BEST LEFT AS INDIANS:
NATIVE-WHITE RELATIONS
IN THE
YUKON TERRITORY, 1840-1950

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Abstract

Native peoples form a vital part of the social and economic fabric of the Canadian North. Though much neglected in the historical literature, they have maintained an important presence in the regional order from the emergence of the fur trade to the present. This study places native activities in the context of Euro-Canadian developments, tracing native-white relations in the Yukon Territory from first contact in the 1840's to the establishment of a new socio-economic structure in the 1950's.

Economic, social and institutional relations are examined separately, but each illustrates the systematic placement of the natives on the margins of the regional order. Native workers found few openings in the mining and service industries, relegated instead to seasonal, unskilled positions. A distinct social environment emerged in the towns and mining camps, characterized by a white-dominated population and firm restrictions on native entry. Sustained by a vibrant if variable fur market, the fur trade districts developed differently. The natives found a more economically rewarding and socially integrated environment, one mirroring the social and economic accommodation reached during the pre-Gold Rush fur trade period. The major disruptions of the Klondike Gold Rush and the construction of the Alaska Highway and Canol Pipeline during World War II did not change the pattern significantly, as the natives remained only casual participants in the white-dominated economy and society.

These divisions between native and white were reinforced through the policies and programmes of the Anglican Church and the federal government. Both held pessimistic views of the prospects for territorial development and, although they retained a desire to "civilize," Christianize and assimilate the natives, they preferred to protect the natives' harvesting lifestyle until a more appropriate moment. The church and the government seconded public efforts to segregate the natives and sought in a very haphazard way to preserve their access to the region's natural resources.

Though the actions, attitudes and programmes of the white population strongly affected the natives' position, native forces also influenced social and economic developments. The natives maintained a special affinity for the harvesting mode, preferring the reasonable returns and flexibility of hunting and trapping to the rigid discipline and insecurity of wage labour. With their religious and social values based on a continuing accommodation with the physical environment, the natives favoured the pursuit of game for cultural as well as economic reasons. Native choice as much as Euro-Canadian exclusion dictated the natives' position in the Yukon Territory.
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PREFACE

For most Canadians, the Yukon Territory is the land of the Klondike Gold Rush, the route for the Alaska Highway, and more recently the location of a series of controversial proposed pipelines. With the exception of these brief occasions when Canada's far north-west seized the public's imagination, the territory seemingly rested in extended somnolence. Largely removed from national view, the district remained little more than a mecca for nostalgic tourists and repository for prospectors' dreams of another mineral "Bonanza".

This conception obscures far more than it reveals. Indeed, the Yukon has a vibrant past, but the vast upheaval and glamour attending the Klondike Gold Rush and World War II construction projects has obliterated the underlying continuity of the region's historical experience. From before the 1840's, when fur traders first pushed into the upper Yukon River valley, to 1950, when post-war realities forced a national consideration of the north's role in Canada's future, a significant regional order developed in response to a myriad of internal and external forces. The Yukon's social and economic environment has reflected the transiency of the white population, the stability of native habitation and the varied nature of resource development.

The native population remained the single most stable element throughout. Prospectors entered by the thousands, but most left soon after their arrival. Many of the workers stayed for the short, intense summer work period, but departed before the harsh winter gripped the territory. The government's presence was also one of sudden growth and rapid decline, its perception of the north conditioned by a pessimistic,
though not inaccurate, assessment of the likelihood of sustained economic development. With the exception of a few government agents, several dozen missionaries and a few determined northern settlers, the natives were the only truly permanent inhabitants. Though they too felt the disruptions and shared some of the opportunities attending the Gold Rush and subsequent "booms," the natives retained their attachment to both the district and a harvesting lifestyle.

The Indian population clearly provided an element of continuity in a society noted for its instability. Within the ever-changing territorial economy and society, the natives remained almost the only human constant. As a consequence, the assessment of Indian contact with the Euro-Canadian order provides a useful means of charting the broad transformations of the Yukon Territory. Clearly evident through this examination are the comparative persistence of racial (and occasionally racist) attitudes, varying government and popular perceptions of the north, the continued viability of the fur trade, the establishment of distinct economic and social sectors within the regional order, and the natives' commitment to their way of life. The study therefore examines more than racial interaction; it considers as well the evolution of territorial society.

The Canadian North has seldom been the focus for this form of regional history. Addressing the Royal Society of Canada in 1970, W. L. Morton noted that Canadian historians had consistently ignored — and hence underestimated — the psychological and environmental impact of the north on national developments.¹ Despite the clarity of Morton's appeal

and the proliferation of regional studies elsewhere in Canada, the call for the increased study of northern history remains largely unanswered. With the exception of Morton, Morris Zaslow and a small band of northern enthusiasts, few Canadian historians have turned their attentions northward. To date, the north is still decidedly outside the mainstream of Canadian historiography.

Impeding the development of a truly "northern" historiography is the difficulty inherent in defining the term "north". W. L. Morton described the north as the region beyond the limit of agricultural settlement. His definition reflects his view of the north as a psychological force, but it lacks an historical dimension. As both Morris Zaslow and Douglas Owram point out, the "north" is a variable term, changing with expectations and patterns of development. The "northerness" of the old North-West, for example, was an artificial construct, reflecting British and Canadian perceptions more than environmental realities.

229-242.

2 Regional history has recently come under attack from several quarters. See J. M. S. Careless, "Limited Identities -- Ten Years Later," *Manitoba History*, 1/1981, 3-9.


4 Morton, "The 'North'."

In his major work, *The Opening of the Canadian North*, Zaslow defines three different norths: the North-West (prairie west), Middle North (forested belt or sub-Arctic) and the Arctic (treeless tundra). His definitions are both geographic and historic, suggesting that the "north" is both an environmental and temporal creation. The Yukon provides an excellent example of the utility of Zaslow's definitions. The Arctic slope, politically part of the Yukon Territory, belongs to a different north than the rest of the district. It possesses both a distinct geographic character and a different historical heritage. Because of the two regions' divergent traditions, the Arctic slope will not be included in this study, which will examine instead the upper Yukon River valley.

The "Middle North," of which most of the Yukon Territory is a part, has attracted few historians. Like the district itself, the literature is dominated by popular writing on the Kondike Gold Rush and, to a lesser extent, the building of the Alaska Highway. Available studies consist of little more than narrative, often anecdotal, histories. Several of these works, including T. Karamanski, *Fur Trade and Exploration*, A. A. Wright, *Prelude to Bonanza*, P. Berton, *Klondike*, and D. Zaslow, *The Opening of the Canadian North*.  

6 Zaslow, *The Opening of the Canadian North*.


9 A. A. Wright, *Prelude to Bonanza*, (Sidney: Grey's, 1976).
Rempley, *The Crooked Road*, 11 are worthwhile pieces. In the main, however, the literature consists of unreliable glorifications of the heady Klondike days or equally favourable portrayals of the efforts of American and Canadian construction workers on the various World War II defense construction projects.

There are signs that a more systematic assessment of the region's past is underway, although much of the material remains unpublished and largely inaccessible. Government commissioned research, especially through the federal agency Parks Canada, has provided a variety of studies relating to national historic sites. 12 Hal Guest's "Dawson City" offers an extensive survey of the city's rise and subsequent decline. 13 Similarly, R. Friesen's work on the Chilkoot Pass and Gordon Bennett's useful survey, *Yukon Transportation: A History* provide detailed analyses of the development of the regional transportation system. 14 Unfortunately, the bulk of Parks Canada production, like that of the Territorial Government's Department of Tourism, Heritage and Cultural Resources, relates to specific historic site reclamation projects and does not aid significantly in understanding larger developments, particularly outside the Gold Rush period. 15 Indeed, these studies, while very helpful, have


12 For a listing of studies, see Parks Canada, 1983 *Bibliography* (Ottawa: Parks Canada 1983).


been compromised from the outset because they were prepared without the foundation of a regional history necessary to provide satisfactory context.

Potentially more valuable is the work prepared by graduate students. Freed from the constraints of government-sponsored research, these historians have been more willing to push beyond the narrow confines of site-oriented studies. Here again, the preponderant influence of Morris Zaslow in shaping northern historiography is evident. Zaslow supervised many of the theses and dissertations prepared on northern and Yukon topics; not surprisingly, they share many of his preoccupations and interests. Other centres, particularly the University of Manitoba, are producing graduate students interested in northern topics, but the Canadian North remains far behind the rapid expansion in the historiography on other regions of the country.

15 Two exceptions are the regional histories. Ken Coates, *The Northern Yukon: A History* (Manuscript Record Series, No. 403); A. A. Wright, "The Kluane District," (Parks Canada, unpublished manuscript).

16 Several graduate papers, including the studies by Guest and Bennett, were first prepared as government research projects.


The more recent research to be found in the graduate papers and historic sites research on the Yukon, unfortunately, has not taken us much beyond the traditional emphasis on the Klondike Gold Rush. Mainly, they have fleshed out earlier descriptions offered by Berton and others. The notable exception is Zaslow's *The Opening of the Canadian North*. Carefully written and researched, the volume provides a much needed introduction to the history of the Canadian north. But by virtue of its survey character and because it was prepared in advance of a significant historiography, the book does not examine a number of important topics in sufficient detail. Zaslow is pre-occupied with the "opening" of the north, which results in an emphasis on the unfolding of the Euro-Canadian frontier, the expansion of the limits of settlement, and the federal government's role in these developments. Many northern areas become "southern" as they succumb to explorers, settlers and developers, with the focus of the study shifting ever northward. In the Yukon context, Zaslow's interests resulted in a very casual treatment of Indians and native-white relations.\(^{19}\)

Zaslow is not alone in paying little attention to the processes of native-white contact. Other historians have similarly offered limited commentary on the Indians' role in the history of the region. The natives have not, however, gone unstudied. Beginning in the 1930's ethnographers, anthropologists and archaeologists have undertaken numerous studies of the aboriginal inhabitants of the upper Yukon River valley. Cornelius Osgood (Han and Kutchin), Anne Acheson Welsh (Kutchin), Catherine McClellan (Southern Yukon), John Honigman (Kaska), Dominique Legros

\(^{19}\) Zaslow, *Opening*, pp. 144-146.
(Tutchone). Julie Cruikshank (mythology) and others have combined personal observations, native oral tradition and limited documentary research to create sensitive and sensible portraits of indigenous cultures in the Yukon. Though often exemplary within their discipline, these studies still do not offer extensive or systematic assessments of the evolution of native-white relations. The Yukon natives, therefore, have been studied in detail, but narrowly. Their contacts with the Euro-Canadian population and their role in the changing pattern of the Yukon society and economy have received limited consideration.

These gaps in the literature on the Canadian North and particularly the Yukon Territory illustrate the need for a thorough examination of Indian-white relations in the upper Yukon River valley. The historical questions raised in this regional context should be of interest outside the rather narrow confines of northern history. Assessments of missionary activities and federal government programs illustrate the process of applying international and national initiatives in a northern setting. The national application of federal Indian policy, including secular and Christian education should also be clarified by reference to regional

Similarly, this study addresses several noticeable gaps in the existing Canadian literature on native-white relations. With the exception of C. Bishop's ethnographic, *The Northern Ojibway and the Fur Trade* and D. Francis and T. Morantz, *Partners in Furs*, few studies in this subject area examine northern Canadian settings. The current work also adopts an expanded chronological framework, covering the period from 1840 to 1950. Existing writing by historians on Indian-white relations is voluminous for the pre-Confederation period, but scanty thereafter. To date, little material exists on the post-Confederation period, despite the obvious significance of developments following the advance of settlement and expanded resource developments. As well, virtually nothing exists spanning the two periods, describing the difference in contact relations between the pre- and post-Confederation eras and assessing the evolution of native-white contact through the many crucial transformations. By bridging existing chronological and geographic gaps in the historiography, this regional study should inform the broader examination of Indian-Euro-Canadian relations.

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Though historians have paid little attention to the period after 1900, anthropological work on the sub-Arctic considers native activities in the Twentieth Century in detail. In these studies, the contact history of the north is typically divided between contact-stable (or fur trade) and post-1945 government intervention.\textsuperscript{24} Though the Yukon example illustrates the importance of post-World War II changes, the treatment of the earlier period as a single period is less acceptable. The division assumes a stable fur trade economy, an assumption that does not account for industry reorganization following the termination of the Hudson's Bay Company monopoly, subsequent competition for native trade, changes in Indian technological culture, and a revived interest in the northern fur trade in the Twentieth Century. This approach also obscures the impact of northern adventurers, scientists, prospectors, missionaries and government agents, all active in the area long before 1945. For the Yukon in particular, the disruptive influence of the Klondike Gold Rush, 1896-1904, belies any description of the region as "stable". Charles Bishop, both in his monograph on the Ojibway and later in an article with A. J. Ray, offers a different chronology for native history, and Indian-white contact, in the sub-Arctic.\textsuperscript{25} This more appropriate division (Early Fur Trade, Competitive Trade, 1763-1821, Trading Post Dependency, 1821-1890, Era of Early Government Influence, ...

\textsuperscript{24} See Helm, Handbook. This chronology is also applied in Peter Usher, "The North: Metropolitan Frontier, Native Homeland," in L. D. McCann, ed. Heartland and Hinterland (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1982).

1890-1945, and Modern Era, post-1945) emphasizes the changing nature of fur trade relations, the preliminary impact of missionaries, government agents and new technology, and the important changes associated with the post-war period. Though this chronology, specifically defined with reference to the central sub-Arctic and therefore of limited direct use for the Yukon, will not be applied, an acceptance of an evolutionary pattern of contact is implicit.

Several basic considerations condition the following analysis of the natives' response to changing socio-economic conditions. The cornerstone is a belief in the efficacy and efficiency -- to the Indians -- of their hunting and gathering lifestyle. To use Marshall Sahlins's provocative phrase, they were the "original affluent society." Within the context of their own culture and the constraints of their expectations, harvesters readily satisfied their biological and material requirements. The nature of the hunting and fishing existence ensured that the natives maintained a positive attachment to their way of life. The flexibility, leisure and mobility afforded by a reliance on natural resources served as an agreeable focus for economic and social behavior. Europeans viewed this manner of living with disdain, considering it inferior to the more regular work patterns of the industrial age. Though many contemporary and scholarly observers deemed aboriginal methods impractical, the natives clearly favoured the harvesting way of life.


27 For an excellent analysis of popular and academic attitudes toward natives, see R. Berkofer, The White Man's Indian Images of the American Indian from Columbus to the Present (New York: Knopf, 1976).
This positive environmental accommodation — itself the essence of the vitality of the native life — conditioned both belief and social systems. The availability of natural resources set population limits, determined habitation patterns and influenced social structures.\textsuperscript{28} The continuing ability of the Yukon Indians to hunt, trap and fish — an option they retained through to 1950 — is therefore a central concern. As Hugh Brody demonstrated for the natives of North-Eastern British Columbia, this environmental accommodation is not an "aboriginal artifact," but rather a positive, on-going adaption to economic realities.\textsuperscript{29}

Though anxious to preserve their hunting lifestyle, the Indians were not blind to the many advantages of European expansion. Material and technological improvements from the iron axe to the outboard motor were key additions. Once attained, they were not readily surrendered. To gain these new items did not, however, require the abandonment of existing economic and social patterns. Michael Asch described the Mackenzie Indians' accommodation to the new Euro-Canadian order as a "mixed economy," in which natives by preference continued their harvesting. As need and inclination dictated, however, they participated in those sectors of the Euro-Canadian economy — from the fur trade to hard-rock mining — necessary to satisfy their material requirements.\textsuperscript{30} Much as Asch has de-

\textsuperscript{28} Some anthropologists, notably Marvin Harris, take this to an extreme, arguing for veritable biological determinism. David Riches and others emphasize the importance of human processes in determining native social patterns. Marvin Harris. \textit{Cultural Materialism} (New York: Random House, 1979); D. Riches. \textit{Northern Nomadic Hunter-Gatherers: A Humanistic Approach} (London: Academic Press, 1982).

\textsuperscript{29} Brody. \textit{Maps and Dreams}.

scribed for the Mackenzie River Indians, the Yukon natives did not select either the harvesting or the industrial economy; rather, they melded the two into an acceptable and rational economic system designed to provide for their material and cultural needs.

These considerations of native preference, plus an acceptance of their ability to respond positively to different economic conditions, provide the foundation for subsequent assessments of native activities. The main purpose, however, is not to focus on Indian activities, but rather to examine native-white relations in the Yukon River valley from 1840 to 1950. As suggested, the natives of the Yukon operated with a clear perception of self-interest, defined of course with reference to their own culture. The Euro-Canadian population, an odd collection of fur traders, missionaries, government workers, prospectors, developers and settlers, similarly approached the natives and the north within a framework etched by contemporary perceptions. That natives and whites often came to similar conclusions — for instance on the need to keep the Indians as harvesters of game — for conflicting reasons, only illustrates that the meeting of races was, first and foremost, a confrontation of cultures and mentalities, often incompatible, seldom mutually comprehended. Fundamental misunderstanding, mutual or one-sided, un intentioned or malevolent, stands at the centre of inter-racial encounter in North America. The Yukon Territory is no different.

In the Yukon's case, a variety of economic, social, demographic and institutional forces, both native and white, combined to separate the races, keeping the Indians on the margins of white society. That the Indians inhabited the fringes does not, however, simply attest to the power of exclusionist attitudes and programmes. Though these proved of considerable strength, natives seldom challenged the barriers of prejudice. Their continuing commitment to harvesting reduced, if not eliminated, the desire to enter the industrial and urban sectors of the territorial economy and society.

The late and differential pattern of development in the Yukon sets the region somewhat apart from other northern districts. Experiences in this quarter, however, offer insights into native-white relations in other non-settlement areas, many of which, like northern British Columbia, northern Ontario and the Mackenzie River valley, faced similar Euro-Canadian expansion. Despite the disruptive influence of the gold rush and war-time construction projects, the Yukon Indians retained access to land and resources up to 1950. The continued viability of the harvesting economy, a condition shared throughout much of the Canadian north, strongly influenced native response to white expansion and, equally, Euro-Canadian reaction to the Indians.

To address the aforementioned themes, this study has been organized into four sections. A brief discussion of aboriginal economic and social patterns serves as basis for further discussion of native response to Euro-Canadian advances. The second section deals with economic ties from the fur trade through World War II, placing the natives within the broader territorial context. An examination of social contact, includ-
ing inter-personal relations and demographic consequences of white expansion, constitutes the next division. The final chapters deal with institutional relations, focusing alternatively on religious, educational and government programmes and their impact on the Indians of the Yukon.
CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND

According to Indian legend, the ancestors of the natives of the Yukon River basin crossed to North America by land bridges from a distant continent. Recent archaeological discoveries have confirmed this interpretation, dating earliest known occupations of the region at 30,000 years B.C. or earlier. Between that time and the arrival of the Hudson's Bay Company fur traders in the 1840's, the Indians occupied and utilized the ecologically diverse region now known as the Yukon. An examination of native life in the region before first contact, with particular emphasis on patterns of mobility, harvesting and social organization is therefore an appropriate place to begin.

The geographic context is important in understanding native adaptations. The environmental challenge facing the Indians differed significantly from contemporary images of the frozen and barren north. The current Yukon Territory (given institutional form in 1898) is dominated by a large central plateau, flanked on the east by the Mackenzie Mountains and the southwest by the formidable St. Elias Range. The region is cut by rivers, principally those of the Yukon River network which, through such tributaries as the Porcupine, White, Stewart, Pelly, and Teslin, drains much of the area. Several districts fall outside the reach of the central river system. In the southeast, the Frances River watershed is part of the Mackenzie River drainage basin, while to the

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1 As Julie Cruikshank has illustrated, native legend and scientific analysis are not as different as often imagined. Julie Cruikshank, "Legend and Landscape: Convergence of Oral and Scientific Tradition in the Yukon Territory", *Arctic Anthropology*, vol. 18, No. 4 (1981), 17-28.
extreme southwest the Alsek River flows directly into the Pacific Ocean. To the north, the Peel River bisects the territory, draining to the east and joining the Mackenzie River shortly before the latter empties into the Arctic Ocean. The climate is less than benign, with a frost-free period of only seventy days conspiring with consistently cold winters to ensure that the waterways remain frozen much of the year. The Yukon is heavily forested, although the temperature and limited precipitation permits only stunted tree growth. Animal resources are diverse and comparatively abundant, with moose, caribou, mountain sheep, goat, bear and a variety of fur-bearers available throughout the region. While the rivers hardly teem with fish, there are regular salmon runs along the Yukon and Alsek Rivers and white-fish, grayling, and several other fish species inhabit many of the lakes and rivers. The image of the north as a barren wasteland hardly applies to the Yukon, but the suggestion that the region contains an inexhaustable bounty of harvestable resources is similarly untenable.  

Several problems emerge in any attempt to describe native life in the Yukon River valley before the arrival of the Hudson's Bay Company. Few adequate or insightful contemporary commentaries are available. Though intimately involved with the natives, fur traders and missionaries active in the district seldom recorded details of Indian society and cus-

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3 A. H. Murray, Journal of the Yukon, 1847-1848, ed. L. J. Burpee, (Ot-
toms. Fur traders A. H. Murray, Strachan Jones and William Hardisty and missionaries W. W. Kirby, V. C. Sim and T. H. Canham provided comparatively useful portraits, but all focus on the Porcupine-Fort Yukon region. Subsequent descriptions by explorers, travellers, miners and police officers belong to a separate period -- the pre-Klondike mining era -- and are of limited use in assessing native life in the mid-19th century.

Ethnographic and anthropological reconstruction provide further tools for defining the contours of Indian society. Cornelius Osgood, who worked among the Han and the Kutchin in the 1930's and John Honigman, who studied the Kaska Indians the following decade, offer detailed summaries based on extensive interviews with native informants. More recently, Catherine McClelland, Julie Cruickshank, Anne Acheson Welsh and Dominique Legros have reconstructed patterns of native existence and thought before the arrival of the white man. In conjunction with more general literature on Athapaskan society, their works allow for a preliminary description of native society.

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Six principal Indian groups, the Kutchin, Han, Kaska, Tagish and Teslin inhabited what is now the Yukon Territory. (Map 1) With the exception of the last group, tied linguistically and culturally to the coastal Tlingit, all the natives were Athapaskans. As a result, the Indians conformed in many cultural attributes to the larger patterns of the hunters of the subarctic forest. The area of habitation of all these groups in the pre-contact period extended beyond the territorial boundaries which constitute the parameters of this study. Kutchin bands, for example, ranged from the lower Mackenzie River to east-central Alaska. Similarly, the Han Indians straddled the 141st meridian (the eventual Canada/United States border) along the Yukon River. There is very little evidence that these ethnographic divisions were formalized in extensive political organization or tribal consciousness. Linguistic differences existed as did distinctive local and regional cultural characteristics. While sensitivity to specific native adaptation to ecological conditions must be maintained, James VanStone has suggested that the various Athapaskan cultures represented "a cultural continuum carried on by a series of interlocking groups whose individual lifeways differed only in minor details from those of their most immediate neighbours." While there is then socio-cultural justification for treating the Yukon Indians as a single unit, such a description must be qualified by an acknowledgement of the importance of regional variation.


10 James VanStone, Athapaskan Adaptations.
Map 1: Native Distribution
Anthropologist VanStone describes the Yukon Athapaskans as conforming to a central-based wandering pattern, meaning that larger groups congregated on a regular basis, usually at a spring fishery. Upon completion of harvesting and when demand for food exceeded readily available local supply, the Indians dispersed into smaller groups, usually family units. The region's limited resources and the resulting enforced mobility ensured that more compact and permanent settlement did not occur.

The natives throughout the Yukon River basin hunted a variety of animals and birds, caught several species of fish, and collected a variety of plants in the course of their seasonal activity. With important regional variations, the seasonal cycles of all Yukon natives incorporated summer fishing, with much of the catch dried and stored for later use. Most hunting took place in the fall, while rivers remained open for navigation and before winter limited travel. Hunting continued through the winter months, although due to limited game stocks and truncated mobility in that season, hardship occasionally visited upon those who were ill-prepared.

The Indians adopted a highly nomadic existence, staying largely in the river valleys and travelling to the high country only in pursuit of specific game. The availability of major sources of food followed seasonal patterns, such as caribou migrations and salmon runs. Equally, moose and smaller game could not be harvested indefinitely from one site, forcing regular camp movements. Although the Yukon natives tended to operate out of selected central bases, they wandered extensively in pursuit of game. Regional variations in climate, geography and the

11 Ibid.
availability of game also forced significant adaptations. In the Peel-Porcupine River areas, the Kutchin exploited the large caribou herds, using circular enclosures called "surrounds" to trap the migrating animals.\textsuperscript{12} Along the Yukon River, the Han built fish traps or used gill nets to harvest the salmon run.\textsuperscript{13} Natives in the Alsek-River - Dezadeash Lake district similarly relied heavily on salmon stocks, although their harvesting methods differed.\textsuperscript{14} In all areas, natives harvested moose and caribou, supplementing their food supplies with small game, stream and lake fishing, and berry picking.

Harvesting required extensive mobility, which in turn limited the complexity of their social organization. A rough band system evolved, based upon the groups of natives that met each summer. But even these groups had limited structural significance. Leadership remained vaguely defined, varying according to the tasks involved and the skills of the men in the group. Often one man functioned as the trading chief while another led the band during hunting expeditions. Shamans, or medicine men, exerted considerable power through their perceived ability to understand and manipulate the spiritual world, but general religious beliefs lacked rigidity or regional coherence. In the place of the codified structure European missionaries would soon offer, the Indians held imprecise, individualistic interpretations of the spiritual world, dominated by a sense that spirits imbued the natural surroundings, forest and fauna. The larger native groups, however, did not have a systematic

\textsuperscript{12} C. Osgood, \textit{Contributions to the Ethnography of the Kutchin}.
\textsuperscript{13} C. Osgood, \textit{The Han Indians}
\textsuperscript{14} C. McClellan, \textit{My Old People Say}. 

22
or shared assessment of the significance and power of those spirits. These amorphous beliefs were highly functional as they formed an integral part of the natives' relationship with the animal world, impinging upon and controlling the pursuit of sustenance.  

The essence of Athapaskan society in the Yukon was its consistent ability to adapt to human and ecological change. Social organization, religious beliefs, harvesting patterns and mobility were consistent throughout the region only in their ultimate flexibility. The substantial differences reflected not only environmental diversity, but also the impact of a harsh, often unforgiving northern setting. The scattered nature of animal resources, annual freeze-ups of rivers and the limited regenerative capacity of flora and fauna exacted their toll. The environment similarly required that the people function primarily in the smallest viable social unit -- the extended family -- which again restricted the prospects for a more inclusive social organization.

This family-oriented, nomadic subsistence structure formed the basis of Indian society in the Yukon River valley before the arrival of Hudson's Bay Company explorers in the 1840's. Important regional variations in harvesting patterns, seasonal movements, language and tribal identification represented comparatively minor deviations from the common threads running through native existence in the Yukon River valley. The environmental relationship, a delicate, occasionally unreliable balance between man and resources, defined the contours of Indian social and economic behaviour. Native adaptation following the arrival of

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15 This general description comes from ibid.; Kehoe, North American Indians 487-504; McClellan, My Old People Say and especially June Helm, Handbook of North American Indians, Vol. VI: Subarctic.
Euro-Canadians derived from the Indians' pre-contact condition. Despite the comments of fur traders and missionaries to the contrary, the natives' lifestyle was not oppressive, not a desperate struggle for meager subsistence. Instead, harvesting provided a means of survival and leisure which the natives accepted as a comparatively "affluent" existence. Reactions to social and economic change attending white expansion, importantly, originated in the Indians' belief in the efficacy of their system and their commitment to maintaining a hunting-gathering existence as a preferred form of economic activity.
CHAPTER TWO

ECONOMIC RELATIONS IN THE FUR TRADE ERA

Inhabitants of the upper Yukon River valley felt the impact of an expanding European fur trade long before the arrival of the first whites.¹ Traders of the Russian American Fur Company, active along the Pacific Coast and on the lower reaches of the Yukon River, had not actually expanded operations upstream, but through the medium of inter-tribal exchange their trade goods passed into the interior. When the Hudson’s Bay Company began to expand into the Northwest following the 1821 merger with its long-time rival, the North-West Company, explorers found numerous signs along the Liard and Mackenzie Rivers of the extensive reach of the Russian trade. John Bell, the first white man to cross the Richardson Mountains and reach the Porcupine River, and John MacLeod, explorer of the upper reaches of the Liard system, both noted the existence of Russian trading goods among the Indians well inside what they believed to be the Hudson’s Bay Company’s trading sphere.² Similarly, when John Franklin travelled along the Arctic Coast west of the mouth of the Mackenzie River in 1826, he commented that the Inuit near Herschel Island


participated in the Russian trade through inter-tribal exchange with the Kutchin Indians to the south.³

Regular native trade within and between regions pre-dated the European fur trade. Groups possessing an abundance of a particular indigenous commodity, such as salmon, copper or caribou, traded supplies in excess of their requirements for goods not available in their region. This regular, though not extensive, trade encouraged the development of a series of institutional arrangements utilized after European fur traders arrived. As Franklin, and later explorer Thomas Simpson, noted on the Arctic coast, formal trading partnerships existed between Kutchin and Inuit traders to facilitate exchange. This was of particular importance, given the frequency of hostilities between the two groups, to ensure that the trade continued without interruptions. Similar arrangements conditioned exchange between the coastal Tlingit Indians to the south and their inland trading partners and less formal institutional structures operated to expedite trade among the various interior native groups. These native trading networks and institutions formed in the pre-contact period assumed even greater importance when the first European traders appeared.⁴


⁴ Ugarenko, "The Distribution of the Kutchin;" Ostenstat, "The Impact of the Fur Trade;" Tanner, "Structure of Fur Trade Relations," C. McClelland, My Old People Say deals with the southern Yukon; Osgood, Contributions to the Ethnography of the Kutchin.
When whites began to trade with Indians on the outer fringes of the Yukon River natives’ trading networks -- Russians to the west and south, British and Canadians to the east -- the extent of existing patterns of exchange altered significantly. Earlier institutional arrangements nonetheless remained in place to facilitate the dispersal of the newly arrived European commodities. The maintenance of individual trading connections, however, depended not upon their longevity, but on the cost and availability of the desired European goods. Access to a dependable supply of European manufacturers allowed the Tlingit Indians, the first external native group to secure such a source, to greatly expand their inland trading operations. Acting through intermediary tribes, including the Han and the Tutchone, the Tlingits drew much of the upper Yukon basin into their trading sphere. Such pre-eminence was conditional upon other native groups' inability to locate their own supply of European goods. The situation could, and did, change rapidly. When the North-West company, and later the Hudson’s Bay Company, expanded operations along the lower Mackenzie River in the early 19th Century, the eastern bands of the Kutchin Indians found themselves with a secure source of desired commodities and soon established themselves in a strong middle-man position vis-a-vis the western Kutchin and the Han Indians. Although the pre-contact institutions and trading networks remained in existence after the arrival of European traders on the periphery, the actual patterns of trade proved to be highly variable with considerable


reorientation occurring as native groups moved to exploit new sources of European supplies.

Native trading patterns and institutions proved vital to the Hudson's Bay Company's expansion plans and, equally important, influenced trading relations between the firm and the people of the Yukon River basin. Following the discovery of the Colville River by Thomas Simpson and Peter Warren Dease in 1837, the Hudson's Bay Company launched a two-pronged exploration of the region west of the Mackenzie River. In both instances, the company found its way impeded by the existence of functioning native trade networks. Realizing the importance of maintaining a monopoly over either a source of supply or a trading district, the Indians attempted to prevent Hudson's Bay Company expansion. The natives acted from a position of some strength, and were able to limit or restrain access to the fur reserves of the Yukon River basin. At the same time, they always possessed an alternative supply of European manufacturers through the Tlingit (Chilcat) Indians or the natives along the lower Yukon.

