

Moral Development and Moral Action:
A Study of Youthful Offenders

By

THOMAS MORAN

B.A., University of Nebraska, 1974
M.S., Oregon State University, 1977

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
(Department of Psychology)

We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard.

UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

November 1987

© Thomas Moran, 1987

In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Department of Psychology

The University of British Columbia
1956 Main Mall
Vancouver, Canada
V6T 1Y3

Date Nov. 26, 1987

ABSTRACT

This study was designed to explore possible relations between moral maturity and moral action by evaluating groups of delinquent and non-delinquent youth, and examining their relative position on multiple measures of moral maturity and criminality. Subjects were 60 male adjudicated juvenile offenders between the ages of 14 and 17, and 20 non-delinquent controls. All youth participated in a series of structured interviews used as a way of assessing their abilities on Kohlberg's moral reasoning, Turiel's social convention understanding, and Selman's social perspective taking measures, and were administered Hogan's socialization, empathy, and autonomy scales. The delinquent youth were assigned immorality ratings and further classified according to legal categories. Ratings for Hare's Psychopathy Checklist were obtained from primary therapists for the delinquents and from school counselors for the non-delinquent comparison group.

The results revealed that as a group, delinquent subjects showed substantial developmental delays in their performances on measures of moral reasoning, social convention understanding, interpersonal awareness and indices of socialization and autonomy. Hogan's empathy measure also showed a trend in the same direction. The majority of the delinquent youth were found to score at a preconventional-concrete reasoning level and showed a general lack of social-moral character. Tests of communality among the six moral maturity measures produced distinct and internally consistent cognitive reasoning (i.e., moral reasoning, interpersonal

awareness, and social convention understanding) and moral character (i.e., socialization, empathy, and autonomy) clusters which lend support to the claims of Brown, Harre', and Hogan regarding the multidimensionality of moral development. There was an expected inverse relationship between immorality and moral maturity for the low and moderate seriousness groups, and an inconsistent pattern for the high group. This later finding was interpreted as an artifact of the fact that those delinquents whose criminal acts were judged most immoral were particularly guilty of various sexual offenses.

The psychometric properties of the Psychopathy Checklist confirm its usefulness with adolescent populations. Three internally consistent factor scales emerged (i.e., motivational deficit, lack of ego strength, and behavioral deviation). While psychopathy was found to significantly correlate with immorality ratings, an unexpected positive relationship was also found between psychopathy and moral reasoning for the sex offender group.

Taken together, all of these results were interpreted in terms of Heider's theory of the psychology of action, which views behavior, in this case moral behavior, as a combination of "can" (i.e., moral reasoning competency) and "try" (i.e., moral character).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	iv
LIST OF TABLES	vi
DEDICATION	viii
ACKNOWLEDGMENT	ix
CHAPTER 1	
1.1. Introduction	1
1.1.1. A critique of previous research	2
1.1.2. A survey of alternative accounts of moral maturity	5
1.1.3. General Hypotheses.....	9
CHAPTER 2	
2.1. Theories of Moral Maturity	12
2.1.1. Kohlberg: Justice principles and moral development	12
2.1.2. Turiel: Social convention understanding	15
2.1.3. Non-cognitive perspectives on moral maturity	17
2.1.4. Psychopathy	18
2.1.5. Selman: Stages of interpersonal awareness	21
2.2. Taxonomy of the Immorality of Delinquent Acts	23
2.2.1. Direct ratings of the immorality of delinquent acts	24
2.3. Summary of the Methodology	25
2.3.1. Subject selection	25
2.3.2. Stimulus materials	25
2.3.3. Procedure	26
2.3.4. Scoring and reliability	27
2.3.5. Summary of hypotheses	28

CHAPTER 3

Results	29
3.1. Moral Maturity: A Comparison of Delinquents and Non-delinquents.	29
3.1.1. Principal components analysis of moral maturity measures.	34
3.2. Comparisons within the Delinquent Sample	38
3.2.1. Immorality ratings	39
3.2.2. Seriousness level ratings	40
3.2.3. Interrelations between perceived immorality and seriousness	42
3.3. The Relationship Between Moral Maturity and the Seriousness and Immorality of Delinquent Acts.....	46
3.3.1. Correlational analyses relating immorality ratings to moral maturity measures	52
3.3.2. Special consideration involving the juvenile sex offenders	53
3.4. Psychopathy	61
3.4.1. Principal Components of the Psychopathy Checklist	61
3.4.2. Psychopathy and moral maturity	63
3.4.3. Classification of psychopaths and non-psychopaths	66

CHAPTER 4

Discussion	70
4.1. Delinquents versus non-delinquents	71
4.2. Relationship between moral maturity measures and the seriousness and immorality of delinquent acts	74
4.3. Limitations and future directions	79
REFERENCES	83

APPENDICES

A. Kohlberg's Moral Reasoning	88
B. Turiel's Social Convention Understanding	94
C. Hogan's Scales of Moral Development	99
D. Selman's Interpersonal Awareness	101
E. Hare's Measure of Psychopathy	105
F. Delinquency Rating Scale	107
G. Consent Forms	112

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1:	Discriminant Function Analysis: Classifying Delinquents and Non-delinquents	31
TABLE 2:	Analysis of Variance: Delinquents versus Non-delinquents ...	32
TABLE 3:	Factor Analysis of Moral Maturity Measures	35
TABLE 4:	Correlation Matrices of Moral Maturity Measures: Delinquents and Non-delinquents	37
TABLE 5:	Mean Immorality Ratings	41
TABLE 6:	Cross-Classification of Legal and Immorality Rating Systems	44
TABLE 7:	Discriminant Function Analysis: Classifying Delinquents and Non-delinquents According to Immorality Ratings	48
TABLE 8:	Analysis of Variance: Levels of Immorality and Moral Maturity Measures	50
TABLE 9:	Pearson Correlations Between the Perceived Immorality of Delinquent Acts and Moral Maturity Measures	54
TABLE 10:	Analysis of Co-Variance: Juvenile Sex Offenders, Non-sex Offenders, and Non-delinquents by Moral Maturity	56
TABLE 11:	Stage Distribution of Moral Reasoning, Interpersonal Awareness, and Social Convention Understanding by Group	57
TABLE 12:	Correlation Matrices of Moral Maturity Measures: Juvenile Sex Offenders and Delinquent Non-sex Offenders	59
TABLE 13:	Factor Analysis of Hare's Psychopathy Checklist	62
TABLE 14:	Correlations Between the Psychopathy Factor Scales and Measures of Moral Maturity	65
TABLE 15:	Discriminant Function Analyses: Classifying Psychopaths and Non-psychopaths	68

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I would like to express my heart-felt gratitude to Michael Chandler, my thesis supervisor, for his steadfast support, theoretical and empirical contributions, and sensitivity during my graduate work at the University of British Columbia and the production of this dissertation. Appreciation is expressed to Lawrence Walker and Robert Hare for their constructive suggestions to earlier versions of this dissertation and for their active roles as thesis committee members. I extend a special warm thanks to Nancy Benson, who provided me unconditional support throughout the dissertation process, and without whose caring would have been difficult to achieve. The cooperation of Orin Bolstad of the Morrison Center, Patricia Sawyer and Bill Maddex of the Gresham Public Schools, David Dougher of the Children's Farm Home, Bill Morris of the Multnomah County Juvenile Court, and their respective staffs is gratefully acknowledged. Finally, I would like to thank those youth who participated in this research project.

DEDICATION

to the memory of Hilda MacLeod

CHAPTER 1

1.1. Introduction

The purpose of this study was to explore possible relations between the commission of illegal and sometimes immoral acts on the part of young persons and their progress toward the achievement of moral maturity. This work was predicated on the broadly shared assumption that existing research into the normative course of moral development may have direct relevance to our understanding of other less typical youth, distinguished by having been adjudicated as delinquent. Over the past several decades numerous investigators (see Blasi, 1980; Jennings, Kilkeny, and Kohlberg, 1983; and Jurkovic, 1980 for recent reviews) have sought to demonstrate such a relation between delinquency or criminality and deviations in the acquisition of age-appropriate moral maturity. The study reported here extends this research tradition by going beyond the more usual categoric comparison of delinquent and non-delinquent samples to a more detailed examination of the moral maturity of juvenile offenders differentiated in terms of the degree to which their serious illegal acts also represent offenses against commonly held standards of morality. The intuition which guided this research was that the problematic relations that others (i.e., Jennings, Kilkeny, and Kohlberg, 1983) have reported between measures of moral maturity and delinquent status may have been a result of the fact that not all acts which are illegal are also necessarily immoral. Clear relations between delinquency and measures of moral maturity, if they exist, should be expected only to the degree that the law violations under study directly contradict some generally recognized moral prohibition. The central hypotheses, tested in this study were, then, that: 1) measures of moral maturity would predict to delinquent acts only in so far as such

offenses also constitute departures from recognized moral codes; and 2) that the seriousness of such moral lapses would increase in direct proportion to the degree that those responsible for them fall short of acceptable standards of age-appropriate moral maturity.

1.1.1. A critique of previous research

While previous research has succeeded in demonstrating some real but modest relation between criminality and moral immaturity, these findings have been both more mixed and considerably less impressive than the clarity of the conceptual relation between these two classes of variables would lead one to anticipate (Hudgins & Prentice, 1973; Fodor, 1972). Two possible reasons suggest themselves as ways of understanding this failed expectation. First, the clear majority of these previous studies (Haviland, 1977; Fodor, 1972, 1973) have treated juvenile delinquents as a homogeneous group, and without regard to the case-specific details of their illegal acts. By batch processing delinquents of every stripe such investigations have risked diluting whatever relation might actually exist between moral maturity and specific offense categories. As Quay and his colleagues (Quay, Peterson, & Cosalvic, 1960) and others (i.e., Hetherington, Stouwic, & Ridberg, 1971) have demonstrated, legal definitions often mask the enormous diversity which is present in actual delinquent acts, and obscures the fact that while some young offenders have acted in ways that would likely be seen as criminal in any context, others appear to be guilty of little more than becoming well socialized into a system of temporarily specific sub-cultural values that happens to be at variance with existing codified law. A few investigators have pursued a more differentiated research strategy by further sub-dividing their study populations according to standard legal offense categories (Jurkovic & Prentice, 1977; and Campagna & Harter, 1976) or in terms of

various personality descriptors (Hawk & Peterson, 1974; Hetherington et al., 1971; Quay et al., 1959), but these investigations continue to represent the exception rather than the rule.

Despite their more differentiated character, studies of the sort just outlined nevertheless still continue to be ill-suited in bringing to the surface whatever relations might potentially exist between morality and criminality. This is true for the important reason that while codified laws have as one of their purposes the defense of public morality, they obviously serve other and less morally relevant purposes as well. Many existing laws, which if broken, would result in one's being labeled a juvenile delinquent, have little to do with morality as generally conceived, and, instead, serve to help regulate civic life, preserve convention, or facilitate the smooth working of commercial and bureaucratic enterprises. Consequently, many youth who are adjudicated as delinquent, have won this status as a consequence of running afoul of such statutory laws, and are not guilty of anything that could be construed easily as a moral offense, at least by those who do not automatically equate immorality with any law violation. To mix such "status" offenders in with others whose illegal acts represent more or less blatant violations of usual moral prohibition, and to hope for any clear relation to emerge with measures of moral maturity, is to be optimistic at best.

From the perspective adopted here, any conceptually compelling relation between measured delays in moral development and delinquency could only be expected in those instances in which real violations of usual moral prohibition are at stake. Similarly, not every act that can be reliably counted as a clear offense against moral principle is automatically equal in immorality to other offenses that also unambiguously violate other and perhaps more serious moral prohibitions.

For example, bald-faced lies that serve one's own interests at the expense of innocent others typically qualify as immoral acts by most ethical standards, but are rarely seen to be as morally reprehensible as is robbery or murder. Developing some metric which permitted the scaling of delinquent offenses in terms of how much they are in violation of usual moral standards, holds out the prospect of aiding in the making of such discriminations, and, consequently, was one of the procedural goals of this research.

A second potential explanation for the modest correlations which previously have been reported between moral maturity and juvenile criminality lies in the fact that the authors of the few studies which do explore this relation have tended to approach the task of assessing moral maturity in ways which have been restricted by their special allegiances to one or another of a set of possible alternative theoretical accounts of moral development. This state of affairs is an understandable consequence of the fact that the majority of such studies are the outgrowth of efforts to demonstrate the potential social relevance of some particular theoretical account of moral development. From the more functional perspective adopted in this present study, however, such narrowly theory-driven studies were seen to be dangerously parochial. Real relations between moral maturity and certain categories of criminality might well exist, but fall outside of the orbit of any particular theory. For this reason the present study attempted to be more eclectic and to draw upon a range of available theories and measures of moral development, each of which appears to hold out some separate promise of informing our understanding of possible relations between juvenile delinquency and moral maturity.

A brief outline of those theories considered is detailed below. This

survey begins with an account of Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning, precedes to a discussion of Turiel's model of social convention understanding and then turns to a description of Hogan's theory of moral character. Finally, the relevance of Selman's theory of interpersonal awareness and Hare's account of psychopathy are discussed.

1.1.2. A survey of alternative accounts of moral maturity

Unquestionably, the elaborate account of moral maturity provided by Kohlberg (1969, 1976) and his colleagues (e.g., Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, & Lieberman, 1983) over the last quarter of a century must occupy some central place in any proposed analysis of the relationship between lawlessness and moral maturity. This same conclusion is endorsed by the work of several other investigators who themselves have set out to study possible relationships between criminality and Kohlbergian measures of moral maturity (Campagna & Harter, 1975; Jurkovic & Prentice, 1977). The present research effort undertook to partially replicate aspects of certain of these earlier studies, with the important provision that attention should also be directed to the moral relevance of the particular offenses perpetrated.

What is perceived here as the short fall of any study which relies exclusively upon a Kohlbergian account of the moral developmental process is that Kohlberg, or at least certain of his interpreters, have tended to equate the whole of morality with the cognitive task of making judgments regarding the justice implications of alternative courses morally relevant action (Turiel, 1983). While this deontic approach (Walker, 1980) to matters of moral reasoning may be a defensible alternative in the pursuit of ethical philosophy, as a psychological theory, it intentionally leaves out, among other things, a range of teleologic considerations, referred to pejoratively by Kohlberg (1971) as a "bag of virtues", which are of major

theoretic significance to some (i.e., Harre', 1983), and may have considerable practical relevance in any attempt to understand juvenile delinquency.

In response to the argument that the moral judgment process is only a part of the larger domain of moral development, other investigators have centered research attention upon those alternative developmental processes by means of which young persons acquire an understanding of what society holds out to be the right and wrong thing to do (Turiel, 1978, 1983). From the more problem-focussed perspective adopted in this study, any complete accounting of the moral maturity status of both delinquent and non-delinquent youth necessarily must make reference to this range of more teleologic considerations by attempting to assess the degree to which individuals understand such matters of social convention. To this end, an important goal of this proposed research was to bring into play procedures which measure awareness and understanding of what society holds out to be the "right" and "wrong" things to do.

Finally, as Hogan (Hogan, 1982; Hogan & Busch, 1984) pointed out, moral maturity entails more than a grasp of justice principles (as emphasized by Kohlberg) or knowledge of social conventions (as stressed by Turiel), and must be understood also to hinge, in important part, upon one's ability to bring oneself to sacrifice apparent personal advantage in the pursuit of what one knows or judges to be the morally right thing to do. It follows, then, from Hogan's argument, that any comprehensive assessment of moral maturity must necessarily include some attempt to measure the character strength which individuals bring to bear in obligating themselves to undertake what they take to be the right thing to do. For these reasons the present study also included, among its list of measures of moral maturity, those personality variables which Hogan (1982)

and others (e.g., Harre', 1983), have earmarked as being of central importance to the achievement of moral maturity.

In partial summary, then, the primary purpose of this research was to explore the relation between several aspects of the developing moral maturity process and delinquent activities of various degrees of immorality. It was assumed here that the problematic character of much of the existing research concerned with these relationships is a joint by-product of the facts that insufficient attention has been paid: 1) to the full range of ways in which various delinquent acts actually represent violations of usual moral standards, and 2) to the full scope of the process of moral development. The research plan followed in this study was intended to serve as a partial corrective for these shortcomings and included efforts: 1) to develop a typology for classifying the degree of immorality of various delinquent offenses; 2) to extend the range of measures of moral maturity under consideration to include the full compliment of variables proposed by Kohlberg (1976), Turiel (1983) and Hogan (Hogan & Busch, 1984; Hogan, Johnson, & Emler, 1978); and 3) to reexamine the possible relations between morality and criminality in light of these more differentiated considerations.

Beyond this list of primary variables, this study was further expanded to include two other sets of measures which hold out the promise of deepening our understanding of any relation that might emerge between measures of moral maturity and types of delinquent offenses. In particular, the variables of interpersonal awareness and psychopathy were included for study. While other variables and different measures might have been chosen, these particular additions were seen to be especially justified by the fact that both have been regularly implicated in matters of moral maturity and have been shown to be associated with various

indices of antisocial behavior. In particular, numerous theorists (e.g., Selman, 1980, Walker, 1980) have argued that specific levels of perspective-taking competence are prerequisite to given levels of moral maturity. Others (Chandler, 1972; 1973; Chandler, Greenspan, & Barenboim, 1973, Gough, 1957, 1948; Selman, 1980) have presented evidence which directly links developmental delays in such competencies to various measures of antisocial behavior. In light of these prior findings, any attempt to directly correlate moral development and criminality without also exploring the possible part which perspective taking might play in this relation would have been incomplete.

The relation between psychopathy and criminality is all but definitional, and has been well documented in a long series of studies by Cleckly (1976), Hare (1980, 1983, 1985; Hare & McPherson, 1984), and others (Jurkovic & Prentice, 1977). There are also compelling theoretical reasons to anticipate that psychopathy, like role-taking, may provide a conceptual bridge linking criminality and moral maturity. In particular, the work of Hogan (1982) and Turiel (1983), which stresses the role of socialization in the achievement of moral maturity, suggests such a bridge to the work of Hare (1983) and others, that portrays psychopathy as a partial symptom of socialization failures or a collapse of will. On these grounds it was seen to be essential to include in this study a measure of psychopathy as a means of evaluating its potential part in explaining any observed relation between morality and criminality.

