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ABSTRACT

This study explores the moral characteristics of late eighteenth-century Scottish culture in order to ascertain both its specific nature and its contribution to modern consciousness. It argues that, while the language of moral discourse in that socio-economic environment remained in large part traditional, containing aspects from both neo-Stoicism and classical humanism, it also incorporated and helped to develop an explicitly modern conceptual network. The language of sensibility as discussed by Adam Smith and adapted by practical Scottish moralists, played a key role in the Scottish assessment of appropriate ethical behaviour in a complex society.

The contribution of enlightened Scottish moralists to the language and literature of sensibility has been virtually overlooked, with a corresponding impoverishment of our understanding of some of the most important eighteenth-century social and cultural developments. Both literary scholars and social historians have made the mistake of equating eighteenth century sensibility with the growth of individualism and romanticism. The Scottish contribution to sensibility cannot be appreciated in such terms, but needs to be examined in relation to the stress that its practitioners placed upon man's social nature and the integrity of the moral community.

Scottish moralists believed that their traditional ethical community was threatened by the increased selfishness, disparateness, and mobility of an imperial and commercial
British society. They turned to the cultivation of the moral sentiments as a primary mechanism for moral preservation and regeneration in a cold and indifferent modern world. What is more their discussion of this cultivation related in significant ways to the development of new perspectives on adolescence, private and domestic life, the concept of the feminine and the literary form of the novel.

Scottish moralists made a contribution to sentimental discourse which has been almost completely overlooked. Henry Mackenzie, Hugh Blair and James Fordyce were among the most popular authors of the century and their discussion of the family, the community, education, the young and the conjugal relationship was not only influential per se but also reflected a particularly Scottish moral discourse which stressed the concept of sociability and evidenced concern about the survival of the moral community in a modern society. To the extent that literary scholars and historians have ignored or misread their works, they have obscured rather than enlightened eighteenth-century culture and its relationship with the social base.
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Historical explanation is not the application of generalizations and theories to particular instances: it is the tracing of internal relations. It is like applying one’s knowledge of a language in order to understand a conversation rather than like applying one’s knowledge of the laws of mechanics to understand the workings of a watch. (Peter Winch from *The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy*)
INTRODUCTION

The second half of the eighteenth century has often been referred to as Scotland's age of improvement.¹ The phrase is somewhat misleading since there was precious little economic growth immediately following the Seven Year's War and, thereafter, the lowland economy progressed only very modestly until the real economic upturn at the very end of the century.² All the indices -- linen, tobacco, grain prices, and the rationalization of agriculture -- point to steady, albeit hardly dramatic, growth between 1750 and 1785. None of this translated into anything like an observable metamorphosis in commercial trade, agricultural productivity, or national wealth. The greatest, and certainly the most visible, transformation occurred in the urban centres. Edinburgh, for example, experienced the largest increase in actual numbers, if not in strict percentage terms. This city, with its traditional intellectual and social attractions for the wealthier members of landed society, certainly witnessed some significant changes during the closing decades of the century.³ It rapidly became the focal point for luxurious consumption, as well as intellectual and fashionable refinement, in the nation. Because of its historical and strategic importance, Edinburgh also became the centre for the dissemination of information and culture.⁴ Its literati held undisputed pride of place within the nation and helped to mould the movement known as the
Scottish enlightenment.

The Scottish highlands were a different story altogether. Despite significant geographical and economic variations, they tended to constitute an economic backwater, as Adam Smith pointed out in such examples as that of the highland villagers who still used pebbles or nails as major forms of currency. Agricultural production was pitifully low and remained so throughout the century, because of the highlanders' use of primitive technology and an outdated system of crop rotation. Even the cattle, never mind the human beings, found it difficult to forage for nourishment and had to be fattened up in the northern counties prior to their sale in England. Indeed, so far behind were the highlands, that even those Scotsmen who were concerned about the negative effects of economic improvement were unabashed improvers as far as the highlands were concerned. The highlands was, as Youngson has aptly termed it, a region of poverty. Its remote populations, many of which spoke only Gaelic and could not read any English, remained stubbornly impervious to the social, cultural, and economic propaganda of the enlightened Edinburgh literati. Alexander Carlyle regarded the highlanders as an abject nation which had "not yet felt the sweets of Independence or Industry, nor been instructed by rational or manly Preachers." The much used phrase, age of improvement, needs to be understood, therefore, in a cultural as well as an economic sense. Its meaning rested in a critical way in the civic consciousness and discourse of those patriotic Scotsmen who
believed in considered economic advancement, positive liberty, polite learning and the creation of a stable but recognizably modern nation. Their enthusiasm for the Forth Clyde Canal was so extreme that the original proposal had to be scrapped in favour of a much grander scheme.8 The construction of the New Town during the 1780s and 1790s was a testament to the classical and orderly aesthetic consciousness of Edinburgh’s most respectable citizens.9 The support for new university buildings attested to their faith in the power of education to mould the rational, sensitive and, above all, virtuous citizen. The spread of clubs throughout the lowland centres was indicative of the desire of many patriotic Scotsmen to have economic and polite culture proceed hand in hand. And the rage for agricultural improvement, as demonstrated in the constant experimentation in new seed varieties from the mid 1760s on, remained an ever present feature of Scottish life.

The construction of the Forth Clyde Canal, the rejuvenation of Edinburgh University, club life and agricultural improvement all attest to the support which enlightened Scotsmen gave to the creation of a more modern, commercial, tolerant and explicitly national community. As such, the age of improvement was a cultural phenomenon, a complex network of symbols and mental approaches, as well as a corpus of knowledge or a series of events. It represented new ways of looking at the world, founded upon deductive reason and empirical observation, rather than dogma or tradition. It was reflected in the attacks of the Moderate clergy of the Church
of Scotland upon the Spirit of Fanaticism which for so long had checked the advancement of Art as well as Industry. At the level of high culture, Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations* (1776) represented what was most positive and creative in the Scottish attitude towards economic modernization. This *Scottish* product had an enormous impact upon British society generally, providing the intellectual rationale for a commercial and industrial society. At the same time, *The Wealth of Nations* was the highly visible tip of an immense socio-cultural iceberg. There were countless patrons of improvement in Scotland who, while they might not have understood the first thing about Smith's attack upon the entire edifice of mercantilism, helped to create the *milieu* in which his masterpiece was produced. The Scottish discussion of the economy and its improvement has been of particular interest to historians, who have been eager to trace its contribution to the notion of a *market economy* and Marxist economics. However, this preoccupation has not gone entirely unchallenged. As distinct from those who look to the eighteenth century Scottish writers for the roots of economic, and possibly alienated, individualism, other observers have focused upon the Scottish preoccupation with the concept of community, their conviction that man was by nature a social being and their understanding of society as an organic and moral entity. In an early and pioneering work, for example, Gladys Bryson maintained that a distinctive feature of eighteenth century Scottish thought was its emphasis upon the social attributes of
man and the tendency of members of the Scottish School to give human affectivity and the notion of community priority over abstract reason.12 Certainly, an excellent case could be made for just such an interpretation of Adam Smith's other famous work, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759). Just as a man could not know his own bodily features without the aid of a *looking glass*, argued Smith, so too the propriety and impropriety of man's behaviour could only be assessed with reference to the community — that *mirror* which the solitary individual lacked.13 A comparison of Smith's theory and recent perspectives on human interaction merely highlights the profound insights of this Scottish writer.14

But the Scots did not view themselves as sociologists and any attempt to pigeon-hole them as the forerunners of that discipline is likely to obscure at least as much as to illuminate. Eighteenth century Scottish writing had a strong ethical bent, however, and it viewed morality not as the product of some abstracted reason but of the common sentiments of the human community itself. This community needed to remain intact, and its sentiments carefully preserved, if society was not to become a war of all against all. In large part, David Hume's *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739) was a Scottish moralist's warning against the intrusion of a faulty reasoning faculty outwith its proper sphere of influence.15 The customs, habits, and experience of the community, he warned, needed to be taken into account in the creation of any science of society or morality.
This emphasis upon the moral character of Scottish thought has been productive of some new and important research which reveals both the complexity of the enlightened Scottish consciousness during this period of social change and the unwillingness of Scottish writers to completely detach human from economic matters. Their primary model always remained the moral rather than the market economy. Nicholas Phillipson’s examination of civic morality in Smith’s *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Ralph Lindgren’s penetrating discussion of the centricity of the concept of community in both Smith’s early and later writings, and Richard Teichgraeber’s attempt to re-evaluate the relationship between Smith’s moral and economic discourse, all show evidence of the potential of an approach which concentrates upon the moral rather than the market aspects of Scottish thought. Their concentration upon Adam Smith, to the exclusion of other thinkers and writers, tends to obscure the nature of Scottish thought somewhat but does become understandable when one considers that the capture of *The Wealth of Nations* would be a great victory in the present unfortunate propaganda war over the nature of eighteenth century thought.

There are those, however, who would like to see enlightened Scottish moral discourse put into an even broader framework, and Dr. Richard Sher is one of these. In a timely essay calling for a more liberal definition of the Scottish enlightenment in terms of culture, he points out that the Scottish literati, to whom such luminaries as Adam Smith
belonged, were a community of multidimensional beings who performed many different roles. Adam Smith himself was a complex character and his friend Hugh Blair was "often amused with the opposite views which he took of the same subject, according to the humour in which he happened to be." Moreover, the culture in which he and his fellow literati operated was rich and varied, a complex and often paradoxical interaction of traditional and modern values, beliefs and ideas. One need not go quite as far as Sher in identifying the enlightenment with this same culture, but one is bound to recognize that he has made an excellent case for paying much closer attention to the variations in discourse and consciousness that characterized it. Given the cohesiveness of the Edinburgh literati and their self-definition as a republic of letters, it behoves us to pay attention to all levels of their thought, however unreasonable, traditional or trivial these may at first appear.

What a movement away from intellectual texts or excessively rigid categories immediately discovers is that the respectable members of enlightened Scottish society were by no means as modern as they might first seem. For example, the enlightened Scots of the late eighteenth century were not the unqualified defenders of improvement that they are so often caricatured as being. They were acutely and often painfully aware that economic improvement did not necessarily imply human improvement. Even in his economic, as distinct from moral, writings, Adam Smith pointed out that economic progress in
terms of the increased division of labour could have potentially disastrous effects upon the condition of the manual worker. Smith was critical of large manufacturies because of their effect upon the moral identity and creativity of the worker. Moreover, it is now recognized that Smith did not view the emerging bourgeoisie as an especially dynamic or socially responsible class of individuals.

Still, it remains true that Smith was a decided optimist when compared with many of his friends and contemporaries. Enlightened Moderate preachers in the Church of Scotland, including Smith's close friends Hugh Blair and John Drysdale, painted a much more threatening picture of the moral consequences of economic evolution. The essays of the cream of Edinburgh's young literati, the Mirror Club, were characterized by the discussion of strategies for avoiding moral corruption and communal disintegration in the wake of the new commercial environment. Despite all attempts at urbanity and cheerfulness in the Mirror and Lounger, the decline of the moral community always loomed in the background. The concerns of the Moderate Clergy and the Mirror Club were by no means unrepresentative; a similar message filled the pages of such vehicles of communication as the Caledonian Mercury and the more refined Scots Magazine.

With few exceptions, such as the eccentric Earl of Buchan, most of these practical moralists were moderns to the extent that they accepted the necessity for commercial development and rejected any solutions which appeared to undermine the
development of a refined and commercial polity. At the same
time, they were quite literally obsessed with counteracting the
dangerous moral effects of a powerful commercial empire and
concomitant society of strangers. Such warnings were
undoubtedly present in Scottish writings prior to the Seven
Year's War; they were particularly evident in the civic
humanist orientation of the works of Adam Ferguson. However,
the general tenor of enlightened discourse appears to have been
fairly optimistic before 1763. The first edition of Adam
Smith's *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, for example, saw little
threat from the emerging commercial environment and the sort of
communal opinion which it helped to foster. After the Seven
Years War, concerns which seem to have been repressed before
became more and more visible, reaching a veritable crescendo by
the late 1770s. In his revisions to *The Theory of Moral
Sentiments* for the 1790 edition, we witness an Adam Smith who
was more and more concerned about the corruption of public
opinion and its effectiveness as a guide to ethical
behaviour. We also see a moralist who had become
increasingly concerned about the mad scramble for wealth and
status in Scottish society. And we are confronted with a far
less optimistic thinker who had now transferred his allegiance
from a recognizably modern community to the impartial spectator
within the human breast.

After his visit to London in 1787, Smith spent his
declining years in the Edinburgh literary community. Poor
health and official duties prevented him from developing his
ideas on law and government, as had been his original intention. His revisions to the *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, therefore, constituted his last words to the world and there is no doubt that he considered these changes and additions as particularly important ones. What the revisions to *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* also demonstrate is that Smith was not unaffected by the traditional moral discourse of his fellow Edinburgh *literati*. Like them, he was concerned to outline the nature of moral regulation in an increasingly problematic social arena. It was within such a discursive climate that Smith shifts his focus away from communal norms and towards the safer individual conscience.

The pages that follow will attempt to outline the developing moral approach and programme of the *literati* between 1763 and the 1790s. In particular, they will attempt to bring into sharp relief the significance which the *literati* attached to the smooth functioning of the traditional moral community in Scotland as well as their fear that such moral interaction would become contaminated by the artificial, selfish, and often sinister behaviour which was condoned, if not exactly encouraged, in a luxurious commercial state. Faced with these threats to both personal autonomy and the traditional organic supports for virtuous action, the Scottish *literati* occasionally turned inward, in the manner of Adam Smith, to stress conscience and self command. More typically, however, they stressed the necessity for increased sociability towards one’s fellow man. Only through the stimulation of this
sensibility and complacency towards others, argued the literati, could the egotistical behaviour inherent in a commercial world be counteracted and the moral community reaffirmed. Without such cultivation of man's sensitivity towards others, the community would not only cease to be a moral entity, it would cease to exist in anything but name.

The Scottish moralists never for a moment forgot the warnings of the Greeks and Romans — the virtuous dead — which had been handed down to them, particularly through such Florentine civic humanists as Machiavelli. They typically believed that ancient ethics, despite its lack of a true appreciation of the subtlety of human feelings, described virtue and vice in their clearest terms. In addition, they constantly employed the weight of the civic humanist and Stoic traditions in order to detect the early symptoms of moral and national disintegration in Great Britain. And, while they firmly believed that it was possible for a commercial Scottish nation to avoid the fate of the Athenian, Roman and Florentine empires, they were not overly sanguine about the odds. If Scotland was to avoid the fate of historic communities of the past, the nation's citizens had to have their virtue constantly aroused.

It was in its strategies for the maintenance of national virtue that the Scottish republic of letters proved itself to be most progressive. Adapting an essentially Smithian model of human sympathetic interaction, they concentrated upon the capacity of individuals to cultivate innate fellow-feeling and
to develop as moral beings. Not only did they place considerable emphasis upon moral cultivation, but they also attempted to extend the educational process long past the traditional age of admittance into adult society. In this way, they fashioned their own concept of adolescence -- a concept which allowed for considerable supervision and control over the prospective members of the moral community. They also illuminated private life and the domestic circle, both as a protection against a commercial society of strangers and as an ideal environment for the stimulation of interactive sensibility. They were among the first moralists anywhere to propagandise the novel as a respectable literary form and, especially, as an effective mechanism for the moulding of sensitive youth. And they helped to propagate the new view of women as the catalysts and managers of sensibility within the protected haven of the domestic and private sphere.

Most educated people believe *The Wealth of Nations* to be the pre-eminent Scottish contribution to the modern world. If one limits one's thinking to purely economic concerns, such an emphasis is perhaps excusable. But a concentration upon this work, and the Scottish contribution to economic thought generally, obscures the significant moral component in Scottish thinking. It ignores the fact, for example, that Smith himself was a moral theorist before he became an economist. Moreover, the obsession with Smith and the discourse surrounding economics and improvement obscures such significant socio-cultural developments as the construction of adolescence.
the rise of the novel, new attitudes towards women, and the cult of domesticity. If one wishes to discover the nature of eighteenth-century consciousness, then it is to practical moralists like Henry Mackenzie, James Fordyce, and Hugh Blair that one needs to turn. Not only were they three of the most popular, respected and imitated writers in eighteenth century Britain; they were also Scottish moralists. As such, they deserve far more attention from historians of Britain and Scotland than they have hitherto received.

Unfortunately, there exists no general treatment of practical moral discourse in eighteenth century Scotland and, therefore, the choice of particular moralists needs to be defended and the primary discursive domains within which they spoke and wrote have to be carefully defined. The first chapter provides some background on the various practical moralists in late eighteenth century Scotland, be they the enlightened preachers in the Church of Scotland, the legal _cum_ literary clique revolving around Henry Mackenzie, or the editors, contributors and correspondents of the Scottish periodical press. Wherever possible, the relationships between these individuals and with other elements within Scottish society will be outlined.

Chapter two discusses the particular discursive modes which these eighteenth century moralists applied to the problems of their day. One of these was the civic humanist tradition which warned of the dangers that could accrue to public spirit and virtuous citizenship in a community that had
become corrupted by the introduction of luxury and its attendant selfishness. Despite the fact that a refined civilization allowed more scope for pliable and sensitive expressions of fellow feeling than its primitive counterpart, the commercial society upon which this same civilization was based could all too easily distort these emotions. If the snare of luxury and dependence was to be avoided, the warnings of the ancient moralists had to be heeded; their clear view of the basic distinction between virtue and vice needed to be appreciated; and the effects of wealth upon the moral sentiments of the community had to be countered. As one form of personal and protective morality, the late eighteenth century Scottish moralists, particularly the Moderate party of the Church of Scotland, advocated the Stoic virtue of self-composure. Such self-command allowed the individual to maintain his or her moral autonomy in a dangerous and potentially corrupting social world. But, if the language of civic humanism and Stoicism belong to the ethical vocabulary of the virtuous dead the language and literature of sensibility was very much a part of the world of the present. In addition to the active citizenship of civic humanism and the personal integrity of Stoicism, Scottish moralists placed their greatest stress upon the quality of benevolence or increased sensitivity towards one’s fellow man. In their eyes, such sensibility was neither inconsistent with patriotic spirit or personal self-command. Not only was it the true cement of the moral community, but it was also the key to national virtue and its
rejuvenation.

The inculcation of a gentle sensibility consistent with that degree of self-control that could protect the individual from a potentially hostile commercial environment was a subtle task requiring an understanding of the nature of each individual. Since society could no longer be entrusted with the socializing function, it was necessary to place one's faith in education, or as Scottish moralists preferred to regard it, moral cultivation. Chapter three deals with this issue of moral formation and the particularly Scottish approach to its attainment. Practical moralists, particularly Hugh Blair, James Fordyce, and Henry Mackenzie focused upon the supposedly natural sensibility of the young. Youth, they argued, was the period during which the social passions were at their height and had not yet become corrupted by involvement in the world. Within the safe confines of domestic society, and under the control of virtuous teachers in the home and classroom, the sensibility of the young could be carefully nurtured. This task, however, involved a completely new approach to the young and their education. It meant keeping the young at home as long as possible, a close monitoring of the youth's nature by parental tutors and teachers, and the development of new and progressive techniques of cultivation designed to win the youth's affection. Thus, while the subjective feelings of youth were recognized, they were incorporated in an approach that clearly objectified the young and made them subject to new controls.
The new emphasis upon education in the home implied and related to the concentration upon the potential of the domestic and private realm for socialization. Here, among intimate acquaintances, carefully chosen company, and the family circle, just the right atmosphere for the cultivation of sensibility could be created. As the commercial society became more suspect with the rise of *nouveaus* and *nabobs* and the intrusion of their values within the Scottish community, Scottish moralists began to pin more and more of their hopes upon these smaller, more intimate, and presumably more honest forms of interaction. Chapter four deals with the intriguing change of focus away from the explicitly public realm of the civic humanist tradition to the more virtuous interaction of men and women engaged in private life. Atticus, rather than Cicero, was to become the model of virtuous behaviour. In addition, Scottish moralists helped to fashion a new and sentimental view of the home and the family.

Within the confines of the domestic sphere and private life -- the most fitting area for the expression and development of fellow feeling -- practical Scottish moralists began to pay closer and closer attention to the affective nature and function of the female sex. Because she was protected from the selfish and competitive commercial world by the very nature of her domestic retirement, the wife and mother or sister did not have her delicate sensibility bruised by a deceitful and *interested* world. Moreover, women were thought to be more affective or complacent than their male
counterparts. In terms of their sensitivity, they remained in something very much like a state of perpetual adolescence. Like divine youth, these domestic deities could have a most useful effect upon those men whose natural feelings had been jaded by the world or whose virtue, if it survived, tended towards excessive firmness and stoic manliness. Women could imperceptibly teach their stubborn husbands and sons that pliancy of mind towards the feelings of others which was the sine qua non of the maintenance and preservation of the moral community. The Scottish perspective on women and their complacency is the subject matter of chapter six.

In its literary manifestation, the focus on women and sensibility led some Scottish moralists to concentrate upon a new literary form which could more easily locate the virtues of the domestic sphere and depict in detail the actual workings of sensibility in daily life. The attitude of the late eighteenth century Scottish moralists to that new literary genre -- the novel -- is treated in the sixth chapter. That the novel was already a popular form of literature among one of the Scots' primary target groups, women, made it an ideal mechanism for cultivating their innate sensibility. While poetry and drama were capable of delivering a certain amount of moral content, only the novel allowed the moralist sufficient time and space to show how the human sentiments operated in ordinary life and to depict those situations in which it might go astray or become corrupted. The novel also allowed for that realistic and minute description with which the reader could more easily
identify. In addition, it was far better suited to illuminate gentle sensibility than the more grand, excessively emotional, or imaginative forms of literature. For these reasons and others, many Scottish moralists were avant garde in their approval of the novel as a form of ethical propaganda.

Some of the most popular novels of the entire eighteenth century were written by one of the central characters in this study. In addition to his role as a practical moralist in the Spectatorial tradition in the pages of the Mirror and Lounger, Henry Mackenzie was the author of the famous work The Man of Feeling (1771). While this and other novels of Mackenzie have been interpreted in various ways by different and differing literary scholars, it will be argued here that they are far better understood as moral tracts than as essentially literary productions. Both Henry Mackenzie and the older Hugh Blair were advocates of the novel primarily as a "channel for conveying instruction, for painting human life and manners, for showing the errors into which we are betrayed by our passions, for rendering virtue amiable and vice odious."  

The final chapter of this study is an attempt to bridge the gap between the cultural concerns of the Edinburgh literati and the theoretical formulations of the high Scottish enlightenment. Attention will be concentrated upon the moral theory of Adam Smith, whose contribution to the discussion of sensibility and sympathy is referred to in the earlier chapters. The chapter will focus upon those significant changes which Smith made to the final edition of The Theory of
Moral Sentiments. For it was in the edition of 1790, that Adam Smith fully developed the concept of the impartial spectator or the man inside the breast, which allowed the individual to make autonomous moral choices in the face of a divided or deceived public opinion. Even more than his discussion of the workings of sympathy, the concept of the impartial spectator constitutes what is truly original in his discussion of ethics. In the concluding chapter, it will be argued that Smith was forced to develop this concept in order to deal with the growing consensus among the Scottish republic of letters that public opinion in a highly mobile and competitive state was not a sufficient guarantor of virtue. Moreover, because of the literati’s concentration upon sensibility towards others in their practical moral discourse, they maneuvered Smith into establishing much more firmly the pre-eminence of self-command as the essential defining characteristic of virtue in the moral community. In many respects, the final and most important edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments needs to be located within practical moral discourse in Scotland.

If one is looking for consistency or system in the works of late eighteenth century practical Scottish moralists, one is bound to be disappointed. Nor did they strive for such qualities in their work. They attempted to be reasonable rather than to display a reason which, past a certain point, they distrusted. In terms of strict logic, they occasionally appear to contradict themselves. But, in their view, man was
far too complex a creature to be easily dissected by the art of reason. Moreover, they regarded it as extremely dangerous to allow rational criteria to outweigh moral considerations. Their significance for future generations resides not in their contribution to the High Enlightenment, although their influence upon and relationship with thinkers such as Adam Smith was far from negligible, but in the way that they contributed to modes of discourse which were to become integral to the *mentalities* of nineteenth and twentieth century society. It was in their search for defensive strategies to deal with an increasingly impersonal and luxurious society in Scotland that they were most ingenious and pioneering. Some may choose to regard their qualified approval of improvement and their criticism of its moral effects as a peculiarly eighteenth century form of Scottish schizophrenia. But as two critics of modern capitalist society have suggested, "A schizophrenic out for a walk" is a better model of modern man than "a neurotic lying on the analyst's couch." 25
all the Preacher's instructions are to be of the practical kind; and... persuasion must ever be his ultimate object. It is not to discuss some abstruse point, that he ascends the Pulpit. It is not to illustrate some metaphysical truth, or to inform men of something which they never heard before; but it is to make them better men...The Eloquence of the Pulpit then, must be Popular Eloquence. (Hugh Blair, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres)

There were several organs for the dissemination of practical morality throughout the Scottish nation, all of which were centred upon the city of Edinburgh or its literati. These included: the sermons of Moderate clergymen, those moralistic periodicals the Mirror and Lounger, and often overlooked newspapers and journals such as the Caledonian Mercury and the Scots Magazine. To these must also be added the didactic novels of Henry Mackenzie, which were held in high esteem by his Scottish peers and established Mackenzie's claim as an acknowledged leader in Edinburgh literary circles. In his role as a major novelist, the driving force behind the Mirror and Lounger, and the linchpin between older and more recent literary circles, Mackenzie was perhaps pre-eminent in reflecting the moral concerns and practical advice of the enlightened Scottish literati of the late eighteenth century.

It is essential to point out, however, that Mackenzie was only one of a host of Scottish writers who furnished topics for
the debate on ethical subjects during this period. The contributions to Scottish periodicals evidence a preoccupation with moral questions that was at once intense and sophisticated. Such profound issues as the origin of moral sentiments, the relationship between abstract ethics and an increasingly refined commercial polity, and the civic effects of the extension of national wealth, were issues which were freely canvassed and, as we hope to demonstrate, dominated the pages of the popular press during the closing decades of the eighteenth century. The same issues and concerns also characterized the sermons of those polite products of the transforming Scottish Church -- the Moderate clergy.

It is appropriate that any discussion of moral discourse in eighteenth century Scotland should begin with a reference to the sermons of Protestant ministers. The pulpit had long been the instrument of ethical instruction in Scotland but its nature and function underwent considerable modification during the eighteenth century as the Moderate clergy of the Church of Scotland began to use the sermon as a vehicle for propagandising new values of religious tolerance, rational behaviour, and polite manners. Much to the chagrin of some of the more orthodox Calvinist preachers, the Moderate clergy were not at all adverse to giving their parishioners advice upon such practical matters as: how to avoid bankruptcy, the proper treatment of servants, and appropriate methods for educating the young. Their approach was typically utilitarian. Drunkenness, for example, they condemned not as a sin but as a
bad habit for men engaged in business. They condemned gambling as the ruination of many traditional landed families. And they criticized gossip and excessive wit for their harmful effects upon community cohesion and as an unwarranted intrusion into the affairs of individuals.¹

As the popularity of Moderate sermons among the polite elite of Edinburgh suggests, such practical advice was eagerly consumed by the Scottish upper ranks. It provided them with a guide to proper behaviour in a modern and more explicitly European community. At a deeper level, the sermons offered an ethical framework with which the members of a more commercial community could be comfortable. Not only was the polite neo-Stoicism of the Moderate preachers an orderly and sensible method for moderating anxiety about social change, but the new clerical emphasis upon sociability and benevolence provided incentives for ethical action in an increasingly secular world.

Perhaps the most intriguing and informative parallel with the sermons of late eighteenth century Moderate preachers is Joseph Addison's *Spectator*. Hugh Blair adopted selections from the *Spectator* as models of discursive eloquence in his *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres* which were delivered at Edinburgh University in the 1760s and 1770s and which provided a new generation of Scotsmen with their basic approach to culture.² In the *Spectator* one finds many of the same themes and preoccupations that characterized Moderate sermons: an increasingly secular world view, an emphasis upon polite as distinct from traditional or saintly interaction, and an
attempt to construct an ethical *frame of mind* consistent with a flexible and adaptable personality.³ It was this same *Addisonian frame of mind* that James Boswell was forever attempting to cultivate, with rather limited success, in the pages of his *London Journal*.⁴

It is not very surprising that Scottish moralists, many of whom had been students of Blair, revived the tradition of the *Spectator* in the pages of those highly respected Scottish periodicals the *Mirror* and the *Lounger*. Henry Mackenzie and his colleagues in the *Mirror Club* perceived the moralistic periodical as a potentially broader vehicle than the sermon for presenting a new ethical message to the Scottish elite. In the pages of the *Mirror* and *Lounger*, the *literary republic* of Scotland and its capital were able to promote their increasingly secular vision unhampered by religious conventions and constraints. In such periodicals they could expand upon the insights of *Mr. Spectator* in their practical advice to insecure social actors in a new and puzzling commercial world.

The members of the Mirror Club were proud to be seen in the *Spectatorial* tradition of Addison, which is not at all the same thing as saying that they were mere parrots of Addison and Steele. On issues such as the role and nature of women, the significance of adolescence, the moral potential of domestic life, and the importance of the novel, the Mirror Club went far beyond their illustrious predecessors. Their discussion of sentiment and sympathy was much more developed than that of Addison and Steele and owed not a little to the brilliant
Insights of Adam Smith. Their notion of man and his world owed more to the social philosophy of the Scottish School than it did to the Lockean empiricism favoured by Mr. Spectator. Moreover, their appreciation of the moral community and the threat that it faced from egoistic individualism, ran much deeper than anything that is to be found in the papers in the Spectator. Yet, despite these important differences, the Mirror Club viewed their task in much the same way as Joseph Addison -- the creation of moral but polite human beings.

If anything, this task was elevated to an especially high status in the Scottish community. It became intrinsically blended with a peculiarly Scottish primitivism. In his A Critical Dissertation on the Poems of Ossian, the Son of Fingal, Hugh Blair suggested that the ancient Scottish bards were the most important members of the state. Not only did their status survive that of the priests or Druids, argued Blair, but they were responsible for humanizing and softening the heroic virtue of ancient Scotsmen. According to Blair, Ossian's particular genius was to blend grace and delicacy with the sublimity of his heroes. Blair's glorification of the ancient Scottish bard was rapidly echoed in the writings of John Dalrymple and the Reverend Donald Macqueen on the nature of ancient highland society. Such an interpretation allowed the modern Scottish republic of letters to invoke the traditional authority of the bard, suitably adapted to the more modern role of supervisors of the Scottish community into the mainstream of modern socio-economic life. Thus, for example,
James Beattie could be referred to as Scotland's sweet Bard in the pages of the *Scots Magazine*. Henry Mackenzie identified his own works with the "joy of sorrow" that was characteristic of Ossian. Robert Burns, Mackenzie's admirer and protégé, also demanded to be read in the bardic tradition in poems such as *Epistle to J.L***k, An Old Scotch Bard*. In this poem, Burns not only praised Robert Ferguson and John Lapraik but made explicit connections between their genius and that of Pope, Steele, and Beattie. Similarly, in his poem *The Vision*, Burns identified the role of the Scottish bard with the promotion of the arts and polite behaviour as well as the inculcation of patriotic martial valour.

The role of moralist and bard was exemplified, therefore, in both the sermons of Moderate preachers such as Hugh Blair and John Drysdale and the highly polished essays of Henry Mackenzie and his friends in the *Mirror* and *Lounger*. By paying particularly close attention to the discourse in these important vehicles of moral instruction, one can learn a great deal about the attitudes, preoccupations, mentalities, values and ideologies of the Scottish literati during the closing decades of the century. Despite the contemporary popularity of such works, however, a full picture of the nature and range of moral discourse can only be obtained by referring to a more extensive Scottish audience and more avowedly popular organs of discussion. It is for this reason that we will also examine the contents of the Scottish periodical press during this period. For not only did the Scottish periodical press devote
a considerable amount of space to the ethical concerns of educated Scotsmen, but it also directed its large readership to, and interpreted, those works which treated of moral subjects in a more elegant or sophisticated fashion. Nor were the pages of the periodical press considered to be beneath the talents of would-be bards or established members of the Scottish republic of letters. Individuals like Mackenzie, Beattie, and Burns were only too happy to contribute to journals such as the Scots Magazine or newspapers like the Caledonian Mercury. Burn's Address to a Haggice, to cite one example, was first published in the Caledonian Mercury of 11 November 1785 and a number of his poems were printed in the Scots Magazine during the late 1780s and early 1790s.

I

Unfortunately, there exists no decent guide to the periodical literature of Edinburgh or Scotland during the eighteenth century. W.J. Couper's The Edinburgh Periodical Press and M.E. Craig's The Scottish Periodical Press do very little more than to provide a list of the relevant publications interspersed with a few contemporary anecdotes. When the authors do admit a bit of interpretive data, it is all too likely to contain serious errors or quite misleading information. On one page, for example, W.J. Couper claims that the Edinburgh Advertiser was the least political of all the Edinburgh newspapers: barely two pages later, the author claims
that the paper was an avowed advocate of the politics of Pitt and Dundas. Inquiry into the city politics of Edinburgh during the late eighteenth century reveals that the avowed support of Henry Dundas was likely to embroil a paper in some of the most vicious political squabbles of the day. Moreover, contemporary opinion suggests that even some Dundas supporters found the Advertiser to be a particularly scurrilous, partial and inaccurate organ. Even more misleading is M.E. Craig's unsubstantiated claim that the Caledonian Mercury was little more than a news sheet, had no real interest in cultural matters, and consisted largely of advertisements. Nothing could be further from the truth. The paper devoted considerable space to specifically cultural matters. In 1769, it went to a bigger format and, in 1776, it attempted a daily circulation, in order to accommodate the essays, letters and poems of the energetic young literati of Edinburgh. So far was it from being uninterested in culture that it actually printed three of the essays from Henry Mackenzie's Lounger within its pages. It also printed lengthy sections from such luminaries as John Millar, David Dalrymple, William Robertson, James Beattie, and Adam Ferguson. And the paper had a much better title to the discovery of Robert Burns than did Henry Mackenzie's oft cited essay on the Ayrshire ploughman for the Lounger.

Along with the Edinburgh Evening Courant and Ruddiman's relatively short lived Weekly Mercury (1777-1783), the Caledonian Mercury was one of the most respected newspapers in
Edinburgh. In 1739, it had a circulation of 1400 and, presumably, this number grew much bigger during the century. The paper was sufficiently successful that it was able to make a move from a thrice weekly to a daily publication in 1776 and only discontinued this practice because of an impending increase in the newspaper tax. The paper was regarded by both the literati and Scottish landed society as a highly impartial organ. It was the first choice of landed gentlemen who wished to publicize the resolutions of their county meetings on such topics as fictitious votes, entail, or the militia question. During the height of anti-sedition sentiment in the mid 1790s, counties such as Roxburgh and personages such as the Duke of Buccleugh adopted the Caledonian Mercury as their main vehicle for advertising county meetings and resolutions.

Of course, no Scottish newspaper during this period relied solely upon its native land for the provision of information. But the Caledonian Mercury began a determined policy of increasing Scottish content after its irritation with the scandalous treatment of Scotland by English periodicals in the wake of the Bute affair of the 1760s. In August of 1764, it printed an extract from a work by Carlo Denina eulogizing Scottish over English letters and, in 1765, it began the publication of thirteen essays by the SPECULIST on moral and cultural topics. These were Scottish products, probably the creations of an Edinburgh club; they were modelled upon Addison's Spectator, and some of them were very good. The first two, for example, were picked up by the prestigious Scots
Magazine and numbers seven to nine were comparable in quality to the essays in the Mirror and Lounger. Others were extremely spotty, however, giving rise to the presumption that they were not all composed by the same individual.

In 1766, the paper began printing a great deal of travel literature, which was rapidly devoured by a Scottish populace beginning to expand its intellectual and cultural horizons. The travels of Smollet were particularly popular. The same year saw the first publication of a series of excerpts from the historical works of David Dalrymple, Lord Hailes, and also chapters from Brook's sentimental novel The Fool of Quality. By 1769, the Caledonian Mercury had already begun to take shape as a public testing ground for the efforts of the young literati of Edinburgh. A letter from PHILOIKILOS congratulated the paper in this regard and lavished particular praise on such new contributors as SPECULATIST and PHILANDER. Another correspondent lauded the paper for its printing of travel literature and for its spread of much needed information on agricultural improvement. An entirely new series of seventeen essays of a very high quality was contributed under the name of SPECULATIST in 1771. The same year witnessed a summary of John Millar's Observations Concerning the Distinction of Ranks in Society and extracts from Henry Mackenzie's poem The Pursuits of Happiness and his novel The Man of Feeling.

The highly visible clergy of the Church of Scotland were not forgotten either. In 1769, the paper printed excerpts from
William Robertson's *History of Charles V* and, in 1772, it published long articles on the Church of Scotland and this leading figure among its Moderate party. In addition, it printed many of the speeches given in the General Assembly of that year. *CLERICUS* wrote in to tell the editor that the speakers in question were very proud to see their words recorded for posterity in the *Caledonian Mercury*. With regard to the patronage issue, which bedevilled the Church of Scotland and divided its clerical ranks during these decades, the editor was decidedly on the side of the Moderate clergy who supported religious tolerance and the right of lay and landed patrons to appoint pastors. Thus, while one *HUMANUS* wrote in to praise the general impartiality of the paper, he could not refrain from criticizing its one-sided approach to the issue of patronage.

During the mid 1770s, the paper printed many letters from *ANTI-JUNIUS* which were really mini essays on the loss of virtue in the modern age and a bardic exhortation for the rejuvenation of public, if not necessarily martial, spirit. It printed more material from David Dalrymple's rapidly growing corpus of historical research as well as extracts from Professor Richardson of Glasgow's new book on Shakespeare. Moreover, it kept very close tabs on a newly formed and highly significant Edinburgh club -- the *Pantheon Society*, whose *ability and candour* the editor praised in 1777. The *Pantheon Society* was extremely popular and influential in late eighteenth century Scotland, attracting many of the lawyers,
divines, and visiting landed gentlemen in the city. Some of its representative topics of debate included: Whether is fancy or judgement most consulted in chusing a wife, the rather wordy Suppose a man, his mother, wife, and daughter, together on sea in a boat, a storm arises, the boat is overset, he can possibly save but one of them: query, Which of the three ought he to save? (the wife was chosen by a considerable majority), and Whether is marriage at an early or middle period of life, best calculated to ensure happiness in the conjugal state? The club was also an arena for the poetic efforts of would-be Scottish bards, as Alexander Campbell pointed out in his An Introduction to the History of Poetry in Scotland of 1798. A fuller list of the topics discussed and the votes taken in the Pantheon can be found in the Appendix.

There is an analysis of the Pantheon Society in David McElroy's Scotland's Age of Improvement: A Survey of Eighteenth Century Literary Clubs and Societies. McElroy's account is problematic, since he seems to want to picture the Pantheon as a democratic and convivial club of the sort condemned by Hugh Blair in his Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. Popularity should not be equated with democracy. The membership of the Pantheon included the lawyers and preachers of the city as well as established writers such as James Boswell; its meetings were expressly designed to facilitate the attendance of the gentry and aristocracy who tended to reside in Edinburgh over the cold Scottish winter months. McElroy also seems puzzled by what he regards as the frivolous nature
of many of the questions discussed in the Pantheon given that society's reputation as a serious debating club. The simple solution to this problem is that the questions discussed were not at all frivolous. Relationships between lovers, parents, children and friends were of crucial importance to the literati as will be demonstrated in future chapters. McElroy's comments on the Pantheon are, to say the very least, anachronistic. They show little appreciation of the specific attributes of Scottish culture in the late eighteenth century.

In addition to praising the Pantheon Society and freely advertising its meetings, the Caledonian Mercury also acted as a propagandist for two of its favourite authors -- Hugh Blair and Adam Ferguson. The editor, John Robertson, gave some initial support to Henry Dundas, William Robertson, and the Moderate clergy in connection with the Roman Catholic Bill. However, he withdrew this support once he had ascertained the extent of public feeling against such a bill within the Scottish community. In addition, he grew more and more irritated with Dundas for his rather machiavellian attempts to oust Sir Lawrence Dundas from the control of the city in 1780. The works of Moderate clerics still received pride of place, however, and in July of 1781, the editor was happy to print poems from John Logan -- a fascinating transitional figure between the circle surrounding Hugh Blair and that of Henry Mackenzie's Mirror Club. In the same year, he advocated the setting up of a Temple of Fame wherein "long tried and conspicuous merit might be held up to public
admiration, and the wheat, even on this side of the grave, in some degree, separated from the chaff of frivolity, dissipation, and dissolution of manners.  "39 His suggestion was shortly taken up by the important Society of Actuaries, who began to actively seek subscriptions for the project. 40

Support for the Moderate message continued through 1784 and 1785, with the printing of Hugh Blair’s highly respected sermon On Gentleness which the editor had already praised some years earlier. 41 In addition, the editor published a letter from ACHATES which recommended the sentimental sermons of Samuel Charters and compared them most favourably with those of Blair. 42 Again, specific sermons were singled out for particular attention. These were the sermons on Death, Devotion, and Rachael Weeping for her Children which, despite their misleading titles, were all attempts to inculcate an emotion termed gentle sensibility in their hearers and readers.

With regard to more explicitly secular morality, three issues of Henry Mackenzie’s Lounger were printed whole in the Caledonian Mercury in 1786. In the following year, Robertson, printed Robert Burn’s poetic tribute to the author of The Man of Feeling and the guiding hand of the Mirror and Lounger -- Henry Mackenzie. 43 “Here Douglas forms wild Shakespeare into plan,” wrote Burns, “And Harley rouses all the God in man.” And, in the following year, he also printed Mackenzie’s epilogue to his friend Alexander Macdonald’s play Virmonda. 44

John Robertson retired as publisher in 1790 and the paper was taken over by a Mr. Robert Allan. 45 The takeover involved
no change in editorial policy or subject matter. For example, in 1791, the paper printed the entire speech to the *Pantheon* of Alexander Williamson on a topic of great interest in Edinburgh polite circles. That topic was, *Has suffering Humanity been more indebted to the generosity of the Male or Female Sex?*, which acted as an introduction to the issue of feminine sensibility, its importance in a polite polity, and its beneficial moral effects upon society generally. There was also much praise of John Drysdale's *Sermons* when the two volumes came out in 1793. Characteristically, the editor praised these sermons for their undogmatic nature and the way in which they penetrated human nature and exposed vice. Robert Allan followed the Moderate clergy and most of the *Mirror Club* in praising the Lord Advocate, Henry Dundas, for his anti-sedition speeches in the House of Commons and his severe actions in Scotland. Generally, the paper supported Henry Dundas in the hectic days that followed. It was also about this time that the paper began to concentrate its efforts upon news and political events. The Edinburgh *literati* became more and more polarized along political lines and the former flood of moralistic and cultural essays to the *Caledonian Mercury* diminished to a mere trickle as the Scottish *republic of letters* entered into its decline. Patriotic energies were absorbed in the creation of a militia, the condemnation of sedition and its negative effects upon the moral community, and the efforts of the *Highland Society* to build up the fisheries and erode the last vestiges of fuedalism in the Highlands. But
the editor of the *Caledonian Mercury* could still take time out, in particular, to praise the Moderate preacher Hugh Blair and the effect of his sermons which exhibited such a union of "mild religion, and of pure and liberal philosophy, with discriminating observations on the modes of human conduct, and the fortunes of human life." 49

If modern commentators have been inclined to underrate and misrepresent the *Caledonian Mercury* as a source of the views of the Edinburgh *literati* and educated Scotsmen generally, they have not been so unkind to the more prestigious *Scots Magazine*. According to M.E. Craig, for example, the *Scots Magazine* had no serious rival in its treatment of *belles lettres* and its discussion of national and domestic events. 50 Contemporary opinion bears out this interpretation. Hugo Arnot, in his *History of Edinburgh*, wrote that the *Scots Magazine* has "always been esteemed an accurate, judicious, and impartial publication." 51 Another contemporary suggested that the "rise of this magazine constitutes a marked event in the annals of Edinburgh and Scottish literature." 52 If a Scotsman or woman was serious about polite letters and Scottish culture, it was to the *Scots Magazine* that he or she turned.

The *Scots Magazine* was modelled upon the *Gentleman's Magazine* of 1731, and it consistently reprinted materials from that and other English periodicals. Like many Scotsmen, the journal also retained a particular fascination for the French thinker, Rousseau, and excerpts from his and other French works regularly graced its pages. But much of its content was
explicitly Scottish. In terms of both space and support, perhaps its favourite author was James Fordyce, a Moderate minister and brother of David Fordyce, the moral philosopher at Marischal College prior to his untimely death at sea in 1751. James Fordyce received his degree at Glasgow University and was, on the strength of his preaching, offered a position with a congregation of Protestant dissenters in Monkwell Street, London. His friend Hugh Blair usually preached there whenever he visited the English metropolis, and it was Fordyce who introduced Blair to Samuel Johnston. While at Monkwell Street, Fordyce composed several works upon the nature of women and the education of youth. Not only were these immensely popular in their day, but they were also singled out by none other than Mary Wollstonecraft for special criticism. An intimate of Lord Bute, Fordyce retained a Scotsman’s distaste for the English metropolis throughout his lifetime. This may help to explain the avoidance of his sermons and company by that dedicated anglophile -- James Boswell.

The Scots Magazine favoured Fordyce because he wrote on two of its particular hobby horses -- the role of women and the cultivation of youth. It gave considerable space to the writings of Fordyce on both of these subjects, printing lengthy extracts from Sermons to Young Women and The Character and Conduct of the Female Sex. Fordyce’s moralistic works were highly praised by the editor, who continued to print the author’s little didactic poems throughout the second half of the century.
education who followed in the footsteps of Fordyce, such as Vincesimus Knox, John Bennett and Mrs. Griffiths also received ample attention in the periodical. This attention is more than can be said of some modern historians of sex and sentiment, who have tended to overlook such popular English writers. In addition to these authors and a veritable host of letters from Scottish correspondents, the topics of education and women were also discussed in extracts from Lord Kames' *Loose Hints on Education*, John Gregory's *A Father's Legacy to His Daughters*, and the popular series of eight essays entitled *Letters on Education* by BELZEBUB which were printed in the *Scots Magazine* in 1778 and 1789. Some space was also given to the more caustic strictures on education of the pompous and idiosyncratic Earl of Buchan.

In terms of the philosophy of the Scottish enlightenment, the journal's highest praise seems to have been reserved for Adam Ferguson. Extracts from his *History of the Progress and Termination of the Roman Republic* were printed in May and September of 1783 with highly flattering comments from the editor. In 1792, the periodical also published sections from his *Principles of Moral and Political Science* on the subject of freedom of action. Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations* also received no little praise when it came out in 1776. The only cull from this great work were some of Smith's new additions on the East India Company, which were printed in March of 1785. The largest number of pages given to any of the big guns of the Scottish enlightenment, surprisingly, was devoted to the
philosopher of Marischal College -- James Beattie. But this was not so much because of Beattie’s intellectual brilliance as it was the direct result of his attack upon scepticism and the supposed positive influence which his works could have upon the young and susceptible. Thus, for example, in 1771, the editor praised Beattie’s poem *The Minstrel* as well as his *Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth.* Two years later, he printed another extract from the latter work on the perennial subject of interest -- Rousseau. The editor also stressed the significance of Beattie's *Dissertations, Moral and Critical* for the inculcation of virtue in the young and the cultivation of their sensibility in 1783, although he could hardly suppress a chuckle in connection with the author’s ridiculous analysis of the moral content of dreams. In 1786, the editor recommended Beattie’s work on the Christian religion, again on the grounds of its positive influence on the young. And, finally, in 1789, the *Scots Magazine* printed a piece from Beattie on the art of writing. If the public dissemination and recommendation of one’s views constitutes putative influence, then certainly there is an excellent case for the influence of Beattie as theoretical moralist in Scottish polite circles.

In connection with *belles lettres* and explicitly practical morality, the *Scots Magazine* also acted as a vehicle for the writings of such Moderate preachers as Blair and Drysdale and for the efforts of Henry Mackenzie and his colleagues in the *Mirror* and *Lounger.* Hugh Blair held a privileged position...
right from the start. Lengthy sections of his *A Critical Dissertation on the Poems of Ossian*, which acted as a theoretical introduction to that work, were printed in the February and March editions of the 1763 *Scots Magazine*. In 1777, the first volume of his sermons received special notice and was highly touted for its message of tolerance and anti-dogmatic content. Six years later, the journal lauded Blair’s *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres*, including lengthy extracts from that work. The topics treated included the relationship between virtue and taste and the nature of the sublime. Not surprisingly, one selection dealt with Joseph Addison and the *Spectator*, whose influence on Scottish moralists, especially the *Mirror Club*, was simply immense.

Other Moderate preachers also received attention. The periodical included a lengthy, academic, and highly praiseworthy review of the sermons of Samuel Charters in 1786. A piece by Thomas Somerville on the Test Act, stressing the need for religious tolerance, was printed in full in May of 1792. Dalzell’s account of the life of John Drysdale was printed in the following year. And the poems of the Reverend John Logan, including the disputed *Ode to the Cuckoo* were highly popular with the audience of the *Scots Magazine*.

The literary efforts of the Moderate clergy were, therefore, well publicized in the journal’s pages. So too were the works of Henry Mackenzie and the *Mirror Club*. During the early 1770s, Henry Mackenzie’s poem *The Pursuits of Happiness*, advocating the pleasures of the simple life of the middling
gentry, was published and there was also a long and very favourable account of his play *The Prince of Tunis*. The late seventies and early eighties witnessed the publication of no less than twelve of the essays of the *Mirror Club* in the *Scots Magazine*. An *ex-officio* member and the editor of the *Mirror*, William Creech had his essays on the changes in the manners of the inhabitants of Edinburgh printed in the journal in 1783. This essentially civic humanist treatise on the decline of virtue in a luxurious commercial state also helped to spark a series of letters on the subject in the pages of the *Caledonian Mercury*, *Edinburgh Evening Courant*, and *Scots Magazine* itself. Between 1785 and 1787, no less than eight essays and one poem from the *Lounger* were printed in the journal. Many of these were inserted within the space of a few days of their original publication. With the termination of the *Lounger* as a periodical and its publication in book form, the *Scots Magazine* was pleased to advertise the work in the form of favourable reviews from the *English Review* and the *European Magazine*. In particular, they published those essays which compared Mackenzie with Joseph Addison. One such comparison was likely written by Mackenzie’s old Moderate friend, John Logan, who had by this time become an editor of the *English Review*.

It should be clear that the *Scots Magazine* is a useful index to the culture and moral preoccupations of the late eighteenth century Scots and that it provides fascinating insights into what people read and what it was that particularly interested them in what they read. In addition to
the authors discussed above, the *Scots Magazine* and *Caledonian Mercury* also contained many essays and letters written by individuals who are no longer remembered or whose identity is hidden under pen names. Hugo Arnot, for example, wrote in under the name of *BONIFACE*; William Creech was *THEOPHRASTUS*; Alexander Carlyle was *NESTOR*; and the Earl of Buchan was *ALBANICUS*. Such letters and essays, even where the authors are unknown, also reflect upon the cultural *cum* moralistic discourse of the age and show just how broadly based some of the *Mirror Club*’s and Moderate clergy’s attitudes and perspectives really were. In the chapters that follow, these sources will be freely cited in order to present as broad a picture of the cultural debate of the period as is possible.

II

Innumerable volumes of sermons were churned out by Scottish publishers in the late eighteenth century. By the 1780s, publishers such as William Creech were taking up considerable space in the newspapers simply advertising the new editions of sermons. Despite this mass production, surprisingly few volumes were singled out by the Scottish periodical press for any attention. The *Caledonian Mercury* and *Scots Magazine* did recommend, however, three: those of Hugh Blair, John Drysdale, and Samuel Charters. All of these individuals were members of the Moderate party in the Church of Scotland. The Moderate party, led for most of this period by
William Robertson, considered themselves to be the progressive wing of the Scottish Church. They were advocates of religious tolerance, even in the case of such a sceptic as David Hume, whom they befriended and protected from the wrath of their ecclesiastical opponents -- the High flyers or Popular party. Although their politics were conservative and their adherence to the status quo unshakable, their socio-economic programme was unmistakably liberal. Preachers like Hugh Blair welcomed the increase of knowledge among the moderns and the unfolding of secret causes and springs that is identified with the term enlightenment. They wanted to utilize such knowledge to help bring Scotland into the modern, polite and civilized European community. To this end, they attempted to ensure that Moderates were appointed to important university positions and as kirk ministers. In a country with no clear institutional focus and disparate communities, the kirk pulpit was a crucial factor in modernization.

The Moderate clergy were central to the Scottish enlightenment and helped to define its mildly progressive and highly social focus. A resolute minority rather than an absolute majority in the Church of Scotland, men such as these realized that Scotland needed to accommodate itself to a new and commercial world if it was to survive as a meaningful national community. However, if this adaptation was to proceed smoothly, the power of reaction in the Scottish community, the orthodox religion of the mass of the Scottish people, had to be mitigated against. As one Moderate preacher, James Finlayson,
put it in his brief sketch of the life of Hugh Blair, one of their intentions was to protect against "a greater infusion of the democratical influence than is compatible with good order, and the established constitution of the country." Fortunately, they had a useful defensive weapon to hand in the form of the law of patronage.

The Moderates consistently argued that landowners, the crown and civic authorities -- rather than individual kirks -- should be the ones to appoint clerics to benefices. As a result of their support for this unpopular law, the Moderates came in for a constant stream of abuse from the parishes and from the aggressive, but tactically deficient, Popular party. The Popular party or Wildmen, as Henry Mackenzie called them, condemned the law of patronage outright as contrary to the tradition of presbyterianism or claimed that it was never intended to be interpreted in such a literal fashion as to allow highly unpopular appointments at the kirk level. In reply, the Moderates asserted the legal rights of patrons and the utilitarian necessity for social and public order. They were willing to use the law of patronage as an instrument for asserting the authority of the General Assembly, which they usually controlled, over individual and often recalcitrant kirks. Their choice of weapon was undoubtedly an ideal one. For all the wild posturing of the Popular party, there was very little likelihood that a Westminster Parliament, with its contingent of Scottish landowners, would ever give up such an effective means of control over a wilful presbyterian church.
The debate over patronage was carried on through the period, and was exemplified in the *Drysdale Bustle* of the 1760s, which, as Dr. Richard Sher has demonstrated, highlighted both the tactical manoeuvering and skillful use of propaganda by Principal Robertson and his party.\(^{81}\) The patronage issue as a whole filled not a few of the pages of the *Scots Magazine* and *Caledonian Mercury* and, over the long term, was arguably the single most important issue of the period. But the significance of the patronage debate should not be allowed to obscure the cultural products of the members of the Moderate party. In addition to their definition as an ecclesiastical faction, the Moderates tended to espouse a common set of beliefs, attitudes and ideologies which we can conveniently label as *Moderatism*. This common outlook, which had its basis in perceived contemporary problems and needs, was not always related, but constantly overlapped and intermingled with more specifically clerical interests. It expressed itself in their support for *belles lettres* and the Edinburgh theatre, their cautious espousal of both economic and cultural improvement, their advocacy of freedom of conscience, their concern about the education of youth in a modern society and, above all, in their attempts to construct a new moral framework or temper, rather than casuistical code, which could allow the individual to preserve his or her moral autonomy in a commercial environment. Sermons were the main vehicle for the inculcation of this mental framework.

In an essay entitled *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth*
Century Moderate Divines, I argued against Ian Clark that the Moderates were not religious men in any fundamental sense. They are better understood as civic minded moralists than as orthodox, or even unorthodox, Calvinists. Central religious notions such as sin, hell, salvation and grace played little part in their thinking. Even the concept of divine revelation and a Christian heaven can be seen as reinforcements for a morality that was earthly rather than other worldly in its origin. It is certainly not necessary to go quite this far, however, to accept the fact that Moderate sermons are rendered far more intelligible in terms of secular modes of ethical discourse — such as Stoicism, civic humanism, and sentiment — which are fundamentally human, practical and historical in their focus. What is most interesting about the Moderate's use of scripture, for example, is their decided inability to adopt it as anything other than a reinforcement for truths which they could and did arrive at through an analysis of human nature.

Fundamentally, therefore, Moderate sermons were a popular form of secular morality. And the term popular is an understatement here. Visitors to Edinburgh in the late eighteenth century were intrigued to discover that Moderate preachers such as Hugh Blair, John Drysdale, and John Logan were fashionable among the most polite elements in Scottish society. David Dalrymple, Lord Hailes, for example, frequented the sermons of Robertson and Blair and even took notes. In their printed form, Moderate sermons were highly regarded, not only for their elegance, but also for their insights into human
sensibility. As the editor of the *Caledonian Mercury* wrote of Blair’s sermons:

At the period when his sermons were first offered to the world, this species of writing had lost almost all of its former power over the minds of the public. Mere elegance and propriety of style could have had but a small effect to make sermons so suddenly popular and eminently fashionable. It was the skill with which they were adapted to the very tone of the public taste, humour and judgment.84

It was as practical moralists rather than as philosophers, theologians or orthodox divines that the Moderates owed their claim to contemporary Scottish fame.

It is inevitable that any discussion of Edinburgh divines during the late eighteenth century should focus upon Hugh Blair. Next to the *Spectator*, Blair’s sermons were the single most popular work in the English language written in the eighteenth century.85 Thus, it is surprising that the sermons have not been subjected to anything like a detailed content analysis. Obviously, there is much that they could tell us about the British, as well as Scottish, reading public. The popularity of his sermons is not the only reason that Blair is a good person with whom to begin a discussion of the Moderate clergy. Next to William Robertson, Blair was probably the most important Moderate divine. Not only did he play a crucial role in the affairs of the General Assembly, albeit behind-the-scenes; he also solicited support in Edinburgh for kirk and university appointments; and he had been in the forefront of the defence of Hume and Kames against the attacks of the more puritanical members of the Scottish Church during
the mid century. Most important, however, the "influence which Dr. Blair had over the younger members of the church, was greater than any other clergyman whatever."Hugh Blair was educated at the University of Edinburgh where he received his M.A. in 1739. In 1741, he was licensed to preach in the presbytery of Edinburgh and thereafter served in some of the city’s leading churches prior to his promotion to the prestigious High Church, at the expressed request of several Lords of Session. It was after this appointment that Blair began to publish some writings, beginning with a review of Hutcheson’s System of Moral Philosophy for the first Edinburgh Review. Here, he praised Hutcheson’s general treatment of moral questions, but took issue with what he viewed as the author’s excessively aesthetic view of the concept of benevolence. As we shall see, Blair’s understanding of the nature of moral sentiments was always closer to that of Adam Smith than it was to either Hutcheson or Hume. Between 1776 and 1788, he occupied the newly created position of professor of rhetoric and belles lettres at Edinburgh University. The position had been created expressly to display his particular talents and one fruit of his academic labours was the publication of the influential Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres in 1783. This work is particularly interesting for its illumination of Joseph Addison’s Spectator, its advocacy of popular and undogmatic preaching, and its espousal of the novel as a respectable and important literary form. Blair, as we have seen, came prominently into public
attention with his dissertation on Ossian, which received much
attention in the Scottish periodical press in 1763. But his
chief claim to fame was undoubtedly his sermons, the first
volume of which was published in 1777. This was so favourably
received that Blair published three other volumes during his
lifetime (1780, 1790, and 1794) and prepared another volume for
the press, which was published shortly after his death in 1800.
The sermons were so successful that they place Blair in an
uncommonly comfortable financial position for a Scottish
minister. He was the first cleric in Edinburgh to have his own
carriage, much to the vicious delight of his ecclesiastical
opponents who considered his sermons too worldly. And
despite all the fashionable public approbation, the sermons
were attacked by some Scottish divines, such as the anonymous
author of Letters on Dr. Blair's Sermons, who claimed that they
did not conform to the uncorrupted word of God and were too
tailored to suit the taste of an evil world. In addition,
this critic correctly pointed out that "this volume, so much
admired in the world by men of all sorts, contains no gospel to
the poor." Writing more than half a century later in The
Scottish Nation, William Anderson too condemned the sermons for
substituting "cold and unsatisfying moral disquisitions" in the
place of the "truths of revelation." But it was precisely
these same supposedly cold and unsatisfying moral lectures that
the upper classes in Edinburgh and in British society relished.
As James Boswell, who was justly terrified of orthodox Calvinism, put it, Blair's sermons "lighted things up so
finely, and you get from them such comfortable answers."  

John Hill, Blair’s contemporary biographer, singled out the influence that Blair had over the younger members of the Scottish church. Not only did he teach a good many of them, but he was well known for his benevolence towards aspiring young clerics. Thus, he made many recruits to the Moderate cause and with these he maintained a connection that went far beyond the traditional teacher student relationship. For John Logan, for example, he obtained the position of tutor to the young Sir John Sinclair, compiler of the famous *Statistical Account of Scotland*, which began publication in Edinburgh in 1791. He also patronized his young friend’s popular historical lectures at St. Mary’s chapel in Edinburgh between 1779 and 1781. Together with William Robertson and Dugald Stewart, he actively promoted the historical works of the promising Thomas Somervile. Minister to the lucrative living of Jedburgh, Somervile had been tutor to the son of Gilbert Elliot of Minto. But he is best known to modern historians as the author of *My Own Life and Times*, an autobiographical account which sheds much light on polite Scottish society in the age of Dundas and the late enlightenment. Ironically, he has recently been misquoted in order to support Lawrence Stone’s untenable assertion that Scotland was a cultural backwater in terms of the discussion of sentiment and sensibility. Yet another member of the group which revolved around Blair was Samuel Charters, who was also an intimate of Logan and Somerville. The sermons of all of
these men were often little more than a paraphrase of those of their illustrious mentor.

Nor were Blair's patronage and alliance confined to men of the cloth. The young Henry Mackenzie sent the manuscript of his play *The Prince of Tunis* to Blair for his advice and correction. Blair also praised Mackenzie's novel *The Man of the World*, for which the latter was particularly grateful. While a professor at Edinburgh University, Blair encouraged and befriended the young and then unknown Henry Dundas. This particular alliance was to prove fruitful for both parties in the decades that followed. Dundas supported the Moderate positions on patronage and the Roman Catholic Bill and Blair was an outspoken defender of the Dundas regime in Scotland. It was Dundas who obtained a pension of two hundred pounds for Blair from the king in 1780. Among those of his own generation, Blair numbered intimate relationships with several important figures. He was extremely close to Adam Smith, William Robertson, and Jupiter Carlyle. With Adam Ferguson, he was friendly, but not as intimate as with the others, perhaps because of the sharp contrast between his timid and Ferguson's strong personality. Still, Adam Ferguson was in the habit of giving his manuscripts to Blair for correction prior to publication. The same can be said of yet another famous Scottish writer — Thomas Reid.

In terms of Edinburgh's institutional and commercial life, Blair also played a significant, albeit usually overlooked, role. He had a close relationship with the *Mirror Club's*
publisher and future Lord Provost -- William Creech. The city council invariably consulted Blair when they wished, as they often did, to construct a loyal address to the king. Even more important, they consulted Blair in connection with the appointment of professors to vacant chairs at Edinburgh University. Although many of these efforts in the city, as in the General Assembly, were not highly visible, they were clearly significant to the Moderate cause. It is not surprising that Principal Robertson thought sufficiently highly of his services to the Moderates that he desired to have Blair as his successor as Principal of the University of Edinburgh. With both Robertson and Dundas on his side, Blair might very well have obtained this position had he been more aggressive in his pursuit.

One of Blair's best friends and a staunch Moderate ally, John Drysdale could never be accused of timidity. Born in Kirkcaldy and educated by David Millar in the parish school, as was Adam Smith, Drysdale always remained very close to Smith who, according to Andrew Dalzell, loved Drysdale. He was eventually licenced to preach in Edinburgh in 1740. Presented to Lady Yester's church in 1763, he was elected as Moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in 1773 and 1784. Like Blair, Drysdale was particularly active behind the scenes and his reputation among his Moderate allies stemmed largely from years of correspondence with provincial clergymen. His appointment as a minister of Lady Yester's followed a heated struggle over the right of presentation that was fought
out between the Moderates and the Town Council on the one hand and the Popular party on the other. In the years that followed Drysdale was to become one of the most eloquent supporters of the Moderate position on Church patronage and the authority of rank within the social order. His sermon entitled *On the Distinction of Ranks* was perhaps the penultimate Moderate statement on the inviolability of the social bond and the imperatives of station. It was for such services that Drysdale was twice elected to the office of Moderator of the General Assembly, the second time when Robertson refused to come out of retirement in order to defend the Moderate interest.

His sermons, while not nearly so well composed as those of Blair, were extremely popular in polite Edinburgh circles and even obtained a highly complimentary mention in the reflections of Thomas Somerville. The sermons were hard hitting and direct, for Drysdale preached emotionally and from the heart. Indeed, he argued that religion itself was "a principle in the heart" and he adamantly refused to deal with what he regarded as insignificant religious obscurities. William Robertson praised his sermons highly, especially the aforementioned *On the Distinction of Ranks*. More than any other Moderate preacher, Drysdale was an apologist for the existing social structure of British society and, in this sermon, he argued that the master and servant relationship was natural to society, that man was a social being rather than a free individual, and the any levelling of social rank was inimical
to the communal interest. So firm was Drysdale's belief in the inviolability of the social order that he went so far as to posit the existence of remarkably similar ranks and orders in a future state. For heaven, like earth, was a community and, as such, it had need for a hierarchy which could preserve good order. That a society of saints might have no need for institutions of good order appears not to have occurred to this hard hitting pragmatist.

Samuel Charters was a quite different type of individual. Although he wrote on practical subjects such as the avoidance of bankruptcy, his particular trademark was the sentimental and melancholy discourse. His sermons relied on many of the same biblical quotations and themes as those of Hugh Blair but went even further in terms of pathos. An intimate of the Blair circle his volume of sermons even included a contribution by Thomas Somerville on the subject of the heavenly city. Thus, he is yet another example of the sort of cross fertilization that occurred between Blair and his young protégés.

Born in 1742, Charters was educated at the University of Glasgow. As a young man, he met Somerville in Edinburgh and the two began a friendship that lasted throughout their lives. It was Charters who introduced Somerville to Hugh Blair in August of 1770; thereafter, Somerville claimed to have enjoyed much of Blair's confidence and friendship. The two young men accompanied Blair during a retirement to the west coast made necessary by the effect upon the latter's spirit when his daughter died. Together, Charters and Somerville worked with
the Moderates in support of patronage and the Roman Catholic Bill. Moreover, they were both active opponents of the slave trade and the application of the Test Act to the Church of Scotland. Besides his volume of sermons, Charters was much esteemed for two other pulpit orations *A Sermon on Alms* and a *Discourse on the Duty of Making a Testament*, which were frequently reprinted. The philosopher, Adam Smith, thought sufficiently highly of his preaching to recommend that the London publisher William Strahan publish the *sermons of the Reverend Mr. Samuel Charteris*.¹¹⁷

Yet another important figure in the Blair circle was John Logan. Although Logan was praised in the Edinburgh press more for his poetry than his sermons, the evidence suggests that these were much admired in Scottish society.¹¹⁸ Actually, John Logan is one of the most interesting and overlooked of all the Moderate clergy. Poet, playwright, historian, preacher and editor, Logan tended to spread his not inconsiderable talents far too thinly to obtain any long term reputation. However, during his own lifetime, Logan was a Moderate of some consequence and a potential leader of the Moderate cause. His life history is an intriguing one. Before obtaining a licence to preach in Edinburgh, he acted as tutor to the well known improver, Sir John Sinclair. According to the brief biography preceeding his first volume of sermons, it was his great fame as an eloquent preacher which obtained him a unanimous call from the kirk session of South Leith, a position which he filled until the early 1780s when a mysterious scandal forced
him to resign his charge. Shortly before this, he had written a play entitled Runnamede: A Tragedy which received favourable reviews in the Scottish press but was not particularly successful in performance in Edinburgh. Henry Mackenzie, who was a friend of Logan, was sceptical of the play's quality but, at the author's request, passed it on to Adam Smith for his perusal. Smith did not approve of the play either, as he indicated in a letter to Andrew Strahan in September of 1785.

In the same letter, however, Smith had considerable praise for Logan's historical lectures which were given at St. Mary's chapel and which Smith claimed "were approved and even admired by some of the best and most impartial judges." Logan's moderate mentors, including Blair, Robertson and Carlyle, were forever attempting to have Logan develop these historical ideas into print, but to little avail. Both of his published pieces, Elements in the Philosophy of History and A Dissertation on the Governments, Manners, and Spirit of Asia, were sloppily written and fragmentary in nature. They represented a concerted attempt, however, to reduce the laws of any given society to the manners of its inhabitants. Logan forcefully argued that neither the government nor legislation could act as the preserver of national manners and morals. On the contrary, the "form of government, in every country, arises from the spirit and manners of the people." The despotism of the Eastern empires was related to the character of its inhabitants who were "prepared by nature for servitude" and who "submitted
quietly to the yoke." Public spirit, independence, and the rights of mankind, he insisted were "names that have never been pronounced in the regions of Asia." Logan had no quibbles about characterizing the East as a static society marked by Immutability. Authentic history, he informed his audience, had only begun with the invasion of Greece by Darius, putting into motion the springs that would allow for the rise of the great Western civilizations.

Logan's historical lectures encompassed a civic humanist critique of eastern luxury within an enlightened view of the significance of the manners of national communities. As such, they went beyond the more simplistic analyses of those ancient historians who, as Hugh Blair put it, attributed national decline to luxury and refinement without any assessment of the nature of the respective community. It was as a historian that Logan perceived himself and the scandal at South Leith was partly brought about because of his despondency at not having obtained the professorship of civil history at Edinburgh University in 1780, which went to Alexander Fraser Tytler. Logan fully expected to obtain the position as a result of the patronage of his lectures; but it was not to be. Adam Smith, in his letter to Strahan, reported that Logan was unfortunate in having his historical lectures "run down by the prevalence of a hostile literary faction, to the leaders of which he had imprudently given some personal offence." In one of his letters to Carlyle, Logan suggested that he had confided something to Robertson which caused the latter to turn against
him.  Thus it was that Smith found himself composing a letter of reference for Logan to the London journals in 1785. Logan did take up residence in London and eventually became the editor of the *English Review*. Still, his activities as a supporter of the Moderate party did not end there. His published poems, as well as his sermons, continued to be well received by the Moderate *literati* and Edinburgh press. Furthermore, in his function as the editor of the *English Review*, Logan acted as the propagandist for both Blair’s *Sermons* and Adam Ferguson’s *The History of the Progress and Termination of the Roman Republic* to a wider British audience. His ties with the Blair circle were firmly demonstrated in his letters to Alexander Carlyle, in one of which, he wrote:

> If you see Somerville of Jedburgh at next Assembly, tell him that there will be an account of Samuel Charter’s Sermons in the next *English Review*. In that article there is a compliment to Dr. Blair, to make some atonement for the freedom with which he was treated formerly, and to show that the Review is now in different hands.

Thus it was that Logan helped to spread the Moderate *frame of mind* outwith polite Scottish and Edinburgh circles.

### III

Before embarking upon his rather precarious and spotty literary career, the young John Logan had belonged to a small Edinburgh literary club called the *Feast of Tabernacles*. The members of this club had, for the most part, belonged to
the earlier Belles Lettres Society, which existed between 1759 and 1763. This club, which was really a junior version of the Select Society was supported by such honorary members as William Robertson and Hugh Blair and included many of the young literati of the city. Thomas Somerville attributed all his success in literary pursuits and "what I deem of still greater importance, an estimation and love of truth" to its influence. Its offspring The Feast of Tabernacles was equally important. It counted among its members such future luminaries as Henry Dundas, Robert Blair, Henry Mackenzie, William McLeod Bannatyne, Alexander Abercromby, William Craig, John Logan, and Henry Dundas. There were the future literary and legal elite of Edinburgh. Robert Blair, for example, was to become Lord President of the Court of Session and one of Edinburgh's most respected citizens. Abercromby and Bannatyne would become famous advocates and judges in the Court of Session. In addition to having the distinction of being a favorite pupil of Adam Smith, William Craig eventually rose to prominence as a judge and member of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. Henry Mackenzie, of course, was the author of the cult novel The Man of Feeling which will be discussed in some detail in a later chapter. His literary fame was such that only occasionally did he act in his capacity as a lawyer. Not only did he also play a significant role in Edinburgh's Royal Society, but he and William McLeod Bannatyne constituted the real driving force of the prestigious Highland Society which had as its purpose the improvement of the Highlands and the
preservation of Gaelic literature and antiquities. There is no dispute either that Mackenzie was a leader in Edinburgh literary circles towards the end of the century, although there is no conclusive evidence for his biographer's claim that he was the literati's sole figurehead.  

The precise role of Henry Dundas, future political manager of Scotland, is difficult to determine with precision. According to John Ramsay of Ochtertyre:

the Feast of Tabernacles was a club composed of lawyers and literary men, whose bond of union was their friendship for Mr. Dundas, who met at Purvey's Tavern in Parliament Square. Ramsay's view is somewhat misleading if only because the group did not disband in 1774, when Dundas set off for London as a Member of Parliament for Midlothian. Indeed, the Feast of Tabernacles appears to have remained in existence until 1779, at which time its name was changed to the Mirror Club and, at the instigation of William Craig and under the capable leadership of Henry Mackenzie, the club began publication of that famous Scottish periodical the Mirror. Nonetheless, Ramsay was correct in suggesting that the relationship between this group and Henry Dundas was always a close one. Although the Feast of Tabernacles left no account of its meetings or organization, there is a striking correspondence between the social and literary questions proposed by the young Dundas in the Belles Lettres Society and the themes developed nearly twenty years later by the Mirror Club. These included the relationship between virtue and poverty, the superiority of divinity over law as a social profession, and the significance
of the heart in literature. Thus, if it cannot be maintained that Dundas was the *sine qua non* of the *Feast of Tabernacles*, it can be shown that he shared their social preoccupations and cultural views. With Hugh Blair encouraging from the wings, Dundas gradually made his mark as a leading light in the *Belles Lettres Society* and, despite his lack of a firm financial foundation, was entrenched within the Scottish *republic of letters* prior to his involvement in politics. A poem in the *Caledonian Mercury* said of Dundas: "Tho' none so rich of Irna's swains, his greatest treasure is — his Mind." Lest those narrowly nationalistic Scottish historians who persist in regarding Dundas as little more than a political hack and a venal time server dispute this fact, they are referred to the *Proceedings of the Belles Lettres Society* in which Dundas's role and cultural views are well documented.

