

BRITISH COLUMBIA 1972-75: THE GENESIS OF A TWO-PARTY SYSTEM

by

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Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to posit an explanation for the rather spectacular reversal of Social Credit fortunes in British Columbia during the 1972-75 period and the concomitant creation of the province's present two-party system.

A detailed examination of the political events of the period was undertaken in an attempt to determine what had taken place and in what order. The research involved analysis of electoral statistics and press clippings, personal interviews and the traditional review of available academic literature.

The thesis rejected a monocausal explanation of Social Credit's 1975 electoral victory. Research indicates that Socred leader Bill Bennett was able to capitalize on the widespread - and largely self-created - disenchantment with the NDP government and position his party to be seen by the public as the only credible alternative. Contrary to popular perception, the post-1972 version of Social Credit was not a "coalition" in the political sense. Rather, Liberal and Conservative elites recognized Bennett's success in projecting Social Credit as the only realistic alternative to the NDP and joined him to protect their legislative seats and further their respective political careers.

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I greatly appreciate the assistance rendered by Professor Terence Morley of the University of Victoria both for his insights into the subject matter of this thesis and for the wide latitude accorded to me for the purpose of examining available material connected with the British Columbia Project. Also, my thesis supervisor, Professor Paul Tennant, was very helpful in forcing me to clarify terms and focus attention on nuances of the English language.

Various other individuals were very helpful in my search for data: Mrs. Iza Laponce, Mr. George Brandak and Mr. George Elliston, all of the U.B.C. Main Library, assisted me greatly in locating research resources. Also, I wish to thank staff of the British Columbia Archives in Victoria for their assistance with the retrieval of various items.

The opportunities afforded to me to interview Gary V. Lauk, Peter S. Hyndman and Arnold Hean have also considerably assisted my understanding of the 1972-75 period in British Columbia's political history. Without their help, my task certainly would have been more difficult.

Last but not least, I am deeply indebted to a number of personal friends for their various assistances: Marc Desjardins helped me by sorting out a number of computer problems associated with putting the the thesis on computer; Karin Wilson and Paul Biscop read the initial draft and gave me the benefit of their input; and Christian Boure, my best friend, assisted me in a seemingly-infinite number of personal ways. Most of all however, I am deeply grateful to my friend and fellow-student David Stewart for his immeasurable assistance and moral support during some of my darkest moments. Dave took a great deal of time, on a number of occassions, to proofread the thesis and give me the benefit of his keen academic insight. I shall always be truly grateful.

Sources

The sources utilized in researching this thesis topic were wide and varied. I attempted to read all that was written on the subject matter presently available in the field as well as interview key people who might be responsive to discussing the related matters with me.

I succeeded in obtaining interviews with former Socred Party President Peter Hyndman, former NDP Mines Minister Gary Lauk and former Majority Movement Co-Chairman Arnold Hean. I was not so fortunate when it came to others. Mrs. Grace McCarthy courteously declined my request for an interview. As Garde Gardom and Patrick McGeer were Bennett government cabinet ministers at the time my research was being undertaken, I decided to seek an interview with Allan Williams in the hope of getting his candid perspective as a former Liberal who joined Social Credit in 1975. Unfortunately, I was unsuccessful in my various attempts to make contact with him. Also, my attempts to arrange for an interview with Bill Bennett, through the good offices of one of his assistants, came to nought.

The data compiled in the appendices to this thesis were obtained from a wide variety of sources including Howard Scarrow's Canada Votes: A Handbook of Federal and Provincial Election Data, the Statement of Votes for various elections, newspaper articles and interview material.

The data provided in Robert Lapper's article (see Bibliography) constituted a first step in my research on the nomination of Social Credit candidates for the 1975 provincial

election. However, since Lapper's study was based on often incomplete questionnaires about matters which took place much earlier, I sought verification from newspaper sources. Initially, newspaper accounts in The Vancouver Sun, The Province and the Victoria Times were used to supplement the basic information provided by Lapper. As those newspapers gave little or no real coverage of many of the nomination contests outside Greater Victoria or the Lower Mainland, this material was supplemented by additional information obtained from various local community newspapers available on microfilm at the British Columbia Archives in Victoria. In all circumstances where a newspaper report of a nomination meeting conflicted with information in the Lapper article, I accepted the newspaper report as probably being more accurate.

I had some assistance from Peter S. Hyndman, former President of the B.C. Social Credit Party, in determining the political background of 1975 Social Credit candidates. Newspaper reports were also of assistance.

I. INTRODUCTION

On August 30, 1972, forty years after the formation of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, its organizational heir, the New Democratic Party, came to power in British Columbia in a legislative landslide exceeding virtually all projections. The "socialist hordes" had finally broken through the "gates," winning almost 40 percent of the popular vote and 38 of the Legislature's 55 seats. The once seemingly-impregnable Social Credit League, which had governed the province continuously since 1952, was reduced to approximately 31 percent support and 10 seats. Social Credit had not only been routed but was consigned, by many observers, to the annals of history.

Less than 1200 days later, on December 11, 1975, Social Credit was returned to office with a mandate that surpassed even that received by the NDP three years earlier. Over 49 percent of the people of British Columbia supported Social Credit in 1975, a degree of support which had been accorded to no other political party in British Columbia since 1928.¹ The end result of the events leading up to the 1975 election meant that for the first time since the formation of the C.C.F. in 1933, British Columbia effectively had a two-party system. This feature of the post-1975 B.C. political reality was reinforced in the

¹ See Appendix A. Although this assertion does not unequivocally cover the elections of 1945 and 1949 when Liberals and Conservatives did not run against each other, support for those parties was probably in the range of the previous three elections, with the result that it is doubtful that either party had the support of 49 percent of the electorate.

subsequent three elections and has shown no real sign of deterioration.

The question that generated my interest in this topic was "What happened in British Columbia between the years 1972 and 1975 to bring about the substantial reversal of Social Credit fortunes between the elections of those years?" When embarking on my study, I did not have a clearly-formed view of what actually had taken place, but I was genuinely intrigued by the possibility of researching the subject. As various observers had suggested that a "coalition of the right" was responsible for the demise of the NDP government and the restoration of Social Credit, I wondered whether this accurately described the cause of the phenomenon.

I began by a consideration of the literature on coalition and then undertook a detailed examination of the political events of the period in an attempt to determine just what had occurred - and in what sequence. I had assistance from a variety of material including academic writings of the period, material located at the B.C. project at the University of Victoria, electoral statistics for a number of years as well as the wealth of press clippings available at the Vancouver Public Library. As a result of my research, I came to some clear conclusions as to what in fact had taken place.

My purpose in this thesis is to posit an explanation for the rather spectacular reversal of Social Credit fortunes in the period 1972-75 and the concomitant creation of British Columbia's present two-party system. I shall argue that Social

Credit's 1975 electoral victory resulted from a combination of factors of which two were key: widespread and largely self-created disenchantment with the manner in which the NDP governed the province; and Bill Bennett's capitalization on that disenchantment by successfully positioning Social Credit, by 1975, to be seen as the "one well-organized responsible group opposed to extremism"² and hence as the sole credible alternative to the NDP. Furthermore, as a subsidiary matter, I shall consider the various uses of the word "coalition" and argue that its use in the context at hand tends to create confusion as to what actually occurred and therefore should not be used.

² This phrase, originally descriptive of the Liberal Party, appeared in the editorial comment of the British Columbia Miner, the official organ of the mining industry upon the election of the Patullo government in 1933. See: Robert E. Groves, Business Government: Party Politics and the British Columbia Business Community, 1928-33 (Vancouver, 1976), p. 180.

II. THE NDP GOVERNMENT: A FAILURE OF POLICY CO-ORDINATION AND POLITICAL JUDGMENT

The 1972-1975 period has been described as one of "ragged ebullience in which inexperience combined with enthusiasm to open doors and empty tills ... [one that] revealed the extent to which politicians are prisoners of their experience as much as their prejudices."³ The events of this period set British Columbia on a course, both governmentally and politically, from which there could be no turning back. The period was one in which the size and scope of government would change permanently. Furthermore, it set the stage for the present two-party system.

Prior to its election in 1972, the NDP had always been a party that had enjoyed the freedom from discipline that continual electoral failure provides. The government that was sworn in on September 15, 1972 was largely composed of men and women who had served on the Opposition benches - some, for many years. Those individuals carried with them to the Cabinet Room the collegial style to which they had become accustomed in opposition.

During the NDP government's brief period in office, the legislature passed 367 bills, more than double those of the preceding three years.⁴ The government's legislative

³ Walter Young, Politics in British Columbia in the 1970s: The Three Year Decade. (Department of Political Science, University of Victoria, 1981), p. 4

⁴ Lorne J. Kavic and Garry Brian Nixon, The 1200 Days - A Shattered Dream: Dave Barrett and the NDP in B.C. 1972-75 (Coquitlam, B.C., 1978), p. 248.

accomplishments were not only numerous, but impressive in scope. They included a Land Commission Act, a Human Rights Act, Mincome, Pharmacare, the B.C. Petroleum Corporation, strengthened tenants' protection, a legal aid services program, the creation of Housing and Consumer Affairs Ministries, an agricultural income maintenance program and a new Labour Code. Also enacted were government automobile insurance, financial aid to post-secondary students, a new mineral royalties act, Community Resource Boards, aid to nursing care homes, and daycare subsidies. Urban transit was greatly improved and more parks were created than in the previous two decades of Social Credit rule.⁵

In large measure, the political problems which the Barrett government sustained resulted not from the substance of its legislation, but rather from its style of government, as well as from the perception it fostered of being "out of control." As one former cabinet minister stated:

Each minister in the Barrett Administration felt that they had to right the wrongs of a generation in three and a half years, within the parameters of their portfolios - and they went about to do it.⁶

In going about its task of "righting wrongs," the government failed, however, to pay adequate attention to the public relations' requirements implicit in undertaking such an endeavour. The consequence of this failure was that the public

⁵ Ibid., pp. 248-249.

⁶ Interview with Gary V. Lauk, June 24, 1986.

was left feeling "dizzy" with the pace of change, concerned about the manner of change, and skeptical about the government's overall management abilities and financial judgment.

David Barrett, as Opposition Leader, was used to being a non-directive, permissive type of leader whose approach to caucus management was one of offering encouragement and general direction, while creating a congenial forum for his colleagues to explore their differences. Upon forming a government, Barrett's personal proclivity for group interaction, rather than strict control from the Chair, ensured that his Cabinet would effectively be "federal" rather than "unitary" in character. As Premier, Barrett did not take on the role of central co-ordinator at the head of a group of policy innovators, but rather allowed things to happen seemingly on the assumption that a government of social democrats constituted "a kind of critical mass for the generation of policies for the common weal."⁷

The failure of Premier Barrett to take control of his cabinet's decision-making process resulted in a situation where the major decisions and innovations made during the NDP period came about through the influence of dominant ministers rather than from any real, collective consideration of overall policy priorities and co-ordination.⁸ As Gary Lauk stated:

The psycho-dynamics of the Barrett administration, within its cabinet, was such that little groups of

⁷ Young, loc. cit., p. 22.

⁸ Paul, Tennant, "The NDP Government of British Columbia: Unaided Politicians in Unaided Cabinet," Canadian Public Policy III:4 (Autumn 1977), p. 492.

cabinet ministers would make decisions affecting particular areas without an overview expressed by the group as a whole ... You had a number of cabinet ministers who were merely trying to jockey into position for their own ministries and succeed in getting their own policies prioritized. (sic)⁹

Although Paul Tennant was correct when he stated that "the NDP government's overall policy process was marked by [the] absence of planning and absence of co-ordination and control,"¹⁰ he was inaccurate in his suggestion that the Barrett government was "unaided." The Barrett government, notwithstanding its appearance of haste and lack of consideration, consulted carefully and widely,¹¹ and was well-advised with respect to policy and program details.¹² Its failure was in its lack of a political overview. In essence, the government did not organize its political agenda with a consistent and conscious "eye" on the political ramifications for the next election.

At the beginning of the NDP government's term of office, the British Columbia population in general and the business community in particular indicated a willingness to adopt a "wait and see" approach to the new government.¹³ One businessman summed it up when he stated:

This has been hanging over British Columbia for 30

⁹ Lauk Interview.

¹⁰ Tennant, loc. cit., p. 501.

¹¹ Young, loc. cit., p. 19.

¹² While Lauk was very candid and generally accepted Tennant's line of analysis, this was one area in which he thought Tennant to be inaccurate.

¹³ "Business Calm but Shocked as Socialists Roll to Win: 'Wait and See' Becomes Maxim," The Sun (Vancouver), August 31, 1972.

years. Now its here. We're either going to find out we can live with it or we're going to throw it the hell out.¹⁴

It did not take long however, for many people in the province to view the new government and its direction with an acute sense of alarm. For some, the sensation was one of fear.

By early 1973, the government began to give the appearance that it did not carefully plan its decisions, but rather "fell" into them. The sense of alarm and fear which ensued was fostered not so much by the government's policy choices as by the manner in which those policies were pursued. The problem was that the government created the impression that it was moving into new areas of responsibility without adequate preparation. An examination of five major initiatives of the 1972-75 period will serve to indicate how the government, by its actions, helped to create the impression that it was acting in haste and without due consideration. Those initiatives were: the land use control legislation, the government's incursion into the domain of automobile insurance, its handling of the mineral royalties issue, its implementation of rent controls, and the fiasco over the \$102.8 million "clerical error" in the Human Resources budget. The political impact of each of these matters will be briefly considered.¹⁵

¹⁴ Ibid.

