BLO GSAL GRUB MTHA'

by

ANNE ELIZABETH MACDONALD
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We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard

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Department of Religious Studies

The University of British Columbia
Vancouver, Canada

Date Oct. 0/88
Abstract

Translation and Study of a Fourteenth Century Grub mtha’ Text

This thesis presents the translation and study of the twelfth section of *Blo gsal grub mtha’*, an early fourteenth century Tibetan text composed by the bKa’ gdamspa scholar, dBu’pa blo gsal.

*Blo gsal grub mtha’* as a whole represents a distinct sort of scholarly literature known as *Grub mtha’* that finds its roots in Indian *siddhānta* literature. Tibetan *Grub mtha’* texts set forth, as the name in translation reveals, the "established tenets" of various Indian, Tibetan, and occasionally Chinese philosophical schools. The section of *Blo gsal grub mtha’* translated here presents the tenets of the Mādhyamika school of Tibetan Buddhism in general, and their fourteenth century bKa’ gdamspa manifestation in particular.

The central tenet of Mādhyamika philosophy is that all phenomena are empty of self-nature. Even that which is discovered to be the ultimate - emptiness (*stong pa nyid, śunyatā*) - is also said to be devoid of any real self-nature. All phenomena are dependent-arisings, lacking reality, existing like dreams and magical illusions. These assertions are discussed in detail in the translation and in the second part of the introduction.

Of special interest to scholars of both Indian and Tibetan Buddhism, however, is dBu’pa blo gsal’s classification of the Mādhyamika subschools. The early Tibetan Buddhist scholars took upon themselves the task of categorizing and inventing names for the various Mādhyamika “schools”, and dBu’pa blo gsal’s classification represents the development of such thought to the fourteenth century. The introduction elucidates both dBu’pa blo gsal’s divisions of the Mādhyamika sub-schools and elaborates on earlier and later classifications set forth by Tibetan scholars. The investigation provides
insight into both the tenets of the Madhyamika school and the attempts of the Tibetans to arrange the previously unclassified Madhyamika subschools in a manner that would render them more logical and accessible to themselves and to future generations of scholars.
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ABBREVIATIONS

AAA Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka of Haribhadra, ed. Wogihara (1932).


ADSPP Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā.


AMN Akṣayamatinirdeśa.


AŚ Antaraśloka


BCV Bodhog cittavivarana of tantric Nāgārjuna.


BhKN Bhāvanākrama of tantric Nāgārjuna.

BMP Bodhimārgapradīpaṇḍīyikā of Atiśa.


BSGT Blo gsal grub mtha’ of dBus pa blo gsal.

C. or [C] Co ne edition. The numbers in parentheses immediately after C. indicate the inventory number in Mibu (1959) for the bKa’ ’gyur.

CKGT lCang skya grub mtha’, Sarnath ed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>Catuhṣataka of Āryadeva, Tib ed., frag. and reconstituted Skt. by Vaidya (1923).</td>
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<tr>
<td>DBh</td>
<td>Daśabhūmika, Skt. ed. by Rahder (1926).</td>
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<tr>
<td>D. or [D]</td>
<td>sDe dge edition. The numbers in parentheses immediately after D. indicate the inventory number in Tohoku.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. or [H]</td>
<td>lHa sa edition. The numbers in parentheses immediately after H. indicate the inventory number in Takasaki (1965).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIP</td>
<td>Journal of Indian Philosophy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNA</td>
<td>Jñānaśrīmitranibandhavali, ed. by Thakur (1959).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNA (SSŚ)</td>
<td>Sākārasiddhiśāstra of Jñānaśrīmitra.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JNA (SSŚ)</td>
<td>Sākārasaṃgrahasūtra of Jñānaśrīmitra.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSS</td>
<td>Jñānasārasamuccaya of Āryadeva, Tib. ed. with JSSN.</td>
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<tr>
<td>k</td>
<td>kārikā</td>
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<tr>
<td>Laṅk</td>
<td>Laṅkāvatārasūtra, ed. by Vaidya (1963).</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAS</td>
<td>Lokātīstava of Nāgājuna, reconstructed Skt. by Patel (1932), Tib. ed. by LVP.(1913).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRCM</td>
<td>Lam rim chen mo of Tsong kha pa, Peking ed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LS</td>
<td>Drang nges legs bshad nyings po of Tsong kha pa, Sarnath ed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LS(R)</td>
<td>dGe bshes Rab brtan's commentary on the LS, see Drang nges rnam 'byed...see Tib. Bibl.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVP</td>
<td>la Vallee Poussin, Louis de</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA</td>
<td>Madhyamakālaṅkāra of Sāntarakṣita.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MĀl</td>
<td>Madhyamakāloka of Kamalaśīla.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAM</td>
<td>Madhyamakālāṃkāra-vṛtti-madhyamakapratipadāsiddhi of Ratnākaraśānti.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP</td>
<td>Madhyamakālaṅkārapaññikā of Kamalaśīla.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAS</td>
<td>Madhyamakārthasaṁgraha of the second (?) Bhāvaviveka, Tib. ed. in Ejima (1980).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAU</td>
<td>Madhyamakālāṃkāropadesa of Ratnākaraśanti.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAV</td>
<td>Madhyamakālaṅkāraṁvṛtti of Śāntarakṣita.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAv</td>
<td>Madhyamakāvatāra of Candrakīrti, Tib. ed. with MAvBh.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAvBh</td>
<td>Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya of Candrakīrti, Tib. ed by LVP (1907-1912).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MH</td>
<td>Madhyamakahṛdaya of Bhāvaviveka, chap. III.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MM</td>
<td>Mūlamadhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna, Skt. ed. by De Jong (1977), Tib ed. in LVP's notes (1903-13).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MsTH</td>
<td>Manuscripts of Touen-houang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mtyut</td>
<td>Mahāvyutpatti.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. or [N]</td>
<td>sNar thang edition. The numbers in parentheses immediately after N. indicate the inventory number in Nagashima (1975) for the bKa. 'gyur and Miby (1967) for the bsTan 'gyur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NB</td>
<td>Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti, ed. with NBT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBh</td>
<td>Nyāyabhāṣya of Pakṣilasvāmin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBT</td>
<td>Nyāyabinduṭīkā of Dharmaottara, Skt. ed. by Stcherbatsky (1918), Tib. ed. by Stcherbatsky (1904).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVT</td>
<td>Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭikā of Vācaspatimisra.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. or [P]</td>
<td>Peking edition. The numbers in parentheses after P. indicate the volume and the reproduction number.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPS</td>
<td>Pitāputrasamāgamasūtra.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPU</td>
<td>Prajñāpāramitopadesa of Ratnākaraśanti.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PVV  Pramāṇavārttikavṛttri of Manorathandanin, Skt. ed. by D. Shastri (1968).
PVSSP  Pañcavimsatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā.
SDVK  Sātyadvayavibhaṅgakārikā of Jñānagarbha.
SDVV  Sāryadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti of Jñānagarbha.
SDVP  Sātyadvayavibhaṅgapāñjikā of Śāntarakṣita.
Siddhi  La Vallee Poussin (1928-9).
SMVK  Sugatamatavibhaṅgakārikā of Jitārī.
SMVbh  Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya of Jitārī.
SNS  Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, Tib. ed. by Lamotte (1935).
ŚS  Śikṣāsamuccaya of Śāntideva, ed. by Bendall (1897-1902).
SS  Subhāṣitasamgraha, ed. by Bendall (1903) and (1904).
SSS  Sarvasiddhāntasamgraha, ed. by F.W. Thomas and LVP.
ŚSap  Śūnyatāsaptati of Nāgārjuna.
ŚV  Ślokavārttika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.
TA  Tattvāloka-nāma-prakaraṇa of Kamalaśīla.
TAv  Tattvāvatāra of Śrīgupta.
TAvV  Tattvāvataṛavṛtti of Śrīgupta.
TKh  I Ta ba'i khyad par of Ye sse sde.
TRat  Tattvaratnāvalī of Advayavajra, Skt. ed. by Ui (1952).
TS  Tattvasaṃgraha(kārikā) of Śāntarakṣita, ed. with TSP.
<table>
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<th>Description</th>
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<td>TSN</td>
<td>Trisvabhāvanirdeśa of Vasubandhu, Skt. Tib. ed. in Yamaguchi (1972); LVP (1932-3).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSP</td>
<td>Tatvasaṃgrahapañjikā of Kamalaśīla, ed. by D. Shastri (1968).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VN</td>
<td>Vādanyāya of Dharmakīrti, ed. by D. Shastri (1972).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vś</td>
<td>Viṃśatikā(kārikā) of Vasubandhu, see VśV.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VVV</td>
<td>Vigrahavṛtvāvartanīvṛtti of Nāgārjuna, Skt. Tib. ed. same as for VV.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YŚ</td>
<td>Yuktīṣaṭṭikā(kārikā) of Nāgārjuna.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YŚV</td>
<td>Yuktīṣaṭṭikāvṛtti of Candrakīrti.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

The Mādhyamika School:
Inception and Development in India

Early in the first millennium C.E.,¹ the person recognized as the founder of the Mādhyamika school of Buddhism composed a series of philosophical treatises that revolutionized Buddhist thought of his day and left a profound imprint on that of the following centuries. According to Tibetan tradition,² he was born in South India of Brahmin parents who, not long after his birth, were informed by an astrologer that their son would die at the age of seven. During the year of his predicted death they felt themselves incapable of bearing the sight of his lifeless body and so sent him off to travel with a servant. The servant and the child wandered awhile and, as luck or legend would have it, the young boy eventually found himself at the gates of the great monastery of Nālandā, where he was welcomed, advised to don the robes of a Buddhist monk, and allowed to secure the rites with which to cheat the Lord of Death. The predicted time of demise passed without event, and he commenced the study of Buddhist texts and practices under his preceptor Rāhulabhadra, the abbot of Nālandā. As the years passed he became a scholar and teacher of such renown that even the Nāgas, the mythical dragon-like beings from the Nāga water-realms, came to listen to his discourses. Reports of his expertise soon reached the ears of their king, and an invitation to teach in the Nāga kingdom was extended to the great scholar. Inspired by mention of previously unavailable Buddhist scriptures that were protected in the Nāga world, the monk accepted the invitation to the watery kingdom. He emerged from it many years later, weighted with the Prajñāpāramitā, the

1. For the variation in scholarly dating for Nāgārjuna's life, see D. Seyfort Ruegg (1981), p. 4, n. 11.
Avatamsaka, the Ratnakūta, and other books of the Mahāyāna school that had been guarded there from the time of the Buddha. He became known as Nāgārjuna - "one who has achieved [his goal] with the aid of the dragons".¹

The Chinese Kumārajīva’s version of the story is slightly different.² It does not include the prediction of an early death and instead reports that Nāgārjuna was a bold and passionate youth who, together with two companions, had versed himself in the art of magic, and had specifically mastered the art of invisibility, so as to gain entry to the royal harem. One night, however, upon the trio’s stealthy entry into the harem (their secret having been revealed to the royal guards), the protectors of the harem violently slashed through the air with their swords, mortally wounding Nāgārjuna’s two invisible, yet vulnerable, cohorts. Nāgārjuna himself narrowly escaped. Shaken by his brush with death he reflected, and realized deeply that the origin of suffering is desire. The experience inspired him to involve himself with the Buddha’s teachings, and soon thereafter he entered the Buddhist Order. Finding his subsequent study of all available Buddhist texts incapable of quenching his deep thirst for wisdom, he began a search for better

1. Thurman (1984), p. 24. Obermiller (1932), p.128, translates Bu ston as follows, (In the name) Nāgārjuna, Nāga (has the following signification): 1. Born from (that ocean) which is the Essence, the Plane of the Absolute (just as the real Nāga is born in the sea), 2. not abiding in the two limits or extreme views of Eternalism and Nihilism (just as the real Nāga knows no limits as regards his abode), 3. securing the possession of the treasury of the Jewels of Scripture (just as the Nāga possesses immense wealth in gold and jewels), 4. endowed with an insight (that is like fire), burning down and illuminating (akin to the fiery eyes of the Nāga).

Arjuna has the meaning of "he who has secured power". Accordingly, the teacher is Arjuna since he is: 1. The guardian, the ruler of the kingdom of the Doctrine and 2. The subduer of the hosts of enemies, that is of all the sinful powers of this world. Being united, these two component parts form the compound name Nāgārjuna.

2. Other sources for Nāgārjuna’s life, including the following Chinese version, are cited in K.V. Ramanan (1978), p. 336, n. 5.
texts - a search that found its consummation in the discovery of the Mahāyāna sūtras in the Nāga kingdom.

Although the traditional accounts are numerous and encrusted with the weight of the miraculous, there is general agreement, based on archaeological, epigraphical, and literary evidence, that an historical Nāgārjuna did exist.

T.V.R. Murti writes,

Though the traditions of his life are greatly overlaid with legendary details, there is no reason to doubt that Nāgārjuna was a real person. The circumstances of his life are briefly told. He was, in all probability, a Brahman from the South who came to Nālandā and propogated the new Prajñā-pāramitā teaching. The legend which credits him with having brought the Satasāhasrikā from the abode of the Nāgas means that he was the founder of a new and important phase in Buddhism. All our accounts agree in connecting his abode with Dhānyakaṭaka or Śrīparvata in the South, and of his personal friendship with the king Śatavāhana (Andhra) for whom he wrote the Suhṛllekha. Tradition places him four hundred years after the parinirvāṇa of the Lord, whereas the consensus of opinion among European scholars is that he lived about the middle of the second century A.D.¹

The decorative elaborations of the legends aside, the historical Nāgārjuna remains one of the most influential and profound scholars of the Mahāyāna. He is credited with being "one of the first and most important systematizers of Mahāyānist thought".² Although recensions

of the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras may have been in existence in a more primitive form as early as the second century B.C.,

1 it was Nāgārjuna who first, in clear and scholarly expositions, revealed their purport. In treatises such as the famous Mūla-Madhyamakakārikās,2 the Yuktisāṭṭika,3 the Śūnyatāsaptati,4 the Vaidalya-sūtra, and the Vigrahavyāvartani,5 he systematically explained the fundamental philosophical stance around which, according to him, the Mahāyāna revolved, i.e., the theory of the emptiness of self (gang zag gi bdag med, pudgalanairatmya) and of all elements of existence (chos kyi bdag med, dharmanairatmya).

One of the schools of thought that Nāgārjuna’s treatises engendered became known as the Mādhyamika. Mādhyamaka, a Sanskrit word, has come to mean "that which proclaims the middle". Although the Mādhyamika school maintained unique views, proclamation of the middle was not an assertion new to Buddhist thought, for all the schools of Buddhist tenets that had come into existence in the years following the Buddha’s sermon at Deer Park, in which he had referred to a middle way, claimed to follow a middle way. The Buddha had advocated a position free from the two extremes that had been part of the experience of his life prior to his Enlightenment and that had, in fact, acted as hindrances to his attainment of peace and wisdom. Neither his youth as a prince blessed by the succulent fruits of cyclic existence nor the years he had spent as a self-mortifying ascetic in the Indian forests had brought him final peace, and thus at Deer Park he had taught the

2. The Sanskrit text is found in Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā-Madhyamakavṛtti. Four manuscripts are extant.
4. The verses of the Śūnyatāsaptati are found in the bsTan ’gyur in three separate and sometimes differing versions: the kārikas, the verses with a commentary by Nāgārjuna, and the verses of Candrakīrti’s Vṛttī.
Eightfold Path, the middle way free from the extremes of the radical lifestyles and views that had once acted as links in the chain that had bound him to saṃsāra.

The Mādhyamikas considered themselves adherents to the Middle Way not so much because they progressed along a middle path, but rather because they understood the middle way of phenomena. And in their proclamation of the middle way they asserted a mode of existence of phenomena that was unique and distinct from that of any other school. All other Indian schools, including the Buddhist ones coterminous with Nāgārjuna’s exegesis of Mahāyāna philosophy, placed within their systems the assertion of a final reality. The Sāṃkhyaśas declared the ultimate reality to be a dualistic one, the Vaiśeṣikas asserted atoms, and the Buddhist Abhidharmikas, Sarvāstivādins, and Sthaviravādins, etc., all posited some sort of final nature that acted as a substratum for existence. Nāgārjuna refrained from positing any sort of final reality that truly existed, stating that to do so was to fall from the middle way to the extreme of permanence. He repudiated the possibility of the existence of ontological entities and declared the emptiness of all things.¹ For Nāgārjuna and the Mādhyamikas who were to follow him, nothing at all, anywhere, could exist in reality, independently, possessed of self-nature, able to stand by itself, solid and unchanging.

With the propogation of Nāgārjuna’s works, the Mādhyamika view increased in popularity in India, and soon became the focus of innumerable heated debates between Buddhists and the orthodox schools and between Buddhists themselves. The fact that the Master’s verses could be interpreted in different ways inspired a number of scholars in later years to compose commentaries on the original. Three

¹ J.W. de Jong briefly comments on the main Western scholars who have studied Nāgārjuna’s “emptiness” in his article entitled Emptiness (1972). For a more detailed survey, see de Jong (1974).
commentators, whose expositions were studied and whose arguments have resounded throughout the halls of Mahāyāna Buddhist monasteries until the present day were Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka, and Candrakīrti. Buddhapālita, born in South India in approximately 470 C.E., authored the *Māla-madhyamika-vṛtti*. He was the first main commentator to employ the logical tool of consequences, in lieu of syllogisms, in the elucidation of Nāgārjuna’s treatises. His utilization of the prasaṅga (consequence) method, which uses the opponent’s own views to force the opponent to see the contradictions within his position, was refuted by Bhāvaviveka, born in South India in approximately 500 C.E. He studied Buddhapālita’s commentary and then severely criticized Buddhapālita’s methodology in his *Prajñāpradīpa*, claiming that the prasaṅga method was an inadequate tool in the attempt to establish the Mādhyamika’s position, and insisted that such could only be accomplished with the aid of syllogisms. Candrakīrti, the third commentator of this group, born in South India around the beginning of the seventh century, in turn refuted Bhāvaviveka’s criticism of Buddhapālita to re-establish the validity of

1. The three mentioned here are included because of their impact on later Tibetan scholasticism. For other commentators (Āryadeva, Sthiramati, etc.) see Ruegg (1981), p. 47-49.
3. Murti (1955), p. 95 translates *prasāṅga-vākyā* as *reductio ad absurdum*.
4. Various of Bhāvaviveka’s treatises have been examined, for example, by S. Iida (1980), M.D. Eckel (1980), and C. Lindtner (1986).
6. The *Prajñāpradīpa* is no longer extant in Sanskrit; it is available in Chinese and Tibetan. Of equal importance are Bhāvaviveka’s *Madhyamakahrdayakārikās* (available in Sanskrit and Tibetan) and their commentary, the *Tarkajvalā* (Tibetan only). This work, as will be noted later, was one of the earliest siddhānta (tenets) texts; it contains a review and discussion of the main schools as they existed in Bhāvaviveka’s day. For the titles of the chapters of the *Madhyamakahrdayakārikās* (Sanskrit, Tibetan, and English) and a list of translations of the chapters (English, German, and Japanese) see Iida (1980), p. 12-17.
the prasaṅga method of reasoning. His works include the Madhyanarakāvatāra and the Prasannapadāṁulamadhyamanakāvatī. The tendencies of these authors to employ differing logical techniques to establish their position not only revealed methodological preferences, but also indicated differences in opinion regarding the status of conventional "reality"; the split in understanding found fruition in the founding of the two major sub-schools of the Mādhyamika. In Tibet these sub-schools received the designations Svātantrika-Mādhyamika and Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika.

India in the seventh and eight centuries C.E. saw the continued flourishing of the Mādhyamika school and the further delineation of views within it. Scholar-monks continued to compose philosophical treatises - the most noteworthy of these scholars being Śāntideva, recognized as a Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika, Jñānagarbha, who followed in the tradition established by Bhāvaviveka (but established his own school that has been termed by the Tibetans the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika), and two scholars in his lineage, Śāntarakṣita and his student Kamalaśīla. Their works were studied in the huge monastic complexes of northern and central India. In time, the fame of the teachers and teachings within these centres began to spread far beyond the confines of India’s borders and, in the same way that a mountain stream’s spring trickle soon turns into a rushing torrent of water, Mādhyamika Buddhism saw its movement into the northern countries.

Mādhyamika into Tibet

...the main Buddhist centres of central India during the eighth to twelfth centuries were the great monastic universities of Nālandā, Bodhgayā, Odantapuri and

1. L. de la Vallé Poussin edited the Tibetan translation of the Madhyanarakāvatāra and Bhāṣya; see Bibliotheca Buddhica ix (St. Petersburg, 1907-12). He translated part of it in Museon (1907, 1910, 1911). He also edited the Sanskrit text of the Prasannapadā; see Bibliotheca Buddhica iv (St. Petersburg, 1903-13).
Vikramashīla, housing thousands of monks and learned men, those who had taken monastic vows and those who had not, and attracting scholars from every Asian country which had developed an interest in Buddhism. From the fourth to the eight centuries Chinese monk scholars were frequent visitors, and from the eighth century to the final eclipse of Buddhism in India at the end of the twelfth the Tibetans were constantly visiting Nepal and India for texts, instructions and initiations.¹

Conversely, by the eighth century, Indian Buddhist scholars had also begun to accept invitation to spread Buddhist teachings outside their homeland. Śāntarakṣita, mentioned above, is recognized as being "chiefly responsible for the implantation of Buddhism in Tibet",² due to, initially, his visits there, according to Tibetan records, in 763 C.E. and his residence there from 775-788.³ It was his influence that inspired construction of the first Buddhist monastery bSam yas⁴, modelled after the Indian Odantapuri, and that planted the seeds for the transfer and synthesis of traditional academic monastic training. After his death, his student Kamalaśīla was invited to Tibet to further the work begun by Śāntarakṣita. Kamalaśīla's "victory" over the Chinese Hvashang Mahāyāna in the Great Debate of bSam yas in 792⁵ was representative of the increasing interest in Indian Buddhist philosophy and practice in Tibet and of the influence of Indian Buddhist scholars.⁶

³ Ibid., p. 89.
⁴ bSam-yas-mi-'gyur-lhun-gyis-grub-pa'i-gtug-lag-khang, built in 775 C.E. One version of the political and social struggles that backlit the construction of bSam yas during the early diffusion of Buddhism in Tibet is described in the first chapter of Tucci (1980).
⁵ D. Snellgrove and H. Richardson (1980), p. 79.
⁶ Tibetan accounts attest to one Great Debate. For an account based on Chinese sources, see Paul Demieville (1954). It would seem more likely that there was a series of debates that reflected both Chinese and Indian Buddhist influences and the differing philosophical
By the year 800 C.E., many Indian sūtras and śāstras had been and were in the process of being translated by highly competent translators. The intensity of the importation of Indian Buddhism into Tibet is reflected in a catalogue of translated works that has been preserved in the Tibetan Canon. It includes the first "official" translations made during Śāntarakṣita’s visit and those made, most probably, up until King Khri gTsug lde brtson’s (Ral pa can) assassination in 838 C.E.: the list is composed of seven hundred and thirty-six titles of translated works. The proliferation of the doctrine was cut short in 838 with the assassination, and with the usurpation of the throne by gLang dar ma. While Tibetan accounts accuse gLang dar ma of being solely responsible for a persecution of the faith and for the decline of Buddhism in Tibet, it would seem more tenable that at that time internecine disputes and border concerns began to take priority over religious issues. Royal attention focused on the encroaching Chinese and, with the murder of gLang dar ma in 842, a political dissolution that would last for two centuries began. As Tibet fell into a state of anarchy the connections with the Indian intellectuals were severed. (Tibetan historians designate the years from 838 to 842 C.E. the end of the "early diffusion" (snga dar) of Buddhism). Suggesting that the traditional accounts exaggerate a limited persecution, D. Snellgrove and H. Richardson write,

Buddhism was now neglected, rather than persecuted, for the continuing civil strife exhausted and impoverished the leading families in Central Tibet, on whom organized religion of any sort always depended for patronage. But in


the outlying regions, such as the small principalities of the
east where Buddhism was the established religion, and
later in the new kingdoms of the west, which bordered on
the Buddhist lands of north-western India, Tibetans
continued and developed their practice of the new faith.¹

According to Tibetan accounts, it was not until 978 C.E.² that a full
restoration of Buddhism in Tibet was instigated by Tibetan teachers and
Indian scholars.³ In the years that followed, numerous translations of
sūtras and tantras, together with their voluminous commentaries,
were completed and, in parts of Tibet, the reigning house once again
spread the umbrella of royal patronage over the favoured religion.
Sixty-four years after the commencement of the Buddhist renaissance,
Dīpamkāra Śrījñāna, a renowned Indian scholar-monk, more
commonly known as Atiśa, accepted the invitation of King 'Od lde,
King Byang chub 'od, and King Zhi ba 'od to come to Tibet.

Perhaps the greatest stimulus to religious developments in
Tibet in the eleventh century was the mission of the great
Indian teacher Atiśa, who arrived in Gu-ge in 1042 at the
age of sixty after repeated invitations from the religious
kings of Western Tibet. He had studied and taught at the
Indian monastic universities of Bodhgaya, Odantapuri,
and Vikramashīla, and he was probably the most famous
and revered religious teacher in India at the time.⁴

Alaka Chattopadhyaya also writes,

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2. Ibid.
3. For an account of the commencement of the later diffusion (phyi dar) from a traditional
4. Ibid.
The crowning achievement of the rulers of western Tibet was, of course, the bringing of Atiśa. This shaped the subsequent history of the country.1

R. Sherburne briefly comments on the traditional Tibetan accounts,

All Tibetan historians mark his arrival at Tho ling in 1042 as the rebirth of Buddhism in their country - the "Second Spread" (phyi dar) of the religion that had first crossed their mountains in the seventh century.2

During the first three years of his residence in Tibet Atiśa gained both the devotion of powerful members of the ruling family of Western Tibet and the respect of the great translator Rin chen bzang po.3 With the latter, he corrected earlier translations and oversaw numerous new translations of Indian texts. Atiśa had been invited to Tibet primarily to strengthen traditional monastic values during the Buddhist renaissance there, based on the kings' hope that his influence would discourage the Tibetans' involvement in corrupted Tantric practices. Probably partially to fulfill the kings' wishes, during these first three years Atiśa composed his magnum opus, the Bodhi-patha-pradīpa,4 together with its autocommentary, the Bodhi-mārga-pradīpa-pañjika, both of which explicate the Mādhyamika view and lay strong emphasis on the practice of proper morality. But it would seem that one of the most significant events during these years was his meeting with his future disciple, 'Brom ston pa. At 'Brom ston pa's request, Atiśa postponed his departure for India in order to undertake a tour of central Tibet, where thousands of monks resided. In the years that followed, Atiśa provided

3. Rin chen bzang po lived from 958 - 1055 C.E. He had been sent by the Buddhist King Ye shes 'od to study in Kashmir. He returned to Tibet and eventually translated 158 texts from Sanskrit into Tibetan.
4. For an English translation of this text, see R. Sherburne (1983).
the Buddhist community with valuable teachings and succeeded in instituting many of the desired reforms within it.

The bKa' gdams pa Sect

Upon Atiśa's death at Nye thang in 1054, 'Brom ston pa proceeded to Rva sgreng to found what would remain the main monastery of his religious order.1 His "order" became known as the bKa’ gdams pa2 sect. His intention in founding the order was the same as that which had inspired him to encourage Atiśa to go with him to central Tibet: to restore discipline to religious life. In contrast with the free-roving non-celibate tantric practitioners, the bKa’ gdams pa followers were required to refrain from marriage, intoxicants, travel, and the possession of money. We are reminded that "only in retrospect can 'Brom ston pa’s foundation be referred to as a new religious order"3 since no distinctive religious order had yet existed in Tibet. In addition, Atiśa and 'Brom ston pa’s efforts had been largely in reaction to the

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When 'Brom ston asked Atiśa which was more important and more basic (gtso), the text of the scriptures (bka', Revelation, and bstan bcos, Skt. sastra, the books written by Indian masters), or one's teacher's instructions (bla ma'i gdams ngag), Atiśa replied that direct instruction from one's teacher is more important. So it came about that the first two schools of Buddhism to appear in Tibet, those which trace their origins back to Atiśa and Marpa, both bear the name bKa’ brgyud...The school which Marpa founded still retains the name of bKa’ brgyud, while the followers of Atiśa, the bKa’ gdams pa, also called themselves bKa’ rgyud bKa’ gdams pa.

Thu bkan blo bsang Chos kyi nyi ma, in A. Chattopadhyaya (1967) Appendix A Section 5 p. 385, reports that Atiśa and 'Brom ston pa’s sect received the appellation bKa’ gdams pa "because it conveys the preaching of the Buddha word for word, without omitting any word".
loosening of religious discipline due to the Tibetan populace’s involvement in the freer and often malpractised Tantric rituals, and had not been explicitly for the purpose of establishing a Buddhist sect.

Thus, at the beginning of the bKa’ gdam pa order, most of those persons and monasteries that had come under Atiša’s influence were not necessarily cognisant of being "bKa’ gdam pa", and nor did they term themselves such; they tended rather to delineate and name their religious "orders" based on their spiritual lineages, i.e., based on the succession of scholars and gurus through whom they had received their knowledge.

It was from within the enclaves of this sect that the dGe lugs pa sect, actually a later continuation of the bKa’ gdam pa, emerged in the fifteenth century.

Thus absorbed by its successor, the bKa’ gdam pa Order disappears from the Tibetan scene, and in retrospect tends to be remembered only as a passing phase of Tibetan monasticism. However, its influence has been far more widespread than its comparatively short-lived existence might suggest, in that it affirmed the importance of a sound monastic tradition precisely at a time when the importation of Indian Buddhist teachings into Tibet seems to have depended so much upon the exertions of independent scholars, usually non-celibate, who traveled in pursuit mainly of tantric initiations, and the relevant tantric texts and commentaries.  

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1. G. Tucci (1980), p. 35, writes, While not rejecting the Tantric exercises of the Vajrayāna, this school developed them intelligently, opposing the aberrations and heresies into which the followers of Tibetan Buddhism had fallen.
Before their "reconstitution" the bKa’ gdamgs pa were responsible for the establishment and growth of many monasteries and for the vast production of translations and exegetical works. Still, the most significant contribution that this organized Buddhist order made to Buddhism in Tibet - that led to an overall unity within later Tibetan monasticism - was the acceptance of, and emphasis on, the Indian Buddhist monastic rule (Vinaya). Snellgrove goes on to state, 

Presumably the label of bKa’ gdamgs pa can only be applied in a restrictive sense to those religious foundations that were consciously modeled on the pattern set by 'Brom ston. But since all monastic foundation in Tibet, whatever variations existed in their transmitted teaching traditions, were inevitably based upon the bKa’ gdamgs pa model so far as adherence to any monastic rule was concerned, 'Brom ston pa might well be hailed as the father of Tibetan monasticism.

Thu bkan blo bzang Chos kyi nyi ma (1737-1802) recorded that dBus and gTsang, two of the three main provinces of Tibet, were filled with monasteries of the bKa’ gdamgs pa sect during the years following Atiśa and Brom ston pa’s activities. The most renowned of these were Rva-sgreng and, in the province of gTsang, sNar thang monasteries. The latter was founded by gTum ston, a disciple of the famous bKa’ gdamgs pa.

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
4. Thu bkan blo bzang Chos kyi nyi ma, Grub mtha’ thams cad kyi khungs dang ’dod tshul ston pa legs bshad shel gyi me long in A. Chattopadhyaya (1967), Appendix A, Section 5, p. 390.
pa scholar Šar-ba-pa, in 1153.\(^1\) sNar thang, as it existed in the first half of the fourteenth century, was the residence of the author of the *Blo gsal grub mtha’* (the Mādhyamika section of which appears in translation in the latter part of this paper). His full name seems to have been dBus pa blo gsal byang chub ye shes.\(^2\) In the *sDe dge rgyal rabs*, he is called Blo gsal byang chub ye shes; in the *bKa’ gyur dkar chag* he is referred to as dBus pa blo gsal sang rgyas ’bum; in the *Co ne bsTan ’gyur dkar chag* he is termed dBus pa blo gsal rtod pa’i seng ge. He will be referred to as dBus pa blo gsal throughout this thesis. He is probably best known for his participation in the compilation of the first Canon in Tibet, the sNar thang Canon\(^3\).

The circumstances surrounding dBus pa blo gsal’s involvement in the establishment of the Canon are rather humourous and were well-known throughout Tibet.\(^4\) The account of the events that led up to the gathering of texts for the first Canon that involve our author are as follows: dBus pa blo gsal had two teachers, bCom ldan rig pa’i ral gri, a learned scholar at sNar thang who had a legion of disciples, and ‘Jam pa’i dbyangs, a "mahā-pandita".\(^5\) ‘Jam pa’i dbyangs was, at the same time, a student of bCom ldan rig pa’i ral gri. One night, as a practical joke, ‘Jam pa’i dbyangs disguised himself with the mask of a wrathful religious protector, changed his gait (so as to appear like a demon) and, under the pale light of the moon, crept up on bCom ldan rig pa’i ral gri and chased him around the monastery. bCom ldan rig pa’i ral gri was so surprised and terrified by ‘Jam pa’i dbyangs’ appearance that when he realized the true identity of the "demon", he banished ‘Jam pa’i dbyangs from sNar thang. His joke having backfired, ‘Jam pa’i dbyangs travelled to Sa skya. Once established there, he was invited to the court of Buyantu Khan, the fourth Emperor of the Mongol dynasty.

\(^1\) D. Snellgrove (1987), p. 507.
\(^2\) As documented in *Deb ther sngon po and bKa’ gdam chos byung gsal ba’i sgron me*. For folio no., see K. Mimaki, p. 13, n. 26.
\(^3\) The Cone, Derge and Peking Canons were compiled in later years.
\(^4\) George N. Roerich (1976), p. 337.
\(^5\) Ibid.
of Yüan, to act as the Emperor's guru. The banished "demon" proceeded to the Mongol Court and, once there, in attempts to pardon himself before his sNar thang teacher, sent bCom ldan rig pa'i ral gri presents. None of the presents were able to appease bCom ldan rig pa'i ral gri's wrath until a box of Chinese ink, a necessity for book-copying, arrived. 'Jam pa'i dbyangs also sent his former student, dBus pa blo gsal, a similar gift to sNar thang. 'Jam pa'i dbyangs then requested that all the books of the bKa 'gyur and bsTan 'gyur be collected and copied by the sNar thang scholars, to be stored within the monastery. dBus pa blo gsal, supplied by 'Jam pa'i dbyangs with the necessary tools, with the aid of Lo tsa ba bsod nams 'od zer and rGyan ro byang chub 'bum, applied himself to the task of tracking down the Tibetan texts to include them in the Canon or to copy them so that they could be combined with those already at sNar-thang.

