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This thesis examined differences in reasoning concerning hypothetical versus real-life moral situations in order to better understand the moral development of delinquents in general, and psychopaths in particular. Participants ranged in age from 15 to 18 years and were divided into three subgroups: 14 psychopaths, 15 delinquents, and 15 normal youths (total N = 44). All subjects were individually interviewed and assessed on (a) Hare's (1985) psychopathy checklist, (b) two of Kohlberg’s hypothetical moral dilemmas, and (c) a subject-generated real-life moral dilemma. Reasoning regarding these dilemmas was scored for both moral stage and moral orientation. It was found that the normal youths attained a higher level of moral reasoning than both the delinquents and psychopaths. Secondly, it was found that all groups scored lower on the real-life than the hypothetical dilemmas, indicating that hypothetical dilemmas may elicit a person’s best level of reasoning, whereas real-life dilemmas may entail factors which lower the level of moral reasoning used in an actual situation of moral conflict. Third, non-incarcerated subjects were found to use more of the perfectionism and fairness orientations (Subtype B) than did the incarcerated. It was also found that psychopaths used more of the egoistic utilitarianism orientation than did non-psychopaths when discussing real-life dilemmas. That is, they focused more on issues related to themselves than did either the delinquents or the normals. Thus, this study reveals a pattern of deficiencies in the moral reasoning development of psychopaths and delinquents when compared to their normal counterparts. As well, hypothetical and real-life dilemmas were found to differ in the level of moral reasoning that they elicited.
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Introduction

A question, commonly asked of theories on moral reasoning, is whether or not there is a relation between such reasoning and moral behavior. That is, once an individual's stage of moral reasoning has been established, can particular actions then be predicted from this? Also, does moral reasoning about hypothetical situations represent reasoning about an actual real-life encounter? Although Kohlberg's theory is primarily one of reasoning rather than actual behavior, his assumption is that moral reasoning does relate to moral action, even though the relation is a complex one including many other variables (Kohlberg, 1969, 1978). As for empirical evidence, most research on moral development to date does not extend into the realm of moral action, focusing instead on the structural character of moral reasoning; and those few studies that do attempt the connection often encounter much unaccounted-for variance thereby making interpretation difficult.

This thesis is an attempt to bridge some of the gap between reasoning regarding hypothetical situations and reasoning about actual behavior, through the use of real-life dilemmas. By comparing reasoning about actual behavior with reasoning about hypothetical dilemmas, perhaps it can be established whether or not individuals think differently about dilemmas in which they have been involved than about dilemmas which are more remote. This issue is a particularly salient one in studying delinquency in general, and psychopathy in particular.

Three subject groups of adolescents participated in this study: incarcerated psychopaths, referred to here as "psychopaths"; incarcerated non-psychopaths, "delinquents"; and non-incarcerated normals, "normals". Youths aged 15 to 18 were employed in order to examine the generalizability of the psychopathy measure to younger populations since little research on psychopathy has been conducted with youths, especially normals. Differences between this study and studies with adults
can also be noted. As well, an area which has not been explored is whether young offenders, or the subgroup psychopaths, reason at different levels about the hypothetical or real-life dilemmas; and whether there are apparent differences in moral orientations across groups and dilemma types. Overall, it appears an important first step to connect moral reasoning with subject-related behaviors so as to be able to assess in what way moral reasoning can predict behavior.

Kohlberg's Theory Of Moral Reasoning

Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental theory of moral reasoning examines individuals' thought structures when they are put into a situation of moral conflict. However, rather than investigating moral development through a focus on content, or what people believe, Kohlberg investigates why individuals reason as they do. Through a series of hypothetical dilemmas, typically delivered in an interview format, Kohlberg's model attempts to discern differences among individuals in the form of their thinking. Basing his ideas, in part, on Piaget's (1932) cognitive-developmental model, Kohlberg (1958, 1969, 1976, 1981) developed his own more comprehensive theory of moral development. Kohlberg has proposed three levels of moral growth, with two stages comprising each level. The first level, that of "preconventional" thought (Stages 1 and 2), is illustrated by individuals responsive to cultural rules of right and wrong, but who interpret these rules in terms of rewards and punishments. Therefore an individual who perceives rules as external to him/herself would be at a preconventional level of moral reasoning. Stage 1, within the preconventional framework, identifies individuals who possess an egocentric point of view, where right is considered to entail strict obedience to authority and avoidance of punishment or negative consequences. Within the same level, individuals in Stage 2 serve their own or others' needs and attempt to make fair, concrete exchanges. At the "conventional" level (Stages 3 and 4), individuals
are interested in maintaining the same values and/or expectations as their family, group, or society, with less concern regarding the concrete consequences of such beliefs than previously. Those at Stage 3 regard themselves in relation to others, or the role they play in their primary group of family and friends; whereas at Stage 4, adherence to the authority and rules of society is observed in order to maintain its functioning. Finally, at the level of "postconventional" or "principled" thought (Stages 5 and 6), the individual makes a clear effort to define moral values which have validity separate from society's. Stage 5 emphasizes individual prior rights and social contract, where it is correct to uphold basic rights even if it goes against group laws. In Stage 6, which is more of a theoretical construct, abstract and universal principles are generated and adhered to (See Table 1 for Kohlberg's stage descriptions). According to Kohlberg (1976), the preconventional level is usually found among children under 9 years of age, as well as a few adolescents and adults; the conventional, in most adolescents and adults in our society; and only a minority of adults reach the postconventional level of reasoning.

Another aspect of Kohlberg's theory is that style or form of thinking is the crucial component, whereas content plays a lesser role (Kohlberg, 1971, 1981; Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983). This assumption differs from Piaget's theory of morality (1932) in which he examined what children regarded as "more moral" behavior, that is, what they believed the right action was. In Kohlberg's model, the moral decision is not as important as the reasoning behind that decision; therefore people with opposing opinions on an issue can still be categorized at the same level of moral reasoning, and people with the same opinion can justify it with very different stages of reasoning. In his early works, Kohlberg maintained that the form of moral reasoning did not determine content (Kohlberg, 1971). However, this
Table 1

Kohlberg's Six Stages of Moral Judgment

Level A: Preconventional:

Stage 1 - Stage of Punishment and Obedience
- right is literal obedience to rules of authority, avoiding punishment and not doing physical harm.
- egocentric point of view (physical consequences).

Stage 2 - Stage of Individual Instrumental Purpose and Exchange
- right is serving one's own or other's needs and making fair deals in terms of concrete exchange.
- concrete individualistic perspective.

Level B: Conventional:

Stage 3 - Stage of Mutual Interpersonal Expect, Relationships and Conformity
- right is playing good (nice) role, being concerned about the other people and their feelings, keeping loyalty and trust with partners and being motivated to follow rules and expectations.
- individual in relation to others.

Stage 4 - Stage of Social System and Conscience Maintenance
- right is doing one's duty in society, upholding the social order, and maintaining the welfare of society or the group.
- differentiates societal point of view from interpersonal agreement or motives.

Level C: Postconventional and Principled Level:

Stage 5 - The Stage of Prior Rights and Social Contract or Utility
- right is upholding the basic rights, values and legal contracts of a society, even when they conflict with the concrete rules and laws of the group.
- prior-to-society-perspective.

Stage 6 - Stage of Universal Ethical Principles
- guidance by universal ethical principles that all humanity should follow.

"strong formalistic" approach has been criticized since many believe thought structures can never be totally separated from content (Beck, 1974; Sullivan, 1977; Walker, 1977). Kohlberg more recently held more of a "weak formalistic" position where form is emphasized, but content is also considered important in moral development (Kohlberg, 1984; Kohlberg et al., 1983). However, this view is not reflected with regards to the scoring of dilemmas (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). Instead, form is considered the crucial component, and the dilemma choice/opinion is not of consequence in deriving scores.

It has been proposed that there are three major criteria for assessing the validity of Kohlberg's strict stage model of moral development: the structure criterion, sequence criterion, and hierarchy criterion (Walker, 1986a). The structure criterion implies that each stage represents a holistic structure and therefore in moral reasoning development individuals should be consistent in their reasoning across situations. The sequence criterion holds that acquisition of stages occurs in an invariant order. So, stages should appear one at a time in a set, irreversibly progressive sequence, one which is a universal phenomenon. The hierarchy criterion predicts that the concepts of a preceding stage of reasoning are restructured into a new stage so that each stage represents a qualitatively different, and better, organization of thinking (Kohlberg, 1981; Kohlberg et al., 1983; Lifton, 1982; Walker, 1986a). Although there is some debate as to whether or not these theory-based assumptions are valid (Gilligan, 1977, 1979, 1982; Haan, 1977, 1978, 1983, 1985; Kurtines & Greif, 1978; Simpson, 1974; Sullivan, 1977), there is also evidence supporting their veracity (Kohlberg, 1971, 1981; Kohlberg et al., 1983; Walker, 1982, 1986a, 1986b). For a more extensive review of the evidence regarding these criteria see Walker (1986a).
According to Kohlberg, then, individuals go through the stages of moral reasoning in a developmental progression. However, there are certain requirements needed in order for an individual to advance to the next stage of development. Kohlberg (1976) argues that both cognitive (Piaget, 1932) and perspective-taking (Selman, 1976, 1980) skills are necessary for moral development to occur. That is, if an individual has achieved an adequate level of cognitive development, along with the necessary perspective-taking skills, he/she is then capable of advancing to the next stage of moral development. Selman (1976) advanced the notion that an individual's cognitive stage indicates the level of understanding of logical problems; role-taking stage shows the level of understanding of social relations; and moral reasoning stage indicates how he/she decides on resolution of social conflicts.

Researchers examining the relation of cognitive and moral development (e.g., Colby & Kohlberg, 1975; Tomlinson-Keasey & Keasey, 1974; Walker, 1980, 1986b; Walker & Richards, 1979) have found that cognitive development parallels moral growth. Piaget's preoperational stage parallels Kohlberg's Stage 1; concrete operations parallel Stage 2; beginning formal operations parallel Stage 3; early basic formal operations parallel Stage 4; and consolidated basic formal operations parallel Stage 5 (Colby & Kohlberg, 1975). Similar findings have been demonstrated regarding perspective-taking and moral development (Selman, 1976; Walker, 1980, 1986a) with each of Selman's perspective-taking stages preceding or occurring concurrently with each moral stage.

Possession of an adequate cognitive and perspective-taking level is not in itself a sufficient precursor for moral development (Walker, 1986a, 1986b). Instead, once these requisite skills have been acquired, many moral conflicts typically must be encountered which a person's present stage of moral reasoning cannot properly resolve. The individual, when resolving these conflicts within him/herself, then
advances toward the next stage of moral development. It has been proposed (Kohlberg, 1973; Walker, 1983, 1986a) that appropriate social experiences entailing cognitive conflict are necessary for development to occur.

In summary, Kohlberg's model attempts to discern stages of moral reasoning through which individuals advance as they develop. In the "Moral Judgment Interview" (MJI), the subject's reasoning about dilemma choices, rather than the actual choices themselves, is evaluated. Therefore, form rather than content is important. According to Kohlberg's strict stage criteria, stages are assumed to be sequential, hierarchical, and structured wholes; and although there have been criticisms regarding their validity, there is also evidence in their support. As well, there is much evidence indicating that cognitive and perspective-taking skills are necessary, but not sufficient, for moral development to occur. Although some critics have concerns (e.g., the appropriateness of the MJI), most researchers realize its usefulness and continue to use it when evaluating moral development.

Moral Orientations

In addition to moral stages, Kohlberg (1976) has described moral orientations, which represent global frameworks or perspectives for organizing and understanding the moral domain (de Vries & Walker, 1986b) and parallel classic ethical theories. Kohlberg (1976, 1984) differentiated four orientations utilized in moral reasoning: normative, utilitarianism, fairness, and perfectionism orientations, all of which can be scored from the MJI data. He described the orientations as follows:

1. Normative orientation - A focus on following the rules and roles of the social order, and making decisions based on these rules.
2. Utilitarianism orientation - A focus on the welfare consequences of any action for the self or for others. This can be sub-divided into "Egoistic" which emphasizes concerns for self such as
reputation and seeking rewards, and "Social" which emphasizes concerns for others such as individual or group consequences.

3. Fairness orientation - A focus on justice issues, emphasizing relations of liberty, equality, reciprocity, and contract.

4. Perfectionism orientation - A focus on the image of a "good self"; that is, attainment of dignity and autonomy, good conscience and motives, and harmony with self and others.

Although moral orientations can be scored from the MJI, they provide information that is distinctive from that of stage descriptions. Stage development occurs in all four moral orientations, and therefore orientations provide non-redundant information which may distinguish individuals (Kohlberg, 1976).