Land Use Control

The Barrett government began its "legislation by thunderbolt" on December 21, 1972 when the cabinet approved the passage of an order-in-council which,

pursuant to section 6 of the Environment and Land Use Act prohibited all subdivisions of farmland, including all lands deemed by the Committee to be suitable for cultivation of agricultural crops, until further order or provision of statute to the contrary ...¹⁶

This was followed by the introduction, on February 22, 1973, of Bill 42, the Land Commission Act, which had as its primary purpose the preservation of farmland in the Fraser Valley.¹⁷ The operative principle behind the bill was the creation of a province-wide zoning scheme which invested a newly-created Land Commission with major adjudicative responsibilities involving the designation of agricultural land.

The political problems which resulted from the implementation of the government's farmland preservation program

¹⁵ I have relied extensively on Kavic and Nixon, op. cit., for detailed information regarding the political problems encountered by the Barrett government in the passage and implementation of its legislative proposals. Notwithstanding the valuable criticisms of this book by both Alan C. Cairns (B.C. Studies, No. 49, pp. 94-102) and Reg Whitaker (Canadian Dimension, Vol. 13, No. 8, pp. 49-53), it remains the most balanced account of the period presently available. It far surpasses Paul Hurmuses' Power Without Glory: The Rise and Fall of the NDP Government in British Columbia (Vancouver, 1976) in that the latter work is more of a polemic against the NDP than an honest attempt at disinterested examination of the subject matter.

¹⁶ B.C. Reg. 4/73.

¹⁷ Andrew Petter, "Sausage Making in British Columbia's NDP Government: The Creation of the Land Commission Act, August 1972 - April 1973," B.C. Studies No. 65 (Spring 1985), p. 7.

primarily came about due to the manner by which the program was promoted and the legislation was enacted. As Andrew Petter has pointed out, the principle of a farmland preservation program had been publicly promoted by Agriculture Minister Stupich before it had even received cabinet approval and before all of its ramifications had been considered.¹⁸ The February 22nd draft of the bill provided that the Commission was to be appointed by Cabinet and to hold office "during pleasure," creating the impression of a government-controlled political body performing adjudicative functions - functions that would have a significant impact on the livelihoods of individuals and on the value and use of their land - with no right of appeal. This impression caused a great deal of fear and opposition among many of those who otherwise might not have been opposed to the notion of a provincial farmland preservation program.¹⁹ Much of the criticism of the proposed Act took the form of general outcries against the tyranny of government and demands for compensation by landowners who stood to lose financially by virtue of this "zoning" process.²⁰ In addition, the lack of an appeal mechanism invited additional criticism of the legislation.

On March 19, 1973, less than one month after the introduction of Bill 42, the Barrett government introduced amendments which, inter alia, allowed for a limited appeal mechanism, provided for local government participation in the

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 31.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 27.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 29.

land designation process, and attempted to allay fears that the government might want to expropriate land in the future.²¹ Although these amendments succeeded in blunting some of the severest criticism of the legislation, it set in motion an emerging belief that this was a government which acted before it collectively 'thought'. Bill 42 received Royal Assent on April 16, 1973, only 53 days after its introduction. Its speed of passage torpedoed any possibility of educating the public as to the need for and the aims of the legislation and thus served to lend credence to opposition claims that the NDP was acting in an extreme and heavy-handed manner. The controversy surrounding Bill 42 was a precursor of things to come.

I.C.B.C.

On February 16, 1973, shortly after the implementation of the land freeze by way of Order-in-Council and just six days prior to the introduction of the Land Commission Act, the government introduced Bill 54, the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia Act. The legislative intent of this bill was the creation of a Crown monopoly to administer a wholly state-run automobile insurance program in the province. Unlike Manitoba's Autopac scheme which had been instituted a few years earlier, B.C.'s "Autoplan" was to encompass the entirety of British Columbia's automobile insurance business without

²¹ Ibid., pp. 28-30.

allowing private insurance companies to underwrite even excess insurance above the government's mandatory minimum. The political problems which accompanied the scheme would plague the NDP government throughout its term.

Although allowing some "designated" agents to sell I.C.B.C. policies with license plates in competition with the Motor Vehicle Branch, Autoplan put hundreds of previously-employed agents out of work. In addition, the Act allowed I.C.B.C. to become the first government insurance company in North America to sell general property insurance. The overall effect was to push some 183 private insurance companies out of the automobile insurance business and to render even the on-going servicing of general insurance of marginal value to many firms.²²

From the day it commenced operation, the Insurance Corporation proved to be a political embarrassment for the government. Its start-up, originally scheduled for February 1974 to coincide with the normal renewal of licenses, had to be deferred until March 1974 to enable the "bugs" to be ironed out. In acquiring its staff, I.C.B.C. was accused of enticing away personnel from private industry and other provincial governments with generous salaries. In obtaining sites for claims centres, the Corporation was accused of paying too much and too little, and of using its status to acquire Crown land for nothing. In Richmond, I.C.B.C. purchased farmland for a claims centre, only to have a head-on collision with the newly-created and very

²² Kavic and Nixon, op. cit., p. 134

controversial Land Commission over the proposed farmland conversion. Furthermore, suspicions of favouritism were raised when it came to light that some relatives and friends of cabinet members were among those designated to be I.C.B.C. agents.

Once in operation, I.C.B.C. continued to have its problems. The Corporation was involved in a series of skirmishes with bodyshops over rates when it refused to meet the full extent of higher rates instituted by the bodyshops - with the consequence that many motorists were forced to pay the difference where it existed. From May to August 1975, I.C.B.C. was paralyzed by a strike of its 2,000 employees which caused serious inconvenience for tens of thousands of motorists deprived of "the only service in town." Upon resumption of service after the strike, the Corporation's efficiency was reduced by the need to clean up the backlog of work in all areas of I.C.B.C. responsibility.

The general perception created by I.C.B.C. was one of claims abuses, mistakes in appraisal, and repairable cars ending up in the junkyard thanks to an "overly-generous" public corporation. By February 1975, when the government was forced to admit that I.C.B.C. had a staggering \$34.5 million deficit, the die was cast. In the minds of many, the NDP had precipitously jumped into a former preserve of the private sector and had seriously mismanaged it.

Mineral Royalties Legislation

It was the introduction of the Mineral Royalties Act on February 19, 1974 that created perhaps the most sustained opposition that the NDP government would encounter during its term.²³ The Act provided for a two and one-half percent royalty on metals and certain minerals, for royalties on a sliding scale up to five percent for succeeding years based on a five-year averaging price, and for a special fifty percent surtax or "super royalty" on prices above twenty percent of the previous five year average. The legislation was designed to rectify a situation of sharply rising mineral prices with high profits for the mining industry but very small returns to the provincial treasury.

The reaction of the mining industry to the mineral royalties legislation was sharp and swift. The industry issued dire warnings of the economic consequences of such legislation claiming that it would all but destroy the province's mining sector. It undertook intensive publicity and lobbying campaigns utilizing radio, television and the written press to refine and dramatize its contention that mining was threatened in B.C., a significant loss of jobs was inevitable and that the entire provincial economy was therefore in danger.²⁴ However, despite

²³ For a detailed analysis of the background, objectives and consequences of this legislative initiative, see Raymond W. Payne, "Corporate Power, Interest Groups and the Development of Mining Policy in British Columbia, 1972-77," in B.C. Studies No. 54 (Summer 1982), pp. 3-37.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 18.

noisy public demonstrations and the industry's efforts, the Mineral Royalties Act received third reading and Royal Assent on June 20, 1974, four months and one day after it was introduced.

Although the government, towards the end of its term, attempted to come to an accommodation with the mining industry, the subsequent decline in mining activity - that to some extent resulted from the fall of world mineral prices - was blamed on the NDP. Even though the legislation was later watered down with the "super royalty" provision effectively withdrawn, the impression was left that the NDP had severely crippled the industry.

The political consequences of the mineral royalties controversy were far-reaching; the government's handling of the whole matter undoubtedly undermined its general credibility in economic matters. Furthermore, it created avowed enemies within the mining industry who explicitly campaigned against the NDP in the following election.²⁵

Rent Controls

On March 14, 1974, Attorney-General Alex Macdonald introduced the Residential Premises Interim Rent Stabilization Act; rent controls had come to British Columbia. Henceforth, no landlord could raise rents more than eight percent per annum without "government" approval except in the cases of new

²⁵ Ibid., p. 28.

apartments in their first five years of use, units renting for more than \$500 per month, and owner-occupied residences of less than four units. The legislation angered landlords and was later blamed for a sharply-increased rental and housing shortage as well as an increasingly negative attitude on the part of building owners towards maintenance. Although the Attorney-General had introduced the measure as a "temporary" one, it was viewed by many as creating long-term problems. The business community saw rent controls as making the problem of rental housing shortage more acute. Although popular with tenants, the rent control legislation added to the image of the NDP as market-place meddlers who, in the eyes of the business community, did not know what they were doing.

Human Resources Fiscal Management

The "achilles heel" of the NDP is, and has always been, that it is perceived as being less than responsible in its management of welfare spending. The condition of the sick, the handicapped and the poor has long been a prime NDP concern. When the Barrett government was elected in 1972, welfare was given high priority with the establishment of 18 new programs. In addition, welfare rates were raised by 20 to 40 percent with a concomitant loosening of means test requirements.²⁶

By early September 1974, rumours had been circulating for

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 199-200.

weeks that the Treasury Board had discovered a gigantic overrun in Human Resources Department spending. Official acknowledgement was finally forthcoming at a press conference on September 18, 1974 when Premier Barrett, in the course of speaking on another subject casually stated:

An unidentified person in the Human Resources Department has made a clerical error ... of \$102.8 million in this year's budget.²⁷

The "clerical error" episode was a public relations fiasco for the NDP. The press and the opposition had a field day with the revelation. Liberal M.L.A., Dr. Pat McGeer stated that the Minister of Human Resources "has been let loose with a shovel in the Treasury vaults."²⁸ The NDP would pay dearly for the mistake and the way it was handled. The "clerical error" stuck in people's minds with the help of constant reminders from Bill Bennett in his campaign the following year.

Other Examples Of Poor Judgment

It would be inaccurate to leave the impression that it was only the five initiatives previously discussed that created public dissatisfaction with the government. In addition to concerns about the nature and wisdom of the government's substantive legislative activity, its style in other areas was a

²⁷ Ibid., p. 191.

²⁸ Ibid.

matter of considerable public discussion. There was Premier Barrett's televised "firing" of Education Minister Eileen Dailly's special Commissioner of Education - apparently without the Minister's personal foreknowledge,²⁹ the uproar over Premier Barrett's use of expletives directed at Vancouver Sun columnist Marjorie Nichols in the legislative corridor,³⁰ and the public embarrassment incurred when Government Whip Emery Barnes voted against his own leader on a procedural matter in the Legislature.³¹ Collectively, these incidents added to the impression that the government was "out of control." Allan Fotheringham's words, in the aftermath of the "Barnes incident," were perhaps indicative of the emerging perception:

Poor battered Mr. Barrett, of course, as with so many other of his recent troubles has only himself to blame. His rather astonishing decision to place the responsible mantle of government whip on the inexperienced Mr. Barnes, untutored in the more devious rules of the legislative game, drew astonished stares all around. ...Mr. Barnes can't handle it. And now Mr. Barrett can't handle Mr. Barnes. If they play rugby like they're presently running this legislature, they'd run the wrong way - without the ball.³²

If the spate of the NDP government's legislative activity along with its public relations blunders caused it problems in

²⁹ Ibid., p. 165.

³⁰ See: Marjorie Nichols in the The Vancouver Sun, March 13th and 14th, 1974 as well as "Gutter Language by Barrett Cited," in the The Vancouver Sun, March 14, 1974.

³¹ See: "Six NDP Dissidents Vote Against Motion by Barrett," in The Vancouver Sun, March 30, 1974.

³² Allan Fotheringham in The Vancouver Sun, April 2, 1974.

its first two years of office, the remainder of its term was largely spent in defending itself against allegations that it was "undemocratic" in style and inclination. In May 1975, two issues dominated media attention: the introduction of the Emergency Programmes Act and the "not a dime without debate" campaign waged by Bill Bennett in the wake of the legislative standoff over the setting of time limits for legislative debate. These issues left the impression in the minds of many that the government preferred to bludgeon ahead with its agenda, using the vehicle of a democratic legislature while, at best, having something less than a healthy respect for democratic procedures.

Bill 61, the Emergency Programmes Act, was introduced by the Government on May 8, 1975 ostensibly for the purpose of dealing "with those disasters which befall modern communities, such as earthquakes, flood and other disasters."³³ According to the actual wording of the bill however, the Act, if passed, would have given the B.C. Cabinet more powers than those possessed by its federal counterpart pursuant to the War Measures Act. The empowering section of the proposed legislation stated:

Where at any time the Lieutenant-Governor in Council considers that an emergency exists, he may, by order, declare that, as a result of circumstances specified in the declaration, a state of emergency exists in the province or in any part of the province.³⁴

³³ Provincial Secretary Ernest Hall quoted in Hurmuses, op. cit., p. 100.

³⁴ Ibid.

Initially, the predominant concern expressed with regard to Bill 61 was its lack of a definition of 'emergency'. Vancouver columnist Marjorie Nichols commented at the time that:

This is the most terrrifying bill ever churned out of the NDP mill ... Well, yes this thing could be used to deal with natural gas. And riots and earthquakes and economic turndowns and possibly even the state of the weather.³⁵

The Emergency Programmes Act would have empowered the government, in the case of an "emergency," to acquire property "by agreement, expropriation, confiscation or other means."³⁶ Furthermore, it would have permitted conscription with or without remuneration, of such persons between the ages of 18 and 60 as the Minister considered necessary.³⁷ Perhaps most damaging from a political standpoint, the Act would have given Cabinet the power to enter upon or demolish property, prohibit travel and fix prices.³⁸

Despite the storm of protest, Premier Barrett initially refused to withdraw Bill 61, claiming that he did not understand what all the fuss was about, as this was simply civil defense legislation. Opposition to the legislation was however unyielding, with the B.C. Civil Liberties Association President stating that "the prospect" that "the bill may be amended or dropped entirely is the only bright spot about it."³⁹ Finally,

³⁵ Ibid., pp. 101-103.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 103.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

on June 13, 1975, Premier Barrett relented and withdrew Bill 61 - but not before the political damage had been done. B.C.'s first socialist government had attempted to pass legislation empowering the state to expropriate private property and enforce conscription without the right of remuneration - when it deemed such to be necessary.

