THE CONCEPT OF SACRED WAR IN ANCIENT GREECE

By

FRANCES ANNE SKOCZYLAS

B.A., McGill University, 1985

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

in

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
(Department of Classics)

We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
August 1987
© Frances Anne Skoczylas, 1987
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Department of CLASSICS

The University of British Columbia
1956 Main Mall
Vancouver, Canada
V6T 1Y3

Date AUGUST 5, 1987
This thesis will trace the origin and development of the term "Sacred War" in the corpus of extant Greek literature. This term has been commonly applied by modern scholars to four wars which took place in ancient Greece between the sixth and fourth centuries B.C. The modern use of the attribute "Sacred War" to refer to these four wars in particular raises two questions. First, did the ancient historians give all four of these wars the title "Sacred War?" And second, what justified the use of this title only for certain conflicts?

In order to resolve the first of these questions, it is necessary to examine in what terms the ancient historians referred to these wars. As a result of this examination, it is clear that only two of the modern series of "Sacred Wars" (the so-called Second and Third Sacred Wars) were actually given this title in antiquity. The other two wars (the so-called Second and Third Sacred Wars), although they were evidently associated by the ancients with the "Sacred Wars," were not given this attribution. Consequently, the habit of grouping all four wars together as "Sacred Wars" is modern. Nevertheless, the fact that the ancients did see some-
connection between these wars does justify this modern classification to some degree.

Once this conclusion had been reached, it became possible to proceed to the second of the problems presented in this thesis, namely the justification for the application of the title "Sacred War" to two specific conflicts. In order to achieve this aim, those conflicts labelled "Sacred Wars" by the ancient historians were compared to two categories of test cases: the other two conflicts classified as "Sacred Wars" by modern scholars and conflicts which share elements in common with "Sacred Wars" but which are not given this attribution by ancient or modern authorities.

In the course of this comparison, I discovered that little differentiated the so-called "Sacred Wars" from the non-"Sacred Wars" and that all of these latter conflicts appear equally worthy of the title as those which were in fact given this attribution. The deciding factor in the classification of a certain conflict as a "Sacred War," as a result, lies not in the specific elements making up its constitution but rather in the political circumstances surrounding it. The two conflicts labelled by the ancients as "Sacred Wars" were given this title by contemporary powers in order to justify military interference in the political affairs of other states which might otherwise have been considered unnecessary. Thus, the term "Sacred War" arose originally as the result of an effective propaganda campaign.
# Table of Contents

Introduction ................................................................. 1

Chapter One: The Ancient Concept of Sacred War .......... 3

Chapter Two: The Modern Concept of Sacred War ............ 29

Chapter Three: Other Religious Disputes ...................... 55

Conclusion ................................................................. 71

Notes ................................................................. 76

Bibliography .............................................................. 117

Appendix ................................................................. 128
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS


BCH—Bulletin de Correspondance Hellenique


IG—Inscriptiones Graecae, editio minor

JHS—Journal of Hellenic Studies

REG—Revue des Études Grecques

SEG—Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum


ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to extend my deepest thanks to Professor Phillip E. Harding, the director of this thesis, for his invaluable guidance, encouragement, and criticism. I would also like to thank Professor A. J. Podlecki and the Department of Classics at the University of British Columbia for additional assistance and suggestions throughout the writing of this thesis. Further gratitude is due Mr. André Gerolymatos of McGill University for the idea and ensuing inspiration.
INTRODUCTION

From the great number of wars in Greek history there are only four that have been labelled by modern scholars as "Sacred Wars." These are, namely, the so-called First (beginning of the sixth century B.C.), Second (circa 448 B.C.), Third (356-46 B.C.), and Fourth (340/39 B.C.). To the modern mind, this attribution makes them appear to constitute a category of "Sacred Wars" exclusive of every other known conflict in ancient Greece, whether motivated by religious ideals or not.

Scholarship has mainly been focused upon each war individually, rather than upon this apparent category of "Sacred Wars" as a unit. Little effort has been made to determine when the term "Sacred War" (τερον πόλεμος) arose for the first time and if, in fact, it was applied to each of these so-called "Sacred Wars" in antiquity. If this was not the case, then perhaps the modern labels of First, Second, Third, and Fourth attached to these wars are misleading in that they create an artificial category of "Sacred Wars" out of conflicts not given this classification by the ancient historians.
Therefore, in order to examine fully the concept of "sacred war" in ancient Greece, we must first ascertain the date at which the term ἱερὸς πόλεμος came into existence. Next, we shall have to clarify which of these wars were in fact labelled as "sacred" in antiquity. Finally, we shall compare those conflicts classified as "sacred" by the ancient sources with two series of test cases: wars given this attribution by modern scholars and wars similar to the so-called "sacred wars" which are not labelled as such by ancient or modern historians. By the light of this comparison, we can perhaps establish what elements justified the use of the term "sacred war" in antiquity exclusively for certain conflicts.
THE ANCIENT CONCEPT OF SACRED WAR

The first step towards an analysis of the concept of "sacred war" in antiquity is to try to discover when the term arose for the first time in the corpus of extant Greek literature. This is not a difficult task, however, since the term appears in so eminent a historian as Thucydides. In the course of his condensed narrative of the Pentecostalia, Thucydides relates briefly the events of the so-called Second Sacred War at I.112.5:

Yet Thucydides was probably not the first to coin the phrase, since he refers to the conflict as a ἱερὸς καλούμενος πόλεμος. The fact that Aristophanes, a contemporary of Thucydides, in his Birds of 414 B.C., satirically suggests the prosecuting of a ἱερὸς πόλεμος against Zeus (line 556) indicates that this term was current at the time. Since this war was evidently known as ὁ ἱερὸς πόλεμος by the contemporary Greek world, the identity of the original source of this name is difficult to ascertain.

The scholia to Birds 556 are not very helpful in this
regard. One scholiast names Philochorus (*F Gr Hist* 328 F 34a) as a source for this war:

ο̇ 'Iερός πόλεμος ἐγένετο 'Ἀθηναίους πρὸς Βολωνίους βουλομένους ἀφελέσθαι ψωκέων τὸ μαντεῖον. νυκῆσαντες δὲ ψωκέων πάλιν ἀπεδώκαν, ὑς ψυλόχορος ἐν τῇ δ. δὸδ ὃ ἔρει πόλεμοι γεγονασιν, οὕτως τε καὶ ὅτι τε ψωκεύσιν ἐπέθεντο λακεδαίμονιον.

Another scholiast on this line adds:

ἐν ἑνώς τῶν ὑπομνημάτων λέγεται' ἔρειν πόλεμον λέγει, καθ’ ἓπος θεοῦ ἔσοντο, ἀμα δ’ τοῦ Ἰεροῦ πολέμου μνημονεύει τοῖς γενομένου 'Ἀθηναίους πρὸς ψωκέας ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἐν Δελφοῖς λεροῦ. ἔσφεδ᾽ ἄντι μὲν ἔπο τοῖς ἐπεδώκας ὑπὲρ τοῦτο ἐπολέμασαν, ἀλλὰ ὑπὲρ ψωκέων διὰ τοῦ πρὸς λακεδαίμονιος ἔχος. γεγονασι δὲ ὃ ὄ ὁ πόλεμος λερῶς πρὸς λακεδαίμονιος πρὸς ψωκέας ὑπὲρ Δελφῶν' καὶ κρατήσαντες τοῦ λεροῦ λακεδαίμονιοι τὴν προμαντεῖαν παρὰ Δελφῶν ἔλαθον' ὕστερον δὲ τρίτῳ ἔτει τοῖς πολέμου 'Ἀθηναίοις πρὸς λακεδαίμονιος ὑπὲρ ψωκέων. καὶ τὸ λερὸν ἀπεδωκαν ψωκεύσι, καθάπερ ψυλόχορος ἐν τῇ δ. λέγει. καλεττω, δ’ ὃ Ἰερός, ὃν περὶ τοῦ ἐν Δελφῶς λερῶν ἐγένετο."

Most of the information contained in these scholia appears to derive from the *Atthis* of Philochorus. But who was the ultimate source of Philochorus? It cannot be Thucydides, as the account of the scholiast contains details not mentioned in the text of Thucydides. Philochorus may have derived these details from Theopompus, but this does not resolve the question of his ultimate source. Moreover, the offhand way in which the scholiast briefly alludes to the testimonies of Thucydides, Eratosthenes (third century B.C.) and Theopompus would not lead one to conclude that his account was based on the work of any of these historians. Therefore, the details of the so-called Second Sacred War which the scholiast claims
to have derived from Philochorus must originally have been supplied by another fifth-century account which has not survived. Evidently, however, the use of the term οἰκονομος to refer to this war was well-rooted by the time of Philochorus.

Our last (and latest) reference to the so-called Second Sacred War as a οἰκονομος occurs in Plutarch Pericles XXI.1-1:

The first half of Plutarch's narrative, that dealing with the campaign of the Lacedaimonians and the counter campaign of the Athenians, appears to be derived from Thucydides (except for the references to Pericles). In the second half of Plutarch's narrative, on the contrary, he must be speaking from his obvious familiarity with the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi. In fact, this bronze wolf is almost certainly the same as that which Pausanias mentions (X.14.7).3 Because Plutarch has so clearly derived the title of this war from Thucydides, his account offers no further clues as to whether Thucydides borrowed the expression from another historian or this term was simply current in contemporary usage.
Our next task is to examine this so-called Second Sacred War in further detail in order to attempt to detach the elements which led to the attribution of the title  ἡμερῶς πόλεμος. The chronology of the war itself is disputed but it is clear that its antecedents lie in the 450's. After the Phocians had captured three of the towns of Doris, the μητρόπολις of Sparta, in 458/7, the Spartans intervened, defeated the Phocians, and forced them to restore those cities to the Dorians. On the route home, the Spartans were attacked by the Athenians at Tanagra in Boeotia. The Spartans were victorious and withdrew to the Peloponnese without further incident. Two months later, in 457/6, the Athenian army under Myronides invaded Boeotia, defeated the Boeotian army at Oenophyta, and became master of Boeotia and Phocis. This point was the high water mark of Athens' dominance over Central Greece. As a result, it was probably following the Battle of Oenophyta that Athens concluded an alliance with the Amphictyonic League.

The record of this alliance survives only in a fragmentary inscription. Previously, it was generally thought that this inscription recorded a renewal of the Athenian alliance with the Phocians, although no explicit reference to the Phocians appears on the stone! In 1948, however, B. D. Meritt proposed a new reconstruction, substituting the Amphictyonic League (who are mentioned on the stone) for the Phocians. Meritt states, on epigraphical
grounds, that this inscription must be dated before the middle of the fifth century.\textsuperscript{11} Moreover, the treaty must have been in effect by 454/3, when the Athenians took the field against Pharsalus in Thessaly, for the Boeotians are already allies of the Athenians (Thucydides I.111.1).\textsuperscript{12} As Meritt argues, the best date for an Athenian alliance with the Amphictyonic League would be following the Battle of Oenophyta.\textsuperscript{13} At this point, Athens was master of Central Greece and probably commanded a majority in the Amphictyonic League.\textsuperscript{14} She thereby must have gained considerable influence at Delphi, a fact perhaps illustrated by favorable oracles issued to Athens during this period.\textsuperscript{15} The Athenian influence in Central Greece and the Amphictyonic League may also have resulted in the Phocian control of Delphi.\textsuperscript{16}

After the Five Year Truce had been concluded with Athens in 451 (Thucydides I.112.1), Sparta felt the time was right to challenge Athens' imperialistic ambitions in Central Greece and to regain influence at Delphi. In the only recorded military action of this period, the Spartans conducted an expedition to Delphi in which they wrested it from the hands of the Phocians and returned it to the Delphians. Thereupon the Athenians marched out under Pericles and delivered the sanctuary back to the Phocians.\textsuperscript{17} Phocian control of Delphi, which presumably was pro-Athenian, did not last long. "\textit{Χρόνου ἐγγενομένου μετὰ ταῦτα}" (the "Sacred War"),\textsuperscript{18} the Athenians were forced to evacuate Boeotia after their defeat at Coronea
and thereby lost their influence over Central Greece. Without the risk of further Athenian intervention, the Delphians were now free to reclaim control of the sanctuary. It is not recorded at what point they did so, but clearly they had recovered their past influence by the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, as by now the oracle showed firm pro-Spartan sympathies (Thucydides I.118.3). Delphian autonomy was subsequently confirmed by an article in the Peace of Nicias (Thucydides V.118.2), and the situation of the sanctuary remained essentially unchanged until the beginning of the Third Sacred War.

Scholars have divided themselves into two opposing camps in their interpretation of the chronology of this expedition of the Spartans and counter expedition of the Athenians. The object of dispute is the "ὅστερον δὲ τρίτων ἔτει τοῦ πρώτου πολέμου" in the fragment of Philochorus preserved by the scholiast on Aristophanes (F Gr Hist 328 F 34). This appears inconsistent with the sense of immediacy of the counter expedition implied in the accounts of Thucydides and Plutarch. The first camp, led by Beloch and supported by the authors of ATL, accept the chronology of Philochorus and attempt to show that there is no conflict between his account and that of Thucydides, as the "ἀδύνατος ὅστερον" of Thucydides allows some leeway in its interpretation. Consequently, they believe that the expedition and counter expedition took place in 449 and 447 respectively. The opposite camp, led by Gomme and Jacoby,
dismiss the chronology of Philochorus and accept the implication in Thucydides and Plutarch that the Athenian reprisal followed closely upon the Spartan expedition.\textsuperscript{21} They therefore date these events to 448.\textsuperscript{22} Of these two possible chronologies, that of Thucydides seems more credible than that of Philochorus (if in fact the scholiast's excerpt can be wholly attributed to Philochorus), especially as the latter also contains other discrepancies.\textsuperscript{23}

One may well inquire why this fairly minor incident was the first to be classified by the ancient sources that survive as a ἱερὸς πόλεμος. The scholiast on Aristophanes Birds 556 (\textit{F Gr Hist} 241 F 38) provides us with two reasons. First of all, "Ἡρὸν πόλεμον λέγει, καθ' ἐρῶς ἔσοντο." A little further on, he goes on to say: "καλεῖται δὲ ἱερὸς, δὴ περὶ τοῦ ἐν Δελφῶν ἱερὸν ἔγένετο." The first reason obviously derives from the title ἱερὸς πόλεμος itself and not vice versa. The second reason, however, is more interesting. As this is the first war up to this time which has been given the title ἱερὸς πόλεμος in the ancient sources, the mere fact that the war was conducted over the sanctuary at Delphi could not have led to this attribution by the original fifth-century coiner of the phrase. The suggestions of the scholiast are clearly inferences from a later viewpoint and add no further clues to the motives of the original source of this title in the fifth century. By the fourth century, however, the face of the Greek world had changed entirely and the term "sacred
war" took on a new importance.

Once again, conflict over the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi had been dignified with the title of ἱερὸς πόλεμος. This was the so-called Third Sacred War, a prolonged struggle between the Phocians and the Amphictyonic League which lasted from 356 to 346 B.C.²⁴ It appears that this conflict was known to the contemporary Greek world by two names: the Phocian War and the Sacred War. The apparent tradition among the Athenian orators of the period, who followed closely the events of the war and were deeply involved in its repercussions, was to refer to it by the name of its protagonists, the Phocians. Isocrates, in his Philip of 346 B.C., alludes to it by the periphrasis "τὰ περὶ Φωκίδος" (V.74). Demosthenes and Aeschines, where they give the conflict a title, refer to it as "ὁ Φωκίδος πόλεμος."²⁵ As allies of the Phocians, it would perhaps have constituted a conflict of interest for the Athenian orators to classify this struggle as a "sacred war."

This was not the case, however, for contemporary writers of the Peripatetic school. Callisthenes of Olynthus, "μαθητὴς Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ ἀνέφωτος."²⁶ wrote a monograph entitled "Περὶ τοῦ Ἱεροῦ Πολέμου" (F Gr Hist 124 F 1). This work, along with his Hellenica, must have been composed before Callisthenes' departure for Asia with Alexander, thus providing us with a terminus ante quem of 334 B.C. for the first recorded instance of the term in reference to this war.
Aristotle, presumably following the example of his protégé, refers to this war as ὁ ἱερὸς πόλεμος in his Politics (1304a), which was left unfinished at his death in 322 B.C. Another pupil of Aristotle, Leon of Byzantium, perhaps also following the example of Callisthenes, composed a monograph entitled ὁ ἱερὸς πόλεμος (F Gr Hist 132 T 1 and 2). Yet a third fourth-century monograph on the Third Sacred War, Περὶ τοῦ ἱεροῦ πολέμου, was written by a certain Cephisodorus of Thebes or Athens (F Gr Hist 112 F 1). This apparent Peripatetic tradition, was carried on a generation later by Duris of Samos, a pupil of Theophrastus, Aristotle's successor. In the second book of his Ιστορία, he refers to the war as ὁ ἱερὸς πόλεμος (F Gr Hist 76 F 2).

Callisthenes and the Peripatetic school, however, were probably not the only fourth-century writers to call this war a ἱερὸς πόλεμος. Pausanias, Strabo, and Diodorus Siculus are familiar with the use of both ὁ φωκυδᾶς πόλεμος and ὁ ἱερὸς πόλεμος to describe this war.

The term ὁ φωκυδᾶς πόλεμος in these authors presumably derives ultimately from the orators, but the question of the source(s) of the term ὁ ἱερὸς πόλεμος is more problematical. Pausanias gives no clear indication of his sources. Strabo uses the authority of Ephorus throughout Book IX, but does not state specifically from what source he derives this particular section. Diodorus Siculus is much more helpful in this regard. In XVI.14.3-5, under the year 357/6, he
mentions three fourth-century writers who have dealt with the events of the so-called Third Sacred War:

Under the year 341/0, in XVI.76.5-6, we find an apparent continuation to XVI.14.3-5:

Diodorus mentions another possible source for his narrative of the Sacred War in XVI.3.8, under the year 360/59:

Hammond believes that the first of these historians, Demophilus, is the main source used by Diodorus in his account of the Sacred War. It is generally agreed that Demophilus wrote the thirtieth and final book of Ephorus, a view which is consistent with the testimony of Diodorus (XVI.14.3 and
XVI.76.5) and the fragments surviving from Book Thirty (F Gr Hist 70 F 93-95). If, as it appears, the monograph of Demophilus on the Sacred War was joined as an appendix to his father's work, the reputation of Ephorus must have made it quite accessible to later historians like Diodorus. Therefore, Hammond is probably right in considering him the main source of Diodorus for this conflict. Furthermore, the fact that Diodorus mentions him first in his list of sources for the Sacred War must have some significance.  

The next writer whom Diodorus mentions in his list of sources for the Sacred War is Callisthenes who, as we have seen, composed a monograph entitled "Περὶ τοῦ Ἱεροῦ Πόλεμου ."

The third and final source given by Diodorus for his account of the Sacred War is Diyllus of Athens. Hammond believes that Diodorus used Diyllus to "supplement" his main source, Demophilus, in his narrative of the Sacred War. While we may agree with Hammond in that Diodorus obviously made use of the 'Ιστορία of Diyllus, the extent to which he did so is impossible for us to gauge, as so little of Diyllus' work remains.

While Diodorus cites Demophilus, Callisthenes, and Diyllus as sources in the preface to his narrative of the Sacred War (XVI.14.3-5), he also mentions Theopompus in his description of the early activities of Philip (XVI.3.8), as we saw above. The fact that Diodorus does not include Theopompus in his list of sources in this preface, however, should not
exclude him from being a possible source for the Third Sacred War because the year 357/6 serves either as a *terminus post quem* or *ante quem* for the other three writers. Moreover, Theopompus evidently made a connection between the so-called Second and Third Sacred Wars, as the twentieth book of his *Philippica*, which dealt mainly with the events of the year 348/7, contained a digression on the fifth-century incident (*F Gr Hist* 115 F 156). One can perhaps infer from this evidence that he also referred to both events as "Sacred Wars."

Although we cannot be sure whether or not Diodorus used it as a source, we do know that Theopompus wrote a treatise entitled "Περὶ τῶν ἐκ Δελφῶν Χρημάτων." This subject proved to be a popular one, with the tale obviously becoming taller as the year passed. We find a version in Book Thirty of Ephorus-Demophilus (*F Gr Hist* 70 F 95), in Phylarchus (*F Gr Hist* 81 F 70), and in Strabo (9.3.8), as well as in Diodorus (XVI.56.5-8 and XVI.64). As all of these versions vary in their details, it is likely that there were many (clearly exaggerated) anecdotes floating around fourth-century Greece concerning the plundering of the temple and its treasures. As a result, it is impossible to assign later descriptions to any one fourth-century source.

