

AN ANALYSIS OF THE CANADIAN FUNCTIONAL PRINCIPLE

BY

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B.A., Sophia University, 1988

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

in

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
Department of Political Science

We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

September 1989

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Date 25 September, 1989

ABSTRACT

The thesis examines the origin and the nature of Canada's functional principle by tracing its development in the critical years of the gradual achievement of Canada's diplomatic independence and by analysing its special features in comparison with the general theory of functionalism.

The functional principle suggests that a country should be given responsibilities in accordance with its capabilities and will to make contributions to a certain sphere of international politics. The functional principle has been perceived as a reflection of an idealist-internationalist aspect of Canada's external behaviour which was borrowed from David Mitrany's theory of functionalism, with which it is often confused. This thesis argues that the Canadian functional principle emerged as a result of the special position in which Canada was placed in the evolving international system and that it must be distinguished from Mitrany's functionalism.

The first part of the thesis deals with the history of the development of Canada's functional idea. Reflecting the increasing complexity of Canada's external relations since Confederation in 1867, and an increasing sense of identity, Canada began to demand a greater role in the decision-making of the British Empire through numerous Imperial conferences. While Canada's functional idea which was being formed in the

1920s and the 1930s asserted a country's right to be given a responsible role in the sphere where it is "concerned," the gradual increase in Canada's national power in the 1940s developed the original idea into one based on "capability" as the major qualification for a country to be entitled a special role. Here, Canada's functional idea was developed into a principle, justifying Canada's right to contribute to international politics as a middlepower.

The second part compares Canada's functional idea with Mitrany's theory of functionalism. In the course of analysis it will become clear that the Canadian functional principle is based on quite a different outlook on international relations from Mitrany's. Canada was not interested exclusively in the technical sphere as Mitrany was. Moreover, Canada regarded the state-system as a fact of international life, whereas Mitrany aimed at world government as a final goal.

The thesis presents a different interpretation of one of the cornerstones of Canadian foreign policy. It yields insight into a continuing theme of Canadian foreign policy, in which a balance is sought between the pursuit of national interest and the furthering of international cooperation. It also has implications for a pattern of behaviour of other states in today's world. Canada has presented one model of diplomacy which achieved relative compatibility of often conflicting domestic and external elements of international relations.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract	ii
Acknowledgments	v
Chapter 1: Introduction	1
Chapter 2: Historical Survey---the Origin and the Evolution of the Functional Principle	6
Canada as a New Dominion of the British Empire: 1867-1911	9
The Era of Loring Christie: The Formation of the Core Idea of the Functional Principle: 1911-1941	13
Development of the Functional Idea into a Principle: Discussions on the Joint War Effort and on the United Nations	23
Chapter 3: Analysis---the Functional Principle and Functionalism	36
The Theory of Functionalism	37
The Relationship between the Functional Principle and Functionalism	40
Chapter 4: Conclusion	53
Notes	58
Bibliography	67

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am grateful to many individuals who have helped me in numerous ways in writing this thesis. I first would like to express my appreciation to the Canadian Government(World University Service of Canada), which has financially supported this academic year. I am deeply indebted to Professor Don Munton, who took an interest in my work and generously gave his time to discuss the thesis. Professors Kal Holsti and Mark Zacher read the thesis and gave me comments. I extend my thanks to other professors and friends at the University of British Columbia for providing insights and encouragement(especially to Isabel, Kathy, and Petula), and to the individuals who supported me from the other side of the Pacific(Mr.& Mrs. Beppu, Hidetoshi, professors at Sophia University). Lastly, I cannot forget to mention my parents, whose moral support has been invaluable throughout my life.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

I think we must look at the future of our foreign policy with hard realism, but without cynicism... We must have some conception of our role in the world if we are to be an independent state at all. This we cannot avoid... If our conception is to be realistic, adapted to our size and the shape we are in, it seems to me that it is bound to be complex in nature, sensitive to equilibrium and opportunity, and for the most part, discreet.¹

The thesis examines the Canadian functional principle, which is frequently mentioned in the literature as one of the cornerstones of Canadian foreign policy, but the origin and the nature of which are still vague. In the course of historical and theoretical analysis of the functional principle, I am concerned with the question of whether a nation establishes a certain principle of foreign policy which defines its national role by autonomous, idealistic will, or, rather, it follows a path out of the situational necessity of international relations. This question has also long been a topic of the old debate between realists and idealists in the study of international relations, a debate which has not been settled to this day.

The functional principle is widely thought to have been first publicly advocated by Prime Minister Mackenzie King during the discussions on the new post-war international organization, the United Nations. It suggests that if a state has the capability and will to contribute to a certain sphere of international relations or function, the state ought to be

afforded responsibilities and influence in the decision-making on issues in that particular sphere. Since this implies that each country has its own function to perform in international society, it means that Canada has a right to be assured a special role to play as a middlepower. Arguing for a larger share of Canadian responsibility in international politics, Mackenzie King advocated that it should be proportionate to the state's capability and willingness to make contributions to particular issues of international relations.

Scholars of Canadian foreign policy have often perceived the functional principle as a manifestation of Canada's internationalism during the 1940s, when it discarded the isolationism of the inter-war period² and became actively involved in international affairs. It is generally and popularly assumed that there is a direct link between the functional principle and David Mitrany's functionalism, which proposes function-based cooperation in the technical sphere of international relations that would lead to numerous interactions among states and eventually to the decline of nationalism and to the integration of the world.

However, despite the frequent references to the functional principle in many writings on Canadian foreign policy, ambiguities and confusion still exist³ with regard to: 1) the timing of its adoption and its development in the course of the history of Canadian foreign policy; 2) its relation to functionalism, one of the main theories of international collaboration in studies of international

relations. Therefore, this essay examines the functional principle with the following three purposes: 1) to trace the origin and the evolution of the functional principle historically; 2) to analyse and discuss the nature of the functional principle by clarifying the ambiguities that exist between the functional principle and Mitrany's functionalism; and 3) to draw implications for the continuing tradition of Canadian foreign policy for general theories of external behavior that are applicable to other states as well.

In the first chapter, the functional principle is historically analysed. Although it is believed that the functional principle originated during the discussions on Canada's involvement in the post-war international organization, we can find the original idea evolving as early as 1867, when Canada became the first Dominion of the British Commonwealth. The functional idea was further developed during the Borden administration as Canada experienced rapid external changes and became more aware of its identity. Loring Cheney Christie, the Legal Advisor to the Department of External Affairs who served under Borden, Meighen, and King, contributed greatly to the formation of the core idea of Canadian functionalism, which was developed into a principle by Hume Wrong and was advocated by Mackenzie King in the 1940s.

The historical survey is followed by an analysis of the nature of the functional principle. The second chapter

will deal with the following two questions: first, what are the characteristics of the functional principle? Secondly, how can it be distinguished from the general theory of functionalism, particularly, David Mitrany's functionalism? The discussion of the commonalities and differences between the functional principle and Mitrany's functionalism will reveal that in spite of the frequent confusion between the two and in spite of the general assumption that Canada "borrowed" Mitrany's idea, there exists some fundamental differences between the two. Although the functional principle and functionalism share some similar assumptions and ideas for solving international problems and although it is possible that Canadian officials were aware of Mitrany's ideas, it is difficult to find evidence of a direct relationship between the two. The functional principle appears endogenously Canadian, and must be distinguished from Mitrany's functionalism.

The Canadian functional principle is best understood as a product of the historical evolution of Canada's status and role in the changing distribution of power of the international system. The functional principle was gradually formed as Canada sought and developed an increasing sense of national identity paralleling its increased autonomy in foreign policy decision-making from Britain. The systemic constraints of the power configuration of the international system required Canada to find a balance between the enhancement of national interest and the maintenance of

peaceful relations with Britain and with the United States, as well as between the two, all three of which have been primary concerns in the history of Canadian foreign policy.

The wisdom of the functional principle can be found in both a realistic assessment of Canada's power and a desire and search for an effective role while accommodating Canada's interest with that of other states, which has been the essence of Canadian foreign policy. Often characterized by pragmatism, flexibility, moderation, and prudence, Canadian foreign policy in essence is well reflected in the above statement of John Holmes, which emphasizes the need for realism without cynicism. Assuming that "men reveal their politics most clearly when they are constructing their regimes,"⁴ the functional principle, which was developed in the course of Canada's debut in world politics, should yield some insights into this character of the continuing tradition of its foreign policy.

CHAPTER 2

Historical Survey---the Origin and the Evolution of the
Functional Principle

The most often cited expression of the functional principle by scholars of Canadian foreign policy is the speech that then Prime Minister Mackenzie King made in the House of Commons on July 9, 1943:

On the one hand, authority in international affairs must not be concentrated exclusively in the largest powers. On the other, authority cannot be divided equally among all the thirty or more sovereign states that comprise the United Nations, or all effective authority will disappear... [Effective] representation on [new international institutions] should neither be restricted to the largest states nor necessarily extended to all states. Representation should be determined on a functional basis which will admit to full membership those countries large or small, which have the greatest contribution to make to the particular object in question....Some compromise must be found between the theoretical equality of states and the practical necessity of limiting representation on international bodies to a workable number. That compromise can be discovered, especially in economic matters, by the application of the functional principle of representation.⁵

Although this speech of Mackenzie King is considered to be the first public expression of the functional principle, the functional idea had already appeared in public as early as 1921. The fundamental ideas of the principle had originated with the evolution of Canada's position in the changing international system of the 19th and early 20th century. Since Confederation in 1867, the critical relationship for Canada had been with Britain as a Dominion of the British

Empire, later the Commonwealth. The relationship with its giant neighbour, the United States, later became increasingly vital. The basis of the functional principle was formed in the process of dealing with these sensitive relations.

