

3 Discussed at length by Lamotte (Mpps:328-333, 1809-1827).
cause of existence. They are those whose minds are fully liberated by proper comprehensive understanding because they have pushed to the limit by means of the paths of seeing and meditation. And they have ultimate perfection of control over their whole mind because of the special qualities of clairvoyance, etc., and mastery in developing their talents to the fullest.¹

The connection is the same [as in the preceding explanation], with each later [quality] being the cause of each earlier. And since the finest qualities have been set forth no further quality need be mentioned. There is, therefore, no fault of going on endlessly. [Here ends the explanation of the Vārttika-kāra.]

With one person, etc., [the PP text] says that although the reciter [Ānanda] is included in the number thus spoken of as one best at retaining the dharma, he does not have such qualities [as have been mentioned in the case of the other monks]. [An etymology of pudgala ‘person’]: Since the state of perfumed and perfumer marked by being effect and cause is not tenable in the case of a permanent entity,² [a person] filled (pūrṇa) with good and bad latencies is impermanent and takes (lāti), i.e., grasps a place of rebirth (gati) corresponding to those [latencies].³ Presented thus, from the point of view of etymologists, one person has the sense of [one] on-going continuum.

The word yad utta (to wit) is an indeclinable intended to specify. On account of being one whose full life-span is desired [Ānanda] is āyuṣmān (possessing life). It [the word āyuṣmat] signifies something beneficial, happiness and respect [and is therefore rendered in English as friend].⁴ He is Ānanda

¹ Literally, it says "and control attaining the excellence of their lineage."
² The worldly personality is the "to-be-perfumed" and good or bad activity "the perfumer." Anything that can be modified cannot be permanent. Hence, what people call soul or self cannot be permanent.
³ A different etymology is given at W81.6-7. See also la Vallée Poussin (1923-31:9.228, 9.245 n. 3).
⁴ Aklujkar notes that the blessings āyuṣmān bhava and āyuṣmati bhava are still heard in India, though not as frequently as the synonymous ciradh jīva. There seems to be no reason to doubt that the etymological meaning of āyuṣmat is "[full/long] life-possessing, long-lived" as an expression of a wish ("May you live long"). This is what H says with ākāṅkṣitāyus. The Buddhists probably took out the connotation "junior" and put "equality" in its place.

Edgerton (106, 108) derives it from Pāli āvuso 'brother.' Perhaps 'born again!' conveys something of its meaning.
(Completely Joyful) because he has attained joy by serving the Buddha which is the same as retaining all scripture. Thus it has been said: This friend Árya Ananda was a Stream-enterer [§7.9.3.4] at the time of the discourses and he had deficiencies with regard to the qualities [of the Arhants] mentioned above. [Therefore the sūtra says] except, setting apart, one person.

One opinion holds that because of having fully completed what is to be done, having their own benefit in mind and because of the blessing of the Tathāgata, these [monks, as distinct from Bodhisattvas] have all riches and are therefore free from the fifteen reasons for wandering off [contained in the following verse]:

A monk goes wandering because of five faults[^1] [1-5], a shortcoming [6], an altercation on account of dislike, desire, etc. [7], wanting to get something, etc. [8], relations and a beloved [9-10], respect for a guru [11], curiosity about some distinctive thing [12], transgression [of his monk’s vow] [13], being caused to do so by the [Triple] Gem [14] and to pay homage to reliquaries, etc. [15].

Hence they do not take themselves off anywhere. Since they have gratitude and respect for the doctrine, etc., they remain continually in the presence of the Tathāgata alone. Thus, being his own, the retinue of great Śrāvakas is spoken of [as distinct from a retinue of Bodhisattvas], as his.

Because of being adepts thirsting to hear the Buddha’s profound, boundless, precious sūtras they slip off to world spheres without end, having assembled together just because that [Mahāyāna] vehicle is being explained. This is the reason why the Jina’s children [i.e., Bodhisattvas] are not read of here in these sūtras.

[^1]: Listed by la Vallée Poussin (1923-31:9.250) "Le Sūtra [Kṣudrāgama, cited MSA:18.101] dit: Cinq calmités découlent de la croyance au ‘je’: il se fout une théorie de l’âme, de l’être, du principe vital; il ne se distingue pas des docteurs hétérodoxes; il prend un chemin qui n’est pas le chemin; sa pensée n’entre pas dans la vacuité, ne s’y apaise pas avec fois, ne s’y établit pas avec satisfaction, n’y a pas propension; les qualités des Āryas ne se purifient pas en lui.”

The enumeration of the fifteen causes differs in the Tib translation.
Others\(^1\) point out: The Noble Sata was taught to bring benefit to those beings who are devoted to words and delight in an extensively worked-out rendition. The Pañca was taught, through gathering all the topics together, out of affection for those beings who delight in medium-size explanation and understand from selective elaboration. The A was expounded, through condensing its topics, to produce benefit for beings who are captured by headings\(^2\) and delight in brief explanation. [W12.1] So in conformity with that, just like the retinue of monks, nuns, male and female ordained laity, by which the doctrine is beheld, and which delights in brief explanation, there is also to be understood an immeasurable retinue of great Bodhisattvas who have pure surpassing intention \([§7.9.3.8]\), who abide in the signless through effort, or who abide in the signless effortlessly, who are involved in the certain work or who are faced with [only] a single rebirth [before attaining bodhi]. Ācārya Dignāga has thus said (PPPi:7),

Hence this A is not short of any topics spoken about [in the longer PP]. It is asserted to be a condensed text. Its topics are just those that have been spoken of [there].

10.5 The scene and retinue according to the longer Sūtras\(^3\)

So, exactly in accord with that, in order to remove the anguish those of plodding disposition feel at not having a retinue, etc., and to cause delight in few desires, the Lord, having set up his own dharma seat, demonstrated that this jewel of a sūtra is realized only through the meditative equipoises. He sat erect

\(^1\) H's opinion.

\(^2\) This seems to be contextually what H intended. Aklujkar mentions that the implicit image behind the term *udghatitajña/udghättitajña* is that of understanding the value of the contents from a slightly opened jewel-box, etc.

\(^3\) Pañca:5-17, translated and explained Conze (1979:37-44), Mpps:431-616. H says the A is a condensation of the larger sūtras. Here he proceeds to summarize and explain the more detailed introduction (*tri-nidāna*) found in the Pañca and Sata. There the Buddha enters meditation and emanates light into a fabulous number of regions. The light purifies numberless countries and inhabitants, excites countless Bodhisattvas and starts a chain of events which end in the Buddhas of the ten directions sending oceans of gifts to Sākyamuni. These gifts are carried by each Buddha's retinue and the description of their colourful arrival from unseen and uncountable regions gives a very different picture than does the simple description of Arhants in the A. Mpps presents the activities in ten stages.
in the full crossed-legged posture free of such faults as excessive stretching, and having molded his hands into the doctrine teaching position and directed his gaze at the tip of his nose, placed himself in single-pointed recollection. Having entered the meditative equipoise called ‘king of stabilizations,’ through combining all meditative stabilizations, he stood up. Then, beholding with his eyes of compassion and mercy this world as afflicted with suffering torment, he caused his group of trainees to understand that this doctrine with its divisions into soft, middling and extensive, and agreement with propensity for spiritual progress, is all-encompassing and results in buddhahood [Pañca:4.14-17]. He then illumined world spheres in the ten directions as numerous as the sands of the river Gaṅgā, by creating sixty times sixty one hundred million billion one hundred thousand light rays of natural light from the major and minor parts, and from all the pores of his body, respectively. He made all living beings destined in regard to unsurpassed, perfect enlightenment. He spread the power of his tongue to those world spheres in the trichilio-megachiliocosm whereby, based on the power of Tathāgatas in the hearts of lotuses resting on the many quivering light rays,\(^1\) by teaching the doctrine complete in all of the six perfections, he demonstrated, without obstruction, the cause of the teaching of the Mother doctrine [the PP]; as before, working for the welfare of living beings, in order that a gathering of those persons seeking it [the teaching of the doctrine] would befall [Pañca:4.18-7.4].

Then, in the same way, since he is free from all fears of being embarrassed in an assembly, etc., he became absorbed in the meditative stabilization called the lion’s yawn,\(^2\) and to make exponents of the doctrine understand that the Mother of the Jinas [PP] is not to be taught in an unclean place, and when listeners are unskilled in the divisions of surface level and ultimate truths, he made manifest such magical emanation that a) there were the eighteen great good omens,\(^3\) b) in

\(^1\) Exactly what H intends here is difficult to say. The passage could be referring to only one Tathāgata, in which case a more faithful translation might be: "based on the power of the Tathāgata in the heart of a lotus in the many multitudes of rays coming out of that [tongue]."

\(^2\) Sata (quoted Mpps:472) has *siṁha-vikriḍita* ‘lion’s delight.’

\(^3\) As explained at Mpps:472-477 these are turning the world upside down, inside out, etc., eighteen times, giving rise to great pleasure in beholders.
just the same way, through removal of the eight shortcomings accumulated by all spheres of the world,\(^1\) there was purification of the area and c) the beings there were endowed with the lot of human and celestial beings and, remembering their past lives, and with delight and joy, initially proceeded forth, each to their own Buddha field, and then paid homage to their Lord Buddhas.

All the beings, free from the shortcomings of blindness, etc., plying the path of the ten virtuous actions, delighting in the four stations of Brahmins\(^2\) and attaining to a bliss like that of the absorption in the third concentration \(\S 6.26.2\) became vessels suitable to hear the Mother of the Jinas and came to possess such a complete understanding that they burst out saying [Pañca:10]:\(^3\)

Excellent is benevolence, excellent is control, excellent is quietude, excellent is restraint, excellent is keeping the vow of chastity and excellent is non-violence towards living creatures.

Thus are his two sorts\(^4\) of miracle in the form of meditative stabilization [Pañca7.5-10.8].

Then the Lord, demonstrating that the PP can be taught when one is in possession of a mastery over all knowledge, as before, in order to generate reverence in trainees, dominated all the spheres of the world and dominated all mountains with his light, color, magnificence and splendour, beautifying, illuminating, ennobling and radiating [them], respectively, like Sumeru, king of mountains.

Similarly, having in mind that trainees would not try if they thought, "This can be understood and taught by those types of people but not by people like ourselves," he showed himself in a natural ordinary body, similar to those of beings in this world sphere, in order to generate enthusiasm for the idea that humans themselves are able to accomplish everything.

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1 See Mahāvyutpatti p.120 (170) and, according to W, in Dīrghāgama 9 (Taishō I:55c).

2 As, according to W, in Dīrghāgama 8 (Taishō I:50c). The cattaro brahmavihārā (four celestial coursings) are not uncommon in the Pāli canon. As maitri, karuṇā, muditā and uppekṣā they figure in the Pāṇājala-yoga tradition too.

3 See Mppś:499, n. 1 for different versions of this verse.

4 Perhaps referring to the samādhi-rāja and simha-vijṛmbhita.
Then the Lord was worshipped with flowers, etc., by celestial and human beings in whom exceptional faith had arisen and who, because of having repeatedly meditated on reality, could see this sort of realization of doctrine on a different occasion [i.e., who knew the genuine thing when they saw it]. As the offerings are enjoyed, because of the enjoyment of well-transformed things, the [trainees’] minds become clear, [as a result of which] merit increases, [their] bodies become very pure and [as a result] they easily accumulate wisdom. This being the case (iti), to take care of them, the Lord placed [these flowers, etc.,] above his head in the form of a canopy, most attractive among all ornaments and equal in size to the world spheres in the trichilio-megachiliocosm, above his head in a way which beautified this world incredibly. And after thus empowering those [flowers, etc.], [W14.1] since, "when one individual is singled out for teaching, those who have not destroyed the propensity to be selfish feel depressed, etc., and lack perfect progress," the foremost Sugata revealed [simultaneously] identical forms of himself as the teacher of all aspects of doctrine as before, in front of living beings in all parts of the universe: a) in order to completely take care of them, etc., b) in order to make it clear that one does not change the way one feels about the Tathāgata, charging favoritism in the elucidation, etc., of [the doctrine] when [only] some [trainees] develop the understanding later, depending on their personality, and through such differences as [some individuals are] quick [in understanding] and [some are] slow, even though [the Lord] turned to all beings with equality.

This is his twofold miraculous power to display himself.1

After that, in order to bring about all sorts of things useful to the world [i.e., out of unqualified compassion, with the interests of even the slow-witted in mind], the Lord dispelled the doubt of those slow-witted persons who suspected that, since he has been born in this thoroughly afflicted world sphere, and since a wisdom, etc., of a higher level could exist, this Lord might not be equal to all Buddhas. He conveyed that he is equal to every Buddha, since Bodhisattvas who

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1 Pañca:10.9-12.4; "La force miraculeuse du Buddha est double: 1) assis au même endroit il prêche la loi de telle maniere que tous les êtres le voient de loin et l'entendent de loin; 2) fixe au même endroit, il prêche la loi de telle maniere que chaque être en particulier voit un Buddha en face de lui prêcher la loi" (MppŚ:526).
have equally completed the undertaking and accumulation [of merit] could have the highest, complete enlightenment, each in their own Buddha field, and all Buddhas are equal in terms of the body of their accumulation [of merit] and truth, and their working for the welfare of the world; not in terms of length of life, family and size.

Similarly, as he teaches the sūtra jewel, in its unmistaken entirety, to trainee Bodhisattvas born in various world spheres who had made prayers to [hear the Lord’s words], in order to show them how to complete the accumulation [of merit], etc., the Lord smiled. On account of this, the beings in all world spheres had uprooted in every respect the seed of doubt about inequality [of the various Buddhas]. They realized the equality of each other’s Lord Buddha residing with their surrounding retinues each in their own world spheres.

Then, first taking notice of the auspicious omens such as the great [shaking] experiences, etc., the Jina Children in the world spheres in the ten directions each approached their own Tathāgata, and making a homage to their feet, asked, "Lord, who is causing this majesty?" [They did this] since it is incorrect to go with unseemly haste without taking leave of one’s teacher, in order to [receive permission to go]. They were answered, and through having heard words of praise they comprehended the favorable[-to-departure] thought of their Lords and submitted, "Lord we are going [to that world sphere] for the purpose of seeing, etc., such a Lord and his retinue, etc." Having received [permission], taking lotuses made out of various jewels (which their Lords wanted to offer to make reverence to the doctrine), reports and messages, and having been commissioned to ask after the Buddha’s health with the words, "I hope there are no difficulties, etc.," they were given the advice that they "should be cautious in that world because of the rampage of the five degenerations." [W15.1] They worship Tathāgatas in between [their world sphere and here] along with their incredibly huge retinues; arrive, bow to the [Lord’s] feet and make extensive worship. [Śākyamuni’s] then blesses their offerings and each becomes stationed in their own respective places. They deliver the statements of message,

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1 For the rest of the traditional greeting, see Mppš:582 n. 1.
[as instructed] by their respective Tathāgatas, they make presentations of the lotuses.

This is the twofold miraculous power to throw light on the dharma.

Then the Lord, thinking that those lotuses have been sent for letting it be known that, even though [he] took birth in [this] impure world sphere, [he] is not defiled by the faults of that [world, and thus] to worship the excellent doctrine, threw them back into their respective regions. Having [then] stationed Tathāgatas in these lotuses, in order to make all sentient beings destined for unsurpassed, complete enlightenment, having glorified the excellent doctrine and having come to know the assembly of great Bodhisattvas with corresponding abilities who had come together, with his discourse on the Mother of the Jinas he taught the PP which is beneficial at the start, in the middle and at the end [Pañca:12.4-17.21].

One should understand that this is the triple\textsuperscript{1} introduction [of the Pañca and Śata]. It is not given in this [A] since [in the A] the continuing context (adhikāra) is that of teaching to bring benefit to those who understand from headings and delight in brief explanation. This [A merely] says: While the Lord coursed at the great city of Rāja-grha on Mount Grdhra-kūta, surrounded by the specified retinue, propounding doctrine, then, right there, in the very presence of the Lord, together with his retinue, have I thus heard this precious sutra.

By [mentioning] all these things such as the specified location, etc., the compiler, by following worldly convention, lets it be known that his [or hers] is an authoritative cognition, thereby communicating that trainees should listen and contemplate, etc., with reverence. In accordance with this view Ācārya Dignāga has said [PPPi:3-4]:

As a factor to turn those with faith towards [the dharma], the compiler establishes that his is authoritative cognition by describing the teacher, his witnessing retinue, time and place. In the world, one who tells of a speech is known to have validly cognized it through indications of direct witness to the time and place.

\footnote{The three are the \textit{samādhi-prātiḥārya}, \textit{śrddhi-prātiḥārya}, and \textit{dharmāvabhāsa-prātiḥārya}.}
10.6 The contents in brief

Explicators of the contents of sūtras should state the purpose, the condensed topics, word meanings, connections [between sections] and objections and responses.

Thus, it has been determined in [Vasubandhu's] Vyākhyā-yukti that a sūtra is to be explained under five rubrics. Of these, the purpose has been explained [W2.1-5.5]. Therefore, in order that listeners will understand easily, and because it is easy for explicators to explain a treatise where the topics have been delineated, the condensed topic is now set forth through a brief survey.

10.6.2 [W16.1] In that respect, at the start [§7.4], the state of being knower of all aspects is described through showing it to be the result, since a Bodhisattva intent on buddhahood has the thorough knowledge of all aspects, beginning with production of an [altruistic] mind. Since it [the state of being knower of all aspects] does not exist without thorough knowledge of the paths of Śrāvakas, etc., the state of being knower of paths is taught next; and since even that does not exist without thorough knowledge of all things after it is stated the state of being knower of all.

Then, to master completely the three states of being knower understood thus, again, through having brought together the modes of knowledge of all aspects, paths and things, by means of a meditation on the three states of being knower, [the Bodhisattva] attains the full awakening to all aspects. By means of the special path, from attainment of a realization which has gone right to the end, having reached the culminating clear realization; having ordered the topics meditated on separately, and in combination, [the Bodhisattva] makes them manifest in order to bring about certainty. Thus [the Bodhisattva] understands the serial clear realization. Then, after having again meditated to bring about complete familiarity, and having fully awakened in a single instant [to all 173

\[1\] W15.23-21.21; P70.3.1-72.4.1; AA3-17; AAV:12.7-14.27.

\[2\] At W26.15, W395.8, etc., the special path is the eighth to tenth bhūmis; here, however (cf. Obermiller 1933-6:8-9) it is the nirvedha-bhāgiya.
aspects],\(^1\) in the second, [i.e., next] instant after that, he [or she] perfectly attains full awakening to the body of truths. These, in brief, are the eight clear realizations which are a condensation of the topics in the PP. And thus [AA3-4] says:

The PP is explained by way of eight subjects. These eight are the state of being knower of all aspects, knower of paths and knower of all, then awakening to all aspects, culminant [realization], serial [realization], awakening in an instant, and the body of truths.

10.6.3 Since a topic is considered to have been well explained when what has been briefly mentioned is explained at length, the condensed topics are again set forth in extenso, [and each of the above eight clear realizations is broken down into its constituent parts; §2.16.2, §7.9].

In regard to that, one wishing to attain perfect enlightenment, first of all generates the mind [set on] enlightenment, a mind which is born from the womb of emptiness and compassion and which is of two sorts, aspirational and engaging [in the Bodhisattva deeds]. Then, to carry through to completion the religious practices implied by that mind set on enlightenment, one adheres to preceptual advice about the way to achieve the progress achiever (pratipatti), etc., in order to develop it [i.e., the progress achiever=path] by way of protecting the good qualities which have been attained. He [or she] then ascertains the fourfold proximate penetration, a mundane meditative state of mind concordant with [its result; §6.10], the realization of the four noble truths, which raises up from the proximate liberation root of virtue, [a root] characterized by faith, etc., and attained when hearing, etc. has reached its culmination [§6.8].\(^2\) Since one who has the progress achiever [gets] the above-mentioned proximate penetration and also other [paths like] the path of seeing, etc., the Bodhisattva--the substratum of the progress achiever whose very nature is the dharma-element--should, based on all phenomena as objective support, concentrate on

\(^1\) Literally, the compound says "as having become one who has comprehended single-instant-full-awakening."

\(^2\) This is referring to the first two stages of the path also called the path of accumulation and the path of preparation.
the triple aim. [This triple aim] should stand as the target in light of the fact that the progress achiever goes forward governed by the greatness of the intention [to raise] all beings into the foremost state, the greatness of removal and the greatness of realization. Then, this progress achiever to attain those [aims] is activity based on, when in the domain of the three states of being knower of all, virtuous dharmas in general, and, when in the domain of the four clear realizations starting with the full awakening to all aspects, vis-a-vis each realization, activity based on the six perfections.

(W17.1) Thus, from amongst these [four] different courses, beginning with the course in armor, which are paths of preparation, seeing, meditation and the special path, [all paths which deal with] things as they really are, having first armed oneself with armour by means of the course in armour which is enthusiastic perseverance; and, by means of the course in going forth, having mounted oneself upon the entire Mahāyāna doctrine; then, by one who has gathered the collections with the course in accumulation the course in emergence is to be realized.

Thus, by revealing [the state of being knower of all aspects] by following the sequence of acquisitions of qualities that carry one to buddhahood, the state of being the knower of all aspects has been comprehensively captured in the first chapter [of the AA]. And thus [AA5-6] says:

Production of [altruistic] mind, preceptual advice, four limbs of [proximate] penetration, substratum of the progress achiever (the nature of which substratum is the dharma-element), objective support, aim, the activities of putting on armor and going forth, collections and emergences [these ten figure in the description of] the Sage's being knower of all aspects.

10.6.4 Next, since there is no realization of the state of being knower of all aspects without the thorough knowledge of all paths, in order to teach this state of being knower of paths [the Lord first taught the basis of the state of being knower of paths in the following manner]. With his own natural radiances
making the fruitional\textsuperscript{1} light of the celestial beings, etc., look drab, [a Tathāgata] removed their [i.e., the Arhants'] pride that they are protectors, etc., of the world, etc., thus teaching indirectly that only a person whose stream of pride has been destroyed is qualified to attain this [state of being knower of paths].\textsuperscript{2} After having taught the basis [of the state of being knower of paths], and set forth its special locale, etc.,\textsuperscript{2} with the consideration that "all paths are to be fully completed," in the state of being knower of paths he first taught about the Śrāvaka and Pratyeka-buddha paths. The Lord then set forth the Bodhisattvas' path of seeing which is greatly beneficial and has these worldly, etc., good qualities.

After that, the context being the discussion of the path of meditation, he first mentions its function because it can be briefly stated and because the turning of the trainees [towards the path] depends on the [expected] result. The path of meditation is said to be twofold, contaminated and uncontaminated,\textsuperscript{3} so first (from amongst the three contaminated paths of meditation categorized in accord with attitudes of belief, dedication, and admiration) the mental attitude of belief is mentioned, since, like distillation of gold from the elements it brings forth virtue. After this, in order to greatly encourage Bodhisattvas who cultivate it, praises, commendations and glorifications which are in the form of ever increasing joy,\textsuperscript{4} are then mentioned with the thought "thus praises, etc., are extended to belief by the Buddhas, etc." After that, preceded by the attitude of dedication which, like a mold for a golden ornament,\textsuperscript{5} turns that virtue into an instrument for perfect enlightenment, the attitude of admiration is spoken of in order that the equality of the virtuous activities of one's own and others, will be attained.

\textsuperscript{1} Since a vipāka is a transformation it is changeable and, therefore, impermanent unlike the natural radiance of the Buddha.

\textsuperscript{2} The five parameters (AA2.1) delimiting a state of being knower of paths are discussed by Ruegg (1969:189ff).

\textsuperscript{3} Cf. AK1.4ab.

\textsuperscript{4} That is to say, \textit{stobhita} stands for a greater joy than \textit{stuta} and \textit{Samsita} for a greater joy than \textit{stobhita}.

\textsuperscript{5} Literally, "like a goldsmith an ornament."
The uncontaminated path of meditation is twofold, because of the division of practice and purity. So having expounded the first as something characterized by fully carrying out [the practice], the second [W18.1] is then shown to be characterized by complete purity.

Thus, the Bodhisattva's state of being knower of paths has been discussed starting from the second chapter [of the A] up to the following statement in the eighth chapter where [Subhūti asks] Lord, is such understanding of that Bodhisattva his PP? and the Lord replies Subhūti, it is because of being completely pure... And thus [AA7-9] says:

Darkening, etc., the path of the Learner [=Śrāvaka] and Rhino [=Pratyeka-buddha], the path of seeing (which is greatly beneficial on account of qualities belonging to this and the other world), function, belief, praises commendations and glorifications, dedicatory and admiring attitudes of the highest sort, carrying out and complete purity: this is the path of meditation of wise Bodhisattvas. Thus is explained the state of being knower of paths.

10.6.5 Then, since there can be no perfect thorough knowledge of paths without thorough knowledge of all things, in order to teach the state of being knower of all it [the PP] points out: Bodhisattvas are not stationed in existence or quietude, on account of seeing the faults of cyclic existence by means of wisdom, and on account of being given over to bringing about the welfare of others because of their compassion. [The PP] mentions such is not the case with the Śrāvakas and Pratyeka-buddhas. To corroborate just that, by way of [an explanation that the Bodhisattva's state of being knower of all] is pervaded [by compassion and understanding emptiness, while the Śrāvakas' and Pratyeka-buddhas'] is the reverse of that, the Mother of the Jinas teaches being distant on account of grasping signs, and not [distant] on account of grasping the signless, respectively. It thereby explains what is to be shunned and its antidotes, in terms of whether there is, or there is not, grasping, respectively. Then, after explaining in regard to the meditation on these, that the Bodhisattva's training is only by way of pervasion [by wisdom and compassion], based on a teaching about the
equality of that [training]\(^1\) the PP gives expression to the path of seeing which one should contemplate.

Thus the state of being knower of all pertaining to the Śrāvaka and Pratyeka-buddha is discussed starting from [A] chapter eight where it says, Friend Subhūti spoke... up to the following sentence in the ninth chapter: Subhūti, there is neither evolution nor withdrawal of any dharma; this, Subhūti, is a great Bodhisattva’s PP. And thus [AA10-11] says:

Not being stationed in existence because of wisdom nor abiding in peace because of compassion; distant because of lacking method, and not distant because of method, what is to be shunned and antidotes, training and its equality, and the path of seeing of Śrāvakas, etc.: thus is a state of being knower of all asserted.

10.6.6 Then, in order to completely master the three states of being all-knower which have become thoroughly known, one again meditates on the three states of being all-knower by amalgamating together the modes of knowledge of all aspects, paths and things. Therefore, [W19.1] in order to teach the full awakening to all aspects [the PP] says that meditation should be carried out on the aspects by means of special trainings, through adopting and rejecting the ennumerated good qualities and faults, respectively, based on an understanding of the definition [of the training]. [This should be done] by one in whom has been produced the proximate liberation root of virtue. Having thus indicated aspects, etc., then, the PP first states that an enthusiastic person who has developed proximate liberation, by way of realizing proximate penetration, etc., attains the quality of the groups of irreversible trainees. Preceded by the cultivation of the sameness of worldly existence and nirvāṇa which is the cause of buddhahood, when his [or her] buddha-field is brought about due to skillful means, Buddha activities effortlessly proceed forth in accord with the fortune [of living beings]. Thus proximate penetration, etc., have been taught.

Thus, the full awakening to all the aspects of Buddhas, etc., is described wherever possible starting from [A] chapter nine where it says, When this had been said, friend Subhūti addressed the Lord. "Lord, this is the

\(^1\) That is to say, based on the understanding that all practices are equally without svabhāva.
great perfection..." up to the following sentence in the twentieth chapter: These or those great Bodhisattvas are not captured by this human, divine or demonic world. And thus [AA12-13] says:

Aspects, trainings, qualities, faults, definitions, the proximate liberation and [proximate] penetration, group of irreversible trainees, equality of existence and quietude, and unsurpassed purity of field: this is full awakening to all aspects and skillful means.