On the strength of the preceding arguments, methods for indexing both psychopathy and perspective-taking competence were added to the list of measures to be employed in this study. Altogether, then, these seven moral maturity descriptors, including those of Kohlberg, Turiel, and the three measures proposed by Hogan, along with Selman's measure of

interpersonal awareness, and Hare's Psychopathy Checklist, together constituted the set of predictor variables to be placed in relation to the criterion measures of delinquency status.

Finally, because several and perhaps all of the measures already discussed could or have already been shown to covary with general intelligence, it was decided to include a brief IQ measure as a check on the possibility that other differences that might be observed could be explained as an artifact of potential intellectual differences. The Shipley Institute of Living Scales was chosen for this purpose.

In brief outline then, this study set out to: 1) identify a diverse group of youthful offenders and an appropriately matched sample of non-delinquent controls; 2) assess the level of moral maturity, interpersonal awareness, psychopathy, and intelligence characteristics of these subjects; 3) scale the offenses of the delinquent group in terms of the degree to which their illegal activities also constitute violations of legal and moral prohibitions; and 4) examine the relations between these predictive and criterial measures in light of the various hypotheses detailed below.

1.1.3. General Hypotheses

The central hypothesis that guided this study was that young persons who commit acts that are in serious violation of accepted moral standards will tend to be those whose moral development is also delayed or arrested relative to their non-delinquent or less delinquent peers. Because acts thought to be immoral also tend to be illegal, this general hypothesis translates into the joint expectations that: 1) as a group, adjudicated delinquents will demonstrate less moral maturity than their non-delinquent age mates; and 2) that among delinquents, those responsible for the most morally reprehensible offenses will also be those whose moral development

is most in arrears. Because moral maturity level was indexed separately in this study in ways consistent with the theories of Kohlberg, Turiel, and Hogan, both of the hypotheses above were tested three times. Beyond these primary hypotheses, a secondary set of expectations were formulated having to do with the contributions of both interpersonal awareness and psychopathy. With reference to the first of these measures it was anticipated that because advancement in perspective-taking competence is widely held to be a precondition for progress toward moral maturity, measures of interpersonal awareness would covary with moral competence and show an inverse relation to criminality. In addition, it was hypothesized that psychopathy ratings would covary, not only with the degree of immorality of known delinquent acts, but also with various indices of moral maturity and interpersonal awareness. These expectations were grounded in the common role which socialization is said to play in each of these measures (Hare, 1985; Turiel, 1983).

Having introduced the study problem, outlined the various independent and dependent variables considered, and detailed the nature of their hypothesized relationship, several additional matters remain. Important among these are the tasks of describing in detail the exact nature of the assessment procedures employed and of further warranting the decision to include these rather than other available constructs and procedures. Beyond these procedural justifications, which will make up the bulk of the detailed methods section that follows, it also will be necessary to outline precisely how the offenses of the delinquent sample were to be scaled for levels of immorality. The following methods section consequently ends with the presentation of a series of converging classificatory and judgment procedures by means of which such rankings of offenses was accomplished.

CHAPTER 2

2.1. Theory Based Measures of Moral Maturity

The description of methods and procedures detailed below goes beyond the scope of the usual skeletonized listing common to journal length articles, and includes, in addition, a detailed discussion of the considerations which led to the selection of the particular procedures adopted. Attention first will be turned to the various ways in which moral maturity was assessed in the context of this study. Following these accounts of the specific measures drawn from the work of Kohlberg, Turiel, and Hogan, attention will be turned to the assessment of perspective-taking competence and a rationale for the selection of Selman's (1980, 1981) test of interpersonal awareness as a measure of the construct will be provided. Next, arguments are offered to justify the adopting of Hare's (1985) procedures as a means of indexing psychopathy and the Shipley Institute of Living Scales as a means of measuring general intelligence. The last major section in this general listing of methods deals with a description of procedures used in the scaling of delinquent offenses. Finally, a summary will be offered in the form of a traditional methods section. Here, a description of the subject population and the phrasing of the proposed assessment process is presented, along with a detailed listing of the hypotheses to be evaluated.

2.1.1. Kohlberg: Justice principles and moral development

Three decades of research by Kohlberg and his colleagues (Colby et al. 1983; Kohlberg, 1976) have served to make the study of moral reasoning all but synonymous with the developmental study of moral maturity. Consequently, no study intended as a broad exploration of the relation between moral development and delinquency could afford to ignore this body of important work. In addition to the theory's more general relevance to

the present research problem, several studies by Kohlberg (1969; 1976; Colby et al. 1983; Jennings & Kohlberg, 1983) and others (Jurkovic & Prentice, 1977), which hinge upon this theory, have been directly concerned with the role which moral reasoning maturity might play in the careers of youthful and adult offenders.

Kohlberg's theory, which is too well known to require detailed treatment here, is, in the most general sense, a descriptive account of the ways in which still deeper structural changes in overall cognitive functioning are reflected in the modes of conceptual resolution of conflicts engendered by the need to resolve competing human interests. His account details a sequence of six such stages and three general levels of moral reasoning maturity. The first or preconventional level, references an essentially hedonistic orientation toward social and moral interactions and is marked by a failure to adequately understand competing points of view. Conventional morality, the second level in Kohlberg's hierarchy, centers upon the clarification and endorsement of routine social values (i.e., conformity). Finally, principled reasoning, which tempers such conventional considerations with an interest in universal justice principles and transcends social standards, represents the third and highest of Kohlberg's moral levels.

While the precise role of moral reasoning maturity in determining the outcome of concrete behavioral choices is not, and in principle could not be, entirely specified by Kohlberg's theory (Blasi, 1980; Colby et al., 1983; Kohlberg, 1976), there is, within this account, the general expectation that more morally mature individuals will be less likely to behave in ways which violate "universal" moral standards than will less morally mature persons. On the strength of such reasoning, several investigators have set out to determine whether, as the theory would

suggest, known criminals evidence lower levels of moral reasoning maturity than do matched groups of non-criminals. Recent reviews of this scattered literature (Blasi, 1980; Jennings et al., 1983; Jurkovic, 1980) indicate that, even in the absence of any attempt to discount those cases in which the offenses in question had little or nothing to do with violation of moral norms, there, nevertheless, is a surprisingly strong relation between morality and delinquency. Across the 15 studies reviewed by Blasi (1980), for example, approximately 80% of the youthful offenders studied were shown to employ age inappropriate preconventional reasoning in their responses to Kohlberg's moral dilemmas. Despite the wide variation present in the kinds of delinquent offenders studied, there appears to be, then, evidence of an unexpectedly strong association between delinquency and moral immaturity.

From the perspective adopted in this study, these earlier research efforts fall short of fully illuminating the extent to which moral reasoning maturity might actually govern conduct in morally hazardous situations primarily because no efforts were made to order the samples of youthful offenders studied in terms of the degree to which their illegal behavior also represents explicit violations of moral standards. The present research effort undertook to go beyond these earlier, more categorical efforts by not only determining the Kohlbergian stage of moral maturity characteristic of members of the delinquent study sample, but by also scaling the degree to which their delinquent offenses actually represent violations of usual moral standards. Consequently, it was hypothesized not only that delinquents would again be shown to be less morally mature than non-delinquent controls, but that, among the delinquent sample, there would be a significant inverse relationship between moral maturity level and any metric which ordered these delinquent

offenses in terms of their moral reprehensibility. More specifically, it was expected that those delinquent individuals whose known offenses were also clearly "immoral" would evidence lower levels of moral reasoning in response to Kohlberg's standard moral dilemmas than would delinquents whose crimes were less at variance with usual moral norms. Form B of Kohlberg's standard test of moral maturity was utilized for this measurement purpose. Appendix A details the specific moral dilemmas employed, the order of their presentation, and references the stage mode on which the scoring procedures are based (Colby & Kohlberg 1987).

2.1.2. Turiel's theory of social knowledge development

In contrast to the work of Kohlberg (1976) and his co-workers (e.g., Colby et al., 1983), which has focused attention almost exclusively upon the study of the moral reasoning process, Turiel (1977, 1978, 1983) has maintained that moral maturity, taken in the broadest sense, also requires the acquisition of a clear knowledge of those specific behaviors which one's society deems to be right or wrong. Turiel does not take issue with the importance which Kohlberg attached to the changing ways in which developing persons reason about moral matters. What he does insist upon, however, is that acquiring such mature moral reasoning strategies constitutes only a part of the developmental agenda facing children. Of equal importance, he argues, is the task of acquiring specific knowledge regarding those social conventions which set limits on how persons "ought" to behave in any given social context. It is Turiel's contention, now backed by a series of empirical studies (Greiger & Turiel, 1983; Nucci, 1981; Turiel & Smetana, 1984) that, from a very young age, children are able to reliably distinguish matters of morality and conventionality. He also maintains that the developmental course by means of which young persons acquire a mature understanding of these separate moral domains is

demonstrably different from the development of moral reasoning competencies, and requires separate measurement.

To demonstrate this point Turiel (1978, 1983) has developed a set of procedures meant to index the more or less sophisticated ways in which social conventions are commonly understood. On the basis of an analysis of responses to these measures he has distinguished seven levels or steps dividing the least and most mature comprehensions of such conventional matters. This progression is understood to depend upon: 1) where the authority which supports such conventions is seen to reside; and 2) how arbitrary such claims to authority are judged to be. In sequence, young persons are described as locating such authority in empirical regularities, rule systems, and social structures. At least at the earlier of these levels such claims are understood by Turiel to eventually collapse in the face of a growing sense that the standards upon which they rest are ultimately arbitrary. With continued developmental progress these acts of negation are understood by Turiel to sponsor the discovery of new and better rationalized reasons for behaving in accordance with the expectations of one's own society. Because each of Turiel's subsequent stages is meant to warrant conformity to legitimate authority on grounds that are progressively more abstract and consequently "moral" in character, there is reason to hypothesize an inverse relation between his levels of conventional understanding and the degree to which one's behavior is at variance with usual moral standards. Some support for this later hypotheses is provided by a recent study by Geiger and Turiel (1983) in which they demonstrated that: 1) students who were disruptive in the classroom were classified as occupying lower levels in this seven stage developmental sequence; and 2) low and unchanging scores were also associated with chronic disruptiveness, as measured at the time of a one-

year follow-up.

Turiel's procedures for measuring levels of understanding of social convention make use of a series of story problems and interview probes which permit the classification of respondents into one of his seven levels. Appendix B contains a set of story problems and interview probes developed by Turiel, along with a fuller description of the social convention levels used in assigning responses to scoring categories.

2.1.3. Non-cognitive perspectives on moral maturity

Outside the intimate circle of cognitive-developmental theory, numerous other investigators, whose work usually has been rooted in a tradition of personality assessment, also have struggled with the question of possible relations between moral maturity and criminality. In contrast to theorists such as Kohlberg (1976) and Turiel (1983), who tend to see prosocial behavior as contingent upon the developing capacity to reason about the just or conventional thing to do, representatives of this second and somewhat orthogonal tradition have laid stress upon the fact that more is involved in behaving prosocially than simply knowing what should be done. By this account, at least half of the moral battle involves having the strength of character, will-power, courage, or inclination to do what is already acknowledged to be the right thing.

Among such theorists, Robert Hogan (Hogan & Busch, 1984) has been especially outspoken in stressing the distinction between knowing and bringing one's self to do the right thing, and has offered a model meant to account for the development of such abilities. Hogan's model proposes a three step developmental process which: 1) begins with the achievement of early socialization skill; 2) moves on, in middle childhood, to the development of empathic sensitivities; 3) and ends in adolescence with the accomplishment of newly-won capacities of personal reflectiveness and

autonomy. He argues that "socialization" implies more than a simple cognitive understanding of what is usually judged to be right and wrong, and stresses, in addition, that well-socialized individuals are personally committed to actually upholding such societal expectations. Similarly, "empathy", by Hogan's account, implies more than simply knowing what others might feel, but also includes a readiness to care about such feelings and to take them into account in guiding one's own action. Consistent with the personality assessment tradition within which his work has evolved, Hogan's assessment strategy focuses upon the direct measurement of these traits of socialization, empathy and autonomy, operationally defined by sets of items drawn from the California Personality Inventory (CPI) and Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). The particular CPI and MMPI items isolated by Hogan for this measurement purpose are illustrated in Appendix C.

By Hogan's account, low scores on such measures are indicative of poor socialization or lack of empathy or autonomy and, consequently, are taken to be indicative of moral immaturity. Drawing upon this interpretive framework, it was hypothesized that: 1) delinquents would prove to be more morally immature on Hogan's measures of socialization, empathy, and autonomy, than would non-delinquent controls; and 2) that among the delinquent subjects studied, those whose crimes were rated as more morally reprehensible would also score more negatively on Hogan's measures.

2.1.4. Psychopathy

In addition to the various socialization and empathic sensitive problems just mentioned, Hogan also might have listed a variety of other characterlogic factors generally thought to be responsible for preventing persons from acting on the basis of what they "know" to be right.

Especially obvious in any such list of potential personality attributes would be all propensities on the part of subjects to leap before they look, to act impulsively, or to behave without sufficient care for the consequences of their actions. Similarly, failure in the ability to delay gratification, also could serve easily to make non-operative whatever moral knowledge one might possess or be able to bring to bear in more reflective moments.

What seemed required, then, in order to flesh out the range of personality features which might compliment and extend the list of measures purposed by Hogan, was some scheme for indexing the extent to which the subjects of this research are inclined to act impulsively, to show lack of foresight, or concern for the consequences of their behavior. Taken as a group, this symptom cluster can be seen to be essentially co-extensive with what other investigators (Cleckley, 1976; Hare, 1985; Quay et al., 1960) have chosen to label as "psychopathy." While it is recognized that the possible implications of psychopathy as a clinical syndrome may go beyond those intended here, it is assumed, nevertheless, that this dimension does reference much of what Hogan and others (Harre', 1983) regard as essential in successfully translating moral knowledge into moral action. On these grounds, it was judged to be important to supplement the CPI and MMPI measures proposed by Hogan with another procedure capable of indexing the extent to which the subjects of this study share the roster of traits or attributes commonly associated with psychopathy.

Unfortunately, for present purposes, the bulk of available research concerned with the measurement of psychopathy has focussed upon adult samples. There are, in fact, some (e.g., DSM-III-R, 1986) who maintain that young adolescents lack a sufficiently well-formed character to

justify their being labeled as psychopaths at all. Such claims are based at least in part, on the fact that some of the defining characteristics of psychopathy, especially those that concern failures to sustain human relations and an inability to make long-ranged life plans, involve matters which are not especially discriminating for adolescents. Despite these real concerns, many contemporary personality theorists (e.g., Robins, 1966) presuppose that psychopathy involves attributes which are formed during the early socialization period and, in principle, could be measured during adolescence. On these grounds it was seen to be a reasonable undertaking to determine the degree to which the subjects of this study share some of the usual features of adult psychopaths.

Among the available measures for indexing psychopathy, the procedure which has the most complete research history is the rating scale developed by Hare (Hare, 1985; Schroeder, Schroeder, & Hare, 1983). This revised 20-item Psychopathy Checklist (PCL) procedure is typically filled out by persons who are familiar with the target individuals, and usually is completed following a detailed clinical interview. In this procedure, the degree of psychopathy is measured as a direct function of the number of hallmark behaviors that are identified as characteristic of the subject in question. In the present study, a slightly modified version of this procedure was employed. Hare's psychopathy ratings were secured from professional persons who served as therapists for and who had familiarity with the various members of the delinquent sample. In the case of the non-delinquents, similar ratings were obtained from school counselors or advisors familiar with each student who served as a control subject.

The modifications to Hare's existing procedures consisted of eliminating three items which were either clearly inappropriate for persons of the age of this study group (i.e., marital relationship), or

redundant (i.e., juvenile delinquency). The third item, "revocation of conditional release" was excluded from the present analyses because it had little relevance to the study population in question. The resulting list of the rating scale items (Adolescent Behavior Checklist) is contained in Appendix D.

The hypotheses related to this measure included the expectation that youth who receive higher ratings on the psychopathy checklist are also more likely to obtain lower moral maturity scores. Similarly, it was anticipated that the more morally reprehensible a delinquent's illegal action, the more likely he would be to obtain a higher psychopathy rating. Finally, it was expected that juvenile offenders would receive higher psychopathy ratings than non-delinquent controls.

2.1.5. Selman's stages of interpersonal awareness

Beyond the index of psychopathy just discussed and the list of first order measures directly concerned with moral maturity, there are a variety of other second order variables that might be expected to mediate any observed relation between moral maturity and delinquency. The dimension of perspective taking is an especially obvious candidate in this list, in that it has been held out by Kohlberg (1976), Selman (1980), and others (Chandler, 1972, 1973) as constituting a necessary but not sufficient condition for moral maturity, and has been linked directly to delinquency and other forms of antisocial behavior (Chandler, 1972, 1973; Gough, 1948). On these grounds a decision was reached to include Selman's measure of interpersonal awareness in this study as an index to perspective taking competence.

Of the many available models of interpersonal awareness, that put forward by Selman (1980, 1981) provides the greatest range and most detailed discriminations and, consequently, was judged to be best suited

the purpose of this study. In particular, Selman's developmental model includes several stages of perspective taking relevant to the adolescent period. In addition, Selman's (1980, 1981) model has conceptual roots that reach into the early accounts of identity development proposed by James (1898), Baldwin (1906) and others (Mead, 1934), has a rich history of use with troubled youth (Selman, 1980, 1981), and has been explicitly related to Kohlberg's stages of moral development (Chandler, 1972, 1973; Selman, 1980, 1981; Walker, 1980). This model defines role taking as "the ability to understand the self and the other as subject, to react to others like the self, and to react to the self's behavior from the other's point of view" (Selman & Byrne, 1974, p. 803). Selman portrays social perspective taking as a theoretical construct for which measures of interpersonal awareness serve to operationalize the "developing conception of the structure of the relation between the self and other" (Selman, 1979). On these grounds Selman depicts the development of social perspective-taking competence as a progression through five stages of interpersonal understanding, cutting across four social domains: the individual, friendship, peer group, and parent-child (Selman, 1980). Among the several procedures proposed by Selman, his "friendship story" was chosen for inclusion in this study because of its special relevance to concerns common in this age group. A detailed listing of Selman's stages and domains is presented in Appendix E, along with the particular story dilemma and question probes used in this study.