Achievement and preservation of independence, which has been a continuing theme of Canadian foreign policy, has taken several different forms. During the period between 1867 and 1945, Canada's expression of its identity demonstrated either one or a combination of the following: 1) Canada as a nation which inherited the British tradition; 2) Canada as a nation in North America apart from European power politics; and 3) Canada as a nation resisting the influence of the United States.

This chapter traces the development and evolution of the functional principle. The history of the functional principle can be divided into three periods: 1) 1867- 1911; 2) 1911-1941; and 3) 1941-1945. The first period covers the era from Confederation until the end of the Laurier administration. In this period Canada slowly started to grow as an independent nation. Canada's identity as a nation was closely linked to its membership in the British Empire, and Canada was not uncomfortable with Britain taking the lead in conducting external relations for the whole Empire. Although this period does not directly concern the later advocacy of the functional principle, it is important for understanding the historical background in which Canada's functional idea

gradually developed.

The second period deals with the beginning of the Borden administration until the death of one of the most important figures in the formation of Canada's functional idea, Loring Cheney Christie, the Legal Advisor to the Department of External Affairs. As Canada's external relations became more complex in the context of the shifting international balance of power and the changing relations within the North Atlantic Triangle⁶, Canadian officials, especially Christie, felt an increasing need for a stronger sense of national identity and diplomatic autonomy. Christie can be called one of the founding fathers of Canada's functional idea, serving the Department of External Affairs for nearly thirty years and directing Canadian foreign policy behind the scenes. This era has witnessed several major achievements in increasing Canada's status as an independent nation. Canadian policy-makers made statements expressing the ideas that became the basis for Canada's functional principle. Numerous discussions on the status of the Dominions at the Imperial Conferences throughout the 1920s, and mounting pressures for greater autonomy culminated in the Statute of Westminster in 1931. Although "imperial" sentiment was still strong at the beginning of this era, Canada after World War I started to identify itself by non-involvement to European politics, which resulted in less affinity to imperial ties. This "isolationist" or "quasi-isolationist" attitude continued until Canada engaged in the Second World War.

Finally, the third era deals with the period during the war when the allied powers were engaged in designing the post-war world order, especially the new international organization to be established after the war. Many scholars characterize Canadian external behaviour in this era as "internationalism." Determined to take an active part in the new coming era and searching for a significant role to play in the post-war international organization, the United Nations, Canada developed a "principle" by combining and condensing certain ideas of Canada's foreign policy, the origins of which go back to the 1867 Confederation. "The functional principle," as it came to be called, adopted more internationalist, activist nuances during the war. It was advocated by Mackenzie King and tested during the drafting of the Charter of the United Nations, especially on the question of membership of the Security Council and of special agencies.

Canada as a new Dominion of the British Empire: 1867-1911

From the British Empire to the British Commonwealth, to the Commonwealth of Nations, and finally to the Commonwealth---"Changes in its name reflected changing global realities," was the observation made by a recent overview report on the Commonwealth published by the Department of External Affairs in Canada.⁷ The transformation of names also reflected the changing nature of Canada's external relations and the development of the endogenously Canadian conduct of diplomacy.

While Canada's territorial boundaries had been defined quite early in its history, the acquisition of sovereignty was rather a slow process.⁸ This process for an autonomous government was facilitated by Confederation in 1867, as Canada became the first independent Dominion of the British Empire. With the British North America Act, Canada (Ontario and Quebec), Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick joined in federal system of government. The British North America Act, however, did not endow Canada with the right to amend the Act by its own legislatures, and the British Government still retained the disallowance and reservation powers. Above all, it did not make any reference to the new Dominion's right to conduct its own external policy nor to Canada's status in external relations. All the diplomatic powers were reserved in the hands of the British Government. Since diplomatic autonomy is one of the attributes of a sovereign nation, the Dominion of Canada remained in substance a self-governing colony of the British Empire.⁹

At this stage Canada's independence in foreign policy decision-making was not considered as urgent a goal to be achieved as it later became. What concerned Canada most in the early years of independence was "survival" as a nation. Since the American Civil War of 1860-65 had strained Anglo-American relations and caused great fear in Canada that it might be annexed by the United States, Canada's primary task was seen to be to moderate and harmonize relations between

Britain and the United States and remaining a state distinct from the United States.¹⁰

Reliance on Britain in the conduct of diplomacy was considered necessary for Canada to survive as a nation and even for the enhancement of Canada's national interest. Indeed, in early periods of Canadian foreign policy, "imperialism was one form of Canadian nationalism...the imperial system was the vehicle through which [Canada] would attain nationhood."¹¹ The Treaty of Washington in 1871, which removed the fear of war between Britain and the United States and between Canada and the United States, became the cornerstone of cooperative North Atlantic relations. With this Treaty signed, Canada's survival as a nation was more or less assured.¹²

Canada's external relations became more complex during the Laurier administration. Although the Treaty of Washington became the basis for peaceful North American relations and assured Canada's survival as a distinct nation, the simple geographical fact that Canada is situated next to a powerful, giant neighbour, nevertheless meant that frequent contacts with the United States remained a continuing threat to Canada's national identity. This inevitable consequence of geographic proximity and links increased the need for Canada's autonomy in order, first, to handle numerous complicated issues between Canada and the United States more efficiently,

and second, to preserve Canada's national identity. Canada's preoccupation with its relations with the United States and the increasingly felt need for diplomatic independence were reflected in Laurier's statement in the House of Commons on October 23, 1893:

I have often regretted...that we are living beside a great neighbour who, I believe I can say without being deemed unfriendly to them, are very grasping in their national acts, and who are determined upon every occasion to get the best in any agreement which they make. I have often regretted also that while they are a great and powerful nation, we are only a small colony, a growing colony, but still a colony...

The difficulty, as I conceive it to be, is that so long as Canada remains a dependency of the British Crown the present powers that we have are not sufficient for the maintenance of our rights. It is important that we should ask the British Parliament for more extensive power, so that if ever we have to deal with matters of a similar nature again we shall deal with them in our own way, in our own fashion, according to the best light that we have.¹³

Throughout the history of Canadian foreign policy, however, greater diplomatic independence has also been a means to solve problems peacefully with other states and has not been exercised at the expense of harmonious relations with other states. Diplomatic autonomy in this era was regarded as a means to solve problems peacefully between Canada and the United States. Laurier, who spoke for Canada's increased degree of autonomy in foreign policy, also stated in 1907:

...[We] can never conceive of war between us, or of war between Great Britain and the United States. We mean to settle all our difficulties with that nation by peaceful means, by diplomatic action, by negotiation, but never by the arbitrament of war.¹⁴

The Era of Loring Christie: the formation of the core idea of the functional principle: 1911-1941

A turning point came in Canada's external relations during Borden's administration. In the 1910s, Canadian officials came to regard Canada's autonomy in foreign policy decision-making as more and more important, and this trend continued in the 1920s and the 1930s. Although Borden, like all the former prime ministers, was an imperialist¹⁵, he spoke more strongly for Canada's national interest than others. While Laurier favoured a more centralized and institutionalized British Empire, Borden preferred to see Canada play an active role in the world community, standing more on its own in the conduct of external relations. For example, with regard to the defense of the British Empire, he thought that if Canada were to contribute to it, its voice must be reflected in the policy formation of the Empire.¹⁶ Here, one can see the seeds of the idea of Canada's functional principle beginning to sprout which would later assert Canada's national interests in the spheres where Canada has a vital concern and capacity to contribute.

The increased complexity of interdependent external relations during the Borden administration increased Canada's sense of national identity and awareness of the need for national autonomy.¹⁷ It is also worth noting that as Canada sought an increased degree of national autonomy, the need for international cooperation was also recognized. Borden, who

was a stronger advocate of Canada's national autonomy than any former prime minister, also supported what is called the "linch-pin" theory, the idea that defined Canada's role as the key to friendly relations between Britain and the United States. In 1911 Borden stated that "Canada's voice and influence should always be for harmony and not for discord between our Empire and the great Republic and I believe that she will always be a bond of abiding friendship between them."¹⁸

It was during the Borden administration that the Canadian Department of External Affairs, originally established in 1909, started to become an active bureaucracy. At first the Department was seen as a vehicle for administering external relations expediently and efficiently, rather than an embodiment of Canada's national will to play a special and significant role in world politics.¹⁹ With the introduction of a new Department of External Affairs Act in 1912, the process and the character of foreign policy making in Canada was changed. This new Act, which reduced the control over foreign policy of the Secretary of State of Canada, a role which used to be performed by Prime Ministers, allowed more room for the personnel of the Canadian External Affairs Department to conduct an active foreign policy, especially for the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, who would have close contact with and a direct voice to the Prime Minister.²⁰ Thus, the new Act provided Canada

with greater flexibility in asserting its interests externally and facilitated the transformation of Canada's external relations from one of colonial state to one of increased external autonomy.

One of the most influential Canadian officials in the development of Canada's external relations throughout the 1910s, 1920s, and 1930s was Loring Cheney Christie, who was appointed by Borden as a Legal Advisor to the Department of External Affairs in April of 1913.²¹ Christie, a well-educated, theoretically-minded official, soon became a confidential assistant of Borden in external affairs.²² He wrote numerous letters, memoranda, and speeches eloquently for the Canadian officials that he served. Especially under the administration of Arthur Meighen, who proved to be preoccupied with domestic politics, taking little interest in external affairs, most of the important foreign policy decision-making was left to Christie.²³

Christie shared similar ideas on external policy with Borden²⁴; he was both a nationalist and an imperialist. What concerned Christie during the Borden era was, therefore, the enhancement of Canada's national interest as well as the maintenance of harmonious external relations within the Empire and with the United States. For the enhancement of the national interest, Christie strongly argued for Canada's domestic unity and for autonomy in foreign policy decision-making. He believed Canada should become an independent nation with a status equal to that of Britain or any other

sovereign nation. In a memorandum of December, 1913, in which he outlined his basic view of Canada's position in world politics, he suggested that "the Canadian people must sooner or later assume a control over foreign policy, that is, over the issues of peace and war, no less effective than that now exercised by the people of Britain or by the U.S.A."²⁵ With regard to relationships within international society, Christie considered the preservation of peaceful, friendly relations with Britain and with the United States as essential to the security of Canada. Like Borden, he recognized Canada's position as an "interpreter and reconciler"²⁶ between the Britain and the United States.

