MOTIVATIONAL PLURALISM:
A REVISION OF PLURALIST THOUGHT

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ABSTRACT

This paper is premised upon the assumption that classical pluralist theory is no longer a useful tool of explanation for contemporary western societies. In its original form, as espoused by Arthur Bentley and David Truman, pluralist theory was accepted as mainstream political thought, apparently capable of demystifying the structure and relation of power blocks within modern western democracies. As time elapsed, however, greater numbers of critics emerged and glaring inadequacies began to show through its once flawless facade.

The group of neo pluralist writers were the first to attempt wholesale salvage of the model. One of their foremost considerations was the expulsion of the myth of perfect competition amongst groups. This was replaced instead, with what was then an alarming proposition: contrary to the original pluralist contention, there exists a marked tendency for power to concentrate in the hands of an elite policy community. The neo pluralists further suggested it was important to understand the structure and organization of a group if a coherent group theory of politics was to be developed. While they illustrated the undemocratic nature of the coalescence of power within pluralist society, however, various proponents of this model also suggested that groups were a functional requirement within any modern democratic governing system.

A group of economic theorists, led by Mancur Olson and his rational actor model, also contributed significantly to the downfall of classical pluralism. At the same time, Olson's criticisms also undermined elements of neo pluralist thought. He argued that, contrary to both the pluralist and neo pluralist assumptions, the goals and aspirations of groups were not necessarily the product of the values and desires of the group membership. Olson argued that by
virtue of the nature of the *collective good*, those in control of the organizational mechanisms of the group could dictate the policy goals of the group and still maintain the mandate of the group membership. Olson's paradigm also had the advantage of being analytically convenient, a precise model within which social phenomena could be neatly packaged.

Further contributions have built upon Olson's model, developing his emphasis upon the internal dynamics of the group and, in particular, the importance of group leadership. The *organizational behaviouralists* illustrated the utility of Olson's introduction of selective incentives, and also that it could be taken further, that *material* incentives were only *one* type of incentive. The exchange theorists further narrowed this analysis with an exclusive focus upon the relation between the entrepreneur and the group membership and characterizing it as an exchange of value. They adopted Olson's leadership focus but incorporated non-material incentives within their framework.

The end result is the potential for the development of a coherent and effective analytical tool. With the systemic level of analysis provided by the neo pluralist framework, recent contributions to group theory may make possible an interest group theory of politics capable of providing a level of insight into social phenomena previously unavailable to proponents of this theoretical tradition.

It is thus the object of this paper to combine elements of group analysis previously considered distinct. Terry Moe builds upon Olson's analysis, illustrating that individuals will form organizations for reasons of a non-economic nature. While the interaction of groups within contemporary society has been shown to differ from the original conception of the classical pluralists, the neo pluralist perspective, with the addition of Moe's insight, holds the potential for a valuable analytical tool.
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S.L.N.
INTRODUCTION

Are pluralist group theories, in general, and neo pluralism in particular, still of use to students of the public policy process within western democratic states? With the recent resurgence in popularity of theories positing an autonomy of the state, and their emphasis upon the significance of its actors and institutions, theories of decision making in modern western democracies have once again reeled to the opposite extreme when confronted with the apparent obsolescence of a theoretical status quo.

Pluralist theories focus upon the distribution of power within society as the key point of analysis. With the resurgence of statist theories, however, the focus is swinging away from the question of the distribution of resources and towards the analysis of the rules and institutions within which the political interaction of society takes place. One of the key factors leading to the supposed obsolescence of pluralist theories and the subsequent rise of institutionalist thought was the apparently unexplainable increase in social legislation in the late 1960s and early 1970s, seemingly hostile towards the interests of organized business. With the increased success of groups opposing the interests of business within the policy process, neo pluralism seemed to have reached its limit of usefulness.

Despite the appearance of impotence on the part of neo pluralist thought, however, it is the aim of this paper to bring the group "back in". Perhaps the

single largest factor contributing to the demise of pluralist influence was the neo pluralist assertion that, because of the perceived importance of business interests to the economic welfare of the state, and thus to the perpetuation of the existing social order, organized business interests possessed a privileged position within the policy process ensuring vastly disproportionate influence in the eventual determination of policy solutions. One of the questions this paper seeks to explore is that of the contemporary role of the state in pluralist theory. Is it possible for a group theory of politics to adequately account for the role of the state in contemporary western democracies?

It should be emphasized, however, that this work is essentially theoretical in its approach. This paper makes no claim to empirical substantiation of the explanatory capacity of elements of models utilized herein. The purpose of this exercise is, rather, to attempt to develop a more sophisticated pluralist model which may at some future point prove useful in its explanatory ability.

Observers clearly differ upon the relative autonomy of the state in its relation to interest organizations within society. This paper does not seek to champion any single or particular explanation when it rejects the element of business privilege. It merely posits that the adoption of Selznick's institutionalized typology allows the rejection of this popularly discredited viewpoint. To the extent that it embraces any conception of the role of the state, it is that posited by the neo pluralist school, delineating the relation of groups within the policy community to the state and other groups.

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The label motivational pluralism is enlisted as a means for distinguishing between itself and the neo pluralist school upon which it is so closely based. While neo pluralism focuses upon groups as the primary unit of analysis in its consideration of the distribution of power in modern western democracies, motivational pluralism forces the analysis deeper. Revisions made to the pluralist body of thought have tended to address two seemingly unrelated questions. First, neo pluralists revised the systemic level explanation of the distribution of power within society, suggesting that the relative importance of business interests to the health of the public economy ensured them a position of privileged input. Secondly, Mancur Olson, Terry Moe and others have made revisions to the theory of groups, illustrating, among other things, that the supposed pluralist nature of groups, and the representative nature of group goals, is not as the original pluralist conception portrayed it. Indeed, Olson's *Rational Choice* model questions one of the basic tenets of pluralist thought. In light of these two disparate avenues of development, is pluralist thought now too fragmented to be of use to contemporary students of public policy? This paper seeks to answer this question by illustrating the complementary nature of these schools of thought. This paper will suggest that, in order to develop a necessary understanding of the complexities of groups, an appreciation of their internal organizational characteristics is necessary. It is not possible to explain and predict the interaction of groups within society without appreciating the motivations of the individuals which comprise them.

Chapter Outline

Thus, the first section of this paper discusses, in some detail, the development and significance of the body of thought commonly referred to as *classical pluralism*. The chapter sets out the basic tenets of the model and
focuses, in particular, upon the original seminal contributions of Arthur Bentley and David Truman. This section discusses the difficulty this "theory" experienced in effectively coping, in particular, with the influence of internal group dynamics in its apparent explanation of the power blocks of modern western democracies.

The second portion focuses upon the theoretical successor of classical pluralism: neo(or post) pluralism. Where the classical pluralists seemed to unfairly relegate the role of the state to a position of virtual insignificance, these theorists have returned it to a portion of its former glory. Thirty years after David Truman's *The Governmental Process*, Charles Lindblom and Robert Dahl developed a somewhat more sophisticated role for the state in modern western democracies.

The third section of this paper outlines the contributions of Mancur Olson and Terry Moe, in particular, and their insights into the understanding of the motivation of the individual group member. Olson and Moe managed to turn the attention of theorists away from the state, groups, and associated actors, and towards the significance of the individual level variables within interest groups. Olson argued that only those groups seeking material gain, or groups organized by philanthropic individuals, could possibly attain any significant level of organized activity. Moe illustrated that Olson was, in part, incorrect. *The Organization of Interests* is particularly insightful in its suggestion that groups founded upon non-material incentives are quite capable of developing advanced

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levels of organization and, contrary to Olson's assertions, that individuals will organize for solidary or purposive reasons. The chapter incorporates these observations concerning the nature of group activity into what is an essentially neo pluralist framework of groups, stressing a newly realized appreciation of the internal elements of group activity and the importance of the aspect of organizational characteristics in developing an analysis of groups and the policy process.
A HERITAGE OF CLASSICAL PLURALISM

The tradition of political thought we have come to call Pluralism is the by-product of an intellectual duel dating from the early eighteenth century. In complete contradiction to what was then popularly accepted political thought, J.S. Mill claimed society could be conceived in terms of two basic institutional structures: the individual and the state. It was Mill's contention that all other allegiances and associations paled in comparison with this overriding relation of society. He argued that the individual and the state existed as two competing elements of a system in which the natural state of equilibrium demoted the role of the state to a position of secondary importance vis-à-vis that of the individual. The state was a restricting device seeking to arbitrarily and unnaturally control the free and random actions of individuals. As Latham has put it, Mill's perception of society closely approximated a random and spontaneous grouping of people:

...like marbles on a plate, held loosely together within the circumference of a common restraint but otherwise complete, unengaged, private, and unique.

The state was an unnatural manifestation, an entity whose role within

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1For his treatise on the philosophy of the individual see, J.S. Mill, On Liberty (Markham, Ont.: Penguin, 1982).

society should correctly be maintained as "nightwatchman." By applying economic-like rationale to the interaction of individuals on a political level, and emphasizing the need for unhindered relations between individuals, the utilitarians developed a mode of thought whose influence would remain salient over two hundred years hence.

In response to this school, another group of thinkers emerged advocating a conceptual relationship between the individual and the state in dialectical opposition to that suggested by the utilitarians. The statists suggest the formal organization of the state performs a crucial function in the choreography of man's social interaction. While the utilitarian theorists advocated the primacy of the individual, the statists considered the function of the formal organization of the state a necessity within contemporary society. The state orders the actions of individuals; it is the finite end to the process of constant evolution of the community. Typical of this school, Hegel viewed the state as an end greater than the sum of its parts, an institution capable of giving both structure and meaning to the interaction of man. As Earl Latham has suggested, writers such as Hegel, Fichte and Treitschke conceived of individuals within society as:

...beads on a string, of which the separate parts by themselves were incomplete and without meaning, and which existed only to fulfill the pattern of the necklace.

Where the utilitarians attempted to destroy the significance of the state by deductive reasoning, the statists attempted to perpetrate the same upon the concept of the individual.

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3 A group of German thinkers, writing in the early part of the 19th century, Hegel, Fichte and Treitschke, are representative of this school.