Hypotheses concerning the development of interpersonal awareness and its relationship to moral maturity were as follows: 1) non-delinquents would show higher levels of interpersonal awareness than delinquents (Chandler, 1972, 1973); 2) among the delinquents those whose offenses were rated as being less immoral would show higher interpersonal awareness; 3)

there should be a positive relation between interpersonal awareness and all direct measures of moral maturity (i.e., Kohlberg, 1976; Turiel, 1983; Hogan, 1980; Walker, 1980); and 4) there should be an inverse relationship between interpersonal awareness and psychopathy ratings (Gough, 1948; Hare, 1985).

2.2. Taxonomies of the Seriousness and Immorality of Various Delinquent Offenses

This section describes how the illegal acts committed by the delinquent members of this study were rated as being more or less serious violations of moral prohibitions. Several potential schemes for developing such a response measure were available, all of which fall into one or another of two general categories. The first concerns the different ways in which existing legal distinctions and definitions of delinquent activities might be taken as proxy indicators of immorality. The second concerns alternative schemes for rating various illegal or antisocial acts in terms of the degree to which they violate existing moral standards. In the first instance, a case can be made for utilizing existing legal distinctions between what are commonly regarded as more or less serious delinquent offenses, and employing these standards as a rough index of the degree to which the behaviours in question constitute violations of conventional moral standards. For example, crimes against property, (i.e., burglary), are typically regarded as less serious than are crimes against persons, and both of these broad offense categories are widely viewed as involving acts that are more serious than "status" offenses such as truancy or underage drinking, that become delinquencies only because of the tender age of those that commit them. Numerous investigations (e.g., Thornton & Reid, 1982) have made use of legal distinctions in developing an index of the "seriousness" of the

delinquencies they have studied. A similar course was followed in this study and the most serious offenses of all of the delinquent members of the study sample were categorized as either: 1) status; 2) property; or 3) person crimes.

The obvious problem with the use of the above offense categories as proxy indicators of immorality is that there are numerous acts that are commonly regarded as immoral but only sometimes illegal (i.e., lying) and others, that while illegal, are rarely seen as immoral (i.e., school refusal). What was seen to be required instead of or in addition to any such imperfect category scheme was some more direct and continuous measure indicative of the level of immorality reflected in the delinquencies of which the subjects of this study had been convicted.

2.2.1. Direct ratings of the immorality of various delinquent acts

Over and above the three level seriousness index detailed in the preceeding section, an effort was made to obtain expert ratings of the moral seriousness of the delinquent behaviors of the subjects of this study. These efforts proceeded in two steps. First, a review of the records of the Oregon Juvenile Justice System was undertaken, and a list was drawn up of the most common crimes characteristic of the population of youthful offenders from which the present sample was drawn. This list was then culled for redundancies in an attempt to produce a complete but distinct list of demonstrably different delinquent offenses. This process resulted in a list of 50 crimes highly similar to those identified by other investigators (Rossi, Waite, Bose, & Berk, 1974; Sellin & Wolfgang, 1964; Wadsworth, 1979; and Walker, 1978). This list was then submitted to a panel of 102 teachers, principals, and student teachers (71% were female). These persons were asked to rate all 50 offenses along a dimension reflecting what they judged to be the degree of immorality

expressed by each. The results of this process yielded a glossary of juvenile crimes and associated ratings that was used as a reference source for indexing the degree of perceived immorality of the most serious illegal acts committed by each member of the delinquent sample. While other methods of delinquency classification were considered (e.g., composit profiles), it was decided that the most serious offense provided the most reliable and consequently the most adequate index of these youth's criminal behavior. A copy of this Delinquency Rating Scale, along with an associated list of the means and standard deviations for each of the 50 delinquent acts rated, is presented in Appendix F.

In summary, then, the crimes of the delinquent sample were classified twice: first, according to whether they constituted status crimes (category 1), crimes against property (category 2), or persons (category 3) and second, in terms of the degree to which they represented offenses against public morality as determined by a panel of judges.

2.3. Summary of Methods

2.3.1. Subjects Selection

Subjects for this study were 60 male juvenile offenders between the ages of 14 and 17 and 20 non-delinquent controls. The delinquent sample consisted of youth who had been adjudicated as delinquent and who were currently under the supervision and control of the juvenile justice system of the state of Oregon. In particular, cooperative relations were established with the juvenile justice component of the Morrison Center for Youth and Family Services, an agency serving a cross-section of adjudicated youthful offenders in the greater Portland area, and a subset of those delinquents involved in its outpatient and day treatment programs were solicited for possible inclusion in the study. Professional, parental, and youth consent was also obtained as a prerequisite for

inclusion for testing. These consent forms are included as Appendix G. Three potential participants (one delinquent and two non-delinquents) were not tested because of parental refusal to provide consent. Members of the control sample were youth drawn from a working class neighborhood high school who had no prior record of juvenile offenses and who were selected to match as closely as possible members of the delinquent group in terms of age, race, socio-economic level (Gottfried, 1985; Hollingshead, 1975), and educational level.

2.3.2. Stimulus Materials

The various testing materials used in assessing moral maturity, interpersonal awareness, and psychopathy can be found in Appendices A through E (A=Kohlberg; B=Turiel, C=Hogan; D=Hare; and E=Selman). Moral reasoning maturity was evaluated by employing the three Form B dilemmas from Kohlberg's procedure. This choice was based on the fact that certain other of the alternative forms developed by Kohlberg include items directly related to criminal acts and thus might have produced spurious results when employed with a delinquent sample. Each moral dilemma presented was followed by an abridged version of Kohlberg's standard set of interview probes. The omitted items were among those indicated as acceptable deletions by Colby and Kohlberg (1987).

Each subject's knowledge and understanding of conventional societal values was evaluated using a series of story problems developed by Turiel (1978). The variables of rule attainment, social interaction, and identity stressed in Hogan's account of moral maturity were indexed by the socialization, empathy, and conformity scales of the California Personality Inventory (CPI; Gough, 1953; Hogan, 1970, 1969; Hogan & Busch, 1984). The modified index of psychopathy developed by Hare (1985) was employed to evaluate the degree to which subjects displayed psychopathic

behaviors or dispositions. Finally, Selman's (1980) friendship story was used to assess level of interpersonal awareness.

Additionally, The Shipley Institute of Living Scale (Zachary, 1986) was included as an estimate of intellectual functioning. This procedure was followed because several investigators (e.g., Rutter, 1984) have suggested that there is a strong relationship between societal misconduct and intelligence. The Shipley has been found to highly correlate with the Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS; $r = .79$ to $.90$; Bartz & Loy, 1970).

2.3.3. Procedure

Two separate testing sessions were scheduled for each subject, one for the various interviews and one for questionnaire completion. All adolescents were tested individually with half given the paper-and-pencil and half the three interview measures first. Items from Hogan's three scales were randomly ordered. The interview protocol consisted of first Kohlberg's moral reasoning, then Selman's interpersonal awareness, and finally Turiel's social convention understanding measures administered in that order. The interviews and testing session both lasted from one and one-half to two and one-half hours. Responses to Kohlberg's and Selman's dilemmas and Turiel's vignettes were tape-recorded to expediate the testing procedure and to allow for later transcription and subsequent scoring. Primary therapists or school counselors completed the ratings on each subject's level of psychopathy.

2.3.4. Scoring and Reliability

A second rater scored a subsample of 16 cases for the Kohlberg, Turiel, and Selman procedures to determine the level of interrater reliability. Global stage scores were computed on the basis of the dominant stage of reasoning for the chosen issue in the Kohlberg moral

reasoning measure, and across all three of Turiel's vignettes, and Selman's six friendship topics. Weighted average stage scores, which represent the product of the sum of differential weights assigned to the respective stages, were computed for these measures allowing for parametric statistical analysis. On the Kohlberg measure there was 92% agreement within one-third of a stage on the assignment of moral reasoning major-minor stage scores. Similarly, the interpersonal awareness interview was scored within a third of a stage 93% of the time. Turiel's measure of social convention understanding was less precise with only 67% of the interview protocols scored within a third of a level. Given the fact that this scoring scheme involves seven levels, however, little interpretive relevance is attached to within stage differences. Thus, the fact that 100% of the protocols were scored within two-thirds of a level suggests that the result of this measure could be scored with sufficient precision for the purpose of this study. Due to the absence of a second judge with the requisite information, interrater reliability for the Psychopathy Checklist was not assessed in this study, but has been found to range between .80 and .85 in similar investigations (Hart, 1987).

2.3.5. Summary of Hypotheses

In view of the fact that seven different indices of social and moral maturity and two separate criterion measures are employed, it will prove helpful to list in summary form the various hypotheses evaluated. For the six primary measures of moral maturity (i.e., Kohlberg's moral reasoning dilemmas, Turiel's social convention vignettes, Selman's interpersonal awareness story, and Hogan's measures of socialization, empathy, and autonomy) it was hypothesized 1) that delinquent subjects would evidence less moral maturity than non-delinquents; 2) that, among the delinquent subjects, those whose offenses were more serious or immoral would show

lower levels of moral maturity than those whose crimes were less serious or less immoral. Because numerous items from Hare's Psychopath Checklist are directly concerned with the commission of criminal acts, no hypotheses regarding anticipated differences between delinquent and non-delinquent subjects was appropriate. It was hypothesized, however, that higher psychopathy ratings would be assigned to those whose delinquencies were more serious or more immoral, and that these ratings would be negatively associated with all six primary measures of moral maturity.

Previous research and theory support a variety of interpretations regarding possible relationships between the various moral maturity measures outlined above. While no specific hypotheses were formulated in advance, several analyses were conducted in an effort to explore these possible inter-relationships. In particular, it was felt to be of interest to determine the extent to which the six primary measures formed a single unified picture of moral maturity and to identify the extent to which these measures discriminated non-delinquents from more or less serious delinquent groups. To this end, a series of exploratory factor and discriminant analyses were undertaken.

CHAPTER 3

Results

This study was initiated in an effort to examine possible relations between delinquency and moral maturity from two viewing distances: first, by contrasting delinquent and non-delinquents in terms of a manifold of measures of moral development; and second, through a more fine grained analysis of the delinquent subjects alone. The results presented below follow this same order, and begin with an account of the differences between the delinquent and non-delinquent samples on the six dependent measures of moral development. The subsequent section reports the results between various subgroups of the delinquent sample contrasted in terms of the degree of seriousness or immorality of their most serious offenses. Finally, because the psychopathy measure employed can be viewed alternatively as either an additional dependent variable or as a further method of classifying the delinquent population, results generated through the use of the Psychopathy Checklist are presented separately in a third and final section.

3.1. Moral maturity: A comparison of delinquent and non-delinquent subjects

Preliminary analyses of the demographic variables indicated that the delinquent and non-delinquent subjects did not differ significantly in socio-economic status ($F(2,77) = 2.833, p=.07$). Lower intellectual scores were observed ($F(2,77) = 4.725, p<.01$) for the delinquent sample on the Shipley Institute of Living Scales, (non-delinquent $M = 104, SD = 9.07$, delinquents $M = 96, SD = 8.87$), however, and consequently this intelligence quotient estimate (IQest) was included as a covariate in all subsequent analyses. There were too few racial minority subjects (i.e., $n=4$ for non-delinquents, $n=6$ for delinquents) to analyze potential race

differences.

To determine the overall ability of these six moral maturity measures to discriminate the study sample into their respective delinquent and non-delinquent statuses, and to assess the relative degree to which each of these measures contribute to such group assignment, a discriminant function analysis was performed. The results of the discriminant function analysis, based upon a direct method of variable entry, indicate an overall main effect, $F(1,78) = 14.700$, $p < .001$. The test for homogeneity was non-significant, indicating that conditions required for the inclusion of this analysis had been met. The derived canonical coefficient generated by the discriminant analysis also revealed that 89% of the subjects could be correctly classified as either delinquent or non-delinquent on the basis of their performance on these various tests of moral maturity. As can be seen in Table 1, which details these results, only Kohlberg's moral reasoning measure and Hogan's socialization scale made significant independent contributions to this overall prediction formula. The set of within-group correlations with this standardized function do indicate, however, moderate to high relationships between five of these six measures. The empathy variable was the only exception to this general pattern.

Given the overall significance of the multivariate F-test in the discriminant analysis, univariate analyses of variance could be and were computed on each of the moral maturity measures. As hypothesized, these initial findings, detailed in Table 2, show that across all variables, with the single exception of Hogan's measure of empathy (which indicated only a trend toward significance), the non-delinquent sample evidenced significantly higher levels of moral maturity than did the delinquents. Specifically, these results indicate that delinquents were less able: 1)

TABLE 1
Discriminant Function Analysis:
Classifying Delinquents and Non-delinquents

Standardized Canonical Coefficients	Variable	Pooled within-group Correlation
.79	Socialization	.79
.62	Moral Reasoning	.57
.11	Autonomy	.43
.00	Social Convention	.36
-.05	Interpersonal Awareness	.35
-.05	Empathy	.28

Classification Summary Table

Actual Group	n	Predicted Group	
		Delinquent	Non-delinquent
Delinquent	60	54 (90%)	6 (10%)
Non-delinquent	20	3 (15%)	17 (85%)

TABLE 2

Analysis of Co-Variance:
Delinquents versus Non-delinquents
by Moral Maturity

	Delinquent (n=60)	Controls (n=20)	F
Moral Reasoning	M=246 SD=29.9	M=290 SD=35.4	19.292 p<.001
Interpersonal Awareness	M=251 SD=43.1	M=287 SD=42.3	4.854 p<.03
Social Convention Understanding	M=339 SD=88.6	M=414 SD=74.2	8.049 p<.006
Empathy	M=32 SD=5.0	M=36 SD=5.5	2.791 p<.10
Socialization	M=31 SD=9.9	M=51 SD=12.7	44.663 p<.001
Autonomy	M=28 SD=11.0	M=50 SD=9.6	9.252 p<.003

to reason through matters involving competing moral issues; 2) to understand usual standards of social convention; 3) to take the viewpoints of others; and were 4) less autonomous; and 5) less socialized than their non-delinquent peers. Although straight forward and consequently presented in minimal detail, these initial results lend direct support to five of the hypotheses summarized in the section 2.3.5.

In brief these results show that, on the average, the delinquent subjects occupied different stages or levels of moral maturity than non-delinquents, with the delinquents lagging behind their non-delinquent counterparts by approximately one-half of a full stage in moral reasoning, one-third of a stage in interpersonal awareness and two-thirds of a level in social convention understanding. These results imply that, as a group, the non-delinquents responded to Kohlberg's measure in ways that defined right and wrong primarily in terms of general societal expectations; valued trust, loyalty and mutuality in relationships; and gave as reasons for doing what is right, a desire to maintain rules and respect authority. These non-delinquents were also more likely to describe social conventions as open to negotiated change, and gave social perspective taking responses that suggested that friendship was understood to be contingent upon mutual intimacy and support. By contrast, the delinquent group more often tended to see right and wrong in relation to their own current interests, and to interpreted any action that served their own needs as automatically self-justifying. Similarly, these delinquent youth typically understood social conventions in more fixed and concrete terms and viewed friendship as a less abiding, fairweather arrangement of convenience. Taken alone or together, these findings suggest that the delinquent sample is substantially delayed in their ability to reason about right and wrong, to take the points of view of others, or to

understand societal conventions.

The same picture is replicated with regard to the components of the second more trait-like measures of moral maturity indexed by Hogan's personalogic scales. Specifically, the typical delinquent youth scored two standard deviations below the mean of the present non-delinquent subjects and of Gough's (1957) standardization sample on both the socialization and autonomy scales. According to Gough, young persons who score in this extreme range on these variables are typically under-motivated, lack a sense of personal independence, self-understanding and self-insight.

3.1.1. Principal components analysis of moral maturity measures

In an attempt to examine relationships among these six measures of moral maturity, a principal components analysis was conducted. Here, as elsewhere, the delinquent and non-delinquent samples were combined whenever a reasonable claim could be made that these two groups constituted a continuum running from no delinquency involvement through serious delinquency involvement. Results from the orthogonal (varimax) rotation of this matrix (unforced number of factors), indicate a two-factor solution, accounting for a total 67% of the variance (see Table 3). The first factor suggests a cognitive reasoning dimension consisting of the weighted average scores from Kohlberg's moral reasoning measure, Turiel's measure of social convention understanding and Selman's interpersonal awareness task. Hogan's three personalogic scales (empathy, socialization, and autonomy) all contributed to the construction of the second factor, labeled here as moral character.

A very similar factor structure was found when only the delinquent subjects' responses were analysed, with a similar two-factor solution accounting for only a slightly smaller portion of variance (i.e., 60%).

TABLE 3
Factor Analysis of Moral Maturity Measures

	Cognitive Reasoning	Moral Character
	Factor 1	Factor 2
Moral Reasoning	.830	.087
Interpersonal Awareness	.850	.236
Social Convention	.718	.326
Autonomy	.138	.860
Empathy	.194	.769
Socialization	.234	.670
Eigen Values	2.924	1.065
Cumulative Variance	49%	67%

While the sample size of the non-delinquent group did not allow for a comparable factor analysis, a further assessment of the internal consistency of these factors by groups, computed separately for the delinquent and non-delinquent samples, contributes to the conclusion that a similar factor structure may hold for the non-delinquents as well. The Cronbach alphas of these derived factor scales were, in fact, higher for the non-delinquent (i.e., cognitive reasoning = .74, moral character = .60) than the delinquent sample (i.e., cognitive reasoning = .55, moral character = .51).

The correlation matrix upon which the principal components analysis was based is presented as a means of further unpacking and clarifying the relationships observed between the various moral maturity measures. As can be seen from an inspection of this matrix, detailed in Table 4, several clusters of related and unrelated measures can be identified. First, as already confirmed by the principal components analysis, scores from the scales that make up both the cognitive reasoning and moral character factors show close agreement, but there was surprisingly little relationship between scales situated within one or the other of these two different factors. Because these results argue against any easy assumption that moral maturity is a monolith, further attention will be focussed upon the apparent independence of these two classes of measures in the subsequent discussion section.

