A SOCIETY TRANSFORMED --
A POLITICAL ANALYSIS
OF RURAL MALAY SOCIETY

By

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This thesis presents a political analysis of rural Malay society in Peninsular Malaysia. Like other traditional societies in Southeast Asia, Peninsular Malaysia has had to contend with the intrusion of economic modernization and the adoption of western democratic institutions and processes. These influences have had a profound affect on how politics is conducted in these states. Since governments must now acquire and maintain the support of a largely rural based population through the electoral principle, these governments must link their bureaucracies and political structures with the peasant in order to maintain stability for their governing bodies. One important way of achieving this goal is to coopt into the institutions of state, those persons viewed by the villager as leaders of their community.

What, then, becomes the glue which bonds the villager to state institutions? That glue is the patron-client relationship. The coopting of a patron produces the necessary linkage between state institutions and the villager. But in order for this connection process to be completed, these leaders must in turn connect with higher level leaders (patrons) who operate within pyramidal structures of patron-client relationships throughout the various levels of the bureaucracy and political structures. I refer to these
linkage connections as "linchpins".

By examining a number of village case studies in Peninsular Malaysia, I provide evidence that the nature of the patron-client relationship has been transformed by the modern state influences. The political dominance of the government has created patron-client structures influenced by the political institutions (e.g., political parties). This political influence has weakened the ability of the bureaucracy to function with any effective linchpins between it and the villager. On the other hand, the political influence has strengthened the linchpin connections between the villager and the politicians. The effects of this dominance has not only shifted patron-client relationships but also has created the environment for either alliance formation, through the existing power structure as factions (within a political party, for example), or has created the potential for peasant group action which could be manifested in protest movements generated outside the patron-client structure. The result could be a weakening or dissolution of patron-client structures. Combine these possibilities and the result will be inimical to state stability.
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INTRODUCTION

The intrusion of economic modernization and the adoption of aspects of (or variants on) western democratic institutions and processes into traditional societies in Southeast Asia has had a profound affect on how politics is conducted in these states. Malaysia, which is the focus of this study, is no exception. Especially important has been the introduction of the electoral principle, since governments must now acquire and maintain the support of the large mass of rural-based peasants. (This is all the more important in states like Malaysia where there is significant rural weightage on constituencies). Accordingly, a government must link its bureaucracy and political structures with the peasants in order to maintain stability for its governing bodies. How can this linkage be accomplished when these institutions tend to have little, or no, relevance to villagers? One such way, with a minimum of resource allocation, is to coopt into the institutions of state\textsuperscript{1} (e.g. civil service, political party etc.), those persons who are accepted by the villagers as leaders of their community. These would be people respected by the villagers, people whom the villagers would turn to when in need. By coopting such people into state institutions, presumably the villager, by following the direction of his leader, will become supportive
of these institutions.

Interestingly, very little seems to have been written about the rural Malay villager in a political context. What has been written does not clearly indicate that any glue exists that bonds the villager to state institutions. This thesis will attempt to identify and analyze the basis of local village politics based on patron-client relationships. These relationships do not simply represent a sociological study of human interaction. They are critical components in the structuring of connections from the institutions of state to the villager. Their operation determines the ability of the government and the political structures to meet their objectives. The interaction is dynamic, complex and far from stable.

In researching this topic, I found little information which assessed Malaysian politics, at the village level, in a way that clearly identified and explained the dynamics of the patron-client relationship in a political context. Many readings which, almost in passing, mentioned the relationship, did so with a distinctively sociological flavour. But politics is people. An understanding of the patron-client relationship, therefore, is fundamental to understanding politics involving the Malay villager. I hope this thesis will provide a fair examination of the dynamics of this relationship and how they operate as a linkage pattern, not only between the villager and his direct
"patron", but also how the linkages extend upward to higher political and bureaucratic "patrons". The overall linkage pattern must be addressed in order to understand the complete political framework now encompassing the villager. This thesis does not provide an exhaustive examination of the subject. In an attempt to be brief, I have discussed what, in my view, are important areas to support my hypotheses. I hope that, through this thesis, I will inspire further research on this interesting topic.

This thesis will be confined to Peninsular Malaysia and will discuss the dynamics of the Malay villager's connection with the institutions of state. It is through a series of vertical connections, which I refer to as linchpins, that the government bureaucracy and political structures come in contact with the villager. In Malaysia, the highly centralized nature of its governmental structures tightly controls the manner in which these linchpins operate. Government dominance of the villager - as achieved through its political agent the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) - has been effected by tapping traditional values, norms and customs. Traditional roots of loyalty, deference and inequality still obtain. In contemporary Malaysia, the patron-client relationship is very much alive among the villager.

Malaysia is not strictly a traditional society any longer. That society must now cohabit with government
bureaucracies patterned after the British civil service, political parties, elections, etc. In an ideal western democratic world, political participation fully extends to the mass population. There are group actions of numerous kinds involving considerable horizontal interaction. Such interaction in the Malay village is very much conditioned by the vertical operation of patron-client relationships. These relationships, however, have undergone a transformation with the introduction of some western democratic institutions to the local village level. This transformation has broadened the patron-client relationship to now include a political base with modern influences. The nature of this change and how it affects the relationship between the villager and the state institutions is the focus of my thesis.

HYPOTHESES

The expansion of patron-client relationships has created a complex structure of linchpin connections with the institutions of state. Once considered strong and durable, such traditional relationships have tended to become less cohesive and more narrowly focused. The result is a shifting of clients and patrons. This shifting pattern is directly attributed to the influence of political structures, through the linchpin connector, on peasant society. It is through the party apparatus of UMNO, the dominant party in the ruling coalition, that a more direct contact is being cultivated with the villager. This contact includes a reshaping of the
traditional patron-client structure.

With the introduction of political parties and electoral politics, traditional leaders have now assumed a more prominent role of broker/middleman. In this role they are tied into higher levels of political and bureaucratic leadership. These distinctions will be important to my analysis and provide support for the hypotheses set out herein. In addition to the more traditional village leader, a more formal organization leader is emerging, attempting to merge with the informal social leader respected by the villagers. Leadership will therefore be discussed in the context of patron-client relationships and how leadership operates within complex organizations.

The political structures are effectively shifting power relationships in such a way as to weaken the base upon which these relationships are built. For example, the political party influences of UMNO are shifting those patron-client relationships through UMNO's domination of the ruling coalition (e.g. MPs and state assemblymen). Instead of creating linchpins of tight control, the government, through its own political arm, may be creating a mutant instead of a variant, one that can weaken both political and government structures. This is evident by the alignment and dissolution of patron-client relationships within this framework.

What impact does all of this have on the peasant? The village unit is becoming less significant as a force in
maintaining traditional norms, customs and values as modern institutions are introduced to the village. Traditional leaders (e.g., the penghulu) are losing influence as well. When traditional institutions break down, new leaders will likely be unable to maintain the same cohesiveness associated with traditional patron-client relationships. This is due to the changing nature of those relationships, which are becoming more susceptible to dissolution. Peasants have two choices; they may either re-align with another patron operating within the existing power structure, or they may operate outside that structure. The latter choice suggests a complete breakdown of the vertical linchpins with state institutions. This breakdown may create a group of orphaned clients with no patron. These clients have the potential to develop horizontal ties with leadership emerging from their midst. This latter choice is conducive to the formation of peasant movements based on common interests (e.g. landlessness) which can be destructive to the interests of state institutions. This last point requires some elaboration.

Malaysia is a one party dominant system which is structured to maintain stability while contending with deep ethnic cleavages. Ethnic issues are aspects of Malaysian politics. Providing an example of "consociationalism", the government, through the National Front (NF) - with UMNO recognized as the predominant member - permits individual
parties to participate in governing as part of a coalition. The predominance of UMNO tends to inhibit the growth of class awareness among Malay peasants. Traditional loyalties, as operating through patron-client relationships, retard that growth. However, deep intra-ethnic divisions can occur as, for example, between the poor Malay peasant and the rich Malay (e.g., landlord) should economic benefits be distributed unequally. Class consciousness can be awakened, culminating in class conflict. Examples of this awakening will be discussed in Chapter 5.

**METHODOLOGY**

A number of village case studies are examined to support the above hypotheses within the theoretical framework presented. By using examples from various Malay villages, in Peninsular Malaysia, with similar culture, customs and traditions, I will be able to conduct useful testing of these hypotheses. Data used are mainly secondary. Some data have been obtained from magazine articles. The secondary material is from the following sources:

A.B. Shamsul presents a case study on a kampung area in Selangor from its early 19th century history until 1985. The villagers in these kampungs are rubber and oil palm cultivators. The study not only describes the interaction among the villager and traditional leaders, but also shows how the state institutions complete the linchpin connection with the villager. Another Selangor study by Stephen Chee, in
1974, analyzes the rural development committee where linchpin roles are discussed in the context of direct connections with the villager. S. Husin Ali examines three diverse communities as typical of rural Malay society. They are in Kangkong in Kedah, Kerdau in Pahang and Bagan in Johore. This study is especially helpful in providing insight into the nature of linchpins prior to the race riots of 1969. Most notable in Ali's work is his diagram depicting the flow of influence and authority between various leaders (village headman, penghulu, district officers, elected representatives) and the villagers. (See Appendix A). This diagram forms the basis of my study and is used to build a network of linchpins well beyond his illustration. Ali's diagram is also assessed, using more recent data from the above sources, to determine its current applicability. (As a result of my study, I present Appendix B appended to this paper which provides a much more extensive examination of the patron-client relationships from village to national institution levels. This appendix will be drawn to the reader's attention throughout the thesis). A number of studies by Marvin Rogers of a group of villages known as Sungai Raya assist in identifying the shifting pattern of the linchpin as it affects the traditional leader. Last, Shukor Kasim, David Gibbons and Halinah Todd present a joint work on the poor Malay villagers who cultivate paddy in Kedah. I use this 1982 study to substantiate the breakdown in the patron-client
structures and the political consequences arising from it. I augment these studies with material from current editions of *Far Eastern Economic Review*.

Chapter 1 provides a short background on Peninsular Malaysia. From this background I will introduce a theory of patron-client relationships as the theoretical framework for my analysis. Chapter 2 will introduce the Ali diagram referred to above. This diagram displays the linchpins at a first (or direct) level of connection with the villager. I will introduce these linchpins and make certain observations as to their effectiveness. Chapter 3 will present an analysis of these observations by their connection with a higher sub-level of leadership. Chapter 4 will expand on the Ali diagram to a second, more indirect, level of linchpin. These linchpins operate within the bureaucracies and political structures at village, mukim (sub district), district, state and national levels. Their interaction will be examined and analyzed in the context of the observations and analyses of Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 5 discusses certain unusual dynamics of the patron-client structure. For example, these structures permit a form of group action among either clients or patrons. The resulting formation of horizontal ties has significance for the patron-client structures which may operate within existing power structures or outside of those structures. How this dynamic affects the role of opposition parties, such as the Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS),
is also discussed. Chapter 6 is the general conclusion. It will give a brief review of my hypotheses and conclusions drawn from them. Also I will comment on the implications of my findings.

In summary, essential to the study of contemporary politics in Malaysia is an understanding of the dynamics of patron-client relationships. Such relationships underpin the dominant vertical linkages connecting the various levels of political institutions to the Malay villager. Modern institutions, such as bureaucracies and political parties, are also penetrated by informal patron-client networks which weaken formal authority structures. Referred to by James Scott as "personal alliance networks", they are as critical in the day-to-day operation of national institutions as in local village politics. The main difference is that the former networks are more obscured by the formal appearance of modern institutions.
Notes:

1. Where used in this paper, state institutions will refer to our general understanding of the term, i.e., political organizations, parties, governmental organizations and bureaucracies, including civil service, committees, agencies etc.

2. "Linchpin" is defined in The Oxford Dictionary (1986 edition) as: 1) pin passed through axle-end to keep wheel in place or 2) element or person vital to an organization etc. The Oxford Dictionary, (1986 edition), Oxford: University Printing House. 1986. I define the term, in this thesis, as follows: someone who performs a role connecting institutions of state, such as bureaucracies, political parties, etc., with the villager. This role, as achieved through the operation of the patron-client relationship, permits state institutions the ability to obtain villager support for, or compliance with, state objectives. In addition, this linkage role provides the villager with access to those institutions in meeting villager needs.


4. UMNO is one of a number of Malaysian political parties comprising the "National Front" (or ruling coalition). In Peninsular Malaysia, other major NF parties include the Malaysian Chinese Association and Malaysian Indian Congress. See The Europa Year Book: A World Survey, Vol.II, 1988, p.1771.

5. I use the terms "informal" and "formal" in distinguishing leadership within the informal social system and the formal organization. In group theory, a common technique to ensure compliance (or at least acquiescence) of the primary group with the organization (e.g. bureaucracy, governmental organizations, political parties etc) is to tie the social power of the informal group to the purposes of the formal organization. This is by way of the formal organization leader assuming the role of the informal social leader. This technique can be applied to patron-client relationships where the informal social system
leader is coopted into the organization to a formal leadership role thereby merging the informal/formal role and achieving support from the clientele.

6. "Penghulu" is defined by S. Husin Ali in Malay Peasant Society..., op.cit., p.180 as follows: In his contemporary role, he is head of a sub-district who constitutes the lowest level of the administrative hierarchy. He is considered a civil servant and is paid a salary. He is also supposed to symbolize leadership at the village level. Historically, penghulu (and penggawa in Kelantan) were generally considered representatives of the Rulers. For more information on the penghulu and his role, see chapter 2 of this thesis.

7. Milne and Mauzy, Politics and Government..., op.cit., pp.352-355. The main ethnic divisions in Peninsular Malaysia are Malay, Chinese and Indian. (p.353). The authors further note that predominance of one party is necessary for stability in developing countries with deep ethnic cleavages, since near equality in power can lead to fear of domination and "security via hegemony". Malaysia is such an example. (p.354).

8. Ibid., pp.381-382. With regard to class cleavages, I confine my comments to class distinctions involving the Malay peasant.

9. Kangkong's main economic activity is rice-growing by wet paddy farming. Being near the sea, fishing is an additional activity. Kerdau relies on rubber and timber but some rice is grown by swamp paddy. Bagan's main form of agriculture is rubber tapping with the addition of coconut harvesting. See Ali, Malay Peasant Society..., op.cit., pp.3-5.

CHAPTER 1

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THEORY

Many Malay villages tend to form as linear settlements along rivers, waterways, roads, etc. Depending on location, these villages may or may not have easily defined physical boundaries. The recognized Malay word for hamlet or village is "kampung", denoting a natural settlement. The administration of most states in Peninsular Malaysia is divided into districts, subdistricts (mukim) and villages (kampung). The smallest administrative unit of the state government is the mukim which is represented by an appointed official (penghulu). The penghulu lives in his kampung and works from his home. The size of the mukim can vary. In Kedah, for example, a mukim may consist of approximately ten kampung. A kampung may vary from a few houses to over two hundred. The penghulu's influence in his own kampung is considerable, but does not usually extend directly to other villages. In this regard, the penghulu is assisted by a village headman who may head more than one village.

The Malay villager in Peninsular Malaysia considers rice paddy the traditional crop. It has spiritual and symbolic value. Many of the kampungs I use in this study have this agricultural base. Other villagers, such as those studied by
Shamsul, are rubber and palm oil cultivators. All the studied areas can be described as agricultural, which is typical of rural Malay society. Land, therefore, becomes a central social and economic force tied to the village unit. Apart from inheritance, property is acquired as gifts from kin, through purchase or by government grant. It is strongly regarded as a personal possession. The coherence of the village as a social unit depends on this factor, along with many others, including the interaction between traditional and modern forces.

Contemporary rural society in Peninsular Malaysia is deeply rooted in its history, which is shaped by customs (adat) embodying shared norms, values, beliefs, mores and traditions. Status is determined by adherence to these customs. Personal qualities such as age, kindness, honesty, cleverness and piety are also considered status giving. Villagers seek out these qualities in those whom they believe can perform roles of leadership. With the addition of modern influences, wealth, education and occupation can be important considerations. Marked with this is the "Malay way", emphasizing traditional courtesy, consultation and consensus.

A unifying factor for the Malay villager can be religion. Islamic ties in Peninsular Malaysia reportedly extend back to the 13th century. The Islamic organization is centred on the mosque which has become a unifying symbol.
Educational organizations include religious schools (pondok), which are common in northern Peninsular Malaysia. Since the 1970's, the Islamization of Malaysia has steadily increased and has become the last barrier insulating the Malay ethnic identity. The Islamic resurgence at the village level has an important effect on the villager's land holdings. Under the Islamic law of inheritance, a complex body of legislation determines the apportionment of land to the family heirs following the death of the husband/father. The equal distribution among males can cause the economic position of the family members to deteriorate. This factor will be discussed in Chapter 5.

In rural Malay society, group function is neither strong nor stable. It is a society of dyadic relationships which are the basis of personal ties. The relationship between an Islamic teacher and his student would be such a relationship. Breaking the personal tie breaks the relationship. Village leadership is also structured in this manner. Leaders are not chosen by organizations but emerge because of their influence over others, through the dyadic relationship. These relationships are flexible. For example, landowners and tenants may have permanent or temporary relationships depending on the circumstances.

The rapid population growth experienced in Peninsular Malaysia this century has adversely affected the villager as land has become more scarce. For example, in Malacca, wide-
scale migrant work has become necessary. In Kelantan, many villagers have left their villages to clear land in the state's interior or work tapping rubber. In Kedah, renting land has become more difficult. The genesis of this changing environment is found in colonialism. A brief description of pre-colonial rural Malay society is useful at this point followed by a discussion on the colonial influence.

The localization of power in pre-colonial Peninsular Malaysia was pervasive and networks of patron-client bonds were common. The typical patron was a petty local leader who owed his leadership to personal skills, wealth and occasional connections with regional leaders. These factors enabled him to maintain a personal following. However, it was the village which served historically as a key unit of solidarity and security. The village also provided minimal guarantees of protection and material welfare, particularly when the village was cohesive and insulated from outside forces. The less isolated the village, the more difficult it was for the village to meet its obligations. Patron-client bonds existed within this community structure. But the patron's bargaining strength was limited by village norms and pressures. As an alternative primary social network, the village provided similar services to those of the patron. Consequently, the village not only restricted the degree of imbalance in patron-client exchanges but also the social
significance of clientage in the community as a whole.  

More exploitive forms of patron-client ties were discouraged by redistribution mechanisms operating by virtue of the local power situation. A wealthy villager would be pressured by villagers to redistribute much of his gain through expensive ceremonial offices, charity, loans etc. Some of his wealth was traded for prestige by ensuring everyone had a subsistence livelihood. He therefore became a legitimate patron with status, prestige and a clientele obligated to him.  

The local power situation dictated these parameters as he could not rely on outside force or law to protect him. The relative autonomy of the traditional village gave local legitimacy a practical value and helped ensure that patrons would honour traditional norms of reciprocity.  