Let us now sum up our conclusions concerning the fourth-century nomenclature of the so-called Third Sacred War. We have seen that this war was known to its contemporaries by two names: ο Φωκίνος πόλεμος and ο Ιερός πόλεμος. The term
"Phocian War" appears from our extant evidence to have been used extensively by the Athenian orators and clearly predates the use of the term "Sacred War" to refer to this conflict. This title was preferred by Callisthenes and his fellow Peripatetics and presumably also by the historians of the period: Demophilus (and Ephorus), Theopompus, Dyllus, and Duris of Samos. Consequently, it seems that to refer to this war as a "sacred war" was not peculiar to the Peripatetic school, although the tradition apparently originated with it, but eventually became a feature of the historiographic genre as a whole.

We must now turn to an examination of the events of the so-called Third Sacred War, in the hope that it will provide us with some clue as to why this conflict was dignified with the title of ἱερὸς πόλεμος. As we have seen, aside from casual references to the war in the speeches of the orators and the few scattered fragments of the fourth-century historians which survive, we have no contemporary record of this conflict. Book XVI of Diodorus Siculus, supplemented by Book Eight of Justin's brief Epitome of the Historiae Philippicae of Pompeius Trogus, forms the basis for most of our knowledge of the so-called Third Sacred War. Both dating from centuries after the incident, these are the only extant narratives of the events of this conflict. It is no wonder that controversy shrouds the chronology and many of the details of this war.
The bare outline of events, at least, is clear. In the spring Amphictyonic meeting of 356, the Phocians were threatened with Amphictyonic reprisal, if they did not discharge at once a large fine which had previously been levied against them. From the confusion in our sources, it appears that this fine was merely a pretext to inflict punishment on the Phocians for more deep-seated reasons. The Thebans had been harbouring a grudge against the Phocians since the Battle of Mantinea. After the Battle of Leuctra, the Phocians had been forced to join the Theban alliance (Xenophon, Hellenica VI.5.23). The Phocians, however resented their new status as subjects (δοῦλοι) of the Thebans and showed their displeasure by refusing to join the Theban coalition at Mantinea (Xenophon, Hellenica VII.5.4).

After the death of Epaminondas and the collapse of the Theban hegemony, the Thebans had to resort to political rather than military means to achieve their aims. At some unspecified point after the Battle of Leuctra, the Thebans accused the Spartans before the Council of the Amphictyonic League of having occupied the Cadmeia in a time of peace and also brought some alleged charge against the Phocians. The Spartans were subsequently fined five hundred talents (Diodorus XVI.28.2) and the Phocians were assessed a penalty of πολλα τάλαινα (Diodorus XVI.22.3). Neither the Spartans nor the Phocians paid off this penalty within the prescribed period of time but the matter was ignored until 357/6. At
this time, already provoked by the results of the Battle of Mantinea and further irritated by the recent affair in Euboea, the Thebans judged the time was right to take action, taking advantage of the fact that Athens was engaged in the Social War and would not be able to interfere. Once again, the Thebans used their influence on the Amphictyonic League to retaliate against the Spartans and the Phocians. In order to gain the support of the majority of the voting members, Thebes had only to approach Thessaly, an easy target due to her longstanding hatred of Phocis. The Amphictyonic League thus planted itself firmly behind the Thebans and ordered the Phocians to discharge their fine under the threat of having a curse laid upon their land. The Spartans also were threatened, should they not pay off their fine (which was now raised to one thousand talents).

At this news, the Phocians were thrown into a quandary, as theirs was a small state without many resources. They had no hope whatsoever of paying off the fine, because of its extreme magnitude. Yet, if the Amphictyons proceeded to place their territory under a curse, they would then all be deprived of their livelihood. Then Philomelus, son of Theotimus, a high-ranking Phocian, came forward and urged his fellow-countrymen on to action. He argued that the judgments of the Amphictyonic League were completely unfair and advised them to seize the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi, on the grounds that it was theirs by ancestral right, since the
Homer Catalogue of Ships listed Delphi among the Phocian towns (*Iliad* II.519). With the resources therein, they would be able to defend themselves if necessary against the Thebans and other Amphictyons. Thereupon the Phocians, not knowing where else to turn, elected him "strategos autokrator" and proceeded to challenge the Amphictyonic judgement.

Philomelus then set about gathering support for his cause. He received fifteen talents in secret and a promise of future aid from the Spartan king, Archidamus, who was in a similar position himself with regard to the Amphictyonic League. With this money added to his own personal resources, Philomelus was able to hire mercenaries to seize the oracle (*Diodorus* XVI.27.3). He then sent envoys to the Greek states insisting on the ancient Phocian right to the administration of the sanctuary and guaranteeing the safety of its treasures (*Diodorus* XVI.27.3-4). At these assurances, the Athenians, the Spartans, and others allied themselves with the Phocians. The Boeotians, the Locrians, and their supporters remained hostile however.

After further Phocian military successes, the Locrians appealed to the Boeotians for aid. The Boeotians, in turn, sent envoys to the Thessalians and the other Amphictyonic members, asking them to declare war against the Phocians. The motion was passed and the war began in earnest (*Diodorus* XVI.28.2-4). Philomelus now recruited a still larger army of
mercenaries and with this force he began a successful campaign against the Locrians, the Boeotians and the Thessalians (Diodorus XVI.30). Philomelus also forced the Boeotians to discontinue their brutal policy of executing all mercenaries captured from the Phocian forces as temple-robbers by meting out the same fate to some Boeotian prisoners (Diodorus XVI.31.1-2). Philomelus' wave of good fortune was not destined to be of long duration. Shortly after this, the Boeotians by sheer force of numbers defeated the Phocians at Neon. Philomelus, still fighting bravely, was cornered by the enemy and threw himself off a precipice. His army then retreated back to Phocis under Onomarchus, "οὐδὲν ἀξιοῦσι τὴν στρατηγόσ."  

At an emergency meeting of the common assembly of the Phocians, Onomarchus came forward and urged his compatriots to continue the war. When he had been elected "strategos autokrator," Onomarchus proceeded to recruit further mercenaries to fill the ranks of his army (Diodorus XVI.32). In need of further funds, Onomarchus unscrupulously "borrowed" from the sanctuary of Apollo, forging the bronze and iron into weapons and striking coinage from the silver and gold. With these extra resources, he was able to bribe the Thessalians (among others) to remain neutral, leaving his hands free to make inroads on the territory of the Locrians and the Boeotians (Diodorus XVI.33).

At this point, Philip of Macedon played a part for the
first time in the events of the war when the Thessalians appealed to him for military aid against Lycophron, the tyrant of Pherae. Lycophron, in turn, obtained the support of the powerful Phocian army. At first, Onomarchus dispatched his brother Phayllus to Thessaly with seven thousand men. After this preliminary force was defeated, Onomarchus came in person with the entire Phocian army and defeated the combined troops of Philip and the Thessalians in two engagements. Philip, outnumbered but not discouraged, withdrew to Macedon. Onomarchus, on the other hand, encouraged by this success, made an incursion into Boeotia and took the city of Coronea.

At the beginning of the next campaigning season (spring 352), Philip returned to Thessaly with a larger army. Once again, Lycophron requested military aid from his powerful allies, the Phocians. A decisive battle of the combined forces of the Thessalians and Philip against Lycophron and the Phocians was fought, most probably on the Crocion Plain between Halus and Phthiotic Thebes, from which this battle derives its modern name ("Battle of the Crocus Field"). Onomarchus and his men were routed and fled to the sea where Chares "happened" to be sailing by. Onomarchus was among the many Phocian soldiers who drowned in an attempt to swim out to the Athenian triremes. In total, there were over six thousand Phocian casualties and three thousand Phocian captives in this ill-fated battle (Diodorus XVI.35.4-6). Philip capitalized on the fact that this was nominally a
"sacred war" by ordering his soldiers to don laurel wreaths before the battle as avengers of Apollo. In keeping with his self-proclaimed role of Delphic avenger, Philip hung the dead body of Onomarchus and threw the rest (τοὺς ἄλλους) into the sea on the grounds that they had been guilty of sacrilege.

After the death of Onomarchus, his brother, Phayllus, succeeded to the post of "strategos autokrator." From further funds "borrowed" from the sanctuary at Delphi, he attempted to recoup the Phocian losses in the Battle of the Crocus Field by hiring still more mercenaries at double the usual rate of pay (Diodorus XVI.36.1) With his forces increased by reinforcements from his allies (Sparta, Athens, and Achaea) and also by the mercenaries of Lycophron (who had surrendered the city of Pherae to Philip), Phayllus engaged the Boeotians in several unsuccessful battles (Diodorus XVI.37.3-6).

Meanwhile, encouraged by his success in Thessaly, Philip prepared to extend his influence further south. The Phocians organized a defense at Thermopylae with the support of the Athenians and successfully prevented Philip from advancing through the pass. This was the last decisive action in the war until 346.

The conflict now disintegrated into a tedious war of attrition, in which the resources of both the Thebans and the Phocians were gradually drained. Soon Phayllus died of a φθείρα.
vósos and passed on the office of strategos to the young Phalaecus. After several more years of skirmishing, Phalaecus was accused in 347 of stealing the sacred treasures for his own private use (ὀλοκληρώσας) and was subsequently deposed and a board of three generals was chosen to replace him.

By this point, the financial resources of Thebes were almost exhausted and her losses in the Sacred War were falling solely upon her citizens rather than upon foreign mercenaries. Finally, in 346, the Boeotians sent an embassy to Philip requesting an alliance (Diodorus XVI.59.2). Philip seized the opportunity and advanced to Thermopylae. Meanwhile, the Phocians, fearing the outcome, should Philip take the field against them, had appealed to Athens and Sparta for help. Athens sent a force under Proxenus and fifty triremes to the defense of Thermopylae, while Sparta dispatched one thousand hoplites under Archidamus. Phalaecus, however, had somehow regained his post of general and he proceeded to send away the Athenian and Spartan forces from Thermopylae. When Philip arrived at Thermopylae, Phalaecus capitulated on condition of safe conduct for himself and his army of eight thousand mercenaries to the Peloponnese. Upon hearing the news of the defection of their commander and most of the army, all the Phocian towns surrendered unconditionally.

Philip, having put a decisive end to the war "δεέλευ μάχης," continued his role as devout defender of Apollo by calling an
assembly of the Amphictyonic League to decide the fate of Phocis, instead of taking matters into his own hands (Diodorus XVI.59.4). One tribe actually proposed the traditional punishment for temple-robbers, that the offenders be thrown off a cliff (Aeschines 2.142). Nevertheless, due to Philip's influence, a more merciful policy prevailed. All the Phocian towns were to be destroyed and their inhabitants were thereafter to dwell in scattered villages of no more than fifty houses. All their horses were to be sold and all their arms destroyed. An annual payment of sixty talents to replace the treasures of the sanctuary was imposed.\(^7\) In addition, Phocis was deprived of her share in the Amphictyonic League and her two votes were given to Philip.\(^6\) Philip was now the leading power in the Amphictyonic League and could control the voting by virtue of his own two votes and his sway over Thessaly and her perioikoi. Philip presided over the Pythian Games of 346 B. C. and then returned home to Macedon (Diodorus XVI.60.2-4).

Thus ended the so-called Third Sacred War, with Philip's use of the machinery of the Amphictyonic League to legitimize his position in Greece. Although, as we have seen above, the bare facts of the conflict are clear from the narrative of Diodorus, the chronology is hotly disputed. Once again, we find modern historians divided into two camps: those who believe that the account of Diodorus contains a narrative doublet,\(^7\) and their opponents, who argue that such a doublet
does not exist and therefore Diodorus' chronology should stand.\textsuperscript{78} The question rests upon Diodorus' account of the crucial first years of the war. Did he insert an extra year into his narrative (the controversial "doublet") between the Phocian seizure of Delphi and the Amphictyonic declaration of Sacred War? Although the narrative of Diodorus does contain various contradictions and apparent repetitions, can we really impute to our main source for this period such carelessness as to record unknowingly the events of the same year twice? It seems a contradiction in terms to derive most (indeed, almost all) of our facts concerning this conflict from Diodorus but at the same time to disregard his chronology altogether. Moreover, Hammond has shown, quite convincingly, that the internal evidence in Diodorus squares with the external evidence from independent sources.\textsuperscript{79} Thus, he dates the seizure of the sanctuary to 357/6 and the declaration of war by the Amphictyonic League to 355/54, and his chronology has won wide acceptance.\textsuperscript{80}

One may well wonder what this lengthy war concluding in the upheaval of the Greek world had in common with the bloodless squabble of the previous century. The obvious similarity, of course, is that both wars were fought over Delphi. Delphi, by this time, was truly a panhellenic centre. Its infallible (at least according to Book One of Herodotus) oracle had existed since the Dark Ages and had finally achieved true panhellenic stature during the era of
colonization. Few colonies were established without divine assent from Apollo and often others later invented oracles to atone for this oversight. In addition to the reputation of its oracle, Delphi also hosted the Pythian Games, which along with the Olympic, Nemean, and Isthmian Games formed the only panhellenic festivals. This group of panhellenic festivals fostered a sense of national unity and attracted visitors and competitors from all over Greece. Delphi, therefore, had very quickly attracted an enormous amount of wealth and prestige and, consequently, it is not surprising that numerous attempts were made to control the sanctuary. The first attempt to do so with military force in the classical period was aptly named a "Sacred War," as the scholiast to Aristophanes' *Birds* 556 remarks.\(^8\)

A second similarity between the two incidents lies on a less superficial level. The motivation behind the two conflicts was essentially the same. Although both "Sacred Wars" were nominally on behalf of Apollo, in reality both were fought for strictly political motives. In other words, religion was merely an excuse to provoke a war in both cases.

The differences between the two wars appear far more striking. Nevertheless, we must remember that the ancient accounts of the fourth-century war are extremely copious and emotional in comparison with the terse Thucydidean description of the fifth-century incident. Consequently, it is difficult to ascertain whether or not public reaction to the fifth-
century affair was on the same emotional level as that provoked by the fourth-century crisis.

In spite of our lack of evidence, it seems likely that this was not the case. Although both the Spartans and the Athenians had orchestrated armed take-overs of Delphi in the fifth-century, neither side is recorded as having committed any crime heinous enough to brand them as "sacrilegious" as the Phocians were a century later. Therefore, the armed occupation of Delphi was probably not sufficient in itself to incite the pious outrage against the Phocians which is reflected in our sources, especially since the contemporary Greek world was quite aware that the Phocians had been forced into action by the Thebans. Sympathy for the Phocians, for the most part, began to fade when their leaders more and more unscrupulously plundered the temple treasures in order to pay their army of mercenaries. Even Aeschines who, as an Athenian, was nominally an ally of Phocis and shows himself sympathetic towards the Phocians (he claims in 2.142 to have saved them all from execution as temple-robbers), censures their seizure of the sacred treasures (2.132).

We saw above that catalogues of the treasures plundered from Delphi by the successive Phocian commanders were a popular contemporary topic. As time passed, the tale grew taller and writers took pleasure in recounting the divine retribution which they considered justly incurred by the sacrilegious Phocians and their allies. Although the use of
temple monies to finance a war was not unprecedented, the Phocians had "borrowed" the enormous sum of over ten thousand talents and had melted down irreplaceable treasures, dating back to the generosity of Croesus, for their own profane use. The widespread feeling of outrage generated by the Phocian spoliation of the sanctuary is a feature of the fourth-century conflict not found in our accounts (terse as they are) of the fifth-century incident.

The other major differences between the two wars lie in the distinct features of the fourth-century conflict. The protracted ten-year struggle imposed a lasting impression on the Greek world. The novel use of mercenaries revolutionized warfare. The Thebans proved that the use of the machinery of the Amphictyonic League to settle a private grudge was most effective. The ultimate intervention by Philip of Macedon (also using the machinery of the Amphictyonic League) changed the face of the Greek world. Therefore, the fourth-century war had consequences significantly more far-reaching than the fifth-century conflict.

It is perhaps for this reason that the contemporary historians, unlike modern scholars, did not give it a number—it was simply known as "οἱ ἥρως πόλεμος." There is nothing at all in its title to indicate that it had been preceded by another "Sacred War" in the previous century. Perhaps the fact that it evidently superseded the minor squabble of the fifth century in importance caused it to become "the Sacred
War" par excellence. After all, very few conflicts in ancient Greece took on such dimensions as this exhaustive struggle.

Nevertheless, it is important to remember that the fifth-century incident is the original "Sacred War" and that the fourth-century conflict apparently began as a "Phocian War." This was the term consistently used by the Athenian orators during the course of the war although, as allies of Phocis and enemies of Philip, they may have been reluctant to acknowledge it as a "Sacred War." Before long, however, the historiographic tradition, influenced perhaps by Philip's propaganda, saw the connection between the fifth-century and fourth-century conflicts and borrowed the term "Sacred War" from Thucydides' narrative. In this way, a "Phocian War" became a "Sacred War" for posterity.
THE MODERN CONCEPT OF SACRED WAR

In the previous chapter, we established that the so-called Second and Third Sacred Wars were labelled as such (ἱερὸς πόλεμος) in antiquity. These wars had little in common except that both were fought over the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi. In order to arrive at a working hypothesis to explain why the term ἱερὸς πόλεμος was exclusively applied to these conflicts, we must contrast them with two categories of test cases: wars which modern scholars have labelled as "sacred" and wars which share elements in common with ἱερὸς πόλεμος but are not given this attribution by ancient or modern authorities.

The first category, wars which have been classified as "sacred wars" by modern scholars,89 consists of two other wars fought at Delphi. These are, namely, the First Sacred War and the Fourth Sacred War. Yet, neither of these wars was given the title ἱερὸς πόλεμος in antiquity. This raises the question once again of which elements justify the use of this term. In order to address this question, we must examine these so-called "sacred wars" in detail.
The nomenclature of the so-called First Sacred War is consistent. The earliest extant source to mention this war by name is Callisthenes of Olynthus, whom we have already met in our discussion of the so-called Third Sacred War. Athenaeus quotes Callisthenes (F Gr Hist 124 F 1) in a passage of his Deipnosophistae (XIII.560 B-C):

καὶ ὁ Κρασινὸς πόλεμος ὤναμαζόμενος, δὲ φησὶ Καλλισθένης ἐν τῷ Περὶ τοῦ Ἱεροῦ Πολέμου, ὅτε Κυρρατοὶ πρὸς Φυκεῖς ἐπολέμησαν, δεκαέτης ἂν. ἄρπασάντων Κυρρατῶν τὴν Πελάγαυνος τοῦ Φυκέως θυγατέρα Μεγιστῷ καὶ τὰς Ἀργείων θυγατέρας ἑπανοικίσας ἐκ τοῦ Πυθικοῦ Ἰεροῦ. δεκάτω δὲ ἔτει ἐδὰν καὶ ἦ Κύρρα.

This brief passage in Athenaeus does, however, leave ambiguous which war is discussed in Callisthenes' monograph "Περὶ τοῦ Ἱεροῦ Πολέμου". Does the monograph as a whole concern the so-called First Sacred War or is Callisthenes' treatment of ὁ Κρασινὸς πόλεμος simply a digression contained in his narrative of the so-called Third Sacred War? At first sight, the title "Περὶ τοῦ Ἱεροῦ Πολέμου" appears to refer to the so-called First Sacred War, because that is clearly the war which Callisthenes is describing. This first impression is based on inference, however, not only from the context but also from the misleading modern title of the First Sacred War, as this war is not labelled as a Ἱερὸς πόλεμος by any extant ancient source.

In order to ascertain which war Callisthenes refers to as ὁ Ἱερὸς πόλεμος, it is necessary to examine more closely the scope of Callisthenes' work. We know from Diodorus (XIV.117.8) that Callisthenes began his history with the
In his introduction to the Sacred War under the year 357/6, Diodorus included Callisthenes in his list of sources, as we have seen. Therefore, Callisthenes' *Hellenica* spanned the years 387/6-357/6 and could not have contained an account of the Crisaean War, which took place in the early sixth century, except as a digression. Nevertheless, it is not Callisthenes' *Hellenica* which includes a digression on the Crisaean War but rather a separate work, entitled "Περὶ τοῦ Ἰεροῦ Πολέμου ."