4 Latham, op. cit., p. 379.

5 Latham, op. cit., offers a much more extensive discussion of the philosophical development, carefully tracing the intellectual heritage of both these schools.
Early Pluralism

In response to this statist school, the first early doctrines of pluralist thought emerged seeking, again, to champion the lot of the individual. These early writers, among them Harold Laski and G.D.H. Cole, sought to correct what they perceived as the simple inaccuracy of description embodied in the philosophical idealist (statist) model of society. They considered the basic assumptions of this group to be contrary to actual fact and sought to illustrate that the state did not absorb all loyalties and attentions of individuals. Thus, contrary to the statist position, they argued that a multitude of associations less grandiose than the state possessed a significant claim upon the devotion, loyalty and allegiance of individuals. Groups such as trade unions, religious organizations, veterans associations, merchant groups; all possessed allegiance from individuals within society, a form of allegiance that could not be offered to the state. They argued the state was merely one association among many, all of which were competing for the allegiance of the individual. The state possessed no claim upon any individual greater than any other group or association within society and, as such, had no basis upon which to claim a higher relative status. They argued that most members of society perceive themselves as members of clubs, lodges, unions or religious groups before they perceive themselves as members of the state. All elements of a separate personality or independent desire were removed from this rendition, and in its place arose the role of the specific group organizations. These groups, and not the state, were recognized as the institutions which, in fact, performed the most essential roles in the life of each individual citizen. Individuals, in their own estimation, are members of

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6 Central to the pluralist conception of society is the hypothesis of societal proliferation. It suggests that increasing levels of social differentiation will bring about a more stratified and specialized population. These increasingly specialized groups of people will engage in increasingly specialized activities and, as a result, will develop more diversified goals and interests. These
the state only incidentally. Taken to its extreme, this pluralist doctrine advocates a society of political communities organized syndically by industry, with common affairs administered by the common consent of those governed.\(^7\)

This early version of pluralist theory contributed two particularly important insights to the contemporary perception of human nature. First, in seeking to retrieve the importance of the individual, they pointed to what was unquestionably the group nature of society, both in the political and economic spheres. Secondly, it managed to illustrate a sampling of the infinite number of accommodations possible between, as Latham has put it, "the common and the universal on the one hand and the diverse and particular on the other."\(^8\)

Classical Pluralist Thought

Arthur Bentley has written: "When the groups are adequately stated...everything is stated."\(^9\) The pluralist delineation of the forces and pressures exerted by groups within society forms the very nucleus of classical pluralist thought. Society, it is argued, is nothing more than the groups which comprise it. Classical pluralists argue that because a society is incapable of recognizing any demands expressed within its boundaries not expressed in the form of group pressures, it follows that the national interest can only be articulated through cumulative group expression. Thus, the state does not

\(^7\)See Paul Pross, op. cit.

\(^8\)Latham, op. cit., p. 380. His remark is in reference to the tendency of individuals to coalesce in groups of a vastly different nature, holding memberships in any number of different groups at one time. This overlapping membership is key to the maintenance of the "pluralist" nature of society.

\(^9\)Arthur Bentley, p. 222.
possess a national or state interest in itself; it is merely an "umpire", an arbiter between two or more competing groups within society. As such, they argue, the state is incapable of formulating demands which are not the result of group competition.10

A product of their intellectual heritage, pluralist writers have similarly offered the individual a central role within their model. "Man," they state, "is a social animal. He is, with rare exceptions, always found in association with other men."11 A person only exhibits truly human characteristics when in association with other people. Hence, and with few exceptions, individuals are almost always found in association with other individuals. These associations may include varying degrees of both organization and formality, but regardless of form, are a functional necessity in maintaining the distinction separating man from other animals. In short, an individual only possesses meaning and significance when engaged in some form of relation with other individuals in society.12

The nature of this characterization of the individual is clearly influenced by sociological theory. Similarly, the classical pluralist characterization of the "group" draws from, in particular, social psychology and sociology. In hopes of contributing to the understanding of man as a "social being," pluralist writers adopted elements of the former to illustrate, in particular, the degree of dependence modern man had come to exhibit toward groups within society.13

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12 Truman, op. cit., p. 15.

13 Two works prominent in the writings of David Truman have been: Lloyd Warner and Paul S. Lunt, The Social Life of a Modern Community (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1941); and The Status System of a Modern Community (New
influence such writers exerted upon classical pluralist thought is evident when Truman writes:

Although no two human organisms will develop identically in any one of the environments mentioned, the limitations, aspirations, and values that each holds will have developed in relation to the groups with which each has been early associated.\textsuperscript{14}

The pluralist notion of the importance of commonality of experience is certainly a product of this extra-disciplinary influence. Arising from one individual's awareness of the importance of others within society, the pluralist school contends this commonality of experience will result in a relative similarity of both attitude and behaviour towards certain matters. At the same time, however, the model recognizes the irrefutable position that no two human organisms are identical in both biological functioning and endowment, although their physiological and psychological processes may be virtually the same. The pluralists readily acknowledge that uncertain behavioural differences will be a by-product of this. Furthermore, even supposing the unlikely scenario of the existence of two individuals with identical group affiliations at a given point in time, it would seem virtually impossible for such experiences to have remained so since birth. As Truman has pointed out:

Their behaviour and attitudes are not simply the product of their current affiliations, but are the result of a genetic process that includes in some measure the whole of their life experience. The child is, in a sense, the father to the man.\textsuperscript{15}

Thus, within the pluralist conception of the interest group, psychological and sociological factors are clearly significant. A representative definition of a

\textsuperscript{14} Truman, p. 18.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 22.
pressure group is offered by Truman when he suggests that an "interest group" is:

...any group that, on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of behaviour that are implied by the shared attitudes.  

It is, thus, shared attitudes which constitute interests within society and which, in turn, are the products of the interaction of groups.

The pluralists suggest certain analytical benefits exist with this particular conception of a group. This definition, they argue, permits the identification of various "potential groups," together with existing ones, inviting investigation of an interest whether or not the interest is actually a manifest component of a group at a given moment. Thus, it is possible to envisage potential interest groups formed on the basis of widely held attitudes not expressed in the interaction of groups. This definition also allows the analyst to properly focus his attention upon the crucial degree of "integrative interaction" within groups, an important consideration, as it is the frequency of interaction within a group which will, in part, determine the primacy of a particular group affiliation within an individual. As it will be shown, this can be of major importance in determining the relative effectiveness with which a group asserts its claim upon other groups. Furthermore, this particular conception of the interest group also usefully enables the observer to evaluate the importance of the role of formal organization. A group's organization, it is argued, is indicative of its developmental progression, and whether it is highly organized, or simply a potential group, such factors will significantly determine its effectiveness.

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16 Ibid., p. 33.

17 This topic is dealt with in more depth below when the level of organizational development is discussed, together with its effects upon a group's fortunes. It is sufficient to appreciate, however, that while the pluralists accord a degree of recognition to internal structures of organization, they fail to fully
The pluralists contend it is possible to observe degrees of behavioural uniformity within social groupings. In this instance, they argue, the task of the social scientist is to identify and explain the areas of behaviour to which these uniformities apply. Thus, pluralists seek to measure this phenomena and note the conditions under which it occurs. It is this element of uniformity which forms the basic rationale for the overt emphasis upon groups and their position within classical pluralism as the basic social unit of analysis. That is, the interaction of groups within society produces a certain uniformity of behaviour, providing social scientists with the motivation to concentrate upon groups as society's lowest common denominator. These uniformities, moreover, depend largely upon the relationships of the persons involved and not solely upon the specific similarities of experience. Where the analysis of groups is at issue, the observer will focus upon the interactions of those persons involved.

As a significant element of pluralist theory concerns the role of the individual within the group, it is understandable that these writers should devote a certain effort to the analysis of the organization of groups, those formal and informal structures governing the organizational interaction of individuals. The classical pluralist conception posits the development of the organization of groups along a rough conceptual continuum. At one extreme lie those groups which are considered "potential," where the membership may possess similar characteristics but, as yet, no formal structure of organization. At the opposite extreme is the organized formal association complete with a bureaucratic structure and professional management style. At all points between lie groups at various levels of progression, their level of interaction being roughly reflected in the stage of organizational development exhibited. In addition, a diversity of group organizational characteristics is functionally requisite within a society of develop their significance.
complex political arrangements. Where the interactional pattern of individual behaviour proves intricate, so too will the pattern of political behaviour. What is more, the development of such patterns can assume a variety of possible forms depending upon the varying circumstances involved.

An often critical indication of the level of group organizational development is the existence of an active minority within that group. By definition, organization (a standardized, habitual pattern of interaction) requires varying degrees of participation in decision making from elements of the group membership. Thus, any relatively advanced organization possesses a certain degree of delegation of authority and responsibility. This delegation of authority necessarily creates specific roles within a group, typically hierarchically ordered and with varying degrees of direct input into decision making. It should be remembered, however, that the authority exercised within such groups is always a matter of degree. Rarely is any delegation of authority within groups complete and non-rescindable. Thus, the representative nature of groups, originating from the individual, is not impaired by this embrace of a decision making elite. This characteristic is a prominent facet of democratic society and a functional requisite for the continued existence of the group. As James Bryce has written as early as 1921:

In all assemblies and groups and organized bodies of men, from a nation down to the committee of a club, direction and decisions rest in the hands of a small percentage, less and less in proportion to the larger and larger size of the body, till in a great population it becomes an infinitessimally small proportion of the whole number. This is and always has been true of all forms of government, though in different degrees.\(^\text{18}\)

There are, nevertheless, aspects of the active minority now recognized as

leading to the impairment of equality of interaction within the group. A by­
product of prolonged membership within the active minority enables individuals to
acquire skills that empower them to maintain their position over a prolonged
period of time. Veterans of these positions develop particular manipulative skills
generally unavailable to other members within the group, placing them in
positions of relative advantage vis-a-vis those members of the organization
confined to the rank and file. Such advantages lead to the entrenchment of
particular individuals at particular points within the group's structure for
prolonged periods of time.

Despite these advantages accruing to the group leadership, however, the
ideal of total cohesion within a group membership is rarely achieved. The
internal political harmony of the group typically relies upon two mutually inter­
dependent factors: the leadership skills of the active minority; and the actual
composition of the group membership. As the tasks facing the group leaders will
be defined by the attitudes and values of the group membership, there will exist
a roughly continuous effort to maintain harmony between the desires of the
membership and the actions of the leadership. How articulately the leadership
represents those demands will be determined, in part, by the degree of success
the group leadership attains in its direction of the group's affairs. The
appearance of harmony within the structure of a group, however, should not lull
the observer to the assumption that such a group represents a homogeneous
mass. A group is a set of interactions; not simply a mass of physical people
but, rather, some of the interactions of those people, varying in frequency and
intensity, and in a constant state of flux.19

19This concept of interaction is a key theme in The Governmental Process,
1947), p. 415, also articulates this idea and is cited extensively throughout
Truman's work.
An extension of this conception of group structure is the principle of "overlapping membership" within groups. The pluralists argue that no one individual is wholly absorbed by any group to which he/she may belong. A person's membership within a single group represents part, and only part, of the individual's total interaction within society. The individual will possess allegiances with other groupings within that society, either formally or informally. The specific concept of "membership" employed by the pluralists is clearly key to the rationale of this concept. Membership is not defined solely in terms of those persons who religiously pay dues to a particular group. Membership, rather, is conceived in terms of the sympathies and values possessed by individuals, and whether they perceive any group as articulating these attitudes.

