DEATH OF A COMMUNITY, REBIRTH OF A HOMELAND?

PLANNING PROCESSES FOR A KWAKIUTL INDIAN COMMUNITY

By

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ABSTRACT

During the 1960s, residents of isolated Kwakiutl Indian communities, located near the northern tip of Vancouver Island in Johnstone Straight, were encouraged by representatives of the Department of Indian Affairs (DIA) to relocate to regional urban centers. The majority of families from various Kwakiutl bands were, as a result, assimilated into non-native centers throughout the province.

This thesis examines the planning processes that contributed to the death of the Johnstone Straight communities; identifies the impacts of relocation on members of one Kwakiutl band, the Tanakteuk; and evaluates various alternatives for Indian development in the future, including an assessment of the desirability of reinhabitation of Kwakiutl homelands.

A literature review of international regional planning theory and development approaches points to the popularity of growth center development theory for two decades after World War Two. This theory continued to guide Canadian planning initiatives during the 1960s, resulting in the decline of rural communities, both native and non-native.

Interviews with Kwakiutl band members and former DIA personnel, and an examination of DIA documents, contribute to a profile of events leading to the relocation of Kwakiutl bands in the region. Consistent with the proponents of the growth center theory, DIA
suspected that the costs of providing services and facilities could be minimized in urban centers as a result of achieving economies of scale not possible with scattered villages, and that employment opportunities in industry would be greater. The department acted on this belief by reducing the provision of crucial services to the Johnstone Straight communities, without consulting those Indians directly affected.

An examination of documentation suggests that the relocation of Indians to urban centers was further advocated by DIA personnel for an additional reason: such a move would encourage Indians to abandon traditional lifestyles, and promote their assimilation into modern Canadian society. According to the assumptions on which orthodox development theory and DIA planning processes are based, Indians must adopt the values and lifestyles of participants in modern society for their development to proceed.

A questionnaire was administered to Tanakteuk Band members to investigate the impacts of relocation and the level of support for re-establishing the community of New Vancouver in their traditional homeland. Results of the survey demonstrate that the socio-economic conditions of the Tanakteuk families have not significantly improved as a result of being incorporated into mainstream Canadian society. In retrospect, growth center doctrine proved to be an inappropriate guide for the planning process for natives. While relocation may have increased access to services and facilities, it did not result in increased
employment opportunities. Moreover, by promoting assimilation into non-native societies, relocation threatened the cultural survival of the Tanakteuk. Having evaluated several options, the re-establishment of a community in New Vancouver has been identified by five Tanakteuk heads of households as the most rational means to strengthen their culture and further the long-term development of the Band. An alternative theory of development based on a synthesis of a territorial development approach and systems theory supports this planning option.

The case study of the Tanakteuk provides strong justification of the need for major changes to the planning processes used by the Department of Indian Affairs. An orthodox approach to development must be replaced by an alternative that aims to strengthen Indian society through the development of Indian economies within Indian cultural frameworks under the control of Indian political institutions. Planning processes must account for cultural differences of clientele.
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To the eagle ... 
And those who do 
of like kind.

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Of course, this thesis would not have been possible without the Tanakteuk's vision of a better future. I thank Anne Glendale and Chief William Glendale for sharing their dreams with me.

And to my parents, many thanks.
You will need
to come closer
for little is left
of this tongue
and what I am saying
is important.

I am the last one...

"Truganinny"
by Wendy Rose
in *Harper's Anthology of 20th Century Native American Poetry*
edited by D. Niatum
1988
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

The standard of living for the Indian population in Canada has been enhanced in some material ways over the last twenty-five years: the availability of housing has increased; benefits from living in closer proximity to infrastructural facilities are evident; health care, education, and social services are more accessible to those in need.

However, for some Indians, improvements in their material standard of living have occurred at the expense of their psychological and spiritual well-being. During the 1960s, crucial services to several remote Kwakiutl Indian villages in the northern reaches of Johnstone Straight off Vancouver Island were withdrawn by the federal government, resulting in the relocation of families to urban centers where their material needs would be met at a fraction of the cost. While some families were provided with the opportunity to continue living in on-reserve communities, most families dispersed to non-native settlements throughout Vancouver Island and the lower mainland of British Columbia.

Objectives

The objectives of this thesis are to examine the planning processes that contributed to the death of the Johnstone Straight communities, to identify the impacts of relocation on members of one Kwakiutl Band, namely the Tanakteuk, and to evaluate various
alternatives for Indian development in the future. This includes an assessment of the desirability of re-inhabitation of Kwakiutl homelands, using the Tanakteuk community of New Vancouver as a case study. Development options other than re-establishment of lost communities are explored. Implications are drawn from the Tanakteuk case study for Indians across Canada who have expressed a desire to relocate to their traditional homelands. The planning process used by representatives of the Department of Indian Affairs (DIA) in remote native communities during the 1960s is discussed against the backdrop of planning processes and development approaches acceptable in mainstream Canadian society at the time.

For the purpose of this thesis, planning process is defined as the formulation and implementation of policies, programs and projects. Development is the enhancement of the individual's or community's self-determination, self-reliance, participation in decision-making, and a sense of purpose in life and work (Wien, 1986).

SCOPE

Although factors that contributed to the decline of remote Indian communities across Canada twenty years ago may be similar, the focus of research in this thesis is limited to several Kwakiutl villages scattered throughout the northeastern portion of Vancouver Island and the adjacent mainland (Figure 1). In
particular, discussion is centered on members of the Tanakteuk Band. Each of the fifteen Kwakiutl bands—of which the Tanakteuk are one—has its own name, but as a group they have come to be known as the Southern Kwakiutl. Their collective histories have been drawn upon to enhance the case study of the Tanakteuk Band presented in the thesis.

No attempt is made to explain why some isolated Indian villages in the region survived and others did not. Although it has been suggested that the key factor may be the quality of leadership within the community at the time when pressure from external forces was greatest, this issue is not closely examined. It is also beyond the scope of the thesis to attempt to compare the quality of life of the inhabitants of these surviving communities to those members of bands who have dispersed.

BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM

The federal government is responsible for the health and welfare of Indians under the British North America Act (1867) and as set out in the Indian Act (1985). Until the 1960s, the provision of economic and social assistance to Indians was carried out by one federal department (although the actual name of the department changed from time to time), in contrast to the provision of services to other Canadians by representatives of many government departments and levels of government. Throughout the thesis, the federal body responsible for Indian affairs is
FIGURE 1. MAP OF KWAKIUTL TERRITORY
referred to as the Department of Indian Affairs (DIA) for simplicity. In reality, responsibility for Indian affairs has shifted among several departments, often under different acronyms, although this practice ceased nearly three decades ago.

Although the Indian Act has been subject to review and amendment since 1876, at the end of the 1960s it did not differ greatly from the original form (Ponting, 1980). The Act touches virtually every aspect of Indians' lives. In the words of one former Assistant Deputy Minister of DIA:

The Indian Act is a Land Act. It is a Municipal Act, an Education Act and a Societies Act. It is primarily social legislation, but it has very broad scope: there are provisions about liquor, agriculture and mining as well as Indian lands, band membership and so forth. It has elements that are embodied in perhaps two dozen different Acts of any of the provinces and overrides some federal legislation in some respects... It has the force of the Criminal Code and the impact of a constitution on people and communities that come within its purview (Doerr, 1974:40).

Until the late 1960s, the administration of federal government services and facilities was carried out on reserves by the Indian Agent, who was responsible for implementing policy affecting development. Several major motifs have characterized DIA policy from the time of initial contact with Indians until 1969: protection of Indians from the evils of white society, assimilation of Indians from a "backward" traditional society into modern society, and the adoption of Christianity (Gibbins & Ponting, 1986). According to Manuel and Posluns (1974:54), "it was the job of these new white chiefs to displace our traditional
leaders...to bring our way of life into line with the policies that had been decreed in Ottawa." Because of his sweeping powers, the Agent inevitably generated a state of dependency among his Indian clientele (Ponting, 1980).

Changes in the Indian Act in 1951 established Band Councils in an attempt to better represent the interests of all reserve inhabitants in a democratic process. (Indians, however, were denied the right to vote in federal elections until 1960). Despite these changes, final decisions taken by the Bands—regardless of the issue or impact on the community—were subject to approval by the Indian Agent as a representative of the Crown.

Among Canadians, general knowledge of the conditions of Indians prior to 1960 was limited; most Canadians tended to recognize Indians across the country as a homogeneous ethnic group in ignorance of their cultural diversity. However, in response to various social and political events during the 1960s, there was an increase in the awareness of "the Indian problem", and an arousal of public concern about their standard of living. Indians suffered from poverty, underemployment, and unemployment; in 1965, for example, Indians had per capita gainful earnings of $300 compared to the national average of $1,400. Natives were marginal to the many services that other Canadian received, they were over-consumers of welfare services, and they were housed in substandard dwellings (Hawthorn et al., 1967).
As efforts in Canadian society to cope with national unity, ethnic diversity, regional disparities and poverty gained momentum in the 1960s, a collective sense of guilt about the historical treatment of Indians emerged, and DIA came under heavy criticism for paternalism. In response, DIA experimented with a variety of programs ostensibly designed to reduce dependence on the government, and to encourage Indian participation in the decision-making process.

Under pressure to address immediately disparities in the standard of living between non-native and native Canadians, DIA emphasized the provision of services and facilities to native communities during the decade. At the same time, however, government officials were growing increasingly alarmed at the prospects of coping with the general expansion of the welfare state. The costs of providing amenities for native and non-native communities with a small population scattered over remote areas was high.

According to popular regional planning theory during the 1960s, "growth centers" were the solution to regional disparities, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter Three. By concentrating the population in urban industrialized centers, infrastructure and services could be offered to all Canadians at a fraction of the cost, due to economies of scale. Migration from small, remote communities to growth centers was encouraged largely through the withdrawal of government services.
DIA representatives recognized the advantages associated with the concept of growth centers, as well as implications for the development of Indians. If natives were encouraged to move from reserve communities, where the values of a traditional society were prevalent, to urban centers, the assimilation of Indians into modern society would be hastened, and the "development" of Indians would result. At the time, development was perceived as a linear progression from traditional societies to industrialized ones based on mass consumerism (Rostow, 1960).

Critiques on the causes of underdevelopment and internal colonialism had not yet emerged in the literature. Neither had the concept of social or environmental impacts.

The release of the federal government's White Paper on Indian policy in 1969 resulted in a level of Indian organization unparalleled in Canadian history, with remarkable consequences (Cardinal, 1977; Manuel and Posluns, 1974; Whiteside, 1973). This policy, which was rejected by all native organizations, proposed that reserves would be dismantled, and all legal distinctions such as the Indian Act that set native peoples apart from other Canadians be removed, allowing them to participate equally in Canadian society. Although the White Paper was never implemented, it served as a catalyst for Indian demands for participation in any decision-making process.

Native organizations became increasingly militant about
aboriginal rights as pride in Indian heritage re-awakened during the late 1960s and early 1970s. The issue of aboriginal rights embraces not only land, but cultural, social, religious, linguistic and political matters. In 1973, six Supreme Court justices agreed on the existence of aboriginal rights in Canadian law, but were divided on its application in law in the landmark Calder case initiated by the Nishga Tribal Council (Weaver, 1981).


As discussions about self-government and the rights of Indians to control resources on their land increased in the 1980s, many members of Kwakiutl Bands from communities which declined in the 1960s because of the withdrawal of services expressed their
desire to re-establish communities on-reserve. Development of Indians in these communities would be based on a synthesis of a territorial development and systems theory approach that is radically different from orthodox development approaches characteristic of DIA policy. This alternative proposes that Indian society should be strengthened through the development of Indian economies within Indian cultural frameworks under the control of Indian political institutions anchored in and drawing their legitimacy from local Indian communities (Loubser, 1984).

In response to over one hundred requests from Indian Bands across Canada for assistance in relocation or the establishment of "new" communities, such as New Vancouver, DIA released a policy directive in December, 1987 which outlined the criteria under which support would be extended: the health and safety of individuals in the existing location must be endangered, and the development of a community must be the most cost-effective alternative. However, relocation proposals which include an immediate or future requirement for financial resources relative to the existing community will not be supported. DIA takes no responsibility for the outcome of previous planning processes.

It is within the described context of historical circumstance and present conditions that the issue of re-establishment of lost Indian communities across Canada is discussed in the thesis, drawing implications from the Tanakteuk case study.
Chapter Two presents a historical analysis and description of Kwakiutl life in several remote communities. Based on a literature review and interviews with members of several Kwakiutl Bands, Kwakiutl economic activities, social relations and institutions, and culture is discussed over three phases: prior to contact with non-natives; during a period of increasing contact with white settlers until the 1960s; and village life during the 1960s, leading up to the time when services to the communities were withdrawn. The broad categories of community socioeconomic structure as described by Weaver and Cunningham (1984) have been used to illustrate the character of Kwakiutl life.

The purposes of including the description of socio-economic conditions in Chapter Two are to provide an understanding of the historical transformations of Kwakiutl's productive economic activities and the social relations and institutions which have accompanied them, for comparison with results of the survey of current conditions in Chapter Four; and to provide a context for considering the development alternatives described in Chapter Five.

Chapter Two also includes a profile of significant sequence of events and factors that resulted in the decline of communities in the region and the subsequent dispersal and relocation of the population. To generate the profile, several members of Kwakiutl
Bands and DIA staff members were interviewed, and material was gathered from DIA archives and relevant literature.

Chapter Three presents a discussion of the concepts on which national and international regional development and planning initiatives were based during the 1960s, set against a description of the political and social climate of this period. The influence that programs emerging out of these concepts had on planning for remote Indian communities is examined. DIA's traditional approach to development is reviewed.

Chapter Three is based on a literature review.

Chapter Four focuses on a case study of Tanakteuk Band members. A profile of Canadian Indians residing off-reserve is presented, followed by a profile of the Tanakteuk Band. The results of a survey of Band members are evaluated. The survey attempts to determine Band members' perception about the factors which led to relocation; and to assess the impact of relocation on their lives. A profile of current socio-economic conditions of Band members is also presented. In addition, the level of support among Band members for the re-establishment of the community of New Vancouver is evaluated.

The analysis of survey results is supplemented by additional sources, namely interviews with Band members, national statistics of socio-economic conditions of off-reserve Canadian Indians, a consultant's study of Mamalelegala Qwe'Qwa'sot'enox Band members,
whose situation is similar to that of the Tanakteuk's, and literature on the effects of relocation.

**Chapter Five** is prescriptive in nature. An alternative to the orthodox development approach characteristic of DIA policy is presented—one which is based on a synthesis of territorial development and a systems theory approach. Criteria to evaluate development approaches are also offered. Scenarios of future development options for the Tanakteuk Band are discussed, ranging from a course of inaction to one in which funding for a new community is secured. The rationale for establishing a new community in New Vancouver is explored, and a community development strategy based on territorial development and a systems theory approach is presented. The author's assessment of why DIA should support the re-establishment of a community follows. Finally, DIA's policy on support for "new" communities is discussed, along with the implications that this policy has for the development of Indian bands across Canada whose situations are similar to that of the Tanakteuk Band.

In this chapter, the theoretical discussion on development alternatives is based on a literature review. The proposed community strategy is a result of a series of meetings with the Chief and Council of the Tanakteuk Band, as well as interviews held with representatives from the Kwakiutl District Council, the Tribal Council of which the Tanakteuk Band is a member.

**Chapter Six** includes a summary of the thesis and conclusions.
Definitions belong to the definers--
not the defined

Toni Morrison
from Beloved
1987
CHAPTER TWO: THE HISTORICAL TRANSFORMATION OF KWAKIUTL MODES OF PRODUCTION AND INSTITUTIONS FROM PRE-EUROPEAN CONTACT UNTIL RELOCATION

In order to understand the present, we must look to the past. The purpose of this chapter is to present snapshots of Kwakiutl culture as it existed prior to the loss of communities on several isolated Indian reserves off north-eastern Vancouver Island. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section examines life prior to association with Europeans. A description of Kwakiutl society characterized by increasing interaction with white settlers follows. These two sections attempt to demonstrate the historical transformations of a people's productive economic activities and the social relations and institutions which have accompanied them. In the third section, a description of Kwakiutl life during the 1960s prior to the relocation of remote communities is presented. In each of these sections, the category of community socioeconomic structure suggested by Weaver and Cunningham (1984) is utilized as a framework, providing the titles to each sub-section, namely: 1) organization of economic production; 2) relationship with the physical environment; 3) relations with other communities; and 4) psychological development and behaviour patterns. In the fourth section, factors that contributed to the relocation of families from isolated reserves to centralized urban centers throughout the province are examined.
Information was gathered from interviews with members of several Bands and DIA personnel, from literature, and from archival documents.

There is a wealth of descriptive material on the Kwakiutl, most notably the systematic studies of rituals associated with the potlatch by anthropologist Franz Boas, first published in the 1880s. The reader is advised to consult these reports directly for a detailed account of early Kwakiutl culture. The biography of a prominent Kwakiutl elder, James Sewid, as described in *Guests Never Leave Hungry* by James Spradley (1969) provides additional material on the topic.

Section One: Kwakiutl Society Prior to Contact with Europeans

For thousands of years the Kwakiutl lived in one of the richest natural habitats in North America, where an elaborate material culture was created with only the simplest of tools (Fagan, 1984). Their lives were so closely dependent upon and intertwined with the environment around them as to be inseparable: nature determined the cycle of economic production activities as well as the distribution of the population in the region, and influenced their psychological development and behaviour patterns.
Organization of Economic Production

The most important resource for the people in pre-contact times was the abundant marine life, consisting of salmon, oolichan, herring, halibut, clams, crabs, mussels and seaweed. Traditional methods for gathering fish included spearing, trapping, netting and use of hook and line. Women were responsible for preserving food and gathering berries, roots, seaweed and shellfish, while men fished and hunted. The collection and storage of food took place during the spring, summer and fall, leaving the winter largely free for other activities.

The mountains were covered with thick forests of hemlock, yew, cedar and fir, providing easily accessible material that was used for almost every conceivable purpose: canoes capable of carrying up to forty people; religious masks and totem poles; multi-family houses; boxes for food storage; and clothing (Goldman, 1937). The pattern of economic production of Kwakiutl life was determined by the seasons.

Relationship with the Physical Environment

Travel between villages was by water, since land travel was difficult. Some of the larger villages had as many as thirty houses and a population between two hundred and seven hundred (INAC, 1986). Seasonal migration to other settlements located near the best fishing grounds occurred in the spring, summer and fall. Several families or groups from many different tribes would
share these settlements. Access to fishing stations, hunting and trapping grounds, and plant gathering sites was based on historical use, allotted by the chiefs according to family relationships (Speck, 1987). During the winter, a number of tribes would gather at a single village for extended periods of ceremonial activity. Although several tribes may have shared one village, each continued to be an autonomous group. Travel, friendships and marriages were essentially limited to one's own and to the closest neighboring bands. Obligations among households and their linked relatives permeated the economy, religion and art of the village (Hawthorn et al., 1958).

Awareness of social rank dominated the twenty-five politically autonomous tribes that comprised Kwakiutl society. According to Codere (1961), the Kwakiutl never thought of themselves as a unified people or "nation", although they shared a similar culture and spoke Kwakwala. Each tribe was ranked in a lineal hierarchy. Tribal membership was patrilineal, although the mother's tribe was also important.

