EPISTEMOLOGY, INVENTION, AND THE AIMS OF RHETORIC

by

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A major objective of contemporary writing instruction is to equip students with skills that enable them to communicate information in clearly organized prose. In particular, the formal inventional strategies of argumentative discourse assist students in imparting information in logically consistent structures. Unfortunately, when emphasis is placed mainly on formal and organizational concerns, the activity of writing seems to become for students an end in itself, detached generally from any genuine communicative purpose and any actual context outside the writing class. Argumentative writing that emphasizes formal structures can appear to students to be little more than an exercise which affords them opportunity to demonstrate their facility with organizational and formal logical skills, an exercise which appears essentially to isolate writers from their ethical commitment to, and responsibility for, the impact and consequences of their arguments for their readers. Another indirect yet nonetheless major consequence of the emphasis on formal argumentative skills is that students tend to overlook the vital function that argumentative discourse performs in the realm of sociopolitical, cultural, and humanistic issues and disputes. In effect, students are less likely to realize that informal argumentative skills can improve their effective access to this realm. One of
the major aims of the composition class then should also be to prepare our students for their roles as responsible literate contributors to the well-being and maintenance of their society and culture.

In order to participate effectively in this realm, students require informal inventional skills (that is, strategies for discovering, judging and selecting the most effective arguments for a particular piece of discourse) that accommodate the contingent and variable subject matter and issues that characterize sociopolitical and cultural discourse: opinions, values, beliefs. Students require not only strategies for organizing information, but also strategies for analyzing the peculiarities and specific features of audiences and context, and ultimately for incorporating these characteristics into the discourse.

The purpose of this paper is to argue that contemporary composition pedagogy should complement formal argumentation with instruction in informal argumentation. One way of achieving this culturally and politically valuable objective is to revive, with some modification to suit contemporary students and circumstances, the model of informal argumentation and invention posited in classical rhetoric. The ancients based their inventional strategies for persuasive argumentation on the complex relationship between the aims of rhetoric and epistemological concerns,
strategies that reflected the ethical and emotional, as well as logical, components of most cultural and sociopolitical discourse.

Chapter One describes the classical model of informal argumentation. This chapter details the array of informal inventional strategies prescribed in the Greco-Roman rhetorical tradition of Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian. These strategies derived from a profound understanding of the ethical, emotional, and logical interplay characteristic of the aims and context of political, judicial, and civic disputes. During the Middle Ages, rhetorical pedagogy privileged not informal argumentation, but modes of discourse that responded to this essentially non-democratic period. Relying not on effective public oratory to conduct its civic, cultural, and political affairs but rather on formal and stylistic arts, the Middle Ages privileged *ars praedicandi* (the art of preaching), *ars dictaminis* (the art of letter-writing) and *ars poetriae* (preceptive grammar). The Renaissance, with its emphasis on civic humanism, revived the classical tradition of informal argumentation. The influence of Aristotle but mainly Cicero and Quintilian is evident in the representative rhetorics of Erasmus and Thomas Wilson.

Towards the end of the Renaissance, the classical tradition of informal argumentation encounters its severest
interruption, as Chapter Two explains. Due to the overwhelming influence of the New Science and Logic on all branches of study during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, subsequent rhetorics incorporated formal treatments of invention and argumentation, thereby replacing informal argumentation in rhetorical pedagogy. Responding to the efforts of Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes, and John Locke in the seventeenth century, and to David Hume and David Hartley in the eighteenth, to devise empirical and rational methods that would generate a body of certain, undisputable truth and knowledge about the material as well abstract worlds, eighteenth-century rhetoricians such as George Campbell, Hugh Blair and, in the early nineteenth century, Richard Whately, adopted definitions of logical reasoning, proof, and evidence derived from the New Logic. The influence of Campbell, Blair, and Whately on nineteenth-century composition instruction was extensive. Popular composition rhetorics such as those of Alexander Bain, Henry Day, and John Genung also privileged formal argumentation.

The tradition of formal argumentation dominates contemporary writing instruction. As Chapter Three argues in its examination of composition texts by Frank J. D'Angelo, William E. Messenger and Peter A. Taylor, and James A. McCrimmon, the bulk of current composition rhetorics and handbooks privilege formal argumentation. Formal argumentation is not particularly effective in the
realm of sociopolitical and humanistic affairs. A number of contemporary theorists recognize this shortcoming; theorists such as Maxine Hairston, Janice Lauer, Gene Montague, Andrea Lunsford, and Janet Emig, Linda Flower, and Rise B. Axelrod and Charles R. Cooper propose models of informal argumentation.

In order to reinforce the need to complement formal argumentation with informal argumentation, Chapter Four highlights the insights of modern rhetoricians such as Kenneth Burke, Richard M. Weaver, Wayne C. Booth, and Chaim Perelman. Reviving in many basic respects the fundamental yet profound wisdom of classical rhetoric, these rhetoricians expound insights into the nature of human disputes, communication, and interaction that highlight the cultural, sociopolitical, and humanistic aims and responsibilities that rhetorical pedagogy should promote. In essence, their discussions support this thesis' claim that contemporary composition pedagogy needs to revive a framework and model of informal argumentation that assists our students in responding to these very aims and responsibilities.
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INTRODUCTION

One of the most striking inadequacies of college-level writing instruction is that students are not provided with inventional strategies that improve their ability to engage in informal argumentation. I define the realm of informal argumentation as the humanistic world of ideas, beliefs, values, and opinions. This is the realm of social and political actions and affairs. In order to improve our effective participation in it, we need to address the inextricable relationship among human nature, human knowledge, and human interaction and communication. A model of writing instruction whose rhetorical aims include the preparation of students to contribute responsibly to the sociopolitical well-being of their society and its members must recognize that the substance and nature of this realm of discourse inevitably involve not only rational but also psychological, emotional and ethical, and moral concerns. Informal argumentation can serve to achieve this aim. However, formal argumentation rather than informal argumentation dominates current writing instruction. As a result of this common shortcoming in college writing instruction, students are often unable to appreciate that inventional skills can improve their effective participation in the realm of human affairs and actions. Concurrently, students fail to appreciate that, in general, writing offers them effective access to this complex realm.
In the bulk of contemporary writing instruction, the inventional component of written argumentation includes mainly strategies for the formal management of arguments. This widespread regard for formal inventional strategies results from the twentieth century's inheritance of a rhetorical and pedagogical tradition influenced by rational and empirical views of science and knowledge derived from the seventeenth-century epistemology of Francis Bacon, John Locke, and Rene Descartes. Although induction and deduction, and other modes of formal arrangement do, indeed, prove useful for organizing and structuring argumentative discourse, these inventional skills mainly prepare students for their academic and technical writing; these skills mainly enable students to organize information and knowledge into formal arguments.

These formal strategies, however, often prove ineffective for conducting arguments in humanistic contexts. Formal induction and deduction, the privileged modes of argumentation in current writing instruction, are strategies incompatible with the world of uncertainties, probabilities, and unverifiable truths and knowledge.¹ All too often have

¹ This is the world of matters we share or address with others. In this world, our views and opinions can be challenged by others who are also concerned with or affected by the subjects and issues we find compelling, issues that be moral, economic, political, cultural, educational or religious. Clearly, a formally valid argument, one whose
we seen that rigid logical and rational modes of argumentation are of little help when our aim is to promote a belief or value, to support an opinion, to justify a course of action, or to change someone's mind. Since these purposes prevail in our everyday concerns and conduct, our students need invention strategies and a rationale for informal argumentation, if they are to participate effectively in the humanistic world of ideas and actions.

The thesis then has two main purposes: 1) to identify in the history of rhetoric the major events that have led up to the formal skills approach to argumentation so widespread in contemporary writing instruction; and 2) to argue the culturally valuable need to include informal argumentation in current composition instruction. Chapter One will discuss the rhetorical foundation for informal argumentation.

propositional structure is logically consistent, advocating legalized abortion or euthanasia, for example, will have little effect on an audience comprised of devout Catholics. Other examples of real world issues that comprise this realm include questions such as the following:

(1) should the government be able to prohibit doctors from extra-billing patients?

(2) should public transit rates for students be decreased to 50% the regular fare?

(3) should an introductory level course in literature study and composition remain a required course to be taken by students at the University of British Columbia?

Each of these questions involves an issue to which there are two sides, and for both sides of which variable yet convincing and effective arguments can be found.
posited in classical rhetorical theory. This chapter will also delineate the purpose and invention method for rhetorical argumentation prescribed by Greco-Roman rhetoric. Chapter Two will discuss the impact of the "new" logic on formal argumentation and rhetorical proof during the seventeenth and eighteenth century, focusing particularly on the "new scientific" tradition in rhetorical education that replaced the classical tradition. This chapter will also discuss the influence of the new tradition on nineteenth century rhetoric. Chapter Three will evaluate a number of contemporary composition texts whose formal treatment of argumentation follows in the new rhetorical tradition, but consequently little serves the student in the conduct of his or her everyday affairs. Chapter Three will also evaluate a number of contemporary composition texts that offer treatments of informal argumentation that serve as humanistic alternatives to formal argumentation. Chapter Four will examine several modern theories about argument in order to establish a theoretical foundation and rationale for teaching informal argumentation.
CHAPTER ONE
THE CLASSICAL TRADITION OF INFORMAL ARGUMENTATION

To appreciate the value of including invention strategies for informal argumentation in current writing instruction, we need to look at the history of rhetoric. The classical rhetorical tradition of Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian offers contemporary writing theorists a theoretical and practical model of informal argumentation, valuable in its insights into the complex nature of human argumentation. This model offers guidelines for a humanistic alternative to current formal invention approaches to written argumentation.

Throughout the history of the discipline of rhetoric, practical models of argumentation have been informed by a theoretical discussion of the complex interplay between epistemology and the aims of rhetoric. The classical tradition of informal argumentation was built upon a theoretical foundation that addressed the role that probable, contingent, or unverifiable knowledge played in persuasive argumentation in a variety of humanistic contexts. However, this tradition is interrupted in the Middle Ages due to changes in the aims assigned to rhetoric, aims that reflected both the close connection between Christian theology and epistemology and the essentially non-democratic nature of this period. Although Medieval
rhetoric replaces the classical tradition with three formal arts, *ars praedicandi* (the art of preaching), *ars poetriae* (grammar study), and *ars dictaminis* (the art of letter writing), it is the Renaissance with its strong emphasis on civic humanism that recovers the classical model of informal argumentation.

The rhetoric of ancient Greece and Rome was characterized by its commitment to serving social and cultural aims. In response to this commitment, the ancients promoted a rhetorical education that provided students with invention strategies for engaging in informal argumentation in a variety of political, judicial, and civic contexts. In these strategies, Greco-Roman rhetoric displayed its profound understanding of the nature of contingent human discourse, the logical and psychological complexities of human argumentation, and the nature of knowledge in the various arenae of human concerns and conduct. Essentially, these invention strategies were built upon a theoretical foundation reflecting the complex interplay between epistemology and the aims of rhetoric. This theoretical foundation in turn predicated a pedagogical tradition that regarded rhetoric as a humanistic discipline committed to the well-being of the society and the culture.

In the classical world, rhetorical theory and education dealt with five divisions or canons that assisted the rhetor
in the preparation of a speech: **inventio** (the invention or discovery of arguments), **dispositio** (the arrangement of the material in the speech), **elocutio** (the study of style and diction), **memoria** (the study of mnemonic devices), and **actio** (delivery or rules for the rhetor concerning voice control, stance, and gestures).

Invention, the first division, detailed methods for the discovery of the subject matter and arguments appropriate to a speech which aimed to effect persuasion. The classical mode of invention included guidelines for establishing the "status" of the argument - that is, the question to be argued - and recommendations for selecting proofs relevant to the argument.

Two types of proofs were acknowledged: non-artistic and artistic. Non-artistic proofs included the statements of witnesses, confessions, or contracts. Since such proofs were considered to be outside the rhetor's art, the classical rhetor focused principally on three forms of artistic proof, each corresponding to an element in the rhetorical occasion - the speaker, the person addressed, and the subject. **Ethos** was concerned with the persuasive power of the speaker's character; **pathos** was concerned with the ways of appealing to the audience's emotions; and **logos** dealt with the appeal of logical arguments. Logical persuasion included two types of arguments: the enthymeme
(the rhetorical counterpart of the syllogism or logical deduction) and the example (the rhetorical equivalent to logical induction). The *topoi* (or commonplaces) provided the lines of argument, or the propositions, for the enthymeme. Three types of oratory corresponded to the arenae in which the rhetor employed the art of persuasion: 1) deliberative or political, 2) forensic or legal, and 3) epideictic or ceremonial.

The methodology of rhetorical invention delineated by the rhetoricians of ancient Greece and Rome reflected a coherent and complete treatment of the means of discovering and deciding upon the subject matter and the arguments of a speech. In these precepts and guidelines, the ancients provided the means for engaging in informal argumentation in the realm of human affairs and conduct, a realm consisting of common beliefs, popular opinion, and probable knowledge. The Aristotelian-Ciceronian system of rhetorical invention incorporated an epistemology that provided for probability and for apparent truth. The ancients viewed as essential to their theory of rhetoric an explicit discussion and statement of the functions, purposes, and aims of rhetoric since this discussion provided the basis from which the artistic precepts of invention were derived. In their theoretical and practical approach to invention, the Greco-Roman rhetoricians displayed an astute appreciation of the nature and realm of informal argumentation. As a result of
this astute awareness, classical rhetorical pedagogy versed students in the vital role of rhetoric in the maintenance of culture and society. Unlike the majority of our contemporary students, students of classical rhetoric came to appreciate rhetoric's contribution to humanistic as well as cultural and social aims.

By establishing probable knowledge as the basis of the art of rhetoric, Aristotle proffers a theoretical foundation for informal argumentation as well as a resource for rhetorical invention from which the rhetor can draw subject matter and arguments, a resource both informed by probable knowledge, common beliefs, and popular opinion and based on unverifiable or demonstrable knowledge.¹ In his practical

¹ Although the classical tradition of informal argumentation first takes systematic shape with Aristotle (See George Kennedy's The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) for a discussion of pre-Aristotelian rhetoric, particularly Chapter Three.), it is Plato's harsh rebuke of Sophistic oratory that motivates Aristotle's rhetorical theory. Kennedy suggests that Aristotle's Rhetoric is an attempt to refute Plato's prescriptive view of a "true" rhetoric (pp. 14-18). Two dialogues convey Plato's criticism of a rhetoric concerned with apparent, mutable knowledge and contingent civic and political affairs: Gorgias and Phaedrus. In Gorgias, trans. W.D. Woodhead, in Plato: The Collected Dialogues, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), Socrates attacks rhetoric as a part of education for political life, claiming that the courts and other assemblies are more interested in beliefs and appearances than in genuine knowledge of right and wrong (454a - 465e). In Phaedrus, trans. R. Hackforth, also in Plato: The Collected Dialogues, Socrates advocates instead a true rhetoric, one governed by the moral aim "to influence men's
wisdom, Aristotle appreciated rhetoric's value as the "faculty of discovering in the particular case what are the available means of persuasion" (1355b). The cases to which Aristotle refers commonly involve an issue under deliberation and always occur in the realm of human affairs where absolute truth is neither available nor absolutely verifiable. As Aristotle states in *Rhetoric* (1357a), "the duty of rhetoric is to deal with such matters as we deliberate upon . . . such as seem to present us with alternative possibilities." These matters involve human actions.

Aristotle's concern with probable knowledge is a major feature of his discussion of *logos*. Of the three means of persuasion which the rhetor can rely on through the use of language, *logos*, deals with the persuasive arguments which the rhetor provides to prove a truth or an apparent truth. Two types of proof are available to the rhetor: the example and the enthymeme. The example, a form of rhetorical induction, involves one variety of argument. The rhetor seeks to prove a case by citing a parallel case comprised souls", by leading them to virtue and ideal truth (271c - 272b).

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either of actual past facts or of invented analogies. By suggesting the similarity between the example and the case in question, the rhetor attempts to establish a similar correspondence between the outcome of the example and that which he aims to prove. Aristotle cautions, however, that the rhetor should resort to argument by example when he is unable to argue by enthymeme. Examples should supplement the enthymeme; if the examples precede the enthymeme, the argument takes on an inductive air, which, according to Aristotle, "rarely suits the conditions of speech-making" (1349a).

The enthymeme, or rhetorical deduction, follows the three part form of the syllogism: major premise, minor premise, conclusion. Whereas the syllogism is a formal pattern of reasoning with expressed premises, the enthymeme may imply rather than express its major premise. The enthymeme also differs from its syllogistic counterpart in terms of its truth value: the major premise of a syllogism must be an established truth, one that is scientific, demonstrable, or known to be absolutely true. The major premise of the enthymeme, on the other hand, may be probably true or even unverifiable. The unverifiability of certain kinds of knowledge is a cornerstone to the Aristotelian theory of rhetoric, a point Aristotle plainly makes in Book 1 (1356b) when he states that "rhetoric is concerned . . . with what seems probable to men." Enthymemic reasoning is
based on premises "generally admitted or believed" (1357a). Aristotle explains that the enthymeme consists of fewer propositions than the syllogism since there is no need to mention propositions drawn from common knowledge or familiar fact (1357a). These propositions the hearer himself supplies.

The conclusions which arguments based on general probabilities lead an audience to draw are not inevitably true, but only generally true. The formal validity of enthymemetic argumentation doesn't necessarily justify the conclusion. Since human actions are frequently of a contingent nature, the deliberation of human affairs similarly assumes a contingent or variable character. For this reason, enthymemes may be based either upon propositions that are apparently true or upon propositions that are necessarily true.

In Aristotle's treatment of the enthymeme, rhetoric is characterized as an art which makes probability its basis. Aristotle's concern is with discerning contingent or probable knowledge, that knowledge potentially shared by the rhetor and the audience, or based on common belief. This dynamic governs the nature and the form of the enthymeme; the rhetor identifies ethos, that is, those features of his personal character that he can project through his speech, those specific features that he wishes his audience to
acknowledge and respond to. The rhetor implicitly incorporates into his argument pathos, that is, the assumptions, the popular opinions, or the knowledge which he perceives his audience to hold.

Aristotle's treatment of the enthymeme consequently provided students of classical rhetoric with a mode of reasoning that was particularly well-suited to persuasive argumentation in the realm of contingent human knowledge and concerns. These students, unlike most contemporary students, learned composite invention skills, not merely formal skills, but analysis, discovery, and judgement. Students of classical rhetoric learned that the discovery and selection of the most appropriate and effective arguments included the identification and analysis of the audience's beliefs, values, and opinions, as well as the analysis of the subject matter itself. In his discussion of enthymememic reasoning, Aristotle essentially illustrates his view of persuasive argumentation as an interactional activity involving an array of logical and psychological choices.

In conjunction with the enthymeme, the topoi guided the discovery of subject matter; or, in other words, the topoi supplied the proofs of the speech. The rhetor employed these lines of argument to guide the selection of facts and details about the subject that pertain directly to the case
to be argued (Rhetoric, 1396). As Aristotle discerned, the rhetor often cannot know all the facts about the subject. Nor does he require them all to form the basis for his argument. The topoi assist the rhetor in selecting from his store of common and specialized knowledge the information that proves relevant to the speech.

Aristotle's list of lines of argument include matters pertaining to good and evil, the noble and the base, and justice and injustice, as well as matters concerning character, emotions, and moral qualities (1396b, 30-35). This list, according to Aristotle, offers a selection of arguments about the general range of concerns or questions that the average Greek citizen might have occasion to dispute. In this feature of Aristotle's treatment of the topoi, we see that classical rhetoric prepared students for effective participation in the realm of human affairs and conduct.

Reflecting the nature of persuasive argumentation as an interactional process involving appeals to the "complete person", Aristotle's discussion of the three means of artistic persuasion - ethos, pathos, logos - is indispensable to an art of rhetoric committed to social and cultural aims. The generating principle at the heart of his theory of invention is that the speaker must know his audience in order to effect persuasion. The theoretical
guidelines for deciding what to say require the speaker's considerable attention not only to the subject matter but also to the audience to be persuaded, particularly the beliefs, opinions, and values it subscribes to.

In his discussion of the types of oratory, Aristotle further displays his understanding of the nature of persuasion and rhetorical invention. He discusses three varieties of oratory in terms of the audience addressed, the desired aim of the speech, and the particular occasion or situation. Recognizing the relevance of these three strategic concerns for discovering the available means for persuasion, Aristotle incorporates them into his theory of invention:

(1) In deliberative oratory, the speaker aims to advise a political assembly on matters concerning expedient or harmful actions;
(2) In forensic oratory, the speaker aims to establish the justice or injustice of an action by either attacking or defending somebody in a law-case;
(3) In edideitic oratory, the speaker aims, during a ceremonial occasion, to praise or to censure a person (1358b).

Aristotle's discussion of these three types of oratory and the respective aims of each type emphasizes the discovery of the various means of persuasion. This emphasis is evident in his comments on the topoi. Aristotle explains that the topoi provide not only the logical matter of arguments but also guidelines for selecting propositions that highlight the harmful and the good aspects of an action.
or a person, the just and the unjust, or the noble and the shameful. By discussing in Book II of *Rhetoric* how the topoi also provide lines of argument for effecting persuasion through character and emotional appeals (1396b), Aristotle displays the complex interplay among ethos, pathos, and logos.

In sum, these discussions offer students of classical rhetoric an exhaustive theoretical and practical model of rhetorical invention in informal argumentation. These principles and skills essentially provide the substance of a rhetorical education that addresses concerns regarding human nature and human knowledge, that assists humanistic aims, and that serves social and cultural purposes.

Although Greek rhetoric influenced Roman rhetorical theory, the tradition associated mainly with Cicero and Quintilian more sharply defined rhetoric as a branch of political science in its broadest sense. The practical rhetoric of ancient Rome aimed at civilizing and legislating humanity. Although the art that empowered the speaker to achieve these political aims remained in many basic respects Aristotelian, Cicero's treatment of rhetorical invention did not coincide entirely with that of Aristotle. While nonetheless replicating the commitment of Greek rhetoric to humanistic aims, Cicero added to the classical discussion of invention the concept of *stasis* and extrinsic proofs,
retained the topoi, but ignored the enthymeme. In spite of these specific differences, Cicero's treatment of invention still provided students of Roman rhetoric with invention al skills for conducting effective arguments in political, judicial, and civic contexts. In general, Ciceronian rhetoric nonetheless continued in the classical tradition of a rhetorical education committed to both humanistic and political purposes.

At the heart of Ciceronian rhetorical theory is a dominating emphasis on the utility of knowledge. As Cicero proclaims in De Oratore, the meritorious orator is one who has "attained a knowledge of all important subjects and arts" since oratory derives its "beauty and fullness" from knowledge. Cicero's concern with knowledge focuses on its effective use in conducting human affairs, that is, on the rhetorical or eloquent use of knowledge in matters of law, state, and society, a feature also characteristic of Aristotelian rhetoric.