In the same period that the debate over the Emergency Programmes Act was taking place, Socred leader Bill Bennett commenced his cross-province "Not a Dime Without Debate" campaign. This issue had its genesis in May 1974 when the NDP government introduced a change in standing orders to limit debate on estimates. The new Standing Order 45A stipulated that if the estimates were not passed in 135 hours or forty-five sittings (whichever occurred last), then the remaining estimates would be passed automatically without additional debate.⁴⁰ Although such a change was reasonable in the eyes of many, its success rested upon the assumption that the opposition accepted such a limitation in principle. The opposition parties in fact did not accept the principle of debate limitation, and in the spring of 1975 forced the issue by ensuring that all the estimates were not passed when the 135 hour limit expired. With less than 20 percent of the estimates passed when time ran out, bitter legislative wrangling ensued. On May 13, 1975, the government sought to pass the remaining estimates without debate. Upon his expulsion from the House for his behaviour in

⁴⁰ Terence Morley et al., The Reins of Power: Governing British Columbia (Vancouver, 1983), p. 34.

the midst of the furor, Bill Bennett promptly embarked on a province-wide crusade "wrapped in the robes of democracy proclaiming 'not a dime without debate'."⁴¹

The political repercussions of the debate over time limits were far-reaching. The NDP's constructive reforms were now overshadowed. The party that had always been viewed (and viewed itself) as the champion of parliamentary tradition had to defend itself against the charge that it had violated the most basic of those traditions. The charge was made more stinging by virtue of the fact that W.A.C. Bennett, in his time, had regularly abused the Opposition with all-night sessions and "legislation by exhaustion." The NDP government, on the other hand, had improved the rights of the Opposition with the introduction of Question Period and the appointment of an Opposition M.L.A. to the chairmanship of the Legislature's Public Accounts Committee. At the public relations level however, the NDP lost the argument.

Characterizing the perception of the NDP held by many people when it was first elected, one academic writer stated:

Perhaps we as academics did not see the end of the world coming when the NDP was elected. Many immigrants, businessmen, and housewives did: British Columbia was soon to be a satellite of the U.S.S.R.⁴²

As a consequence of two years of intense legislative activity,

⁴¹ Young, op. cit., p. 29.

⁴² Mercedes Ballem, "The Unity Party: Its Death and Resurrections." (A Paper dated September 30, 1979 and forming part of The British Columbia Project, University of Victoria), p. 1.

the events of 1975 added to the suspicion in some quarters that this was a government that intended to radically transform the way people carried on their lives. Furthermore, many considered the NDP to be "arrogant, impervious to criticism or suggestion," with their methods being "repugnant to the great majority of B.C. residents."⁴³ In retrospect, it cannot be surprising that the NDP government failed to win a second term. It could probably only have done so if its opponents had remained divided as to the best way to bring about its defeat. By and large, this was not to be the case.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 37.

III. SOCIAL CREDIT POST-1972: THE "COALITION" DESCRIPTION

The period leading up to the 1975 provincial election has been described both as "a period of realignment" in B.C. politics⁴⁴ and as one in which a "coalition of the right"⁴⁵ emerged to defeat the NDP government. The election of 1975 was indeed a "realigning" one in that it was one in which the "popular feeling associated with politics [was] sufficiently intense that the basic partisan commitments of a portion of the electorate change[d]."⁴⁶ However, the use of the term "coalition" to describe the period leading up to the 1975 causes more difficulty.

After a review of the political science literature with respect to "coalition," it would seem that while political theorists have defined "coalition" in a variety of ways, no one definition has been widely accepted in the literature.⁴⁷

Coalition has been defined as "the joint use of resources to determine the outcome of a decision,"⁴⁸ "a subgroup which comes into existence in order to control a decision,"⁴⁹ and as a

⁴⁴ Donald E. Blake, 2 Political Worlds: Parties and Voting in British Columbia (Vancouver, 1976), p. 31.

⁴⁵ Among others, see ibid., p. 25; Morley et al, op. cit., p. 89; and G.L. Kristianson, "The Non-partisan Approach to B.C. Politics: the Search for a Unity Party - 1972-1975," in B.C. Studies No. 33 (Spring 1977), pp 13-29 at p. 14.

⁴⁶ Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter, An Abridgement (New York, 1964), p. 276.

⁴⁷ Eric C. Browne, Coalition Theories: A Logical and Empirical Critique (London, 1973), p. 12.

⁴⁸ W.A. Gamson, "A Theory of Coalition Formation," American Sociological Review 26 (June 1961), p. 374.

⁴⁹ W.H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven, Connecticut, 1962), p. 12.

"combination of actors seeking to control payoffs."⁵⁰ Eric Browne, after considering other definitions in the literature, described coalition as "the result of goal-oriented behaviour of two or more actors who consciously make common cause contingent on some prearranged distribution of rewards."⁵¹

The most explicit definition of coalition found in the literature is that of E.W. Kelley, who stated that:

By a coalition we mean a group of individuals or groups who: 1. agree to pursue a common and articulated goal; 2. pool their relevant resources in pursuit of that goal; 3. engage in conscious communication concerning the goal and the means of obtaining it; 4. agree on the distribution of payoffs (benefits) received when obtaining the goal.⁵²

Dictionary definitions of coalition also lend assistance to understanding the manner in which the term is used. According to Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged, coalition is defined as

1a: the act of coalescing: the union of things separate into a single body or group (coalition of water vapour into raindrops) b: a group or body formed by the coalescing of originally distinct elements: COMBINATION (they formed a coalition with the theatre owners)
2 in government and politics: a temporary alliance of distinct parties, persons or states for joint action or to achieve a common purpose (the party could keep control only by coalition with two smaller parties)

⁵⁰ M.A. Leiserman, "Factions and Coalitions in One-Party Japan," American Political Science Review 62 (February 1968), pp. 62-63.

⁵¹ Browne, op. cit., p. 13.

⁵² E.W. Kelley, "Techniques of Studying Coalition Formation," Midwest Journal of Political Science 12 (February 1968), pp. 62-63.

(the parties of the right formed a coalition against the Communists) (a coalition of free nations).

The Oxford English Dictionary suggests four uses of the term but suggests that now the term is most-commonly understood in its fourth usage:

1. The growing together of parts, coalescence;
2. Union into one mass or body; combination;
3. Union, combination, fusion (of parties, principles, interests, etc.);
4. esp. in politics. An alliance for combined action of distinct parties, persons, or states, without permanent incorporation into one body.

The Concise Oxford Dictionary goes farther and, by use of an appropriate symbol, indicates that its political definition is particularly descriptive of how the term is usually understood in the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth. That version describes coalition in its political sense as a "temporary combination of parties that retain distinctive principles."

As a consequence of the availability of a number of usages of "coalition," it becomes clear that the context in which the word is used is crucial to a proper understanding of its meaning. In the context of the events of the 1972-75 period, the waters are further muddied by virtue of the fact that, at the time, there were those who believed that the re-invigorated Social Credit party was simply the result of a marriage of convenience between right-wing elites - a marriage which might well prove to be temporary. If such had been the case, the use of the term "coalition" to describe the phenomenon would have been appropriate. However, as this thesis implicitly rejects

such an explanation of the re-emergence of Social Credit, I would submit that the use of the word lends uncertainty as to its meaning.

Among the political writers who attempt to define "coalition," two themes by-and-large seem to be common: coalitions, in the political sense, are creatures of agreement between actors about goals so as to control the distribution of payoffs; and they are implicitly temporary arrangements. A coalition in the political sense can be best understood as a non-permanent alliance of actors who decide to pool their resources for the purpose of controlling an outcome and its payoffs.

In view of the above definition, I would suggest that the use of the term "coalition" in the context of the 1972-75 B.C. political environment is less than helpful. I would submit that when the circumstances surrounding the revitalization of Social Credit are scrutinized, the empirical evidence does not bear out any suggestion that the phenomenon took place as a result of an "agreement," explicit or implicit, temporary or permanent, between right-wing elites. Rather, those circumstances point in the direction of a genuine Bennett-led realignment in British Columbia politics - one in which most non-Socred elites observed from the sidelines before taking an active role.

Ideally, the term "coalition" should not be used to describe the pertinent events which occurred in British Columbia during the 1972-75 period. Although the term does allow for a number of usages, in its political sense it implies the

existence of an agreement of a temporary nature for specific purposes - that in the circumstances of Social Credit between 1972 and 1975 apparently did not exist. The consequence of the use of this term in this context is that it serves to create confusion as to its meaning and hence tends to mislead.

IV. SOCIAL CREDIT: THE NON-SOCIALIST ALTERNATIVE EMERGES

A. THE REBUILDING OF SOCIAL CREDIT

1. Bill Bennett Takes The Helm

The rebuilding of Social Credit, after its devastating 1972 defeat, ostensibly began on March 23, 1973 when W.A.C. Bennett announced his intention to retire as Socred leader. His resignation was to take effect upon the selection of a replacement at a leadership convention, to be held at the Bayshore Hotel in Vancouver on the weekend of November 22-24, 1973. Giving an indication of the type of leader he thought should succeed him, he told a Socred meeting in New Westminster:

I know you will elect a brilliant young person to lead you for another 20 years ... God bless him or her.⁵³

On a platform next to him sat Mrs. Grace McCarthy, former Minister Without Portfolio in his government and the person he described as "the number one freedom fighter in B.C."⁵⁴

On June 5, 1973, W.A.C. Bennett tendered his resignation as the M.L.A. for South Okanagan. His letter to the Speaker of the Legislature stated, in part:

While I have been a Member for so many years

⁵³ "Bennett Urges Socreds: 'Pick a Young Leader'," The Sun (Vancouver), March 24, 1973.

⁵⁴ Ibid. The Sun hinted that the presence of Mrs McCarthy on the platform next to W.A.C. Bennett could possibly be construed as a subtle endorsement of her as his successor. However, as events unfolded it became clear that she was not the "brilliant young person" he had in mind.

representing South Okanagan, it is with great regret that I tender this resignation, but I feel it is time for a younger person to represent this Constituency.⁵⁵

Premier Barrett called a by-election for September 7, 1973 and a few days later, W.A.C.'s son, Bill Bennett, announced his intention to seek the legislative seat under the Socred banner.

The South Okanagan by-election campaign took place against a background in which various non-socialists in B.C. were considering how to prevent a re-occurrence of the fracturing of the "free-enterprise vote". The Liberal, Progressive Conservative and Social Credit parties were exhorted by various non-socialists to put aside traditional differences in favour of a united stand against the NDP. A variety of proposals were brought forward including electoral reform (and particularly a return to the single transferable vote which had been abolished after the 1953 election). However, most interest centred on the desirability of combining the three opposition parties into a single force against the NDP thereby ensuring a "free-enterprise" 60 percent majority.⁵⁶ The unspoken premise of the proponents of these attempts was that Social Credit was finished as a political force in the province, that the party, like the government was W.A.C. Bennett - and that it was disappearing along with him.⁵⁷

As early as March 23, 1973, the day that he called for a

⁵⁵ Mitchell, op. cit., p. 430.

⁵⁶ Kristianson, loc. cit., p. 15.

⁵⁷ Young, loc. cit., p. 27

Social Credit leadership convention, W.A.C. Bennett rejected the idea of an alliance with the provincial Liberals or Conservatives. "The only movement," he said "that can beat the socialists is the same movement that beat them seven times in a row."⁵⁸ Instead, he issued the invitation to disaffected partisans of all other political parties to join Social Credit. "Welcome them warmly," he urged his Socred supporters, "because they'll come by the hundreds and the thousands."⁵⁹

The most prominent group advocating an electoral alliance was the Majority Movement for Freedom and Private Enterprise, an organization which was formed in early 1973. Co-chaired by Burnaby Lawyer, Arnold Hean and Kamloops lawyer and self-made millionaire, Jarl Whist,⁶⁰ the group held a series of meetings urging unity to defeat the NDP by way of "unifying the three free-enterprise parties, or failing that, the free enterprise vote."⁶¹ In a tabloid-sized handout issued in mid-1973, the Majority Movement's purpose was stated:

For the first time we have found ourselves together, on the same side, in the political arena. Most of us now realize that what differences that we had were small, and what unites us in common is very large and very important.

The Majority Movement has been formed to offer a non-political alternative which goes beyond party differences. It is open to concerned British

⁵⁸ "Bennett Urges Socreds: 'Pick a Young Leader'," op. cit.

⁵⁹ loc. cit.., p. 27

⁶⁰ I was informed by Mr. Hean that Mr. Whist was a law partner of Rafe Mair, the individual who secured the Socred nomination for Kamloops in 1975 and subsequently became a cabinet minister in Bill Bennett's government.

⁶¹ Kristianson, loc. cit., p. 15.

