THE TANTRA-ŚUDDHA OF BHAṬṬĀRAKA-ŚRĪ-VEDOTTAMA
A TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY

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Abstract

This thesis is a translation of and commentary on the *Tantra-suddha* (Purity of the System), a 14th century (circa) Sanskrit philosophical monograph defending the religious validity of the Pañcarātra school. The work is attributed to a Śrī Bhaṭṭāraka-śrī-vedottama. Set in the framework of a debate between two Mīmāṃsaka disputants the text follows the "objection-response" (*pūrva-pakṣa* - *uttara-pakṣa*) format so characteristic of the genre.

I have divided the work into three more or less cohesive sections. In the first the author is faced with the problem of justifying the validity of his school and its *smṛti* in the absence of confirmation by a *śruti*. He does so by hypothesizing a supporting *śruti* which existed in the past but has since been lost.

In Section 2 the opponent plays the devil's advocate and suggests that the author:

1. Claim universal validity for all *smṛtis*, (independent of *śruti* support),
2. reject the traditional requirement that *smṛtis* be free from any taint of an ulterior motive, and
3. claim the status for the *smṛti* of being an equally valid alternative to *śruti* in instances where the two appear to conflict.

Fully cognizant that to accept any of these would be to undermine his position the author rejects all three proposals.

In the third section the author clarifies the distinctions between his own school and four Śaivite ones. He then responds to a number of objections and citations that declare the Pañcarātra system to be non-Vedic, both in its beliefs and in its ritual practices. This he does by reinterpreting the intentions of alleged opponents such as Śaṅkara and Kumārila or by simply declaring
deprecatory passages as inaccurate.

The text draws heavily upon an earlier work by Yāmuna, the Āgama-
pramāṇya, which also sought to defend the Pāñcarātrikas. Arguments and conclusions correlate highly throughout, with one significant difference. Whereas Yāmuna speaks from the perspective of Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta, Bhaṭṭāraka Vedottama infuses the Pāñcarātra school with a much more monist tinge. This is perhaps the sole reason for studying the text; it reminds us that religious schools are rarely stagnant. Considerable variation occurred within movements bearing the same name and we would be foolish to cling to our generalizations too seriously.
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INTRODUCTION

Placing the text

This thesis is a translation of and commentary on the Sanskrit monograph (prakarana) Tantra-Suddha,^1 "Purity of the (Pañcarātra)\textsuperscript{2} system" -- attributed to Bhaṭṭāraka-śrī-vedottama. The Sanskrit text was edited by T. Gaṇapati Śāstri and published in 1915 in Vol. XLIV of the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series. To my knowledge it is the only published edition of the work. In his brief preface the editor states that it is based on a single palmleaf manuscript written in the Malayālam script.

Little is known about the author, but he is estimated by the editor to have lived in the 14th or 15th century. His name, Bhaṭṭāraka-śrī-vedottama, is probably not his birth name but rather the combination of a pair of honourific titles or epithets, a practice not uncommon in South India. This title would suggest he was an influential figure in or leader of a maṭha (religious ashram or school) and was likely familiar with Vedic ritual and lore. Further evidence for a southern origin for the text is attested by the fact that, to our knowledge, no other manuscript has been found outside Kerala. A final point, which will be discussed below, is the author's heavy reliance upon another southern text, the Āgama-prāmāṇya of Yāmuna, who lived in the late 10th and early 11th centuries.

\footnote{1 Dr. Ashok Aklujkar has suggested that the original title was Tantra-śuddhi rather than Tantra-suddha. This seems likely given the nominal character of śuddhi as opposed to the adjective suddha. It is also easy to imagine a change from suddhyākhyam to suddhākhyam.}

\footnote{2 In the literature the school has been called both "Pañcarātra" and "Pāñcarātra" while the followers have been variously termed, "Pañcarātras," "Pāñcarātras," "Pāñcarātrins," "Pāñcarātrins," and "Pāñcarātrakas." In this thesis the word "Pañcarātra" will be used to refer to the school itself while its adherents will be called "Pāñcarātrakas," which is the author's name for them.}
Against this geographical placing must be weighed some internal evidence. In Section 3 the author expends much effort distinguishing his school from various Śaivite sects. The most prominent of these in his eyes appears to be the Pāṣupatas, a group placed in western India in what is now Gujarat by Gonda (MRLS p. 165) and Dasgupta (Vol. 5, p. 18). The Vīraśaivas, on the other hand, who trace their roots to south-western India in what is now Karnataka are not mentioned at all by the author, although they had been active for one or two centuries before the time assigned to Bhaṭṭāraka-śrī-vedottama by the editor. Nor are the Śaiva-Siddhāntas discussed, albeit they represented the most prominent southern Śaivite school at the time.

Although it is difficult to specify exactly where the Pāñcarātrikas first thrived Schrader (p. 16) argues they spread from the North to the South, with the majority of the śamhitās (works within their tradition) being composed in the North. D.L. De (p. 643) links the Pāñcarātrikas with the Yādava tribe of Kṛṣṇa. Mahābhārata 12.336.30 describes the home of the Pāñcarātrikas as Śveta-dvīpa, (lit. the "white island") but does not elaborate further. The movement itself is a very old one, as indicated by their inclusion in the Nārāyaṇiya section of the Mahābhārata. The Pāñcarātra śamhitās are estimated by Schrader (p. 19) to be no older than the eighth century. They were certainly known in the South by the 11th century insofar as both

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3 In this thesis the term "Śaivite" will be used as a generic noun or adjective pertaining to all worshippers of Śiva. "Śaiva," on the other hand, will be taken to mean only that specific Śaivite sect discussed by the author in Section 3.

4 The Vīraśaivas are normally dated from the time of the poet Basavaṇṇa in the late 12th or early 13th century. Gonda (MRLS p. 156) suggests the Vīraśaivas were a branch of the older Kālāmukha tradition, which the author does discuss. An alternative explanation for this non-mention would be that the author predates the 13th or 14th century.

5 Pereira (p. 167) dates them back to at least the eighth century and Dasgupta (Vol. 5, p. 16) believes the bulk of their Śaivagama was completed by the ninth century.
Yāmuna (in the Āgama-prāmāṇya) and Rāmānuja (in his commentary on Brahma-sūtras 2.2.42-45) defend the movement.

**Purpose and form of the text**

The stimulus for the Tantra-śuddha, as its name implies, was to defend the legitimacy of the Pañcarātra system and its āgama (collected body of works considered authoritative) against orthodox Vedic critics who maligned its claim to be based on the Veda. The Pañcarātrikas were worshippers of Viṣṇu in his supreme form (known as Vāsudeva or Nārāyaṇa) as well as in his various manifestations, particularly those of Kṛṣṇa and the four vyūhas (emanations of Viṣṇu). They were among the numerous bhakti schools prevalent in India from the first millenium onwards which stressed devotion to a personal deity rather than ritual practice and discriminative wisdom (vijñāna) as the path to spiritual achievement and ultimate liberation. Yet they claimed to remain within the general Brahmanical tradition in that, unlike the Buddhists and Jains, they did not reject the authority of the Vedas.

Proponents of the more traditional schools however, particularly Mīmāṁsā and Advaita Vedānta, generally refused them such a standing and questioned

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6 For a more detailed explanation of the vyūhas see Section 3, para. 12 below.
7 Gonda (MRLS p. 110) has remarked of the Pañcarātrāgama, "Throughout this literature there is the uncontested tradition that it is based on the Veda; like other authoritative writings of Hinduism it sometimes claims to be the 'Fifth Veda'." See also Dasgupta Vol. 3, p. 18. Against their self-evaluation it should be noted that Mahābhārata 12.350.64 assigns them a separate place as one of the four great schools of religious/philosophical learning along with the Veda, Śāṅkhya-Yoga and Pāṇḍūpata traditions. Dasgupta (Vol. 3, pp. 18-20) refers to a number of deprecatory passages from various works, including the Aśvalāyana-smṛti, the Kūrma, Parāśara, Śamba, Vāyu, Viśhanāradiya, Liṅga, Āditya and Agni purāṇas and the Vaśiṣṭha, Śūta, Viṣṇu, Śātāpatha, Hārīta, Bodhāyana and Yama sanhitās.
8 See for instance, Śaṅkara's bhaṣya on Brahma-sūtras 2.2.42-45. The Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, were not so clearly opposed. In the fourth āśhaika of the Nyāya-maṇjarī Jayanta Bhaṭṭa
the Vedic sanction not only for the ritual practices they taught but for the \textit{Pañcarātrāgama} itself (or Pañcarātra \textit{smṛti} as it is called in this text).

The \textit{āgama} available in the author's time was probably extensive. Schrader (pp. 6-14) has listed over 200 \textit{saṃhitās} referred to within the Pañcarātra literature and estimated that "the Saṁhitā literature of the Pañcarātras must have once amounted to not less but probably more than one and a half million ślokas." Among the works known to us the most important ones include the \textit{Sātvata (Sattvata-)saṁhitā}, \textit{Īśvara-saṁhitā}, \textit{Lakṣmi-tantra}, \textit{Jayākhyā-saṁhitā}, and \textit{Ahirbudhnya-saṁhitā}. Other, less specifically sectarian texts which were obviously influential within the school at that time include the \textit{Viṣṇu} and \textit{Bhāgavata purāṇas}, the \textit{Bhagavad-gītā}, and the Nārāyaṇīya section of Book 12 (Śānti-parvan) of the \textit{Mahābhārata}.

That the work is called a \textit{prakaraṇa} is indicative that the author did not intend to compose a general work on the Pañcarātrikas or an all-encompassing defence of their numerous ritual practices. A \textit{prakaraṇa} seeks merely to discuss one aspect of a system in the desire to add something original. The purpose here is to affirm the system's authority in the face of accusations to the contrary. However it is a limited sanction that the author seeks. The \textit{Tantra-śuddha} is not a full-scale defence of all bhakti movements or all \textit{smṛtis}. While carving out his own school's niche in the house of Vedic orthodoxy the author is careful to distance himself from the other major devotional group, the Śaivites.

\begin{itemize}
\item endorses both the \textit{Śaiva-gama} and the \textit{Pañcarātrāgama} (see fn. 19 below).
\item Of the extant works 30 have been briefly encapsulated by Smith in his very useful descriptive bibliography (Smith, Vol. 1).
\item See Dasgupta, Vol. 3, p. 13 for a further list of Vaiśnava Upaniṣads.
\item He does however devote some energy to justifying two such practices -- \textit{nirmālya-dhāraṇa} and \textit{nivedya-bhakṣaṇa} -- in Section 3 of the text.
\end{itemize}
The author’s defence of the alleged divergence of his system from the orthodox mainstream is structured on ground rules established by his opponents within that mainstream. Thus, he argues for his views not on the basis of intuition or emotional fervour but according to principles of logic and scriptural support developed in the Brahmanical systems.

In common with other Indian philosophical works this one is set in the framework of an imaginary dialogue. The opponent, who may be real or hypothetical, begins by raising objections and generally constructing a prima facie case against the Pāncarātrikas. This tentative position, called the pūrvapakṣa, is then refuted by the author in his uttara-pakṣa or final position.

In this instance the two parties, although at odds over the status of the Pāncarātrikas, do share a number of beliefs. Both structure their arguments around the tenets of the Māmaṣa school and seem to accept its guidelines regarding the interpretation of the orthodox śruti, i.e. the Vedas and Brāhmaṇas. Both accept the primacy of that śruti, and the necessary dependency thereon of any legitimate school of thought. And both are opposed to the heterodox schools of Buddhism, Jainism and Śaivism, although the Pāncarātrikas seem to have evinced some tolerance towards the last.

Having said this, it should be noted that the opponent does assume different characteristics during the discussion. This is particularly apparent in Section 2 where his suggestions to assign universal validity to all smṛtis and

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12 It is not clear which of the two major Māmaṣa schools (Bhaṭṭa or Prabhākara) the two disputants subscribe to. In his criticism of the Pāncarātrikas in Section 1 the opponent cites only the five pramāṇas accepted by Prabhākara but omits from the discussion the sixth pramāṇa — anupalabdhi — accepted by Kumārila. However anupalabdhi is mentioned in Section 2 as the basis for invalidating the use of rice or barley whenever the other is used in a sacrifice. In other areas the author appears to endorse the Bhaṭṭa school of Māmaṣa. He follows Kumārila’s interpretation of Māmaṣa-sūtra 1.3.3 in Section 2 and quotes from the Tantra-vārttika in Section 3.

13 See Gonda (V&S), pp. 94-95 for further discussion of this inter-sectarian tolerance.
(later) to allow an option between following śrutī or smṛtī are not in accordance with Mīmāṃsā teachings. He should thus be regarded more as a composite figure, offering differently motivated objections at different times.

Similarly, different people appear to be speaking on behalf of the Pāñcarātrikas. Tentative uttara-pakṣas are presented in Section 2 by someone called apara (lit. "another"), who may be a less mature debater within the school. His views are generally succeeded by the author’s own positions.

In many instances it is difficult to tell exactly who is speaking, as the author frequently anticipates objections and states them as questions posed to himself. Thus a sentence beginning with nanu (it may be objected . . .) is not inevitably in the opponent’s voice. Nonetheless this does not pose serious problems as it is usually evident whether a particular statement is one the author endorses or not.

The issues and arguments at hand are well-worn ones. They have virtually all been raised in the major works and their commentaries of the preceding centuries -- the Mīmāṃsā-sūtras, the Nyāya-maṇjarī, the Brahma-sūtras, the Āgama-prāmāṇya, etc. Like many Indian philosophical works then, this is specialists' literature. The author was clearly writing the Tantra-suddha for a reader presumed to be familiar not only with the features of the Pañcarātra system but also with the orthodox objections to its validity. Thus brief snatches of citations, such as those from Kumārila and Śaṅkara in Section 3, are regarded as sufficient to identify the relevant passages to the reader.14

14 Sheldon Pollock has accurately remarked that reading a Sanskrit philosophical text is like walking into the middle of a conversation.
Topical structure

The published edition of the *Tantra-śuddha* is continuous but for ease of reading I have divided it into three sections. Of these, Sections 1 and 2 generally deal with issues concerning the authority of *smṛtis* in general while Section 3 more specifically supports the Pañcarātra *smṛti*. These relate to three general *pūrva-pakṣas*:

1. There is no support in *śruti* for the Pañcarātra *smṛti*.
2. The author should either accept universal validity for all *smṛtis* or else accord it the status of an optional alternative to the *śruti*.
3. The Pañcarātra system is non-Vedic in nature.

Section 1

In the first part of the work the author is faced with the difficulty of affirming the validity of the Pañcarātra *smṛti* in the absence of any surviving *śruti* statement which directly corroborates it. Moreover, the opponent contends that the validity of the Pañcarātra *smṛti* is not verifiable by any of the five *prāmāṇyas* or means of truth accepted by the Mīmāṃsā school.

In his reply the author skirts the objections and attempts to establish his school's legitimacy in a two-fold manner. First he emphasizes the valid lineage of the Pañcarātrikas by linking them with a line of sages beginning with Nārada, an early divine *ṛṣi* who shuttled between heaven and earth. This noble origin supports his second point that Nārada and his successors were loyal to the Veda and would not have taught anything contrary to it.

The inference then is that the Pañcarātra *smṛti* which we have now and which was derived from these seers must have been based on a *śruti* which they either knew directly or were at least aware of. Such a *śruti* could sanction the Pañcarātra system either expressly or indirectly. In the latter case one
would be able to infer the validity of the system from the śruti. That this śruti has been lost in no way undermines the authority for the smṛti because it is well-known that many other śrutis have also been lost.

The notion of a lost Vedic recension is certainly plausible. Many once-vigorous śākhās or branches have vanished over time. However this raises the theoretical problem that if such a defence is allowed any school would be free to claim sanction from śruti statements which have since been lost. This objection is then disallowed by the author on the grounds that the heterodox schools generally shun rather than seek sanction by the Veda.

Much of the train of discussion follows similar points raised by Śabara in his bhāṣya and Kumārila in his Tantra-vārttika on the section dealing with smṛti authority (Mīmāṃsā-sūtras 1.3). The latter writer in particular deals with the issues of claiming a basis on a lost śruti and the problem of denying the heterodox schools the same privilege.

The essential point is that the extant śruti does not openly deny the validity of the Pañcarātra system; indeed both disputants concede there is no mention of this issue at all in the Veda. The opponent interprets this omission in a negative light while the author views it more positively. That is, the former clearly regards the school as invalid until proven valid while the author seems to adopt the opposite posture -- it is valid until proven invalid.

Section 2

In the second part the opponent tries to clarify the degree of authority the author attributes to his āgama. Given a situation in which the Pañcarātra smṛti

15 Frequently their separate identity was based on nothing more than minor variations in pronunciation but some did contain statements not found in the others.
contradicts the extant Āruti in some detail the opponent enquires which one should be followed. The author responds by redefining any such conflict as one between two Ārutis, i.e. the extant Āruti and the inferred Āruti (which endorsed the Pañcarātra system but has since been lost).

Posing as his own devil's advocate the opponent then suggests the Pañcarātrikas would do better to argue for the universal validity of all smṛtis independent of the Āruti. In this way they would not have to resort to the weaker tactic of hypothesizing a possible supporting Āruti at some point in the past. The opponent, in effect lays a trap in hopes of inducing the author to concede a special status for the smṛti -- that of validity independent of Āruti -- which the opponent can then denounce as an indisputably non-Vedic notion. To use a more picturesque analogy, the opponent offers the author enough rope to hang himself. However the author resists the bait and reiterates the primacy of Āruti, while adding that this in no way removes the possibility of the prior existence of a Āruti supporting the Pañcarātrikas.

In a similar tactic the opponent also advises the author to disregard Mīmāṁsā-sūtra 1.3.416 which specifically invalidates smṛtis based on ulterior motives. The opponent justifies doing so on the grounds that the sūtra is too convenient a tool for heterodox opponents (e.g. atheists or materialists) to use to discredit certain smṛtis. For instance it could be claimed that the true motive for a smṛti statement enjoining a sacrificial fee to be paid to a priest for his services was greed on the part of the composer-priest who was seeking to benefit himself and his cohorts. Less cynically, one could point out that at the very least the fee was prescribed for the very mundane purpose of supporting the priest and his family. The problem is that if one concedes that such

16 हेतुदर्शनाच् च
motives may have influenced the composers of certain smṛtis, all smṛtis are cast in a suspicious light.

When this suggestion is rejected the opponent proposes treating smṛti and śruti as equally valid options, much as ritual practitioners may choose between conflicting śruti statements which recommend rice or barley for use in a sacrifice. The author's approach differs somewhat from that of Śabara\(^{17}\) but the end result is the same -- the suggestion is rejected. If option is accepted as a possibility between śruti and smṛti, that assumes not only independent validity for the smṛti but also a potential conflict (or else option would not be needed). If one accepts that the smṛti is based on an earlier śruti this would then imply a further śruti-śruti conflict. In his reply the author basically disallows hypothetical situations. He will not consider the existence of any more mutually contradictory śruti statements than already exist. The opponent's last objection had begun with the presupposition of a lost śruti from which he argued forward in time for the validity of a derivative smṛti which then conflicts with an extant śruti.\(^{18}\) Had the author accepted that presupposition he would have been faced with the dilemma of retroactively invalidating a śruti. Under his own guidelines he could not have even entertained the existence of such a śruti because its derivative smṛti was in conflict with an extant śruti.

The form of the author's answers indicates he is seeking a sanction for his school, but it must be a rather qualified one. He does not want to upset the traditional understanding of śruti and smṛti nor does he want acceptance on

\(^{17}\) In his bhāṣya on Mīmāṁsā-sūtra 1.3.3 Śabara argues that the optional usage of śruti or smṛti is permissible only when neither choice is clearly shown to be wrong.

\(^{18}\) By contrast the author had previously argued in Section 1 for the supposition of a lost śruti in order to validate a (derivative) smṛti which is held to be in complete accordance with the Veda.
terms that could also be met by heterodox schools such as that of the Buddhists.

**Section 3**

The third section begins by exploring the possibility that the Śaivites too might claim Vedic legitimacy by hypothesizing an earlier supporting śruti. In order to exclude them from the orthodox fold the author adopts a two-pronged strategy. He begins by reiterating his school's Vedic credentials through the identification of Vāsudeva as the material cause of the universe. This monist position is then contrasted favourably with the dualist theology of the Pāṇḍūraṅgas. His second tactic is to point out the contradictory beliefs among the four major Śaivite schools: the Pāṇḍūraṅgas, Śaivas, Kālāmukhas and Kāpālikas. According to the author not only do these schools diverge among themselves -- despite all claiming to worship the same God -- they diverge from the Veda.\(^{19}\) His criticism of the Śaivite schools is interesting in that for the most part it is based not on purely sectarian grounds as we would expect, but on inconsistency within their own ranks. Despite being a Vaiśnava

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\(^{19}\) The attitude of the Śaivites to the Veda was by no means completely negative. Śrīkanṭha's *bhāṣya* on *Brahma-sūtra* 2.2.38 declares that Śiva composed both the Veda and the Śaivāgama. In the fourth *āṁśika* of the *Nyāya-mañjarī* (p. 379 Śastri edition) Jayanta Bhaṭṭa supports both the Śaivāgama and the *Pāṇḍūraṅga-gama* on the grounds that both were composed by trustworthy persons and did not oppose the Veda: श्रीवर्मचारण्योऽस्तु तद्योगा एवान्यथोपदिश्यन्ते। न चैष ब्रह्मण्यं वैकल्पिकत्राद उपायानाम। अत आप्नं प्रणीतत्वादैवावनिसुद्दत्वाचु च न तयोर अप्रायामण्यम्। The Pāṇḍūraṅga practices of meditation upon OM and *trīṣaṇa-saṇa* indicate they still retained some links with Vedic orthodoxy. Kauṇḍinya also exhibits a clear preference for Brāhmaṇas in *Pāṇḍūraṅga-sūtras* 1.9, 1.13, 4.20 and their commentary. The Kāpālikas are said in Section 3 to recognize the sacred thread. Nonetheless, they clearly accorded their own āgama a higher place, universally crediting its authorship to Śiva himself (Gonda, MRLS p. 162). The prevalent attitude seemed to be that the Vedas are acceptable but inferior to the Śaivāgama (Gonda, MRLS p. 169).
himself, the author is careful to deprecate only the divergent practices of Śaivism and not the deity.20

As mentioned near the beginning of this introduction the author pays particular attention to the Pāśupatas. This preoccupation is apparent in his selection of Śaivite text to examine. Although the Śaivāgama was extensive, particularly in the region under the influence of the Śaiva-Siddhāntas in South India, the author concentrates instead upon the relatively obscure text, the Pāśupata-sūtras. Undeniably one of the earliest works in the Śaivite tradition it was curiously ignored by the rest of the Śaivāgama.21 The focus upon the Pāśupatas would suggest one of two things:

1. They were the Pāńcarātrikas’ most visible competitors within the bhakti movement in the author’s region.
2. The author is following the precedent of Yāmuna and Śaṅkara who also deal with the text.

It is the second explanation which seems the more plausible.

Following this, numerous objections from the Tantra-vārttika and Brahma-sūtras (including Śaṅkara’s bhāṣya) are discussed. The Pāńcarātrikas are vilified on a number of grounds:

1. They are included by Kumārila in the ranks of the clearly less acceptable schools of the Sāṅkhya, Yogins, Pāśupatas and Buddhists.
2. They specify new, non-Vedic rites and sacraments when determining those eligible to perform rites of worship in the Pāńcarātra temples.
3. They permit Śudras to perform religious functions.

20 See footnote 13 above.
21 Gonda (MRLS p. 220) remarks, "... as far as I am aware the āgamas do not mention the Pāśupata-sūtras or Kaundinya’s commentary." Dasgupta (Vol. 5, p. 17) makes the same point.
4. Through their conception of the vyūhas they accept a real origin for individual souls, thus contradicting the Vedic doctrine identifying ātman with Brahmā.

5. They are included in the section on logical refutation in the Brahma-Sūtras (2.2) along with a number of other schools rejected therein by Bādarāyaṇa (according to traditional Kevalādvaita interpretation).

6. They have traditionally been regarded as heretical.

7. They are accused by Śaṅkara of demeaning the Vedas in a passage from their āgama concerning the sage Śāṅḍilya where he is described as finding the highest truth in the Pañcarātra smṛti after failing to find it in the Vedas.

8. They are generally disregarded by the śiśtas (spiritual elite).

9. They established a second, Tāntric system of knowledge, implying their exclusion from the Vedic tradition.

10. In their religious functions they accept leftover food and flowers, thus polluting themselves.

The first objection is handled by asserting that Kumārila included the Pañcarātrikas with non-Vedic schools purely in the context of a pūrva-pakṣa. His remark deals with heterodox systems in general, among which the Pañcarātrikas are commonly but incorrectly placed.

The second objection concerning the creation of new rites is disallowed on two counts:

a. Other, additional rites such as the śiro-vrata have come to be accepted.

b. The Pañcarātra rites do not oppose the Veda.

The eligibility of the Śūdras is justified by noting that since sruti allows the Nīṣāda people (who are outside the four varṇas or social classes) to conduct
rites there is surely an opportunity for the Śūdras to do so.

The issue of the creation of new souls in the fourth objection is explained as a misinterpretation. No origin for the soul was ever proposed by the Pāñcarātrikas and the vyūhas should not be taken as such. Rather they are simply emanations of Viṣṇu which permit devotees to focus their devotion.

In reply to the fifth objection the author suggests that Bādarāyaṇa included the Pāñcarātrikas in the section on invalid schools incidentally, rather than deliberately. The answer to the sixth objection is a lengthy one and touches upon:

(a) The ultimate unity of Viṣṇu, the vyūhas and the avatāras,
(b) the absence of conflict between the Veda and the Pañcarātrāgama,
(c) the need to accept the entire system, not merely the more defensible elements,
(d) the genesis of the Pañcarātrāgama in the teachings of Nārāyaṇa to Nārada, and
(e) the reliability of the teachings, (unlike those of the Buddhists which were intended to mislead humanity)

The reference to Śaṅḍilya’s pronouncement in the seventh objection is explained as an example of henotheism -- praising one thing by belittling another. It might also be described as emphasizing one issue or tenet in an exaggerated fashion not intended to be taken literally. Examples from the Aitareya-brāhmaṇa and Mahābhārata are then cited as precedents for this manner of speaking.