At the beginning of De Oratore, Cicero expresses the importance of oratory to society and to the state: "there is to my mind no more excellent thing than the power, by means

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of oratory, to get a hold on assemblies of men, win their
good will, direct their inclination wherever the speaker
wishes, or divert them from whatever he wishes" (I.vii.30).
Cicero adds that the highest achievement of eloquence
(oratory) is that it led humanity out of "its brutish
existence," and established social communities shaped by
laws, tribunals and civic rights (I.viii.33-34). In these
descriptions of the normative and civilizing functions of
elocution, a shift from the scientific-philosophical
rhetoric of Aristotle to the more civic-philosophical
oratory of Rome is apparent.

For Cicero, persuasion relies on three considerations:

(1) the proof of the speaker's allegations,
(2) the securing of the audience's favour, and
(3) the rousing of their feelings to whatever impulse
the case may require (De Oratore II.xxvi.115).

On the surface these considerations are similar to the
three types of artistic appeal Aristotle acknowledges to be
essential to persuasive argumentation: logos, ethos, pathos.
Although Cicero defines invention as the "discovery of valid
or seemingly valid arguments to render one's cause
plausible" (De Inventione I.vii.), his treatment of
argumentative proofs focuses only on logical proof, the type
of proof that will support the speaker's allegations. 4

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4 Cicero, De Inventione-- De Optimo Genere Oratorum--
Topica, trans. H.M. Hubbell (Cambridge: Harvard University
Cicero recognizes that securing the audience's favourable response to the speaker's character (Aristotle's ethos) and rousing their feelings (pathos) are two factors essential to oratory; he does not, however, treat these two factors as types of proof but rather as concerns of style (De Oratore II.xlii.181--xlvi.194).

Cicero's treatment of proof also differs from that of Aristotle in that Cicero deals with the concept of *stasis*. He explains that after the speaker masters the facts or circumstances of a case, he must identify the issue in question (*constitutio*), that is the *stasis*, or the *status*, of the argument. Since the nature of the speech and the selection of relevant arguments are both governed by the issue in question, the speaker must first determine the issue (De Oratore II.xxiv.104). In De Inventione, an extensive discussion of rhetorical invention, Cicero describe four types of controversy "to be resolved by speech and debate." The controversy must involve a question about a fact (*constitutio concojecturalis*), or about a definition (*constitutio definitiva*), or about the nature of an act (*constitutio generalis*), or about legal processes (*constitutio translativa*) (De Inventione I.viii.10).

Press, Loeb Classical Library, 1949). All references are cited parenthetically.
The prerequisite importance of performing this task is clearly stated in Cicero's description of the realm of human disputation:

For all the issues disputed among men, whether the matter is criminal, as a charge of outrage, or a civil proceeding, as one relating to an inheritance, a personal kind, as a panegyric, or a philosophical debate, as on the way to live, there is not one of which the point is not either what has been done, or what is being done, or going to be done, or as to the nature or description of something (De Oratore II.xxiv.104).

Although the concept stasis (constitutio or "issue in question") extends to both deliberative and epideitic oratory, Cicero privileges its application to forensic or judicial oratory.

Cicero recognizes that all argumentation is carried on either by induction (inductio) or by deduction (ratiocinatio, or syllogistic reasoning). Nonetheless, his treatment of invention overlooks the basic importance of the enthymeme in argumentative proof. Cicero is concerned mainly with how many parts a full argument should have, a substantial concern in the discussion of argumentation in De Inventione (I.xxxi.51--I.xl.75). Cicero focuses on the syllogism, emphasizing its effectiveness as a formal structure of proof which makes its premises explicit (De Inventione I.xxxiv.51).

In Topica, Cicero accounts for this preference and explains the importance of the topoi (topics): "every
systematic treatment of argumentation has two branches, one concerned with invention of arguments and the other with judgement of their validity" (II.6).\(^5\) Judgement involves dialectic; invention involves the topoi, or the commonplaces (loci communis). Cicero describes topoi as a region or place from which to draw an argument, and argument as "a course of reasoning which firmly establishes a matter about which there is some doubt" (II.8).

Cicero's discussion of rhetorical proofs focuses on the nature and types of evidence in persuasive discourse. While Aristotle's treatment of invention stresses the orator's discovery of knowledge, Cicero emphasizes the practical application of that knowledge in judicial contexts. Two forms of argumentative proof are at Cicero's disposal: extrinsic arguments (identical to Aristotle's inartistic proofs) and intrinsic arguments (analogous to Aristotle's artistic or logical proofs). Extrinsic arguments are not produced by the orator, but are supplied to him by the case itself or by the parties involved. The material of extrinsic arguments includes documents, oral evidence (testimony, witnesses), statutes, decrees of the state, opinions of the counsel (De Oratore II.xxvii.116).

\(^5\) Cicero, Topica. All references are to the Loeb edition; see footnote 4 for full citation.
Whereas Aristotle excluded these sources of extrinsic proof from the rhetor's art (*Rhetoric* 1355b), Cicero includes them, explaining that the orator "need only consider the handling of extrinsic proofs" (II.xxvii.117). However, the orator must consider both the handling and the discovery of intrinsic arguments, for this kind of proof is founded entirely on the orator's reasoned argument. By assigning extrinsic proofs a role in the art of persuasive speaking, Cicero expands the source of rhetorical proof to include evidence derived from authority and from other sources external to the orator.

Cicero's recommendations for handling extrinsic proof imply that the selection of proofs also involves an analysis of what kinds of authorities, witnesses, or documents a particular audience will accept as reasonable. Cicero recognizes that convincing argumentation involves not simply the marshalling of proof, but the careful analysis as well of how the proof will be received and why. Although he does not go into detail, he comments in *De Oratore* that "the right way to corroborate witnesses, documents or examinations" requires large study and practice (II.xxvii.118-119). *De Inventione*, however, discusses extrinsic proof, particularly written documents, their effectiveness as well as problems regarding the interpretation of this kind of proof (II.xl.116--II.li.156).
By expanding the source of invention to include arguments or proofs not the product of the orator's own making, Cicero adds to the composite nature of invention, analysis, discovery, and judgement, the ability to adapt and incorporate extrinsic proof.

With these inventional strategies, Cicero further contributes to the classical model of informal argumentation in humanistic settings. Cicero applies the art of rhetoric to the conduct of civil and political affairs; in particular, he offers strategies for dealing with "all the issues disputed among men, whether the matter is criminal, as a charge of outrage, or a civil proceeding . . . or a discussion of policy . . . or of a personal kind, as a panegyric, or a philosophical debate, as on the way to live" (De Oratore II.xxiv.104). Like Aristotle, Cicero addresses the kinds of knowledge and concerns that characterize human disputes. Cicero's inventional precepts enable the orator to derive rhetorical proof from what he perceives the audience already to believe, accept, or opine, or what the audience is likely to.

In Institutio Oratoria, Quintilian's treatment of logical invention varies little from that of Cicero in De Inventione, Topica, and De Oratore. In this respect and in his overall treatment of rhetoric, Quintilian is firmly rooted in the Ciceronian tradition which views rhetoric as a
practical branch of political science. Books III-VII of *Institutio Oratoria* deal with invention. In particular, Book III, provides a technical discussion of "basis" or "stasis" — the term equivalent to Cicero's "constitutio" (issue or constitution). Book V deals with artificial and inartificial (artistic and inartistic) proofs, arguments from example, enthymemes, epicheiremes (five-part syllogisms), and commonplaces. Quintilian also admits his indebtedness to Aristotle, whose three kinds of rhetoric — epideitic, deliberative, and forensic — can accommodate any cause or question under discussion (*Institutio Oratoria* III.iii.1). The influence of both Aristotle and Cicero on Quintilian place him clearly in the classical rhetorical tradition. Like students of Aristotle and Cicero, students of Quintilian were provided with inventional skills for conducting informal arguments in a variety of social and political contexts.

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6 Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria*, trans. H.E. Butler (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Loeb Classical Library, 1960). Books I-XII. Quintilian is concerned with the complete education of "the perfect orator," one who possesses "exceptional gifts of speech . . . [and] the excellences of character as well," and who can "really play his part as a citizen and is capable of meeting the demands both of public and private business, the man who can guide the state by his counsels, give it a firm basis by his legislation and purge its vices by his decisions" (I.Pr.10-11). These concerns echo those shared by both Aristotle and Cicero; for all three rhetoricians, rhetorical education was essential to the well-being of the society. Moreover, for Quintilian, a rhetorical education not only prepared the orator, it obligated him to promote the welfare of the state and culture.
Although there are obvious differences among Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian's approaches to rhetorical invention, each addresses the logical and psychological complexities of informal argumentation. Their approaches, in turn, derive from the prevailing epistemology of the day and respond to a specific rhetorical aim: to conduct human affairs through informal argumentation. Aristotle deals in *Rhetoric* with the realm of common knowledge relating to everyday affairs, with opinions and popular beliefs, and with the realm of probability and propositions. The epistemology embodied in this treatise offers a view of knowledge contingent on a given occasion and on the components of a communication model consisting of speaker, speech, and audience (1358a). Focusing on Aristotle's alignment of rhetoric with political science, both Cicero in *De Oratore* and Quintilian in *Institutio Oratoria* maintain that the complete orator must acquire a knowledge of all important subjects and art if he is to participate in civic and political life.

Despite the minor variation among the epistemological concerns of these Greek and Roman theorists, the aims and functions they assign to rhetoric, and their views on the realm in which rhetoric was to operate, they contributed to one extensive theory of rhetorical invention. For the ancients, the canon of invention guided the discovery and selection of the subject matter and pertinent arguments for a speech. At the heart of classical invention lay an
appreciation of the role of probable knowledge in human discourse. The world of human discourse is concerned with matters that human beings argue about or must be persuaded of, not certain issues but controversial matters. These issues are generally based on probabilities, that is, on common knowledge, popular beliefs, or opinions. They have no single definitive outcome. The enthymeme, the major form of rhetorical reasoning in persuasive argumentation, draws its premises not from any specific science but from propositions or probabilities relating to everyday affairs, civic, judicial, or political.

The discussion of Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian on the proper province and aims of rhetoric generated a methodology for informal argumentation. The practical effectiveness of this methodology is particularly evident in the classical model of rhetorical proof and reasoning. Equally significant, these discussions established a pedagogical tradition which placed at its core a rhetorical education committed to serving the civic, political, ethical and moral welfare of the society and its citizens. The pedagogical tradition of classical rhetoric aimed to prepare students to deal with the ideas and problems, the issues and concerns, that constituted the moral and political affairs of the community. In essence, students were given an understanding of the complexity of human affairs, as well as argumentative skills for dealing with them.
While the canon of invention was a major focus of attention in classical rhetorical theory, the Medieval arts of discourse, on the other hand, paid little attention to the classical model of rhetorical invention. Instead, Medieval rhetoric emphasized precepts and skills for the production of formal and highly technical written discourse. The prominence of *ars praedicandi* (the art of preaching), *ars dictaminis* (the art of letter-writing), and *ars poetriae* (preceptive grammar), during this period, reflects the beginning of a pedagogical shift away from an education that privileged training in informal argumentation.  

A number of circumstances characterize the aims assigned to Medieval rhetorical education. During this period, one during which theology and epistemology were in many respects indistinguishable, rhetoric was adapted to the Christian aim to spread the word of God. As a consequence, one component of the Medieval pedagogical tradition concentrated on the art of preaching, on preparing the clergy to spread the gospel. Assigned the enormous

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7 For a detailed discussion of the Classical influence on the Medieval rhetorical arts, see James J. Murphy, *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages: A History of Rhetorical Theory from Saint Augustine to the Renaissance* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974). On several occasions throughout my discussion of Medieval rhetoric, I refer to this historical survey, indicating these references in parentheses.
responsibility of training the clergy for this task, Medieval oratory adapted aspects of Ciceronian rhetoric to *ars praedicandi*, emphasizing the canons of arrangement, style, and delivery, while excluding invention. The two other components comprising the Medieval rhetorical tradition, *ars poetriae* and *ars dictaminis*, also emphasized arrangement and style. Basically a non-democratic period, the Middle Ages required modes of formal written discourse to conduct its civic and political affairs, a requirement these two rhetorical arts met.  

Although Augustine is not properly of the Middle Ages, his *De Doctrina Christiana*, an extremely influential treatise on the art of preaching, reflects the diminished status of rhetorical invention and a shift towards a rhetorical education that privileged the formal and stylistic preparation of sermons. *De Doctrina* also illustrates a major aim assigned to Medieval rhetoric: to

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* A major distinction implied here is that classical rhetoric was built on the view that it is mainly in democratic societies that rhetoric can function as a means of conducting civic and political matters. More precisely, it is mainly in a society where its citizens are free to as well as encouraged to contribute through speech to social and political decision-making and affairs that rhetorical theory and education emphasizes the effective virtues of informal argumentation.

illustrates a major aim assigned to Medieval rhetoric: to edify human souls through God's immutable wisdom. Christian rhetoric's main concern became finding ways and forms of conveying pre-ordained truths, or absolute truths, to a wide range of audiences. Since Augustine's recommendations for conveying the scriptures would have found little use for the emphasis in Classical invention on probable knowledge and modes of reasoning based on probabilities, a treatment of classical invention is non-existent in De Doctrina Christiana. Because of his classical training and background, Augustine did, however, adapt some of the precepts of Roman rhetoric to the art of preaching, an art which aimed to achieve the Platonic ideal -- the edification of human souls. He found the topics (commonplaces) to be especially useful to the preacher's art. They served, however, not as lines of argument, but as modes of stylistic and formal development.

Although he disregards the enthymeme, Augustine does adapt the syllogism to the sermon. But he does so with some qualification. In Book II of De Doctrina Christiana, he discusses the syllogism as a useful reasoning process when it is applied to "solving all sorts of questions that appear in sacred literature" (IX.xxxi.48). According to Augustine, this logical structure is valuable only insofar as it tests the validity of the inference. It does not measure the truth value of propositions since the truth of propositions
is discovered in the Scriptures, and is not instituted by mankind (II.xxxii). Thus, the rules of inference are of little relevance to the preacher's art; and the truth of propositions is to be considered in itself (II.xxxiv).

According to Augustine, exegesis involves two activities: (1) a way of discovering the subject matter to be understood and (2) a way of teaching or expressing it (IV.i). Augustine's interest in rhetoric consists mainly of attention to its formal and stylistic usefulness to the Christian preacher, to the preacher's efforts to understand and to convey the truth to be derived from the Scriptures. Rhetoric became an instrument for scriptural exegesis and elucidation. According to Augustine, eloquence (oratory) involves "skillful use of vocabulary and plentiful verbal ornaments" (IV.iv). Through this skillful usage, "the expositor and teacher of divine Scripture" is able to conciliate those who are opposed, to arouse those who are remiss, and to teach those who are ignorant of his subject (IV.vi). Persuasion is largely achieved through the heights of eloquence (IV.xiii). Since persuasion through argumentation was not privileged, the role of Classical rhetorical invention was minimal in the Medieval art of preaching.

Clearly, informal argumentation was not a focus of Medieval rhetorical education. It should be pointed out,
however, that *ars praedicandi* responded to one of the concerns of this period: the goal of Christian spiritual edification. The aim to convey the Truth to a diverse range of audiences required attention mainly to syle and delivery, to strategies for adapting pre-determined subject matter to a sermon. Students of *ars praedicandi*, mainly clergy, may not have been prepared for civic and political discourse; nonetheless, they were prepared for the arena that mattered at the time, the arena of the sermon.

Another reason the Middle Ages did not privilege a vital theory of informal argumentation is that Medieval society placed little value on oratorical training other than for preaching. Most political and civic matters, as well as many religious ones, were conducted not through speeches but through written correspondence, documents, and letters. This shift from oral to written modes of communication resulted in rhetorical training that emphasized formal discourse, and thus the canons of arrangement and style. The Medieval rhetorical genres, *ars poetriae* and *ars dictaminis*, illustrate this shift.

Combining two closely related aims: *ars recte loquendi* (the art of speaking (or writing) correctly) and *ennaratio poetarum* (the analysis and interpretation of literary works), *ars poetriae* indicates the shift in Medieval rhetorical education away from the emphasis in classical
rhetoric on invention and informal argumentation. *Ars poetriae* concentrated on matters of syntax, metrics, rhythmics, modes of signification, and on matters regarding tropes and figures, and formal arrangement. The student of *ars poetriae* received training in the production of written materials, particularly precepts in the ordering, planning and wording of written discourse.

In classical rhetorical education, grammar study was regarded as prerequisite to oratorical training. As Quintilian points out in *Institutio Oratoria*, a student required training in grammar and literary study before he could advance to "instruction in the theory and practice of declamation" (II.i.2). Medieval rhetorical education, too, regarded grammar study as necessary to both the appreciation and production of literary or written discourse. Augustine in particular regarded grammar as prerequisite to an understanding of Scripture. Thus, Medieval rhetorical education not only shifts away from informal argumentation, it also aligns grammar study with the art of preaching.

Although the classical model of informal argumentation received little attention in Medieval discourse theory, Medieval preceptive grammar adapted the topics (or commonplaces) to its precepts for developing a piece of discourse. Whereas the ancients stressed both the stylistic and logical value of the commonplaces, the Medieval
theorists treated the commonplaces mainly in terms of their formal and stylistic strengths. John of Garland's *De arte prosayca, metrica, et rithmica* (after 1229), a thirteenth century work offering precepts on verse composition, lists an number of topics which can serve to amplify "difficult material" (Murphy, 178). A marginally earlier work, Matthew of Vendome's *Ars Versificatoria* (c. 1175), includes in its discussion of description a number of topics which can serve as modes of development (Murphy, 164-65).

Like its counterparts *ars praedicandi* and *ars poetriae*, *ars dictaminis* also indicates the shift in Medieval rhetorical education away from training students in informal argumentation. This rhetorical genre attempted to adapt the stylistic and formal precepts of Ciceronian rhetoric to the technical skill of letter writing. Dictaminal study trained students to convey written messages accurately. To achieve this aim, *ars dictaminis* concentrated on the parts of a letter and style. Alberic of Monte Cassino's *Dictaminum Radii*, a pivotal work on the Medieval art of letter writing, discusses the prologue, proemium, and salutatio of a letter, as well as tropes and figures of diction and thought.

The attention to formal written discourse in Medieval rhetoric reflects the ends rhetorical education was adapted to serve. With the advent and spread of Christianity, Medieval rhetorical education became interwoven with
Christian education. Rhetoric was enlisted to assist the aims of the Church: to preach the Gospel. Characterized as an essentially non-democratic period, the Middle Ages required rhetorical training in the production of written documents and letters for the administration of Church and state, not training in informal argumentation. *Ars poetriae* provided the mechanical and technical training (grammar, style, delivery, and arrangement) that served the two other rhetorical arts: *ars praedicandi* and *ars dictaminis*.

Due to the prominence of *ars praedicandi*, *ars poetriae*, and *ars dictaminis* during the Middle Ages, Medieval rhetorical education for the most part overlooked the vital role that informal argumentation played in the maintenance of human affairs, a key feature of classical rhetorical theory. The Renaissance, however, recovers the classical tradition of informal argumentation.¹⁰ The politically oriented rhetorical treatises of Cicero and Quintilian

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¹⁰ Although Aristotle's *Rhetoric* survived, according to Murphy, in nearly one hundred manuscripts during the thirteenth through fifteenth century, it played an insignificant part in the medieval development of discourse theory. This insignificance was likely due, Murphy suggests, to the *Rhetoric* being regarded as an adjunct to the study of ethics and political science. The *Rhetoric* was regarded not as a rhetorical or or dialectical work, but rather as a treatise more appropriate to the study of moral philosophy. Cicero's early *De Inventione* and the anonymous *Rhetorica ad Herennium* were the two works most influential during the Middle Ages. Not until the fifteenth century did Cicero's *De Oratore* and Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria* become popular. For a detailed discussion of the historical influence of these works prior to the Renaissance, see James J. Murphy's chapter "Survival of the Classical Traditions" in *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages* (1974), pp. 89 - 132.
offered models for the rhetorical treatises of the early Renaissance. Given this period's extensive interest in civic humanism, *De Oratore* and *Institutio Oratoria* offered the Renaissance an ideal yet pragmatic means of conducting its political, judicial, and civic affairs. Consequently, students of the Renaissance rhetorics of Erasmus and Thomas Wilson received a rhetorical education committed to serving social and cultural aims.

Erasmus' *De Copia* clearly displays the influence of the classical model of invention and informal argumentation.  

Book II of *De Copia*, *On Copia of Thought* deals with invention. Erasmus' recommendations for methods of embellishing and amplifying thought basically serve as means of developing subject matter and arguments. He discusses the Roman concept of *status* (p. 66), rhetorical propositions (p. 60), and the commonplaces, or the "copious accumulation of proofs and arguments" (p. 66). Like the ancients, Erasmus sees the commonplaces both as ways of enlarging upon a theme and as sources of content for arguments (p. 67).

According to Erasmus, the force of *exempla*, which the Greeks called "paradigmata," is "most powerful for proof, 

11 Desiderius Erasmus, *On Copia of Words and Ideas*, trans. Donald B. King and H. David Rix (Milwaukee, Wis.: Marquette University Press, 1963). Erasmus' *De duplici copia verborum ae rerum* was an influential Renaissance rhetoric that provided training in both speaking and writing. All references are to this translation and are cited parenthetically.
and therefore for copia" (p. 67). *Exempla* bears some resemblance to Aristotle's example -- to rhetorical induction or analogy. But Erasmus regards *exempla* mainly as a means of obtaining variety of content by drawing from the works of historians, poets, philosophers, and theologians (p. 68). Thus, historical, fictional, literary, or scriptural analogies serve as the most powerful forms of argumentative proof. Although Erasmus terms his inventional strategies methods of embellishing and amplifying, they correspond nonetheless with the informal inventional strategies the ancients regarded as vital to effective informal argumentation.

Following closely in the tradition of classical rhetoric, Thomas Wilson's *The Arte of Rhetorie* (1553) also offered Renaissance students of rhetoric inventional strategies for engaging in informal argumentation.\(^\text{12}\) Clearly subscribing to the Roman view that rhetoric should serve cultural and social aims, Wilson explains that "an orator must be able to speak fully of all those questions, which by lawe and profite of man, suche as are thought apte for the tongue to set forward" (p. 13).

\(^{12}\) Thomas Wilson, *The Arte of Rhetorie*, intro. Robert H. Bower (Gainesville, Fla.: Scholar's Facsimiles and Reprints, 1962). All references are to this edition and are cited parenthetically. Like Erasmus' *De Copia*, Wilson's *The Arte of Rhetorie* was also popular. It was significant, however, because it was one of the first English vernacular rhetorics of the Renaissance.
Invention is defined as "the finding out of apte matter...a searchyng out of thynges true, or thynges likely, the whiche maie reasonably sette furth a matter, and make it appere probable" (p. 18). Wilson identifies the "places of Logique" as sources of plentiful matter that will "prove any cause and seke onely to teache thereby the truthe" (p. 18). For Wilson, the perfect orator must also be a logician, since logic provides the places (commonplaces) that will serve to confirm the cause (or aim) of each of the three types of orations he acknowledges (p. 37). Orations may contain matter that involves praise or dispraise, that establishes whether a cause is profitable or unprofitable, or right or wrong (p. 23). These three causes, of course, accord with the three types of oratory discerned by the classical rhetoricians: epideictic, deliberative, and forensic.