British colonial rule, from the late 19th to early 20th centuries, shaped the country's politics, economy and the patron-client relationships. It extended gradually and indirectly by way of the residential system, which was first introduced in the state of Perak in the late 1870's. By the late 1880's, four states were operating under the system. In 1895, these four states were formed into a "Federation", each with a Resident responsible to a British Resident-General, who in turn was responsible to the Governor of the Straits Settlements. As development became increasingly more widespread, there was a greater demand for more specialized and complex bureaucratic institutions to deal
with the maintenance of law and order, tax and revenue collecting, administering a market economy, etc. New offices were established to contend with these developments, namely, Chief Minister, State Secretary, District Officer, and Assistant District Officer (and others of lower rank).  

No longer were the traditional rulers or chiefs permitted to collect taxes and revenue for their own use. These were now state functions, carried out by state functionaries. The rulers continued to collect revenue but only for the administration's treasury. For the Federated States, much of the chief's role was assumed by Assistant Residents while the jurisdiction of the rulers was extended over the entire state. Many of the political and administrative functions of the traditional aristocracy were assumed by the new state bureaucracy. There was, however, some participation from the rulers and chiefs. For example, state councils, which became the sole legislative body, were formed to consult on state related matters. Included on the council were the ruler, major chiefs and resident.  

Colonialism changed the nature of the traditional vertical patron-client ties. The concentration of the exchange relationship was altered. There were now multiple dependencies, each less intense and comprehensive. The ties became less diffuse and more separate and narrow. In those areas most subjected to colonial influence, the new patron's effectiveness often became specialized to a particular aspect
of a diversifying social structure. Colonialism was also responsible for the commercialization of agriculture and concentration of land ownership in rural Malay society. The impact of market forces in the rural areas produced a new elite consisting of landowners and a class of peasants working as tenants and labourers. Colonialism broke the relative autonomy of the local community and undermined many of the community's redistributive pressures. If a patron lost social approval, he could solicit an outside ally with the power to assist his local position. The relative power of the patron substantially increased while his need for clients decreased. The patron therefore had new leverage which was strengthened by the growing complexity of a colonial-ruled society.

British colonialism began the process of connecting the Malay villager with state institutions, utilizing the prevailing patron-client structures. The emergence of the nation-state did little to impede the vitality of that process. Indeed, the more modern state institutions further developed these connections with the introduction of political parties and electoral politics. Within this framework, I begin my analysis by presenting a theory of patron-client relationships. The political structure of patron-client relationships is typical of both local and national politics in Southeast Asia. The relationships are characteristic of contemporary
and traditional politics in the region. The style of the linkage reflects their traditional particularistic, diffuse and informal characteristics. They do not include those vertical ties simply governed by impersonal regulations and legal contracts, e.g., money lenders/borrowers, employers/employees, or officials/citizens. James Scott defines the patron-client relationship as an exchange relationship between two roles. It is:

a special case of dyadic (two person) ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socio-economic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron.

It is the reciprocity of mutually valued services which distinguishes the relationship from one based on pure coercion or formal authority alone. Three other essential characteristics of the relationship are: its basis in inequality, its face to face contact, and its diffuse flexibility as a system of personal exchange.

The inequality between the patron and client is rooted in the disparity in wealth, status and power. The client, who has entered into an unequal exchange relationship, is unable to completely reciprocate. The patron will command loyalty or deference by satisfying the basic subsistence needs of the client. The degree of compliance though, will be determined by how dependent the client is on his patron's services. The more his basic needs are met, the stronger the sense of
obligation or debt. For the patron, such a debt becomes a "store of value - social credit that...(a patron) can draw on to obtain advantages at a later time." 34 The patron's status is enhanced by this relationship which in turn gives him the capacity to mobilize his client or clientele on request. The larger the clientele and the more dependent they are on him, the greater the ability to organize group action. 35

A second important feature of the dyad is the face to face contact. This is the personal quality of the relationship. The regular operation of reciprocity often forms a bond of trust and affection between the patron and client. When a client needs a loan or someone to act on his behalf with authorities, the client knows he can rely on the patron to provide the necessary assistance. The mutual expectations are shaped by community values and rituals. The relationship is not simply a neutral link of mutual advantage. 36

A third feature reflects the affective quality of the relationship. Patron-client structures are diffuse. Scott refers to them as "whole person relationships" where the multiple nature of the relationship can involve a variety of potential exchanges. For example, a landlord may have a client tied by tenancy, friendship, earlier reciprocal arrangements, former ties with family, etc. The linkage would be very flexible both in terms of needs and resources of the dyad. The more diffuse the relationship is, the stronger and
more durable it becomes.\textsuperscript{37}

Patron-client structures are based on power relations. They will endure best in an environment which maintains the status quo. Patrons will retain clients as long as the patron continues to dominate the supply of services needed. A patron will also retain his clients if the reciprocity binding the partners is acceptable.\textsuperscript{38} In stable rural settings, the power relationship between peasant and elite can produce a norm of reciprocity. This would include reciprocal rights and obligations which acquire a moral force of their own. Sudden efforts to reset these norms will be viewed as a violation of traditional obligations which patrons have historically assumed. Such changes or breaches provide the client with a moral basis for action against the patron.\textsuperscript{39}

The basic social guarantees of security and subsistence are the cornerstones of traditional patron-client legitimacy. Should there be a breach of these guarantees, the original basis for the attachment and deference is removed. Clients will consider the relationship unjust and exploitive.\textsuperscript{40} The more homogeneous the clientele, the greater the potential is that shared interests might threaten the relationship. Shared situation and common experience (e.g., village community) create the potential for horizontal ties and group action at the expense of patron-client ties.\textsuperscript{41} The balance of reciprocity in the exchange relationship seems to depend largely on the relative bargaining positions of the dyad
which, since colonialism, has been influenced by such structural changes as land scarcity, expansion of state power and population growth.\textsuperscript{42} What, then, comprises the exchange relationship?

For the patron, the exchange relationship provides for the client's basic means of subsistence which may include steady employment, seed, equipment etc. The patron would be expected to aid the client in difficult economic times even at the patron's expense. This expense would include absorbing any loss in order to maintain a subsistence level for his client. The patron would also provide protection, including physical security, if necessary. Finally, patrons, as a group, may provide collective services to the village. Such services would include donation of land for communal use, support for public services, community protection, etc.\textsuperscript{43}

The client to patron flow is less defined. A client will generally lend labour and services. The client contributes the labour to the farm, business or personal services to a patron's household, etc. Some of the services may be of a more symbolic nature, such as expressions of deference. In this regard, the most important service provided is being a loyal member of the patron's local faction.\textsuperscript{44} As part of this faction the client would protect his patron's reputation, and assist him in advancing his patron over other patrons.\textsuperscript{45}

A major component of patron-client relationships is
instrumental ties. But it is the affective quality of the relationship which will determine how cohesive the relationship remains. Placing dyads on a continuum, one would find the largely instrumental relationship at one end, with the largely affective one at the other. The farther along the continuum toward the affective end, the stronger and more cohesive the relationship. However, cohesiveness should not be mistaken for coerciveness. At one end of the continuum would be a tenant completely dominated by a landlord. Farther along, an independent smallholder would be less dependent, less dominated and more likely to receive inducements rather than threats. The greater the coercive power of the patron, the more likely he will employ sanctions, threats of punishment or withdrawal of a client's benefits. An example is provided by the plight of two women villagers in the Kasim et al study whose tenancy was removed by the landlord. They had no other patron to approach. (This example is the subject of discussion in Chapter 5). A less dominant patron would be more inclined to offer inducements. In either case, superior control of resources would be used to obtain the compliance of the follower.

Patron-client structures are not simply isolated two person relationships. They are much more complex than that. Although they are dyads, they can operate in configurations referred to by Scott as "pyramids", "clusters" and "networks". Scott identifies these terms as follows.
cluster consists of a patron's immediate following of numerous clients who are tied to that patron. Clusters have a base of membership specific to each link with individual ties to the patron. The pyramid is a vertical extension downward of the cluster. A patron's clients may in turn be patrons of a lower level clientele and so on. It is within this pyramidal structure that horizontal dyadic ties appear as, for example, an alliance between two patrons of comparable standing. Finally, networks are composed of the patron-client linkages operating within a given community or area.\textsuperscript{49}

Patron-client networks can join persons who are not kinsmen and can act as building blocks for elaborate chains of vertical integration. They represent a type of social connection that may be dominant under some conditions and marginal under others.\textsuperscript{50} According to Scott, a peasant's main social link is to the elite patron. This link reduces the social significance of horizontal ties between the peasants themselves. The overall pattern is one of a disaggregated peasantry vertically connected by bonds of loyalty to agrarian elites.\textsuperscript{51} But patron-client dyads are not isolated from their environment, which can include other overlapping dyadic relationships. According to Scott, that environment also includes kin groups and village as alternative "agencies" of protection, maintenance and advancement:

Although most invididuals are enmeshed in all three units, the more effective the social guarantees of village and kin are, the less socially significant patron-client dyads will normally be. Each link is
particularly strong and weak but as a society becomes more complex, the importance of the patron-client links will also grow because of the growing need for economic and political contacts outside of the kin, village networks.52

This statement suggests that rural Malay society is not completely subsumed by the patron-client relationship to the exclusion of other forms of interaction. Two types of interaction, i.e., the horizontal nature of group action and the vertical operation of the patron-client dyad, are not mutually exclusive. In fact, they may act in conjunction with one another. For example, patrons may want to achieve specific goals which require the mobilization of their clientele for co-ordinated action. Such co-ordination could be initiated by the clients or by the leader. When a group of clients believes their individual welfare (whatever that might be) depends on the success of the patron attaining his goals, they will provide united support. Should individual clients not concur, pressure may be applied by a small core of sub-leaders who provide a form of collective leadership for the clientele. The nature of this leadership has the potential to conflict with the leadership of the patron, who may also be a client of a higher patron.53 If a clientele of individual sharecroppers worked separately for a landowner patron, this would not be viewed as group action nor perceived as such by the individual clients.

Leadership is common to both patron-client relationships and group behaviour in complex organizations. The nature of
leadership, however, is different. This distinction has important consequences for informal and formal leadership roles. The cohesiveness of the dyadic structures and the strength of consequential linkages also depend on how the informal social leader is tied to the formal leader of the organization.

According to Carl Lande, a patron will make a larger personal contribution to his relationship than the corporate group head. The patron may, in fact, create the clientele, whereas the corporate group exists independent of the leader. The patron provides external connections, maintenance for the most needy, and has a personal obligation to fulfil commitments made for the client's benefit. In return, he receives more discretionary power. He can decide who is admitted as clients and which ones will acquire most favoured status. He may set many of the goals for which the clientele is mobilized. Once goals are achieved he receives the credit and prestige. He determines how rewards will be distributed among the clientele in accordance with their services to him. Further, the leader has a central position in the structure of the clientele. Subordinates find greater security in their personal attachment to the leader than in any group membership. It is in this way that the client confers upon the patron the power to decide how the dyad will operate.

Lande presents a model of a political system based on a leader - follower relationship possessing characteristics
which may be summarized as follows:

1) The system will rely on a single leader with a disaggregated collection of followers.
2) It will be leader centred, not group centred. The leader creates the group and not vice-versa.
3) The system is tied together by vertical dyadic bonds.
4) The interests uniting leader and follower are particular and not categorical. The purpose is to advance each other's complementary private interests and not to attain a common general objective.
5) The leader seeks power and prestige while the follower seeks protection, both physically and materially. Each requires the other to achieve their goals.
6) The tie between leader and follower requires reciprocity.
7) The dyadic system is dynamic and unstable. A leader's following can expand quickly should he acquire new resources or contract in similar fashion. Either partner can dissolve the relationship; the follower by attaching to another patron, the leader by withdrawing or ending the supply of benefits. As a result, personal attributes of the leader are important in determining size and loyalty of a following.
8) Large dyadic structures will likely have several levels of followings. These pyramid structures comprise chains of vertical dyads linking upper level leaders to clients at the bottom indirectly through a series of sub-leaders. Each linkage depends on face to face contact. Such structures are,
or can be, unstable. This characteristic requires some elaboration.

A sub-leader can be removed from a dyad for a number of reasons. For example, his patron may decide to terminate the relationship as the sub-leader is not providing an acceptable form of reciprocity for the patron. In a political forum, the sub-leader may be unable to mobilize sufficient political support, among his clientele, for the higher level patron. Since the sub-leader is unable to fulfill his part of the exchange relationship, it dissolves. As a result, the sub-leader will lose power and influence with his following since he will not have access to the supply of benefits from the higher patron. The sub-leader may then shift to another patron to restore a supply of benefits to himself and his clients. In this way, the sub-leader may re-acquire his client base and bring additional clients to the new patron who may, or may not, be part of the same pyramid. The additional cluster may therefore increase the power and influence of the higher level patron to the advantage of the sub-leader and his clients.

Where patterns of rural landholding are stable and hereditary, the rural patron-client dyad also tends to be stable and inherited. The client will not support rival patrons. The relationship is ideally one of affection and loyalty. When rural society is organized in this way, the result is a highly oligarchical political structure. A number
of rural landholding patrons are the political actors and their clients are their political resources. The vertical structure of alliances retards the emergence of class loyalties or actions among the clientele, even if there is intense competition among rural patrons for land and power. What is not retarded is factionalism.

Factionalism is related to competition between dyadic non-corporate groups. The rivalry creates both conflict and a sense of community. One of the aims of each faction is to bring benefits to its leader and followers. In order to accomplish that goal, it must defeat similar efforts of rival factions. It is a "zero-sum" game. Rival dyadic relationships require support from the clientele. But that kind of activity permits the fragmentation among groups or "camps". For example, supporters of one faction's leader may have conflicting obligations to support the other faction's leader. Individuals may be harmed unintentionally. This harm could expand the rivalry and the conflict by involving new individuals. Factions have a limited life. For example, a faction which withdrew from a village would presumably lack factions initially in the newly created village until new ones formed. In the Shamsul study, a group of villagers left the village to form its own kampung.

Members are connected to a faction through the leader since the unit has no corporate existence. Also, a faction leader may have several different kinds of connections with
his followers from which to draw support. In the context of clusters, horizontal dyadic ties can easily form. For example, two or more patrons of comparable standing may make an alliance. This alliance would form the basis of factional systems in local politics. A Malaysian example would be the formation of a faction within UMNO in 1987 to challenge the party leadership of the prime minister, Datuk Seri Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad, in the party's April elections. Trade and Industry Minister Tengku Razeleigh Hamzah and Datuk Musa Hitam, who at the time was the deputy president of UMNO, formed an alliance in their attempt to elect Razeleigh as party president. The failure of the Razeleigh-Musa faction to wrest the presidency from Dr. Mahathir resulted in a restructuring of that pyramid downward. Razeleigh resigned his cabinet post and other ministers (and deputy ministers) were fired.66 "The purge was then steadily extended down the UMNO organizational ladder."67 In keeping with the nature of such alliance systems, this was a "zero-sum" game and temporary. The Razeleigh-Musa alliance formally ended in January 1989 with Musa reconciling with Dr. Mahathir.68

Generally, there are different styles of politics in the indirectly ruled, more traditional areas in Southeast Asia than in the directly ruled, heavily commercialized areas. The former rely on pre-existing patron-client bonds and incorporate them into the state institutions. The latter have to contend with many less stable, more instrumentally tied
dyads; for as a greater opportunity exists to form new linkages, there is greater expense in favours and patronage.69

Importing Western democratic institutions such as political parties and electoral politics into Peninsular Malaysia has had the effect of combining complex organizations and new political structures with a traditional society based on a social bond of patron-client relationships. Consequently, patron-client structures have once again been transformed by external forces. For example, new resources for patronage, such as party connections, development programs and bureaucratic power, have been created. Patron-client dyads are linked upward to the national level with jobs, money and small favours in return for political support.70 A number of trends have emerged.

Patron-client ties have tended to become more fragile and less persistent. The market economy and its effects on the social structure have, to some degree, narrowed the scope of the exchange relationship between patron and client. Traditional patrons no longer serve as total protectors. The new patron has tended to become more effective in specialized ways, such as through political or administrative influence. The patron's limited capacity in maintaining the exchange relationship, therefore, reduces the diffuseness and stability of that relationship.71

Generally, the traditional patron personally controlled
local resources. The introduction of colonialism and independence reduced that control by increasing the importance of external resources for local patronage. New patrons could form a client base by tapping sources of patronage created through the establishment of schools, agricultural services and public employment. Many of the new patrons were office-holders whose positions were subject to transfer or political change. Consequently, they were less secure and more inclined to maximize short-term gain. These newer ties were not as strong or as comprehensive as the existing traditionally based structures.72

The new types of patron-client structures often were likely to be more instrumental and less affective. Where once the traditional leader dominated, he now had competition from administrators, school teachers, local businessmen, etc. The greater the penetration of the government, the more likely competition would occur. This penetration also caused patron-client clusters to become more distinct or narrow. For example, a bureaucrat could have a client base primarily within his agency, a businessman among labourers and a landowner among tenants. As a consequence, vertical integration was just as intense as in the traditional patron-client structure; however, the new relationships tended to reduce the universality of coverage.73 With the loss of that universal "cover", some clients could become orphaned from any patron within the power relationship. This result could
be achieved if the patron considered the client unable to reciprocate adequately in the exchange relationship. These orphans could, through co-ordinated group action, generate internal group dynamics among individuals of a certain class. The result could be the rise of leaders from within the group and group action outside the framework of the existing networks. Such an eventuality is anathema to those desiring state institution stability. Ali's landless peasant protest in the 1960s is an example.

The introduction of political parties and the electoral system has transformed the basic patron-client relationship in at least four important ways. First, a client's bargaining position has improved with the addition of electoral politics and the right to vote. Redistributive mechanisms of the traditional village have resurfaced, to some extent, as the patron's position has become more dependent on the social approval of his community. The successful electoral patron also must offer more to his clients than his opponents. Second, with a national government and national elections, it is necessary for the vertical network links to extend to the local village level. The easiest way to achieve this linkage while maintaining strong central control is to tap existing patron-client structures. For example, pre-existing personal links may be used for campaigning purposes rather than mass meetings or policy stands. A party's success can depend on the ability of the local patrons to deliver their clients'
The nature of the new exchange relationship becomes one of local patrons and clients providing votes while the political party undertakes to help its locals (through the patrons) with jobs, dealing with the bureaucracy, etc. The electoral process has tended to localize power, giving the patron more discretion in administrative and development decisions affecting the locality. A third consequence of elections is the expansion of patron-client ties and the absorption of existing ones into the political framework. A local patron will seek out more clients to strengthen his electoral position.

