PARFIT'S USE OF THE BUDDHIST VIEW ON PERSONAL IDENTITY

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ABSTRACT

The fundamental questions raised in Derek Parfit's *Reasons and Persons* are 'what persons are?' and 'how they continue to exist?'. In discussing the concept of a person, Parfit considers these three questions:

(1) What is the nature of a person?
(2) What makes a person at two different times one and the same person? and
(3) What is necessarily involved in the continued existence of each person over time?

Parfit then distinguishes these two views about the nature of a person.

* That persons are separately existing entities distinct from brains and bodies and their experiences. They continue to exist, although we know of their continuity because of thoughts, sensations and experiences that they have.

* That persons are not separately existing entities, distinct from our brains and bodies. The existence of a person, during any period, just consists in the existence of his brain and body, and the thinking of his thoughts, and the doing of his deeds, and the occurrence of
Parfit has not gone into a detailed discussion about the Buddhist view. My concern is that Parfit draws out of context from Buddhism and claims that the above second view to which according to him the Buddha would have agreed is true. Parfit's belief is that this is the truth about ourselves. But, coming to this view, Buddhism has considered not just the missing personal identity view. Buddhism talks about the 'being'. "All living beings are mortal and all forms are to disappear". Buddhism has an ontological view which grasps not only human beings but all other living beings in terms of impermanancy.

It is the second, Reductionist view, that Parfit finds liberating and consoling which makes him less concerned about his own future, and his own death, and more concerned about others. Here, the difference between the Buddha and Parfit is in what they do with the philosophical proposition once they arrive at it. For Buddha, realisation of this true belief is the starting point in practising the moral disciplinary path to attain the final goal of Nirvana, the cessation of suffering.

My aim here will be to question Parfit on his understanding of Buddhism and how he has used Buddhist quotations to support his theory. My method will be to collect contexts
in the early Buddhist texts in which the self is talked about, and to consider the various translations and commentarial explanations to see what makes the best sense of the concept of self that Parfit talks about in those contexts.
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WHAT PARFIT SAYS OF THE BUDDHA'S VIEW

Derek Parfit in discussing 'Person' and "Personal Identity' claims that we could describe our lives in an 'impersonal' way. In his view what most of us believe about ourselves, and about our actual lives is false. We are not aware of this false view and so believe that our identity must always be determined. He says that we believe this on the basis of the view that we are separately existing entities; that a person is a separately existing entity, distinct from his brain and body, and his experiences.

In trying to establish a Criterion of Personal Identity, Parfit looks for what this identity necessarily involves or consists in. There are two criteria that Parfit considers.¹ One is the Physical Criterion of Personal Identity and the other is the Psychological Criterion of Personal Identity. What the identity necessarily involves or consists in, in the Physical Criterion, is the spatio-temporal physical continuity of an object. That is, an apparently static object that continues to exist. In the Psychological Criterion, Parfit discusses several views. A kind of psychological continuity that resembles physical

¹ Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p.202-209. Hereafter, in references, I will use the number in the Bibliography and the relevant page number.
continuity involves the continued existence of a purely mental entity, or a soul, or a spiritual substance. The other kind of psychological continuity that Parfit describes, and resolves to improve, involves the continuity of memory.

Parfit, revising John Locke's suggestion that experience-memory provides the criterion of Personal Identity, put forward the view of what he calls Relation R. In order to do this, Parfit, appeals to a concept of an overlapping chain of experience-memories. ([26], p.205)

On Locke's view, according to Parfit, what is involved in a person's continued existence are the direct memory connections. That is to say, between X today and Y twenty years ago, there are direct memory connections if X can now remember having some of the experiences that Y had twenty years ago, it makes X and Y one and the same person. ([26], p.205)

On Parfit's revised version of Locke's View, even if there are no such direct memory connections, there may be continuity of memory between X now and Y twenty years ago. Parfit says that this would be so if between X now and Y at that time there has been an overlapping chain of direct memories. This overlapping chain is that in each day within the last twenty years, the person remembered some of their
experiences on the previous day. On the revised version, some present person X is the same as some past person Y if there is this continuity of memory between them.

Since there are several other kinds of direct psychological connections, Parfit also revises the view so that it appeals to them too. One such direct psychological connection is that which holds between an intention and the later act in which this intention is carried out. Other such direct connections are those which hold when a belief, or a desire, or any other psychological feature, continues to be had.

On the revised Lockean view, if there is only a single direct psychological connection such as the continuity of memory, X and Y would not be the same person. According to Parfit for X and Y to be the same person there should be enough direct psychological connection. When there are enough direct connections Parfit calls it strong connectedness. Parfit says that enough is a matter of degree and that we cannot plausibly define what counts as enough. ([26],p.206)

Because Personal Identity is a transitive relation, 
(Parfit's example of a transitive relation: a relation F is transitive if it is true that, if X is F-related to Y, and Y is F-related to Z, X and Z must be F-related.) the criterion of identity must be a transitive relation, says Parfit.
Since strong connectedness is not a transitive relation, Parfit appeals to psychological continuity, which is a transitive relation.

The two general relations

**psychological connectedness**: the holding of particular direct psychological connections

**psychological continuity**: the holding of overlapping chains of strong connectedness

is what our identity over time involves. This is what Parfit calls the Relation R. Parfit adds another claim to this. He says that our identity over time just involves the holding of the Relation R, with the right kind of cause.

In explaining what he means by the term 'cause', Parfit says that the normal cause is there when the words are used in their ordinary sense in the Psychological Criteria. That is, in the ordinary sense, a psychological connection of my remembering having an experience has the normal cause, only if

1. I seem to remember having an experience
2. I did have this experience and
3. my apparent memory is causally dependent, in the normal way, on this past experience.

It is a reliable cause, if the apparent memory is not causally dependent in the normal way on the past experience but is deliberately brought about. For example, my having
an apparent memory of a certain experience is not a real memory of that past experience but I have this apparent memory only because someone who was with me at the time of the experience, later told me.

Any cause is seen in Parfit’s imaginary story about the teletransportation case. ([26], p.199-201) A Scanner destroys his brain and body while recording the exact states of all his cells. It then transmits this information by radio. Travelling at the speed of light, the message will take three minutes to reach the Replicator on Mars. This Replicator will then create out of new matter a brain and body exactly like his. It will be in this body that he will wake up. Psychological Continuity in its widest sense allows this continuity to have any cause. Parfit says that we need not decide between these three versions. ([26], p.208) Parfit also claims that the right kind of cause could be any cause. ([26], p.215)

Having thus described his version of a Criterion of Personal Identity, Parfit argues for the conclusion

(1) We are not separately existing entities, apart from our brains and bodies, and various interrelated physical and mental events. Our existence just involves the existence of our brains and bodies, and the doing of our deeds, and the thinking of our thoughts, and
the occurrence of certain other physical and mental events. Our identity over time just involves (a) Relation R -psychological connectedness and/or psychological continuity, either with the normal cause or with any cause, provided (b) that there is no different person who is R-related to us as we once were. ([26], p.216)

Parfit also argues that because this (1) is true, so are his following conclusions:

(2) It is not true that our identity is always determinate. I can always ask, 'Am I about to die?' But it is not true that, in every case, this question must have an answer, which must be either yes or no. In some cases this would be an empty question. ([26], p.216)

(3) There are two unities to be explained: the unity of consciousness at any time, and the unity of a whole life. These two unities cannot be explained by claiming that different experiences are had by the same person. These unities must be explained by describing the relations between these many experiences, and their relations to this person's brain. And we can refer to these experiences, and fully describe the relations between them, without claiming that these experiences are had by a person. ([26], p.217)

(4) Personal Identity is not what matters. What fundamentally matters is Relation R, with any cause. This relation is what matters even when, as in a case where one person is R-related to two other people, Relation R does not provide personal identity. Two other relations may have some slight
importance: physical continuity, and physical similarity. (In the case of a few people, who are very beautiful, physical similarity may have great importance. ([26], p. 217)

Parfit says that most of us would accept some of the claims that he is denying and thus he argues that most of us have a false view and if we came to see that this view is false, it might make a difference to our lives.

Parfit claims that when we ask what persons are, and how they continue to exist, the fundamental question is a choice between two views. On one view, he says, we are separately existing entities, distinct from our brain and bodies and our experiences, and entities whose existence must be all-or-nothing. ([26], p. 273) The other view that Parfit describes is what he calls the Reductionist View. He says that the Reductionist's main claim is that we should reject the beliefs that imply the earlier view (he calls the earlier view a Non-Reductionist view). Parfit also claims that, of these, the second view is true. Even though Parfit writes saying that "As appendix J shows, Buddha would have agreed" ([26], p. 273), for Buddha the intellectual conviction of Personal Identity is not what matters; it rather arises from experiencing the impermanancy of everything that exists. Therefore the Buddhist attitude is different from that of Parfit's. As I will show in detail, in the last chapter of this thesis, Buddhism is not content
with arriving at the intellectual conviction that there is no self. A Buddhist aims at an entirely new attitude to life. A Buddhist practises to live as if there were no self. Experiencing the impermanancy of everything that exists is what makes the Buddhist aim at this attitude life. When Parfit says the Reductionist View is not merely a part of one cultural tradition but may be, as he claims, the true view about all people at all times ([26],p.273) this (comment) does not go along well with identifying it as the Buddhist attitude to life.

The appendix J 'Buddha's View' ([26],p.502-3) contains these quotations:

At the beginning of their conversation the king asks the monk his name, and receives the following reply: 'Sir, I am known as "Nagasena"; my fellows in the religious life address me as "Nagasena". Although my parents gave (me) the name "Nagasena"... it is just an appellation, a form of speech, a description, a conventional usage. "Nagasena" is only a name, for no person is found here'. ([5],p.182)

A sentient being does exist, you think, O Mara? You are misled by a false conception. This bundle of elements is void of Self, in it here is no sentient being, just as a set of wooden parts receives the name of carriage, so do we give to elements, the name of fancied being. ([34],p.839)

Buddha has spoken thus: 'O Brethren, actions do exist, and also their
consequences, but the person that acts does not. There is no one to cast away this set of elements and no one to assume a new set of them. There exists no Individual, it is only a conventional name given to a set of elements. ([34],p.845)

Vasubandhu:...When Buddha says, 'I myself was this teacher Sunetra', he means that his past and his present belong to one and the same lineage of momentary experiences; he does not mean that the former elements did not disappear. Just as when we say 'this fire which has been seen consuming that thing has reached this object', the fire is not the same, but overlooking this difference we indirectly call fire the continuity of its moments. ([34],p.851)

Vatsiputriya. If there is no soul, who is it that remembers? Vasubandhu: What is the meaning of the word 'to remember'? Vatsiputriya. It means to grasp an object by memory. Vasubandhu: Is this 'grasping by memory' something different from memory? Vatsiputriya: It is an agent who acts through memory. Vasubandhu: The agency by which memory is produced we have just explained. The cause productive of a recollection is a suitable state of mind, nothing more. Vatsiputriya: But when we use the expression 'Caitra remembers' what does it mean? Vasubandhu: In the current of phenomena which is designated by the name Caitra, a recollection appears. ([34],p.853)

The Buddhist term for an individual, a term which is intended to suggest the difference between the Buddhist view and other theories, is santana, i.e. a 'stream'. ([5],p.247-261)

Vatsiputriya. What is an actual, and what a nominal existence? Vasubandhu. If something exists by itself (as a
separate element) it has an actual existence. But if something represents a combination (of such elements) it is a nominal existence. ([35], p. 26)

The mental and the material are really here, But there is no human being to be found, For it is void and merely fashioned like a doll, Just suffering piled up like grass and sticks. ([5], p. 133)

Parfit remarks that Nagel once claimed that it is psychologically impossible to believe the Reductionist View. Parfit also says Buddha claimed that, though this is very hard, it is possible, and that he finds Buddha's claim to be true. ([26], p. 280) Having stated how Buddha would have agreed with him on the nature of Personal Identity, Parfit advances views about the importance of Personal Identity. Now, I shall state Parfit's views regarding the importance of the Reductionist View of Personal Identity. In the last sections of this thesis, I will show how Parfit and Buddha differ on these views. I will also show how Buddha does not hold the Reductionist View in Parfit's sense but holds a more radical view about the concept of self.