The First World War had a strong impact on Canada's outlook on its external relations. While imperialism had been synonymous with Canadian nationalism since Confederation, imperialism increasingly became seen as an impediment to Canada's control over its own diplomacy. Canadians started to express their nationalism in the form of distrust toward European power politics, identifying Canada as a nation of North America rather than a nation based on the Imperial ties. Canada lost nearly one percent of its population in the war. Despite this significant contribution to the war efforts, its voice was not reflected as much as Canada wished during the war-time Imperial decision-making. Having suffered great losses both in terms of human and financial resources, Canada

started to show increasing reluctance toward involvement in European affairs.²⁷ Further encouraged by the traditional "splendid isolation" of the United States, distrust toward European politics increased Canadian nationalism and lessened imperial sympathies.

There were some domestic factors that encouraged this tendency as well. First, Imperial ties meant a dual loyalty to Canada and to the Empire; the antipathy of Quebec toward the British Empire caused difficulties. The desire to avoid a repeat of the Conscription crisis during World War I created added pressure to avoid further entanglements in Empire conflicts between English and French speaking Canadians, which had long been a serious problem. Moreover, when Arthur Meighen took office on July 10, 1920, Canada was faced with numerous domestic problems. The unpromising prospects of Meighen's Unionist party, the nationalization of the railroad, and other problems made Canada concentrate on the "cultivation of its own garden."²⁸

The election of 1921 reflected the attitudinal change toward isolationism. Arthur Meighen, who was an advocate of the compatibility between the unification of foreign policy under the British Empire and Canada's complete national autonomy, lost the 1921 election. Mackenzie King, a strong advocate of a Canadian nationalism which rejected strong Imperial ties, took office.²⁹ Canadian nationalists of this period demanded the full independence of Canadian foreign policy from Britain, including autonomy in security matters.

In the absence of any major international crisis in the early 1920s, the external problem that remained to be solved was the clarification of Canada's status and relations in the new Commonwealth, especially with regard to whether Canada's military contribution to the Commonwealth should be maintained after the war.

The 1920s saw a series of Imperial Conferences where Canadian policy-makers attempted to increase Canada's autonomy in its Imperial relations. These efforts of Canadian officials were eventually to lead to the enactment of the 1931 Statute of Westminster.

The Imperial Conference in 1921 provided the first public appearance of Canada's "functional" idea³⁰, although it was not until King's era that it was elevated to a "principle." The four important subjects to be discussed at the Conference were: 1) the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance; 2) naval policy; 3) imperial policy; and 4) the agenda for the constitutional conference.³¹ The question of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which would expire on July 13, 1921, was the most urgent and important topic on the agenda. It was also on this question that Canada's "functional" idea was first advocated by Prime Minister Arthur Meighen, who was strongly influenced by Loring Christie.

Considering the possible renewal of the Alliance as harmful to the relationship between Britain and the United States, Christie had argued prior to the conference that "the

abandonment of the alliance was vital to the maintenance of sound Anglo-American and Canadian-American relations."³²

Meighen wrote to Lloyd George in a message based on a

Christie's memoranda:

We feel that every possible effort should be made to find some alternative policy to that of renewal. Admitted that the Alliance has been useful in the past, it nevertheless seems true that the conditions have been so altered that the old motives no longer hold, while the objections have greatly increased. It is unnecessary to elaborate those points at the moment, but I would emphasize the need of promoting good relations with the United States. In view of her tendency towards abandonment of attitude of isolation generally, her traditional special interest in China which is as great as ours, and of the increasing prominence of the Pacific as a scene of action, there is danger that a special confidential relationship concerning that region between ourselves and Japan to which she was not a party would come to be regarded as an unfriendly exclusion and as a barrier to an English speaking concord.³³

Britain, however, was strongly inclined to the renewal of the Alliance. Disturbed by this British attitude, Christie wrote in another memorandum "... in matters of high policy respecting North America the voice of Canada should be predominant as far as the British Empire is concerned."³⁴

Christie's idea was conveyed in a somewhat moderated way by Meighen's speech at the Conference in June.

During the discussions on coordination of imperial policy, Meighen argued that the Dominions' views must be reflected more in the decision-making of the Empire. He made three requests. First, regular consultation in the matter of foreign policy must be held between Britain, the Dominions, and India. Second, the opinions of the Dominion and Indian

governments must be taken more into consideration by the Ministry which advised the King. Third and most importantly, that "in spheres in which any Dominion is particularly concerned the view of that Dominion must be given a weight commensurate with the importance of the decision to that Dominion." With regard to the third point, Meighen added that "speaking for Canada, I make this observation with particular reference to our relations with the United States."³⁵

The third point was significant in that it not only argued for Canada's increased diplomatic autonomy in general but also argued for particular influence within particular "spheres." At this point that meant on North American issues, where Canada had a particular interest and therefore should be given special weight in making decisions. This was the first time that the idea of "issue separation" appeared, an idea which would later be advocated as "functional separation" in the 1940s. Along with the idea of issue separation is the consideration given to difference in "weight" with which a state's voice is reflected in the international decision-making according to the nature of the issue. In other words, since the various issues of international relations can be put into a hierarchy according to the importance of each issue to the state, different issues assume a different power configuration of international relations.

The consideration of "weight" in different spheres of international politics was added to the discussion concerning equality in the status of the Dominions of the

British Empire at Imperial Conferences through the 1920s. It became a question of how to "balance" the equality of status and the difference in the weight that the voice of each Dominion should be given according to the type of issues that were dealt with. The question on the "balance" between equality and concentration of authority was also to become a central question during the discussions on the establishment of the United Nations in San Francisco.

Meighen's points at the Imperial Conference in 1921 were carried on to the Imperial Conference in 1926, which became another major step for Canada's diplomatic independence. Imperial relations were the most important subject of discussion at the Conference. At the first meeting of the committee on inter-Imperial relations, held on October 27, Lord Balfour tabled a report, announcing an agreement to award the Dominions sovereignty in international affairs. Referring to the situation of the British Empire, in which "co-existence" and "unity" of autonomous Dominions must be maintained, Balfour stated that the equality of status of the Dominions was the "essential foundation of the Imperial fabric."³⁶ The Dominions are

autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status and in no way subordinate to one another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.³⁷

However, he also added that:

this equality of status is combined at present... with differences of function. ...The principles determining the general direction of Foreign Affairs may be, and ought to be, the product of consultation... But there are always moments... when decisions... must be rapid, and when consultations, if they involve delay, are a danger rather than a strength. If this be so, it must be on one of the seven self-governing communities that the greatest weight of responsibility must be thrown; and so long as the centre of difficulty is Europe,...it seems impossible to ask any other portion of the Empire to perform the major duties which now devolve upon Great Britain.³⁸

By decisions which "must be rapid," Balfour meant the issue of war and peace. Although equality of status among states in the British Commonwealth and full diplomatic autonomy were assured by the Balfour Report, it implied that only Great Britain should be responsible for security issues. Canadian officials considered this exclusion from consultations in this vital and most fundamental issue of international politics to be inconsistent with the theoretical equality of status that was to be established.³⁹

By the Statute of Westminster, which assured the right of the Dominion Parliament to exercise its power to make laws concerning diplomatic matters, Canada's de jure external sovereignty was finally achieved. British Government no longer had the power to make laws for Canada; nor did it any longer have the power of disallowance or reservation. Despite the significance of the Statute of Westminster, however, arguments for de facto autonomy and increased share of voice in the Commonwealth⁴⁰ decision-making continued to arise throughout the 1930s. Loring Christie, who had left External Affairs in 1923 when his imperialist views had conflicted with

Mackenzie King's nationalism, returned in 1935 to serve External Affairs as a Counsellor of the Department. When he returned, he had discarded his imperialist sympathies, but the reason for this shift is still a mystery.⁴¹ He shared isolationist sentiments with O.D.Skelton, the influential Undersecretary of State for the Department of External Affairs, and Prime Minister Mackenzie King. He strongly argued for Canada's independent, responsible role in the world even in the sphere of war and peace.⁴²

The era from Borden to Mackenzie King saw the evolution of the dominant idea about Canadian foreign policy.⁴³ Canada, which used to identify itself by strong imperial ties, started to identify itself by the rejection of those ties. Canada's functional idea was born out of this process. While arguing for more voice in the decision-making in the Commonwealth, Canada proposed a sphere(or function)-based concept of one's contribution to international relations.

Development of the Functional Idea into a Principle:

Discussions on the Joint War Effort and on the United Nations

It is widely perceived that after Canada entered World War II, it was committed to active involvement in world politics. Although this shift in Canadian attitudes toward international politics from the inter-war "isolationism" to

"internationalism" is often contrasted in an exaggerated way, the change simply reflected the change in international environment. Canada's inward-looking attitude and avoidance of commitments in world affairs owed much to the absence of major international events in the inter-war period. Moreover, Canadian "isolationism" was not "isolationism" in the sense of one of the general foreign policy orientations⁴⁴, a withdrawal from all or most of external involvements. Canada never adopted a policy to close the nation entirely from other countries. Canada's "isolationism" simply meant an avoidance of commitments, especially toward European affairs, in which Britain was a part, and therefore, meant an antipathy toward imperial policies. Canadian "isolationism," if this is the right word to use, was one expression of the identity of an emerging nation.