Columbians who value personal freedom above all else. The Majority Movement exists to unite the thousands of voices, from every part of our province, who realize that we are powerless as long as we are divided.⁶²

Even though in the aftermath of the 1972 election Social Credit refused to entertain "unity" discussions, Bill Bennett did not fail to notice the appeal that the unity movement had to many voters. In the South Okanagan by-election, he campaigned under the slogan "Unity" - the Majority Movement's theme. In the Socred party literature, the party's cross-sectioned base of support was emphasized and Bennett's posters featured the Majority Movement's colours: red, white and blue. Furthermore, his platform was strikingly similar to that of the Majority Movement - that "we must as a united group, defeat the NDP."⁶³

The by-election was also to be contested by the Conservative Party's new and politically attractive leader, Derril Warren, who had failed to get elected in the 1972 general election notwithstanding the 12.7 percent of the popular vote the Conservative Party had garnered under his leadership - the highest it had received since the Socreds were first elected in 1952. The South Okanagan contest would determine whether or not the Conservative Party would have a chance of once again becoming the conservative political standard bearer in British Columbia. It was also the first post-1972 test of Social Credit's reservoir of support.

⁶² Undated Majority Movement pamphlet quoted in Kristianson, ibid.

⁶³ Ballem, op. cit., p. 6.

The South Okanagan by-election results, although not a landslide in Bill Bennett's favour, were sufficient to eliminate the immediate threat posed by Warren and the Conservative Party. (See Table 1 below)

TABLE 1

SOUTH OKANAGAN - Percentage of Valid Votes
Received by Major Party Candidates in B.C.
Provincial By-Election held September 7, 1973

McIver (N.D.P.)	25.9
Bennett (Social Credit)	39.5
Dyck (Liberal)	9.9
Warren (P.C.)	24.4

Bennett had publicly maintained that it was necessary to "liberalize the party ... to widen its base ... to appeal to the professions - people [the Socreds] had never been able to attract."⁶⁴ On that score he was elected in heartland of traditional Social Credit support, winning a plurality of votes in every polling district in the constituency.⁶⁵ The way was now clear for Bennett to seek the leadership of the British Columbia Social Credit League.

On October 10, 1973, just over one month after his by-election win, Bill Bennett announced his intention to seek the Social Credit party leadership. Claiming that his campaign in South Okanagan had attracted a new breed of "young, enthusiastic Socreds," he indicated that he wished to extend his success into a recruiting program elsewhere in the province so as to "broaden

⁶⁴ Stan Persky, Son of Socred: Has Bill Bennett Gotten B.C. Moving Again? (Vancouver, 1979), p. 48.

⁶⁵ Province of British Columbia, Statement of Votes: General Election December 11, 1975 and By-Elections, p. 132

and expand" the party.⁶⁶

The November 22-24, 1973 Social Credit leadership convention featured a race for the party presidency as well as for the party leadership. Grace McCarthy, a friend and confidant of W.A.C. Bennett as well as a big booster of Bill Bennett's leadership bid, succeeded to the party presidency on November 23rd by a margin of only 26 votes over former Socred cabinet minister Kenneth Kiernan. After her election, W.A.C. Bennett proclaimed her "Queen Grace of the Social Credit party," and further stated: "You watch the party membership grow now."⁶⁷ It was a prophetic statement.

The actual leadership contest which was held the following day resulted in a decisive victory for Bill Bennett. Having staked out his position as the "left wing" candidate⁶⁸ for the leadership, Bennett defeated five other aspirants by obtaining 56 percent support on the first ballot. His 833 votes far surpassed those of the second runner-up, Bob McClelland, who had 269. The real rebuilding of Social Credit was about to begin.

⁶⁶ "Leadership Race: Bill Bennett's In," The Vancouver Sun, October 10, 1973.

⁶⁷ "McCarthy Picked as Socred President," The Vancouver Sun, November 24, 1973.

⁶⁸ Marjorie Nichols in The Vancouver Sun, November 22, 1973.

2. The Struggle For "Alternative" Status

The year 1974 was a watershed for both the NDP government and the Social Credit party. The events of that year would crystallize two public perceptions: 1) that the government was going too far, too fast and was "out of control"; and 2) that Social Credit was the only viable alternative to the NDP. It was the year of the Mineral Royalties Act controversy, the start-up of I.C.B.C., the implementation of rent controls and the \$102.8 million "clerical error." It was also the year in which the people of B.C. witnessed such spectacles as the public "firing" of the Education Commissioner, the Premier swearing at a female reporter, and the Government Whip voting against his own leader. The year saw the Majority Movement fold, the Conservative Party disintegrate and Social Credit attract supporters by the thousands. By the end of 1974, the stage was set for Social Credit's dramatic political comeback the following year.

The second post-1972 electoral test of residual Social Credit support came in the North Vancouver-Capilano by-election, held on February 5, 1974. Called as a result of the earlier resignation of Liberal M.L.A. David Brousson, the by-election was vigorously contested by all four parties, notwithstanding an initial intensive effort by the Majority Movement to convince the opposition parties to unite behind one "free-enterprise" candidate. The Liberals nominated Gordon Gibson Jr., son of the constituency's former M.L.A., whose chances were favoured by virtue of the fact that the Liberals had taken approximately 40

percent of the riding's popular vote in 1972 (compared with about 20 percent by each of the other parties). Chosen by the Socreds, NDP and Conservatives respectively, were North Vancouver Mayor Ron Andrews; Diane Baigent; and Conservative Party president Peter Hyndman who had been a narrow loser to Liberal Allan Williams in neighbouring West Vancouver-Howe Sound in the 1972 general election.

The North Vancouver-Capilano by-election results represented a considerable "shot in the arm" to the Socreds. Although they lost, they did so only narrowly as is indicated in Table 2 below.

TABLE 2

NORTH VANCOUVER-CAPILANO - Percentage of Valid Votes
Received by Major Party Candidates in B.C.
Provincial By-Election held February 5, 1974

Baigent (N.D.P.)	17.3
Andrews (Social Credit)	30.7
Gibson (Liberal)	31.1
Hyndman (P.C.)	20.7

While Gibson won the by-election, he managed to maintain the traditionally Liberal seat for his party by only 57 votes over the Social Credit candidate. Because of the closeness of this race, the Social Credit party felt encouraged. Henceforth, Social Credit leader Bill Bennett adamantly refused to entertain either the Majority Movement's proposal of offering only one "free-enterprise" candidate per riding or to consider

participation in a "unity party" arrangement.⁶⁹ Instead, all efforts were directed to the revitalization of Social Credit as the one "free-enterprise" party capable of defeating the NDP in the next election.

From the date of the by-election to the end of November 1974, events of immense significance to the futures of both the NDP and Social Credit took place at a phenomenal pace. On February 19th, Mines Minister Leo Nimsick introduced the Mineral Royalties Act in the Legislature. This event was followed by the opening, on March 1st, of the controversial and problem-prone Insurance Corporation of B.C. and the passage a few days later of Standing Order 45-A. On March 14th, the government introduced its rent control legislation, and on the 29th it was subjected to the embarrassment incurred by the Barnes incident.

Amidst the tumultuous events of March 1974, a new battle - one largely unnoticed by the general public - began to take form: the battle over how electoral opposition to the NDP would be mounted in the next election, and who would lead it. On the one hand, a number of high profile opposition M.L.A.s, egged on by the Majority Movement, actively discussed the creation of a "unity party" to defeat the NDP. At the same time, Bill Bennett attempted to re-inforce the perception that Social Credit was the only real alternative to the government.

⁶⁹ See "No Deals for Political Backing, Says Bennett," The Province (Vancouver, May 8, 1975) where Bennett is quoted as stating that this has been his position since "Day One." That Bennett at no time ever endorsed the majority or unity proposals is corroborated by Young, loc. cit., p. 28.

The Majority Movement should, however, be distinguished from the "unity party" efforts which took place more-or-less concurrently. While the fates of the Majority Movement and the attempts to form a "unity party" ran virtually parallel courses - with their peak in early 1974 and their denouement towards the end of that year - the two entities are distinct. The Majority Movement originated in the business community and its membership was comprised of members of the public. The "unity party," on the other hand, had it been formed, would have been comprised of politicians - the majority of sitting opposition M.L.A.s. Discussion of a possible unity party was the political manifestation of the emotions underpinning the Majority Movement.⁷⁰

Although Scott Wallace, who became Conservative Leader on December 1, 1973 indicated, early on, an interest in the Majority Movement's proposals, Liberal Leader David Anderson and Socred Leader Bill Bennett stood resolutely in opposition to them. Anderson clearly hoped that the Liberal Party would become the focal point of opposition to the NDP. Bill Bennett held his ground as the leader of the largest opposition party in the Legislature.

The maze of events which ultimately wrecked the unity party movement began on March 7, 1974 when Highways Minister Graham Lea alleged in the Legislature that unidentified M.L.A.s from all opposition parties had been holding meetings to work out the

⁷⁰ Ballem, op. cit., p. i.

possibilities of an opposition merger. The whole matter might have blown over had it not been for the decision of Conservative Leader Scott Wallace to call a press conference, in which he admitted to his own interest in forming a new united opposition party and named Socred Bob McClelland as one of the discussants. The result was two-fold: Socreds, under pressure from Bennett backed out of such discussions and denounced Wallace as having broken a "confidence"; and Wallace was seen as having effectively undermined the confidence of Conservative activists in their own party. As Marjorie Nichols stated:

Now, through public acknowledgement of the fact that he personally is interested in forming a new political party, Wallace has effectively written off his own party.⁷¹

On March 9, 1974, a few days after the Wallace statement, an event occurred of the sort which would soon become commonplace. Conservative candidate for Nanaimo, Graeme Roberts, announced at a joint press conference with Bill Bennett that he had joined Social Credit. In doing so, he stated:

I know in my own heart that thousands and thousands of people are thinking the same way.⁷²

While stating that he intended to remain a federal Conservative, Roberts indicated his intention to work actively to convince other Conservatives, as well as members of other parties to join

⁷¹ Marjorie Nichols in The Vancouver Sun, March 12, 1974.

⁷² John Gibbs, "Former Tory Candidate Joins Bennett's Socreds," The Vancouver Sun, March 20, 1974.

the Socreds. In his decision to become a provincial Socred, Roberts would soon be followed by numerous other Conservative and Liberal party activists.

Although most of the early prominent desertions to Social Credit came from the ranks of the Conservative Party, the Socreds won over Surrey Mayor William Vander Zalm on May 29, 1974. Vander Zalm, who was a former provincial Liberal candidate and leadership aspirant indicated that he believed that B.C. now needed a "choice between socialism and non-socialism."⁷³

For all intents and purposes, the month of June 1974 was the one in which the Majority Movement fizzled out and serious hopes of forming a unity party were dashed. The pertinent events took place in the context of a public rally which had been scheduled by the Majority Movement for June 21st, at the Legislature, for the purpose of bringing together opponents of the proposed Mineral Royalties Act.

Two days before the proposed rally, Conservative leader Scott Wallace publicly criticized Bill Bennett, in a speech in Courtenay as "... the only obstacle to the formation of a united opposition party in B.C." He claimed that "several" Social Credit M.L.A.s⁷⁴ had expressed interest in the formation

⁷³ "Vander Zalm a Socred," The Vancouver Sun, June 1, 1974.

⁷⁴ According to Allan Fotheringham in The Vancouver Sun, June 22, 1974, the nine M.L.A.s involved were: Liberals Allan Williams, Patrick McGeer and Garde Gardom; Conservatives Scott Wallace and Hugh Curtis; and Socreds Bob McClelland, Newell Morrison, Harvey Schroeder and another unnamed Socred. Ballem, op. cit., p. 18, suggests that the discussions included Socreds Alex Fraser and Don Phillips.

of a new party but that "...the move has been blocked by the rigid and self-interested, fixed position taken by Bill Bennett."⁷⁵ The remarks were, from the unity movement's perspective, ill-timed and unfortunate.

On Thursday, June 20th, the day that the Mineral Royalties Act was passed and received Royal Assent, Social Credit M.L.A.s hit back at Wallace, accusing him of "malicious mischief-making" and saying that he lacked credibility or honesty.⁷⁶ The Socred caucus' statement read, in part:

The Conservative leader is a person to be pitied. He is doing a great disservice to the people of this province and he should resign because he is serving as the leader of a party he admits he wants to destroy.⁷⁷

Bennett, meanwhile, in a separate statement, said:

Unity can only happen when people come together on an individual basis within their communities and constituencies, and it has been proven that this cannot happen at the direction of armchair generals or personally ambitious politicians secretly meeting to get power through the back door when they have been rejected at the front.⁷⁸

Bennett had repeated his theme that opposition unity could only be achieved through the Social Credit party.

The Majority Movement's demonstration against the Mineral Royalties Act took place, as planned, on June 21st even though the legislation had received Royal Assent the previous day. By

⁷⁵ Kristianson, op. cit., p. 26.

⁷⁶ "Wallace Branded Malicious by Socred MLAs," The Province (Vancouver), June 21, 1974.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

any standard, it could not be viewed as having been a success. The rally was not only poorly-timed, but it was also poorly-attended with only about 300 people taking part. Furthermore, it was discovered by the press that many of the demonstrators were uninformed about the nature of the issue and had only come because they had been given free transportation to Victoria.⁷⁹

At the June 21st rally, Liberal M.L.A.s Pat McGeer and Allan Williams publicly announced, in the presence of their party leader, that they were prepared to "bolt" the Liberal Party if a new unity party arrangement could be agreed upon.⁸⁰ Anderson, in his counterblast, maintained his refusal to consider "unity" talks and sardonically stated that "Barrett won't be beaten by any group that has got the brains to organize a rally for the day after [the Mineral Royalties Act] is passed."⁸¹

In the final analysis, the unity party movement was killed by two people: Bill Bennett and Scott Wallace. Bennett remained intransigent - despite entreaties that he and his party enter formal unity discussions - and instead, concentrated on the renewal of Social Credit. For Wallace's part, he succeeded in offending the Socreds to such an extent that they rallied behind their leader and worked with him to broaden Social Credit and create the perception - in the community at large - that only Social Credit could defeat the NDP.