10.6.7 One who attains full awakening to all aspects has a realization, by means of the special path, which goes right to the ultimate excellence. So next, in order to teach the culminant clear realization, [the PP] first states the characteristic signs, increase [in merits], process of settling firmly and mental composure in the four proximate penetrations, respectively. Then there is mention of the four hindrances which are to be removed and, corresponding to the particular times of their removal, the four antidotes which are to be applied on each of the path of seeing, and path of meditation, respectively. These are understood in terms of the two times two ideas of something apprehended, and two times two ideas of an apprehender, based on the sets of things embraced and rejected, and based on substantially and imputedly existing persons, respectively. The uninterrupted meditative stablization [so called] in that there is nothing placed in the way of the attainment of buddhahood, together with the wrong practices which are to be avoided is then taught because of a skill in means based on both [ultimate and surface level] truths.

Thus, the culminant clear realization together with its cause is described starting from [A] chapter twenty where it says Subhūti, if this great Bodhisattva even in another dream... up to the following sentence in the twenty-ninth chapter: Since these virtuous and non-virtuous dharmas are immeasurable the PP is correspondingly immeasurable. And thus [AA14-16a] says:

[W20.1] Sign, its increase [in merit], process of settling firmly, and mental composure, four types of antidotes to the four types of ideas on each of the paths called seeing and meditation, uninterrupted meditative stabilization
and wrong practices [figure in the explanation of] culminant clear realization.

10.6.8 Next, since one who has attained the culminant clear realization places in a sequence the topics understood separately, and in combination, and meditates on them to make them stable, therefore the serial full awakening, which has [implicit in it] the cause [of the sequential clear realization], is explained in terms of thirteen sub-categories of giving etc., which are all-inclusive in [A] chapter twenty-nine by the single statement, One should know the sound of the PP by the sound of the roaring lion. And thus [AA16ab] says:

Threefold and tenfold [i.e., thirteenth fold due to the constituents which figure in the description] is the serial [clear realization].

10.6.9 After this, one who has meditated on the serial clear realization, in order to make him [or her]self completely accustomed [to all the aspects], comes face to face, in a single instant, with all those same [previously] comprehended dharmas having four varieties in terms of the characteristic mark of the unripened, uncontaminated [realization of] all dharmas in a single instant, etc.¹ Thus the single instant full awakening, together with its cause, is described in the very same [twenty-ninth] chapter [of the A] with just the single line Through the unshakeableness of all dharmas the PP is to be known as unshakeable. And thus [AA16cd] says:

Single instant full awakening is fourfold in terms of characteristic marks.

10.6.10 Then, the person who has cultivated full awakening in a single instant, in the second instant fully awakens to the body of truths.² Therefore [the PP], after having mentioned the threefold successive full awakening of Bodhisattvas, in order to explain that the three remaining bodies³ are posited a) as appearing

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¹ The four are given in the Sāratamā (Jaini 1979:169-171).
² For a detailed discussion of H's interpretation of the dharma-kāya and how it differs from the AA and AAV see §7.8
³ That is, according to H, the jñāna-dharma, sambhoga and nirmāṇa kāyas.
from the standpoint of correct surface level reality,\(^1\) b) as having, ultimately, the nature of the truly real, and c) as being within the range of cognition of the Buddhas, Bodhisattvas and Śrāvakas, etc., when set forth from the point of view of their respective interests; in accordance with the maxim\(^2\) that

> [There is no thought of a lack of self-being other than consciousness] since discrimination is thought to be not different from what is discriminated.

first says that even though the body of own-being is not other than those [other three bodies], it is separately attained, but is not made, by means of the world-transcending path. It is, therefore, realized,\(^3\) not as something artificial, by cultivating the knowledge of all dharmas as non-bifurcated [into subject and object] and similar to illusions. Then, [the PP] explains that the body of truths and its deeds (which arise from the collection of wisdom and is within the range of cognition of Tathāgatas alone) should definitely be asserted, from the point of view of yogic convention, to be all the non-dual mental and emotional aspects effecting such tasks as teaching doctrine, etc., which have emerged from the fundamental sea-change occasioned by the dawning of a special meaning.\(^4\) [W21.1] It then teaches that the body of complete enjoyment ([so called] because [those beholding it] have the pleasure and happiness of the complete enjoyment of ultimate, unblemished, Mahāyāna doctrine) surrounded by great Bodhisattvas situated on the ten levels eager to hear the various sūtra jewels, is a conveyance ennobled by the major signs and minor marks of the accumulation of an immeasurable collection of merit. Then the body of emanations, which works for the welfare of the entire world, in accord with their propensities, which is an unbroken continuum right from the beginning of transmigratory existence in the form of the Tathāgata Śākyamuni, etc., which arises from just a

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1 The term *tathya-śānyṛtī* is associated with Bhavya. Ordinary objects of sense perception are correct surface realities while echoes, dream images, reflections, etc. are false surface realities.


3 This reflects the consistent Tib translation of *adhigama* ("attainment") by *rtogs pa* "realization."

4 That is, the twenty-one sorts of wisdom at AA8.2-6. The complex ideas lying behind this difficult sentence are dealt with in the discussion of the Buddha bodies at §7.8.6.
portion of the accumulation of merit and wisdom and which is suitable to be seen by Śrāvakas and so forth, is taught.

Thus the Lord Buddhas' dharma-body-full-awakening is discussed starting from [A's] chapter twenty-nine where it says Thus, Subhūti, by a great Bodhisattva... up to the chapter's end where it says The fulfillment of the unsurpassable Buddha dharmas... And thus [AA17] says:

There is [a body] of own-being (svābhāva) together with one of enjoyment and, similarly, another, of emanation; together with activity the dharma body is proclaimed fourfold.

10.6.11 After that, to let trainees know that they should practice like the Bodhisattva Sadā-prarudita, by way of a story of his earlier practices to teach the benefits of practicing the PP after pleasing one's spiritual friends, a triad of chapters, which are intended to set forth exactly the same order of clear realizations discussed earlier, are taught in conclusion, in terms of progress on the middle way. Since this [triad], being easy to understand, is not captured in the verses of the AA, for now [i.e., in the opening seventeen ślokas of the AA] there is just one summary of the topics [in terms of all eight clear realizations] since there will be a presentation of two other sorts of summation [one in terms of six aspects of the realizations, and another in terms three aspects of the realizations, at the conclusion of Maitreya's text].

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1 W992; Sucherbatsky and Obermiller (1928:40).
II PERFECT WISDOM

11.1

There indeed the Lord addressed friend elder Subhūti.

Now, by commenting on word meanings, etc. the meaning of the sūtra is explained. There is something that introduces a sentence. The word indeed adds force to the sentence. Subhūti [literally, Well-rich] is one whose bhūti (‘wealth’), i.e., richness of mind is su, viz, sobhana ‘excellent,’ i.e., foremost amongst those who are calm and collected. He is an elder on account of attaining prominence through such things as worship in the human and celestial world.

Here, sometimes the teaching of Tathāgatas’ is through actual physical authorization, by the laying on of hands, etc., like the teaching of the Daśa-bhūmika-sūtra, etc.; at other times, as in the Ajāta-śatru-śoka-vinodana-sūtra, through verbal authorization; [W22.1] and at yet other times, such as in the Samanta-bhadra-caryā-nirdeśa-sūtra, through a mental authorization.

The Lord addressed (the past tense of ‘address’) Subhūti, whose mind was on something else, in order to focus his attention, verbally authorizing him for an explanation of the PP. This the Lord does [for the following reasons]: (a) So that those entrusted to Ārya Subhūti will be disciplined in Mahāyāna, step by step, through proper acceptance, etc., and by help and sponsorship, thereby ensuring that the [Tathāgata’s] own lineage will not be broken, or (b) in order to help those who are trained when they behold [the Tathāgata’s] power and

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1 W21.22-27.25; P72.4.1-74.5.7; A3; AA18-20; Pañca:18-36.16; AAV:15-31.

1 Here begins the explanation of the A proper and of the third, most expanded, circle of the AA’s codification of the topics of the PP. In order to make the point that not only perfect wisdom, but perfect wisdom united with production of [altruistic] mind, is the arbiter of authentic Mahāyāna activity, the entire path, together with its result is set forth as altruistic endeavor.

2 See the Vyākhyā-yukti, §10.6.

3 Literally, "through recourse to palms, etc., consisting in the movement of the body."

4 Taishō X:535a et seq according to W.

5 The Ajāta-śatru-kaukṛtya-vinodana, Taishō XV, No. 628 according to W.
think, "Inconceivable is the power of the Tathāgatas’ skill in means since he causes even an utterly incapable person to teach."

May it occur to you, Subhūti, how in regard to the¹ the PP of great Bodhisattvas, the great Bodhisattvas come out in the PP.

How does [the Lord gives authority to Subhūti]? [Anticipating such a question the PP] says may it occur to you, etc. Even though, since a dharma discourse is under way, [Subhūti] is [in the state to which he is being exhorted], nevertheless, [the Lord] says Oh! Subhūti, may it occur to you, may you (te=tava) come face to face with the special knowledge of dharma, meaning, etymology and which confers confidence.²

Bodhisattvas (Enlightenment-spirited) are those in whom there is spirit, intent, for enlightenment, the state of personal enrichment within the absence of attachment to any dharma. Since Śrāvakas could also be like that [the A] says Mahāsattva (Great-spirited). Those who have spirit for greatness,³ the enrichment of others’ welfare are Mahāsattvas. Since non-Buddhist good persons also may have a great spirit of a different sort there is the word Bodhisattva. Therefore [the A] says, from the start of the PP of those great Bodhisattvas.

The Bodhisattvas who have emerged from the first [of the three] incalculable eons, who are increasing their belief-based practice [§6.8.2] and have a store of accumulated merit, settle in a cross-legged posture in a clean spot and, with the Buddha and Bodhisattvas as objective support, having focussed with their root-mind by means of a name, on the mode of the PP revealing the selflessness of all dharmas [i.e., on selflessness which is the main thing taught in the PP sūtra] then should determine, with a discursive mind, the divisions such as varieties of

¹ This is the common usage of ārabhya in Buddhist Skt, attested by Edgerton, p. 102 as meaning ‘referring to, having to do with.’
² pratisaṁvid literally, ‘specific knowledge’ but practically speaking, understanding which allows one to teach well (cf. AK7.37, la Vallée Poussin 1923-31:89-94). The four are dharma-pratisaṁvid ‘knowledge of names,’ artha-pratisaṁvid ‘knowledge of things,’ nirukti-pratisaṁvid ‘knowledge of semantic derivation,' and pratibhāna-pratisaṁvid ‘the knowledge which confers confidence [causing unstuttering eloquence].’
³ mahati turned into a noun.
words, chapter division and so on of that same [PP]. Then, they thus investigate the meaning of the PP by way of four sorts of meditation: (a) enumerating by grasping numerically in terms of the different stages of the eight clear realizations; (b) gauging by ascertaining the individual nature of each clear realization; (c) interpreting by avoiding both superimposition and over-negation; and (d) making decisions by justifying with valid non-conceptual and inferential cognitions,\textsuperscript{1} with his [or her] analytic mind, from two points of view [considering whether] these signs [i.e., statements] do, or do not, make sense individually and collectively, respectively. After that, he [or she] fastens on the properly investigated sign (nimitta) with the fastening mind, and penetrates that same properly investigated meaning with the mind connected to the root mind which has as its support a name. Then he [or she] should meditate, [W23.1] with a hoping, aspiring mind, which has a liking for that by which he [or she] is motivated. By attainment of the state of being knower of all aspects through such sequential arising of wisdom caused first by hearing, thinking and meditation [the Bodhisattvas reach PP; §8.5].

[An explanation of the term prajñā-pāramitā]:\textsuperscript{2} Having dissolved [the basis pārami implicit in pāramitā of the compound prajñā-pāramitā] as pāram [meaning] 'to the final limit of excellence' eti ('one goes'), kvip [a code word in Pāṁinian grammar] is added, and then taken away completely. Then, "since prescription of an infix is not invariably applicable,"\textsuperscript{3} [the infix] tuk is not added [i.e., we derive pārami and not pāramit] and, since [there is an axiom in grammar that says] "with primary derivatives [in the context of a tat-puruṣa compound] variation is noticed" there is no elision of the accusative case [ending m of pāram. Thus] pārami is derived.\textsuperscript{4} Being that, pārami is pāramitā [an abstract noun by addition of suffix tā]. [The other constituent] prajñāyāḥ of the compound prajñā-pāramitā [understood as prajñāyāḥ pāramitā] means

\textsuperscript{1} Cf. MSA:14.4-6.
\textsuperscript{2} The translation of this paragraph is based entirely on the explanation by Aklujkar. For a helpful analysis of two etymologies of pāramitā see Kajiyama (1970:136-142).
\textsuperscript{3} That is, rules regarding infixes do not always hold good.
\textsuperscript{4} The accusative case ending m of pāram is not dropped, as is usual in the case of the first member of a compound, so one derives pārami instead of (para + i) → pare.
"of that [knowledge] which is characterized by a thorough analysis of dharmas."\(^5\)

The principal PP is Lord Buddha, the non-dual wisdom which is like an illusion. On the other hand, (a) the text consisting of words and sentences, and (b) the paths characterized as seeing and so forth, are PP in a secondary sense.\(^6\)

Thus Dignāga has said [PPPi:1]:

The perfection of wisdom is non-dual wisdom. It is the Tathāgata, and is to be accomplished. Because the treatise[s] and path have that [i.e., the Tathāgatha] as goal that name also applies [to them].

Therefore, [in the phrase from the start of the PP of great Bodhisattvas] there is a circumscribing in the form ‘principally concerning only the PP of the three types [i.e., non-dual knowledge, path and text] as related to them [the Bodhisattvas] and devoid of unrecommended instruction.’ [The circumscribing] is not in the form of those [Bodhisattvas] alone\(^7\) because this [PP] is indispensable for all three enlightenments [Śrāvaka, Pratyeka-buddha and Bodhisattva]. [We know this is correct] because it will say right here [in the A, W41.19]: Even if one wishes to train on the Śrāvaka level one should listen to this very PP, etc., reflecting the fact that [the PP sūtras] teach a sequence of attainments having all variety and useful for the ultimate human goal.

In this context, since the following has been mentioned in the Ārya-gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra, etc.: "Son [or daughter] of a good family, the altruistic mind is the seed. Also it is itself the fruit, the essence of all Buddha dharmas"\(^8\) how comes to mean, ‘by way of the twenty-two different sorts of realization of an altruistic mind [set on] enlightenment, characterized by desire for the perfect enlightenment which underpins others’ welfare, great Bodhisattvas should come out in, definitely attain, the entire threefold PP.’

\(^5\) Cf. AK1.3.

\(^6\) Cf. Triratnadasa’s PPPi Vivaraṇa (P5808:2.2.4).

\(^7\) On mukhyā, gaṇḍ and prāddhānād see AAGser:127-131.6.

\(^8\) Ārya-gaṇḍavyūha Taishō X:825a according to W.
[The Lord] himself has briefly taught the PP, by way of a summons [to Subhūti], to let it be known that an [altruistic] mind [set on] enlightenment has sālambana (‘those with objective support’) and sva-rūpa (‘own-form’) as its divisions, and that its division is the topic of the sūtra.

Here then in brief is what the statement [in the A] means: The Lord summons the elder Ārya Subhūti [by saying]: So that the great Bodhisattvas, through their realizations of all sorts of an altruistic mind set on enlightenment, would perfectly obtain the entire threefold PP, as may be possible, through the step by step production of proper wisdom arisen from hearing, [contemplation and meditation], Oh! Subhūti, you (second person) should bring special knowledge fully to mind in the four ways in order to give an extensive explanation of how they do so, starting from the beginning of only the PP connected with them.

11.2 Bodhicitta

W24.1 To expand on this: According to the maxim that

There, first, because of the potency of the [Bodhisattva's] lineage the seed of compassion is awakened; and with the full complement of practice and thought an [altruistic] mind [set on] enlightenment comes to be possessed,

[the Bodhisattva] produces the [altruistic] mind [set on] enlightenment which is full of emptiness and compassion, on account of the potency of lineage, etc., [i.e.,] because of embracing the Bodhisattvas' vows, etc. Having made a prayer that "After I become a perfect Buddha may I strive for the sake of others' well-being, in accord with their propensities, by teaching, etc., the doctrine of the three vehicles," [the Bodhisattva thinks], "One should acquire [the goal] through practice." Thus an altruistic mind set on enlightenment which is based on the welfare of others, possesses cause and effect,9 and is characterized as

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9 This cause and effect is the pranidhi and prasthāna bodhi-cittotpāda, respectively. The wish that "In the future I will become a Buddha and for the sake of living beings shall teach the doctrines of the three vehicles, etc.," is the first causal production of an [altruistic] mind. Then, "I shall complete the full means of accomplishing the enlightenment thus wished for," is the way in which the resultant, engaging production of an [altruistic] mind arises.
desire to attain perfect enlightenment, is [divided] twofold in terms of prayer and engagement [in practice], for as it says [in Bodhi-caryāvatāra 1.16]

Just as a division into one wanting to go and a goer is set out, similarly, a division of these two in accordance with the sequence is to be known by scholars.

[Question:] Does not [MSA:4.1]¹

The Bodhisattvas' intention which has great enthusiasm, great understanding, great purpose and great emergence, and which has two aims, is the birth of a mind.

say that production of an [altruistic] mind is that arising [main] mind with an associated intention which has a specific object reflected in it? Desire for perfect enlightenment is a yearning for that [enlightenment], a mental factor [identifiable as] longing for that auspicious dharma,² so how could that [desire itself] be the production of an [altruistic] mind?

[Response:] What you point out here is indeed true. However one who intends (having seen humanity leaderless and sunk in the ocean of misery) to raise it up, generates, given that there is a yearning characterized as a longing for auspicious dharmas, the mind [to attain] the state of Buddha. Therefore here [in the expanson of the two-fold bodhicitta given by us], the result [production of an altruistic mind] is taught by means of the cause [desire to benefit others]. Since the usage is based on letting it be known that all auspicious dharmas of a Bodhisattva who longs and yearns thus increase, there is no fault [of our explanation of cittotpāda].

¹ This section is based on AAV:15. Dargyay (1981:104, 106-7), says Vasubandhu interpreted cittasambhava to mean not that cetanā was a birth or arising of bodhicitta but rather the origin of bodhicitta. He says, "When the wish for enlightenment arises in the Bodhisattva this motionless citta becomes elevated, moved. The cause for this 'rising mind' (cittotpāda) is the wish for enlightenment (pranidhi). This wish is a mental factor (caitta) not mind as such."

² Such passages, drawing a clear distinction between citta and caitta render problematic Conze's (1967:301) otherwise desirable translation of citta (in bodhicitta and cittotpāda) as 'thought.'
Alternatively, a prayer¹ is [what is really meant] by yearning [which is called] desire for perfect enlightenment. The production of an [altruistic] mind, which functions simultaneously with it, is referred to in an extended use by the word 'yearning' based on the fact that yearning is the main thing at the time the [bodhi] mind is produced. Thus, it is justifiable to hold that, for Bodhisattvas, the [bodhi] mind is produced as something together with the prayer, [and hence it comes to be called 'desire'].

What, then, is this perfect enlightenment, desire for which is the essence of production of an [altruistic] mind, and what is the others’ welfare which is its purpose?

I will answer in accord with the Pañca. In it, [Pañca:18.1] the brief explanation of perfect enlightenment is in [the following]:

Śāriputra, [W25.1] great Bodhisattvas wishing to fully enlighten all dharmas in all respects should apply themselves to the practice of the PP.

The extensive² explanation is in [Pañca:18.7]:

Śāriputra, a great Bodhisattva abiding here in the PP through the mode of non-abiding should make complete the perfection of giving, having taken [the stance that] what is given, the giver, and the receiver are not observed [i.e., with total detachment].

The brief explanation of 'the well-being of others' is in [Pañca:18.17]:

A great Bodhisattva who wishes to place in complete nirvāṇa as many beings as there are in worlds as numerous as the sands of the river Gaṅgā, in each of the ten directions, in a nirvāṇa where there is no remaining aggregate, should practice the PP.

The extensive explanation of this is in [Pañca:18.20]:

¹ Literally, 'directing of the mind.'
² Exactly what H intends by vistara 'extensive' is unclear.
A great Bodhisattva who wishes to place in benevolence those beings who are miserly, in ethical conduct those who are immoral, and in patience those beings who are malicious, should practice the PP.

And thus [AA18] says:

Generation of mind is a desire for perfect enlightenment for the welfare of others. According to the [PP] sutra that [desire] and that [welfare] are spoken of in brief and extensively.

11.3 Divisions of bodhicitta

Here are its divisions.¹

The first production of an [altruistic] mind of Bodhisattvas, is something together with longing, and is like the earth because it is the foundation from which issues forth the accumulation [of merit and wisdom needed] for full awakening to all dharmas in all aspects.

The second is something together with əśaya² and is like refined gold, because the əśaya (‘hope’) for benefit and happiness, systematized in the six perfections, in this and future lives is immutable. The consideration behind this is: That which is a substratum (śaya) right up to (ə) perfect enlightenment is əśaya (‘good intention’).

The third is together with adhyāśaya (‘further basis’ or ‘surpassing intention’) and is like the waxing moon in that all the white-side dharmas find ever greater increase. adhyāśaya is derived from adhika (‘additional’) əśaya (‘basis’ or ‘good intention’).

These three comprise the neophyte’s soft, middling and great level of accumulation, respectively.

The fourth is together with practice (prayoga) and is like fire because the practice of the three states of being all-knower, a conflagration, goes over more and more [objects of knowledge] as if they were its particular different fuels. prayoga is derived from an enhanced (prakṛṣṭa) yoga. This [cittotpāda]


² H’s explanation is based on three meanings of the word əśaya: ‘hope,’ ‘good intention’ and, perhaps, ‘basis’

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comprises the path of preparation leading into the first \[pramudita\] level and is connected to the level of belief-based performance.

The fifth, together with the perfection of giving, is like a great treasury since it is not exhausted even though immeasurable living beings are given complete satisfaction through enjoyment of [its] material wealth.

The sixth, together with the perfection of good ethics, is like a jewel-mine because, with it as a foundation, the jewels of all good qualities come forth.

The seventh, together with the perfection of patience, is like a great sea because it is unmoved even when all that is unwished for befalls one.

The eighth, together with the perfection of perseverance, is like an indestructible diamond because, as with an inexorable trust, it is not shattered.

The ninth, together with the perfection of concentration, is like a mountain because wavering that comes about from being distracted by objects is completely absent.

The tenth, together with the perfection of wisdom, is like a great medicine since it cures all the disease of harmful obscurcation and obscuration to knowledge.

The eleventh, together with perfect skillful means, is like a virtuous friend because it does not abandon the welfare of living beings whatever the situation.

The twelfth, together with the perfection of prayer, is similar to a wish-granting gem because it furnishes the results that have been prayed for.

The thirteenth, together with the perfection of strength, is like the Sun because it ripens the harvest of trainees.

The fourteenth, together with the perfection of gnosis, is like the outpouring of a melodious song, because of the dharma instruction that makes trainees long [to hear].

These ten comprise the ten levels, the joyful, etc., respectively, and are the range of activity for those on the paths of seeing and meditation.

The fifteenth, together with clairvoyance, is like a great king because it governs for others' needs with untrammelled power.

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1 The 'philosopher's stone.'
The sixteenth, together with a collection of merit and wisdom, is like a storehouse in that it is a place of treasure in the form of a great collection of merit and wisdom.

The seventeenth, together with the [thirty-seven] factors of enlightenment, is like a highway because it is followed by the vehicles of all Arya persons.

The eighteenth, together with calm abiding and insight, is like a vehicle because, carried along [by two] tied to a yoke [i.e., by two working in unison], one is carried easily without falling into either samśāra or nirvāṇa.

The nineteenth, together with retention and intuition, is like a spring. Just as a spring holds and gives water abundantly, in an inexhaustible supply, this holds the heard and unheard [intuited] dharma and supplies limitless instruction.

These five comprise, amongst the Bodhisattva levels, the special paths [i.e., eighth to tenth level].

The twentieth, together with a compilation of dharma, is like a melody because it conveys something dear to those trainees desirous of liberation. This comprises the path of preparation that leads into the Buddha level and is connected to the Bodhisattva level.

The twenty-first, together with the way by which all pass, is similar to a river’s stream because, through realizing the sameness of knower and known, and by being the means to expansive compassion and wisdom it is an uninterrupted work for others. This comprises the Buddha level and is attained in the fundamental stage.

The twenty-second, together with the dharma body, is like a great [rain] cloud because it is the source of all the activity done for the welfare of living beings, in the form of a body of emanations, by demonstrating the things, such as living in the heavens of Tuṣita, etc., which are for the welfare of others. This too is included in the Buddha level, being attained in the stage subsequent to pure, worldly gnosis, mentally constructed by trainees, insofar as they objectify the

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1 See Mpps:1119-1208.
3 Cf. W21.3-5. Five special qualities of a sambhoga-kāya are mentioned in AARgyan:567: (a) teaching only Mahāyāna doctrine, (b) having only Ārya Bodhisattvas as attendants, (c) teaching until the very end of cyclic existence (d) having all 108 major and minor marks (e) living in Akanīṣṭha.
emanations, etc., which proceed forth under the power of the non-conceptual Tathāgata.

Thus [the twenty-two divisions of the production of an altruistic mind] cover [all the levels] starting from the level of the neophyte up to the Buddha level, whereby it is set forth that, by following the sequence of realization of topics, the order is exactly as explained above, the divisions neither more or less, and, moreover, that one should not teach some other sort of sequence. [W27.1] As before [W23.16: You are to disclose] how, comes to mean, ‘by way of the twenty-two different sorts of realization of an [altruistic] mind [set on] enlightenment, which has this sequence,’ the great Bodhisattvas [progress] in the entire threefold [PP]. And thus [AA19-20] says:

And because [of the difference indicated by the similies] of earth, gold, moon, fire, treasure, jewel-mine, sea, vajra, mountain, medicine, virtuous friend, wish-granting gem, sun, song, monarch, storehouse, highway, vehicle, a spring, melody, river and cloud, this [production of an altruistic mind] is of twenty-two types.

This should definitely be understood as a cause and effect sub-division, made through the division of the ordinary Bodhisattva level and Tathāgata level.¹ To explain: In the [M]SA [4.2-3b] it says²

On the levels this production of an [altruistic] mind is thought of as (a) belief, (b) pure surpassing intent, (c) something subject to maturation and (d) free of obscuration. It is asserted to be based in compassion and as always having intent to benefit living beings.

On account of this statement, the production of an [altruistic] mind, [with the production] consisting of causal and resultant objective supports [and not as a single undivided phenomenon] is stated as something to be produced. The sub-division of this [production of an altruistic mind], when being done, should be

¹ I.e., as a process capable of division and as the earlier phase of it leading to the next.
² Vasubandhu explains (Bagchi ed. p. 15) adhimokṣa = the belief-based practice of the non-Ārya Bodhisattva, ādhyāṭayīka = practice of the Ārya Bodhisattva, vaipaśāya = the pure Bodhisattva level, and anāvarāpaṇika = the resultant Buddha level.
done as accordingly. Otherwise, since only causes would have been divided, it would not have been divided fully and thus it [i.e., its account] would indeed be incomplete. Others however, say that just the eight productions of an [altruistic] mind, starting with the one which is like a great king [i.e., 15-22 in the above list], are included in the special path on the Bodhisattva levels.