The eighth objection is simply denied on the grounds that śiṣṭas already perform the Pañcarātra rites throughout the country. And as for the accusation of belonging to the Tāntric, as opposed to Vedic fold, this is related to the well-established tradition of dividing rites into śrauta, smārta and
domestic. They may arise from different sources but each is valid

The reply to the final objection concerning the use of leftover food and flowers will be recounted below under the heading "The author's debt to Yāmuna." The final passages of the section state the kāmya or voluntary nature of such rituals and how they do not contravene the prohibition on more than two meals per day.

Many of these objections revolve around the same core issue: is the Pañcarātra system faithful to the Veda? Although the system's Vedic roots (or lack thereof) are explored in Section 1 the debate later returns again and again to this same question. Of the ten objections listed in Section 3, five or six may really be considered just variations on the theme of vedānusāra (faithfulness to the Veda).

The author's sympathy with the Kevalādvaitins

The interesting aspect of the author's reply to the objection concerning the vyūhas is the pains he takes to reinterpret Śaṅkara's apparent condemnation of the Pāñcarātrikas in his bhāṣya. Where it might have seemed more advantageous to simply attack the Kevalādvaitin, the author chooses instead to act almost as an apologist for his ostensible enemy. He explains away the criticism with the defence that jīva is used by Śaṅkara in the more general sense of "being" rather than the specific meaning of "individual soul." A similar interpretation of motives occurs when he rationalizes the inclusion of the Pāñcarātrikas in the section on conflict by Bādarāyaṇa. The latter is said to have not intended to criticize those who truly understand the Pañcarātra doctrine but merely those less intelligent ones who superficially accepted the creation of a new soul called Saṅkarṣaṇa. It is curious that he did not adopt
Yāmuna’s position as outlined in Āgama-prāmāṇya 99-105. There sūtras 2.2.42-43 are described as the pūrva-pakṣa which is then disproven by sūtras 2.2.44-45. That Bhaṭṭāraka-śrī-vedottama did not adopt this same position seems to support the view that he was not unsympathetic to Śaṅkara.

These monist leanings are also suggested in the reply to the sixth objection where the author reemphasizes the ultimate unity of Viṣṇu, the vyūhas and the avatāras and the deference to the Veda by the Pañcarātrāgama.

The author’s debt to Yāmuna

One of the most noteworthy features of the Tantra-śuddha is how closely it follows Yāmuna’s Āgama-prāmāṇya (or vice versa). The latter is a 10th century (circa) Vaiṣṇava work which also sought to legitimize the Pañcarātra system (the āgama in its title refers to the Pañcarātrāgama). The degree of similarity between the two far transcends any possibility of coincidence. Many lines are lifted word-for-word or lightly paraphrased in the Tantra-śuddha, the same verses from outside sources are often used, the arguments generally follow the same lines, and the conclusions reached correspond highly throughout. The order of the topics varies between the two but most of the objections raised by Bhaṭṭāraka-śrī-vedottama are also discussed by Yāmuna (whose longer text addresses a number of other issues as well). Many of these points of similarity will be noted in the text itself as they occur. However, as one example I will briefly summarize the two authors’ defences of the practices of eating food remnants and wearing garlands previously offered to the deity (nivedya-bhakṣaṇa and nirmālya-dhāraṇa).

In Āgama-prāmāṇya 134 Yāmuna begins by questioning whether the

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22 This is also Rāmānuja’s rendering of the sūtras.
opponent objects to food and flowers in general or specific food and flowers. He rhetorically dismisses the first interpretation on the grounds that food and flowers should not be wasted. He handles the second by sarcastically asking how the opponent can object since he does not recognize the divinity of the Pañcarātra temple deity (i.e. if there is no deity to partake there can be no leftovers). Following further arguments Yāmuna then notes in Āgama-prāmāṇya 136 the purifying features of the remnants, comparing them to the soma consumed at a sacrifice. This is then followed by a passage from the Brahma-purāṇa which orders the performance of the cāndrāyana rite of expiation for those who partake of food other than nivedya. The argument concludes with a citation from Mahābhārata 12.322.24 describing the dining habits of Pañcarātra sages in the palace of King Upicara.

Bhaṭṭāraka-śrī-vedottama's defence in Section 4 begins also by asking the opponent to clarify his objection. The same two interpretations are then rejected, again with the feeling that the opponent's nose is being gently tweaked. The analogy of soma is brought up and the same passages from the Brahma-purāṇa and the Mahābhārata are then cited.

Despite such a high degree of what would be plagiarism in modern terms, Bhaṭṭāraka-śrī-vedottama never acknowledges even the existence of the Āgama-prāmāṇya. One possible explanation would be that the Tantra-suddha could have been an attempt to condense and summarize the major points and arguments of the earlier text, perhaps for teaching purposes. It is conceivable that the author felt it redundant to even mention the title of his source as his contemporaries were probably as familiar with it as he was. Another hypothesis is that this text may have simply been personal notes of the author which were never intended for dissemination.

An alternative view is that it may have been Yāmuna who did the
borrowing. If we were to assume the *Tantra-śuddha* preceded the *Āgama-prāmāṇya* this would at least account for the omission of the Vīraśaivas. However, one is then left to explain the correspondences between the arguments used by Rāmānuja in the *Śrī-bhaṣya* on *Brahma-sūtras* 2.2.42-45 (apart from the *pūrva-pakṣa/uttara-pakṣa* division he proposed) and those found in Section 3 of the *Tantra-śuddha* where the objections of Śaṅkara are dealt with.23 It is far more likely that this author borrowed from Rāmānuja and Yāmuna than the other way round. Regardless of the order we ultimately assign however, it is clear that the *Tantra-śuddha* must be closer in time to the *Āgama-prāmāṇya* than the 14th or 15th century.

A significant point of departure between the two works appears to be that whereas the *Āgama-prāmāṇya* defends the Pañcarātra system from a Viśiṣṭādvaitin position the *Tantra-śuddha* attempts the same task from a perspective closer to that of Śaṅkara’s Kevalādvaita Vedānta. This change in emphasis is perhaps the primary reason for studying this text. The *Tantra-śuddha* serves as a reminder that Indian religious groups bearing the same name were not stagnant, monolithic entities; they grew and changed not only over the centuries but across different regions. It is thus superficial and misleading for us to attempt to force them into convenient, preconceived categories of the sort, "All devotional schools were dualist" etc.

Comments on text presentation

Instances of unclear readings or suspected corruption apparently occurred in various places in the manuscript. The editor, T. Gaṇapati Śāstri, has generally indicated his readings or suggestions in round brackets ( ) or else

23 These correspondences will be discussed in Section 3.
footnoted them, although his policy of emendation is never explained in the
text. His footnotes will be duly noted as belonging to him. Some of these
uncertainties may be attributable to the nature of the Malayalam script. Dr.
Aklujkar has frequently noted that certain characters which bear no
resemblance to each other in the nāgari script are difficult to distinguish in the
older Malayalam script, e.g. the characters for ka and ta. Disagreements with
Śāstri’s edition and suggested readings where there is uncertainty will be
indicated with square brackets [ ] and/or footnotes.

I have chosen to divide the original nāgari text into manageable portions of
several sentences each. For ease of reading I have hyphenated compounds
wherever possible. I have also enclosed in quotation marks " . . . " those nāgari
passages followed by iti which are direct quotations from other texts or from a
statement earlier in the present work. Numerous common words such as śruti,
smṛti, and varṇa have been left untranslated as have certain technical terms
such as codanā and dharma whose meanings are particularly difficult to
render in one or two English words.

The Sanskrit passages are followed by my translation and, where helpful,
by my commentary explaining the author’s line of reasoning. I also try to
point out any underlying assumptions or implications of the passage that may
not be apparent to the casual reader. Related discussions and references and
problems in reading are usually cited in footnotes. The abbreviations
preceding the English passages stand for:

P-R: - Pāñcarātrika

Opp: - Opponent

Comm: - Commentary
A Monograph Called "The Purity of the (Pañcarātra) System"
Composed by Śrī Bhāṭāraka-śrī-vedottama

अलक्षितं यत् पदम् अन्तरिक्षे भुवस् तलं ्ै यद् अधस् चकार ।
विभेद यथं चाण्ड-कपालम् ऊष्ठर्वः तत् पातु विश्वं पदम् अच्युतस्य ॥

That stride, unperceived in the sky, which pushed down the very plane of the earth,
And which broke the top of the egg-shell; may that all-encompassing stride of the Unfallen One protect you.

Comm: This maṅgala or benedictory verse is based on the famous incident from Viṣṇu's incarnation as Vāmana the dwarf wherein he bestrides the universe in three steps, thus capitalizing on the demon Bali's offer to grant him whatever land he could encompass in three steps. The anda-kapāla is almost certainly a synonym for brahmānda-kapāla, the cosmic egg of Indian mythology from which all Creation stems. Acyuta is an epithet of Viṣṇu.

Common to much of Indian literature, the maṅgala seeks not only a form of divine assistance and sanction for the author's efforts but also indicates his denominational bent to the reader -- in this case, Vaiṣṇavism.

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1 As noted in the introduction (fn. 1) this may well have originally been śuddhyākhyaṁ.
2 Tala also has the sense of "bottom."
Section 1- Pramāṇas and the Pañcarātra smṛti

1. इह पञ्च-रात्रि-तन्त्र-विषयः। तत्त्वं किं प्रमाणम् अप्रमाणं वेति संसायः। किम् अत्र संशयं-कारणम्। उभय-पक्षः-गता युक्तयोऽनिधानिः-विषयः। संशयं-कारणम्। तत्र त्रयी-विद्वन्ति अत्यन्तम् अपरिमृहीतवादः धर्म-प्रमाणवेन शिष्टे: परिगृहीत-चतुर्दश-विषया-स्थानेषु पञ्च-रात्रि-तन्त्रस्यापरिगृहीतवाचः ्त्रयी-बाह्य-शास्त्रः-दिगम्बर-पाशु-पतादि-तन्त्रवत् पञ्च-रात्रि-तन्त्रम् अप्यप्रामाण्यम् इति पूर्वः पक्षः। सर्व-लोकार्थें-भूत-नारदादि-शिष्ट-जन-परिगृहीतवात् परिगृहीत-शास्त्रानन्तरभूतंतःप्रथमाणिः।

P-R: In the following the Pañcarātra system is the subject-matter. Regarding it, an uncertainty exists: is it valid or invalid? What is the cause of uncertainty here? The arguments -- whose distinctions are not determined -- pertaining to the two alternatives are the cause of uncertainty. In this context the preliminary position is, that because of:

(i) the complete non-acceptance by those knowledgeable of the three (Vedas), and

(ii) the exclusion of the Pañcarātra system from the 14 branches of knowledge\(^3\) accepted by the learned as an authority for dharma, the Pañcarātra system is also invalid, like the systems of the Buddhists, Jains, Pāṣupatas and others, which are outside the three Vedas.

The final view is that:

(i) because of being accepted by eminent people such as Nārada who has

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\(^3\) This is a reference to Yājñavalkya-smṛti. 1.3 which lists the 14 branches as the Purāṇas, Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, Dharma-sāstra, the six Āṅgas, -- śikṣā, chandas, vyākaraṇa, nirukta, jyotiṣa and kalpa -- and the four Vedas. A related discussion occurs in Agama-prāmāṇya 17: यदपि धर्मम्-प्रमाणस्या समस्तास्तिकः-जनं-परिगृहीतेऽत्र चतुर्दश-विद्यास्यानेन्द्रपरिग्रहनं तदप्यावैदिकः लिङ्गम्। अन्यथा हीद्धम्अपि तदन्त्यतमल्वेन स्मर्यत्।
become a model for the whole world, and
(ii) even though it is not included among those reckoned as śāstras, it is possible to justify its validity as in the case of the works, the Mahābhārata and Rāmāyaṇa and others, composed by Dvaipāyana (Vyāsa) and Vālmīki, the Pañcarātra system is also authoritative just like the statements made by people such as Manu, Gautama and others who are closely connected with the Veda.

Comm: The phrase "whose distinctions are not determined" means the respective merits of the two positions are as yet unresolved. The Pañcarātra system has its own ancient lineage of authority -- a line of sages beginning with the divine rṣi Nārada -- which negates the necessity for explicit Vedic sanction. Other texts such as the epics by Vyāsa and Vālmīki are accorded authoritative status as are the works of sages such as Manu and Gautama. The latter two are accepted as having an association with the Veda (veda-saṃyoga). The format of the siddhānta-statement follows that of the pūrva-pakṣa: two reasons with an example or analogy appended to the second.

2. ननु न स्मृतिर वेदवन्निरपेक्ष प्रमाण, मूल-प्रमाण-सापेक्षवात्। पूर्व-विज्ञान-सापेक्ष-विज्ञान स्मृतिः इत्युच्यते। तस्याशं च पूर्व-विज्ञान-प्रामाण्योपपाधिकम् एव प्रामाण्य, न स्वतः। सर्वाण्येव हि स्मरणानि प्रत्यक्षाविदि-प्रमाणावगतम् एवार्थं समर्थयति।

Opp: A smṛti (recollection) is not independently valid like the Veda because of its dependence upon the authority of a source. It is said, "A smṛti is knowledge which is dependent upon earlier knowledge." And its (the smṛti's)
authority is conditioned by the authority of earlier knowledge; (the authority) does not arise of (the _smṛti_'s) own nature. Indeed all _smṛtis_ convey a content which is already apprehended by a valid means of knowledge such as perception etc.

Comm: The opponent acknowledges that a _smṛti_ may well convey a valid meaning but it must be verifiable by another traditionally-accepted means of knowledge (_pramāṇa_). Between the two major branches of Mīmāṃsā thought -- the school of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and that of Prabhākara -- there is general agreement on what these _pramāṇas_ are. Both sides accept _pratyakṣa_ (direct sensory perception),⁴ _āgama_ (traditional or inherited knowledge), _anumāṇa_ (inference or reason), _upamāṇa_ (analogy) and _arthāpatti_ (presumption). Additionally, a sixth -- _anupalabdhi_ (non-perception) -- is accepted by Kumārila.

3. तद्ध इह परम-निःशेषसादेर भगवदाराधानादेशः च साध्य-साधन-सन्बन्ध न प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि समर्थितं शक्यनुस्वरि।
   नापि शाक्तः तदनुपलभात्।
   न च पद्य-राग्र-स्मृतिस्ततमूल-श्रुत्य व्याप्ता, येन पद्य-राण्र-स्मृत्य तत्मूल-श्रुतिर्अनुमित्येत।
   सत्येत खण्डु पद्य-राग्र-प्रतिपादित-देवताराधन-तत्-फलावत्योऽसे
   च साध्य-साधन-सन्बन्धभावो नात्मानान्त-गम्यः सन्बन्धार्द्धिनादृ एव, तथा तन्मूल-श्रुतिर्
   अपि नानुमेयाः, सन्बन्धार्द्धिनादृ एव।

⁴ Radhakrishnan notes that the term has a wider scope in Nyāya thought, "Though _pratyakṣa_ originally meant sense-perception it soon came to cover all immediate apprehensions whether with the aid of the senses or not." (Vol. 2, p. 48) For the Mīmāṃsāsakas however it seems limited to cognitions arising from sensory perception, (Radhakrishnan, Vol. 2, p. 380).
Opp: Now, in this case, perception and the other means are unable to bring to us the relationship of end and means between the supreme blissful state and the adoration etc. of the Lord.

Nor is Testimony (able to), because (mention of the Pañcarātra school) is not found.

Nor is the Pañcarātra smṛti pervaded by its source śruti, so that a source śruti could be inferred through the Pañcarātra smṛti. Just as the existence of the means-and-end relationship between the adoration of the deity as taught by the Pañcarātrikas and the acquisition of that (ultimate state of bliss) is not attainable through inference because of the very imperceptibility of the relationship, so also the source śruti is not to be inferred because of that same imperceptibility of relationship.

Comm: The opponent notes the inability of the usual means of knowledge to confirm the efficacy of the Pañcarātra devotional practices such as the adoration of Kṛṣṇa or Viṣṇu in achieving the state of ultimate bliss or liberation. We do not witness devotees of Kṛṣṇa or Viṣṇu achieving this state. (This of course does not preclude the possibility that an internal transformation has occurred, merely that it is not evident to the external senses.) Śabda or "Testimony" (the Veda) similarly fails to provide support for such a relationship as there is no mention anywhere that the Pañcarātra system is to be honoured. Given the absence of a surviving śruti to support the Pañcarātra smṛti, the opponent considers the possibility that the sort of śruti necessary to justify the smṛti may have existed at one time but has since been lost.

The traditional example of vyāpti (pervasion, concomittance or invariable association) is that of smoke and fire. Wherever we find smoke we invariably
find fire but the reverse does not hold, for there can be fire without smoke. Hence smoke is said to be pervaded by fire in that the latter has a wider domain than the former. The relevance of this concept here is to point out that, like perception, inference cannot be used to buttress the Pancharatra views. The Pancharatra smṛti is not pervaded by śruti and so we cannot infer the existence of the latter on the basis of the former.  

4. न चागमेन तन्मूलः-श्रुतिभोध:। आगमो हि द्वि-विधः पौरुषेयोः पौरुषेयस् च। न तावत् पौरुषेयागम-बलेन तन्मूलः-शृत्यक्षोधः संबज्जति विप्रलब्ध्याशः॥।

Opp: Nor by traditional knowledge is there the apprehension of a source śruti. Traditional knowledge is of two kinds: human and non-human. As for the apprehension of a source śruti on the strength of human tradition, it is not at all possible, because of the suspicion of deception. For some are seen in the present time chattering even non-traditional things by superimposing āgama [i.e. wrong attribution from a legitimate tradition]. Thus a suspicion arises that the state of being based on the Veda is propounded by the authors of the Pancharatra smṛti in the case of their own compositions -- either having found a source śruti, or even without having actually found it -- for the sake of

5 A similar objection is raised in Āgama-prāmāṇya 10: न च करण-पथ-दूर-वर्त्तिनि प्रस्तुतवस्तुन्यः-विनाभावद्वादाधारणाधिनोदयम् अनुमानम् उत्पत्तिः अतः, न यहष्ट-चर-वहितस् तदविनाभावितया ध्रुमम् अनुसंदेहति।

6 The editor reads सन्देहः.

7 A non-human āgama would include not only divine revelations but also those from supremely-accomplished persons.
achieving the status of credible statements, and to that extent (that there is such a suspicion) there is damage to validity.

Comm: Human tradition is too susceptible to distortion and manipulation to be used as a valid standard.8

5. नान्यपोषेयागम-बलान्त मूल-श्रुत्यवबोध, तदनुपलब्धात्। न हि कसिंधूर्यम
अपोषेयागम: पञ्च-रात्र-स्मृति-मूल-श्रुति-प्रतिपादक उपलब्धते। तस्मान् नागमेनापि मूलोपलब्धिः।

आन्यपुपमानेन मूलोपलब्धिः, सहसांिनिरपणात्।

आन्यथापर्या तदनुपलब्धिः, सयू: शुल्या विनानुपपतेर अभावात्। समृतिस्
तवनुपपसमाना मूल-मात्र कल्पयति न प्रमाण-भूता श्रुति, तया विना समृतेर
अनुपपस्यभावात्, ऋषेयापि समरणोपपते। तस्मान् आन्यापर्यापि मूल-श्रुति-
प्रसिद्धः।

तस्माद् आयितप-श्रुति-मूलत्वासंबंधवाद् ऋषेय-मूलत्व-संबंधाच् ज निम्तूसेवता पञ्च-
रात्र-स्मृतिर्इति सिद्धम्।

Opp: Neither is there cognizance of a source śruti on the strength of non-human tradition because it is not found (in the Veda). For no non-human tradition is found which states a source śruti for the Pañcarātra smṛti. Therefore, neither by tradition is there an apprehension of the source.

Nor is there a determination of the source by analogy, because there is no determination of something similar (to a source śruti).

8 The implication is that the Pañcarātra tradition is also not safe from such tendencies. A similar warning is raised in Agama-prāmāṇya 10:

न नवत्तैसवेय वचनसंस्थलाकाय सम्भवः।
विपलभुध्यश्च अघि ब्रह्ममोष्याच्च पुरुषात्।
अद्वानेऽद्धि हि इत्यम्ते केवलिं आमसिक्षाचलात्।
अनागमिकं एवार्थि व्याच्यक्षाणा विच्छकणा:।
Nor is there an apprehension of it by implication, because of the absence of non-justification in the case of a smṛti without a śruti [i.e., it is not that the existence of the smṛti will not be justified if the śruti were not there]. As for the smṛti, the lack of explication (of its existence) implies nothing more than a source in general, not necessarily a validating śruti, because of the absence of disproof of a smṛti by that (śruti) [i.e., it is not that the smṛti will not be explicated if such a śruti did not exist]. There can be the origin of a recollection (a smṛti) from error as well. Therefore there is no proof of a source śruti even by implication.

Therefore, it is proven that because of the impossibility of there being a source śruti of the intended sort and because of the possibility of being based on error, the Pañcarātra smṛti is definitely unfounded.

Comm: Upamāna is the identification or classification of a previously unknown thing on the basis of a similar, known thing: a sadṛśa. A traditional instance is that of the cow and the wild bull. Someone enquiring about what a wild bull looks like is told it resembles a cow. Venturing into the forest he finds such an animal and on the basis of its similarity to a cow determines that this indeed is a wild bull.

Prabhākara's example of arthāpatti is that of the man Devadatta who is definitely known to be alive but who is not found living at his house. The unavoidable implication is that he is residing elsewhere. The opponent rejects the applicability of implication here by pointing out that a smṛti can exist without a source śruti: it can't perhaps be absolutely validated but it can

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9 Taken from Dasgupta, Vol. 1, pp. 391-2. Another example is that of the fat Deva-datta who declares he is fasting. He is not seen eating during the daytime yet his weight remains the same. The unavoidable implication is that he is eating during the night.
exist. Therefore the mere fact that a smṛti exists does not imply a preceding śrutī. The existence of a smṛti signifies its dependence upon some source, not necessarily an authoritative śrutī. The smṛti may well be the product of misunderstanding or confusion.

Having eliminated as possible means of validation the five pramāṇas accepted by both schools of Mīmāṁsā the opponent declares the invalidity of the Pañcarātra smṛti.

6. अपि च वेद-मूला: पञ्च-रात्र-स्मृतयः परिकल्प्यन्ते।
	|   |   |
|---|---|
\[10\] तदार्थ-समरणवद्
     \[१०\] इश्व-वेद-वाक्यम् उपलभ्य नारदादिभिः
              ऋषिभि: पञ्च-रात्र-स्मृतयः प्रणीता इत्यष्टि
               पारम्पर्येवं स्मर्येत्, न च स्मर्येत्।

**Opp:** Moreover the Pañcarātra smṛtis are considered (by the Pañcarātrikas) to be based on the Veda. In that case, like the recollection of the content [i.e. the Pañcarātra teachings allegedly based on the Veda], one should also recall through uninterrupted succession, "Having acquired such-and-such a Vedic statement the Pañcarātra smṛtis were composed by the ṛṣīs Nārada et. al.," yet this is not remembered.

(f) **Comm:** The opponent here anticipates a defence by the Pañcarātrikas: namely that their founders recalled the meaning or sense, instead of the specific words, of the Vedic passages upon which they based their smṛtis.\(^{11}\)

\[10\] Dr. Aklujkar has suggested that the original reading may have been यदि च...
    परिकल्प्यन्ते तदार्थ-समरणवद्...
     a change to "And if... then..." which would create a smoother transition to the new issue of recalling the exact source.

\[11\] A similar objection is raised in Āgama-pramāṇya 89: न चार्थ-समरणस्य पयोजनत्वात्
    तस्य विफलत्वात् तद्द्व अनादरणीयम् इति युक्तं, न हि यत् प्रामाण्यं तद् एव विस्मर्तं
    युक्तम्।
7. तथाप्येता(हस्त)र्थ-समरणस्यः प्रयोजनवत्वान् मूल-समरणस्य च विफलत्वाद् अनाहतं तैर् इति।

तद्ध्ययुक्तम्। न हि यत्-कृत्य प्रामाण्यं तद्ध्व विस्मरतू युज्यते, अर्थ-स्पृते: स्वतं-प्रामाण्याभावत्। संवेशं च संप्रतिपन्नम् एतद्, यद्व वेद-मूलत्व-झानाद् विना न प्रामाण्यं निस्पौयत इति। एवं च सति, कथ तन्न ते नारादायः कुरुः।

**P-R:** Although this was so, there was some gain in remembering this sort of content and because it was of no use to remember the source it (the source śruti) was disregarded by them (Nārada et. al.).

**Opp:** That is improper. It is unsuitable to forget that very thing which has bestowed authoritativeness (the śruti) because of the absence of self-validation in the case of the recollection of content. And it is acknowledged by all that, without the knowledge that something (like this) has a source in the Veda authoritativeness cannot be determined. This being so, how did Nārada et. al. fashion the system?

**Comm:** If one bases something like a religio-philosophical system on something else such as a śruti one has no right to preserve merely the meaning of that initial foundation while discarding the exact words. It is important to preserve the original statement because a mere recollection of the meaning has no validity in itself. If Nārada et. al. did know the basis of their beliefs -- the mūla-śruti -- then they should have preserved it as well.

8. अथोच्चेत नारादादिभिर्अप्यथ्मात्रं एवान्येभ्योऽधिगतं, न मूल-भूतं वेद-वाक्यं दष्टम् इति। तत्ति तैर् अप्यन्येभ्यस् तैर् अप्यन्येभ्योऽर्थ-मात्रं अवगतं, न

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12 One would normally expect nanu or cet in this sentence to indicate an alternative possibility or explanation..
Opp: Now, it would be said that only the content itself was gained from others by Nārada et. al. as well; the Vedic statement which was the source was not seen. In that case, since the meaning itself was learned from others and by them from others as well, the Vedic statement was known by no one. Therefore these Pañcarātra smṛtis should be regarded as unfounded because of the logical predicament of being an unfounded tradition, like the blind leading the blind [lit. a chain of blind people].