The connection between Dundas and the *Mirror Club* can be treated in an even more tangible way. Virtually every member of the group, which had now extended to include another former member of the *Belles Lettres Society*, Robert Cullen, and a number of corresponding members such as David Hume (advocate), David Dalrymple (Lord Hailes) and Alexander Fraser Tytler, received some sort of patronage from Dundas at one time or another. For their part, men like Mackenzie and Abercromby were staunch supporters of the Dundas regime in Scotland. Mackenzie, for example, lauded Dundas in his political essay *The Parliament of 1784*, wherein he eulogised "the laudable practice of the gentleman who presides at the Board of Control
Abercromby went so far in his approval of Dundas's reactionary measures in the aftermath of the French Revolution as to condemn his old friend Dugald Stewart for having been too kind to Condorcet in his writings.

But it was not primarily as political men, but as members of the Scottish republic of letters that the Mirror Club members regarded themselves. And within that same republic, the Mirror Club took upon themselves the mantle of the ancient Scottish bard whose function it was to stimulate the virtue of Scottish citizens and to criticize any vices which might begin to appear among them. Henry Mackenzie, for example, regarded himself as a moralist and wished his works to be judged primarily in ethical terms. Similarly, his analysis and criticism of other literary works was grounded in his moral concerns. He identified the tender melancholy in his own novels with the Joy of Grief that he found in Ossian. Moreover, he considered this literary concept as an antidote to modern indifference and as something quite distinct from romanticism. And his expressed aim, as he told his cousin Elizabeth Rose, was to touch memory and affection rather than mere argument or moral reasoning. The moral message of Mackenzie and the Mirror Club will be discussed in much greater detail hereafter. For now, it is sufficient merely to suggest that ethical concerns were central to Scottish republic of letters, be its members lawyers, divines, or heaven taught ploughmen.

In the distinctive tradition of the Edinburgh literati and
legal class, the Mirror Club also looked upon itself less as a group of professional practitioners than as the artistic and administrative representatives of Scottish landowners. For Mackenzie and many of his friends, the law was a boring and somewhat suspect activity which provided the economic foundation for their self-conscious role as moralists and men of letters. The essays in the Mirror and the Lounger were aimed specifically at the landed classes and even the most assiduous bourgeois-hunting scholar would be hard pressed to find any examples of self-conscious middle class role models. Henry Mackenzie and his colleagues believed that land, rather than trade, was the moral foundation of Scottish society and, while they appreciated the importance of commerce, it was the virtue of the established proprietors of land that they were interested in. Their essays were invariably a bardic combination of criticism and exhortation to virtue, which helps to explain their fascination with the role and poems of Ossian. Unlike the ancient Scottish bards, who encouraged a martial spirit, or their successors, the literati of the first half of the eighteenth century, who tended to emphasize the need for civility and economic improvement, the Mirror Club were obsessed with the negative effects of luxury and corruption. In no uncertain terms, they condemned those nabobs and contractors who they believed were subverting the natural and moral social order. What is more, they repeatedly pleaded with the nobility (Benevolus) and the gentry (Homespun) to retain the simpler and more virtuous manners of their
grandfathers and grandmothers. And, while they did not recommend a return to the more martial society of the past, they began to focus upon the supposed hospitality, courage, and affective virtue of an older and more stable moral community.

The Mirror and Lounger are given pride of place in this work as an index to the polite culture and practical moral discourse of the late eighteenth century in Scotland. This being the case, before moving to a fuller discussion of Henry Mackenzie and his literary circle, it will be in order to say a few words about the publication and circulation of these two periodicals. Although, as Mackenzie himself noted, the time and place were hardly propitious for the construction of literary periodicals along the lines of the Spectator, they did not sell at all badly. Bannatyne provides us with the rough figure of about four hundred copies of each publication. But that figure hardly represents the total circulation. Many of the subscriptions would have been group or club ones and the papers would also have been passed from hand to hand. Some residents of Edinburgh would undoubtedly have saved themselves the expense by walking down to William Creech's shop and perusing a copy there, as was described in the second number of the Mirror. Even more significant, many of the essays were printed in other Scottish periodicals, some directly on the heels of their initial printing. No less than twenty three essays and one poem were culled from the Mirror and the Lounger in the Caledonian Mercury and Scots Magazine and it would be very surprising indeed if other Scottish journals and papers
did not also borrow freely from these impressive Edinburgh products.

There can be no question about their immense popularity in bound form, however. As Horst Drescher clearly demonstrates in *Themen und Formen des Periodischen Essays im Spaten 18 Jahrhundert*, the volumes sold like hotcakes. The *Mirror* went through eleven editions prior to 1802 and the *Lounger* went through six editions prior to 1805. Unfortunately, it is difficult to discover exactly who read the papers. Since the bound volumes were very expensive, a person would need to have sufficient means to purchase them. With regard to the essays themselves, there exists no subscription list. It is possible to name only a few of the subscribers: James Beattie, William Strahan, Dugald Stewart, John Home, William Richardson, Hugh Blair and the Duchess of Gordon. All the internal evidence clearly indicates that the periodical was aimed at the literati and respectable landed society. At the same time, it is more than likely that such a polite journal, which went to great lengths to define the characteristics of true gentlemen and gentlewomen, would have considerable appeal among anxious nouveau and bourgeois elements in late eighteenth century Scottish society, who hardly constituted anything like a self-conscious class and who were only too eager to ape the manners of more refined society. In addition, those who were new to the blandishments of refinement could learn how to avoid the mistakes of families like the Flints, Mushrooms and Colonel Plums whose desire to become men of fashion was both pitied and
ridiculed by Mackenzie and his friends.

In his painstaking account of the contributors to the *Mirror* and *Lounger*, Horst Drescher divides his subject matter in terms of whether or not they were official members of the *Mirror Club*, corresponding members such as David Dalrymple and James Beattie, or what he terms ex-officio members such as the supportive publisher, William Creech. Although this division makes some sense, it can be misleading to the extent that it leads to a concentration upon the original membership and obscures the fact that some of the most frequent contributors were in fact corresponding members. In particular, Alexander Fraser Tytler, son of William Tytler, contributed four essays to the *Mirror* and seven essays to the *Lounger*. David Dalrymple, Lord Hailes, gave the first journal seven essays as well. Tytler's contributions were, therefore, more numerous than those of William McLeod Bannatyne and David Dalrymple's outnumbered those of Robert Cullen and George Home. What a descending list in terms of contributions to the two journals shows most clearly, however, is the commanding role played by Henry Mackenzie, who single-handedly accounted for nearly half of the essays in the two journals. It also demonstrates strong supporting roles from Alexander Abercromby and William Craig: 150

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<th>Profession</th>
<th>Mirrors</th>
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<tr>
<td>*Henry Mackenzie lawyer</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>111</td>
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<tr>
<td>*William Craig lawyer</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>36</td>
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<tr>
<td>*Alex. Abercromby lawyer</td>
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A.F. Tytler lawyer/historian 4 7 11
*W.M. Bannatyne lawyer 6 2 8
Wm. Richardson professor 6 1 7
David Dalrymple lawyer/historian 7 0 7
*Robert Cullen lawyer 3 3 6
*George Home lawyer 6 0 6
Cosmo Gordon M.P. 2 0 2
James Beattie professor 0 2 2
Robert Henry historian/divine 0 2 2
William Tytler historian 0 2 2
William Strahan publisher 1 deceased 1
*George Ogilvie lawyer 0 deceased 0
*William Gordon gent. farmer 0 deceased 0

Despite the fact that some of the Mirror Club members were not active in terms of published contributions, this should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the Mirror Club operated democratically. The papers were scrutinized by members at regular meetings and unsatisfactory productions were rejected. There is, for example, a manuscript copy of a rejected essay which Craig had proposed for publication in the Mirror in which, ironically, he tried to console many of Scotland's young literati who had not been able to place their essays in that refined journal. If nothing else, the essay suggests that the number of would-be contributors was fairly large. The democratic nature of the Mirror Club might also be questioned by Mackenzie's clear domination of the two journals. However, this fact can be partly explained by the increasing legal
duties of his friends. Abercromby, Craig, Cullen, and Bannatyne's involvement in legal cases increased dramatically after the publication of the first issue of the Mirror. Thus, it was only natural that their contributions should decrease, especially after they became Lords of the Court of Session.

Nonetheless, Mackenzie's contribution was simply enormous. Not only was he undoubtedly the driving force of the two periodicals, but it was primarily his moral message that was promulgated in their pages. The son of a celebrated Edinburgh physician, Mackenzie was educated at the Edinburgh High School and later attended Edinburgh University. In 1765, he went to London in order to acquire a working knowledge of the English Exchequer. Despite being advised to qualify for the English bar, Mackenzie had a Scotsman's love for his native Edinburgh and returned there to become a partner in a legal firm and, eventually, an attorney for the crown. His experiences in, and distaste for, London were significant influences on his first novel, The Man of Feeling, which became one of the best sellers of the century. In addition to a play entitled The Prince of Tunis, which was popular in Scotland, and some poetry, including The Pursuits of Happiness which glorified the gentry as personified by his friend William Gordon, Mackenzie also published two other novels, The Man of the World (1773) and Julia de Roubigné (1777), which will be discussed in considerable detail in a later chapter. It was as a novelist, in particular, that Mackenzie has commanded the attention of literary scholars and historians of Scottish culture. For this
reason, his work in the *Mirror and Lounger* had been regarded primarily as an appendage to his fame as a novelist. But Mackenzie himself seemed as proud of some of his work in the former, such as the tale of *La Roche*, as he was of parts of his major novels.

The best assessment of Mackenzie's contribution to eighteenth and nineteenth century literature, as well as his important role in the encouragement of Scottish letters, can be found in the pages of Harold William Thompson's *A Scottish Man of Feeling*.\(^{154}\) In addition, Thompson shows just how important Mackenzie's acceptance and propagandization of the new German proto-romantic writers such as Lessing were for their acceptance in Britain. It is because of this role that Henry Mackenzie came to interest German scholars who are concerned to delineate the transition between the literature of sensibility and that of romanticism.\(^{155}\) But there was much more to Mackenzie than this, and the literary focus has tended to obscure his role as a Scottish moralist who derived ethics from finely tuned social sentiments rather than encouraged a romantic reaction against reason. Even Thompson fell into the trap of regretting Mackenzie's artificial sentimentality and highlights only those elements than contributed to the romantic tradition -- a tradition that has had much power over the minds of educated Scotsmen. Thompson also overlooked Mackenzie's sharp criticism of the German romantics for their *metaphysical refinements of sentiment* and for their inability to *paint the nicer shades of feeling*, which inability he clearly regarded as
indicative of a backward culture, such as Shakespeare's England. At the same time, he undoubtably preferred such strong painting to the "flat insipid representation of restrained passions and chastened manners" that he found in some more characterically modern writing.

Despite all these literary successes, Mackenzie's legal abilities remained highly regarded in his native city, where he occasionally acted in important legal cases at the request of such people as Henry Dundas and Henry Erskine. Such was his reputation in legal circles that Lord Hailes sent him his work on ancient law and terminology for his criticisms in 1768. Since Hailes was the reader and critic of the works of Hugh Blair, Alexander Fraser Tytler and William Robertson, this solicitation of the young Mackenzie demonstrates the latter's increasing stature in the legal/literary culture of the city at a very early period. Mackenzie wrote back to say that the work was far too obscure and that he hoped Hailes would employ his considerable talents in something more useful, such as the modernization of Lord Stair's Noble Institutes. In another of his letters to Hailes, Mackenzie hit upon a theme that was of great significance to the two men when he condemned the evils of excessive luxury and especially its sudden influx in Scotland. Both men had a lot in common. They shared a mutual distaste for the overly deductive nature of Kames' work, as did another of their allies -- Alexander Fraser Tytler. They both respected Machiavelli and believed that his message had been misunderstood. The friendship between the older
and younger man became a strong one and helps to explain Hailes' generous contributions to the *Mirror*. For, unlike his young friends, Hailes had already established himself as an essayist in the *World* and did not have anything to prove on that score.  

The connection with Dalrymple was further strengthened by Mackenzie's relationship with another historian — Alexander Fraser Tytler — with whom he had been friends at the Edinburgh High School. Tytler was well known for his hero worship of the poet Alan Ramsay; he only regretted that Ramsay had made the mistake of condemning the union of Scotland with England. A highly moralistic writer, he believed that *sympathy* was one of the noblest principles of the human mind, objecting, however, to Adam Smith's treatment of the subject as too *hypothetical*. Like Mackenzie, he was fascinated by the plaintive nature of old Scottish ballads and the *Joy of Grief* in the poems of *Ossian*. Such *feeling* he believed could have a much greater effect upon virtue than *theoretic and metaphysical criticism*.

These beliefs had an important influence upon Tytler's attitude towards the historian's craft, which he, like his teacher Hugh Blair, believed should always provide decisions based upon *virtue and honour*. He sternly disapproved of those historians and philosophers who tended to lose sight of the moral question in their researches and analyses. Thus, he criticized Lord Kames *philosophical farming* as well as his metaphysics for its excessive reliance upon *ingenious thought*.
and plausible hypothesis.\textsuperscript{168} Such works, he maintained, overlooked the complexity of man's nature. In addition to being critical of overly deductive metaphysics and conjectural history, however, Tytler had precious little time for those antiquarians who were overly obsessed with the collection of minute details.\textsuperscript{169} He wanted to leave ample room for moral judgement in history.

Mackenzie and Tytler shared similar interests as well as backgrounds. Both were staunch admirers of Joseph Addison, and Tytler believed that the influence of the \textit{Spectator} upon Scottish thought and letters was particularly great.\textsuperscript{170} They shared a mutual fondness for music and were especially partial to the pathetic qualities of old Scottish ballads. Along with Mackenzie, Tytler was a supporter of the new German literary movement and even translated Schiller's \textit{The Robbers}.\textsuperscript{171} Anything but romantics, Tytler and Mackenzie were impressed with the natural feeling and sublimity of Lessing, something that they also discovered in the works of Alan Ramsay and the poems of \textit{Ossian}. The two men were sufficiently close that, in his later life, Mackenzie composed a poem about Woodhouselee entitled \textit{The Old Man}.\textsuperscript{172}

Tytler moved in the literary set surrounding Dugald Stewart, with whom Mackenzie also maintained close connections.\textsuperscript{172} Mackenzie's letters to Stewart indicate a firm relationship with that philosopher and biographer of Adam Smith. They occasionally worked together, as in their construction of a loyal address to the king on behalf of the
Edinburgh Town Council in 1807. None of this is surprising, since Stewart was also intimate with two of Mackenzie’s closest colleagues, William Craig and Alexander Abercromby.

Stewart’s wife has left to posterity her gentle chiding of Craig and Abercromby for spending “at least three evenings in the week in our house” in 1794. Mackenzie’s stature was high in another, and older, philosophic circle as well. When his close friend John Logan wanted Adam Smith’s patronage for his new play Runnemade, it was Henry Mackenzie who acted as go-between. Moreover, Mackenzie was sufficiently familiar with Smith to send the philosopher two alternate opening essays for the Mirror and to allow him to chose the one which he thought was best. This fact lends further support to the suspicion that the title of the journal itself derived from Smith’s use of the concept of the social mirror in The Theory of Moral Sentiments.

Politics played a role in the creation of the various literary sets and circles in late eighteenth century Edinburgh. But it did not define them. Bannatyne and Cullen were involved in the electoral reform movement in the Scottish counties in the 1780s and 1790s. This made them opponents of Henry Dundas in terms of British politics. Still, Cullen and Mackenzie maintained a cordial relationship and had a mutual friend in the form of Sir Robert Liston, who was the private tutor to the sons of the Earl of Minto and future ambassador to Spain. Bannatyne was chummy with William Craig and extremely proud of his connection with the Mirror Club, despite its long term
relationship with Dundas. Both of these whigs came together with Craig, Woodhouselee and Mackenzie for a dinner in honour of Henry Dundas in 1802, in the aftermath of his impeachment and acquittal in connection with his mishandling of East India Company funds. When Woodhouselee let slip a mild criticism of Cullen, it was not so much for his politics but for his intimate association with Lord Kames. Mackenzie's connection with the Pitt-Dundas alliance, which was engineered by his cousin George Rose, earned him the avowed enmity of Charles Fox. Mackenzie's private feelings for Fox were likely similar, since he referred to that filthy Fox in his private notes. However, in his writing for more public consumption (i.e. the rough draft of Anecdotes and Egotisms) Mackenzie professed a kindly sort of attachment to the English politician. This was consistent with the significance that he attached to the concept of a republic of letters which should avoid political squabbles in its moral and literary function.

Although his support for Pitt and Dundas put him on the other side of the political fence from his friend William McLeod Bannatyne, they managed to retain their intimacy. These two men were the real force behind the very important Highland Society. The December 8th, 1784 meeting of the Society included William Creech, George Dempster, Henry Dundas, Adam Ferguson, Alexander Fraster Tytler, Mackenzie and Bannatyne. When the Society received its charter in 1787, it had two hundred members. In spite of its illustrious and ever
expanding membership, much of the day to day work was left to Bannatyne and Mackenzie. By 1794, with the Duke of Argyle sitting as president, Mackenzie and Bannatyne had become the two extraordinary directors. In the following year, Mackenzie acted as the convener of sub committees relative to bringing to the view of government certain alterations in the Salt Laws and procuring a proper selection of books for the Society. The duty on salt was a real problem for the highland economy, since it made the salting of beef impossible. In 1797, Mackenzie spoke to the Society on obtaining relief from the servitude of Thirlage or the old feudal obligations in highland society: he obtained the Society's support and rapidly framed a bill for its abolition. These efforts would also obtain for him the praise of the Perthshire county freeholders.

In the following year, Mackenzie, with Bannatyne's help, began the tricky and diplomatic job of looking into the authenticity of the much admired Poems of Ossian for the Society. Here, he was able to make full use of his contacts with Hugh Blair and Sir John Sinclair in order to gather as much information as possible. At the same time, Mackenzie encouraged the Society to support subscriptions for the war with France. In the years that followed, Mackenzie and Henry Dundas urged the Society on in its efforts to prevent Highland Immigration and to improve the Highland economy. Mackenzie also became heavily involved in the pet project of the Society to establish self-sufficient fishing villages in the Highland
counties. He led a committee looking into the state of the herring fishery and another assessing the comparative quality of Scottish and English barley. He also spoke on the need to apply for a new charter that could "embrace more general objects and more effectually encourage agriculture and other improvements all over Scotland." And his work on the poems of Ossian and on behalf of the Scottish fisheries won him the praise of the Scottish press.

Mackenzie worked well with Bannatyne in the Highland Society, but his closest relationships were with two other Mirror Club members. Next to Mackenzie himself, William Craig and Alexander Abercromby were the most significant contributors to the Mirror and Lounger. Alexander Abercromby was admitted as a member of the Faculty of Advocates in 1766 and received the appointment of sheriff-deputy of Clackmannanshire shortly thereafter. While in this position he attempted to have the duties on distilleries lowered in order to help reduce that persistent fact of Scottish life -- smuggling. He was a sensitive individual, with an acute sense of honour, as Henry Mackenzie pointed out in his essay/obituary on him for the Royal Society of Edinburgh. Like the others in the Mirror Club, letters were his first love and law a necessary evil. It was only with considerable difficulty that his friend Dundas could prevail upon him to accept his appointment to the Court of Session. In this position, however, he was to play a key role in the sedition trials of the 1790s. His natural sensitivity notwithstanding, his judgements were anything but
lenient. And when asked the pertinent question why statements that might have been construed as patriotic a mere few years before were now regarded as treasonous, Abercromby did not bat his enlightened Scottish moralist’s eyes, replying that, as the manners of a people changed, so too must its laws and legal judgments. Indeed, as we have seen, even his good friend, Dugald Stewart, did not escape Abercromby’s wrath when he did not alter his analysis of Condorcet with the hindsight that followed the revolution in France.

William Craig acted as the mediator in the dispute between Stewart and Abercromby — a dispute that was symptomatic of increasing political rifts in literary rank. In one of his letters to Stewart outlining Abercromby’s objections to the abstract theories of the French philosophes, Craig cited his friend’s conviction that “the safety and happiness of every individual in his little domestic circle necessarily depends.” On the Mirror Club’s attitude towards this little domestic circle much more will be said hereafter. For now, Abercromby’s extreme reaction is interesting as an example of the increasing politicization of the Scottish republic of letters in the years following the outbreak of the French Revolution. This fossilization along English political lines, and the gradual decline of the bardic tradition of Scottish moralizing, greatly upset Henry Mackenzie who viewed the literary elite of Scotland as a central and necessary force in the creation of a modern but moral Scottish community. He believed that such gentlemen should remain above the political
squabbles of the day while in their role as men of letters. One such model was William Craig.

Craig was admitted to the Scottish bar in 1768. His rise to success was slow because of his greater interest in literary than in legal pursuits. Fortunately for him, Dundas' patronage obtained him a judgeship, and here he acquitted himself well by all accounts. Craig had been the prime mover of the Mirror Club and it was also his idea to publish the Mirror. One of Adam Smith's favorite students, there is much from Smith's The Theory of Moral Sentiments in Craig's contributions to both periodicals. Indeed, Craig may have even taken the name of the first journal from Smith's description of public opinion as a mirror in his famous work. In addition to his connection with Smith, Craig was also an intimate of Dugald Stewart and there is evidence in the form of a dinner invitation that he occasionally reciprocated Mrs. Stewart's gracious hospitality.

Together, Craig, Abercromby and Mackenzie accounted for one hundred or approximately seventy per cent of the essays in the Mirror and Lounger. In addition, this youthful literary elite presented a remarkably similar moral programme to the higher ranks of Edinburgh and Scottish society. But it should be remembered that these men were taught and patronized by older elements in Edinburgh literary and philosophical society. Blair was a subscriber and supporter of the Mirror Club as well as the teacher of many of its members. Adam Smith was asked to choose between alternative versions of the first essay to be
published in the periodical. Lord Hailes contributed several essays. James Beattie deemed the publication worthy of two of his own moralistic, albeit idiosyncratic, papers. The well-known historian, William Tytler, also contributed an essay on female loungers. But the linchpin of this old and new literary coalition, of course, was Henry Mackenzie, whose reputation in Scottish literary circles was established even before the publication of his work *The Man of Feeling* in 1771.

It is important to appreciate the range of Mackenzie's efforts in Edinburgh society at this time. His patronage of Robert Burns and other poets, his literary alliance with his admirer Sir Walter Scott, and his promotion of German letters in Edinburgh's Royal Society (to which virtually all of the *Mirror Club* belonged), only provide a very partial picture of Mackenzie's responsibilities, contacts, and stature within the Edinburgh community during these decades. Once one appreciates the breadth of these commitments, as well as his overriding concern to help smooth the process towards a more civilized and economically viable community, one will hopefully not underestimate his contemporary significance and, especially, his specifically Scottish aims and attitudes. One will not, for example, as so many literary scholars have done, take his work as a novelist and essayist completely out of its Scottish milieu. For, just as his activities in the Highland Society reflected his belief in considered progress in polite and economic terms, so too his work as an essayist and novelist represented an attempt to provide a new ethical framework or
frame of mind that would qualify the individual for moral action in a new world that was not necessarily as supportive of civic virtue and personal integrity as the older and more integrated community had been.

Conclusion

In the pages that follow, I hope to show that the attempt to provide a new ethical temperament for moral action in a rapidly changing society was something that went to the very heart of cultural discourse in late eighteenth century Scotland. It not only helps to explain the revival of the literary form of Joseph Addison's *Spectator* in that country, but it also allows for a new appreciation of the dramatic changes in and revitalization of the Scottish sermon as a form of secular moral propaganda. But moral discourse did not stop there. It literally filled the pages of newspapers such as the *Caledonian Mercury* and the prestigious *Scots Magazine*. It constituted the other side of the coin of improvement, as educated Scotsmen were eagerly and anxiously exploring available and novel modes of discourse in order to arrive at new solutions to ethical action within a commercial environment.

These new solutions shunned dogma and casuistry. They advocated the adoption of specific temperaments and frames of mind -- based upon the sympathetic emotions and the cultivation of a tender melancholy-- that were flexible rather than strict.
and rigid rules for behavior. Such temperaments, reflective of the distinction between a mechanical and organic society, needed to be carefully nurtured in the growing moral being, particularly in those men and women of rank whose example and behaviour were critical to national virtue. While this cultivation implied an acceptance of and accommodation to the modern commercial environment, it certainly did not represent an unqualified acceptance of all its characteristics and socio-moral features. As was the case with Emile Durkheim a century later, the Scottish literati were concerned about the preservation of the moral community in an increasingly individualized social world, wherein monetary gain, personal satisfaction and the division of labour could all too easily become ends unto themselves. Accepting and supportive of improvement, if carried out by those whose manners were social and humane, they did not want that improvement to become a substitute for communal integrity and ethics.
I intend to examine some general systems, both ancient and modern...before I proceed to a more particular enquiry...This will not, perhaps, in the end, be found foreign to our present purpose. (David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, bk. 1, pt. iv, sec. 11)

This chapter argues that at least three distinctive modes of discourse entered into the discussion of morality in late eighteenth century Scotland. These were: civic humanism, Stoicism and sensibility. More accurately described as conceptual networks than as paradigms, they were not mutually exclusive and were constantly interconnected with one another. Civic humanism warned against the threat to autonomous moral behaviour in a luxurious and excessively refined commercial state. In addition, it defined the public spirit which was believed to be central to communal integrity and strength. Stoicism was that theory of a harmonious universe which allowed the individual to retain his morality in the face of a seemingly iniquitous physical and social environment. For the Stoics, self-composure was the key to ethical behaviour. Most Scottish moralists, however, believed that neither of these ancient moral vocabularies reflected the significant insights into human behaviour derived from an analysis of sentiment and sensibility. The achievement of the moderns was their understanding of the way in which the humane emotions
stimulated virtuous interaction among the members of a given community. These insights needed to amplify the cruder but fundamental distinction of virtue and vice in the work of the Stoics and the civic humanists.

Unfortunately, the language and literature of sensibility of the eighteenth century has been treated in a very cavalier fashion. The social historian, Lawrence Stone, equates sensibility with affective individualism, and tends to run together this same set of emotions with eroticism and romantic love.¹ The cultural counterpart to Stone’s thesis, Jean Hagstrum’s Sex and Sensibility, defines sensibility as a complex union of physical and spiritual emotion — “a fusion of emotion and idea”. The idea, however, plays a remarkably minor role and Henry Mackenzie is virtually struck off the list of sentimental authors because he lacks that psychological piquancy and zest which supposedly characterized the literary and philosophical genre.² Both of these authors overlook one of the most important discussions of sensibility — that of Adam Smith in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Moreover, their obsession with the specifically sexual characteristics of sensibility begs rather than informs the proper historical question. If Michel Foucault is correct and sexuality an essentially negative agency of power and control, historians should beware of judging eighteenth century cultural artifacts by such a dubious standard.³

The pages that follow will argue that it was sociability rather than individualism that was the critical ingredient in
the Scottish definition of *sensibility*. This sociability was far more extensive than mere sexual emotion. Although it recognized the importance of adolescence and sexual attraction, it examined these with specific reference to man’s nature as a social being and his desire to be *lovable* as well as *loved*.

In his emphasis upon complacency or sociability, Henry Mackenzie was a typically Scottish writer. Like Adam Smith, he believed that morality was contingent upon social interaction in a community. Smith’s own intellectual contribution to the eighteenth century discussion of *sentiment* and *sensibility* needs to be taken into account if the intellectual context of the Scottish discussion of man’s moral nature and the defining characteristics of virtuous behaviour are to be properly understood. For what Smith attempted in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* was nothing less that a total redefinition of virtue, one which incorporated the discourse of the ancient Stoics within a much more modern and prudential characterization of moral behaviour. It will be argued that, while practical Scottish moralists tended to reject Smith’s conclusions about the precise nature of the moral man, they borrowed freely from his discussion of *sympathy* and its role as the primary ingredient of morality.

**Civic Humanism**

For many Scotsmen, as for their English counterparts, the language of civic humanism reflected a deep concern that man’s
appetites would result in a loss of personal autonomy during a commercial reign of corruption and fantasy. In his masterly work *The Machiavellian Moment*, John Pocock has demonstrated the significance of concepts derived from the tradition of civic humanism to a proper understanding of the political debates and general mentalité of eighteenth century Britain. Not only has he shown how this paradigm illuminates such concerns as the relationship between land and commerce, attitudes towards the spread of paper currency and credit, and conceptions of military valour and a standing army, but he has also demonstrated the close connection between the civic humanist mode of discourse and the Englishman's attitude towards the ancient constitution. Civic humananism played an equally important role in the Scottish discussion of virtue and citizenship, although it was not very closely married to the notion of an ancient constitution. Scottish civic humanist discourse was, instead, related to the concept of manners, particularly the manners of the ancient and landed families in that country. These manners, which circumscribed and protected national virtue, needed to be preserved uncorrupted if the nation was to be able to maintain its integrity and independence.

In the eyes of many eighteenth century Scots, the English nation was already headed down the slippery slope of moral extinction. In an extract from the *North Briton Extraordinary*, a pamphlet published in Edinburgh in 1765, the author pointed to the extent of corruption and crime in London, the faction in
England which denied the Scots a militia and ensured the demise of Lord Bute, and the complete absence of valour in Scotland's southern neighbour. But such authors were well aware of the importance of commerce and improvement to national vitality and strength. Thus, while they deplored the luxury and vanity of both the English and the French, they also called upon their fellow countrymen to imitate their efforts in manufacturing. Vain ostentation, in particular, gave observant Scotsmen cause for concern. Its emergence in their own country must be carefully scrutinized. As for luxury, Altamont was but one of a legion of moralising Scots who condemned Londoners in 1767 as a group who "spend one half of their time in contriving wants, and the other in supplying them." He found it ludicrous that they even had people employed to clean their teeth, comb their hair, and cut their nails.

Such criticisms were sustained long after the Bute affair was buried or after the various heats of the militia question died down. Indeed, these civic humanist concepts remained a discursive constant throughout the late eighteenth century. Rarely, however, did they take quite as strong a form as that presented to the Caledonian Mercury by North Briton in 1778:

You, ye once a nation -- you, ye unregenerated race -- it is a negative good fortune to you, that the imbecility of your language labours in vain, it trembles under the weight of your own incapability to express either the superlative profligacy of your character, or the fable colour of your fate.

The luxury, which was the ruin of the ancient empires, originated from the accumulation of wealth, the produce of kingdoms which they had subdued. -- You, by some infatuation or for some internal cause, are the
singular instance of a nation suffering itself to sink under the feeble force of felons whom you had outlawed... Prodigal of the gaudy gliter of your gaiety, in the profuse expenses of your equipages, of your table, and your dress; you exhibit more than the ancient conquerors of the globe -- but you are incapable to support the dignity of the British empire.  

But, even in more cool and detached analyses, the progress of the American war was attributed to excessive refinement and luxury and the concomitant effeminacy and dependence which this produced. The Caledonian Mercury gave pride of place to a long letter from An Old Fellow and an Englishman, complaining that Britain's military failure was "owing to the loss of our ancient manners. Virtue is always connected with plainness and simplicity; effeminacy always with luxurious refinement. Our ancestors were men; we are, alas!, we are ______ very despicable."  

Similar feelings were also expressed in a long line of letters and poems to the papers and periodicals on the conduct of the English general Howe who, it was argued, had been personally "debilitated by luxury and dissipation."  

These civic humanist attacks upon the English exhibited fear as well as chauvinism. The danger was that corruption would spread to their northern neighbour as Sister Peg 'became more rich and refined. As M pointed out in his praise of some poems by William Cameron, a student of James Beattie, the disease of luxury was highly contagious and every effort needed to be made in order to prevent its spread:

Throughout the whole of them, a spirit of poetry and virtue is perceptible. Frugality is recommended; rural quiet and contentment extolled; and innocence duly celebrated; Luxury, the prevailing fault of the age, and
selfishness, the perpetual attendant of luxury are severely chastised; Pride, insolence, and inhumanity, are mentioned with just abhorrence; the great end of poetry is constantly kept in view.\textsuperscript{13}

Literary instruction and entertainment went hand in hand with didactic complaints about the decline in public spirit and active citizenship among the leading inhabitants of Scotland.\textsuperscript{13}\textsuperscript{13} ANTI-JUNIUS, for example, deplored the lack of public spirit in Scotland since the union; he attacked those great families who took their rents and revenues south; and he praised patriotic writers such as David Loch, who encouraged the woollen manufacture while condemning the modern traits of bribery, perjury, and venality.\textsuperscript{14} Nor can this be dismissed as the ramblings of some old fashioned warrior patriot. For the same author also opposed the creation of a militia on the grounds that it drained labourers from agricultural improvement and the new manufacturies.

In yet another letter to the Caledonian Mercury, ANTI-JUNIUS addressed his remarks to the "Great Men, and the Nobility" of Scotland, whose manners he believed were rapidly becoming altered by wealth.\textsuperscript{15} VOX POPULI also spoke directly to the landed interest and deplored their recent lack of public spirit. In a highly characteristic letter, he wrote:

What is now become of our Douglases, of our Hamiltons, and of our Gordons, those steady, firm, and resolute ancestors of their country's independency of old? Have their descendents degenerated, or have they taken their sight to foreign climes?...Our situation puts me in mind of a mortal man. When he is young, he is brisk and active, his blood boils hot at the smallest indignity; when he arrives at maturity, he still retains his wonted vigour, and will not
patiently pocket an affront; but in a short while, his strength fails him; the candle of life burns low in its socket, and his blood runs cool in his veins; he gradually declines; and, at last the whole fabric tumbles down and is no more.  

The very lack of public spirit in modern Scotland, he concluded, was a sign that the nation was approaching its grand climacteric and in a very short period of time the Scots would be deprived of our existence as a nation. The only thing that could prevent this eventuality, this and other writers suggested, was if the leaders of landed society would resume their role as protectors and supporters of the national character and moral community. "Vice sends out its springs in the great," wrote MONITOR, and "as they descend to the inferior orders of men, gather into a strong torrent, that by its violence, threatens to break down every fence raised for the safety and prosperity of society."  

The various debates relating the role and function of landed society -- entails, the independence of the peerage, a Scottish militia, and even the preservation of game -- were all discussions allowing for civic humanist analysis and concepts. An appreciation of the civic humanist mode of discourse also illuminates the intensive debate over banking and the abuse of fictitious votes among the landed gentlemen of Scotland and their moral advisors. Even more interesting, perhaps, is the way in which the discussion of improvement during the early 1760s reflected the fears of many educated Scots with regard to the effects of a rapid rise in landed wealth. A letter to the Scots Magazine in June of 1764 advocated economic improvement
through an increase in the size of farms. Its author correctly suggested that large farms allowed for that rationalization of resources which could lead to increased agricultural production. In addition, he pointed out that any excess population which was thrown off the land could go into the newly developing manufactories, thus benefiting both agriculture and commerce. This optimistic analysis of the symbiosis of agriculture and commerce was not without some negative aspects, however. The author was concerned about a supposed recent decline in population which he believed had stemmed from the luxury which had now descended to the lowest class. The luxury of the present age also mitigated against marriage in all stations and had a detrimental effect upon population in general. But this same development, he argued, was a general social phenomenon and should not be blamed specifically upon large farms.

A reply to this hotly discussed letter attacked both its author and David Hume, who was considered to be one of the champions of improvement. H.L. attacked Hume for refusing to accept that ancient societies were more heavily populated than modern ones. And he condemned the author of the letter for assuming that large farms did not make a major contribution to the spread of luxury in the nation. Advocating small over larger farms, he condemned his opponents in the following fashion:

Our author warns the class of men for whom he writes, against luxury, and its concomitant vices. But to plead for large farms, and to restrain the possessors of them from imitating
the fashions of their superiors, is as hopeful a project as that of the honest Irishman in the play, who opened the windows, and at the same time attempted to shut out the light.

Thus, economic improvement was dangerous whenever it could be shown to contribute to an increase in luxury among the rich or to the upward mobility and increase of artificial values among those of a lesser rank.

If large farms were to be maintained, many believed that it was best that they remain in the hands of the ancient nobility, whose traditional paternalism could offer some social compensation in return for wealth. The problem here was that it was difficult to obtain the credit that was needed for economic improvement if the land was locked up from one generation to another. Thus began that fascinating discussion of the pros and cons, and general nature, of the reform of the Scottish law of entails, which cannot be properly appreciated without reference to the vocabulary of civic humanism. For example, John Dalrymple argued that the Scottish nobility had already succumbed to the corruption that followed in the train of luxury and would end up alienating all of their land if it was not entailed. As corrupt as some members of the landed aristocracy had become, however, it was still in the national interest that they maintain their position in the social hierarchy. Commerce, while a blessing for the Scottish nation, would become a disintegrating influence if individuals would easily use their money to purchase land; for the history of the ancient states showed that "trade thrives most where there is least land belonging to a trading people." The assumptive
principle of Dalrymple's analysis was that the *sinking of ancient families* was tantamount to the destruction of national virtue. Ancient families, rather than any constitutional arrangements, were the protection of the nation's liberties and the bulwark against both tyranny and invasion. Were entails in Scotland to be destroyed, "the country would be crowded with men of 200 l. or 300 l. a year fortune. Our own luxury, and the contagious imitation of English luxury, would soon bring on an equality of fortunes with a vengeance."

Not everyone agreed with Dalrymple's arguments, although they did receive a great deal of publicity and support in the press. The Faculty of Advocates, for example, considered some sort of reform absolutely necessary if Scotland were to make an agricultural advance into the modern age. But what was interesting about the debate in general was its analysis in terms of luxury and corruption, trade and land, dependence and independence and all the other key concepts of eighteenth century civic humanist discourse. Dalrymple's opponents made use of the same civic humanist language, criticising the old landed families for their luxury and dissipation and pointing out that the more virtuous ancients had no need of *entails* in order to preserve their independent manners. The Kincardine freeholders declaimed against entails, for example, because they mitigated against the valour, learning and industry of the *gentry* who, in their eyes, were the true preservers of national virtue and independence as opposed to those *overgrown potentates* whose land was locked up and who did not pay their
Like the debates about fictitious votes, credit and banking or the preservation of game, therefore, the discourse centering around improvement and entails cannot be properly understood unless the fears and convictions of Scots about the moral effects of wealth are taken into account. Tied to a mercantilist approach to commerce and population in the decades prior to the publication of Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations* (1776), the eighteenth century Scots viewed national strength primarily in terms of numbers rather than the extent of the division of labour. For this reason, they were especially concerned lest the increasing luxury and rapacity of Scottish landlords should contribute to the perceived decline in population. A poem by AGRICOLA for the *Scots Magazine* of 1772, for example, began by condemning Scottish banking practice and pointing to the recent spate of bankruptcies. It ended with a characteristic warning against the effect of luxury upon immigration:

Cease, Avarice, then, cease, Luxury your spoil
Nor thus exaust our isle,
And urge your country's doom

Landlords, both in the highlands and lowlands, were urged to be more humane to their tenants and not to lose sight of human factors in their eagerness to improve their estates. Each and every shortage in provisions initiated a flood of letters and essays to the newspapers and journals, blaming the condition of the poor and their immigration abroad, upon not only "the failure of crops, monopolizing, withholding from market,
forestalling, regrating, &c; but luxurious living, the grand and principal cause, it is in the power of innumerable members of society to suppress."

Large landlords were encouraged to stem their use of luxury items. Hospitality and justice in the countryside were extolled, together with the nobility's traditional role of serving the country in times of war.

An addiction to pleasure leads to the degeneracy of a people, maintained the author of the aptly titled Reflections on the too prevailing Spirit of Dissipation and Gallantry: showing its dreadful Consequences to Public Freedom. If one looked at the alternating periods of liberty and slavery in the chronicles of nations, one discovered that the periods of public spirit and freedom were marked by a moderate indulgence in pleasure. But both Greece and Rome were examples of what could happen when empires became established and pleasure or selfishness became a ruling principle:

Till the introduction of those Asiatic modes of gaiety and pleasure, which historians so bitterly complain of, and unanimously represent as the prime cause of the corruption and ruin, we find that they were content with the relaxations of a simple kind: easily procured; of no excessive cost; and yet, many of them far from devoid of elegance. But when these foreign luxuries had been once imported, they soon put an end to that simplicity and gravity of the disposition for which they had been so long renowned; and were follow'd by a perversion of morals that speedily infected the whole commonwealth, and threw their liberties into the hands of all who could prove daringness enough to invade them.

This too would soon be the fate of Britain if luxury were not controlled. Against all those who argued à la Mandeville that luxury was beneficial to trade and commerce, this author
 countered that the profit of a few individuals always had to be weighed against the odious consequences to manners and morals if these same fatal pleasures were further encouraged.

The civic humanist concern lest the importation of luxurious and dependent manners should destroy the nation helps to explain the often vicious attacks which the Scottish literati perpetrated on those nabobs who made their fortunes in the east and returned to introduce new luxuries or to purchase land in their native country. Not only were the qualified Nimrods criticised for fleeing their drafty ancestral mansions in order to live in the warm cities, but the nabobs, with very few exceptions, were caricatured as a moral disease in the social body. In a popular poem appropriately titled Rigour and Desolation a Scottish author contrasted those ancient domes in which some worthy Lord, or Knight, or Squire had helped the poor and entertained the stranger with the situation which now obtained:

A tyrant Nabob now has bought them all,
Far distant spends their rents, and lets them fall.

Mr. Mirror and Mr. Lounger were ever contemptuous of the nabobs and contractors who they believed were taking over the social life of the capital and exporting their degenerate manners into the Scottish countryside. In their opinion such individuals were social performers or figure makers. These figure makers were the creatures of luxury; they could never utilize their wealth in simple elegance; the best that they could do was to display it:
It is impossible to enumerate the pranks which the sudden acquisition of riches, joined to this desire of Figure-making, sets people a-playing. There is nothing so absurd or extravagant, which riches, in the hand of a weak man, will not tempt him to commit from the mere idea of enjoying his money in the way of exhibition.  

A typical example was the Mushroom family. Having acquired wealth overnight, Mr. Mushroom's brother attempted to set himself up as both an improver and a member of parliament. The fact that he had no knowledge of either politics or agriculture did not deter him from attempting to adopt the figure of a public spirited man. As for Mr. and Mrs. Mushroom themselves, they adorned their bodies in garish and uncomfortable clothing in order to adopt the figure of men of fashion. And like so many of the new arrivals in Edinburgh, they brought in private teachers to give their simple minded daughters lessons in dancing, music and French. The Mushrooms are but one example; the essays In the Mirror and Lounger are crammed with descriptions of that species of animal which had descended upon Edinburgh and whose desperation to acquire a figure had so disrupted Scottish society.

The nabobs would have been laughable had they merely remained private individuals with no influence upon the national community. But these men were setting a contagious example in establishing new habits and desires. In a civic humanist attack upon the Colonel Plums in Scottish society, Henry Mackenzie warned of the dangers which a commercial nation faced from the acquisition of an empire. Not only were commercial men demonstrably not fit to play the role of
conquerors and sovereigns, he maintained, but they returned to their native land with a sordid lust for gain which resulted in precisely the same national corruption that had plagued Rome. Through the mouthpiece of the character Umphraville, Mackenzie warned Scotsmen of the effects of an uncontrolled commercial empire:

In the lower ranks, the desire of gain, as it is the source of industry, may be held equally conducive to private happiness and public prosperity; but those who, by birth or education, are destined for nobler pursuits, should be actuated by more generous passions. If from luxury and the love of vain expense, they shall also give way to this desire of wealth; if it shall extinguish the sentiments of public virtue, and the passion for true glory, natural to that order of the state; the spring of private and national honour must have lost its force, and there will remain nothing to withstand the general corruption of manners, and the public disorder and debility which are its inseparable attendants. If our country has not already reached this point of degeneracy, she seems, at least, as far as a spectator of her manners can judge, to be too fast approaching it.

Unless one understands just how seriously the members of the Mirror Club regarded this degeneration as a real possibility, one will never appreciate the significance which they attached to those safeguards -- such as a virtuous education -- which could help to prevent the day of reckoning.

The Mirror Club's debt to the tradition of civic humanist discourse has been discussed elsewhere; therefore, there is little need to dwell upon it here. However, it is interesting to note that the civic humanist concerns which were embodied in the the Mirror and the Lounger also informed Henry Mackenzie's novels and unpublished writings. In the draft of a
political tract on the Spanish campaigns of the early nineteenth century, for example, Mackenzie blamed the repeated failures of the British army upon their inability to bear fatigue. This, in turn, he attributed to the recent increase of luxury within the nation. "Unless something is done to counteract the natural effect of wealth and civilization upon our habits," he wrote, such military disasters were predictable. In addition to these comments, there exists a lengthy essay entitled *The Political and Social Conditions of the Republics of Medieval Italy, as Compared with those of Greece*, in which Mackenzie asserted that the history of those two nations related in important ways to present day events and that a comparative study proved that commerce needed to be controlled by land and agriculture if national degeneracy was to be avoided. The decline of Italy, he argued, stemmed from the fact that the "old noble agricultural population had been gradually exterminated in consequence of the increasing corruption of the later empire." Mackenzie's analysis is particularly revealing in so far as it evidences an appreciation of the political knowledge and insights of Machiavelli, whose specific influence is rarely acknowledged by eighteenth century writers.

Civic humanist discourse was also common currency among the Moderate clergy of the Church of Scotland. John Pocock has already illuminated Adam Ferguson's use of this tradition in *The Machiavellian Moment*. Indeed, in *The History of the Progress and Termination of the Roman Republic* we discover a
former clergyman who adopted concepts central to civic humanism in a typically Scottish way. Ferguson was particularly interested in depicting that period of transition between a pristine but somewhat crude republic and the total decline of national character that was the product of an aging empire. This was the very position in which late eighteenth-century Scots perceived themselves to be. While Ferguson and his fellow Scots studiously avoided the revolutionary implications of the American colonists as well as the austere primitivism of Rousseau, they warned of the sharp decline in national character when wealth and dominion totally replaced genius, magnanimity and national spirit. What is most interesting about Ferguson's argument, however, is that it extended far beyond academic circles. Both the Scots Magazine and the Caledonian Mercury printed lengthy excerpts. The editor of the Scots Magazine particularly recommended the book to his readers and was probably representative in his perception of the author's moral intent:

This we consider as one of the great excellences of the work, that it fills the mind with high ideas of heroic virtue, and with the admiration of that energy of mind and greatness of character, of which the annals of modern ages afford so few examples.

The editor went on to praise the work, not so much in terms of its historical accuracy or intellectual brilliance, but as an "antidote to that degrading and systematic selfishness which has obtained such authority over the councils and conduct of statesmen and politicians." The correct response to systematic selfishness was not intellectual hypothesis but moral
exhortation.

In his lectures on Asia, there is no doubt that John Logan too was concerned to warn his fellow countrymen against the pernicious influence of Asiatic manners on the inhabitants of Great Britain. Once manly exertion had been curtailed and the proper objects of distinction challenged, he argued, pomp, pleasure, luxury and effeminacy became the universal pursuit. Similarly, in his lectures on the philosophy of history, Logan like Ferguson, charted the decline in the ancient Roman character. A formerly "severe people began to adopt the vices of the vanquished" and to develop a taste for luxury. "As frequently has happened in history," he suggested, "Asia corrupted Europe." In a language that every educated Scotsman was familiar with, Logan pointed to the signs of an empire in decay: great riches contrasting with massive poverty, private opulence and public wretchedness, foreign splendour and domestic misery, heroic virtue and internal disorder.

For some reason, the civic humanist mode of discourse did not play as critical a role in Moderate sermons as one might have suspected from the foregoing example. In general, the sermons of Moderate preachers were concerned to inculcate a more private kind of morality that had its basis in Stoicism rather than civic humanism. If we look at the sermons of John Logan, for example, it is only occasionally that we meet with passages that have a close connection with civic humanism. In a sermon on the rule of morality, Logan pointed out that manners and morals, rather than laws, were the true foundation
of society and the only genuine source of public prosperity. Practice and experience, he added, confirmed the truth inherent in such speculation. If one looked properly at history, one discovered that nations rose to greatness through their virtue; empires were obtained and controlled through temperance and probity of manners and a serious regard for religion. Once a people became dissolute, corrupted and profane, they became slaves to their neighbours. "Public depravity paves the way for public ruin," wrote Logan:

When the health and vigour of the political constitution is broken, it is hastening to its decline. When internal symptoms of weakness appear, the least external violence will accomplish its dissolution.

While it might be argued that the vocabulary of this sermon owes something to the equally traditional discourse of the Presbyterian jeremiad, this and other Moderate sermons were clearly composed in historical as opposed to religious time. The sermons of preachers like Hugh Blair and John Logan were more concerned with the relationship between the present and the past than in any religious calendar leading to the day of atonement. Moreover, any conception of a special relationship between God and the Scottish nation was pushed far into the analytical background while these preachers contemplated the development of civilizations from their rude beginnings to a more refined present. The historicity of the civic humanist tradition was retained and expanded upon. Thus, Hugh Blair could refer to the Book of Genesis as a description of "human manners in their primitive simplicity, before the
arts of refinement had polished the behaviour, or disguised the characters of men."\textsuperscript{46} Even the act of creation itself was deduced by pushing historical analysis backwards in time rather than relying upon the authority of revelation alone.\textsuperscript{47}

Those sermons dealing with the decline of nations were typically preached upon such subjects as the American war or hostilities with France and tended to bring out the clergymen's more public morality. In Logan's sermon on the American war, for example, not only did his attack upon the Americans utilize the civic humanist mode of discourse, but he actively campaigned from the pulpit for a Scottish militia. In the discourse of civic humanism proper, the concept of a militia was central because such a body reflected the independence and valour of the nation's citizens. Not surprisingly, therefore, those scholars interested in the significance of civic humanist discourse in Scotland have tended to highlight the militia debate. Like many Scotsmen, Logan was never overly concerned about the dangers inherent in a standing army, and he did not view a Scottish militia as a substitute for a trained force of fighting men. But he did believe that arms should also be placed in the hands of citizens and that each entitled member of the community should become a soldier in turn. "When such a system of military arrangements takes place," he claimed, "the prosperity of a state becomes independent of single men, there is a wisdom which never dies, and a valour which is immortal."\textsuperscript{48}

Thus, civic humanist concepts informed Logan's sermons,
both directly and indirectly. Much the same can be said of the sermons of Hugh Blair. In a sermon entitled *On the Importance of Order in Conduct* which was published in 1780, Blair commented in the following way upon the increased luxury, social mobility, and fantastical values of the present age:

> an age manifestly distinguished by a propensity to thoughtless profusion, wherein all the different ranks of men are observed to press forward with vanity on those who are above them; to vie with their superiors in every mode of luxury and ostentation; and to seek no further argument for justifying extravagance, than the fashion of the times, and the supposed necessity of living like others around them.⁴⁹

Like many Scotsmen, Blair viewed the Scottish banking failures of the 1770s as evidence that luxury and ostentation were gaining ground while men's sense of true proportion was in decline. He constantly warned his readers of the dangers in allowing their expectations to exceed their bank accounts.⁵⁰ In particular, he criticised the guardians of the nation's virtue for selling their birthrights for what he contemptuously referred to as the *shadows* and *unreal forms* of worldly display.⁵¹

In order to combat such socially corrosive developments, Blair occasionally assumed the pose and rhetoric of a classical moralist. In his sermon *On the Use and Abuse of the World*, for example, he adopted the concepts of luxury and dissipation, combining them with a more characteristic analysis of historical change:

> They are the abusers of the world, who intemperately give themselves up to its pleasures, and lead a life of licentiousness, riot, and dissipation. Amidst the wealth and
luxury of the present age, it will be admitted, that persons of this description are not infrequent, who, being opulent in fortune and perhaps high in rank, think themselves entitled to pass their days in a careless manner, without any other object in view than the gratification of their senses and passions.  

Such statements could arguably have come from the mouths of quite orthodox Calvinist ministers. The concepts of civic humanism were used much more explicitly, however, in a sermon entitled On Luxury and Licentiousness. Here Blair quite consciously adopted the paradigm of ancient virtue being corrupted by imperial expansion and the introduction of foreign wealth in order to explain biblical history:

It appears from many passages in the writings of this prophet, that in his days great corruption of manners had begun to take place among the people of Israel. Originally a sober and religious nation, accustomed to a simple and pastoral life, after they had enlarged their territories by conquest, and acquired wealth by commerce, they gradually contracted habits of luxury; and luxury soon introduced its usual train of attending evils. In the history of all nations, the same circulation of manners has been found; and the age in which we live resembles, in this respect, the ages which have gone before it.

Criticisms of luxury were, of course, nothing new to Scottish ministers and the language of luxury and corruption often coincided with that of the traditional presbyterian jeremiad. What the cited passage demonstrates, however, is that historicity so characteristic of Machiavellian discourse. Neither religion nor any religious people could claim immunity from that same historical principle.

Blair often complained about "this age of dissipation and luxury in which we live." Some of his most heated diatribes
are to be found in the final volume of his sermons. One, in particular, *On a Life of Dissipation and Pleasure* stands out for at least three reasons. In the first place, it was highly praised by Blair's biographer and Moderate colleague, James Finlayson, as "a sermon written with great dignity and eloquence, and which should be regarded as his solemn parting admonition to a class of men, whose conduct is highly important to the community and whose reformation and virtue he had long laboured most zealously to promote" — presumably the landed aristocracy. Second, this was Blair's final composition intended for publication. Third, it clearly demonstrated the connection in Blair's own mind between luxury, manners, and the social order. "Do you feel no compunction," he asked this select audience, "at the thought that, by your luxury and extravagance, you are adding to the scenes of sorrow which abound in this afflicted world?" Just as long as wealth was properly employed, he suggested, the social order and moral community would remain intact. But those of elevated station who indulged in selfish display were corrupting the public manners. Especially in times of scarcity and of war, it was the function of the elite to solidify the social unit and to reinforce its values.

The civic humanism of the Moderate clergy was far from being radical in its implications. It was carefully sifted in order to reinforce the values of a traditional -- i.e. landed -- society. Even where it condemned, as it often did, the luxurious behaviour of Scottish *Nimrods*, there was never
any question of restructuring a social order which, for Moderate clergymen such as John Drysdale, was etched in letters of Craigmiller stone. Indeed, as far as Drysdale was concerned, the convenience of heaven lay in the fact that it was a social state not subject to either a corruption of manners, social revolution, or that Machiavellian *wildcard*—fortune. Only there existed the perfect moral community, complete with a distinction of ranks that could never be questioned. Only the heavenly city was immune to the ravages of history and *fortuna*.

**Stoicism**

It is most unfortunate that so little work has been done upon the influence of Stoicism upon eighteenth century British thought. Stoicism underwent a fortuitous reappraisal by the Dutch humanists of the late sixteenth century and made a contribution to ethical and political thought which rivalled Machiavelli's earlier restatement and adaptation of the Greek and Roman concepts of *aretē*, *virtus* and *fortuna*. Through the works of Justus Lipsius, in particular, the Roman *Stoa* with its stress upon constancy, moderation, abstinence, and prudence was moulded into a vigorous personal and political mode of practical discourse which allowed individuals and governments to bear with the *publica mala* and to mould the modern consciousness and state. This revival of the Roman stoic tradition also contributed to a legal culture which found its
early apotheosis in the figure of Grotius and to new attitudes towards a centralized army which could support a powerful authoritarian state. While Stoicism would appear to have lost some of its potency as an active political theory by the age of the enlightenment, it yet retained no little power as a practical mechanism for the maintenance of personal integrity. This was certainly the case with many of the enlightened men of eighteenth century Scotland and one of their avowed cultural heroes, Mr. Spectator.

Virtually nothing has been written on the significance of Stoicism in Joseph Addison's Spectator, possibly because of the short sighted tendency to stereotype Mr. Spectator as an optimistic representative of the emerging bourgeoisie. Only a slender essay has been produced upon the role of Stoicism in Samuel Johnston's ethical writings, which, like the Mirror and Lounger, fit into the Spectatorial tradition. Yet both of these men relied heavily upon stoic teaching in the formulation of their ethical frameworks. One of Joseph Addison's intentions was to teach mankind how to achieve an easy and virtuous existence despite the accidents of fortune or the confused and phantastical nature of modern social life. As a means to this end, he advocated a mental detachment from the physical world as well as an absolute adherence to the rules of reason. His ideas, attitude, and use of moral terminology had its strongest parallels in Stoic philosophy, and it is not surprising that Mr. Spectator so frequently referred to the writings of Epictetus and Seneca, or to those Stoic doctrines
Addison’s works were held in particularly high esteem among the Scottish literati and it would be very surprising indeed if some of Mr. Spectators Stoicism did not brush off on his admirers and imitators. Richard Sher’s work demonstrates the need for a closer look at the contribution of Stoicism to the thought of Francis Hutcheson and later Moderate divines such as Adam Ferguson. In addition, D.D. Raphael’s introduction to the latest edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments argues that Smith’s discussion of the nature of propriety and a morality cannot be properly understood without reference to the Stoics and their emphasis upon self-composure. In fact, Raphael goes so far as to claim that “stoic philosophy is the primary influence on Smith’s ethical thought.”

No attempt will be made here to fill this obvious gap in British and Scottish scholarship. In any case, a concentration upon actual moral discourse rather than abstract theory necessarily steers us away from the treatment of many of the complex and explicitly philosophical implications of Stoicism in eighteenth century thought. These may go deeper than one would suspect. Adam Smith’s concentration on a society of strangers, which has been the focus of much recent scholarship, could have as much to do with the stoic belief that the wise man remains always a stranger (Sapiens ubicunque est peregrinatur) than with the implicit model of an urbane and polite commercial polity. Both Adam Smith, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments,
and his student William Craig, in an essay for the Lounger, made subtle distinctions between the harsher Stoics such as Epictetus and the more humane Marcus Aurelius. In his own sermons, John Logan occasionally criticized those who misrepresent the Stoic philosophy as an absence of any feeling and who overlooked the essential humanity of some of the members of that school of thought. Similarly, Adam Ferguson’s lectures on ethics evidence a far from simple minded reverence for the doctrines of the Stoics.

It is understandable that Scottish moralists paid close attention to the ethical teachings of the Stoics during a period of social transition. Stoicism had developed as an ethical response to changes taking place in ancient society and was essentially a mechanism for the preservation of individual personality in the face of complex and confusing external stimuli. Placing their emphasis upon reason, or a clear understanding of the laws of cause and effect, the Stoics highlighted the power of internal speech and the idea of consequence or succession as a means of allowing men to rise above their feelings and hopes in order to see life for what it really was -- a mixture of pleasure and pain. Reason could be usefully contrasted, as it most certainly was in Addison’s Spectator, with imagination, which painted a world of shadows and appearances upon the mind and caused men to carry on an inordinate search after wealth, fame and honour. One could never be content or easy with such goals, only disappointed. Moreover, without ease or self-composure, one’s behaviour could
hardly be ethical.

Thus, reason, according to the Stoics, differed from the specifically enlightenment discussion of knowledge, science and progress. It was primarily a mechanism for controlling the natural excesses of the passions. However, it was precisely this concept of self-control that Hugh Blair made the intellectual linchpin of many of his sermons. If anxiety and fantasy were the characteristics of a period of rapid change, then stoic self-composure provided a remedy:

the doctrine which the changes of the world perpetually inculcate is, that no state of external things should appear so important, or should so affect and agitate our spirits, as to deprive us of a calm, an equal and a steady mind. 75

Individuals could withstand all the vicissitudes of fortune and even achieve virtuous tranquillity, he incessantly urged, if only they could adopt this temperament. "It has been the study of the wise and reflecting, in every age," he wrote, "to attain this steadiness of mind." 76 And the titles of many of his sermons are testimony to the significance which he attached to this temper of mind and habit of soul. 77 They include: On Moderation, On Tranquillity of Mind, On Patience, On the Disorders of the Passions, On Fortitude, and On a Contented Mind -- to list but a few of the most obvious examples. Even many sermons with more vague titles, such as On Overcoming Evil with Good and On the Slavery of Vice, upon closer examination often turn out to be little more than elaborations on stoic self-composure.

The Stoics pushed their emphasis on logic so far into
their ethical claims as to argue that the individual who managed to harmonize his will with whatever accidents might befall him must necessarily be happy. Although occasionally inconsistent, Blair was usually not prepared to go quite that far. However, he did believe that self-control was an essential prerequisite of happiness and virtue. In his sermon *On Fortitude*, for example, Blair claimed:

> without some degree of fortitude there can be no happiness: because amidst the thousand uncertainties of life, there can be no enjoyment of tranquillity...firmness of mind is the parent of tranquillity. It enables one to enjoy the present without disturbance; and to look calmly on the dangers that approach, or the evils that threaten in the future.\(^78\)

Happiness, for Blair, was essentially an internal state, highly dependent upon the ability to reason correctly. Those internal sources of happiness or misery, he argued elsewhere, were the only certain foundation for the enjoyment of oneself.\(^79\)

The same argument runs throughout the sermons. In one of the earliest, Blair stressed the importance of a man's state of mind for determining his happiness. In *On the Disorders of the Passions*, he argued that prosperity had nothing to do with happiness because it debilitated instead of strengthened the mind. "Its most common effect," he suggested, "is to create an extreme sensibility to the slightest wound."\(^80\) In yet another sermon, he wrote: "Many are the resources of a good and wise man under all the diseases of life. In the midst of them, it is always in his power to enjoy peace of mind and hope in God."\(^81\) Blair elsewhere claimed that "Tranquillity of mind, or, in the words of the text, a mind not moved or disquieted by
the accidents of life, is undoubtedly one of the greatest blessings that we can possess on earth." And, in the opening sermon of his final volume, Blair spoke thus of the human condition: "Whatever course the affairs of the work take, he (man) may justly enjoy peace of mind.".

The concept of *fortuna* was one of the banes of civic humanist discourse, almost rivaling *luxury* in its negative effects upon the historically situated moral community. Stoic teaching allowed for a personal resignation to the accidents of fortune without a concomitant withdrawal from active life. In sermons such as *On the Influence of Religion upon Adversity*, *On the Motives to Constancy in Virtue* and *On a Contented Mind*, Blair warned his readers against becoming dissatisfied with their condition in life and advised them to cultivate a quiet resignation to whatever was. While this advice very often took the form of telling individuals that they should not try to move out of their rank in the social hierarchy, it cannot be dismissed simply as a defense of the status quo. For Blair's message here was directed more to the individual than it was to specific social classes: moreover, its frame of reference was not particular but universal. "Look abroad into life," he wrote:

and you will find the general sense of mankind bearing witness to this important truth, that mind is superior to fortune; that what one feels within, is of much greater importance than all that befalls him without.

For Blair, as for the classical Stoics, self-composure was much more than a prophylactic against anxiety (however much
this may help to explain the popularity of Moderate sermons for men like James Boswell). It was even more than an admirable virtue in itself. In a dangerous and potentially corrupting world, self-composure was the necessary condition for virtue. Without it, men were in danger of becoming the slaves of those external impressions which were hurling themselves upon the imagination. But individuals could rise above their social milieu, he maintained, if they could achieve that degree of self-control compatible with autonomous moral action. In a sermon On the Slavery of Vice, Blair defined true liberty -- the essential characteristic of virtue in civic humanist discourse -- as the ability to make deliberate choices without being obstructed by either external force or violent internal impulse. Such independence from the circumstances of external fortune was only possible, however, if the individual had already achieved some degree of self-command:

Religion and virtue...confer on the mind principles of noble independence. The upright man is satisfied from himself. He despises not the advantages of fortune; but he centers not his happiness in them. With a moderate share of them he can be contented; and contentment is felicity.

And in another sermon, Blair rather uncharacteristically went so far as to argue that the human mind was a kingdom to itself. It could retain its composure even if its bodily owner were confined in a prison or stretched on a sick bed.

Like his close friend Adam Smith, Hugh Blair was heavily indebted to the stoic philosophers for his use of the concept of self-composure. It was this more than anything else that
these two men wanted to extract from Stoic wisdom. Blair, however, deviated somewhat from the Stoics in his development of the doctrine of a *hidden hand*. In Stoic philosophy proper, the universe was postulated as a self-regulating system operating according to immutable laws. Because this system was perfect and harmonious in every respect, there was no need for a *God* or the *universal reason* to tamper with its workings. Once the machinery had been set in motion, its creator had nothing to do but sit back and watch. Now both Blair and Smith were familiar with this Stoic line of reasoning and were not uninfluenced by it. Smith, for example, referred to the universe as an *immense machine*. And Blair sometimes referred to its creator as the *Supreme Artificer*. But neither of them was prepared to regard either the universe or human society primarily in those terms. As is well known, Smith developed the concept, both in his ethical and economic writings, of an *invisible hand* which actively guided individual passions towards socially desirable goals. Smith only referred to the concept once or twice in each of his major works and his use of the term in *The Wealth of Nations* has been usually regarded as typifying his scientific penetration into the *secret springs* of human behaviour and the commercial polity. It seems equally plausible, however, to argue that Smith used the term in the same way that he did in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* — as a form of self-deceit which enabled the individual to combine prudence and self-love without an undue concern about its negative social effects. In other words, Smith utilized the
term quite consciously in order to reconcile the private and public interests of a modern society. The *hidden hand* was a moral band aid rather than a typically Smithian social surgery.

Smith only referred to the concept of a *hidden hand* once or twice in his major works, but the same cannot be said of Blair. In his sermons the concept of a *hidden hand* plays a contiguous role with that of stoic self-composure. As Raphael points out in his own interpretation of Smith, the concept of a *hidden hand* was not uninformed by stoic principles. The terminology that Blair invariably employed when speaking of a *hidden hand* was that of the Stoics. In one of his early sermons, *On our ignorance of Good and Evil in this Life*, Blair wrote:

> There is not any present moment that is unconnected with some future one. The life of every man is a continued chain of incidents, each link of which hangs upon the former. The transition from cause to effect, from event to event, is often carried on by secret steps, which our foresight cannot divine, and our sagacity is unable to trace.

This is nothing more than the stoic belief in continuity and coherence throughout the physical and social universe, except that it contains the added dimension of a historical progression carried on by *secret steps*. In Blair's scheme, God could be summarized by the concept of a benign force guiding all communities and individuals in their own best interest -- the *hidden hand*. The "same powerful hand, which perfected the work of creation, shall, in due time, disembroll the plans of Providence," Blair wrote:

> the course of Providence is progressive. Time
is required for the progression to advance: and before it is finished, we can form no judgement, or at least a very imperfect one, concerning it.91

Thus, Blair added the concepts of historical time and place to the self-regulating universe of the Stoics. God not only created nature but He was continually acting upon it, bringing it towards a predetermined end. The analogy that Blair liked to use was not that of a heavenly clockmaker but, rather, a divine gardener bringing his seed into fruition.92

The concept of a hidden hand was necessary in order to explain the apparent confusion and lack of justice in the world. Blair did not find the stark and static logic of the Stoics sufficiently comforting and he made this abundantly clear in a number of sermons, including one appropriately entitled On all Things working together for Good to the Righteous. Here, he criticized Stoicism because it so readily sacrificed the individual on the altar of universal reason.93

"Among many ancient philosophers," he maintained:

it was a favorite tenet, that all seeming disorders in the world are rendered subservient to the order and perfection of the universe; or that all things work together for the good of the whole. But to the good of the whole, they conceived the interest of individuals to be oft-times to yield. The revelation of the Gospel has opened to us a higher and more comfortable prospect.

One should beware of reading too much into Blair's reference to revelation, for he did not proceed to discuss Christ's teachings or promises. Instead, he went on to refer to the Supreme Artificer who, "although we are insensible of it," was constantly advancing all things
"towards a happy issue." Under the surface of life, he concluded, there lay "hidden springs, that are set in motion by a superior hand, and are bringing forward revolutions unforseen by us."

The sermons of John Drysdale also stressed the concept of *self-composure* and a *hidden hand*. In a sermon *On the Happy State of the True Penitent*, for example, he emphasised that this "inward peace, or composure of mind, is therefore the first thing to be secured, in order to be happy." He added that the "peace of the true penitent is not at the mercy of varying circumstances of this life. It depends not on the health of the body, nor the easy flow of animal spirit, nor on the success of worldly schemes." As far as Drysdale was concerned, there was only one way of achieving this tranquillity of mind and that was resignation to the will of God. In a sermon entitled *On Trust in God*, he asserted that "Confidence in God, submission to his will, a determined acquiescence in his disposal of all things, will prove the most effectual means of establishing the soul in peace and tranquillity." So important was this theme of resignation to Drysdale's mind, that he made it the organizing principle of many sermons. Even *benevolence*, which was a concept he strongly stressed, took second place to his emphasis upon *resignation*. The only antidote to "this changeable and disastrous world" he argued in one of two pivotal sermons *On the Real Nature of Human Life,*
was to adapt one's desires and inclinations to that which one cannot change. Freedom, as for the Stoics, consisted not in opposition but in cheerful resignation to the course of Providence.

To adopt stoic self-composure was not merely to make a virtue of necessity. Rightly understood, he argued, the plan of Providence was beneficial in an individual as well as a general sense. Men could at last be tranquil because a hidden hand was directing all things in their own best interest:

The Divine Providence is therefore particular, as well as universal; and as the general afflictions of mankind are calculated for the good of the whole species, so those of every particular person are best suited to his character, -- are best for him in every way.

The so-called injustices of the world, including those personal misfortunes and anxieties which were so characteristic of periods of dramatic change, were actually a part of God's scheme of individual and social improvement. God himself was an improver. Once this fact was properly understood, resignation to fortune became a reasoned response rather than a stoic duty.

Despite his clumsy style, which is one reason why Drysdale's sermons never achieved the recognition of those of his more elegant colleague, Drysdale preached much the same message as Hugh Blair. Both preached an essentially stoic message of personal comfort and morality which could act as an effective counter to the publica mala. Stoic self-composure enabled the individual to avoid contamination by a potentially
corrupting society. The doctrine of a hidden hand enabled the religious moralist to evade the stultifying psychological effects of a recognition of the civic humanist interpretation of social revolutions. It should always be remembered that these doctrines were practical comforts and reassurances rather than systematically developed theology or philosophy. Like the Moderate conception of heaven, they were necessary supports for moral action and individual integrity in social life. While they may have dispelled some of the gloom that surrounded a historical appreciation of the fragility of society, they could never eradicate it. Like Blair and Drysdale, John Logan's sermons also reinforced the consolations that could obtain through the device of a particular Providence. His historical lectures, on the other hand, were much more pessimistic in their emphasis upon the potential corruption of manners within a commercial empire.

Whatever its intellectual merits, Adam Smith and the Moderates' concentration upon self-command as the sine qua non of happiness and virtue, ensured its importance in the treatment of moral questions in Scottish literary circles. It mitigated, for example, the Mirror Club's particular stress upon virtuous sensibility by emphasizing the dangers of allowing the passions too much rein. Thus, while the Mirror Club were especially concerned to cultivate what they referred to as gentle sensibility, and to highlight the emotional as opposed to the rational nature of man, they were constantly aware that the social passions needed to be ruled by reason and
prudence. While they constantly applauded the virtues of fellow-feeling, therefore, the Mirror Club also warned against excess sensibility. In the case of those individuals whose sentimental equipment was rather limited, they were even willing to give self-control a pre-eminent position in moral education.

Not surprisingly, the member of the Mirror Club who was most concerned about the necessity for self-command was one of Adam Smith’s favorite students — William Craig. While he remained essentially a moralist of sensibility, he still demonstrated an admiration for stoic teaching:

Without going so far as the Stoics would have us, we may venture to assert, that there is scarce any state of calamity in which a firm and virtuous mind will not create to itself consolation and relief; nor any absolute degree of prosperity and success in which a naturally discontented spirit will not find cause of disappointment and disgust.100

In a number of his contributions to the Mirror and Lounger, Craig warned that without self-control, extended sensibility towards others would metamorphize into misanthropy. One of his characters, Mr. Fleetwood, has such acute feelings that he is positively uneasy and ill-equipped to deal with the realities of everyday life.101 His ideal type, Mr. Sidney is a man who combines sentimental feelings with an ability to bear the greatest misfortunes without any alteration of behaviour. "Under the pressure of calamity," wrote Craig, "his behaviour remained unaltered and...he was able to go through the duties of life with becoming dignity and ease."102 His elegance and sensibility of mind were never allowed to unseat his great
firmness and perseverance.

Sentiments and Sensibility

Despite a corresponding emphasis upon self-composure, Adam Smith's *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* was based upon an entirely different premise than that of Stoic philosophy. Thus, while it is correct to underline Smith's debt to this ancient mode of discourse, it is misleading to concentrate upon it unduly. Adam Smith derived propriety and morality from a plurality of human feelings or sentiments rather than from reason. Both propriety and morality were founded in turn upon achieved sympathy -- the harmonization of feelings and behaviour between different actors through a complex process of interpersonal negotiation that Smith likened to the tuning of musical instruments. Because Smith believed that the actor's ability to synchronize with the misfortunes of others was extremely limited, however, his conception of sympathy had a lot more to do with self-command than with the actor's ability to pity others. Acts of disinterested benevolence, he argued, were by nature uncommon, since men "though naturally sympathetic, feel so little for another, with whom they have no particular connection, in comparison of what they feel for themselves." But self-command and the related virtue of justice were things which applied to all men in all situations and which kept the moral community together. It was this stress upon self-command and justice which caused Smith to
identify with the Stoics who, although they did not fully understand human nature, placed emphasis on precisely this sort of ethical behaviour. Smith's identification with the Stoics increased in the various drafts of Theory of Moral Sentiments and the doctrines of the stoic school were given their fullest treatment in the sixth edition of 1790.104

Smith's treatment of the moral sentiments and human sensibility in general was a significant contribution to the ethical discourse of his day. Indeed, it would seem that any definition of sensibility would need to take The Theory of Moral Sentiments into account as the only complete attempt to rigorously define the nature and characteristic of human emotional exchange in the eighteenth century. However, remarkably few writers on sensibility during this period have seen fit to refer to Adam Smith's work as anything other than a footnote to the general discursive domain. Those who have, like R.F. Brissenden, asserted the critical importance of Smith's contribution to this discussion have either misread or caricatured his argument.105 Not only have they mistakenly equated sympathy with empathy, the very assumption that Smith wanted to question, but they have also overlooked the centricity of sociability in his thought. This blindness can only be explained with reference to their assumption that the literature of sensibility is characterised by the primacy of individual liberty and personal feeling.