Fearing prolixity, the passage in the Pañcā [given in AAV:16-22] setting forth all the sorts of sub-division of the production of an [altruistic] mind [set on] enlightenment is not cited here as scriptural evidence. Here [in the A the division] is not given expression, since [the A’s teaching] is from the point of view of helping living beings who are captured by headings and delight in brief explanation. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned sub-division [of the bodhicittotpāda] is definitely to be understood, because, it has already been stated [by us] that this precious sūtra jewel [=the A] proceeds as a condensation of the topics in the Pañcā. And, accordingly, the master Dignāga said [PPPi:7],

Hence this A is not short of any topics spoken about [in the longer PP]. It is asserted to be a condensed text. Its topics are just those that have been spoken of [there].

11.4 Preceptual advice

Then this occurred to friend Śāriputra: Is this friend elder Subhūti going to teach the great Bodhisattvas’ PP through the operation of his own self-resident power of disclosure and wisdom, and the authority of his own power of disclosure and wisdom, or is it through the majesty of Buddha?

Since he has understood only the [Lord’s] urging [of Subhūti, and the capability thereby invested] Ārya Śāriputra is ignorant of the force behind the authorization because of understanding it to be a mere request. He supposes that just as he is not capable of the profound PP, on account of its being understandable by a Tathāgata’s all-aspect gnosis, Ārya Subhūti, who has not

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1 AA1.21-24; W27.26-36.17; P74.5.7-77.5.1; Pañcā:37-119 (see Conze 1954a:10-13 for corresponding sections); AAV:31-53.

2 Conze (1973) understands Prajñā-pratibhāna as a tatpurusa which is probably correct if one wishes to interpret the PP text in itself. Note, however, that below, H understands the word as a dvandva.
removed obscurations to knowledge, is also not capable. With then, etc., [this doubt of Śāriputra is set forth]. This refers to the entire set of doubts which is to be explained.

[The sentence] beginning with Is this [i.e., the particle kim] expresses just that [set of doubts]. The word kim is used in the sense of doubt. By a self-resident [means] by something whose mode of existence is tied to himself [i.e., belonging to Subhūti]. When at this stage there is a doubt about it [i.e., about whether the capacity belongs to Subhūti, the A adds:] not by [a capacity] belonging to him that is caused by someone else, but by his own, i.e., developed by [Subhūti] himself. Wisdom means investigation of dharmas. Disclosure\(^1\) means reasoned and unhindered utterance. Through the operation means by bringing about something not there before. The power is the unhindered potential of both.

The [A] says this in another way with and through the authority. Here also self-resident is to be understood. Through the authority means by enhancing it [so that it is upto the task of teaching]. His power is what is well established. [Hence] is [Subhūti] going to teach through the authority of his own wisdom and disclosure; or, a word indicating an alternative, [will he teach] through the agency of Buddha?

Thus Śāriputra thinks that perhaps, since [a Tathāgata’s] specific means surpasses understanding:\(^2\) ‘At some time or other he [=Subhūti] attained a gnosis that was not there before, or he ennobled his well-established knowledge, or the Tathāgata’s authority was obtained. Otherwise, like me, Subhūti too would not be capable [of teaching the PP]. Also, one cannot say that because he is foremost amongst those who are calm and collected he has a particular talent whereby he teaches, because then I, too, who am foremost amongst those with

\(^1\) prābhāna also means 'intuition.'

\(^2\) Alternatively, acintyatvād upāya-viśeṣasya could be taken with kadācid, etc. Its meaning then would be "Since I [=Śāriputra] cannot think of a specific means, [I must suppose] (a) either that, at some time ..."
wisdom, would then also get to teach.’ Śāriputra’s point is that the calm and collected meditative stabilization is not put to use in teaching.¹

Then friend Subhūti, through the majesty of Buddha, understood with his mind this sort of speculation that was going on in friend Śāriputra’s heart, and said this to him: Friend Śāriputra, one should understand that whatever the Lord’s Śrāvakas propound, teach, instruct in, set forth, elucidate and illuminate it is all the Tathāgata’s human labour.

On account of the faculties [of Subhūti] being soft, it is not possible to immediately generate new gnosis, [excellence of existing knowledge], etc., even though [the Lord’s] skillful means surpass understanding. So the [A] says, then, etc., expressing the same doubt as the one just left behind.

[W29.1] Since Śrāvakas have knowledge of others’ minds only after they concentrate, not otherwise, knowledge without concentration is spoken of [i.e., suggested] with the words through the majesty of Buddha.

This is what was mentioned above. Of this sort is [the speculation] having the nature of the three doubts just explained. A speculation is a mental-chatter that searches all around based on [or concerning?] either heart (cetanā) or intellect (prajñā). It is a coarseness (audārikatā) of mind. [Speaking] from the point of view of surface level reality, having understood with a mind mirroring that [i.e., Śāriputra’s speculation, Subhūti] said this, i.e., what is going to be said. The [A] expresses that very thing [viz, what Subhūti said] which the words beginning, Friend Śāriputra, one should understand, etc.

This speech of [Buddha] has twelve branches: discourse, recitable verse, prophecy, verse, indicative verse, elucidation, reporting of events, introduction, treatise, life stories, precept and miracle.²

¹ If araṇā samādheḥ is taken as an ablative it would mean: ‘out of [i.e., because of] araṇā meditative stabilization,’ i.e., that kind of samādhi does not give one the necessary capability.

² These are set forth in Pañca:95-116 and are discussed exhaustively by Lamotte, Mppś:2279-2305.
[Srāvakas] propound [the PP] since to plant the seed of enlightenment by producing wisdom arisen from hearing they set [it] forth in a text;¹ they teach since in order to ripen [the seed of enlightenment] by producing the wisdom arisen from thinking, they elucidate the meaning [of the text]; they instruct in since in order to liberate all around by generating wisdom arisen from meditation, they illuminate by generating certainty as to text and meaning.² These three verbs they set forth, etc., are thus the explanation of they propound, etc., respectively. It is all human labour [what somebody does when] possessed [by Buddha]. Since all that [Srāvakas] propound, etc., is caused by that [possession] it [the propounding, etc.] is, by extension, all spoken of with the words human labour.

Why is this so?

The Śrāvakas, also, bear witness to the ultimate reality they have realized, so why should not all activities such as propounding be done through their ability alone? Having anticipated this qualm Subhūti himself asks: why is this so. Some say this [=Subhūti’s asking the question himself] is because when formulated by others there would be the flaw of being uninspired, etc.³ Others say it is either to avoid the fault of breaking the flow of narrative at a subsequent stage or to help those who are unable to formulate questions because of temerity [i.e., stage-fright], or to avoid the fault of distracting those whose minds are one-pointed and who would lose their concentration (īryāpatha) by having to speak.

It is because those training in that dharma which is taught by the Tathāgata, when there is dharma-instruction,⁴ actualize and take hold of that ultimate reality. Having actualized and taken hold of that ultimate reality, all that

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¹ H sets up a series of equations, at this point, between the different verbs in the A. bhāṣante ‘say’ = udārante ‘set forth,’ etc.
² Or ‘the meaning of the text.’ The three sorts of wisdom are discussed in §8.5.
³ If others asked it would be implied that those others, the listeners, were sceptical and thus there would arise the fault of nīrasikāra, ‘being uninspired’ or, ‘lack of involvement or interest’ on the part of the listeners, which hardly does credit to the PP text.
⁴ dharma-desanāyām is really not needed. H takes it as a loc. absolute, but the place of the word in the sentence argues against it.
they propound, teach, and instruct in, [i.e.,] all that they set forth, elucidate and illuminate is not contradicted by ultimate reality. [W30.1] It is an outflow of the Tathāgata’s dharma-teaching alone that those children of good families,¹ friend Śāriputra, while instructing [others], do not bring that ultimate reality into conflict with ultimate reality.

It is because, etc., gives the answer. Those training, by way of the four proximate-penetration self-realizations, in that dharma to be expressed when there is dharma-instruction (locative absolute), actualize that ultimate reality that they have realized with the path of seeing. They take hold of it with the realization of the path of meditation. All that refers to the sūtras, etc., which are the dharma of discourse and whose subject is realized.² It is not contradictory to ultimate reality, i.e., to the realization [of it], because [the sūtras, etc.] illuminate [only] that which is not contradicted by that [ultimate reality]. Therefore this befitting outflow, is an issue only of that Tathāgata’s dharma-teaching which is referred to, by extended usage, as human labour. The fruit, [the cause] of which corresponds to [the cause of] that [teaching given directly by the Tathāgata], which is the sūtras, etc., is that scriptural ultimate reality. Those Śrāvakas give instruction in [it]. They do not bring it into conflict with the ultimate reality which they have realized. Since giving instruction is a representative [and not an exhaustive] mention, one should understand saying and teaching also, on the strength of the context.

This [preceding section] says the following: Since [the Śrāvakas] lack the skillful means to remain constantly in equipoise³ they are incapable of teaching, even a dharma subject they have realized, without contradicting their own understanding, so how much more so a subject they have not realized. Therefore

1 Here, apparently, referring to Śrāvakas.
2 The comparison here is between the two divisions of the doctrine into āgama- and adhigata-dharma; cf. AK8.39ab सदन धर्म ि-िि: शास्त्रूत्त भागाधीशातातंकः ।
3 The term samādhiṇa can also mean being able to answer a question to the satisfaction of the listener. In that case the passage would mean: ‘Since [the Śrāvakas] lack skill in [handling] means that would always satisfy the hearer.’
one should understand just the agency of Buddha [lies behind their being able to teach]. According to the maxim,¹

How much can one who is [simply] following his own guess figure out? Because it is the cause of that hidden thing the method brings about, it is indeed difficult to explain.

even having used one's reasoning, one is incapable of teaching.

Then friend Subhūti, through the agency of Buddha, said this to the Lord: Lord, you say this: "May it be apparent for you, Subhūti, from the start of the PP of great Bodhisattvas, how the great Bodhisattvas progress in the PP." Lord, in regard to the 'Bodhisattva' 'Bodhisattva,' that you talk about; Lord, of what dharma is this the appellation, namely this Bodhisattva? Lord, I do not at all see what dharma this 'Bodhisattva' is.

Turning from the incidental [satisfying of Sariputra], now Ārya Subhūti gives expression to the preceptual advice with Bodhisattva, etc. [W31.1] A Bodhisattva in whom has arisen the first [altruistic] mind [set on] enlightenment, etc., at the proper times, seeks to acquire an accumulation of merit through practising beneficial dharmas like generosity.

He goes, by attainment of concentration and achievement of clairvoyance, through the regions of the world, for the purpose of making obeisance to, and listening to innumerable Buddhas. He venerates innumerable Buddhas, for immeasurable eons, and attains to a most excellent adaptability of mind through veneration of them. [MSA:14.17-18]

Thus, abiding in meditative concentration through the power of his adaptability of mind, according to the maxim [MSA:14.3] that

¹ Padas ab = Vākyapadīya 2.469cd according to W. Rau's edition. Probably authored by Bhartrihari's student as Aklujkar (1977-78:11-12) has shown. Padas cd = PV Pramāṇa-siddhi 134; also found in a slightly different version at W81.13. Manoratha-nandin (Shastri 1984:50), glosses parokṣopeya with [para]-duḥkha-praśamaḥ, and hetu with mārga. Probably Dharmakīrti intended tad-ākhyānam not as "its explanation" but as "explained as his," the suffering person implicit in parokṣopeya who, having heard the Buddha, enters the path. Or he may have meant simply, "It is hard to explain for a person who does not know what is upāya and what is upeya."
he then obtains from the Buddhas wide-ranging preceptual advice in the stream of doctrine, in order that his calm abiding and insight will become expansive

starting from then friend Subhūti, after first referring to the words spoken by the Lord, [Subhūti] refers to preceptual advice in order to bring into the discussion a Bodhisattva proceeding forth in such a fashion.

Regarding ‘Bodhisattva, Bodhisattva:’ In this meaning he is bodhi (enlightenment) because, through the force of wisdom, he hangs onto enlightenment; and he is also a sattva (living being) because, being intent on great compassion, he depends on living beings. Thus he is called Bodhisattva, just like the [negative compound] aśubha (‘inauspicious’) [in ‘inauspicious meditative stabilization’] which is so named because the inauspicious is the meditative stabilization’s objective support. The word [Bodhisattva] is repeated [in the phrase ‘Bodhisattva, Bodhisattva’] in order to include the Bodhisattva mentioned in other places as well.

Ultimately, of what imaginary, etc., nature is this the appellation, direct indication? In a word, of nothing at all. This is exactly what [Subhūti] says with the words: Lord, I do not at all see. That dharma means having imaginary, etc., nature because, from the point of view of the truly real, no one to whom preceptual advice is to be given is found.

Lord, I do not at all see what dharma this so-called PP is either. Lord, I am one who does not find, acquire or at all see a Bodhisattva or a Bodhisattva-dharma, I am one who does not find, acquire or at all see the PP. So to which Bodhisattva and about what PP will I give preceptual advice and instruction?

[In response to the thought that], nevertheless, there are topics on which preceptual advice is given [the A] says: Lord, I do not at all see, etc. Then at least there is a topic of preceptual advice. With this consideration [the A] says Lord, I do not at all see that either, etc. The PP has the nature of the ten

1 An alternative etymology of Bodhisattva is given W78.14.
2 Skt vipsā, repetition of an expression, conveys the sense of ‘each, every.’
3 On the three natures of the Mātreyaparipṛcchā see §5.5.1-6.
sorts of dharma starting with progress achiever (*pratipatti*). To explain: On preceptual advice the following is stated is in the *Pañca* (*Pañca*:37), "Lord, how does a great Bodhisattva course in the PP? The Lord spoke: Śāriputra, [W32.1] here a Bodhisattva does not fully see a Bodhisattva and that name [=‘Bodhisattva’]" and so on.

I do not find through hearing, I do not acquire through contemplation, and I do not at all see through meditation a *Bodhisattva-dharma* either, i.e., that dharma a dharma of which Bodhisattva is the appellation. Alternatively, because of the absence of an intimate connection with a particular definite meaning, I do not find [that dharma] with gnosis in which the form of the object being understood does not appear;¹ I do not acquire it with gnosis in which the form of the object being understood does appear, this because there are things in dreams, etc., even in the absence of concrete reality; and from both points of view, therefore, I do not at all see it.

About which PP, which [PP] has ten sorts in the form of progress achiever, etc., will I give preceptual advice, first taking as point of departure non-degeneration, by teaching with the aim of protecting good qualities already achieved; and then, afterwards, about which PP will I give instruction taking as point of departure attainment of good qualities that have not [upto that point] been attained? From the point of view of what is real, absolutely nothing at all. And yet, from the point of view of expressive convention,² there is preceptual advice--this is what is implied here. Accordingly he [=Subhūti] will say here [in the A] itself, afterwards, This is preceptual advice, etc. [W34.3].

11.5 Ten topics of preceptual advice

One should understand this [preceptual advice] to be in tenfold on account of differences in its topics.

Among the ten types, preceptual advice about the progress achiever (*pratipatti*) is the teaching that progress in the [altruistic] minds [set on]

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¹ On nirākāra and sākāra see §8.2. 'In which the form of the object being understood does not or does appear' is borrowed from Eckel (1987:79, ns. 57-60). A less cumbersome, though less self-explanatory translation might be ‘non-imaging and imaging.’

² The term udbhāvanā-samvrtyā is frequent in the AAA. It is one of H’s qualifications of the surface level of truth. The translation ‘expressive’ (cf. Edgerton) is based on the Tib brjod pa’s kun rdzob
enlightenment, divided as above [§11.3], without transgressing the ultimate and surface level truths, evolves through a yoga of non-observation in a way not common to Śrāvakas, etc.

Preceptual advice about [the four noble] truths is: (a) in regard to [the noble truth of] suffering, the instruction that the resultant emptiness of form, etc., and the PP are one and the same thing because of being what truly is; (b) in regard to [the noble truth of the] origin [of suffering], the instruction that, because emptiness and forms, etc., which are its cause [i.e., kleśa and karma], are not different, therefore forms, etc., are not subject to origination and cessation, defilement and purity, etc.; (c) in regard to [the noble truth of] cessation [of suffering], the instruction that in emptiness which is free of production, cessation, defilement, purity, degeneration and increase, etc., there is no form, up to and including, no arising of ignorance and no cessation of ignorance, no Buddha and no enlightenment; and (d) in regard to [the noble truth of the] path, the instruction that the emptiness of the inner, etc., neither joined with, nor not joined with perfect generosity, etc., with emptiness of the outer, etc., or with the earlier or later limits, and vice-versa, is the progress achiever.

Preceptual advice about the Three Jewels is [the following set of instructions]: (a) in regard to Buddha, the instruction that there is a gnosis of the observed and observer being the same thing. This is because the Buddha and his enlightenment are the same. Therefore, one cannot find the state of being knower of all aspects, viz., the buddha-defining property [as anything separate]. There is, thus, no contact with forms, etc., [the so-called objects of omniscience, and the observed and observer are therefore the same thing]; (b) in regard to Dharma, the instruction that there is a lack of own-being of all the included

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1 I.e., the five skandhas understood as a result of kleśa and karma.

2 According to Conze (1979:62 n. 18) following Obermiller (1933-6:37-38), this says that the path is the inner being, or the emptiness of the inner sense faculties, etc., which is a different way of referring to the inner being. This being is neither joined with perfect generosity, etc., (the Bodhisattva deeds), nor with the emptiness of outer, etc., ("the emptiness of the external environment which constitutes the sphere of his action"), nor with the earlier limit (sansāra) nor with the later limit (nirvāṇa). Nor is the being entirely separate from them ("otherwise there could be no skill in means and spiritual progress"). And the perfections, the outer environment, bondage and liberation are similarly not joined to, and yet not entirely separate from, the inner being.
dharmas subsumed under the totality of things, antidotes and aspects [cf. §10.2, W3.25ff], included in the three states of being all-knower; and (c), in respect to Community, the instruction that, in the case of the following individuals there is a proceeding forth by way of non-production. [These individuals are] the seven great persons who are divided in terms of their being candidates for, and recipients of the results [of Stream-enterer, Once-returner, Non-returner and Arhant]. [The eighth great person, the recipient of the result of Arhant is not mentioned here.] That Arhant has been included in the domain of the Buddha-jewel [and is therefore not referred to]. [The above seven, excluding the Arhant] together with the Pratyeka-buddha as the eighth, are ennumerated, in terms of the differences of having soft faculties, etc., as twenty Ārya, irreversible, trainee Bodhisattvas.¹

Since, having begun to progress toward the aforementioned aims with an initial enthusiasm, the longing for such things as physical ease makes some people settle, preceptual advice regarding non-attachment is, therefore, [W33.1] a teaching about the body, etc., in terms of its being devoid of own-being.²

Since if, even after trying for a long time the desired aim is not forthcoming, a fatigue can come about on the part of a person given to panic, preceptual advice in regard to not tiring is a teaching in terms of everything from form up to perfect enlightenment as being beyond investigation.³

Since the heart can recoil when one is receiving instruction on which path, taught by all the Buddhas, etc., situated at the ten directions, must be followed

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¹ The terminology and system behind this complex sentence have been discussed exhaustively in the introduction §7.9.3.

² After setting out on the path the person finds great difficulties, gets tired, and falls into the wrong idea that he or she has been really engaged in a religious activity and is weary. Bringing to mind again the rememberance that even the physical body is like an illusion, the person is re-energized.

³ After even more effort, the goal seems as distant as at the beginning. To overcome the sense of defeatism that arises when the unending task is seen, one contemplates the fact that there is nothing whatsoever to escape from or attain.
for each particular goal, preceptual advice about fully embracing the path is, therefore, instruction that all dharmas are fundamentally unproduced.¹

Preceptual advice about the five eyes is the instruction that progress is in terms of the oneness, from the point of view of the truly real, of the flesh-matured, divine, wisdom, dharma and Buddha eyes which focus, respectively (a) on specific things, (b) on demise and rebirth of all beings, (c) on non-imagination of any dharma (d) on the realization of every Ārya person and e) on the awakening to dharmas in all their aspects.²

Preceptual advice about the six clairvoyances is the teaching that (a) magical apparition, (b) divine ear, (c) reading others’ minds, (e) recollection of previous dwellings [lives], (f) the composite divine eye and (g) realization of the extinction of contamination which do such things as function (a) to shake the earth, etc., (b) to hear the faint and non-faint sounds existing in all world spheres, (c) to know the minds of others in their state of longing, etc., d) to recollect one’s own and others’ many earlier lives, e) to see all forms and f) to bring about the removal of kleśa and the obscurations to knowledge, respectively, should be understood as being in a state of primordial calm.³

A yogin [or yoginī], who like a conjurer of illusions embodies non-settling on anything, through realizing all dharmas to lack a self-nature cultivates the path of seeing. [This path] consists of sixteen instants systematized in accord with the four truths and is made up of the dharma, and subsequent, forbearance and knowledge gnoses.⁴ [It is cultivated] as an antidote to the concrete entities which that [path] is to remove. Such teaching is preceptual advice about the path of seeing.

Because the supposition of a [real] difference between composite and non-composite phenomena is not possible since the [ultimate] nature of one is the

¹ The difference between this and the previous advice is probably simply one of degree. The full embrace of the path is an understanding of emptiness that removes the final hurdle which lies between the Bodhisattva and the goal of enlightenment.
² Discussed in greater detail by Lamotte Mpps:2260-63.
³ I.e., they never really got off the ground. See Mpps:1809-1838.
⁴ These are technical terms for the sixteen instants, divided into four sets of four relative to each of the four noble truths. They have been discussed at length in the introduction §6.15.2.
[ultimate] nature of the other, similarly, seeing and meditation are not separate because the above-mentioned path of seeing’s objective support is an entity made manifest that does not differ from [the path of seeing].\textsuperscript{1} Therefore there is no establishment of a path of meditation through a distinctive mark.\textsuperscript{2} Nevertheless, it [=the path of meditation] is cultivated, as an antidote to the entities which that [path] is to remove, as an ultimate property of dependent origination.\textsuperscript{3} This instruction is preceptual advice about the path of meditation.

Such tenfold preceptual advice is spoken of with the word PP, because here [in the A] the wish is for a condensed text. To explain: In the Pañca a text is clearly specified for each preceptual advice. Fearing prolixity, I will not cite the passages as evidence.

And yet, Lord, if, when such propounding and teaching, and if, when such instruction is taking place, the Bodhisattva’s heart does not become morose, defeatist, despondent [and] dejected, if his [or her] mind does not recoil, does not become crest-fallen, if he [or she] does not get scared, get frightened [and] become terrified \textsuperscript{[W34.1]} then he [or she] precisely is the great Bodhisattva to be instructed in the PP. This is precisely what is to be known as the great Bodhisattva’s PP. This is preceptual advice about the path of meditation.

Thus, then [the A] states with the words And yet, etc., what sort of Bodhisattva is to be advised with preceptual advice. If \textit{(saced)} is an indeclinable particle used in the sense of \textit{yadi} (‘if’). When the ten sorts of preceptual advice are thus, because of non-apprehension of the Bodhisattva and the PP, being propounded, the heart is not morose does not recoil\textsuperscript{4} since it is not despondent is not upset and hence, because of resorting to the dharma with faith, does not, at the outset, get scared with fear for no reason.\textsuperscript{5} When

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} I.e., the notion of cultivating a profound understanding is misplaced because, ultimately, there is no state of knowing different from what is known.
\item \textsuperscript{2} \textit{lakṣanika} usually means ‘in a secondary/metaphorical sense.’ However, the context here indicates that it should be understood as derived from \textit{lakṣaṇa} ‘defining mark.’
\item \textsuperscript{3} For an explanation of the term \textit{pratītya-samutpāda} see §§5.3.8-9.
\item \textsuperscript{4} As before (W29.9ff) \textsc{H} establishes groups such as \textit{bhāsyamāne}, \textit{cittarān nāvālīyate}, \textit{na viṣidati}, \textit{notrasyati}....
\item \textsuperscript{5} \textit{asthāne} literally means ‘no standing place.’
\end{itemize}
being taught, the heart is not defeatist does not feel cowed, since it does not get dejected get into a state of confusion and hence, because of the wisdom of those who know the truly real, does not, in the mid-term, get frightened with a fear of continuity [of life and death]. When instruction is taking place, the mind (manas which is referred to as mānasa) does not recoil slip back, since the mind does not become crest-fallen the broken spirit does not withdraw, and hence, because of being in possession of faith and wisdom does not become terrified, at the end, with fear of uncertainty [of the unknown].

Another possible explanation: At the time when it is being propounded, etc., because of having a clear grasp of word, meaning and of both [word and meaning], one does not become morose, defeatist or despondent, respectively. Why? Because, through a precise grasp of the topic uncontradicted by direct, inferential or scriptural[ly based] valid cognition, mind is not dejected, does not recoil, and does not become crest-fallen. Hence, at the outset, in the mid-term and at the end [the Bodhisattva] does not get scared, does not get frightened and does not become terrified. Thus [the text] should be construed. He [or she] precisely means just him [or her], that Bodhisattva who, because of skill in separating the surface level and the ultimate, is free from feeling morose, etc., with respect to the above-mentioned preceptual advice.

[Question:] With this precisely a defining characteristic has not been spoken about, so how could the PP be specifically touched on [in this brief passage].

We say [in response]: That subject, in the propounding, etc., of which, [the Bodhisattva] does not display a morose heart, etc., is the PP, having ten divisions starting with progress achiever. Since this has definitely been stated there is a touching on of something implied. Therefore, there is no flaw.

If he [or she] remains thus, that is precisely his [or her] instruction in preceptual advice.

1 Cf. AK6.5, discussed §8.5.
2 H distinguishes between apparent synonyms by inventing these "respectively" constructions.
In conclusion [Subhūti] says If, etc. If that Bodhisattva, because of the above-mentioned preceptual advice, becomes steady in the matter as specified, then that is precisely to be known as his [or her], the Bodhisattva's instruction in preceptual advice teaching about what should be done for attainment of the desired goal.

[W35.1] Thus, all that [which follows] has been mentioned in the section on preceptual advice in regard to the PP, the nature of which is an [altruistic] mind [set on] enlightenment and the [ten] attributes implied by that [mind. These are]: (a) a progress achiever in the form of not resorting to an objective support; (b) its objective support, the four noble truths; and (c) foundation, the three refuges; (d) the cause of special advancement, non-attachment; (e) the cause of a non-retreating advance, not tiring; (f) the cause of not advancing in the other [lesser] vehicle, fully embracing the path; (g) the cause of advance independent of reliance on others, five special eyes; (h) the cause of bringing the state of being knower of all aspects to full completion, six clairvoyances; and (i-j) the cause of advance to the final stage, the paths of seeing and meditation. Since with just this much the entire purpose is served preceptual advice has [just] the ten varieties in the above-mentioned sequence. And thus [AA21-22] says:

About the progress achiever, the truths, the Three Jewels beginning with Buddha, non-attachment, not tiring, fully adhering to the path, the five [special] eyes, the six qualities of clairvoyance, the path of seeing and [the path] called meditation: preceptual advice should be understood as consisting of ten.