After Canada achieved full, de jure independence from Britain in 1931, its external relations, particularly relations outside the framework of the British Commonwealth, became complex and important. Canada's active involvement in international affairs, which came to be characterized as "internationalism," reflected this reality as well as Canada's national interest to increase its voice in international politics which accords with its national capability. It was under these circumstances that Canada embarked on the search for its national role in the whole gamut of international relations for the first time in its diplomatic history.

Some Canadian officials such as Hume Wrong and

Lester Pearson were in the 1930s becoming anxious to leave behind the inter-war "isolationism" as well as the colonial mentality, which Canada still did not seem entirely to have overcome. They hoped to have other countries, especially the United States, recognize Canada as an independent nation whose foreign policy was no longer defined by the Commonwealth.⁴⁵ In contrast, others, especially the "old practitioners"⁴⁶ who had been involved in external affairs in the 1920s and 1930s, such as O.D. Skelton and Loring Christie, were observing the matter more coolly.

In 1941 there was a major change in the players of Canadian foreign policy: two major figures died; Skelton, on January 28, and Christie, on April 8. This was what C.P. Stacy calls "the end of an era."⁴⁷ After the death of these two important figures, isolationist attitudes were more openly criticized by those officials who were pressing for greater involvement and a larger share of responsibility in international politics for Canada. Around this time, Mackenzie King also largely discarded his "isolationist" leanings.

Canada's "internationalism," which was later developed and demonstrated by such officials as Louis St. Laurent and Lester Pearson during the intensified Cold War, was characterized by its emphasis on the importance of international institutions for solving international conflicts. As a result of searching for a special role,

Canada came to define itself as a "middlepower"⁴⁸, "a concept which was merged in part into Canada's functional idea. The product was the "functional principle."

The idea of responsibilities and influence depending on a particular sphere of world politics was introduced by Christie and publicly stated by Meighen. If the Canadian functional idea owes its fundamental concepts to Loring Christie, then, it was Hume Wrong who developed the idea into a "principle." It seems appropriate to assume that he coined the term "functional principle."⁴⁹ In the coordination of the war effort among Allied powers and in the designing of the new post-war world order, Canada was faced with difficulties gaining recognition as an important and independent nation. Canada's great concern with its identity and status among the Allied powers can be found abundantly in the memoranda and letters of its officials during the war.⁵⁰ Hume Wrong, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, was a principal advocate of greater Canadian responsibility in international politics, and his support led to the further development of the functional idea.

Wrong was concerned with the special position that Canada occupied among the Allied powers⁵¹ Canada was unique in the degree to which its foreign policy was defined by its relationship with Britain and with the United States. Canada, though only an emerging power, was nevertheless making

significant contributions to the Allied war effort.

Realistically assessing Canada's capability and balancing its own interests with the demands of its relationship with Britain and the United States, Wrong outlined in a memorandum of January 20, 1942, several possible ways for Canada to seek representation on various war boards such as the Joint Shipping Board, the Raw Materials Committee, the Joint Allocation boards, and the Joint Planning Board:

How far... is Canada entitled to go in pressing a claim to participate in inter-Allied bodies which are designed to co-ordinate the war effort?... The principle, I think, is that each member of the grand alliance should have a voice in the conduct of the war proportionate to its contribution to the general war effort. A subsidiary principle is that the influence of the various countries should be greatest in connection with those matters with which they are most directly concerned.^{5 2}

Meighen's statement at the Imperial Conference in 1921 had considered the "concerns" of the state in particular spheres of world politics as the qualification for the state to assume a greater role and responsibility. Wrong added the criteria of the "capability" of a state to contribute to international society to the Christie-Meighen notion of the functional idea and elevated it to the major qualification. In other words, Canada's functional idea, by this time, came to be based on both "capability" and "concerns," with the former of primary importance.

The incorporation of the concept of "capability" was in part the result of an increase in Canada's national power.^{5 3} Since the Canadian contribution to the war was quite significant but it tended to be overlooked in the making of

key decisions, Canadian officials naturally thought that it deserved a bigger share of responsibility in various war boards for joint cooperation than it had had internationally before the war. The increase in national power also promoted the willingness of Canadian officials to become more involved in world politics. It also increased the pressure placed on Canadian representatives to satisfy Parliament and the public that their wartime sacrifices could be justified by the argument that the country was being allowed its fair share in directing the course of the new world order.⁵⁴ It was in this context of keen awareness of its national capability that Canada developed the concept of "middlepower."

The concept of "middlepower" had been gradually forming in the minds of Canadian officials since the time Canada was seeking due representation on war boards⁵⁵, and developed rapidly during discussions on the post-war international organization especially on the membership of United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA). The concept assigned to Canada a special place in the international hierarchy, a place for those neither great powers nor small powers, "thereby fine-tuning the taxonomy"⁵⁶ and making the distribution of authority more fair. As the Prime Minister put it,

The United Nations cannot in our view be merely divided into one group of great powers exercising responsibility on behalf of them all for the political and military settlement, and another group composed of all the rest who are excluded from responsibility, no matter how great their contribution may be nor how profound their interest in the questions to be settle ends.⁵⁷

Such a system would be a denial of the democratic principle. It would also be unreal, for it is not always the largest powers that have the greatest contribution to make to the work of these bodies, or the greatest stake in their success. In the opinion of the Canadian Government representation of countries on international bodies should be determined on a functional basis whenever functional criteria can be applied.⁵⁸

Thus, by the incorporation of the concept of "capability," which defined Canada's status as a "middlepower," the functional idea became a principle of "gradation of authority."⁵⁹ Each member of an organization must be entitled to some authoritative control in spheres in which the state has capability to contribute.⁶⁰ Wrong chose the functional principle among other alternative ideas of foreign policy as the most suitable one for Canada to pursue.⁶¹

Canada emphasized the capability to make contributions to international politics as the most important qualification of responsibility and influence. The functional principle was advocated in order: 1) to ensure a place for non-great powers, Canada included, as against great powers, and 2) to distinguish Canada from other smaller states as a middlepower entitled to a bigger role than other smaller states. It was not without struggles and difficulties, however, that Canada tried to find its place. In fact, the dilemma that Canada had traditionally faced since 1867 loomed larger as Canada engaged in the discussions on the War Board and on the post-war world order---that is, the dilemma between its desire to be recognized as a sovereign nation and the

recognition of that unfavorable reality of world politics, that influence is concentrated among the great powers.

Canada argued that because of its contribution to the provision of munitions, it deserved membership on the War Boards, and that, as a large producer of food, it deserved a seat on UNRRA.⁶² Canada failed, however, in gaining representation either on major war boards or on UNRRA. Throughout the turbulent years of discussions on these memberships, Canada was faced with the reality of the old "big power complex" of world politics, which made unlikely acceptance of a new distribution of power of international relations of the sort Canada had in mind. The atmosphere of international conferences was negative about recognizing Canada's contribution and its claims for greater responsibility. Canadian officials often complained that they were "often included in the British Empire as an entity; or alternatively, in 'the Dominions' collectively; or, ... as part of the 'North America area'."⁶³

The functional principle was tried and tested again during the discussions on the drafting of the United Nations Charter. When discussions on a new world organization began among the great powers, Canadian officials were determined to place their country in a responsible position in the international organization, which they considered as the key instrument of cooperation and for the adjustment of

differences and the achievement of common purposes among states. Although they recognized the importance of economic and social issues, security matters remained their primary concern. Above all, Canada was concerned with the set-up of the Security Council and with recognition of a place for itself. These preoccupations led to Canada's involvement in drafting the Charter on such well-known questions regarding the Security Council as the veto, the non-permanent membership question, and regionalism.

The Moscow Declaration had been issued on November 1, 1943, supporting a general international organization. The Department of External Affairs had subsequently started sorting out proposals for the new international organization. Since one of the major Canadian concerns was representation on the Security Council, Canada had exchanged its views with Britain, asserting prior to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944 its right to be represented in the Security Council.⁶⁴ The Dumbarton Oaks draft proposal, however, was a disappointment for Canada, since the new organization was defined as more restricted in the responsibilities and in the scope given to smaller powers than Canada had expected.⁶⁵ At this stage, neither Britain nor the United States gave Canada any support for the idea that Canada should be represented as a non-permanent member of the Security Council. They were more concerned with the role of and relations among great powers themselves, particularly how to deal with the Soviet Union.⁶⁶

By the efforts of able Canadian officials at the San Francisco Conference in 1945, the draft Charter was amended more in favour of Canada than it had been before, although the basis remained what the great powers wished it to be. What concerned Canada most was the question of the relationship between "power and responsibility." Canada recognized that the great powers should have the key role in the maintenance of peace and security. However, while acknowledging their special roles, Canada was against a Security Council possessing great authority to enforce settlements of disputes and especially to require all member states to assist in enforcement. For this reason, Canada was not enthusiastic about the great powers' right of the veto. Canada believed smaller countries should not feel that decisions would be made arbitrarily by great powers; the smaller countries which made contributions to world security and prosperity should be entitled at least to argue their cases. At the same time Canada expected to be in a better position than other lesser powers to prevent the domination by the great powers.⁶⁷ Canada's objection to the veto failed, because a strong, police-like function was expected for the Security role of the new organization.⁶⁸

On the question of regionalism, Canadian policy-makers believed that regionalism would yield another opportunity for great powers to dominate the world, each ruling its own particular sphere of influence.⁶⁹ They were

particularly concerned with the United States playing too dominant a role in the Western Hemisphere. Regionalism was also thought to be dangerous because different regions might form alliances against others.⁷⁰ The possibility of region-based cooperation and regional distribution of power was nonetheless incorporated in many Articles of the Charter, despite Canada's objection.