Scholars working closely with the text of The Theory of Moral Sentiments have quite clearly shown, however, that
Smith's moral theory was explicitly social in its character. It emphasized the crucial significance of the moral community for the cultivation of ethical feelings. Not only did Smith recognize the critical variable of community in his analysis, he also had little respect for those who wanted to place individual feeling at variance with the social unit. Smith's methodology was sociological rather than psychological. His modernity lies in the way in which he depicted the relationship between the individual and the community and the ways in which inter-group harmony was achieved. Moreover, his treatment of the complex interpersonal negotiation that takes place in the achievement of group norms -- the toning up and down of emotions for the achievement of sympathy -- represented an intellectual contribution to the concept of society that rivals that of such modern sociologists as Georg Simmel and Irving Goffmann.

The term that best approximates Smith's use of sensibility is sociability. All men, argued Smith, desired to be approved of by their fellow men and therefore readily entered into sympathetic exchange. But, since it was difficult if not impossible to really put oneself in the place of another, especially if that other was experiencing pain, the group norms which resulted from such interactions inevitably stressed the control of personal emotions rather than the more artificial extention of humanity towards others. Thus, the suffering individual could only hope to obtain compassion by:

lowering his passion to that pitch, in which the spectators are capable of going along with him.
He must flatten, if I may be allowed to say so, the sharpness of its natural tone, in order to reduce it to harmony and concord with the emotions of those who are about him. What they feel, will, indeed, always be, in some respects, different from what he feels, and compassion can never be exactly the same with original sorrow.  

What Smith expressly denied, therefore, was the possibility of truly empathetic relationships in society. Group norms were founded upon interpersonal accommodation and stressed self-control. Several scholars have pointed out that Smith's discussion of morality was nothing less than a complete redefinition of the traditional civic humanist conception of virtue. This redefinition based virtue upon prudence rather than public spirit and, at the same time, made it particularly applicable to modern commercial society. The relationships that Smith so painstakingly described seemed typical of a highly urban, and relatively self-interested, society of strangers. What Smith may have been suggesting was that the impersonal world of urban commerce was far from being inimical to virtuous behaviour. If virtue was defined primarily in terms of self-control and justice, then there was little to fear and much to gain from the new world. Limited self-interest, mitigated by native sociability and derived self-control, could result in the creation of a virtuous character. To be sure, such an individual would hardly resemble the classical hero of the civic humanist tradition. But Smith had precious little time for such splendid characters who so often lacked the temperate coolness and self-command that he admired. Moreover, the man of correct and modest
virtue tended to demonstrate far greater amiability and respect for his fellows than the impetuous warrior of old.\textsuperscript{110}

The practical Scottish moralists who followed Smith were profoundly influenced by his analysis. They not only based ethics upon the moral sentiments but they also adhered closely to Smith’s model of interactive sympathy in the face-to-face situation. Thus, for example, they began to focus their attention on the cultivation of the moral sentiments through interpersonal dynamics and away from the explicitly public arena. They clearly recognized the importance of sympathy, or emotional correspondence, to normative formation. Above all, they accepted Smith’s presentation of moral cultivation as an involved and complex process, requiring considerable mental pliability as well as an innate sociability or, as they termed it, complacency. At the same time, they were reluctant to accept what they regarded as an overly reductionist approach to ethics and the modern world.\textsuperscript{111} They were not at all willing to view virtue primarily in terms of self-control or to give justice priority over benevolence. And, while Smith himself did not accept the modern commercial and productive society without some misgivings, their intellectual debt to civic humanism meant that they were not nearly so optimistic about the modern world.

It would be quite incorrect to think that these practical moralists did not fully understand or appreciate Smith’s argument. In a letter to Lord Kames on the subject of the latter’s \textit{Sketches of Man}, for example, Hugh Blair argued
against the existence of an original moral or religious sense in ways that clearly paralleled Smith. William Craig, in an essay for the Mirror, expressly utilized the Smithian concept of spectatorial sympathy in order to explain Hamlet's ability to trifle with his friends in the very midst of his melancholy. Not only was an appreciation of the subtleties of Smith's argument apparent in a number of William Craig's essays, but it was evident in many other essays in the Mirror and Lounger as well.

But the Mirror Club, like other practical moralists, wanted to adapt Smith to their own needs. In a revealing discussion of The Theory of Moral Sentiments for the Mirror, Robert Cullen described the self-command of a virtuous man whose wife had recently died. In The Silent Expression of Sorrow, Mr. Wentworth bravely attempted to hide his feelings and retain his self-composure among sympathetic friends. However, Cullen's description best fits a man of feeling rather than a stoic sage. Wentworth's tears constantly start from his eyes; he utters deep sighs in a low and broken voice; his lips and cheeks constantly quiver and his countenance betrays a heart that was ill at ease. Not only does Wentworth resemble the hero of Henry Mackenzie's The Man of Feeling, but his literary cum moral function is demonstrably that of eliciting that same spectatorial sympathy that Adam Smith regarded as so very exceptional. And yet, in his conclusion to this same essay, Cullen innocently claimed to have done nothing more than summarize the argument of Adam Smith:
This is well explained by a philosopher, who is no less eloquent than he is profound. He justly observes, that we naturally, on all occasions, endeavour to bring down our passions, to that pitch which those about us can correspond with. We view ourselves in the light in which we think they view us, and seek to suit our behaviour to what we think their feelings can go along with.

Craig's attempt to transform Smith's man of prudence into a man of feeling was paralleled in Henry Mackenzie's equally cheeky presentation of David Hume in the *Lounger* essay on *Father Nicholas*, in which he presented the rational sceptic as a closet man of sentiment. What both Cullen and Mackenzie wanted to suggest was that human sensibility could and should express itself as an extension of humanity towards others. The implication was that benevolence towards others was at least as natural as the toning down of one's own feelings or self-control. The social instinct, in other words, was capable of a much higher degree of cultivation than Adam Smith's model of social interaction would allow.

Whether or not these practical moralists adopted the Hutchesonian doctrine of a moral sense or Smith's more genetic conception of morality as deriving from a multiplicity of moral sentiments -- in fact, they could be quite inconsistent -- is of less significance than their clear appreciation of the importance of sociability, the interactive process, and, especially, the concept of achieved sympathy. For them, both the moral sense and the moral sentiments were capable of a high degree of cultivation through social negotiation. For this reason, they tended to reject David Hume's conception of sympathy and benevolence as far too abstract and
utilitarian. William Craig, writing for the *Lounger* quoted at length from a "very ingenious philosopher, who possesses a singular power of illustration joined to an uncommon depth of thinking" on the subject of Humean benevolence. The philosopher in question was Adam Smith; the quotation was from *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. Craig was in full agreement with Smith that "it is not the view of utility or hurtfulness which is either the first or principal source of our approbation and disapprobation." The character in Craig's essay, the *improver Dormer* is highly disapproved of by the impartial spectator precisely because he sacrifices genuine social feelings to abstract aesthetic arrangements. For the *Mirror Club*, as for Adam Smith and the Moderate divines, utility was far too remote and not sufficiently social a principle to be the foundation of morality. Real benevolence, as opposed to abstract notions of *public spirit* or *improvement*, was founded directly upon the human propensity for fellow feeling which could be cultivated through symbolic interaction.

The significance of sensibility and sympathy to the general Scottish moral debate comes out clearly in the newspapers of the period. In his address to the *Eclectic Society* of Glasgow, XYZ argued that civilization was the sun which allowed the *seeds of sympathy* to vegetate. Although he warned that it gave rise to the luxury and corruption that could very possibly destroy the nation, he suggested that it also brought into play an improvement in the moral sentiments that was conducive to virtue. Similarly, *TRIBULLUS*, in his
Reflections on Poetry, Occasioned by Mr. Logan's Poems, pointed out that "the improvements which take place in society, while they civilize and soften, tend also to tame and disguise the characters of men." Still, he believed that the advantage was:

on the side of refined periods: for one stroke of sensibility is worth pages of description...The language of the heart touches the heart, and is remembered forever.

Individuals of rank and station were constantly encouraged to cultivate their sensibility. In an Ode on Lord Hay's Birthday which was printed in both the Edinburgh Magazine and the Scots Magazine in 1773, the author advised those men of rank in the village and the castle to cultivate their sympathetic hearts:

Ye sons of Luxury, be wise;  
Know Happiness for ever flies  
The cold and solitary breast;  
Then let the social instinct glow  
And learn to feel another's woe;  
And in his joy be blest.  

In the pages of the Caledonian Mercury in 1771, the popular SPECULATIST contrasted that softness of temper or tenderness of disposition which should always be cultivated with those nouveaux and hardened wretches who, like Sir Obdurate Avarice had recently risen from low positions in society and then scorched and mistreated the poor in their worship of luxury and extravagance. Fortunately, the author reflected, the sensuality of modern pleasure did not yet universally prevail and there were still some individuals of rank and fortune who regarded it as a greater pleasure to help the poor and
unfortunate than to indulge in the idle expenses of assemblies and masquerades. In a poem entitled Benevolence: An Ode, a journeyman shoemaker by the name of Woodhouse addressed his social superiors in the following terms:

'Tis yours, with sympathetic breast
To stop the rising sigh
And wipe the tearful eye,
Nor let repining Merit sue unblest;
This is a more applausible taste
Than spending wealth
In gorgeous waste,
Or with dire luxury destroying health:
It sweetens life with ev'ry virtuous joy,
And wings the conscious hours with gladness as they fly.125

Finally, against the indifference of a luxurious age, CAMISIS wrote to the Scots Magazine in 1787 that he would far rather dissolve in tears at the lightest grief than ever to lose his heart to sympathetic woe.126 The tear, he pointed out, always "sparkled in Virtue's eye."

"The warmth affection pours tho' ev'ry vein," wrote one of these poets, informs "the happy mortal how to live."128 Furthermore, they suggested that the significance of human
feelings and sympathetic interaction was a particular insight of the modern age. TRIBULLUS, for example, pointed out that the elegant, tender and fine sensibility of John Logan's poetry could only have been produced in a refined and polished period. The editor of the Caledonian Mercury commented that works such as Sentimental Tales were "not unsuitable to the genius of the present age." It was only when the human passions had been combined with the social graces in that Sensibility divine and the sympathetic mien, suggested D.R. in the Scots Magazine, that the exact nature of morality could be understood. True virtue, he added, was Innocence and Beauty combined with Tenderness. Or, as A Lady succinctly put in her poem On Mr. Beattie's Essay on Truth, only true taste and genius could "inspire Sympathy's sweet creative fire."

The Scottish press particularly praised Beattie for his recommendation of the power of sympathy as a tool for inculcating virtue. In a lengthy review of his essays in 1779, the editor of the Scots Magazine remarked upon Beattie's recognition of that happy sensibility which should always be encouraged within the human breast. Commenting on the philosopher's treatment of sympathy, the editor approvingly added:

"Sympathy, as the means of conveying certain feelings from one breast to another, might be made a powerful instrument, he says of moral discipline, if the poets, and other writers of fable were careful to call forth our sensibility towards those emotions only that favour virtue, and invigorate the human mind."

Like every other Scottish moralist of sentiment, Beattie was
concerned about excess. He wanted sentiment to touch the heart, not tear it to pieces. The SPECULATIST, for example, advised that human sensibility had to be pointed in the right direction lest the social instinct be thwarted in its moral aim. This was the case with Lady Love puppy who lavished all her finely cultivated tenderness on her dogs, not her fellow man. Henry Mackenzie, for whose novels Beattie's discussion of sympathy reads like an advertisement, made a similar criticism of Mrs. Sensitive in the Lounger.

The question that practical Scottish moralists asked themselves was how best to point human sensibility in such a way as to maximize its effect upon the moral community. In answering this question, they focussed upon a concept with a long British history and one which had obsessed Joseph Addison in the pages of the Spectator. That concept was melancholy. In the Spectator, Addison constantly fretted about this English malady to which he himself was subject, and he was inclined to think that it could be dealt with most effectively by indulging the mood: "for while contemplating the greater miseries of others a man forgets his own and thus obtains the needed mental catharsis." The Scottish moralists developed this insight much further than Addison did, and tended to look upon melancholy as something internal to the human mind rather than as an external product of ghastly British weather or environment. Melancholy was, in effect, a milder passion that was conducive to morality.

In a poem entitled On Melancholy, a young Scotsman of
eighteen with the initials W.H. referred to melancholy as that fable queen which freed the pensive mind from Passion's midst and discovered Vice in her own hideous colours.\textsuperscript{137} Melancholy, for this writer, was one of those calmer passions which the moralist Hutcheson recommended.\textsuperscript{138} It was a gentle emotion which taught the individual to shun the world's gilden scene and to develop those internal resources which were conducive to Virtue. Melancholy and virtue, he suggested, went hand in hand. In his reflections on Logan's poetry, TRIBULLUS maintained that Logan's particular genius was his use of a vein of melancholy which was something quite different from modern sickly complaints or the funeral gloom of earlier and more primitive poetic efforts.\textsuperscript{139} Logan's genius allowed him to apply the balm of that gentle melancholy which "soothes while it wounds, and delights while it dissolves the soul."

Logan's poetry was nothing if not popular. An Epistle to the Rev. Mr. Logan, in the Caledonian Mercury of August 18, 1784 praised him for his uncanny ability to imitate nature and to depict a human sorrow which was spontaneous and undisguised by modern art.\textsuperscript{140} His sweet verses, the author added, highlighted the joy of sorrow and the nature of tender Sympathy. Much the same was argued about the sermons of another Moderate preacher -- Samuel Charters. In a long and fairly academic review of these compositions, an anonymous correspondent suggested that the improvement in the art of preaching in Scotland could be particularly attributed to the "progress of sentimental philosophy that was first brought into
vogue in this country by the late Dr. Hutchieson of Glasgow." What chiefly differentiated Charters from the other followers of the sentimental school was his detailed knowledge of the human heart and the secret springs of conduct. The reviewer lamented, however, that the tenderness and melancholy of Charters' sermons was likely to be overlooked because:

the taste of the age is too frivolous, and its spirit too dissipated to give Mr. Charters an equal chance of success in the race of popularity, with some of his contemporaries.

Despite the perceived selfishness and frivolity of the modern luxurious age, at least one of Charters' contemporaries was to win unbridled fame for his sermons. For Hugh Blair, as for many Moderate preachers and the writers in the Mirror and Lounger, the passions were the main springs of human action. "Look abroad into the world," he wrote, "and observe how few act upon deliberate and rational views of their true interest. The bulk of mankind are impelled by their feelings." In the same sermon, he also pointed out:

arguments may convince the understanding, when they cannot conquer the passions. Irresistable they may seem in the calm hours of retreat; but, in the season of action, they often vanish into smoke. There are other and more powerful springs, which influence the great movements of the human frame. In order to operate with success on the active powers, the heart must be gained. Sentiment and affection must be brought to the aid of reason.

As Blair saw it, the fundamental problem with the Stoic mode of discourse and with speculative thought generally was that it paid far too little regard to the realities of human nature.
Such cold analysis could not hope to have an effect upon individual behaviour. "Moral and religious instruction derives its efficacy," Blair wrote, "not so much from what men are taught to know, as from what they are brought to feel."  

One of Blair's chief aims in his ethical writings was to urge the cultivation of the social passions. In particular, he advised the cultivation of a particular kind of sympathy. This distinctive emotional response went by a wide variety of labels in Moderate sermons, including ingenious sensibility, the tender heart, gentle sensibility, tender sympathy and gentle melancholy. What it implied was a temper of mind which inclined the individual to downplay his own ego and to enter into the troubles and feelings of his fellow human beings. As Blair put it, it was "native feeling, heightened and improved by principle. It is the heart which easily relents; which feels for everything that is human; and is backward and slow to inflict the least wound." At the same time, the concept denoted an extremely delicate and sophisticated responsiveness, characteristic of civilized societies, which allowed the mind to react to subtle variations in emotional stimuli. In other words, it was a tender and gentle process of identification with others rather than any crude outpouring of undifferentiated fellow feeling. While gentle sensibility clearly flowed from native affection, this sociability was cultured and refined.

Stoic self-composure was not sufficient as a guide to practical morality; it had to be supplemented with gentle
sensibility. In the second of two sermons On the Government of the Heart, Blair argued that a moderation of the passions, while it was the necessary principle of self-enjoyment, did not constitute true morality. A man "must also cultivate a kind, generous, and sympathizing temper" which felt for all distress and allowed one always to be obliging and humane in social intercourse.145 So important was this temper to Blair's way of thinking, that one could not possibly call oneself a Christian if one did not possess it.

Blair's treatment of the nature of the Christ figure is illustrative of the importance which he attached to this gentle sensibility. For Blair, it was not any specific doctrines of Christianity that were important; rather, it was the moral character of Christ himself. "It was not with a cold unfeeling disposition," Blair wrote, "that he performed the office of relieving the distressed. His manner of bestowing relief clearly showed with what sensibility he entered into the sorrows of others."146 In yet another sermon, entitled On the Compassion of Christ, Blair again emphasized that "unlike that hard indifference in which some ancient philosophers vainly gloried," Christ truly felt as a man and "the sensibility of his nature was tender and exquisite."147 Christ's religion was one of refined feeling, not dogma.

Sensibility was a natural social instinct; gentle sensibility was a very precise tool for avoiding the moral pitfalls of modern social life. Indeed, so complex were the workings of this emotion to Blair's mind, that he and other
Scottish moralists looked upon it as a more suitable subject for the painter than the preacher. In his sermon *On the Character of Joseph* for example, Blair dwelt upon his favorite Old Testament personification of *gentle sensibility* at some length. He began by describing Joseph's reaction upon hearing the news of his father from his unsuspecting brothers. Joseph's tears, wrote Blair, "were the effusions of a heart overflowing with all the tender sensibilities of nature." He then went on to claim that "no painter could seize a more striking moment for displaying the characteristic features of the heart, than what is here presented." So subtle and complex, therefore, was this temper of mind that it was easier to convey in delicately shaded pictures than in words. Henry Mackenzie was to use much the same language to describe his own attempts to *paint* the delicate shades of his characters' emotions in his novels.

If Blair sometimes found it difficult to classify the emotion of *gentle sensibility* in an analytically precise way, he was not however at a loss to determine an appropriate technique for its cultivation. As the title of one of his sermons suggests, Blair was forever advising his readers *On the Benefits to be derived from the House of Mourning*. What he meant by this was the stimulation of melancholy feelings through reflection on the death and sufferings of others. This particular manifestation of sensibility, which Blair sometimes referred to more exactly as *the tender melancholy of sympathy*, could be stimulated through the actual visiting of funerals and
sickbeds or through a process of reflection on one's deceased parents, friends and loved ones. In one of his many sermons directed at the young, Blair advised his naive audience to "go sometimes to the house of mourning as well as to the house of feasting. Accustom yourselves to think of the distresses of human life; of the solitary cottage, the dying parent, and the weeping orphan." Elsewhere, he urged that by "voluntarily going into the house of mourning; by yielding to the sentiments which it excites, and mingling our tears with those of the afflicted, we shall acquire that humane sensibility which is one of the highest ornaments of the nature of man." And, in his sermon On Death, Blair pointed out that there were "many things which the funerals of our fellow creatures are calculated to teach; and happy it were for the gay and dissipated, if they would listen more frequently to the instruction of so awful a monitor." He did not, however, go on to discuss such fundamental religious issues as judgement and repentance. Nor did he advocate anything like the cultivation of a stoic attitude towards suffering and death. Instead, he advised his readers to indulge in a taste for funeral melancholy because it warmed the heart with the glow of humanity.

Blair was by no means the only preacher to stress the significance of gentle sensibility or to advocate techniques for downplaying the individual ego and stimulating the social passions. Blair's discussion of the concept was paralleled in the sermons of his young friend, Samuel Charters. In a sermon
on the necessity for proper moral cultivation, for example, Charters discussed the nature of the social passions in terms very similar to those of Blair:

Man is born to trouble and his heart is formed for sympathy. The young are prone to compassion, it is only necessary to encourage and direct it. Let them learn betimes to feel for distresses to which they themselves are subject, and to bestow that sympathy and those kind attentions which they themselves may quickly stand in need of. This is humanity. Men are bound together by their common sensibility to pain and sorrow, more strongly perhaps than by any other tie.  

Unlike Smith, Charters viewed sympathy primarily in terms of an emotional reaching out to those fellow human beings who were in pain or sorrow. In a world wherein "all is vanity and vexation", he called upon individuals to develop a sincere attachment and cordial sympathy towards others.  

Like Blair, Charters too was concerned to re-interpret Christianity in the light of sensibility. He depicted Christ as an individual of great sensibility and argued that there were "peculiar regards in the gospel to those whose hearts are tender." Not surprisingly, he also noted the benefits of tender sympathy upon social behaviour:

The heart of the wise is in the house of mourning. Scenes of sorrow humanize the heart. While you behold the last agonies of a friend, every tender emotion awakes, the world is shut out, immortality opens, vain and covetous and sensual passions find no place, the heart is moulded into a pure serious benevolent frame, a frame which becomes human nature, which bears a resemblance to the Father of mercies.

Charters went even further in advertising this frame or temperament of gentle sensibility than did Blair. He adopted a
melancholy, almost poetic, tone in many of his sermons; there was little distinction between writer and content.

The same could be said equally of the final sermon in Charters' volume, which was not written by the author himself, but by his close friend Thomas Somerville. Somerville's well known memoirs were frank and unsentimental, so it is fascinating to see him in the somewhat different role of a preacher of sensibility. Ostensibly, the sermon dealt with the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead. In actual fact, Somerville merely used the religious text as a vehicle for stressing the tender sympathy of Christ and the importance of an affectionate heart. Somerville's own volume of sermons is also interesting in that he based morality upon the "natural, instinctive sentiments of mankind" in a language that is clearly taken from Adam Smith's *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. What is more, he stressed both the importance of human sociability and the tender sympathy exhibited by Christ. Finally, he distinguished between the dogmatic preacher who was overly concerned with the keeping of the Sabbath and the enlightened Christian who followed Jesus because the "virtue which he taught, is the most rational and sublime, the most social and beneficial, the most conducive to the dignity and improvement of the individual, and to the peace and happiness of mankind."

John Drysdale's sermons contained little of the sentimental tone of Charters. But here too, we find a significant amount of discussion on the contribution of
sensibility to morality. In his sermon *On Keeping the Heart*, for example, Drysdale claimed that "actions flow immediately from the thoughts, but more especially from the affections and dispositions of the heart." In another place, he defined *true religion* as "a principle of the heart" rather than any abstract system of rules for external behaviour. In addition, he claimed that one of the great recommendations of the gospel was its ability to soften the heart "into sympathy and the tenderest affections for our neighbours." Thus, despite his enormous debt to Stoicism, Drysdale could also utilize the language of sensibility.

John Logan, whose sentimental poetry was so admired by the readers of the Scottish press, was equally concerned to derive morality from human feeling and to emphasise the significance of spectatorial sympathy to human relations. For him, as for so many other Moderate preachers, Christianity was essentially a religion of feeling. "All that refinement which polishes the mind; all that gentleness of manners which sweetens the intercourse of human society, which political philosophers consider as the effects of wise legislation and good government," he argued, were lessons that were taught by Christianity. Christian *meekness* or *gentleness*, he cautioned his audience, was not the same as that *courtesy of manners* which was learned in the world; it flowed from a feeling heart and was refined by a cultivated education. "Man," maintained Logan, "is oftener guided by sentiment and feeling than by abstract reasoning." What is more, a
"general feeling, with regard to morality, pervades the human species." For Logan, it was not so important to document the origin of moral distinctions as it was for Adam Smith. Whether they derived from moral sense or sentiment he suggested, was less significant than the fact that they were natural to the human frame and were based upon irreducible human feelings.

It was this same sensibility or complacency that led to truly refined, as opposed to artificial manners, which also allowed man to sympathize with the woes of others. Such a capacity for sympathy, Logan emphasised, was not at all incompatible with a serious mind, which was the companion of a feeling heart:

It is a-kin to that virtuous sensibility from which all the sympathetic emotions are derived; and readily associates with those good affections which constitute the most amiable part of our nature. The thoughtless and dissipated are unconcerned spectators of human happiness or misery; they mar not their enjoyments by rushing into foreign woe; and are never so much in earnest, as to give a tear to the distresses of mankind.

But such men were unnatural; they had been corrupted by the artificial manners of those around them. By nature, man was a serious being. There was a string in the heart which was closely tuned to the voice of sorrow and impressions of grief had the strongest effects upon the human mind. Compassion, he asserted in another sermon, was an "affection wisely woven into our frame by the Author of our nature." Mankind were not unconcerned spectators, he maintained in another place. "We are interested in every event that befalls our fellow man. Sympathy makes us feel the distresses of others; and the best
affections of the heart become the sources of woe.\textsuperscript{169}

Given his appreciation of innate sensibility and spectatorial sympathy, therefore, it is hardly surprising that Logan, in concert with his fellow Moderates, also sought to define those techniques whereby the individual could stimulate virtuous sensibility and achieve the highly moral state of sympathy. In a world which was not generally a school of virtue; in a world wherein corrupted manners, vicious deeds and evil communications assailed the individual on every side; it was imperative to retire occasionally into the relative safety of one's own mind.\textsuperscript{170} Here, one could construct a world of our own and call up whatever ideas one pleased, "dazzled no longer with the false glitter of the world." There is a time when solitude has a charm," wrote Logan, "when cheerfulness gives place to melancholy; when the house of mourning is better suited to the soul than to the house of mirth."\textsuperscript{171} Such a use of the imagination was natural to men, Logan suggested, for men delighted to attend to histories of woe and to sit as spectators to scenes of sorrow. Even those individuals who bore their own fates with that stoic self-command that Adam Smith so strongly advocated, through some strange perversion of mind, could often rush into sympathy for the distresses of others.

Given the significance which these Moderate clergymen attached to fellow feeling and sympathy, it is surprising that historians have paid so little attention to their discussion of the workings of the moral sentiments. In the case of Henry
Mackenzie and the Mirror Club, however, it has been impossible for historical and literary observers to overlook the centricity of their language of sensibility. William McLeod Bannatyne pointed to the importance of cultivated sentiment in an early essay for the Mirror, adding that one of its advantages was "that delicate complacency of mind which leads us to consult the feelings of those with whom we live, by showing a disposition to gratify them as far as in our power, and by avoiding whatever has a contrary tendency." Far from being an insignificant quality, he added, this same sensibility was essential to social life. Also writing in the Mirror, the Baron David Hume underlined the relationship between the social instinct and morality proper. A jealous sensibility, he suggested, was the chief safeguard of virtue. And George Home also illuminated the social affections, particularly as evidenced in cheerfulness and good humour, as not only contributors to happiness but also as the harbingers of virtue. These expanded the "heart to all the interest of humanity." An unfeeling heart, he added, was incapable of virtue.

The importance of sociability, even in the matter of trifles, was an underlying theme in the Mirror and Lounger. Despite the fact that the Mirror Club were careful not to push this sociability too far, lest it destroy the moral autonomy of the individual, its members believed that fellow feeling must be carefully cultivated in the interest of virtue. Henry Mackenzie asserted that neither the precepts of the moralist
nor the mere sense of duty provided an adequate moral framework. "The feelings must be won," he claimed, "as well as the reason convinced, before men change their conduct."

Among men of little social affection, he added, there could be but little virtue.

But sociability was inherently problematic in the fantastical and personally corrosive world of artificial luxury. One of the chief weapons of this world was ridicule which, by degrees, broke down the individual's awareness of moral rectitude and blunted the natural feelings. Mackenzie had already plotted the relentless progress of corruption over potential virtue in his novel *The Man of the World*. He was to return to this theme again and again in the *Mirror* and *Lounger*, especially in the tales of characters like *Father Nicholas*. Although he had a sound moral training in his youth, the future *Father Nicholas's* manhood, independence and sensibility were crushed by his involvement in the dissipated society of Paris. In order to avoid shame in the eyes of evil companions, he adopted the characteristics of a man of the world -- selfishness combined with an ability to counterfeit. But *Father Nicholas's* fate was not an inevitable one. Individuals could cultivate their virtuous feelings while still retaining their manhood. Indeed, these same virtuous feelings were the perfect antidote to the pernicious influence of men of the world. For one could not entertain them and remain social chameleon at one and the same time. He who feels that luxury of pensive tenderness, suggested Mackenzie, "will not easily be
won from the pride of virtue." 178

"We are all of us too little inclined to look into our own minds," added Mr. Mirror, "all to apt to put too high a value on the things of this life." The road back to virtue was an internal, as well as an external one. It involved the use of sophisticated mental techniques in the cultivation of the sentiments. What the Mirror Club argued was that one could adapt that pliancy of mind or complacency which was so highly developed in a polite and refined society, in order to construct mental scenes most appropriate to the development of the virtuous emotions. These feelings "sprang from nature" and could never be "created by artificial instruction." 179

Nonetheless, they could be cultivated with the aid of the sympathetic imagination.

Pliancy of mind, sometimes referred to as sympathetic imagination, was the tool whereby a corrupt society could be regenerated. Used in the sense of the Mirror Club, this was anything but a technique for allowing the individuals to "shift the hue and colour of their minds, according to the change of situation or the variety of incidents." 180 Rather, it was a mental mechanism for discovering "wisdom and virtue, simple, uniform and unchanging." The same tool which had helped to transform men into artificial automata, could be adapted to make them morally sensitive again. As Mr. Lounger put it:

there needs a certain pliancy of mind, which society alone can give, though its vices often destroy, to render us capable of that gentle melancholy which makes sorrow pleasant, and affliction useful." 181
Mackenzie wanted to emphasize that sympathy was "the most powerful principle in the human composition." In particular, he wanted to argue that the attainment of a state of sympathy with the problems of others was the ideal means of encouraging personal morality and social benevolence. In a state of sympathy, the turbulent passions were put to sleep while the milder passions or virtuous sentiments were excited. "A melancholy kind of indulgence," the encouragement of a gentle "flow of sorrow" represented exactly the sort of sympathetic correspondence that Mackenzie had in mind.

Like his Moderate friends, Henry Mackenzie suggested that it was appropriate occasionally to go to the house of mourning. The actual or fictitious contemplation of the funeral of a virtuous young lady, for example, gave rise to the kind of melancholy indulgence which was a far cry from the death's head and the bones of traditional religion. Such sorrow was neither ungentle nor unmanly. Instead, this was a potentially fruitful sort of melancholy conducive to virtue. "Amidst the warmth of social affection and of social sympathy," wrote Mackenzie, "the heart will feel the weakness, and the duties of humanity."

In an early essay for the Mirror, Mackenzie outlined the significance of both the social disposition and gentle melancholy to the active virtues. Although he appreciated that an excessive indulgence of this temperament might well disqualify the overly sensitive individual for life in ordinary society, he was persuaded that a certain degree of it was
morally imperative:

a man under the impressions I have described, will be led to look into himself, and will see the vanity of setting his heart upon external enjoyment. He will feel nothing of that unsocial spirit which gloomy and aescetic severities inspire; but the gentle, and not unpleasing melancholy that will be diffused over his soul, will fill it with a calm and sweet benevolence, will elevate him to look upon the rest of the world as his brethren, travelling the same road, and subject to the like calamities with himself; it will prompt his wish to alleviate and assuage the bitterness of their sufferings, and extinguish in his heart every sentiment of malevolence or of envy.

In his treatment of this "gentle, and not unpleasing melancholy," Mackenzie's language closely paralleled that of the Moderate preachers. Not only could it help the soul to feel sweet benevolence and to rise above any mean or selfish passion, but it also taught man to regard the rest of the world as his brethren. This was no mere passive emotion. For such a soul was by nature philanthropic; it actively sought to relieve the distresses of others.

We are at the point where the discourse of sensibility connected with and reinforced the needs of the Scottish social order. Throughout the pages of the Mirror and Lounger, Mackenzie and his colleagues promoted a new role for the landed and upper classes, not as heroic warriors or conspicuous consumers, but as practitioners of benevolence. They believed that this benevolence, if it were to act as a true bond for a threatened moral community, needed to be based upon genuine fellow feeling rather than abstract notions of utility or public duty. At the same time, this fellow feeling should not
be pushed too far. In all one's internal flights of gentle melancholy, one needed to keep a firm grasp upon one's initial complacency. One needed, as George Home indicated in his essay for the Mirror, to retain one's good nature and cheerfulness, despite any negative characteristics in one's social environment. Otherwise, gentle melancholy could be transformed into spleen or melancholy and result in a withdrawl from the social arena. This danger, however, was particularly applicable to the man of sentiment in a modern and supposedly corrupt age, wherein virtue tended neither to be recognised nor vice punished. "In the earlier periods of society, before mankind are corrupted by the excesses of luxury and refinement," wrote Home, the public arena tended to reward true merit more accurately than the present.  

The Greek and Roman republics, in particular, were exemplary in recognising and applauding virtue. The modern world, despite its much vaunted humanity, was not peopled by such disinterested and impartial observers. One could never be sure that one's fellow citizens would "give the preference where it was due."

Mackenzie developed a similar argument in one of the last essays in the Mirror. While he made it clear that nothing was more attractive than those "delicate strokes of sentimental morality, which refer our actions to the determination of feeling," there was always a danger of pushing sentiment and sensibility too far. Particularly in the case of young enthusiasts of sentiment, it was necessary to ensure that they did not fall victim to ethical error or become dissatisfied
with social life. Self-command, prudence and equanimity were needed to temper the gospel of sentiment if it was to be socially effective. The cultivation of a gentle sensibility that was not incompatible with stoic manliness or the public spirit of civic humanism was no simple task. The moral education of the finely balanced man of feeling had to be conducted with consummate care and attention, not to mention a deep understanding of the individual and the passions. It demanded a new approach to both the subject and the matter of education, which will be the topic of the next chapter.

Conclusion

No less than three relatively distinct sets of vocabularies were involved in the discussion of practical morality in late eighteenth century Scottish cultural circles. Civic humanism, particularly its stress upon the luxury and corruption which could destroy moral autonomy, indicated the dangers to which virtue was subject in a refined age. Stoic discourse accentuated the role of reason and self-command to the maintenance of the ethical personality in a problematic world. Together, these two ancient discursive domains dealt with the public and private practice of virtue. But there was another, truly modern discursive network, which provided a much deeper understanding of the relationship between the individual and society. Sensibility gave pre-eminence to the human feelings, specifically those softer and cooler affections which
had their root in an instinctive sociability, for the cultivation of the moral personality and community. Drawing upon the theoretical framework of Adam Smith, practical Scottish moralists viewed sensibility not only as the key to understanding distinctions between refined and primitive societies, but also as a temper of mind which could effectively neutralize the threat of luxury to the historically vulnerable modern state. But the Scottish moralist had to tread the sticky path of sensibility with some care, lest it too become another weapon in the armoury of the artificial man of the world. Moreover, if indulged too far, sensibility made one unfit for active participation in society. Sensibility was the key; it needed to be cultivated if the nation was to be saved; but the ancient lessons of manly independence and stoic self-control could only be ignored at considerable risk to the individual and the polity.

The complex balancing act that ensued, a product of overlapping yet distinctive discursive networks, guaranteed a new and intensive attention to education as the vehicle for constructing the virtuous personality in a modern organic society. In addition, it suggested new and powerful controls over entry into the ranks of a moral community organized primarily in terms of land and status. The young elite could no longer be left alone to develop their own ethical strategies in accordance with the general will of the community. Moralists now sought to turn them into subjects in novel relationships of power and subordination. As always, the young
learned their new role more quickly than their parents. A STUDENT wrote in an essay To the Principal of Edinburgh University:

The mind is never so sensible to honour, nor more susceptible of emulation, as in youth. Then are our passions strongest; then are they more easily roused; and when roused, with the greatest difficulty are they restrained; because at this period we are less under the direction of reason, and least debauched by the world. 188

This obliging student must have pleased Principal Robertson, for he hit two very important nails on the head. The young were not as yet corrupted by the luxurious world and their moral sentiments were at their height. What is more, he called for more direction over the young, by means of chastisements, rewards and the excitement of emulation. He was not to be disappointed.
CHAPTER THREE

THE CONSTRUCTION OF ADOLESCENCE IN LATE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY SCOTLAND

Nature brings her purest fires,
Love that burns with chaste desires;
Friendships undebas'd by Art,
Candour's unsuspicious heart;
Valour's generous ardent flame,
Burning with the thirst of fame:
These in simple colours dress'd,
Grace the mirror of thy breast;
Virtues, pleasures, half divine,
These, enchanting Youth! are thine.
(from On Youth by Mrs. Moody, Scots Magazine, July, 1788).

There exists a fairly widespread historical impression that adolescence was an invention of industrial society which reached its apotheosis in late nineteenth century America. Phillipe Ariès, for example, believes that adolescence was not a recognized social category until the aftermath of the industrial revolution.¹ In Youth and History, John Gillis points out that, while youth may have been recognized as a vague stage during the medieval period or as a threatening menace during the urbanization of the late eighteenth century, a modern and sentimental view of adolescence had to await the late second half of the nineteenth century.² In a similar vein, John and Virginia Demos view the social construction of adolescence as the culmination of a crisis that was taking place in the American family and among its young members as a result of urbanization and rapid industrialization.³ And Selwyn Troen has also written about the discovery of the
adolescent by American educational reformers in the early
nineteen hundreds.4

The argument that adolescence is a relatively modern
phenomenon has not gone completely unchallenged, however. In
his massive work The Family, Sex and Marriage in England,
1500-1800, Lawrence Stone asserts that the view that
adolescence was a special problem of the nineteenth or early
twentieth century is sheer historical fantasy.5 Unfortunately,
Stone is not very specific as to what he himself means by
adolescence and only briefly describes some of the more
negative attributes of unruly apprentices in the seventeenth
and eighteenth century. A much stronger case is presented by
Natalie Zemon Davis, who suggests that late medieval French
villages had sociétés joyeuses which provided rites of passage
for young men while, at the same time, allowing them symbolic
outlets for sexual frustration.6 Her analysis is less
convincing, however, when applied to the urban centres, whose
Abbeys of Misrule included married adults as well as callow
youths. Adopting a specifically Ericsonian model of
adolescence, Steven Smith has suggested that London apprentices
of the seventeenth century evidenced distinctly adolescent
traits, positive as well as negative.7 In addition, he claims
that apprenticeship not only helped to institutionalize the
adolescent stage for its members but provided precisely the
kind of peer group bonds that tend to characterize a youth
culture.

Such analyses rightly point to the danger of viewing the
pre-industrial era as one in which youth was completely invisible. Still, the researcher needs to beware of attaching more significance to the societes joyeuses or apprenticeship than they are able to bear. Rites of passage and ritualized outlets for sexual and other tensions were not specific to these sub groups in what was, after all, a highly incorporated society. Nor is it necessary to deny the existence and significance of youth during the period between 1500 and 1700 in order to appreciate the startling and undeniable fact that contemporary commentators rarely singled out that stage for particular attention. Less interesting, perhaps, than the issue of the existence of youth culture, is the fact that historians like Davis and Smith have been forced to resort to explicitly modern psychological and anthropological theories in order to establish its existence. By doing so, they have neatly reinforced the historical perception that pre-industrial societies thought sufficiently little of the young as to have no discursive formulations of their own for illuminating the adolescent stage. In other words, Smith and Davis have substituted scientific explanations and cultural archetypes for what they found so patently lacking in the symbolic world of the past.

But this emphasis upon cultural archetype, as well as industrial society, tends to obscure, rather than clarify our understanding of the conceptual categorization and genesis of adolescence. For the enlightened men of the eighteenth century had already discovered the adolescent and his uses. In his
Emile, Rousseau singled out the years after the age of fifteen as a critical transitional period between childhood and full maturity. This period of tempestuous revolution was foretold by a murmuring of the passions. For Rousseau, sexual puberty was an important turning point in the human development. But the passions of the adolescent were not at all confined to the opposite sex. "All his connexions with his species, all the affections of his soul, are born with this sentiment," argued Rousseau. Far from turning into a sexual animal, the period of puberty awakened the individual's feelings of sociability. Youth was the period of compassion, forgiveness, and generosity. The young were particularly prone to sympathy with their fellow men. Moreover, this same sympathy was much more "with their pains than with their pleasures... The sight of happiness is more apt to inspire envy than love... But who does not sympathize with the unhappy sufferer?"

Rousseau's intellectual contribution to the concept of adolescence has been duly noted, even by American psychologists, but its influence upon the old régime has been regarded as minor. What has been overlooked, however, is the fact that Rousseau was not the only writer to discuss the emotional nature and social utility of adolescents. Rousseau's Scottish admirers not only developed but propagandized a recognizably modern view of adolescence long before the era of industrialization. This view was not applied in the widest democratic sense, of course, but was aimed at Scottish 'elite and their literary representatives. Thus, it focussed upon the
sons and daughters of landed society, but could also include the offspring of divines and lawyers. The new view of adolescence did not so much reflect an actual crisis within the family or youth itself, but was consciously developed by an elite culture as a mechanism of social control in the widest sense. The discursive formations revolving around the concept of youth and its perceived emotional characteristics were deeply embedded in the moral literature of late eighteenth century Scotland. This same literature, of immense significance within Scotland itself, was also well received throughout Great Britain and the United States. However, it reflected a particularly Scottish concern about the negative effects of an emerging commercial society upon national virtue and manners. Not only did this new perspective of youth negate the formerly vague or adult status of the young, but it also targeted them as a dependent variable within a complex social equation.

The term *adolescence*, of course, is a modern, rather than an eighteenth-century one. Given the grave historical danger in attempting to impose modern and rigid scientific categories upon the world of the past, it may seem somewhat anachronistic for the Scottish historian to adopt it. It is clear, however, that the Scots themselves felt the need for a new term which could help to illuminate the distinct period between childhood and adulthood. Writing in 1760, William Smellie, the acting editor of the *Scots Magazine* and a practical moralist in his own right, lamented the lack of differentiation between the
stages of emotional growth. "We are obliged," he complained, "to use the word child for all that space between infancy and adulthood." In the decades that followed, the term youth would come to be imbued with many, but certainly not all, of the qualities that we today associate with adolescence. More than a mere stage of semi-dependence or a set of rites and ceremonials leading to full adult participation, youth came to denote a sharp appreciation of the period between puberty and a full entry into adult life. For the Scottish literati of the late eighteenth century, the period began about the age of fourteen and fifteen. They regarded the period as one of growth, primarily in emotional and intellectual terms. While they rarely referred to the physical changes associated with puberty, they were aware that a newly awakened attraction to the opposite sex was characteristic of the period. Indeed, they sought to manipulate this attraction in the interest of virtue. But the blossoming of passion or feeling that was associated particularly with youth was not at all restricted to the sexual plane. Youth was the period of affection and attachment generally. It was warm towards friendship, honour and virtue. What is more, it was the period when sociability and the sympathetic emotions were at their height.

It was also a period of impressionability. As Hugh Blair put it in one of his many sermons directed at the young:

Your character is now, under divine assistance, of your own forming; your fate is, in some measure, put into your own hands. Your nature is as yet pliant and soft. Habits have not preoccupied your understanding.
Precisely because it was passionate and impressionable, youth was in a position of grave danger. Its passions, unchecked by experience or a mature reason, could easily run to excess. The external environment, especially, could seduce it and lead it astray. Thus, youth needed to be strictly supervised. At the same time, this supervision needed to take into account the nature of the growing individual. In a plea to parents and tutors, James Fordyce warned of the vulnerability of youth and its too early exposure to a dangerous world. He also advised that it was necessary to win over their hearts:

> Expect not however to see them perfect, or established all at once. Require not too much from their tender years. Make candid allowance for the gaiety, the giddiness, and little innocent frolics of youth. Remember you were once young. Restrain them not from a sober mirth, and decent amusements suited to their age and station.  

Parents and tutors were instructed to be friends as well as teachers.

The writings of Hugh Blair and James Fordyce, both ministers of the Church of Scotland, attest to a new attitude towards youth and its education. Such an attitude, to be sure, had not simply appeared overnight. As early as 1742, James Barklay of Dalkeith had called for a new emphasis on the moral instruction of youth, one which stressed the importance of character formation and called upon educators to plant generous purpose in the glowing breast of the young. Even more interesting, David Fordyce, the brother of James Fordyce, also stressed the need for better supervision and moral instruction of the young. Especially concerned lest the new rage for
polite manners in the Scotland of the 1740s could corrupt the virtue of the young, he also advocated a system of instruction geared more explicitly to the imaginative and passionate nature of this age group.\(^{19}\)

While James Barklay and David Fordyce may have helped to pioneer a new appreciation of youth, it is not to them that we should look for anything like a full exposition of its problems and potentials. Writing in the 1740s, the concern of these Scottish educators about modern manners and the corruption of the young might well have seemed somewhat exaggerated to those enlightened contemporaries advocating commerce, improvement and civilized behaviour. In contrast to his fellow moral philosopher Fordyce, it is interesting to note that Adam Smith found no need to dwell unduly upon the education of youth. The moral community performed the socialization function naturally, and the sooner the better. Smith, whose thought typified the optimism of the early Scottish enlightenment, therefore, had very little to say about youth. It was for him a gay and impressionable period, lacking somewhat in his pre-eminent values of stability and self command. His concept of moulding the moral personality revolved around the removal of the child from the indulgent partiality of parents at a fairly early age and pushing him out into the society of play-fellows and companions in that great school of self-command -- the world.\(^{20}\)

A given society or social elite does not focus upon the period of adolescence unless it has a good reason for doing so. Youth tends to be ignored, and even invisible, unless it
becomes a problem or is targeted as a useful stage to be manipulated. By the late eighteenth century, there was a general appreciation of the significance of youth in polite Scottish society that was not restricted to a few educators. The late eighteenth century practical Scottish moralists illuminated adolescence because they wanted to manipulate its sensibility or propensity to sympathy. They wanted to do this because they regarded the proper cultivation of youth as a preventative for and an antidote to the contagious effects of changes that were taking place in Scottish society. As William Creech, the publisher of the Mirror suggested in his contribution to John Sinclair's Statistical Account, the economic improvement within Edinburgh society was balanced by a decline in the bonds of the moral community. As a result of the "gradual progress of commerce and luxury and the corresponding effect upon manners," the social bonds between the different ranks had been dissolved; patriotic civic gatherings had been replaced by luxurious private parties; morality and religion were on the defensive; children no longer respected their parents; and the fashion that once enhanced rank had been transformed into mere foppism.21

Given this widespread perception, therefore, it was difficult for the Scottish literati to adopt an unequivocally positive attitude towards commercialization or the virtue of the nation's elite. Writers in the Scots Magazine, for example, began to warn their readers about the modern corruptions in manners and advocated an increased attention to
the moral instruction of the most vulnerable -- the young. In 1774, the editor condemned the recently published Lord Chesterfield's Letters as an unsuitable handbook for the instruction of youth, pointing out that the work tended to obscure virtue and vice under a mask of refined manners.22 James Fordyce, who was regularly featured, also singled out Chesterfield for condemnation and emphasized the dangers faced by conceited and spirited youth in a potentially corrupting society.23 He singled out evil company and the fantasy world of fashionable society as the biggest threat:

See you that youth, whose happier days
Inspir'd each gen'rous mind with praise;
Whom careful Culture's prudent hand
Had taught his passions to command,
Whose manners spoke a gentle heart,
Beyond the reach of modern art.

Here was a typical late eighteenth century depiction of the properly educated upper class Scottish youth -- one whose feelings had been cultivated, not removed, and who was characterised by a gentle heart rather than an affectation of feeling or that easygoing indifference which mimicked complacency but masked a vicious or interested personality. Even such an ideal type, Fordyce warned, could be metamorphised into an unnatural immoral being through the example of evil company.

Other articles, poems and editorials stressed the virtuous feelings of susceptible youth and advocated an educational programme which could cultivate this natural sensibility of the young elite.24 In one of two essays on sensibility, for example, A LADY pointed out that such an education not only
conformed to the emotional nature of the young individual, but it was also highly conducive to the paternalistic and socially stabilising virtue of benevolence.25

The period of youth, therefore, was now being singled out as one of considerable importance and quite distinct from other periods of life. In an essay entitled *Observations on the Passions*, one author outlined the three stages from which the life of a man was to be viewed -- infancy, youth and manhood:

> The first includes that portion of time before reason shows itself; in the second it appears indeed, but being incompetent to the proper government of the creature, requires the aid, support, and correction of education; in the third it attains to its maturity.26

James Fordyce, in *Addresses to Young Men*, also suggested that "besides the difference of form and appearance sufficiently visible for the most part, the several periods of life, from the commencement of reason, may commonly be discriminated from one another by a certain cast of thought and disposition proper to each."27 Youth, he added, was marked by: a lively fancy, good understanding, a retentive memory, spirit, a warm temper and tender feelings, pride, ambition, and a love of action. In the young, he also found: a propensity to amusement, candour and bluntness, impatience, naive hopes, and, of course, "a restless attachment to the other Sex." These characteristics, he concluded might leave youth open to manifold dangers; but they were also valuable seeds of improvement.

Another important propagandist of the new view of youth, and a central figure in the discourse centering on it, was Henry Mackenzie. In his novels and the essays of the
Mirror and Lounger, he targeted adolescence, not as an important but as the crucial stage in character formation and moral cultivation. What is more, he argued that youth needed to be protected from the world and its sensibility most carefully nurtured by professional parents and educators. More than any other writer perhaps, he advocated an extension of adolescence until such a time as the young individual was able to deal with modern social life. Children who were "prematurely bedaubed with the varnish of the world," wrote Mackenzie, generally contracted all the vices of age long before they arrived at manhood.28 Furthermore, they lost that youthful sentiment of virtue and social affection which alone could enable them to withstand the artificiality and artifice of the commercial environment. In this, one of his many attacks upon Chesterfield and modern education, Mackenzie claimed:

In place of cherishing all the amiable simplicity and frankness of children, every emanation of the heart is checked by the constant restraints, dissimulation, and frivolous forms of fashion and address, with which we harass them. Hence they are nearly the same at fourteen as at five and twenty.

For Mackenzie, this period between fourteen and twenty-five was very important indeed. And he was by no means alone in this conviction.

One revealing source for the discussion of youth was the
Caledonian Mercury which, in 1768, published a series of letters from CATO on the state of Scottish society at that time. In one of these, he adopted the familiar language of civic humanism to condemn a nation that had "become extremely rich, and had been at its period of greatness, its manners are corrupted and it is replete with luxury and vice." In his very next letter, CATO attacked the practice of sending young gentlemen abroad to complete their education. They soon try, he wrote, to copy the luxurious French in dress, taste and manners. The young, he stressed, were in particular need of protection from this same luxury and vanity.

In the same year, another writer submitted an essay entitled Useful Remarks on Education in which he advised parents to be very careful in raising their children. Neither too strict nor too indulgent an education was advisable. Instead, one had to avoid extremes and ensure that the education was balanced. If such advice sounds somewhat vague, the aim of this balanced education was more precise and explicitly moral. "The pre-eminence of virtue is to be in every way inculcated and this native love of praise encouraged in the tender breast." The youth was to be carefully educated and his tender breast dexterously manipulated. From this time on, we find more and more correspondents beginning to stress the role of this same tenderness of youth.

Two of the most popular essayists in the newspaper during this period were the SPECULATIST and PHILANDER. In 1769, PHILANDER gave some advice to a dissatisfied and idle country
correspondent by the name of LORENZO. The latter, he pointed out, had an estate in the country and should manage part of the business himself. In addition to practising moderate economic improvement, he and his wife should practice self-improvement by studying belles lettres. Most important, however, LORENZO should spend his time educating his children:

how important is the task assigned him, and how much of his time ought he to employ in tending their rising years, and in forming their tender minds to every sentiment of goodness and of virtue.

In the same year, the paper contained one of many future addresses to youth, in which the author encouraged young people to prepare themselves for marriage. Marriage, the author added, was on the decline due to the "gaiety, levity, and extravagance which so dreadfully appears throu' the whole nation." The period we live in, he remarked, was a licentious age marked by the delusive pleasures of riot and dissipation.

The SPECULATIST wrote many moralistic and polite essays for the Caledonian Mercury. In his first essay on male education, for example, the author discussed the relationship between virtue and manners in the following way:

As virtue, knowledge, and integrity are undoubtedly implied in the word manners; those qualities must be inculcated and attained, to render the rule essentially beneficial to mankind; I would beg leave to alter the words of the proverb a little in order to enforce it, and would desire that all who are entrusted with the nurture of children would read it thus: Education makes the man.

Having made this essential point, the author described exactly what an education in virtuous manners for a young man should
look like. For men of genius, it needed to be centered upon the classics, although it could include some more modern subjects as well. It should not be pedantic and should include history, which provides "a just knowledge of things." Its primary aim was the creation of the virtuous citizen not the formal scholar.

In the same article, the author hit upon a subject that was to become of increasing importance to the literati. This subject was discussed in terms of the relationship between a youth and the world:

Nothing is more prejudicial, than too early commencing the man, before the judgement is ripened by experience, or guarded against the temptations which daily blast us...There has been a maxim of late years too much inculcated which is to let youth have what is called an early knowledge of the world; and hence it is that boys have, according to this modern phrase, a knowledge of the world, who through their whole lives never know one necessary qualification of life. They become instructed in the vice and follies of the age.

The need to prolong youth until it was prepared to deal with the world was a common theme in the pages of the Mirror and Lounger. In fact, Mr. Lounger's treatment of this issue stimulated a series of delightful essays in the Scots Magazine, entitled Original Thoughts on Education. Also published in the Edinburgh Evening Courant, the author literally played the devil's advocate. BELZEBUB advised parents who wanted to be truly modern and liberal, to push their children into company and the world as quickly as possible. This was necessary if the young man was ever to become a true man of fashion and disciple of BELZEBUB. He condemned those systems of education
which prevented an early entry into manhood. "What signifies Greek and Latin, or knowledge, or morals, to a fine gentleman?", he asked. Besides, ancient and modern educational programmes took far too long to implement, whereas BELZEBUB suggested that his would turn a boy into a man much earlier. "Your son will be a MAN at twelve: and a boy all the rest of his life," he gleefully pointed out. The best form of education, he concluded was one in which "no restraint is put upon the inclinations of YOUTH, that they are early introduced into life -- to public amusements; and that they soon commence men of the world." 

Delaying entry into a problematic society was one component of the new attitude towards youth, the cultivation of youthful feeling was another. The SPECULATIST emphasized the importance of teaching individuals their duties in terms of their rank in society. It was particularly incumbent upon the upper classes to practice benevolence, he maintained. Thus, it was necessary to "Instill into their minds the most early sentiments of humanity and justice." To this end, the tender feelings of youth were to be encouraged and developed. Furthermore, all aspects of the youth's behaviour were to be scrutinized and monitored. Education was to be total and to be directed at the inner man; it was not at all confined to formal learning within institutions.

Institutions were not unimportant, however, as can be seen in the lively debate on the nature and function of the Edinburgh High School from 1775 on. In that year, the
Caledonian Mercury printed an editorial on the importance of education and pleaded for more money to build a new high school, away from the low class district it then occupied. By 1776, a number of letters had been printed in the paper, generally critical of educational practice and philosophy in the High School itself. In particular, writers opposed the insensitive beating of young boys, the lack of discipline, and the preoccupation with absurd rules of Latin grammar as opposed to a more general appreciation of the classics which could contribute to character formation. All of these letters suggest a concern with the emotions and morals of the young.

This obsession with moral cultivation also extended to Edinburgh University with writers generally encouraging young Scotsman to attend this institution rather than an English or continental university, wherein the young learned habits of dissipation and idleness and wherein parents "for the mere possibility of having their sons poets, or mathematicians, they run them into the certainty of learning every vice." The author of this same tirade advised the Scotsman, however, not to fall into the error of "perceiving the dangerous consequences of a university education, thinks it better that his son should know nothing, than that he should know too much." Some forms of education may have been dangerous, but education itself was imperative.

In order to deal with the possible adverse moral effects of education in a large city like Edinburgh, private academies were opened. For example, the Nicholson Street Academy was
operated by a Mr. Ruffin who, in 1782, offered to take in gentlemen's sons who were too inclined to pursue their own interests if attending the University or High School; and, in 1790, Mr. Ferrier began private education classes, not only to supplement university tuition, but especially to watch over the morals of young men. A PARENT wrote to the paper in 1784, condemning vice among the young and stressing the need for a more fitting education in which morals and manners would take precedence. And, in 1786, the same author cited the necessity for also checking the manners of the teachers in the high school:

In an age when patriotism and public virtue have deserted the land; when luxury, licentiousness, and corruption have pervaded all ranks of the community; when every man is venal and mercenary, and no one can be safely trusted without a guard; Parents, it becomes you, who are deeply interested in the state of the rising generation, to keep a watchful eye over the public institutions for the education of youth. From thence only, we can expect that innocence and honesty, those habits of virtue and the sentiments of generosity, which may yet revive the vigour and the virtue of happier times.

Since moral cultivation was the sole mechanism for reviving the nation's health, its professional practitioners had to be individuals of scrupulous morality.

For education to have its proper effect upon youth, argued several correspondents, it was necessary to have an increased respect for teachers. In a debate upon the newly published Loose Hints upon Education (1781) by Lord Kames, both MONITOR and LYCURGUS felt that teachers should be held in much higher esteem than they were at present. To this end, parents
needed to enter into the educational process in order to ensure more civility among young gentlemen who were all too used to treating their instructors as social inferiors. These two writers also championed a greater attention to private education and a more liberal and explicitly moral plan of education than the narrow one which is used at present. The upper ranks, noted LYCYURGUS were taught incivility and disrespect for teachers at an early age. These youths needed to appreciate that teachers were "the most useful class of men."  

In 1782, the newspaper ran a long essay complete with instructions for a domestic tutor in a landed family. The document is a fascinating insight into the social relations of the day. In addition to an extensive list including learning how to drink toasts and avoiding helping the assembled company to the host's dishes and bread, the tutor was to follow three essential norms. First, he was to maintain authority over his young charges. Second, he was not to take any ignominious treatment from his master, since this might weaken his position with his students. Last, but certainly not least, the domestic tutor was to cultivate the confidence and affection of the young men under his wing. He was to act in loco parentis and to maintain a certain tenderness of his own for his students. That the education of the young and the concomitant role of parents and teachers were topics of particular concern to enlightened Scottish society should now be abundantly clear. The view of education itself was, in the words of
contemporaries, more liberal and tender than typical eighteenth century practice. However, the aim was greater, not less, control over the growing individual. It was nothing less than an attempt to capture the young emotions. This control was not confined to the imparting of knowledge or skills; indeed, the new discussion of education paid little attention to these areas. Its focus was character formation and its range included virtually everything connected with manners and morals. Thus, alongside the social creation of its adolescence, youth was presented with a new set of mechanisms for its manipulation.

II

One of the perennial themes of civic humanist and moral discourse generally is that of friendship. Thus, it is hardly surprising that Blair and his Moderate colleagues continually referred to the importance of good friendships in their sermons. What is more, they constantly rejected any conception of a Christian heaven in which such relationships would not be continued. But it was not just any sort of friendship that Blair and his colleagues referred to. In a sermon on the subject he clearly distinguished between intimate private friendships and those which generally obtained in social life. Blair's sermon On Friendship is important for several reasons. It demonstrates Blair's preference for the private as opposed to the public sphere. It reflects a Rousseauean
concern with the disguise of real character in the world. Finally, it is an example of the way in which Blair linked the themes of friendship and domesticity with one of crucial significance in his sermons — the ingenuous sensibility of youth. The friendships that he wanted to discuss grew "neither out of interested designs, nor party zeal" but flowed from "that similarity of dispositions, that corresponding harmony of minds, which endears some person to our heart." Such friendships may be rarer in the present than in past times, but "Happy it is, when they take root in our early years; and are engrafted on the ingenuous sensibility of youth."

Blair had a great deal to say about youth and its sensibility. Many of his sermons were aimed specifically at this age group. Moreover, these had an influence which stretched beyond even that of his other sermons. For, the sermons containing advice to the young were printed and reprinted in countless volumes of moral essays for youth until well into the nineteenth century. Thus, when Blair's sermons were being criticized as vapid and contradictory by educated men, they were still being used as a source of moral instruction for the young. And, what is perhaps more important, they helped to set the pattern for such instruction.

Blair did not only single out the young as the particular object of his sermons. Because he was convinced that to every age there belonged "a distinct propriety of behaviour," he occasionally pointed the odd sermon specifically at middle or old age groups. But it was certainly to the young that he
usually spoke in sermons of this sort. And, even in those sermons which dealt expressly with other age groups, Blair invariably made some reference to the critical importance of the earlier period of life. In a sermon *On the Duties and Consolations of the Aged*, for example, Blair advised the more venerable members of his congregation to preserve as much of their youthful affections as possible. He said:

> Chilled by hand of time, the heart loses that tender sensibility with which it once entered into the concerns and sorrows of others...it is both the duty and the interest of the aged, to cherish the remains of kind affections; and from the days of former years, to recall such impressions as may tend to soften their hearts.

Much the same analysis was developed in Blair’s sermon *On the Duties belonging to Middle Age*. In this sermon, he was not so much concerned about that total decay of passion, which was characteristic of old age. Instead, he wanted to warn against the *passion for interest* which was a distinguishing feature of mature involvement in the modern commercial world. Blair’s emphasis on the importance of certain youthful qualities, however, remained unchanged:

> Amidst the excesses of youth, virtuous affections often remain. The attachments of friendship, love of honour, and the warmth of sensibility, give a degree of lustre to the character, and cover many a failing.

But when self-interest became the ruling principle of the heart, argued Blair, it crushed the *tenderness* and *generosity* of the young heart.

Blair underlined the importance of the sensibility and sympathetic capacity of the young in many of his sermons. But
nowhere did he develop his ideas on this subject to a greater extent than in one of his earliest sermons *On the Duties of the Young*. He began this moral discourse by outlining his own particular conception of youth and its character development.

Blair wrote:

Now is the seed-time of life; and according to what you sow, you shall reap. Your character is now, under divine assistance, of your own forming; your fate is, in some measure, put into your own hands. Your nature is yet pliant and soft. Habits have not established their dominion. Prejudices have not preoccupied your understanding. The world has not had time to contract and debase your affections. All your powers are more vigorous, disem-barrassed and free, than they will be at any future period. Whatever impulse you now give to your desires and passions, the direction is likely to continue.

It does not take any great analytical prowess to recognize that Blair was here singling out youth as a period of singular, indeed paramount, importance. Not only was it the formative period of life but it was also the time when energies could be concentrated to their greatest effect. What is perhaps somewhat less obvious, but of equal significance is the dichotomy which Blair here established between the world and the affections of youth. In this passage, the social environment was given a negative connotation; it tended to contract and debase the moral sentiments.

During the course of this sermon, Blair went on to develop this dichotomy even further. He argued that youth was the "season of warm and generous emotions." At this period in life, the "heart should then, spontaneously rise into the admiration of what is fair and excellent, and melt at the
discovery of tenderness and goodness." The defining characteristics of the world -- particularly those great cities which corrupted the heart -- were those of interest, cunning and deceit. As Blair put it:

If at an age, when the heart is warm, when the emotions are strong, and when nature is expected to show itself free and open, you can smile and deceive, what are we to look for, when you shall be longer hackneyed in the ways of men; when interest shall have completed the obduration of your heart.

The same point is reiterated throughout the sermons. Blair pictured the world as a soulless place which destroyed natural affections. The man of the world, a modern term of abuse which Henry Mackenzie adopted as the title of one of his novels, is one in whom these feelings have been completely or almost completely negated. Such an individual merely pursued selfish interest behind the mask of polite sociability.

Blair contrasted this man of the world with his own conception of the ideal type of youth in a sermon entitled On Candour. He opened the sermon by making a sharp distinction between true candour and that "guarded, inoffensive language, and that studied openness of behaviour, which we so frequently meet with among men of the world." Such individuals, Blair claimed, merely disguised their evil intentions behind smiles and smooth words. True candour, on the other hand, while it might lack something in external courtesy, was a virtue which consisted in sincerity or fairness of heart and genuine
sociability with others. This natural openness and generosity was a character that came perfectly naturally to the sympathetic youth. Indeed, Blair went on to maintain that, if this quality was not properly nurtured in youth, there was absolutely no hope for an individual's future moral development:

if they who are beginning the career of life set out with all the scruples of distrust; if, before they have had reason to complain of the world, they betray the diffidence of a jealous, and the malignity of a censorious mind, sad is the presage which may thence be drawn of their future dishonour...To youth it particularly belongs to be generous in sentiment, candid in opinion, undesigning in behaviour, open to the most favourable construction of actions and conduct.

Youth were by nature ingenuous and sensible. In a world that was extremely interested and indifferent, Blair wanted a little youth to go a long way. For it was only by cultivating one's youthful qualities to their fullest extent that one could hope to develop those sentimental rather than stoic internal resources with which one might combat the wiles of the world. It is interesting to note, however, that Blair did not, as one might have expected, discuss the possibility of extending adolescence as one means of ensuring that the individual would be better prepared to cope with modern social life. That idea, however, was very seriously entertained by other moralists, notably the authors of the Mirror and Lounger.

Blair undoubtedly regarded youth as the most critical stage of life. However, his assessment of its characteristics was not entirely one-sided. In addition to being the period when
the sympathetic emotions were at their most powerful, it was also a period characterized by vanity and impetuosity. These characteristics made the young particularly vulnerable to the allure of the world and often resulted in their moral downfall. Thus, Blair continually exhorted his young audience to temper their natural feelings and desires with a little circumspection and to listen carefully to the counsel of those more experienced than themselves. In a sermon entitled *On our Ignorance of Good and Evil in this Life*, for example, he warned the young against the power of headstrong desires:

This admonition I particularly direct to those who are in a period of life too often characterized by forward presumption, and headlong pursuit. The self-conceit of the young, is the great source of those dangers to which they are exposed; and it is particularly unfortunate, that the age which stands in most need of the counsel of the wise, should be the most prone to condemn it.  

Moreover, in the second of his two sermons *On the Government of the Heart*, Blair also observed:

that the young and ignorant are always the most violent in pursuit. The knowledge which is forced upon them by longer acquaintance with the world, moderates their impetuosity.

While Blair was certainly responsible for helping to create a new view of youth as a force for moral regeneration, he was far from being blind to its shortcomings. In addition to encouraging the young to cultivate and consolidate their social passions, he also urged them to moderate these passions within reason. "Let them never give up their hearts profusely to any attachment," he wrote, "without the countenance of reason and religion." Blair's youth, unlike Rousseau's *Emile*, was never
to be left completely to his own devices. His moral cultivation had to be carefully conducted by appropriate adult supervisors.

Apart from suggesting that the moral cultivation of youth demanded close attention, however, Blair did not discuss the appropriate monitory mechanisms. One point can be made with some confidence. So complex was human nature in Blair's eyes, and so careful did one have to be in cultivating the various passions involved, that the most fundamental aspects of education could only be carried out by individuals familiar with the youth's nature and development. Blair's analysis of the sentimental youth invariably led one to place great stress upon education within the family unit. Moreover, it encouraged a far greater awareness of the importance of the emotional relationship between parent and child to the learning process.

Some of these themes were articulated by Blair's more pragmatic colleague -- John Drysdale. In his sermons 'On Education and On Early Piety, Drysdale described youth as "the season most favourable for the acquisition of every useful, valuable and virtuous quality." This was because the heart had not yet been hardened by vicious habits but was "tender, fit to receive good impressions, and open to instruction." The primary purpose of the educator was to carefully cultivate and balance the youthful passions. The function of this same cultivation in the modern age was that of counteracting by every proper method the ways of the world which tended "so directly to strengthen a selfish and interested disposition."
Thus, it was necessary to complement sensibility with principle of mind in order to provide the suggestive and vulnerable youth with a defence against seduction.

Thus Drysdale also viewed the sensibility of youth as a moral force in a modern and excessively individualistic environment. If the sympathetic capacity of the young could be sufficiently nourished, they could act as a buffer against the disintegration of the moral community. Where Drysdale went beyond Blair was in his emphasis upon education within the domestic circle and on the role of the parent. Not once in his sermon On Education did Drysdale make any reference to institutionalised learning as such. Instead, he encouraged education in the home. Repeatedly, he concentrated upon the need to establish a close relationship between parents and children. "Very much of the propriety and the success of education," he maintained, "depends on the conduct of parents, and of those with whom children pass their early days." Moreover, he provided parents with some interesting hints for educating their offspring. The critical ingredient was kindness. If ever correction was needed, he suggested, "it must be with that calmness and tender reluctance which will convince the child that nothing but concern for his welfare could have forced the parents to employ it."

Drysdale also advised parents to encourage the child to become an active participant in the educational process. "Whatever the child learns," he stressed, "whether it be knowledge or virtue, must be chiefly his own doing: that is his
own mind must be the willing and active instrument for acquiring it." Thus, he advised parents to gain the hearts of their children if they wished to improve them. Much the same advice was given by Samuel Charters, who advised parents to "Sweeten authority with love." "Exert it not capriciously," Charters warned, "but for the good ends which the child may in time discern."

The parental relationship was to be cultivated from childhood; it was most critical, however, during the period of youth, when the passions were at their height. Charters advised those parents and such as have influence on youth to give a proper bias to these passions. Youthful vanity could be directed at what is truly praise-worthy rather than the false distinctions of wealth and beauty. The young could be taught to "value themselves for obedience, activity, self-denial, and humanity." Youth, echoed John Logan in a sermon of his own, was a period of discipline. The good habits learned in the domestic environment were critical to a virtuous life, he urged; they were not to be put away like some childish things.

If youth needed to be disciplined, it also needed to be nourished. A sermon on education by Samuel Charters focused upon the critical distinguishing feature of the period. He argued that all men were formed for sympathy, but it was the young who were most prone to compassion. What was imperative, he concluded, was for parents and teachers to encourage and direct the sympathetic emotions. For Moderate preachers such
as Blair, Drysdale, Logan and Charters, this common sensibility to pain and sorrow was the strongest bond between men. In a period when such bonds appeared to be weakening, such sensibility required special provision and care. Only by cultivating the social passions to their fullest extent could the moral nature of the Scottish community be maintained and the seemingly inexorable progression to a group of disparate and impenetrable individuals be halted. Such a viewpoint on the part of these practical, rather than other worldly, moralists, led them to concentrate upon youth as the crucial period in life when the social passions were at their strongest. In the process, they helped to initiate a discussion of both domestic life and education.

III

Young men were also a central focus of the Mirror and Lounger. Their authors regarded adolescence as the critical period of life and, like the Moderate clergy, asserted the need to carefully cultivate the young by means of the art of education. So noticeable was this concentration upon youth that it completely coloured all of the Mirror Club's literary criticism in addition to forming the subject matter of many of their essays. Indeed, one modern literary scholar has suggested that, although the Mirror Club advanced several avant garde literary positions, their insights were considerably obscured by the irritating tendency of Henry Mackenzie and his
colleagues to be overly preoccupied with the moral effects of literature upon young men.\textsuperscript{65}

The illumination and social stratification of youth was reflected in the essayists' fascinating use of descriptive adjectives. On the one hand, youth is unthinking; on the other, it thinks only of enjoyment. Youth has tremendous sensibility, but it is also very susceptible to corrupt influences. Youth is vivacious rather than reasonable. It is thoughtless and inexperienced; it is also gay, fanciful, enthusiastic and romantic. Typically, it is unassumingly modest; sometimes, however, it is characterized by presumptuous self-conceit. This use of such descriptive and highly charged terms, while occasionally contradictory, reflected the essayists' perception of youth as a distinct phase of life with very definite, albeit volatile, characteristics.

This stage needed to be manipulated by education. "However widely the thinking part of mankind have differed as to the proper mode of conducting education," wrote Mr. Mirror, "they have always been unanimous in their opinion of its importance."\textsuperscript{66} Thus began one of the first of the Mirror's many discussions of education and youth. Here, the author established some of the principles on which he and his colleagues would discuss these subjects throughout their essays. The first of these principles was the belief that all men, from the clown to the dancing master were equal from the hand of nature. But while all men were theoretically equal, the education of some was more socially significant than
others. Those "born to labour for their subsistence" were of little interest to Mr. Mirror. His remarks were explicitly directed at "those who are placed in a conspicuous station."

It was to the elite of Scottish society -- to gentlemen as Mr. Mirror referred to them -- that he directed any positive remarks upon education and youth. And his self-ordained mission was to provide some hints as to a practical education -- one which formed an alliance between "the virtues and the graces, the man and the citizen, and produce a being less dishonourable to the species than the courtier of Lord Chesterfield, and more useful to society than the savage of Rousseau." It was for the former, rather than the latter, that the writers in the Mirror reserved their scathing criticism. Rousseau, at least, did not obscure the essential relationship between virtue and vice or encourage the young to place self-interest before duty. Mr. Mirror would often paraphrase Rousseau in his role of observer of manners, but never Lord Chesterfield.

While expressing some admiration for Locke as an educational theorist, Mr. Mirror, alias George Home, regretted that this thinker had too summarily dismissed Greek and Latin as vehicles for moulding the young. The ancient authors and dead languages were "a most important branch in the education of a gentleman." This was precisely because the ancients spoke the language of virtue so clearly and simply:

Not to mention the slowness with which he acquires them, prevents his memory from being loaded with facts faster than his growing reason can compare and distinguish, he becomes
acquainted by degrees with the virtuous characters of ancient times: he admires their justice, temperance, fortitude, and public spirit, and burns with a desire to imitate them. The impressions these have made, and the restraints to which he has become accustomed, serve as a check to the many tumultuous passions which the ideas of religion alone would, at that age, be unable to control.

Classical learning was, therefore, one foundation of Mr. Mirror's scheme of education. The latter was not to be merely, or even predominantly, utilitarian, as far, at least, as the young members of the Scottish elite were concerned. It was to emphasize classical writers because of their treatment of concepts central to civic humanist and stoic discourse, such as fortitude and public spirit. It was also to be an ethical education designed to cultivate individuals who were not easily able to entertain more complex moral concepts and who were characterized by the many tumultuous passions of youth.

Youth was the period of enthusiasm and heat. It was also marked by thoughtlessness and inexperience. A classical foundation could build upon the the good qualities of youth, teach him patience, and provide him with models of firm and patriotic behaviour. Thus, it helped to strengthen virtue and judgment at the same time as the young "become acquainted with the corruptions of the world." It could provide the future members of the elite with the wisdom and experience of past ages -- an experience which he stood sorely in need of in a hostile and demanding commercial environment.

The simplicity of ancient morality was also its advantage. In a confusing world, it provided straightforward definitions
and models of virtuous behaviour. Unfortunately, the parents of children of superior rank tended to scorn classical learning and to send their children out into a dangerous social arena without any preparation whatsoever:

They are introduced into the world almost from very infancy. In place of having their minds stored with the bright examples of antiquity, or those of modern times, the first knowledge they acquire is of the vices with which they are surrounded; and they learn what mankind are, without ever knowing what they ought to be. Possessed of no sentiment of virtue, of no social affection, they indulge, to the utmost of their ability, the gratification of every selfish appetite, without any other restraint than what self-interest dictates. In men thus educated, youth is not the season of virtue; they have contracted the cold indifference and all the vices of age, long before they arrive at manhood.