9. अथ पल्लीन-शाखान्तर-मूलता कल्पित, तदा सर्वासं बुद्धादि-समृदीनाम् अपि तद्व-द्वारं प्रामाण्यं प्रसज्जयेत। यस्य यद् अभिप्रेतं स तत् पल्लीन-शाखा-मस्तकं निक्षिप्य प्रमाणिकुप्याति!

अथ विद्यमान-शाखा-गता एवैतेक्षथेः, तदा नारदादय इव सर्वं पृथक्ष । तत्त्वोपलधेरिनिति स्मृति-पणण-asेैथर्यं स्यात।

Opp: If being based on another, lost Vedic recension could be imagined, then authenticity could be attached to all the smṛtis, even those of the Buddha etc. with that (hypothesis) as the door. If someone intended (to claim) "x" (as a smṛti) he would place it on the head of a lost Vedic recension and declare it to be authoritative.13

On the other hand, if these contents (statements which could be construed as endorsing the Pañcarātra system or some doctrinal aspect thereof) are actually part of existing Vedic recensions, then it would be pointless to

13 See Āgama-prāmāṇya 89 for related discussion: अथ विस्मरणोपपन्तये पल्लीन-नित्यानुमेय-शाखा-मूलता आत्मीयं तदा यद् एव येन प्रमाणं तथा परिणृहितं स तत् पल्लीन-शाखा-मस्तकं निक्षिप्य प्रमाणीकृप्याति।
compose a smṛti since, like Nārada et. al., all men could acquire them from the same source.

Comm: The dilemma for someone professing to abide by orthodox Vedic tradition is that if a system is allowed to claim an unverifiable sanction like a passage in a lost Vedic text then even the heterodox schools like the Buddhists could theoretically fall back on this rationale. In other words, how do you allow such a privilege for yourself and not for other schools?

10. अपि च कौशलयः वेद-वाच्यात् इव नारदादिभिः पतिपन्नः, किं विधि-परादव
उतार्थ-वाद-सरपादू हत्यपि न ज्ञायते। न च नारदादि-वचनाद् एव मूल निरिच्छन्नम्,
तेषां हि निर्मूलम् अपि विप्रलम्भकतया लोक प्रतारितितम् एवं वदेद्।
तत्रमाद् अप्रमाणं पर्यं-राज-स्मृतिर् इति सिद्धम्। तद् उक्तं "धर्मीस्य शाब्द-मूलत्वाद्
अशाब्दम् अनपेक्षं स्फात" (भै. १. ३. १) इति॥

Opp: Moreover, it is also not known from what kind of Vedic statement this is understood by Nārada et. al. Is it from some (statement) intending to enjoin or from something having the form of a recommendation? Nor do we ascertain the source from the statements themselves of Nārada et. al.; through being deceptive even they might say something unfounded to fool the world.

Therefore it is proven, the Pañcarātra smṛti is invalid. For it is said, "Because of the dependence of dharma upon Testimony, that which has no Testimony (for support) [lit. that which lacks sabda] is not to be accepted." (Mīmāṁsā-sūtra 1.3.1)
Comm: Śruti statements were traditionally divided by the Mīmāṃsakas into five major categories with various subdivisions according to nature or intent. These are:

(i) vidhi - injunctions or orders
(ii) artha-vāda - explanatory passage, statement of purpose, incidental commendation of or (rarely) advice against a particular religious practice; these state something which was either not stated previously or else was stated imperfectly
(iii). niśedha - prohibitory injunction
(iv) mantra - sacrificial formula
(v) nāmadheya - name of a sacrifice or its parts

A vidhi statement for instance, may prescribe anointed sand to be placed on the altar but not indicate what the sand should be anointed with. If a nearby non-injunctive statement (artha-vāda) praises the merits of ghee then the quite justifiable conclusion may be drawn that the sand should be anointed with ghee. The artha-vāda statement did not specifically prescribe this and its authority is inferior to that of a vidhi, but clearly it may be used to guide actions. The opponent's point is that not only is the exact wording of the source Śruti unknown but so is its general nature. Dharma here carries the connotation of punya or merit. A religious or ritual practice is virtuous only to the extent that it is based on support in the Śruti. Human beings cannot determine non-mundane results of actions.

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14 See Laugākü Bhāskara's Artha-saṁgraha 1.10:
11. अनुसर्यते ।

P-R: This is the reply. The Pañcarātra smṛti is a valid means of knowing, because of the smṛti's basis in direct experience. Without having experienced the thing himself, no man is able to remember. And the established causes of experience are contact (of the senses with the objects) etc. And since these (causes) are not possible in the case of an extra-sensory thing, on the basis of the remainder principle it is thought that only codanā, (Vedic urging) is the cause of experience. And codanā is possible as the cause of the prior understanding by Nārada et. al. For it is said: "Contact with the Veda is justified in the case of the members of the three (upper) varṇas (social classes)."(Śābara-bhāṣya 1.3.2). On the other hand, the teachings of extra-sensory things [e.g. dharma, merit, demerit, etc.] by the Buddha et. al., whose connections with the Veda are unjustified, are regarded as rooted in error, since at the time of considering their source codanā had not mounted even the path of possibility.

15 The structure of the author's defence follows the lines of Śabara's interpretation of Mīmāṁsā-sūtras 1.3.1-2. As in Śabara's bhāṣya the author treats 1.3.1 as the pūrva-pakṣa to be refuted by the uttara-pakṣa of 1.3.2, which he uses to conclude his reply at the end of Section 1. Śabara writes in 1.3.2 concerning the preceding sūtra which ostensibly denied validity to the smṛtis: 'अथ वेदिति प्राक्कृत स्मर्तिः। प्रमाण स्मृतिः।'

16 Manu-smṛti 2.70-80 also leaves little doubt that the Śūdras were excluded from study of the Vedas.
Comm: Since dharma is beyond the senses pratyakṣa is ruled out as a possible cause of the experiences of Nārada et. al. In the absence of pratyakṣa inference, analogy etc. are also ruled out. This leaves only codanā, which is a Vedic urging or impelling to act or believe in a certain way.16 The three upper classes -- Brāhmaṇas, Kṣatriyas, and Vaiśyas -- were the only ones allowed to study the Veda. And as members of this subset of society Nārada et. al. most probably possessed the necessary śrutī passages.

The final statement is in response to the opponent's earlier observation (para. 9) that the Buddhists and other heterodox schools could claim sanction on the basis of a lost śrutī or śākhā. The proponent suggests that no one, including the Buddhists themselves, even entertains the possibility that the Buddha's teachings are rooted in codanā. Since they claim independence from any Vedic source one need not worry about them seeking legitimacy on the basis of a lost śrutī or śākhā.

12. यद् उक्तं चोदनन पूलये चोदनक गिरिति नोपलभ्यतः17 इति । नित्यानुमेयस्य तत संकायिद ।
कथम् अनुप्यारिताः मूलत्वम् यति चेदः नैव दोषः । पाठविचछेदत् पारस्परग्राहः स्मरणात् सिद्धः । यथेव हि ग्रन्था-संप्रदायाबिचछेददाद् अस्तित्व-सिद्धः तथैव नित्यानुमेय-श्रुती-संप्रदायाबिचछेददाद् अस्तित्व-सिद्धः ।

16 codanā is described in Mimāṃsā -sūtra 1.1.2 as the designator of dharma: चोदनालक्षणोऽत्थैध्यमः। Commenting on the same passage, Śabara defines codanā as: कियाधाः प्रयत्नकं वचनम् “(codanā is) a statement which promotes activities.” In Hermeneutics and Language in Pūrva Mimāṃsā (p. 150) Othmar Gächter remarks, ”it forms the primordially authoritative section of the Vedas, as it is pure śabda as pramāṇa, i.e. it has no extraneous source leading to error.”

17 To judge from the plural in the next sentence the original reading might well have been: चोदनक गिरितिष्ठत नोपलभ्यन्ते, the plural referring to the codanās or śrutī urgings for the various Pañcarātra practices.
Regarding (your question) "When there is the basis of a codanā why is the codanā not seen?", we respond that those (codanās), being always inferrable, are never given expression.

If it be argued, "How can the unuttered be a source?," this is not a fault. As in the case of a continuously maintained text [e.g., the Veda] its existence is proven on the basis of being remembered in an unbroken sequence. As the proof of existence is from the continuity of the tradition of the text so in that same way the proof of existence (of a codanā) is from the continuity of the tradition that a śruti is always inferrable.

Comm: The author here restates the opponent’s query (para. 6) as to why Nārada et. al. did not preserve the original statements on which they based their teachings. He then answers to the effect that their basis on codanā was so obvious that they did not feel the need to continually refer to it.19

13. तद् अपुकृतम्, अन्ध-परपरा-न्याय-पसंज्ञात् (इति)20। या हि चोदना न कदाचिद् उच्चारिते, तस्पात् सर्व-पुरूष-प्रत्यक्षाधि-प्रसराभावात् दुर्भभतरम् असितत्वम्। तदा च स्मृतेः अपि निर्मूलत्वम्। ततो वर्ण प्रलीन-श्रुत्यनुमानम् एव। न च प्रलय-योगो न संभाव्यते। दश्यते हि प्रमादालस्य-निद्राभिः पुरुष-क्ष्यायान् मानुपलक्षिधः।

P-R: This is illogical because (if this defence is accepted) there would be the predicament of having to accept the maxim of a blind tradition. Indeed that codanā which is never uttered is an even more difficult phenomenon to find because it is not amenable to the operation of sensory perception etc. by

19 As will be seen below this should not be regarded as the author’s final defence. It appears instead to be part of a rather tentative uttara-pakṣa.
20 Iti is a questionable addition by the editor (or an unnecessary word in the ms.) as the sentence does not really require it.
all people. And then there would be the baselessness of the smṛti as well. Inference of a lost śruti is decidedly preferable to this. Nor is an occurrence of loss impossible. Non-availability (of śrutis) due to the destruction of men and through inattentiveness, idleness and sloth is indeed seen.

Comm: The author now rejects his own proposal on the same grounds as those used against the Buddhists; that is, the mere continuity of a tradition is no testimony to its validity because there are examples in which followers of a certain school blindly perpetuate a set of unfounded teachings. The author is aware of the flimsy nature of the argument that because Pañcarātra adherents nowadays claim support in the Veda, the original founders must have had such support. Either Nārada et. al. did have access to a Vedic statement endorsing their school and/or their beliefs or they didn't have such access and merely preserved the tradition that there was such a statement or mūla-śruti. Parts of the Veda have been lost for various reasons. People entrusted with preserving certain texts have been killed while others have grown careless and lazy over the years and have neglected their duties.

14. अथ पलीन-श्रुति-मूलत्वेन प्रामाण्ये बुद्धावि-स्मृतीनाम् अपि प्रामाण्य-परसं इति।
तन्न, वेद-संयोगाभावात् पुरुष-समरणान्यथानुपपति-बाध्यत्वाच्छुल्लत्यन्त्रां िसः।

Opp: Then, when something becomes valid through being based on a lost śruti, there is the predicament of the authoritativeness of the smṛtis of the Buddha et. al. as well.
P-R: This is not so, because (in that situation) inference of a śruti is outside the realm of possibility other than through a tradition of human recollection which in turn is due to connection with the Veda.

15. अथ वा विद्यमान-शाखागत-श्रुति-मूला हमाः स्मृतयः। न चास्माकम् अपि मूल-श्रुतयुपलब्धिः-प्रसंसः। भिन्न-पकरण-पतितत्त्वात् पुरुषाणां प्रमाद-संबंधाद् विप्रकृणत्त्वाच् च शाखानां स्मृति-मूलं बचनम् अस्माभिः।नोपलभ्यते।

P-R: Or, alternatively, these smṛtis are (really) based on the śrutis found in existing Vedic recensions. However, even then, finding a source śruti is not a predicament for us. (We can declare that) the basis of (our) smṛti is not found by us because of being spread over different sections (of texts), because of the possibility of human negligence and because of the branches being (geographically) scattered about.

Comm: It is not the case that one must infer the existence of a śruti in order to account for the recollection of the Buddha, etc. Unlike Nārada and the other early Pāncarātrikas, the Buddhists did not have nor did they claim to have veda-saṁyoga: connection with the Veda. Their teachings stem from the Buddha. One could justifiably hypothesize a possible lost mūla-śruti for the Buddhists only if they had such a tradition of veda-saṁyoga and if their traditionally handed down teachings could not be explained other than through connection with the Veda. Thus there are no grounds for supposing a pralīna-śruti for the Buddhists.

A further possibility is proposed that the relevant mūla-śruti may not be lost but has just remained unnoticed for various reasons. That is, they are not lost in time but are being maintained at places unknown or inaccessible to us.
The author in this way disclaims any blame or embarrassment over being unable to produce the sort of Vedic citations required to endorse the Pañcarātra school.

16. किमथर्वेद-वाक्यान्येव तैर नोपसहतानाति चेद, उच्चये। यदि तावत्त तान्येव वाक्यान्यत्वायाप्येप्ये, तत्र (त?क) मान्यत्वावात्२¹ स्वाध्याय-विरोधः स्यात्। अनेन च दर्शनेनान्येश्चिर्थ-वादोद्दरणेन विधि-मात्रम् एवाधीयीरन् कर्मणायिक-मात्र वा। तत्र वेद-पलयः प्रसज्जयेत। न चावशर्म नारददयः सर्वं-शाखाध्यायिनः। ते हि प्रयत्नेन शाखान्तराध्यायिभ्यः शुल्बार्थ-मात्र त्य-वाक्येर् अपि स्मरणार्थं निबध्योः।

P-R: If it be argued, "Why were these same Vedic statements not collected by them?" we say, how would it be if these statements were taught? In such a case there could be a conflict with one's own selected text because of an alteration in the sequence. And by this viewpoint, by the omission of the explanatory passages, even others could study merely the injunctions or simply that which is useful in performing (ritual) action. In that case the loss of the Veda would follow. Nor were Nārada et. al. necessarily students of all the (Vedic) recensions. It is possible that having heard through effort just the meaning from students of the other recensions they would record (those contents) even with their own words for the sake of recollection.

Comm: Each Brāhmaṇa family was traditionally responsible for passing on a part of the Veda. Different people thus specialized in different Vedas and aspects of ritual.

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²¹ Despite the editor's uncertainty over the correct reading, क्रमाण्यवात् alone fits the context much better. It is also possible, albeit less likely, that the editor is suggesting as a reading तत्क्रमाण्यवात् "because of their having a different sequence."
Dr. Aklujkar has suggested the phrase *kramāṇytvāt svādhyāya-virodhaḥ* may be interpreted in two ways:

(i) The insertion of the collected statements into the scholar's own specialized section of the Veda (thereby improperly disrupting the traditional order of study and recitation) would create a conflict, or,

(ii) The scholar would be studying portions from outside his assigned text, again precipitating a conflict.

If *śruti* statements were collected out of context in the manner implicit in the opponent's question it would set a dangerous precedent. The author is implying that the whole Veda must be preserved in its entirety and in its traditional order. One cannot extract sentences here and there and teach them out of context in order to provide doubters with a sanction for the Pañcarātra system.

17. न च वाक्य-विशेषापरिज्ञानांम् अस्ति। स्मृतेऽविधिः-रूपत्वात् तन्मूल-श्रुतिः
अपि ताहश्चेष्ट, नार्थ-वाद-रूपेति निपिच्छनुमः।
अपि च विस्मरणम् अपि तेषां संभाज्यते। हृदयते हि अध्यवेश्यस्मरणं
गन्धार्ष(इच?रय)22। यदा तु शाखान्तरेषु विद्यते एताः श्रुतयः, तदवपि कर्ष्या
शाखायां किं वा पठधन्त इवस्याऽत्तर्व च(व?स्म)रणाद23 वेदिकतव-मात्रं धागाय्य-
सिद्धस्य स्मरनिः। तदृश-विशेष-परिज्ञानं पुनर्य अनौपयिकत्वाद् अनाहंते ते:।
तर्माद् वेद-मूलत्वात् पञ्च-रात्रि-सूति: प्रमाणम् इति सिद्धम्। तदृ उक्तं "अपि वा
कर्तृ-सामान्यात् प्रमाणम् अनुमानं स्थात्" (जै. १. ३. २।) इति।

22 Assuming the ms. reading was रय the editor is correct in suggesting रय.

23 विस्मरणाद् is the probable reading. If विबचरणाद् is taken as the reading it could be interpreted as "because of explaining this part (elsewhere) -- in which recension . . ." The implication then would be that Nārada et. al. did in fact state the sources of the statements they used, but these have apparently been lost. However this rendering seems unlikely given that no word for "elsewhere" is used and no mention is made of where else it is explained. Additionally, the author has just finished suggesting the possibility of forgetting the source.
P-R: Nor is there ignorance about the specific kind of statement (the source śruti was). Since the smṛti has the form of an injunction, we conclude its source śruti is also like that, not something having the form of an explanatory statement.

Moreover, even forgetting (the precise nature of the source śruti) is possible on their part [i.e., Nārada et. al.]. For the forgetting of a part of the text is found even in the present time. Even when these śrutis exist in other Vedic recensions, because of forgetting this part -- in which recension and how they are recited -- they (Nārada et. al. or people in general) remember for the establishment of validity merely that it is Vedic in nature. The specific knowledge of the particular (śākhā) is, however, ignored by them because of being of no use.

Therefore it is established that because of being based on the Veda, the Pañcarātra smṛti is valid. It is said, "Or else, by reason of a common agent inference could be valid." (Mīmāṁsā-sūtra 1.3.2)

Comm: The author responds to the earlier criticism (para. 10) that the Pañcarātrikas may not even know what sort of śruti Nārada et. al. based their teachings on. It is to the Pañcarātrikas' benefit to claim a vidhi rather than an artha-vāda for their source.

Dr. Aklujkar has noted the following: if the earlier occurrence of vākyaviśeṣa (at the beginning of the paragraph) is taken to mean vākyānāṁ viśeṣāḥ "specific features [e.g., vidhitva, artha-vādatva, etc.] of sentences," which is also a possible meaning, teṣāṁ here could be taken to mean "(forgetting of) sentence distinctions." However if it were intended one would have expected the author to use vākyaviśeṣāṇāṁ vismarañām and not to put teṣāṁ where subjective genitives usually occur.
What is really critical for the establishment of validity is that these statements be of Vedic origin -- not the names of the recensions in which they are found. The author is using an analogy with ritual performance to defend his case. Śruti and smṛti are preserved by the same people -- Brāhmaṇas -- who perform the actions enjoined by śruti and smṛti.24 In sacrifices there are times when the actions or specific details outlined in the smṛti lack a clear basis in śruti. On such occasions we rely upon the inference of trustworthy persons -- the Brāhmaṇas performing the rituals -- to establish whether the smṛti statement is valid and consistent with the spirit (if not the actual word) of śruti. The author seems to be saying that just as we can trust Pāñcarātra Brāhmaṇas in the field of ritual action so too we can trust them when they declare that in their tradition the smṛti must at one time have been based on a śruti even though such a śruti is no longer preserved. Similarly we can trust Nārada et. al. when they say the Pāñcarātra system is based on the Veda.

24 As noted earlier in fn. 15 the author here implicitly draws on Śabara’s interpretation of this sūtra. For both disputants, the fact that the agents of the smṛti are also the agents of the acts prescribed by the Veda is testimony to the validity of the smṛti.
Section 2 - Śruti-smṛti relationship

1. स्मृति: प्रामाण्यं इत्युक्तम्। इदम् इदानीं विचार्यते किं प्रत्यक्ष-विरोधेश्चिति: स्मृति: प्रामाण्यं, उत्तरप्रामाण्यम् इति।
किं पुनर् अत्र संशय-कारणम्। उच्च्यते। उभयन्त्र युक्तिः संकृतस्फुरणम् अन्यतर-युक्तिः पावच्यानवधारणं च।
एकसिमन् धर्मिणि विरुद्ध-धर्मोपसथापक-प्रत्यक्षानुमि-श्रुति-जनित-विज्ञानयोर्
वेदिकत्वाविशेषे तुल्य-बलत्वात् प्रत्यक्ष-श्रुति-विरोधेश्चिति: स्मृते। प्रामाण्यम् इति प्रामाण्ये युक्तिः।
तत्योर् वेदिकत्वाविशेषेश्चिति: कल्पित-श्रुति-जनित-विज्ञानेन शिशुः-जन्मनापहते
विषयत्वात् कल्प्य-श्रुति-जनित-विज्ञानस्य मन्थरे-जन्मः प्रामाण्यं नास्तीति अप्रामाण्ये युक्तिः।

Opp: So it is said that the smṛti is valid. This is now to be deliberated: Is the smṛti valid even when there is a manifest conflict (with a śruti) or is it invalid?

But is there cause for uncertainty here? In response we say that under both alternatives there is the manifestation of an argument and there is the non-ascertainment of predominance of either argument.

The argument for validity is that where there is no difference in being Vedic between the cognition generated by an attested śruti and the cognition generated by an inferred śruti which invest conflicting properties in a single object [lit. property-possessor], because (the cognitions) are of similar strength the smṛti is valid even when there is a conflict with the attested śruti.

The argument for invalidity is that, even when there is no difference in Vedic conformity, the cognition produced by an attested śruti which has a swift birth takes away the domain (of an issue); hence the cognition produced by an imagined śruti has no validity.

1 The meaning intended here is that of प्रत्यक्ष-श्रुति-विरोधेश्चिति.
Comm: The dharmin represents the smṛti. One śruti or śruti-produced cognition invests it with an acceptable quality while the other bestows an unacceptable one. If we accept the existence of the lost mūla-śruti then we must also accept its status as comparable to that of the extant śruti; both must be equally Vedic in nature. And given this equality of authority, a smṛti based on the mūla-śruti must also be valid, even if in apparent conflict with the attested śruti. The argument for invalidity is that when an issue is settled by what is readily available there is no need to invent other means (e.g., an imagined śruti) to settle it.

2. आस्ति विरोध-सिद्धवत्-कारण प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्य-चिन्ता। विरोध एव कयोः कुज्र चेति विमर्शनीयम्। न तावत् स्व-सामगी-जनम-विज्ञानयोः प्रमितौ विरोधः, स्वतः-प्रामाण्याप्युपगमात्। स्वत एव हि सर्ब्धर्मा विज्ञानानां प्रामाण्यम् इति मीमांसक-सिद्धतिः। तद्विध स्वतः-प्रामाण्यं ज्ञान-कारणपैवः प्रामाण्य-कारणवत्। तस्मानं ॥ न प्रमितौ विरोधः। (ना)पि ॥ प्रयोगः, प्रामण-विज्ञानानां स्व-विभये प्रत्सित-निवृत्तपैवः-प्रसव-हेतुत्वाद॥

P-R: Set aside the consideration of validity and non-validity (that you propose) as if a conflict is proven. (First) this needs to be examined: between which two or where is the conflict? To begin with, there is no conflict in the experience of two cognitions which arise from their own components [i.e. are produced self-sufficiently], because of the acceptance of (the thesis of) self-validation. The Mīmāṃsāka position is that the validity of all knowledge is in its very nature. Indeed, that alone is self-validity which consists in the cause of cognition also being the cause of validity. Therefore there is no conflict.

2 The editor reads अस्मान्, but तस्मान् seems more appropriate.
3 The editor’s addition of a negative is contextually demanded.
[i.e. the conflict we are talking about cannot be found] in the experience (of the two cognitions). Nor (is there a conflict) in application, because the valid cognitions are the cause in their own domain of giving rise to proceeding forth, abstention and indifference.

Comm: The following arguments should be regarded as a tentative uttara-pakṣa by another, less mature member of the author's camp: a siddhāntyekadeśin or ācārya-deśiya. He responds to the opponent by putting on hold the proposed issue of debate and attacking its basic premise, namely that some sort of conflict exists. The compound siddhavat-kāreṇa literally means, "by the sound 'proven'." The speaker uses it to object to the assumption that the existence of a conflict has already been established.

The Mīmāṁsakas held that all cognitions are self-validating in the sense that they are inevitably true at the time of their occurrence. The traditional example of the inherent validity of a cognition is that of a rope mistaken in the dark for a snake. The validity of the snake-cognition is attested to by its results -- fear, sweat, goose bumps etc. -- all of which occur whether the object is really a snake or merely assumed to be one. These effects are possible only if the cognition is taken as valid. Cognition is here regarded as an event rather than an abstracted or reified entity to be verified over time. Thus our later cognition that the "snake" is actually a rope is as valid (and no more so) than the earlier one.

The concept of svataḥ-prāmāṇya means that all the conditions necessary to prove the validity of a cognition are present in the circumstances of the cognition's generation.

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When we put a cognition -- e.g. "fire is hot" -- into practice we can do so in three possible ways.

(i) We will apply it; i.e. we will use fire when we need to heat something.
(ii) We won't apply it; i.e. we will refrain from using fire when we don't want to heat something.
(iii) We will remain indifferent and use or not use it.

In any case we will be operating under the cognition that fire is hot and this cognition is valid within its own domain of application. Even if we were to believe fire is not hot, this too would be a valid cognition governing our actions. The Pāṇcarātrika's point is that, as good Mīmāṃsakas he and his opponent must agree that cognitions arise within their own realm or situation and are assumed to be valid at that time. Hence the question of conflict between cognitions doesn't arise on a practical level either.

P-R: The reply in this case is this. In the experience and in the application (of a cognition) a conflict does exist. In the experience, first of all, a conflict definitely exists because of the admission of the bādhya-bādhaka relationship [i.e., the relationship between that which is to be invalidated and that which invalidates]. In application as well, conflict is indeed evident in the carrying out of (the content of) one (cognition), because of the impossibility of carrying out the (content of the) other.

5 Sandhi not observed in edition.
Comm: This is now the author presenting the superior uttara-pakṣa. He objects that even for Mīmāṁsakas the notion of conflicting cognitions is accepted within the framework of the bādhyā-bādhaka relationship. Returning to the well-known example above, the rope is the invalidator or bādhaka of the imagined snake which is the bādhyā. In other words, the later cognition of a rope is what will disprove the earlier cognition of the imagined snake.

If I believe something, e.g., "fire is hot," I cannot act as if I didn't believe it. If I do then I must have changed my cognition beforehand. Conflict arises in any situation where a choice must be made between two incompatible actions.