Kohlberg (1976, 1984) stated that the normative and utilitarianism orientations, when grouped together, form Subtype A at each stage because the justifications used at this subtype are more predictive and situation-bound. Subtype B is formed by grouping the fairness and perfectionism orientations since justifications represent a more prescriptive and general manner. Kohlberg and his colleagues (Candee & Kohlberg, 1987; Kohlberg & Candee, 1984; Kohlberg, Higgins, Tappan, and Schrader, 1984) have also introduced another typology, substituting the heteronomous (Type A) and autonomous (Type B) moralities for the Subtypes. A moral type reflects an individuals' level of social perspective, within a given stage. Type A's reason according to external considerations, or fixed rules and authority. Type B's, however, are more flexible and reason with regards to the protection of individual rights and welfare. Therefore, they see themselves as more responsible for determining the morality of an action (Candee & Kohlberg, 1987). Candee and Kohlberg (1987) have also now introduced a Type C, which demonstrates relativistic thinking. There is as yet little empirical basis for the types, however, and in fact
this typology still appears to be in flux. However, the notion of moral orientations is of clear conceptual importance and has elicited considerable research to date, and it is these orientations that are focused on here.

Upon examination of studies which investigate Kohlberg's orientations, several interesting trends emerge. First of all, it appears that the normative and utilitarianism orientations demonstrate similar patterns; as do the fairness and perfectionism orientations. Two studies (Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982; Tietjen & Walker, 1985) found support for grouping normative and utilitarianism together, and fairness and perfectionism together; since the groups that appeared to be moral leaders used fairness and perfectionism (Subtype B) orientations; whereas the others tended to use normative and utilitarianism (Subtype A) orientations. As well, use of normative and utilitarianism orientations has been found to decrease with increasing age (de Vries & Walker, 1986a; Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982). They are also the two orientations which studies find are used most often (de Vries & Walker, 1986b; Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982; Tietjen & Walker, 1985). On the other side, use of the fairness and perfectionism orientations has been found to increase with age (de Vries & Walker, 1986a); and are used less than the normative and utilitarianism (de Vries & Walker, 1986b; Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982; Tietjen & Walker, 1985). Finally, higher stage subjects have been found to use the fairness and perfectionism orientations more than lower stage subjects (Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982; Pratt, Golding & Hunter, 1984; Tietjen & Walker, 1985). However, it has also been found that moral orientations were not related to stage score (de Vries & Walker, 1986b). Therefore, stage of reasoning apparently does not always predict moral orientation; instead individuals with certain characteristics may demonstrate a certain level of reasoning and a particular moral orientation. Research has also found orientations to distinguish leaders from non-leaders (Tietjen & Walker, 1985); city from rural
youths (Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982); and those in favor of capital punishment from those opposed (de Vries & Walker, 1986b). These findings do not necessarily correlate with stage of reasoning, again demonstrating the unique contribution supplied by moral orientations.

Put together, these findings, although at first seemingly contradictory, demonstrate a trend. Since most of the studies which examine moral orientations report results for preconventional or conventional individuals, if we visualize the normative and utilitarianism orientations as attached to lower moral reasoning, it is not surprising that most subjects used these two orientations predominantly. As well, since age has been shown to be positively related to stage of moral development, again it would be logical for the normative and utilitarianism orientations to be used less as subjects get older. With relation to the fairness and perfectionism orientations, the findings support the contention that higher stage individuals use them more often than low stage individuals. Even a study by Pratt, Golding and Hunter (1983) which only examined the utilitarianism and fairness orientations, found utilitarianism to be used more often than the fairness orientation.

Gilligan (1977, 1979, 1982) holds that Kohlberg's model focuses only on what she labels a justice/rights moral orientation, and that women do not typically use this orientation. As a result, she claims that women are down-graded in level of moral reasoning. Therefore, she proposed a different theory of orientations than Kohlberg. In this theory she contends that there are two distinct orientations in moral development: the justice or rights orientation and the care or response orientation. She defines the rights orientation as emphasizing abstract and general principles, with a focus on the individual. The response orientation, on the other hand, stresses the maintenance of relationships, and focuses on interdependence
with others. Gilligan believes that these orientations are sex-related, with men typically utilizing rights considerations; and women, response considerations. She also believes that more natural dilemmas pull out these different orientations better than the standard Kohlbergian ones.

Although Gilligan has not made any claims regarding Kohlberg’s orientations, there appear to be parallel themes throughout these two models. Kohlberg’s normative or fairness orientations seem to parallel Gilligan’s rights orientation, due to the presumed focus on rights, duties and justice. As well, the utilitarianism or perfectionism orientations, due to the presumed focus on relationships, welfare, and caring for self and others, seem to parallel Gilligan’s response orientation (Walker, 1986b). In a paper by de Vries and Walker (1986a) which examined moral orientations using both Kohlberg’s and Gilligan’s models, they found that hypothetical dilemmas tended to pull normative and fairness orientations; while real-life dilemmas tended to pull utilitarianism and perfectionism orientations.

In this study, consistent with other studies, it was expected that the use of the normative and utilitarianism orientations would be high. However, it was further hypothesized that the psychopaths would utilize the utilitarianism, and specifically the egoistic, orientation more so than the non-psychopaths, since psychopaths typically focus only on concerns for themselves. This result was expected independent of stage; that is, even those psychopaths at the same stage of moral development as the non-psychopaths should use more of the egoistic utilitarianism orientation. As well, following de Vries and Walker’s (1986a) finding, it was expected that real-life dilemmas would pull utilitarianism and perfectionism orientations; whereas hypothetical dilemmas would pull normative and fairness orientations. Finally, it was hypothesized that non-offenders would be higher on the use of the fairness and perfectionism (Subtype B) orientations than young
offenders, confirming previous studies on moral leaders (Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982; Tietjen & Walker, 1985).

Real-Life versus Hypothetical Dilemmas

Kohlberg's method of examining moral development is to elicit an individual's reasoning pertaining to a set of hypothetical dilemmas. An example of one of Kohlberg's dilemmas involves a man, Heinz, who is faced with the conflict of whether or not to steal an over-priced drug in order to save his wife's life. Although Kohlberg believes these dilemmas pull an individual's highest level of reasoning, critics argue that they are not realistic and therefore may not be accurately assessing level of moral reasoning (Baumrind, 1978; Gilligan, 1982; Haan, 1977) since they are unfamiliar and subjects may not identify with the protagonists. Therefore, attempts have been made to change these dilemmas or to assess real-life dilemmas of the subjects.

A number of studies have been completed which attempted to devise more natural or real-life dilemmas; however, the results are inconsistent. For instance, Leming (1976) found classical, or hypothetical, moral judgment to tap the highest moral competence; whereas real-life practical moral judgment was more likely to typify actual performance. As well, it has been found that "prison" dilemmas elicited lower moral reasoning than the standard dilemmas within a prison population (Kohlberg, Scharf, & Hickey, 1971); as did "school" dilemmas, among a student population (Higgins, Power, & Kohlberg, 1984). Linn (1987) found higher stage reasoning for the Kohlbergian hypothetical dilemmas than reasoning concerning a real-life situation (a physicians' strike) in which the subjects were involved.

In contrast to the findings of lower moral reasoning in real-life dilemmas, Haan (1975) found higher stage reasoning associated with the "Free Speech Movement"
(FSM) dilemma than with the standard hypothetical dilemmas. As well, Gilligan and Belenky (1980) found higher moral reasoning among women discussing their abortion decisions, when compared to their reasoning about hypothetical dilemmas. Smetana (1981), however, found moral reasoning about the abortion decision to be highly related to the reasoning about hypothetical dilemmas.

A problem related to all of these studies is that, although the real-life dilemmas may have been more realistic, in fact they were dilemmas raised by the researchers. Therefore, since they were not the subjects' choice of dilemma they may not have been considered by the subjects to be good examples of moral problems. It seems important to use subject-generated dilemmas in order to be sure they relate to the individuals' personal experience. Rybash, Roodin, and Hoyer (1983) attempted to do just this by asking older adults to discuss a real-life moral dilemma. It was found that subject-generated dilemmas frequently differed in content from the Kohlbergian standard dilemmas. However, in their study, Rybash et al. did not assess the differences in stage of moral reasoning that real-life and hypothetical dilemmas elicit.

A study conducted by Walker, de Vries, and Trevethan (1987) attempted to examine whether differences in stage of moral reasoning existed between hypothetical and real-life dilemmas. Subjects were asked to generate a real-life dilemma from their own experience, and reasoning about this and the standard Kohlberg dilemmas was compared. The results indicated that slightly higher reasoning was associated with the hypothetical dilemmas than with the real-life dilemmas. This suggests that standard dilemmas may in fact elicit individuals' highest level of moral reasoning since the person is allowed to reflect on issues without being influenced by the practical implications involved. Therefore, hypothetical dilemmas may bring out what a person "should" do; whereas, real-life
dilemmas may bring out why a person acted as they did. As well, a study by Selman and Jaquette (1977), concerning hypothetical and real social conflicts, demonstrated that severely emotionally disturbed youngsters oscillated more than their less disturbed age-mates in their interpersonal reasoning. They also used lower stage reasoning in real, as compared to hypothetical, situations. Although it should be noted that this study did not assess moral conflict, it suggests that there may be differences in reasoning related to moral, as well as the social conflicts that were examined, depending on whether the conflicts are hypothetical or real-life.

Therefore in this study it appeared important to elicit a dilemma from the subject's own experience. It was hypothesized that, consistent with other subject-generated data, all the groups would score lower on the real-life dilemmas than the hypothetical dilemmas. However, it was suspected that the young offenders would evidence a larger disparity in their reasoning between the hypothetical and real-life dilemmas than the non-offenders, since in Selman and Jaquette's (1977) study on social conflicts those with emotional disturbances had more discrepancies which could typify young offenders as well. Also, young offenders have been convicted for engaging in illegal and presumably immoral behaviors which suggest a low level of moral reasoning in actual situations.

Moral Reasoning and Moral Action

An assumption some appear to make regarding Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning is that individuals' moral action should be predictable from their moral reasoning score. Kohlberg (1969, 1978) also believes that moral reasoning is correlated with moral action, however he does not think that the relation is a perfect one. That is, moral reasoning may be an indicator of how someone will respond in a situation, however other factors such as emotion, sense of commitment, et cetera, may also play large roles (Blasi, 1980; Walker, 1986a).
Therefore the question to be answered is how well can the moral reasoning of an individual predict what he/she will do in a given situation?

Although Kohlberg's theory of moral development could stand in its own right as a theory of moral reasoning and not of moral action, practically it would not be a very useful model. If someone's stage of reasoning has no bearing on how he/she will behave, of what utility is the theory in real-life? So even though a theory of moral reasoning may be theoretically sound, in practice it would have no relevance and in all likelihood, would be of little theoretical interest. Therefore, in order to extend Kohlberg's theory to real-life events, a connection needs to be found between moral reasoning and moral action.

Some theorists (e.g., Blasi, 1983; Kohlberg & Candee, 1984; Rest, 1983) have advanced hypotheses which attempt to link moral reasoning to moral action. According to Kohlberg and Candee (1984), there are two approaches to defining moral action: personal responsibility and universal right. In the personal responsibility approach, moral action is defined as any action which is consistent with what an individual judges as being right. Therefore, if an individual believes an action to be right and follows that belief, researchers would consider that to be morally correct behavior. On the other hand, in the universal right approach, moral action is defined in a universal or objective sense. So, there are certain behaviors which are morally correct, regardless of whether a particular individual sees them as right.

By using the personal responsibility approach, Kohlberg and Candee (1984) have developed a model of moral action. According to this model, a person's moral stage in combination with the type of moral problem cause the individual to make a "deontic choice", that is deciding from a rule or principle whether or not an act is right. For example, deciding whether or not stealing in general is wrong would
constitute a deontic choice. From this a "judgment of responsibility" must be made in which individuals decide whether they should perform the act which is right. Therefore, if a person decides that stealing is wrong, he/she then must decide whether or not to steal. Non-moral skills also come into play once the judgment of responsibility has been made, and these include factors such as IQ, attention, delay of gratification, situational effects, et cetera. So the individual may decide to steal if the temptation at a particular moment in time is too strong. Finally from all of this a moral action is performed (or not performed); the individual does or does not steal.

Kohlberg and Candee (1984) claimed that the higher the stage of moral reasoning of a person, the more likely he/she is to make a judgment of responsibility which is consistent with his/her deontic choice, and to subsequently act upon this choice. Empirical evidence presented by Kohlberg and Candee for their model (e.g., data from Haan, Smith, & Block, 1968; McNamee, 1978; Milgram, 1974) demonstrates that the higher the stage of the subject, the more often he/she will act upon what he/she believes to be right. For example, in McNamee's (1978) study, subjects' moral behavior was assessed according to the amount of help they gave to someone posing as a drug user on a bad trip. In addition, subjects' reasoning as to whether or not they should help was examined. It was found that higher stage subjects more often made the decision to help and subsequently acted upon that decision. Therefore by using this approach, Kohlberg and Candee (1984) believe that higher stage subjects are increasingly more moral. In a reanalysis of Haan et al.'s (1968) FSM study, Candee and Kohlberg (1987) found Type B's to be more consistent in what they said and what they did than were Type A's. That is, among those individuals who believed the sit-in was right, more Type B's actually sat in.
Using the universal right approach, morally correct behaviors can be evidenced as those actions which would be chosen by high stage individuals, through the application of a valid ethical principle. According to Kohlberg and Candee (1984), if a consensus exists among higher stage persons on either the behavior or deontic choice, then the action can be universally categorized as right or wrong. Kohlberg and Candee also state that Type B individuals will be more likely to perform the correct moral action, as compared to Type A’s, since they intuitively perceive the principles of a dilemma the same as high stage persons. In the previous example of stealing, according to Kohlberg and Candee (1984), a Type B individual may not steal, but would be unable to explain why he/she did not steal. Gibbs, Clark, Joseph, Green, Goodrick, and Makowski (1986) provide evidence of Type B’s being more likely to take morally courageous action than Type A’s. In their study, morally courageous action, as assessed by teacher ratings of the subjects, was positively related to being classified as Type B.