11.6 Discursus on the twenty membered Ārya Saṅgha

Now, however, in regard to the Saṅgha jewel, this division of Bodhisattvas into those with dull faculties, etc. should be understood. Based on the sixteen instants of the path of seeing included in the state of being knower of paths to be explained [later, in AA2.11-16], the candidate for the first fruit of [Stream-enterer] is twofold in terms of motivation by faith and motivation by [knowing]

1 H's explanation of these twenty members of the Ārya Saṅgha has been thoroughly discussed in the introduction §7.9.3ff. Unlike in the AAV, where Ārya Vimuktiśena's explanation is based on the AK, here, in the AAA, the explanation follows the AS more closely.
reality on the [first] fifteen mental instants of that path of seeing. Then there is one who is not free from attachment to desires and is a Stream-enterer on the sixteenth mental instant of the path of seeing. Then, on the path of meditation, because of the removal of up to the fourth sort of kleśa,¹ there are two types of the same [Stream-enterer], in terms of going from one human or divine family to another. Then there is one who becomes the candidate for the second result by removing the fifth sort of kleśa operating in the desire realm, who as one with soft and sharp faculties is [motivated by] faith or attains through seeing and is [reckoned] as only one [of the twenty]. Then there is the Once-returner who has abandoned the sixth sort of kleśa operating in the desire realm. Then there is the next, the same [Once-returner, but destined for] a single interruption² amongst celestials, since a single rebirth is in store for him [or her]. Then there is one who becomes the candidate for the third result by removing the seventh and eighth sort of kleśa operating in the desire realm, who is [motivated by] faith and attains by seeing and is, as before, [only reckoned one of the twenty].

Then the one who is called a Non-returner, because of having removed the ninth sort of kleśa operating in the desire realm, is to be known fivefold. Here the antarā-parinirvāyin (‘one who attains nirvāṇa in the intermediate state’) is one who, because of having removed the tie to taking rebirth, but not the tie to bringing to reality [the state between life and death], either brings [nirvāṇa] to reality just while proceeding forth to the intermediate state, or attains the end of suffering by actualizing the path in the intermediate state. The upapadya-parinirvāyin (‘one who gets nirvāṇa at the time of birth’) is the one who, having taken birth in the form realm because of removing neither tie, attains the end of suffering right there at birth. There is the abhisāṃskāra-parinirvāyin (‘one who gets nirvāṇa with effort’) because of attaining the end of suffering by actualizing the path. [W36.1] [The next] is the anabhisāṃskāra-parinirvāyin (‘one who gets nirvāṇa without effort’) because of being the opposite of that.

¹ For the complicated different categorizations of kleśa, and their removal at different stages of the path, see the detailed discussion at §6.17.
² eka-viṣīka, literally ‘with a single wave/ripple.’
The fifth is the Ascender. He [or she] is, furthermore, heading to Akaniṣṭha and heading to the Bhavāgra. Amongst them, the one heading to Akaniṣṭha is threefold: one who enters Akaniṣṭha after ascending over [the intervening celestial realms], one who [enters] after ascending over half [of the celestial realms], and one who [enters] after dying in every [celestial] realm. The one heading to the Bhavāgra is free from attachment to forms and is of two sorts: one for whom there is peace in this life and one who witnesses [absorption (samāpatti)] with a physical body.

After that, one who has removed the eighth sort of Bhavāgra klesa is a candidate for the fruit of Arhant. Then there is the Pratyeka-buddha who, being only based on the Śrāvakas’ scriptural collection, actualizes his [or her] own path and does not arise as a Buddha. Thus there are the twenty.

This subject is accordingly expounded at length in Pañca [60-72]. In the Avaivartika-cakra-sūtra, beginning with the Bodhisattva motivated by faith, up to the Pratyeka-buddha Bodhisattva, the arrangement of [Ārya Saṅgha] members has been spoken about for greater clarity by the Lord. So one should look for [it] in that very [sūtra]. Here, we are not giving an extensive presentation with the consideration ‘why grind again what is already ground?’

And accordingly, without [explicitly] including recipients of the first and second results or candidates for the fourth result because they are easy to understand, [AA24-25] says:

Those of dull and sharp faculties, attaining by faith and vision, [those who go] from family to family; those having a single interruption, those in the intermediate state, at birth, with work, without work, proceeding to

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1 Literally, ‘that [heaven] which is situated below none.’ For an explanation of the different regions of the three realms (dhātu) see §6.26.2, chart §9.3.
2 ‘Summit of existence’ is situated at the top of cyclic existence (saṁsāra) and can be transcended, in Mahāyāna cosmology, only by reaching nirvāṇa.
3 The klesas are divided into great, middling and soft, and then each of these is again sub-divided into great, middling and soft for a total of nine klesas. When the level of practice serves as an antidote to the last of the klesas, the softest soft, one becomes a candidate for the final result of Arhant. This has been explained in detail §6.30.
4 Taishō IX, p.230a according to W.
Akaniṣṭha, the three ascenders; one intent on Bhavāgra, destroyer of attachment to form, for whom there is peace in this life, who witnesses with a body and the Rhino [=Pratyeka-buddha]: these are the twenty [members of the Ārya Saṅgha].
III APPROACHING ULTIMATE REALITY

12.1

Then, with the collection of merit amassed, the thoughtful ones with fixed intention, whose mindstreams are governed by good dharmas like faith, etc., with a firm clairvoyance that is the outcome of countless eons [of practice], enter, through the preceptual advice, into the level of performance in order to accomplish their collection of wisdom.

Based on this, in regard to the neophyte [Bodhisattva] who has received such preceptual advice, in order to purify the level of belief-based performance, on top of the root of virtue characterized by faith, etc., (which [root] is the proximate liberation [§6.8] attained after the excellence of hearing, etc.), the four proximate penetrations [§6.10] (which are mundane meditative states concordant with the penetration of the four noble truths) should be explained. The superiority of these [proximate penetrations] to the warmed [proximate penetration], etc., of Srāvakas, etc., should be stated as follows: (a) because of being special in having as objective support entities characterized as

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1 W36.18-75.22; P77.5.1-87.2.2; AA26-36;Pañca:119-160; AAV:53-72.

The Bodhisattvas who are seeking to become enlightened for the welfare of others have listened to the doctrine in order to learn the practice. They have learned that it is perfect wisdom, in essence, knowledge that all phenomena are empty (śūnyā). This emptiness qualifies all dharmas but, as suggested by the focus of the A, where the existence of Bodhisattvas is brought into question, the preceptual advice finally boils down to the explanation that the listening persons are themselves without a self or soul (pudgala-nairatmya).

How the Mahāyāna practice of penetration to this profundity surpasses the similar yogic state of the Śrāvaka and Pratyeka-buddha thus becomes the topic of this next section. The four sub-divisions of the deepening realization (warmed, peaked, forbearance and supreme worldly dharma), are first described in terms of a) their objective support, dharmas revealed in their primordial emptiness, and b) the subjective experience (here described as the ākāra 'mode of meditation') which is concomitant with such realization. Finally, the deepening realization of Bodhisattvas is looked at again from the point of view of the gradual melting away of unwarranted beliefs and biases, categorized first from the point of view of the less sophisticated received wisdoms of the crowd (=the conceptualizations of apprehended object), and then, from the point of view of tutored idealist philosophies (=the conceptualizations of apprehender).

2 Cf. AS (Rahula:105-6).

3 Cf. Obermüller (1933-6:61-63).
impermanent, etc. [§6.11, §7.4]; (b) because of being special since the mode of meditation (ākāra) is non-settling, etc., insofar as [the proximate penetrations] are antidotes to the view that dharmas [have own-being]; (c) because of being special as cause of the realization of [all] three paths, and (d) because of being special in terms of mentor, i.e., a spiritual friend in the form of skillful means.

Similarly, it should be stated that: (a) there are two sorts of conceptualization of apprehended object based on thoroughly afflicted entities and antidotal entities, and [W37.1] (b) two conceptualizations of apprehender based on a substantially existent person and a nominally existent person, and thus it is respectively by these four conceptualizations which are to be removed by the paths of seeing and meditation included in the peaked realization to be explained below [AA5.5-34], that these proximate penetrations come to possess saṁklesa ('afflictions'). Similarly, it should be stated that each of these [four proximate penetrations], coming into contact with the specified conceptualizations, is superior because of being sub-divided into soft, middling and great. Thus there is a fivefold superiority.

On the other hand, the fourfold warmed, etc., root of virtue of Śrāvakas, etc., is established as follows: It has for its objective support [only] the four [noble] truths [taken as] concrete entities which are characterized by being illustrative, etc. [It only operates], through the mode of meditation on impermanence, etc., as antidote to the view that a self exists. It becomes a cause for the realization of [only] their own vehicle. It is without a mentor. Since the fourfold conceptualization does not hinder progress to their enlightenment, it comes about as unassociated with that [fourfold conceptualization] even though [the

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1 The three paths are the paths of the Śrāvakas, Pratyeka-buddhas and Bodhisattvas.
2 upāya-kauśala-kalyāṇa-mitra could be construed here as a dvandva of upāya-kauśala and kalyāṇa-mitra.
3 On different meaning of the term see Bendall and la Vallée Poussin (1906:228 n.4).
4 The difficulties associated with this passage and the apparent differences between the number of special qualities listed in the AAV and AAA have been discussed in the introduction §6.11.4. The five special qualities H has in mind are (a) objective support, (b) mode of meditation, (c) cause, (d) mentor and (e) suppressing the conceptualizations of apprehended object and apprehender.
5 According to AK1.13 (la Vallée Poussin 1924-31:1.24, 1.45; S. Jha 1983:44-45), rūpāṇā is the definition of form. It is rendered 'being illustrative' in light of Tib gzugs su rung ba.
fourfold conceptualization to be removed by the Bodhisattva-yāna] is operating on the Śrāvaka path. And thus [AA26-27] says:

On account of objective support, mode of meditation, cause and mentor, the soft, middling and great warmed, etc., [proximate penetrations--stages of the path referred to in the PP sūtra as] Protector Bodhisattva--each of which come into contact with one of the four conceptualizations, are superior to the Śrāvaka, as well as Rhinolike Pratyeka-buddha, paths.

12.2 Warmed proximate penetration

*Furthermore, Lord, great Bodhisattvas coursing in the PP and meditating on the PP...*

There, on the topic of the objective support of the soft, warmed, root of virtue [the A] says furthermore, etc. Furthermore indicates PP instruction from another point of view. Although the text has a general expression, in the PP, it means in [the PP] delimited by having things such as the state of impermanence, etc., as objective support. To explain: "The Lord said elsewhere: A sūtra Monks, should be explained in the light of other sūtras." And it says in Pañca [119.11-18] concerning the objective support of the soft, warmed [proximate penetration], "Here, friend Śāriputra, the Bodhisattva [does not settle on the idea that] form is impermanent ... that form is misery ... that form is empty ... that form is devoid of self, etc." In this [A] there is just this much difference, that it states things briefly. On the other hand, in that [Pañca] there is an extensive statement about each of the [four] truths. Therefore suspicion [to the effect that the A is not referring to the soft warmed] should not be entertained.

[The Bodhisattva is] coursing with non-stabilized gnosis and meditating with stabilized [gnosis].

[By the foregoing] this has been said. The objective support is something having sixteen aspects starting with impermanence, etc., based on the four [noble] truths of suffering, etc. [W38.1]

...should practice in such a way that they do not pride themselves, as they practice, even on that [altruistic] mind [set on] enlightenment.
With which mode of meditation should one take that [entity] as support? Anticipating such a question [the A] says in such a way, meaning in the sequence to be explained. Even on means: Not only should they not pride themselves on that which is to be taken as objective support--the reason for this being the absolute invisibility of the knowable--but they should not pride themselves, the meaning is that they should not settle on, even that mode of meditation, such as a cessation of settling, etc., which has the form of an enlightening cognition with which they would reach the objective support. This is to say so much as [they should take the objective support] in terms of the non-settling, etc., mode of meditation which serves as the entrance to ultimate reality.

This is what has been said [in the foregoing]. The Śrāvakas take an entity defined as illustrative, etc., as objective support. In their case the modes of meditation are [on its] impermanence, etc., because of being [only] an antidote to the view that there is a self. Bodhisattvas, however, take an entity in the form of impermanence, etc., as objective support. In their case the modes of meditation are [its] being free of settling, etc., because they are an antidote to the view that dharmas [have own-being].

[Question] If being free of settling is the non-existence of settling, then, in that case, since [settling] would not exist, its antidote would not make sense. And, [if being free of settling] is what does not settle, then, would not it absurdly entail [non-settling] being also present in eyes and so forth [which see, but do not, in and of themselves, feel attraction]?

In response we say: To the extent it [non-settling] is an opposite [of settling] it is [a kind of settling]. To the extent it is an antidote [of settling] to that extent it is non-settling. How is it an opposite? To the extent that there is a seizing on "there is" or "there is not" generated out of groundless imagining. How is it an antidote? To the extent neither [grasping at "there is" and "there is not"] is there. And how is there an absence of the two? If the two come to be known in the form "from the point of view of the truly real, neither exist." As [the A] will say

1 Cf. AAV:54-55 on which this is based.
2 I.e., the Bodhisattvas' meditation is more refined.
3 I.e., you do not need an antidote to remove something that does not exist.
immediately afterwards, Friend Sāriputra, here in regard to non-mind [a "there is" and "there is not" do not exist].

What is the reason for that?

"But given that the mode of meditation free from settling, etc., is validly established, how could there be no settling for one who investigates?" [Having anticipated this question, the A] thus says What is the reason for that, which means, because of what reason is that; or, alternatively, the meaning [of this question is]: because of being the cause of what goal, on account of what purpose, is there this [recommendation of] non-doing of settling [i.e., that one should not settle].

It is because that mind is no mind. The fundamental nature of mind is clear light.¹

As a response [Subhūti] says It is because, etc. Because, since it lacks a single or plural own-being, the fundamental nature own-being, state of non-origination of mind is clear light, i.e., is something from which the darkness of all groundless conceptualization has been dispersed. Therefore mind, which is not other than the non-settling modes of meditation etc., is, really, no mind. Thus does [Subhūti] think: How, really, could the non-settling, etc., mode of meditation (which is not outside the limit of what mind is, on account of that [mind] being devoid of own-being), [W39.1] take the place of settling [i.e., itself become settling]?

Then friend Sāriputra inquired of friend Subhūti: Friend Subhūti, is that mind, then, the mind that is no mind, something which is?

Whether one construes the negative marker a (‘no’) in acittam (‘no mind’) in the sense of a non-affirming or affirming [negative],² seeing that the wrong

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¹ This section of the A and AAA has been translated into French by Ruegg (1969:41ff).
² acitta construed as a prasajya-pratisedha would mean ‘it is not mind.’ As a paryudāsa-pratisedha it would mean ‘it is something other than mind.’ The translation ‘non-affirming and affirming negation’ for prasajya- and paryudāsa-pratisedha, respectively, has been borrowed from Hopkins’ helpful discussion of the two terms (1983:723-27). Eckel (1985:71, 1987:126), following Matilal (1971:162-5), renders the terms ‘verbally and nominally bound negation,’ echoing their earlier grammatical meaning.
view will not be removed where it is done within the context of a belief in simply being or not being, [Śāriputra] says Is that mind, the mind which is no mind, something which is? The sentence is to be construed as follows: That mind is not different from the non-settling, etc., mode of meditation. The mind that, really, is said to be no mind, is that mind something which is?

Logically, since the entity [being qualified] is non-existent, the negative marker 'no' has not been used here in an affirming sense [because there is no basic entity asserted beyond mind]; but in a non-affirming sense.

Then friend Subhūti said this to friend Śāriputra. Friend Śāriputra, in that state of no mind, which is a state of no mind [in my remark], does there either exist, or does one find, either a state of "there is" or "there is not"?
Śāriputra replied. No, friend Subhūti, one does not.

Subhūti, having in mind that in this case, as well, there is also no idea of mere "there is" and "there is not," and wanting with just this to set forth a refutation, says to Śāriputra, by way of formulating a counter-question, friend Śāriputra, in that state, etc. No mind is the mere non-being of mind. That state of it is acittatā ('no-mindness'). In that state of no mind does there exist either a state of "there is" that is an outcome of non-objectification [of no-mind]; or does one find [a state of "there is"] that is an outcome of objectification? One should construe or a state of "there is not" in the same manner. One should understand that the earlier vā (either/or) is in anticipation of the later, and the later either/or is in anticipation of the former.¹

What permanence or termination can there be in the case of an unborn entity? The imaginary different qualities are imagined about an own-being.

Citing Kajiyama, Eckel says the former "is used to refer to a form of negation whose primary purpose is negative, as in the example 'They do not look at the sun,'" ...while the latter "contains the further suggestion of an affirmation [as] in the statement 'He is a non-Brahmin,'" [i.e., he is a kṣatriya, vaiṣya or śūdra].

¹ Skt has the option of using vā only once at the end of the pair, or of repeating vā after each member of the pair.
Just as nobody can etch letters, etc., on sky, similarly with the different qualities which are imagined about something unborn.\(^1\)

Intending this, [Sāriputra] says No, one does not to both [of the alternatives] expressed immediately before.

Subhūti says: Friend Sāriputra, if in that state of no mind, there neither exists nor does one find either a state of "there is" or "there is not" then, would this question of yours, namely what Friend Sāriputra thus expressed [W40.1] "Is that mind, then, the mind that is no mind, something which is?" be proper?

Now, using [Sāriputra's] own statement in refutation, Subhūti says: Friend Sāriputra, etc. The expression api nu (Then, ... ?) is used in the sense of a denial.\(^2\) It means that it is definitely not [proper]. The question means cavil. [Subhūti] expresses that very [question] with would that question, etc. This is what [Subhūti] thinks: If, in that state of no mind, there neither exists, nor does one find, either a state of "there is" or "there is not," then how could there be this question of yours, "Is that mind, then, the mind that is no mind, something which is?" Even in that [question], by no mind the same mere absence of mind is intended. Therefore the superimposition of "there-is"-ness in the form of existing or not existing is definitely unsuitable.

When this had been said friend Sāriputra addressed friend Subhūti: Friend Subhūti, what then is this state of no mind?

When a mind that is a basis for attributes does not exist, there can be no no mind either, because one cannot use the negative marker no without there being something for it to negate. Hence [Sāriputra] says what then, etc.

Subhūti said: Friend Sāriputra, the state of no mind is without change and conceptualization.

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\(^1\) Included as two antara-ślokas between Satya-dvaya-vibhaṅga 36-37 (Eckel 1985:100).

\(^2\) Pāṇini 2.1.64.
Since "the wise person does not mount atop the rooftop balcony of true reality without the ladder of surface truth" [Subhūti] says is without change, etc., to respond from the point of view of a yogin’s surface truth. The state of no mind is without change because it becomes a cause of a final unchanging outcome on the Buddha level only when cultivated in a sequence. It is without conceptualization because it is a cause of a final outcome free from distortion.

Then friend Śāriputra proffered his appreciation to friend Subhūti. Excellent, friend Subhūti, excellent. And no wonder. You speak of [acittatā] just as one whom the Lord has declared to be foremost amongst the calm and collected would.

And, since what has been said is thus not contradicted by understanding, [the A] says then, etc. Excellent, excellent is said twice to indicate [Śāriputra’s] amazement. Just as means in which manner. The words and no wonder convey respect. arañā means arañā-samādhi—that meditative stabilization, through the power of which raṇas, viz., kleśas do not arise, in others’ minds with the purpose of afflicting oneself and others.[W41.1] Being declared to be foremost amongst those coursing in that [calm and collected stabilization], you speak of the state of no mind. Thus one should construe acittatā by changing the case-termination [to the accusative acittatām].

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1. Probably a paraphrase of MHK:3.12. Similar ideas are found right from the Dhamma-pada and even in the Yoga-bhāṣya, etc.
2. yogi-samvrtyā (cf. the earlier term udbhāvanā-samvrtya at W32.10). The samvrtya level is divided by Mādhyamikas into true and false conventional/surface level realities. The former are functioning things in general and the latter common falsehoods like the appearance of a face in a mirror. Since only emptiness itself is the ultimate truth (paramārtha) those characterizations of the ultimate truth like "It is without change," "It is beyond words" voiced by the Seers are still on the conventional level even though they transcend the understanding of ordinary people.
3. This is a reference to the five stages of the path explained in the introduction §6.7ff.
4. See Edgerton:442.
5. The word raṇa is derived from root raṇ in the sense raṇas are those which cause raṇ, i.e., cause affliction. arañā is rendered 'calm and collected.'
[Question] But has not the PP, even if it is together with skillful means, been taught on Buddha’s authority? So what special excellence could there be such that Śāriputra is also aware of it, and proffers his appreciation to Subhūti?

None at all. Nevertheless, there is no fault in [Śāriputra] proffering appreciation [to Subhūti] after a discussion. [Such a depiction] is for the benefit of the trainees [under the guidance] of the two by indicating [their] greatness or for the removal of doubt on the part of future trainees through the same support of the Tathāgata.

And it is because of this that a great Bodhisattva is to be considered irreversible from unsurpassed, perfect, enlightenment and a great Bodhisattva is to be known as unseparated from the PP.

Indicating the greatness of the state of no mind, [the greatness of which can be known] from the fact that there is even a [Bodhisattva] of uncertain lineage who, on account of having sharp faculties, is fixed as irreversible even at the stage of proximate penetration (because of the inconceivably special quality of the means), [the A] says, and it is because of this, etc. Because of this, i.e., because they do not pride themselves even on this [altruistic] mind [set on] enlightenment, since the mode of meditation is non-settling, etc., and (this is the significance of the and [in and it is because of this])² since the support entity is characterized as impermanence, etc. Is to be considered means is to be ascertained. Since, by the eighth level, absolutely all [Bodhisattvas] are fixed on the stage of irreversibility there is no fault [in saying, in general, that a

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¹ The statement in the A was probably originally a general praise of the PP. According to the AA, however, which H is following at this point in his exegesis of the A, the specific stage of the path being described is the warmed proximate penetration. This is the lowest stage of the path to which the heat of the fire of direct seeing can penetrate. According to Mahāyāna theory (cf. MSA:3.6; Ruegg 1969:156) the very sharpest Bodhisattva, i.e., the one who was initially hardest to convince about the truth of the PP, becomes irreversible from future enlightenment even at this very first moment of intuition about ultimate reality. Others with softer faculties, i.e., who were initially easier to convince, become irreversible at higher stages of the path. By the eighth bhūmi even the dullest Bodhisattvas become irreversible. H says this is a quality of the state of no-mind, i.e., lineage (gotra). See introduction §5.8, §7.9.3.4

² Skt commentators frequently derive extra significance out of ca (‘and’) that the original does not seem to warrant.
Bodhisattva is irreversible, even though all are not irreversible at the stage of proximate penetration. And (the and is used because [the Bodhisattva] is not only irreversible) he [or she] is to be known as not separated from the PP in the form of proximate penetration, because of experiencing no loss.

Even if one wants to train on the Śrāvaka level one should listen to, take up, hold, give voice to, fully master and cause to be set forth this very PP. One should be trained in and apply oneself to this very PP. Even if one wants to train on the Pratyeka-buddha level one should listen to, take up, hold, give voice to, fully master and cause to be set forth this very PP. One should train in and apply oneself to this very PP. And even if one wishes to train on the Bodhisattva level one should listen to, take up, hold, give voice to, fully master and cause to be set forth just this PP. [W42.1] Endowed with skillful means, one should apply oneself to this very PP in order to obtain fully all Bodhisattva attributes.

Having thus set forth the objective support and mode of meditation, to give the sense of the special causal feature of the soft warmed [proximate penetration], [the A] says Even if one wants to train, etc. A level is nothing but gnosis when it has attained special stage. If one wants to make progress there, one should listen principally by sorting out the text and its contents with ear-consciousness and the mind-consciousness it occasions to just this [PP] (which [here] is mainly set on teaching proximate penetration). One should take it up by putting it in the mind with thought. One should hold it by bringing it to completion with a practice in a meditative state. One should give voice to it by reading it aloud as one’s own position. One should fully master it by acquiring traditional inherited learning (āgama) and realization. One should cause it to be set forth by elucidating it for others in commentaries, etc. In all of these, starting with

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1 A bhūmi 'level' should not be understood as something concrete.

2 Edgerton and Conze (1967) translate "as one earlier committed oneself to do."
listening, by bringing the preparatory and subsequent minds\(^1\) to perfect completion one should train in [the PP]. But it is by concentrating in meditative equipoise with the root mind that one should apply oneself to it.

Because gender is based on worldly usage, in *yogam āpattavyam* ‘one should apply oneself to’ the word *yoga* [which is usually masculine] is used in the neuter gender.

In regard to endowed with skillful means, since [MSA:18.69-70] says

Skill in completing collections of a Buddha's attributes, in bringing living beings to maturation, in speedy attainment, in taking action to completion, and in not allowing the path to be discontinuous is incomparable in [this fivefold] means of Bodhisattvas on all the levels. Based on this skill, they accomplish every aim.

Hence skillful means is just the special quality of mind which, based on the surface level and ultimate, quickly brings the specified aims. Endowed with possessing that, one should apply oneself to practice meditative stabilization in order to fully obtain to get all Bodhisattva attributes, attributes which belong only to all Bodhisattvas, are not shared in common with Śrāvakas, etc., and which are characterized by the state of being knower of paths.

There is a reading *sarva-buddha-dharma-samudāgamāya* (in order to fully obtain all Buddha attributes) in some manuscripts but it is wrong since just below [W42.27, the A] says all Bodhisattva attributes.

*Why is this so?*

Having anticipated the qualm that in the Śrāvaka vehicle, also, Bodhisattva attributes such as giving, etc., are taught [the A] says *Why is this so.*

*It is because all Bodhisattva attributes in which great Bodhisattvas should train and to which they should apply themselves are taught extensively in this very PP. [W43.1] Even if one wants to train on the level of unsurpassed, perfect enlightenment one should listen to, take up, hold, give voice to, fully*

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\(^1\) La Vallée Poussin (1923-31:4.137 and 6.187) explains "la periode preparatoire (prayogāvasthā), anterieure a la 'comprehension' (abhisamaya)" and "par la force de ces jñānas se produisent des jñānas posterieurs (prsthajāta)." The actual realization is effected with the *maula-citta.*
master and cause to be set forth this PP. Endowed with skillful means, one should apply oneself to just this very PP in order to obtain fully all Buddha attributes.

This is the answer [to the question Why is this so]. The word because has the sense of "on account of which." In which [means] in which Bodhisattva attributes. This is what [the A] intends: The attributes of Śrāvakas, etc., are set forth at length in their basket [of teachings] while Bodhisattva attributes are [set forth in that basket] incidentally. Here, however, just the Bodhisattva attributes are taught extensively and the Śrāvaka attributes incidentally.

In regard to unsurpassed, perfect enlightenment. That of which [or compared to which] there is nothing higher, viz., important is unsurpassed. Perfect enlightenment means full awakening to all aspects without distortion, as much as the Buddha level. In order to fully obtain all Buddha attributes [means] in order to realize all the Buddha attributes which characterize the state of being knower of all aspects.

Why is this so?

Having anticipated the qualm that in the Śrāvaka vehicle also Buddha attributes are taught [the A] says Why is this so.

It is because all Buddha attributes in which great Bodhisattvas should be trained and to which they should apply themselves are taught extensively right here in this PP.

In order to give exactly the same sort of answer [the A] says It is because, etc. The [section] starting from Even if one wants to train on the Śrāvaka level ... up to the final are taught extensively right here in this PP states this: The soft, warmed virtue is the cause of attaining the realizations of all three vehicles. One should know that absolutely every [level] starting with the warmed has this causal relationship.
Then friend Subhūti said this to the Lord. Lord, I am someone who does not find, acquire, or at all see exactly what is named "Bodhisattva."

To convey the sense of the objective support of the middling [Subhūti] says Lord, I am someone, etc. The non-finding of what is named "Bodhisattva" that referent of which Bodhisattva is the name, was stated earlier [W30.25] with I do not at all see what dharma this "Bodhisattva" is. At this point the difference in the [A’s statement] is that the non-finding of a Bodhisattva in the form of a name, who is to be given preceptual advice, is taught. This is based on

All this is only name. It is established only in thought. Something expressed which is different from an expression is not conceivable.