Perhaps where Canada was most successful was on the question of the role of non-permanent members of the Security Council, which is reflected in Article 23.⁷¹ Known as the "Canadian clause," Article 23 provided that the Security Council would be consist of eleven members of the United Nations, including six non-permanent members which are elected by the General Assembly every two years. With regard to the qualification for the non-permanent membership, it stated that:

due regard [is] specially paid, in the first instance, to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.⁷²

In other words, the Article states that non-permanent members will be elected based on both 1) the member's capability and 2) geographical distribution. Here, the idea contained in the Canadian functional principle which recognized the capability of a country to make significant contribution to maintenance of international peace and war as the major qualification is incorporated in the Charter. However, although Canada had

insisted that "geographical distribution" should be subordinate to the "degree of contribution" of a country,⁷³ these two qualifications ended up being given equal weight. Canada, in fact, failed to obtain a seat as a non-permanent member of the Council due to the geographical distribution. Moreover, looking back on more than forty years of the United Nations' experience, the geographical distribution has more often been in practice the criterion for the non-permanent membership than "capability."

It is difficult to judge how successful the functional principle was in the assertion of Canada's right to play a significant role. When we look at what came out explicitly in the Charter, Canada's contribution must be evaluated as minor. It was rather in the process through which the Charter was formulated that Canada demonstrated its traditional "quietly constructive" diplomatic style and developed a good reputation with other states. While regarding the participation of great powers and the preservation of their proper role as a sine qua non of the United Nations, a lesson learned from the experience of the League⁷⁴, Canada cooperated with other middle and small powers in enhancing their role and preventing dominance by the great powers. In other words, Canada had a good sense of the need for balance between centralization and decentralization of authority, which is the essential for the maintenance and stability of any organization.

The functional principle, however, failed to obtain for Canada the status which Canada desired and deserved to have. Prior to the beginning of the discussions in San Francisco, the functional principle, along with the concept of "middlepower," provided Canada with a justification for asserting an increased status in international politics. Nonetheless, assertion of the functional principle gave way to realism in the course of discussions in San Francisco, since Canada had to adjust its ideals to the political reality of international power structure and the United Nations. Although "internationalism," often considered to characterize Canadian policies in this era, tends to connote an idealistic policy orientation, Canadian foreign policy, for the most part, demonstrated at San Francisco a realistic side of moderation, prudence, and discretion. What came out as a Charter was the product of accommodation between Canada's national interest and that of others.

CHAPTER 3

Analysis---The Functional Principle and Functionalism

The last chapter historically traced the origin and evolution of the functional principle. This section will analyze and discuss the nature of the principle more concretely, contrasting it to Mitrany's theory. Since these two are often confused, I will clarify the ambiguities that exist between the functional principle and Mitrany's functionalism in the attempt to better understand the nature of the functional principle. My central argument is that the functional principle must be distinguished from Mitrany's functionalism, and that it reflected Canada's national interest to maintain its identity and to increase its status in international relations. The Canadian foreign policy can be best understood as the product of the accommodation between Canada's interest and the systemic constraints of the international society which require Canada to cooperate with other states.

David Mitrany developed the functional theory of international cooperation in his 1943 Working Peace System. In many writings on Canadian foreign policy, it has been noted that Canada borrowed Mitrany's ideas in the process of seeking its identity and its role in the world.⁷⁵

The functional principle and functionalism, however, must be distinguished as two separate ideas stemming from

different views of international relations and directed at different objectives. The clarification of the confusion between the two ideas will be helpful in understanding the peculiar features of the functional principle. Two questions are to be asked for this purpose. 1) What are the key premises of functionalism as a theory of international collaboration in the study of international relations? 2) What is the relationship, if any, between the Canadian functional principle and Mitrany's functionalism?

The Theory of Functionalism

The origin of functionalism can be traced back to long before the Second World War, to the functional activities of international institutions of the nineteenth century.⁷⁶ It is, according to Anglin, a notion "as old as power politics itself."⁷⁷ However, it was after the Second World War that it appeared as a new approach toward international cooperation.

Functionalism, which was developed by Mitrany, poses several premises about the causes of war. The first premise concerns the material conditions of mankind, and posits that since war is a disease caused by the inadequacy of the economic and social circumstances of mankind. Cooperation in economic and social spheres is thus an important prerequisite for the resolution of political conflict and for the prevention of war.⁷⁸ Mitrany's ideas on peace were influenced by among others the Marxian emphasis on the importance of

material conditions in determining the political conditions of mankind.⁷⁹

Second, Mitrany attributes the causes of war to the institutional deficiency of the states system.⁸⁰ The state is increasingly proving to be inappropriate in dealing effectively with technical problems, which only international organizations and their special agencies can solve. Inis Claude summarizes Mitrany's idea on the state-system as follows:

The state system imposes an arbitrary and rigid pattern of vertical divisions upon global society, disrupting the organic unity of the whole, and carving the world into segments whose separateness is jealously guarded by sovereignties which are neither able to solve the fundamental problems nor willing to permit them to be solved by other authorities.⁸¹

Therefore, more authority should be given to international organizations and their special agencies to deal with economic and social problems, which the individual states are no longer capable of solving in today's world. By offering a forum for collaboration on technical issues, the international institutions would be able eventually to take over the functions that nation states used to perform.⁸²

Third, Mitrany attributes the causes of war to the "subjective conditions of mankind."⁸³ In other words, Mitrany shares the idea contained in the UNESCO Charter: war is created in the minds of men, in their habits of thought, attitudes, emotions, etc. While the state system inhibits the development of collaborative behavior among states by fostering patriotism and encouraging conflict of interests,

functional organizations are likely to offer opportunities to develop habits of cooperation, since they encourage pursuit of commonality of interests in economic and social spheres.⁸⁴ An increased number of supra-national organizations and their activities would shift the loyalties of people from their nation-states to international organizations, and eventually to a world government.

These premises on the causes of war lead to two basic hypotheses on international collaboration: "separability" and "transferability."⁸⁵ The separability hypothesis separates power from welfare, and the political (i.e., the tasks of politicians) from the technical (i.e., the tasks of experts). Since war can be attributed to the economic and social conditions of mankind, functionalism is consequently concerned with welfare, justice, and quality of life rather than with the direct prevention of war by protecting states' security.⁸⁶

The transferability hypothesis is an important corollary of the separability hypothesis. Mitrany sees the possibility of constructive peace in "national coactivity" rather than "national coexistence."⁸⁷ He suggests that lessons that have been learned at the economic and technical levels of coactivity are fungible to political levels because "fundamental loyalties will be increasingly shared by the state and the agencies of the world community."⁸⁸ The logical steps of fungibility are: first, developing a commonality of

technical purposes among states; second, establishing functional agencies and their coordination; third, organizing universal planning agencies; and ultimately, as the end product, a world federation.⁸⁹

The Relationship between the Functional Principle and Functionalism

The relationship between the Canadian functional principle and functionalism as a theory of international relations is not as clear as it is widely perceived to be, although several commonalities exist between the two. Mitrany emphasized the importance of universal international organizations, where each and every country can play a responsible role. Canada also considered them as crucial in its active participation in international politics. Moreover, Mitrany advocated functional cooperation based on his distrust of regional cooperation.⁹⁰ Similarly, in designing international organizations, Canada preferred "universalism" to "regionalism."

It is more appropriate to assume, however, that the commonalities between the functional principle and functionalism were what Canada "happened" to share with Mitrany's theory rather than what Canada directly borrowed from Mitrany's theory. Canada's motivations and objectives were based on its self-interest as an emerging nation. Canada's support for universalism, for example, arose from its

objection to regionalism. Canada feared that if regionalism became a principle of international organizations, the maximization of its interest would be hampered by Britain, which would exercise its influence as the mother country of the Commonwealth, or by the United States as a regional leader in the Western Hemisphere. Similarly, the Canadian belief in international cooperation through international organizations reflected Canada's desire to enhance its status in the world by utilizing their forum.

It is difficult to determine how much Canadian officials were influenced by Mitrany's functionalism. It is possible that they were at least aware of it, and that because of some similarities that the Canadian functional principle and Mitrany's functionalism happened to share, the two ideas were merged. Discussing what he sees as the fusion of the functional principle and functionalism, Anthony Miller suggests that "in 1945, two functionalist traditions, [which were] analytically distinct, coexisted in Canada. They subsequently merged..."⁹¹ Those two functional traditions were: "functional representation" which connotes Canada's interest to play a bigger role in the world in competition with others; and "functionalism," which is best represented by Mitrany and shows the cooperative, disinterested nature of the functional principle.⁹²

As early as 1916, Leonard Woolf had argued for universalization of the functional principle of representation

by noting the success of the Universal Postal Union as an example.⁹³ Mitrany's functionalism first appeared in 1933 with the publication of Progress of International Government.⁹⁴ His second book, A Working Peace System, was published in 1943.⁹⁵ Hume Wrong, a major exponent of the functional principle in the 1940s, mentions Mitrany's theory in the memorandum of November 3, 1943:

Two meanings can be given to functional international organization. The meaning of the term as used hitherto by us has been that effective international authority in a given matter ought to be concentrated in bodies in which the countries mainly concerned are represented... There is another meaning given to the term, used especially by Professor Mitrany in a study recently issued by Chatham House. He argues that the world should be bound together by a large number of different international institutions organized to deal separately with the many functions requiring international cooperation. The two meanings overlap and are not essentially inconsistent but the variation in use of the term should be borne in mind.⁹⁶

Mitrany's ideas on international collaboration appeared about the same time that the traditional theme of Canadian foreign policy was developed into a principle, adopting more activist and internationalist nuances. However, this highly voluntary, internationalist feature of Canada's functional idea was in part the product of the international context of this particular era, when active internationalism was increasingly accepted as the direction of Canadian foreign policy. At that point, Canada was determined to break with the "low dishonest decade"⁹⁷ and was to become the fourth largest industrial power in the free world with the fourth

largest naval and air force.⁹⁸

We have seen in the historical survey that even the idea which took a particular form as "the functional principle" in the 1940s was not altogether idealistic. Throughout the discussions on a new post-war world order, the continuing theme was to make more consistent the state's capability and its deserved status. In this sense, if we use Miller's terms, "functional representation" reflects the major theme of Canadian foreign policy much more accurately than disinterested "functionalism."