Grub mtha' Literature

Within the context of this work, however, our attention focuses on another of dBus pa blo gsal's accomplishments¹: the Grub pa'i mtha' rnam par shad pa'i mdzod, known here, for the sake of convenience, as Blo gsal grub mtha'. Grub mtha' works are, as a group, a distinctive sort of literary genre that present the varying views of schools of philosophy. Their intent is usually to distinguish the various views one from another. The Tibetan compound grub mtha' (siddhānta in Sanskrit), translates as "established conclusion", and, by extension, as "tenet". Thus literature included under this rubric states, and often

¹. dBus pa blo gsal is also credited with the composition of a Chos 'byung and a grammatical treatise. Neither, however, have survived the passage of time. It might also be noted here that both of dBus pa blo gsal's teachers, 'Jam pa'i dbyangs and bCom ldan rig pa'i ral gri (see List of Rare Books) were responsible for composing their own Grub mtha' but that neither book seems to have survived the centuries. In parts of Blo gsal grub mtha' previous to the Madhyamika section, it appears that dBus pa blo gsal criticizes the opinions of one of his teachers. See Mimaki (1982), p. 15, n. 31.
elucidates, the "established conclusions" of varying schools. dKon chog 'jigs med dbang po, an eighteenth-century dGe lugs pa author, in his Grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa rin po che'i phreng ba defines "grub mtha'”,

The etymology for "tenet" (siddhānta) is: a tenet [literally, an established conclusion] is a meaning which was made firm, decided upon or established in reliance on scripture and/or reasoning and which will not be forsaken for something else. Dharmamitra’s Clear Words, A Commentary on [Maitreya’s] "Ornament for the Realizations" (Abhisamayālaṃkāra-kārikā-prajñāpāramitopadeśastra-ṭikā) says: "Established conclusion" [tenet] signifies one’s own established assertion which is thoroughly borne out by scripture and reasoning. Because one will not pass beyond this assertion, it is a conclusion.¹

Tibetan Grub mtha’ literature finds its roots in the earlier Indian darśana (philosophical school) tradition and was generally modelled after Bhāvaviveka’s Madhyamakahrdaya (and autocommentary) and Tarkajvāla, Sāntarakṣita’s Tattvasaṅgraha, and Kamalaśīla’s Tattvasaṅgraha-paṇḍjika² all of which review and discuss the doctrines of the main Indian schools. Of these three, it was Bhāvaviveka’s work that acted as the prototype for the works of Tibetan encyclopaedists. In terms of style, however, Tibetan Grub mtha’ tend to resemble tantric Āryadeva’s Jñānasārasamuccaya and Jitāri’s Sugatamata-vibhaṅgakārikā³.

Within Tibet, two types of Grub mtha’ existed. One type focused on the Indian schools and the other focused on the Tibetan, Bon po and

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2. The Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha, the Sarva-siddhānta-saṃgraha, and the Śad-darśana-samuccaya, etc., were also compiled in Sanskrit at about or before this time.  
Chinese schools. *Blo gsal grub mtha'* is of the first sort and, following in the pattern established centuries earlier in India, and in league with the majority of the Tibetan *Grub mtha* texts, attends to the philosophies of the Indian non-Buddhist schools as well as to those of the four major Buddhist schools\(^1\). A few of the Tibetan *Grub mtha* focus exclusively on the tenets of the Buddhist schools (see the list below - no. 21, 22, 28, 31). Unlike the Sa skya pas, bKa' gdams pas, dGe lugs pas andbKa’ rgyud pas, the sNying ma pas and Bon pos do not consider the Madhyamika as the highest school and include the tantric schools in their enumeration of Buddhist schools. They therefore list nine Buddhist schools.

Following Mimaki, the Tibetan *Grub mtha* texts are as follows.\(^2\) They are divided according to sect.

I. sNying ma pa and other early authors:
   2. Ye shes sde, *Iَا bَا i khyad pa*.
   3. dPal brtsegs, *Iَا bَا i rْ i m pa bْ hْ aٌ d pa*.
   4. Nyi ma 'od, *Iَا bَا i rْ i m pa*.
   5. Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po, *Iَا bَا i bْ rْ jْ eٌ d byْ aٌ n g pa*.
   6. Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po, *Grub mْ tْ hَاٌ i bْ rْ jْ eٌ d byْ aٌ n g pa*.
   7. Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po, *Man ngْ aٌ g ْ lْ tَا bَا i pْ hْ rْ eٌ n g bْ aٌ zْ hْ eٌ bْ yْ aٌ bَاٌ i ْ gْ rْ eٌ lْ pa*.
   8. Klong chen rab 'byams pa, *Grub mْ tْ hَاٌ mْ dْ zْ oٌ d pa*.
   9. Klong chen rab, 'byams pa, *Yid bْ zْ hْ i nْ mْ dْ zْ oٌ d pa* (and *Rang 'gْ rْ eٌ lْ pa*).

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1. Schools examined in *Blo gsal grub mtha* are: Lokāyata (*Jig rten rgyang phan pa*), Sāṁkhya (*Grangs can pa*), Śaiva (*dBang phyug pa*), Vaiśṇava (*Khyab 'jug pa*), Digambara (*gCer bu pa*), the eighteen sects of the Lesser Vehicle (*sDe pa bco brgyad*), the Vaibhāṣika (*Bye brag tu smra pa*), Sautrāntika (*mDo sde pa*), Yogācāra (*Sems tsam pa*), and Mādhyamika (*dBu ma pa*).
2. Mimaki (1982), p. 6-8
10. 'Ju Mi pham rgya mtsho, *Yid bzhin mdzod kyi grub mtha’ bsdus pa.*
11. bDud 'joms rin po che, sNying bstan rnam gzhag.

II. Sa skya pa:
13. Sa skya Paṇḍīta Kun dga’ rgyal mtshan, *gZhung lugs legs par bshad pa.*
14. sTag tshang Lo tsa ba Šes rab rin chen, *sTag tshang grub mtha’.*
15. Pañ chen Śākya mchog ldan, *dBu ma rnam par nges pa’i bang mdzod lung dang rigs pa’i rgya mtsho.*
17. Go rams pa bsod nams seng ge, *rGal ba thams cad kyi thugs kyi dgongs pa zab mo dbu ma’i de kho na nyid spyi’i ngag gis ston pa nges don rab gsal.*

III. bKa’ gdam pa:

IV. dGe lugs pa:
20. Tsong kha pa, *Drang nges legs bshad snying po.*

1. Translated by Wayman (1978) (Samatha secton only). Inclusion of this text and some others in the list reveals that Mimaki’s definition of *grub mtha’* is very wide. Mimaki (1982), p. 46, defends inclusion of *Drangs nges legs bshad snying po,* Parmi les oeuvres de Tsong kha pa, c'est cet ouvrage qui s'aparente le plus à un *grub mtha’.* Il consiste de deux grandes parties, le première exposant le philosophie des Vijnanavadin en s'appuyant sur le *Samdhinirmocanasutra* et la deuxièmme celle des Mādhyamika en se fondant sur l'*Aksayamatinirdesa*. La partie concernant les Mādhyamika a deux subdivisions: celle des Svātantrika et celle des Prāsaṅgika. La subdivision de Svātantrika est encore subdivisée en deux parties...
21. Se ra rJe btsun pa Chos kyi rgyal mtshan, *Grub mtha’ rnam gzhag.*
23. Pan chen bSod nams grags pa, *Grub mtha’i rnam gzhag.*
26. lCang skya II Rol pa’i rdo rje, *lCang skya grub mtha’.*
27. lCang skya II Rol pa’i rdo rje, *Dag yig mkhas pa’i ’byung gnas,* chap. 5: *Grub mtha’i skor.*
28. bsKal bzang Iha dbang, *Grub mtha’i rnam bzhag dge legs ’byung gnas.*
29. dKon mchog ’jigs med dbang po, *Grub mtha’ rin chen phreng ba.*
31. dGe bshes Ngag dbang nyi ma, *Nang pa’i grab mtha’ smra ba bzhi’i ’dod tshul gsal bar bshad pa blo gsar rig pa’i sgo ’byed.*

V. *bKa’ rgyud pa:*
33. ’Ba’ ra ba rGyal mtshan dpal bzang, *Grub mtha’i rnam bzhag (and dKa’ ’grel).*

VI. Various:

VII. *Bon po:*

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2. Mimaki (1982), includes this text with the next two.
35. Vairocana=Ba gor Rin chen blo gsal, *Thag pa rim pa mngon du bshad pa’i mdo rgyud*.

36. Tre ston rGyal mtshan dpal, *Bon sgo gsal byed*.

37. dPal btsun Nam mkha’ bzang po, *Theg pa rim pa gsal ba’i sgron ma*.

38. Sar rdza bKra shis rgyal mtshan, *Theg dgu’i grub mtha’ rnam*.

Occasionally, scholars have questioned the value of the study of Tibetan *Grub mtha’* literature. Mimaki poses their dilemma,

> On entend souvent la critique suivante à propos de l’étude des grub mtha’ : dans l’étude de grub mtha’, s’agit-il du bouddhisme indien ou du bouddhisme tibétain?¹

To this criticism which implies that *Grub mtha’* literature represents neither, Mimaki responds that it is both. He states that since the Tibetans wrote them, the *Grub mtha’* indeed represent Tibetan Buddhism, and since they examine Indian Buddhism, the *Grub mtha’* also show Indian Buddhism. He terms the criticism a “word-game”², and urges scholars to go beyond such attitudes.

D. Seyfort Ruegg, in a short article on the Mādhyamika school that also deals with *Grub mtha’* literature, addresses the same, but more general issue.

In order no doubt to better establish the specificity and identity of Tibetan culture and also of Tibetology as an academic discipline, a tendency has recently appeared among some scholars to discount connections between India and Tibet even in the area of Buddhist thought. Now, when we acknowledge the dependence of much of

1. Ibid., p. 3.
2. Ibid.
European philosophy on Plato or Aristotle we certainly do not put in question the original contributions made by West-European philosophers starting in medieval times; or when the Arabist notes the links between medieval Islamic and Greek philosophy he does not thereby deny all specificity to Islamic philosophy. It is then suggested here that, by the same token, the study of Buddhism in Tibet and indeed of Tibetan civilization as a whole can lose nothing by fully acknowledging their close ties with the Buddhism of India and with Indian civilization. Tibetan studies can indeed only gain by being pursued in coordination with (but certainly not in subordination to) Indian studies...

As for the dBu ma pas, there is no evidence to indicate that they have understood their task to be to set themselves off from their Mādhyamika predecessors in India. On the contrary, they have very clearly striven to penetrate, explain and put into practice the understanding of Buddhism achieved by Nāgārjuna and his disciples up to Abhayakaragupta and Śākya-Paṇḍita; to their interpretations they regularly refer, and also defer in a not uncritical manner. They thus combine close adherence to the traditions and likes of thought established by their predecessors in India with the production of very valuable contribution of their own in the area of textual exegesis and philosophical hermeneutics as well as in the domain of philosophical and meditative theory and practice.¹

Indeed, there is great value in the study of Tibetan Grub mtha’ literature, particularly of a text written as early as that of the bKa’ gdams pa dBus pa blo gsal. In general, the Grub mtha’ texts, usually composed prior to the relatively late printing (seventeenth-eighteenth

century) of the Tibetan Canon, tend to contain readings closer to the original texts. They thereby allow for the correction of mistakes within the Canon. For example, the Canon’s version of Jñānagarbha’s *Satyadvayavibhaṅgakārikā* 10cd reads,

\[
\text{de bas} \ 'di ni kun rdzob sde} / \\
yan dag don \text{yn} \text{yang dag min} / / ^1
\]

Therefore, this is conventional [truth].
It is ultimate [truth] and is not correct.

*Blo gsal grub mtha’* has in place of the Canon’s verse’s *yn* its negative, *min*. The translation of the *Blo gsal grub mtha’* verse reads:

Therefore, this is conventional [truth].
It is not ultimate [truth] and is not correct.

Obviously, in keeping with Mādhyamika thought, dBus pa blo gsal’s version is correct. Thus one can be guided to rectify the error in the Canon.

The *Grub mtha’* are also a welcome help for the interpretation of difficult passages in Indian texts that 1) have commentaries that in themselves are laconic, or that 2) lack commentary altogether. For texts with difficult commentaries, the *Grub mtha’* clarify, and for the latter - texts without commentary - the *Grub mtha’* themselves act as commentary.

An additional contribution that authors of the *Grub mtha’* literature offered toward the understanding of Indian Buddhism was the ingenious invention of and the application of rubrics to the Indian philosophical systems, under which the systems could be more clearly defined. The terms Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika, Svātāntrika-Mādhyamika, Yogācāra-Mādhyamika, and Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika

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1. SDVP P. [100] (5283) sa 14b1-2.
were not names with which, as for as we can determine at present, the Indian Buddhists classified themselves or by which they delineated themselves from each another, but were rather appellations construed by the Tibetan scholars to aid in the understanding of the various doctrinal positions held by the Indian scholar-authors. M. Eckel, in his examination of the Indian scholar Jñānagarbha, writes,

The intricacies of the relationship between Jñānagarbha and Dharmakīrti indicate some of the intellectual atmosphere in the Indian Buddhist community at a time when Indian Buddhist thought was at the height of its powers. During these years, traditions of interpretation developed that in time produced the categories we now use to classify the different "schools" of Buddhist thought. But in the minds of the philosophers themselves the categories of philosophical affiliation do not seem to have been as sharp as they now seem to us, with nearly a thousand years of historical and philosophical study to color our understanding. In Jñānagarbha’s time philosophical exploration crossed traditional lines, sometimes in conflict, sometimes in agreement, and sometimes in the complex combination of conflict and agreement that makes it hard to see clearly where one tradition starts and another ends.¹

Thus the Tibetan classifications of Indian schools, while undoubtedly beneficial, need to be approached with an air of cautiousness. Due to the above-mentioned "porousness" of the walls between the Indian schools, the authors of the later classifications of the schools, as will be noted later, were not always in agreement.

Let us turn now to the importance specifically of *Blo gsal grub mtha*'.

It should be noted that on folio 1b of *Blo gsal grub mtha*’, the Sanskrit title, "Siddhāntavyākhyānakoṣa", is written before the Tibetan, giving the work the appearance of being a translation of a Sanskrit text. It is not a translation; this style that includes a Sanskrit title before the Tibetan title seems to have been in vogue in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The Sanskrit was most likely invoked to lend credence and a sense of authority to the treatise.

*Blo gsal grub mtha*'s importance, in regard to the Tibetan Buddhist tradition, lies mainly in the date of its composition. A Khu Rinpoche Shes rab rgya mtsho (1803-1875) includes *Blo gsal grub mtha*’ in his *List of Rare Books*. The books included in his list are as follows:

1. Phya pa Chos seng gi  Phyi nang gi grub mtha’i rnam bzhag bsdus pa.
2. Bya mChad kha pa’i  Grub mtha’ mdor bsdus.
3. bCom ldan rigs ral gyi  Grub mtha’ rgyan gyi me tog.
4. de’i slob ma mChima ’Jam pa’i dbyangs kyi  Grub mtha’.
5. De’i slob ma dBu pa blo gsal gyi  Grub mtha’.
6. Shes rab rdo rje’i  Grub mtha’.
8. Rong ston Sakya rgyal mtshan gyi Nang pa’i grub mtha’ smra ba dang po gsum gyi rnam bzhag.
9. lHa lung gi dbang phyug Byang chub rin chen gyi mChad kha pa’i Grub mtha’ gces bsdus kyi tik chen.
10. Ra ba stod pa mChog lha ’od zer gyi  Grub mtha’.

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1. Mimaki (1982), p. 16, includes Saskya Paṇḍita Kun dga’ rgyal mtshan, Klong chen rab ’byam pa and sTag tshang lo tsa ba shes rab rin chen as examples of other Tibetan authors who adhered to this style.
2. dPe rgyun dkon pa ’ga’ zhig gi tho yig don gnyer yid kyi ku nda bzhad pa’i zla ’od ’bum gyi snye ma.
11. Dwags po bKra shis rnam rgyal gyi Grub mtha’ shan ’byed rgyas ’bring bsdus gsum.
12. bKra shis ’od zer gyi Grub mtha’ mdor bsdus.
13. dKa’ bcu Padma bzang po’i Grub mtha’ mdor bsdus.
15. sTag lo’i Grub mtha’ kun shes rtsa ’grel.

With the exception of Tsa lo’i’s Grub mtha’ and the fifth book in the List of Rare Books - dBus pa blo gsal’s Grub mtha’ - these books have not survived the passage of time. However, Blo gsal grub mtha’s rarity lies not so much in its quantitative scarcity as in its qualitative uniqueness. dBus pa blo gsal wrote in the first half of the fourteenth century, nearly four hundred years before the full emergence of this literary genre. The Grub mtha’ works best-known by Western scholars issue from the later centuries.

The pioneer of Grub mtha’ study was V.P. Wasselief, a Russian scholar who examined parts of a sixteenth century work in the mid-nineteenth century. He was followed by Sarat Chandra Das who, in 1881-82, translated into English and published portions of Grub mtha’ shel gyi me long by Thu bkan blo bzang chos kyi nyi ma. Perhaps the most well-known of Grub mtha’ English translations are those of dKon mchog ’Jigs med dbang po’s Grub pa’i mtha’i rnam bzhag rin po che’i phreng ba. The Madhyamika section was translated by S. Iida in his PhD thesis in 1970 and published in 1980 in his book, Reason and Emptiness. The Grub mtha’ was translated by Herbert V. Guenther and published in 1971 in Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice. In

2. Published in Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal. It was reproduced and edited by Ngawang Geleg Demo and Gene Smith, Collected Works of Thu’u bkwan (Delhi, 1969). Sections of this Grub mtha’ were subsequently translated and published by Helmut Hoffman in Quellen zur Geschichte der Tibetischen Bon-Religion; D. Seyfort Ruegg in Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 83 (1968) p. 73-91; Lu Cheng in Studia Serica Series B, no. 1 (Dhentu, 1942); K.K. Mittal in A Tibetan Eye-View of Indian Philosophy (Delhi, 1984).
3. 1728-1781.
1976 Geshe Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins published their translation of the same *Grub mtha’* in *Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism*.

Guenther, in his preface to *Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice* writes (referring to dKon mchog ’Jig med dbang po),

> As a dGe lugs pa (follower of the "new" tradition started by Tsong kha pa [1357-1419]), he strictly adhered to the tradition which recognizes only works of Indian origin as authoritative; consequently he emphasizes the customary Indian, that is, epistemological aspect of Buddhist philosophy.¹

However, although there existed the tradition in Tibet that ascribed authority only to the Indian texts, there existed simultaneously the tendency amongst scholars, once the commentary on a literal translation of an original Indian text was made, to rely on the commentary alone.² The reliance on the Tibetan commentary over the original translation led Tibetan authors to glean and cite their Indian sources from the commentaries and, in consequence, to occasionally cite erroneously verses or of parts of verses. Hence, dBus pa blo gsal’s distance in time from many of the later commentators and his proximity to the earlier Tibetan tradition place many of his textual citations in better accord with the Indian originals. Further, with the establishment of the dGe lugs pa tradition by Tsong kha pa and his disciples mKhas grub rje and rGyal tshab rje, both of the later fourteenth-early fifteenth centuries, dGe lugs pa writers of later years made a practice of almost never altering the fundamentals of the founding fathers’ philosophical points. dBus pa blo gsal’s treatise then, written prior to the advent of the dGe lugs pa school, occasionally points to areas in variance with those of the later tradition.

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Early Categorization of Mādhyamika Subschools

One of the major areas within Blo gsal grub mtha' that reveals discrepancies with the works of the later dGe lugs pa school concerns the subdividing of the Mādhyamika school. dBus pa blo gsal subdivides the school as follows,

Group I
1) Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika Bhāvaviveka
2) Yogācāra-Mādhyamika Śāntarakṣita, Haribhadra
3) 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa -Jñānagarbha,
               Candrakīrti

Group II
1) Svātantrika Bhāvaviveka (Jñānagarbha, Kamalaśīla)
2) Prāsaṅgika Buddhāpālita (Candrakīrti)

Note that he sets forth two separate groups, one consisting of Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika, Yogācāra-Mādhyamika, and 'Jigs rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa (Mādhyamikas who conform to that which is renowned in the world), the other of Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika. Later dGe lugs pa authors combined the two categorizations: they placed Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika and Yogācāra-Mādhyamika under Svātantrika, and equated and dissolved the 'Jigs rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma to the Prāsaṅgika division. Following are examples of the later categorizations by two sixteenth century and one seventeenth century dGe lugs pa authors. dGe 'dun rgya mtsho's (1475-1542) divisions of the schools is given first.1

1) Svātāntrika
   - Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika   Bhāvaviveka and followers
   - Yogācāra-Mādhyamika   Śāntarakṣita and followers

2) Prāsaṅgika   Buddhapālita and followers

Chos kyi rgyal mtshan’s divisions are similar.¹

1) Svātāntrika
   - Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika   Bhāvaviveka, Jīanagarbha
   - Yogācāra-Mādhyamika   Śāntarakṣita, Haribhadra, Kamalaśīla

2) Prāsaṅgika   Buddhapālita, Candrakīrti, Śāntideva

'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa’s divisions are more extensive, but continue to follow the dGe lugs pa pattern that makes the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika and Yogācāra-Mādhyamika subschools of the Svātāntrika and that does away with the ‘Jigs rten grags sde spyod pa’i dbu ma pa classification.²

1) Svātāntrika
   - Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika   Bhāvaviveka, Jīanagarbha
   - Yogācāra-Mādhyamika
     a)- rNam bden dang mthun pa   Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, Āryavimuktisena
     b)- rNam rdzun dang mthun pa   Haribhadra, Jitāri, Kambala

² Classification from Grub mtha’ chen mo. In Mimaki (1982), p. 29.
2) **Prāsaṅgika**  
Buddhapālita, Candrakīrti, Śāntideva

 unreasonable pa blo gsal does not anticipate fully the later dGe lugs pa systematization and, in a flourish that at first glance appears to complicate matters, includes various of the Indian scholars in two schools simultaneously. Bhāvaviveka is mentioned as a representative of the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika school in the first grouping and, in the second set of classifications, consisting of the division of Mādhyamika into Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika, is set forth as a Svātantrika. Candrakīrti is recorded as being a 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa and as a Prāsaṅgika. And Jñānagarbha, curiously, is held to be both a 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa and a Svātantrika.

For example, in folio 100b2 of *Blo gsal grub mtha*, dbus pa blo gsal writes,

> The master Jñānagarbha and the master Candrakīrti assert conventional [truths] as being the accepted conventions of worldly beings.

He then quotes Jñānagarbha’s *Satyavyāvibhaṅga-kārikā* (k 21) and Candrakīrti’s *Madhyamakāvatāra* V1 35 and states,

> Because of this [Jñānagarbha and Candrakīrti] are known as the 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pas.

In folio 98b3 of *Blo gsal grub mtha*, as substantiation for Jñānagarbha’s assertion of Svātantrika views, dbus pa blo gsal quotes from Jñānagarbha’s *Satyadvayavibhaṅga-kārikā* (k 12 and 8). The curiousness of the assignment of this specific dual affiliation to Jñānagarbha lies in the equation and assimilation in later texts of the 'Jigs rten grags sde spyod pa school to that of the Thal 'gyur (the
Prāsaṅgika) school and not to the Rang gyud pa (the Svātantrika) school.

The mystery of the inclusion of the Indian authors in two separate groups of schools is resolved with examination of the classifications given by authors prior to, contemporary with, and subsequent to the fourteenth century dBus pa blo gsal. For the earliest Tibetan references to the Mādhyamika school we turn to two of the most ancient Tibetan texts still extant: the ITa ba'i rim pa bshad pa by dPal brtsegs and the ITa ba'i khyad par by Ye shes sde, both of the ninth century. Each of these authors, it can be seen, differentiated Bhāvaviveka’s school of thought from Śāntarakṣita’s school of thought, and set forth the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika school and the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika school as the two divisions of the Mādhyamika school.¹ One should note however, that the Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika schools are not referred to in either treatise. There are other texts of the ninth century that also contain the appellations Yogācāra-Mādhyamika and Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika but, except for Nyi ma 'od's ITa ba'i rim pa that mentions the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika school, the authors of these texts are not known.²

Later, in the thirteenth century, but earlier that our author, the famous Sa skya pa scholar Sa skya Paṇḍita Kunga rgyal mtshan (1182-1251), in his gZhung lugs legs par bshad pa, classified the schools under two main rubrics that determined the names that appeared below them. The rubrics were 1) kun rdzob kyi sgo nas dbye ba, i.e., division by way of the conventions and 2) don dam gyi sgo nas, i.e., division by way of the ultimate. Two of the schools under the rubric "division by way of conventions", the tha snyad kyi rnam gzhag nyan thos dang mthun pa'i phyi rol don yod par smra ba'i dbu ma pa (Mādhyamikas who assert the existence of the exterior object in accord with the Śrāvaka presentation of conventions) and the tha snyad kyi rnam gzhag sems

¹. dBus pa blo gsal includes, in his Grub mtha’, the verse from Ye shes sde’s ITa ba'i khyad par that mentions the two schools. See Blo gsal grub mtha’ 100b5.
². For references to Nyi ma ‘od’s ITa ba'i rim pa, see Mimaki (1982), p. 42.
tsam pa dang mthun pa rnal 'byor spyod pa pa'i dbu ma pa (Mādhyamikas who are Yogācāras in accord with the mind-only presentation of conventions) relate roughly, respectively, to the classifications Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika and Yogācāra-Mādhyamika of the Blo gsal grub mtha'. It would also seem that the school termed tha snyad kyi rnam gzhag gang dang yang mi 'gal bar smra ba'i dbus ma pa (Mādhyamikas who assert without contradiction with anyone the presentation of conventions) would correspond to the Jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa classification. Sa skya pa Paṇḍita Kunga rgyal mtshan’s classification can be presented as follows,

1) (kun rdzob kyi sgo nas dbye ba)
   - tha snyad kyi rnam gzhag nyan thos dang mthun pa'i phyi rol
     don yod par smra ba'i dbu ma pa
   - tha snyad kyi rnam gzhag sems tsam pa dang mthun pa rnal
     'byor spyod pa pa'i dbu ma pa
   - tha snyad rnam gzhag gang dang yang mi 'gal bar smra ba'i
     dbu ma pa

2) (don dam gyi sgo nas dbye ba)
   - dbu ma sgyu ma lta bu
     Rab tu mi gnas pa
     a) - Rang rgyud pa
     b) - Thal 'gyur ba

We can note that the names Rang rgyud pa (Svātantrika) and Thal 'gyur ba (Prāsaṅgika) appear under the second rubric "division by way of the ultimate".

Mimaki draws attention to another point regarding Sa skya Paṇḍita’s classification. He writes,
Il faut noter qu’il considère les Svātantrika et Prāsaṅgika comme sous-écoles de l’école des Rab tu mi gnas pa. L’école des sGyu ma lta bu et celle des Rab tu mi gnas pa sont déjà connues dans un texte indien, la *Tattvaratnavali* d’Advayavajra. L’originalité de Sa skya Panḍita consiste à ranger les écoles des Svātantrika and des Prāsaṅgika sous celle des Rab tu mi gnas pa.¹

Bu ston Rin chen grub (1290-1364), writing only a few years after dBus pa blo gsal, in his *Chos 'byung*, the introduction to his recension of the sNar thang Canon³, classifies the Mādhyamikas as follows,⁴

- dbu ma Thal ’gyur ba = 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa⁵ Buddhapālita, Candrakīrti
- Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika Bhavya
- Yogācāra-Mādhyamika Jñānagarbha, Śrīgupta, Śantaraksita, Kamalaśīla, Haribhadra

¹ Mimaki (1982), p. 33. Compare with the bKa’ rgyud pa ‘Ba ra ba rgyal mtshan dpal bzang’s arrangement of schools. He equates the Rab tu mi gnas pa to the Thal ’gyur pa, and the dBu ma sgyu ma lta bu to the Rang rgyud pa.
² Abbreviation for *bDe bar gshegs pa’i bstan pa’i gsal byed chos kyi ’byung gnas gsung rab rin po che’i mdzod*.
⁴ Bu ston Rinpoche brought the (original) copy of the bsTan ’gyur from sNar-thang and excluded from it all duplicate texts, for the original sNar-thang copy contained all the texts available at that time. He classified the texts which had remained unclassified, as well as added about a thousand new texts. This new copy (of the collection) was deposited at the vihāra of Zha lu.
⁵ E. Obermiller (1932), p. 135.

5. Grags pa rgyal mtshan (Sa skya Panḍita’a uncle) appears to have been the first Tibetan scholar to include the ‘Jigs rten grags sde [phyod] pa school as a Madhyamaka subdivision. His examination of the schools is recorded by Go rams pa bsod nams seng ge in his *rGyal bu thams cad kyi thugs dyi dgongs pa zab mo dbu ma’i de kho na nyis spyi’i nag gyis ston pa nges don rab gsal*. See Mimaki (1982), p. 33.
Bu ston Rin chen grub, for the first time within a Tibetan text, equates the Prāsaṅgika school to the ‘Jig rten grags sde spyod pa school. Note that he terms Jñānagarbha a Yogācāra-Mādhyamika, in contradistinction to the majority of later dGe lugs pa writers.¹

The fourteenth century (1310-1391) bKa’ rgyud pa author ’Ba’ ra ba rgyal mtshan dpal bzang includes the two schools recorded earlier by Sa skya Panḍita - the dBu ma sgyu ma lta bu and the Rab tu mi gnes pa² - in his Grub mtha’i nam bzhag and autocommentary. His classification follows.

- Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika
- Yogācāra-Mādhyamika
- sNang ba mi spyod dbu ma [=’Jig rten grags sde spyod pa’i dbu ma pa]
  a) dBu ma sgyu ma lta bu [=Rang rgyud pa]
  b) Rab tu mi gnas pa [=Thal ’gyur ba]

In contrast to Sa skya Panḍita, who considered the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika as subschools of Rab tu mi gnes pa, author ’Ba’ ra ba rgyal mtshan dpal bzang equates the Prāsaṅgika school with Rab tu mi gnes pa and equates the Svātantrika with dBu ma sgyu ma lta bu. These in turn are considered sub-schools of the ’Jig rten grags sde spyod pa’i dbu ma pa. With regard to the fact that he too cites Jñānagarbha’s

¹. Even the later dGe lugs pas disagreed with each other regarding Jñānagarbha’s school. D. Lopez (1987), p. 446, n. 16, in accord with the previous quote from M. D. Eckel (1986) states that the “philosophical climate of late Indian Buddhism was substantially more fluid” than the later Tibetan works might imply.

². Tsong kha pa, in his lhag mthong chen mo, asserts that some of the Tibetans who preceded him classified Mādhyamikas dependent on their stands with regard to the ultimate. According to him, the two groups were the sGyu ma rigs grub pa (Establishers of Illusion through Reasoning) and the Rab tu mi gnas par smra ba (Proponents of Thorough Non-Abiding). The sGyu ma rigs grub pas asserted that the ultimate truth is a composite of emptiness and appearance, while the Rab tu mi gnas par smra bas asserted that the ultimate truth is the mere elimination of superimpositions with respect to appearance. See D. Lopez (1987), p. 56; K. Mimaki (1982), p. 33 n. 67.
Satyadvayavibhaṅga-kārikā 21 and Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra VI 35 to support his classification of ‘Jig rten grags sde spyod pa’i dbu ma pa, Mimaki writes, "il est possible que dans sa classification il ait été influence par dBus pa blo gsal".\(^1\)

By the fifteenth century, the Sa skya pa scholar Pan chen Šākya mchog ldan (1428-1507) was in a position to refer to and criticize the tradition of Mādhyamika classification that had arisen in Tibet. In his dBu ma rnam par nges pa’i chos kyi bang mdzod lung dang rigs pa’i rgya mtsho\(^2\) he presented, as he viewed it, the classification according to the earlier masters (sngon gyi slob dpon rnams) and, following that, set forth his own categorization.

I. sngon gyi slob dpon rnams (earlier masters)

(kun rdzob)
- Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika Bhāvaviveka, Jñānagarbha
- Yogācāra-Mādhyamika Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla
- ‘Jig rten grags sde spyod pa’i dbu ma pa Candrakīrti

(don dam)
- Śvātantrika
- Prāṣangika

II. his position

- grub mtha’ ’og ma → Mādhyamika
  - Jñānagarbha Sautrāntika → Mādhyamika
  - Śāntarakṣita Sautrāntika → Yogācāra → Mādhyamika
- not grub mtha’ ’og ma, but ‘Jig rten grags pa nyid
  → Mādhyamika Candrakīrti

Śākhya mchog ldan was of the opinion that the Mādhyamikas could be divided into two main groupings. However, unlike his predecessors,

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who divided Madhyamikas relative to their views on conventionalities and ultimates, he divided them with respect to whether not they achieved the Madhyamika view by way of initially working with the lower tenets (grub mtha’ ’og ma), i.e., the tenets of the Sautrāntika and Yogācāra schools. Those who achieved the Madhyamika view without first being involved with the lower tenet systems followed "what is known in the world" ('jig rten grags pa nyid) and thereby moved directly into the Madhyamika view. According to his classification, there is the implication that there were scholars whose views related to more than one school. For example, Śāntarakṣita, consistently considered a Yogācāra-Mādhyamika, here is seen to have attained the Mādhyamika view after having relied on both the Sautrāntika and Yogācāra tenet systems. Probably this relates to the fact that Śāntarakṣita (and Kamalaśīla) held views that were in accord with certain views within the Sautrāntika school.¹

Other subdivisions of the Mādhyamika existed;² those presented here are a small, yet representative group that serve to demonstrate the efforts made by scholars, beginning in the early ninth century, to attempt to differentiate the schools that adhered to the Mādhyamika doctrine.