Although Kohlberg and Candee (1984) believe a relationship exists between moral reasoning and moral behavior, they do not think that in every situation this relationship will appear. Rather, they contend that higher stage individuals will be more consistent in doing what they feel is morally right; and that when high stage persons agree on a morally correct action, this action could be considered more moral in the universal sense. However, there are some situations where high stage individuals do not agree on the right course of action, as well as cases where there may be more than one correct solution, according to the people involved (e.g., abortion).

There has been no direct research conducted on Kohlberg and Candee’s (1984) model, however there has been a lot of research on the relation between moral thought and moral action. Some findings appear to agree with this kind of model.
and some appear to disagree; but most simply attempt to find some small connection between action and thought. When examining this literature, it becomes apparent that there is a division between those studies investigating moral behavior within the general population and those studying differences between offenders and their normal counterparts. In the first type of study, subjects are generally children or undergraduates and the typical procedure is to induce some kind of immoral behavior (e.g., resistance to temptation) from the participants and to relate this behavior to level of moral reasoning. In the second type of study, the research paradigm often involves examination of the variation in stage of moral reasoning between either adult offenders or young offenders and some control population. Therefore, quite often these two kinds of studies produce different types of evidence. Because of this, these research areas will be discussed separately, and comparisons, when relevant, made.

**Normals.** Most studies of moral action conducted on the general population involve assessing individuals' stage of moral reasoning and then determining whether or not they commit what is considered to be a moral or immoral act. However, there have also been a few studies which have tried to examine moral behavior from the other end; that is, obtaining stage scores for individuals who have already been involved in some morally relevant action. Finally, there is a small body of research that attempts to examine moral reasoning in the action situation so as to eliminate rationalizations for behavior which has already occurred.

One of the earliest and most extensive studies of moral action was completed by Hartshorne and May (1928-1932). In these studies they attempted to assess whether or not cheating and other moral behaviors could be predicted by individuals' personality variables. However, they found that cheating was not consistent among subjects and that few predictions could be made as to which
children would cheat in any given situation. Therefore, they argued that moral behavior was more a function of the social context which the child was in, rather than due to the child’s moral predispositions. However, Kohlberg and Candee (1984) argued that Hartshorne and May were not actually examining moral action since they did not evaluate what the subjects believed was moral. So, although they found that the children were not consistent, consistency should depend on one’s understanding of what is moral, and then following through on this decision. Blasi (1980) also makes the distinction in the Hartshorne and May study that they were investigating "moral information" rather than "moral judgment". He argues that cheating may not have the same moral meaning for everyone and therefore what may be considered cheating to one person may not be to another. So Hartshorne and May’s studies may have been flawed in that they assumed they were assessing the same moral behavior in all subjects.

In contrast to the findings of Hartshorne and May, the majority of studies involving the relation of moral reasoning to cheating behavior have found a significant relation between moral thought and moral action (Forsyth & Scott, 1984; Kohlberg, 1969; Malinowski & Smith, 1985; Schwartz, Feldman, Brown, & Heingartner, 1969). That is, those individuals with higher stages of moral reasoning were found to be less likely to cheat in the experimental situation. For example, Malinowski and Smith (1985) demonstrated on college students, with the use of Rest’s "Defining Issues Test" (DIT)\(^1\), that the lower the subject’s moral reasoning score the more likely he/she was to cheat and the sooner this behavior began. Kohlberg (1969) demonstrated similar results with children, when the experimenter induced them to cheat. It was found that higher stage subjects were less likely to cheat than were low stage subjects (20% of principled as compared to 67% of conventional, and 83% of preconventional). In addition to cheating behavior, moral
reasoning has been found to be positively related to fewer conduct problems in school (Bear & Richards, 1981; Kalliopuska & Mustakallio, 1986); avoidance of stealing (Tsujimoto & Nardi, 1978); and acting on beliefs regarding abortion (Rholes & Bailey, 1983). Blatt and Kohlberg (1975), however, found that although they could increase levels of moral reasoning through a discussion group; this did not in turn produce less cheating behavior in those subjects that had increased their moral reasoning score. Therefore, simply increasing moral reasoning does not necessarily result in increased moral action.

Aside from the ethical considerations, a problem with studies that attempt to induce subjects to commit immoral acts is that the behavior may not be viewed by the subject as immoral. That is, what is considered to be immoral to one individual may not be to another. Therefore other researchers have abandoned the laboratory setting and have instead attempted to examine subjects' behavior in a more natural setting; that is, how they act in actual situations of moral conflict. Although this does not entirely eradicate the problem, these studies, rather than attempting to induce a behavior, instead examine behaviors that the subjects are involved in, and are thus more likely to regard as right or wrong. Along this line, studies have examined the relation between moral reasoning and political orientation and actions: some finding a connection between higher stage reasoning and left wing practices (Fishkin, Keniston, & MacKinnon, 1973; Nassi, 1981; Nassi, Abramowitz, & Youmans, 1983); and others finding no direct connection (Emler, 1983; Emler & Hogan, 1981; Emler, Renwick, & Malone, 1983). As well, Candee and Kohlberg's (1987) reanalysis of Haan et al.'s (1968) study of the Berkeley Free Speech Movement (FSM) found that those individuals with higher levels of moral reasoning tended to be more active (more likely to be arrested) in the sit-in; whereas those at lower stages were not as active. Therefore the results of this study attempted to connect
higher levels of moral thought to what was implied to be the morally correct behavior, that is, participating in the FSM. The problem with this "post-hoc" study is that moral reasoning and action were examined after the event had taken place. Therefore subjects may have been trying to justify their previous actions rather than giving a true indication of their reasoning. Or, since moral reasoning was based on questionnaires, subjects could have been simply reverberating what they had heard from higher stage individuals and that may not have been detected. Another attempt at connecting moral reasoning and moral action was made by Renwick and Emler (1984), by examining moral reasoning and self-reported delinquent behavior. They found that there was no significant relation between moral reasoning and reported commission of serious misdemeanors.

In order to eliminate after-the-fact reasoning, Haan (1978) attempted to induce moral conflict within friendship groups so that moral reasoning could be examined during a real-life experience (e.g., moral games). She found that level of moral reasoning was a poor predictor of actual behavior. Situational determinants instead appeared to affect behavior; that is, in pleasant situations more moral behavior occurred than in stressful situations. The problem here, however, is that some of the games may not have induced moral conflict as the researchers expected, or varying degrees of conflict may have been experienced by the subjects. Turiel and Rothman (1972) conducted another study which examined behavior changes due to moral reasoning and found that exposure to moral reasoning at a higher stage affected the behavioral choice of some children. Individuals at Stage 4 who saw reasoning a stage above their own showed what the researchers believed was more moral behavior; that is, stopping a game which punished other individuals; whereas those subjects at Stages 2 and 3 did not show such behavior.
Blasi (1980), in a review of the literature, noted mixed findings in the relation between moral reasoning and moral action. In the sections dealing with the relation of normal subjects' moral reasoning and behavior, he found support for the claim that moral reasoning relates to resisting pressure to conform one's judgment; clear, but less, support for the hypothesis that higher stage individuals tend to be more honest and altruistic; and little support for the claim that principled individuals resist the social pressure to conform in moral action more so than others.

Eleven studies were examined, addressing the issue of resistance to conformity in judgment and independence in action. Blasi (1980) found that in all of the studies, there was a positive relation between moral stage and resistance to temptation. However, there was more ambiguity in the relation between moral reasoning and moral action; situational determinants appeared to play a role as well. With regard to honesty, Blasi reported findings of 17 studies; seven finding no support for the relation between moral reasoning and honesty; three giving mixed results; and seven supporting the relation. After examining the measures of moral reasoning and the assessments of honesty used, Blasi concluded that the relation between moral reasoning and honesty was supported. Finally, of the 19 studies of altruism, Blasi found 11 to confirm the relation between moral cognition and altruistic behavior, and therefore concluded that there was a relation present.

Overall, it appears that there is some connection between moral reasoning and certain indices of moral action, although the relation varies according to the action observed. As well, many of the studies may be flawed in that they may be assuming something to be a moral action, whereas in reality it may not be to the subjects involved. Blasi (1980) also argued that some of the inconsistent findings could be due to unclear rationale underlying the hypotheses made, such as researchers assuming an action to be immoral; the use of unreliable or
unstandardized assessments making comparisons of studies unclear; and inappropriate selection of behaviors for examination (e.g., sitting in for the FSM as indicating morally correct behavior).

**Offenders.** Evidence regarding moral reasoning within the adult offender population is scarce. In a review of the literature, Hayes and Walker (1986) found that in the few studies examining moral reasoning in adult offenders, slight or no differences were evident in comparison to non-offenders. However, they claimed that type of offence may be an important variable: that is, those at lower levels of moral reasoning may commit different types of crimes than those at higher levels. For instance, individuals with a preconventional outlook on life may commit more crimes which involve little chance of being caught. Thornton and Reid (1982) demonstrated that this could be the case. In their study they found that prudent offenders (those who committed crimes where there was little chance of getting caught) had lower levels of moral reasoning than either imprudent offenders or a control group. As well, Link, Scherer, and Byrne (1977) found psychopaths to be higher in moral judgment than either incarcerated non-psychopaths or normals. However, a problem with this research is that the incarcerated sample was composed of the criminally insane, which is one criterion used for excluding an individual from being classified a psychopath (Hare & Cox, 1978).

Other studies have attempted to raise prisoners' levels of moral reasoning through the use of intervention programs. For example, Arbuthnot (1984) implemented two treatment programs: one using Kohlberg's cognitive conflict model; and one using the "Association for Values Education Research" (AVER) program, which emphasized rational decision-making. He found that both programs produced significant increases in moral reasoning, which demonstrates that inmates are not necessarily fixated in their level of moral development. As well, Scharf and Hickey
(1976) initiated an alternative prison system for women, which was centered around sociolegal thinking. Comparing the posttest reasoning of the women in the model cottage to those in a traditional cottage within the same institution, they found higher reasoning for the individuals in the alternative system. In fact, these women showed more of an upward shift in moral reasoning on the posttest than did other male prison systems, one of which used a moral discussion group. A measure of recidivism was also taken, and indicated that only 16% of the women in the model cottage had returned to prison after 2 years in the community; although no comparison was made for recidivism with inmates in traditional cottages.

Although there has been little research on adult offenders’ levels of moral reasoning, it appears that when offence type is controlled, certain offenders are lower in moral reasoning than others, as well as being lower than non-offenders. Also, stage of moral reasoning does not seem to be fixed, since treatment programs have achieved successful results in raising levels of moral reasoning in inmates. There is also a hint that this may generalize to behavior, since lower recidivism rates were found for those inmates whose levels of moral reasoning were raised.

The research conducted on young offenders can be divided into three sections: studies examining moral reasoning in young offenders, as compared to a matched group of non-offenders or various subgroups of offenders; moral reasoning and behavior in young offenders; and evaluations of treatment programs devised for young offenders.

Quite a bit of research has been completed in the area of moral reasoning in young offenders, and there tends to be agreement among the results. Kohlberg (1958), in his initial study of moral reasoning, found that delinquents were significantly lower in moral reasoning than were their normal counterparts (preconventional as opposed to conventional). These results have been replicated.
numerous times with the MJI (Fodor, 1972; Hudgins & Prentice, 1973; Kohlberg, 1978); as well as with other measures of moral reasoning such as the DIT (Emler, Heather, & Winton, 1978; Hains, 1984; Hains & Miller, 1980; Hanson & Mullis, 1984); and the "Sociomoral Reflection Measure" (SRM)² (Gavaghan, Arnold, & Gibbs, 1983); with only a few studies finding no differences (Hains & Ryan, 1983; Jurkovic & Prentice, 1974). As well, literature reviews by Blasi (1980), Hayes and Walker (1986), and Jurkovic (1980), have all found delinquents to display lower levels of moral reasoning than non-delinquents. Therefore, it appears to be fairly well established that, as a whole, young offenders lag behind matched groups of non-offenders.