The first thrust of the Company's effort to expand westward centered on Peel's River Post, opened in 1840 by John Bell following an unsuccessful attempt to cross the Richardson Mountains. Only recently established in a middleman position, the Peel River Kutchin did their utmost to hinder attempts to push west. The natives offered Bell virtually no assistance in his quest, frequently misrepresenting the difficulty of

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7 Kamouriski, Fur Trade and Exploration.

the terrain and the concomitant problems of transmountain transport. Similarly, individual natives agreed to guide the Company's men only to abandon them long before they reached their objectives. On at least two occasions, Indians from west of the Richardson Mountains anxious to encourage expansion into their area reached Peel's River and provided flattering descriptions of the prospects for trade in their home areas. Encouraged by the reports and prodded by Hudson's Bay Company Governor George Simpson, Bell finally succeeded in crossing the mountain barrier in 1842, only to be abandoned by his guide once again. Bell solved the problem in 1845 when, on Simpson's recommendation, he hired Indian assistants who knew nothing of the area to the west and whose self-interest did not conflict with the purposes of exploration. In that year, Bell finally reached the "Youcon" River, believed at the time to be the Colville. Although the Peel River Kutchin ultimately failed to hold the Hudson's Bay Company in the Mackenzie River basin, their active interference postponed the firm's expansion into the Yukon River watershed for seven years.

With Bell's discovery and the opening of an area somewhat wistfully believed to be a "New Athabasca," the Company moved quickly to incorporate the region into its trading system. In 1845 the Hudson's Bay Company built a small outpost, Lapierre's House, on the west side of the

9 HBCA, D5/7, fol. 250, Bell to Simpson, 11 Sept. 1842; HBCA, D5/8, fol. 421, Bell to Simpson, 10 August 1843.


11 HBCA, D5/7, fol. 250, Bell to Simpson, 11 Sept. 1842.

12 HBCA, D4/31, fol. 93, Simpson to Bell, 3 June 1844; HBCA, D5/14 fol. 212-215, Bell to Simpson, 1 August 1845.
Richardson Mountains and the following year Alexander Hunter Murray led a contingent of men to the junction of the Porcupine and Youcon Rivers, where they erected Fort Youcon. This expansion, however, did not permanently destroy native trading patterns extant before the company headed west. The eastern Kutchin lost a valuable trading position, but bands around the new post assumed the role of middlemen. Elimination of inter-tribal networks had not occurred; instead, the trade simply "leap-frogged" one link in the chain. The Kutchin near the new post, formerly dependent upon other natives for their supplies, now possessed a secure source of European manufacturers. Aware of the implications of the Hudson's Bay Company's expansion, the post Indians, in part, abandoned their former role as fur trappers and assumed the new mantle of fur traders and provision hunters.

The second phase of the Hudson's Bay Company's westward movement, led by Robert Campbell along the Liard and Pelly Rivers, also encountered serious difficulties with native trading networks. The consequences in this instance proved markedly different from Bell's experience. Campbell's early trade, which centred on the sparcely populated area around Frances Lake and the upper Pelly River, encountered few problems with the Indians -- and also attracted very little trade. As he extended his operations toward the Yukon River, however, he brought the Company's trade into conflict with the interior exchange network of the Chilcat


14 Ugarenko, 138-142; HBCA, D5/34, fol. 71, Anderson to Simpson, 10 July 1852.
Indians and their inland partners. As had happened to Bell in the north, Campbell's native tripmen forced him to conclude an exploratory voyage prematurely when they refused to continue, ostensibly for fear of "savage" Indians downstream. When, after five years of procrastination and questionable management, Campbell finally opened a post, Fort Selkirk, at the junction of the Lewes (Yukon) and Pelly Rivers, the long-anticipated returns failed to (Map 2) materialize.

Continuing a long-established practise, Chilcat traders regularly travelled inland to trade, outbidding the Hudson's Bay Company for the Indians' furs and preventing Campbell from achieving a profitable return. On August 21, 1852, Chilcat traders returning from a trading foray arrived at Fort Selkirk. Campbell had only two other men at the post, the rest having been dispatched on provisioning and trading duties. When the coastal Indians ransacked the fort, he was powerless.

While Campbell must bear a healthy portion of responsibility for the episode, the attack indicated a larger conflict in progress. Unlike Bell, whose actions overturned trading arrangements of relatively short duration, Campbell interfered with a much more established and more economically viable network. The Hudson's Bay Company officer himself noted

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16 HBCA, B200/b/19, fol. 11. Campbell to Lewes, 25 July 1843.

17 In five years at Fort Selkirk, Campbell never achieved a profit, let alone begin to repay the accumulated debt. HBCA, Df/34, fol. 71, Anderson to Simpson, 10 July 1852. See also Pelly Banks and Fort Selkirk Journals in PAC, MG 19, H25 and MG 19, D13.

Map 2: H.B.C. Trading Posts 1847-1893
that the Chilcat's knowledge of the terrain and the interior natives' customs and language allowed the coastal Indians to maintain their supremacy. Other, more practical considerations, including reliability of supply and lower prices also served to solidify the existing trading alliance. The inconsistent receipt of supplies, a situation created by their reliance upon the turbulent waters of the West Branch of the Liard River as a supply route, hindered the Hudson's Bay Company traders in their opposition. They also adhered to the Mackenzie River District tariff, a pricing structure which compared unfavourably with that offered by the Chilcats. Participants in the competitive maritime fur trade, the coastal Indians offered regular supply, comparable quality and substantially lower prices. Even more than the longevity of the existing trading networks, these considerations ensured the Chilcat's continuing supremacy. Fort Selkirk and its predecessors, Pelly Banks and Frances Lake, never proved economical and following the destruction of the former post in 1852, the Hudson's Bay Company did not attempt to revive the southern Yukon fur trade. Instead, the Company concentrated its efforts on the consistently profitable operation at Fort Youcon.

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19 HBCA, B200/b/29, fol. 235, Campbell to Gent in Charge R. District, 18 October 1851.

20 HBCA, B200/b/24, fol. 60, Campbell to McPherson, 24 July 1850; HBCA D.5/22, fol. 162, Campbell to Simpson, 22 April 1848.


22 Though a post operated at Lapierie's House, trade was not permitted. The firm directed natives to take their furs to either Fort Youcon or Peel's River. HBCA, B220/b/29, fol. 34, Anderson to Peers, 25 January 1852.
Suffering initially from an insufficient outfit and a lack of certain specific items in high demand, the firm's officers attempted to use native trading institutions, as they perceived them, to organize the trade. Aware of the function of partnerships in inter-tribal exchange, the traders erroneously assumed that forging an alliance with a band's trading chief would allow them to dictate terms of trade to the entire group. In times of shortage, the officers traded such highly valued goods as guns and beads only with these "principal men." The trading chief did not, however, enjoy the status with his band so readily ascribed by the Hudson's Bay Company employees. A group of natives selected the trading chief to represent their interests at the trading post, but arrangements thus concluded were not binding on the band members. After granting preferential treatment to a chief, the Hudson's Bay Company officers often found the trade of the remaining natives went elsewhere.

That the Hudson's Bay Company's men misjudged the importance and function of a native institutional structure is somewhat surprising given the firm's long and extensive experience in the fur trade and, more directly, in dealing with the Athapaskan Indians. Trade conducted along the Mackenzie River following the merger of the Hudson's Bay Company and the North-West Company was most analogous to the Yukon situation, but that trade functioned under a monopoly. Although the firm could call upon ample experience in highly competitive trade elsewhere, the officers in direct control of the Yukon trade had been trained and had

23 Tanner, "The Structure of Fur Trade Relations," 37-44.
worked primarily in the Hudson’s Bay Company-dominated Mackenzie River basin after 1821. This background led several officers to attempt to impose inappropriate conditions and regulations on the Fort Youcon trade. For example, the Company had a long standing policy that such high demand goods as guns and beads were traded only for the most valuable furs, thus ensuring that the natives tendered the most highly valued pelts such as prime beaver and marten. Lacking a complete complement of trading goods in many of the first years, the Hudson’s Bay Company traders decided to temporarily abandon the policy. They had not anticipated that the natives would now demand that the relationship be maintained as a "standard of trade," meaning that the Indians refused to trade their better furs for anything but guns and beads. Similarly, William Hardisty, Chief Factor in Charge of Mackenzie River District, decided in 1865 to impose an immediate restriction on the granting of supplies on account (credit) to the Indians. Although the firm attempted to implement the change throughout the district, evidence from Fort Youcon suggests that the practise of advancing trade goods in anticipation of future receipts of furs continued. The natives resisted any attempt to impose new or unfavourable conditions on the Fort Youcon trade.

27 Native assertiveness in the fur trade is well-accepted in recent historiography. Robin Fisher, Contact and Conflict, A. J. Ray, Indians in the Fur Trade, A. J. Ray and D. Freeman, Give Us Good Measure.
This apparent conflict between the firm's district-wide policies and attitudes at Fort Youcon reflected the more competitive nature of the Yukon River trade. The natives hesitated to accept the dictates of the Hudson's Bay Company and played a significant role in determining the nature of the regional fur trade. The Indians' exploitation of competition between European traders clearly demonstrates their ability to influence conditions of trade under favourable economic conditions. Through their extended, if indirect, contact with Europeans, the natives had developed an obvious understanding of the whites' motivation for trading furs and awareness of the implications of competition for the traders' profits and, more importantly, for tariffs and trading standards.

That the Yukon natives would take advantage of competitive opportunities in the 1880's, when numerous traders vied for furs is not surprising. Native interest in competitive trade, however, appeared in 1847 when the firm first expanded to Fort Youcon. As soon as Murray arrived the Indians exploited the Europeans' fear of competition. At the time the only legitimate alternative to the Hudson's Bay Company was a small, irregularly maintained outpost of the Russian American Fur Company at Nulato, about seven hundred miles downstream from the British establishment. The Indians quickly reported the Russians "activities," claiming that they had ascended to the site of Fort Youcon the previous year and that they planned to return that same season.28 Aware that his post stood inside Russian territory in contravention of an explicit trade agreement with the R.A.F.C., Murray feared that the apparent competition

would destroy any possible viability of the Fort Youcon trade. The natives continued to provide Murray with "information" on a regular basis, claiming at various times that his rivals had outfitted their boat with a cannon, that they offered a more favourable tariff and dispensed many gifts, and that they spread inflammatory rumours about the Hudson's Bay Company. While the natives' information did not appear to accurately reflect the activities of the Russian firm, it does illustrate the Indians' appreciation of the value of European trade rivalry. Even though distance meant that only minimal competition existed, the natives did their best to make the most of the situation and tried to present the Russians as a serious threat to the Fort Youcon trade.

The Indians' encouragement of competitive trade elicited a number of responses from Hudson's Bay Company officers, not all favourable to the natives. Fear of Russian expansion led them to respond quickly to native requests, if at all possible, in order to prevent their defection. In particular, the firm met the natives' demands for specific commodities. Fort Youcon traders requested that the company's Pacific Division collect some coastal shells and send them to the Youcon, where they were a highly valued item of trade. In calling for the adjustment of the tariff, in contrast, the natives enjoyed less success. The Company refused to act, realizing that the high costs of trading in the area could be profitably met only if the tariff remained unaltered. Also the Peel River Indians, trading in the Mackenzie River basin, were reasonably in-

29 HBCA, B200/b/23, fol. 9, Murray to McPherson, 24 June 1849.
30 HBCA, B240/2/1, fol. 45, Youcon Journal, 27, Nov. 1847; fol. 76, 24 May 1848.
31 HBCA, E37/9 fol. 40, Anderson to Colville, 15 March 1852.
formed of conditions to the west. If the exchange rates were relaxed, they threatened to resort en masse to the Fort Youcon to trade.\footnote{32} In 1862, the Hudson's Bay Company finally received tangible evidence that Russian competition existed when a servant of the Russian American Fur Company arrived at Fort Youcon.\footnote{33} Believing the event signalled Russian expansion, and basing their actions on the natives' oft-repeated descriptions of the nature of the Russian trade, the officers of the Hudson's Bay Company decided to respond aggressively. The decision to send annual trading boats downstream cut the Fort Youcon Indians out of a considerable portion of their jealousy guarded middleman trade.\footnote{34} From 1847 to 1863, however, the "manufacturing" of competitive circumstances worked to the natives' benefit.

The natives did not rely solely upon exploitation of competition to press their demands. Indeed, they found a number of means to encourage Hudson's Bay Company compliance. The apparent vulnerability of the Company establishment, an isolated island fortress of less than twenty men in the midst of several thousand natives of dubious loyalty weighed heavily on the Hudson's Bay Company men, especially Alexander Murray. On several occasions, the natives spoke openly of their plans to attack the post unless the firm offered more favourable conditions of trade. In the aftermath of Campbell's Fort Selkirk fiasco and the Hudson's Bay Company's refusal to retaliate, the Indians' threats became even more

\footnote{32} HBCA, B220/b/37, fol. 277, Hardisty to Council, 30 Nov. 1870.

\footnote{33} HBCA, B200/b/34, fol. 136, Jones to Hardisty, 23 June 1803.

\footnote{34} V. Stefansson, \textit{Northwest to Fortune} (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1936), 219-20; HBCA. B.200/6/34, fol. 57. Jones to Hardisty, 10 Nov. 1803; HBCA, B200/b/37, fol. 28, Hardisty to McDougall, 29 January 1809.
incessant.\textsuperscript{35} When native threats became particularly persistent and ominous, the senior officer of the Mackenzie River District directed the Fort Youcon trader to visit all the natives in his area and explain the economic advantages of a continuation of the firm's trade.\textsuperscript{36} No appeals to loyalty, or friendship — merely a recitation of the function and value of the trading post. The Hudson's Bay Company acknowledged the military threat and attempted to meet it through an appeal to the natives' economic priorities.

Not all native schemes were of such belligerent tone. The threatened or actual withholding of furs remained the primary means used to press demands. The natives resorted to the tactic whenever the Hudson's Bay Company did not provide goods in the quantity or quality desired.\textsuperscript{37} Robert Campbell was convinced that the Indians had formed a "combination" to protest trading conditions at Fort Selkirk. The natives, as one, refused to bring either furs or meat to the post.\textsuperscript{38} The effectiveness of these boycotts should not be underestimated for they proved a very powerful means of ensuring rapid compliance. Restriction of trade served other purposes than securing a modification of the firm's outfit or prices. On one occasion a group of Indians forced the removal of an Hudson's Bay Company trader, Strachan Jones, from Fort Youcon by refus-

\textsuperscript{35} HBCA, B200/b/32, fol. 24, Hardisty to Anderson, 15 October 1853; HBCA, B.200/b/33, fol. 15, Ross to Council, 29 Nov. 1858.

\textsuperscript{36} HBCA, B200/b/32, fol. 42, Anderson to Hardisty, 1 January 1854.

\textsuperscript{37} For Fort Selkirk, see PAC MG19, D13, Pelly and Lewes Forks Journal, vol. 1, 30 Sept. 1849. For Fort Youcon, see HBCA, E37/10, fol. 95, Anderson to Simpson, 25 March 1855.

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid. The observation is repeated several times thereafter.
ing to trade until the individual was reassigned.\textsuperscript{39}

The Hudson's Bay Company encountered little serious European competition during the first quarter century of direct native-white trade in the Yukon River basin. Through the use of inter-tribal trading networks, the artificial creation of competition, intimidation and trading boycotts, however, the native overcame an apparent monopoly and secured more favourable conditions for trade.

With the 1867 transfer of control of Alaska from Russian to the United States of America, the economy of the upper Yukon River valley took on a markedly different complexion. American traders moved onto the lower reaches of the Yukon River soon after the announcement of the purchase of Alaska. Encouraged and assisted by a sympathetic U.S. government, "Yankee" traders reached Fort Youcon two years later. Responding to reports that the Hudson's Bay Company traded well within American territory, the federal government dispatched Captain Raymond of the United States Navy in 1869 to survey the Yukon River and to ascertain the precise location of Fort Youcon.\textsuperscript{40} His subsequent 'discovery' that the post was on U.S. soil, an open secret within the Hudson's Bay Company for many years, led to the removal of the Hudson's Bay Company to British (soon to be Canadian) territory and to a rapid restructuring of the regional economy. The Hudson's Bay Company opened Rampart House

\textsuperscript{39} HBCA, B200/b/35, fol. 99, Hardisty to Jones, 1 April 1865. J. Dunlop, an apprentice clerk also left after incurring the displeasure of the Indians. HBCA, B200/b/33, fol. 15, Ross to Council, 29 Nov. 1858.

along the Porcupine River in 1870, burned it down that same year and moved further upstream to Lapierre's House.\textsuperscript{41} The following year, the firm opened a new Rampart House a short distance upstream from the first and remained at the site until 1890.\textsuperscript{42} The discovery in that year that this post was also on American soil led to its abandonment and the construction of a third Rampart House just east of the 141st meridian (Canada-United States border) along the Porcupine River. This establishment remained open for only three years, as the Hudson's Bay Company withdrew from the area completely in 1893.\textsuperscript{43} (Map 2) The American traders were no less erratic as initially a number of small companies vied for what all believed to be a highly profitable trade. Posts regularly opened and closed, new companies formed as competitors merged operations in an attempt to counter the high cost of doing business in the isolated district. By 1874, the Alaska Commercial Company dominated the Alaskan portion of trade, regularly running a steamboat along the Yukon River to supply an expanding string of posts.\textsuperscript{44} Even the dominance of this single firm did not eliminate competition, as a number of small, independent traders still competed for business. This fluid, irregular framework stood in stark contrast to the comparatively stable pre-1869 trade.

\textsuperscript{41} Asen Balikei, \textit{Vinta Kutchin Social Change} (Ottawa: Northern Co-ordination and Research Centre, 1963), 34-36. HBCA, B200/b/37 fol. 272, Hardisty to Smith, 30 Nov. 1870; HBCA, B200/b/40, fol. 5, Hardisty to McDougall, 10 March 1871.

\textsuperscript{42} HBCA, B200/b/43, fol. 597, Camsell to Wrigley, 29 March 1890.

\textsuperscript{43} HBCA, A74/1, fol. 38, Chipman to Camsell, 7 January 1893.

\textsuperscript{44} S. D. Johnson, \textit{Alaska Commercial Company, 1868-1940} (San Francisco, 1940); A. Wright, \textit{Prelude to Bonanz}, L. N. McQuesten; "Recollections of Leroy McQuesten", Yukon Territorial Archives (YTA), Pamphlet 1952-3.
The natives, especially those Indians directly attached to Fort Youcon, responded negatively to the Americans' arrival. The natives initially refused to trade furs or provisions with the interlopers and frequently pledged their allegiance to the Hudson's Bay Company. As the Company withdrew up the Porcupine River, a substantial number of the Fort Youcon Indians joined the exodus.\(^4^5\) This animosity was not general throughout the region and applied almost exclusively to the "homeguard" Indians eliminated from a profitable, if declining, middleman position by the Americans' arrival. The Hudson's Bay Company's success in retaining native support, initially attributed to the quality of their goods and the fairness of the trade, appears to have been due largely to the presence of James McDougall, a long-time Fort Youcon trader highly respected by the Indians. When he later left the area, many of the natives abandoned the Hudson's Bay Company in favour of the Americans. The Indians' remonstrances of support accompanying the expulsion from Fort Youcon proved tenuously based. As the economic advantages of the American trade became more apparent, the Indians quickly dropped their allegiance to the Hudson's Bay Company.\(^4^6\)

\(^{45}\) HBCA, B200/B/38, fol. 15, McDougall to Hardisty, 3 January 1870.

\(^{46}\) HBCA, B200/b/37, fol. 255, Hardisty to Council, 2 August, 1870.
Table 1
HUDDSON’S BAY COMPANY FUR RETURNS, 1847-1893
(Averages in £)[1]

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<tr>
<td>1880-84</td>
<td>636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885-89</td>
<td>542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890-93</td>
<td>708</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Incomplete returns.


Due to the inherent difficulties of supply and the aforementioned problem of the Peel River Indians' awareness of trading conditions to the west of the Richardson Mountains, the Hudson’s Bay Company enjoyed few options in selecting competitive strategies. The Company expanded existing competitive measures, granting greater debt to reliable natives and offering relatively long-term employment (3 to 6 months) in an attempt to tie individual Indians to the firm.47 For the most part, the Company relied on the attraction of certain of its trading goods, especially blankets and tobacco, which remained in great demand throughout the Yukon River basin and which assured the Hudson’s Bay Company of at least a small share of the Yukon fur trade.48

47 HBCA, B200/b/40, fol. 74, Hardisty to Sinclair, 1871; HBCA, B.200/b/37, fol. 272, Hardisty to Smith, 30 Nov. 1870.
48 Coates, "Furs Along the Yukon," 152-75.
Driven by internal competition as well as confrontation with the weakened Hudson's Bay Company, the Yankee traders utilized a broader array of techniques to attract native traders. Initially these followed the traditional lines of granting generous gratuities, lowering prices, offering better rates for Indians' furs, travelling to trade directly with native bands, and incorporating competitors' trade goods into their outfits. Finding these methods only marginally successful, the Americans resorted to other methods, focusing primarily on the use of natives to encourage other Indians to alter their trading patterns. Adopting techniques long used with success by the Hudson's Bay Company, some Americans hired native runners to travel to distant tribes in order to solicit trade. Later attempts to compete with the Hudson's Bay Company saw the Alaska Commercial Company set up Indians as "free traders" in the immediate vicinity of Rampart House, supplying them with a generous complement of goods and encouraging their proteges to offer debt and better prices to secure trade.

Whatever the measure adopted, each attempt to entice native trappers and traders away from a European rival worked to the economic benefit of the Indians, offering a new trading source, alternative employment, a wider range of trade goods, or a more advantageous pricing policy. The

49 Ibid. HBC blankets were particularly valued as trade goods. The Company was most concerned in 1881 when the "Yankees" began trading English trade goods at lower prices. HBCA, B200/b/43, fol. 30, Camsell to Grahame, 23 March 1881. W. Ogilve, Klondike Official Guide (Toronto: Hunter, Rose, 1898), p. 48.

50 HBCA, B200/b/37, fol. 272, Hardisty to Smith, 30 Nov. 1870; HBCA, B200/b/39, fol. 35, McDougall to Hardisty, 20 Dec. 1873; HBCA, B200/b/40, fol. 120, Hardisty to Wilson, 30 March 1875.

51 PAC, MG29, All, MacFarlane Papers, vol. 1, fol. 607-08, McDonald to MacFarlane, 10 January 1877.
natives quickly exploited favourable circumstances, altering patterns of trade to take advantage of the best possible conditions. Even maintaining ties with the Hudson's Bay Company, an option selected by a number of natives in the upper Porcupine River area, included noticeable benefits. While the pricing arrangements were only marginally competitive, the ready availability of credit and the limited possibility of securing comparatively long-term employment with the firm served as attractive enticements. As well, the natives always retained, and frequently utilized, their option of resorting to competitive traders whenever conditions warranted.

Somewhat surprisingly, the expansion of commercial whaling operations to the Herschel Island region in the late 1880's also altered the Yukon River basin fur trade. While their primary concern remained whaling, the Arctic mariners quickly discovered that the fur trade offered an avenue for quick and lucrative profits. Blissfully ignorant of the structure of the interior exchange of both the Hudson's Bay Company and its more aggressive American rivals, the whalers adopted a variety of novel measures to attract the natives. In their lust for furs, the whalers regularly traded such goods as alcohol and Winchester repeating rifles, both banned for trade with the Indians by the Canadian government. The social extravaganza which characterized the Herschel Island trading ses-

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52 Ibid., vol. 1, fol. 817-18. McDonald to MacFarlane, 1 January 1881; Ibid., fol. 819-20. Sim to MacFarlane, 4 January 1881.

sions also served as an attractive alternative to the sedate interior exchange. The Hudson's Bay Company trader at Rampart House, John Firth, watched helplessly as the whalers siphoned away the remnants of the once flourishing corporate trade in the Yukon River valley.  

By the early 1890's, the fur trade had lost its economic pre-eminence in the district. American traders continued to encourage the natives to trap and trade, but the embryonic development of an alternative economy, based on the extraction of mineral resources, increasingly attracted most of the business interest in the area. Based on a continuation of the natives' hunting-gathering cycles, the fur trade had proven valuable to the Yukon Indians and they had responded aggressively and creatively to the developments in the industry. Their subsistence economy had readily accommodated demands for time to trap, dress furs and, particularly, to undertake the numerous, often lengthy trips required to trade their harvest. The fur trade lost its pre-eminence; a new economic order emerged which, at first glance, placed little importance on the role of the Indians and their harvesting economy. It was unclear as to how the natives' would adapt to the emerging realities of the mining frontier.

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54 HBCA, B200/b/43, fol. 755, Camsell to Chipman, 30 March 1892.
CHAPTER THREE

NATIVES AND THE PRE-GOLD RUSH MINING FRONTIER

The departure of the Hudson's Bay Company in 1893 did not signal the end of the Yukon fur trade. But although the fur trade continued, it gave way to an incipient but expanding mining industry. From the 1880's, there would no longer be a singular Yukon "economy." Instead, the region's marketable wealth came from two sectors, mining and harvesting, with only tenuous links between the two. Any assessment of the economic role of the Yukon Indians following the arrival of the miners must take into account the conflicts and accommodations between the two economic sectors. Manpower requirements, demand for resources, comparative stability of markets and the ascribed role of the natives in the different sectors, in combination with the Indians' definition of their self-interest, determined the extent and nature of the Indians' involvement in the mining economy. Consequently, extra attention must be paid to the functioning of the labour market on the mining frontier, for the demand and availability of labour set limits and defined opportunities for native involvement. As well, the relative viability of what had become the Indian mode of life -- hunting for both subsistence and trade and trapping furs for market -- remained a crucial determinant of the natives' response to the new economic order.

Hudson's Bay Company officers and Church Missionary Society clergymen knew of the existence of sizeable quantities of gold in the tributaries of the Yukon River for some time. Anxious to retain the region as a fur preserve, the traders kept the information to themselves, as did the missionaries who wished to protect their native charges from the antici-
pated ravages of a mining frontier. Such efforts ultimately proved un-
successful as the lure of gold which had drawn thousands of prospectors
to California in the 1840's and to British Columbia a decade later
pulled miners inexorably northward. The discovery of major gold depos-
its in the Cassiar District in 1872 set off yet another "rush," albeit
much smaller than its predecessors. When those diggings had been worked
over, would-be miners continued northward. By the early 1880's pros-
ppectors were scouring the creeks of the Yukon though without much suc-
cess.

Two streams, the Stewart and Forty Mile, both in the west-central Yu-
kon, attracted particular attention and small mining communities formed
at both locations. George Dawson, an official of the Geological Survey
of Canada who inspected the upper Yukon River valley in 1887, estimated
the mining population at less than 250. That number increased slowly in
subsequent years, as reports filtered out of the region of gold in "pay-
ing" quantities in the Yukon streams. The mining population fluctuated
widely as disenchanted and financially-ruined prospectors left the area,
only to be replaced by those optimistic enough to believe that riches
remained to be found beneath the cold waters of the Yukon River wat-
ershed. Similarly, the population was extremely volatile as the miners

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1 F. Whymper, Travels in Alaska and the Yukon (London: 1869), 227; Beck-
les Willson, The Life of Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal (Toronto,

2 This is based on George Dawson, Report on an Exploration in the Yukon
District. (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1898); A. Wright, Prelude to Bo-
nanza, A. Cooke and C. Holland, The Exploration of Northern Canada
(Toronto: Arctic History Press, 1970); L. N. McQuesten, Recollections
of Leroy McQuesten. YTA, Pamphlet, 1952-53.

3 Dawson, Report, p. 162.
eagerly abandoned one stream and headed to another at the slightest hint that a new gold field had been uncovered. To 1896, Forty-Mile remained the most profitable and consistent of the creeks, with miners realizing more than $14 a day for their efforts, a sizeable sum even after taking the high costs of goods and services at the isolated outpost into account. Before the discovery of gold on Rabbit Creek, which in turn touched off the Klondike Gold Rush, the Yukon mining community remained small and geographically concentrated, content with the remunerative if unspectacular returns, yet ever vigilant for a new or larger strike.4

The actual mining operations offered few employment prospects for Indians in the area. Natives seldom staked claims, apparently seeing little attraction in the extensive work undertaken with no guarantee of a profitable return. Those few who followed the miners to the fields usually sold their claims within a short time. The technology and, just as important, the ideology of placer mining ensured that most miners conducted operations on a small scale, rarely involving more than two or three men. Unlike quartz or hard rock mining, which required labour and machine intensive operations, Yukon placer mining remained essentially small scale, with power supplied by hand and the manipulation of natural water supplies. Gold bearing dirt was accumulated, usually during the winter, from shafts dug (often through permafrost) to the bedrock underlying a creek bed. Miners stockpiled dirt until spring run-off, at

which time the stream would be diverted through a sluice-box (a long, narrow trough with a riffled bottom designed to trap the heavy gold dust and nuggets). The accumulated dirt was mixed with water and run through the sluice. At an appropriate time, the flow of the water was stopped and the riffles checked. The operation of the placer mines was highly seasonal and, because of the small size of the claims, normally run by individuals or partnerships. Additional labour requirements usually came only during the spring run-off when the care had to be taken to ensure that all the carefully gathered dirt was "washed" while water supplies lasted. Each miner typically handled his own claim; to have a labourer on hand was a luxury affordable only by those with a "proved" mine. Characterized by a small population and utilizing an individualized, extractive technology, the placer mining operations in the Yukon River valley in the 1880's nonetheless had a significant economic impact on those Indians resident near the mines.  

While the border (Forty-Mile) region felt the principal effect, a lesser number of natives in outlying districts came into the new economy, drawn by miners reaching ever further afield. Most of the prospectors entering the district came by way of the Chilkoot Pass, a small mountain divide connecting Lynn Canal and the headwaters of the Yukon River. The coastal Chilcat (Tlingit) Indians, and to a lesser degree the inland Tagish bands, earned money by transporting supplies through the mountains. Many of the prospectors and travellers who travelled this route found the Indians' charges usurious, but the Chilcats' jealously protected monopoly of the passes had to be respected and most paid

5 Ibid.
rather than face the prospect of packing their own supplies. The prospectors' willingness to risk the usually placid, occasionally treacherous, waters of the Yukon River in hastily built scows and rafts thwarted an extension of this activity into river travel. As well, Alaska Commercial Company sternwheelers plied the waters of the Yukon from American territory well up into Canada, bringing in the bulk of provisions and supplies required by the miners. Natives did find a limited amount of work along the river as guides, pilots, and packers, but the prospectors' generally limited financial means restricted this avenue to occasional work.