The Roman concept of *stasis* is a major concern to Wilson. The orator must identify the "foundacion or principall pointe" in every debated matter. This foundation is otherwise known as the issue, the state, or the constitution of the cause. In accordance with the Romans, Wilson acknowledges that "the chief grounds of a matter" governs "whereunto wee must leavell our reasons, directe our invencion" (106-107). Wilson lists three types of stasis: (1) conjectural -- whether a thing is or not, (2) legal --
what it is, (3) juridical — what manner of thing it is (p. 109).

Adopting many features of Ciceronian rhetoric, the rhetorical treatise of Wilson, as well as that of Erasmus, followed in the pedagogical tradition of classical rhetoric. This tradition regarded rhetoric as the art of persuasive discourse and as a humanist discipline committed to social and cultural aims.

Although there are disparities among this assortment of rhetorical treatises from the classical period through to the early Renaissance, the influence of classical Greco-Roman rhetoric is apparent throughout the discussions. The various treatments of invention similarly address a number of theoretical and technical concerns regarding the aims of rhetoric, the nature of argumentation and persuasion, and especially the kinds of knowledge and reasoning that characterize the realm of rhetoric. In the classical period, Aristotle offers a treatment of rhetorical invention, exhaustive in its attention to probable knowledge, to the realm of human affairs, and to the various psychological and logical modes of persuasion. Cicero and Quintilian give Aristotelian rhetoric a more pragmatic and specific application by focusing on judicial oratory, and on invention as the source of forensic proof and argumentation.
Assessing the complex interplay among epistemology, invention, and rhetorical aims, these classical rhetoricians predicated a sound theoretical foundation for a civic and humanistically-oriented education. The pedagogical tradition of classical rhetoric regarded rhetorical education as the training essential to the citizen's effective participation in the society and the culture. By providing students with informal inventional strategies for producing argumentative discourse, classical rhetorical education enhanced the role its students played in the conduct of civic and political affairs.

Changes in the aims and proper province of rhetoric are necessarily tied to changes in the status and nature of argumentation in rhetorical education. This relationship is evident in the interruption of the classical pedagogical tradition during the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance's recovery of it. However, the classical pedagogical tradition of a rhetorical education with its commitment to the maintenance of civic and political affairs witnesses its severest interruption in the attacks of the new science on classical argumentation and rhetorical proof. As a result of these attacks, rhetorical education from the late Renaissance onward privileges a mode of formal argumentation derived from seventeenth-century views of empiricism and rationalism.
Chapter Two discusses the influence of seventeenth and eighteenth century epistemology on the aims and proper function of rhetorical argumentation during the eighteenth and nineteenth century. In particular, this chapter argues the general ineffectiveness of formal argumentation in humanistic contexts.
CHAPTER TWO

THE FOUNDATIONS OF FORMAL ARGUMENTATION

During the seventeenth and eighteenth century, investigations into a new scientific method forced the critical evaluation and eventual rejection of traditional rhetorical argumentation and reasoning. Due to the influential views of Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes, and John Locke in the seventeenth century, and David Hume and David Hartley in the eighteenth, empirical and strict formal modes of logical proof were incorporated into contemporary and subsequent treatises on rhetoric. The influence of these epistemologists is particularly evident in the eighteenth-century rhetorics of George Campbell, Hugh Blair, and Richard Whately. These rhetoricians, in turn, influenced the nineteenth-century rhetorics of Alexander Bain, John Genung, and Henry Day. By rejecting traditional rhetorical proof, these rhetorics replaced traditional informal argumentation with formal and empirically-based inductive and deductive argumentation. Instead, these rhetorics encouraged a rhetorical and pedagogical tradition based upon the new science and logic, and not upon classical informal argumentation. These rhetorics recognized the potential impact that empirical and rational method could have on building a certain body of certain knowledge and truths about the world. They overlooked, however, the general inappropriateness of these logical modes to conducting
reasoning in the realm of unverifiable and contingent human beliefs, values, and opinions.

In the preface to The Great Instauration, the work which includes The Advancement of Learning (1605) and Novum Organum (1620), Francis Bacon provides the epistemological motive for his work. Rejecting all knowledge which is too hastily abstracted from principles that are vague, ill-formed, or questionable, he proposes the need to devise a new scientific method that will assist the restoration of the sciences, the arts, and all human knowledge from "a firm and solid basis" (1). By such a method of human understanding, universally valid principles governing humanity, nature, and society could be discovered and acted upon. According to Bacon, this new scientific method or "new logic" would aim to find "not what agrees with principles, but principles themselves" (p. 11). The new logic would combine inductive reasoning with observation and an experimental method.

This empirical approach greatly affected Bacon's view of traditional rhetorical invention and his view of eloquence (rhetoric). According to Bacon, the new scientific method would require a new kind of logic, which he termed the "art of interpreting nature," a new logic that

1 Francis Bacon, The Physical and Metaphysical Works of Lord Bacon: Advancement of Learning and Novum Organum, Joseph Devey, ed. (London: George Bell and Sons, 1893).
would differ widely from the common logic, the common logic being traditional deduction, a key feature of Aristotle's inventional method. Bacon assigns to rhetoric the duty of applying and recommending the dictates of reason to the imagination, in order to excite the affections and the will (p. 234). This function of rhetoric derives from Bacon's doctrine of the use and objectives of the mental faculties (p. 181). By appealing to the human understanding, logic produces resolutions by appealing to the will, appetite, and affections, ethics produce actions; by appealing to the imagination, eloquence effects persuasion (p. 235). In maintaining this view of the division of the mental faculties, Bacon promotes the Ramistic truncation of the classical model of rhetoric.² Whereas the classical model included five canons (arrangement, style, memory, delivery, and invention, whose proper realm was the discovery of

² Peter Ramus' influence on late Renaissance rhetoric is evident in two works, *Dialectica* (1555) and *Rhetorica* (1548). In *Dialectica*, he eliminates the distinction between dialectic and scientific logic, dialectic as an art that argues from probabilities and scientific logic which argues from certainties or necessity. In *Rhetorica* (1548), he limits rhetoric to mere ornamentation, to stylistic considerations (tropes and figures) by restricting *inventio* and *dispositio* (arrangement) to logic or dialectic. One of the most significant effects of Ramus' efforts to conflate all argumentation to a single art of discourse is that subsequent rhetorical treatises would derive their definitions and forms of rhetorical proof and evidence solely from the discipline of logic. See Walter J. Ong, S.J., *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958).
subject matter and arguments, that is, logical, emotional, and ethical proofs), the truncated model included only style and delivery.

In effect, Bacon reduces rhetoric's domain to the doctrine of ornament in speech, to stylistic concerns only, leaving the discovery of subject matter and arguments to other arts. In a discussion of the logical arts and rational knowledge, Bacon identifies four categories of logic: (1) the art of inquiry or invention, (2) the art of examination or judgement, (3) the art of custody or memory, and (4) the art of elocution or delivery (p. 183). This alignment differs from that of classical rhetoric, where the art of inquiry and the art of judgement were conjoined under the canon of invention. Classical rhetoric also regarded the art of memory and the art of delivery as two separate canons which, along with invention, were considered essential to the rhetorical art.

Bacon also modified the function of the traditional topics or commonplaces. He admits the need for rhetorical sophisms or "colours" (237). These colours, however, serve only as forms of speech, even though they are similar to Aristotle's topoi or lines of argument. In a discussion of the art of memory, Bacon explains that the commonplaces are useful for assisting the retention of knowledge, and are
thus able to offer subject matter to invention and to strengthen the judgement (211-12).

Although the art of judgement traditionally dealt with proof or demonstration and proceeded by induction or deduction (the syllogism), or by their abridged counterparts the example and the enthymeme, Bacon ignored these two methods and their counterparts, proposing instead a genuine method of induction (203-05). This new method (or novum organum) would enable the reliable discovery and investigation of the world of nature.

In his efforts to devise a new method of inquiry, one that would combine inductive reasoning (from particular events to general principles) with experimentation and observation to serve as the foundation upon which to posit all human knowledge, Bacon criticizes the methods and approaches of the ancient philosophers. The ancients, he argued, denied all certainty of human knowledge and held that understanding went no further than appearance and probability. Such a criticism would be aimed at classical rhetorical invention with its essential proviso for probable, apparent, and variable knowledge. Bacon adds, in

3 Focusing his attack on the Scholastic method of disputation (wherein a problem was first divided into its parts, then objections systematically raised, and the answer to the problem formed on the basis of the performance), Bacon aims his larger criticism at the intellectual movement that dominated Medieval learning and thought, Scholasticism.
his caution against traditional inductive and deductive reasoning, that this epistemological regard for probability was adopted by those who excelled in eloquence, by those who acquired a reputation for disputing both sides of a question (187).

Another reason for Bacon's attack on the approaches of the ancients involves his caution against "the idols, or false notions, which possess the mind" (15). These false notions hinder understanding because they are acquired from the opinions or sects of philosophers, or from preposterous laws of demonstration. In place of these traditional sources of knowledge, Bacon substitutes the "immediate and natural perceptions of the senses." In order to arrive at genuine knowledge, Bacon recommends letting the senses judge experiments, and letting experiments reveal the truths of the world (15). In this recommendation, Bacon argues his view that a genuine body of human knowledge and understanding must be founded upon personal experience and observation, and not furnished by the untested and unverifiable opinions and beliefs, or assumptions, handed down through tradition.

The implications of Bacon's scientific method on traditional rhetorical invention are substantial indeed. Essential to the classical notion of invention was the view that probable or contingent knowledge characterized human
affairs, conduct, and concerns. Any art that attempted to deal with the civic, political, or judicial affairs of humankind would recognize this feature. But Bacon's efforts to promote a scientific method that would generate genuine human knowledge, that is, knowledge founded on true principles, neglected to discern adequately that the world of human affairs and conduct, unlike the physical or natural world, could not be accounted for solely in terms of an empirical method.

As a result of Bacon's empirical concerns, a student of Bacon's rhetoric would not be provided with invention strategies adapted to the nature of contingent human argumentation. Unlike the student of classical rhetoric, a student of Bacon's rhetoric would not be given skills for dealing with the kinds of knowledge prevalent in the realm of human affairs and concerns: opinions, beliefs, and values.

Sharing with Bacon many of the same epistemological concerns (certain knowledge, the truths of the natural world, and reliable methods of reasoning), Descartes' rationalism also forced a reevaluation of the classical definition of invention that ultimately led to Descartes' rejection of the classical model of informal argumentation, and the classical pedagogical tradition that favoured this mode of argumentation. In Discourse on Method (1637), he
admits the esteem in which he held eloquence, but adds that this ability is a gift of nature rather than the reward of study (p. 7). Furthermore, those persons capable of cogent reasoning and the clear, intelligible expression of their thoughts are most persuasive, even though they may have never studied rhetoric (p. 7).

Although Descartes does not deal specifically with rhetoric, his views of knowledge and the nature of knowing reflect on traditional rhetorical invention and its regard for probable knowledge. Descartes complains that philosophy "has been studied for many years without having produced anything which is not in dispute and consequently doubtful or uncertain" (p. 8). With respect to this view, in Rules for the Direction of the Mind, he advocates rejecting all knowledge which is merely probable, and recommends instead pursuing certain knowledge of the truths of nature (p. 149). Descartes maintains that perfect, indubitable knowledge is possible, provided one follows an ordered, rational method of scientific investigation, moving from an understanding of the most simple propositions to the most complex. Thus, Descartes implicitly criticizes and rejects enthymemetic reasoning. Although Descartes does not deal specifically with rhetoric, he discredits traditional rhetorical

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invention with its regard for probable knowledge, arguing that traditional logic and modes of reasoning little served the pursuit of indisputable human understanding and knowledge.

While Descartes admits, unlike Bacon, the value of the syllogism, he nevertheless cautions that the syllogism is useful merely because it is a convenient weapon of debate. He also cautions that no certain knowledge can be reached through "the probable syllogisms of the Scholastics" (pp. 150-51). In essence, Descartes rejects the Aristotelian rhetorical syllogism, because it accommodates premises built on uncertain knowledge, opinions, and probabilities. By rejecting the syllogism, Descartes implicitly rejects the enthymeme, a key feature of classical rhetorical argumentation adapted from dialectic.

The epistemological implications of Descartes' rational method for classical rhetorical invention are apparent in the Cartesian method's incompatibility with probable knowledge and enthymemic reasoning. Aristotle explains in Rhetoric that during the rhetorical occasion the speaker deliberates a matter in "the hearing of persons who cannot take in at a glance a complicated argument, or follow a long chain of reasoning" (1357a). Thus, the speaker relies on the enthymeme which consists of few propositions. For Aristotle, it would simply not be possible or necessary,
during the rhetorical occasion, to conduct the kind of scientific investigation that Descartes recommends. Since Descartes regarded this feature of enthymemic reasoning as a hindrance to the pursuit of certain knowledge, a student of Descartes would not learn about the role of probable knowledge and traditional rhetorical proof in informal argumentation. Ultimately, this student would not be privileged with rhetorical training that assisted his effective participation in the realm of everyday human affairs.

Like his predecessors, Francis Bacon and Rene Descartes, John Locke argued for the advancement of science and the discovery of yet unknown truths, that is, for mathematical knowledge and, especially, for knowledge of the natural and physical world. Similarly, Locke's interest in explaining the nature of human understanding and the nature of knowledge discredited traditional Scholastic reasoning, and, ultimately, the mode of informal argumentation privileged in classical rhetorical theory. In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), particularly Books III and IV, Locke discusses probability, the syllogism, and knowledge, a discussion which comes to exert a substantial
influence on the nature and types of evidence incorporated into subsequent rhetorical treatises.\textsuperscript{5}

Locke criticizes the art of disputing, for it little serves the discovery of knowledge and truth of things (II, pp. 126, 281). Locke describes the art of rhetoric as "the artificial and figurative application of words ... to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgement" (II, p. 146). According to Locke, certainty of knowledge results from the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas as expressed in propositions (II, p. 168). All ideas, however, come from sensory experience, from perceiving and reflecting on that material which our observation supplies (I, pp. 121-22). In his quest for certain knowledge, Locke suggests the need to reexamine, or to question one's opinions, judgements, or beliefs (II, pp. 370-71). In these matters concerning probability, however, the propositions (or rather the particulars or sensory cum experiential basis of these propositions) that concern a question are neither always nor entirely available. Thus, Locke recommends that those who have not "thoroughly examined to the bottom all their own tenets must confess they are unfit to prescribe to others

and are unreasonable in imposing that as truth on other men's beliefs, which they themselves have not searched into, nor weighed the arguments of probability, on which they should receive or reject it" (II, p. 374).

Locke proposes a definition that firmly roots probability in his empirical view. The probability of any proposition, Locke claims, depends upon the conformity, that is, the analogy or likeness of anything with our knowledge, observation, and experience, or upon the testimony of others, provided that the testimony has been verified by their own experience or observation (II, pp. 365-66). Locke's notion of empirical probability inevitably conflicts with traditional rhetorical proof, since his definition makes little allowance for a theory of rhetorical proof based on the unverifiable and variable features of probable knowledge.

In his discussion of reason, Locke, agreeing with Bacon and Descartes, discredits the syllogism, claiming that "we reason best and clearest, when we only observe the connexion of the proof, without reducing our thoughts to any rule of syllogism" (II, p. 389). Locke assigns four considerations to reason:

(1) the discovery of truth,
(2) the methodical arrangement of it,
(3) the perceiving of connections among propositions,
(4) the making of a right conclusion.
Of these four concerns, the syllogism regards only the third, the connexion of the proofs. In doubting whether the syllogism is the "only proper instrument of reason, in the discovery of truth," Locke claims that he has commonly observed this "artificial method of reasoning" to be "more adapted to catch and entangle the mind, than to instruct and inform the understanding" (II, p. 399). It serves more properly to assist victory in matters of dispute, than to assist "the discovery of truth in fair inquiries" (II, pp. 399-400).

Locke's epistemological pursuits, to inform and instruct the understanding, demanded intellectual arts that would enable the human mind to discover certain and new knowledge about the universe. These concerns detailed in Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding overshadowed rhetoric's traditional function as a discipline valuable for the conduct of human affairs. In traditional rhetoric, logical invention guided the discovery of proofs to be drawn from the store of common knowledge or familiar facts already assumed or known by the rhetor and the audience. As a consequence of his theory of empirical probability, Locke forces a reconsideration of the value and function of Aristotelian rhetorical proof. Whereas Aristotle based his theory of probability on generally unverifiable knowledge, on popular opinion and common beliefs, Locke proposed a theory of probability based instead on the view that there
are varying degrees of correspondence between propositions and sensory experience. As Locke explains, deductive or syllogistic reasoning "discovers no new proofs, but is the art of marshalling and varying the old ones we have already" (IV, xvii, p. 401). In order to adapt rhetoric to the seventeenth century's concern with informing human understanding with new discoveries, a logic adapted to empirical proof was included in subsequent treatments of rhetorical invention.

Consequently, this adaptation resulted in students of Locke's views receiving a rhetorical education that served the intellectual aims of the new logic and science espoused during the seventeenth century by Locke, as well as Bacon and Descartes. Due to Locke's efforts to promote a logic of empirical proof, an emphasis on the value of traditional rhetorical proof in the conduct of human affairs diminished in eighteenth-century rhetorical education.

Many of the epistemological issues addressed in the seventeenth century also engaged the concern of the eighteenth century. In the discussions of David Hume and David Hartley, attention continued to be given to empirical and rational views of knowledge. These theorists, like those of the seventeenth century, focused on the association of ideas, formal reasoning, empirical method, and particularly on causation, experience, and testimony. Out
of the discussions of Hume and Hartley, as well as those of Bacon, Descartes, and Locke, came a new logic that would replace traditional rhetorical invention in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century rhetorical treatises.

Like his seventeenth century predecessors, Hume questioned the value of traditional scholastic logic and rhetorical proof. Due to the promise that the new logic offered to the establishing of a body of genuine human knowledge, Hume's views on empirical and mathematical reasoning were enthusiastically received by the eighteenth century. Contemporaries of Hume's such as George Campbell, Richard Whately, and Hugh Blair incorporated in their rhetorical treatises definitions of argumentative proof adapted from the new logic.

In Section IV of *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (1748), Hume divides human reason into two categories, demonstrative and moral. The first of these categories, influenced by Locke, deals with purely logical relations among ideas. Proposition of this sort are intuitively or demonstratively certain, and are discoverable "by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on

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what is anywhere existent in the universe" (Enquiry, p. 40). Demonstrative reasoning occurs in the abstract sciences such as geometry, algebra, and arithmetic. Moral reasoning, the second category of human reason, pertains to what Hume terms "matters of fact" relations. All reasoning regarding matters of fact (or existence) derives from the relation of cause and effect. This relation enables the human mind to go beyond the evidence of memory and the senses (Enquiry, p. 40). According to Hume, experience is the foundation of cause and effect (Enquiry, p. 42). The foundation of all conclusions from experience is inference, rather than any formal chain of reasoning or process of the understanding.

Whereas Aristotle regarded "cause to effect" as one line of topical argument that could be adopted to deductive reasoning (Rhetoric, 1400a), Hume considers this relation as the basis for a logic of empirical or experimental proof because he views this relation as both natural and philosophical. As Hume points out in A Treatise of Human Nature (1739), cause and effect reasoning leads to conclusions concerning the existence of objects or of their qualities (Treatise, p. 94). In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, he discerns that all arguments concerning existence "are founded on the relation of cause

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and effect, that our knowledge of that relation is derived entirely from experience, and that all our experimental conclusions proceed upon the assumption that the future will be conformable to the past" (Enquiry, p. 49).

Although Hume privileges a mode of reasoning consonant with his views on experience, observation, and inference, he warns that this mode is not infallible. Out of this cautionary discussion results a theory of testimony and probability that is incorporated into the discussions of rhetorical proof of George Campbell and Richard Whately. No species of reasoning, according to Hume, is more common, more useful, and even necessary to human life than that which is derived from the testimony of men and the reports of eyewitnesses and spectators" (Enquiry, p. 119). The value of testimony as a form of proof rests on the condition that the "veracity of human testimony" and the "conformity of the facts to the reports of witnesses" be observable.

Since Hume recognizes the difficulty that strict adherence to this condition creates for Christian doctrine, he distinguishes two types of testimony, one based on actual past experience and the other on faith. As he concludes in his discussion of miracles, there are methods other than reason for proving the veracity of things (Enquiry, p. 141).
Hume's inquiry into the nature of human understanding and reasoning contributed to the development of the new logical method that would come to dominate definitions of invention in eighteenth-century rhetoric. In both Treatise and Enquiry, he delineates the rhetorical foundation underlying the logical method he offers as an alternative to traditional Aristotelian inductive and deductive logic. Instead of a priori argumentation, Hume offers a logic for the experimental method. Hume's views on testimony also mark a departure from Aristotelian rhetorical proof. Whereas Aristotle viewed testimony and witness as forms of inartistic proof (Rhetoric, 1355b), outside the realm of rhetoric, Hume's contemporaries, George Campbell and Richard Whately, award them high status in their treatments of rhetorical proof.

Hume's ideas on human reasoning clearly privilege a view of logical proof that contrasts with traditional rhetorical proof; his treatment of abstract and experiential proof, however, does not provide for the kinds of probable and contingent knowledge that characterize human affairs. This emphasis adapted from concurrent epistemological concerns also contributed ultimately to a shift in the aims of rhetorical education from the Enlightenment onward. While classical rhetoric equipped its students with an informal mode of reasoning well-suited to the conduct of everyday political and civic affairs, the new tradition of
rhetorical education influenced by seventeenth- and eighteenth-century treatments of epistemology aimed to prepare students to meet the new scientific and intellectual demands of this period.

Following in the epistemological tradition initiated in the seventeenth century, David Hartley's Observations on Man, His Fame, His Duty, and His Expectations (1749) contributes to the development of eighteenth-century treatments of rhetorical invention and argumentation. Although Observations on Man is not specifically a treatise on rhetoric, it, too, promoted the new logic that influenced definitions of rhetorical proof in eighteenth-century rhetoric.

Like Hume, Hartley regarded empirical and mathematical reasoning as means to the "ascertainment of truth, and advancement of knowledge" in both the abstract and the natural world. In Chapter III of Observations on Man, Hartley discusses the nature of ideas and propositions. Echoing Locke and Hume, he recommends two kinds of formal

propositional logic, mathematical and experimental (pp. 324-33).