As Truman has stated:

Membership should not be understood narrowly as including only those who pay dues to a formal organization. Those "fellow travellers" who share the attitudes characteristic of an interest group must also be received in some degree as participants in it. 20

While, of course, there exist other identifiable effects upon the cohesion of a group, overlapping membership is viewed by pluralists as the most significant of these. The importance of this concept is determined within the context of how interest groups function within society, and it is here that its effect is deemed crucial. In the long run, it is argued, memberships in both organized and potential groups overlap, imposing both conformity and restraint upon groups in the process. This, in turn, allows stable policies to exist in a system characterized by a multiplicity of interest groups. That is, because

Although the pluralists clearly possess an understanding of the physical manifestations of the organizational structure of groups, they fail to extend this knowledge to an understanding of how differing organizational structures effect the nature of the group's actions.

20 Truman, p. 28.
individuals are members of other groupings within society, they will not allow one group to exercise its power to the point where they find their other interests in a relatively disadvantaged position. This vigilance by the individual forces interest groups to maintain their actions and demands within an accepted limit, not forcing other, smaller interests into a disadvantaged position. In short, overlapping membership ensures the system of pluralism remains pluralist in nature.

As noted above, however, the effect of such influences may be minimized or accentuated depending upon the actions of the group. Leadership has been defined, not as a specific characteristic, but as an interaction between members of the group and the leader. The power of the leader is said to flow from this relationship with the members of his group. As Truman has stated: "Power is the relationship, not something external to it."21 Despite the wealth of theories on the topic of leadership which preceded pluralism I in the fields of psychology and sociology, the position of the classical pluralist writers is, in the words of W.O. Jenkins, that: "No single trait or group of characteristics has been isolated which sets off the leader from the members of his group."22 Furthermore, the pluralists believe that the individual who exhibits the abilities to develop a relation with the group, which then empowers him as leader, must be capable of maintaining the confidence of the group membership. Failure in this respect will lead to the replacement of the leader with an individual capable of maintaining the necessary relation. Truman writes:

...the occupant of a leadership position is the object of expectations on the part of other members of the group--

21Ibid., p. 189.

expectations that become stronger as the leadership position becomes more inclusive. One who fails to live up to those expectations, or a sufficient number of them, will drop to a less important position in the group’s structure, or will be dropped from the group entirely.\textsuperscript{23}

On the same theme, Harold Lasswell writes:

Power is an interpersonal situation; those who hold power are empowered. They depend upon and continue only so long as there is a continuing stream of empowering responses.\textsuperscript{24}

This characterization should not be construed, however, as depicting the leader as entirely dependent upon the whims of the membership. The significance of the power relation outlined above stresses the degree of awareness a leader must possess of the limits imposed by membership expectations. The point is, rather, a prolonged term in office will be possible only if a leader is careful not to overstep these guidelines.

Leadership Tools

The leader, of course, is not without means with which to manipulate the group membership. There exist specific resources available to executives of many groups which allow them to elicit from the membership the desired consistent responses which are the substance of leadership. Through the manipulation of \textit{internal propaganda} for instance, the group

\textsuperscript{23}Truman, p 191. To support this contention, Truman cites M. Sherif, \textit{An Outline of Social Psychology}, pp. 162; particularly his results with autokinetic phenomenon; and, F. Whyte, \textit{Street Corner Society}(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943). Of particular relevance herein, Sherif states: "A movement may be initiated at the outset by a handful of determined leaders who know the discontent and restlessness of the people to whom they appeal. But once the movement starts to acquire a definite leader-and-membership structure and gets under way, the leader is no longer free to stop or alter the course of action as his whims dictate."(p. 420, Sherif, op. cit.)

leadership may control the flow of information to its membership, information upon which members base their perceptions of the group and its leadership. Such tools may take the form of a periodical or information bulletin provided only to group members, personal contacts with key individuals within the group structure, or even the group's annual convention or meetings. This method of control can be particularly effective in a situation where the group possesses information about its area of concern unavailable through other sources.

A second device for the manipulation of group membership, and often related to internal propaganda, is the provision of services through the group to its membership. If a service produced by the group is a desirable commodity in itself, this service can be used as an incentive to persuade group members of the benefits of policies supported by the leadership. Group insurance plans are services typically provided by larger groups and which may be sufficient incentive to lure members to join.

Thirdly, a group's leadership may resort to sanctions upon specific individuals, or sub-groups of individuals within the group, in order to maintain cohesion and control. Such sanctions may vary from an unstated form of disapproval to, ultimately, expulsion from the group. There is an opportunity cost involved in the use of sanctions, however, particularly those which are harsh. If the activities of those being sanctioned prove popular amongst the group membership, sanctions will endanger the power relationship of the leaders. Harsh sanctions, particularly expulsions, can cost the group, in terms of membership numbers, more than would ultimately have been gained by their successful implementation. For this reason, the leadership of the group must exercise caution in the use of such measures.

Lastly, the tool of secrecy is a device often used by groups to maintain their cohesion and exclusiveness, and is used by many groups in varying degrees
of application. It can be effective in limiting overlapping membership for a
period of time by requiring an individual to participate in one group exclusively.
This technique of manipulation is also useful for suppressing differences, thus
preserving the appearance of unanimity in the face of competing elements inside
and/or outside the group. It can also achieve this by facilitating solutions to
problems within the group in a "closed door" situation, free from the stress of
public glare.

While the pluralists realize these various instruments are available to the
group leader, they rarely consider them practical methods of maintaining
leadership. Where overlapping membership creates a plurality of group
identifications for individuals, the main task facing the leader(s) of any group is
the solicitation of members and the maintenance of the group harmony and
cohesion. If leaders wish their groups to be successful and to grow in size,
membership is the single most essential ingredient; beside it, all other
considerations pale. Thus, the primary task of a group leader is to maintain the
harmony and cohesion of the group, facilitating an atmosphere conducive to an
increase in the group's membership. Those leadership tools which prove costly
to the leadership are usually not feasible alternatives.25

Conclusion

At the core of the pluralist conception of the group, then, is the
perception of the individual as a social animal. Man must interact with other
persons; it is his nature. In turn, this interaction will, in a natural progression,
lead to the formation of groups of individuals revolving around particular

25 The classical pluralists have illustrated an appreciation of the existence of leadership tools but, because of their belief in the representative nature of groups, and thus the accountability of group leaders to their membership, they fail to understand the complete potential which these tools offer to group leaders.
interests within society. Because all individuals within society are members of

groups of some type, and most members of more than one, these formations are

naturally the most significant unit of social analysis. In their exploration of the
organization and interaction of groups within society the pluralists have

stipulated a system similar in principle to a laissez-faire style of economic
organization. Because groups are the actual source of "power" within society,
the state's role is akin to that of an umpire, reacting to group initiatives and
lacking in the ability of independence of thought or action. The groups,
internally, may be hierarchically organized in terms of leadership, but group
goals and values are always the product of the individuals which compose them.
It is in part because of this primary role of the individual that no single group
is able to develop a position of hegemony within society, always forced to
compete with the interests of other groups in a system of relatively perfect group
competition.

The pluralist writers adopted a rough typology of internal organization of
interest groups. They admitted that all but the smallest groupings of individuals
required the development of some vague hierarchical style of group organization.
They stressed, however, that this development of a group leadership did not
impair the representative nature of group goals. Because the group leader must
maintain harmonious relations with the group membership, the ends sought by the
group would be in complete agreement with the goals and values harboured by
the individual group members. While the pluralists recognized the existence of
"leadership tools," they argued that they were potentially dangerous, which any
leader ultimately used at his/her potential peril.

These institutional characteristics still comprise the basis of contemporary
group analysis. The difference arises, however, in the relative significance now
attributed to these organizational characteristics. The pluralists stressed the
group nature of society and the importance of the individual as a member of a
group. They erred, however, in failing to look at the actual structure of the
interest group, its internal organization and dynamics. The neo pluralists, as
will be shown, inherited this trait, along with much of the remainder of the
classical pluralist model.
In recent times classical pluralist thought has been criticized for becoming significantly removed from the phenomenological reality it has sought to explain and predict. Contemporaries of Truman and Bentley, among them Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom, recognized this inability of pluralism I to effectively explain the actual structure of relations within contemporary society. As a result, they sought to alter and re-align the theory with the perceived reality of post-war North American society.

The Generation Gap

One of the key distinguishing marks of the neo pluralist model is a more detailed and contemporary view of the state than that offered by its classical predecessor. While initially considered a significant achievement, the original pluralist dismantling of the monolithic, homogeneous conception of the state offered by Hegel and others suffers from the same blight of extremism as that which they are seeking to bring to disrepute. As the discussion above has indicated, the classical pluralist conception of the state is simply an extension of this earlier position. As Earl Latham has so energetically written:

The pluralists did useful work when they evaporated the misty figment of the state which the idealists had presented

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as a colossus of unity, a monolith, an absolute, a total system swallowing and assimilating all personal beliefs, attachments, obligations, and relations endowed with some of the attributes of human personality like will, and having an autonomous and independent life and existence apart from the lives and personalities of the members of the political community.²

What is significant, however, is the actual inability of the classical pluralists to extinguish a meaningful role for the state. While it was possible for pluralist writers to disregard the significance of the state within their model, they could not conceive a model with the function of the state unfulfilled. Thus, while its significance was presumed minimal, those functions previously performed by the state were re-distributed to other elements within the system: church, union and professional organizations, among others. The aspect of personality was thus exorcised from the state only to be resurrected within specific group organizations. That is, while it was argued that the state could not possess an identity separate from that of the individuals which composed it, other organizations apparently could. The predicament of the pluralist model was that, while it could not reconcile the role of the state with its individualist principles, it perceived a functional need for this role within society.³ The coordination function served by the state was considered necessary to facilitate the realization of the political community they ultimately envisioned, a community based upon a federation of constituent groups replacing the consolidated and authoritarian conception of the state envisaged by the philosophical idealists. Thus, it is not the function of the state which is forsaken by the pluralist school, merely the state as a unit of analysis.