There was considerable demand for Indian labour around the mining camps, particularly at Forty-Mile where the local natives participated extensively in the emerging economic order. The new ventures proved highly remunerative, offering material gain far in excess of that available through trade with the Hudson's Bay Company or its competitors. The limited development of the district severely restricted the supply of white labourers. Whenever miners uncovered paying quantities of gold most men in the district worked their own claims. With white workers at a premium, if available at all, would-be employers turned, if reluctantly, to the available pool of natives. Retailers and wholesalers supplying the mines often needed assistance unloading sternwheelers. Even more importantly, these vessels required a steady supply of cut cord wood in order to ply the waters of the Yukon. Like the other seasonal and temporary chores, the role of packer fell largely to the Indians. Most of the mines in the Forty-Mile district were a considerable dis-

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tance from the Yukon River. Miners attempting to provision their opera-
tions either carried in their own supplies or, as most chose to do, hired a packer to do the work. Most of this work went to the natives.\footnote{Evidence on native labour is widely dispersed. The account is drawn from PAC, MG17, B2, Church Missionary Society (hereafter CMS), Bompas to C.M.S., 20 January 1893, May 1893, 15 May 1894; PAC, MG20, B22, Ogilvie Papers, file 4, Bompas to Lt. Governor, 3 Dec. 1891; Report of Inspector C. Constantine, 20 January 1896, Annual Report of North West Mounted Police, 1896, YTA, Anglican Church (AC) New Series, file 4, Constantine to Deputy Minister of the Interior, 19 November 1896; Ogilvie, Information Respecting the Yukon District (Ottawa: Dept. of the Interior, 1897); Ogilvie, The Klondike Official Guide (Toronto: Hunter Rose Co. Ltd., 1898); G. Dawson, Report of an Exploration, PAC, MG29, C92, Bowen Papers, R. J. Bowen, "Incidents in the Life of R. J. Bowen," unpublished manuscript.}

The natives seldom received the remuneration offered the few whites willing to hire out. Packers in the Forty-Mile area received up to $.30 a pound, for carrying the goods as far as 85 miles from the settlement. Winter rates fell to approximately a third of the summer stipend, but in that season dog teams could be used with a concomitant reduction in the time and effort.\footnote{Report of Inspector Constantine, 20 January 1896.} Wage rates in the mines and elsewhere fluctuated according to the season and the number of labourers available. Monetary offerings reflected the shortness of the summer which placed a premium on that season. While labourers earned between $6 and $10 a day, a standard maintained in several instances by a labourers' agreement that they would not accept less. While native remuneration seldom matched that granted their Caucasian counterparts, healthy, well-regarded Indian males earned from $4 to $8 each working day.\footnote{Ibid.; CMS, Bompas to CMS, 20 January 1893; Constantine to Deputy Minister of the Interior, 19 Nov. 1896; Bompas to Lt. Governor, 3 Dec. 1891.} Although there were occasional signs of racially motivated attempts to exclude the Indians from
the more lucrative work in the mines and to limit their wages.\textsuperscript{10} those natives securing temporary positions improved on their former earnings. The restricted demand for native workers, however, prevented the Indians from more assertively controlling their labour, as they had done in the fur trade.

In addition to employment in the mines or in related transportation activities, other Indians capitalized on a variety of additional opportunities. The demand for foodstuffs, including salmon for dog meat, moose, caribou and other game for human consumption, improved dramatically over the fur trade era. With the major mining camps located close to the migratory trails of northern caribou herds and with moose readily available in the river valleys, the Indians easily harvested enough game to serve their own needs and those of the white population.\textsuperscript{11} Natives outside the immediate vicinity of the mines carried the bulk of the provision trade as those able to reach a closer accommodation with the mining economy found it comparatively easy to satisfy their material or cash requirements without resorting to the hunt, except to fulfill personal needs.

Natives occasionally took a more direct role in the mining activity, staking claims on promising or newly opened creeks and then selling at a substantial profit to late arrivals.\textsuperscript{12} Given the prospective return from the creeks, the prospectors paid seemingly unreasonable sums to secure a

\textsuperscript{10} PAC, RG10, Department of Indian Affairs (hereafter IA), vol. 3962, file 147, 654-1, pt. 2, Bompas to Indian Commissioner, 5 September 1896.

\textsuperscript{11} CMS, Bompas to CMS, 15 May 1894.

\textsuperscript{12} AC, New Series, file 4, Constantine to Deputy Minister of the Interior, 19 Nov. 1896.
toe-hold on suitable property. Following the Rabbit Creek (Bonanza) discovery and before many realized the extent of the gold field, miners bought Indian cabins located nearby along the Yukon River, paying from $100 to $200 for each of the small structures. With hindsight and the intervention of Church of England missionary W. C. Bompas, the natives appealed for an extra payment in keeping with the rapid inflation of costs in the area. In this instance, the natives would have done well to have held onto their land, but the incident illustrates the potential for a substantial return through the sale of native land holdings in this case cabins, but more often mineral claims.13

The renowned discovery of gold in Bonanza Creek in August 1896, quickly galvanized activity in the Yukon River valley. Forty Mile and all other mining camps emptied as every miner in the area headed to grab a share of the new "Eldorado." Many of the natives who profited from the mining economy at Forty-Mile followed the migration to Dawson City and re-established themselves in their newly accepted role as provision hunters and casual labourers. The Klondike Gold Rush which followed reshaped the economic and social fabric of the Yukon in a way few envisaged. It was a major find to be sure, but those on the scene foresaw room for only a few thousand extra miners on the creeks. No one anticipated the human deluge that followed. In the short term, before news of the strike reached "outside" in 1897, the Yukon economy continued largely as before, with the natives secure in their role as a supplementary labour force to the mining community.

13 Ibid.; Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND), file 801-30-0-01, Bompas to Minister of the Interior, 28 October 1896, Extract from William Ogilvie's letter dated 8 November 1896.
Before turning to a detailed examination of the gold rush and attending transitions, however, an assessment of the impact of mining on the economic strategies of the Yukon Indians is in order. Limited primarily to those in the west-central region between the Stewart River and Forty-Mile to 1896, this mining activity affected only about 10% to 20% of the Yukon River natives. Few Yukon Indians participated in the new economic order, staying instead with hunting, gathering and, to the extent to which it still operated, the fur trade. For those Indians drawn to the mines, the potential for change was great. A cash economy based on wage labour and retail stores functioned on an expanded scale for the first time. The comparative stability of the Hudson’s Bay Company trade was gone. The American fur trade operated as something of an intermediary stage between these apparent extremes, but it had not functioned independently long enough to serve as a meaningful transitional phase. With higher wages and more competition for their business, those natives geographically located and personally disposed to participate in the mining economy found within it a much easier way to satisfy their still limited material needs.

Even with the considerable potential for change, the natives’ role during the fur trade and the pre-Gold Rush mining interlude remained surprisingly consistent. Participants in both, the Fort Youcon natives worked during the fur trade as provision hunters, fishermen and as part-time labourers, assisting the Hudson’s Bay Company by manning canoes or moving post supplies. Their function as middlemen for natives to the west and south, whom they prevented from trading directly with the fort, limited their actual trapping operations. The experience in
the early stages of the mining frontier differed little. Wages and ma-
terital rewards rose, but the Indians continued to serve as provisioners,
abit for an expanded population, and as a readily available short-term
labour force engaged primarily in transportation and packing. Signifi-
cantly, these same Indians continued to obtain furs for trade, not
through their own trapping efforts, but via trade with distant bands de-
nied access to the mining centres. The onset of mining had not altered
the natives' economic activities in a major, or unsettling way. In-
stead, the Indians retained a role analogous to that attained during the
Hudson’s Bay Company era, a position which allowed them to earn suffi-
cient money to purchase their requisites from the Euro-Canadians while
interfering in only a limited way with the hunting and fishing cycles.

The part-time and seasonal activities undertaken for both the fur
traders and the miners conformed to rather than altered the Indians' an-
nual pattern. Indeed, that the natives could provide for their own sub-
sistence, provision an expanding white population and occasionally work
in mine-related ventures underlines the comparative "affluence" of the
Yukon Indians' way of life. Supplying their own food requirements obvi-
ously did not demand all their time and effort, leaving them free to
perform a variety of other tasks for the miners. From an economic

14 The best description of this process is in "Incidents in the Life of
R. J. Bowen," 116-133.

15 In Constantine to Deputy Minister of the Interior, 19 November 1896,
the Inspector claimed that the Indians imitated the whites, refusing
to hunt and fish unless absolutely necessary. While a few temporari-
ly adopted a more "white" mode of life, his larger generalization is
misleading. Importantly, Constantine staunchly defended miners and
had little time for those, such as Bompas, who sought to preserve In-
dians' rights. Constantine's comments on the Indians, appended to a
refutation of Bompas' claims that the government should protect na-
tive fishing and land rights, are of highly questionable validity.
standpoint, the mining activity did little to alter the central basis of the Indians' lifestyle or their seasonal dependance upon the products of field and stream. The expanded opportunities for short-term employment made it easier to satisfy an expanding but hardly voracious appetite for the retailers' wares. They purchased luxuries, including alcohol, more readily and those few items more fully integrated into the natives' material culture (guns, knives and other iron goods being the prime examples) could be acquired with less effort. The combination of seasonal wage labour plus a continued fur trade offered a new level of affluence for those natives able to participate.

If the miners' arrival did not change native behaviour decisively, it nonetheless introduced the rudimentary beginnings of an industrial economy to the Yukon River basin. While the fur trade and the attending preconditions of racial accommodation and interdependence remained, the old order had certainly been relegated to the background. Though mining was geographically concentrated in the west-central Yukon, the new activity attracted the majority of white interest. Gold, not fur, was now king and the requisites of the former industry determined the contours of regional economic development in the following decades. Since the natives were potential workers, the dynamics of the labour market held the key to the level of integration. The Indians' ability and desire to work, availability of white workers, seasonal fluctuations in economic activity, the nature of the work performed, and the employers' willingness to hire natives worked together to form the framework of the mining labour market. While this market, a highly informal and fluid construct, remained of limited importance in the pre-Gold Rush years, the
system established laid the basis for the natives' participation in the new economic order.

The Yukon mines offered little regular work on the creeks for anyone without a claim. Employment prospects came largely from the two main support industries, transportation and provisioning. The limited demand for labour was seasonal, requiring large numbers of workers in the summer months and few for the remainder of the year. The need for assistance seldom included skilled labourers. Exceptions existed, such as the need for skilled technicians on the riverboats or trading post clerks, but most jobs required only a strong back and a solid constitution. On the supply side, potential employers drew from a small, irregular pool of white labourers or a larger, stable number of Indians.

Drawn by high wages, a few whites came in each year specifically to work in the mines. Given the location and the cost of reaching the west-central Yukon, this cadre of workers remained small. A second, and larger group of white labourers included those miners yet to strike pay dirt or out of supplies. Often financially constrained due to unsuccessful mining efforts, yet unwilling to abandon the quest for gold, these miners offered their services to raise funds for yet another foray onto the creeks. While more numerous than the first group, this second body of men was a compressed and unstable work force with supply dependent upon the failure of prospectors already in the region. While the first to be employed, especially for work in the diggings, they could not be counted on as a steady pool of seasonal labour. That left only the Indians. Self-supporting through fishing, hunting and fur trading, on-site due to the fortuitous juxtaposition of the gold fields and the
home territories of the Kutchin and Han Indians, willing to accept limited work in order to satisfy their material desires, the natives were ideally situated to meet the needs of the embryonic Yukon mining industry.

The machinations of the local labour market accounted for the successful and remunerative adaptation of the west-central Indians to the expanding mining frontier. The situation before 1896, could be characterized as a casual, seasonal labour market, a situation uniquely suited to the natives' needs and interests. As long as demand remained seasonal so as not to conflict with hunting and fishing, as long as the mines supporting activities sought unskilled labourers rather than skilled technicians, and as long as the available pool of white manpower stayed small and variable, the local natives found a significant economic role. Before the Gold Rush, the local economy allowed the natives to continue their harvesting pursuits while simultaneously providing short-term and remunerative employment. Since the demand for the native harvest of fish, meat and furs remained high and as the emerging economy required primarily unskilled workers, the regional order assured the Indians a key role in the local economy.

If the fur trade had offered the Yukon Indians a profitable entree into the western economy, the limited mining activity before the Klondike Gold Rush provided an even more advantageous economic situation for those natives positioned to participate in the new order. Based on the

16 For an excellent description of the functioning of a casual, seasonal labour market in an industrial setting, see Garth Stedman Jones, Outcast London, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971). Jones' work also illustrates the importance of examining the structure and evolution of labour markets.
small number of much preferred white labourers and the limited technol­
ogy of placer gold extraction, the benefits for the Indians were precari­
ous.\textsuperscript{18} The natives, however, achieved a successful accommodation with a
small-scale, localized mining community; whether the balance achieved
would stand up in the face of an onslaught of miners and a growing so­
phistication in mining technology remained to be seen. Importantly, the
miners made no attempt to draw the Indians to the centre of the new eco­
nomic system. Instead, the now-dominant white community valued the In­
dians' role as provisioners and seasonal labourers but sought to prevent
any racial integration of the mines. They had, in effect, set up a ra­
cial class system which assured a constant source of native labour. The
natives seldom challenged the exclusiveness of the placer diggings, wel­
coming the remunerative opportunity to combine preferred harvesting pur­
suits with occasional wage labour.

\textsuperscript{17} Indians near the mining camps restricted the access of other natives
to the markets and wage labour opportunities, a process reminiscent
of attempts to preserve fur trade monopolies. See "Incidents in the
Life of R. J. Bowen."

\textsuperscript{18} The natives' successful adaptation to the 19th Century mining fron­
tier in the Yukon is not unique, although it contrasts with most por­
traits of the expansion of mining activity. See the rather different
portrayals of the B.C. experience of Robin Fisher, \textit{Contact and Con­
flict} and Rolf Knight, \textit{Indians at Work: An Informal History of Na­
tive Indian Labour in British Columbia, 1858-1930}. (Vancouver: New
Star, 1978). On a more positive adaptation, somewhat analagous to
the Yukon, see J. Kay, "Indian Responses to a Mining Frontier." in W.
CHAPTER FOUR

NATIVES IN THE KLONDIKE GOLD RUSH ECONOMY

The comparative quietude of the Yukon mining economy exploded in August, 1896, when "squaw man" George Carmacks and two Indians, Skookum Jim and Tagish Charlie, discovered a major deposit of placer gold near the junction of the Yukon and Klondike Rivers. The initial "rush" resembled any number of other stampedes in the region over the past decade and a half. At first hint of the find, miners throughout the Yukon River valley grabbed their tools, abandoned their diggings and headed for the new strike. Previous stampedes subsequently proved to be minor annoyances, the discoveries shown to be either illusory or incapable of sustaining extensive mining activity. On this occasion, the discovery proved neither false nor limited.

The story of the Klondike Gold has been oft-told and only the bare outlines need be sketched here. News of the Yukon discovery reached the outside world in the summer of 1897 when miners carrying thousands of dollars worth of gold arrived in Seattle and San Francisco. The response throughout depression-ridden North America was instantaneous. The great Klondike Gold Rush commenced. A few thousand prospectors made it to the Yukon that same year, but the majority arranged their affairs so as to arrive in the gold field the following summer. Estimates as to the size of this human wave vary, but the number arriving in 1898 alone probably exceeded 50,000. Most of the would-be miners experienced shat-

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1 The best treatment is M. Zaslow, *The Opening of the Canadian North*, 101-146. A. A. Wright, *Prelude to Bonanza* contains a good discussion of the discovery and initial reaction. On Dawson City see H. Quest, "Dawson City", (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Manitoba, 1982).
tered dreams, as the prime gold-bearing ground had been staked long before their arrival. Disgruntled and demoralized, many thousands left for the south soon after completing the journey to Dawson City. This town had sprung up on the flats at the mouth of the Klondike River to service the mines. While the population in the area soon dropped from the heady heights of 1898-1899, the federal census of 1901 recorded over 27,000 people in the territory. Many continued to leave, an exodus encouraged by the discovery of gold near Nome, Alaska in 1899, but the lure of the Yukon nonetheless continued to exert its magnetic appeal. Every year would-be prospectors, each believing that they could share in the bounty of the northern "Eldorado," found their way into the Yukon River basin. By 1907, however, the gold rush had dwindled and all but died. Mammoth dredges replaced the placer miners in the creek beds and hydraulic mining operations stripped the banks and the hill sides of their wealth. The days of the individual miner, in the Klondike fields at least, were over. Large mining consortiums bought the rights to the major creeks and secured federal government leases to all-important water supplies.

As an economic force, the gold rush lasted less than a decade, giving way to the more systematic and more highly capitalized exploitation of the Yukon's mineral resources. This short duration belies its signifi-

2 Canada, Census 1901.

3 See Guest, "Dawson City" for a useful discussion of the transiency associated with the Gold Rush.

cance, for in short order the Gold Rush radically overturned the demographic, racial and economic balance in the Yukon River valley. Before 1896, natives outnumbered whites by approximately four to one; the 1901 census, taken two years after the height of the rush, revealed a population of eight whites for every Indian. For several decades, the natives had benefited financially from the arrival of the whites, a prosperity tenuously founded on a shortage of white labour and the benign attitude of the new arrivals to the native population. In the aggressive, individualistic frenzy of the gold rush, the need for an accommodation with the Indians evaporated, any prior consideration for the natives' interest largely consumed by the lust for gold.

At the same time, far more Indians throughout the region felt the effects of the new order. Prospectors utilized several corridors in coming to the Yukon, although the Chilkoot and White Passes from the Lynn Canal to the headwaters of the Yukon River remained the most favoured. Other routes, including the Dalton Trail in the southwest corner of the district and a variety of branch routes connecting the supply centre of Edmonton with Dawson City offered access to the gold fields. Indians along each of these routes participated, if often tangentially, in the gold rush economy. The Bennett Lake-Dawson corridor, however, remained the principle focus. (Map 3)

The mining activity itself centred on the tributaries of the Klondike River and while Indians throughout the territory felt the pull of the gold rush, the economic forces were strongest in the immediate hinterland of the mines. A significant number of natives moved closer to Daw-

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5 The earlier figure comes from a DIA estimate of 2600 natives in 1896 and approximately 600-700 whites. Canada, Census, 1901.
Map 3: Routes to the Klondike Gold Fields
son City to take advantage of perceived economic opportunities. Although decimated by disease, the local Fort Resolution (Han) Indians remained in the area, as did a number of former residents of the Forty-Mile district who followed the miners' migration upstream. Natives from as far away as Fort McPherson on the Peel River and along the Porcupine River in the northern Yukon came to Dawson, drawn by the social and economic activity. While the number of Indians actually attracted to the gold fields was comparatively small, the reordering attending the rush affected most of the Yukon natives. Vastly different in scale and shape from previous economic structures, the gold rush economy offered a variety of prospects and restrictions to those Indians who attempted to participate.

The most noticeable characteristic of the Yukon Indians in the Klondike period is their comparative anonymity. In previous years, the natives maintained a high profile and the documentary record is replete with comments on their activities. The natives receive scant attention in the gold rush literature. The records reflect the fact that the gold rush was an overwhelmingly white phenomenon, with the Indians swiftly relegated to a peripheral position. A prodigious number of diaries, biographies and travelogues appeared, but the Indians, if they appear at all, emerged on the margins. The authors, and one suspects the readership, of these tracts had little interest in what many perceived to be

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the dying remnants of yet another group of Indians. The relentless pursuit of gold and the hardships awaiting those intrepid "Cheechakos" (newcomers) who ventured north held far greater interest. As a consequence, this voluminous body of literature offers very few insights into the activities of the Yukon Indians. Also, government agents and even most missionaries viewed the care and protection of the white population as their principal responsibility and as a result comments on the Indians also appear irregularly from these sources. Despite limited contemporary comment, the natives of course had a role to play in the development of the gold fields and their experience represented an important phase in their adaptation to the changing Yukon economy.

From the beginnings of the Klondike rush, the natives attempted to retain the functions they had performed at the Forty-Mile camps. A number of them worked as labourers, guides or wood-cutters, always on a short-term basis. In addition, the demand for meat in the camps re-

7 For reasons presented here, no effort will be made to list the voluminous books, articles and typescripts which fit this description. The reader is referred to the useful work by R. Friesen, The Chilkoot Pass: A Literature Review (MRS #203; Parks Canada, 1977); H. Guest, Dawson City: San Francisco of the North or Boomtown in A Bog (MRS #241; Parks Canada, 1978); and Guest, "Dawson City."

8 The only notable exception is the records of the R.C.M.P. (PAC, RG16), although even there comments on the Indians are sketchy. See also P. Berton, Klondike, S. D. Clark, The Developing Canadian Community (Toronto: UTP, 1962); H. A. Innis, Settlement and the Mining Frontier (Toronto: Macmillan, 1936) which reflect the standard Eurocentric focus.

mained high and a ready market existed for caribou or moose meat. During the first months of the rush, demand for native labour exceeded all previous experience and high wages predominated. As prospectors began to cross over the mountain passes and into the Yukon River basin, Indian residents near the routes found ready and remunerative employment as packers. The Chilkoot Pass provided most miners with their ingress to the Yukon. At the bottom of the pass, a number of Chilkat Indians offered to pack goods up the steep trails. Their prices had risen in step with demand, increasing from 1c per pound in 1896 to 5c -- 7c in 1897. The major onslaught of prospectors in 1898-1899 did not, however, bring greater rewards. Expanded use of tramways, packtrains and eventually the construction of the White Pass and Yukon Route railway connecting tidewater and Whitehorse undercut the Indians' packing enterprise. Similar opportunities existed in the far north, along the passes connecting the Mackenzie River basin and the Yukon River watershed. The number of prospectors was much smaller than in the south, but the Kutch-in found remunerative employment packing supplies across the Stony Creek Pass (joining the Peel and the Porcupine) and providing provisions for miners encamped along that route and the Peel-Wind River path to the Klondike. No white entrepreneur added transportation devices to these routes as the rush through the northern Yukon lasted for only two


11 See R. Friesen, The Chilkoot Pass and the Great Gold Rush of 1898, 72-95, 139-160. Most miners, themselves of moderate means, carried their own goods. Hence the famous photographs of the solitary string of bent-over men winding its way up the mountain pass.
years.\textsuperscript{12}

Initially, the Yukon Indians enjoyed a material prosperity greater than in the years of the Forty-Mile mines. Additionally, expansion of mining activities ensured that the benefits of the 1896 discovery were dispersed more widely than previously. Based on the scarcity of labour and lack of alternatives to Indian manpower, such rewards proved transitory. The arrival of tens of thousands of miners in 1898-1899 and the expansion of roads and rail lines between Dawson City and creeks eliminated much of the local need for native labour.\textsuperscript{13} In short order, the technological advances spawned by the success of the gold fields restricted a number of former native occupations and severely limited the Indians' prospective role in the emerging economy.

The provision trade continued to be the only section of the economy to provide consistent returns. This trade expanded geographically. Earlier efforts reached little beyond the mining community market, supplemented in a small way through sales to missionaries and traders in the border region. With many thousands of miners, government officials (especially the North West Mounted Police), and a few emerging settlements (Whitehorse, Dawson, Carcross and Selkirk, being the most notable), natives throughout the district participated in the growing provision trade. While the market increased, there were nonetheless


\textsuperscript{13} Technological advances in transportation are well described in G. Bennett, \textit{Yukon Transportation: A History}, 24-58.
significant limitations to the natives' ability to develop the markets' full potential. To prevent widespread starvation, the federal government decreed that each person entering the territory bring 1,000 pounds of foodstuffs, an estimated one year supply. This stringently enforced government edict obviously lessened demand for native produce. That many of those entering the region decided to leave soon after arriving in Dawson compounded the impact of the supply regulations. To raise the money required for a fare to the "outside" and to exact some pecuniary benefit from the toil of packing the goods over the mountains, these disgruntled sojourners sold their outfits in the mining camps, adding to the available food stocks. The miners could not bring in fresh meat and fish, but as long as resources allowed, many relied on their own hunting and fishing skills to satisfy their needs, thereby further restricting the market for animal carcasses and increasing competition for local resources. To supply the considerable market that still remained, the natives went further afield in pursuit of caribou and moose and occasionally had to compete with white fishermen for access to the Yukon River salmon run. The expanding transportation infrastructure, especially the provision of a year-round rail link between the coast and Whit-

14 Zaslow. *Opening* provides a good description of administrative maneuvers. See also Guest. "Dawson City," DIA, vol. 3962, file 147, 6544 pt. 2, Bompas to Commissioner For Indian Affairs, 5 August 1896.

ehorse. ensured a more reliable supply of foodstuffs from the south and a further reduction in demand for native supplies. Tales are legion about the gold miners' voracious appetites and the outrageous sums offered for specific foods, but this demand was normally restricted to such luxury items as fresh eggs, fresh milk and beef.

In addition to supplying meat, several new avenues of employment opened up for the Indians. Few offered regular or lasting income. Women earned money manufacturing clothing for sale to the miners. There was also a steady demand for other native products, including snowshoes and sleds, but the Indians' inability and unwillingness to produce large quantities restricted the market. Similarly, in the first days of the rush there seemed to be an insatiable demand for dogs, and those Indians willing to part with their animals earned sizeable sums of money. Since these same dogs were essential to their hunting activities, the natives seldom surrendered the animals. Several white entrepreneurs capitalized on the demand for dogs by heading to the northern reaches of the territory - the Porcupine River country and the Arctic slope - where they purchased dogs from Indians and Inuit. They then drove the animals back to Dawson and sold them for a handsome profit.

The availability of government relief also altered economic conditions and options. Prodded by Bishop Bompas and other members of the


17 W. Mason, The Frozen Northland (Cincinnati: Jennings and Graham, 1910); Cody, Apostle of the North, 279 states prices for dogs reached $250 or, on a rental basis, $1 per dog each day.
Church Missionary Society to provide better care for the natives.\textsuperscript{18} the federal government directed the North West Mounted Police to provide supplies for destitute Indians. Only those natives with access to the police posts scattered along the Bennett to Dawson corridor could call on the limited benefits. General prosperity, plus strict government regulations ensured, however, that few Indians called on the allotments. Government relief, utilized by only the ill and the aged in this period, served as an important counter-balance to the occasional insecurity of the hunting and gathering economy, particularly in those areas feeling the impact of combined native and white hunting pressure.\textsuperscript{19}

Though most natives continued to hunt for sustenance and market and trap furs for trade, others became more active participants. Several found semi-skilled employment. Work was available for deckhands on one of the many steamboats plying the waters of the Yukon and for woodcutters supplying cord wood for the same vessels.\textsuperscript{20} The new economic prospects attracted a number of Indians to the mining camps. The Peel River Kutchin migrated almost en masse toward Dawson City. Like the area residents, they found a variety of seasonal and trapping employment opportunities. Describing these "Dawson Boys," Richard Slobodin wrote:

\textsuperscript{18} DIA, vol. 4037, file 317.050, J. D. McLean to T. W. Jackson, 28 Jan. 1902; DIA, vol. 4001, file 207, 418. Longdon to Pedley, 28 May 1903, White to Smart, 1 January 1901, Accountant to Secretary, DIA, 1 May 1902.


Summer activities, however, opened up a new life. Fourteen major summer occupations for this period have been recorded, of which ten were quite novel to these people. They included deckhand on steamboats, scow pilot, carpenter, motorboat mechanic, pool-hall handyman, licensed trader, and, for women, laundress and mining camp cook.  

Slobodin's study traced the Indians beyond the Gold Rush to the mid-1910's, and several of the noted occupations occurred in the post-Klondike period.

While a number of employment prospects existed, few of which were new to the Yukon Indians, they continued to be of a seasonal nature. Each winter, the natives left their summer positions and returned to their hunting camps and trap-lines. Importantly, the Indians accommodated most new economic ventures within the contours of their hunting-gathering patterns. Summarizing the impact of the gold rush on the natives, anthropologist Alice Kehoe wrote:

Dene, eager for cash or novelty, flocked to these towns, men selling fish and meat or working as labourers on the steamboats, at the river docks, and in the towns, women working as laundresses if their husbands brought them along. The majority of Dene men made excursions for wage labour on the pattern of hunting and trapping, leaving the wives and children in camp.  

Her description conforms closely to Michael Asch's characterization of the "mixed economy", with the natives able to readily accommodate varied, but transitory sources of wage labour into a regular seasonal cycle.

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21 Slobodin, "The Dawson Boys."


Since two Indians, Skookum Jim and Tagish Charlie, participated in and profited from the discovery of the Bonanza claim, it is not surprising that a few natives continued to prospect. There is, however, no indication of the numbers. Several commentators agreed that after a native staked a paying claim it would be "bargained away from him by the cleverer white." Before Skookum Jim and Tagish Charlie returned to Carcross, where Charlie died in 1908, they combined with Jim Boss in an attempt to hit yet another big strike. Their efforts went unrewarded.

A few Indians put aside their harvesting practices (though seldom permanently) while joining the mining economy. While they enjoyed varying degrees of success, most shared the fate of Skookum Jim and Tagish Charlie. Rich men in their day, they, like many of the "successful" miners, lost most of their money in short order. The activities of a few entrepreneurs, a term that applies with special validity to Jim Boss — miner, trader and road house operator — indicates that there was no uniform "native" response to the expansion and evolution of the Yukon economy. Location, timing and personality all played a role in determining the response of individual Indians to the prospects and limitations posed by the expansion of mining.

One of the most significant implications of the Klondike rush lay in the extension of Euro-Canadian economic interests throughout the territory. Before 1896-1899, white activity remained cloistered in the west-central Yukon, with only limited expansion elsewhere. As a result,

24 DIAND, 801-30-0-1, Bompas to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 12 July 1899.

many natives had little or no direct contact with whites. Their attempts to expand operations were often blocked by other natives protecting a middleman position. When the gold-rush unleashed its legions of would-be miners, old barriers broke down and engulfed previously little known areas. The Copper Indians in the White River region had been prevented from contacting the whites near Forty-Mile by the Han and from reaching the Haines area to the south by the Tlingit. When the first N.W.M.P. patrols reported back from the district, the officers noted their reliance on out-dated guns, a lack of requisite supplies and their general backwardness. The isolation of the Copper, Kaska and eastern Tutchone bands dissolved as white prospectors and traders expanded operations. For these natives, new economic opportunities included little more than provisioning and fur trading, but improved accessibility to white traders made the acquisition of material goods far easier.

As before, the economic prospects of the Yukon natives depended on their own interests and the structure of the territorial labor market. Attempts by employers to match their needs with the available supply of able-bodied workers determined the number and type of positions available to Indians. The economy retained much of its seasonal character.


with demand expanding in the summer and contracting dramatically as winter approached. The need for skilled workers grew rapidly, particularly in the Dawson City and Whitehorse service industries. Lacking requisite technical and social skills labor, the natives instead vied for available unskilled positions. The large number of white workers in the district prevented any major native entry into the labor force. Each winter, thousands of men and women crossed over the Chilkoot and White Passes, and travelled downstream with the break-up of the river ice, arriving in Dawson as the demand for workers increased. Unable to find suitable or remunerative gold claims, these men often offered their services to others, working in the mines or in Dawson. The size of this labor pool allowed wage rates to actually decline, even in the face of uniformly high prices. Under such conditions, the Yukon labor market offered few openings for the less desirable Indians. Exclusionist policies kept natives out of the mines. Policies designed to prevent competition from cheap labor similarly barred the Chinese. Bishop Bompas and the police encouraged such exclusion. DIA, vol. 3962, file 147, 654-1, pt. 2, Bompas to Indian Commissioner, 5 September 1896; CMS, Bompas to CMS, 2 March 1898.
tive" status. The natives' choice was a logical one, for they likely earned more from their hunting and trapping activities than was possible through temporary employment near the mines. Consequently, the Indians retained the position held before 1896 — fur trappers and meat harvesters — although even in these ventures they faced the new challenge of white competition.

There was one rather ironic instance where the forces of labour supply and demand worked to bar the Indians from a potentially remunerative source of income. In other gold rush and frontier settings, native women earned regular incomes as prostitutes. Given the overwhelmingly male composition of the incoming population, many government agents and missionaries feared that the limited supply of women would similarly lead to native prostitution. There were, however, few recorded instances of such activity, fewer even than in the early days of the Forty-Mile camps when native women frequently visited the miners' cabins. These early relations remained more social than financial, but the anticipated demand for female companionship in the wake of the gold rush promised to put such affections on a different footing. The extensive publicity attending the Gold Rush, however, ensured that women of a talent and inclination to satisfy the miners' baser instincts quickly found their way north and began to reap their share of the gold diggings. Because of the adequate supply of white women, native women found little place in this financially rewarding, if socially and medically undesirable, pro-

30 Fisher. Contact and Conflict. 19-20, 101, 113, 128, describes B.C. native prostitution. In this instance he notes that Indian prostitution ceased with the arrival of a white settler population.

31 Guest, "Dawson City", esp. chapter "Langourous Lillies of Soulless Love."
ession. The laws of supply and demand worked to protect Indian women from absorption into an unsavoury segment of the territorial workforce.