Parfit considers an ordinary case where, even on any version of the Reductionist View, there are two possible outcomes. In one of the outcomes, I am about to die. In the other outcome I shall live for another forty years. Parfit says that if these forty years would be worth living, the second
outcome would be better for me. He says the difference between these outcomes would be judged to be important on most theories about rationality, and most moral theories. He also says that it would have rational and moral significance whether I am about to die, or shall live for another forty years. ([26],p.215)

This is the natural view that Parfit calls the view that Personal Identity is what matters. That is, what is always judged to be important is whether, during these forty years, there will be someone living who will be me. The rival view that Parfit brings out is the view that Personal Identity is not what matters. Parfit claims that what matters is Relation R: psychological connectedness and/or psychological continuity with any cause. Parfit says that it makes a great difference which of the two views [(a) Personal Identity is what matters, (b) what matters is Relation R] we believe to be what matters. He says if we cease to believe that our identity is what matters, this may affect some of our emotions, such as our attitude to ageing and death. ([26],p.215)

On the Reductionist View, persons are not separately existing entities, distinct from their brains and bodies, and their experiences. There is no deep further fact that unites the continued existence of a person. The unity of a
person's life can be explained not by claiming that the experiences in this life are all had by this person but by describing the various relations that hold between these different experiences, and their relations to a particular brain. ([26], p.445)

Parfit says that

Even Reductionists do not deny that people exist. And, on our concept of a person, people are not thoughts and acts. They are thinkers and agents. I am not a series of experiences, but the person who has these experiences. A Reductionist can admit that, in this sense, a person is what has experiences, or the subject of experiences. This is true because of the way in which we talk. What a Reductionist denies is that the subject of experiences is a separately existing entity, distinct from a brain and body, and a series of physical and mental events. ([26], p.223)

By considering an imaginary case Parfit points out that we could not tell from our memory, from our states of mind or from the content of our experience, whether we really are aware of the continued existence of a separately existing subject of experience. Parfit says that when we have had a series of thoughts, the most that we are aware of is the psychological continuity of our stream of consciousness. It seems to me that it is this view of a stream of consciousness ([26], p.224) that helps Parfit to build his theory that what matters is Relation R.
Our change of view about personal identity may justify a change in our moral views. Parfit says if we can show that most of us have false beliefs about our own nature, and the nature of our continued existence over time, an appeal to the truth may support certain claims both about rationality and about morality. He says the Reductionist View supports various moral claims. ([26], p. 449)

Parfit talks about what is important in Relation R, both in theory and in practise. He says it is the psychological connectedness. Since connectedness can hold to any degree says Parfit, that we can say I am now strongly connected to myself yesterday, when I was strongly connected to myself three days ago, and so on. But he says that it does not follow that I am now strongly connected to myself twenty years ago. ([26], p. 206) Considering desert and commitments, Parfit argues for a general claim that, if the connections are weaker between a criminal now and himself at the time of his crime, he deserves less punishment. He says similar claims applies to commitments. ([26], p. 347)

Parfit advances an argument against the Self-Interest Theory. This is a theory about rationality which gives to each person this aim: to be concerned about the outcomes that would be best for himself, and that would make his life go, for him, as well as possible. Parfit's argument appeals
to the fact that part of what is important in Personal Identity is the psychological connectedness which holds over time to reduced degrees. He says if some important facts hold to a reduced degree, it cannot be irrational to believe these facts to have less importance. Therefore Parfit says that it cannot be irrational to be less concerned, now, about those parts of our future to which we are now less closely connected. ([26],p.347)

Parfit further explains that it may not be irrational to do what one knows will be worse for oneself. Great imprudence he says may not be irrational. He claims that we should regard those who act imprudently as morally wrong. ([26],p.347)

Parfit says if we become Reductionists, we can plausibly claim that a fertilized ovum is not a human being, and that it becomes a human being only gradually during pregnancy. He says this supports the claim that abortion is not morally wrong in the first two or three months, and that it gradually becomes seriously wrong, before the end of pregnancy. ([26],p.347)

Parfit talks about people who have made Non-Religious Ethics their life's work, about Atheists who made Ethics their life's work. He says Buddha may be among this few, as may be Confucius, and a few Ancient Greeks and Romans. He also
states that Hume was an Atheist who made Ethics part of his life's work. ([26],p.453)

Accepting the change of view and denying those who accept the Extreme Claim (the claim that, if the Reductionist View is true, we have no reason to be especially concerned about our own futures ([26],p.307)), Parfit says that he finds the truth (Reductionist View) liberating, and consoling. He says that it makes him less concerned about his own future, and his death, and more concerned about others. ([26],p.347)

Parfit seems to think that the Buddhist theory of not-self (anatta) is similar to his claim that Personal Identity is not what matters, what matters is Relation R. Parfit also seems to think that Buddhist ethics arise from the Relation R. For Parfit, the Reductionist View that what matters which is the Relation R is what leads him to be more impersonal and more concerned about others. It is this Reductionist View which, as it seems to me, that Parfit regards as the truth that is liberating and consoling for him, which I maintain is different from the theory of not-self of the Buddha.
BUDDHA'S VIEW

I THE PRIMARY SOURCES

In any discussion (or treatment) of Buddhism, it is important to give a clear view of where one stands on representing Buddha's position. Considering this problem, eminent scholars such as E.J.Thomas, T.W.Rhys Davids, K.N.Jayatilleke, Venerable Walpola Rahula, Venerable Nyanatiloka, Arthur Berriedale Keith, D.T.Suzuki, Th.Stcherbatsky and many others have put forward many valuable interpretations. Behind these various interpretations and conflicting opinions and with reference to the early Buddhist texts one is able to discern some pervasive features of the original doctrine.

From the earliest times to the present day the notion of a permanent substance has persisted in coming into the discussion of 'self', 'soul' or 'Ego'. Some say that the essential part of a being is 'essence' or 'spirit'. Others say the essential part is 'matter' as bodies. In these discussions we find materialists who denies the existence of minds and idealists who denies the existence of matter, maintaining that all bodies, including one's own, exist only as ideas in some mind. In chapter three I will show the many views that both Buddha and Parfit argues against.
Here, I would mention some of the views in the western philosophical tradition about the reality of the self and the body as discussed by Richard Taylor in his work 'Metaphysics'.

Those who are unwilling to deny the existence either of minds or of bodies, have suggested that the connection between them is that of cause and effect, that my body acts upon my mind and my mind upon my body, and that just this causality is what connects and unites the two into one person. This is the theory of interactionism.

Others, unable to see how a mind, which is not material, can have physical effects, have maintained that the body acts upon the mind to produce consciousness, thought, and feeling, but that the mind itself has no physical effects, which is the theory of epiphenomenalism.

Still others, finding the same difficulty in the idea of the body's acting upon the mind as in the idea of the mind's acting upon the body, have suggested that there is really only one kind of substance, and that what we call "mind" and "body" are simply two aspects of this. This is called the double aspect theory.

Again, to meet the same difficulty, it has been supposed that mind and body, being different substances, never act upon each other, but the histories of each are nevertheless such that there seems to be such a causal connection. This is the theory of parallelism.

It has even been suggested that this parallelism is wrought by God, who, in
creating a person, arranges in advance that his mental and physical histories should always be in close correspondence without interacting, in the manner of a pre-established harmony.

Alternatively, it has been seriously maintained that all of one's mental life is caused, from moment to moment, by God, who sees to it that this mental life is in close correspondence with what is going on in the body. This theory has come down to us under the name of occasionalism. ([32], p.12-14)

According to Buddha all the above theories are inadequate to represent his view about self. The Buddhist View begins with the premise that all things lack permanence (sabba sankhara anicca = all formations are impermanent) ([12], p.400). There is no exception to the thing called self, which with all its formations is changing all the time and which has nothing in it which is itself immortal. When we look at the five aggregates (pancakkhandha)\(^2\) that the self is constituted of, it is seen to be only a combination of ever-changing physical and mental forces or energies and has nothing immortal which thereby separates the self from the countless other forms of life.

The three characteristics of existence are explained by the Buddha in this way:

All formations are transient; all formations are subject to suffering; all

\(^2\)see appendix A which gives a detail description of the five aggregates.
In Buddhism there is no physical or mental substance that is immortal in the discussion of the self. In Buddha's view the explicit descriptions of the five aggregates constitute the nature of a person, leaving no room for a permanent, unchanging mental or physical substance. There is only a combination of ever-changing physical and mental forces that are transient, subject to suffering (in a broad sense – to be explained) and without an Ego-entity. The life in this temporary unified configuration of these impersonal mental and material elements is explained as being of a duration of an infinitesimal 'moment'. In Parfit's claim that what matters is Relation R, mental substance (stream of consciousness) is the form of connection and continuity. In a discussion of Personal Identity this is different from the Buddha's View, as I will show in the last section of this chapter.

In the early Buddhist texts a complete description is given of what Buddha holds as to what we call 'the individual'. The 'individual' is a combination of ever-changing physical and mental forces or energies. This process is described in terms of the five groups or aggregates (pannacakkhandha).

The Buddhist theory of causality (paticca samuppada =

$3^{[40]}$ Vol.III p.134
conditioned genesis) describes the factors which condition and result in the process we call the 'individual'. Just like the aggregates, here too, the view is presented in terms of causal correlations without going into explanations in terms of a first cause, a physical or a metaphysical substance.

The principle of the doctrine of Conditioned Genesis is given in a short formula of four lines.