Development of Mādhyamika Classification

It may prove beneficial, at this point, to review briefly the historical development of the Mādhyamika school in Tibet. Ye shes sde’s Ita ba’i khyad par, written at the beginning of the ninth century, is representative of the period known as the snga dar - the early propagation of Buddhist thought and technique. This period saw the entry and assimilation of Buddhism into Tibet. It commenced with the

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¹ The main view they held in common with the Sautrāntika school was that of the momentariness of things (ksanabhanga, skad cig ma 'jig pa). See Mimaki (1976), p. 74-5.
² Other classifications may be found in Mimaki (1982), p. 27-37.
visits of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla to Tibet in the eighth century, and
with the exoduses of Tibetans to the great Indian monasteries to seek
out teachings. At this time a preliminary attempt was made to interpret
and systematize the material acquired and translated. The snga dar in
Tibet "ended" with the disintegration of the political structure in the
mid-ninth century; a new era, known as the phyi dar began, in large part
due to the efforts of the western kings in the eleventh century. D.S
Ruegg classifies the second propogation as the period of "full
assimilation"\(^1\), encompassing the years from the end of the tenth to the
fourteenth centuries. It was marked by continued effort on the part of
the Tibetans to penetrate, explain, and organize Buddhist philosophy.
This period was followed by the "classical period"\(^2\) that lasted from the
fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries, in which exegesis and
systematization of the religious and philosophical materials were
stressed.

It was during this initial diffusion of Buddhism, strongly influenced
by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, that Ye shes sde and dPal brtsegs came
to include the name rNal ’byor spyod pa’i dbu ma (Yogācāra-
Mādhyamaka) in their texts. During these early years few Prāṣaṅgika
texts were translated: out of fifty-one Mādhyamika texts translated
from Sanskrit to Tibetan, only five were texts of the Prāṣaṅgika
school.\(^3\) The paucity of translated Prāṣaṅgika texts resulted in the better
acquaintance of scholars with the works by Bhāvaviveka; because of
this, the second name, mDo sde (spyod) pa’i dbu ma (Sautrāntika-
Mādhyamika) came to be included in the ITa ba’i khyad par and the ITa
ba’i rim pa bsad pa.

The use of the terms for the two schools became widespread, and
Tibetan authors, their attention focused on the composition of
exegetical treatises, began to include the newly-coined designations in

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2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Mimaki (1982), p. 45. The only work by Candrakīrti that was translated was the Yuktisāṣṭikā-śrīti.
their commentaries. By the eleventh century, the rNying ma pa Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po had utilized the terms in his commentary on Padmasambhava’s eighth century *Man ngag lta phreng*, an Indian text in which they had not been employed. Even though the Kashmiri nun Laksmi used the two terms in her *Pañcakramaṭikā-Kramārtha-prakāśikā*, written at the beginning of the eleventh century (two centuries after Ye shes sde introduced them) it is likely that she learned of them from Tibetan sources; the terms Yogācāra-Mādhyamika and Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika had not been employed in works by Indians prior to hers. It seems, based on the information that has been accrued to date, that the Tibetans were the inventors and instigators of the use of the two appellations.

At the commencement of the phyi dar, and in the years that followed, Candrakirti’s books and many other Prāsaṅgika texts were translated. Due to an increased familiarity with the Prāsaṅgika texts, and an understanding of their relationship to aspects of Bhāvaviveka’s works, the names Rang rgyud pa (Svātantrika) and Thal ’gyur pa (Prāsaṅgika) came to be coined and used. Thus we can see that the two groups of terms, the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika and Yogācāra-Mādhyamika on the one hand, and the Rang rgyud pa and Thal ’gyur pa on the other, arose from within quite different historical contexts. In addition, the two groups of appellations responded respectively to two different approaches to Mādhyamika thought. The first grouping related to the positions taken by Mādhyamikas with regard to the status of conventional phenomena, and the second grouping was made according to whether a Mādhyamika employed syllogisms or consequences to bring about an understanding of the ultimate. Hence, until the later dGe lugs los subsumed the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika and Yogācāra-Mādhyamika under Svātantrika, the two sets of terms, as in the case of dBus pa blo gsal, remained differentiated.

1. Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po also authored the first two Grub mtha’ of the later diffusion: the *ITa ba’i brjed byang* and the *Grub mtha’ brjed byang*.
It appears that Pa tshab Nyi ma grags (1055-?), the Tibetan scholar who translated a number of Candrakīrti’s works, was the first to use the terms Rang gyud pa and Thal ’gyur pa. As in the case of the terms coined during the early diffusion, the designations Rang gyud pa and Thal ’gyur pa, noted above, were also Tibetan innovations. The fact that the terms were Tibetan products was known and recorded by the Tibetans. This is evident in the writings of Tsong kha pa¹ and of Śākya mchog ldan².

Tsong kha pa (1357-1419) is credited with having initiated the melding of the two groups. In his Lam rim chen mo, composed in 1402, he employs the terms Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika, Yogācāra-Mādhyamika, Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika, but does not explicitly bring together the two groups.³ Neither does the Drang nges legs bshad snying po, written in 1406, explicitly set forth a conmingling of the two sets of classifications. However, since in the latter part of the treatise he subdivides the Mādhyamika into Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika, with Svātantrika further subdivided into two - groupings of Mādhyamikas according to their adherence to Bhāvaviveka’s position or to Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla’s position - Drang nges legs bshad snying po is held to be the first work to contain the unification of the two classifications. His classification of the Mahāyāna Buddhist schools is as follows:⁴

1. Lam rim chen mo (kha) 6b6-7: Gang ri’i khrod kyi phyi dar gyi mkhas pa mams dBu ma pa la Thal ’gyur pa dang Rang rgyud pa gnyis kyi th snyad byed pa ni Tshig gsal dang mthun pas rang bsod mi bsam mo / “The scholars of the second diffusion of Buddhism made, for the Mādhyamika, the two names Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika, but I do not think they are pure invention, because they accord with the Prasannapāda.”
2. dBu ma mnam pa’i bang mdzod lung dang rigs pa’i rgyo mtsho (kha) 13b3: Rang rgyud pa dang Thal ’gyur pa shes bos mams kyi th snyad byas pa mams so/ “Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika are names made by the Tibetans.”
3. See Mimaki (1982), p. 46, for the folios that record the classification.
Vijñānavādin
Mādhyamika

1) Svātantrika
   Bhāvaviveka
   Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla

2) Prāśāṅgika

It was this basic plan, with the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika and Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika\(^1\) school subsumed under the Svātantrika division, that the later dGe lugs pa scholars followed and incorporated into their works.

Any certainty to the conclusion that Tsong kha pa was the first to combine the two sets of classification is undermined by statements from a Bon po Grub mtha’.\(^2\) Tre ston rGyal mtshan dpal’s Bon sgo gsal byed (also known as Bon sgo dkar chag) also reveals a classification of the Buddhist schools that includes the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika and Yogācāra-Mādhyamika as subschools of the Svātantrika. According to historical information on and by the Bon po, it is highly unlikely that Tre ston rGyal mtshan dpal produced his Grub mtha’ after Tsong kha pa’s lifetime, and it is quite probable that he lived during the latter half of the thirteenth century and the first part of the fourteenth century (possibly a contemporary of dBus pa blo gsal). In his Grub mtha’ he writes,

With regard to the Mādhyamikas there are the three: the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamikas who assert the luminous mind, devoid of the two [i.e., subject and object]; the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas who assert [the meditation] like the veins and winds; and the Grags ste spyod pa’i dbu ma pas who

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1. Tsong kha pa did not employ these exact terms in Drang nges legs bshad snying po; he divided the Svātantrikas according to whether they held Bhāvaviveka’s or Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla’s position.
assert emptiness free from extremes. Moreover, the first
two are called Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas and the last
Prāsaṅgika.¹

It would seem that Tre ston rGyal mtshan dpal was not well-
acquainted with the Indian Buddhist schools. His description of the
Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika corresponds better to the Yogācāra-
Mādhyamika, and he seems, in his statement regarding the Yogācāra-
Mādhyamika, to confuse the "yoga" of Yogācāra with the practice of
tantric yoga. However, leaving his confusion aside², one must search
for the possible basis for his statement, "the first two are said to be
Svātantrika-Mādhyamika and the last is Prāsaṅgika". He could have
turned to Bu ston, dBu pa blo gsal or 'Ba' ra ba to equate Grags ste
spyod pa'i dbu ma pa³ to Prāsaṅgika. Mimaki suggests that if his
source was Bu ston, Tre ston rGyal mtshan dpal might have classified
Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika and Yogācāra-Mādhyamika under
Svātantrika simply because Bu ston equated 'Jig rten grags sde spyod
pa with Prāsaṅgika. Whatever his sources, the existence of the Bon po
Grub mtha’ suggests that Tsong kha pa’s classification had precursors
and merits further attention.

In conclusion, let it suffice to say that the Grub mtha’ literature is an
apt testimonial to the efforts made by Tibetan Buddhist scholars to
analyze and categorize Indian Buddhism. In general, Blo gsal grub
mtha’ is representative of the attention that was given to classification
and elucidation of the Indian schools and, in particular, this Grub mtha’
represents such early fourteenth-century attention and effort. In the
Mādhyamika section of Blo gsal grub mtha’, by way of terse kārikās,

¹. The Tibetan is found in Mimaki (1982), p. 48.
². Here, too, one cannot discount the possibility of textual corruption.
³. ‘Jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa.
brief commentary on the kārikās, and numerous quotations from Indian Buddhist texts, dBus pa blo gsal presents his analysis of, as it has been regarded in Tibet, the most profound school of Buddhist thought.
The Madhyamika View:  
The Middle Way

In the Exhortation to Kātyāyana (Ka tya ya na yi gdam snag, Kātyāyanavavāda) the Bhagavān, who knows being and non-being, negated both "it is" and "it is not".

MMK XV k 7, as quoted in Blo gsal grub mtha'
103bl

Nāgārjuna, writing in the second century C.E., sought to reiterate and clarify what he felt to be the Buddha’s understanding of the nature of existence in order to refute the philosophical positions that had developed and become prevalent in the centuries that followed the Buddha’s Nirvāṇa. The Madhyamika school of Buddhism came to base itself on his exegesis of the Tathāgata’s teachings, and took its name from Nāgārjuna’s principal work, the Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikās. The Madhyamikas who appeared subsequent to Nāgārjuna returned again and again to his texts to quote, explain, and elaborate on his philosophy.

The Madhyamika is the only Buddhist school to assert the emptiness (stong pa nyid, śūnyatā) of all aspects of existence. Later Madhyamikas defined themselves in their treatises as those persons who, in propounding Buddhist tenets asserted that no phenomena (chos, dharma), including particles, truly existed.1 They also stated that they were the only Buddhists who maintained a middle way free from the

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1. Geshe Sopa and Jeffry Hopkins (1976), p. 122. This is the definition given in dKon mchog ’jigs med dbang po’s (1728-91) Grub pa'i mtha'i nmam par bzhag pa rin po che phreng ba. The Tibetan is found in Iida (1980), p. 28:

bden grub kyi chos rdul tsam yang med par khas len pa'i grub mtha' smra
ba'i gang zag de dbu ma pa'i mtshan nyid
two extremes of permanence and annihilation, and claimed that they fully upheld the meaning of their name "Madhyamika", which translates as "belonging to, or pertaining to, the middle". The later Tibetans, in translating the title of the school founded by Nāgārjuna, kept the original meaning and rendered the name of the school the dBya ma, "The Middle", and called adherents to it dBya ma pa, "Persons of the Middle".

Although only the Madhyamika school actually has the word "middle" inherent in its name, it is not recognized by the other Buddhist schools as the only school to adhere to middle way. Jacques May writes,

> Now, the Middle Way constitutes the fundamental principle of Buddhism as a whole. So it could be conceived that all Buddhists should be called Madhyamaka or Madhyamika.¹

Indeed, the Vaibhāṣikas, Sautrāntikas and Yogācāras, while not insisting that they too be termed Madhyamikas, also claim to follow a middle way.

Adherence to the middle way basically means not leaning toward or following extremes. These extremes, however, have received different interpretations dependent upon the school in which the middle way has been couched, and while each Buddhist school makes the claim to avoidance of the extremes, the "higher" schools insist that, from their point of view, those below have involved themselves with one or both of the extremes.

According to later Tibetan interpretation, the Vaibhāṣikas, who base themselves primarily on the *Mahāvibhaṣa*, an abhidharma text, assert partless particles of matter and consciousness and the true existence of these, yet claim to avoid the extreme of permanence by refuting what they interpret to constitute a view of their permanence: the existence of

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the principal (*pradhāna, gtso bo*) of the Sāṃkhya.* They further claim to adhere to the middle through their refutation of the extreme of annihilation, which, in their school, is seen as the rejection of the law of cause and effect of actions.

The Sautrāntikas, or the other Hinayāna school of tenets, emphasize the sūtras over the abhidharma texts, and also assert the true existence of external objects. In accord with the Vaibhāṣikas they tread the middle way which avoids the positing of the principal and the rejection of cause and effect.

The Yogācārins, belonging to the school of one of the two major divisions of Mahāyāna, believe that all phenomena are of the nature of the mind. Within their scheme of the three natures they find their middle way: the extreme of permanence, instead of being the unchanging agent of the Hinayānists, here is viewed as being the true existence of the first of the three natures, the imaginary (*kun btags, parikalpita*) natures. To believe that objects are not the nature or entity of consciousness and to conceive of them as separate from consciousness is, for the Yogācāras, to slip to the side of permanence. Slippage into a view of annihilation would involve the denigration of the second and third natures - the assertion that the dependent (*gzhan dbang, paratantra*) natures and the thoroughly established (*yong grub, parinispanna*) natures do not exist at all.

They avoid this extreme by asserting that these two natures ultimately exist, that is, that objects ultimately exist as the nature of consciousness, that consciousnesses truly exist, and that the emptiness of the duality of subject and object truly exists.²

Thus, by avoiding these two extremes, the Yogācāras claim to follow a middle way free from the extremes of permanence and annihilation.

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2. Ibid., p. 43.
The Mādhyamikas, however, find fault with the so-called "middle paths" of the lower schools, charging that none of them are able to maintain a middle stance and do, in fact, fall to extremes. For the Mādhyamika, the extremes are not those set forth by the Vaiśśika, Sautrāntika or Yogācāra, and rather involve extreme modes of existence of phenomena. The actual mode of existence of phenomena, for the Mādhyamika, is without self-nature (rang zhin med pa, niḥsvabhāva), i.e., without true existence (bden par med pa, satya asat). This mode of existence, this "emptiness" (stong pa nyid, śūnyatā) of phenomena is absolutely necessary for maintenance of the law of dependent-arising taught by the Buddha. Without it, the dependent-arising of phenomena would be impossible to maintain as a true Buddhist should. Phenomena with self-nature would be unable to change, since they would exist in and of themselves, independent of, and different from, all other phenomena: a frozen mode of existence that would not allow for the fluidity of dependent-arising. Thus, for the Mādhyamika, the extreme of permanence is not the adherence to a view that asserts a "principal" or to a view of the true existence of imaginary natures but is rather the conception of the ultimate existence of phenomena (don dam par grub pa, paramārthāsiddha). The ascription of ultimate existence to phenomena superimposes a mode of existence (gnas lugs) that is not in harmony with the actual nature of things. Anything that ultimately exists would be unable to change and would not be related to anything else. Since this does not accord with the real mode of existence of phenomena, a view that assumes ultimate existence is termed an extreme, specifically, an extreme of permanence.

The Mādhyamikas hold that phenomena do not ultimately exist, but in refuting the extreme of permanence, do not negate phenomena entirely. To do so, according to them, would be to fall to the extreme of annihilation. This opposite extreme would not only involve the removal of ultimate existence from phenomena, but would also completely eliminate phenomena. There would occur a denigration of phenomena to the extent that the name of the extreme implies: an "annihilation" of phenomena to complete non-existence.
Thus the Madhyamikas follow a middle path that refutes ultimate existence but affirms the conventional existence (kun rdzob tu yod pa, samvṛtisat) of phenomena. Both extremes are avoided with the singular assertion of the dependent-arising of phenomena, for "dependent-arising" infers and affirms the conventional existence of phenomena and yet negates their ultimate existence. This affirmation of the conventional existence of phenomena keeps the Madhyamikas from the extreme of annihilation and, at the same time, because phenomena are understood to exist interdependently, and not inherently, holds them from the extreme of permanence. Phenomena are retained; their ultimate existence is rejected. Emptiness is simply the lack of ultimate existence of phenomena. It (emptiness) is designated such to give expression to the final nature of all phenomena. The fact that phenomena are empty allows for dependent-arising.

Based on the Madhyamika assertion of the emptiness of phenomena and the statement's positive implication of dependent-arising all the other schools' extremes are seen to be "trifling and fabricated",¹ and the views of the schools themselves are seen to fall to an extreme. The Vaibhāṣika position that allows for the ultimate existence of the partless atoms of matter and consciousness, according to the Madhyamika, falls to the extreme of permanence. The Sautrāntika's assertion of the ultimate existence of things likewise finds itself mired in a conception of permanence. The Yogācārins, under the critical eye of their Mahāyāna cohorts, in maintaining that the dependent and thoroughly established natures truly exist also slip to the extreme that has snared the Hinayānists. The oral commentary provided by a modern Madhyamika further implicates the positions held by the Vaibhāṣikas, Sautrāntikas, and Yogācārins.

If a phenomenon is truly existent, it must be unchanging in nature; thus for it to cease, it must become utterly non-existent. Since the Vaibhāṣikas, Sautrāntikas, and

¹. Ibid.
Yogācārins assert that these impermanent phenomena, which they hold to be truly existent, disintegrate every moment, they thereby come to hold the extreme of annihilation.¹

Hence the Mādhyamikas contend that only adherents to their school warrant the appellation "Proponents of the middle way". The views held by the other schools lead their members to misappropriate the title and ultimately draw them into the philosophical quicksand that those following the Mādhyamika middle path so discreetly, by refuting both "it is" (yod pa, sat = permanence) and "it is not" (med pa, asat = annihilation) avoid.

The Mādhyamika Object of Negation

Here, the object of negation is just the belief in the truth [of appearances and emptiness] and not the appearances [themselves]. This is because [there is] suffering in that [belief] and also because it is not necessary or possible [to negate] appearances.²

The Mādhyamika philosopher’s inquiry into the nature of phenomena does not come about from mere intellectual speculation or curiosity, but rather serves a soteriological purpose. Realization of the emptiness

¹. Ibid., p. 44.
². Blo gsal grub mtha’, 104b2, k XII-14.
of self and phenomena is said to bring about liberation from cyclic existence and, in the same way that the Buddha’s inquiry into reality had brought about the achievement of vast intellectual understanding, the attainment of Nirvāṇa, with its concomitant joy and freedom from the suffering of cyclic existence, so is the philosopher/meditator’s investigation said to have the power to bring about the highest wisdom and experience. The main shackle that prevents liberation and keeps the individual circling endlessly throughout the realms of existence is said to be the conception of true existence of phenomena.¹ The conception of true existence is said to cause sentient beings to attach a mistaken reality to phenomena which, in turn, drives them to desire or to be repulsed by the various objects of consciousness. They are thereby led to commit actions that bring about suffering and continued bondage in saṃsāra. This conception of true existence is also known as the "extreme of permanence" or "the extreme of existence" (yod mtha’, astyanta), and a synonym for this "extreme of existence" which sheds some light onto the meaning of the term "true existence" is termed the "extreme of superimposition" (sgro ‘dogs kyi mtha’, āropānta).

According to the Mādhyamika, on the occasion of the perception of phenomena, a mistaken conception is "superimposed" onto phenomena, thereby "covering" the actual nature of phenomena to masquerade as this actual nature. This mistake is made from the side of the mind and is imposed onto the things of the world, misleading the mind as to the actual status of things. The error is habitual and innate, so much a part of the fabric of the mind that every other doctrinal system (according to the Mādhyamika), has included it under the rubric "reality". That which is superimposed onto phenomena is the conception that things truly exist, independently.

Western scholars examining the Mādhyamika presentation of the mode of existence of phenomena have chosen to rely on varying

1. Hypothetical synonyms for true existence (bden par yod pa, satya-sat) are true establishment (bden par grub pa, satya-siddha), ultimate establishment (don dam par grub pa, paramārtha-siddha), established properly (yang dag par grub pa, samyaksiddhah) and established through its own entityness (ngo bo nyid gyis grub pa, svabhāvata-siddha).
Sanskrit and Tibetan terms to describe the object of the Mādhyamika negation, which negation is implicit in concepts such as superimposition. Richard Robinson, in a short presentation of Mādhyamika thought, defines the object that is to be negated, svabhāva, as,

...a term that means something 1) existing through its own power rather than that of another, 2) possessing an invariant and inalienable mark, and 3) having an immutable essence.¹

He goes on to state,

Intellectually, svabhāvas are false reifications, conceptual figments. Emotionally, they are the foci of obsessions, the illusory idols which enslave the passions.²

In a recent work Lopez, in explaining his choice of English word "entityness" to represent the Mādhyamika object of negation writes,

"Entityness" is chosen here to suggest something that is capable of independent existence, something similar to substance, as described by Wittgenstein in The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 2.024, "Substance is what exists independently of what is the case." (Pear and McGuiness translation). It would be the Mādhyamika position that phenomena have entities, that is, that they exist, but that entityness, some kind of substantial property or absolute object, is a falsity hypostasized by ignorance. Entityness seems akin to what Heidegger calls "the thingness of the

² Ibid., p. 52.
thing" in his essay "The Origin of the Work of Art". He writes:

This block of granite, for example, is a mere thing. It is hard, heavy, extended, bulky, shapeless, rough, coloured, partly dull, partly shiny. We can take note of all these features in the stone. Thus we acknowledge its characteristics. But still, the traits signify something proper to the stone itself. They are the properties. The thing has them. The thing? What are we thinking of when we now have the thing in mind? Obviously a thing is not merely an aggregate of traits, nor an accumulation of properties by which that aggregate arises. A thing, as everyone thinks he knows, is that around which the properties have assembled. We speak in this connection of the core of things. The Greeks are supposed to have called it hupo keimemnon. For them, this core of the thing is something lying at the ground of the thing, something always already there. The characteristics, however, are called ta sumbebekota, that which has always turned up already along with the given core and occurs along with it.¹

_Svabhāva_ literally means "[its] own (sva) existence or being or nature (bhāva)".² Translated by Western scholars in a variety of ways,³ it is categorically denied by the Mādhyamika. The "thingness of the thing" in this Buddhist system is no more than the result of mistaken perception. It is understood to be a conceptual construction that has as much reality as the traditional Tibetan Buddhist examples of non-existents, for example, the horn on a rabbit’s head or a turtle’s hairs.

A contemporary Tibetan Mādhyamika scholar comments:

3. For example: "own being, asciity" (Ruegg); "self-being" (May); "substantial existence" (Iida); "substance" (Lindtner); "intrinsic nature" (Ames); "inherent existence" (Hopkins).
most fundamentally it is that inherent existence is, in fact, totally imaginary and non-existent. To exist inherently would mean to exist independently of any and all conditioning factors. For example, an inherently existent table would be one that somehow exists entirely from the side of its own intrinsic, essential nature. It would be something that stands out all by itself, as though its causes, its parts and its being conventionally apprehended as a table all had nothing to do with its essential being. It is rather easy to recognize intellectually that such a mode of existence is a logical impossibility; nevertheless, we instinctively apprehend all phenomena - including ourselves- as existing in exactly this impossible manner.¹

It is this hypostasized, fabricated "reality", posited by fundamental ignorance to be the nature of phenomena, that is, as dBuś pa blo gsal writes in his *kārikā* 14, negated by the Mādhyamika. Conventional phenomena are not refuted. Their refutation would leave a sheer nothingness, an annihilation of all. Thus, in his explanation to his *kārikā* 14, dBuś pa blo gsal writes,

> Therefore, believing in the truth of appearances and emptiness, which is the basis of all suffering, is the object of negation.²

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2. *Blo gsal grub mtha’*, 104b3.
The Two Truths

Buddhist philosophers, in their attempt to explain and distinguish the plethora of knowables, set forth many varied categorizations of objects of knowledge.\(^1\) The categorization that is emphasized and employed by the Mādhyamika is headed by the rubric "two truths" (bden pa gnyis, satya-dvaya). In an essay where he substantiates his assertion with mention of Nāgārjuna’s *Mūlamadhyamikakārikā* XXIV, Candrakīrti’s *Madhyamakāvatāra* VI, and Śāntideva’s *Bodhicaryāvatāra* IX,\(^2\) T.V.R. Murti states,

All Mādhyamika treatises take the two truths - paramārthasatya and saṃvrtisatya - as vital to the system; some even begin their philosophical disquisitions with the division.\(^3\)

dBuṣ pa blo gsal begins the Mādhyamika section of *Blo gsal grub mtha’* with an explanation of the two truths. His first kārikā, emphasizing the all-inclusiveness of the two truths, reads,

The perfect Buddha himself taught objects of knowledge in just two truths. Therefore, objects of knowledge, which are also the five categories\(^4\) are not other than the two truths.\(^5\)

Later, in his sixth kārikā he emphasizes the fundamental importance of the two truths in the quest for liberation and Buddhahood.

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1. Objects of knowledge (*shes bya, jñeya*) include all objects that are cognized by consciousness. Since emptiness can be cognized by the highest wisdom consciousness, it too is an object of knowledge.
3. Ibid., p. 25, n. 16.
4. For the five categories, see BSGT 96b4. They are form, mind, mental factors, composite factors, and unconditioned phenomena.
5. *Blo gsal grub mtha’*, 96a5, k XII-1.
From knowing or not knowing the two things [two truths] one finds or does not find the state of Omniscience.¹

In a quotation from the *Pitāputrasamāgama-sūtra* he reveals the identity of the two truths: conventional (*kun rdzob, samvṛti*) and ultimate (*don dam, paramārtha*).

Thus the Tathāgatha understood the two truths, conventional [truth] and ultimate [truth]. Objects of knowledge also are exhausted in these, conventional and ultimate [truths].²

The two truths exhaustively include all objects of knowledge. They "cover" all objects of knowledge and, including them all, do not allow for a third truth. Since they are mutually exclusive, no object of knowledge exists that is either both or neither; hence, the possibility for a third truth is nullified. All objects of knowledge, including emptiness, and all other possible categorizations of objects are included under the umbrella of the two truths, i.e., are either one or the other.

Truths however, exist as they appear.³ It would be pointless, and actually quite impossible, to have two different sets of truths, were they to uphold this definition of truths. Conventional truths appear one way (truly existent) and exist another (devoid of true existence). Since conventional truths do not exist the way they appear they do not fulfill the requirements of "truth". Only emptiness exists as it appears to the mind cognizing it and thus only emptiness qualifies as a truth. Emptiness is, in fact, ultimate truth. The division into truths, then, does not find its base in "truths".

dBuṃ pa blo gsal writes,

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¹. *Blo gsal grub mtha’,* 99b4, k XII-6.
². Ibid., 96a6.
[The two truths are] distinguished only from [the point of view] of appearances. The union [of the two truths] is the Middle Path.¹

Appearances (snang ba) are the basis of the division into two truths. In his elaboration on kārikā XII-4c-d, where dBus pa blo gsal writes, "The definitiveness of the number is contingent on the two consciousnesses,"² he clarifies the fact that the two truths find their bases not in truths, but in appearances, and that they are dependent for their designations on different types of consciousnesses. Within the Mādhyamika system of the two truths, clearly one of the truths, from the point of view of the qualifications necessary for a "truth", i.e., existing as it appears, does not represent the actual status of phenomena.

dBus pa blo gsal etymologizes the word samvṛtisatya (conventional truth) and asserts that it is "the truth which completely conceals".³ He goes on to quote Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra VI k 28.

The error [in the mind] is the one which completely conceals because it obscures the real nature. On account of that whatever is artificial seems to be truth. The Muni said that [krtrima] is truth for that which completely conceals and the artificial things [he called] saṃvṛti, that which completely conceals as well.⁴

Two aspects of saṃvṛti are revealed in the above quotation. Saṃvṛti is the concealer, i.e., the ignorant consciousness that, due to its misapprehension of the nature of phenomena, assumes that what is

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¹ Blo gsal grub mtha', 97b6, k XII-4c-d.
² Ibid., 98a1.
³ Blo gsal grub mtha', 98b1. His etymology, spelled out, would be as follows: The etymology of saṃvṛtti (sic) -satya is a truth (satya=bden pa) which completely (sam=yang dag) conceals (vṛti= sgrib byed).
⁴ Blo gsal grub mtha', 98b1.
empty of true existence is truly-existent. The objects of knowledge onto which the concealing consciousness superimposes true existence are also known as concealers.\(^1\) The objects are called concealers because, when cognized by the ignorant consciousness they do not represent their actual nature. They are, in a way, like costumes worn by actors in a play - hiding the actual identity of the actor while causing the audience to mistake the character played by the actor for the person so costumed. They are called conventional truths not because they exist as they appear, i.e., laden with true existence, but because they are truths for an ignorant consciousness, which assumes that all objects exist the way they appear.

An ignorant consciousness is not just a consciousness which does not know suchness but a concealer of suchness through actively assenting to the false appearance of objective existence. Even in direct sense perception, forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects appear to exist inherently, as if they existed in their own right. All phenomena except emptinesses appear to the cognizers that certify them as existing as if they exist inherently.\(^2\)

The concealing truths, or, as they are more commonly known - conventional truths - are not established by the ignorant consciousness. If they were established by the mistaken consciousness, when the "error" (gti mug, moha) on the mind was removed and replaced with a consciousness non-mistaken as to the mode of existence of objects, conventional truths would completely disappear, thereby making the middle way as defined by dBus pa blo gsal (the union of the two truths) impossible. Only the fabricated true existence of conventional truths is

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deigned existent by the ignorant consciousness; the removal of the conception of true existence that comes about with the cognisance of the lack of true existence of objects does not negate conventional truths. When true existence is refuted, their conventional existence is not eradicated. Mere conventionalities remain, free of any superimposed reality. The removal of true existence and the retention of mere conventionalities make possible the middle way.

Real and False Conventional Truths

Conventional truths are further divided into the two categories of real conventional truths (yang dag kun rdzob bden pa, tathyasamvrtisatya) and false conventional truths (log pa’i kun rdzob bden pa, mithyasamvrtisatya). Real and false conventional truths differ according to the Mādhyamika subschool that posits them. According to the Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas, real conventional truths are divided dependent upon their ability or inability to function (don phed nus pa, artha-kriyā). dBus pa blo gsal describes the Svātantrika-Mādhyaymika divisions:

Among these two, functional appearances are free from imagination, arise from causes and appear in conformity with what can perform a function; those lacking [these qualities] are non-functional appearances.¹

The traditional Svātantrika-Mādhyamika example of a real conventional truth is water. Water is drinkable - therefore functionable - and is suitable for the quenching of thirst - therefore functionable. Water in a mirage serves to illustrate a false conventional truth: it

appears to be drinkable and suitable for the soothing of thirst but is unable to fulfill either function.

The Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas disagree with the Svātāntrika assertion of real and false conventional truths, holding that since all conventional consciousnesses are mistaken with regard to their objects - taking them to exist as they appear - the positing of real conventional truths contradicts the Mādhyamika thesis of no real existence. The Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas understand all conventional truths to be falsities that appear one way but exist another, and claim that it is not possible or logical to make the distinction into real and false. However, having stepped into the realm of conventional truth they deign to make a distinction, and base that distinction on the quality of the sense faculties. They do so because it is with this in mind that "the world" i.e., all those who do not know emptiness, makes its distinction between real and false. The Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas refrain from asserting real conventionalities in the way that the Svātāntrika-Mādhyamikas do, and instead just "go along with" the world's presentation of such categories. dBus pa blo gsal states,

He quotes Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra VI k 25,

The world knows that which is grasped by the six undamaged sense faculties. It is truth just from the point of view of the world. The remainder is considered false, just from the point of view of the world.

1. Ibid., 98b6.
2. Ibid., 99a1.
Ultimate Truth

Ultimate truth (don dam bden pa, paramārthasatya) is the truth that appears as it exists. Only one object of knowledge fulfills this requirement, that object being emptiness. All phenomena other than emptiness fall under the heading "conventional truths", for they are cognized by the consciousness that assents to the appearance of true existence. Emptiness is a truth because its appearance to a wisdom consciousness is in accord with its mode of existence. When it is directly cognized by a wisdom consciousness only emptiness, minus the false appearance of inherent existence, is cognized. Paramārthasatya is etymologized by dBus pa blo gsal as "the truth of the most supreme reality". Emptiness, for him, is quite simply the lack of true existence of an object of knowledge. It is not, as later dGe-lugs-pa scholars would have it, an existent (yod pa, sat), for it is beyond existence and non-existence. When the final nature of an object is sought by the analytical consciousness, absolutely nothing is found. dBus pa blo gsal quotes from an unidentified source,

When one analyses with reasoning anything appearing in such [and such] a way nothing is found. Just what is not found is ultimate [truth] and it is the original state of reality.

A Western scholar comments,

...things dissolve under ultimately penetrative analysis, which is common knowledge for Centrist [Mādhyamika] philosophers. The smallest subatomic particle disappears

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1. See BSGT 98b2.
2. See, for example, 'Jam yang shay ba’s inclusion of emptiness under the category of existents in J. Hopkins (1983), p. 405-6, p. 213-19.
when one tries to pin it down ultimately. It becomes a mere probability, impossible to determine whether it is a wave or a particle. Tables and chairs and houses and human beings come apart, piece by piece, mental event by mental event, and nowhere is anything durable, analysis-resistant, to be discovered.¹

Ultimate truth, in turn, does not exist ultimately. The prerequisite for ultimate existence is findability under analysis, i.e., findability by the focused consciousness that searches for the reality of its object. When an object is analyzed only a "lack" is found - an emptiness of true existence in place of something substantially existent; a similar cognisance of lack of reality results from any analysis of emptiness itself. This inability to withstand analysis deems that ultimate truth is also not ultimately existent. In fact, for the Mādhyamika, it is a grave error to ascribe true existence to emptiness. To believe emptiness is the "Absolute" in terms of something that exists truly and independently is to fall from the middle way to the extreme of permanence.

T.V.R. Murti, using the word "Absolute" in a positive and non-mistaken sense, describes the ultimate as follows.