In summary, the results reported above provide strong support for the key hypothesis regarding anticipated differences between the delinquent and non-delinquent samples. The single exception to this general pattern was Hogan's empathy scale. Otherwise the delinquent subjects evidence statistically and psychologically interpretable delays across all of the remaining moral maturity measures. Overall, these results are consistent

TABLE 4
Correlation Matrices of Moral Maturity Measures:
Delinquents and Non-delinquents+

	MR	IA	SConv	Emp	Soc	Aut
Delinquents (n=60)						
Moral Reasoning (MR)	---	.50***	.40***	.17	.00	.16
Interpersonal Awareness (IA)	.54**	---	.35**	.15	.00	.06
Social Convention (SConv)	.67***	.51**	---	.32**	.13	.17
Empathy (Emp)	.31	.20	.45*	---	.17	.55***
Socialization (Soc)	-.10	.38*	.04	.24	---	.22*
Autonomy (Aut)	.26	.25	.39*	.27	.53**	---
Non-delinquents (n=20)						

+ Note that the correlation matrix for the delinquent sample is in the upper triangle and in the lower triangle for the non-delinquents. All significance levels are reported as one-tailed tests.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

with findings separately reported by other investigators (see Section 1.1), indicating similar relations between one or another of these six measures of moral maturity and the presence or absence of delinquency. Specifically, here and elsewhere, measures that most clearly have as their purpose the assessment of an individual's cognitive ability to judge and reason about morally hazardous situations, to grasp societal standards regarding the appropriateness of morally relevant behaviors, to be perspectival and autonomous, and to endorse socially appropriate behaviors all count as significant discriminators of delinquency in this study.

3.2. Comparisons Within the Delinquent Sample

As outlined in section 2.2.1, the great bulk of previous developmental research into possible relations between moral maturity and criminality has restricted attention to the question of whether samples of delinquent and non-delinquent youth differ in their levels of moral development. A major goal of the present investigation was to go beyond this "either-or" orientation in an effort to determine whether moral maturity scores are also capable of further differentiating more from less immoral delinquent offenders. Once this prospect is raised it becomes immediately apparent that there is no one routinized, unequivocal or self-evident way in which known delinquent offenders might be shown to divide themselves in terms of the depth or degree of their immorality or the seriousness of their criminal involvement. As noted earlier, two such measures were adopted in this study. The first involved a direct attempt to rate each of the subjects in terms of the level of immorality judged to characterize their most serious delinquent offense, and the second consisted of locating the most serious offense of each of the delinquent subjects within a more conventional three-fold category system of status, property, and person crimes. By this latter standard, direct assault upon persons are seen as

altogether worse than criminal acts directed against their possessions, and acts that are illegal only because of the youthful status of the offenders who commit them were judged to be less serious still. This measure, referred to here as an index of "seriousness", was expected to covary with, but not be entirely redundant with more direct immorality ratings.

In subsequent paragraphs, data resulting from the application to these two standards of measurement are described. While these measurement details might have made up a part of the earlier methods section, it was felt that the novelty of the procedures utilized to obtain these immorality ratings warranted the findings based on this method being included in the results section. Following this summary, the six measures of moral maturity previously employed in the comparison of the delinquent and non-delinquent subjects were again evaluated in terms of their ability, singularly or in combination, to predict both of these outcome measures.

3.2.1. Immorality ratings

The principal hypothesis under study here was that subjects who showed delays in the achievement of age appropriate levels of moral maturity not only would be more likely to be delinquent, but that the levels of the perceived immorality of their offenses would also vary inversely with their level of moral development. In order to test this hypothesis a panel of 102 judges, chosen from the ranks of principals, school teachers, and student teachers in the greater Portland area, were presented short descriptions of those 50 crimes most commonly committed by youthful offenders. Judges were asked to rate these offenses from zero to five on a scale intended to express the degree to which each was understood to stand in violation of usual standards of morality. By and large these

judges were in close agreement (Cronbach alpha = .96) regarding the degree to which each of these delinquent acts contradicted usual moral standards. A listing of these target crimes, their mean immorality rating, and the variation of these judgments are listed in Appendix F.

Using these ratings as a standard, the most serious crimes of which each of the delinquent subjects had been convicted was assigned an immorality rating by matching that offense with its closest counterpart from the glossary of delinquencies and associated immorality ratings compiled by the procedures described above. Table 5 depicts the range and frequencies of offenses characteristic of the present study sample, along with brief descriptions indicating the general types of delinquent acts representative of these different immorality ratings. As can be seen from an inspection of this table, the delinquent acts of which the present study sample had been convicted, varied widely in the degree to which they were seen to be immoral, with various status violations being regarded as the least immoral, and crimes involving sexual violence receiving particularly high immorality ratings. These immorality ratings, along with the second and more conventional metric of "seriousness", to be described below, were employed separately in all subsequent analyses.

3.2.2. Seriousness level ratings

The most serious offense of each delinquent subject was also classified as a status offense (category 1), a crime against property (category 2), or a crime against persons (category 3). While assignment of particular delinquencies to levels within this category system was primarily clerical, a spot check involving 20% of the delinquent sample demonstrated that this classification could be made with essentially perfect accuracy. Table 6 displays the frequency with which the offenses of the subjects of the present sample fell into each of these categories.

TABLE 5

Mean Immorality Ratings

Offense	n	Mean Rating	Standard Deviation
Rape	10	4.94	.10
Molestation	8	4.81	.10
Armed Robbery	5	4.44	.26
Burglary	14	3.85	.30
Shoplift/Vandalism	17	3.60	.22
Status	6	2.03	.75
All Offenses	60	3.96	.87

As can be seen from an inspection of this table, earlier efforts to select subjects in such a way as to cover the full spectrum of possible offense categories was reasonably successful, although few subjects were available who had committed only status offenses. Forty-five percent of the sample fell into each of the property and person categories, and only 10% into the status offense category. Parenthetically, it should be noted that this method of classifying delinquencies (and perhaps the immorality ratings detailed above) yielded distributions that do not automatically represent the base-rate of such crimes in the population of delinquents as a whole. In fact the actual proportion of status, property, and person offenses committed by adjudicated delinquents in the greater Portland area during the 1983 calendar year (the last year for which such statistics were available) are 30%, 62%, and 8% respectively. Similar comparison figures are not available for the immorality ratings. Given these sampling considerations, the actual ability to predict either the seriousness or immorality of other delinquent acts on the basis of the moral maturity measures utilized in this study may not be the same as reported for the present sample.

3.2.3. Interrelations between perceived immorality and seriousness

In the process of developing the two methods of categorizing the delinquent sample outlined above it was recognized that the panel of judges who carried out the task of generating the immorality ratings were likely to employ standards that paralleled, to some degree, those already contained within the more customary legal categories of status, property, and person crimes. This follows from the fact that our existing judicial system is, to a certain degree, self-consciously intended as a technical expression of the moral standards of the society that it serves. Consequently a high level of overlap between these two classification

systems was not unexpected. Still, it was not self-evidently the case that any categorization of crimes into the usual classification of status, property, and person crimes would necessarily mirror group judgments as to the level of perceived immorality implied by in such offenses. In an effort to determine the degree to which these two classification systems actually overlap, the distribution of the more continuous immorality ratings were divided into rough thirds and recast into high, medium, and low levels. These categoric scores were then cross-classified with the seriousness dimension of status, property, and person crimes (see Table 6). As can be seen from an inspection of this table, the dimensions of seriousness and perceived immorality are largely overlapping, with the bulk (82%) of the person offenses also being judged to be the most immoral, and all of the status offenses being characterized as acts of low immorality. Cohen's Kappa (Cohen, 1960), a measure of agreement between such classificatory systems, was calculated on these data and yielded a concordance index of .62, described by Cohen as "moderate".

On the basis of these findings, it appeared likely that any tendency present in the data for the various measures of moral maturity to predict the immorality of delinquent offenses also would apply in some degree to the more conventional legalistic categories of seriousness. Subsequent analyses largely confirmed this expectation (see section 3.3.1). At the same time, however, the lack of a complete overlap between these two measures, and their different conceptual roots, recommended their joint use. In addition, the continuous character of the immorality ratings made it possible to undertake certain more powerful parametric analyses, further recommending the inclusion of both of these outcome measures.

Before proceeding further with an analysis of possible relations between the subjects' moral maturity scores and the level of perceived

Table 6

Cross-Classification of Legal and
Immorality Rating Systems

<u>Legal Categories</u>	<u>Immorality Level</u>			Row Totals
	Low	Moderate	High	
Status	6 100%			6 10%
Property	10 37%	17 63%		27 45%
Person	1 4%	4 15%	22 82%	27 45%
Column Totals	17 28%	21 35%	22 37%	

immorality of their delinquent acts, an attempt was made to systematically survey exactly what sorts of behaviors had been labeled most and least immoral in this particular sample. To this end, the low, medium, and high levels of perceived immorality generated for the preceding comparison with seriousness were again considered and the specific delinquencies that fell into these categories were listed and scrutinized for possible common content. The unanticipated result of this descriptive analysis was to draw to the surface the fact that 18 of the 22 subjects categorized as having committed highly immoral delinquencies had all been convicted of sexual crimes of some description. Otherwise put, this finding represents the conjoint facts that, 1) the panel of judges who had contributed the immorality ratings consistently saw sexual crimes along with other assaultive but non-sexual offenses, as being highly morally reprehensible; and 2) within this particular sample, the frequency of such sexual crimes was much higher than that of all other equally morally reprehensible but non-sexual offenses. The upshot of these facts was that in this sample, to be categorized as having perpetrated a delinquency high in perceived immorality was all but co-extensive with having perpetrated a sexual crime. There is no formal reason that this should have been the case in that the sample of subjects in the high immorality group might just as well have been convicted of murder, arson, or a variety of other heinous but non-sexual offenses. That this was not so may reflect the real but undocumented base rates of such sexual offenses within the general delinquent population or, less interestingly, might be an artifact of unknown and non-generalizable sampling biases unique to the population under treatment at the Morrison Center from which the subjects were drawn. In either case, it became apparent that, in this sample, to be judged to have committed a highly immoral delinquency was tantamount to

being known to have committed a sexual offense of almost any description. Violent rapes and apparently non-assaultive sexual acts, for example, commonly received the same high immorality rating. For this reason, the serious prospect was raised that what was originally intended as a scoring category reserved for seriously immoral offenses of a wide variety of sorts had inadvertently become a proxy indicator of sexual delinquencies in this study. On this possibility, and in an effort to avoid confusing the general meaning of immorality with matters specific to sexual offenders, it was judged to be appropriate to test certain of the original hypotheses, not only with the entire delinquent sample as originally planned, but also to repeat certain of these analyses with the subsample of sexual offenders removed. The effects of this post-hoc decision to sometimes table those subjects who had sexually offended was seen as conservative, in that it not only reduced the size of the study group, but also restricted the range of the immorality ratings. Any relation between moral maturity scores and immorality ratings that might emerge within this restricted interpretive context was consequently anticipated to be both valid and potentially more interpretable.

3.3. The Relationship between Moral Maturity and the Seriousness and Immorality of Delinquent Acts

The place of the non-delinquent control group in any examination of the relation between moral maturity and the seriousness or immorality of delinquent acts is open to multiple interpretation. On the one hand they could be viewed as irrelevant to any such analysis because, having committed no known offense, they literally fall off of any continuous measure of the seriousness or immorality of delinquent acts, and their law abiding behavior could be viewed as having no place in any category scheme involving immoral or status, property, and person crimes. From another

perspective, however, these same control subjects meaningfully anchor the dimensions of seriousness and immorality and their inclusion in relevant comparisons can be regarded as crucial. To this end certain comparisons were made either including or excluding the non-delinquent subjects.

The first question to be addressed in this section was a determination of the degree to which the dimensions of perceived immorality and seriousness vary in some meaningful manner across the six measures of moral maturity. As an initial means of considering such possible relations, discriminant function analyses were computed using both immorality and seriousness ratings as outcome measures. Table 7 displays the summary cross-tabulations of these actual and the predicted group memberships for the immorality levels, including the non-delinquents as a zero-order immorality group.

Results from the discriminant function analysis indicate an overall significant difference among the four immorality levels, $F(3, 76) = 4.669$, $p < .001$, with 65% of the entire sample being successfully classified into their appropriate immorality levels. This result could be viewed as somewhat inflated, however, in light of the fact that a disproportionate number of those correctly classified belonged to the non-delinquent group. Here again, as was the case in earlier results based upon direct comparisons between delinquent and non-delinquent subjects, Hogan's socialization scale and Kohlberg's moral reasoning measure were the only variables contributing significantly to the prediction equation. As before, all moral maturity measures, with the single exception of empathy, correlated either moderately or highly with the standardized canonical function, again suggesting that other of the cognitive and characterologic measures could have played a similar role in the discriminant analysis.

TABLE 7

Discriminant Function Analyses:
Classifying Delinquents and Non-delinquents
According to Immorality Ratings

Standardized Canonical Coefficients	Variable	Pooled within-group Correlation
.796	Socialization	.82
.532	Moral Reasoning	.56
.101	Autonomy	.42
.049	Social Convention	.39
-.013	Interpersonal Awareness	.36
-.045	Empathy	.28

Classification Summary Table

Actual Group	n	Predicted Group			
		Control	Low	Moderate	High
Control	20	17 (85%)	1 (5%)	1 (5%)	1 (5%)
Low	17	3 (18%)	8 (47%)	3 (18%)	3 (18%)
Moderate	21	0 (0%)	4 (19%)	12 (57%)	5 (24%)
High	20	2 (9%)	1 (5%)	4 (18%)	15 (68%)

A parallel discriminant function analysis intended to determine the efficiency with which the six moral maturity measures could be employed to predict the distribution of all subjects into the legal categories of no offense, status, property, and person offenses was also planned. The test of homogeneity of variance (Box's $M = 87.166$, $F = 1.815$, $p < .001$) for this anticipated analysis was significant, however, rendering the results uninterpretable. In an attempt to reduce this heterogeneity the non-delinquent subjects were dropped in a second analysis, but again a similar result was obtained (Box's $M = 60.533$, $F = 2.524$, $p < .001$). Finally, it was reasoned that the possible source of this heterogeneity might be due either to the small sample size of the status offender group, or the minor nature of their delinquent status. The results of a final discriminant analysis that excluded these six status offenders but included the non-delinquents did produce a non-significant test of homogeneity of variance. The classification table based on the discriminant function analysis indicated overall significance, $F(6, 70) = 3.298$, $p < .001$, and shows that overall, 72% of the subjects could be successfully placed into their respective offense categories. Because the number of levels of seriousness is different, however, these results are difficult to compare to the counterpart analysis involving immorality ratings. If the immorality rating levels are similarly reduced to two levels, however, a crosstabulation reveals that there is a 93% overlap between these two metrics and consequently suggests that they are highly redundant.

Results of an analysis of variance exploring the relation between the six moral maturity measures and the four levels of immorality assigned to delinquent and non-delinquent subjects are presented in Table 8. Tests for homogeneity of variance were non-significant across all measures of

TABLE 8

Analysis of Variance: Levels of
Immorality and Moral Maturity Measures

	Immorality Level				F Ratio	Notes
	Non- Delinquent (ND) (n=20)	Low (L) (n=17)	Moderate (M) (n=21)	High (H) (n=22)		
Moral Reasoning	M=290 SD=35.4	M=239 SD=36.6	M=241 SD=29.6	M=255 SD=22.6	10.866 p<.001	ND>L,M,H
Interpersonal Awareness	M=287 SD=42.4	M=255 SD=38.2	M=237 SD=51.4	M=260 SD=36.2	4.702 p<.005	ND>M
Social Convention	M=414 SD=74.2	M=345 SD=96.9	M=298 SD=75.2	M=374 SD=80.8	7.317 p<.001	ND>M H>M
Empathy	M=36 SD=5.5	M=32 SD=5.6	M=31 SD=3.6	M=33 SD=5.8	2.809 p<.05	ND>M
Socialization	M=51 SD=12.7	M=35 SD=7.7	M=29 SD=10.9	M=28 SD=13.5	20.802 p<.001	ND>L,M,H
Autonomy	M=50 SD=9.6	M=39 SD=7.7	M=38 SD=10.9	M=38 SD=13.5	5.318 p<.002	ND>L,M,H

moral maturity. Once again main effects were found for five of the six moral maturity measures after per comparison error rate was adjusted to $p < .008$. Tukey's post hoc analyses were used to further assess possible differences between groups. For three of these measures (i.e., moral reasoning, socialization, and autonomy) the non-delinquents were significantly more morally mature than were the delinquents regardless of their immorality levels. On these measures no other differences between the delinquent groups were observed. For the remaining three variables (i.e., interpersonal awareness, social convention understanding, and empathy) the planned comparisons revealed a pattern of both anticipated and unanticipated results. In every case where the non-delinquents were contrasted separately with each of the other groups only those delinquents in the "moderate" level of immorality proved to be significantly different from the non-delinquent subjects. While the fact that the non-delinquents were statistically indistinguishable from the "low" immorality group was not especially surprising, the opposite result had been expected with the "high" immorality subjects. A further exploration of these counter-intuitive findings is taken up in further analyses in which those delinquents whose offenses were sexual in nature are examined separately. Among the remaining comparisons the only additional finding to emerge was that, again surprisingly, the high immorality group received better social convention scores than did the moderate immorality group. The interpretive difficulties presented by this unexpected finding are also further addressed in section 3.3.2, where other comparisons involving the sex offender group are taken up.

The results of parallel analyses of variance, this time concerned the relation between the seriousness measure (i.e., no offense, status, property, and person) and their relationship to the six moral maturity

measures, showed all tests of homogeneity of variance as non-significant. Since the results show considerable overlap with those presented in Table 7, they are not presented in a separate table. Although there were again main effects for the same five moral maturity measures a slightly different pattern of results emerged than was reported with the immorality measures. Only on Kohlberg's measure of moral reasoning did the non-delinquents do better than all classes of status, property, and person offenders considered separately. Once again, in every other case the non-delinquents were indistinguishable from the status offenders, but evidenced greater moral maturity than the property offenders. The non-delinquents out-performed the person offenders only on the socialization and autonomy scales. As before, the non-delinquents and the most serious delinquents were not different on the interpersonal awareness task, social convention understanding, or empathy scale. Among the remaining comparisons contrasting the seriousness categories, the only additional finding to emerge was that the status offenders obtained significantly higher socialization scores than either the property or person offenders.