The economic legacy of the gold rush was decidedly less positive than earlier mining developments. Previously profitable native incursions based on a scarcity of white labour gave way as the massive flood of would-be prospectors filled most available jobs and even spilled over into the native spheres. The Yukon Indians no longer occupied the centre of the territorial labour pool. Pushed to the periphery, they harvested a regionally threatened resource base for sale to a population with a growing number of alternative sources of food. The fur trade, however, continued to offer a respectable return, but for natives in the Dawson City hinterland, those resources appeared to be rapidly dwindling. At the opposite end, the emergence of native capitalists, individuals motivated by the search for profit and personal material gain, indicated the full range of native response to the new realities. In the final analysis, the gold rush indicated the precarious nature of the natives' link to the mining economy. White society did not encourage integration of Euro-Canadians and Indians. Instead, as members of a casual labour pool, the natives served to fill short term demands, but generally fended for themselves outside the economic mainstream. The natives accepted this emerging condition with equanimity, for with only

a few exceptions, most Indians willingly and ably maintained their highly valued hunting and gathering pursuits.

The economic order presaged in the Forty-Mile and Stewart River gold camps did not come to pass. In its stead, the Yukon showed signs of developing two separate economic systems, one based on the extraction and transportation of mineral resources, the other on fur trapping and the pursuit of game. Points of contact were few. By the end of the Klondike Gold Rush, the Yukon economy had been set on yet another course, this one pulling native and white apart in contrast to the manner in which the pre-1896 mining frontier had drawn them together.
CHAPTER FIVE

NATIVES IN THE 20TH CENTURY INDUSTRIAL ECONOMY

From the arrival of the Hudson’s Bay Company to the discovery of gold along Bonanza Creek in 1896, the natives of the Yukon had been closely integrated into the regional economic order. The Gold Rush altered that situation, establishing an economic order which offered only a peripheral role for the Indians. With the decline of the gold rush, however, the future course of the territorial economy lay uncharted. No obvious successor emerged to the rich placer fields which had enjoyed such an intensive brief existence. That magnitude of economic activity would not be matched again until the Second World War when American military exigencies led to a series of major construction projects in the area. In the intervening years, the economy of the Yukon lacked clear direction.¹

To 1904, the regional economy had been built on a single resource of a time, first furs then gold. The period after the gold rush saw the emergence of a more diversified, if significantly smaller, order. The Indians had an important role in the emergent economic system, providing the most vital link between two rather divergent sectors. The post-Gold Rush economy centred on a diversified mining industry and the selective harvesting of game. The continued exploitation of the Klondike gold fields, a revived search for new deposits, the opening of several new mines and a myriad of related transportation and supply activities formed the central core of the Yukon economy. Government attention, ¹

¹ For material on Twentieth Century economic activities, see footnote 28, preceding chapter.
public expectations and investment capital focused almost exclusively on the prospects for mineral development. The harvesting sector, operating away from the Whitehorse-Dawson corridor, had markedly different characteristics. Based on a resurgent fur market and a growing interest in big game hunting, and reaching into virtually every corner of the Yukon, this segment attracted little "outside" interest. The Indians had a role in both economic systems, circumscribed in the first, predominant in the second. Importantly, they provided almost the only linkage between the two sectors.

Mining remained the principle focus for the Yukon economy. While the slow death of the gold rush, as much a social phenomenon as an economic event, sapped the territory of much of its population base, mining activity continued and even diversified. The gold fields near Dawson City remained in production, but the nature of that industry had changed dramatically. The prospector's tools became obsolete, replaced by mammoth dredges which scoured the ground once again for gold left behind by the inefficient methods of the earlier placer miners. With most of the creeks bound by large water-rights concessions or controlled by one of the mining firms formed to systematically exploit the resource, the individual miner was effectively shut out. While the arrival of the big companies had initially created animosity, limited returns from the fields convinced most prospectors to move on. The highly mechanized industry continued to find gold, although in decreasing quantities. Further rationalization of the industry became economically essential, leading to the founding of the Yukon Consolidated Gold Corporation, a consortium of the three largest dredging firms, in 1929. This new cor-
poration, aided by stable gold prices, continued operations through the 1930's and provided much of the territory's gold production.²

In the gold fields, a new order had replaced the era of the prospector. Those individuals, characteristically dogged by their relentless lust for gold and their irrepressible confidence, searched for new deposits. Turning away from Dawson City and its environs, they scoured the territory from the southern border to the Arctic coast, pushing without success into a number of previously unopened areas. Efforts in the last years of the 19th Century had uncovered gold at Atlin in northern British Columbia but that find died quickly. Promising reports filtered in from around the territory, as one prospector after another staked a discovery claim on yet another "Bonanza" creek. Only a few sites, such as the Livingstone Creek area in the central Yukon and the gold and silver deposits in the Kluane Lake district attracted more than a cursory glance. Nonetheless, the quest continued.

The most promising mineral activity came not from gold, but from other ores detected in the search for placer deposits. Copper mines opened in the Whitehorse area by the turn of the century, but high transportation costs limited the profitability of such enterprises. A major silver-lead deposit had been identified in the Mayo area by 1906, but the minerals remained unclaimed for another decade. Once developed, the Mayo-Keho mines provided the major economic catalyst for the Yukon, and by the 1920's several mines combined with a concentrating mill were in operation. This development, the first significant exploitation of low grade ores in the territory, led to rapid changes in the transportation

infrastructure, including an upgrading of rail capacity and deployment of more suitable sternwheelers along the Yukon and Stewart Rivers. A restructured Yukon mining economy emerged, but with an even more peripheral role for the Indians. Based on mechanized mining and skilled labour, this economy held few openings for the natives. Demand for labour, in contrast to the Klondike Gold Rush period, remained limited if more stable. The more systematic extraction procedures required a predominately skilled labour force, and the corporate management of the mines ensured that the required workers were on site. Seasonal demand for labour continued, although hard-rock mining in the Mayo area lacked a cyclical dimension. Because of improved transportation and communication links to the "outside," principally the Vancouver market, that demand could be readily met without resorting to the native labour pool.

Some Indians entered the work market. A limited number who found employment in the mines, almost exclusively the smaller copper operations in the Whitehorse area. Few managers, however, substituted native labour for the readily available, highly skilled, albeit more expensive white workers. Although only a small number of natives challenged the barriers in an attempt to enter the white man's world, the industrial economy quite clearly had few openings for the Indians.

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Several Indians mined for themselves. Northern Administration Branch, RG 85 (hereafter NAB), vol. 609, file 2657; AC New Series, file 2, Vowell and Green to Secretary of Indian Dept., 14 August, 1908.

5 AC, New Series, file 3, A. E. Green to Secretary, Indian Department, 16 April 1909.
If the Indians could not, or would not, meld into the evolving industrial order, they did find reasonable remuneration in supplying the mines and in related transportation activities. Several, for example, worked as deckhands on the riverboats. No figures are available on the number securing such positions, although it is likely that the total seldom exceeded a few dozen. Any attempted assessment is thrown into doubt by a Department of Indian Affairs official's observation that a group of Fraser River Indians from southern British Columbia came to the Yukon each summer to find work on the vessels. Woodcutting continued to provide a steady source of income, an activity readily incorporated into the Indians' hunting-trapping economy. The Yukon River steamship fleet consumed vast quantities of wood each year, and a ready market for wood existed along the riverbanks. These opportunities were, however, limited to those living along rivers with regular steamship service. By the mid-1920's, however, small vessels plied most of the major navigable

rivers. As in many other potentially profitable ventures, the natives soon found their predominance in this field challenged by small-scale European wood-cutting operations. Through to the 1950's, however, supplying the steamers served as a major source of native income, particularly for those along the heavily travelled Yukon River route.

Provision hunting for the mines and settlements proved even more remunerative and drew the Indians closer to the white communities. In the three major centres, Dawson City, Mayo and Whitehorse, the demand for wild game remained steady. With beef and pork hard to obtain, the local population turned to the less familiar, but less expensive, indigenous supplies. While many hunted for their own requirements, others relied on native and white provision hunters. The natives found this activity particularly attractive as it provided a comparatively high financial return and did not require a major reorientation of seasonal patterns.

There are few statistical indications of the size of the provision market, although one recent estimate of the demand in Dawson City, a town of approximately 9,000, in 1904 suggests that residents required some 600 moose and 2300 caribou annually to supplement available meat stocks. While a good portion would have been provided by private hunters, particularly in the Dawson area where the Forty Mile caribou herd annually passed within several miles of the town, provision hunters still had a significant role. The market proved variable, being dependent upon the consumption habits of the local population, price and

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7 An attempt to change to coal mined near Carmacks was abandoned due to the poor quality of the Yukon product.


9 R. McCandless, "Yukon Wildlife".
availability of alternative meats, competition from Euro-Canadian hunters, and the availability of game near the towns. While the main focus of the provision trade remained on the major centres, an important secondary market existed among fur traders in the back country. The various traders, in a manner reminiscent of the similar trade in the H.B.C. period, readily accepted meat from the natives and often depended solely on what the natives sold. Importantly, it is only in this secondary and limited market that the Indians enjoyed even a modicum of security and freedom from white competition.

Government records provide limited evidence of the contours and profitability of the provision trade. A list of game licences issued in 1921 illustrates the extent of white competition in this "native" field. Of the 53 licences recorded, only seven went to natives (all in the Mayo area). In no way does this indicate the comparative participation of whites and Indians, for natives seldom took out the licences formally required to market their harvests. It does, however, indicate that a substantial number of whites engaged in what many saw as a native endeavour. Statements of game purchased by the Waechter Brothers of Dawson City in 1925 and 1927 illustrate the nature of competition and returns from the sale of meat. In both years, natives far outstripped whites both in number offering produce for sale and quantity of meat sold. Prices ranged from 10c to 22c per pound, with payment dependent

10 McCandless

11 See YTA, Codzow Papers, Account Book which lists a number of meat purchases from natives. On sale of game in Whitehorse, see YRGI, Series 3, vol. 4, file 12-6A, Higgins to Percy, 25 August 1926.

upon the type of meat and manner in which it was dressed. The associa-
tion with the Waechter Brothers Co. proved lucrative for several na-
tives. B. Silas and J. Johns earned $236 and $565 respectively for meat
sold in 1927. Since these figures relate to only one firm, it is possi-
ble that the men also sold to other retailers or, as is most likely, di-
rectly to consumers.\(^{13}\) The market for game continued into the 1940's,
ending only when heightened concern for wildlife conservation and a per-
ceived increase in hunting pressure finally convinced the territorial
government to join other Canadian jurisdictions in banning the harvest-
ing of wild game for retail sale.\(^{14}\)

The provision trade provided a profitable, if irregular, source of
income for those Indians in a position to participate. White hunters
also recognized the potential profits from the enterprise, competing
most efficiently for available game stocks (especially close to the
towns) and markets. Urban purchasers allegedly favoured the meat of-
fered by white market hunters. George Jeckell, Commissioner of the Yu-
kon, evoked the public's feeling toward the trade when he noted:

> In past years the white population was small and the amount of
game meat sold to the white population by the Indians was in-
significant, and this was particularly due to the fact that
white people in general do not care to purchase game from In-
dians because the game they take is not slaughtered carefully
and not kept clean and wholesome.\(^{15}\)

\(^{13}\) RGI, Series 3, fol. 12, file 13-2A. Statement of Game Purchased by
Waechter Bros. Co., 1925; file 13-28, Statement of Game Purchased by

\(^{14}\) See, for example, RGI, Series 3, vol. 10, file 12-20A. Gibson to
Jeckell, 9 September 1942.

\(^{15}\) RGI, Series 3, vol. 10, file 12-20C. Jeckell to Gibson, 13 January
1944.
The provision trade, in sum, was of only tangential importance to the Yukon economy. Alternative meat supplies existed, if at higher cost, and the amount brought into the territory increased over time as transportation links improved. For the Indians, provisioning was a double-edged sword, offering a welcome if inconsistent source of funds while simultaneously adding to pressure on available game stocks. Whether harvested by natives or white market hunters (the latter demonstrated little interest in the long-term stability of the trade), game supplies adjacent to major centres faced serious depletion. As well, since most hunters offered only the hind quarters for sale, the possibility of extensive waste persisted. For many Indians, the provision trade and the similarly structured wood-cutting enterprise provided the only significant points of contact with the territorial cash economy. Neither activity drew the Indians close to the mining industry; instead, through a combination of native choice and white-imposed limitations, the natives found themselves relegated to the economic periphery.

In summarizing the natives' role in the industrial economy, two points stand out. White businessmen and mine operators clearly perceived little benefit in hiring native labourers, except when labour market conditions made such practices essential. This reticence reflected deeply embedded perceptions of the Indians' unwillingness to accept industrial work discipline. At the same time, however, the natives rarely sought such employment, preferring harvesting to the rigidity of the industrial workplace. Native involvement in this sector seldom extended beyond providing support services, principally wood-cutting, provision hunting and working on river boats, and even those activities ad-
hered to Indian seasonal cycles. These tasks, importantly, did not force a repudiation of the natives' nomadic and cyclical patterns. Instead, as Michael Asch has argued, they became key elements in the "mixed economy." Anxious for occasional infusions of cash to pay for required or desired material goods, the natives sought some measure of accommodation with the cash economy (the fur trade also provided a major source of money, as will be detailed shortly). Such short-term participation, however, does not indicate that the natives wished to move out of their harvesting mode of production and into an industrial pattern. Instead, the very marginal nature of the Indians' accommodation suggests that they remained basically committed to the efficacy of the hunting and trapping lifestyle and, equally important, found the combination of hunting, fishing, trapping and occasional other work to be financially acceptable.

From 1904 to 1942, native participation in the industrial sector of the Yukon economy retained this essential form. Based on the extraction of minerals and related services, this sector offered little for the natives beyond part-time and peripheral employment. With the onset of World War II, the complexion of the regional economy changed dramatically. The construction of the Alaska Highway and the building of the Canol Pipeline from Norman Wells, North West Territories to Whitehorse dominated the new activities. (Map 4) Proposals to build a highway through the Yukon to Alaska had been debated for many years, but the threat of a Japanese assault on Alaska and Pacific coast revived interest in the project. The U.S. army decided to proceed with construction. Thousands of men, accompanied by tons of equipment, descended on the Yu-
kon in the spring of 1942. More than 34,000 men eventually participated in the highway construction, with a smaller group working on the pipeline at the same time. By October 1943, a usable military road was in place and work commenced on improving to highway standard. Obviously, this massive infusion of capital and manpower and the construction of a transportation route through the previously unopened southern Yukon had significant implications for the territorial economy.

While most of the workforce consisted of labourers imported from southern Canada and the United States, local residents found some opportunities. A number of natives joined in the new enterprise, hiring on as guides for survey crews, as labourers and, in a very few instances, as equipment operators. Employment prospects for women were more limited, but some living near construction camps found work taking in laundry, sewing and house cleaning. The government attempted to spur an obvious demand for native handicrafts by sponsoring a program to encourage native women to make souvenirs and clothing for soldiers. The lack of enough young women with the requisite skills to participate in the potentially lucrative undertaking ultimately forced an abandonment of the project. Positions existed and many natives took advantage of the short-term prospects. Most Indians, however, saw the new opportunities


18 DIA, vol. 7553, file 41-166-1, Gibbon to Indian Affairs Branch, 10 April 1943. The file contains further details on the undertaking. See in particular ibid., Lowe to Hoey, 15 June 1943.
for what they were — short-term entrees into the regional industrial economy, not markedly dissimilar from the positions natives held in the mining/transportation sector in the previous half-century. They readily returned to the bush to hunt and trap when the transitory but lucrative opportunities passed.

Throughout the period of Highway construction and indeed up to 1946, fur prices remained high, serving as an attractive enticement to stay with the work they knew and liked the best. (See Table 4) The construction of the Alaska Highway, Haines Road, Canol Pipeline and related projects had a variety of implications for the Yukon Indians, but the new activities did not spur an immediate or lasting alteration of native economic patterns. The type of work available to Indians — unskilled and temporary — resembled the position they held since the gold rush. The ready availability of skilled, non-Indian (many of the workers and servicemen were American Negroes) labour ensured that project organizers treated the local natives as a casual labour pool. As before, natives were called upon when required, especially when they needed special Indian skills. They were not expected to carry out a major portion of the work. While the scale of the American-Canadian invasion in 1942-1944 came close to matching the earlier Klondike Gold Rush, the construction phase did not reshape native economic activity. As before, most natives sought and found only peripheral and temporary employment in the industrial sector, thus allowing a continuation of hunting/trapping practices. Importantly, most of those seeking an accommodation with the new economy soon returned to their former pursuits.
CHAPTER SIX

NATIVES IN THE HARVESTING ECONOMY

From 1896 to 1950, the Yukon Indians made only a peripheral accommodation with the industrial sector. Barred by personal choice and management decision from a deeper integration into the mining and transportation industries, the Indians opted almost as a group for the second sector of the territorial economy. Despite extensive mining development, the natives retained an option shared by few other Indian groups in North America — that of maintaining a hunting/trapping lifestyle through the first half of the Twentieth Century. Due to the small size of the white population, which dropped as low as 2700 in the 1920's and 1930's, and with a concentration in the Dawson, Mayo and Whitehorse areas, the natives faced little challenge to their use of the land throughout the district. Whites primarily sought minerals, alienating only an insignificant amount of land from general use. Throughout most of the Yukon, the pursuit of game remained the major economic activity.

Given their skills and habits, the Yukon Indians were well-placed and predisposed to harvest, or assist in harvesting, animal resources. They were seldom completely alone, their activities intertwined with those of white fur traders, their prosperity determined in large measure by the volatile fur markets of North America and Europe, and their hunting procedures subject to fluctuating pressure from white men drawn into the hunt by potentially high returns. While a fur trade somewhat different from its 19th Century predecessor served as the mainstay of this second sector, other ventures including fishing and big-game guiding also attracted the natives' attention. These latter two pursuits, small both
in scale and economic impact, will be examined before turning to the larger and more important fur trade.

An irreplaceable part of the aboriginal seasonal cycle, fishing seldom enjoyed much success as a marketing venture. Natives around the territory, but particularly along the Yukon River and in the extreme southwest corner of the region, harvested salmon during annual runs. Natives also caught other fish species, particularly whitefish and trout, when available and required, usually in the spring as stored food stocks ran low. Native fishing also provided an adequate supply of dog food to sustain the canine helpers so crucial to northern Indian life. Most fishing, therefore, served primarily to satisfy personal needs, with only occasional surpluses offered for sale. The government permitted the Indians free access to the fishery, stepping in whenever whites threatened native harvest. Some natives attempted to sell their catch, particularly in Dawson City, but these were only small, illicit ventures. In one instance, a Moosehide Indian named Silas enjoyed short-lived success marketing his catch to a Dawson restaurant. The profitable operation ceased when a white fisherman protested the unlicensed incursion. The investigating officer noted that previous fish sales in town had passed unchallenged, but faced with the fisherman's complaint

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2 Two examples appear in the records: a 1902 debate over rights on Little Salmon Lake and a 1939 argument over Watson Lake. YRGI, series 3, vol. l, file 2019, Wood to Stewart, 2 July 1902; Ibid., vol. 17, file 28798, Sandys-Wunsch to Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 28 April 1939, Gibson to Jackell. 6 October 1943.
he had no option but to prevent the natives from selling their catch.\(^3\) The Yukon River fishery remained small, serving little more than personal needs, as indicated by the Indians' reluctance to take out the licences required to legally market their harvests.\(^4\)

While the Yukon River fishery provided few prospects, conditions in the Alsek River drainage area were more favourable. In the southwest corner of the territory, larger fish runs ensured that the harvesting of salmon remained a vital part of the natives' food production. Because of the limited local market, fishing within the territory consisted solely of supplying personal needs. Vigorous local competition existed for available fish stocks, with loud protests following any infringement of fishing grounds or attempted government interference in the harvesting. The opportunity to participate in the Haines, Alaska salmon fishery was of even greater significance. While it remained impossible to market Yukon-caught fish, natives in the southwest exported their labour to take advantage of high wages on the coast. For generations, Yukon Indians had made annual treks to the Pacific coast for trade and social gatherings. They easily adapted this cycle to incorporate a short stint in the fisheries, where high prices for the natives' catch (8c per dog salmon and 30c for each Coho and Sockeye in 1918) ensured a regularly profitable return. Even in this instance, commercial fishing was a casual rather than regular occupation, resorted to only when a specific need or desire dictated.\(^5\)

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\(^3\) YRGI, Series 3, vol. 1, file 2019, Silas to Dear Sir, n.d.; McCarvill to OC "B" Division, 17 July 1909.


\(^5\) RCMP, vol. 539, file 2, Sergt. Mapley to O.C. Whitehorse Sub-district,
sek drainage basin, fishing had only a limited market function, serving more as a regular source of food than income.\(^6\)

While only technological improvements and a small cash market separated the fishery from aboriginal practices, big-game guiding represented more of a departure from the natives' lifestyle. The industry took shape in the early years of the Twentieth Century, increasing slowly in scale as the Yukon came to be recognized as a world class preserve of trophy sheep, moose, and caribou. Throughout this period, however, the guiding business remained small and geographically compact, most of the activity focused on the southern territory. Fewer than twenty hunters per year entered the territory in pursuit of trophies and memories. While the individuals spent considerable sums on equipment and guides' wages, the industry was of limited economic consequence.\(^7\)

The vast majority of guides were whites, the most notable exception being Johnny Johns, an enfranchised Indian and the most famous of all territorial operators. The Yukon Territorial Game Ordinance of 1923, however, barred natives from serving as Chief Guides, limiting them to lower status positions as assistant guides and camp helpers.\(^8\) The government later eased that provision by giving the Commissioner of the Yu-

\(^7\) February 1917; AC Champagne file, "L. G. Chappell report on missionary work undertaken in Champagne District, Summer 1934. The extremely exploitive American fishery, both along the Alaska Panhandle and at the mouth of the Yukon River, had serious implication for upper Yukon and Alsek River fish stocks. AC, Stuck File, Hudson Stuck to Isaac Stringer, 29 March 1920.

\(^6\) Ibid.; RCMP, vol. 549, file 109, Inspector Bell to O.C. "B" Division, 24 October 1918.

\(^7\) See R. McCandless, "Yukon Wildlife," for a description of the industry's development.

\(^8\) Yukon Territory, Ordinances 1923, Chapter 5.
kon discretionary powers to decide if the Indian requesting approval could carry out the anticipated responsibilities. In 1941, Billy Hall applied for a license to guide a party into the Little Atlin region. The government delegated an R.C.M.P. officer to investigate Hall's personal and financial well-being. The policeman's report offered a positive character reference, but questioned Hall's ability to provide the required equipment. Commissioner Jeckell refused the licence application. There is little doubt that the government, supported by other guides, worked to keep the Indians out of this potentially profitable enterprise. Their discriminatory actions stemmed from a belief that Indians could not adequately serve the hunters and would thereby harm the region's image in the industry. There was also a fear of allowing too many guides into the small guiding market. The limited number of tourist hunters could not support an overly large guiding infrastructure, and most "guides" worked regularly as trappers or traders.

Experience in the industry typically proved rewarding, with wages for assistant guides reaching as high as $10 a day in the early 1940's. Only a few natives, primarily in the Kluane and Southern Lakes (Carcross, Tagish and Little Atlin) regions had access to these irregular employment opportunities. While guiding enjoyed a high profile, it did not represent a major economic departure before 1950, offering only a


few Indians yet another part-time source of income. Importantly, like most other of the opportunities available to the Indians, it called on those talents deemed to be particularly "native", primarily the ability to hunt and track game.\textsuperscript{11}

In contrast to the peripheral nature of the fishery and the big game guiding business, the fur trade was a vital, often expansive, enterprise through the first half of the century. If not the most remunerative activity in the Yukon (mining led significantly gross receipts), the fur trade was more geographically diverse. Natives in all corners of the territory participated directly, with a trading post located near most major aggregations of native population. (Maps 5, 6 and 7) In 1921, for example, the government issued licenses for twenty-seven separate establishments owned by eighteen different companies or individuals. The only area not directly served in that year -- and it was a major exception -- was the Old Crow-Porcupine district. Nine years later, when the fur trade neared its zenith, the industry expanded even more widely with forty-six posts operated by thirty different vendors (Taylor and Drury Ltd. ran eleven of the locations) in operation. The number of establishments varied on a yearly basis according to changing world prices for furs and the profitability of individual establishments. During most years, natives throughout the Yukon could select from several posts

Map 5: Fur Trade Posts, 1921

Δ Taylor Drury Post
• All other fur company posts
(Figure refers to the number of different non-Taylor-Drury posts at that location.)
Map 6: Fur Trade Posts, 1930

- Triangle: Taylor Drury Post
- Circle: All other fur company posts

(Figure refers to the number of different non-Taylor-Drury posts at that location.)

Miles

0 150

99
Map 7: Fur Trade Posts, 1939

- ▲ Taylor Drury Post
- ● All other fur company posts
(Figure refers to the number of different non-Taylor-Drury posts at that location.)
within a reasonable travelling radius. (Table 2) In the volatile markets of the late 1920's and 1930's, the option was of obvious competitive benefit to the native traders.

Table 2
FUR RETURNS BY REGION
SELECTED YEARS ($)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Whitehorse(1)</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>104,951</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dawson</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>100,556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1924</td>
<td>128,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>143,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1943</td>
<td>170,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central(2)</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>46,488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>33,806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1924</td>
<td>41,217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>82,958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1943</td>
<td>67,998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>125,643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>55,223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1924</td>
<td>70,901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>69,563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1943</td>
<td>90,056</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Includes Liard district, 1939, 1942.
(2) Includes Selkirk-Carmacks and Upper Stewart districts.


The eagerness with which the traders entered the market is indicative of general fur trade prosperity. From 1920 to 1950, traders exported a yearly average of $304,060 worth of pelts from the territory. Markets fluctuated widely as the Yukon returns varied according to the caprices of the international fur markets. Totals of over $600,000 were attained in 1927-28, 1944-45 and 1945-46. At the opposite end, the market bot-

12 For comparative purposes, Yukon gold production never fell below $529,000 in any one year, reaching as high as $3,205,000 in 1942.
tomed at a low of $78,000 in 1920, with a secondary benchmark of $123,000 set in 1933. The fur trade economy operated like most commodity markets, ranging erratically over the years. The trade peaked in the 1924-28 period, dropped noticeably the following five years, then regained previous form in the 1939-1948 period.

Table 3

YUKON FUR RETURNS - 1919-1950

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Pelts</th>
<th>Value of Pelts ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1919-20</td>
<td>55,354</td>
<td>323,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920-21</td>
<td>16,125</td>
<td>78,189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921-22</td>
<td>69,796</td>
<td>203,402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922-23</td>
<td>46,198</td>
<td>199,522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923-24</td>
<td>50,070</td>
<td>347,079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924-25</td>
<td>36,616</td>
<td>309,549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925-26</td>
<td>35,767</td>
<td>320,803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926-27</td>
<td>25,991</td>
<td>382,261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927-28</td>
<td>64,375</td>
<td>610,348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928-29</td>
<td>35,736</td>
<td>484,919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929-30</td>
<td>108,632</td>
<td>295,492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-31</td>
<td>61,832</td>
<td>145,224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931-32</td>
<td>57,679</td>
<td>132,268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932-33</td>
<td>52,282</td>
<td>146,055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933-34</td>
<td>43,803</td>
<td>122,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934-35</td>
<td>41,309</td>
<td>230,074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935-36</td>
<td>42,768</td>
<td>276,946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936-37</td>
<td>50,308</td>
<td>347,558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937-38</td>
<td>67,655</td>
<td>295,857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938-39</td>
<td>77,475</td>
<td>267,721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939-40</td>
<td>80,617</td>
<td>288,292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940-41</td>
<td>70,953</td>
<td>373,399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-42</td>
<td>66,700</td>
<td>398,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942-43</td>
<td>52,897</td>
<td>338,035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943-44</td>
<td>78,005</td>
<td>467,188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944-45</td>
<td>87,292</td>
<td>669,217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-46</td>
<td>107,252</td>
<td>677,495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-47</td>
<td>58,777</td>
<td>373,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947-48</td>
<td>131,227</td>
<td>230,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948-49</td>
<td>151,969</td>
<td>143,810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949-50</td>
<td>153,574</td>
<td>199,086</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the overall market went through its gyrations, so too did the price of individual pelts. Yukon trappers fortunately lived in a region that supported a variety of fur bearing animals in harvestable quantities, the most important of which were marten, beaver (when not protected by government edict), lynx, muskrat, and several species of fox. But even this variety did not totally insulate the local market from the vagaries of international demand. Muskrat prices, for instance, ranged from a low of only $.53 in 1931-32 to over $3.00 a pelt in 1946. Among the higher priced furs, the silver fox was particularly vulnerable to changing demand, with the national market price dropping from a 1919 figure of $246 to slightly over $12 thirty years later. Seldom gradual or easy to forecast, these fluctuations originated largely in the changing trends of high fashion. In one particularly traumatic period, 1947-1950, prices fell from 60% to 75% in three years. (Table 4)

Table 4

FUR PRICES -- FIVE YEAR AVERAGES, 1920-1949

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Beaver</th>
<th>Lynx</th>
<th>Silver Fox</th>
<th>Marten</th>
<th>Mink</th>
<th>Muskrat</th>
<th>White Fox</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920-24</td>
<td>17.81</td>
<td>21.38</td>
<td>152.91</td>
<td>24.47</td>
<td>9.78</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>38.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925-29</td>
<td>23.85</td>
<td>31.69</td>
<td>94.38</td>
<td>24.72</td>
<td>15.11</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>41.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-34</td>
<td>13.12</td>
<td>23.86</td>
<td>44.17</td>
<td>14.57</td>
<td>9.15</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>22.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935-39</td>
<td>11.35</td>
<td>30.60</td>
<td>27.73</td>
<td>22.10</td>
<td>11.05</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>13.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940-44</td>
<td>26.15</td>
<td>42.89</td>
<td>23.76</td>
<td>38.47</td>
<td>12.12</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>22.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-49</td>
<td>33.93</td>
<td>27.16</td>
<td>19.37</td>
<td>35.99</td>
<td>20.19</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>38.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Since the prices quoted here represent final and average market value, they indicate only in a general way the amount of money actually tendered for furs in the Yukon River basin. With high costs for trans-
portation and supplies combined with Yukon businessmen's eagerness to protect themselves from the vagaries of the fluctuating market, it is obvious that the traders offered substantially lower prices than those attainable in southern markets. At the same time and as a result of the area's extreme winter climate, the Yukon offered a prime product. In consequence, many of the Yukon furs would have been valued at substantially above the national average. Unfortunately, no traders' records are known to be extant which would allow for an analysis of prices offered to natives. Several comments in the records, however, suggest the prices offered, as well as the fierce competition for the Indians' furs. Anglican missionary, Chas. Johnson, noted from Carcross in 1920 that two local traders had bought 300 muskrats from trapper John Johns for $1,000 and that the price subsequently rose to $5 a pelt. The national price for muskrat pelts that year averaged only $2.54. Estimates made by Corporal Thorntwaithe of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police of the value of furs traded in the Porcupine River area in 1928 seem closer to the mark. Cross fox he listed at $40 sold nationally for an average of $75 and lynx estimated at $30 per skin brought the wholesaler around $47. Similarly, in 1930 muskrats bought near Old Crow for 20-25c each sold in the southern markets for around 84c.

13 Dan Cadzou of Rampart House left portions of an account book for 1907-1912 which reveal that trappers received substantially less than that paid in southern markets. The source (YTA, Cadzou Papers, Account Book) is very incomplete and unreliable. On Cadzou, see, T. Riggs, "Running the Alaska Boundary," Beaver, Outfit 276 (Sept. 1945), 40-43.

14 AC, C. F. Johnson file 2, Johnson to Stringer, 7 April 1920.

15 NAB, vol. 797, file 6535, Maclean to Cory, 12 October 1928.

16 AC, Rampart House, Fort Yukon and Old Crow file, McCullum to String-
Estimating prices paid to the Indians for furs is, in reality, a futile task, both due to the lack of systematic evidence and, even more importantly, because most trade operated on a barter and credit system. Traders could manipulate prices simply by increasing the cost of their trade goods, thus reducing the real value of the trappers' returns. Everyone anticipated lower prices as traders, shippers and auctioneers all expected their share of the returns. Acknowledging that the traders took a healthy segment of the value of each fur, evidence nonetheless suggests that the fur trade offered a remunerative source of income to successful trappers, both white and Indian.