The situation was made all the more serious because of the role that these same individuals would be called upon to play in society generally, argued Mr. Mirror. Their corruption would provide a bad example that could spread throughout the moral community itself and their habits or manners would inevitably contaminate the body politic. As society's leaders became corrupted, so too must the system of government and the system of defence. Both civic and martial virtue, therefore, were dependent upon the proper education or cultivation of the future leading citizens of the nation.

Thus, the first of many essays on youth and education contained a number of important themes. Not the least of these was the delaying of full entry into the world until such a time as the individual was firmly equipped to deal with its temptations. Delaying entry into social life was imperative if
the virtuous feelings of youth were to be nurtured and the inexperience of youth protected. Unfortunately, Mr. Mirror concurred with BELZEBUB that this was not the current practice:

The ancient system for the acquisition of knowledge, was by listening to the instruction of the wise and experienced; and in some of the old schools a probationary silence for a very long period was insisted upon for that purpose. In those times, that might be suitable enough; but now, when life, according to some philosophers, is so much shortened, there are so many things to talk about, the ancient mode would be surely preposterous.

This being the case, continued a sarcastic Mr. Mirror, the "highly improved system of Education" that we have "applied to the young" is that of forcing them to speak even before they have understanding. Youth are brought forward into company at a very early age and are "particularly cautioned against that antique bashfulness" that characterised the youth of former days.

Bashfulness or modesty, as Mr. Mirror pointed out in several essays, was one of the most engaging qualities of youth. However, the modern system that had been invented had done away with modesty almost entirely. Speaking of youthful blushes, the character Colonel Caustic explains:

Why, if I may judge from the little I have seen...your young folks have no time for them now-a-days; their pleasures begin so early, and come so thick.

And, employing the common horticultural analogy, he compared modern youth with their counterparts in the last generation:

'tis like the difference between your hot-house asparagus and my garden ones; the last have their green and their white; but the first is tasteless from the top.
The Mirror Club's references to the past generation were an accepted moralistic device for criticizing modern practice. What needs to be stressed here, however, is that they were fashioning a new view of the young rather than looking back to former generations. Thus, Henry Mackenzie adopted the aging persona of SENEX in order to caution against a most serious modern concern. Youth, he claimed, should not usurp the privileges of age. The modern Socttish young man and lady were entering into fashionable social life far sooner than nature, or Time intended. Young ladies who, only a few years before, had gone to bed at eight o'clock, were now staying up long past midnight rapping their fans in the corner of the ballroom. And young men, who until recently had played at taw and leap frog, were now discussing politics and advocating infidelity. "At no period, perhaps," suggested Mackenzie, was "this prematurity of behaviour more conspicuous than at present." "In vice," he added, "as in self-importance, they contrive to get beyond the ignorant present time; and, at the years of boyishness, to be perfect men in licentiousness and debauchery."

The Mirror Club wanted to put a halt to this conspicuous, unnatural and dangerous practice. To this end they called for the extension of the period of youth. They advised against the sending of young men abroad before their moral characters were fully formed. They cautioned landed families against shipping their young men off to foreign universities, where they "learn nothing but vice and folly" and lose their attachment for their own society. And, while they saw some sense in the Grand
Tour of Europe, once higher education had been completed, they admonished against "a long residence abroad in the early period of life," which could only lead to an attachment to foreign manners and a lack of proper feeling for one's native soil.

The true hero of the *Lounger* is a country gentleman by the name of *BENEVOLUS*. This ideal type takes special care to the education of his son. He adamantly refuses to send his son abroad to a foreign university and gently criticizes his neighbours, those members of landed society who abide by the practice. He will eventually allow his son to make the *Grand Tour*, but, before doing this, he wants to make absolutely certain of his attachment to the Scottish moral community:

In this purpose Benevolus has perfectly succeeded with his son, who is now eighteen, with much of the information of a man, but with all the unassuming modesty of a boy. 'Tis his pleasure and his pride to acknowledge the claims which his native scenes have upon him. He knows the name of every hamlet, and of its inhabitants; he visits them when he can be of use, gives encouragements to their improvements, and distributes reward to the industrious. In return, they feel the most perfect fealty and regard to him. The old men observe how like he is to his father.

Interestingly enough, *Benevolus* himself puts his little community before his own self-interest. A moderate improver, he has "not, however, that inordinate desire for extending the bounds of his estate, that some great proprietors have." Quite the contrary, he gives his gentry friends needed credit instead of gobbling up their land.

These descriptions of *Benevolus* and his son may seem insipid or engagingly simplistic to modern ears. The concepts
of aristocratic benevolence and fealty must have been wearing a little thin in late eighteenth century Scotland as well. But it is necessary to remember that the essays on the socialization of youth in the *Mirror* and the *Lounger* were explicitly aimed at maintaining and reinforcing this traditional system of social stratification during a period of stress and change. The prolongation of adolescence and the intensification of controls upon the young elite were ingenious devices designed to help support a system, or moral community, that could no longer be taken for granted as well as to cocoon the young landed gentleman from the possible corruptions and social contamination of a new commercial state.

The preceding description of the *Mirror Club's* discussion of youth and its education shows their interest in prolonging this period of life. But they, like other Scottish moralists, also wanted to manipulate its emotional nature. It was in their treatment of the sympathetic character of the young that the *Mirror Club* contributed to and helped form the modern concept of adolescence. If youth was vulnerable because of its lack of reasoning power and inexperience of the modern social arena, it was also a stage in life that was conducive to the cultivation of the moral sentiments. Youth was the age of passion; or as the authors in the *Mirror* preferred to refer to passion's more virtuous sister -- a period of sensibility. It was at this stage of life that one had one's warmest attachments and entertained the loftiest projects for exhibiting one's virtue. As distinct from childhood -- which
was the season of dreams, amiable simplicity, and frankness — youth was the season of feeling. To Mr. Mirror's mind, such a period was extremely important to emphasize and cultivate in a modern indifferent world.

The term indifference was an important one in the moral vocabulary of late eighteenth century Scotland, for it incorporated many of the literati's attitudes to a modern and refined commercial polity. It held several different shades of meaning for the members of the Mirror Club. It could, for example, signify a certain ambivalence of feeling or an easiness which allowed a person to conform far too completely to the norms of his or her social group.

Indifference also had a more sombre connotation, when it referred to individuals who were totally destitute of any feeling — unemotional Automata. But indifference could have yet another and much more sinister meaning. It could signify the studied nonchalance which concealed the individual's true motives from others:

the man of courtly manners often puts on a placid and smiling semblance, while his heart rankles with malignant passion.

In a society in which dissimulation was a way of life, it was difficult to know what the true motives of any other person were. But since the aim of any actor is public applause, it stood to reason that the motives of many individuals were selfish or interested ones — especially in a commercial society which elevated the selfish passions. Mackenzie and his colleagues, only too familiar with Rousseau's condemnation of
polite civilization, were acutely aware of this danger. They constantly railed against the *interest* and *indifference* of the present age, often using the two terms in close conjunction. In the pages of the *Mirror* and *Lounger*, they scrutinized the manners of polite Edinburgh society which they believed had a tendency to hide *vice* and *interest* under a veil of *nonchalance*. In particular, they concentrated their venom on what they regarded as a *catechism* written for the young role player — *Lord Chesterfield’s Letters*.82

In the *Mirror*, Henry Mackenzie described the experience of a naive young man who, when he sought to acquire more polite and fashionable manners, had Chesterfield’s work recommended to him:

> how much was I astonished, when, through a veil of wit, ridicule, elegant expression and a lively illustration, I discerned a studied system of frivolity, meanness, flattery, and dissimulation inculcated as the surest and most eligible road to eminence and popularity.83

Mackenzie was particularly worried about the effect of this work or its viewpoint on the morals of the young. The fundamental error in Chesterfield’s *catechism* was that it treated talent and ability only according to the selfish use that could be made of them.

In their treatment of modern *indifference*, and Chesterfield in particular, the *Mirror Club* again focused upon the nature of youth and the importance of its cultivation. Like Hugh Blair, they also cited the importance of early friendships based upon the sensibility of the young:

> In the present state of society, we have few
opportunities of exhibiting our true characters by our actions; the habits of the world soon throw upon our manners a veil that is impenetrable to others, and nearly so to ourselves. Hence the only period when we can form friendships is a few years in youth; for there is a reserve in the deportment, and a certain selfishness in the occupations of manhood, unfavourable to the forming of warm attachments. It is, therefore, fatal to the very source of friendship, if when yet children, we are to be prematurely bedaubed with the varnish of the world. And yet, I fear, this is the necessary effect of modern education. 84

If we harass youth, if we check the emanations of their hearts, wrote Mr. Mirror, we will turn them into selfish and interested individuals devoid of feeling. "After a youth spent in joyless dissipation," they will enter into adult life as "slaves to selfish appetites and reigning prejudices."

The importance of virtuous friendship is a common theme in the Mirror and Lounger and one that is explicitly related to the theme of adolescent sensibility. ADRESTUS, alias Henry Mackenzie, again adopted the pose of an older spokesman and complained of the present race of men and the lack of true friendships among them. Of youth, in particular, he said that he would not complain of their little irregularities or imprudence:

I know these must always be expected and pardoned in the young; and there are few of us old people who can recollect our youthful days without having some things of that sort to blush for. No, Mr. Lounger, it is their prudence, their wisdom, their foresight, their policy, I find fault with. They put on the livery of the world so early, and have so few of the weaknesses of feeling or of fancy!... Their no-ambition, their no-love, their no-friendship, or in one word their indifference about every object from which some worldly advantage is not to be drawn, is equally observable on the other
Mackenzie clearly regarded such indifference as unnatural in the young and he wanted them to play the socially useful role of emotional adolescents.

If one did not carefully cultivate the supposedly natural feelings of youth, one ended up with indifferent adults whose only passion was that of the sordid pursuit of the dizzy and topsy-turvey values of a luxurious society. These same values were no longer confined to the various metropoli argued the Mirror Club, but they had penetrated the heart of the Scottish moral community -- the country. Mr. Mirror especially deplored the lack of attachment to the countryside, or what he referred to as rural sentiment, among modern youth. Upon their selfishness, little impression could be made by rural objects and rural scenery. Their hearts were made "callous by selfish and interested indifference." "'Tis with regret rather than resentment," Mackenzie concluded, "that I perceive this sort of turn so prevalent among the young people of my acquaintance."

The most famous essays in the Mirror and Lounger -- the tales of La Roche, Father Nicholas and Louisa Veroni were all written by Mackenzie and were deliberate attempts to elicit the sort of spectatorial sympathy which was supposedly typical of the young. The same can be said of Henry Mackenzie's novels, such as The Man of Feeling which were very careful attempts to attach the youthful sentiments to virtue and not, as some commentators have suggested, a blunt response to the eighteenth
century demand for sentimental literature. Mackenzie was extremely precise in his delineation of the boundaries between good and evil, careful never to bring his account of the virtuous affections into conflict with reason, and determined to represent the moral sentiments in terms of that same gentle sensibility or tender melancholy that was conducive to morality.

But at no time were the Mirror Club willing to cast aside older notions of morality in their treatment of the moral sentiments. The "romantic spirit and enthusiasm of youth" needed to be encouraged in order to temper the "cool and steady maxims of business and the world", but they were not meant to replace the lessons of the classical authors. Young men were not equally sensitive or morally perceptive. Many were too indolent to fully appreciate the subtleties of virtuous sensibility. "Of youth," wrote Mackenzie, "it is essential to preserve the imagination sound as well as pure, and not to allow them to forget, amidst the intricacies of Sentiment, or the dreams of Sensibility, the truths of Reason, or the laws of Principle."89

Thus, the ethical vocabulary of sensibility -- with its stress upon the sentiments, gentleness, melancholy, pity, and humanity -- needed to be combined with more venerable modes of ethical discourse. Mr. Mirror believed that Scotland's elite needed a patriotic education based upon classical authors. Here, the warnings against a luxurious and corrupt empire were spelled out with considerable clarity. And while the ancient
authors may not have understood the intricate workings of the moral sentiments, they brought the distinctions between virtue and vice into sharp relief. Such distinctions, argued Mackenzie, as crude as they were, needed to be internalised by young enthusiasts who were only too "willing to be impelled by the passions, though not restrained by the principles of virtue." 90

A classical and sentimental education was not for everyone. Those who made less than seven hundred or eight hundred pounds per year had to be careful lest they educate their children beyond their likely station in life. 91 The sons and daughters of the Scottish clergy were in particular danger of over educating their children and making them dissatisfied with their future. And even the landed gentry of some means needed to ensure that their education of younger sons remained within reasonable bounds. Mr. Mirror's remarks upon moral cultivation, therefore, were directed primarily at the wealthier gentry and the landed aristocracy. But in a rare essay directed at those destined to enter the world of business, Mr. Mirror pointed out that it was appropriate to pay at least a modicum of attention to the classics:

Of minds uninformed and gross, whom youthful spirits agitate, but fancy and feeling have no power to impel, the amusements will generally be either boisterous or effeminate, will either dissipate their attention or weaken their force. The employment of a young man's vacant hours is often too little attended to by those rigid masters who exact the most scrupulous observance of the periods destined for business...in mere men of business, there is a professional rule of right, which is not always honourable. A superior education generally corrects this, by
opening the mind to different motives of action, to the feelings of delicacy, the sense of honour, and a contempt of wealth, when earned by the desertion of those principles.  

Mackenzie, in this last substantive essay for the Lounger, may have begun to recognize that the mere man of business was also the man of the future. For, in this last admonition to his fellow countrymen, Mackenzie conceded that the "influx of foreign riches and foreign luxury, which this country has of late experienced, has almost levelled every distinction but that of money, among us." Even the nobility, he added, had begun to give way to the "tide of fortune."

In such a climate, the education of youth was the only safeguard to virtue, not to mention the traditional stratification system:

The love of letters is connected with an independence and delicacy of mind, which is a great preservative against that servile homage which abject men pay to fortune; and there is a certain classical pride, which from the society of Socrates and Plato, Cicero and Atticus, looks down with honest disdain on the wealth blown insects of modern times, neither enlightened by knowledge nor ennobled by virtue.

The significance of a classically based education, of course, stands out clearly in this passage. Equally interesting, however, is Mackenzie's use of the term society. If the community around one becomes increasingly corrupt and interested, then one needs to construct an internal society of more impartial spectators. One crosses mentally into another, and better, society of the virtuous dead. This "magic art of raising the dead, and conversing familiarly with the greatest men of past times," as Lord Kames put it, helped to exclude
interest and deception and to provide a clearer guide to virtuous action. Thus, the concepts of sociability and the moral community were transported from a problematic historical setting in order to operate within a more timeless internal sphere.

The writers in the *Mirror* and *Lounger* wanted to combine classical learning with a modern understanding of the moral sentiments in order to halt moral and social corruption. Youth, thus educated, could effect a rejuvenation of the moral community. At the very least, they could help to delay the day of reckoning. *Mr. Mirror* pleaded with the parents of the young:

> If riches naturally tend to render trifles of importance; if they direct our attention too much towards exterior accomplishments; if they propagate the courtly and complying spirit too extensively at any rate, we certainly in this country, so wealthy and luxurious, have no need of exhortations to cultivate or acquire these qualifications. The habits that may arrest for a little time the progress of this corruption, ought now to be insisted on. Independence, fortitude, stubborn integrity, and pride that disdains the shadow of servility; these are the virtues which a tutor should inculcate, these the blessings which a fond father should supplicate for his offspring.

If education or moral cultivation was so very critical to the survival of the moral community, it is hardly surprising that *Mr. Mirror* viewed it as the most important task of the parent, whom he occasionally referred to as a tutor. Estate improvement or involvement in British political life were secondary concerns to the proper cultivation of youth. Thus, *Mr. Mirror* actually commented favourably on those who renounced
politics and the **bustle of the world**, just as long as it was to attend to the education of their children.\(^96\) In the *Mirror*, considerable approval was paid to virtuous parents like **Mr. Selby, Emilia** and **Mr. Hargrave**. In the *Lounger*, their counterparts were **Aurelia** and the parents of the virtuous **Almeria**.\(^97\) And, of course, there is **Benevolus**, whose qualities as a parent compared only with those of his wife **Lady Benevolus**. Not only did the essayists in the *Mirror* and *Lounger* regard the parental activities of these individuals as infinitely more meaningful than those who, like **Mr. Bustle** or **Dormer**, became **improvers** or **politicians** while, at the same time, neglecting the upbringing of their children.\(^98\) But **Mr. Mirror** went much further in his praise of private life, family relations and the domestic scene, as shall be demonstrated in the next chapter. This new view of education, at once subtle and total, necessarily shifted the pedagogical emphasis from the institutional educator to the parent. In *Loose Hints on Education*, Lord Karnes, for example, developed an argument with which the *Mirror Club* and the Moderate clergy would have heartily agreed. He maintained that an **opulent nation** stood in particular need of **censors** who could supplement the laws by correcting the more important **manners** of the citizens. "Our only resource for exercising that important office," he added:

> are fathers and mothers. Let it sink into their heart, that we have no reliance but upon them for preventing universal corruption and of course dissolution of the state.\(^99\)

Youth, therefore, held an important place in the moral schemes of the writers in the *Mirror* and *Lounger*. It would be
no exaggeration to say that Mackenzie and his colleagues were obsessed with this stage of development — a stage categorized by warm feelings which needed to be cultivated properly if they were to blossom into sensitive adulthood. In order for this cultivation to take place, it was necessary to prolong this period and monitor it closely. This meant that teachers, but especially parental tutors should regard the socialization of the young as their primary responsibility. The necessity for and nature of this socialization cannot be fully appreciated unless one takes into account its highly problematic context — the commercial and fashionable world. As far as the literati of the late eighteenth century were concerned, the refined and mobile society based upon a commercial empire was an inherently dangerous interpersonal arena. While they were far too realistic to reject this social context, their adoption of the concepts of civic humanism, and their appreciation of the insights of Rousseau, made them acutely aware of its negative properties. In particular, they regarded it as an indifferent and calculating environment, peopled with interested role players.

Combatting these dangerous tendencies, and the concomitant threat to the traditional system of social stratification which the Mirror Club supported without question, involved the subtle and artistic manipulation of the passions of the young elite. This was a very fine balancing act that required considerable time and patience. The process, however, was made even more complex by the excesses connected with the sensibility of youth
itself. The finest minds, argued Mr. Mirror, were marked by a certain pliancy or sympathetic capacity which was especially vulnerable in a theatrical and selfish social milieu. In other words, the highly sensitive individual could not help but be disgusted by the callous and vicious behaviour that he witnessed in the world. All the heroes of Mackenzie's novels, for example, deplore modern man's lack of humanity towards his fellows and the breakdown of communal bonds that they witnessed. Their very sensibility could tempt them to withdraw from society in disgust.

Hence the repeated warnings in the two journals against false refinement or excess sensibility. Ultimately, man was made for action in the world and the young elite, especially, needed to play out their new role as men of sentiment within their respective communities. Moreover, it was only in social life that the virtuous could fully develop their own sensibilities and avoid the extreme of misanthropy. Misanthropists such as Umphraville and Colonel Caustic serve an important function in the Mirror and Lounger not only as moral critics but as virtuous recluses whose fine sense of moral distinctions are forever lost to an unfeeling world. As Mirror Club member William Craig aptly put it, despite all its excesses and corruptions, one should not "quarrel with the world." If virtuous youth was to play its part in preserving the nation's virtue, it had to become an active player on the stage of life. Writing about the excessively sensitive youth, Mackenzie noted:
In such bosoms, feeling or susceptibility must often be repressed or directed; to encourage it by premature or unnatural means, is certainly hurtful.\(^\text{102}\)

Too much trembling sensibility produced alienation from a society; amiable sociability, on the other hand, acted as a social cement.

The classical model, not surprisingly, was Marcus Aurelius -- "one of the most illustrious men that ever lived."\(^\text{103}\) In the Lounger, Craig informed his young readers that this individual performed, in his own person, exactly the sort of balancing act that a proper education was supposed to achieve. Here was a man who "united the most sublime views of contemplation, with the most splendid exertions of activity, in the greatest theatre that history has exhibited to our view." In Marcus Aurelius, feeling was not simply passive sentiment, but was something that equipped the individual to act virtuously in the social arena. It is not surprising that a member of the Mirror Club would highlight Marcus Aurelius in this way. For he, indeed, was a man who humanized both Stoic and civic humanist doctrines, who united feeling with reason, and who lived an active and virtuous life in a position of social authority.

IV

The Scottish literati of the late eighteenth century placed high hopes upon the cultivation of youth. The youth of the elite were to be educated in such a way as to be able to
function within a modern organic environment without compromising any of their finely nurtured moral sentiments. "Education," they argued, could "do much to confirm goodness, to correct depravity of temper and disposition; and in characters more common than either of those extremes, education can give exertion to indolence, refinement to insensibility, strength to the weak, and support to the too susceptible mind." It was a mode of instruction that had to be tailored precisely to each individual youth and it was up to parents to mark the features of their children and to watch their different propensities. Most important, this cultivation was based upon, and directed, the emotional nature or sensibility of the young.

It has been argued that upper class Scotsmen rather belatedly discovered childhood during the first half of the eighteenth century. They were not nearly so slow, however, in exhibiting the nature and uses of adolescence. The latter concept, which they helped pioneer, was to have significant educational and social ramifications which were by no means confined to Scotland. James Fordyce's works for the young were extremely popular in England and were followed by numerous imitators. The moral writings of Hugh Blair were used to inculcate the moral feelings of the young until well into the nineteenth century. And Mackenzie's *The Man of Feeling* was one of the few eighteenth century novels to win moralists', and anxious parents', seal of approval. The works of the late eighteenth century Scottish *literati* were especially well
received in America, where they would help to lay the foundation for a more extensive social construction of adolescence in that country. Just as the paradigm of civic humanism had its last major manifestation on the Atlantic seaboard, so too the concept of adolescence was to have a profound impact upon American society.

But roots of the concept of adolescence were not confined to Scotland and it is not the argument of this chapter that the Scots discovered that stage of emotional development. Rousseau has a much greater claim to that fundamental insight. However, their contribution to the propagandization of the concept was considerable. Moreover, unlike Rousseau, who respected his Emile's freedom, it was the Scots who demonstrated the ways in which the emotions of youth could be manipulated in order to support the traditional moral community of an iniquitous society. In their writings, adolescence became integral to multiple and novel forms of power relationships. The young may have been called upon to reform a corrupt society, but this social reformation was to be carried out on adult terms.
In its most common eighteenth-century usage, the term public referred to the commonwealth, state or nation. The term public good suggested the well-being or advantage of the same and related to any activity which conspicuously contributed to the integrity of the social body. Private life referred to any activity which took place outside the public realm and related particularly to men who did not hold public office. The notion that private life implied one's most intimate personal feelings or inner psyche was a much later development which need not concern us here. However, there were various levels of intimacy and different sorts of relationships which were possible outside public life. Late eighteenth century writers were fairly consistent about the distinction between private life in general and those forms of behaviour which pertained particularly to the domestic sphere and nuclear family. As exemplified by Cicero's confidant, Atticus, private life in the general sense meant the lack of involvement in politics, conspicuous acts of benevolence, or heroic military service. It was the day to day life of the individual as a member of his community. For the landed gentleman, it was the place where he performed his accepted social function as a landlord and community leader. It was also the domain in which he made his closest friendships.
Domestic life, on the other hand, centered on the household and the nuclear family or little circle, as Scottish moralists referred to it. The extended family model was not the norm in pre-industrial Britain, a fact which is amply supported by the kind of domestic advice given in periodicals such as the *Spectator* and the *Mirror*. What did complicate the integrity of this little circle, however, was the existence of servants, whose close proximity with and knowledge of confidential family affairs often complicated the moralist’s analysis. For the Scottish moralists of the late eighteenth century, servants could either be accepted as veritable, albeit clearly subordinate, family members or set apart as the party colored gentlemen downstairs. Even in the latter case, their constant face-to-face interaction with family members necessarily made them significant others.

*Mr. Spectator*, especially Richard Steele, focused upon the domestic circle as one possible arena for the practice of heroic virtue. Thus, he helped to initiate an ethical shift away from the explicitly civic environment and towards intimate familial relationships. But this conceptual movement was anything but a paradigmatic leap; it was tentative at best. The predominant model of virtue in the *Spectator* was neither the amiable private man nor the doting family member, but Cato, Joseph Addison’s ideal type. But there were already forces at work in British society which were to further weaken the tenacious hold of the traditional civic vocabulary upon the British imagination. As Lawrence Stone suggests, during the
course of the eighteenth century, some members of the upper gentry and wealthy bourgeoisie had begun to place greater emphasis upon the family as an affective and self-contained unity. This was particularly evident, for example, in new architectural arrangements of household space, which allowed for greater privacy and the prevention of intrusion from ever prying servants or overly intrusive neighbours. Scottish moralists were able to build upon this social foundation and to go much further than Mr. Spectator in their analysis of the moral uses of the affectionate family.

The pages that follow will explore the treatment of public life and the domestic circle by late eighteenth century Scottish moralists. It will be argued that what began as an essentially civic humanist critique of emerging commercial society, ironically developed into a cultural shift away from the classical notion of public spirit and its substitution with the notion of private sensibility. The most appropriate arena for the practice and cultivation of this sociability was the protected haven of an affectionate family. There, family members could tone down one another’s extreme passions and doting but manipulative parents could successfully cultivate their children’s sensitive natures.

The Public and the Private Domain

Ideally, these two spheres complemented one another. The independent landowner served his country in war and in
parliament. Any discursive confusion that did occur about the specificity of these various domains was largely attributable to the existence and relative influence of a court. Political life in London centered around the crown and was inseparable from the activities of some highly visible and conspicuously fashionable political families. Thus, the public domain was closely linked to what an eighteenth century man termed the *fashionable round*. The existence of a court, its tendency towards luxury and extravagance, and its cultivation of dependent relationships between ministers and petitioners, posed that threat to independent virtue and civic personality which became the grist for the neo-Harringtonian critique of late seventeenth century British political life. What is more, the ever changing and highly impersonal nature of courtly life in a large metropolis allowed for that high degree of role playing which, as so many eighteenth century moralists warned and *Lord Chesterfield's Letters* seemed to attest, was not hospitable to virtue, in either its public or its private manifestations.

Late eighteenth century Scottish moralists had a particular perception of the proper relationship between the public and the private spheres. While Scottish noblemen maintained a decent balance between public and private relations; while they returned to their estates when parliament was not in session; their independence could be hoped for, if not assumed. But when they began to make London their primary residence and entered into the life of fashionable high
society, they were in grave danger of losing both private and public virtue. The problem, however, was not confined to London. Luxury, Scottish writers believed, was spreading out of its circumscribed, and to some extent, natural setting. The values of the court, further perverted and without any redeemable social function, were spreading along with the commercialization of Great Britain, as wealth began to find itself in the hands of nabobs and contractors who, it was argued had neither the the training nor the temper of mind to use it properly.

To the classically aware late eighteenth century Scotsman, this commercial world, especially of the large cities, was a socially corrosive force. The metropolis of London, in particular, was singled out as "the great source of vice and corruption," to which Scottish Nimrods and greedy lairds were rushing like lemmings, only to have their manners debased, their health impaired, and their fortunes exhausted. The commercial empire of Great Britain was typically compared with the overextended empire of classical Rome, which eventually "impaired her constituição and brought on it at last her total decay." The ill effects of such an environment, it was necessary to protect all individuals, but especially the young and inexperienced. Social interaction in this same world was problematic, since the latter was characterized by political faction, private luxury and interested deception. James Fordyce warned his young audience:
Has not the ruin of all the great states and empires of which we read in story, been preceded and accelerated by factions, seditions, insurrections, conspiracies... and the interest of the community sacrificed to the covetous and ambitious designs of individuals, till at length the struggle ended in the total overthrow of the weakest.\textsuperscript{8}

The "visible decay in public spirit," he went on to stress, was determined by two essential facts: "the unbounded luxury of the great" and the "enormous growth of commercial luxury, and the prodigious influx of eastern plunder."

Venality and corruption, wrote another author, now prevailed in public assemblies while "the enchantress pleasure, aided by voluptuousness and sensuality, seduces into her toils every rank and class of an infatuated people."\textsuperscript{9} In particular, corruption stemmed from the lust for power and wealth among our nobility and was now firmly established throughout the moral community, which, as TRIBUNUS aptly put it, was "kept together by habit, more than the authority of the magistrates."\textsuperscript{10}

It is tempting, but misleading, to assume that such reactions to modern society implied a total rejection of commercial development or national wealth. As another writer to the Caledonian Mercury suggested, terms like luxury and commerce tended to be bandied about far too loosely.\textsuperscript{11} Wealth, if used to construct public monuments such as obtained in the Spartan and Roman commonwealths, was a clear social benefit. Similarly, commerce, operating in its proper sphere of influence, could help to make the nation stronger. The corruption of the community only occurred when men of station spent their riches for their own private gratification
instead of public works and when private individuals became too enriched. Then it was that the state became progressively impoverished, that corruption occurred, and the moral community was ultimately destroyed.

Given the perception that society had now become corrupted at its aristocratic apex and that a general depravity of manners loomed on the horizon, it was the unenviable task of the modern Scottish bard to decide what could be done about it. If a viable ethics was to be fashioned for the mature individual, it had to take into account that the artificial, rather than civic, values of the court, with the aid of commerce, had intruded into the private sphere. As a result this arena for more intimate social interaction was rapidly becoming hostile to virtue. Not only did the late eighteenth century Scottish moralists want to reverse this trend, but they were concerned to provide gentlemen with a safer and truer picture of virtue in a confusing world. To this end, they not only condemned the false values of the fashionable round but they also began a general re-evaluation of the virtues of that same private life which they viewed as under attack. In the process, they began to stress the important role of individuals such as Atticus as generous friends and impartial spectators in face-to-face interaction within their community. And while they most certainly did not do away with the old civic vocabulary's stress upon public spirit, late eighteenth century Scottish moralists began to define the true essence of that concept in terms of sociability and humanity within smaller and
more cohesive social groups. In their writings, private sensibility became the *sine qua non* of more visible public morality.

One of the topics discussed at length by the *Belles Lettres Society* in the early 1760s was *Whether the Character of Cato or that of Atticus is most Excellent?*. Notebook comments on this discussion attest to the fact that the question was an intentionally provocative one which, at the same time, illuminated an issue of profound importance. Cato was the representative *par excellence* of public life, the darling of those who, like the Earl of Buchan, viewed virtue primarily in terms of active political contributions to the state or a high profile defence of its constitutional arrangements. Atticus, on the other hand, represented the virtuous individual in private life, a man who tended to eschew the corruptions of the imperial political sphere altogether. His arena of influence, therefore, was intentionally circumscribed and his apolitical nature might be construed as unpatriotic.

Not so, decided the young Edinburgh *literati*. Atticus was the superior man. He acted as a moderating influence on those in power: his pragmatic attitude was often of much greater service to the state than its more spirited defence by Cato. In his role as a detached, but not unsympathetic, observer, and in his capacity for genuine and affectionate friendship, Atticus was indispensable to that society in which he dwelt.

The topic proposed by Robert Cullen and debated in the
Belles Lettres Society was no mere academic debating issue, designed only to show off the rhetorical skills and classical learning of the young Edinburgh literati. The ethical significance which Scottish moralists placed upon private life and relationships shows up again in a series of front page articles written for the Caledonian Mercury in 1769 by A Freeholder in the Country to his Friend in Town. In these, the author treated of the conception of liberty held by the infamous John Wilkes and his patriotic and anti-Scottish allies in England. Not only did Wilkes and the opposition make the mistake of confusing license with liberty, the author argued, but they also misunderstood the intimate relationship between private and public life:

> the doctrine, that a man may be possessed of public virtue, who is destitute of that quality in private life, is not only contradicted by all the former experience of mankind, but is itself so absurd as to be a reproach to the human understanding. It was a wise law in the Athenian state, that no person convicted of impiety, or any atrocious crime, should be allowed to speak in a public assembly. ¹³

Private manners and morals, he insisted, were crucial to public virtue. To concentrate unduly upon and increasingly factious and corrupt public sphere was to fail to appreciate its source in the everyday life of the community.

Much the same theme was stressed in an ethical essay by a writer who went under the initial of W, which was printed in the Caledonian Mercury in 1782.¹⁴ The essay was entitled On Sacrificing Private Friendships to Public Virtue. Its author disagreed with the Ciceronian emphasis upon the latter to the
detriment of the former, maintaining that private friendship was the *cohesion of the moral world* and every bit as necessary as those physical laws which operated in the natural world. According to this science of private life, men could only be virtuous in so far as they participated in this law of the moral universe. The author went even further and claimed that "public welfare could not exist but in private happiness."

Inevitably, of course, the private arena was associated with the virtuous countryside and contrasted with that scene of dissipation -- the court. In *Ode on a Country Life*, printed in the *Scots Magazine*, the author wrote:

> The pomp of courts I do despise,  
> Where knaves with promises and lies,  
> Endeavour to beguile.

His solution was not only to move into the country, however, but to surround himself with a few close friends of *sound* and *strong* morals:

> With them sometimes I'll ride or walk,  
> At night on learned subjects talk,  
> From fools and nonsense free.  

Similarly, in *An Ode on Lord Hay's Birthday*, first printed in the *Edinburgh Magazine*, the author stressed the preferred role of that aristocrat who *lets the social instinct glow* and performs the benevolent function in the village and castle, far removed from the *song of Flattery* and the *sons of Luxury*. And, again, in a poem printed in 1783, the writer stressed that the *true Nobility's role* was to perform the social functions of hospitality and justice in the countryside, not to be either *faction's slave* or the *flatterers of a court*. Yet another
poem, appropriately entitled *Dissipation*, deplored the coming of the nabobs from the East Indies and their pernicious effect upon the habits of the various metropoli. He wrote:

Retire, ye wise! Retire from towns,
To flow'ry lawns and verdant downs;
Shun Dissipation's charms.
Let Virtue, still, your hearts improve;
And Beauty, Innocence, and Love,
Shall bless your longing arms.  

Only away from the influence of the court and metropolitan life could truly disinterested friendships be cultivated. That these same friendships were the very foundation of moral character, however, the author of the poem *The Joys of Society* made perfectly clear:

The social sweets of Friendship's gentle train  
The joys domestic happiness may give,  
The warmth affection pours thro' ev'ry vein,  
Inform the happy mortal how to live.  

But, as another would-be poet pointed out in *Friendship: An Ode*, one had considerable difficulty in engaging in the delights and social solace of true friendship among the flattering tribe on Life's deceitful stream. It was only in the private sphere that such friendships could be acquired. And, even there, they needed to be cultivated early by those who had not yet succumbed to the all pervasive ethic of self-interest.

The articles and comments upon education in the periodical press further evidence a tendency to put far greater faith in the virtues of the private, as distinct from the public, arena. Here, it was often assumed that the welfare of society depended much more upon character formation than it did upon political
arrangements. In 1769, for example, the editor of the Scots Magazine remarked that the national affairs of Great Britain would soon assume a different face if but a small part of the revenue used to pension off so-called PATRIOTS was employed in the education of youth. He was commenting upon a plan for the education of gentlemen, which had recently been published in England. Even that tedious re-incarnation of Cato himself -- the self-important Earl of Buchan -- suggested that the education of youth was perhaps more important than "a well poised and well administered government." However, his address to the rector and students of the Edinburgh High School still focused upon the formation of the "brave, well organized and good citizen" rather than the sensitive friend.

The Moderate clergy of the Church of Scotland adopted a gentler and more sympathetic form of discourse, as befitted their ideal of a polite, refined, and humane society. They saw their function as that of grafting gentleness and sensibility upon the stern injunctions of classical morality:

A manly steadiness of conduct, is the object which we are always to keep in view; studying to unite the gentleness of manners with firmness of principle, affable behaviour with untainted integrity.

The key to the development of the humane individual, as we have seen, was sociablility or sensibility. This needed to be cultivated in the elite if the moral community was to remain intact.

Unfortunately, the Moderates noted, the public arena could mould sociability to its own ends. The world was a dangerous
place, and amidst its *open contentions* and *secret enmities*, the virtues of *mildness* and *gentleness* were hardly sufficient to "carry us with honour through the duties of our different stations." Indeed, they could lead to the individual's moral destruction:

Vice has abounded in every age, it hath propagated itself much more easily by the assistance of this social disposition. We naturally mould ourselves on the pattern of prevailing manners, and corruption is communicated from one to another...how much are we in hazard of being misled into vice by the general manners which we behold around us.

Similarly, in another sermon, Blair condemned the deception and artifice of the *world* which so often corrupted the social sentiments. "Sensibility," he wrote:

> indeed tends to produce gentleness of behaviour; and when such behaviour flows from native affection it is valuable and amiable. But the exterior manner alone may be learned in the school of the world; and often, too often, is found to uncover much unfeeling of heart.

Interest and ambition were the subjects taught in this *school of the world*. In private life, added Blair, these had led to *violations of honour and trust*; in public contest, the well being of nations had been "often sacrificed to the ambitious projects of the great."

The public arena, therefore, had become inimical to the cultivation of virtuous sentiment. One of the most important
vehicles for the exercise and development of the moral sentiments was that of sincere friendship. But friendships of this kind were virtually impossible in the public shere. Blair complained:

nothing is more ready to be abused than the name of public spirit, and a public cause. It is a name under which private interest is often sheltered, and selfish designs are carried on. The unwary are allured by a specious appearance; and the heat of faction usurps the place of the generous warmth of friendship.27

True friendship, Blair claimed, was nowadays possible only in private life, wherein face-to-face interaction was likely to be more sincere and founded upon a genuine harmony of minds. Even there, true sympathy was difficult to establish among mature, and often selfish, adults.

Blair admitted that it was tempting to renounce a vicious world. But man was formed for action and such a renunciation meant that the individual lost any positive influence over its temper and pleasures, and delivered it over to the whims of the loose and giddy, not to mention the designs of the wicked. The solution was not to surrender the public sphere but to give the pre-eminence to the private sphere of life. "Talk not of a court. Talk not of the wealth of the east," Blair advised, referring to a public realm corrupted by an infusion of commercial wealth. "These," he suggested, "in the hours of heart-bitterness, are spurned."28 It was in friendship, in the family circle, in the conjugal relationship, and in cordial intercourse, in general, he added, that a man's happiness and virtue resided.
That public life could be detrimental to one's virtuous health, Blair was convinced. Moreover, he illustrated this point in his use of two examples from the Old Testament. These were the cases of Haman and Hazael, whose passions were corrupted by political power. In these two sermons, the public/private dichotomy supplemented the timeless theme of a power that corrupts. Had Haman remained in his Private station, argued Blair, he would have been far less miserable, and certainly more virtuous, than when "placed at the head of the greatest empire in the east." Similarly, as a private man, Hazael demonstrated the existence of moral sentiments. He could not, for example, tolerate the thought of cruelty or injustice. "But no sooner was he clothed with the coveted purple," Blair noted, "than it seemed to taint his nature."

One of the primary moral functions of an attachment to private life was that it could act as a counterbalance to the bustle and interestedness of the public domain. Periodic retirement from the world, argued Blair, in one of his last sermons, was an important aid to reflection and reason. No one who was constantly engaged in the "bustle of worldly occupation" could hope to be capable of that self-discipline that was attendant to virtue. What is more, it was only in private life that a man's sympathetic capacity could be developed. Hugh Blair pointed out that the private sphere was not, like religious retirement, a refuge of perpetual peace. "For the nearer that men approach to each other:"

the more numerous the points of contact are in which they touch, the greater indeed will be the
pleasure of *perfect sympathy* and agreements of feelings: but at the same time, if any harsh and repulsive sensations take place, the more grating and pungent will be the pain.32

Just as true happiness and virtue were only conceivable in the face-to-face interactions of private life, these interactions could also be productive of *jealousies, feuds, and animosities*. But at least the *amiable* and *attentive* man had a decent chance of leading a good life in this circle.33

Private life, therefore, was the proper school of virtue, exercising and extending individual sensibility within the indispensable face-to-face interchange of beings who trusted one another. There individuals could learn the art of harmonising with others in the social *symphony* and to tone down any extreme or discordant passions that they might have. Great events might very well provide the scope for heroic virtue, but these extreme situations were very rare and could not contribute to a habitual frame of mind. Fortunately, a *benevolent temper* did not need to exert itself in schemes of *high generosity* or *extensive utility*; it could play its role at least equally well in the *ordinary round of affairs* that made up the general tenor of social life in the moral community:

Such occasions may relate to the smaller incidents of life. But let us remember, that of smaller incidents the system of human life is chiefly composed. The attentions which respect these, when suggested by real benignity of temper, are often more material to the happiness of those around us, than actions which carry the appearance of greater dignity and splendour.34

One could always alleviate the sufferings of others, console them in their pain, aid them whenever possible, and promote
their cheerfulness. It was precisely these kind of services which were the cement of society, Blair suggested, and which ensured a comfortable union. No man who considered himself wise or good should ever regard such actions as beneath him.

The man of virtuous sensibility did not operate solely, or even primarily, within the sphere of public virtue or public felicity. His benevolent powers were demanded in all the scenes of everyday life, domestic activity and social intercourse. And there was no man, however so far removed from active public life, but could find opportunities for practicing virtue by cultivating friendship, promoting peace and performing those little acts of kindness and humanity which we all owe to one another.

In addition to a theatre for benevolence, the sphere of private life also acted as a school of self-command. It helped to train the individual in method and regularity. "Occasions of irritation" arose in private as well as public life. It was only by the moderation and self-command acquired in such situations that "we can inure ourselves to patience, when the great conjunctures of life shall put it to severer trial." This being the case, argued Blair, there was no excuse for irritation or impatience in the private sphere or lesser offices of life. Harsh and peevish dispositions were equally reprehensible in the social and domestic as in public and formal.

In many of his sermons, this representative Moderate preacher made the point of stressing that the private sphere
was the most important arena for practicing sympathy. He argued that the so-called lesser offices of life often made a more important contribution to society than those actions which had greater public splendour. "By seasonable discoveries of a humane spirit," he wrote in an early sermon, "we sometimes contribute more materially to the advancement of happiness, than by actions which are seemingly more important." He compared such regular and healthful activities with the light of day and the purifying breeze. They may have been less splendid, but they were more beneficial, than the blaze of a comet or an aromatic gale.

Blair went much further in stressing the social significance of the private domain, however, when he pointed out that it was in this school that virtue was formed. It was this daily train of social intercourses which, more than anything else, determined character, disposition and the cultivation of virtuous habits. Such mundane qualities of private life as order and economy, he argued elsewhere, were not only useful in and of themselves, but were "the basis on which liberty, independence, and true honour must rise." Of slight accidents, he maintained, the tenor of human life was formed and, along with it, the ruling temper of the mind.

Unless the value of private virtue was appreciated, Blair wrote in an essay condemning those who scoffed at religion, the foundation of all public order would be torn up. Elsewhere, again stressing the importance of both self-command and gentleness to social cohesion, Blair pointed out that these
needed to be cultivated in the *daily and familiar intercourse* of life "where temper chiefly exerts its power, either for promoting or disturbing the tranquility of our days." Not only was private happiness and morality dependent upon this same cultivation, but public virtue was in itself a dependent variable upon private morality. "The foundation of all public happiness," wrote Blair:

> must be laid in the good conduct of individuals; in their industry, sobriety, justice and regular attention to the duties of their several stations. Such virtues are the sinews and strength of the state; they are the supports of its prosperity at home, and of its reputations abroad; while luxury, corruption, venality, and idleness, unnerve the public vigour, disgrace the public character, and pave the way to general ruin.

Therefore, it was necessary, both as *private men and Christians*, to cultivate "those virtues which are essential to the prosperity of our country."

As we have seen, Blair's Christianity was essentially a religion of sentiment which pictured Christ as the ideal *man of feeling*. Blair was also concerned to picture Christ as the perfect model of the private man. Among his apostles, he played the role of a tender and sincere friend, living in perfect intimacy with them, and showering them with paternal and benevolent affections. If this *illustrious example* were only to be followed, argued Blair:

> Men would then become happy in their connections with one another. This world would be a blessed dwelling; and the society of human beings on earth would approach to the joy and peace of the societies of the just in heaven.

Happiness, morality and order, it would appear, were more
dependent upon general humanity and paternal benevolence, than they were upon either human legislation or religious dogma.

More than any other Moderate preacher, Blair extolled the virtues of private life. This fact alone goes a long way towards explaining his phenomenal popularity among the British reading public, many of whom must have been seeking a moral code that was more applicable to their own situation than was classical ethical discourse. In his novels, and in the \textit{Mirror} and the \textit{Lounger}, Henry Mackenzie also attempted to elevate the virtues of private life. Nor has this fact gone completely unnoticed by contemporary scholarship. In \textit{The Created World of the Edinburgh Periodicals}, Charles Knight rightly questions the common assumption that the \textit{Mirror} and \textit{Lounger} were merely paler imitations of the \textit{Spectator} or literary vehicles for exhibiting Mackenzie's elegant pen.\textsuperscript{48} He points out that the \textit{Mirror Club} moved much further than \textit{Mr. Spectator} in terms of replacing abstract moral theory with practical moral advice. Moreover, he suggests that they directed their message quite explicitly to those engaged in private and domestic life. This marked a clear shift away from "the more specific and political satire of Addison's papers" and towards the "emergence of individual and domestic concerns." This movement, from the theoretical and expressly political, to the private and practical sphere, in Knight's opinion, reflected the provincial nature of the \textit{Mirror Club}'s audience and the necessity to maximize the potential readership.

While one might have some reservations about Knight's
assessment of the causal factors operating here, there is no doubt that a shift of the kind that he described did indeed occur. Mr. Spectator was especially concerned to provide political actors like himself with a code of action during a troublesome political period. While he certainly did not confine his discussion of virtue solely to the public sphere -- citing the duties of friendship and married life as possible avenues for the practice of virtue -- it is clear that the private sphere was neither his immediate nor primary focus. With the advent of the Mirror and Lounger, however, we witness a concentration on practical and private morality that is qualitatively different from previous periodical literature.

"'Tis but a very small proportion of men," wrote Robert Cullen in the Lounger, "who can move in the sphere of government or of greatness; but scarce anybody is exempted from performing a part in the relations of ordinary life." Even the great public men looked forward to playing the role of private individuals; the hero anticipated the time when he could take off his laurels and sit down beside his own fireside. "Notwithstanding the importance we are apt to ascribe to the employments...of the greatest and most illustrious," echoed Mackenzie, the latters' chief solace and gratification were the trifling occurrences and little occupations of everyday life. Public business and political arrangements, he continued, were usually the result of accident or education. The real man was such, and felt himself to be such, by virtue of his character as it was displayed in
ordinary life.

Mr. Mirror's self appointed task was the elucidation of the virtue that existed, or could exist, through sociability in everyday life -- those private walks of life where disinterested virtue most often flourished but was ignored by the world. Not only was he disinterested in the "biographies of heroes or statesmen;" he really did not believe that such splendid behaviour could easily excite the "useful though less splendid virtues of private and domestic life." Only a close attention to practical morality in everyday interaction could serve the ethical function:

Like those familiar paintings that show the inside of cottages, and the exercise of village duties, such narrations come home to the bosoms of the worthy, who feel the relationship of Virtue, and acknowledge her family wherever it is found. And perhaps there is a calmer and more placid delight in viewing her amidst these unimportant offices, than when we look up to her, invested in the pomp of greatness, and the pride of power.

Morality, clearly, did not consist primarily in those greater and more important concerns; it also dwelt in the lesser and more trivial offices of life.

An immediately recognizable classical model of civic virtue was that of the military man who risked his life for his country. In the Lounger, Alexander Abercromby noted that the merit of military heroes seldom went unnoticed. Put a young man in uniform, however, and that same individual felt himself immune from all the usual ties of sociability. He often engaged in a degree of extravagance and dissipation quite inconsistent with true morality. For his part, argued
Abercromby, he would seek to find virtue wherever it existed, and not be misled by showy appearances. "True nobleness of mind is everywhere the same," he suggested, "and may be equally shown in the honourable dealings of private life, as in the most splendid exertions of spirit or valour." It was the duty of both the historian and the moralist, he added, to highlight and exemplify such merit wherever it was found.56

True virtue was capable of being practiced in the private sphere; in fact, it was more likely to be authentic there. It was reflective of the operations of native sentiment or the sympathetic capacity of men rather than the accidental demands of an external situation or the high profile and closely observed duties of public life. Indeed, it was the case that public life tended to prostitute virtue. Two of the essays in the Mirror, for example, tell a story that was pointed at the excessive ambition of some of Scotland's young elite.57 Antonio was the son of a very rich Scottish merchant. Having made the Grand Tour with the sons of a very important English minister, and having been of considerable service to one of them in a very delicate matter, Antonio was led to believe that he might eventually be rewarded with an important political post. Despite the repeated entreaties of his friends and relations to return to Scotland, where his virtue and education might have been better utilized, Antonio waited patiently for his posting. After whittling away at his fortune of 20,000 pounds and what was left of his self respect, Antonio returned to his native land and lived off the meagre savings of a kind
hearted sister. Mr. Mirror, in this case George Home, commented thus on Antonio’s tragic history:

I have seen few men who were proof against the attention of ministers. Though it does not always gratify, it seldom fails to excite three of the most powerful passions, vanity, ambition and avarice.⁵⁸

Even unfulfilled, therefore, political power could destroy the integrity that was central to virtuous personality. Antonio himself warned his young friends against unbounded political ambition and pointed out that true satisfaction and friendship were far more likely to occur in the sphere of private life. Friendships in this realm, particularly family and domestic friendships were more sincere and lasting than those developed in the world, lamented an older but wiser Antonio.

The case of Antonio is instructive in so far as it shows the Mirror Club quite consciously warning a wealthy young Scotsman against entry into London political life. Mackenzie presented a similar case in the tale of a young lady who married an older man of great fortune and singular worth.⁵⁹

For a time, they lived together in a state of great domestic happiness:

This happiness, however, it was not my good fortune long to enjoy. Some prospects of political ambition, in which Mr. M____ was engaged, called him from those domestic enjoyments, which seemed for a while to have interested him, into more public life.

In that same public sphere, however, the virtue of both husband and wife was corrupted. They were introduced into the round of dissipation in the capital. They eventually succumbed to the values of the court, as prescribed by that literary arch
villain Lord Chesterfield. And now, having lost both her husband and her reputation for virtue, a chastened woman urged others not to tempt fortune and enter into the scene of public temptation.

William Craig also recounted the sad history of a good and honest member of ancient family who went to parliament and formed new plans and views for his family. Needless to say, his fortune was soon decimated and his family educated far beyond the station in life to which they were now reduced. As an unhappy daughter remarked:

The quiet ordinary path is the road to real and lasting enjoyment...there is more chance of felicity in the private stations of life, than in all the noise, and pomp, and show of a more exalted station.

The main message for the Scottish nobility here was that it would be better to stay at home than to participate in the political and courtly life of the metropolis. At the very least, they should make their estates their primary residence and not flitter away their fortunes in an extravagant London life.

A more humorous, but equally socially destructive, example was that of Mr. Wilfull — another member of an ancient family and a champion of liberty and the constitution. Only rarely, and then around election time, did Mr. Wilfull reside at his estate. His manners, both towards his acquaintances and his family, were course and vulgar rather than amiable. His private property, as a result of his public and national concerns, was not properly cared for. And his treatment of his
tenants was even worse, since he restricted them to very short leases on the grounds that "a man's estate was not his own, if a low fellow had the use of it for twenty or thirty years." Mr. Lounger, alias Mackenzie, was happy to leave this champion for independence to return to live with an old aunt who, though she practiced rather old fashioned Tory principles, was "very fond of her nephew, very indulgent to the servants, and very hospitable to the neighbours." As in his novels, therefore, Mackenzie had nothing but contempt for those public spirited men who lacked the essential characteristic of sensibility and the virtues of humanity.

Similar histories were acted out on a lesser scale in the Mirror Club's treatment of some of Scotland's gentry. Eager to be thought of as politicians, Mr. Bustle and Mr. Dormer neglected the lesser but important duties of their station in life. They disturbed the peace of the community by fabricating enmities with their neighbours, and they virtually ignored their families altogether. Dormer was particularly assiduous about what he regarded as the public spirit. His constant maxim was that the interest of the individual should never supersede that of the Public. Indeed, so great was his love for this ideal and abstract Public that he had "no time for private friendships or for the exercise of private virtues."

But, William Craig asked:

are there not private virtues, are there not private interests and attachments, that are as important, as necessary to constitute a virtuous character, as a regard for the public interest? And ought general considerations of utility to supersede the attention to everything else?
A love of utility or public order, Craig went on to argue, was not the same thing as social benevolence or humanity. It proceeded more from a love of theory than from affection for one’s fellow man. Moreover, it could mask the most unfeeling of hearts. No one, for example, had heard of any private charity being performed by Dormer; no one in distress had ever felt his sympathy.

What the Mirror Club were suggesting in their advice to the different sectors of the landed class, therefore, was not simply that public life was a more corrupting arena for the practice of virtue than was its private counterpart. The ordinary duties, the lesser offices, of private life were the social cement and the real environment for the achievement of that sympathy which was moral in character. True virtue could only be developed and strengthened through daily and frequent intercourse in the society of everyday life and common interaction. It was in the ordinary occurrences of life, wrote Mackenzie:

> still more than of others, that good or evil is in great measure regulated by the temper and disposition of him to whom they fall out.  

Private and domestic life were, then, the most useful and least problematic arenas for the practice of virtue. Here, one could with safety exercise that "certain pliancy of mind, which society alone can give, though its vices often destroy." In private life, but most especially within the intimate domestic circle, one could participate in the symphony of sensibility. Without this same sympathetic pliancy, however, even the refuge
of private life could become a prison for its members. Virtue was a social characteristic, just as man was a social animal. It was acquired through interaction and demanded flexibility rather than an excessively stubborn independence. As William MacLeod Bannatyne put it "much the greatest part of domestic quarrels originate from the want of this pliancy of disposition which people seem, very absurdly, to suppose may be dispensed with in trifles." But, as we have seen, virtue had much to do with trifles and the integrity of the public realm was dependent upon the sympathetic feelings of private men. This fact was ingeniously suggested in the title of a work written by Thomas McDonald in 1795 -- Thoughts on the Public Duties of Private Life.

The Cultivation of Domesticity

The shift of focus from the public to the private realm, therefore, stemmed from much deeper causes than the mere provinciality of Scottish life or the fact that an Edinburgh audience was not the same as its London counterpart. It was not simply the case, as Charles Knight suggests, of retaining the general moral message of the Spectator while, at the same time, limiting its focus to a more practically minded readership. Rather, it related to the utilization of an ethics based upon sensibility as opposed to religious dogma or public spirit. This same sensibility, for reasons that have been discussed, only operated properly within small and relatively
intimate social groups. Furthermore, the emphasis upon private morality was intimately connected with, and reinforced by, the conviction that Scotland's elite needed to perform its paternalistic and benevolent functions within a more circumscribed sphere and to avoid becoming excessively engrossed in public affairs or the dissipation of a corrupt court inhabited by role playing strangers.

While containing relatively original and obviously significant aspects, however, this shift from the public to the private realm was perhaps less consequential and pregnant for the future than the interest which Scottish moralists showed for the smallest social unit compatible with intimate, and potentially virtuous, action -- the domestic circle. This little society as they were fond of calling it, was to become the ultimate school and safeguard of virtue.

When the Scottish literati referred to the domestic circle, they invariably concentrated upon the relationship between the two spouses (conjugal felicity) and with their children (parental tenderness). Although the odd grandparent, or virtuous aunt, might occasionally play a positive role within the domestic scene, the focus of the moralists' attention was the nuclear family unit. In fact, intruders upon the nuclear family, especially relatives, when they were developed to any significant extent in the pages of the Mirror and Lounger, were usually a negative influence. In particular, such well-intentioned intruders interfered with the upbringing and education of children. This latter function -- that of the
socialization of the child — further enhanced the significance of the domestic sphere. For not only was the home -- a term now used with considerably reverence -- the school for the practice of interactive sympathy, it was also the place wherein children were brought up and made aware of the dangers of the world.

One of the most revealing indicies, and perhaps the most appropriate vehicle for the feelings which adhered to the family unit during the latter decades of the eighteenth century, was that of domestic poetry. This literary form, so prominent yet overlooked in the periodical press, was full of praise for marriage and the home. That the home and the conjugal state were the most appropriate stimulants of complacent sensibility, HYMAEUS made absolutely clear in a poem written for the Scots Magazine in 1764. The poem, entitled The Married State, went:

If you ask from what source my felicity flows,
My answer is short -- From a wif,
Who, for cheerfulness, sense, and good-nature, I chose,
Which are beauties that charm us for life.

To make home the seat of perpetual delight,
Ev'ry moment each studies to seize,
And we find ourselves happy, from morning to night,
By the mutual endeavour to please.67

In another poem on the same theme of familial sympathy, but more sharply underlining the distinction between the domestic and a more public realm, an author enthused:

O how superior these domestic joys,
To what the world calls pleasure, pomp, and state!
Where envy blasts not, nor Distrust annoys,
Nor false dissemblers flatter those they hate.68

A regular contributor to the Scots Magazine and the Caledonian Mercury was W.O., who was probably William Oglivie, the poet and miscellaneous writer from Aberdeen. His poems dealt with a wide variety of contemporary themes, not the least of which was a stern criticism of the increasing luxury of the Scottish nobility and gentry.69 Several of his productions, however, dealt with the sublime pleasures of domestic life. In Rustic Simplicity, for example, he advocated:

The dear domestic joys of life,
Are worth a thousand others;
A tender husband, prudent wife,
Kind sisters, and good brothers.70

In this affectionate circle, he went on to point out, no peevish passions disrupted the social peace. The ostensible reason for such a high degree of sympathetic harmony, he made clear in another of his poems, this time stressing the importance of gentle manners and ease within this little heaven:

Gentle manners, virtuous lives,
Make easy husbands, happy wives.
These are the only means we know,
To make a little heaven below.71

The use of the term heaven is not as inappropriate as it might first seem. For what had begun so well on earth could continue in the hereafter. Not a few of the poems, especially of the 1770s and 1780s, were composed in order to praise departed spouses, parents and children. These differ from poems on the same subject written during the late 1750s and early 1760s in that they exhibit familiar tenderness rather
than a grim preoccupation with death. Poems such as The Dying Husband to his Wife, On the Death of a Sister, On the Death of a Beloved Wife, On the Death of a much-Loved Wife, To the Memory of a Very Promising Child, A Monody Occasioned by the Death of a Brother and Elegy on a Family Tomb -- all attest to a heightened sense of family affection and a desire to continue these domestic joys serene in the world to come. Even the inscriptions on family monuments, which stressed the domestic attributes of those they commemorated, found their way into the Scottish press. Witness, for example, the one erected to a rich Glasgow merchant who not only extended the commerce of his country and acquired a considerable fortune to boot, but who, "with affectionate tenderness, fulfilled the duties of domestic life." And the editor of the Scots Magazine was pleased to report the inscription on a new monument erected in Greyfriars kirkyard:

HERE LIES INTERR'D
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE CATHERINE POWLET,
DAUGHTER OF HIS GRACE HARY DUKE OF BOLTON,
SPOUSE OF ADAM DRUMMOND OF MEGLINCH,
FOR GOODNESS OF HEART, FREE OF ALL GUILE,
FOR SINCERE HONESTY AS A FRIEND,
FOR FAITHFUL AFFECTION AS A WIFE,
FOR PREFERING DOMESTIC HAPPINESS TO COURTLY SPLENDOUR,
AND DECENT OECOMONY TO DISSIPATED PROFUSION,
EQUALL'D BY FEW,
SURPASS'D BY NONE.

In a similar vein, the author of a 1787 Monody on the death of James Hunter Blair, the late Lord Provost of Edinburgh, was concerned to inform people that there was more to this patriotic magistrate than could be summed upon in terms like improvement and public spirit:
From the approving public eye retr'd,
His virtue still was active and sustained
The scene of private life with equal grace.
Long, long, will those, a numerous band of friends
Who in calm domestic hour, much pleased
Viewed him fulfilling every sacred duty. 75

Thus there is considerable socio-cultural evidence for the rise of affective familial relations in late eighteenth century Scotland and, if the debates of the earlier Select Society on topics such as the Marriage Act is representative of social views, the roots of this new perception of the joys of domesticity may begin much earlier. The evidence, therefore, refutes Lawrence Stone's unsubstantiated claim that Scotland was at least a generation behind her sister kindom in terms of its views on affectivity and the family. Indeed, without attempting to suggest that these new attitudes were totally unique to Scotland, it will be argued that Scottish moralists and writers were in the forefront of the development of these perspectives. What is more, their treatment of the subjects of familial affection, while it provides cultural support for the claim that the rise of the *companionable marriage* was an eighteenth century phenomenon, also questions the claim of both literary scholars and social historians that the eighteenth century witnessed a *reduction of sociability* and the triumph of *affective individualism*. 76

The Scottish cultural evidence clearly supports the notion that there was a preoccupation with the *sacred duties* of family life by the late eighteenth century. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the *bachelor* became targeted as an
enemy of society. Lawrence Stone provides some interesting information on the phenomenon of bachelorhood from the mid-sixteenth century on, suggesting that the necessity of preserving the family patrimony intact tended to delay the age of marriage among Britain's elite. But Stone's primary interest here is in the connection between the unreleased sexual energies of bachelors and the rise of eroticism. Thus, he tends to ignore the ways in which the concept of the bachelor became a dependent cultural variable of the new stress upon affection within the family unit and the new social roles which this little circle was called upon to perform. Thus, well to do bachelors received a degree of criticism which was nothing short of extreme in the periodical press and which was neither confined to nor focused upon their sexual gallantry. In October of 1764, for example, one correspondent actually called for a tax upon celibacy, pointing out the connection between the single state and individual luxury at the present, that bachelors were without any determinate connections in society, and that they were far too prone to factious ambition. In November of that same year, another article on the corrupt influences of "luxury, ostentation, extravagence and idleness," targeted the young rich who chose to remain in a "wistful state of celibacy" as among the chief villains. In later articles, the connection between the married state and virtuous sensibility, rather than fixed social position, was stressed. The popular Sketch of a thing called a Bachelor by POLAND appeared in the newspapers in 1780. According to the
author, not only was the bachelor mere lumber without any social use, but such a creature was incapable of tender impressions:

If ever he speaks the language of sensibility, he speaks it on the excellence of some favorite dish, or the choice liquors with which his cellars abound.

Not surprisingly, this and other issues associated with the conjugal relationship found their way into clubland. A debate of the Pantheon Society on the imposition of a tax upon bachelors for the support of orphans and foundlings was defeated by a mere vote. Some other representative topics of debate included: Whether is Fancy or Judgement most consulted in chusing a Wife, Whether is the state of Celibacy or Marriage most conducive to Private happiness, Ought children, at the years of discretion, to be under the influence and control of their Parents in forming the matrimonial connection?, and Whether is Marriage at an Early or Middle period of life, best calculated to ensure Happiness in the conjugal State?

In 1786, the paper printed an essay entitled Sketch of the Life of an Old Bachelor. The persona of the old bachelor was used by many Scottish moralists, including the authors of the Mirror and Lounger in order to emphasize the importance of conjugal and paternal affection to both happiness and virtue. Here, the author argued that married life helped one to "avoid the temptations to which single men are exposed." Even more important, it was an aid to his "integrity, his constitution, or his temporal happiness." The old bachelor had earlier appeared in the pages of the Scots Magazine in a poem by W.O.
An Old Bachelor's reflections on Matrimony argued that "life, true life" was only to be found in "social joys, and social tears." It was, therefore, the happy youth who could discover a wife "whose temper to his own allied." In the domestic realm, a husband, parent, wife and friend, in every dearest sense, was to be found. It was, in fact, a self-contained community or kingdom:

A queen is she, and he's a king,  
And their dominion is -- their home.

The parents were unquestionably the rulers of this dominion. They were meant to be benevolent despots, however, and their children to be willing subjects. Parents were to watch over the development of these subjects assiduously, marking each and every sign of character and beginning the cultivation of moral character. "Sow the seeds of grace within," wrote the author of a poem entitled Two Lamps -- the two lamps being education and sentiment. It was imperative to do this early, "while, guiltless of a weed, the soil with all its powers may bless your toil." The first step in this cultivation was the imparting of filial piety, gratitude and love for the parent. The second was to teach the child sympathy -- to feel Pity for another's woe. The final step was to transform this cultivated sensibility into a more controlled and socially useful benevolence. Thus, an education in sensibility had as its aim the smooth functioning of the moral community rather than an exploration of individuality.

This critical social task was to be accompanied by lavish doses of parental largesse. Parental affection was not the
mere by-product of the growth of individualism during the eighteenth century, it was a cultural imperative. *Parental tenderness* and *friendship* were terms that recurred repeatedly in poems such as *The Looking Glass: or, Parental Fondness*. Concomitant with this same tenderness was a deeply felt anxiety that began to pervade didactic domestic poetry for *unsuspecting youth* combined with high expectations for the child's future. In *An Ode on Lord Hay's Birthday*, for example, the anonymous author referred to both a *Parent's fears* and a *Parent's hopes* in connection with their *unsuspecting offspring*, who was to be pitted against the *sons of Luxury* in the cause of social renewal. In yet another poem of this kind, T.L. of Dumfries praised heaven on the birth of some unnamed *young gentleman*. Of his new parent, the author prayed:

Nor, disappointed, let them e'er complain
That all their wishes, all their hopes were vain;
That form'd to virtue by the classic page,
Be now their joy, the comfort of their age.

The literary representatives and bards of Scotland's upper classes clearly had very high expectations, both of parents and children.

As has already been suggested, domestic topics readily found their way into clubland and were not considered beneath the dignity of the members of the popular but fashionable *Pantheon Society*. While one evening they might discuss the effect of the Scottish rebellions or the advantage of extending Britain's commercial empire, they could just as easily debate the relative merits of peevish and passionate husbands, compare
drunken husbands and scolding wives, assess the strongest basis of friendship, or treat of the moral merits of the sensibility of women. A number of debates are worthy of particular mention, but perhaps the most intriguing, and the one which most evidences the significance which the Pantheon Society placed upon the private and domestic sphere was the well attended debate on Whether disappointment in Love, treachery in Friendship, or loss of Liberty, be hardest to bear? As might be expected in an eighteenth century male debating society, liberty won the debate. But the fact that the question was posed in the terms it was attests to the attention that educated men were paying to private friendships and the conjugal relationship. In addition, the vote was a very close one. Apparently, many of those 200 fashionable gentlemen who attended the Pantheon that night placed friendship and love before that classic concept of the civic humanist tradition -- liberty.

Many of the members of the Pantheon Society were ministers or lawyers, two groups who played a dominant role in the cultural life of the nation and who made their own contribution to the phenomenon that is referred to as the Scottish Enlightenment. Both the Moderate clergy and the legal elite, as represented by the Mirror Club, showed considerable interest in domestic life during the later decades of the century. It has already been shown how much attention preachers such as Drysdale and Charters attached to parental affection and domestic education. Hugh Blair also emphasized the moral
significance of the domestic sphere:

Not a day passes, but in the common transactions of life, and especially in the intercourse of domestic society, gentleness finds a place for promoting the happiness of others and for strengthening in ourselves the habit of virtue.  

The moral sentiments were, of course, innate, but they needed to be cultivated through social interaction and the establishment of sympathy. "One of the first principles of order," Blair informed his readers, "is, to learn to be happy at home. It is in domestic retreat that every wise and virtuous mind finds his chief satisfaction." Here it was that the sympathetic or benevolent temper was developed. "Particularly amidst that familiar intercourse which belongs to domestic life," wrote Blair, "all the virtues of temper find an ample range." Those who looked upon the domestic hearth as an arena for empathy or unchecked emotion were sadly mistaken, he went on to suggest:

there, on the contrary, more than anywhere, it concerns them to attend to the government of their heart; to check what is violent in their tempers, and to soften what is harsh in their manners. For there the temper is formed. There the real character displays itself. The forms of the world disguise men when abroad. But within his own family, every man is known to be what he truly is. In all our intercourse, then, with others, particularly in that which is closest and most intimate, let us cultivate a peaceable, a candid, a gentle and friendly temper.

But the most delicate attentions were necessary for the achievement of sympathy within the domestic sphere. Individuals brought so close together must "unavoidably rub, at times, the more on one another." That was precisely why it
was "within the circle of domestic life, that the character of the man of peace will be particularly distinguished as amiable; and where he will most comfortably enjoy the fruits of his happy disposition."

Blair's treatment of the domestic hearth is important for its stress upon interactive sympathy and for the important distinction which he made between sympathetic and empathetic environments. But, when it came to the topic of domesticity, Blair was a better theorist than a propagandist, as were most of the Moderate preachers. This may well have been as much a problem of their particular form of discourse — i.e. the sermon — as anything else. John Logan's sermons, for example, did not treat of conjugal affection or parental tenderness to any considerable extent. However, his poetry most certainly did. Here, we are witness to the dear names, finer ties and sweeter claims of connubial love over what the unwedded heart could feel. We also see the benevolent affections and parental tenderness of an aristocratic father, who had lost his estate because of the perfidy of false friends. Such themes and descriptions fit in well with the newer focus upon private life and the domestic sphere.

There was one set of sermons, however, which did bridge the gap between a more academic analysis of the relationship between sympathy and virtue and the propagandistic domestic poetry of the period. Even more than Blair or Charters, the preaching of of James Fordyce was intimate and conversational, punctuated at regular intervals by enthusiastic appeals to the
emotions. It was precisely this style, which he and his brother developed in the works *Theodorus* and *The Eloquence of the Pulpit*, which allowed James Fordyce to treat of such things as conjugal love, parental affection, and the intimate family in ways that were pleasing and relevant to his fashionable congregation.\(^{96}\)

His *Addresses to Young Men* (1777), which were originally delivered as sermons, contained no less than three sermons on friendship.\(^{97}\) The most remarkable characteristic of these sermons is the way in which they show the focus of practical morality shifting from the public through to the private and ultimately residing in domestic sphere. For Fordyce was extremely sceptical of the possibility of virtuous friendships outside of the domestic environment. It was not until his third sermon on the subject that he got down to discussing what a friendship between male peers should look like and, even then, he regarded his description as much more of an ideal type than something that actually existed in the world. Given this attitude on Fordyce's part, he was much more concerned to warn against bad private friendships — public friendships being virtually impossible — than he was to encourage them. Virtuous friendship seemed likely in only two cases. It was possible with the only truly impartial spectator, God, and, more to the point, it was possible in the domestic circle.

Since an examination of these sermons demonstrates the tension that was becoming evident to Scottish moralists, even between the more virtuous private realm of male members of the
community and the more isolated familial relationship, it is worth discussing them in some detail. In the first of these three sermons, Fordyce emphasized the importance of the filial relationship as a true friendship. He warned parents against turning the all important domestic circle into a prison for their adolescent children and exhorted them to turn their favorite residence into a place where tranquility and kindness predominated:

Gracious Heaven! can you endure to think of turning those houses, which should be habitations of peace, into prisons, and yourselves, who should be the guardians of your offspring, into their jailers? Can you bear the reflection, that instead of causing their honest hearts to palpitate with joy and gratitude every time you enter, you their Parents, the instruments of their happiness — that You should by your dreaded presence, quash every comfort which began to rise when you were gone, and kill the little buds of affection, which did you but smile upon them, would break forth like those of the spring at the sun's reviving rays.98

In addition to parents acting as friends to their children, Fordyce begged the young adolescent to cultivate his parents "as the most faithful counsellors, and their most precious Friends; Friends whose sincerity, whose benignity, whose zeal for their welfare" could only be exceeded by the friendship that obtained within the most virtuous conjugal relationships.

In the second sermon, Fordyce's elitist orientation was reflected in his claim that true friendship could never exist between individuals of differing social rank. It could, and should, only take place between those of a similar station. There was one exception, however; it was the familial
relationship:

The most perfect friendship that can subsist in the case of a subordination or peradventure in any case but that of happy wedlock, is what obtains between a wise parent, where there is much benignity on the one side, and a well-taught mind on the other; where the air and voice of authority are softened into the tone and aspect of superior graciousness.

Such a relationship, despite the clear subordination of youth, was "the best of societies." It was the most perfect copy of the relationship which existed between God and man. And, it would be continued in an afterlife, where the young would continue to express gratitude for the paternalistic services rendered. One is reminded here of Drysdale's belief in the existence of a social rank in heaven which supposedly mirrored the British social structure of the eighteenth century.

Only the conjugal relationship had the potential for greater closeness, Fordyce suggested. In a sermon On Love, for example, he maintained that this relationship (one based upon eros as well as agape) was particularly conducive to virtuous simplicity. Fordyce recognized that this friendship was somewhat problematic in the sense that it had some basis in sexual attraction -- a passion which had a distinct tendency to go beyond its proper bounds. However, when toned down and modified into affectionate sensibility, it was perhaps the greatest stimulus to virtue. It acted as an encouragement to the creation of that special symphonic harmony between two individuals. What is more, the daily and affectionate contemplation of the loved object added yet another incentive and reinforcement to the desire to excell in virtue.
Fordyce argued that love was a passion which could be channeled towards beneficial social ends. As distinct from some present day social historians and literary scholars, he also claimed that the intimate love relationship owed a great deal to sympathy, or the accommodation of one individual to the feelings of another. This same accommodation went far beyond mere physical attraction; it constituted an attraction of the mind and temperament. Thus, the relationship, for Fordyce and other Scottish moralists, was not marked by an animal passion which, in any case, could never be manipulated for very long, but by human sensibility in general. The conjugal relationship, therefore, was a relationship in which that same sensibility could be morally exploited. Adopting the musical image that was characteristic of the Moderate discussion of sympathy in general, and Adam Smith's *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* in particular, Fordyce wrote:

> Between two minds of the opposite sexes that are tuned to one another, there may be much diversity in many particular notes; but the general ground and air are the same, and the different parts serve only to complete the harmony.

Fordyce adapted the formal requirements of the sermon in order to converse more easily about the family, domestic relations, and the respective roles of men and women. But journals like the *Mirror* and *Lounger* were much more obvious vehicles for the discussion of these intimate topics. In letters to the *Mirror* and the *Lounger*, fictitious correspondents noted that Mackenzie and his friends did not regard the "occurrences of domestic life unworthy your
attention." One of these even went so far as to suggest that Mr. Lounger must be a married man, since otherwise he could not have described domestic situations as well as he did. It is in letters such as these that we observe the Mirror Club quite self-consciously patting itself on the back for its ability to realistically portray the little scenes of domestic life.