The Real is the Absolute - at once transcendent of empirical determinations and immanent in phenomena as their innermost essence.²

The Mādhyamika emptiness is a self-emptiness that refers specifically to an object's lack of its own true existence. dBus pa blo gsal warns of the dangers involved in slipping into the view of self-existent

emptiness, first in his kārikā XII-13 and then in a quotation from the Ratnāvali,

[The Buddha] said that those who are attached to non-existence are incurable. Therefore, those who desire liberation should not take emptiness to be an absolute.\(^1\)

Moreover, stupid because he apprehends this [Dharma] wrongly he is stupid and conceited in his learning, and through abandoning [Dharma], destroys himself and goes headfirst into the Avīci Hell.\(^2\)

Ultimate truth, within the Mādhyamika system, does not exist in a domain removed from the world of phenomena, nor does it miraculously appear as the "Real Substance" inherently existent in all phenomena. Relieved of ontological status, it is the mode of subsistence of objects of knowledge.

dBus pa bio gsal quotes tantric Nāgārjuna’s Bodhicittavivarana on this point.

Ultimate [truth] is not perceived outside conventional truth. Emptiness is conventional [truth] and conventional [truth] is emptiness.\(^3\)

Emptiness has been called the highest quality or highest predicate of all objects of knowledge.\(^4\) Mādhyamikas assert that conventional and ultimate truths are not the same or different. Although they are different objects of knowledge for different consciousnesses, since the basis of the division into the two truths is appearances, they cannot be

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2. Ibid., 104a5.
3. Ibid., 97a3.
different entities. Later exegesis within the Tibetan dGe lugs pa tradition states that the two truths are not separate entities, but one entity within nominal difference.\textsuperscript{1} It is asserted that were conventional and ultimate truths to be completely different entities, the emptiness of an object could not be its final mode of existence, because the emptiness would have to exist totally divorced from the object. If that were the case, not even a person who had obtained omniscience could claim to have abandoned the conception of true existence since his realization of emptiness would be separate from objects and would be powerless in overcoming the innate misapprehension of the nature of phenomena.\textsuperscript{2} Were the two truths to be the same, they could not exhibit any deviation from each other, and would have to be mirror images of each other. Since conventional truths have aspects such as shape, colour, and tangibility, ultimate truth would have to sometimes be round, sometimes be blue and, if the conventionality were a blanket, would have to be soft to the touch.

The Mādhyamikas' understanding of the relationship between the two truths inspires them to call this understanding the middle path. dBus pa blo gsal claims to have designated the middle path, which all other Buddhist schools have failed to discover, the "union of appearance and emptiness"; right in the "middle" because of its avoiding the extremes of superimposition (sgro 'dogs pa, samāropa) or permanence (rtag pa, śāśvatā) and denigration (skur pa 'debs pa, apavāda) or annihilation (chad pa, uccheda). Realization that conventionalities lack real existence avoids the extremes of superimposition and realization of the fact that conventionalities are relieved of true existence, and not their mere existence, keeps the Mādhyamika from the extremes of denigration.

\textsuperscript{1} J. Hopkins (1983), p. 413.
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid.
Dependent-Arising

The Mādhyamika’s view of the true condition of existence is one that allows for only "mere appearances"; a world of form, feelings, etc., that neither exists nor does not exist. The true status of phenomena recognized, the Mādhyamika describes existence with a series of metaphors which describe it as having no more reality than a mirage or a bit of froth. The three realms of the Buddhist world lose their substantiality and seem to nearly fade away, remaining, as it were, like a dream. dBus pa bio gsal quotes from Nāgārjuna’s Śūnyatāsaptati k 66,

Composites are similar to a city of Gandharvas, a magical illusion, a mirage, a hair net, froth, a bubble, a magical creation, a dream and a circle drawn by a firebrand.¹

Jacques May, commenting on another of Nāgārjuna’s kārikās, writes,

A dream, a mirage have a very tenuous existence; but they exist somehow; they are there somehow; they are not nothing.²

The phantom world appears, yet it does not truly exist. Phenomena, for the Mādhyamika, are understood to be "dependent-arisings," due to the fact that they arise from causes and conditions, and not from themselves, or from truly-existent others. "Causes and conditions" implies causes and conditions as normally conceived, i.e., the causes and conditions of a rose include the bush, the bush seed, water, light, oxygen, etc. Within the framework of Mādhyamika thought, causes and conditions also refer to the parts of the observed object itself, for instance, the petals, stamen, pollen of the rose and, for the Prāsaṅgika-

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¹ dBus pa bio gsal grub mtha’, 105b1.
Mādhyamika, to the thought that designates the existence of the object, i.e., the thought "rose" that imputes "rose" onto the arrangement of petals, pistils, etc.\textsuperscript{1} Just the word "dependent-arising" brings, quite automatically, even to the mind untrained in Mādhyamika terminology, the idea of interdependence. dBus pa blo gsal, writing of the middle way as the union of emptiness and appearance, quotes Nāgārjuna’s verse of homage to the Buddha in his \textit{Vigrahavyāvartani} that praises his proclamation of the synonymity of emptiness, dependent-arising, and the middle path.\textsuperscript{2}

All objects of knowledge are empty of self-existence and therefore are not independent. They are contingent upon something else. If objects were not empty and truly existed, independent of everything else, they could not be affected by causes and conditions. This is the insight behind the equation of emptiness with dependent-arising. The rose actually exists free of the solidity of true existence - it is not independently established but it has true existence mistakenly imposed onto it. Since it is not there independently, it can only exist dependent on something else,\textsuperscript{3} i.e., it is a dependent-arising. Everything that is a dependent-arising lacks true existence and is therefore empty. All phenomena that are empty do not exist under their own power and are therefore dependent-arisings. As Streng says,

\begin{quote}
Considered in the context of emptiness (śūnyatā), co-originating dependently loses its meaning as the link between two "things"; rather it becomes the form for expressing the phenomenal "becoming" as the lack of any self-sufficient, independent reality.\textsuperscript{4}
\end{quote}

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{1} J. Hopkins (1983), p. 168.
\item\textsuperscript{2} \textit{Blo gsal grub mtha'}, 98a5: 
\begin{verbatim}
gang gis stong dang rten 'byung dag 
dbu ma'i lam du don gcig par 
gsung mchog mtshungs pa med pa yi 
sangs rgyas de la phag 'tshal lo//
\end{verbatim}
\item\textsuperscript{3} Lopez (1987), p. 40.
\item\textsuperscript{4} Frederick J. Streng (1967), p. 63.
\end{itemize}
The Madhyamikas employ various logical analyses to show that objects of knowledge lack true existence. Of these, the "king of reasons" is dependent-arising. It is set out in a syllogism as follows: "Phenomena do not truly exist because they are dependent-arisings". It is the most powerful reason because of its ability to overcome both of the extremes. In a recent publication R. Thurman writes,

> The most powerful reason advocated by the Dialecticist is known as the "reason of relativity", namely, "all thing are empty of intrinsic identifiability; because they are relativistically originated." Contemplation of the thesis cures absolutism, and contemplation of the reason cures nihilism.¹

As noted earlier, the Yogācārins need two separate reasons to refute their extremes of permanence and annihilation: their claim that phenomena are not of a separate nature from consciousness holds them from the extreme of permanence, and their assertion that impermanent phenomena truly exist as the same entity of consciousness keeps them from the extreme of annihilation. The Madhyamikas assert the single "king of reasonings" - dependent-arising - which perfectly refutes both extremes. The extreme of permanence is avoided because phenomena arise dependently, not independently, and the opposite extreme, the extreme of annihilation is avoided because only true existence, not mere existence, of an object of knowledge is negated. Mere conventionalities, or as dBus pa blo gsal says, "mere appearances" are not non-existent. They arise in dependence, devoid only of an independent self-nature.

Thus, for the Madhyamika, dependent-arising and emptiness are synonymous. The two are not synonymous in the same way that "water" and "H₂O" are synonymous, but are equivalent because an

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object's being empty of true existence is the meaning of its being a dependent-arising. This compatibility of emptiness and dependent-arising allows the Mādhyamika to set forth cyclic existence and nirvāṇa in a way that accounts for the variety and relationships of things while, at the same time, denying that anything - from persons to even the most minute particles of the universe - truly exists.

Divisions of the Mādhyamikas:

Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika, Yogācāra-Mādhyamika,
and 'Jig sden grags sde phyod pa dbu ma pa

The Mādhyamika school stood united behind the assertion that all objects of knowledge are empty, and it was this assertion that made it separate from all other Buddhist schools. Internally, however, from about the sixth century C.E., there arose disagreements and debates about the proper interpretation of Nāgārjuna's profound karikās. As noted earlier, the later Tibetan authors gave the contending groups different names in order to delineate, understand and explain the differences between them. Beginning with Ye shes sde's Ita ba khyad par, composed during the sna dar, or early dissemination of Buddhism into Tibet (ninth century C.E.), the schools were classified in terms of their position on the status of conventionalities. The Mādhyamikas who said conventionalities existed as the nature of the mind were seen to reflect the views of the Yogācāra school of Buddhist thought, and were thus designated Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas. The Mādhyamikas who asserted that conventionalities were not the nature of the mind but existed separate from the mind were called Sautrāntika-Mādhyamikas, since their views concurred with those of the Sautrāntika school.

The now famous terms, Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika, gained currency during the phyi dar, the second dissemination of Buddhism to Tibet

(eleventh century). These terms divided the Madhyamika according to the modes used to generate an understanding of emptiness. Thus Tibetan texts written early in the second dissemination that set forth the presentations of the Madhyamika schools often divide their presentations into two parts, with one part containing the divisions of the Madhyamika with regard to their views on conventionalities, and the other containing divisions "from the ultimate point of view".

dBus pa blo gsal follows the pattern established by his predecessors. He commences his presentation of the schools with a kārikā detailing the Madhyamika views of conventional truth.

The Yogācāra-Madhyamikas, etc., [i.e., and the Sautrāntika-Madhyamikas and 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pas] are listed as those who assert conventional [truth] to be the nature of the mind, the external object, and as things appear, respectively.

dBus pa blo gsal utilizes Ye shes sde's terminology and, continuing in the tradition established by Grags pa rgyal mtshan, inserts a third categorization of Madhyamika, the 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pas - the "Madhyamikas who conform to that which is reknowned in the world". He lists Śāntarakṣita and Haribhadra as Yogācāra-Madhyamikas and, to demonstrate their views on the equivalency of objects and consciousness, quotes from Śāntarakṣita's Madhyamakālaṁkāra. His inclusion of a verse from Nāgārjuna's Yuktisāṭikā shows his acquaintance with Yogācāra "source" material. Bhāvaviveka is identified by dBus pa blo gsal, in agreement with earlier Tibetans, as a Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika, since "his conventional [truth] is concordant with [the theories of] the Sautrāntikas". The third division of Mādhyamikas is into the one identified by later Tibetans

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1. See, for example, the divisions the Mādhyamika school according to Grags pa rgyal mtshan in Mimaki (1982), p.32.
2. Blo gsal grub mtha', 100a2, k XII-7.
(for example, Bu ston Rin chen grub) as synonymous with the Prāṣaṅgika: the 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa. Included in this division, according to dBus pa blo gsal, are Jñānagarbha and Candrakīrti. With regard to their views on conventionalities, it can be said that the 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pas refrained from making any independent statement as to the nature of conventionalities, and merely deferred to the world for such statements. Whatever was accepted in worldly consensus was suitable to be used as the 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa’s assertion of conventionalities. In the years following dBus pa blo gsal, when the Tibetan authors fell away from the habit of delineating of schools according to their views regarding both conventional and ultimate truth, and began an inclusive melding of the sub-schools, the 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa school was naturally dissolved into the Prāṣaṅgika. As noted in the earlier discussion of the Prāṣaṅgika’s rejection of the division of conventional truth into real and false, and in material that will follow, this same view toward conventional truth is upheld; the Prāṣaṅgikas merely "go along with" the conventions accepted by worldly beings. But, within a framework like dBus pa blo gsal’s that requires groupings based on assertions from both conventional and ultimate points of view, the inclusion of the 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa view is needed, for it allows for a point of view on conventionalities that is compatible with Prāṣaṅgika assertions.

dBus pa blo gsal finds a basis for the 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa’s assertion of conventionalities in accord with those of the world in Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra VI k 3,

Since, if one analyzes these things, instead of [arriving at] anything which has a real nature, one ends up with unfindability. Therefore, worldly transactional truth is not analyzable.¹

1. Ibid., 100b4.
Analysis of conventionalities leads to emptiness and emptiness takes one beyond conventionalities, which obscure the ultimate, to the ultimate itself. Since this cognizance of emptiness contradicts the perception of truly-existent conventionalities, analysis, so to speak, "harms" the conventionalities, i.e., it takes away their "truth". Therefore the 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pas leave conventional truth in the hands of a world that does not know emptiness. They merely "go along with" the decisions and assertions of the world.

Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika

The second grouping of subschools of the Mādhyamika finds its basis in methods used to produce an understanding of emptiness in a person's mind. The Svātantrika school, starting with Bhāvaviveka, holds that a syllogism must be employed to bring about a correct understanding of emptiness. D.S. Ruegg writes,

Bhāvaviveka took up a position radically opposed to Buddhāpālita's on the matter of the logical establishment of the Mādhyamika's philosophical position in general and of the negative statements in particular. In his view the necessary co-ordination with scripture (āgama) of an adequate logical method of reasoning (yukti) requires more than prasāṅga arguments because, to establish the Mādhyamika's position, there is needed in addition an independent (svatantra) inference (anumāna), which can also be embodied in a proper "syllogism" (prayogavākya). And it is from this characteristic use of a svaṭantrānumāna that Bhāvaviveka's school has received its name of Svātantrika.¹

The Prāsaṅgika school, relying on Chandrakīrti’s rebuttal of Bhāvaviveka’s procedure, points out that syllogisms are not necessary for realizing emptiness, which can be understood with prasaṅga statements only.

Thus, the two schools, when classified by the Tibetans, received their names from the two main types of logical statements that were used to establish an understanding of emptiness.

In the BSGT, dBus pa blo gsal sets forth his view of the main tenets held by the two schools, and we can compare the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika views by examining his statements. They are as follows:

They [Svātantrika] assert 1) that all objects and minds are not necessarily false and mistaken; 2) that there exists a view which is admitted on the conventional level; 3) that on the conventional level there is truth and that truth can be divided into real and false; 4) that the absence of self-nature of an illusion is the ultimate and 5) that the Buddhas have a self-perpetuating wisdom consciousness.¹

Set beside his list of Prāsaṅgika assertions, the differences between the two are clear.

Thus, [the Prāsaṅgikas] assert: 1) that all objects that appear are false and all consciousnesses are mistaken; 2) that no view exists [even on the conventional level]; 3) that on the conventional level there is no truth nor [division of it] into real and false; 4) that ultimate truth is free from elaborations; 5) that Buddhas do not have self-perpetuating consciousnesses.²

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¹ Bio gsal grub mtha’ 101a5.
² Ibid., 101b3.
These would appear to be the five main differences that can be contrasted. However, immediately following this presentation of the assertions of the Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas is a kārikā that further clarifies the difference. It reads:

The real difference of these modes [of Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika] is the assertion or non-assertion of reasons from real things and of valid cognizers [that come about from them]. [The differences] that are otherwise expressed by others are cleared away.¹

With this statement it would appear that dBus pa blo gsal concurs with the views of his Mādhyamika predecessors in regard to the main difference between the two schools. We can note that in a remark² following the kārikā, he refers to the previous distinctions listed, i.e., that the Svātantrikas say that the Buddhas have a self-perpetuating wisdom consciousness while the Prāsaṅgikas do not, etc., as being "slight" (cung zad). The essential difference relates to whether or not a reason that brings about an inference is asserted. Such a reason is one of the main elements of a syllogism.

Let us examine the basic characteristics of and differences between syllogisms and consequences according to Tibetan Buddhist writers. When emptiness is cognized, it is initially cognized inferentially, that is, in reliance on a correct sign. This inferential cognition comes about first because emptiness is not an object of knowledge that can be known by ordinary direct perception (mngon sum, pratyakṣa); emptiness, unlike tables and houses that are known by direct perception and that are classified as manifest phenomena (mngon gyur, abhimukhi), is, like previous lifetimes and subtle impermanence, a hidden phenomenon (lkog gyur, parokṣa). Once emptiness is realized inferentially, i.e., by means of an inferential cognizer (rjes dpag tshad ma, anumāna-...

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¹. Blo gsal grub mtha' k XII-ll 101b4.
². BSGT 102a3.
pramāṇa) repeated meditation on and the resultant familiarity with this conceptual understanding of emptiness has the power to bring about a transformation of the understanding of emptiness - from one based on thought to one that is based on a direct cognition of emptiness. The cognition which develops and which facilitates direct perception of emptiness is known as a yogic direct perceiver (māl 'byor mgon sum, yogipratyākṣa).

A correct sign (rtags yang dag, samyag liṅga) or a correct reason (rgyu mtshan yang dag, samyag nimitta), serves to produce inferential cognition. It brings about knowledge of something previously unknown. Terms, within the Buddhist schools, are reasons, and these reasons aid a person in discovering information that is otherwise hidden. Any thing can stand as a correct reason for something else. The usual Buddhist example of a good sign, or reason, is the smoke on the distant hill. Although the person perceiving the smoke cannot see anything but smoke, in reliance on the sign "smoke" (due to its cause and effect relationship with fire) the presence of fire on the hill can be inferred. Thus the knowledge of fire can be achieved in reliance on a correct sign.1 In the same way, knowledge of emptiness can be achieved through reliance on a "good sign".

A correct reason, or sign, is one of the parts of a proper syllogism and, depending on it, an inferential cognition can be produced. The traditional Nyāya syllogism is made up of five members. Using the traditional example that uses "smoke" as the sign for "fire", the Nyāya syllogism is as follows:

Theory (pratijña): The mountain possesses fire

Cause (hetu): Because there is smoke

Example (udāharaṇa): Wherever there’s smoke, there’s fire, like in a kitchen

1. Correct signs are of three types: correct effect signs ('bras rtags yang dag, samakkāryahetu), correct nature signs (rang bzhin gyi rtags yang dag, samyaksvabhāvahetu), and correct signs of non-observation (ma migs pa'i rtags yang dag, samyakanapalabdhihetu). The example above is a correct effect sign.
Application (upanaya): The mountain is similar [i.e., possesses smoke]

Conclusion (nigamama): therefore it is similar [i.e., possesses fire] Buddhist syllogisms are the same as Nyāya syllogisms, but are set forth in three parts instead of five. Besides the sign, the other parts of a syllogism are the probandum (bsgrub bya, sādhya), divided into the predicate of the probandum (bsgrub bya'i chos, sādhyadharma) and the subject (chos can, dharmin). An example of a Buddhist syllogism would be:

The subject, sound, is an impermanent phenomenon because of being a product.\(^1\)

The subject of the syllogism, the locus of inference, is "sound". The predicate of the probandum is "impermanent phenomenon", and the sign, or reason is "being a product". Given that this example provides the basic framework for a syllogism, many more syllogisms could be constructed. Syllogisms, however, may be correct or incorrect, and since inferential cognitions depend on correct syllogisms, it is necessary to fulfill the requirements of correct syllogisms. These requirements can be met by the sign; a correct sign creating a correct syllogism must fulfill the three relationships that are designated the "three modes" (tshul gsum, tri rūpa).

The three modes are 1) being the property of the subject (phyogs chos, paksadharma) 2) the positive inclusion (rjes khyab, anvayavyāpti) and 3) the negative exclusion (ldog khyab, vyatirekavyāpti). The first means that the sign must be an attribute or quality of the subject. Returning to the example, the sign "producthood" must be an attribute of sound. Since in the Buddhist world sound is a product, the sign is the first mode. For it to be the second mode, i.e., the positive inclusion, the

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1. A syllogism of this sort would be directed to certain former Vaiśśikas who, according to Buddhists, would be questioning an inner contradiction in the Vaiśśika world view which holds sound is a product and is also, as an attribute (guna) of space (ākāśa), permanent.
sign must be pervaded by the predicate of the probandum. The sign in
the example is also the second mode, for whatever is a product is
pervaded by being impermanent. The third mode, the negative
exclusion, requires that the negative of the predicate be pervaded by the
negative of the reason - more simply, whatever is not the predicate must
necessarily not be the reason. In the syllogism, "The subject, sound, is
an impermanent phenomenon because of being a product", whatever is
not the predicate "impermanent" must necessarily not be the sign.
Anything that is not impermanent, i.e., permanent or non-existent,
cannot be a product. As can be seen, the reason in the example fulfills
each of the three prerequisites (tshul), and is thus a correct reason
within a correct syllogism. This is the sort of syllogism used by the
Svātantrika school. According to them, the three modes must be
accepted by themselves and by the opponent towards whom the
syllogism is directed.

Consequences (prāsaṅga), on the other hand, are not of the three
modes. They are constructed so that a consciousness that infers the
implied three modes could be generated, but, in and of themselves, they
only restate the opponent's own assertions. These are stated in such a
manner that a consequence of the opponent's assertion which
contradicts other of his assertions become self-evident, leaving him
unable to respond. When the opponent reassesses his views and
resolves the contradictions in his views, his is able to discover and state
the syllogism implied by the consequence. For example, the opponent
who holds that sound is permanent and a product, and who also believes
that whatever is a product is impermanent would be met with the
consequence, "It follows that the subject, sound, is not a product
because of being a permanent phenomenon". Unlike the Buddhist, he
would accept all three modes. He would have no response, and would
be left with the unwanted thesis, "sound is not produced" that
contradicts his own assertion that sound is a product. Thus the
consequence put out by the Buddhist serves to generate the implied and,
according to the Buddhist, correct syllogism: "The subject, sound, is
impermanent because of being a product".
This difference that is based on the assertion or non-assertion of syllogisms is posited as the major difference between the Svātantrika school and Prāsaṅgika school. Though both schools use the two methods, only the Svātantrikas insist that syllogisms be explicitly stated. The Prāsaṅgikas respond that consequences alone are sufficient to break adherence to mistaken views, for once the opponent recognizes his error, it is redundant and of no purpose to explicitly set forth the syllogism.
BLO GSAL GRUB MTHA’

(Blo gsal grub mtha’ XII: Mādhyamika)

[1. General explanation of the two truths]
[1.1. Universality of the two truths]

[96a5] I will now explain the tenets of the Mādhyamika Mahāyānists: [the Buddha] taught all phenomena in terms of two truths (bden pa nyis, satya-dvaya).

The perfect Buddha (rdzogs pa’i sangs rgyas, sambuddha) himself taught objects of knowledge in just two truths. Therefore, objects of knowledge, which are also the five categories (gzhi lnga, pañca-vastu) are not other than the two truths.

(k XII-1)

[96a6] As the Bhagavān [=Buddha] said in the Pitāputrasamāgama-sūtra¹:

Thus the Tathāgata understood the two truths, conventional [truth] (kun rdzob, samvṛti) and ultimate [truth] (don dam pa, paramārtha). Objects of knowledge also are exhausted in these, conventional and ultimate [truths]. Moreover, the Bhagavan thoroughly saw, knew and realized these in so far as they are empty. Because of

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1. Pitāputrasamāgama-sūtra (D. nga 60b4-5, P. zhi 70a4-6). The Sanskrit is found in Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā (117.16-18 (=SS 256.4-6): etavyac caiva jñeyam-yad uta samvṛtiḥ paramārthaḥ ca / tac ca bhagavatā śūnyataḥ suvīḍṛtaḥ susāksātkṛtam / tena sarvajña ity ucyate / tatra samvṛtir loka-pracāratas tathāgatena drṣṭā / yah punaḥ paramārthaḥ so ‘nabhūlāpyaḥ...’caitat SS 3sa SS
The first sentence of PPS as cited in our text does not have corresponding Sanskrit in the Sanskrit BCAP, and is only found in the Tibetan version of the BCAP.
this, he is called "Omniscient" (thams cad mkhyen pa, sarvajña). Of these [two truths] the Tathāgata saw that conventional [truth] is worldly activity (’jig rten gyi spyod pa, loka-pracāra). Ultimate [truth] is inexpressible (brjod du med pa, anabhilāpya).

Also [in the same sūtra]¹:

These two truths of the Knower of the World (’jig rten mkhas pa, loka-vidu)², you have seen them yourself, without having heard [of them] from others. These are conventional [truth] and ultimate [truth]. A third truth does not exist.

[The Buddha] also said in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra (X k 299 = II k 185)³:

There is conventional [truth] and ultimate [truth]. A third [truth] arisen from cause does not exist. Conventional [truth] is constructed by conceptuality (rtog pas brtags pa, kalpita). When this is cut off, it is [ultimate truth which is] the domain of experience of the Superiors.

[1.2. The five categories and the two truths]

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1. PPS (D. nga 61b4-5, P zhi - 71a7). The Sanskrit is found in BCAP 175.8-11:

   satya ime duvi loka-vidūnām diśta svayaṃ asrūṣita pareṣām /
   samvṛti yā ca tathā paramārtha satyau na sidhyati kim ca trūyau //

2. ’jig rten mkhas pa, Buddhist hybrid Sanskrit loka-vidu. The exact equivalent in normal Sanskrit would be loka-vidvas- (cf. Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar, 16.49); but the usual epithet is loka-vid, Tib. ’jig rten mkhyen pa (cf. Mvyut 8)


   samvṛtīḥ paramārthaḥ ca tṛṭiyam nāsti hetukam /
   kalpitam samvṛtir hy uktā tac-chedād ārya-gocarah //
[1.2.1. Real conventional truth: form, mind, mental factors and non-associated compositional factors]

Therefore, the five categories (gzhi nga, pañca-vastu) of knowables do not exist apart from the two truths either. Thus,

With regard to the five categories, the first four are, for the most part, real conventional [truths] (yang dag kun rdzob, tathya-samvṛti).

(k XII-2ab)

For some Yogācāra-Mādhyamika [logicians] even these [appearances] are real conventional [truths].

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1. The Sanskrit term is found in Madhyamakahrdaya III k 7 and 12; and also in Abhisamayālaṃkāralokā 20.22, 79.17, 112.2, 169.19, 548.19, 594.22, 641.19-20, 914.16 (cf. Amano (1965) p. 623 n. 5).
3. As will be seen later (BSGT 100a3-4), this refers to Sāntarakṣita and Haribhadra.
1.2.2. Unconditioned phenomena and suchness

The three unconditioned phenomena (‘dus ma byas, asamskrta) are just mere names (ming tsam, samjñā-mātra). Suchness (de zhin nyid, tathata) is ultimate [truth].

(k XII-2cd)

1.2.2.1. Unconditioned phenomena

[97a1] The three [unconditioned phenomena], space (nam mkha’, ākāsa) and the two cessations (‘gog pa, nirodha) are conceptual constructions expressing, relative to their object of negation (dgag bya, pratiṣedhya), that it does not exist. They have no reality and are exhausted in their mere names (ming tsam nyid, samjñā-mātra). As it is said in the Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā (V k 7):

Therefore, space is not a thing (dngos po, bhāva) nor is it a non-thing (dngos med, abhāva). It is not characterizable (mtshan gzhi, laksya) and does not characterize (mtshan

1. Suchness as the fourth unconditioned phenomenon is asserted especially by the Madhyadeśa Vaibhāṣikas (Yuldbus kyi Bye brag tu smra pa), by the Vijñānavadin authors such as Asaṅga, Vasubandhu and Śūraṇa, and, among the Madhyamikas, by Bhāvaviveka. See May (1959) n. 398 and Mimaki (1976) n. 420.
2. For example, when one says that space is only the non-existence of a tangible obstructor, it is the tangible obstructor that is the object of negation (dgag bya, pratiṣedhya).

    tasmān na bhāvo nābhāvo na laksyaṁ nāpi laksanam /
    ākāśam ākāśa-samā dhātavaḥ paśca ye 'pare //
nyid, laksana). The five other elements (khams, dhātu) are similar to [the element] space [ultimately].

[1.2.2.2. Suchness]

Suchness (de bzhin nyid, tathatā) is ultimate truth. It is also stated in the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra

The suchness of conventional [truth] is ultimate [truth].

1. At first glance dBus pa blo gsal's citation of the MM V k 7 here seems a bit strange. This verse of the MM relates to the element space, one of the six elements (dhātu: earth, water, fire, air, space and consciousness) and not to space as one of the unconditioned phenomena (asamskrta). In the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, Vasubandhu asks himself if the first is the same as the second, and responds in the negative: the first forms part of the category of visibles (rupa-dhātu). See AKBh 18. 10-25 (ad AK I k 28); LVP i pp. 49-51. Thus in Abhidharmic philosophy these two "space"s are clearly distinguished. But in the philosophy of the Sautrāntika and above, unconditioned space is just a name. Cf. AKBh 92.4-9 (ad AK II k 55d); BSGT 79b2-4 (text: Mimaki (1979a) pp. 202-3, tr: Mimaki (1980) p. 156 and n. 36). dBus pa blo gsal is most likely using the quotation within the context of Mādhyamika philosophy; he is stating that the final nature of unconditioned phenomena is like that of conditioned phenomena, i.e., without entity. See also May (1959) n. 398.

The master [Nāgārjuna] also taught in the *Bodhicittavivarana*:

Ultimate [truth] is not perceived outside conventional [truth]. Emptiness (*stong nyid, śūnyatā*) is conventional [truth] and conventional [truth] is emptiness.

And also:

When one investigates with reasoning (*rigs pa, yukti*) anything appearing in such [and such] a way, nothing is found. Just what is not found is ultimate [truth] and it is the original state of reality (*ye nas gnas pa*).

From the *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* [-kārikā] (k 17ab) by Jñānagarbha:

[The Buddha] asserted the suchness of conventional [truth] as ultimate [truth].

1. Like all the Tibetan authors, our author dBus pa blo gsal does not distinguish tantric Nāgārjuna (modern scholarship dates him 7-8th C.) from Mādhyamika Nāgārjuna (modern scholarship dates him 2nd-3rd C.). For example, ICan skya II Rol pa'i rdo rje enumerates the *Bodhicittavivarana* among Nāgārjuna's other Mādhyamika treatises, cf. *ICan skya grub mtha* 282, 18. The question of two or three Nāgārjunas does not, however, pose a problem for the Tibetans, since for them Nāgārjuna is one and the same person who lived for six hundred years. See, for example, *ICan skya Grub mtha* 281.5. For the third Nāgārjuna, author of *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa*, see Lamotte (1970), *Traité* t. III, p. 1375.

2. *Bodhicittavivarana* a (P. [61] [2665] gi 54b8); b (P. [103 (5470) gi 224b2]. The form of this verse in the Tibetan canon is different from that of this text, though the meaning is the same:

   *kun rdo'zob las ni logs shig na'/ de nyid nye bar mi dmigs so'/

   *kun rdo'zob stong pa nyid du bshad / stong nyid* kho na kun rdo'zob yin'//

   1'ma yin te  - a  2  dmigs pa ma yin te - a  3  pa - a  4  ste - b.

3. Original source not identified. This verse is not in the BCV.

[1.3 The two truths and their connection with definitive meaning and meaning requiring interpretation]

In the way that a doctor takes care of a patient, so the Omniscient One taught, by means of the two truths, the scriptures (gsung rab, pravacana) that show definite meaning (nges don, nitartha) and meaning requiring interpretation (drang don, neyartha).

(k XII-3)

[97a5] For example, a wise doctor shows the ways to nurse a patient. In the same manner, the Bhagavan, having seen the character (khams, dhatu) mental dispositions (bsam pa, aśaya) and emotional afflictions (nyon mongs, kleśa) of trainees (gdul bya, vineya-jana)\(^1\) taught, as the aforementioned two truths the various sūtras (mdo sde) with definite meaning and meaning requiring interpretation. As it is said in the Akṣayamati-nirdeśa\(^2\):

A sūtra taught for the establishment of conventional [truth] requires interpretation. A sūtra taught for the establishment of ultimate truth is definite.

---

2. Akṣayamatinirdeśa (P. [34] (842) bu 155b7): mdo sde gang dag kun rdzob sgrub bar bstan pa de dag ni drang ba'i don ces bya'o// mdo sde gang dag don dam pa sgrub par bstan pa de dag ni nges pa'i don ces bya'o/

This passage is cited in Indian and Tibetan works such as Madhyamakāloka [P] 161b6-8, Lam rim chen mo kha 4a8-b1, CKGT 313. 18-20. The AMN title that dBus pa blo gsal presents here, 'Blo gros mi zad pa bstan pas zhus pa' is unusual, and he later, in BSGT 109b6, gives the one that is normally used, 'Blo gros mi zad pas bstan pa'i mdo'. It is known, furthermore, that the name of this sūtra was transmitted in at least two different ways: cf. for example, Mvyut n. 1344 (Blo gros mi zad pas bstan pa / Akṣayamati-nirdeśa), n. 1400 (Blo gros mi zad pas zhus pa (-pariprcchā ). Is the present case a combination of the two titles, perhaps due to some confusion on the part of dBus pa blo gsal?
Also in the *Samādhīrāja-sūtra*¹:

Whatever the Sugata taught of emptiness one knows as a definitive sort of sūtra. Where person (*gang zag, pudgala*) sentient being (*sems can, sattva*) and man (*skyes bu, puruṣa*) are taught, one knows all these phenomena to require interpretation.

[97b2] The master [Nāgārjuna] also stated, in regard to this same thing, in the *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā* (XXIV k 8)²:

The Buddhas taught Dharma in dependence on the two truths: worldly conventional truth (*'jig rten kun rdzob bden pa, loka-saṃvṛti-satya*) and ultimate truth.

[1.4] Intermediary verse (*bar skabs kyi tshigs su bcad pa, antaraśloka*):

Similarly, words [directly presenting Buddha’s] intention, (*dgongs, abhiṇḍrāya*), masking his thought (*ldem dgongs*), literal (*sgra ji bzhin*) and non-literal (*sgra ji bzhin ma yin*); all he said out of mercy is not other than the two truths³.

(AŚ XII-1)

[2. Detailed explanation of the two truths]

1. SR VII k 5 (cf. tr. Tamura (1975) 1 p. 137):

   *nīlārtha-sūtrānta-viśeṣāḥ jānati yathopadīṣṭā sugatena śūnyatā /
   yāsmin pūrṇo pudgala sattva puruṣo neyārthatāṁ jānati sarvadharman //

  ¹-sūtrānta viśeṣa Gilgit = Dutt (1941) Ṛ yasmin Garjuna

   (Tib.) P. [31] (795) thu 22a5-6.