The variable returns and the high cost of securing supplies for a winter's trapping led to the extensive use of credit or, in the trade vernacular, "jawbone". The granting of credit had, of course, been a prominent feature of the Yukon River fur trade from the earliest years of Hudson's Bay Company operations, although the practise extended little beyond the Fort Youcon-Porcupine River corridor. As traders fanned out throughout the territory during and after the Gold Rush, they adopted the practise of supplying a trapper in advance of payment.\(^{17}\) The system had as many variants as it had practitioners, with terms changing according to market conditions and the level of regional competition. Traders spared no effort in their attempts to tie the individual trapper, particularly those with recognized skills, to a single post. Several of the larger firms, especially Taylor and Drury Ltd., paid for

...er, 23 July 1930.

\(^{17}\) The topic is covered in McCandless, "Yukon Wildlife", and A. Tanner, "The Structure of Fur Trade Relations". Both suffer from the lack of useful records covering the Twentieth Century fur trade.
their furs with tokens redeemable only at company stores. Competition was occasionally fierce, particularly in the halcyon days of the 1920's and 1930's. In 1928, for example, six traders vied for the Porcupine River trade, with two establishments at Rampart House, three at Old Crow and a final one at LaPierre's House. The returns that year, estimated to be in excess of $133,000, justified the vigorous battle for the trappers' business. Under such circumstances, traders eagerly granted debt to any competent trapper, expecting in return to have right of refusal to his catch. The competition had the related impact of forcing fur prices up (and commodity prices down). The natives, well versed in competitive trade, sought the best market for their furs. If a local trader offered acceptable prices and extended credit, he could likely count on a sizeable portion of the local trade. At the same time, however, natives willingly travelled considerable distances to alternative markets if the traders in their home areas were perceived as demanding exhorbitant prices for goods. This eagerness to search for competitive trade expanded greatly following the introduction of the motor powered boat in the 1920's, thereby making traders even more cognizant of the need to respond quickly to changes in market conditions.

Though far from compliant pawns in the fur trade, the natives were vulnerable to price changes and to the potential withdrawal of credit. The Indians quickly became accustomed to a yearly cycle which included the securing of supplies on credit in the fall and the repayment of debt

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18 NAB, vol. 797, file 6535, Maclean to Cory, 12 October 1928.

19 NAB, vol. 609, file 2657, extracts from report of Constable Young, 18 March 1925.

20 AC, Morris file, Morris to Stringer, 24 June 1928.
in the winter or spring. Any sudden or unexpected alteration in the availability of credit, be it for market or punitive reasons, would severely upset the trappers' plans and prospects. Rampart House trader Dan Cadzow, an ardent Anglican who saw his role extending far beyond his basic economic function, used the withholding of credit to encourage natives to act responsibly (according to his definition of the market of course). Altering the pattern of credit disbursement typically lacked such philosophical overtones. In 1914, C. C. Brett of Teslin noted that "The Indians will be in need of relief about Xmas. Taylor and Drury have cut off their credit entirely, as they conduct business to suit themselves and as Mr. Drury told me that 'they weren't running a benevolent society for the Indians'." As Adrian Tanner demonstrated in an extensive study of more recent trading practices, the granting of credit varied markedly from monopoly to competitive situations, with the latter of obvious benefit to the Indians. Improvements in transportation technology, high prices and a consistently large number of traders active in the field ensured that from the 1920's, the natives found credit generally available either in their immediate vicinity or within a reasonable distance.

The structural outline of the fur trade remained intact throughout the period from 1900 to 1950. Prices varied on a yearly basis (not to mention according to the quality of the fur), but available credit and competition ensured an equitable return for the fur trapper. The pur-

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21 AC, Cadzow file, Cadzow to Stringer, 20 March 1917.
22 AC, Brett file, Brett to Stringer, 16 October 1914.
23 Tanner, 44-72.
suit of fur bearing animals provided a reasonable, at times lucrative income, but not without major variations causing short term and localized distress. Natural cycles in the availability of game remained an integral part of the natives' hunting-trapping economy and could be readily accepted and accommodated. Price fluctuations and changes in market demand proved more difficult, but long-standing experience in the fur trade, credit disbursements, and the traders' and trappers' faith in the stability of the industry carried both groups through lean years. Government regulations proved more difficult to accommodate, principally because they functioned largely oblivious to market conditions.

Most government intervention in the fur trade came in the form of export taxes targeted at the marketing end of the industry. In the 1920's and 1930's, however, growing concern over the depletion of resources led the Yukon government to impose a series of trapping restrictions in an attempt to rebuild wildlife stocks. The territorial government's decision to regulate the harvesting of game had, in each instance, noticeable repercussions for those involved in the fur trade economy. The seasonal cycles of the Indians and their white counterparts involved the regular harvesting of species, depending on location. Government moves to prevent the taking of a particular type of fur-bearer disrupted routines and schedules, throwing into question the trappers' ability to repay their debts. Similarly, traders faced the unwelcome prospect of being unable to supply an eager external market. There were several major trapping closures before 1950, including beaver (1918-1924, 1928-1931, 1946-49), marten (1924-26)\(^\text{24}\) and a series of see-

\(^24\) YRG1, Series 4, vol. 10, file 241A, Territorial Secretary to Const. C. D. Tidd, 30 August 1918; YRG1, Series 3, vol. 3, file 12-5B, Gold
sonal closures relating to other species. While granting short-term concessions, such as allowing traders to export furs caught before the new regulations had been explained to trappers, the government enforced its legislation with some care. Trappers typically accepted the various restrictions without prolonged argument, switching their traps to other game. The government eased the transition somewhat by imposing only seasonal closures, with the period set aside for harvesting often coinciding with the prime trapping times. Beaver, for example, were of greatest value when taken in mid-winter. When the total closure on beaver was lifted in 1924, the government imposed a shortened season stretching from January 1 to May 15. Since most trapping of beaver for market occurred in the winter months, this particular restriction caused little inconvenience.

A series of government regulations barring non-Yukon Indians from hunting within the territory had a more direct impact. The various game laws did not explicitly intend to exclude the Indians. Rather, poor planning and limited knowledge on the part of territorial officials led


25 See, for example, YRGI, Series 3, vol. 10, file 12-19B, R. A. Gibson to G. A. Jackell, 9 June 1941 which deals with restrictions on the Old Crow muskrat season.

26 YRGI, Series 4, vol. 10, file 241A, Territorial Secretary to Const. C. B. Tidd, 30 August 1918. Furs trapped outside the territory but traded in the Yukon received exemptions. Ibid., Isaac Taylor to Geo. Mackenzie, 10 July 1918, Affadavit by Wm. Drury, 24 Nov. 1919.

27 Since some fur bearers were harvested for food, these restrictions had considerable impact. Game caught for sustenance generally escaped the regulations, YTA, Teslin Band Collection. Hawksley to Dear Sir, 8 Nov. 1923.
to the inadvertent closure of traditional hunting territories. The Yukon Game Ordinance of 1927 required a payment of $100 from all persons not resident in the territory in return for a grant of hunting privileges.\textsuperscript{29} The new regulations severely affected natives hunting in the Porcupine River area. Alaskan natives had long entered the district to trade and avoid export taxes.\textsuperscript{29} and Indians from Fort McPherson continued their long-standard practice of hunting in the Peel River basin and on the western slopes of the Richardson Mountains. Federal government officials, particularly O. S. Finnie, urged the territorial government to remove the restriction on natives from the North West Territories.\textsuperscript{30} Citing allegations of over-hunting by the Fort McPherson Indians, the Yukon government was reluctant to comply. They finally gave in and on September 3, 1929, made the necessary revisions to the Game Ordinance.\textsuperscript{31} No similar provisions were forthcoming for the Alaskan natives, a situation applauded by the Canadian Indians along the Porcupine, due primarily to the direct threat they posed to the economic viability of the

\textsuperscript{29} YRGI, Series 3, vol. 4, file 12-6A, Insp. Caulkin to P. Reid, 2 August 1926; ibid., file 12-6B, Thornthwaite to Gold Commissioner, 31 January 1927.


\textsuperscript{30} YRGI, Series 3, vol. 5, file 12-8A, Maclean to Finnie, 6 Feb. 1929.

regional fur trade. To the south, the Yukon-British Columbia border region posed similar problems as residents from both jurisdictions readily crossed the border to hunt or trade. However, an amicable relationship between Yukon Indian Agent John Hawksley and his Stikine Agency counterpart Harper Reed ensured that no government regulations prevented natives from hunting and living where they wished. Both agreed, however, that the natives had to observe all provincial and territorial game laws. While not exclusively tied to the fur trade, the various restrictive measures imposed and accommodations reached by the Yukon government regulated access to the fur resources of the territory. Through to the 1940's, however, the government continued to pursue an essentially open policy, with all residents and approved non-residents able to compete equally for available fur bearing animals.

The first proposals that the government find some means of regulating individual access to wildlife came from native trappers. Joe Squam, an Indian "chief" of dubious standing from Teslin requested in 1932 that an area he described as "my hunting and trapping ground" be granted for his permanent personal use. The government rejected his appeal for fear that, as Yukon Comptroller G. Jeckell phrased it, "such actions would greatly hamper the exploration and development of the mineral resources

32 DIA, vol. 6761, file 420-12, Thornthwaite to OC, RCMP, Dawson, 9 April 1929; YRG1, Series 3, vol. 5, file 12-8A, Gold Commissioner to O.S. Finnie, 3 January 1929. Eagle, Alaska natives, closely related to those at Moosehide, were accorded more liberties. YRG1, Series 3, vol. 6, file 10A, Hawksley to Gold Commissioner, 14 May 1931.


34 DIA, vol. 6761, file 420-12, Squam to Indian Department, 22 Aug. 1932.
of the territory." While authorities ignored this suggestion for trap-line designation, increasing tensions in the 1940's between white and Indian trappers over access to valued lands brought the issue to the fore once again. South of the border in British Columbia, registered traplines had been in place since 1926 and were generally conceded to have been effective in protecting native access to game. By 1947, the Yukon government was compelled to consider a similar system. Launched primarily by Indian Agent R. J. Meek and supported by a nascent conservationist movement in the territory, this appeal originated in the perceived need to protect the natives from white encroachment. Meek sought to protect native access to game. He suggested that traplines be granted first to Indians, then half-breeds and "old-timers" and lastly to white trappers drawn into the business by the abnormally high prices of the decade. With widespread support for the program, including Meek's assurance that the Indians backed the system, the government began the registration of traplines in 1950.

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35 YRGI, Series 3, vol. 6, file 12-11B, Jeckell to Hume, 21 Nov. 1932. An earlier effort by Harper Reed to restrict trapping hardly represented an attempt to impose traplines. It was simply a temporary response to poor trapping returns. YTA, Teslin Band Collection, Reed to Chief Billy Johnston, 16 July 1930.

36 YTA, Teslin Band Collection, Stikine Agency Inspection Report no. 3, 31 July 1935, Simpson to Chief Billy Johnston, 1 October 1942.


When unveiled, the registration program included an unpopular surprise. Yukon Game Commissioner Thomas Kjar imposed a $10 annual fee per trapline. With fur prices at low ebb, many feared the Indians would be unable to meet the expected payments. Again, Indian Agent Meek supported the natives, arguing that the payment was excessive, that British Columbia imposed no such fees for Indian trappers, and that low fur prices already threatened to make trapping uneconomical. Although Meek’s appeal garnered considerable support with the federal bureaucracy and among the Indians, it failed. Registration proceeded in the fall of 1950 with the $10 charge intact. The registration program came into effect just as fur prices entered a strong downward slide and as a limited, but growing, number of alternative employment prospects came available. The registration program proved both economically and socially disruptive after 1950. Government agents encountered serious difficulties getting the natives to identify their personal trapping areas. Even more important, the Euro-Canadian insistence on male ownership and inheritance challenged the natives’ matrilineal social structure and threatened the stability of social relations in many native camps. Trapline registration capped an expanding series of legislative initiatives designed to regulate the fur harvest. While the registra-

41 Ibid., Chief Peter Moses, Councillor Moses Tizya and Councillor Joseph Netro to R. J. Meek, 24 July 1950, Chief Wm. A. Johnston et. al. (petition), 7 July 1950.
42 Ibid., Gibson to Meek, 4 Nov. 1950.
tion program contributed to a steady decline in the fur trade after 1950, government intervention before that date had minimal impact.

Government regulations only added to the uncertainty and irregularity of the fur trade. With market prices varying widely, the availability of credit subject of the traders' caprices, and an inconsistent supply of fur-bearing animals, the trappers often found themselves in precarious positions. Compounding their difficulties, the Indians faced increasing competition from white trappers. Typically less committed to trapping as a full-time occupation, whites usually entered the field as prices rose, dropping out at the first sign of a major decline. Any suggestion that white and native trappers co-existed harmoniously is not supported by available evidence, although it is equally incorrect to suggest that the traplines provided a forum for inter-racial violence. Indians frequently complained of white incursions into their trapping territories and they opposed the government's decision to allow whites (but not natives) to use poison to kill wolves. Similarly, government agents and R.C.M.P. officers regularly commented on inter-racial tensions, pointing out almost in unison that the white participants exhib-


44 This is repeatedly suggested in McCandless, "Yukon Wildlife".

45 DIA, vol. 6761, file 420-12, Squam to Indian Department, 22 August 1932; YRG1, Series 3, vol. 4, file 12-A, Clyde Thompson to Mr. Hawksley, 20 October 1927.

46 YRG1, Series 3, vol. 6, file 12-10A, Squam to Department of Indian Affairs, 26 March 1931; YRG1, Series 3, vol. 10, file 12-19A, Const. Harrington to O.C., RCMP, Aklavik, 26 March 1940.
ited little regard for native rights and were endangering game supplies with their exploitative habits.\textsuperscript{47} White trappers occasionally expressed similar sentiments about the Indians, blaming them for any marked decrease in trapping returns.\textsuperscript{48} Government records reveal no instances of violence over trapping rights, but it is apparent that tranquility did not characterize relations in the woods.

The Indians outlasted most of their white competitors because the Euro-Canadians could not overcome the irregularities of the fur trade. Throughout the first half of the century, and excepting those few who accepted a more complete accommodation with the industrial/extractive economy, the Yukon natives continued to follow a pattern of subsistence hunting, gathering and fishing. Indeed, even many of those who worked as woodcutters or day labourers did so only seasonally, devoting much of their time to the pursuit of game.\textsuperscript{49} The natives were not indifferent to the fur trade, for they developed a taste for -- even a dependance upon


\textsuperscript{49} For an excellent series of descriptions on this mingling of activities very much like M. Asch's "mixed economy," see AC, Selkirk Children Reports files which detail movements and economic undertakings at Fort Selkirk.
-- the products of the trading post but neither were they irrevocably wedded to it. Low prices or insufficient demand, forced the natives to postpone trapping ventures until markets recovered or they developed an acute need for particular material goods. In extreme cases, natives abandoned the trade for several seasons, usually because of decreases in regional food supplies. Importantly, the natives could and occasionally did survive without the fur trade. This flexibility and the ability to survive the vagaries of the market place through a reliance on subsistence hunting (in turn based on the natives acceptance of limited material abundance) assured the Indians of a pre-eminent role in the Yukon fur trade.

The Twentieth Century fur trade stood in stark contrast to the comparative stability of the Hudson's Bay Company era. Even after the arrival of American traders along the Yukon River after 1869, the trade focused on a few posts with the H.B.C. and the Alaska Commercial Company attracting most of the furs. Competition was vigorous, but controlled, with both firms looking to the long-term interests of the industry. After the turn of the century, and particularly beginning in the 1920's, conditions changed. Although several large firms led by Taylor and Dru- ry Company maintained a commanding presence, the trade included a plethora of small entrepreneurs. The fur rush replaced the search for gold and as prices remained high through to the end of the 1940's traders competed vigorously for the natives' pelts. Price fluctuations,

50 See, for instance, Sergeant Clay to OC. "B" Division, 5 March 1915, RNWMP, Annual Report 1916, 200; YRG!, Series 7, vol. 33, file 33937, pt. 9, Report - Patrol from Dawson to Snag, Wellesley Lake, etc. 19 Feb. 1931.

51 Again, see Sahlins, "The Original Affluent Society."
government regulation, competition from white trappers, frequent alterations in trading patterns, improvements in harvesting techniques (including better rifles, canvas tents, and improved traps) and differential credit systems added to the growing complexity of the fur trade.

These changes affected the natives most strongly. As before, competition worked to their short-term benefit, forcing up prices for furs, lowering commodity costs and encouraging more flexible credit arrangements. The expansion in the number of location of posts doubtlessly aided Indian trappers, allowing primarily for a more regular manipulation of fur trade competition. New credit arrangements which encouraged natives to transfer allegiances as market forces dictated, and the introduction of a monied trade (even if only in Company tokens) represented a substantial shift from the comparatively inflexible trade of the H.B.C. before their 1893 withdrawal. Technological innovations especially motorized boats (introduced in the 1920's) added to the ease of trapping and enabled a more rapid exploitation of resources over a broader range than ever before. That the trapping -- both by whites and Indians -- may have been excessive in the face of high fur prices is suggested by the territorial government's decision to regulate hunting patterns.

The revitalization and expansion of the fur trade in the Twentieth Century clearly benefited the trappers of the Yukon, particularly those Indians well-placed and conditioned to respond to the new opportunities. Far from being forced into the fur trade through exclusion from the industrial sector, the natives choose the industry for its exemplary flexibility, its suitability to preferred seasonal and cultural patterns and for its comparatively profitable returns.
Even with a vital fur trade, subsistence hunting contained its drawbacks. The natives' reaction to poor hunting conditions reveals that the harvesting of fish and game served as the cornerstone for participation in the fur trade. Securing an adequate supply of game obviously remained pre-eminent. The pursuit of fur-bearers became feasible only when required amounts were set aside. Whenever meat supplies fell low, the Indians lacked the resources to pursue smaller game. Until they solved this fundamental problem, trapping operations were typically held in abeyance. There are a number of recorded instances, particularly in the Old Crow area, where poor meat harvests forced indefinite postponement of trapping. As trader Dan Cadzow reported from Rampart House in 1917 when meat and fish supplies fell perilously low, "there is quite a little fox and martin (sic) but no lynx but the trapping is at a standstill." The interdependence of hunting and trapping worked both ways, keeping the Indians in the bush when markets declined, but conversely preventing them from participating in a potentially lucrative harvest when faced with food shortages.

The hunting-trapping economy relied on a ready and consistent supply of ungulates and fur-bearing animals. Throughout the Twentieth Century, however, many charged that white and native overhunting had significant-

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54 AC, Cadzow file, Cadzow to Stringer, 23 Dec. 1917.
ly depleted territorial animal resources. While there is little doubt that the influx of gold seekers during the Klondike Gold Rush put abnormal pressure on game stocks, particularly in the Whitehorse-Dawson corridor, the territory-wide impact is less clear. Numerous allegations surfaced that the Indians, upset over white incursions, engaged in wanton destruction of game in an attempt to drive out the miners. Several miners levelled repeated charges against the natives in the Kluane-Burwash area in 1911 and again in 1920. The Indians' apparent disregard for the entreaties of the R.C.M.P. officer sent to settle the dispute, only served (in the minds of some) to confirm the reported destruction. Not all so readily accused the Indians. In an official report on the preservation of game in the Yukon, Supt. R. E. Tucker of the R.C.M.P. noted, "Some time ago the Indians did slaughter game ruthlessly, but now the export of hides is forbidden there is no object to killing more than they require for food." Tucker, whose experience in the territory dated from 1898, also commented that big game was more plentiful in 1920 than twenty years earlier. The question of over-hunting is difficult to resolve adequately, although it is important to note that subsequent sur-

55 DIA, vol. 3462, file 147, 654-1, pt. 2, Bompas to Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 25 May 1906.


veys of the Yukon turned up few signs of unwarranted destruction of game. When confirmed depletion was encountered, it was generally attributed to wolves. A more widely accepted assessment of native hunting habits was offered by R.C.M.P. Constable McCormick who commented, "The Indians are careful about killing the game, having had lots of experience of being on short rations, indeed almost starving some years." 

The construction of the Alaska Highway, discussed earlier in relation to the industrial sector of the Yukon economy, also affected hunting and gathering. The major impact came from hunting along the newly opened corridor. Civilian and military personnel working on the highway received special hunting permits. Numerous allegations surfaced that Americans killed animals solely for sport and that great wastage of game occurred. Though doubtlessly exaggerated, the comments convinced the government to pass regulations prohibiting the discharge of firearms within one mile of the highway. Of more serious consequence to the Indians in the Burwash-Kluane Lake region was the 1942 decision to set aside much of the land between the highway and the Alaska-Yukon border.


60 Const. McCormick to OC, RCMP, Dawson, 1 August 1924, (NAB, vol. 609, file 2657). A complaint by T. A. Dickson that natives near Kluane used meat for dog food was supported by RCMP investigation. Difficulties of enforcement made action impossible. YRG1, series 3, vol. 9, file 12-18A, Report re: Complaint of T. A. Dickson -- General Game Conditions, 26 Sept. 1938.

61 See McCandless, "Yukon Wildlife"; YRG1, Series 3, vol. 11, file 12-21A, Bostock to Gibson, 28 Nov. 1946.
as a game preserve. The government declared the Kluane Game Sanctuary, later a national park, off-limits to all hunting and trapping, barring local natives from a well-used and well-stocked hunting ground. Appeals on behalf of the Indians by Indian Agent Meek and local Catholic missionary Rev. E. Morisset did convince the government to make limited muskrat trapping concessions within the park.

The opening of the Alaska Highway did not dramatically alter occupational patterns. The natives of the southern Yukon, the area most affected by the new construction, remained primarily as hunters and trappers, participating in the industrial sector in a limited and impermanent fashion. An Anglican missionary at Champagne in the summer of 1949 summarized the situation:

The white population is occupied exclusively in connection with the maintenance of the Alaska Highway. Many of the Indians are similarly occupied, though spasmodically, in more menial capacities. Hunting and trapping in winter, and fishing in summer, are the principal interests of the Indians generally, the young men being employed by the various Highway authorities occasionally. Few of the Indians accept, or are suited for, regular employment.


63 Ibid., Morisset to Simmons, 13 April 1950; Morisset to Indian Affairs Branch, 11 April 1950, Gibson to Simmons, 22 April 1950.


It is difficult to ascertain with any precision the extent of native involvement in the mining and harvesting sectors. The argument has been advanced that movement toward the mining sector was temporary in nature, limited by reduced long-term employment prospects, white employers' preference for Euro-Canadian workers, and a general native preference for the "hunting way." The natives of the Yukon made short-term adjustments, in their economic patterns, on a seasonal and occasionally annual basis, to take advantage of new economic opportunities. They had done so in the early fur trade, during the expansion of mining in the 19th Century and throughout the gold rush years. Their occupational flexibility was then maintained up to 1940. The construction of the Alaska Highway similarly fit into this pattern, offering temporary opportunities for unskilled labourers. When those positions ended, as most did after the initial construction phase, the Indians returned to their trap lines. Indeed, even the few more regular opportunities, such as highway maintenance, fit into a seasonal cycle which, while centering on the pursuit of game, had long accommodated short-term, season specific employment in the industrial sector.66

It is difficult to assess with precision native participation in the two sectors of the Yukon economy as limited census material on the area offers few insights. One set of documents, registrations of native births, provides some imprecise indications of native economic patterns. The registration of native births dates from the 1930's, but only began

to be collected systematically after the introduction of Mother's Allowance in 1945. As part of the registration process, the recording agent (usually the territorial Indian Agent) noted the father's occupation. A sample of registration entries (approximately 30% of total cases) indicates that even in the aftermath of the construction of the Alaska Highway the vast majority of Indian males continued to consider themselves trappers. There are as well two weaknesses in the data base which suggest an understatement of the number thus occupied. Because of Indian Agent Meek's own interest in encouraging industrial employment, it is likely that he and other recording agents over-emphasized non-traditional economic practices, even if the individual worked as a woodcutter, section hand or labourer only part-time. Similarly, the continuing inconsistency of the registration process often meant that inaccessible areas (where trapping would obviously predominate) were not incorporated systematically in the sample. Once again, the likelihood is that non-trapping occupations were over-represented. The following table nonetheless illustrates that among the active male population, trapping continued to be the predominant occupational pursuit through to 1950. (Table 5)

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57 Records are found in Yukon Territorial Government, Vital Statistics Branch, active files. The materials could only be examined on the condition that they be sampled and that no names be recorded in data notes.
Table 5
FATHER'S OCCUPATION AS LISTED AT TIME OF REGISTRATION
OF INDIAN BIRTHS, 1930-1950

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>1930-1935</th>
<th>1936-1941</th>
<th>1942-1950</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trappers</td>
<td>40 (87%)</td>
<td>63 (85%)</td>
<td>113 (75%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourers</td>
<td>4 (9%)</td>
<td>6 (8%)</td>
<td>14 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section Hands</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>4 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodcutters</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
<td>3 (4%)</td>
<td>7 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Given/Dead</td>
<td>2 (4%)</td>
<td>3 (4%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

46 (100%) 74 (100%) 150 (100%)

Source: Random Sample (Approximately 30% of total cases) From Native Birth Registrations, Vital Statistics Branch, Yukon Territorial Government.

A noticeable decrease followed the construction of the Alaska Highway, but even then three quarters of the listed males considered themselves trappers. While by no means conclusive, the data suggests the preponderant importance of the hunting-gathering sector to the Yukon Indians as late as the 1950's.

Although it is clear that the Indians continuously opted for the harvesting sector, a decision conditioned both by white economic exclusionist policies and native choice, any idyllic notion of natives co-existing in blissful harmony with their environment is out of place. The inconsistency of supply caused by white competition, natural game cycles and decreases in salmon stocks due to American fisheries on the lower Yukon injected serious insecurities into the lives of the Yukon Indians. The hunting-gathering economy held out a number of prospects. Some, like the fur trade, were fairly lucrative. The opportunity to continue subsistence hunting allowed for a persistence of preferred practices and customs. While occasional hardship remained part of the Indians' accepted lot, those natives opting for the pursuit of game normally found their economic expectations realized.
The natives' lack of interest in the aggressive, accumulative materialism of the industrial sector ensured that few crossed over to the discipline and control of the industrial workplace. Instead, the fur trade and provision hunting, both of which readily conformed to the cycles and practices of their subsistence lifestyle, provided for the circumscribed material needs of the Yukon Indians. Though pushed to the margins of the larger Yukon society, particularly as viewed from the white, industrial perspective, the natives generally accepted the cultural and material benefits of their mixed economy. Despite significant economic change in the territory, the natives avoided gradual or rapid integration into the industrial order, preferring a tangential and peripheral accommodation which permitted and even valued a continuation of harvesting practices. Within the framework and constraints of their economic outlook, a perception which the whites found difficult to understand and accept, the hunting-trapping economy offered the natives a realistic, even appealing, alternative to the uncertainty of wage labour. From the expansion of mining in the 1880's through to the construction of the Alaska Highway in the early 1940's the attractions of the industrial economy could not overcome the special appeal of the harvesting life, which meant everything to the Indians and virtually nothing to the whites.
CHAPTER SEVEN

NATIVE-WHITE SOCIAL RELATIONS

Canadian historians have paid remarkably little attention to the evolution of northern society. A pre-occupation with explorers, government scientists and Euro-Canadian mining activities has diverted attention from this important subject. The prevailing notion of the Yukon as a "temporary" society has led to several detailed studies of social conditions during the Klondike Gold Rush ¹ but very little on previous or subsequent developments. This emphasis obscures both the long-term changes in the territorial order and the evolution of native-white social relations.

The central threads running through the social history of the Yukon are native permanence and Euro-Canadian transiency. Territorial population fluctuated widely over time in keeping with the cyclical nature of the northern economy. The natives commercially dominated the fur trade period, despite a major decline in population caused by the introduction of new diseases. The arrival of thousands of gold seekers during the Klondike Gold Rush upset the comparative equilibrium of the early mining frontier. By 1900, whites far outnumbered the dwindling native population. The number of non-natives declined thereafter as the gold economy all but collapsed. The natives slowly regained their numerical importance, constituting about 40% of the population in 1931, but in real num-

bers their population remained stagnant (Table 6).

Table 6
YUKON POPULATION, 1901-1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Yukon</th>
<th>Native</th>
<th>% Native</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>27,219</td>
<td>3,322</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>8,512</td>
<td>1,489</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>4,157</td>
<td>1,390</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>4,230</td>
<td>1,638</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>4,914</td>
<td>1,508</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>9,096</td>
<td>1,563</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>14,628</td>
<td>2,207</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>18,385</td>
<td>2,580</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The number of whites expanded rapidly after 1940, as World War II construction projects brought thousands of temporary, and hundreds of permanent, workers into the Yukon.

The demographic imbalance, including both early native dominance and subsequent white numerical superiority, strongly influenced the evolution of the regional social order. A continuing sexual imbalance in the white population, with men far outnumbering women (Table 7), led many males to seek the affections of native women, if only temporarily.

Table 7
SEX RATIOS, YUKON POPULATION, 1901-1951
(Males per 100 Females)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Males per 100 Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Canada Census, 1901-1951

As important as the shortage of white females, however, were attitudes concerning the desirability of native-white social contact. Beginning
with the fur trade and continuing through to 1950, racist attitudes dom-
ininated by negative appraisals of native social and moral behaviour lim-
ited social contact. The region's dual nature, therefore, re-emerged in
social patterns. The fur trade provided a comparatively integrated set-
ting, while white exclusionist policies ensured that towns and mining
camps remained largely segregated.

Social interaction illustrated most graphically the distances between
native and white in the Yukon. Relegation of Indians to physically pe-
ripheral reserves, restricted native access to hospitals and schools,
and the frequent observation of unhealthy or inebriated Indians high-
lighted the native marginalization and points to a central theme in the
social history of the Canadian north. Contemporary northern communi-
ties, consisting typically of demarked native reserves and carefully
protected Euro-Canadian subdivisions, are creations of the past, demon-
strating the continued importance of segregationist attitudes from the
Gold Rush to the present.

Social contact obviously began with the fur trade and the opening of
trading posts in the Yukon River valley. The nature of fur trade social
relations has recently attracted considerable attention, particularly in
the work of Sylvia Van Kirk and Jennifer Brown. Documenting the exten-
sive and variable relations between native women and white traders,
their work focuses on an elusive search for a definition of fur trade
"society". Van Kirk's study is of particular importance here for, al-
though she does not deal explicitly with the Yukon district, her argu-

2 Sylvia Van Kirk, Many Tender Ties: Women In Fur Trade Society,
1670-1870 (Winnipeg: Watson and Dwyer, 1980); Jennifer Brown, Strang-
ment concerning changes in the pattern of selecting marital partners is challenged somewhat by the practices of the northern fur trade. Focusing primarily on the southern districts and especially Red River, Van Kirk argues that by the 1840’s fur traders opted for white women over half-breeds and natives as their marital partners. By the time the Hudson’s Bay Company opened Fort Youcon in 1847, the long-entrenched pattern of taking a native or "country-born" wife had, she argues, ended. White women increasingly dominated Red River society; the development of long-term liaisons with non-white women remained no longer the accepted practice for high rank company employees.

While Van Kirk amply demonstrated her thesis in the context of the Red River area, analysis of social contact in the Yukon fur trade puts some of her generalizations regarding fur trade society into question. Because of changes in attitude in the upper echelons of the company’s service, it was no longer appropriate by the late 1840’s to discuss liaisons with native women in company correspondence. As a consequence, after that time the typically insightful records of the Hudson’s Bay Company offer little on inter-personal relations between the fur traders and Indians. At the opposite extreme the first commanding officer at Fort Youcon, Alexander H. Murray, brought his white wife with him to the north.\(^3\) From this example, it might appear that Van Kirk’s argument holds for the Yukon. If this were indeed true, then the social impact of the fur trade in the Yukon would have been very limited.