Although Canadian foreign policy showed more internationalist attitudes in the 1940s than at any other time in the history of Canadian foreign policy, Mitrany's functionalism alone is incapable of explaining Canada's continuing external behavior. Those who observe the functional principle exclusively in light of its idealistic aspect tend to conclude that the functionalist idea survived only in a brief period of the history of Canadian foreign policy, and disappeared from Canadian thinking after the 1940s.⁹⁹ Throughout history, Canada's functional idea, however, has possessed a distinct element of realism. While dominant Canadian ideas about foreign policy have changed from imperialism to isolationism, and from isolationism to internationalism, the dominant theme has remained the same: the maximization of national interest balanced by a realistic assessment of the state's own power, which has enabled the principle to remain a flexible concept that continues to be

part of the philosophy and influence the minds of Canadian policy-makers.

Further, even though there is evidence that some External Affairs officials were aware of Mitrany's theory of collaboration, as is shown in the memorandum of Wrong, it is doubtful if they understood the core part of David Mitrany's concept and saw it as their major goal. Rather they developed some ideas related to Mitrany's that would rationalize the enhancement of Canada's status in international society. What appealed to Canada most in Mitrany's idea was probably the implied sympathy with smaller states that such action would build a better world. Recognizing the inevitable importance of the participation and authority of great powers, Mitrany argued that authority must be used for the common good of international society, so that ultimately the smaller and weaker states will benefit.¹⁰⁰ While cooperating with other smaller states, however, Canada distinguished itself from small powers and developed a concept that would better maximize its interest: that of middlepower.

The fundamental differences between the functional principle and functionalism are summarized in three points:

The first concerns the concept of "hierarchical functional differentiation." Although Canada shared the idea of issue-oriented contribution to the international society with Mitrany's functionalism, the notion of hierarchy of power distribution was added and stressed in the Canadian functional

principle. While the nature of Mitrany's functionalism was based on horizontal differentiation of functions, Canada emphasized that the functional differentiation was determined by the difference in national capability. In other words, different hierarchies must be formed according to the particular distribution of capability on each issue in order for organizations to operate effectively. Mitrany's functionalism was functional in that cooperation in different functions, especially economic and social, could be transferred to other functions by increasing common interests among states and by shifting loyalties toward a world government. The functional principle was functional in that power hierarchy differed from function to function.

Although egalitarian cooperation in the forum of international organizations is desirable for achieving a peaceful and just world order, a certain degree of concentration of authority is required if such organizations are to have control over the behavior of states. Excessive stress on the equality of status among states is too rigid to deal with different circumstances, especially in security matters, where efficient decision-making is often required. The functional principle reduced the dilemma between decentralization(or equalization) and centralization by incorporating a concept of hierarchy of authority into the ideas of horizontal functional differentiation.

Douglas Anglin, calling the functional principle "the single most important Canadian contribution to the theory

and practice of international organization"¹⁰¹, suggests that the functional principle can be distilled into two core ideas: 1) "the Great Powers are entitled to take the lead in international affairs, but not to dominate them."; 2) "control should be shared with such other powers but only such other powers as are able and willing to make a definite contribution to the particular object in view."¹⁰²

Canada shared the interests of smaller states, which feared international organizations being exclusively centred around the great powers. It also argued, as other smaller states did, that each country should be able to play a significant role according to its capability and resources. While being sympathetic to smaller powers, Canada was not willing to be put into the category of small states. In Canadian thinking, the hierarchy of authority had to be gradual and states should not be categorized only into "big powers" and "small powers." Canada's power was not enough to be called a great power. Canada found a place for itself in the concept of "middlepower," which was the product of a realistic assessment of its capacity and of its national interest.

Many Canadian officials have recognized the importance of the realistic assessment of its power. Lester Pearson, who is considered to be the epitome of Canadian "internationalism," was a realist in this sense. Sceptical about the egalitarian status of countries and recognizing the critical importance of the gradation of authority, he stated:

A lot of nonsense is being talked nowadays about sovereign equality. It is one of those phrases, the facile and unthinking acceptance and use of which can be almost as great a handicap to international cooperation as the arbitrary concentration of power in the hands of a few states at the expense of the rest.¹⁰³

In sum, according to the Canadian functional principle, functions are differentiated by different capabilities of states. There are certain functions for which great powers must be responsible, there are functions that small powers can perform, and there are functions for middle powers as well.

Second, security issues continued to be the most important in the Canadian functional principle. The international cooperation that Mitrany's functionalism advocated focused exclusively on the economic and technical spheres. Since his idea was based on distrust of the state system, Mitrany disregarded any possibility of cooperation emerging from political spheres unless numerous networks of international collaboration developed from the economic and technical spheres so that it would be transferred to political one. Canada did voice its interest in international economic and social co-operation during the post-war planning period, especially in supporting strengthened roles for the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. For example, Mackenzie King noted that "[the functional principle] can be given wide application particularly in the case of international economic and technical organizations."¹⁰⁴ Prior

to the San Francisco conference in 1944, he stated:

[Real] security requires international action and organization in many fields---in social welfare, in trade, in technical progress, in transportation, and in economic development.¹⁰⁵

However, as Canada engaged in discussions on the post-war world order, the importance of economic and social matters was somewhat secondary while security issues loomed large as a basis for all spheres of world order. Without an atmosphere of international security, economic and social cooperation would be ineffective. Moreover, although Canada recognized the importance of economic and social cooperation in the United Nations system in making a more enduring contribution to peace in the long term¹⁰⁶, the short term maintenance of peace still required coordination in the political and security spheres.

In drafting the Charter, Canada concentrated its attention on security matters, especially on the foundation of the Security Council, since it became obvious that the importance of economic and social agencies would be recognized by all participants and included in the Charter. The concept of "middlepower" was developed about this time with particular concern about Canada's status in security matters. Thus, despite the recognition of the importance of economic and social cooperation,

[the] Canadian delegation was reluctant to abandon entirely the traditional tests of international power and significance. This was partly because the principal aspiration of the new organization remained the performance of politico-security, rather than functional

tasks, and for these the possession of military capabilities was still the ultimate prerequisite. As it happened, Canada's military assets in 1945, as measured by their contribution to the war, were very substantial, and hence were not a currency to be lightly devalued.¹⁰⁷

Thus, the reasoning of Christie throughout 1920s and 1930s remained effective in Canadian thinking: Canada must engage in the most crucial aspect of international politics; the problem of war and peace, if it was to assume sovereignty as an independent nation.¹⁰⁸

Third, there is an absence of the "transferability" hypothesis. Mitrany's functionalism aimed at the integration of the world through the transference of the lessons learned in the technical field into the political, which involved the transfer of sovereignty to international agencies that would possess autonomous tasks to perform the functions that had been performed by nation states.¹⁰⁹ Calling this century a "historical turning point," he stated:

what for our purpose is decisive is historically also without precedent... [Now] the whole of our world is enfolded in the new transformation... The inventions and discoveries have rendered traditional ideas of what politics is about almost as obsolete as astrology and alchemy...¹¹⁰

In contrast, the idea of any type of world federation is absent from Canada's functional principle, which was born out of the struggles to achieve de jure and de facto independence and increased status in the world as an emerging nation. Since how to remain an independent nation, whether from Britain or from the United States, remained the foremost

concern of Canadian foreign policy, the core element of national interest has been paramount and is the opposite of interdependence or integration. Hume Wrong, while he was sorting out the best policy to take for Canada's external affairs, was clear about the impossibility of any type of supra-national central government. For Canada, the state-system was a "fact of international life" which was not easy to overcome. After outlining several alternative policies for Canada in the memorandum of January 20, 1942, he wrote:

There is, of course, no such thing as a "Supreme" Council, since its supremacy would involve the surrender of sovereignty by the participating States.¹¹¹

Special Agencies of the United Nations would not lead to a world government but would substitute for it.

Canada

appreciated that it would be impossible, even if it were desirable, to centralize all international activities under one unitary organization. Consequently, she warmly approved of the establishment of specialized organization.¹¹²

The United Nations was for Canada a reflection of the world society, which was composed of independent nations pursuing their own interests while finding a minimum ground of cooperation. It was a forum in which it could enhance its interests, as well as a forum for collaboration among states.¹¹³ Canada tried to utilize the organizational framework of the United Nations to adjust its interests with those of others, the best example of which is the drafting of the United Nations Charter.

The enhancement of Canada's interest had to be achieved without sacrificing cooperation with other states. Canadian officials in the 1910s and 1920s tried to strengthen Canada's autonomy as an independent Dominion within the cooperative framework of the Commonwealth.¹¹⁴ Similarly, the functional principle, as it was developed through the 1930s and 1940s, was intended to strengthen Canada's position as a middlepower within the framework of international institutions. The central theme of Canadian foreign policy was the accommodation between the enhancement of national interest, that is, the preservation of its independence, and the need for international collaboration. Whatever changes different external contexts may bring, Canadian foreign policy can be seen as the product of this accommodation.