The impact of elections also tends to heighten factionalism. Unless one party completely dominates, the dyad structure promotes the survival of opposition parties. Rival national and regional parties need allies at the local level. The net effect of electoral competition is to awaken latent factional differences among patron-client clusters and sometimes to lend support to weak patrons whose dyad would have otherwise dissolved.

Competitive elections have also increased downward distribution pressures. In return for votes, each patron depends on rewards in order to maintain, not only his wealth and position, but also status among his clientele by distributing those benefits. One positive effect for the client is that the client subsistence level rises. One
negative effect for the patron is a higher level of client expectations. A neo-traditionalist party (such as UMNO) can rely on the traditional legitimacy of many of its leaders who have been successfully coopted into the political machinery. A party without such connections may have to rely more often on highly instrumental ties and attendant difficulties in tapping patron-client structures for support. Such a party would require a significant amount of financial resources to maintain an effective relationship. It is often only the ruling party that can satisfy this condition.77

Electoral politics has brought into prominence the role of broker/middleman. Scott distinguishes the role of patron from that of broker or middleman. Acting as a broker/middleman means serving as an intermediary to arrange an exchange or transfer between two parties who are not in direct contact. This role involves a three party exchange where the agent does not control the resource transferred. The status of the actor is also not specified to others in the transaction, unlike the patron who is of superior rank to his client. A civil servant distributing jobs in his jurisdiction to create or maintain a following would be acting as a patron. These jobs would be perceived as personal gifts from resources under his control and as intended to create a feeling of personal debt and obligation among the beneficiaries. If the civil servant was viewed as someone acting as an agent who would send jobseekers to a politician
who controlled the jobs, he would be acting as a broker. The extent to which he succeeds in representing his acts as personal generosity will determine whether subordinates are bound.78

According to Scott, the terms "broker/middleman" denote roles, not people. It is therefore common for a single individual to act both as a broker and patron. For example, a local landowner, as a patron, may become head of his village's political party. In his political capacity he becomes a middleman between his village supporters and the resources controlled by higher party officials. Therefore, in this capacity, he may serve his clients as a broker. The diffuse nature of the patron-client relationship permits this role to become a natural extension of the relationship. The political party can also give the local patron direct control of its programs and grants in an area. This increases the patron's resource base for maintaining his patron role on a larger scale, without the need for brokerage.79

Brokers are also able to influence the quality of the exchanges taking place between the other two parties. Their mediation can alter the meaning of issues and goals in order to ensure their own freedom of action. Brokers can provide linkage between distant central authorities and relatively independent local level leaders. These "gap bridgers" work where newly formed national offices lack the personal authority and necessary connectedness with the villager.80
The broker/middleman controls the resource of communication. This is a key element in the linchpin connections from the institutions of state to the villager. The brokerage role, therefore, can be a very powerful and influential one. With modern institutions becoming a fixture within rural Malay society, the role of broker has become much more prominent. The broker acquires power and influence thereby increasing status. The potential is there for him to become a patron, if he is not already one.

This chapter has identified rural Malay society as one dominated by dyadic relationships. It has traced these relationships through eras of pre-colonialism, British colonialism and independence. Having identified its historical significance, I have presented a theory of patron-client relationships. From this theory, observations and analyses of the linchpins connecting the institutions of state with the villager can begin.


3. There are also fishing villages.


6. Ibid., pp.72-75.

7. Ibid., p.91.


12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., pp.xvi-xx.


15. Ibid.

16. James C. Scott, "The Erosion of Patron-Client Bonds and Social Change in Rural Southeast Asia", *Journal of*


19. Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya, A History of Malaysia, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1982, pp.172-175: the authors state that the cornerstone of the Residential system was the concept of indirect rule. The administration of Perak from 1877-1889 "became the yardstick by which other Residents and their achievements were measured". The co-operation of the Malay ruling class was essential. Accordingly, compensation was provided to the rulers, princes and leading chiefs. The Rulers were given liberal allowances as well as security from potential challengers. Indirect rule was maintained through a State Council, which became the sole legislative body. Included on the Council were the ruler, selected princes and chiefs along with the Resident.


21. "Federation" did not mean a division of powers between federal and state governments. The Rulers of the four states (Perak, Selangor, Pahang and Negri Sembilan) agreed to accept a British Resident-General and follow his advice. The four states became known as the Federated Malay States. In 1911, the position of Resident-General was abolished and replaced by a "Chief Secretary", further reducing state legislative powers. R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Politics and Government in Malaysia, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1980, pp.15-16.


24. see note 21 which names the federated states.

25. see note 19 for comment on State Council.


28. Ibid., p.22.


30. Ibid., p.132.

31. Ibid., and James C. Scott and Benedict J. Kerkvliet, "How Traditional Rural Patrons Lose Legitimacy: A Theory with Special Reference to Southeast Asia", in Schmidt et al., op.cit., p.443. It is noted that the examples of impersonal contracts do not exclude the possibility that some of those relationships can exist in a patron-client relationship. These examples are simply intended to show another more modern version of vertical relationship not premised on patron-client relationships. They do not possess, on their own, any "debt obligation" as that term is understood in the context of patron-client theory.


33. Scott, "The Erosion of Patron-Client Bonds..", op.cit., p.3.

34. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics..", op.cit., p.126.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid., p.131.


40. Ibid.


43. Ibid., p.9.
44. Ibid.


49. Ibid., pp.127-128.


51. Ibid., p.7.

52. Ibid., p.16.


54. Ibid., p.xxxiv.

55. Carl Landé in his article "The Dyadic Basis of Clientelism" in Schmidt et al., op.cit., on p.xix describes the difference between a corporate and non-corporate group. A corporate group is described as: "...a discrete, multi-member aggregate having property, aims and duties which inhere in the group as such, and are distinct from those of its individual members. Each member has rights and duties with respect to the group. All members are bound together by virtue of their shared membership in the group and by their common obligation to protect its interests and fulfill its obligations." Included as examples are modern world organized interest groups, political parties and nation states. The non-corporate group discussed herein lacks two distinctive characteristics of the corporate group, i.e., undivided common property, aims and duties, and uniform linkage through common membership. In dyadic non-corporate groups, individuals are aided in protecting their individual interests. Any group action is confined to "helping individual members advance their individual interests and fulfill their individual obligations".
56. Ibid., p.xxviii.

57. In the context of group theory, there are primary groups, organized voluntary associations and then those which are nothing more than categories, i.e., unorganized groups consisting of all individuals who have some particular characteristic in common. See Landé, "Group Politics and Dyadic Politics: Notes for a Theory", in Schmidt et al., op.cit., p.506.

58. Carl Landé, "Group Politics and Dyadic Politics: Notes for a Theory" in Schmidt et al., op.cit., p.508. It is possible to have group action undertaken by clients. For example, supporting a patron to be elected will require coordinated action among the clientele. See note no.55 above. For a detailed examination of the dynamics of this type of "group action", see chapter 5 of this thesis.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid., pp.xxix-xxx.

62. Ibid., xxxii.

63. A "zero-sum game" in game theory is where a 'win' for one player is a 'loss' for the other. It is a win/loss situation.

64. Lande, "The Dyadic Basis of Clientelism" in Schmidt et al., op. cit., p.xxxiii.

65. Ibid., p.58.

66. See the following articles in *Far Eastern Economic Review*:
   "Daim for the wolves?", March 26, 1987, p.34.
   and Mauzy, "Decline...", op.cit., p.214.


69. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics..", op.cit., pp.140-144.

70. Ibid., p.136.
71. Ibid., p.137.
72. Ibid., pp.136-138.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid., pp.140-144.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid., p.143.
78. Ibid., p.127.
79. Ibid.
80. Landé, "The Dyadic Basis of Clientelism", in Schmidt et al., op.cit., pp.xxv and xxxvi.
CHAPTER 2

THE DIRECT LEVEL CONNECTION

This chapter is intended to identify the existing patron-client relationships at the village level and to make certain observations about the nature of these relationships in the context of their linchpin role with the villager. Once having done so, I will analyze those relationships in Chapter 3. I will introduce a diagram by S. Husin Ali (see Appendix A) which depicts the flow of influence and authority between various leaders (linchpins) and the villagers. I refer to this level as the first or direct level of linchpin connections. These leaders include traditional authority figures, such as village headman and penghulu, as well as district officer, state assemblyman and political functionary. All have direct face-to-face contact with the villager. I will also comment on how modern institutions have influenced these connections. As well, I introduce my own set of diagrams (Appendix B) which, in my view, give a more comprehensive treatment of the connections.

In his book, *Malay Peasant Society and Leadership*, S. Husin Ali not only examines the nature of leadership, but also how influence and authority between the villager and the first level of linchpin operates. His diagram of this
exchange will be used as a starting point. Subsequent kampung studies will be used to determine the effects of time on his relationship structure.

Two of the most prominent traditional leaders in rural Peninsular Malaysia are the village headman and penghulu. Both positions have been institutionalized. However, the incumbents themselves can affect their ability to function as linchpins. For example, in the Shamsul study, a personality conflict between the headman and penghulu has affected the nature of patron-client relationships. The village headman, like the penghulu, has derived authority from being part of the village social system. Traditionally, the village headman's position was hereditary. If, however, there was no natural successor, villagers of status, through consultation, would decide who the replacement would be. It was in this way that the village headman would represent village norms and customs. In a patron role, his position was conditioned by this village influence. He was a peasant leader as well as a leader of peasants, commanding power, influence and the necessary deference from his following. In this capacity the headman was considered to be representative of the village, acting as a spokesman for his community.

The introduction of modern political institutions to Peninsular Malaysia has altered the role of the village headman. He now serves as a linchpin between the villager and state institutions. For example, the headman is both chairman
of a local Village Development and Security Committee (VDSC) and, where applicable, the local village UMNO party branch. These external forces have impacted on his role as a peasant leader and the prevailing patron-client structures of which he is a part. No longer is the village headman considered a focal point of communication within the village. The headman must now share that distinction with bureaucrats and politicians.

The headman's basis of authority has been changed by the external influences of modern institutions. Historically, the headman was considered a representative of the Ruler. He would collect taxes or mobilize labour for his immediate chief or Ruler. In some cases that link to the Ruler remains. Today, the position of village headman is filled through a selection process administered by a civil servant (the District Officer). Further, the trend is for the headman's appointment to be recommended, or approved, at a political level. Often it is the Chief Minister of a state who performs this task.

The political "rubber stamping" of the headman's appointment signifies the degree to which the political processes are manifested at the local village level. The headman is being coopted into party politics. For example, the village headman is usually a member of the ruling national party UMNO. As noted, in "UMNO" villages he is also appointed chairman of the local UMNO party branch. It is in
this way that the headman carries out his role as linchpin between the political structures and the villager. It is apparent that the political intent is to enable the government, through its dominant party, to mobilize the villager for political support by relying on the leadership of the headman. By coopting the headman into the political machinery, the linchpin connection in that regard is secured.

Like the headman, the penghulu was part of the traditional political hierarchy under the patronage of the territorial chiefs and/or Rulers. In pre-colonial Malaya, land was nominally retained in the name of the Ruler. At the mukim level, the penghulu was the single most important person. Traditionally a nominee of the Ruler,7 he controlled access to land in his area. Peasants were obliged to provide the penghulu with a share of their labour and produce.8 This position was a very powerful one, operating within a large patron-client pyramid with the penghulu placed near the apex. However, the introduction of external forces, first colonialism and then modern western democratic institutions, has greatly impacted on the penghulu's role and functions.

Colonialism brought the penghulu into the colonial district administration. His appointment, at least theoretically, was endorsed by a Ruler thereby tying him by tradition to the local community.9 With the new land tenure system and administration, a penghulu no longer had control of resources within his mukim. However, the administration
did permit considerable power to rest with the penghulu. With the introduction of the District Officer, and the decline of the territorial chiefs, the penghulu became the linchpin between the villager and the colonial administration. For example, in the villages Shamsul studied, land applications made to the district office had to be channelled through the penghulu. Further, he oversaw implementation of the food crop policy and was responsible for the enforcement of various regulations. The peasants required his patronage to deal with the colonial bureaucracy. His political and economic power were therefore not really diminished, but the social basis upon which this power was achieved was different.

The introduction of modern western democratic institutions has again altered the role and function of the penghulu. Although he continues to head his mukim, the penghulu's authority seems to have been adversely affected by these modern changes. Like the headman, the penghulu is no longer a focal point of communication with the villager. He now shares that role with others: bureaucrats and politicians. The penghulu also continues to be considered part of the government bureaucracy. He is now appointed, or in some cases, selected through a screening process, by the District Officer. As it is a government position, the penghulu is not permitted to seek political office.

Ostensibly, the penghulu possesses the most important formal statutory authority at the village level. As part of
the civil service, he is salaried and subject to transfers and dismissal. Some of the penghulu's current functions are conveying information from the government, investigating backgrounds of land applicants, advising the District Officer on social problems, serving on government committees, etc.\textsuperscript{13}

The penghulu, as a traditional leader, has been coopted into the government bureaucracy to serve the needs of the formal organization. (His ability to retain this traditional leadership role in light of this change, is discussed in Chapters 3 and 4). The coopting process is designed to provide a linchpin connection between the government and the villager. However, this linchpin connection must depend on other such connections at higher levels, i.e., a patron to the penghulu. It is in this way that a series of vertical connections are required to fully connect the institutions of state with the villager. The District Officer performs such a role vis-à-vis the penghulu. (See Appendix B(3)).

Although Ali comments that the District Officer's linkage with the villager may be at the direct level, his linchpin role is evident at a higher, more indirect, level. (See Appendix A). It is at that level where the District Officer acts as a patron to the penghulu, or village headman, thereby limiting any regular direct connection with the villager. However, it is useful at this point to give some background on the role of the District Officer so that some observations and comments on his effectiveness as a
linchpin can be made. This is necessary for the analysis which follows in chapter 4.

British colonial rule introduced a system of districts and District Officers (D.O.s) to Peninsular Malaysia.\(^{14}\) Although the D.O. was treated by some as a "traditional" leader,\(^ {15}\) that tradition was relatively short-lived. Under the residential system, local administration was under the general supervision of the British District Officers. The District Officer functioned as a Resident on a smaller scale.\(^ {16}\) The D.O. was in charge of a district and there were many D.O.s in a state. The D.O. reported to the Resident who oversaw the state's operations, assuming many of the functions of the Rulers and territorial chiefs. The D.O., along with the Resident, was responsible for the maintenance of law and order and for collecting revenue and taxes in his district.\(^ {17}\) Although having many duties, the D.O.'s most time-consuming duty was land administration.\(^ {18}\)

The District Officer currently serves as an administrative agent of the federal and state governments in Peninsular Malaysia. As a Malay civil servant, the D.O. is appointed to his position through either state or federal public service commissions. As head of a district in the state, he reports to the federal Ministry of Housing and Land Development through the state government.\(^ {19}\) Provisions in the federal constitution permit members of the federal public service to serve in the states and these have been used to
fill key positions with the Malaysian Administrative and Diplomatic Service (MADS) officers, e.g., State Secretary and D.O.20 Under the District Officer are Assistant District Officers (A.D.O.s), each of whom is in charge of a mukim. The D.O. is a co-ordinator of government development programs and selects and appoints village headmen and penghulu. He chairs various development committees and interacts regularly with politicians at various levels. Since independence, the District Officer's decisions on administrative matters have been subject to representations and influence from elected representatives.21

Both village headman and penghulu have been drawn into party politics, and the bureaucracy, with varying degrees of success. Success is measured by the ability of the institutions of state (at both federal and state levels) to maintain an effective linchpin connection with the villager. The Ali diagram shows a relatively structured two-way flow as a result of the vertical linkages. Although the diagram distinguishes their nature, both political and bureaucratic, it does not reveal the complex nature of the exchange relationships. (See Appendix B). For example, the headman is shown in the formal reporting relationship linked through the penghulu to the District Officer. That may be so within the structure of the Village Development and Security Committee (VDSC); however, is that necessarily the case for other types of linkages? What impact does the headman's role as chairman
of the local UMNO party branch have on the linkage pattern? Nor does the diagram place any particular weight on any of those linkages. Before undertaking an enquiry into these linkage patterns in the next chapter, some observations should be made.

The first observation at this level is the influence of the political structures on the government bureaucracy. This influence is observed in the roles of the penghulu and headman. As noted, both headman and penghulu are now appointed by the District Officer, having gone through a selection process. The selection process determines suitable candidates. In the case of the headman, his appointment is approved by the Chief Minister of a state. The UMNO village headman also appears to have become a linchpin connector between the state assemblyman and the villager. With the growing influence of political power at the village level, the headman seems to be able to function as an effective linchpin. (An analysis of this observation is provided in Chapter 3). What of the penghulu?

The penghulu has a more strictly formal relationship with the bureaucracy. His reporting relationship, and his exchange relationship, is with the District Officer. (See Appendix B(3)). But there are political influences placed upon the penghulu which do affect his own patron-client relationships at the village level. For example, in the Shamsul study, both the penghulu and village headman were
allied with leading state and federal politicians as part of a patron-client pyramid involving the distribution of benefits from rural development projects. (See Appendix B(5)). The penghulu and headman could then distribute benefits to their clients within the village or community. The penghulu can acquire power and influence in this manner. But why would those politicians want the penghulu as a client? For the penghulu, distribution of benefits means power and influence over his clients, enabling the patron-client relationship to stay together. The politician can use the penghulu's support in complying with various government regulations under the penghulu's control in order to obtain development contracts and to mobilize support at election time.23

The second observation at this linchpin level of connection with the villager, is how the bureaucracy affects the linkage between these traditional leaders and their clients. The penghulu's promotional prospects and in turn, prestige and influence, depend on support from the bureaucracy, especially the District Officer. Government officials recognize that the penghulu will often retain a strong community following (or clientele) as a traditional leader. Careful to use this to their advantage, these officials will meet with the penghulu prior to visiting any villages under his jurisdiction. The penghulu will cooperate in order to maintain his power base. The bureaucracy,
therefore, can assist the penghulu in his efforts to be effective as a linchpin with the villagers. However, the linchpin role of the penghulu seems to be diminishing. The headman seems to receive little benefit from his function within the bureaucracy as chairman of the VDSC. Yet, in his vertical linkage upward, he reports to the penghulu, who in turn reports to the District Officer. Supposedly, an inducement to support the District Officer and the bureaucracy is acquired status to enhance the headman's own personal authority. But this does not appear to be taking place. The reasons for this anomaly will be explored in the next chapter.