When this is, that is
This arising, that arises
When this is not, that is not,
This ceasing, that ceases.

The factors which condition the 'individual' are short-lived. They are riddled with anxiety that leads to suffering. The craving is the cause of suffering. This is an experiential truth. When one acquires an experience of spiritual bliss, experiencing this truth becomes more and more obvious. The cessation of craving is the cessation of suffering. The doctrine of Conditioned Genesis enumerates a set of twelve conditions. They are compared to a circle that has no beginning. Although some scholars tend to

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4 see appendix B

5 Imasmim sati idam hoti
Imassuppadha idam uppajjati
imasmim asti idam na hoti
Imassa nirodha idam nirujjhati
[12], Vol. III p. 63 also [10], Vol. II p. 28-9
interpret, Buddha used the factor of ignorance in this circle of twelve factors only as a convenient starting point. Due to a cause there is an effect. As such the formations of an individual are in an ever-changing process. Parfit's claim that our identity over time just involves the Relation R with any cause, is in agreement with the Buddhist view. But when Parfit says this is what matters, Buddhism is in disagreement as will be shown in the last section of this thesis.

The doctrine of rebirth, the permanent soul or atman that prevailed in the society in which Buddha lived, was a subject that Buddha questioned critically. Buddha did not assert the existence of an animistic soul which survived the death of the body and transmigrated but he did assert the continuity without identity of individuality due to the operation of causal factors. Also Buddhism is not a form of materialism which holds the view that nothing survives the death of the body and on that builds an ethical teaching. Some hold the view that Buddha held the status known as Avyakata (which means no explanation given with regard to problems) regarding self, which suggests that he did not give any specific views about the questions of human survival, reincarnation, or life after death. But what the Buddha held was the view that mere metaphysical speculation about prior or future lives which did not result in the verification of facts about them was useless. This again
was regarding the various views of human survival that were held in the society in which Buddha lived.

For Buddha, gaining an understanding of the nature of existence, served to show a way out of the universal fact of suffering, imperfection, impermanency, emptiness, insubstantiality. All these are included in the Pali word dukkha. Realising the impermanency of the self is as important as realising the impermanency of everything that exists in the world. After this realisation what is more important for the Buddha is the ethical transformation of man by leading him through practical moral discipline to the supreme goal of Nirvana.

Here are a few definitions and descriptions of Nirvana (the Pali word is Nibbana) as found in the original Pali texts:

Calming of all conditional things, giving up of all defilements, extinction of "thirst", detachment, cessation, Nibbana.

O Bhikkhus, what is the Absolute (Asamkhata, Unconditioned)? It is O Bhikkhus, the extinction of desire (ragakkhayo) the extinction of the hatred (dosakkhayo), the extinction of illusion (mohakkhayo). This, O Bhikkhus, is called the Absolute.

6 The term suffering used throughout this text should be taken as a translation of the Pali word dukkha.

7[10], Vol I p.136

8[10], Vol. IV p.359
O Bhikkhus, whatever there may be things conditioned or unconditioned, among them detachment (viraga) is the highest. That is to say, freedom from conceit, destruction of thirst, the uprooting of attachment, the cutting off of continuity, the extinction of thirst (tanha) detachment, cessation, Nibbana.  

The abandoning the destruction of desire and craving for these Five Aggregates of Attachment: that is the cessation of dukkha. ([12], p.191)  

The cessation of Continuity and becoming (bhavanirodha) is Nibbana.  

O Bhikkhus, there is the unborn, ungrown, and unconditioned. Were there not the unborn, ungrown, and unconditioned, there would be no escape for the born, grown, and conditioned. Since there is the unborn, ungrown, and unconditioned, so there is escape for the born, grown, and conditioned. ([30], p.112)  

Here the four elements of solidity, fluidity, heat and motion have no place; the notions of length and breadth, the subtle and the gross, good and evil, name and form are altogether destroyed; neither this world nor the other, nor coming, going or standing, neither death nor birth, no sense-objects are to be found. ([30], p.111)  

Realising Nibbana is described in the Dhatuvibhanga sutta (no.140) of the Majjhima Nikaya as follows:  

\[40\], Vol. II p.34

\[10\], Vol. II p.117
A man is composed of six elements: solidity, fluidity, heat, motion, space and consciousness. He analyses them and finds that none of them is 'mine' or 'me' or 'myself'. He understands how consciousness appears and disappears, how pleasant, unpleasant and neutral sensations appear and disappear. Through this knowledge his mind becomes detached. Then he finds within him a pure equanimity (upekha), which he can direct towards the attainment of any high spiritual state, and he knows that thus this pure equanimity will last for a long period. But then he thinks; If I focus this purified and cleansed equanimity on the sphere of Infinite Space and develop a mind conforming thereto, that is a mental creation (samkhantam). If I focus this purified and cleansed equanimity on the Sphere of Infinite Consciousness... on the Sphere of Nothingness... or on the Sphere of Neither-perception nor Non-perception and develop a mind conforming thereto, that is a mental creation. Then he neither mentally creates nor wills continuity and becoming (bhava) or annihilation (vibhava). As he does not construct or does not will continuity and becoming or annihilation, he does not cling to anything in the world; as he does not cling, he is not anxious; as he is not anxious, he is completely calmed within (fully blown out within = paccattam yeva parinibbaya
ti). And he knows: "Finished is birth, lived is pure life, what should be done is done, nothing more is left to be done". Now, when he experiences a pleasant, unpleasant or neutral sensation, he knows that it is impermanent, that it does not bind him, that it is not experienced with passion. Whatever may be the sensation, he experiences it without being bound to it (visamyutto). He knows that all those sensations will be pacified with the dissolution of the body, just as the flame of a lamp goes out when oil wick give out. Therefore, O Bhikkhu, a person so endowed is endowed with the absolute wisdom, for the knowledge of the
extinction of all dukkha is the absolute noble wisdom. This is the deliverance, founded on Truth, is unshakable. O Bhikkhu, that which is unreality (mosadhamma) is false; that which is reality (amosadhamma), Nibbana, is Truth (sacca). Therefore, O Bhikkhu, a person so endowed is endowed with this Absolute Truth for the Absolute Truth (paramam ariyasaccam) is Nibbana, which is Reality.

The four Noble Truths and the Noble Eightfold Path (Middle-Path) describes the Buddhist concept of Dukkha, how craving give rise to birth, the sensual craving, the craving for Individual Existence and Dukkha. The cessation of this craving, is the cessation of dukkha. To attain the cessation of dukkha, the Middle-Path is explained as the one that leads to peace, to discernment, to enlightenment and to Nibbana.

Buddha's ethics is seen in the Middle-Path. The right understanding, right mindedness, right speech, right action, right living, right effort, right attentiveness, and right concentration is the Middle-Path that answers the questions regarding human conduct.\textsuperscript{11}

Buddhist ethics has a goal in following the moral disciplinary path. That is to arrive at Nibbana which is considered to be 'the reality' (sacca) or the 'the ultimate

reality' (parama sacca) in Buddhism. K.N.Jayatilleke explains this as the summum bonum, which not only human beings but all beings in the universe should seek to attain. For unless and until they attain it, they are subject to the unsatisfactoriness and insecurity of conditioned existence which is impermanent. The word Nibbana as Jayatilleke points out means both 'extinction' as well as 'the highest positive experience of happiness'. He says that both these connotations are important for understanding the significance of the term as it is employed in the early Buddhist texts. ([14], p.117-127)

An important observation that has been disregarded by many of the followers of Buddhism according to David J.Kalupahana, is that the early Buddhist notion of human existence, and the notion of human suffering, is dependent on the sort of knowledge it recognized. The most reliable knowledge according to early Buddhism is panna and is identified with the 'knowledge of the cessation of influxes" (asavakkhayanana). Thus although this highest knowledge is related to the cessation of one's own defilements, it is also said to reveal, as a result of such cessation, the true nature of things in the world, the true nature of things in their "causal dependence" (patiicca samuppada) and not the existence of a 'self' (atman) or a 'substance' (svabhava). ([15], p.423)
II INTERPRETING THE PRIMARY TEXTS

Different interpretations and the vast amount of evidence as support to what the Buddha taught has been the reason for many Buddhists having different opinions about Buddhism. The discovery of many of the historical texts, and their interpretations with reference to other existing texts adds to the available facts in determining the degree and accuracy of the knowledge the authors of those existing texts had.

There are many misconceptions and different interpretations and conflicting opinions. But, basically all those who are engaged in scholarly work on Buddhism agree that Buddha held that in man there is no permanent, everlasting and absolute entity called soul, self, ego or atman. Even with this much clear, some scholars tend to misrepresent this view. It is important to understand that the Buddhist doctrine is not that of no-soul or no-self but of no separate soul or self. All things, without exception whatsoever, are without permanence, without 'reality', and in that sense illusion. In this sense alone there is no self, and the belief in a self which has its rights and selfish interests is an illusion based on Ignorance.

To give a clear understanding of Buddhism, the early
Buddhism which I would like to discuss in relation to what Parfit holds as the Buddha's view regarding persons, and of why I insist on early Buddhism to discuss Buddha's view, I will begin by going back to the time Buddhism originated and say a little about its historical development.

From ancient times in India, the religions of its people came to be built on the basis of faith in the Divine, and gradually during the Vedic, Brahmanic, Aranyaka, and Upanisad periods assumed different forms of philosophical speculations. By the time of the Upanisad period all the primitive ideas had so evolved that the 'karmakhandha' (religious devotion through works) in the Vedas followed by Vedic man was completely overlooked and his mind was directed towards 'dhyanakhandha' (meditation). ([3], p.1)

Gautama Buddha's appearance as a promoter of freedom of thought and intellectual revolution was especially beneficial to Indian Society. Buddhism was able to be most influential and popular at the time mainly for two reasons; born to a powerful king, Gautama denounced his rights to wealth and power by denouncing the rigid system of casteism, and at the time people were ready for intellectual discourse. Buddha had to teach his doctrine to those who already had exposure to other religious and philosophical influences. There were many groups such as Brahmins, Carvakans, and Sankhayans who opposed Buddha's teachings.
We can see in many of the suttas in Digha Nikaya how Buddha had to answer and clarify many of the views of his followers that did not agree with his teachings.

Buddha's teachings after arising from such a society went back into it after Buddha's passing away to Nirvana. The Buddha was always eager to dispel doubt. Even just a few minutes before his death, he requested his disciples three times to ask him if they had any doubts about his teachings, and not to feel sorry later that they could not clear those doubts.

It may be, Brethren, that there may be doubt or misgiving in the mind of some brother as to the Budhha, or the doctrine, or the path, or the method. Inquire brethren, freely. Do not have to reproach yourselves afterwards with the thought: Our teacher was face to face with us, and we could not bring ourselves to inquire of the Exalted One when we were face to face with him.