\(^3\) Murray, *Journal of the Yukon*, HBCA, B240/2/1, fol. 27, Youcon Journal, 31 August 1847.
Despite corporate disapproval and contrary to Van Kirk's suggestion, however, liaisons with native and half-breed women continued once the Hudson's Bay Company expanded into the Yukon River valley. The firm clearly deterred officers from cavorting with the "inferior" Indians and half-breeds. Such upper level restrictions dissuaded upwardly mobile young men from establishing public liaisons with native women.

These restrictions had less effect on the company's lower ranks. Engaged servants and minor officials, especially those who acknowledged their limited prospects for personal advancement, enjoyed open sexual contact with the Indians. Again, evidence is sparse, with the normally valuable corporate record virtually barren on the topic. Scattered comments by travellers in the area, however, point to fairly systematic liaisons. Antoine Houle, half-breed interpreter at Fort Youcon, frequented Indian camps and allegedly supported several wives. John Firth, who eventually became postmaster at Rampart House, married a Fort McPherson "Loucheux" Indian. Such alliances appeared frequently in the district. W. Dall, who visited Fort Youcon in 1867, felt that the Hudson's Bay Company actually encouraged relationships. As he phrased it:

Every effort is made, to make these men (company servants) marry Indian wives; thus forcing them to remain in the country by burdening them with females whom they are ashamed to take back to civilization and cannot desert.

4 W. Dall, Alaska and Its Resources (Boston: Lee and Shepard, 1970), 106.
5 HBCA, B200/b/43, fol. 209, Camsell to Grahame, 24 March 1884. Firth's wife may have been a half-breed, K. Crowe, Original Peoples of Northern Canada (Montreal: Arctic Institute, 1976).
6 Dall, Alaska, 104.
Dall's comments must be approached with caution. An American unfamiliar with Company-servant relations, he found the labour system at the post archaic, almost feudal in its oppression of the workers. Nevertheless, the observation suggests that personal inter-racial relations were a familiar feature at Fort Youcon. Further confirmation is provided by Robert Kennicott, a scientist attached to the Smithsonian Institution, who passed the winter of 1861 at LaPierre's House. He thought little of the traders' choice of wives, pointing out that they "were by no means fair to look upon, one was fat and the other forty, [sic] age sixty, for that matter." He further noted that post officer James Flett and at least one other employee had native wives. 7

Numerous questions remain unanswered and, for the most part unanswerable. There is no indication as to what happened to the Indian wives when their husbands left the district. It is likely that they stayed behind if the trader departed for a distant post or for Red River. Similarly, there is no evidence to suggest how the native women re-entered Indian society, although it is expected that the pattern of easy and rapid re-integration common elsewhere held true for the Yukon. There is little evidence to indicate why native women accepted white traders as mates, beyond the again typical assertions that they did so for personal gain and to solidify trading relations between the Company and the band. 8


8 Van Kirk, p. 75-94 expands on the notion of Indian wives as "women in between" in the context of trade relations.
This picture of fur trade social relations is admittedly incomplete. Native men came into contact with white society almost exclusively through their economic activities, particularly the limited trading ceremonies. As well, the fur traders drew an indeterminate number of Indian women to the fur trade posts as sexual partners. Since many of those taking wives, like John Firth, remained in the region and as the number of whites involved was small, the social dislocations were limited. At the same time, the lack of social approval ensured that the liaisons remained within the lower ranks of the Hudson's Bay Company and that approval for such activities remained unwritten. Though the upper echelons had, as Van Kirk suggests, restricted their relations with native women, their model was not being adopted at the lower ranks. The fur trade "society" of the Canadian west and north included far more men and women than this select group. The continuation of past marital practices among the lower echelons suggests that the inter-racial nature of the regional society -- and of fur trade districts in general -- continued long after white women drew the affections of corporate officialdom.

The failure to secure the approval of the white social elite ironically became the major legacy of social relations in the fur trade era. While the company allowed, if not encouraged, their men to keep native wives, the simple fact that the officer class maintained their social distance implied a degree of disapprobation. To the elite fur traders,

missionaries and explorer/travellers, marriage to an Indian remained unacceptable. Characterized as "lazy", "aggressive", "turbulent" and, in W. C. Bompas' phrase, "the lowest of all people," the natives clearly stood apart from the "better" class of whites. As Bompas' comment suggests, the whites readily applied the evolution-based theories of cultural superiority then current in western intellectual circles, and obviously found the Yukon Indians wanting. This negative stereotype of the Yukon Indians, devoid of any conception of the "noble savage", subsequently provided the intellectual basis for further attempts at social segregation which also conditioned their attitudes about the natives' economic utility.

Such concerns remained for the moment the preserve of the established classes. For the miners who followed the fur traders, consideration of racial character and the snobbish disapproval of inter-racial sexual contact held limited significance. The image often expressed of the early Yukon mining frontier is of a rapacious group of prospectors who, when not scouring the creeks for gold, eagerly debauched the local natives. There is a great deal of missionary hyperbole in such assessments, for the clergymen of the Church Missionary Society sought signs of the degeneration of the Indian in the face of advancing white civili-


11 See R. Berkhofer, White Man's Indian, for the broader context suggested here.

zation. Unfortunately, these same missionaries offered the only detailed descriptions of relations between whites and natives.

Sexual contact increased markedly in this period and relationships thus consumated differed strikingly from those of the earlier fur trade era. In the virtual absence of white women in the area, native females provided the only readily available sexual solace. As the Reverend R. J. Bowen commented on the border region mining camps,

the white prospectors . . . had been thoughtless enough to lure the Indian squaws into their home(s) and into the dance hall. The results of such action was seen in the number of half-breed children.

Missionary correspondence is replete with accounts of systematic debauchery, of native women lured unwittingly into the miners' tents, of Indian men "selling" young daughters to avaricious prospectors and of the widespread use of alcohol. Liquor figured prominently in the missionaries' rhetoric, typically being described as an irresistible lure for native women or as a reliable method for placating native men.

Similar relations characterized native-white contact at Herschel Island, off the Yukon's northern coast. American whalers entered the area in 1890 and quickly established an extensive land-based fur trade that attracted many Indians from the Porcupine River district. The trading ceremonies were lusty social events. Native women clambered on board

13 J. Usher, "Social Program."
14 PAC, Bowen Papers, "Incidents in the Life of R.J. Bowen."
15 Cody, Apostle of the North, Archer, Heroine of the North, CMS, Bompas to Sec., 25 May 1895, Bompas to Dear Sirs, 2 March 1895; Bompas to CMS, 15 May 1894; Bompas to CMS, 26 July 1895, Bompas to CMS, 3 January 1894; diocese of Selkirk by W. C. Bompas, c 1893; Bompas to CMS, 20 January 1893; DIA, vol. 3906, file 105, 378, Bompas to Minister of the Interior, 5 June 1894, Deputy Supt. General to Hon. T. Wayne Daly, 18 Sept. 1893.
the sailing vessels into the arms of long-deprived sailors, and the consumption of seemingly endless supplies of liquor ensured a constant state of inebriation. A marked contrast to the sedate exchanges in the interior, the coastal trading events served as an attractive enticement for inland Indians. As Charles Constantine reported from his vantage point at Fort Cudahy, several hundred miles to the south, "This liquor is sold or traded to the natives for furs, walrus ivorybone and their young girls who are purchased by the officers for their own foul purposes." While these comments and other descriptions of the Herschel Island trade refer primarily to the coastal Inuit, many Porcupine River Kutchin also participated. Along the Yukon River and off Herschel Island there appears, therefore, to be evidence to support the missionaries' claims concerning the debauching of the natives and the deleterious social impact of the arrival of miners and whalers.

The miners and whalers sought out the sexual favours of the native women, and such relationships became the major point of contact between Indians and whites. The frequency and significance of these liaisons, however, is less clear. While half-breed children appeared as a logical consequence of miscegenation, a distinctive cross-cultural social group did not appear. The missionaries saw the children as deserving of special consideration and attempted to draw them out of the native world


17 PAC, MG30 E55, Constantine Papers, Constantine to O. C. Regina, 20 Nov. 1896; See also RCMP, vol. 336, file 254-07, Whittaker to Col. White, c. 1905; CMS, Bompas to CMS, 24 May 1895.
and place them under the wing of resident clergy. For the most part, however, the half-breed offspring of impermanent liaisons remained with the Indians. The small and geographically isolated number of such children ensured that there would be no ready institutionalization of half-breed status. Unlike the southern plains, where a sizeable Metis population with a distinctive identity evolved, in the Yukon River valley half-breeds remained members of native society, barred by colour and culture from a permanent place within the mining community.

It is particularly difficult to determine the extent of the alleged debauchery. White miners made liquor available for their native "friends", either in their own cabins or in native camps. In many instances, these gatherings provided an opportunity for the miners to elicit sexual favours from inebriated native women.

Endless appeals by the missionaries to put a stop to the liquor trade led, in 1894, to the establishment of a North-West Mounted Police presence in the area. The police officers remained pessimistic about their chances of effecting a noticeable change in social relations. Inspector Charles Constantine noted in 1896 that

we cannot expect that a mining country will become polished and in a high state of civilization in the course of a few months, but has to (be) done gradually more persuasively at first than by forcing it.19

Constantine's superiors shared his reluctance to impose strict controls on social behavior. N.W.M.P. Comptroller Fred White echoed a widely held view within the force when he wrote, "It is difficult to convince

18 PAC, Bowen Papers, "Incidents and the Life of R. J. Bowen"; Archer, Heroine, Cody, Apostle.

the goody-goody people that in the development and settlement of a new
country, allowances must be made for the excesses of human behaviour." 20

The institutionalization of the inter-racial drinking party stands as
the major legacy of the pre-Gold Rush mining era. With the natives
spending most of their time away from the mining camps, these brief, in­
tense celebrations became the principal medium through which the two
groups came together. From the white perspective, and this is evident
for the miners, missionaries and policemen, the natives' social attri­
butes came to be viewed largely in light of their party behaviour. The
women's lack of "civilized" morals and the men's inability to control
the effects of liquor (desires and actions which, incidentally, mirrored
those of the miners and whalers) became the dominant images of the na­
tives. For the Indians, however, these parties likely represented lit­
tle more than brief flings, a decided change from the routine of the
bush and a sought-after component of the regular trading excursions.
Very quickly, however, these parties provided unintended evidence to
confirm the North American Nineteenth Century stereotype of the drunken
and morally lax Indian. 21

White commentators, particularly C.M.S. missionaries, decried the
widespread availability of alcohol and feared the consequences of con­
tinuing consumption. Their concern, born as much out of a self-inter­
ested anxiety about uncontrollable, inebriated natives as concern for
the Indians' well-being, reflected the widespread stereotype of the de­

20 Quoted in W. R. Morrison, "The Mounted Police in Canada's Northern
Frontier," 144.

21 R. Berkofer, White Man's Indian. One of the best examples of this
attitude is Report of John Hauksley, DIA, Annual Report, 1915/16,
117. Hauksley came to the Yukon in the period in question.
bilitating impact of alcohol. Accepting the common images and fears, the Canadian government imposed a permanent interdiction on native drinking. Importantly, when Inspector Charles Constantine led the first North West Mounted Police detachment to the area in 1894, he carried explicit instructions to address the problem of native drinking. Though the NWMP modified law enforcement practices to conform to the wider tolerances of the mining frontier, police officers placed particular emphasis on restricting Indian access to alcohol. Much of the early efforts concentrated on white suppliers, with fines beginning at $100 imposed on anyone caught selling or providing liquor to natives. 22

These government imposed restrictions actually served to shape the structure of native drinking in the district. Legal barriers blocking access to legitimate suppliers forced those natives desiring liquor to turn to the less satisfactory options of manufacturing homebrew or purchasing through white bootleggers. The illicit trade became particularly important, both in the early mining phase and thereafter, spreading quickly throughout the territory despite RNWMP vigilance. Legal prohibitions similarly forced the natives to consume their liquor either in their camps or, as was particularly common before the Gold Rush, in the miners' cabins. Ironically, the law brought natives and whites together in the presence of alcohol, simultaneously placing Indians in the role of supplicants dependent upon others for their pleasures, precisely what the government designed its legislation to prevent. 23

22 The courts, however, refused to accept native testimony. The difficulty this entailed in securing convictions did not however dampen the policemen's ardour. RCMP, vol. 485, file 221. Moodie to Commissioner, 4 August 1918. See also RCMP, vol. 549, file 109, Report of Serg. Maple, 28 September 1918.
While commentaries on native activities in this period are replete with discussions of Indians' drinking, the precise context and significance of that consumption is difficult to assess. The role of alcohol in native societies has drawn considerable attention — but little consensus — among anthropologists and historians. Donald Horton's argument that liquor served to reduce anxiety dominated much of the early discussion. He suggested that, acting as a power disinhibitor, alcohol allowed the relaxation of aggressive and sexual tensions to a tolerable level.

Numerous scholars, including ethnographers I. and J. Honigmann working among the Kaska, applied Horton's analysis to a variety of "primitive" groups, offering slight modifications of the central theory.

Later studies questioned Horton's interpretation. Many, particularly those focusing on contemporary situations, emphasize "socio-economic deprivation" as the prime determinant of native drinking. Others ar-

23 As this relates to contemporary American context, see P. May, "Arrests, Alcohol and Alcohol Legalization Among An American Indian Tribe," Plains Anthropologist 26 (1975), 129-134.


gued that the natives' apparent lust for alcohol originated in liquor's utility in assisting the attainment of dreams, a most valued experience. Alternate explanations suggest that drunkenness served as a substitute for institutionalized social interaction with whites or, as Nancy Lurie suggests, as an assertion of Indianness. The various theories accounting for the natives' apparent affinity for alcohol share a common inflexibility. They assume a uniform "Indian" response to liquor.

More useful, particularly in understanding conditions in the Yukon, is the approach advocated in Edgerton and MacAndrew's *Drunken Comportment*. Arguing that there is no uniform physiological response to alcohol, they suggest that drinking behaviour has to be learned. In native societies, where few models for intoxicated behaviour existed, patterns came from the white man. At the first stage at least, the response of specific native groups came from lessons offered by the whites bringing the alcohol. Edgerton and MacAndrews also point out, supported by a contemporary study of Indian drinking, that social scientists typical-

articles dealing with contemporary native drinking in the north, see John Homer and Jack Steinbring, eds., *Alcohol and Native Peoples of the North* (Boston: University Press of American, 1980).

29 R. C. Daly, "The Role of Alcohol Among North American Indian Tribes as Reported in the Jesuit Relations," *Anthropologica* 10 (1968), 45-57.


ly ascribe all deviant behaviour to post-conquest consequences of alcohol consumption, missing the obvious observation that violent, aberrant actions were a part of native life before the arrival of the whites.

The Yukon provides a useful case study for the Edgerton-MacAndrew approach. Natives greeted the introduction of alcohol enthusiastically and imbibed regularly. The demand, however, had finite limits, and there was little violence associated with consumption. The many "Hootch" parties remained peaceable, with few beatings, no murders before the twentieth century and little destructiveness. The police and missionaries, however, refused to acknowledge the possible peaceful role of alcohol, living in dread of intoxicated violence. That natives failed to act as expected reflected the social context within which native drinking began.

The crucial preliminary exposure to alcohol came, for most of the Yukon Indians, in the form of "spree" drinking. Miners returning from their diggings, often burdened with the results of a winter's work, and the whalers anchored off Herschel Island engaged in regular and raucous celebrations. Despite the missionaries' remonstrances, Indians joined in the parties, obviously enjoying the recreational value of liquor. While drinking, the white men were not noticeably violent, even before the arrival of the North West Mounted Police. The behaviour the Indians associated with the consumption of alcohol did not generally include violence or wild debauchery. Instead, liquor was typically consumed in small groups, with the emphasis on what a native woman from Teslin referred to as a "hi-you" time.\(^{33}\)

\(^{33}\) RCMP, vol. 514, file 521, A. C. Bell to OC "B" Division, 12 August 1916.
Alcohol consumption in Yukon society, for both whites and Indians, was recreational and drinking was normally associated with pleasure, sexual or otherwise, and partying. Not surprisingly, the natives readily integrated alcohol into the potlatches held to celebrate funerals, to trade or exchange gifts. Equally important, alcohol became closely tied to sexual relations between native women and white men. Short-term liaisons normally revolved around the inter-racial drinking party. The Indians accepted drinking and sexual behaviour as a standard social response both to the use of alcohol and relations with white men.

This period also saw the emergence in the Yukon of a slightly different European type, typically (and derogatorily) referred to as a "squaw man." Commonly used throughout Canada and the United States, the pejorative term described those white men who lived with Indians.34 These individuals went further than simply taking a native wife, although that alone was a socially questionable choice by the North American standards of the 1880's. They also opted to live in the hunting-trapping manner. But the squaw men did not completely separate themselves from white society, often preserving their materialistic points of view and an awareness of the possibilities for personal profit through the fur trade or prospecting. They remained men in between, not fully integrated into the Indian way of life, yet significantly divorced from white society. Importantly, with few exceptions they did not fulfill the role of "patrons" or intermediaries between the two groups. To those in the mining communities, men who "descended" to live with the Indians became marginal men, only tangentially connected to the larger society and deemed

34 Again, see Nash, Red, White and Black, Morner, Race Mixture.
little different from the natives. The natives had less difficulty accepting the squaw men, allowing them into their camps, recognizing their liaisons with native women, and encouraging their participation in the hunting economy. There is no precise indication of the size of this particular social group before 1896, although the comparatively small number of half-breed children recorded by the missionaries suggests that it was not large.

Whereas before 1896 social contacts remained geographically and demographically circumscribed, the Klondike Gold Rush and the attending influx of miners radically altered the demographic balance. In short order, whites numerically swamped the natives as thousands of prospectors poured over the mountain passes into the Yukon River valley. The limited social contacts of the earlier period fell into disarray. Large scale mining frontiers are seldom kind to indigenous populations. Given the magnitude of the population shift, the most remarkable characteristic of the Klondike period is the surprisingly limited amount of interracial contact. With few exceptions, natives stayed socially distinct from the gold rush community, placed by choice, encouragement and regulation on the margins of territorial society.

Part of the explanation for the racial exclusiveness of Gold Rush society lies in the efforts of the Church of England missionaries and the North West Mounted Police. Bishop Bompas' main task involved separating

35 George Carmacks, co-discoverer of the Klondike fields, was a "squaw man" and encountered significant discrimination as a result. A. A. Wright, Prelude to Bonanza discusses the problems he encountered after locating gold on Rabbit Creek.

36 Fisher, Contact and Conflict, 95-118.

37 Pierre Berton, Klondike, Hal Guest, "Dawson City".
whites and natives. To Bompas, the rationale was obvious:

To abandon them now that the place is overrun by miners would involve their destruction by more than a relapse to heathenism, namely in their being swallowed up in the miners' temptations to drink, gambling and immorality.38

Anxious to protect the Indians from their own "weaknesses", Bompas urged the natives in the Dawson City area to remain on the Moosehide reserve, some three miles downstream from the mining centre. The federal constabulary seconded Bompas' efforts, particularly as regards alcohol which was acknowledged to be the greatest evil facing the Indians. The presence of a sizeable police force added substance to earlier proscriptions and the N.W.M.P. spared little effort in pursuing whites accused of distributing liquor to the natives.39

Once again, alcohol emerged as the principal social intermediary. The natives' willingness to pay high prices for liquor ensured a consistent supply. The consensus was that efforts to stop the use of liquor had been unsuccessful. Euro-Canadians readily agreed that avaricious whites easily led the natives, with their insatiable demand for intoxicants, toward inebriation and corruption. Since most whites saw drunkenness as a sign of demoralization, the general public readily accepted Bompas' conclusion that "their habits are deteriorating through too much contact with the whites."40 The liquor parties hardly reflected native lifestyle and customs. It appears that for most Indians parties continued to be occasional, often seasonal events. They illustrated not that the natives had sunk into depravity through contact with the whites.

38 CMS, Bompas to CMS, 4 May 1898.


40 CMS, Bompas to CMS, 23 August 1898.
but rather that they continued to be socially distinct. Beyond these occasional forays into the white man's world, few opportunities existed for extended social contact.

Most of the Yukon Indians were physically isolated from the Gold Rush, and the preponderance of whites ensured that the geographic segregation was replicated in social distance. This separation often reflected Indian choice. The N.W.M.P. officer at McQuesten noted in 1900 that a number of natives left the area as a result of white encroachments and alleged thefts of Indian goods.\textsuperscript{41} Living in the shadow of Dawson City, Moosehide residents tended to stay in their place, maintaining only irregular contacts with the town. Even here there were few attempts, or opportunities, to breach social barriers, and the natives limited their intervention to a small number of peripheral economic activities. The high incidence of disease in the Moosehide community also restricted attempts by the local Indians to enter Dawson's social sphere. Perceived economic opportunities attracted other natives to the mining community, but it is doubtful that they shared widely in the myriad of social activities.\textsuperscript{42}

In the pre-Gold Rush period, the miners' sexual desires and the limited number of white women ensured a regular desire for the sexual favours of Indian women. During the Klondike Gold Rush the demand remained surprisingly limited. There are several explanations, including the presence of the North-West Mounted Police, and the efforts of other government officials and missionaries to prevent such contact. More impor-

\textsuperscript{41} RCMP, vol. 189, file 339, Davis to OC, Dawson, 2 Oct. 1900.

tant, however, was the availability of prostitutes to service the
miners. Recognizing the sexual imbalance in the territory (men outnumbered women by more than 5 to 1 in 1901) and the likelihood of unrest if prostitution was prohibited, the government and police decided to allow the "lascivious ladies of soulless love" to ply their trade, although under strict regulations. With a readily available supply of "professionals," the miners resorted less often to the "socially undesirable" Indian women.43

For all its grandeur, the Klondike Gold Rush did not significantly alter patterns of social relations. The process of marginalization remained more one of disregard than callous action on the part of the whites. The natives stayed close by, performing minor though valuable seasonal functions, but integration into the larger society did not follow. Liquor parties moved from the mining centres and dance halls to the Indian camps. Social and legal proscriptions removed prior public sanction for such events, with severe punishment for any whites caught in the act. Previously the medium for much of the interaction, native women no longer attracted as much attention as sexual partners. Instead, as stereotypes of the Indians as "drunken", "dirty", and "diseased" took firmer root, even temporary cohabitation with a native became cause for social disapproval.

43 Hal Guest, "Dawson City" has the best discussion of this topic. On the N.W.M.P. generally, see the provocative article, Thomas Stone, "The Mounties as Vigilantes: Reflections of Community and The Transformation of Law in the Yukon, 1885-1897," Law and Society Review, vol. 4, no. 1 (Fall, 1979).
A major indication of the Indians' social marginality during the Klondike Gold Rush is their virtual invisibility in the vast literature generated by this event. The gold rush attracted a great deal of media attention and in the era of "yellow journalism" writers earned sizeable sums by feeding an insatiable southern demand for information. Living in the Yukon, but not socially part of it, the Indians appeared in this material more as part of the physical environment than of the elaborate social milieu.\textsuperscript{44} It is significant that the only major published pieces dealing exclusively with the natives, two short articles by the well-regarded journalist Tappan Adney, described moose hunting techniques among the northern Indians.\textsuperscript{45} The Gold Rush developed around and amongst the Indians, but seldom incorporated them in anything more than a marginal way. This exclusiveness reflected native choice in part. With the exception of the "Dawson Boys" from Peel River, few Indians moved toward the gold fields. With few jobs available, other native groups physically separated themselves from the mining camps. Excepting the missionaries and the N.W.M.P., most whites simply ignored the natives. What limited accommodation occurred resulted from economic considerations, and the nature of those ties ensured that social integration did not follow.

\textsuperscript{44} See Hal Guest, "San Francisco of the North", and R. Friesen, "Chilkoot: A Literature Survey" for discussions of available materials. P. Berton, Klondike; illustrates the predominantly white character of the Gold Rush. See also M. Zaslow, The Opening of the Canadian North.

\textsuperscript{45} T. Adney, "The Indian Hunter of the Far Northwest: On the Trail to the Klondike," Outing, 39, no. 6 (1907), 623-633; Adney, "Moose Hunting With the Tro-Chu-Tu" Harpers New Monthly Magazine, 100 (1900), 495-507.
The outmigration of whites following the gold rush gave the Indians a renewed numerical importance. The period from 1904 to the construction of the Alaska Highway did not, however, see significant alterations in existing patterns of social integration. Instead, institutionalization of distinctiveness, and rigid exclusion of natives from the dominant white society characterized this forty year period. The separateness of the races derived in large measure from the two-sector form of the regional economy. Because of the exclusiveness of the mining economy, there was little in that environment to draw natives and whites together. In contrast, any whites who participated in the trapping business, as trappers, traders or in related transportation activities, found considerable cause to reach a social accommodation with the Indians. The same motivation did not exist for the majority of the whites, carefully cloistered in protected residential environments or working in the white dominated mining industry.

A more complete integration of native and white occurred away from the Dawson-Whitehorse corridor. In those instances where whites worked and lived amongst the Indians and where economic prosperity hinged on interdependence between trappers and traders, harmonious relations existed. As Reverend C. C. Brett commented concerning the Teslin area in 1914,

The whites generally speaking, are rather exceptional here. I heard the trapper say that during his eight years here, he has not heard a native woman complain of a white saying anything (sic) to insult them. I don't wish to infer that the whites there pretend to be saints, but they are a pretty good crowd of men on the whole.46

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Although the Teslin natives apparently resented the occasional derogatory reference to themselves as "Siwashes," they appeared well satisfied with the inter-racial accommodation. In the back country districts, like Teslin, relations extended beyond trade and friendship. It is in these back country districts that squaw men became particularly prevalent. Dan Cadzow, trader at Rampart House after the turn of the century, is perhaps the most prominent example. Committed to the Porcupine River fur trade, he took a native wife soon after his arrival and remained a prominent figure in the area until his death. Cadzow was unique in that he eschewed the Indian way, building a handsome cabin for himself and his wife, which he furnished with the best he could buy from southern retailers. Men such as Cadzow, Poole Field at Ross River, Eugene Jacquot at Burwash, Del Vangorder at Ross River and others around the territory committed themselves to their respective areas. Their acceptance of the Indian way for themselves or, as in Cadzow's case, the people they chose as neighbours obviously led them to more complete relationships with the Indians.

Marriages did not always follow. The men often sought short-term liaisons, especially if they intended only a brief stay. This was particularly true in the 1920's and 1930's, when the profitability of the northern fur trade brought a number of short-term operators into the business. Although over-stated, the contention by Grafton Burke, physician at the Hudson Stuck Memorial Hospital at Fort Yukon that "traders in these isolated places vie with each other as to who can 'swell the

48 T. Riggs, "Running the Alaska Boundary."
population”. 49 demonstrates that many traders did not share the commitment of Cadzow and others to the Yukon Indians.

The general population continued to disdain or at least question the squaw man. N.A.D. Armstrong’s reaction to the marriage of his friend Coward to a "dusky bride" named Alice is not untypical. "What a pity," he wrote in his diary, "that the fine specimen of a man should have fallen so low as to marry a full-blooded squaw – such is life." 50 The indictment offered by such men as N.W.M.P. Assistant Commissioner Z. Wood is no less striking. Referring to the Whitehorse area, he commented, "These (squaw) men purchase liquor and retail it to the Indian, and we have also reason to believe they allow their squaws to cohabit with other white men and Indians." 51 Those who opted for an Indian bride faced ostracism from the "better" elements of white society. Laura Berton described the case of one young man, the son of a Dawson civil servant, who had married a half-breed woman while his parents were "outside." As Berton wrote:

She was a pretty little thing. bright and neat, and I think could have made him a good wife, but the parents were so shocked they would neither see nor speak with him. This attitude drove him from the town and back into the bush, where his life was spent among the Indians, hunting and cutting wood for a living. Now here he was, standing by the river with his dark, wiry children clustered about him, the fish wheel in the background turning slowly with the current, the salmon smoking under the trees. In all intents and purposes he was a native. 52

49 AC, Fort Yukon file, Grafton Burke to J. Hauksley, 21 May 1926.


52 L. Berton, I Married the Klondike, 169.
Selecting a native wife forced difficult choices, for in so doing an individual cut many bonds with white society. Occasionally, those who stayed with their Indian wives used their knowledge of white society to the benefit of their native friends and family. Such men were exceptions, however, as the squaw men did not automatically assume a role as intermediaries between the races. Instead, they were more often shunned if not ostracized, their morals and taste questioned by the upright residents of Whitehorse and Dawson.

The disdain for the squaw men was particularly evident during attempts to provide school facilities for half-breed children in Dawson and Whitehorse. Although public schools were available in both centres, as late as 1947 it was noted that "it is not denied that these children (natives and half-breeds) are not welcome there." Mission schools for half-breed children were established in response. Full-blooded natives already being served through Anglican day schools and the Carcross Indian Residential School. The Anglican church built St. Paul's Hostel in Dawson in 1920, and in 1946 the Reverend E. Lee opened a similar facility in Whitehorse. In both instances, the public opposed the schools, although few accepted the alternative of allowing the children into the territorial establishments. The opening of such schools did not assuage public anger. Instead, the fact the federal government provided financial assistance only added to the hostility.

founding of St. Paul's Hostel revealed the general disapproval of the squaw men. As the Mayo-Keno Bulletin noted in September 1925:

Why should the people's money be used to house, feed and clothe the somewhat prolific progeny of able bodied men who have mated with native women . . . . Does the Federal Government realize that the result of its misplaced generosity is to encourage a certain class known as 'squaumen' to shift their parental responsibilities on the shoulders of an unwilling public.\textsuperscript{56}

While the regularity and permanence of several of these relationships cannot be denied, there is no accurate means of assessing their number and longevity. Commenting in 1909 on the situation around Whitehorse, Superintendent Snyder of the Royal North West Mounted Police wrote:

There are in this district a number of white men who are living with Indian women . . . . While some of these men profess to regard these women as their wives, I do not think any of them seriously intend to live with them for life -- as otherwise there is nothing to prevent their being married to them in the usual manner legally.\textsuperscript{57}

Three years later, Bishop Stringer noted that there were only "about half a dozen" men in the Yukon living permanently with native women. Given the far reaching tentacles of the Anglican church and the missionaries' familiarity with local conditions, it is likely that his estimate was not far wrong. The legality of these informally constituted marriages, usually ratified only according to Indian custom, was an important issue. Any woman so marrying lost her legal status as an Indian, as did her children.\textsuperscript{58} Census materials and even territorial marriage

\textsuperscript{56} AC, St. Agnes Hostel file, Extract from Mayo-Keno Bulletin, 8 Sept. 1925.

\textsuperscript{57} RCMP, vol. 369, file 133, Snyder to Asst. Comm., 29 Jan. 1909.

\textsuperscript{58} This issue was not adequately resolved before 1950. As long as there was no formal marriage, the government considered women to be natives. Children remained native unless their fathers assumed full and public responsibility. See RCMP, vol. 369, file 133, Pedley to
registers do not offer much insight; the incidence of mixed marriages and those involving half-breeds largely escaped bureaucratic purview. The impermanent nature of most of these liaisons would distort any statistics thus garnered, making it impossible to accurately assess the incidence of such relationships.

That these informal and transitory liaisons formed a significant part of the social landscape is suggested by strong demographic pressures within white society. Because of its northern isolation and economic instability, the Yukon remained a frontier society through to 1950. Few long-term settlers came north, the workforce sustained instead by a continuous circulation of transient workers. Typically unaccompanied by wife or family, these men found few outlets for their romantic and sexual desires within the white community, except as could be assuaged through heartless trysts with prostitutes. With a massive imbalance in favour of males among the white community, (Table 7), a large number of young men sought out Indian women. Originating more in lust than romance, contracted by men with little intention of remaining long in the north, these liaisons were typically short-lived, sexually-oriented and often related to the consumption of alcohol. Functioning without the restrictions on sexual behaviour dominant among white females, Indian women accepted the status, pleasure and occasional material returns from such liaisons.