4. अपर आहूँ प्रत्यक्षानुमित-श्रुति-बलत्वनेन पुरुषान्तर-प्रत्यक्ष-श्रुति-बलत्वनेन 6 वा तुल्य-बलत्वे-छृति-स्मृत्योऽऽ न तत्वद विरोधः समरित । किंतु 7 श्रुत्योर एव तु परस्पर-विरोधः । तत्र च विकल्पोऽविरोधो वा विषय-न्यवस्थय स्विषय-नानात्मव वा तत्योऽऽ।

यद्य वा प्रयोग-विषये तत्योर विरोधः । सर्वाधिपि श्रुति-स्मृत्योर् विरोधस्य (त) दैव निषिद्धवात् तत्सिद्धवत्-कारण प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्य-विचारो नारभ्योधय इति।

6 बलूँ मूलम् I (editor's footnote; presumably this was the original ms. reading).
7 बलूँ मूलम् I (see fn. 6) The two emendations made here by the editor appear to have been introduced for syntactical reasons. Dr. Aklujkar has suggested that the reading could be, प्रत्यक्षानुमित-श्रुति-बलूँ मूलं पुरुषान्तर-प्रत्यक्ष-श्रुति-बलूँ मूलं वा। अतुल्य . . . "The source (of a smṛti) has strength in the form of either, (i) an attested or inferred śrutī, or (ii) a śrutī attested by another person (such as Nārada). In any case, there cannot be a conflict between a śrutī and a smṛti because the strengths of the two are not equal." Such a reading would have the added advantage of removing what is otherwise an inconsistency in understanding the first part of the compound प्रत्यक्षानुमित-श्रुति-बलत्वनेन. In para. 1 above pratyakṣānumita-śrutī is used as a dual with a distinction drawn between a pratyakṣa-śrutī and an anumita-śrutī. Here however, I have rendered it in the singular. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that manuscript corruption caused balāṁ mūlam to be altered over the centuries to balatvena. It is perhaps conceivable though, that a preceding sentence or phrase has been lost.
8 This had clearly become one expression meaning "but" by the author's time.
Another [respectable] person says that whether through the strength of a śruti inferred to have been evident or through the strength of a śruti evident to other beings [i.e. an extant śruti], because (the two śrutis) are of equal strength conflict never occurs between a śruti and a smṛti. But a mutual conflict can be entertained between two śrutis. And in that case there is an option or non-conflict between the two through the arrangement of (varying) subject-matter or through having differences in domain.

Or it may be that there is a conflict between them only in the domain of application. In any case whatsoever of a conflict between śruti and smṛti, the consideration of validity and non-validity is not to be undertaken by the declaration of "proven" [i.e. assuming a conflict is proven] because of (the acceptance of a conflict) being prohibited (by us) at that very time (at which it is raised).

Moreover (in this matter) some declare a rejoinder [i.e. avoidance of our preceding objection]. In this view, the consideration of validity or non-validity as if a conflict is "proven" pertains to the texts of the Buddhists, Jains and Pāśupatas etc. which are outside the three (Vedas) in this view.

Comm: Apara may be a pun on a-para, "one of our own." It is frequently used in śāstric literature to refer to a thinker whose view is acceptable within certain limits to the author. The first line poses problems in interpreting puruṣāntara. In para. 7 below the term refers to people far in the past such as Nārada et. al., but here it seems to indicate presently existing beings other than

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9 One would normally expect something like atra "in this matter" here.
the two disputants. If we apply the former interpretation to both instances of the compound we are left with the problem of distinguishing the mūla-śruti known to Nārada from the anumita-śruti.

For a faithful Mīmāṃsaka -- which both the author and his opponent appear to be -- a true śruti cannot be discredited. Hence there are really only two possibilities in cases of a perceived conflict. The first is that the two offer alternatives in a certain action or ritual and hence we have the option (vikalpa) of following one or the other. The second is that the statements actually pertain to different areas of application, a notion which presumably has been misunderstood before. As for the question of a conflict between śruti and smṛti; it's a non-starter. The Pāñcarātrikas will reject the possibility the instant it is raised.

If a śruti-smṛti conflict does not really exist, why do respectable authors [e.g. Jaimini, Kumārila] discuss the topic at all? One way to explain interest in the topic is to say that they do not engage in discussion to cast doubt on the validity of systems like the Pāñcarātra, but to point out the unacceptability of non-Vedic smṛtis.

5. अन्यद्व दर्शनम्। श्रौत-समार्थ-विज्ञानयोः पुनर् अयम् एव विशेषः, यदुत प्रत्यक्षानुमित-श्रुति-मूलत्व तत्मूलत्व-कृतः कस्चिद् विशेषोऽर्थित। अनेनेव तस्योर विरोधः प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्य-द्विन्देति।

P-R: Another viewpoint is as follows. Between cognitions generated by smṛtis and śrutis there is this very distinction; that is to say, there is some distinction made on the basis of their source because of one being based on an attested śruti and the other on an inferred śruti. Only because of this
(distinction) is there the consideration of validity and invalidity when there is a conflict between the two.

6. किं ताबत् प्राप्तम्। विरोधेःपि प्रमाणं स्मृतिः इति। कुत्? पूर्वम् एव स्मृति-प्रामाण्यस्य साधित्वात्। अन्यथा हि सैव स्मृतिः प्रमाणम् अप्रमाणम् इति विरुढ्धम् उक्तं स्यात्। श्रुति-मूलत्वे प्रमाणं तद्-विरुढ्धत्वे श्राविति-लोभादि-मूलतब्धः इति स्मृति-प्रामाण्यम् अनवसिधतम् एव स्यात्।

Opp: What is arrived at thus far? The smṛti is valid even when there is conflict. How? Because of the prior establishment of the validity of the smṛti. Otherwise there would be the contradictory statement that, "The same smṛti is valid and invalid." The validity of the smṛti would be unstable since when based on a sruti it is valid; when there is a conflict with (the sruti) it is based on error, greed etc.

Comm: The opponent here attempts to extrapolate from the author's own argument. Whereas the Pāñcarātrika had been arguing for the validity of his school's smṛti in circumstances where there was no direct corroboration within the extant śruti, the opponent now suggests that validity be extended to any smṛti, even when it conflicts with an extant śruti. In essence this would be a condition of de facto universal validity for all smṛtis.

7. अपि च, परस्पर-विरुढ्धार्थ-प्रतिपादकत्वं श्रुतोत्तरं ययिदं न स्यात्, तदा श्रुति-विरुढ्ध-स्मृतेर्मुलान्तर-कल्पना [न]१० स्यात्। यदा तु श्रुतयोगपि परस्पर-विरुढ्धार्थोऽपि प्रत्येकसं "उदितं ज्ञातीं "अनुदितं ज्ञातीं," "अतंतरं शोभिषिं गृह्यतीं" "नातंतरं शोभिषिं गृह्यतीं" इति, तदा कार्यपिद्यत्स्मृतोत्तरं प्रत्यक्ष-श्रुति-वचन-

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10 The editor's reading omits this negative but it is contextually demanded.
Moreover, if śrutis did not state mutually conflicting meanings, then there could be no hypothesis of another source for a smṛti which contradicts the śruti. But when even śrutis having mutually conflicting meanings are found such as, "Sacrifice when (the sun is) risen," "Sacrifice when (the sun is) not risen," "Take the 16th (step of the soma sacrifice) at night," "Don't take the 16th (step of the soma sacrifice) at night," then, in the case of some smṛtis whose meanings conflict with attested śruti statements and whose sources are the statements of an invisible [i.e. inferred] śruti, the rejection of a śruti evident to other persons [i.e. Nārada et. al.] and made available by the (traditional) recollections of persons in contact with the Veda -- merely because a conflict with the studied statements is seen -- is improper.

Comm: Given that contradictions exist, the mere existence now of a śruti statement saying one thing does not rule out the possible earlier existence of a contrary śruti. That it may contradict an existing śruti is unimportant since we see that existing śrutis conflict with one another anyway.

8. "न चै चैं प्रति शिष्यते" (मिमांसकाः सूत्र २.४.१८) इति सर्वं-श्रुतानां सर्वं-पुरुषान् पति पामाण्यम् अविशिष्टम्। तस्मात् प्रत्येक-श्रुति-वचनानां परस्पर-विचारार्थवेष्टे परमाण्य, तथेतैव प्रत्यक्षापुरुषतम्-श्रुति-वचनानाम् अपीत्यभुध्युपगत्यम्। तेन स्मृतानां सर्वदा पामाण्यम् एव गाढाम्, अपामाण्यम् एव वा। न पुन: प्रत्य(क्ष-श्रुत)विरोधेऽ पामाण्य तद्विरोधे तद्वपामाण्यम् इत्यर्थ-जरितीय लघ्यम्।

Opp: As has been said, "It is not taught to one only" (Mīmāṃsā-sūtra 2.4.18), the validity of all śrutis is undifferentiated with respect to all beings.
Therefore, the following view is to be accepted. Just as the attested śruti statements are valid even when there is a mutual conflict of meaning, so also the attested and the inferred śruti statements (are valid). In this way either the validity of the smṛtis should always be accepted, or the non-validity. But the "half-an-old-woman" principle should not be applicable, "Validity when there is no conflict with the attested śruti but non-validity when there is conflict with it."

Comm: Each Vedic group possessed its own traditional recension but the details of rites in each such work were not intended to be restricted to that śākhā only. They were universal in application.

The opponent likens the status of the qualified validity of the smṛti to a well-known proverb or principle succinctly summarized by the compound, ardha-jaratīya. A young man was offered an older woman in marriage. He replied that he would like to marry her body but not her face. A modern counterpart would be that of wanting to have your cake and eat it too.

9. अपि च, वेद-विरुद्धव-झानवन्तोषपि समवीरसस्तत्रेष्टपन्ते। तत्र तद्व-चक्तृणां वेद-मूलव-बल मुक्तवा किम् अन्यत् समरण-कारणं संभवति। न च लोभाविदः हष्ट-कारणवेनापामाण्यमुच्चयेत्, समतवस्मृत्यपामाण्य-प्रस्थात। कवि वा हष्ट-कारणवेन नोत्पेक्षितुर्वशक्यं, संविधातवस्मृत्यक वा धैर्यिचन्द्र इति। तथा च लोकायतिकाः सर्वम् एवार्धांगार्धां। वैदिकं कर्म हस्तार्थम् आचार्य्ये। विरोधम् अपि केनापि निमित्तेन कल्पितत। तस्मात् कवचिदद्वष्टार्थम् वादिना समृत्यपामाण्येवश्रीकृतेन सर्वत्र तद्दौ-योजनान्यापामाण्यनासिकाः कल्पितत। अतो मीमांसकैर्नासितकारां न प्रसरे देयः।

11 This may be a reference to the Pañcarātra sage Śaṅdilya, cited in Section 3 in a quote from Śaṅkara's bhāṣya on the Brahma-sūtras.

12 The editor reads एव इष्टार्थम् but this was likely an oversight or printing error.
Opp: Moreover, even retainers of tradition knowledgeable of the conflict (of the Pañcarātra system) with the Veda are seen in (your) system. In those cases [on the part of those people] what else, other than the strength derived from being based on the Veda, can be the cause of the (tradition of) recollection? Nor should one proclaim that (certain parts of the smṛti) are invalid because of mundane [i.e. verifiable] causes such as greed etc., because then there would be the predicament of the invalidity of the entire smṛti. For how is it possible not to imagine that there is a mundane cause, or that (the smṛti) is somehow suspicious? And thus the materialists declare that every Vedic ritual action whose purpose is non-mundane (actually) has a mundane purpose. They also imagine conflict on the basis of any reason whatsoever. Therefore, when the invalidity of a smṛti is accepted in some cases on the basis of having a mundane purpose etc., the atheists imagine invalidity everywhere by extension from that. Hence no scope should be granted by the Mīmāṃsakas to the atheists.

Comm: The motivation behind the first two sentences is unclear. In this section the opponent seems to share with the Pañcarātrikas the same basic belief that the Veda was the primary source of Nārada et. al. Earlier thinkers of the śruti-smṛti relationship have expressed the opinion that the validity of a smṛti not supported by śruti should be dependent upon the absence of a drṣṭa-kāraṇa (ulterior or worldly motive, vested interest). The opponent thinks that this is an unreasonable condition and that his approach will result in getting rid of it, thus simplifying the theory. For all statements it is possible to imagine an ulterior motive. Thus, the opponent questions why the author would want to open himself to all such potential objections and controversies by insisting on purity of motive for a smṛti to be valid.
10. अथ च यदि वेदो विरुद्धम्  
अर्थ न प्रतिपादयति, यदि वा हृद्यार्थः, तदा श्रुतिविरुद्धार्थः-प्रतिपादिका हृद्यार्थः च स्मृति: श्रुति-मूलतां जड्यात। यदा वेदेनापि (हृद्य- 
विष्णुवादि-कर्मम्)  
अविवेक्यो विद्यावदानम् हृद्यवेदानं कर्म  हृद्यार्थः विधीयते, तदा 
न हृद्यार्थः वेदावेदिकार्थः अपाराप्यव वा वक्रतं शाक्यम्। तस्माद वेद-मूलत्वम् एव 
स्मृतीनां निवोदयव, न पुनः हृद्यार्थः दवादिना स्मृति-प्रामाण्यव अपलपनीयम् । तस्मात् 
स्मृति-प्रामाण्यस्य प्रसारितवाद वेद-विरोधेशपि  
अविशिष्टम् आसा प्रामाण्यम् इति 
युक्तम्।

Opp: Moreover, if the Veda does not state a contradictory meaning or one 
having a worldly purpose, then a smṛti stating a meaning in conflict with a 
śruti and having a mundane purpose would abandon its basis in śruti. When 
actions such as the offering of a sacrificial fee to the priests (or the pounding 
and grinding of rice) which have mundane purposes, are prescribed by even 
the Veda, it is impossible to declare that (the smṛti) is non-Vedic or invalid 
because of having a worldly purpose. Therefore, in the case of smṛtis, only 
having a basis in the Veda is to be retained; the validity of the smṛti, on the 
other hand, is not to be denied because of having a worldly purpose etc. 
Therefore it is proper that, since it is (already) established that the smṛtis are 
valid, even when there is a conflict with the Veda their validity is unchanged.

11. अनुच्चयते । श्रुति-विरोधे स्मृति-प्रामाण्यम् अनपेक्षय, तद्-अविरोधे श्रुति- 
मूलत्वेन स्मृते: प्रामाण्यम्। पर: कालचन वेद-विरुद्धाः स्मृतयः, ताः: सर्व श्रुति-मूल, न

13 वेद: श्रुति-विरुद्धम् is the editor's reading, which is understandable, given the common 
pronunciation of vedas śruti as veda-śruti. It should be noted however, that up to this point the author 
has implicitly identified veda with śruti and it seems an unlikely distinction for him to make now.
14 The status of this insertion by the editor is unclear. The compound was probably in the ms. and 
he could not make sense of it. Mīmāṁsā-kośa Vol. 7, p. 4492 notes the compound हृद्य-पिष्ठी 
which is contextually more appropriate here -- "pounding and grinding (of rice)."
15 Sandhi not observed in the edition.
P-R: On this matter we say that when there is a conflict with a śruti the validity of a smṛti is to be disregarded; when there is no conflict, the smṛti is valid from being based on a śruti. Those smṛtis which conflict with the Veda are all based on error; they are not based on a śruti. There is no independent validation of smṛtis. Nor would there be the inference (that they are) based on the Veda, because of conflict with an attested śruti. Only so long as the meaning (of smṛti statements) is not taken away by an attested śruti is there the possibility of inferring (the existence) of a śruti as the source of those smṛti statements. However, when their own domain is taken away then inference itself will not at all obtain. Between two cognitions (which invest) conflicting properties in a single object there is no delivering of its own domain by a subsequent slow-moving cognition when that same domain is communicated previously by a swift-moving (cognition), because of the carrying away of the domain by that earlier cognition. However, where there is no rapidly-moving cognition which takes away the domain of a later cognition, even a slow-moving cognition is not blocked. For it is not established by Lord’s command that if a cognition once gains validity it should always possess it.
Comm: The first statement harks back to a similarly-worded argument for *smr̥tti*-validity by the opponent in para. 1. As in that instance, here too speculation regarding other cognitions is denied once an issue is settled.

12. सर्वम् एव विज्ञानम् उत्पद्यमानं स्व-विरोधिना बलीयसा विज्ञानेन यन् न विरुध्धयते, तस्य स्पष्टं एव विज्ञानस्यात्म-लाभः। यस्य तृतीयमानस्य मूलम् एव केनचिदं अपहियते, न तस्य कदाचिदं अप्यात्म-लाभः संभवति। न च बलीयो-रुख-जनमना विज्ञानेन बलवद्-विरोधाभावे प्यात्मा न लघुधन्यः। नाप्यसति विरोधे लघु आत्मेति विरोधे सत्यपि तेनात्मा लघुधन्य इत्यत्र किंचिन प्रमाणम् अर्थित, सर्वत्र चोत्सगर्गिपाद-न्याय-संभवात्। न च कविचिद् उत्सर्गः पदर्शित इति सर्वत्रापवादसंभवः। तेनोत्सगर्गिपादयोऽविषयः विज्ञाय बाधोऽवाधोऽ वा पण्डतेतर् विवेचनीयः।

P-R: For every arising cognition which is not blocked by an opposing, stronger cognition there would definitely be the acquisition of itself [i.e. it would come into being]. However if the source (of a cognition) which is coming into being, is denied by some (other cognition), its (the former cognition's) self-acquisition is never possible. But it is not the case that there can be no self-acquisition by a cognition, whose birth was (once) impeded by a stronger (cognition), even in the absence of the stronger (cognition). Nor is it by any means true that if there is self-acquisition (of a cognition) when a conflict does not exist, the self is to be attained by that (same cognition) even when a conflict does exist, because the logic of general rules and exceptions is possible everywhere. And since a general rule is shown (to apply) in some domain an exception in all domains is not impossible. Therefore, having discerned the domains of the general rule and the exception, invalidation and validation are to be distinguished by scholars.
Comm: So long as a smṛti statement is not being refuted by a śruti statement it has the potential of assuming authority. A cognition which comes into its own when not contradicted is in different waters when striving to be recognized in the face of opposition. As the author goes on to point out, there are exceptions to general rules, but these are not unconditionally allowable. Hence, all smṛtis cannot be arbitrarily declared valid.

13. न तु सामान्य-दर्शन-मात्रण प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्य-व्यवहारः। यो हि सामान्यतो-हृद्य-मात्रण न्यवहरति, तस्य मूग-तूणिकास-सत्तलेनापि तृण-निवृत्ति: स्यात्, सत्तल-पानस्य तृण-निवृत्ति-साधनवात्। अथ मूग-तूणिकास-सत्तल-पानस्यतृण-निवृत्ति-साधनवात् तृणितस्य परमार्थ-सत्तलम् अपि तृण-निवृत्ति-साधनं न स्यात्। ताबद्व एव हि सत्तल-विज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्य, यावन् [न]16 "सत्तलम् इदं, मूग-तूणिकेयम्" हिति बाधः। एवं, ताबद्व एव श्रुत्यनुमान-पूर्वक स्मृति-प्रामाण्य यावत् प्रत्यक्ष-श्रुत्या सम्मेतेर विषया[न]पहारः।17

P-R: There is, on the other hand, no (justified) designation of validity and non-validity merely by looking (at a situation) in a general way. According to one who designates (validity) merely by general observation, the water of a mirage would remove thirst because a drink of water is a means of removing thirst. Or conversely, because of mirage-water's inability to remove thirst, real water would also not be effective in quenching thirst. Only so long as there is no invalidation in the form, "This is not water, this is a mirage," is the cognition of water valid. In the same way, only to the extent that the domain of the smṛti is not denied by an attested śruti is the validity of a smṛti preceded by the inference of a (mūla-) śruti.

16 The editor's reading is actually यावनसत्तलम् but this clearly contradicts the author's intention. The loss of a negative in the original manuscript or the printed edition is quite conceivable in the given phonetic situation.

17 The editor's reading is विषयपहारः but this again clearly contradicts the author's intention.
Comm: The term mṛga-ṭṛṣṇikā literally means "thirst of a deer" but is a common idiom for mirage. It was so named after thirsty deer who fruitlessly chased after distant mirages in the desert.\(^\text{18}\)

14. अत: कवचित् स्मृते: पामाण्य कवचिद् अपाणाण्य च न्यायेर् नवस्थायपताः नार्थे-वैशस-पसङ्गः। तत्रामु एवं न चक्तवर्यं "सर्वासं स्मृतीनाः पामाण्यम् एवाभ्युपगत्त्व, न पुनः कर्त्यारिचित्व पामाण्य कर्पारिचिद् अपाणाण्यम् अभ्युपगत्त्व्यम्" इति।

तत्रामु पत्यक्ष-शृद्धा शृद्धुनृमानस्य विरुध्वलाद्र वेद-विरुद्भ-स्मृतिनां वेद-मूलवांसभवाद् भानित-मूलव-संभवाद्व अपेक्षणीयाः सर्वां एव वेद-विरुद्भ: स्मृतय इति सिद्धम्।

P-R: Thus, there is no predicament of a semi-murder for those who would determine by rules that a smṛti is sometimes valid and sometimes invalid. For this very reason it should not be said that only the validity of all smṛtis should be accepted, and that the validity of one and the invalidity of another should not be accepted.

Therefore it is established that all smṛtis which conflict with the Veda are to be disregarded because an attested śruti will block the inference of (another) śruti, because smṛtis which conflict with the Veda cannot have a basis in the Veda, (and) because it is possible (such smṛtis) are based on error.

Comm: A semi-murder is like being a little bit pregnant; either one is or one isn't. The opponent had suggested universal validity as a means of avoiding what he saw as a serious problem: the uncertainty caused by

\(^{18}\) See also the Tantra-vārttika on Mīmāṃsā-sūtra 1.3.3 (p. 286, Gosvāmi edition) for a related discussion.
situational fluctuations in the validity of *smṛtis*. For the author, however, this problem does not arise. So long as the *smṛti* always accedes to the primacy of a *śruti* we have a means of consistently assessing validity. Nonetheless, each situation must be assessed individually with particular weight given to the applicability of any extant *śruti* statement.

15. आह। श्रुति-स्मृत्योर् विकल्प आश्रीयतां ब्रह्म-यज्ञ-श्रुत्योर् इव। न पुनर्अत्यन्त-बाध्य आश्रयणीयः।

अन्तःप्यते। तुत्त्व-बल-विकल्पोऽपि तावद् अष्ट-दोष-दुष्टत्वाद् अगतिक-गति-
न्यायेन कवचिद् आश्रीयते। तत्र विषय-शिष्ट-विकल्पाश्रयणस्य कः प्रसंजः। स्मृतिः
तावत् श्रुतिन् न निरंपक्षतया धर्मं प्रमाणं, येन विकल्प-पदवीं ब्रजेत्। सापेक्ष-
प्रमाणत्वान् न स्मृति: स्वतः। प्रमाण-पदवीम् आसूदा। श्रुत्या च बाधिता जीवितुम्
एवाश्रमं कर्थं विकल्प-पदवीं ब्रजेत्।

*Opp:*¹⁹ (An opponent) says this. Let option be resorted to between a *śruti* and a *smṛti*, as between two *śruti*s (prescribing the use of) rice or barley (in rites and sacrifices). An utter invalidation would not be resorted to.

*P-R:* With regard to that we say that as for the the option (between statements) of equal strength, it is resorted to in some cases by the axiom of last resort, since (option) is flawed by eight faults. In that case, what is the scope for not resorting to option between those taught as unequal? The *smṛti*, for its part, is not independently valid like the *śruti* with respect to dharma, so that it could go to the path of option. As it is a dependently valid [i.e., it anticipates the aid of some other means] means of knowledge the *smṛti* has not mounted the path of validity on it's own. And how can that which is unable even to exist when opposed by a *śruti* rise to the status of being an option?

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¹⁹ This is not the primary opponent but rather a doubter.
Comm: An opponent with possibly somewhat different motives tries a different tack. Certain śrutī statements recommend rice for use in sacrifices while others recommend barley. The solution accepted by the Mīmāṃsākās is that the use of either is optional; in other words both statements are equally valid.

"Fault" here has primarily the sense of "theoretical inflation, sacrifice of economy." agatika-gati means a state or situation in which none of the usual or preferable ways of avoiding a difficulty is available. In other words, one is "cornered."

The author asks rhetorically how it is possible to entertain option as a solution when deciding between statements of unequal authority, considering that option is considered with great reluctance even in the case of equally strong śrutī statements.

16. तुल्य-बल-विकल्पसम कथम् अष्ट-दोष-दुष्टत्वम् इति।
तद् उच्चयते। 'ब्रीहिभिर यजेत,' 'यवेर यजेत'त्युभयम् अधि वाक्यं प्रमाणम्।
तत्र ब्रीहि-बाक्याभयणे यव-बाक्यम् अनाभयणीयं भवति, अशक्यत्वाद् युगपद्
उभयानुष्ठानस्य। तत्र प्राप्तं यव-बाक्यं-गतं प्रामाण्यं विना कारणेनापहतव्यम्,
अप्रामाण्यस्य च प्रमाणतं बछत-गौचर-कन्यम् अभाव-प्रमाणास्त्यम् अभिकर्तन्यम्।
एवं अधि, केनापि हेतुना प्रयोग-साधनत्वेन यवाभ्युपगमे, पूर्वम् अपास्तुप श्रामाण्यस्य
पुनर् आश्रयणीयं, तन्न-निरसेनाज्ञी-कृतस्याप्रामाण्यस्य पुनः परित्याग इति चत्वरो
दोषा एक्सिमन् बाक्ये प्रसज्जयते। द्वितीयेष्विप प्राप्त-परित्यागोस्प्राप्ताभयणं
परित्यक्तोपादाया यतनानीतस्य परित्याग इति चत्वरो दोषा।

20 Śabara also raises the possibility of vikalpa between śrutī and smṛti (using the same analogy with the rice and barley śrutī statements) but then rejects it in his bhāṣya on Mīmāṃsā-sūtra 1.3.3: अथ किमं विकल्पं विकल्पयेत् ब्रीहि-यजवत् बुहस्त्र-रथन्तरवद् वा। नासतिः...
21 See for instance Mīmāṃsā-sūtras 12.3.9 and 12.3.24.
22 The ensuing explanation follows the Tantra-vārttika on Mīmāṃsā-sūtra 1.3.3 (p. 287, Gosvāmi edition).
Opp: How can the option between ones of equal strength be flawed by eight faults?