The realities of representation in the modern polity are similarly left

untreated by the pluralists. Paul Pross articulates the apparently fundamental inability of pluralism I to reconcile two contradictory but necessary components of representation in modern democracies: space and sector. It is a serious limitation of pluralist theory that does not account for the necessity of contemporary governments to appeal to their constituencies in both a geographical and a sectoral sense. It has become an accepted reality of political office in systems where aspirants appeal to voters, not only as constituents of the ridings within which they reside, but also as members of special interest sectors. Because of the pluralist conception of an equilibrium of groups and the perfect competition between opposing groups this implies, they cannot adequately account for this necessity of governing.

Simple naivete similarly plays a role in this development of the pluralist conception of equilibrium supposed to exist between competing groups within society. As has been noted above, this balance is to be maintained by the ever-watchful vigilance of the individual member, alert and aware of the potential abuse resulting from the attainment, by one group, of a relative monopoly of power. It is the natural and dynamic nature of the interaction of man within society which ultimately serves as the guardian of the precious diversity of pluralism. Attributing such a crucial theoretical role to such a thoroughly unreliable and imperfect system of machinations as the system of free enterprise, it is argued, is simply naive. The actual effectiveness of such a tool in acting as an efficient mechanism of control and allocation has long been doubted and, in itself, can no longer be touted as an acceptable mode of conflict management.

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4 See Paul Pross, *Group Politics and Public Policy* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1986), ch.11. While Pross was not the first to articulate this contribution, he is the most recent proponent.

5 Neo pluralist writers such as Pross have speculated that the remarkable
The element of perfect competition between groups within society is similarly questioned by the neo pluralists. In early writings, Robert Dahl has suggested that open competition between groups allowed virtually any group access to the policy process. Theodore Lowi, however, points out that within the policy process there exists a capacity for "non-decision making;" that is, groups simply will not consider options deemed undesirable. Those options which are not considered cannot become part of the policy solution. Thus, those groups in a position of influence within the policy process simply elect not to consider options deemed hostile to their cause, thus confining the debate upon policy options to a selection of choices sanctioned by the relevant institutionalized groups. This has resulted, Lowi argues, in: "...socialism for the organized; capitalism for the unorganized."

Pross, in particular among the neo-pluralist writers, develops a detailed model within which the elements of space and sector are compatibly accounted for. In doing so, however, he also confirms an essentially classical pluralist description of society. Contrary to popular perception, he argues, the presence of interest groups does not promote anti-democratic tendencies within political systems. Using what is an essentially functionalist rationale, Pross argues that without the aid of pressure groups in the development of policy, legislatures of modern welfare states would continue to become overloaded. This process would continue until the system is overburdened to the point where legitimacy imbued ideological consensus of the times within which Truman was writing may have figured prominently in the emergence of his viewpoint.

6 For an example of Dahl's classical pluralist writings, see: Democracy in the United States (Chicago, Il: Rand McNally, 1976).

7 Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism (New York: Norton and Co., 1979). Lowi has emerged as one of the harshest critics of pluralist thought arguing, once again, and together with Pross, that pluralism is incapable of accommodating both functionally and spatially articulated demands.

8 This model is presented in, Pross, ch. 11.
within the system by the consent of the electorate is lost. Therefore, he argues, pressure groups are a functional necessity, allowing policy decisions to be made more quickly and with less direct input from legislatures. The envisioned effect is a prolonged and less turbulent life for the government of the day. He writes:

Pressure group politics is a symptom, not the cause...though the threat of the special interest state can by no means be ignored in Canada, our highly visible and active pressure group system is not only far from being inherently perverse, it may actually contain the means of overcoming the space-sector tension described.

Clearly, however, the neo-pluralist school is not convinced of the self-regulating nature of pluralist society, nor the presence of a natural state of equilibrium. They argue that while there may be a common right to participate within the decision making apparatus, there is not a common opportunity. Far from promoting any type of natural equilibrium, pluralism accentuates those social and economic disparities already existing. At its extreme, pluralist society is viewed as, "a monstrous engine of inequity capable of ultimately destroying the society that created it." The arena of policy making is not a marketplace enjoying the euphoria of perfect competition, but a forum within which admittance may be limited to those capable of mustering the requirements of membership.

Neo Pluralist Society

Within this forum management by consensus is the norm. The sub-government maintains a low-key, bureaucratic and conciliatory style of management by ensuring that all matters dealt with remain part of the "routine"

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9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., p. 249.
11 Ibid., p. 234.
business of government. By ensuring all elements of day-to-day business are kept at the bureaucratic level, the sub-government policy body can reduce to a minimum the degree of outside interference allowed to permeate the policy process. The utility of this procedure is two-fold: it keeps the public eye from lighting too long upon the delicate business of government and, more importantly, keeps the less privileged groups from coming too close to the jealously guarded center of the policy process.

When issues of public policy emerge as open and public topics of debate, it is due to the malfunctioning of this exclusive process of policy development. Both the complexity and volume of debate on issues of public concern is simply too burdensome a load for the forum of open discussion. There is both a lack of space within the public medium, and a lack of interested persons within the general population, to serve it well. For these reasons the overwhelming preponderance of discussion, debate and decision making takes place well out of the gaze of the public eye. The implications of this upon the nature of the policy process is, to be sure, profound.

Pross argues that, particularly in the post-war era, the intensity and growing importance of policy debate has produced a policy community, a relatively select and well-informed group of persons grouped together to better determine the relevant issues and concerns in the development of public policy. With the ever-increasing importance of government within the modern democratic welfare state, its actions are becoming more worthy of attention by a larger number of interested parties. Interest groups, among other actors, have formed a significant component of this new policy community. Officials, wishing to determine the response of a particular section of the population to a prospective policy proposal, may approach one or more appropriate groups for a sample response. They could seek advice in the formative stages of legislation, and
even assistance in the implementation of the final policy outputs. Within the bureaucratic framework officials may openly use the support of specific groups to indicate the projected success of policies, thereby establishing their potential political benefit. There is even the possibility that, where organized groups do not exist, government agencies will seek to encourage their creation in an effort to incorporate them into the policy process.

Within this policy community the neo pluralists posit four basic functions for interest groups: communication, legitimation, regulation and administration. To effectively perform these functions, however, a group must possess certain attributes of formal organization. In particular, effective groups must possess a formal structure, clear definition of roles, a system for the generation and allocation of resources, a collective memory, rules governing behaviour and, perhaps most importantly, procedures for effectively reaching and implementing decisions. While "solidary" or "latent" groups lack the means to act effectively in a cooperative manner, organized interests are typically quite capable of such concerted actions.

The Institutionalization of Groups

An infrequent component of neo pluralist writings have utilized Philip Selznick's issue-oriented/institutionalized typology of pressure groups. The institutionalization of pressure groups is the process through which an organization becomes an institution, how a "technical instrument designed as a means to definite goals," becomes a "responsive, adaptive organism." It is significant within this understanding that organizations are not seen to create

13 Pross, p. 114.
values but, rather, to embody them. As this process develops the organization becomes increasingly institutionalized. In turn, as the group develops its level of institutionalization, it is better able to perform its functions.

Selznick's typology, similar but not by any means identical to that offered by the classical pluralist school, can be conceptualized along a linear continuum of development. At one extreme lies the institutionalized group, exhibiting five developmental characteristics. 1) It will possess organizational continuity and cohesion. Continuity, in particular, is an important element for maintaining a watchful eye upon the evolution of new policies. 2) The group will possess extensive knowledge of its area(s) of concern, enabling it to determine significant fluctuations in conditions. 3) The group will have a stable membership base. This membership will typically be attracted by secondary inducements and easily swayed in the determination of policy decisions by the career leadership of the group. 4) There will exist both concrete and immediate operational objectives within the group. In order to facilitate attainment of these the philosophy of the group will be sufficiently general to allow the necessary bargaining with government. 5) The organizational imperatives of the group will be more important than any particular operational objective. The group will rarely prejudice its privileged position with government over a particular objective if the attainment of that objective will result in possible unfavourable disposition of government policy makers toward that group in future. These groups represent the most successful and privileged of the groups at work within the policy process, often finding themselves with discretionary powers provided to them by government, and placed in a position of trust and confidence by mandarins within the policy process.

At the opposite extreme of Selznick's continuum a vastly different type of pressure group is found, and one that typically accounts for the largest number
of groups within this policy process. According to Selznick's typology, issue-oriented pressure groups exhibit seven characteristic elements. 1) These groups possess a poor organization structure relative to their institutionalized counterparts. There is a limited degree of organizational continuity, and group cohesion is often non-existent. 2) The practical working knowledge of government is often simplistic, or simply incorrect. 3) The membership of the group is typically fluid, never developing a stable basis with which to attract new members. 4) Because of its organizational precariousness, the group will experience considerable difficulties in formulating long-range objectives, and adherence to any such policies will be virtually unheard of. 5) Contributing to the incapacity for coherent action will be the typically low regard displayed by such groups for those organizational mechanisms they have managed to develop for the execution of any policy goals. 6) The group will lack a sufficiently general philosophical development, thus prohibiting it from accepting short-term defeat in return for long-run reward. Typically, the group will be obsessed with a small number of dominant issues upon which its relative success or failure will become dependent. 7) Its inability to broaden its general philosophical appeal will result in a narrow and specialized membership base.

Both of these ideal cases represent extremes with which no group is ever likely to completely conform. Furthermore, despite the apparent advantages accruing to institutionalized groups, such a level of organizational development is not without its costs. The institutionalized group becomes trapped in a dilemma when burdened simultaneously with the trust of both government and its membership. If the group appears too closely aligned with policy makers the leadership can face a serious loss of credibility. What is more, once a group is an accepted and recognized component of the policy process, it is no longer free to raise all issues of concern to its membership. It must become selective in
both the types of issues raised and the methods employed in raising them. Because of its bureaucratic structure, the institutionalized group will not respond as quickly as less hierarchically organized groups, possibly creating frustrations amongst the membership. On the other hand, issue-oriented groups are capable of such quick responses because of their flexible structure and willingness to lobby on any issue. Issue-oriented groups do not possess especially privileged positions with government, on the whole, and thus have little to lose by transgressing the accepted norms of the policy community. Yet, on questions of a complex nature which require prolonged and expert work on the policy making pressure points, such groups will usually falter, unable to maintain their stance over a period of time.

Groups and the State

While specifics vary between particular systems, access to key government decision makers is recognized as a universally valuable tool for lobby groups of all types. The ability to confer with those in positions of power within the policy making bureaucracy bestows an element of recognition upon a particular group, an indication to others this group is an accepted member of the policy community. This recognition is, in effect, an acknowledgement of power within this select cadre. The group is recognized as a harbinger of potentially vital information, a residual of power and influence at ease within the bureaucratic machinations of the policy process. This position of respect and influence is the most distinguishing characteristic of the successful institutionalized group. The neo pluralists maintain that if a group is an accepted member of the inner policy apparatus it will not seek to actually "pressure" decision makers. A methodical, highly organized system of mutual cooperation better characterizes the manner of interaction at work within the
inner policy echelons. Indeed, to resort to the use of demands for particular actions is all but admitting a lack of sufficient influence and recognition within the policy sphere to accomplish the task through regularized channels. Such tactics are usually the reserve of the issue-oriented groups, as successful institutionalized organizations rarely break ranks within the bureaucratic pecking-order.  