His final attempt to clear any doubts, can be seen in his statement:

It may be, brethren, that you put no questions out of reverence for the teacher. Let one friend communicate to another.\(^\text{12}\)

When considering that over the centuries many divisions, methods of practice and emphases on different aspects of

\(^{12}\text{Mahaprinibbana Sutta in [28], Vol I p.172}\)
teaching arose, developed and faded away and then arose again, it is clear that Budhha's endeavor to accomplish a clear understanding of the doctrine was not successful. A main reason for this could be the fact that Buddhism originated from a society which had powerful religious leaders like the Brahmins, and also the nature of the philosophical discourses at the time were much alike.

As it seems even in the earliest records in history of Buddhist scriptures, among the many clear philosophical dialogues there remain a few contradictory, out-of-place statements. What the early Buddhists consider the teaching of the Buddha to have been is contained in the Pali texts, the Digha and Majjhima Nikayas. Even though these scriptures contain a large number of references to the social, political and religious condition of India at the time they were put together, there remains an uncertainty among scholars as to what the exact time was. 13

The eternal soul concept can be tracked back to the age of Brahminism. The view then was that the eternal soul goes through many lives until it is completely purified and finally becomes united with God, or Brahman, Universal Soul, or Atman, from which it originally emanated. This soul or self in man is the thinker of thoughts, feeler of

13[28], Vol I Preface

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sensations, and receiver of rewards and punishments for all its actions of good and bad. Such a conception is called the idea of self.

Buddha himself has been a great opponent of the concept of Atman or Soul. But the methods used in preserving what he has said leave a lot of room for those who could not entirely agree with him to add to it their views. Scholars who work in the areas of ancient scriptures tends to give an unaccounted criticism of the later works such as Milinda Panha and Katha Vatthu being 'impudent forgeries' that were concocted by scholastically dull, sectarianly narrow, literary incapacacious, and senile imbecile Ceylon Buddhists. However they themselves are flabbargasted about the so called Ceylon Buddhist's capability of forging extensive documents so well, with such historical accuracy, with so delicate a discrimination between ideas current among themselves and those held centuries before, with so great a literary skill in expressing the ancient views and accept that it is a unique, incredible performance.

I would say that the Ceylon Buddhists at the time were not trying to write something anew but were writing down what they thought was handed down to them by whoever brought it

to Ceylon. The thin line of difference between the two doctrines of Hinduism and Buddhism regarding their many issues must have been an added influence for this kind of writing.

The Buddha, like other Indian teachers of his time, taught by conversation. A highly educated man, (according to the educational standards of the time) speaking constantly with men who were exposed to similar education, he followed the literary habit of his time by embodying his doctrine in set phrases, oral suttas, on which he enlarged on different occasions in different ways. Though writing was widely known, the lack of writing materials made any lengthy written books impossible. The earliest records of any extent were the Asoka Edicts and they had to be written on stone.

In the absence of books, suttas were the recognized form of preserving and communicating opinion. The earliest ones were not in Sanskrit but in the ordinary conversational idiom of the day, that is, in a sort of Pali.

When the Buddha passed away into nirvana, these sayings were collected together by his disciples into the Four Great Nikayas. They cannot have reached their final form until about fifty years afterwards. Other sayings and verses, most of them ascribed not to the Buddha, but to the disciples, were put into a supplementary Nikaya.
For a generation or two the Nikayas (at the time oral books) as originally put together were handed down by memory. About hundred years after the Buddha's passing away there was a schism in the Buddhist community. Each of the two schools kept an arrangement of the canon. Each of these two schools broke up, in the following centuries into others; and several of them had their different arrangement of the canonical books, differing also no doubt in minor details.

For a consistent doctrine, what is in the Nikayas is sufficient. In Katha Vatthu it is mentioned that the whole canon was the word of the Buddha and that it has been recited, at the council of Rajagaha, immediately after his passing away. Several of the Dialogues in the Pitakas purport to relate conversations that took place between people, contemporaries of the Buddha, but after the Buddha's passing away. Therefore, we cannot be certain that no interpolation took place.

III THE ACCURACY OF PARFIT'S NOTION OF THE BUDDHIST VIEW

Instead of taking Buddhist doctrine from the more recent books, that are based on the works of the commentators like Buddhaghosa or of works like Milinda Panha, it would have better served the purpose of showing the futility of
Personal Identity, if Parfit has looked into the Nikayas. Parfit then would not have resort to the Relation R as what matters in a discussion of Personal Identity. Parfit would have seen the three characteristics of existence in the Buddhist View. Where all formations are impermanent, Parfit would not hold the view Relation R is what matters. Where all formations are subject to suffering, there would be no need for Parfit to look for an argument against the Self Interest Theory or the Extreme Claim. I will be discussing in the next sections, how Parfit and Buddha differ on these issues.

The quotations Parfit gives when putting forward the "Buddha's View" are taken from recent works that are based on later works on Buddhism, but not from the direct translations of the early documentary scriptures. Most of the quotes that Parfit refers to are quotes from the recent books which quotes work that was composed later. For example, the whole of the Pali Pitakas\(^{16}\) were known, and were regarded as final authority, at the time and place when Milinda Panha was composed.\(^{17}\) Milinda Panha is a later work on Buddhism. It is a work from which the writers of the more recent works that Parfit refers to, quote. And it is from some of them that Parfit quotes. Throughout the

\(^{16}\)see appendix C

\(^{17}\)For more details see [29] Part I, introduction
history of Buddhism, even from the time when Buddha was alive, there has been the tendency to misrepresent the Buddha's View. And as such what the later commentators like Dhammapala and Buddhaghosa have recorded are not composed before the time of the Pitakas and therefore cannot be considered as having full authority on holding the Buddha's View.

Parfit's reference to the Milinda-Nagasena conversation ([26], p. 502) is to show that there is no permanent separate soul distinct from the physical and psychological continuity. This reference Parfit has drawn from another source in which it was quoted. ([5], p. 182-3)

Questioning the historical authority of the Milinda Panha, T.W. Rhys Davids says\(^{18}\) that the book starts with an elaborate and very skilful introduction, giving first an account of the way in which Nagasena and Milinda had met in a previous birth, then the life-history, of each of them in this birth, then the account of how they met. This introductory story occupies in Rhys Davids' translation, thirty-nine pages and the two chapters there after occupy only sixty pages more. Throughout the whole story Rhys Davids says the attention is constantly directed to the very great ability of the two disputants, and to the fact that

\(^{18}\) [29] Part II, introduction
they had been specially prepared through their whole existence (in the many births) for this great encounter.

In a source like this, one cannot look for an accurate account of the Buddha's theory of non-identity in the self, since the source give prominence to the non-Buddhist idea of two people going through many births, just to meet in a later birth for a historically great discussion on the self. Questioning the degree and accuracy of the author's knowledge Rhys Davids shows that the three Pitakas were known to the author at the time of his writing. Rhys Davids says that although in the majority of cases in his works on Buddhism, his quotations or references entirely agree with the readings shown in the early texts but there are a few important exceptions. For example, in the three Pitakas, the prominence is given to the facts of impermanency, continuity without identity and not-self. In his work, those facts are barely contained in the great conversation between the King and the Monk, and are ignored when the author describes their many births (in which they knew each other and were preparing themselves for this great encounter that was going to take place) which gives the reader the idea of a continuity with an identity, which is non-Buddhist.

Considering the well known Buddhist texts, Rhys Davids remarks that
While the Digha Nikaya may be held to excel it in stately dignity, the Visuddhimagga in sustained power, and the Gataka book in varied humour, the palm will probably be eventually given to the 'Questions of King Milinda' as a work of art.\textsuperscript{19}

In Steven Collins' \textit{Selfless Persons} a quotation from Visuddhimagga is stated thus:

\begin{quote}
just as a puppet is empty, soulless (nijjivam) and without curiosity, and while it walks and stands merely through the combination of strings and wood, yet it seems as if it had curiosity and interestedness; so too this [human] 'name-and-form' is empty, soulless and without curiosity, and while it walks and stands merely through the combination of the two together, yet it seems as if it had curiosity and interestedness. This is how it should be regarded; hence the Ancients said: 'The mental and the material are really here, But there is no human being to be found. For it is void of and merely fashioned like a doll, Just suffering piled up like grass and sticks.' ([5],p.132-3)
\end{quote}

Parfit quotes only the last four verses. In his Notes, Collins says:

\begin{quote}
5. Vism.XVIII.32 (Nanamoli's translation, slightly adapted). The verse quoted as from 'the Ancients' is not among those recorded in the canon. ([5],p.284)
\end{quote}

As I stated in the second section, even during the time when Buddha was alive there were doubts about his teaching. Conflict with other similar religious teachings, and because

\textsuperscript{19}[29] Part I, introduction
those who came to Buddhism already had other religious backgrounds, were the main reasons, in my opinion, that made the authors of the later works on Buddhism give priority and prominence to some Buddhist teachings and ignore or mention casually the more important teachings. This can be seen in many of the works on Buddhism from the ancient times to the present day. A careful study of the existing documents shows which of the documented views we could accept as being a coherent and a consistent doctrine. It is on this view, I argue, that Parfit used Buddhist quotations from works that were based on inaccurate documentation of Buddhism.

Not using primary sources has led Parfit into thinking that the Buddhist doctrine of not-self (anatta) is the view that he claims by denying what matters is Personal Identity and claiming that what matters is Relation R. In the next section, I will show how Parfit describes the nature of Personal Identity and how Buddha insists that there is no Personal Identity in his explanation of the Aggregates.

It seems to me that the basis for the Reductionist claim for Parfit rests on the awareness of the psychological continuity of "our stream of consciousness".([26],p.224)

Parfit's use of the quote

The Buddhist term for an individual, a term which is intended to suggest the difference between the Buddhist view and other theories, is sāntana, i.e. a 'stream' ([26],p.503)
is exploited, and misleading in the context of the Relation R. The continuous flux of ever-changing psycho-physical process is the 'stream'. It is a 'stream', since the individual being is, something that happens, a process, a continuity. Every living being, since it is a process, is described as a flux, a flowing, a stretching forth. The five aggregates which constitutes the so-called 'individual' is the continuous process of action. Consciousness is only a single aggregate which arise as a reaction or a response to another aggregate, and the single aggregate of consciousness is not regarded as a 'stream of consciousness' in Buddhism.

The foundation, Relation R, which helps Parfit to build his change of moral views is significantly different from that of the Buddha. Ignoring this significant difference, leaves the possibility open for Parfit to use Buddha's Atheist ethics as arising from the Reductionist view that Parfit holds.
HOW PARFIT AND BUDDHA DIFFER ON PERSONAL IDENTITY

Parfit describes the nature of Personal Identity, asserting that its existence involves the existence of our brain and body. Buddha's approach to the question of Personal Identity is different from that of Parfit's. Buddha explains how the existence of the brain and body is without a Personal Identity. At the time of their approach to the discussion of Personal Identity, both the Buddha and Parfit faced many of the earlier, well known and established views. Parfit's view of Personal Identity can be considered radical comparing to the other views that he considers but Buddha's explanation is certainly more radical than any of the others including Parfit's. There is a vast difference between the radical approach of the Buddha and that of those who are reductionists in the modern, Western sense, and it should not be misinterpreted so as to see Buddha as Parfit's sort of reductionist.