In each tribe, there were several ranked kinship groups called "numayms"; membership to what was essentially an extended family was acquired from either one's father or mother. In addition to hierarchically ranked tribes and numayms, social positions were also ranked. Those holding the higher positions in each clan were the "chiefs", those holding the lower positions were the "commoners". The position of slave also existed within the social
order, a position with neither rights nor rank nor legacy. Slaves were property to be used or given away. Most were taken as booty in raids or were the descendants of such captives (Kirk, 1986).

Relations with Other Communities

Trade and warfare played fundamental roles in Northwest Coast Indian life. For generations, goods were exchanged between the Southern Kwakiutl, the Nuu-chah-nulth of the west coast of Vancouver Island, and the Nuxalk people who inhabited the coastline around Bella Coola; trade links with tribes from other coastal regions as well as the interior region stretching from the Coast Mountains eastwards to the Rockies also existed. Local trade centred on food redistribution. Across greater distances, trade may have revolved more around matters of prestige (Kirk, 1986).

Inevitably, conflict between these various groups developed. Raids between different language groups, as well as between Kwakiutl tribes were triggered in response to a trespass into a chief's realm, in order to seize slaves, to gain new prerogatives normally acquired through marriage, or to demonstrate grief over the loss of a loved one (Kirk, 1986). Women and children were usually enslaved, while the men were usually killed.

Because the position of chief was largely determined according to one's social position, the authority of leadership was not challenged through inter-tribal violence.
Psychological Development & Behaviour Patterns

Secret societies were the most important religious groups. Members of each society were usually of the same sex and had similar ranks in their respective numayms. These positions were inherited, but in different ways. The whole social organization of the Kwakiutl changed from kinship groups to secret societies at the time of the winter ceremonials.

No priesthood directed religious practices; however, certain meetings with spirits led to power as a shaman or "medicine man". Rituals reflected the deep reverence for the intertwining of the natural and supernatural realms, and respect for the physical and spiritual was shown by every rank in society.

The major institution for assuming, maintaining, and increasing social status was the potlatch, which was a complex ceremony involving feasting, singing, dancing and distribution of gifts. Potlatches were occasions for witnessing the inheritance of, and validated claims to, certain ranks and their accompanying privileges and property, as well as a time to settle legal and political disputes between different numayms and tribes (Speck, 1987).

The abundance of natural resources meant that economic pursuits did not require all of the people's time and energy, enabling them to develop a complex social and ceremonial life. Ironically, upon their arrival on the northwest coast of North America, it
was these riches that first impressed the Europeans, resulting in contact that would affect Kwakiutl society forever.

Part Two: Increasing Interaction with Europeans

The first descriptions of Kwakiutl life were made when Captain George Vancouver explored their territory in 1792. An estimated 10,700 Kwakiutl inhabited the region at this time (Duff, 1964). Contact with whites was minimal before 1849, at which time the Hudson's Bay Company established a trading post at Fort Rupert (Fisher, 1977). A fish saltry was built in the area in 1870 by other settlers (Speck, 1987). Trading with whites brought increased material wealth, which increased the size of the potlatch and changed its function to some degree (Spradley, 1969).

Although native people continued to dominate the region in terms of total population until the middle of the nineteenth century, they were losing control of their lands and lives as the frequency and intensity of contact with whites increased (Kirk, 1986). With the transition from the fur trade and the consolidation of settlement, the Indian's role had been reduced from integral to peripheral in British Columbia's economy.

In comparison with other parts of the continent, few Indians in this region were killed in battles with non-natives. The Indians' own intertribal wars were quite another matter; the introduction
of firearms resulted in high mortality rates without abatement into the 1860s. Indians were more likely to die from European diseases. Epidemics of smallpox, measles, influenza, tuberculosis, and venereal disease, and the effects of alcohol resulted in a population decline to less than three thousand by 1880 (Duff, 1964). This led to confusion in inheritance patterns, and competition for many high-ranking positions left vacant, to say nothing about the devastating psychological effects on those left behind. Whole villages were often wiped out, forcing the relocation and consolidation of several bands within the remote region. During this period, Indian society fell into social and economic disorder (Fagan, 1984). To some extent it was a society of broken souls and minds that missionaries and government officials set about reshaping and administering after the 1880s (Kirk, 1986).

Organization of Economic Production

Advances in technology greatly affected the economy of the region over the years. Until the late 1920s, practically all salmon fishing was done by gill-netting, using comparatively simple methods. Under these conditions, Indians were relatively competitive in the market (Knight, 1978). Without refrigeration, the canneries scattered along the isolated fjords were dependent on the women and older children for canning, net-mending and other processing operations, as white labour was in short supply.
The canneries' need for family labour gave Indian fishermen a bargaining power often out of proportion to their skill and efficiency (Hawthorn et al., 1958).

During the late 1920s and 1930s, the fishing industry experienced a number of drastic changes. It was among the hardest hit industries in the province during the depression. At the same time, gasoline-powered boats displaced boats propelled by oar and sail. Few Indians could raise the capital needed to purchase mechanized commercial boats; the majority worked under contract on cannery-owned boats (Knight, 1978). (Under section 89 of the Indian Act, Indians are excluded from taxes, liens, mortgages or other charges on their lands and from loss of possessions through debt, making it very difficult to raise outside investment capital). Within the region, Indians faced stiff competition from recent Japanese immigrants in the industry. Furthermore, as the canneries became increasingly mechanized, the need for Indian labour declined. A considerable number of Indians were permanently displaced from the fishing industry, although everyone continued to fish, as well as hunt, as part of subsistence activities.

Indians made unprecedented gains in numbers, per capita income, and status in the fishing industry during World War Two and the immediate post-war years. Shortages in labour and equipment during wartime, Japanese internment, coupled with virtually
unlimited demand and high prices, greatly increased the family's income. More boats became Indian owned and operated (Knight, 1978). Unfortunately, this situation did not last. Continued technological change requiring capital intensive investments and consolidation further disadvantaged the Indian in the fishing industry. Racist attitudes of cannery officials towards natives did not improve the situation (Hawthorn et al., 1958).

Although forestry gained increasing importance in the economy of the coast, Indians played a relatively minor role in the industry, only occasionally working as casual labourers. The seasonal peak in logging coincided with the salmon fishing and canning season, and the majority of Indians preferred the type of employment associated with the latter.

Relationship with the Physical Environment

As the number of white settlers in the region increased, natives were forced to fit into new patterns and even compete for traditional resources and rights. It seemed that there was nothing the Indian could do (Fagan, 1984). In 1860 legislative responsibility for Indian affairs was transferred from the Imperial government to the Province of Canada. In 1867 the British North America Act (section 91, subsection 24) gave the new federal government the authority to legislate on matters relating to "Indians and Lands Reserved for Indians".

The province of British Columbia entered Confederation in 1871.
However, unlike other provinces which had made treaties with Indian tribes under a Royal Proclamation in 1763 as the country was opened up for settlement, the Indian policies of British Columbia differed from those of the rest of Canada on matters involving land. The province denied the existence of any native title, and disagreed with a federal recommendation that 80 acres of land was to be allotted per Indian family of five; instead, 20 acres was determined sufficient, in comparison to an allotment of 320 acres per person allowed for white settlers. Indians were perceived by the authorities to be a fishing people not dependent on a land base (Kirk, 1986); in fact, land played such an integral part in Kwakiutl society that to take their land away was to deprive them of their identity (Fagan, 1984). Concepts of land tenure derived over 10,000 years were no longer valid. In spite of various government inquiries and commissions established over the years, the issue of aboriginal title and land rights is still contentious.

Commercial and canning operations were increasing in the region during the 1870s and 1880s, and Indians were concerned that their traditional fishing grounds would inevitably be exploited by whites (Fisher, 1977).

Relations with Other Communities

In 1876 all previous legislation dealing with Indians in the existing provinces and territories was consolidated and revised
as the Indian Act (Miller et al., 1978), with an Indian Agent in each region acting as the representative of the Crown. Any transaction between an Indian and a non-native required the approval of the Agent. He had an extraordinary range of administrative and discretionary powers that allowed him to also become an instrument of social control in Indian society. As both a magistrate and administrator, there was little chance of appeal from an Indian Agent's decision.

In the early 1880s, the Indian custom that Agents as well as missionaries were most anxious to eradicate was the potlatch. The majority of government and religious representatives thought that in comparison to white culture, indigenous culture was inferior and barbaric, and that the potlatch was the most formidable of obstacles in the way of the Indians becoming Christian and civilized (Fisher, 1977). In the first attempt to legislate Indian culture out of existence, an 1884 amendment to the Indian Act imposed two to six months imprisonment for anyone participating in the potlatch. The potlatch was such an integral part of their society that to eliminate it would almost be to destroy traditional Indian culture (Fisher, 1977). Recognizing this, many Indians began to protest vigorously, while others quietly continued to potlatch in defiance of the law.

Renewed enforcement of the law against native ceremonials was felt in 1921. Ceremonial regalia were seized, and sold to museums and private collectors. Those who were caught participating in
potlatches were sentenced to jail terms: the great chieftains of the Kwakiutl were degraded to feeding the pigs in Oakalla prison (Sewid-Smith, 1977). Under a 1927 amendment to the Indian Act, political organizing was prohibited (Miller et al., 1978), thus further reducing any opposition to the government's actions. It wasn't until 1951 that potlatching was removed as an offense in the legislation.

Psychological Development and Behaviour Patterns

There were subtler attempts to change the values of the Indian. Government relegated all social and educational responsibilities to the missions, which promulgated a completely foreign culture. No attempt was made to understand Indian religious beliefs or cultural values (Cardinal, 1969). Emphasis was placed on the replacement of the numayms with the nuclear family--indeed, the traditional family was even outlawed (Kirk, 1986). Modern, single family houses replaced the old communal dwellings. Kinsfolk living in different villages continued to recognize their social obligations to each other, but gradually exchanges among kin living in the same community became more important.

In the old days the band elders, in conjunction with parents, were responsible for the education and value orientation of the children. However, government officials decided a formalized educational system that taught Christian values was needed to advance Indian society; in the early years education was viewed,
as it still is, as an essential tool of assimilation (Ponting, 1980; Hawthorn et al., 1958). The government was happy to have the Indians domesticated without the expenditure necessary to handle the job itself; the church was assured of a dominant role in the formation of government policy (Cardinal, 1969). This alliance of convenience was to last until the early 1950s.

The first schools created by the missionaries were residential schools, a system that allowed parents to continue their nomadic lifestyles while children boarded at school, sometimes the year round. The virtues of a farming culture, the discipline of manual labour, strict adherence to regular hours, religious instruction and the exclusive use of the English language were emphasized. Children were punished for speaking their native language (pers. com. Wasden, 1988).

In most cases, children as young as five or six were taken from their parents and placed in residential schools until they were fifteen, spending only Christmas and summer holidays with their families on the reserve. Residential schools served to alienate the child from his own way of life and religion without in any way preparing him for a different society (Cardinal, 1969). As a result of the increased secularization of Canadian society, the traditional role of the church in Indian affairs faded out in the late 1950s. By this time, attendance at school for children was compulsory across Canada. The denominational residential school
system for Indians was abandoned. Instead, the federal government established schools on most of the reserves, making it necessary for at least one member of the family to remain sedentary during the academic year, while the rest of the family fished. Due to the isolation and lack of amenities, many teachers were reluctant to accept postings in the more remote communities; consequently, the quality of education was often poor (Cardinal, 1969).

The methods used to govern the people also changed after contact with Europeans. Although the Indian Agent usually worked with the hereditary chief of the village when discussing business matters, in a few cases another man was chosen, should the highest ranking position be held by a woman, by an individual who could not speak English, or if the chief was considered to be difficult to get along with by the Indian Agent (Sedley, 1969). General band meetings were held for other important matters, such as the leasing of timber rights.

An amendment to the Indian Act in the early 1950s allowed a band to have an elected council instead of a hereditary chief to represent them in the decision-making process. This was viewed as more democratic by federal government representatives; it also eliminated the difficulties associated with obtaining quorum at village meetings. Different Kwakiutl villages gradually adopted this method of representation.

In less than one hundred years, the advent of white settlers had altered the face of Kwakiutl society almost beyond
recognition. The intensity and magnitude of change differed between generations as well as amongst the bands, with villages located in remote locations being less affected than Indian communities dwelling in closer proximity to white settlements. In the next section, the outlines of community socioeconomic structure in the more isolated villages during the 1960s is presented.

Part Three: Kwakiutl Society in the 1960s

In the face of subtle and direct pressure by white society to change, what was Kwakiutl society like in remote villages such as New Vancouver during the 1960s? Hawthorn et al. (1958) have stated that no customary actions, elements of belief or attitude, knowledge or techniques have been transmitted from earlier generations to the period leading up to the 1960s without major alteration. However, Rohner (1970) argues that although their economic activities, religious practices and beliefs, social or ceremonial life, their house style or the food they consumed was remarkably similar to non-natives in the region, the Kwakiutl who lived in these isolated communities were somehow distinct from the general Canadian population.

Organization of Economic Production

The economic activity of residents in remote Indian villages varied with the season, and within each household. An outline of
the seasonal economic and subsistence activities appears in Figure 2. Fishing, clam digging, and logging dominated the cash economy, but there were also other important resources such as social assistance. Certain commercial and subsistence activities were customarily assigned to men, while the majority of domestic chores were allotted to women.

Two types of commercial fishing operations were common: gill netting and purse seining. Most Indians preferred to own or at least operate their own gill-netters rather than sign on as crew members of a seiner, since this allowed for greater independence. Crew positions on seine boats were filled first by family, then by friends, then by local villagers, and finally by "outsiders" from other villages or whites (Wolcott, 1967). Continued technological advances reduced the need for labour, while increasing the need for the purchase of modern equipment to remain competitive; many Indian owners lost their boats and equipment as mortgages payments were not met. A prolonged strike in 1963 contributed to the loss of boats and equipment.

Fish were sold to one of the three fish-packing companies based in Alert Bay, which sent packers around to each village daily; the fishermen were expected to sell their fish only to the company for which they worked, since they were dependent on the company for credit and for a steady market. Because fish were processed in Vancouver, there were no longer employment
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FIGURE 2. KWAKIUTL SEASONAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES (EARLY 1960S)  
(Adapted from Rohner, 1967, page 29)
opportunities for local Indian women in the industry.

Digging for clams was another primary source of immediate cash. Complaints about the growing scarcity of the resource increased during the 1960s, similar to grievances associated with commercial fishing.

Logging provided seasonal work, although technological improvements in the sector reduced the need for local labour. Throughout the 1960s, forests in the region were logged-off, and camps within close proximity to communities were shut, further reducing employment potential for Indians.

Most food staples were purchased from stores, but subsistence activities contributed to the local economy; any surplus was sold for cash. A limited amount of trapping for mink and otter occurred. The production and sale of native art work also provided some income. For those individuals with boats, hauling materials within the region was an additional source of income.

The three administrative sources of income for many of the villagers were family allowance, relief, and unemployment insurance benefits (Wolcott, 1967). Applications for relief were made to the Indian Agent upon recommendation by the Band Council; frequently there were complaints about the fairness of distribution of welfare payments among the recipients.

Relationship with the Physical Environment

Government conservation policies and regulations introduced
during the 1960s had a dramatic impact on fishing in the region. As equipment became more efficient, stricter limitations where one could fish commercially were imposed. Offshore fishing by Japanese and Russian fleets as well as an increase in Canadian sport fishing activities were cited as reasons for depleted stocks. The Davis Plan, a new licencing scheme introduced during the 1960s as a means to effectively manage salmon stocks and rationalize the structure of the industry, resulted in fewer boats in the region (Pearce, 1982). (This, in turn, had the effect of isolating the remote reserves as employment declined and fewer boats travelled between the outlying communities.) Although the Davis Plan set aside Indian licences, natives tended to let them lapse; once DIA bought up the licences, it was difficult for native fishermen to get back into the industry because they lacked capital.

As Indians became increasingly integrated into broader Canadian society, their relationship to the physical environment in terms of living arrangements and lifestyle altered. Demand increased for amenities that European Canadians took for granted. The level of services available on the islands varied, as did village size. Each community consisted of approximately fifteen to twenty single-family units, with a population of about one hundred that fluctuated seasonally. (People frequently migrated between villages for extended periods of residence.) Residents pooled their money together to purchase and maintain
small diesel electric generators for power (Sedley, 1969). Water was pumped from village wells to a large storage tank, although no dependable supply usually existed. None of the houses had indoor toilets. Houses were heated by stoves, but refrigerators were non-existent (Wolcott, 1967). There was no R.C.M.P. detachment located on any of the islands. They were generally not called in except for emergencies. In medical emergencies, patients were taken by float plane to the hospital in Alert Bay.

As of 1962, a one or two room schoolhouse was located in each of the villages, offering education up to the eighth grade. Older children were sent to residential schools located in Alert Bay, with visits home for the holidays. Twenty to forty children were generally enrolled locally. The schools followed a curriculum similar to that offered throughout the province (Hawthorne et al., 1958).

The hiring of teachers was through a provincial district superintendent. However, the Indian Agent was still in charge of the physical plant at each day school. Teacher recruitment for the village schools was a continuous problem, mostly due to isolation. According to Wolcott (1967), the quality of education was lower in the village schools than that of other provincial schools. Parents were critical of the lack of opportunity for organized activities and constant supervision in the village schools, although they did not comment on the academic program.
Because of this, most of the villagers believed that the residential school in Alert Bay with its better facilities was superior (Wolcott, 1967).

**Relations with Other Communities**

In some ways, these villages were only partial communities, dependent upon and intricately linked with similar isolated villages, and with non-native communities. For most shopping and business purposes, and for most social activity, villagers travelled to Alert Bay, which served as a major link with the rest of Canadian society.

Under section 73-78 of the Indian Act, formal authority for interaction between native and non-native communities was vested in Band Councils. Elections for a two-year term of office were administered by the Indian Agent. The Councils were accorded authoritative rights and obligations to look after matters that affected the well being of band members (Miller et al., 1978), including the allotment of land, issues dealing with band membership, and making recommendations for social assistance or employment in band projects. However, decisions were subject to final approval by the Indian Agent. Councillors were also instrumental in organizing committees dealing with educational, welfare or health and sanitation issues. The only fund operated officially by the Band Council was the band trust account, capital and revenue sections; councillors had no control over the
actual day-by-day administration of the band's budget, which was regulated by the Indian Agent.

Because the Indian Agent was required to record Council decisions, a representative of the agency was generally present at all Band Council meetings. Rarely did the Band Council initiate a discussion in order to obtain action or facilities from the Indian Agent, since many of the councillors were self-conscious or unfamiliar with the extent of their powers on council (Hawthorn et al., 1958). Thus, community planning activities on remote reserves in the 1960s were almost exclusively instituted by government representatives. The structure and nature of the planning process was overwhelmingly "top-down": local response to a proposal put forward by the Indian Agent was taken into consideration after discussion from a Band Council, and the plan was perhaps modified to reflect the community's input. From this point forward, however, decisions regarding the welfare of the community were implemented solely at the discretion of the Indian Agent, with no effort made to modify or monitor future events once a decision had been taken. Issues outside the jurisdiction of Band Councils which may have affected the vitality of the community, such as the continuance of the day school, was the exclusive responsibility of the government representative.