The penghulu and village headman may interact within their own patron-client structure. (See Appendix B(2)). As the patron, the penghulu may rely on individual village headmen to help and support him in dealing with the villagers. The relationship between the penghulu and headmen can affect administration at the village level. Their relationship is one of providing mutually valued services. Conflicts between them can lead to polarization of support and clashes between factions in the village. The lack of uniformity in recruiting the penghulu can create different alliance patterns which affect prevailing patron-client structures. In the Ali study, Ali notes that many headmen help, support and obey the penghulu in keeping with customs of loyalty and obedience to the ruler. However, the
introduction of a selection and appointment process under the jurisdiction of the District Officer has, in some cases, created conflicts between the two leaders so as to dissolve and re-align existing patron-client structures. The Ali study provides an example. In Bagan, the village headman, who inherited his position, did not accept the authority of the appointed penghulu. The result was a conflict between the two, which appears to have resulted in a realignment of a patron-client relationship at the expense of the headman. As a leader, a village headman must meet villager (client) expectations. If he does not, the dyad dissolves and different ones may form. The penghulu sought assistance from the headman in mobilizing villagers into work teams to spread dirt brought in to improve muddy pathways. The headman refused to cooperate with the penghulu. Unable to provide this perceived necessary aid to the community, the headman appears to have lost status. In this case, a landlord organized a petition against the headman and sent it to the District Officer. This example would suggest a possible realignment of clients to the landlord as the leader/patron. 27 This realignment could also extend to the District Officer. In the Shamsul example mentioned earlier, a split between the penghulu and village headman was at the expense of the penghulu. In that case a group of villagers left the village and created a new kampung nearby.

The evolutionary paths of the traditional leadership
roles of the penghulu and headman are different. The penghulu is firmly attached to a formal complex organization with patron-client ties to superiors within the bureaucracy, e.g., District Officer. The penghulu also appears to have some patron-client ties with the politicians, e.g., state assemblyman. (See Appendix B(4A)). The headman seems to have stronger ties to the political structures, e.g., state assemblyman, with weaker ones to the bureaucracy, through the penghulu and District Officer. The intrusion of the bureaucracy and political party on the headman and in turn his clientele has created new patterns of patron-client relationships. In this case the village headman could be a "client" of both the District Officer (or penghulu) and part of a separate structure through political authorities, such as the state assemblyman. (See Appendix B(4A)). Such ties permit the headman to maintain the status quo in his patron-client relationship within the village. These connections are advantageous to the dominant ruling party when UMNO controls the area. The penghulu, on the other hand, may be finding more competing interests within his patron-client structure, simply because he must act as an agent of a government committed to modern rural development. His client relationship with the District Officer develops the potential for competing interests to emerge. The consequences of this interaction on the patron-client relationship at the village level, for the penghulu, can be observed in the Ali
study. For example, in Kangkong, both UMNO and PAS were represented. Those villagers supporting UMNO viewed the penghulu as "our man", thereby maintaining the client base. Those who supported PAS saw the penghulu as a representative serving the government and not their needs. No clientele base existed there.28

With respect to the village headman, Milne and Mauzy in Politics and Government in Malaysia, comment that "the importance of the Ketua [village headman] to the village is no longer so much as a social leader, but as a means of obtaining government assistance..." I would add that the village headman's role is changing in emphasis. He may not necessarily be so much a village leader as a constituency leader. (See Appendix B(4(A) and B(5)). With party politics, the constituency becomes a factor which impacts on the patron-client relationships at the village level. This will also be discussed in Chapter 3.

Modern politics is reshaping patron-client relationships throughout both levels of linkages. Political parties have presented a new dimension to the positions and roles of leaders in rural Malay society. That dimension is the role of broker/middleman. (This variation will be explored with the penghulu and village headman in the next chapter). Ali discusses this role mainly in the context of leading political functionaries, such as ex-government officials, ex-penghulu, ex-clerks, landowners, labourers and peasants.30
Brokerage politics, however, is much broader, affecting most levels of leadership to varying degrees. Eric Wolfe defines the broker/middleman role as follows:

They stand guard over the critical junctures and synapses of relationships which connect the local system to the large whole. Their basic function is to relate community oriented individuals who want to stabilize or improve their life chances, but who lack economic security and political connections, with nation oriented individuals who operate primarily in terms of complex cultural forces standarized as national institutions, but whose success...depends on the size and strength of their personal following.31

Ali describes these leaders and their connections with the villager in a political context. The areas Ali studied reflect current trends of a concentrated small group of people who are active participants in the local political branches. These people are not only the leading members of the branch committees, but they also establish and operate numerous social organizations. With their influence and power, both social and political, they are regarded by the villagers as "strong men".32

Most of the leading officeholders (chairman, secretary, treasurer) at the local level are respected and enjoy high status in their community. This is common to the studies covered. Two processes are responsible for this outcome. First, party branches were often organized on initiatives from outside the village (from district or state organizations). It was then necessary to coopt respected villagers to hold leadership positions. UMNO was
particularly successful, during its early expansion, coopting penghulu, headmen, etc. to organize village branches. Support at the local level came from family, friends and clients. The second process, which may or may not have involved such initiatives, had a more grass-roots flavour, with the branches determining their own leaders. However, the influence of the patron-client relationship would necessarily involve the same respected, high status individuals. Most of the ex-officials and landlords controlled the land. This control provided a strong base among existing clientele to be mobilized for political purposes.\(^{(34)}\)

The resource of communication between the rural Malay villager and the leaders is very much controlled and shaped by these people. School teachers have been especially effective and have achieved high status. Working closely with children and parents, they are often the eyes and ears to the external environment. Respect and deference are accorded them. They assist the villager in completing government forms, acting on their behalf in dealing with bureaucracies, etc. Feelings of obligation are often expressed as unrepayable 'kindness debts'. The teacher therefore has a resource base from which to operate within the party branches at the local level.\(^{(35)}\) Acting as a middleman for their respective parties, the state legislative council members and federal parliamentarians can communicate with their constituents at the local level and vice-versa.\(^{(36)}\)
Party functionaries also can be important leaders. The functionaries can bargain favours with the politicians for their following in return for mobilizing village support. When these promises are not kept, this 'patron', along with his 'clientele' may align with another party/politician who presents a better offer. ³⁷ (See Appendix B(4A)). Ali refers to such people as leader-brokers. More traditional leaders, such as elders and religious functionaries, do not possess the same standing. Restricted by a small following, their position to bargain is weaker. Further, such leaders as the penghulu or political party member can mobilize support among their followers, and simply go directly through the political connectors. ³⁸

Ali concludes his study by observing that the penghulu and local party functionaries are becoming more circumscribed in their power and influence. The penetration of a money economy and party politics into the village has increasingly integrated them into a larger political structure. ³⁹ The District Officer and elected representatives can and do have direct contact with the villager. The government has the machinery to implement projects and claim direct credit. They do this through the mass media at the expense of the party functionary. According to Ali, those officials are simply developing into channels of communication of directives from above, serving "only as a source of strength and support for the party at the local level". ⁴⁰
The observations and comments in this chapter have identified a shifting pattern of patron-client relationships at the direct level of connection with the villager. The complexity of these relationships has been illustrated by diagrams (Appendices A and B). Chapter 3 will provide a detailed analysis.
Notes:


3. It is noted that some villages have headmen belonging to or supporting PAS (Pan Islamic SeMalaysia), which is the other major Malay political party; an opposition party.


5. For the purposes of this study I use the term Chief Minister which will include Menteri Besar. In states with hereditary Rulers, the head of government is known as the Menteri Besar. In other states in Peninsular Malaysia (Malacca and Penang) he is known as Chief Minister. Simon Barraclough, A Dictionary of Malaysian Politics, London: Heinemann Publishers Asia Pte Ltd., 1988, p.53.


7. the term "Ruler" is used throughout this paper instead of Sultan since some Rulers do not use the title of Sultan. The Rulers refer to themselves as the Rulers. Sultan is only used correctly when referring to a state with a sultan. Diane K. Mauzy, pers. comm.


9. Note: community in this context is broader than village.


11. Shamsul, From British To Bumiputera Rule, op.cit., p.23.

13. Ibid.


15. Although District Officers are referred to in some readings as "traditional" leaders, they were introduced to Peninsular Malaysia as part of the British colonial residential system in 1874. They are not indigenous traditional leaders such as penghulu and village headmen.


17. Ibid., pp.173-175 and in Stephen Chee, *Local Institutions and Rural Development in Malaysia*, Ithaca: Cornell University, 1974, pp.21-22, he notes that it was at the level of the district that educated Malays were coopted into a Malay Administrative Service specifically designed to supply personnel for rural administration. The Malayan Civil Service was completely staffed by British recruits until the 1930's. On the distinction within the MCS, Milne and Mauzy in *Politics and Government*, op.cit., comment that the former MCS is now the Malaysian Administrative and Diplomatic Service (MADS) which is not to be confused with the higher ranks of the civil service in general. For a more detailed explanation refer to pp.264-272.

18. Ibid., p.281.


20. Milne and Mauzy, *Politics and Government*, op.cit., p.278. Not only do the DO's rotate often(p.281), they may be seconded in a variety of ways, e.g., from state to federation, or vice-versa, or state to state (p.278 footnote). Further, DO's may not necessarily be from the district. This is partly why other "local" connections are needed. Diane Mauzy, pers. comm.


23. Ibid.,


26. Ibid., pp. 119-124.

27. Ibid., p. 126.

28. Ibid., p. 166.


34. Ibid., pp. 5-8.

35. Ibid. The influence of teachers has started to decline as they have become less important in UMNO elections. Small businessmen and Malay capitalists are now much more important. This is a result of the NEP which is altering the way politics is conducted. Comments by Diane Mauzy on thesis draft, September 1989. For further information of the effects of the NEP on the Malay villager, refer to Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis.


37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

CHAPTER 3

THE DIRECT LEVEL LINCHPIN - AN ANALYSIS

In this chapter I will provide an analysis of the observations and comments about the direct level linchpins presented in Chapter 2. I will test the hypothesis that the political dominance of the government is shaping the patron-client structures in such a way as to reduce the effectiveness of the connections with the bureaucratic institutions operating at the direct level. I include in this analysis the more prominent linchpins and their interaction with a higher sub-level of linchpin which operates through the bureaucracy and political structures at the village, mukim, district and state level. This interaction has been influenced by the major economic restructuring of Peninsular Malaysia with the implementation of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971. The impact of the government's economic modernization priorities on patron-client structures, within the context of higher administrative and political level linchpins, will be the focus of Chapter 4.

Modern state institutions have attempted to blend demands of complex organizations with existing traditional structures founded on personal exchange relationships. This process is achieved through a two step linkage process. The
peasant leader (patron) is linked to the formal organization. As a patron, his clientele is subject to his directions in meeting organization objectives. This process suggests a fairly stable structure. However, the linkage is a personal one, not one of position. That is, the peasant leader may or may not subscribe to the goals, objectives, or norms of the organization. The cooptation, therefore, can be fragile. This is significant for the organization as it is through the coopted leader that the formal organization will achieve its objectives at the village level. The cooptation is conditioned by the patron-client relationship. In this regard, the coopted leader would not only be a patron of his clients outside the organization, but a client of a higher patron within the formal organization structure. It is the personal exchange of mutually valued services within this patron-client pyramid which determines the effectiveness of the organization. This process is demonstrated by the role of the village headman in his capacity as chairman of the VDSC and local UMNO party branch. By examining these roles, I will also test my hypothesis of the growing political influence of government institutions at the local village level.

Village Development Committees\(^2\) (subsequently named Village Development and Security Committees) were created by the federal government in late 1961 as part of government efforts to increase Malay political support and raise their standard of living.\(^3\) During the first two five year plans,
rural development was largely administrative. To convey the image of an effective and responsive government, the bureaucracy was mobilized to produce a "development cover crop" of community enhancements, e.g., roads, bridges, clinics, etc. At the village level, they were organized by directives from the District Office, not in response to a recognized village need. These committees, in general, have failed to meet their objectives. Rural development has been a major political platform since the first general election in 1955. Increasing rural development meant reorganization and mobilization of the administrative capacity to achieve rural development goals.

Chaired by the village headman, these ten-man committees were expected to meet a number of developmental objectives. Some of these included: coordinating villager support for their own social and economic benefit; preparing development programs with government officials carrying out the tasks of community development; to prepare and implement self help projects within the village; to provide effective leadership to the villager in order to develop their own initiative in undertaking projects for their economic benefit; changing villager attitudes to become more development oriented and acting as a communications link between villager and government, especially in formulating requests for government assistance.

The VDSCs are designed to carry out government policies
and objectives, with little or no interest in local village concerns. Community development, in contrast to traditional leadership roles, can result in conflicts since it requires the alteration of values and behaviour patterns. This is how the informal leader, as village headman in a social system, is unable to reconcile the demands of the formal organization through a formal leadership role in meeting organization objectives. The nature of the patron-client relationship, however, can act as a bridge, to give the appearance that these two leadership roles are congruent.

The Stephen Chee study notes that the effectiveness of the VDC depends on the village headman. Although coopted into the bureaucracy, the village headman generally is still very much perceived as one of the villagers (a peasant leader). He implies that the villager is not interested in economic growth per se, nor in dealing with anyone acting as an economic change agent. The headman is a solidarity maker, not a task-oriented leader. Chee would conclude that the headman functions within the parameters of the patron model maintaining the status quo and perceives his role as a spokesperson for the village as a unit. Thus, he is unable to perform an effective linchpin role insofar as his VDSC responsibilities vis-à-vis development are concerned. Consequently, he is unable to provide an adequate avenue for government influence on the villager. This is partly because the village headman, as a patron, perceives the VDSC as a
communications link upwards only. (His political role, however, is a much more effective linchpin and will be discussed below).

Although Chee's limited explanation is plausible, it does not explain why the patron-client relationship would not simply provide the necessary glue to ensure an effective operation of the VDSC. Marvin Rogers attributes the decline of VDSCs, in his study and generally, to the lack of serious effort by the government to develop these entities as viable institutions. Little, if any, training is provided to the committee members to understand and appreciate their role; the lack of incentives and no control of resources are also mentioned.

In Sungai Raya, between 1966 and 1978, the VDSC achieved little success in meeting the objectives of the government. Periodically, the committee would petition the government for assistance in repairing mosques, providing cattle, etc. It could not (or more properly would not) mobilize the villagers for community improvement projects to any degree. Community "development" has little relevance to the Malay villager of Peninsular Malaysia. What relevance it does have is very much dictated by the patron. It is also apparent from this example that the patron-client relationship (through the operation of the VDSC) was not operating in any effective way.

Although Rogers does not emphasize the point, he does
note UMNO's use of rural development projects as patronage, appealing to the political-based linchpins (e.g. State Assemblyman), which has been a more effective channel of obtaining assistance than the VDSC. An example of the expanding political activity at the village level is observed by Rogers. A state assemblyman in 1976 opposed community-based development projects stating he would do so until further assistance was given to raise the Malay's standard of living, a purported objective of the VDSC.

Rogers has noted the lack of resources controlled by the VDSC as one reason for its decline. Why should that be so when the government has the capacity, as well as the potential linchpin connections, to make it an effective government tool in promoting its objectives, through the bureaucracy, with the villager? The answer will support the hypothesis set out at the beginning of this chapter.

The VDSC was established by the government to operate on its behalf at the local level for rural development. In keeping with the nature of the linchpin at the village level, the village headman was appointed as its chairman. The village headman, as a peasant leader, would also become the formal leader of the organization. Theoretically, this produces a cohesive and stable structure as the leader brings with him the support of his followers or clients. But that has not happened. The more compelling reason for VDSC impotence is found in the influence of political structures.
on the government of Malaysia, as supported by the Rogers example above.

The dominant party of the ruling coalition, UMNO, effectively controls the government. It is through the political arm of the government that distribution of benefits is effected at the local level. The village headman, as chairman, must report to the penghulu, who in turn reports to the District Officer. But the latter two officials are tied into the bureaucracy. It has already been shown that the District Officer's influence vis-a-vis the villager is weakening. His access to and control of resources has become limited as the political influences have percolated through the strata.

The penghulu, who has been fully coopted into the bureaucracy, has also become distanced from the villager and the headman. The penghulu is losing his traditional base while the headman is retaining or increasing his. Along with the growing influence of the political functionaries, the village headman has become an effective aid to the ruling political party and the politician. (See Appendix B(4,5)). In this respect his traditional patron role has been expanded to include a brokerage role; one where the politician links to the villager through the headman. It is the role of the headman, not as chairman of a VDSC, but as a broker/patron with the politician, who performs his function receiving and distributing rewards to himself and his clientele. It is
therefore not in the interest of the village headman to promote, or support, the VDSC. The strong vertical pull of the politician has realigned the pyramid of the patron-client relationship. As a result, the penghulu, by being absorbed into the bureaucracy, is losing the traditional authority base. (See for example Appendix B(2)). Unlike the village headman, the penghulu is unable to perform as effective a brokerage role; again diminishing his influence.

The District Officer's role could make a difference, however it does not. The District Officer is permitted to distribute at his discretion up to M$25,000 for rural development. Would not this be the resource base necessary to cultivate and maintain a viable clientele consisting of the penghulu, village headman and villagers themselves? The answer again can be found by examining the political influence at the village level.

The District Officer, as a representative of the government, is also under the influence of the ruling party. The District Officer will therefore work in conjunction with local politicians - either through his superiors (patrons) or directly - and likely serve their interests. Interested in his own advancement within the bureaucracy, the DO will serve those interests he deems useful to his situation. Political officials, such as state assemblymen and MPs, or upper level bureaucrats, will be tapped. He, therefore, becomes more of a client to an upper level patron and less interested and
connected with the villager. This upper level influence therefore reduces his effectiveness as a linchpin at the village level and in turn that of the penghulu.

It must be acknowledged that the government does not pursue VDSCs with the vigour necessary to have them function as designed. It is responsible for ensuring a strong UMNO ruling party for national reasons. As a result, the government's stated goals are veiled by a much more political one, ensuring UMNO remains the dominant ruling party in Peninsular Malaysia. The District Officer, as a representative of that government, will act accordingly. His advancement depends on it. Therefore, with the authority to distribute funds for rural development projects in hand, he will satisfy local politician desires which may include letting contracts to political supporters. This is done at the expense of the penghulu, since his position is firmly positioned within the bureaucracy. The penghulu's client base becomes much more narrow.

Evidence of this shifting pattern of linchpins is found in the Rogers Sungai Raya studies. Like many UMNO branches, the Sungai Raya branch was chaired by the village headman. During the 1970s, it functioned as a communications link between the government and villager and served as an important channel for securing additional governmental assistance for the community. It also occasionally mobilized electoral support for the UMNO-led coalition. How was this
accomplished?