⁷⁹ Ballem, op. cit., p. 20.

⁸⁰ "Key Liberals Ready to Jump: Williams and McGeer Eye Unity Party to Beat NDP," The Province (Vancouver), June 22, 1974.

⁸¹ Ibid.

Events now began to move more quickly as high profile desertions to Social Credit from the other parties began to take place. On June 26th, the Conservative candidate for the constituency of Okanagan Boundary in the forthcoming federal election, George Whittake, publicly announced his conversion to Social Credit at the provincial level.⁸²

On Friday, July 12th, Vancouver lawyer and former provincial Conservative Party president Peter Hyndman announced that he had taken out a Social Credit membership and intended to seek the Social Credit nomination in his home constituency of West Vancouver-Howe Sound for the next provincial election.⁸³ The same day, federal Conservative candidate Doug Jebson made a similar announcement.⁸⁴ Furthermore, on the day following these announcements, a headline in The Province entitled "Bennett - Plus Rallying Forces - Could Fell Barrett" revealed the increasing recognition that Social Credit had become the vehicle that had the best chance of beating the NDP.⁸⁵

The provincial Conservative Party was dealt a major blow ten days later when Conservative M.L.A. Hugh Curtis announced on July 22nd that the provincial Conservative Party was going "out of business" and that any discussions with respect to how Scott Wallace had been conducting his leadership of the party

⁸² "Interior Tory Candidate Joins B.C. Socreds," The Province (Vancouver), June 27, 1974.

⁸³ "B.C. Tories 'Evaporate': Hyndman Jumps to Socreds," The Vancouver Sun, July 13, 1974.

⁸⁴ "Tory Swings to Socreds," The Vancouver Sun, July 13, 1974.

⁸⁵ "Bennett - Plus Rallying Forces - Could Fell Barrett," The Province (Vancouver), July 13, 1974.

were now irrelevant. Curtis stated that the Conservative Party would soon be absorbed by a "unity party" or by Social Credit and that he would make his own decision within two months.⁸⁶

The spectacle of Conservative activists publicly joining the Social Credit party continued unabated in August 1974. On August 19th, sixteen members of the Vancouver-Point Grey Progressive Conservative Association executive, including the group's president, publicly defected to Social Credit, a phenomenon that Bill Bennett described as being "just the tip of the iceberg."⁸⁷ It was followed on August 29th by the defection to Social Credit of six Vancouver Island Liberals, including the past president of the Cowichan-Malahat constituency association.⁸⁸

Bill Bennett and Grace McCarthy understood, from the outset, the importance of generating party enthusiasm and loyalty. Also they understood the value to be gained from a perceived sense of momentum. In early 1974, under the direction of McCarthy and former Socred cabinet minister Dan Campbell, the Social Credit party embarked on a mammoth membership drive, offering membership in the party at the cut-rate of \$5 for four years. The object was not to raise funds but rather to give the party's supporters a "label" and to generate a sense that Social

⁸⁶ "Says Curtis: 'Tories Finished', The Vancouver Sun, July 23, 1974.

⁸⁷ "16 Point Grey Conservatives Defect to Bennett's Socreds," The Vancouver Sun, August 20, 1974.

⁸⁸ "Six Liberals from Island go to Socreds," The Province (Vancouver), August 30, 1974.

⁸⁹ Young, loc. cit., pp. 28-29.

Credit was a party on the move.⁸⁹ The strategy paid off. On September 24, 1974, Grace McCarthy proudly announced that Socred party membership had risen to more than 50,000 people, up from 4,000 at the time of the 1972 election, making Social Credit the largest political party in British Columbia's history.⁹⁰

On October 25th, Hugh Curtis announced that he had become a Social Crediter, leaving Scott Wallace as the sole Conservative M.L.A. Wallace, however, remained adamant that he would not "bend in the face of another blow to the [Conservative] party generally."⁹¹

Throughout the remainder of 1974 and 1975, Social Credit continued to attract money, talent and support from the other "free-enterprise" parties,⁹² and by so doing, showed itself to be the only party with a realistic chance of defeating the NDP. On July 28, 1975, Mrs. McCarthy stated that nearly 5,000 people had joined the Socreds in the previous two months.⁹³ The membership recruitment continued, with Bill Bennett announcing on September 3, 1975, two days after the conversion of former federal Liberal cabinet minister Jack Davis to Social Credit, that 469 membership applications had been processed the previous day alone.⁹⁴ By the time of the December 1975 election, Social

⁹⁰ "'Socreds Now Total 50,000'," The Vancouver Sun, September 24, 1974.

⁹¹ "Wallace Stays Firm After Curtis Switch," The Vancouver Sun, October 26, 1974.

⁹² See: "22 Richmond Tories Jump to Social Credit," The Vancouver Sun, September 27, 1974; and "Former Liberal Executive in P.G. Turns Socred," The Province (Vancouver), November 2, 1974.

⁹³ "Former Top B.C. Liberal Seeing the Socred Light," The Province (Vancouver), July 29, 1975.

Credit had an estimated 75,000 signed-up members.⁹⁵

3. The Non-Socred "Unity" M.L.A.s

By the time of the December 1975 election,

In the context of the quickly-moving events of 1974-75, Liberal M.L.A.s Allan Williams, Pat McGeer and Garde Gardom found themselves in an increasingly untenable position. The success of Social Credit in attracting members, talent and money away from the other free-enterprise parties was, by mid-1975, obvious. Although the logical step for them would have been to join Social Credit when this trend became evident, they were clearly hesitant to do so. Unlike Hugh Curtis, who was first elected in 1972, each of these Liberal M.L.A.s had built their political careers and reputations in opposition to Social Credit during the W.A.C. Bennett period, with Pat McGeer having served a stint as Liberal leader. Becoming Social Crediters and serving under the direction of a political neophyte named Bill Bennett could hardly have been their preferred option.

On May 6, 1975, Allan Williams announced that he would leave the Liberal Party unless it decided to realign itself with the other free-enterprise parties; he indicated that if such an occurrence did not take place he would consider either joining

⁹⁴ Allan Garr, Tough Guy: Bill Bennett and the Taking of British Columbia (Toronto, 1985), p. 26.

⁹⁵ "Davis as Welcome 'As Any Other New Socred'," The Province (Vancouver), September 3, 1975.

⁹⁶ "Williams Says He'll Quit if Liberals Shun Unity Action," The Vancouver Sun, May 6, 1975.

Social Credit or leaving politics.⁹⁶ When asked, on the following day to comment, Bill Bennett remained firm: he would make no special deals to entice Williams or any other potential defector to Social Credit. Bennett stated:

I don't make special deals. There are no special inducements. Over 30,000 people made the decision to join our party last year and I expect the same this year, and that well could include some very prominent names. ...That includes prominent political figures who have come, it includes existing M.L.A.s plus those who may come in future.⁹⁷

Furthermore, Bennett reiterated his rejection of any deals regarding guaranteed nominations or electoral co-operation, stating that:

My position from Day One is that politics, the party system, was designed to be a positive system, not negative. A political party functions only when it has broad membership. The constituency associations control and direct the activities of the party, and among these activities are the selection and election of candidates. ...I would be totally irresponsible to compromise on my commitment to [the membership] and their right to select and elect candidates, or to even consider any deal which compromises the constituencies of our party.⁹⁸

On May 9, 1975, two days after Bennett's statement, Allan Williams and Pat McGeer resigned from the Liberal caucus to sit in the House as independents. They were joined, on May 20th, by Garde Gardom who expressed his hope that the three opposition

⁹⁷ "No Deals for Political Backing, Says Bennett," loc. cit.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

parties could still reach "some kind of understanding or accommodation" in order that the "free-enterprise" vote would not be fractured.⁹⁹ His hope was to be in vain.

The resignations of Williams, McGeer and Gardom from the Liberal caucus took place amidst the controversy over the Emergency Programmes Act which had been introduced on May 8th. Also, this was a period in which Bill Bennett's "not a dime without debate" campaign got underway. Both controversies assisted Bill Bennett in his attempt to become, as a matter of public perception, the prime antagonist of the NDP. The Emergency Programmes Act was withdrawn on June 13th, but not before it reinforced in the minds of many that this government had to go. On June 27th, another high profile Liberal publicly abandoned his party. B.C. Liberal Party Executive Vice-President Don Wray stated that he agreed with the position taken by Williams, McGeer and Gardom, and "that it is now time to put the needs of the province before those of political parties."¹⁰⁰ On July 28th, Wray joined Social Credit. His defection was followed, on September 1st, by that of Jack Davis. Finally on September 30th, the suspense regarding Williams, McGeer and Gardom ended when they jointly announced that henceforth they would be sitting in the Legislature as Socreds and would seek Social Credit nominations in their respective constituencies for the forthcoming election - an election that, as it turned out,

⁹⁹ "Garde Gardom Quits Liberals 'For Unity'," The Vancouver Sun, May 21, 1975.

¹⁰⁰ "Vice-President Don Wray Quits Liberals," The Province (Vancouver), June 28, 1975.

was called just over one month later.

In retrospect, the decisions of Curtis, Williams, McGeer and Gardom to become Socreds during the 1974-75 period are better understood when viewed in their respective contexts. There are valid reasons to believe that the circumstances in which those M.L.A.s joined Social Credit were other than the results of "deals." Bill Bennett, it must be remembered, had consistently rejected any "deal-making" for the purpose of attracting supporters or incumbent M.L.A.s to Social Credit: in point of fact Bill Bennett held all the cards.

A riding-by-riding analysis of the 1972 election indicates that although the resurgent Conservative strength did not, on its own, defeat Social Credit in that election, it apparently did affect the outcome in a number of contests. Had Social Credit garnered all Conservative votes cast in the 1972 election, the Socreds would have captured nine seats that went to the NDP: Esquimalt, both seats in Vancouver-Little Mountain, Kamloops, Dewdney, North Vancouver-Seymour, Delta, Omineca, and Fort George.¹⁰¹ In addition, such a scenario would have netted the Socreds three of the five seats that went to the Liberals and of course, the two seats won by the Conservatives.¹⁰²

The victory of Hugh Curtis in Saanich and the Islands occurred in a constituency that had traditionally been held by Social Credit. From the vantage point of 1974 when the provincial Conservative Party was falling apart, Curtis must

¹⁰¹ The Sun (Vancouver), August 31, 1972.

¹⁰² Ibid.

have been aware that his own seat was precariously held. His margin of victory in 1972 was such that a shift of only six percent back to a resurgent Social Credit party would have deprived him of the seat. (See Appendix B) By mid-1974, it would have undoubtedly occurred to Curtis that if he defected to the Socreds while sitting in the Legislature, he would be in a very strong position to obtain the Social Credit nomination at the time of the next election - and be re-elected.

Allan Williams found himself in a similar situation. Although he first won the constituency of West Vancouver-Howe Sound in 1966 with 52.8 percent of the popular vote, his support declined to 46.4 percent in 1969 and 33.9 percent in 1972. In 1972, Williams narrowly defeated Progressive Conservative candidate Peter Hyndman who obtained 31.6 percent support, with the Social Credit candidate following behind with 22.8 percent. (See Appendix C) In July 1974, Hyndman announced his conversion to Social Credit as well as his intention to seek the West Vancouver-Howe Sound Social Credit nomination. When, in September 1975, Williams announced his decision to sit as a Social Credit M.L.A., his political calculation undoubtedly included a recognition of the consequences of doing otherwise. In all likelihood, he would have been forced to run against Socred candidate Peter Hyndman at a time when the Conservative Party was in a state of disintegration. By effectively declaring himself to be the incumbent Socred M.L.A. for West Vancouver-Howe Sound in September 1975, Williams put himself in a strong position to capture the Social Credit nomination and

win re-election. By doing so, he out-maneuvred Hyndman.

In the two-member constituency of Vancouver-Point Grey, political support for Liberals Gardom and McGeer had also been slipping since 1966. (See Appendix D) A survey of the elections in the constituency from 1966 to 1972 reveals some very useful information. The decrease in the total percentages of votes obtained by the Liberals in 1972, in relation to the previous election, was roughly equivalent to the increase received by the NDP. At the same time, the Social Credit decrease of 15.3 percent between 1969 and 1972 was matched by a phenomenal Conservative increase of 14.6. Although it would be folly, in strict analytical terms, to suggest that the increase in NDP support in 1972 took place at the expense of Gardom and McGeer, or that the increase in Conservative support was wholly at the expense of Social Credit, the percentages were meaningful to the extent that they had the potential of influencing the behaviour of politicians.

By mid-1975, Gardom and McGeer were undoubtedly aware of their increasingly precarious hold on their legislative seats. The level of public support for them, as Liberals at least, had been consistently declining. Social Credit, meanwhile, had successfully completed a major membership drive, was highly successful in securing money and talent from other parties, and was clearly perceived as the only realistic alternative to the NDP. Furthermore, these M.L.A.s could see the decomposing state of the Conservative Party and appreciate its ramifications in Vancouver-Point Grey, particularly given the defection to Social

Credit of 16 Conservative executive members the previous August. In such circumstances, if Liberal support had continued to erode, Gardom and McGeer could have had serious difficulty getting re-elected - as Liberals. By joining Social Credit in September 1975, Gardom and McGeer, like Williams, put themselves in the advantageous position of being incumbent Social Credit M.L.A.s at the time the 1975 election was called.