The views Parfit argues against are these ([26], p.209-210):

(i) There are no purely mental objects, states or events.
(ii) every mental event is just a physical event in some particular brain and nervous system
(iii) that mental events are not physical events
(iv) that all states and events are,
when understood correctly, purely mental
(v) that we are separately existing
entities
(vi) a person is a purely mental entity
(vii) a person is a separately existing
physical entity
(viii) though we are not separately
existing entities, personal identity is
a further fact, which does not just
consist in physical and/or psychological
continuity

Parfit argues for the following claims ([26], p. 210-212) and
says that they are true and there is no inconsistency
between them. Some of these claims describe the same fact
in two ways: the way we speak, and the reality. (This
accounts for some apparent inconsistency.) He also states
that

If much of this summary seems, on a
first reading, either obscure or
trivial, do not worry. ([26], p. 209)

(1) a person's identity over time just
consists in the holding of certain more
particular facts,
(2) these facts can be described without
either presupposing the identity of this
person, or explicitly claiming that the
experiences in this person's life are
had by this person, or even explicitly
claiming that this person exists. These
facts can be described in an impersonal
way.
(3) a person's existence just consists
in the existence of a brain and body,
and the occurrence of a series of
interrelated physical and mental events
(4) a person just is a particular brain
and body, and as such a series of
interrelated events
(5) a person is an entity that is
distinct from a brain and body, and as
such a series of events
a nation's existence just involves the existence of its citizens, living together in certain ways, on its territory.

a nation just is these citizens and this territory

a nation is an entity that is distinct from its citizens and its territory

though persons exist, we could give a complete description of reality without claiming that persons exist

there exists a particular brain and body, and a particular series of interrelated physical and mental events

a particular person exists

The variety of views that were predominant at the Buddha's time is discussed in the Brahmajala Sutta of the Digha Nikaya. This sutta consists of sixty-two divisions. Among them there are four possible points of view and their several variants recorded. These four types of theories ([14],p.129) are

(1) that we survive death in the form of discarnate spirits, i.e. a single after-life theory
(2) that we are annihilated with death, i.e. a materialist theory
(3) that we are unable to discover a satisfactory answer to this question or there is no satisfactory answer, i.e. a sceptical or positivist theory
(4) that we come back to subsequent earth-lives or lives on other similar planets, i.e. a rebirth theory

There are thirty-two single after-life theories listed in the Brahmajala Sutta. There are sixteen variants of the theory that the soul after death is conscious. They are
variations regarding the material form of the soul, the duration of the soul, the nature and extent of consciousness, and the hedonic tone of the experiences. There are eight variants each of the theories that the soul after death is unconscious and is superconscious.

Stating the misconceptions that are held about Buddha's teachings, K.N.Jayatilleke says that the misconceptions can be cleared away only by making a careful study of the authentic texts of Buddhism.[(14),p.129] He then states what we find when we do so, that Buddha did assert

(1) the continuity without identity of individuality due to the operation of causal factors
(2) the doctrine of anatta, which denied the existence of a physical, mental, psycho-physical or independent entity within or related to the psycho-physical aspects of personality
(3) that mere metaphysical speculation about prior or future lives which did not result in the verification of facts about them was useless.

In Samyutta Nikaya it is maintained that the totality of existence of what appears to the ignorant man as his 'Ego' or as 'individuality' or 'I' is impermanent, and is only a combination of ever-changing physical and mental forces or energies, which are often stated in terms of the five groups or aggregates (pancakkhandha).
Parfit's quotation of Cila Mara states that "this bundle of elements is void of self". ([26], p. 502) In Anguttara Nikaya and in Samyutta Nikaya the five groups of elements are talked about but nowhere is it said that they have an existence as one 'group' or 'bundle' or a 'heap' as sometimes misinterpreted by scholars. Individual existence is the illusion of the mere process of these mental and physical phenomena. They never occur in a simultaneous totality of all their constituents. Also the single constituents of a group which are present in any given body-and-mind process, are of an evanescent nature, and so also their varying combinations. Sensations, perceptions and mental formations are only different aspects and functions of a single unit of consciousness. They are to consciousness what redness, softness, sweetness, etc., are to an apple and have as little separate existence as those qualities.

Identity for the Buddha is to be found in this continuous flux of psycho-physical process itself. This process is not a discrete one of perishing particulars. Buddha did not, (in the way Parfit postulates Relation R) believe in the reduction of the self-concept into the five groups or aggregates but instead explained the continuous flow of psycho-physical process as what is designated 'self',

\[20\{40\} \text{Vol.IV p.100}\]
Where Parfit argues for the conclusion that impersonality is the true view, Buddha expounds impersonality as the true view and goes on to talk about the reality we should strive to attain. The doctrine of Conditioned Genesis governs the ever-changing psycho-physical process. It is explained as: if this is, that comes to be; from the arising of this, that arises. If this is not, that does not come to be; from the stopping of this, that stops. The change of view to becoming a Reductionist and to having an impersonal attitude is a liberating and consoling truth for Parfit.([26],p.347) Buddha states in detail that attitude, and resolves to follow the experiential middle-path to put an end to craving which leads to frustration, anxiety and suffering.

Personal Identity is not what matters for Parfit, but rather the Relation R: the psychological connectedness and psychological continuity. The holding of particular direct psychological connections or the holding of overlapping chains of strong connectedness is not what would support a change in our views and support our claims about rationality and morality in Buddha's teachings. Understanding that the nature of everything that exists is subject to an ever-changing process is what would support a change in our views.
Parfit describing the difference between the two possible outcomes - I am about to die, or shall live for another forty years - says that what is judged by most people to be important here is whether, during these forty years, there will be someone living who will be me. On the view that Personal Identity is what matters, this is important. On the view that Relation R is what matters, this is not important. The reason Parfit gives for this being unimportant is, if what matters is Relation R, with any cause, we should regard this way of dying as being about as good as ordinary survival. ([26], p. 215)

Parfit also says for X and Y to be the same person a single direct psychological connection is not enough, but there has to be enough direct psychological connections. This means for X and Y to be the same person, memory, intentions, beliefs, desires and enough other psychological connections are necessary. Here, we see, in Parfit's sense of Personal Identity, the existence of a separately existing physical or mental entity is denied but continuity of psychological features attached to an identity is accepted.

A person is a particular brain and body, and as such a series of interrelated events, says Parfit in one of his claims that I stated in the beginning of this section. When we talk about a person, we say it is an entity that has a brain and body, and has particular thoughts, desires and so
on. So for Parfit it is not contradictory to claim (in the ordinary way of talking) that a person is an entity that is distinct from a brain and body, and as such a series of events. ([26], p. 211)

A similar argument is seen in the two possible outcomes that Parfit describes. Under any normal circumstance, I am about to die. But there is this way of transmitting all my information to a Replicator that will create a brain and a body exactly like mine. It will be regarded as me in the theory of Relation R. Parfit even says that physical continuity and physical similarity may have slight importance. In the case of people who are very beautiful, Parfit says, physical similarity may have great importance. ([26], p. 217) So, in the ordinary sense of the word, my Replica would not be me but since it is Relation R that matters it will be me. And this way of dying is as good as ordinary survival.

The Buddhist explanation of the individual concerns certain aggregates that are impermanent and constantly changing. Only through the illusion of self can even memory, intentions, beliefs, desires and any such psychological features, be seen as "mine". Therefore, in the Buddhist sense, not only is the existence of a separately existing physical or a mental entity denied, but also the continuity of a psychological feature attached to an identity is
denied.

Thus we see that in the discussion of Personal Identity, Parfit and Buddha both seem to agree only on the claim that there is no separately existing physical or a mental entity which is the self. Parfit's Reductionist View explains the Personal Identity in terms of Relation R. But Buddha taking a different approach, steadily maintains the claim that Personal Identity is an illusion, and so isn't capable of being explained, by Relation R or in any other way.
HOW PARFIT AND BUDDHA DIFFER ON ETHICS

Buddha and Hume among the few others that Parfit mentions were Atheists who made Ethics part of their life's work. ([26], p.453) Parfit seems to think that Hume's "bundle" theory and Buddha's reference to the "bundle of elements" are the same. Parfit says

as Sidgwick writes, Hume believed that the Ego is merely a system of coherent phenomena... The permanent identical "I" is not a fact but a fiction ([26], p.139)

Putting forward Sidgwick's suggestions, Parfit says that Hume's view is inadequate although he will defend an improved view that, in the relevant respects, follows Hume. ([26], p.139)

D.C. Mathur discussing the positions of Buddha and Hume on the problem of the self says

The Buddha, as well as Hume, denied the existence of a permanently and identically enduring self in the flux of experience. But there is a world of difference in the motivation for dealing with the problem of the self, in the treatment of the subject matter, in their respective assumptions regarding the nature of experience, and consequently in the quality of the conclusions arrived at.

He further says that

Hume was led by sheer logical consistency to inquire whether there was any "impression" corresponding to the
commonsense "idea" of the self as a self-identical entity. He did not share Gotama's task of liberating mankind from attachment to a permanent self, resulting in anxiety and suffering. ([20], p.258)

The more impersonal view that Parfit promises to defend following Hume is not the source of Buddhist ethics. As Parfit says ([26], p.347) the impersonal view of Reductionism is the truth that he finds liberating and consoling, and which makes him less concerned about his own future, and his death, and more concerned about others. We also see how Parfit runs into 'a more extreme argument" (we have no reason to be specially concerned about our own futures) ([26], p.307-312) which claims that only a deep further fact (= though we are not separately existing entities, personal identity is a further fact, which does not just consist in physical and psychological continuity) justifies the special concern about our own futures. And since there is no such fact, we have no reason to be especially concerned about our own futures. Parfit says this extreme claim is defensible, but so is its denial. ([26], p.346)

In contrast to the above view of Parfit's, the Buddha's teaching begin with the more impersonal view of self identity and the ethical task of the Middle Path to attain the highest knowledge of the true nature of the world.

Whatever is subject to origination, all that is subject to cessation ([12] I, p.380), ([40] IV, p.186)
Decay is inherent in all component things, work out your salvation with diligence. ([28] II,p.173)

The emphasis on impermanency is the originating point in development of ethics.