Since this balance between the enhancement of its interest and the need for cooperation differed from time to time, the functional principle became a flexible concept. Depending on the international context, the principle led Canada to show either more reluctance or more willingness to become involved in international activities.¹¹⁵ It could justify withdrawal from international politics, as in the 1930s, when isolationism was a manifestation of Canada's nationalism and when international cooperation was maintained with a minimum degree. Or, it could support active participation in international affairs as in the 1940s, when "international co-operation for peace [was] the most important

aspect of national policy."¹¹⁸

The wisdom of the Canadian functional principle can be called self-interested internationalism, that is, the functional principle allows the simultaneous pursuit of national interests and the spirit of internationalism. In the Canadian experience, the enhancement of national interest and collaboration with others are not mutually exclusive.

CHAPTER 4

Conclusion

This essay has examined the functional principle dealing with its development since Confederation in 1867. We have seen that the genesis of the functional idea paralleled Canada's gradual acquisition of external autonomy as a sovereign nation. In the process of achieving diplomatic independence, Canada has identified itself in several ways in terms of its relationship with Britain and with the United States.

In the early period after Confederation, Canada depended on Britain in handling diplomatic matters. Canada distinguished itself from its neighbour, the United States, which had become independent from Britain by revolution, by identifying itself in terms of the British tradition. The preference for "imperialism" was transformed after World War I into one for a certain "isolationism" as Canada came to perceive the Imperial ties as an impediment in achieving its complete external sovereignty. Non-involvement in European politics in the "isolationist" period was again one expression of Canadian identity. It was in this period of the 1920s and 1930s that Canada developed the idea of a function-based contribution to international relations for the first time, which at this point meant imperial relations.

By the 1940s, reflecting the increase of Canada's overall national power and the expansion of its external activities outside the Imperial framework, Canada began to demand a more significant role to play in the international arena. Although in the 1920s and the 1930s Canada had advocated the functional idea based on a country's concern in a particular sphere of international politics, increase in national power enabled Canada to assert its right to be given a responsible role in a sphere not only where it is concerned but also where it has the capability to make contributions. Merged with the concept of "middlepower," the functional idea was elevated into a principle in the 1940s.

The functional principle, which thus emerged out of the situational factors of international relations in which Canada was placed, is based on a different image of the world and aims at different objectives from those of Mitrany's functionalism. The fundamental differences can be found in that Canada did not focus exclusively on what Mitrany calls the "technical" sphere of international relations. For Canada the "political" sphere, where Mitrany did not see a possibility of cooperation among states, was the sphere where it focused its attention while finding room for its contribution. Canada continued to show its concern with security issues, directly related to the problem of war and peace. Therefore, Canada asserted the functional principle in security issues to assure Canada's special role as a middle

power. Further, since the state system was for Canada a fact of international life, the notion of world integration, which Mitrany regarded as the end product of functional cooperation, was absent from Canadian thinking. Analysed this way, we can conclude that the Canadian functional principle does not share the key assumptions that David Mitrany posed on the possibility of international cooperation. The functional principle was the reflection of Canada's national interest to seek and preserve its independence and maintain its identity rather than of a disinterested internationalism which aims at world government by voluntary cooperation among states.

One thing that must be noted about the nature of the functional principle is that although it was a reflection of Canada's interest, it did not lead to radical diplomatic conduct to change the existing power distribution, which is common to emerging powers. Canadian diplomacy has demonstrated relative success in balancing its interest by realistic assessment of its power and of the systemic constraints of the international system. As condensed in Lester Pearson's famous words "nationalism and internationalism are two sides of the same coin,"¹¹⁷ the accommodation of national interest with the furthering of international cooperation has been maintained in Canada's external behaviour. Although Canadian foreign policy has often been analysed as a series of independent eras in which a

particular politician offered a view on Canada's external role, balancing national interests and the need for international cooperation is one of the continuing characteristics that has remained. It is significant in today's world, where international politics can afford only peaceful transformation.

When one asks what allowed Canada such flexibility and pragmatism in balancing its interest with that of others in the global community, perhaps one must touch on Canada's domestic political process and its importance in the formation of the Canadian diplomatic style, a theme which has not been dealt with in this thesis. Discussing the "Political Culture of Canadian Foreign Policy"¹¹⁸, Denis Stairs has stated that:

the conduct of foreign policy can sometimes usefully be viewed not merely as the expression abroad of perceived interests of state, but as a manifestation of national political character... [Some] of the principles and practices of Canadian politics at home may also be evident in our behavior abroad.¹¹⁹

The most decisive domestic factor that has influenced Canada's diplomatic style is the pluralism of the society, which is more peacefully maintained in Canada than most other countries. Being the most decentralized country in the world¹²⁰, Canada is the country closest to peaceful international society in a miniature. From domestic experience, in which the preservation of distinct provincial interests and the maintenance of national unity had to be compatible, Canadian leaders understood well the need to balance political diversity with a certain degree of

cooperative consensus in international society. Pragmatism, rather than reliance on dogmatic ideology, moderation and compromise, the "respect for diversity and for its power as the engine of politics," and the avoidance of extremes--- the characteristics of the Canadian diplomatic style were learned from the domestic political process as well as the systemic necessities of international politics.¹²¹

Ensuring its independence and maintenance of its identity, the theme behind Canada's functional idea, remained after the Second World War as well. The questions of Canada's independence and identity after 1945 have been revolving around its relationship with the United States, as "interdependence" between the two countries has deepened. Just as the increased complexity of Canada's external relations resulted in its stronger sense of identity and demand for autonomy in its pre-war history, deepening relations with the United States have often led Canada to advocate policies which would articulate Canada's position. "The Third Option"¹²² in Trudeau's era encouraged Canada to pursue a policy to live "distinct from but in harmony with"¹²³ the United States. The recent Free Trade issue has become another opportunity for Canada to question its identity. The examination into the Canadian functional principle thus shows that its nature is based on one of the continuing aspects of Canadian foreign policy: maintenance of national autonomy.

N O T E S

¹ John W. Holmes, The Better Part of Valour: Essays on Canadian Diplomacy. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1970. 26-7; the same essay is also in King Gordon, Jr., ed., Canada's Role as a Middle Power. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1966. 27-8.

² For a discussion of Canada's interwar period, see James Eayrs, "A Low Dishonest Decade: Aspects of Canadian External Policy, 1931-1939," in H.L. Keenleyside, ed., The Growth of Canadian Politics in External Affairs. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1960. 59-80.

³ See, for example, Michael Tucker, Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues and Themes. Toronto: McGraw Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1980. 6-7.

⁴ Denis Stairs, "The Political Culture of Canadian Foreign Policy," Canadian Journal of Political Science. Vol.15. 1982. 671.

⁵ Canada: House of Common Debates. July 9, 1943. P.4558.

⁶ John B. Brebner, North Atlantic Triangle: the Interplay of Canada, the United States and Great Britain. New York: Columbia University Press, 1945.

⁷ "Overview: Canada and the Commonwealth," (Canadian Foreign Policy Series). Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, June, 1987.

⁸ See, for example, Robert Jackson, et.al., Politics in Canada: Culture, Institutions, Behaviour, and Public Policy. Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1986. 56-9.

⁹ See, for example, Charles P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Relations. Vol.1. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977. 1-16; Yuko Ohhara & Nobuya Bamba, Gaisetsu Kanada-shi [History of Canada]. Tokyo: Yuhikaku Sensho, 1984.

¹⁰ See, for example, Nobuya Bamba Kanada: Nijuisseiki no Kokka [Canada: a State of the 21st Century]. Tokyo: Chuokoron-sha. 1989. 138-40.

¹¹ Carl Berger, The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism, 1867-1914. Toronto, 1970. 259-60; cited in Stacey, op.cit., 1977. 52.

¹² Stacey, op.cit. 13.

¹³ Ibid., 99.

¹⁴ Ibid., 101.

¹⁵ Kim Richard Nossal, suggesting that "imperialism" was the dominant idea about Canadian foreign policy prior to the First World War, defines it as "an admixture of sentimental, economic and legal attachment to the British Empire that regarded the empire as a normative good, [which] suggested that Canada's interests in the international environment be defined in terms of its relationship with the Empire." See Kim Richard Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy. Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1985. 44-8.

¹⁶ Stacey, op.cit., 1977. 151. Emphasis added.

¹⁷ Similar ideas are noted by some statist theorists. See, for example, Peter Katzenstein, "International Relations and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States," International Organization. Vol.30, 1976; See also, Kal J. Holsti, Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982. iv-vi; 73-104.

¹⁸ Stacey, op.cit., 1977. 151.

¹⁹ Ibid., 117-23.

²⁰ Ibid., 166.

²¹ For the study of Loring Christie and his contribution to Canadian foreign policy, see Robert Bothwell, "Loring Christie: The Failure of Bureaucratic Imperialism," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1972)

²² Stacey, op.cit., 1977. 166-7.

²³ Ibid., 320-1.

²⁴ Ibid., 167.

²⁵ Ibid., 167.

²⁶ This view of Christie on Canadian foreign policy was stated in the lectures given by N.W. Rowell, which Christie composed. See, Stacey, op.cit., 1977. 303.

²⁷ See Eayrs, op.cit., 1960.

²⁸ Stacey, op.cit., 1977, 318-9.

²⁹ See, for example, Charles P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict: A history of Canadian External Relations. Vol.2. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981. 3.

³⁰ See, for example, Anthony Miller, "Functional Principle in Canada's External Relations," International Journal. Vol.35. (Spring, 1980)

³¹ Stacey, op. cit., 1977. 334.

³² A.R.M. lower, ed., "Loring Christie and the Genesis of the Washington Conference of 1921-1922," CHR, March, 1966; cited in Bothwell, op.cit., 1972. 298.

³³ L.C. Clark, ed., Documents on Canadian External Relations. Vol.3(1919-1925). Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1970. 163.

³⁴ Bothwell, op.cit., 1972. 302. (Christie memo of March 3, 1921); also cited in Stacey, op.cit., 1977. 337. Emphasis added.