Villagers frequently voiced dissatisfaction with the council system, claiming interference; or they became angry when demands
based on family ties went unfulfilled (Rohner, 1967; Sedley, 1969; Wolcott, 1967). Neither the villagers nor the councillors had a clear image of appropriate behaviour for a system that was largely introduced by non-natives (Hawthorn et al., 1958). Councillors generally received little training or instruction from DIA regarding the council system. The extent to which the Band Council system acted as a vehicle for increased Indian participation in community planning and decision-making on reserves during the 1960s is thus questionable.

Psychological Development and Behaviour Patterns

Close family relations existed between villages, although the village remained as the primary reference group for the individual. Social control of the individual was governed largely by the recognition or withdrawal of acceptance by the majority of villagers (Rohner, 1970). Within the group, certain individuals were recognized for their leadership, and an informal ranking of an individual’s status within the community evolved.

Social occasions included sporting events, formal band activities, drinking, religious activities and formal social gatherings which were considered by some as the contemporary form of the traditional potlatch (Wolcott, 1967). Although the practice of giving away gifts had undergone considerable modification, it was still an important part of these occasions.

Many of the Indians in the region had adopted the Anglican or
Pentecostal faith. For some, church services were simply social occasions (Rohner, 1970). The villages were infrequently visited by clergy, and no permanent church existed on any of the islands.

Drinking was the most popular and frequent past-time of both sexes (Rohner, 1970). Inevitably, social behaviour was affected as a result of the reduction of inhibitory mechanisms. Fights rarely occurred between villagers unless within the context of drinking.

Rohner (1970) suggests that the distribution of goods and services in Kwakiutl villages during the early 1960s can be divided into two classes: the subsisting-oriented class, which comprised the majority; and the future-oriented class, which was conspicuously more acculturated, and often in a position of formal authority. Those individuals in the former class tended to concentrate on daily activities, with little thought given to long range planning. Surplus material wealth was shared between members of the community. Families in the future-oriented class did not involve themselves in these patterns; of necessity, to reach this position, social relations with other families was restricted. These families had the most material wealth, and tended to plan for the future, which often included strategies for leaving the village.
PART FOUR: FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO RELOCATION OF COMMUNITIES

Except for natural disasters, the life cycle of Kwakiutl communities over the generations had been relatively stable, influenced of course by adaptations to white society. By the late 1960s, however, population within some villages plummeted from over one hundred inhabitants to one or two individuals (DIAND, 1972). For some of the isolated reserves, the loss of inhabitants was gradual, spanning twenty years; other villages were deserted almost overnight.

These communities ceased to exist for a variety of economic and social reasons. This section examines factors that contributed to the decline of villages in the region, with emphasis placed on the decline of New Vancouver, traditional homeland of the Tanakteuk. It is divided into three parts: initially a profile of regional events generated from interviews mostly with Tanakteuk Band members is presented; interviews with three DIA staff comprise the second part; and documentation from DIA archives that offers explanations about the relocation of communities in the area is contained in the third section.

Kwakiutl Opinion

To avoid repetition, recollections from interviewees of events that contributed to the decline of isolated communities and the subsequent dispersal of the population has been compiled into a single profile. Six members of the Tanakteuk Band, randomly
selected from the Band membership list, were contacted and agreed to an interview; two Tsawataineuk Band members from the community of Kingcome Inlet who have been active in regional politics and community development for over fifty years were also interviewed. This is largely the Tanakteuk's story, although it is very similar to that of the Mamelelegala Qwe'Qwa'Sot'Enox' Band's dispersal from Village Island, as documented in a report by Geach (1987), a consultant hired by DIA to investigate the feasibility of the Mamelelegala re-inhabiting their community.

From approximately 1945 onward, Mr. Murray Todd, the Indian Agent, encouraged Indians in the region to move to the Industrial School Reserve located at Alert Bay. Land had been set aside by the Anglican Church for any "progressive" B.C. Indian who wanted to transfer there, providing that certain conditions were met: to have been a pupil of the Anglican School, to have been married in the church, to have no use for the potlatch, and to try to live a clean life (Sedley, 1969).

In 1950, the Indian Agent encouraged some of the residents who had moved to the Industrial School Reserve to amalgamate with the Nimpkish Band on the basis of promises of a new school, water system and roads; 351 acres of the Industrial School Reserve were set aside strictly for use by the Nimpkish, while the remaining 60 acres were retained for the use of all Bands.

Small communities such as the one in New Vancouver were poorly
serviced in comparison to other, more centralized villages; after the initial installation of facilities, no further improvements or additions to infrastructure of the communities occurred as government representatives expressed the sentiment that it had become too costly to provide teachers and medical services, and to maintain wharves and electric plants among scattered reserves. However, because of the high demand for plots on the Industrial School Reserve, a waiting list was established; only a few families from outlying villages could move to Alert Bay each year. Funding for the relocation of houses was severely limited, further restricting the number of families able to move, despite a reduction of services within their own communities.

For transportation to Alert Bay, the majority of villagers were dependent upon an individual within the community who was wealthy enough to own a larger boat. In most cases, this was the chief of the Band, who often belonged to the "future-oriented class" described by Rohner (1970), and was typically among the first to leave the village. Consequently, when the chief moved from the community, links with supplies and employment opportunities were severed. In addition, several heads of households lost their jobs as seiners when the chief/boat owner relocated.

Not everyone wanted to leave their isolated village, being content with their traditional lifestyles enhanced by modern amenities. Yet, as more and more people felt forced into leaving the communities to obtain better education, medical services,
housing and employment opportunities, the reduction in the quality of services and facilities was further reinforced and rationalized by the Indian Agent. Caught in a cycle of depopulation and reduction of services, people had fewer and fewer choices about staying in remote communities.

In New Vancouver, without consultation with the Band Council, the decision to leave vacant the teaching position for the academic year was taken by the regional superintendent, effectively closing the elementary school as of August 31, 1969. Parents were told by the teacher on behalf of the Indian Agent that it was their responsibility to ensure that children were enrolled in school; if the children were truant, they could be taken from their parents and made wards of the Crown.

Most of the parents in isolated villages such as New Vancouver did not want to send their children to boarding schools, because of their perception that growing up separated from families increased the potential for children to "get into trouble". Education in the villages was provided up to the sixth grade, after which children were enrolled in schools in larger centers. Families with most of their children away from home became frustrated by the inconvenience of visiting their offspring, a factor that contributed to dissatisfaction with village life.

At least in New Vancouver, at no time was any financial assistance or social counselling offered by any government
representative regarding the relocation of families or the community as a whole. No compensation was offered to families for property left behind, although it was impossible to rent or sell the dwellings because of the withdrawal of government services.

Families from remote villages continued to move to Alert Bay. In 1971, the North Island District Council passed a resolution which named a portion of the Industrial School site Whe-la-la-u, established a management committee and agreed on a subdivision plan for housing members of bands previously located in outlying islands. However, during the 1970s and early 1980s blockades were set up by the Nimpkish to prevent further relocation of homes from remote villages to Whe-la-la-u, asserting that the land belonged solely to the Nimpkish. In 1974, 40 acres of Whe-la-la-u were acquired by the Nimpkish and an additional 11 acres were turned over to them in 1981. Members of Bands from remote reserves such as the Tanakteuk felt that they were not welcome in Alert Bay, yet their traditional villages had fallen into such disrepair so as to no longer be habitable. The question of ownership of the Industrial School Reserve is still in dispute.

Opinions of DIA Personnel

Interviews were conducted with two DIA staff concerning departmental policy and activities relevant to the dispersion of Bands from remote communities. Excerpts from an interview by Geach (1987) with a third staff member of DIA is also presented.
According to Bobby Joseph (pers. com. 1988), an employee of the Campbell River District Office during the 1960s, there had always been a tacit policy within DIA to encourage Bands from remote reserves to relocate to more central and accessible reserves. Officially, the reason given was to provide improved education, social services and housing for Indians. Indeed, as Indian parents became aware of the benefits of education and the importance of health care, they were anxious to live in communities which provided these services. The implicit rationale within DIA for the withdrawal of government services from these areas, however, was "to civilize us, to get rid of Indians, to make us white like everyone else so that we wouldn't be any different". According to Joseph, the goal of total cultural assimilation underscored all DIA programs, although this was never documented in an official policy directive to his knowledge.

In addition, reserves in the region were increasingly isolated, and employment opportunities declined as a result of the Davis Plan, the licencing scheme introduced in the fishing sector in the 1960s. It was difficult for families without their own transport to survive in remote communities (pers. com. Joseph, 1988).

In an interview with Geach (1987), Alex McConnell, Director of Capital Programs of DIA, stated that he was unaware of any explicit departmental policy that encouraged the relocation of Indians from remote communities to more central and accessible
reserves. However, he indicated that limited employment opportunities in the area, an increasing sense of isolation, and the growing attraction of the Industrial School Reserve as a settlement were factors that contributed to Band members' decisions to relocate.

A regional planner of 16 years experience with DIA, Alain Cunningham, also stated that no explicit policy to encourage the relocation of Bands from remote communities to centralized reserves existed (pers. com. 1988).

Historical Indicators

Very little information relevant to the Band's dispersion from New Vancouver was found in a review of DIA District and Regional Files. Shkilnyk (1985) suggests that for DIA personnel, the issue of relocation may not have been important enough to warrant documentation. Two letters do provide some evidence of DIA's rationale for relocation of various bands. These letters were written by A.E. Fry, District Supervisor for the North Island District, and addressed to the Regional Director. A relevant excerpt from one letter (DIAND, 1971) is presented below:

"Reviewing briefly the reasons for the relocation they are:
1) Changes in the economic pattern and the consequent change in the pattern of essential services in the North Island area have deprived four villages in the mouth of the Knight's Inlet to the east of Alert Bay of employment, schools, convenient access to stores and other normal services and any dependable transportation method to essential medical service."
2) Under these circumstances it has become increasingly illogical for these Bands to participate in the Department's programs for Indian people in their own villages on their own reserves. Their existing housing is inadequate and services are practically non-existent. Many people no longer have any place to stay and are scattered about the area in the most uncertain of living arrangements.

3) Alert Bay is the center of the economic and social life of the area. Fishing employment is based there, men hire out from there into logging, there is some service employment in the town itself and there are schools, stores and medical facilities. Families living there can, for example, send their children to the provincial school each day whereas from the no longer viable villages the children have to be sent to an Indian Affairs residence at enormous social and financial cost.

4) There is land in Alert Bay set aside for the use of all Bands in common and the District Council has directed that this must be used for a housing development for the benefit of these people whose own villages are no longer a possible place to live."

In another letter from Fry to the Regional Director, off-reserve housing is recognized as an inappropriate solution to the problem of relocation for some Indians, since some "continue to require a reserve as a physical base for their life style" (DIAND, 1969).

Like the Tanakteuk, the Quawshelah people (Tsulquate Band) of Smith Inlet also inhabited a remote reserve in the region, and had similar social and economic problems. In 1964, this community was relocated to a location just north of Port Hardy, B.C. The following reasons for relocation were given by DIA: poor housing conditions; remoteness from supplies; no water supply; no existing water distribution; no school facilities; no
electricity. In 1962, the Quawshelah people had voted unanimously to relocate. It is reported that prior to the voting the residents were informed by government agents that if they remained in Smith's Inlet they would receive no help at all from the Department (Geach, 1987). The position of DIA regarding assistance available to Tanakteuk Band members may be similar.

A federal program was designed in 1965 to offer Indians opportunity for financial assistance and social counselling services in relocation to employment centers. However, there were no criteria for the selection of candidates for this program, nor were additional references to this program located in District files. A.C. Roach, the Kwakiutl Indian Agent in 1965, stated in a letter to the Regional Manager that, "No organized plan for relocation has been instituted in this Agency under the program of relocation assistance" (Canada, 1965).

SUMMARY

In this chapter, a historical analysis of Kwakiutl society from pre-European contact until the 1960s was presented, using the categories of community socioeconomic structure suggested by Weaver and Cunningham (1984). Key events contributing to the depopulation of some of these villages in favour of settlement in more accessible, centralized communities was discussed.

Almost exclusively and without consultation, changes in modes
of economic production and institutions have been forcibly or indirectly imposed on Indian society by the non-native majority who hold political and economic power. While Indians have benefitted from the adoption of centralized services and amenities, damage to the psychological and cultural collective may be irreparable.

Through understanding the historical transformations of a people's productive economic activities and institutions, a realistic evaluation of contemporary society can be made. Clearly Kwakiutl society and culture were as developed according to their own standards as was European society.
Whether their intentions were to provide us with services or to assimilate us, it doesn't matter.

The results were the same: they took away our soul.

Bobby Joseph.
May, 1988
Over the past thirty years, regional and development planning policies of the Canadian and American governments have aimed to reduce unemployment, accelerate economic growth, eliminate regional disparities, mitigate poverty and promote social justice and national unity. The purposes of this chapter are: 1) to examine the concepts on which national and international regional development and planning initiatives were based during the 1950s and 1960s, and determine the influence that programs emerging out of these concepts had on planning for remote Indian communities, such as New Vancouver; and 2) to examine how the Department of Indian Affairs' orthodox approach to development, in which the assimilation of Indians into mainstream Canadian society was emphasized as part of the process of modernization, affected Indians such as members of the Tanakteuk Band.

The concept of growth centers characterized international regional planning theory and practice from after World War Two until the early 1970s (Weaver, 1978; Hansen, 1974). The works of Isard, Friedmann, Perroux and others proposed that the centralization of industry and services in urban centers would result in the stimulation of regional economic growth and development, while minimizing costs attributed to economies of scale not possible with scattered, small communities. During the
1960s, government initiatives based in polarized development theory were implemented throughout all regions of Canada, including areas with a concentration of Indian communities. It wasn't until the works of Frank, Sunkel and Coraggio emerged out of a growing disenchantment with the concepts of polarized development in the late 1960s that alternatives to development were suggested: the "underdevelopment" and continued dependency of Third World nations resulted from structural factors rather than unequal development. The situation of the North American Indian was analyzed in this context, based on accusations of internal colonialism fueled by non-natives' paternalism and greed for land.

Much of the literature on the development of Canadian Indian policy emphasizes that government intervention in Indian affairs has been solely motivated by paternalism or racism (Cardinal, 1969; Manuel & Posluns, 1974; Ponting, 1980; Weaver, 1981; Gibbins & Ponting, 1986). By eliminating cultural attributes that define "Indianness", assimilation of Indians into mainstream Canadian society would supposedly improve the standard of living of natives while eliminating further government financial and political responsibility for the group--an important factor for a government that judged many of its programs solely upon the criteria of economic efficiency (Matthews, 1977). Based on the outlook described above, the relocation of Indian communities in
the late 1960s was justified by implicit beliefs among government representatives that the "development" of Indians required their assimilation from a traditional culture into modern, non-native society.

But this assumption is too simplistic. Undoubtedly, the policies and programs of DIA have historically been motivated by racist and paternalistic desires for cultural assimilation; however, various political and social events that influenced the Canadian psyche during the 1960s resulted in the public's demand that Indians have access to the same standard of living enjoyed by non-native Canadians. At the time, the centralization of communities as outlined in polarized development theory was accepted among government representatives, including DIA, as the most efficient way of providing access to services and facilities for all Canadians, including Indians.

Therefore, it is argued in this thesis that the relocation of Indian communities such as New Vancouver during the late 1960s resulted from the implementation of widely accepted planning strategies in combination with policies and programs whose objectives were cultural assimilation.

Issues to be discussed in this chapter are: the evolution of ideas about regional development and planning; theories about the perpetration of underdevelopment; internal colonialism—a portion of the underdevelopment critique—applied to the situation of the North American Indian and members of the Tanakteuk; and the
political and social climate of Canada during the 1960s which influenced government initiatives and programs. The development of DIA policy and programs and their implications for remote Indian communities in the 1960s are then described.

The Evolution of Theories of Regional Development & Planning

Although the lineage of regional development thinking can be traced to the works of Peter Kropotkin and Patrick Geddes at the turn of the century, contemporary regional doctrine dates back only 30 years. It was in the decades following World War II that an explicit concern for economic development was combined with theories purporting to explain the location of economic activities, giving birth to regional science and spatial development planning (Weaver, 1978). The main architects of this synthesis in the United States were Douglass North (1955), Walter Isard (1956) and John Friedmann (1955); and in Europe, Francois Perroux (1950, 1955). Out of this literature emerged an interest in growth pole theory and polarized development.

North (1955) proposed that regional economic growth occurred in response to exogenous demand for regional resources. According to export base theory, the concepts of regional complementarity and increasing regional inter-dependency pointed to a continuing process of functional integration of the national space economy. Thirty years later, increasing the territorial division of labor, decreasing the friction of distance and augmenting the level of
inter-regional trade are still usually said to be the keys to local economic growth and development (Weaver, 1978).

Isard (1956) argued that the cost of overcoming the friction of distance should be considered of equal importance with other production factors of labor, resources and capital; market mechanisms would arrange economic activities in their optimal, profit-maximizing locations. Such an economy would be predominantly urban-centered, implying a high degree of polarization in the location of people, resources and capital.

In 1955 Friedmann suggested that the primary concern of planners should be to optimize the location of economic activities, implying that regional planning must become spatial systems planning. As rural to urban migration increased, the links established between and within urban centers became increasingly important.

As part of the conceptual evolution in the field of planning, the idea of growth poles began with Francois Perroux. Poles were groups of industries that would attract other industries, starting a process of self-sustaining economic growth which would radiate throughout the economy (Perroux, 1950). Darwent (1969) distinguishes between growth poles, defined in terms of the expansion of interrelated economic sectors, and growth centers, defined in terms of geographic location. Because growth center policies rely on the concentration of sectoral activities within
very specific geographic places, Hansen (1974) insists that the terms can be used interchangeably, as utilized in this thesis. It should be emphasized that growth centers are not simply urban centers that are growing rapidly (Hansen, 1974). Rather, a growth center is an object of public policy and government designation.

In 1957 Myrdal expressed concern that economic development, having started in certain favored locations, would continue through a process of circular, cumulative causation. Growth would be transmitted through a network of spread and backwash effects. He warned that conscious policy intervention would be required to prevent the cumulative advantages experienced in the initial growth areas from causing backwash effects to prevail in most other places.

In 1958 Hirschman proposed a concept similar to Myrdal's, although he spoke of "trickle-down" and "polarization". Hirschman maintained that, while development might polarize around initial growth centers because economies of scale could be rationalized and the effects of distance minimized, eventually trickle-down effects would predominate in the search for resources and new markets. Initially there would be an international and inter-regional inequality of growth, but out of the imperatives of capitalist geographical expansion, subsequent growth centers would emerge.

The transformation of the growth pole notion from an abstract concept applicable to geographic space can be attributed to
Boudeville (1966) and Friedmann (1966). The doctrine can be described as follows: disparities in welfare between different regions can be overcome by extending the polarized development process into depressed areas, through the establishment of growth centers which link such areas to the economic growth impulses generated within the broader urban system. At first, most analysts agreed that eventually an equalization of regional incomes would be achieved (Borts & Stein, 1962; Williamson 1965). However, Perloff et al. (1960) argued that some areas, changing over time in response to changes in the structure of the national economy, would become increasingly wealthy, while other areas would experience an absolute decline in their volume of economic activities.

After extensive work in the Third World, Friedmann re-emphasized this less optimistic view. He concluded in A General Theory of Polarized Development (1972, original 1967) that polarized development was a predominantly political process, with a dominant core area systematically exploiting its surrounding periphery through a monopoly of information and political power. Explanations of, and prescriptions for growth and development in spatial terms must cover many non-economic variables to be successful (Darwent, 1969). Friedmann argued that eventually a crisis of transition would occur, leading either to a diffusion of political power and economic opportunity, or ending in
continued exploitation and possible political revolution.