Numerous papers in the twin journals focus in, as with a telephoto lens, on the most minute aspects of family life in the home. In John Homespun's virtuous gentry residence, for example, we watch a happy family engaging in such playful activities as blindman's-bluff, Cross-purposes or the playing of Loo for cherry stones. Mr. Lounger affectionately introduces us to his old servant, Peter, and his faithful dog. And he gently leads us into the domestic life of the aristocratic Benevolus family, where we sit at the breakfast table and listen to this little society making its plans for the day. There, we hear the little philosophers discussing their lessons in the library on a rainy day, and we watch this same young elite enquiring into the conditions of a senior tenant farmer on their father's estate on that one night of the week when an extra space was set at the usually restricted family table.

One needs to appreciate the Mirror Club's attention to domestic life in terms of an eighteenth century audience conversant with, and attracted to, the literature of sensibility. These individuals, I think, would have found
something relatively new in the Mirror Club's attention to the
symphony of feeling within private homes, among husbands and
wives, and between parents and children. To modern eyes, the
picture presented seems insipid and unrealistic. Such doting
parents and children are rare at the best of times. But it
should be remembered that Mackenzie and his colleagues were
trying to merge realistic and minute portrayal with moral
message; their primary concern was ethical rather than mimetic;
they wanted to direct their moral message at the ordinary
behaviour of dull people in everyday life.

The one thing in particular that they wanted to depict and
reinforce was a happy and self-contained home life. To their
minds, this took precedence over even the most virtuous private
friendships. For example, Mr. Lounger extolled the Benevolus
family, telling his readers that there was:

a living harmony in the appearance of the
family, that adds considerably to the pleasure
of this and every other entertainment. To see
how the boys hang upon their father, and with
what looks of tenderness the girls gather round
their mother! "To be happy at home" said
Benevolus one day to me, when we were talking of
the sex, "is one of the best dowries we can give
a daughter with a good husband, and the best
preservative against her chusing a bad one. How
many miserable matches have I known some of my
neighbour's girls make, merely to escape from
the prison of their father's house."

Like James Fordyce, the Mirror Club believed that the home
should be anything but a prison. Even apart from the existence
of a family, the home was the place wherein one could escape
from external stimuli and achieve an inner peace conducive to
virtue. Mr. Mirror was aware that this concentration upon the
domestic realm left him open to the criticism that he was encouraging individualism and selfishness. For he was quick to argue that such contentment was far from being an anti-social feeling. Rather, the sentiment of home was the basis of humanity towards others. Adopting a line of analysis that would later be incorporated in Edmund Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France, he argued:

Nor has Nature given us this propensity in vain. From this the principle of patriotism has its earliest source, and some of those ties are formed, which link the inhabitants of less favoured regions to the heaths and mountains of their native land. In cultivated society, this sentiment of Home cherishes the useful virtues of domestic life; it opposes, to the tumultuous pleasures of dissipation and intemperance, the quiet enjoyments of sobriety, oeconomy, and family affection; qualities which, though not attractive of much applause or admiration, are equally conducive to the advantage of the individual, and the welfare of the community.

This foreshadowing of Burke is not so surprising if one considers that the latter was much taken with Smith's discussion of sympathy in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. It is brought to light even more pointedly in Mr. Mirror's comments on the French. Henry MacKenzie noted that the French, who are a lively people, seemed to have no vocabule that answered to our substantive Home. And yet, he reflected, this often overlooked feeling was one of the best preservatives and rewards of virtue.

Mr. Lounger, having introduced us to his Pomeranian dog Ceasar, further underlined this connection between domestic life and virtue:

I hold it indeed as the sure sign of a mind not
poised as it ought to be, if it is insensible to the pleasures of home, to the little joys and endearments of a family, to the affection of relations, to the fidelity of domestics. Next to being well with his own conscience, the friendship and attachment of a man's family and dependents seems to me to be one of the most comfortable circumstances in his lot. His situation with regard to either, forms that sort of bosom comfort or disquiet that sticks close to him at all times and seasons, and which, though he may now and then forget it amidst the bustle of public, or the hurry of active life, will resume its place in his thoughts, and its permanent effects upon his happiness, at every pause of ambition or business.

the home was a sanctuary of comfort and protection; it was the environment in which the underlying temper of the mind was formed. More important, however, it was the place wherein one exposed and moderated one's sentiments in face-to-face interaction.

In a fascinating discussion of cultivated sentiments, William McLeod Bannatyne urged the necessity for that delicate complacency of mind which led the individual to consult the feelings of others and to moderate their own feelings in order to gratify them as far as is in our power. In his own version of the symphony of sympathy, he elaborated on the crucial importance of acquiring and practising this disposition within the family. It was not only the case that the lack of it poisons the domestic happiness of families, he urged. But this same complacency, sensibility of temper or pliancy of disposition, had to be attended to in this lesser sphere before it could become operative within a greater. The manners, as distinct from the duties of life formed a sort of Pocket Coin, or refined sociability which was necessary to social
intercourse, whether or not it was utilized in great and important transactions.

If the domestic circle was such an important school for the development of social sensibility, then it logically followed that the celibate life became a target for moral criticism or, at the very least, a useful foil against which the superiority of family life could be presented. Having in an earlier essay informed his readers that he was indeed a bachelor, *Mr. Lounger* recounted his emotions after returning home from a solitary walk and noticing that *Peter* was looking a little bit older than he used to do. Mr. Lounger felt the lack of those domestic comforts which are supplied to the man who is the head of a dutiful, affectionate, good-humoured and virtuous family. Nor could he easily account for Cicero's omission of this important subject in his treatise *de Senectute*. The possession of children in particular, *Mr. Lounger*, alias Mackenzie, deemed an inestimable blessing:

Perhaps the Roman manners and customs were not very much calculated to promote this; they who could adopt the children of others, were not likely to be so exclusively attached to their own, or to feel from that attachment a very high degree of pleasure... But though a bachelor myself, I look with equal veneration and complacency on the domestic blessings of a good old man, surrounded by a virtuous and flourishing race, in whom he lives over the best days of his youth, and from whose happiness he draws so much matter for his own.

Thus, Mackenzie drew an important distinction between the ancients and the moderns in terms of familial affection. In the same essay, he effectively replaced the public sphere of classical discourse with that endearing society -- the
The major purpose of the latter, he stressed, was not that of supplying the physical needs of individuals. Its purpose was to supply their social and emotional needs and to transform them into virtuous and useful people.

There is absolutely no doubt who wins the contest between even the most amiable bachelor who lives in solitary loneliness and a married man, even though of far lesser intelligence or abilities. The man who weds an honest and warm woman, and who expends much of his energy on the education of his children, is described as infinitely happier and far more socially useful than his talented single counterpart. But it was absolutely imperative that the married man and father acquire an affection for the domestic circle. In one of the rare illustrations of the tensions that might exist between a world of male friendships and the domestic hearth, Mr. Lounger gently chided those husbands who spent too much of their spare time in the coffee-rooms, instead of at the family fireside. And he expressly deplored the situation of individuals who frequented such habitations in order to escape from their wives.

Mr Lounger adopted his most serious tone, however, in condemning those who preferred public pleasure to domestic bliss. In a paper entitled The Regrets of him who has thrown away domestic happiness in frivolous dissipation, Alexander Fraser Tytler emphasized the difficulty a modern moralist faced in convincing individuals that virtue and happiness were concepts that related specifically to domestic life. While classical history provided us with ample evidence for assessing
the behaviour of the virtuous, and not so virtuous, dead, it was difficult for people to recognize virtue closer to hand. Writing under the persona of Lucilius, Tytler provided the example of a virtuous wife — Maria. The latter individual was most careful to superintend the minutest aspects of domestic life and to care affectionately for her husband, not because of any lack of fondness for society, he was quick to add. Rather, she recognized that the domestic sphere was the proper environment for the practice and exhibition of her virtue. Her husband, on the other hand, persisted in his vain and extravagant lifestyle, only rarely indulging in "a genuine relish for calm and domestic happiness." His recognition of the importance of this sphere only came after Maria herself joined the ranks of the virtuous dead.

The moral lesson, therefore, was to recognize that happiness and morality existed primarily in the domestic sphere and not to be distracted by attractive external impressions. This, in effect, meant closing off the family from excessive outside influence or danger, which was no easy matter for a sociable member of Scotland's landed classes as well as the master of servants. The treatment of servants in the Mirror and Lounger is particularly informative. They could, like Albert Bane or Peter, be accepted as virtual family members. More often, they had to be kept at a distance, lest their influence on the young interfered with the latter's moral cultivation. But always, the master needed to adopt a sociable or complacent relationship with his servants since they formed
an essential part of his day to day interaction and contributed to the development of his own sympathetic qualities. Thus, although servants could often be a severe test upon one's benevolent tempers, Mr. Lounger deplored those landed parents and children who adopted a haughty and despotic behaviour in relation to this group of individuals.\textsuperscript{115} Complacency to servants, echoed Mr. Mirror was an essential part of politeness.\textsuperscript{116}

In addition to the problem of servants, several essays in the Mirror and Lounger consisted of descriptions of, and warnings against, domestic intruders. Mr. Dalton, for example, complained of the normative stress upon hospitality in the countryside and sought to "escape the evils of a good neighbourhood", which so disturbed his family's peace and domestic economy.\textsuperscript{117} But these intruders were particularly dangerous when they interfered with the moral cultivation of the young. Mr. Homespun's family, for example, were caused all sorts of trouble, both by the interference of a noble neighbour and by the appearance of a family of nabobs or Mushrooms flushed with the wealth of India.\textsuperscript{118} These filled his daughters' impressionable heads with all sorts of ridiculous values. Mr. Homespun eventually realized that he could be master of his own house. Mrs. Careful also informed Mr. Lounger that she was constantly interfered with, in the education of her children, by female Loungers who liked to while away their time in idle conversation.\textsuperscript{119} An improperly run family provided its own distraction. Although the newly
rich Flints hired a classically trained tutor to instruct their son; they constantly interfered in the educational process. Since sociability was the key concept in the moral vocabulary of the Mirror Club, Mackenzie and his friends were concerned to clarify its true meaning and relationship to the sanctity of the domestic hearth. Mr. Mirror, for example, distinguished between sociability in general and that ill founded and misplaced indulgence of society which could challenge the pre-eminence of the family circle. For example, he attacked those who moulded their personalities in such a way as to win the title of good-hearted fellows from their acquaintances. The term, he suggested, was a misnomer if it was in any way related to either excessive profusion or a lack of proper sensitivity to the needs of one's family. Similarly, generosity, if it was to have any real meaning, had to relate first and foremost to that domestic economy which provided the underpinnings of social life. A misplaced emphasis on the wider society, Mackenzie remarked, encouraged too much that was evil and discouraged the good qualifications of sober and decent characters. "If we look into the private histories of unfortunate families," he claimed:

we shall find most of their calamities to have proceeded from a neglect of the useful duties of sobriety, oeconomy, and attention to domestic concerns, which, though they shine not in the eyes of the world, nay, are often subject to its obloquy, are yet guardians of virtue, of honour, and of independence.

Thus, Mr. Mirror encouraged Scotland's elite to move away from notions of honour and hospitality based upon lavish profusion.
and conspicuous consumption, and to pay greater attention to those domestic concerns and relationships which were society's true foundation.

In essays such as the one outlined above, the *Mirror Club* seemed especially concerned to warn those of elevated station against excessive profusion and to encourage them to more personally, and socially, responsible behaviour. But their concern with domestic economy was not confined to the aristocracy. It could apply to "all above the lower ranks, of all who claim the station or the feelings of a gentleman." For this group, it was absolutely imperative to acquire for themselves, and to instill into their children, the science of domestic morality. "In forming the minds and regulating the conduct of men," urged Mr. Lounger:

nothing seems to be of greater importance than a proper system of what may be termed domestic morality; the science of those relative duties, which do not apply only to particular situations, to large fortunes, to exalted rank, to extensive influence, but which constitute that part and character in life which almost everyone is called to perform.

Whereas both *Mr. Spectator* and Adam Smith viewed the world to be the primary arena for the development and practice of virtue, Henry Mackenzie and the *Mirror Club* were nothing if not purposeful in their attempt to award ethical predominance to the domestic sphere. As opposed to the giddy pleasures and magical delusion of public life, they asserted the cares of the household and the education of children. But, and this point must be stressed, the purpose of the cult of domesticity and the moral cultivation of the young was not in any way a
withdrawal from the ethical community. Instead, it was an attempt to construct truly sympathetic men and women who would reinforce its bonds.

Conclusion

According to late eighteenth century Scottish moralists, the highly public life of both politics and courtly display had lost its virtuous bearings. To their classically illuminated vision, self-interest and the corruptions of a commercial society had metamorphized statecraft, politeness, and fashion into scenes of faction, artful deception, and dissipated extravagance. The key to social regeneration, as the member of Glasgow’s Eclectic Society pointed out was to stress those virtues which only a civilized society could produce to any great extent -- humanity, the social passions or "the feelings which interest us in the fortunes of others." These same passions and their manifestations were the primary subject matter of the moralist, or mannerist as Henry Mackenzie liked to call himself, rather than the legislator. They were not something that could be enforced from above. Nevertheless, they were necessary to the ethical survival of the nation.

These writers believed that the moral community that was Scotland was in decline. Face-to-face interaction in the visibly public sphere was characterized by masks which hid the true feelings and intentions of the social actor; it was difficult, if not impossible, for the social passions to
operate properly in that realm. Only in more intimate and less interested social settings could a true *symphony of sympathy* occur. Thus, in a corrupted age, the proper schools for moral cultivation were private life and the domestic sphere. For adults, the proper vehicles for the maintenance of the virtuous personality were close friendships and the conjugal relationship. For the child, particularly the young person getting ready to go out into a dangerous *world*, the most *significant others* were parents. In these circumscribed interactive spheres, the social passions or *sensibility* could be *matured and brought to perfection.*\(^{125}\) Tenderness could assume its *empire over the heart*. The *seeds of sympathy* could *vegetate* and initiate a renewal of national virtue.

Ultimately, therefore, private and domestic morality would have their desired public effect. We should not, however, attribute excessive optimism to these late eighteenth century writers. As William Craig pointed out in one of the pages of the *Lounger*, it was one of the social responsibilities of the moralist to maintain a cheerful composure since this "contributes much more to happiness and virtue than the opposite impressions of a darker and more dismal nature."\(^{126}\) In any case, suggested the aforementioned member of the *Eclectic Society*, the most corrupt ages always provided the toughest test and most splendid arenas for the flowering of disinterested virtue. And, one might add, if the nation's integrity were to prove irrecoverable, at least there still remained the possibility of retaining a more private, albeit
hardly individualistic, code of morality. As Mackenzie himself put it in his novel *The Man of Feeling*, the man of virtuous sentiment did not hate a corrupt world. He pitied it.¹²⁷
CHAPTER FIVE

A PECULIAR APTITUDE TO PLEASE:
COMPLACENT WOMEN AND SCOTTISH MORALISTS

Woman! -- to her the task assign'd,
To harmonize man's rugged mind!
To guide us thro' life's stormy way,
And gild with hope our rising day!
Melt with a tear -- or with a smile,
O'erpay whole years of anxious toil.
(from An Apostrophe in Favour of Love,
Scots Magazine, March, 1778).

Much has been written on the nineteenth century discussion of women and their role in the family. In general, nineteenth century historians have been concerned to associate supposedly new views on women and domesticity with the rise of the industrial bourgeoisie and more individualistic approaches to human relationships (the family and romantic love) and interactive physical space (the superior cosmos of the home).1 Until relatively recently, the eighteenth century discussion of women and their domestic function has been overlooked, with the notable exception of those literary scholars who have examined the construction of new feminine roles in the novels of writers such as Samuel Richardson.2 Moreover, some of the most important modern research touching upon issues related to the nature and function of the eighteenth century woman is marred precisely by the inability of researchers to shed their nineteenth century historical blinkers. Thus, for example, Lawrence Stone relates the changing perceptions of women and the domestic realm to affective individualism and the gradual
growth of romantic love. Despite a Weberian insistence upon the dialectical relationship between culture and society, he virtually ignores the endless cultural debates upon women during the eighteenth century.

The Spectator can be regarded as the classicus locus of a new appreciation of the importance of women. In the fourth issue of that journal, Richard Steele informed the female sex that this periodical was aimed expressly at them. In other essays, he suggested that a woman’s role in the domestic arena called for heroic virtue on their part. Addison did not engage in a similar glorification of the domestic hearth as an arena for virtue. He did, however, suggest that women could play an important part in modifying the harsh passions of men and turning them into more sociable creatures. For this reason, he also acted as the champion of marriage in plays such as Rosamond and The Drummer. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that another champion of women, Samuel Richardson, regarded the female sex as more obliged to Addison than to the works of any single man in the British world.

What were little more than hints or assertions in the Spectator were developed into full blown analyses of the emotional properties and social function of women during the later eighteenth century. One need only refer to the works of such English authors as Vincesimus Knox, Mrs. Griffith’s, and John Bennett to recognize that new roles were being created for women as lovers and mothers during the eighteenth century. Not surprisingly, these works were extremely popular in Scotland,
where the writings of James Fordyce had already propagandized a
privileged place for women in the moral order. This new role
for female sex had precious little to do with affective
individualism; rather it stressed the contribution that women
could make upon men's sympathetic emotions. Because of their
inherent complacency, women were able to soften the harsh
emotions of men into precisely that sort of amiability which
could preserve the notion of community in an increasingly
fragmented society. Women, wrote John Bennet, were made
perpetually to please; they were the embellishers of society;
they exalted the selfish into social enjoyment. Women, he
added, could transform a frivolous, effeminate and dissipated
age into one of virtue.

A close attention to eighteenth century Scottish cultural
attitudes towards women clearly demonstrates that, while the
nineteenth century may have expanded the discourse on purely
sexual female topics, it did not invent, or significantly
amend, such well developed eighteenth century concepts as the
dutiful daughter, the feminine ideal or harmonious
domesticity. Despite the tenacity of nineteenth century
historians in wedding such concepts to industrial society, they
were firmly imbedded in the moral literature long before the
machine age. What the eighteenth century contribution to the
discourse on femininity particularly demonstrates, however, is
the danger of overlooking the importance of female sentiment
and sympathy in a misleading obsession with such narrowly
individualistic concepts as puberty, sexual passion, and
romantic love. A concentration on the latter ignores the serious tensions between increasing individualism and a declining community which so forcefully struck the minds of eighteenth century observers.

The Scottish contribution to the eighteenth century debate upon women was clearly recognized by none other than Mary Wollstonecraft herself. In *A Vindication of the Rights of Women* (1792), she singled out two Scottish authors for special censure. The most important of these two Scotsmen was James Fordyce, one of the pivotal, albeit largely ignored, protagonists in any discussion of the history of women. His *Sermons to Young Women* (1765) was one of the hottest sellers of its day. Four editions of the work had to be printed between June and November of 1766 alone. And the rapturous applause with which these sermons met in Scotland may have been unparalleled. As a usually sedate and taciturn Scottish editor informed his readers:

> As friends to society we think it incumbent upon us to recommend them warmly to our readers; we flatter ourselves that every man of taste and virtue will agree with us in our sentiments concerning them; we are confident that every woman of virtue will.

> As we are no strangers to the feelings and apprehensions of those parents who have daughters to educate in an age of so much levity and dissipation, we think all are under peculiar obligations to the author.

This unprecedented positive reaction cannot be attributed, even in part, to the Scottish authorship of the sermons. The work was published in London and its author still remained anonymous. It was the message, rather than its messenger, that
was popular.

Fordyce's message, alongside that of another Scotsman, David Gregory, were condemned by Wollstonecraft because their end products were docile, subservient and exceedingly complacent beings, whose primary goal in life was to superintend the domestic sphere and meet every wish of their husbands. Indeed, such works represented a more general attempt to confine women to domestic retreat which, it was felt, was the proper sphere of influence and environment for their sympathetic virtues. This great confinement, which in its nineteenth century manifestation can only be compared to the movement to segregate the insane in asylums, did not, however, have as its primary aim the protection of women from the public domain or even the subjection of women to men. Nor did it downplay the significance of female intellect or education, just as long as these were kept within their proper limits. What it did signify was a new and critical role for the modern woman in a civilized commercial society. That role was the preservation and cultivation of a virtue that had its foundation in sensibility.

This new emphasis on the part of Scottish moralists upon the cultivation and role of women made its greatest impact with the publication of Fordyce's work in the 1760s. However, it was not without an important precedent. As early as 1745, the significance of proper female cultivation had been pointed to by James Fordyce's older brother and avowed mentor -- David Fordyce. His Dialogues on Education contained numerous
reflections upon the character and moral formation of women and was clearly intended as a plan of education which grafted an eighteenth century appreciation of human sensibility upon the ancient discussion of morality and education. It argued, for example, that grace and politeness were not at all inconsistent with virtue, if they proceeded from natural feeling rather than any ill-conceived association of ideas.\textsuperscript{11} Manners, correctly understood, were not Rousseau's artificial norms, but reflected sociability -- the handmaiden of morality.\textsuperscript{12} Education itself was the process of cultivating virtue both from reason and natural feelings.\textsuperscript{13} In a problematic public world, however, one of education's critical tasks was highlighting those false connections and impressions that resulted from contact with fashionable, and supposedly polite circles.\textsuperscript{14}

Some of the most fascinating aspects of this early discussion of a sentimental education and women were: its appreciation of the corruption of a luxurious and fashionable society; the tensions that it exhibits between the public and private domains; the superiority which it attaches to private and domestic education; and, more to our purposes here, its emphasis upon the softness, complacence and power of women \textit{vis a vis} their husbands and children.\textsuperscript{15} Throughout the work, Fordyce suggested that female education was every bit as important, if not more, than male education. The male characters in his work are somewhat apologetic and defensive about introducing the topic; nevertheless, they feel that it
has to be aired:

Upon them depends our Happiness or Misery in a nobler Sense than what is commonly apprehended; so that the Respect and Honour which is paid them by any of their Admirers is not founded on Caprice or Passion, but on the justest Grounds. What I would therefore observe, is, that if their Task in Life is so important...it must be an unpardonable fault in us, if we do not contribute our Share towards qualifying them for it. They, whose Business it is to form the Minds of others, had need to have their own well formed.16

Fordyce went on to suggest that their role as Mothers, Nurses and Tutors was far more important than the Generality are aware of.

Moral philosopher and Scottish clergyman, Fordyce continually stressed that the dominant character of the female sex was their tenderness or sensibility.17 It was this characteristic, in particular, which gave them moral power over their husbands and children and constituted their noblest feature. In addition, he made constant reference to the social or Sympathetic sense of our nature. And, in a quite remarkable foreshadowing of Smith's development of the concept of the impartial spectator, he viewed morality in terms of the gradual accretion of correct associations until "a strong Party formed in our Breast against vicious Impressions."18 He even predated Smith in his use of the musical metaphor to describe the achievement of sympathy. Regarding "the sensibility we have for the Happiness and Misery of Others," he wrote:

This is one of the tenderest and most powerful instincts of our nature. Our Hearts, like musical Strings, feel every Vibration which is made on those of others, so that they beat to each other's Pleasures and Pains. So powerful
is this Instinct, that we love to indulge the social Sympathy, even where it gives us Pain, and are seldom better pleased with ourselves than when we weep over and bewail the Miseries of others. 

The important point to understand here is not simply that the sympathetic instinct was critical to moral formation, but also that women seemed to be more capable of experiencing and deploying this same sensibility than were men. If complacency and domesticity were important characteristics for men, they were absolutely imperative for women. Indeed, Scottish moralists after Fordyce would sometimes go so far as to imply that the ultimate responsibility for the integrity of the moral community rested with the female sex. In the process, they transformed women into heavenly angels, which was only fitting since they could look for little recognition, happiness, or equality here on earth.

Fashion, Adolescence and Cultivation

On October 17, 1772, a writer complained to the editor of the Caledonian Mercury about the prodigious spread of polite education in the city of Edinburgh. Thus began a continual stream of letters to the paper during the 1770s and 1780s condemning such education, particularly as it applied to women. What the correspondents said they meant by modern fashionable education was the cultivation of false refinement or artificial politeness. It was also an education which emphasized the "more fashionable qualifications of music and dancing, &c."
rather than "implanting early in their tender minds the principles of morality and religion." In 1775, ARISTIPPUS satirically condemned the new boarding schools that were opening up in the city and Scottish countryside. These, he claimed, turned healthy young women into "delicate, emaciated, colourless, nerveless forms of the polite acquaintance." Similarly, in 1773, A LADY criticized the "present mode of educating young girls in Edinburgh." citing the fact that all their hours were devoted to French, dancing, music and other trivial ornaments. These young girls, she added, learned no true sentiment or feeling. Instead, they acquired only an affectation of sentiment. In an extract from Letters concerning a Plan of Education for Rural Academies, yet another author objected to the sending of young girls to boarding mistresses in the town, which was far too expensive for the fortunes of many of their parents. Furthermore, he informed his readers that in these same institutions the culture of the heart was sacrificed to every accomplishment, amusement, and scene of dissipation. Instead of learning to be good wives, intelligent mothers, and to deal with domestics and the other relations of life, these products of the boarding schools appeared in the gay world with "a head overwhelmed with dress, and replete with ideas of fashion and diversion, with a heart captivated with the pleasures and intoxicated with the folly and dissipation of the town."

The debate over the proper cultivation of the female heart and the function of the boarding schools was also taken up by
the Pantheon Society, thus showing the interest taken in the education of young women among the literati of Edinburgh and landed gentlemen of the country.\textsuperscript{27} It also reflected the fear among the elite and their representatives that those of small or relatively new fortunes would attempt to use such institutions as a springboard into upper class society.\textsuperscript{28} Not all writers, however, were totally opposed to the boarding schools. Some thought them to be acceptable if properly run by women of good character, as did a rather small majority of the voters in the Pantheon Society. That popular essayist, the SPECULATIST, while he condemned modern fashionable education for women in general, conceded that some expertise in music and dancing was a must for modern young ladies.\textsuperscript{29} But he and others were concerned lest the polite products of these schools should be deficient in terms of their intellectual and moral cultivation. These writers constantly exhorted young women and their parents to cultivate moral character and to steer away from excessive luxury and vanity. They opposed genuine refinement to artificial politeness and genuine feeling to the illusion of sentiment.\textsuperscript{30}

A letter from one R.S., printed in both the Caledonian Mercury and Scots Magazine in 1773, singled out the fair sex as in particular need of a "monitor of sense, complacence, and of spirit", who could expose the reigning foibles.\textsuperscript{31} He added that such a monitor could usefully point out the duties that women had to their husbands; show some models of amiable character; and indicate why some promising young women failed
to make good wives. Finally, such a monitor could show how far boarding school education "tends to pervert the mind of many young ladies, and by giving them a turn to dress, secrecy and public entertainments, renders them devoid of sentiment."

What all of these criticisms of the boarding schools have in common is a fear that artificial refinement would corrupt the native sentiment of young women. This condemnation was new in terms of its intensity, but not its content. As early as 1765, James Fordyce's *Sermons to Young Women* attacked these institutions as places where young girls learned "nothing that is domestic or rational." Far better, he argued, to keep the young woman at home and under the control of her mother than to send her out into a public institution or fashionable world that was so replete with danger. "As long as the present fashionable system of female education continues," he despaired of "seeing the effeminate, trifling, and dissolute character of the age reformed."

Unlike Fordyce, the writers in the *Mirror* and *Lounger* were not so violent in their condemnation of boarding school education. They did, however, echo Scottish concerns about social mobility by pointing out that a boarding school education could make a young woman far too genteel for her plain spoken mercantile family. Also, they suggested that a man look for someone with less public education than most of fashionable set when looking for a permanent partner. And, throughout the pages of the two journals, the model mothers -- *Mrs. Careful, Lady Benevolus* and *Emilia* -- invariably educated
their daughters at home. But on the effects of too fashionable an education in general, Mr. Mirror’s criticism rang loud and clear:

It was formerly one of those national boasts which are always allowable and sometimes useful, that the Ladies of Scotland possessed a purity of conduct, and delicacy of manners, beyond that of most other countries. Free from the bad effects of overgrown fortunes, and of the dissipated society of an overgrown capital, their beauty was natural and their minds were uncorrupted. I am sorry to be obliged to conclude that there begins to appear among us a very different style of manners. Perhaps our frequent communication with the metropolis of our sister kingdom, is one great cause of this.35

Indeed, in another place, Mr. Mirror pointed out that London had now become the Glass of Fashion from which Scottish women took their role models.36 Edinburgh was rapidly on its way to becoming a mimic metropolis.

It was largely the result of the rage for modern fashion that the orientation of women had changed during the past half century, the Mirror Club wanted to argue. Stressing their positive communal function, Umphraville claimed that men listened to women in the drawing rooms of fifty years ago.37 Colonel Caustic, the Lounger’s champion of female status and virtue, also declared that women performed a more important social function in the past. Commenting on a modern sumptuous entertainment put on by a nabob, he exclaimed:

I would not exchange an hour passed in the society I have had the honour to see assembled in your Ladyship’s drawing-room for twenty such dinners. There a conversation at once gay and polite, afforded the highest entertainment of which a rational character is capable. There I have seen a Hume trifling with the beautiful and
the young, and at the same time communicating knowledge and instruction in a manner most pleasing, simple and unaffected.  

Thus, Alexander Abercromby cited the important effect which women had upon the general sociability and morality of men. His sentiments were echoed by Henry Mackenzie, who characterized the modern age as one which had lost its attention to women and love and where fashion, nonchalance, and the playing of cards had virtually destroyed any feelings of respectful and delicate affection towards women. Card playing among women was especially condemned for its stimulation of those aggressive and selfish emotions which were the polar opposites of virtuous sensibility towards others.

The Mirror Club's sentiments were general in literary circles and were reflected in numerous historical comparisons. In another attack on the pernicious influence of the English metropolis, for example, the Speculatist contrasted the behaviour of English women frequenting masquerades with the more grave and stately behaviour of Roman matrons. Despite the fact that the behaviour of the ladies in the last age was very reserved and stately, Dr. Gregory informed his daughters, it at least had the effect of making them more respected than the present mode of female manners. Similarly, Mr. Mirror suggested that, while the manners of the older generation were a bit stiff, constrained and overly precise, they did ensure that chastity and obedience which the modern generation was rapidly in danger of losing.

This didactic comparison of the virtue and manners of
women of the past with those of the present was also made by James Fordyce. In an elaboration on a biblical passage concerning the domestic duties of women, he exclaimed:

What a description is here! Can you attend to it without emotion? Or have modern manners so warped your minds, that the simplicity of ancient virtue, instead of appearing to you as an object of veneration, looks romantic and ridiculous.

When Scottish moralists referred to the romantic genre, they signified the historical romances of an earlier generation rather than the modern romantic movement. Fordyce pointed out that such productions may have been exaggerated, but at least they did not conflict with morality. The romance that they portrayed, however ideal, had some relation to virtuous feeling:

The times in which we live are not in danger of adopting a system of romantic virtue. The parents of the present generation, what with selling their sons and daughters in marriage, and what with teaching them by every possible means the glorious principle of Avarice, have contrived pretty effectively to bring down from its former flights that idle, youthful, unprofitable passion, which has for its object personal attractions, in preference to all the wealth of the world.

The modern generation, he concluded, were far too selfish and calculating. Even love or mutual fondness, as Fordyce preferred to refer to it, had been lost in the shuffle of a fashionable society in which, appropriately, one of the primary female skills was reckoned to be proficiency in the playing of cards.

But it would be a mistake to picture Fordyce as a total reactionary, even if at times he sounds like one. He did not,
like the Earl of Buchan, yearn for a return to the civic virtue of the past. Buchan’s criticism of boarding school education certainly parallels that of Fordyce and Mr. Mirror, however. He condemned them as places wherein our women are educated to be governesses, opera girls and fortune hunters, in addition to learning to sing and dance the minuet:

All these accomplishments are attempted to be taught within the compass of 3 or 4 years; and the plain girl with 500 pounds fortune, is educated in the same manner with the beauty who has five thousand.45

But Buchan’s only solution to the problem of female education in the modern age was ridiculously simplistic. He called for a return to the virtuous past and directed women to learn “needle work, and the occupations of the lovely daughters of King Alcinous, with the economy of a table.” Here was no discussion of female sensibility, and women were quite clearly of secondary significance to men. Indeed, Buchan spent most of this essay on female education discussing the puberty and condemning the effeminate practices (masturbation?) of young men.

Fordyce’s solution to the problem of modern manners -- i.e. their artificiality, luxuriousness, and selfishness -- was neither simplistic nor masculine. He concentrated upon those virtuous feelings, that sensibility, which he regarded as quintessentially female and the product of refined, as distinct from primitive, social groups. For him, more and not less sensibility was the solution to the modern problem of virtue; and women, whose nature was ideally suited to this same gentle
tenderness, were its best practitioners. He admired the proud and austere virtue of ancient women, but he did not recommend it. Although the picture of a Roman Matron was greatly respectable, he claimed, it was not an ideal type. The very prowess, patriotism, and glory of such ancient models was their drawback. For these stern virtues resulted in:

the diminution of that gentleness and softness, which were ever, and ever will be, the sovereign charm of the female character.  

As was the case with sensibility in general, for both men and women, this social feeling needed to be tempered by reason and self-control. It must needs be gentle and meek rather than empathetic or extreme in nature. Without this proper check, the social passions, like passion in general, could too easily run to excess:

where an easiness of temper is particularly prevalent, and the heart uncommonly susceptible to warm emotions, in the way of love and friendship; there, without question, a peculiar strain of prudence and fortitude is required.

The ancient philosophers, however, erred in putting too much stress upon reason and self-control. Sensibility, especially in young women, had to be nurtured and cultivated, not denied. Its problematic nature notwithstanding, sensibility was the key to social regeneration and women were its natural custodians.

Such an analysis, which will be examined in greater detail shortly, implied that female education needed to be treated just as seriously as its male counterpart. It also signified a concentration upon, and prolongation of, female youth. Thus, James Fordyce distinguished between the childhood and the
adolescence of the fair sex. Their earliest days, he noted, were marked by sprightliness and simplicity; as they grew older, both their perceptions and their passions developed. They blushed more often — the "precious colouring of virtue" -- and contracted a "quicker perception of what is decent and wise." The period of sensibility was also the period of moral cultivation. At this stage young women developed that sweet timidity and secret sentiment of shame which acted as the guardians of their virtue. This naturally virtuous and guarded female temperament could be debased, however, by entering into public life too soon or too much. The emotions of delicacy which characterized adolescence, he pointed out, would become blunted by familiarity with vice.

It was crucial to keep the young woman at home as long as possible. "If a young person...will be always breaking loose through each domestic enclosure," argued Fordyce, she would run the risk of corrupting her precious and developing sensibility. The domestic sojourn could be wisely employed in the building up of internal resources with which one could combat a selfish world. As was the case with men, youth -- the period of sensibility -- was the best time to build up that internal light which allowed the individual to make those minute distinctions which were essential to the maintenance of integrity in an impersonal and confusing social arena. Female youth, argued Fordyce, was a sportive, sprightly and happy period of life, which made it somewhat unstable. But parents and teachers needed to recognize this period as crucial to
proper moral foundation and to make allowances for their innocent gaiety.52

The moral cultivation of the female needed to incorporate such educational aids as proper reading material. Although Fordyce approved of a few novels, notably those of Samuel Richardson, he did not regard that genre in general as suitable reading material.53 His solution to the problem of female reading material was that women, like young men, should consult the classics. They too should have the pleasure of "conversing with the best authors living and dead, and from this happy commerce have contracted an intellectual turn." This same temperament would help them to avoid the temptations of mingling with the unthinking crowd.54 From the "barrenness of modern conversation" in fashionable society, the young female could always "betake herself to the society of the celebrated dead." Here, at least, morality rested clear and unadorned.

The cultivation of the adolescent female mind was an important theme of the Scottish moralists of the period. Their advice can be best summed up in a short poem by AMICUS entitled Advice to a Lady:

While youth, and health, and vigour springs,  
Your mind be careful to adorn;  
To meaner souls leave meaner things,  
And be the pomp of dress your scorn. 55

In a similar vein, Dr. Gregory's popular A Father's Legacy to his Daughters argued that there was no "impropriety in your reading history, or cultivating any art or science, to which genius or accident lead you."56 It should be remembered that this was not a widespread opinion at the time and that many of
the Scottish moralists clearly regarded themselves as enlightened advocates of the female sex in regard to the issue of intellectual cultivation. Indeed, they foreshadowed Mary Wollstonecraft in their condemnation of the absurdity of believing that an uncultivated woman could ever hope to make a decent wife or mother. And they vehemently attacked those, who like Lord Chesterfield, patronized women as little more than "children of a larger growth." At the same time, their genuine respect for female intellectual capability was tempered by their belief that women's social and moral role lay pre-eminently in their affectivity rather than their rationality.

This same emphasis on female education, cultivation, and youth was continued in the essays of the Mirror and Lounger, many of which were aimed explicitly at a female audience. Mr. Mirror fairly owned that "he addresses many of his papers chiefly to the ladies, and feels a high degree of pleasure when he is told that any of them has been lucky enough to interest or to please the fair part of his readers." His purpose, however, was instruction rather than entertainment. For he wanted to criticize the effect of modern fashion and manners upon the female sex:

With them obedience and subordination are terms of contempt; even the natural relations of time are disregarded; childhood is immutably forced into youth, and youth assumes the confidence and self-government of age; domestic duties are held to be slavish, and domestic enjoyments insipid.

Thus, Mr. Mirror and Mr. Lounger railed against the early
introduction of young women into the giddy world of fashion and called for their more careful cultivation.

The Lounger's Colonel Caustic was one of the Mirror Club's champions of women. His most insistent criticism of the modern age was its lack of proper respect for the fair sex. And his greatest anxieties revolved around the lack of any kind of cultivation for young women. Even considered primarily as a Beauty, he noted, a woman had a sort of professional character that required intelligence and talent to maintain. But the present generation of young women were entering into fashionable society without any preparation whatsoever. "Now-a-days", Caustic complained, "there are so many irregulars who practice at fifteen, without a single requisite except mere outside!" The social tragedy, he continued, is that women ought to be considered as much more than mere Beauties. For they alone held that "gentle but irresistible power" to "mould the world to a finer form:"

that should teach benignity to wisdom, to virtue grace, humanity to value; when we look upon them in the less eminent, but not less useful points of view as those dispensates, those household deities, from whom man is to find comfort and protection, who are to smooth the ruggedness of his labours, the irksomeness and cares of his business; who are to blunt the stings of his sorrows, and the bitterness of his disappointments.

But in order to carry out this awesome task properly, female youth needed to be carefully moulded. Many of the women that Caustic saw fluttering in the Edinburgh playhouse were young, he admitted. However, he suggested that they "will never be older, except in wrinkles." Similarly, in his observations on
the young ladies at the Edinburgh Assembly, Caustic wondered if they would ever grow to maturity. "Yonder," he said, "is a set of girls, I suppose from their looks and their giggling, but a few weeks from the nursery."  

The Mirror Club believed that young women should not be introduced into social life too extensively and that their adolescent days should be used profitably. In particular, this period should be utilized to cultivate the female heart and educate her to be a good wife and mother:

According to the present system of female education among us, the culture of the mind and heart, the knowledge of those useful duties which a good wife and mother owes to her husband and children, are but slightly attended to, if not altogether neglected, for those exterior accomplishments which ought properly to be the hand maids of the former. Hence the dissipation of individuals, and the final wreck we-often see of families.

The Mirror Club wanted to begin the construction of a new kind of woman who could tread the slippery paths of youth with care and, uninfected, breathe the tainted air of a corrupt society. What is more, they wanted women to reform that same society.

Women's Nature and Function

One of Mary Wollstonecraft's criticism of works devoted to the instruction of women was that they were aimed primarily at ladies rather than the more useful members of the middle class. This tendency was certainly evident in many of the writings of the Scottish moralists, who often singled out such role models as Lady Buccleugh and the Duchess of Argyle. In focusing upon
such individuals, Scottish authors demonstrated their elitist bent and their conviction that the upper classes were responsible for setting the tone for the manners of the nation. They also adopted the bardic function in order to warn the upper classes against succumbing to the temptations of luxury. In a poem by R.C. on Lady Glenorchie, for example, the author wrote:

To squander wealth, and honour far more dear,
Heap'd on the shrine of Luxury and Scorn,
Full many toil; a nobler course you steer,
Soothing the lament wild of worth forlorn.
To tend the widows and the orphans cry,
By vice oppress'd, to still the bursting grief
Of female Virtue, with despairing eye,
Sunk at her spoiler's door to beg relief. 64

Or, in a pamphlet on the woollen industry, A Peer of the Realm, alias Lord Elibank, criticized those young women who gadded about the Scottish metropolis all day long playing the coquette. 65 He contrasted these with Lady Buccleugh, Lady Lauderdale, and Lady Rosenbery, who were supporting local industry and practising aristocratic benevolence.

Pieces such as these affirmed the traditional paternalistic role of the nobility. But a new, and more circumscribed, role was also propagandized during the final decades of the eighteenth century — one that was based upon female sociability in the smaller and more intimate domestic circle. Its focus was both the gentry, which many considered to be the moral backbone of the nation, and the landed aristocracy. As early as 1763, in a poem entitled Happiness, an eighteen year old Scotsman defined contentment and virtue in terms of a small country estate, away from the evils of court
and metropolis. In addition, he described the sort of wife with whom he wished to share this moral paradise:

As soft as pity, and as warm as love; 
Quick, but not witty; neither grave nor gay, 
But cheerfully good-humour'd every day; 
Nor deeply read, nor courting to be thought 
More deeply read than a lovely woman ought; 
Yet with such knowledge, both of books and things, 
As e'en from chit-chat entertainment brings.66

Here we see an early example of the *leit-motiv* that would recur again and again in the Scottish discussion of the social symphony. Women were to play a soft, humanizing, and complacent role; and they were to play out this role particularly in the domestic circle.

One should never underestimate the significance which the Scottish literati attached to *good-humour* and *chit-chat* generally. This ease, consideration for others, or general sociability was what constituted the basic difference between rude and refined societies and the moral *cement* of the community. The necessity for men to cultivate their own complacency, to avoid excessive pedantry or harshness, and to learn to be able to *trifle agreeably* had long been a major theme of Scottish moralists.67 What was novel in the message of the literati during the period under discussion, however, was the observation that women evidenced a much greater ability to exercise this sensibility than did men.

In a poem written for the *Scots Magazine* in 1789 entitled *The Similie*, the author contrasted the nature of men and women in the following way:

The oak is man, in firmness drest,
with strength of fondness in his breast,
Delighting in the tie: --
The ivy is the gentle wife. 68

Gentleness was also contrasted with strength in a poem entitled *The Sexes*, written by the popular student poet, John Armstrong. Here, the author pointed out that male virtue tended to be of a more aggressive or *martial* sort, characterized by the classical virtues of bravery, firmness and patience. Female virtue was of a quite different order:

'Tis her's to sooth the mental strife,
And sweeten all the ills of life.
In Man each sterner art has place,
In Woman each enchanting grace;
Women from Men protection find,
And Men by Women are refin'd. 69

Much the same point was made in the friendly reprimand which James Beattie delivered *On Seeing Lady Gordon in a Tartan Scotch Bonnet*. Women's virtue, he claimed, did not reside in martial arms but in "smiles, graces, gentleness, her only arms." 70

Female and male virtue were, if not exactly of a different kind, of a different tone. In order to maximize social virtue generally, the two sexes needed to complement one another. It was for this reason that the late eighteenth century Scottish moralists lamented the decline in the power of *love* among the moderns. But it was not that exaggerated or extreme emotional feeling of a more romantic age that they recommended. Far from it; it was *conjugal affection* of a more gentle and tempered nature that they wanted to stress. *A Picture of True Conjugal Felicity* was another long headline article in the *Scots Magazine* in the year 1765. In this essay, the author outlined
the ideal type of marital relationship. Amanda was an agreeable rather than a beautiful person. She did not affect wit or learning, but had a mild temper and engaging manners. "Being fully convinced that her first happiness depends on the affection of her husband:"

She makes it her constant study and practice to deserve it. She in all things seeks to make her house and her company desirable to him, by every complacency to his will, and every attention to his gratification.

Her husband Manly, on the other hand, was an individual firm from principle but with that quick sensibility that often accompanied a good heart. His social duties, however, not only exposed him to toil and anxiety, his contact with a corrupt world often caused him disgust.

What Manly stood sore in need of, argued the author, was a bosom companion who could moderate his disgust and increase his sociabliity. In the protective haven of the domestic circle, the woman could mould her husband into something milder and more socially useful. The author adopted the common musical analogy:

strength and softness blended together constitute the truest harmony in sounds, so does the force of the manly mind and heart, mingled with the sweetness of the female, give that excellence to each other, from which mutual felicity results.

In the process, Mary Wollstonecraft claimed, the woman was turned into a house slave. But Scottish moralists did not see it that way at all. By emphasizing her natural complacency, the woman could mould her husband. Her contribution was infinitely more significant than his, since
his influence on her character development was relatively small. Thus, the Scots could speak of female complacency as something which enabled the woman to "enjoy the amiable female privileges of ruling by obeying, of commanding by submitting, and of being perfectly happy from consulting another's happiness."

This emphasis on female sociability is interestingly evidenced in poetic tributes to upper class role models in the periodical press. It is no longer abstract paternalism, glamorous beauty, largess, or awesome respectability that is their characteristic feature but, instead, their softness, tenderness, and domestic affection. A poem by J.T. entitled To the Scots Magazine on the death of a young lady emphasized the loss of one who was "soft, tender, gentle, amiably sweet." Another on the death of Miss Amelia Farqueson of Invercourld, proudly described its subject, not as possessing a dignity born from pride, but virgin grace and gentlest manners which reflected an inborn harmony of mind. A tribute to Lady Buccleugh consciously shunned traditional artistic modes of description, one by one, in order to depict her as a tender mother and faithful wife. The recently deceased Countess of Eglintoune was described in 1778 as "blest with each native grace, each gentle art, that charms the eye, and captivates the heart." Her Virgin's softness and modest virtues, the author continued, would have added lustre to any character, but certainly dignified a noblewoman who was conspicuously placed to stem the torrent of a licentious age. And, finally, the
monumental inscription for Lady Douglas in 1780 read as follows:

NATURALLY WELL DISPOSED
AND HAPPY IN SOBER EDUCATION
IN A DISSIPATED AGE
SHE HAD NO RELISH FOR THAT MODE OF LIVING
WHICH TOO GENERALLY PREVAILS
SHE FOUND THE DUTIES OF A WIFE,
A MOTHER, AND THE MISTRESS OF A FAMILY,
EQUAL TO HER TIME:
AND IN ALL OF THEM SHE WAS EXEMPLARY.
AGREEABLE IN HER TEMPER AND MANNER,
THOSE WHO SAW HER
WISHED TO SEE HER AGAIN. 78

No grim reminder of mortality here! But its author could not overlook the opportunity to command other women of station to DO LIKEWISE.

That this was a deliberate shift in emphasis is suggested from the internal evidence in the poems and inscriptions themselves. But the distinction between older and newer notions of female respectability was made most clear in the poem The Contrast. Here, the grace and mildness of Louisa were differentiated from the pomp, beauty and sense of Melissa:

Melissa, born to be admir'd
Might give a nation laws;
Her sense, her beauty, all conspir'd
To draw a world's applause;
While mild Louisa's gentle mind
To no vain pomp aspir'd,
For calm domestic joy's design'd,
More lov'd, tho' less admir'd.
Melissa's wit, Melissa's face,
No tongue could praise to high;
No heart but felt Louisa's grace
And praised her with a sigh. 79

Women's proper domain was to rule over the hearts and manners of men, not to give them laws. Sociability, in any case, served a more important function than legislation.
The propagandizing of a distinctive view of the female sex was not confined to newspapers and magazines. A vehicle of particular significance was Fordyce's *Sermons to Young Women*, which also had a profound effect upon the later English works of Vincessimus Knox and John Bennett. According to Mary Wollstonecraft:

Dr. Fordyce's sermons have long made a part of a young woman's library; nay, girls at school are allowed to read them; but I should instantly dismiss them from my pupil's, if I wished to strengthen her understanding, by leading her to form sound principles on a broad basis; or, were I only anxious to cultivate her taste; though they must be allowed to contain many sensible observations.  

Wollstonecraft particularly objected to Fordyce's focus upon *female sensibility*, which she dismissed as "those pretty feminine phrases which men condescendingly use to soften our slavish dependence."  

As a champion of abstract human rights, Wollstonecraft did not appreciate the importance with which Scottish writers such as Fordyce could imbue this same quality of *sensibility*. Human happiness," wrote the latter:

is made of of many little ingredients, with a few principle ones; and next to religion, those in reality contribute to it most largely, who give the greatest consolation by their sympathy, and the greatest pleasure by their friendship. Friendship and sympathy, when thoroughly awake, are constantly employed in numberless pleasing services, and amiable attentions, to which language cannot appropriate names; but which the heart of the person obliged feels.  

For Fordyce, as for so many other Scottish preachers during this period, sentiment was the basis of both morality and religion.
But women clearly demonstrated a greater capacity for moral and religious feeling than did men. They had a greater "fund of what may be termed Sentiment, or a pathetic manner of thinking, which I have not so frequently met with in men." observed Fordyce. He elaborated upon this observation in a sermon entitled On Female Meekness, wherein he suggested that men and women had different natures. Roughness and even ferociousness were possible to overlook in men, who were typically deficient in the tender feelings. But such qualities, he urged, always shocked us when they were exhibited by a woman. Elsewhere, he described even temporarily aggressive women as absolute demons and female furies. When men of sensibility sought a partner, he argued, they invariably looked for a woman with soft features, a flowing voice, a form not robust, and a demeanour delicate and gentle. These characteristics were both requisite and natural. Furthermore, the very best women were those who were prone to sympathy and who had that wonderful dexterity for disarming fierceness and appeasing wrath.

Fordyce would have been quick to add that such qualities were also characteristic of the very best of men, although they were neither as prevalent nor as extensive as among the fair sex. A god who was also a man, however, exhibited such traits in a very high degree. Fordyce, like other Scottish preachers, was concerned to picture Christ as the perfect model of meekness and gentle sensibility. With regard to the sensibility of Christ, Fordyce remarked:
how sweetly such discoveries as these coincide with the disposition to modesty, sympathy, generosity, the desire of pleasing, the dread of violence, the horror at barbarity, the promptness to cherish tender sentiment, and form endearing connections, which are all so natural to the worthiest part of your sex.

Of course, this desire to please and concomitant ability to sympathize with the misfortunes of others had to be brought under the government of good sense. Thus, Fordyce advised young women to acquire early the habits of self-control. But true virtue, he maintained, derived from feeling.

For Fordyce, as for other Scottish moralists, an ideal test of properly cultivated sensibility was the treatment of servants by their masters. Even more than men, ladies dealt with servants on a day to day basis in the home: one could not easily disguise one's feelings behind the polite mask on such occasions; and, given the often provoking behaviour of servants, these interactions were the sure trial of genuinely benevolent feelings and self-control. Fordyce's comments on servants and their ladies reflected his insistence that fellow-feeling, appropriately controlled by criteria of reason and rank, were meant to operate in the little offices of life. Although this relationship was a significant one, it paled in significance to that which women had with male peers and their husbands. It was here that female sensibility had its greatest influence for good.

In his very first sermon, entitled On the Importance of the Female Sex, especially the Younger Part, Fordyce maintained that there were two reasons why parents should take extra
special care with the moral cultivation of their daughters. The first was the traditional argument that the honour of the family was more closely dependent upon the conduct of daughters than of sons. In other words, it was a fact of eighteenth century life that male promiscuity or even innocent gallantry did not have the same negative impact, in terms of reputation and inheritance, as did that of women. But second, and more important in terms of Fordyce’s analysis, was the positive influence which virtuous women could have over men. Men were undoubtedly attracted to women, he pointed out, especially young and beautiful women. This attraction, which was mental as well as physical, could be used in order to “promote a general reformation among our sex.”

The power of women over men, argued Fordyce, was far greater than that of men over women. Even potentially riotous young men could be “checked all at once into decency by the accidental entrance of an amiable young woman.” Such female power was an indispensible moral tool in an age characterized by luxury and fashionable dissipation. Socializing with virtuous women could act as a counter to the influence of a corrupt commercial world. “To form the manners of men,” Fordyce wrote:

various causes contribute; but nothing, I apprehend, so much as the turn of the women with whom they converse...Such society, beyond anything else, rubs off the corners that give many of our sex an ungracious roughness. It produces a polish more perfect and more pleasing, than that which is received from a general commerce with the world. The last is often spacious, but commonly superficial. The other is the result of gentler feelings, and a
more elegant humanity; the heart is itself moulded; habits of undissembled courtesy are formed.

In this same gentle and politely restrained interaction, men could acquire that true ease or complacency which Scottish moralists believed to be most characteristic of the female temper. This could result in more genuine politeness and humanity than that artificial behaviour which marked men of the world.

Female softness and meekness, therefore, were a vaccination against or antidote to the corruption of modern fashionable life. But if it were to be effective, women had to be themselves made immune to the very real danger of contamination from public life. If women were to adopt the artful disguises that characterized the public arena, true complacency would be lost to a spacious, but hollow complaisance. The beneficial effects of female sociability upon the moral community would be lost. Even the domestic hearth would no longer be safe from selfishness and deceit. And women would have totally defeated "nature's intention in that mental and moral difference of sex, which she has marked by characters no less distinguishable than those that diversify their outward forms."

Almost as great a danger to male and social regeneration, however, was any tendency to concentrate their efforts on intellectual or physical equality with men. In both of these areas, Fordyce maintained, it was generally accepted that women had less vigour than men. Thus, he chastized those sadly
mistaken masculine women who strove for such equality without appreciating their true interests. To be sure, he readily agreed, women needed to cultivate their minds, especially in connection with moral issues. But their chief business was:

to read Men, in order to make yourselves agreeable and useful. It is not the argumentative but the sentimental talents, which give you that insight and those openings into the human heart, that lead to your principal ends as Women.98

Nevertheless, Fordyce continued, education was imperative to this study. Women should cultivate a taste for history, which demonstrated the operation of the human passions in the affairs of the past. Travel literature could both enlarge the mind and illuminate virtue in different settings. Astronomy made them citizens of the universe. And fables, allegories and poetry were aids both to morality and the imagination. But he reserved special praise for moralistic journals such as the Spectator and its followers. Like his brother before him, Fordyce bemoaned the fact that there were not more materials of this sort to aid in the cultivation of young women. What was needed, argued David Fordyce twenty years earlier, were more moral Mirrors which could combat modern follies with art and wit.99

The purpose of a mirror was to accurately reflect nature, and the Mirror Club were particularly eager to make women understand theirs. Commenting on the mingling of young gentlemen with both courtesans and respectable young women at the Edinburgh playhouse, Abercromby wrote:

When every distinction is removed between the
woman of virtue and the prostitute; when both are treated with equal attention and observance; are we to wonder if we find an alteration of the manners of women in general, and a proportional diminution of that delicacy which forms the distinguishing characteristic of the respectable part of the sex?

In these artificial times, women needed to be reminded that a "certain delicacy of sentiment and of manners is the chief ornament of the female character, and the best and surest guardian of female honour." Once removed, women were in danger of losing their reputation. But, and this is the point that Abercromby wanted to stress, it was not their own conduct only that they were accountable for, but also that of their admirers. "It is unquestionably in their power," he concluded, "to form and correct the manners of men."

Mackenzie took up the same subject in greater detail in an essay entitled Of Female Manners. Here, he argued that whereas it was a moot point whether or not there was such a thing as a gender or sex in the soul, it could never be disputed that there was one in manners:

the same applause which we involuntarily bestow upon honour, courage, and spirit in men, we as naturally confer upon chastity, modesty, and gentleness in women.

Mackenzie went on to indicate that whenever he referred to the mild demeanour and modest deportment of women, he was not only talking about them as engaging and external aspects of female character; these denoted both internal purity and innocence. They reflected natural female feeling, not simply polite acquirements.

Virtue of a certain kind, or tone, was natural to women.
And among women, argued William Craig, virtue per se tended to be found in its most pure and unalloyed form. "There is a real perseverance in virtue, and a real magnanimity in the other sex," he remarked, "which is scarcely to be equalled in ours." In men, seemingly virtuous actions were often found to contain impure motives. Because their actions were generally performed on the grand theatre, and were often of a heroic nature, they invariably responded as much to the carrot of public applause as to genuine feeling. But the silent and secret virtue of a woman was more likely to be "the pure and unmingled effect of tenderness, of affection, and of duty."

In Craig's essay, and throughout the Mirror and Lounger, there exists some theoretical confusion about the nature and cultivation of women. The Mirror Club were far too intelligent not to be aware that the female character derived in part from the way in which it was socialized and its relative exclusion from the public domain. At the same time, they believed that that nature of women was different from that of men and that female cultivation should reflect these differences. In an essay on female accomplishment, for example, Henry Mackenzie argued that female cultivation should not exclude mental embellishment. At the same time, such study should not be allowed to interfere with the proper nature and role of women. On the graces and lesser accomplishments, Mackenzie maintained:

They are necessary even to the men, for without them learning grows pedantry, and wit becomes rudeness. But, in women, a certain softness of address and grace of manner are so indispensable, that no talents or acquirements can possibly please without them. To give that
softness, to confer that grace, reading and reflection will not suffice alone.103

Employing the musical analogy that the Scottish writers on sensibility were so fond of, he continued:

Emilia’s harpsicord will settle the matter. Let us take treble for the first sort of accomplishments, and bass for the latter; strike with the right hand -- 'tis music, but without strength; with the left -- 'tis harsh, and wants softness; touch it with both hands, and the instrument is quite as it should be.

Be the understanding of a woman ever so great, wrote Mackenzie, "it should always be delivered sotto-voice."

Like Fordyce or AMICUS, Mr. Lounger took upon himself the mantle of a friend to the fair sex. "I both know the extent and the importance of their power," he wrote:

and for the sake of our sex as much as theirs, I wish them not to forfeit it, by a departure from that modesty, that gentleness, those feminine graces, which are the supports of an influence so essential to the manners and to the happiness of society.104

Alexander Abercromby picked up the same theme when he argued that there was a natural female pliability of mind which led them to be more interested in what is amiable than what is splendid and what is beautiful than what is sublime.105 If one were to take away from women this quick perception and delicate sensibility, from which proceeded their modest shyness and bewitching softness, one would be left with a man, not a woman.

It was not that men should be destitute of such qualities. Abercromby pointed out that the Lockes and Newtons of this world were quite wrong if they thought that sociability was beneath them. But, in women, such a lack was particularly
noticeable and unnatural. Not only did it run contrary to their nature, but it also deprived society of an important cement and stimulus to virtue. Those "negative and gentler virtues which characterize female worth," needed to be utilized in social regeneration. As Abercromby put it:

Considerable use, however, might be made of this difference, in disposition, in feeling, and in situation between the sexes, if, in their intercourse with one another, those qualities which are the most estimable in each were allowed their influence in a beneficial, not an extravagant degree. Were men to derive from the society of women gentleness, complacence, sensibility...Virtue would assume her most winning as well as her most respectable form; and many votaries would be fixed by her smiles, whom her precepts had been unable to retain.

Women were to act as mirrors for men. For a harsh masculine virtue, they were to substitute a morality that had its primary impetus in feeling.

If social regeneration was to be effective, however, women had to be respected. They had to avoid any hint of contamination or diminution of their virtuous characters. They had to avoid mimicking men or warping their sensitive natures in the public arena. The empire of sentiment, argued Mackenzie, was absolutely dependent upon a delicate respect for the ladies. In the polite modern age, this respect was rapidly being eroded. Women needed to re-assert their pre-eminence in the moral sphere by acting like women and demanding the humble homage of men. Nor was Mackenzie being at all frivolous when he singled out card playing or the prevailing Rage for Play as both a cause and symptom of the decline of female rule. The playing of competitive games with
men, with money as its sordid object, brought women down to a level which could only contribute to male disgust or inattention. Card playing, wrote Mackenzie, had a "most direct and powerful tendency to level the supremacy of the sex and to stifle the feelings of respectful and delicate affection. Besides that, the passions it excites are of that ungentle kind." 107

If women were to be the moral guides and conscience of men, they had to operate within their own appropriate sphere and not intrude into the dangerous arenas of either public business or fashionable play. If they were to act as moral mirrors to men, they had to be cultivated very carefully indeed. They needed to blend mental accomplishments with the preservation and refinement of their inherent sensibility. And they needed to employ the resultant graces and qualities where they could be most effective. To a certain extent, this was the drawing room and private parties, which Henry Mackenzie and his friends were eager to restore as appropriate arenas for female interaction and sociability. Even more, however, female sensibility was to operate within the family unit, in the relationship with one's husband and children.

Forming the Domestic Angel

The importance which the Scottish moralists of the late eighteenth century attached to the domestic sphere as the one most appropriate for the operation of sensibility has been
discussed in the previous chapter. Given their concern about the commercial and fashionable world, their appreciation for small scale interaction and sociability, and the urgency which they attached to the proper socialization of the youth, it was only to be expected that they would focus their attention upon domestic life. Both in their role as the sensitive sex and as the mothers of a rising generation, it was also predictable that women and the home would become particularly associated in the moral strategies of the literati. Mary Wollstonecraft accused James Fordyce of turning women into *house slaves*; late eighteenth century Scottish moralists would have preferred to call them *angels*.

The public reaction to Fordyce's attempt to define women's place in the home is revealing. John Lockman's exultation upon reading his *Sermons to Young Women* was fairly typical:

> Did all Divines set forth such winning lore, <br>SERMONS would charm, and NOVELS please no more.\(^{108}\)

The editor of the *Scots Magazine* was also an ardent supporter of the Fordyce message, printing large extracts from these sermons as well as from Fordyce's *The Character and Conduct of the Female Sex* (1776). Another would-be poet provided a humorous compliment, stating: "Thy sermons, Fordyce, are scarce worth our reading three times over."\(^{109}\)

Many of the correspondents to the Scottish periodicals took up this theme of female retirement in their letters and contributions. In *Advice to the Ladies*, one claimed:

> Seek to be good, but aim not to be great; <br>A woman's noblest station is retreat;
Her fairest virtues fly from public sight,
Domestic worth, which shuns too strong a light.\textsuperscript{110}

Similarly, another poem favourably contrasted \textit{domestic joys} with the \textit{delusive toys of routs and balls}.\textsuperscript{111} Correspondents encouraged men to choose a wife who practiced the virtues of domesticity and avoided the temptations of the public arena. The ideal woman was only to be found in \textit{domestic retirement}. A letter from \textsc{Asiaticus}, for example, was published in both the \textit{Scots Magazine} and the \textit{Edinburgh Evening Courant}. Ostensibly written by a functionary of the East India Company who had returned to Scotland to look for a wife, the author did not want a woman who had operated in a \textit{dissipated high life} but, rather, looked for his mate in the "bosom of retirement, practicing every domestic virtue and amiable accomplishment."\textsuperscript{112}

The conjugal and maternal relationships which obtained in the home became the ones most expressive of female virtue. It was not the heroic feats of Hector or Achilles that provided the most appropriate definition of moral behaviour but, rather, the \textit{tender interview} between Andromache and her husband, and the \textit{timid shrinking} of little Astyanax from the harsh symbols of martial valour.\textsuperscript{113} This theme was particularly stressed in the sermons, poems and essays of Fordyce which were given pride of place in the \textit{Scots Magazine}. In one excerpt, Fordyce was quoted emphasizing the moral significance of sociability or the art of \textit{trifling agreeably}.\textsuperscript{114} Women, Fordyce argued, were the best teachers of this art. They were highly amiable; capable
of a high degree of sympathy; and their most characteristic virtue was their "propensity to melt into affectionate sorrow." If such women only practiced the science of domestic happiness, the first principle of which was sociability, men could find a safe haven of morality and contentment in their homes. In another passage, extracted from The Character and Conduct of the Female Sex, Fordyce again reiterated the domestic role of women as a city of refuge for their husbands. Moreover, they could teach their husbands the science of courtesy, since they were its true mistresses, "having from nature a peculiar aptitude to please."

In his sermons proper, Fordyce developed the relationship between the complacent women and the domestic sphere at considerable length. He spent some time on the need for a woman to learn the skills of an oeconomist because great families and large estates could only be saved from ruin by wiser and more economical policies. But his greatest concern was the role of the woman as mother and wife. Fordyce was one of the first moralists to advocate a clear division of labour between the husband and the wife:

> dividing with the partner of your heart the anxious yet delightful labour, of training your common offspring to virtue and society, to religion and immortality; while, by thus dividing it, you leave him more at leisure to plan or provide for you all.\(^1\)

To the mother was assigned the moral and emotional cultivation of the children. She was to superintend the gradual openings of their minds and to study the turn of their tempers. She moulded their passions and taught the young idea how to shoot.
In addition to the role that the virtuous woman was to play vis-à-vis her husband, therefore, this moralist was calling for an intensification of the emotional bonds and concomitant control of a mother over her children.

In a sermon entitled On Female Virtue, with Domestic and Elegant Accomplishments, Fordyce wondered how anyone could possibly regard this maternal role as in any way servile. Women were anything but servants, he argued, they had the most honourable station. They were:

manifestly intended to be the mothers and formers of a rational and immortal offspring; to be a kind of softer companion, who by nameless delightful sympathies and endearments, might improve our pleasures and sooth our pains; to lighten the load of domestic cares, and thereby leave us more at leisure for rougher labours, or severer studies.118

Within this natural division of labour and domestic chores, the woman could use her sympathetic skills to maximum effect. She could smile on each of her children in turns, superintend their behavior, describe their occupations, and encourage them in all that was praiseworthy.119 Tempering the necessary parental authority with affection, she could construct a truly harmonious and loving household. Fordyce depicted the ideal family scene, invoking that image of the sympathetic symphony which became so familiar:

where the good humour and good sense of each contribute to the ease and entertainment of all; while this agreeable diversities of temper and understanding that takes place amongst them serves, like discords in music, to carry on the intellectual harmony.120

If the family was meant to be a harmonious symphony, a virtuous
The woman's role as mother and emotional manipulator of her children was clearly important, and, with Fordyce, we see the cultural construction of a maternal relationship that has bedevilled both nineteenth and twentieth century theorists. But in this period, the role of the woman as mother still took second place to the one that she played in relationship to her husband. This theme was the most critical one in Fordyce's treatment of the feminine function and helps to explain the significance that he and other Scottish moralists attached to concept of love. True love was a gentle, not an extreme passion. The Scots were very deliberate in referring to it in terms of affection rather than that romance which they believed characterized an earlier and more primitive age. The conjugal relationship had to be affectionate; affection was the natural attraction of two complementary minds; it could never be forced. This being the case, marriages should never be made for convenience or reasons of economy, and parental authority must always be waived when it came to the choice of a marriage partner. Unless marriage was a sentimental union, it was morally reprehensible and socially destructive.

Fordyce's sharp criticism of arranged marriages and cold relationships strikes a distinctly modern chord. His passionate propagandization of the conjugal relationship as a sentimental union, which writers like Edward Shorter or Lawrence Stone would have us regard as the by product of modern egoism, did have its objectionable side, however. Not only did
it depend very heavily upon female complacency, but it went to
great lengths in terms of outlining just how far a virtuous
woman should yield to her husband.

Subjection to one's husband was an imperative. Fordyce
argued that such subjection was not only authorized by the
Bible, but it was sanctioned by all the feelings of nature.
"To preserve the attachment of a husband unimpaired," he
suggested, "the utmost attention and the mildest complacence
are commonly requisite on the side of women." To the possible
objection that particular husbands might not be worth the
keeping, Fordyce replied:

Not that I would justify the men for any thing
wrong on their part. But had you behaved to
them with a more respectful observance, and a
more equal tenderness; studying their humours;
overlooking their mistakes, passing by little
instances of unevenness, caprice, or passion,
giving soft answers to hasty words, complaining
as seldom as possible, and making it your daily
care to relieve their anxieties, and prevent
their wishes, to enliven the hour of dullness,
and call up the ideas of felicity; had you
pursued this conduct, I doubt not but you would
have maintained and even increased their esteem,
so far as to have secured every degree of
influence that could conduce to their virtue, or
your mutual satisfaction; and your house might
at this day have been the abode of domestic
bliss. [21]

In other words, both domestic happiness and male virtue were
dependent upon female complacency and submission. Cases of ill
treatment and inattention from husbands notwithstanding, it was
essential to the health of the moral community that women learn
to yield rather than assert themselves. The companionable
marriage was founded upon female resignation. "A generous
readiness to make every kind allowance for what may be amiss in
others, is perhaps the rarest quality in the world," Fordyce lamented, "it is however one of the most necessary, in the several connexions of society, but especially in the nearest of all connexions."

That men were often bullies, that they typically expected too much from the women that they married, were facts which Fordyce readily admitted. He particularly disapproved of male behaviour towards women in the present age, which so clearly demonstrated a lack of proper attention to, and affection for, the female sex. At the same time, it was the woman's role to act as the invisible conductor of male feeling and to reform his manners and morals. This role could only be performed, he believed, if women exercised their power of gentle sensibility. A general reformation could be achieved in no other way. The problem with modern woman was that she had forgotten whence her power derived in her lust for external beauty and fashionable adornment:

From that moment, female softness is forgotten, Christian condescension is held mean; Humility, the parent of almost every excellence, is utterly despised; and hence a perpetual aim at proud dominion, instead of that obsequious majesty ascribed by the poet to innocent Eve. Moreover, it was fortunate for them that their sensibility easily ran to religious piety. For, if sociability with their husbands was unavailing; if

The female role, he continued, was "to command by obeying, and by yielding to conquer."

Given the sort of behaviour that Fordyce's woman was to put up with from men, it is little wonder that he so often referred to them as angels. Moreover, it was fortunate for them that their sensibility easily ran to religious piety.
neither their partners nor the outside world recognized their necessarily obscure virtue; there was always one friend who would converse with them and judge their actions impartially. The impartial conversant and powerful advocate, of course, was God. With him, one could have a conversation. With him, one could indulge the sentiments of the heart. Fordyce went so far as to suggest that this conversation consist of vocal prayer rather than secret or internal language, since the former was most representative of genuine sensibility.

Domestic confinement was also conducive to female piety. It removed women from the bustle and interest of social life and encouraged the proper development of the internal emotions. "The situation of men," wrote Fordyce:

lays them open to a variety of temptations, that lie out of your road. The bustle of life, in which they are generally engaged...Their passions are daily subject to be heated by the ferment of business. In order to carry out their moral function, women must remain in an environment conducive to the proper cultivation of sentiment. In order for men to be able to maintain their own sensibility in a corrupt world, they needed to be able to come home to a harmonious, sentimental, and easy household.

Fordyce's insistence on the strategic importance of female manners to the preservation of the moral community caused him to place special emphasis on the domestic environment for the cultivation of sensibility. In the process, he advocated family and conjugal relationships that seem strikingly modern. But, ultimately, this pioneering strategy had its roots in a
perception that communal bonds were disintegrating because of external pressures, rather than in a vision of a new kind of individual or society. "To this nation," he asserted, "there can accrue no good from the spirit of luxury, of levity, and of vice, so prevalent, and so spreading, in a sex that leads the world." Moreover, he praised those sage legislators of ancient times who, while they may not have appreciated the importance of sympathy to the moral community, rightly prescribed to women "a particular gravity and simplicity of manners."

The members of the Mirror Club were equally painfully aware of the significance of female manners and continued that propagandization of the domestic sphere which Fordyce had helped to initiate. They contrasted the woman of fashionable high society with that household deity who softened the hardships of male life and humanized rough male feeling. They criticized those who, like Lady Townly, evidenced little taste for their husband's principal place of residence. They praised those women who found their fulfilment within the domestic circle, and who made the home an empire of sentiment.

Having outlined the brilliant pleasures and the dazzling seductions of high society, for example, Mackenzie commented:

If I dared to contrast this with a picture of domestic pleasure; were I to exhibit a family virtuous and happy, where affection takes place of duty, and obedience is enjoyed not exacted; where the happiness of every individual is reflected upon the society, and a certain tender solicitude about each other, gives a more delicate sense of pleasure than any enjoyment merely selfish can produce; could I paint them in their little circles of business or of
amusement, of sentiment or of gaiety, I am persuaded the scene would be too venerable for the most irreverent to deride, and its happiness too apparent for the most dissipated to deny.  

And yet, Mackenzie regretted, women all too often relinquished the title of dutiful wife and mother in order to ape some fashionable woman who was as "weak as she is worthless, despised in the midst of flattery, and wretched in the very centre of dissipation."

In an essay entitled the *Good Effects of Complacency and Gentle Reformation*, Bannatyne instructed husbands in the art of weaning their wives away from the pleasures of town life and towards a preference for *domestic society*. Horatio gradually lured Emilia into domesticity by manipulating her fine sensibility and taste in literature. He introduced Emilia to reading material which so engrossed her attention as to keep her at home reading rather than "exhausting her spirits at a ball, or wasting the night at cards." Next, he arranged private parties at his city residence, selecting company with a turn towards rational and sentimental conversation. The birth of children furnished his wife with a whole new variety of *domestic enjoyments*. And, gradually, Emilia set up house at his country estate:

*Emilia* and he have ever since passed their time in that delightful retreat; occupied with the education of their children, the improvement of their place, and the society of a few friends, equally happy in themselves, and beloved by all around them.

In this way, the domestic *empire of sentiment* extended its influence outward.
Alexander Fraser Tytler offered the marginally less patronizing case study of Saintforth and Lucinda, who happened to acquire a small estate in the country after a disastrous financial experience in the town. Lucinda, who had been a much admired lady of fashion, discovered the retired domestic role to be much more to her taste and satisfaction. As Saintforth informed a country friend:

How delightful...was it for me to perceive that the taste of my Lucinda seemed equally adapted with my own to our new mode of life! Far from inheriting that instability of mind with which her sex is generally reproached, her ardour was unabated, and every thought was centered in the cares of her household and the education of her children. Completely engaged in these domestic duties, while I superintended the labours of the field and garden, we had not other anxiety than what tended to give zest to our enjoyments.

Not only should there be a division of labour between the sexes, Tytler implied, but a woman's virtue shone most brightly in the domestic sphere. Alexander Abercromby insinuated the same thing in the following question: "May not the same softness and delicacy dispose her to prefer those gentle manners and amiable qualities which adorn private and domestic life?"

The Mirror Club commented favourably on those ladies of high station who retired from fashionable life in order to tend to the education of their children. Colonel Caustic, for example, praised a Lady who, at the height of her beauty, "retired from the world to dedicate her time to the education of her children." Her example patterned that of the penultimate female role model -- Lady Benevolus, who succeeded
in transforming her former *lofty elegance* into a *matron gentleness*.\(^{135}\) She now confined her quick perception and genius to the efficient management of the household, a particular but unperceived attention to her husband's friends, and, especially, the cultivation of her children. She was particularly successful in establishing that familial harmony which Scottish moralists were eager to push. Her husband *looked upon her with delight,* his friends could not but love her *chastened grace,* *modest neatness* and *timid liveliness,* and her children consulted *Mamma* in all their arrangements.