We have already explained [W32] I do not find, etc. Alternatively, one can construe the meaning as I do not find a past [Bodhisattva], I do not acquire a present [Bodhisattva], and I do not at all see a future [Bodhisattva] since every dharma is empty at all three times.

... and [I am someone] who does not find, acquire or at all see the PP either. Lord, I (who do not find, acquire or at all see exactly what is named "Bodhisattva," and also do not find, acquire or at all see the PP either) to which Bodhisattva, and about what PP, will I give preceptual advice and instruction? Lord, it really would be a shame were I, who do not find, acquire or at all see a real entity, to fashion, merely in name, the addition and subtraction, namely this "Bodhisattva."

"At least there is, nevertheless, a name which is the topic of 'preceptual advice.'" With this consideration [Subhūti] says, I do not find the PP either,
intending thereby that the PP is merely a name. The expression Bodhisattva refers to something whose own-being is a name since the context is that of a name. In regard to would be a shame: Since an object is established on the basis of experience, it would be a shame, i.e., there would be a sense of regret in the mind, because of not finding it. This is just what is being said with I, who, etc. In regard to addition and subtraction: prescription is addition and subtraction is prohibition. [PV4.225] says:

There is no expression in addition to injunction and prohibition in verbal communication.

Since everything is encompassed by the two terms only that much is here spoken of. This is what has been said [in the foregoing]: From the point of view of what is truly real, the objective support is form, etc., qualified by the state of being free from addition and subtraction [i.e., unchanging]. [W45.1]

Furthermore, Lord, what is named also neither stands, nor does not stand; and neither stands aside nor does not stand aside.

In terms of which mode of meditation should one take that as objective support? To answer this [Subhūti] says furthermore, etc. What is named, the objective support, neither stands in the form of a continuum; nor, does not stand. This is according to the maxim that

Since there is no object to refute it is clear that, ultimately, there is no refutation. And the application of negation, without an object [to be negated], is not proper. And even if one resorts to [the idea of a negative substratum, a śūnyatā having] a merely imagined [nature], [the application of a negation] would be something on the surface level, not ultimate [which is not tenable since śūnyatā is ultimate reality].

It neither stands aside as something dissimilar to a continuum nor, in exactly the same way, does it not stand aside.

Why is that so? It is because what is named does not exist.

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1 Satya-dvaya-vibhāga 9cd-10d (Eckel 1987:76, 125 n. 45 and 161). Only the Tib of 9cd is exactly the same in the Tib translation of the AAA.
Having anticipated the question, "Why are a continuum and dissimilarity with a continuum in the case of a named entity which appears on the surface level not tenable?" with why is that, [Subhūti] says because it does not exist. "From the point of view of what is truly real" is to be supplied [in this sentence] since there is no fault [in positing a continuum] on the surface level. This is what is intended.

Thus that which is named neither stands, nor does not stand; and neither stands aside nor does not stand aside.

In summing up [Subhūti] says thus that, etc. This is what has been said [in the foregoing]: From the point of view of ultimate reality, the mode of meditation is the truly real devoid of being a continuum, or of being dissimilar to a continuum.

12.4

Lord, if, when such a profound PP is being propounded, taught, and explained, the great Bodhisattvas' heart does not become morose, defeatist, despondent [and] dejected, if their mind does not recoil, does not become crest-fallen, if they do not get scared, get frightened [and] become terrified ...

To convey the sense of the objective support of the great [Subhūti] says Lord, if, etc. A profound PP...thus [is the PP] which, [W46.1] on account of being merely a name, has a merely conceptual own-being, and whose depths are not plumbed by those who are at other fords [i.e., followers of other spiritual philosophies] and by [certain] of our own [number] who feel scared by what lacks foundation [in concrete reality]. This is what has been said [in the foregoing]: The objective support is the [noble] truth of suffering, etc., qualified by the state of being a mere conceptual entity.

... it is believed, on account of [their] surpassing intention, that they are to be known as great Bodhisattvas unseparated from the PP, standing on the Bodhisattva level from which there is no turning back, standing firmly, in consequence of taking no stand. ¹

¹ This translation owes much to Conze (1973:85).
In terms of which mode of meditation should one take that [=mere conceptual entity] as objective support? [Subhūti] says it is believed, etc. Because that conceptual entity is not expressible as any good, etc., dharma, it is believed it is over-objectified.1

Extended, extensive, joyous, set on beneficence, great and righteous; the āśaya (‘intention’) of the noble ones is adhyāśaya (‘surpassing intention’) because of having additional elements in this way.2

Because of such surpassing intention the Bodhisattva is unseparated from, i.e., is in possession of the PP, mainly the great warmed [proximate penetration]. Elsewhere, as well, the meaning of PP should be similarly known by force of context. Standing on due to not losing what has been attained, the eighth Bodhisattva level from which there is no turning back because the Bodhisattva has attained the result of that [level] which is irreversibility; [the Bodhisattva is] standing firmly due to not losing what has not been gained, which [in turn] is because of the Bodhisattva’s gaining progressively higher, special realizations as one fit for producing that [=the Bodhisattva levels]. And since both [standing and firm standing] are by means of the yoga of non-settling [the A] says in consequence of taking no stand. This is what has been said [in the foregoing]: The mode of meditation is the state of being inexpressible as the door to ultimate reality.

In reference to the objective support and mode of meditation of the great warmed, in Pañca [126.21-128.2] it says, "Furthermore, Lord, that conceptual dharma-term, which is what the Bodhisattva is..." and so on, at length, up to "...and also [that conceptual entity] which is what the Buddha is: it is not expressible as any dharma whatsoever, be it good or bad" and so on, up to "be it existent or non-existent, just like in a dream." Therefore one should not

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1 How exactly H understood the term adhimuc and its derivatives is difficult to determine. The translation ‘belief/believe’ reflects the Tib mos pa. The term has been discussed at length by Edgerton:13-14.

2 See 10.3; cf. Vasubandhu’s commentary on MSA:16.16 (Bagchi:100), Bodhisattva-bhūmi (Dutt 1966:214-16).
entertain any suspicions [about the meaning of the A not being as we have explained it].

Thus the warmed [proximate penetration], warmed, as it were, because of being a precursor to the fire that is non-conceptual gnosis, with such objective supports and modes of meditation is threefold. The fact that it is in closer proximity, given that there is no hinderance, to the path of seeing, should be known as the feature which distinguishes it from proximate liberation.\(^1\) And thus [AA27-28ab] says [i.e., lists]:\(^2\)

"The objective support [of the Bodhisattva's soft, warmed, proximate penetration] is impermanence, etc., based on the [four noble] truths.\(^3\) Its mode of meditation is the cessation of settling, etc. It is the cause of attaining all three vehicles. [W47.1] Addition and subtraction of form and so forth [are objective support of the middling. A conceptual entity] standing aside [i.e., not being true as a single instant] and standing [i.e., not being true as a continuum [is the mode of meditation]. [Impermanence, etc.] as a conceptual entity [is the objective support of the great] and being inexpressible [its mode of meditation]."

12.5 Peaked proximate penetration

*Furthermore, Lord, the great Bodhisattvas coursing in the PP and meditating on the PP should not stand in form, nor stand in feeling, discrimination, composites nor in consciousness.*

Now, after the warmed, to convey the sense of the objective support of soft peaked virtue it says furthermore, etc. *Coursing* and *meditating on the PP* mainly, the peaked have [already] been explained [at W37.16]. Alternatively, one can connect *coursing* with the preparatory and subsequent mind and *meditating* with the root mind. In regard to *should not stand in form*, etc.: Among them, *form* is something illustrative, "feeling is experience,

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1. The difference between these stages of the path has been dealt with at §6.8-6.10.
2. The glosses of AA27-28ab are based on H's explanation.
3. Conze (1954a:14) construes *satyadhāram* as "which are basis of the four truths." However, the syntax and the Tib *bden pa'i rten* can "possessing the truths as basis" favors a bahuvrīhi which is better.
discrimination is what seizes on a sign,"¹ composites are mental
constructions and consciousness is becoming aware.

The form is, in turn, threefold:² a [completely] imaginary form on account
of imagination in the form of the subject-object bifurcation; a conceptualized
form on account of there being conceptuality [in accordance with the view that],
through the fabrication of what is not real, just consciousness itself appears like
that [form]; and form in ultimate reality, just no-form from the point of view of
the truly real, this because of the final outcome being in the form of emptiness.
So are to be expressed also feeling, etc.

[As explained by Vasubandhu, AK1.22cd] the particular order of form, etc.,

... is in accord with grossness, impurity, as what is exemplified by a pot, etc.,
and the realms.³

They should not stand should not park their thought in, by objectifying a
concrete entity, that form, etc., which, from the point of view of the truly real,
does not exist.

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¹ AK1.14. The basic meaning of saṁjñā is, perhaps, 'representative token.' The translation 'discrimination' (cf. Tib 'du shes) has been chosen in light of the AK definition (nimittodgrahanātmākā) quoted by H.
² This passage has been discussed in the introduction §5.5.1.
³ In regard to grossness. Dge 'dun grub (Mdzod ṭik thar lam gsal byed 41) says: "Why such an order? It is from rougher to more subtle. Forms are, by and large, grosser and obstructive. Amongst the non-physical, feelings in the arms and legs etc., are gross. Discrimination, as the apprehension of a characteristic mark is slightly less gross than that. Composite motivations such as 'May I be happy,' etc., less gross than that and the bare nature of consciousness is most subtle"

In regard to impurity: "In the course of eternal transmigration, the man and the woman are reciprocally charmed at their bodies, because they are attached to the pleasure of sensation. This attachment proceeds from erroneous notions (saṁjñā-viparyāsa). The results of afflictive emotions [which come about from the erroneous notions] are saṁskāras. And it is the mind-stuff that is sullied by afflictive emotions" (translation based on S. Jha 1983:76).

In regard to a pot, etc. "Form is like the pot, feeling the food, discrimination the condiment, composites the manual dexterity [or cook] and consciousness the eater." And in regard to the realms.

"The concern of those in the desire realm is physical sense objects, in the form realm feeling and in the first three parts of the formless realm discrimination. In the highest level it is composites. Consciousness is everywhere" (Mdzod ṭik thar lam gsal byed 42).
This is what has been said [in the foregoing]: Because form, etc., is empty of own-being, and its own-being cannot, therefore, be got at by way of its intrinsic self-identity,\(^1\) the objective support is form, etc., qualified by the state of not being fit to be a location.

*Why is that? It is because if they stand in form, they course in a composite of form and does not course in the PP. Similarly with feeling, discrimination and composites. If they stand in consciousness, they course in a composite of consciousness and do not course in the PP.*

Having anticipated the question, "Why is the objective support thus?" with *Why is that,* [w48.1] with *It is because,* [Subhūti] says what the mode of meditation is by a process of exclusion. Thus [Subhūti] thinks: A mode of meditation is just the subjective dimension of the objective support. Because the standing of an object is based on [its] experience, only that objective support should be taken which agrees with the mode of meditation [i.e., as nothing but an experience of impermanence, etc.]. So, then, if they stand in form [by objectifying it] in terms of the mode of meditating on impermanence and so forth, then they course in a composite of form, i.e., in a concept of form experience,\(^2\) and thus do not course in the PP primarily the soft peaked. This applies equally to feeling, etc.

This is what has been said [in the foregoing].\(^3\) From the point of view of ultimate reality, an mode of meditation of this sort should be conceived of in that, ultimately, emptiness and all phenomena such as form are identical to each other. Among them, since impermanence, etc., are absent, in emptiness there is, therefore, no being stationed in form [by incorrectly or correctly conceiving it] in terms of the modes of meditation on permanence or impermanence, etc. To

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\(^1\) Explaining AA28ab; a literal translation would be scarcely meaningful. Obermiller (1933-36:64-76) has a helpful list of the sections in the AAA directly related to AA28-33.

\(^2\) When aware of non-duality, having transcended the subject/object bifurcation of ordinary perception, the meditator reflects on the fact that even this non-duality, the nature of which is awareness itself, is impermanent. If this realization of impermanence is given too much truth value, if it seen as anything more than a complex ('a composite of form') that comes into being and goes out of being depending on particular conditions, then it is not the perfection of wisdom.

\(^3\) Explaining AA28cd.
explain: In reference to the mode of meditation of the soft peaked, in the Pañca it has been said: "Form is itself emptiness; emptiness is itself form..." and so on up to "...Lord, that emptiness of impermanence is not impermanence," etc.

Why is that so? It is because, coursing in a composite, they neither comprehend the PP, nor engage in practicing the PP, nor bring the PP to completion. With the PP uncompleted, they do not emerge into the state of being knower of all—as those who comprehend what is not [really] comprehended.

"Given that the cultivation [of understanding] is impossible in the absence of a composite [experience], how, then, could it be that coursing in a composite is not coursing [in PP]?" Having anticipated this question with Why is that, [Subhūti] says it is because, etc. Thus [he] thinks: A composite is a conceptual entity and perfect wisdom is something from which all conceptuality is gone. So how could one coursing in a conceptual entity, with the supposition that it [the conceptual entity] is real, be coursing in the PP? One should course only as though an illusory person.2

The three verbs neither fully comprehend, nor engage in practising, nor bring to completion should be viewed as applicable to the preparatory, root, and later stages, respectively. In the PP means mainly in the soft peaked.

[Explanation of] they do not emerge into, etc. Comprehending means making their own. What is not [really] comprehended is the composite which should not be seized on. [Being thus] they do not emerge into state of being knower of all.3 One should construe it thus.4 And, because it [=sarvajñatā] is common to the three states of being knower of all, it is the state of being knower of all aspects [i.e., unique gnosis of Buddha] that is being

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1 According to Dutt's edition the corresponding section is Pañca:128.2 et seq but the passage H quotes is slightly different.

2 The Bodhisattva is like an illusory person (a) because he or she is not ultimately real, is only a fictitious entity or (b) because, like a magician, he or she produces a display of apparently real things for the benefit of trainees.

3 Conze (1975) construes the passage differently: "He cannot go forth to all-knowledge, so long as he remains one who tries to appropriate the essentially elusive."

4 I.e., aparighitath parighnana nityasyati sarvajñatāyām.
spoken of here [W49.1] with the term state of being knower of all.¹ Wherever it is appropriate it is [to be understood] thus elsewhere as well.

Why is that so? It is because in the PP form is not comprehended. Similarly feeling, discrimination and composites are not comprehended in the PP either. What is non-grasping of form is not [itself another] form. Similarly with feeling, discrimination and composites. And what is non-grasping of consciousness is not [itself another] consciousness.

Having anticipated the question, "How is a composite unsuitable to be seized on" with Why is that, [Subhūti] says it is because form, etc. Thus [Subhūti] thinks: Form and so forth which are essentially composite objects are not comprehended in the PP since, logically, they do not exist. Hence, the composite, which is that object, should not be seized on since its appearance is not in accord with reality. Making exactly this same point [Subhūti] says, what is not grabbed hold of relative to form is not form. The underlying thought is that a [positive] injunction and a negative recommendation apply to different kinds of objects.²

Even that PP [we have been talking about] is not comprehended.

This is to state that even in the case of the PP one should not suppose that it is truly real since [such a supposition] would entail a distortion.

It is just thus that the great Bodhisattva should course here in the PP.

In summing up it says It is just thus, etc. The word hi (just) is for emphasis. It means only thus.

And this is the meditative stabilization of great Bodhisattvas called sarvadharma-parigṛhīta ("not grabbed hold of as any dharma"). It is vast, placed at

¹ A sarvākārajñatā which understands impermanence is, per se, a sarvajñatā. It is a mārgajñatā if motivated by the Bodhisattva ideal and sarvākārajñatā if a Buddha's gnosis. This has been discussed in the introduction §7.4, §7.5.2, §7.6.

² It is possible that H has in mind here an aspect of the apoha theory: namely that the positive and negative aspects of any particular locus are different objects of understanding; cf. PV Svārthānumāna 41-42.
the front, not regulated by a measure, and not shared in common with Śrāvakas and Pratyeka-buddhas.

Thus, with this, etc. [the A] speaks of the soft, peaked meditative stabilization issuing from an objective support and mode of meditation. The meditative stabilization, which is not grabbed hold of as any dharma such as form, has a fitting name and has been referred to with it. It is vast because of the abundance of the dharma-element, placed at the front [§50.1] since it is in front (puratas) of the mind, because of the above-mentioned objective support and mode of meditation. Thus says Ārya Vimuktisena [AAV60]. For the same reason one should not accept the reading not placed at the front (vipulo'puraskṛtaḥ) found in some manuscripts. It is not regulated by a measure either because of its invariable association with the state of being knower of all aspects [an unlimited knowledge] or, it is not regulated by measure because it is tied to effecting the welfare of a limitless number of living beings through immense compassion and wisdom. It is not shared not realized by others, because it has the specified five distinctive features such as objective support, etc. [§12.1].

12.6

Even the state of being knower of all is not comprehended, because it cannot be seized as a specific shape.

To convey the sense of the objective support of the middling [Subhūti] says even the state of being knower of all, etc. By the word even, impermanence, etc., and emptiness are included. Why is it not comprehended? It says because, etc. A nimitta (specific shape) is a unique form. Insofar as, from the point of view of what is truly real, [a specific shape and its emptiness]

1 puraskṛta was originally probably intended in the usual sense of ‘placed ahead of, recommended, honoured.’ However, H, following Ārya Vimuktisena takes it is a rather different, specific sense, as will be seen below.

2 H obviously presupposes here that the reading known to Ārya Vimuktisena must be older.

3 Conze (1975) construes a dvandva "unlimited and steady."

4 In the A the meaning of nimitta does not seem to be exactly the same as laksana. Following H, 'as a specific form' is perhaps nearer to the A's original meaning.
have the same form as each other, there is, therefore, no seizing on it [=a specific shape].

This is what has been said [in the foregoing]: As things having the nature of the dharma-element [i.e., ultimate reality], (a) impermanence, etc., (b) the state of being knower of all aspects and (c) emptiness are in themselves without any own-being. Therefore they are essentially one relative to each other. Hence the objective support is form, etc., qualified by the state of having no specific form.¹

If [omniscience] could be seized as a specific shape the itinerant Śrenīka² would not have gained faith in this [doctrine]. Because here the itinerant Śrenīka, having come to believe in this knowledge of omniscience, motivated by faith, comprehended with one component of wisdom. Having comprehended, he does not seize on form. Similarly he does not seize on feeling, discrimination, composites or consciousness. There, moreover, he does not review that knowledge with delight and joy.

What fault is there in seizing as a specific shape? [Subhūti] says if, etc. If [omniscience] could be seized as a specific shape then the itinerant ascetic called Śrenīka who, on account of seizing [omniscience] as a specific shape in his own doctrine (śasana), for an interminable time did not see [the possibility of] liberation, being disenchanted he would certainly not have gained faith complete confidence³ in this [PP] doctrine with the yoga of no specific shape. The idea is that [he would not gain liberation] because of the fact that [in both his earlier and in later Buddhist doctrine] there would equally be seizing [omniscience] as [having] a specific shape.

Referring to just that it says because here, etc. Here is in the unshaped one [=Buddhist doctrine]. Knowledge is omniscient because of bestowing Tathāgatahood. Having come to believe in, having adopted an attitude of belief in, shapeless [omniscience, Śrenīka, who], because of having soft

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¹ Explaining AA29ab.
² Śrenīka Vatsa-gotra, according to Conze (1977:125-6), was "a non-Buddhist ascetic whose conversations with the Buddha form a section of the Saññyuktāgama of the Sarvāstivādins." For more details see Mpps:2141-42, n.1.
³ On this meaning of abhisampratyaya see Edgerton:58.
faculties was motivated in the sense of being propelled on the path by faith, comprehended with one component of wisdom. [This component was the understanding] of the selflessness of persons. Having comprehended, at a later time he did not take form, etc., to mind as a specific shape. There means in meditation which has no specific shape. Moreover, he does not view with delight and joy that knowledge which brings about the cultivation of that [animitta] as one having a specific shape.

In this context delight is a mental feeling of well-being and joy a physical pliancy.¹ He [=Śrenika] being a person whose attachment to worldly things was gone, comprehended by resorting to either the first or second concentration. Thus says Bhadanta Vimuktisena [§2.12].

He does not view that knowledge of form as within, nor does he view that knowledge of form outside, nor does he view that knowledge of form both within and outside, nor does he view that knowledge as elsewhere than form. Similarly he does not view that knowledge of feeling, discrimination or composites as within nor of consciousness as within. He does not view that knowledge of consciousness outside. He does not view that knowledge of consciousness as both inside and outside. He does not view that knowledge as elsewhere than consciousness. In this going over the topic² the itinerant Śrenika had belief; he was motivated by a faith in this, in all this knowledge of omniscience.³ He took ultimate reality as his criterion for judgement⁴ and trusted in it. Hence he did not seize on any dharma. Nor did he find any dharma which should be seized upon, or one from which he should find freedom. He did not even consider nirvāṇa.

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¹ Cf. AK1.14.
² pada-paryāya 'at the turn of his footing.' Conze understands pada-paryāya to refer specifically to the Satyuktāgama. I think it more likely to refer to his going over the different phenomena, starting with form and ending with omniscience, and realizing about each in turn that they lack a specific shape which defines them as what they are.
³ Probably sarvajña-jānē was to be taken with the following words in the view of the PP author. H, however, takes it with the preceding.
⁴ I.e., only one who knows the ultimate reality is really omniscient.

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In terms of which mode of meditation should one take that as objective support? With this query in mind [Subhūti] says he does not view, etc. Of form means of an inner sentient (upātta) source (āyatana) composed of primary and secondary elements. He does not view the knowledge which cultivates that as within, i.e., as being inner emptiness. One should add as a specific shape. Nor [does he view the knowledge of form an external insentient source composed of primary and secondary elements outside as being an outer emptiness; [nor the knowledge of form a body composed of both of those, both within and outside as being the emptiness of both.

So then does he see [knowledge of form as] elsewhere than form? [Subhūti] says not elsewhere, etc. In that case how is he to be said to have entered into the cultivation of the dharma? It says in going over the topic, etc. One should understand that, located in this going over the topic, i.e., in this particular stage of yoga, in the level of belief-based performance, Śrenīka had belief [in, but] that he had not realized [omniscience]. On account of this, Śrenīka, insofar as he had not realized the truly real, is said to be motivated by faith in this, in all this knowledge of omniscience which has no specific shape, on account of not having sharp faculties. [W52.1] [Subhūti] intends to say that when one realized true reality, one becomes motivated by ultimate reality.

How, then, did [Śrenīka], although having soft faculties have such belief? In response [Subhūti] says [he took] ultimate reality, etc. Because of a prior propulsive force, having taken the ultimate reality of the PP as his criterion for judgement on account of its being non-deceptive, he trusted in [it] as without a specific shape. Hence therefore he did not seize through superimposition on any dharma; nor did he find in a state of being any dharma which should be seized upon taken as his own practice, or [from which] he should find freedom as something which should be avoided. Never mind everything else, he does not consider he does not, really, awaken even to nirvāṇa.

This is what has been said [in the foregoing]. The mode of meditation is, ultimately, (since an own-being has been refuted) not making form, etc., into something which is possessed. In that context, the example of Śrenīka is for the purpose of making it known that he directly witnessed the object of that [meditative stabilization] meaning just through the power of his belief, which
meditative stabilization he rejected on account of [its] being connected with non-Buddhists.¹

12.7

Lord, this also should be known as the great Bodhisattvas’ PP insofar as they do not seize upon form, and similarly insofar as they do not seize upon feeling, discrimination, composites and consciousness. Nor do they enter nirvāṇa, in the mid-term, before they complete the ten Tathāgata powers, four Tathāgata fearlessnesses and eighteen unshared Buddha qualities.

To convey the sense of the objective support of the great [Subhūti] says Lord, this also, etc. This stands for what is going to be stated. The word also is because [the PP] is not only what was said above. Pointing out just that, [Subhūti] says insofar as [they do not seize upon form], etc. Insofar as (yad) is an indeclinable used in the sense of yasmād [introducing a reason clause]. The idea is that [it is PP] because of non-observation of form, etc., as having specific shape.

[Question:] Well then, since everything would cease on account of non-finding, a Bodhisattva, like a Śrāvaka, would enter nirvāṇa. [In response Subhūti] says and do not [pass into nirvāṇa, in the mid-term], etc. The word ca (and) is here in a delimiting sense.

"Putting up with feeling, in a body not yet absorbed, his mind is liberated like a light going out."² Thus [i.e., as this citation indicates, Hīnayāna] nirvāṇa is prohibited in the Mahāyāna. On the authority of the Saddharma-puṇḍarīka-sūtra, for that time, based on servicability (prasrabdhī) [of body and mind], with the aim of the welfare of living beings, and not in between, i.e., in the mid­term as a Śrāvaka would, [does a Bodhisattva] enter total nirvāṇa. This he can do because of the strength in the form [W53.1] of the great power of skillful means caused by witnessing a state free from specific shape. Since the

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¹ Cf. AAV:61.15.

² La Vallée Poussin (1903-13:520 n. 2) cites Thera-gāthā 906 and Mahā-parinibbāna Sutta VI.10 (asallīnena cittena vedanam ajjhavāsayi, pajjotasseva nibbānāhā vīmokho cetaso ahū) for comparison.
nirvāṇa of Śrāvakas does not exist at the stage of proximate penetration [the words] "in due course" have been left out.¹

Since other powers are there to some extent at least, before they complete, means thoroughly completed, in all respects [and] is to be construed right up to Buddha qualities. The [ten] Tathāgata powers, etc., will be dealt with later on.²

*Therefore, Lord, this is to be known as the great Bodhisattvas' PP as well.*

In summing up it says therefore, etc. This is what has been said [in the foregoing]: The objective support is really form, etc., qualified by not-seeing in terms of specific shapes such as blue, etc., because of being in a state completely devoid of own-being.

*Furthermore, Lord, great Bodhisattvas coursing and meditating on the PP should thus pay close attention and thus reflect: What is this PP? Whose is this PP? Is that dharma which does not exist and is not found the PP?*

In terms of which mode of meditation should one take that as objective support? With this in mind [Subhūti] says furthermore, etc. Thus means in the order that will be stated. They should pay close attention because at the time of cultivation the entity, as apprehended, is re-observed. They should reflect because at the time of listening and thinking there is a determination with reason and scripture. *What is this* [PP] means what, from amongst the aggregates of form, etc. Alternatively, it means it is a substance, quality, action, universal, particular or inherence.³ Whose is it means is it connected with a self or a dharma. To the contrary, since form, etc., has not been produced it is nothing, nor is it something which belongs to someone or something.

[Question] If it is so [i.e., if there is nothing, then the PP] would, therefore, be non-existent. [Subhūti] says [in response] is that dharma, etc. The intended

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¹ H is referring to the fact that Bodhisattvas do not attain the cessation of klesa (=nirvāṇa) until they attain the eighth Bodhisattva level.
² W452-6; also Mpps:1505-1566.
³ For the six categories of the Vaiśeṣika school, see Vaiśeṣika-sūtra of Kaṇāda (Muni Jambuvijaya 1961:1.1.4ff).
meaning is that the PP is not really non-existent because one cannot apply a negation marker without [at least tentatively] having an object for it.

If great Bodhisattvas, thus paying close attention and thus reflecting, do not become morose, defeatist, despondent [and] dejected, if their mind does not recoil, does not become crest-fallen, if they do not get scared, get frightened [and] become terrified then great Bodhisattvas are to be known as not separated from the PP.