P-R: It is explained as follows. "One should sacrifice with rice," "One should sacrifice with barley"; both statements are valid. In that situation the statement (prescribing) barley becomes inapplicable [i.e., not resorted to] when resorting to the statement (prescribing) rice, because of the impossibility of simultaneously performing both (a rice offering and a barley offering). There, the validity pertaining to the barley statement is to be abandoned without cause and the truth of invalidity is to be accepted, this truth being similar to the object of a sixth sense and being determinable by the absence proof. In this way also, when there is the acceptance of barley as the means of performance for some reason one must again resort to the authority of what was previously discarded. Four faults apply in one statement since there is also a renunciation of the non-validity of what is accepted by this refutation. The four faults are, the renunciation of what is indicated when there is also a second (choice), the recourse to what is not indicated, the employment of what is rejected, (and) the renunciation of that which is brought through effort [i.e. the inferred invalidity of one statement].

Comm: The first two faults arise immediately when the priest chooses rice, for instance. The very act of choosing is an indication that the barley injunction is somehow invalid or less valid than the rice injunction. This means that the given validity is abandoned and an absent invalidity is taken to be actually there. We really have no means to ascertain this absent validity and so we have to presuppose it is known through anupalabdhi, (or abhāva, as
it is called here). An analogy of the range (gocara) of something non-existent is given to explain this. If a cognition arises independent of perception by the five accepted senses we are forced to concede the existence of a sixth sense or means of cognition, albeit such a sense is not admitted by philosophers. If in future one decides to use barley in the sacrifice one is in effect undermining the validity of the situation reached when barley was rejected. The final sentence is a formulaic restatement of the four faults. To summarize in more concrete terms, they are:

(i) If barley is not used then a Vedic injunction is set aside for no good reason.

(ii) Through not being followed the barley injunction is treated as invalid, according to the absence-proof.

(iii) If barley is later used then one is accepting an injunction whose validity was previously rejected.

(iv) The previous judgement of invalidity accorded to the barley injunction is now rejected.

These same four difficulties similarly apply to the rice statement if rice is first disregarded and later used, leading to a total of eight faults.

17. तथापि तुल्‌-बल्लवाद् गत्यन्तराभावाच् च बीहि-यवयोर् विकल्प आर्थितः। द्वयोर् अधि प्रमाणत्वाद् अन्वयतर-प्राबल्यान्वाधारणाद् युगपाद् उभयानुविष्टानस्य चेष्वरेणापि कर्तुम् अशाक्यत्वाद् उभयोर् अप्रामाण्यं प्रसक्तम्। (अ)प्रमाणत्वं कल्पनम् अन्वगतिका गतिः। सति गत्यन्त्रे त्वप्रामाण्य-कल्पनम् अयुक्तम्। तत्र द्वयोर् अप्रामाण्य-कल्पनादि वर्तम् एकस्पैवाप्रामाण्य-कल्पन, सर्व-नाशे समुत्पन्ने ब्याप्ति स्थापित: इति न्यायपालः।

23 This pramāṇa, accepted by Kumārila but not Prabhākara, was not included in the discussion in Section 1.
24 The addition of the negating prefix by the editor is contextually justified.
P-R: Nevertheless, because (the śruti statements are) of equal strength and because there is no other recourse the option of rice or barley has been resorted to. Because of the validity of the two, because of the non-determination of the superiority of either, and because of the impossibility of performing both simultaneously, even by God, the invalidity of both follows (if option is disallowed). The hypothesis of invalidity is a situation with no way out. When another resort exists however, the invalidity hypothesis is unsuitable. In such a case, the hypothesis of the invalidity of one only is better than the hypothesis of the invalidity of both, from the principle that a wise man abandons half when the loss of everything arises (as a possibility).

Comm: If option were not a possibility then we could consider treating both statements as invalid. However that would amount to undermining the reliability of the entire scripture.

18. अपर आह । मा भूत् विकल्पोऽष्ट्र-दोष-दुष्टत्वात् । समुच्छयोऽस्तु । मिश्येर्
यागः क्रियताम् । तथा च सति शास्त्र-द्वयस्यापि प्रामाण्यम् अनुगृहीतं भवति, नान्यतर-
शास्त्रस्य प्रामाण्य-परित्यागः ।

P-R: Another says thus (on the matter). Let there not be option, because of being flawed by eight faults. Let there be a combination. Let a sacrifice be performed by mixing. In that case, the validity of both śāstra (statements) is adhered to (and) there is no renunciation of the validity of either śāstra (statement).
Comm: As before, *apara* is probably not an opponent but rather another member of the author's camp.

19. अज्ञ्यते। मिश्र-पक्षे शास्त्र-द्वयस्यापि प्रामाण्यं प्रत्यस्ततत्त्वम्। शास्त्र-द्वेषेनापि निरपेक्ष-साधनबावनमात्र सापेक्ष-साधनबावनमाच्। तथा हि। ब्रह्म-शास्त्रं ब्रह्मिण्यं निरपेक्ष-याग-साधनात्मं प्रतिपादतयाः। यव-शास्त्रम् अपि तथा। (वार्त?)*25 तत्र मिश्र-प्रयोग-पक्षे नैव ब्रह्मिभिः इष्टं स्थान, नापि यवः। निरपेक्ष-साधनत्वं प्रतिपादनं-परत्वावच्यास्त्रं-द्वयस्यापि। तत्र शास्त्र-द्वयस्यापि बाध एव कृतः स्थान, नानुगः। अतः पापोयान्य अर्थ मिश्र-पक्षः। तत्मात् उभयाप्रामाण्य-कल्पनाद् वरम् एकस्पौर्ध्राप्रामाण्य-कल्पनाम् इति ब्रह्म-यव-शुश्योर् विकल्प आधितः।

*P-R:* On this matter we reply thus. With regard to a combination the validity of both *śāstra* statements would disappear because both would convey (simultaneously) independent and dependent effectiveness [which is logically impossible]. To explain. The *śāstra* (prescribing) rice teaches that the sacrifice (using rice) is effective independently (of other materials); the *śāstra* (prescribing) barley does likewise (for barley). According to this view (advocating) the use of a combination, there would actually be no sacrifice with rice, nor with barley, because both *śāstra* statements intend to state independent effectiveness. In such a case an injury would actually be done to both *śāstra* statements, not a service. Thus this alternative of combination is worse (than the alternative of option). Therefore, the option between the *śrutis* (prescribing) rice and barley is resorted to since the hypothesis that only one is invalid is better than the hypothesis that both are invalid.

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25 The editor's uncertain reading here is probably a ms. corruption of यवानाः.
Comm: The injunction prescribing rice asserts that rice by itself is sufficient to ensure a successful rite and makes no mention of using barley. Similarly the barley injunction is complete in itself. To use both together is to denigrate both statements by implying that rice alone or barley alone is not sufficient, i.e. that the śruti statement is somehow wrong or incomplete as it stands. At least with option the integrity of one injunction is respected. To perform a sacrifice in a manner not enjoined by some śruti is to do violence to the scripture. One must adhere strictly to the injunction, without making subjective modifications.

P-R: This alternative of option is indeed faulty, because of the predicament of uncertainty. And this uncertainty is not proper. What is valid is always valid; as well, what is invalid is always invalid. Since there is never a reversal of their own forms by these two, it is possible to make use of a form which is determined by the specification of uniformity, but not an undetermined form. Thus, there would no confidence of any sort when sometimes the same (statement) is valid, sometimes it is invalid. Therefore this alternative of option, although it is also flawed by many faults is permitted in the case of the two śrutis (prescribing) rice and barley because of absolute unavoidability.
Comm: *vikalpa* doesn’t lead to a fixed validity and is thus only a last resort. Its use implies a *śruti* statement is only conditionally valid, according to time and circumstances, and this renders rather tentative the decision of which to use at what time, e.g. rice or barley.

21. **śruti-smṛtyo**: पुनर् न कर्त्तचिद्द अयि विकल्प-पक्षः संभवति, अतुल्य-बलत्वात्। तस्माच्छुरति-समृत्योर विरोधे स्मृति-जनित-प्रत्ययः श्रृति-जनित-प्रत्ययो बाधकः बलबल्वात्। अतः न नपेक्षः प्रत्यक्ष-श्रृति-विरुद्ध-स्मृति-प्रामाण्यम् इति सिद्धम्। तद् उक्तं विरोधं तन्नपेक्षयं स्थाद् असति द्वानुमानम् (जॆ. १. ३. ३) इति।

P-R: On the other hand the alternative of option is in no way possible between a *śruti* and a *smṛti*, because they are of unequal strength. Therefore, when there is a conflict between a *śruti* and a *smṛti* the cognition produced by the *śruti* is the invalidator of the cognition produced by the *smṛti* because (the *śruti*) is of greater weight. Thus it is proven that the validity of a *smṛti* which conflicts with an attested *śruti* is to be disregarded. As has been said, "But when there is conflict it should be disregarded; when there is none then there is inference." (*Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* 1.3.3.).

Comm: "Inference" refers to the supposition of an earlier *mūla-śruti*. Only when there is no conflict between a *smṛti* and an extant *śruti* is one permitted to infer the existence of a *mūla-śruti* for the *smṛti*.

22. इत्यत्र चान्येक्षयं प्रत्यक्ष-श्रृति-विरुद्ध-स्मृति-प्रामाण्यं, संभवन्-मूलान्तरत्वात्। संभवति हि मूलान्तः भानित-लोपान्ति प्रत्यक्ष-श्रृति-भम्न-मूलापाः समुद्दे। रूप्त-मूलत्व-संभन्ते च सति, नारूप-मूलत्व-कल्पना पुनर्भोर्ता। अतः प्रत्यक्ष-श्रृति-विरोधे स्मृतिः एव बाध्यते, न श्रृति: स्मृति-विरोधे। पीति सिद्धम्। तद् उक्तं "हेतु-दसौनाच् च" (जॆ. १. ३. ४) इति।
P-R: From this (injunction), the validity of a *smṛti* which conflicts with an attested *śruti* is to be disregarded, because of the possibility of other sources. For, another basis such as error, greed, etc. is possible for a *smṛti* whose source is defeated by an attested *śruti*. And when the possibility exists of a perceived source [i.e. an ulterior motive] the hypothesis of an unperceived source is not acceptable. Thus, it is proven that when there is a conflict with an attested *śruti* only the *smṛti* is refuted; the *śruti* is not (refuted) even when there is conflict with the *smṛti*. As has been said, "And by seeing the motive." (Mīmāṃsā-sūtra 1.3.4.).

Comm: The author here replies to the opponent's earlier suggestion (para. 9) that he disregard the precondition of having no ulterior motive.

23. श्रुतिनिरोधे स्मृति-गोचरं यद् अप्रामाण्यम् अभवति, तद्वेदः संयोगि-पुरुषप्रणीत-स्मृति-विषयं न भवति, पुरुषान्तर-प्रत्यक्ष-शाखान्तर-गत-चचन-मूललबाद् तासाम्। अत एव भानित-लोभादि-मूलतापि तासा न संभवति, किंतु 26 अप्रत्यक्ष-शाखान्तर-गत-चचन-मूलासु तः स्मृतय इत्येतावत्। यदा तु तात्विकपि वचनानि प्रत्यक्षी-भक्षयन्ति, तदा तुल्य-बललबाद् विकल्पः।

P-R: When there is a conflict with *śruti* the invalidity spoken of regarding the *smṛti* [lit. whose domain is the *smṛti*] does not concern *smṛtis* composed by humans in contact with the Veda, because of (the *smṛtis*) bases in statements found in other recensions accessible to other people (such as Nārada). For this very reason (the possibility of) being based on error and greed does not arise in the case (of the *smṛtis* of Nārada et. al.); rather, these *smṛtis* are based on

26 Sandhi not observed in the edition.
statements attributed to other, unseen recensions. However, if these statements (of the unseen recensions) were also to become accessible, then because they are of equal strength there may be an option.

Comm: In other words, don't attempt to extend the invalidity of other contradicted smṛtis to the smṛtis composed by people like Nārada who were aware of Vedic statements that no longer survive.

24. कथं तह्रीवं सूत्रं "विरोधे त्वनपेक्षयं स्याद् असति झनुमानम्" इति।
तत्रोच्चपते। वेद-बाध्य-शाक्य-दिगम्बर-पाशुपतादि-स्मृति-विषयं सूत्रम्। उक्तं च मनुना "या वेद-बाध्य-स्मृत्यः" (मनु १२.९५) इति।

Opp: How then would you account for this sūtra? "But when there is a conflict it should be disregarded; when there is none then there is inference." (Mīmāṁsā-sūtra 1.3.3.).

P-R: We reply, in that instance, that the sūtra is concerned with the smṛtis of the Buddhists, Jains, Pāṣupatas etc. which are outside the Vedas. And it was said by Manu, "These smṛtis which are outside the Veda." (Manu-smṛti 12.95).

Comm: The author interprets Jaimini’s intentions as being solely to exclude the possibility of validity for heterodox smṛtis. He was thus concerned not with smṛtis in general (and certainly not with orthodox smṛtis

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27 Nearly the same words are found at the end of Kumārila’s Tantra-vārttika on Mīmāṁsā-sūtra 1.3.3: या: वेद-बाध्य: स्मृतयो . . . (p. 330, Gosvāmi ed.) Kumārila attributes the line to Manu “and others,” -- Manavādibhiḥ.
such as those of the Pāñcarātrikas) but with heterodox smṛtis in a negative sense.28

25. अथ वा, बद-संयोगि-पुरुष-प्रणीत-स्मृति-विषयम् एव सूत्रम्।
ननु तासां श्रुति-मूलवे श्रुत्योर्व एव परस्पर-विरोधः। तत्र च तुल्य-बलत्वाद्
विकल्पे कथम् अप्रामाण्यम् इत्युक्तम्।
तत्रोत्तते। स्व-मूल-श्रुति-कल्पना-सवप्पेश्चाः एव स्मृति-प्रामाण्यं, श्रुतेस् तु निर्पेश्चाः
एव प्रामाण्यम्। सा च श्रुति: स्व-विरोधे कल्प्य-श्रुति-मूलाया: सम्प्रदेयः| मूल-कल्पनां
निरुपिण्द्व। ततश्च चाप्रामाण्यम् उभयथापिन्त। या: काश्चन श्रुति-विरुद्ध-समृतयः, ता: सर्वाः प्रामाण्यवेदनपेशेणैपि इति सिद्धम्।

Opp: Or rather, let us say the sūtra is concerned only with smṛtis composed by humans in contact with the Veda. If (the smṛtis composed by people in contact with the Veda) are based on (other) śrutis then there actually is a mutual contradiction between two śrutis. And in that case, when there is an option because they are equal in strength, why has it been said there should be invalidity?

P-R: On that matter we reply that the validity of a smṛti is indeed dependent on the hypothesis of its own supporting śruti, but the validity of the śruti is decidedly independent (of other sources). And when there is a conflict with it that (attested) śruti blocks the hypothesis of a source for a smṛti whose basis would be an hypothesized śruti. And so there is invalidity both ways as well. It is established that those smṛtis which conflict in some way with a śruti are not to be entertained as being valid.

28 This is also the position of Kumārila. Śabara however interprets the sūtra as pertaining to the disqualification of smṛtis in general. There does seem to be no indication in Jaimini's context that a specific class of smṛtis is the subject-matter and I would tend to agree with Śabara.
29 The editor actually offered a choice here (presumably because of ms. corruption) between श्रुतेर् and समृतेर् but contextually the latter must be correct.
Comm: The suggestion is that by being derived from a śruti a smṛti acquires something of its source's authority. And if a lost śruti taught something apparently contradictory to an extant śruti then its derivative smṛti would be similarly contradictory. Yet if the lost śruti is valid (and as a śruti it surely must be) then how can its smṛti be judged invalid for conflicting with the extant śruti?

If an hypothesized śruti would have to contradict an extant one in order to support a smṛti then there is no possibility of supposing such a śruti. A smṛti may be disregarded for either of the following reasons:

(i) If it is contrary to an extant śruti.

(ii) If there is no possible mūla-śruti that would not contradict the extant śruti.
Section 3 - Non-Vedic nature of the Pañcarātra system

1. स्मृतिः प्रमाणम् इत्युक्तम्। श्रुति-विरोधे स्मृतिः अप्रामाण्यम् अपि वर्णितम्।
   इदम् इदानीं विचार्यते। किं पञ्च-रात्र-स्मृतिः श्रुति-विरुद्धतः पाशुपतादिविवर्त वेद-
   बाध्या, किं वा बिरोधाभावान् मन्यादिः।

P-R: It has been said that the smṛti is valid. When there is a conflict with śruti the invalidity of the smṛti has also been discussed. (The following) is now being considered. Is the Pañcarātra smṛti outside the Veda like those of the Pāsupatās etc. through being contrary to the śruti, or does it conform to the Veda like the smṛtis of Manu etc. because of the absence of conflict?

2. नन्वें संसायो नौपपयते।
   कृत:।
   पञ्च-रात्र-तन्त्रस्य श्रुति-विरोधाभावात्।
   कथम्।
   भगवान् एवैः कावुदेवो जगत्-पुकृतिर् अधिपत्ताता चेति वेद-सिद्धेश्वर-
   प्रतिपादनात्। स च भोक्तुर्व आत्माति च। तन्त्रेषु प्रतिपादने। क्रया-योगो ज्ञान-योगस्
   च भगवतः पाप्तुपपते तन्त्रे विवर्त्यते। अभिगमनोपादानेत्या-स्वाध्याय-योगैः
   भगवन्तं वासुदेवं वर्षं-शतम् अन्वरतम् आराध्य क्षीण-क्लेशो भगवन्तम् एव प्रतिपादते
   इति च। तदृ एतत् स्वर्ग श्रुति-पसिद्धम् एव। श्रुत्युनुसारिणि च स्मृतिः प्रमाणम् इति
   मीमांसाकारानास्थितिः।

P-R: Doubt does not arise in this manner

Why?

Because of the absence of conflict with the śruti by the Pañcarātra system.

How?

Because (we) propound (the thesis) of a Lord as established in the Veda,
"The one and only God is Vāsudeva, the substratum and ruler of the universe."

1 This second ca appears out of place and it is possible some words preceding it have been lost.
And it is stated in the systems that He is the Self of the experiencer. *Kriyā-yoga* and *jñāna-yoga* are taught in the systems as being the means of attainment of the Lord. (Further, it is taught that) having propitiated continuously for 100 years the Lord Vāsudeva with (the practices of) approaching, collecting, worshipping, studying one's own traditional lore and yoga, one whose impurities are destroyed reaches the Lord Himself. All this is well-known in the *śruti*. And the position of the Mīmāṃsakas is that the *smṛti* which adheres to the *śruti* is valid.

*Comm:* In the Pañcarātra tradition Vāsudeva (an appellation of Viṣṇu)\(^2\) is not only the one who creates and oversees the universe, he is what the universe is made of -- its material as well as efficient cause. *Kriyā-yoga* and *jñāna-yoga* are accepted by the Pañcarātrikas as legitimate means for finding God. *Kriyā-yoga* refers to the sacrifices and actions, while *Jñāna-yoga* is the discipline of cultivating true knowledge of the Supreme Being. *abhigamana*, *upādāna*, *ijyā*, *svādhyāya* and *yoga* are the five elements of the *pañca-kāla*, the daily practice enjoined upon a devout Vaiṣṇava. The terms are technical\(^3\) and refer to:

(i) *abhigamana* - going to the temple in an appropriately devout frame of mind.

(ii) *upādāna* - collecting the materials of worship.

(iii) *ijyā* - actual worship of the deity.

(iv) *svādhyāya* - recitation of one's assigned scriptures or mantras, e.g., the

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\(^2\) The two figures are explicitly equated in *Viṣṇu-purāṇa* 6.5 but they are also distinguished at times. Vāsudeva is regarded as the first *vyūha* or emanation from Viṣṇu in the cycle of Creation. See discussion in para. 12 below on the *vyūhas.*

\(^3\) See also Śaṅkara's commentary on *Brahma-sūtra* 2.2.42 where he lists the practices.
Pancarātrāgama.

(v) yoga - meditation


P-R: It is not taught in this way in the systems of the Pāṣupatas etc. For there Īśvara (Śiva) is taught not as being the substratum (but) as the ruler, merely the efficient cause and not as the Self (of individual creatures). And this hypothesis of Īśvara is outside the Veda. Moreover the Māheśvaras (followers of Mahēśvara) by contrast, believe the following. The followers of the teachings of the Great Lord are divided into four: the Pāṣupatas, Śaivas, Kālāmukhas and Kāpālikas. The Lord Maheśvara is the supreme teacher of all these, since they are followers of the path of conduct taught by him. Nevertheless they disagree with each other.

Comm: The author here begins his comparison of the Pañcarātra concept of God with that expressed in Pāṣupata theology. He emphasizes the limited role their deity plays in comparison to his own. In the Pāṣupata school God is merely the agent or instrument of Creation, working with a pre-existing body

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4 These same four divisions occur in Āgama-prāmāṇya 83 and in Rāmānuja's Śrī-bhāṣya on Brahma-sūtra 2.2.37 and are generally accepted by scholars, with some variations on the third group. Vācaspati Miśra, in his Bhāmati on 2.2.37, lists them as the Śaiva, Pāṣupata, Kāruṇika Siddhāntins and Kāpālikas. "Śaiva" may refer to the southern Śaiva Siddhānta school as may the "Kāruṇika Siddhāntins." For this thesis I have used "Śaiva" to refer to this particular school of Śaivism discussed by Bhaṭṭāraka-śrī-vedottama, and "Śaivite" as a generic noun covering all four schools.
of material. The result is a dualistic system which not only undermines the pre-eminence of God but, according to the author, is also at odds with the Veda.5

4. तत्र पाशुपता मन्यन्ते । पश्चात् संसारिणः, तेषाम् अधिपतिर् ईश्वरः पश्चात् संसारिणाम् उपकाराय पञ्चाध्यायी-शास्त्रं प्रणीतवान् । तत्र पञ्च पदार्थाः व्याख्यायन्ते कारणं कार्यं योगो विधिर्दुःखान्तं इति। तत्र कारणं द्विविधं निमित्तम् उपादानं च। निमित्त-कारणम् ईश्वरादि। उपादान-कारणम् ईश्वर-कला-शन्द-वाच्यं प्रधानम्। महादादि च कार्यं।6

P-R: Among them, the Pāṣupatas believe the following. Conscious beings are transmigratory; their master is Īśvara who, for the benefit of transmigratory beings, has composed a śāstra of five chapters. There (in the Pañcādhyāyi) five categories are explained: cause, effect, yoga, practices, and the end of sorrow.7 Among these the cause is of two sorts, instrumental and material. The instrumental cause is Īśvara etc. The material cause is unevolved nature referred to by the term Īśvara-kalā. And the result is the first principle [lit. the Great One].

Comm: The śāstra referred to is the Pāṣupata-sūtras, a work dating from

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5 The author here shows agreement with Śaṅkara's critique of God as a "superintendent" in the bhāṣya on Brahma-sūtras 2.2.36 and 37. Nonetheless he apparently overlooks (or was ignorant of) the existence of monist Saivite systems, e.g., the Kaśmir school.
6 This corresponds closely to Āgama-prāmāṇya 84, which reads:

7 These are also listed in Śaṅkara's bhāṣya on Brahma-sūtra 2.2.36.
the 4th-6th centuries A.D. (according to A. Śāstri, the editor of the 1940 edition). Comprised of five chapters it also possesses a bhāṣya by Kauṇḍinya. The use of the word Pāśupata, derived from Paśupati (lit. lord of the beasts), is indicative of humanity's inferior nature relative to Śiva. Many of the Pāśupata practices were intended to emphasize this beast-like status and nature of humans. Each chapter of the Pāśupata-sūtras deals with one of the five categories. kāraṇa refers to the material and efficient causes of the universe (i.e. the Lord), kārya is the effect (i.e. the universe from which the existence of a cause, Īśvara, is inferred), yoga involves chanting of mantras and inward stillness, the vidhis pertain to bathing in ashes and other purificatory rites and duḥkhānta is the state of final, sublime release from transmigratory existence.

According to Kauṇḍinya's commentary on Pāśupata-sūtra 2.5 (p. 58:) there are 25 elements or categories, the first being puruṣa. The next is pradhāna -- unevolved nature -- which is pervaded by puruṣa. Each element thereafter is pervaded by the one before and everything is pervaded by Maheśvara.

Mahat, the first principle, is the Sāṅkhya term used to apparently denote

8 The founder of the Pāśupata system is traditionally said to be Lakulīśa or Nakulīśa (R.G. Bhandarkar, p. 166). A. Śāstri (p. 1) mentions Nakulīśa as the first in a line of eighteen teachers of the Pāśupata system. See also Dasgupta, Vol. 5, pp. 6-7.

9 The editor of the Pāśupata-sūtras, A. Śāstri, differs in his definition of the second term. He limits kārya to the individual soul (p. 10 of the introduction).

10 Although a Sāṅkhya term, mahat is probably not used here by the author in the Sāṅkhya sense of a synonym for buddhi. In the Pañcarātra system, it is clearly distinguished from buddhi, according to Schrader (pp. 72-73) who identified it with prāṇa, "... nothing else can be meant by Mahat than the Prāṇa or Mukhya Prāṇa of the ancient Upaniṣads, which is both vitality (prāṇa, āyus) and sub- or super-conscious intelligence (prajñā), and on whom the five Prāṇas as well as the senses are said to depend like servants on their master."
the physical cosmos arising from *pradhāna*. *kalā* is defined by Kaunḍinya (p. 74) as: अत्र कला नाम - कार्य-करणार्या: कला: From this it would seem to be a general term given to both the cause of the manifest world and the world itself. Śiva/Paśupati is called *kāla* in 2.23 and *kalā* is thus anything derived from Him.  