The best known essays in the *Mirror* and *Lounger* also highlighted the role of female sentiment within the domestic sphere. In the most famous tale of *La Roche,* we meet a somewhat different ideal type of female virtue in the dutiful daughter.\(^{136}\) *Madamoiselle La Roche* is a shy and modest, yet highly cultivated, daughter of a French minister. In order to take care of her ailing and widowed father, she has given up many offers of marriage. A soothing and feeling child, who softens the hardships of her father, her untimely death maximizes the sympathy and admiration of the reader. Moreover, the essay was an ingenious attempt to contrast this young woman's quiet unfolding of domestic sentiment with that lack of appreciation for the social symphony which characterized the scepticism of David Hume.

Of the same pathetic type is the story of *Father Nicholas.* Here, the domestic virtue deliniated is that of the dutiful wife and mother.\(^{137}\) Despite all the illicit liaisons and
inattentions of her husband, *Emilia* maintained her trust and affection, confining herself, during his many absences, to domestic employments and the cultivation of her son. While her husband caroused, the *soft Emilia* grew weaker and weaker. She eventually died after her husband ran away in shame. *Emilia's* ultimate sacrifice, however, accomplished her husband's belated reformation. He thereafter entered a monastery and became a paragon of virtue.

In both *La Roche* and *Father Nicholas*, Henry Mackenzie took his readers to the *house of mourning* in order to milk their spectatorial sympathy for all it was worth. *Louisa Veroni*, who exhibited the virtuous women in the roles of both daughter and wife, only narrowly escaped the same fate.\(^{138}\) The story is worth developing in some detail, since it highlights many of Mackenzie's literary techniques as well as his definition of female virtue. *Louisa* lived in a small cottage with her father. Having had a superior education to that of her parent, she was a much more able conversationalist. However, she did not take advantage of this superiority and devoted all her efforts to comforting her father in his old age. Adopting the musical analogy which was common in his works, Mackenzie painted the father and daughter playing their lutes in little family concerts in the evening. The virtuous *Veroni* household is the centre of the village and attracts many of its neighbours who wish to partake in the social symphony. When *Louisa* leaves, this social symphony comes to an untimely end. *Grief and sickness* strike the elder *Veroni* and his neighbours
are cheerful no more.

The snake in this moral community is Sir Edward, an individual who had been seduced by fashionable manners. He skillfully seduced Louisa, luring her off to London with vague promises of matrimony. Although Mackenzie could not, of course, approve of Louisa's behaviour in leaving her father's home, he recognized it as the result of genuine affection and refused to blame the woman for the loss of her chastity. In fact, Louisa remains a woman of virtuous sensibility despite her position as a kept mistress. She often wished to reproach her lover for his immoral and unkind treatment, but "her heart was not made for it; she could only weep." Although she could not put her feelings into demands or accusations:

sometimes a few starting tears would speak them; and when time had given her a little more composure her lute discoursed melancholy music.

It came to pass, however, that Louisa's gentle sensibility wrought a reformation over her lover. He began to look upon fashionable London life with disgust in comparison with the higher society of Louisa where he discovered sensibility and truth. As her health began to fade, Sir Edward's own sleeping sensibility began to awaken. He married his beloved; left fashionable society in order to live in the country with her father; and cheerful music was once again heard in Veroni's village.

There was no harsh music in Louisa Veroni; her virtuous sensibility was such that she was capable only of cheerful or melancholy tones. Her virtue did not reside in the traditional
qualification of pre-marital chastity; nor was it dependent upon it. It resided in sentiment. By painting a picture of virtuous sensibility operating in an unmarried alliance, Mackenzie was redefining the typical understanding of female virtue. He stressed the imperative of affection over virginity and inheritance. These latter had their place, of course, but they did not define female virtue. Even Samuel Richardson, whose novels projected a new and sentimental view of women and who was greatly admired by Mackenzie, did not go this far in his reappraisal of traditional notions of female morality.*

Louisa Veroni and the wife of the future Father Nicholas provided their husband or lover with a mirror in which they could see their own vice. They provided examples of ideal virtue and forced their husbands to assess their own behaviour. In their retired and domestic roles, that acted as potential correctors of the manners which obtained in a corrupt society peopled by artful role players. A similar mirror was the virtuous Aurelia, described by Craig in an essay whose title was an attack upon the public realm — the Injustice of the world in forming an estimate of character and conduct.*

Here, the author contrasted Aurelia with the fashionable Cleora. Whereas the former lived a retired life of domestic quiet, the latter ran the giddy round of fashionable dissipation. While Aurelia dutifully tended to the education of her children, Cleora allowed hers to keep late hours and frequent every public entertainment. Aurelia was economical; Cleora was leading her family into bankruptcy. But with a mind
fitted for every domestic enjoyment, Aurelia was saddled with a worthless, inattentive, and extravagant husband. Her economies were nullified by his expenses; he contributed nothing to the cultivation of his children; his absence from the home was sadly regretted by his affectionate wife and offspring. In the face of such treatment, however, Aurelia maintained her children's love for their father. She derived her pleasure from her children and the affective bonds that existed between them. Despite all her problems, she succeeded in retaining her amiability and cheerfulness, occasionally mitigated by melancholy, hoping against hope for the moral reformation of her husband. "Yet with all her afflictions and all her sorrows," argued Craig:

who would not rather wish to be the suffering and virtuous Aurelia, than the gay and thoughtless Cleora? The one may enjoy the dissipation of the world, and the good-liking of its votaries; but the other must possess that approbation from her own mind, which infinitely surpasses all the external enjoyment which the world is able to bestow.

For the woman with a bad husband, then, the only refuge was that of the mind.

Such descriptions imply a highly iniquitous relationship and situation, but this was imperative if women were to play their moral function in a degenerate society. Women were meant to be a moral influence upon men; if men had become corrupt, then it was up to women to put them back into contact with their native moral sentiments. They were the ultimate mirror through which men who had to deal with the world could look at, and correct, their failings. For example, Aurelia:
was like another conscience; the reflection of her quiet and gentle virtues was like a mirror that did but show him his own ugliness, and frightened at the sight, he only thought how to escape it.

There was always a possibility that men would respond to their better feelings and allow themselves to become moulded into moral beings. But, reformation notwithstanding, it was women's function to cultivate their own complacency and to become domestic angels, whatever all too human treatment they might meet with from men. Any other role was not only contrary to their nature: it also negated the continuity of the moral community in a complex, confusing and individualistic society.

Conclusion

The attack upon fashion, the re-examination of the nature of women, and the creation of an ideal type which approximated the divine, were all moral strategies which revolved around an appreciation of the significance of sensibility. When confronted with a fashionable and commercial society that was neither conducive to a traditional discussion of virtue or the social order, the late eighteenth century Scottish moralists devised a number of such strategies designed explicitly to preserve and encourage that genuine and moderate sensibility which was believed to be crucial to the continuity of the moral community.

One of these strategies, perhaps the most important, was the construction of a new role for women. The Scottish
practical moralists were by no means the first to identify women as more feeling than their male counterparts. Nor were they unusual in locating women’s place within a relatively confined sphere. But, in terms of their appreciation of the significance of women and their construction of well defined, and highly propagandistic, models and strategies for the cultivation and expression of particularly female sensibility, the Scottish writers most certainly contributed to a clearly articulated recognition of the differences between the sexes, the different spheres within which they should operate, and, most important, the crucial contribution that women could play in the reform of society. That this analysis may not have always been logical or consistent is quite beside the point. It was an effective discursive vehicle for helping to mould a new and influential perspective on the sexes. That new perspective, however, was specifically designed to reinforce traditional and decaying social bonds.

Despite its elevation of the household deity, this new view of women implied their physical and social domination by men. Women, in fact, suffered a compound domination. They were a target for moralizing males both in adolescence and in adulthood. Indeed, there was no reason to single out female adolescence in the precise manner that had been accomplished with young men. Their very susceptibility to feeling defined women in a perpetual state of adolescence -- not childhood as some historians would have it -- and rendered them unsuitable for any involvement in the public sphere apart, of course, from
the operations of charitable benevolence. While they had considerably greater moral potential than men, they were not designed for activities involving rigorous self-discipline, such as intellectual pursuits. And even their superior qualities were only allowed to obtain invisibly, within the private and intimate domestic realm.

The increased social power which these same strategies gave to men over women should not be underestimated. The empire of sentiment was not nearly as liberating as some historians would have us believe. For it was not simply the case that one group dominated another, but that this domination was justified by an elaborate, plausible and captivating analysis of separate spheres of influence. Interestingly enough, this strategy was at its most emotive in its divinization of women. The latter, of course, could best demonstrate their heavenly status by submitting to, pleasing, and soothing men. Who would not be tempted to relinquish all title to earthly equality in order to become more like an angel? "Why are girls to be told that they resemble angels," asked Mary Wollstonecraft, "but to sink them below women?"
Yet I would not be understood to undervalue that Species of Writing; on the contrary, I take it to be much more important & indeed more difficult than I believe is generally imagin'd by the Authors: which is perhaps the Reason why we have so many Novels & so few good ones. (Henry Mackenzie in a letter to Elizabeth Rose of Kilravock, July 31, 1769)

Some Perspectives on Mackenzie and the Novel

The status of the novel was a hotly debated issue in late eighteenth Century Scottish literary and debating circles. When the Pantheon Society dealt with the question Does reading Novels tend more to promote or injure the Cause of Virtue? in 1783, the vote was a very close one in favour of the novel.¹ The fact that the novel came out on top may have had much to do with the fact that Hugh Blair, Henry Mackenzie, and the Mirror Club had done much to promote the novel among the Edinburgh literati. In his Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres which were delivered in the city as early as 1759, Blair took issue with the general condemnation of novels, pointing out that:

fictitious histories might be employed for very useful purposes. They furnish one of the best channels for conveying instruction, for painting human life and manners, for showing the errors into which we are betrayed by our passions, for rendering virtue amiable and vice odious. The effect of well contrived stories, towards accomplishing these purposes, is stronger than
any effect that can be produced by simple and naked instruction.

Blair went on to make it clear that it was not the older romances of knight errancy that he had in mind but the more familiar novel which pictured the tenderness of everyday life. "The most moral of all our novel writers," he added, "is Richardson the Author of Clarissa, and of very considerable capacity and genius, did he not possess the unfortunate talent of spinning out pieces of amusement into an immeasurable length."³

Henry Mackenzie and the Mirror Club were also active promoters of the novel as a vehicle for the cultivation of the moral sentiments. That the Mirror Club should have come to focus upon the novel is, in some respects, hardly surprising. Writing in the tradition of the Spectator, they were already familiar with discursive and narrative techniques very similar to those employed by the novelist.⁴ Moreover, they recognized that the novel was ideally suited to the realistic portrayal of that same domestic and private life for which they were ardent propagandists. Equally important, they realized only too well that the young were much more inclined to read works of fancy or imagination than the didactic essays of the Mirror or the sermons of Moderate preachers. Novels were a primary reading material of women as well. And, while it would be an error to assume that Mackenzie's own novels were aimed solely at young women or that they were a simplistic response to the rapidly expanding female reading market, there is no doubt that young women were the focus of his attention.⁵ It was they who had
made the novel a popular, if somewhat suspect, literary form. It was their sensibility, in particular, that needed to be cultivated if the moral community was to be maintained.

But if the novel had certain characteristics that were conducive to the spread of the Scottish literati’s message, it had some serious drawbacks. It was still a marginal form of literature, the respectability of which had yet to be accepted. In addition, it was the target of fellow moralists, who tended to associate the genre with the spread of false and artificial values among the young. Finally, it was a literary form which wandered perilously far from, and attracted an audience with little commitment to, the neo-classical discussion of virtue. It was not easy, therefore, for moralists whose debt to the classical tradition was deeply felt, to boldly embrace the more complex and confusing world of the modern novel.

More than anything else, the Mirror Club’s acceptance of the novel and the narrative domestic essay underlines the pre-eminence which its members attached to the moral sentiments. The classics were an important aid in the cultivation of the inner man or woman but, because these works did not illuminate that feeling which was necessary to redeem a corrupt civilization, they were ultimately inadequate. If the moral feelings of young people were to be cultivated properly, it was necessary to supply them with a form of reading material directed at their emotions. In particular, it was important to show young enthusiasts of sentiment the errors of an excessive sensibility which could be individualistic or anti-social, and
that *gentle sensibility* which was conducive to social sympathy.

A number of students of the novels of Henry Mackenzie have rightly pointed to the importance with which this popular author imbued the concept of *sensibility*. However, they have generally mistaken this same *sensibility* for romantic passion rather than what it really was -- a more subdued and socially orientated emotion. An early, but fairly typical, example is found in Walter Francis Wright’s *Sensibility in English Prose Fiction, 1760-1814*, wherein the author states:

Mackenzie...felt that natural impulses should at all times take precedence over intellect, and that whatever one might do under the sway of emotion must inevitably be superior to what one could do when judging intellectually the wisdom of an action.

Given Mackenzie’s respect for ancient philosophy, civic humanist discourse, and enlightened reason in general, he would have been absolutely horrified at such a misleading appraisal. He was nothing if not consistent in his belief that feeling always had to be tempered by reason and prudence. Still, it remains the case that Mackenzie placed more stress upon the role of the cultivated sentiments than reason and that he remained an advocate of *gentle sensibility* rather than the *sway of emotion* throughout his literary career.

One of the most sensitive modern treatments of Mackenzie’s novels is also flawed by the author’s inability to appreciate the exact nature of Mackenzie’s use of the concept of *sensibility*. In *Henry Mackenzie*, Gerard Barker outlines the subtleties in Mackenzie’s depiction of the sensitive temperament in a deceitful and selfish commercial world.
Unlike some commentators, Barker clearly appreciates the combination of pathos and didacticism in Mackenzie's work and strongly defends the *man of feeling* as an ideal moral type. Barker even suggests an intellectual relationship between Mackenzie's novels and Adam Smith's treatment of sensibility in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. In the final analysis, however, he makes the mistake of equating the concept of sympathy in Mackenzie's novels and Smith's moral philosophy with empathy. A closer examination of Adam Smith's moral theory would have helped him to avoid such a misleading interpretation.

A tighter analysis of the concept of *gentle sensibility* also corrects the false impression that Mackenzie's attitude towards sensibility was inconsistent. For example, Horst Drescher argues that Mackenzie's attitude towards the so-called *cult of sensibility* had undergone a profound change by the time that he came to discuss the novel and the tendency of the young towards *excess sensibility* in the pages of the *Mirror* and the *Lounger*. More subtle, but equally misleading, is Robert Mayo's argument that Mackenzie qua moralist adopted a different perspective than Mackenzie the novelist and, hence, emerged as a critic of the sentimental novel. What Drescher ignores, and Mayo points out, is that some of the best essays in the *Mirror* and *Lounger* were actually mini-sentimental novels in their own right. What Mayo has overlooked is the fact that Mackenzie was critical of *excess sensibility* even in his function as novelist.
Mackenzie never wore his moralist’s hat so tightly upon his head as when he was writing his novels.\textsuperscript{12} The latter, it will be argued, were primarily vehicles for moral sermonizing and inculcation. They were not, as has been argued by an ingenious young author, simplistic responses to the demand of a rapidly growing female bourgeois readership.\textsuperscript{13} Mackenzie was interested in propping up a traditional society rather than in reflecting a new one; his primary targets in the novels were the future wives of the landed gentry and aristocracy. It was a new value system for the latter group and their role as benevolent landlords — certainly not capitalists — that Mackenzie wanted to emphasize. If the nation’s elite could combine a feminine sympathy with masculine power, he argued, the bonds of community could be continued into a new and commercial age. If not, the community would self-destruct.

None of this negates the fact that the novels were popular with an extensive audience that included the bourgeoisie. Like Blair’s sermons and Fordyce’s addresses, Mackenzie’s novels were a British phenomenon. While a full analysis of their appeal lies outwith the scope of this chapter, one or two reflections may not be out of order. If young middle class ladies found the novels appealing, it may have been partly because they presented models of upper class breeding and refined sentiment for their emulation. Such an interpretation coincides with the general understanding of historians that the middling orders of Great Britain did not start acting as anything like a self-conscious class until late in the
nineteenth century. In a very penetrating work, John Richetti has suggested yet another reason for the popularity of novels like those of Mackenzie. His argument is worth particular consideration, since it parallels the thesis presented here and helps to widen it into a more general British context. Richetti has noticed that the eighteenth century British novel presents what he refers to as religious parables, the most common of which is that of a conflict between helpless virtue and a vicious and aggressive world.

When Richetti adopts the term religion, he does so in an anthropological rather than a theological sense; what is at stake here is not religious dogma or belief, but a social myth which serves important, albeit secret and unconscious, needs. The conflict between a masculine and feminine ethos in these novels, he argues, dramatizes "the natural and spontaneous urgings of an inner spirit versus the mechanized and corruptly efficient institutions of the world."

Similar moral antitheses were clearly present in each of Mackenzie's major works. What is more, unlike some of his English counterparts such as Richardson, Mackenzie utilized this ideology directly and self-consciously. It reflected his and his fellow literati's concern to preserve the moral community in the heart of a modern society.

The Mirror Club on Literature

In order to appreciate both the negative, as well as the
positive, comments on that *species of composition* known as the
novel in the pages of the *Mirror* and *Lounger*, it is necessary
to keep two things in mind. The first is that the *Mirror*
Club's condemnations of novel writing and reading did not apply
to all novels and that Mackenzie and his colleagues were quite
clear as to the sort of works that they wanted to see on young
people's shelves. The second is that the *Mirror Club* wanted
sentiment to act as a regenerative influence in an impersonal
society; they did not want it to contribute to some kind of
useless and mindless cult that completely disregarded reason,
prudence, and authority.

To be sure, the *Mirror* and the *Lounger* contain numerous
negative references to novels. This criticism sometimes
paralleled, but was far more subtle than typical attacks upon
the novel in the eighteenth century periodical press. In
particular, Mackenzie and his colleagues, especially William
Craig, wanted to warn young people and their parents of the
effect which the reading of too many novels could have upon
impressionable minds. In Mackenzie's case, this attitude was
nothing new. Even in his role as novelist, he had attacked
novel reading and the excessive indulgence of sensibility. In
*The Man of Feeling* (1771), for example, he described the
prostitute, *Miss Atkins*, as an individual who had lost her sense
of proper moral judgement and self-control from the reading of
too many *romantic* novels. In *The Man of the World* (1773), he
warned parents against cultivating the feelings of their
children to such an extreme that they might stray from the path
of virtue. 18

In order for sensibility to be virtuous, it had to conform to reason and self-control. This ethical consideration was particularly evident in the essays of William Craig. The latter's first reference to the novel came in an essay describing the character Umfraville's sister. 19 This kindly woman had in her younger days been an avid reader of novels. Nowadays, however, she restricted her reading to more serious and explicitly moral subject matter, "though she still retains a partiality for the few works of that kind which are possessed of merit." That is precisely the distinction that the Mirror Club wanted to make. While in general contemporary novels were not conducive to the inculcation of moral sentiments and principles, there were some novels that most certainly were. As Mackenzie also pointed out, while there were few novels which gave lasting pleasure, the novels of writers such as Richardson and Fielding, despite their relative tediousness and courseness, both engaged the hearts of their readers and delineated all the nice features of their characters. 20

The problem with most of the novels that had been produced, as far as Craig was concerned, was that they gave young people "romantic notions of life, and particularly warm and passionate ideas about love." 21 Thus, one of his characters, Amanda, whose time has chiefly been spent in reading books of sentiment, novels and tender poetry, had highly exaggerated expectations. She directed these same passions and expectations at the wrong object, choosing to
marry a man whose true character she neither knew nor appreciated. The dupe of her own romantic wishes, she was incapable of operating properly in the ordinary transactions and relations of life. Thus, she ignored the solicitous advice of her parents and willfully put herself into a most precarious position. In such ways, Craig pointed out, "the best and most amiable feelings of the heart, may be led into fatal errors."

Craig treated of two similar cases in the *Lounger*. The stern and unfeeling *Mrs. Williams* had very little imagination and carefully protected her equally unsensitive daughters from "anything which might give them a romantic turn," especially those *novels that melt*. Although certainly not the most amiable of women, she was a more successful parent than *Mrs. Hambden* who so encouraged the sensibility of her children as to make them totally unfit for an admittedly callous world. Similarly, in the story of *Woodsort*, a man of much passive feeling but very little active virtue, Craig warned his readers against indulging in too much reading of those *romantic novels* that were too removed from real life. He reflected that a man who was benevolent from principle, without much feeling, could "by the possession of a firmer mind and greater habits of activity, perform many more benevolent and generous actions."

Such a concentration upon *firmness of mind* and an attack upon excess sensibility, was not unexpected from the admiring student of Adam Smith. Certainly, Craig was more suspicious of sentimental novels than was his colleague, Henry Mackenzie. But we should be careful not to jump to facile conclusions.
Craig claimed that "a certain degree of sensibility ought to be cultivated." And, in another of his essays, he placed *The Man of Feeling* right alongside the *Spectator* as a moral teaching tool. Craig himself attempted to utilize the morality of sentiment in a number of papers. In his essay *Of Private and Domestic Virtues* for example, he introduced just such a sentimental tale by suggesting that domestic descriptions were best suited to "touch the feelings, or direct the conduct." The concentration on domestic life and sentiment made the novel, as well as biography, a natural literary choice. The issue, as Craig and Mackenzie saw it, was that the generality of novels did not perform this function properly. In a rarely cited essay entitled *Of the Art of Drawing Characters in Writing*, Mackenzie claimed that most novels were interested in developing a complex and intriguing plot rather than illustrating the predominant passions of the heart. With the exception of superior writers such as Richardson and Fielding, Mackenzie continued, the reader was never really acquainted with the characters depicted. But Mackenzie's lengthiest, and most cited, treatment of the novel came in *Lounger* 20. This essay began with the bold statement that the literary genre of the novel "surely merits a higher station in the world than is generally assigned to it." Not only did the novelist face most of the difficulties of the epic writer and dramatist, Mackenzie maintained, but his attention to the events of private life left him open to the criticism of any reflecting individual. "Because it represents domestic scenes and situations in
private life," he wrote, "anyone may detect errors and discover blemishes."

No special literary training was needed to read or, to a certain extent, appreciate a good novel. But considerable skill and training were required to write one. Mackenzie bemoaned the fact that novel writing had become the occupation of the narrow and the vain. Individuals possessing only a heated imagination and excursive fancy, without any genius or knowledge, had set themselves up as dictators of the public taste. The major problem with such works -- especially the sentimental sort coming out of France -- was their inability to distinguish vice from virtue. Mackenzie's criticism of these works was carefully considered. It was his opinion that the novel should reflect the more extensive and polite feelings of a refined age; and he praised the French for their attention to subtle feelings and entanglements of delicacy. But he disapproved of the tendency of many of the best works to bring into play a rivalry of virtues and duties and to thereby obscure moral distinctions. He especially objected to the way in which friendship, love and generosity were invariably opposed to such virtues as justice, obedience and economy. Moreover, like Craig, he warned against that enthusiasm of sentiment which gave pleasing passive impressions to the mind but had little real effect upon conduct.

To these eighteenth century moralists, the novel was by no means the only acceptable literary vehicle for the inculcation of virtue. Thus, it is revealing to compare the comments on
the novel with those on other, and more respectable, literary forms. In the first of two essays on comedy, for example, Craig argued that the Greeks were rather gross and unrefined in their presentation of comic characters. Citing John Millar's *The Distinction of Ranks*, he suggested that while the Greeks were undoubtedly a wise and moral people, they were very deficient in delicacy and politeness. Later comedy was superior to the extent that it eschewed real personages in order to illuminate particular situations or human passions. Having thus learned the general features of the human mind, modern authors became even more subtle in their portrayal of those small and minute aspects of character and life which were usually classed under the term manners or petites morales. Although the French were undoubtedly the masters of this kind of literary representation, argued Craig, Addison and Sterne also held a distinguished place.

Craig was willing to depict modern comedy, and by implication literature in general, as an improvement upon earlier forms. What he objected to, however, was that this same concentration upon the little parts of conduct detracted from more basic and universal aspects of character:

Manner may be put in the place of substance; and what is frivolous may be preferred to what is manly. As this species of corruption may be considered as the greatest in literary composition, so it is more certainly the greatest in morals. When what is trifling is only regarded, there never can be any real greatness in character. All sublime and manly efforts will be at an end; all noble exertions in the field, and all genuine eloquence in the senate, will be extinguished. Our battles will be bloodless, and in our speeches prettiness
will be preferred to simplicity and force.

Craig ended this tirade by pointing to the most notorious example of modern frivolity and vice, Lord Chesterfield's Letters, which represented "the manner of doing a thing as preferable to the thing itself."

This essay was followed up by one written by Henry Mackenzie, who agreed with Craig that modern literature was more polished and refined than its ancient counterpart. However, the moderns tended to paint those nicer shades of ridicule which obscured the distinction between virtue and vice. This tendency was especially threatening to the proper moral cultivation of the young. For, even when the author had been careful to make the proper distinctions, his naive young audience might not. "They who wish to escape its correction," he wrote, will "easily discover the difference between the scenic situation and theirs." At the same time, they would take from the comic drama or novel any piece of advice or condemnation of opposition that suited the inclination of their passions.

Dramatic comedy, Mackenzie continued, was social in its effects and tended to reinforce the passions of the crowd. To the laughter and ridicule of these interested spectators, the young were particularly vulnerable. This vulnerability was further accentuated by the fact that the comic plot invariably revolved around love and marriage, which so naturally attracted the interest and feelings of youth. The virtues of prudence, reason and obedience to parents all tended to get short shrift,
while the audience triumphed and laughed alongside the successful lovers, whose marriages were the "frolics of amusement, made on the acquaintance of a day, or some casual encounter." The School for Scandal, he added, may well have been a witty play, but it shook the very foundation of morality.

Thus, the Mirror Club's criticism of the majority of novels must be seen in the perspective of their criticism of most literature. Far from being a critic of sentiment, in the the Mirror and Lounger Mackenzie condemned the comic drama of Congreve on both sentimental and moral grounds. "Morality may no doubt be trite and sentiment dull, in the hands of authors of little genius," he wrote:

but profligacy and libertinism will often be as silly as wicked, though, in the impudence with which they unfold themselves, there is frequently an air of smartness which passes for wit, and of assurance which looks like vivacity. The counterfeits, however, are not always detected at that time of life which is less afraid of being thought dissipated than dull, and by that rank which holds regularity and sobriety among the plebian virtues. The people, indeed, are always true to virtue, and open to the impressions of virtuous sentiment. With the people, the comedies in which these are developed still remain favorites; and Corruption must have stretched its empire far indeed, when the applauses shall cease with which they are received.

Clearly, Mackenzie was eager to stress the role of sentiment relative to the moral development of the young. Although he understood the danger of obscuring virtue and vice in the labyrinth of refined feeling, he was not quite as eager as William Craig to assert the claims of manly fortitude and
eloquence. In the place of ancient virtue and rhetoric, he wanted to highlight sensibility.

Mackenzie's comments on tragedy were equally applicable to the novel. "In forming the minds and regulating the conduct of men," Mackenzie began:

nothing seems to be of greater importance than a proper system of what may be termed domestic morality; the science of those relative duties, which do not apply only to particular situations, to large fortunes, to exalted rank, to extensive influence, but which constitute that part and character in life which almost every one is called to perform. There were three literary vehicles for instilling this same domestic morality. The first were purely didactic works which spoke the language of authoritative wisdom. The second were historical works, particularly biographical, which could teach by example. The third included those works which moulded the "heart and manners through the medium of the imagination." The two principal forms of this last category were stories and novels and theatrical compositions.

If some of Mackenzie's comments on novels seemed harsh, his attack upon the majority of theatrical compositions was even more extreme. Whereas ancient tragedy pictured vice and virtue in a simple manner, he stated, in modern drama "there is an uncertain sort of outline, a blended colouring, by which the distinction of these objects is frequently lost." A particular cause of this was the undue emphasis on love to the exclusion of reason. Whereas reason condemned every sort of weakness, enthusiasm and sickly sensibility, modern drama had dignified weakness with the label amiable and had thereby provided the
young with a very misleading impression of their duty and the necessity for exercising self-discipline. But Mackenzie developed his argument much further in a second essay on the subject. Here, he pointed out that there were some excellent modern plays, such as Lillo's *Fatal Curiosity* and Moore's *The Gamester*. These compositions did not concentrate upon high and fashionable life, but presented domestic problems as the *distress of the scene*. Most tragedy was not of this sort, however. It fell into the error of dealing with *elevated personages* and tended to dignify the most *extreme passions*. In plays such as *St. Valori* or *The Orphan*, even the most vicious passions were presented in a favourable light. In some great plays, such as Shakespeare's *Othello*, virtue was not sufficiently distinguished from its opposite and it was possible for a naive youth to pity *Othello's* jealousy rather than be horrified at his revenge.

Mackenzie was worried about the effect of drama upon the moral sentiments of the spectator. If the treatment of the passions was too subtle or complex, and especially if *love* entered the picture, the young were inclined to make erroneous judgements. It did not suffice in moral terms, argued Mackenzie, that the sinner was punished at the end of the play. This might not sufficiently affect youthful sentiments. Indeed, he suggested that the reverse could be equally true. *Poetic justice* might simply increase the young spectator's propensity to sympathize with the protagonist. The dramatist not only had to make a faithful presentation of the human
sentiments of his characters, therefore, he also had to take into account the sympathetic equipment of the spectator.

It would be incorrect to suppose that Mackenzie wanted to condemn the stage in these essays. After all, he was an accomplished playwright himself. But he did want to warn against dangerous modern tendencies and to proscribe many productions for uninformed youth, whose creed was drawn perhaps too much from Romance and Tragedy. Referring to the romantic tragedies of the past generation, however, Mackenzie said: "Nor am I so much a bigot to the opinions I have delivered as to deny that there are uses, noble uses, which such productions may serve, amidst the dangers to which they sometimes expose the reader." What they could achieve was the transportation of the spectator to a region of exalted virtue and dignified sentiment which might act as an antidote to the unfeeling temperament of worldly minds. This moral function was imperative:

In the present age, and among certain ranks, indifference and selfishness have become a sort of virtues, and fashion has sometimes taught the young to pride themselves on qualities so unnatural to them...and that race must have become worthless and degenerated indeed, whom their terrors shall fail to rouse, and their griefs to melt.

But these heroic romances needed to be sparingly allowed and judiciously chosen. Mackenzie ended by citing his own comments on the necessity for carefully cultivating youthful sentiments in The Man of the World:

(The young) resemble some luxuriant soils which may be enriched beyond a wholesome fertility, till weeds are their only produce; weeds, the
more to be regretted, as in the language of the Novelist himself, "they grow in the soil from which virtue should have sprung."

Thus, if Mackenzie was concerned about the negative effects of novels and tragedies, especially in connection with the moral cultivation of the young, we should not construe this to mean that he did not appreciate their utility and necessity in a corrupt age. Moreover, because he wanted to ensure the effectiveness of the literary manipulation of youthful and female sentiment, only the right kind of literature would suffice. These were not only points that Mackenzie made in his essays, but he also made them within his novels. The latter he obviously regarded as exempt from any criticism on moral grounds. While he appreciated that some of his readers might find some fault with his compositions in terms of their literary merit, he trusted that "there is nothing to be found, in my publications, that may forfeit their esteem as a man."31 Indeed, Mackenzie's moral concerns intruded so far into his novels as to detract considerably from whatever merit they might have had. The young had precious little chance to make their own errors of judgement. The novels were punctuated with mini-lectures reinforcing the shaping of the youthful imagination with words of authoritative wisdom. While attempting to present complex characters and to illustrate the operations of sensibility in a refined society, Mackenzie never allowed these to obscure the timeless nature of true virtue, especially in terms of obedience to age and authority. Peer group influence was skillfully discredited. Reason was never
brought into conflict with feeling. And MacKenzie went to incredible lengths to make his virtuous protagonists worthy of the spectatorial sympathy which he skillfully elicited. Those characters who were vicious, even if they could never totally extinguish their natural moral sentiments, were very clearly so. The plot was little more than an intentionally flimsy structure on which to hang descriptions of properly functioning human sentiment. The settings for the display of these same sentiments were invariably private and domestic in nature. Setting, plot and characterization all contributed to one very focused end -- the careful cultivation of the moral sentiments.

The Man of Feeling

The Man of Feeling is an intriguing piece of work. This is not because of its merit in any strict literary sense for, although the prose is flawless, the novel's characterizations are so stereotypically black or white, that the reader is constantly reminded of the moral, rather than mimetic, purpose of the work. This is not to say that MacKenzie did not attempt to be as realistic as possible given the moral framework and naive young audience with which he had to work. The central character, Harley, does have some faults. Upon his first introduction to an unmitigatedly evil world, he evidences youthful naivety. His jealousy over the supposed betrothal of his beloved, Miss Walton, suggests a momentary excess of passion. Moreover, MacKenzie's strong hint that Harley was
tempted to make use of the services of a brothel, points to an attempt to draw a believable character. But Mackenzie did not want to leave even the most moronic reader in any doubt as to the fact that Harley was the embodiment of virtuous sensibility. Even more poorly drawn are those men of the world with whom Harley comes into contact. They are relentlessly cunning, selfish and immoral, however much they may verbalize the fashionable language of sentiment. These are not complex characters with mixed qualities; they are the bad guys with whom the good guy has to deal. Moreover they are the interested creatures of the metropolis and its values -- those false monitors of youth whose aim is to lure the innocent into vice.

Despite this weak characterization, the novel does fascinate in a number of ways, and is far more complex in terms of structure and theme than is commonly supposed. In the first place, it attempts to illustrate the operation of the moral and social feelings in the ordinary affairs of life. We witness Harley's affections developing and being refined through small scale interactions dependent upon the genuine complacency of his character. This steady growth of moral personality is what unifies an otherwise extremely, and deliberately, fragmentary novel. Each of the fragments, however, illustrates an isolated scene in which moral truth and feeling can be exhibited. The fragments also act as mini-novels of feeling for the youthful reader with a short attention span; many of them are clearly pointed at young women; and they leave little to the judgement
of the reader. The lacunae between the various segments, however, forces the serious reader to concentrate upon the nature of Harley and the exhibition of his moral character, rather than some distracting narrative of events.\textsuperscript{32}

There is no doubt that Mackenzie was being quite deliberate in all of this, and attempting to capture and mould a particular young and generally female audience. At the same time, there is much in the novel to attract the more sophisticated reader. The various characters occasionally act as neo-classical spokesmen for some of Mackenzie's civic humanist, political, and economic ideas. Moreover, Mackenzie was good at forcing his readers to actively participate in the \textit{symphony of sympathy}, making them play the role of impartial spectators in pathetic scenarios, and even the most urbane reader can find his or her emotional equipment being manipulated. But Mackenzie did not extract from his readers an extreme emotion that was temporary or narcissistic; instead, he skillfully teased out that \textit{gentle tear} which was conducive to moral reformation and active virtue. The novel does not end with any hatred or total withdrawal from a corrupt world. "No: there is such an air of gentleness around," wrote Mackenzie, "that I can hate nothing; but, as to the world -- I pity the men of it."\textsuperscript{33}

It is the world, however, rather than individuals, which is the true villain of Mackenzie's novels. It represents the antithesis and corruption of native sociability. A few examples of the ways in which Mackenzie uses the term must
suffice to demonstrate its significance. In a chapter entitled *Of worldly interests*, Mackenzie claimed that the world falsely defined *happiness and misery* in relation to *power, wealth, and grandeur.* In another place, he categorized it as the *world of semblance*, which impersonated happiness without being able to feel it. According to the *fantastic ideas* of this same world, argued Mackenzie, the *man of feeling* was either an enigma or a fool. At the very least, he was an eccentric, lacking in a proper appreciation of the more appropriate notions of *utility* and *expediency*.

The *world* was not only mistaken in its values, sacrificing true happiness for its misleading appearance. It was also characterized by interest and deceit. The *world*, wrote Mackenzie citing Hamlet, "will smile, and smile, and be a villain." Its votaries pretended to a virtue they did not possess and pursued their own interest behind masks of friendliness and courtesy. These were referred to as *men of honour* and *guides to its manners*. In addition to being a *scene of restraint and disappointment*, therefore, the *world* was an arena for *dissimulation*. It was anything but the proper habitat for Mackenzie's much misunderstood hero -- the *man of feeling*. As Harley himself suggested:

> There are some feelings which perhaps are too tender to be suffered by the world. The world is in general selfish, interested, and unthinking, and throws the imputation of romance and melancholy on every temper more susceptible than itself.

But it was the world that was wrong in its judgement, not the man who trusted to his gentler feelings.
There are some recognizably modern elements in the picture of the world presented thus far. Yet it closely parallels traditional treatments of the subject. "Philosophers and poets have often protested against this decision," wrote Mackenzie, "but their arguments have been despised as declamatory, or ridiculed as romantic." Fortunately, for our purposes, Mackenzie's treatment of the world could be much more specific. All that was evil in the world was particularly associated with the metropolis -- London. Right at the very beginning of the novel, Mackenzie forced his young readers to make this association. Some grave and prudent monitors, he sarcastically suggested, had advised the man of feeling to go to London in order to pursue his interests with a certain Baronet, who owned large tracts of land in Harley's neighbourhood. What Harley wanted was a fair sized tenancy in order to supplement his meagre income of 250 pounds per year. Harley's aunt, with a tear on her cheek, warned her nephew of the temptations of the metropolis. Peter, his faithful old servant, shook his single lock of hair disapprovingly, choking on the phrase that London is a sad place. And lest the reader miss the point, the narrator informed her that honest Peter's benediction would be heard "where these tears will add to its urgency."

Although Harley was able to survive London uncorrupted, his experiences highlighted the deceit, interestedness, and general conceit of appearances that characterized the metropolis. He met with what he thought was a fine gentleman; he turned out to be a mere exciseman. He was cheated out of
his money by a seemingly compassionate card shark and his accomplice. He had his watch and what remained of his finances purloined by a cunning publican. The Baronet himself added the final blow by politely refusing Harley's application for land in order to grant it to a man who had pimped his own sister for this exemplary parliamentary representative of the nation.

 Appropriately, Harley returned to the quieter and marginally less fantastical world of the countryside. However, the false values and interestedness of the courtly metropolis had begun to penetrate this corner of the world as well. Although virtue existed here, and was met with more frequently, selfishness seemed to predominate. We meet Old Edwards who had been forced from his tenancy by a rapacious landlord. The local squire had recently levelled a small children's school because it blocked his view. Old Edward's son and daughter died of heartbreak after a crop failure, the effects of which were not alleviated by aristocratic benevolence. The Justices of the Peace in the area were far more concerned about the preservation of their own game than the survival and happiness of their fellow human beings.

 The moral community was on the defensive. The values of a corrupt court and metropolis were penetrating the countryside. Virtue and feeling were in decline, even among those who lived "sequestered from the noise of the multitude" and who had more opportunity to listen to the voice of their feelings. Any dichotomy between a corrupt court and a virtuous countryside
became increasingly blurred as landowners began to adopt the manners of the metropolis and to forget their functions of sociability and benevolence. Moreover, by exporting courtly manners into the countryside, the landowning classes and nouveau riche were acting as a corrosive rather than the cement of British society.

Mackenzie wanted to make his criticism of modern luxury and fashion more direct than the framework of the sentimental novel could easily allow. For this reason, he injected snatches of dialogue that were nothing more than thinly disguised moral lectures addressed to the young. This dialogue was not conducive to plot development or characterization. An example in point is that of the splenetic wise man and prototype for *Umphraville* and *Caustic* -- the misanthropist. Sermonizing Harley on the abuse of moral discourse in the *coin of the world*, he asserted that the contemporary use of such terms as *honour* and *politeness* made a mockery of true friendship and virtue:

> You have substituted the shadow Honour, instead of the substance Virtue; and have banished the reality of Friendship for the fictitious semblance, which you have termed Politeness; politeness, which consists in a ceremonious jargon, more ridiculous to the ear of reason than the voice of a puppet. You have invented sounds which you worship, though they tyrannize over your peace; and are surrounded with empty forms, which take from the honest emotions of joy, and add to the poignancy of misfortune.55

Thus began the misanthropist's lecture to poor Harley on all that was wrong with the world.

The old philosopher began with the modern notion of
Fashion. Even in the nursery, he continued, children began to learn the system of avowed insincerity. The most popular modern authors and authorities were not those who preached truth and morals, but those who taught this so-called Ingenious knowledge. As a result, the education of Youth had become preposterous. The school years were spent learning to improve upon talents rather than to discover if any existed. No regard was paid to the natural intelligence, diligence, or probable station in life of the child. "From this bear-garden of the pedagogue," young men, with no ideas in their heads save those of dress and fashion, were shipped out on the Grand Tour, during which they were incapable of learning anything significant about human nature. When they returned, they purchased their seat in Parliament and exposed the commonwealth to the fruits of their ignorance and superficiality. Young women, too, were trained to no useful purpose. From the first, they learned that the only goal of a young woman was to get married. When they were a little older, they were instructed in the ultimate significance of the wedded state -- the "enjoyment of pin-money, and the expectation of a jointure."

The cause of this general emphasis upon fashionable disguise and calculating self-interest, of course, was luxury. But our splenetic philosopher did not condemn all luxury out of hand or demand a return to a more primitive state. Acting as a mouthpiece for Mackenzie's own views, he admitted that some luxury was inseparable from national development. But if the moral community was to survive its ill effects, luxury needed
to be confined to its proper arena:

It is not simply of the progress of luxury that we have to complain; did its votaries keep in their own thoughtless sphere of dissipation, we might despise them without emotion; but the frivolous pursuits of pleasure are mingled with the most important concerns of the state; and public enterprise shall sleep till he who should guide its operation has decided his bets at Newmarket, or fulfilled his engagement with a favorite mistress in the country.

Public life, he argued, had become an arena for the exhibition of petulance, sarcasm, and irresolution. It was no longer conducive to the practice of virtue.

There was no ray of hope or humanity in this old man's unequivocal condemnation and withdrawal from the world. The misanthropist went so far as to scorn those who would look for virtue in little family circles or deduce benevolence from the natural impulse of the heart. Instead, he followed a Mandevillian line and categorized all men as selfish and interested creatures, whose most seemingly altruistic actions stemmed from a desire for praise or reward. Mackenzie, of course, did not accept this gloss and wanted to push a more humane philosophy. Thus, while he had Harley agree with the truth of much of what the old man said, and even the necessity for its harsh presentation for some tempers, he criticized the latter's lack of fellow feeling. "It is curious to observe," Harley reflected, "how the nature of truth may be changed by the garb it wears; softened to the admonition of friendship, or soured into the severity of reproof." In a confused way, the old misanthropist represents various strains of ancient and modern thought. He carries his
logic so far as to deny the complexity of human behaviour and the existence of altruistic passions. In his total distaste for all ease, pleasure, and even moderate personal luxuries, he removes himself from the rest of human kind. His pessimistic analysis of human corruption leaves virtually no hope for the restorative powers of feeling. Be that as it may, there was much truth in what the old cynic had to say, as Harley testified in a discussion with another soul mate — the happy and peaceful Ben Sifton. Here, Harley claimed that the modern age was Frivolous and Interested. He condemned many modern philosophers for laughing at the pedantry of our fathers and defending selfish motives of action. The modern philosophe, he suggested, erred in substituting sneer and ridicule for ancient reason. Their works were symptomatic of "the corruption of a state; when not only is virtue declined, and vice prevailing, but when the praises of virtue are forgotten, and the infamy of vice unfelt." 

The attack upon both private morals and public virtue, Harley specified, had its root cause in the immense riches that had recently been acquired by private individuals. These mushroom gentry, as Mackenzle referred to them elsewhere in the novel, had erected a new foundation for ambition, one which ran contrary to both ancient reason and any rational moral discourse. Nowadays, he suggested, pleasure and the wealth which could procure it had become the primary social goal. Harley also returned to this issue again in the novel, in his lengthy treatment of the East India Company. Harley, alias
Mackenzie, pointed out that he was not against commerce per se. But the subjection of India was not only unjustifiable in moral terms, it could not even be excused by reference to such utilitarian considerations as the superiority of British law or the despotism of the indigenous Nabobs. For the British who went to India went there primarily for the wealth that they could obtain. They expected, and were expected by their countrymen, to return to their native land as rich men. "You describe the victories which they have gained," declaimed an impassioned Harley:

they are sullied by the cause in which they fought; you enumerate the spoils of those victories; they are covered with the blood of the vanquished!

A similar argument is developed in Old Edward's description of the barbarous way in which wealth tended to be acquired in India. The British officers that he described had no sense of the ties of humanity and human fellow feeling in their lust for riches. Thus, they lashed, mocked, and almost killed an ignorant old Indian on the strength of a slender rumour that he had hidden a treasure from the British.

One commentator on the energy and persistence of this theme in The Man of Feeling suggests that Mackenzie's liberalism was ahead of its time in condemning British practice in India. In Before Jane Austen, Harrison Steeves also expresses surprise at Mackenzie's attack upon British imperialism, given the times in which he wrote. But what is really at stake here is not a theory of economic and personal liberty, but a classical humanist critique combined with an
enlightened appreciation of the moral sentiments. Mackenzie was especially concerned to picture those nabobs or mushroom gentry who wore their coats of arms in their purses as a socially corrosive force who were replacing the notion of community with indifference, self-interest and the crude cash nexus. His main concern resided in the maintenance of the moral community, not the liberalization of commerce or the rights of man.

But the moral community was in grave danger of disintegration. The young, claimed Harley, were early hackneyed in vice and had any of their "finer emotions blunted by the repetition of debauch."65 "Our boys," he complained, "are prudent too soon." Even love, "the passion most natural to the sensibility of youth," had succumbed to the contagion of self-interest. Modern love was characterized, not by its former plaintive dignity, but by the unmeaning simper of the coxcomb and the settlement of the dowry. This was doubly tragic, since the empire of sentiment needed to be asserted against the indifference and selfishness of the age.

Mackenzie, like most Scottish moralists, did not want to return to the simpler virtue of the ancients. He wanted to stress sensibility and fellow feeling, but not to the extent that it would dethrone reason. Thus, Harley is predisposed to feel for others; he has an unusually high degree of complacency or pliability of mind. But he is also a reasonable individual. His ability to discriminate between genuine and undeserving objects of fellow feeling grows in the duration of the novel.
As Mackenzie himself put it, the novel consisted of:

recitals of little adventures, in which the dispositions of a man, sensible to judge, and still more warm to feel, had room to unfold themselves.

Between sense and sensibility there is no conflict. Emotion is given priority over syllogism; but reason is demonstrably not thrown out the window. The virtuous characters' tears most certainly flow, but they are strictly rationed in terms of the merit of the sympathetic object. Harley sometimes has nothing more than a moistened eye; occasionally, he sheds but one cordial drop; he only bursts into tears when witnessing a pure and unadulterated scene of domestic tragedy or a case of gross and unmitigated injustice.

If the villains of the novel tend to defy belief in their deafness to humanity, it is precisely because Mackenzie wanted to make their victims worthy of Harley's, and the reader's, sympathy.

Harley is complacent, but never to excess. Nor is he overly accommodating with others. Some literary commentators have described him as a totally feminine character, but he can give stern moral lectures that Mackenzie would never have placed in a female mouth. This is particularly evidenced in a carefully constructed scene in the stagecoach from London, wherein Mackenzie has Harley criticize a young soldier for his abusive language. The soldier immediately took umbrage and attempted to pick a fight but, when he looked into the latter's face, he "discovered something there which tended to pacify him...and was rather less profuse of his oaths during the rest of the journey." It was in this same stagecoach that Harley
made friends with Ben Silton, who is described as a man who "wore a look remarkably complacent." Shortly afterwards, Harley met old Edwards, who was also not "without those streaks of complacency, which a good mind will throw into the countenance." The latter had shown considerable bravery during his military service in India; yet he could also shed tears with Harley. When Harley arrived home, he greeted an aunt who had "a look of more complacency than is perhaps natural to maiden-ladies of threescore." This genuine, not excessive, sociablity, which Harley summed up in the observation that all men are relations, is what allowed one to enter into the feelings of others and to feel sympathy for rather than empathy with them. Not surprisingly, its most accomplished practitioner is a woman -- Miss Walton, the primary object of Harley's fellow feeling.

In a corrupt social world, too much empathy could be a dangerous things. Youthful passions could easily run to excess when exposed to the cunning of artful men. Love was just such a passion. Mackenzie's heroes, such as Harley or Harry Bolton, experience love as an emotion which gradually unfolds from compatibility of temperament and never soars to romantic excess. The resultant lovers have a tender and intimate influence upon one another; but there is never any question of them living in the eyes of the other or totally losing themselves in love. Given the care with which Mackenzie treated love -- something that he regarded as a crucially important and tricky subject -- it is surprising that so many
writers have pictured him in the romantic tradition.

When Mackenzie treated of romantic love, he did so in a negative way. The prostitute that Harley befriended, for example, allowed her emotions to be totally manipulated by an artful man of fashion. "It was love!," she said:

Love which had made too fatal a progress in my heart...I interpreted every look of attention, every expression of compliment, to the passion that I imagined him inspired with, and imputed to his sensibility that silence which was the effect of art and design.74

Once caught in the web of this romantic vision, which had been stimulated by reading too many romantic novels, Miss Atkins was at her seducer's mercy. "He now expressed himself in such ardent terms," she recounted to Harley, "that prudence might have suspected their sincerity." But both prudence and delicacy had been long eroded by this romantic outlook.

The propensity for affection, even a willingness to err on the side of a generous sensibility, were never meant to exclude reason or prudence. Mackenzie made this perfectly clear in his careful delineation of the gradual meeting of minds in the lovers of his novels. He also illustrated it in one of the novel's fragments entitled The Pupil.75 The story is told to Harley by a landed gentleman, but its moral was aimed directly at the naive young reader rather than the silent man of feeling. When a young man, Edward Sedley's father decided to send him on the Grand Tour. Before doing so, however, he acquired the services of a destitute but worthy nobleman to act as the young man's tutor. While visiting Milan, young Sedly made the acquaintance of a fashionable set of young noblemen.
He was loath to relinquish their *friendship*, even when he began to lose large sums of money to them in gaming. But a father's prudence and the superior wisdom of his tutor, Mountford, eventually came to the young man's aid. He was gently led to unravel the false associations that he had made and eventually discovered that his *friends* were perfect villains. Upon this discovery, Sedly came to his senses and relinquished both their company and influence.

The story of the prostitute and the fragment of *The Pupil* were thinly veiled lectures directed at young men and women, warning them against allowing their sociability to become excessively romantic or pliable. In the latter tale, especially, Mackenzie distinguished between a dangerous sociability and a more deserving sympathy by taking Sedly and his young readers to the sick bed of one of Sedley's engaging young companions' debtors. Here, in the small and pathetic domestic circle, the language of gentle sensibility could ring out loud and true, in contrast to the polite masks, false honour, and illusion of sentiment in the fashionable world of young Italian noblemen. Here too, Sedley learned his proper aristocratic role. It was to practice genuine sociability to his neighbours and a feeling benevolence to the poor and ill treated -- to right the wrongs of an iniquitous world and to restore to bonds of feeling between men -- not to squander away one's socially precious resources at the gaming table.

This is a theme that Mackenzie returns to again and again in his novels, and one that is central to *The Man of the World*. 
The young elite needed to cultivate their sentiments because sensibility was the basis of social benevolence. The function of the landed gentleman was to practice this benevolence, which was the only justification of his wealth and social station. The problem, as Mackenzie saw it, was that wealth was not only getting into the wrong hands, but it was corrupting the manners of the landed elite. Thus, while wealth properly used could help to maintain the social fabric and reinforce the ties of community, the recent influx of foreign luxury was rapidly transforming that same community into a disparate collection of self-interested and alienated individuals. Harley, from ancient family and of gentle manners, had precisely the right temperament and background for the practice of social benevolence. Although he did not have the financial means for extensive benevolence, he was demonstrably not the inactive creature of feeling that some scholars have described. He did all that he could to alleviate the distresses of others. Not only was he a good listener, but he gave financial aid to the prostitute and provided the virtuous old Edwards with a home. He took in the orphaned grandchildren of his aged friend, and his death resulted from attending a neighbour in his illness. But, while he practiced a heartfelt benevolence:

the great part of the property in his neighbourhood being in the hands of merchants, who had got rich by their lawful calling abroad, and the sons of stewards, who had got rich by their lawful calling at home; persons so perfectly versed in the ceremonial of thousands, tens of thousands, and hundreds of thousands. 76

Mackenzie’s distaste and sarcasm were expressed in his remark
that the degrees of precedency of such individuals were "plainly demonstrable from the first page of the Compleat Accompant."

**The Man of the World**

The role of landed society as practitioners of benevolence, rather than consumers of luxury, received further attention in Mackenzie's second novel. Indeed, the significance which Mackenzie attached to this theme helps to explain what otherwise might be construed as complete literary confusion. For *The Man of the World* consisted of two volumes, each of which was stylistically superior, and ostensibly more tightly organized, than *The Man of Feeling*. But the two volumes could not have been more different from one another. The first parallels the Harley story in its attention to domestic detail and its delineation of virtuous sensibility unrewarded by a corrupt world. The major distinction between this first volume and Mackenzie's earlier novel was its almost paranoid obsession with the artful and painstakingly diabolical machinations of a supposedly representative man of the world. Mackenzie was as determined to terrify his young readers as he was in the dissection and inculcation of true sensibility.

The second volume breaks with virtually all of Mackenzie's own rules for the treatment of social affection. Rather than being in any way realistic or bravely experimental, it followed
the well established path of lesser sentimental novels. Its main characters were all individuals of high station. Their virtue was eventually recognized and rewarded. The novel revolves around a complex narrative storyline, and incorporates such conventional devices as mistaken identity, the element of fate, and an intricate plot full of twists and turns. All of these were techniques which Mackenzie self-consciously spurned in *The Man of Feeling*. The conclusion to the novel even resorted to something very much like a *deus ex machina* in the form of a nurse, who announced the true identity of the noble orphan, unravelled her relationship to a long lost uncle, and established her right to the estate of a miraculously reformed and conveniently dying, man of the world.

One can only surmise as to what was going on in Mackenzie's mind here. But one factor that suggests itself is that the author was so eager to place individuals with benevolent feelings into positions of social authority that he was willing to forgo domestic realism and pathos in the interest of poetic justice and wishful thinking. For, throughout the second volume, he constantly reiterated the necessity for country gentlemen to practice a benevolence based upon genuine feeling. The concluding paragraphs of the novel, for example, described the lot which the hero and heroine were to play in the British countryside:

> their benevolence is universal; the country smiles around them with the effects of their goodness. This is indeed the only real superiority which wealth has to bestow.78

The benevolence that Mackenzie wanted to recommend here
was not simply that of aristocratic largess or acts of conspicuous public virtue. These were also practiced by vicious men of the world such as Sir Thomas Sindall, who persecuted his tenants in private, while enjoying a brilliant public reputation. Instead, it involved acts of private benevolence which solidified the moral community and whose motives could only be genuine. Thus, for example, when Harry Bolton inherited the estate of his old friend, Mr. Rawlinson, he immediately reassured his tenants that he wanted to be both a father and a friend to them. He promised to renew all their leases at the old rent and to deal speedily with their smallest problems. He visited all of their neat little dwellings and complimented their inhabitants on their industry. What is more, he made it quite clear that he put social considerations before economic ones:

I know the usual mode of improving estates; I was told by some sagacious advisers in London that mine was improvable; but I am too selfish to be contented with money; I would increase the love of my people.

The preservation of the social order and the moral integrity of the community were first and foremost in Bolton's mind.

The most intriguing character in this second volume is Mr. Rawlinson, a man of native virtue who had gone away to India and returned with a moderate fortune of a few thousand pounds and a good conscience. With this money, he practiced private acts of benevolence. In addition, he helped to support the traditional social structure by bailing out a deeply indebted friend in landed society. Having been bequeathed the estate
upon his friend's death, Rawlinson chose not to live upon it, perhaps not having the training or aptitude for aristocratic country life. Nonetheless, he practiced a singular method of improving its value:

He lowered the rents, which had been raised to an extravagant height, and recalled the ancient tenants of the manor, most of whom had been driven from the unfriendly soil, to make room for desperate adventurers, who undertook for rents that they could never be able to pay. 82

It was to this same estate that Harry Bolton succeeded upon the death of his friend, the equally sensitive Rawlinson.

Thus we see how Mackenzie wanted to forge the bonds of feeling within an essentially landed society. Men of sensibility were to aid one another through the ties of virtuous friendship and to permeate society with their influence. Even the luxury of an empire could be redeemed in terms of social responsibility and humanity, both at home and abroad. To Mackenzie's mind, paternalism and sentimentalism should take precedence over, and subsume, such contemporary rages as agricultural improvement or public politics. So critical was the commitment to sociability and fellow feeling in the novels that Mackenzie criticized the older aristocratic conception of honour because it obscured these values and put too much distance between individuals and social stations. More important, perhaps, Mackenzie wanted to differentiate his own discussion of virtue from that of the ancient philosophers, particularly the Stoics.

Mackenzie's discussion of Stoicism also came in the second volume of The Man of the World, adding to the novel's
architectural confusion. But this discussion of Stoicism is most revealing in its subtle treatment of the relationship between self-control and feeling. Mackenzie wanted to make it absolutely clear that, while he did not undervalue the significance of the former, he wanted to emphasize the latter. The character Bill Annesly suffered the typical consequences of an excessively passionate and headstrong youth when confronted with an artful man of the world. In order to obtain the sexual favours of his sister, the evil Sir Thomas Sindall systematically corrupted young Annesy and put him further and further into debt. In desperation, Billy Annesly resorted to crime, was eventually transported, and, after a series of adventures which highlighted his innate virtue but lack of self-control, ended up living with an American tribe.

Here followed a description of the Cherokee way of life, which emphasized manly fortitude. Billy Annesly performed laborious tasks without wincing; he witnessed the severe torture of Indian captives, who taunted their tormenters with never a groan escaping from the sufferers. He, in turn, suffered torture until he proved himself sufficiently valiant to be worthy of tribal membership. Billy Annesly gradually learned to admire this society of primitive liberty and equality. He often reflected on its military prowess, fierce independence, and complete distaste for artificial and luxurious needs. It was a society wherein "greatness cannot use oppression, nor wealth excite envy; where the desires are native to the heart, and the languor of satiety is unknown."
Mackenzie contrasted the virtues of this primitive society with the so-called civilization of Europe. Among Europeans, young Annesly was systematically cheated, lied to, treated as a servant, and left to rot in a French prison. He commented sarcastically upon those notions of comparative morality which categorized the most inhumane actions as savage. None of this means, as one author has incorrectly suggested, that Mackenzie was a moral relativist. Although he wanted to suggest that self-composure was necessary to virtue, he was not advocating any return to a society of tents and insensibility. Nor did he wish to push the importance of self-control to anywhere near the extent that his friend Adam Smith did. Billy Annesly had had his moral sentiments carefully nurtured by his father. He remained essentially a man of feeling, lacking however that softness and gentleness which characterized his sister. Thus, he embarrassed his adopted Indian father by shedding tears on his death bed. Moreover, in his final redemption, he was far from being the hardened warrior of the Cherokee nation.

In any case, Billy Annesly was not one of the ideal types of the novel, nor were ancient virtue, military valour or fortitude its informing principles. The former were Harry Bolton, Richard and Harriet Annesly, and Miss Lucy Sindall; the latter were sensibility and paternalistic benevolence. It was these individuals and these virtues that were to reform a corrupt society. And corrupt is obviously an understatement here. Mackenzie wanted his young readers to be under absolutely no illusion about the polite and fashionable world.
and he pictured it in a ridiculously black light. The *man of the world* -- Sir Thomas Sindall -- was a villain without peer. Even his most seemingly generous acts of benevolence were performed with one intention only, that of enhancing his image. His calculated selfishness knew no bounds. Much more than a mere foil to illuminate disinterested virtue; he was a warning sign to all who would seek to associate virtue or pleasure with a life of luxury and ostentation.

The negative overtones with which Mackenzie imbued the metropolis and the votaries of the *world* should not, however, be allowed to obscure the fact that a major interest of the novelist was the cultivation of youth in virtuous sentiments. The first volume of the novel dealt at considerable length with the education of the young and provided explicit instructions for what was an incredibly complex process. There is very little in these same instructions pertaining to the acquisition of knowledge or skills; for the process was almost completely geared to the cultivation of the sentiments.

The central character and hero of the first volume, Richard Annesly, was the widowed father of two children. His son Billy, as we have seen was of rather too warm a temperament, which tended to silence his understanding. Harriet was equally sensitive, but her sensibility was of a more social kind, characteristic of women, which precluded extreme reactions. Richard Annesly took the education of his children most seriously:

Such were the minds which Annesly's tuition was to form. To repress the warmth of temerity,
without extinguishing the generous principles from which it arose, and to give firmness to sensibility where it bordered on weakness, without fearing its feelings where they led to virtue, was the task he had marked out for his industry to accomplish.

This was a delicate balancing act, calling for a considerable parental contribution to the educational process. Annesly was the ideal type of the tender parent, personally supervising both his children's manners and education. Together, he taught them reading, writing, arithmetic and geography. While Billy read Latin and Greek with his father, reflecting the significance of the classics for male education, Harriet received instruction in female accomplishments from Mrs. Winstanly. Dancing and music were not excluded from the educational process and were, indeed, crucial to the children's cultivation process. Every week, the dancing master joined in the little family concerts that reflected the symphony of feeling which obtained within the Annesly domestic circle and which reflected that special relationship between parents and children.

Richard Annesly adopted a system of positive reinforcement, rather than negative punishment, in the education of his children. Misbehaviour was corrected by the forfeiture of a lesson. Small sums of money were given to the children for garden work and embroidery; but these were to be spent in charitable activities in the village, for the elder Annesly was particularly concerned to make the association between property and benevolence in the soft minds of his children. In the same manner, he attempted to instill
sentiments in his children in a positive and gradual way, making certain that the heart felt a principle before the judgement was convinced of its veracity. All of this advice was clothed more "in the garb of advice from a friend, than lectures from a father, and were listened to with the warmth of friendship, as well as the humility of veneration." Mackenzie even used the persona of the narrator to point to the contrast between such relationships and the more common lack of intimacy between fathers and their children.

Billy Annesly had the inclination to become a lawyer, and despite misgivings about the corruptions of university life, it was thought proper to send him to Oxford. When it came time for his son to leave, Richard Annesly gave both of his children a series of paternal instructions in order to warn them against the glaring objects of the world which, while they had showy surfaces, were lacking in intrinsic value. In this section of the book, where literary considerations are totally replaced by moral didacticism, Richard Annesly, alias Mackenzie, distinguished between a natural confidence and that naive simplicity which left one open to the corruptions of the world. The world, he suggested, was the captive of pleasure and the enemy of virtue. Despite all its faults, however, one should not relinquish the world. One could always gain by learning how better to interact with other people, whereas a withdrawal from the world only constricted the operations of sensibility:

the social feelings grow callous from disuse, and lose that pliancy of little affection, which sweetens the cup of life as we drink it.
Even the polite manners of the fashionable world, which so often repressed the warmest feelings of the human breast, had some utility, argued Mackenzie, in so far as they tended to tone down "the turbulence of passion and animosity."96 But politeness could never be taught as an art. It was, rather, "the expression of liberal sentiment."

Thus spoke a Scottish moralist on the fine distinctions between sentiment, sensibility and politeness. Just as long as modern manners were a reflection of natural feelings and the desire for obliging, he continued, they were a good guide to social interaction. But when they were merely the product of national or temporary fashions, they needed to be scrutinized most carefully. The "music, the painting, the poetry of the passions" were "the property of every one who has a heart to be moved."97 These moral sentiments, rather than fashionable manners, were the true parents of justice and humanity. They were timeless and human.

In these affectionate lectures, Annesly taught his children, and Mackenzie taught his readers, to make the proper moral associations and to tie them firmly to their sentiments. Harriet and Billy, however, met with rather harsh fates from their contact with the world, causing at least one literary scholar to suggest that the educational process was in some way defective.98 Since the advice given by Richard Annesly paralleled the advice given to youth in the Mirror and Lounger, such a conclusion is very unlikely. It fails to take into account Mackenzie's argument that the spectator's sympathy is
increased whenever virtue suffers at the hands of an evil world. Moreover, it overlooks the basic theme of the novel, which is that the world is inimical to virtue and has the capacity to corrupt even the most carefully cultivated individuals.

A more careful look at the case histories of Billy and Harriet Annesly shows that the problem did not lie with the educational process but with the machinations of the world. To be sure, Billy Annesly had a character fault in that he tended to be overly headstrong and ambitious of praise. But his feelings had been carefully cultivated and were only with great difficulty stifled by the machinations of the artful Sir Thomas Sindall, who studied with him at Oxford and introduced him to the company of evil companions. Oxford, Mackenzie suggested, was too far removed from the influence of a virtuous parent, and the simplicity of Billy's manners were eventually transformed by a man whose own education had not been properly taken care of. Sindall's mother was a virtuous individual, but a very bad parent -- a distinction which Mackenzie believed it was important to make. Not only did she pay insufficient attention to her son's nature, but she also allowed him to do just as he wished "at first because his spirit should not be confined too early, and afterwards he did what he liked, because it was past being confined at all."

Thus, Billy Annesly was removed from the only society that he had known to a society composed of strangers. These not so impartial or affectionate spectators began the slow corruption
of his manners. Had he not been so far removed from a better example, Billy Annesly might very well have avoided moral contamination. However:

Annesly was distant from any counsel or example, that might counterbalance the contagious influence of a dissolute society, with which his time was now engross'd. 100

His moral destruction was only a matter of time. Harriet Annesly, however, was of a quite different order. Not only had her sentiments, like her brother's, been carefully nurtured, but she had even learned the "art of forming them." 101 In order to corrupt her virtue in the formal sense, Sir Thomas Sindall had to perform even more diabolical actions than the diabolical character Lovelace in Samuel Richardson's *Clarissa*. At least Lovelace is a sufficiently intriguing character to have attracted the sympathetic interest of some perverse modern scholars. But even the most ingenious student of literature and, what is more important, the most ingenuous youth, could not rehabilitate Sindall's character or excuse his actions. He not only lured Harriet to London, he escorted her to a cottage under false pretenses, and there opiated and raped her. Still, she remained true to her moral sentiments, right up to and including her tragic death. In the concluding sections of the second volume, a reformed and dying Sindall referred to her as an *angel of Mercy*. 102

Nor was Billy Annesly's education wasted. He finally affirmed his father's hope and love for him by returning to Britain to help the hero rescue his love, and Billy's niece, from the rapacious clutches of Sir Thomas Sindall. Mackenzie's
point in this tragic scenario was twofold. First, it was imperative to build education upon the natural feelings and moral sentiments of youth. Sensitivity was to be in every way encouraged, albeit also tempered by the correct use of reason and prudence. Such sensibility was to be distinguished from the false politeness of the world and, indeed, was to act as a counter to its interestedness and deceit. The second point that Mackenzie wanted to make was that the young should never underestimate the power of this world. It was capable of corrupting even the most carefully cultivated sentiments. One had to maintain contact with one's close friends and family within the best approximation of the moral community and to avoid the contagion of fashionable strangers. For women, especially, it was necessary to remain within the safety of the domestic enclosure. And even for those men who had to enter into the public domain, it was imperative to balance out this necessarily infectious contact with interaction in the more virtuous private and domestic realm. As Harriet Annesly informed her wayward brother:

Alas! that you should leave this seat of innocent delight; but men were made for the bustle of society: yet we might have been happy here together; there are in other hearts, wishes which they call ambition; mine shrinks at the thought, and would shelter for ever amidst the sweets of this humble spot.

The significance of the domestic sphere and the dangers of fashionable life, logically led to the view that a woman's role and safety adhered to the domestic realm. Their task it was to tone down men's disgust with or attraction to the false values
of the world. The purity of their moral sentiments, as Mackenzie was to argue in *Julia de Roubigné*, was the last bastion against moral corruption.

*Julia de Roubigné*

There is a progressive development of themes in Mackenzie's novels. In *The Man of Feeling*, the spectator is taught to discern the nature of true sentiment and its significance for the moral community. Moreover, a new kind of male hero was presented to the public -- one who embodied sensitivity and who epitomized true benevolence. In *The Man of the World*, Mackenzie stressed the importance of cultivating the natural sentiments of the young and also warned them of the dangers of a society so attached to fashion and luxury. *Julia de Roubigné* developed a theme that had grown in significance between the first and second novels. This was the function to be played by female complacency and sympathy. More than either of the first two works, *Julia de Roubigné* was directed at women. That this was his most carefully crafted and best written of all his novels, attests to the importance which Mackenzie attached to his female angels.

In *Julia de Roubigné*, Mackenzie returned to first principles. He adopted the technique of an epistolary novel, which had been well developed by Richardson, in order to avoid a narrative which could only *destroy sentiment*. Thus, the story line is incidental to the way in which the characters'
sentiments unfold in letters written to intimate friends. The setting is France, but it might have just as well been England or Scotland. The letters were primarily those of the heroine, Julia; a French nobleman by the name of Montauban; and Savillon -- a man of feeling and an intimate of Julia. The latter character, as well as the good natured, but equally sensitive Rouille, serve primarily to accentuate the flaws in Montauban's excessively heroic or masculine character and to provide appropriate male examples of virtuous sensibility. But it is the difference and relationship between Montauban and Julia which provides the dynamic of the novel.

Both Julia and her mother were angels. The mother was referred to as a meek angel while Julia herself was alternately labelled a guardian angel and a sweet angel. Just as her mother concentrated her attention on soothing the harshness of her husband's spleen, the daughter united the gentleness of her mother's disposition with the "warmth of her father's heart, and the strength of her father's understanding." Julia was a particularly beautiful woman, but her greatest attraction lay in her temperament. It was her complacency and sympathy, carefully cultivated by reason and education, which made her influence so extensive. "The music of Julia's tongue gives the throb of virtue to my heart," wrote a much impressed Montauban, "and lifts my soul to somewhat superhuman." She was a woman who, despite her intellectual superiority, was all tenderness and who derived her greatest happiness from making others happy. As such, she contrasted sharply with another minor
character in the novel, Madame de Sancerre, who terrorized the domestic peace with her sharp wit and pretensions to brilliance.\textsuperscript{108}

Montauban, on the other hand, was the stern man of honour. His rough virtue tended to eschew sociability and his harsh exterior alienated both Julia and others. Yet there was much in Montauban's character that was admirable, suggested Mackenzie. He was not a devotee of the fashionable world, \textit{detesting it from principle rather than ill-usage}.\textsuperscript{109} Unlike many absentee marquesses, Montauban had decided to live on his estate.\textsuperscript{110} Moreover, he was benevolent, from a deep sense of duty rather than natural feeling. Thus, he was admired, but not loved, by his neighbours and tenants. Anything but a rapacious landlord, he despised those who were \textit{devourers of land} and found "much less pleasure in being a master of acres, than a friend of men."\textsuperscript{111} Not surprisingly, this man of antique virtue expressed only qualified support for agricultural improvement. "I have set about trying some experiments in agriculture," he wrote, "I know that I shall lose by many of them; but it will not be lost to the public."\textsuperscript{112}

What Montauban lacked was sociability. Thus, if there were limits to his enthusiasm for agricultural improvement, he himself was very much in need of \textit{cultivation}. His contact with Julia, not surprisingly was the single most beneficial contribution to his emotional growth. She first taught this stiff knight to dance and thereafter to look somewhat more
kindly on his fellow man. As he grew in sensibility, his exterior rust was smoothed off. He became more closely in touch with his natural moral feelings as a result of his connection with the gentle Julia.

As conforms with Mackenzie's view of appropriate love, Montauban was particularly attracted to Julia's mind or temperament, which demonstrated the reality and function of female sentiment without any concomitant artifice or false refinement. The problem was, however, that while Julia admired Montauban and respected his good qualities, her affections were more closely connected with Savillon. These affections, on both sides, had grown slowly from youth and reflected a genuine compatibility of minds. It was only that thorny eighteenth century problem -- their difference in social station -- which prevented Savillon and Julia from marrying.

The issue became complicated when Julia's parents began to put inordinate pressure upon their daughter to marry Montauban. Although they ultimately did not force her affections, the tension between filial obligation and natural feeling was intense, contributing to a near fatal depression of Julia's spirits. Finally, a concatenation of events results in Julia's rational, rather than sentimental, decision to marry Montauban. This turns out to be Julia's only mistake. As Julia herself had pointed out in a letter to a friend, the most important requisite for marriage was genuine affection. Any attempt to win or feel affection after the fact was a very dangerous experiment.
Mackenzie's argument thus far into the novel was that, while the relationship between a complacent woman and a virtuous man was a highly beneficial one, especially in terms of the growth of the latter, it had to have its basis in real affection. Parents should not, nor should financial or other exigencies, enter unduly into the decision making process. Moreover, this genuine affection was something quite different from romantic abandon, and Montauban's affections were given over just a little bit too rapidly and his feelings were too warm to augur well for the future. The relationship between Julia and Savillon, on the other hand, had developed almost imperceptibly, until they both found themselves in sympathetic harmony. The latter, not the former, was the true love relationship.

Nonetheless, Montauban was a man of promise and Julia's complacency and respect seemed to indicate that the marriage might succeed. If their love was not as yet like that pulse in the soul which was shared by Julia and Savillon, it was slowly developing. In any case, the fact of the married state absolutely precluded any concentration on what might have been. Despite any harshness, inattention, or lack of proper affection on the husband's part, Mackenzie believed that the woman had to continue to be complacent and sympathetic. She had, like Fordyce's angels, to put her entire concentration into the happiness of her husband. Without this admittedly superhuman effort, all attempts at male emotional development and the rejuvenation of the moral community, would go for nought.
Julia was just such an angel.