According to Hartley, the principle source for invention are the "Trains of visible Ideas, which accompany our Thoughts . . . both in Matters of Fancy, and in Science" (I, 435). He defines invention as "the art of producing new beauties in works of imagination, and new truths in matters of science" (I, 434). Invention involves memory. It also requires the speaker to possess an extensive knowledge of the arts and sciences in order to provide a large stock of ideas for furnishing "figures, illustrations, comparisons, arguments, motives, criterions" (I, 434). Invention also requires the ability to reason by analogies. Hartley explains that reasoning by analogy is an inventional guide "much preferable to imagination," since in science it is analogy that leads the mind to new propositions (I, 435).

Like Bacon, Hartley observes the Ramistic distinction between logic and rhetoric: rhetoric (and poetry) is the knowledge of words (I, 353), and logic the art of using words as symbols for making discoveries in all branches of knowledge "through mathematical methods of investigation and computation in matters of all sorts" (I, 358). Hartley regards the invention of arguments and proofs as the proper province of logic. As such, Hartley requires rhetorical proof to be drawn from the new logic.
The new investigative logic indeed proved useful for ascertaining the truths of both the material and abstract universe. But Hartley's views, like those of Bacon, Descartes, Locke, and Hume, nonetheless encouraged the general shift during this period away from traditional scholastic logic. And like his predecessors, Hartley failed to observe the general ineffectiveness of empirically-based propositional logic in the realm of human argumentation.

The innovative views of Bacon, Descartes, Locke, Hume and Hartley on human understanding and knowledge affected all branches of learning. In particular, their views of empirical and mathematical reasoning were incorporated into the treatments of argumentation in the popular rhetorics of George Campbell and Hugh Blair in the eighteenth century and Richard Whately in the early nineteenth century. Due to the promise of the new logic to provide sound modes of reasoning

9 I should stress here that these five (Bacon, Descartes, Locke, Hume, and Hartley) were not rhetoricians, but rather philosophers whose views on logic, reasoning, and science influenced treatments of rhetorical proof. Given the historically consistent relationships between epistemological concerns and definitions of historical aims and proof, their influence was inevitable. More importantly, their attacks were not aimed singularly at classical rhetorical proof, but at Scholastic logic, the tradition and method of logic that had influenced most branches of study up to the late Renaissance, rhetoric included.
and argumentation, these rhetoricians replaced the classical model of rhetorical proof and informal argumentation.  

Reflecting the epistemological views of the preceding two centuries, George Campbell's influential *Philosophy of Rhetoric* (1776) promotes empirical and rational approaches to argumentation.  

Due to the powerful influence of the new science, Campbell disregards the classical tradition of rhetorical proof and informal argumentation. Essentially a discussion of rhetoric's connection to faculty psychology, Campbell's rhetorical treatise nevertheless subscribes to the Ramistic distinction between logic and rhetoric and consequently incorporates wholesale the definitions and methodology of formal logical proof detailed in the discussions of Bacon, Descartes, Locke, and Hume.

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10 See James A. Berlin's *Writing Instruction in Nineteenth Century American Colleges* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984) for a similar perspective on the pedagogical tradition that results from the eighteenth-century efforts of Campbell and Blair to establish a new rhetoric corresponding to the new logic. As Berlin concludes, "the classical idea of education had been completely defeated by the elective curriculum with its emphasis on the scientific method in all areas of study even . . . in the traditional humanistic art of rhetoric" (p. 18). See also Chapter 6 on current-traditional rhetoric, which discusses the influence of the scientific and technical world view on the aims of late nineteenth-century writing instruction.

For Campbell, any discourse has four aims: to enlighten the understanding, to please the imagination, to move the passions, and to influence the will. Relating eloquence to grammar and logic, Campbell refers the speaker (or writer) to logic in order to discover the truths to be conveyed and the arguments to be employed in both instructing the understanding and persuading the will. Whereas the canon of invention in classical rhetorical theory served this function, Campbell, following Bacon and Locke, assigned this function to logic. Drawing from the new logic, Campbell extensively delineates the different sources of evidence that will provide the "sense" of every speech (p. 35).

Campbell divides evidence into two kinds: intuitive and deductive. Intuitive evidence includes the type of evidence that results purely from "intellection" (cf. Locke's "perception"), and that regards abstract notions and ideas such as mathematical axioms. A second type of intuitive evidence arises from the "consciousness" one has about the reality of sensations and passions. A third type termed "common sense" involves memory, and is based upon a source of knowledge that is common to mankind and that regards the truths of human life and existence (35-42). Campbell classifies under intuitive evidence everything that results from "the simple contemplation of the ideas or perceptions which form the propositions under consideration" (p. 42).
Obviously influenced by Hume, Campbell divides deductive evidence into scientific (or demonstration) and moral. Moral evidence is the proper province of rhetoric, however. Whereas the subject of scientific evidence is "abstract, independent truth, or the changeable and necessary relations of ideas," the subject of moral evidence is the "real but often changeable and contingent connexions that subsist among things actually existing (pp. 43-44). Scientific evidence does not admit any contrariety of proofs; in moral evidence, however, there is almost always real, not apparent, evidence on both sides, in the form of contrary experiences, presumptions, or testimonies (pp. 44-45). Scientific evidence consists of one coherent series of proofs, each of which depends on the preceding proof and suspends the following one. Moral reasoning, on the other hand, permits a combination of many distinct, independent proofs (p. 45).

Campbell divides moral reasoning into four subdivisions of evidence: experience, analogy, testimony, calculations of chance (pp. 50-58). According to Campbell, experience provides the material which enables the mind to make the inductive moves from simple ideas to complex ideas, and to see relations among ideas. The relations that Campbell mentions are many of the same that the ancients listed under the topics or commonplaces: comparison, cause and effect, definition (50-3). Note, however, that these relations are
observed in the study of nature; Campbell restricts experiential evidence to phenomena of the physical and natural world. Analogy is essentially indirect experience.

Claiming that testimony is more adequate evidence than any conclusions from experience, Campbell privileges testimony (p. 54). Locke's discussion of probability and testimony is an influence here. The influence of Hume is also acknowledged by Campbell, who remarks that "testimony is capable of giving us absolute certainty," provided that testimony is founded on faith and not on reason.

Nonetheless, Campbell recommends confining one's belief in human testimony within the proper bounds. When receiving the testimony of a person, the recipient should regard the reputation of the attester, the manner of the address, the nature of the fact attested, the occasion, the design or motive behind the address, and the disposition of the audience (p. 55). All of these concerns affect the degree of credibility in human testimony.

Campbell also dismisses the syllogism because it bears no affinity to moral reasoning. Moral reasoning proceeds by analysis, by ascending from particulars to universals. According to Campbell, analysis is the only method by which to acquire natural knowledge (p. 62). The syllogism is the synthetic method of reasoning; synthesis is applied to knowledge already acquired. Campbell concludes that there
is no reason to revive the syllogism, since it little benefits either eloquence or philosophy.

Campbell's treatment of evidence and reasoning bears little resemblance to the classical treatment of rhetorical proof. Whereas the ancients, relying on the topics or commonplaces and enthymemic reasoning, concentrated on the investigation and discovery of effective arguments, Campbell, displaying the influence of the new scientific movement of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, concerned himself with the nature, types, and degrees of scientific evidence. Whereas the ancients were concerned with contingent and variable logical arguments, Campbell was concerned with degrees of certainty in various kinds of evidence.

Although Campbell's students learned how to apply formal arguments and marshall various types of evidence, this mode of argumentation was more suited to the realm of scientific knowledge. According to Campbell, the "business of logic [is] to evince the truth," the achievement of this aim relying mainly on the formal or empirical presentation of the truth. The humanistically-oriented model of classical rhetorical proof, on the other hand, often proceeded from assumed or unverifiable beliefs, opinions, or values. Campbell's model of rhetorical proof may have been effective for the kind of formal discourse conducted in the
courtroom, the senate, or the church. Like the classical rhetoricians, Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, Campbell recognized the value of rhetoric to the maintenance of civic, political, and judicial affairs. Unlike the ancients, however, Campbell privileged modes of argumentation that emphasized the rational and empirical validity of the subject matter and arguments of a discourse, and, in the case of pulpit oratory, the validity of arguments based on faith, testimony, and the scriptures. In Campbell's view, conviction relies solely on the information itself; as he maintains in *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, "pure logic regards only the subject, which is examined solely for the sake of information." Given his two-fold allegiance, to the new logic as well as the Church, Campbell deals little with how contingent emotional and ethical factors can be incorporated into persuasive discourse regarding social and political issues.

Like Campbell, Hugh Blair also excluded an informal investigative dimension from his definition of invention. Blair's *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres* (1783), a popular English rhetoric of the late eighteenth century, limited rhetoric (or eloquence) to style, delivery, and arrangement. Linking invention to genius, Blair deals mainly with the management and arrangement of arguments.  

Blair defines eloquence as public speaking, as speaking in such a manner so as to attain the desired end. Persuasive eloquence is founded on reason and arguments, the latter involving three requirements: to invent, to arrange, and to express. Blair suggests, however, that the invention of arguments is not within the power of art, but dependent on individual genius (Vol. II, p. 180). He distinguishes between the discovery of reasons that will be used to convince someone and the advantageous management of these reasons (II, pp. 179-180). Art, he maintains, can very little supply a speaker with arguments for every cause and on every subject. On this point, he disagrees with the ancients, all of whom valued the topics as sources of argument. Blair advises the speaker to ignore the loci, and to look closely instead at the subject itself. The loci, according to Blair, are "very showy academical declamations," producing neither useful discourse nor real business. Instead, Blair acknowledges two different methods of reasoning that will assist "the disposition and conduct" of arguments: the analytic and the synthetic (II, pp. 180-183). These he regards as formal modes for arranging information into propositions.

Acknowledging the aim assigned to rhetoric during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, to convey information
from the various branches of learning, Blair regards rhetoric as the study of "how we communicate our thoughts to one another with most advantage" (I, p. 2). Rhetoric is, therefore, simply the study of how to arrange and express our thoughts in either spoken or written discourse. Blair, implicitly adhering to the Ramistic distinction between logic and rhetoric, excludes logical considerations from his treatise. Rhetoric serves solely to convey the arguments and knowledge that may be obtained from arts and sciences external to the rhetorical art. The forms of such arguments are speeches aiming to instruct, to inform, or to convince the understanding. As Blair points out, "knowledge and science must furnish the materials that form the body and substance of any valuable composition" (I, p. 4).

Although Blair recognizes the role that the art of rhetoric plays in the conduct of human affairs, he is concerned with arrangement (formal argumentation) and with style and delivery. Along with Campbell, Blair applies eloquence to three contexts: popular assemblies, the courts, and the church. In popular assemblies, the speaker aims to convince an audience of some choice or conduct that will serve the public utility or good (Lec. XXVII, p. 48). This aim, however, is achieved through solid reasoning and argument, not through informal argumentation (Lec. XXVII, p. 49).
Eloquence of the bar is concerned with what is just and true. Since judicial eloquence deals with laws and statutes, it little requires, Blair implies, methods for discovering informal logical proof. Blair explains that in classical rhetoric judicial oratory was more akin to popular eloquence. Classical judicial oratory involved fewer statutes and laws than did eighteenth-century eloquence; and the decisions of causes relied not so much on the interpretation and application of formal laws, but rather on the "equity and common sense of the judges" (II, pp. 74-81).

Blair concludes that in the classical world a citizen pleading a cause was better prepared for arguing his case effectively if he'd studied eloquence (rhetoric) rather than jurisprudence. Blair's comments implicitly acknowledge the role of informal argumentation and invention in classical rhetoric. Blair acknowledges the need in classical rhetoric for informal inventional strategies for investigating and selecting the arguments which were "most fitted for influencing the judges before whom he spoke." Informal argumentation, however, is inappropriate for eighteenth-century eloquence.

The need for a mode of informal logical proof diminishes as well in Blair's definition of pulpit oratory. Like that of *ars praedicandi*, the aim of preaching is to persuade human beings to become good (II, p. 101-126).
According to Blair, the subjects of a sermon, the truths of virtue and vice, are generally abstract and familiar to his congregation. Since the orator is not conveying new information, nor convincing them of what they don't already believe or know, the orator concentrates on "dressing truths . . . in such colours as may most forcibly affect their imagination and heart" (II, p. 102). "To assist this function of true eloquence . . . the art of placing truth in the most advantageous light for conviction and persuasion" (II, p. 104), Blair emphasizes style, delivery, and arrangement.

Like Campbell, Blair's concern with formal reasoning as modes of arrangement and the exclusion of informal inventional strategies did little to assist the student in learning how to conduct informal arguments. Although Blair's rhetoric was committed to the civic and political aims of the eighteenth century, it little emphasized informal argumentation.

The intellectual aims of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to apply empirical and rational approaches to all branches of knowledge, even to those that traditionally served the conduct of human affairs, namely politics, theology, law, ethics, resulted in Richard Whately's efforts to prescribe a formal approach to rhetorical argumentation. Though Whately's *Elements of Rhetoric* (1828) is an early
nineteenth-century work, it contributed to the influence of eighteenth-century rhetoric on the nineteenth century. In addition to Campbell and Blair, Whately popularized formal approaches to argumentative discourse, as well as empirical and rational approaches to rhetorical proof.

Concurring with his recent predecessors' insistence that rhetorical invention could deal only with truths already known, Whately limited rhetoric to the finding and arranging of suitable arguments to prove a given point which had been previously investigated and researched (p. 39). Whately explained that the conclusion that the speaker/writer aimed to establish must be clear to himself, before he sought the proofs of a given proposition. Logic thus enables the speaker to discover the truth; and rhetoric serves to convey, to prove, or to establish that truth to the satisfaction of another. In effect, rhetoric serves to obtain the hearer's conviction (p. 36). Elsewhere in Elements of Rhetoric, Whately states that the principal object of the discourse is (1) "to give satisfaction to a candid mind, and convey instruction to those who are ready to receive it," or (2) "to compel the assent, or silence the objects, of an opponent" (p. 108).

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Whately's primary concern in *Elements of Rhetoric* is the selection and arrangement of the forms and divisions of arguments. The rhetorical process, according to Whately, involves conveying truths to others by reasoning, that is by finding proofs to support a given proposition. Whately identifies four divisions of arguments. The first division regards the forms of stating arguments, the syllogistic or the enthymemetic and the categoric and hypothetical (p. 42). The second division regards the subject matter. The argument may be necessary or probable (certain or uncertain), depending, for example, on whether the subject matter is drawn from mathematics or human affairs (p. 42). The third division pertains to the intention of the reasoner; that is, to whether he wishes to establish the conclusion directly or indirectly, or to disprove it (p. 42). The fourth division is based on the relation of the subject matter of the premises to that of the conclusion, the relation being based on cause to effect or on example (p. 43).

Whately distributes arguments into two classes: *a priori*, and Example and Sign. *A priori* arguments Whately equates with arguments from cause to effect (p. 47). The second of the two classes is subdivided into sign and example. The term "sign" describes an argument from an effect to a condition, or an *A posteriori* argument (pp. 52-
Whately includes under "sign" the argument from testimony, recognizing its importance as a form of evidence and argument in much the same way as Locke, Hume, and Campbell do. The sub-class of arguments termed Example provide for the range of arguments included among Induction, Experience, Analogy, and Purity of reasoning (pp. 85-86).

As a result of Whately's reduction of rhetoric to the art of managing and arranging arguments, rhetorical invention finds itself limited to formal and managerial considerations. In Whately's scheme, the exploratory role of invention diminishes. Whereas classical rhetoric regarded invention as an activity in which the discovery of or inquiry into the subject matter of a speech and the discovery and selection of arguments were generally one and the same, Whately restricts invention solely to the arrangement of given subject matter into formal arguments. In Whately's scheme, neither logic nor rhetoric deals with the subject matter of the speech; instead, the subject matter is obtained from "the science or system conversant about that subject matter" (p. 40). In this restriction, we see that rhetoric becomes less an art geared towards the situation-bound and dynamic conduct of informal arguments. We shall see that instead rhetoric emphasizes skills that guide the marshalling of information. 14 During the

14 Albert R. Kitzhaber concurs with this view of nineteenth century writing instruction. See chapter IV of his dissertation "Rhetoric in American Colleges: 1850-1900"
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, rhetoric becomes more concerned with the skillful construction of formal, abstract arguments. Whately's rhetoric excluded invention strategies that enable one to identify and investigate the probable and variable values, beliefs, and opinions that generally characterize human affairs and disputes.

During the eighteenth century, the rhetorical aim to inform the understanding in the new and certain truths of nature and the abstract universe replaced the traditional...

(Ph.D. diss., University of Washington, 1953). In this examination of the definitions, relations, and scope of rhetoric during the latter half of the nineteenth century, he explains:

... there was a rapidly diminishing interest in defining rhetoric in the philosophical fashion of earlier years. With a new, more flexible, and more diversified curriculum, it no longer seemed either necessary or practicable to establish the exact position of rhetoric with relation to other subjects. Explicit statements of the scope of rhetoric became fewer, but the scope itself became increasingly more narrow, confined finally at the end of the century to practical rules to guide written composition -- and, more often than not, only the mechanical aspects of this (pp. 122-23).

Nan Johnson bases her examination of Franz Theremin's Elocuence a Virtue (1844), Henry Day's Elements of Rhetoric (1850), and Matthew Hope's Princeton Textbook in Rhetoric (1854) on a similar view. In her essay "Three Nineteenth Century Rhetoricians: The Humanist Alternative to Skills Management" in The Rhetorical Tradition and Modern Writing, edited by James J. Murphy (New York: Modern Language Association, 1982), she argues for the restoration of a humanistic perspective in rhetorical education, a perspective that complements and balances the emphasis on what she terms "skills management," or "craft-dominated instruction," (that is, stylistic and organizational skill) in contemporary writing instruction.
aim of classical rhetoric: to persuade audiences during judicial, political, and civic disputes. Consequently, rhetorical invention was restricted to methods for forming arguments and arranging evidence, and to guidelines for organizing subject matter into discourses which aimed to instruct or to inform. These aims come to dominate nineteenth century rhetorical instruction due to the influence of Campbell, Blair, and Whately. Due to their influence, composition texts and rhetorics in the nineteenth century adopt wholesale the view of invention as formal guidelines for developing and organizing discourse. These rhetorics automatically assume the objective efficacy of empirically-based lines of formal reasoning in rhetorical argumentation. Regarding the discovery and selection of subject matter and arguments, these rhetorics also attribute these activities not to method or art, that is, traditional classical rhetorical invention, but to the power of the imagination, taste, and genius.\textsuperscript{15} During the nineteenth century, composition texts and rhetorics in the nineteenth century adopt wholesale the view of invention as formal guidelines for developing and organizing discourse. These rhetorics automatically assume the objective efficacy of empirically-based lines of formal reasoning in rhetorical argumentation. Regarding the discovery and selection of subject matter and arguments, these rhetorics also attribute these activities not to method or art, that is, traditional classical rhetorical invention, but to the power of the imagination, taste, and genius.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{15} Sharon Crowley elaborates this point in "Invention in Nineteenth-Century Rhetoric," CCC, 36, No.1 (1985), 51-60. Crowley explains that the eighteenth-century model of rhetoric (that of Campbell and Blair, in particular) assumes that intellectual capacity depends to a great extent upon genius, and, consequently, cannot be taught. Contrasting this model with that of classical rhetoric, one which gave speakers or writers a set of intellectual conventions, she points out the nineteenth-century pedagogical difficulties for a model of the discovery process embedded in the eighteenth-century model of rhetorical invention. She claims that this model which linked invention to one's genius and powers of observation would have been almost impossible to use in the classroom.
In the representative nineteenth-century composition rhetorics of Alexander Bain, Henry Day, and John Genung, the practical implications of the rhetorical and epistemological concerns of the preceding two centuries are strikingly apparent. These textbooks provide invention precepts useful to the student for developing different kinds of discourse: descriptive, narrative, expository, and persuasive. However, these discourse types serve as abstract formal structures that guide the arrangement of specific subject matter into formal compositions. They basically guide the production of formal kinds of discourse, all of which aim to convey information. Argumentation continues to be treated as an adjunct to persuasive discourse, with inductive and deductive reasoning being treated as lines of formal development. Argumentation too becomes a formal mode of discourse, the aim of which is to convey the truth of a proposition through clear, ordered, formal reasoning.
Alexander Bain's *English Composition and Rhetoric* (1866) follows in the recent tradition of rhetorical argumentation laid out in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Like Campbell, Whately, and Blair, Bain patterns his method of invention and rhetorical proof after the new logic. Bain's treatment of invention and argumentation follow uniformly in the eighteenth century tradition of a rhetorical education that prepared students to convey the advances and knowledge in various branches of learning affected by the new logic.

Bain claims that "to a mind perfectly rational, scientific or logical evidence produces conviction." Associating argumentation with logic, he adds that the mind is convinced by "trains of reasoning or deductions from these." This second remark of course echoes Descartes, who promoted a method of ordered, formal reasoning. Bain recommends four types of arguments derivative of the recent epistemology: a form of inductive argument similar to Hume's argument from cause and effect; analogy; and "probabilities," that is, arguments drawn from the laws of nature and mathematics.

Although Bain's concept of probability superficially resembles Aristotle's notion of probability in rhetorical proof, Bain's application of probable arguments shares little with Aristotle's. Bain applies probable arguments to issues and problems concerning experimental probability and mathematical calculations. Unlike Aristotle, he does not address the significance of probable knowledge to informal argumentation and the conduct of human affairs.

Although Bain follows in the seventeenth and eighteenth century rhetorical-epistemological tradition, he recovered the syllogism, just as Whately did a few decades earlier. Bacon, Descartes, and Locke all rejected the syllogism, claiming that it was useful for arguing knowledge already assumed, but not for advancing knowledge. They also argued that since the rhetorical syllogism in traditional learning derived its major premise from the realm of common opinion and belief, it little served genuine learning. Since its major premise was not founded on sound principles and certain knowledge, they were suspicious of it. Bain, however, recognized that the syllogism could be a useful tool for inducing conviction, provided that the rhetorician-logician founded the major premise on empirically-based principles and knowledge. Bain recovered the syllogism for its formal value, not for its adaptability to informal argumentation, a feature vital to classical rhetorical invention.
Bain defines rhetoric's concern as "the means whereby language, spoken or written, may be rendered effective." He applies the effective use of language, however, not only to argumentation but to four kinds of compositions, three of which, description, narration, exposition, serve to inform the understanding, and the fourth, persuasion, to influence the will. The breakdown of discourse into four types, each serving a specific aim, is a feature significant to the nineteenth century, one that illustrates the prominent attention to arrangement and form in nineteenth-century composition instruction. Each of the first three types of compositions is characterized by a series of methods that guides its production. In effect, each of these discourse types is governed by an inventional strategy (or by inventional choices) that directs the selection, arrangement, and analysis of the subject matter. In descriptive, narrative, and expository compositions, the function of invention is to assist the formal development of the composition.