This was only the beginning of a growing critique of the growth pole theory based on observations of unequal development. Orthodox theories of development in the works of North, Issard, Myrdal, Hirschman, Friedmann and Perroux share Rostow's assumptions (1960) that modern sectors of the economy are the engines of growth, and that technological change acts as the stimulus for progress. The injection of capital for economic development, coupled with education and training hastens a traditional, "backwards" society through various stages of growth, culminating in a modern, industrialized society based on mass-consumption. Rostow (1960) presumes in his stages of growth theory that the concepts of development and modernization are interchangeable.

The lack of development in traditional societies has been attributed to the character or values of a culture (Hallowell, 1955; Barnouw, 1950; Spindler, 1955; McGregor, 1946). Development is said to be promoted as traditional ties are weakened, through education or physical integration into modern (urban) regions. Traditional societies, such as Indian cultures, with values inappropriate for participation in the modern economy will become economically redundant, and will experience poverty and unemployment. Orthodox development theories favour economic considerations to such an extent that the social vitality of traditional societies is completely ignored (Matthews, 1977).
As illustrated in Chapter Two, on the basis of European standards, non-natives perceived Indian communities such as New Vancouver to be lacking in capital, resources, training and skills. The value of subsistence activities was ignored when calculating economic vitality. Social vitality was recognized, but was viewed as an impediment to development. Attempts to eradicate the potlatch, and to educate Indian children in residential schools demonstrate the eagerness of non-natives to hasten the development of natives from a traditional society to a modern one by destroying the value system and culture of Indians.

As Indians were reduced to minority status in Canadian society, it became increasingly difficult (or undesirable for some natives) for Indian communities to resist incorporation into the modern economy.

The Theory of Underdevelopment

In 1967, Frank published a critique of orthodox theories of development that challenged the assumptions on which the theory of regional growth was based. He argued that economic development must be examined in terms of the global economic system to understand underdevelopment. Foreign exploitation of natural resources and foreign industrial investment resulted in dependency, alienation, social disintegration and suppression. Certain areas would have to exploit the potential surplus of other areas in order to develop.
Sunkel (1973) made a comprehensive application of dependency theory to spatial development, and concluded that individuals who do not serve the needs of transnational corporations are excluded from the modern sector of the economy. The marginalized population becomes landless rural peasants who move into urban areas where they can barely survive.

The neo-Marxist critique was applied to growth center theory by Coraggio (1975), who concluded that growth center policies not only could do little to spread economic growth and development, they actually thwarted it by implanting new points of capital expropriation and dominance in the dependent space economy. Growth centers merely extended the spatial pattern of underdevelopment.

Weaver (1978) summarizes underdevelopment theory in the following terms: functional economic power, removed from the control of territorial authority, exacerbates the social and geographical inequities inherent in polarized development. The hypothesized spread effects of economic growth suffer fatal leakages as economic multipliers are captured by distant industries and financial institutions. Labour, capital, and resources of poor regions are exploited by unequal terms of exchange. Increasing dependency on outside economic interests results. Small scale local production and traditional social relationships are destroyed as a result of competition and
uncontrolled urban-industrial development. Only those individuals who serve the outside economic interests themselves benefit, while those who do not are marginalized from the process of development.

In dependency theory, underdevelopment is the outcome of an exploitative, dependency-creating relationship between "core" and "periphery" economic sectors. The peripheral society remains underdeveloped as the result of a complex of political and economic relationships and structures upon which it has become dependent, and which are controlled by and serve the interests of the core society.

The early 1970s saw an explosion of literature on the theories of underdevelopment and its application (Amin, 1974; Stuckey, 1975). Some investigated the economic heritage of colonialism and neo-colonialism (Rodney, 1972; Brett, 1973; Leys, 1974) and the role of urbanization in underdevelopment (De Souza & Porter, 1974; Soja & Weaver, 1976). Hechter (1975) suggested that the economy of Britain was sustained by core/periphery exploitation. Other studies along this theme quickly followed (Secchi, 1977; Lee, 1977; Tarrow, 1977; Seers et al., 1978; Tarrow et al., 1978), fueled by the resurgence of cultural regionalism in many areas of the world (Weaver, 1978).

Internal Colonialism and North American Indians

The theory of internal colonialism has been used as a tool in
the analysis of dependency and underdevelopment among Canadian and American Indians for over thirty years. Prior to Frank's theory on underdevelopment in Latin America, Cohen (1960) suggested that the policies of the American federal government have been guided by the desire of whites to gain a monopoly over Indian resources, and that policies were predicated upon a long-run goal of minimizing the cost of their control. Hagen (1962) added that colonialist practices of the American Bureau of Indian Affairs was the principal source of Indian poverty. Thomas (1966) argued that the colonial relationship between American Indians and the government undermined traditional native social structures, and in conjunction with the high degree of social isolation promoted by confinement to reserves, resulted in Indian underdevelopment and an internal elite of marginal Indians.

Patterson (1971) describes the parallel experiences of native North Americans and other colonized people as including their relocation to reserves and their loss of land, the use of military force, the introduction of contagious diseases, genocidal warfare, and the rise of messianism as a reaction to colonial domination. Jorgenson (1971) uses Frank's metropolis-satellite framework to attack acculturation theories of Indian underdevelopment by demonstrating that the integration of Indians as satellites of the white American metropolis generates the conditions which allow an economic surplus in the form of land and natural resources to be drained off for the benefit of
whites. Present Indian underdevelopment is a direct result of colonial domination which has used political power to maintain an exploitative relationship (Jorgenson, 1971).

Other researchers have adapted the colonialism model to the Indian in the United States (Ruffing, 1979; Anders, 1979 & 1980) and Canada (Puxley, 1977; Marule, 1978; Kellough, 1980; Frideres, 1983). Dependency theory and the colonialism model in Canada have been illustrated using examples of the effects on native communities of renewable and non-renewable resource extraction controlled by elites of the modern economic sector. The role of trading companies in Canada is one of the first demonstrations of dependency theory at work (Wien, 1986). Recent examples concentrate on oil and gas exploration by multinational corporations in the Arctic (Watkins, 1977). Both Wien (1986) and Ponting (1986) argue that the Canadian government—that is, DIA—have played the most prominent role in the underdevelopment of Indian societies, largely through the implementation of policies and programs, including welfare distribution.

According to dependency theories and colonialism models, the traditional sector of native society is neglected or actively undermined in terms of resource allocation as the modern sector develops (Asch, 1977). The social structure of peripheral native societies is affected, due to external ties associated with dependency. The use of capital intensive technology and
institutions which support it is created and controlled by non-native interests extraneous to the locale of the Indian community. Most Indians cannot benefit from employment opportunities created by modern development because they lack the necessary skills and education. Local development is suppressed as any economic surpluses are drained away. Consequently, the Indian community ends up in a worse predicament than before the onslaught of modernization due to two factors: all important decisions are controlled externally; and the objectives of the modern sector are based on external priorities, and are not designed to satisfy local needs.

The theory of internal colonialism can be illustrated using the situation of the Tanakteuk Band. Resources from their traditional land base were sold to multinationals in the forestry and fishing industries, such as MacMillan Bloedel and B.C.Packers, at prices controlled by the multinationals. Band members became indebted to these companies for the purchase of supplies and equipment to remain competitive in a technologically advancing market. Long term leases for resource development projects on reserve land were arranged by Indian Agents who used their political power to maintain an exploitative relationship. Functional economic power was essentially removed from the control of territorial Indian authority, since decisions were subject to final approval by DIA.

Subsistence activities such as fishing and hunting were controlled by the imposition of government regulations and
licensing schemes, and trapping was ruined by large scale mining and logging activities within the region. As traditional means of economic production were altered by the modern sector, inhabitants of New Vancouver became increasingly dependent upon external injections of capital, such as welfare payments. Psychologically, the isolated community came to depend upon the provision of external agencies for services. As economic productivity was eroded by a decreasing land base, and their position in non-native society was marginalized, Tanakteuk Band members moved to urban centers such as Alert Bay. Traditional social relationships weakened, and many Band members felt alienated from their culture.

With no real political or economic power, Indians as a group experienced poverty and levels of unemployment that were significantly higher than non-native Canadians. Attention now turns to an examination of factors in Canada during the 1960s which facilitated the implementation of government programs designed to address poverty and unemployment.

**Canadian Values and Planning Processes During the 1960s**

The implementation of policies and substantive theories in regional/development planning are based on ideological assumptions that, together with the socio-economic, political and spatial organization of a country, change the contents of planning and determine its outcome (Friedmann & Weaver, 1979). To
understand planning initiatives implemented by the Canadian federal government during the 1960s—initiatives increasingly based on the concept of growth center doctrine—one must realize that the period was characterized by concerns about national unity, regional economic disparities, ethnic diversity, and the elimination of poverty.

The 1950s and early 1960s were a period of intensive urbanization in Canada. A gradual but noticeable shift in values towards an urban focus resulted (Robinson, 1981), preceding legislative changes (Phidd, 1974). The passing of the Agricultural and Rural Development Act (ARDA) as part of a regional development strategy in 1961 illustrated the government's pre-occupation with rural poverty and unemployment, as well as efficient land use.

The creation of the Atlantic Development Board (ADB) in 1962 represented the first comprehensive strategy to arrest regional disparities in Canada, an issue that was to dominate federal politics throughout the 1960s (Phidd, 1974). The 1963 establishment of an Area Development Agency (ADA) allied to the Department of Industry reflected the government's intention to speed up economic development and industrial adjustment by providing tax concessions to industrial firms located in areas of high unemployment. The shift towards promoting economic growth in urban rather than rural regions had begun. In 1965 it was
complemented by the creation of mobility training programs designed to encourage labour to reside in urban centers (Weaver & Gunton, 1982).

Until this time regional development policies had followed an ad hoc approach (Francis, 1974). The Economic Council of Canada was established in the mid 1960s as part of a comprehensive system of planning. It emphasized improved administrative co-ordination between federal and provincial governments and stronger emphasis in regional policies on a growth-oriented approach to provide greater spill-over effects from the more prosperous areas to the more depressed ones (Phidd, 1974).

The Privy Council of Canada declared war on poverty in 1965, heightening the public's demand that something be done immediately to address the issue of poverty in Canadian society (Lotz, 1977). For most Canadians, poverty was not simply determined by levels of income, but included the quality of available services, such as housing, schools, medical and social programs, as well as the satisfaction of aspirations (Harp, 1971). These demands for service delivery had evolved out of conditions associated with the growth of the welfare state.

According to Anderson & Boothroyd (1984), the basis of the welfare state is the classical approach to development, which recognizes the importance of competition and the market place in allocating wealth, coupled with subsidization, regulation, residual welfare, Keynesian economics, and institutional welfare,
to offset the unfairness and inefficiency of the market place. These elements were present in every federal planning initiative of the late 1960s.

Initially, Canadians expected the government to provide an adequate "safety net" to the disadvantaged individual or region through residual welfare programs, such as social assistance payments. Government-sponsored activities could achieve two goals at once when Keynesianism was combined with residual welfare theory: national economic fine-tuning, and local social rehabilitation (Anderson & Boothroyd, 1984). Gradually, Canadians expected the government to provide universally a vast array of services to meet a vast range of assumed needs. Canadians began to perceive government as a constructive, rather than a mere regulatory, agent (Gertler, Lord & Stewart, 1975), resulting in institutional welfare programs, such as medicare, old age pensions, and public education. Institutional welfare, which sees development as an ongoing social activity requiring ongoing state action and support, legitimizes government intervention in society (Anderson & Boothroyd, 1984). The welfare state reached its zenith in Canada in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Canadians' perceptions about the appropriate role of government and the welfare state in the late 1960s paved the way for the acceptance of government planning initiatives.

In 1966, as part of the federal government's attack on regional
disparity, the Fund for Regional Economic Development Act (FRED) was passed to concentrate on rural poverty and employment opportunities. Programs financed by FRED were conceptualized in terms of total and integrated social and economic planning (Poetschke, 1971).

A report published in 1967 by the Economic Council of Canada forecast the end of federal regional development strategies that emphasized rural initiatives as exemplified by ARDA and FRED. Its authors were critical of earlier programs designed to achieve rural economic growth, and insisted that "labour force adjustments" which encouraged the movement of population out of areas of underdevelopment were needed (Buckley & Tihanyi, 1967). Regional development policies were evaluated strictly on the basis of economic criteria, and if the authors showed concern about the social consequences of their proposed "adjustment", it was tempered by their belief that economic gains would compensate for social and cultural loss (Matthews, 1978).

In 1968, regional development in Canada moved from the economic to the political arena. Pierre Elliott Trudeau promised if elected Prime Minister of Canada, he would attempt to rectify regional economic differences in the interests of national unity. The Department of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE) was established in 1969; its programs concentrated on industrial incentives, infrastructure assistance and social adjustment in "special areas" to improve Canadians' standard of living.
Industrial incentives were believed to be the key to solving the problem of regional underdevelopment. Industrialization was equated with the process of modernization, which was essentially a consolidation of smaller economic, political, and social units into larger ones in the interests of a more rational and efficient distribution of resources (Glenday, Guindon & Turowetz, 1978). Once substantial improvements were made to infrastructure and social services available in a selected region, industry was supposed to be attracted to these urban centers because of incentives, and opportunities and a reduction of poverty would result (Matthews 1978). From 1969 onwards, government spending was concentrated almost exclusively on urban development initiatives. Services in remote communities were reduced, and no new investment opportunities outside of urban growth centers were encouraged.

As previously outlined, the concept of growth centers was popular in international planning theory during the early 1960s. Rather than adopting a regional development approach from a distinctly Canadian experience, such as Harold Innis's staples theory (1930)—in which economic activity is concentrated around the production of a primary resource commodity for export—the international paradigm of polarized development was adopted. Frank's criticisms about polarized development and the theory of
underdevelopment (1967) were ignored by Canadian planners, or they were not yet incorporated into our national psyche.

With little attention being paid to developing jobs in rural areas, workers from these regions had little choice but to move to urban centers (Iverson & Matthews, 1968). Proposed industrial developments in urban areas received widespread publicity during the late 1960s, attracting many migrant workers who benefitted from high paying, temporary construction jobs on public work projects designed to improve infrastructure for industries. The result was a massive rural depopulation, further rationalizing the withdrawal of services from smaller communities. Government cited the cost of maintaining and providing facilities and services to only a handful of people scattered over a large geographical area (Wadel, 1969), and pointed out that centralization was more economically efficient. As urban centers were flooded with migrant workers, a labour surplus often resulted; the rural poor simply became the urban poor (Harp, 1971). Mobility did not necessarily reduce disparities in income for individuals or areas.

The emphasis on development in urban growth centers and the consequent depopulation of rural communities in the late 1960s affected all regions of Canada. But it was more apparent in severely economically-disadvantaged regions, such as the Maritimes, farming communities throughout Western Canada, and coastal regions of British Columbia. Remote fishing communities,
or outports, in Newfoundland were also targeted for development oriented around growth pole doctrine. Residents of outports were offered financial incentives to relocate to designated growth centers under a five-year joint federal-provincial resettlement program, which began in 1965. It was renewed for an additional five years in 1970. From 1969 onwards, the resettlement program was administered by DREE.

Under the initial program, a total of 119 outports were evacuated (Copes & Steed, 1973). The second phase of the program saw only a trickle of applications for resettlement, fueled by anti-urban sentiments that had received wide currency throughout North America. Eventually, the list of communities targeted for evacuation was cancelled, and the resettlement scheme was abandoned (Copes & Steed, 1973).

During the late 1960s remote and rural communities throughout Canada experienced the withdrawal of government-funded services and facilities as a result of efforts to centralize the population into urban locations designated as growth centers for industry. This included non-native as well as Indian communities. The reader is reminded of the reasons given by DIA for the resettlement of the Tanakteuk from New Vancouver to urban centers such as Alert Bay, as outlined in Chapter Two: for improved access to employment opportunities, services and facilities which were provided with greater economic efficiency associated with
economies of scale and the centralization of physical and human resources. DIA's resettlement of remote Indian communities was a perfectly rational act, given the acceptance of growth pole doctrine that prevailed in international and national regional planning theory and practice at the time.

However, the resettlement of native communities was also encouraged to speed up the process of cultural assimilation of Indians into mainstream Canadian society. Attention now turns to an examination of DIA policies and programs, as well as social and political events in Canadian society during the 1960s that influenced the Department of Indian Affairs.

DIA's Policies & Programs During the 1960s

Among Canadians, general knowledge of the conditions of Indians prior to 1960 was limited; most Canadians tended to recognize natives across the country as a homogeneous ethnic group, in ignorance of their cultural diversity. Canadians were also largely ignorant of DIA's policies and programs (Weaver, 1981). However, a Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons was appointed to examine Indian administration in 1959, resulting in an increase in the awareness of "the Indian problem", as well as the arousal of moderate public concern. The report recommended that DIA speed up the process of integrating Indians into the wider Canadian society (Canada, 1961).

The issue of ethnic diversity in Canadian society was
heightened by discussions about Quebec's demand for greater autonomy within Confederation during the 1960s; this increased Canadians' awareness of Indians as a special minority. As efforts to stamp out poverty received greater media attention in 1965, Indians became more visible to the public and were placed all too obviously among the most disadvantaged minorities in society (Harding, 1965; Borovoy, 1966). The release of the Hawthorn Report (1967), a study of the conditions of Indians in Canada, also fueled interest in natives. The report demonstrated that Indians suffered from extreme poverty, underemployment and unemployment in comparison to non-native Canadians.

Policies and programs of the federal government directed towards the development of Indians came under intense criticism during the 1960s. The public attributed the plight of the Indian to historical paternalism. Public sympathy for the Indian cause was enhanced by the civil rights movements in the United States, and by the emerging nationalism of decolonizing Third World nations. The youth movement and activism on campuses in Canada lent further support (Tanner, 1983).

What, then, were DIA's policies and programs during the 1960s that caused such national outrage? The legislative dominance of the Indian Act—compared to over 4,000 separate and unsystematized statutory enactments in the United States (Harper, 1946)—makes the evolution of Indian policy over one hundred years relatively easy to trace. Several major policy motifs have
been identified by Gibbins & Ponting (1986): protection of Indians from the evils of white society, assimilation, and the adoption of Christianity.

Until the 1970s, of these three motifs, assimilation was the central pillar. Indians needed to shed their language and customs to become self-sufficient members of modern society; until that time, they were to be protected by special legislation and treatment (Miller et al., 1978). After all, whites had their best interests at heart. Ignorant of white ways, Indians' views on their own welfare were not to be given much weight. Christianity would speed the adoption of European values while saving souls. The process of assimilation was encouraged through education, enfranchisement, and settlement. Ironically, the creation of reserves and the confinement of Indians to them isolated natives from European society, slowing the process of assimilation. Subsequently, Indians were encouraged to leave their communities and migrate to urban centers, where they could experience the benefits of modernization.

The federal government's program to modernize the administration of Indian affairs after World War Two included a tripartite policy: 1) to expand and improve educational facilities; 2) to introduce to reserves the types of welfare services and social assistance programs that had been extended to other Canadians after 1945; and 3) to implement a system of local
self-government (Tanner, 1983). Although the Indian Act had been subject to frequent amendment since 1876, at the end of the 1960s it did not differ greatly from the original form (Ponting, 1980). Neither did policy governing Indian affairs. The assumptions on which the Act was based, however, were now expressed with greater subtlety, as were policy objectives when racism became less acceptable during the 1960s.