For those studies which found no significant differences in moral reasoning between offenders and non-offenders, a possible explanation could lie in the composition of the groups. That is, different subgroups of delinquents could vary on levels of moral reasoning. Therefore, some researchers have attempted to divide delinquents into various subgroups. For instance, predelinquents have been found to be lower in moral reasoning on the DIT than were normals (McColgan, Rest, & Pruitt, 1983). As well, Campagna and Harter (1975) found similar results with sociopaths, even when mental age was controlled for. In this study, however, sociopathy was defined in very broad terms which were basically behavioral, and no comparison group of incarcerated non-psychopaths was utilized. Jurkovic and Prentice (1977) did take these factors into account. In their initial study of delinquents and non-delinquents, they found no significant differences (Jurkovic & Prentice, 1974). However, in a later study, when they sub-divided delinquents into unsocialized psychopaths, neurotic-disturbed, and socialized-subcultural groups, psychopaths were found to be lower in moral stage than the other two groups, as well as a group of normals (Jurkovic & Prentice, 1977). In this study, incarcerated
male youths were classified into one of three groups only if their score on one scale of Quay and Parson's (1971) system exceeded their scores on the other scales by 50 points. Therefore, youths who were intermediary were not included. It was found that the psychopaths were more immature than the other three groups in cognitive development, role taking, and moral reasoning. These studies provide us with the idea that perhaps not all young offenders are the same in moral development, and maybe only some subgroups lag behind.

Other subgroup studies have consisted only of young offenders, and again seem to demonstrate the need to control for, or examine, certain characteristics within different groups of delinquents. For example, Blasi (1980) suggests the need to control for offence type when looking at stages of moral reasoning. Thornton and Reid (1982) attempted to do this, by examining the effects of offence type, and discovered that prudent young offenders, like adult prudent offenders, were lower in moral reasoning than were imprudent young offenders. Petronio (1980) found that delinquents who were repeat property offenders had higher levels of moral reasoning than were nonrepeaters; and Kohlberg (1978) suggested that drug addiction may play a role in the delinquency of conventional as opposed to preconventional youths. Furthermore, certain psychological characteristics, such as yielding to persuasion in a moral interview (Fodor, 1972), feeling no guilt over a crime (Douglas, Simonian, & Gibbs, 1987; Ruma & Mosher, 1967), and being a psychopath (Fodor, 1973), have been found to be negatively associated with level of moral reasoning.

It seems important, given the findings of these studies, to look at moral reasoning with regard to certain variables, such as number of offences, seriousness of crime, and various personality characteristics, in order to examine the ways in which different subgroups of offenders reason morally. Obviously there are very
different types of individuals in detention, and very different reasons why someone may commit a crime. Therefore, it seems appropriate to divide the young offenders according to a predetermined group composition; that is, psychopaths and non-psychopaths. Although other groupings could be used, psychopathy score, according to previous research, appears to be a useful group distinction to use.

The small amount of research conducted on the relation between moral reasoning and behavior in young offenders tends to show that those lower in moral reasoning commit more immoral acts. For instance, non-delinquents have been found to have higher levels of moral reasoning, and to resist the temptation to cheat more than delinquents (Hains & Miller, 1980; Sagi & Eisikovits, 1981). As well, Haviland (1977) demonstrated that delinquents used more punishment when teaching a rat to run a maze than did non-delinquents. Emler et al. (1978) also found that young offenders admitted to committing more delinquent behaviors than non-offenders, and to have lower moral reasoning. However, they also found that moral reasoning was not correlated with commission of crimes; indicating that some individuals high in moral reasoning admitted to committing more crimes; and conversely, some low in moral reasoning were found to commit less crimes. Therefore, predicting who will commit more crimes from level of moral reasoning, according to this study, may not be feasible. Along this line, Petronio (1980) found that young offenders who had repeated their crimes, had higher moral reasoning scores than non-repeaters, again demonstrating that other variables may be playing an active role in behavior. Petronio explained these results by proposing that as the delinquents committed more crimes, they utilized higher moral standards in order to rationalize the 'badness' of their actions.

In reviewing the literature on moral behavior, the data seem to reveal that delinquents commit more immoral acts than do non-delinquents. However, as
demonstrated by Emler et al. (1978), this does not necessarily mean that those with lower levels of moral reasoning behave less morally. It could be that some offenders, who are high in moral reasoning, commit certain offences; while those low in moral reasoning, commit others. It could also be the case that certain situational variables affect high and low moral reasoners differently. Therefore, this is another reason why number of offences and seriousness of offence were examined, in order to demonstrate differences in the two groups of offenders.

Lastly, researchers who have attempted to develop treatment programs in moral reasoning for juvenile delinquents have found that, like the adult population, those in the treatment groups improved in moral reasoning. For example, Rosenkoetter, Landman, and Mazak (1980) found that delinquents who were put into moral discussion groups increased one-fifth of a stage on the MJI. However, the problem with this study is that no control group was used for comparison. Fleetwood and Parish (1976) did include controls, and found that a juvenile delinquent group exposed to a moral dilemma discussion program scored higher on the DIT than did a group who did not participate in the discussions. As well, Niles (1986) found that a group of delinquents increased one-third of a stage on the MJI when exposed to a moral reasoning treatment program, whereas there was no increase for either a placebo or control group. They found no differences in behavior, however. Similar results were found using the SRM (Gibbs, Arnold, Ahlborn, & Cheesman, 1984); and using the MJI on behavior-disordered youths in a school setting (Arbuthnot & Gordon, 1986). Jurkovic (1980), however, in his literature review suggested equivocal results from studies that attempted to increase moral reasoning. Many of these studies, though, did not use the MJI or related measures, instead utilizing Piagetian moral reasoning tasks; therefore, comparisons are limited. As well, Hayes
and Walker (1986), although finding some success in the studies that tried to change moral reasoning, found the link to more moral behavior tenuous at best.

From the research findings on the criminal population, it appears that offenders on the whole do have some impairment in moral reasoning development, as compared to the normal population. However, this impairment is not necessarily typical of all offenders, as studies investigating various subgroups (e.g., psychopaths) have demonstrated. Inconsistent findings to date may in fact be due to grouping offenders into too broad categories, thereby eliminating any meaningful comparison groups. As well, offenders do not appear to be fixed at a lower level of moral development, since some treatment programs have evidenced an increase in moral reasoning due to moral discussion groups. Another point to be made is that we cannot be sure whether lower stage individuals commit more crimes or are more likely to be caught; or if incarceration leads to stunted moral growth.

In the area of behavior, the findings are inconsistent. Although offenders appear to have lower levels of moral reasoning, and also seem to have committed more numerous and serious crimes; the correlation is not always present. This means that some offenders have high levels of moral reasoning, and some normals have low levels; and commission of crimes is not always related to low levels of moral reasoning. Again, this points to the need to separate offenders into subgroups with common characteristics.

This study divided young offenders into psychopathic and non-psychopathic groups; controlled for such characteristics as race, age, sex, and parental occupational prestige scores; and examined variables like seriousness of offence and number of offences. In this way, important characteristics were either held constant or examined in relation to moral development, and one psychological characteristic was varied - psychopathy. Therefore, an attempt was made to
determine whether psychopaths differed in level of moral reasoning, or moral orientation, from non-psychopaths. As well, a comparison group of normals were utilized, in order to examine whether non-incarcerated youths differed from the psychopaths or delinquents on the measures used.

Psychopathy

According to the American Psychiatric Association's *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM-III) (1980), "antisocial personality disorder" can be characterized by the following criteria: beginning as a juvenile, a history of violating others' rights through continuous and chronic antisocial behavior; an inability to accept responsibility in employment or in social life; failure to respect the law; demonstration of aggressive and violent behavior; impulsivity; and disregard for the truth. If an individual displays a majority of these criteria, and the behavior is not due to physical causes such as mental retardation, he/she is considered to have an antisocial personality disorder. Another name for this syndrome is sociopathy or psychopathy as many now call it.

Although the DSM-III provides a fairly clear definition of psychopathy, the description, since it attempts to provide a diagnosis rather than an explanation for psychopathy, is behavioral and to a large extent ignores personality factors (Hare, 1986a). Therefore, too many criminals fit into the category antisocial personality disorder, although they may be quite different. Cleckley (1976), however, provided a caricature of a psychopath which includes elements of personality such as superficial charm, lack of affect, and absence of remorse. Although a behavioral description is easier to assess, Cleckley thinks that there is more involved than can be seen simply through observing behavior. That is, although the psychopath appears in many respects normal; this 'mask of sanity' can be displaced through a careful examination of the differences between his/her words and subsequent
actions. Hare (1983, 1985a) also believes that the DSM-III places too much emphasis on behavior and not enough on the personality characteristics underlying these behaviors; and therefore, the psychopathy checklist may be a more appropriate measure to use.

Hare (1985b) introduced the "Psychopathy Checklist", which is a revision of his original research scale (Hare, 1980). The checklist is a 20-item scale, which is used in the place of global clinical rating scales, for diagnosis of psychopathic individuals. Global ratings assessed psychopathy on the basis of a 7-point scale according to which an individuals' behavior and characteristics were consistent with Cleckley's (1976) conception of psychopathy. Although these ratings were reliable, the criteria for making a judgment were not clearly defined. In order to eliminate this problem, the psychopathy checklist was developed. Basically, the psychopathy checklist is completed after an interview with an individual concerning elements such as education, work history and goals, finances, physical and mental health, relationships, substance use, criminal history, and other general information. The interviewer then completes the checklist on a 3-point ordinal scale: 0, indicating that the item does not apply to the individual; 1, that the item applies to a certain extent; and 2, that the item applies to the individual. Hare (1983) found that his psychopathy checklist, which in addition to behavioral patterns examines personality correlates, had good agreement with the DSM-III in the diagnosis of psychopaths. It has also been found that the original (1980) checklist had high internal consistency and interrater reliability (Hare, 1980, 1983, 1985a; Hare & McPherson, 1984; Schroeder, Schroeder, & Hare, 1983). As well, preliminary results with the newer version of the checklist demonstrate that it has the same psychometric properties as the original and has high reliability in the classification of inmates (Hare, 1986a, 1986b).
It has been found that the group categorized as psychopaths do, in fact, differ from non-psychopathic individuals. For example, among adult prisoners it has been found that psychopaths tend to commit more crimes than non-psychopaths, particularly violent crimes (Hare, 1981; Hare & Jutai, 1983; Hare & McPherson, 1984; Wong, 1985). This finding led Hare and McPherson (1984) to the conclusion that psychopaths lack the inhibitory controls for some behaviors which causes them to commit these crimes. Also, Hare and Jutai (1983) demonstrated that psychopathic criminals do not burn out faster than non-psychopathic criminals, contrary to prior claims. In this study they found that although non-psychopathic criminal behavior peaked early and then declined, psychopathic criminal behavior did not follow that pattern. Gough (1948) also suggested that psychopaths may be deficient in role-taking abilities, which again distinguishes them from other criminal populations. Studies with delinquents have often divided subjects into subgroups such as unsocialized-psychopath, neurotic-disturbed, and inadequate-immature (Quay, Peterson, & Consalvi, 1960), and an additional group, socialized-subcultural (Quay & Parsons, 1971). Quay et al. (1960) found that psychopathic delinquency related to commission of crimes against persons, recidivism, and problem behavior while incarcerated; whereas neither neurotic delinquency nor inadequate delinquency did. As well, Jurkovic and Prentice (1977) demonstrated that the delinquent psychopathic group differed from neurotics, subculturals, and normals on moral reasoning and formal operational skills, again substantiating the group distinction. From these studies there appears to be justification for having the categorization psychopathy. These individuals seem to differ both cognitively and behaviorally from other groups of inmates and from non-incarcerated individuals.

The DSM-III stipulates that an individual must be at least 18 years old in order to fit the description of a psychopath. As well, much of the research on
psychopathy to date has evaluated adults rather than youths. However, many researchers believe that youths can also be labelled as psychopaths. In fact, Hare’s checklist is currently being used with younger subjects, and it appears from the preliminary findings that psychopaths can be distinguished from non-psychopaths with fairly good reliability, in young offender populations. For example, the interrater reliability of total scores for 50 young offenders at a correctional institute was .90 and the coefficient alpha was .90, with a mean score on the checklist 23.56 (SD = 8.17) out of 38. Global scores conducted on the same youths gave a mean score of 5.06 out of 7 (SD = 1.50) and interrater reliability for 17 subjects was .91 (Forth & Hare, 1987). Therefore, the psychopathy checklist appears to have good internal consistency as well as good interrater reliability, even when compared to the global ratings.

In the relation of psychopathy to moral reasoning, the little research that has been conducted has found incarcerated psychopathic youths to be lower in moral reasoning than incarcerated non-psychopaths (Fodor, 1973); and lower than non-incarcerated normals (Campagna & Harter, 1975). However, there are a couple of problems associated with these studies. First of all, they did not include incarcerated psychopaths, incarcerated non-psychopaths and non-incarcerated non-psychopaths within the same study. Therefore comparisons of moral development among all three groups were not made. This problem has been rectified by Jurkovic and Prentice (1977). In their examination of the various subtypes of delinquents, they included a non-delinquent group. The results showed psychopathic youths to be less morally mature than the other three groups, and no significant differences were found in moral reasoning between normals, neurotics and subculturals. Another problem with this research is that psychopathy is not assessed in a consistent manner across studies. That is, psychopathy ratings may take the form of clinical...
assessments, behavioral descriptions, or more objective measures such as Hare's psychopathy checklist. Therefore, in various studies the scoring systems used for psychopathy may not be reliable and the groups deemed to be psychopaths may differ from one study to the next.