From the outset, Bill Bennett had stated that there would be no inducements or special deals proffered for the purpose of enticing M.L.A.s from other parties to join Social Credit. There is no evidence to indicate that he ever acted in contrary fashion. Indeed, Peter Hyndman, in an interview on November 18, 1985, stated his belief that no deals or inducements were ever made. He indicated that after the 1975 election, he was an active participant in discussions with Bennett about the makeup of the new Social Credit cabinet. Hyndman insisted that Bennett had a completely free hand in the composition of the cabinet and was bound by no deals. Although the addition to Socred ranks of high-profile M.L.A.s from the other parties undoubtedly assisted Social Credit in its attempt to create a perception of momentum, there is no certainty that the Socreds would not have been successful in 1975 without them.

In viewing the world from the perspective of the Liberal defectors, G.L. Kristianson, former Executive Assistant to Liberal leader David Anderson, stated:

All were in the midst of successful careers and not eager to spend more time in Victoria except as cabinet ministers. McGeer was fond of saying that he would

not go back after another election to sit in opposition.¹⁰³

In McGeer's case, there was speculation that he had aspirations of eventually becoming Socred leader.¹⁰⁴ In any event, the defecting M.L.A.s must have realized that even without promises or inducements from Bennett, their backgrounds made them prime candidates for ministerial positions. If they wished to be more than - at best - opposition M.L.A.s, they must have been aware that there was only one choice for them. Clearly, their expressed concerns about the desirability of defeating the NDP pointed them in the same direction as their self-interests. Bennett did not need to make any deals to get them to join him. In fact, it was very much in their own interests to do so - their political survival, in all likelihood, depended on their doing so.

In the end result, there is no evidence of any agreement between Bill Bennett and any of the defecting M.L.A.s. Rather it seems that decisions were made by the M.L.A.s in their own self-interest without guarantees of any kind. Hence, describing the political phenomenon which occurred as being the result of a "coalition" is, at best, misleading. Such a description tends to imply the existence of a bargain and creates the impression

¹⁰³ Kristianson, loc. cit., p. 21.

¹⁰⁴ Two days before the 1975 election, Liberal leader Gordon Gibson claimed that W.A.C. Bennett had once stated, in front of a group of M.L.A.s, that McGeer had been his first choice as his successor to the Socred leadership. Gibson inferred that McGeer was still "interested." See: "'Pat McGeer was W.A.C.'s Choice'," The Vancouver Sun, December 10, 1975.

that the success of Social Credit in 1975 is attributable to the actions of these elites - a suggestion which while flattering to the M.L.A.s involved, is apparently one without evidentiary foundation as well as one that would not seem to be susceptible to verification.

By the time the 1975 election was called, the Conservative Party had disintegrated, the Liberal Party was in the process of disintegrating, and the people of British Columbia were fully aware of which organized group had the most potential of defeating the NDP. While it is true that the defections of the three Liberal M.L.A.s aided and abetted the disintegration of the B.C. Liberal Party, it is also clear that their decisions were not made in a vacuum. They undoubtedly realized that the party to which they were transferring was the one which, by virtue of Bill Bennett's rebuilding efforts, offered the most hope for electoral success and political advancement.

B. THE 1975 SOCIAL CREDIT NOMINATION PROCESS: EVIDENCE OF GENUINE PARTY REJUVENATION

An examination of the 1975 Social Credit nomination process lends further credence to the view that the 1975 electoral result occurred due to a genuine rejuvenation of Social Credit. That rejuvenation was evident in the circumstances surrounding the selection of Social Credit candidates to run in the 1975 election.

By November 3, 1975, when Premier Barrett called the election, only one Social Credit constituency association, that

of Kamloops, had nominated its candidate for the next election. Rafe Mair, a former Kamloops alderman, had been selected in March 1975 over three other contestants including the President of the local constituency association. The other forty-seven provincial constituency associations held their formal nomination meetings between November 6th and November 18th inclusive. Those gatherings were, for the most part, large, enthusiastic and highly-competitive events. In many cases, the local community newspapers described them as the biggest nomination meetings ever held in their areas. Some of the meetings were estimated to be as large as 2,000 people, with the meeting in Yale-Lillooet choosing from amongst eight contestants.

Robert Lapper, in his paper entitled "Contested Nominations,"¹⁰⁵ compared the degree of competitiveness for NDP and Social Credit nominations over three elections - 1972, 1975 and 1979. While he found, on the basis of a questionnaire, that the percentages of reported contested NDP nominations for those years were fairly constant at 35%, 35% and 31% respectively, he discovered that such a pattern did not occur in the case of Social Credit. Although Lapper reported that the percentages of Social Credit nominations contested were 21%, 67%, and 32% respectively, it now appears that only 15 of 55 Socred nominations were not contested in 1975. On the basis of my own

¹⁰⁵ Robert Lapper, "Contested Nominations," a paper dated January 2, 1982 and forming part of The British Columbia Project (University of Victoria).

research using community newspapers, I have ascertained that 73% of the 1975 Social Credit nominations were contested. Lapper attributed the sizable increase in 1975 Social Credit nominations to "a high-level of interest in a revived 'free-enterprise' coalition."

Those individuals who were ultimately chosen as Socred candidates for the 1975 election came from many occupational backgrounds (with a decided emphasis on small business) and had a variety of previous political affiliations and involvements. The list of Socred candidates included the four incumbent M.L.A.s who defected in the 1974-75 period, one NDP M.L.A. - Frank Calder - who declared himself to be a Socred after the election was called, and a number of deserters from the Liberal and Conservative parties who had previously been either candidates for, or supporters of, their respective parties. (See Appendix E)

To the extent that interest in the political process can be measured by involvement in the nomination of candidates, the 1975 election generated a great deal of interest in the Social Credit Party. Despite the fact that nomination meetings were often called on short notice, they exhibited a high degree of competitiveness. Of the 55 nominations available, 13 were sought by incumbent M.L.A.s. While only 2 of the incumbent 13 M.L.A.s who sought renomination as Social Credit candidates had to "fight" for their nominations, 38 of the remaining 42 candidate-positions were contested.

A very useful classification system for designating the

relative partisan safety, or "swing potential," of a given constituency has been devised by T. Patrick Boyle. He has defined a "Swing" constituency as one in which a potential "swing" in competitive party support of less than 6% from the party holding the legislative seat to its nearest competitor would result in the former party's candidate being defeated.¹⁰⁶ In other words, a "Swing" constituency is one in which the actual difference of votes between the two parties is less than 12%. The system which Boyle has designed further includes the categories "Fairly Safe," "Generally Safe," and "Safe." The "swing" classification for each of the categories is as follows: Swing (0% to 5.99%); Fairly Safe (6% to 9.99%); Generally Safe (10% to 19.99%); and Safe (20% and up).¹⁰⁷

Appendix F indicates the number and percentage of Social Credit nominations contested in 1975 according to the Boyle classification system, using the 1972 Statement of Votes to determine the categorization of each constituency.¹⁰⁸ As can be seen from this data, no constituencies could be classified as "Safe" on the basis of the 1972 results. Although in the "Swing Other" and "Fairly Safe Other" categories there was a relatively low degree of competition for nominations, it should be noted that these categories included the home constituencies of

¹⁰⁶ T. Patrick Boyle, Elections British Columbia (Vancouver, 1982), p. 24.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 30.

¹⁰⁸ The categorizations with respect to the constituencies of South Okanagan and North Vancouver-Capilano were determined by reference to the official votes statements for their respective by-elections, found in Statement of Votes: General Election December 11, 1975 and By-Elections.

Curtis, Williams, Gardom and McGeer who, by the time the nomination meetings took place, were technically incumbent Social Credit M.L.A.s.

T.H. Qualter has suggested that where a party is unlikely to win a legislative seat, there is not likely to be more than a token candidate put up for nomination.¹⁰⁹ With regard to Social Credit in 1975, this proposition is not borne out by a review of the available information. As can be seen from a perusal of Appendix F, the degree of competition in every category of constituency, except that of "Fairly Safe Other" exceeded the overall percent of contested nominations for the elections of 1972 and 1979 - as determined by Lapper. (It should be noted that the category "Fairly Safe Other" contained solely Vancouver-Point Grey, the dual constituency represented by Gardom and McGeer.) The evidence can be taken as indicating that in 1975, interest in Social Credit was so intense that people competed for nominations in constituencies where Social Credit did not reasonably expect to win.

The impact of legislative incumbency in discouraging nomination competition is one of the most striking features of the 1975 Socred nomination process. Although 2 of the 8 Socred incumbents seeking re-nomination were challenged, both of them in due course were re-nominated. As well, all four of the prominent "defecting" M.L.A.s plus Frank Calder and Jack Davis were spared the necessity of having to fight for their

¹⁰⁹ Terence H. Qualter, The Election Process in Canada (Toronto, 1970), pp. 61 and 65.

nominations. As for Hugh Curtis in Saanich and the Islands, it might be argued that not only was he technically the Socred incumbent, but that since he had joined the party in mid-1974, he was now perceived as a Socred. This perception may have been assisted by the fact that by November 1975 Curtis was the Social Credit caucus chairman.¹¹⁰

Williams, McGeer and Gardom, on the other hand, were arguably in a different situation since they had not joined the Social Credit Party until September 1975. There had been speculation that Williams would be challenged in West Vancouver-Howe Sound by his old nemesis Peter Hyndman. However, just prior to the calling of the election, Hyndman had secured the Presidency of the Social Credit Party and, in not challenging Williams, perhaps was acknowledging the need for "unity" as expressed by the two would-be candidates in Vancouver - Point Grey who withdrew in favour of Gardom and McGeer. Emphasizing that the decision to withdraw was strictly their own, with no pressure from Bill Bennett or anyone else, the prospective candidates for Vancouver-Point Grey suggested that to do otherwise would be to "do a disservice to your party, your province and your country."¹¹¹

Finally, the extent of Bill Bennett's involvement in the candidate selection process is worthy of consideration. Although undoubtedly he would have had preferences concerning

¹¹⁰ Frances Russell, "3 New Socred MLAs 'Feel Welcome' at Rally," The Vancouver Sun, November 1, 1975.

¹¹¹ "Two Step Aside as Candidates," The Vancouver Sun, October 29, 1975.

the selection of candidates, there is no evidence that either he, or the central party generally, attempted to influence the local constituency associations to accept certain candidates over others. Certainly there is no evidence that the constituency associations were pressured to keep the nomination processes "under control." The sheer size of some of them would have made such an endeavour next to impossible.

Bill Bennett had said on various occasions that he would not "compromise" on his commitment to the party membership "and their right to select and elect candidates, or even consider any deal which compromises the constituencies of [the party]." ¹¹² That Bennett kept his word in the matter is supported by Peter Hyndman's assertion that although Bennett and others in the Socred hierarchy "encouraged" good candidates to get involved in constituency associations and seek nominations, the leadership did not tamper with the autonomy of the local nomination process. ¹¹³ Hyndman has emphasized that if desirable candidates insisted on a guarantee of success at the candidate selection level, they were simply told not to bother seeking the nomination.

That the leadership of Social Credit did not seriously interfere in the candidate selection process would seem to be further buttressed by the results of some of the nominations and contests. Although there would seem to be no written accounts of the Socred leadership successfully attempting to influence

¹¹² "No Deals for Political Backing, Says Bennett," op. cit.

¹¹³ Hyndman Interview, November 18, 1985, op. cit.

the local nomination processes in 1975, there have been various reports that might support suppositions of leadership unhappiness with the final outcome of a contest. In North Vancouver-Capilano, the losing contestant, Reverend Desmond Kimmett, stated that Bennett had wanted him as the candidate "because the image I represent is what the party is all about these days."¹¹⁴ In an interview after his successful 1975 nomination bid, former Vancouver Centre M.L.A. Herb Capozzi "refused to comment on reports that Bennett did not want him as a candidate."¹¹⁵

In the final analysis, the evidence indicates that the 1975 Social Credit nomination in general exhibited a high degree of interest and competitiveness. It seems that the party leadership generally refrained from interfering in the candidate selection process, leaving final authority with the local constituency associations. The sheer extent of active participation and competition in the 1975 nomination process would seem to indicate that a hands-off approach had been taken.

It is of particular interest that the clear exception to the competitive norm was the series of acclamations given to the defecting M.L.A.s as well as Frank Calder and Jack Davis. There are, however, reasonable explanations for these phenomena. All of the defecting Conservative and Liberal M.L.A.s were technically Socred incumbents by the time the 1975 election was

¹¹⁴ "Andrews Favoured in Nomination Stakes," The Vancouver Sun, November 8, 1975.

¹¹⁵ "Capozzi, Lau Win Socred Nominations," The Vancouver Sun, November 17, 1975.

called. Also, one should not lightly discount the seriousness of the expressed sentiment that to challenge the high-status Liberals who had come over to Social Credit would have been to "do a disservice" to the party and the province. In Calder's case, his generally safe NDP constituency of Atlin had returned him to the Legislature continuously (with the sole exception of 1956) in every election since 1949.¹¹⁶ Calder's defection to Social Credit after the calling of the 1975 election and his subsequent candidacy gave the Atlin Social Credit Association an excellent opportunity to win the seat.

I would surmise that the high-profile Liberal elites who joined Social Credit in 1975 were warmly welcomed due to the status which they brought to their new party. They were the kind of "new" Socreds that Bill Bennett had deliberately set out to attract when he became party leader in 1973. All had experience in the Legislature or in government and were professionals in their own right: Davis was a former federal cabinet minister and an engineer by background; McGeer was the former provincial Liberal leader as well as being a highly-regarded neurological researcher; Gardom and Williams were both lawyers. These individuals were perhaps seen as bringing a degree of respectability to Social Credit that it had previously lacked - particularly amongst those educated and professional sectors of the population that Bill Bennett wished to target as supporters of the "new" Social Credit party.

¹¹⁶ Kavic and Nixon, op. cit., p. 41.