[W54.1] In summing up [Subhūti] says if, etc. They are to be known as not separated from the PP, the nature of which is the great peaked, because of the realization.

This is what has been said [in the foregoing]: The mode of meditation is the PP's state of being ultimately non-existent, because, as a proper investigation of dharmas, wisdom is determined to be a non-finding of all things.

Thus the peaked [proximate penetration, so called] because it is at the peak of the wavering root of virtue,¹ with such objective supports and modes of meditation is threefold. And thus [AA28cd-30] says:

(a) Not standing in form, etc., their [=form, etc.] state of being devoid of intrinsic self-identity, that pair's reciprocal own-being not standing in their impermanence,² etc.; (b) the state of their being empty of those identities [therefore] the reciprocal state of self-identity on the part of these two; (c) non-seeing of particular shape in the case of grasping of dharmas, the examination of wisdom, on account of the non-finding of all.³

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¹ Cf. AAV:62.5; Obermiller (1932-3:35) says: "Before entering the Path of Training, the roots of virtue of the Bodhisatva are in danger of being stopped in their growth by enmity and other defiling agencies. On the second degree of the Path of Training this is no more possible. The roots of virtue, which up to that time had been unsteady, here attain a firm and stabilized position, and the climax of their growth. This is why the second degree of the Path of Training is called 'the climax.'"

² anityata probably shortened to anitya for the sake of metre.

³ If one were to interpret in the light of what H has stated above AA28cd-30, which appears to be no more than a set of syntactically unconnected key words from the Pañca, would mean: "[The objective support of the soft peaked is] not standing in form, etc., which have no own-being by way of their intrinsic self-identities. For both [impermanence of forms, etc., and the emptinesses which are their ultimate nature] there is a reciprocal own-being [so the mode of meditation is] not standing in their
Then friend Śāriputra said this to friend Subhūti: What is the reason, friend Subhūti, that they are to be known as great Bodhisattvas not separated from the PP when form itself is separated from the own-being of form; similarly, when feeling itself, discrimination itself, composite factors themselves, and when consciousness itself is separated from the own-being of consciousness; when the PP is separated from the own-being of the PP and when the state of being knower of all is separated from the own-being of a state of knower of all?

Now, after the peaked, to convey the sense of the topic of the objective support of the soft, forbearance virtue, [Subhūti] says what is the reason, etc., starting with a question. In regard to separated from the own-being of form: "[When] it is turned into an object" is the [implicit] remainder [of the sentence]. This is what has been said [in the foregoing]: When form, etc., is turned into an object lacking the own-being of form, etc., what is the reason that [a Bodhisattva] then is to be known as not separated from the PP, mainly of the nature of soft forbearance?

When this had been said friend Subhūti addressed friend Śāriputra Exactly, friend Śāriputra, this is just the point. For form itself is separated from the own-being of form, similarly feeling itself, discrimination itself, composite factors themselves, and [W55.1] similarly, friend Śāriputra, consciousness itself is separated from the own-being of consciousness, the PP is itself separated from the own-being of the PP and the state of being knower of all itself separated from the own-being of a state of knower of all.

This is the ultimate reality of dependent origination, namely that "With the existence of this, that comes about." Intending this [Subhūti] says for form impermanence, etc. [The objective support of the middling is forms, etc. qualified as follows]. Their [i.e., forms, etc. qualified as being impermanent, etc., and the emptiness of omniscience] being empty of those identities, they both have a reciprocal self-identity. [The mode of meditation is] not grasping these dharmas [as connected with anything. The objective support of the great is forms, etc., qualified by] non-seeing of particular shape [in the case of grasping of dharmas]. [The mode of meditation is] the examination of wisdom, on account of the non-finding of all."
itself, etc., making known the answer. Otherwise, if [Śāriputra’s] question were ‘...when form itself is separated from the own-being of form,’ [Subhūti’s] response, ‘...form itself is separated from the own-being of form’ would be inappropriate.

The PP lacks even the mark which identifies the PP. An identifying mark lacks even the own-being of an identifying mark. What is marked lacks even the own-being of the marked. Own-being lacks even the mark which identifies own-being.

Having anticipated the question "How, though, does form, etc., lack own-being," [the A] expresses the meaning of that [sentence form itself, etc.]. This is because just showing that the PP is separated from own-being shows the lack of own-being in other things. The PP is separated from even the general mark which identifies PP. The word even is used because [PP lacks] the specific mark as well.¹

[Question:] At least, since the teaching does result in removal of error, the marked and the identifying mark exist. [In response Subhūti] says an identifying mark even is separated from, etc. The identifying mark is what is common to the set. What is marked is the individual [or particular]

[Question:] Their own-being then at least exists? [In response Subhūti] says [own-being even is separated from] the mark which identifies own-being. The idea is as in [Nāgārjuna’s Niraupamyā-stava]².

The truly real is free from [the distinction in the form of] marked and the identifying mark. It lacks a language sign. Something marked or an identifying mark is suited to pertain to the conceptual.

This is what has been said [in the foregoing]: The objective support is form, etc., qualified by the absence of an own-being since, as emptiness, the marked and the identifying mark are identical [i.e., have an identical fate].

¹ It will be recalled that H identifies the PP as mukhyato mṛdu-ksānti-svabhāvayā in certain contexts. This is what is meant by specific mark, as distinct from the PP in general.

² Tucci (1932b), partially quoted AAV:62.15-16.
When this had been said friend Śāriputra addressed friend Subhūti: Friend Subhūti, will a great Bodhisattva who trains in this, then, emerge into a state of being knower of all?

[W56.1] In terms of which mode of meditation should one take that as objective support? Starting with such a question [Śāriputra] says will...then, etc. Will one who conventionally trains in this in the matter of this objective support emerge into the state of being knower of all. By gaining its cause, the soft, forbearance virtue is the thought [behind the question].

Friend Subhūti replied: Exactly, friend Śāriputra, this is just the point. The great Bodhisattva who trains in this will emerge into a state of being knower of all.

To assert that what has been said [by Śāriputra] is not incompatible with ultimate reality [Subhūti] says Exactly, etc. The expression will emerge conveys so much as the following: From the ultimate and conventional points of view, the mode of meditation is the [awareness] that just non-being is the own-being of form, etc. By cultivation of that mode of meditation [the Bodhisattva] will emerge.

12.9

Why is that so? Friend Śāriputra, it is because all dharmas are unoriginated and because they do not emerge [into nirvāṇa].

Why is that so? anticipates the question, "How, though, will one training in soft, forbearance virtue proceed to the state of being knower of all aspects?" [In response] to convey the sense of the objective support of the middling [Subhūti] says it is because, etc. The idea is that where, because of the higher and higher superiorities of objective support, etc., there is the special realization, one will without fail emerge. The first hi (because) is for determination. It means definitely unoriginated. Why so? The reason is as follows: The momentary one is impermanent [so] there is cessation [i.e., refutation] of a dharma [attribute/event] in the form of birth [i.e., there is no real birth of anything]. Thus all dharmas do not emerge, i.e., have not gone to nirvāṇa.
Thus the objective support is form, etc., qualified by non-production and non-cessation because of a natural absence of own-being.

Friend Śāriputra, the state of being knower of all comes near a great Bodhisattva coursing in such a manner. As the state of being knower of all gets nearer, there occurs progressively, in order to ripen living beings, purity of body and mind, purity of signs, purity of the Buddha field and meeting with the Buddhas come about.

In terms of which mode of meditation should one take that as objective support? [Subhūti] says coursing in such a manner, etc. Coursing means meditating. This is based on the fact that "All [roots] expressing the idea of going (car) mean 'understand' [depending on the context]." In such a manner means according to the principle explained above. [The state of being knower of all] comes near means it would be something close by, because realization is soon attained. In order to ripen living beings means in order to mature living beings by joining them with good dharmas. Purity of body, etc., means that by awakening to the [ultimate] form of all dharmas there is complete purity of body, etc. Because of the fact that the cause of purity is thus, from cultivating the aspect of purity in a causal manner there occurs purity of body, i.e., threefold pure physical action, and purity of mind, i.e., threefold pure mental action. When finally [the purities] come to be naturally constant, brilliant and complete there is purity of the thirty-two signs of a great being. Purity of the Buddha field is purity of living beings and the environment. Since it is impossible [for this purity to be there] in all its totality

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1 H takes lakṣaṇa to mean the '32 signs of a great being,' which agrees with the context here, but in the A 'our notion or understanding of an individual entity' seems to be intended.

2 This is an unusual sense of samavadhāna which usually means 'co-attentiveness.'

3 H appeals to this maxim of Skt Grammarians, Mīmāṁsakas and commentators in general.

4 According to Madhyamakāvatāra 2:9 a threefold transcendence is present when action is done in the awareness that kāraṇa-kārya-karma are qualified by absence of own-being. "Quand il y a idée de la triade, celui qui s'abstient, l'abstention, l'objet de l'abstention, la moralité est nommée vertu transcendante naturelle; vide d'attachement a cette triade, elle est surnaturelle" (la Vallée Poussin 1907:292).

5 These are listed in AA8.13-17 (Conze 1954a:98-99).
at the stage of proximate penetration, what is being referred to is just the little bit there is.

Thus it is, friend Śāriputra, that the great Bodhisattva who is coursing in the PP becomes proximate to the state of being knower of all.

In summing up [Subhūti] says thus, etc.

12.10

Then friend Subhūti again said this in reference to great Bodhisattvas. If they course in form they course in a particular shape. If they course in the particular shape of form they course in a particular shape. If they course with the idea that form is a particular shape they course in a particular shape. If they course in the production of form they course in a particular shape. If they course in the destruction of form they course in a particular shape. If they course with the idea that form is empty they course in a particular shape. If they course with the idea "I am coursing" or if they course with the idea "I am a Bodhisattva" they course in a particular shape. For [in such a situation] they are indeed coursing in [worldly] experience [as the form of their thinking] "I am a Bodhisattva," [indicates].

Similarly, if they course in feeling, discrimination, composite factors or in consciousness they course in a particular shape. If they course in the particular shape of consciousness they course in a particular shape. If they course with the idea that consciousness is a particular shape they course in a particular shape. If they course in the production of consciousness they course in a particular shape. If they course in the cessation of consciousness they course in a particular shape. If they course in the destruction of consciousness they course in a particular shape. If they course with the idea that consciousness is empty they course in a particular shape. If they course with the idea "I am coursing" or with the idea "I am a Bodhisattva" they course in a particular shape. For [in such a situation] they are indeed coursing in [worldly] experience [as the form of their thinking] "I am a Bodhisattva," [indicates].
Furthermore, if it occurs to them that "One who courses thus courses in the PP and cultivates the PP," then they would be coursing only in a particular shape. These Bodhisattvas should be known as lacking skillful means.

To convey the sense of the objective support of the great it says if they...in form, etc. Thus [Subhūti] thinks: To the extent that they course in a yoga of settling, because of seizing on a particular shape, to that extent, in accordance with the statement that "Bodhisattvas are ones for whom particular shapes are kleśas ('hardship')," they fall into the cyclic world's hardship, the root of which is objectification [experiencing something as existing].

Here form is something which has become an effect, the particular shape of form an accompanying causal condition, the idea that form is a particular shape the substantial cause, production birth, cessation due to the state of momentary impermanence [i.e., instantaneous disintegration], destruction due to the state of a continuum's impermanence [i.e., its not going on for ever], and empty the non-existence of both [production and cessation]. They should be known as lacking skillful means because of proceeding incorrectly.

Then friend Śāriputra said this to friend Subhūti: How, then, do great Bodhisattvas, when they are coursing, course in the PP?

When this was said, friend Subhūti addressed friend Śāriputra: If great Bodhisattvas do not course in form, if they do not course in the particular shape of form, if they do not course in the idea that form is a particular shape, if they do not course in the arising of form, if they do not course in the cessation of form, if they do not course with the idea that form is empty, if they do not course with the idea "I am coursing," or with the idea "I am a Bodhisattva;" similarly, if they do not course in feeling, discrimination, composite factors or in consciousness, if they do not course in the particular shape of consciousness, if they do not course with the idea that consciousness is a particular shape, if they do not

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1 The equation of the rūpa-nimitta with the accompanying causal condition and the rūpam nimittam iti with the substantial cause is rather puzzling.
course in the production of consciousness, if they do not course in the
cessation of consciousness and if they do not course in the destruction of
consciousness, if they do not course with the idea that consciousness is empty,
if they do not course with the idea "I am coursing," if they do not course with
the idea "I am a Bodhisattva;" and if it does not, furthermore, occur to them
that "One who courses thus courses in the PP and cultivates the PP"...

Having pointed out [the objective support] from the standpoint of what it is
not, [Subhūti] states from the standpoint of what it is with how, etc.

[W59.1]... great Bodhisattvas coursing in such a manner course in the PP.

In summing up [Subhūti] says great Bodhisattvas, etc. Since the dharmas
cannot be justified as either individual or universal, Bodhisattvas coursing
in such a manner, where the objective support is form, etc., qualified by the
particular shapelessness of dharmas, would be coursing in the PP, viz.,
great forbearance.

While they course they do not come to think "I am coursing." Nor do they
come to think "I am not coursing." They do not come to think "I am both
coursing and not coursing," nor do they come to think "I am neither
coursing nor not coursing." They do not come to think "I shall be coursing; I
shall not be coursing; I shall be both coursing and not coursing," and they do
not come to think "I shall neither be coursing nor not coursing."

In terms of which mode of meditation should one take that as objective
support? [Subhūti] says while they course, etc. The idea is that

They have no conception at all of an affirmation, a refutation, the two
together, or the negation of both.¹

Why do they not come to think [like that]? It is because all dharmas are
really unapproached and unobtained.

Having anticipated the question "How, though, does one meditate without
going into anything?" with why do they not come to think [like that]?

[Subhūti] says it is because all dharmas, etc. Since the particular shapes of form, etc., are, by their very nature, without a substratum, attention to a belief is without belief, and attention to the truly real without knowledge. Thus, because of taking to [coursing] with such an aspect which is an opening to ultimate reality, [all dharmas] are unapproached, since belief does not appropriate [them], and unobtained since attention to the truly real does not grasp [them].

[This part of the proximate penetration] is called ksānti 'forbearance' [from root kṣam], because, [in it], due to the absence of bad states of rebirth there is exceeding forbearance of dharmas. With its objective supports and modes of meditation it is threefold. And thus [AA31-32ab] says:

The absence of an own-being of forms, etc., the fact that non-being is their own-being; their being unoriginated and not emerging, purity; their particular shapelessness [and], since their particular shapes are not underpinned by anything, absence of belief and conviction.

Precisely because of this [preceding], the statement of the revered Acārya [Vasubandhu, AK6.23] that "one who attains forbearance does not go to bad states of rebirth," which is to the effect that "Bodhisattvas do not produce forbearance" [since a Bodhisattva, who has vowed to benefit all living creatures willingly undergoes bad rebirths] is problematic. This is because [in the above AA comment on the PP] there is a statement to the effect that the Bodhisattvas attain forbearance. [However] since [Vasubandhu] intends to say ‘through dependence on karman’ even [his] sūtra taken to mean, "one who attains forbearance does not go to bad states of rebirth," does not contradict the [the

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1 There are three apāyas: birth as an animal, as a wandering ghost or as a hell-being. H understands AAV:63.25 adhimātra-dharma-kṣamaṇāt to mean that at this stage for the Bodhisattva even hellish torments are no longer experienced as real.

2 Based on H, AA31-32ab would read: "[The objective support of the soft forbearance is form, etc., qualified by] absence of an own-being of forms, etc., [the mode of meditation is] the fact that non-being is their own-being. [The objective support of the middling is] their being unoriginated and not proceeding forth. [The mode of meditation is] purity. [The objective support of the great is] their particular shapelessness, [the mode of meditation is] absence of belief and conviction since their particular shapes are not underpinned by anything.
This is definitely how the matter should be understood for elsewhere it is read that Śāriputra and others, as ordered by the Lord, took Sundara-nanda and went to experience hell.

12.11 Supreme dharma proximate penetration

And it is this that is said to be the meditative stabilization of great Bodhisattvas called sarva-dharmānupādāna ("not appropriating any dharma"). It is vast, placed at the front, not regulated by a measure, and not shared in common with Śrāvakas and Pratyeka-buddhas.

Now, after the forbearance, to convey the sense of the objective support of the soft, supreme dharma root of virtue, [Subhūti] says and it is this, etc. The meditative stabilization, on account of which no dharma is appropriated, is the meditative stabilization called "not appropriating any dharma." Its objective support is really form, etc., in the form of the meditative stabilization itself. The words vast, etc., are to be construed as ayam vipula ...ucyate.

Abiding in this very meditative stabilization great Bodhisattvas quickly awaken to unequalled, perfect enlightenment.

In terms of which mode of meditation should one take that as objective support? It says [Abiding] in this very, etc. Through the force of one's prayer, merit, wisdom and the dharma-element, the operation of the meditative stabilization comes about spontaneously, in line with the dispositions [of those beholding them], in all realms of the universe. When objectified in terms of such a result aspect, quickly they awaken to unequalled, perfect enlightenment.

1 In H's view, 'through dependence on karman' is an implicit assumption behind Vasubandhu's remark. Hence he does not take Vasubandhu's remark as excluding the possibility that the Bodhisattvas could take rebirth on the strength of their compassion; that possibility is still left open. As an instance in support of it he points out the kind of rebirth Śāriputra and others could [tentatively] experience because of the force of the Lord's command.

2 Explaining AA32c.
Through the agency of Buddha, friend elder Subhūti spoke thus: Lord, those
great Bodhisattvas, who abide by means of this meditative stabilization, in
unsurpassed, perfect enlightenment were prophesied by previous
Tathāgata Arhants, fully completed Buddhas.

To convey the sense of the objective support of the middling it says through
the agency of Buddha, etc. Even though [Subhūti’s remarks] have [already]
been contextualized [as taking place] through the majesty of Buddha [$10.4],
the reiteration of that [with the expression buddhanubhāvena] is to make the
special feature of [Subhūti’s] disclosure clear or, alternatively, to bolster the
trainees’ recollection of that [majesty].

[W61.1] It was prophesied means it is in the nature of things that Buddhas
make a prophesy about a yogin [or yogini] who has perfectly achieved
meditative stabilization. This is because [the yogin or yogini] takes forms, etc.,
that have the quality of being the cause for [such] a prophesy, as objective
support. [Explanation of] by Tathāgatas, etc.: [They are] Tathāgatas on
account of the richness in achieving others’ welfare by teaching the doctrine, in
all its aspects and without mistake. [They are] Arhants on account of the
richness in achieving their own welfare through destroying afflictive
obscuration and obscuration to knowing along with the latencies. Because they
realise a path that brings forth both these richnesses they are perfect Buddhas.

[Who abide] by means of this means by means of [this meditative
stabilization which is] the middling, supreme dharma.

They do not at all see even that meditative stabilization. They do not get
conceited about that meditative stabilization [thinking]: "I am in
meditative stabilization. I shall become absorbed in meditative
stabilization. I am becoming absorbed in meditative stabilization. I have
become absorbed in meditative stabilization." For them nothing
whatsoever, in any manner, nothing at all, in any respect exists.

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1 On the special Buddhist meaning of vyākṛ see Edgerton:516.
2 eśā dharman. Obermiller (1933-6:74) says, "Such is the true state of things [that the background of
all the elements constituting the Bodhisattva’s personality is the unique element of Buddahood which
finally becomes delivered]."
In terms of which mode of meditation should one take that as objective support? [Subhūti] says they do not, etc. They do not at all see with a non-conceptual mind, they do not get conceited about that with conceptual mind, since it does not, ultimately, exist. I am in meditative stabilization means 'I am one who has got meditative stabilization.' I shall become absorbed in meditative stabilization, etc., refer to either the preparatory, root and concluding conceptualizations or to [conceptualizations] in the three times. [Explanation of] sarvāna (nothing whatsoever), etc. Because of the statement that 'there are two totalities (sarvatā), the totality of things and the totality of aspects,' [here] sarvāna means nothing, divided in terms of past, [present and future] things, nothing whatsoever means a thing in the form of the totality of conceptualizations which [totality] is about an aggregate, etc. In any manner means even in the soft, soft aspect, nothing at all means no aspect with a latent state. [None] exists, comes into being, because there is no conceptualization that is tenable, since the knowledges that "I am in meditative stabilization," etc., do not arise in the case of the Bodhisattva whose very nature is the realized meditative stabilization. This because they meditate by way of the mode of meditation which is an opening to ultimate reality.

When this had been said friend, Śāriputra addressed friend Subhūti. Can that meditative stabilization be shown, friend Subhūti, that meditative stabilization abiding by means of which a great Bodhisattva's unsurpassed enlightenment is prophesied by Tathāgata Arhants, fully completed Buddhas?

To convey the sense of the objective support of the great [Śāriputra] says [Can that meditative stabilization be shown,] friend Subhūti, [abiding] by means of which great, supreme dharma meditative stabilization, [the Bodhisattva is prophesied]. The sense is "[Can it be shown] in some form differentiable from a Bodhisattva, etc.?"

1 Explaining AA32d
Some manuscripts read *katamena*.\(^1\) There [in so reading], the problem is whether the statement ‘can that meditative stabilization be shown,’ of the same questioner is incongruent.\(^2\)

*Subhūti said: No indeed, friend Śāriputra, it is not so.*

The answer is **no indeed it is not so**. From the point of view of ultimate reality, the three things (meditative stabilization, Bodhisattva and PP) have the same form as each other. Thus, form, etc., which have the quality of not being amenable to being shown in a separable form is the objective support. [Such a meditative stabilization] can absolutely not [be shown]. This is the sense.

*Why is that so? It is because that son [or daughter] of good family neither knows, nor identifies, even that meditative stabilization.*

"How, though, is it that something being meditated cannot be shown?" This question is anticipated with **Why is that so? It is because**, etc., gives the answer by stating the mode of meditation. Since the supreme method of *meditative stabilization* is non-conceptualization, in line with the fact that all dharmas do not exist, when the objective support is [viewed] in terms of such an aspect of ultimate reality [a Bodhisattva] does not know that meditative stabilization with non-imaging thought. This is because there is no cause for the proximity [of such bare perception]. And [Bodhisattvas] they do not identify with imaging [thought] since there is [such thought] in dreams, etc., without any real entity [behind it].\(^3\) The word **also** is used because it is not just

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\(^1\) I.e., not "Is that meditative stabilization, abiding by means of which ...," but, "Abiding by means of which of the various meditative stabilizations is a Bodhisattva’s unsurpassed enlightenment prophesied by Tathāgata Arhants?"

\(^2\) If the questioner asked "by means of which meditative stabilization," he would not himself assert that the meditative stabilization can be shown. The first expression indicates uncertainty of knowledge on the part of the questioner. He would not himself later talk as if he knows the nature of that meditative stabilization.

\(^3\) If an image of the object known does not appear in the mind’s eye there would be no awareness of any object to talk about. And even if an image of the meditative stabilization did appear, that is no ground to argue it really does exist. Even fabricated dream images appear in the mind’s eye but one cannot say of such things that they are real.
the mode of meditation. The idea is that beholding something as one thing or the other is contingent upon conceptualization.

Friend Śāriputra said: Friend Subhūti, you say he [or she] neither knows nor identifies?

Śāriputra says he [or she] neither knows? etc., intending thereby that when nothing is grasped there can be no object of meditation, meditator or meditation.

Friend Subhūti said: I say "He [or she] neither knows nor identifies." And why is it that he [or she] neither knows nor identifies? It is because that meditative stabilization does not exist, therefore he [or she] neither knows nor identifies.

Having thought that, on the surface level, there is no fault Subhūti said he [or she] neither knows, etc. Having anticipated a question about exactly what he was trying to get at with why is that, [Subhūti] says because it does not exist. "Ultimately" is the [implicit] remainder [of this remark]. [W63.1] It has, however, been explained that there are effort and so forth, as in the case of an illusory person, governed by the earlier propulsive force.

Then the Lord proffered his appreciation to friend Subhūti: Excellent, Subhūti, excellent. So it is, Subhūti, so it is. And no wonder, for it is disclosed for you by the agency of the Tathāgata. You teach with the authority of the Tathāgata.

Since what [Subhūti] said does not contradict ultimate reality, [the Lord] says excellent, etc., to proffer appreciation. It is disclosed for you (genitive), in the sense that a gnosis in which that discloses itself is produced. You teach since you explain that to others as objective support.

And thus should a great Bodhisattva train in this matter.

In summing up [the Lord] says and thus, etc. The word and is used in a delimiting sense. It means just thus, in this matter, in the proximate penetration.
Why is that so? Because training thus a great Bodhisattva is trained in the PP.

"How, though, should this one [=the Bodhisatva] train step-by-step?" This question is anticipated with Why is that so. [In response the Lord] says because training thus, etc. [He or she trains] in the PP the nature of which is proximate penetration.

Thus the supreme dharma, so-called because it is supreme amongst all mundane dharmas, with objective supports and modes of meditation, is threefold. And thus [AA32cd-33] says:

Meditative stabilization, its functioning; prophecy, extinguishing conceit; the fact of the three having an own-being the same as each other, non-conceptualization of the meditative stabilization. Thus is proximate knowledge, from the point of view of soft, middling and great.

This is what has been said [in the foregoing]. Those who have made an investigation into dharmas, have a stabilized mind and are cultivating the selflessness of all dharmas, gradually [go through the following process].

a) When, with a little of the illuminating light of gnosis that comes from not settling on separate things, they behold just mere thinking mind, then for them there is the warmed stage. Just this, here in the Mahāyāna is called the meditative stabilization "to which light reaches" (āloka-labdha).

b) When, from trying enthusiastically to meditate on selflessness in order to increase that same dharma light, the light of gnosis becomes medium clear, [W64.1] then there is the peaked stage. Just this is called the meditative stabilization "in which light increases" (vṛddhaloka).

c) When, being stationed in mind only, there arises the brilliant light of a gnosis free from settling on outer objects, then there is the forbearance stage. Since it enters [into the ultimate] without the medium of an apprehended object [but still with the idea of an apprehender] this meditative stabilization is called

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1 The same samādhīs occur at MSA:14.23-26, MSam:3.12 (Lamotte 1973:169-70) and in the BK (Tucci 1956:533-34).
"the meditation in which one part of ultimate reality is entered into" (tattvārthaika-deśa-praviṣṭa)

d) And when there is the outcome of a light of gnosis, free from the distracting appearance of apprehender of objects, then there is the stage of the worldly supreme dharma. Just this is called the "uninterrupted" (ānantarya) meditative stabilization.

All these stages are termed levels of belief-[based] performance because of [the Bodhisattva’s] firm belief. It is written in the Ratna-megha-sūtra that a Bodhisattva at this level, even though an ordinary person, transcends every hardship that befalls foolish people, and becomes specially endowed with innumerable meditative stabilizations, retentions, freedoms and clairvoyances.

12.12 Four conceptualizations

Then friend Śāriputra said this to the Lord: Lord, a great Bodhisattva training thus trains in the PP?

Having thus mentioned the specifics of the objective supports, modes of meditation, and causal efficiencies of the proximate penetrations having been set forth, now, from amongst the topic of coming into contact with one of the four conceptualizations,¹ the text expresses the first conceptualization of apprehended object (having reference to all concrete entities) with [Lord, a great Bodhisattva] training, etc. [Śāriputra’s remark] is meant as a question.

When this had been said, the Lord addressed friend Śāriputra: Śāriputra, training thus great Bodhisattvas train in the PP.

With the thought that, from the point of view of expressive surface-level reality, he does train it says training thus, etc.

When this was said, friend Śāriputra addressed the Lord: [W65.1] Lord, in which dharma do great Bodhisattvas thus training, train?