The studies conducted to date indicate that psychopaths differ from the rest of the criminal population, as well as from non-incarcerated individuals, in their moral thinking. If this is in fact the case, an interesting question is whether this difference is fixed. Kegan (1986) suggested that psychopathy, rather than being innate, may be a specific type of developmental delay where individuals remain in the second stage of moral and cognitive development. The evidence he provided for this statement is, first of all that the common features of psychopathy are related to mental organization; that is, deficits in cognition, social-cognition, or affective areas. Second, contrary to what many suggest, Kegan believes that psychopaths, rather than being amoral instead are as moral as a normal 8- or 10-year old and simply lag behind in concerns of morality. Lastly, Kegan thinks that if psychopathy is developmental, then rather than finding a "cure", it needs to be "outgrown". Therefore psychopaths, although they may biologically be full grown, have not passed childhood in their thinking. There has been no longitudinal research, nor intervention programs, to date on this topic. Therefore, we cannot be sure whether delays in moral reasoning cause psychopathy, or whether psychopathy causes these deficits in moral reasoning development. As well, these differences in moral reasoning in psychopaths have not been empirically translated into differences in moral behavior.

This thesis attempted to address some of the shortcomings of other research connected to moral reasoning and psychopathy. By including three groups: psychopaths, delinquents, and normals, it was hoped that any differences among
these groups could be assessed while other measures remained constant. As well, by using Hare's checklist, which has been shown to have good reliability in distinguishing psychopaths, it was hoped that those youths deemed to be psychopathic actually would differ from the other incarcerated youths.

**Hypotheses**

This study attempted to integrate some of the findings on moral reasoning and moral behavior. By using three subject groups (incarcerated psychopaths, incarcerated delinquents, and non-incarcerated normals), differences which the syndrome of psychopathy make on individuals' moral reasoning were examined. By eliciting real-life dilemmas, comparisons could be made between reasoning about standard Kohlbergian dilemmas and a dilemma the subject has actually encountered.

Regarding the area of moral reasoning, I hypothesized that, following other studies, psychopaths would be lowest in moral reasoning on the MJI, followed by delinquents, and finally, normals would score highest. Since young offenders, and particularly psychopaths, tend to be the most immoral in their criminal behavior, it was believed that perhaps they would be the most immature in moral reasoning as well. Although no research has been conducted to date on these groups, the same result was predicted for real-life dilemmas.

Regarding the difference in subjects' scores on the hypothetical and real-life dilemmas, it was hypothesized that, although all groups would score lower on the real-life as opposed to the hypothetical dilemmas, the young offenders would have a larger difference in their moral reasoning scores between the two situations than the non-offenders. This was hypothesized since I believed that normals would probably reason with more consistency about their own actions, and how they think they should act. However, I believed young offenders would probably say they
should do a certain action in a hypothetical situation; whereas in a real situation they would be more discrepant in describing their actual performance.

In relation to moral orientations, following de Vries and Walker's (1986a) findings, I hypothesized that real-life dilemmas would pull utilitarianism and perfectionism orientations; and hypothetical dilemmas, normative and fairness orientations. As well, I hoped to extend other studies (Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982; Tietjen & Walker, 1985), and hypothesized that non-offenders would utilize fairness and perfectionism orientations (Subtype B) more than young offenders. I believed this would be the case, since those deemed to be moral leaders in previous studies appear to use more of the Subtype B orientations. As well, although I believed that the dominant orientations to be used by all of the subjects would be the normative and utilitarianism, I hypothesized that psychopaths would more often use the egoistic utilitarianism orientation, and the other groups would utilize this less often. Since psychopaths are characterized, more so than non-psychopaths, as demonstrating concern with regard to their own actions (Cleckley, 1976), this orientation appears the most appropriate for them, and may distinguish them from the other subjects even at the same stage of moral thought.

In brief, the hypotheses of this study were:

**Hypothesis I.** Psychopaths would score lowest on moral reasoning measures, followed by delinquents, and finally normals would score highest, as evidenced in both hypothetical and real-life dilemmas.

**Hypothesis II.** All groups would score lower on the real-life dilemmas than the hypothetical dilemmas. However, incarcerated subjects would show a bigger gap between their real-life and hypothetical reasoning than would non-incarcerated subjects.
Hypothesis III. Real-life dilemmas would pull utilitarianism and perfectionism orientations, whereas hypothetical dilemmas would pull normative and fairness orientations.

Hypothesis IV. Non-offenders would use more fairness and perfectionism (Subtype B) orientations than would the young offenders.

Hypothesis V. Among all groups, use of the normative and utilitarianism orientations would be higher than use of the fairness and perfectionism orientations. However, psychopaths would use more of the utilitarianism, specifically the egoistic utilitarianism, orientation than would non-psychopaths, even when controlling for moral stage.
Method

Subjects

The initial sample for this study consisted of 31 Caucasian male young offenders, incarcerated at a residential correctional facility for young offenders, and a comparison group of 15 Caucasian male high school students. The controls were matched as closely as possible with the young offenders on variables such as age, education, and occupational status of parents. Only males were included since there were relatively few females residing at the correctional institute (approximately 10% of the total population). These subjects ranged between 15 and 18 years of age.

Through the use of Hare's psychopathy checklist (Appendix C-2) and scoring criteria, the young offenders were divided into two groups: psychopaths and delinquents. Those who scored 28.5 or more, out of a possible 38 (or 75%, as designated by Hare, 1985), on the checklist were considered to be psychopaths; and those with a score of less than 26.5 were deemed the delinquents. A small buffer zone was included in order to have the highest delinquent and the lowest psychopath separated by at least 2 points. From the initial group of young offenders, two subjects were excluded from further analyses as they were within this buffer zone. Therefore, the final groups consisted of 14 psychopaths, 15 delinquents, and 15 normal adolescents (total N = 44).

In order to determine whether there were any differences across groups in demographic characteristics, analyses of variance (ANOVA), with group as a between-subjects factor, and subsequent Tukey multiple comparison tests as appropriate, were conducted, for the following variables: age, education, and father's and mother's occupational status (as assessed by the Standard International Occupation Prestige Scale, Treiman, 1977). These analyses revealed no significant
effects, except for age, indicating that these groups are reasonably well matched. The analysis for age revealed that psychopaths were significantly older than either delinquents or normals (17.5 versus 16.6 and 16.7 years). This confound between psychopathic status and age is not of much concern for the interpretation of the results of this study since it has typically been found that age and level of moral reasoning are positively correlated and it is hypothesized here that psychopaths (i.e., the oldest subjects) will be lowest in moral reasoning. Thus, this confound provides a more conservative test of the hypotheses under examination than would be the case if the groups were perfectly matched for age. Note that, despite the age differences, there were no differences across groups in level of education (one of the best predictors of level of moral development, Walker, 1986a).

Procedure

Consent to interview the youths was obtained from both the correctional facility and the high school. Then by examining the files of the young offenders, potential subjects were picked who fit the criteria established above. These youths were then approached and asked to participate in the study. High-school students, who matched as closely as possible the incarcerated subjects, were similarly recruited. Subjects were assured of the confidentiality of the information and were asked to sign a consent form regarding participation, and where necessary, parental consent was obtained. Subjects were paid $5 for their participation. All adolescents approached agreed to participate in the study.

All youths were individually interviewed; first they responded to the standard Kohlbergian dilemmas (Appendix A), then they were asked to generate and discuss a real-life dilemma (Appendix B), and finally were given the psychopathy interview (Appendix C-1). The psychopathy interview was completed after the moral reasoning interview in order to ensure that the youths' answers did not influence the
The entire interview took from 1 to 2-1/2 hours to complete, with more time typically required for the young offenders' interviews since the psychopathy interview was more relevant for these youths. The interviews were audio-taped: the psychopathy interview was reviewed for the scoring process and the moral reasoning section was transcribed for scoring of stage of moral reasoning and usage of moral orientations.

**Materials**

**Hypothetical Moral Reasoning.** Hypothetical moral reasoning was examined through a modified version of Kohlberg's MJI (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). Two of Kohlberg's dilemmas, from Form C of his interview, were utilized: "Valjean" and "The Two Brothers" dilemmas (Appendix A). Although there are typically three hypothetical dilemmas posed in the MJI, due to time constraints, two dilemmas were believed to be sufficient. Since consistency has been found between the various hypothetical dilemmas (Walker 1986a), two dilemmas appear to be a sufficient basis for evaluating an individual's level of moral reasoning.

**Real-Life Moral Reasoning.** Subjects were asked to relate a real-life moral dilemma that they had experienced. Once the dilemma was generated, answers regarding the conflict, the solution, and whether the action taken was the right one were sought (Appendix B). Appendix D contains a synopsis of the content of the real-life dilemmas.

**Psychopathy.** The psychopathy checklist (Appendix C-2) was completed on each subject, following a modified version of Hare's psychopathy interview (Appendix C-1). This measure has been devised to differentiate psychopaths from non-psychopaths through a structured interview focusing on the previously explained elements of the individual's life. The incarcerated subjects' files were also examined in order to observe any discrepancies in information given by the subjects.
themselves. The psychopathy checklist combines information from both the interview and the files and generates an overall psychopathy score. In this way the young offenders were separated into psychopathic and delinquent groups. The high school control group were also given the psychopathy checklist in order to ensure that none of them scored within the psychopathic range. These subjects comprised the normal group.

Scoring

**Psychopathy.** From the audio-taped sessions, the interviewer completed the psychopathy checklist ratings, and calculated a score out of 38 for each subject, thereby distinguishing the psychopaths from the non-psychopaths. As well, another experienced independent investigator completed the psychopathy checklist for a randomly chosen one-third of the subjects (N = 13). Interrater reliability was found to be r = .97, which is consistent with, or slightly higher than, other research in this area (Forth & Hare, 1987; Hare, 1986a).

As was expected, none of the normal subjects fit within the psychopathic range, and they therefore constituted a good non-psychopathic control group. An ANOVA of psychopathy score across groups revealed a significant difference across all three groups (p < .001). The mean psychopathy rating for psychopaths was 33.79 (SD = 2.19, range = 31-37); for delinquents the mean rating was 19.13 (SD = 5.33, range = 7-26); and for normals, 7.73 (SD = 3.88, range = 2-14). Therefore it appears that there are three distinct groups, with normals scoring the lowest in psychopathy, delinquents next, and finally, psychopaths with the highest scores.

For the incarcerated subjects (psychopaths and delinquents), the overall mean psychopathy rating was 26.23 (SD = 8.37), with an alpha coefficient of .92. This
again is consistent with, or slightly higher than other studies conducted with young offenders (Forth & Hare, 1987; Moran, 1987).

**Moral reasoning.** Moral reasoning for both the hypothetical and real-life dilemmas was scored following Colby and Kohlberg's (1987) manual. Scoring was conducted blindly and by each dilemma separately across subjects. In the hypothetical dilemmas, each statement that matched a criterion judgment (which indicates both stage and orientation), in the appropriate section of the manual, was scored. Since the manual is not designed specifically for real-life dilemmas, scoring of these dilemmas followed Walker et al.'s (1987) procedure, in examining general stage definitions, rather than particular critical indicators.

1. **Moral stage.** Both weighted average scores (WAS) and global stage scores (GSS) were determined for each subject, for both the hypothetical and real-life dilemmas. The WAS is the sum of the products of the percent usage at each stage multiplied by the number of that stage (ranges from 100 to 500). The GSS, on the other hand, was analyzed on a 9-point scale, which is assigned on the basis of the pattern of percent usage and consists of pure and mixed stage scores. A pure stage is assigned if one stage has 25% or more of the scored responses; whereas, a mixed stage score is assigned if two stages each have more than 25% of the scores.

2. **Moral orientation.** Moral orientation scores (normative, fairness, utilitarianism, and perfectionism) were assessed through the elements which accompany the criterion judgment scores. Each score was expressed as a percentage of all scored responses attributable to the elements depicting the orientation (following Walker, 1986b). Since one hypothesis focused on the egoistic component of the utilitarianism orientation, a percentage score was calculated for this as well. The egoistic utilitarianism orientation is comprised of two of the four
elements in the utilitarianism orientation: concern regarding reputation and seeking reward; and appears to differentiate "self" versus "other" concerns.

3. Interrater reliability. Interrater reliability was established by having a second independent rater blindly score 15 randomly selected interviews. For the hypothetical dilemmas there was 80% agreement on the 9-point GSS scoring, and reliability on the WASs was $r = .75$. For the real-life dilemma, interrater reliability for the WAS was $r = .79$, and for the GSS there was 73% agreement.