There is another reference to this work on the Sacred War in Cicero (*Epistulæ ad Familiares* V.12.2):

...an, ut multi Graeci fecerunt, Callisthenes Phocicum bellum, Timaeus Pyrrhi, Polybius Numantium (qui omnes a perpetuis suis historiis ea, quae dixi, bella separaverunt)... From this reference in Cicero, it becomes clear that Callisthenes' monograph on the "Sacred War" is an account of the fourth-century conflict, and not the Crisaean War and that it was composed as a separate appendix to the main body of his history, in this case the *Hellenica*. Because the closing date of Callisthenes' *Hellenica* marked the beginning of the hostilities over Delphi, it is likely that this monograph constituted a sequel to the *Hellenica*. Therefore,
Callisthenes' discussion of the Crisaean War must have been a digression on an earlier conflict over Delphi contained in the larger context of his monograph on the "Sacred War." It is clearly the fourth-century conflict which is given the attribution δ ζερός πόλεμος and not the Crisaean War.

Another reference by name to the Crisaean War is found in the Hypothesis to Pindar's Nemean IX. The scholiast says:

Περὶ τῶν ἔν Σικυώνι Πυθώνι δ' Ἀλκαρνασεύς οὕτω γράφει:

... ... ... ὑπὲρ δὲ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῶν Κρισαίων κατὰ ἀλλασσαν ἀρχόμεν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια πορευόμενα καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μακράς γνωσμένης τῆς πολιορκίας, Κλεισθένην τὸν Σικυώνιον ναυτικὸν ὅδρα παρασκευάζοντα κυμάσαι τὴν συντομίαν αὐτῶν, καὶ διὰ ταῦτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν τῷ τρίτῳ τῶν λαφρῶν ἔδοσαν τῷ Κλεισθένει καὶ Σικυώνιοι. ἂφ'οθα
 καὶ Σικυώνιοι τὰ Πύθια τριτοῦ παρ' ἑαυτοῖς ἔθεσαν.

The scholiast does not state explicitly the identity of δ'

Ἀλκαρνασεύς. Drachmann (ad loc)94 suggests that the scholiast refers to Herodotus V.67. This suggestion is probably correct, since in this chapter Herodotus discusses Cleisthenes and his opposition to the ὅσοι καὶ δρταὶ at Sicyon in honour of Adrastus. Moreover, this passage of Herodotus is cited a little further on in the scholium to Nemean IX 30a, where it should be noted that Herodotus is mentioned by name and not by birthplace. Herodotus, however, makes no reference whatsoever to Cleisthenes' role in the Crisaean War or his institution of Pythian Games at Sicyon out of the spoils. And, in Herodotus' History, the oracle at Delphi is generally portrayed as unsympathetic to Cleisthenes. Therefore, the θησί following the lacuna in the scholium cannot refer to Herodotus.
The crucial point to consider regarding the authorship of the section of the scholium following ψηνα is whether or not the lacuna contained the name of another source. Unfortunately, the length of the lacuna is impossible to determine. If the lacuna was a short one and did not originally contain the name of any other source, then the Halicarnassian mentioned cannot be Herodotus, because he does not mention Cleisthenes in this connection at all. Moreover, there is no written reference to Herodotus as ὁ Ἀκρανασεύς before the second century B.C. From the time of Aristotle (Rhetoric III.9.1) until later Alexandrine scholarship, Herodotus was referred to as ὁ θουργὸς. Nevertheless, if the scholiast dates from the later Hellenistic period, it is much more likely that he is referring to Herodotus as the Halicarnassian par excellence.

Noel Robertson, following Wilamowitz, proposes the identification of ὁ Ἀκρανασεύς as Dionysius of Halicarnassus. He suggests that Dionysius "might well" treat the foundation of Pythian Games in his work περὶ χρόνων (F.Gr Hist 251 F 1), which does not survive. Since Dionysius' book on chronology is not extant, Robertson's suggestion cannot be positively proved or disproved. Nevertheless, Dionysius is not likely to have discussed Cleisthenes or the Sicyonian festival in detail. Furthermore, the change of verbs in the scholium and the particle δὲ do indicate a change of source.

The thesis that the lacuna does contain the name of
another source was first put forward by Drachmann (ad loc). He proposes that the section on Cleisthenes' involvement can be attributed to Menaechmus of Sicyon, who is also mentioned in the scholium to Nemean IX 30a. This is a reasonable conclusion since it is likely that Menaechmus lived in the latter half of the fourth century in the wake of the furor over Delphi. Furthermore, Menaechmus is a natural candidate to tie Cleisthenes in with Delphi, as he wrote both a Σημειώσεις (F Gr Hist 131 F 1) and a Πολεμικές (F Gr Hist 131 F 2). Nevertheless, too little of Menaechmus' work remains for us to verify this conclusion with any degree of certainty. It seems likely, however, that Menaechmus would have had far more motivation to discuss Cleisthenes and the foundation of the Pythia at Sicyon than Dionysius of Halicarnassus. At any rate, the source from whom the scholiast derives his information refers to this war as ὁ πόλεμος τῶν Κρυσαίων.

Pausanias is another ancient source to mention this war by name. Like the scholiast in the Hypothesis to Pindar's Nemean IX, Pausanias links Cleisthenes to the Crisaean War. In his description of the monuments at Sicyon, Pausanias (II.9.6) mentions the stoa of Cleisthenes and remarks:

Ψηφοδότησε δὲ ἀπὸ λαφύρων ὁ Κλεισθένης αὐτῆς τῶν πρῶτων Κέρα γολίθρων συμπολεμήσας Ἀμφικτύων.

Pausanias has clearly derived his information from a local Sicyonian tradition (perhaps Menaechmus) concerning this
stoa and its namesake.

Strabo, on the other hand, appears to be using yet another source, one who wishes to emphasize the role of Eurylochus of Thessaly in the Crisaean War. His first reference by name to the war occurs in IX.3.4:

In IX.3.10, he alludes to the war once again:

In all these cases (Callisthenes, Menaechmus, and Ephorus). As a result, it is likely that this war was not called a ἱερὸς πόλεμος by a single fourth-century source, which is peculiar in view of the increased concern over Delphi occasioned by the Phocian War.

The furor over Delphi did, however, lead to renewed interest in past conflicts involving that sanctuary and the Amphictyonic League. Not much attention had been paid to the Crisaean War before this time (it is not mentioned by
Herodotus or Thucydides). As a result of the Phocian War, however, contemporary historians became interested in the Crisaeian War and clearly drew some connection between it and the fourth-century conflict. Despite the fact that they did not call it a "Sacred War," they saw occasion to refer to the Crisaeian War several times at least in the decade following the conclusion of the Phocian War.

The first datable reference to the war is found in Speusippus' *Letter to Philip of Macedon* of 342, on the authority of a certain Antipater of Magnesia (*Fr Gr Hist* 69 F 2): "Κρίσατοι δὲ υπὸ τῶν Ἀμφικτύων ἀνηρέθησαν."

Probably about this time, Callisthenes included a section on the Crisaeian War in his work on the Phocian War. Although we cannot assign a definite date to Callisthenes' monograph "Περὶ τοῦ Ἱεροῦ Πολέμου," the terminus post quem is provided by the conclusion of the Phocian War in 346 and the terminus ante quem by Callisthenes' departure with Alexander in 344. Callisthenes also collaborated with Aristotle on ἡ τῶν Πυθιανῶν ἀναγραφή, which was probably begun in the mid-330's before he set out for Asia. The title of this ἀναγραφή (or πάναξ in the laudatory inscription) would lead one reasonably to infer that it consisted of a bare list of names, but the testimony of Plutarch (*Solon* XI.1) reveals that it also contained historical narrative.

It has been suggested that the details of the Crisaeian War found in the Hypotheses to Pindar's *Pythian Odes* are
derived from the ἀναγραφή of Aristotle and Callisthenes because the dates are given according to both Athenian and Delphian archonships. It is important to remember, however, that the inscription merely honours Aristotle and Callisthenes for composing a πόλεμος of victors and organizers (presumably the agonothetai) and gives no indication of the dating system originally used by Aristotle and Callisthenes. The Delphians may have used their own dating system when they transcribed the material from the πόλεμος onto the marble. Nevertheless, Aristotle and Callisthenes may have composed the work using the Delphian system of chronology as a gesture of respect for the eventual proprietors.

The chronology of the scholium, at least, must ultimately have come from Delphi, perhaps from the ἀναγραφή of Aristotle and Callisthenes, which was inscribed on stone for everyone to see. The scholiast may have obtained the details, however, from some other source. The scholiast did use Euphorion, the third-century poet, as a source, although he was clearly not the only authority from whom he derived his information (μαρτυρεῖ καὶ Ἑὐφορίων). Since most of the credit for the defeat of the Crisaeans is given to Eurylochus and the Thessalians, it has been suggested that the scholiast followed a Thessalian source. Because of this Thessalian bias in the Hypotheses Pythiorum, it is not likely that the ἀναγραφή of Aristotle and Callisthenes was the sole or even the main source of the scholiast, as the testimony of Plutarch (Solon
XI.1) implies that it emphasized the Athenian role in the war. The extant fragments of Antipater and Callisthenes, as we have seen, contain no more than passing references to the Crisaean War. The first surviving narrative of its events is found in Aeschines' speech Against Ctesiphon (III.107-112) of 330 B.C. This is by no means an unbiased account, however. Aeschines is using the events of the Crisaean War in order to justify his actions that led to the war over Amphissa, often called the Fourth Sacred War.

The only other narrative of the Crisaean War is found in a speech attributed to Thessalus, son of Hippocrates. It is included in the Hippocratic Corpus (Littre IX, p. 404-428), but its authenticity and date are questioned. Some scholars accept it at face value as a fourth-century composition, while others reject it as spurious and assign to it a late Hellenistic date. This account, like that of Aeschines, is not an unbiased one, as its author wishes to emphasize (invent?) the part which the Asclepiads of Cos played in the Crisaean War.

All the other literary references to the Crisaean War focus only upon certain aspects of the conflict and many of them date from Hellenistic times (or later), although, as we have seen, they often derive their information from fourth-century sources.

It is necessary now to examine the events of the Crisaean War in order to determine the similarities and differences
between it and the so-called Second and Third Sacred Wars (which were entitled ἵεροι πόλεμοι by the ancient sources). As the earliest accounts of the war date from the fourth century, many of the details have become confused (and therefore disputed) through the passage of time.\textsuperscript{112} Scholars, both ancient and modern, cannot even agree upon the name of the protagonist in the Crisaean War, the city called both Crisa and Cirrha in our sources.\textsuperscript{113}

The causes of the war are particularly controversial. The most common cause of the war given in our sources (probably as a result of its very vagueness) is that the Crisaean had committed sacrilege (ἀσεβείαν, ἀφρότηταν) against the sanctuary at Delphi and its offerings.\textsuperscript{114} Another tradition shows the Crisaean abusing their control of the coastline and the roads going into Delphi either by severely taxing\textsuperscript{115} or, as brigands, robbing and even killing visitors to the temple.\textsuperscript{116} Callisthenes (\textit{F Gr Hist} 124 F 1) attributes the cause of the war to the seizure of a woman, but this is suspect, as well as the ten year length of the war, as an attempt to force a parallel with the Trojan War. \textit{[Thessalus] (Littré IX, p. 406), on the other hand, does not confine himself to a single cause but provides us with a long list:}\n
\begin{quote}

\begin{verbatim}
Οὔτοι δὲ οἱ Κρίσαιοι τότε πολλοὶ καὶ ἰσχυροὶ καὶ πλούσιοι, 
tοῦτοι τοῖς ἁγαθοῖς ἐπὶ κακῷ ἔχρησαντο. Ἐξυβρίζοντες γὰρ
πολλὰ δεινὰ καὶ παράνομα εἰργάσαντο, ἐς τὸν θεὸν ἀσεβοῦντες,
Δελφοὺς καταδουλοῦμενοι, προσοῦκους ληξίζομενοι, θεωροῦκε 
συλέουσας, γυναικῶς τε καὶ παιδίας ἀγνέοιντες, καὶ ἐλς 
τὰ σώματα ἐξυβρίζοντες.
\end{verbatim}

\end{quote}
The testimony of [Thessalus] also is suspect, because he is blatantly attempting to forge together all the conflicting traditions concerning the cause of the Crisaean War.

Despite all this confusion, it is evident that the enviable position of the Crisaeans controlling the routes into Delphi both by sea and by land had either provoked jealousy among their neighbours or had led to abuse on their part of their control over the oracle and those consulting it. For whatever reason, the Amphictyonic League resolved upon war against the Crisaeans and obtained a favourable oracle from Delphi. Therefore the war against the Crisaeans began in earnest and the Amphictyonic forces were strengthened by allied reinforcements.

The connection of the Amphictyonic League with Delphi at this time is difficult to determine. Most of our ancient sources appear to imply that the Amphictyonic League existed already at Delphi before the war began. Nevertheless, the same sources state explicitly that the city of Crisa was in control of the sanctuary at this time. It seems unlikely that both the Amphictyonic League and the powerful city of Crisa would peacefully have co-existed at Delphi. A more plausible hypothesis is that the Amphictyonic League, with its Thessalian majority, saw the situation at the beginning of the sixth century as an opportunity to extend its influence from Anthela to Delphi. By "defending" Delphi from the allegedly sacrilegious Crisaeans, the Amphictyonic League was able
legitimately to gain control of this venerated sanctuary and the resources therein.

This interpretation is reinforced by Aeschines, who refers (II.115) to an oath and a curse sworn at ἡ πρώτη σύνοδος of the Amphictyonic League. This oath and curse appear to be the same as those which Aeschines quotes (III.109-112) as having been sworn by the Amphictyonic League upon the conclusion of the Crisaean War. Aeschines adds (III.113) that the record of this oath and curse existed still at Delphi in his day.

The propaganda used by the Amphictyonic League to justify its cause must have been enormously effective (as it was to be two and a half centuries later), as other states subsequently tried to glorify their share in the war. There are three traditions about the role played by each of the allies in this conflict. The Athenian version states that Solon was involved in the Crisaean War in the capacity of advisor and Alcmaeon was the leader of the Athenian contingent. The Sicyonian tradition (originating with Menaechmus?) attributes the command of the Amphictyonic forces to Cleisthenes of Sicyon. The third tradition emphasizes Thessalian involvement in the war and assigns the role of Amphictyonic commander to Eurylochus of Thessaly.

Modern scholars, for the most part, agree that Athens played no great military role in the Crisaean War, but are divided as to whether Sicyon or Thessaly was the predominant
power. Parke argues that a Thessalian commander-in-chief would be logical due to the majority in the Amphictyonic League of the Thessalian bloc. Sordi, on the other hand, believes that the Thessalians did not gain control over their perioikoi until long after the conclusion of the Crisaean War, around 560 B.C. Moreover, the distant Thessalians with their agricultural economy would not have anything to gain by destroying the powerful port of Crisa. Sicyon, however, a powerful rival of Crisa on the Gulf of Corinth, had everything to gain by the destruction of Crisa and her hold on the western trade route. This argument is hampered by the fact that the Amphictyonic League was clearly a local Thessalian religious organization in origin and, as such, would have desired control over the sanctuary at Delphi by means of the destruction of the city of Crisa.

Nevertheless, the opposing traditions can be reconciled. Thessaly may have used a conflict nominally on behalf of Apollo (as Philip was to do two centuries later) to extend her influence southward. Thus, Eurylochus presumably put his army and cavalry at the disposal of the Amphictyonic League and was subsequently appointed commander of the land forces. Moreover, it seems improbable that anyone but a Thessalian could have been leader of an Amphictyonic force at this time, when the organization was still a local Thessalian one. Sicyon, on the other hand, as a sea power, was given control of the fleet. In this way, the war was waged by a co-
operative force of allies.

Our sources provide us with very little detail about the course of the war. It was apparently composed of two stages. During the first stage of the war, the blockading operations of Cleisthenes' fleet in the Gulf of Corinth ended a long siege, and the city of Crisa was razed to the ground.

The defeat and destruction of Crisa occurred in the archonship of Gylidas at Delphi and an ἀγών χρηματίτις was celebrated out of the spoils.

After the downfall of their city, the surviving Crisaeans took refuge on Mount Cirphis, separated by the Pleistus River from Mount Parnassus, and continued resistance from there. Two stratagems are mentioned in our sources pertaining to this stage of the war. The first is a tradition that the Amphictyons poisoned the water supply of the Crisaeans with hellebore and were able to overcome them in their weakened condition. The second stratagem came about as a result of an oracle given to the Amphictyonic forces:

In order to circumvent the geographical impossibility, the Amphictyons dedicated to Apollo the Crisaean Plain, which lay between Delphi and the sea. These stratagems are suspect as later romanticized inventions, but guerilla operations obviously continued from Mount Cirphis after Crisa had been
destroyed. Six years later, the last remnants of Crisaean resistance were overcome.\textsuperscript{133} Finally, in 582/1, the victory was celebrated by the institution of the άγών στέφανιτης, the first in a series of official Pythian festivals.\textsuperscript{134}

Most of our sources agree that the Amphictyonic League was fighting against Crisa on behalf of Delphi. George Forrest,\textsuperscript{135} however, has challenged this traditional view of the Crisaean War in a re-interpretation of the Homeric Hymn to Apollo. The crucial lines (540-43) are at the end of Apollo's speech to the Cretan sailors, where he warns them:

$$\text{ἐξ ἀλλοιωτικοῖς σημαντορεῖς ἁρπαγμένοις, τὼν ὑπ’ ἀναγκαίᾳ δεδημησθ' ἠματα πάντα.}$$

The general modern consensus is that these lines refer to the Crisaean War, although scholars remain undecided whether they date from before or after the war.\textsuperscript{136} Forrest, on the other hand, argues that these lines cannot allude to the liberation of the sanctuary from an outside threat (Crisa) but rather to a change in the organization of Delphi (ἄλλοι σημαντορεῖς).\textsuperscript{137} Forrest concludes that these "new masters" can only be the Amphictyons,\textsuperscript{138} and the tradition of the "liberation" of the sanctuary arose out of later propaganda by the winning side.\textsuperscript{139}

Forrest has raised an interesting problem and his criticism of the usual interpretation of these lines is valid. Nevertheless, his interpretation rests upon the assumption that these lines in fact refer to the Crisaean War and, more
precisely, that they date from after its conclusion. There is no conclusive evidence in the Homeric Hymn itself connecting these lines with the Crisaean War. This suggestion, although generally accepted, is a modern inference based on the fact that there were no other known conflicts at Delphi during the archaic period. Inference or not, however, Forrest's conclusion squares with our meager influence concerning the expansion of the Amphictyonic League to Delphi and at least has the virtue of not being misled by later propaganda disseminated by that organization.

The war which modern historians refer to as the Fourth Sacred War took place in the period of increased concern over Delphi and the Amphictyonic League in the years following the conclusion of the Phocian War. The main facts of this conflict emerge from the rival versions of Aeschines (III.113-129) and Demosthenes (XVIII.139-159), both of whom were involved with it personally.

The war was apparently known as "the Amphissan War" by its contemporaries. Demosthenes refers to it as "δὲν Ἀμφισσην πόλεμος" (XVIII.143 and 163). Aeschines alludes to it by the equivalent periphrasis "περὶ τοῦ Ἀμφιτυονικά" (III.221 and 237). Plutarch speaks of the war in the same terms. Nowhere in antiquity is this war labelled a "sacred war," although Demosthenes (XVIII.143) does refer to it as an Amphictyonic War (πόλεμος Ἀμφιτυονικά). In modern times it was finally classified as a "sacred war" for the first time,
the fourth in a series.

The causes of this war are fairly clear. The Locrians of Amphissa, a city on the edge of the Crisaean Plain (Strabo IX.4.8), had apparently begun to cultivate the plain once again, although this was land consecrated to Apollo. A tradition existed that this land had been consecrated as a result of the Crisaean War, although this may simply have been an aetiological explanation to account for the sacred land surrounding the sanctuary. What is important, however, is that this tradition of the consecrated land clearly existed long before the Phocian War placed Delphi and its sanctuary in the limelight.

An Amphictyonic law of 380/79 (IG II² 1126, SIG 145, lines 15-26) fixes the punishment to be imposed upon those encroaching upon the sacred land and limits the uses of this land:

Isocrates, in his Plataicus of c. 373 B.C., refers to
this consecrated land in the course of a polemic against the Thebans (31):

οῦ δυστυχῆσάντων ἡμῶν μόνοι τῶν συμμάχων ἐδεντο τὴν ψήφου, ὡς χρῆ τὴν τε πᾶλιν ἐξαναρακτίσασθαι καὶ τὴν χώραν ἀνεύαν μηλιδοτον ὃσπερ τὸ Κρισαῖον πεδίον.