UMNO's increasing use of rural development projects as patronage enhanced the importance of the local branch as a channel for requesting assistance from the government. By 1978 the UMNO organization at the village level, led by the village headman, was recognized as the most important channel for help. The assemblyman advised the villagers to secure benefits from the government through UMNO or to contact him personally. (Notably absent was a suggestion to go through VDSC). The headman became both an administrative and political leader of the community. The local UMNO branch, therefore, became less necessary as a vehicle for mobilizing electoral support and more as a means of promoting the acceptance of UMNO and the government. In the Sungai Raya study, the state assemblyman also held high status. His regular face to face contact with the villagers and his role in the patron-client pyramid, from which benefits were distributed through UMNO, has made him a prominent connector with the villager. This supports the Ali diagram of the direct linchpin connection of the state assemblyman with the villager. For reasons that will follow, this direct connection is unlikely to become as dominant, generally, as other linchpins. The state assemblyman may, however, assume this role in locations where the opposition party has left a weak UMNO branch. The assemblyman may therefore want to use a more direct connection to establish a linchpin for political
support only. In such cases, though, the dyadic relationship could be more narrowly focused and more unstable.  

I have said that political influences dominate the direction of the government, and power accrues to those in control of resources. Why, then, would a state assemblymen risk diluting that power, and corresponding influence, by delegating the ability to distribute rewards and benefits to the villager through the village headman? I have shown that the brokerage role can be a powerful one, particularly if assumed by a traditional leader who is a patron in his own right. It is because of the nature of the dyad tied to traditional norms and values of the villager, and as represented by the headman, that makes the headman a valuable tool to be used by the assemblyman for political purposes. Also, the headman would likely retain a stronger patron-client relationship with his clientele simply due to proximity. The connection, therefore, enhances the assemblyman's position of power vis-à-vis his superiors and the headman's position vis-à-vis the villager, as well as that of UMNO, when mobilizing support. The patron-client pyramid remains in place with little work necessary from the assemblyman in cultivating a relationship directly with the villager. This enables the assemblyman to devote his energies to broadening the pyramid structure not only from below, but from above to his own advantage. It seems that the assemblyman's attempts at directly linking with the villager
is discouraged by design.

There is perhaps a more significant and underlying reason why the state assemblyman and government may not wish to pursue such direct linkage attempts. This will be discussed below. Suffice it to say at this point that the direct linkage rests with the village headman, in a brokerage role, not only to maintain but to enhance the linkage with the clientele. The involvement of the political leader in this way also retains the informal/formal leader connection through the village headman. The assemblyman, a recognized formal leader of a complex organization, is not required to become the necessary informal leader to broaden and cement his connection directly with the villager. The village headman is well suited for this purpose. The introduction of a political leader to the linchpin connections does, however, lead to a further dynamic which assists in supporting my hypothesis of the unstable nature of the developing patron-client relationships. I refer to the local politician's constituency.

With the introduction of politics, voting constituencies have been created. Patron-client relationships are utilized to mobilize political support for candidates. However, these constituencies are often broader than the village unit which historically has served to shape norms and values. Further, the village unit has required patrons to undertake at least a minimum of bargaining and reciprocity in the exchange
relationship with the client. It is noted that village
headmen can be heads of more than one village. But
constituencies are often broader again, including towns and
districts. This shifting of the "community" to include areas
much broader than the village, has worked to decrease the
strength of the village in maintaining an historical
reference point to the patron-client relationship.

The social approval necessary to maintain the patron-
client structure will be identified with the constituency;
not the village. It will be these clients who receive the
benefits from the pyramid, including those distributed by the
state assemblyman. It is in this way that redistributive
norms of the village weaken as modern political institutions
intrude on the village. An example of the negative effects of
constituencies on the villager is evident from Poor Malays
Speak Out. Redistributive norms, lost through the effects of
colonialism, have resurfaced with electoral politics.
However, the village influence as an alternative agency of
social guarantees has been circumscribed by the introduction
of the modern constituency. With a weakening of the
redistributive mechanism, the more significant the patron-
client relationship becomes. This statement must be qualified
as it suggests that the patron-client relationships are
going stonger and therefore creating a more stable
political environment. I do not draw that conclusion. The
existence of the patron-client relationship is a complex one.
I have identified, through theory articulated by James Scott and others, that these relationships are complex and varied. They are not simple individual two person relationships. They can operate in various configurations and their stability within those configurations is far from assured. Examples of this complexity are attempts by state assemblymen to forge direct linkages with their constituents.

Earlier, I noted that there may be an underlying reason why state assemblymen may not wish to pursue such linkage attempts to any degree. A state assemblyman will often operate within a pyramidal patron-client structure. As a patron, the assemblyman may have a number of village headmen as his clients within his constituency. Each village headman will have a client base within his particular village. By directly providing a patron service to individual clients bypassing the lower level patron (village headman), the assemblyman sets up the potential for sub-leader interaction. (see Appendix B(4)). As discussed in my theoretical framework, sub-leaders may, under certain circumstances, act in a form of collective leadership. If the sub-leaders determine that the dyad relationship is not performing with the necessary reciprocity, i.e., loss of power and influence by the sub-leaders, the dyad could break down. A possible outcome could be the shifting of these sub-leaders, along with their clientele, to opposition political parties, such as PAS. The diffuse nature of these lower level
patron-client relationships may determine the extent of the dissolution. The effects of bypassing local leaders can create a highly unstable structure, causing a collapse, re-alignment, etc. of existing patron-client relationships.

With the introduction of modern western-derived political institutions to Peninsular Malaysia, the Ali diagram has depicted a multiple vertical linkage pattern at a direct level with the villager. What can be seen from the diagram is the capacity for varied connections depending on the needs of the participants within the dyad. One observation about the Ali diagram is that it does not identify any particular weight associated with the linkages as shown. It is clear that the political influence has shaped the connections so as to give more weight to those linkages identified more closely with the political structures. The diagram also does not disclose that the role of the leader generally determines how the connection will take shape. For example, the village headman would not necessarily be effective in his role as chairman of the VDSC vis-à-vis the District Officer. However, in his political role as chairman of the UMNO branch he is more successful as a linchpin. The diagram does, however, reflect the addition of these linchpins to those of a traditional base, which has produced numerous connections. These additions (e.g., political functionaries, state assemblyman) produce an environment susceptible to more narrowly focused linchpins, often limited
to specific needs at a specific point in time. The villager, or more properly the client, may therefore be a client of more than one patron depending on the needs of the client and the circumstances. This introduction of differently based patron-client relationships reduces the "universal cover" of the traditional diffuse, whole person relationship. The consequence of the more narrowly based relationship is a reduction in the affective quality of that relationship with a weakened foundation, subject to change at any time. The less diffuse the relationship, the weaker and more unstable the structure becomes.

In conclusion, the interaction of the potential linchpins at the direct level has illustrated the shape and pattern of the linkages resulting from the political influences on state institutions. It also shows how this pattern is restructuring patron-client relationships. Whether or not this pattern always operates in a way that supports the objectives of these institutions is the subject of Chapter 5. The next chapter will extend the Ali diagram to a higher level of linchpin connection operating within the state institutions, both political and bureaucratic. I refer to that level as the second, or indirect, level.
Notes:

1. A discussion of the New Economic Policy is found in Chapter 4 of this thesis. Since I introduce it here, a short comment is required. As outlined in the Second Malaysia Plan (1971), the NEP sought to reduce and eradicate poverty, by raising income levels and increasing employment opportunities for all Malaysians. Also, it sought to accelerate the restructuring of Malaysian society to correct economic imbalances. This process involves modernization of its society including the rural population. Milne and Mauzy, Politics and Government..., op.cit., pp.326-327.

2. "VDC": In 1975, Village Development Committees were renamed Village Development and Security Committees (VDSC) as a result of increasing government concern about communist activity in northern Malaysia. The focus of the committee, though, remained the same. Marvin L. Rogers, "Patterns of Change in a Rural Malay Community: Sungai Raya Revisited", in Asian Survey, vol. xxii, Nov.8, August, 1982, p.769.

3. Ibid.


5. Rogers, "Patterns of Change in a Rural Malay Community..", op.cit., p.769.

6. Chee, Local Institutions..., op.cit., pp.15-16. It should be noted that, politically, rural development was not intended to create any kind of "rural revolution" or dismantle tradition. The government wanted to maintain a conservative deferential rural base. Diane Mauzy, pers. comm.


9. Chee, Local Institutions..., op.cit., p.53. This is apparently changing, according to Diane Mauzy. This might indicate the shifting pattern of linchpins. For example, the village headman, in his political role as
chairman of the local UMNO branch, directly deals with the state assemblyman as a distributor of economic benefits to himself and his clientele. Chapter 4 of this thesis elaborates on this point.

10. Rogers, "Patterns of Change...", op.cit., p.769. His extensive studies of Sungai Raya from 1966-1978, along with the Stephen Chee study in Selangor, illustrate the general inability of the VDSC's to operate as intended by the government. In Sungai Raya, the village headman did not perceive himself as the leader of locally instituted development. His attitude did not change over the entire period of the Rogers study (pp.768-769).

11. Chee, Local Institutions..., op.cit., p.49. In government attempts, through the VDSC, to mobilize villagers for community development in Sungai Raya, the committee encouraged villagers to grow vegetables and fruit on unused land near their homes as part of a nation-wide program to reduce cost of food. Approximately one-half of the village households participated in this 1975 scheme. One year later, only those villagers who already had gardens were continuing to grow the vegetables. Rogers, "Patterns of Change...", op.cit., p.769.

12. Chee, Local Institutions..., op.cit., p.49. The Chee study recognized that the pre-1975 VDC had a limited capacity in this regard and their direct economic role was de-emphasized, further breaking down the patron-client structure of District Officer, Penghulu, Village Headman, Villager (p.51). However, the VDSC does seem to work from the villager upward, e.g., as a mechanism for formal complaints against neighbours (p.55), and petitioning the government to repair mosques, provide cattle, etc. Rogers, "Patterns of Leadership...", op.cit., p.418.


14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., p.772.

16. Ibid., pp.775-776.

17. Ibid., pp.768-770.

isolation of some rural areas creates a communications gap which the politician attempts to bridge, either personally or through his party agents. A variety of personal services are performed. I discuss this dynamic in Chapter 5 of this thesis.

19. The Ali diagram does not reflect "overlapping memberships" (e.g. village headman); Diane Mauzy, pers. comm.
CHAPTER 4

THE INDIRECT LEVEL OF LINCHPIN CONNECTIONS

The last chapter provided evidence of the inability of certain linchpins to operate effectively within the government bureaucracy at the village level (e.g., District Officer and penghulu). I tested the following hypotheses: 1) the political dominance of the government is shaping the patron-client structures in such a way as to reduce the effectiveness of their connections with the bureaucratic institutions and 2) the result of this dominance has produced a shifting pattern of clients and patrons. I also showed how such political dominance was strengthening other linchpin roles in their connections with the villager (e.g., village headman and state assemblyman). In conducting this examination, I relied on the work of S. Husin Ali, who depicted the exchange relationship of these linchpins by diagram.(See Appendix A).

The Ali diagram, however, does not depict the linchpin pattern beyond the direct level. Chapter 4 will more fully test the hypotheses stated above by examining a higher, more indirect, level of linchpin connections. This examination will include a discussion on some national level programs and committees designed to administer development. In this
regard, I will discuss District Committees, such as the District Action Committee, District Development Committee, Land Committee and Planning Committee, as well as some national agricultural organizations directed at the villager. How does their operation affect linchpin patterns with the villager? Answering this question will provide insight into the linkages, not only down to the villager but upward to state and national institutions. It is hoped that a clearer over-all picture will emerge as to the interaction among the direct and indirect linchpin levels.

Development Projects, through the New Economic Policy (NEP), have become an important feature of local administration. Implemented in 1971, the NEP had two major objectives: First, "to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty...irrespective of race", and second, "to restructure Malaysian society to correct economic imbalances, so as to reduce and eventually eliminate the identification of race with economic function". These objectives were political in nature; designed ultimately to attain national unity. However, the primary motive was to raise the Malays economically so as to create a "level playing field" vis-à-vis the non-Malays. In fact, this meant government intervention in order to place capital in the hands of the Malays (by government trusteeship) and create a Malay capitalist class. The first objective was not considered so essential, although spin-offs were desired. Although there
was little NEP emphasis on the rural sector, there have been some renewed efforts to reduce rural poverty. Politically, some rural development was deemed necessary, given rising expectations, to retain the rural Malay vote for UMNO. The resulting development projects at the rural level have, more than anything else, shaped and directed the manner in which the linchpins operate between state institutions and the villager. The political control over the distribution of benefits flowing from NEP enhances political and economic power among them.

Since the introduction of NEP, the national government has made many changes to the general administrative structure in order to facilitate implementation of its various development programs. The most significant change has been the increased dominance of the elected representatives over the decision making process within the district bureaucracy. This is particularly evident in the operation of the district development machinery traditionally considered the domain of local bureaucrats.

At the district level, all projects implemented under the NEP are considered development projects. Shamsul's study considers four of the more important committees established to administer development in the kampungs. A short description of each follows. The District Action Committee (DAC) is the most important and largest of these committees. Consisting of approximately sixty members, they are MPs and
state legislative assemblymen, civil servants (federal and state), including all penghulu, and officials of statutory government bodies (e.g. RISDA\textsuperscript{5}). The chairman of the committee is the District Officer.\textsuperscript{6} The DAC functions as the highest decision-making body in the district in all matters relating to district affairs. Its business deals with specific development policies, financing of projects, and evaluating the general progress of the implementation of all projects. It is also empowered by legislation to create special committees to deal with urgent problems. At the time of the Shamsul study, it directly controlled M$4-4.5 million annually, from which M$3.5 million was spent in development projects.\textsuperscript{7} The four state assemblymen and the two MPS received in excess of M$100,000 each annually for special development in the district. In addition, there was an extra M$900,000 available for development over that allocated by state and federal authorities. These special funds are only made available to those elected representatives who are members of the ruling coalition (NF) and not the opposition party.\textsuperscript{8}

The District Development Committee (DDC) is responsible for monitoring the progress of all development projects in the area. It also coordinates with various departments in implementing projects. Its composition is smaller than the DAC, consisting of a core group of approximately ten district level heads of government and statutory bodies as well as six
politicians. The District Officer chairs the committee. At its regular monthly meetings, other officials (e.g., ex-government officials) are asked to participate in an effort to provide a broad range of progress reports on development in all sectors. A report is submitted to the DAC for its consideration. Most of the members of this committee are members of the DAC.9

The Planning Committee (PC) is smaller again, consisting of District Office officials, district engineers and technicians, surveyors, etc., as well as politicians. Its responsibilities are confined to the technical aspects of the development projects. The planning of industrial sites, soil analyses, pollution control, etc., come under its jurisdiction. The District Officer, or his representative, is chairman. Most of these members are also members of the DAC and/or DDC.10

The Land Committee (LC) is the smallest, with only four members. These members are the Collector of Land Revenue, as chairman, and three state assemblymen. The Collector of Land Revenue is also known as the ADO in-charge of land.11 They make decisions on such matters as land alienation, land applications for projects, collecting land revenue, etc. Members of this committee are also members of the DAC.12

Three features observed from the composition of these committees are: 1) the political participation in most committees; 2) the apparent influence of the District
 Officer; and 3) the common membership among them. These features are significant to the operation of the linchpin connectors to the villager. First, an examination of the political participation.

The common membership among these committees shows that a small but important group sits on all committees. The political representatives play a major part in that process. Proposals advanced by the politicians receive special attention by the other committee members who are not politicians. One reason for this dominance is the local political factor. In the area studied by Shamsul, nearly eighty percent of the members of the committees who were not politicians, were members of the ruling party, with a small group actually being party officials. Government rules stipulate that government officials cannot participate in any political activity unless they receive permission.13

The implication of the Shamsul study is that the composition of all development committees of the district is almost entirely members of the NF and/or UMNO.14 These non-politician members of the committees are therefore subject to influence by the elected representatives who are also their party leaders. This has tended to increase the dominance of politicians at the district level. The ultimate power of decision-making in implementing development projects under the NEP lies within the UMNO-dominated NF party organization. This pattern is observed throughout the mukim
and villages within Shamsul's district. Such a result solely from general political membership seems unlikely. For example, the District Officer apparently has a prominent role in these committees, especially the DAC. Is he subject to the same influences which could be contrary to his official mandate?

It would appear that the District Officer, as chairman of most of these committees, including the most powerful DAC, plays a predominant role in the development machinery at the district level. As a result, he should be able to function as an effective linchpin not only with the lower level villager but also with higher level political and bureaucratic officials. But as noted in Chapters 2 and 3, the District Officer does not appear to have the influence that his formal position suggests.

Since independence, many factors have caused a weakening of the "traditional" role of the District Officer while strengthening the role of the politician.\(^{15}\) That traditional role has changed from maintaining law and order and collecting revenue to "serving as a change agent at the district level and coordinator of government development programs".\(^{16}\) A 1979 article by G. Shabbir Cheema captures the extent to which political control has come at the expense of the D.O. The study shows that it was often necessary for the District Officer to persuade local politicians of the appropriateness of a development project and to be sensitive
to their demands on the D.O. as elected representatives. Any conflict between the District Officer and a politician could result in the politician simply approaching the state level political leadership for assistance. His new role as co-ordinator of various agencies of the government at the district level does require compliance with D.O. directives. However, in practice his subordinates are responsible to their own department heads on whose recommendation their employment prospects reside. The transfer of land administration to another government department and removal, in practice, of judicial functions have further reduced his authority. The District Officer is now responsible to the State Director of Lands and Mines, State Development Officer, State Financial Officer, State Secretary and the political leadership at the state level.

Cheema suggests his role has been strengthened by the change. The District Officer has a more significant role of co-ordination and communication, both vertical and horizontal, due to the increased number of government agencies at the district level. Cheema distinguishes between the D.O.'s formal functions and his informal functions. In suggesting that his role has not diminished, Cheema separates the formal functions of his position with his informal functions identified with the villager. The strength lies in the District Officer's prestige of office and the villager's traditional deference to authority. But Cheema's study
really reinforces my hypothesis that political domination of
the bureaucracy is reshaping the linchpin connections at the
village level. The District Officer is becoming less of a
linchpin. The Cheema study reflects this.

From what has been shown, the District Officer's patron
relationship has changed markedly. In fact, his role in the
exchange relationship with his client base may have been
reduced from patron to broker only, with the villager, as his
influence within the hierarchy has been correspondingly
reduced. Cheema states: "Due to the prestige of his office,
the DO is still performing his role as a mediator and
arbitrator of community conflicts and, thus, provides social
leadership". A further examination is needed to determine
whether the District Officer is a victim of a shift of
patron-client relationships within a pyramidal structure. If
that is so, the District Officer role in the powerful
development committees should not provide the avenue to
strengthen his linkage with the villager.

It is apparent from the Shamsul study that the District
Officer has indeed succumbed to the changing structure of
Malaysian politics. Although all four development committees
cited above give the appearance of bureaucratic-dominant
structures, the influence rests with the elected
representatives. In the Shamsul study, this consists of two
members of parliament and four state assemblymen. Known as
EXCO, the state executive council of the State Assembly has
the final say in determining what policies, programs, etc., will be approved. All four committees can only recommend courses of action to the EXCO. This committee, a type of state cabinet, is the highest decision-making body in the state. It ultimately controls the distribution of funds, alienation of land, and the planning and implementation of all development within the state. The state legislative assembly is dominated by National Front party members. The dominant ruling party within the Front is UMNO. Accordingly, EXCO is dominated by UMNO members in most states.