Classical invention guided the discovery of subject matter and the selection of arguments; Bain's concept of analysis and development, however, differs from the classical concept. Classical invention involved an inquiry into the contingent subject matter and arguments that would prove in all likelihood most effective to the speaker's
persuasive purpose. This inquiry involved an analysis of the aim of the speech, its context, and the values, beliefs, or opinions that would most serve or influence the desired aim. Bain, however, applies the activities of analysis and development to the skillful selection and arrangement of information and details on a particular subject into an organized formal structure whose aim is either to describe, to narrate, or to explain an object, event, or phenomenon. In this respect, these four kinds of compositions respond to the general aim of rhetorical education in the nineteenth century: to convey information for academic and intellectual purposes. 17

Bain's treatment of argumentation and invention reflects a feature of nineteenth-century rhetoric consistent with that of the seventeenth as well as eighteenth century. The major purpose of argumentative discourse was to test or to display the truth of an idea or proposition; argumentation was a formal method of informing the understanding with certain knowledge for academic or

17 For a brief survey of the historical development of explanatory or expository rhetoric, see Robert J. Connor's "The Rhetoric of Explanation: Explanatory Rhetoric from Aristotle to 1850," Written Communication, 1, No.2 (1984), 189-210. The interest in formal argumentation during the nineteenth century is closely linked, I believe, to the development of expository rhetoric, a development that responded to the aim how best to communicate information without necessary reference to overt persuasion.
professional purposes. In essence, nineteenth-century rhetoric regarded argumentation as a formal activity which served intellectual purposes. These purposes clearly differed from those of classical rhetoric. Unlike classical rhetoric, which regarded argumentation as a fundamentally humanistic and interactional activity essential to the conduct of the affairs of the society and culture, nineteenth-century writing instruction regarded argumentation as a formal, generally empirically-based activity that aided the student's pursuit and exchange of knowledge.

This nineteenth-century focus contrasts substantially with the function assigned to argumentation in classical rhetorical theory. For Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, argumentation was indeed an intellectual activity, but it was also a complex activity. For the ancients, rhetorical argumentation was a way of participating in the society and culture, a way of contributing to the conduct of its affairs and concerns; it was an interactional and humanistic activity, as well as intellectual. In classical rhetoric, the aim of argumentation was rarely to demonstrate truth objectively, or for its own sake, or to prove a new truth or to advance knowledge. The ancients built a theory of rhetoric on the understanding of the role argumentation played in the effective conduct of human affairs. Consequently, their method of invention and rhetorical proof
derived from the understanding that the conduct of human affairs frequently relies on reasoning whose premises are often implicit, or without empirical or warrantable basis, or supplied by the speaker's or audience's own subjective values, beliefs, or opinions. This theoretical foundation for informal argumentation is absent in nineteenth-century composition instruction.\(^\text{18}\)

Henry Day's *Elements of Rhetoric* (1866), a text less influential than Bain's popular *English Composition and Rhetoric* (1866), nonetheless contains a similar treatment of

\(^{18}\) In "The Evolution of Invention in Current-Traditional Rhetoric: 1850-1970," *Rhetoric Review*, 3, No.2 (1985), 146-162, an article which argues that the investigative component of instruction was not absent from nineteenth-century current-traditional rhetoric, Sharon Crowley implicitly supports my claim. She argues, as I have, that Lochean empiricism influenced current-traditional rhetoric and its assumption that reality, thought, and language are distinct from one another. She adds that Bain, Day, and Genung, in reimporting invention into rhetoric, also brought with it the logician's assumption that thought is an abstract activity to which language is external and secondary. The inventional procedures advocated by them came, however, to be regarded as structural features for any discourse rather than as means of inquiry, this change occurring as later textbook authors lost touch with the intellectual context from which these logical/inventional terms and their uses had been drawn. Textbooks such as *The MacMillan Handbook* (John Kierczak, 1939), *Scribner's Handbook* (Albert Markwardt, 1940), the *Prentice-Hall Handbook* (Glenn Leggett et al., 1951) or those by James McCrimmon and Brooks and Warren she cites as examples. Crowley and I (among others) agree that one of the problems in contemporary rhetoric and composition pedagogy is that the methods and practice that dominate current pedagogy are derived from theoretical assumptions whose historical intellectual basis requires critical assessment if these methods are to continue as effective strategies in writing instruction.
formal argumentation. Like Bain, Day's discussion of argumentative proof and discourse modes as invention strategies continues in the pedagogical tradition established two centuries earlier.

Day defines invention as "the art of supplying the requisite thought in kind and form for discourse". Although he claims that invention has a two-fold nature, "the mere supply of the thought," and arrangement (or disposition), he deals mainly with formal and organizational strategies (p. 35). For Day, invention predominantly involves selecting a theme or a subject for the discourse and determining the form in which it is to be discussed (p. 38). Concerned with the skill of thematic and formal development, Day includes for practice an extensive list of suggested themes to be developed into narrative and descriptive essays, or essays which give examples or an analysis, or those which compare and contrast. This emphasis on modes of development and themes indicates the growing interest of nineteenth-century rhetorical education on style and organization, on providing students with abstract models for arranging information into structures that highlight a certain aspect of the information, in narration the sequence of events and in description the characteristic features, for example.

Although Day does not regard them as distinct discourse types, he considers Explanation, Confirmation (or Conviction), Excitation, and Persuasion as distinct processes which lead to the aims: to produce a new conception, to produce belief, judgement, or conviction, to effect an emotional change, and to influence the will to act, respectively. (p. 42). Since persuasion benefits from all the other processes, they may serve as invention modes in much the same manner as Bain's modes of communication. According to Day, the process by which an object or truth may be explained involves narration, description, analysis, exemplification, comparison, and contrast (pp. 54-55). The process of excitation involves the same list (p. 142). The process of confirmation deals with argumentation.

Claiming that the logical views on which they were founded are "inapplicable to present modes of thought," Day rejects the classical topics (p. 33). He offers in their place a topical method much resembling the treatment of argumentative proof in the treatises of Hume, Campbell, and Whately. In his discussion of "confirmation" (or argumentative process), he explains that the object of the topical art is "to facilitate and guide rhetorical invention by a distribution of the different kinds of proof into general classes" (p. 94). In essence, Day extensively delineates the manner in which various kinds of logical proofs can be applied to simple or complex propositions.
Like Campbell and Whately, he discusses analytic, synthetic, and empirical proof, which include four subcategories consistent with the views of the new logic: experience, cause and effect, signs (testimony and authority), and example.

Day also separated investigation (or discovery) from rhetorical invention and dealt only with confirmation, that is, proofs and their formal arrangement. Day's view of argumentation as a formal mode of conveying information is evident in the distinction he draws between investigation and confirmation. He comments that in investigation either or both the matter and truth of the judgement are unknown, whereas in confirmation the judgement is already known in respect to both matter and truth (p. 87). In other words, the discovery of subject matter is not the proper province of rhetoric.

Like his contemporary Bain, Day adopted a treatment of rhetorical proof prescribed by the new logic of the seventeenth and eighteenth century. Although Day's Elements of Rhetoric was less-known than Bain's English Composition and Rhetoric, Day's treatment of argumentation as a formal mode of discourse placed him in the pedagogical tradition that excluded informal argumentation. Instead of informal inventional strategies, Day emphasized explanation, confirmation (or conviction), excitation, and persuasion as
thought processes for presenting a theme or topic in formal discourse. This treatment of invention excluded strategies for investigating and ascertaining the knowledge, beliefs, or opinions held by the reader or hearer and that would influence one's argument. Day's concern with thought processes for communicating information omitted a treatment of informal argumentation.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the restriction of invention to formal modes of development is firmly rooted in rhetorical composition. Argumentation, too, is treated as a mode of discourse that organizes information into propositions. John F. Genung's *The Practical Elements of Rhetoric* (1899) exemplifies the formal treatment of argumentation and rhetorical proof throughout the nineteenth century.²⁰

²⁰ I should add that for Genung, rhetoric is a branch of study, and rhetorical discourse can be both expository and poetic. In *Practical Elements of Rhetoric* (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1899), he defines rhetoric as "the art of adapting discourse, in harmony with its subject and occasion, to the requirements of a reader or hearer" (p. 1). Rhetoric includes both speech and literary discourse. Genung's emphasis on literary discourse is apparent in his *Handbook of Rhetorical Analysis* (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1888). He explains that becoming a writer involves theory, example, and practice. The handbook contains examples of literary models to be analyzed for their stylistic and structural features, the latter of which Genung regards as invention. In *Outlines of Rhetoric* (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1894), a text which emphasizes the composition of written discourse, Genung defines rhetoric as "the art of expressing our thoughts with skill" (p. 2). The writer's "paramount purpose... is to make others see a subject as he sees it - with the same clearness, the same fullness, the same power, the same beauty" (pp. 2-3). Rhetoric is also "the art of making literature," according to Genung, and as such two kinds of
Regarding rhetoric as discourse intended to impart information, Genung defines invention as ways of developing "a line of thought from its central theme through its outline to its final amplified form" (*Practical*, pp. 7-8). Invention also deals with ways of selecting, arranging, and modifying the line of thought to suit the requirements of the literary discourse (pp. 7-8).

Although invention can be applied to the selection and arrangement of material for literary undertakings, Genung insists that only ordering and arranging the discourse can be dealt with in a text-book (pp. 7-8). On this point, he concurs with Blair. Thus, in his treatment of invention, he deals with organization, arrangement, and development of material. His discussion of narration, exposition, and description, like that of Bain, focuses on the formal nature of these modes of development (pp. 326-408). Like Bain and Day, Genung includes the modes under invention.

Genung excludes the investigative element from invention, claiming that reasoning belongs to logic rather than to rhetoric. Thus, argumentation should not be
concerned with the "minutiae processes of reasoning," but with how "reasoning can be adapted to clear and effective communication of thought" and with what forms of argument most usefully serve this concern (p. 407). For Genung, rhetorical argumentation involves deciding upon the ways of ordering and arranging information to prove the truth or falsity of an idea. He advises following the logical order in which knowledge is obtained: the direct observation or the discovery of facts (testimony or authority); empirical induction; or deductive syllogism, provided that its premises are unquestionable or "truisms" (undisputable) (pp. 408-429).

By the close of the nineteenth century, rhetorical invention claimed as its proper realm only strategies useful for organizing, arranging, and developing a piece of written discourse, this feature evident in the practical rhetoric of John F. Genung, as well as those of Alexander Bain and Henry Day. The modes of discourse, narration, description, exposition, and persuasion, which subsumed argumentation, were treated as modes of development. Nineteenth century rhetoric also restricted empirically-based lines of inductive and deductive reasoning to formal modes of development for argumentative or persuasive compositions. Unlike the treatment of invention in classical rhetoric, the nineteenth century generally excluded the element of
discovery or investigation (or inquiry) from its treatment of invention.

The epistemological concerns of the preceding two centuries contributed substantially to rhetoric's being limited to, in Bacon's words, the art of "recommending the dictates of reason to the imagination." Due to the efforts of Bacon, Descartes, Locke, Hume, and Hartley to construct a new scientific method, traditional Aristotelian logic and the arts which it served were discouraged. The criticism of traditional logic put forth by these thinkers resulted in the removal of the investigative element from the rhetorical art. Rhetoric came to be regarded mainly as an art of conveying ideas to the understanding in formal discourse. The sole concern of invention became the arrangement of subject matter acquired from other branches of learning into arguments and proofs, this view firmly promoted by the eighteenth century rhetoricians, Campbell, Blair, and Whately.

The rhetorics of Alexander Bain, Henry Day, John F. Genung reflect the status of argumentation and invention in nineteenth century rhetorical practice.21 These practical

21 I have focused only on the rhetorics of Bain, Day, and Genung as well as those of Campbell, Blair, and Whately, in order to illustrate the tradition that dominates contemporary composition instruction, a tradition which Daniel Fogarty terms "current traditional". (See Daniel Fogarty, Roots for a New Rhetoric, 1959). This focus only partially reflects the activity in nineteenth-century
texts detailed principles and advice on the production of formal discourse, emphasizing style and arrangement and regarding argumentation as a formal mode of discourse. Inventional activity is reduced to considerations of form and organization, and all but excludes any investigative treatment of subject matter.

This practical treatment of rhetorical invention is also apparent in twentieth-century composition instruction. Formal and empirical logic, as well as modes of proof derived from empirical and rational principles such as testimony and scientific authority, continue to be treated as invention strategies mainly for organizing argumentative discourse. This treatment of invention and argumentation perpetuates the pedagogical tradition born out of seventeenth-century discussions of rhetoric and epistemology, a tradition committed to the interests of the new science. Like previous students schooled in this tradition, contemporary students who receive a rhetorical education only in formal argumentation are generally ill-equipped for participating effectively in the complex realm of rhetoric. I have not discussed elocutionary rhetoric of Belletristic rhetoric per se. For a synoptic description of nineteenth century rhetoric, see Donald Stewart's "The Nineteenth Century" in The Present State of Scholarship in Historical and Contemporary Rhetoric, edited by Winifred B. Horner (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1983). Stewart identifies five strands of rhetorical theory in the nineteenth century: classical, elocutionary, psychological-epistemological, belletristic, and practical.
of human concerns and affairs.\textsuperscript{22} Unfortunately, many of the contemporary composition rhetorics which promote formal argumentation often do so without adequately addressing the theoretical foundation of this mode of argumentation. Many of the composition rhetorics which promote formal and empirical logical approaches to argumentation inadvertently and unquestioningly reinforce seventeenth-century and eighteenth-century assumptions about the nature of logical proof and argumentation. Just as their predecessors did, these contemporary composition rhetorics neglect to discern or even to address the inappropriateness and consequent ineffectiveness of formal approaches to argumentation in humanistic contexts comprised of contingent values and probable opinions and beliefs. Chapter Three discusses this issue more fully.

Chapter Three also discusses the recovery of the investigative function of rhetorical invention in a number of contemporary composition rhetorics, a feature so vital to the classical view of rhetorical argumentation and proof. This view of invention closely relates to the view of writing in contemporary composition theory as an epistemic

\textsuperscript{22} As I maintain throughout this thesis, opinions, values, beliefs, and actions constitute this realm. To conduct discourse effectively in it, one must acknowledge, generally speaking, the social and practical nature of this realm, also its humanistic and interactional nature. Rhetorical education which seeks to prepare students for this realm of discourse must necessarily address the psychological, the ethical and the emotional, as well as the rational, dimensions and substance that characterize it.
activity, as a process of discovery. Just as classical
invention involved a multiplicity of activities, inquiry,
analysis, discovery, evaluation, judgement, and selection,
to arrive at the appropriate subject matter and arguments of
a speech, so does epistemic connote these same and numerous
activities.
CHAPTER THREE
FORMAL AND INFORMAL ARGUMENTATION IN
CONTEMPORARY COMPOSITION PEDAGOGY

In contemporary composition pedagogy, two approaches characterize instruction in written argumentation: formal and informal argumentation.¹ The dominant approach, formal

¹ For my purpose, which is to suggest the inadequacy of formal strategies for argumentation and rhetorical proof derived from scientific methods in current composition instruction, I have attempted to draw a basic distinction between formal and informal argumentation. However, this demarcation is not incompatible with other efforts to taxonomize the variety of approaches to composition in current pedagogy. Paul J. Kameen's "Rewording the Rhetoric of Composition," PRE/TEXT, 1 (1980), 39-59, distinguishes among approaches, according to three bases:

1) the "realm of forms," which emphasizes the abstract modes of thought which organize knowledge and discourse;
2) the "inner precinct of the self, with particular emphasis on experiential writing and authentic voices";
3) the "domain of audience, with particular emphasis on writing as a heuristically-enabled, information processing behaviour."

In "Contemporary Composition: The Major Pedagogical Theories," College English, 44, No.3 (1982), 765-777, James A. Berlin bases his taxonomy of pedagogical theories of composition on the way "rhetorical theories differ from each other," that is, "in the way writer, reality, audience and language are conceived - both as separate units and in the way the units relate to each other." He adds that "In the case of distinct pedagogical approaches, these four elements are likewise defined and related so as to describe a different composing process, which is to say a different world with different rules about what can be known, how it can be known, and how it can be communicated. To teach writing is to argue for a version of reality, and the best way of knowing and communicating it" (p. 766). He discusses four dominant groups: the Neo-Aristotelians or Classicists, the Positivists or Current-Traditionalists, the Neo-Platonists or Expressionists, and the New Rhetoricians. He identifies how each group adapts the "epistemic complex," to "specific directives about invention, arrangement, and
argumentation, follows in the pedagogical rhetorical tradition of the preceding two centuries. A survey of recent composition texts or handbooks reveals that the majority recommend formal induction and deduction as strategies for argumentative discourse. However, these formal strategies are generally unsuitable for humanistic argumentation. As Chapters One and Two have sought to establish, these formal strategies are generally unsuitable for humanistic argumentation. This unsuitability reflects one of the most conspicuous features of the realm of human affairs and actions: this realm is concerned with two-sided issues, issues that are ethical and emotional, as well as moral, religious, cultural, or economic. Since these modes of argumentation derive from scientific logic and method, formal induction and deduction are strategies ill-suited to effective discourse in the political, social, and cultural realms of ideas and actions.

Recognizing this general limitation, a number of composition theorists propose strategies for informal argumentation. These theorists include Maxine Hairston, style. In other words, Berlin identifies how the "distinct world construct" of writer, reality, audience, and language (epistemic complex) influences rules for discovering and communicating knowledge.

Although I have applied my interest in informal argumentation mainly to composition pedagogy, its aims and its methods, this study has benefitted from discussions of informal logic and argumentation occurring in other fields of study. There has been over the last quarter century a large movement toward informal argumentation in philosophy,
Janice Lauer, Gene Montague, Andrea Lunsford, Janet Emig, Linda Flower, Rise Axelrod, and Charles Cooper. This list exemplifies proponents whose alternative approaches to argumentation self-consciously restore the classical traditional framework of rhetorical argumentation. In particular, their strategies for invention and rhetorical proof reflect the probable, contingent, and verifiable knowledge that comprise human concerns and affairs. The realm of human deliberations consists mainly of values, beliefs, and opinions.

In spite of this recognition of the general nature of humanistic argumentation, the pedagogical tradition of formal argumentation dominates current writing instruction. Formal induction and deduction, modes of argumentation inherited from nineteenth-century rhetorical pedagogy, are the two strategies most commonly found in contemporary composition texts. Widely-used texts such as Frank. J. D'Angelo's *Process and Thought in Composition*, second edition (1980), and James A. McCrimmon's *Writing with a Purpose*, sixth edition (1976), or less well-known texts such as William A. Messenger and Peter A. Taylor's *Elements of Writing* (1984) exemplify this pedagogical inheritance.

In the areas of epistemology, logic, and language philosophy in particular. A striking example of this large movement, *Informal Logic: The First International Symposium*, edited by J. Anthony Blair and Ralph H. Johnson (Inverness, Cal.: Edgepress, 1980) features a collection of papers on informal logic which addresses concerns ranging from the philosophical and pragmatic significance of informal logic to its pedagogical applications and implications.
These modes of argumentation are indeed useful for establishing or communicating logical certainty in the realm of material and empirical phenomena and verifiable knowledge. However, they are not suitable for the humanistic realm of social and cultural concerns, a realm motivated not only by rational but also by ethical, emotional and psychological considerations. In addition to the pedagogical rhetorical tradition of formal argumentation, the twentieth century has inherited an overwhelming reverence for scientific logic and certainty. This complex inheritance underestimates the nature of human discourse, its aims, its dynamics, and its subject matter.

In *Process and Thought in Composition, 2nd ed.* (1980), Frank J. D'Angelo privileges formal approaches to written argumentation. This popular contemporary composition text follows in the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century pedagogical tradition of formal argumentation. Like Whately, Bain, and Genung, predecessors in this tradition, D'Angelo regards argumentation and invention as formal activities. Undoubtedly formal argumentation is valuable to students for it offers them formal pattern for organizing and ordering their thoughts into expository prose. It also helps students to apply formal relationships to their ideas,

as D'Angelo discerns. But as Chapter Two has suggested, formal argumentation does not adequately provide for effective discourse in the humanistic realm of contingent knowledge, ideas, beliefs, and opinions. Thus, our students need instruction in informal argumentation as well as formal.

Regarding writing as a form of thinking, D'Angelo defines invention as "the process of discovering ideas for speaking or writing" (Process, p. 5). D'Angelo's invention strategies enable the writer to probe the subject matter for a piece of discourse. These strategies include "any mental activity that will bring to conscious awareness something previously unknown" (Process, p. 34). D'Angelo focuses, however, on formal procedures for guiding the writer's discovery and analysis of ideas and subject matter, the same formal procedures that govern the organization of subject matter into both expository and argumentative discourse. He regards the traditional topics of invention as formal categories replicating cognitive activity.

In D'Angelo's view, the topics provide formal strategies for both invention and arrangement. D'Angelo blurs the distinction between invention and arrangement. See Process and Thought in Composition, Chapter 1 and the discussion of paradigms, Chapter 3, in which D'Angelo explains form as underlying abstract patterns.
explains in *A Conceptual Theory of Rhetoric* (1975) four assumptions that account for the close connection he sees between invention and arrangement. Regarding the topics, he says they are patterns of development which simultaneously serve an organizational and a heuristic function. The topics are also conceptual patterns that may be idealized and, consequently, that the rhetorician is able to abstract from actual discourse. They are universal conceptual patterns of discourse containing structural features that underlie all languages (*Theory*, 27-29). For our purposes, the key issue in these assumptions is two-fold. First, the topical patterns, according to D'Angelo, are found both in the way writers think or discover ideas and in the way they structure or organize discourse. Secondly, these patterns are universal patterns of human thinking activity.

Given this view of the topics, D'Angelo suggests that the writer discovers the subject matter and ideas for his writing according to the same principles the reader follows in the process of receiving ideas or information. This view of the topics suggests that there is little difference between the way the writer discovers the ideas and the way or structures, as "idealizations" that represent the writer's linguistic-cognitive competence. See also Frank D'Angelo, *A Conceptual Theory of Rhetoric*, (Cambridge: Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 1975), pp. 56-57, in which D'Angelo insists that formal patterns of development function as organizational as well as heuristic strategies. All references will be cited parenthetically, and referred to as *Theory*. 
the reader receives them. In D'Angelo's view, we come to knowledge through formal procedures or patterns. For this reason, *Process and Thought in Composition* privileges inventional strategies that enable the writer to give form to ideas, or to structure them.

D'Angelo's interest in formal thinking and structure is also evident in his discussion of persuasion as an aim. Just as the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did, D'Angelo relies on formal methods of reasoning; induction and deduction serve as kinds of logical thinking that go into the making of arguments. He defines arguments as "the giving of reasons to support the truth or falsity of a proposition," and proposition as "a statement upon which an argument is based or from which a conclusion is drawn" (*Process*, p. 241). The topics serve as modes of inductive reasoning, that is, reasoning from the particular to the general; these include examples, testimony, analogy, cause and effect, analysis, description, narration, and comparison (*Process*, p. 241).