For Parfit the impersonal view is the basis for ethics. Unless persons are separately existing entities, distinct from their brains and bodies, and their experiences, their identity is not always determinate. Unity of a person's life can be explained only by describing the various relations that hold between the different experiences had by a person, and their relations to a particular brain. Persons are not fundamental for Parfit, ([26],p.445) and we saw this in his example of the Scanner and the Replicator. Since it is not the fact that the experiences in this life are all had by this person that explains the unity of a person's life, in Parfit's sense Personal Identity is indeterminate. This view in this sense is more impersonal.

When we cease to believe that persons are separately existing entities, and come to believe the unity of life involves only the various relations between the experiences in this life, according to Parfit, we become more concerned about the quality of experiences and less concerned about whose experiences they are. ([26],p.346) According to Buddha, decay is inherent in all composite things, and since Nibbana is not composite it is this which we should strive
to attain. It is for this salvation that we should follow a moral path and should become more concerned about the quality of experiences.

The Buddhist attitude to suffering (dukkha) and not-self (anatta) is derived from the fact of impermanency. The impersonal mental and material elements are arranged together in a temporary unified configuration. The life of all existents in this temporary unified configuration is explained as the duration of an infinitesimal 'moment'. Not as the way the human and other lifetimes are 'conventionally' understood, or understood by Parfit (in the way he uses for the holding of Relation R). What unifies and prolongs this configuration is explained in the Conditioned Genesis (patičca samuppada) as the ignorance, craving, desire.

The challenge that Parfit encounters in the Extreme Claim does not face Buddha, since the impermanency of everything that exists justifies our special concern to work for our salvation with diligence, to arrive at the cessation of the continuity and becoming. The concept that there is such a thing as 'our' salvation can be seen as paradoxical in the Buddhist context. Buddha would argue in a similar situation, that, the paradox has to be experienced before escape from it is possible, or that, the philosophic realisation is necessary before the rational insight is
possible. I will not go into an argument regarding this issue in this thesis.

The questions that Parfit raises, such as 'What makes me the same person throughout my life, and a different person from you?' and 'What is the importance of the unity of each life, and of the distinction between different lives, and different persons?' ([26], introduction) are for Buddha mere metaphysical speculations and since they do not provide for the verification of facts about them, they are useless. What was important for Buddha was finding the true reality of everything that exists. For Parfit, certain key ethical views arise from changing from the view that 'what matters is Personal Identity' to 'what matters is Relation R'. Though Parfit seems to think so, Buddhist ethics does not arise in any such way from the Relation R. Parfit is more concerned about the issues that Buddha explains as mere metaphysical speculations. Thus, Parfit's ethical issues reflect what Buddha explains as minor details of mere morality.

Before I discuss some of these views of Parfit, I shall say how most of these views differ from Buddha's approach to ethics. In Buddha's View, a wider notion of ethics is visible in the Middle Path. The Middle Path avoids two extremes: one extreme being the search for happiness through the pleasures of the senses, which is 'low, common,
unprofitable and the way of the ordinary people'; the other being the search for happiness through self-mortification in different forms of asceticism, which is 'painful, unworthy and unprofitable'. Here I would like to add a word about how the early Buddhism (Theravada) differ from Mahayana Buddhism. Theravada Buddhism gives more attention and priority to the individual enlightenment whereas Mahayana Buddhism gives prominence to the salvation of All. It is said that in Mahayana Buddhism a Bodhisattva, one who has enough merit to attain nirvana, would stand on the threshold waiting for the others to join in.

One would say that Theravada approach is selfish but rather it is an enlightened selfishness.

Devote yourselves to your own good. Be earnest, be zealous, be intent on your own good ([28],p.154)

is the teaching of the Buddha. The essentials of discipline in the Middle Path aim at promoting and perfecting eight factors of ethical conduct (sila), mental discipline (samadhi), and wisdom (panna).([12],p.301) These factors of the Path are not followed and practised one after the other but are to be developed simultaneously, as far as possible according to the capacity of each individual. These eight factors in the Path are all linked together and each helps the cultivation of the others. This Path is followed to attain a state of freedom, happiness, perfection and knowledge as well as for harmonious living.

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Criticizing great imprudence Parfit says

Reconsider a boy who starts to smoke, knowing and hardly caring that this may cause him to suffer greatly fifty years later. This boy does not identify himself with his future self. His attitude towards this future self is in some ways like his attitude to other people, such as the aged parents of his friends. This analogy makes it easier to believe that his act is morally wrong. ([26],p.319)

Parfit also says

...we should claim that great imprudence is morally wrong. We ought not to do to our future selves what it would be wrong to do to other people. ([26],p.320)

According to Parfit great imprudence may not be irrational and the charge 'imprudent' will become for many people a mere description (as opposed to having a moral meaning) and this is why the objection to great imprudence should come from the direction of morality. ([26],p.318-319)

The claim that we ought not to do to our future selves what it would be wrong to do to other people, as Parfit thinks, makes it easier to think that one's act of this kind is morally wrong. ([26],p.320) Buddha approaches this situation in a different manner. The Buddhist way of life is described in the Middle Path. This is the way to the cessation of suffering (dukkha). For one who follows the Middle Path there is no room for imprudence, and thus for the Buddhist it will be irrational to act imprudently. The
charge "imprudent" will not become a mere description because imprudence will be a barrier for the Buddhist way of life and to the goal of attaining the cessation of suffering.

The claim about the abortion issue is another ethical issue of Parfit's that reflects what Buddha explains as minor details of mere morality. Ethical conduct found in the Middle Path is built on the vast conception of universal love and compassion for all living beings. Compassion (karuna) and wisdom (panna) are the two qualities that a Buddhist should develop equally. In a concept of love and compassion for all living beings, the following claim of Parfit's will be considered incorrect. Parfit's Reductionist View supports the claim that abortion is not morally wrong in the first two or three months, and that it gradually becomes seriously wrong before the end of the pregnancy.([26],p.347) Buddha in the Brahmajala Sutta speaks about minor details of mere morality. It is said in this sutta that

> it is in respect only of trifling things, of matters of little value, of mere morality, that an unconverted man, when praising the Tathagata,\(^{21}\) would speak.

Among the many of such trifling, minor details of mere morality such a man would praise we find

Gotama the recluse holds aloof from such

\(^{21}\)another term for Buddha
Considering next the other end of life Parfit says ([26], p.323) that on the Reductionist View, a person can gradually cease to exist some time before his heart stops beating. Parfit says that this will be so if the distinctive features of a person's mental life gradually disappear. This claim, says Parfit, distinguishes the person from the human being, and if the person has ceased to exist, then we can plausibly claim that we have no moral reason to help his heart to go on beating, or to refrain from preventing this. Parfit also says that if we know that a human being is in a coma that is incurable—that this human being will certainly never regain any consciousness—we shall believe that the person has ceased to exist. Since there is a living human body, the human being still exists and Parfit says we should claim that only the killing of persons is wrong. As I have shown the difference regarding Parfit's claim on the abortion issue and Buddha's position on an ethical conduct that is built on the conception of universal love and compassion for all living beings, a claim such as 'only the killing of persons is wrong' will be contradictory for Buddha.

Parfit also considers what, on the Reductionist View, we should believe about desert and commitments. According to
him some writers claim that only the deep further fact supports the concept of desert, and that, since there is no such fact, we cannot deserve to be punished for past crimes. ([26], p. 347) Parfit argues for the general claim that, if the connections are weaker between a criminal now and himself at the time of his crime, he deserves less punishment. Parfit says a similar claim applies to commitment. ([26], p. 347) Parfit's criticism on great imprudence will have to some extent an unsteady impact on this claim. If connections are weaker between the boy who starts to smoke now and his future self fifty years later, 'it cannot be irrational to be less concerned, now, about those parts of our future to which we are now less closely connected' ([26], p. 347) Parfit should have said that the boy's act is less morally wrong. This in a way will make morality a matter of degree.

The Utilitarian View is explained by Parfit as follows:

All that matters are the amounts of happiness and suffering, or benefits and burdens. It makes no moral difference how these amounts are distributed as between different people. ([26], p. 330)

On discussing the Distributive Justice (distribution of benefits and burdens between different people) Parfit claims that Utilitarian acts on the fact of separateness of persons (we are different people, each with his own life to lead; we believe that our identity is determinate). What Parfit
argues for is the claim—the impersonality of Utilitarianism is less implausible than most of us believe.

Parfit's argument rests on the Reductionist View. Ceasing to believe that persons are separately existing entities, according to Parfit, gives us more reason to be more concerned about the quality of experiences and less concerned about whose experiences they are. ([26],p.346) In this way Parfit shows how a change of view about the nature of Personal Identity might affect our beliefs about the Principle of Equality and other distributive principles. ([26],p.329)

On this claim Buddha would agree with Parfit in this way. In following an Ethical Conduct of striving to attain an experiential insight into the nature of things as they are, quality of experiences will be more of concern than whose experiences they are.

For Buddha, moral effort, energy of will and moral responsibility are our own immediate experiences of initiative and effort in overcoming evil tendencies. If there is any experiential truth in the self-idea it is this fact of moral effort, awareness, and mental alertness. ([20],p.255) This immediate sense of moral initiative is what Buddha holds as the only phenomenologically verifiable aspect of the concept of the self.([20],p.257)
The Paticca Samuppada contains twelve factors, which explains how life arises, exists and continues. Many scholars have failed to see that Buddhism upheld a theory of non-deterministic causal conditioning along with the doctrine of free-will. K.N.Jayatilleke quotes from the writing of two scholars thus:

This misunderstanding, however, is not limited to Western scholars. A Sinhala Buddhist scholar, a layman, has represented the Buddhist teaching on this matter as follows in a paper read before a Philsophers Conference: "What does Buddhism have to say regarding free-will?" The question does not seem to ever have been asked of the Buddha, but, if he had been asked, he would probably have answered that the question does not arise or that it is inaccurately put. There can be no such thing as a free will outside the causal sequence which constitutes the world process" (G.P.Malalasekera, The Status of the Individual, in East and West, ed.Charles A.Moore, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1966,p.73)

Another Buddhist scholar, a monk, says the following: "The question of Free Will has occupied an important place in Western thought and philosophy. But according to the Conditioned Genesis, this question does not and cannot arise in Buddhist Philosophy...Not only is the so-called free will not free, but even the very idea of Free Will is not free from conditions" (Walpola Rahula, What The Buddha Taught, Gordon Fraser,Bedford, 1959,pp.54-5).

I agree with Jayatilleke in saying that Buddha distinguished the Causal Theory from Determinism, and also faced the
question of free-will and asserted its reality in no uncertain terms. But I do not agree with Jayatilleke's argument ([14],p.248) that in Buddhist ethics upholding the reality of survival after death, makes the individual moral responsibility meaningful. As Jayatilleke himself points out ([14],p.129) Buddha asserted the continuity without identity of individuality. On a discussion on 'Reincarnation and Beyond' Jayatilleke ([14],p.180) quotes:

sometimes the subject during what is called "wakeful state" is not a reincarnationist, or even has never heard about such an idea, or else belongs to a creed that denies it emphatically.