The salient point in this passage is that Isocrates is clearly using the Crisaean Plain as an example of punishment following defeat in war. This, then, is our earliest reference to the Crisaean War and indicates that an earlier tradition of this war predated the increased concern over Delphi in the aftermath of the Phocian War.

The Amphictyonic law and the testimony of Isocrates show that this consecration was still in effect at this time and, therefore, the encroachment by the Amphissans was legally an offense. It is not specifically stated when the Amphissans began encroaching upon the consecrated land, but it must have been at some point after the Amphictyonic decree of 380/79. Since Aeschines (III.119) points out to the Amphictyonic League the forbidden buildings erected upon the Crisaean Plain, the encroachment of the Amphissans must have been going on for some time but this offense was ignored until it was politically expedient to bring it up.

The occasion arose at the autumn meeting (Pylaea) of the Amphictyonic League of 340 B. C.\(^1\) Diognetus was the official representative of Athens to the Amphictyonic Council (hieromnemon) for that year\(^2\) and Aeschines had been elected by the Athenians as one of three delegates (pylagorai).\(^3\)
Upon their arrival at Delphi, the Athenian delegation received a secret report that the Locrians of Amphissa (at the persuasion of the Thebans) were going to bring about a resolution (δέγμα) that a fine of fifty talents be levied against the Athenians for having dedicated gilded shields in the new temple at Delphi (the old Alcmaeonid temple had been destroyed by fire in 373 B.C.) before it had been officially consecrated.¹⁴⁸ This lack of protocol, however, did not cause offense so much as the inscription on these shields:

'Αθηναῖοι ἀπὸ Μήσων καὶ Θηβαίων,
δότε τάναντια τοῖς Ἑλληνίδοις ἐμάχοντο.

(Aeschines III.116)

As Diognetus, the hieromnemon, and one of the other pylagorai had come down with a fever, Aeschines was asked to reply to this charge on behalf of the city.¹⁴⁹ At the beginning of his speech, Aeschines alleges (III.117) that he was interrupted by a certain Amphissan, who reproached Athens for her alliance with Phocis in the Phocian War, among other offenses. In return, Aeschines pointed to the Crisaean (or Cirrhaean) Plain, which was clearly visible from the lofty seat of Delphi on Mount Parnassus, as tangible evidence of the offenses of the Amphissans (III.118-119).

As a result of Aeschines' persuasive oratory,¹⁵⁰ the matter of the shields was forgotten immediately and the hieromnemones voted to make an official survey (περιστοχος) of the consecrated land.¹⁵¹ All the Delphians of military age and all the hieromnemones and pylagorai were to participate in
this expedition. On the following day (Aeschines III.123), after the inspection and a fair bit of Amphictyonic destruction were carried out, the Amphictyons were attacked by the Locrians of Amphissa and barely managed to escape to Delphi with their lives.¹⁵²

An emergency assembly was convened at Delphi the very next day and it was voted to hold a special meeting of the Amphictyonic League before the next Pylaea (spring 339) in order to decide the fate of Amphissa (Aeschines III.124). Demosthenes had persuaded the Athenians not to attend this meeting and the Thebans had also decided to abstain (this city was presumably in an awkward position due to her instigation of the crisis), but all the other Amphictyonic members were present.¹⁵³ At this meeting, Cottyphus of Pharsalus,¹⁵⁴ president of the Amphictyons, was elected as general (strategos) of the Amphictyonic forces.¹⁵⁵

The next campaigning season (spring 339), an expedition was made against the Amphissans and a fine was levied against them.¹⁵⁶ The Amphissans, however, refused to pay the fine and at the next Pylaea (autumn 339) Philip (who had previously been on campaign in Scythia) was elected commander.¹⁵⁷ At the head of the second expedition, Philip made as if to march to Cirrha but, to the shock and surprise of both Athens and Thebes, seized Cytinium and Elateia instead.¹⁵⁸ This unexpected development resulted in the alliance of Athens and Thebes and finally in the infamous battle of Chaeronea in 338.
Thus, like the Phocian War, the Amphissan War served to legitimize Philip's arrival in Greece.

The question remains, however, why the Crisaean and Amphissan Wars were not labelled by the ancients as ἱεροὶ πόλεμοι. The modern classification of "sacred war" which has been attached to these conflicts appears the natural term to use, as both the Crisaean and Amphissan Wars are closely linked to the Phocian War in particular.

The similarities between these conflicts are so great, in fact, that the tradition between them has become confused. All three of these wars were fought nominally on behalf of the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi by the Amphiictyonic League against an offender who had exhibited some form of ἐπιθετος. The real issue in these wars, however, was control of the sanctuary and alleged encroachment of sacred land often served as a catalyst in these struggles. It is difficult to entangle the separate strands of evidence, especially in the case of the Crisaean War, the only one for which we have no contemporary evidence, except for the enigmatic lines at the end of the Homeric Hymn to Apollo which, if they do in fact refer to the Crisaean War, may be near contemporary.

The Crisaean War possesses very few elements which are not allegedly present in the Phocian and Amphissan Wars. Even the name of its protagonist in the majority of the ancient sources, Cirrha, reappears in connection with the Amphissan War. The ten year duration of the war, as given by
Callisthenes (F Gr Hist 124 F 1), is apparently an attempt to draw an artificial parallel between it and the Trojan War, as well as the Phocian War. Ten, however, was a traditional number and all three of these wars might have been remembered in later accounts as ten year wars just for that reason. One scholar even considers the tradition of the two stages in the fighting to be a reflection of the events of the Phocian War.159

The biggest area of confusion is to be found in the causes of the war. Callisthenes (F Gr Hist 124 F 1) alleges that the seizure of a certain Phocian woman was the reason behind the outbreak of the war. This romantic detail is suspect, however, as an obvious attempt to mirror the Trojan War. Interestingly enough, Duris of Samos (F Gr Hist 76 F 2) makes an almost identical allegation with respect to the Phocian War, probably for the same reason.160 The common tradition of sacrilege against the god161 is found in much more explicit detail in ancient accounts of the Phocian War. The cause of the war given by Pausanias (X.57.6), that the Crisaean were encroaching upon land sacred to Apollo, is reflected in ancient accounts not only of the Phocian War,162 but also of the Amphissian War.163 Finally, the imposition of taxes,164 or worse,165 upon visitors to the sanctuary is also a recurrent theme in accounts of the Amphissian War.166

Modern scholars agree, for the most part, that the intrusion of details into the Crisaean War from the Phocian
and Amphissan Wars resulted from the long interval between the outbreak of war in the early sixth century and the first written record of it. By the mid-fourth century, historians had forgotten the real casus belli and simply modelled it upon similar contemporary events. Nevertheless, it is necessary to be cautious in accepting such an argument at face value, because most of our available information about early history has this gap.

Noel Robertson, however, does not share the common view. In an interesting article, he re-interprets all the ancient evidence for the Crisaean War and concludes by relegating it to the realm of saga. Coupled with the fact that most of the details of this conflict are doubled elsewhere, Robertson argues that the lack of evidence for this war until the 340's constitutes proof that the Crisaean War never existed. He believes that the silence of Herodotus and Thucydides is especially damning. Robertson, then, claims to be following the example of Demosthenes and Antipater in classifying the Crisaean War as a , invented by the partisans of Philip for propaganda purposes in the political turbulence following the settlement of the Phocian War.

Although Robertson's interpretation is mainly based on inference from an argumentum ex silentio, it is useful in that it provokes a need to re-examine the Crisaean War in relation to the other three wars labelled by modern scholars as "sacred." Some of the criticisms he makes are valid but he
has overlooked some significant facts.

First of all, when Aeschines denounces the Amphissans for having cultivated the Crisaean Plain, no-one questions the fact that this land was indeed sacred to Apollo, despite Demosthenes' allegations to the contrary. Since this information was apparently common knowledge, Aeschines cannot have invented the consecration of the plain. Secondly, two pieces of evidence, Isocrates' *Plataicus* 31 and the Amphictyonic law of 380/79 (IG II² 1126, SIG 145) prove that this plain was in fact sacred to Apollo and had apparently been so for a long time. Therefore, neither Aeschines nor any other of Robertson's "partisans of Philip" can have invented the consecration of the Crisaean Plain. The tradition that the consecration of the land came about as a result of the Crisaean War, as our ancient sources unanimously state, clearly predates the 340's and, probably, the fourth century altogether.

The fact that the Crisaean War is not explicitly treated by any historian until the mid-fourth century is not a conclusive proof of its non-existence either. It appears, on the contrary, that this conflict was largely ignored (except for the passage in Isocrates and the Amphictyonic decree of 380/79, which is less specific) until the mid-fourth century, when it was resuscitated as propaganda in the wake of political unrest surrounding Delphi. As a result of its long descent into near oblivion, the details of the Crisaean War
became confused and different versions circulated which contemporary politicians used for their own ends. Herodotus and Thucydides did not deign to mention what was essentially a minor conflict until it was amplified for political reasons after the Phocian War.

It is curious, however, in this period of intense concern over Delphi, that the Crisaean and Amphissan Wars, which had so much in common with the Phocian War, were not also given the attribute ἀνευτὸς πάλαισας. In order to reach any kind of conclusion on this subject, it is necessary to turn to another category of test cases, religious disputes over other sanctuaries, and determine in what terms they are spoken of in antiquity.
OTHER RELIGIOUS DISPUTES

The second category of test cases to be contrasted with the wars entitled θεροὶ πόλεμοι in antiquity consists of examples of other conflicts which apparently share elements in common with them but are not labelled as such by ancient or modern authorities. The selection of the test cases to be examined out of the numerous disputes with religious overtones which took place throughout ancient Greek history was not purely arbitrary. Each test case possesses a specific element in common with the conflicts referred to as θεροὶ πόλεμοι.

With this purpose in mind, two test cases were chosen to represent this category. The first to be discussed is the confiscation by the Arcadian League of the offerings at Olympia in 364 B.C. This will illustrate the element of sacrilege. The second, the dispute between Athens and Megara of 350/49 over the Sacred Orgas, raises the issue once again of consecrated land to be left untilled. By comparing and contrasting these conflicts with those labelled "sacred wars" by ancient and modern sources, it will be possible to determine more clearly the motives behind the attribution of the title.
Let us now proceed to the first of these test cases, namely the confiscation by the Arcadian League of the sacred offerings at Olympia. This apparent act of sacrilege forms a link in the larger chain of events which eventually culminated in the Battle of Mantinea in 362 B.C. The catalyst of this particular crisis was the Elean seizure of the town of Lasion in the summer of 365.175

This conflict had been brewing since the aftermath of the Battle of Leuctra. After the decisive Spartan defeat at Leuctra, the Eleans obviously harboured hopes of regaining some of their former possessions, which the Spartans had seized and declared independent in the course of the Corinthian War (Xenophon, Hellenica III.23 and 30). These former Elean possessions included the territory of Triphylia, located south of Elis on the western coast of the Peloponnese, and the town of Lasion, a little further north. To their consternation, the Eleans were frustrated in this desire on all sides. Not only were all cities, both great and small (including specifically the disputed district of Triphylia), declared autonomous by the common peace treaty of 371,176 but the people of Triphylia and the other former Elean cities (presumably Lasion was among this number) claimed to be Arcadians in complete and total rejection of Elean demands (Xenophon, Hellenica VII.1.26). The Arcadians, on the other hand, were overjoyed at this news (they also had claims on Lasion at least dating back to the beginning of the
and welcomed these towns with open arms into the Arcadian League. Resentment built up among the Eleans, especially after the Arcadians had rejected the proposed peace treaty of 367 in which the King of Persia had re-assigned the disputed territories to Elis, and was finally manifested by the seizure of Lasion.

This hostile action provoked an immediate Arcadian response and led to renewed war in the Peloponnese. Once again, the face of the complex system of alliances in the Peloponnese underwent a transformation. At the beginning of the decade, the diplomatic situation was represented by two major systems of alliances: the Boeotian and the Spartan. By the eve of the Elean-Arcadian War, the network of alliances had changed somewhat. Relations between Thebes and Arcadia and Elis and Arcadia had cooled (Xenophon, Hellenica VII.1.26); Achaea, formerly neutral, had joined the Spartan side (Xenophon, Hellenica VII.1.43); Sicyon (at the instigation of Euphron) had switched its allegiance to the Arcadian-Argive coalition (Xenophon, Hellenica VII.1.45); Athens had joined Arcadia in a defensive alliance (Xenophon Hellenica VII.4.2 and 6); Corinth and its allies had become neutral as a result of a pact with Thebes (Xenophon, Hellenica VII.4.6-11). The outbreak of war further complicated the situation. The Achaeans (Xenophon, Hellenica VII.4.17) and the Spartans (Xenophon, Hellenica VII.4.20) fought together on the Elean side against the Arcadians, Argives, Thebans, and
Messenians (Xenophon, *Hellenica* VII.4.27).

The Arcadians, provoked by the Elean seizure of Lasion, were completely successful in their counterattack and gained control of much Elean territory, including the sanctuary of Olympia (Xenophon, *Hellenica* VII.4.14). The next summer (364) was the occasion of the one hundred and fourth Olympiad and the Arcadians accordingly made preparations to hold the games as usual. Perhaps in order to legitimize their position, the Arcadians recognized the claims of the Pisatans, in whose territory the sanctuary was located (Strabo VIII.3.30), to be the original hosts of the Olympic Games and "reinstated" them to their alleged ancient status. Free of its subjection to the rival Eleans and once more an independent state, Pisatis was quite willing to join the Arcadians, even if in only a nominal capacity, in presiding over the Olympic festival.

The one hundred and fourth Olympic Games apparently began as if nothing out of the ordinary had occurred. Competitors from throughout Greece and abroad assembled and the first event, the horse-race began (Xenophon, *Hellenica* VII.4.29). This air of normality was not, however, of long duration. Midway through the next event, the pentathlon, the Eleans stormed the sanctuary and penetrated as far as the innermost sacred precinct, named the Altis. The Arcadians rallied their forces, supported by allied troops, and leapt to the "defense" of the sanctuary. A great battle took place within
the sanctuary itself and Diodorus (who loves a colourful story) adds (XV.78.3):

\[ \text{Διώδορος προσθέτει, ότι οι Έλληνες επί τὴν ταυτή γωνίαν επί τὴν μάχην τῶν Ελλήνων καὶ μεθ' ήσυχίας καὶ άστορείας ἔπεσαν μεταξὺ τῶν άνδραγάθας.} \]

The Eleans, who apparently were held in little regard in matters of warfare (Xenophon, Hellenica VII.4.30), at first were successful at routing the enemy but eventually retired for the night after meeting with a reverse. Meanwhile, the Arcadians, fearing this unexpected valour of the Eleans, hastily constructed a stockade around the sanctuary out of the temporary buildings which had been carefully erected for the festival (Xenophon, Hellenica VII.4.32). Alarmed at this Arcadian show of force, the Eleans withdrew altogether.\textsuperscript{188}

After this military interlude, the Olympic Games were resumed and presumably brought to a peaceful conclusion, although the Eleans later refused to recognize this particular Olympiad as legitimate.\textsuperscript{189} Crushed by their recent defeat in the Battle of the Altis and their considerable loss of territory,\textsuperscript{190} the Eleans henceforth kept a low profile. The ball, so to speak, was now in the court of the Arcadian League.\textsuperscript{191}

It was not long before the Arcadian administration of Olympia provoked further antagonism. This time, however, the dispute arose within the League itself. The magistrates of the Arcadian League (οἱ ἐν Ἀρκάδισι ἄρχοντες) had apparently been appropriating the sacred money from Olympia in order to
pay the federal standing army, the Eparitoi. The Mantineans, however, protested against this use of the sacred money as they were eager to have peace with Elis. The Mantineans proceeded to pass a vote to have nothing further to do with the sacred money "καὶ αὐτὸι τὸ γεγυμνόνον μέρος εἰς τοὺς ἑπαρτοὺς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἑκπορόσαντες ἀπέπεμψαν τοὺς ἄρχουσιν." This blow to the finances of the League was immediately countered by the federal magistrates, who summoned the leaders of the Mantineans before the Ten Thousand. When the Mantineans failed to appear for trial, they were condemned in absentia. The Eparitoi were sent to arrest them but were not admitted within the walls of Mantinea (Xenophon, Hellenica VII.4.33).

Meanwhile, other members of the Arcadian League had seized upon Mantinea's suggestion and a vote was passed by the Ten Thousand not to use the sacred funds from Olympia any longer. As a result, those soldiers who were unable to support themselves without pay dropped out of the Eparitoi and their places were taken by those Arcadians with means, who eagerly grasped this opportunity for control of the standing army (Xenophon, Hellenica VII.4.34). The federal magistrates, however, remained free during this period to pursue their own policies.

These actions effectively divided the Arcadian League into two camps: one, oligarchic (comprising the Ten Thousand and the Eparitoi), headed by Mantinea and the other,
democratic (composed of the federal magistrates and their supporters), headed by Tegea.\textsuperscript{195} The final split occurred when the Mantinean party concluded a peace treaty with Elis, renouncing all claims to Olympia and its sanctuary, over the objections of the Tegean party and its Theban supporters (Xenophon, \textit{Hellenica} VII.4.35 ff). This growing antagonism came to a head in the summer of 362, when the Mantinean section of the Arcadian League and its allies (including Sparta, Elis, and Achaea) faced the Tegean party and its supporters (among these numbered Thebes, Argos, and Messene) on the battlefield.\textsuperscript{196} The Battle of Mantinea, made notorious by the closing words of Xenophon's \textit{Hellenica}, sounded the death-knell for the Theban hegemony in Greece and the Arcadian League's bid for supremacy in the Peloponnese.

This dispute over the sanctuary of Zeus at Olympia is reminiscent of the Phocian War in several ways. First of all, the conflict in both cases occurred over a panhellenic sanctuary. Strabo (VIII.3.30) describes the oracle, games, glory, and wealth of the temple at Olympia in almost the same terms as Delphi:

\begin{quote}
tēn δ' ἐπι φάνειν ἔσχεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν διὰ τὰ μαντεῖα τοῦ Ἄλαθος' ἐκεῖνου δ' ἐκλεωθέντος, οὐδὲν ἤττον συνέμενεν ἢ δόξα τοῦ λεοντ. καὶ τῆς αὐξήσεως, ὃσιν ἔσμεν, ἔλαβε διὰ τὴν κατηγορίαν καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα τῶν Ὀλυμπιακῶν, στεφανότητι τε καὶ λεόντο
\end{quote}

Pausanias also devotes an equally large section of his narrative to the temple of Zeus at Olympia (Books V-VI) and the offerings therein as to that of Apollo at Delphi (Book X).
Clearly, then, the sanctuary at Olympia was considered no less "sacred" in the eyes of the Greeks than Delphi.

The resemblance of this conflict to the Phocian War does not, however, end here. The armed take-over of a panhellenic sanctuary on the grounds of an alleged aboriginal claim, the confiscation of sacred offerings to pay one's army,¹⁹⁸ and the eventual reparations exacted from those guilty of sacrilege are all elements which recur nearly twenty years later in the Phocian War, forming a curious sort of déjà vu.

Nevertheless, despite the armed battle within the sacred precinct of the sanctuary and the confiscation of the sacred offerings, this conflict is not called a ἱερὸς πόλεμος by any ancient source. In fact, it is not given a name at all but is merely treated as one in a series of conflicts which culminated in the Battle of Mantinea. The armed conflict in the sanctuary itself has been named the Battle of the Altis only in modern times.

We may perhaps find a clue as to why this conflict was not given the attribution ἱερὸς πόλεμος in the attitudes of the ancient historians. Curiously enough, we find in their accounts of this dispute no trace of the infamy heaped upon the Phocians for virtually the same offenses. Diodorus (on the authority presumably of Ephorus), who in his self-righteousness has so much to say on the subject of the sacrilegious Phocians, simply states the facts (XV.78.1-4, 82.1-3) and shows little trace of bias on either side.
Diodorus' account, however, is inaccurate in several major respects and may be put aside for the most part in favour of that of Xenophon.