3.3.1. Correlational analyses relating immorality ratings to moral maturity measures

In the discriminant analyses described in the previous section, it was necessary to force the continuous immorality ratings into three categorical levels representing low, moderate, and high degrees of perceived immorality. What was lost in this process was the opportunity to capitalize upon the continuous character of these ratings. Consequently, in a further attempt to evaluate the relationships between the rated immorality of delinquent acts and moral maturity, correlations were computed between these measures within the delinquent sample. The results

of this analysis indicated that of the six moral maturity measures, only Hogan's socialization scale correlated significantly with perceived immorality, $r(60) = -.46, p < .01$. If the delinquents are further sub-divided into those who were and were not convicted of sexual offenses, however, different and interesting patterns of relationships emerge. An examination of these correlations presented in Table 9 shows that among the non-sexual offender group all three of Hogan's personality scales were inversely related to the immorality ratings. That is, subjects who were the least empathic, well socialized and the least autonomous tended to commit acts that were rated as most immoral. Surprisingly, however, within the sex offender group, there was a positive relationship between both Kohlberg's measure of moral reasoning and Selman's measure of interpersonal awareness, Hogan's measure of autonomy, and rated levels of immorality. If per comparison error rates are calculated for both of these sets of six comparisons, with a resulting alpha level of .008, only the negative correlation between socialization and immorality ratings for the non sex-offender group is significant. If a less conservative approach is taken to these data and correlations that reach the .05 level are interpreted, then these results suggest that while members of the non-sex offender group lack the empathy, socialization skills and autonomy to put their limited moral reasoning competences into practice, very different processes are at work with the sexual offenders who, paradoxically show a positive relation between moral reasoning, interpersonal awareness and autonomy, and the perceived immorality of their acts.

3.3.2. Special Consideration Involving the Juvenile Sex Offenders

Based on the analyses just reported showing different patterns of results for sex offender and non-sex offenders and given the fact that sex

TABLE 9

Pearson Correlations Between the Immorality of
Delinquent Acts and Moral Maturity Measures

	All Delinquents (n=60)	Sex Offenders (n=18)	Non-Sex Offenders (n=42)
Moral Reasoning	.15	.46*	.01
Interpersonal Awareness	.06	.50*	-.11
Social Convention	.13	-.02	-.25
Empathy	.03	.19	-.29*
Socialization	-.46**	.09	-.63***
Autonomy	-.09	.48*	-.29*

One-tailed tests of significance; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

offenses were consistently assigned very high immorality ratings, a reworking of many of the earlier analyses seemed called for. In particular, it seemed appropriate to re-examine all those hypotheses concerning anticipated relations between immorality and seriousness ratings and the six moral maturity measures. Under this construction it was hoped that the originally hypothesized relationships between immorality and the six measures of moral maturity would be even more strongly supported. The results of a Multivariate analysis of variance including these six measures of moral maturity yielded a significant main effect, $F(6,71) = 3.640$, $p < .003$, warranting the computation of individual F-tests of the variables. Table 10 presents the results of ANOVA's, with IQ estimate as a covariate, contrasting sex offenders, non-sex offender delinquents and non-delinquents across these six measures. This approach proved only reasonably productive. Bartlett's test of homogeneity was non-significant across all measures of moral maturity and the Tukey ranges test was used to evaluate differences between these three groups. Even adjusting the significance level to account for per comparison error rate ($p < .008$), all five of the moral maturity measures, with the usual exception of the empathy scale, once again proved to significantly differentiate the non-delinquent and delinquent subjects where offenses were non-sexual. Tukey post hoc comparisons indicate that there were no statistical differences between the sex offenders and the non-delinquent samples on interpersonal awareness, understanding of social convention, or empathy.

Table 11 portrays a more detailed breakdown for the performances for the cognitive reasoning measures across the three groups. This table shows that while the sex offenders were one-third of a stage behind the non-delinquents, the delinquents whose offenses were non-sexual in nature

TABLE 10

Analysis of Co-Variance: Juvenile Sex Offenders,
Non-Sex Offenders, and Non-delinquents
by Moral Maturity

	Sex Offenders (n=18) (SO)	Non-sex Offenders (n=42) (NSO)	Non- Delinquents (n=20) (ND)	F-ratios	Notes
Moral Reasoning	M=255 SD=21.97	M=242 SD=32.24	M=290 SD=35.36	15.696 p<.001	ND>SO, NSO
Interpersonal Awareness	M=261 SD=38.67	M=246 SD=44.60	M=287 SD=42.37	6.099 p<.005	ND>NSO
Social Convention	M=392 SD=72.65	M=317 SD=85.83	M=414 SD=74.22	11.972 p<.001	ND>NSO SO>NSO
Empathy	M=31 SD=5.65	M=31 SD=4.58	M=36 SD=5.48	5.537 p<.01	ND>NSO
Socialization	M=29 SD=9.57	M=31 SD=10.1	M=51 SD=12.7	27.796 p<.001	ND>SO, NSO
Autonomy	M=40 SD=13.8	M=38 SD=9.8	M=50 SD=9.6	8.127 p<.001	ND>SO, NSO

TABLE 11

Stage Distribution of Moral Reasoning,
Interpersonal Awareness, and Social Convention
Understanding by Group

	Moral Reasoning Global Stage Score						
	2(1)	2	2(3)	2/3	3(2)	3	3(4)
Non-Delinquents	0	1 5%	1 5%	3 15%	1 5%	12 60%	2 10%
Non-Sex Offenders	3 7%	8 19%	8 19%	11 26%	6 14%	5 12%	1 2%
Sex Offenders	0	1 6%	7 39%	2 11%	4 22%	4 22%	0

	Interpersonal Awareness Global Stage Score							
	1	1(2)	2(1)	2	2(3)	3(2)	3	3(4)
Non-Delinquents	0	0	0	2 10%	1 5%	2 10%	12 60%	3 15%
Non-Sex Offenders	1 2%	1 2%	0	6 14%	9 21%	14 33%	11 26%	0
Sex Offenders	0	0	0	4 22%	4 22%	2 11%	8 44%	0

	Social Convention Understanding Level					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Non-Delinquents	0	0	4 20%	9 45%	7 35%	0
Non-Sex Offenders	1 2%	8 19%	18 42%	13 31%	2 5%	0
Sex Offenders	0	0	5 28%	10 56%	2 11%	1 6%

were one-half a stage below. Similarly, on the interpersonal awareness task, sex offenders scored one-quarter of a stage below the non-delinquents while the delinquents other than sexual offenders scored two-fifths of a stage lower. Finally, with regards to social convention level, the sex offenders were approximately equal to the non-delinquents whereas the the remaining group of delinquents scored a full stage below the non delinquents. Consistant with previous investigators (e.g., Walker, 1980) that social perspective taking as operationalized by interpersonal awareness, was found to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for moral reasoning for the non-delinquents. This relation, however, did not hold true for the delinquent sample, who scored 25% higher stage attainment in the moral maturity task than in interpersonal awareness.

In an attempt to further clarify these results and to evaluate the consistency across measures within each group, Cronbach alpha coefficients were computed on the derived factor scales of the moral maturity measures (see Table 3). The results indicate that members of the sex offender group showed poor internal consistency for both the cognitive reasoning factor ($\alpha=.32$) and Hogan's moral personality factor ($\alpha=.42$) indicating unreliable measurement. The non-sex offender delinquents, however, generated higher alpha coefficients ($\alpha=.58$ and $.57$ respectively). This finding suggests that, in contrast to the sexual offender group, members of the non-sex offender sample were reasonably consistent in their response patterns across all the moral maturity measures. These finding are lent additional meaning when a more detailed inspection of the inter-variable correlation matrix is carried out. The correlation matrix, presented as Table 12, shows that on the cognitive reasoning measures the non-sex offenders have a pattern of relationships

TABLE 12

Correlation Matrices of Moral Maturity Measures:
Juvenile Sex Offenders and Delinquent Non-Sex Offenders+

	MR	IA	SConv	Emp	Soc	Aut
Delinquent (Non-sex offenders)(n=42)						
Moral Reasoning (MR)	---	.46***	.40**	.11	-.03	.11
Interpersonal Awareness (IA)	.58**	---	.40**	.07	.06	.03
Social Convention (SConv)	.24	.04	---	.27*	.21	.19
Empathy (Emp)	.19	.21	.20	---	.27*	.48***
Socialization (Soc)	.23	-.10	.16	.07	---	.33**
Autonomy (Aut)	.28	.09	.12	.67***	.05	---

Juvenile Sex Offenders (n=18)

+ Note that the correlation matrix for the non-juvenile sex offenders is in the upper triangle and the in the lower triangle for the juvenile sex offenders. All significance levels are one-tailed tests.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

similar to those of the non-delinquent sample (see Table 4). Specifically, there are significant intercorrelations among the cognitive reasoning measures and among Hogan's moral character scales, but not between these two moral maturity domains. The results for the sex offender group were considerably different. Only two relationships were significant, that between moral reasoning and interpersonal awareness and between empathy and autonomy.

In summary, the results reported in this section provide mixed support for the series of hypotheses that predicted that the six measures of moral maturity would discriminate among more or less immoral and serious offenders. Consistent with these expectations, non-delinquents did prove to be more empathic, better able to take the perspectives of others and more competent in understanding social conventions than delinquents at every level of immorality and seriousness. Contrary to expectation, however, the measures of moral reasoning, socialization, and autonomy did not significantly discriminate these groups in any straightforward way. Here the usual pattern was that the non-delinquents: 1) were not meaningfully different from the status offender or low immorality groups; 2) were significantly different from the property offender and moderate immorality groups, but, paradoxically, 3) were indistinguishable from the most immoral, person offender delinquent groups. A partial explanation for this last unanticipated finding is to be found in the fact that those delinquents who had offended against persons and who were rated as most immoral proved, in 18 cases out of 20, to have been convicted of a sexual crime. When, this sexual offender group was temporarily removed from the sample some additional support for a subset of the original hypotheses was obtained, along with a series of potentially informative findings about the sexual offender group itself. These interpretive matters are taken up

in detail in the discussion section.

3.4. Psychopathy

The concept of psychopathy, as articulated by Cleckly (1976) and operationalized by Hare (1980), has become all but synonymous with serious and chronic disregard for societal values and, consequently, offers the prospect of an alternative approach in dimensionalizing delinquent conduct. On the strength of this possibility, all of the delinquent and non-delinquent subjects of this study were rated using Hare's Psychopathy Checklist (PCL) with the intention of treating these ratings as an outcome measure to which the various indices of moral maturity might be related. Because at the time that this research was formulated the PCL has not previously been employed with adolescents, an evaluation of its psychometric properties as they specifically pertain to this sample were carried out. These findings are presented first, followed by results which outline the relationship between moral maturity and psychopathy.

3.4.1. Principal components structure of the Psychopathy Checklist

A principal components analysis was undertaken to assess the degree to which the underlying factor structure for the ratings assigned to this sample reproduced item constellations similar to those found by Hare and Harper (1987). The results of this analysis, presented in Table 13, suggest the presence of three orthogonal factors. A total of 63% of the variance was accounted for in this analysis and item communalities ranging from .43 (bored) to .76 (irresponsibility). The items in the first factor depict various aspects of motivational disposition, where a lack of willingness to accept personal responsibility for one's behavior and a perception of one's life as boring, etc. appear to contribute to a propensity to act in antisocial ways. The second factor, labeled moral sentiment, contains a group of items indicative of an emotional

TABLE 13
Factor Analysis of Hare's Psychopathy Checklist

	Communality	Motivational Deficit Factor 1	Moral Sentiment Factor 2	Behavioral Deviance Factor 3
Irresponsibility	.763	.853	.189	---
Lack of realistic goals	.655	.780	.214	---
No responsibility actions	.638	.712	.294	.212
Impulsivity	.678	.705	.162	.393
Poor Behavioral controls	.690	.699	---	.437
Proneness to boredom	.437	.600	---	.235
Lack remorse or guilt	.728	---	.803	.274
Callous, lack of empathy	.725	.236	.799	.175
Grandiose self worth	.684	---	.705	.424
Shallow affect	.624	.362	.695	---
Glib, superficial charm	.574	.215	.655	.313
Promiscuous sex behavior	.650	---	.152	.792
Pathological lying	.640	.388	.265	.647
Conning, manipulative	.665	.265	.473	.609
Criminal versatility	.577	.514	---	.548
Early behavior problems	.498	.357	.368	.485
Parasitic lifestyle	.528	.417	.365	.470
Eigen values		7.749	1.792	1.213
Cumulative Variance		46%	56%	63%

shallowness and a general disregard for the feelings, perspectives, or feelings of others. The third factor focuses on antisocial behaviors and describes young persons whose behaviors tend to be criminal and exploitive. These findings, although marginally different than those presented by Hare and Harper, are not at serious variance with them. Hare and Harper identified a 2-factor solution with an oblique rotation, made up of a personality factor ("Poverty of affect and verbal duplicity") and a behavioral ("Chronic antisocial behavior") factor. Essentially, the motivation factor obtained in the present study is made up of items that were spread across both of Hare and Harper's factors. One technical reason for these minor differences may be that the analyses in this study were conducted on a 17-item version of Hare's original 22-item scale.

To further evaluate these derived factors, Cronbach alpha coefficients were computed to determine internal consistency among the items forming each of the sub-scales as well as the overall 17-item scale. The alpha coefficients for the motivational, moral sentiment, and behavioral scales were .88, .85, and .84, respectively. The total PCL scale alpha was .92. These Cronbach alpha coefficients are quite high, indicating both internal consistency between items within the overall PCL scale, and within the items of the three derived subscales. The intercorrelations between the three subscales were moderate, ranging from $r=.52$ (motivation with moral sentiment) to .68 (moral sentiment with behavior).

3.4.2. Psychopathy and moral maturity

Because so many items on the PCL concern the presence or absence of a criminal history, it was essentially true by definition that the delinquent and non-delinquent subjects would differ on this measure. This expectation was clearly confirmed, with the non-delinquents receiving a mean psychopathy rating of 3 (SD = 4.8) and the delinquents receiving an

average rating of 26 ($SD = 11.4$). Because of heterogeneity of variance, (Bartlett-Box $F = 15.123$, $p < .001$), no valid tests of this obvious difference could be conducted. As predicted, however, there was a positive correlation ($r(60) = .41$, $p < .001$) between psychopathy and immorality ratings. In view of these and earlier results indicating a strong relation between immorality ratings and the commission of sexual crimes, a further attempt was also made to determine whether there was also a relation between psychopathy and the presence or absence of such sexual offenses. In fact only six of the subjects categorized as psychopathic had also sexually offended and an analysis of variance revealed that sex offender and non-sex offenders did not obtain significantly different psychopathy scores, $F(1,58) = 2.887$, $p = .09$.

When attention was turned to the interrelations between the total Psychopathy Checklist scores and the six moral maturity measures, only Hogan's socialization measure was shown to be significantly correlated (see Table 14). When similar relationships were computed separately for the sex offender and non-sex offender groups the only new finding was a significant positive relationship between psychopathy and autonomy for the sex offender subjects. The previously reported significant negative relationship between psychopathy and socialization also persisted for the non-sex offender delinquents, but not for the sex offender group. This and other non-significant result may be an artifact, however, of the reduced range of immorality ratings among the sex offender group.

Given the general absence of low relationships between the overall index of psychopathy and the moral maturity measures, additional Pearson correlations were computed between each of the three derived factor scales of psychopathy and the moral maturity measures (See Table 14). For

TABLE 14

Correlations between the Psychopathy Factor
Scales and Measures of Moral Maturity

	Psychopathy Checklist	Factor Scales		
		Motivational Deficit	Moral Sentiment	Behavioral Deviance
All Delinquents (n=60)				
Moral Reasoning	-.04	-.25*	.08	.08
Interpersonal Awareness	-.03	-.16	.00	.08
Social Convention	.11	-.03	.17	.15
Empathy	.01	-.14	.08	.08
Socialization	-.47***	-.37**	-.38***	-.47***
Autonomy	.07	-.02	.05	.14
Non-Sex Offenders (n=42)				
Moral Reasoning	-.15	-.30*	-.12	.03
Interpersonal Awareness	-.16	-.22	-.20	.00
Social Convention	-.02	-.09	-.02	.07
Empathy	-.20	-.23	-.14	-.14
Socialization	-.46***	-.33*	-.47***	-.43**
Autonomy	-.08	-.07	-.12	-.03
Sex Offenders (n=18)				
Moral Reasoning	.25	.00	.56**	.08
Interpersonal Awareness	.29	.11	.45*	.17
Social Convention	.23	.22	.32	.05
Empathy	.34	.12	.29	.39
Socialization	-.47*	-.56**	-.03	-.53**
Autonomy	.39*	.11	.37	.46*

One-tailed tests of significance; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

reasons similar to those outlined earlier, these correlations are also reported separately for all delinquents combined, non-sex offender delinquents, and sex offenders. These results show that Hogan's socialization scale continued to show a moderately high correlation with all three psychopathy factor scales within most of these comparison groups. The single exception to this occurred with the sex offender group where moral sentiment factor scores did not correlate with socialization. A new finding to emerge in this more detailed analysis was that with the sex offender group an unexpected positive correlation was observed between the moral sentiment factor and both moral reasoning and interpersonal awareness. In other words, among the sex offender group the better their reasoning about moral dilemmas and the greater their ability to take the perspective of others, the less likely they are to show remorse, guilt, empathy, and the other descriptors that make up what has been labeled here the moral sentiment scale. Although this result appears counter-intuitive, it could be seen as consistent with the view that what psychopathic individuals lack are not so much social cognitive skills, but an interest in applying these abilities for altruistic or prosocial ends. The only other significant correlation observed was an overall negative relationship between moral reasoning and the first factor scale, labeled motivational deficiency. This finding suggests that across the delinquent population, or as a whole, those individuals who were rated more highly on items associated with poor motivation (i.e., proneness to boredom, irresponsible, etc.) correspondingly achieved lower moral reasoning scores.

3.4.3. Classification of psychopaths and non-psychopaths

If the standard scoring convention recommended by Hare is adopted, 16 youth from the sample of 60 delinquents would be classified as

psychopathic. Using this as a grouping factor, further interrelationships were sought between this dependent measure and the six moral maturity measures. There was a significant main effect for the discriminant function analysis, $F(6, 72) = 5.832, p < .001$. Table 15 highlights the results of this analysis which indicates that 70% of the cases can be successfully classified as psychopathic or non-psychopathic based on the direct method approach that includes all variables into the formula. The ability to classify these youth was largely determined, however, by Hogan's socialization and autonomy scales. More specifically, the standardized function indicates that a high autonomy loading combined with negative socialization produce the largest weights. Although much smaller in magnitude, the moral reasoning measure also makes some contribution to this overall formula. Similarly the pooled within-group correlations show that only Hogan's three personologic or moral character scales related to the standardized function, while the three cognitive reasoning measures showed correlations close to zero.