As reflected in its policy, DIA's approach to development rests on the following assumptions: first, Indians are on a path from a traditional society to a modern one; second, movement along this path is inevitable, irreversible, and beneficial; third, the appropriate government strategy is to assist the transition to a modern society primarily by providing physical improvements and social services to Indians on the basis of equality with other Canadians; and fourth, the main barriers to development are the attitudes and culture of the Indian people (Shkilnyk, 1985). This is clearly an orthodox orientation to development.

In response to increasing awareness and criticism by the Canadian public, DIA implemented a variety of programs from 1963-67 to reduce Indian dependence on government through the encouragement of local initiatives in Indian communities. These programs included the transfer of federal services to the provinces, the creation of Indian advisory boards, experimental relocation programs, research on the administration of justice, draft legislation for an Indian Claims Commission, and community
development programs. It is generally agreed that all of the programs failed (Weaver, 1981).

The attempt to transfer federal services to the provinces in 1963 failed because most provinces argued that Indians were a federal responsibility under the BNA Act. In 1965, Indian advisory boards were established at national and regional levels, ostensibly to allow for Indian participation in the government's decision-making process. Gradually, Indian representatives came to feel that the program was designed to circumvent participation and consultation at the community level; Indian leaders rejected the Boards as a satisfactory method of offering input into policy and programs (Weaver, 1981). The advisory boards were terminated in 1967.

In 1966, an experimental program began to relocate families from remote reserves where unemployment was high to larger settlements with job opportunities. Although some adults improved their educational skills, the program failed to help them make the difficult adjustments to off-reserve life, and most returned to their reserves (LLoyd, 1967). The program was not continued.

Concerned with the large number of Indians in jail, DIA began a study of the problem in 1964. The report did not result in any immediate program revisions. Another program centered on the issue of land claims and treaty obligations. In 1963, a bill to provide an advisory mechanism to settle claims was introduced in
the House of Commons, and circulated to Indian communities across Canada. The Government's failure to recognize the concept of aboriginal title, as well as its inability to deal with the issue of cost of compensation, created anger in Indian communities, and an Indian Claims Commission was never established.

Perhaps of greatest significance was the failure of community development programs introduced in 1964. Under the program, the objectives of reducing dependency on DIA and promoting self-determination and confidence were pursued with vigour by idealistic community development workers. Inevitably clashes with Indian Agents arose, as Agents perceived their authority challenged (Lotz, 1977). The traditions of the bureaucracy triumphed; community development workers were withdrawn.

In the mid-1960s, DIA extended the concept of local government to communities in its efforts to encourage self-determination. Under regulations provided by DIA, Indian bands could administer certain programs such as social assistance, recreation, and work opportunity programs. The results were unexpected: a decade later, government had become the major employer on most Indian reserves, making Indian people more dependent on government support than at any other time in history (Weaver, 1981).

These programs reflected DIA's assumptions about development which characterized its policies until 1970. Indians were not invited to participate in, nor were they consulted about the implementation of programs.
In 1969 the federal government proposed a radical change in policy direction, *A Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy* (DIAND, 1969), referred to as the White Paper. It mirrored the government's crusade to protect the rights of individuals, while de-emphasizing collective ethnic survival (Gibbins & Ponting, 1986). The policy change proposed that the legislative and constitutional bases of discrimination be removed; the *Indian Act* was to be repealed. Rather than being legislatively set apart, Indians were to receive the same services as other Canadians, delivered through the same channels and government agencies. In addition, the White Paper recognized that lawful obligations incurred by the government through treaties must be respected, although a very limited interpretation of treaty rights was expressed, and that the control of Indian lands be transferred to Indians. The White Paper paid scant attention to the liabilities accumulated from the inequalities of the past (Ponting & Gibbins, 1986).

The proposals outlined in the White Paper were immediately compared to the diastrous termination and relocation policy implemented by the United States government from 1945-60 (Weaver, 1981). The program, which attempted to relocate unemployed Indians from reserves to urban areas, offered financial incentives to natives who participated. Its objectives were to speed the process of assimilation and thus terminate the need for
reserves and federal authority. Relocation resulted in the loss of leadership on reserves, while most American Indians simply traded rural poverty for urban slums. Urbanized Indians suffered economically, socially, and psychologically. Many lost their culture. Eventually, natives interpreted the policy as being governed by ulterior motives designed to facilitate the total assimilation of Indians into mainstream American society (Tyler, 1973; Fixico, 1986).

The process out of which the White Paper evolved epitomized DIA policy-making over the century. After two years of consultation with Indians across Canada, ostensibly to receive their input about changes to the Indian Act, the government released a report which totally ignored the Indians' input. Natives were outraged. Even though the White Paper had called for a recognition of the unique contribution of Indian culture to Canadian life, Indians charged that the new policy was a thinly disguised program of extermination through assimilation (Cardinal, 1969). Native leaders viewed the policy as an attempt by the government to deny responsibility for their welfare.

The White Paper was eventually retracted in 1971. Assimilation was at least officially placed aside as an explicit policy goal, although it may well continue as a socio-economic and cultural process (Gibbins & Ponting, 1986).
Summary

During the 1960s federal planning initiatives in Canada were based on the concept of growth pole doctrine popular in international regional planning theory, despite increasing criticism of this approach. Remote and rural communities across Canada were centralized into urban "growth centers" to promote regional economic development, and to take advantage of economies of scale when providing services and facilities. This approach to development resulted in the closure of many native and non-native communities. The political, economic and social climate of mainstream Canadian society at the time influenced federal planning initiatives for regional development, as well as affecting policy and programs within the Department of Indian Affairs.

The emphasis on growth pole doctrine in Canadian planning initiatives during the 1960s extended to development approaches for native communities. Communities like New Vancouver experienced a reduction in services and facilities, and the population was encouraged to resettle in urban growth centers where opportunities for employment were greater and services could be provided at reduced costs.

However, there was an additional motive behind encouraging Indians such as the Tanakteuk to relocate to urban centers: to speed up the process of assimilation into mainstream Canadian society. Federal government policy towards Indians has been
characterized by orthodox development approaches, even though their underdevelopment may be attributed to factors associated with internal colonialism.
Good intentions
don't mean a thing ...
CHAPTER FOUR: AN EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTS OF RELOCATION FROM NEW VANCOUVER TO URBAN CENTERS, & AN ASSESSMENT OF THE LEVEL OF NATIVE SUPPORT FOR THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF A TANAKTEUK COMMUNITY

In the previous chapter, it was demonstrated that DIA development policy during the 1960s aimed to improve Indians' access to services, facilities and employment opportunities, and to speed the process of cultural assimilation. In the case of Kwakiutl Indians, were these objectives achieved?

To help answer this question, the results of a survey of Tanakteuk Band members are evaluated (Appendix 1). The survey attempts to: 1) determine Band members' perceptions about the factors which led to relocation; and 2) to assess the impact of relocation on their lives. In addition, at the request of the Chief and Council of the Band, the survey evaluates the level of support among Band members for the re-establishment of a Tanakteuk community in New Vancouver in the near future.

The analysis is supplemented by additional sources, namely interviews with Band members, national statistics of socio-economic conditions of Canadian Indians residing off-reserve, a consultant's study of Mamaleleqala Qwe'Qwa'sot'enox Band members who, like the Tanakteuk, were relocated from their community of Village Island, and literature on the effects of relocation.

The chapter is divided into three parts: a general profile of
Canadian Indians residing off-reserve is presented, followed by a profile of Tanakteuk Band members. The third part discusses survey results, including circumstances contributing to relocation from New Vancouver, the immediate impacts of relocation on families, a summary of Band members' current lifestyles, and an assessment of support among Band members for the re-establishment of a community in New Vancouver.

Prior to a discussion of survey results, several points must be made. Although there are many examples of Indian communities across Canada which were relocated in entirety, to make way for a hydro-electric dam for example, such is not the case with inhabitants of New Vancouver and other Kwakiutl communities in the region. Instead, and far less dramatic, as a result of trends described in Chapters Two and Three, families quietly packed their belongings and scattered to communities across Vancouver Island.

Unlike members of other Indian bands who have the option of returning to communities on-reserve should an urban lifestyle be unsatisfactory, the Kwakiutl bands such as the Tanakteuk lack this alternative. Houses and infrastructure on-reserve have deteriorated to the point where dwellings are no longer habitable.

Because these Kwakiutl Indians do not reside on reserve, they are not entitled to benefits which are derived from reserve
status, such as receipt of Band support program funds for administration of capital and social programs, housing and infrastructure subsidies, opportunity for self-government, and exemption from property tax. They are, however, entitled to educational assistance and medical benefits similar to any status Indian living off-reserve.

Profile of the Canadian Off-Reserve Population

In Canada, the off-reserve Indian population has grown steadily from the 1966 level of 42,000 to almost 100,000 persons in 1981. This represents 30% of the total Canadian status Indian population (Siggner, 1986). In comparison to other provinces, British Columbia has the highest proportion of its native population living off-reserve. The young working-age group between 25 years and 44 years continue to show the greatest tendency to reside off-reserve. The effects of the June, 1985 legislation to amend the Indian Act (Bill C-31) on the proportion of Indians living on-and off-reserve have yet to be evaluated.

Depending on demographic, social, housing, and economic conditions both on- and off-reserve, migration to urban centers is expected to increase (DIAND, 1980). Migration between reserves and urban centers can occur several times throughout an individual's life (Nagler, 1975).

Levels of educational attainment among off-reserve Indians appear to be well below those of the average Canadian, but are
higher than that of on-reserve Indians. Twenty percent of off-reserve Indians have post-secondary education in B.C., in comparison to 13% of on-reserve Indians (Siggner, 1986).

Unemployment of off-reserve Indians is consistently three to four times higher than that of the non-Indian population, regardless of the state of the national economy. This is usually attributed to lack of training, physical disability, and discrimination in employment (DIAND, 1980). On-reserve unemployment rates range from 35 to 75 percent, usually depending upon the proximity of reserves to urban centers, seasonal factors, and the definition of "non-wage" (traditional) pursuits. On-reserve, the majority of employment opportunities result from federal or band-sponsored government initiatives. Officially, the unemployment rate in rural/reserve areas is only slightly higher than in urban non-reserve areas, at 18 and 16 percent respectively (Siggner, 1986).

Low average incomes and high levels of welfare dependency for off-reserve Indians are a direct reflection of their high unemployment rates. According to Stanbury, in 1975 about 30% depended solely on social assistance; two-thirds of families and individuals lived below the poverty line. It is not surprising that a significant proportion of Indians off-reserve live in substandard housing. In 1980, 83% of off-reserve Indians in B.C. rented accommodation, in comparison to 30% nationally for non-natives (DIAND, 1980). Perhaps as a reflection of poor housing
conditions and overcrowding, Indians living off-reserve in B.C. were three and a half times as likely to be hospitalized as non-natives (Stanbury, 1975).

Conditions for Indians living off-reserve in terms of education, employment, income and housing appear to be only modestly better than for Indians on-reserve (DIAND, 1980). It must also be kept in mind that off-reserve Indians are ineligible for benefits associated with on-reserve status. Unfortunately, direct comparisons between on- and off-reserve populations are difficult because it is beyond the jurisdiction of DIA under the Indian Act to maintain statistics on off-reserve Indians.

Tanakteuk Band Profile

At the end of 1987, Tanakteuk Band membership totalled 124, including one dozen Band members re-instated as a result of Bill C-31; another 17 applications are being processed. Sixty-eight Band members (60%) are female. The population is relatively young: fifty-one Band members (41%) are 18 years or younger; and 72 Band members (58%) are between 19 years and 65 years. Only one Band member is over the age of 65 (INAC, 1988).

Ninety percent of Band members live off-reserve, scattered throughout urban centers on Vancouver Island and the Lower Mainland. The remaining 10% reside on other Indian bands' reserves, or at Whe-la-la-u, the parcel of land in Alert Bay set aside for Indians who relocated from special access communities
during the 1960s. The Band office is located in Campbell River.

Due to the Band's dispersion and incomplete Band records, the whereabouts of many Band members is unknown. This contributes to the difficulty of presenting an accurate socio-economic profile of the Tanakteuk. A survey of an Indian band in circumstances similar to that of the Tanakteuk (Geach, 1987), and interviews with Tanakteuk Band members, point to certain trends. Individuals 40 years or over have had little formal education. Those between 19 and 40 years have achieved a higher formal educational standard, with most having partially completed high school. Only a handful of Mamaleleqala and Tanakteuk Band members have attended post-secondary institutions.

The training and skills of Tanakteuk Band members who live in and around Campbell River and Alert Bay reflect their traditional relationship with the resource base of the area. The fishing and forestry industries have been important for training and skill acquisition. Many male Band members have worked in both industries, fishing during the summer months and logging during the off-season. Several female Band members have training in accounting, bookkeeping and secretarial work. The majority of female Tanakteuk Band members are primarily homemakers, several of whom are married to non-natives. A few of the younger women are single mothers dependent on social assistance.

In general, the Campbell River-based Tanakteuk Band members
have a more stable employment history than either the Port McNeill-Alert Bay group or the Vancouver group. The majority of Band members living in the Campbell River area are fishermen, which accounts for their relatively stable incomes. Those in Port McNeill and Alert Bay rely more on seasonal work. Unemployment benefits are often collected in between periods of work. The unemployment rate in the Campbell River area is much lower than that of the Alert Bay area.

With one notable exception, Band members based in Vancouver have a very poor employment history. Their situation parallels that of most Canadian natives living in urban centers.

The Survey

In conjunction with the Chief and Band Manager of the Tanakteuk Band, a survey was designed by the author in four parts to determine: 1) the circumstances which contributed to a family's decision to leave New Vancouver in the late 1960s; 2) the immediate impacts of relocation on the lives of Band members; 3) what Band members lives are like today; and 4) the level of support for re-establishing a community at New Vancouver. The questionnaire was sent to the 26 heads of households on the Band membership list whose current addresses are known, along with an explanatory letter signed by Ann Glendale, a Councillor and Band Manager. Replies were to be returned within a month in the self-addressed, stamped envelope provided.
Responses were received from six of the 26 questionnaires. After an ample amount of time had passed, 13 heads of households who had not replied to the mailed questionnaire were contacted in person or by telephone. The other seven heads of households were no longer at the given address, and their whereabouts were unknown. In total, the opinions of 19 heads of households were gathered, representing a 73% response rate of those asked to participate in the survey. A summary of survey results appears in Table 1.

Circumstances Contributing to Relocation

Thirteen of the 19 individuals contacted stated that their families departed from New Vancouver because of the school closure; they had no choice but to leave in order to obtain an education. Ten of the 13 respondents were children enrolled in elementary school in New Vancouver in 1969, so the decision to leave was taken by their parents. The remaining three of the 13 who responded in this category were parents in New Vancouver; most of the other adults at the time are deceased.

Three of the 19 respondents stated that they left in order to be less isolated from services and facilities. In a similar vein, two individuals responded that they or their families left when transportation links between New Vancouver and other communities in the region were severed. One respondent left for personal reasons.
TABLE 1: SURVEY RESULTS

Note: Unless otherwise noted, the sample size is 19.

Circumstances Contributing to Relocation

Main reason for leaving New Vancouver for another settlement:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>School/no choice</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To be less isolated</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due to transportation</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Did government representatives contact family prior to leaving?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too young or uncertain</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Immediate Impacts of Relocation

What was the most difficult thing about moving?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finding a job</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finding a house</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nothing</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lonliness/Meeting new people</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Did moving from New Vancouver result in physical or mental problems?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How often did you see friends & relatives?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequently</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Few time a year</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**TABLE 1 (CONTINUED)**

If schooling in New Vancouver was available, would your family have moved anyways?

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Was it easy to find work after relocating?

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too young</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Was more or less money spent on food each week?

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Did your family feel as if they belonged in the new community?

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Current Lifestyles**

Where you live now, do you

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Own</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Didn't say</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Address unknown</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Additional 7 responses added to the sample size of 19, for a total of 26 respondents.)

Are there members of your household currently involved in organizations or activities to promote Indian culture?

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do people in your house speak or understand Kwakwala?</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has your family ever wanted to move back to New Vancouver and live as before?</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Support for Community Re-establishment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Maybe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If there was an elementary school in New Vancouver, would you want to live there?</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If there wasn't an elementary school in New Vancouver, would you want to live there?</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Maybe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Would you like to be more involved in the planning of a new community?</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do you think that the government asks you enough about what you want for the future?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is interesting to note that no one indicated that the primary reason either they or their family left New Vancouver was to find work. The results may have been different if those who were adults at the time had participated in the survey. Several Band members stated that employment in the area was available, but without access to it, their families could not benefit.

When asked whether the family would have left New Vancouver if the school had continued to operate in the community, seven of the 19 Band members who responded replied that they would have relocated elsewhere regardless. Eleven respondents believed that either they or their parents would have chosen to stay in the community if the school had remained open. One respondent did not reply to this question.

When asked whether members of the community had been consulted by a government representative about the school closure, most respondents stated that they were too young at the time to know. Two of the three respondents who were adults in 1969, including one of whom was on Band Council, stated that the Indian Agent did not contact them. The spouse of the Chief at the time insisted that Band Council had been notified of the decision. All Band members agree that no assistance to relocate was offered by the government, nor was there compensation for property abandoned as a result of relocation.

When asked to suggest what the government could have done to
help families relocate from New Vancouver, several recommendations were repeatedly offered: financial compensation should have been forthcoming; assistance in obtaining employment and appropriate accommodation should have been provided; help in adjusting to a new culture and lifestyle should have been available. Almost all of the responses were prefaced with remarks that Band members should have been given the opportunity to participate in the decision to stay in New Vancouver or to relocate. Only two individuals stated that it was not the government's responsibility to assist in any way.

The Immediate Impacts of Relocation

Prior to relocation, six families lived in New Vancouver. After the closure of the school in 1969, one family with no children continued to live on the island for several years. Members of the other five families moved to Campbell River, Fort Rupert, Nanaimo, Alert Bay, Victoria and Vancouver, depending on the location of extended family members. Thus, in reply to the question whether family ties were affected by relocation, most responded that they continued to see family and friends frequently, or at least several times a year.

Eleven of the 19 respondents identified problems associated with meeting people and adjusting to a mostly non-native environment as the greatest difficulty resulting from the relocation. Most of the respondents were children at the time of
the move, and consequently were enrolled in a much larger school than the one left behind in New Vancouver. Three respondents identified problems with finding work as the major difficulty. One respondent did not reply to this question. Four respondents stated that they did not face any difficulties.

Twelve of the 19 respondents perceived the move from New Vancouver as resulting in physical or mental problems for members of their families, in comparison to seven who replied that relocation did not affect their physical or mental health. No one was aware of any suicides that could be directly related to relocation.

Nine of the 19 respondents stated that they did not feel as if they belonged in their new community. Six people did not have an opinion, and four individuals felt as if they belonged in their new surroundings.

In response to the question "Was it easy to find work after moving from New Vancouver", eight of the 19 respondents stated that they were enrolled in school at the time. Three people replied that they obtained employment soon after leaving New Vancouver, while eight people responded that they had difficulty in finding a job. Not including the eight school children at the time, eight of the 11 individuals who were employable at the time, had difficulty in finding work.