Xenophon, on the other hand, betrays a sympathy for the Eleans (VII.4.30 and VII.4.32) and remarks twice (VII.4.34 and 35) upon the impiety of the sacrilege committed by the Arcadian magistrates. In spite of this apparent pro-Elean bias, nowhere are any invectives heaped against the Arcadians for their seizure of the sanctuary and subsequent misappropriation of the sacred offerings and nowhere is the conflict referred to as a ἱερὸς πόλεμος. This is especially peculiar in light of the fact that Xenophon followed the Thucydidean approach to history that he did not make any connection between this dispute and the fifth-century conflict over Delphi, which was a much more minor affair.

For some reason the Arcadian League was not branded as sacrilegious in the same way that the Phocians were twenty years later, although their offense was similar. Perhaps it is due to the fact that the conflict was not over Delphi that no historian made the connection between sacrilege and the use of the term ἱερὸς πόλεμος until the renewed interest in the sanctuary of Delphi in the decade following the conclusion of the Phocian War.

Let us keep this hypothesis in mind as we proceed to our second test case: the dispute over the Sacred Orgas. The ἱερὰ ὅργας was a strip of land between Athens and Megara, sacred to
the Eleusinian goddesses. The original meaning of the term was "a well-watered, fertile spot of land," but it is always referred to as uncultivated by the ancient authorities.

This strip of land had long been a bone of contention, probably on account of its fertility. At the end of the sixth century B.C., the Athenians were causing the rumour to circulate that the Spartan king Cleomenes had met his horrible death as a result of his devastation of the Sacred Orgas. The more famous disputes over this land, however, occurred between Athens and Megara.

The first recorded instance took place in the fifth century, among the antecedents to the Peloponnesian War. One of the alleged grounds for the notorious Megarian Decree was the encroachment by the Megarians upon the Sacred Orgas. This religious offense is usually regarded as merely an Athenian pretext for the seemingly harsh economic measures of the Megarian Decree, but one scholar argues that the Athenian accusation was not a political excuse to provoke hostilities but a genuine charge of , for which penalties could be severe indeed. Although this is an interesting suggestion, it is important to remember that trumped-up charges of were common enough (as we have seen in our discussion of the so-called "sacred wars", for example).

The Sacred Orgas returned to the limelight in the middle
of the fourth century. The antecedents of this dispute are recorded in a long and interesting inscription from Eleusis, dated to the archonship of Aristodemus (352/1). This decree makes provisions first of all to fix the disputed boundaries of the Sacred Orgas (τῶν ὀρῶν ἀμφισβητούμενῶν has been restored) once and for all. Then the decree sets out a complex procedure by which the oracle at Delphi is to determine "εἰ λύλου καὶ ἀμείωτον ἐστὶ τῶν ὀρῶν τῆς Ἀθηναίων μυθικῶν τοῦ βασιλέα τῆς Θεογνησίας παλαιάς ὑπαρξάσειν τῶν ἔν τοις τῶν ὀρῶν εἰς οὗ ἀφορμῆς τοῦ προστάτου καὶ ἐπισκευῆς τοῦ ἱεροῦ τοῦ θεοῦ" or "εἰ λύλου καὶ ἀμείωτον ἐστὶ τῶν ὀρῶν τῆς Ἀθηναίων τῶν ὀρῶν ἐντός τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἀποκαλυπτόμενα τῆς ἱερᾶς ὑπαρξάς ἐάν ἄνετα τοῦ ἱεροῦ θεοῦ." While awaiting the decision of the committee to fix the boundaries and the response of the oracle, provisions are to be made for the inscription of this decree and that of Philocrates τὸ ἐπερὶ τῶν ἱερῶν, for the expenses of the elected officials, and for the proper preparation of the new boundary markers. The decree concluded with a list of names of those elected to the various offices.

Although this decree does not specifically mention any trouble with the Megarians, a passage from Demosthenes informs us that the longstanding dispute between Athens and Megara had flared up once again. Demosthenes, in his speech On Organization, says (32):

εἰ τῆς ἀναγνώσεως τῆς ψηφισμαθήματος καὶ τῆς πράξεως ἐφεξῆς διέλθον, οὗτ' ἂν εἰς προτεύοιτο τῶν αὐτῶν ταύτα ἱκάνεται. οἷον ἀ πρὸς τοὺς καταράτους Μεγαρέως ἐψηφίσασθ᾽ ἀποτομουμένους τῆς ὑπαρξάς, ἐξελέγα, καταλελεῖ, μὴ ἐπειρέσθεν...δὰντα καλά, ὡ
It is not certain at what date this proposed expedition against Megara was voted, but apparently it never took place. The decree of 352/1 was presumably either a consequence of this trouble or hostilities arose as a result of the application of this decree. Since the campaign against the Megarians referred to by Demosthenes did not take place, the latter alternative is more probable as Didymus, quoting Philochorus (F Gr Hist 328 F 155) and Androtion (F Gr Hist 324 F 30), gives an account of an actual Athenian expedition of 350/49:

διεξελεκται δὲ περὶ ταῦτα τῆς ὑπὸ  Ἀθηναίων πρὸς Μεγαρέας περὶ τῆς Λεράς 'Οργάδος, γέγονε δὲ ταῦτα καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος ἄρχοντα, καθισών Λιστορταῖ Φιλόσωφος οὕτωσι γράφων. "Αθηναῖοι δὲ πρὸς Μεγαρέας διενεχόμενοι ὑπὲρ τοῦ ὀρκομοῦ τῆς Λεράς 'Οργάδος εὐθυλῆθον εἰς Μέγαρα ἐκ "Εφείλτου στρατηγοῦτος ἕτερ τῆς χώρας, καὶ ὑφέσαντο την Ὀργάδα τὴν Λεράν" ὁρισται δ' ἔγενοντο, συγχωροῦσάν των Μεγαρέων, λακρατείδης δ' ἡρῴατης καὶ δ' ὀλυμπιόχος Ἰεροκλείδης καὶ τὰς ἐσχατιὰς τὰς περὶ τὴν Ὀργάδα καθόλουσαν, τὸν θεοῦ χρησάντος ἱών καὶ ἀμείνου ἅνετος καὶ μὴ ἐργαζόμενος, καὶ ἀφάρμασαν κύκλῳ στήλαις κατὰ φήμα πασίν ἕκοράτους."
The actions recorded by Philochorus and Androtion parallel exactly the two measures contained in the decree. The altercation obviously arose as a result of the redefinition of the boundaries by the committee determined by the decree. These passages of Philochorus and Androtion also record the response of the oracle at Delphi to the question proposed in the second measure of the decree. The oracle had apparently determined that it was "λάξον καὶ ἀμείλυνον" not to cultivate the ἐσχατωλαί (τὰ νῦν ἐντὸς τῶν ἔλεγον ἐνεργήσαμεν τῆς ἱερᾶς ὀργάδος). Cawkwell, argues from these passages that the dispute of 350/49 concerned the ἐσχατωλαί (which he equates with the ἄροφος of Thucydides I.139.2) alone, rather than the Sacred Orgas as a whole, but the accounts of Philochorus and Androtion state, on the contrary, that the conflict occurred over the marking out of the boundaries (ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἄροφος τῆς ἱερᾶς ὀργάδος). At any rate, the Athenian intervention must have resolved the problem once and for all, as we hear of no further disputes involving the Sacred Orgas.

This conflict of 350/49 was largely ignored by modern scholars until the publication of a thought-provoking article by W. R. Connor in 1962. Connor argues for a redating of the denunciation of the Megarians for encroaching upon the sacred land by the herald Anthemocritus and the Charinus decree subsequent to his death, that is mentioned by Plutarch (Pericles XXX.2-3) among the antecedents to the Peloponnesian War, from the fifth century to the dispute over the Sacred
Orgas in the middle of the Fourth. Although Connor's proposal is interesting and there are problems involved with placing Anthemocritus and the Charinus decree in 431, there is really not sufficient evidence to remove them to a fourth-century context,\textsuperscript{212} as Connor himself admits.\textsuperscript{213} Nevertheless, regardless of the question to which century the Charinus affair belongs, it indeed shows drastic measures taken by both the Athenians and the Megarians over the Sacred Orgas.

Despite the severe provisions of the Charinus decree, nowhere is either of the conflicts between Athens and Megara over the Sacred Orgas termed a war, let alone a "Sacred War." Yet the motif of encroachment upon sacred land was listed among the alleged causes of the Crisaean, Phocian, and Amphissan Wars.\textsuperscript{214} The verb \textsuperscript{\textgamma\nu\eta\nu} found in the Eleusinian decree is even used by Isocrates (\textit{Plataicus} 31) to refer to the Crisaean Plain. In 350/49, however, a similar offense provoked only a campaign to force the Megarians to co-operate. Why should this offense in one case cause a "Sacred War" and in another merely a campaign to settle the issue. Even the minor fifth-century incident at Delphi is described by Philochorus as a "Sacred War," while the dispute over the Sacred Orgas, equally worthy of the title, is apparently left unnamed by him.

Was the sanctuary of the Two Goddesses at Eleusis perhaps less sacred in the eyes of the Greeks than the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi? Yet Pausanias (III.4.6) says: "\textgammage\rho\epsilon\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\sigmaου\nu\nu"
Therefore, like the Olympic Games and the oracle of Apollo at Delphi, the Eleusinian Mysteries were an institution of panhellenic importance. Nevertheless, sacrilege against the Two Goddesses did not on any occasion kindle a ἱερὸς πόλεμος.

One must, however, consider the date of the dispute over the Sacred Orgas of 350/49. It occurred during a period when the Phocian War was in full swing. Curiously enough, the embassy sent to enquire about the cultivation of the ἐσχάται is the only recorded instance of a consultation at Delphi in the course of that war. Perhaps one "Sacred War" at a time was enough. Still, this explanation would not account for the fact that the sacrilege committed by the Arcadian League at Olympia in 364 also failed to provoke a ἱερὸς πόλεμος.

From the discussion above, it is clear that neither category of test cases contains a war given the title of ἱερὸς πόλεμος in antiquity. Two other wars fought over the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi were labelled as "sacred wars" by modern scholars, probably as a result of their close similarity to the so-called Third Sacred War. Conflicts over other sanctuaries, on the other hand, even those with elements common to the so-called "Sacred Wars," did not lead to the attribution of the term ἱερὸς πόλεμος in any case. All the disputes which we have examined took place in the fourth
century B.C., one even at the same time as the so-called Third Sacred War, so one cannot argue that Greek religious sensibilities have undergone a change. It appears, however, that after the Phocian War Greek attitudes towards Delphi itself underwent a change. The exhaustive length of the war, protracted by the novel use of mercenaries, focused the attention of the Greek world upon the sanctuary at Delphi for ten long years. Naturally enough, interest in former conflicts over Delphi was reawakened after this and the term ιερὸς πόλεμος was rediscovered in the text of Thucydides. Subsequently, of course, it was unthinkable to apply the term to a conflict which did not concern Delphi and thus neither the sacrilege of the Arcadian League nor the dispute over the Sacred Orgas was ever known by this title.
CONCLUSION

In the preceding chapters, it has been established that the term "Sacred War" was first used by Thucydides in the fifth century B.C. to refer to an essentially minor conflict over Delphi. The term then disappeared for over a century, although both the Arcadian seizure of Olympia and the dispute over the Sacred Orgas were equally (if not more) worthy of the title as the fifth-century conflict. It finally resurfaced in the fourth century B.C. in reference to the so-called Third Sacred War, when it was apparently applied exclusively by Callisthenes and the other writers of the historiographic genre.

Two questions now remain to be answered. First of all, why does Thucydides give an essentially minor incident the dignified title of "Sacred War?" And secondly, why is Callisthenes apparently the first historian in antiquity to derive this term from Thucydides and apply it to a contemporary conflict?

In order to address the first of these questions, it is necessary to recall the exact words of Thucydides in his brief description of the events of the fifth-century incident
(I.112.5): "ο θερός καλόσμενός πόλεμος." This Thucydidean reference to the conflict as "so-called" and the fact that Aristophanes alludes to it as a θερός πόλεμος in Birds 556 suggest that this was the term current in contemporary usage. As we have seen, wars in ancient Greece were usually given names by their contemporaries to facilitate future reference and this particular war was apparently known as the "Sacred War" in extant literature from Thucydides onwards.

Thucydides' reference to the "Sacred War" as "so-called," however, deserves further attention. Not only does it reveal that Thucydides himself was not the originator of the term but it also implies a certain hint of disagreement concerning the application of such a title to this particular conflict. Consequently, it seems likely that Thucydides derived the term from the Spartan version of the incident. Raphael Sealey remarks (A History of the Greek City-States [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976], p. 291) in his account of the incident: "evidently that was the Spartan name for it," but unfortunately he does not shed any further light on the subject.

Sealey's thesis, however, is a logical one in several respects. First of all, the instigators (in this case, the Spartans) of a war would benefit the most from a cloak spread over their actions such as this title, which seemingly bestows divine approval (another case in point would be the Crusades). Secondly, the Spartans were famous for using propaganda to
justify their campaigns. Sparta's expulsion of the tyrants in the sixth century was nominally justified as the "liberation of Greece from tyranny," as was her later role in the Peloponnesian War. Thus, use of such propaganda by the Spartans was not unprecedented. Moreover, Spartan use of Delphi itself for propagandic purposes is attested by Herodotus (for example, I.67-68).

Therefore, it is probable that Thucydides used the term "Sacred War" to refer to the fifth-century conflict because that was the Spartan name for it. After the use of this term by Thucydides and Aristophanes in the fifth century, it was not used again until Callisthenes re-introduced it in the middle of the fourth century. This historian was apparently the first to give the title of "Sacred War" to a conflict which had hitherto been referred to by the Athenian orators as the "Phocian War."

Although the attribution of the title "Sacred War" to this conflict seems to have been a feature of the historiographic genre, it is likely that Callisthenes was the first to do so. First of all, as the writer of a Hellenica, Callisthenes was clearly following the Thucydidean approach to history and probably derived the title "Sacred War" from him. Secondly, he obviously had a keen interest in the early history of Delphi, as his collaboration with Aristotle shows, as well as in the so-called "Sacred War," since he devoted an entire monograph to this subject. Thirdly, as nephew and
protégé of Aristotle, Callisthenes would naturally have been inclined to favour the Macedonian version of the conflict. Since Philip purported to be the champion of Apollo bestowing divine justice upon the sacrilegious Phocians, Callisthenes clearly condoned this Macedonian propaganda by giving the conflict the title of "Sacred War." The Athenian orators, on the other hand, as allies of Phocis and sworn enemies of Philip (especially Demosthenes), would be prohibited on two counts from following Callisthenes' example in calling it a "Sacred War." Finally, Callisthenes was deeply interested in Homeric saga. He, therefore, attempted to force an analogy between the Trojan War and the Crisaean War, the latter of which he treated in his monograph "On the Sacred War." Tradition has it that all three of these wars were ten years in duration, and this may have been the basis of Callisthenes' analogy. Nevertheless, Callisthenes evidently saw a similarity between the Crisaean War and the Phocian War, thereby justifying the habit of modern scholars of referring to the former as the First Sacred War. In conclusion, although other writers such as Xenophon and Theopompus followed in the Thucydidean tradition, the title "Sacred War" was apparently overlooked by them until Callisthenes had his own reasons to reapply it.

It seems, then, that the term "Sacred War" was not so much a concept in ancient Greece as originally a fifth-century justification, which was picked up again as propaganda in the
fourth century by Philip II and partisans of his Macedonian cause. The ultimate triumph of Philip of Macedon marked the end of an era in Greek history and henceforth propaganda was no longer needed to the same extent. Therefore, the title "Sacred War" was never used again in reference to any conflict in ancient Greece and modern scholars inferred from Callisthenes' analogy that the term was used exclusively when the conflict concerned Delphi.
NOTES

1 As at the present state of our knowledge we are not yet able to determine the exact date of Thucydides' composition of his History, it is impossible to state with any certainty whether his reference to the Sacred War antedates or postdates that of Aristophanes. Even if the main bulk of Book One was written before 414 B.C., he may have added the term ἀερὸς πόλεμος upon revision. Therefore, the reference to a ἀερὸς πόλεμος in Aristophanes may be the first instance of this term in the corpus of extant Greek literature. But since Thucydides describes (albeit briefly) the actual events of the conflict, I have chosen to give him precedence.

2 Although Jacoby quotes most of this passage in his section on Philochorus (F Gr Hist 328 F 34b), I have taken it from his section on Eratosthenes (F Gr Hist 241 F 38) where he quotes it in full.

The scholiast adds the following to the end of the note:

Θορυβεῖ καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ Θουκυδίδης καὶ Ἐρατοσθένης ἐν τῷ δὲ καὶ Θεόπομος ἐν τῷ πε.

3 cf. SIG⁴ I 59.

4 Thucydides I.107, Diodorus XI.79-80.

5 Thucydides I.108.1-2. Diodorus, however, states
(XI.80.6) that the issue of the battle was in doubt (ἀμφίδοξος) since both sides laid claim to the victory.

6 Thucydides I.108.2.
7 Diodorus XI.81-83.
8 IG I² 26, Tod 39. For an English translation, see Charles W. Fornara, Archaic Times to the End of the Peloponnesian War (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1977) #82.

11 Meritt, AJP 69 (1948): 312 and 314.
12 Meritt, AJP 75 (1954): 373.
13 The authors of ATL date both the Battle of Tanagra and the Battle of Oenophyta to 458 (171 ff), contrary to the usual dating scheme from Diodorus (Tanagra-XI.80 and Oenophyta-XI.83.1).
14 Larsen 216.


This is the generally accepted date for the Phocian possession of Delphi, although we have no explicit evidence of a Phocian take-over from the Delphians. Nevertheless, if the Phocians had seized control of the sanctuary from the Delphians before the period of Athenian influence in Central Greece, presumably the Spartans would have interfered, as they did in the case of Doris.

17 Thucydides I.112.5, Plutarch Pericles XXI.1-2, and Philochorus (F Gr Hist 328 F 34) as we have seen above. To this list may be added Strabo IX.3.15.

18 Thucydides I.113.1.

19 Thucydides I.112.5 and Plutarch Pericles XXI.2.


1972) 189 n. 72.

Jacoby comments: "Consequently τρίτις ἐτελ in the careless excerpt (which must not in its whole contents be ascribed to Philochorus) is incredible, whether ἐτελ be a mistake for μηνυ or whether it is taken from Thucydides I.112.1"

22 Gomme 409, Cloché 24. Jacoby (loc cit) thinks it possible that the Athenian reprisal may have fallen in the following Attic year. Thus the Spartan expedition would take place in 449/8 and the Athenian in 448/7.

23 Meiggs 423 remarks: "one may well doubt whether he (Philochorus) thought the Athenians fought the Spartans in the second war." Furthermore, Jacoby (loc cit) points out that the reference to the Boeotians in F Gr Hist 328 F 34a may result from a confusion of Thucydides I.112 with chapters 111 and 113.

24 The chronology of this war is disputed also and will be discussed (briefly) in a later section dealing with the events of the war.

25 Demosthenes II.7 (349 B. C.), XIX.83 (343 B. C.), and XVIII.18 (330 B. C.), Aeschines III.148 (330 B. C.). So also Plutarch in his Pericles XII.1, in a section derived word for word from Demosthenes XVIII.18: "τοῦ Ἐμπλεκοντος συνεστίτις."

26 F Gr Hist 124 T 1 and following, where Jacoby has grouped together most thoroughly the ancient testimonies to the life of Callisthenes. A translation of these testimonies can be found in Charles Alexander Robinson Jr., A History of

27 F Gr Hist 76 T 1.

28 Diogenes Laertius V.36.

29 ἵππος πόλεμος: ἐς τὸν πόλεμον τὸν ἔρων ὄνομαζόμενον οἱ ἥβαλοι κατέστησαν (Pausanias VIII.27.10) ἀνάθημα ἐστὶ θηβαῖων, ὅτε φωκεύσων ἐπολέμησαν τὸν ἔρων καλοῦμενον πόλεμον (X.13.6)

Φωκεύς πόλεμος: ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῷ Φωκεύς (X.35.3)

Both: ὑστερον δὲ καὶ τὸν Φωκεύς πόλεμον, ὄνομαζόμενον δὲ ὑπὸ Ἑλλήνων ἔρων, συνεχῶς δέκα ἔτεον ἐπολέμησαν (IX.6.4) ἐπέθεθεν δὲ Φίλιππος πέρας τῷ πολέμῳ Φωκεύς τε καὶ ἔρως κληθέντα τῷ αὐτῷ (X.3.1)

30 ὁ Φωκεύς καὶ ἵππος καλοῦμενος...πόλεμος(Strabo IX.3.8)

ἐν τῷ Φωκεύς πολέμῳ (IX.4.11)

31 ὁ ἵππος πόλεμος: Diodorus XVI.14.3, 23.1 (twice), 38.6, 59.4, and 64.3.