59 YTG. Vital Statistics Branch, marriage registrations to 1950 did not indicate ethnicity.
These frequent liaisons carried significant social cost. Largely because of the Euro-Canadian competition, Indian males found themselves unable to attract suitable partners until they were comparatively old. Anglican Church records of native marriages point to a fundamental transition in patterns of union between 1900 and 1950. Females consistently married younger than males, with the gap widening significantly over time. Between 1925 and 1950, the average age differential between native partners was twelve years, almost three times the value for the preceding twenty-five year period. (Table 8) Other evidence substantiates this observation. Native birth registrations recorded the ages of fathers and mothers, permitting another survey of the age differences of partners. Again, the age differential increased over time, although the change was not as dramatic as that suggested by the church materials. (Table 9) A tabulation of conjugal condition in the 1941 federal census points in the same direction. Of women between the ages of 15 and 24, for example, 42% were married compared to less than 13% of males of the same age. In the 25 to 44 cohort, fewer than 6% of females remained unattached, while the percentage of males yet to marry stood three times as high. (Table 10) The evidence cumulatively suggests that females readily found a white or native partner at around twenty years of age (see Table 11) (and documentary materials indicate that sexual activity began even earlier), but Native males on average could not find a mate until they reached 29 years.  

60 This represented a marked change from pre-contact conditions. See McClelland, My Old People Say, June Helm, Handbook.
### Table 8
AVERAGE AGE AT FIRST RECORDED MARRIAGE, ANGLICAN CHURCH RECORDS, 1900-1950.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Females 1900-1924</th>
<th>Males 1900-1924</th>
<th>Females 1925-1950</th>
<th>Males 1925-1950</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fort Selkirk</td>
<td>25.9 (29) (1)</td>
<td>27.5 (33)</td>
<td>22.2 (13)</td>
<td>28.3 (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rampart House</td>
<td>17.9 (15)</td>
<td>22.0 (13)</td>
<td>18.0 (27)</td>
<td>36.5 (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moosehide</td>
<td>20.5 (44)</td>
<td>25.6 (44)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Yukon</td>
<td>22.1 (95)</td>
<td>26.2 (95)</td>
<td>19.7 (51)</td>
<td>32.1 (51)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Number in bracket indicates number of cases.

Source: Parish Records, Anglican Church, Diocese of Yukon.

### Table 9
AGES OF FATHERS AND MOTHERS, FIRST RECORDED BIRTH, 1930-1950

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Range</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930-34</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935-39</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940-44</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-50</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10
CONJUGAL CONDITION, YUKON INDIANS, 1941

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>15-24</th>
<th></th>
<th>25-44</th>
<th></th>
<th>45-65</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>Males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other(1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Other refers to separated, divorced or widowed.

Source: Canada Census, 1941.

Table 11
AGE AT MARRIAGE, INDIAN-WHITE MARRIAGES, ANGLICAN CHURCH RECORDS, 1906-1928.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age At Marriage</th>
<th>Husbands (White)</th>
<th>Wives (Native)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50+</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Age</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Parish Records, Anglican Church, Diocese of Yukon.

While competition limited the Indians males' ability to locate a wife, the impermanence of most relationships frequently hurt the females. The transitory nature of such contacts led to frequent misunderstandings. Native women often found themselves pregnant by a white man who left the district before claim could be made on his financial resources. Short-term liaisons, usually brief encounters in the aftermath of drinking parties, served to re-enforce notions of Indian women as promiscuous, even amoral. To many whites, the native women served as
playthings, not partners, to be discarded when no longer required. Inter-racial sexual relations re-emphasized the marginality of the Yukon Indians, pointing once again to the natives' causal utility and the whites' continuing refusal to offer the Indians permanent status within their communities.

Internally destructive and functioning without the approbation of white society, such liaisons remained an important feature of the Yukon social environment, especially outside the Dawson-Whitehorse corridor. The fur trade economy once again constructed its special version of native-white social relations. Anglican Church records of inter-racial marriages suggest that such liaisons maintained a special character. Husbands averaged 16 years older than their native wives, most of whom married under twenty years of age. (Table 11) Most were well-established traders or hunters who had decided to remain permanently in the territory. Sanctioned alliances remained the exception, however, as short-term relationships dominated native-white interaction in the fur trade environment. In those areas removed from the mines and the Yukon River transportation system, especially the Kluane, Teslin, Pelly River and Porcupine River districts, mixed marriages, formalized or not, of short and long duration, remained an indelible part of the social fabric.

Two distinct social environments can therefore be seen to have existed in the territory, one encompassing the scattered fur trading population, the other oriented around Dawson, Whitehorse and the mining camps. The natives dominated the former. The only whites were a few R.C.M.P. officers, a small number of fur traders and white trappers, and several missionaries. In each instance, occupation and purpose brought the
whites into close contact with the natives, resulting in generally harmonious relations. Numerically, the natives far outnumbered the whites. In the isolated Old Crow district in 1928, there were fewer than twenty-five whites in the midst of more than 200 Indians. When the fur trade declined in the late 1940's, the number of Europeans dropped to less than ten. Under such conditions, and in a manner reminiscent of relations during the Hudson's Bay Company era, natives and whites reached a mutually acceptable social accommodation, although impermanence continued to typify most relationships.

In the more densely populated Whitehorse-Dawson corridor, the reverse held true. The towns and mining camps remained white enclaves for the most part. Whites exerted considerable effort to ensure that the settlements retain their essentially Euro-Canadian character. Aided by the government and missionaries, the white communities attempted to keep the towns clear of Indians. Accomplishing this task seldom proved easy. The availability of occasional work enhanced the attractiveness of the towns to the natives. Abundant liquor supplies, medical facilities and government offices also added to the drawing power of what passed for urban places. The number of Indians residing near and in the cities fluctuated according to the availability of work and wages. Similarly, as government relief for indigents and health care for the infirm became available, Whitehorse and Dawson in particular attracted a steady number of the ill and the aged. The white population responded negatively to any influx to the margins of the towns, urging government to maintain

Federal government officials, including Indian agent John Hauksley and various Royal North West Mounted Police officers, agreed with the residents' concerns. Investigating possible sites for an Indian residential school in 1910, School Inspector T. Bragg echoed the widely held view that natives be kept out of town because immoral influences are generally found in white communities and such social conditions generally exist as will afford bad examples to Indian children and put temptation in their way. I think, however, that it is safer to keep them away from places where liquor is sold and where Indians are known to procure it and from places where Indian girls are known to be living in amoral relations with white men.

From the government's paternalistic perspective, the towns were complex social environments from which the "childlike" natives had to be protected. While saving the Indians from the ravages of white debauchery provided the official justification for the attempted exclusion of Indians, there is no doubt that white residents pressured the government to enforce the desired racial segregation. The government adopted several approaches to prevent or regulate native incursions into white residential space. The physical segregation of the races proved the most popular and successful. The government established special native reserves outside the towns. Given that many of the Indians lived near the towns on a seasonal basis, the best option

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63 DIA, vol. 3962, file 147, 654-1, T. Bragg to Sec., DIA, 23 June 1910. See also Dept. of Supt. Moodie, RNWMP, Annual report 1914, 274.
seemed to be to isolate them close to, but decidedly away from, the urban centres. This maneuver had the added benefit of working both ways. Not only did it keep natives out of towns, but because the government could legally control access to the Indian reserves, it also ensured that few whites entered the native camps. In all major population centres, Dawson City (Moosehide reserve), Mayo, Fort Selkirk, Carmacks, Carcross and Whitehorse, the government opened small reservations to keep the Indians outside of white settlements.

In most instances, white protests over natives settling within the towns initiated the process. In Whitehorse, the Indians' construction of a series of ramshackle huts among the white homes convinced the government of the need to establish a reserve. John Hawksley noted regarding Carmacks, "Last year the white residents complained to me of the Indians camping within the limits of the village of Carmacks. Action was at once taken, authority was obtained from the Department of Indian Affairs for surveying a reserve." Practical considerations conditioned the town of May's insistence that the Indians be removed:

Some rich silver mines have been discovered and there is considerable activity in the vicinity . . . . It is thought that owing to the above the town will develop and the land which the Indians now occupy will be needed.

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64 YG vol. 29, file 13014, W. C. Bompas to Commissioner of Y.T., 29 Nov. 1904.

65 The reserve issue is discussed in a different context in the last chapter.


There was obviously more than just the need for land behind the subsequent decision to relocate the natives two miles downstream from Mayo—and on the opposite side of the river. The Indians were physically, though not forceably, removed from residential proximity and placed under the theoretical protection of a government reserve.68

Creating a residential reserve solved few problems, for the natives seldom remained within its confines. With no treaty between the government of Canada and the Yukon Indians and with small reserves that could barely suffice as seasonal homes, the authorities had no legitimate means of forcing the Indians to stay on site. While the government encouraged the natives to leave the reserves to hunt and trap, every effort was made to keep them out of the towns. As Superintendent Moodie reported in 1913, "They are kept out of town as much as possible, but it is only by bluff."69 Lack of legal authority to block native access proved to be little impediment. Indian Agent Hawksley regularly imposed curfews, demanding that all natives vacate the towns each night (around 5 p.m. in the winter and 7 p.m. in the summer).70 The program occasionally lapsed, and at one point Hawksley despaired over his inability to prevent the Indians from settling amongst the white population.71 With the assistance of the police, however, Hawksley expanded his curfew pro-


gram in 1929, establishing a nightly limit of 8 p.m. (the end of the Dawson picture show), after which time all natives had to leave town. The initiative remained in force even though acknowledged to be "ultra vires."\(^{72}\) Such legal barriers to regular interaction were eventually expanded. By 1933, Hawksley allowed natives to reside in Dawson only with a special temporary permit granted only for employment purposes.\(^{73}\) As late as 1947, R. J. Meek adopted similar tactics to keep the natives on their reserves and away from Dawson.\(^{74}\) Supported by the RNWMP, the Indian Agent established a series of rigid impediments in the way of Indians wishing to enter the towns. Coupled with the residential reserve program, these undertakings ensured the Indians' continuing physical and social segregation.

Such efforts did not, however, completely achieve their goals. Enfranchised Indians, the few that there were, could not be barred from the towns, and several even managed to secure regular employment. Preventing the native ministers of the Anglican Church from residing in the towns posed particularly sensitive difficulties. Mrs. Robert McDonald, native wife of the respected northern Yukon missionary, remained in Dawson for a number of years after her husband's death, sustained by church and government pensions. Likewise, Anglican synod meetings and other ecclesiastical gatherings often brought such native missionaries as Julius Kendi and his wife into the towns for short periods. While whites


\(^{74}\) DIA, vt.6477, file 927-1, pt. 1, Meek Report, 28 February 1947.
tolerated these selected and trained exceptions, toleration remained far removed from acceptance.\textsuperscript{75} Even those tolerated temporarily within the urban societies were there on sufferance, in this instance because of their ecclesiastical significance.

That the white population did not wish any close accommodation, or even familiarity, with the Indians is further revealed in the debate over native involvement with schools and hospitals. Institutions which may have provided a meeting ground became instead the most visible symbols of racial segregation. The Indians and whites had separate school systems, a situation encouraged by the Anglican clergy. With a number of natives and half-breeds residing close to each of the towns, however, it seemed that some accommodation with the territorial public school system was desirable. Any such attempted integration was sternly resisted and as late as 1949, Teslin offered the only integrated school in the Yukon.\textsuperscript{76} As Indian Agent R. J. Meek recorded that year,

\begin{quote}
the Yukon School Ordinance does not discriminate against Indians, but the several times Indian children were placed in Territorial Schools it ended as a fiasco. A case as recent as 1947 happened at Mayo. Neither the administration nor the teachers would discourage admitting Indians to Territorial Schools, it is always a few parents who raise a violent objection.\textsuperscript{77}
\end{quote}

As mentioned earlier, the rancour led to the establishment of distinctly "Indian schools" in Dawson (St. Paul's hostel for half-breeds) and Whitehorse (Reverend Lee's school for Indians and half-breeds). Once again, significant impediments to native-white interaction had been

\textsuperscript{75} Berton, \textit{I Married the Klondike}, 59-60.
\textsuperscript{77} DIA, vol. 6478, file 929-11, pt. 1, Meek to IAB, 24 Nov. 1949.
erected.

Further evidence of discriminatory barriers can be seen in the treatment offered to the natives by the territorial medical fraternity. As with the schools, Indians encountered two separate standards of health care, one for themselves and one for the white population. In most centres, the people consistently demanded the segregation of hospital facilities. Whites in Dawson, Mayo and Whitehorse repeatedly refused to share hospital wards with native patients. The Mayo hospital, funded by the local Treadgold Mining Company, refused to admit natives to its general wards. Instead, Indians received treatment in a tent to the rear of the main structure, even in winter. The medical professionals apparently shared the general attitude, although they continued to serve their native patients. In 1939, a number of doctors refused to offer their services to Indians at the same rates charged to whites. The Department of Indian Affairs argued that it was "not prepared to admit that sick Indians are less desirable patients than white people" but the prevailing feeling in the district defeated the Department's opposition. As Yukon Controller G. A. Jeckell wrote concerning hospitalization practices,

They (white residents) most decidedly object in maternity cases to have their wives and infants share a maternity ward with an Indian mother and infant and the management of St. Mary's Hospital at Dawson is compelled to defer to this opinion.


79 YRG1, Series 4, vol. 24, file 403-2, G. I. MacLean to O. S. Finnie, 16 August 1928.

Discriminatory attitudes did not abate significantly over time. During a 1947 tuberculosis survey in Whitehorse, white residents opposed the request that they share hospital gowns with "diseased" Indians. Alternatives were hastily found.82 Medical care, like the schools and even the towns, became a bastion of segregation, providing graphic evidence of the continuing social distance between white and Indian in the Yukon.

The image of the Indian in the public mind both derived from, and provided a justification for, these policies of social segregation. The fur trade portrayal of the native lasted but a short time. The natives' assertive role in the Hudson's Bay Company trade contributed to a widely held view of the Indians as assertive, self-interested and aggressive,83 but that perception died with the coming of the Gold Rush. Most of the new arrivals saw little utility in the native way of life, and disdained Indian standards and customs. The emergent images reflected actual circumstances, but also illustrated a general twentieth century depreciation of the vitality of Indian society.84 "Dirty" and "diseased" appeared frequently in connection with the Indians, an indication of the impact of epidemics and disapproval of native standards of cleanliness.85 Whites similarly challenged the Indians' perceived inability to

81 Ibid.
83 PAC, Pelly and Lewes Journal, vol. 1, 9 June 1848; HBCA, B200/b/33, fol. 15, Ross to Council, 29 Nov. 1858; HBCA, B.200/b/34, Jones to Hardisty, 23 June 1803; HBCA, B200/b/35, fol. 106, Hardisty to McDougall, 4 April 1865; Hardisty, "The Loucheux Indians", Jones "The Kutchin Indians".
84 Berkofer, The White Man's Indian. On the function of changing white images of the Indian, see F. Jennings, The Invasion of America.
work and their apparent lack of morality. Several commentators ex-
pressed hope for their possible improvement, provided of course that
they could be kept from alcohol and whites. In general, however, a
less positive perception of the natives prevailed. While it is risky to
extrapolate from the scattered comments of missionaries, policemen, and
Indian agents to the views of the general population, there appears to
have been a marked shift in popular attitudes over time. The natives'
peripheral economic and social position, the evident impact of disease,
and the frequent appearance of inebriated Indians near population cen-
ters contributed to the formation of a decisively negative image. Based
on incomplete knowledge and antipathy for native cultural forms, the
stereotype of the Indians as drunken, shiftless and uneducable contrib-
uted significantly toward the process of social segregation. To the
white population, the Indians belonged on a different, somewhat degrad-
ed, intellectual plane.

Acting through the government, the white population remained deter-
mined to keep the races apart. Indians had their world — in the bush
— and it served both groups if they remained amongst the trees and the
animals. The towns and the mining camps, on the other hand, remained as
white preserves. Given the impressive efforts to keep native and white
segregated, the question arises as to the success of the government and
white population in achieving the goal. The evidence, drawn largely
from census data, is contradictory and incomplete. Although there is no

85 YRG1, Series 2, vol. 44, file 36495; J. Loche to J. G. Gibben, 28
June 1905; PAC, NAD Armstrong Papers, vol. 3, Diary 1920, fol. 47, 20
June 1920.

information as to how census takers compiled their data, it is likely that Indians in the vicinity of population centres, even if on residential reserves, were incorporated into urban totals. In 1931, for instance, the national census listed 156 Indians as living in towns. Two years later, Indian Agent John Hawksley noted that no Indians lived in Dawson, none in Mayo and only four families comprising less than twenty individuals resided in Whitehorse. To further complicate matters, Indians often camped or erected cabins near towns on a seasonal basis, while spending most of their time on the traplines and hunting grounds. Recorded population data therefore, decisively overstated the number of Indians permanently resident in the towns and did not account for local patterns of segregation and seasonal mobility.

Limited data suggests that the process of social isolation succeeded. (Table 12) In Dawson in particular, white efforts to keep the Indians on the Moosehide reserve seem to have worked. The figures for Whitehorse suggest otherwise, although population statistics do not list those on the reserve near the town separately. Here, as in Dawson, the Indians resided primarily on the reserve and not in the white settlement. The urban centers held out numerous attractions for the natives: jobs, alcohol, government services, retail stores, health care and occasionally educational facilities. Those Indians who insisted upon living near the towns, most of whom did so only on a seasonal basis, found themselves on the physical and social margins. Exclusionist policies and public attitudes worked to keep them there. To World War II, those programs succeeded to a considerable degree.

Table 12
NATIVE RURAL/URBAN POPULATION, 1901-1951

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>3,322</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>1,152</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>1,382</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>1,469</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>1,362</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1,320</td>
<td>230(1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Indians in Whitehorse only.

Source: Canada, Census 1901-1951.

The construction of the Alaska Highway, begun in 1942, radically altered existing demographic and racial patterns in a manner reminiscent of the Klondike Gold Rush. Countless opportunities for native-white interaction and new demands on the Indians worked against the existing barriers to inter-racial accommodation. Despite the social restructuring attending the arrival of several tens of thousands of construction workers within a three year period, however, attitudes and policies did not change significantly. With a sizeable number of jobs available along the highway route, the native population shifted temporarily toward the urban centers, especially Whitehorse. That reorientation, however, was not of the magnitude typically suggested and in most instances lasted but a short time. Instead of a radically new social order, with cataclysmic consequences for the Indians, between 1942 and 1950 the natives faced an elaboration and intensification of past experiences. The magnitude of social contact increased markedly, especially in previously

88 For an expansion on these themes, see Ken Coates, "Alaska Highway Construction and the Indians of the Southern Yukon." For a contrary view, see Julie Cruikshank "The Gravel Magnet." and D. Remley, The Crooked Road.
isolated districts. There had been few whites in the southwest corner of the territory before 1942; the coming of the highway brought several thousand through the area, if only briefly. Again, however, patterns of contact did not deviate significantly from past practises.

Alcohol and the inter-racial party continued as the principle medium of social interaction, and, as before, liquor served to entice sexual favours from native women. The social and recreational functions of liquor consumption continued to dominate Indian drinking. The police stepped up enforcement measures, particularly in the southern Yukon, leading to a significant increase in arrests for alcohol consumption. The dramatic rise led several commentators to suggest that the construction of the highway spurred a surge in native drinking. As with most crimes of social control, recorded breaches of the law actually indicate as much about the size and zeal of the police force and prevailing public attitudes as they indicate about actual occurrences. Evidence from the Whitehorse Police Court supports this contention. Superficially, the increase in average yearly convictions from 17 in 1940-44, to over 53 in the next five years might imply a marked (but hardly alarming) rise in alcohol consumption. When the size of the police force, which shifted its headquarters from Dawson to Whitehorse in 1943-44 is taken into account, it is more likely that the increase is attributable more to changes in patterns of enforcement than alterations in drinking habits. (Table 13) Though there were indications of several individuals with notable drinking problems (significantly most were graduates of the Carcross Residential School), for the most part native alcohol consumption adhered to the past patterns of frequent inter-racial parties and spree or pot-latch drinking.
Native-white sexual relations clearly became more prevalent, and venereal disease developed into a veritable epidemic among young native girls and women. White prostitutes again followed the construction workers north, lessening demand for native women, except in isolated districts where Indian females, even young girls, received considerable attention. The incidence of sexual contact stands in stark contrast to the continuing pattern of racial segregation. The overabundance of single men, and not a shift in attitudes toward Indians, accounted for much of the interest. This pattern of resorting to women outside "acceptable" society is not at all uncommon and indeed stands as one of the more constant features of frontier societies dominated by unaccompanied

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89 I. Honigmann and J. Honigmann, "Drinking in an Indian-White Community", *QRSA*, vol. 5. (March 1945), 575-619; See also J. Honigmann, "On the Alaska Highway" Dalhousie Review, (January 1944), 401-408. Most of Honigmann's work related to the Kaska Indians in the Liard River district.
Sex and liquor continued to provide the meeting ground for natives and whites in the Yukon.

The coming of the Alaska Highway increased the frequency of such encounters, leaving behind a sizeable legacy of half-breed children and abandoned women, but it did not alter basic racial relationships. Improvements over the pre-1942 period were minor indeed. Indian Agent Meek wrote in 1948.

The Indians of Whitehorse seem to be slowly breaking down certain barriers of prejudice which was(sic) unfortunately very prevalent in the past. At the ceremony in celebration of Scout Week, Indian boys were invited to participate. Such 'victories' had little impact. A limited number of individuals moved toward a more complete accommodation. Changing employment habits and attempts to educate their children, particularly evident among the natives of Whitehorse and Carcross, suggest that a few natives eschewed former patterns. To 1950, that group remained a small minority, not representative of the larger native population which continued to prefer the pursuit of game over the pursuit of material wealth.

In social matters, as with the economy, the persistence of well-established patterns, even in the face of substantive pressures to change, is notable. The Hudson's Bay Company's tenure in the area established the practise of closely allied economic and social relations. Even after the venerable firm left the territory, the fur trade social environment survived, exhibiting a stronger and more permanent accommodation between white and Indian. Squaw men, themselves typically involved in

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90 Nash, Red, White and Black, Morner, Race Mixture.

the fur trade became the most visible symbol of that inter-racial accommodation. Town and mining camp life differed markedly. For a variety of reasons, the urban centers attracted natives, but mainly on a seasonal basis. Once there, they found no ready acceptance. Instead, major social and institutional barriers served to keep natives distinct from whites. The only significant mediating institution, the inter-racial party, functioned to further entrench that distinctiveness, the superficiality and impermanence clearly illustrated to all involved. Exceptions existed. Several individuals and families sought and achieved a more complete integration, but they stood out for their uniqueness.

Once established and particularly when ossified through government policy, these patterns proved difficult to alter. Even under the demographic pressures of the Klondike Gold Rush and the construction of the Alaska Highway, relations did not shift except in small degrees from past procedure. To be sure, the intensity of social relations changed under such conditions. There were more parties, alcohol was more widely available, and more men sought the sexual favours of native women. Importantly, the meaning of these temporary contacts did not change. The Indians remained marginal, of interest only when white needs and interests demanded. From the natives' perspective, such temporary contacts proved quite disruptive. The influx of single young men in 1896-1904 and again in 1942-1945 drew away even more of the younger native women, making it more difficult for native males to find suitable mates. The impermanence of inter-racial liaisons mitigated against any significant demographic crisis. Indeed, since most of the offspring of such alliances were raised as Indians the native population actually increased.
The Indians remained on the periphery, looking in on a white society that held little attraction. The continuation of economic practices seem to have lessened the severity of the discrimination, for few natives attempted to breach the entrenched social barriers. In the 1950's, as government programs such as the Mother's Allowance, old age pensions and increased welfare assistance expanded and as falling fur prices undermined the viability of the hunting-trapping way of life, however, these entrenched social relations persisted. These combined forces drew the Indians into the towns, but past attitudes prevailed. Segregation policies, in place since the Gold Rush, took on new meaning as the natives moved closer to Whitehorse, Dawson and other towns through the 1950's and 1960's. Solidly entrenched and seldom before challenged, the exclusionist barriers proved excessively difficult to erode, let alone breach.
CHAPTER EIGHT

POPULATION AND DISEASE

The assessment of social interaction must proceed beyond the consideration of native choice and European exclusionism. At a more fundamental level, the meeting of races went beyond a clash of values and customs, beyond the parameters of white prejudice and native disdain for industrial work patterns. When the first Europeans entered the Yukon River valley, they ushered in a confrontation of immunological systems, bringing diseases and infections that wreaked havoc on the native population. The medical consequences assisted significantly in the marginalization of the Yukon Indians.

The question of the demographic consequences of contact has attracted considerable attention of late, although few Canadian scholars have contributed to the discussion. The focus for much of the debate has

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been the re-estimation of aboriginal populations, providing a radically different basis for the consideration of the impact of disease. The importance of reaching an acceptable estimate of the early habitation of the Yukon is clear. As a hunting-gathering people in an area typically regarded as harsh and forbidding, the sub-arctic natives are usually described as few in number, widely dispersed, and living on the meagre fringes of subsistence. However, such a view has been offered without a proper assessment of the likely pre-contact population. By offering an admittedly speculative calculation of aboriginal population, it is possible to examine more adequately the demographic implications of white expansion.3

Two considerations complicate any such calculation. First, indirect contact began long before Robert Campbell and John Bell breached the eastern and southern mountain barriers. Russian, Spanish and English traders had navigated the waters off the Pacific North-West coast since the mid-18th Century. North-West Company and Hudson’s Bay Company traders were similarly active in the nearby Mackenzie River drainage basin and beginning in the 1830’s the Russian American Fur Company commenced trading along the lower Yukon River. As discussed earlier, the natives of the Yukon participated in the expanding fur trade through inter-tribal exchange and, in certain circumstances, direct contact with distant trading posts.4 These early traders also brought diseases which spread

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3 For an excellent example of the value of an assessment of pre-contact population, and how that estimate conditions subsequent analysis, see F. Jennings. The Invasion of America.

rapidly among vulnerable native populations. It is impossible to assert with certainty that such illnesses penetrated into the upper Yukon, but it is reasonable to assume that regular trade contacts made such passage probable. Therefore, before the first white commentators reached the area, disease had likely visited upon the Indians, hampering any specific determination of the native population based on historical sources.

Compounding this difficulty is the absence of useful contemporary enumerations in the pre-mining period. The few census lists extant are highly localized, referring to specific bands or narrowly defined regions. The only significant aggregation of data relates to the northern Kutchin Indians. Estimates by fur traders, missionaries and ethnographers have allowed Shepherd Krech to study demographic change in this region and to determine the likely extent of pre-contact Kutchin habitation. Similar records do not exist for the rest of the region, a reflection of the limited travel in the area before the gold mining period. As a result, a systematic reconstruction along the lines adopted by Krech is not possible.

While statistical precision cannot be guaranteed, recent debate over the proto-historical native population allows for a speculative excursion into the field. Until recently, scholars deemed the Canadian north capable of supporting only a sparse, non-agricultural population. Long

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5 Krech, "On The Aboriginal Population."

the seminal work on the topic. James Mooney's *The Aboriginal Population of America North of Mexico* (1926) suggested a Yukon River valley population of around 4,000. A.L. Kroeber attempted to add more precision to Mooney's calculations, arguing that the barren north supported a population density of less than one person per 100 sq. km. a figure which converts to a pre-contact Yukon population of approximately 4,700. Ethnographer C. Osgood lent credence to the low estimate when he suggested in 1936 that the initial Kutchin population (covering about 1/3 of the territory) had been close to 1,200.

The Mooney-Kroeber estimates, which posited a total native population in North America of about one million before the arrival of Europeans, faced few challenges before the 1960's. The first indications of the need for a reassessment emerged from scholars studying Mexico, particularly W. Borah and S. Cook. Henry Dobyns brought their insights to a consideration of North American aboriginal population when he suggested that a more reasonable estimate would be ten million natives, or ten times Mooney's earlier figure. Dobyns's article sparked new interest in the topic, leading to a spate of work on native demography. The histo-

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7 James Mooney, *The Aboriginal Population of America North of Mexico* Smithsonian Miscellaneous Collections, vol. 80, no. 7 (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1928). He claimed there were 2,200 Kutchin and 800 "Nehane."

8 A. L. Kroeber, *Cultural and Natural Areas of Native North America* (Los Angeles: University of California, 1963). He suggested a density of .87 per 100 km.

9 C. Osgood, *Contributions to the Ethnography of the Kutchin*. The estimate was based on an 1858 HBC survey.

10 Borah and Cook, *The Aboriginal Population*.

Krech examined the area in the northern Yukon—lower Mackenzie River for which extensive documentation exists relative to Dobyn's debate. He concluded that the aboriginal population of the Kutchin stood at approximately 5,400, double Mooney's and Kroeber's estimates and about 1/3 the value calculated through an application of Dobyn's depopulation ratios.12

Krech's work offered two approaches to estimating native population: a calculation based on population density utilizing available documentary evidence and a determination of depopulation as suggested by Dobyn. (Table 14) Based on an extrapolation from Krech's detailed study (and it is important to note that he makes no claims for his work beyond the Kutchin Indians), the pre-contact Yukon population likely stood at between 8,000 and 9,000. (Table 15) The population was unevenly distributed, with larger concentrations in the resource-rich Southern Lakes, Alsek-Kluane, Central Yukon and Porcupine River districts. This number of natives, which is on the order of three times the first federal estimate in 1898 for the territory, appears consistent with population loss among other North American native groups and with the evidence Krech

12 Krech, "On the Aboriginal Population." Although I accept Krech's thrust, evidence he did not cite supports a possible upward revision of his estimate. A. H. Murray estimated a trading population (Fort Youcon Kutchin and some Han) of 250-300 Indian males in 1847. HBCA, B200/b/22, fol. 15, Murray A. McPherson, 20 Nov. 1847. Krech uses a published estimate, also from Murray, of 210 adult males. Similarly, Bishop Bompas of the C.M.S. estimated the number of Indians at Fort Youcon, LaPierre's House, and Peel River in 1865 to be "at least 1000," Church Missionary Intelligencer, vol. 11, New Series (1866). See also YTA, AC 80/93, "Statement of the Indian Population of Mackenzie River District 1871," which listed a total of 812 persons at the three posts. Further criticism of Krech's approach can be found in Ugarenko, "The Distribution of the Kutchin," 14-15.
used in analysing the Kutchin.

Table 14
YUKON NATIVE POPULATION RATIOS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ratio</th>
<th>Nadir Population</th>
<th>Estimated Pre-Contact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dobyns (1966)</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krech (1978)[2]</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Approximate population in 1930 from Department of Indian Affairs, *Annual Report, 1929.* Several Yukon Indian groups were included in B.C. population statistics.

(2) Relates only to the Kutchin Indians.

Table 15
PRE-CONTACT POPULATION DENSITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per 100 km(2)</th>
<th>Total Yukon Pre-Contact(1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kroeber (1939)</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krech (1978)[2]</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Indian Affairs (1895)</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Area of Yukon equals 536,324 km(2).

(2) Kutchin only.

To further validate this assessment of the proto-historical population, it is essential to account for the population decline from 8-9,000 to the federal estimate of 2,600 in 1895.13 (The latter figure, more a guess than an enumeration, was likely too high.) Due to limited evidence, the period to 1900 can be examined only through documentary re-

13 Department of Indian Affairs, *Annual Report, 1896* suggested a population of 2,600.
cords. Further, estimating the impact of disease before the arrival of Campbell and Bell in the 1840's remains speculative, based on an extrapolation from conditions in adjoining territories. It is nonetheless likely that a major decrease in population occurred before the turn of the century.