5. योगोःपि "ओऽऽ्राम् अभिध्यायित, हृदि रुपीत धारणाम्" (5.24-25) इत्येवम्

P-R: Yoga too, is described thus, "One should meditate on the syllable OM; one should hold the mental retentions (of OM) in the heart." The practice (includes) bathing in the morning, noon and evening [lit. at the time of the three *soma*-pressings], secret conduct and ending with the offering (of ?). The end of suffering is liberation. So the ultimate cessation of suffering is called by the word *duḥkhānta*. This same cessation of suffering is called by the word *mokṣa*. In *mokṣa* they propose the transference of the qualities of Īśvara into that liberated one. That liberated soul is not inanimate [material] like a stone, as in (the doctrines of) the Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas.

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12 See also Dasgupta Vol. 5, p. 137 for a similar view.
13 A. Śāstri’s edition reads, कृष्णि in place of रुपीत. The essential meaning of the passage however is unchanged.
14 The editor expressed uncertainty over whether this was *kasya* or *tasya*. As mentioned before, the similarity of the old Malayālam characters for *ka* and *ta* make such confusion understandable. However *tasya* would seem to be the textually appropriate choice here. The following *ca* is somewhat problematic as its more logical place would be immediately after *mokṣe*. This may suggest some words have been lost.
Comm: The heart, as used here, refers to the locus of the ātman or soul. Kauṇḍinya defines it in 5.25 as: तत्र हृदि इत्यात्म-पन्याचौः। The text in parentheses in the statement regarding the practice is problematic. The suffix ddha seems to be part of the past participle of विध - to kindle. Gaḍu is a bodily excrescence while gaḍḍukā is a water-jug. Together however, ddhagaddukā make little contextual sense.

In the stage of liberation the devotee acquires the divine properties of his deity, although some separation between deity and devotee is still implied. The author here alludes to the concept of liberation posited by two schools associated with the Pāṣupatas. Although originally independent traditions with distinctive textual roots -- the Nyāya-sūtras and the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras -- the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas borrowed ideas from each other and were generally allied on most issues against the other systems. And by the author's time they had come to be treated as a unitary body. For them the emancipated soul was defined in a negative sense -- as existing in a state of freedom from pain or sensation.

15 This practice plus Kauṇḍinya's clear preference for Brāhmaṇas (see 1.9, 1.13, 4.20 and their commentaries) indicate the Pāṣupatas still retained some links with Vedic orthodoxy.

16 Āgama-prāmāṇya 84 reads: गृहाचर-मुख-शमशानभसित-र्नानावसान: परः which van Buitenen treats as a corruption. His proposed reading is: गृहाचर-भरस-र्नान-शयनादिक्रिया-परः।

17 See Keith (pp. 262-263) who links the Naiyāyikas with the Śaivas and the Vaiśeṣikas with the Pāṣupatas. Potter (pp. 21-22) accepts that this was the tradition but questions the evidence for associating the Vaiśeṣikas with the Pāṣupatas. He does concur that both schools worshipped Śiva rather than Viṣṇu. In the Nyāya-mañjarī, for instance, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa addresses his maṅgala to Śambhu, an epithet of Śiva.


19 Gautama's Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.22 describes it as complete freedom from suffering. Vātsyāyana's bhāṣya on the same sūtra further notes that this state is not characterized by bliss. Radhakrishnan (Vol. II, p. 170) has remarked that the Nyāya mokṣa has been compared to a deep, dreamless sleep.
P-R: The Saivas, on the other hand, believe the adoration of the Supreme Lord, preceded by initiation, bestows enjoyment and final beatitude. Likewise, they believe in the omniscience of liberated souls in the state of final emancipation. And so they say:

"Then when karman becomes even through passage of time,
When one is initiated by the guru through the sending down of great power.
He is omniscient like Śiva as one free from incompete understanding [lit.
someone who knows something]
Then, filled with the manifestation of Śivaness, he is no longer a transmigratory one [a being subject to transmigration], etc."

The Great Lord himself declared thus when questioned by Garuḍa.

Comm: The Saivites placed great emphasis on dīkṣā (initiation) by a proper guru. Only after such initiation is one able to reap the bounty of Śiva's blessings. śakti-nipāta literally means the "descent of power" and refers to the

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20 I was unable to trace this reference. However Gonda (MRLS, p. 186) describes a Śaivite text (also unavailable to him) entitled the Karanāgama in which a very similar discussion occurs in Chapter 1 among Maheśvara, Garuḍa and Bhagavat (Viṣṇu?).
directing by the guru of his stored-up energy into the disciple at an opportune time. The devotee then acquires the omniscience of his deity and attains liberation from the cycle of rebirth.

7. कालामुखास्त्रे चाहैः। भस्माना सनानं कपाल-भोजनम् ईश्वराराधनं लकृत-धारणम् इत्यादि-विशेषानुष्ठानाद् दृष्टांर्ग-लक्षण-पुरुषार्थवापित्तस् इति। 'कपालिकां च मुद्रा-ष्ट्रक-परिष्ठानात् तद-धारणाच् चापवर्ग-प्राप्तिर् इति मन्यन्ते।' तथा चाहैः।

चण्टिका रुचक्स्त्रे चैव कुण्डलं च सिखा-मणिः।
भस्म यज्ञोपवीतं च मुद्रा-ष्ट्रकं प्रकृतितम्॥
कपालम् अथ खट्टाः उपमुद्रे प्रकृतिते।
आभिरं मुद्रित-देहस् तु न भूयं हि जाते॥ इति।
"तान् ये(?) नस्तकारादिभि: पूजयन्ति तेष्पि सर्व-कल्याण-भाजो भवन्ति। किं

21 Agama-prāmāṇya 83 reads: एवं कालामुखा अपि समस्त-शास्त्र-प्रतिष्ठा-कपाल-पात्र-भोजन-शव-भस्म-रसान्तत्-पाशान-लगूद-धारण-सुरा-कुम्भ-रथपान-तत्तथा-देवतार्चितंदेर्व एव दृष्टांर्ग-साही-भंडार्यम् अभिधानाः श्रुति-वाहिन्यता एव।
22 Agama-prāmāṇya 83 reads:
मुद्रित-ष्ट्रक-विष्णुयात् पुनस् तस्येव धारणात्।
अपवर्ज-फल-प्राप्ति न ब्राह्मणमाधिि।
23 Dyczkowski (p. 27) has noted that the Kāpālikas "do not appear to have had any scriptures which were peculiarly their own, nor written independent works." Not surprisingly then, I was unable to trace this reference. However it follows almost to the word Agama-prāmāṇya 83, which differs only in the first two lines:

कर्णिका रुचक्स्त्रे चैव कुण्डलं च शिखा-मणिः।
भस्म यज्ञोपवीतं च मुद्रा-ष्ट्रकं प्रचक्षते॥
It also resembles Rāmānuja's Śrī-bhāṣya 2.2.36. which reads:

कर्णिका रुचक्स्त्रे चैव कुण्डलं च शिखा-मणिः।
भस्म यज्ञोपवीतं च मुद्रा-ष्ट्रकं प्रचक्षते॥
आभिरं मुद्रित-देहस् तु न भूयं हि जाते।

For a brief discussion of the resemblance between the Kāpālika mudras and the Buddhist ones see Dyczkowski p.146, fn. 141.
24 From the editor's presentation of the text it appears the ms. reading was unclear, although he nowhere states that bracketed items are the ms. readings.
P-R: And the Kālāmukhas say the attainment of the mundane and non-mundane goals of human existence results from the specific practices of bathing with ashes, eating from a skull, worship of Īśvara, bearing a cudgel and so forth. And the Kāpālikas believe the attainment of final beatitude [release from saṁsāra] results from the complete acquaintance with the sixfold marks and from wearing them. Thus they say:

"Small bell, necklace, earring, crest jewel,
Ashes, and the sacred thread are proclaimed as the six marks.
The skull and the club are proclaimed as secondary signs.
He whose body is marked with these is not born again here."

They [the Kāpālikas] say that Lord Maheśvara Himself said, "Even those who worship these (six mūdrās) with homage etc. attain all that is excellent. How much more those who undertake the Great Vow and are one with the Supreme Lord?"

Comm: The Kālāmukhas and the Kāpālikas were the two most extreme sects among the Śaivites. To cultivate disinterest in worldly possessions and experiences they adopted not only harsh ascetic practices but also bizarre and superficially counter-religious activities such as drunkenness, orgies and even cannibalism. For these they were harshly condemned by most mainstream Hindus.26

mahāvrata was a Vedic as well as Śaivite term. In the latter sense however it meant following the example of Śiva in his wrathful form of Bhairava. This

25 I was also unable to trace this reference.
26 See for instance, Gonda (V&S), pp. 92-93.
form is described in Śiva-purāṇa 3.8 and in the 5th skanda of the Devī-
bhāgavata wherein Śiva cuts off one of Brahmā's heads and is thereupon
cursed by Brahmā to carry a skull and beg for his food. Thus the Kāpālikas
adopted this practice of eating food from a skull as well as bathing in
crematory ashes.

8. सेषम् अन्योन्य-निष्ट्र-चतुविंध-चयां-देव-कल्पना च त्रयी (भाग्या?बाघ्या)27, न केवलम् ईश्वर-कल्पनेव। न चैत्य आशीङ्गनीयं कथम् हुय ब्रह्म-बाघ्र-प्रक्रिया
भगवता महेष्वरेण विरचितति, यत: केनचिद् अर्थिततनेन क्षेत्रेण महेष्वर-समान-नामना
त्रयी-मार्ग-बहङ्कुन्ततं प्रक्रिया विरचितता। तथा-नाम-सामान्येन केनचिद् भान्त्या
महेष्वर-नामकोपविष्ट-मार्गम् अवलम्बितवान्। अतः पाशुपतादि-तन्त्रवत् पुरुष-रात्रे
तन्त्रस्य न वेद-बालज्ञवस्। तस्माद् अनुपपन्नेभः28 चिन्ता।

P-R: And it is this hypothesis of a division into four kinds of observances
conflicting with each other which is outside the three (Vedas); not just the
hypothesis of Īśvara alone (as the instrumental but not material cause). Nor is
it to be wondered why this process, which is outside the Veda, was devised by
Lord Maheśvara, since the practice which is excluded from the path of the
three (Vedas) was (actually) devised by some soul of a later [i.e. more recent]
time with a name similar to (that of) Maheśvara. Through the similarity of
these names some, in confusion, have clung to the path taught by one called
Maheśvara. Thus, the Pañcarātra system is not outside the Vedic pale like the
systems of the Pāśupatas etc. Therefore this issue (raised above that the
Pañcarātrikas resemble the Pāśupatas et. al.) is without basis.

27 The editor has suggested either भाग्या or बाघ्या as a possible reading but the latter seems more
likely.
28 The editor's reading is उपपन्नेभः, but contextually the negative, अनुपपन्नेभः, seems called
for.
Comm: It is noteworthy that the author considers it impossible that non-Vedic practices could go back to Maheśvara Himself.

9. अन्तर्वत । भागवत-तन्त्रस्य वेद-विरुढ्ध-जीवोपत्त्यादि-कार्यविहीनां कार्यविहीनां कर्म समुपजायते । यद्य अपि भगवदराधनादि-लक्षणम् कर्म ज्ञाने च पञ्च-रात्रेऽत्तत्त्रेषु पदिश्यते,३२ तत्त्व अप्यनुपयोगम् अनु)विस्मरणीयं च स्व-हस्त-प्रक्षिप्त-शैववद् ३० इति श्रद्धामहे । तत्सान् नामुपयन्तने पंचता।

Opp: This is the reply. The Bhāgavata system is seen to teach various matters such as the origin of the soul etc., which conflict with the Veda; because of being similar to that system a suspicion of invalidity arises in us regarding other systems such as the Sātvatas as well, in which there is no divergence from the path of the three (Vedas). We suspect that whatever rites in the form of adoration etc. of Viṣṇu and knowledge are taught in the Pañcarātra systems are inapplicable and not to be relied on, like the milk put in a dog-skin bag. Therefore, this (issue of being non-Vedic) is not unjustified.

(h) Comm: The Sātvatas (also known as the Sātvatas) were a group of Kṛṣṇa-bhaktas intermittently identified with the Bhāgavatas, the school which arose from the South Indian Vaiṣṇava tradition of the later centuries of the first millennium. As worshippers of "Bhagavat" (Viṣṇu) they in turn, are

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29 This is the first reference in the text to the existence of more than one Pañcarātra system.
30 This simile occurs in virtually the same words in Ṭāgama-prāmāṇya 17: स्व-हस्त-निष्कप्त-शैववद्.
usually associated with the Pañcarātrikas.31 This passage however, clearly implies the Sāttvatas were regarded as a separate school from the Bhāgavatas. One possibility, suggested by the context and by the plural "systems" in the next statement, is that the opponent views the Bhāgavatas and Sāttvatas (the latter including the Pañcarātrikas) as allied but distinct systems. By discrediting one (the Bhāgavatas) the opponent intends to undermine the other.

As a dog is considered a polluting animal in Indian society milk placed in a bag or water-sack made of dog-skin is useless and of questionable quality.

10. किं तावत्त प्राप्तम्। पञ्च-रात्र-तन्त्र वेद-बाधम् इति।

कुलः।

विरोधाधिकरणे तन्त्र-टीकायां भट्ट-पादेः पञ्च-रात्र-तन्त्रस्य वेद-बाधलबेन परिकारणतेवाद् 'यान्येतानि त्रयी-विबिध्रः न परिगृहीतानि'त्यादिना 'साक्ष्य-योग-पञ्च-रात्र-पशुपत-शाक्यादि-ग्रंथ-परिगृहीत-धर्माधर्म्य-निबन्धनानान्'त्येतत्त्वेऽप्येन 'तस्माद् धर्मं प्रति त्रयो-बाधम् एवं जातीयः प्राप्तायेनान्येकं स्याद्' इत्यत्त्वेन ग्रन्थेन।

Opp: What is arrived at thus far? The Pañcarātra system is outside the Veda.

Why?

Because of the inclusion of the system of the Pañcarātrikas as being outside

31 In Mahābhārata 12.348.3, 55 and 84 and in Ahirbudhnya-saṃhitā 12.1 the three are linked. In Lakṣmi-tantra 1.21 the Bhāgavatas are identified with the Sāttvatas. One of the major texts in the Pañcarātrāgama is entitled the Sātvata-saṃhitā. In his bhāṣya on Brahma-sūtras 2.2.42 and 44 Śaṅkara seems to equate them. In Āgama-prāmāṇya 3-4 Yāmuna seems to identify the Bhāgavatas with the Pañcarātrikas. Dasgupta (Vol. 3, pp. 14-15) distinguishes the Bhāgavatas from the Pañcarātrikas but notes that the words bhāgavata and sātvata are interchangeable. Jaiswal (pp. 44-45) and Gonda (MRLS p. 48) both reject the identification of the Bhāgavatas with the Pañcarātrikas.
the Veda in the *tantra* commentary by (Kumarila) Bhaṭṭa-pāda in the section on conflict, beginning with, "The others which are not included by those knowledgeable of the three (Vedas)" -- continuing with -- "The bases of proper and improper conduct accepted in the scriptures of the Sāṅkhya-Yogas, Pañcarātras, Pāśupatas, Buddhists etc." -- and ending with -- "Therefore with regard to dharma, this kind (of system) which is outside the three (Vedas) is not to be regarded as being authoritative."

*Comm:* These quotes are taken from a long passage in the *Tantra-vārttika.* on *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* 1.3.4 (pp. 328-330 Gosvāmi ed.)

11. अपि च पाच्छरात्रिकास्त्रैवर्णिकानां स्मार्ति-गर्भाधानावित्त-संस्कार-संस्कृतानाम्
अविन-होत्र-दर्श-पूर्ण-मास-ज्योतिष्टोमादि-श्रीत-कर्मण्यपित्तानाम्
अपि पुनः
भगवदाराद्धनाधिकार-सिद्धवर्ध-दीक्षादि संस्कारान्तरं वर्ण्यन्ति।
यद्यम् अपि
वेदानुसारी मागेस्व तदा तैर एव संस्कारेः: संस्कृत तत्वाद्
भगवदाराधनादिभव्यधिकियेन्। किं संस्कारान्तर-वर्णिनेन।
वर्ण्यन्ति च
संस्कारान्तरम्।
तनु नूनम् अवैदिकम् पञ्चः-रात्र-तन्त्रम् इति मन्यामहे।
शूद्रस्याप्यपित्ताम् आह्! तस्माद् अप्पैविदिकतम्।
वेद-विरुद्ध-जीवोत्पर्यादि-कथनाद् अप्पैविदिकतम्।

*Opp:* Moreover, the Pañcarāтриkās prescribe another sacrament -- initiation -- for the purpose of establishing eligibility for the worship of the Lord among members of the three varṇas who have (already) undergone the *smṛti* sacraments such as the impregnation rite and who are (already) eligible for *śruti* rites such as the fire sacrifice, new and full moon sacrifices and the *soma* sacrifice. If this path also conforms to the Veda, then, because of being purified by those same sacraments, they should be eligible also to worship the

32 Gosvāmi reads *Pañcarātra* but other than that the two passages are the same.
Lord. Why prescribe another sacrament? Yet they do specify another sacrament.\(^{33}\) We therefore believe the Pañcarātra system does not conform to the Veda.

Furthermore they have declared the eligibility of a Śūdra (for performing religious functions). On this basis too there is non-conformity with the Veda.

It is non-Vedic also because of the mention of the origin etc. of the soul, in contradiction of the Veda.

\textit{Comm:} If the path claims to be Vedic why shouldn't anyone eligible to perform Vedic rites be permitted to perform the Pañcarātra rites? By creating their own qualifications the author and his cohorts are setting themselves apart from and even undermining the stature of the Vedic sacraments.

The opponent does not cite any Pañcarātra smṛti passage upholding the eligibility of Śūdras, so presumably this practice of the Pañcarātrikas was too well-known to require elaboration. And indeed the Pañcarātrikas were far less discriminating than other orthodox schools regarding the participation of the lower members of society in religious functions.\(^{34}\)

The second objection focuses on the Pañcarātra concept of \textit{vyūhas} or emanations, which seems to imply the creation of an individual soul named Saṁkarṣaṇa. This ostensibly conflicts with the Vedic tradition of the

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\(^{33}\) See Smith, Vol. II, p. 42 for an extensive list of the different rites and requirements proposed by the Pañcarātrikas. Gonda (V&S pp. 64-65) also discusses Vaiṣṇava dīkṣā. See Āgama-prāmāṇya 92 for related discussion.

\(^{34}\) Smith (Vol. II, p. 96) remarks, "Indeed, with the notable exception of an authoritative work like Pādma-saṁhitā, the abiding hallmark of the social outlook of the Pañcarātra literature is to welcome all, including "stṛ-śūdra" (even women and Śūdras)." On the same page he provides a copious list of references from the āgama illustrating this tolerance. Jaiswal (p. 46) has similarly noted, "The Pañcarātras, on the other hand, showed no respect to the varṇa rules and their initiation was open to all with no distinctions of caste and sex."
eternity (unchanging nature) of the soul.

12. अथि च भगवता वेद-न्यासेने35 'उत्तरत्यसभ्वाद्' (ब्र. २. २. ४२) इति पञ्चराजाधिकरणे तद-दर्शनस्य निराकृतवात्, तर्क-पादे बौद्धादिपर-पक्ष-निराकरण-पकरणे निराकृतवात्, "शैवं पाशुपतं चैव बौद्धम [अत्य]हांत तथा। कापालं पांचचरात्र क"36 इति पाणिनिद्वेदे स्मरणात्, "चतुर्वत् वेदेशु श्रेयोसलब्धवा शाणिडल्य इदं शास्त्रम् अधीतवान्"37 इत्यादि वेद-निन्दा-दर्शनात्, शिष्ट-विग्रहितवाद, वैदिकं तान्त्रिकं इति विभाग-करणात्, शिष्ट-विग्रहित-निर्माण-धारण-निवेद्य-भक्षणाद्य-करणात् पाशुपातादि-तन्त्रचतुर्वत् पञ्च-रात्र-तन्त्रम् अथि वेद-बाह्यम् एवति पाप्तम्।

Opp: Moreover, it is thus established that the Pāñcarātra system is indeed outside the Veda like the systems of the Pāṣupatas etc.:

(i) because of being repudiated by the venerable Vyāsa in the section concerning the Pāñcarātra (system) with this view, "because of the impossibility of the origin (of the soul)" (Brahma-sūtra 2.2.42),

(ii) because of being repudiated in the discussion of the opposing views of the Buddhists etc. in the Tarka-pāda (section on logical refutation - Brahma-sūtra 2.2),

(iii) because of traditionally being regarded as being heretical (in the passage): "The Śaivite, the Pāṣupata, the Buddhist, the Jain, the

35 Sandhi not observed in edition.
36 There may well be an earlier source for this quote but it corresponds exactly to Āgama-prāmāṇya 48 which reads:
शैवं पाशुपतं चैव बौद्धं अप्याहृतं तथा।
कापालं पञ्च-रात्रं चैवद्वेदान्तवात्-स्मृते:।
The emendation by the editor to match this reading suggests he was also aware of Yāmuna's text.
37 Although a well-known passage it seems to be so only because of its presence in Saṅkara's bhāṣya on Brahma-sūtra 2.2.45. Bhandarkar (p. 55) has described a similar-sounding passage he found in the Parama-saṁhitā, but I was unable to trace it. Āgama-prāmāṇya 90 reads: उक्तं हि चतुर्वत् पुरुषार्थम् अलब्दमान: शाणिडल्य इदं शास्त्रम् अधीतवान्...'
Kāpālaka and the Pāñcarātrika,

(iv) because of the derision of the Veda (in this passage), "Not having found the highest (truth) in the four Vedas Śāṇḍilya studied this śāstra,"

(v) because of being censured by the śīstas [spiritual elite],

(vi) because a division like, "Vedic, Tāntric," is made,

(vii) because of accepting the (practices of) wearing the garlands worn by the deities and eating the food offered to the deity, which (practices) are censured by the śīstas.

Comm: The first objection uses the appellation Vyāsa, which likely refers to Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the Brahma-sūtra. According to Śaṅkara's commentary the sūtra is directed against the Pāñcarātra teaching of the four vyūhas -- Vāsudeva,38 Saṁkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha -- which emanate from Viṣṇu and are used to explain the Creation process.39 Within this rubric Lord Vāsudeva creates Saṁkarṣaṇa who is identified with individual soul or ātman. From him comes Pradyumna who is identified with manas "mind," which in turn devolves into ahaṅkāra "I-awareness, ego," represented by Aniruddha.40 That Saṁkarṣaṇa is alleged to represent the

38 Vāsudeva, in his form as the first vyūha, should not be confused with Vāsudeva as the highest reality.
39 See van Buitenen's introduction (pp. 16-22) to his translation of Āgama-prāmāṇya in which he discusses the problems in interpreting sūtras 2.2.242-45 which ostensibly deal with the Pāñcarātrikas.
40 Descriptions of the four and their roles abound in the Pāñcarātrāgama. See for instance Sātvata-sarhitā 7.25-28 or Lākṣmi-tantra 4.8-28 and 6.6-12. Schrader (pp. 35-42) has provided an excellent summary of the vyūhas, their properties and their roles in Creation. A parallel popular mythology also exists, derived from the Viṣṇu-puṭṛaṇa among others, wherein Vāsudeva is Kṛṣṇa (4.15), Saṁkarṣaṇa is his brother Balarāma (5.1) and Pradyumna and Aniruddha are Kṛṣṇa's son (5.26) and grandson (5.28) respectively. In Kūrma-puṭrāṇa 1.49.38-42 Saṁkarṣaṇa is called Śeṣa, which of course is another epithet of Balarāma. See also Bhāgavata-puṭrāṇa 4.24.34-36, 11.5.29 and 12.11.21. Rāmānuja accepted the vyūhas as objects of worship but does not appear to have utilized them in his own teachings (Anantharangachar, p. 64). The vyūhas should not be confused with
individual soul is held by the opponent to contradict the Vedic teaching that souls are eternal and have no origin.

_Tarka-pāda_ is the name commonly given to the second section of Chapter Two, wherein Bādarāyaṇa refutes the various systems of Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Vaiśeṣika etc. using logic and reason. This is in contrast to his refutations based on _śruti_ and _smṛti_ statements in the earlier parts of the _Brahma-sūtras_.

The third objection is intended to reflect the orthodox Brahmāṇical attitude.

Objection four is also referred to in Śaṅkara's commentary on _Brahma-sūtra_ 2.2.45. Here Śaṅḍilya is described as a devotee of Viṣṇu who fails to find the highest spiritual truth in the Veda and so turns to the _Pañcarātrāgama_, or at least one text in the tradition.41 This is perceived by Śaṅkara and the opponent as a slighting of the Veda.

Objections five and six indicate that by the author’s time (and probably much earlier) there was a clear categorization of what was Vedic and what was Tāntric, with little or no overlap. The opponent's statement implies that the Pāñcarātrikas belonged with the Tāntric groups, hence they cannot claim to be Vedic.

Objection seven implicitly touches on the issue of pollution. During Pāñcarātra rituals food is usually offered to an image or statue of the deity and the statue is often wreathed in garlands. These items are later distributed to the devotees. The objection is based on the assumption that even food eaten by the deity should be treated like food eaten by a living being; i.e. unfit for others to consume. Similarly, (in the opponent's view) garlands should not be

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41 Śaṅḍilya is a rather ubiquitous figure, appearing variously in _Mahābhārata_ 2.137.22, 12.47.6, and 13.4.17; _Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad_ 2.6.1, 4.6.1, and 4.6.3; and _Chāndogya Upaniṣad_ 3.14.
passed from one wearer to another even if the first wearer is God himself.