All of the respondents stated that their families spent more money on food each week after leaving New Vancouver.
Current Lifestyles

Most of the 19 respondents stated that they liked where they currently live, although a few mentioned that despite the passing of 20 years, they still miss the close ties established between family and friends in New Vancouver.

Seven of the 19 respondents own homes off-reserve; four individuals rent accommodation off-reserve. Six respondents rent accommodations on-reserve, mostly in Whe-la-la-u; two participants did not reply to this question. It is assumed that the seven respondents who were sent surveys but whose whereabouts are currently unknown do not own their homes, since the individuals were no longer living at the address. It is estimated, then, that at least 17 of the 26 heads of households do not own their own homes.

Seventeen of the 19 respondents are not involved in any organization or activities to promote Indian culture, while two people are involved. Slightly more than half of the respondents do not speak or understand Kwakwala, most likely the younger members of the households. Participation rates in Indian organizations of Band members whose whereabouts are unknown cannot be determined.

When asked whether their family has ever wanted to move back to New Vancouver and live as before, ten of the 19 respondents said yes, six said no, and three individuals had no opinion. When
asked to identify what it is that is missed about their lives in New Vancouver, several responses were given: the sense of community and "oneness" with the land, culture, friends and family; the peace and quiet that was recalled; and the sense of well-being and healthiness associated with a subsistence lifestyle.

Support for Community Re-establishment

The current Chief and Council wish to evaluate the level of support among Tanakteuk Band members for re-establishing the community of New Vancouver. In the letter of explanation accompanying the survey, Band members were not asked for a definite commitment to move, but to indicate whether they are interested in the possibility. At this time, specific plans or strategies could not be proposed, except to state that employment would be based on fishing, forestry and tourism, with assistance for initial training and funding requested from the government.

In response to the question "If there WAS an elementary school in the community, would you want to live there?", five heads of households replied yes, seven replied no, and the other seven heads of households were uncertain. Because no specific plans could be proposed at this time, the high rate of uncertainty among respondents is to be expected. In reply to the question of whether there would be interest in living in New Vancouver if there WASN'T an elementary school on the island, four heads of
households replied yes, ten replied no, and five were uncertain.

Nine of the 19 respondents would like to be involved in the planning of a new community; seven were not interested, and three were uncertain. Individuals who were interested in participating listed a variety of skills needed to build and maintain the community as a viable economic unit: operating heavy equipment, house-building, plumbing, installing electrical wiring, book-keeping, accounting, logging, and commercial fishing.

In response to the question "Does the government ask you enough about what you want for the future?", twelve heads of households replied no, one said yes, and six declined to answer.

Comparison of Tanakteuks' Responses to Classic Responses

The impacts of forced relocation on native and non-native individuals and communities have been well-documented (Buffington et al., 1974; Johnson & Burdge, 1974; Burdge & Ludtke, 1973; Napier, 1973; Wilson, 1973; Colony, 1972; Fellman & Brandt, 1970; Wadel, 1969; Iverson & Matthews, 1968; Thursz, 1966; Kemp, 1965; Fried, 1963). Some of the effects of relocation are psychological stress; disruption of social ties and established social patterns; changes in housing conditions, tenure and costs; changes in location causing changes in accessibility to jobs, services and activities; and changes in the economic situation of relocatees. In general, the poor and members of minority groups suffer the greatest hardship in relocation (Finsterbusch, 1980).
For Tanakteuk Band members, the effects of relocation from the community of New Vancouver are similar to those described in the studies listed above. Certain individuals are happy with the eventual outcomes of relocation, and others continue to grieve for their lost homes. Although the community was not forcibly relocated, the majority of Band members felt as if they did not have a choice about leaving behind their homes in New Vancouver, as demonstrated in the survey; therefore, their perceptions of being forcibly relocated are valid.

Tanakteuk Band members suffered from psychological stress and a dramatic change in social patterns from relocating. According to interviews with Band members, the majority were thrust into an environment which they were culturally unprepared for, and the shock of adjustment to non-native society was great. The majority of Band members felt unwelcome in their new communities, and related an increase in physical and mental problems of family members to the forced relocation. Although the survey is unable to determine whether there was a direct increase in alcoholism or incidences of suicide among Tanakteuk Band members resulting from relocation, other studies of native communities have documented this (Shkilnyk, 1985; Dickman, 1969; Lal, 1969; Landa, 1969). In interviews with Band members, most indicated that they did not experience a traumatic disruption in family ties, although this may be more of a function of historically having extended family in many communities.
Band members experienced changes in accessibility to jobs, services and activities as a result of relocation. Whether the impacts have been positive is debatable, and the argument is laden with value judgements. Access to services and facilities improved. Access to traditional subsistence activities was severely restricted in urban centers, nor was it as easy to participate in cultural events in a non-native environment. As for employment opportunities, nearly half of those surveyed stated that it was not easy for them to find work upon relocating to urban centers. Many Band members are currently employed as fishermen, an economic activity that was pursued prior to relocation, while others still require unemployment benefits to supplement wages obtained through seasonal labour as loggers. Previously it was stated that the unemployment rate for on- and off-reserve Indians currently does not differ significantly. Therefore, it is difficult to state with certainty that Tanakteuk Band members benefitted from improved access to employment opportunities as a result of relocation.

As described in other studies on the effects of relocation, people who are forcibly moved may experience changes in economic conditions. Several off-reserve Tanakteuk Band members must rely on social assistance, similar to Indians currently living on-reserve. Off-reserve Band members can no longer easily supplement their diets with food from traditional activities, and thus
expenditures on food have increased.

Perhaps one of the most noticeable results from relocation for Tanakteuk Band members has been in changes in conditions in housing, tenure and costs of accommodation. At least 17 of the 26 heads of households currently do not own their own homes; prior to relocation from New Vancouver, all of the heads of households owned their homes. Granted, there has been an increase in total band membership, and it is recognized that most Indians on-reserve today face serious overcrowding, and long waiting lists for quality accommodation. However, off-reserve status Indians are not entitled to the same housing benefits extended to on-reserve Indians under the Indian Act. In combination with a denial of other rights extended to on-reserve Indians such as tax exemption and band support programs, it would seem that the situation of Tanakteuk Band members has not significantly improved as a result of relocation from New Vancouver.

Summary

In this chapter, the results of a survey sent to the 26 known heads of households on the Tanakteuk Band membership list were evaluated to determine the impacts of relocation, and to evaluate support for the re-establishment of the community of New Vancouver. Responses were obtained from 19 of 26 individuals, representing a response rate of 73%.

The evaluation of the survey results would be strengthened if
all Band members participated. However, because of the Band's dispersion and poor records, this is not feasible. In addition, the majority of respondents were children in 1969, and many adults at the time of the relocation are now deceased. It is difficult to determine what effects nostalgia has had on the reflections of Band members' responses.

Notwithstanding these caveats, based on the survey results, interviews with Band members, and statistics on the socio-economic conditions of off-reserve Indians, it is possible to evaluate whether the objectives of planning and development initiatives taken by DIA during the 1960s were achieved: to improve Indians' access to services, facilities and employment opportunities, and to speed the process of cultural assimilation. Undoubtedly Indians such as Tanakteuk Band members have received greater access to services and facilities from relocating to urban centers. Judging from the decline in participation in Indian organizations and activities, and the declining ability to communicate in native languages, cultural assimilation into non-native society has been facilitated.

Only a minority of Tanakteuk Band members participate in traditional activities today (pers. com. Glendale, 1988). Whether employment opportunities were enhanced by relocating to urban centers from New Vancouver is not certain. Band members identified that they faced difficulty in finding jobs in their new locations, and it is not possible to demonstrate clearly that
the socio-economic condition of Band members 20 years later is superior to what it would have been had the community of New Vancouver continued to exist. The quality of life has been dramatically altered, but whether it has improved is debatable.
"You don't solve a community problem by eliminating the community."

A. McDonough on the relocation of Africville, a community of black Nova Scotians in *The Globe & Mail* July 2, 1988
CHAPTER FIVE: DEVELOPMENT AND POLICY APPROACHES IN THE 1980S

In introducing this chapter, two adages come to mind, namely "You can't go home again"; and "Home is where the heart is." The conflict between these two statements is apparent. For many Kwakiutl who have been relocated from communities in their traditional homelands, if this is where their hearts are, then they must go home again.

The objectives of this chapter are: 1) to evaluate some alternatives for Indian development, including an assessment of the desirability of re-inhabitation of homelands, using the Tanakteuk community of New Vancouver as a case study; 2) to examine official DIA policy on the re-establishment of communities as a mechanism for development; and 3) to consider the implications that DIA policy has for the development of the Tanakteuk Band, and other Indian bands in the future.

This chapter is organized into two parts. In the first part, certain critical assumptions are identified, followed by a discussion of criteria to evaluate the success of development initiatives. These criteria are applied to the orthodox development approach characteristic of DIA policy. A description of an alternative development approach that is widely accepted in the literature ensues.

In the second part of the chapter, various development scenarios that an Indian band without a community—such as the
Tanakteuk—may wish to consider are presented and evaluated according to the criteria outlined. Discussion then focuses on the rationale for supporting the re-establishment of communities, using New Vancouver as an example. After this, the formulation of a community development strategy for the Tanakteuk is suggested, and the argument is made for DIA support of a community. The Department's current policy on extending support for the re-establishment of "new" communities is then presented, and implications of this policy for the Tanakteuk Band, as well as other Indian bands in similar situations, are discussed.

Critical Assumptions

The discussion in this chapter is underlaid by several critical assumptions. Indian culture and inherent values on which it is based are distinct from that of other ethnic minorities in Canada. Initiatives must be taken by natives and non-natives alike to appreciate and strengthen that culture, which is invaluable to all Canadians. As Canada's first inhabitants, Indian citizens should enjoy special rights, such as self-government and self-determination. Finally, the formal recognition of historical atrocities committed by non-natives against the Indian people over the past one hundred years does not constitute sufficient retribution for these wrongdoings. Federal and provincial governments must take additional
measures of financial compensation for stolen resources, and continue support for meaningful development initiatives.

Criteria to Evaluate Development Initiatives

Early development strategies focused primarily on economic growth; it was assumed that a national growth in per capita income would, in time, lead to the solution of other problems associated with underdevelopment such as poverty and the inequitable distribution of income and services (Allen & Anzalone, 1981; Sameter, 1984). However, the realization that economic growth has not worked as expected led to the questioning of assumptions on which this concept of development is based. Within the past twenty years, many definitions of development recognize the increases in desire for self-determination, self-reliance, participation in decision-making, and a sense of purpose in life and work as being the essence of development (Wien, 1986).

The situation of native people in Canada as an underdeveloped society is quite different from the problems of many Third World indigenous peoples. While the underlying principles for development may be universal, the "basic needs" approach to development favoured by many international organizations in the 1980s is inappropriate for Canadian Indians: influenced by consumption expectations characteristic of industrialized nations, Canadian natives wish to achieve a standard of living
which is at least convergent with our national norms.

To evaluate the success of development initiatives in Canada, the following criteria must be met: development must proceed under local (that is, Indian) control; projects must meet local priorities and needs; development plans must build an integrated economy; and initiatives must emphasize collective ownership and control (Whittington, 1986; Wien, 1986; Frideres, 1983; Usher, 1978; Stanley, 1978; Berger, 1977; Watkins, 1977). An emphasis on the use of small-scale, less capital-intensive forms of production which minimize impacts on the environment may also be included as a criterion.

Economic development schemes for Indians must be initiated and controlled by Indians (Usher, 1978; Frideres, 1983). This does not necessarily mean that resource extraction would cease or that multinational corporations would not be involved; capital and technology requirements in some industries would dictate otherwise. But control over the development process, and clear ownership of the land and resources would enable Indians to control the pace and purpose of developmental activity. This would enable them to capture resource rents, to develop backward and forward linkages with a view to building a more diversified economy, and to pursue development patterns that are consistent with their cultural and environmental priorities (Wien, 1986).

A major objective of development must be to satisfy the needs
and priorities of local people as opposed to outside needs (Weaver, 1978). According to Whittington (1986), the important considerations of economic development for natives are: the generation of native employment opportunities; the training and development of natives in the skills necessary to participate in economic development schemes; the provision of local services; and the stimulation of the local economy.

According to Wien (1986), development plans need to be integrated in at least two respects: modern and traditional activities need to be developed together, rather than one at the expense of the other; and various sectoral development strategies need to be integrated, so that complementarities result. This would also enhance the security of the local economy, eliminating over-dependence on the dictates of world market prices for a single commodity.

Initiatives that emphasize collective ownership and control are also essential (Ponting, 1986; Mackie, 1986). Individual ownership, or competitive individual occupational mobility, is an approach that yields benefits for the few at the expense of many, and leads to the formation of elite families and extreme inequalities (Wien, 1986). Frideres (1983) argues that natives must reject the idea of individual entrepreneurship because this leaves the economic structure that is dominated by non-native society intact.

Native development initiatives should emphasize small-scale,
labour-intensive projects and forms of production (Usher, 1978) designed to utilize local resources that are plentiful, and to conserve resources that are scarce. Berger (1977) states that natives want a healthy economy based on renewable resources because such development is more suited to maintaining, and perhaps strengthening their social fabric and not destroying the environment on which traditional activities are based. In addition, renewable resource development could act as a buffer to protect natives from the negative social and economic impacts of large-scale industrial development, with its site-specific, non-renewable resource economy, and its typical boom-and-bust cycle, especially in the north.

Criteria Applied to Orthodox Development Approaches

Orthodox development approaches which form the basis of DIA policy do not meet the criteria discussed above (Wien, 1986). Department personnel largely decide which projects are economically feasible in the community, with little input from Indians; fiscal control rests with DIA personnel; projects are sectoral in nature, and export-based in orientation (Lithman, 1982). A $345 million Native Economic Development Fund was established to promote native self-sufficiency in 1983; however, this program emphasizes individual entrepreneurship, not community economic development. (According to The Globe & Mail (August 24, 1988), less than half of the funds allocated to the
five-year program have been released as of August 1988. The program is due to expire in March 1989.)

Lithman (1982) argues that DIA is more concerned with the development of its own agenda than with its clientele. He suggests that DIA personnel have established an internal system of rewards which has very little to do with the rewards of their work for Indian communities; this system measures success based on advancing one's position within the federal bureaucracy rather than promoting development in Indian communities. Neither is the mode of DIA operations designed to make personnel responsible or committed to the development of specific communities. Lithman adds that the actions of DIA personnel are designed to protect their adherence to euro-Canadian values, not to Indian communities, and this contributes to the failure of DIA orthodox development approaches. Projects are judged solely by economic criteria, regardless of other factors, such as skills acquisition, which may contribute to the overall development of individuals or communities.

An examination of the DIA budget reveals that the Department's approach to development has been to supply goods and services (INAC, 1987). Almost all of the budget is devoted to the provision of welfare, housing, and education. These expenditures are remedial in nature, and the proportion of the federal budget going to developmental or preventative activities is estimated to

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be only six to fourteen percent (DIAND, 1980). Clearly, DIA's approach satisfies the basic needs of most Indians, but does little to address the broader issues associated with development.

The results of this type of "development" are despair, dependency, and the disintegration of the social and cultural fabric of Indian communities (Shkilnyk, 1985). Poverty and the effects of anomie, such as alcoholism, child abuse and suicide are perpetuated. As presented in Chapter Four, the socio-economic profile of on- and off-reserve Indians, in comparison to that of non-native Canadians, illustrates the failure of past approaches.

In general, orthodox development theories result in class inequities and cultural assimilation (Wien, 1986). The pattern of external financial and technological dependency on the federal government must be broken, and the appropriation of Indian resources by the public and private sectors must stop. Because the nature of dependency, and the ends and means of self-reliance are not merely economic, the social and political institutions presently supporting dependent development must also change. A narrowly focused, top-down approach is no longer acceptable to native communities (Sinclair, 1985). What then is the solution?

An Alternative Approach to Development

A consensus about an alternative approach to Indian development has appeared in the literature over the past decade (Anderson & Boothroyd, 1984). Two examples of this new thinking are A
Strategy for the Socio-Economic Development of Indian People, published jointly by the National Indian Brotherhood (NIB) and DIA in 1977, and the Jack Beaver report, To Have What is One's Own, published in 1979. The Beaver report's two major policy recommendations were for the implementation of Indian self-government, and for the implementation of community-based planning and development; the latter presumes adequate money, technical assistance, and administrative support structures to implement plans. The planning orientation is bottom up, complemented by top-down decentralization of planning control from government. Under this approach, DIA would be restructured to facilitate development, not initiate or control its proceedings, which become a function of the community.

The recommendations for Indian socio-economic development strategies discussed in the National Indian Brotherhood's report in 1977 are similar to those made in the Beaver report. The NIB report states that development should focus on serving the interests and needs of the community, rather than those of outside interests, or those of the individual. Enhanced local initiative and local planning are the predominant objectives of the proposed NIB strategy. The report stresses that greater emphasis must be placed on developmental projects which support self-sufficiency as opposed to the predominant welfare orientation of existing programs. According to the NIB report, the role of DIA should be to coordinate development initiatives
in Indian communities.

Anderson & Boothroyd (1984) have described the approach outlined in the Beaver report as a synthesis of territorial development and a systems approach. This approach involves increasing the independence of bands economically, organizationally and culturally as appropriate, while also taking advantage of and participating fully in the larger national society, under guidelines based as much on the bands' own terms as on society's terms. A synthesis of territorial development and systems approaches attempts to combine the advantages of both, while recognizing the limitations of each.

Territorial development emphasizes a diversified economy focused on internal variety rather than community specialization. Weaver (1978) states that territorial development refers to the use of an area's resources by its residents to meet their own needs--needs which are defined by regional culture, political power and economic resources. The political, economic, social and cultural aspects of a community must be integrated in development initiatives. He identifies two of the major substantive components of territorial development as selective closure, that is, attempting to meet the region's needs internally, and strategic regional advantage, which means limiting development of resources for export to those which enjoy a favored bargaining position for whatever political or economic reasons.
Under the territorial development approach, regional communities, rather than the state, are the dominant political structure. Indian development should involve increasing Indian independence—at the band or regional level—from the larger society. At the community level, bands would control the pace and direction of change, and evaluate economic development initiatives according to impacts on culture and the environment. The territorial development approach views Indian culture as an asset.

In contradistinction to the territorial development approach, the systems approach stresses the need for political, economic, social and cultural integration of the community into the larger social system, having recognized that societies throughout our world are increasingly and inextricably intertwined. Supporters of the systems approach insist that progress is inevitable, and the development of complexity ideal because it is more adaptive to change, and thus more stable (Holling, 1978). Under such an approach, Indian communities should be encouraged to fully participate in a highly integrated, interdependent, hierarchial and homogenizing world economy, where each region specializes in the production of those goods and services for which it has a comparative advantage (Cunningham, 1984).

Under the systems approach, band government should be strengthened, although bands should not be fully autonomous, in order to protect the rights of the individual. The state plays an
equally important role as does the community or band government. Change in Indian culture is judged as inevitably good, and geographical mobility to a non-native environment should not necessarily be avoided.

Both the territorial development approach and the systems approach satisfy the criteria discussed previously in this chapter. Both share fundamental areas of agreement, although perhaps for differing reasons. According to Anderson & Boothroyd (1984), both approaches agree that mere revision of welfare state programs are insufficient, market forces cannot solve all problems, development is essentially an integrated process, and economies are strengthened by diversification. Both approaches believe in strengthening territorial organizations smaller than the state. And both approaches see the need for a restructuring of DIA.