Not knowing the Lord’s intent, Śāriputra asks in which dharma do they really train.

¹ This is the fourth of the five (or six) reasons for Mahāyāna superiority listed AA25c; §12.2.
When this had been said, the Lord addressed friend Śāriputra: Śāriputra, great Bodhisattvas training thus do not train in any dharma at all.

In that context, on account of conceptualization based on the bare concrete entity, one could get stuck in misunderstanding, so the Lord says they do not train in any dharma at all, ultimately, [they train] nowhere at all.

Why is this so? Because, Śāriputra, these dharmas do not exist in the way unlettered, foolish, ordinary individuals have settled [on them].

Having anticipated the qualm "How though could someone training not train" with and why, [Subhūti] says because these dharmas, etc. Persons are foolish on account of contact with thoroughly harmful dharmas. They are ordinary individuals because of lacking purified dharmas. They are unlettered when they lack belief and great learning about such dharmas.

Thus [the Lord] thinks: [Dharmas] do not exist in the way in which they are settled on due to apprehending them as existing which [in turn] is because of the ignorance-conceptualization [= the first of the nine vikalpas]. So those who, from the point of view of surface reality, are training do not really train.

Friend Śāriputra said: How then, Lord, do they exist?

If they do not exist in that way, then, [by extension], they exist in some other way; and in that case [too], there will be a fault because of seizing on something. Intending this [Śāriputra] says how then, etc.

Just as they do not exist, replied the Lord, in the same way they do exist.

When distortion which has got going is removed, [dharmas] do not exist in the way they are settled on. Even though it is said they are thus, still, really they are not. Therefore [the Lord] says just as, etc. Just as they do not exist in the light of reasoned [analysis], in the same way, on the surface level, as entities attractive only when there is absence of analysis, they do exist. This amounts to saying that that state of not existing is the state of existing.
Not existing in such a way, therefore they are called avidyā.¹

(Not existing) in such a way, etc., is the summary. Because of not existing in such a way, therefore for that reason, according to the discipline of word-derivation, from the point of view of surface reality, they are called avidyā (ignorance), i.e., distorted knowledge or non-knowledge. With this [evam avidyamāṇāḥ, etc. statement] is set forth the ignorance conceptualization.² [W66.1]

Unlettered, foolish, ordinary individuals have settled on them. All dharmas, [though] non-existent are made up by them.

To convey the sense of the conceptualization of the aggregates of form and so forth [the Lord] says [unlettered...] them, etc. To let it be known that all [types of] conceptualizations tied to the [idea of an] entity are specifically connected with this the connection with the earlier [statement] is explained [by the Lord again saying the unlettered have settled on these]. One should also understand it to be thus in the following [seven] cases as well. How have they settled? [The Lord] says [All...] by them, etc. All these really non-existent dharmas, the aggregate of form and so forth, are made up superimposed out of formation of the unreal through conceptualization of them [=the aggregates of form, etc.].³

Having made them up, attached to the two extremes, they neither know nor see these dharmas. Hence they make up all these dharmas which are non-existent.

¹ By resorting to pragmatic word-derivation the author of the A relates two verbal roots a) ्विद (1st class) meaning ‘to be found’ or ‘to exist,’ and b) ्विद (2nd class) meaning ‘to know.’ While ‘not existing’ (avidyamāna) is an ātmanepada present participle of ्विद (1), ‘ignorance’ (avidyā) is derived from the negative prefix a+vidyā ‘knowledge,’ an abstract feminine noun from ्विद (2). H links the two.

² The four conceptualizations (AA25c and AA34-35 on Pañca:145-154) are each subdivided into a set of nine and H considers each in turn.

³ Cf. MMV1.1 analysed Nagao (1979:36).
To convey the sense of the conceptualization which consists in settling on name and form [the Lord] says having made them up, etc. On account of the conceptualization which settles on them [=name and form], those who have settled on the two extremes of eternalism and nihilism do not know these dharmas name, form, etc. [They do not know them] with an ordinary wisdom arisen from hearing and so forth,\(^1\) [wisdom which knows] that, since something permanent has no function associated with it,\(^2\) on the surface level, [name, form, etc.] are only impermanent.\(^3\)

Through meditation on the following lines [Nāgārjuna’s Ratnāvalī 1.98]\(^4\)

When later there is ascertainment of reality, one does not even find the being [=positive entity] which is made up earlier out of ignorance. Whence [can one then find] an absence?\(^5\)

ey do not see with extra-ordinary knowledge either. Hence, through the force of settling on them [name, etc.], they make up all these dharmas starting with name and form which are really non-existent.

*Having made them up they settle on the two extremes.*

To convey the sense of the conceptualization which consists in being attached to the two extremes [the Lord] says having made them up they settle on the two extremes. The idea is that this is on account of the conceptualization which consists in being attached to them.

*Having settled down, and having resorted to grasping based on them, \(^6\) they make up dharmas gone by; they make up dharmas which will come to be and they make up dharmas which are coming into being.*

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\(^1\) For an explanation of śrutamaya wisdom see §8.5, §7.7.

\(^2\) The artha-kriyā doctrine was first formulated by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. It asserts that real things are known as such by their ability to perform the functions ascribed to them.

\(^3\) Ultimately, of course, even the permanence/impermanence consideration is uncalled for.

\(^4\) Hopkins (1975:31); Lindner (1982:112-113) points out the similarity with Yukti-śaṣṭikā-kārikā 3.

\(^5\) Absences are dependent on presences. As concepts they depend on the latter.

\(^6\) I.e., having developed the view that our experience of external things is due to the existence of those things.
[W67.1] To convey the sense of the conceptualization which is in the form of ignorance of the afflicted and pure [the Lord] says having settled down, etc. Having resorted to grasping based on them means grounded in the cause for settling. They make up dharmas gone by [and so on] up to [they make up] those which are coming into being through the force of the conceptualization in the form of ignorance of an afflicted, or purified, dharma's nature.

Having made [them] up they settle on name and form.

To convey the sense of the conceptualization which consists in not being stationed on the Ārya path [the Lord] says having made [them] up they settle on name and form. The idea is that [this situation is such] because of settling on not being on the path of seeing, etc. Here, name is the non-physical aggregates of feelings, etc.; form is the form aggregate.

They make up all dharmas which are [really] non-existent.

To convey the sense of the conceptualization in the form of grasping [the Lord] says they make up all dharmas which are [really] non-existent. The idea is that [this situation is such] because of settling on the grasping of them [i.e., because of believing that they are actually grasped].

They make up all these dharmas which are [really] non-existent. They neither know, nor do they see, the path as it really is.

On the topic of the conceptualization of I, etc., it says [they make up all...] non-existing, etc. [Dharmakīrti, PV Pramāṇasiddhi 221] says:

When ‘I’ exists there is the idea of ‘the other.’ From the ‘self-and-other’ division come clinging and hate. Based in these, two all afflictions arise.

In accordance with this [observation], because of settling on an I, as before [W66.19], they neither know nor do they see, as it really is without distortion the path of seeing, etc., marked by the selflessness of dharmas and persons.

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Neither knowing nor seeing the path as it really is, they do not emerge from the three realms and they do not awaken to the perfect limit (bhūta-koti). Therefore, they are counted as "foolish persons."

To convey the sense of the conceptualization consisting of the production of purity, etc., [the Lord] says not knowing the path as it really is, etc. They do not emerge from do not go out of the three realms, viz., the cyclic existence. They do not awaken on account of settling on the production of purity, etc. The perfect limit is the true reality as supreme goal. [Because they do not awaken], therefore for [that] reason they are counted as they get the designation foolish persons.

[W68.1] They do not have faith in the true dharma.

With they do not have faith in the true dharma, etc., [the Lord] speaks of the second conceptualization of apprehended object, which conceptualization is based on antidotal concrete entity. They do not have faith in do not believe in the true, which is due to undistorted object, dharma characterized as an antidote. This is because they do not experience it, in and of itself, on account of their realization (pratipatti) being distorted by the presence of conceptualization that settles on that [dharma].

Not indeed, however, Śāriputra, do the great Bodhisattvas settle on any dharma.

With Not indeed, however, etc., [the Lord] speaks specifically of the distorted pratipatti from the point of view of what it is not. Dharma means purified dharma. "Through the conceptualization of apprehended object" is the [implicit] remainder [of the sentence].

And this [second conceptualization of apprehended object] is thus of nine sorts, because of different objects. The nine sorts are as follows: conceptualization of the wherewithal, conceptualization of a door of entry, conceptualization of lineage, conceptualization of production, conceptualization of emptiness, conceptualization of perfection, conceptualization of the

1 The pratipatti is the means of progress to the goal. This is complete non-settling. When the Bodhisattva settles on that non-settling the settling distorts even that.
path of seeing, conceptualization of the path of meditation and, lastly, conceptualization of the path of no more learning. And thus [AA34] says:

There are two conceptualizations of apprehended object relative to a concrete entity and its antidote. Each is of nine sorts divided by way of stupidity, etc., and the wherewithal, etc.

Some [=AAV:70.18-25] say: Here, the first conceptualization of apprehended object is of absolutely all entities; the second just of pure entities. This is the difference between the two conceptualizations of apprehended object. Based on this it is said that "the first conceptualization of apprehended object is the second also." Thus [conceptualization of pure apprehended object] relates back [to conceptualization of all entities] in the sense of being what is left [when the conceptualization of the afflicted is removed]. To the extent that it is the first it is also the second. This is as follows: The first conceptualization of apprehended object is of all entities. One which would be the second alone, and not the first is, for example, the second conceptualization of apprehended object based on the pure alone.

Others² say the first [conceptualization] is based on afflicted concrete entities while the second is based on pure entities. They are different from each other, because, being in the form of one excludes being in the form of the other.

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1 See note to the Skt text for a comparison of the AAV and AAA and a different interpretation of this passage. The present gloss is a provisional attempt to make sense of the terse iti pūrva-pādaka, based on the explanation in the AAGser and AARGyan.

2 The meaning of Ārya Vimuktisena's teaching, that whatever is the first conceptualization is the second as well, follows from the general Buddhist psychological axiom that the deeper or more ingrained the mental defilement, the more wide-ranging its influence in the personality of the yogin. AARGyan:164 explains that "...when, in viewing the bare [i.e., undifferentiated] afflicted and pure conceptualization of apprehended object, one settles on the truth of what is being apprehended, then it is always going to be a conceptualization of a pure apprehended object. The assertion that any conceptualization of an afflicted apprehended object is always going to be a conceptualization of pure apprehended object misses the point." 

² Most probably Haribhadra's own view?
12.13 Conceptualization of an apprehender

[W69.1] When this had been said, Ṣāriputra addressed the Lord: Lord, a great Bodhisattva who trains thus trains in the state of being knower of all?

With When this, etc., [the A] speaks about the first conceptualization of apprehender, [which conceptualization] is based on a substantially existing person. Thus in the sequence stated above, does [a Bodhisattva] train? The idea is, within having the first conceptualization of apprehender?

The Lord said this: Ṣāriputra, the great Bodhisattva who trains thus does not train in the state of being knower of all, either. Ṣāriputra, the great Bodhisattva who trains thus trains in all dharmas; training thus he [or she] trains in the state of being knower of all, comes near the state of being knower of all and emerges into the state of being knower of all.

Since obscuration in the form of conceptualizations [if it exists] is the same [in all the stages], the Lord said he [or she] does not train. "Really" [being trained] is the [implicit] remainder [of the sentence]. On the surface level, however, the new practitioner is trained otherwise [training] would be untenable. [The Lord] says [the great Bodhisattva] who trains thus, etc. The three phrases starting from he [or she] trains in the state of being knower of all are to be understood as applicable to the preparatory, [root and subsequent] stages, respectively.

And this [first conceptualization of apprehender] is thus of nine sorts, because of different objects. They are as follows: conceptualization of an independent I, conceptualization of an I-unit, conceptualization of an agent I, conceptualization of an I which is a beholder, etc., conceptualization of an I which is the substratum for the thoroughly harmful, conceptualization of an I which is a substratum for detachment, conceptualization of an I which is a substratum for the path of seeing, conceptualization of an I which is a substratum for the path of meditation and, lastly, conceptualization of an I which is a substratum when the purpose is accomplished.

Then friend Subhūti said this to the Lord: Lord, should someone question thus: "Will this illusory person train in the state of being knower of all,
come near the state of being knower of all and emerge into the state of being knower of all?" how should one point out to such a questioner?

With Lord, should someone, etc., [Subhūti] speaks about the second conceptualization of an apprehender [a conceptualization] based on a nominally existing person.

[The text here speaks] about this conceptualization by way of removing a devious cavil. In the case of settling in the form 'a merely nominally existing person is the apprehender,' since the form in which he [or she] appears is a distortion of reality, an illusory person, a person whose nature is an illusion would just nominally exist. Thus, there would be the [unwelcome] consequence of training even just that [sort of person]. And this is not so because [that illusory person] is not sentient.

w70.1] If training took place even without knowledge, then everyone would get to train and liberation would be attained effortlessly. With this in mind [Subhūti] inquires: [Lord, should] someone [question thus], etc., how should one point out answer that [person]?

When this had been said the Lord addressed friend Subhūti: So then, Subhūti, I am going to put a question on this back to you [the very questioner]. You should explain to the extent that you are able.

Appearing as they are not is something common to form, etc., [i.e., is not something unique to the illusory person]. Hence, there is no other way but to train like an illusory person and yet liberation is not established effortlessly. Intending this the Lord says, so then, etc. Because you inquire thus, therefore I am going to put a question I will formulate a counter-question on this inquiry back to you [the questioner himself].

"Good, my Lord." Thus, Subhūti listened to¹ the Lord.

Good means so be it, my Lord. Having thus made a commitment, thus, in that manner, [Subhūti] listened was listening to, in the presence of, the Lord.

¹ H also seems to have been troubled by the genitive bhagavatah (see his gloss below). It appears to be a substitute for the dative common when pratiśru 'promise' is used.
The Lord said this: Subhūti, what do you think: is that illusion one thing and that form something else; that illusion one thing and that feeling something else, is that illusion one thing and that discrimination and those composites something else; is that illusion one thing and that consciousness something else?

How did [Subhūti] listen in that manner? [To inform, the A] says the Lord said, etc.

Subhūti said: No it is not, Lord. The illusion is not one thing and the form something else. Lord, the form is itself an illusion and the illusion itself a form. Lord, the illusion is not one thing and feeling, discrimination and composites something else; feeling, discrimination and composites are themselves, Lord, illusion and the illusion is itself feeling, discrimination and composites. [W71.1] Lord, that illusion is not one thing and the consciousness something else. Lord, the consciousness is itself illusion and illusion is itself consciousness.

In answering [Subhūti] says no it is not, etc. There is not separateness from it at all, Lord, since that illusion is not one thing and that form, etc. is not something else. Form, etc., is itself illusion and illusion is itself form, etc. The idea is that when both are really in a state devoid of own-being because of lacking a single or plural nature, appearing as they are not is common to all of them.

The Lord said: Subhūti, what do you think? Here in the five appropriating aggregates is it merely a saṁjñā (‘sign, imprint of a shape’), a saṁajñā (‘projection’), a prajñāpti (‘nominal entity’) [or] vyavahāra (‘exchange’) what we call a "Bodhisattva?"

Given that the sameness of illusion and form, etc., has been stated, to state that it is as an illusory person, as it were, that one should train [the Lord] says, what do you think, etc.

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1 The English equivalents are based on Ārya Vimuktisena.
Here, in the five appropriating aggregates which are like an illusion is there samjñā grasping of a shape [a sign]"Bodhisattva," a samajñā, awareness of "I," united with a concrete entity, a nominal entity a consciousness which has settled on the known and the cognition as apprehended object and apprehender, or an exchange (vyavahāra), the carryings on (vyavaharana) about relations between different sentient or non-sentient things? Thus explains Ārya Vimuktisena.2

According to Bhadanta Vimuktisena: At the Buddha-lineage stage the name (samjñā) "Bodhisattva" is just a name alone. At the stage of the production of an [altruistic] mind, the Bodhisattva is a samajñā ("an equal knower"). [The derivation of this is as follows]:3 In that the samajñā mind knows, [the Bodhisattva] is knower. [In that such a mind] is a knower equally [the Bodhisattva] is an equal-knower. [Such a mind] is the semantic notion occasioning the use of the samajñā that a "Bodhisattva" is. The samajñā ("equal-knower") is based on the equal knowledge of all living beings. On the seven preparatory levels [the Bodhisattva] becomes a nominal entity because of penetrating to the merely nominal state of all dharmas. On the eighth level, etc., a [Bodhisattva becomes] a usage since he [or she] has attained the signless, spontaneous path and is expressible [only] through a mere convention.

When this had been said, friend Subhūti addressed the Lord: It is so, Lord; it is so, Sugata.

In order to accept [what the Lord said], since a Bodhisattva other than form, etc., is not tenable [Subhūti] says it is so, etc. He says it twice in awe. [W72.1]

Therefore, Lord, a great Bodhisattva training in the PP should train, as an illusory person, as it were, in unequalled, perfect enlightenment.

Therefore, etc., is the summary. Since this is the case, therefore because of that reason, since there is no other recourse it is proper that one train as an

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1 Cf. AK1.14 samjñā nimittadgrahaṇātmikā.
2 W71.12-15=AAV:70.7-10.
3 jña = one which knows, a knower (jñātā). samajñā = knows equally (samaṇh jñām). The transition from samajñā to samajñā is unclear.
illusory person, as it were, in unequalled, perfect enlightenment. [One is an illusory person] from being endowed with non-settling [which, in turn] is due to [realizing] that, just as cyclic existence arises from illusory previous action, so too, even extra-ordinary dharmas arise from illusory knowledge. Yet liberation is not established effortlessly because reality, only when known, brings liberation, not when not known. This is the point.

Why is this so? Because, Lord, what we call the five appropriating aggregates should be taken to be just that illusory person.

Having anticipated the qualm "How, given that a person is illusory, could there be systematization into afflicted and purified stages" with, Why is this so, [Subhūti] says [Because...] just that, etc. The five appropriating aggregates are contaminated form, etc. One should further understand in the A statement pañca skandhās ca "the [mere] five aggregates" in order to include the five uncontaminated aggregates. The idea is that there is systematization of afflicted and purified stages just as there seems to be, even though the person is illusory.

Why is this so? Because you have said, Lord, that form is like an illusion. And what form is, the six sense-faculties and the five aggregates are as well. Because you have said, Lord, that feeling, discrimination and composites are like an illusion, and because you have said, that consciousness is like an illusion. And what consciousness is, the six sense-faculties and the five aggregates are as well.

Having anticipated the question, "How, though, could there be similarity with an illusion" with Why is this so, [Subhūti] says Because you have said, etc. One should not find fault with this as being repetitious, because there is not repetition when a subject already discussed is being inquired about in another manner. One should understand it thus in every case [of seeming repetition].

In regard to you have said, Lord. Just prior to the statement here in the five appropriating aggregates is there this name "Bodhisattva?" etc., you have said, Lord, that which is form, etc., is like an illusion. The six sense-faculties are the eye, etc. Together with consciousnesses and objects is
the [implicit] remainder [in the sentence] since later he will say, the five aggregates. What consciousness is, that the six sense-faculties are because there is a reflection, in that form, of just consciousness itself. The six sense-faculties are to be understood as earlier [i.e., as the eye, etc.].

[W73.1] Thus the conceptualization of apprehender based on a nominally existing person has been stated. And just this is thus of nine sorts, because of different objects. The sorts are as follows: conceptualization of the aggregates as a nominal entity, conceptualization of the entrances as a nominal entity, conceptualization of the elements as a nominal entity, conceptualization of a dependent origination as a nominal entity, conceptualization of purity as a nominal entity, conceptualization of the path of seeing as a nominal entity, conceptualization of the path of meditation as a nominal entity, conceptualization of the special path as a nominal entity and, lastly, the conceptualization of the path of no more learning as a nominal entity. And thus [AA35] says:

Similarly, the apprehender is thought to be of two sorts, based on substantial and nominal existence, [each sub-divided into nine] in the form of an independent I, etc., and from being based on the aggregates, etc.

12.14 Mentor

Lord, will not great Bodhisattvas, newly getting going in the [great] vehicle, having listened to this account get scared, get frightened and become terrified?

The Lord replied: Subhūti, if great Bodhisattvas, newly getting going in the [great] vehicle, get into the clutches of an evil friend they will get scared, get frightened and become terrified.

Having mentioned [the fact that the Bodhisattva’s proximate penetration is superior because of] coming into contact with the four conceptualizations, now, in explaining the mentor,¹ the nature of which is a spiritual friend with skillful means, [Subhūti] says Lord, will not, etc.

¹ Cf. AA25b; §11.1.
Those newly getting going in the [great] vehicle are those who have freshly entered into the Mahāyāna. This [account] is superior on account of the profundity, expansiveness and distinction of the objective supports, etc. They will get scared, etc., [is explained as follows]: In that context, being scared is experiencing fear where it is not called for. Being frightened is being continually scared as when one is on an untrodden path. Being terrified is being fixated with terror because the fear that has arisen is not removed. The meaning is that they become morose, defeatist and recoil back. Get into the clutches of an evil friend [is explained as follows]: One who, without making a distinction between surface and ultimate reality, and without removing the grasping which has been cultivated from a time which has no beginning, teaches non-production, etc., straight away is an evil friend. This is because they cause evil-doing which results in hell, etc, and in giving up the good dharma. They get into his clutches means they become fit for grabbing[by an evil friend].

But if, Subhūti, great Bodhisattvas newly getting going in the [great] vehicle are taken in hand by a spiritual friend they will not get scared, nor get frightened and they will not become terrified.

[W74.1] Since a topic discussed from the negative point of view becomes firmly settled when discussed from a positive viewpoint [the Lord] says but if... be taken in hand by a spiritual friend. One free from the traits of jealousy and so forth, who teaches the selflessness, etc., of all things, etc., with skillful means that do not upset or scare the mind, etc.,¹ in accord with the propensities [of the listener], after the fashion of one letting a powerful king know that his beloved queen has passed away, is a spiritual friend because of bringing about results like good future rebirth. They are taken in hand, etc., [is to be understood] as above.

When this had been said, friend Subhūti addressed the Lord: Lord, who, then, are to be known as a great Bodhisattva's spiritual friends?

¹ parigraha 'full embrace.' Obermiller (1933-6:85), following the Tib which understands an inner and outer skillful means, translates, "skill in the means of action which manifests itself in the absence of mental depression, in the absence of fear etc." and "along with it, the teacher who is devoid of envy."
With Lord, who then, etc., there is a question about the nature of a spiritual friend.

The Lord replied: Those who give him [or her] preceptual advice and instruction about the perfections. Those who point out to him [or her] Māra’s activities, saying "Māra’s faults are to be known thus, these are Māra’s faults. Māra’s activities are to be known thus, these are Māra’s activities, and, being aware of them, distance yourself from them."

In answering [the Lord] says [those] who [give], etc. [Spiritual friends are] those persons who as above [W32.7-9] give preceptual advice and give instruction having [themselves] obtained benefit to him [or her] to a person such as Devadatta in the perfections of giving, etc., without violating the bounds of surface and ultimate truth; and [they are persons] who, having [themselves] removed the non-beneficial, point out Māra’s activities to him [or her] to Devadatta, etc. How do they do so? [The A] says [Māra’s faults are] thus, etc. Māra’s faults are Māra’s hindrances when, approaching disguised as Buddha [Māra] asks, "Of what use is unsurpassed enlightenment to you?" calling into question the value of future aims. In just the same way these are Māra’s faults [when Māra says] "Of what use is undertaking to copy the PP, etc., to you?" calling into question the value of present aims. On the topic of those activities one gradually\(^1\) undertakes, and avoids, because of the force of his [=Māra’s] dissuasion [the Lord] says Māra’s activities are thus. [The Lord] says what should be done, after being aware of them, etc., with, distance yourself from them.

These, Subhūti, are to be known as the spiritual friends of a great Bodhisattva who is armed with great armour, gone forth by the Mahāyāna and mounted upon the Mahāyāna.

These, Subhūti, etc. is the summary. [Of a Bodhisattva] who is armed with great armour, of one who is endowed with the course in armor [W75.1] which will be stated; of [a Bodhisattva] who has gone forth by the Mahāyāna, of one who is, in just the same fashion, in possession of the course

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\(^1\) The force of yathākramam here is unclear.
in going forth; of a Bodhisattva mounted upon the Mahāyāna, of one who, just on that account, is carried forward in the Mahāyāna [this is the spiritual friend]. To explain: [A Bodhisattva] who started with it [the prasthāna-pratipatti] as a means and who later mounts [it] is intended here. And thus [AA36] says:

(a) A state of mind that is not upset, etc., (b) a teacher of the state of no own-being, etc., which removes what opposes that [=the teacher] is the mentor, in all respects.

Since it is the Lord's own word that "a sūtra should be explained with other sūtras as a guide" we have constructed an explanation, following the sequence in the explanations by earlier masters such as Vasubandhu and so forth, in accord with the Pañca, and having added such words as bhāvah and adhyāhārah [i.e., what is implicitly remaining to be said] in accord with the Abhisamayālaṁkāra-kārikā. Similarly, since a word of general signification, through the force of context, etc., has a particular meaning; since the words [in this explanation] are turned to the specified sense, which does not contradict the revelation, because of following the [speakers] intention; and because of the reason that there is no revealed statement contradicting this, [my] explanation is certainly in accord with the text [being commented on]. So do not entertain the thought "How [can this book which] does not follow the text, in this fashion, be an explanation."

Otherwise, were one not to resort to this method, it would not be an explanation at all of the revelation, because words, being conventions, refer to a number of things and one would be unsure whether one had grasped hold of their [context] specific meaning.

Moreover, it is by [masters such as] Asaṅga and others themselves that this explanation is [essentially] written. So one should take it to be authoritative. For one hears that, "Even though the master Asaṅga had attained to the realization and had knowledge of the revelation's entire meaning, he did not recognize (in non-repetitious teaching as well) the precise signification of individual words, because of the profundity, and because there is so much repetition. So he could

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1. First the means lead the Bodhisattva and later the means are mastered.
2. As earlier, §11.2.
not figure out the PP's meaning and became depressed." Hence, with him in view, Maitreyā the Lord explained the PP Sūtras and composed the Abhisamayālaṁkāra-kārikā-śāstra. Having listened to that it was explained again by the Ārya Asaṅga and by the masters such as Vasubandhu. But enough of this digression.
13.1 Lineage

When this had been said, friend Subhūti addressed the Lord: Lord, you say, "These, Subhūti, are to be known as the spiritual friends of a great Bodhisattva who is armed with the great armour, gone forth to the Mahāyāna and mounted upon the Mahāyāna." And there, in what you speak of as "a great Bodhisattva," Lord, what is the substance [literally, 'meaning of the word'] "Bodhisattva?"

[W76.1] For one who has taken to the pratipatti (‘progress achiever’) after the proximate penetration, there is a path of seeing, etc., which is different from the [above] specified proximate knowledge. Therefore, conveying the substratum of the progress achiever, the nature of which is the dharma-element [AA1.5; §10.6.3, the A] says: Lord you say, etc.2

This is what has been said [in the foregoing]. Lord, you say ["These...are...the spiritual friends] of a great Bodhisattva" [W74] and in other sūtras you speak of "a great Bodhisattva" [W22ff]. There in the former statement and in those other sūtras, given that the dharma-element is the nature of Buddha dharmas, what is the meaning of the word (padārtha) meaning of the locus "Bodhisattva?"

When this had been said the Lord thus replied to friend Subhūti: Subhūti, the meaning of the word "Bodhisattva" is nothing.