In summary, the Psychopathy Checklist when applied to this sample of youthful offenders showed strong psychometric properties, divided into three easily interpretable clinical scales (i.e., motivation, moral sentiment, and behavior), and yielded high internal consistencies for the complete checklist and for the separate factored scales. The results presented in this section do not lend support to findings reported by some investigators (i.e., Jurkovic, 1980) suggesting that psychopaths are delayed in their moral reasoning competence compared to non-psychopathic delinquents. The only single moral maturity measure significantly associated with psychopathy was Hogan's index of socialization. Here, those subjects who received high psychopathy ratings were also shown to be

TABLE 15
Discriminant Function Analyses:
Classifying Psychopaths and Non-psychopaths

Standardized Canonical Coefficients	Variable	Pooled within-group Correlation
.89	Autonomy	.64
-.77	Socialization	-.50
.00	Empathy	.33
.13	Social Convention	.08
.15	Interpersonal Awareness	.07
-.33	Moral Reasoning	-.05

Classification Summary Table

Actual Group	n	Predicted Group	
		Non-psychopaths	Psychopaths
Non-psychopaths	44	31 (71%)	13 (30%)
Psychopaths	16	5 (31%)	11 (69%)

70% of case were correctly classified

more poorly socialized. More detailed consideration of the factor scales revealed that for non-sex offender delinquents, low levels of moral reasoning were associated with low levels of motivation. Two of Hogan's moral character variables (i.e., autonomy and socialization) served as the chief predictors in classifying delinquents into the psychopathic and non-psychopathic groups while the three cognitive reasoning variables appeared to have little predictive utility.

CHAPTER 4

Discussion

The goal of this study was to explore possible relations between moral maturity and moral action by comparing various indicators of moral development descriptive of young persons positioned along dimensions of increasing lawlessness and perceived immorality. The coarsest cut through these data yielded results that mirror scattered findings reported by other investigators demonstrating differences between delinquent and non-delinquents on one or another measure of moral maturity. The present findings differed from previously reported results gleaned from earlier univariate studies partially as a consequence of the fact that a broader manifold of moral maturity measures was considered. The general picture that emerged was that, by almost every standard of measurement evaluated, the non-delinquent subjects showed more evidence of moral maturity than did their delinquent counterparts. Here, the novelty of the present results lie, not so much in once again demonstrating the individual efficacy of certain of these separate predictor variables, but in the aggregate picture that emerged from their simultaneous consideration.

Subsequent to these "either-or" comparisons, a further series of analyses was undertaken in an effort to determine the extent to which these same indicators of moral maturity were predictive of the degree to which particular adolescents had strayed from usual moral or legal standards. Here, the unanticipated fact that almost all of the delinquent subjects whose offenses were rated as most morally reprehensible also proved to have been convicted of sexual crimes intruded into the

previously planned comparisons, and forced certain modifications in the anticipated data analysis strategy. Despite this eventuality, two major classes of findings still emerged. First, as anticipated, all but one of the moral maturity measures did prove to predict to the degree of seriousness and immorality, as well as the simple presence or absence of delinquent acts. Further, other of these results went some distance toward establishing that adolescents convicted of sexual offenses possess a unique, but still interpretable, pattern of moral development difficulties. Finally, the results are seen to make some contribution to furthering our understanding of the structure and place of psychopathy in interpreting juvenile delinquency.

In the pages that follow each of these matters are taken up in further detail and efforts are made to discuss their potential relevance, both as a means of better understanding delinquent behavior and as a tool in deciphering the theoretic place of moral development in accounting for antisocial behavior. Following a further consideration of these matters, attention is turned to a final discussion of some of the perceived limitations of the present study and an exploration of the relevance of these findings as a guide to future research.

4.1. Delinquents versus Non-Delinquents: A consideration of categoric findings and their relevance for the moral developmental process

As detailed in section 1.1.1, previous research into the potential contribution of measures of moral maturity to an understanding of delinquent behavior has tended to be univariate in its conception, separately tracing out the possible predictive or theoretical relevance of individual descriptors of moral maturity. What is obviously lost in all such single focus inquiries is a broader conception of the interaction and relative contributions of the several different dimensions that together

constitute the present fuller manifold of moral maturity indicators. The multidimensional approach to the measurement of moral maturity adopted in this study provides a partial corrective to such more narrowly conceived efforts. In particular, it is plain from an examination of the results of this study that the deficits in moral development characteristic of the present delinquent sample tend to be broadly based and evident in essentially all of the dimensions of measurement considered. That is, whether one considers knowledge of social convention, interpersonal awareness, moral reasoning maturity, socialization or indices of autonomy, the delinquent subjects of this study were found to be consistently in developmental arrears. These differences were all found to persist, even when the IQ differential that also characterized these groups was statistically controlled. Only the empathy measure failed to significantly discriminate the delinquent and non-delinquent groups, but even this variable showed a trend toward significance, suggesting what amounts to an across-the-board deficit in moral maturity for the delinquent subjects.

When efforts were made to explore the inter-relations among these separate moral maturity measures, the picture that emerged, from both the discriminant and principal components analyses, was that two independent clusters of measures differently characterize these subjects. In the first instance, all of the more cognitively oriented measures (i.e., Kohlberg's moral reasoning measure, Turiel's measure of conventional social knowledge, and Selman's interpersonal awareness) tightly co-varied. These same relations appear to hold whether one considers all subjects simultaneously, or examines the delinquent and non-delinquent groups separately. Results based upon this cognitive factor indicate that, in comparison to their non-delinquent age mates, the delinquent

subjects suffered a generalized inability to reason about matters relevant to the making of moral decisions. The second factor, comprised of Hogan's socialization, empathy and autonomy measures, points to a separate failing on the part of the delinquent subjects to achieve what Hogan and others have described as a robust "moral character." That is, as a group, the delinquent subjects fell decidedly below published normative standards and the present non-delinquent comparison group in their concerns for the feelings of others, their commitment to commonly shared social values, and their sense of self-understanding and personal autonomy.

The tight clustering of these two separate sets of predictor variables was evidenced not only by their high loadings on the separate factors to which they relate, but also in their essential interchangeability as discriminators of the delinquent and non-delinquent subgroups. All of these findings speak against the possibility that moral maturity is best viewed as being of a single piece and are understood instead to be more consistent with the claim of investigators such as Blasi (1983, 1980), Brown (1965), Hogan (1982), Jurkovic (1980), and others who argue for the multidimensional nature of moral development and the necessity of adopting multivariate approaches to its assessment.

One important note of caution is required, however, before too much confidence is placed in the two-factor solution that emerged from these data. In addition to whatever actual communalities might hold between the three cognitive and the three personality measures studied, it is also true that Kohlberg's, Turiel's, and Selman's cognitive measures all rely upon detailed clinical interview procedures, while Hogan's measures of socialization, empathy and autonomy are all based upon paper-and-pencil scales composed of simple true-false statements. As was made clear in the classic paper by Campbell and Fiske (1959), under such measurement

conditions responsibility for the appearance of separate factors or clusters of scales sometimes can be traced to the presence of common method variance rather than any true relation between the different traits or abilities under study. A full test of this possibility would require access to currently unavailable measures which used interview techniques for assessing Hogan's personality trait variables and paper and pencil tests for indexing the more cognitive dimensions of moral maturity. Unless or until such measures are available, any attempt to interpret the relations of the six measures employed in this study must be viewed with extreme caution.

4.2. Relationship between the moral maturity measures and the seriousness and immorality of delinquent acts

A second major goal of this study was to attempt to determine the extent to which the measures already shown to discriminate delinquent from non-delinquent subjects could also serve to differentiate those delinquents who had committed more and less serious offenses. This inquiry was undertaken in two distinct but related ways, relying in one case upon conventional distinctions between status, property, and person offenders and in the other by undertaking to develop a direct index of the perceived immorality of various delinquent offenses. While successful overall, these efforts proved to be less straight forward than anticipated for two different sets of reasons. First, while a large panel of judges apparently understood the task of rating delinquencies in terms of their level of perceived immorality, and were able to make such judgments in highly consistent ways, they tended, in the end, to use only a portion of the five-point rating scale provided, ranking most of the offenses in question as quite high on the dimension of immorality. The variance of these judgments would have been increased automatically if a forced

distribution had been imposed on the raters. For the present exploratory purpose, however, it was felt more appropriate to permit the judges to employ the scale as they saw fit and to allow the immorality rating assigned to each of these offenses to find its own place within the five-point scale. The consequence of this decision was to force the search for discriminating predictor variables to operate within a dense and tightly packed set of ratings of offense categories only minimally separated from one another. The fact that strong covariations were still observed between this immorality measure and five of the six moral maturity measures suggests that the small difference in immorality that divide these various offenses are psychologically real. At the same time, however, the present findings might have proved even more compelling either if there had been more variability in the immorality ratings, or if a fuller compliment of more and less immoral acts had been included.

Secondly, as was already described in detail in section 3.3.2, the present subset of delinquent youth whose offenses were rated as most immoral proved to be made up almost exclusively of young persons whose crimes were sexual in nature. While currently available criminal justice statistics do not make it possible to determine the exact base rate of such sexual offenses in the population of delinquents from which this sample was drawn, it is likely the case that such offenses do not typically represent a third of any randomly selected group of young offenders. The most likely reason for their over-representation in the present sample is that the Morrison Center, under whose auspices these subjects were secured, is mandated to provide psychological treatment to those delinquent youth judged most likely to profit from therapeutic interventions. Youthful offenders whose crimes are seen to be rich in psychodynamic implications are consequently likely to be enrolled in this

program. Sexual crimes especially fit this bill of particulars, leading to what is assumed to be an over-representation of such offenders in the present sample.

Had it proved to be the case that this special group of delinquents, whose crimes ranged from non-violent sexual acts to forcible rape, were broadly distributed across the range of immorality ratings, then the impact of this likely sampling bias might have proved to be minimal. As it was, however, this group was uniformly rated as having committed especially "immoral" offenses. The effect of this rating practice was to reserve the upper end of the immorality rating scale for this sex offender group, producing what could have proven to be a serious confound. In the end, the early discovery of this sampling anomaly, and the subsequent decision of separating out the sex offender group for independent analyses, made it possible to both test certain of the original hypotheses in a slightly modified form and, serendipitously, to gain some insights into this special population of sexual offenders.

Two general classes of findings emerged from these analyses: 1) as hypothesized, delinquents whose offenses were not of a sexual nature showed delays on most measures of moral development, and these moral maturity problems proved to be related to the perceived immorality of their offenses; whereas 2) the sex offender group evidenced no such delays on the cognitive measures of moral reasoning but, like their other delinquent counterparts did show special impairments on measures of socialization.

These and other of the present findings can be lent additional interpretive meaning by setting the cognitive and personality factors identified into rough correspondence to Heider's (1958) classic accounts of "can" and "try." According to Heider, every action (and here the focus

is upon morally relevant action) can be understood as the multiplicative product of the capacity or ability to perform that act (can) and the willingness or preparedness to set such capacities into motion (try). In this study, it will be argued, the cognitive factor (defined by Kohlberg's, Turiel's, and Selman's measures) can be taken as a rough moral proxy for Heider's capacity dimension, and the personality factor (defined by Hogan's three personality scales) can be viewed as an indicator of "try". Under this description, and consistent with present findings, the non-delinquent subjects have both the capacity and the willingness to proceed morally, and thus remain on the right side of the law. By contrast, garden-variety delinquents -- that is, those whose offenses are non-sexual in nature -- were found to show deficits in both of these constituent components of morally relevant action, by lacking both the cognitive ability and the strength of moral character to systematically follow socially proscribed courses of action. Those delinquents whose offenses were sexual in nature, however, appeared to have no difficulty in understanding the perspectives of others, in recognizing social conventions, or in reasoning in an age appropriate fashion about moral matters, but did appear to lack those commitments to "try" to behave within the confines of usual moral prescriptions.

In short, non-delinquents can and try to behave morally, sexual offenders can do so but seem not to try, and other delinquents appear to fail by both measures. Roger Brown (1965) alludes to a similar distinction in his account of moral sentiment as opposed to moral knowledge. Romm Harre' (1983) also has offered a similar interpretation of the joint workings of "can" and "try" by reporting upon the formulation of moral actions in societies which he characterized as abiding by "honor moralities". By this account, certain societies leave little room for

debate about what one should and should not do, and all of the variance in morally hazardous situations is consequently taken up by the question of whether one is sufficiently committed to such commonly understood values, to give them one's best "try". Under the present interpretation something like this distinction may be responsible for the difference between the non-delinquent and sex offender groups. Both seem to have little doubt about what others expect of them. Where they part company is along that dimension of "try" indexed by the social commitments and sense of personal autonomy that Hogan describes as moral character. As is pointed out below, this same pattern of adequate social knowledge and an absence of motivation to apply it may also help to explain the special character of those delinquents high in psychopathy.

To the extent that such an interpretive analysis is supported by the present or future data, different etiologies and different sorts of treatment programs (i.e., Arbuthnot & Gordon, 1986; Gibbs, Arnold, Chessman, & Ahlborn, 1984) may suggest themselves as appropriate to delinquents convicted of sexual and non-sexual crimes. For the more typical delinquent there would appear to be developmental room for further growth along the dimensions indexed by both the cognitive and personality factors identified in this study. By contrast, of those delinquents who sexually offended, many would appear to have little to learn about the cognitive dimension of moral reasoning. Here, "trying" to put into practice what is already known would seem to be the problem that needs further work.

The preceding conceptual account also has apparent relevance to that aspect of the present data set that applies to the Psychopathy Checklist (PCL). The pattern of obtained relation between this measure and the remaining set of moral maturity indicators suggest that, like the sexual

offender group, those rated high on psychopathy also showed developmental delays on Hogan's socialization scale, the principal contributor to the "try" as opposed to the "can" factor detailed above. Despite this similarity to the sex offenders, there was little actual overlap in the membership of these groups. Only six of the psychopathic subjects had committed sexual crimes and in general the sex-offenders obtained neither higher nor lower psychopathy scores than did other delinquents. What is implied in this patterning of similarities and differences is that being cognitively capable of functioning in morally mature ways (can), but poorly prepared characterologically to apply that knowledge (try), has more than one possible consequence, and is equally descriptive of the otherwise unrelated psychopathic and sex offender group. What is not apparent from the data currently in hand is how these two groups differ in other aspects of their current psychological development, or their future prospects.

4.3. Limitations and future directions

While the foregoing discussion has touched upon certain of the procedural limitations of this study, along with suggestions as to how these shortcomings might be corrected in future research, these cautions and future prospects need to be drawn together and listed out as a guard against any potential misreading of what has been and what still needs to be accomplished.

The first serious limitation of this study arose as a function of the fact that the delinquent sample proved to contain relatively few subjects who had committed serious crimes against persons that were other than sexual in nature. The potential relevance of this eventuality was further compounded by the fact that the sex offender group proved to be unique in ways other than the rated seriousness or immorality of their crimes,

requiring that they be isolated and treated separately in certain of the analyses. One consequence of the separate treatment of this sex offender group was to curtail the range of the seriousness and immorality ratings. Despite this fact, most of the hypothesized relations between these indices of moral maturity and the criterial measures were supported. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that these relations would have gained in strength and clarity had a larger sample of delinquents been included whose offenses were judged to be immoral without also being sexual in nature. A further test of this possibility constitutes one clear direction for future research.

A second aspect of the findings reported here that requires additional attention is the two-factor solution that emerged from the principal components analysis of the six moral maturity measures. The interpretive problem associated with this result centers on the potential confound produced by the fact that the various scales that compose the cognitive and characterologic factors that emerged were not only conceptually but methodologically related. What is not known is whether a similar factor structure would result if whatever method variance that was present could be disassociated from the constructs of interest. Accomplishing this purpose would require the availability of pencil-and-paper measures of cognitive reasoning competencies and structured clinical interview methods capable of qualitatively assessing moral character. Although there have been attempts to develop more objective measures Kohlberg's stages of moral reasoning (i.e., Rest, 1979; Gibbs & Widaman, 1982), these procedures have evidenced only moderate concurrent validity. No similar attempts have been made to develop paper-and-pencil measures of social role-taking or social convention understanding, or to produce interview measures of assessing moral character traits of interest to Hogan. In the absence of

such assessment tools the possibility remains that the clear breakdown of moral maturity into the dimensions of "can" and "try" observed in this study may prove to be an artifact of measurement constraints.

Third, it is important to work to further extend the efforts initiated in this study to develop procedures for evaluating the immorality of various delinquencies and, if possible, to draw out the differences that divide such ratings from any simpler measure of seriousness. In the current investigation, the data showed that the immorality ratings obtained were closely associated with seriousness. While it may prove to be the case that conventional legal categories of seriousness are "naturally tied" to perceptions of the immorality of such crimes, it is possible that the apparent redundancy of these measures is an artifact of certain measurement restrictions in this study. Alternative designs engineered to test this possibility could easily be implemented. The use of Q-sort or paired comparison strategies, for example, would necessarily extend the variability of obtained immorality ratings, increasing the possibility that this metric might depart from simpler seriousness. Alternatively, without intending to fault the raters who participated in this study, it may have been the case that the teachers and counselors who provided the immorality ratings were poorly prepared to maintain a clear conceptual distinction between how illegal and how immoral any particular delinquent act might be. Some other panel of "experts" better schooled in what constitutes clear definitions of immorality, might succeed where others have failed in discriminating these conceptually separate but practically related matters. In any case, the initial promise shown by these first efforts to array delinquencies along a dimension of immorality suggests the merits of devoting additional research efforts to further developing such measures.