V. THE 1975 ELECTION: A POST-MORTEM

When the results of the 1975 election came in on the evening of December 11th, it was apparent that the NDP had taken a severe drubbing. Not only was the NDP reduced to 18 seats in the Legislature, but Dave Barrett was personally defeated in his own constituency of Coquitlam. The NDP lost a number of its traditionally-secure Lower Mainland seats as well as all nine formerly-Socred constituencies which it had won in 1972 as a possible consequence of increased Conservative gains that year. Additionally, the NDP was wiped out in the Fraser Valley agricultural constituencies and lost seven of the nine seats it previously held in constituencies where mining was a significant economic factor.¹¹⁷

Although overall, the aggregate of 1975 NDP support in the province remained within .4 percent of that received in 1972, the nearly-identical popular vote totals masked a great deal of movement at the voter level.¹¹⁸ Popular myths notwithstanding, had it not been for compensating defections from other parties, the NDP's 1975 defeat, in popular vote terms, would have been even more convincing.¹¹⁹

Social Credit, on the other hand, won 35 seats and received

¹¹⁷ For a discussion of the possible electoral effect of the mineral royalties controversy on the outcome of the 1975 election, see Payne, *op. cit.*, p. 28. Although he admits that the correlation is inconclusive due to a lack of a systematic analysis, he suggests that such a correlation is probable.

¹¹⁸ Donald E. Blake et al., "Sources of Change in the B.C. Party System," in B.C. Studies No. 50 (Summer 1981), p. 5.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

a hitherto-unprecedented 49.2 percent of the popular vote. The Conservatives and Liberals were all but demolished, electing only their provincial leaders and retaining only 3.9% and 7.2% of the popular vote respectively. (See Appendix A)

Although the Majority Movement did not succeed in its original task of securing an electoral arrangement in which free-enterprise candidates would not run against each other, its broader objective came to fruition. That objective was to see a vehicle created that would unite the major "free-enterprise" political actors and prevent a fracturing of the anti-NDP vote.

The vehicle which emerged was not one in the tradition of the non-partisan movement, as advocated by Arnold Hean when he stated that British Columbia could no longer afford to "enjoy the luxury of party politics."¹²⁰ Nor was it one of political "coalition" in which the political actors entered into a temporary alliance to control a political outcome. Rather, Bill Bennett, along with Grace McCarthy, Dan Campbell and Peter Hyndman, worked to generate a sense of enthusiasm for a "positive" alternative to the NDP - and, as the interest shown in the candidate selection process indicates, they succeeded.

There has been speculation as to whether the NDP could have done more to try to prevent the realignment which took place.¹²¹ Kristianson has suggested that it is difficult to understand, in retrospect, why the NDP did not carry through on its earlier

¹²⁰ Excerpt from letter dated May 3, 1974 from Arnold Hean to David Anderson. Quote taken from Kristianson, loc. cit., p. 19.

¹²¹ Kristianson, loc. cit., pp. 28-29.

plans to introduce campaign financing legislation with disclosure requirements, spending limits and partial public funding of campaign costs before going to the polls.¹²² In my opinion, such legislation, had it been passed prior to the election, would not have significantly affected its outcome. As Kavic and Nixon have suggested:

Money itself [is] not enough to decide every seat. The NDP outspent the Socreds by some \$700 in Atlin and by \$4,500 in North Vancouver - Seymour, but were unable to either wrest victory from the defector Calder or to save a seat where [NDP incumbent, Colin] Gableman had previously squeezed in with less than a third of the vote. Conversely, the Socreds had outspent their opponents in every other constituency, but 20 seats still eluded them.¹²³

Social Credit won the 1975 election because it was able to capitalize on the polarized political environment which the NDP, by its public relations mis-management, helped create. It did so by successfully positioning itself as the only credible alternative to a government that the majority of British Columbians wanted removed from office. In all likelihood, the NDP had lost the election even before it was called.

Perhaps one of the keys to Social Credit's electoral success since 1975 is that it has been solely a provincial party, having formally severed its connections with the national party in 1971.¹²⁴ By having no organizational links to any party

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Kavic and Nixon, op. cit., p. 236.

¹²⁴ Morley et al., op. cit., p. 91.

at the federal level, a British Columbia Social Credit government avoids either being seen as compromising the province's interests for the sake of protecting a national political organization, or being punished for the perceived "sins" of a federal party. More important - particularly with respect to the 1973-75 period - the fact that Social Credit was a provincial party meant that it could actively encourage federal Liberal and Conservative partisans to become enthusiastic provincial Socreds without the necessity of disowning their respective federal loyalties. Hence, Social Credit obtains the best of both worlds: on the one hand, it has been able to attract support, money and organizational resources from federal Liberals and Conservatives, while on the other hand it has been able to avoid the potential political liabilities which can flow from too-close an organizational attachment to any federal party.

Martin Robin, in 1966, described W.A.C. Bennett and British Columbia Social Credit in the following terms:

To Bennett and his leading colleagues, Social Credit is an instrument of power rather than a means of reform or way of life. ...The fundamental principle of Social Credit legislation, and the basic rationale of the movement, is to preserve intact the modified free enterprise system and, the necessary corollary to this, to keep the New Democratic Party from gaining power.¹²⁵

When one looks at the circumstances leading up to the 1975

¹²⁵ Martin Robin, "The Social Basis of Party Politics in British Columbia," Queens's Quarterly, LXII (1965), p. 696.

election, the case could be made that, in large measure, Robin's rationale for Social Credit in 1966 was openly acknowledged by its supporters in 1975. Without necessarily acceding to Walter Young's view that the post-1975 Social Credit party is one "which today bears only superficial resemblance to the party of W.A.C. Bennett,"¹²⁶ I would submit that the party, since Bill Bennett became leader, has been one that sought to broaden itself to include sectors of the populace that it had not previously attracted. A November 30, 1974 Socred convention decision to change the party's official name from the British Columbia Social Credit League to the British Columbia Social Credit Party, although otherwise insignificant, was symbolic of its desire to be seen as a broader political organization. The sustained degree of increased political support which Social Credit has received since 1975 is indicative of Bill Bennett's success in moulding his party into such an organization.

¹²⁶ Young, loc. cit., p. 1.

VI. CONCLUSION

The post-1973 version of Social Credit was born of opposition to the Barrett government while its political resurrection in 1975 can be attributed to two conditions, neither of which would have been sufficient on its own to bring about that resurrection. First, in large measure, the 1975 election result was attributable to the general alienation which the NDP government brought upon itself as a consequence of the manner by which it conducted itself during its term of office. Second, Bill Bennett, by skillfully taking advantage of a number of opportunities which became available, succeeded in capitalizing on that alienation.

Although the government was lauded for its many achievements, at the political level those achievements were overshadowed by a sense that the government went too far too fast, and in certain respects seemed to be out of control. In the pace of its timetable and the style of its operation, the NDP government failed to appreciate how much change and furor the people of B.C. could handle in a relatively short period of time. Such a failure proved to be fatal with the consequence that the stage was set for the realignment which subsequently occurred.

From the point at which Bill Bennett became Socred leader, he worked to encourage the belief that Social Credit was the only credible alternative to the NDP. He held his ground against the unity party movement and ultimately reaped the benefits. Once Social Credit's credentials had been established

by virtue of impressive membership increases as well as numerous public defections from the Conservative and Liberal parties, important non-socialist political elites joined Social Credit, for the minimum purpose of enhancing their own political careers.

In the final analysis, the political turbulence created by the NDP government's manner of governing gave the post-1973 Social Credit party an intensified sense of purpose: it existed to unite those who opposed the NDP. Social Credit's success in 1975 represented a reaffirmation of a resonant theme in British Columbia since 1933: that "socialism" - whatever image the word may conjure - remained the dominant issue for the politics of this province. In Social Credit mythology at least, the people of this province, in 1975, heeded the British Columbia Miner's 1933 warning that "[i]n future ... it would be fatal to have more than one party to represent those who believe in individual freedom." In this era, Social Credit is that party.

APPENDIX A*POPULAR VOTE STATISTICS FOR MAJOR PARTIES 1920 - 1983

<u>Year</u>	<u>Conservative</u>	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>Socred</u>	<u>Labour/ CCF/NDP</u>	<u>Combined Vote of Two Largest Parties***</u>
1920	31.5	38.0		12.6	
1924	29.6	32.3		12.8	
1928	53.3	40.5		4.6	
1933	26.7**	41.7		31.5	
1937	28.6	37.3	1.2	28.6	
1941	30.9	32.9		33.4	
1945	<u>Coalition</u> 55.8		1.5	37.6	93.4
1949	61.4		1.2	35.1	96.5
1952	16.8	23.5	27.2	30.8	58.0
1953	5.6	23.6	37.8	30.9	68.7
1956	3.1	21.8	45.8	28.3	74.1
1960	6.7	20.9	38.8	32.7	71.4
1963	11.3	20.0	40.8	27.8	68.6
1966	0.2	20.2	45.6	33.6	79.2
1969	0.1	19.3	46.8	33.9	80.7
1972	12.7	16.4	31.2	39.6	70.8
1975	3.9	7.2	49.2	39.2	88.4
1979	5.1	0.5	48.2	46.0	94.2
1983	1.2	2.7	49.8	44.9	94.7

* The information tabulated in Appendix A was derived from Canada Votes: A Handbook of Federal and Provincial Election Data, Statement of Votes - Thirty-Third Provincial Election, May 5, 1983, Statement of Votes: General Election September 30, 1963 and Elections British Columbia. (See Bibliography)

** The Non-Partisan movement was headed by a former leader of the Conservative Party, and represented the Conservative Government's desire to form a non-partisan government. According to Canada Votes, there was considerable confusion in the reporting of this election, with sources disagreeing over whether certain candidates were labeled as Independents, or whether they were to be included in another manner. For the purposes of this table, they have all been counted as Conservatives notwithstanding that the Conservative Party did not officially contest the election of 1933.

***For 1945 and 1949, the Coalition is treated as one party.

APPENDIX B - SAANICH AND THE ISLANDS - PERCENTAGE OF VALID
VOTES RECEIVED BY MAJOR PARTY CANDIDATES IN B.C. PROVINCIAL
ELECTIONS OF 1966, 1969 AND 1972

1966

Tisdale (Social Credit)	50.1
Haw (NDP)	26.4
Campbell (Liberal)	23.6

1969

Brothers (Social Credit)	48.5
MacKenzie (NDP)	38.6
Remesz (Liberal)	10.6

1972

Isherwood (Social Credit)	25.1
Sherwood (NDP)	23.6
Anderson (Liberal)	15.3
Curtis (Conservative)	35.9

* The information tabulated in Appendix B was derived from Statement of Votes: General Election September 12, 1966, Statement of Votes: General Election August 27, 1969, and Statement of Votes: General Election August 30, 1972.
(See Bibliography)

APPENDIX C - WEST VANCOUVER-HOWE SOUND - PERCENTAGE OF VALID
VOTES RECEIVED BY MAJOR PARTY CANDIDATES IN B.C. PROVINCIAL
ELECTIONS OF 1966, 1969 AND 1972

1966

Eckardt (Social Credit)	34.8
MacKenzie (NDP)	12.5
Williams (Liberal)	52.8

1969

Corcoran (Social Credit)	38.4
Mundy (NDP)	15.2
Williams (Liberal)	46.4

1972

Corcoran (Social Credit)	22.8
Copes (NDP)	11.8
Williams (Liberal)	33.9
Hyndman (Conservative)	31.6

* The information tabulated in Appendix C was derived from Statement of Votes: General Election September 12, 1966, Statement of Votes: General Election August 27, 1969, and Statement of Votes: General Election August 30, 1972.
(See Bibliography)

APPENDIX D - VANCOUVER-POINT GREY - PERCENTAGE OF VALID
VOTES RECEIVED BY MAJOR PARTY CANDIDATES IN B.C. PROVINCIAL
ELECTIONS OF 1966, 1969 AND 1972

1966

Bonner (Social Credit)	20.0)) 36.2
Ranta (Social Credit)	16.2)	
Brown (NDP)	5.0)) 10.1
Lavalle (NDP)	5.1)	
Gardom (Liberal)	23.6)) 53.9
McGeer (Liberal)	30.3)	

1969

Rathie (Social Credit)	20.3)) 39.0
Widman (Social Credit)	18.7)	
Bush (NDP)	6.8)) 13.1
Macey (NDP)	6.3)	
Gardom (Liberal)	21.6)) 46.4
McGeer (Liberal)	24.8)	
DeWolfe (Conservative)	1.7)) 1.7

1972

Puil (Social Credit)	12.6)) 24.7
Sweeney (Social Credit)	12.1)	
Sabatino (NDP)	8.0)) 16.1
Thomas (NDP)	8.1)	
Gardom (Liberal)	20.7)) 42.8
McGeer (Liberal)	22.1)	
Kelsey (Conservative)	7.7)) 16.3
Linnell (Conservative)	8.6)	

- * The information tabulated in Appendix D was derived from
Statement of Votes: General Election September 12, 1966,
Statement of Votes: General Election August 27, 1969, and
Statement of Votes: General Election August 30, 1972.
(See Bibliography)