To give the answer it says Subhūti, the meaning of the word Bodhisattva, etc. That is to say so much as: that which is the substance (padārtha) Bodhisattva, the basis (padārtha) of the dharmas of a Buddha, is, really, nothing (a-padārtha), no entity that serves as a locus, no lineage.

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1 It is helpful to consider topics four to six of AA1.5-6, i.e., lineage, the objective support and aims as a unit (see introduction §2.16).

2 W76.1-78.6; P87.2.2-87.5.8; AA37-39; Pañca:160-164; partially translated by Obermiller (1933-6:86-94) and Ruegg (1968:129-132).
What is the reason for this? Subhūti, it is because the great Bodhisattva trains in absence of attachment to all dharmas.

"How, given that liberation is not tenable without a realization, and [that a great Bodhisattva] is one who realizes Buddha dharmas, could a Bodhisattva be nothing?" Having anticipated this question with What is the reason for this, [the Lord] says [it is because...] all dharmas, etc. In the absence of attachment to all dharmas, there being no settling on an entity or its sign since, otherwise, realization would not be tenable, [the Bodhisattva] trains as an illusory person, as it were, to realize the Buddha dharmas. So how, really, could there be a substance? This is the idea.

On the surface level, however, since the pratipatti ('progress achiever') quality changes with change in stages, the Bodhisattva, the substratum of the Buddha dharmas the nature of which is the dharma-element, becomes thirteen-fold [and] is mentioned as lineage.¹

There, first of all, (i-iv) there is the substratum of the arising of the four sorts of worldly, proximate penetration. (v-vi) After that [there is the substratum] of the extra-ordinary paths of seeing and meditation. (vii-viii) Then, through the power of their production, simultaneously [there is the substratum] of the arising of all antidotes and prevention of opposites—like pushing out a thief and slamming the door.² (ix) Then, because of their [=the antidotes and their opposites] non-findability, [there is the substratum] of the abandonment of the idea that the bad and the antidotes are prevented or arise, respectively.³ (x) Then, through the power of the skillful means of earlier prayers and giving, etc., [there is the substratum] of wisdom and compassion characterized as [W77.1] not located in cyclic existence or in nirvāṇa. (xi) Then, with the production of that

¹ This sentence is an amplification of AAV:73.1-2.
² There are two stages to the path of seeing, meditative equipoise (samāhita-jñāna) and post-equipoise state (prṣṭha-labdha-jñāna). This equipoise is sub-divided into two, (cf. AK6.28ab) called unhindered path (ānantarya-mārga) and path of deliverance (vimukti-mārga). Here these are called antidote (pratipakṣa) and remover (prahāna) [of conceptualization] and the difference between them is "like pushing out a thief and slamming the door."
³ With the attainment of the path of deliverance comes an actual stopping (pratisaṅkhya-nirodha) of the conceptualizations.
[=wisdom and compassion, there is the substratum] of the dharma not shared in common with Śrāvakas, etc.; (xii) Then [there is the substratum] of the sequence of others’ welfare consisting in establishing them in the three vehicles by [means of instructing them out of] an intention to involve [them in the Mahāyāna], etc.,¹ in accord with [their various] states of mind. (xiii) And [lastly, there is the substratum] for as long as there is cyclic existence, of a signless, spontaneous understanding of what needs to be done for others.

And therefore, since the sequence of the realizations is thus, this is their order. And since all attributes of all realization are included in this, these alone are mentioned, not less and not more.

In this manner, since, on the surface level, a substratum-entity is implied, one should understand that all this content is implied in this [A]-PP. Fearing prolixity I will not write out as evidence the portions of the text mentioned in the Pañca about the substratum of each topic. And thus [AA37-38] says:

Lineage is said to be the locus of the six realization dharmas,² of antidote and abandonment, of the complete embracing of those [=antidote and abandonment], of wisdom and mercy, of that which is not shared in common with Śrāvakas, of the sequence of others’ welfare and [lastly] of understanding operating effortlessly.

[Question:] If just dharma-element is cause for the realization of the noble dharmas, and hence, if the Bodhisattva who consists of that, is the naturally abiding lineage of the supreme Buddha qualities called ultimate reality, then, since the dharma-element is the common essential nature [of the Bodhisattva and of all other beings likewise], a division of lineage [along the following lines] would not be possible: (a) This is the naturally abiding lineage coming down from beginningless time acquired [purely] by virtue of [one’s] ultimate reality; (b) this is [the lineage] that has been brought to a state of development

¹ The four intentions (abhisaṃdhi, idem dgongs) are avatāraṇābhisārdhi, laksṇābhisārdhi, pratipakṣābhisārdhi and pariṇāmanābhisārdhi. For a clear and concise explanation see Das (1902:712, idem po entry no. 2).
² These are the four nirvedha-bhāgīya, darśana-mārga and bhāvana-mārga.
acquired from cultivation of the earlier roots of virtue;¹ (c) this is the lineage of Śrāvakas, Pratyeka-buddhas and Tathāgatas, definite in that it cannot be taken away, even by great hindrance; and this is the lineage of Śrāvakas, etc., which is indefinite, in that it can be taken away by hindrance.²

[Response:] To the extent that it will be support when there is realization in the Śrāvaka-yāna, etc., to that extent the dharma-element is posited as being a cause for the realization of the noble dharmas, and hence is mentioned as lineage. Thus it is the satisfaction [of the questioner] settled. Alternatively, just as a substratum such as a pot, and so forth, made out of one and the same clay substance and fired in one and the same fire, differs as the container of different things such as honey and sugar which it holds, similarly, a variety of substrata are mentioned relative to the variety of the dharmas to be based on it--these being included in the three vehicles as what is to be attained. Thus there is no fault. And thus [AA39] says:

Since there are no divisions in the dharma-element different lineages are not [really] tenable. Because of the different qualities which are based on it, however, its divisions are proclaimed.

According to the science of word derivation, however, dharma-element is lineage (gotra) inasmuch as it frees up [uttāra-tra] good qualities [guna-goi].³

For from that these good qualities arise and issue forth. This is the meaning.

[W78.1] With this in mind it is thus said that all Ārya persons emerge from the uncreated.⁴

[Question]: Surely lineage should have been mentioned right at the start [as in the MSA] because of its being something which precedes production of an

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¹ Cf. Vasubandhu on MSA:3.4 (Bagchi 1970:12); also Bodhisattva-bhūmi 3.2.
² Cf. MSA:3.6, Ruegg (1969).
³ Cf. MSA:3.4d [सन्तु-असन्तु चैव विवेयं] गुणोत्तरणवार्त: which Vasubandhu explains [तत् पुनः हेतु-भावन सतू फल-भावन मसतू] गुणोत्तरणार्थे गोत्रे वैदिकवर्गं गुणा उत्तरस्यस्मादु उज्ज्वलेऽस्तीति कुला (Bagchi1970:11-12). Obermiller (1933-6:92) explains the etymology as follows: "The dharma-dhātu is gotra inasmuch as it saves (trāyate = tra) the virtuous properties (of a living being; guṇa = go)."
⁴ Presumably uttāraṇa goes from tra to tra (Tib sgrol ba means to liberate), as smoothly as guṇa undergoes its metamorphosis to go!

⁴ W142; Conze renders [asaṁskṛta]-prabhāvita “derive their dignity from.”

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[altruistic] mind and the proximate liberation and penetrations as well. How can it be spoken of thus [i.e., as it is in the AA where it comes after those topics]? True, [what you have stated just now] is the order of things [as they occur]. But this sequence [followed here], where having stated the result then the cause is mentioned afterwards, is one of statement [for pedagogical purposes]. Hence, there is no fault.

13.2 Objective support

It is because, Subhūti, great Bodhisattvas when there is non-attachment, through the content of all dharmas, awaken to unsurpassed, perfect enlightenment. As for [your question regarding their being called ‘great’], Subhūti, Bodhisattvas are called great because their purpose is enlightenment.

What is the objective support of the Bodhisattva who is the substratum of the above-mentioned progress achiever? To answer this question, after [stating] the substratum, to convey the sense of the objective support [the Lord] says, [it is because...] all dharmas, etc. The state of non-attachment results from the content of subsequent understanding of absolutely all dharmas which stand as objective support. [The content of subsequent understanding comes into being] by properly adhering to the non-transgression of either truth. When that is there, they awaken, through purification of the objective support, to unsurpassed, perfect enlightenment, [but] not otherwise. Therefore, Bodhisattvas (those whose very being is enlightenment) are called great since their own welfare, in all respects, is accomplished through their depending on enlightenment as goal.

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1 W78.7-79.21; P87.5.8-88.3.5; AA40-41.
2 The range of meaning in the words artha and bodha/bodhi, and the different ways to understand the words in a compound, make the sense of the passage somewhat difficult to construe. The Tib seems to have tried to cope with the problem by translating artha differently in the two compounds (anubodhanārthena and bodhyarthena): rjes su rogs pa'i don du and byang chub don du nyer bas na. Conze (1973) takes the former compound as "[when there is non-attachment] in the sense that they understand all dharmas."
3 That is, the conventional/surface level truth and the ultimate truth.

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Here, first of all, having divided in general all dharmas, the virtuous, non-virtuous and neutral, into three sorts—with the thought these are, respectively, (a) such physical activities as leading the life of a renunciate, (b) transgressions like murder and so forth and (c) neutral physical activities, etc.—one entertains them [the three sorts] as objects to be embraced, to be rejected and towards which one is dispassionate.

Then again, taking to what is to be embraced, one contemplates thus: ‘the five grasping aggregates, etc.\(^1\) included within the ordinary path are ordinary. The four concentrations, etc., included within the proper path of the Āryas are extra-ordinary. In that context, one determines that the ordinary, five grasping aggregates, etc., are contaminated insofar as they are not antidotes to the belief in self, while the extra-ordinary mindfulnesses, etc., are non-contaminated insofar as they are antidote to the view of self. One determines the former as what is to be rejected, and the latter as what is to be embraced.

Then, accepting the non-contaminated, one considers in two ways: the harmonies with enlightenment, etc.,\(^2\) included within the desire realm, etc., which are dependent upon causes and conditions are, from the point of view of surface reality, composite; the state of the real and so forth [Pañca:168.14-17], which are not included in the three realms and which are not contingent on causes, are, from the ultimate point of view, non-created dharmas.

Then one nurtures the thought in two further ways: the four concentrations and so forth which arise in the mindstreams of all Ārya beings and which emerge from the uncreated are dharmas shared in common, and the ten powers, etc., [Pañca:168.21-23] which arise in the mindstream of a perfect Buddha are unshared dharmas,

Thus, in accord with the process of realization, all dharmas are taken as the objective support, after the manner of an illusion, as they are. [W79.1] Thus the objective support should be understood as elevenfold.

And since passages stating the above-mentioned order of realizations are certainly clear in the Pañca a doubt should not be raised. Thus [AA40-41] says:

\(^1\) The five grasping aggregates begin the list of the afflicted dharmas (Pañca166.5-8) and the four concentrations the list of the purified dharmas (Pañca166.9ff).

\(^2\) Explained at length Mpps:1119-1209 and 1505-1755.
The objective support is all dharmas. They are, furthermore, virtuous, etc.—[those which are] called the ordinary realization and those which are thought of as the extraordinary; dharmas which are contaminated and uncontaminated; which are composite and non-composite; dharmas which are shared in common with trainees and which are not shared by the Sage.

Those\(^1\) who think that the objective support is just the dharma-element, the continually pure non-dual gnosis, should explain how one attains specific purities that are increasingly superior since [the dharma-element] is always in a state of purity.\(^2\)

If [they say, quoting MAV:1.16] "Like the purification of the water element, gold and sky, purification of this [dharma-element] is asserted," then, there would be settling on the antidote as [i.e., in the form of the awareness] 'the knowledge of reality is pure,' and, by implication, there would be settling on what is to be shunned. Therefore, since the conceptualizations of antidote and what is to be shunned would not have been removed, there would be, as unwelcome consequence, only partial purity.

If [they]\(^3\) ask: How is there a basis of an objective support in your system as [the Pañca:164.14ff paraphrase] "Subhūti, non-being is the objective support of the state of being a knower of all aspects," [indicates]?

[The response is:] There is no flaw since [in our system], with the consideration that "there is no being that stands logical analysis [i.e., is logically defensible], non-being is called [is regarded as] a proper convention[al truth]. And the gradual realization of the illusion-like nature of that [proper conventional truth] which covers the truly real over is purification. Looked at in this manner, then, lineage is that in which fundamental reality is predominant, and the objective support that in which transformations [of fundamental reality] are predominant. Since neither is denied in respect of either, there is a difference

\(^1\) Vijñāpti-mātrins according to Obermiller (1933-6:98-99).
\(^2\) This passage (W79.9-21, ending ityārya-vimuktisenaḥ), an explanation of and expansion on AAV:79.19-80.12, has been discussed in §5.6.3.
\(^3\) Still the Vijñāpti-mātrins according to Obermiller (1933-6:98-99).
\(^4\) Or: 'adherence to.'
\(^5\) This appears to be H's own formulation of the Mādhyamika position.
of characteristics in the substratum and the objective support. There is much to
be said in regard to systematizing the objective support but enough of such
incidental matters. Thus [says] Ārya Vimuktisena.

13.3 Aims

Subhūti said: Again, where you have spoken, Lord, about "a great
Bodhisattva," Lord, for what reason is a Bodhisattva spoken of as a Great
Being (mahāsattva)?

After [stating] the objective support, with the consideration, "What is the
aim of a Bodhisattva having such an objective support and course?" [the A] says,
in order to point out the aims, Again, etc. For what reason for what purpose
is being Bodhisattva spoken of as a Great Being?"

[W80.1] The Lord replied: Bodhisattvas cause a great multitude and great
band of living beings to attain [spiritual] foremostness. And since that is the
purpose they are called Great Beings.

To set forth the answer [the Lord] says [Bodhisattvas cause...a great,
etc. A great multitude of living beings is an expression for an
immeasurable group of beings in general. Since even just one [living being]
would be great [i.e., big, augmented] because of the greatness of the proceeding
forth of beginningless cyclic existence, there is the word multitude. A [great]
band of living beings is specifically an expression of something grouped
through sattva-sabhāga [i.e., of a group sharing something particular] on the
basis of the general [word sattva-nikāya]. Through distinction of the group of
the [eight]2 different candidates for, and recipients of, the result [of Stream-
enterer], etc. the dissimilar beings are excluded.3 Causes to attain

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1 W80.4-84.4; P88.3.5-89.2.7; AA40; Pañcā:169-175.
2 See §7.9.3.2 for the eight Āryas, Pañcā:169.10-12 for the total list of special persons.
3 H indicates that although a Bodhisattva wishes to take all beings to the foremost status, it is only in
the case of those who are following the proper path that he can bring this about. sabhāga may be an
equivalent of bhāga 'section, division,' just as satattva is of tattva. Or it may mean ‘one with luck’ as
the Tib construes it. But in that case its presence where one expects a noun is problematic.

Alternatively, it is possible that we have here an adaptation of the apoha theory. If this is so the
passage might be construed to mean ‘...amongst the fortunate ones, in particular, who, from amongst the
[spiritual] foremostness [is explained as follows]: Having comprehended the greatness of the thought which is the foremost state of all living beings [i.e., having understood the greatness of putting living beings first], by going forth with that aim, they afterwards, through expounding the doctrine and so forth, will bring about the [spiritual] foremostness of all living beings who wish to attain it. Because of that means because of that reason. Bodhisattvas are Great Beings (mahāsattva) because their sattva, i.e., minds, are great.

Then friend Śāriputra addressed the Lord: It occurs to me, also, Lord, the reason why a Bodhisattva is called Great Being.

When there is greatness of thought there is greatness of removal [of wrong views together with their latencies].¹ In order to teach the greatness of removal Śāriputra says It occurs to me, etc. This [statement of Śāriputra] is [his] way of requesting permission since he is under the governance of a Guru. That reason (artha), the reason why being a Bodhisattva one is called Great Being is also disclosed to me, Lord. The meaning of the sentence is thus. The word also is used because [the reason is not known] only by the Lord.

The Lord replied: May it occur to you, Śāriputra, that thing for which you feel now is the time.

[The Lord] expresses the sense of the permission with May it occur, etc. May that thing properly occur appear to you, for the conveying of which you feel now is the occasion time fitting for discussion.

Friend Śāriputra said: Because he [or she] will teach doctrine in order to remove the great [i.e., firmly rooted] view of self, view of a living being, view of a life, view of person, view of becoming, view of dissolving, view of annihilation, view of permanence, view of one's body, as well as other such views, for that reason a Bodhisattva is called Great Being.

generality of living beings are differentiated in terms of reversal of wrong sorts [of apprehension], as the band of the [eight] different candidates for, and as the band of the recipients of, the result [of Stream-enterer], etc.'

¹ I.e., with proper wisdom one attains pratisamkhyā-nirodha; cf. §6.6, §6.15.4
Having received permission [Sāriputra] says because he [or she] will teach, etc. There self refers to the substratum of the feeling of I, the idea being that the feeling of I is located in it [=self].

Living being [sad+tva-sattva] is [so called] because of naturally wasting away [sad ‘to sink down’ – sādana ‘wasting away’]; life because it persists, under the control of the life-force, until the commonly located aggregate finishes; person (pudgalā) because of again and again [punaḥ-puḍ] settling down into [it-]la migrations [gati-ga]; becoming (bhava) because it becomes (bhavati) manifest; dissolving (vibhava) because it becomes (bhavati) invisible. Annihilation is "It does not exist now, it existed." Permanence refers to "what exists through its own being does not [ever] become non-existent." [View of] one's body is viewing the five aggregates in the form (ākāra) of "I" and "mine." Other such views refers to, besides the views mentioned above, wrong view and judging [as best one’s foolish] ethics and vows, etc., the nature of which is a settling of the sort that superimposes self, etc., and dharma. He [or she] will teach doctrine in order to remove in order to get rid of these [views] together with their latencies. The idea is [that they will do so] after having attained the greatnesses of removal and realization, otherwise [if one were to take it literally to mean they taught while still Bodhisattvas] "because [one is talking about] the true reality of that hidden thing the method brings about, it would indeed be difficult [for them] to explain." [The expression] the reason why has the sense of because of that.

Then friend Subhūti addressed the Lord: It occurs to me, also, Lord, the reason why Bodhisattvas are called Great Being.

The Lord replied: May it occur to you, Subhūti, those things for which you feel now is the time.

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1 H is suggesting etymologies. āhita-āvā, āham-m, or etasmin-tman.
2 The logic behind H's comment, ā nikāya-sabhāga-parisamāpteḥ is unclear. The word sabhāga is used in a different sense just previously at W80.9.
3 jīvita-jīva or jīvita-ji, vaś/vartate-va.
4 The five different views, as an amplification of the anus'ayas has been discussed at length in §6.17.2.
5 See above W30.17; PV Pramāṇa-siddhi 134.
Subhūti said: Lord, Bodhisattvas are called Great Beings [as] they have no attachment for, and do not stick to, even what [we call] enlightenment mind, omniscient mind, non-contaminated mind, incomparable mind, mind comparable to the incomparable and not shared in common with any Srāvaka or Pratyeka-buddha.

Since there is a special realization when every fault, such as desire and so forth, is removed, the Bodhisattva's realization is great. [Subhūti] speaks in just the same way with Lord, the Bodhisattva is called Great Being, etc.

It is not just another thing [it is something special]. Therefore there is the word api (even). The enlightenment mind is that mind the aim of which is enlightenment, i.e., to say so much as the mind, the nature of which is prayer and engagement [in practice; §11.2]. A mind carried away by the [idea of] being knower of all is the omniscient mind aspiring [to liberate all living beings] which is included in the level of belief-based performance. Because of the penetrative understanding of extra-ordinary non-conceptual gnosis, there is non-contaminated mind with pure surpassing intention on the seven preparatory levels. On account of going along spontaneously without specific shape, mind is incomparable. It is subject to transformation on [the levels] starting from the eighth. The mind comparable equal to the incomparable Buddhas is free of all obscuration and is connected with the Buddha level.

Alternatively, enlightenment mind is that mind which has become the nature of the Bodhisattva, which [nature] has the form of non-production. And just this is then mentioned fourfold, from the point of view of what is a surface level [truth] for yogins, as the omniscient mind, etc., through the reversal process connected, in some way or other, with mirror-like wisdom, and so

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1 On the so-called don dam sems bskyed see Sparham (1987:145).
2 H again appears to have in mind an adaptation of the apoha theory. Ultimate reality is undifferentiated as this or that. By a process of conceptualization, particulars come to have a merely surface or conventional reality. The process of conceptualization is a knowledge process that functions to know, and give quasi-reality to, existing things by way of differentiating them from all that they are not.
forth. All of these are not shared in common by not realizable by, Śrāvakas and Pratyeka-buddhas. [A Bodhisattva] has no attachment for does not settle on, and does not embrace does not stand on even this mind which is the sort that one would likely be partial to because it is so magnificent. With this [phrasing] the greatness of realization is conveyed. The word api in [tatrāpi] (even in this) is because it goes without saying [that he has no attachment] for other [less magnificent things]

What is the reason for this? It is because that omniscient mind is non-contaminated and is not stuck.

"Since without settling or standing on something meditation is not possible, how can there be these two [non-settling and non-standing]." Having anticipated this question with what is the reason for this, [Subhūti] says, It is because, etc. That just-mentioned omniscient mind, which term stands for all the minds mentioned earlier, is non-contaminated because it serves as an antidote to attachment. It is not stuck because it serves as an antidote to standing. Therefore, there is cultivation by an illusory person, as it were. This is the idea.

And therefore, even this which is the non-contaminated, non-stuck omniscient mind, in regard to even that mind they are without attachment and without sticking. This is the reason why Bodhisattvas are reckoned Great Beings.

And therefore, in regard to even this, etc. is the conclusion.

Then friend Śāriputra addressed friend Subhūti: Friend Subhūti, what is the reason they are not attached to, and do not stick to, even this mind?

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[Thinking] that, even if non-contaminated, still something would exist, so non-settling and so forth would be inappropriate, [Śāriputra] says [Friend Subhūti,] what is the reason, etc.

Śāriputra replied: It is because there is no mind, friend Śāriputra, that they are not attached to, and do not stick to, even this mind.

For an answer [Subhūti] says it is because there is no mind, it is because, really, it [=the mind] is not produced.

Śāriputra said: Friend Subhūti, is that mind, then, the mind that is no mind, something which is?¹

Subhūti replied: Friend Śāriputra, in that state of no mind, does there either exist, or does one find, either a state of "there is" or "there is not?"

Śāriputra said: No friend Subhūti, it is not so [i.e., one does not].

Subhūti said: Then, friend Śāriputra, if in that state of no mind there neither exists, nor does one find, either a state of "there is" or "there is not," then how did friend Śāriputra ask thus, "Is that mind, then, the mind that is no mind, something which is?"

Śāriputra said: Excellent, friend Subhūti, excellent. And no wonder. You teach just as one whom the Lord has declared to be foremost amongst the calm and collected.

From Śāriputra said upto ...has declared to be foremost amongst the calm and collected has already [W40.22-25, §12.2] been explained. Coming about as it does, through the dictates of a different topic, there is no fault of repetition. And thus the Master Dignāga [PPPi:57cd] has said:

In connection with different topics that very same content is repeated again.

¹ With this, the very question that was asked before (W39.5-8, §12.2) we have come full circle!
So,¹ along the lines of Ajita-jaya's aims,² one should understand that the threefold aim of the Bodhisattva's practice is mentioned [in the sūtra].

What is the difference between the objective support and the aim? Along the lines of placing an arrow [on the bow] and its penetrating the target, the objective support pertains to the present time, and is close at hand, while the aim pertains to the future and is far off. Thus [says] Ārya Vimuktisena. And thus [AA42] says:

This aim of the Self-originated Ones [=Bodhisattvas] should be understood by way of three greatnesses: the triad of (a) thought, (b) removal and (c) realization which are the foremost state for all living beings.

¹ W83.23-26 (ending ityārya-vimuktisena) equals, almost word for word AAV:84.16-19; §2.6.5.
² The name Ajita-jaya is associated with Maitreya. If Ārya Vimuktisena is indeed referring to Maitreya, this would be the earliest reference associating the AA with him. It is possible, however, that the phrase should be rendered simply as 'the goal of conquering what is not conquered.'
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Indian sūtras and śāstras are listed alphabetically by title in the first section; Tibetan commentaries are listed alphabetically by author in the second section; reference works are listed alphabetically by author in the third section; works by modern writers are listed alphabetically by author in the fourth section.

I Indian Sūtras and Śāstras


Abhisamayālaṅkārā-kārikā-vṛtti Śuddhamati (Śantipa). Alternative title (according to Jaini 1979:3) Śuddhimati. Extant only in Tib. Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi tshig le'ur byas pa'i 'grel pa dag par ldan pa. P5199.


Abhisamayālaṅkāra-nāma-prajñāpāramitopadeśa-śāstra-ṭīkāPrasphuṭa-padā (Dharmamittra). Text extant only in Tib. Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi tshig le'ur byas pa'i 'grel bshad tshig rab tu gsal ba zhes bya ba. P5194.

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Abhisamayālāṃkāra-nāma-prajñāpāramitopadeśa-sāstra-vṛtti (Haribhadra).

Abhisamayālāṃkāra-vārttika (Bhadanta Vimuktisena). Extant only in Tib. 'phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa stong phrag nyi shu lnga pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi tshig le'ur byas pa'i rnam par 'grel ba P5186. Skt title [Ārya]-Pañcaviṃśati-sāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitopadeśa-sāstra-abhisamayālāṃkāra-kārikā-vārttika.


Abhisamayālāṃkāra-nāma-prajñāpāramitopadeśa-sāstra-vṛtti Kīrtikalā (Ratnakīrtī). Extant only in Tib. Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan shes bya ba'i 'grel pa grags pa'i cha zhes bya ba. P5197.

Abhisamayālāṃkāra-nāma-prajñāpāramitopadeśa-sāstra-vṛtti Durbodhāloka-nāma-tīkā (Dharmakīrtī[śrī], Kulanta/Kuladatta). Extant only in Tib. Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan shes bya ba'i 'grel pa rtogs dka' snang ba zhes bya ba'i 'grel bshad. P5192.


Abhisamayālāṃkāra-bhagavatī-prajñāpāramitopadeśa-sāstra-vṛtti-prajñā- pradīpāvalī. (Buddha-jñāna). Extant only in Tib. Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan shes bya ba'i 'grel pa shes rab sgron ma'i phreng ba. P5198.


Ārya-prajñā-pāramitā-vajracchedika-ṭikā (Kamalaśīla). Extant only in Tib. 'phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa rdo rje gcod pa'i rgya cher 'grel pa P5216.


Prajñā-pāramitā-piṇḍārtha-nāma (Kumaraśri-bhadra). Text extant only in Tib.
   Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i don bs dus pa zhes bya ba. P5195.

Prajñā-pāramitā-saṁcaya-gāthā-kośa-tāla (Dharmāśri). Text extant only in
   Tib. Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa sdud pa'i tshig su byas pa'i mdzod kyi
   lde mig.

Prajñā-pāramitā-saṁcaya-gāthā-pañjikā (Buddha-jñāna). Text extant only in
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[Bhagavad-prajñā-pāramitā]-ratna-guna-saṁcaya-gāthā. See Conze (1960),
   Yuyama (1976).

Bhagavad-ratna-guna-saṁcaya-gāthā-pañjikā-nāma (Haribhadra). Also called
   Subodhini. Extant only in Tib. Bcom ldan 'das yon tan rin po che sdud pa'i
   tshig su byas pa'i dka' 'grel shes bya ba. P5190.


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Vyākhyāyukti (Vasubandhu). In Tib. Tib title Rnam bs had rig pa. P5562.

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