Finally, the data produced by Hare's Psychopathy Checklist was interpretively rich, but somewhat at variance with the findings of other studies. In particular the Psychopathy Checklist was found to be negatively related to Hogan's socialization scale and negatively associated with general immorality ratings. The principal components analysis computed on these data did, however, yield a three-factor solution, different than that reported by Hare and Harper (1987). Two facts may be responsible for these differences. First, in spite of the clear clinical interpretability of the derived factor scales and their high internal consistency, restrictions in the present sample size, the potential heterogeneity of the delinquent sample, and potential rating bias by the therapists may have resulted in a factor structure unique to this sample. Forth (1987), for example, was unable to obtain the identical factor structure with another slightly larger sample of incarcerated youth. Future research which employed larger sample sizes and had a broader compliment of delinquent subtypes would be required to fully test the stability of the present findings. All of the above limitations aside, the results of the present study are seen to go some important distance toward demonstrating that knowledge regarding an individual's progress toward moral maturity is a powerful predictor, not only of the prospect of delinquent behaviors, but also of the degree to which such delinquencies depart from commonly accepted standards of morality.

References

- American Psychiatric Association. (1986). Diagnostic and statistical manual III-R. Washington D.C.: American Psychiatric Association.
- Arbuthnot, J., & Gordon, D. A. (1986). Behavioral and cognitive effects of a moral reasoning developmental intervention for high-risk behavior-disordered adolescents. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 54, 208-216.
- Baldwin, J. M. (1906). Mental development in the child and the race. (3d ed., revised), New York: MacMillan.
- Bartz, W. R., & Loy, D. L. (1970). The Shipley-Hartford as a brief I.Q. screening device. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 26, 74-75.
- Blasi, A. (1980). Bridging moral cognition and moral action: A critical review of the literature. Psychological Bulletin, 88, 1-45.
- Blasi, A. (1983). Moral cognition and moral action: A theoretical perspective. Developmental Review, 3, 178-210.
- Brown, R. (1965). Social psychology. New York: Free Press.
- Campagna, H. F., & Harter, S. (1975). Moral judgment in sociopathic and normal children. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31, 199-205.
- Campbell, D. T., & Fiske, D. W. (1959). Convergent and discriminant validation by multitrait-multimethod matrix. Psychological Bulletin, 56, 81-105.
- Chandler, M. J. (1972). Egocentrism in normal and pathological childhood development. In F. Monks, W. Hartup, & J. DeWitt (Eds.) Determinants of behavioral development. New York: Academic Press.
- Chandler, M. J. (1973). Egocentrism and antisocial behavior: The assessment and training of social perspective-taking skills. Developmental Psychology, 9, 326-332.
- Chandler, M. J., Greenspan, S., & Barenboim, C. (1974). Assessment and training of role-taking and referential communication skills in institutionalized emotionally disturbed children. Developmental Psychology, 10, 546-553.
- Cleckly, H. (1976). The mask of sanity. (5th ed.). St Louis: Mosby.
- Cohen, J. (1960) A coefficient of agreement for nominal scales. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 20, 37-46.
- Colby, A., & Kohlberg, L. (1987). The measurement of moral judgment (Vols. 1-2). New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Colby, A., Kohlberg, L., Gibbs, J., & Lieberman, M. (1983). A longitudinal study of moral development. Monographs of the Society for the Research in Child Development, 48(200).
- Fodor, E. M. (1972). Delinquency and susceptibility to social influence among adolescents as a function of level of moral development. Journal of Social Psychology, 86, 257-260.
- Fodor, E. M. (1973). Moral development and parent behavior antecedents in adolescent psychopaths. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 122, 37-43.
- Forth, A. (1987). The contingent negative variation in the psychopath. Unpublished masters thesis, University of British Columbia.
- Gibbs, J. C., Arnold, K. D., Cheesman, F. L., & Ahlborn, H. H. (1984). Facilitation of sociomoral reasoning in delinquents. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 52, 37-45.
- Gibbs, J.C., & Wideman, K.F. (1982) Social intelligence: Measuring the development of sociomoral reflection. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Gottreid, A. W. (1985). Measures of socioeconomic status in child development research: Data and recommendations. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 31, 85-92.
- Gough, H. G. (1948). A sociological theory of psychopathy. American Journal of Sociology, 53, 359-366.
- Gough, H. G. (1953). What determines the academic achievement of high school students? Journal of Educational Research, 46, 321-331.
- Gough, H. G. (1957). Manual for the California Personality Inventory. Palo Alto: Consulting Psychologists Press.
- Greiger, K. M., & Turiel, E. (1983). Disruptive school behavior and concepts of social convention in early adolescence. Journal of Educational Psychology, 75, 667-685.
- Hare, R. (1980). A research scale for the assessment of psychopathy in criminal populations. Personality and Individual Differences, 1, 111-119.
- Hare, R. (1983). Diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder in two prison populations. American Journal of Psychiatry, 140, 887-890.
- Hare, R. (1985). Comparison of procedures for the assessment of psychopathy. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 53, 7-16.
- Hare, R., & Harper, T. (1987) Assessment of psychopathy. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Psychological Association, Vancouver.
- Hare, R., & McPherson, L. M. (1984). Violent and aggressive behavior by criminal psychopaths. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 7, 35-50.

- Harre', R. (1983). Personal being: A theory for individual psychology. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Hart, S. (1987). Diagnosis of psychopaths in a forensic psychiatric setting. Unpublished masters thesis, University of British Columbia.
- Haviland, J. M. (1977). The punitive beliefs and behaviors of adolescent delinquent boys. Developmental Psychology, 13, 677-678.
- Hawk, S., & Peterson, R. A. (1974). Do MMPI psychopathic deviancy scores reflect psychopathic deviancy or just deviancy? Journal of Personality Assessment, 38, 362-368.
- Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. Hilldale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Hetherington, E. M., Stouwie, R., & Ridberg, E. H. (1971). Patterns of family interaction and child rearing attitudes related to three dimensions of juvenile delinquency. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 77, 160-176.
- Hogan, R. (1969). Development of an empathy scale. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 33, 307-316.
- Hogan, R. (1970). A dimension of moral judgment. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 35, 205-212.
- Hogan, R. (1982). A socioanalytic theory of personality. In M. M. Page (Ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation (Vol. 25). New York: Praeger.
- Hogan, R., & Busch, C. (1984). Moral action as autointerpretation. In W. M. Kurtines & J. L. Gewirtz, Morality, moral behavior and moral development. New York: Wiley.
- Hogan, R., & Johnson, J. A., & Emler, N. P. (1978). A socioanalytic theory of moral development. New Directions for Child Development, 2, 1-18.
- Holland, J. L. (1973). Making vocational choices: A theory of careers. Edgewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Hollingshead, A. B. (1975). Four-factor index of social status. Unpublished manuscript. Yale University. Department of Sociology, New Haven.
- Hudgins, W., & Prentice, N. M. (1973). Moral judgment in delinquent and nondelinquent adolescents and their mothers. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 82, 145-152.
- James, W. (1898). Principles of psychology. New York: Holt
- Jennings, W. S., Kilkenney, R., & Kohlberg, L. (1983). Moral development theory and practice for youthful and adult offenders. In W. S. Laufer & J. M. Day (Eds.), Personality theory, moral development, and criminal behavior, Toronto: Lexington Books.

- Jennings, W. S., & Kohlberg, L. (1983). Effects of a just community programme on the moral development of youthful offenders. Journal of Moral Education, 12, 33-50.
- Jurkovic, G. J. (1980). The juvenile delinquent as moral philosopher: A structural-developmental perspective. Psychological Bulletin, 88, 709-727.
- Jurkovic, G. J., & Prentice, N. M. (1977). Relation of moral and cognitive development to dimensions of juvenile delinquency. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 86, 414-420.
- Kohlberg, L. (1969). Stage and sequence: The cognitive developmental approach to socialization. In D. A. Goslin (Ed.) Handbook of socialization, theory, and research. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Kohlberg, L. (1971). From is to ought: How to commit the naturalistic fallacy and get away with it in the study of moral development. In T. Mischel (Ed.), Psychology and genetic epistemology. New York: Academic Press.
- Kohlberg, L. (1976). Moral stages and moralization: The cognitive-developmental approach. In T. Lickona (Ed.) Moral development and behavior: Theory, research, and social issues, New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston.
- Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self, and society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Nucci, L. (1981). Conceptions of personal issues: A domain distinct from moral and societal concepts. Child Development, 52, 114-121.
- Quay, H. C., Peterson, D. R., & Consalvi, C. (1960). The interpretation of three personality factors in juvenile delinquency. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 24, 555.
- Rest, J. (1979). Development in judging moral issues. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Robbins, L. N. (1966). Deviant children grown up. Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins.
- Rossi, P. H., Waite, E., Bose, C. E., & Berk, R. E. (1975). The seriousness of crimes: Normative structures and individual differences. American Sociological Review, 39, 224-237.
- Rutter, M. (1984). Juvenile delinquency: Trends and perspectives. New York: Guilford.
- Schroeder, M. L., Schroeder, K. G., & Hare, R. D. (1983). Generalizability of checklist for assessment of psychopathy. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 51, 511-516.
- Sellin, J. T., & Wolfgang, M. E. (1964). The measurement of delinquency. New York: Wiley.

- Selman, R. (1979). Assessing interpersonal understanding: An interview and scoring manual. Harvard-Judge Baker Social Reasoning Project, Boston. Unpublished manuscript.
- Selman, R. (1980). The growth of interpersonal understanding: Developmental and clinical analysis. New York:Academic Press.
- Selman, R. (1981). The development of interpersonal competence: The role of understanding in conduct. Developmental Review, 1, 401-422.
- Selman, R. & Byrne, D. (1974). A structural-developmental analysis of levels of role-taking in middle childhood. Child Development, 45, 803-806.
- Selman, R., Lavin, D., & Brion-Meisels, S. (1984). Troubled children's use of self-reflection. In F. Serafica (Ed.), Social-cognitive development in context. New York: Guilford Press.
- Thornton, D., & Reid, R. L. (1982). Moral reasoning and type of criminal offense. British Journal of Social Psychology, 21, 231-238.
- Turiel, E. (1977). Conflict and transition in adolescent moral development II: The resolution of disequilibrium through structural reorganization. Child Development, 48, 634-637.
- Turiel, E. (1978). The development of concepts of social structure: Social concention. In J. Glick & A. Clarke-Stewart (Eds.), The development of social understanding. New York: Gardner Press.
- Turiel, E. (1983). The development of social knowledge. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Turiel, E., & Smetana, J. G. (1984). Social Knowledge and action: The coordination of domains. In W. M. Kurtiness & J. L. Gewirtz (Eds.), Morality, moral behavior, and moral development. New York: Wiley.
- Wadsworth, M. (1979). Roots of delinquency: Infancy, adolescence and crime.
- Walker, L. J. (1980). Cognitive and perspective-taking prerequisites for moral development. Child Development, 51, 131-139.
- Walker, M. A. (1978). Measuring the seriousness of crimes. British Journal of Criminology, 18, 346-364.
- Zachary, R. A. (1986). Shipley Institute of Living Scale: Revised manual. Los Angeles: Western Psychological Services.

Appendix A

Kohlberg's Moral Reasoning

- A. Stages of Moral Development
- B. Hypothetical Dilemmas
and Question Probes
- C. Scoring Sheet

Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development

Level I Preconventional

Stage 1: "Heteronomous Morality"

What is Right: To avoid breaking the rules backed by punishment, obedience for its own sake, and avoiding physical damage to persons and property.

Reasons for doing right: Avoidance of punishment, and the superior power of authorities.

Stage 2: "Individualism, Instrumental Purpose, and Exchange"

What is Right: Following rules only when it is to someone's immediate interest; acting to meet one's own interests and needs and letting others do the same. Right is also what's fair, what's an equal exchange, a deal. an agreement.

Reasons for doing right: To serve one's own needs or interests in a world where you have to recognize that other people their interests, too.

Level II Conventional

Stage 3: "Mutual Interpersonal Expectations, Relationships, and Interpersonal Conformity"

What is Right: Living up to what is expected by people close to you or what people generally expect of people in your role as son, brother, friend, etc. "Being good" is important and means having good motives, showing concern about others. It also means keeping mutual relationships, such as trust, loyalty, respect and gratitude.

Reasons for doing right: The need to be a good person in your own eyes and those of others. Your caring for others. Belief in the Golden Rule. Desire to maintain rules and authority which support stereotypical good behavior.

Stage 4: "Social Systems and Conscience"

What is right: Fulfilling the actual duties to which you have agreed. Laws are to be upheld except in extreme cases where they conflict with other fixed social duties. Right is also contributing to society, the group, or institution.

Reasons for doing right: To keep the institution going as a whole, to avoid the breakdown in the system "if everyone did it," or the imperative of conscience to meet one's defined obligations.

Level III Postconventional or Principled

Stage 5: "Societal Contract or Utility and Individual Rights"

What is Right: Being aware that people hold a variety of values and opinions, that most values and rules are relative to your group. These relative rules should usually be upheld, however, in the interest of impartiality and because they are the social contract. Some nonrelative values and rights like life and liberty, however, must be upheld in any society and regardless of majority opinion.

Reasons for doing right: A sense of obligation to law because of one's social contract to make and abide by laws for the welfare of all and for the protection of all people's rights. A feeling of contractual commitment, freely entered upon, to family, friendship, trust, and work obligations. Concern that laws and duties be based on rational calculation of overall utility, "the greatest good for the greatest number."

Stage 6: "Universal Ethical Principles"

What is Right: Following self-chosen ethical principles. Particular laws or social agreements are usually valid because they rest on such principles. When laws violate these principles, one acts in accordance with the principle. Principles are universal principles of justice: the equality of human rights and respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons.

Reasons for doing right: The belief as a rational person in the validity of universal moral principles, and a sense of personal commitment to them.

Note. From Kohlberg, 1976, pp.34-35.

HYPOTHETICAL DILEMMAS

FORM B

There was a woman who had very bad cancer, and there was no treatment known to medicine that would save her. Her doctor, Dr. Jefferson, knew that she had only about 6 months to live. She was in terrible pain, but she was so weak that an overdose of a pain-killer would make her die sooner. She was almost crazy with pain, and in her calm periods she would ask Dr. Jefferson to give her enough of the drug to kill her. She said she couldn't stand the pain and was going to die in a few months anyway. Although he knows that mercy-killing is against the law, the doctor thinks about granting her request.

1. What do you think is the problem in this story?
2. Should Dr. Jefferson give her the drug that would make her die?
Why or why not?
3. Should the woman have the right to make the final decision?
Why or why not?
4. Is there any way a person has a duty or an obligation to live when he or she does not want to, when the person wants to commit suicide?
Why or why not?
5. It is against the law for the doctor to give the woman the drug. Does that make it morally wrong?
Why or why not?
6. In general, should people try to do everything they can to obey the law? Why or why not?
How does this apply to what Dr. Jefferson should do?

Mr. Jefferson did perform the mercy-killing by giving the woman the drug. Passing by at the time was another doctor, Dr. Rogers, who knew the situation Dr. Jefferson was in. Dr. Rogers thought of trying to stop Dr. Jefferson, but the drug was already administered.

1. What do you think the problem is in this situation?
2. Should Dr. Rogers report Dr. Jefferson?
Why or why not?
3. The doctor does report Dr. Jefferson. Dr. Jefferson is brought to court and a jury finds Dr. Jefferson guilty. It is up to the judge to determine the sentence. Should the judge give Dr. Jefferson some punishment or should he suspend the sentence and let Dr. Jefferson go free? Why or why not?
4. Thinking in terms of society, should people who break the law be punished? Why or why not? How does this apply to how the judge should decide?
5. The jury found Dr. Jefferson legally guilty of murder. Would it be wrong or right for the judge to give him the death sentence?
Why or why not?
6. Is it ever right to give the death sentence? Why or why not? What are the conditions when the death sentence should be given (if ever) in your opinion? Why are these conditions important?
7. Dr. Jefferson was doing what his conscience told him when he gave the woman the drug. Should a lawbreaker be punished if he is acting out of conscience? Why or why not?

Judy was a 12-year-old girl. Her mother promised her that she could go to a special rock concert coming to their town if she earned the money to buy a ticket to the concert. She managed to save up the \$15 the ticket cost, plus another \$3. But then her mother changed her mind and told Judy that she had to spend her money on new clothes for school. Judy was disappointed and decided to go to the concert anyway. She bought a ticket and told her mother that she was spending the day with a friend. A week passed without her mother finding out. Judy then told her older sister, Louise, that she had gone to the concert and lied to her mother about it.

1. What do you think is the problem in this situation?
2. Should Louise, the older sister, tell their mother that Judy had lied about the money or should she keep quiet?
Why or why not?
3. In wondering whether to tell, Louise thinks of the fact that Judy is her sister. Should that make a difference in Louise's decision?
4. Is the fact that Judy earned the money herself important in this situation? Why or why not?
5. The mother promised Judy that she could go to the concert if she earned the money. Is the fact that the mother promised important in the the situation? Why or why not?
6. Why in general should a promise be kept?
7. What do you think is the most important thing a mother should be concerned about in her relationship to her daughter? Why is that the most important thing?
8. What do you think is the most important thing a daughter should be concerned about in her relationship to her mother? Why is that the most important thing?

Appendix B

Turiel's Social Convention Understanding

- A. Levels of Social Convention
- B. Vignettes

TURIEL'S DEVELOPMENTAL LEVELS OF SOCIAL CONVENTION

Level	Approximate Age
1. <u>Convention as descriptive of social uniformity.</u> Convention viewed as descriptive of uniformities in behavior. Convention is not conceived as part of structure of function as social interaction. Convention uniformities are descriptive of what is assumed to exist. Convention maintained to avoid violation of empirical uniformities.	6-7
2. <u>Negation of convention as descriptive social uniformity</u> Empirical uniformity not a sufficient basis for maintaining conventions. Conventional acts regarded as arbitrary. Convention is not conceived as part of structure or function of social interaction.	8-9
3. <u>Convention as affirmation of rule system: early concrete conception of social system.</u> Convention seen as arbitrary and changeable. Adherence to convention based on concrete rules and authoritative expectations. Conception of conventional acts not coordinated with conception of rule.	10-11
4. <u>Negation of convention as part of rule system.</u> Convention now seen as arbitrary and changeable regardless of rule. Evaluation of rule pertaining to conventional act is coordinated with evaluation of the act. Conventions are "nothing but" social expectations.	12-13
5. <u>Convention as mediated by social system.</u> The emergence of systematic concepts of social structure. Convention as normative regulation in system with uniformity, fixed roles and static hierarchical organization.	14-16
6. <u>Negation of convention as societal standards.</u> Convention regarded as codified societal standards. Uniformity in convention is not considered to serve the function of maintaining social system. Conventions are "nothing but" societal standards that exist through habitual use.	17-18
7. <u>Conventions are coordination of societal interactions.</u> Conventions as uniformities that are functional in coordinating social interactions. Shared knowledge, in the form of conventions, among members of social groups facilitate interaction and operation of the system.	19-25

STORY A

Peter has been brought up in a family in which all the members call each other by their first names. In his family, it had been acceptable for the children to address their parents by their first names, rather than by their titles of Mother and Father. Upon his arrival in school, he discovers that people address teachers by their titles or Mr. and Mrs. He decides that he will call teachers by their first names anyway. But the teachers in the school feel strongly about being addressed formally and believe that the rules should be strictly enforced. The principal tells Peter that he must stop calling teachers by their first names. Peter refuses to do so.