Under a synthesis of approaches, DIA would act as a development facilitator and as an interface between bands and the government. The systems approach would be taken to developing the contractual and organizational relationships between bands and the government, and the cultural and social fabric of the community would be strengthened internally by using the territorial development approach (Anderson & Boothroyd, 1984). By combining the territorial development approach with the systems approach in Indian development, it is recognized that local change should not
be held up pending national change, at the same time that changes made locally may facilitate change in larger systems as well.

Because the internal market on reserves may be too small to sustain viable industries, native development initiatives must be competitive with industries located in the larger society in order to sell their products in both external and internal markets (Ruffing, 1979), regardless of whether the territorial development or the systems approach is emphasized. The former favours internal diversification of a community's economy so as to reduce the need for imports; and the latter approach favours diversification of competitively-priced exports to pay for a broad range of imports. It is ultimately up to community members to determine which approach best suits their needs and goals.

Evaluation of Development Scenarios for the Tanakteuk

In light of the alternatives available, what types of development scenarios do bands without an on-reserve community today consider as appropriate? The Chief and the two Councillors for the Tanakteuk Band, in conjunction with representatives of the Kwakiutl District Council (a tribal council of which the Tanakteuk are members) have considered five options for their development. In a meeting between the Chief and Council of the Band and myself, the criteria proposed by Wien et al were introduced for discussion, and the Chief and Council agreed to evaluate the five development scenarios for the purposes of this
thesis. The results of the discussion are presented below. Other Indian bands in a situation similar to the Tanakteuk's may evaluate the options differently, or may consider alternative options to those presented here.

It must be noted that the Chief and Council favored one option--that of community re-establishment--prior to considering the criteria proposed in the thesis. (Of the five heads of households who have indicated their desire to relocate to New Vancouver as identified in Chapter Four, two sit as members of the Tanakteuk Band Council.) Although it would have been ideal to hold a workshop attended by all Band members to jointly evaluate the five options, this was financially and logistically impossible under the circumstances. However, the five options for development were informally discussed by myself with the 13 heads of households who were contacted by telephone or in person, as identified in Chapter Four. Further research in this area is essential.

Perhaps the simplest option considered by the Band is maintenance of the status quo, that is, Band members may choose not to pursue specific development initiatives. The majority of the Band would continue to live off-reserve in communities scattered throughout the province. This option implies an acceptance of the absence of a geographically-cohesive community of Band members. The Chief and Council rejected this option for
Band development, since it does nothing to promote native self-sufficiency or Band control over collective resources. In addition, this option fails to contribute to the building of an integrated economy for Band members to participate in, or rely upon. As identified in Chapter Four, the five Tanakteuk heads of households who have indicated their support for relocating to a community in their homeland would most likely reject this option as unacceptable, since it does not actively attempt to improve their current socio-economic situation.

The second option that the Chief and Council have considered is re-establishing a community in a location in closer proximity to modern conveniences—perhaps on a parcel of land near an urban center—rather than on one of the remote Tanakteuk reserves. This option is favoured by the Chief and Council of the Mamaleleqala Qwe Qwa Sot Enox Band (Geach, 1987), another Kwakiutl band whose members were relocated to various urban centers during the 1960s.

While this option may result in a geographically-cohesive community, three disadvantages were identified by the Chief and Council of the Tanakteuk Band, prompting them to reject this option for development. Land would have to be purchased, requiring capital the Band does not have. To secure financing, the Chief and Council felt that the independence of the Band may be compromised. In addition, under the current Indian Act, only on-reserve land is exempt from taxation; special tax status could result in the production of cheaper goods and services on-
reserve, providing a comparative advantage for exports from band development initiatives. This, in turn, could contribute to the enhancement of native self-sufficiency and local control. Should the band consider the purchase of off-reserve land, it could try to have the land declared a reserve; however, the Chief and Council were pessimistic that government representatives would agree to do so. Indeed, it would be a time-consuming process. Finally, the Chief and Council rejected this option as culturally undesirable because it does not satisfy Band members' quest for re-establishing a link with their traditional homelands.

The third option for development considered by the Chief and Council was amalgamation with another Indian band in the region with an on-reserve community, allowing Tanakteuk band members to take advantage of benefits derived from on-reserve status. Under section 17 of the Indian Act, if a majority of Tanakteuk Band members voted to join another band, assuming that the second band was agreeable to amalgamation, the Tanakteuk Band would cease to exist. Tanakteuk Band members would become members of the other Band, and Tanakteuk resources would belong to the collective of band members resulting from amalgamation. (Community development at Whe-la-la-u in Alert Bay is ruled out, however, because this reserve already faces serious overcrowding).

The Chief and Council rejected this option because it would result in the extinction of the Tanakteuk Band as a distinct
entity, an action that fails to enhance control over their collective resources. In addition, this option was considered unacceptable since it would destroy the cultural identity of Band members, and do nothing to address the priorities and needs of the Tanakteuk Band. The Chief and Council felt that this option was as unpalatable as was cultural assimilation into non-native society; prior to contact with non-natives, Kwakiutl bands would raid each other's communities for slaves and bounty, and it is unlikely that members of the Tanakteuk would wish to join a band with which there has been past rivalries.

The fourth option considered by the Chief and Council was establishing summer residences on-reserve in New Vancouver, and living in various urban centers for the remainder of the year. This would allow the Band to take advantage of modern services and facilities such as schools, as well as providing limited advantages for promoting cultural identity, and economic benefits associated with on-reserve status. It would allow for native control and the collective ownership of resources, and it could promote an integrated (if somewhat seasonal) economy.

At best, though, this option is a compromise, since any sense of community would be seasonally interrupted. It also requires Band members to invest capital in two communities, rather than concentrating funds for development in one location. This could represent financial hardship for individuals who are already impoverished. It also imposes certain hardships associated with
seasonal relocation every year.

As previously mentioned, the Chief and Council of the Tanakteuk favor the re-establishment of a community in New Vancouver. This was the fifth option for development which was considered. It is discussed in detail below.

Rationale for the Re-establishment of a Community

Based on correspondence with five Tanakteuk heads of households who have indicated a desire to relocate, the re-establishment of a community in New Vancouver would accomplish several objectives. These individuals are angry that they have been denied support for what they believe to be their right as Indians to pursue a traditional lifestyle; and that their children no longer recognize the value of their native heritage and culture because of pressures that promote assimilation into non-native society. They are bitter about the lack of control they have had over their lives in the past, and believe that the best way to regain their pride and dignity as individuals and as a Band is to prove they are capable of looking after themselves and their families. These five heads of households are unhappy with the lifestyle characteristic of urban centers, and wish to return to a way of life that respects traditional ties with the land.

In short, these people want to go home. Their ancestors have lived in and around New Vancouver for thousands of years, and
despite the changes associated with the twentieth century, they want to share a community lifestyle based on the values of their ancestors. This is impossible to do under current circumstances.

Although only five heads of households have firmly expressed their commitment to relocate to New Vancouver at this time, these individuals hope that their initiative will serve as a catalyst for the relocation of other Band members, once the viability of a community has been established. The Chief and Council recognize that relocation to New Vancouver would not be in the best interests of every Band member, and respect differing opinions of individuals on the adoption of a traditional lifestyle. They also recognize that younger Band members may not be satisfied with life in a remote community, but believe that these Band members will come to appreciate the values associated with this way of life as they mature.

Relocation to a community consisting primarily of Tanakteuk Band members would improve the social and psychological conditions of families, build cohesiveness, cultural identity and community pride, and increase the potential for Band self-sufficiency. It would allow Band members to gain control over their collective resources, while meeting their priorities and needs. Perhaps of greatest importance, to support the argument for self-government in the future, the Band would need a strong community within their homelands.

The current living conditions of many Indians who live in
Vancouver and Whe-la-la-u are characterized by poor, overcrowded housing, often with uncertain tenure and little sense of community identity (Geach, 1987). As demonstrated by the survey in Chapter Four, at least 17 of the 26 heads of households do not own their own homes. The establishment of blockades to prevent the relocation of homes from remote reserves to Whe-la-la-u by the Nimpkish Band during the 1970s and early 1980s is evidence of the hostility in the community that Tanakteuk Band members who reside there must face daily. As active participants in their own community, Band members would feel as if they truly belonged.

Many Band members are underemployed, unemployed, or on welfare. In addition to strengthening cultural ties and building Band cohesiveness, a new community would likely provide tangible benefits to many Band members by creating job opportunities and providing affordable housing under secure tenure arrangements. By living on-reserve, Band members would be eligible for benefits associated with residency, as described previously; and would have access to federal programs to which they are currently denied, such as economic development initiatives.

Development of a new community would provide Band members with an opportunity to regain their native identity within a familiar context, slowing down the process of cultural assimilation.
Formulation of a Community Development Strategy

If Indian bands were to re-establish their communities by taking a synthesis of territorial development and systems approaches, what initiatives would be required for the community to function? What follows is a community development strategy that Tanakteuk Band members may wish to consider. It was formulated after an informal discussion about development options was held with the Chief and Council of the Band. With modifications, the community development strategy presented here may be appropriate for other coastal Kwakiutl bands.

The strategy acknowledges the need to match people with resources, and takes into consideration the skills and training available within Band membership. It also attempts to recapture the Band's traditional economic modes of production, re-establish its relationship with the physical environment, re-define its relations with other communities, and re-assert traditional social and educational responsibilities that have been altered during the 20 years since the Tanakteuk left New Vancouver.

Initiatives in mariculture, forestry management and silviculture, and recreation and tourism would form the basis of community economic development. A discussion of the initiatives on which development would be based follows, under the headings of economic, human resources and physical development.

Economic Development:

As illustrated in Figure 3, six of the Band’s seven reserves
are very isolated, scattered along Knight's Inlet (DIAND, 1983). With the exception of the reserve located in Tsawwati, which consists of 163.5 hectares, the reserves are small and fragmented, that is, each is under 50 hectares in size. The reserve situated at Dead Point where the community of New Vancouver was located is less remote, although access is either by boat or float plane. This reserve is almost 40 hectares in size. Travelling time to New Vancouver from Alert Bay is approximately one hour.

Although a current inventory of forestry and marine resources has not been developed in detail, there is definite resource potential on the reserves. All of the reserves have been logged at one time, and the timber currently on-reserve varies between three forestry classes: mature, immature, and not sufficiently restocked (pers. com. Glendale, 1988). Site productivity also varies. The main species found are western cedar, shore pine, Sitka spruce, and western hemlock (Forestry Handbook for B.C., 1983). Under the provincial government's Small Business Enterprise Program, the Band could compete for cutting rights on areas adjacent to their reserves. Reforestation and silvicultural activities also offer prospects for employment of Band members, if suitable funding and contracts could be arranged.

Knight's Inlet is world-renowned for its rich productivity for supporting marine life, where shrimp, abalone, clams, crabs,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number/Name</th>
<th># of Hectares</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Tsawwati</td>
<td>163.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Keogh</td>
<td>43.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Kwatse</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Freda Point</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Sim Creek</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Ahnuhati</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. New Vancouver (a.k.a. Dead Point)</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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FIGURE 3. MAP OF TANAKTUEK RESERVES
scallops, oysters, geoducks and other species are harvested commercially, along with salmon, cod, halibut and rockfish. The West Coast fishing industry is plagued by a number of problems including harvesting over capacity, declining stocks, high cost/price structures, centralization and vertical integration (Pearce, 1982); however, these problems do not affect the viability of aquaculture projects. Sites immediately offshore of the reserves, especially in Knight's Inlet, are suitable for aquaculture development, specifically pen rearing of salmon. There is also the possibility of raising nori (seaweed) for the Japanese market. The harvesting, processing and marketing of clams and oysters is another option (pers. com. Dale, 1988).

The Band's reserves have excellent recreation and tourism potential. Knight's Inlet is already in demand as a destination for sports fishing (Regional District of Mount Waddington, 1985), and requests for accommodation, guides, boat and gear rental could be met if a small resort or fishing camp could be established on one of the Band's reserves. Band members already possess the skills necessary for this type of operation, although some training in the hospitality industry may be required. The Band could also build a small store, marina, and marine petrol station near the site of New Vancouver to service sailboats that ply Johnstone Strait during the summer months.

In addition, subsistence activities would supplement Band members' income, reducing the dependence on external markets.
Human Resource Development:

As discussed in Chapter Four, many Band members have experience in several of the areas suggested for economic development initiatives, although skills upgrading would be required. Administrative skills needed to manage a small community and for business enterprises may be lacking, and no one has experience in mariculture operations. Access to job development programs administered by Canada Employment and Immigration Commission, the Federal Forest Resource Development Agreement program, and the Indian Community Human Resource Strategy would assist in the Band's human resource development strategy. As the community grew, additional skills and training would be required to match the needs of Band members.

Physical Development:

Because of the remoteness of the Knight's Inlet reserves, the logical choice for community development among the Band's lands is the site at New Vancouver. At the very least, the five households who have indicated a desire to relocate to New Vancouver would want the level of services and facilities that the community had up to the late 1960s, that is, utility services including a wharf, electric power generation, and piped water supply. Septic tanks for sewage disposal would be needed. A band office would also be required. The use of appropriate technology in the development of the community would be encouraged. Houses would be single family wooden dwellings, on a minimum of quarter-
acre lots. Local materials would be used wherever possible. The community would expand as required.

As identified in Chapter Four, the lack of access to education within the community was the critical factor in the decline of New Vancouver in the late 1960s; the operation of a school may once again prove to be the determining criteria in the survival and growth of the re-established community. Four heads of households indicated their desire to relocate to New Vancouver regardless of whether there was a school in the community; therefore, a school may not be required immediately. However, considering that 41% of Band members are under 18 years of age, an elementary school may be needed in the future. It would also provide recreational facilities for the community, and could perhaps serve as a health clinic, church and community hall. Secondary education could be provided in Port McNeill.

A feasibility study of re-establishing the community in New Vancouver was conducted by Ker, Priestman & Associates (1986). The report concluded that extensive repairs or total replacement of facilities in use 20 years ago, such as the dock and watertower would be required. An estimate of approximately $500,000 for infrastructure was given. Costs for the construction of houses and a school was not included.

Band members have indicated that they would want to be involved in the planning, design, and construction of the community.
Several Band members have experience in construction, and could contribute their labour to reduce the overall costs of the physical development of the community.

The proposed economic, human resource and physical development strategies attempt to meet the basic needs of Tanakteuk Band members by using their immediate resources; while at the same time recognizing as necessary the integration into broader Canadian society and external markets to satisfy demand for consumer goods that such a small population could not produce. The proposed basis of the community's economy reflects traditional modes of production complemented by modern technology, as well as dependence on the environment and interdependence on each other.

Although assistance from a number of federal departments would be needed, DIA would be the principle liaison between the Band and other government agencies when implementing these strategies. DIA would facilitate development, not control it, by providing technical assistance, administrative support structures, and adequate funding for infrastructure and initial capital. The private sector could participate in future economic ventures.

Why DIA Should Support Indians' Request for Assistance

Based on the author's interpretation of events as described in Chapters Two and Three, what follows is an argument of why DIA should support the re-establishment of communities such as New
Vancouver as a mechanism for the development of bands which were relocated previously.

A violation of trust by DIA regarding the dispersion of Indians from their traditional homeland to communities throughout British Columbia cannot be clearly identified. However, the Department abrogated its moral responsibility to act in the best interests of natives when it withdrew crucial services from remote communities without consultation with them. This action represented a fundamental violation of native collective rights and democratic principles on which Canadian society is based. It also demonstrated gross insensitivity by the bureaucracy to native culture, and suggests that crown representatives took advantage of the ignorance and timidity of Indians which had resulted from one hundred years of oppression.

A decision to support Indians' request for assistance to rebuild their communities would at least partially rectify the past mistakes of the federal government. Albeit after many years and intensive lobbying, the Canadian government has accepted its responsibility for previous errors, and agreed to pay $300 million in compensation to Japanese Canadians who were wrongfully interned during World War Two (The Globe & Mail, September 23, 1988). According to native leaders, the two ethnic groups share similar experiences (The Globe & Mail, September 28, 1988). The actions taken by government representatives against Japanese Canadians and native Canadians resulted from racial
discrimination. Neither group was consulted about their fates. Members of both groups suffered severe financial, social, cultural and psychological upheaval as a result of forced relocation. And, until the announcement of compensation to interned Japanese Canadians, members of both groups were not offered financial compensation by the government for property that they were forced to leave behind when they were relocated.

One could argue that it would be foolish to spend thousands of dollars on a project that has no guarantees of success, or that would only serve the interests of a handful of people. However, it must be recognized that bands without an on-reserve community such as the Tanakteuk have foregone benefits associated with on-reserve status for 20 years. For bands with similar population as the Tanakteuk, but with an on-reserve population, funding can amount to $150,000 to $300,000 per year (Geach, 1987). After two decades, an estimated $3 million to $6 million has been saved by DIA as a result of the Tanakteuk being without an on-reserve community. One could also argue that the financial rewards accrued from selling resources extracted from Indians' land, such as timber, oil and gas, and minerals, have never been adequately returned to Indian communities; if the value of the resources extracted was extracted, it would amount to millions of dollars. Indians argue that this money should be directed towards their future development (Speck, 1987).
Having discussed why I believe DIA has a moral responsibility to support Indians' request for assistance to reinhabit their homelands, I will now examine current DIA policy regarding the issue of relocation to "new" communities. Indians would argue that these communities are not new; rather, they have existed for centuries, and although abandoned for two decades, deserve to be revitalized (pers. com. Glendale, 1988).

DIA Policy On "New" Communities

In response to persistent requests by over 100 bands across Canada for federal assistance to relocate Indian communities, a policy directive describing the criteria which each request would be evaluated against was released by the Minister of Indian Affairs in December, 1987. (The policy also discusses conditions under which expansion of existing reserves would be supported). The policy states that the health and safety of residents is given the highest priority when assessing support for various projects, while emphasizing the government's determination to continue the cost-effective development of reserve communities.

In its policy, the Department distinguishes between two sets of circumstances: 1) where the community has no choice but to relocate; and 2) where members of the community wish to relocate as a result of personal circumstances. Full assistance is promised in the former case--such as a community faced with flooding due to a hydro-electric project--while very little

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encouragement is given to communities such as the Tanakteuk who find themselves in the latter situation. The policy as it applies to an Indian band's request for financial support of the re-establishment of a community such as New Vancouver is as follows:

The department may relocate existing communities or establish new reserve communities, if:

(a) the normal physical development at the existing reserve location is restricted due to topographic or soil conditions, or due to other exceptional circumstances related to health and safety, and

(b) the development of the community at a new reserve site is the most cost-effective alternative.

The policy goes on to note that "Relocation proposals which include an immediate or future requirement for financial resources relative to the existing reserve or community, will not be supported" (INAC, 1987).

An earlier draft of the policy estimated that costs in excess of $600 to $700 million for initial capital, plus $45 to $50 million annually in on-going operations and maintenance would be required to satisfy requests for relocation assistance across Canada; and stated that "the issue must be considered within the context of the need to provide essential programs, services and capital facilities to existing communities, and the new priority initiatives in the areas of self-government and economic development." The draft report suggests that because the Department cannot assume the increased financial responsibility
associated with relocation, that the policy be "carefully defined." This implies that during the policy formation process, the criteria under which requests would be funded be established so as to deliberately restrict the number of communities that would be eligible for financial assistance.