   *dve satye samupāṣāriya buddhānāṁ dharmadeśanā /
   loka-saṃvṛti-satyaṁ ca satyaṁ ca paramārthaṁ //

The two truths are: the mistaken objects and nothing whatsoever presenting itself to the non-mistaken mind.

(k XII-4a-c)

[97b4] Saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, appearing in all their diversity to worldly consciousness (tha snyad pa'i blo), are conventional truth. When just that is analyzed and nothing whatsoever presents itself to a non-mistaken mind, there is the ultimate truth. It is also stated in the Satyadvayavibhaṅga[-kārikā (k 3) of Jñānagarbha]:

[In various Sūtras] the Muni (thub pa) taught the two truths, conventional [truth] and ultimate [truth]. Only that which corresponds to appearances is conventional [truth]. That which is different [from appearances] is the other (gcig shos, itara) [truth].

The master Candrakīrti also says in the Madhymakāvatāra (VI k 23):

All things have a dual identity which is established by correct and false sight. The domain of those who see correctly is called the ultimate and [the domain] of those who see falsely is called conventional truth.

1. SDVK k 3 (C. 1b3-4, D.1b3-4), cited also in SDVV (C. 4a2, D. 4a2).
2. Madhymakāvatāra VI k 23 (cf tr. LVP (1910) p. 299, Ogawa (1976) p. 80), of which the Sanskrit is found in BCAP 174.26-29:

\[
\text{samya-g-dṛṣṭa-darśana-labdha-bhāvaṁ rūpa-dvayaṁ bibhṛati sarva-bhāvaḥ} / \\
\text{samya-g-dṛṣṭa yo viṣayaḥ sa tatvam dṛṣṭa-dṛṣṭaṁ samvṛti-satyam uktam} //
\]

3. The MAv version (ngo bo gnyis: dual identity) is closer to the Sanskrit than the BSGT version (ngo bo nyid).
4. The MAv version (de nyid: reality) is closer to the Sanskrit than that of the BSGT (don dam).
[2.1 Union of the two truths]

[The two truths] are distinguished only from [the point of view] of appearances (snang ba, ābhāsa). The union (zung du chud pa, yukanaddha) [of the two truths] is the Middle Path (dbu ma'i lam, madhyamā pratipad).

(k XII-4c²-d)

[97b6] The basis for the division into these [two] is mere appearances. Since the nature of an appearance is ultimate [truth], this does not contradict [the ultimate]. The divisions are the two truths. The definiteness of the number is contingent on the two consciousnesses. In regard to the significance of the division since the Samdhinirmocanasūtra¹ says:

Composite elements (’du byed khams, saṃskāra dhātu²) and [the] ultimate are [characterized by being] free from being the same or different. Those who imagine that they are the same or different have gone wrong and enter into error.

Therefore, [conventional and ultimate truths] are not the same or different. They are, in fact, inexpressible as just that or anything else, for as it says in the Maitreyaparipṛcchā³:

---

2. See May (1959) n. 108 and n. 255.
One should know that the sphere of the inexpressible is not
different from the signs of the composite ('du byed kyi
mtshan ma, saṃskāra-nimitta) and that it is also not not
different.

Therefore, the union of appearance and emptiness is the
Middle Path (dbu ma'i lam, madhyamā pratipad), free from the
extremes of superimposition (sgro 'dogs pa, samāropa), denigration
(skur pa 'debs pa, apavāda), permanence (rtag pa, śāsvata) and
annihilation (chad pa, uccheda). For as the master [Nāgārjuna] says:

That which is a dependent-arising we call emptiness.
Emptiness is a metaphorical designation. Just that is the
middle path1.

---

Nagao (1979) p. 31):

\[
yāḥ praṇītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṁ tāṁ pracakṣmahe /
\]

\[
sa praṇītātipi upādaya pratipat saiva madhyamā //
\]

This verse is cited among others in the Madhyamakālaṭāravṛtti (D. 71a1-2, P. 68b5: for
pāda c, D. rgyur byas, P. bsgyur byas) by Sāntarakṣita. On examining the variants, it can
be seen that the verse cited by our author is more like the MAV verse than that of the MM.
It is possible that dBus pa bio gsal cited it from the MAV: a common practice amongst the
Tibetan authors. For analogous stances, see May (1959) p. 237 n. 840. See also Alex
Homage to the unparallelled Buddha who excellently proclaimed that emptiness, dependent-arising and the middle path are synonymous\(^1\).

Similarly, from the *Yuganaddhakrama* [the fifth and last *krama* of tantric Nāgārjuna’s *Pañcabakrama*]\(^2\):

Having understood the two [truths], conventional and ultimate, separately from their difference (*so so’i char, prthag vibhāgataḥ*) union (*zung du ’jug pa, yuganaddha*) is said to be where they are joined together.

In the *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* [-*kārikā* (k 36) by Jñānagarbha it is also said\(^3\):

Since it arises from causes therefore why should it become annihilated? If the [cause] disappears the [effect] disappears: so explain how there is permanence.

---


   \[
   \text{yah śānyatāṁ pratiśyasamutpādaṁ madhyamāṁ pratipadaṁ ca /}
   \text{ekārthāṁ niśāgāda praṇāmāṁ tam apratima-buddham //}
   \]


   \[
   \text{samvṛtīṁ paramārthaṁ ca prthag jñātva vibhāgataḥ/}
   \text{samānīlanāṁ bhaved yatra yuganaddhaṁ tad ucyate //}
   \]

   (Tib.) D. 56a1-2, P. 62b6-7.

3. SVDK k 36 (C. 3a4-5, D. 3a4), cited also in SDVV (C. 13b7, D. 13b7).
The etymology (nges pa'i tshig, nirukti) of samvṛtī¹ (sic)² satya is: a truth (satya = bden pa) which completely (sam = yang dag) conceals (vṛti = sgrib byed), for it says in the Satyadvayavibhaṅga [-karika (k 15ab) by Jñānagarbha]³.

That by which or in which reality is concealed is asserted as conventional [truth].

Also from the Madhyamakāvatāra [(VI k 28) by Candrakīrti]⁴:

The error [in the mind] (gti mug, moha) is the one which completely conceals (kun rdzob, saṃvṛtī) because it obscures the real nature. On account of that whatever is artificial (bcos ma, kṛtrima) seems to be truth. The Muni said that [kṛtrima ] is truth for that which completely conceals (kun rdzob bden, saṃvṛtī-satya) and the artificial things (bcos mar gyur pa'i dngos, padārtham kṛtakam) [he called] saṃvṛtī, that which completely conceals as well.

---


2. The version in our text is saṃvṛtī and not saṃvṛtī. The first is derived from saṃ +vṛt (to become, evolve) and the second from saṃ +vr (to cover, envelop). The Mādhyamika authors, notably Candrakīrti, rely more on the second interpretation (cf. Prasannapada 492, 10-12, May (1959) p. 226 n. 777), while the Yogācāra authors rely more on the first (cf. Nagao (1978) pp. 39-43, 305-20, Nakamura (1980) p. 250-1). dBus pa bio gsal writes saṃvṛtī, but he bases his entire interpretation on saṃvṛtī. Most likely the text is corrupt.

3 SDVK k 15ab (C. 2bl), D. 2bl), cited also in SDVV (C. 9a2, D. 9a2).

4. MĀV VI k 28 (cf. tr. LVP (1910) p. 303. Ogawa (1976) p. 91). The Sanskrit is found in BCAP 171.6-9:

mohah svabhāvavaraṇādṛhi saṃvṛtih satyaṁ tayā khyāti yad eva kṛtrimaṁ jagāda tat saṃvṛtisatyam ity asau muniḥ padārtham kṛtakam ca saṃvṛtīm //
Furthermore, paramārthasatya is the truth (bden pa, satya) of the most supreme (dam pa, parama) reality (don, artha). For as it is said in the *Laṅkāvatāra*-sūtra X k 258cd\(^1\):

[The Yogin] sees in the [consciousness] free from subject-object the supreme wisdom free of Self.

[2.3 Divisions within conventional truth]

[2.3.1. Svātantrika opinion]

With regard to conventional truth there are two divisions: [that which is] able to perform a function and [that which is] not able to perform a function.

(k XII-5ab)

[98b3] The Svātantrikas assert as real conventions (yang dag pa’i kun rdzob, tathya-saṃvṛti) appearances that are able to perform a function (don byed nus pa, arthakriyā-samartha) and as false conventions (log pa’i kun rdzob, mithyā-saṃvṛti) appearances that are unable to perform a function. It is also said in the *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* [-kārika (k 12) de Jñānagarbha\(^2\):

---


   jHānam anātmakaṁ śreṣṭhaṁ nirābhāse na paśyati //

   (Tib.) P. 184a5: bdag med ye shes mchog yin te / snang ba med tshe mi mthong ngo //

   As the comparison of the variants shows clearly, dBus pa blo gsal does not cite this directly from Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra. This sentence is cited in many treatises such as *Madhyamakālaṅkāra-vṛtti* P. 79b3-4, *Madhyamakāloka* P. 171a4, *Bhāvanākrama* I (Skt.) 210.14: (Tib.) 259.13-14, *Prajñāparamitāpadeśa*. 183b1-2; and the comparison of variants allows us to conclude that our author cited it from either the *Madhyamakālaṅkāra-vṛtti* or the *Madhyamakāloka*, although the verb at the end of pada d is non-honorific in these two treatises, mthong ngo, instead of gzigs so. One ought especially notice that pada d considerably differs from the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra as it is cited in *Bhāvanākrama* I (nirābhāsena paśyati / snang ba med pas mthong bar ’gyur) and in PPU (theg pa chen pos (D. 161a7 po) mthong bar ’gyur).

2. *Satyadvayavibhaṅga*-karika (k 12) of Jñānagarbha (C. 6b5, D. 6b5).
Although real and false conventional [truths] are similar in appearance, they are distinguished by their ability or inability to perform functions.

Among these two, functional appearances are free from conceptuality, arise from causes and appear in conformity with what can perform a function; those lacking [these qualities] are non-functional appearances, for as this same [treatise, the Satyadvayavibhaṅgakārikā (k 8) of Jñānagarbha] goes on to say1:

One should know that real conventional [truth] is the mere thing (dngos tsam, vastu-mātra), free from imagined signification and arisen2 in dependence on [causes and conditions]. False [conventional truth] is completely imagined (kun brtags, parikalpita).

2.3.2. Prāsaṅgika opinion

The other [Mādhyamikas, i.e., Prāsaṅgikas say real and false conventions relative to] non-defective and defective [sense faculties] are from the viewpoint (ngor) of the ordinary folk (byis pa, bāla); there is no real and false [for them].

(k XII-5cd)

The Prāsaṅgikas just go along with worldly beings who believe that which appears to the consciousness of an undamaged sense faculty to be true and that which appears to the consciousness of a

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1. SDVK k 8 (C. 2a2-3, D. 2a2), cited also in SDVV (C. 5b2-6, D. 5b3-6). A comparison of variants indicates that dBus pa blo gsal cited this verse from the SDVV instead of the SDVK.

2. The word par in pāda b of our text (gang skyes par) renders the reading difficult, while the reading of either the SDVK (skyes pa ste) or of the SDVV (gang skyes te) is easier.
damaged sense faculty to be untrue\textsuperscript{1}. As it is said in the *Madhyamakāvatāra* (VI k 25)\textsuperscript{2}:

The world knows that which is grasped by the six undamaged sense faculties. It is truth just from the point of view of the world. The remainder is considered false, just from the point of view of the world.

And also [in the *Madhyamakāvatāra* (V k 24)]\textsuperscript{3}:

Furthermore, the seeing wrong is asserted to be of two sorts [dependent upon whether or not] the faculties are clear or have a defect. The consciousness of a defective sense faculty is asserted to be false relative to the consciousness of a good sense faculty.

\[99a3\] Therefore, with regard to things, there are objects, sense faculties and consciousnesses. They do not function yet appear to function, and all three have a similar mode of existence in the state of a dream and also in the state of awakening. Hence, [the Prāsaṅgikas] do not assert a distinction between real and false conventional truth. Again, from the same treatise (*Madhyamakāvatāra* VI k 53)\textsuperscript{4}:

This [ultimate truth] is like being awake. The three [object, sense faculty and consciousness] exist until one

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2. MAV VI k 25 (cf. tr. de Vallee Poussin (1910) p. 301, Ogawa (1976) p. 86). The Sanskrit is found in BCAP 171.15-18:

\[\text{vinopaghātena yad indriyāṇāṁ saññāṁ api grāhyam avaiti lokaḥ} /\]
\[\text{satyaṁ hi tal lokata evaś āśeṣaṁ vikalpitaṁ lokata eva mithyā} //\]
\textsuperscript{1} evaṁ BCAP, eva LVP (1910) p. 301 n. 1.
awakes - and awakening, all three do not exist there. 
Awakening from the sleep of ignorance is like that.

And also [in the *Madhyamakāvatāra* (VI k 54)]¹:

When a consciousness [generated] from a *timira*-afflicted sense faculty sees hairs because of the influence of a visual defect (*rap rib, timira*)² both [the hairs and vision] are true, relative to that consciousness; both are false relative to clear vision of the object.

[99a5] They [Prāsaṅgikas] also speak of the conventionality of the Superiors ('*phags pa’i kun rdzob, ārya-samvṛti*) and of mere conventionality (*kun rdzob tsam po, saṃvṛtī-mAṭra*)³

[2.4. Ultimate truth]

Because the elaborations (*spros pa, prapañca*) have been pacified, ultimate [truth] is indivisible.

(k XII-6ab)

[99a6] Ultimate truth is indivisible since all ideas of extremes such as existence and non-existence etc. have been pacified. The master

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1. MAv VI k 54 (cf.tr. LVP (1910) p. 333, Ogawa (1976) p. 159).
3. The term *kun rdzob tsam* (*saṃvṛti-mātra*) is found in *Madhyamakāvatārābhāṣya* 108.5-6, 12, 15 (ad MAv VI k 28). However, although the term ’*phags pa’i kun rdzob* (*ārya-saṃvṛti*) is not found as such, it seems that it is based on the MAvBh 108.11-15: *de itar na re zhig bcom ldan ’das des kun rdzob kyi bden pa dang kun rdzob tsam gsungs pa yin no l/ de la so so’i dkye bo rams kyi don dam pa gang yin pa de nyid ’phags pa snang ba dang bcas pa’i spyod yul can mams kyi kun rdzob tsam yin la / ...(cf. tr. LVP (1910) p. 305: "Thus the Bhagavan taught saṃvṛtisatya and saṃvṛtimātra. That which is real (paramārtha) for ordinary people is only saṃvṛti (saṃvṛtīmātra) for the Āryas who are found in the sphere where there is appearance.")..
[Nāgārjuna] stated in the *Madhyamaka-sastra* (*dBu ma’i mdo*, XVIII k 9):

Not known from other (*gzhan las shes min, aparapratyaya*)\(^2\), at peace, not manifesting from elaborations, beyond concepts (*mam rtog med, nirvikalpa*), without diversity, this is the characteristic (*mtshan nyid, laksana*) of the ultimate.

Also from the *Rājaparikathā Ratnāvalī* (I k 62)\(^3\):

Know therefore that the Buddha’s immortal teaching that is beyond existence and non-existence, called profound, is the gift of the Dharma (*chos kyi khud pa, dharma-yautaka*).

---

   
   \[
   \text{aparapratyayam śāntam praṇapticair aprpañcitam} / \\
   \text{nirvikalpam anāṅrtham etat tattvasya laksanam} //
   \]
   
   Note that *dBu pa blo gsal*, in pada d, changed *de nyid* (of the MM) into *don dam*, most likely in order to conform to the context of his text. Furthermore, *dBu pa blo gsal* used three different appellations to designate the MM: *dBu ma’i mdo*, *dBu ma rtsa ba* and *dBu ma rtsa ba shes rab*. For the frequency of these terms, see the Index of Proper Names, Mimaki (1982), p. 275-280.

2. *Aparapratyaya* has been translated literally here (“not known from other”), following the Tibetan. Cf. PrasP 373.1-2: *tatra nāṣmin para-pratyayo ‘stīty aparapratyayam paropadesāgamyam svayam evādhigantavyam ity arthaḥ /* (Tibetan: De Jong (1949) p. 104.10-12) *de la ‘di la gzhän las shes pa yod pa ma yin pa na gzhän las shes min te / gzhän gyi bstanz pas rtogs par bya ba ma yin gyi / rang nyid kyis rtog par bya ba yin no shes bya ba’i don to //

   
   \[
   \text{dharma-yautakam ity asmān nāṣty-astīva-vyatikraman} / \\
   \text{viddhī gambhīram ity uktam buddhānām sāsanāṃtām} //
   \]

(Tib.) C. 118a, D. 109a, N. 126b, P. 132a; ed. Hahn (1982).
Anything that is called ultimate [truth] expressible in words (rnam grangs kyi don dam pa, paryāya-paramārtha) is the negation of the convention of production, etc. That object of negation is then a conceptual construct, and the negation is therefore also a

1. The term appears in Madhyamakārthasamgraha k 4, where Bhāvaviveka divides ultimate truth into two: ultimate truth expressible in words (rnam grangs kyi don dam, paryāya-paramārtha) and ultimate truth inexpressible in words (rnam grangs ma yin don dam, aparyāya-paramārtha): dam pa’i don ni spros bral te / de yang rnam pa gnyis su bya / rnam grangs kyi ni don dam dang / rnam grangs ma yin don dam mo //

There is not agreement that the author of the MAS is the same person as the famous Mañjuśrī dialectician. Ejima (1980, p. 18-33) tries to eliminate the MAS from the works of the famous Bhāvaviveka. Lindtner (1981, p. 200, n. 14), while aware of Ejima’s discussion, believes it authentic. It is also necessary to note that among Tibetan authors there is the opinion that supposes the existence of two Bhāvavivekas (cf. for ex. CKGT 283 11-12; Mimaki (1982) n. 67).

The term paryāya-paramārtha does not appear in SDVK, SDVP, MA, MAV, or BhK. It seems therefore that it was not known by Mañagarbha, Śāntarakṣita or Kamalaśīla. However, the equivalent of this term, don dam pa dang mthun pa[‘i don dam pa] (paramārthānukūla [-paramarthā]"ultimate truth in conformity with ultimate truth") was known by these three authors: cf. SDVK k 9ab, SDVV D. 6a1-2, SDVP P. 6a4 (ad SDVK k 5) and P. 13vb-4 (ad SDVK k 9ab), BhK I (Skt.) 199.7, (Tib.) 245.26. Mañagarbha explains that the negation of production depends on ultimate truth because it conforms to ultimate truth, but that when one examines it through logic, it is seen only to depend on conventional truth: cf. SDVV D. 6a1-2: skye la sogs pa bkag pa yang (SDVK k 9a) // yang dag par skye ba la sogs par rtog pa’i dangos po bkag pa’i gtan tshigs kyis //yang dag pa dang mthun phyir ‘dod (SDVK k 9b) // don dam yin par kho bo cag ‘dod do // gzhan dag (=Yogācāra, cf. SDVP P. 13b3) ni yang dag pa kho nar ‘dzin pas /yang zhes bya ba ni bsdu ba’i don to // de yang rigs pas dpyad na kun rdzob kho na ste / ...

The counterpart of the term in question, mam grangs ma yin don dam (aparyāya-paramārtha), mentioned also in the MAS, does not appear either in the SDVK or in Mañagarbha’s SDVV, but does appear in Śāntarakṣita’s SDVP (P. 6a5). Indeed, according to this, it is the SDVK k 5 that expounds the ultimate truth that does not appear in any consciousness, i.e., aparyāya-paramārtha. It is appropriate, however, to emphasize the fact that none of the three terms (paryāya-paramārtha, paramārthānukūla[-paramarthā], aparyāya-paramārtha) appear in the MA or the MAV by Śāntarakṣita nor in the MAP by Kamalaśīla, although one finds in these tracts (ad MA kk 69-78) a fairly elaborate discussion on the related question. See also Ejima (1980) p. 29-30.
conceptual construct; and it is therefore conventional truth. It is said in the *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* [-kārikā (k 10)]¹:

How could the negation of that which is essentially a conceptual construct not [itself] be a conceptual construct? On account of that, it [negation of production, etc.] is conventional [truth]. It is not² ultimate [truth] and it is not correct.

However, since it [negation of production, etc.] is in conformity with ultimate truth (*don dam pa dang mthun pa, paramārthānukula*)³ it is given that name. As it goes on to say in the same [treatise, the *Satyadvayavibhaṅga-kārikā* (k 9ab)]⁴:

> Because the negation of production, etc. is in conformity with reality, we assert it as ultimate [truth].

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¹. *SVDK* k 10 (C. 2a3-4, D. 2a3), cited also in SDVV (C. 6a3-5, D. 6a4-5) and SDVP (C. 25a3 and 25b2, N. 13b4 and 14a4, P. 13b8-14a1-2). *SVDK* k 10ab will be cited again in BSGT 109a3.

². In pāda d, our text reads *yang dag don min*, whiles the Canon reads *yang dag don yin*.

³. The term’s equivalent is found, for ex., in BhK I (Skt.) 199.7, (Tib.) 245,26.

⁴. =*SVDK* k 9ab (C. 2a3, D. 2a2), cited also in SDVV (C. 6a1, D. 6a1-2) and SDVP (C. 24b5, D. 24b5-6, N. 13a6-7, P. 13b1-2). The form of this verse as cited in our text differs considerably from that of the Tibetan Canon. But, since ICang skya Rol pa’i rdo rje (for example) cited this verse in exactly the same form (cf. CKGT 353.14-15), it is evident that this verse was transmitted in this form among the Tibetan authors. As to its difference with the Tibetan Canon: the first pāda is found as is in the text of the Canon; but our second pāda is found as is (*...pa’i phyir*) only in the SDVP and in a slightly different form (*...phyir ’dod*) in the *SVDK* and the SDVV. Our third pāda does not exist anywhere in these texts of the Canon. The problem is fairly complicated, but we could suppose the following possibilities. Pāda b of the Canon (SDVK and SDVV) could be made by the contraction of the second and third pādas of our verse. Or, it is also possible that dBus pa blo gsal erroneously took as a verse the prose of the SDVV (*don dam pa yin par kho bo cag ’dod do: C. 6a1-2, D. 6a2*) which immediately follows the *SVDK* k 9b: it has already been noted that dBus pa blo gsal has the tendency to cite the *SVDK* for the SDVV.
[2.5. Importance of the divisions of the two truths]

From knowing or not knowing the two things [=two truths] one finds or does not find the state of Omniscience.

(k XII-6cd)

[99b4] Those who know completely the two truths reach the state of Omniscience by the force of training in the two collections (tshogs, saṃbhāra). It is said in the Satyadvayavibhaṅga [-kārikā (k 2)]¹:

Those who know the division of the two truths do not misunderstand the words of the Able One. They, having accumulated the collections (tshogs, saṃbhāra) in their entirety², accomplish [their own and other’s welfare (bdag dang gzhan gyi don, sva-parārtha)³ and go definitely⁴ to the perfect other side.

[99b6] They are different to those ignorant [of the two truths]. The master [Nāgārjuna] stated in the Mūlamadhyamaka [-kārikā XXIV k 9]⁵:

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1. SDVK k 2 (C. 1b2-3, D. 1b2-3), cited also in SDVV (C. 3b7, D. 3b5) and SDVP (C. 17a1-4, D. 17a2-4, N. 4b6-5a1, P. 4a4-6).
2. Cf. SDVV[D] 4a1: ...bsod nams dang ye shes kyi tshogs ma lus par bsgrubs pa...; SDVP[P] 4a5: bsod nams dang ye shes kyi tshogs ma lus pa yongs su rdzogs par 'gyur la./
3. Cf. SDVV[D] 4a1: bdag dang gzhan gyi don phun sum tshogs pa bye brag tu byar med pa'i pha rol tu nges par shin tu phyin par 'gyur ro /; SDVP[P] 4a5-6: ...bdag dang gzhan gyi don phun sum tshogs pa rab kyi mthar phyin par 'gyur te / de ni sngas rgyas nyid du 'gyur ro //.
4. Cf. SDVP[P] 4a7: 'gro 'am/mi 'gro snyam du the tshom za ba'i rgyu med pa'i phyir / 'gro ba nyid ces bya ba smos so //

ye 'nayor na vijñānanti vibhāgaṁ satyayor dvayoḥ /

te tattvaṁ na vijñānanti gambhīraṁ buddha-sāsane //
Those who do not know the division into the two truths do not understand the profound reality of the Buddha’s teaching.

The master Candrakīrti also stated [in the Madhyamakāvatāra VI kk 79-80]:

For those who stray from the path of the master Nāgārjuna there is no way [to get] peace. They have lapsed from conventional [truth] and the truth of reality. On account of that lapse, they do not achieve liberation\(^1\).

The truth of convention (*tha snyad bden pa, vyavahāra-satya*) is the method and ultimate truth is the outcome of the method; those\(^2\) who do not know these two divisions, on account of mistaken conceptions (*rnam rtog log pa, mithyā-vikalpa*), enter into bad paths\(^3\).

[3. Three sub-schools of the Madhyamika: the Sautrāntika-Madhyamika, the Yogācāra-Madhyamika, and the 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa’i dbu ma pa]

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1. MAv VI k 79 (cf. tr. LVP (1910) p. 355, Ogawa (1976) p. 199). The Sanskrit is found in SS 396.3-6, differing slightly from the Tibetan version of the MAv:

\[\text{ācārya-Nāgārjunapāda-mārgād bahirgatānāṃ na śivābhuyāyaḥ} / \]
\[bhraṣṭā hi te saṃvṛti-satya-mārgāt tad-bhraṃśataś cāsti na mokṣa-siddhiḥ // \]
La Vallee Poussin (id. p. 355 n. 1) tries to correct, following the Tibetan version, śivābhuyāyaḥ for śive ‘sty upāyaḥ and saṃvṛti-satya-mārgāt for saṃvṛti-tattva-satyāt.

2. The demonstrative pronoun is in the singular in the Sanskrit and also in the Tibetan version of the MAv, but in the plural in our text.

3. MAv VI k 80 (cf. tr. LVP (1910) p. 356, Ogawa (1976) p. 199). The Sanskrit is found in SS 396.7-10; that of pada ab in BCAP 179.26-27 (BCA IX k 4):

\[\text{upāya-bhūtaṃ vyavahāra-satyam upeya-bhūtaṃ paramārtha-satyam /} \]
\[\text{tayor vibhāgaṃ na paraite yo vai mithyā-vikalpaḥ sa kumārga-yātaḥ //} \]
Explanation of the ways in which the two truths are explained.

The Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas etc. [i.e., and the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamikas and 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pas] are [listed as those who assert] conventional [truth] to be 1) the nature of mind, 2) the [exterior] object and 3) as things appear, [respectively].

(k XII-7)

The master Śāntarakṣita and the master Haribhadra, etc. assert appearances of forms, etc., matter, mind and mental factors, and dream objects, etc. [and other analogous illusory consciousnesses]¹ as correct conventional [truth]. As it is said in the Madhyamakālaṅkāra (kk 91-92)²:

Cause and effect are also just consciousness alone. Whatever exists in its own right is consciousness.

In that they are contingent on "mind only" (sems tsam, citta-mātra) exterior things are known to be unreal. Based on this principle (tshul, naya), relative to it [their] complete selflessness (anātman) is known as well.

Also, since in the Aṣṭasāhasrikā-[prajñāpāramitā]-ālokā³, conventional [truth] is spoken of as concordant with the "Mind Only" [School], these [masters] are known as Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas (rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma pa).

¹. Cf. BSGT 96b6.
². MA k 91-92 (C. 56a5-6, D. 56a6-7, N. 47b4-5, P. 52a3-4): k 91 is cited in MAV (C. 78b7, D. 78b7, N. 73b7-74a1, P. 78b4) and k 92 in MAV (C. 79a5, C. 79a5-6, N. 74a7, P. 79a3-4).
The master [Nāgayun] also asserts this since he states in the *Yuktisastikā* (kk 21 and 34ab):

Here, nothing is produced and nothing is destroyed. Production and cessation are just consciousness¹.

It is important, however, to be aware that it is not exactly the same verse as YŚ k 21 in the Tibetan Canon, which is in a generally different form from that of our text; notably pada d, which differs completely. Here is the YŚ k 21 of the Tibetan Canon:

```
dharmo notpadyate kaścin nāpi kaścin nirudhyate /
upadyante nirudhyante pratyaya eva kevalāḥ //
```

This verse 21, accompanied by the following (YS k 34), as in our text, is cited in many other texts, such as the *Madhyamakālamkāravṛtti* (P. 79b5-7) by Śantarakṣita, the *Prajñaparamitopadesa* (P. 161b8-162a1) by Ratnakaraśānti, the *Madhyamakālāmkaṃkāra-vṛtti-madhyamakapratipadasiddhi* (P. 199b6-7, cf. 133b2) by Ratnakaraśānti and the *Madhyamakālāmkaṃkāropadesa* (P. 260a8-b1) by Ratnakaranśānti (without YŚ k 34 in MAM): all these treatises cite it in the same form as that of our text. The form of this verse cited by Ratnakaraśānti is, on the other hand, slightly different in Tibetan translation. Cf. -PPU (P. 161b8), MAU (P. 260a8-b1):

```
dngos mams skye ba yod min zhing // 'gag pa'ang gang na yod min zhing
```


A Sanskrit sloka of close semblance is found in JNA (SSŚ) 488.22-23 and JNA (SSŚ) 545.3-4:

```
dharmopa notpadyate kaścin nāpi kaścin nirudhyate /
upadyante nirudhyante pratyaya eva kevalāḥ //
```

```
dos mams skye ba yod min zhing // 'gag pa'ang gang na yod min zhing
```

```
shes pa 'di nyid kho na ni // skye shing 'gyur ba yin //
```
Sāntarakṣita (eighth century), in his MAV, cited this verse in a slightly different form than that of the YŚ, and it is possible that dBus pa blo gsal cites it from the MAV, Ratnakarasānti from somewhere else.

The remark that Kamalāśīla (eighth C.) made concerning this verse in his MAP merits attention. He does not consider it belonging to the YŚ, but rather to the Laṅk. Cf. MAP P. 138b2:

\[ \text{\textquoteleft\textquoteleft phags pa Lang kar gshegs pa las gsungs pa\textquoteright\textquoteright khungs shes pa \textquoteleft\textquoteleft ba\textquoteright\textquoteright zhig kho na \textquoteleft\textquoteleft o Zhes bya ba smos te /}. \text{Here the reference is to Laṅk II k 138 (\textquoteright\textquoteright=X k 85).} \]

\[ \text{\textquoteleft\textquoteleft gyur ba yin no P} \]

-Kaṭhakaśā (eleventh C.) takes these two verses as Nāgārjuna’s. Cf. -PPU (P. 161b7):

\[ \text{\textquoteleft\textquoteleft Klu sgrub kyi zhal snga nas kyang...; \text{-MAU(P. 260a8)Klu sgrub kyi zhal nas kyang /; \text{-MAM (P. 119b6): Klu grub kyi zhal snga nas kyi kyang ji skad du /;/... \text{-MAM (P. 133b2): slob dpon Klu sgrub kyi zhal snga nas kyi kyang /...} \]

Tsong kha pa addresses this problem in his Drang nges legs bshad snying po, and supports Kamalāśīla. Cf. LS 123.8-14: ‘Grel bshad las tshigs bcad dang po Lang gshegs las drangs par bshad do // Shā nū ni pas \textquoteleft\textquoteleft di gnyi ga Klu sgrub kyi yin par byas nas \textquoteleft\textquoteleft dis sems tsam du bstan pa la dBu ma pa dang sems tsam pa gnyis \textquoteleft\textquoteleft dra bar bzhed de / zhi ba \textquoteleft\textquoteleft tshos rgyun gcig tu drangs pa la bsams par mgon yang der byed pa po so sos mdzad pa rgyun gcig la drangs pa gzhan yang yod do // “In the commentary (=MAP), [Kamalāśīla] explains that the first
The great elements ('byung ba che, mahābhūta) and so forth which have been spoken about are included in consciousness.  

verse is cited from the Lāṅkāvatārasūtra. Śānti-pa (=Ratnākaraśānti), in attributing these two verses to Nagarjuna, states that the two [schools], i.e. the Madhyamika and the Vijñānavādins are the same, since [the position] "mind only" is set forth by these [verses by Nagarjuna]. It seems that [Śānti-pa] had in mind the fact that Śāntarakṣita cited [these two verses] in succession. However, in this case, there are other [examples] where [two verses], composed by different authors, are cited in succession".

Bhāvaviveka also cites this verse (YŚ k 21) in his MRP (P 327b1-2, cf. Lindtner (1981) p. 171 and p. 203 n. 41) and attributes it to the master (slob dpon, thus Nāgarjuna):

\[
'di na 'ga' yang skye ba med \// 'gag par gyur par gyur pa cung zad med \//

skyе ba dang ni 'gag pa dag \// brtags pa'i rkyen rnams kho na 'o \//
\]

Owing to the fact that Kamalasila would have to ignore this passage in order to give his interpretation concerning this verse in the MAP, and that the tendency to attribute it to Nāgarjuna seems to be rather strange, the author of the MRP could definitely not be the same person as the famous Madhyamika author. ICang skyе Rol pa'i rdo je (1717-1786) moreover expresses this opinion. Cf. CKGT 283.11-12: dBu ma rin chen sgron ma ni Legs ldan chung bar grags pas mdzad pa yin gyi slob dpon 'dis mdzad pa min no \// " The MRP was composed by he who was known as the little Bhāvaviveka, and not by this master (=the famous Madhyamika Bhāvaviveka )"; CKGT 17.16-7: Legs ldan phyи mar grags pa'i dBu ma rin chen sgron ma las kyang... See Mimaki (1982) n. 67 and n. 441.

Here in our text, "some" think that the two verses in question are from the YŚ of Nāgarjuna. Thus, by these "some" our author probably understood Ratnākaraśānti and others.