For moral orientations the reliability coefficient between raters was .80 for the hypothetical dilemmas, and .75 for the real-life dilemmas.

These reliabilities, although not perfect, are within the acceptable range for such subjective scoring and are typical of those reported in the moral development area (e.g., Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, & Lieberman, 1983; Walker, 1986a).
Results

In order to examine the five major hypotheses, a series of analyses were conducted. Each hypothesis and its related results will be discussed in turn.

Level of Moral Reasoning

Hypothesis I focused on group differences in level of moral reasoning, with the expectation that psychopaths would score the lowest, followed by the delinquents, and that the normals would score the highest. To examine this hypothesis, a 3(Group: psychopaths, delinquents, normals) x 2(Dilemma: hypothetical, real-life) ANOVA, with repeated measures on the last factor and using the WAS as the dependent variable, was conducted. The resultant ANOVA summary table is presented in Table 2. Significant differences were found among the groups, F(2, 41) = 5.575, p < .01; also between dilemmas (which will be discussed with respect to Hypothesis II); however, no significant interaction effect was found. Therefore, this demonstrated a difference among the three groups in level of moral reasoning.

In order to examine exactly which groups differed from one another in level of moral reasoning, a Tukey multiple comparison test was conducted. It was found that the normal youths were significantly higher than both the psychopaths and delinquents in WASs (mean WASs averaged over hypothetical and real-life dilemmas were 257.47 versus 224.43 and 230.17).

Although the psychopathic youths were not found to be significantly different from the delinquents on their moral reasoning scores, when these scores are examined (Figure 1), it can be seen that the psychopaths do score lowest, especially on the real-life dilemma, followed by the delinquents, and the normals score highest.

In order to illustrate further these group differences in moral reasoning, two crosstabulation tables were completed for the GSSs: one for the hypothetical GSS and one for the real-life GSS. Since the numbers in some of the cells were too
Table 2

Summary of the Analysis of Variance for the Weighted Average Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of variance</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9131.336</td>
<td>5.575*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error (between)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1637.976</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dilemma</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>48311.301</td>
<td>61.482**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group x Dilemma</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>356.664</td>
<td>0.454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error (within)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>785.780</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* $p < .01$

** $p < .001$
Figure 1. Mean weighted average scores for hypothetical and real-life dilemmas.
The image contains a bar graph with the following details:

- **Legend**
  - HYPOTHETICAL
  - REAL-LIFE

- **Y-axis**
  - Labeled as WEIGHTED AVERAGE SCORES
  - Ranges from 185 to 295

- **X-axis**
  - Labeled as GROUP
  - Categories are Psychopaths, Delinquents, and Normals

The graph shows the weighted average scores for each group, with the Hypothetical scores significantly higher than the Real-Life scores for each category.
small, no further analyses were conducted. The results showed that all the youths tended to use lower stage reasoning, mostly within the preconventional and conventional levels. This was not surprising since all subjects were within the age range of 15 to 18, and should therefore be at approximately the same level of moral development. As can be seen from Table 3, it does appear that psychopaths used lower stage reasoning, delinquents slightly higher, and finally the normals used the highest. In reasoning regarding the hypothetical dilemmas, the psychopaths ranged from Stages 2 to 3, with Stage 2/3 where the majority fit. Although most of the delinquents also utilized Stage 2/3, their stage use ranged from 2/3 to 3, with none in Stage 2. Finally the normal youths ranged from Stages 2/3 to 3/4, with only 46.67% at Stage 2/3.

In the real-life dilemmas, the psychopathic youths ranged from Stage 1/2 to 2/3, with Stage 2 being the modal stage. Delinquents ranged from Stage 1/2 to 3 and Stage 2/3 was their modal stage. Finally, the normals’ stages ranged from 1/2 to 3, with Stage 2/3 being the modal stage.

As can also be observed from this table, there was a clear dilemma difference, with the hypothetical dilemmas eliciting mostly conventional level reasoning, and the real-life dilemmas eliciting preconventional, for these subjects.

**Hypothetical versus Real-Life Moral Reasoning**

Hypothesis II stated that all groups would score lower on the real-life dilemmas than the hypothetical dilemmas. However, it was expected that the incarcerated subjects would show a bigger gap between their real-life and hypothetical reasoning than would the non-incarcerated subjects. As revealed by a previous analysis (Table 2), there was a significant difference between dilemmas, \( F(1, 41) = 61.482, p < .001 \), with all groups scoring lower on the real-life than the hypothetical dilemmas (mean WASs = 214.23 versus 261.07; about half a stage...
Table 3

Percentage of Youths at each Global Stage Score for Hypothetical and Real-Life Dilemmas, by Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>1/2</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>2/3</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>3/4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hypothetical</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychopaths</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delinquents</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normals</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Real-Life</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychopaths</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delinquents</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normals</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
difference). However, this analysis failed to reveal the predicted interaction between group and dilemma. Therefore, although the incarcerated youths did score significantly lower in WASs than the non-incarcerated, and all groups scored lower on the real-life dilemmas than the hypothetical, it was not found that the young offenders had a bigger gap between their real-life and hypothetical reasoning than the non-offenders (see Figure 1).

Moral Orientation

Hypothesis III predicted that real-life dilemmas would pull utilitarianism and perfectionism orientations; whereas hypothetical dilemmas would pull normative and fairness orientations. To examine this, a $3(\text{Group}) \times 2(\text{Dilemma})$ ANOVA, with repeated measures on the last factor, was completed for each of the four orientations. The results indicated that there was a significant difference between dilemmas for the normative, $F(1, 41) = 28.701, p < .001$, fairness, $F(1, 41) = 5.711, p < .05$, and utilitarianism orientations, $F(1, 41) = 43.629, p < .001$. However, no significant difference was found for the perfectionism orientation. Since four ANOVA's were conducted with regards to these orientations, the probability of Type I error is increased; that is, one of the ANOVA's is more likely to be significant by chance alone. Therefore, the Bonferroni inequality test (Snedecor & Cochran, 1980) could be used to rectify this. The critical value, then, would change from .05 to .013, and therefore the normative and utilitarianism orientations would still be significant and the fairness orientation, although not significant, would be close ($p = .02$). Figure 2 illustrates that the differences are in the predicted direction, with hypothetical dilemmas pulling more of the normative and fairness orientations than the real-life; and real-life dilemmas pulling more of the utilitarianism orientation than the hypothetical. However, the percentage of the perfectionism orientation is fairly constant across both the hypothetical and real-life dilemmas. These analyses yielded
Figure 2. Percentage of normative, fairness, utilitarianism, and perfectionism orientations in hypothetical and real-life dilemmas.
no other significant main or interaction effects, except for a group effect for the perfectionism orientation, $F(2, 41) = 7.249, p < .01$. Less usage of this orientation was evidenced by the psychopathic and delinquent youths than by the normals. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis regarding Subtype B examined in the following section.

Subtype B

From Hypothesis IV, it was expected that non-incarcerated youths would use more of the fairness and perfectionism (Subtype B) orientations than would the incarcerated youths. In order to examine this hypothesis, a 2(Group: incarcerated, non-incarcerated) x 2(Dilemma) ANOVA, with repeated measures on the last factor and using Subtype B as the dependent variable, was performed. As can be observed from Table 4, there was in fact a significant difference found between the two groups, $F(1, 42) = 7.752, p < .01$, with the non-offenders using more than twice as much Subtype B reasoning than the young offenders (means = 28.0% versus 12.1%). As well, the difference between dilemmas was close to significance, $F(1, 42) = 3.967, p = .053$, with hypothetical dilemmas pulling more Subtype B than did real-life dilemmas.

Egoistic Utilitarianism Orientation

Hypothesis V predicted that among all groups, use of the normative and utilitarianism orientations would be higher than use of the fairness or perfectionism orientations. However, it was also expected that the psychopathic youths would use more of the egoistic utilitarianism orientation than would the non-psychopaths. As can be seen from Figure 2, for both the hypothetical and the real-life dilemmas, the normative and utilitarianism orientations were used more often than the fairness and perfectionism orientations. Overall, the normative and utilitarianism orientations were
Table 4

Summary of the Analysis of Variance for Subtype B Scores between the Incarcerated and Non-Incarcerated Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of variance</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5028.840</td>
<td>7.752**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error (between)</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>648.713</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dilemma</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1292.068</td>
<td>3.967*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group x Dilemma</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>241.617</td>
<td>0.742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error (within)</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>325.678</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p = .05

** p < .01
used the most (23.9% and 58.8%, respectively). The fairness orientation was used 8.4% and the perfectionism orientation, 8.8%.

In order to examine whether psychopaths used more of the egoistic utilitarianism orientation than the non-psychopaths, a 2(Group: psychopaths, non-psychopaths) x 2(Dilemma) ANOVA, with repeated measures on the last factor and using the egoistic utilitarianism orientation as the dependent variable, was completed. The resultant summary table is described in Table 5. The results of the ANOVA showed significant group, dilemma, and interaction effects. Therefore, in order to determine the locus of this interaction, the simple main effect of group was examined for both real-life and hypothetical dilemmas. For the hypothetical dilemmas there was no significant difference between the psychopathic and non-psychopathic youths. However, for the real-life dilemmas, a significant group effect was found, $F(1, 42) = 6.312, p < .05$, with the psychopaths using more of the egoistic utilitarianism orientation than non-psychopaths. Figure 3 demonstrates this result. Therefore, it appears that, although psychopaths do not use more of the egoistic utilitarianism orientation than non-psychopaths when discussing hypothetical dilemmas, they clearly use more of the egoistic utilitarianism orientation than do non-psychopaths when discussing real-life dilemmas.

Recall that it was hypothesized that this group difference in usage of the egoistic utilitarianism orientation would appear even within the same stage of moral reasoning. To examine this prediction for the real-life dilemma, subjects' moral stage scores were recoded into modal Stage 2 or lower ($N = 31$) and modal Stage 3 ($N = 13$) and then a 2(Group) x 2(Stage) ANOVA was conducted (a similar ANOVA for the hypothetical dilemmas was not conducted since the previous analysis revealed no significant effects). As before, a significant group effect was revealed, but no other
Table 5

Summary of the Analysis of Variance for the Egoistic Utilitarianism Orientation between Psychopathic and Non-Psychopathic Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of variance</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5867.992</td>
<td>6.671*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error (between)</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>879.564</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dilemma</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>37524.453</td>
<td>61.217**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group x Dilemma</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2967.742</td>
<td>4.842*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Simple Main Effects

| Group for Hypothetical Dilemmas | 1  | 244.789     | 1.862 |
| Error (between)                 | 42 | 131.437     |      |
| Group for Real-Life Dilemmas    | 1  | 8590.909    | 6.312* |
| Error (between)                 | 42 | 1361.111    |      |
| Error (within)                  | 42 | 612.976     |      |

* p < .05

** p < .001
Figure 3. Percentage of egoistic utilitarianism orientation for psychopaths and non-psychopaths in hypothetical and real-life dilemmas.
Legend

PSYCHOPATHS
NON-PSYCHOPATHS

PERCENT EGOISTIC ORIENTATION

HYPOTHETICAL
REAL-LIFE

DILEMMA
effects, indicating that psychopaths' greater focus on egoistic concerns was found even when controlling for moral stage.

Finally, as is evident from Figure 3, the dilemma effect reveals more usage of the egoistic utilitarianism orientation for real-life dilemmas than for hypothetical dilemmas (consistent with the findings discussed in the previous section on moral orientations).
Discussion

Some interesting results of this study can be seen from the previous section. First of all, there was a clear difference between the incarcerated and non-incarcerated youths in moral reasoning, with higher scores found for the non-incarcerated subjects. And although not statistically significant, there was a pattern whereby psychopaths scored lowest in moral reasoning, followed by delinquents, and finally the normals scored highest. Secondly, with regard to moral orientations, many of the expected findings occurred, particularly that the psychopaths used more of the egoistic utilitarianism orientation than did the non-psychopaths; and that the non-offenders used more Subtype B reasoning than did the young offenders. Finally, differences between hypothetical and real-life reasoning were found throughout the analyses. This section discusses the implications of these results.

Psychopathy

The psychopathy checklist, from a comparison of this study with related research, appears to be a reliable measure for distinguishing psychopaths from non-psychopaths, even within an adolescent population. The implication of this finding is that youths as young as 15 can be meaningfully categorized as psychopaths, and therefore classification need not wait until an individual is 18, as is stipulated in the DSM-III. In order to examine whether psychopathy evidences a developmental trend, further research could focus on longitudinal studies of young offenders in order to discern whether over time they become more or less psychopathic. It could be that these youths are developing into psychopaths; or alternatively this condition could be a temporary adolescent phase some youths pass through.
Another interesting finding is that the psychopathy checklist seems appropriate for use with a non-criminal population. That is, two independent researchers were able to achieve good interrater reliability in the classification of these youths. As well, the normal group's mean checklist score serves to demonstrate that they are in fact a distinct group from the delinquents. Although little work has been done with non-incarcerated adolescents, it appears important to be assured that the "normal" sample used in a study does not include any psychopathic members.