ὁ Φωκεύς πόλεμος:Diodorus XVI.34.2 and 59.1 (ὁ πρὸς Φωκεύς πόλεμος in XVI.40.1)

32 IX.2.2, 2.4, 3.11 ("Ἐφορος δ’, ὃ τῷ πλείστου προσχωμέθα διὰ τὴν περὶ τάδε ἐκπεμέλειαν...) and IX.4.7.

33 This is a section on the plundering (σύλληψις) of the sanctuary. The possible sources for this subject in particular will be discussed later in my treatment of Diodorus.

34 N. G. L. Hammond has written a very perceptive article on this subject: "The Sources of Diodorus Siculus XVI," Classical Quarterly 31 (1937): 79-91.

35 "The most obvious and I think the only candidate for Source 2, a monograph on the Sacred War with the
Phocian commanders as central theme, is Demophilus: for the other known monographers, Cephisodorus and Leon, are not mentioned in Diodorus and the complete lack of fragments suggests that they were not used by later authors." Hammond, CQ 31 (1937): 84.


37 It should be noted, incidentally, that Callisthenes was one of the main sources of Ephorus, and thus Demophilus, for this period (F Gr Hist 124 T 33-35 and Barber 131-34).

38 Hammond, CQ 31 (1937): 90.

39 F Gr Hist 73 F 1-4—none of which deal directly with any of the events of the Sacred War.

40 Hammond (CQ 31 [1937]: 84) remarks apropos of the use of Theopompus as a source: "Theopompus can be excluded for Graeco-Macedonian affairs because his work in fifty-eight books presented too heavy a task to a compiler such as Diodorus and because the numerous fragments we possess find no echo in Diodorus."

First of all, this argument appears to do an injustice to Diodorus. Hammond believes, rightly enough, that the main source of Philip's early career was Ephorus, whose history spanned thirty books. If Diodorus is capable of labouring through thirty books of Ephorus, why not fifty-eight of Theopompus? Moreover, why would he mention Theopompus at all if he derived none of his information from him? Secondly, the fact that the extant fragments of Theopompus are not reflected in Diodorus is not a conclusive proof of his exclusion as a
source as this argument would apply to all the other sources mentioned by Diodorus. Ephorus is generally agreed to be the main source of Diodorus for Greek affairs in Books XI-XVI, but this should not exclude the possibility that Diodorus also referred to other historians such as Theopompus.

41 Hammond's dates. Chronology will be discussed following the narrative of the war.

42 Diodorus (XVI.23.3) states that the reason for the fine was the cultivation of land sacred to Apollo. Pausanias (X.15.2) also mentions the cultivation of sacred land but states elsewhere (X.2.1) that he is not sure whether the Phocians had committed a crime (the cultivation of sacred land?) or whether the Thessalians had been at the root of the fine through their longstanding hatred of the Phocians. Justin (VIII.1.6) says that the Thebans accused the Phocians of having laid waste to Boeotia (perhaps Justin is confusing this with the later raids made by the Phocians upon Boeotia during the war). Aristotle (Politics V.1304a) attributes the cause of the war to stasis arising from a dispute over the hand of an heiress. Duris of Samos (F Gr Hist 76 F 2) says that the war was incited as a result of the seizure of a Theban woman by a Phocian.

43 Diodorus XVI.23.2-4 and 28.2-4, and Justin VIII.1.4-6. From the juxtaposition of the Spartans and the Phocians in the accounts of Diodorus and Justin, it appears that both charges were brought forward at the same time.
44 The arguments of Neil J. Hackett (The Third Sacred
War, diss., University of Cincinnati, 1970, 12-15) that the
threat of Theban reprisals was levelled against the Phocians
soon after the Battle of Leuctra are convincing. He concludes
that the Phocian fine was fixed not long after the battle and,
after the period allotted for payment had elapsed, threats of
punishment by the Amphictyonic League began in the mid 350's.

45 Diodorus XVI.7.2-3, Demosthenes VIII.74, Aeschines
III.85, Tod 153 and 154, Phillip Harding, From the End of the
Peloponnesian War to the Battle of Ipsus (Cambridge: 1985)
#65 and 66.

46 Diodorus XVI.7.3-5, Demosthenes XV.3, and Dionysius of
Halicarnassus, Lysias 12.

47 The Amphictyonic League was originally a religious
organization centred around the sanctuary of Demeter at
Anthela, near Thermopylae. Later, the sanctuary of Apollo at
Delphi also came under its jurisdiction. The Amphictyonic
League was composed of twelve tribes of northern and central
Greece, each casting two equal votes at the biannual meetings
convened at Thermopylae and concluded at Delphi (Strabo
IX.3.7, Aeschines II.115, Hypereides VI.118, and Harpocrate
s. v. κοινα ).

The original composition of the Amphictyonic League is
not certain (incomplete membership lists are found in
Aeschines II.116, Pausanias X.8.2, and Theopompus–Harpocrate
F Gr Hist 115 F 63). The earliest complete list surviving
dates from 343 B.C. (SIG 230, Tod 172 A, Harding 88, and FD 14). It records as members of the Amphictyonic League the Thessalians, those from Philip (that king having received the two votes previously belonging to the Phocians—Pausanias X.3.3, Diodorus XVI.60.1, and Antipater of Magnesia, F Gr Hist 69 F 2), the Delphians (who probably received their votes in 346, obtaining one vote apiece from the Perrhaebians and the Dolopians—Tod 172 A and J. R. Ellis, Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism [London: Thames and Hudson, 1976] 121), the Dorians, the Ionians, the Perrhaebians-Dolopians, the Boeotians, the Locrians, the Achaeans, the Magnesians, the Aenianians, and the Malians. For further detail on the membership lists, see also the tables in Ellis 132-33 and SIG p. 314-15 and the insightful article by Georges Daux, "Remarques sur la Composition du Conseil Amphictionique," BCH 81 (1957): 95-120.

At the time of the beginning of the Sacred War, Thessaly along with her perioikoi controlled a clear majority of the twenty-four votes on the Amphictyonic Council. Thebes, with her allies the Locrians (who had a longstanding border dispute with the Phocians—Xenophon, Hellenica III.5.3) governed four.

48 Herodotus VII 176 and VIII.27-31, Pausanias X.1, and Aeschines II.140.

49 Diodorus XVI.23.2-4 and 29.4.

50 Diodorus XVI.23.4, Justin VIII.1.8 and Pausanias X.2.2.
Diodorus XVI.23.4: περιοριζον δὲ καθερομενὴν τὴν χώραν οὗ μόνον ἀνινδρον ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κυνῶν ἐπιφέρειν τῷ τῶν ἀπάτων τοῦ βίου ἀνατροπῇ.

Diodorus XVI.23.4-6, Pausanias X.2.2-3, and Justin VIII.1.8-9.

Diodorus XVI.23.6. Hackett (3-4 and 18-19) argues convincingly from the ancient evidence that a board of strategoi formed the basis of the Phocian federal government. When an emergency arose, one of the strategoi might be given dictatorial powers (strategos autokrator) for as long as the need was present. This was apparently the case in 356, when Philomelus was appointed to the position of strategos autokrator. His status, therefore, was entirely constitutional and there is no indication that he arose to power tyrannically.

Hackett (13) summarizes the long range factors of the Phocian decision as follows: "a deep-seated hatred for the Thessalians, a long standing claim to Delphi and the pre-eminence in the Amphictyonic Council, an ever growing opposition to Theban supremacy in central Greece, and the continuous pressure of Theban threats of vengeance after Mantinea."

The immediate causes are, of course, the fine itself and the Amphictyonic threat of reprisal, should the fine not be paid off.

Diodorus XVI.27.5, Pausanias III.10.3, and Justin VIII.1.8-9.

Diodorus XVI.31.3-5, Pausanias X.2.4-5, and Justin VIII.1.13-14.

Diodorus XVI.14.2 and 35.1, and Polyaeusus IV.2.19.
Diodorus XVI.35.1-3. Polyaeus (II.38.2) says:

ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φυγῇ τῶν βασιλέα τῶν Μακεδόνων Φίλιππον μαθῶν 
εἶπεν ὁύκ ἐμφυγον, ἀλλ' ἀνεχώρησα ὡστε αὐτῷ τὸν ἔμβολον ἐν' ἀδίκες πολέμωμας 
αὐτῶν τοιοῦτοις ἐμφυγον τὴν ὑποδέχοντα.

Diodorus XVI.35.3. Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics III.viii.9) and the scholiast on this passage (F Gr Hist 115 F 94) use this battle at the Hermaion of Coronea as an example of the cowardice of mercenaries as opposed to the courage of citizen soldiers.


Justin VIII.2.3. Justin then adds (VIII.2.4): "Phocenses insignibus dei conspectis conscientia delictorum territi abiectis armis fugam capessunt." This is most unlikely as Onomarchus and his force of hardboiled mercenaries would certainly not be affected in so extreme a manner by such patent religious propaganda. Consequently, this charade was probably not designed as a scare tactic against the Phocians. Griffith (Hammond-Griffith 274-5) raises the interesting question of to whom this religious propaganda was addressed. He remarks that it is "highly improbable" that this play on religious sensibility was on behalf of the Greeks because:

"a neutral, unpolitical opinion of ordinary people who were genuinely shocked by the 'impiety' of the
Phocians probably did not exist. This is shown by the ease with which the Phocian generals could raise army after army of mercenaries, while their sacred money lasted."

Griffith thinks it much more likely that this whole charade was on behalf of the Macedonian soldiers, who were much less aware of the true facts of the war and needed reassurance after their previous defeats at the hands of the Phocians (Diodorus XVI.35.2).

62 Diodorus XVI.35.6. In XVI.61.2, Diodorus states that Onomarchus was slain in battle and then crucified. Pausanias (X.2.5) says that Onomarchus was cut down while fleeing to the sea by his own men, who blamed him for their defeat. At any rate, it seems clear that Onomarchus was dead before Philip hung (or crucified) him as commander of the "sacrilegious" Phocian troops.

63 The question here, as Griffith (Hammond-Griffith 276-77) rightly points out, is whether τοὺς ἄλλους refers to the six thousand corpses or the three thousand captives. Griffith comes to the logical conclusion that it is the corpses which are being thrown into the sea. Not only would a mass drowning be highly impractical but no other examples are recorded anywhere. Moreover, the denial of burial rites to the sacrilegious was much more effective propaganda.

64 Diodorus XVI.36.1 and Pausanias X.2.6.

65 Diodorus XVI.38.1-2, Justin VIII.2.8, and Demosthenes IV.17, XVIII.32, and XIX.84 and 319.

66 Diodorus XVI.38.6 says that Phalaecus was the son of
Onomarchus but Pausanias X.2.7, on the contrary, declares that he was the son of Phayllus.

67 Diodorus XVI.56.3 and Pausanias X.2.7.

68 Although Thebes had previously received contributions for the war from various supporters (Tod 160 and Harding 76) between 354/3 and 352/1, the small sums from this source could not compete with the vast resources of the Phocians "borrowed" from the temple at Delphi. Therefore, Thebes was forced to appeal in 351 to Persia for further financial help (Diodorus XVI.60.1). By 347, Thebes had probably exhausted all help from this quarter and her growing desperation is shown by her request to Philip to send military aid (Demosthenes XVIII.19 and Diodorus XVI.58.2).

69 Isocrates V.55.

70 Aeschines (II.132) states that the Phocian government promised to hand over to Athens Alponus, Thronion and Nicaea, garrisons which controlled the pass of Thermopylae, in return for military aid.

71 Aeschines II.133 and Diodorus XVI.59.

72 G. L. Cawkwell ("Aeschines and the Peace of Philocrates," REG 73 [1960]: 413-438) proposes the logical thesis that Phalaecus' return to power and subsequent hostility to Athens caused the beginning of Athenian negotiations with Philip for peace.

73 It seems likely that Phalaecus had previously reached an agreement with Philip in secret, as his apparently arrogant
refusal of Athenian and Spartan aid is otherwise hard to explain. As Griffith (Hammond-Griffith 334) rightly points out, Phalaecus' action is explicable by self-preservation. His army by this time was presumably running short of funds (cf G. L. Cawkwell, Philip of Macedon [London: Faber and Faber, 1978] 96) and, unable to procure additional resources, Phalaecus was already contemplating settlement with Philip. Therefore, Phalaecus had to regain control of the pass for bargaining power. Sealey ("Proxenus and the Peace of Philocrates," Wiener Studien 68 [1955]: 147) and Ellis (106 and 266 n. 67) also believe that Phalaecus had entered into negotiations with Philip before regaining control of the Phocian government. Hackett (123 n. 34) and M. M. Markle ("The Strategy of Philip in 346 B. C.," Classical Quarterly N. S. 24 [1974]: 265), on the other hand, contend that Philip was "forced" to come to terms with Phalaecus only after his arrival at Thermopylae.

74 Diodorus XVI.59, Aeschines II.132-35. Justin VIII.5.1-5 must be taken with a grain of salt.

75 Diodorus XVI.60.2. In 56.6, Diodorus estimates the total sum of the pillaged treasures at over 10,000 talents. Parke (Parke-Wormell 230), supported by Hackett (114-15), suggests that Diodorus derives this figure from an estimate taken by the Amphictyonic League.

A series of inscriptions recording the Phocian fine have been found at Delphi and at Elatea (SIG 230-35). From this
inscriptional evidence, it is clear that no payments were made until 343 B.C. By the eleventh payment, in the archonship of Demochares, the amount had been reduced to ten talents a year. The payments appear to have ceased altogether around 322, by which point less than five hundred talents had been repaid (Ellis 123, Tod 172, FD p. 63-64, Harding 88).

76 Diodorus XVI.60, Pausanias X.2.2-3, and Antipater of Magnesia F Gr Hist 69 F 2.


78 N. G. L. Hammond, "Diodorus' Narrative of the Sacred War and the Chronological Problems of 357-352 B. C.," JHS 57 (1937): 44-78, Ellis 73-75, and Griffith (Hammond-Griffith) 227-29. Hackett (127) does not believe there is sufficient evidence to resolve the problem, although he does favour Hammond's chronology.

79 Hammond, JHS 57 (1937): 44-78.
Griffith (Hammond-Griffith, 227) remarks: "The delay of eighteen months between the seizure of Delphi by the Phocians (spring 356) and the Amphictyonic declaration of a Sacred War against them is difficult to explain satisfactorily except on the lines that during that interval it was not possible to muster a majority in favour of declaring war, because the Thessalian voting power was not united."

Hackett (33 n. 36) accounts for the delay by suggesting that the Phocians "were not believed to be a serious or permanent menace in Delphi until the two Locrian attacks (24.4;28.3) had failed, and Philomelus had further strengthened his hold on Delphi by recruiting additional troops (25.1;28.1)."

The two "Sacred Wars" mentioned by the scholiast are clearly the two campaigns of the fifth-century conflict, and not the so-called Second and Third Sacred Wars. In fact, the scholiast does not seem to be aware of the fourth-century war at all, although Theopompus' discussion of it in Book Twenty of his *Hellenica* contained a digression on the fifth-century incident.

Isocrates V.54-55 and Justin VIII.1.10. Xenophon *Poroi* 5.9 hints that the Thebans themselves were prepared to seize control of the sanctuary, should the Phocians abandon it.


Theopompus (*F Gr Hist* 115 F 247-9), Ephorus-Demophilus (*F Gr Hist* 70 F 95) and Phylarchus (derived from Duris of Samos?) (*F Gr Hist* 81 F 70).

Pausanias III.10.5 and X.2.4-7 and Diodorus XVI.56.8, 58.5-6 and 61-64.

Athens had borrowed over 4800 talents from Athena and
the Other Gods between 433 and 426 at a rate of interest at slightly over one and one-fifth percent per annum (Russell Meiggs and David Lewis, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969]: #72, ATL 326-45, Gomme vol. 2: 432-436 and vol 3: 687-89). Athens, however, had substantial resources and a network of tribute-paying allies to provide the means of paying off these loans. Phocis, on the other hand, with its limited resources, had no hope of paying off the sum of over 10,000 talents which it had "borrowed" from the temple at Delphi.

87 Diodorus XVI.56 (cf. Herodotus I.50-51).

88 It is not stated in Thucydides whether or not the Amphictyonic League was involved in the fifth-century dispute. It may, however, because of its alliance with Athens, have closed its eyes to the whole affair.

89 Noel Robertson ("The Myth of the First Sacred War," *Classical Quarterly* 28 N. S. [1978]: 38 n. 3) is the only scholar (whom I have read) to point out the fact that the "numbered series of Sacred Wars" are modern labels and that the term θερός πόλεμος was applied only to the so-called Second and Third Sacred Wars by the ancient sources.

90 This is the opinion of Charles Burton Gulick (editor of the Loeb edition of Athenaeus, *ad loc*).

91 Καλλισθένης δὲ τὴν τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν πραγμάτων ἱστορίαν γέγραφεν ἐν βάβλοις δέκα καὶ κατέστρεψεν εἰς τὴν κατάληψιν τοῦ θεροῦ καὶ παρανομεῖν ψευδομῆλον τοῦ φωκέως (XVI.14.4)
92 Cicero obviously derives the title of "Phocicum bellum" from the "δ Φωκικὸς πόλεμος" of Demosthenes and the Athenian orators.

93 This is the opinion of Beloch GG III2: 25-26, Jacoby (ad loc) and C. L. Sherman (editor of the Loeb volume of Diodorus, ad loc), and A. B. Bosworth, "Aristotle and Callisthenes," Historia 19 (1970): 409.


95 Strabo (XIV.2.16) and Plutarch (Moria 604 F) are apparently attempting to reconcile the two traditions (cf W. W. How and J. Wells, A Commentary on Herodotus [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964] vol 1: 53]. Many thanks to Dr. J. A. S. Evans also for an interesting discussion on this point.


97 Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, Aristoteles und Athen (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1893) vol 1: 18 n. 27.

98 Drachmann is supported in this conclusion by Marta Sordi, "La Prima Guerra Sacra," Rivista di Filologia e di Instruzione Classica 31 (1953): 338 and by Parke (Parke-Wormell 105) who believes that Menaechmus was motivated by patriotism to exaggerate Cleisthenes' role in the war.

99 Jacoby (ad loc). This conclusion is probably correct as Menaechmus is known to have written a history of Alexander (F Gr Hist 131 T 1). The only evidence to the contrary is the
entry in Hesychius (F Gr Hist 131 T 3) which implies that
Menaechmus is earlier than Aristotle: "Προσλογάς βιβλίον τοῦ Ἔβριος Μέναιχμων ἐνυχθένγ ." Robertson CQ 28 N. S. (1978): 56
n.3 dismisses it as "merely the inference of some Alexandrian
scholar faced with two concurrent works. Alternatively we may
postulate two Menaechmi (!) or even several."

100 This suggestion is made by Sordi, RFIC (1953): 339.

101 Ephorus? Strabo obviously places great faith in
Ephorus (esp. IX.3.11) and uses him as an authority throughout
this chapter.

102 This point is made by Robertson CQ 28 N. S. (1978):
51.

103 Aristotle alone is named as author of this register
by Plutarch (Solon XI.1), Diogenes Laertius (V.26), and
Hesychius (F Gr Hist 131 T 3). An inscription at Delphi,
however, honours Aristotle and Callisthenes as joint authors
of a victor's list (SIG 275, Tod 187, Harding 104).

Robertson (CQ 28 N. S. [1978]: 55) following Jacoby (ad
loc) suggests that the inscription outweighs the literary
evidence, "for it is natural that in later memory the greater
name should have ousted the lesser. And, indeed, if the
younger and obscurer man originally received equal credit, we
must suspect that the labour was chiefly his."

A. B. Bosworth (Historia 19 [1970]: 409) remarks, on the
other hand, that the text of the ἀναγραφή could not possibly
have been completed before Callisthenes departed to join
Alexander on campaign in Asia. Therefore, he suggests that Callisthenes was originally commissioned to compose the ἀναγραφή but was forced to leave Aristotle to complete the work while he was absent. This theory would also explain the absence of Callisthenes' name in the literary record.