1. YŚ k 34ab (C. 21b4-5, D. 21b5, N. 21b4 P. 24a3-4, MsTH PT 796 fol. 2b3, cited also in YŚV C. 20b2, D. 21b7, N. 23b6, P. 24b4; cf. tr. Yamaguchi S. (1965 p. 76-7, Uryūzu (1974) p. 63). The Sanskrit is found in JNA (SSS) 405.1 and JNA (SSS) 545.7: mahābhūtādi viśeṣaṇa samavarudhyate /

See also the preceding note. In addition to the sources that have been enumerated, the PPU 169b8-170a1 cites this verse, attributing it to Nāgarjuna.
For the master Bhāvaviveka, conventional [truth] is not [set forth] concordant with the Mind Only [School]. He says in the Madhyamakahrdaya (V k 28cd)¹:

[The Buddha] taught "mind only" in the Sūtra in order to negate the creator (byed po, kāraka) and the enjoyer (za po, bhoktr).

Therefore, [Bhāvaviveka who] asserts that there is an object of the knowing mind and that consciousness comes into being together with the form² [of the object] is known as Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika (mDo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa) since [his] conventional [truth] is concordant with [the theories of] the Sautrāntikas.

The master Jñānagarbha and the master Candrakīrti assert conventional [truths] as being the accepted conventions of worldly beings. It is stated in the Satyadvayavibhaṅga [-kārikā (k 21)³:

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¹ MH V k 28cd (Tib. ed. tr. Yamaguchi S. (1964a) p 12 from the end; (Tib.) D. 21a4, P. 23b5). The Sanskrit manuscript reads:  
śāstr'eva cittamātrotkītih ² kārtṛ-bhoktr-niśedhataḥ //  
¹ sastreva ms. ³ okti ms.

It is interesting to note that the reading of the Sanskrit ms. does not accord with that of Tibetan canonical version, notably for pāda a. This fact shows without doubt the existence of a Skt. ms. in Tibet other than that used for the Tibetan canonical translation. But it is more interesting to note that Tsong kha pa cites these verses precisely in the form that the actual Sanskrit ms. presents. Cf LS 120.19-20: bstan bcos sms tsam zhes gsungs pa // byed po za po dgag phyir ro //. This fact proves the existence of a Tibetan translation other than that of the Tibetan Canon. Here is a good example that shows that it is necessary to treat the transmission of Sanskrit ms. and Tibetan translations with a great deal of care.


3. SDVK k 21 (C. 2b4, D. 2b4), cited also in SDVV (C. 10a7, D. 10a7). Once more, the comparison of variants shows that pāda c of the BSGT is different from the SDVK and the SDVV; for pāda a, the BSGT and the SDVV present similar readings that diverge from that of the SDVK.
Since an identity is a [mere] appearance one cannot get at it through analysis. Under scrutiny it turns into something else and is therefore sublated.

Also from the *Madhyamakāvatāra* (VI k 3):\footnote{MAv VI k 35 (cf. tr. LVP (1910) p. 313, Ogawa (1976) p. 121). For pāda b, the translation by Nag tsho Tshul khrims rgayal ba (1011-?) etc. (P. [98] (5261) 'a 230a8) is "de bzhin nyid kyi dngos..." instead of "di nyid bdag can dngos..." as in the translation by Pa tshab Nyi ma grags (1055-?) etc. on which the LVP edition is based. Cf. Ogawa (1976) p. 121 n. 3.}

Since, if one analyses these things, instead of anything which has a real nature, one ends up with unfindability. Therefore, worldly transactional truth is not analyzable.

Because of this, [Jñānagarbha and Candrakīrti] are known as the 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa [Mādhyamikas who conform to that which is known in the world]\footnote{2. For this school and the expositions of the Tibetan authors regarding it, see the introduction.}. Similarly, in the *ITā ba'i khyad par* of the great translator (*lo tsa ba chen po*)\footnote{3. TKh (C. 218b4, D. 213b4, N.244a6, P. 252b1-2, MsTH PT no. 814 fol 5a5-b1). The citation, however, is not literal (see, for ex., the proper names Bhavya and Śāntarakṣita), and our author seems to have changed the text. See the Canon's version and that of the MsTH: 'a tsā 'rya Bha byas' mdo sde 'pa'i dbu ma zhes btags / 'a tsā 'rya Śānta tsa kshi' tas mdo sde 'pa la ni' rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma zhes btags so / 'tša NP MsTH 'Ba' phyas MsTH 'tsha NP MsTH 'Bhan ta rag shi MsTH 'bza'd MsTH 'tsha NP MsTH. The variant (mDo sde pa'i dbu ma / mDo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma) indicates without doubt that our author used a text closer to the Canon than to the MsTH. The Tibetan authors often cite this TKh passage, but never literally (cf. LRCM kha 6b1-4, CKGT 292.6). Is this due to the fact that the TKh is conserved only in a pitiable state in the Canon? For detail, see Mimaki (1982), p. 40-1.} Ye shes sde it is said:

The works of the master Bhāvaviveka and the master Śāntarakṣita are called Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika and Yogācāra-Mādhyamika respectively.
It is asserted that ultimate [truth] is the pacification of the elaborations (spros pa, prapañca) of existence and non-existence. The books (gzung, grantha) that clearly explain this are the Mādhyamika-śāstra (dBu ma'i mdo) and others.

(k XII-8)

It is asserted that ultimate truth is the pacification of all elaborations of existence and non-existence and that furthermore, the Tathāgatha, having understood it, taught it. As the master [Nāgārjuna] said in the Mādhyamika-śāstra (XVIII k 7)¹:

> When objects within the domain of mind cease, the objects of expression cease. The unoriginated and unceasing is a characteristic similar to liberation (mya ngan 'das, nirvāṇa).

The master Kamalaśīla also stated in the Tattvāvatāra²:

> It is taught that the self-realized suchness is divorced from labels (tha snyad, vyavahāra)³ and other [manifestations of

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\[
\text{nirvṛttaṁ abhidhāvyaṁ nivṛtte citta-gocare} \\
\text{anupannāniruddhā hi nirvāṇam iva dharmañ} \\
\]

The variant in pada d (mtshan nyid /chos nyid) should be noted.

² Ta (D. 273a3-4, P. 312a4). The same verse is also cited in BSGT 103b6.

³ The variant in pada d (tha snyad / tha dad) should be noted. In the context of the TA, the reading tha dad is indispensible, because it is this last verse of the treatise that posits the idea that truth is neither different (tha dad) from phenomena, nor identical (tha mi dad) to phenomena. Did dBus pa blo gsal replace tha dad with tha snyad in order to be in conformity with the context of the BSGT? Or did the text of the TA that he saw already have tha snyad?
conventional truth], is at peace and free from all elaborations of being and non-being.

[5. Two sub-schools of the Mādhyamika: the Svātṛ-trika and the Prāṣāṅgika]

[101a2] Explanation of the difference between the Svātṛ-trika and the Prāṣāṅgika.

[5.1. Svātṛ-trika]

The Svātṛ-trikas assert as a distinguishing feature (khyad par, viṣeṣaṇa) the negative and affirmative theses which come about through the three reasons (rtags, hetu), the two valid cognizers (tshad ma, pramāṇa) and the two consequences (thal ba, prasaṅga).1 They do not assert that objects and so on are false, etc. (k XII-9)

[101a3] The Svātṛ-trikas such as the master Bhāvaviveka etc. explain that there are three reasons (rtags, hetu): from cause ('bras bu, kārya), from nature (rang bzhin, svabhāva), and to the unobserved (ma dmigs pa, anupalabdhi); that there are two valid cognizers (tshad ma, pramāṇa): direct (mgon sum, pratyākṣa) and inferential (rjes su dpag pa, anumāna); and that there are two consequences (thal 'gyur, prasaṅga): one which forces a reason (sgrub byed 'phen pa, sādhana) and one which damages [the assertion] (sun 'byin). When they establish emptiness, non-arising and illusoriness (sgyu ma bzhin, māyā), etc., and remove belief in the truth of subject (yul chen, viṣayin) and object (yul, viṣaya) with these there is ultimately (don dam par, paramārthatas) the state of emptiness (stong pa nyid, śūnyatā). They distinguish their thesis (dam bca', pratijñā) with this, etc.

1. For all these terms of logic and their references, see, for ex., Mimaki (1976) p. 46-66.
2. For these three logical terms and their references, see for ex., Mimaki (1976) p. 46-66.
[101a5] They [Śvātantrikas] assert 1) that all objects and minds are not necessarily false and mistaken, 2) that there exists a view which is admitted on the conventional level, 3) that on the conventional level there is truth and that truth can be divided into real and false2, 4) that the absence of self nature of an illusion (sgyu ma, māya) is the ultimate and 5) that the Buddhas have a self-perpetuating wisdom consciousness (rang rgyud kyi ye shes).

[5.2 Prāsaṅgika]

As for the others [Prāsaṅgikas] the appearance of affirmatives and negatives which come about by way of the four reasons and the four valid cognizers just indicates the internal contradiction of the opponents’ [thesis].

[That which the Śvātantrikas assert as conventional truth] does not exist [for the Prāsaṅgikas] because it contradicts the truth. It [conventional truth] is exhausted in its designation (btags pa, praṇapti). (k XII-10)

[101a6] When the Prāsaṅgikas such as master Buddhápālita, etc., with four reasons (rtags, hetu): inference conventionally known to someone else (tha snyad du gzhan la grags pa’i rjes dpag, para-prasiddhānumāna)3; consequence (thal ’gyur, prasaṅga) expressing a

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1. Compare with the Prāsaṅgika opinion set forth in BSGT 101b3-4.
2. See also BSGT 98b3-4.
3. Cf. -PrasP 34.13-35.1 (ad MM I k 1): kim punar anyatara-prasiddhenaḥ anumānenāsti anumāna-bādhāḥ/ asti sā ca svaprasiddhenaiva hetunā, na para-prasiddhena, lokata eva drṣṭatvāt /; (Tib.) P. [98] (5260) ’a 12b2-3: yang ci gang yang rung ba la grub pa’i rjes su dpag pa’i sgo nas kyang rjes su dpag pa’i gnod pa yod dam zhe na / yod de de yang rang nyid la grub pa’i gan tshigs nyid kyis yin gyi/ gzhan la grub pas ni ma yin te/ ’jig rten nyid du mtong ba’i phyir ro //; -PrasP 35.4-5: ata eva ca kaiścid uktam na paraṭāḥ prasiddhībalād anumāṇā-bādhāḥ, paraśiddher eva nirācikṛṣṭavād iti //; (Tib.) P. [98] (5260) ’a 12b5-6: de nyid kyi phyir ’ga’ zhig gis gzhan la grags pa’i dbang gis ni rjes su dpag pa’i gnod pa ma yin te/ gzhan la grags pa nyid dpag par ’dod pa’i phyir ro zhes bshad do //.
contradiction ('gal ba, virodha); reason equal to that which is to be proved (bsgrub bya dang mtsungs pa, sādhyaśama); consequence through similarity of reason (rgyu mtshan mtsungs pa'i mgo snyoms); and four valid cognizers (tshad ma, pramāṇa): direct

1. The term ('gal ba brjod pa'i thal 'gyur) itself does not seem to appear as is in the PrasP, but it could be based on, for ex., PrasP 100.5-8 (ad MM II k 12).

2. In Indian logic, sādhyaśama is considered one of the five fallacious reasons (hetvābhāsa). Cf. Nyāyasūtra I-2-8: sādhīyāviśīṣṭāḥ sādhyaḥsādhyatvāḥ // "The sādhyaśama [is a fallacious reason that] is not different from that which is to be proved, because it is not to be proved." The sādhyaśama example that Pāṇḍilasvāmin Vātasyāyana gives in NBh 384.3-385.1 is as follows: [Assertion:] Shadow is a substance (dravyam chāyā). [Reason:] Because it possesses movement (gatimattvāḥ). In this syllogism, the reason (or middle term) 'shadow possesses movement' is itself a statement to be proved: it therefore cannot be used as a valid reason to prove the assertion. This is sādhyaśama as it is explained in NS and NBh.

Among the Mādhyamika texts, the term is found in, for ex., MM IV kk 7-8, Vigrahavyāvartani k 28, Vigrahavyāvartanīrtti ad VV k 28 and k 69, PrasP 33.6, 58.8, 127.11, 153.5, 222.2, 382.16, 413.2. But the Mādhyamika sādhyaśama does not seem to be exactly the same as that of the Naiyāyika. See Bhattacharya K. (1974). See also Randle H. N. (1930), Indian Logic in the Early Schools, Oxford Univ. Press, p. 15 n. 3 and Matilal B. K. (1974).

3. It seems that the term is not found in the PrasP. Here is an explanation of the term based on dGe bshes Rab brtan's commentary on Tsong kha pa's LS: if, in ultimate truth, the visual faculty could see the visible (gzugs), it would follow that the auditory faculty (ma ba) could also see the visible, because they are equal as faculties (dbang po) which perceive that which doesn't exist in ultimate truth; that is, the thesis that in ultimate truth the visual faculty sees the visible is (by a parallel reasoning) reduced to absurdity. Thus he proves that the visual faculty does not see the visible in ultimate truth. Cf. LS(R) 122a6-b3 = p. 243-4 (ad LS 117.6-7): sbyor ngag ji lta bus 'gog snyam na MIG NI chos can DON DAM PAR GZUGS LA MI LTA STE / dbang po yin pa'i phyir / dper na RNA BA'I DBANG PO BZHIN NO ZHES PA DANG / 'di thal ngag byas na sgra 'dzin nyan shes kyis gzugs mthong bar thal / gzugs 'dzin mig shes kyis don dam par gzugs la bla ba'i phyir zhes pa lta bu rgyu mtsan mtsungs pa'i mgo snyoms kyil thal 'gyur ro / mgo snyoms tshul ni mig gis don dam par gzugs la lta na gang du yang ma blos par bla dgos par 'gyur zhing di ltar lta na ma bas kyang gzugs la lta chog par thal bar 'gyur zhes pa'o // (LS in capitals).

4. These four Prāṣāṅgika reasons are mentioned in, for ex., the gZhung lugs legs par bshad pa by Sa skya Pandita (fol. 149a4-5: 'di la bzhī ste / gzhan la grags pa'i rjes dpag dang / rgal ba brjod pa'i thal 'gyur dang / rgyun (sic, read rgyu mtsan) mtsungs pa'i mgo snyoms dang / bsgrub bya dang mthungs pa'i ma grub pa'o //...; and Lam rim chen mo by Tsong kha pa, kha 60b5-61a3 (cf. tr. Nagao (1954) p. 233-4, Wayman (1978) p. 287).
(mgon sum, pratyakṣa), inferential (rjes dpag, anumāna), scriptural (lung, āgama) and from analogy (nye ba 'jal ba, upamāna) establish emptiness and remove belief in the truth of subject and object they do not, thereby, make any particular assertion in their thesis since [for them] even conventionally there is not truth. All refutation and assertion is made relative to an opponent since their (pha rol po, para) assertions have an internal contradiction. With regard to the Mādhyamikas, just as there is no assertion from their (Prāsaṅgikas) own side (rang phyogs, sva-pakṣa), so also there is no refutation of the other side (gzhan phyogs, para-pakṣa) either.

[101b3] Thus, [the Prāsaṅgikas] assert: 1) that all objects that appear are false and all consciousnesses are mistaken; 2) that no view (lta ba, darśana) exists [even on the conventional level]; 3) that on the conventional level there is no truth nor [division of it] into real and false; 4) that ultimate truth is free from elaborations; 5) the Buddhas do not have self-perpetuating consciousness (rang rgyud kyi ye shes). If these [points] were to be explained together with their reasons, [our treatise] would become very large.

[5.3. Real difference between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika]

The real difference (khyad par dngos) of these modes (tshul, naya) [of Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika] is the assertion or non-assertion of reasons from real things and of valid cognizers [that come about from them]. [The differences] that are otherwise expressed by others are cleared away. (k XII-li)

2. Compare with the Svātantrika opinion shown in BSGT 101a5-6.
Here, the real difference between these two [schools, i.e. Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika] is, while both say all phenomena are essentially empty one does, and the other does not, assert reasons that are based on real things (dngos po stobs zhugs, vastu-bala-pravṛttta) and that are established autonomously (rang rgyud, svatantra) and valid cognizers [based on those reasons]. Hence it is a division of [asserting and not asserting] a reason (gtan tsigs, hetu). Thus it says in the Satyadvayavibhaṅga [-kārikā (k 18-19)]:

To the extent that the factor of appearance exists [in common] in the consciousnesses of the two debators there is an conception of subject (chos can, dharmin), and attribute (chos, dharma). Then an inference comes into being, not when it is otherwise. So, if the logicians (rigs pa smra pa, nyāya-vādin) use such [inferences] who could refute them?

It is also said in the Madhyamakāloka [of Kamaśīla]:

1. See the equivalent of the term in, for ex., NBT 56.20: vastu-bala-pravṛttam ālinganī; (Tib. 128.13-14) dngos po'i stobs kyis zhugs pa'i rtags (ad NB III s 46).
2. SDVK kk 18-19 (C. 2b3-4, D. 2b2-3), cited also in SDVV (C. 9b5-6, D. 9b5-6). These two verses will be cited in BSGT 106a1-2. Note that Jñanagarbha’s SDVK is cited here as representing the Svātantrika opinion.
3. See the equivalent term in, for ex., PV I k 212d.
4. MĀI (D. 181a6, P. 198a5-6) The form of the passage in the Tibetan Canon differs appreciably from that found in Blo gsal grub mtha’; the second sentence of the latter is not found in the Canon. Here is the Canon’s version: kho bo cag kyang tshig tsam gyis chos thams cad ngo bo nyid med par sgrub pa yang ma yin la / thal bar sgrub pa tsam gyis kyang ma yin no / ’o na ci zhe na / yang dag pa’i tshad ma nyid kyis sgrub bo // Other such discrepancies with the MĀI sometimes occur. For example, a MĀI passage cited in the ITa ba’i khyad par by Ye šes sde with the clear mention of the MĀI is not found in the MĀI (cf. ITa ba’i khyad par P. 254a2-3, MsTH PT no. 814 fol. 9a4-5). In the case of the ITa ba’i khyad par citation, it could be supposed that Ye šes sde summarized the MĀI passage (D. 159a7-b1, P. 173b3-4, cf. Matsumoto (1981c) p. 111). But in our case could the existence of another Tibetan translation of a different transmission be supposed?
We do not prove that all phenomena are empty only by consequences (thal ’gyur, prasaṅga), but prove [it] as well through the force of correct valid cognizers. Moreover, we assert it just because the Bhagavan has authorized it (rjes su gnang ba, anujña)\textsuperscript{1}.

[102a2] And from the Madhyamakāvatāra (VI k 31 ab)\textsuperscript{2}:

Since the world’s [acceptance of what is true] is not at all authoritative, when reality is at issue, the world does not harm [what the transcendent establishes].

It is also said in the Prasannapadā:\textsuperscript{3}

Since a Mādhyamika does not assert the other position (phyogs gzhan, pakṣāntara) it is not proper that he formulates an autonomous inference (rang gi rgyud kyi rjes su dpag pa, svatantrānumāna).

[102a3] This [explanation] clears away [the opinion of] some\textsuperscript{4} who differentiate [Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas] with slight distinctions such as Buddha having or not having transcendental wisdom or the existence of truth or lack of it on the conventional level

\textsuperscript{1} Cf. Dictionnaire deTshe ring dbang rgyal, Bacot (1931) 56a3-4: rjes su gnang ba / anurūpa, ājñāpta, anujña.
\textsuperscript{2} MAv VI k 31ab (cf. tr. LVP (1910) p. 308, Ogawa (1976) p. 109).
\textsuperscript{4} Cf. BSGT 101a5-6 and 101b4. It has not been determined precisely to whom dBus pa blo gsal refers by "some" (kha cig ).
and those others\(^1\) who say the division into Svātṛṭika and Prāsaṅgika did not exist in India (\`phags pa\textquoteleft i yul).

\[6.\] Intermediary verses\(^2\)

Where there is an absence of true existence, it excludes reasoning from things and [the understanding] from reasoning. If there is true existence how could things be empty of truth?

Even if things (chos can, dharmin) are mere imputations the [imputing] mind would be a true subjective element. Therefore, since that which characterizes valid knowledge is not suitable vis-a-vis [the subjective aspect] it is not tenable [that it is true].

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1. Here dBus pa blo gsal refutes the opinion of "those others" who do not assert the existence of the distinction between the Svātṛṭika and the Prāsaṅgika in India. One cannot be sure that dBus pa blo gsal knew that these terms were invented by the Tibetans, in contrast to Tsong kha pa and Sakya mchog Idan, for ex., who knew it quite well. Cf. LRCM kha 6b6-7 (cf. tr. Nagao (1954) p.111, Wayman (1978) p. 182): Gangs ri\textquoteleft i khrod kyi phyi dar gyi mkhas pa mams dbu ma pa la thal 'gyur ba dang rang rgyud pa gnyis kyi tha snyad byed pa ni tshig gsal dang mthun pas rang bzod (read bzor following the other editions) mi bsam mol/ "The scholars of the second diffusion of Buddhism to Tibet created, for the Madhyamika, the appellations of the two [sub-schools], Prāsaṅgika and Svātṛṭika, but I do not think that they are pure invention (rang bzor), because they conform to the Prasannapada"; -BN kha 13b3: Rang rgyud pa dang thal 'gyur ba zhes bod mams kyi is tha snyad byas pa mams so // "Svātṛṭika and Prāsaṅgika are names fabricated by the Tibetans" (cf. Matsumoto (1981d) p. 423 n. 1).

2. Vetter has clarified the role of antarasloka and in what capacity it differs from samgraha\textquotesingle sloka (recaptulative or mnemonic verse): antarasloka expresses an independent idea, on which the text's author did not think it necessary to comment, while samgraha\textquotesingle sloka summarizes the preceding prose (cf. Vetter (1966) p.7). But this difference became less and less strict, and certain antarasloka became invested with the role of samgraha\textquotesingle sloka amongst the Indian authors. This could be why the Tibetan authors almost uniquely used the antarasloka, (with one exception: Klong chen rab \textquoteleft byams pa in his Grub mtha\textquoteleft mdzod.). For detail, see Mimaki (1980a).
Since there is no valid knowledge your contradictions are made non-definite. If [they] don't exist what is disproved or proved is equally without valid cognition.¹

Where object and subject are false and mistaken [respectively] it is difficult to establish, even from the point of view of the world, a division of correct and incorrect on the conventional level.

A valid cognition would be mistaken on account of an object of a single transcendental valid cognition being false. [If transcendental wisdom] is not mistaken, since its object would be true one would have contradicted [the basic tenet that] all things are false.

Where there is no [subjective element] to establish what is observed a [subjective element] observing that is not possible. Other lines of reasoning, having become ineffective [in the light of the above logic] do not establish those [subject or object].

Where the omniscient transcendental wisdom does not exist [even conventionally] what Sangha and Dharma are there? If on the transactional level even cause and effect do not exist that is a nihilistic view.

[7. The phenomena existing in conventional truth do not exist in ultimate truth and, in reality, are beyond existence and non-existence]

¹. By definition a valid cognizer apprehends a real thing. Now, the consciousness in question only has a nominal entity for its object. It is therefore not able to be a valid cognizer.
7.1. Explanation following the Sūtra

The Bhagavan (bcom ldan 'das) taught existence, non-existence and transcendence of existence and non-existence.

(k XII-12ab)

[102b2] The Bhagavan taught that all phenomena exist in conventional [truth], do not exist in ultimate [truth] and in reality (de kho nar, tattvatas) transcend existence and non-existence. As it is said in the Lānkāvatāra [-sūtra (X k 429)]:

As conventions (saṃvṛtyā) all phenomena exist; as ultimates they do not. That which is in respect to [things] without self-nature (rang bzin med, niḥsvabhāva) is called saṃvṛti [concealer].

Also in the Trisamvaranirdeśa [-parivarta]:

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bhāvā vidyante saṃvṛtyā paramārthe na bhāvakāh/

niḥsvabhāveṣu yā bhrāntis tat satyaṃ saṃvṛtir bhavet/ (Tib.) P. 190b6. Cited in many texts. For ex., SDVV[D] 9a3; BhK I (Tib.) 249.18-21; MĀI[P] 168a3-4.

dBus pa blo gsal’s version differs considerably from that of the Canon, in particular for pāda ab which, one might notice, are identified in dBus pa blo gsal to the corresponding pādas of Lāṅk X k 120 cited immediately after in our text (102b4-5).

2. Trisamvaranirdeśaparivarta (sDom pa gsum bstan pa'i le'u = chap. 1 of the Ratnakūṭa: P. [22] (760(1)) tshi 10b5. The Sanskrit is found in PrasP 370.6-8 (ad MM XCIII k 8, cf tr. De Jong (1949) p. 27, Sprung (1979) p. 181): [lōko mayā sārdham vivadati] nāhaṃ lokena sārdham vivādāmi // yal loke 'sti saṃmataṃ tan mamāpi asti saṃmataṃ / [yal loke nāsti saṃmataṃ mamāpi tan nāsti saṃmataṃ...].
I do not dispute with the world, since what the world asserts as existing, I also assert as existing.

Also in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*:

Everything exists as conventions; they do not exist as ultimates. It is taught that ultimately all things are entityless.¹

and:

Non-existence presupposes existence and existence presupposes non-existence. Therefore one does not need to understand existence; neither does one need to suppose existence.²

[7.2. Explanation following the Mādhyamikas ]

The wise, who profess the Middle Way, have clarified this doctrine (*tshul, naya*). (k XII-12cd)

[7.2.1. Existence in conventional truth]


   sarvaṃ vidyati saṃvṛtyāṃ paramārthe na vidyate/
   dharmanam niḥsvabhāvatvaṃ paramārthe 'pi dṛṣṭyate //


   astitva-pūrvakāṃ nāsti asti nāstītva-pūrvakam/
   āto nāsti na gantavyāṃ astitvaṃ na ca kalpayet //

   (Tib.) P. 193b3-144a6-7. Cited in MAV[P] 72a6-7 and MĀl[P] 165b4. Laṅk III k 83 and 3 k 501 are exactly identical in Sanskrit, but slightly different in Tibetan. Regarding the comparison of variants, our text is closer to X k 501.
The master [Nāgārjuna] put forth this same idea in the *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā* (XXIV k 10):

Ultimate [truth] (*dam pa'i don, paramārtha*) is not understood without reliance on convention (*tha snyad, vyavahāra*); one does not attain nirvāṇa without having understood ultimate [truth].

In the *Vigrahavyāvartani* (k 28cd):

We do not make conversation without asserting language.

Similarly, the master Bhāvaviveka said in the *Madhyamaka-hṛdaya*:

Without the ladder of correct conventional [truth] it is not possible for the wise man to ascend to the top of the palace of ultimate reality (*yang dag, tattva*).

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   vyavahāram anāśritya paramārtho na deśyate /
   paramārtham anāgamyā nirvāṇāṁ nādhigamyate //


   saṃvyavahāram ca vayaṁ nānabhupagāmya kathayāmah //
   (Tib.) ed. Tucci (1929) p. 33.

3. This verse occurs between MH III k 11 and 12. The Skt. is found in AAA 169.19-20:

   tathya-samvṛti-sopānam antarcaṇa vipaścitaḥ /
   tattva-prāsāda-śikharōrohaṇaṁ na hi yujyate //

   Cf. Ejima (1980) p. 271; Iida (1980), p. 67 includes the Sanskrit as:

   tattva-prāsāda-śikharōrohaṇaṁ na hi yujyate /
   tathya-saṃvṛti-sopānam antarcaṇa yataḥ //
The master Candrakīrti also said in the *Prasannapada*¹:

Because the Mādhyamikas assert that dependent-arising exists conventionally they are not like Nihilists (*Med pa pa, Nāstika*).

The master Kamalaśīla also said in the *Tattvāloka* (kk 93 and 95):

These definitions of a valid cognition have also been taught as conventionalities in order to lead people to reality so accept them²

If one does not depend on language, even though one makes use of other methods, one cannot distinguish reality [taught] by myself and others.³

These teach the way things exist conventionally.

[7.2.2. Non-existence in ultimate truth]

[103a5] On the other hand, the master [Nāgārjuna] has also stated in the *Vigrahavyāvartani* (k 29, 30 and 63):

If I had any thesis then I would have this fault. Because I do not have a thesis I am quite faultless.⁴

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2. TA (D. 247b5, P. 279b3-4).  
3. TA (D. 247b6, P. 279b5-6)  
If something were observable, if it were provable or disprovable by things like direct perception [I could be faulted]. Since this does not exist, I cannot be criticized.¹

Because there is no object of negation (*dgag bya, pratisedhya*) I do not negate. Therefore, you libel me falsely in saying that I negate.²

[All these] words show the way things do not exist ultimately.

[7.2.3. The transcendence of existence and non-existence ]

[103b1] Furthermore, the master [Nāgārjuna] said in the *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā* (XV k 7 and XXII k 11):

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yadi kācana pratijñā syān me tat eṣa me bhaved dosah/
nasti ca mama pratijñā tasmān naivāsti me dosah//
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yadi kimcid upalabhyaṁ pravartayeyaṁ nivartayeyaṁ vā /
paryakṣādiṁhī arthaṁ tad-abhāvāṁ me 'nupālambhāḥ //
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Cited in PrasP 16.9-10 (cf. Johnston and Kunst (1951) p. 128 n. 2). (Tib.) ed. Tucci (1929) p. 37. Our text’s variant for pāda is visibly inferior to that of the Tibetan Canon; therefore, it has been corrected.


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pratisedhayāmi nāhaṁ kimcit pratisedhyam asti na ca kimcit /
tasmāt pratisedhayasya adhīlaya eṣa tvayā kriyate //
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(Tib.) ed. Tucci (1929) p. 67. In this verse, the variants of our text are better than those of the Tibetan Canon: pāda b is much closer to the Sanskrit and in pāda d the reading (*skur pa*) proposed as improvement by Johnston and Kunst (1951) p. 145 n. 8 is found as proposed.
In the *Exhortation to Kātyāyana* (*Ka tya ya na yi gdam s ngag, Kātyāyana-vāvāda*) the Bhagavan, who knows being and non-being, negated both "it is" and "it is not".¹

One cannot say that he [= Tathāgata] is empty, or that he is not empty. One cannot say that he is both, [i.e., empty and not empty at the same time] or neither [i.e., not empty and not not-empty at the same time]. [These terms] are to be used as designations (*gdags pa, prajñapti*).²

And in Nāgārjuna’s *Acintyastava* (kk 21-22ab):³

"It is" is an eternalistic view. "It is not" is a nihilistic view. Therefore, you taught the Dharma which is free from the two extremes (*mtha’ gnyis, anta-dvaya*) and said that phenomena are free from the four extremes (*mu bzhi, catuṣkoti*).

In the *Ratnāvalī* [I k 57 of Nāgārjuna]:⁴


*Kātyāyanāvāvāde cāsūtī nāstītī cobbhayam /
pratisiddham bhagavata bhavabhava-vibhavina //


śūnyam it na vaktavyam aśūnyam iī vā bhavet /
bhayaṁ nobhayāṇaṇaḥ ceti prajñapti-artham tu kathate //

3. ACS kk 21-22ab (rest. Skt.):

*aśūtī śāśvata-grāho nāstītī uccheda-darśanam /
antadvaya-vihiṇas tad-dharma ‘yaṁ deśitas tvayā /
catuṣkoti-viṇirmuktā dharmas tat kathitas tvayā /

Cf. MM XV k 10ab.


*nāstiko durgatiṁ yāti sugatiṁ yāti cāṣṭiḥaḥ /
yathābhūta-parijñānaṁ mokṣam advaya-nāśritaḥ //
Nihilists proceed to bad rebirths (ngan 'gro, durgati). Eternalists go to good rebirths (bde 'gro, sugati). Those who do not rely on the two [extremes], because they know reality as it is (yang dag ji bzhin, yathābhūta) become liberated.

[103b4] Similarly, the master Āryadeva says in the *Catuḥṣataka* (k 400):¹

It is impossible to criticise, even after a long period of time, someone who does not assert of something that it exists, does not exist, or that it both does and does not exist.

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¹ Cf. Vaidya (1923) p. 128 and 167; Bhattacharya V (1931) p. 296. The reading in *Blo gsal grub mtha'* resembles that of the MA k 68 (D. 55b1, P. 51a6; MAV D. 72a1, P. 69b8-70a1) cited also in the *Jñānasārasamuccaya-nibandhana* (P. 51b5, (Tib.) ed. Mimaki (1976) p. 206) by Bodhibhadra:
Also, in the *Jñānasārasamuccaya* [(k 28)](k 28) of tantric Āryadeva):\(^1\)

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-na san nāsan na sad-asan na cāpy anubhayātmakam /
catuṣkoti-vinirmuktaṁ tattvaṁ mādhyaṁ mukkā ṛṣiṣāḥ //,
and also in *Sarvasiddhāntasamgraha* III k 7:

-na san nāsan na sad-asan na cobbhābhyāṁ vilakṣaṇam/
catuṣkoti-vinirmuktaṁ ta[t]vaṁ mādhyaṁ mukkā ṛṣiṣāḥ //

The Tibetan of our text is a bit different from that of the JSS:

-yod min med min yod med min / gnyis ka'i bdag nyid kyang min pas /
-mthaʿbzhi las grol dbu ma pa / mkhas pa mams kyi de kho na'o //,
and much closer to that of the BCAP (P. 213a8):

-yod min med min yod med min / gnyis kyi bdag nyid du yang med /
-mtha' bzhi dag nges grol ba / de nyid dbu mar mkhas mams bzhes //.

Following Bodhibhadra's commentary (JSSN P. 51b1-3, tr. ed. Mimaki (1976) p. 204-7), the third and fourth of the four extremes of the JSS k 28ab are successively the negation of non-existence/non-non-existence and the negation of existence/non-existence: not the usual order. But the reading of our text takes the normal order of the four extremes: the negation of existence/non-existence for the third extreme and that of non-existence/non-non-existence for the fourth (cf. also MRP following). It is now known that the SMVK by Jitāri is composed of exactly the same verses as the kk 21-28 as the JSS and that the SMVK k 8 is the same verse as the JSS k 28. The SMVK k 8 (P. [101] 5296 ha 64b7-8, P. [103] 5461 gi 209a6-7, P. [146] 5867 nyo 283a8) reads:

-yod min med min yod med min / gnyis kyi bdag nyid du yang med /
-mtha' bzhi dag nges grol ba 1 / dbu ma de nyid mkhas pa  'dod //

The same verse is cited twice in the MRP (P. 342b3-4 and 345b3) by the second Bhāvaviveka:

-yod min med min yod med min / gnyi ga min' pa ma yin te2 /
-mtha' bzhi las ni mam grol ba / de nyid dbu ma pa yis rig /

\(^{1} \text{ba' \text{i} [146].} \)

\(^{2} \text{ma 342 la 342 mu 342} \)

In the MRP, the verse is attributed to Āryadeva, whereas in the SS it is attributed to Saraha. There is one commentary in the Tibetan non-Canonical works for the JSS by Mi pham contained in *Collected Writings of 'Jam-mgon 'Ju Mi-pham-rgya-mtsho*, vol.II, Gangtok, 1975, p. 297-323 (fol. 1-13b4). See Mimaki (1982).
Those skilled in the Middle Way assert a truth definitely free from the four extremes which does not exist, does not not exist, does not both exist and not exist and is not something that is neither.