13. अत्रोच्चये। विरोधाधिकरण-न्यायस्तु वैद-बाह्य-समृति-विषयो न पुनर् वैद-संयोगे-पुरुष-प्रणीत-समृति-विषय इति न्याय-विषय-समर्पण-परं भट्ट-पादीयं वचनं, न पुनः प्रच-रात्रस्य वैद-बाह्यत्व-प्रतिपादन-परं विरुद्धांश-विषयं वा।

P-R: In this matter we reply (as follows). Regarding the argument in the section on conflict [i.e. conflicting systems], it is concerned with *smṛtis* outside the Veda and is not concerned with *smṛtis* composed by persons in contact with the Veda. Thus the statement of Kumārila is solely intent on making known the subject of the argument; it does not concern itself with propounding the externality to the Veda of the Pañcarātra system or with (Pañcarātra) elements conflicting (with the Veda).

Comm: Although it is possible and indeed, natural to interpret Kumārila's remark as including the Pañcarātra *smṛtis* with those not established as derived from the Veda the author seems to distinguish between "not being included by those knowledgeable of the three Vedas" (*trai-vidbhīna parigṛhitani*) and "being outside the Veda" (*veda-bāhya*). He seems to be suggesting that while the Veda-knowers do not accept the Pañcarātra system they do not necessarily assert that it is indeed outside the Vedic tradition. Such splitting of hairs over word-meanings is plausible but not supported by anything in Kumārila's discussion.

14. यदद उक्तं संस्कारान्तरोपदेशाद् इति, तत्रोच्चये। न संस्कार-सिद्ध-मान्येष वैदिकत्वं विहन्यते, शिरो-चतुदद उपयते। यथेव द्वपनीत-वेदविशिष्ठप वेदाधिष्ठयनेनक्रितस्ये युनर्मुण्डकोपिणिद्धयने शिरो-चतु नाम संस्कारः श्रुते "शिरो-चतु विधिबद्ध यैस् तु चौर्णम" (मुण्ड. ३. २. १०) इति, तथेहापि भविष्यति।
As for the statement, "because of the teaching of other sacraments," the status of being Vedic is not quashed merely by differences in sacraments, for those (differences) can be accounted for, like the śīro-vrata rite. Just as the rite called śīro-vrata is heard of in the study of the Mundaka Upaniṣad (3.2.10) by an initiated member of one of the three varṇas who is already eligible for the study of the Veda, as attested by the statement, "By whom according to rule, the śīro-vrata rite is performed," so too it will be here. If an additional rite is enjoined for the purpose of establishing eligibility for the adoration of the Lord in the case of one desiring other fruits, then what is the conflict? Nor is there a conflict with what went before [i.e. the preceding Vedic rites], because one can account for different sacraments on the basis of differences of eligibility. Nor is a sacrament (performance) that is śrutiderived or smṛti-derived prohibited, so that one would suspect a condition of being non-Vedic. Therefore there is no substance in (the objection) that there is non-adherence to the Veda because of the teaching of other sacraments for the initiated members of the three varṇas even when they are eligible to perform rites prescribed in the Veda.

Comm: The śīro-vrata rite is the practice of shaving one's head in

Dr. Aklujkar has suggested the original reading may have been Śrīt: स्मार्त-संस्कार, which would more naturally translate as "a smṛti-derived sacrament that is in keeping with the śrutि."
preparation for studying a *sarhyāsa upaniṣad* like the *Munḍaka*. Brāhmaṇas normally maintained a tuft of hair. The rite is not mentioned among the Vedic sacraments but nonetheless came to be accepted for a specific purpose on the basis of its mention in the *upaniṣad*. By extension from this precedent therefore, the Pañcarātrikas are not necessarily non-Vedic for prescribing additional rites for worship. The Pañcarātra rites merely add to but do not reject any of the established sacraments.

15. शूद्रस्या यज्ञार्थिकाराद् अवैदिकत्वात् इति यद् उक्तं, तद् असत्, स्थिरपतितिवद् उपपत्ते। प्रथम हि "निषाद-स्थिरति याज्येद्" इत्यत्र वाचनिकोशधिकारः सिद्धः, तथेषापि भविष्यति। "श्राब्देष्ठ चतुरो वर्णान" इति ब्राह्मणाद् इतिहास-पुराणादि प्रथमेष्ठ शूद्रस्याप्यक्षाकारो, न चावैदिको तथात्रापि भविष्यति।

*P-R:* As for the statement, "From the eligibility even of the Śūdra there is non-conformity to the Veda," it is untrue, for it can be accounted for like "the sacrifice of the chief official." Just as eligibility is established in that case from the statement itself, "One should have the chief official of the Niṣāda sacrifice" so also it will be here (in the case of the Śūdras). Just as from the statement in the Epics, the Purāṇas etc., "Let it be proclaimed to the four varṇas," there is eligibility also of the Śūdras, and there is no state of being non-Vedic, so too it will be in this (our) case.

*Comm:* The Niṣāda are viewed as outside the three main varṇas, and hence, as ineligible to perform sacrifices. Yet *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra* 6.1.51 and Śabara’s accompanying *bhāṣya* discuss the citation above and acknowledge the right of a Niṣāda chief to perform at least the *raudra* sacrifice.43

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43 I was unable to trace the original citation. For a discussion of Śūdra ineligibility to perform the
The statement cited may have been a well-known introduction to or conclusion of these works. Although denied by Manu the right to study the original Vedic texts the Śūdras were permitted to receive the message of the Vedas through the Epics and Purāṇas which were Vedic in spirit if not in actual wording. The implication is that if the Epics and Purāṇas did not become non-Vedic by being extended to the Śūdras neither would the Pañcarātra system.

16. यत्तौक्तम्, बेद-विरुद्ध-जीवोपयज्ञानिकः कथनाद् अवैविकतम्भ इति, तत्रोच्चयते।
नात्र जीवायुपति: कदाचिद् अभिधीयते। किं तत् इति। संकर्षणादि-मूर्तिः-त्रयस्य व्यूह-रूपेणोपति:।
सा प्रभुवतो न विरुध्यते, राम-कृष्णादि-प्रादुर्भाविचरत्। यथैव हि
चराचर-जीव-भूतस्य भगवतो वासुदेवस्य स्वेच्छया राम-कृष्णादि-प्रादुर्भाविचरते
न विरुध्यते, तथेन्द्रिय भविष्यति। तत्र जीवादि-शब्द-प्रयोगो न्यवहाराय साकेतिकः,
नाग्यथा। अन्यथा चतुर्वीर्य चर्मादि यथा-क्रम-पूजार्थ वासुदेवादि-मूर्ति-चतुष्टयं
कथं चिनियुज्ज्वते।

P-R: Where it is said, "(The Pañcarātra system) does not conform to the Veda because the mention of the origin of the soul etc. conflicts with the Veda," we reply (as follows). Here (in our system) the arising of the soul is never expressed. What then? It is the arising through the form of the vyūha emanations of the triad of manifestations - Saṃkarṣaṇa etc. And like the manifestations of Rāma, Kṛṣṇa etc. this does not conflict in the case of the Lord. Indeed, just as the manifestation of Lord Vāsudeva, who has become the life of the entire world, as Rāma, Kṛṣṇa etc. by free will is not contrary, so also it will be here. The use of the word jīva etc. in that context is conventional for

agni-hotra and other important rites, see Śābara-bhāṣya 6.1.25-38

44 Dr. Aklujkar has suggested that something like पारमार्थिकः is more likely to have been the original reading here. The following अन्यथा could have corrupted the reading.
the sake of communication, not otherwise. Otherwise, why would the fourfold manifestations of Vasudeva et. al. be employed for the purpose of sequential worship by the four varṇas?

(p) Comm: The existence of divine incarnations in no way undermines or competes with the ultimate reality and supremacy of Vasudeva. Similarly the triad of Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha poses no threat to the Lord's stature. Indeed, for the benefit of his devotees who require some sort of personalization as a focus for their worship the Lord manifests himself in forms such as the vyūhas, thus confirming they are not really jīvas.

17. यत् तृत्, भगवतं सृष्टिकृतप्रायं निराकृतत्वमात्र अवैदिकत्वम् इति, तत्रोच्चये। सकल-परम्परा-राज-तन्त्र-परिश्रम-रहितरय। तन्त्रक-देन्त्र-श्रवण-मात्रं विवक्षितायांक्षाना अतिकोलोन्त-पिततत्तया यथा-श्रुतम एवार्थ गृहीतवा वासुदेव-संज्ञकात् परमात्मनं संकर्षण-संज्ञाको जीव उत्पत्ते, तस्माच् च पद्यं-संज्ञक मनः। तस्माद् अपनिनिर्ध-संज्ञकोङ्गकारं इति वेद-विवृद्धार्थात्माम् आचक्षे पे, तत्-मत्म अपाकारं विपुल-मतिभीं: सूत्रकौरेपरं अधिकरणम् आरुक्षम् 'उत्तमसंभवां' (व 2. 2. 174) इति, न पुनः: सादात्व: एव परम्-राज-निराभिकृष्या।

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45 In his Śrī-bhāṣya on Brahma-sūtra 2.2.44 Rāmānuja praises the compassion of the Lord for doing just this to help His devotees:

वासुदेवार्धम् परं व्रज्वासोऽभिशित-वर्तमम् स्वाभिशित-समाश्रयणीयत्वाय स्वेच्छाया चतुर्थिःबत्तिष्ठति इति हि तत्-प्रक्षे।

He then cites a passage from the Sātvata-sanhītā to encapsulate the spiritual progression from worshipping the vibhāvas (e.g. Krishṇa, Rāma) to worshipping the four vyūhas to the final stage of worshipping the Supreme Brahman: विभवार्थानां व्यूहं पाप्य व्यूहार्थानां परं भ्रो वासुदेवार्धम् सूत्रं पाप्यते... Bhandarkar (p. 56) relates how the Brāhmaṇas worship the single god while the other varṇas worship the vyūhas. Āgama-prāmāṇya 95 also indicates the four vyūhas are to be worshipped successively by the four varṇas: वर्णेष्य चतुर्भिः चतवार: पूजनीया यथाक्रमम्।
P-R: As for the statement, "There is non-conformity with the Veda because of being repudiated by the venerable author of the sūtra, (Bādarāyaṇa)" we reply as follows. Because someone who lacks a study of the complete Pañcarātra system grasps a literal meaning due to an excessively soft [i.e. dull-witted] mind there is an incomplete ascertainment of the intended meaning due to hearing of one part of the system. (He thus) asserts the soul named Saṅkarṣaṇa rises from the Supreme Soul named Vāsudeva, and from him the mind which is called Pradyumna, and from him the ego which is called Aniruddha and declares this as having a meaning contrary to the Veda. To refute that view the section was begun, "Because of the impossibility of origin," by the highly intelligent author of the sūtra, not out of a desire to repudiate the Pañcarātra (system) itself.

Comm: Sūtra again refers to Brahma-sūtra. An unsophisticated listener, having simply heard that part of the Pañcarātra teachings which refers to the personal emanations of Vāsudeva, might take them literally and regard them as contrary to the Veda which emphasizes the oneness of Brahman. His view is intended to be dispelled by the sūtra passage. Bādarāyaṇa merely used the vyūhas to remove misconception; he did not reject the Pañcarātra system by following a superficial understanding of it.

18. यत् पुनः इदम् उक्तं "पर-पक्ष-निराकरण-पादे निराकृतत्वाद्" हति, तद् अपि प्रस्वत्व-कृत्वाचिन्तया वेति परिहरामः।

P-R: As for the statement, "From being repudiated in the section on refutation of opposing views," that also we refute as being incidental or through imagining an issue (where there is really none when the Pañcarātra
teaching is properly understood).46

Comm: The author is here answering the second of the seven objections, this one claiming that the mere inclusion of the Pañcarātra school in the section on false systems (Brahma-sūtra 2.2) is incriminating evidence. He counters that Bādarāyana must have included the Pañcarātrikas in this section, which is otherwise devoted to invalid or criticized schools, merely incidentally to show the weaknesses of the schools which were really to be refuted.47

19.  यद् अधि "शैवं पाशुपत्मं" इत्यादि-समर्थ, तद्ध अपरमर्यं इति बुम्, बेद-विरुद्धार्थ-वादित्वाभावात्। यथैव हि बेदेन प्रतिपाद्यते कृतस्थम् अद्वितीयम् असाह्य सर्व-जीव-पद्याग्नि-रूप स्व-मायावेश-वशाजु जन्म-निमित्तोपादान-कारण बड़ेति, यथैव पाल्च रात्रिकैर् अधि प्रतिपाद्यते। तस्मात् बेद-विरोधाभावात् परच-रात्र-स्मृति: प्रमाणम्।

अनुमानाच् च, विवादास्पदी-भूल्क परच-रात्र प्रमाण, बेदानुसारित्वान्, मन्वादि-स्मृतिवद इति। य: पुनः अशो विरुद्धवद् अवभासते, सोऽथ्यविरोधिन्न्न भूल्कयेयो स्त्यार्थ-वाद-भागः।

P-R: As for the traditional recollection "A Śaiva, a Pāṣupata" and so on we declare this is a poor recollection because the (Pañcarātra system) is not a propounder of things contrary to the Veda. For, just as it is taught by the Veda

46 The expression कृत्वाचिन्नता seems to refer to the tactic of imagining a problem in order to have an opportunity to explain things correctly.
47 Bādarāyana did not refer to the Pañcarātrikas by name. This statement is more a defence against Śaṅkara’s bhāṣya than against the sūtra. By comparison, Baladeva (who was also a Vaiṣṇava) argued in his commentary that sūtras 2.2.42-45 pertained to the Śāktas and not to the Bhāgavatas. Rāmānuja, on the other hand, accepted that the sūtras do deal with the Bhāgavatas but maintained that 2.2.42-43 present only a pūrva-pakṣa. This is then refuted by 2.2.44-45 which he interprets to endorse the Pañcarātra system. Āgama-prāmāṇya 99 argues similarly.
that Brahman, the immutable, non-dual, and unattached, which is the nature of
the universal and individual soul, is the instrumental and material cause of
Creation, subject to the entrance of its māyā, so too it is taught by the
Pāñcarātrikas. 48 Therefore, because of the absence of conflict with the Veda,
the Pāñcarātra smṛti is valid.

And by inference, the Pāñcarātra (system) which is the object of dispute is
valid, because it conforms to the Veda, like the smṛtis of Manu et. al. And
even that part which appears like a conflict is to be explained as being a non-
conflict just as an explanatory passage (is understood in the case of the Veda).

20. अत्र केचिद् आहुः । विरोधाधिकरण-न्यायेन वेद-विरूढः-जीवोत्पत्तपादि-विषये
सर्व-वेष्टन-समरणचद्र-अप्रमाणम्, अविरूढः-सर्वेष्वर-तत्त्व-निरुपण-तदाराधनादि-विषये
प्रमाणम् अहंकादि-स्मृतिवद् इति ।

P-R: Here some say that with regard to the origin etc. of the soul which
conflicts with the Veda, by the argument in the section on conflict [Mīmāṁsā-
sūtras 1.3.3-4] (the Pāñcarātra system) is invalid, like the sarvā-veṣṭana-smṛti;
with regard to the description of the true nature of the unopposed universal
Lord and His adoration etc., it is valid, like the smṛti dealing with the aṣṭaka
ceremony etc.

Comm: Two analogies are given here. The first is discussed by Śabara in
his bhāṣya on Mīmāṁsā-sūtra 1.3.3. The sarvā-veṣṭana-smaraṇa refers to a
smṛti rule prescribing that the sacrificial post used in the vaisarjana rite be
covered entirely by a cloth during the ritual. This is said to contradict a śruti
injunction wherein the priest must touch the post during the ritual; hence it

48 See Lakṣmī-tantra 2.52-56 for a monist account of Creation.
cannot be completely covered. On the basis of this obvious conflict, Śabara rejects the smṛti practice (which he later ascribes to ulterior motives).

The second analogy is related to Śaṅkara's bhāṣya on Brahma-sūtra 2.1.3. There he relates how the āstaka rite (a sacrifice to the ancestors on the eighth day after a full moon) is recommended in a smṛti statement but is neither prohibited nor recommended in the Veda. On the basis that no apparent contradiction occurs, he agrees that it be allowed.

The implication of the two analogies is that the Pāñcarātrikas should abandon that part of their system which conflicts with the Veda (e.g., the vyūha theory) and keep the remainder.

21. तद अयुक्तम् इत्यपरे । कुतः । एक-देशस्य प्रामाण्यम् एक-देशस्य 
चाप्रामाण्यम् अभ्युपगच्छताम् अर्थे-जरतीय-पस्माद् अनाश्चास-प्रस्माच्च ।

P-R: Others say this is improper. How so? For those who accept validity in one place and invalidity in another there is the predicament of the "half-an-old-woman" proverb [i.e. one part of the system is valid and another invalid] and the predicament of no breathing room (to make a case).

Comm: If a spokesman for a school were to accept the invalidity of a part of his teachings this would undermine his efforts to defend the validity of the remainder. He would have no logical manoeuvering room, for any opponent could simply question why the remainder of the teachings are to be treated differently from the portion that has already been discarded. One either accepts a religious or philosophical system in its entirety or not at all.

22. ननु पठच-रात्राधिकरणे भाष्यकारैर् अप्युभयथाभावोश्रीकृतः ।
Opp: Is it not so that being both ways [i.e. partly valid and partly invalid] is accepted even by the author of the bhāṣya (Śaṅkara) in the section on the Pañcarātra system?

P-R: It is not so. He considers there to be no conflict at all.

Opp: What then is the basis of the context of the bhāṣya which has proceeded as if a conflict is proven?

P-R: Indeed, it is the very same as that of the sūtra.

Opp: Then what is (the sūtra's) explanation?

P-R: It has been said here, "The beginning of the section is from the point of view of one who speaks of contrary meaning." This should not be overlooked.

Comm: This discussion refers to Śaṅkara's commentary on Brahma-sūtra 2.2.42 where he notes that he has no quarrel with the notion of Brahman assuming multiple forms. However he does object to the concept of an individual soul (Saṅkarṣaṇa) arising from the Supreme Self. The author must somehow account for the purpose of bhāṣya interpretation. Why does Śaṅkara speak as if a conflict between the Pañcarātra system and the Veda was already established? In the passage beginning sakala-paṅca-rātra-tantra-pariśrama-rahitasya . . . the topic of the domain of the sūtra has already been addressed. Similarly, the bhāṣya is not directed against those who have a proper understanding of the Pañcarātra system; rather it has in mind those
shallow minds who have misunderstood the teachings or taken them too literally.

23. अपि च, नारद-प्रभृतयो देवर्षयः परम-रहस्य-विज्ञानं भगवन-नारायण-
मुखार्विन्दाद आकर्ष्यं, सामाकल्प्य, संप्रदायं प्रवेशितवन्त हि स्मरिते
"नारद: सुमहुद-भूत्तो लोकानुगह-काम्यता।
वासुदेवादु अवाप्येवं सत्यिक्षेप मरं परम्॥" इत्यादि ।

Moreover, it is traditionally held that the divine seers Nārada et. al.,
having heard from the lotus mouth of Lord Nārāyaṇa the knowledge of the
supreme mystery, (and) having comprehended it completely, set the tradition
in motion:

"The lofty being Nārada, out of a desire to benefit the world,
Having obtained this supreme doctrine from Vāsudeva, condensed it."
Since this is so, only from unfortunate ones does this sort of speech come out
again and again in this way: "A śāstra composed by Lord Nārāyaṇa is valid in
one place and invalid in another place."

Comm: Abhavya is a derogatory term for those who have no spiritual
future, who are not going to become what they should.

49 I was unable to trace this exact reference but it seems likely to have occurred either in a text
from the Pañcarātrāgama or in some version of the Mahābhārata corresponding to 12.321 ff. of the
critical edition by Belvalkar et. al. There Nārada finds Nara and Nārāyaṇa at the Badari hermitage
and questions the latter on issues of worship. Verse 321.14 reads:

नारद: सुमहुद-भूत्तो लोकान् सवीन् अच्यिपरत्।
तं देशम् अगमद् राजन् बदयित्रेवम् आशुगः॥
24. Nor should it be suspected that there is no evidence to confirm (the Pañcarātra smṛti) is composed by the Lord since in the Skanda-purāṇa the following is preserved:

Kapila is the proclaimer of the Sāṅkhya (system), Keśava [Kṛṣṇa] of the Pañcarātra.

The proclaimer of the five categories [i.e the Pāṣupata system] is actually the god Mahēśvara.

Opp: Is it not possible that the activity of even the Lord can also be delusionary as in the case of māyā-moha, since He is omniscient and cannot be

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50 I was unable to find this passage in the Skanda-purāṇa but it is likely the same one referred to by Rāmānuja in his Śrī-bhāṣya on Brahma-sūtra 2.2.45 where he apparently quotes from the Mahābhārata: "ज्ञानान्येतानि राज्यं विद्विद् नानामातनि वै। सार्वजनिक वक्ता कपिलः"  

The first line, सार्वजनिक... is also cited in Āgama-prāmāṇya 114.

51 माया-मोहो नाम विष्णुना स्व-शरीरात् सूक्तो दैत्य-मोहनायेति कथा विष्णु-पुराणे (3. 91) अनुसंधेय। (editor’s note)  

"Delusion in the form of māyā was created by Viṣṇu from his body as a means to deceive the Daityas; this narrative in the Viṣṇu-purāṇa (3.17) should be attended to." Other instances of such deception include his incarnation as Vāmana the dwarf wherein he tricked the demon Bali into handing over as much land as he could cover in three strides. As Nṛṣīṁha the man-lion, he was able to overcome the boons protecting the demon Hiranyakasipu. During the churning of the ocean he adopted the guise of the beautiful woman Mohini to distract the demons and enable the gods to whisk away the amṛta. Even the Buddha is occasionally regarded in Brāhmaṇical mythology as an incarnation of Viṣṇu sent to teach a false doctrine and mislead the forces of evil.
confused?

_P-R:_ True. Where there is conflict with the Veda there is the hypothesis of (the Lord) as an agent of delusion. Elsewhere (though) there is definitely trustworthiness. In this case, because of the absence of conflict with the Veda, only the trustworthiness of the Lord is hypothesized, not (His role as) an agent of distortion.

Comm: Particularly in earlier works, Viṣṇu often plays the role of a deceiver or trickster. Given this sort of record it is not impossible or out of character that the teachings given to the Pañcarātra school by Viṣṇu may be unreliable.

>P-25. नन्वन्य एव बालेव-समान-नामानारद-नामने प्रोक्तवान्। तत: समान-नाम-निवायदनोज्य विभ्रम: पान्तपरातिर्क्तवान्।

_Opp:_ Perhaps someone else named Vāsudeva taught the (Pañcarātra śāstra) to one named Nārada. Thus, there may be an error on the part of the Pañcarātrikas due to the similarity of names.

_P-R:_ No. If such were the case then because of the absence of evidence and the predicament of "no breathing room" elsewhere as well, non-activity (by the Lord) would obtain everywhere. Therefore we conclude there is indeed validity because (the Pañcarātra śāstra) was composed by the Supreme Lord (and) because a line of tradition was established for the Pañcarātra śāstra

52 The editor reads प्रभृतिधर्म:- but this must be a printing error.
by the composers, such as Nārada, of the śāstras concerning dharma.

Comm: The same objection of false identity was proposed in para. 8 above by the author against the Śaivites to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the Maheśvara they alleged to have founded their system. His defence here is that if one casts doubt on this teaching of Viṣṇu which is permitted by the Veda, then all His incarnations and teachings would be similarly suspect. In none of the instances would one be able to state categorically if it were a legitimate teaching or deception by the Lord. This would open a Pandora's box of problems in endeavouring to determine what is valid and what is not.

26. अपि च, न हि पाण्डरात्रिकाः पाशुपतादिवर्धृ बेदस्य पौरष्येत्वम् अप्रामाण्यं वा चवन्ति। नापि वेद-परिर्ख-वर्णाश्रय-चूति-न्यातिरेकेन वर्णादीन् कल्पयन्ति। यथा दीक्षा-पवेश-मात्रेण बाध्यणा भवन्ति, कपालतदि-बल-धारिणः च यतः, 53 तिः सहस्र भस्म-स्नानम् एव, न ब्रह्म-स्नानम् इत्यादि सिष्ट-बीभत्साकारः 54 जैवादिभि: परिकल्प्यते, तथा न किंचिचिछहे-बीभत्साकारः पाण्डरात्रिके: कल्प्यते। तस्मात् 55 शैवं पाशुपतम् इत्यादि-स्मरणम् अपस्मरणम् इति सम्यन् एवोकतम्।

P-R: Moreover, neither do the Pāñcarātrikas declare that the Veda is made by a person or that it is invalid as the Pāṣupatas etc. do. Neither do they regard

53 Āgama-prāmāṇya 85 reads:
दीक्षापवेश-मात्रेण बाध्यणो भवति क्षणात।
कापालं बलम् आस्थाय यतिः भवति मानवः॥

54 बीभत्सार्करोऽति कर्मण्यात। (editor's note) Dr. Aklujkar noted that this is an explanation given in terms of Pāñinian grammar by the editor. It indicates that "kāra (causal) needs to be taken in the sense of "kara and that one can, if forced to, derive "kāra in a non-causal sense according to Pāñini. Perhaps a simpler solution would be to emend "kāra to "kara or to read ākāra as the final member of the compound making it mean "the form of which is repulsive." The former solution is better in light of the second occurrence of bibhātsākāram in śīṣṭa-bī. 55 Sandhi not observed in the edition.
the varṇas etc. in contradistinction to the model of the varṇa system set forth in the Veda.\(^{56}\) They (the Śaivas) set up (the following) which are repulsive to the śiṣṭas. They become Brāhmaṇas merely by entering into initiation, and ascetics when they take vows such as carrying a mendicant's bowl etc., bathing only in ashes at the three junctures [sunrise, noon and sunset], there is no washing with water, etc. But there is nothing similar to this which would cause disgust in the śiṣṭas is set forth by the Pāṇcarātrikas. Therefore, it is correctly said that the traditional recollection, "A Śaiva, a Pāṣupata" etc. is a wrong smṛti.

Comm: The "etc." in Pāṣupatādi refers to the Buddhists and Jains who did not accept the mystic or divine origin or infallible nature of the Veda. However in the term Śaivādibhiḥ "etc." denotes the different Śaivite sects.