The government bureaucrats are therefore subject to the political will at both district and state level. (See Appendix B(5)). This political will is enhanced by the party affiliation of most of the committee members, which reinforces the strength of the politicians at the local level. Government rules restrict political participation of its bureaucrats. However, according to Shamsul, these individuals not only received permission to be party members, but were also permitted to be party officials.

Formally, these government committees are the decision-making bodies on implementing and shaping all development under the NEP within the district. But the ultimate power rests within the various party branches of the National Front, especially UMNO branches, in the district. The district development machinery has become an integral part of the total ruling party organization and now operates within
the context of the political factions, coalitions, etc. This development organization has become the most effective instrument in suppressing opposition from other parties and dealing with opposition within UMNO itself. The large supply of patronage offered through the NEP programs, and the potential power gained by associating with the district development machinery, has greatly affected the patron-client networks and alliances. How is rural development used in this manner?

Shamsul categorizes rural development into agricultural projects and basic amenities projects. Designed primarily for the peasant smallholder, agricultural projects were established to remedy underemployment and low productivity. In 1973 a Rubber Industry Smallholders' Development Authority (RISDA) was formed to assist rubber smallholders improve production technology. As a national organization it has established branches at the district and mukim levels. However, policy is formulated without regard to local circumstances. The main beneficiaries have become the village leadership. The local officials of these institutions are subject to political pressure. For example, in Shamsul's district, distribution and implementation of projects reflected political influence favouring rich UMNO smallholders at the expense of the poor PAS ones. Also, considerably more aid was allocated to the political supporters of UMNO from RISDA officials who themselves were
Another main national-based institution set up for agricultural projects reflects the changing linchpin pattern of the village headman and diminishing influence of the District Officer as a patron. That institution establishes farmer associations at the village level. The Farmers' Organization Authority (FOA) is designed to assist villagers in establishing farmers' associations, co-operatives, etc.; provide agricultural assistance through seedlings, fertilizer, etc.; and develop large areas for certain crops. Setting up a farmer's association in the village is accomplished by FOA officials working in co-operation with village heads, who recruit members from the village. It is the village headman along with the FOA officials who then decide the type of agricultural projects the village needs and the appropriate kind of assistance. The FOA depends heavily on the co-operation of the village headman. In most cases, the village headman will assume the organizing role and together with VDSC members will command total control over the type of projects needed by the village as well as its distribution process.

This type of project would appear to be exactly what would be expected from a government attempting to improve the peasant's life situation. The role of headman as patron, mobilizing his clients to effect improvements in their subsistence livelihood, seems to capture the essence of the
traditional patron-client relationship. RISDA on the other hand, is more structured and imposed from the top-down, with no input from the local village level. If the village headman were part of a patron-client pyramid, he may very well be at the base as a client.

The FOA projects, however, do not seem to be reaching the most needy villagers. Membership in the association is determined by the village headman and his VDSC members. The implementation and distribution of the projects become highly individual and political. Shamsul observes that in the preceding years, the main participants in every FOA project consisted of the village headman, his sons, VDSC members and relatives, as well as some followers of the headman. Shamsul further records the village headman as stating he would not allow any "anti-government" individuals to participate in FOA projects. Shamsul viewed this as an expression of the headman favouring those who support UMNO, and discriminating against those supporting the opposition party. 31

The above example illustrates a number of points. First, the village headman is active as a patron in a pyramid structure with clients drawn from one level within the VDSC and another lower village base. As these projects are monitored at the national level, perhaps the Member of Parliament would be a higher level patron. (See Table 5). Further, the nature of the patron-client structure suggests a narrow focus, one not inclined to be favourable to the
village as a unit. It should be noted that entire villages can be "UMNO" (e.g., in Johore); however, there can only be a finite supply of patronage. The result is a distribution network premised on nepotism and vertical linkages absent objective rules and criteria. This focus is evident from the statements that the projects do not seem to find their way to the needy villager. This was certainly a main factor in traditional patron-client relationships based on village redistributive norms. Second, localization of power at the village level has permitted political influence. In Shamsul's study, the village headman was aligned with the state assemblywoman and, on her behalf, determined project distribution based on the headman's prevailing political view. His client status with the state assemblywoman determined his actions at the village level.

State-based organizations differ from the national organizations when administering development projects. Proposals from the VDSC are submitted to the district office and also to the elected representative. Proposals are also discussed at the various district development committees and reports submitted to the DAC. Competition within the DAC occurs between the penghulu and elected representatives as to distribution. Proposals originating from the mukim level must have approval of the elected representative before they can be sent to the DAC. Once passed and funds provided, it is the elected representative, through the village headman, who
determines how and to whom the benefits will be distributed.\textsuperscript{34} State projects, although limited in size, do have political value and can be used at the village level to retain political support for those loyal to the patron.\textsuperscript{35}

Shamsul's study also shows how the government departments may operate independently of recognized rural development schemes, setting up their own processes. For example, the Department of Agriculture established its own development projects which were relatively inexpensive compared to RISDA projects. These small projects, though, have high political value at the village level. The elected representatives may delegate the power to distribute these benefits to the local village headmen, who generally are UMNO branch chairmen. They would then distribute as they deemed appropriate, based on their own personal following.\textsuperscript{36} In addition, lower ranking bureaucrats at the local level become directly involved in such distribution methods. As members of the ruling party, their aspirations for advancement mean working closely with their village headmen in distributing such benefits. Should they clash, the decision would likely favour the one with the closest ties to the elected representative.

The second type of project mentioned by Shamsul are the basic amenities projects. These are generally more costly.\textsuperscript{37} Their stated purpose is to improve the quality of life of the village poor and to reduce unemployment. Shamsul's findings
reveal that, although beneficial, individuals receiving the most benefit are the leading state politicians and district officials and their allies (or clientele), e.g. penghulu, village headman, village elites, and local bureaucrats. Politically, the bureaucrats occupy the most powerful and strategic position in the distribution process, deciding which areas and groups to supply.  

The tendering process of government funded projects has added to the power base of the leadership and reinforced the patron-client ties. Contracts under a certain amount can be let at the discretion of the District Officer or Assistant District Officer of the Community Development Section. Contracts above a certain amount must ultimately be approved by the DAC. Most of the projects are construction, either road or building. Contracts for supplying materials involve considerable amounts of money. A practice is for elected representatives to establish their own companies for the more expensive contracts. As shareholders they may include Chinese Towkays, Malay contractors, rich village heads, landlords, influential schoolteachers, those considered loyal and trustworthy. The large projects, though, often attract outside interest from federal or state level politicians and business associates. Therefore, district politicians often have to subsume their own interest when their patrons appear.

District level bureaucrats also become involved in the
process. Operating independently of the politically-controlled groups, they serve their own networks of petty contractors. Some are shareholders in their own companies while others receive cash or goods flowing from their close association with the contractors. With so many small contracts there is little difficulty in distributing the patronage. Further, the politician-controlled group is dependent on the bureaucrats for processing paperwork relating to the projects. Favourable reports are necessary as well from the branches. Once contracts are distributed, allocation to the areas within the district is next. The politician is the most influential at that point.

The pattern of patron-client structures has become quite clear. The political influence exerted at state and district levels has effectively shifted the weight of patron-client structures to those connected with the political, instead of bureaucratic, institutions of state. The effective linchpins are those patrons who can tap into the political structures to achieve both personal benefits and benefits for their clientele. What are some implications of this "shift"? Chapter 5 will provide some answers to this question by examining linkages in the context of group action and party politics.
Notes:


2. Diane Mauzy, pers. comm.


5. Shamsul, "The Politics..", op.cit., p.219. "RISDA" is the Rubber Industry Smallholders' Development Authority. Established in 1973 to help Malaysian rubber (and lately, oil palm) smallholders improve production, the government viewed rubber as a crop associated with rural poverty. Included in its activities would be replanting, opening land for plantations to benefit the smallholder, advice on marketing, improving production techniques, etc. RISDA is one of the main national-based institutions operating within the region. A.B. Shamsul, *From British to Bumiputera Rule*, op.cit., pp.203-204.


7. Ibid.


9. Ibid., p.196.

10. Ibid., p.197.

11. Ibid.


14. Ibid.

16. Ibid., p.67.

17. Ibid., p.66.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.


22. For example, UMNO has not dominated in Penang. Since the formation of the National Front, Gerakan, which formed the state government in 1969, has shared some EXCO posts with UMNO. Diane Mauzy, pers. comm.


24. Ibid., pp.218, 235-236: Shamsul, in a note at pp.235-236, comments further. He argues that it is inevitable for most administrators at the district level to become involved in party politics, in light of the lucrative nature of the NEP programs. Especially since 1974, it has been common for newly recruited Malay bureaucrats to become UMNO members or officials in their branches at the kampung level. This would be done to prepare the way for possible future admission to higher political office. An example is provided. In the 1982 general election, the Selangor deputy state secretary, who had been an active UMNO member for many years, resigned from the civil service and ran for political office. He was successful in winning the parliamentary seat of his own area. He was later appointed one of the deputy ministers of the Ministry of Finance. It is not uncommon for Malay administrators at all levels to be officials or members of UMNO or the National Front; but not of the opposition parties.


27. Ibid., pp.219-220.

28. Ibid., p.220 and Shamsul, From British to..., op.cit., p.205. This is not uncommon. See note 47, Chapter 5 of this thesis. At the District level, RISDA was
represented by its District Chief on the DAC. Shamsul, *From British to...*, op.cit., (p.205).

29. Ibid., p.206. These crops are not major crops such as rubber or rice. They are mainly secondary crops or "crops in interplanting", e.g., cocoa, coffee, sugar cane and pineapple.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid., p.207. See note 51, Chapter 5 this thesis for elaboration.

32. Diane Mauzy, pers. comm.


34. Ibid., p.209.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid., p.220.

37. Ibid., p.211.

38. Ibid.


40. Ibid., p.223.

41. Ibid., p.224.
CHAPTER 5

GROUP ACTION AND PARTY POLITICS

In theory and in practice, patron-client relationships do permit forms of group action to take place, either among leaders (patrons) or followers (clients). For example, achieving a patron's goals may depend on his ability to mobilize his clientele at a particular point in time "for massive efforts of coordinated action". Broad examples can be cited as war leaders, outlaws and candidates for elected office. A group of clients may therefore view their individual welfare (e.g., lives, spoils and patronage) and patron's success as depending on their united support. This feature of the dyad can permit the formation of horizontal ties. This chapter will examine such action within the political framework established in the earlier chapters.

The dominance of patron-client relationships, especially in rural Malay society, may suggest a tightly controlled environment of such horizontal ties. However, the type and degree of control is dependent on many factors. It may be conducive to the institutions of state or it may not. Observable at the local village level can be peasant protests, uprisings and forms of leadership interaction. UMNO's political dominance of the Malay villager is not
universal. Malay villagers do have a political option outside the ruling coalition. That option is the Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS). The horizontal ingredient in the dyadic structure can be addressed using examples from the PAS experience with the Malay villager.

PAS is the only major Malay-based rival to UMNO. In the 1986 general election, PAS obtained approximately 46% of the vote in Kelantan state and 40% in Trengganu state, both located on the north-east coast of Peninsular Malaysia. At the national level, it won only one parliamentary seat, although it won nearly 40% of the vote in seats contested in the four northern states. In 1988, at a PAS general assembly meeting, strategy was discussed concerning improvements to the party machinery. Recognizing UMNO's influence within the government, delegates expressed concerns about Malaysia's election commission, which it claimed was not independent of the NF, and other inappropriate election practices. According to one delegate, the lower the rank of the election officers, the more overlap there appeared between those officers and UMNO officials. PAS president Yusof Rawa has said "PAS' weakness lies not in our poverty but in people's lack of confidence that we can form a government". PAS concern more properly should be expressed as a question: can it achieve the necessary political power by establishing (or aligning with) pyramids and networks of patron-client relationships operating within the existing power structure?
PAS strength has always been based on rural Malay peasants and traditional village religious leaders. This strength is particularly evident in northern Peninsular Malaysia. After independence, PAS emphasis on Islam and Malay nationalism began to attract wide support in such states as Kedah, Perlis, Trengganu and Kelantan. These states have a predominantly agrarian Malay population with a strong faith in Islam. In these states the pondok schools (Islamic schools) were established. Religious teachers in the kampungs "took great effort to popularize PAS among the villagers as the genuine party which defended the interests of both Malays and Islam".

In this region of the country, the early PAS success was also based, in part, on a connection with the frustrations and hopes of the poor Malay peasant. The lack of response from UMNO to grass-roots concerns reflected its elitist nature. On the other hand, the PAS politician connected with the villager, either directly, or through village leaders, by being attentive to those concerns. In a region of limited economic development, where the peasant had fewer resources of his own, constituents tended to turn to the politician in a variety of situations, including non-political ones, for support and advice.

In general, the religious and communal appeal of PAS in the 1950's was particularly effective when it could also focus attention on economic and educational liabilities.
facing Malays, especially in the economically depressed northern region. The coopting of Malay teachers and students from Muslim religious schools and Malay primary schools spearheaded the party's introduction to the Malay villages.\(^\text{10}\)

The initial electoral success of PAS in 1959, winning control of state governments in Kelantan and Trengganu\(^\text{11}\), was the beginning of a roller-coaster ride of electoral swings influenced by the alignment and re-alignment of patron-client structures. In this regard, factionalism, and the corresponding movement of clusters from the 1960s through to the 1980s, illustrates the fluid nature and complexity of the pyramidal structures. For example, factional infighting within PAS in the early 1960s is noted as causing a considerable shift in electoral support away from the party in the states of Kelantan and Trengganu. The result was a change in state government.\(^\text{12}\) The introduction of NEP in 1971, and the opportunity to participate in the ruling coalition (NF), benefitted the PAS leaders and the party's ability to establish footholds in former non-PAS villages.\(^\text{13}\)

Factions caused the expulsion of the PAS in 1977 as well as the formation of another "Malay" party known as the Berjasa party.\(^\text{14}\) The early 1980's reflected the return to more traditional PAS strength in Kelantan and Trengganu. Electoral shifts in the late 1980s, as evident by recent by-elections, further illustrates the faction influence.\(^\text{15}\)

In Shamsul's kampung studies, UMNO and PAS branches were
established in Kampung Asal. Each party had a differently formed base. UMNO was established from the top-down by elites at the mukim level while PAS was formed directly from the village grass-roots.\textsuperscript{16} The introduction of PAS to this district was through Kampung Asal. The person responsible for establishing PAS influence was a rubber smallholder and part-time religious teacher. He became well known in the village for the success of his religious classes for both children and adults. Further, he established a primary religious school in the village. Ultimately, he assumed the position of village headman, as unanimously approved by the villagers. This technique of gaining the confidence of the villagers before attempting to organize a PAS branch was common in Selangor.\textsuperscript{17}

When PAS was formed in 1958 in Kampung Asal, its political base was religious. Its principles stressed the importance of sacrificing energy, property and life for the community's sake.\textsuperscript{18} Local competition was absent from any UMNO branch (none existed), so PAS enjoyed political success. This success was rooted in the history of Kampung Asal, which had been formed unofficially by a group of peasants who cleared wasteland to grow certain food crops\textsuperscript{19}, contrary to the law of the colonial administration. The penghulu, as the administration's agent, was ignored and his authority not recognized. The rift in the relationship between penghulu and village headman of kampung Asal has continued to
contemporary times.

The effects of colonialism, in the early 1900's, on the region, weakened the patron-client relationships to the extent that part of the clientele left. The exchange relationship obligations were not kept by the penghulu. The continuation of land disputes into the 1920's and 30's exacerbated the division between the penghulu and village headman of Kampung Asal. The post-independence political effects of this have been illustrated in a more topical way. The village head of the nearby village, Kampung Chempaka, was not receiving adequate support from his own party, UMNO. Similarly, PAS leaders were unable to use their dominant membership in the VDSC to any advantage. The reporting relationship was to the bureaucracy, which was controlled by UMNO. As a result, the village headman would consult with the state assemblyman to discuss the difficulty of having a strong PAS organization within his village perimeter. "He was known to have insisted that the [state assemblyman] channel more rural development projects to Kg.[Kampung] Chempaka in order to show that the UMNO controlled government did not forget the villagers". But the state assemblyman was more concerned, given the limited patronage at his disposal, with consolidating his patron-client relationship with other kampungs within the district. It was, therefore, unnecessary to be too concerned about a small pocket of PAS and a similarly small pocket of UMNO villagers. The patron-client
pyramid therefore shifted. The effect of this shift had an interesting development. Not only was the PAS village being neglected by government rural development schemes, but potential UMNO clients of the larger kampung Chempaka were being by-passed. The result was a linkage between UMNO and PAS village leadership initiated by PAS leaders. UMNO would assume a political front within the overall kampung, with PAS handling the business activities. This served two purposes. The UMNO political dominance would re-establish the linchpin with higher level politicians and restore a regular flow of benefits to the kampung. Dominance of UMNO within the district bureaucracy made it necessary for this venture to have connections with the higher UMNO positions.21 For PAS, the leaders would become part of a patron-client structure with access to economic development benefits. It seemed to be a workable solution which, according to Shamsul, extended from its inception - when PAS was part of the ruling coalition between December 1971 and December 197722 - until the time he completed his research in 1984. But this arrangement between this group of sub-leaders to improve their individual welfare did not necessarily mean improving the welfare of their clients, especially those in Kampung Asal. For example, Shamsul states that the economic benefits were not being distributed to the PAS-supported village: "Kg.[Kampung] Asal was still an underdeveloped village, denied of many basic facilities...without electricity and
water supply to this date."

Perhaps some benefits were seeping through. But why would PAS apparently abandon its clientele, on which its political success is presently based? This may be an example of a patron determining how the dyad will operate.

In this case, the PAS leaders decided to pursue economic interests to the advantage of their own leadership. It was a horizontal connection with its UMNO leader counterparts. A group of sub-leaders acted together to achieve mutual advantage. Here, the pyramid would be structured with UMNO leaders performing as linchpins with higher officials while PAS leaders would become an appendage to the UMNO local leaders. The PAS leaders may have been acting as a client, with little or no immediate benefits below them. This would suggest a perpetuation of a minimum level of subsistence for the villager. This suggestion may not be unfounded. For example, in 1985, PAS spent M$600,000 to purchase approximately forty-eight acres of land to build a relatively self-sufficient community base, complete with mosque, school and shops. This amount of money is not easily obtainable from the main method of acquiring funds, which is through donations from the village poor. As long as PAS can at least meet a subsistence level for its supporters, the patron-client structure may remain cohesive enough.