APPENDIX E - PROFILE OF CONSTITUENCIES AND NOMINATED 1975 SOCIAL CREDIT CANDIDATES

Region and Constituency	Social Credit Candidate in 1975 Election	Occupation and Known Municipal Involvement	Elected or Defeated	Boyle Classification - 1972 Election	Known Former Political Profile of Socred Candidates	Number of Other Contestants For The Nomination
<u>Greater Victoria</u>						
Esquimalt	Kahl	Teacher	Elected	Swing N.D.P.	Previous Lib. Supporter	Six
Oak Bay	Carson	Automobile Dealer	Defeated	Generally Safe P.C. ¹	S.C. Supporter	One
Saanich and the Islands	Curtis	Sales Manager/Broadcaster	Elected	Swing P.C. ²	P.C. Incumbent	None
Victoria (2)	Bawlf Rendle	Businessman/Alderman Insurance Agent	Elected Defeated	Swing S.C.**	P.C. Supporter S.C. Supporter	Two
<u>Island and North Coast</u>						
Alberni	Haggard	Contractor/Alderman	Defeated	Generally Safe N.D.P.	S.C. Supporter	Two
Comox	Hanuse	Logger	Defeated	Generally Safe N.D.P.	S.C. Supporter	Eight
Cowichan - Malahat	Ennals	Physician	Defeated	Generally Safe N.D.P.	Previous S.C. Candidate	Two
Mackenzie	Paetkau	Physician	Defeated	Generally Safe N.D.P.	S.C. Supporter	Two
Nanaimo	Roberts	Automobile Dealer	Defeated	Generally Safe N.D.P.	Previous P.C. Candidate	One
Prince Rupert	Last	Manager	Defeated	Swing N.D.P.	Previous Lib. Supporter	Four
<u>North Vancouver and West Vancouver</u>						
North Vancouver - Capilano	Andrews	Mayor	Defeated	Fairly Safe Liberal ³	Previous Lib. Supporter	One
North Vancouver - Seymour	Davis	Engineer Economist	Elected	Swing N.D.P.	Previous Lib. M.P.	None
West Vancouver - Howe Sound	Williams	Lawyer	Elected	Swing Liberal ⁴	Lib. Incumbent	None
<u>Vancouver - Burnaby - New Westminster</u>						
Burnaby - Edmonds	Loewen	Businessman	Elected	Generally Safe N.D.P.	S.C. Supporter	Four
Burnaby North	Oswald	Longshoreman	Defeated	Generally Safe N.D.P.	S.C. Supporter	Three
Burnaby - Willingdon	Veitch	Business Consultant	Elected	Generally Safe N.D.P.	S.C. Supporter	None
New Westminster	Seigo	General Insurance Agent	Defeated	Generally Safe N.D.P.	S.C. Supporter	Two
Vancouver - Burrard (2)	Hillier Price	Mechanical Engineer Business Consultant	Defeated Defeated	Fairly Safe N.D.P.*	S.C. Supporter S.C. Supporter	One
Vancouver Centre (2)	Capozzi Lau	Businessman Businessman	Defeated Defeated	Fairly Safe N.D.P.*	Previous S.C. Incumbent S.C. Supporter	Five
Vancouver East (2)	Babic Mandrusiak	Contractor Salesman	Defeated Defeated	Generally Safe N.D.P.*	S.C. Supporter	None
Vancouver - Little Mountain (2)	McCarthy Wolfe	Florist Automobile Dealer	Elected Elected	Swing N.D.P.*	Previous S.C. Incumbent Previous S.C. Incumbent	One
Vancouver - Point Grey (2)	Gardom McGeer	Lawyer Neurological Researcher	Elected Elected	Fairly Safe Lib.* ⁵	Lib. Incumbent Lib. Incumbent	None
Vancouver South (2)	Rogers Strongman	Airline Pilot Businessman	Elected Elected	Swing N.D.P.*	Previous P.C. Supporter Previous P.C. Supporter	Two
<u>Vancouver Suburbs and Fraser Valley</u>						
Chilliwack	Schroeder	Clergyman	Elected	Fairly Safe S.C.	S.C. Incumbent	One
Coquitlam	Kerster	Automobile Dealer	Elected	Generally Safe N.D.P.	S.C. Supporter	Four
Delta	Davidson	Businessman	Elected	Swing N.D.P.	Previous P.C. Supporter	Four
Dowdley	Musallam	Automobile Dealer	Elected	Swing N.D.P.	Previous S.C. Incumbent	Four
Langley	McClelland	Publisher/Broadcaster	Elected	Swing S.C.	S.C. Incumbent	None
Richmond	Nielson	Broadcaster	Elected	Fairly Safe N.D.P.	Previous P.C. Supporter	One
Surrey	Vander Zalm	Nurseryman/Mayor	Elected	Generally Safe N.D.P.	Previous Lib. Candidate	One
<u>Central Interior</u>						
Cariboo	Fraser	Businessman	Elected	Swing S.C.	S.C. Incumbent	None
Kamloops	Mair	Lawyer/Former Alderman	Elected	Swing N.D.P.	S.C. Supporter	Three
Yale - Lillooet	Waterland	Mining Engineer	Elected	Generally Safe N.D.P.	S.C. Supporter	Seven
<u>Okanagan</u>						
Boundary - Similkameen	Hewitt	Manager/Alderman	Elected	Swing S.C.	S.C. Supporter	One
North Okanagan	Jordan	Homemaker	Elected	Swing S.C.	S.C. Incumbent	None
South Okanagan	Bennett	Businessman	Elected	Generally Safe S.C.	S.C. Incumbent	None
Revelstoke - Shocan	Olynyk	Manager Superintendent	Defeated	Fairly Safe N.D.P.	S.C. Supporter	One
Shuswap	Bawtree	Rancher	Elected	Swing N.D.P.	S.C. Supporter	Four
<u>Kootenays</u>						
Columbia River	Chabot	C.P. Rail Supervisor	Elected	Swing S.C.	S.C. Incumbent	None
Kootenay	Haddad	Businessman/Former Mayor	Elected	Fairly Safe N.D.P.	Previous Lib. Candidate	Four
Nelson - Creston	Coleman	Electrician	Defeated	Fairly Safe N.D.P.	S.C. Supporter	None
Rossland - Trail	Campbell	Publisher	Defeated	Fairly Safe N.D.P.	Previous S.C. Incumbent	Two
<u>North</u>						
Atlin	Calder	Businessman	Elected	Generally Safe N.D.P.	N.D.P. Incumbent	None
Fort George	Lloyd	Logging Contractor/Alderman	Elected	Swing N.D.P.	S.C. Supporter	Two
Omineca	Kempf	Businessman/Mayor	Elected	Swing N.D.P.	S.C. Supporter	Five
Skeena	Shelford	Manager	Elected	Fairly Safe N.D.P.	Previous S.C. Incumbent	Three
<u>Peace</u>						
North Peace River	Smith	Life Underwriter	Elected	Generally Safe S.C.	S.C. Incumbent	Two
South Peace River	Phillips	Automobile Dealer	Elected	Swing S.C.	S.C. Incumbent	None

* Both successful candidates were from the same party. Classification is based on comparison of the combined percentages received by candidates of the same party.

** As against Liberal. While using the comparison of the combined percentages received by candidates renders this result, it should be noted that in fact one Socred and one Liberal were elected. (Liberal Anderson barely won the seat over Socred.)

1 As against Social Credit. This constituency was represented by P.C. leader Dr. Scott Wallace, a former Socred who became a P.C. in 1971 and was re-elected as such in 1972 and 1975.

2 As against Social Credit. Curtis was elected as a P.C. in the 1972 election and became a Socred in 1974.

3 As against Social Credit. Liberal David Brousson was elected in 1972, resigned in 1973 and was replaced by Liberal Gordon Gibson in a by-election held September 7, 1973.

4 As against Social Credit. Williams ran as a Liberal in the elections of 1966, 1969 and 1972 and then joined Social Credit in September 1975 prior to the calling of the election and the holding of the candidate nomination meeting.

5 As against Social Credit. Gardom and McGeer ran as Liberals in the elections of 1966, 1969 and 1972 and then joined Social Credit in September 1975 prior to the calling of the election and the holding of the candidate nomination meeting.

APPENDIX F - NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF CONTESTED NOMINATIONS BY 1972 ELECTORAL CLASSIFICATION

Boyle Classification	Number of Constituencies on the basis of the 1972 results*	Number and Percentage of Constituencies which had actual Nomination Contests	Number of Nominations Available	Number and Percentage of Socred Candidates Selected in Contested Nominations
Safe Socred	None	-	-	-
Generally Safe Socred	1	1 (100%)	1	1 (100%)
Fairly Safe Socred	2	1 (50%)	2	1 (50%)
Swing Socred	7	2 (29%)	8	3 (38%)
Swing NDP	11	10 (91%)	13	12 (92%)
Fairly Safe NDP	8	8 (100%)	10	10 (100%)
Generally Safe NDP	14	11 (79%)	15	11 (73%)
Safe NDP	None	-	-	-
Swing Other**	3	1 (33%)	3	1 (33%)
Fairly Safe Other***	1	0 (0%)	2	0 (0%)
Generally Safe Other****	1	1 (100%)	1	1 (100%)
Safe Other	None	-	-	-
TOTAL	<u>48</u>	<u>34 (71%)</u>	<u>55</u>	<u>40 (73%)</u>

* South Okanagan and North Vancouver-Capilano figures are based on the by-elections

** North Vancouver-Capilano; West Vancouver-Howe Sound; and Saanich and the Islands

*** Vancouver-Point Grey

**** Oak Bay

APPENDIX G - CALENDAR OF SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL EVENTS IN B.C.
- 1972-75

1972

August 30	NDP elected Government of British Columbia
September 15	NDP assumes Office
December 21	Order-in-Council prohibiting sub-division of farmland receives Cabinet approval

1973

February 16	I.C.B.C. Legislation introduced
22	Land Commission Act introduced
March 19	Amendments to Land Commission Act introduced
23	Socred leadership convention called for November 22-24, 1973
April 16	Land Commission Act passed
June 5	W.A.C. Bennett resigns as M.L.A. for South Okanagan
September 7	Bill Bennett defeats Derril Warren in South Okanagan by-election
October 10	Bill Bennett announces his intention to seek the Socred leadership
23	Liberal M.L.A. D.M. Brousson resigns his North Vancouver-Capilano legislative seat
November 23	Grace McCarthy becomes President of the British Columbia Social Credit League
24	Bill Bennett becomes Leader of the British Columbia Social Credit League
December 1	Scott Wallace becomes Leader of the British Columbia Progressive Conservative Party

1974

January 12	NDP Education Commissioner John Bremer is publicly "fired" by Premier Barrett on T.V.
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1974 (continued)

February	15	Social Credit candidate is narrowly defeated in traditionally Liberal North Vancouver-Capilano
	19	Mines Minister Leo Nimsick introduces Mineral Royalties Act
March	1	I.C.B.C. commences operation
	7	Highways Minister Graham Lea alleges private discussion with respect to Opposition merger
	12	Premier Barrett swears at Marjorie Nichols in Legislative corridor
	13	Marjorie Nichols, in her <u>Vancouver Sun</u> column graphically describes her recent encounter with Premier Barrett
	14	Rent controls are introduced
	19	Nanaimo Conservative Graeme Roberts announces his defection to Social Credit
	29	Government Whip Emery Barnes votes against Barrett's motion to adjourn the Legislature
May	30	William Vander Zalm becomes a Socred
June	19	Scott Wallace publicly criticizes Bill Bennett as "the only obstacle to unity"
	20	Socred M.L.A.s publicly support Bennett
	20	Standing Order 45-A is adopted by Legislature
	20	Mineral Royalties Act receives Third Reading and Royal Assent
	21	Majority Movement rally takes place at which Williams and McGeer indicate interest in a "unity party"
	26	Federal Conservative George Whittake announces provincial switch to Social Credit
July	12	Peter Hyndman announces his conversion to Social Credit
	12	Federal Conservative Doug Jebson does likewise
	22	Conservative M.L.A. Hugh Curtis publicly announces that his party is "finished" at the provincial level

1974 (continued)

August 19 Sixteen members of the Vancouver-Point Grey Progressive Conservative executive announce their defection to Social Credit

 29 Six Vancouver Island Liberals publicly defect to Social Credit

September 18 Premier Barrett admits to \$102.8 million "clerical error in Human Resources budget

 24 Grace McCarthy announces that Socred party membership has risen from 4,000 to 50,000

 26 Twenty-two Richmond Conservatives, including a majority of the provincial constituency association's executive, defect to Social Credit

October 25 Hugh Curtis defects to Social Credit

November 1 Former Prince George Liberal Association President, Jack Heinrich, announces his switch to Social Credit

 30 Social Credit League changes its name to the British Columbia Social Credit Party

1975

March 22 At contested nomination, Kamloops Socreds choose Rafe Mair

May 8 Emergency Programmes Act introduced

 9 Williams and McGeer resign from Liberal caucus to sit in the Legislature as Independents

 13 Bill Bennett commences his "Not a Dime Without Debate" campaign

 20 Gardom resigns from Liberal caucus to sit with Williams and McGeer as an Independent

June 13 Emergency Programmes Act is withdrawn

 27 Provincial Liberal Vice-President Don Wray resigns from his position stating that he no longer supports the Liberals provincially

July 28 Don Wray joins Social Credit

 28 Grace McCarthy announces that 5,000 people joined Social Credit in the previous two months

1975 (continued)

September	1	Former federal Liberal cabinet minister Jack Davis announces that he has joined Social Credit
	3	Bill Bennett announces that 469 Social Credit membership applications had been processed on the previous day alone
	28	Gordon Gibson becomes Liberal Leader
	30	Williams, Gardom and McGeer join Social Credit
November	1	Peter Hyndman becomes President of the British Columbia Social Credit Party
	3	Premier Barrett calls an election for December 11
	6-19	All remaining Social Credit nominations take place
December	11	Social Credit wins the election, defeating the NDP

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PERSONAL INTERVIEWS

Hean, Arnold

Former Co-Chairman,
Majority Movement for
Freedom and Private Enterprise

July 2, 1986

Hyndman, Peter S.

Former President,
British Columbia
Social Credit Party

November 18, 1985 and
June 17, 1986

Lauk, Gary V.

Former B.C. Cabinet Minister
in 1972-75 N.D.P. Government.
Portfolios: Economic Development;
and Mines and Petroleum Resources

June 24, 1986