Moral Reasoning

The results of the present research are consistent with previous studies (Emler et al., 1978; Fodor, 1972; Gavaghan et al., 1983; Hains, 1984; Hains & Miller, 1980; Hanson & Mullis, 1984; Hudgins & Prentice, 1973; Kohlberg, 1958, 1978) in demonstrating non-incarcerated youths to be more advanced in moral reasoning than incarcerated youths. In this study, differences averaged about one-third of a stage. However, in an examination of the three groups, although the mean WASs showed psychopaths to be lowest, delinquents the next highest, and normals the highest in moral reasoning, the difference between the psychopaths and delinquents was not significant. Studies such as Fodor (1973) with incarcerated psychopaths and incarcerated non-psychopaths; Campagna and Harter (1975) with incarcerated psychopaths and non-incarcerated normals; and Jurkovic and Prentice (1977) with incarcerated psychopaths, incarcerated neurotics, incarcerated subcultural delinquents, and non-incarcerated normals; all found psychopaths to be significantly lower than the other groups in moral judgment. Since these three studies used somewhat less reliable measures for distinguishing psychopaths, the difference between this study and the previous ones may simply be due to how the groups were established. Therefore, this research may have different types of youths labelled as psychopaths. It is also possible that significant levels were not achieved
in this study because the difference in psychopathy score between some of the delinquents and psychopaths was not very large. Perhaps if a larger buffer zone was utilized, as in Jurkovic and Prentice (1977), significant differences would have appeared. Or alternatively, if a larger sample size was used, conventional significance levels may have been achieved among all three groups.

It appears from this study that Kohlberg’s theory of moral reasoning can differentiate those youths who have committed what society deems to be immoral acts (i.e., young offenders), and somewhat less clearly, a subgroup of these incarcerated youths, psychopaths. Therefore, there does seem to be a connection between moral reasoning and moral action, with those youths who have committed crimes scoring lower in moral reasoning than those who have not committed crimes, on both hypothetical and real-life dilemmas.

If, as this research demonstrates, young offenders and particularly psychopaths are less mature in moral development than normals, it would be important to examine whether this is due to incarceration or whether their moral immaturity leads them to commit the crimes initially. As well, an appropriate next step would be to examine where differences lie within the real-life dilemmas of the incarcerated and non-incarcerated subjects. So, perhaps an investigation of the practical considerations which intervene between moral reasoning and action could tell us more about why one person commits an immoral act and another person does not.

Moral Orientation

With regards to the moral orientations, consistent with de Vries & Walker (1986a), hypothetical dilemmas were shown to pull the normative orientation; whereas real-life dilemmas pulled the utilitarianism orientation. As well, when using the critical value established by the Bonferroni procedure, the fairness orientation was close to significance, with hypothetical dilemmas pulling more than real-life dilemmas.
However, unlike their findings, in this study the use of the perfectionism orientation was consistent across dilemmas. Therefore, it appears that abstract dilemmas focus more on justice issues and rule following, whereas real-life dilemmas tend to elicit a focus on consequences to self and/or others. This study only included adolescents and therefore the variations between this and de Vries and Walker's findings could be due to the fact that very few of the adolescents utilized this orientation at all. Perhaps it is the case that the perfectionism orientation is used more by adults in their real-life dilemmas, rather than by youths.

Consistent with other research in this area (de Vries & Walker, 1986a; Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982; Tietjen & Walker, 1985), overall the normative and utilitarianism orientations were used more than the fairness or perfectionism orientations. Since all of the youths in this study fall within the preconventional or conventional levels, it seems to be the case that the normative orientation (with its focus on following rules) and the utilitarianism orientation (with its focus on concern for self or others) are connected with lower levels of moral development. In the real-life dilemmas, the utilitarianism orientation was used much more frequently than the other three, so perhaps individuals focus more on self or other interests when discussing dilemmas they have actually encountered. Also, in the real-life dilemmas the normal youths focused more so than the delinquents or psychopaths, on the perfectionism orientation. That is, they tended to focus on an image of a "good self" more so than the other two groups. This difference could be due to the actual dilemmas generated. Most of the incarcerated youths discussed a conflict concerning a crime, and they often admitted being in the wrong. The normal youths, on the other hand, tended to discuss conflicts in which they acted in ways they considered to be morally correct. So, the normal youths may have utilized the perfectionism
-64-

orientation more than the incarcerated subjects since they, in this instance at least, were trying to achieve a good self image.

Non-incarcerated youths were found to use more of Subtype B (fairness and perfectionism) than the incarcerated youths. This follows studies which found higher Subtype B use for city than rural youths (Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982); tribal leaders than non-leaders (Tietjen & Walker, 1985); and those opposed to capital punishment than those in favor of it (de Vries & Walker, 1986b). It appears, then, that those individuals who can be termed "moral leaders" tend to use more Subtype B reasoning, where there is a focus on justice and an image of the "good self".

Finally, with regards to the egoistic utilitarianism orientation, it appears that when discussing their real-life dilemmas, the psychopaths used more of the egoistic utilitarianism orientation than did the non-psychopaths even when at the same stage of moral development. Therefore, both groups used close to the same amount of the egoistic utilitarianism orientation, where there is a focus on concern for reputation or seeking reward, when they were discussing hypothetical dilemmas, but when it was a situation they were actually involved in, psychopaths became more concerned about themselves, and less about others, than did the non-psychopaths. Perhaps in more abstract situations psychopaths try to give the most objective answers, whereas in an actual situation, the practical considerations concerning self become more salient to these individuals.

It appears then that moral orientation give useful information about these youths, and about the dilemma differences. Subtype B reasoning seems to be able to separate incarcerated from non-incarcerated subjects and demonstrates the different concerns expressed by each. As well, the egoistic utilitarianism orientation gives some very unique information. In the real-life dilemmas all youths were more concerned about themselves than others, as compared to the hypothetical dilemmas.
However, the psychopaths used significantly more of this egoistic thinking that did non-psychopaths in the real-life dilemmas. So, this orientation may demonstrate that psychopaths, when talking hypothetically, claim they worry about other people, but when they are in an actual situation they forget about others and their concern shifts to self-interests.

**Hypothetical versus Real-Life Dilemmas**

Clear differences were found in level of moral reasoning between types of dilemma, with all groups scoring lower on the real-life dilemmas than on the hypothetical dilemmas. This finding is consistent with other studies which have found hypothetical dilemmas to pull higher reasoning than more true to life dilemmas (Higgins et al., 1984; Kohlberg et al., 1971; Leming, 1976; Linn, 1987) and with real-life dilemmas generated by the subjects themselves (Walker et al., 1987). Therefore, it appears from this study that hypothetical dilemmas may elicit an individual’s highest possible level of moral reasoning, reasoning someone may give if he/she were subtracted from the situation at hand. Real-life dilemmas, however, may elicit moral reasoning that is somewhat lower than what an individual is capable of, reasoning that takes into account the many practical considerations involved in an actual situation of moral conflict. This appears true of all the groups examined. Therefore, real-life dilemmas may be getting closer to explaining how an individual’s level of moral reasoning actually influences his/her moral behavior.

The implications of these findings are that perhaps hypothetical and real-life dilemmas could be used to assess different areas of moral development. The MJI may be more suited to examination of an individual’s best competence level in moral reasoning, and therefore these abstract dilemmas may be better for distinguishing differences between people on a standardized measure. The real-life dilemmas, on the other hand, may be more applicable to moral reasoning regarding behavior. That is,
these dilemmas may elicit a more realistic assessment of individuals' moral judgment while they are dealing with a moral conflict and which includes more practical concerns relating to the situation.

Since differences were found between the hypothetical and real-life dilemmas, of what consequence is this finding to Kohlberg's structure criterion? According to this criterion, individuals should be consistent in their reasoning across situations. However, in this study, the youths were not consistent in their reasoning from the hypothetical to the real-life dilemmas. Rather, all subjects were about a half a stage lower (one interval on the 9-point scale) in moral reasoning when discussing a situation they were involved in, than in more abstract dilemmas. There are several possible reasons for the discrepancy between Kohlberg's theory and the current results. First of all, the youths were asked to generate a real-life dilemma they had already encountered and since some of the questions regarding their dilemmas were retrospective, it is possible that the individuals' reasoning reflected the moral stage they were in when the conflict occurred. So perhaps the youth, if in the situation now, would use the same level of moral reasoning as he did for the hypothetical dilemmas. Secondly, it is possible that the hypothetical dilemmas elicit higher stage reasoning because they do not include any practical considerations, or ego controls. Therefore, referring back to Kohlberg and Candee's (1984) model, perhaps real-life situations bring non-moral skills into the picture, thereby bringing down an individual's highest possible level of moral reasoning in order to include these ego controls.
References


Niles, W. J. (1986). **Effects of a moral development discussion group on delinquent and predelinquent boys.** *Journal of Counselling Psychology, 33,* 45-51.


Footnotes

1. The DIT is a ranking scale developed as an alternative to Kohlberg's MJI, and is designed as a recognition measure which assesses moral reasoning.

2. The SRM is a group-administerable written production-task measure of sociomoral reasoning adapted from Kohlberg's MJI.
Appendix A

Hypothetical Dilemmas
Hypothetical Dilemma 1

In a country in Europe, a poor man named Valjean could find no work, nor could his sister and brother. Without money, he stole food and medicine that they needed. He was captured and sentenced to prison for 6 years. After a couple of years, he escaped from the prison and went to live in another part of the country under a new name. He saved money and slowly built up a big factory. He gave his workers the highest wages and used most of his profits to build a hospital for people who couldn't afford good medical care. Twenty years had passed when a tailor recognized the factory owner as being Valjean, the escaped convict whom the police had been looking for back in his home town.

1. Should the tailor report Valjean to the police? Why or why not?

2. Suppose Valjean were a close friend of the tailor, should he then report him? Why or why not?

3. Does a citizen have a duty or obligation to report an escaped convict?

4. If Valjean were reported and brought before the judge, should the judge send him to jail or let him go free? Why?

5. Thinking in terms of society, should people who break the law be punished? Why or why not? How does that apply to what the judge should do?

6. Valjean was doing what his conscience told him to do when he stole the food and medicine. Should a lawbreaker be punished if he/she is acting out of conscience or moral motives?
Two young men, brothers, had gotten into serious trouble. They were secretly leaving town in a hurry and needed money. Karl, the older one, broke into a store and stole $500. Bob, the younger one, went to a retired old man who was known to help people in town. Bob told the man that he was very sick and needed $500 to pay for the operation. Really Bob wasn't sick at all, and he had no intention of paying the man back. Although the man didn't know Bob very well, he loaned him the money. So Bob and Karl skipped town, each with $500.

1. Which is worse, stealing like Karl or cheating like Bob? Why?

2. What do you think is the worst thing about cheating the old man? Why?

3. In general, why should a promise be kept?

4. Is it important to keep a promise to someone you don't know well or will never see again? Why or why not?

5. Why shouldn't someone steal from a store?
Appendix B

Real-Life Dilemma
The two stories we have just discussed represent examples of moral dilemmas. A moral dilemma is when you have two or more options as to what you could do, and you cannot decide what the right thing to do is. In other words, you have to make a decision about what is the right thing to do in a situation, and you aren’t sure what to do. For example, the tailor’s moral conflict, in the first story, was whether or not to report Valjean.

1. Could you describe a situation you were in when you had a moral conflict as to whether or not you should do something.
   - Describe the situation leading up to the dilemma.
   - What were the two sides of the conflict for you?
   - Why was it a conflict for you?

2. In thinking about what to do in this situation, what did you consider, or think about?
   - Pro and con considerations for both sides of the argument.

3. What did you do?
   - Do you think you did the right thing?
   - How do you know it was (wasn’t) the right thing to do?
Appendix C-1

Psychopathy Interview
Psychopathy Interview

ID Number: ___________________________ Date: ______________________

Interviewer: ___________

I. GENERAL INFORMATION

*How much time do you have left to serve in this institution? _________

Age: ____ Date of Birth (day/mo/yr): ______________________

Place of Birth: ______________________

Race: ___________

Father's Occupation: ___________

Mother's Occupation: ___________

II. EDUCATION

1. What is the highest grade you've completed?

2. Any upgrading? To what grade?

3. Have you ever had any college/technical/apprenticeship programs? Describe the nature and level of these programs.

4. Number of Elementary schools attended? If more than one, why changed?
   - Number of High schools attended?

5. In Elementary school, what was your attendance level like (days missed per year for last 2 years not including final year)?
   - Attendance level for High school?

6. How did you do in Elementary school? (grades received, failed, why)?
   - How did you do in High School?

7. In Elementary school, how did you get along with others? (fighting, many friends, enemies, introverted/extraverted)?
   - How did you get along with others in High school?