The impotence of PAS as an effective alternative to UMNO for rural Malays was also demonstrated in a parliamentary
constituency by-election held in 1985 in Padang Terap, Kedah. Although in the home state of the Prime Minister, Padang Terap was reported to be one of the twenty poorest areas in the country and fairly representative of the remote regions with a predominantly Malay and Muslim electorate. The area comprises primarily farmers and rubber smallholders and is considered to have a subsistence economy. The constituency however, does include Chinese and Indian electors.

During the campaign, fighting erupted at a land development project of 2,000 residents. Land projects have traditionally been UMNO strongholds because the final selection of residents is made by local government officials who are UMNO members. But within the above project, PAS had obtained the requisite membership support to establish a party branch, suggesting a swing in loyalties from UMNO. PAS hoped Padang Terap would become its stronghold in Kedah. With ninety percent of the residents being Muslim and poor, this should have provided a support base for PAS. Despite an intensive campaign, UMNO was successful in the by-election. The main explanation suggested for the UMNO victory was the standard promise of rural development. The corollary perhaps would be that the government, through UMNO, was testing its ability to withstand apparent limited (but nevertheless growing) support for PAS in the area. The result of the election would determine what, if any, further measures were necessary to ensure PAS did not acquire more
political strength. By limiting the involvement of PAS in the land schemes (through political manipulation), PAS leaders would be unable to maintain the linchpin connection with the government to the benefit of the villager. The reported fighting may have been an indication of a shifting within the patron-client structure. The ability of PAS to operate within the project indicated that a cluster within a pyramid had shifted. A break-down of some kind had occurred suggesting that a number of clients re-aligned with PAS leadership.

I have argued that in order for PAS leaders to be an effective linchpin between state institutions and the villager, they must align within a patron-client pyramid to tap into the resources necessary to provide a cohesive exchange relationship. I have provided an example of this alignment from the Shamsul study. Further, I have shown some of the political difficulties facing PAS in achieving this objective. A more recent example of this dynamic comes from a June 1989 by-election in Teluk Pasu, Trengganu, which was won by PAS.28

To its supporters, the success of PAS might indicate that it is making inroads into UMNO territory and that a trend is emerging. It might indicate that it is climbing the pyramid of power from which it can become even stronger, resulting in a growing client base at the village level. However, an analysis of the by-election win is necessary before accepting such notions. First, it was not really a
breakthrough for the party. Trengganu was not unknown to PAS. In fact, PAS and UMNO had alternated in holding the Teluk Pasu seat, although the incumbent had been an UMNO state assemblyman who died in May 1989\textsuperscript{29}. Second, the total number of votes for PAS was 3,671 (of which approximately 3,000 were from its own ranks) compared with its 1986 election count of 2,800. Third, the PAS candidate would probably have not won the election but for an alliance with Semangat'46, which is believed to have provided the critical margin of votes (over 500). This Semangat'46 group of political leaders had separated from UMNO in 1988 as a result of bitter infighting and deregistration of UMNO. Its successor, UMNO Baru, has carried on under the name of UMNO.\textsuperscript{30}

What conclusions can be drawn from this by-election win? clearly, the PAS victory was the result of the UMNO dissident group which brought to PAS their voting support. The horizontal group action mentioned earlier resurfaces. Without tapping into the political power structure of UMNO, PAS is unlikely to achieve any degree of electoral success beyond the village. Even though the supporters were dissident UMNO party officials, their clientele to a certain extent was still intact. The personal following is an essential factor when dealing with an opposing party (UMNO). It can be the bearer of considerable power and influence through either political or economic avenues. In this case, Semangat'46 had the assistance of Tunku Ibrahim Ismail Nasiruddin Shah, the
Sultan's brother. His kinship meant an automatic respect from voters, especially the older ones. The UMNO Baru village "strong man" was reportedly weakened in his role by internal party factionalism and rivalry. It was reported that the Chief Minister wanted to keep federal ministers away from the electioneering, except for the Deputy Prime Minister who had grass-roots appeal. This position might be explained by UMNO's reluctance to make any serious attempt to win the election and fail. If they had involved the federal ministers, the loss could have been much more harmful to the party leadership at the national level. Finally, the PAS candidate was a long-time leader within the area and had a strong and broad-based following.

Despite the PAS victory, aided significantly by an alliance with a powerful ex-UMNO faction, PAS holds few seats in Trengganu or the other states. The limited PAS success illustrates the inability of a rural Malay-based party to function, through its leadership, as effective linchpins while outside the power structure. UMNO members have the upper hand by far in maintaining and perpetuating the patron-client structures. This is accomplished primarily through rural development. The emphasis, though, is not really the personal quality of the relationship, as identified in the traditional notion of patron. The ability of the UMNO leadership, and in turn the government, to hold the patron-client structure together is economically derived. It,
therefore, has a more instrumental structure which can be influenced by the vagaries of global markets, government deficits and factions. However, PAS is structured differently. Although its top leadership may be considered religious leaders of peasants, their local leaders are usually peasants with some religious qualifications. The strong bond with the village is maintained mainly through the religious institutions. The personal quality is there and is strong, much more so than in villages more susceptible to outside influences. The leadership therefore assumes a more traditional role. It also restricts the scope of that leadership. For example, in the recent by-election, the broad personal appeal of Semangat'46 leader Tengku Razaleigh was a major factor in the victory. Candidates in elections in other areas may not necessarily have that advantage. The political dominance of UNMO combined with its influence on the economic modernization under the NEP has serious political ramifications for PAS. Its electoral success may, for the foreseeable future, depend on pockets of poor village areas with strong personal attachment of followers or alliances such as that entered into with Semangat'46. In the case of the latter, even that will limit the ability of PAS to operate within the prevailing power structure through the patron-client pyramid, cluster and network. In the case of the former, its ability to perform any linchpin role will be severely restricted. There is little likelihood of its
leadership becoming tied to higher level patrons within the existing power structure. The above analysis should also help our understanding of the reasons for the occurrence of peasant uprisings, protests and other forms of group action which I now address.

Despite the political dominance of the ruling party within the state institutions, and the complex patron-client structures operating within the power structure, peasant uprisings and protests occur. It would seem that in a tightly-controlled environment there should be no such activity. However, as I explain, the structure of patron-client relationships are not necessarily that strong or stable. Protests are one manifestation of this fact. In order for this kind of activity to occur, there must either be a collapse of the existing patron-client structure or villagers outside that structure. The basis for the connection—deference and loyalty—must evaporate. Protest can occur even when patron-client structures exist. The following examples will provide evidence for my comments. Each example presents a leader-follower process with the addition of horizontal ties of group action.

In 1985 there was a violent uprising in Kampung Memali in Kedah. Malaysian security police, under the authority of the Internal Security Act, were sent to arrest a local religious leader on an outstanding warrant. The result was a mass uprising involving over 400 villagers and 200 police.
Many were injured and some were killed, including the village leader to be arrested. In this case the leader had been an Islamic teacher and former PAS official.

In rural Malay society, the religious teacher continues to command considerable respect. This relationship becomes even stronger in the more remote regions of the country. The leader's past connections with PAS were also important in forging close ties with the villager. Mainly consisting of rubber smallholders, the average (not median) household income was M$200 a month. Remote and poverty-stricken areas in Kedah favour PAS and Kampung Memali is considered a PAS stronghold. Whether or not the religious leader was the headman, he had the full support of his clientele. It was this strong connection with the villager which would be used to defend a village leader.

Wan Hashim, in A Malay Peasant Community in Upper Perak, comments on a peasant protest in Baling in 1974. Baling is near Kampung Memali, a short distance from the Thai-Malaysian border. The peasants, like those in Kampung Memali, were poor. The peasant smallholders cultivated rubber, which at that time was suffering from the downturn in the global market. Economic conditions were depressed to the extent that some villagers were reportedly starving. In this case the peasants, according to Hashim, were guided in their protest by party leaders engaged in factional infighting. Interestingly, the village leader in Kampung Memali (1985)
participated in the protest in 1974 as an active member of ABIM (Malaysian Muslim Youth Movement). Also participating was the ABIM chief, Anwar Ibraham, who is now an UMNO vice-president and the Minister of Education.\(^{37}\)

Both these examples illustrate the operation of the linchpin but at the most basic level. Local leaders mobilizing villagers in co-ordinated group action to support the leader's objectives. There is, however, another example which is more disturbing to the nature of present patron-client structures. That is the protest of landless peasants. In Ali's *Malay Peasant Society and Leadership*, certain villagers in the late 1960s adopted protest methods outside the legal framework. The issue was land, or more properly, the lack thereof. Villagers had applied to the government for land but without success. Appeals to the recognized linchpins, such as state assemblyman and penghulu, were also unsuccessful.\(^{38}\) Here, the patron-client structure broke down. The clients were orphaned. The result was group action among the peasants. Their individual welfare was rooted in united group action. Having no patron to turn to, they looked within their midst. Through consensus, a leader was found who exemplified qualities of leadership, e.g., diligence, honesty, integrity, piety, ability to deal with officials, etc. Such a leader would be a peasant leader espousing the norms of the collectivity.

Common to the above examples is the inability of
existing patron-client structures to accommodate these types of activities. The Memali case represents group action of religious extremism with little interest in linkage to higher authority. The Baling case represents leader activated protest frustrated by being outside the patron-client structure. The Ali protesters represent peasant group action undertaken to compensate for the inadequate patron-client structures. It may not be considered "the Malay way"; however, it must be remembered that the traditional notion of patron-client relationship is based on security and subsistence. When there is no other recourse, leadership emerges at the local level to create a different kind of group action. Among the poor Malay villager, therefore, the seeds of protest lay near the surface. This metaphor is appropriate as land scarcity - and the resultant poverty-seems to be the machine to till that soil, bringing those seeds to the surface. State institutions recognize this possibility. What do they seem to be doing about it?

One federal government attempt to provide benefits to the Malay poor has been through the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA), which was established in 1959. FELDA was intended to encourage the Malay peasant to grow cash crops for export instead of the traditional paddy farming. This was to be accomplished through estate farming. Since estates were considered more productive than smallholdings, a publicly managed estate development was viewed as achieving high
productivity with individually owned small parcels of land. This land reform scheme was an attempt to retard the negative economic effects of the gradual fragmentation of land, due in part to the Islamic inheritance customs.

A collective form of ownership replaced the individual titles of the FELDA schemes in the 1960's. The settlers would work the land and acquire joint land title. In an effort to reduce overhead costs, the government, in 1985, introduced a new share system where settlers were registered as shareholders. They would eventually receive bonuses and dividends without actually owning the land. This decision appeared to alienate the peasants. It was reported that peasants were unhappy about the schemes because of its lack of ownership, a developing "estate labourer" mentality, and equal distribution of payment for unequal effort. Fearing a manifestation of this discontent, possibly in political support for PAS (which is established in some of the schemes), the government seems to have altered its course, stating that the schemes would be reverting to an individual form of ownership. The manipulation of these schemes for political purposes, though, has been a feature since its inception.

The government, as dominated by UMNO, has ensured that schemes generated under FELDA operate as avenues for maintaining grass-roots political support. Applicants are screened for their political affiliation, thereby making
FELDA schemes UMNO strongholds. Even the system of land clearing has been influenced by political considerations. In Selangor, only single men were recruited, who spent the following five years clearing and planting oil palm. They were unable to perform other work until the trees were ready for harvesting. In Pahang, a large network of FELDA schemes hired labourers to clear the land and do the planting. In addition, houses were built for the FELDA families. The reward for five years of hard work was land, a basic one room house, free seedlings, continued government assistance with fertilizers and guaranteed sales of the harvest. It is not easy to gain membership in a FELDA scheme and due to strong competition, there are lengthy waiting lists.43

Rural development means continued votes and power for UMNO. The patron-client relationship is used to cement this support. Accordingly, any agrarian reform should not disrupt this relationship. FELDA, like other schemes (e.g., RISDA and FOA), is no exception. The structure of these schemes does not allow easy access for the village poor. Most of the FELDA projects are in the politically secure southern part of Peninsular Malaysia while the poorer states of the north have received limited access.44 Moreover, these schemes are located in areas which are viable for plantation agriculture. Many of the settlers in these schemes do come from the poorer northern states. As a result of being moved, often out of their own state, their patron-client relationship dissolves.
Are these projects successful? The average family income of FELDA scheme settlers is well above the poverty line as determined by the government. In addition, their living conditions are much improved. In 1988, approximately 106,000 families were (or were soon to be), settled in 422 Felda schemes. The total area covers 764,000 hectares. Higher commodity prices in 1988 meant FELDA settlers were earning M$700 a month (rubber) and M$580 a month (oil palm). But in a much earlier 1980 study, estimates of the number of poor rural families were more than 400,000. As of 1988, it is estimated that FELDA has dealt with no more than 10% of the landless at any one time. Poor Malays Speak Out captures the essence of the plight of the poor in rural Malaysia. Through individual examples from kampungs in Kedah, this 1982 study follows a number of villagers and their efforts to contend with their poverty. Did FELDA provide any assistance to these villagers?

Common to all their difficulties is the lack of land to provide a basic subsistence livelihood through paddy farming. In a way, these kampungs in Kedah could represent many throughout Peninsular Malaysia. The traditional base is being eroded by the intrusion of modern forces. Those forces include the mechanization of farming, which increases the economic benefits of the landowners. Many peasants do not own their land; they are tenants. Their livelihood is
dependent on their patron/landowner who, according to the
theory, is to provide their basic welfare. As shown by the
authors, that welfare is being reduced and in some cases
disappearing. The traditional role of the patron is being
reshaped by these modern forces. The result may either be a
shifting of the nature of the exchange relationship which
continues to maintain the status quo, or a removal of the
exchange relationship in which case the client may become
orphaned from any patron. In the latter case, the village or
kinship "alternative agencies" of protection may become more
prominent.

Some of the villagers studied did adjust their situation
to accommodate this changing environment. In one instance, a
peasant borrowed money from a Chinese businessman who had
employed him, to start his own small chain saw business. The
paddy was not sufficient to maintain support of his family.
He therefore continued to operate within the prevailing power
structure. Another villager followed a similar path,
establishing himself as a broker for machine owners.48

Others have not been as able to develop the alternative
work necessary to maintain an adequate living. One woman
peasant had her patron-client relationship dissolve as the
patron progressively removed her tenancy on his land. The
village and kinship structures became her support. Another
peasant also experienced the trend of landowners reclaiming
land from them. The landowner then leased it to Chinese
operators who paid in advance for the use of the land. The peasant's family had to depend mainly on kinship connections for support. Like all the sample villagers, he looked to education and government employment as providing the avenues for his children to escape the poverty. In one instance, he approached the headman, as chairman of the local UMNO branch, seeking help for his daughter who had not met the government's entrance requirements and had been rejected. He was unsuccessful. That area was also known for its PAS interest.\textsuperscript{49}

The children are the focal point of the family. It is the provision of their welfare which determines the peasant's perception of subsistence. Their children's success, as viewed by education and employment opportunities, will ultimately benefit the family in the kampung. They will assist the family financially. The peasant is drawn into an environment not of his choosing, contending with external forces which are altering his subsistence base of agriculture. These villagers may be resigned to their "rezeki" (fate).\textsuperscript{50} However, some have used initiative to improve their situation and others have not. Perhaps PAS or protest is another way to manifest their "rezeki", particularly among those who have seemingly lost their patron linkage.

I have noted the government's attempt, through FELDA, to provide economic support for the Malay poor.\textsuperscript{51} I have also
noted the political considerations tied to its operation, and the government's apparent concern about PAS. Why would the government in 1988 be concerned about a weak and narrow based village party? The answer may stem from the 1988 break within UMNO. The successor party, UMNO Baru, is aware that former UMNO members remain in the land schemes. This could lead to an opposition patron-client structure, including PAS supporters, and seriously weaken the ability of the land schemes to operate as UMNO would like. This is not a hypothetical concern by UMNO, as illustrated by the by-election win by PAS (allied with the UMNO dissidents) in 1989.

The UMNO split in 1988 has broader implications and is symptomatic of the prevailing power structure within the patron-client relationship. In my theory, I identified factionalism as a feature of the patron-client dyad. A faction leader may operate in a pyramid with client clusters. Shifting of the components within the structure makes factionalism particularly virulent. The UMNO split and emergence of UMNO Baru and Semangat'46 has had repercussions throughout the national party as well as through levels reaching to the kampung. The patron-client structures magnify the split. For example, following the removal of Dr. Mahathir's rival, it was suggested that Members of Parliament allied with the dissident, Tengku Razaleh, would be pressured to resign. Further, a number of state
assemblymen were expected to be expelled from the National Front. The impact is severe since so much power rests with the politicians that any benefits received at the village level would be affected. For example, if any of those state assemblymen were members of EXCO, that would significantly affect a considerable number of clients. State, District, mukim and village clients would no longer have the same kind of access to economic benefits derived from the NEP programs. The uncertainty of the outcome of factional infighting itself could be sufficient to cause a level of clients to seek new patrons. The political manipulation does not stop directly with the politician. The District Officer, in the bureaucracy, can also experience its impact. In the UMNO example above, the Prime Minister intervened in the government's transferring process by ordering, through the Chief Minister of Kelantan, the transfer of a number of District Officers. This intervention was not only evidence of political influence within the bureaucracy, but also an illustration of the extensive nature of such clusters. (See Tables 4 and 5). Factionalism in this case could lead to a more direct attempt by the politicians to encroach on areas of government decision-making, for example, personal loyalties.

In conclusion, it is apparent that the village poor are a potential reservoir for peasant protests. Protest may be initiated from within existing patron-client structures or
through the formation of horizontal ties within the client group from which their own leaders emerge. That situation arises because of inadequacies in the patron-client structures (political interference and modernization adjustments), and is the most dangerous for the institutions of state. Also dangerous for these institutions is factionalism. If the two coincide, a political crisis could be the result. It is therefore imperative for the government to ensure that linchpins are formed to preclude that possibility.
Notes:

1. Lande, "The Dyadic Basis of Clientelism", in Schmidt et al., op.cit., p.xxviii.

2. Ibid.

3. Shamsul, From British to Bumiputera Rule... op.cit., p.4.


5. Ibid.


11. Ibid., p.231.

12. PAS won control of the state governments in Kelantan and Trengganu in 1959, but lost the state government of Trengganu to the Alliance in 1961. This was due to considerable factional infighting for leadership positions within the party. One faction was weakened by the party's failure to select one of his candidates as the new Speaker of the state assembly. Not only was the new Chief Minister subject to criticism, but also the leader of the party at the state level. Internal feuding culminated in the defection of party members and the formation of the government by the Alliance without dissolution of the Assembly. See Means, Malaysian Politics, op.cit., pp.231-232 and Milne and Mauzy, Politics and Government..., op.cit., p.145.