Mackenzie did not simply present this role model and allow the reader to make her own evaluation. The moralist intruded upon the domain of the sentimental novelist, providing women with a list of their wifely duties. Julia's mother's instructions closely parallel the ones set forth in Fordyce's sermons and in the essays in the *Mirror* and *Lounger.* In order to carry out her wifely duties properly, a woman had to be all *sweetness of temper* and to cast aside any pretensions to *the brilliancy of wit.* Male pride should never be undermined and the wife should measure all her conduct in terms of pleasing her husband. Even the smallest trifles should not be overlooked in the endeavour to please, since it was little things that often won over the husband's affection. The wife also needed to practice this art of pleasing because it was the *prerogative of the husband* to expect to be pleased and the nature of the woman to do the pleasing. The question of power, argued Mackenzie under this persona, would never arise if the husband was never required to use it. Besides, a woman's role lay in supporting her husband's weakness, in teaching him to be at peace with himself, and reconciling him to the world. Because of this fundamental role, a woman should never complain about injustice from a husband, but only look for inadequacies in her own behaviour:

> the only government allowed on our side, is that of gentleness and attraction; and that its power, like the fabled influence of imaginary beings, must be invisible to be complete.

Thus, the real ethical power rested in the hands of the
complacent woman. Mackenzie concluded this lecture by warning his female readers never to talk to others about the faults of a husband. The sacredness and delicate cords of marriage would be broken forever "if third parties are made witness of its failings, or umpires of its disputes." In this way, the nuclear family was closed off from outside influence and criticism.

Julia took all of this advice to heart and, despite the appearance of an ardent Savillon, whom she had firmly believed to be married, did not break faith with her husband. Montauban, however, upon discovering the connection between Savillon and Julia, allowed a false and delusive sense of aristocratic honour to obsess him. His harshness, despite a struggle with his emerging moral sentiments, caused him to choose revenge as the only solution to his wounded ego. Like Othello, his character defect leads him to his own madness and the murder of Julia, who remains tender and affectionate even in the knowledge that she had been poisoned by her husband. The final scenes of the novel highlight Julia's angelic nature and contrast her sharply with the antic horror of Montauban:

she sat at the organ, her fingers pressing on the keys, and her look up-raised with enthusiastic rapture! -- the solemn sounds still ring in my ear! such as angels might play, when the sainted soul ascends to Heaven! In heaven alone, this female sacrifice of mistaken honour could find her harmony and peace.

Nor was the heavenly allusion gratuitous. Throughout the novel, Mackenzie emphasized the relationship between sentiment
and religion in ways that his Moderate clerical friends would have highly approved. Religion was critical in the case of women, he suggested, because it provided consolation and a reinforcement to virtuous feelings in a world that was inimical to virtue. This was not the religion of the enthusiast, but the mild and charitable religion of feeling. This same religion of feeling helped the virtuous woman to become her husband's true friend and conscience. Julia's mother, for example, "talks of the world as a scene where she is a spectator merely, in which there is something for virtue to praise, for charity to pardon; and smooths the spleen of her husband's observations by some palliative remark which experience has taught her." In much the same way, religion enabled the unfortunate Julia to deal with the calamities of life and to look for the reward for her virtue in an afterlife that conformed to the moral feelings.

Julia's fate was totally undeserved. Mackenzie increased pathos, realism, and spectatorial sympathy by painting a picture of virtue unrewarded except, of course, in heaven. It was also Savillon's -- the male Julia's -- fate to be doomed to unhappiness in a world and social structure that did not make the moral sentiments its guiding light. As the ideal male, if not a central character, in the novel, his reflections upon the nature and function of women were ones that Mackenzie wanted to impress upon his female readers. Whether or not there was a sex in the soul, Savillon like Mr. Mirror, did not pretend to know. Custom and education had established one, however,
and for a very good reason. They set limits on the extent of female learning and knowledge in order to emphasize feminine softness and retirement, something which men all too often lacked. Furthermore, they resulted in a difference in manners which could only facilitate the moral development of the male sex:

There is a little world of sentiment made for women to move in, where they certainly excell our sex, and where our sex, perhaps, ought to be excelled by them.  

While women's manners might be the product of environment as well as nature, they were no less necessary for that complimentary division of virtue which could enable men, especially, to deal with the new world.

As an exemplary man of feeling, Savillon's story is of some interest in that it returns us to Mackenzie's moral starting point -- his assessment of luxury, the social structure, and the role that feeling could play in a corrupt state. Not from a noble family, Savillon was, however, raised in an artistocratic household and had great nobleness of mind. He eventually completed university and went to Martinique in order to work under a merchant uncle. The uncle, a man of considerable industry and good nature, but no cultivated sensibility, put the young man to work in his plantations. Rather than perform the role of tyrannic feudal overlord, the young Savillon freed the negro slaves under him and allowed them to work under more humane conditions. To this colonial empire, he brought the values of humanity and helped, at the same time, to increase his uncle's fortune. Upon the
old man's death, the estate went to his nephew, who planned to use the money to restore Julia's father to his ancient ancestral estate, to marry Julia, and to perform the function of a benevolent landlord in his native country. The acquisition of wealth per se was of little interest to him. But, if that same wealth, honestly and humanely gained, were properly used, it was quite a different matter. He wrote to his friend:

our philosophy is false; power and wealth are the choicest gifts of Heaven; to possess them indeed, is nothing, but thus to use them, is rapture.\(^{127}\)

Martinique might just as well have been the East Indies, and the French man of feeling a well bred Scotsman, perhaps the younger son of a landed family, without any fortune to sustain him. For Mackenzie, foreign wealth had to be obtained and used properly if social corruption was not to be a foregone conclusion. This could only happen if landed society became men of feeling or if men of feeling became the owners of estates. Education, or the cultivation of the sentiments, could play a key part in this process, as could the cult of domesticity and a greater emphasis upon the roles of wife and mother. In *Julia de Roubigne*, none of this happened. Mackenzie did not adopt the artificial and unrealistic solution of *The Man of the World*. Savillon did not marry his Julia, and their joint benevolence did not make the French countryside shine. Savillon returned to Martinique in sorrow, while Julia went to another world in which sentiment and happiness were more compatible.
Concluding Remarks

Mackenzie, of course, was not the only so-called sentimental writer in eighteenth-century Britain. In particular, his admiration for and debt to Samuel Richardson have been touched upon in these and other chapters. If the admiration was genuine, however, the actual borrowings were primarily technical and superficial. To be sure, both authors were concerned to illuminate the importance of the human emotions and particularly the sentiment of love. Nowhere in Richardson's novels, however, is elevated an emotion or temperament which approximates that of Mackenzie's gentle sensibility. The earthy pastoralism of Pamela is undoubtedly supportive of a certain kind of sociability and the domestic scene but has little in common with the more refined sentiment that is so critical to the characterization of a Lucy Sindall or Julia de Roubigné.\textsuperscript{128} The temperament of Clarissa, it might be argued, is much more sophisticated. Like Harley, Clarissa is an ideal type, unfit for a cruel and deceitful world. But her stark individualism and spirituality, at once heroic and romantic, clearly lack that softness, tenderness and complacency which Mackenzie wanted to inculcate in his own works. Sir Charles Grandison, Richardson's exemplar of modern masculine virtue, contrasts quite sharply with Mackenzie's Harley or Savillon. Grandison is, as one literary scholar has suggested, a static character whose ethical behavior derives
from the public domain and who faces no inner conflict. His benevolence is a series of textbook events rather than the product of feeling. 

It was Mackenzie's chief contribution to British literature, not only to present a detailed account of the workings of gentle sensibility in small scale and domestic interaction, but also to be the first to present a male role model who embodied characteristics which would have been regarded by readers as explicitly female. By advocating a gentle or controlled and sophisticated sensibility in all of his novels, he attempted to milk female feeling to the extent that it could both stimulate and moderate traditionally masculine definitions of virtue. As the composer of Verses to the Author of the Man of Feeling put it:

Whilst other writers, with pernicious art
Corrupt the morals, and seduce the heart,
Raise lawless passions, loose desires infuse,
And boast their knowledge gathered from the stews --
Be thine the task of such wishes to control,
To touch the gentler movements of the soul;
To bid the breast with gen'rous ardours glow,
To teach the tear of sympathy to flow.

Mackenzie was not simply an advocate of feeling. Nor was he the first to highlight the emotional nature of women. He was a practical philosopher of the moral sentiments whose concept of gentle sensibility illuminated explicitly social, as opposed to individual, feelings and whose doctrine of sympathy was integral to the continuity of the moral community. What is more, Mackenzie was first and foremost a moralist rather than a novelist. He was remarkably explicit, both inside and outside his novels, as to the moral uses of the novel for teaching the
Mackenzie published no further novels after *Julia de Roubigné*. Instead, he devoted his considerable energies to a myriad of other tasks, including the *Mirror* and *Lounger*, multifarious activities in the Highland Society, and less visible but equally significant political activities. But it was his move from the novel to the moral periodical that has puzzled many literary scholars who have sought to discover the rationale behind it. Without wishing to add unnecessary fuel to the heated debate on this subject, it may be helpful to point out a few salient facts before making some tentative observations. In the first place, it is interesting to note that Mackenzie claimed that he nearly did not publish *Julia de Roubigné* because, in his opinion, it was not good enough to lay *before the world*. He remarked that the work owed its existence to one or two female Critics who were apparently sufficiently enthusiastic to twist Mackenzie's arm on the subject. While all of this may well be taken with a grain of salt, it does suggest that Mackenzie might have stopped publishing even earlier and that his commitment to the genre was not as great as some of its twentieth century exponents might wish.

Even more interesting, however, there is some hard evidence which suggests that Mackenzie did begin work on another novel. In the National Library of Scotland, there is some manuscript material of Mackenzie's which was the basis of an epistolary novel. Its central character was an English
student who had come to study at Edinburgh University and its primary subject matter was Scottish life and letters. The letters begin with a comparison of English and Scottish universities, much to the favour of the latter. They describe a debating club at Edinburgh University in which the protagonist advocates religious tolerance while dishing out some harsh criticism to a Humean sceptic. The hospitality and sense of community in Edinburgh is dealt with in another letter, which was clearly meant to be a counter to Edward Topham's *Letters from Edinburgh* (1776). There are other letters which refer to the lawyers of Edinburgh, Lord Kames, and the heated controversy over the number of judges in the Court of Session. Finally, there is a revealing epistle highlighting the role of the Edinburgh literati as a self-conscious *Republic of Letters* which retained its cohesion and integrity in order to perform its social role.

That Mackenzie never completed this novel, is a historical tragedy of the first degree. It could have told us a great deal about the self-concept of Scottish literary society during the late eighteenth century. Be that as it may, this manuscript material indicates that Mackenzie did not necessarily reject the novel in order to write moral essays in the tradition of the *Spectator*. The fascination with this supposed shift, in any case, is misplaced. It shows a lack of appreciation for the novelist cum moralist at work in such extended essays as *La Roche, Father Nicholas*, and *Louisa Veroni*. Given the deliberately episodic and fragmented nature
of Mackenzie's own novels, it really is difficult to see a clear rationale for strictly separating the two forms.

Moreover, any preoccupation with this shift rests on an assumption that Mackenzie and his friends would have rejected. That assumption is that the novel is the most progressive form of literature and that a move away from this same genre indicates backward thinking and an undue adherence to the status quo. While Mackenzie understood the power of the novel as an intimate and realistic form of literature, he regarded these characteristics as subservient to its potential as a moral tool. His and the Mirror Club's ethical concerns dictated their interest in the novel, not any appreciation of egoistic individualism or the mimetic principle. It should also be remembered that Mackenzie and the Mirror Club were never uncritical commentators on the novel. While they appreciated its uses, they echoed the advice of James Fordyce to young women when he wrote that, apart from the beautiful productions of Richardson, "there seem to me to be very few, in the style of the novel, that you can read with safety, and yet answer that you can read with advantage." Mackenzie attempted to provide a few novels that the young could not only read with advantage, but could return to again and again in order to stimulate their sensibility without endangering their morals.
CHAPTER SEVEN

THEORY AND DISCOURSE: THE SIXTH EDITION OF THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS

As I consider my tenure of this life as extremely precarious, and am very uncertain whether I shall live to finish several other works which I have projected and in which I have made some progress, the best thing, I think, I can do is to leave those I have already published in the best and most perfect state behind me. (Adam Smith to Thomas Cadell, March 15, 1788)

It is worthy of note that Adam Smith spent the last years of his life revising The Theory of Moral Sentiments. He did not, as one might have expected, further refine and update his economic analyses in The Wealth of Nations but returned to those ethical concerns which first brought him into the public eye and established his reputation as a philosopher. At the very least, what Smith's extensive reworking of his moral theory indicates is that he continued to regard his ethical writing as a significant contribution to posterity. As such, he might have been very surprised by the virtually complete eclipse of his moral by his economic writings in the thought of the generations that followed. In addition, Smith's return to The Theory of Moral Sentiments suggests that ethical, rather than economic, concerns were uppermost in his mind during the closing years of his life.

As we have seen, late eighteenth century Scottish cultural life in general was characterized by its preoccupation with
moral issues. The Mirror Club and the Moderate Clergy of the Church of Scotland were concerned to prevent the disintegration of the moral community. Like CIVIS and other writers in the Scottish press, they mined sentiment in the interest of virtue and advocated that mild philosophic composure which resulted from melancholy. In this way, they advocated the stimulation of those sentiments which concerned the individual in the sorrows of others. Only such an extension of native fellow feeling, they believed, could ensure the bonds of the national community.

For Adam Smith, such an ethical programme was at once unnatural and unrealistic. Human beings were not capable of any great extension of humanity towards others. The achievement of a state of sympathy, therefore, depended much more upon self-command than it did upon gentle sensibility. The moral community itself was dependent upon justice rather than benevolence for its continued existence. Despite this major difference, however, Smith had much in common with the aforementioned practical moralists of late eighteenth century Scotland. They all started from a similar initial premise — that morality had its basis in human fellow feeling rather than abstract reason. They all focused upon the significance of face-to-face interaction in small groups and affirmed the normative functions of community. In their treatment of a precisely honed gentle sensibility, practical Scottish moralists were well aware of the moderating function of self-control. They did not want to push sensibility so far
that it resulted in an undifferentiating empathy or an anti-social misanthropy. For his part, in the final edition of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Adam Smith conceded that a *moderated sensibility to the misfortunes of others* and an *affective melancholy* might be of some social benefit. Nor was this an insignificant gesture from the man who had earlier expressed nothing but contempt for those *whining moralists* who sought to extend men's benevolent emotions towards their fellows.²

The pages that follow suggest that Smith was influenced in much more significant ways by the the practical moral discourse of his fellow *literati*. This influence became embodied in the final edition of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* as a much fuller discussion of the nature of virtue, a re-affirmation of the critical importance of stoic self-command, and, most important, a clearer delineation of the concept of the *impartial spectator*. The latter concept was a long time in its genesis. In the first edition of his work (1759), Smith refused to accept any other standard of propriety than that of actual spectators in the real world. It was only in the second edition of 1761 that Smith hesitantly suggested that there could be yet another tribunal of conduct apart from that of spectators in everyday life. Responding to the criticism of Gilbert Elliot of Minto that conscience sometimes dictated actions which diverged from accepted public opinion, Smith suggested that men "call upon a Superior tribunal established in their own minds" in order to correct a *weak or impartial*
public arena. But Smith adamantly refused to completely divorce propriety of action from public opinion at that time. It was only in the sixth and final edition, long after the work had been received and digested in Edinburgh moral and intellectual circles, that Smith expanded upon the brilliant device of the *impartial spectator*, which resulted from the individual’s internalization and concomitant subjectivication of social norms.

This chapter will focus upon this and other significant additions which Smith made to the 1790 edition of his work; an edition, it is interesting to note, upon which he claimed to "have been labouring very hard" in one of his letters to his publisher, Thomas Cadell. As important as some of these changes may have been in terms of their intellectual sophistication, however, it is necessary to bear in mind that they had little, if any, bearing upon the development of moral discourse in Scottish cultural circles. By the time Smith had completed the draft of his sixth edition, moralists such as Hugh Blair and Henry Mackenzie had charted their own less systematic course into sentimental Stoicism and the literature of sentiment respectively. Smith’s development of the concept of the *impartial spectator* and his clarification of the precise relationship between human sensibility and its culmination in either *self-command* or *humanity* came too late in the day to influence their thinking on ethical subjects. But Smith’s re-working of the content of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* certainly brought into relief many of the same issues and
concerns that were central in their works. These included a growing distrust of public opinion or the world, a preoccupation with the corrupting influence of wealth and fashion upon the moral sentiments, and a renewed interest in the benevolent side of human sensibility. It is for precisely these reasons that Smith’s revisions to *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* need to be located within the context of the more general discussion of morality within polite Edinburgh circles. In particular, it will be argued that one of Smith’s most significant intellectual contributions to ethical theory -- the concept of the impartial spectator -- can be fully understood only with reference to this same socio-cultural environment.

In the first edition of his work, Smith stressed the crucial importance of the cool and impartial spectator in the assessment of the propriety of a given sentiment or action. By this, he meant that public opinion was the sole criterion for measuring the decency or indecency, the merit or demerit, and the degree of virtue attached thereto. Admittedly, it was a particular kind of public opinion that Smith had in mind. In the first place, it was informed; it was aware of the whole complex of circumstances within which a specific sentiment or action was expressed. Second, it was impartial; it was neither the prejudiced opinion of nearest relations nor that of most intimate friends. Finally, it was the opinion of men who were educated in the middle and inferior ranks of life rather than those men of fashion who are born into high stations and who considered themselves exempt from the opinions of the general
community. But, given these fundamental qualifications, Smith appeared to have every confidence in the moral mechanism of public opinion. His model was one of a harmonious and self-regulating human community in which public opinion played the dominant normative function. Even such anomalies as custom, fortune and the disposition to admire the rich and great did not appear to Smith to be sufficiently problematic to bring this optimistic model into question. They were merely aberrations whose function in the grand scheme of things could be readily understood. As Smith remarked in his discussion of custom: "All these effects of custom and fashion, however, upon the moral sentiments of mankind, are inconsiderable...and it is not concerning the general style of character and behaviour, that those principles produce the greatest perversion of judgement."  

By the second edition of 1761, however, Smith had already begun to alter his stance. As D.D. Raphael points out in his article The Impartial Spectator, it was in the second edition that Smith made public the concept of a tribunal within the breast, the abstract man, the representative of mankind, which acted as the supreme judge of men's sentiments. Smith led up to this novel concept by discussing one of his favorite topics -- the moral development of the child. He pointed out that although the first response of the uninitiated was to strive to accommodate his behaviour to suit those around him, this accommodation became progressively difficult as he came into contact with different types of people pursuing diverse goals.
In order to avoid the difficulties inherent in such a situation, Smith argued, we soon learned "to set up in our own minds a judge between ourselves and those we live with. We conceive of ourselves as acting in the presence of a person quite candid and equitable, of one who has no particular relation either to ourselves, or to those whose interests are affected by our conduct...an impartial spectator who considers our conduct with the same indifference with which we regard that of other people."

Even at this early stage of the concept's development, Smith's discussion of the supposed impartial spectator asserted the superiority of the individual's imagination over and above actual social reality. In other words, it posited a supposed spectator in place of a real one. Furthermore, the concept of the impartial spectator was linked to and, in fact, reinforced the function of self-command. The child or weak man, for example, could only control his feelings in accordance with the opinion of actual spectators in the world; he was necessarily the slave of the world. The man of firmness, on the other hand, could control himself in virtually any situation, by referring his sentiments and actions to the judgment of "this supreme arbiter of his conduct."

Smith had developed the concept of an impartial spectator as a direct result of the criticism of a fellow member of the Scottish literati -- Gilbert Elliot of Minto. Elliot had criticized Smith on the grounds that public opinion could sometimes be absent, ill-informed, partial or divided. But
Smith was clearly not very comfortable with the concept at this early stage, and notwithstanding the fact that he posited it as the highest court of ethical appeal, he was extremely reluctant to set it apart from public opinion proper. "Its jurisdiction," he wrote, "is in great measure derived from the authority of that very tribunal, whose decisions it so often and so justly reverses." The reference point was still that of real, rather than ideal, spectators. And the man within the breast was an amalgam of the men without.

As V. Hope has pointed out, the development of Smith's moral theory was characterized by an uneasy shift from the man without to the man within. Whereas Smith still strove to retain the link between public opinion and the man within the breast in his very brief discussion of the impartial spectator in the second edition, he was much more willing to cut the conceptual umbilical cord by the time he came to make his major revisions in the sixth edition. By this time, Smith had become "even more sceptical of popular opinion and replaced the passage just quoted with the statement that the jurisdiction of those two tribunals are founded upon principles which, though in some respects resembling and akin, are however, in reality different and distinct." It is worth our while to stop and consider exactly what Smith was saying here. This was a fundamental change of direction on his part and cannot be dismissed as confused or cryptic writing. For, it was also in the sixth edition that Smith began to make a sharp distinction between man's need for public praise and his desire for
praise-worthiness. The love of praise-worthiness, he claimed in one passage, "is by no means derived altogether from the love of praise. Those two principles, though they resemble one another, though they are connected, and often blended with one another, are yet, in many respects, distinct and independent of one another." 14

Thus, from his earlier view of conscience as a mirror of communal attitudes, Smith had moved to a much more subtle and complex understanding of the individual's internalization of social norms. In place of a morality which was a reflection of an objective reality, Smith had now substituted a morality whose ultimate legitimization was subjective. And, as Raphael rightly points out, this conceptual advance, in conjunction with his treatment of imaginative sympathy, was a major contribution to empirical ethics. 15 Indeed, in terms of sheer explanatory power, Smith's discussion of the impartial spectator can be said to rival many modern and better known psychological and sociological accounts of morality. The intellectual merits of Smith's account is perhaps most clearly evidenced in the recent philosophical discussions of authors such as V. Hope, George Morice and Knud Haakonssen. 16 For all of these writers, Smith made a major contribution to ethical discourse by showing how sociableness and the mutuality of sympathy ultimately led men to construct a moral code which transcended their immediate social environment. Haakonssen, in particular, claims that Smith provided an empirical basis for moral laws.
Smith's development of the concept of the impartial spectator, while fascinating in and of itself, raises quite different questions for the cultural historian than it does for the student of ideas. The questions to which a cultural historian immediately addresses himself are these: why did Smith gradually, and with no small difficulty, abandon his conception of a harmonious society in which public opinion was infallible as a general guide to conduct? What socio-cultural perceptions could have caused him to so alter his original stance? As we have seen in the case of Gilbert Elliot of Minto, Smith was far from being immune to the criticisms and concerns of his fellow Scottish literati. By the late eighteenth century, this same tight-knit community had begun to express serious reservations about the integrity of the moral community and to suggest that its moral sentiments were rapidly being corrupted by the increase of luxury and social mobility. In their eyes, the public arena and its values had become highly suspect; the public opinion of an increasingly fashionable world was anything but an ideal moral looking glass. If this was the general perception of the Scottish literati, whose give and take may have been Smith's primary model of social interaction for The Theory of Moral Sentiments, then it would be unusual if Smith himself remained entirely uninfluenced by it.

Other explanations of Smith's change of intellectual direction have been advanced, however, and these need to be taken into account. In his article Moral Philosophy and Civil
Society, Hiroshi Mizuta suggests three social facts which are chiefly responsible for Smith’s change of direction. None of these facts have anything to do with Smith’s membership in the Scottish literati or his exchange of ideas with individuals such as Gilbert Elliot. The reasons that Mizuta stresses are more cosmopolitan in nature: Smith’s recognition of class antagonism as a result of his research for *The Wealth of Nations*; the French Revolution, which began while Smith was revising the all important sixth edition; and the Calas case in France, wherein public opinion sent a just man to his execution. Of these, the last is much more plausible than the first two. The Calas case had a profound effect upon many intellectuals, including Smith, who went so far as to single out the incident for attention in the final edition of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. However, this same discussion concentrates less upon the falliability of public opinion than it does upon the horror of an individual who has been incorrectly judged by his community. Indeed, it underlines the importance of public favour to moral formation by illuminating the individual alienation which results from its withdrawal. Smith’s own use of the Calas case, therefore, does not really support Mizuta’s claim.

The second fact, the French Revolution, had not yet manifested its more negative side in 1789, when Smith was working on his sixth edition. The Edinburgh literati generally adopted a wait and see attitude towards the proceedings, and they were visibly impressed by the public spiritedness of
Necker's budgetary measures and the aristocracy's generous response. It is true, however, that Smith foreshadowed later criticisms of the French Revolution in his concern about the effects of such dramatic change upon the moral sentiments of the French community. But in those passages wherein he most clearly had the French Revolution in mind, Smith did not decry the supposed inaccuracies of popular opinion. Quite the contrary; he condemned the conceit of those men of system who were interfering with both natural and traditional communal sympathies.

Mizuta's claim that, by 1789, Smith had recognized the peculiar characteristics of the middle class as a result of his investigations into economic life, and begun to turn his back on the vulgar multitude of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, may appeal to those who search for intellectual symbols of class conflict. And, it may very well be the case that Smith was becoming more aware of the possible antagonisms between the various sectors of society that could result from economic advancement. However, the argument that Smith had become the spokesman for the dynamic middle class by 1789 must be seriously qualified. Leaving aside Mizuta's rather limiting and anachronistic use of terms like the middle classes, Smith's treatment of sensibility and sympathy suggests that he never really had the vulgar multitude in mind in the first place. His discussion of imaginative sympathy, impartial spectators, and self-control, as Nicholas Phillipson and others have convincingly argued, implied the fundamentally middling world
of the gentry, literary clubs, Scottish clergymen, improving societies and business associates. Indeed, if one is looking for a heightened awareness of the class issue in the mature Smith, it is just as plausible to argue that he became more, not less, wary of the motives and behaviour of those engaged in specifically economic transactions and sought ways to protect the vulgar multitude from their self interested behaviour.

An important textual clue which has been almost completely overlooked in the discussion of this problem, however, is that of a completely new account of the corruption of moral sentiments which Smith added to the very first section of Part I of the sixth edition. In the first edition, Smith regarded the only serious threat to the self-regulating world of public opinion as moral casuistry and its crude stepsister religious fanaticism. "False notions of religion," he wrote, echoing his Moderate friends, "are almost the only causes which can occasion any very gross perversion of our natural sentiments in this way. But, in the sixth edition, there is a new villain -- the disposition to admire the rich and great. Although Smith continued to regard this propensity as a perfectly natural phenomenon, and one which contributed mightily to the preservation of the social order, by 1789 he was now prepared to label it "at the same time, the great and most universal cause of the corruption of our moral sentiments." Smith had shifted the focus of his concern. Whereas in the early editions his obvious target had been those doctrinaire clerics who manipulated men's sense of religious duty (as is evidenced,
for example, in his excessive praise for Voltaire's *Mahomet*), his main worry in the final edition was the excessive ambition of the middling ranks in social life.

Mizuta suggests that it is in precisely this same chapter (I.iii.3) that Smith defined the middle class basis of his social model by contrasting the *considerable degree of virtue* in the *men of inferior and middling stations of life* with the *flattery and falsehood of the superior stations of life.* Mizuta has overlooked the fact that Smith had already made this fairly common moral distinction in the preceding chapter, which was included in the very first edition (I.iii.2.5). What is really new in the chapter on the corruption of moral sentiments is Smith's criticism of many of those *candidates for fortune* in those same middling stations who "too frequently abandon the paths of virtue." In terms that are reminiscent of many of the sermons and periodical essays of the day, Smith suggested that such applicants for greatness were "always most miserably disappointed in the happiness which they expect to enjoy in it." He made his moral concerns even clearer by claiming that the excessively ambitious man tends to "assume the equipage and splendid way of living of his social superiors without considering whatever may be praiseworthy in any of these." And, finally, he cautioned such individuals that they would not only lose their moral integrity but also be *reduced to beggary* by their new style of living. What is fascinating about such discussions is just how closely they parallel the sermons of Moderate preachers, such as Hugh
Blair's *On the Importance of Order in Conduct* and Samuel Charters' *Owe No Man Anything* which attacked the increase of imaginary wants among Scotland's gentry and men of business and the increase in bankruptcies as a result of the desire to imitate the fashionable manners of the rich. Similarly, Henry Mackenzie's *Mirror Club* and essayists such as *Old Squaretoes* in the *Caledonian Mercury* urged the middling ranks to eschew excessive luxury, maintain their prudent behaviour, and remain within their allotted social stations.  

Smith also related the corruption of the moral sentiments with the disposition to admire the rich and successful in the newly added Part VI -- *Of the Character of Virtue*. He began this discussion by pointing out that there were two different standards whereby the individual could measure his conduct:

The one is the idea of exact propriety and perfection, so far as we are each of us capable of comprehending the idea. The other is that degree of approximation to this idea which is commonly attained in the world.

In social practice, Smith argued, individuals tended to judge themselves by both standards, principally the latter. Unfortunately, he continued, this latter tribunal could all too often be imposed upon others by men of excessive self-admiration. These individuals, who often lacked the temperate coolness and self-command which Smith regarded as the sine qua non of moral behaviour, nevertheless often achieved "great success in the world, great authority over the sentiments and opinions of mankind."
this world, it would not have unduly concerned Smith. His model of the moral community was in no way dependent upon those ranks of men whose luxurious manners and inflated egos were the reflection of their own feelings of superiority and who necessarily lacked the industry, prudence, modesty and respect for others which he admired. However, the problem was that excessive ambition and rash egotism were no longer the prerogative of the upper classes:

In the humble projects of private life, as well as in the ambitious and proud pursuits of high stations, great abilities and successful enterprise, in the beginning, have frequently encouraged to undertakings which necessarily led to bankruptcy and ruin in the end.  

Smith went on to criticize the vain man of private station who sought to court public opinion, not by treading the orderly path of true virtue, but by imitating the manners of those above him. This individual, seeing the respect which is paid to rank and fortune, wished "to usurp this respect, as well as that for talents and virtues." His dress became flamboyant, denoting a higher social station and fortune than he possessed. His expenses increased exponentially, often resulting in bankruptcy. Such behaviour, Smith added, was especially common among those who "from a remote province, come to visit, for a short time, the capital of their own country."

Smith himself suggested that such behaviour had been the complaint of moralists in all ages. But we should always be wary of viewing Smith in the simple role of a traditional moralist. The fact of the matter is that Smith was now quite worried about the ambition of the middling ranks of British
society, something which had not caused him any undue concern before. Whereas altruism and self-interest were naturally directed by sociability towards the point of propriety in Smith's earlier view of a harmonious moral community, we now witness a growing concern on Smith's part that the middling ranks were becoming as vain and selfish as their social superiors. Instead of providing the moral backbone of the community, the middling ranks were beginning to hasten its disintegration.

Smith's increasing preoccupation with moral corruption through vanity and ambition resulted in a changed perception of the nature and constituency of the moral community. No longer did Smith, as he had done in the past, treat of the middling ranks as a uniform or cohesive force, exempt from the folly and ostentation of the rich or powerful. He now divided them into such categories as: the vain, the proud and the prudent. Only the prudent man was the proper model for moral behaviour. The vain man was far too eager to court public opinion. Thus, he was a usurper of a social respect that he did not deserve and tended to be an artful deceiver. The proud man put himself apart from society and, although less harmful to communal sentiments than the vain man, was incapable of self-improvement. The prudent man fell somewhere between these extremes. Although he paid regard to the sentiments of others, he relied ultimately upon the great inmate of the breast to direct his conduct.

This increasing suspicion of the public arena and its
opinion, therefore, stemmed from a realization that there was more than one standard to which it was attuned. On the one hand, public opinion represented those shared ethical values which had been arrived at by the complex process of accommodation within a social group. At the same time, public opinion could also reflect the propensity of individuals to arrive at a state of sympathy with the rich and powerful. According to the Smith of the sixth edition, it was this same irregularity of sentiment that could lead public opinion astray:

We desire both to be respectable and to be respected. We dread both to be contemptible and to be contemned. But upon coming into the world, we soon find that wisdom and virtue are by no means the sole objects of respect; nor vice and folly of contempt...Two different models, two different pictures, are held out to us, according to which we may fashion our own character and behaviour; the one more gaudy and glittering in its colouring; the other more correct and exquisitely beautiful in its outline; the one forcing itself upon the notice of every wandering eye; the other, attracting the attention of scarce any body but the most studious and careful observer. They are the wise and virtuous chiefly, a select, though, I am afraid, but a small party, who are the real and steady admirers of wisdom and virtue. The great mob of mankind are the admirers and worshipers, and what may seem more extraordinary, most frequently the disinterested admirers and worshipers, of wealth and greatness. 39

Smith had moved a long way -- from an optimistic faith in a self-contained moral community to the elevation of the virtuous few.

The snake in Smith’s garden of Eden was the "disposition of mankind, to go along with all the passions of the rich and
powerful.**40 In 1759, he clearly did not regard this disposition as an anomaly which could falsify his model of ethical judgement. Why then did he come to view this necessary and natural disposition as such a threat in 1789? Smith had clearly become more sceptical about the ability of the *middling and inferior classes* to lead lives of *tolerable decency*. But nowhere in his *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* does he tell us why he came so firmly to this conclusion by the late century. If the historian is to answer this question in full, he must look outside the text itself and into the general moral discourse within which Smith and other Scotish moralists were writing. For Smith was not the only member of the Scottish *literati* to evidence concern about the corruption of moral sentiments as a result of the tendency of individuals in the *middling and inferior stations of life* to put public praise above praiseworthiness during the second half of the eighteenth century. While Smith did not, like Henry Mackenzie’s *Mirror Club* or the Moderate clergy of the Church of Scotland, adopt the traditional discourses of civic humanism and Stoicism to describe the changes taking place in British society, he shared their conviction that men of middling station were straying from the path of sober virtue in an attempt to ape the manners of their superiors.**41 As we have seen, the letters to the Edinburgh papers between 1770 and 1790 evidence a concern with this same development. To cite another example, *MONITOR* wrote to the *Caledonian Mercury* in 1786 deploring the breakdown in social bonds which necessitated a *poors’ rate*: 
The bad example of the higher orders has an influence upon the inferior ranks. The opulent farmer imitates the indecency and irreligion of his master. Vice sends out its springs from the great, which, as they descend to the inferior orders of men, gather into a strong torrent, that, by its violence, threatens to break down every fence raised for the safety and prosperity of society. In vain the virtues of justice, of temperance, of chastity, of charity are recommended.  

There was a general consensus among educated and polite Scotsmen that the moral community was now being threatened, not only from without, but from within. Sociability and humanity were being replaced by artificial politeness and disguised self-interest.

The solution of the majority of Scottish moralists was the manipulation of inherent sociability in order to extend men's sympathy towards their fellows. They put their hopes for communal salvation upon an increase in social benevolence, extending downwards from the highest ranks in Scottish society. Smith moved in a quite different direction. In addition to developing the concept of the impartial spectator in the final edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith also clarified his earlier discussion of self-command and found himself drawing closer and closer to the Stoics in his stress upon the individual's ability to achieve an inner consistency despite all external pressure. Moreover, he further delineated the ethical principles -- especially that of superior prudence as "the utmost perfection of the intellectual and of all the moral virtues" -- which were arguably implicit in his earlier discussions of propriety. Unlike the concept of the
impartial spectator, none of these additions may have constituted a major theoretical change, although the new emphasis upon superior prudence does occasionally contrast somewhat with Smith's earlier vision of worldly wisdom. Be that as it may, their examination does provide the cultural historian with some clues as to the kind of peer criticism with which Smith now felt that he had to deal. This is particularly the case in Smith's fuller treatment of the relationship between sensibility, humanity, and self-command in parts III and VI.

The additions to Part III -- Of the Foundations of our own Sentiments and Conduct, and of the Sense of Duty -- were significant because therein Smith more carefully defined sensibility. His earlier use of the term sensibility was not always analytically precise and he sometimes used the term as a substitute for humanity. In these same earlier editions, moreover, Smith made it abundantly clear that he regarded humanity not only as a relatively weak variable in typical face-to-face sympathetic equations, but also as something of a womanish quality. This left Smith open to the objection that he was in fact countenancing an ethic of stoic insensitivity towards others. Such an impression might have been further reinforced by the passages in Part III directly preceeding the additions of the sixth edition (III.3.9). For it was here that Smith berated those melancholy moralists who sought to increase man's sensibility to the misfortunes of other men. Such individuals, Smith claimed, only succeeded to "damp the
pleasures of the fortunate, and to render a melancholy
dejection habitual to all men."\(^45\)

In the new passages, Smith clarified a position that must
have been challenged by those sentimental moralists -- his
friends among the Moderate clergy, moral philosophers such as
James Beattie, and the likes of Henry Mackenzie's *Mirror Club.*
After all, one of his closest friends, John Drysdale, was
pushing *benevolence* in every other sermon.\(^46\) It is difficult
to believe that Smith was not responding to the writings and
comments of his fellow literati when he refined his use of the
term *sensibility.* He began by pointing out that an
*extraordinary sensibility* to the misfortunes of our *nearest
connections* was perfectly natural. In such forms of social
bonding, *stoical apathy* or *hard insensitivity* were never
agreeable to the disinterested spectator.\(^47\) In quite
uncharacteristic fashion, he even conceded that a certain
amount of sensibility to the pain of other individuals was no
bad thing. "That moderated sensibility to the misfortunes of
others," he wrote, "which does not disqualify us for the
performance of any duty; the melancholy and affectionate
remembrance of our departed friends; the pang, as Grey says, to
*secret sorrow dear*; are by no means undelicious sensations."\(^48\)
Thus, Smith appeared to have approved of that very sensibility
which other Scottish moralists had made the linchpin of their
programme for social regeneration.

But Smith was not to be won over so easily. He pointed out
that moral theory must make a clear distinction between our
sensibility to the misfortunes of others and our sensibility to those of our own. While the real or supposed spectator of our conduct might approve of the former, he would typically condemn the latter. Bearing in mind Smith's assessment of sympathy as being dependent to a high degree upon the toning down of feelings to the extent that an impartial spectator could go along with them, Smith's distinction made the sort of sensibility described above largely irrelevant to moral construction and the harmonious functioning of the ethical community. Having neatly neutralized the criticisms of his literary peers, Smith quickly returned to more familiar territory by citing the case of the young child who had absolutely no command of his own feelings. The only passion which it learned to control while under the custody of its partial protectors, he argued, was that of anger. But, when it was old enough to go to school, the child met with no such partial indulgence. It had to moderate its feelings "to the degree which its play fellows and companions are likely to be pleased with." Thus began that lengthy discipline in the school of self-command "which the practice of the longest life is seldom sufficient to bring to complete perfection."

After elaborating on the way in which the individual who was well schooled in self-command, rather than tender sensibility, came to identify himself with the impartial spectator so as to achieve a stoic-like tranquillity in the face of all the miseries and disorders of human life, Smith summed up the relationship between sensibility and self-command
as follows. "Our sensibility to the feelings of others," he wrote:

so far from being inconsistent with the manhood of self-command, is the very principle upon which that manhood is founded. The very same principle or instinct which, in the misfortune of our neighbour, prompts us to compassionate his sorrow; in our own misfortune, prompts us to restrain the abject and miserable lamentations of our own sorrow...In both cases, the propriety of our own sentiments and feelings seems to be exactly in proportion to the vivacity and force with which we enter into and conceive his sentiments and feelings.

Thus, Smith more rigorously defined sensibility as the capacity of the individual to respond to any emotional stimuli whatsoever or, what amounts to the same thing, the propensity of the individual to seek a state of sympathetic harmony. It was this same capacity which led the individual to pursue two distinct sets of activities — to tone down his own sentiments and to enter into the sentiments of others.

What is interesting about Smith's discussion of the relationship between sensibility and self-command is less what he says than what he does not say. His primary purpose was to demonstrate that his model, far from being incompatible with human sensibility, hinged directly upon it. At the same time, he allowed that his model was not incompatible with a certain amount of exquisite sensibility or humanity. But his treatment of the latter quality was brief and grudging to say the least. Despite his acceptance that human sensibility could lead to either self-command or humanity, he did not seem to think that very many men were capable of achieving this attribute. Nor was he interested in exhorting them to cultivate such a whining
and womanly quality. It was not humanity but self-control that Smith was primarily interested in.

Smith's stress upon self-command was brought into sharp relief in Part VI. This section of the work has rightly interested both historians and philosophers because it is precisely here that Smith came closest to replacing the traditional conception of virtue with that notion of worldly prudence which conformed most directly to the realities of a modern commercial state. It was also in this same chapter that Smith pushed his emphasis upon self-command to its most radical conclusions. Not only did he want to claim that the point of propriety in the face-to-face situation was almost entirely determined by the self-command of the individual primarily concerned, but also, he went on to argue that, without self-command, behaviour lost most of its moral quality.

His desire to elevate the attribute of self-command was evident even from the opening passages of Part VI, wherein he praised the regularity and steadiness of the selfish but prudent man and contrasted such an individual favourably with men of exquisite sensibility or more splendid talents. He made this emphasis even more clear in the following sections, which dealt with the relationship between individual sensibility and the nature and function of the social bond. Smith, of course, had already treated of this relationship in the earlier editions. However, in Part VI he discussed the workings of sensibility with regard to two social units which he had overlooked before -- the family and the kinship network.
as exemplified by the Scottish clan. Both of these groups had been the topic of considerable discussion by Scottish moralists by the time that Smith came to treat of them. For example, Scottish moralists focused upon the family and the domestic circle as an arena for the practice and development of exquisite sensibility towards others. James Fordyce and Henry Mackenzie, in particular, had tried to elevate the affectionate family as a primary force for the regeneration of an insensitive community. Moreover, in his novels, Henry Mackenzie further propagandized the role of these little circles in the maintenance of the moral community.

It was possible to argue, as did many Scottish moralists, that the affectionate interaction of family or clan members was based far less upon self-control than upon humane sentiments. In Part VI, Smith set out to demonstrate that this was not the case. Even in the instance of the very closest of friendships -- that between brothers and sisters which was so emphasized by Scottish moralists such as Henry Mackenzie -- he pointed out that a high degree of self-command was involved in the establishment of sympathy. "Their situation," he wrote, "renders their mutual sympathy of the utmost importance to their common happiness; and, by the wisdom of nature, their same situation, by obliging them to accommodate to one another, renders that sympathy more habitual." 53 As evidence that family affection was nothing more or less than a product of this habitual accommodation, Smith cited the fact that absent sons were quite incapable of achieving that easy accommodation
with their families that the resident siblings were able to maintain. Brothers and sisters who had been educated in different countries, he added, felt a "similar diminution of affection." 54

In a similar vein, Smith went on to describe the tribal relationships as exemplified, in particular, in the Scottish clan. It should be remembered that the clan relationship had been the subject matter of Scottish moralists for nearly three decades. Hugh Blair's introduction to Ossian's Poems of Fingal, printed in the Scots Magazine of 1763 began a general rehabilitation of the highlander and clan society on the part of the lowland literati. Thereafter, the sociability and virtues of highlanders became a weapon with which to condemn the growing luxury and indifference of the commercial lowlands. John Dalrymple's Description of the Character of Highlanders, for example, was the headliner article in the Caledonian Mercury for March 30, 1771. Here, the author claimed for highlanders all the politeness of a courtly society without any of the latter's respective follies. In A Dissertation on the Government of the People in the Western Isles, the Reverend Mr. Donald Maqueen wanted to impress upon his readers the ancient valour, generosity, and affability of the highland chieftans. 55 The sentimental relationship between clansman and chief was further romanticized by Henry Mackenzie in his story of Albert Bane for the Lounger. 56 Moreover, together with Henry Dundas, Mackenzie actively promoted the return of the forfeited highland estates following the '45 to those chiefs who were
supposedly natural and sympathetic social leaders.

Smith had little time for the sentimentalization of highland society. He argued that it was quite ridiculous to suppose that the kinship relationship in the tribe or clan was based upon any mysterious affection. Chosing his words carefully, he wrote:

Their association is frequently necessary for their common defence. They are all, from the highest to the lowest, of more or less importance to one another. Their concord strengthens their necessary association; their discord always weakens, and might destroy it.

For Smith, the kinship ties between the various members of the Scottish clans, and by implication the relationship between a lord and his tenants, were the product of historical necessity. Now that the law was powerful enough to perform the protective function that the clan had hitherto performed, the structure itself was doomed to destruction. With more than just a hint of sarcasm, Smith added that those same lords who were so concerned to establish their own tribal ancestry in the modern age, were typically the most reluctant to perform their traditional duties towards their poor tenants. "It is not in that order, I am afraid," he wrote, "that we are to expect an extraordinary extension of what is called, natural affection."

Because Smith was not able to foresee reform from the benevolence of the people above, he was forced to concentrate upon individual self-command. By pushing the implications of his model of face-to-face interaction in everyday life into such structures as the family and clan, he was able to put even
greater stress upon *self-command* and *accommodation* than he had done in his early editions. But it was only in section iii of Part VI that he made his emphasis upon self-control most explicit. Here, he cited several examples to demonstrate that this quality was without a doubt the *sine qua non* of moral behaviour. Even when it accompanied forms of action that the disinterested spectator must disapprove, Smith claimed, self-control "sometimes interests us, and commands even some degree of a certain sort of esteem for the very worthless characters that conduct it." However, when it accompanied acts of "prudence, of justice and proper beneficence," he continued, this attribute could not fail but to increase the spectator's approval. "Self-command," Smith concluded, "is not only itself a great virtue, but from it all the other virtues seem to derive their principal lustre."

Smith did acknowledge, however, that there could occasionally be a problem with the attribute of *self-command*. It could sometimes be directed by improper motives. For example, "apparent tranquility and good humour may sometimes conceal the most determined and cruel resolution to revenge." Here, Smith was outlining a traditional criticism of the refined polity by Scottish moralists. Modern social role players could wear masks which covered their real intentions. In his novel *The Man of the World*, Henry Mackenzie demonstrated that a cool and controlled exterior could hide selfish and malignant passions. But Smith brushed such concerns aside, noting that Cicero himself regarded "this deceitful character,
not indeed as of the highest dignity, but as not unsuitable to a certain flexibility of manners, which, he thinks, may, notwithstanding, be, upon the whole, both agreeable and respectable." Besides, he continued, truly vicious characters of this sort were only dangerous during periods of public disorder and faction, and among the highest ranks of society. The vast majority of men "who are contented to walk in the humble paths of private and peaceable life," he maintained, posed no such threat to the moral community. Clearly, Smith regarded respectability as much more crucial to the smooth functioning of the community than honesty. Moreover, he implied that a high degree of self-centeredness was allowable, just as long as it was polite and controlled.

Having dealt with this major criticism of the moral value of self-command, which so informed the writings of Rousseau and his Scottish admirers, Smith returned to that same issue which he had earlier attempted to clarify in the additions to Part III -- the relationship between sensibility in general and self-command in particular. As in the aforementioned additions, he was concerned to stress that, although his model was not incompatible with a certain amount of humanity, it was self-command that was the critical characteristic of virtue. The point of propriety, he noted, would always be different in the case of different sentiments. "The disposition to the affections which tend to unite men in society, to humanity, kindness, natural affection, friendship, esteem, may sometimes be excessive," he wrote, but they rendered "a man interesting
to everybody."\(^{64}\) The man of little humanity was his own worst enemy, however, and not a threat to the moral community. It was quite otherwise with regard to "the affections which drive men from one another." Here, Smith emphasized that the passions had to be controlled if a society was to maintain its cohesion:

A fretful temper, which feels, with too much sensibility, every little cross accident, renders a man miserable in himself and offensive to other people. A calm one, which does not allow its tranquillity to be disturbed, either by the small injuries, or by the little disasters incident to the usual course of human affairs...is a blessing to the man himself, and gives ease and security to all his companions.\(^{65}\)

In characteristic fashion, Smith went on to point out that "sensibility, however, may very easily be too exquisite, and it frequently is so."\(^{66}\) He advised those "whom Nature has endowed with this too exquisite sensibility, and whose lively feelings have not been sufficiently blunted and hardened by early education and proper exercise," to avoid those public occupations for which they were not suited. Unlike the Mirror Club, Smith was not interested in the creation of men of feeling. If a certain amount of sensibility was crucial to his model, too much was clearly detrimental. And, for Smith, the point of excess was remarkably low in comparison with most late eighteenth century Scottish moralists.

In the conclusion to Part VI, Smith re-iterated the overriding importance of self-command to his model of ethical behaviour. "But though the virtues of prudence, justice, and beneficence, may, upon different occasions be recommended to us
almost equally by two different principles," he wrote:

those of self-command are, upon most occasions, principally and almost entirely recommended to us by one; by the sense of propriety, by regard to the sentiments of the supposed impartial spectator. Without the restraint which this principle imposes, every passion would, upon most occasions, rush headlong, if I may say so, to its own gratification...Respect for what are, or for what ought to be, or for what upon a certain condition would be, the sentiments of other people, is the sole principle which, upon most occasions, overawes all those mutinous and turbulent passions into that tone and temper which the impartial spectator can enter into and sympathize with.67

By constantly stressing the function of the social spectator, be he real or ideal, Smith showed himself to be much more concerned about the control of individual feelings than in their cultivation. In this intentionally stern and masculine approach, he differed widely from most late eighteenth century Scottish moralists, who wanted to so extend individual sensibility as to allow him to enter more easily into the feelings of others. In this emphasis, he remained entirely consistent.

If Smith's approach remained so remarkably uniform between 1759 and 1790, why then did he spend so much time and effort in elaborating upon his discussion of human sympathy and propriety, in order to show that it did not exclude a certain amount of humanity towards others? Why too did he allow that a certain moderated sensibility towards others was in keeping with his model of proper social behaviour? And, what is more important in intellectual terms, why did he feel it necessary to underline the absolutely central role of self-command for
his model? It has been suggested here that Smith's revisions to *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* were essentially a dialogue with the fellow members of the close knit Edinburgh literati. While Scottish moralists found Smith's discussion of sensibility and sympathy compatible with their own understanding of the importance of the emotions, the sociability of men, and the necessity for achieving emotional harmony, their treatment of these concepts differed in significant ways from Smith himself. Smith regarded any inordinate stress upon extended sensibility towards others as a totally ineffectual and even dangerous approach to the inculcation of morality. For him, the sympathetic bonds which were crucial to the preservation of community, were based primarily upon self-control. He wanted to make that point perfectly clear in his revisions.

Smith's revisions to *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* illuminate those areas of agreement which most Scottish moralists shared. They evidence a change in the attitude towards the stability of the moral community between the earlier and later eighteenth century. In particular, they demonstrate the concern on the part of Scottish moralists in the late eighteenth century that the middling ranks of society -- those respectable men whose behaviour, for Smith, most approximated virtue -- were having their moral sentiments corrupted by the luxurious manners of their social superiors. Adam Smith, as befitted his genius, was able to circumnavigate the implications of this perceived and much discussed
development by fully developing the brilliant device of the *impartial spectator*. In this way, he was able to retain and re-assert his emphasis upon self-control and social role playing without having to rely upon an increasingly problematic public opinion as the sole measure of propriety. But, since this concept was not developed in anything like a systematic way until 1790, practical Scottish moralists were hardly able to utilize it in their own writings. In order to stabilize the Scottish moral community, and in tune with the movements of their age, these moralists moved in a different ethical direction. While retaining Smith's emphasis upon the importance of interactive sympathy in small groups, they focused precisely upon that variable in social interaction which Smith was so eager to minimize -- the individual's benevolent affections and his and, especially, her humanity towards others.68 In the process, Scottish moralists made a major contribution to sentimental literature as well as to the concepts of sentimental womanhood and education.

In the latter respects, Adam Smith may be said to have been out of touch with some of the most significant movements of the day. He was not much of a reader of sentimental novels, although he did have all three of Henry Mackenzie's works in his library.69 His view of women was anything but flattering, since he tended to describe as *womanish* all those lacking in appropriate self-control. Moreover, his perception of education minimized that emotional relationship between parents and children which has become an accepted characteristic of the
modern age. At the same time, one cannot help but admire Smith's intellectual consistency and his brilliant attempt to construct a theory of morality which was at once real and ideal. The concept of the impartial spectator -- Smith's demigod -- still stands as one of the most creative and original solutions to the moral dilemma of a man who is both part of, and yet transcends, his social environment. The fact that this concept was specifically developed within a Scottish discursive network which pointed to the inaccuracies of public opinion within a refined commercial state takes nothing away from its intellectual stature.
CONCLUSION:
THE DECLINE OF THE SCOTTISH LITERARY REPUBLIC

During the closing decades of the eighteenth century, polite Scottish discourse revolved around moral rather than economic issues. This was evidenced, not only in the works of Henry Mackenzie and the *Mirror Club* and in the sermons of Moderate divines. It was also reflected in Adam Smith's preoccupation with the ways in which ethics were constructed and maintained during the closing years of his life. This moral discourse reflected a concern that the moral community, dependent upon a traditional social order, could be destroyed by some of the characteristics that adhered to economic individualism and the *society of strangers* which was constructed around it. Excessive selfishness, increasing anonymity, and the increase in artificial needs and ostentation among all ranks of society, could corrupt those communal sympathies upon which morality was based. As the natural and traditional community metamorphized into an increasingly superficial and indifferent society, there was an imminent danger that its characteristic *manners* would be threatened. Once these natural modes of interaction had ceased to function, the nation would no longer exist. No ancient constitution or legislative edict could save the moral community once its *manners* had degenerated.

Scottish moralists assessed the changes taking place in their community in terms of available ethical languages, which are better viewed as interconnected discursive domains than as
intellectual paradigms. Stoicism, civic humanism and sensibility were not mutually exclusive ways of looking at the world, but distinct linguistic sites which complemented and qualified one another. Civic humanism, while it tended to blind its adherents to the positive potential inherent in the new mechanisms for the increase of wealth, illuminated the threat to the moral public polity entailed in the rapid extension of luxury and fashion among the members of a given national community. Sensibility asserted the significance of the social affections to the maintenance of traditional communal bonds. Stoicism, on the other hand, warned of the dangers to ethical integrity if the passions, even the social passions, were pushed beyond their proper limits. One always runs an intellectual risk in categorizing the various discursive domains. For example, should one too easily dismiss the contribution of more explicitly religious forms of discourse to the late eighteenth century debate on morality by the Edinburgh literati, many of whom were ministers? Could not Stoicism be elevated to a more significant position, not only because of Adam Smith's approval of the Stoics, but also because of its more indirect intellectual contribution to theories of natural law and morality? Has civic humanist discourse received perhaps too much attention, given its brilliant analysis by John Pocock and his students? There is a tendency towards faddism in history just as there is in modern social life generally, and the conscientious historian needs to warn his readers of his own particular biases.
In this thesis, I have concentrated my major energies on an elaboration of the late eighteenth century Scottish use of concepts related to the language of sentiment and sensibility. The use of this language by polite Scotsmen, I would suggest, had a distinct tendency to secularize moral discourse. Moreover, in basing their ethical theories upon human feeling, Scottish moralists also freed themselves to some extent from the constraints of more traditional ethics. It was now possible for them to discuss novel solutions to the problem of individual and social corruption which did not necessarily involve a reliance upon such time worn concepts as manly independence, fortitude and public spirit. It was also possible for them to advocate -- although not without reservations, exceptions, and contradictions -- a more expressly feminine solution to the problem of morality in the modern age. In the process, Scottish moralists also made a significant contribution to the development of sentimental literature, the concept of sentimental education, and the discussion of such issues as the companionable marriage. These developments, of course, have recently ceased to be the preserve of literary scholars and have become a veritable gold mine of information on the social relations and attitudes of eighteenth century men and women. This being the case, any light which the specifically Scottish discourse on the human sentiments can shed upon the sentimental movement in general would seem to be a timely addition to the fund of historical knowledge and a useful palliative to some of the loose
generalizations to which both social historians and literary scholars appear to be addicted.

It is important to remember, however, that the cultivation of one's tenderest feelings was only one solution to the problem of ethics in a problematic world. Another was a retreat into the individual conscience. By 1790, Adam Smith had charted an ethical course away from an increasingly problematic public opinion in order to emphasize the demigod within the breast -- the *impartial spectator*. Most Scottish moralists, however, avoided this *masculine* approach to ethics in the modern world. Building upon an essentially Smithian analysis of interactive sympathy, these practical moralists sought to cultivate man's innate sensibility to the extent that he could more readily show benevolence towards others. They urged individuals, especially those in traditional positions of rank and power, to develop their sympathetic emotions. The encouragement of a *gentle sensibility* especially through the ethical manipulation of feelings of *tender melancholy* would not only help to cement social relations, but it would also result in a healthy weakening of the individual ego. When an individual indulged in a tender melancholy, his fondness for his fellows increased while all selfish emotions and artificial needs receded into the background. A gentle yet discerning sympathy with one's fellow man resulted.

In this way, a particular strain of melancholy thinking and literature could intensify the socially sensitive conscience. By the skillful manipulation of pathos, the
Scottish literati hoped to turn the growing tide of interest and indifference. On a strictly personal level, the cultivation of one's feelings of gentle sensibility could act as a vaccination against the corrupting poisons of luxury, wealth, and fashion. On the social level, it redeemed the wealth of an advanced commercial polity by transforming it into a vehicle for active charity or benevolence. Thus, the riches of a developing empire could be utilized to reinforce traditional social bonds and an established social order. The sermons of John Drysdale, the Lounger's essays on Benevolus, and Henry Mackenzie's plan for social regeneration in *The Man of the World* suggested that the maintenance of the moral community depended upon transforming country gentlemen into men of feeling. But benevolence had to be an active, rather than a passive principle, and Scottish moralists were concerned that the cult of sentiment that was rapidly spreading during the second half of the eighteenth century was too removed from real life to be of any real social benefit. Thus, they were particularly careful to distinguish their own perception of gentle sensibility from that sickly or exaggerated sensitivity which made the individual unfit to perform his or her social function. In their minds, gentle sensibility was a very precise social tool which had to be cultivated with considerable care.

The most appropriate period for the cultivation of the humane sentiments was adolescence. Like Rousseau, Scottish moralists recognized the period between puberty and adulthood
as the time when the individual's emotional character began to develop. Moreover, they believed that the *ingenuous sensibility* of youth could be effectively manipulated in order to reinforce the communal bond. If the individual's attachment to his social group could be firmly established during this formative period, argued Henry Mackenzie, Hugh Blair and James Fordyce, it could be translated into active benevolence during the period of adulthood. This social and moral cultivation was a delicate matter, however, requiring an intimate knowledge of the characteristics of adolescence itself and an appreciation of the dangers to which it was subject. Precisely because it was a period during which the passions were at their strongest, *unthinking youth* always ran the risk of allowing their feelings to get the better of their reason.

It was partly because of their volatile natures that the young needed to be protected and controlled by affectionate *parental tutors*. In addition, the young needed to be isolated from the corrupting elements in an increasingly artificial and impenetrable society. If the humane sentiments were to be properly cultivated, the risk of outside contagion had to be studiously avoided. The most effective means to achieve this end was the extension of adolescence until that time when the morally developed character was capable of dealing with a *society of strangers* on more advantageous terms. Thus, Henry Mackenzie's *Mirror Club* and essayists such as *BELZEBUB* constantly warned against the early introduction of young men and women into what they invariably referred to as the *world*. 
The world in question was particularly identified with the fashionable society of the large cities, whose fantastical values and relatively weak communal bonds made them inappropriate arenas for the cultivation of social sympathy. But there was an awareness on the part of these same Scottish moralists that the values of fashionable society were not restricted to the glitter of the urban centre; they had begun to penetrate the countryside as well. Rural sentiment, as Henry Mackenzie called it, was on the decline in the country itself. The links in the chain of community were weakening even in this classical haven of virtue, integrity, paternalism and tradition.

Scottish moralists began to focus their attention upon smaller and more intimate social groups which were founded upon a genuine harmony of minds. In the cordial intercourse of private friendship and, especially, amidst that familiar intercourse which belongs to domestic life, they argued, the individual could cultivate a peaceable, a candid, a gentle, and friendly temper. In the closest and most intimate social group -- the nuclear family -- the sensibility of ingenuous youth could be carefully nurtured and nourished. In order for this cultivation to be successful, however, the authority of parents had to be absolute. While authority was always to be sweetened with love, it implied considerable restrictions on the freedom of the young. Not only were the stimuli from the external community carefully filtered before they could reach the maturing individual, but peer group influence was quite
systematically undermined.

There was one issue, however, with regard to which parental authority did not apply — the choice of a mate. Because of the Scottish moralists' emphasis upon the home and the domestic circle as an arena for the exercise and cultivation of gentle sensibility, it was absolutely critical that the familial relationship be based upon genuine affection or sentiment. This implied that the marital bond had to be based upon a correspondence of mind rather than considerations of inheritance or financial security. The Scottish *literati* redefined marriage in terms of an inviolable sentimental bond. Moreover, they hoped that the harmony that did not obtain among suspect strangers in a commercial society, could yet obtain between a man and a woman whose differing natures served only to complete the harmony. This intensely affectionate relationship, and its extension to include any offspring, became the key to the moral welfare of the community, and the discourse surrounding the home and family began to replace the traditional language of public virtue and active citizenship. Fordyce, for example, viewed the home as the haven of virtuous affection. Henry Mackenzie went so far as to argue that patriotism had its basis in the *sentiment of Home*, rather than in a more abstract view of the duties of man and citizen. Still, it would be a mistake to think that Scottish moralists regarded the public and private spheres as completely separate. The *sentiment of Home* encouraged the development of a sociability whose effect was by no means restricted to the
domestic circle. As was the case with the Mirror Club's description of the Benevolus or Veroni family, social affection radiated out from the family to the surrounding community.

The concentration upon sentiment, the family and the socialization of the young, also led the literati to focus a considerable degree of attention upon women. The Scottish practical moralists began to pay considerable attention to their supposed complacency, gentleness and softness. Although they agreed that female sensibility always had to be tempered by prudence and fortitude, the innate affectivity of women was the single most powerful force of the modern age. Female complacency was at once the most natural and the most overlooked cement of society. Its nature was that of pleasing and placating; it was quick to perceive and to sympathize with the sorrows of others. Unlike the sterner virtue of males, female complacency was definitively social in its nature and effects. Not only was it important for men to develop these same characteristics in their own personalities, but women were men's most suitable teachers. They could temper wisdom with benignity, virtue with grace, and value with humanity. In the conjugal bond proper, they could soften their husband's firmness, soothe the mental strife of men who had to deal with an often iniquitous world, and help to restore the bonds of the moral community with their sympathy and generosity. Women could be the mirrors in which men could view their own virtues and vices.

This new role was not meant to be an insignificant one.
Writers such as Henry Mackenzie and James Fordyce were far from being hypocritical when they referred to women in the home as "angels" or "domestic deities." The other side of the coin, however, was that, if women were to perform their moral roles effectively they had to maintain their domestic retirement from a corrupt society which might destroy their sensitive natures. In order to cultivate the social affections of their morally inferior husbands, women had to employ that female softness which necessarily reinforced their social inferiority. Finally, it was their moral duty to make themselves agreeable, often in the case of male counterparts who were quite beyond redemption. Any other policy, such as the assertion of equal rights or the demand for a more equitable relationship, led to a proportional diminution of those characteristics which were so imperative to the preservation and rejuvenation of the moral community. Even more than their adolescent counterparts, therefore, women became the victims of the new role that Scottish moralists had assigned them. While they became the acknowledged rulers of the empire of sentiment, they most certainly relinquished power in other spheres.

One of the tools in the creation of both the new woman and the new man was the novel. This new, and not yet quite respectable, literary genre was attracting a large female audience. But, instead of reinforcing the values of domesticity, complacency, and tenderness, this genre tended to concentrate upon romantic liaisons and fantastic situations that bore little relationship to everyday communal interaction.
What was of even greater concern to Scottish moralists was the fact that so many of the novels written in the decades following Fielding and Richardson tended to obscure the proper relationship between virtue and vice. Moralists such as Hugh Blair, Henry Mackenzie and the Mirror Club believed that properly written novels had a tremendous potential for inculcating communal sympathies, both in men and women, because of their ability to depict the more natural operations of complacency and sensibility in those humbler merits of ordinary life to which we feel a nearer relation and from which precept is more powerfully enforced, and example more readily drawn. In addition, and equally significant, they could elucidate the dangers faced by virtuous sensibility in an increasingly indifferent and artificial social arena. Mackenzie's novels, in particular, were an attempt to stimulate the gentle sensibility of young readers of station while, at the same time, warning them of the selfish, interested and unthinking characteristics of a society of strangers. As distinct from the excessively romantic writings of the past and present, Mackenzie's novels were also intended as a guide to moral action within the community. The sensitivity and melancholy which he tried to instill were explicitly social, rather than individualistic, in nature. In the benevolent offices of private life, Mackenzie argued, men of feeling could yet preserve the bonds of community and protect that environment conducive to public virtue.

Adam Smith, of course, took a quite different direction
from these melancholy moralists. Instead of encouraging what he viewed as an artificial humanity or benevolence, Smith underlined even more strongly the manly quality of self-command. But despite his greater intellectual abstraction and consistency, Adam Smith clearly shared many of the moral concerns of his fellow literati. Far from being the simplistic middle class apologist that some scholars picture him as being, Smith was obviously troubled by what he perceived as corruption in the sentiments of the middling ranks of Scottish society as they began to vie with one another in vanity and ostentation. By the time he came to revise the final edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith no longer held an unqualified faith that the public opinion of a society of strangers would equate with morality or even prudence. Like other Scottish moralists, Smith was forced to establish a firmer foundation for moral action in the modern world.

In spite of all their differences, the Scottish literati, especially its Edinburgh contingent, formed a self-conscious republic of letters. They took their role as a literary community and as moral advisors to significant elements within Scottish society most seriously indeed. They read, exchanged, and corrected one another's works, even when they were in fairly profound intellectual disagreement. They not only demonstrated considerable tolerance for diverse opinions and emphases in one another's writings, but they also associated themselves as a group with the movement for civility and improvement within the Scottish nation. Despite the natural
squabbling to which all social groups, no matter how close, are subject, the Edinburgh *literati* functioned as an exemplary moral community in its own right. Its older members, particularly Hugh Blair, encouraged and patronised the newest recruits. In return, men like Craig, Logan and Cullen retained considerable affection for their elder mentors. Thus, the Scottish literary community had a capacity for longevity which is granted to few literary alliances.

Yet within a few years of the publication of the final edition of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, there were clear signs that both the Scottish *republic of letters* and its bardic function were in serious decline. The Scottish historian, Arnand Chitnis has rightly pointed to a number of factors which hastened its demise.¹ Chief among these, he asserts, were party politics and the increasing industrialization of British life. The former began the rift which the latter, by opening up new opportunities for Scotsmen in the south, effectively completed. While not denying the significance of these and other factors to the breakdown of the literary community, it may be observed that they were not sufficient conditions for the event. Political divisions between whigs and tories had caused friction for some time, but these were not enough to do serious damage to the integrity of a community of such long standing. Men like William McLeod Bannatyne and Henry Mackenzie continued to work closely together despite important political differences. Opportunities for literary Scots in the south had existed for many decades and writers such as David
Hume and Henry Mackenzie quite consciously rejected them. It was only in the aftermath of the French revolution that Scotland heard the death knell of its literary republic. The harsh measures employed by Henry Dundas to crush the least sign of disfavour, let alone sedition, began the process of widening any existing cracks in the literati's ranks. The literati began that process of polarization which marked the end of an era when "no literary combinations then existed in this country, nor was the critic's candour ever seen to be influenced by the principles of his party either in science or politics."² "Sociability," lamented Thomas Somerville, "was another of the characteristics of those times."³

The history of the Speculative Society during this period graphically symbolizes the tenuousness of the Scottish literary republic by the mid 1790s. This was arguably the most important club in eighteenth century Scottish history as through its ranks passed virtually every member of the Edinburgh literati at one time or another. Between 1789 and 1794, the society experienced a decline in attendance at its meetings, a reflection of the fact that the communal bonds among the literati were already dissolving. In December of 1794, Walter Scott and Francis Jeffrey moved that the Society be allowed to discuss "the political topics of the day."⁴ So strong were the objections to such a move at this time that, despite the fact that the motion was withdrawn, twenty-eight resignations, mainly from senior members, were simultaneously laid upon the table. Among those who were eager to move the
society in a more explicitly political direction, much to the chagrin of their former teacher and author in the *Mirror* and *Lounger*, Baron David Hume, were Henry Brougham, Francis Jeffrey and Francis Horner. In the aftermath of the dispute, this group consolidated its hold upon the *Speculative Society*, and both Brougham and Horner became its presidents.

If the *Speculative* debate echoed the death knell of the Scottish republic of letters, it was the famous *Edinburgh Review* which put the nails into its coffin. Brougham, Horner and Jeffrey founded the periodical in 1802 and harnessed it to the whig cause of parliamentary reform. Henry Mackenzie, the elder spokesman for the literati at this time, was deeply disturbed by a development that could only further polarize the literary community. In a letter which he composed for the *Edinburgh Review*, Mackenzie praised the journal for its exhibition of liberal learning and excellent writing but expressed his concern that the periodical had far too much of the spirit of party. He reflected his own attachment to social order and government from above by condemning the periodical's support for the Spanish nation's mob revolution against their own government and the higher orders. The discussion of political themes in general, he claimed, ran completely counter to the ideal of a Republic of Letters. The adherence to a particular party turned a free man into a slave. "We may say," he added, "as the ancients said of a man who became a slave, that on that day he lost half his virtue." Adopting a more fatherly tone, Mackenzie concluded his letter.
by advising the young *Edinburgh Reviewers* to divide their journal into two parts, thereby separating the political from the literary components. In this way, he added, the literary section might be somewhat cooler.

In the draft of a lengthy essay on the *Edinburgh Review*, Mackenzie amplified his criticism to include the philosophical approach of the *Reviewers*. Here, he suggested that the *Review* had departed from the metaphysics of Edinburgh society. It tended to regard metaphysics as a deductive classification rather than as a science which combined observation with experiment. Men, he pointed out, were constantly experimenting with one another in the matter of morals. Morality did not derive from reason or abstract laws — *philosophy in the closet* — but from the process of human interaction within the moral community. For Mackenzie, as for most late eighteenth century Scottish writers on moral topics, the traditions and manners of the specific historical community always took precedence over abstract considerations of reason or utility. He was quite correct in suggesting that Brougham and company were departing from that approach.

With the publication of the *Edinburgh Review*, Scottish letters did not end but entered into a new and more explicitly British phase. The *Edinburgh Reviewers* used their journal as a propagandistic vehicle for the advocacy of free trade, the movement to eliminate the old poor law, and in support of the Lancastrian method for mass education. Henry Brougham in his capacity as a parliamentarian and Lord Chancellor was
associated with all of these reform movements as well as a supposedly Benthamite attempt to rationalize the legal code of Great Britain. It was this learned friend who championed the movement for mass education, which he viewed essentially as a mechanism for creating disciplined industrial workers. While there was much that was Scottish in Henry Brougham's attitude towards reform, his philosophical allegiance was to Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations* and the rationalistic French philosophers rather than to the eighteenth century moral discourse. Like so many contemporary scholars, he adroitly removed Smithean economics from its ethical framework and from the *metaphysics* of the Edinburgh literary community.

The Scottish sentimental and pathetic tradition was carried on, however, in the *genre* that Henry Mackenzie had helped to make respectable -- the novel. Walter Scott was undoubtedly influenced by his hero, Henry Mackenzie, and perhaps eclipsed his mentor in eliciting spectatorial sympathy for his characters. The notion of the moral community of sensitive men and women is a powerful literary beacon in novels like *The Heart of Midlothian*. And the nostalgia for past societies which exhibited true hospitality and fellow feeling acts as an implicit ethical criticism of the *society of strangers* of the present.

It is beyond the compass of the present work to assess the nature of Walter Scott's contribution to the epic tradition or his intriguing attempt to form a bridge between the Scottish and British consciousness. Like the works of his predecessor
Henry Mackenzie, Scott's novels have been misunderstood and caricatured, not the least by their Scottish readers. Whereas the primitivism of the late eighteenth century Scottish literati was carefully considered within a cautiously progressive approach to the modern world, Scott's admirers have reduced his novels into crude instruments of the never ending reproduction of the Scottish past. This peculiarly backward looking historical consciousness has severely shackled the minds of Scotsmen in chains of ancient memory and present impotence.

In contrast with so many of their modern countrymen, the Scottish literary community of the eighteenth century sought realistic solutions to the problems of their day. They viewed themselves as activists on many fronts; what is more, their analysis of the Scottish community was anything but what Scott's novels and the Scottish consciousness have become -- a romantic and socially moribund symbolic husk. However one might regard their elitism, their patronizing attitudes towards women and youth, or even their scholarly and literary abilities, one can never deny the intensity of their civic responsibility. Their attempt to mould a modern yet moral Scottish community deserves of the respect of anyone who deplores the lack of heart and community in the modern marketplace.
NOTES: INTRODUCTION


9 The Making of Classical Edinburgh. See also, William Creech's speech on improvement to the Chamber of Commerce, Caledonian Mercury, July 12, 1787. For a list of contributors to the new university buildings, see Caledonian Mercury, November 28, 1789.


14 See Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, (New York, 1967), 29-30 for a similar emphasis on the face-to-face relationship. Also see, J.Ralph Lindgren's The Social Philosophy of Adam Smith, (The Hague, 1973), 18 and 142 wherein the author compares Smith’s social theory with that of Peter Winch.


17 Donald Winch provides some provocative comments on this debate in Adam Smith’s enduring particular result: A Political and Cosmopolitan Perspective, Wealth and Virtue, 253. See also J.G.A. Pocock’s Cambridge Paradigms and Scotch Philosophers: A Study of the Relations between the Civic Humanist and Civil Jurisprudential Interpretation of Eighteenth-Century Social Thought in the same volume.


20 The Wealth of Nations, V.i.f.52-5.

21 T.C. Smout makes this point in Where had the Scottish Economy got to by the Third Quarter of the Eighteenth Century?, 63. He also makes the astute observation that it was the gentry not the bourgeoisie who, for Smith, were the moral custodians of the nation, 69. For Smith’s own treatment of the gentry, see The Wealth of Nations, III.ii.

22 J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition, (Princeton, 1975), 498-505. Ferguson’s Institutes of Moral Philosophy, For the Use of Students in the College of Edinburgh was published in 1769 and Ferguson had already long been preaching his particular brand of civic humanism, with its emphasis on military prowess, in the classroom. On Ferguson, see Richard Sher, Church and University in the Scottish
Enlightenment: The Moderate Literati of Edinburgh, (Princeton, 1985), 192f. For the significance which Ferguson attached to moral practice, as opposed to theory, see his collection of essays in the Edinburgh University Library, MS. Dc. 1. 42 no. 546 wherein he stated that the "great Business of man is deliberation and active Conduct."

23 See D.D. Raphael's comments on this development in his introduction to The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 16.


NOTES: CHAPTER ONE

1 See, for example, Samuel Charters, Sermons, (Edinburgh, 1786), sermons v, vi, xvi, and xvii on these topics.


3 On the Spectator, see Peter Gay, The Spectator as Actor, Encounter, (December, 1967) and Edward A. Bloom and Lillian D. Bloom, Joseph Addison's Sociable Animal, (Providence, 1971). It should be noted, however, that both of these works suffer from the tendency of their authors to force Addison into the mould of a bourgeois optimist.