[103b6] The master Kamalaśīla also said in the Tattvāloka:¹

> The self-realized truth, which is free from every elaboration of being and non-being, etc., and is at peace, is taught as being that from which conventional designations (tha snyad, vyavahāra), etc., have been removed.

These quotations teach how ultimately (de kho nar) [things are] beyond existence and non-existence.²

[104a1] All these [quotations teach 1) how things exist conventionally, 2) ultimately do not exist and 3) are beyond being and non-being, etc.] as well as the reasons (rtags, liṅga) to be discussed [below] are to establish what the master [Nāgārjuna] set forth [in the first lines of his Mūlamadhyamika-kārikā]:³

[Homage to the Buddha] who taught dependent-arising, which is free of cessation, production, annihilation, permanence, coming, going, diversity, unity and in which elaboration is stilled.

[8. Diverse points of view of the Mādhyamikas]

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¹ TA (D. 273a3-4, P. 312a4). The same verse was already cited in BSGT 101a2.
² A visible blank here has been filled by the addition of de.

> anirodhām anutpādam anucchedam aśāśvatam /
> anekārtham anānārtham anāgāmam anirgāmam //
> yaḥ pratīya-samutpādaḥ prapticopaśamaḥ śivam /
> deśayāmāsa saṃbuddhas taṃ vande vadatām varaṃ ///
[8.1. Criticism of the attachment to emptiness as an absolute]

[The Buddha] said that those attached to non-existence are incurable (bsgrub tu med pa, asādhya). Therefore, those who desire liberation should not take emptiness as an absolute (mtshan ma, nimitta).

(k XII-13)

[104a3] The Bhagavan said that Mādhyamikas who are attached to emptiness (stong pa nyid, śūnyatā) are incurable (bsgrub tu med pa, asādhaya). This is spoken of many times. For example, in the Kāśyapaparivarta of the Ratnakūṭa Sūtra:

Better the view of the transitory collection ('jig tshogs la lta ba, satkāyadrṣṭi) as solid as Mt. Sumeru than the conceited person’s (mngon pa’i nga rgyal can, adhimānika) view of the emptiness of all dharmas. It is not a view, because views are removable but this [conceit] is incurable (gsor mi rung ba, acikitsya).

and,

For example, a doctor gives a man a purgative to remove an illness (nad, roga). If, having cleared out the morbid elements (nad, doṣa) [the purgative itself] is not eliminated the cause of the illness (nad, nidāna) [will

1. Cf. Kāśyapaparivarta 64: varaṇi khalu puna Kāśyapa Sumeru-mātrā pudgalā-drṣṭir āśriā na tv evādhimānākasya śūnyatā-drṣṭimālinā / tat kasmād dheto pudgalā-drṣṭi-gatānām Kāśyapa śūnyatā niḥsaraṇaṇi śūnyatā-drṣṭi puna Kāśyapa kena niḥsarīṣyantih /; (Tib.) 'Od srung gang zag tu lta ba ri rab tsam la gans pa bla’i / mngon pa’i nga rgyal can stong pa nyid du lta ba ni de lta ma yin no / de ci’i phyir zhe na / 'Od srung lta bar gyur pa thams cad las byung ba ni stong pa nyid yin na / 'Od srung gang stong pa nyid kho nar lta ba de ni gsror mi rung ngo zhes nges bshad do /.' Cited in PrasP 248.9-11 (Tib. P. 96a2-3), MĀI P. 157b6-7, where there is gang zag instead of 'jig tshogs.
2. Cf. PrasP 248.11 (Tib.) P. 96a3
3. For doṣa as a technical term of Indian medicine see, for ex., L’Inde classique 1651, 1657.
remain] and there will not be recovery. In the same way, though emptiness is the best thing to get a person out of the slough of [wrong] views ('byin pa, niḥsarana), if someone views emptiness as an absolute he is incurable. Thus spoke the Victor (rGyal ba, Jina).\(^1\)

[104a5] And the master [Nāgārjuna] also says in the Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā (XIII k 8):\(^2\)

All the Jinas (rGyal ba, Jina) have declared that emptiness gets one out of (nges par 'byin pa, niḥsarana) all [false] views, [but] that those who view emptiness [as an absolute] are incurable (bsgrub tu med pa, asādhya).

Also in the Ratnāvalī (II k 20):\(^3\)

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1. Cf. KP 65 (with Tib. and Chin.):
   
   \[
   \text{yatāḥ hi vaiḍyō puruṣasya dadyādd virecanaṁ roga-vinigrāhāya} / 
   \text{uccālya doṣāḥ ca na niḥsaret ca na copāśānti} / 
   \text{...em eva dṛṣṭī-gahanāśrīṣṭu yā śūnyatā niḥsaranaṁ paraṁ hi} / 
   \text{sāṣī ...}(incomplete)... 
   \]


   \[
   \text{śūnyatā sarvadṛśīnām proktā niḥsarasānaṁ jinaṁ} / 
   \text{yesām tu śūnyatā-dṛṣṭis tān asādhīyaṁ babhāśire} // 
   \]


   \[
   \text{aparo 'py asya durjñānān mārkaḥ paṭḍita-māṇīkaḥ} / 
   \text{pratikṣepa-vināṣṭāṁ yāty avīcim adhomukhaḥ} // 
   \]

   Cited in PrasP 496.8-9 (cf. Tucci, ibid. n. 1). (Tib.) C. 120a, D. 111a7-b1, N. 129a, P. 134b; ed Hahn (1982).
Moreover, stupid because he apprehends this [Dharma] wrongly he is stupid and conceited in his learning and, through abandoning [Dharma], destroys himself and goes headfirst (spyi tshugs, adhomukha) into the Avīci Hell (mnar med pa).

Also in the *Lokātishastava* (k 21):¹

You taught the nectar of emptiness to remove all [wrong ideas (*kun rtog, samkalpa*). You censure strongly anyone who becomes attached to that.

Therefore, the wise who desire liberation will completely remove the view which regards emptiness as an absolute (*mtshan ma, nimitta*).

[8.2 The object of negation for the Mādhyamika]

[104b2] Examining the Mādhyamikas’ object of negation (*dgag par bya ba, pratiṣedhya*).

Here, the object of negation is just the belief in the truth [of appearances and emptiness] and not the appearances [themselves]. This is because [there is] suffering in that

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¹ *Lokātishastava* k 21 (cf. tr. LVP (1913) p. 14). The Skt. is found in BCAP 174.8-9 and 197.27-8:

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sarva-samkalpa-haneya śūnyatāmṛta-deśaṇā /
yasya tasyām api grāhas tvayāśāv avasāditaḥ /
```
[belief] and also because it is not necessary or possible [to negate] appearances.

(k XII-14)

[104b3] Since it is not necessary (dgos pa, prayojana) to negate mere appearances, or even possible to negate them, mere appearances are not the object of negation here. Therefore, believing in the truth of appearances and emptiness, which is the basis of all suffering, is the object of negation. As said in Jñānagarbha’s Satyadvayavibhaṅga [-kārikā (k 28)]:

We do not negate the appearance: it is not logical to negate anything that is experienced.

Also in the Madhyamakālaṅkāra [-kārikā (k 78) by Śāntarakṣita]:

We do not negate as a self, what is, in essence, an appearance. Therefore the presentation of what is to be proved (bsgrub pa, sādhyā) and a proof (sgrub pa, sādhana) is not disturbed.

[104b5] The master Kamalaśīla also said in the Tattvāloka:

Since the identities of conventional realities such as perceptibles, etc., (mthong ba, dṛṣṭya) which have a conventional nature are not negated, direct perception (mngon sum, pratyakṣa) is not excluded; the imaginary constructions (brtags pa, kalpita) are negated.

1. SDVK k 28 (C. 3a1, D. 2b7), cited also in SDVV (C. 12a6, D. 12a6).
2. MA k 78 (C. 55b6, D. 55b6, N. 47a4, P. 51b4), also cited in MAV (C. 75a2, D. 75a2-3, N. 69a7, P. 73b6-7). Our text has bsgrub pa and sgrub pa instead of sgrub pa and bsgrub bya like the MA: the order is inverted, but the meaning remains the same.
3. TA (D, 262a5 P. 297b5).
Similarly, the Madhyamaka-Tattvātāra [by Śrīgupta] states:

With the correct view (yang dag lta ba, samyag-dṛṣṭi), even the most subtle things [i.e. partless particles] are not taken as objective support. So they say there is no self-nature, but not because of rejecting appearances.

The master Śāntideva also said [in the Bodhicaryāvatāra (IX k 26)]:

Here, [that which] is seen, known or heard should not be negated. Here, the idea [of these] as true which is the cause of suffering should be removed.

The manner of negating [the belief in truly existent things is] also explained by the master [Nāgārjuna] in the Vigrahavyāvartani (k 23):

Like a [magical] creation (sprul pa, nirmitaka) obstructing [another magical] creation; like an illusory man (sgyu

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1. One of the antaraśloka of the Tattvāvatāravṛtti (D. 41b3-4, P. 46b5). Śrīgupta's Tattvāvatāra is not in the bsTan 'gyur, but is completely conserved in the Tattvāvatāravṛtti, the autocommentary. There is a Japanese translation of the first, taken from the second, in Ejima (1980) p. 219-21.

2. BCA IX k 26 (cf. tr. LVP (1907b) p. 116-7):
   yathā drṣṭam śrutiṃ jñātānāḥ naiveda pratīṣṭhāyate /
   satyataḥ kalpanā tv atra duḥkha-hetur nivāryate //

   nirmitaka nirmitakaḥ māyāpuruṣaḥ svamāyayaḥ sṛṣṭam /
   pratīṣṭhāyeta yadvat pratīṣṭhado 'yam tathaiva syāt //
   sprul pa yis ni sprul pa dang / sgyu ma yi ni skyes bu yis /
   sgyu mas phyung la 'gog byed ltar / 'gog pa de yang de bzhin 'gyur //
ma'i skyes bu, māyā-puruṣa) obstructing another magical illusion, so is negation said [to function].

[8.3 Reasoning that negates the belief]

Since what proves the two truths is the reasoning (rīgs pa, yuṅkti) that stops belief [in true existence], it is explained next.

Since the variety of [things] are just appearances and are also empty of truth, they are like a dream and a magical illusion. [If they] do not appear or are true [they] are not a magical illusion.

(k XII-15)

[105a3] The variety of [things] appearing as apprehended (gzung ba, grāhaya) and apprehender (‘dzin pa, grāhaka) are nothing more than mere appearance to that which is conscious of each of them, and since when they are analyzed they are also empty of truth, it is thus established that they appear like a dream and a magical illusion etc. and are without self-nature. If they had a nature of truth, did not appear or had a true self-nature they would not be like a magical illusion, since a magical illusion [merely] appears in consciousness and is devoid of real entity.

[105a5] The Bhagavan also said:

Form (gzugs, rūpa) is like a dream and a magical illusion.
Feeling (tshor ba, vedanā) is also like a dream and a magical illusion.¹

¹. Original source not identified.
Also in the Lankāvatārasūtra (X k 130 = II k 148)¹:

The three existences are like imaginary falling hairs (skra shad, keśonḍuka), are a misconception, like mirage water (smig rgyu'i chu, marīcyudaka), are like a dream (rmi lam, svapna) and a magical illusion (sgyu ma, māyā): those who meditate thus will be liberated.

[105a6] The master [Nāgārjuna] also stated in the Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā (VII k 34)²:

Like a dream, a magical illusion, a city of Gandharvas (dri za'i grong khyer, gandharavanagara): it is taught that production (skye, utpāda), abiding (gnas, sthāna) and disintegration ('jig pa, bhaṅga) are like that.

It is also stated in the Śûnyatāsaptati (k 66)³:

1. Lank X k 130 ( = II k 148) (cf. tr. Izumi (1927) 55,161, Suzuki (1932) p. 83, Yasui (1976) 85, 252; 2 k 150 following them):
   keśonḍuka-prakhyam idam marīcy-udaka-vibhramam¹ /
   tribhavana svapna-māyābham² vibhāvento vimucyate //
¹-vibhramat ²-akhyām²
(Tib.) P. 179a1 (=102b2). Lank X k 130 and II k 148 are almost identical in Skt., but are considerably different in Tibetan. The comparison of variants reveals that dBus pa blo gsal consulted Lank X k 130. Compare with the Tibetan version (P.) of the Lank II k 148:
   srid gsum 'di ni rmi lam dang / skra shad 'dzings dang sgyu ma 'dra /
   smig rgyu chu bzhin nor ba ni / rnam par bsgoms na rnam par grol //
   yathā māyā yathā svapno gandharvanagarāṃ yathā /
   tathotpādas tathā sthānāṃ tathā bhaṅgā udāhṛtāṃ //
Composites (’du byed, saṃskāra) are similar to a city of Gandharvas, a magical illusion, a mirage, imaginary falling hairs, froth (lbu pa, phena), a bubble (chu bur, budbuda), a magical creation (sprul pa, nirmita) a dream and a circle drawn by a firebrand (mgal me’i ’khor lo, alātacakra).

[105b2] These [citations] establish that conventional [truth] appears and is devoid of self-nature.

[8.4 The Mādhyamika subject]

[105b2] [Objection:] Since commonly appearing subjects (mthun par snang ba’i chos can) do not exist [for the Mādhyamika] it is impossible [to present] a reason that establishes the two truths.

[Response:] Just as mere sound free of specifications (khyad par, viśeṣāna) is established, so mere appearance bereft of parts is not not established for both [debators].

[105b3] For example, for the two [debators of which one as Vaiśeṣika] asserts that sound (sgra, śabda) is a quality of space [and the other as Buddhist asserts that it] is a secondary element, mere sound is established for both as a common appearance (mthun snang). Similarly, [for the Mādhyamika] here also just the mere appearance bereft of true and false parts is established for both debators (rgol ba, vādin) and is the subject (chos can dharmin); therefore there is no fault. If one says this is not true, one denies one’s own experience and thus becomes even more stupid than a Lokāyata (’Jig rten rgyang phan pa); one would also not be able to negate the wrong ideas of the opponents (pha rol po, para) by [exposing] the [internal] contradictions (nang ’gal) inherent in their assertion, due to the fact that the basis (gzhi, āśraya) of the specification would not be is established.
It is also said by the master Kamalaśīla [in the Tattvāloka]:

There would ensue the fault that in consequence a basis for the refutation of a permanent functioning thing and for a refutation of a quality (yon tan, guna) [substantially different from a dravya], etc., would not be established if that [basis] were not present here. There would be no valid cognition and then in consequence the convention of it not being [permanent or substantially different] would not come about relative to this [basis]. And why wouldn’t this fault [of not being able to establish a given base as devoid of a wrongly-imputed specification] also come about even if there were a valid cognition? [It would since you deny a basis common to both debators].

Therefore, the Mādhyamikas, who teach all phenomena to be devoid of an identity, assert as the subject a mere appearance which is known [by all], from the wise to the cowherds (gnag rdzi, gopala). For as stated in the Satyadvagavibhaṅga [-kārikā (kk 18-19) by Jñānagarbha]:

To the extent that the appearance factor exists in the consciousnesses of the two [debators], to that extent, depending on that, there is an understanding of subject and attribute, etc., [in common for the two]. Then, there is an inference. Otherwise, there is not. Therefore, if the logicians (rigs pa smra ba, nyāyavādin) use such [inferences], who could refute them?

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1. TA (D. 260b7-261a1, P. 296a3-5).
2. SDVK kk 18-19 (C. 2b3-4, D. 2b2-3), also cited in SDVV (C. 9b5-6, D. 9b5-6). These verses were already cited in BSGT 101b6-102a1.
Also from the *Madhyamakālaṅkāra* [kk 76-7) by Santarakṣita]:

Leaving aside particular subjects which crop up in doctrine, all these things which prove and are to be proved apply to things known [by all] from the wise to women and children. If that weren’t the case, how could you respond with the answer "the basis is not established," (āśrayāsiddha) etc., [when someone says the hare’s horn is sharp because its a horn].

and also in the *Tattvāloka* [by Kamalaśīla]:

Moreover, the actual thing is properly thought to be the actual thing which is the subject wherever it’s from the point of view of being something.

and:

Since the experts of logic (*rigs pa shes pa, yukti-jñā*) always make as the subject something that is in conformity with the property, the wise [i.e., who understand *sūnyatā* inferentially] speak of their own subject.

The subject is something without self-being which is in conformity with the non-existent nature which is to be established in respect of it. Therefore, it is not [true] that the [subject of the thesis] is not established (*ma grub pa, asiddha)*

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1. MA kk 76-77 (C. 55b4-5, D. 55b5-6, N. 47a3-4, P. 51b3-4), also cited in MAV (C. 75a1-2, D. 75a1-2, N. 69a6-7, P. 73b5-6). Cf. MAP P. 130b2-6.
2. TA (D. 260b1, P. 295b2-3).
3. TA (D. 260b2-3, P. 295b4-5). The variant of our text for pāda b of the first verse ought be noted.
[8.5. The object to be proved for the Mādhyamika]:

The author of the Madhyamakaśāstra (Nāgārjuna) and his commentators clearly assert that the mere negation of the object of negation, explained earlier, is the object to be proved, by the reasons that will be explained.

(k XII-17)

[106a6] [Nāgārjuna and his successors] assert that the mere negation of the above mentioned imaginary true, permanent or produced etc., is the object to be proved by the reasons that will be explained. As the master [Nāgārjuna] said [in the Lokaparīkṣā]¹:

Here, one asserts the negation of existence but [in doing so] does not establish non-existence.

[106b1] The master Bhāvaviveka also said [in the Madhyamakahṛdaya (V k 106)]²:

Therefore, even though the object of inference is not established as real; [inference] removes what is not concordant with (mi mthun phyogs, vipakṣa) knowledge of reality.

The master Jñānagarbha also [said in the Satyadvayavibhaṅgakārikā (kk 29-30)]³:

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1. _The Lokaparīkṣā_ (‘Jig rten brtag pa) by Nāgārjuna. Bhāvaviveka cites the verse in question in his Prajñāpradīpa and Avalokitavrata specifies the title of the work in his Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā. Cf. _Prajñāpradīpa_ (P.[95] (5253) tsha 114b4).

2. MH V k 106 (D. 24a3, P. 26b7-8; cf. Tib. ed. tr. Yamaguchi S. (1964a) p. 38 from the end). The Skt. ms. reads:

   _ato 'numāna-visayaṃ na tā(t)vaṃ pratipadyate /
   ta(t)va-jñāna-vipakṣo yas tasya tena nirākriyā //

3. SDVK kk 29-30 (C. 3a1-2, D. 2b7-3a1), also cited in SDVV (C. 12a7 and 12b1-2, D. 12a7 and 12b2). The comparison of variants demonstrates again that dBus pa blo gsal
The aspects of production, etc., which do not appear, but which others imagine as real, are negated.

So it is right to negate just such imaginaries. This non-imaginary refutation hurts self alone.

The master Kamalaśīla also [said in the *Tattvāloka*]:

In order to prove in detail the selflessness of all phenomena, we assert here again in a proper manner (*ji ltar rigs pas, yathāyogam*) the non-mistaken reasons.¹

and:

Having got to the relationship [between the *hetu* and *sādhyā*] from those, through language [or conventions] and eliminated the imaginary entity as real, what else is there for fools to argue about?²

---

1. Reasonings that prove that phenomena do not have self-nature³

---

1. TA (D. 261b6-7, P. 297a5-6).
2. TA (D. 262a6-7, P. 297b8).
[9.1. Reason: dharmas are empty of being singularities or pluralities]

[106b4] Now the explanation of reasonings that prove [that phenomena are empty].

Since in their diversity things lack self-nature, singular or plural, ultimately, they are without a true self-nature, like [objects in] a dream. (k XII-18)

[106b5]
[Minor:] These appearances of form and so forth lack self-nature, singular or plural.

[Major:] That which lacks self-nature, singular or plural, in reality, does not ultimately have true self-nature. For example, like a dream [object].

[Conclusion: These things do not ultimately have true self-nature]

[This syllogism is based on the non-perception of the pervasion (khyab par byed pa mi dmigs pa, vyāpakānupalabdhi). That a valid reason must first have the mode of being a property of the subject (phyogs chos, pakṣa-dharma) was established by the expert of logic (Rigs pa mkhyen pa = Dharmakīrti). As it is stated in the Pramāṇavārttika (IV k 22):

Given that it [the subject, for example, sound] precedes the pervasion, even without it [the pervasion], just through

1. It is necessary to understand here the following pervasion (khyab pa vyāpū): having an ultimately real nature is pervaded by having a singular or plural nature. That which pervades (khyab par byed pa, vyāpaka) is having a singular or plural nature. It is not found here; hence, what is pervaded by it is also not found.
2. PV IV k 22:
   vyāpti-pūrve vināpy asmāt kṛtakah śabda īdṛśah /
   sarve 'nityā iti prokte 'py arthāt tan-nāśadhīr bhavet //
saying, 'Sound is a product; all things like that are impermanent' that [sound] is implicitly understood as disintegrating.

Also in the Vādanyāya:

Here, [there is] no determined order [for the two premises] because there is no difference between the two [types of premises] in regard to what one wants to establish. Having established first that the subject exists, then the pervasion is established. For example,

[Minor:] Sound exists or is created.

[Major:] Everything like that [i.e. that exists or is created] is impermanent, like a pot and so forth

and:

On this [point] there is not even a slight determination, and in a particular demonstration, one should formulate the members [of the syllogism in any order].

---

1. VN 8.3-5 (cf. ed. Sāṅkṛtyāyana (1935-6) 6.2-5): 

   atrāpi na kaścit kramaniyamaḥ; īṣṭārtha-
   siddher ubhayatrāviśeṣat / dharminiś prāk sattvaṃ prasādhyā paścād api vyāptih prasādhyata
   eva / yathā-san śabdah kṛtako vā, yaś caivaṃ sa sarvo 'nityah, yathā—ghaṭādir iti / 1
   yasmād dharmini Shastri; (Tib.) C 326a2-3, D. 327a1-3, N. 384a7-b2, P. 365a6-8.

2. VN 103.7-8 (cf. ed. Sāṅkṛtyāyana (1935-6) 108.5-6): 

   na hy atra kaścit samayah
   pratyāyanāviśeṣe'py evam evāvayavāḥ1 prayoktavyā iti / 1 evāvayavāḥ Sāṅkṛtyāyana, eva
   śabdāḥ (?) Shastri; (Tib.) C. 345b7-346a1, D. 347b3-4, N. 408a4, P. 390a5-6.
[Being] one and [being] many is mutually exclusive.
Since [being one and being many] is related in existence
[being one] is negated by [something being] many [i.e., by
its having parts]. Just that [negation of being one]
establishes the negation of the plurality.  (k XII-19)

[107a4] Since being many is mutually exclusive with being one,
something’s appearance as many [i.e., having parts] negates its being
one. This is because the mutual exclusivity [between an hypothetical
one and many] is established. Since being one and many are related in
existence, through the negation of one, many is negated, since the
relation [between many and the hypothetical one it is built up on] is
negated.

[107a5] Moreover, since these [objects] which appear in their
variety within a bifurcation into subject and object (gzung 'dzin,
grāhya-grāhaka) have spatial and temporal parts, they do not exist as
one. Hence, they are also not established as a plurality which is a
composite. Therefore, this reason is not unproven.

[107a6] It exists in the concordant example (mthun pa'i phyogs,
sapakṣa) and not in the disconcordant example (mi mthun pa'i phyogs,
vipakṣa); therefore, it does not prove the opposite ('gal ba, viruddha)
and is not non-ascertained (ma nges pa, anaikāntika). This [reasoning]
shows emptiness (stong pa nyid, śūnyatā) as one of the three doors of
liberation (rnam par thar pa'i sgo, vimokṣamukha)¹ [and consists in]
egating [thing’s self-nature] after having analyzed the nature. It is

¹ For the three doors of liberation, see, for ex., the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa (Tib. P. [34] (843)
bu 228a1-3) and AKBh 450.6-8 (ad AK VIII k 25) cf. tr. LVP (1971) viii p. 187): nirmālas
tu vimokṣamukha-trayam (AK VIII k 25a¹-b) / anāsravās tv ete trayaḥ samādyhas trīṇi
vimokṣamukhāny ucyante / śūnyatā vimokṣamukham apranihitam ānimitām vimokṣamukham
iti /; (Tib.) P. ngu 87b8-88a1: de dag dri med mam thar sgo gsum mo / ting nge 'dzin gsum
po de dag dri ma med pa ni thar pa'i sgo yin pa'i phyir mam par thar pa'i sgo stong pa nyid
dang / mam par thar pa'i sgo smon pa med pa dang / mtshan ma med pa ste / rnam par thar
pa'i sgo gsum zhes bya'o /. For other references, see LVP (1971) viii p. 187 n. 2.
stated in the _Madhyamakālaṅkāra_ (k 1):

[Assertion:] These things talked about by ourselves and others [i.e. opponents] do not have self-nature.

[Reason:] Because in reality they are not singular or plural.

[Example:] Like a reflection (gzugs brnyan, pratibimba).

[9.2. The reason which destroys like a diamond bit: the impossibility of production from the four causes]

That which is not produced from the four extremes is not produced. This is a diamond bit (rdo rje gzegs ma, vajrakana) which destroys the rock of the Substantialists (dNgos por smra pa, Bhāvavādin). (k XII-20)

[107b2]

[Major:] Whatever is free from being produced from self, other [things], both [self and other], and causelessly, in reality is not produced, like space.

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1. MA k 1 (C. 53a1, D. 53a1-2, N. 44a5-6, P. 48b8), cited also in MAV (C. 56b6-7, D. 56b7, N. 48a6-7, P. 52b5-6). The Sanskrit is found in BCAP 173.17-8: 

\[
nihsvabhāvā amī bhāvās tattvataḥ sva-paroditāḥ / 
ekāneka-svabhāvena viyogāt pratibimba-vat /
\]

It is worth noting that Se ra rJe btsun pa Chos kyi rgyal mtshan (1469-1546) cites this verse in his bsTan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan 'grel pa dang bcas pa'i mam bshad rnam pa gnyis kyi dka' ba'i gnad gsal bar byed pa legs bshad skal bzang gi rol msho (abridged title: sKabs dang po'i spyi don, Ser byes, 25a7-b1), but with the variant bden par med de instead of rang bzhin med de for pāda c. This must be connected with the Tibetan interpretation of the Svātantrikas and the Prāsaṅgikas concerning the acceptance of conventional truth: the Svātantrikas assert as conventional truth that which is established by its own nature - inherently-existent (rang bzhin gyis grub pa), although they do not assert it as truly established (bden par grub pa); the Prāsaṅgikas do not assert either on the plane of conventional truth. See the discussion, for ex., in LS.
Appearances as things are also free from being produced from self, other, both and causelessly.

Conclusion: Appearances, in reality, are not produced.

This syllogism is based on reasoning to what is not found based on the vyāpaka (khyab par byed pa mi dmigs pa, vyāpakānupalabdhi).

Among those [four extremes], production from self:

If the effect is not different from the cause [the effect] is established [as the cause]; therefore, production would be senseless. Also, if [the effect] is not established it is not logical that the effect is produced, because the cause would not exist.

Production from other and production from both.

If [the cause is] destroyed [at the moment of the production of the effect the destroyed cause] would not be able [to produce an effect]. And even if [the cause is] not destroyed [at the moment of production of the effect, it would follow that the cause exists] at the same time [as the effect]. Therefore, there is no cause so it is not [possible] that the cause exists. What is produced from other and both?

Causeless production

---

1. It is necessary to understand here the following pervasion: production in reality is pervaded by a production from the four extremes. That which pervades is a production from the four extremes: it is that which is not perceived in these appearances. Hence, the non-perception of that which pervades.
2. A verse from BSGT, chapter IV (Grangs can pa, Sāṃkhya) 22a2.
3. According to the context, this must also be a verse from BSGT.
If there is no cause [it follows that] what is produced would happen a certain time and not at another [dependent on cause]. Even sharp thorns and so forth are produced from their own causes. [Your] example [to show causeless production] is not established.1

I have explained [all this] earlier in the refutation of the Sāṃkhya and other [schools]; therefore, this reason [of the second syllogism, i.e., non-production from the four extremes] is not unproven. This [reason] exists in concordant examples (mthun pa’i phyogs, sapakṣa) such as space, a reflection, etc., and is absent from discordant examples (mi mthun pa’i phyogs, vipakṣa); therefore, it does not prove the opposite (’gal ba, viruddha) and also is not non-ascertained (ma nges pa, anaikāntika).

[107b6] With this reason, called "The Diamond Bit" (rdo rje gzegs ma, vajra-kaṇa) the rock mountain of the Substantialists (dNgos por smra ba, Bhāvavādin) is entirely destroyed. As Kamalaśīla stated [in the Tattvāloka]2:

It is the subtle diamond (rdo rje phra mo, sūkṣma-vajra) since it entirely destroys the rock of things that ourselves and others discuss and since it is not even turned back by all four extremes.

[108a1] This [reasoning] shows [the meditation of] signlessness (mtshan ma med ba, ānimitta) as one of the three doors of liberation and consists in negating [the self-nature of things] after having analyzed the cause [of things]. The master [Nāgārjuna] also said in the Mūlamadhyamika-kārikā (I k l)3:

---
1. A verse from BSGT, chapter III ('Jig rten rgyang phan pa, Lokāyata) 12b3.
2. TA (D. 267b1, P. 304b5-6).
There is never production anywhere, of any thing, from self, from other, from both, or without cause.

[9.3. Reason: the impossibility of the production of an effect]

These external and internal things, in reality, do not arise, since an existent or non-existent result is devoid of coming into being, like space. (k XII-21)

[108a3]
[Major:] The existent or non-existent effect, empty of coming into being, in reality, does not arise, like space.
[Minor:] These appearances as external and internal things are also empty of coming into being as existent or non-existent results.
[Conclusion: These appearances, in reality, are not produced.]

[This syllogism is based on] the reasoning to what is not found based on the vyāpaka (khyab pa byed pa mi dmigs pa, vyāpakānapalabdhi).¹

[108a4] Thus, an existent effect does not arise, because it is already established. A non-existent effect does not arise either, because it is a non-thing. Something non-established becoming established does not arise either since there does not exist another [category] over and above existent effect and non-existent effect; therefore, this reason

¹ It is necessary to understand here the following pervasion: production in reality is pervaded by the coming into being of an effect. That which pervades is the coming into being of an effect: it is not perceived in these appearances; hence the non-perception of that which pervades. In other words, the coming into being associated with an effect is vyāpaka, or pervader of coming into being. This is one reason to the non-findability of what is pervaded by the absence of what pervades.
is not unproved. Since the pervasion (khyab pa, vyapti) is established as above [where examples are in the concordant example and not in the discordant example], it does not prove the opposite ('gal ba, virodha) nor is it non-ascertained (ma nges pa, anaikāntika).

[108a5] This [reasoning] shows [the meditation of] wishlessness (smon pa med pa, apranihita) [as one of the three] doors of liberation and consists in negating [the self-nature of things] after having analyzed the effects [of things]. It is also said by the master [Nāgārjuna] in the Śūnyatāsaptati (k 4ab):

Existence is not produced, because it exists [already].
Non-existence is not produced, because it is non-existent.

[9.4. Reason: dependent-arising]

Wherever has an immutable self-nature could not possibly be a dependent-arising. All things do not have self-nature, because they are dependent-arisings, like [for example] a reflection.

1. SSap k 4ab (C. 24b1, D. 24b1, N. 24a6, P. 27a7; cf. tr. Yamaguchi S. (1972) p. 15, Uryūzu (1974) p. 92). Whereas SSap k 66 cited earlier in BSGT 105b1-2 corresponds well enough to its canonical version, SSap k 4ab cited here differs considerably, and corresponds more to that cited in the commentaries, although even there it does not correspond literally. First, the canonical version of the SSap k 4ab:

\[
yod phyir yod pa skye min te / med phyir med pa' skye ma yin /
\]

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\[
yod phyir yod pa skye min te / med phyir med pa' skye ma yin /
\]
[108b1]

[Major:] Whatever arises in dependence, in reality, does not have self-nature, like a reflection.

[Minor:] These appearances as things which are the basis of the debate (rtsod pa'i gzhir gyur pa, vivādāspadībhuṭa) arise in dependence.

[Conclusion: These appearances do not have self-nature]

This syllogism is based on reasoning to what is not found based on the vyāpaka (khyab par byed pa 'gal ba dmigs pa, vyāpaka-viruddhopalabdhi).

[108b2] Similarly, transmigratory existence ('khor ba, saṃsāra) is a dependent-arising of ignorance (ma rig pa, avidyā), for it is stated in the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra (Yum):

The Sugata (bDe bar gshegs pa) said that however many sentient beings there are - inferior, middling and supreme, all originate from ignorance.

Liberation (mya ngan las 'das pa, nirvāṇa) is a dependent-arising of the perfection of wisdom (shes rap kyi pha rol tu phyin pa, prajñāpāramitā): It is also stated in the same [Sūtra]:

1. It is necessary to understand here the following pervasion: having self-nature in reality is pervaded by not being produced by conditions. That which pervades is not being produced by conditions, and the opposite of that which pervades is therefore production by conditions: it is just that which is perceived in these appearances; hence the perception of the opposite of that which pervades.

2. RGSG XXVIII k 5ab (cf. tr. Conze (1973) p. 61):

   yāvanta sattva mṛdu-madhyam'-ukṛśa loke
   sarve avidya-prabhavā sugatena uktāḥ /

3 RGSG XXVIII k 6ab (cf. tr. Conze (1973) p. 61):

   yāvanti jñāna-naya-dvāra upāya-mūlāḥ
   sarve ti prajñā- vara-pāramitā-prasūtāḥ /
As many roots, methods, modes and doors of wisdom as there are, all have arisen from the perfection of wisdom.

[108b3] The [positive] pervasion\(^1\) [of the syllogism] is established on a double moon (zla gnyis, dvi-candra), reflection (gzugs brnyan, pratibimba) etc. [The negative pervasion of the syllogism, i.e.,] the negation of dependent-arising pervades the three characteristics\(^2\) of a self-nature and is also established on space. The master (Nāgārjuna) stated [in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (XV k 2cd and 8cd)]:

Self-nature (rang bzhin, svabhāva) is not fabricated (bcos min, akrtrima) and does not depend on other [things].\(^3\) It is never possible for self-nature to change.\(^4\)

[108b5] By this [reasoning], [we] prove that all the phenomena of transmigratory existence and liberation (\(\text{\textquoteright}khor \text{\textquoteleft}das, saṃsāra-nirvāṇa\)) do not have self-nature. Moreover, it is stated in the Anavataptaṇāgarājaprāprccha-[mahāyāna-] sūtra \(^5\):

\(^1\) According to the reading of our text and of the Canon the compound 'upāya-mula' is taken as a dvaṁdvā (thabs dang rtsa ba), contrary to Conze's translation: "As many roots of skillful devices as there are, ...". But the reading of the MsTH (thabs kyi rtsa ba: recension A after Yuyama (1976) p. 110 and 185) justifies his translation.

1. The positive pervasion of the syllogism: that which is produced by conditions does not have self-nature. The negative pervasion of the syllogism: that which has self-nature is not produced by conditions.

2. For the three characteristics of self-nature, see the verses of the MM (XV k 2cd and 8cd) that are be cited immediately below.


\[
\text{akrtrimaḥ svabhāvo hi nirapeksah paratra ca}\]


\[
\text{prakṛter anyathābhāvo na hi jātupapadayate}\]

5. Anavataptaṇāgarājaprāprcchā (D (156) pha 230b2-3, P. [33] (823) pu 238a6):
Whatever is produced by conditions is [in fact] not produced, and does not have a product’s self-nature.\(^1\) Whatever depends on conditions is said to be empty; whoever understands emptiness is cautious (bag yod, apramatta).

The master [Nāgārjuna] also said in the *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā* (VII k 16)\(^2\):

\[\text{rkyen las skyes pa gang yin de' ma skyes }\text{//} \text{de la skye ba ngo bo nyid kyis med /}\]
\[\text{rkyen la rag las gan yin stong par gsungs }\text{//} \text{stong nyid gang shes de ni bag yod pa'o }\text{//}\]

\(^1\) de D, te P \text{//} D, / P

It is evident that our author did not cite this verse directly from the Canon. The Sanskrit is found in a, PrasP 239.10-13 (ad MM XIII k 2), b. id. 491.11-14 (ad MM XXIV k 7), c. id. 500.7-10 (ad MMXXIV k 14), d. id. 504.1-4 (ad MM XXIV k 18), e. BCAP 172.11-14 (ad BCA IX k 2), f. SS 395.22-396.1:

\[\text{yah pratyayair jāyati sa hy ajāto' na' tasya upāda-svabhāvo 'ṣtu' }\]
\[\text{yah pratyayādhīnu sa śūnyā' ukto yah śūnyatām jānati' so 'pramattah }\]
\[\text{'ajāta f 'no a 'upādu svabhāvo abde, upūpāda svabhāvo c,} \]
\[\text{'upāda evāṣya bhavet svabhāvat f 'śūnyu bc 'jānati f} \]


1. On the text and interpretation of the second pāda, see LVP (1932-3a) p. 74, 93. See also May (1959) p. 224 and n. 770.

\[\text{pratīya yad yad bhavati tat tac chāntam svabhāvataḥ /} \]
\[\text{tasmāt updayamāṇam ca śāntam upattir eva ca /} \]

Except for pāda b, the Tibetan version of the Canon is considerably different from our text; it follows:

\[\text{rten cing 'byung ba gang yin pa / de ni ngo bo nyid kyis zhi /} \]
\[\text{de'i phyir skye bzhin nyid dang ni / skye ba yang ni zhi ba nyid /} \]
Whatever arises in dependence is naturally at peace. Consequently, produced and producer are also at peace.

[10. Emptiness itself is not truly existent]

[108b6] Negating the true existence of emptiness:

Since the negated refutation is not true, the negation also has no truth. Hence, all phenomena are pacified of the elaborations of existing and not existing. (k XII-23)

[109a1] Ultimately, the emptiness and non-production etc., which are a negation of true existence, are also not true, because the object of negation which is empty is not true. Furthermore, a negation lacking an object [negated] is not logical. The master [Nāgārjuna] also stated in the Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā (XVIII k 7cd):

The non-void does not exist at all so how could there be a void?

[109a3] Also in [Jñanagarbha's] Satyadvayavibhaṅga [-kārikā (kk 9cd-10ab)]:

Since the object of negation does not exist, it is clear that in reality, the negation does not exist. How could a


   na kimcid asty aśūnyam ca kutah śūnyam bhaviṣyati /

2. SDVK kk 9cd-10ab (C. 2a3-4, D. 2a2-3), cited also in SDVV (C. 6a2-4, D. 6a2-4). k 10ab was already cited in BSGT 99b3. Contrary to other examples concerning this text, the comparison of variants indicates that our text here is closer to the SDVK than the SDVV.
negation of something in essence a conceptual construction not [itself] be a conceptual construction?

[Śāntarakṣīta] also said in the Madhyamakālakāra (kk 71ab and 72ab): ¹

Since production and so forth does not exist, non-production and so forth is impossible. Where there is no object the affixing of a negation is not proper.

[109a4] Therefore, all phenomena pacified of all elaborations of existence, non-existence, both, and neither is the ultimate [truth]. This was explained earlier.²

[11.] Intermediary verse:

Where there is non-existent production, there is neither abiding (gnas pa, sthāna), negation, annihilation, permanence, going, coming, one nor many. (ĀŚ XII-9)

[109a5] These [reasons] prove that the ultimate [truth] is the absence of self-nature. Now, in order to remove objections (rtsod pa, vivāda) to the mode [of proving] absence of self-nature [we present first the opponent’s objections and then our refutations].

¹. MA kk 71ab and 72ab (C. 55b2-3, D. 55b2-3, N. 46b7-47a1, P. 51a8-b1), cited also in MAV (C. 73a4-5, D. 73a5, N. 67a4-5, P. 71b3-4.
². Cf. BSGT 99a5-b2.
[12.1. Objections based on Āgama and the Mādhyamika response]
[12.1.1. General objection]
[12.1.1.a. Objection]

[Objection: The entitylessness of all phenomena is not established in Āgama, since a) no one accepts [all statements to be true], b) they are irrelevant, c) or are understood by way of a hidden intention. (k XII-24)

[109a6] Some of our own schools (rang gi sde pa, sva-yūthya) use the following objection: first of all, that all phenomena lack self-nature is not established in Āgama, since a) no one accepts them to be true; b) the statements merely accord with the beliefs [of certain misguided trainees] and are irrelevant as [statements of] fact. Moreover, since c) when a certain Sūtra says:\n
All phenomena are entityless, non-produced, pacified from the beginning and are naturally in a state of nirvāṇa, it should be understood as requiring interpretation (drang ba'i don, neyartha) so the teaching of the Bhagavan is doctrine understood in terms of various hidden intentions (dgongs pa, abhiprāya).

[12.1.1.b. Mādhyamika response]

[109b2] [Response:] In order to answer [these objections]:

1. Principally the Yogācāra.
2. SNS VII 9 (cf. tr. Lamotte (1935) p. 195). An almost identical passage is cited in BSGT 111a5 with the designation of Samdhinirmocanasūtra. For similar passages in other Sūtras, see Lamotte (1935) p. 193, n. 2. Futhermore, in the MĀI by Kamalaśīla (P. 144a1-2), the same passage is cited with the designation "mdo kha cig las" as in our text. And seen that our author accords considerable importance to Kamalaśīla's philosophy (BSGT 113a1; BSGT 126a6-b1) and that the structure of our text from rubric 12 (BSGT 109a5 and following) seems to be inspired by the MĀI (cf. synopsis of the MĀI in Ejima (1980) p. 228-30), it is possible that dBus pa blo gsal cites the passage in question from the MĀI, and not directly from the SNS.
These foolish reasons are not established because a) the wise accept [such Agama to be true] b) a trustworthy person’s statements (yid ches kyi tshig, äpta-vāda) are not deceptive [with regard to the meaning] (slu ba med pa, avisamvāda) c) and they [the Words that explain the absence of self-nature] teach the ultimate [truth] itself.

(k XII-25)

[109b3] The first reason which you have stated is unproved (ma grub pa, asiddha) because the superior individuals (skyes bu dam pa, saj-jana) wise in ideas assert that the Buddha’s word is good in the beginning, middle and end, like fine gold that can stand up to a triple analysis.1

[109b4] [Your] second reason is also unproved, since a trustworthy person’s statements are not deceptive with regard to the meaning. As the expert of logic (Rigs pa mkhyen pa = Dharmārtha) said [in the Pramāṇavārttika (I k 216)]2:

Since a trustworthy person’s statement (yid ches tshig, äpta-vāda) is universal to the point that it does not change [experience] even if its object is a hidden phenomenon and there is not a category [to classify it], this mind (a trustworthy person’s statement) is declared inference (rjes su dpag pa, anumāna) [by Dignāga3].

1. Three analyses, i.e., burning (bsregs pa, tāpa), cutting (bcad pa, cheda) and rubbing (bdar ba, nikaṣa). This is a frequent example: see, for ex., MĀI [P] 160a7, JSS k 31 = TS k 3587 cited also in TSP 15.23-4.
2. PV I k 216:

   äpta-vādāvisamvāda-sūmānyād anumānātā

   buddher agatyābhigītā parokṣe 'py asya gocare //

3. PVV 324.12: …ācārya-Dignāgabhīhiitā… Here it the PS II k 5 (cf. tr. Kitagawa (1965) p. 92), cf. PS (K) P. 4b2: yid ches tshig ni mi bslu ba / spyi las rjes su dpag pa nyid /. The Sanskrit. is found in NVT 205.17 (cf. Randle (1926) Fragment E) and ŚV Śabdapariccheda
The third reason is also unproved because the Scriptures (gsung rab, pravacana) which teach selflessness and so forth teach ultimate [truth]. As it is asid in the Sarvabuddhaviṣayāvatāra-Jñānalokālaṃkāra-sūtra¹:

Anything definitive in meaning (nges pa'i don, nītārtha) is the ultimate [truth].

And also in the Aksayamatinirdeśa²:

1. Sarvabuddhaviṣayāvatāra-Jñānalokālaṃkāra-nāma-mahāyānasūtra (D. (100) ga 297b2, P. [28] (768) khu 325b2). This passage is cited, for ex., in MĀI[P] 162a6-7 and LRCM kha 5a2 (cf. tr. Nagao (1954) p. 107, Wayman (1978) p. 179). The comparison of the variants indicates that our author has probably cited this passage from the MĀI, and not directly from the Canon. It may be added that Tsong kha pa cites this passage in the same form as in our text. See also the following note.

2. Cf. AMN (P. [34] (842) bu 156a5-7):

Cf. PrasP 43.4-9:

uktam cārāyāksayamatisūtre... / yāvad ye sūitrāntāḥ
śūnyatānimittāpraṇihitānabhisaṃskārājālānupādābhāva[nirātma]niḥ-sattva-
nirjīvanihpugalāsvāmi-vimokṣamukhā nirdiśṭāḥ ta ucyante nīśārthāḥ /.

Cf. also LRCM kha 5a2 (tr. Nagao 107, Wayman 179).

As can be clearly seen, our author does not cite the passage directly from the Canon. It is quite probable that he was inspired by the MĀI (D. 149b5-6, P. 162a7): skye ba med pa la sogs pa yang 'phags pa blo gros mi zad pas bstan pa las / nges pa'i don to zhes bstan te /. Tsong kha pa cites the same passage from the MĀI in his LRCM (kha 5a2; tr. Nagao 107, Wayman 179). But it may be noted that in the LRCM the citation from the MĀI goes from 'de lta bas na' (LRCM 4b8; MĀI D 149b4, P. 162a5) until 'nges so' (LRCM 5a3; MĀI D. 149b6, P. 162a8), and not to 'don yin no' (LRCM 5a1) as Nagao (id. p. 107 and Wayman
[Sūtras which teach] non-production and so forth are also definitive in meaning.

The master Kamalaśīla stated the same [in the Madhyamakālōka]:

We do not cite as authoritative the words of the Bhagavan in order to prove [the absence of self-nature] to the non-Buddhists (mu stegs can, tīrthika) who do not follow the scriptures of the Tathāgata. However, we present it as a scriptural authority [for our view] to those who accept Āgama, when analyzing what the Āgama means.

[12.1.2. Objections of the Vaibhāṣika and the Yogācāra]
[12.1.2.a. Objections]

Some (=Vaibhāṣikas) [object]: [the theory of the Mādhyamikas concerning] the lack of self-nature is not [correct] because [the Bhagavan] set forth sources (skye mched, āyatana) such as forms (gsugs, rūpa). Others (=Yogācāra) say [that absence of self-nature] contradicts the Sūtra which teaches consciousness as ultimate [truth].

[k XII-26]

[110a3] The Vaibhāṣikas assert that it is not correct to say that all phenomena do not inherently exist, because it contradicts the Bhagavan’s statement about sources such as forms. As the Abhidharmasūtra (Chos mngon pa’i mdo) says:

\[\text{id. p. 179)}\text{ thought.}\]
1. MĀl (D. 148b5-6, P. 161a3-4).
2. Cf. AKbh 24.3-5 (ad AK I k 35, cf. tr. LVP (1971) i p. 65): utkānt ca Sūtre caṅṣur bhikṣo ādhyātmikaṁ āyatanaṁ catvāri mahābhūtāṁ upādāya rūpa-prasādo rūpy anidarṣanam
What is the eye? O Bhikṣu, it is made from the four great elements, invisible and undemonstrable yet obstructive.

[110a4] Similarly, the Yogacāra-Vijñānavādins [assert] that it is not [true] that all phenomena lack inherent existence, because many Sūtras of definitive meaning, such as the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, the Daśabhūmika, etc. say that consciousness free of subject-object duality (gzung ba dang ’dzin pa gnyis med pa’i shes pa, grāhya-grāhakādvaya-jñāna) ultimately exist. Therefore, there is a hidden intention (dgongs pa can, ābhprāyika) behind [the Buddha] saying in the vast basket (shin tu rgyas pa’i sde snod)\(^1\) that all phenomena lack inherent existence.

[12.1.2.b. Mādhyamika response]

[110a6] These objections are not correct, because,

[The Bhagavan] spoke of sources such as forms relative to other [beings’ awareness], and not in reality. [He also] declared "mind only" in order that [beings] might enter into the middle way (dbu ma’i lam, madhyamā pratipad). (k XII-27)

[110b1] There is no fault [in our thesis]. In order to lead beings, who, due to the power of predispositions are mistaken with regard to subject and object duality [the Bhagavan] spoke about sources such as

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\(^1\) See also BSGT XI 83a4-5. The Mahāyāna Sūtras in general and the Prajñāpāramitā in particular would probably be meant by ‘shin tu rgyas pa’i sde snod” (vaipulyapitaka).
forms to conform with these [beings] and not as definitive meanings. As the master Vasubandu has stated [in the Viṃśatikā (k 8)]¹:

If sources such as forms have been spoken about, it was with a hidden intention (dgongs pa’i dbang gis, abhipraya-vaśat), for trainees (’dul ba yi skye bo, vineyajana), just as [he has spoken about] a living creature that comes into being spontaneously (brdzus te byung ba’i sems can, upapāduka-sattva).

[110b2] Moreover, the extensive teaching in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra (X k 153c)² that:

The object does not exist; only mind [exists].

and in the Daśabhūmikasūtra³ that:

These three realms are only mind.

is in order [that beings] will, having turned from the belief in real outer

   ṛūpādy-āyatanaśitarvan tad-vineyajanaṃ prati /
   abhipraya-vaśād uktam upapāduka-sattva-vat //
   For spontaneous generation, see Levi (1925) p. 49 n. 1.
   nasty arthaṃ cittam eva tu //.
   (Tib.) P. 180a8: don ni sems ni ‘ba’ zhig go //.
   Cited in MAV P. 61b8 and MĀl P. 157a5. Whereas the Tibetan form of this verse of our text is rather different from that of the Canon, it is exactly the same as that of MAV and MĀl: it is quite probable that dBus pa blo gsal cites this verse from these treatises.
₃. DBh 49 E: citta-mātram idaṃ yad idaṃ traidhātukam /. Cf. VSV 3.2-3 (cf. tr. Levi (1925) p. 43):
   citta-mātram bho jinaputrā yad uta traidhātukam iti Sūtrāt /; Siddhi p. 420.
   The same passage was already cited in BSGT XI 82b3.
objects, enter the Middle Path. It is not to show that consciousness free from the two [agent and object] as ultimate [truth]. For as it is said in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (X kk 256-8)¹:

By relying on "mind-only" [the yogi] does not suppose there are the outer objects. When based in reality, [he] will pass beyond even "mind-only". Having gone beyond "mind-only", [he] must go beyond [consciousness] without an appearance [of subject-object duality].² The yogi who abides [in the consciousness] free of appearance where [it, i.e., this consciousness without

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   cittamātraṃ samāruhya bāhyam arthaṃ na kalpayet /
   tathālāmbane sthītvā cittamātram atikramet /
   cittamātram atikramya nirābhāsam atikramet /
   nirābhāsa-sthito yogī mahāyānaṃ sa paśyati /
   anābhoga-gatiḥ śāntaḥ prāṇidhānair viśodhitā /
   jñānam anātmakaṃ sreṣṭhaṃ nirābhāse na paśyati //

   (Tib.) P. 184a3-5. Cited in treatises such as MAV P. 79b1-4, MĀI P. 171a 2-4, BhK I (Skt.) 210.9-14: (Tib.) 259.3-14, BhKN D. 4a1-2, P. 48a8-b1 (only the first two verses), PPU P. 183a8-b2, TKh (P. [145] (5847) 253a5-7 = PT n 814 fol. 6b3-5: K 256-7 only cited).

   Verse 258cd was already cited in BSGT 98b3. dBus pa bco gsal does not cite these verses directly from the Laṅk, and most likely cites them from the MAV or the MĀI. The Tibetan version for these three verses reads:

   sems tsam la ni gnas nas ni / phyi rol don la mi brtag go /
   yang dag dmigs la gnas nas ni / sems tsam las ni 'da' bar bya /
   sems tsam las ni 'das nas ni / snang ba med las 'da' bas bya /
   mal 'byor snang ba med gnas na / theg pa chen po mi mthong ngo /
   lhun gyis grub rtogs zhi ba ste / smon lam dag gis mam par sbyangs /
   bdag med ye shes mchog yin te / snang ba med tshe mi mthong no /

   2. Translated following Kamalaśila’s interpretation. Cf. BhK I 211.10-2:

   evam cittamātram atikramya tad api dvaya-nirābhāsāṃ yaj jñānam tad atikramet /.
appearance of the two\(^1\) does not appear] beholds the Great Vehicle.

The spontaneous state (\textit{lhun gyis grub, anābhoga}) is pacified and purified through prayer. He does not see in the [consciousness] free from subject-object the supreme wisdom free of Self\(^2\)

Also, in the [\textit{Sarvabuddhaviśayāvatāra}] \textit{Jñānālokālaṁkāra} [-\textit{sūtra}]\(^3\):

The Buddhas know the Dharma without ever finding any object or mind. Homage to [the Buddhas] who have no objective support.

\[12.1.3. \textit{Yogācāra objection: the Mādhyamika’s thesis is only an interpretive teaching}\]

\[12.1.3.a. \textit{Objection:}\]

The hidden intention behind [teaching] the lack of inherent existence of all phenomena is the three entitylessnesses (\textit{ngo bo nyid med, nihśvabhāva}).

\(\text{k XII}\)

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1. Translated following Kamalaśīla’s interpretation. Cf. BhK I 211.19-20:
   
   \begin{verbatim}
   tathā cādvaya-jñāna-nirābhāse jñāne yadā sthito yogī tadā paramatattve
   sthitavāt mahāyānām sa paśyati /
   \end{verbatim}

2. The two last verses already cited in BSGT 98b3.

3. \textit{Sarvabuddhaviśayāvatāra-Jñānālokālaṁkāra-nāma-mahāyānasūtra} (D. (100) ga 300b2, P. [28] (768) \textit{khu} 328b6-7):

   \begin{verbatim}
   
   sangs rgyas rams kyis' lan 'ga' yang / 
   sems dang chos kun gtan mī dngigs

   chos rams thams cad kun mkhyen pa / 
   mi rten khyod la phyag 'tsal lo /
   \end{verbatim}

   \(1\) \(\text{kyi P} \quad 1\) \(\text{ma D}\)

This verse is cited, for ex., in MĀI [P] 171a7-8. The comparison of variants shows that our author probably cited it from the MĀI, and not from the Canon.
As it is said in the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*:

My hidden intention, in teaching the entitylessness of all phenomena is the three entitylessnesses; i.e., [that imaginaries] lack an inherently existent defining characteristic (*mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa, laksananiḥsvabhāva*); [that dependent-natures] lack an inherently existing production (*skye ba ngo bo nyid med pa, utpattiniḥsvabhāva*), and [that the thoroughly established nature] lacks an ultimate inherent existence (*don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa, paramārtha-niḥsvabhāva*).

The entitylessness of all dharmas is thus [i.e. a teaching requiring interpretation]. Thus object the Yogācāra.

[12.1.3.b. Mādhyamika response]

This [teaching, i.e., the triple entitylessness] was also taught to [enable beings] to enter into the Mādhyamika path free from the [two] extremes. (k XII-28cd)

[111a2] To the extent that a thoroughly imagined character (*kun btags pa'i mtshan nyid, parikalpita-lakṣaṇa*) such as permanence, etc., is not established of conventional [things] which are like magical

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   *Don dam yang dag 'phags ngas chos mams kyi ngo bo nyid mam pa gsum po 'di lta ste / mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa nyid dang / skye ba ngo bo nyid med pa nyid dang / don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid las dgangs nas chos thams cad ngo bo nyid med pa'o zhes bstan to /.* The Canon's text is slightly different than our text. Cf. SNS VII 8.

2. On the triple entitylessness, see for ex. Siddhi p. 556.
illusions, there is the entitylessness of character (\textit{mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa}, \textit{lakṣaṇa-niḥsvabhāva}). When a dependent-arising’s [other-powered nature] (\textit{gzhan gyi dbang}, \textit{paratantra}) is analyzed, [it is understood as being] non-produced; therefore there is the entitylessness of production (\textit{skye ba ngo bo nyid med pa}, \textit{utpatti-niḥsvabhāva}). All phenomena are established ultimately lacking an inherently existing nature - this is thoroughly established entitylessness (\textit{don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa}, \textit{paramārtha-niḥsvabhāva}).

[111a4] Thus, since by teaching the hidden intention of the three entitylessnesses, it teaches the Middle Path free from the two extremes through revealing, the \textit{Samdhinirmocana-sūtra} is established as a text of definitive meaning. As it is said in the same \textit{Samdhinirmocanasūtra}:

Moreover, \textit{Paramārthasamudgata} (\textit{Don dam yang dag \textsuperscript{'}phags}), even in referring to ultimate entitylessness, delineated by the selflessness of all phenomena, I explain that all dharmas are not produced, not destroyed, pacified from the beginning, and by nature completely in [a state of] nirvāṇa.

Similarly, in the \textit{Lāṅkāvatārasūtra}:

When one investigates with intelligence (\textit{blo, buddhi}), there is neither dependent nature (\textit{gzhan dbang, paratantra}), thoroughly imagined nature (\textit{brtags pa, kalpita}), nor thoroughly established nature (\textit{grub pa'i dngos po, nispanno bhāva}): so how could one imagine with intelligence?\footnote{1. SNS VII 9 (cf. tr. Lamotte (1935) p. 195). Part of this passage was cited with the information ‘\textit{mdo kha cig las}’ in BSGT 109b1. 2. Lāṅk II k 196=X k 374 (cf. tr. Izumi (1927) p. 76, 180, Suzuki (1932) p. 114, Yasui (1976) p. 119, 278: 2 k 198 following them):}
There is no self-being, consciousness (rnam rig, vijñapti), entity, nor basis of all. Foolish (byis pa, bāla), cadaver-like nit-pickers imagine these [things].¹

[111b1] These briefly refute that the Mādhyamika thesis contradicts Āgama.

[12.2 Objections based on reasoning and the Mādhyamika response]

[111b1] To refute the contradiction [of the Mādhyamika thesis] with reasoning,

[12.2.1. The Mādhyamika thesis is in contradiction with perception]
[12.2.1.a. Objection]  

buddhyā vivecyamānaṃ tu¹ na tantraṃ nāpi kalpitam /  
nispanno nāsti vai bhāvaḥ katham buddhyā vikalpyate /  
¹ hi X

(Tib.) P. 119a4=188b2-3. Cited in MAV (C. 68a6, D. 68a6-7, N. 61b3, P. 65b1). According to the comparison of variants, it can be seen that our text is closer to the Laṅk II k 196 than X k 374, and still closer to the MAV (particularly MAV [CD]).


na svabhāvo na vijñaptir na vastu na ca ālayāḥ /  
bālair vikalpitaḥ hy ete sava-bhūtaḥ kutārśkasīḥ /  
(Tib.) P. 134b3-4=177a7-8². Cited in MAvBh³ 160.13-6, MAV⁴ (C. 68a6, D. 68a7, N. 61b3-4, P. 65b1-2). Our citation does not correspond precisely to any of these versions:

¹rang bzhin med cing rnam rig med / dngos po med cing kun gzhi med /
²di dag ro bzhin byis pa yis / log pa'i rtog pa can gyis brtags /
³rang bzhin med cing rnam rig med / kun gzhi med cing dngos med na /
⁴byis pa ngan pa'i rtog ge pa / ro dang 'dra bas 'di dag brtags /
⁵rang bzhin med cing rnam rig med / kun gzhi med cing dngos med na /
byis pa ngan pa rtog ge pa / ro dang 'dra bas 'di dag brtags /
⁶rang bzhin med cing rnam rig med / dngos po med cing kun gzhi med /
ro mtshungs byis pa'i rtog ge pa / ngan pa rams kyis 'di dag brtags /
[Objection:] Absence of self-nature is not realized by direct perception (mngon sum, pratyakṣa) because it is an object-possessor [which knows] something. Since direct perception is devoid of an identity, how could it [direct perception] realize that [absence of self-nature]? (k XII-29)

[111b2] The selflessness of all phenomena is not realized by direct perception because it [direct perception] is an object-possessor [which knows] something. Were it not to be so, since what appears to it would be destroyed, it could not be direct perception. Being devoid of an identity, [your ultimate truth] is incapable of generating a consciousness in which its identity is revealed [and hence not anything] because the ability to perform a function is the definition of a thing.

[111b3] Also, if even direct perception itself is devoid of an identity, how could it [cause one to] realize the absence of self-nature of all phenomena? If it is not without identity, all phenomena would not lack self-nature.

[12.2.1.b. Mādhyamika response]

[Response:] The yogi (rnal 'byor pa) who has familiarized himself with reality realizes that all phenomena are without self-nature. Also, as to the second [point raised by the opponents] the doctrinal system [of the Mādhyamikas who operate] by way of the two truths is not able to be confused. (k XII-30)

[111b5] The first [point] expressed [by the opponents] as a fault is not correct because it is known through the yogic direct perception (rnal 'byor pa'i mngon sum, yogi-pratyakṣa), arisen from meditation,
that all phenomena are selfless. Even if [the opponents] say this [yogic perception] does not exist, it is not logical, because there would not be the valid cognition that harms (gnod par byed pa'i tshad ma, bādhaka-pramāṇa). It is also not [logical to say that yogic perception does not exist] by [the following reason: if it existed, the distinction between] our own and other's object would disappear; there would be [the fault] of non-ascertainment (ma nges pa, anaikāntika).

[111b6] It is also not logical [for the opponents] to say: "Direct perception has an object which is a thing" because the direct perception which sees this world has as object [things] which are false [such as] forms and so forth and because the wisdom consciousness of the Buddha and other [saints] does not see any real entity of things. As it is stated in the Dharmasamgiti1:

When no phenomenon is seen, it is the supreme seeing.

[112a2] There is also not the fault [that the opponents have raised] in saying: "because even direct perception itself is entityless", because on the conventional [plane] such a direct perception is arisen from real meditative stabilization and realizes the entitylessness of all phenomena; on the ultimate [plane] it is without entity. Therefore, there is not any criticism that harms this doctrinal system of the [Mādhyamika] sage [who uses] the method of the two truths.

[12.2.2. The Mādhyamika thesis contradicts inference]
[12.2.2.a. Objection]

1. Dharmasamgiti (D. (238) zha 68b6, P. [36] (904) wu 74b2-4): bcom ldan 'das chos thams cad ma' mthong ba ni yang dag pa' mthong ba'o /. 1 miP 2 par P. The Sanskrit is found in SS 264.1-2: adarśanam bhagavan sarvadharmanām darśanam samyag-darśanam iti. Cited, for ex., in MAV P. 78a1-2. Cf. BhK I (Skt.) 212.2-3: tathä coktam sūtre 'katamaṃ paramārtha-darśanam / sarvadharmanām adarśanam' iti /; (Tib.) 261.7-9: de skad mdo las kyang gsungs te / don dam pa mthong ba gang zhe na / chos thams cad mthong ba med pa gang yin pa'o zhes 'byung ngo /
[Objection:] Since the example (dpe, drṣṭānta) and the subject are not established, inference does not operate. If these were established, it would not be [true] that all phenomena are without entity. (k XII-31)

[112a4] Inference does not operate to prove either all things or emptiness because the bases of these - the example, the subject and the reason itself, etc. are not established [for the Mādhyaṃka]; moreover, [for them] they are not produced. If they were established, it would be a contradiction with the statement (dam bcas, pratijñā) that the entityness of all phenomena is not established.

[12.2.2.b. Mādhyaṃka response]

[Response:] This [objection] is without connection because on the real (de nyid du, tattvatas) [plane] [the opponents] prove the evident (grub pa bsgrub, siddha-sādhana), and on the conventional (tha snyad du, vyavahāratas) [plane] it is not [true] that [the example and other elements of logic] are not established. Therefore, there is no criticism against us. (k XII-32)

[112a6] This objection is without connection with the reasoning. Thus, on the real (de kho nar, tattvatas) plane, the example and other [elements of logic] are not established [for the Mādhyaṃka]. Therefore, if [the opponents] prove thus by consequences, they prove the evident, because we do not assert that the example, etc. are established on the real [plane]. Because of that, this [objection of the opponents] is not a consequence (thal ba, prasaṅga) because the consequence reduces [the defendents] to what they do not assert.

[112b1] But if [the opponents] prove that the example, etc. are not established on the real [plane], it is also [the fault] of non-ascertainment
(ma nges pa, anaikāntika): thus even this is not an objection. If [the opponents] say that the example, etc. are not established on the conventional [plane] it is [the fault] of non-established reason (ma grub pa, asiddha). If they say that it is not produced even on the conventional [plane] like the horns of a rabbit (ri bong rwa, sāsa-viśāna) it would be the view of annihilation (chad par lta ba, uccheda-dṛṣṭi): on the conventional [plane] convention such as actions (las, karman) and effects (bras bu, phala) indeed exist. Therefore, one makes conventions such as inference, based on the subject etc., which are renowned in the world in order to introduce [beings] to reality. As the expert in logic (Rigs pa mkhyen pa = Dharmakīrti) said [in the Pramāṇavārttika (I k 85-6)]:

The establishment of the attribute and the subject of the attribute (chos dang chos can, dharma-dharmin) such that the difference and non-difference [between them] are without connection with the meaning of reality, are known in the world.

Similarly, based on this [establishment and that which follows], the wise make the establishment of that which is to be proved (bsgrub bya sgrub pa, sādhya-sādhana) for the sake of introducing [beings] to ultimate [truth].

Therefore, [the opponents] do not find occasion to reach we Mādhyamikas by this manner of criticism.


dharma-dharmi-vyavasthānaṁ bheda 'bhedāś ca yādṛśaḥ /
asamīkṣita-tattvārtho yathā lokepratyayate /
tam tathaiva samāśritya sādhyā-sādhanasamsthitih /
paramārthāvatārāya vidvadbhir avakalpyate /

Dharmakīrti here clearly explains that all the logical rules operate on the conventional plane, and are not applicable to ultimate truth. These verses are cited in MĀI [P] 187a8-b1.
Intermediary verses:

Ultimate [truth] is the object of correct consciousness (rig shes) but beyond the object of the mind grasping the extremes.
The subject, although like an illusion, is the object of correct consciousness but is not real. (AŚ XII-10)

Appearance and emptiness are not contradictory: the correct consciousness (rig shes) which understands emptiness does not harm the valid cognizer in which appear forms and so forth. Therefore, there is no contradiction. (AŚ XII-11)

The negation of production occurs on the ultimate [plane] but not on [the plane of] mere appearance. Consequently, there is not falling to the extremes of the view of permanence and of annihilation. (AŚ XII-12)

Regarding this point, one knows in detail the objections and responses to objections from the treatises of the wise Kamalasīla (Pa dma'i ngang tshul) which clearly show the position of the Mādhyamikas free from extremes. (AŚ XII-13)

1. Should rig shes be corrected with rigs shes (logical consciousness)?
2. The 'treatises of the wise Kamalasīla' should be understood principally as the MĀI and the TA; they have been cited abundantly in our text. The Sarvadharmanihsvabhāvasiddhi that is a sort of summary of the MĀI is included here.
[14. Conclusion and Vow]

[113a1] By that [shown above] the doctrinal position of the "Propounders of lack of self-nature of all phenomena" on the [five] categories of objects of knowledge has been explained. The theory of the [school] on the path (lam, mārga) and the effect ('bras bu, phala) will be explained [in chapter XIII].

May I, through having explained to beings the stainless doctrinal positions showing the selflessness of all phenomena attain [the state of] omniscience, as king of the Dharma, the most excellent of those who show reality again to the world. (k XII-33)

End of chapter XII, the Explanation of the Mādhyamika Position, from Grub pa'i mtha' nam par bshad pa.

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