The Implications of the Policy for the Tanakteuk & Other Bands

Under this policy directive, it is highly unlikely that the Tanakteuk would receive financial assistance from DIA for the re-establishment of New Vancouver. Neither would other Indian bands relocated in the past as a result of DIA planning processes be likely to receive assistance. Despite the recognition of mental trauma associated with relocation, it would be difficult to prove that the health and safety of Indians are endangered to an extent that would meet the criteria. While it may be argued that the development of on-reserve communities may be the most cost-effective alternative in the long term, the request for assistance to re-inhabit Indian homelands could be denied on the basis that financial resources in excess of what the Department is currently providing would be required. Today, under the Indian Act, DIA is obligated to provide very little to bands such as the Tanakteuk which have the majority of members residing in off-reserve communities. Clearly, it is in the financial interests of DIA not to support the re-establishment of reserve communities for bands like the Tanakteuk, even though the policy may not
reflect the best interests of DIA's constituency.

By stating that funding requests for relocation must be considered within the context of providing services to existing communities, the Department is implicitly encouraging competition between Indian Bands. This policy implies that existing Indian communities will be disadvantaged should relocation proposals be funded. In a strategy that may cynically be described as "divide and conquer", DIA has created the situation whereby existing Indian communities feel threatened by requests for support for re-established communities. Consequently, members of relocated bands such as the Tanakteuk are not likely to receive encouragement from other Indian communities or organizations. Furthermore, each band requesting relocation assistance is pitted against others, in attempts to demonstrate that their need is the greatest.

The Department claims to support the development of Indian communities. In a speech given by the Minister of Indian Affairs in August 1988, Bill McKnight said, "Nothing has a higher priority for me or my Department than community self-government. It is a cornerstone of our policy and the focus of our attention". The 1983 Special Commons Report on Indian Self-Government in Canada concluded that development efforts have the best chance of success when carried out at the community level. But what if there is no community?
Summary

In this chapter criteria were presented against which the success of various development approaches were discussed and evaluated. It was suggested that the re-establishment of communities such as New Vancouver was in the best interests of Indian bands, and the potential for success was demonstrated. An argument of why DIA should support Indian's request for assistance was then presented. Finally, DIA's relocation policy was examined, and it was observed that requests for funding for bands in situations similar to the Tanakteuk's would not likely receive support. It was suggested that the criteria under which funding requests would be granted were designed to discourage the relocation of Indians because of increased financial burdens on the federal government. In addition, it was suggested that the policy encouraged competition for scarce resources between existing Indian communities and bands such as the Tanakteuk.
"We the leaves are rustled by the wind, we fear not. These things do not frighten us; they frighten you."

Spoken in 1796 by an Indian as he saw the deforestation and despoilation wrought by Europeans.
CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Development is a process of evolution. Each new theory of development seems to evolve out of the lessons learned from the previous one. The definitions of development have changed dramatically over the past one hundred years. So, too, have the lifestyles of the Kwakiutl since the arrival of European settlers.

This chapter briefly summarizes the thesis, and presents some conclusions about development and the planning process for Indian communities in Canada, based on the experiences of the Kwakiutl.

Summary

This thesis began by demonstrating the historical transformations of the Kwakiutl's economic activities and the social relations and institutions which accompanied them over the past one hundred years. Prior to European contact, Kwakiutl society was characterized by a complex social and ceremonial life. Dramatic changes in Indians' organization of economic production, the relationship with the physical environment, relations with other Indian communities, and psychological and behaviour patterns have occurred since European settlement in the region.

As demonstrated in Chapter Two, by the 1960s, Indian society on the west coast had been completely marginalized from mainstream
Canadian society, through a process facilitated by the authority of the Indian Act. DIA policy emphasized the protection, assimilation and Christianization of Indians. On the basis of an orthodox approach to development, it was believed Indians must abandon their traditional values and adopt those of modern society in order to progress. Because non-natives assumed they knew what was best for the development of natives, Indians were excluded from the planning process.

As a result of this attitude of cultural superiority, Kwakiutl bands were not consulted about the closure of schools in their communities during the 1960s. Government services and facilities were gradually withdrawn from isolated villages in the region because DIA representatives decided that it was too costly to maintain a geographically-scattered population. Residents of remote Kwakiutl communities such as New Vancouver were encouraged to relocate to urban centers, where economies of scale would reduce costs while the physical needs of Indians could be addressed. Participation in modern, non-native society would hasten the assimilation— and the development— of Canada's Indians.

The emphasis on centralization of services and facilities in growth centers characterized international and national planning initiatives during the 1960s. Various social and political events influenced the Canadian public's acceptance of these directions in planning. As described in Chapter Three, urban growth centers
were presented as solutions for the problem of regional economic disparities across Canada during this decade. It was not until the theory of underdevelopment and internal colonialism was proposed that the validity of growth centers as a development approach was questioned.

Analysis of a survey of Tanakteuk Band members as part of a case study in Chapter Four demonstrated that while access to services and facilities for Band members improved as a result of relocation from their remote community to urban centers, there was no significant improvement in obtaining employment. The unemployment rate for on- and off-reserve Indians in Canada does not differ significantly. Today, the economic activities in which Band members are engaged are similar to those pursued prior to relocation.

However, the socio-economic situation of most Band members has changed in other ways. Ninety percent of Tanakteuk Band members are no longer entitled to benefits associated with on-reserve status. Families spend more on food in urban centers, as a result of no longer being able to supplement their diets with subsistence food. And the majority of Band members have experienced dramatic changes in conditions in housing, tenure and cost of accommodation.

Tanakteuk Band members suffered from psychological stress and a change in social patterns as a result of relocation. The shock of
adjustment to non-native society was great; Band members have identified an increase in physical and mental problems of family members as a result of the move. Impacts on culture have also been noted: only a minority of Band members participate in traditional activities today. The move from a native community to a predominantly non-native urban environment has facilitated the cultural assimilation of the Tanakteuk.

In Chapter Five, the need for alternatives to orthodox development approaches was identified, and criteria to evaluate the success of development initiatives were presented: development must be controlled by natives; it must meet local priorities and needs; development plans should build an integrated economy; and development projects should be based on collective ownership and control of resources. The importance of small-scale, less capital-intensive initiatives based on the development of renewable resources was also pointed out.

An alternative development approach was suggested, one based on a synthesis of a territorial development and a systems approach. This alternative meets the criteria outlined in the thesis. The Chief and Council of the Tanakteuk Band used the criteria to evaluate five options for development under consideration, namely maintaining the status quo, purchasing land off-reserve near an urban center, amalgamation with another band in the region, establishing summer residences on-reserve, and re-establishing a permanent community at the site of the old village.
Of these options, the reinhabitation of traditional homelands was favored. The Chief and Council believe that relocation to a community consisting primarily of Tanakteuk Band members would improve their social and psychological conditions, build community cohesiveness, strengthen cultural identity and community pride, and increase the potential for Band self-sufficiency. Five heads of Tanakteuk households expressed their commitment to re-establishing the community of New Vancouver, as described in the survey in Chapter Four. These individuals are confident that their enthusiasm for this development initiative will act as a catalyst for the commitment of others to relocate.

A community development strategy can be developed which incorporates the principles outlined in a model for Indian development based on a synthesis of a territorial development and a systems approach. Employment in the community would be based on mariculture and fishing, forestry and tourism, with assistance for initial training and funding requested from the government. The proposed strategy for development reflects traditional modes of production and community organization, complemented by modern technology.

Finally, DIA's policy on supporting the re-establishment of "new" Indian communities was examined. It was suggested that DIA has a moral obligation to support Indians' request for assistance to reinhabit their communities abandoned as a result of planning
processes adopted by DIA during the 1960s. However, because of policy criteria, it is unlikely that support for the re-establishment of Indian communities such as New Vancouver will be forthcoming.

Conclusions

The situation of the Tanakteuk Band is not unique. There are hundreds of relocated communities across Canada (INAC, 1987). Some, such as Grassy Narrows in Northern Ontario (Shkilnyk, 1985), and Duck Lake in northern Manitoba (Lal, 1969) were relocated for improved access to supplies and services, and employment opportunities. Other communities, such as Whitedog in Northern Ontario (Shkilnyk, 1985), and Chemuhowan in northern Manitoba (Landa, 1969) were relocated because of flooding due to the construction of dams for hydro-electric mega-projects.

Several Indian communities in British Columbia are scheduled for relocation in the near future. Inhabitants of the community of Ingenika will be forced to move as a result of a past hydro-electric project. And the community of Prophet River will relocate because of health problems associated with poor sanitation in their present environment. The Kluskus Indian Band in the Caribou-Chilcotin region of the province wants to relocate to the site of their traditional community. Members of several other Indian communities share the desire to relocate to the sites of their previous villages because Band members are unhappy
with current circumstances resulting from forced relocation in the past. Within Kwakiutl territory alone, in addition to the Tanakteuk, some members of the Mamalelegala-Qwe'qua'sot'enox, the Tlatliskwala (Nuwitti), and the Tlowitsis-Mumtagila Bands have expressed intentions to re-establish communities in their homelands.

On the basis of the results of the case study of the Tanakteuk Band, what conclusions can be drawn about orthodox development approaches used by DIA in the past? About the relocation of communities? What can we learn about the planning process in Indian communities? What changes should be incorporated into DIA policy regarding development approaches and the planning process?

The assumptions on which orthodox development approaches are based—that the culture and values of traditional societies are impediments to modernization, and thus obstacles to development—are inappropriate in the 1980s. Indeed, they have never been successful, as witnessed by the disproportionate number of status Indians, both on- and off-reserve, who have been marginalized from mainstream society, as described in Chapter Four.

A radical new approach to development is needed, one in which the values and cultures of Indian societies, as well as those of other ethnic minorities, are respected. Development must aim to increase a community's control over its collective resources, while satisfying local priorities and needs. Success should not
be measured solely by economic criteria; the social vitality of a community should be recognized. Development initiatives should aim to strengthen the cultural and social fabric of a community. A synthesis of a territorial development and a systems approach to development as identified by Anderson & Boothroyd (1984) is one alternative to be considered. Such an approach to development would strengthen the role played by band governments in the planning process.

The case study of the Tanakteuk has shown that, although Indians have been relocated as part of the development process from communities where traditional lifestyles predominated into modern communities, the socio-economic conditions of families have not improved significantly as a result of adopting non-native values. Relocation of Indians to urban centers does not necessarily result in increased employment opportunities for them, although it does result in improved access to services and facilities.

Relocation from a predominantly native environment to non-native urban centers promotes the cultural assimilation of Indians into mainstream Canadian society. However, an increase in the cultural assimilation of Indians certainly cannot be interpreted as an indicator of success in development initiatives—rather, it would seem that a valuable attribute has been lost.

It is doubtful whether the relocation of Indians from remote
communities to urban centers during the late 1960s would have occurred if an evaluation of the social vitality of the community, and an appreciation of Indian culture—or any ethnic culture other than one with a European orientation—had been considered as part of the planning process for development initiatives. This suggests that the planning process must be tailored to suit the needs of individual communities and regions, taking into account cultural differences of the clientele. Planning assumptions which may apply mainstream Canadian society may be inappropriate for special minority groups, such as Indians.

For communities facing forced relocation in the future, it is up to planners and policy analysts as part of the planning process to consider the impacts on the economic, social, cultural and political structure of a community resulting from relocation; and in conjunction with community members, to take steps to minimize any negative impacts that may result. A planning initiative should not be evaluated solely by economic criteria; the less tangible factors such as community cohesion and psychological health of individuals must be considered as well.

Perhaps one of the most important conclusions that can be drawn from the case study of the Tanakteuk Band and from studies of other Kwakiutl communities is the need to recognize the right of community members to participate in a planning process that will have impacts on their community. Residents of New Vancouver were
told of the decision taken by the Indian Agent to close the community school; for twenty years, members of the Band have felt resentment and anger about the lack of control they have had over their lives. If Band members had been allowed to participate as equals in proposing and evaluating alternatives to the school closure in 1969, perhaps the outcome would have been different, or at least the feelings of bitterness and hostility directed towards non-natives and government bureaucrats by some Band members would be somewhat alleviated. People must be allowed to participate in the decision-making process if they are to respect its outcome.

Communities such as New Vancouver were relocated during the 1960s as part of a planning process based on growth pole doctrine. With the benefits of hindsight, one can conclude that "the generalized prescription of growth center policies for all nature of regional ills was one of the most unrealistic aspects of the last decades of regional studies" (Weaver, 1978). Instead of relocating community members to an environment where access to amenities and employment opportunities may be greater, the planning process should focus on providing employment and an appropriate level of service within the community, using local resources that are available. Alternatives to community relocation must be thoroughly considered.

Finally, the planning process used by the Department of Indian Affairs must reflect the changes that have come to be widely
accepted in the literature and in planning practice over the past 20 years. This includes an approach to development that emphasizes community-based planning and development initiatives controlled by Indians. The orthodox approach to development characteristic of DIA policy must be replaced by an alternative; perhaps a synthesis of a territorial development and a systems approach would best suit the needs and interests of DIA's clientele. Should this approach to development be adopted, a major re-structuring of DIA would be required. The role of DIA would be to coordinate and facilitate development initiatives by providing the necessary technical expertise to communities and Indian organizations.

Judging by the December 1987 policy directive which identifies the circumstances under which DIA will support the re-establishment of "new" communities, it is unlikely that Bands such as the Tanakteuk who have lost their on-reserve communities as a result of previous DIA planning processes will receive support for the reinhabitation of their homelands. While the development of Indian communities may be the most cost-effective alternative to continued welfare assistance in the long-term, the federal government does not consider the long-term benefits of re-establishing a community under an alternative development approach when applying the policy criteria. One can conclude that the DIA policy directive on support for the re-establishment
of "new" native communities is an impediment to the development of Indian bands which were relocated in the past.

In summary, the following conclusions can be drawn from this study:

1) Orthodox development approaches are inappropriate for the development of Canadian Indians. Orthodox development approaches promote cultural assimilation, class inequities and continued dependency.

2) Growth pole doctrine in particular may be inappropriate for solving problems associated with regional disparities involving Indian communities.

3) Relocation of Indians to urban centers improves access to services and facilities, but does not necessarily increase employment. Relocation also promotes cultural assimilation of natives into non-native society.

4) A radical new approach to development is needed, one which attempts to strengthen Indian society through the development of Indian economies within Indian cultural frameworks under the control of Indian political institutions anchored in and drawing their legitimacy from local Indian communities.

5) Planning processes must account for cultural differences of clientele, and respect these differences. The planning process should be tailored to meet the specific needs of the region or community.

6) The social, cultural, political, and economic impacts of relocation on a community must be considered as part of the decision-making process, and steps must be taken to minimize identified impacts. Alternatives to relocation should be thoroughly evaluated.

7) If people are not allowed to participate in decisions that affect either their fate, or the fate of their community, the consequences can be feelings of anger, frustration, hostility and suspicion that complicate future planning processes.
8) The planning processes which characterize DIA initiatives must more fully reflect new ideas and practices that have evolved over the past twenty years with regard to Indian development.

9) The criteria outlined in DIA's policy directive on the re-establishment of Indian communities are impediments to the development of Bands without on-reserve communities.

People will not always allow themselves to be isolated from the planning process by those with power to affect change. Canadian Indians are no longer content simply to contemplate a dream that someday they will control the development of human and physical resources that are rightfully theirs.

These facts and this past seems a true nightmare of history.

But it is easy enough to awake.
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Cunningham, Alain. April 15, 1988. Former Regional Planner with the Department of Indian Affairs from approximately 1971 until 1987. Vancouver, B.C.

Dale, Norman. Series of interviews from January, 1988 to May, 1988. Administrator for the Kwakiutl Territorial Fisheries Commission, and Assistant Professor in the School of Community & Regional Planning at U.B.C. from 1983-86. Campbell River, B.C.


Duncan, Robert. May 2, 1988. Former Tanakteuk Band member, now a member of Campbell River Band. Campbell River, B.C.

Duncan, Violet. May 2, 1988. Spouse of elected Chief of the Tanakteuk Band during the 1960s. Campbell River, B.C.


Joseph, Bobby. May 3, 1988. Former District Manager of Campbell River Regional District, Department of Indian Affairs; current Administrator of the Musgamaw Tribal Council; Tsawataineuk Band member. Alert Bay, B.C.

The following questions ask about the circumstances involved in your family's departure from the community of New Vancouver on Harbledown Island many years ago. Please answer them as well as you can.

1) What year did your family move from the community of New Vancouver?

2) Where did your family first move to when they left?

3) Please check off the MAIN reason why your family decided to move to another settlement instead of staying in New Vancouver?

   _____ to find work
   _____ for school
   _____ for medical care
   _____ to be near friends or relatives
   _____ government told us to move
   _____ to be less isolated
   _____ had no choice because others left
   _____ other (specify ____________ )

4) Did anyone from the government talk to members of the family about moving before leaving?

   _____ Yes   _____ No   _____ Don't know

If "yes", who was the person and what did they say?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________
5) What was the most difficult thing about moving? (Check one)
   _____ finding a job
   _____ finding a house
   _____ meeting new people
   _____ other (specify ____________)

6) Do you think that moving from New Vancouver resulted in any physical or mental problems for members of your family?
   _____ Yes       _____ No

7) After moving from New Vancouver, how often did you see your friends and relatives? (Check one).
   _____ Never
   _____ A few times a year
   _____ Frequently
   _____ As often as before

8) If the government had continued to pay for an elementary teacher on the island, would your family have moved anyways?
   _____ Yes       _____ No

9) After moving from New Vancouver, was it easy to find work?
   _____ Yes       _____ No

10) After moving, do you think that your family spent more or less money on food each week?

11) After your family moved, did they feel as if they belonged in the new community?
    _____ Yes       _____ No       _____ No opinion

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12) Has your family ever wanted to move back to New Vancouver and live as before?
   ____ Yes     ____ No     ____ No opinion

13) Now that your family no longer lives in New Vancouver, is there anything that is missed, or is there anything about the life before the move that you would like to have back?
   ____ Yes     ____ No     ____ No opinion

If "yes", please comment. ______________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________

14) Is there anything you feel the Government could have done to help your family when they moved from New Vancouver?
    Please comment. __________________________________________________________
    ______________________________________________________________________
    ______________________________________________________________________

15) Do you like where you live now? Please comment.
    ______________________________________________________________________
    ______________________________________________________________________
    ______________________________________________________________________

16) Do you ____ own or ____ rent where you live now?

17a) Are there members of your household currently involved in any organizations or activities to promote Indian culture?
    ____ Yes     ____ No

17b) How many people in your household can speak Kwakwala?
    __________
18) Your Chief and Council are presently considering moving back to the site of New Vancouver on Harbledown Island. If there WAS an elementary school in the community, would you want to live there?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

19) If there WASN'T an elementary school on the island, would you want to live there?

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
</tr>
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</table>

20) Would you like to be more involved in the planning of a new community?

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

21) Do you think that the government asks you enough about what you want for the future?

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
</tr>
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22) Please check off whether any members of your household have ever done the following jobs?

- [ ] built a house
- [ ] cut or logged timber
- [ ] repaired & serviced engines
- [ ] installed wiring in a building
- [ ] installed plumbing in a house
- [ ] operated heavy equipment
- [ ] did book-keeping or accounting
- [ ] did secretarial work
- [ ] fish-farming or oyster-growing
- [ ] fished commercially