One intelligent man, a Protestant, asked the hypnotist in a deep, booming, slow voice, "Why do you ask such a question?" The question was repeated, "Were you or were you not born the first time?"

He still hesitated, as if to conquer a strong inner opposition, and then began to describe his life a couple of centuries ago in a monastery somewhere in Spain.

When he awoke, slowly and by reversing the age-regression process, the tape was played back to him. He was amazed because he did not know about reincarnation and never though it possible.

Jayatilleke states that it is a curious fact, which calls for an explanation by itself, that those who in their normal conscious experience are materialists or atheists, who do not believe in pre-existence or rebirth, give alleged accounts of prior lives under deep hypnosis.([14],p.180) In
the Brahmajala Sutta we see dream interpreters are included in the low arts, of living by wrong means of livelihood. ([28] I,p.17)

As Mathur points out ([20],p.257) Buddha holds the experiential truth in moral initiative:

Never Brahmin, have I seen or heard of such an avowal, such a view. Pray, how can one step onwards, how can one step back, yet say: there is no self agency; there is no other agency? What think you Brahmin, is there such a thing as initiation? Yes, Sir. ...Well Brahmin, since there is initiative and men are known to initiate, this is among men the self-agency, this is the other agency. ([ ],p.237-238)

Jayatilleke also states ([14],p.246) the same story how when a certain Brahmin approached the Buddha and told him that he was of the opinion that there was no free will on the part of himself or others, Buddha admonished him and asked how he could say such a thing when he himself of his own accord could walk up to the Buddha and walk away from him. I think this element of initiative supports and also does not contradict the other theories of the Buddha, and is better than to resort to an explanation of survival after death which contradicts the view of continuity without identity of the individual.

If it be asked how does the Buddha justify the ethics of the Middle Path, then, he would answer that it is the constant
deepening of one's reasoning of the experiential truth of not only of not-self but of total impermanency of everything that exists. Then, the difference between Buddha's ethics and Parfit's ethics is that for Parfit, an intellectual conviction of the Reductionist View enables one to make choices which will maximize one's happiness, and the general maximizing of happiness is seen as the ultimate goal. The attitude of Parfit and Hume towards the Self and Ethics as arising from an intellectual conviction seems to be similar in nature.
Parfit's argument that we are not separately existing entities, apart from our brains and bodies, and various interrelated physical and mental events and that our existence just involves the existence of our brains and bodies, and the doing of our deeds and the thinking of our thoughts, and the occurrence of certain other physical and mental events, at least closely resembles the Buddhist attitude toward doctrine of not-self (anatta).

This Buddhist View is explained by the five aggregates which according to the Buddhist View constitutes the so-called 'being'. Though Parfit accepts the existence of a person, the Buddhist explanation does not even leave room for the notion of person in Parfit's sense. A close look at the five aggregates, which comprise matter, sensations, perceptions, mental formations, and consciousness, makes one realise that they are of a nature of cause and effect. It can be due to any cause that any of these aggregates form. The formations once formed do not last. Their ever-changing nature is the reason that we have so many different experiences. There is no permanent experiencer because the experiencer exists also due to the formations.
Discussing Descartes, Parfit says ([26], p.224) Descartes should not have claimed that a thinker must be a separately existing entity. Descartes should not have claimed, 'I think, therefore I am' but instead could have claimed, 'This is a thought: thinking is going on' or 'This is a thought, therefore at least one thought is being thought'. And then Parfit declares that

Because we ascribe thoughts to thinkers, we can truly claim that thinkers exist. But we cannot deduce, from the content of our experiences, that a thinker is a separately existing entity. ([26], p.225)

Parfit discusses an argument for this view suggested by Lichtenberg,

Because we are not separately existing entities, we could fully describe our thoughts without claiming that they have thinkers. We could fully describe our experiences, and the connections between them, without claiming that they are had by a subject of experiences. We could give what I call an impersonal description. ([26], p.225)

Parfit's attention is focused in this discussion on arguing for the premise that 'we are not separately existing entities'. Buddha also argues for the same premise 'we are not separately existing entities'. Since their approaches were different (as I have shown in chapter three) Parfit arrived at this premise with an intellectual conviction and Buddha realised this premise as an experiential truth.

After coming to this impersonal description, Parfit claims that in our identity over time what matters is Relation R.
and this is what matters. Relation R is the psychological connectedness and psychological continuity of a person. The more important is the psychological connectedness which is the holding of particular direct psychological connections. ([26], p.206)

Parfit also talks about three versions of the Psychological Criterion. (I have stated them in chapter one) These differ according to Parfit, over the question of what is the right kind of cause. On the Narrow version of this Psychological Criterion, the cause must be a normal cause. On the Wide version of the Psychological Criterion, the cause could be any reliable cause. On the Widest version of the Psychological Criterion, the cause could be any cause. An analogy that Parfit employs to argue that we need not decide between these three versions is as this:

Some people go blind because of damage to their eyes. Scientists are now developing artificial eyes. These involve a glass or plastic lens, and a micro-computer which sends through the optic nerve electrical patterns like those that are sent through this nerve by a natural eye. When such artificial eyes are more advanced, they might give to someone who has gone blind visual experiences just like those that he used to have. What he seems to see would correspond to what is in fact before him. And visual experiences would be causally dependent, in this new but reliable way, on the light waves coming from the objects that are before him. ([26], p.208)

Would this person be seeing these objects? If we insist that seeing must
involve the normal cause, we would answer No. But even if this person cannot see, what he has is just as good as seeing, both as a way of knowing what is within sight, and as a source of visual pleasure. If we accept the Wide Psychological Criterion, we could make a similar claim. If psychological continuity does not have its normal cause, it may not provide personal identity. We can claim that even if this is so, what it provides is as good as personal identity. ([26], p.209)

It seems to me that Parfit comes to the conclusion that Relation R does not provide Personal Identity ([26], p.217) when it does not involve the normal cause, even though what it provides is equivalent to Personal Identity in the Buddhist sense. And since it is being held by Parfit to be 'as good as' Personal Identity, Parfit's attitude towards the Relation R may be subjected to the same criticism by the Buddha that he (the Buddha) levels against the attitude towards Personal Identity with the normal cause. What I will do is examine Parfit's attitude towards the Relation R to see if such criticisms are justified. If they are then Parfit has not undergone the appropriate attitudinal change supposedly attending to the Buddhist realisation of not-self.

In the Buddhist explanation of the Aggregate of Sensation, it is said that through the contact of the external world with the eye the sensation of visible forms are experienced. The visual experiences can be causally dependent on the eye
or arise in the new reliable way that Parfit specifies. It
is noteworthy here to mention that the Buddha's explanation
does not have a limitation of a normal cause. In the
Aggregate of Sensations are included all our sensations
experienced through the contact of physical and mental
organs (in Buddhist texts one comes across the term mental
organ; the mind (manas) is considered a faculty or organ
(indriya) like the eye or the ear and hence a mental organ)
with the external world. The artificial eye and the light-
waves coming from the objects that are before him will help
him to see only through the contacting of his physical and
mental organs.

A similar argument can be seen in Parfit's imagined story,
where his brain and body are destroyed and the Scanner and
the Replicator produce a person who has a new but exactly
similar brain and body, and who is psychologically
continuous with him as when he pressed the green button. In
the Buddha's View, it is the psycho-physical process that we
hold as the person and there is no "I" to be found. So the
problem whether it is the same or a different person, would
not arise. For Parfit, on the two Wide Psychological
Criteria, he would be him. ([26],p.208) In Buddha's View,
since everything that exists is subject to impermanency,
physical features, (i.e. being beautiful) have no
importance. But for Parfit, in the case of a few people who
are very beautiful, physical similarity may have great
importance. ([26],p.217) As explained by Buddha in the paticca samuppada, it will be seen as craving, clinging and desire through ignorance for the illusion of self.

Parfit says that

If we accept the Reductionist View, it is R and not the identity that matters. We may accept that Relation R has nearly all the importance that, on the Reductionist View, personal identity has. And we may accept that, on this view, what fundamentally matters is not personal identity but R. ([26],p.272)

Parfit argues against Personal Identity being a purely mental entity, a separately existing physical entity or a further fact that does not consist in physical and/or psychological continuity. ([26],p.209-210) But Parfit gives great importance to the Relation R.

Buddha agrees with Parfit in denying Personal Identity as being such, but Buddha also denies the importance of the Relation R. The psycho-physical process of the individual, according to Buddha is the five aggregates which arise, exist and continue in reaction or response with one another. But they do not exist as one whole. They are all impermanent and constantly changing. If we attribute something like Relation R as that which can hold between (in Parfit's sense - "stream of consciousness") what is subject to constant change, then in the Buddhist sense it will be like attributing a relation to an illusion (self).
Therefore holding Relation R as of importance would be for Buddha as same as holding the view of Personal Identity as important.

As Parfit thinks, changing the view to a Reductionist one make a difference to our lives. ([26], p.217) In the Buddhist sense the Reductionist View that what matters is Relation R is equivalent to what Parfit claims he is liberated from. As Buddha taught, the realisation of the premise 'we are not separately existing entities' is the starting point to follow the ethical path for the liberation from suffering (dukkha). For Parfit, this change of view makes it easier for him to do more utilitarian and hedonic ethics, and that in the Buddhist sense is the clinging and craving for the illusion of self that we should strive to cease. For Buddha, the understanding that comes from the deep realisation and experiencing this not-self focuses on the Ultimate Good -the ethical ideal of Ultimate Happiness, moral Perfection, final Realisation and perfect Freedom, Nibbana.
CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the First Chapter of this thesis, I have put forward what Parfit says of the Buddha's View. The Impersonal (Reductionist) View that Parfit resolves to establish is different from the impersonal view that Buddha holds. Parfit's Impersonal View holds the view that 'what matters is Relation R'. According to Parfit it is to this Reductionist View he claims that Buddha would have agreed.

In the Second Chapter, I present the Buddhist View and show how it is different from Parfit's intellectual conviction of the futility of Personal Identity. For Buddha, arriving at this conclusion of not-self came through experiencing the impermanency of everything that exists, and therefore it is an experiential truth. I present a clear view of the Buddha's position with regard to this claim with reference to the early Buddhist texts. I have also shown the accuracy and validity of the primary texts and also the fact that interpreting the primary texts has been subjected to conflicting opinions in later works on Buddhism. Since Parfit quotes from recent works that are based on these later works and since they give prominence to some Buddhist views and not others, my argument in the third section of this chapter was that Parfit used Buddhist quotations from
works that were based on inaccurate documentation of Buddhism. Using these later works has led Parfit into thinking that the Buddhist doctrine of not-self is the view that he claims as the Reductionist View.