This view of logical argumentation incompletely provides for the way argumentation is generally conducted in humanistic contexts. When people argue, rarely do they think in terms of what formal structure will best convey their arguments. Nor is their first concern the propositional validity of their arguments. Generally,
people are concerned mainly with finding the reasons that will support an argument. Ideally, they will first identify their own reasons for advancing an argument. They will then select which reasons to put forth not by determining the logical necessity between premises and conclusions but by judging the potential effect of a particular reason on a particular audience. The process of selecting arguments generally entails an examination of the readers' or hearers' opinions, ideas, or values, and how these might influence, promote, or hinder the effect of a particular argument on that audience.

Although the concern of this thesis is not audience per se, D'Angelo's list of questions which enable the writer to determine the social, educational, and cultural characteristics of his or her audience is particularly relevant to a discussion of informal argumentation and rhetorical proof. D'Angelo advises writers to identify the political, religious, or philosophical beliefs of an audience in order to "come up with a more complex picture of your audience" (Process, p. 22). Unfortunately this purpose falls short of acknowledging the possibilities this advice has for determining rhetorical proof. Indeed, this kind of

5 For the most part, this assertion is based on common sense and everyday reflection. Other evidence, more substantial, is easily available in disparate yet interrelated fields such as informal logic, psychology, communications theory, and of course classical and modern rhetorical theory.
analysis can be valuable for guiding stylistic and organizational choices; it can also assist the writer in identifying and judging what information and subject matter needs to be presented to a particular audience. But more importantly, it can assist the writer in deciding what arguments will most effectively serve (and even obstruct) a persuasive aim. In other words, this kind of analysis can enhance logical as well as content choices.

D'Angelo's cursory concession to audience is typical of discussions of formal argumentation in contemporary pedagogy. Although writers are encouraged to conduct a rigorous analysis of audience, often too little significance is given to the value this analysis affords in determining the subject matter or rhetorical proof appropriate to an audience. In part, this shortcoming is attributable to the fact that formal argumentation is constrained by a positivist framework. This framework privileges strategies for logical choices derived from scientific method. Since this framework derives from a theoretical tradition which concentrated on two major concerns, logical validity and

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6 I use the term positivist in a very general sense. I am referring mainly to two themes characteristic of this philosophical movement. The first is that scientific method is the only procedure that leads to valid knowledge. The second is that the principles of science can guide human conduct and can serve as the basis of social organization. In Chapter Two, I have discussed a number of the principal sources of this movement, Bacon, Locke, and Hume, arguing in particular the limitations of strict formal scientific logic in humanistic argumentation.
empirical knowledge, it little regards how the writer's affective or intentional aims influence logical choices.\footnote{The most conspicuous treatment of the terms intentional and affective can be found in Wimsatt and Beardsley's examination of them in the context of modern literary criticism and poetics. They address the problems in determining authorial intention, that is, "the author's attitude toward his work, the way he felt, what made him write," and conclude that "the design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of literary art." Although I am not entirely unsympathetic to their claims and since the concern of this thesis is not criticism, I do maintain that authorial intention is a principle essential to any theory of effective informal argumentation. See "The Intentional Fallacy," W.K. Wimsatt and Monroe S. Beardsley in Critical Theory Since Plato, ed. by Hazard Adams (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1971), pp. 1015-1022.}

Although D'Angelo's view of the topoi is informed by his theory of cognition, he follows in the tradition of eighteenth-century rhetoric, emphasizing the formal aspect of his inventional strategies. Whereas Aristotle saw the topoi as strategies for discovering ideas or propositions that the rhetor and the audience already shared or would agree on, D'Angelo's strategies mainly assist the writer in organizing his own topical ideas into text form into a piece.

\footnote{Wimsatt and Beardsley's concern with the affective principle is that this approach confuses what a poem is and what it does. This thesis does not permit me to explore here what they have termed "a special case of epistemological skepticism," that is, the problem with basing a standard of criticism on the psychological effects of the poem. However, a theory of informal argumentation should take into account what results or ends a writer hopes to achieve as well as how he or she can best achieve them. See Adams' Critical Theory Since Plato, "The Affective Fallacy," by Wimsatt and Beardsley, pp. 1022-1031.}
of discourse. Since D'Angelo assumes that the logical or
topical structure of a piece of argumentation manifests
universal cognitive activity, he gives little attention to
the way readers receive the ideas, or are led to conviction.
This assumption typifies the underlying theoretical
foundation of formal argumentation in contemporary pedagogy.
It assumes that the sole aim of argumentation is to induce
conviction, an aim that can be achieved "objectively", our
scientific and rhetorical pedagogical inheritance insists,
through formal induction or deduction.

However, D'Angelo's assumption overlooks a fundamental
feature of human knowledge and humanistic argumentation.
Human conviction commonly derives not merely from formal or
empirical reasoning but from faith, belief, and emotion. As
Aristotle discerned in his discussion of invention and
argumentation, the realm of human affairs and concerns
consists largely of unwarranted or unverifiable knowledge.
This realm consists mainly of beliefs, values, and opinions.
The pedagogical tradition of classical rhetoric prepared
students for this realm.

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8 We need only to ask ourselves what it is in a piece of
discourse that actually convinces us, when we address
cultural and political, religious, ethical, or moral issues.
I maintain that it is the beliefs, values, opinions, or
emotional and ethical appeals incorporated into the
discourse that secure our conviction.
D'Angelo too is concerned with preparing students for their everyday affairs (*Process*, pp. 240-241). He sees rhetoric as serving humanistic and social aims. These aims, however, are inadequately served by the modes of formal argumentation privileged by the pedagogical tradition born out of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century rhetorical-epistemological discussions. D'Angelo's formal inventional and argumentative strategies lack an investigative component that reflects the interactional and contingent nature of human discourse. This investigative component would enable the writer to adapt or adjust the content of the argument to the beliefs, values, or opinions held by a particular reader (or listener).

William E. Messenger and Peter A. Taylor's *Elements of Writing*, another contemporary composition text, shares some major similarities with D'Angelo's *Process and Thought in Composition*. The treatment of argumentation in *Elements of Writing* follows in the rhetorical epistemological tradition of the eighteenth and nineteenth century in that it privileges formal argumentation. Like D'Angelo, Messenger and Taylor advocate formal lines of reasoning, induction and deduction, and formal methods of development. And like

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D'Angelo's text, Messenger and Taylor's *Elements of Writing* follows in the pedagogical tradition of formal argumentation, with its invitational and argumentative strategies ill-suited to the realm of social and cultural discourse.

Messenger and Taylor offer a number of formal guidelines for constructing logical arguments. Even though arguments may also appeal to the feelings and emotions of the reader, they advise writers to direct their arguments to the reader's intellect. They advise the writer to treat the thesis as a proposition, which he or she should then set out to prove through logical reasoning. Relying on facts, sufficient evidence and formal lines of reasoning, the writer should support an opinion or proposition fully. If the writer is unable to support the argument with "good, hard evidence," the writer has "no business arguing a question" (p. 113). The writer should also begin with sound premises and make use of authoritative evidence and testimony.

Like D'Angelo, Messenger and Taylor regard induction and deduction, the "two basic methods of reasoning," as the most effective ways of constructing arguments, since these two modes "are the main ways people think anyway" (p. 107). Built into this viewpoint is the assumption that sound, formal reasoning is in itself persuasive. Messenger and
Taylor subscribe to the view that persuasive writing is "designed to change the way its readers think or feel about something, and perhaps also [to] cause them to do something they wouldn't have done before" (p. 106). This task is accomplished mainly through formal logical reasoning. Although Messenger and Taylor appreciate the need for the writer to know how the reader thinks and feel about a subject in order to choose effective arguments, their treatment of induction and deduction suggests that the effectiveness of an argument is built into the propositional structure of the argument. This high regard for formal argumentation overlooks the general inadequacy of formal logic as strategies for effective discourse in the realm of opinions, values, and beliefs.

Unlike D'Angelo, whose Conceptual Theory of Rhetoric provides the theoretical framework for his Process and Thought in Composition, Messenger and Taylor provide us with no separate theoretical text. We are left to infer the theoretical foundation for the inventional strategies and approach to argumentation they recommend. Although they do not trace their rhetorical origin to the eighteenth century, nor does D'Angelo, their emphasis on formal argumentation clearly places them in the tradition established by Campbell, Blair, and Whately. They follow in the pedagogical tradition of rhetorical argumentation that adapted rhetorical invention to definitions of reasoning and
rhetorical proof derived from seventeenth- and eighteenth-century rationalism and empiricism. They followed in a tradition that also limited invention to matters of organization and formal development. This shortcoming is a striking feature of the rhetorical pedagogical inheritance of contemporary composition pedagogy. While formal strategies may enable students to organize information into logically correct structures, induction and deduction do not necessarily improve the ability of writers to argue the contingent and variable concerns of everyday social, political, and cultural life.

James A. McCrimmon's widely used text *Writing with a Purpose*, 6th ed. (1976) also privileges formal argumentation. Like D'Angelo's *Process and Thought in Composition*, it too generally exemplifies the twentieth century inheritance of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century pedagogical tradition of rhetorical argumentation. McCrimmon defines persuasion as "verbal communication which attempts to bring about a voluntary change in judgement so that the reader or listeners will accept a belief they did not hold before" (p. 206). Argument involves observation and the drawing of a conclusion from that observation; more

precisely, McCrimmon regards argument as the relation between the observation and the conclusion.

McCrimmon's definition of proof also indicates his emphasis on formal argumentation. According to McCrimmon, rhetorical proof induces readers to accept an argument because of the apparent logical relation between the premises and the conclusion (p. 209). He recommends two types of formal argumentation: syllogistic and inferential, the latter of which includes arguments based on generalizations, causal relationships, causal generalizations, or analogies.

Classifying them as "the standard way of responding to information (p. 27), McCrimmon's invention strategies assist the writer in gathering and using material for discourse which aims to convey information. McCrimmon claims that the process of invention is one so natural that writers are rarely aware of the activity, even though it generally involves three stages of activity: observation, interpretation, and conclusion. McCrimmon emphasizes the value of this thinking process as a method of organizing the "tremendous amount of information people generally have stored in their minds/memory." He recommends four common patterns for thinking about experience that enable the writer to generate information: observing similarities and differences, grouping, generalizing, and establishing causal
relations. These patterns are indeed very useful for dealing with information regarding material or observable or experiential phenomena, or dealing with, in McCrimmon's words, "what we see, hear, feel, taste, and smell."

However, this mode of argumentation is not particularly well-suited to, nor indicative of, the manner in which argumentation is conducted in humanistic contexts. In the kind of argumentation that characterizes human affairs, the writer often cannot demonstrate logical necessity between premises and the conclusion, nor can he or she draw from personal or observable experience for material. The concerns and issues that comprise human affairs often cannot be observed nor neatly fitted into logical patterns.

McCrimmon, as well as Messenger and Taylor, and D'Angelo, exemplify the pedagogical tradition that privileges formal modes of written argumentation. Each text regards the thought processes that go into the writer's investigation and discovery of information as similar to those forms which organize the subject material and ideas into argumentative composition. But since formal argumentation relies on lines of reasoning and modes of rhetorical proof derived from the empirical and rational concerns of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, it does not accurately reflect the way humanistic argumentation is conducted. Although formal induction and deduction and
modes of evidence based on principles of causality, experience, observation, or testimony and authority are aptly suited to conveying truths or knowledge about phenomena in the natural or abstract world, these strategies have limited use in humanistic discourse. Rarely does human discourse follow long, formally laid-out lines of reasoning. Nor can assertions regarding human matters or concerns always be supported with empirical, demonstrable, or tangible evidence. Formal lines of reasoning and empirical modes of evidence, both traditional components of scientific argumentation, serve to establish or to convey certainty or validity. However, contingent or probable knowledge occupies the realm of human discourse. For the most part, values, beliefs, and opinions comprise this realm. Therefore, contemporary composition pedagogy requires a complementary alternative to strict formal argumentation, if writing instruction is to serve humanistic and cultural purposes more effectively.  

Recognizing the importance of writing instruction to these purposes, a number of contemporary composition theorists have recommended alternatives to formal argumentation. Though their strategies for invention and argumentation may differ somewhat from each other, these

11 I emphasize the complementary nature of my recommendation. What contemporary writing instruction requires is not an alternative that supplants but rather an addition to supplement formal argumentation.
theorists realize that lines of reasoning and definitions of argumentative proof or evidence derived from the principles of scientific logic only marginally prepare students for arguing humanistic concerns and issues. Representative texts such as Maxine C. Hairston's *Successful Writing* (1981), *Four Worlds of Writing*, Second Edition, (1985), co-authored by Janice M. Lauer, Gene Montague, Andrea Lunsford, and Janet Emig, Linda Flower's *Problem-Solving Strategies to Writing* (1981) and Rise B. Axelrod and Charles R. Cooper's *The St. Martin's Guide to Writing* (1985) exemplify efforts to provide students with strategies for informal argumentation, ones that more effectively admit students into the realm of social, cultural, and political discourse. In general, these texts suggest a recovery of theoretical assumptions in current pedagogy about the nature of human discourse that much resembles the theoretical framework upon which classical informal argumentation was posited.

A striking feature of the treatment of argumentation offered by these composition theorists is the emphasis they place on the exploratory or investigative role of invention. To some degree, each of these texts reflects the view of writing as epistemic, as an activity which includes exploration, inquiry, and analysis. Effective

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12 Janice Lauer's explanation of epistemic more aptly than Berlin's (see Footnote 1, above) suits my discussion of the need to include strategies for informal argumentation in current composition pedagogy. She links epistemic to views of writing as a process of inquiry that is valuable to
argumentation requires the writer to examine not only the subject matter, but also what the writer as well as the reader think about the subject itself. The writer also needs to identify and assess how any assortment of attitudes, opinions, and beliefs which either the writer or reader holds hamper or promote an argument's effectiveness. The realm of human discourse is the realm of variable knowledge. Thus, these theorists have adapted their inventional strategies to the contingencies and incongruities that characterize human knowledge and discourse.

Maxine Hairston's Successful Writing offers an alternative approach to the formal approaches to argumentation found in the texts of D'Angelo, Messenger and writers both as individuals and as members of social, cultural, or political communities. She explains that "views of writing as epistemic suggest that when students raise meaningful questions about incongruities in their own worlds, they gain genuine motivation and direction for writing, and that when students discover new understandings through writing, the writing becomes valuable to them and worth sharing with readers". This principle is consistent with the humanistic aim I assign to composition instruction. See Lauer's "Writing as Inquiry: Some Questions for Teachers," College Composition and Communication, 33, No. 1, (1982), 89-93. Note that Lauer's discussion concentrates on reviewing studies of the inquiry process, in order to relate them to questions about the goals and methods of teaching composition.
Taylor, and McCrimmon. Unlike these contemporaries, Hairston is aware of the inapplicability of formal scientific logic to most persuasive and argumentative writing that students will do. This awareness places her firmly in the theoretical school in contemporary pedagogy that is reacting to the pedagogical and rhetorical inheritance of formal modes of argumentation adapted from scientific logic. Recommending instead strategies that more accurately reflect the kinds of effective argumentation writers do in academic, professional, social, and cultural contexts, she draws from the work of Stephen Toulmin a mode of argumentation patterned after the method of courtroom practice.

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14 Hairston's earlier text, A Contemporary Rhetoric, third edition, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1974), it should be noted, discusses three approaches to argument: the two traditional forms of logical argument, induction and deduction, and Rogerian or "non-threatening" argument, an alternative means of communication when strict logic proves ineffective. Hairston explains that rational communication often breaks down when the argument concerns issues about which we care a great deal, issues that involve questions of morality, fairness, or personal or professional standards (p. 341). Successful Writing, however, does not include a treatment of Rogerian argument. I go on to praise in this chapter (See p. 124) the virtues of Rogerian argument as a means of effective communication in humanistic and social contexts.
Hairston offers a treatment of invention that encompasses organization, as well strategies for discovering ideas and guidelines for focusing on subject matter. Hairston includes in her list of the various methods of organization the following: inductive reasoning, Toulmin's claim and warrant model of argument, definition, cause and effect, comparison, narration, and process analysis. She points out that each of these organizational methods resembles natural human patterns of thought (p. 61).

Although Hairston considers induction a useful inventional as well as organizational device, she cautions that because it serves as a foundation of scientific logic, the inductive method is suited mainly to writing which investigates possibilities, cites evidence, and draws conclusions (p. 63). This kind of reasoning is suited mainly to writing whose primary emphasis is evidence that is demonstrable, accurate, and reliable, or evidence that can be verified, documented, or "checked" (p. 64). Since sound inductive reasoning requires the reasoner to adopt an "objective" stance, a neutral one, he or she has an obligation to consider and present all the evidence -- that which may contradict his hypothesis or conclusion, as well as that which supports it.

Clearly, this kind of scientific reasoning serves the writer aiming to present information under the guise of some
objectively and logically sound exterior. However, most of the social, political, professional or cultural issues students will discuss and argue rarely admit an "objective" approach. Rather, these issues are subjective matters, generally involving at least two sides or perspectives and influenced by a variety of beliefs or values. Thus, Hairston reacts to the pedagogical inheritance of formal scientific argumentation that inadequately accommodates this intrinsic feature of humanistic argumentation.

As an alternative to inductive reasoning, Hairston recommends instead the claim and warrant pattern of argument devised by Stephen Toulmin. According to Hairston, most real-world writing aims to assert an idea and support it (p. 65). For this reason, Hairston subscribes to Toulmin's belief that most people do not use formal logic when they argue. On this point, she differs from D'Angelo, Messenger and Taylor, and McCrimmon, each of whom recommend either or both traditional lines of formal reasoning for structuring arguments -- induction and deduction.

15 Of particular concern to me are the implications for composition instruction of his criticism of the "technical refinements" of logic, and the "bearing the science [of logic] and its discoveries have on anything outside itself -- they apply in practice, and what connections they have with the canons and methods we use when, in everyday life, we actually assess the soundness, strength, and conclusiveness of arguments." See the introduction of Stephen Toulmin's The Uses of Argument (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1958), pp. 1-10.
Hairston refers to Toulmin's *The Uses of Argument* (1958) for the model of informal reasoning she prefers. According to Toulmin, when people argue, they usually make a claim and attempt to follow up that claim or assertion with "data" and explanatory "warrants." In other words, in the realm of human discourse, people simply rely on what seem to them to be "good reasons" to support a claim. Real-world argumentation seldom follows the patterns of formal propositional logic. Real-world argumentative writing more frequently makes use of the five features of Toulmin's model, and, in its most basic form, it makes use of the first three of these five. The "claim" refers to the conclusion or claim the writer wants the reader to accept. The "data" refers to the available supporting evidence for the claim. The "warrant" refers to the general principle that supports the claim. In addition to these three basic features, the Toulmin model also includes the "support," or any material the writer provides to establish the
credibility of the data or warrant, as well as the "qualifier," or qualification of the claim. 16

Hairston recognizes the inappropriateness of formal logical approaches to real-world argumentation. Echoing Aristotle, Hairston reminds writers that the world of human affairs and conduct seldom admits of evidence that is demonstrable, verifiable, or observable. She also discerns that the realm of human dispute rarely includes neutral or objective issues. Implicit in Hairston's caution against imposing formal and empirical logical principles on human argumentation is the appreciation that logical principles adapted from scientific method account for the contingent realm of human actions, values, beliefs, and opinions.

Hairston attributes a number of advantages to Toulmin's method of argument. One advantage is that readers generally respond positively to the data/warrant/claim pattern because

16 The following example of the Toulmin method is taken from Hairston's Successful Writing:

CLAIM: In the 1980's, most people in the U.S. will not be able to buy a house.
DATA: The average cost of a new house in the U.S. is now $63,000.
WARRANT: A person who earns the average income of less than $20,000 cannot afford a $63,000 house.
SUPPORT: The 1980 census.
QUALIFIER: Unless both husband and wife are working.

See pp. 65-70 of Successful Writing for additional examples.
it resembles courtroom procedure. Another is that the Toulmin approach is flexible; it can be adapted to the audience, the purpose, and the writing situation. A third advantage is that this type of argument also allows for flexible arrangement of its parts. A fourth advantage is that Toulmin's model helps the writer generate ideas; since the writer needs to support his opinions with warrants or data, the writer is forced to examine and search his store of information.

In these four advantages, however, there is clearly a bias towards the exploratory value of the writing process. The writer seeks, it would seem, not to persuade so much as share ideas, or to assert or explain a claim. In conveying an idea or information to a reader, the writer himself must also first explore the topic, and, in doing so, the writer comes to a more focused and informed understanding of the topic.

Given this preferred aim to share ideas, or to assert or explain a claim, rather than to establish the truth or falsity of a formal proposition, Hairston discourages formal argumentation. Hairston recognizes that most people do not rely on formal logic when they argue. Hairston's Successful Writing exemplifies an approach that complements formal argumentation in current composition pedagogy. Her approach privileges a humanistic rather than scientific inductive
method. It is built upon the theoretical view that the aim of argumentation in most contexts is to assert an idea, to facilitate understanding, the reader's; and in the process of doing so the writer improves his or her own understanding of the matter addressed. The contexts in which most writing takes place, however, involve knowledge which generally has no objective basis or validity. Frequently, these contexts consist of opposing or contingent views. Hairston's treatment of invention and informal argumentation reflects this theoretical view of the interplay between rhetorical aims and epistemology. Her treatment essentially restores to contemporary pedagogy a humanistically-oriented approach to rhetorical argumentation.

*Four Worlds of Writing*, co-authored by Janice M. Lauer, Gene Montague, Andrea Lunsford, and Janet Emig, is another contemporary composition rhetoric which offers an alternative to formal argumentation. Like Hairston's *Successful Writing*, *Four Worlds of Writing* also exemplifies an increasing awareness in current composition pedagogy of the limitations of formal logic and modes of argumentative proof borrowed from scientific method. Focusing on writing as an essentially humanistic activity, *Four Worlds* details invention strategies that stress a complex investigative

component as well as informal modes of reasoning. These strategies respond to the contingent and probable knowledge that characterize most human discourse. In particular, *Four Worlds* includes invention strategies that enable the writer to discover and explore his or her own ideas, attitudes, and knowledge. At the same time, these strategies allow the writer to participate in the public world, where the writer is not "the ultimate authority," but where his views may be "challenged by others who also participate in and interact with subjects that [he] find[s] compelling" (p. 123).

In the discussion of "writing with a persuasive aim," the authors of *Four Worlds of Writing* recommend strategies for discovering subject matter and persuasive appeals.\(^{18}\) They recommend that the writer begin with a guiding question, since "good writing begins with questions, not

\(^{18}\) Note that *Four Worlds* also includes an appendix of additional exploratory guides to supplement the "three perspective strategy (static, dynamic, and relative) described in chapter 1, pp. 30-32. The appendix includes: brainstorming, speedwriting, looping, and meditating; as well as the journalistic who, what, where, why, how?, Kenneth Burke's Pentad (Action, Agent, Means, Purpose, Scene), the classical topics or "places" (*topoi* or *loci communis*), Richard Larson's Topic questions, and Stephen Toulmin's System of Analysis (claim, warrant, data). I discuss Burke in detail in Chapter Four of this thesis; the Pentad, Burke discusses as essential to understanding the nature of human motivation and action, and the implications a theory of human motives has for rhetorical theory. See Kenneth Burke's *A Grammar of Motives* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954), pp. XV-XXIII.
answers" (p. 24). When formulating the guiding question, the writer should follow four steps. He should first state the subject. He should also identify the expectations or values that may conflict with the subject. The writer should then attempt to formulate a question that captures his puzzlement and that will lead to its elimination. After formulating the question, the writer should identify potential situations in which to investigate his question (pp. 124-30).