13. The Alliance (now NF) has used (and continues to use) the strategy of coopting influential opponents and opposition parties into the government. This has been effective in maintaining political control. This
strategy was employed in the early 1970s to coopt PAS. For PAS, it provided increased access to federal assistance in economic development, especially important to Kelantan and the party in shoring up its sagging political support. Also, at the time, there was an internal leadership crisis within the Kelantan PAS. By late 1977, perceptions from within NF factions resulted in PAS expulsion. See Milne and Mauzy, Politics and Government..., op.cit., pp.185-191 and Mauzy and Milne, "The Mahathir Administration...", op.cit., p.91.

14. In late 1977, a factional split within PAS led to the formation of a breakaway, pro-UMNO party (Berjasa). See Malaysia: A Country Study, op.cit., p.226. According to evidence presented in Milne and Mauzy, Politics and Government..., op.cit., p.390, Berjasa votes probably resulted in the shift of three constituencies from PAS to the National Front by splitting the PAS vote. Following the elections, the National Front and Berjasa formed a coalition government in Kelantan. (p.390). The 1978 general elections followed with major electoral setbacks for PAS which captured only 5 of 87 parliamentary seats it contested and only 9 of the 203 state seats contested. PAS did, however, win 40% of the vote in the four northern states and increased its percentage in Kelantan to almost 45% (p.398).

15. By the 1982 elections, UMNO, PAS and Berjasa were affected to varying degrees by factional infighting within each of the parties. In Kelantan, there was friction between UMNO and Berjasa state organizations. Moreover, PAS was experiencing an internal leadership split between the "Old Guards" and "Young Turks". The former emerged the victor in Kelantan while the latter received the candidate selection in Trengganu. This infighting hurt PAS during the elections, especially in Kedah and Perlis. The UMNO infighting in Kelantan enabled PAS to make a substantial comeback in that state. Diane K. Mauzy, "The 1982 General Elections in Malaysia: A Mandate for Change?", in Bruce Gale, ed., Readings in Malaysian Politics, op.cit., pp.9-12.

16. Shamsul, From British to..., op.cit., pp.158-159. PAS strategy is to become established in the village and win the confidence of the villager. It has a populist, grass-roots base. This is noted by Shamsul as being a common approach in organizing PAS branches in Selangor.

17. Ibid., p.159.

18. Ibid., p.160.
19. Ibid., p.140; Shamsul states that the wasteland was cleared for "ladang" or shifting cultivation, contrary to the law of the Selangor colonial administration which favoured rice and coconut cultivation. The area which gave birth to Kampung Asal was a "ladang" area growing short term crops such as tapioca, vegetables, etc. This dispute began the rift between the peasants, their leader, and the penghulu, culminating with the villagers setting up their own kampung under the headship of their leader p.141-143.

20. Ibid., p.165.


22. see note 14 above.


24. PAS is very weak in Selangor, with little hope of winning state power in the foreseeable future. The alignment might simply have been pragmatic. Diane K. Mauzy, pers. comm., Although it likely was a local decision, it does reflect the patron determining operation of the dyad at that level.


26. Ibid. p.18. The out-going MP (UMNO) was Tan Sri Syed Ahmad Shahabuddin, who had earlier been appointed governor of Malacca, necessitating the by-election.

27. Ibid.


29. Ibid., the name of the incumbent was not reported.


32. Diane Mauzy, pers. comm., offers an additional reason noting the lack of involvement of federal politicians
in the campaign was also due to the lack of "popularity" of these officials in Trengganu. Their appearance would likely have done more harm than good.

33. Ibid.

34. PAS' ability to operate within a power structure was evident when in control of the state governments of Kelantan and Trengganu. Under the Constitution, chief sources of revenue are federally controlled. Nevertheless, the states are entitled to some funding without federal control. In addition, the states depend mainly on revenue from land, licences and related taxes. Kelantan had its own civil service. Consequently, the state controlled all structures down to the village level. In that sense operating within a power structure was possible. See Beaglehole, The District:..., op.cit., pp.79-85. However, currently, PAS has but one parliamentary seat. Their state assembly support is in Kedah (3 of 28 seats), Kelantan (10 of 39), and Trengganu (3 of 32). This data obtained from 1986 elections in The Europa Year Book: A World Survey, 1988, Vol.II, London, Europa Publications Limited, 1988, pp.1771-1772 and recent by-election information, FEER, "Heartland murmurs", op.cit., p.18. Moreover, attempts to form alliances to tap into these power structures have limited utility, as discussed in this chapter. Alliances operating outside the power structure have limited access to patronage and will see an early dissolution. For example, Semangat'46 has been denied patronage. It is being maintained by its leader's (Tengku Razaleh) personal resources which are not unlimited. Diane Mauzy, pers. comm.


36. Ibid.

37. Wan Hashim, A Malay Pesant Community in Upper Perak, Kuala Lumpur, University of Malaya Press, p.75. In "Bitter harvest in the rice bowl", FEER, January 10,1975, p.31, it is suggested that ABIM (Angkatan-Force, Belia-Youth, Islam, Malaysia) and the socialist People's Party were behind the uprising; see also "The Battle of Memali", op.cit., pp.15-16 and "Malaysia", The Europa Year Book: A World Survey, op.cit., p.1771 for current cabinet.


40. FELDA schemes are from 1,000 to 2,000 hectares. The cash crops are usually rubber or oil palm. Approved settlers are located in the scheme and paid a salary until the crop matures. Each head of the household is provided with a 3-5 hectare plot. Drury, "The Limits of Conservative Reform, Agricultural Policy in Malaysia", in ASEAN Economic Bulletin, op.cit., p.297.

41. The government estimated in 1987 that there were 800,000 hectares of idle crops in Peninsular Malaysia, including 160,000 hectares of abandoned or idle paddy land. Paddy and rubber smallholdings have been abandoned or underutilized because the plots were too small to be profitable. Drury, ASEAN Economic Bulletin, op.cit., p.295.

42. "Policy Turnaround", FEER, op.cit., p.17. The article suggests that the change in "ownership" is a recognition of the sensitivity of the land issue. The share system implemented in 1985 has contributed to a substantial drop in motivation such that the government is concerned about political fallout, i.e., permitting opposition parties to obtain a stronger foothold within the schemes. This, combined with the Islamic resurgence, has prompted government action.(p.18).

43. Ibid., pp.17-18.


46. Information based on studies in the early 1980s found that traditional crop peasants in northeastern Peninsular Malaysia generally rented or owned less than one hectare of paddy land. In Trengganu, the "Besut Development Project" showed farmers, on average, farmed a modest 1.5 hectares. However, this was an average figure and not a median figure. Consequently, there were a few large profitable plots while many were barely able to provide subsistence. This was also applicable to a MUDA development in the region. Drury, "The Limits of Conservative Reform..", ASEAN Economic Bulletin, op.cit., p.294.

47. The conservative nature of the government's agricultural policy tends to assist the wealthier landowners. RISDA is an example. Few of the
smallholders are able to take advantage of the program. It is just too costly for a poor smallholder to clear and work the land, expect delayed income and await the tapping of new trees for five to seven years. The only ones able to participate in the scheme would be those who have larger landholdings and alternative incomes to support themselves while waiting for the "harvest". Drury, "The Limits..", ASEAN.., op.cit., p.296.

48. Kasim et.al., Poor Malays Speak Out, op.cit., pp.4-7 and pp.39-44.

49. Ibid., pp.13,52 and 58.

50. Ibid., p.8.

51. In Kasim et al.,op.cit., the authors describe the inability of the Muda Agricultural Development Authority to be effective for the poor. Although MADA has, to a limited extent, used Farmer Associations to contract for maintenance of the irrigation system and farm roads, the employment opportunities have tended to go to the local elite and their children, and not the poor. Further, they commented that after fifteen years of rural development and poverty reduction, as of 1982, 46% of the paddy farm households in the Muda area earned less than the government's stated "poverty line income". (pp.55 and 63).

52. Forced into the open", FEER, op.cit., pp.14-15. I have commented on this example in Chapter 1 of this thesis, p.28, while introducing "factions". Diane Mauzy in "Decline of 'the Malay Way'", Asian Survey, op.cit.,pp.213-217, elaborates on the ripple effect throughout the pyramid. Several ministers and deputy ministers declared support for the Tengku Razaleigh faction (referred to as "Team B"). The party election on April 24, 1987 showed Mahathir winning the party's presidency 761 to 718 votes. Razaleigh and Datuk Rais Yatim resigned from Cabinet. Later, Mahathir fired three more ministers and four deputy ministers. Further repercussions were felt within state-level government agencies and within the private sector. (pp.214-215). Diane Mauzy, pers. comm., adds that many loans of dissidents were demanded and government contracts to their businesses were cancelled. All of this illustrates the unstable nature of the pyramids.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Traditional rural Malay society in Peninsular Malaysia has undergone considerable changes in social, political and economic terms. The development of "modern" institutions, such as bureaucracies and political parties, has introduced the peasant to an environment extending beyond the village. But as dramatic as those changes have been, the basis on which his life is structured remains the patron-client relationship. Not only have these external institutions been incorporated into a traditional society, the traditional society, through its prevailing patron-client structures, has been incorporated into those institutions. The result is a mixture of formal complex organization norms based on western models with those of the informal social system of patron-client relationships. These relationships have tended to become more instrumental and less affective, more narrow and singular in purpose. This is evident from the studies presented here, and as illustrated by the accompanying diagrams (Appendices A and B) with multiple connectors identified. The introduction of an external money economy has altered the subsistence nature of agriculture to one based on a cash economy. In the 1960s and 1970s, Malaysia's primary
cash crops were rubber and palm oil. These external influences have made it particularly difficult on the Malay poor, those without an exchange relationship.

An understanding of patron-client relationships is necessary in order to determine the nature of linkage between state institutions and the villager. Coopting traditional village leaders into state institutions has been used successfully in Peninsular Malaysia. The coopting of a patron produces linkage between state institutions and villager. However, for the linkage to be completed, these leaders must be directly connected with higher level leaders who operate within the bureaucracy and political structures. This vertical connection is premised on patron-client relationships. A theory of patron-client relationships establishes the framework for my hypotheses.

I have attempted to show that the incorporation of political institutions (colonial and western democratic) has transformed the nature of the patron-client relationship. Although retaining the basic structure, new influences have altered that nature. It now includes a political base with modern influences. The exchange relationship is based on patron needs of political support and client needs which may often extend beyond the traditional boundaries.

As these relationships have expanded they have created a complex structure of linchpin connections with state institutions. S. Husin Ali, in Malay Peasant Society and
Leadership, illustrated the expanding nature of these dyadic relationships at a direct level of contact with the villager. He depicted these relationships by diagram. (See Appendix A). I have built on that illustration to show how the linchpin operates at a higher level within the bureaucracy and political bodies. Both government and political structures are active in penetrating the village. They do this through the above-noted linchpin connections.

Traditional leadership has been altered by the modern influences. Both the role of the village headman and penghulu have changed. No longer are they the focal point of the village or community. This is shared with politicians and bureaucrats. They both have become linchpins between villager and state institutions. The village headman is appointed by a civil servant, but given political approval. His political role is placing him further under the political patron (state assemblyman). His connections within the bureaucracy, through the VDSC, are ineffective. This is supported in the studies I use, particularly the Sungai Raya villages. I have shown that this lack of effectiveness stems from the political dominance of the administrative machinery. It is the dominant member of the ruling coalition, UMNO, which is influencing the direction of the government. The headman is also becoming associated with a modernized role as broker. In this capacity, he controls communication and has enhanced his position as an effective linchpin between the villager and
This broker/middleman role has become an extension of his patron role.

Further, the headman is becoming more aligned with the "constituency" instead of the village. This supports the connection between the village headman and state assemblyman. This shift does, however, illustrate a change in the pyramid structure of a patron-client relationship. It can split villagers within a village into political camps. Redistributive norms of the village would no longer seem to have force. Redistribution would now be more likely within the constituency and the patron-client relationships therein. The political influence on the village headman also suggests a lessening of patron-client ties with the penghulu.

The penghulu's role as linchpin has declined with the increase in political influence. His position within the bureaucracy does not provide an adequate client base to maintain and increase power and influence. The political connections are more likely to be used. To compound his difficulty, the District Officer is influenced by his political superiors. With the political dominance of UMNO within the state institutions, the District Officer seeks to retain his own power base and advance within the hierarchy of the bureaucracy. The political influence on the District Officer is therefore prominent and effective. As a result, the penghulu will unlikely receive the necessary benefits to pass along to his clientele. The District Officer's concern
is more of being a client to a higher linchpin, not a patron to a lower one. The effect of this shift on the penghulu has been to extend contacts to the politicians in order to secure some patron role. I have presented evidence of this adjustment in this paper. Also, an alliance of sub-leaders could be possible at this level; mutual concern about individual welfare. The penghulu's role appears once again to be shifting.

The Ali diagram did not indicate the relative weight associated with the connectors at the direct level, nor the roles which gave effect to them. From what I have shown at this level, political influence is increasing and placing the weight squarely on the political side of the diagram. The heavy arrowed firm lines going downward, on the diagram, do not accurately represent what this study concludes. It should be dotted to reflect the extent of that exchange relationship. The influences of the NEP on these relationships, more than anything else, is a likely cause.

The extension of the Ali diagram to a higher level linchpin confirms the central hypothesis of the political influence on state institutions. The NEP and its emphasis on rural development has created a variety of actors, who, ostensibly could be considered patrons. I have shown how this rural development is shaping many patron-client relationships, as funds and contracts are distributed from state to district to village level. By examining various
district committees, I have shown that authority does not necessarily rest with the District Officer, as chairman, but with the political body, EXCO. Political influence, therefore, extends to the higher level linchpin and dictates how the patron-client relationship operates. I also conclude that the District Officer is becoming more of a broker while his patron role is diminishing.

The national government is also active at the village level. Such schemes as FELDA, RISDA and FOA set up different patron-client relationships. In the FOA, for example, the village headman is used to mobilize villagers to support the various agricultural projects. It would seem that this kind of linchpin involving the headman with the villager is operating as theorists intend. However, the headman is not a patron to all villagers. His supporters, friends and family become the membership in the association. This reflects the breakdown of the village as an "agency of protection". The implementation and distribution of the projects become highly individual and political.

One unusual dynamic of the patron-client relationship is the ability to form alliances. This horizontal tie can be accomplished, but still within the dyad relationship. Evidence of this type of relationship is provided in the paper. Alliances can be factions and factionalism can be destructive to patron-client relationships. Intense factionalism can have significant ramifications for patron-
client pyramids and the clusters contained therein. Sub-leaders may break away and take their clientele with them, or a clientele may simply realign with a patron who is expected to fulfil the exchange relationship. The recent infighting among UMNO political leaders is an example. The political effects of this have also been addressed.

Alliances and factions can also operate within a clientele of peasants. I have addressed the phenomenon of peasant protests in this thesis. Many protests or "uprisings" fit within the prevailing leader-follower pattern, i.e., the leader initiates action from the follower. But there is another more dangerous type of structure that forms outside the existing power structure among peasants whose exchange relationship has dissolved. There is no other patron to approach. This horizontal tie determines leadership from within the group. The danger to this process is that the relationship forms from the ground up, unlike the existing power structure. Combine this type of structure with factionalism within existing power structures and the result will likely be destructive to policies and objectives of the government and its political operatives.

In conclusion, I must emphasize that this study is not intended to present a rigidly structured pattern of patron-client relationships. This informal social system, which has been incorporated into state institutions, has unleashed a political dynamic which is very flexible and fluid. I have
attempted to identify this dynamic in the attached diagrams (see Tables 1-5). At the basic village level, the traditional leaders may very well continue to possess a strong following while operating within the basic cluster. However, when that cluster becomes part of a pyramid, the upper levels of that pyramid may be built on a more narrow base. Accordingly, the clusters within them may be more susceptible to dissolution or re-alignment. If that happens at an upper level, the lower more diffuse clusters would likely be carried along as well. The UMNO factional infighting in 1987 is a very good illustration of how such a pyramidal structure is affected by upper level dissolution. Any resulting re-alignment could have important consequences for those near the apex. A more in-depth study of the issues I have raised in this thesis is awaited.
APPENDIX A

FLOW OF INFLUENCE AND AUTHORITY BETWEEN THE DISTRICT OFFICER, REPRESENTATIVES AND THE VILLAGERS

APPENDIX B(1)

DIRECT CONTACT WITH VILLAGER

VILLAGE LEVEL

CLUSTERS

MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT

STATE ASSEMBLYMAN

DISTRICT OFFICER

POHNIU

VILLAGE HEADMAN

MOST FREQUENT

LESS FREQUENT

IN FREQUENT

(1) + (2)

(3) + (5)
MUKIM LEVEL

IDEAL/TYPICAL PATTERN

PENGHULU

V.H.  V.H.  V.H.

IN PRACTICE

POLITICAL

APPENDIX B (2) - CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

APPENDIX B (2) - LEGEND CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

BUREAUCRACY [AS PART OF FORMAL ORGANIZATION]

(i) WEAKENED PATERN
ARROWS DOTTED BOTH
WAYS TO REFLECT
PENGHULU'S LASSERING
LINCHPIN ROLE

(ii) OPERATION OF PENGHULU PYRAMID
WITH GOVERNMENT'S VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT
AND SECURITY COMMITTEE (VSDC)

WEAKENED ARROWS
GOING DOWNWARD
REPRESENT INABILITY
OF VSDC TO FUNCTION
AS INTENDED.
STRONG ARROWS
GOING UP REPRESENT
ITS FUNCTION AS AN
AID TO VILLAGER
TO OBTAIN MINOR
FORMS OF OPEN
SOCIAL ASSISTANCE.

PENGHULU

V.H.  V.H.

[SUB-LEADERS]

MORE OF A WEAK BARKER
THAN PATERN
(i) diagram is same one for both political and bureaucratic structures

The village headman is acting in his capacity as leader of local party branch (political) or as chairman of VDSC in diagram (see (i) and (ii))}
(a) The tendency has been for the village headman to develop his patron connections with the state assemblyman (see Appendix B(4)). He is de-emphasizing his role as a connection with the penghulu and District Officer (e.g. VDSC, see Appendix B(2))

(b) The penghulu's influence is tied to the District Officer which is weakening

(c) The District Officer is tending to become more of a broker with political connections (see Appendix B(4))
APPENDIX B(4) LEGEND

Below the village headman may be a sub-leader level comprising political functionaries, landlords, small businessmen with their own client base.

In this diagram the V.H. acts as chairman of the local party branch consistent with party in power.

Diagram B(i) is an example of a political patron operating with the District Officer through the bureaucracy. The District Officer would be a client (e.g. EXCO influence).
APPENDIX B(5) LEGEND

(*) The overlaps of other connections can be found from 1 - 4

(**) If state jurisdiction EXCO appends to pyramid

(*** ) The MP's main patron-client connection is directly with the village headman

(****) Horizontal ties possible among sub-leaders
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