27. यत्र वा, यथा-श्रुत-जीवोत्पत्तायाभिप्राय समरण भविष्यति। यदृ अपीदम् उक्तं
"चतुष्पुर्णं परं श्रेयोस्तुलक्ष्यं शाण्डिल्यम्" इत्यादि-वेद-निन्द्वा-दर्शनात्" इति, तत्रोच्यते।
न हि निन्द्वा निन्द्य निन्दित्वं प्रवर्तते, अपि तु निन्द्वाद् इतर राजसिद्धम्।\(^{57}\)
यथा बहवृज-ब्राह्मणे प्रातः प्रातर अनुर्त ते बदन्ति पुरोदियाणं जुड्धति येचकिं-होम-प्रायम्
इत्यनुविद्य-होम-निन्दित-होम-प्रायम्, तथात्रापि प्रपुण्य-रात्र-स्तुतिः परासा।

P-R: An alternative (explanation of the smṛti grouping the Pāṇcarātrikas

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\(^{56}\) As indicated in fn. 19 of the Introduction, the attitudes of at least some Śaivite sects towards the Veda were not universally negative. With regard to the social structure, some Śaivites did reject completely the varṇāśrama. Notable among these (at least at the time of their founding) were the Vīraśaivas, a 12th and 13th century political and religious revolutionary movement in southwestern India. Others merely modified the existing system, as the next passage in the text indicates. As for the Pāṇcarātrikas, Jaiswal (p. 46) has suggested that while the later forms of the tradition came to accept varṇa distinctions the early school actually opposed the varṇāśrama.

\(^{57}\) The second line corresponds almost identically to Ṭīkā-prāmāṇya 90. न हि निन्द्वा निन्द्य निन्दित्वं प्रवर्तते। अपि तु निन्दितात् इतरतः प्रशस्तिम्।
with the Pāṣupatas et. al.) is the smṛti pertains (only) to matters such as the origin of the soul just as it is heard [i.e. literally]. As for the statement, "because of the appearance of a derision of the Veda in, 'Not having found the highest among the four (Vedas) Śāṇḍilya' etc." we say (the following). (This) slighting (of the Veda) is not initiated to deride the object of the slight but to praise that which is different from the object of the slight. Just as (it is said) in the Rg-veda-brāhmaṇa, "Those who perform the fire sacrifice before sunrise speak a lie every morning," [Aitareya-brāhmaṇa 5.31.6] the censure of the sacrifice performed before sunrise is for the purpose of praise of the sacrifice which is not performed before sunrise, so also the (Śāṇḍilya-related smṛti) is for commendation of the Pañcarātra system.

Comm: An alternative explanation is that the passage associating the Pañcarātrikas with other unorthodox groups may have meant only those Pañcarātrikas who have a simplistic and incomplete understanding of the teachings. In reply to the fourth objection, praise is often given in relative terms. In the Vedas for instance, certain deities are extolled without intending the deprecation of the other deities. This sort of henotheism is quite common and deliberate in the Brahmānical tradition and the author explains the Śāṇḍilya quote as being a similar sort of statement. It is in no way intended to diminish the Vedas but rather to praise the Pañcarātrāgama.58

28. नन्दु तत्रानुविद्यो होमस्य ब्राह्मणान्तरे बिहिततत्त्वात् तथा-भावः।
इति पर्वते समग्र-श्रेयः साधन-प्रतिपादकवेन सहितान्तरेषु। 59
अवधारिततत्वाद् इति समानश्च चर्चः।

58 This accords with Rāmānuja's argument in the Śrī-bhāṣya on Brahma-sūtra 2.2.45.
59 Sandhi not observed in the edition.
Opp: Is the (Vedic) example not so because of a decree in another Brāhmaṇa which enjoins a sacrifice performed before sunrise?

P-R: Here too then the point is the same as in that case, because of the affirmation in the other (Pañcarātra) Saṁhitās that the Veda is the highest spiritual teaching in every way.

Comm: The opponent questions the relevance of the author's analogy by noting that there is a Brāhmaṇa text prescribing anudita-homa so that practice is defensible. There is no śrūti text, however, prescribing the Pañcarātra view.

Au contraire, the author declares the analogy is apt because the Pañcarāṭrāgama consistently upholds the supremacy of the Veda.

29. यथा वा महा-भारते

चत्वार एकतो वेदा भारतं चैकम् एकतः ।
समागते: सुरसिर्मिस्तुः तुलयारोपितं पुरा ।
महत्वे च गुरुः च धियमाणं यतोश्चिकम् ।
महत्वाच्च च गुरुः च महा-भारतम् उच्चते॥
इति च महा-भारत-स्तुत्यथाति गृह्यते, न वेद-निन्दितः, तद्वद् अन्यपि भविष्यति।

P-R: Or, (to cite a similar instance) in the Mahābhārata, [1.1.208-9].

60 The text differs slightly in the critical edition published by the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute which reads:

चत्वार एकतो वेदा भारतं चैकम् एकतः ।
समागते: सुरसिर्मिस्तुः तुः आरोपितं पुरा ।
महत्वे च गुरुः च धियमाणं ततोश्चिकम् ।
महत्वाच्च भारतवाच्च च महा-भारतम् उच्चते॥

No real change in meaning occurs between the two readings however. The same verse is also cited in Āgama-prāmāṇya 90 as an example of praising one thing by apparently belittling another.
Once, by the great seers who had assembled, the Four Vedas on one side
and the one *Bhārata* on the other were placed upon the scale.

Since it holds over and above in size and weight

It is called the *Mahābhārata* due to (its) size and weight.

As it is understood that the purpose is commendation of the *Mahābhārata*
(and) not censure of the Veda, in this case as well it will be like that.

30. यद् अपीतम् उक्तं शिष्टं-विगहितत्वाद् इति, तद् विपरीतम्। सर्वं-देशेषु श्रौत-स्मार्तेऽकर्मोनुष्ठानकृतिः शिष्टेऽव परिगृहीतत्वाद् अनुष्ठोयमानत्वाद् च।

P-R: As for the statement, "because of being censured by the *śiṣṭas*" the
opposite (is the case), because (the Pañcarātra rites) are accepted and
performed in every region by the very *śiṣṭas* who are practitioners of the *śruti-*
based and *smṛti*-based rites.

31. यद् अपि वैदिकं तात्त्विककम् इति विभाग-करणाद इति, तद्द अपि श्रौतं, स्मार्तं,
गार्हिम् इतिवत् परिहरामः।

P-R: As for where (it says), "from the creation of the division 'Vedic, Tāntric'," this also we refute as being like *śruti*-based, *smṛti*-based and
domestic (rituals).

Comm: Similar sorts of divisions already exist, as for example among the
different types of rituals. And just as such categorization is irrelevant to the
efficacy of each ritual so too merely calling the Pañcarātra system "Tāntric"
does not undermine its validity.

32. यद् अपीतम् उक्तं शिष्टं-विगहितं-निर्मलं-धारणं-निवेदं-भव्यादायः-
As for the statement, "Because of accepting the (practices of) wearing the garlands worn by the deities and eating the [left-over] food offered to the deities, which (practices) are censured by the śiṣṭas," the reply in that case is as follows. What is this "offered garland" and "remnant of food?" Is it merely the substance in the form of the flowers etc. or is it a specific substance? The first is not the (correct) alternative because we don't accept (any food as nivedya or any flower as nirmālya) and because of (the possibility of) too wide an application (if a rule were to be formed). Neither is the second, because distinctions are not determined (by you, the opponent).

Comm: The author asks the opponent to clarify this last of his objections. Is he referring to the practices of utilizing any food or flowers or does he have in mind only those which have been offered to the deity and are thus particularized or rendered distinct?

33. नन्दु देवतोद्देशेन परित्यागो विशेषणम्

61 Āgama-prāmāṇya 134 reads: यत् पुनः शिष्ट-विगर्हित-निमाल्य-निवेद्योपयोगाद् भागवतानाम् शिष्टत्वम् हि त् तत्र पुनः किम् इदं निमाल्यं निवेद्यं चापिष्टेन श्रोत्रितस्य।

62 In his translation of the Āgama-prāmāṇya 134, van Buitenen proposes a different interpretation of this objection. If non-particularized food or flowers are used in the offering and later caused by the opponent to be spurned as leftovers this would amount to wastage. The rationale is that since that same opponent does not acknowledge the divinity present in the temple image or mūrti he must also believe the food has not been "used" by the image. Thus the food and flowers would be simply wasted if they are not given to the devotees.
Opp: Isn't being offered with a deity as the recipient a distinguishing (feature)?

P-R: In that case the offered garlands and food are not to be shunned because they are not offered to a deity (recognized by the Mīmāṃsakas). The divine nature of that (deity) taught in the Pañcarātra system is not accepted by the Mīmāṃsakas, so that the offered garlands and food would become something to be shunned as a thing offered to that (deity). Indeed, as an offering to the Lord the Pañcarātrikas sacrifice substances such as flowers, boiled rice etc.

Opp: What do those who follow the doctrines of the Mīmāṃsakas have to do with them?

Comm: The act of offering to the deity is what defines the characteristics of the left-over food and flowers. As philosophers the Mīmāṃsakas adopted an atheistic position. If the temple deities of the Pañcarātrikas were acceptable to the Mīmāṃsakas then they might have cause to criticize the food and flowers as being nivedya and nirmālya. However since they do not accept

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63 The insertion of न at the beginning of this sentence by the editor is necessary not only contextually but grammatically as well; a sentence cannot begin with खलुः.

64 The editor's uncertain reading was likely due to poor ms. quality. As the clause is passive मीमांसके: is clearly called for.

65 Haplography can account for these two emendations.
the divinity of the images or *mūrtis* they cannot claim a real offering is actually taking place.

34. अथ पान्त्राते केर अभ्युपगतत्वाद् मीमांसकेर अप्यजी-क्रियते, तत्त्रात्र प्रामाण्यम् अप्यजी-क्रियताम्, अभ्युपगत-प्रामाण्यत्वात् तन्त्रस्य तेषाम्।

अथ 66 अपमण-भूतम् एव तन्त्रः पान्त्राते: प्रमण-वुद्धया परिगृहीतम् हिति न मीमांसके: प्रमणी-क्रियते, तथादेवते देवतात्वेन परिगृहीतत्परस्यताम्।

तस्माद अपमण-भूत-तन्त्र-सिद्ध-मन्त्र-प्रतिष्ठापित-प्रतिमास्तु देवलया अभावाद् अपमण-भूत-तन्त्र-प्रतिपादाया देवलया देवतात्वेना[न]भुपुष्पमाच् 67 च तदुद्धेष-त्यागयोः अभावाद् भविष्य-द्रव्यानिरुपणात् केवलस्य चापरिहार्यत्वाद् निम्नोलेवेधा शिष्ट-विगृहितता।

तस्माद मीमांसके: स्व-हृदिम् अनुसरन्धिर निर्मल्य-धारण-निवेद्य-भक्षणायगहिनोऽपि। तन्त्र-प्रामाण्यम् अनुसरन्धिर निर्मल्य-धारण-निवेद्य-भक्षणादि सुतराम अगहिनोऽपि।

**P-R:** If, from being accepted by the Pāñcarātikas, (this practice) is also accepted by the Mīmāṁsakas, then let the validity of the system be accepted as well, because then they will be the ones who have the accepted authority of the system.

However if (the Pāñcarātra system is) not accepted by the Mīmāṁsakas then, with the thought that an invalid system is being accepted as valid by the Pāñcarātikas then they would have accepted as a deity something which is not at all (our) deity.

Thus, because of the absence of divinity among the idols established by the mantras set by a system which is invalid and because of the inadmission as divine of that (deity) set forth by a system which is invalid, there is the absence of an offering and a sacrifice to that (deity). Because of this

66 Sandhi not observed in the edition.

67 The edited text reads तुवनाभ्यू but the negation अनभ्यू is contextually required
(absence), because of the non-mention of a specific substance and because of the unavoidability (of a substance) in general, this censure by the śiṣṭas is indeed unfounded.

Therefore the wearing of garlands offered to the deity and the eating of food remnants etc. left by the deity is not to be reproached by the Mīmāṁsakas following their own view. The wearing of garlands and the eating of food remnants etc. is even more not to be reproached by (those among the Mīmāṁsakas) who accept the validity of the (Pañcarātra) system.

Comm: If the Mīmāṁsakas accept a particular practice then the issue is quickly settled and this in itself lends credence to the overall Pañcarātra system. This harks back to the earlier discussion (para. 21) wherein the author declared a system must be accepted in its entirety or not at all.

The author's intention is to depict the criticism of nirmālya and nivedya as arbitrary and insubstantial.

35. अपि च, सोम-भक्षणच्च चेद द्रष्ट्यन्यम्। यथैव हि सर्वे-शास्त्रेषु प्रतिष्ठितम्
अन्युचितस्त-भक्षणं जयोतिष्टोसा-विशिष्ट-कर्मण्यतिपावनतयांश्री-किये, "तेन
सोमेनोलिछस्त्य भवन्ति"ति वचनादृ, वथा ना प्रतिष्ठितम् अपि मतस्य-मासादि-भक्षणम्
अष्टकादि-विषये परम-पावनतया वचन-प्रामाण्याद्व अश्री-किये नुष्ठीयेते च शिस्तेन,
एवम् अन्तापि द्रष्ट्यन्यम्। शब्द-प्रमाणका हि वर्य, यच्छब्द आह तद्व असमांक
प्रमाणम्॥

P-R: Moreover, this is to be regarded like the partaking of soma. Just as the consumption of remnants which, although forbidden in all the Śāstras, is

68 This is a direct quote from Śābara-bhāṣya 3.2.35 but is originally from Patañjali's Mahābhaśya 1.2.1.
accepted as extremely purifying in a specific rite such as the *soma* sacrifice,\(^{69}\) (as is evident) from the statement, "They become partakers with that *soma,*"\(^ {70}\) or just as the partaking of fish and meat which, although prohibited, is accepted and practised by the *śiṣṭas* on the authority of a statement as being supremely purifying in the context of the *aṣṭaka* sacrifice etc.,\(^ {71}\) so also it is to be regarded here. Indeed we are the ones for whom Testimony is the authority; that which (such) a text expresses is valid to us.

*Comm:* The author here draws on traditional ritual practices to support his case. In the *jyotiśoma* the *soma* left over is consumed by the priests. Other substances such as fish and meat, which are normally not eaten by Brāhmaṇas, are purified by the sacrificial process and regarded as not only fit but desirable for human consumption.\(^ {72}\)

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69 See related discussion in *Mīmāṁsā-sūtras* 3.5.19-20 and Śabara’s *bhāṣya* authorizing the consumption of the *soma* remnant.

70 I was unable to trace this citation.

71 See *Manu-smṛti* 5.31-32, 41-42, and 52 permitting the consumption of flesh in the context of a sacrifice.

72 See *Āgama-prāmāṇya* 136 for related discussion.

73 I was unable to trace this citation. It also occurs in very similar wording in *Āgama-prāmāṇya* 136 where it is ascribed to the *Brahma-purāṇa,* as the *Brahmāṇḍa-purāṇa* is often called. The only variations occur in the first line: . . . *नैवेद्यकं शुद्धं* . . .
P-R: Nor is it to be suspected that there is no Testimony in this case, because (the following) is recited in the *Brahmāṇḍa-purāṇa*:

"The purified food offering from Viṣṇu is to be eaten by the *munis*. One, having partaken of something other than the (leftover) food offering and the (used) garland should undertake the *cāndrayaṇa* ritual. That man who puts on his head the virtuous garland which was touched by the body of Viṣṇu, And which removes sin; he reaches the supreme course of existence."

Further, it is found in the *Śrī Nārāyaṇīya* section in the *Mahābhārata* (12.322.24):

"Those foremost knowers of the *Pāncarātra* [system], in the dwelling of that great soul,

74 The reading in the critical edition is:

पञ्च-रात्र-विद्व मुर्यास् तस्य गेहे महात्मन: ।
प्राप्यं भगवत-प्रोकतं भुजजते चाण्ग-भोजनम् ॥

This same verse is also cited in *Āgama-prāmānya* 136 as:

पञ्च-रात्र-विद्व मुर्यास् तस्य गेहे महात्मन: ।
प्राप्यं भगवत-प्रोकतं भुजजते चाण्ग-भोजनम् ॥

75 I was unable to trace this citation.

76 In the *cāndrayaṇa* ritual the offender begins at the full moon by eating 15 mouthfuls of food but with each day the moon wanes he eats one mouthful less until he fasts completely on the new moon day. Thereafter he eats progressively one mouthful more until the moon waxes full again. Alternatively the penance may begin with 15 mouthfuls on the new moon day and proceed to the full moon and back.
Eat that purifying, foremost food specified by Viṣṇu."
Thus it is found in one of the branches of the Pañcarātra Samhitā:
"That which is consumed, all the fragrant flowers etc.
The curds and milk etc. suitable for bathing (the deity)
Those who, find fault with (this) divine, purifying thing, thinking it a
leftover garland,
They proceed to hell, those bewildered ones who deny His majesty."

Comm: The second passage arises from a narration by Bhiṣma to
Yudhīṣṭhira regarding the activities of a King Uparicara, a great devotee of
Nārāyaṇa. He is the great soul in whose palace the Pañcarātra sages dine on
the specified divine remnants.

The third passage describes the flowers, curds and milk commonly used in
Vaiṣṇava worship to bathe and honour the deity.77

37. नन्तु विहितविशिष्टे निवेद-भक्षण नित्य काम्यं वा।
न तावन्न मित्यम् अकरणे दोषाश्रवणात्।
पदापि काम्यं तदापि किं स्वयं भोजनान्तरम् आशिष्यत् तत्र निवेद-भक्षणं प्राप्यति, 
उत्तर सार्य-पात: पतिद्र-भोजने तन्त्रे ण प्रस्थेन वानुष्ठानं पापयति। न ताबद्
भोजनान्तरम् आशिष्यति, "सार्य-पात्रः हि-जातीनाम् अशान् श्रुति-चोदितम्। नान्तरा
भोजनं कुप्याद्" इत्यन्तरा-भोजनस्य प्रतिषिद्धतवात्। नापि79 तन्त्र: [तन्त्र?] प्रस्थेन
वा विरोधात्।

77 See also Bhagavad-gītā 3.12 and Śaṅḍilya-sūtra 68.
78 The editor reads अभोजनान्तरम् but this must be an oversight or printing error.
79 तन्त्रम् इति स्पात्। उभयोद्देशो नकऽनुष्ठानं तन्त्रम। अन्योद्देशान्यदीयस्यापि
सहानुष्ठानं प्रस्थेन (editor's note) "(Neither) would there be the tantra principle. tantra is the
simultaneous performance by the offering to either. (Where) by offering to one there is the
performance of another as well, (that is) prasāṅga." The two are technical terms in the Mīmāṁsā
system. tantra is neuter and it is unclear why tantraḥ is used.
Opp: Even if we accept the consumption of the offered food, is it obligatory or voluntary?

It is not obligatory, because of the non-mention (in the Pañcarātra tradition) of a fault when not performed.

If, on the other hand, it is voluntary does it imply another meal (in addition to the morning and evening meals)? Or does it introduce the performance (of eating leftovers) in the well-known evening or morning meals by the tantra or the prasaṅga principle? This (practice) never implies another meal because of the prohibition of food in the interval; eating in the evening and morning by the twice-born is enjoined in the śruti. One should not take a meal in the interval (between morning and evening). Neither (can it be according to) the tantra principle or the prasaṅga principle, because of a conflict.

Comm: All prescribed rituals or sacrifices are divided into three forms by the Mīmāṁsakas. The definitions below are from Smith, Vol. II:

(i) nitya - "An adjective referring to anything done regularly, usually on a daily basis." (Such practices are usually obligatory as well.)

(ii) kāmya - "Any ritual undertaken on an optional basis with a view to please the divine powers and derive thereby certain desired (usually mundane) rewards."

(iii) naimittika - "Any ritual undertaken on a periodical basis, namely, as occasion demands, hence monthly and annual festivals, as well as pacification-rites at times of plagues, earthquakes, etc."

The tantra principle pertains to the situation where two objectives are met

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80 Eating between the two meal-times is prohibited for Brāhmaṇas in Manu-smṛti 2.56.
simultaneously and deliberately through a single action. The prasaṅga principle refers to the incidental accomplishment of a second goal by an action directed only at another end. Thus the opponent here is questioning whether the consumption of nivedya is intended to replace the morning or evening meal, or does it do so only incidentally. Either way, there will be a conflict with the injunction against such a meal.

38. **Opp:** What is this conflict?

This is the conflict. The prāṇāgni-hotra sacrifice to be sure, is obligatory, because of the indication of a transgression on the part of the twice-born when not performed by them. Now the means of (this) sacrifice is a food substance. Thus if the consumption of the leftover food offering were also enjoined then that food substance too would either be the means of a sacrifice or not be the means of a sacrifice. Two possibilities exist. When not the means of a sacrifice the very consumption (of the nivedya) would be criticized. And the nivedya would not be justifiable as the means of a sacrifice because of the impropriety of offering an offered substance again to another deity. Therefore the conflict between what is obligatory and what is voluntary is to be described here. Alternatively, the consumption of offered food should be abandoned. There is no satisfaction in the hearts of the great ones in an
intermediary (solution).

Comm: The prāṇāgni-hotra rite is a symbolic variation of the agni-hotra wherein food is offered twice daily to the deities before being consumed by the performer.

If a certain item of food is not the means of a sacrifice then it can't be nivedya and therefore cannot be eaten by the true devotee. Conversely, if it is the means then it becomes a sort of ucchīṣṭa, (having already been offered to one deity), and cannot be offered again to another deity. Thus if it has already been offered to Viṣṇu it cannot then be offered to Agni (the deity of the prāṇāgni-hotra rite), as enjoined in Manu-smṛti 3.84-85.

39. अत्रोच्चते। निवेद्य-भक्षण काम्यम् एवेति बूमः, पाप-श्वयंदि-कामनाधिकार-संयोगात्। न स्वयम् अपि भोजनान्तरम् आक्षिप्ति, उदाहत-मनु-वाक्य-विरोधात्। तत्र कामनाधिकार-विधि-पावित्र-भोजने नित्य-पाणाभिन-होत्र-होमस्यापि काम्य-नित्याभिन-होत्र-होमयोर्। इव देश-काल-कत्रेक्पात् तन्त्र(मु)। इति सिद्धान्तः। इष्ट-द्रव्यस्यापि पुनर् देवतान्तरोद्घेशेन त्यागे न कश्चिद् विरोधः। पाणाभिन-देवतानाम् अपरमात्र-रूपतवादू, विष्वकसेनवत्। पथ्ये व हि भगवदुद्घेशेन त्यक्तम् अपि कुसुम्भदनादि-द्रव्यं पुनर् विष्वकसेनाय निवेद्यते, तदर्द्ध अन्तापि भविष्यति।

P-R: To this we reply (as follows). We say the consumption of the offered food is definitely voluntary, because of the connection (of the consumption) with the eligibility derived from the desire to (accomplish such things as) destroying sins etc. Nor does this (nivedya) imply another meal in itself, because of conflict with the cited statements of Manu (prohibiting eating between the two meals in the morning and evening). Just as there is (co-existence) between an obligatory agni-hotra rite and a voluntary agni-hotra

81 See fn. 79 above.
rite because of the unity of place, time and agent, so too there is co-existence with the obligatory prāṇāgni-hotra rite in that meal made possible by the injunction of eligibility based on desire. This is our final conclusion. When there is a sacrifice by offering the already offered substance to another deity this substance again there is no conflict whatsoever, because the deities of prāṇa etc. are not in the form of the supreme spirit, like Viṣvaksena (is not). Just as substances like flowers, boiled rice etc. which are sacrificed as an offering to the Lord are again offered to Viṣvaksena, so too it will be like that here.

Comm: Both disputants agree that all rites, whether obligatory or voluntary, can only be performed by certain eligible persons. For the Pāncarātrikas however, eligibility in this case is bestowed by a desire to eradicate one's past bad karma. Hence anyone seeking spiritual benefits can theoretically become eligible to perform the rite.

On the other issue there would be no contradiction between the obligatory prāṇāgni-hotra rite and the voluntary nivedya-bhakṣaṇa. Both can co-exist, just as the obligatory (prāṇa-) agni-hotra and the voluntary agni-hotra using actual fire can co-exist.

Prāṇa is the deity of the prāṇāgni-hotra and is on a lesser level than Viṣṇu, much like Viṣvaksena who might be described as Viṣṇu's chief official. Hence there is nothing improper in offering him food that has already been offered to Viṣṇu.

82 Smith (Vol. II, p. 103) calls him, "The commander-in-chief of Viṣṇu's retinue, and the dispeller of obstacles. He occupies in Vaiṣṇava piety a place analogous to that of Gaṇapati in Śaiva piety."
40. अथ

यत् करोषि यद् अज्ञाति यज् जुझोषि ददासि यत्।
यत् पत्स्यसि कोनेय, तत् कुरुष्व मदर्पणम्॥

इति न्यायेन परमात्माराधनम् ८३ एव पाणागिनि-होत्र-होमोज्यपाश्रीयते, तदा
भगवद्वाराधन-योग्य-द्रव्येण भगवन्तम् आराध्य पुनः भक्ष्येन् निवेद्यम् हत्यलम्
अतिविस्तरेण। तस्मात् पाल्यरात्र-तन्त्र प्रामाण्यं इति सिद्धान्तः॥

P-R: On the other hand, by the maxim,

"Whatever you do, whatever you eat, whatever you sacrifice, whatever you
give,

Whatever you practise as austerity, O son of Kunti! Do it as an offering to
me." (Bhagavad-gītā 9.27)

even the prāṇāgni-hotra rite is resorted to only for the worship of the Supreme
Spirit, then, having worshipped the Lord with a substance suitable for His
adoration, one could eat the offering again.

Now enough of prolixity. Thus, it is established that the Pañcarātra system
is valid.

इति श्री-भट्टारक-श्री-वेदोत्तम-विरिचितं तन्त्र-शुद्धार्थं प्रकरणं समाप्तम्।

Thus concludes the monograph called "The Purity of the (Pañcarātra)
System" composed by Śrī Bhaṭṭāraka-śrī-vedottama.

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83 Dr. Aklijkar has suggested that this may originally have been either राधनाथ्येव or
राधनाथ्यम् एव. The meaning would remain constant but it would be smoother grammatically.
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