Four Worlds advises the writer to go to explore his subject, once he has established his guiding question and potential situation. During this invention activity, the writer, attempting to recall ideas stored in the memory and to discover new ones, examines his subject from several points of view in order to prepare himself to understand the question. Four Worlds proposes an exploratory guide that assists the writer in generating three views of the subject, the static, the dynamic, and the relative. The static view focuses on the "relatively, unchanging features, details, definitions of the subject that differentiate it from similar subjects." The dynamic view focuses on the process aspect of the subject, identifying both its historical and physical changes. The relative view focuses on the relationship between the writer's subject and other things (pp. 30-31).
This exploratory guide serves functions particularly valuable to effective argumentation. Exploring the issue to be argued from these three viewpoints gives the writer a balanced understanding of it. This exploratory activity also broadens the writer's understanding of the issue. Since the concerns human beings generally argue are seldom unequivocal or unidimensional, this activity enables the writer to consider as many sides of an issue as possible. It may also awaken the writer to initially unanticipated perspectives on an issue or to opposing perspectives. Often such perspectives are those held by potential readers. This activity can then assist the writer in determining subject matter and arguments most appropriate for a given audience. This exploratory activity is a striking feature of the contemporary pedagogical complement to formal argumentation. Although somewhat modified, it recalls the traditional exploratory and evaluative role of classical rhetorical invention.

Four Worlds recognizes that persuasive writing occurs in the public, not the private world. In the public world of human affairs, conduct, and issues, certainties rarely exist. Therefore, the writer needs to command a supply of informal logical skills, "skills that deal with probabilities, not with the certainties of formal logic" (p. 146). Four Worlds lists a number of informal logical techniques which are divided among the three modes of
organization, description, narration, classification. These techniques, resembling the Aristotelian topoi, include: descriptive example, illustration, cause and effect, consequence, authority, process, analogy, contrast (pp. 147-49). *Four Worlds* also recommends a modified version of formal deductive reasoning that is well-suited to the realm of probability. "Informal deductive proof" involves asserting a conclusion and supporting that conclusion with reasons or criteria drawn from the writer's personal views or experience that the audience will accept. The reasons or criteria are not formally bound to the conclusion, nor do they invariably lead to it. This informal method admits personal beliefs, opinions, and probability (pp. 195-97).

Persuasive writing enables the writer, according to *Four Worlds*, to better judge or gain insight into his public world; this activity also enables the writer to influence his readers to accept his judgement -- to understand, to respect, to share, or to act on it (p. 124). In order to accomplish these aims, the writer needs to analyze his audience, identifying its values, its opinions, or its knowledgeability of the subject (pp. 142-43). These aims as well as the informal strategies *Four Worlds* recommends in part constitute *Four Worlds*' reaction to the rhetorical tradition of formal scientific argumentation and its overwhelming presence in contemporary composition pedagogy.
Four Worlds clearly recognizes the need to provide writers with strategies not only for discovering what they themselves know or need to consider about a subject, but strategies also for discovering what their audiences already know about the subject, or what their audiences need to be informed of. The reader analysis operates as a form of inventional activity that prepares the writer for making choices about content, development, and informal logical appeals. These strategies reflect Four Worlds' recognition that formal argumentation is often ineffective in the public world.

Four Worlds of Writing recognizes that formal argumentation seldom resembles the way people actually exchange, assert, or argue their beliefs, ideas, and opinions. This text appreciates that formal argumentation shows little regard for audiences and the differences among their knowledge backgrounds and bases. This text implicitly realizes that the truth value of formal arguments is determined by the propositional structure of the argument, and not by the argument's bearing on the audience's actual world, nor by an audience's relation to it.

Aristotle too realized that an essential feature of human deliberation is that an argument must draw from what the audience holds to be true, or from what it believes or accepts. Aristotle's audience did more than acknowledge the
major premise of the syllogism; they believed it to be the case. The major premise usually came from their experience, their values, or their beliefs; and, thus, it could be assumed in enthymemic argumentation. Four Worlds recognizes that arguments that are formally or objectively true do not always convince an audience.

In contemporary composition pedagogy, Four Worlds exemplifies a complementary approach to formal scientific argumentation. The realm of scientific knowledge focuses on material, observable, or abstract phenomena. In the social, political, and cultural realm, human knowledge frequently has no objective or external basis. The knowledge that characterizes human affairs is generally personal and subjective, internal, and contingent. Human knowledge consists of opinions, values, and beliefs; it commonly involves conflicting views, or a variety of perspectives on an issue, often one incompatible with another; such knowledge lies outside the realm of science. As a text that promotes strategies for informal argumentation, Four Worlds reflects in current composition pedagogy efforts to recover a humanistic motivation and framework for rhetorical argumentation.

Although her approach differs somewhat from those contained in Successful Writing and Four Worlds of Writing, Linda Flower's Problem-Solving Strategies for Writing
nonetheless reflects increasing efforts in current composition pedagogy to offer alternatives to formal scientific argumentation. Combining traditional rhetorical concerns with cognitive research, Flower's text details humanistically-oriented strategies for written argumentation. It aims to prepare students for the varieties of persuasive writing that they will do as academics, professionals, and citizens (p. VII).

According to Flower, one reason people write is to discuss and deal with problems. Problems may arise when someone experiences conflicting goals, desires, expectations, or attitudes (pp. 19-20). Flower claims that problems are never impersonal; they generally occur in a specific situation and involve other people. This context frames Flower's discussion of persuasive argumentation. People write, she adds, "because they want to make something happen" (p. 162). Effective argument enables the writer to convince his or her reader to take action; or it induces the reader to consider the problem from the writer's perspective. Flower recommends a number of strategies for exploring problems. She also recommends Rogerian argument as a way of increasing communication between two parties, so that a problem may be dealt with. This theoretical

framework and Flower's strategies closely locate her in the school of thought that is reacting to the dominance of formal argumentation in contemporary pedagogy. Flower's text represents one alternative to this dominant approach, and as such draws attention to the limitations of this formal model which contemporary pedagogy has inherited from the preceding two centuries.

In order to discover various perspectives on a problem, Flower lists a number of heuristic procedures that serve as "creative thinking" strategies for generating ideas (pp. 71-78). Although they are unsystematic strategies, "brainstorming" and "talking to your reader," in either an imaginary or an actual conversation, are both effective heuristics. Flower includes topical analysis, tagmemics and synectics, three systemic strategies. Topical analysis derives from the Aristotelian topoi. Tagmemic analysis involves a three-part analysis of a problem, an analysis of the problem as a particle (a thing in itself), as a wave (a thing changing over time), and as part of a field (as a thing in its context) (p. 70). Synectics involves the use of analogies to find new insight. The final heuristic technique Flower discusses, rest and incubation, is in her view probably the most productive of the strategies because it allows the writer to sort through the ideas and information the other strategies have generated.
Observing a distinction between writer-based prose and reader-based prose, Flower also proposes strategies for analyzing the reader that will govern choices for adapting writer-based prose into reader-based. The first draft a writer produces is generally an opportunity for him to simply express his ideas; this is an example of writer-based prose. In adapting a piece of writer-based discourse to the reader, the writer must make decisions about the prose of the reader-based draft according to two theoretical considerations. One is that the goal of the writer is to create a "momentary common ground" between himself and the reader so as to encourage the reader to share the writer's knowledge and attitude toward that subject. Another consideration is that good writing manages to close the gap between the reader and the writer; even if the reader eventually disagrees with the writer, the writer aims at least to invite the reader to see things the way the writer does, even if only momentarily (pp.122-23). This aim is strikingly reminiscent of Aristotle's concern with determining a point of commonality upon which to build an argument. This aim also characterizes the informal alternative to formal argumentation in current pedagogy.

Given this theoretical framework, Flower privileges Rogerian argumentation in her discussion of persuasive
argumentation. Rogerian argument aims not at winning but at increased communication between the writer and reader. The goal of this argument strategy is "to induce [the] reader at least to consider [the writer's] position and the possibility of modifying his or her own" (p. 165). Referring to Carl Rogers' own suggestions, Flower explains that one way for the writer to accomplish this goal is to demonstrate first his understanding and knowledge of the reader's position. One way of acquiring this knowledge is to profile the reader (pp. 164-65).

Profiling the reader requires the writer to identify three critical features: the knowledge, the attitudes, and the needs of the writer (p. 123). In order to adapt the discourse to the reader, the writer needs to pinpoint the reader's knowledge base. What does the reader need to know? Does the reader have enough background knowledge to understand the writer's ideas? These questions and variations on them constitute inventional activity requisite to drafting reader-based prose. The writer also needs to pinpoint the reader's attitudes and the loose cluster of associations that comprise the informal, inexplicit knowledge the reader has. In order to adapt his knowledge to

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the reader, the writer should identify the reader's needs. This kind of focused invention analysis governs many of the writer's logical and content choices. At its most ideal level, reader analysis enables the writer to anticipate the reader's responses, and to appreciate the process of understanding from the reader's viewpoint.

Flower's strategies for invention and argumentation clearly indicate that she privileges informal argumentation. Her approach reflects a movement in current composition pedagogy to restore the traditional classical perspective to rhetorical argumentation, one that privileges the role written argumentation plays in the maintenance of human affairs. She posits her strategies on the basic assumption that human activities mainly involve differing viewpoints, opinions, and attitudes, or, in Flower's terms, "images". As she claims, effective argumentation must deal with "the same old problem of communication: your image of something and your reader's are not the same" (p. 162). The exploratory strategies she recommends enable the writer to see the issue from the reader's point of view, an ability requisite to effective argumentation. The ability to

21 For an insightful discussion of the similarities between Rogerian argument and traditional Aristotelian argument, see Andrea A. Lunsford's "Aristotelian vs. Rogerian Argument," College Composition and Communication, 30, No.2, (1979), 146-151. The points of contact these two theories of argument share constitute a foundation essential to any theory of effective social discourse.
establish common ground, a significant feature of Rogerian argument, is also requisite to effective discourse.

Flower’s emphasis on writing instruction that prepares students for arguing effectively in a variety of contexts is shared by Rise B. Axelrod and Charles R. Cooper in their text *The St. Martin's Guide to Writing.* Like Flower, Axelrod and Cooper regard problem-solving (or proposal-making) as one kind of informal argumentation. Making evaluations and explaining causes are two others. All three activities writers engage in in their everyday affairs in government, business, and education, as well as professionally and socially. Clearly an alternative to formal argumentation, this text discusses inventive and reasoning strategies that enable writers to engage in effective argumentation outside the realm of scientific phenomena and certainty. In general, *The St. Martin's Guide to Writing* represents a theoretical and practical complement to the pedagogical inheritance of formal argumentation.

In their discussion of writing strategies, Axelrod and Cooper provide a list of activities that enable the writer

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to gather information, to search his memory, to generate ideas, and to make decisions. According to Axelrod and Cooper, invention does not cease once the writer has developed new ideas and information; it continues into the drafting stage, providing an opportunity for the writer to build new and meaningful relations among his ideas and information. The drafting stage generally produces what Axelrod and Cooper have termed a discovery draft, a first effort which shows the writer still struggling to discover what he wants to say along with how to say it (p. 8).

Axelrod and Cooper deal with three types of informal argumentation -- proposals, evaluations, and causal explanations. The general inventional strategies described in their text can be adapted to the particular needs of each type of argumentation. In proposal-writing, the writer chooses a problem, finds a solution to it, and tests the problem and its solution (p. 187). The writer will also need to identify his readers, keeping them in mind, while he lists and develops reasons that will convince them to adopt his proposal or to take action (p. 140).

Axelrod and Cooper do not recommend traditional methods of formal reasoning in their discussion of effective reasoning. Like Flower, they also believe that the writer will find the "best reasons" for a proposal, if the writer includes the findings of the reader analysis in his criteria
for judging them (pp. 189-91). The kind of analysis Axelrod and Cooper recommend involves a network of related inventional strategies. One strategy for judging the best reasons to put before a reader requires the writer to explain briefly to himself, after he has compiled a list of reasons, why and how any one reason will be particularly effective with a reader (p. 191). This strategy is of course complemented by the reader profile, which seeks to establish or identify the knowledge base and background of the reader.

Writing evaluations also requires a similarly informal inventional activity. A number of strategies enable writers to decide upon the most convincing evidence and examples. These strategies include: exploring the matter or subject; identifying the criteria governing the evaluation; generating and elaborating on reasons; and assessing the effectiveness of particular reasons on particular readers (pp. 220-224).

Axelrod and Cooper also regard causal explanation as a type of informal argumentation. They base their strategies on the view that there are many questions whose explanations cannot be conclusively arrived at. Indeed, science can furnish causal explanations for many questions. But questions involving everyday social and political concerns, events, and actions generally admit only tentative
explanations. Thus, engaged in this realm of activity, writers aim not to establish certainty, but rather to suggest plausibility (pp. 235-261).

The *St. Martin's Guide to Writing*, as well as *Successful Writing*, *Four Worlds of Writing*, and *Problem-Solving Strategies for Writing*, all exemplify an awareness of the limitations of formal argumentation in humanistic discourse. Offering a broad range of strategies for informal argumentation, these texts characterize approaches to argumentation that complement the pedagogical inheritance of formal induction and deduction as strategies for rhetorical argumentation. These informal strategies recall the rhetorical underpinnings of classical informal argumentation, a foundation that addressed the interplay between definitions of human knowledge, and the social, cultural, and political aims assigned to rhetoric.

Fundamentally humanistic, the pedagogical tradition of classical rhetorical argumentation originated from the complex relationship between the aim of rhetoric, that is, the conduct of judicial, political, and civic affairs, and the contingent and probable knowledge that characterized this realm of affairs. Similarly, in contemporary pedagogy these proponents of informal argumentation realize that ideas, beliefs, and opinions cannot be dealt with conclusively. Nor do these forms of human knowledge have a
basis in objective reality, or in a reality external to the heart and mind. In this realm of human discourse, effective argumentation rarely results from establishing the formal validity of logical propositions. Rather, it results from the writer inducing, increasing, or achieving communication between himself or herself and the reader, each of whom may hold opposing views, dissimilar values, or conflicting opinions. As Aristotle discerned, the issues and actions human beings deliberate admit of alternative possibilities (Rhetoric 1357).

Similarly, modern rhetorical theory addresses the theoretical interplay between the nature of human knowledge and the aims of rhetoric. In Chapter Four, I examine a number of major modern theories of rhetoric in order to propose what I believe a valuable theoretical foundation for argumentation in current pedagogy. As Berlin claims, "pedagogical theories in writing courses are grounded in rhetorical theories." 23 We shall see that modern rhetorical theory, echoing the humanistic tradition of classical rhetoric, addresses the social, cultural, and political purposes assigned to rhetoric, as well as the nature of rhetoric as a modern discipline that serves these purposes.

CHAPTER FOUR
REVIVING INFORMAL ARGUMENTATION

Of the two approaches to written argumentation prominent in contemporary composition instruction, informal argumentation more accurately reflects the kinds of argumentative discourse that most students (and most people for that matter) will engage in. The kind of argumentation I'm referring to occurs in the real world of people and actions. *Four Worlds of Writing* locates this kind of argumentation in the public world, in the world of shared issues and media. It is the world characterized by issues that involve and affect oneself and others in a community. Political, social, religious, civic, legal, economic, this diverse variety of affairs and actions characterizes our responsible and effective membership in our society and culture. In this world, we write to make things happen, to move people to act. By appealing to the values, beliefs, and opinions of others, by challenging or reinforcing them, by affecting the heart and mind of others, writers can accomplish these aims. Particularly evident in its treatment of invention, the methodology of informal argumentation better prepares students to participate in the realm of human concerns and affairs. Informal argumentation better prepares students because it reflects implicitly an understanding of the complex relationship between epistemology and the aims that human discourse can attain.
As Chapter Three suggests, the functions, aims, and strategies assigned to informal argumentation in contemporary composition instruction recall with slight variation the general aims and methods of traditional classical rhetoric.

Like classical rhetorical theory, modern rhetorical theory recognizes the social, cultural, and political purposes served by rhetorical argumentation. Further consonant with its theoretical predecessors, modern rhetoric also recognizes that understanding the kinds of knowledge that comprise the sociopolitical-political and cultural realm of human discourse (ideas, values, beliefs, and opinions), is essential to effective argumentation. In adapting the theoretical foundation of classical rhetoric to contemporary needs and concerns, modern rhetorical theory substantially reinforces the value of informal argumentation in contemporary composition pedagogy. Theorists such as Kenneth Burke, Richard M. Weaver, Wayne C. Booth, and Chaim Pershman offer contemporary pedagogy theoretical points of view compatible with informal argumentation. Employing terms such as consubstantiation, inter-communication and inter-influence, adherence and assent, these modern theorists characterize rhetorical discourse as interactional in nature. Rhetoric also serves sociopolitical-cultural purposes. In general, these theorists highlight the ethical, the moral, and the emotional aspects of rhetorical
argumentation, as well as its rarely strictly logical or scientific nature.

In *A Rhetoric of Motives*, Kenneth Burke expounds a theory of human communication compatible with informal argumentation.¹ Involving an extensive examination of human thought, language, action, and motivation, Burke's views on rhetoric insist that human discourse serve sociopolitical-political purposes and communicative functions.² Burke's views essentially call into question the nature, function, and aims of formal argumentation, simultaneously reinforcing informal argumentation in current pedagogy. Burke's opinions of the function of language and discourse have two implications for contemporary pedagogy: they require contemporary composition pedagogy to reassess the aims and


² I should clarify here that Burke allows the province of persuasion the widest possible range of communicative possibilities. He himself states: "persuasion ranges from the bluntest quest of advantage, as in sales promotion or propaganda, through courtship, social etiquette, education, and the sermon, to a 'pure' form that delights in the process of appeal for itself alone, without ulterior purpose" (*A Rhetoric of Motives*, p. XIV). Although the theoretical implications of this definition are both brilliant and controversial, they are the concern of another work entirely, one altogether more substantial than this thesis. I have for the purposes of this thesis limited my focus to applying Burke's basic theoretical paradigm to a framework for informal argumentation that can be dealt with in a freshman composition class.
effects of formal scientific argumentation; and at the same
time they provide an imperative for instruction in informal
argumentation, an imperative derived from Burke's assertion
that human beings are essentially social creatures driven by
attitudes, sensation, and feelings.

Burke states in *Rhetoric* that the basic form of
rhetoric is "the use of words by human agents to form
attitudes or to induce action in other agents" (p. 41).\(^3\)

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\(^3\) I have referred in this thesis only to Burke's *A Rhetoric of Motives* for it highlights three principles I regard as fundamental to a model of informal argumentation that is rhetorically-based, that serves both humanistic and sociopolitical-political aims: consubstantiation, identification, and division. To appreciate the full impact of Burke's insights and wisdom on human thought, language, and conduct, one must turn as well to *Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature, and Method* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), in which Burke explains how one's motive for and use of language can both identify and divide. See in particular his discussion of "terministic screens," chapter three. One should also turn to *A Grammar of Motives* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), which explains the "dramatistic pentad," a discussion of the five key terms (act, scene, agent, agency, purpose) that designate the basic motives underlying human relations and thought (*A Grammar of Motives*, pp. XV-XXIII). The significance of the pentad to this discussion of the theoretical basis for informal argumentation is that these terms enable us to examine points of contention in matters and concerns we deliberate. As Burke states: [Human beings] may violently disagree about the purposes of a given act, or about the character of the person who did it, or how he did it, or in what kind of situation he acted; or they may even insist upon totally different words to name the act itself" (*Grammar*, p. XV). The pentad in effect provides the writer or speaker with basic stratagems (inventional strategies) for discovering, analyzing, and judging how he or she may be divided from an audience or may identify with them. The significance of the pentad to understanding the sociopolitical-political realm of human thought and action, Burke makes clear: "We sought to formulate the basic stratagems which people employ in endless variations, and
His key term is "consubstantiation". For Burke, consubstantiation denotes the ideal social objective, the ideal goal of rhetoric, which is to achieve a state of sociopolitical-political cooperation and well-being. Burke explains that in enabling human agents to move towards consubstantiality, rhetoric necessarily involves two sub-concerns that typify the nature of human conduct and communications: identification and division. Consubstantiality denotes a way of life, an "acting together". In this process of acting together (of living together), human beings identify one another, or come to share sensations, concepts, images, ideas, and attitudes. However, consubstantiation, or ideal communication, is an ideal because human beings are by their very nature at odds with one another (p. 22). They don't share all the same sensations, attitudes, or concepts. An integral feature of human individuality, this sense of difference characterizes a major distinguishing feature of the realm of sociopolitical-political affairs, a feature Burke terms division. People are divided, are at odds with one

I should point out, however, that Burke's concept of division is in the main biological. Burke states that human beings are biologically distinct from one another, are divided from one another because they are also unique entities. Citing as an example the relationship between an offspring and its parentage, Burke explains that it is possible for a person to identify with another while remaining a unique "locus of motives". In this respect,
another, because of differences in the opinions, values, beliefs, and other impulses that influence their actions and interactions.

Burke's other key concern, identification, responds to the divisive feature of human nature. Division is the necessary impetus for identification. Identification is an activity requisite to effective persuasion (or consubstantiation) because it requires the writer, the speaker, or the person involved in some symbolic use of language, to identify the way he or she is at odds with, or may become identified with, another individual or group. In other words, he or she must identify the ideas, attitudes, and sensations that polarize them or that may bring them together.

This observation about human nature, communication, and interaction reinforces the need to include instruction in informal argumentation in current pedagogy. Burke's view of rhetoric provides informal argumentation with a framework that emphasizes the humanistic and sociopolitical-political potential and responsibility of rhetorical education. Recalling in particular the classical treatment of human beings can be both joined with and separate from another; they can at once be biologically and psychologically distinct substances yet consubstantial with another due to their identified interests or to their being persuaded to identify with one another (pp. 20-22).
rhetorical invention, Burke's theory of identification and division significantly determine what rhetorical invention involves. Like the ancients, Burke recognizes that effective persuasion requires the writer or speaker to identify and analyze the peculiarities of an audience in order to determine what arguments or appeals will prove most effective. For Burke, rhetoric is moral and involves more than true or false propositions. Concurring with Aristotle's definition of rhetoric as the faculty of discovering the available means of persuasion in a given case, Burke suggests that identification determines the means we choose, whether the act of persuasion aims to cause the audience to identify itself with the speaker's interests or whether the speaker identifies an audience's interest in order to establish rapport between himself and his audience (p. 46).