It should be understood, while most policy issues are considered and dealt with by this small cadre within the policy community, there exist obvious exceptions to this rule. For particular policy issues of obvious public interest, requiring an open style of public discussion, forums are clearly available. Commissions of inquiry may be established, prolonged debate within the legislature may be necessary, or inter-governmental consultations may be required. Typically, legislators will seek a more salient role in the policy's preparation. In terms of simple volume, however, the majority of policy is determined by bureaucratic consultation within the confines of the policy community. Thus, while the more contentious and salient issues reach public forums, the vast majority of policy issues do not.

Leadership Tools

Similar to the tools of leadership discussed by Truman, the neo pluralists recognize the existence of differing tools of manipulation available to group leaders, depending upon the group's particular level of development. Of these, Pross offers an interesting characterization:

Discourse, coercion, and corruption are the means groups use to obtain their goals. How they use these methods depends on their concerns, the resources they have at hand, and the

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.
environment surrounding the policy process. When driven, every interest will use whatever tools it can muster to protect its own. Even illegal means may not be excluded. 16

In fact the various tools available to groups within society are rather more straightforward and legitimate than Pross would have one believe. These tools can be conceived in terms of the resources of the various groups, the most important being knowledge, or "information." The preponderance of a group's activity will take the form of an informational resource for members of the policy community. Bureaucrats and other policy makers, in return for specialized information and data on a particular sector of policy concern, will offer valued concessions to groups. Also, the way in which the information is presented, its particular emphasis or bias, can assist in producing desirable outcomes within the policy process. Similarly, if the information reaching a group's membership can be controlled, it is possible to effectively influence the opinions and actions of those members. Furthermore, as Pross has pointed out, a group which maintains a position of importance within the policy process, through its use of information, has produced a group which is somewhat more than the sum of its parts. As he writes:

An organization that stands in a relation of trust between its members and government not only obtains a perspective on the membership that is not available to individuals, but acquires an authority over and above the willingness of members to support it. 17

The mandate of a group is its second major resource within the policy community. A significant degree of legitimacy provides a group with an essential ingredient capable of ensuring its viewpoint is considered within the policy process. Only if a group's mandate is considered significant, will bureaucrats be

16 Ibid., p. 130.
17 Ibid., p. 186.
eager to enlist its support of proposed programs, hoping to obtain public acceptance prior to the introduction of the policy. The involvement of such a group in the developmental stages of the policy process will help to ensure the end result will engender public support within the affected sectors of society. To receive a truly significant input into the policy process, a high degree of support from a significant portion of the affected population is generally required.

Financial wealth is the third and perhaps most obvious of the major resources of interest groups. The majority of revenue raised by groups is typically the result of membership dues. These dues, however, are often purposefully maintained at low levels. The rationale involved suggests it is more significant to possess a large number of members with low membership dues, than a small number of members with large membership dues. While it appears, then, that membership numbers are more important than the capacity to raise money, there is a point where, once a large membership is established, the pursuit of finances must play a significant role within the group. The greater the amount of wealth possessed by a group, the more elaborate and sophisticated functions it can perform. Information, to be of use to the group, must be gathered and organized coherently, a process requiring trained researchers, offices and support staff, all of which must be paid for. Ultimately, for an institutionalized group to succeed at its professed function, access to sufficient funding will be necessary.¹⁸

In order to use these aforementioned tools to their fullest potential, however, knowledge apart from that of their own interest area is required. A group may possess boundless amounts of significant information, mandate and money, yet be unable to use it to its fullest effect. Without a thorough and

familiar understanding of the policy community and its particular dynamic
idiosyncracies, much effort can be wasted in ill-advised and clumsy attempts to
influence, often reducing the bargaining power possessed by a group. In
essence, what is required is a familiarity of the actual flow-chart of decision
making power, something which can differ considerably from the official hierarchy
of the system. As stressed earlier, a group must possess adequate working
knowledge of the hierarchy it is working within and against, if it is to be
effective. Without this, all other resources expended will generally be in vain.

The neo pluralist theory does not seek to explain the role or importance
of individual leaders of groups, even to the extent which the classical pluralists
sought. The preoccupation with the effects of organizational development,
however, bespeaks an appreciation for the effects of internal aspects of group
existence. This particular recognition of internal group dynamics is thus a
significant advancement over the relative dearth of consideration this element
received from classical pluralist writers.

Business Privilege

Perhaps the most salient characteristic of the neo pluralist paradigm is a
product of an entirely separate school of writers. Writing in the early 1970s,
Lindblom and others identified what was then the most alarming inadequacy of
classical pluralist theory: the inability to explain the discrepancy of levels of
power existing between different groups within American society. As we have
seen, classical pluralists suggested any attempt to obtain systemic dominance on
the part of one group would be checked by the overlapping membership of
individuals. The neo pluralists, however, showed this to be false. Lindblom
argued that in modern capitalist societies most decisions regarding the
distribution of societal resources are effected by the large organized business
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interests. Referring to the distribution of material resources within a given economic system, Lindblom writes:

In all societies, these matters have to be decided. They are of momentous consequences for the welfare of any society. But in a private enterprise market system, they are in larger part decided not by government officials but by businessmen.19

He argues that because the actions of organized business are so pivotal to the economic health of modern capitalist democracies, the actions of the business officials, with respect to the overall national welfare, are in many ways as equally important as the actions of senior bureaucratic officials. Among other things, business interests decide a nation's industrial technology, the location of specific industries, and the allocation of various resources. He argues that large categories of decisions determining the welfare of a nation are made by senior businesspeople and, as such: "Businessmen thus become a kind of public official and exercise what, on a broad view of their role, are public functions."20

Writing at the same time, but from a differing analytical perspective, Fred Block also articulated the existence of a "business privilege" in capitalist systems.21 Block argues that within modern capitalist democracies there exists a division of labour between the capitalist and bureaucratic classes, between those who accumulate capital within the system and those who manage the state. Block rejects the instrumentalist proposition of a class conscious ruling-class and, in its place, offers the existence of "structural relationships among state managers, capitalists and workers." He argues that while those who accumulate capital within a capitalist system are fully aware of their interests as

19Lindblom, p. 171.

20Ibid., p. 172.

capitalists, they are not, in general, conscious of what is necessary for the reproduction of the social order they so depend upon. This responsibility, he suggests, falls to those whose job it is to manage the state apparatus. It is they who must concern themselves with the reproduction of the social order because the continued existence of their power rests upon the satisfactory maintenance of the political and economic order.

Both Lindblom and Block suggest that bureaucrats will defer to the general wishes of business interests because the job of maintaining the economic welfare of the state is entrusted to these groups. Bureaucrats in every democratic system are dependent upon the maintenance of some level of economic welfare. Block suggests this is true for two reasons: 1) the capacity of the state to finance itself through taxation or borrowing depends upon the state of the economy; and 2) public support for a regime will decline sharply if the regime presides over a serious drop in the level of economic activity. In capitalist economies, they argue, the level of economic activity is largely dependent upon the private investment decisions of business interests. The effect of this is to give these decision makers, in their collective role as investors, a veto over state policies. Their failure to invest at adequate levels can create major political problems for the state managers. Furthermore, this also means bureaucrats will possess a direct interest in facilitating investment since their own continued power rests upon a healthy economy. In short, because the senior state managers depend upon the actions of business interests to maintain a healthy economic environment, and thus perpetuate the power of the state managers, these managers will generally comply with the wishes of the organized business interests within the policy making arena. 22

This collusion between business representatives and state managers is not

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22 Block, op. cit.
necessarily outwardly manifest, however. Government need not enter into any explicit style of negotiations:

Mutual adjustment is often impersonal and distant. It operates through an unspoken deference of administrations, legislatures, and courts to the needs of business. And it relies on a multitude of common tacit understandings shared by the two groups of leaders, business and governmental, with respect to the conditions under which enterprises can or cannot profitably operate.23

While Lindblom suggests that conflict between these two groups is not unusual, he also suggests the nature of the conflict will normally be confined to a narrow range. Any conflict which results between these two groups will always be constrained by a mutual understanding that together they constitute the necessary elements of leadership within the system. Neither group would seek to undermine the function of the other.24

Business, then, occupies a "privileged" position in the process which determines the policies of the modern democratic capitalist state. Because the actions of the capitalist class have the capacity to effect the health of the capitalist economic system, and because the power of the state managers rests upon the maintenance of a healthy economic atmosphere, business interests are proffered a degree of influence unique amongst all other actors within the policy community. As Lindblom has put it:

Businessmen generally and corporate executives in particular take on a privileged role in a government that is, it seems reasonable to say, unmatched by any leadership group other than the government officials themselves.25

The articulation of the element of business privilege was not inspired solely by a class analysis of the state in modern capitalist democracies,

23 Lindblom, p. 179.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., p. 172.
however. As Garson has pointed out, the period of the early 1970s brought with it a sharp increase in the activities of consumer organizations eager to confront "big business" head on. What had been, until that time, a comfortable relationship between business and government through the policy community, now appeared to be the un-democratic disproportional influence of organized business interests on the policy making process:

The many works associated with Ralph Nader...helped spread even in academia a profound malaise over any such sanguine acceptance of group-politics-as-usual often found in pluralist writings. Then, too, this viewpoint drew on a more generalized sort of radicalism popularized in the previous decade among students now becoming the professors and policy analysts of the 1970s. The government–like but undemocratic nature of corporate power was condemned by political scientists...Even the few ventures of business into the realm of social action and altruism came under sharp attack as camouflage for racist or self–serving ends.26

Conclusion

Within pluralism I we find one explanation for the system of distribution of societal power, particularly within North America. Yet, within pluralism I there also exists an attempt at simple justification. Contemporaries of Truman and Bentley, recognizing the inability of pluralism I to effectively explain the actual structure of relation within contemporary society, sought to alter the theory and re-align it with the realities of post–war society. The neo pluralists argued the state does indeed play a role in the interaction of groups within society, and that there is not an equality of interaction among groups.27 Much of this re-alignment of pluralist thought occurred in response to the rather damning barrage of criticism emerging from the class analysis of pluralism, highlighting, in


27See Lindblom, op. cit.
particular, its naive reliance upon the free enterprise system of groups in maintaining equilibrium within society. This, in fact, is the most fundamental change brought about by the neo pluralists; the assertion that, in fact, all groups within the system are not equal, that groups which fall into Selznick’s categorization of institutionalized (typically business groups) are often at a significant advantage over those groups which are not. Not only are business groups well-funded, better organized and more at ease within the policy process as a whole, but there is a pre-disposition of favourable attitudes towards business groups within the policy process, giving them an overwhelmingly disproportionate input into the policy making arena.