1. Do you think Peter was right or wrong to continue calling his teachers by their first names? Why?
- 1a. Who should give in Peter or the teachers? Why?
- 1b. Is it important to show respect to teachers? Why?
2. Why are people called by titles? Do you think it matters whether people are called by their titles?
3. Why do rules about titles exist in schools?
4. Which do you think is better? Which do you prefer? To call people by their first names or by titles?
5. Is swearing the same or different as calling a teacher by his first name?
6. Is breaking a rule about cheating the same or different as breaking a school rule about using titles to address teachers? How and why?

STORY B

Joe was a senior in high school who was in the process of deciding what he wanted to do after graduation. In spite of his parents' and relatives' objections, he felt he would most enjoy taking care of new born infants in a hospital setting. Joe enjoyed caring for babies, and felt that this job would provide him with the greatest satisfaction. His father objected very strongly, saying that this was a career for a woman and that Joe would be laughed at by everyone if he became an infant nurse. So his father did not want him to do this. Nevertheless, Joe went ahead and enrolled in a course that would train him to become an infant nurse.

1. Do you think Joe was right or wrong in taking the job as an infant nurse? Why?
2. Why do you think his parents see that job as appropriate for women only?
3. Does his father have the right to tell Joe that he can't go into a career as an infant nurse? Why?
4. Is there any difference between breaking a custom like going into a traditionally female job and breaking a rule that prohibits stealing?
5. Does following the career as an infant nurse have anything to do with being a good or bad son? Why?

STORY C

Bob and Ken were two lawyers who had been in business together for five years. They had been classmates in college, and had remained good friends ever since. Recently, however, Ken had decided that he wanted to wear casual clothes to the office, and he made up his mind that he would do it. Bob decided to talk to him about this because he thought it was wrong to dress in sports clothes while being a member of a professional firm. Bob felt very strongly that Ken should always wear a suit and tie to the office, even if he preferred the more casual style of dress. Ken insisted that he shouldn't have to wear anything he didn't want to. So this disagreement led to a very difficult situation, since they had to remain in business together in spite of their strong disagreement about dress in the office.

1. Do you think Ken was right or wrong in his decision to continue wearing sports clothes to the office? Why?
2. Was it right or wrong for Bob to expect Ken to dress in a particular way? Why?
3. Is it right or wrong for people in general to expect others to dress in a particular way? Why?
4. What if it's an office rule to wear a suit and tie to the office? Was Ken right or wrong in breaking the rule? Is it the same or different as breaking a custom?
5. Bob argued that a lawyer has certain obligation to his clients, - one is that the lawyer be honest and fair in his dealings with the client, and the other is that the lawyer should act professionally by wearing a suit and tie to the office. Do you see these two obligations as equally important? Why?
6. Do you think a person could be a good lawyer, even if he doesn't follow the custom of dressing in what most people regard as right for a professional? Why?

Appendix C

Hogan's Scales of Moral Development

Examples of Items Constituting the
Socialization, Empathy, and
Autonomy Scales

Examples of Hogan's moral maturity scales

Socialization

1. I think I am stricter about right and wrong than most people.
2. I am somewhat afraid of the dark.
3. My home life was always happy.
4. My parents often disapproved of my friends.
5. I often think about how I look and what impression I am making upon others.

Empathy

1. It bothers me when something unexpected interrupts my daily routine.
2. I don't really care whether people like me or dislike me.
3. I have a natural talent to influence people.
4. Often I can't understand why I have been so cross or grouchy.
5. I like to be with a crowd play jokes on one another.

Autonomy

1. I like to plan out my activities in advance.
2. I always try to do at least a little better than what is expected of me.
3. I often get disgusted with myself.
4. I don't seem to care what happens to me.
5. I think I would like to be a school teacher.

Derivation of scales. The socialization and autonomy scales were taken from the CPI and the empathy scale consists of 31 items from the CPI, 25 items from the MMPI, and 6 additional items adopted from Institute of Personality Assessment and Research (IPAR).

Appendix D

Selman's Social Perspective Taking

- A. Stages of Interpersonal Awareness
- B. Friendship Story
and Question Probes
- D. Scoring Sheet

STAGES OF INTERPERSONAL AWARENESS

Conceptions of Close Dyadic Friendships

Stage 0 - Momentary physicalistic playmates. Dyadic friendship relations are based on thinking which focuses upon propinquity and proximity (i.e., physicalistic parameters) to the inclusion of others. A close friend is someone who lives close by and with whom the self happens to be playing with at the moment. Friendship is more accurately playmateship. Issues such as jealousy or the intrusion of a third party into a play situation are constructed by the child at Stage 0 as specific fights over specific toys or space rather than as fights which involve personal feelings.

Stage 1 - One-way assistance. Friendship conceptions at Stage 1 are in way in the sense that a friend is seen as important because he or she performs specific activities which the self wants done or accomplished. In other words, one person's attitude is unreflectively set up as a standard, and the friends' actions must match the standard thus formulated. A close friend is someone with more than Stage 0 demographic credentials (e.g., lives close by). A close friend is someone who one knows better than other friends, in terms of one-way knowledge of other's likes and dislikes.

Stage 2 - Fairweather cooperation. The advance of Stage 2 friendships over the previous stages is based on the new awareness of interpersonal perspectives as reciprocal. The two-way nature of friendships is exemplified by concerns for coordinating and approximating through adjustment by both self and other, the specific likes and dislikes of self and other, rather than matching one person's actions to the other's fixed standard of expectation. The limitation of this level is the discontinuity of these reciprocal expectations. Friendship at Stage 2 is fairweather -- specific arguments are seen as severing the relationship although attitudes at the moment defines the relation. No underlying continuity exists which maintains the relation and allows for a conception of the relationship during the period of conflict or adjustment.

Stage 3 - Intimate and mutually shared relationships. At Stage 3 there is the awareness of both a continuity or relation and affective bonding between close friends. The importance of friendship does not rest only upon the fact that the self is bored or lonely as at previous stages; at stage 3, friendships are seen as a basic means of developing mutual intimacy and mutual support. Friends share personal problems; the occurrence of conflicts between friends does not mean the suspension of the relation itself, because the underlying continuity between the partners transcends specific and minor foul weather incidents. The limitation of Stage 3 arise from the overemphasis of the two person clique, and the possessiveness that arise out of the realization that close relations are difficult to form and to maintain in that they take constant effort.

Stage 4 - Autonomous interdependent friendships. The interdependence which characterizes Stage 4 is a sense that a friendship continues to grow and be transformed through each partner's ability to synthesize feelings of independence and dependence. Independence means that each person accepts the other's need to establish relations with others and to grow through such experiences. Dependence reflects the awareness that friends must rely on each other for psychological support, and to give a sense of self-identification through identification with other as a significant person whose relation to the self is qualitatively distinct from less meaningful relations.

Source: Selman (1979).

FRIEND DILEMMA

Charlene and Joanne have been good friends since they were five. Now they were in high school and Joanne was trying out for the school play. As usual she was nervous about how she had done, but Charlene was there to tell her she was very good and to give her moral support. Still Joanne was worried that a newcomer in school would get the part. The new girl, Tina, came over to congratulate Joanne on her performance and then asked if she could join the girls for a snack. Right away Charlene and Tina seemed to hit it off very well. They talked about where Tina was from and the kinds of things she could do in her new school. Joanne on the other hand, didn't seem to like Tina very well. She thought Tina was a little push, and maybe she was a bit jealous over all the attention Charlene was giving Tina. When Tina left the other two alone, Joanne and Charlene arranged to get together on Saturday, because Joanne had a problem that she would like to talk over with Charlene. But later that day Tina called Charlene and asked her to go to see a play on Saturday. Charlene had a dilemma. She would have jumped at the chance to go with Tina, but she had already promised to see Joanne. Joanne might have understood and been happy that Charlene had the chance to go, or she might feel like she was losing her best friend when she really needed her.

1. What do you think the problem is in this story?
2. What do you think Charlene will do, choose to be with her old friend Joanne or go with the new girl Tina? Why?
3. Which do you think is more important, to be with an old friend or make a new friend? Why?
4. Do you have a best friend? What kind of friendship do you have with that person? What makes that person your best friend?
5. Why are friends important? What kind of person makes a good friend?
6. What's the difference between the kind of friendship Joanne and Charlene have and Charlene and Tina's friendship?
7. Which is better to have or be with, one close friend or a group of regular friends? Why?
8. Is it important to do things for each other for a good friendship? Why?
9. Do you think trust is important for a good friendship? Why?
10. How do you think Joanne feels about the new friendship?
11. What does it mean to be jealous in a friendship? What does jealousy do to a friendship?
12. Can people be friends even if they are having arguments? Why?
13. How should arguments be settled between good friends?
14. What makes friendships breakup?

Appendix E

Hare's Measure of Psychopathy

Psychopathy Checklist (PCL)
Revised for Adolescents

ADOLESCENT BEHAVIOR CHECKLIST

0=does not occur, not a problem;

1=occurs infrequently, slight problem

2=occurs sometimes or occasionally, moderate problem

3=occurs frequently, serious problem

- | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|--|
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1. Glibness, superficial charm |
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 2. Grandiose sense of self-worth |
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3. Need for stimulation, proneness to boredom |
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4. Pathological lying |
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 5. Conning, manipulative |
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 6. Lack of remorse or guilt |
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 7. Shallow affect |
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 8. Callous, lack of empathy |
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 9. Parasitic lifestyle |
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 10. Poor behavioral controls |
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 11. Promiscuous sexual behavior |
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 12. Early behavioral problems |
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 13. Lack of realistic, long-term goals |
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 14. Impulsivity |
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 15. Irresponsibility |
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 16. Failure to accept responsibility for own actions |
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 17. Revocation of conditional release |
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 18. Criminal versatility |

Appendix F

Delinquency Rating Scale

- A. Delinquency Rating Scale
- B. Item Means and Standard Deviations

JUVENILE DELINQUENCY RATING SCALE

___ Male ___ Female

Occupation _____

Age _____

The purpose of this study is to obtain ratings by individuals about the relative seriousness of certain delinquent acts committed by juveniles (individuals 18 years and younger). The following list of crimes are arranged in random order. For each crime, please indicate how serious it is to you. The seriousness of each delinquent act is to be judged according to the following scale from 0 to 5:

0.....1.....2.....3.....4.....5
 NOT EXTREMELY
 IMMORAL IMMORAL

- ___ 1. Burglary of a home, stealing a stereo and color TV.
- ___ 2. Selling marijuana to high school peers.
- ___ 3. Fondling genitals of child.
- ___ 4. Forgery of a stranger's check.
- ___ 5. Theft of a car for joy-riding.
- ___ 6. Repeated running away from home.
- ___ 7. Planned killing of a parent.
- ___ 8. Defacing a public building with paint.
- ___ 9. Shoplifting clothes over \$100 in value.
- ___ 10. Forcible rape of a stranger in a park.
- ___ 11. Setting fire in a waste basket in an occupied school.
- ___ 12. Beating up a stranger in a fist fight.
- ___ 13. Driving parents car without a license or permission.
- ___ 14. Attempted rape (no use of a weapon).
- ___ 15. Making obscene phone calls.
- ___ 16. Possession of cocaine
- ___ 17. Harassment of a mentally retarded neighbor.
- ___ 18. Break-in and entry of store, stealing several stereos.
- ___ 19. Repeated truancy from school.

- _____ 21. Loitering
- _____ 22. Behaving beyond parental control/ refusal to obey parents.
- _____ 23. Engaging in prostitution.
- _____ 24. Armed hold-up of a convenience store.
- _____ 25. Being drunk in a public place.
- _____ 26. Impulsive killing of an acquaintance over an argument.
- _____ 27. Using LSD.
- _____ 28. Stealing a billfold from a stranger at knife-point.
- _____ 29. Setting fire to a garage not attached to a house.
- _____ 30. Being out past curfew.
- _____ 31. Bribes younger niece to give him oral sex.
- _____ 32. Illegal possession of a firearm.
- _____ 33. Forcible rape after breaking into a home.
- _____ 34. Mugging and stealing a purse with \$200 in it.
- _____ 35. Minor in possession of alcoholic beverages.
- _____ 36. Disorderly conduct.
- _____ 37. Burglary of a house taking \$50 in cash.
- _____ 38. Assault with a knife.
- _____ 39. Demolishing a statue in a city park.
- _____ 40. Using stolen credit cards.
- _____ 41. Shoplifting \$30 worth of cassette tapes.
- _____ 42. Exposes genitals to a child in a park.
- _____ 43. Intimidation of a neighbor.
- _____ 44. Trespassing in a railroad yard.
- _____ 45. Resisting arrest by a police officer.
- _____ 46. Breaking into a school causing over \$10,000 worth of damage.
- _____ 47. Spray-painting a swastika on a Jewish temple door.
- _____ 48. Torturing animals.
- _____ 49. Making rude and obscene comments to strangers on the street.

Means and Standard Deviations of Immorality Ratings

	Mean	Stnd. Dev.
10. Forcible rape of a stranger in a park.	4.98	.14
20. Babysitting, forcing boy to have anal sex.	4.91	.29
33. Forcible rape after breaking into a home.	4.91	.38
7. Planned killing of a parent.	4.89	.42
31. Bribes younger niece to give him oral sex.	4.85	.38
26. Impulsive killing acquaintance argument.	4.75	.61
14. Attempted rape (no use of a weapon).	4.70	.56
3. Fondling genitals of child.	4.69	.77
48. Torturing animals.	4.67	.63
38. Assault with a knife.	4.55	.57
28. Stealing billfold stranger knife-point.	4.46	.67
42. Exposes genitals to a child in a park.	4.46	.66
24. Armed hold-up of a convenience store.	4.37	.73
34. Mugging and stealing purse with \$200.	4.24	.79
46. Breaking into a school \$10,000 damage.	4.18	.79
17. Harassment of a mentally retarded neighbor.	4.06	.91
47. Spray-painting a swastika Jewish temple door.	4.04	.93
29. Set fire garage not attached to a house.	3.99	.97
12. Beating up a stranger in a fist fight.	3.96	1.04
18. Break-in store, stealing several stereos.	3.94	.90
11. Setting fire waste basket occupied school.	3.86	1.06
1. Burglary home, stealing a stereo/TV.	3.83	.85
40. Using stolen credit cards.	3.80	.87
23. Engaging in prostitution.	3.73	1.25
4. Forgery of a stranger's check.	3.70	.87

Means and Standard Deviations of Immorality Ratings
Continued

	Mean	Stnd. Dev.
50. Stealing a stereo from a parked car.	3.70	.91
37. Burglary of a house taking \$50 in cash.	3.68	.97
2. Selling marijuana to high school peers.	3.67	1.23
5. Theft of a car for joy-riding.	3.63	.98
39. Demolishing a statue in a city park.	3.56	1.00
41. Shoplifting \$30 worth of cassette tapes.	3.49	.94
9. Shoplifting clothes over \$100 in value.	3.46	.94
43. Intimidation of a neighbor.	3.43	1.08
49. Making rude and obscene comments strangers.	3.40	.91
32. Illegal possession of a firearm.	3.21	1.32
16. Possession of cocaine	3.20	1.41
27. Using LSD.	3.18	1.49
15. Making obscene phone calls.	3.14	1.05
45. Resisting arrest by a police officer.	3.06	1.17
8. Defacing a public building with paint.	2.87	1.12
13. Driving parents car no license/permission.	2.43	1.06
22. Behaving beyond parental control.	2.42	1.18
35. Minor in possession alcoholic beverages.	2.37	1.20
25. Being drunk in a public place.	2.32	1.25
36. Disorderly conduct.	2.22	1.17
19. Repeated truancy from school.	2.10	1.19
6. Repeated running away from home.	2.07	1.35
44. Trespassing in a railroad yard.	1.71	1.19
30. Being out past curfew.	1.38	1.12
21. Loitering	1.12	1.07

APPENDIX G

Consent Forms

- A. Parental
- B. Professional
- C. Youth

To be read to the youth:

The staff here as well as your parent(s) have given their permission for you to participate in this study but it is important that you yourself decide whether you want to participate. If you decide to be part of this study, you may still withdraw your consent at any time. That means that if you decide, for any reason, that you do not want to continue you can stop without any problem at all.

Let me describe to you what this study involves. We are interested in the different ways that young people think about certain social issues and problems. In order to find this out, we are interviewing people individually for about one hour. In this interview, we would be asking you to listen to a series of short stories about people who have difficult decisions to make and then to give us your thoughts about these stories by answering a series of questions about them. We also have a questionnaire on attitudes and values we would like you to read and mark down whether they are true or false for you. There are no right or wrong answers to any of these questions - we are simply interested in what you think about these items.

As we said, these interviews will take about an hour. To help us in getting all of your comments down, we would like to tape record the whole interview. When we are finished we will type up your answers and erase the tape. Your name will not appear anywhere on the typed record, so all comments will be kept strictly confidential - neither your parents, or the staff here will see your answers.

There are no trick questions in this study so if something does not make sense or is not clear, or if you would rather not answer that question, just say so. When we are finished I will be prepared to answer any questions you may have about this study or about any of the questions you have answered. If you are willing to participate in this study please read and sign this consent form below.

I have heard the summary description of the adolescent development study and I understand the nature and extent of my participation. I am aware that my participation is strictly voluntary and that I may withdraw from the study at any time. In view of these considerations, I agree () do not agree () to participate in this study.

Name (Print): _____

Signature: _____

Date: _____