104 The table had been inscribed at Delphi by the archonship of Caphis (SIG 252 and FD 58, line 42), which was originally dated to the year 331/0 but has been redated to the year 327/6 by P. de la Coste-Messelière, "Listes Amphictioniques du IVᵉ Siècle," BCH 73 (1949): 229 f. The date of the inscription adds further weight to Boswell's theory that Aristotle was left to complete the commission after Callisthenes' departure for Asia in 334.

105 Plutarch (Solon XI.1) says:

πεισθέντες γὰρ ὑπ' ἐκείνου πρὸς τὸν τάλεμον ὑμηθήσαν
οἱ Ἀμφικτύονες, ὡς ἦλθον τε μαρτυροῦσι καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης
ἐν τῇ τῶν Πυθιοικῶν ἀναγραφῇ Σύλων τὴν γνώμην ἀνατέθεις.

106 Robertson, following Wilamowitz and Jacoby, CQ 28 N. S. (1978): 55 n.5.

107 The scholiast to Hypothesis b quotes three hexameter lines from Euphorion: ὁ πλοτέρου τ’ Ἀχιλῆς ἀκουόμειν Εὐρυλόχου, δελφίνες ὑπὸ καλὸν Ἰητὸν ἀντιβάλουν ᾦ ἱππασίαν πορθήσαντι, Λυκωρέως οἰκίᾳ Φούδου.

The scholiast to Hypothesis d says:

καὶ ὅτι Εὐρυλόχος ὁ Θεσσαλὸς τὸν Ἐλατρὰδος ἐπόρθησε, μαρτυρεῖ καὶ Ἐὐφορίων ὁ πλοτέρου τ’ Ἀχιλῆς ἀκουόμειν Εὐρυλόχου.

108 Sordi, RFIC 31 (1953).

109 For bibliography, see Robertson, CQ 28 N. S. (1978): 68 n. 1. See also Pierre Guillon, Le Bouclier d'Héraclès

Strabo IX.3.4, Pausanias II.9.6 and X.37.5-8, Frontinus III.7.6, Polyaenus III.6 and VI.13, Diodorus IX.16, Plutarch, Solon XI, and the scholia on Pindar: Hypotheses Pythiorum a, b, and d, Nemean IX, and Hypothesis Olympiorum.

Parke (Parke-Wormell 99) remarks that "these accounts are inclined to be distorted either by an effort to force the First Sacred War into parallelism with later wars of the same name, or to glorify particular states or individuals by exaggerating their share in championing Apollo."

This is apparently an insoluble problem as the two names are used almost indiscriminately in the ancient testimonies. This has led to mass confusion in scholars from the Hellenistic period onwards. There are three current modern theories concerning the nomenclature of the city involved in the Crisaean War.

One school of thought, following the example of Strabo (IX.3.1), distinguishes between the two cities of Crisa and Cirrha (George Grote, *History of Greece* [New York: Peter Fenelon Collier, 1899] vol 4: 60 n. 1, and Parke [Parke-Wormell 99-100 and Parke-Boardman 276]). According to this
interpretation, the city of Crisa was located on Mount Parnassus near Delphi and had extended its influence over the plain called both the Crisaean and the Cirrhaean in our sources down to the Corinthian Gulf, which at that time was named after that city as a testament to its importance (Thucydides still calls the Corinthian Gulf the Crisaean Gulf-I.107.3,II.69.1,83.1,86.3, 92.6, 93.1, and IV.76.3). This was the city destroyed by the Amphictyonic League in the Crisaean War. Cirrha, on the other hand, was the port of Delphi which was eventually destroyed in the War over Amphissa.

The second modern theory concerning the nomenclature of this city follows the French excavation of the area. The latest in a series of reports on the excavations is a book by Leopold Dor, Jean Jannoray, Henri and Micheline van Effenterre, Kirrha: Etude de la Prehistoire Phocidienne (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1960). Jean Defradas, Thèmes de la Propagande Delphique (Paris: Librarie C. Klincksieck, 1954) 21 n. 1 contains a complete bibliography of earlier articles. Although these excavations proved that the site on Parnassus originally thought to be that of the sixth-century city of Crisa had not been inhabited since the Mycenaean period, they were not successful in finding the remains of the archaic city. From these results arose a distinction between Crisa, the Mycenaean city on the slopes of Mount Parnassus mentioned by Homer (Iliad II.520) and Cirrha, the archaic city on the coast which was destroyed by the Amphictyonic League after the
Crisaeian War. This archaeological theory has been accepted by Sordi (RFIC 31 [1953]: 320), Defradas (21), and George Forrest ("The First Sacred War," BCH 80 [1956]: 330). This theory is hampered, however, by the lack of success in finding the "real" site of the archaic city.

The third modern theory is that the names Crisa and Cirrha are both used to refer to the same place (H. T. Wade-Gery, "Kynaithos," Essays in Greek History [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958] 23 n. 1 and Noel Robertson CQ 28 N. S. [1978]: 41-48). According to this theory, Crisa was the name of the archaic harbour city, but when it was rebuilt, it became known as Cirrha (on the analogy of θάρσος/θάρρος/θάρρος). Confusion arose later when the original name of Crisa had been forgotten and only the contemporary town of Cirrha remained. This theory, although also based on conjecture, at least has the merit of explaining the prevalence of the name Cirrha in our sources and of identifying the source of the difficulty as later attempts to distinguish between Crisa and Cirrha as two separate cities.

For convenience, I will refer to the archaic city involved in the Crisaean War as Crisa and the harbour town in the War over Amphissa as Cirrha.

114 Aeschines III.107, Plutarch Solon XI.1, and Diodorus IX.16. Pausanias X.37.5 adds that in addition to their other acts of ἄσεβεια, they even went so far as to appropriate (ἄποτέμνω) some of the god's land. Pausanias is probably confusing the
cause of the Crissaean War with that of the War over Amphissa.

Strabo IX.3.4.

Hypotheses Olympiorum, Hypotheses Pythiorum a, b, and d.

Aeschines III.108 paraphrases this oracle:

καὶ αὕτως ἀνειρεῖ Πυθικὴ πολέμεται Κυρρακὸς καὶ Κραγαλὸς πάντ' ἤματα καὶ πάσας νύκτας, καὶ τὴν χώραν ἀυτῶν ἐκπορθήσαντες καὶ αὐτοὺς ἀνδραποδονομόνες ἀναθέτον τῷ Ἀπάλλωνι τῷ Πυθιῷ καὶ τῷ Ἀρτέμιδι καὶ τῷ Λητῶι καὶ Ἀθηνᾷ Προναίᾳ ἐπὶ πάση ἀφρέγῃ, καὶ ταύτην τὴν χώραν μὴ ἀυτοὺς ἐργάζεσθαι μὴ ἀλλὰν ἔαν.

Aeschines is apparently familiar with the record of this oracle kept at Delphi in his own day. Plutarch (Moria 76e) mentions the first lines of this oracle, which he presumably derived either from the record at Delphi or from the text of Aeschines.

Plutarch (Solon XI.1—using the ἀναγραφή of Aristotle and Callisthenes as his source) and Aeschines (III.108) state that Solon advised the Amphictyonic League to make war (ἐπιστρατεύειν) against the offenders. Pausanias (X.37.6) says that the Amphictyonic League "Σόλωνα ἐξ Ἀθηνῶν ἐπηγάγατο συμβουλεύειν."

Plutarch (Solon XI.2) criticizes later tradition exaggerating the role of Solon:

οὐ μέντοι στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τοῦτον ἀπεδείχθη τὸν πόλεμον, ὡς λέγειν φησίν Ἑρμοκοπος Ἕλενθον τὸν Σόλωνον, οὐτε γὰρ Ἀλκιβίας ὁ δέτωρ τοῦτον ἐξήρησεν, ἐν τοῖς τῶν δελφῶν ὑπομνήμασιν Ἀλκιβίας, οὐ διόνυ, Ἀθηναίων στρατηγὸς ἀναγέγραπται.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that the Alcmaeonidae were
almost certainly in exile at this time. George Forrest (BCH 80 [1956]: 50-51) circumvents this problem by comparing Alcmaeon with Alcibiades, "another great Athenian who became commander of his country's forces while still in exile and won his recall by his successes in command." P. J. Rhodes (A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981] 81) agrees that "Alcmaeon's command may have preceded the return of the Alcmaeonids to Athens." Despite the curse and exile, we must keep in mind that this tradition that Alcmaeon was commander of the Athenian contingent originates from Delphi, which was notoriously favourable to the Alcmaeonidae, and not Athens.

119 Scholiast to Pindar's Nemean IX, Pausanias II.9.6 (συμπολεμήσας Ἀμφικτύσηι .) and X.37.6 (ηγεμών ), Frontinus III.7.6, and Polyaenus III.5.

120 [Thessalus] (Littre IX, 412), Hypothesis Olympiorum, Hypotheses Pythiorum b and d, Strabo IX.3.4 and 3.10.


122 Parke (Parke-Wormell 105). He adds that this version "appears to have no motive in local bias."

123 Sordi 342.

125 The scholiast to *Nemean* IX tells us that Cleisthenes and his fleet blockaded the Crisaans in the Corinthian Gulf.

126 Scholiast to *Nemean* IX.

127 Aeschines III.109, [Thessalus] (Littré IX 406).

128 Parian Marble (*F Gr Hist* 239 A 36), *Hypotheses Pythiorum* b and d. For the most thorough account of the chronology, see the article by T. J. Cadoux, "The Athenian archons from Creon to Hypsichides," *JHS* 68 (1948): 99-101, where the archonship of Simon is dated fairly conclusively to 591/0 B.C. Pausanias (X.7.4) is the only evidence to the contrary, as he dates the δυνάμεις to 586 B.C.

129 [Thessalus] (Littré IX 408), *Hypotheses Pythiorum* b and d.

130 Pausanias X.37.6 attributes this stratagem to Solon, Polyaeus VI.13 to Eurylochus, Frontinus III.7.6 to Cleisthenes, and [Thessalus] (Littré IX 412) to Nebrus, an Asclepiad from Cos.

131 Pausanias X.37.6 and Diodorus IX.16. A spurious version of this oracle has also been inserted in Aeschines (III.112).

132 Pausanias (X.37.6) attributes this trick to Solon and Polyaeus (III.5) to Cleisthenes.
Hypotheses Pythiorum b and d.

Parian Marble (F Gr Hist 239 A 38), Hypotheses Pythiorum b and d, Strabo IX.3.10, and Pausanias X.7.5. Pausanias (X.7.6) says that Cleisthenes of Sicyon was the winner of the chariot-race, which was added in this year to the official programme of the games.


Noel Robertson (CQ 28 N. S. [1978]: 49 n. 2 and 3) gives a complete bibliography.

Forrest 35.

Forrest 44.

Forrest 45.

In both these contexts, Aeschines mentions the crisis at Euboea of 348 B. C. in the same breath and in the same terms: III.221: Τὰ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τοὺς Ἀμφισσάς ἡσεβημένα σοι καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Εὔβοιαν ἰσορροπηθέντα,...

III.237: Τὰς μὲν γὰρ περὶ τοὺς Ἀμφισσάς καὶ τοὺς Εὔβοιας ἰσορροπικὰς παραλείπει...

Demosthenes XVIII.1: Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ἐπεκεὶ φύλληυς ὑπὸ τῆς περὶ τῆς Ἀμφισσαν ἐνυποκλασίας ἐπαυβόμενον εἰς τὴν Ἐλατείαν ἐξαιρωθῆναι ἐνέπεσε καὶ τὴν Φωκίδα κατέσκευ.

Plutarch may have derived the general method of reference (although not the exact words) to the conflict from Demosthenes and Aeschines or else from Marsyas (F Gr Hist 135-36 F 20) or Theopompus (F Gr Hist 115 F 328), both of whom he
mentions later in this section (Demosthenes XVIII.2-3).

142 Demosthenes XVIII.150 and Strabo IX.3.4. Aeschines (III.113 and 119) also alleges that the Amphissans had rebuilt the ancient port of Crisa (now Cirrha) and were collecting harbour dues ($\tau\varepsilon\lambda\nu$) from visitors.


144 The fact that Isocrates refers to this land as τὸ Κρίσατον πέραν adds further support to the theory (propounded in note 113) that a previous tradition of a city called Crisa existed, which was confused in the fourth century with the contemporary site of Cirrha.

145 The chronology of this conflict has also been the subject of dispute. Aeschines (III.115) dates this meeting to the archonship of Theophrastus (340/39) so it follows that the Pylaea in question took place either in the autumn of 340 B. C. or the spring of 339 B. C. I follow the chronology of Griffith (Hammond-Griffith 717-719) in dating this meeting to the autumn of 340 B. C. A case has been made, however, for the spring of 339 B. C. (Ellis 290 n. 31 for bibliographical references).

146 Aeschines III.115 and SIG 243 D.

147 Aeschines III.115 and Demosthenes XVIII.149.

148 Aeschines III.116 and Demosthenes XVIII.150 (who denies the existence of any such suit contemplated against Athens).
Aeschines III.115-116 and Demosthenes XVIII.149.

Demosthenes (XVIII.149) describes his audience as "ἀνθρώπους ἀπείρους λόγων καὶ τοῦ μέλλον όσ̆ προσωμένους."

Aeschines III.122 and Demosthenes XVIII.150. The official survey (περιόδος) mentioned by Demosthenes (XVIII.150 and 151) is presumably that which the Amphictyonic law of 380/79 (IG II² 1126, SIG 145 lines 15-21) instructs the hieromnemones to carry out if anyone is discovered by the Amphictyons to be cultivating the sacred land.

Aeschines III.123 and Demosthenes XVIII.151.

Aeschines III.125-28 and the scholium to Aeschines III.128.

Cottyphus and his compatriot Colosimmus served as hieromnemones for an unusually long period of time, from autumn 346 (SIG 244) until autumn 339 (SIG 249) or autumn 337 (P. de la Coste-Messelière, BCH 73 [1949]: 201-247).

Aeschines III.128 and Demosthenes XVIII.151.

Aeschines III.129 and Demosthenes XVIII.151.

Aeschines III.129 and Demosthenes XVIII.152.

Aeschines III.140, Demosthenes XVIII.153, Philochorus (F Gr Hist 328 F 56), Plutarch Demosthenes XVIII.1), and Diodorus XVI.84.2. Demosthenes describes the reaction in Athens to this news in a justifiably famous passage (XVIII.169-178).

Noel Robertson CQ 28 N. S. (1978): 65 remarks:

The first stage of fighting ended after four years with the Cirrhæans defeated: thus were the Phocians defeated
after four years of war in the Battle of the Crocus Field, and the Third Sacred War would have ended then had Philip not been checked at Thermopylae. For six years more the Cirrhaeans kept up a guerilla resistance on Mount Cirphis: thus did the Phocians, falling back on their mountains, prolong the Third Sacred War for six years more.

This analogy, however, seems an extremely laborious attempt to draw a parallel!

160 The fragments of Callisthenes and Duris both appear in an extremely chauvinistic passage of Athenaeus (XIII 560) in which he attempts to demonstrate "ὅτι καὶ οἱ μέγιστοι πόλεμοι ἄλλα γυναικεῖας ἐγένετο."

161 Aeschines III.107, Plutarch Solon XI.1, and Diodorus IX.16.

162 Diodorus XVI.23.3 and Pausanias X.15.2.

163 Aeschines III.113 and 119, Demosthenes XVIII.150, and Strabo IX.3.4.

164 Strabo IX.3.4.

165 Hypothesis Olympiorum, Hypotheses Pythiorum a, b, and d.

166 Aeschines III.113 and 119, Strabo IX.3.4.

167 Forrest 44 and Parke (Parke-Wormell 103).


169 Robertson, however, overlooks the crucial passage in Isocrates' Plataicus, which indicates a tradition of this war preceding the fourth century.

170 Robertson (51) considers the silence of Thucydides in
particular as conclusive: "The tradition of the Sacred War and its modern exponents makes Thucydides a liar or a fool." Nevertheless, this is not a valid argument because both Herodotus and Thucydides leave out many details which they consider irrelevant to their topics.

Demosthenes (XVIII.149) accuses Aeschines of" καὶ λόγος εὐπροσώπους καὶ μῦθους, ζητεὶ ἡ Ἐλλάδα χώρα καθερώθη, συνθεὶς καὶ δέξειλαν.

We must take Demosthenes' criticism with a grain of salt, however, as he is anxious to discredit Aeschines at any cost.

Robertson 39 and 73.

Gustav Adolf Lehmann ("Der Erste Heilige Krieg--Eine Fiktion?" Historia 29 [1980]: 242-46) provides a brief reply to Robertson's article. Lehmann points out that (1) Robertson is arguing from a strained argumentum ex silentio and (2) he has overlooked the critical passage in Isocrates (Plataicus 31), which speaks of the Crisaean War in terms of a concrete example.

Xenophon, Hellenica VII.4.12 and Diodorus XV.77. For the chronology, see S. Dušanić, The Arcadian League of the Fourth Century (Belgrade: 1970) 302 n. 100.
Xenophon, *Hellenica* VI.5.1-3. See T. T. B. Ryder, *Kione Eirene* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965) 71-73 and Appendix IV. As a result of this disagreement over the autonomy clause, Elis was the only city present to refuse to sign the treaty (Xenophon, *Hellenica* VI.5.3).


Xenophon, *Hellenica* VII.1.26: "τοὺς δὲ Τριφυλίους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἀπὸ σφῶν (the Eleans) ἀποστάντας περὶ πάντος πολυμένους." James Roy ("Arcadia and Boeotia in Peloponnesian Affairs," *Historia* 20 [1971]: 583) suggests that Triphylia had joined the League before the Theban embassy to Persia of 367, as the Arcadian ambassador was a Triphylian (Xenophon, *Hellenica* VII.1.33, Pausanias VI.3.9). Lasion was also certainly a member of the Arcadian League when it was seized by the Eleans in 365, as we know from the testimony of Xenophon (*Hellenica* VII.1.39) and Diodorus (XV.77.1-2). Diodorus, however, confuses Lasion and Triphylia throughout this passage.

Xenophon, *Hellenica* VII.1.39 (for Persian endorsement of Elean claims). Plutarch (*Pelopidas*, XXX.1 says only that Artaxerxes made all Greek cities autonomous.

The Arcadians (Xenophon, *Hellenica* VII.1.39) and the other unsatisfied Greek cities (Xenophon, *Hellenica* VII.1.40) rejected the Persian proposal outright at the peace congress at Thebes (*contra* Diodorus XV.76.3 who appears to imply that a common peace was successfully concluded at this point). In support of Xenophon's account are Ryder 137-39 and John

For further information about the diplomatic situation in the Peloponnese during the troubled 360's, see the clear and concise accounts of James Roy, *Historia* 20 (1971): Appendix II 594-99 and Dušanić 300-301.

The Boeotian contingent included the Eleans, Argives, and Arcadians. This group was apparently on good terms already by 370 (Xenophon, *Hellenica* VI.19 and 23) and Thebes joined the Arcadia-Argos-Elis coalition in a formal alliance in 369 after the refusal of Athens (Xenophon, *Hellenica* VII.1.18, Diodorus XV.62.3, and Demosthenes XVI.12 and 19).

The Spartan contingent included Athens, Corinth, and most of the northern Peloponnesian states (Xenophon, *Hellenica* VI.5.29 and VII.1.1).

Xenophon, *Hellenica* VII.4.28 and Diodorus XV.78.3. The fourth-century Pisatan claims are also reflected in Xenophon, *Hellenica* III.2.30.

Apparently, the Eleans were the founders and original hosts of the Olympic Games (Pausanias V.4.5-6 and 9.4 and Strabo VIII.3.30), having gained control of the territory of their neighbours the Pisatans (a rural people). The Pisatans, however, resented their subjection to the more powerful Eleans and, with the help of Pheidon of Argos, managed to seize control of the sanctuary in 668 B. C. (Herodotus VI.127 and Pausanias VI.22.2). Varying accounts of other interludes of
Pisatan control are given by later sources (Pausanias VI.22.2-3, Strabo VIII.3.30, and Eusebius I.198), but Elean might always prevailed in the end.

This brief period of Pisatan independence is evident not only from its coinage (Barclay V. Head, *Historia Numorum* [Chicago: Argonaut Inc., 1967] 426) and a Pisatan proxeny decree (SIG 170) but also from a formal alliance with Arcadia (Diodorus XV.78.2, SEG XXII.339a). Moreover, Dušanić's re-interpretation ("Archadika," *Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts Athenische Abteilung* 94 [1979]: 117-118) of SEG XXII.339 has shown, quite convincingly, that the two fragments belong to two different stelai: a Pisatan alliance with Argos and a separate alliance with Messenia and Sicyon.