8. When you were in Elementary school, did you like school? (Boring, any trouble paying attention, day-dreaming, hyperactive)? How would your teacher describe you?
   - Did you like High School?
9. In Elementary, did you ever get in trouble in school for:
   - Disturbing class? How often (per week)?
   - Attend school drunk/stoned? How often (per week)?
   - Striking teacher/principal? How often (per week)?
   - Stealing from teacher/students? How often (per week)?
   - Other? How often (per week)?

How about High school? (read list)

In Elementary school, how often were you sent out of the classroom or to the principal's office (per week)? How often in High school?

Ever suspended or expelled from Elementary school? Number of times? Age? What for?
- How about from High school?

III. WORK HISTORY

10. Have you ever had a job (full-time, part-time)? Employment record? (ask for each job separately)
   - Position (duties)?
   - From - To - Length?
   - Financial/personal enjoyment (boring)?
   - Why did you leave?

*11. How long between leaving school and first job?

12. Are you a reliable employee? How often are you late or absent? (days per month)

13. Have you ever left a job with no other job in sight? How many times? Why?

14. Have you ever been fired from a job? How many times? Why?

15. Have you ever collected UI? How many times? For how long?

16. Have you ever collected welfare? How many times? For how long?

17. What is the longest time you have been unemployed? How did you support yourself?

18. Have any of these been your source of income? Age onset? Age offset? Regular? Earnings (per month)?
   - Selling drugs? What were you selling?
   - Fencing? What things did you sell?
   - Prostitution?
   - Pimping?
   - Fraud (conning people)?
   - Rolling people (mugging)? How would you pick people? Anyone hurt?
   - Beating people up for money (enforcement)?
   - Others?
IV. CAREER GOALS

19. Is there any trade/occupation you would like to have?

20. Have you planned or done anything to prepare for this occupation?

21. What are your plans after release?

V. FINANCES

22. Have you ever had a loan (bank, personal?)? Do you always pay back your debts?

23. Have you ever fallen behind on payment of your bills (or debts)? If so, what happened?

VI. MEDICAL HISTORY

24. Medical history (i.e., any major illnesses or hospitalizations)

25. Are you on any medications presently? In the past?

26. General health?
   - Hearing, Eyesight, Any reading disorders when growing up?

27. Any head injuries? Ever been knocked unconscious? Any severe headaches, seizures? Age onset?

VII. MENTAL HEALTH

28. Have you ever seen a psychologist/psychiatrist? On the street? When incarcerated? When (first time)? What for? What was the diagnosis and treatment? Did you go because you wanted to, or were you sent?

29. Have you ever received medication for your nerves? Have you ever been in a psychiatric ward?

30. As a child were you ever diagnosed as "hyperactive"? By whom? What age? Treatment? Onset/offset?

31. Have you ever tried to commit suicide? (serious, manipulative) When? How many times? Have you ever thought seriously about it?
VIII. FAMILY LIFE

32. Who were you raised by (note all that apply throughout childhood): Ages and with whom (biological, foster, step-parents).

33. Have your parents ever been on welfare?

34. Siblings: Birth order: _____ of _____ children. Age and sex?

35. Could you describe your home life: What are you parents like - each one separately (warm, caring/ cold; do you feel loved; temper). Describe your relationship with parents (can you manipulate them; do you love them)? Are your parents strict (how often were you punished; type of punishment; treat siblings the same as you)? Did your parents make many rules (such as)? How often did you break the rules? Age onset? Why (physical/sexual abuse, parental separation)? If you broke the rules, what was the punishment? Behavior of siblings? Describe your relationship with you brother/sisters (can you manipulate them; are you close to them; do you love/hate them)?

36. How well do your parents get along (physical/verbal fighting, any separations - how often)? If so, how did this effect you?

37. Have any of your family/relatives ever been in trouble with the law? What for?

38. Do your parents drink or use drugs?

39. Did either of your parents have any psychological problems for which they sought or received treatment?

40. Have you ever run away from home (overnight)? How many times? Ages? Why? Did you contact parents? Did you tell anyone? How old the first time? How long were you away for?

41. Have you ever left home for good? Age? Why? What did you do?

42. Have you ever "hit the road" and traveled without real plans? Did you tell anyone?

43. Have you ever been without a fixed address? Longest time without a fixed address?

*44. How do your parents/partner feel about you being in here? (If negative, how does that make you feel)? For first sentence? For current offence?

CONTACT WITH FAMILY (parents, siblings)

*45. How often do you contact your parents/siblings while on the street (regular contact)? Where do they live now? If no contact, why?

*46. How often do you contact (phone, write) them while you're incarcerated.
IX. RELATIONSHIPS

A. Friendships

47. Is there anyone you feel close to (friend, relative)? Why? Do you like it the way it is? How do you feel about having/not having someone?

B: Sexual Affairs - live-in sexual relationships with male or female:

48. Have you ever been married or lived common-law (ask about each one)? Began when? Ended when? Length? Describe relationship: love/physical, quarreling, physical fights, break-ups, why did it end, length of time to get over, favorite/least favorite quality, manipulative, absences, were you close, trust, were you in love, equal relationship. If not reported, ask if any homosexual relationships. Also if no marriages or common-law relationships, ask about serious girl/boyfriend.

49. Have you ever been deeply in love?

50. How old were you when you had your first sexual relationship?

51. Can you give an estimate of the number of sexual partners you have had? How many were one-night stands?

52. Have you ever been unfaithful to any of your partners? How often? Describe (Partner found out? Reaction? Partner cheat on you?).

53. Do you have any children? If yes, number? Marriage/outside marriage? Any step-children?
   * If children - do you keep in contact with them? Inside and outside of prison?
     - Children's age, birthdate, grades in school - describe
     - Do you financially support your children? Were you ever required to pay child support? If yes, did you?
     - Are you a responsible parent (ever left kids alone, ever spent money for kids on yourself, ever fail to obtain proper health care when necessary)?

X. SUBSTANCE USE

54. Drug use - Have you ever used (age of 1st use of every one; frequency of regular use - day per month):
   - Alcohol
   - Marijuana/hash
   - Stimulants (uppers, speed, T/R)
   - Downers (sedatives, seconal, quaaludes)
   - Tranquilizers (valium, librium)
   - Cocaine
   - Heroin
   - Opiates (opium, methadone, morphine)
- Psychedelics (LSD, MDA, PCP, mushrooms, mescaline)
- Glue/gas sniffing (or solvents, PAM)
- Other?

55. Why do you use drugs (stimulation, escape, relaxation)?

56. Have you ever been addicted to any drugs? Tolerance or withdrawal symptoms? Past or planned treatment?

57. Does your behavior change while you are drunk or stoned (more aggressive, mellow)?

58. Do you ever drive while drunk or stoned? How many times?

59. Do you have any driving violations (speeding, dangerous driving, serious car accidents)? Number of violations? Do you like to speed/take chances when you drive?

60. Do you ever do crazy or dangerous things for fun? What sorts of things?

XI. CRIMINAL HISTORY

61. Do you have any previous charges? Age? Details? Sentence?

*62. What is the longest sentence you have received to date? For what? What age?

63. Are there any crimes which you have committed but were not caught for (including drug use, shoplifting)? Types (list them)?

*64. Were your offences usually: a) spontaneous/planned; b) with others/alone?

*65. Were you usually: a) stoned or drunk/straight or sober; b) nervous/confident; c) the initiator or leader of offences/ the follower?

66. Have you had any informal contact with the law. If yes, how old were you?

*67. At what age did you start doing crime? How old were you when you got your first charge? What were you doing?

68. Have you ever vandalized a school? Someone else’s property? Have you ever set fires? Hurt animals for fun?

*69. What is your current offence - charges/number, sentences?

*70. Describe the offence (what did you do, spontaneous/planned, nervous, role of accomplices, drunk or stoned, motivated by addiction, relationship to victim, who was responsible for the arrest)?

*71. Do you feel this sentence is fair?

*72. Do you think this sentence will have any effect on your life?
73. Who or what was responsible for the offences (who is to blame)?

74. Do you regret having committed them? Why or why not?

75. What effect did the offences have on the victim(s)? How do you feel about the effect on the victim(s)? Have you had any contact with the victim(s)?

76. What is the longest period since age 15 during which you have kept straight? When was it?

77. Did drug use occur before/after onset of criminal activity?

78. Has your drug/alcohol use been a large factor in your getting into trouble?

79. Have you ever used aliases? To whom? Why?

80. Have you ever been on probation? Number of times? Successful?

81. Why did you start crime?

82. Why are you still doing it? What do you like about it?

83. What factors would help you to keep out of trouble in the future?

XII. GENERAL QUESTIONS

84. When do you lose your temper? What do you do?

85. Are you impulsive (do things on the spur of the moment) or are you cautious?

86. Do you get bored easily?

87. Is it easy for you to tell a lie? To whom do you lie? Are you good at lying?

88. Do you find that people are usually fairly easy to con or manipulate? What is the best con you have ever done?

89. Have you ever done anything that made you feel guilty or that you were sorry you had done? If so, what (other than crimes)?

90. What is the most depressed you have ever been? When?

91. Has anyone close to you died? If so, how did you feel?

92. In friendships and relationships, do you open up to other people or do you tend to keep others at a distance?

93. Are you an emotional person? Can you turn your emotions off?

94. If the price were right, is there anything you would not do? If so, what?
95. Do you have a pretty good self-image or do you feel bad about yourself?

96. Are you satisfied with the life you have led so far? Is anything missing from your life? Would you do anything differently if you could live it over?

97. What do you think of authority (eg., teachers, the staff)?

INTERVIEWER'S IMPRESSIONS

A. Appearance

1. Facial expressions of emotions
2. Posture, movements (slow, quick, jerky, frequent)
3. Eye contact
4. Voice expression (volume, tone)
5. Proximity, body language

B. Personality

1. Verbal behavior (good listener, story-telling)
2. Charm, humor
3. Self-esteem, confidence, composure
4. Impatience, irritability
5. Sincerity
6. Manipulativeness
7. Affect: range, depth, appropriateness
8. Empathy
9. Self-image

* These questions were not given to the non-incarcerated subjects.
Appendix C-2

Psychopathy Checklist for Adolescents
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Glibness/superficial charm</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Grandiose sense of self-worth</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Need for stimulation/proneness to boredom</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Pathological lying</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>Conning/manipulative</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>Lack of remorse or guilt</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Shallow affect</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>Callous/lack of empathy</td>
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<td>9.</td>
<td>Poor behavioral controls</td>
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<td>10.</td>
<td>Promiscuous sexual behavior</td>
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<td>11.</td>
<td>Behavioral problems in family life</td>
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<td>12.</td>
<td>Behavioral problems in school</td>
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<td>13.</td>
<td>Lack of realistic, long-term goals</td>
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<td>14.</td>
<td>Impulsivity</td>
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<td>15.</td>
<td>Irresponsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Failure to accept responsibility for own actions</td>
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<td>17.</td>
<td>Juvenile delinquency</td>
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<td>18.</td>
<td>Revocation of conditional release</td>
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<td>19.</td>
<td>Criminal versatility</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* scoring referred to formal contact before age 17 and entailed: 2 = murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, rape, robbery, assault, kidnapping, arson, possession of weapons; 1 = theft, B & E, drug offences, fraud, mischief, willful damage, driving offences, possession of stolen property, escape, vandalism; and 0 = no juvenile history.

** scoring entailed: 2 = AWOL; 1 = breach of probation; 0 = was on probation, but no breaches; omit = if never on probation.

*** scoring entailed: 2 = 4 or more charges; 1 = 3 charges; 0 = 1 or 2 charges; omit = if no charges.
Appendix D

Content of Real-Life Dilemmas
Content of Real-Life Dilemmas

Psychopaths

- Whether or not to do property damage
- Whether or not to do a break and enter
- Whether to go to mother's house for dinner or to a party
- Whether or not to be a witness against brother in court
- Whether or not to do an armed robbery (3 subjects' dilemmas)
- Whether or not to pay back a drug dealer for drugs
- Whether or not to shoot someone
- Whether or not to steal a truck
- Whether or not to stop, when being chased by the police
- Which girlfriend to choose
- Whether or not to help a friend (and get in trouble yourself)
- Whether or not to shoot a wounded horse

Delinquents

- Whether to spend money on Christmas presents or party with it
- Whether or not to do a break and enter (6 subjects' dilemmas)
- Whether or not to break into cars
- Whether or not to escape
- Whether or not to steal (2 subjects' dilemmas)
- Whether or not to turn self in
- Whether or not to take friend's car joy-riding
- Whether or not to go to a rodeo (and risk getting caught) or stay in town
- Whether or not to skip school (and get kicked out)

Normals

- Whether or not to go to school
- Whether or not to steal
- Whether or not to tell on a friend who took parent's car without permission
- Whether or not to report a friend to the police (4 subjects' dilemmas)
- Whether or not to report someone who is vandalizing a school
- Whether or not to yell at a teacher
- Whether or not to tell on a friend who is cheating
- Whether or not to report two bullies
- Whether or not to lie regarding sister's friends whereabouts
- Whether or not to smoke cigarettes
- Whether or not to drink when pressured by friends
- Whether or not to drive bike down wrong side of the road