6 See the Caledonian Mercury, March 30, 1771 and August 12, 1776 for excerpts from these writers.

7 Scots Magazine, October 1783.

8 Henry Mackenzie, Letters to Elizabeth Rose of Kilravock, ed. Horst Drescher, (Munster, 1967), 150. See also, page 78, wherein Mackenzie compared Ossian with the Modern Bard.


10 The Poems and Songs of Robert Burns, Vol. I, 103f, esp. 110.


12 W.J. Couper, 108 and 110


14 For example, see the attack on the Advertiser in the Caledonian Mercury of 5 July 1766. Also see the letter of IMPARTIALIS, Caledonian Mercury, 24 March 1777.

15 M.E. Craig, 8 and 24

16 Caledonian Mercury, 18, 20 and 23 September 1786.
See the *Caledonian Mercury*, 12 July 1766 (Dalrymple); 18 May 1771 (Millar), and 15 March 1769 (Robertson).

See the letter from ALAN RAMSAY, *Caledonian Mercury*, 11 November 1786. This letter could have been from Mackenzie's friend Alexander Fraser Tytler who was something of a Ramsay fanatic.

W.J. Couper, 45.

For instance, see the letter of S.B. to the *Caledonian Mercury*, 24 April 1773.

*Caledonian Mercury*, 2 February 1796.

See the editorial comments in the *Caledonian Mercury*, 7 November 1763.

*Caledonian Mercury*, 9 September 1769.

See the letter from A CALEDONIAN, *Caledonian Mercury*, 25 September 1769.

*Caledonian Mercury*, 18 May and 26 August 1771 (Millar); 17 July and 2 and 7 September 1771 (Mackenzie).

*Caledonian Mercury*, 18 and 20 May 1772.

*Caledonian Mercury*, 19 May 1773. The correspondent was commenting on the General Assembly speeches of the previous year.

*Caledonian Mercury*, 31 August 1774.

*Caledonian Mercury*, 8 April 1776 (Dalrymple); 27 June 1774, (Richardson).

*Caledonian Mercury*, 6 June 1778; see also 19 May 1777.

*Caledonian Mercury*, 11 December 1782; 12 February 1783; 18 June 1783.


David McElroy, 87f.

David McElroy, 89.

*Caledonian Mercury*, 17 February 1777; 8 March 1777.

*Caledonian Mercury*, 19 October 1778; 18 January 1779.

*Caledonian Mercury*, 26 July 1780; 4 September 1780.
38 *Caledonian Mercury*, 9 July 1781.
39 *Caledonian Mercury*, 21 July 1781.
40 *Caledonian Mercury*, 17 November 1782.
41 *Caledonian Mercury*, 3 January 1784; see also, 17 February 1777.
42 *Caledonian Mercury*, 1 March 1786.
43 *Caledonian Mercury*, 9 April 1787.
44 *Caledonian Mercury*, 2 May 1789.
45 *Caledonian Mercury*, 1 July 1790.
46 *Caledonian Mercury*, 8 December 1791.
47 *Caledonian Mercury*, 4 February 1793; 16 May 1793.
48 For example, see the *Caledonian Mercury*, 14 February 1799.
49 *Caledonian Mercury*, 8 and 17 January 1801.
50 M.E. Craig, 30.
52 Cited in W.J. Couper, 82.
55 *Scots Magazine*, July, October and November 1766.
56 For example, see the poem *Evil Company*, *Scots Magazine*, February 1787.
57 *Scots Magazine*, November 1781 and July and September 1782 (Knox); April 1787 (Bennett); April and May 1782 (Griffiths).
58 *Scots Magazine*, March 1781 (Kames); March and April 1773 (Gregory); January-July 1788 and June 1789 (Letters on Education).
59 *Scots Magazine*, May and June 1782.
Scots Magazine, September 1792.

Scots Magazine, April 1776.

Scots Magazine, February and April 1771.

Scots Magazine, February 1773.

Scots Magazine, July and August 1783.

Scots Magazine, March 1786.

Scots Magazine, January 1789.

Scots Magazine, January and April 1777.

Scots Magazine, June, August and October 1783.

Scots Magazine, March 1786.

Scots Magazine, August 1793.

Scots Magazine, June, September and October 1781.

Scots Magazine, July 1771; March 1773.

Scots Magazine, December 1783.

Scots Magazine, July 1787. For further praise of Mackenzie, see also, September 1785 and April 1787.

The letters on manners under the name of THEOPHRASTUS were eventually published separately as William Creech, Letters to Sir John Sinclair, (Edinburgh, 1793); in addition, they were added to Sir John Sinclair's Statistical Account of Scotland, thus providing an interesting comment on the pros and cons of improvement. Buchan's pen name of ALBANICUS was well known to contemporaries. Re. Arnot's pen name of BONIFACE, see the National Library of Scotland, Newhailes MS. TD 1450, no. 476. Arnot wrote several letters to the Caledonian Mercury under this pen name. Another frequent contributor to the periodical press was David Dalrymple, who usually signed his letters D.D. or HANOVER DALRYMPLE. The frequent letters from W.O. to the paper may have been the product of William Ogilvie, poet and miscellaneous writer from Aberdeen. H.M. was in all likelihood Henry Mackenzie, as the poem on a thunder storm to the Caledonian Mercury, August 30, 1769 seems to evidence. R.C. on virtue, vice and the necessity for patrons in the Caledonian Mercury, July 27, 1774 sounds like Robert Cullen. Another author, A.B. was a freeholder and well known personage in Aberdeenshire. There were numerous letters from J.B., who was undoubtedly Boswell. And Alexander Carlyle wrote a pro-militia letter to the Caledonian Mercury of September 14, 1780 under
the name of NESTOR.

76 See the Caledonian Mercury, 21 May 1796 and 14 April 1791. For long lists of a fraction of the sermons being published, see 6 and 8 November 1786.


78 For a good account of the Moderates' efforts in this regard, see Richard Sher, Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment.


83 N.L.S. Newhailes MS 448, entitled Memorandum Book for the Year 1758. The collection is a goldmine of information and is worth reading, if only for the relationship between Boswell and Dalrymple that it evidences. See Newhailes MS. 495 and 700.

84 Caledonian Mercury, 17 January 1801. For an earlier and long assessment of Blair's claim to fame, see An Account of Dr. Blair's Sermons, Caledonian Mercury, 17 February 1777, which also praises other Moderates such as Ferguson, Robertson and Carlyle.

85 For an account of the phenomenal sales of Blair's sermons, see Robert Morell Schmitz, Hugh Blair, (New York, 1948), 53f.

86 Schmitz, 84.

87 Hill, 205. For an example of the way Blair worked for the Moderate cause, see his letters to Hailes, N.L.S. MS. 498 and 691. The first, dated 2 April 1764 solicited Hailes's help in the cause of one of the ministers of Glasgow, whose appointment was being questioned in a petition to the Assembly. The next, dated 27 October 1755 shows Blair attempting to obtain the appointment of Laurence Allen as a teacher in
Dalrymple’s school (Preston kirk).

88 Hill, 206. Hill’s account of Blair is more useful than that of Schmitz in its examination of Blair’s contemporary importance and his relations with other philosophers and clergymen. Schmitz is unable to give a proper sense of this literary community.


90 Schmitz, 27 and 84.

91 Letters on Dr. Blair’s Sermons, (Edinburgh, 1779), 5-7. This work was sufficiently popular that its author published two further volumes in Scotland.

92 Letters on Dr. Blair’s Sermons, 12.


94 Schmitz, 1.

95 Schmitz, 124; see also, John Logan, Sermons, Vol. I, (Edinburgh, 1826), viii-ix.


97 Schmitz, 126.

98 Thomas Somerville, My Own Life and Times, 1741-1814, (Edinburgh, 1861).

99 Schmitz, 68.

100 Hill, 188.

101 Hill, 176-181.

102 Schmitz, 68.

103 Schmitz, 70.

104 Hill, 111.

105 Hill, 217.


108 See Sher, Moderates, Managers and Popular Politics in Mid-Eighteenth Century Edinburgh, for a detailed account of
Drysdale was much praised in Moderate circles for this sermon, which evidences the importance which the Scottish literati attached to the concept of social rank. Later in the century, Henry Mackenzie and the Highland Society were to lavish similar praise on Thomas Brydson's *An Elucidation of the Distinction of Rank in Society*. See the *Caledonian Mercury*, 16 January 1802.

109 *Caledonian Mercury*, 19 May 1784.

110 Thomas Somerville, *My Own Life and Times*, 60-1.


113 Ian Clark, 125.


116 Much of the information on Charters, minister of Wilton, is contained in Somerville, 50, 166-7, 195 and 227.


119 John Logan, *Sermons*, Vol. I, viii-ix. Some details about the scandal can be gleaned from Logan's letters to Alexander Carlyle, Edinburgh University Library MS. La II, 419, letters 3 and 4. These letters are a good index of Logan’s stature with his contemporaries.

120 *The Correspondence of Adam Smith*, 257.

121 *The Correspondence of Adam Smith*, 285.

122 Smith's admiration of Logan is also referred to in Mackenzie's *Anecdotes and Egotisms*, 154.


124 *A Dissertation on the Governments, Manners, and Spirit of Asia*, 22.

125 *A Dissertation on the Governments, Manners, and Spirit of Asia*, 11-12.
A Dissertation on the Governments, Manners, and Spirit of Asia, 18.


The Correspondence of Adam Smith, 285.


Caledonian Mercury, 18 August 1784; see also John Logan, Sermons, Vol. I, xi-xii and Anecdotes and Egotisms, 152-4.

E.U.L., Laing MS., La II, 419, letter 6. In this letter to Carlyle, Logan was fulsome in his praise of both Blair and Ferguson. Moreover, he discusses the latest leaf of the Edinburgh Review in which he recommended their works.


An Account of the Friday Club, Written by Lord Cockburn, Together with Notes on Certain Other Social Clubs in Edinburgh, Book of the Old Edinburgh Club, III, (1910), 142-3. For more information on the Feast of Tabernacles, see N.L.S., Mackenzie MS., 6377, 49. Also see Anecdotes and Egotisms, 152, where Mackenzie stresses the importance of Logan in this group.

Other honorary members were David Hume, Adam Ferguson, and James Fordyce, and Lord Grenville who remarked that the society had "acquired great Reputation among the Judicious and the learned."

For information on the membership of the Belles Lettres Society and the topics discussed, see N.L.S., MS. 56377.

My Own Life and Times, 39.

For Blair's prestige in Edinburgh society and his relationship with Henry Dundas and Henry Mackenzie, see Harold William Thompson, A Scottish Man of Feeling, (London, 1931), 26, 279-80.

Harold William Thompson, 178-213. According to Thompson, not only was Mackenzie the leader of the literati during the closing decades of the century, but he was also the formative influence upon Burns and Scott.

Cited in An Account of the Friday Club, 142.

N.L.S., MS. 56377. Between 1760 and 1763, Dundas was an extremely active, perhaps the most active member of this society. It is interesting to note the sophisticated nature of the topics which he proposed and his readiness to initiate
literary discussion. The only other member of the club who came close to Dundas in terms of his contribution was Mirror Club member, Robert Cullen.

141 Caledonian Mercury, 26 May 1783.


142 Also see David McElroy's original thesis, The Literary Clubs and Societies of Eighteenth Century Scotland, (Doctoral thesis: Edinburgh University, 1952), 618-627. The thesis is more scholarly and less speculative than McElroy's published work. For more details on the clubs, see also his A Century of Scottish Clubs, 1700-1800, (typescript, 1969) in the National Library of Scotland.


144 E.U.L., Dugald Stewart MS., Dc. 6 iii, fos. 109-17, William Craig to Dugald Stewart, circa 1794.


147 See, for example, the Mirror, (Edinburgh, 1790), no. 13. Henry Mackenzie, Letters to Elizabeth Rose, 45, 78, and 150. One of Mackenzie's main tasks as a member of the Highland Society was to look into the authenticity of Macpherson's compilation.

148 For all the figures on publication and circulation, see Horst Drescher, Themen und Formen des Periodischen Essays im Späten 18. Jahrhundert, (Frankfurt, 1971), 51-61. Drescher also provides a careful check on the authorship of individual essays in the two journals.

149 Themen und Formen, 52. Robert Burn's Bachelors' Club of Ayr, for example, purchased editions of the Mirror and Lounger.

150 Themen und Formen, 59. See also, N.L.S., Mackenzie MS. 6362 f20, letter of Mackenzie to Craig, August 29, 1779. Mirror Club members are marked with an asterisk.

151 E.U.L., Laing MS., II, 265. See also Caledonian Mercury, 3 April 1780.

152 The Scottish Nation, Vol. III, 23.

153 Mackenzie began the novel during his stay in London. See Anecdotes and Egotisms, 185-7.
Harold William Thompson, 178-183.

German scholars have long had an interest in Mackenzie for this reason. See, for example, Johannes Kluge, *Henry Mackenzie. Sein leben und seine werke*, *Anglia*, 22, (1911), 1-112.

Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, Vol. II, (1790), 163 and 155. Mackenzie regarded the works of modern German authors in much the same way as he did that of Shakespeare. For him, they were full of fancy and imagination, "remounting as it were the sources of ancient inspiration" and countering the "sober certainties of science and philosophy." Thus, they could be a powerful moral force in the new age. But Mackenzie thought that German literature was inadequate in "painting the nicer shades by which the same great features of the human mind are discriminated in different persons." The Germans lacked delicacy, refinement, and a knowledge of the human passions. They had much feeling but lacked gentle sensibility.

See, for example, the *Caledonian Mercury*, 4 December 1776.

N.L.S., Newhailes Ms. 485, letter from Mackenzie to Dalrymple, 31 October 1768.

Virtually all the members of the Mirror Club corresponded with Hailes and he was particularly generous in helping with their historical inquiries. See N.L.S., Newhailes MS. 478 for letters from Craig and Cullen.

N.L.S., Newhailes MS. 485, letter from Mackenzie to Dalrymple, 20 August 1768. For Dalrymple's view of commerce, see N.L.S., Newhailes MSS., Vol. 32, wherein he condemned luxury and equated economy with reason and virtue.

For Mackenzie's views, see N.L.S., Mackenzie MS. 6388, B. Mackenzie also criticized Kames in the previously mentioned letter to Dalrymple.

For Mackenzie's views on Machiavelli, see N.L.S., MS. 6384 and 5630. For Hailes' view, see N.L.S., Newhailes MSS., Vol. 30. Both writers believed that there were times when it was necessary for the government to assume extraordinary powers.

The *Scottish Nation*, 11.


166 Claire Lamont, *William Tytler, His Son Alexander Tytler (Lord Woodhouselee), and the Encouragement of Literature in Late Eighteenth-Century Edinburgh*, (B. Litt. thesis: Oxford University, 1968), 110. See also Alexander Fraser Tytler, *Memoirs of the Life and Writings of Henry Home of Kames*, (Edinburgh, 1807), clv.


169 Lamont, 181.


171 Lamont, 110 and 73.

172 N.L.S., MS. 3690, 4.

173 *Anecdotes and Egotisms*, 36. See also the *Caledonian Mercury*, 10 April 1807.

174 E.U.L., Dugald Stewart MS. Dc. 6 iii, f33.

175 *The Correspondence of Adam Smith*, 257.

176 *The Correspondence of Adam Smith*, 246-7.

177 For Smith’s use of the concept of the mirror in relation to moral cultivation, see *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 110. On the reflective nature of morality generally, see 94f.

178 N.L.S., MS. 5569 f3 (Cullen); MS. 6362-95, Correspondence and Manuscripts (Mackenzie).

179 *Caledonian Mercury*, 15 July 1802.


After the Forty-Five, 69.

Caledonian Mercury, 14 January 1797.

Caledonian Mercury, 4 May 1797.

Caledonian Mercury, 15 January 1798.

Caledonian Mercury, 12 January 1805.


N.L.S., MS. NE. 20 h 14.


Caledonian Mercury, 20 February 1794. "We all know, that the manners of a people cannot be stationary," he wrote. "New manners necessarily give birth to new crimes."


E.U.L., Dugald Stewart MS. Dc. 6 iii, fos. 109-17.

The Scottish Nation, Vol. I, 691.

The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 110.

E.U.L., Dugald Stewart MS. Dc. 6 iii, f33.

NOTES: CHAPTER TWO


3. For the view of sexuality as an instrument of oppression which was perfected in the nineteenth century, see Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, (New York, 1978).


8. See also the letter by CATO in the Caledonian Mercury, 14 May 1768.

9. Caledonian Mercury, 10 June 1767.

10. Caledonian Mercury, 8 June 1778.

11. Caledonian Mercury, 13 July 1778.

12. Caledonian Mercury, 4 January 1779. See also Caledonian Mercury, 12 May, 12 July and 24 August 1779. In particular, see the essay by POLITICUS in the Scots Magazine, February 1778.

13. Caledonian Mercury, 18 December 1780.

14. Caledonian Mercury, 22 April 1775. For David Loch's use of civic humanist concepts, see especially his statement in the Caledonian Mercury to the Edinburgh Town Council re. the forthcoming election, 10 October 1774. Loch had decided to run against Sir Lawrence Dundas, whom he accused of denying the independence of the citizens of Edinburgh and infecting them with his own luxury and corruption.
Caledonian Mercury, 14 June 1775.

Caledonian Mercury, 1 May 1776.

Caledonian Mercury, 20 March 1786.


Scots Magazine, June 1764.

Scots Magazine, August 1764.

Scots Magazine, November 1764.

Scots Magazine, April 1765.

Scots Magazine, June 1772.

Scots Magazine, April 1773.

Caledonian Mercury, July 3 1771.


Caledonian Mercury, 18 March 1772.

Caledonian Mercury, 3 June 1772.

Mirror 92.

Lounger 36.

Lounger 56.

Mirror 28.


N.L.S., Mackenzie MS. 6379.

N.L.S., Mackenzie MS. 6380 and 6379, esp. 60 and 66.

The Machiavellian Moment, 499-504.

Richard Sher stresses the non-revolutionary, indeed highly conservative, nature of Moderate usage of the concepts
of luxury, corruption and independence in *Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment*, 190.


40 *Scots Magazine*, September 1783.


42 John Logan *Elements of the Philosophy of History*, 164-5.


44 Similarly, the next section shows that Blair’s concept of an invisible hand — while it owed something to the Calvinist notion of a particular providence — also brought together religious and historical time. In essence, Blair posited God as a hidden hand working in human time.

45 Richard Sher places greater emphasis on the concept of the covenanted nation and objects to my tendency to completely secularize the Moderates in his *Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment*, 206f. However, in general, his analysis of the Moderate clergy, with its emphasis on Stoicism and civic humanism, runs parallel to my own. In particular his argument in connection with Adam Ferguson — that his historical analysis was subordinate to moral concerns — supports the argument here.


54 See also, Hugh Blair, *Sermons*, Vol. IV, sermon xi.

Many of these sermons in this volume were written early in Blair’s career. But since they contain reflections on such topics as the French Revolution, I suspect that many of these comments were also added later, when Blair, like other members of the Scottish literati were most concerned about social mobility and the corruption of manners.


On Adam Ferguson as a *conservative moralist*, see *Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment*, 197-199.

John Drysdale, *Sermons*, Vol. II, sermon xii, wherein he described the future state as one different from that on earth where “there has always been in their original constitution some seeds of corruption, which grew up with the state, gradually spread their infection, and at last quite overturned it.”

Gerhard Oestreich, *Neostoicism and the Early Modern State*, ed. Brigitta Oestreich and H.G. Koenigsberger, (Cambridge, 1982). This is an important work, despite its disorganized nature, and one which provides new insights into the foundation of the modern state and its consciousness.

Oestreich, 2 and 36.

Oestreich, 53.

For Mr. Spectator’s Stoicism, see, for example, *Spectators* no. 501, 574 and 575 in the Donald F. Bond edition of *The Spectator*, (Oxford, 1965). Both Peter Gay, in *The Spectator as Actor* and the Blooms in Joseph Addison’s *Sociable Animal* tend to ignore Addison’s Stoicism and try to present him as the optimistic champion of a consciously emerging middle class. But Addison’s Stoicism ran particularly deep and informed many of the essays in the *Spectator*. Richard Steele, too, evidenced himself to be a follower of the Stoics in essays such as *Spectator* 387, wherein he defined *ease* in stoic terms. “The thoughts of him who would be discreet,” he wrote, “and aim at practical things, should turn upon allaying our Pain rather than promoting our Joy. Great Inquietude is to be avoided, but great Felicity is not to be attained. The lesson is *Aequanimity, a Regularity of Spirit*, which is a little above *Chearfulness* and below *Mirth*.”

See Spectators 237 (Seneca), 219 (Epictetus), and 256 (Cicero).

Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment, 175f.

The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 5f (introduction).

Oestreich, 25.

Lounger 77; The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 288.


Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment, 178-9.

A.A. Long, Language and Thought in Stoicism, Problems in Stoicism, ed. A.A. Long, (London, 1972). Long’s outline of stoic reason in terms of internal speech and the ideas of consequence and succession is especially useful for examining the Stoicism of Mr. Spectator and the late eighteenth century Scots. The former often referred to reason as the ability to reflect and to take into account cause and effect. The latter were particularly concerned to show individuals how to converse internally when social conversation was not conducive to virtue.

Spectator 574. It is important to note, however, that Mr. Spectator could use the concept of imagination in a quite different way when he referred to it as the tool of the artist. Here, imagination became the ability to create suitable and surprising images in order to captivate or teach one’s audience. The Scots made a similar distinction.

Hugh Blair Sermons, Vol. IV, sermon xviii.


Hugh Blair, Sermons, Vol. IV, sermon xiv.

Hugh Blair, Sermons, Vol. IV, sermon xiii.

Hugh Blair, Sermons, Vol. V, sermon i.

87 The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 7.

89 Smith was certainly not above advocating various kinds of self-deceit as natural mechanisms for the insurance of personal stability and social harmony. In *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Moderate Divines*, I suggest that religion was just such a form of self-delusion. I would like to thank Harvey Mitchell of the University of British Columbia for lending me an unpublished paper on Smith’s use of self-deceit in order to overcome the problem of power and the respective positions of the rich and the poor inherent in an economic polity based primarily upon self-love.

97 On resignation to Providence, see also John Drysdale, *Sermons*, Vol. II, sermon xi.

100 Lounger 34.
101 Lounger 10.
102 Mirror 47.
103 The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 86.
104 The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 44 (Introduction).
is difficult to understand how someone who stresses Smith's contribution can at the same time suggest that one of the primary characteristics of sentimentalism was a preoccupation with solitariness, 38-9 and 68.


107 Even more striking is the similarity between Smith's discussion of morality and that of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman. See Berger and Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 44 and *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 110. Both the eighteenth century and twentieth century authors claim that morality is socially constructed in the crucial face-to-face situation. Both claim that morality is *reflective* in nature. Both use the analogy of the mirror. For the similarity between Smith and Peter Winch on language and morality, see J. Ralph Lindgren, *The Social Philosophy of Adam Smith*, 18 and 142.


111 Mackenzie’s major criticism of Smith was that he tended to oversimplify human behaviour. He criticized *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* on precisely these grounds but claimed that Smith was correct in saying that man’s notion of approval and disapproval was not based upon utility. He also thought that Smith’s treatment of Stoicism was quite good. See N.L.S., Mackenzie MS. 6387 and 6388.


113 *Mirror* 100.

114 *Mirror* 72.

115 *Loungers* 82-4.


117 For example, it would appear that David Fordyce, an avowed Hutchesonian, was already placing considerable emphasis upon sympathy and the interactive process long before Smith. See *Dialogues Concerning Education*, (London, 1745), especially
380-1. In his synthesis of moral philosophy for Dodley's Preceptor, (London, 1754), Fordyce merely parroted Hutcheson.

118 See N.L.S., Mackenzie MS. 6387 for Mackenzie's views on conjectural history. See also MS. 6388 wherein he condemned overly deductive approaches to the study of human nature.

119 Lounger 88.

120 For the quote from Smith, see The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 180.

121 Scots Magazine, June 1771.

122 Caledonian Mercury, 30 July 1781.

123 Scots Magazine, November 1773.

124 Caledonian Mercury, 10 June 1771.

125 Scots Magazine, February 1774.

126 Scots Magazine, September 1787.

127 Scots Magazine, May 1773; September 1775; March 1784.

128 Scots Magazine, September 1775.

129 Caledonian Mercury, 11 March 1771.

130 Scots Magazine, March 1784.

131 Scots Magazine, August 1780.

132 Scots Magazine, April 1779.

133 Caledonian Mercury, 10 June 1771.

134 Lounger 90.

135 See C.A. Moore, The English Malady, Backgrounds of English Literature, 1700-1760, ed. C.A. Moore, (Minneapolis, 1953), 179-238 for the author's assessment of the Spectator in this regard. Moore also has interesting things to say about some of the Scots' treatment of melancholia as an internal state, which could be cured by natural methods.

136 C.A. Moore, 159. "Melancholy," wrote Addison in Spectator 387, "is a kind of Demon that haunts our Island."

137 Scots Magazine, January 1764.


139 *Caledonian Mercury*, 30 July 1781.

140 *Caledonian Mercury*, 18 August 1784.

141 *Scots Magazine*, March 1786.


154 Samuel Charters, *Sermons*, sermon x.

155 Samuel Charters, *Sermons*, sermon xvi.


157 Thomas Somerville, *Sermons*, (Edinburgh, 1813), sermon iii.


159 Thomas Somerville, *Sermons*, sermon ii.


See, especially, *Mirror* 33 wherein Bannatyne criticized that want of complacency which rendered people unfit to live among their fellows. See, too, *Mirror* 60 wherein Craig argued, "I have long been of the opinion, that one of the most important lessons to be learned in life, is that of being able to trifle upon occasion."
Mirror 101.

Scots Magazine, June 1770.
NOTES: CHAPTER THREE


2 John Gillis, *Youth and History*, (New York, 1981), 1-93. See also, Joseph Kett, *Rites of Passage: Adolescence in America, 1790 to the Present*, (New York, 1977), 3-37, wherein the author argues that, while a period of semi-dependent status existed for the young in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, there was little or no conception of the awkward and vulnerable stage of life that we today associate with adolescence.


5 *The Family, Sex and Marriage in England*, 512.


8 *Emile*, Bk. IV.

9 Jean Jacques Rousseau, *His Educational Theories Selected from Emile*, 182.


12 In particular, the addresses of James Fordyce, which reflected a recognizably modern view of adolescence, went through numerous editions in America. Blair's sermons, many of which were directed specifically at ingenuous, pliant, and vulnerable youth, were popular in both England and America. Particular essays and sermons of Blair and Fordyce were printed and reprinted in countless volumes of moral essays for the young until well into the nineteenth century. See, for example, *Advice to Youth: Containing a Compendium of the Duties of Human Life in Youth and Manhood*, (Edinburgh, 1808).

13 William Smellie, *A Dissertation on the Means of Supporting and Promoting Public Spirit*, Literary and
Characteristical Lives, (Edinburgh, 1808), 357. In this long essay, Smellie was also concerned to establish the social passions of the young and to point to their cultivation as a mechanism for ensuring the preservation of public spirit. See esp. 329f for an attack on Mandeville's egotistical view of the human passions.

For example, see James Fordyce, Addresses to Young Men, (Boston, 1782), 98-101. Of all the authors discussed in this chapter, Fordyce was the one who dealt most with sexual attraction, its dangers and its positive qualities. In a well received sermon to the General Assembly, which made his reputation in Scotland, he also treated of the problem of sexual availability in the growing cities of the late eighteenth century and among the fashionable elite. See James Fordyce, The Folly, Infamy and Misery of Unlawful Pleasure, A Sermon Preached before the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, (Boston, 1761), 6.

For example, see Hugh Blair, Sermons, Vol. III, sermon iv, wherein the author described the virtuous affections of youth and contrasted these with the selfish interest which tended to characterize the adult stage of life.


The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 201.

William Creech, Letters to John Sinclair, 32-44.

Scots Magazine, July 1774.

Scots Magazine, March 1776. For Fordyce's poem on Evil Company, see the Scots Magazine, February 1787.

Scots Magazine, January 1787.

Scots Magazine, February 1789.

Scots Magazine, November 1786.

Addresses to Young Men, 19.

Mirror 22.
29 Caledonian Mercury, 4 May 1768.

30 Caledonian Mercury, 14 May 1768. On the same theme, see VERITAS’ attack on Frenchified soplings, Caledonian Mercury, 16 March 1774.

31 Caledonian Mercury, 21 December 1768.

32 Caledonian Mercury, 10 June 1769.

33 Caledonian Mercury, 21 October 1769. On bachelors, see Loungers 24 and 51.

34 Caledonian Mercury, 17 April 1771.

35 Scots Magazine, February 1788.

36 Scots Magazine, March 1788.

37 Scots Magazine, April 1788.

38 Caledonian Mercury, 6 July 1771.

39 Caledonian Mercury, 1 March 1775.

40 For example, see Caledonian Mercury, 28 July 1776; 6 August 1776; and, especially, 28 November 1786. It would seem that success in reforming the High School and controlling the behaviour of students was gradual at best. The Caledonian Mercury for 11 February 1786 reported two separate incidents in which one student shot a master and another knifed a fellow student.

41 Caledonian Mercury, 11 August 1777.

42 Caledonian Mercury, 28 September 1782 and 5 November 1790.

43 Caledonian Mercury, 29 November 1784.

44 Caledonian Mercury, 28 November 1786.

45 Lord Kames, Loose Hints Upon Education, (Edinburgh, 1781), 221. This work stressed the critical importance of education as a mechanism for avoiding social corruption and the role of parents in the education process. While the author clearly recognizes the event of “puberty, when new appetites and desires spring up” as the most critical period, for education, however, he tends to blur the distinctions between childhood and youth in his analysis. This is not insignificant, perhaps, in showing that a recognition of puberty does not imply a very new perspective on the adolescent.
This was also true of the addresses and sermons of James Fordyce and his English imitators, such as John Bennett and Mrs. Griffiths. The volume consisting of Blair and Fordyce's *Advice to Youth*, for example, went through numerous editions.


See Samuel Charters, *Sermons*, sermon viii and, on gentle sensibility, see sermons x and xvi.

Themen und Formen des Periodischen Essays im Späten 18 Jahrhundert.

Mirror 15. Unlike most of the essays on youth and education, this essay was composed by Home rather than Mackenzie. Despite outlining the general attitude to education of the Mirror Club generally it lacks that explicit emphasis upon the gentle sensibility of youth in Mackenzie's essays.

Mirror 15. For the Mirror Club's discussion of the
education of the middling ranks of society, see especially Loungers 13 and 53.

68 On youthful heat, see Mirror 14; on the romantic spirit and enthusiasm of youth, see Mirror 37; and on young enthusiasts, see Mirror 101.

69 On the young and inexperienced, see Mirror 94 and Lounger 82; on the young having too much vivacity to reason, see Lounger 35; on the young and thoughtless, see Lounger 50.

70 Mirror 15.

71 Lounger 67.

72 For example, see Mirror 4. Also, in Lounger 51, Mackenzie spoke of the ingenuus pudor as "formerly the most pleasing characteristic of youth" now being quite exploded. Young people, he complained, had forgotten how to blush.

73 Lounger 6.

74 Lounger 51.

75 Mirror 57.

76 Lounger 96.

77 See, especially, Loungers 20, 24 and 28.

78 The dreams of childhood are contrasted with the project of youth in Mirror 16. On the amiable simplicity and frankness of children, see Mirror 22. Mr. Mirror had precious little to say about the infant and childhood stages of life. He did, however, follow Rousseau in approving of mothers who breastfed their own children. See, for example, Lounger 82.

79 See Mirror 40 for an account of the SIMULATOR who attempts to reduce the art of pleasing to a system. Also see Mirrors 38, 78 and 103.

80 See, for example, Mirrors 4 and 12. The walking, talking dolls -- the poupees -- obviously held a great fascination for the Mirror Club and were referred to in several essays. See Loungers 19, 22 and 76.

81 Mirror 29.

82 Letters of Lord Chesterfield, ed. R.K. Root, (London, 1929). Chesterfield's work comes up time and time again in late eighteenth century Scottish writing as an example of the extremes to which social role playing could be taken and the danger which such cameleons were to the moral community.
These terms are used to describe the influence of a nearby family of nabobs upon the gentry family of John Homespun in Lounger 17.

Loungers 87 and 93. For yet another example of the way in which this idea of the country could stimulate the moral imagination, see Henry Mackenzie's discussion of his cousin's country home, Culmony, in Letters to Elizabeth Rose, 172-4. Mackenzie used the idea of Culmony as a mental mechanism for transporting himself from the busy and interested life of Edinburgh.

Many of the essays in the Mirror and Lounger discuss the problem of too refined and sensitive an education for those below the 1000 pound income bracket. The sons and daughters of Scottish ministers were singled out as a particular problem, since their parents often had much cultivation but little income.

Lounger 101. This essay, it is interesting to note, was highly praised by Alexander Fraser Tytler in Memoirs of the Life and Writings of Henry Home of Kames, 17. Mirror 100 also dealt with the need for men of business to read the classics. But this was a far less moralistic and more practical suggestion that those retired men of business with great fortunes should have something to occupy their minds.

Lord Kames, Loose Hints Upon Education, 241. Machiavelli may have been the first to discuss exploiting the classics in this way. See Sebastian de Grazia's intriguing account in Crossings into Another World: Machiavelli and Others, Journal of the History of Ideas, XLV, (January-March, 1984), 145-151.

Mirror 35. On the theme of rejuvenating a society's lost virtue, see Letters to Elizabeth Rose, 163. It is interesting to note that Mackenzie here referred to this renewal as a second youth.

For example, see Lounger 55.

Mirror 10.
Mirrors 10, 63, and 101. See also Loungers 18 and 46.

In particular, see Lounger 78 on the misapplied activities of Mr. Bustle and Lounger 88 on Dormer, a man of public spirit rather than private benevolence.


Mirror 101. See also, Loungers 9, 20, 28, and 52. On the concept of extreme sensibility as a way of interpreting Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, see Mirror 99.

Lounger 9.

Mirror 28.

Lounger 77.

Lounger 52.

Craig Beveridge, *Childhood and Society in Eighteenth Century Scotland*, *New Perspectives on the Politics and Culture of Early Modern Scotland*, 265-290. This is a stimulating essay which, however, does tend to confuse childhood with youth in the evidence that the author draws from the second half of the eighteenth century.
NOTES: CHAPTER FOUR

1Richard Sennett's *The Fall of Public Man*, (New York, 1974) attempts to trace this development back to the use of the concept of liberty in eighteenth century England. Narrowly equating liberty with self-indulgence, he attempts to show how it shattered the traditional public/private molecule. An advocate of the operations of sympathy in a public domain peopled by strangers, he strangely ignores the discussion of these concepts in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. Moreover, he completely fails to understand the complex eighteenth century discussion of the relationships between public spirit, independence, and sympathy.

2See, for example, *Spectator* 290 which emphasizes the domestic virtues of heroes of the highest Quality in Life.

3Peter Smithers also makes this claim in *The Life of Joseph Addison*, (Oxford, 1954), 27.

4*The Family, Sex and Marriage in England*, 253f.

5*The Machiavellian Moment*, chapter xii.

6*Caledonian Mercury*, 9 December 1769. On London, see *Caledonian Mercury*, 4 November 1767; 4 December 1767; 22 April 1775 and 7 June 1776.

7*Caledonian Mercury*, 31 August 1772.

8James Fordyce, *Addresses to Young Men*, 333.

9*Caledonian Mercury*, 26 September 1764.

10*Caledonian Mercury*, 28 October 1769.

11*Caledonian Mercury*, 5 October 1765.

12N.L.S., MS. 56377. Under this manuscript number are not only a list of topics and proposers but also a notebook with comments on discussions. These comments may have been made by Thomas Somerville.

13*Caledonian Mercury*, 13 December 1769; see also, 9 and 11 December 1769.

14*Caledonian Mercury*, 4 September 1782.

15*Scots Magazine*, November 1772.

16*Scots Magazine*, November 1773.

17*Scots Magazine*, July 1783. This poem was taken from the
British Magazine and may not have been a Scottish production.

18 Caledonian Mercury, 25 October 1790.

19 Scots Magazine, September 1777.

20 Scots Magazine, February 1780.

21 Scots Magazine, August 1769.

22 Scots Magazine, May 1782.


26 Hugh Blair, Sermons, Vol. III, sermon xiv.

27 Hugh Blair, Sermons, Vol. IV, sermon xvii.


32 Hugh Blair, Sermons, Vol. V, sermon i.

33 Hugh Blair, Sermons, Vol. V, sermons i and xiv. The title of the latter sermon was On a Peaceable Disposition.


36 Hugh Blair, Sermons, Vol. IV, sermon viii.

37 Hugh Blair, Sermons, Vol. II, sermon i -- On the Importance of Order in conduct.


48 Charles Knight, *The Created World of the Edinburgh Periodicals*, *Scottish Literary Journal*, (December, 1979), 20-36, esp. 31. This essay is full of useful insights on the *Mirror Club* including their recognition of the problem of *anti-social man* and their insight into the *reality of the particular*. Its argument re the shift from the public to the private sphere fully supports my own.

49 For a good example of the political context of Addison's analysis, see *Spectator* 243. Most of the essays treating of the existence of virtue in private life were written by Steele, rather than Addison. See, for example, *Spectator* 385.

50 *Lounger* 12.

51 *Mirror* 93.

52 *Lounger* 18.

53 *Lounger* 29.

54 *Lounger* 48.

55 *Lounger* 81.

56 See also, *Loungers* 2 and 5 for the *Mirror Club*’s emphasis on domestic history rather than the history of great events and personages. The editor of the *Scots Magazine* had particular praise of Adam Ferguson for elucidating historical characters by reference to their domestic life. See the *Scots Magazine*, September 1783.

57 *Mirrors* 70 and 71.

58 *Mirror* 70.

59 *Lounger* 75.

60 *Lounger* 21.

61 *Lounger* 65.
62 Lounger 88.
63 Lounger 34.
64 Mirror 72.
65 Mirror 33.
66 Thomas McDonald, *Thoughts on the Public Duties of Private Life*, (Edinburgh, 1795).
67 Scots Magazine, October 1764.
68 Scots Magazine, January 1766.
69 For example, see his poem *To the Present Age*. Scots Magazine, August 1767.
70 Scots Magazine, September 1776.
71 Scots Magazine, August 1780.
72 See the Scots Magazine, July 1768; November 1769; November 1779; May 1772; October 1770; and September 1768. Citation taken from last poem mentioned.
73 Scots Magazine, July 1783.
74 Scots Magazine, September 1776.
75 Scots Magazine, July 1787.
78 Caledonian Mercury, 17 October 1764.
79 Caledonian Mercury, 5 November 1764.
80 Caledonian Mercury, 4 September 1780; see praise for this article in FATIMA'S letter to the Caledonian Mercury, 9 September 1780.
81 Caledonian Mercury, 22 December 1781 and 5 January 1782.
82 Caledonian Mercury, 11 December 1782; 12 February 1783; and 18 June 1783.
83 Caledonian Mercury, 28 August 1786.
84 Scots Magazine, March 1775.
85 Scots Magazine, June 1772.
86 Scots Magazine, October 1772. On the tender parent, see Scots Magazine, January 1776; on friendship between parents and children, see the poem The Partridges, Scots Magazine, February 1791.
87 Scots Magazine, November 1773.
88 Scots Magazine, January 1766.
89 Caledonian Mercury, 18 June 1783; 11 January 1790; 29 December 1788; and 4 January 1790.
90 Caledonian Mercury, 14 January 1790.
91 Hugh Blair, Sermons, Vol. I, sermon vi. The emphasis upon habit here is interesting; it suggests that it is only through interaction with others that virtue is acquired.
92 Hugh Blair, Sermons, Vol. II, sermon i.
93 Hugh Blair, Sermons, Vol. II, sermon iii.
94 Hugh Blair, Sermons, Vol. V., sermon xv.
96 David Fordyce’s Theodorus: A Dialogue Concerning the Art of Preaching, (London, 1755) was often reprinted with his brother’s Sermon on the Eloquence, and an Essay on the Action of the Pulpit. In the latter, James Fordyce emphasized the use of a natural and pathetic approach in order to win over the affections. Stressing the need to achieve sympathy with one’s audience, Fordyce called upon preachers to be masters of this intellectual music and fully acquainted with the language of the heart, 235-294. The sermon is also interesting in the important distinction which Fordyce wanted to make between the profligate and virtuous social actor, 242.
97 James Fordyce, Addresses to Young Men, Vol. II, addresses ix, x and xi.
100 Addresses to Young Men, Vol. II, 111-133. The quotation is on the last page cited.
101 Mirror 94.
For Burke's account of public affection beginning in the family, see *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, ed. William B. Todd, (New York, 1968), 244.

For the use of the term *little society*, see *Lounger* 57.

See also, *Mirror* 78, wherein Mackenzie criticizes some common impressions of the concept of friendship.

*Scots Magazine*, June 1771.
Such a statement is certainly one that Joseph Addison would have agreed with. In *Spectator* 604, he wrote: "The prospect of human misery struck me dumb. Then it was that, to disburthen my Mind, I took Pen and Ink, and did every Thing that hath since happened under my Office of SPECTATOR." On the cultivation of cheerfulness, see *Spectators* 387 and 494.

NOTES: CHAPTER FIVE


2 For example, see Terry Eagleton, The Rape of Clarissa: Writing, Sexuality and Class Struggle in Samuel Richardson, (Oxford, 1982), and Margaret Anne Doody, A Natural Passion: A Study of the Novels of Samuel Richardson, (Oxford, 1974). The latter author is particular good in showing how Richardson went beyond Fielding and Smollet in his emphasis on the feminine. For a more general literary discussion of bourgeois culture and the role of the eighteenth century woman, see Ian Watt, The Rise of the Novel, (Middlesex, 1957).

3 The Family, Sex and Marriage in England, 181-229.

4 Spectator 4.

5 Peter Smithers, The Life of Joseph Addison, 254 and 264.


7 Scots Magazine, April 1787.

8 The terms are used by Deborah Gorham in The Victorian Girl and the Feminine Ideal. Gorham's work is especially informative as to the medical discourse on women in the nineteenth century, although she ignores such eighteenth century medical men as Cadogan, Buchan and Gregory on this topic. This is related to the author's tendency to view certain nineteenth century individuals as ahead of their times in their treatment of women.

9 Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Women, chapter v.

10 See, for example, the Scots Magazine, November 1766.

11 David Fordyce, Dialogues Concerning Education, 290f (on natural feeling and the association of ideas); 364f (on the association of ideas in moral formation).

12 Dialogues Concerning Education, 48-51 (on the connection between manners and female softness); 87f (on the distinction between internal purity and rectitude of manners and external decorum).

13 Dialogues Concerning Education, 307f (the importance of
feeling in education); 161f (criticisms of Stoicism); 179f (utilizing the feelings of children in education).

14 *Dialogues Concerning Education*, 45f and 271-99, on the false definition of manners in polite circles.

15 *Dialogues Concerning Education*, 144, 167 and 392 (on public life); 191 and 317 (on private education and the family); 50 and 303 (on complaisance); 157-8 (on the softness and power of women).

16 *Dialogues Concerning Education*, 197.

17 *Dialogues Concerning Education*, 50.

18 *Dialogues Concerning Education*, 380.

19 *Dialogues Concerning Education*, 380.

20 *Dialogues Concerning Education*, 50 and 75f.

21 See, for example, *Lounger* 57 wherein AURELIUS describes his wife and the little housekeeper, his daughter.

22 See, for example, the *Caledonian Mercury*, 20 January 1773 and 24 November 1773.

23 *Caledonian Mercury*, 13 September 1776.

24 *Caledonian Mercury*, 20 July 1776.

25 *Caledonian Mercury*, 20 January 1773.

26 *Caledonian Mercury*, 24 November 1773.

27 *Caledonian Mercury*, 16 February 1782.

28 To cite but two examples, the *Caledonian Mercury*, 6 December 1790 and 17 April 1771.

29 *Caledonian Mercury*, 16 February 1782.

30 For example, see the letter of R.S., *Caledonian Mercury*, 6 January 1773; *A SATYRIST*, 2 August 1776; *A Letter from a Brother to his Sisters, on Charity*, 3 August 1776; and *ARISTIPPUS*, 7 August 1776.

31 *Scots Magazine*, January 1773.


33 *Mirror* 96.
34 Mirror 67.
35 Mirror 30.
36 Mirror 102. For the Mirror Club's use of the term mimic metropolis, see Mirrors 84 and 92.
37 Mirror 76.
38 Lounger 14; see also Loungers 4, 6, and 32.
39 Lounger 85.
40 Caledonian Mercury, 13 May 1771.
42 Mirror 30.
45 Scots Magazine, June 1782.
46 Sermons to Young Women, Vol. II, sermon xiii.
47 Sermons to Young Women, Vol. II, sermon xiii; see also, Vol. II, sermon ix.
48 James Fordyce, Sermons to Young Women, Vol. II, sermon ix. Also see The Folly, Infamy and Misery of Unlawful Pleasure, 33-4, wherein Fordyce evidenced his respect for such philosophers as Plato, Epictetus, Seneca and Antoninus.
49 Sermons to Young Women, Vol. I, sermon iii.
50 Sermons to Young Women, Vol. I, sermon iii.
51 Sermons to Young Women, Vol. I, sermon v; see also, Vol. II, sermon viii.
52 Sermons to Young Women, Vol. II, sermon viii.
53 Sermons to Young Women, Vol. II, sermon viii.
54 Sermons to Young Women, Vol. II, sermon viii.
55 Scots Magazine, July 1769.
56 A Father's Legacy to his Daughters, 40-1.
57 Lounger 23.
58 Mirror 89.
59 Mirror 30.
60 Lounger 6.
61 Lounger 4.
62 Lounger 16.
63 Scots Magazine, October 1772.
64 Caledonian Mercury, 27 July 1774.
65 Caledonian Mercury, 20 September 1775.
66 Scots Magazine, November 1763. See also, The Pursuits of Happiness in the Scots Magazine, July 1771, wherein none other than Henry Mackenzie viewed happiness and virtue in terms of a small farm with "rosy children fat like cherubs round."
67 Sermons to Young Women, Vol. I, sermon v. On the art of conversation, see also Mirror 5 and Lounger 76.
68 Scots Magazine, March 1789.
69 Scots Magazine, July 1789.
70 Scots Magazine, November 1789.
71 Scots Magazine, August 1765.
72 A Vindication of the Rights of Women, 152.
73 Scots Magazine, August 1765.
74 Scots Magazine, January 1766.
75 Scots Magazine, December 1779.
76 Scots Magazine, June 1775.
77 Scots Magazine, March 1778.
78 Scots Magazine, March 1780.
79 Scots Magazine, September 1774.
80 A Vindication of the Rights of Women, 148.
81 A Vindication of the Rights of Women, 151.
82 Sermons to Young Women, Vol. II, sermon xii.
84 Sermons to Young Women, Vol. II, sermon xiii.
85 Sermons to Young Women, Vol. II, sermons xiii and xiv.
86 Sermons to Young Women, Vol. II, sermon xiii.
87 Sermons to Young Women, Vol. II, sermon xiii.
88 See, for example, Hugh Blair, Sermons, Vol. I, sermon vi and Vol. II, sermon v.
89 Sermons to Young Women, Vol. II, sermon xiii.
90 Sermons to Young Women, Vol. II, sermon xiii.
91 Sermons to Young Women, Vol. II, sermon xiv.
92 Sermons to Young Women, Vol. II, sermon xiv.
93 Sermons to Young Women, Vol. I, sermon i.
94 Sermons to Young Women, Vol. I, sermon i.
95 For more on the concept of ease and its equation with complacency, see Sermons to Young Women, Vol. I, sermon v.
100 Mirror 9.
101 Mirror 30.
102 Mirror 63.
103 Mirror 89.
104 Lounger 10.
105 Lounger 23.
106 Lounger 85.
107 Lounger 85. On the subject of cards, see also the poem by McGuffog Rae in the Caledonian Mercury, 1 October 1792,
which praised the Dutchess of Buccleugh for not indulging in play. See also Sermons to Young Women, Vol. I, sermon vi. Like Mackenzie, Fordyce believed that card playing had a "tendency to destroy all distinctions both of rank and sex."

108 Scots Magazine, November 1766.

109 Scots Magazine, April 1767.

110 Scots Magazine, February 1771.

111 Scots Magazine, March 1775. Such comments, common in both the English and Scottish press, were aimed primarily at people of station who could afford to put their children out to wet nurse.

112 Scots Magazine, November 1784.

113 Scots Magazine, April 1787. This extract was from Strictures of Female Education; chiefly as it relates to the Culture of the Heart by John Bennett, curate of St. Mary's in Manchester.

114 Scots Magazine, November 1766.

115 Scots Magazine, March 1776.


117 Sermons to Young Women, Vol. I, sermon i.

118 Sermons to Young Women, Vol. I, sermon vi.

119 Sermons to Young Women, Vol. II, sermon xii.

120 Sermons to Young Women, Vol. II, sermon xii.

121 Sermons to Young Women, Vol. II, sermon xiv.


123 For example, see Sermons to Young Women, Vol. II, sermon xii wherein Fordyce refers to properly domesticated women as good angels and guardian angels.

124 Sermons to Young Women, Vol. II, sermon xi; see also, Vol. II, sermon ix for his discussion of the inferior tribunal of the world versus the tribunal that was supreme and infallible.

125 Sermons to Young Women, Vol. II, sermon x.

126 Sermons to Young Women, Vol. I, sermon ii.
It is interesting to note Mackenzie's suggestion here that marriage to a woman like La Roche's daughter might have transformed David Hume into a man of feeling. Craig makes similar remarks about the character Umphraville in Mirror 19.

Richardson's freshness consists in his emphasis upon the importance of love and his elaboration upon this interior emotion. But his discussion of virtue proper remains fairly traditional and highly religious in nature. There is none of that heavy religious symbolism in Henry Mackenzie's novels, for example, that characterizes Richardson's Clarissa. For a very good account of the Richardson's novels, see Margaret Doody's A Natural Passion: A Study of the Novels of Samuel Richardson.
NOTES: CHAPTER SIX

1 Caledonian Mercury, 23 April 1783.


4 Robert D. Mayo stresses the role of the Spectator and Tatler in developing these techniques, which finally found their home in the novel, in his excellent work, The English Novel in the Magazines, 1740-1845, (London, 1962), 33-69. See also pages 124f for an enlightened account of the significance of the Mirror and Lounger in developing these techniques further.

5 On the role of the new bourgeois reading public in general, see Ian Watt’s The Rise of the Novel, especially chapters one and two.


7 Walter Francis Wright, Sensibility in English Prose Fiction, 1760-1814: A Reinterpretation, (New York, 1972), 32. For a sensible critique of this point of view, see Alan Dugald McKillop, The Early Masters of English Fiction, (Kansas, 1968), 217. For a somewhat different attempt to picture Mackenzie as a hardheaded realist in his later, as opposed to his earlier, life, see James R. Foster’s History of the Pre-Romantic Novel in England, (New York, 1966), 169-70.

8 Gerard A. Barker, Henry Mackenzie, (Boston, 1975), esp. 37-9 and 65. Barker also supports my claim that Mackenzie was obsessed with what he viewed as the degeneracy of the age, 21-2, 60, 174 and 181.

9 Henry Mackenzie, 29. Barker also claims that Mackenzie often introduced pathos purely for its own sake, 54. He fails to realize Mackenzie’s moral intent in arousing sympathy.

10 Themen und Formen des Periodischen Essays im Späten 18 Jahrhundert, 121, 207-8. Drescher believes that only a few traces of Mackenzie’s sentimentalism were left by the time he came to contribute to the Mirror. For the use of the terms excess of sensibility and extreme sensibility, see Mirrors 47 and 51.


Robert Malcolm Grindell, Henry Mackenzie: A Study in Literary Sentimentalism, (Doctoral Dissertation: University of Arizona, 1972). This thesis is criticized as an example of what happens when the assumptions of Ian Watt’s The Rise of the Novel are applied to Mackenzie’s work. For similar criticisms of the emerging bourgeoisie approach to the novels of Richardson, see Margaret Anne Doody, A Natural Passion: A Study of the Novels of Samuel Richardson.

It would be extremely anachronistic to refer to anything like a self-conscious middle class during this period. As Peter Laslett points out in The World We Have Lost, (London, 1971), there was only one group in this society which contained enough vertical and horizontal links to be entitled to the label class -- the landed aristocracy.


Richetti, 21.


Mirror 19.

Mirror 31.

Mirror 55.

Lounger 52.

Lounger 77.

Lounger 18.
Mirror 63.
Mirror 31.
Lounger 49.
Lounger 50.
Lounger 27.
Lounger 28. See also the letter to the Caledonian Mercury by JOHN HOMESPUN condemning The Gamester for its "gross indelicacy and corruption of manners," 8 April 1790.


Mackenzie advocated this method of presenting characters in Mirror 31.

The Man of Feeling, 133.

The Man of Feeling, 10-11. For a remarkably similar analysis, see David Fordye's Dialogues Concerning Education, 283f.

The Man of Feeling, 100.
The Man of Feeling, 73.
The Man of Feeling, 84.
The Man of Feeling, 118.
The Man of Feeling, 125.
The Man of Feeling, 128.
The Man of Feeling, 128.
The Man of Feeling, 10.

Such an income would place Harley within the ranks of the minor gentry and was not an insignificant income. However, it was certainly not enough to allow Harley to play the benevolent role of a landed individual. When Mackenzie speaks of the ordinary stations of life, we should never make the mistake of thinking that he was speaking of the labouring classes.

The Man of Feeling, 18.
The Man of Feeling, 19.
Robert Grindell develops this argument in his thesis. It is of a piece with his belief that Mackenzie merely echoed the values of a new female reading public. It is interesting that Grindell completely overlooks Harley's more manly qualities.
The Man of Feeling, 100.

The Man of Feeling, 15f. These passages also provide a clear exposition of Mackenzie's view that genuine love involved an "easy gradation from esteem to love."


The Man of Feeling, 57.

The Man of Feeling, 118-125.

The Man of Feeling, 9.

The novel went through 28 editions, whereas The Man of Feeling went through 46 editions. This was still quite phenomenal in terms of sales, especially since the second work was much longer than the first and, presumably, more expensive. Mackenzie's third novel also did well, going through 26 editions.


It is important to note, however, that, despite being a complete villain, Sindall does have some moral sentiments, which he forcefully stifles whenever they arise. See, for example, The Man of the World, Vol. I, 189-90 wherein Mackenzie carefully shows that the moral feelings are natural, even for such as Sindall. At the same time, Mackenzie shows what a truly cultivated and uncorrupted individual would feel witnessing the same sight that momentarily touches the man of the world's emotions.


The Man of the World, Vol. II, 200f. Mackenzie was especially interested in demonstrating the lack of feeling in the most polite of all nations -- France. In this way, he stressed that true feeling was distinct from artificial politeness or refinement.
88 Robert Grindell, 105f.

89 On Mackenzie's friendship with Smith, see Anecdotes and Egotisms, 134. For Mackenzie's comments re Smith and Stoicism, see N.L.S., MS. 6388, Part B, 17.

110 Julia de Roubigné, Vol. I, 11-12. One cannot help noticing that this was a particularly Scottish obsession. The Edinburgh literati, in particular, were concerned about the supposed exodus of landed gentlemen to London.
The issue of marriage, of course, was the one in which parental authority could not be decisive because it interfered with the creation of a truly sentimental union.

Robert Grindell summarizes this debate in his thesis. His own point of view is that Mackenzie was a creature of convention and was merely pursuing his reputation in Augustan literary circles.

He here refers to Topham as an ass. For further criticism of Topham's description of Edinburgh life, see...
Mackenzie’s comments in *Anecdotes and Egotisms*, 219-20, wherein he attacks Topham for merely looking upon the *surface of things* and making no real effort to study the *manners* of the countries through which he passed.

The proposed bill to reduce the number of judges in the Court of Session gave rise to a lengthy debate in Scottish society because it meant, in effect, that the sacrosanct Articles of Union would need to be amended. While the measure was argued for on the grounds of utility, its opponents viewed it as an infringement on the autonomy of the Scottish nation. The *Pantheon Society* debated the issue on 19 June 1779 and decided demonstrably against any alteration. See Appendix.


*Scots Magazine*, October 1766.
NOTES: CHAPTER SEVEN

1 *Caledonian Mercury*, 19 April 1779.

2 *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 139.

3 *The Correspondence of Adam Smith*, 53.

4 *The Correspondence of Adam Smith*, 319-20. Here Smith claimed that the revisions were having a deleterious effect upon his health.

5 *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 38. Smith, of course, was using the term here in the sense of a real rather than ideal spectator.


7 *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 209.


9 *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 130.

10 *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 130.

11 *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 130.


13 *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 130-1. See also Raphael's editorial comments on this, 16 (Introduction).

14 *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 113; see also, 116, 126 and 336.

15 *The Impartial Spectator*, 85 and 97f.


18 *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 120.
See, for example, the Caledonian Mercury, 21 December 1789.


Moral Philosophy and Civil Society, 128-9.

Nicholas Phillipson, Adam Smith as Civic Moralist, 188. On the significance of the gentry in Smith's moral community, see also T.C. Smout, Where Had the Scottish Economy got to by 1776?, 69. On Smith's society of strangers, see Richard Teichgraeber, Rethinking Das Adam Smith Problem, 249-264.

The Wealth of Nations, for example, could conceivably be read as providing practical mechanisms so that the labouring poor would not be victimized by the monopolistic tendencies of merchants and businessmen, rather than as the battle flag of some self-conscious middle class. Here, he argues that the interest of men of business is often opposed to that of the community (I.xi.p.10); that high profits can be much more pernicious than high wages (I.ix.24); and that capitalists tend to both inflate prices and combine against workers (I.viii.13).

The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 176.

The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 61.

The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 61.

Moral Philosophy and Civil Society, 130-1. The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 63

The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 64.

The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 65.

The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 64.

The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 64.

Hugh Blair, Sermons, Vol. II, sermon i; Samuel Charters, Sermons, sermon xvi. See also the essays on the Homespun family in Mirrors, 12, 25 and 53 and, see Loungers 13 and 70.

The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 247.

The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 250.

The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 252.

The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 62.

The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 255f.
The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 262.

The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 62; see also, 149 and 256.

The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 52.

See, for example, Hugh Blair, Sermons, Vol. II, sermon i; James Fordyce, Addresses to Young Men, address xvi; the Scots Magazine, July 1776 for the relevant section from Fordyce's Sermons to Young Women; and the letter from INFORTUNATUS in the Caledonian Mercury, 26 September 1764. These are but a few typical examples.

Caledonian Mercury, 20 March 1786.

The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 5-10 (introduction).

The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 216.

The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 139-40.

For example, see John Drysdale, Sermons, Vol. I, sermon i entitled On Charity. Drysdale used the terms benevolence and charity interchangeably. Also see his first sermon in Vol. II, wherein he suggested that charity was founded upon sympathy and consisted in a strong sensibility to the wants and miseries of others.

The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 143.

The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 143.

The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 145.

The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 152.

Richard Teichgraeber's Rethinking Das Adam Smith Problem makes this point quite forcefully.

The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 212-216.

The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 220.

The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 221.

Caledonian Mercury, 12 August 1776.

Lounger 61.

The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 222.

The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 223.
Unlike Smith, of course, the practical moralists discussed in this work were concerned to maximize the influence of feminine manners for moral and social reform.

NOTES: CONCLUSION


3 My Own Life and Times, 370.


5 N.L.S., Mackenzie MS. 6386.

6 N.L.S., Mackenzie MS. 6388.
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APPENDIX
THE DEBATES OF THE PANTHEON SOCIETY
AS RECORDED IN THE CALEDONIAN MERCURY

1774: Did Brutus do well in killing Caesar?; debate on the woollen manufacture; Pantheon speech in praise of David Loch; Ought game to be made Property?; Whether Ought Love or Money to have the greatest influence in promoting Matrimony; Pantheon plan to raise a monument to Robert Ferguson; Are Incorporations of Benefit to Trade and Manufactures?

1775: Whether is a Prodigal or Miser the most pernicious Member of Society?; Whether is a State of Refinement or Barbarism the happiest?; Would Unlimited Toleration in Religion be advantageous to a State?; Whether had Education, or our natural Disposition, most influence on our Manners?; Has Climate a considerable Effect upon National Characters?; Whether is Childhood, Manhood, or Old Age, the Happiest State?; Whether lenient or coercive Measures should be followed with our American Colonies?; Whether is the Constitution of Great Britain in greater Danger from the Encroachments of the Crown, or from those of the Subject?; Ought a Militia, on the same footing with that of England, to be established in Scotland?; Does the passion of Love spring most from a regard to Ourselves or to the Objects beloved?; Are State Lotteries of real advantage to Britain?

1776: Is Modern Patriotism of Service to Liberty?; Is the impressing seamen a proper method to man the Navy?; Whether would marriage or celibacy, in the clergy, tend most to promote the interests of religion and virtue?; Do the stipends of the clergy of Scotland require an augmentation?; Whether has poetry, painting, or music, the greatest influence upon the passions?; Whether has Fear, Hope, or Pride, the greatest influence upon the actions of mankind?; suspension of Deacon Walker for actions in recent election; Is Popular Applause a just Criterion of Merit?; Pantheon poem entitled The Triumph of Virtue: An Ode is published.

1777: Ought Great Britain to treat with the Americans as colonies of the mother country, or as conquered provinces?; debate on utility of the theatre; Would not the Improvement of Manufactures, and the Internal Commerce of Britain, be of more Advantage, than extending her Dominions abroad?; Is a City or Country Life the most agreeable Situation?; Is Patronage, or popular Election, the most eligible mode of settling vacant Churches?; Is there reason, from past experience, or future hopes, to continue the present War with America?

1778: Is it proper to enter into the matrimonial state without parental authority?; Has Patriotism, or the Love of Fame, of Riches, or of Power, produced the greatest military actions?;
Whether from agriculture or commerce do most advantages result to a state?; Ought the present Ministry to be removed from his Majesty's Councils?; Whether are men happiest in the state of nature or refinement?; Whether or not have the present Minority contributed to the advancement of Liberty?; Does the Comprehending Act tend to produce salutary effects to the nation?; Are there just grounds to suspect, that fatal effects will arise to the nation from abolishing the Penal Statutes against the Papists?; Is it for the interest of Great Britain to treat with America as Independent States?; Whether should Love or Money have the greatest influence in forming the matrimonial connection?; Can a man of Courage, consistent with Honour, refuse a Challenge?

1779: Whether the Company of Learned Men, or that of Ladies, tends most to the Improvement of Youth?; Whether are Mankind most excited to Acts of Charity by Benevolence or Ostentation?; Whether the Beauties of the Person, or the Qualifications of the Mind, tend most to recommend a young Lady to a Lover?; Whether Youth, Manhood, or Old Age, is the happiest Period of Life?; Is an attention to Secular Affairs consistent with the Office of a Clergyman?; Whether has Reason or Rhetoric the greatest effect on Judgement?; Is the Church of Scotland justifiable in using, as a part of her Discipline, the Stool of Repentance?; Are Theatrical Exhibitions prejudicial to Morality?; Is a Clergyman justifiable in reading his discourse from the pulpit?; Whether is the passion of Love, or Hatred, the strongest?; Whether does the Lawyer, the Physician, or the Divine, contribute most to the Temporal Happiness of Mankind?; Can the British Legislature make any Alteration in the Articles of the Union, without an Infringement on the Constitution of this Country?; Whether the Common Council of London are not culpable in refusing to contribute to the support of the State in this alarming crisis?; Whether Knowledge or Riches contribute most to the happiness of the possessor?; Whether Beauty is, upon the whole, of most advantage or prejudice to the Fair Sex?; Are Horse-Races rational amusements?; Is it expedient in the present crisis, to withdraw our land-forces from America, and employ them against the House of Bourbon?; Pantheon poem written against the Common Council of London; Is promiscuous Dancing prejudicial to Virtue?; Whether has Poetry, Painting, or Music the strongest Influence upon the Passions?; Has our want of success in the present war been most owing to those who formed the plans, or to those who were entrusted with their execution?; Whether is Hypocrisy, or Open Profanity, most prejudicial to the interests of Religion?; Whether does extreme Sensibility, or Indifference of Temper, contribute most to the Happiness of the possessor?; Whether is the state of Celibacy or Marriage most conducive to Private happiness?; Is it consistent with the Respect we owe Government to arm ourselves at the present period?

1780: Whether Hope or Possession contributes most to Temporal Happiness?; Whether Merit or Money tended most to raise a man
in the world?; Ought Scotland to co-operate with the English Association in procuring a Repeal of the late Act in favour of Roman Catholics?; Whether does receiving, or communicating Knowledge, afford the greatest Pleasure to the Mind?; Ought the present practice of Tea-drinking to be continued?; Does the conduct of Opposition, in procuring County Associations, at the present crisis, tend to the Real Advantage of the British Empire?; Are the present Convulsions of the State to be attributed to the conduct of Administration or Opposition?; Is Capital Punishment the most proper method to prevent Crimes?; Ought M.P.s to follow their Own Judgement or the Dictates of their Constituents?; Does it require greater Resolution to bear the Smiles of Prosperity, or the Frowns of Adversity?; Is Slander or Flattery most pernicious to Society?; Is a Public or Private Education Preferable?; Whether is the First or Second Election of a member to represent this city in the ensuing Parliament the most Constitutional?; Can the Conduct of Lord George Gordon respecting the Protestant Association, be construed into High Treason?

1781: Whether does Joy or Grief make the strongest Impression upon the mind?; Whether does extreme Sensibility or Indifference of temper contribute most to the happiness of the possessor?; Whether is Lenity or Severity in the Sovereign most conducive to the happiness of the subject?; Was Queen Elizabeth justifiable in putting Queen Mary to Death?; Whether has Navigation been more Useful or Destructive to Mankind?; Whether is the House of Commons or the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland the best field for displaying eloquence?; Whether has the Discovery of North America been of more Advantage or Prejudice to the real interest of Great Britain?; Whether has Riches or Learning contributed most to the happiness of Mankind?; Ought Government to Restore the Private Property taken at St. Eustatia?; Would it be for the Interest of Great Britain, at the present crisis, to Withdraw her Forces from America, and employ them against the French and Spanish?; Whether has Great Britain, America, France, Spain or Holland, the greatest cause to repent of the present war?; Would it be for the benefit of the Inhabitants of this City to remove the Shambles without the royalty, or adopt the plan proposed by the Incorporation of Fleshers?; Is Love a Natural or Fictitious Passion?; Would it be sound policy in the State to impose a tax upon Bachelors, for the support of orphans and foundlings?

1782: Should the American War be Immediately Terminated?; Whether is the Prodigal or Miser most pernicious to Society?; Whether does Money or Merit tend most to recommend a Lady to a Husband?; Are Boarding Schools friendly to female virtue?; Is the proposed plan of Abolishing Corporations, and Appropriating their funds to the service of the State, justifiable?; Is the proposed Tax upon Theatres justifiable?; Is a Standing Army in time of Peace for the real Interest of Great Britain?; Would the proposed Abolition of Patronage be of Advantage to Scotland?; Is it proper to address his Majesty upon the late
change of Ministry? (this results in a fierce debate which almost dissolves the Society); Ought the Rejection of the Scots Militia Bill to be considered as an Unfavourable event to this country?; Should Britain Prosecute the War with America, or Sue for Peace through the Medium of France?; Whether is Ingratitude or Revenge the most hateful vice?; Whether ought Lord Shelburne's or Mr. Fox's plan of Accomodation with America to be Preferred?; debate on fictitious votes; Ought the late Act of Parliament Taxing the growth of Tobacco in Scotland to be repealed?; Would it be for the Interest of the Incorporations of this city, that the practice of Shortening their Leets, in the Election of Deacons, should be abolished?; Whether does the giving or receiving a Benefit excite the most agreeable sensation in the mind?; Whether is Flattery or Poverty most inimical to Female virtue?; Would it be for the interest of Britain at this crisis to conclude a peace with the Contending Powers, including the Independence of America?; Whether is Fancy or Judgement most consulted in chusing a Wife?

1783: Has the increase of Medical Knowledge Decreased the Bills of Mortality?; Is Ceremony an Enemy to Friendship?; Is Constancy more a Male or Female Virtue?; Suppose a Man, his Mother, Wife, and Daughter, together on sea in a boat, a storm arises, the boat is overset, he can possibly save but One of them -- query, Which of the three Ought he to Save?; Ought the Civil Magistrates to have any Coercive Power in regard to Religious Opinions?; Which is more blameable -- the Old Woman who marries a Young Man, or the Young Woman who marries an Old Man?; Which is the most commendable Charity, that which is bestowed on the Education of youth, or that which is Given for relieving the wants of Uneducated old age?; Whether is the Lady of agreeable temper, though deformed, or one of the opposite temper, though beautiful, to be preferred as a Wife?; Ought children, at the years of discretion, to be under the influence and control of their Parents in forming the matrimonial connection?; Which is the most Predominant in the Female breast, to excell in mental or personal accomplishments?; Has Avarice or Ambition been most hurtful to Society?; Do mankind suffer more from Real or Imaginary Evils?; Does reading Novels tend more to promote or injure the Cause of Virtue?; Would it be Sound Policy in the State to prevent Emigrations to America?; Pantheon decides that loss in love is more serious than loss in fortune; Whether is the Town or Country Lady the Fittest Wife for the Country Gentleman?; Ought the Theatre to be encouraged as a scourge of vice and folly, or condemned as a school of gallantry and dissipation?; Has Scotland been more honoured by her Warriors, or Learned men?; Whether is Marriage at an Early or Middle period of life, best calculated to ensure Happiness in the conjugal State?; Were the Sufferings of Mary Queen of Scots, most owing to her Religious Principles, Personal Beauty, or the Rudeness of the Times?; Have the Rebellions of 1715 and 1745, been productive of more Happy or Unhappy consequences to this country?; Has more Unhappiness arisen in the married state, from disparity of Age or Fortune?
Have the Consequences of the Death of King Charles I been such to the nation as to justify the annual commemoration of that event?; Whether is Wealth or Knowledge the Greater source of Independence?; Ought the demands of the Irish Delegates to be granted?; Against which ought Youth to be most guarded, the Snares of their own or the other Sex?; Ought New-year's Day to be kept as a Fast or a Festival?; Ought the late Addresses to be considered as the voice of the Nation?; Whether is Great Britain or her Enemies most benefitted by the Publication of her Parliamentary Debates?

1784: Ought the Schoolmasters' Bill, now pending in Parliament to be passed?; Are the present Fashions with regard to Dress, more ridiculous of the Ladies or Gentlemen?; Has the increase of Medical Knowledge Decreased the Bills of Mortality?

1786: Are Mankind most excited to the attainment of literary acquisitions, from the hope of Honour, Profit or Amusement?

1787: Whether are Natural Talents without Science, or Science without Natural Talents, more capable of Enterprise?

1788: Does the Happiness of Society most depend on the Industry, Science, or Humanity of its Members?; Whether is prosperous or adverse Fortune more unfriendly to Virtue?; Are the Ladies of Gt. Britain superior or inferior to those of other Nations in personal and mental Accomplishments?; What is the best method of preventing and of punishing Crimes?; Which forms the strongest basis of Friendship, reciprocity of Interest, or similarity of Disposition?

1789: Pantheon decides that beauty has been a greater source of happiness than misery to the fair sex; Whether are the Trophies of War or those of Learning more Glorious?; Has Eloquence been more useful or hurtful to mankind?; Whether is the Philosopher or Man of business of greater service to this country?; Which is the More Pitiable State, that of Ignorance or Slavery?; Whether is deformity of body, or imperfection of mind, a greater bar to our success in the world?; Whether has Poetry, Painting, or Music, greatest Influence over the Passions?; Whether is the Prodigal or Miser more hurtful to Society?; Are mankind most indebted to Genius, Education, or Perseverance, for their Success in life?; Which has contributed more to extend man's power, the discovery and use of metals or his dominion over the animal creation?; Does the love of Fame inspire the love of Virtue?; Has Love or Friendship given birth to more heroic actions?; Is Manner or Matter more necessary to the public speaker?; Whether Navigation or Printing has been of more advantage to mankind?; Whether does giving or receiving a Benefit afford more agreeable sensations to the mind?

1790: Pantheon decides that sensibility is more productive of happiness than misery to the fair sex; Whether is the Drunken
Husband or Scolding Wife more destructive of Domestic Happiness?; Is it more for the Interest of Britain to Improve her Advantages at home or extend her Dominions Abroad?; Whether do the Peevish or the Passionate make the Worst Husbands?; Will the Revolutions on the Continent, if Established, promote the Interests of Europe?; Which Enjoys Most Happiness, the Husband returned from Banishment, the Sailor from Shipwreck, or the Slave restored to Liberty?; Whether disappointment in Love, treachery in Friendship, or loss of Liberty be hardest to bear?; Whether there is more magnanimity in accepting or refusing a challenge?; Pantheon decides that Curiosity has been more useful than hurtful to mankind; Whether is fortune, figure, or merit, most consulted in the choice of a wife?; Whether the Jealous Husband or Coquettish Wife is more subversive of matrimonial happiness?; Whether Want or Wealth is the greater enemy to Virtue?; Whether has the late Dr. Cullen or Mr. Howard been of more benefit to Society?; Whether have the Literary, Commercial, or Military Exertions of Great Britain, tended most to advance her Fame?; Pantheon decides that there is more happiness in marriage after a long, than after a short courtship; Pantheon debate re. the respective merits of an enlightened understanding and a feeling heart; Whether indifference as to Love, Liberty, or Science, is most contemptible?

1791: Pantheon has a debate on fortitude; Is Jealousy or Ambition more hurtful to men?; Whether is peace a greater comfort of old age than either wealth or glory?; Whether a beautiful lady, though of a disagreeable temper is to be preferred as a wife, to the lady of an agreeable temper, if deformed in person?; Whether Precipitancy or Procrastination is a greater bar to Success?; Has Enthusiasm been of more advantage or detriment to mankind?; Have the Revolutions in female dress increased or diminished their power over men?; Is the love of power, riches or pleasure most universal?; Is Scotch Poetry more indebted to the exertions of Allan Ramsay or Robert Ferguson?; Is the lover more affected by the death or infidelity of the object beloved?; Whether has the pen, the pencil or the sword rendered man most famous?; Whether Anticipation of the future affords more agreeable sensations than Reflections on the past?; Has rising Genius more to fear from Malice or mediocrity of Fortune?; Whether is Disappointment in Love or Loss of Fortune harder to bear?; Has suffering Humanity been more indebted to the Generosity of the Male or Female Sex?; Is Lenity or Severity best Calculated to suppress Vice?