It is in the context of such debate that the thesis of this paper is presented. While the debate, as a whole, has been obsessed with the systemic level interaction of interest groups, the internal dynamics of these groups has gone largely unnoticed. While it is true that pluralist writers have attributed the traditional role of the state to group organizations, they argued that those groups possessed motivational dynamics which arose from the actions, thoughts and values of the individuals composing those groups. The organizations, in themselves, do not possess a dynamic separate from that. As Truman argued: "The 'individual' and the 'group' are at most merely convenient ways of classifying behavior, two ways of approaching the same phenomena, not different things." There is no "autonomy of the group." Similarly, the neo pluralists saw the goals

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28 See Lindblom, op. cit., and Block, op. cit.

29 The neo pluralist writers, while noting the existence of internal characteristics of groups, did not offer these elements any significant degree of importance within their model.

and motivations of organizations as originating, still, within the individual.\textsuperscript{31} The neo pluralists do not perceive organizations at any level of development as creating values but, rather, simply embodying them. It is this common assumption which is at the root of what this paper seeks to explore.\textsuperscript{32} The insight contributed by the realization of the importance of internal group dynamics alters the nature of the neo pluralist assumptions about groups within society. It is the position taken herein that, with the addition of several recent modifications to the theory of groups, a revised pluralist theory may once again illustrate potential as a useful explanatory hypothesis for the distribution of power, particularly within North American society.

\textsuperscript{31}It is this similarity which justifies the treatment of these two schools as relative allies herein.

\textsuperscript{32}Pross, p. 186. The contention here is that, while Pross may recognize the ability of groups to possess a level of autonomy, the neo pluralist school, as a whole, inadequately addresses this aspect of group behaviour.
Chapter Three

A NEW SUPERSTRUCTURE

The pluralist and neo pluralist camps share a common conceptual premise in their approaches: a group's goals are a product of the values and desires of the membership of that interest group. Thus, any objectives undertaken by the group are objectives which have first originated with at least a majority of those members. Within this assumption is hidden yet another: individuals who are members of a large group will seek to contribute to the attainment of a collective goal because they perceive it to be in their interest to obtain that goal. These assumptions failed to receive a thorough analysis, however, until the emergence of Mancur Olson's *The Logic of Collective Action*, an economic theory of interest group dynamics.

The Rational Actor Model

The most damning of Olson's assertions seek to show why, in large groups, individuals will possess no incentive to contribute to what he has termed

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1 See chapters one and two. The presence of such an idea did not originate with the pluralist school. Aristotle once wrote: "Men journey together with a view to particular advantage, and by way of providing some particular thing needed for the purposes of life, and similarly the political association seems to have come together originally, and to continue in existence, for the sake of the general advantages it brings." (*Ethics*, viii, 9, 1160a.)

2 The primary representative of this school consulted in this chapter will be the rational actor model proposed by Mancur Olson in his *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965). Another example of an economic theory of politics is Charles Beard's *Economic Theory of Politics* (N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945).
the "collective good," and which he has defined as:

...any good such that, if any person $X_i$ in a group $X_1 \ldots X_i \ldots X_n$ consumes it, it cannot feasibly be withheld from the others in that group. In other words, those who do not purchase or pay for any of the public or collective good cannot be excluded or kept from sharing in the consumption of the good, as they can where noncollective goods are concerned.\(^3\)

A collective good, then, cannot be withheld from those who do not seek to contribute to its attainment. Assuming that individuals are rationally self-interested, and that they seek to maximize their personal welfare, they will not act to contribute to the attainment of a group's collective good in the absence of some form of incentive.\(^4\) Thus, it is argued, groups will not act in their self-interest (which is to obtain an optimal amount of the collective good being sought) because individuals will do so. Because all individuals within a group will benefit upon obtainment of the collective good, by definition, regardless of which individuals actually work to achieve the goal, logic dictates groups will not act in their own self-interest and strive for the optimal degree of the good.

If it is assumed that any contribution to the provision of the collective good requires a net expenditure on the part of the individual, and assuming that the group objective will be provided to the individual regardless of their actual contribution, no rational individual will work within the group to obtain the collective good. As Olson writes:

...unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, *rational self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests*. In other words, even if all of the individuals in a large group are rational and self-interested, and would gain if, as a group they acted to

\(^3\) Olson, pp. 14-15.

\(^4\) This assumption of "rational self-interest" is an admittedly contentious proposition within Olson's model and is given consideration below.
achieve their common interest or objective, they will not voluntarily act to achieve that common or group interest. The notion that groups of individuals will act to achieve their common or group interest, far from being a logical implication of the assumption that the individuals in a group will rationally further their individual interests, is in fact inconsistent with that assumption.\(^5\)

If the self-interest of the group is thus defined as the provision of the optimal amount of the collective good, the indiscriminate nature of the collective good can be said to be directly responsible for the tendency groups will exhibit toward sub-optimal provision of that good.\(^6\) If an individual has elected to obtain for him/herself a unit of the collective good, because it will be provided to all members of the group the individual will receive only part of the benefit each unit of the good provides. Thus, any rational individual will cease to provide any amount of the collective good before the optimal amount of the good, for the group as a whole, has been provided. Furthermore, any amount of the good which an individual within the group receives free through the efforts of another individual, or sub-group of individuals, will further reduce the desire of that individual to expend any amount of resources in pursuit of the collective good. Since this scenario is particularly plausible within larger groups, it is argued the tendency toward sub-optimal provision of the collective good is positively related to the size of the group.\(^7\) In situations such as this, optimal

\(^5\)Olson, p. 2.

\(^6\)Olson does not indicate what an "optimal" scale of the collective good for any group will be. In an economic sense, and for our purposes herein, the optimal point of provision of the collective good can be assumed to be the point of intersection of the marginal utility and marginal cost curves pertaining to the good. That is, the optimal degree of a collective good can hypothetically be construed as the point at which the marginal utility derived from the provision of another unit of the good by the group equals the marginal cost of providing that good.

\(^7\)See Olson, p. 46. In this respect, Olson’s theory is best applied only to larger groups. In small groups each member receives a substantially greater portion of the collective good because their exist fewer members between which
provision of the collective good is possible only when a larger member of the group is willing to accept a disproportionately large burden of the cost of providing the collective good. When one or more members of the group undertake to provide a certain level of the good at their own expense, those who do not contribute to its provision will receive more of the good than they were willing to purchase on their own. The level of optimality, as it would be defined by the smaller members of the group unable or unwilling to provide that amount of the good for themselves, is thus more closely approximated when larger members are willing to incur a disproportionate burden of the costs of providing the group goal.

Olson suggests, however, the difficulties experienced by groups attempting to achieve what is ultimately in their self-interest can be offset with the development of coherent and effective structures of organization within the group. He writes:

...no collective good can be obtained without some group agreement, coordination, or organization. In the intermediate or oligopoly sized group, where two or more members must act simultaneously before a collective good can be obtained, there must be at least tacit coordination or organization.

The establishment of an organization within a group, of course, will exert a cost. The development of a structure within the group capable of the effective promotion of the collective good grows proportionately more difficult as the
to divide it. Each individual will be more responsive to both the quality and nature of the collective good. Most importantly, if an individual were to withhold their contribution to the collective good, there would be a much greater danger of the good not being provided than would be the case in larger groups.

Olson appears to be in implicit agreement here with the neo pluralist writers considered in chapter two. While Truman et. al. tended to belittle the role of formalized organization within groups, both the neo pluralist and economic group theorists apparently recognize the importance of this feature of interest groups.

Olson, p. 46. Again, Olson disqualifies small groups from his model in this regard.
number of members within the group increases. As the membership grows, the institutions of organization must develop increased formality and the capabilities to deal efficiently with the more complex issues accompanying growth. Furthermore, a minimum level of organization must be provided in each group to which a commensurate level of minimum cost will be attached. That is, a group seeking to organize will incur a certain minimum cost of doing so, regardless of the amount of collective good being sought. The result is a relatively high per-unit-cost of organization until which time the group attains membership levels making the structures of organization more cost-effective. Because we assume a group possesses finite levels of resources, any amount required to enable the group to develop structures of organization must be subtracted from that amount allotted by the group to the provision of the collective good. In short, while organization may assist a group in obtaining its collective goal, there exist potentially prohibitive costs effectively limiting the utility of this tool for many groups.10

At this point it appears impossible for any but the smallest of groups to effectively seek an optimal level of the collective good. One of the unique contributions of the rational actor model argues that without coercion or the use of selective incentives it is unlikely that groups of any significant size will provide any amount of this good for themselves. However, it is also Olson's assertion that, with the use of selective incentives, the leadership of the group can, and in fact often does, entice people to join the group and compels them to act in accordance with the group goals. A selective incentive allows the group leadership to reward those members who contribute to the provision of the collective good and to withhold reward from those who do not. Typically, these rewards will take the form of coercion or sanction if the required contribution is

10 Olson, op. cit.
not forthcoming. Professional organizations, for instance, often possess some type of quasi-judicial power of regulation over members (i.e., medical and bar associations) which allows the group to dictate the norms of professional conduct. In particular cases government has made membership within such organizations a mandatory requirement for those seeking to practice within a given jurisdiction. The result is the possession, by those organizations, of control over the very livelihood of their members. On the positive side, groups may offer such benefits as special group insurance policies, reduced rate vacations or bulk purchasing programs, all of which can be denied to those who fail to make the necessary contribution to the provision of the group goal. Thus, with the tool of selective incentives it is possible to motivate individual members within large groups to contribute to the provision of the collective good.\(^\text{11}\)

The contribution made to group theory by the economic theorists and their rational actor model is clearly revolutionary. The questions raised by this model strike at the very heart of prior pluralist thought, attacking its most basic assumptions. If we accept that group activity is influenced by the basic economic self-interest of the group member, stimulated by the provision of selective incentives, and not by each individual member's desire to promote the collective good, then we must alter the pluralist conception of the nature of the group goal(s). If the group goal is achieved only through coercion or inducement offered by selective incentives, it does not follow that such a goal need be, or even likely is, the product of the values and desires of the members of that group. If the group leadership is capable of motivating the membership to contribute to the achievement of the collective good, through the use of selective incentives, the collective good can be virtually anything the group leadership