Pausanias (VI.4.2) mentions Sostratus of Sicyon as victorious for the first time at this festival in the παγκράτιον (cf J. G. Frazer, *Pausanias' Description of Greece* [New York: Biblio and Tannen, 1965] 10). Pausanias also mentions (VI.8.3) a certain Eubotas of Cyrene as victorious in the chariot-race in the same festival. Diodorus (XV.78.1) and Eusebius (I.206) name Phocides, an Athenian, as winner of the stadion.

Xenophon, *Hellenica* VII.4.29, Diodorus XV.78.2-3 (Diodorus reverses the roles of the Arcadians and the Eleans). Pausanias (V.10.1) derives the name (Altis) given to the sacred precinct from Ἀλσος, on the authority of Pindar (X.45).
According to Xenophon (*Hellenica* VII.4.29), two thousand Argive hoplites and, surprisingly enough, four hundred Athenian horsemen were present in support of the Arcadians.

Xenophon (*Hellenica* VII.4.32) remarks:

τοιούτοι γενόμενοι οίων τὴν ἀρετήν θεός μὲν ἀν ἐμπνεύσας ὁμοίως καὶ ἐν ἡμέρα ἀποθέτειαν, ἀνθρώποι δὲ οὐδ' ἄν ἐν τολῇ χρόνῳ τοὺς μὴ ὄντας ἀλκύμως ποιήσειαν.

Diodorus XV.78.3: "καὶ τὴν ὀλυμπιάδα ταύτην ὁστερον οὐκ ἀνέγραφαν Ἡλετοί δὲ τὸ ὀσκεῖν βύκα καὶ ἀδύκως διατεθήκαν." Pausanias VI.4.2, 8.3 (κύθηλος) and 22.3 (ἀναλυμπιάς).

Pausanias (V.9.5) records that the number of Elean phylai was reduced from twelve to eight in the hundred and fourth Olympiad as a result of the territory lost to the Arcadians.


Xenophon, *Hellenica* VII.4.33. Diodorus XV.82 (after a minor doublet consisting of a recapitulation of the joint Arcadian-Pisatan management of the Olympic Games) places this episode in the year 363/2. Neither Xenophon nor Diodorus states specifically how long the Arcadians had been mis-appropriating funds, but they both imply that this had been going on for some time. Moreover, gold coins bearing the name of Pisa were struck from the plundered treasures (Head 420) and the record of reparations due from the Arcadian League (*IG IV 616*) of which the total has been estimated at 20,000 Aeginetan staters (Fraenkel *apud* Dušanić 334 n. 32) contribute
to the impression that the sacrilege was no small one.

193 Xenophon, *Hellenica* VII.4.3 and Diodorus XV.82.1-2 (Diodorus completely reverses the role of Mantinea in this dispute).

194 Most scholars interpret this statement of Xenophon (*Hellenica* VII.4.33) to mean that the Mantineans raised their own contribution towards the pay of the Eparitoi (cf Larsen 188, Roy *Historia* 20 [1971]: 585, and Buckler 204). This interpretation has recently been challenged by Dušanić (303 n. 114) who argues rather that the Mantineans gave back to the League the amount given to the Mantinean Eparitoi. As Dušanić points out, this latter interpretation explains the seemingly excessive burden placed on Stymphalus in the reparations (*IG* IV 616) as due to the fact that Mantinea had already repaid its share of the funds from Olympia.

195 The oligarchic-democratic conflict within the Arcadian League is well demonstrated by Roy (*Historia* 20 [1971]: 585-88) and supplemented by Buckler (204-5) against the objections of Larsen (189: "it is difficult to assign blame and even to know which of the two was the more oligarchic and which the more democratic") and Dušanić, who attributes the existing antagonism between Mantinea and Tegea to economic rather than political differences (306).

196 Xenophon, *Hellenica* VII.5.1-5. The formal alliance of 362/1 between Athens, Arcadia (i.e. Mantinea and its supporters), Achaea, Elis, and Phlius (*IG* II² 112, *SIG* 181,
Tod 144, and Harding 56) dates from after the Battle of Mantinea (the arguments of Tod [ad loc] have won general acceptance). For the date of the Battle of Mantinea, see Buckler 260-61.

197 Compare this description of Olympia with Strabo's description of Delphi (IX.3.2-10).

198 The Arcadians, however, did not use the sacred money to hire mercenaries, as did the Phocians.

199 As I observed in note 192, the total of reparations due from the Arcadian League has been estimated at ca. 20,000 Aeginetan staters. This, of course, does not include the amount already repaid by Mantinea, if we accept Dušanić's interpretation of IG IV 616 and Xenophon, Hellenica VII.4.33 (c.f. note 194). This amount, which was presumably to be spread out among the northern members of the Arcadian League, is considerably less than the sixty talents a year to be paid by the Phocians (an enormous amount for a small state left utterly without resources at its defeat) until they had reimbursed the sanctuary at Delphi the 10,000 talents which they had "borrowed" (c.f. note 75). Naturally, the Arcadian fine would be far less than the Phocian because they used the funds from Olympia only to pay the standing army and not to hire thousands of mercenaries and their "borrowing" did not go on incessantly for a number of years.

Another point to be made about the record of Arcadian reparations is that the Arcadians apparently (according to
Fraenkel, editor of IG IV 616) decided of their own accord to submit the matter of reparation to arbitration. The city of Cleonae was then chosen by the Arcadian League and the magistrates governing the temple at Olympia to act as arbitrator.


201 The references have been collected by Dittenberger SIG 204 n. 2.

202 Herodotus VI.75.3: ἑνταῦθα δὲ Κλεομένης άλλα τε ἔδησε τῆς χώρας καὶ τῆς καλουμένης ὕργαδος θεῶν τε τῶν ἐν Ἑλευσύνῃ θεῶς.

Pausanias III.4.2: ὥς δὲ Αθηναῖος ἠθειούμενι λέγουσι, διότι ἐς Ἑλευσύνην ἐσβάλλων ἔκειρε τῷ τέμνοντι τῶν θεῶν...

and III.4.3.... 'Αθηναῖοι δὲ ὄτι ἔδησε τήν ὕργαδα.

203 Thucydides I.139.2: τοῦ δὲ Ἀθηναίου...ἐπικαλούντες ἐπεργαζόμενοι Μεγαρεύσι τῆς γῆς ἱερᾶς καὶ τῆς ἀδριστοῦ...

Plutarch, Pericles XXX.2, Pausanias I.36.3 and III.4.6, scholiast to Aristophanes' Peace 605 (Philochorus F Gr Hist 328 F 121=Fornara 115 A), scholiast to Aristophanes' Acharnians 532 (Fornara 123 B) and Harpocratration s. v. 'Ἀνθεμύκτος.


IG II² 204, SIG 204, Sokolowski 32 and Harding 78.

This speech was generally considered spurious in the nineteenth century, but now it is almost universally accepted as a work of Demosthenes. W. Jaeger (Demosthenes [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1938] 243 n. 24) chronicles thoroughly the change of opinion. Nevertheless, the authorship of this speech does not affect the information contained within.

The answer to this question hinges upon the date of the speech, as Demosthenes is clearly referring to recent events. These references make it clear that the speech belongs to the period 352/49 but it is not certain whether it precedes or follows the implementation of the measures contained in the inscription. Didymus (DemosthenesI col. 13.40=Harding 78B) does date On Organization to 349/8, although, as Jacoby (F Gr Hist IIIB Supplement II 424) remarks, his inference is "crude and probably mistaken." The latest trend of opinion dates the speech to 352 (cf George Cawkwell, "Anthemocritus and the Megarians and the Decree of Charinus," REG 82 [1969]: 329, supported by Legon 286. Although Cawkwell makes a good case, the date of this speech cannot yet be considered fixed.

Demosthenes refers to the Megarians as \( \kappa \varsigma \alpha \tau \alpha \rho \alpha \tau \alpha \tau \omicron \) in 352 B. C. (XXIII.2.2) but makes no further reference to a campaign against them until 349/8 (III.20). As a result, it seems safest to assume with Jacoby (F Gr Hist IIIB, Supplement I
531), W. R. Connor ("Charinus' Megarean Decree," American Journal of Philology 83 [1962]: 237), and Legon (288) that after the threat of a campaign in 352/1 actual military action against the Megarians did not occur until the implementation of the measures of the decree aroused Megarian resentment and unco-operation.


210 This is also the opinion of G. E. M. de Ste. Croix 388 n. 1 and Kevin Clinton, "The Sacred Officials of the Eleusinian Mysteries," Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 64.3 (1962): 18 n. 1.


214 P. Foucart, in the original publication of the decree of 352/1 in BCH 13 (1889), is the only modern scholar to draw a parallel (437) between the Sacred Orgas and the Cirrhaean
Plain.

215 This point is made by Parke (Parke-Wormell 227). Athens, of course, was an ally of Phocis and this was presumably a factor in the oracle's eventual decision.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

ANCIENT SOURCES


MODERN SOURCES


Cadoux, T. J. "The Athenian Archons from Kreon to Hypsichides." JHS 68 (1948): 70-123.


---. Etude Chronologique sur la Troisième Guerre Sacrée.


Davies, O. "Two North Greek Mining Towns." JHS 49 (1929): 89-95.


Hammond, N. G. L. "Diodorus' Narrative of the Sacred War." JHS 57 (1937): 44-78.


Markle, M. M. "The Strategy of Philip in 346 B. C."


HELIKE: ANOTHER CASE OF DIVINE RETRIBUTION

The conflict between the Ionians and the city of Helice in 363 B.C. is interesting in that it furnishes an analogy with the so-called Third Sacred War in particular in its element of divine retribution falling upon those unfortunate souls allegedly guilty of sacrilege. The city of Helice was situated in Achaea, near the Corinthian Gulf. Tradition has it that Helice was one of the original twelve Ionian colonies established by the Athenians in the Peloponnese. From its very early history Helice became an important religious centre, as it was the original home of the cult of Heliconian Poseidon, before the Ionians transferred themselves, cult and all, to Asia Minor. There, Heliconian Poseidon became the patron deity of the Pan-Ionia, the federal assembly of the Ionians held near Priene on the peninsula of Mycale. Helice, however, retained both its cult and its status, as it was the most important city of the region before disaster struck (Diodorus XV.48.3).

Disaster arrived in the form of an earthquake and tidal wave on a winter night in the year 373/2. Probable cause for such a severe expression of divine displeasure was not hard to
find. A few months earlier, the Ionians, unable to hold the Pan-Ionia at its traditional site of Mycale due to an outbreak of war, had transferred it to a safe location near Ephesus. Thereupon they obtained an oracle from Delphi, which advised them to ask for the statue ( Ἐρετας) of Poseidon or, failing that, a copy (ἀργυροσκυλίας) of the ancestral altars from the original home of Heliconian Poseidon at Helice. The citizens of Helice, however, paid heed to an ancient prophesy that harm would come to them should the Ionians sacrifice upon the altar of Poseidon and consequently refused the Ionian request. Frustrated by this outright refusal, the Ionians appealed to the of the Achaeans and were given permission to complete their sacrifice. Upon their attempt to do so, the citizens of Helice seized the persons of the Ionian representatives and mistreated them, thereby incurring a charge of sacrilege.

Poseidon himself struck down the impious city forthwith in a most appropriate fashion. An earthquake caused the collapse of most of the town and the ensuing tidal wave engulfed it completely, leaving only the tops of the trees to show where a prosperous city had once stood. There were no survivors from either Helice or the neighbouring town of Bura and even ten Lacedaemonian ships which happened to be anchored nearby were destroyed. One hundred and fifty years later, Eratosthenes could still see the city of Helice beneath the waves, bronze cult statue of Poseidon and all (Strabo
VIII.7.2). By Roman times, the ruins were still visible, although they had become somewhat corroded by the sea. Eventually, however, the sea swallowed up Helice altogether, and the fourth-century city has not yet been rediscovered.

According to later tradition, the wrath of Poseidon was foretold by ominous portents. Callisthenes (apud Seneca Naturales Quaestiones VI.26.3) says:

Inter multa prodigia quibus denuntiata est duarum urbium, Helices et Buris, eversio, fuere maxime notabilia columna ignis immensi et Delos agitata.

Seneca them (VII.5.3-4) adds:

Talem effigiem ignis longi fuisse Callisthenes tradit, antequam Burin et Helicen mare absconderet. Aristoteles ait (Meteorologica 343a, 343b, and 344b) non trabem illam sed cometen fuisset...In quo igne multa quidem fuerunt digna quae notarentur, nihil tamen magnis quam quod, ut ille fulsit in caelo, statim supra Burin et Helicen mare fuit.

Ephorus (apud Seneca Naturales Quaestiones VII.15.2=Gr Hist 70 F 212) also associates the rising of this comet with the destruction of Helice and Bura. Another interesting portent of the impending disaster is recorded by Aelian (XI.19):

Επὶ πέντε γὰρ ἡμέρᾳν ἠφωνεθήναι τὴν Ἑλίκην, διὸ συνὶς ἐν αὐτῇ ἡσυχαὶ καὶ γαλαταὶ καὶ θρείσται καὶ σκολασενώραι καὶ σφουγγαί καὶ τὰ λουπὰ δια ἤ τοιαῦτα, ἀθρόα ὑπεζήμει τῇ δόξῃ τῇ ἐς Κερύνειαν ἐκφεροῦσῃ.

Clearly, the disaster which befell the unfortunate city of Helice was of such magnitude that any unusual occurrences of the time were naturally associated with it.

Due to its antecedents, the destruction of Helice was considered "a perfect example of divine retribution." Most of the ancient authorities attribute the catastrophe to the
impiety committed by the citizens of Helice. Diodorus even goes so far as to claim (XV.49.6): "λέγουσαν οὖν τὴν πλῆθυ τῶν ἁσβεστάντων οὐδεὶς ἄλλος περιέπεσε τῇ συμφορᾷ."

This, however, is not strictly true. Diodorus, in order to justify this statement, implicates the citizens of Bura in the offense committed by Helice (XV.49.2) but the crew of the ten Spartan ships are forgotten by every extant authority except Diogenes Laertius who attributes the death of their commander, Pollis, to divine retribution for his treatment of Plato.

This theme of divine retribution for those allegedly guilty of sacrilege is echoed in both Pausanias' and Diodorus' accounts of the so-called Third Sacred War. Pausanias (X.2.4-7) gives an account of the fates of the Phocian commanders, implying that they all came to a deservedly nasty end. Diodorus (XVI.61.1) reiterates his conviction that all those who commit sacrilege against the gods meet eventually with divine retribution:

δὴ λέγεται οὖν μόνον τοῖς αὐθένταῖς τής ἔρωσιν ἥδως, ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς προσαφαμένοις μόνον τῆς παρανομώς ἀπαραθητοῖς ἐκ τοῦ δαίμονιος ἐπικολούθησε τιμωρία.

He then goes on to demonstrate this theory in a graphic description (XVI.61-64) of the fates of the various participants in the sacrilege committed by the Phocians. Diodorus even links the two cases of divine retribution by foreshadowing his treatment of the sacrilegious Phocians in his section on Helice (XV.48.4).
Since the incident between the Ionians and the citizens of Helice did not develop into a full-scale war, it cannot furnish an analogy for the use of the term *ερος πόλεμος*. Nevertheless, it does bear a marked resemblance to the so-called Third Sacred War in that the element of divine retribution is spoken of in the same terms by the same sources. This was a theme which had been current in Greek literature since Herodotus—those guilty of *ὑπόπιστος* or *ὑπερβησσα* would eventually be struck down by the hand of heaven—and examples were easy to find or forge.
NOTES TO APPENDIX

1 Strabo VIII.7.1 and 7.4, Herodotus I.145, and Pausanias VII.4.1.

2 Pausanias VII.24.5, Strabo VIII.7.2, and Diodorus XV.49.1. Homer mentions "εὐρέτα Ελξη" (Iliad II.575) and its cult of Poseidon (Iliad VIII.203 and XX.404).

3 Herodotus I.148, Diodorus XV.49.1, Strabo XIV.1.20. Strabo VIII.7.2 informs us that Priene had been colonized by settlers from Helice.

4 A bronze coin bearing the head of Poseidon surrounded by waves was coined not long before the destruction of the town. See Julius Friedlaender, "A Coin of Helike," Numismatic Chronicle 1 N. S. (1861): 216-217 and Head 414.

5 Diodorus XV.48.1, Pausanias VII.24.4, and Aristotle Meteorologica 343b and 344b. Strabo dates the disaster to two years before the Battle of Leuctra (VIII.7.2). Polybius (II.41) says that the catastrophe occurred πρὸ τῶν Λευτρίκων. Eusebius erroneously dates it to Olympiad 100.1 (380/79) instead of 101.4.

6 Strabo (VIII.7.2) derives his account from a contemporary of the event, a certain Heracleides of Pontus.
Diodorus (XV.48) is presumably using Ephorus, also a contemporary, as a source. Seneca, however, criticizes Ephorus on this subject, perhaps unjustly (Naturales Quaestiones VII.16.2=F Gr Hist 70 F 212):

Ephorus non vero est religiosissimae fidae; saepe decipitur, saepe decipit. Sicut hunc cometen, qui omnium mortalium oculis custoditus est, quia ingentia rei traxit eventum, cum Helicen et Burin ortu suo merserit, ait illum discessisse in duas stellas, quod praeter illum nemo tradit.

7 Strabo (VIII.7.2) on the authority of Heracleides of Pontus says simply that the people of Helice did not obey ( ὑπακοῦσαν ) the instructions of the Achaean κοινὸν. Diodorus (XV.49.3) says: "οἱ δ' Ἑλληνες τὰ χρήματα διαρρέασαντες τῶν Ἰωάνων τοὺς τε θεωροῦσιν συνήρτασαν, ἡσέβθησαν τε εἰς τὸ θεῖον."

Pausanias (VII.24.6) and Aelian (XI.19) assert that the Ionian representatives were murdered. As Pausanias' account is so vague (he mentions nothing about the Ionian delegation and identifies the victims merely as ἵκεταί ἄνδρες ) and Aelian's is based on hearsay ( τοῦτο τοῖς φασι καὶ ἐν Ἑλληνικῇ γενέσθαι), it is likely that the tale grew taller with the telling.

8 Diodorus (XV.49.4) remarks:

τοῦ δ' Ἐλληνιδῶν γενονέαν τὴν μηνίν ταῖς πόλεσι φασιν ἐμφανεῖς ἀποδεξώσεις ὑπάρχειν διὰ τὸ τῶν σεισμῶν καὶ τῶν κατακλυσμῶν τοῦτον τῶν θεῶν ἔχειν διελήφθαι τὴν ἐξουσίαν, καὶ διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν τὸ παλαιὸν τὴν Πελοπόννησον ὁλιγῆρων γενονέαν Ποσελίδων, καὶ τὴν χώραν ταῦταν ὑστεροί λεράν τοῦ Ποσελίδων νομίζοντες, καὶ τὸ σύνολον πάσας τὰς ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ πόλεις μᾶλστα τῶν ἄθεαντων τὸν θεὸν τιμῶν τοῦτον.

9 Diodorus XV.48.1-3, Pausanias VII.24-25, Strabo I.3.18 and VIII.7.2, Aelian XI.19, Callisthenes (F Gr Hist 124 F 19-21) apud Seneca Naturales Quaestiones VI.23 and 26 and VII.5,


12 The destruction of the temple of Apollo at Delphi occurred in the same year as the earthquake in the Peloponnese, according to the Parian Marble (*F Gr Hist* 239 A 71), although no ancient source associates the two events (c.f. Parke-Wormell 214).

13 Parke (Parke-Wormell 214).

14 Diodorus (XV.48.4) makes the following distinction:

Diodorus makes it quite clear, however, that his point of view
lies with the latter category, rather than with scientists such as Aristotle.

15 c.f. Parke (Parke-Wormell 214).

16 III.20: τὸν μέντοι Πόλλων λόγος ὑπὸ τὸν Χαβρίου ἠττηθήναι καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐν Ἑλλήνῃ κατακοντωθῆναι τοῦ δαμοκλίου μηνύσαντος διὰ τοῦ φιλόσοφου, ὡς καὶ Φαβωρίνδας φησιν ἐν πρώτῳ τῶν Ἀπομημονευμάτων.