In Chapter Three, I show how Buddha and Parfit both approach from two different standpoints to the problem of Personal Identity. While Parfit describes the nature of Personal Identity, that it exists involving the existence of our brain and body, Buddha explains how the existence of the brain and body is without a Personal Identity.

In Chapter Four, I show how Buddha and Parfit differ on ethics. For Parfit, the Impersonal View of holding what matters is Relation R is the basis for the practice of ethics. For Buddha realising the impermanency of everything that exists, leads to following an ethical path to attain that which is not subject to impermanency.

In the last Chapter, I discuss the Buddhist attitude towards Parfit's Relation R. I show how Parfit's Relation R would be subject to the same criticism that Buddha gives to Personal Identity.

Parfit and Buddha seems to agree only on the premise that persons are not separately existing entities, but, whereas Parfit gives great importance to the Relation R, in Buddha's
View of the not-self there is absolutely no room for such a concept. Parfit's Reductionist View gives him more reason to be more concerned about the quality of experiences and be less concerned about whose experiences they are. In contrast, Buddha's reason for being concerned about the quality of experience is to attain an experiential insight into the nature of things as they are. In conclusion, Buddha would not have agreed with the Reductionist View that Parfit claims Buddha would have agreed with.
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APPENDICES

A THE FIVE AGGREGATES

The five aggregates which constitutes the so-called being are:

1. aggregate of corporeality (rupakkhandha)
2. aggregate of sensations (vedanakkhandha)
3. aggregate of perceptions (sannakkhandha)
4. aggregate of mental formations (samkharakkhandha)
5. aggregate of conciousness (vinnanakkhandha)

AGGREGATE OF CORPOREALITY (MATTER)

In the first, the aggregate of matter, are included the traditional Four Great Elements (cattari mahabutani). They are solidity, fluidity, heat and motion. There are twenty-four secondary phenomena called derivatives (upadaya rupa). These derivatives of Four Great Elements are our five Physical Sense-Organs; eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and their corresponding Physical Sense-Objects; form, sound, odour, taste, bodily impacts, femininity (itthindriya), virility (purisindriya), physical base of mind (hadaya-vatthu), bodily expression (kaya-vinnatti), verbal

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22This section is done with reference to [24] and ([27],p.20-8)
expression (vaci-vinnatti), physical life (rupa-jivita), space element (akasa-dhatu), physical agility (rupassa lahuta), physical elasticity (rupassa muduta), physical adaptability (rupassa kammannata), Physical growth (rupassa upacaya), physical continuity (rupassa santati), decay (jara), impermanence (anicca), nutriment (ahara). The whole realm of matter, both internal and external is included in the aggregate of matter.

AGGREGATE OF SENSATIONS

In the aggregate of sensations are included all our sensations, pleasant, neutral, experienced through the contact of physical and mental organs with the external world. They are of six kinds: the sensations experienced through the contact of the eye with visible forms, ear with sounds, nose with odour, tongue with taste, body with tangible objects, and mind (which is the sixth sensation) with mind-objects or thoughts or ideas. All our physical and mental sensations are included in this group. All sensations, according to their nature is classified as five kinds: bodily agreeable feeling: sukha = kayika sukha vedana 

bodily painful feeling: dukkha = kayika dukkha vedana

mentally agreeable feeling: somanassa = cetasika sukha vedana
mentally painful feeling: domanassa = cetasika
dukkha vedana

indifferent feeling: upekkha = adukkha-m-asukha
vedana

The term 'mind' (manas) in Buddhism is not considered as spirit opposed to matter. Mind is recognized only as a faculty or organ like the eye or the ear. Though it does not come under the material sense-organs, it can be controlled and developed like any other faculty, where Buddhism lays an emphasis on the value of controlling and disciplining these six (mental and physical) faculties. The difference between the eye and the mind as faculties is that the former senses the world of colours and visible forms, while the latter senses the world of ideas and thoughts and mental objects. The whole world is not only of visible form, sound, odour, taste and tangible things but also includes ideas and thoughts. The mind is the faculty that these ideas and thoughts can be sensed. The world experienced by this sixth sense faculty is not independent of the other five physical sense faculties. It is dependent on, and are conditioned by, physical experience. For example, a person born deaf cannot have ideas of sound, except through the analogy of movements experienced through his other faculties.

AGGREGATE OF PERCEPTIONS

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The aggregate of perceptions are also of six kinds. In relation to the six internal faculties and their corresponding six external objects arise perceptions. Like the sensations, perceptions are also produced through the contact of our six faculties with the external world. It is the perceptions that recognizes the objects, whether they be physical or mental.

AGGREGATE OF MENTAL FORMATIONS

In the aggregate of mental formations are included all volitional activities both good and bad. Volition is mental construction, mental activity. Its function is to direct the mind in the sphere of good, bad or neutral activities. Just like sensations and perceptions, volition is of six kinds, connected with the six internal faculties and the corresponding six objects (both physical and mental) in the external world. Sensations and perceptions are not volitional actions. They do not produce karmic effects. It is only volitional actions that can produce karmic effects. There are fifty such activities and of these eleven are general psychological elements, twenty-five are lofty (sobhana) qualities, and fourteen are karmically unwholesome qualities.

AGGREGATE OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Aggregate of consciousness explains how consciousness arise as a reaction or response which has one of the six faculties (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind) as its basis, and one of the six corresponding external phenomena (visible form, sound, odour, taste, tangible things and idea or thought) as its objects. For instance, visual consciousness (cakkha-vinnana) has the eye as its basis and a visible form as its object. Mental consciousness (mano-vinnana) has the mind (manas) as its basis and a mental-object, an idea or thought (dhamma) as its object. So consciousness is connected with other faculties. Thus, like sensation, perception and volition, consciousness also is of six kinds, in relation to six internal faculties and corresponding six external objects.

It should be clearly understood that consciousness does not recognize an object. It is only a sort of an awareness-awareness of the presence of an object. When the eye comes in contact with a colour, for instance blue, visual consciousness arises which simply is awareness of the presence of a colour; but it does not recognize that it is blue. There is no recognition at this stage. It is perception (the third aggregate discussed above) that recognizes that it is blue. The term 'visual consciousness' is a philosophical expression denoting the same idea as is conveyed by the ordinary word 'seeing'. Seeing does not
mean recognizing. Neither do the other forms of consciousness.

One of the Buddha's own disciples, Sati by name, held that the Master taught:

it is the same consciousness that transmigrates and wanders about

The Buddha asked him what he meant by 'consciousness'.

Sati's reply was

it is that which experiences the results of good and bad deeds here and there

Buddha responded

To whomever, you stupid one, have you heard me expounding the doctrine in this manner? Haven't I in many ways explained consciousness as arising out of conditions: that there is no arising of consciousness without conditions

Then the Buddha went to explain consciousness in detail:

Consciousness is named according to whatever condition through which it arises: on account of the eye and visible forms arises a consciousness, and it is called visual consciousness; on account of the ear and sound arises a consciousness, and it is called auditory consciousness; on account of the nose and odours arises a consciousness, and it is called olfactory consciousness; on account of tongue and tastes arises a consciousness, and it is called gustatory consciousness; on account of the body and tangible objects arises a consciousness, and it is called tactile consciousness; on account of the mind and mind-objects (ideas and thoughts) arises a consciousness, and it is called mental consciousness ([27], p.27)
Then the Buddha explained this manner of naming by an illustration: A fire is named according to the material on account of which it burns. A fire may burn on account of wood and it is called wood-fire. It may burn on account of straw, and then it is called straw-fire. So consciousness is named according to the condition through which it arises. ([12] Vol I p.256)

The Buddha declared in unequivocal terms that consciousness depends on matter, sensation, perception, and mental formations, and that it cannot exist independently of them.

Consciousness may exist having matter as its means (rupapayam), matter as its object (ruparammanam), matter as its support (rupapatittham), and seeking delight it may grow, increase and develop; or consciousness many exist having sensations as its means, mental formations as its object, mental formations as its support, and seeking delight it may grow, increase and develop. Were a man to say: I shall show the coming, the going, the passing away, the arising, the growth, the increase or the development of consciousness apart from matter, sensation, perception and mental formations, he would be speaking of something that does not exist. ([10] Vol.III p.58)
B PATICCA SAMUPPADA (CONDITIONED GENESIS)

The twelve factors of the paticca samuppada:

Through ignorance are conditioned volitional actions or karma-formations (avijjapaccaya samkhara)
Through volitional actions is conditioned consciousness (samkharapaccaya vinnanam)
Through consciousness is conditioned mental and physical phenomena (vinnanapaccaya namarupa)
Through mental and physical phenomena are conditioned the six faculties (i.e. five sense-organs and mind) (namarupapaccaya salayatanam)
Through the six faculties is conditioned (sensorial and mental) contact (salayatanapaccaya phasso)
Through (sensorial and mental) contact is conditioned sensation (phassapaccaya vedana)
Through sensation is conditioned desire, craving (vedanapaccaya tanha)
Through desire is conditioned clinging (tanhapaccaya upadanam)
Through clinging is conditioned the process of becoming (upadananpaccaya bhavo)
Through the process of becoming is conditioned birth (bhavapaccaya jati)
Through birth is conditioned decay, death, lamentation,
pain (jatipaccaya jaramaranam...)

We can come to the cessation of the process in its reverse order. (Through the cessation of ignorance, volitional activities or karma-formations cease,...)

All these factors are relative, interdependent and interconnected, and therefore no first cause. The Conditioned Genesis should be considered as a circle or a series of inter-connected phenomena. By acquiring full knowledge and realisation we can put an end to our ignorance and thereby put an end to the process.
The doctrinal works of the Theravada school constitutes what is called the three baskets, namely Sutta Pitaka, the basket of discourses, Vinaya Pitaka, the basket of disciplinary rules, and the Abhidhamma Pitaka, the basket of philosophy. Each of these Pitakas or baskets consists of many books which have their own particular generic names. Those which constitutes the Sutta Pitaka are called Nikaya, while the Vinaya Pitaka consists of Pali and the Abhidhamma Pitaka of Pakarana.

The Sutta Pitaka contains the sermons and discourses of the Buddha and consists of five Nikayas. The first two of which are considered as the earliest documentation on Buddha's teachings.

Digha Nikaya
Majjhima Nikaya
Anguttara Nikaya
Samyutta Nikaya
Khuddhaka Nikaya

The Vinaya Pitaka, consisting of Vinaya rules, was complied to enforce discipline among Bhikkhus (monks) and Bhikkhunis (nuns) of the Order. It has five Pali.

Parajikapali
The Abhidhamma Pitaka contains all Buddha's teachings regarding citta (mind and consciousness) and cetasika (mental factors). It consists of seven Pakarana.

- Dhamma sanganipakarana
- Vibhangapakarana
- Puggalappannattipakarana
- Dhatukathapakarana
- Yamakapakarana
- Patthanapakarana
- Kathavatthupakarana