\(^\text{11}\)Ibid.
desires it to be. In short, there is no reason to suggest that interest groups seek to forward the goals and desires of the members who give them legitimacy in the eyes of those they lobby. Instead, the ends are sought by the leadership of the group, providing it is they who control the use of selective incentives.\textsuperscript{12}

A product of the economic nature of the model is a heavy pre-occupation with rationale which are solely material in content. While Olson's contribution of the importance of selective incentives in the analysis of internal group dynamics is clearly seminal, his analytical focus places limits upon the ultimate scope of his theory. The rational actor model recognizes only economic(or "material") selective incentives, equating \textit{rational} man with \textit{economic} man. In suggesting that each rational person seeks to maximize their own personal welfare, the rational actor model fails to recognize that the definition of "welfare" is individual-specific; instead of material benefit, a person may in fact place greater relative value upon something entirely less tangible. The economic model has failed to appreciate the importance of perception upon each individual's \textit{rational} activity.\textsuperscript{13}

In this model, Olson et. al., have assumed a situation of perfect information where each individual evaluates a given situation from the same complete reservoir of information. In fact, few, if any, decisions possess the benefit of being premised upon perfect information. As a result, individuals actually base decisions upon \textit{personal estimates} of situations derived from

\textsuperscript{12}This further builds upon the importance of the contributions to group theory made by the neo pluralists(outlined in chapter two). In their work the lack of perfect competition among groups in society was a major focus, illustrating the capacity which exists for the hegemonic control of power within society. Olson has further illustrated that the positions advocated by any groups which may become hegemonic are not the values and desires of the group members, but those of the group leadership. In short, what was first articulated as a "democratic" structure of power is, in fact, entirely hegemonic.

\textsuperscript{13}See Terry Moe, \textit{The Organization of Interests}(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980) for a detailed evaluation of Olson's assumptions.
information readily available. Assuming this, and considering that individuals are most likely to contribute to a collective good the greater their estimation of the marginal benefit derived and the lesser their estimation of the marginal cost incurred, individuals may now determine that a rational action would be to contribute to the provision of the collective good. That is, if an individual estimates they will be maximizing their personal welfare by contributing to a group goal, there will exist an incentive for that individual to contribute to the provision of that collective good.¹⁴

Organizational Behaviouralists

Because the perceptual glaucoma of the economic model of group activity is a product of the conscious and intentional bias of the paradigm, other schools of thought offer enlightening additions to Olson's original model. One of the most significant, in this respect, has come from the theorists of organizational behaviour.¹⁵ These writers introduced the concept of value typologies, making the vast number of potentially significant forces capable of motivating individuals to action within groups more recognizable and easily dealt with in an analytical

¹⁴The individual may decide to contribute, then, for reasons that are entirely "political" in nature. If the individual estimates their contribution will make a significant difference in the pursuit of the collective goal of the group, this decision to contribute is motivated for political reasons, not an economic desire to advance their material gain. This supports the pluralist contention that individuals are motivated by political concerns, contrary to Olson's suggestion of rational economic man. For a detailed consideration of incentives see the list of Organizational Behaviourists listed below.

structure. The resulting analysis is somewhat less rigorous and formal than that originally offered by the economic school, but allows the observer to more adequately determine the influence of the different types of motivation upon the organization in question. While the result is admittedly lacking in its analytical convenience and predictive ability, in relation to the original offered by Olson, it offers a comprehensiveness unobtainable within the original by virtue of its ability to provide for influences proven too unwieldy for the more strict economic paradigm. The organizational theorists maintain that situational definitions will vary, not only between organizations, but between individuals within the same organization. They quite consciously assume imperfect information on the part of individuals. Furthermore, they reintroduce an element of subjectivity to the understanding of the internal organizational dynamics of groups with their explicit recognition of the fact that the ability of each individual to come to an optimal choice on a given set of alternatives is limited by the informational estimates formed of the situation confronting them.

Any definition of rational man premised upon a single economic motivation, then, is inadequate. Rationality depends upon the perceptual assumptions within which it is defined by the individual. Inconceivable, however, to a model premised solely upon economic rationale is the existence of different forms of motivational incentives to action. Peter Clark and James Wilson have articulated three separate types of possible incentive capable of motivating individuals to contribute to a collective good. The first is that identified within the rational

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16 This typology is dealt with in more detail below where the different types of selective incentives which can exist for individuals within groups are discussed.

17 The temperament of social phenomena can often have this debilitating effect upon theoretical structures too unyielding to the cantakerous nature of reality.

18 Clark and Wilson, op. cit.
actor model of internal group dynamics: material incentives. Typically, these are such tangible rewards as the provision of goods or services in return for the individual's contribution and are normatively unrelated to the collective good, or to the provision of the good. The second type, solidary incentives, are intangible social values, such as the camaraderie engendered through association with other group members or the status accruing to an individual by virtue of their membership within the group. Because these qualities are acquired simply through the act of membership and are the product of social interaction, these incentives are of neither a political nor an economic nature. The last category of incentive, purposive, is a similarly intangible value and is acquired by the individual through their support of a cause which he/she exhibits efficacy towards (i.e., the collective goal of the group). This type of incentive is entirely political in nature, prompting an individual to action because of their sympathies toward the group goal.

The impact of this contribution is to alter the nature of the collective good as defined above. To this point a key characteristic of the collective good has been the indiscriminate way in which it has been proportioned to all members of the group, regardless of their actual contribution toward its achievement. With the added consideration of solidary and purposive motivations, it is the participation itself which becomes the incentive. Individuals may now contribute to the collective group goal for reasons of a social or political nature without the need of added economic inducements to action.

Non-Material Groups

A further contribution of this school is the realization that the characteristics exhibited by groups founded upon non-material incentives will
differ considerably from their materialist incentive counterparts. Groups using solidary forms of incentive will find the initial development phase of the group more difficult than groups offering the more instrumental type of material incentive. In this initial phase group leader(s) will be placed at the mercy of their clientele, as it is they who will create the atmosphere of camaraderie or confer status by association for prospective members. It will be more difficult for an organizer to make a group membership more attractive to those seeking solidary rewards than for an entrepreneur to, perhaps, alter the color of the toaster being offered to prospective members.

In contrast, any group organizer seeking to establish a group on the basis of purposive incentives will have relatively little trouble. At the outset, comparatively little capital is required to select a particular cause, than promote a group as its sole guardian. The difficulty is found, instead, in the maintenance of the group. Groups established upon purposive incentives are particularly susceptible to changes in the external environment. Government, for instance, may suddenly capitulate upon its opposition to the cause which gave the group life, eliminating the group's raison d'être. What is more, while the structure of the group is simple enough to establish in theory, membership will be difficult to attract unless a proven potential for the provision of purposive incentives is provided.

Furthermore, relative to material incentives, solidary and purposive inducements lend a degree of relative instability to those group structures they support. In groups with any appreciable degree of heterogeneity of membership, non-material incentives will prove to be particularly de-stabilizing in their effect

19 See Clark and Wilson, op. cit; and Moe, op. cit.

20 Moe's political entrepreneur model thus accounts for the differing types of bases upon which groups are formed, suggesting that each will possess differing effects upon the nature of the group's actions. See Moe, op. cit.
upon the organization's roster. Because non-material incentives are less costly to duplicate they are also more easily duplicated by rival group leaders than the more costly material incentives. This allows competing groups to lure away from each other any components of disaffected membership which may arise periodically, resulting in a significantly more fragile membership structure within groups based upon such incentives.\textsuperscript{21}

It is, of course, for these same reasons that prospective group leaders may purposefully seek out non-material incentives for their group(s). The relatively little cost associated with non-material incentives reduces maintenance costs of the group for the leader, particularly within groups organized on the basis of purposive incentives. Providing those services rendered to the membership are positively related to the collective good, there will exist an incentive for the members to provide these services themselves, further reducing the cost to the group leader.\textsuperscript{22} The entrepreneur may also seek to promote political goals within the group for the same reasons. In short, if the risks associated with the elements of instability which accompany non-material incentives appear acceptable to prospective group organizers, non-material incentives are entirely feasible bases of group organization. As Terry Moe writes, in the final consideration, solidarity groups may be more easily motivated to pursuit of the collective good than economically motivated organizations:

Unlike in material associations, members need not participate because they view their activities as instrumental to the group's success(or failure), or because they are "selfishly" maneuvering for a stronger bargaining position. When purposive incentives are important, they may also participate because they gain expressive benefits from the process of participation itself—and, hence, they are more easily

\textsuperscript{21}See Moe, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{22}Moe thus suggests that, despite the apparent drawbacks to certain non-material incentives, there is still sufficient incentive for group leaders to opt for these bases of organization.
induced to engage in activities for or against group goals depending upon whether they support them.\textsuperscript{23}

Exchange Theorists

An additional contribution to the theory of internal group dynamics is offered by the school of "exchange theory."\textsuperscript{24} While this theory, at least in its later form, emerged as a critique of Olson's rational actor model, the two theories possess distinctly similar roots in the theory of economics.

Of particular concern to this study is the nature of the value exchange these theorists envisage occurring between the group organizer and its members. While the theory possesses the outward trappings of a classical economic interpretation, the values exchanged are not necessarily of a tangible and material nature. While it is important for every leader to maintain an adequate flow of benefits from the group to him/herself, and while the membership must obtain the same from the leader, there exists no stipulation that these benefits be of an economic nature. As Moe again illustrates, with reference to the role of the group organizer, the exchange theorists have shown it is possible for an economic model to incorporate a diversity of individual preference orderings:

Like other individuals, he may be motivated by ideology, religion, belief in democracy, social pressures, and perhaps especially likely in this case, such considerations as status and power. He need not be driven solely or even primarily by economic self-interest and need not make decisions

\textsuperscript{23}Terry Moe, \textit{The Organization of Interests}(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

designed to maximize his economic surplus.25

The Political Entrepreneur

The work of both the exchange theorists and organizational behaviouralists proved to be of considerable influence upon Moe in the formulation of his own model of interest group dynamics. Moe's political entrepreneur paradigm advances from the original attempt at reconciliation of extremes to a desire to formulate a model which combines the analytical preciseness of the economic rendition of interest group activity with the more subjective, and yet comprehensive, formulations contributed by the two preceding schools.26 Moe is seeking a "hybrid" of what he perceives are two opposing approaches to the theory of groups. He desires a compromise of a sort between the unwieldy assumptions of the organizational behaviouralists, on the one hand, and the too hypothetical rational actor model on the other. As Moe describes it, however, there is an intense friction between these two aims:

[There exists] an inherent tension between the need for analytical convenience and the desire to be comprehensive and realistic. Analytical convenience is facilitated by the individualistic assumptions of perfect information and economic motivation and by a radically rarified organizational context—or perhaps, as in Olson's analysis, by omitting the organizational context entirely. Comprehensiveness and realism are enhanced by the assumptions of imperfect information and mixed motivations and by an empirically grounded version of the organizational context.27

25 Moe, p. 122.

26 While the analytical connection between Moe's political entrepreneur and the contributions offered by the Organizational Behaviouralists is not drawn directly, the addition of the value typology cited above cannot be underestimated.