Persuasion can include purely logical demonstration, appeals to reason, and appeals to emotion. Claiming that rhetoric deals with opinion in the ethical sense, opinion in the moral order of human action and conduct, Burke refers to the Aristotelian topics. Aristotle's topics serve as a survey of the opinions, attitudes, or values that can be catalogued as available means of persuasion. This survey includes "the purpose, acts, things, conditions, states of mind, personal characteristics . . . which people consider
promising or formidable, good or evil, useful or dangerous, admirable or loathsome . . . " (p. 56).

Analogous to the assumption that invention arises out of Burke's discussion of identification and division is Aristotle's principle that persuasion starts from common ground or shared premises or from the rhetor identifying and assuming a premise which the audience will accept or agree to. This analogous correspondence between Burke's identification and the classical definition of invention as the discovery and selection of subject matter and arguments revives for contemporary pedagogy an integral feature of classical rhetoric. Burke's comments on identification and division implicitly privilege a pragmatic view of language. His concerns with argumentation range beyond questions about objective or logical validity. Rather his concern is with the kinds of knowledge that constitute the realm of human deliberation and action. Such questioning is requisite to an examination of the ways ideas, attitudes, and sensations motivate human beings and effect human conduct.

Burke's concern with "the nature of rhetoric as addressed", a concern also essential to classical rhetoric, further establishes the need for approaches to informal argumentation in current pedagogy. The phrase "rhetoric as addressed" indicates that the speaker or writer in any communicative act must identify his or her relation to an
audience. This is a necessary concern of rhetoric since persuasion always implies an audience. Reminding the reader that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* stresses the rhetor's relation to an external audience, Burke explains that Aristotle dealt with appeals to audiences in "a primary sense". Burke summarizes: "it lists typical beliefs, so that the speaker may choose among them the ones with which he would favourably identify his cause or unfavourably identify the cause of an opponent; and it lists the traits of character with which the speaker should seek to identify himself, as a way of disposing an audience favourably towards him" (*A Rhetoric of Motives*, p. 38). In this comment, Burke recalls the three forms of appeals characteristic of classical informal argumentation: *ethos*, *pathos*, and *logos*.

Given this view of argumentation and language as intrinsically complex human activity, contemporary pedagogy should reassess the dominance of formal argumentation in current writing instruction. As Chapters Two and Three acknowledge, formal argumentation does prove useful for establishing the formal validity of logical propositions. It can also demonstrate the certainty of mathematical and empirical conclusions. But this method of argumentation serves aims which are limited to the realm of scientific knowledge and pursuits. Our students also require argumentative strategies that improve their participation in the sociopolitical-political realm. Burke's views on
rhetoric provide current pedagogy with a theoretical point of view that reinforces the humanistic and sociopolitical-political value of informal argumentation. In effect, Burke's insights into the nature, function, and aims of human discourse reinforce the need to promote inventive and argumentative strategies similar to those of classical rhetoric, strategies that reflect the contingent and probabilistic nature of human discourse, the ethical and emotional, the social and the political.

Sharing with Burke many similar assumptions about rhetorical argumentation, Richard M. Weaver also offers contemporary composition pedagogy a theoretical stance compatible with informal argumentation. Like those of Burke, Weaver's views on the social, ethical, and interactional nature of rhetoric, as well as the values and beliefs, implicitly challenge contemporary pedagogy to reassess the function, nature, and aims of formal argumentation. In *Language is Sermonic: Richard Weaver on the Nature of Rhetoric* (1970), 5 Weaver's efforts to adapt traditional classical rhetorical principles to his own views necessarily require him to question the nature of scientific logic and argumentation. The answers to these questions

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constitute a solid case for including informal argumentation in current pedagogy.

Weaver's criticism of the widespread application of the "scientific" approach to all realms of human understanding and activity requires contemporary composition pedagogy to question the utility of strictly formal scientific approaches to argumentation. He attacks the scientific conception of the human being that arose from "the great success of scientific and positivistic thinking in the nineteenth century [which] induced a belief that nothing was beyond the scope of this method" (p. 203). According to Weaver, this scientific approach, one which universally involves the application of scientific assumptions to all subjects, even those which can not be limited to the realm of naturalistic phenomena, results in human beings regarding themselves at their best as "logic machines" or "austerely unemotional thinkers" (p. 204). He explains that the humanistic side of human beings is considered a liability: one's humanity interferes with a scientifically accurate understanding of the world. In the eyes of those who subscribe to the promise of scientific utopia, excluding rationality, the components that constitute one's humanity, emotionality, aesthetic capacity, and spirituality, obstruct the path to "scientific utopia" (p. 204). Logic or science is compatible only with rationality. In effect, Weaver criticizes the scientific tradition that engendered our
contemporary rhetorical and pedagogical inheritance of formal scientific argumentation. In these observations, Weaver implicitly suggests to current pedagogy the limitations of formal scientific method when applied to the social and political realm of beliefs, values, and actions. Formal scientific logic is limited in this realm because it is incompatible with those components of one's humanity that are the foundation and source of our beliefs and values, emotionality and spirituality in particular.

Weaver adds that the perceived incompatibility of the humanistic components of human beings and logic forced traditional classical rhetoric into questionable status, because of the most obvious and characteristic truths about rhetoric: that its object is the whole person and that it appeals to all the components that comprise one's humanity.

Like Burke, Weaver refers to classical rhetoric, particularly to Aristotle to reaffirm those prominent concerns of rhetoric. He reminds us that Aristotle devoted a great deal of attention in his *Rhetoric* to ethos and pathos, to how people feel about different situations and actions. The theoretical assumption underlying classical informal argumentation: a speech (or other form of discourse) which aims to persuade will have little effect on an audience unless it takes into account how its audience is reacting subjectively to its hopes and fears and special
circumstances. This assumption is no less essential to a model of informal argumentation in contemporary composition pedagogy. It is no less essential because it restores two fundamental principles of classical informal argumentation: rhetorical argumentation deals with matters influenced by one's humanity; and it serves in the broadest sense social, cultural, and political goals.

Weaver's additional comments reinforce the case for informal argumentation. Although he admits that logic does provide rhetoric with analogized forms of thought, he insists that this observation be accompanied by another. He points out that rhetoric has a relationship to the world which logic does not have, and which requires the rhetorician "to keep an eye on reality as well as upon the character and situation of his audience" (p. 208). This distinguishing feature of rhetoric necessarily requires the rhetorician to examine considerations beyond the purely rational that will assist him or will serve him in achieving his aims. The shortcoming of formal argumentation in current composition pedagogy results directly from this observation. It results from the fact that, under the naive guise of scientific objectivity, formal logic ignores how the contingencies of audience, its situation and character, substantially determine the nature, substance, and presentation of one's appeals and arguments.
As an alternative to formal logic, Weaver recommends the topoi of classical rhetoric, the places or sources one could go to find the substance for a persuasive argument. Referring to Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, Weaver explains that these invention strategies of classical informal argumentation are useful for speeches that are designed to influence because they allow us to read or interpret the world of reality according to four very general ideas. The topoi enable the rhetorician to define the nature of a subject, to place it in a cause and effect relationship, to establish its relationship with other subjects, and to influence conduct through external testimony or authority (pp. 208-216). Clarifying their importance to informal argumentation, Weaver explains that the topoi are more than simply valid forms of reasoning; they allow the rhetorician to engage the audience's response to some presentation of reality that involves probabilities, attitudes, values, and beliefs. The rhetorician employs these topics according to "an independent order of goods" or "hierarchy of realities," or, in other words, according to a hierarchy of values and beliefs. For Weaver, rhetoric is advisory. The topoi in particular, rhetoric in general, assist the rhetorician (1) in striving towards "a vision of how matters should go ideally and ethically," and (2) in considering the special circumstances of the audience as the rhetorician advises them towards this vision (p. 211).
Reaffirming a view strongly maintained by classical rhetoric, Weaver states that rhetoric is one of the arts of civil society. Thus, rhetoric necessarily impinges upon morality, ethics, and politics (p. 212), and addresses beliefs, values, conduct, and social goals.

Claiming that rhetoric responds to a basic feature of human nature, that is, to advise oneself and others towards some improved social, political, or cultural state of affairs, Weaver elaborates upon rhetoric's advisory function: rhetoric attempts through language to make one's point of view prevail. It serves a sense of ought (pp. 220-221), in other words what people should do. In this comment, rhetoric's distinction from the realm of certainty and material phenomena, the realm of science and logic, is most distinct.

The implications of Weaver's insights for pedagogy are patently clear. His views on rhetoric reinforce the value of informal argumentation in current pedagogy. By Weaver's text *A Rhetoric and Composition Handbook* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1974) reflects the application of his theoretical concerns. Rhetoric, Weaver explains, is a means of persuasion which takes up where logic ends, for logic may convince the mind, but rhetoric wins the full assent (p. 134). Since it is not formal logic or what Weaver terms "a device of argument" that moves the "total being", but rather the content of the argument that does, Weaver recommends the traditional topics, that is, those regions of experience that characterize "our everyday assertions" (p. 137). Although Weaver recognizes that rhetoric's object is the whole person, and, thus, that ethical and emotional appeals should come into play in
highlighting the nature and limited application of formal argumentation, Weaver explains that formal logic is not suited to the humanistic and sociopolitical-political realm of human discourse. His insights require current pedagogy to examine the aims, purposes, and contexts served by the method of argumentation it privileges. Current pedagogy should subscribe to the view that writing skills can serve humanistic and sociopolitical-political purposes. It will find, however, that formal argumentation inadequately serves these aims. Thus, current pedagogy should promote inventional and argumentative strategies that reflect the nature of humanistic and sociopolitical-political discourse, rhetorical discourse, his text does not deal explicitly with ethos and pathos. See chapter five of his text, "Argumentation", pp. 105-160.

Weaver's essay "To Write the Truth" details his recommendations for the aims of rhetorical education. He argues that the goal of college composition instructors should be not just articulateness, but articulateness about something. Instead of teaching our students utiliter loqui (sophistry, or the irresponsible and deceptive use of language) or recte loqui (etiquette or correctness, for its own sake), we should be teaching them vere loqui, that is, to speak (and write) what is true and good. Implicit in this pedagogical aim is the moral and ethical responsibility that Weaver regards as essential to rhetorical education. For Weaver, teaching our students to write the truth, the highest and most worthy of pedagogical objectives, will teach them to assume moral and ethical responsibility for what they write and how they use language. This responsibility is tantamount, because of the way our use of language affects the order and control of our world. Like his counterparts, both classical and modern (Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, Burke, and Booth), Weaver values highly the responsible role rhetorical education plays in maintaining and improving our society and culture. See "To Write the Truth" in Language is Sermonic (1970), pp 187-98.
strategies drawn from informal logic and which reflect and assist the general goals rhetoric aims to achieve in this realm: civic, political, moral, and ethical. The traditional appeals of classical rhetoric, *ethos*, *pathos*, and *logos*, adapted to suit modern needs, continue to be informal appeals effective in this realm.

Like the views of both Burke and Weaver, Wayne C. Booth's views on the contemporary aims of rhetoric and the subject matter and concerns that comprise this realm in general also provide contemporary composition pedagogy with a sound theoretical framework for informal argumentation. In the tradition of classical rhetoric, Booth's views clearly locate rhetoric in the sociocultural realm of values and beliefs and human conduct.7 Reaffirming precepts fundamental to classical rhetorical theory, Booth's discussion in *Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent* (1974) asserts an approach that complements the "scientific" tradition of formal argumentation that dominates current pedagogy.8 This alternative furnishes composition instruction with a theoretical point of view compatible with informal argumentation, a point of view addressing the

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7 It is clear that like Booth, like Aristotle, the sociocultural realm is where I too believe is and should be located.

humanistic as well as sociopolitical-political objectives of both classical and modern rhetoric.

Booth states that rhetoric is "the art of discovering warrantable beliefs and improving those beliefs in shared discourse" (p. xiii). Whereas philosophy involves the inquiry into "certain truth," rhetoric is "the art of probing what men ought to believe, rather than proving what is true according to abstract methods" (p. xiii). Further explicating the distinction between formal and informal argumentation, Booth points out that rhetoric is suited to "the local opinions of special audiences," uses different arguments when addressing different audiences, proves conflicting resolutions, and is inextricably tied to the convictions held by a rhetorical community (p. xiii).

Booth states more precisely that his concern is "good rhetoric," that is "the art of discovering good reasons, finding what really warrants assent because any reasonable person ought to be persuaded by what has been said" (p. xiv). This view of rhetoric provides informal argumentation with a theoretical foundation that reflects not only the moral and ethical but also the social and political nature of most human discourse. This foundation bases definitions and strategies for rhetorical proof not on principles of logical certainty and validity but rather on principles of acceptability and contingency. Booth's rhetoric involves
the inquiry after reasons a community will accept, reasons
derived from values and beliefs. This sociopolitical-
political framework for informal argumentation Booth offers
contemporary composition pedagogy is strikingly apparent in
his "redefinition" of the human being as a "rhetorical
animal," that is, as a "social self who has made and is
still being made in symbolic exchange [of values] with
others" (p. 137). According to Booth, the highest function
of rhetoric is "to engage in mutual inquiry or exploration,"
not to put forth some preconceived view.

For Booth, and implicitly for contemporary pedagogy, a
humanistic model of argumentation which assists the social
and political well-being of a community, must recognize that
mutual agreement is the aim of rhetoric, and that the mutual
inquiry into, and the exchange of, ideas, values, and
beliefs is essential to achieving this aim. A model of
argumentation effective in the realm of sociopolitical
discourse must also recognize the limitations of strategies
for rhetorical proof adapted from formal scientific logic.

Concurring with the classical view that practical life
requires rhetoric, Booth recalls Aristotle's three kinds of
rhetorical proof. Like Burke and Weaver, Booth also offers
contemporary pedagogy inventionial strategies that restore
the salient features of classical informal argumentation:
logos or substantive arguments, ethos or ethical proof, and
pathos or emotional proof (pp. 144-164). Booth recommends these three kinds of proof as well as the enthymeme and the example, because like the ancients he realizes that rhetoric cannot be reduced to logic or formal reasoning; he concurs with Aristotle that rhetoric enables us to deliberate controversial matters before an audience who are not prepared to take in a complicated argument or follow a long chain of reasoning (Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1357a).

Booth highlights features of classical rhetorical argumentation that reinforce the valuable function provided by instruction in informal argumentation. In particular, Booth refocuses our thinking on what invention activity should involve when dealing with the values, beliefs, and opinions that comprise the sociopolitical-political realm, and with the aims that can be sought therein. These

10 Booth states his pedagogical position in "Boring From Within: The Art of the Freshman Essay" in *The Norton Reader*, 6th ed., Arthur M. Eastman, et al., ed. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1984), pp. 232-244. In this essay, Booth explains that worthwhile writing, writing valuable to the writer and his or her audience, results from the student having and discovering something to say, a serious rhetorical purpose to be achieved, and a sense of the particular audience. In particular, students can be interested in meaningful argument about "social problems and forces, political controversy, and the processes of everyday living" in which they are personally involved. Booth insists that English education should serve moral and civic purposes. Ideas and rigorous and constructive thinking, he claims, are a "civic responsibility". This responsibility mirrored the goals of traditional rhetorical education, goals which also aimed to create an "informed citizenry"
concerns provide for contemporary composition pedagogy a much needed motive for informal argumentative skills: that composition instruction should serve humanistic purposes and sociopolitical-political aims. In Booth's view, a contemporary theory and model of argumentation adapted from the sound principles of classical rhetoric can assist this motive.

Deriving his basic theoretical stance from classical rhetorical theory, Chaim Perelman also offers in _The New Rhetoric_ (1958) and _The Realm of Rhetoric_ (1982) insights into the nature of argumentation that provide a sound case and foundation for informal argumentation in current composition pedagogy. Perelman shares with other modernists that could make choices about probable or provable matters based on reasoned opinion.

Booth reinforces this pedagogical position in "The Rhetorical Stance" in _College Composition and Communication_, 14, Oct. (1983), 139-45. Recalling Aristotle, Booth regards rhetoric as the "art of finding and employing the most effective means of persuasion on any subject, considered independently of intellectual mastery of that subject." Adapting this definition to the purpose of writing instruction, Booth states that our main goal is to assist students in finding the balance among "the three elements that are at work in any communicative effort: the available arguments about the subject itself, the interests and peculiarities of the audience, and the voice, the implied character, of the speaker." This balance he terms the "rhetorical stance". See as well Wayne C. Booth and Marshall W. Gregory's _The Harper and Row Reader: Liberal Education Through Reading and Writing_ (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, Inc., 1984), which lays out this pedagogical stance.

I have referred mainly to _The Realm of Rhetoric_ for it presents more succinctly than _The New Rhetoric_ Perelman's ideas on rhetorical theory. However, both texts address
rhetorical theorists, namely Burke, Weaver, and Booth, an astute understanding of the limitations of formal scientific argumentation in dealing with the realm of opinions and personal truths. In delineating his own theory of rhetorical argumentation, Perelman raises issues about the aims, nature, and effectiveness of formal scientific logic that implicitly yet unavoidably question the widespread presence of formal argumentation in current composition instruction.

Perelman's "new rhetoric" involves a theory of argumentation whose aim is adherence rather than impersonal self-evidence or truth. Concurrently, Perelman's theory of rhetoric highlights the social, interactional, and opinionable nature of most human argumentation. Asserting that rhetoric is the realm of opinions, not impersonal truths, he states rhetoric's function: "to have certain opinions prevail over other competing opinions" (Realm, p. 153). Perelman repeats the classical assumption that rhetoric's realm is the realm of action, the realm of the contingent (Realm, p. 155). Scientific truths do not govern this realm.

Perelman's views on scientific argumentation require contemporary pedagogy to consider the rather limited application of this method of argumentation. Referring to Descartes who based his "new science" on the notion of "unshakable self-evidence", Perelman explains that an argument can never procure self-evidence, and no one argues against what is self-evident. This last remark recalls for Perelman, as well as for Booth and Weaver, Aristotle's fundamental though no less pertinent observation that no one has reason to contest the self-evident (Realm, p. 6). No one contests the self-evident for, by its very definition, self-evident propositions impose themselves in the same way in every rational being; their self-evidence is determined by the propositional validity built into the structure of formal chains of reasoning, such as induction and deduction. Argumentation, according to Perelman, intervenes where self-evidence is contested, where choice and controversy is inevitable, in particular the realm of ethics and politics.

The aim of argumentation then is not to deduce consequences from given premises, but to "elicit or increase the adherence of . . . an audience to the theses that are presented for their consent" (Realm, p. 9). Adherence is the key term for Perelman, for it presupposes a meeting of minds between speaker and audience, usually in social and political contexts (Realm, p. 9-11). Rhetorical
argumentation aims to achieve adherence by acting upon an audience, by modifying its convictions or disposition through discourse. This feature of contemporary rhetoric evident in Booth, Weaver, and Burke as well, derives from classical rhetoric. Serving as the principle upon which the ancients determined their strategies for invention, this feature can be applied equally to models of informal argumentation in contemporary pedagogy.

Reviving the rhetorical wisdom of classical rhetoric, Perelman explains that to make discourse effective, a speaker must adapt to his audience.\(^\text{12}\) Since rhetorical argumentation aims to affect an audience, it is necessary to identify and to characterize one's audience. This activity is extremely important because it is one's audience that will determine one's choice of arguments. Every speaker (or writer), according to Perelman, thinks more or less consciously of those he is seeking to persuade. In order to determine the audience, the writer systematically constructs both a psychological and social sketch of it. This sketch should also reflect the circumstances surrounding the particular argument. Particularly to ethos and pathos, this activity has much in common with classical invention. Aristotle allotted a substantial portion of his Rhetoric to the importance of the analysis of the character traits and

social environment of the audience as inventive activity essential to discovering and selecting the most effective arguments. This adaptation also requires the speaker or writer to choose as his points of departure only the theses accepted by those he addresses (Realm, p. 24). In other words, the speaker or writer chooses as premises of argumentation theses the audience already holds (Realm, p. 23). The speaker (or writer) draws an initial premise or starting point that can be one of two sorts. Points of agreement can be based either upon "reality", that is, facts, truths, and presumptions, or upon what Perelman terms the "preferable", that is, value hierarchies, and the loci of the preferable (the classical topoi).

Perelman's views of the aims of rhetorical argumentation and the kinds of knowledge or subject matter characteristic to it are compatible with informal argumentation. As Perelman explains, persuasive discourse aims to secure both the intellectual and emotional adherence of any sort of audience (Realm, pp. 161-62). Since a great deal of the discourse our students will engage in occurs in the realm of rhetoric, current pedagogy should promote informal as well as formal argumentation. Perelman's views are compatible with the opinion that composition instruction should prepare students for their effective participation in this realm, the realm of controversy and nonformalized thought. By responding to this obligation, current pedagogy
restores with some modification the humanistic and sociopolitical-political aims of traditional classical rhetoric. To satisfy this responsibility, composition instruction needs to promote what Perelman terms "the technique of controversy" (Realm, p. 162). The inventional topoi of classical rhetoric are such a set of strategies for operating in the realm of rhetoric.

In this examination of these modern rhetoricians, Perelman, Burke, Weaver, and Booth, I have highlighted the ideas, principles, and assumptions that provide current composition pedagogy with a theoretical point of view compatible with informal argumentation. While focusing our attention on the humanistic and sociopolitical-political aims and concerns of the classical rhetorical tradition, the views of these modern theorists revive in modern discussions of ideas, discourse, culture, and human action the responsibility of pedagogy to prepare its citizenry to conduct and maintain the civic and political affairs of society.

In particular, the insights of Burke, Weaver, Booth, and Perelman on the nature of human discourse and communication can clearly support for composition pedagogy the view that invention and rhetorical argumentation do and must involve more than strictly logical choices and formal considerations. The writer's inventional activities should
include complex attention to the thoughts, values, beliefs, and emotions that the writer as well as the audience holds. Invention should also enable the writer to examine how the particular situation or context bears on the matter to be discussed or the aim to be achieved, whether that aim be Burke's consubstantiation, Weaver's advisory function, Booth's mutual search for good reasons, or Perelman's adherence. In this respect, epistemology and rhetorical aims necessarily determine the nature of and the strategies for invention.

Made aware of this complex theoretical relationship, composition instructors need to realize that formal argumentation, born out of the seventeenth-century tradition of empiricism and rationalism, serves scientific aims. More importantly, this relationship bears on what I believe should also be the responsibility of composition instruction: composition instruction can and should serve humanistic and sociopolitical-political purposes. It can meet this responsibility by reviving the inventional precepts and strategies of classical informal argumentation: ethos, pathos, logos, the topoi, stasis, and enthymemic reasoning. The truism that epistemology, invention, and rhetorical aims are complexly related is of the utmost importance to this thesis. It determines for composition pedagogy the functions and purposes of instruction in written argumentation. By promoting a theory and model of
informal argumentation that revives the sound principles of classical rhetoric, contemporary composition instruction restores for our students the indispensable humanistic and sociopolitical-political purposes of traditional rhetoric.
CHAPTER ONE


CHAPTER TWO


CHAPTER THREE


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CHAPTER FOUR


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