³⁵ Clark, op.cit., 1970. 171. (Sixth meeting on Imperial relations at the Conference); also cited in Miller, op.cit., 1980. 311. Emphasis added.

³⁶ Alex Inglis, ed., Documents on Canadian External Relations. Vol.4(1926-1930). Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1971. 106.

³⁷ G.P. de T. Glazebrook, A history of Canadian External Relations. rev.ed., Vol.2, In the Empire of the World 1914-1933. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1966. 90-1; cited in Jackson, op.cit., 1960. 639.

³⁸ Inglis, op.cit., 1971, 106-7. This statement of Balfour is partially mentioned in Miller, op. cit., 1980. 312.

³⁹ O.D.Skelton, the Under-Secretary of State for the Department of External Affairs, stated that "it was the British Empire in name but Great Britain in reality which directed the imperial foreign policy." See, Inglis, op.cit., 1971. 114.

⁴⁰ The Statute of Westminster formally ended the British Empire.

⁴¹ See, for example, Bothwell, op.cit., 1972.

⁴² Public Archives of Canada, Loring Christie Papers, "The Canadian Dilemma," December, 1938. Vol.26. file 107, 59-60; cited in Miller, op.cit., 1980. 313.

⁴³ Kim Richard Nossal, op.cit., 1985. 44.

⁴⁴ For a discussion of isolationism as a general foreign-policy orientation, see Kal J. Holsti, International Politics: a Framework for Analysis. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1983. 97-101.

⁴⁵ Stacey states that "the word 'Commonwealth' appeared in 1917-8, but in Imperial Conferences and elsewhere 'Empire' continued to be normal usage. From 1926, however, 'Commonwealth' began to replace it." Stacey, op.cit., 1981. 88.

⁴⁶ J.A. Munro, ed., Documents of Canadian External Relations. Vol.6(1936-1939). Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1972. xi.

⁴⁷ Stacey, op.cit., 1981. 322-3.

⁴⁸ For a discussion of the concept of "middlepower," see, for example, Gordon, op.cit., 1966.

⁴⁹ For example, Stacey mentions that "it was Hume Wrong who reduced [Canada's diplomatic] practice to a theory: 'functionalism'." Stacey, op.cit., 1981. 332-3.

⁵⁰ Documents on Canadian External Relations. Vol.7-10. Ottawa: Department of External Affairs.

⁵¹ Wrong's concern is depicted in the memorandum of January 17, 1942, from Norman Robertson to Mackenzie King. See, J. Hilliker, ed., Documents on Canadian External Relations. Vol.9(1942-1943). Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1980.

⁵² Hilliker, op.cit., 1980. 106-9.

⁵³ Canada was to emerge as the fourth largest power in the world after the war. See, for example, B. Claxton, "The Place of Canada in the United Nations System," The Canadian Journal of Economic and Political Science. Vol.10. (November, 1944)

⁵⁴ Increased domestic pressure is mentioned in the letters and memorandums of Canadian officials. See, for example, the memorandum of February 3, 1943, from Robertson to King. Hilliker, op.cit., 1980. 77; see also the letter of February 8, 1943, from King to Minister of the United States. Ibid., 778.

⁵⁵ As early as December, 1941, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Norman Robertson, wrote in commenting on the proposed joint declaration of Allied powers during the war: "The segregation of Great and Small Powers in the preamble is novel and open to some objection." Hilliker, op.cit., 1980. 100.

⁵⁶ Stairs, op.cit., 1982. 673.

⁵⁷ Hilliker, op.cit., 1980. 776.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 778-9. (King to Minister in the United States)

⁵⁹ The word "gradation" is used by Anglin, Holmes, and Stairs as well.

⁶⁰ Anglin, op.cit., 1956. iii.

⁶¹ Miller, op.cit., 1980. 314.

⁶² See, for example, Stacey, op.cit., 1981. 332.

⁶³ Lester Pearson's memorandum of July 23, 1942, on Combined War Board. Hilliker, op.cit., 1980. 190-3.

⁶⁴ See, for example, Eayrs, op.cit., 1972. 164-5.

⁶⁵ See, for example, Holmes, op.cit., 1979. 230-1.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 230-1.

⁶⁷ See, for example, Eayrs, op.cit., 1972. 153-4.

⁶⁸ It was the lesson learned from the experience of the League of Nations, which failed because of its emphasis on mediatory functions rather than on police-like functions of the Security Council.

⁶⁹ See, for example, Eayrs, op.cit., 1972. 140.

⁷⁰ See, for example, Holmes, op.cit., 1979. 251-2.

⁷¹ Concerning the non-permanent membership, Canada contributed to the revisions of other articles as well: Article 32, which provided that a party to a dispute which was not a member of the Security Council should be invited to participate in the discussions; and Article 44, which assured the right of any member of the organization to participate in the discussions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of the member's armed forces.

⁷² David C. Coyle, The United Nations and How It Works. New York: Columbia University Press, 1966. 225.

⁷³ See, for example, Eayrs, op.cit., 1972. 140

⁷⁴ The non-participation of the United States is said to be one of the major reasons for the failure of the League of Nations.

⁷⁵ For example, Bothwell, Drummond, and English mention that when the world was about to create a new better order after the war, "external affairs officials dug into the theory of international relations and came up with a concept that fitted, or appeared to fit, the Canadian case," which was functionalism. Miller notes that "from the speeches of politicians during the war, it becomes clear that Canada derived from functionalism several ideas that suit its ideals of foreign policy and its position in the world." See R. Bothwell, I. Drummond, & J. English, Canada since 1945: Power, Politics, and Provincialism. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981. 104; Miller, op.cit., 1970. 78. (footnote 48)

⁷⁶ See, for example, Inis Claude, "Functional Approach to Peace," in Swords into Plowshares. New York: Random House Inc., 1956. 344.

⁷⁷ Anglin, op.cit., 1956. 261.

⁷⁸ Claude, op.cit., 1956. 345-7.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 347.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 348.

⁸¹ Ibid., 347-8.

⁸² David Mitrany, A Working Peace System. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966. 11.

⁸³ Claude, op.cit., 1956. 348.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 348.

⁸⁵ See, for example, Claude, op.cit., 1956. 350-1; Ernst Haas, Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organization. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1964. 19-22; and Mitrany, op.cit., 1966. Haas uses the word "spill-over" instead of "transferability."

⁸⁶ See, for example, Claude, op. cit., 1956. 345-8.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 346.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 348.

⁸⁹ See, for example, Miller, op.cit., 1970. 7-8.

⁹⁰ See, for example, Miller, op.cit., 1980, 319.

⁹¹ Ibid., 321.

⁹² Ibid., 321.

⁹³ Leonard S. Woolf, International Government. London: Fabian Society, 1916.

⁹⁴ David Mitrany, The Progress of International Government. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1933.

⁹⁵ David Mitrany, A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organizations. London: Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1943.

⁹⁶ Hilliker, op.cit., 1980. 827-3; also cited in Miller, op.cit., 1980. 318.

⁹⁷ Eayrs, op.cit., 1960. 59-80.

⁹⁸ Claxton, op.cit., 1944.

⁹⁹ For example, Miller states that "after 1947 there was no mention of functionalism by policy-makers... The Canadian government dropped its public advocacy of functionalism." Miller, op.cit., 1970. 88.

¹⁰⁰ Mitrany suggests that by harnessing the authority to a "common task, for common ends, and in a measure under common control," "less powerful and less wealthy peoples would at least get some of the reality of equality for limitation in executive control." Mitrany, op.cit., 1966. 35-6, 79.

¹⁰¹ Anglin, op.cit., 1956. 260; also quoted in Miller, op.cit., 1980. 311.

¹⁰² Anglin, op.cit., 1956. 262.

¹⁰³ Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945. Vol.1. New York: United Nations Information Organizations, 1945. 194; cited in Anglin, op.cit., 1956. 270.

¹⁰⁴ Hilliker, op. cit., 1980. 778-9.

¹⁰⁵ Canada, House of Commons., Debates., 1944. 5909-10; cited in Miller, op.cit., 1970., 90.

¹⁰⁶ Canada and the United Nations. Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1963.

¹⁰⁷ Stairs, op.cit., 1982. 672-3.

¹⁰⁸ Miller, op.cit., 1980. 311-3.

¹⁰⁹ Mitrany, op.cit., 1966. 28-31.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 20.

¹¹¹ Hilliker, op.cit., 1980. 109. (Memorandum of January, 20, 1942, from Wrong to Robertson)

¹¹² Anglin, op.cit., 1956. iv.

¹¹³ For example, Stairs suggests that "it requires no great intelligence to perceive that the functional principle was in the Canadian interest." See, Stairs, op.cit., 1982. 672.

¹¹⁴ See, for example, Anglin, op.cit., 1956. 547-8.

¹¹⁵ A similar point is made by Miller. Miller, op.cit., 1980. 313.

¹¹⁶ Lester B. Pearson, Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson. Vol.1 (1887-1948). Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972. 281.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 281.

¹¹⁸ For discussions on domestic factors relevant to Canada's external behavior, see, for example, Stairs, op.cit., 1982; D. Bell & L. Tepperman, The Roots of Disunity: A Look at Canadian Political Culture. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1979; K.D.

McRae, Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974.

¹¹⁹ Stairs, op.cit., 1982. 667.

¹²⁰ "Canada and Switzerland are the most decentralized of the West European and North American federal states: the percentage of all government revenues spent by the central government was only... 65 percent in Canada, considerably lower than the corresponding figures for the United States..." See A. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977. 123-4.

¹²¹ Stairs, op.cit., 1982. 687.

¹²² See Michael Sharp, "Canada-U.S. Relations: Options for the Future," International Perspectives. (Autumn, 1972)

¹²³ Ibid.

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