27 Moe, p. 20-21.
Moe's quest is, nevertheless, to attempt to reconcile these two propensities: to develop a theoretical model of interest groups which assuages both extremes in the hope of producing, as the final product, an explanation of internal group activity that is both convenient and, at the same time, accurate in its depiction of reality.

Olson's model sought to simplify the organizational context of groups in the hope that a more manageable form of analysis would follow. In doing so, however, the model omitted the very elements of group activity which Moe seeks to explain. Moe's solution is the model of the political entrepreneur. Within this model Moe reduces the leadership structure to a single decision-maker about whom it is possible to devise specific assumptions. The operating environment of the organization is characterized by three important types of external actors: 1) government officials; 2) non-governmental officials; and 3) other organizations and rival entrepreneurs. The focus of the model is upon the entrepreneur through which conclusions about group formation, maintenance and internal politics can be made. By viewing the entrepreneur's options and strategies under varying group conditions, and determining how these are reflected within the group's organizational and structural process, the observer may "pull things together."28

In keeping with the influential contributions made by the organizational behaviouralists and exchange theorists, Moe's entrepreneur is susceptible to a mixed array of motivations, both material and non-material. Because of the particularly pivotal importance of the entrepreneur, any variation in their value preference ordering can have a significant effect upon the policies of the organization. Thus, the model allows the observer to determine what the organizational consequences will be given an entrepreneur's particular

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28 Moe, p. 20.
motivational inclinations. Instead of assuming away all competing non-economic motivations, Moe has made this element the pivotal variable within his model.

The actions of ideologically motivated entrepreneurs, for instance, will differ considerably from those whose sole motivation is maximization of personal economic welfare. Moe suggests that concerns of ideology will take precedence over virtually every aspect of the group's operations, from the development of policy goals to the hiring of additional staff. An ideologically motivated entrepreneur can quite consciously sacrifice considerations of expertise and competence for ideological compatibility in the process of recruitment. The effect of such a policy will be, in turn, the development of a rigid organizational structure, prohibiting the entrepreneur from responding to elements of diversity which may arise within the group. This, in turn, will develop into a need to allow the secession of large and important sub-groups, endangering the long-run effectiveness of the organization. On the other hand, another type of non-materially motivated entrepreneur is that who is primarily interested in the promotion of a democratic process of internal group relations. The main concern of this group leader will be the effective expression of interests articulated by the group membership. In the process of providing this, the group becomes an avenue of representation for any elements of heterogeneity found to exist within the group. As Moe has stated:

...because the entrepreneur is a group participant of pivotal importance, the nature of his value system makes a great deal of difference for internal politics as well as for other aspects of associational life. Different values will lead him to different perspectives on member participation, different uses of the communication structure, and so on—all of which have a hand in determining the substance of group

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29 Moe's political entrepreneur model fully subscribes to the elements of neo pluralist theory with respect to the group's relation to its external environment (i.e., the importance of mandate and acceptance within the policy community). This relation is more fully considered below.
goals, the size and financial basis of the group, and its degree of political success.30

Leadership Tools

In what ways, then, are these specific facets of group existence affected by the recognition of non-material incentives by the entrepreneur? As outlined above, the component of communication is perhaps the most important tool available to the group leadership. In groups of solely economic motivation, communication is simply the means to an end. The tenets of the rational choice model suggest that the economically motivated entrepreneur will attempt to use the content of communication to advance the pursuit of the collective good and will seek to keep the method of communication as inexpensive as possible. When non-material incentives are introduced, however, both the content and method take on a new significance. Moe's model suggests that, depending upon the particular method employed, the entrepreneur could provide solidary incentives to the group membership through such techniques as regular group gatherings, conveying information on group activities to the members. The actual content of the group communication will also take on a new importance, becoming the exclusive vehicle for the provision of potential expressive incentives. With the inclusion of non-material incentives, both the nature and the purpose of group communication will alter, becoming a more direct instrument for the provision of non-economic inducements.

A second instrument available to the entrepreneur and articulated by Moe is that of the sub-group, a smaller collection of individuals working within the framework of the larger organization. These may take the form of such familiar intra-group manifestations as discussion panels or committees of various sorts.

30Moe, p. 141.
The prime attribute of these groups is the buttressing of membership morale through the encouragement of cooperation and the fostering of a sense of identity. With the addition of solidary incentives to the model these sub-groups are an obvious attraction to the group entrepreneur, for not only will these groups be easier to establish, they will also convey added benefits of group camaraderie and status by association for those individuals seeking such rewards. While sub-groups are only means to an end, when considered in the light of economic rationale, they possess the potential to become ends within themselves when more diverse motivations are considered.31

Groups and the State

As the internal relations of the larger organization are altered by the consideration of non-material incentives, so too is the group's relation to external groups and government. Presuming a purely economic rationale of incentive, government is the means by which most entrepreneurs provide the collective good for the group. Once any group has obtained the status and recognition associated with membership in the policy community, access to influential persons, strategic contacts and general potential for successful lobbying are all virtually assured.32 Certain groups may even be endowed with administrative and/or quasi-judicial powers. The economic entrepreneur will view this as increasing his potential for economic gain. The political entrepreneur, however, will seek the political and policy goals which may be achieved at this level, fulfilling any expressive goals he/she, or their membership, may possess. Any individuals seeking solidary incentives will relish in the official recognition accorded the group by government, providing it with a degree of status other

31 See Moe, op. cit.  
32 See Pross, op. cit., for a discussion of the policy community.
groups in the same sector cannot achieve. Similarly, to the economic entrepreneur, non-governmental external groups may be approached as prospects for a coalition of sorts or, the ultimate regularized form of coalition, a merger. In this way it will be possible to increase the mandate of the group, devote more resources to policy concerns, and increase the economies of scale pertaining to the provision of material selective incentives. Furthermore, opposing groups blocking the efforts of one group may be approached with the prospect of logrolling, each group offering to support the initiative of the other for reciprocal consideration. Or, perhaps, one group may simply elect to subsidize the efforts of another group whose efforts they wish to succeed, for whatever reasons.33

Conclusion

It has been suggested that when classical pluralist thought reached its position of dominance within political science in North America, it did so upon a "straw man" characterization of the statist school. In their recent period of resurgence the new statist theories have opted for a similar strategy, producing the current state of pluralist demise. Motivational pluralism seeks to incorporate within a pluralist framework the benefits of the theoretical advances of such writers as Philip Selznick and Terry Moe and, in doing so, seeks to create the potential for a rejuvenated pluralist paradigm. The nature of this model is founded upon an embrace of the pluralist concept of the group nature of society. The pivotal question addressed is one of a distribution of power within society: "Who Gets What, When and How?"34 Motivational pluralism accepts the pluralist

33These elements of group behaviour articulated by Moe are easily accommodated within the neo pluralist policy community.

assumptions of the group nature of society as articulated by such writers as Truman and Dahl. Their neo pluralist successors have argued that the state is influenced by the policy community, comprised on the whole, of institutionalized interest organizations. To predict the composition of the policy community and the nature of the interaction within it, however, requires an appreciation of a previously neglected element of internal group dynamics, particularly structures of group organization. This, in turn, requires an appreciation of the significance of the individual member in interest groups and, particularly, the interest group leader(s). How groups interact within the policy community will be determined largely by the elements of motivation and organization within the group. Specific internal characteristics of a group will strongly influence the actions of the group within the policy community.35

To this point pluralist theories have not sought to examine the internal elements of interest groups. Truman, and later the neo pluralists, both examined the element of group organization, yet failed to attach any significance to it as a potentially useful point of analysis. Motivational pluralism corrects this oversight. It is suggested that the degree of institutionalized organization which effectively separates those groups within the policy community from those without. A group's level of organizational development will determine its ability for potential success within the competition for influence upon bureaucratic decision makers and other groups.36

An element which will work to effect an institutionalized group's success

35This is a fundamental position of the political entrepreneur model.

36See T.L. Gais, M.A. Peterson and J.L. Walker, "Interest Groups, Iron Triangles and Representative Institutions in American National Government," American Political Science Review(June, 1983). This paper offers no empirical substantiation to support any suppositions about the reality of the composition of the policy community. The aforementioned authors have shown a loose correlation which supports the claim that institutionalized groups form the policy community, but more work is still needed to confirm such a conclusion.
within the policy arena is its ability to develop and deploy its resources effectively. Motivational pluralism adopts Moe's characterization of specific group resources as "leadership tools," and recognizes the importance of these tools as determinants within the struggle of the policy community. The possession of a well-honed leadership tool by a skilled, appropriately motivated group leader can be the decisive instrument in producing a desired result within the policy apparatus.37 Similarly, any group leader unfamiliar with the ability of a group to deploy a specific resource, and who is thus unfamiliar with its application, can prove a serious liability to the fortunes of that group. What is significant, however, is that motivational pluralism articulates the various resources of groups and the "tools" of its leadership as important determinants upon the nature of a given group's activity within the policy arena.38

At the heart of this revised neo pluralist model, however, is an appreciation for the motivations of the individual member and group leaders of interest organizations. Moe illustrated that individuals are quite capable of joining and forming organizations for reasons of a non-material nature. He further pointed out that groups founded upon differing motivational bases will exhibit different outward characteristics. Groups founded upon solidary incentives are difficult to initiate, but once began are relatively stable organizations. These groups are likely to attain institutionalized levels of development more quickly than purposive organizations which, while easier to initiate, are less stable once in operation. Furthermore, the demands exerted upon the policy process by groups of differing motivations will be similarly diverse. Groups based upon purposive incentives will typically be activist in nature always needing to pacify its membership's desire for attainment of the explicit goal of

37Moe, op. cit.

38Ibid.
the group. Solidary groups, on the other hand, will exhibit more reserve, the group's policies typically the product of an active elite at the group's pinnacle, the remainder of the membership being content simply to belong. Similarly, demands exerted upon the policy process by group leaders of a particular type will vary from the idealistic purposively driven crusader to the consumate pragmatist motivated solely by the maximization of his/her economic welfare. The point is, the individual and his/her motivations are key in the motivational pluralist model. If the importance of the interaction of groups in the societal distribution of power within modern western democracies is to be fully appreciated, an understanding of the significance of internal level variables within interest organizations will be necessary.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