The decline originated primarily in the particular virulence of "virgin soil epidemics." According to Alfred Crosby, a leading scholar in the field, the term refers to those epidemics "in which the population at risk had had no previous contact with the diseases that strike and are therefore immunologically almost defenseless." From recorded experiences throughout North America, natives died at an alarming rate in the face of such epidemics. There is no reason to suspect that the Indians of the Yukon were any less vulnerable. It might be argued, however, that the isolation of the Upper Yukon River valley protected the inhabitants from the spread of deadly illnesses.

In considering the possibility of shelter through isolation, it must be remembered that inter-regional exchange characterized pre-contact life in the area. Originating to facilitate the exchange of indigenous products, the networks increased in importance with the arrival of European traders on the periphery. These intensified contacts served as potential conduits for epidemic disease. Given the rapid diffusion of epidemics along paths of communication, an occurrence A. J. Ray has illustrated for the Canadian plains, the interior natives soon faced

the same diseases raging among the Indians of the Pacific North-West, lower Yukon and Mackenzie River drainage areas. From 1835 to 1839, for example, a major small-pox epidemic devastated the natives in the Alaskan interior and in the Lynn Canal region. It is extremely likely that the illness spread into the interior. Suggestive evidence of such early diseases comes from Anglican missionary T. H. Canham, active in the Porcupine River district in the 1880's. In an insightful commentary on the life and attitudes of his native communicants, Canham attributed a "great diminution during the past century in the number of native inhabitants" to "the ravages of smallpox communicated from the southern Indians soon after the date of the earliest explorations." The appearance of small-pox, consistently the most deadly of all virgin soil epidemics, at an early date suggests a significant population loss before the arrival of Europeans.


18 The transmission of disease in advance of direct contact is at the centre of debate on the size of aboriginal populations. Earlier forecasts originated in the early reports of population size by white commentators, despite the fact that such descriptions may have come a century or more after the arrival of Europeans in contiguous regions. Most historians and demographers now accept that significant depopu-
There is, fortunately, more substantive evidence of a major native depopulation than Canham's suggestive comments and numerical extrapolation from other districts. H.B.C. traders and Church Missionary Society clergymen offered a variety of first hand assessments of the continuing devastation of European diseases. Shortly after arriving at Fort Youcon in 1847, Alexander H. Murray noted "the great mortality amongst their women last summer," although he did not attribute their deaths to a specific cause. Four years later, Robert Campbell and Fort Youcon traders described an epidemic "carrying off" a large number of Indians. Campbell, travelling along the Yukon River in the summer of 1851, estimated that as many as one third of the natives died from an illness he believed to be the mumps. Minor outbreaks were so frequent that H.B.C. traders became seemingly inured to the sight of sick Indians.

A scarlet fever epidemic which hit the area in 1865 was among the most severe (and the most extensively documented) outbreaks. H.B.C. boat crews from Fort Simpson carried the disease into the Yukon. The company allowed the supply vessels to continue, despite the possibility

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_{19} HBCA, B240/2/1, fol. 45, Youcon Journal, 27 Nov. 1847.


_{21} In 1868, for instance, it was casually noted that sickness had visited the fort and twenty-two Indians died. HBCA B200/b/35, fol. 140; McDougall to Gentleman in Charge, 27 October 1868.

_{22} HBCA, B200/b/36, fol. 43, McDougall to Hardisty, 25 Sept. 1865.
of widespread infection, in order to supply Fort Youcon and maintain their trade. The disease spread rapidly as natives at the post became ill and carried the fever to distant bands. The illness spread upstream and downstream, channelled by the Fort Youcon trading networks. James McDougall at Fort Youcon estimated that 170 of the post Indians died. The trader at Lapierre's House similarly noted that almost half the local band, 34 in all, succumbed.

Depopulation started long before the Europeans made direct contact with the Yukon Indians and accelerated with the arrival of miners and American traders after 1869. Although the individual outbreaks did not match the severity of the 1865 scarlet fever epidemic, the number and variety of diseases had a great cumulative impact. Measles, influenza (la grippe), dysentery, and a host of unspecified maladies assaulted the natives relentlessly. Imprecise reporting and the fact that most Yukon


24 HBCA, B200/b/36, fol. 58, McDougall to Hardisty, 5 July 1866. On Lapierre's House, see HBCA, B200/b/36, fol. 42, Flett to Hardisty, January 1866. To provide some context, the 1861 population in the Porcupine River area was less than 200 persons. Fort Youcon is outside the Yukon's boundaries, but many of the Indians trading at the post moved back to Canadian territory after the fort passed to the Americans in 1869-70. HBCA, B200/b/36, fol. 43, McDougall to Hardisty, 25 Sept. 1865. Inspector Charles Constantine recounted the tale thirty years later, although he claimed it spread from the Chilcat Indians to the south. He also added that an entire band of the Kutchin Indians died. PAC, Department of Indian Affairs (DIA), RG 10, vol. 3906, file 105, 378, Report of Inspector Charles Constantine, 10 October 1894.

25 Numerous illnesses were reported. CMS, Bompas to CMS, 6 Dec. 1872; HBCA, B200/b/43, Camsell to Grahame, 23 March 1881; CMS, Canham to CMS, Nov. 1889; CMS, Bompas to CMS, 19 Dec. 1898; CMS, Bompas to CMS, 23 Aug. 1899; CMS, Reeve to Baring Gould, 23 July 1900; PAC, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, RG18 (hereafter RCMP), vol. 154, file 445, Bowridge to Comptroller, N.W.M.P., 1 Dec. 1900; D. Legros, "Structure
Indians remained beyond the purview of white commentators make a specific measurement impossible, but ongoing difficulties were noticeable throughout the region. Bishop W. C. Bompas noted that 39 individuals died in the Dawson-Fort Selkirk region between 1896 and 1898. In the same period, the group of less than 200 Indians recorded only 12 births. Taking into account the documented severity of virgin soil epidemics elsewhere in North America and the appearance of small-pox, scarlet fever, mumps, measles and influenza between 1840 and 1890, the previously suggested depopulation ratio of 2/3 appears consistent with both evidence and logic.

That epidemics had such a severe impact reflects both the natives' immunological weaknesses and their inability to deal effectively with such afflictions. Facing the ravages of unexplainable illnesses, the natives relied upon the shamans (medicine men) to explain and counter the devastation. Typically, disease was blamed on sorcerers. Europeans came under the net of accusations but did so on the basis of traditional expectations. When several men died following the Chilcat's attack of Fort Selkirk in 1852, the natives blamed Robert Campbell's "bad medicine" and threatened to attack Fort Youcon. Insufficient knowledge

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26 CMS, Bompas to CMS, 19 December 1898.

27 W. Hardisty, "The Loucheux Indians", Strachan Jones, "The Kutchin Tribes," A. H. Murray, Journal of the Yukon, 1847-48 all describe natives blaming sorcerors for illnesses. See also the important discussion in S. Krech, "Throwing Bad Medicine;" On Campbell, see HBCA.
also limited native response to the outbreaks. Instead of isolating or quarantining those affected, the Indians typically fled the scene of infection, resulting in wider dispersal of the disease and a further weakening of those already stricken.

The natives' inability to treat the ill also influenced the eventual severity of the illness. Ravaged by an unknown disease, the natives often sank into lethargy and despair. Efforts at hunting and fishing were severely curtailed, little effort was made to minister to the sick and, as Reverend Canham noted, they "soon lose heart in time of sickness." 28 Fur traders and missionaries often misunderstood the natives' confusion, attributing malaise and inactivity to "stupidity" and "laziness". Both groups suggested the Indians could have escaped the force of the epidemics had they acted with more dispatch in caring for themselves. 29 The apparent diffidence of the Indians toward fatal illness is a further indication of the devastating impact of the inexplicable diseases.

The appearance of epidemics and a high initial death rate do not of necessity point to an on-going depopulation. In a detailed study of Indian-white relations in British Columbia, Robin Fisher argues that unless mortality is "age-selective," with particular impact on the childbearing cohort, the native population could quickly stabilize after an

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28 Canham, "Untitled Comments:" see also, HBCA, B200/b/42, fol. 18, Hardisty to Grahame, 4 Aug. 1876; HBCA, B200/b/43, fol. 35, Cansell to Grahame, 29 July 1879.

29 HBCA, B200/b/35, fol. 186, Hardisty to Council, 30 July 1866; for a later example of the same attitude, see RCMP, vol. 295, file 273, Cuthbert to Asst. Comm., Dawson, 30 June 1905.

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epidemic. Although Fisher appears to have decisively understated the impact of disease on the North-West coast, his argument is worth consideration. Contrary to Fisher's portrayal of British Columbia, evidence in the Yukon suggests that adults of child-bearing age were seriously affected by disease. On separate occasions, HBC traders noted that various illnesses caused "great mortality amongst their women," the death of "several of the most influential men," and during the 1865 scarlet fever scourge, had "carried off nearly half of them, and amongst those many of our best provision hunters." Similarly, when the Chilcat Indians returned to the coast after ransacking Fort Selkirk, several of their hunters succumbed. High mortality among adults likely characterized the general impact of epidemics. Since hunters and traders travelled the most and maintained extensive contacts with different native groups and European settlements, they endured greatest exposure to the epidemics. Far from being immune to the devastation, the adults of child-bearing age suffered as much, if not more, than other members of the native population.

30 Fisher, Contact and Conflict, 21-23; Fisher draws heavily on his understanding of contact situations throughout the Pacific and in this instance relies on Norma McArthur, Island Populations of the Pacific (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1967).

31 See in particular, Gibson, "Smallpox on the Northwest Coast, 1855-1838," which directly addresses Fisher's argument.

32 HBCA, B240/2/1, fol. 45, Youcon Journal, 27 Nov. 1847.

33 HBCA, B200/b/29, fol. 153, Hardisty to Anderson, 5 Nov. 1852. This comment could possibly relate to elders although the context suggests otherwise.

34 HBCA, B200/b/36, fol. 43, McDougall to Hardisty, 25 Sept. 1865.

To 1900, the Yukon Indians encountered sustained population loss with obvious social and economic consequences. Their population reduced by up to two-thirds, seasonal cycles and work patterns disrupted by what Crosby called the "pulverizing experience" of successive epidemics, the natives lost considerable flexibility in their dealings with the white people. The Europeans' "bad medicine" widened the gap between Indian and white, adding to the natives' suspicion of the intruders and convincing many traders, miners and missionaries that the widely held image of the diseased and demoralized Indian reflected Yukon native realities.

Medical and demographic conditions changed significantly after the turn of the century. Conscious of the continuing devastation caused by European diseases, the Canadian government provided an extensive, if not elaborate, medical care network. Of central importance was the government's willingness to impose quarantines to contain the epidemics. Following the Gold Rush, federal authorities moved rapidly to isolate infected individuals and groups, restricting the spread of disease among the still vulnerable Indians and, just as importantly, limiting the possibility that the natives' illness would be transmitted to the whites. Systematic attempts to control and treat diseases had the desired effect, and death rates fell far below the estimated figures for the pre-Gold Rush period. Haphazard recording of native vital statistics between 1900 and 1930 hampers a consideration of death rates in the first thirty years of the century. Recorded deaths from 1930 to 1950 (Table 16) illustrates, however, the impact of medical assistance as death

rates remained comparatively low. Government quarantine efforts and medical attendance in conjunction with increasing immunity to several of the diseases limited the annual number of recorded deaths to between 18 to 37 before 1942.

Table 16
RECORDED NATIVE BIRTHS, DEATHS AND NATURAL INCREASE, 1931 - 1950

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Births</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
<th>Natural Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>(9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>(10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>(20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>(19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>(15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Brackets indicate net natural decrease.


Contrary to the trends evident from 1900 to World War II, the natives' demography between 1942 and 1945 illustrates their continuing vulnerability to European diseases. During the construction of the Alaska Highway and Canol Pipeline (1942-1945), hundreds of Indians previously subjected to little direct European contact inter-acted with
thousands of soldiers and workers involved with the projects. Canadian Liaison Officer C.K. LeCapelain wrote:

There is no question but what the impact of all the construction activities in the Southern Yukon and its consequent influx of white people is having a very harmful effect upon the natives. And it is noticeable that the degree of this harm is in direct proportion to the closeness of the association that the natives have with the whites. The new era is here to stay and is and will continue to present many problems to the administration. One of these problems is how to soften the blow upon the natives and ameliorate conditions so as to prevent their complete devastation.37

LeCapelain's description was on the mark, for recorded deaths in 1942 reached a twenty year high of 64. At Teslin Lake, the medical consequences of construction were particularly evident. Dr. John Marchand of the Public Roads Administration noted between 1942-43 the Teslin Indians suffered successive attacks of measles, German measles, dysentery, catarrhal jaundice, whooping cough, mumps, tonsillitis and menigitis.38 Few areas faced such sustained epidemic pressure, but no Indian bands in the southern Yukon entirely escaped the devastation. The Alaska Highway epidemics did not match the severity of the pre-1900 diseases since the impact was considerably offset by expanded medical assistance and welfare benefits. Nonetheless, as late as the 1940's, the Yukon Indians' continuing vulnerability to European diseases is painfully apparent.


39 John Honigmann, letter to the editor, JAMA, CXXII (1944), 386. Honigmann noted that the diseases Marchand saw at Teslin did not appear among the Liard River Indians.
On a territory-wide scale, population change from 1900 to 1950 consisted of marginal losses and gains. The high estimates of native population before 1911, while suggestive of earlier populations, were too impressionistically calculated to be of much utility. Similarly, there is little corroborating evidence to suggest that pre-Gold Rush population loss continued to 1911 on the scale suggested by the population figures. From 1911 to 1951, the number of Yukon Indians maintained a rough equilibrium, with enumerations ranging between 1300 and 1600.

Recorded native births and calculations of natural increase for the period 1945-1950 suggest that the demographic stagnation was nearing an end. A slowly increasing population through the 1940's coincided with an increased incidence of short-term liaisons between construction workers and native women. The resulting surge in births over deaths hinted at a large, forthcoming native population increase. Trends established in the late 1940's, which mirrored a nation-wide increase in native birth rates, continued over subsequent decades. The territorial native population, which stood at 1583 in 1951, rose to 2,207 ten years later and by 1971 had climbed to 2,580. (1981 population: 3,200 Status Indians). The Yukon Indians have not regained the population levels of the pre-contact period, but they have clearly rebounded from the demographic stagnation evident through much of the first half of the Twentieth Century.

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The demographic stability evident to the 1940's was rooted in a birth rate likely close to the national average of 50 births per 1,000 people each year and a comparatively high death rate. Further evidence of the dynamics of the native population comes from the age-sex structure of the Yukon Indian population. The shape of the population pyramids (Figures 1, 2 and 3. Note that the 1951 figure is skewed by the use of different age categories) are characteristic of pre-industrial populations, indicating high natality, severe infant and child mortality and a continued erosion of population through the life cycle. Up to 1950 the age-sex structure remained comparatively stable. The natives, however, retained their vulnerability to disease, continuing to hold the prospect of a major decline as threatened during the construction of the Alaska Highway. The population structure also held the prospect of a rapid increase. Medical care targeted at infants and youths combined with more adequate protection from disease promised a decrease in the wastage of population through the child-bearing years and a concomitant increase in the number of Indians. Federal government programming for Indians in the 1950's and 1960's followed this latter scenario; a 65% increase in population between 1951 and 1971 suggests that the demographic reconstruction is underway.

While this general profile suggests the demographic framework within which the Yukon Indians lived, a consideration of the causes of death and specifically the impact of endemic disease is necessary to complete the picture. An analysis on the causes of recorded native deaths illustrates, beyond the irregular importance of epidemics, the on-going impact of tuberculosis. (Table 17) During the Twentieth Century this sin-
Native Age Sex Diagrams, 1931

Male

Female

Source: Canada Census 1931

Figure 1

Native Age Sex Diagrams, 1941

Male

Female

Source: Canada Census 1941

Figure 2

Native Age Sex Diagrams, 1951

Male

Female

Source: Canada Census 1951

Figure 3

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gle ailment accounted for between a quarter and a half of all recorded native deaths. By all accounts endemic among the Indians, this disease was a vital part of native life in the district. A consideration of the biological causes and implications of this disease aids significantly in understanding native socio-economic conditions in the first half of the Twentieth Century. 41

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tuberculosis</th>
<th>Pneumonia</th>
<th>Old</th>
<th>Infant</th>
<th>Heart</th>
<th>Influenza</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900-04</td>
<td>39 (25%)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>___</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905-09</td>
<td>24 (27%)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>___</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910-14</td>
<td>44 (38%)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>___</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915-19</td>
<td>47 (32%)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920-24</td>
<td>34 (35%)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925-29</td>
<td>23 (33%)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-34</td>
<td>53 (46%)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935-39</td>
<td>88 (58%)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940-44</td>
<td>68 (35%)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-49</td>
<td>74 (40%)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Menigitis</th>
<th>Cough</th>
<th>Measles</th>
<th>Total Recorded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900-04</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>157</td>
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<tr>
<td>1905-09</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
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<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910-14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915-19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920-24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
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<td>1925-29</td>
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<td>___</td>
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<td>1930-34</td>
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<td>115</td>
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<tr>
<td>1935-39</td>
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<tr>
<td>1940-44</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-49</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For much of the period to 1930, tuberculosis was alternatively listed as consumption.


Tuberculosis is primarily a disease of poverty, spawned in malnourishment, overcrowding, and poor hygiene and is the most widespread of all infectious diseases. Natives across North America have been particularly susceptible to the illness and the Yukon Indians shared this vulnerability. While there has been considerable debate as to whether tuberculosis was indigenous to North America, there is no doubt that the arrival of Europeans dramatically altered the incidence of the disease. Across the continent, tuberculosis became one of the greatest killers of natives. The Indian mode of life increased this vulnerability as regular trading excursions brought them into contact with tuberculin Europeans and natives, and their cramped living accommodations proved excellent breeding grounds for the disease.

The Yukon natives were no exception to the general North American pattern. Missionaries, police officers and Indian Agents agreed that tuberculosis stemmed from the Indians' living conditions, but disparaged

42 Robbins and Cotran, 403.


the prospects of rectifying the cramped quarters, poor hygiene and inadequate nourishment which contributed to the disease's persistence. Anglican missionaries assisted disease prevention. The natives received preliminary education in the pathology of tuberculosis and encouragement to improve sanitation practices. Following a visit to Forty Mile in 1915, Indian Agent John Hawsley, noted with pride that earlier appeals to ventilate cabins, change bed linens regularly and move outhouses away from homes had been substantially successful. These short-term triumphs proved highly localized and often transitory. Government and church officials nonetheless maintained their efforts as part of a Canadian-wide campaign to wipe out the "white plague." While hundreds of Indians in the Yukon suffered from tuberculosis, the extent of infection remained quantitatively unknown until 1947. Between that year and 1949, the government held a series of x-ray surveys throughout the Yukon. The goal was to identify those with the disease and insist upon hospitalization for those seriously affected. The

45 See, for example, DIA, vol. 4601, file 207, 418, Inspector Taylor to Officer Commanding, "E" Division, 22 May 1903; "Report of Asst. Commissioner Wood, 1 December 1904, RNWMP, Annual Report 1905, 19, AC, Old Crow File, McCabe to Coldrick, 4 December 1937.


48 See Stringer to Commissioner, 11 April 1912; RCMP, vol. 5049, file 109, Knight to Commissioner, 16 October 1918.

49 The federal government ordered compulsory hospitalization of those affected. Since the Yukon lacked adequate facilities, the regulations were not enforced. YG, vol. 9, file 1490, pt. J, Gibben to I.A.B., 1 March 1946; Ibid., P. E. Moore to R. A. Gibson, 5 April 1946.
government sent natives with the diseases, especially children, to the newly opened tuberculosis ward at the Whitehorse General Hospital or the Charles Camseill Hospital in Edmonton for more specialized care. The surveys offered few surprises, indicating that close to a quarter of the Indians showed signs of advanced tuberculosis. A July 1949 survey, for example, indicated an infection rate of 143 out of 605 natives tested.\textsuperscript{50} While the confirmed high rate of secondary tuberculosis did little more than provide a precise definition of the extent of the disease, the surveys, more significantly, marked the beginning of a concerted effort to deal with the problem. At this point, the government did little more than hospitalize or isolate the affected individuals. For over half a century, the illness had been a major cause of death among Yukon Indians, striking children and adolescents with particular vehemence. (Tables 18, 19, illustrate the high incidence of death among the young. Note that totals represent deaths from all causes.) Beginning in 1947, authorities took tentative steps toward fighting, if not immediately eliminating, the disease.\textsuperscript{51}


\textsuperscript{51} Robbins and Cotran, Pathologic Basis of Disease, 397.
The Yukon Indians did not suffer alone from tuberculosis. As one medical expert commented, the disease "flourishes wherever there is poverty, malnourishment, poor living conditions, and lack of medical
care.\textsuperscript{52} A description which fit many of the natives across Canada and the United States. Preying on those poorly sheltered or weakened by want, tuberculosis was and is a disease of poverty. As such, the extreme incidence of the ailment among the Yukon natives indicates a great deal about the Indians' living conditions. Indeed, available commentaries on native housing and sanitation practices conforms to medical descriptions of conditions under which tuberculosis flourishes. In the semi-permanent camps and on residential reserves, the natives inhabited cramped homes, often poorly ventilated, handled human and cooking wastes in such a way as to increase disease, practised irregular personal hygiene and adopted irregular eating habits which fluctuated between the standard fare of the northern harvester and the processed food products of the south. Continuing nomadism, particularly through fur trading ventures, ensured the continuing transmission of tuberculosis and other diseases. Such contacts ensured that isolated groups and previously unaffected bands faced routine exposure to tuberculosis.

Besides the obvious demographic consequences, tuberculosis had significant on-going social and economic implications. The illness attacks the respiratory system with particular vigour, leading to a shortage of breath, a significant drop in stamina and general body debility. Given the natives' subsistence activities and particularly the need for extended physical exertion, these symptoms struck at the core of native lifeways. The natives' nomadic pursuits placed a premium on extended travel by foot and boat, demanded extensive if not regular physical activity and required a modicum of health and strength. Along with re-

\textsuperscript{52} DIA, \textit{Annual Reports, 1948-1950}. 

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spiratory ailments such as pneumonia and bronchitis, also common among
the natives, tuberculosis attacked precisely those strengths necessary
for survival in the northern environment. The disease imposed obvious
limits on the many hundreds affected, although the magnitude of the
strictures can only be speculated, particularly as it is a progressive
rather than instantly debilitating illness. On a regional basis, how­
ever, the cumulative impact was significant. Many natives reduced their
physical exertions, a serious problem if the individual happened to be
the family provider. Others left for distant hospitals often never to
return. Beyond this, the widespread stereotype of the malingering na­
tive, based on the frequent observation of Indian men and women seeming­
ly incapable of extended physical exertion, raised the possibility that
many of these "lazy" natives were in the throes of tuberculosis or an­
other similarly debilitating disease. Any discussion of the non-medical
consequences of tuberculosis must remain speculative, however, as the
documentary record offers few direct insights into the impact of the
disease on work patterns and activity levels. This limitation notwith­
standing, there is little question that the illness had a widespread so­
cial and economic impact mirroring its demographic implications. Tuber­
culosis killed many Yukon natives, while severely limiting the
productive capacity of hundreds of others.

Yukon natives continued to feel the effects of European disease dur­
ing the first half of the Twentieth Century, but the demographic conse­quences of contact remained less severe than in the pre-Gold Rush peri­
od. The expansion of medical care facilities, particularly the control
of epidemics through quarantines, limited the impact of disease but came
far too late to prevent a major population loss. While the immediate demographic consequences of epidemics declined, endemic diseases such as tuberculosis flourished. The epidemics epitomized the demographic results of native-white contact, for the Indians faced periodic devastation through the introduction of virgin soil epidemics. While similarly tied to increased inter-racial contact, tuberculosis remained deeply embedded in the Indians' lifestyle and habitation patterns, representing the evolving position of the natives on the margins of Yukon society.

The arrival of the Europeans in the Yukon River valley had demographic implications which both conditioned and reflected social relations. The introduction of new diseases in the early years contributed to a major decrease in population and obviously influenced relations between natives and whites. Indian characterizations of diseases as the Europeans' "bad medicine" increased social and economic tensions. Conversely, the sight of many sick natives apparently incapable of caring for themselves served to confirm white stereotypes of natives as diseased and sub-standard. The loss of population through the Gold Rush and continuing medical debilities thereafter limited the natives' ability to respond positively to new opportunities and threatened their precarious position within the Yukon economy. Similarly, the regular appearance of disease among the Indians and the perception of whites that such illnesses threatened white communities, added support to government and public efforts to segregate the natives. The biological restructuring obviously influenced the marginalization apparent in native-white social relations, limiting the Indians' ability to participate in the larger community and increasing the whites' determination to keep the natives
at arm's length.\textsuperscript{53}

Disparate economic and social forces combined to assign the Yukon Indians to the physical and psychological edges of the regional order. For the most part, these influences lacked coherence or sustained direction, varying widely according to time and place. While these amorphous forces dominated much of inter-racial contact, two institutions - church and state - promised more directed control. The following three chapters assess the purposes, efforts and impact of missionary and government plans for the Indians of the Yukon, plus the natives' responses to those initiatives.

Though historical writing on missionaries and the government dominates the literature on the Yukon, little attention has been given to the consequences and significance of such activities on the natives. Studies of the churches tend toward biographical accounts of "wilderness saints," who left the comforts of southern Canada or England to spread the gospel. Little has been offered analyzing the impact of their mission work. Similarly, writing on government activities emphasizes the role of federal agents and agencies in "opening" the northern frontier. With few exceptions, such works offer only cursory assessments of contact between government officials and their native charges. The activi-

ties of both the church and the federal government, therefore, require more systematic analysis.

Contrary to contemporary and scholastic expectations, the clergy and government officials did not immediately undertake the deliberate restructuring of native society upon arrival in the Yukon. Both made pronouncements of their lofty expectations for the native peoples of Canada, but their idealism was soon tempered by regional realities. Though correctly described as agents of directed cultural change, deliberately seeking the transformation of native society, missionaries and federal agents found that local conditions prevented the achievement of national objectives. An assessment of religion, education and federal programming, the three main elements of institutional activity in the region, illustrates a continuing willingness to accommodate, if not accept, a continuation of native cultural forms. This limited restructuring reflected parsimonious funding, insufficient manpower, and a pessimistic forecast of the prospect for sustained regional development. It did not represent a conscious desire to abandon the goals established by the church missionary organizations or the policy directives outlined in the Indian Act. Nonetheless, it will be argued, missionaries and government agents did not have the impact in the Yukon typically ascribed elsewhere in Canada, nor did they pursue their aspirations of the cultural reformation of native society with the singlemindedness long assumed.

2 The phrase originated with Ralph Linton, Acculturation in Seven Indian Tribes (New York: Appleton-Century, 1940). For an application of this theory in a Canadian context, see R. Fisher, Contact and Conflict (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1978).
On a national level, both church and state expected that their efforts would accelerate the integration of natives into the wider Canadian society. Religion, education and a variety of government programs were expected to serve as mediating institutions, drawing the Indians closer to white norms and preparing them for fuller participation. These activities in the Yukon did not follow such a path, at least not with the coherence of purpose so often ascribed. Government agents and missionaries approached their duties with ambivalence, unsure as to whether their native charges were capable of civilization or whether the limited developmental prospects for the region justified the restructuring of native life. Conversely, the natives did not accept the dictates of church and state compliantly. Instead and consistent with their economic and social behaviour, they adopted those religious components amenable to their own culture and responded to government programs according to their perceived best interests.

The question of native response to Christianity is one of the central themes in the study of native-white relations. Through their religious preachings, missionaries of Catholic and a variety of Protestant denominations hoped to bring the natives of North America closer to the dominant culture. Their efforts suffused with religious zeal, and their reactions to the Indians' conditioned by a belief in the inherent superiority of both Christianity and western civilization, the church set out to reform, restructure and ultimately undermine all remaining vestiges of a "pagan" existence. The missionaries' motives were sincere and, to them, unassailable. Their willing abandonment of the cloistered comforts of Europe or the settled colonies for the insecurity of the
frontier sprang from a deep desire to bring the truth - both spiritual and cultural - to the unwashed. If, as recent scholarship has indicated, their religious message included a condemnation of the aboriginal groups, most missionaries nonetheless came to their task convinced of its righteousness.

On an institutional level, the church missions had as a conscious goal the elimination of native spirituality and the uplifting of Indian society towards a more civilized norm. While the larger church goals remained essentially consistent, it is less clear that the organizational imperatives necessarily shaped missionary-Indian relations in the field. Policy guidelines sketched in the meeting rooms of the Church Missionary Society in England, for example, represented ideals, not necessarily workable directives for missionary operations. An analysis of church activities in the Yukon reveals that the clergy adopted a surprisingly latitudinarian approach to native spirituality and, like their government counterparts, resisted suggestions that they work to swiftly undermine Indian culture. The goal of bringing natives to the wonders of Christianity and western civilization never wavered, but a realistic consideration of conditions in the North limited the application and


achievement of the church's lofty goals.

This analysis of native-church relations will, of necessity, focus on the efforts of the Church Missionary Society of the Church of England in Canada (Anglican). Initially working through the England-based C.M.S., the Anglican Church maintained a continuous presence in the Yukon River basin from 1859 to 1950. In addition to being the only major branch of the Christian church ministering regularly to the Indians, they also operated a territory-wide day school system and administered the area's first two boarding schools. The Catholic Church was sporadically involved in the region. Members of the Oblate order attempted to breach the Anglican domination in the 1860's and 1870's, but were repulsed by the combined efforts of the competing church and the Hudson's Bay Company. Catholic clergy continued irregular operations thereafter, particularly in the eastern and southern districts, but did not offer a consistent missionary effort until the late 1930's. In the final decade, 1940-1950, the missionary scene clouded as Anglicans, Catholics and Presbyterians vied for the Indians' attention.

While the discussion will focus on the motivations and practices of the Anglican Church in undertaking its northern missions, it is essential to offer a few introductory comments on native spirituality. Although the topic, given the dearth of primary sources, is properly a field for anthropological inquiry, a description of the Indians' belief system is an essential pre-condition to an assessment of persistence or change in the post-contact phase. The outline sketched here does not, as anthropologists appropriately do, pay heed to minor variations in structure and practice between native groups. Importantly, and unlike
many early evangelists in New France and colonial America, the northern missionaries acknowledged the presence and feared the vitality of native spirituality. They accordingly based much of their appeal on deliberate attempts to supplant specific native beliefs.

The central characteristic of Yukon Indian spirituality, common to all subarctic Athapaskans, was the absence of a codified or structural religion. Lacking ceremonial consistency, beliefs were strongly influenced by regional conditions and individual experience. Among all the groups, however, animism and shamanism dominated spiritual formulations. Natives believed that animals possessed spirits, inanimate objects had souls, and that humans had to respect the temperament of their ecological surroundings. There is ethnographic and documentary evidence to suggest that the natives' interpretation of the religious world culminated in a belief in a supreme supernatural power or deity. Public manifestations of these concepts came principally through the shamans, or medicine men. Possessed with special abilities to control and interpret the spirits, shamans used their power to respond to illness, famine and climatic difficulties, or to cast spells on enemies. Religion among the Inland Tlingit was more formalized, reflecting coastal ancestry and connections, but it differed more in style than substance from the gen-

eral pattern. Missions entering the Yukon encountered a people with no formalized religion, few regular ceremonies and ecclesiastical power concentrated in the shamans' hands. The natives' spiritual vision should be characterized more as a world view than a religion, for it lacked most of the ceremonial regularity associated with on-going religions.

This amorphous, irregular spirituality became the target of Church Missionary Society attempts to win converts to Christianity. Part of an international network of missions to the unconverted, C.M.S. clergy also brought a clear program for launching their appeal. Idealists in their belief in the ultimate salvation of even the more regenerate peoples, the missionaries had few illusions as to the ease of their task. The most renowned of the Yukon missionaries, William Carpenter Bompas, summarized those beliefs when he wrote, "These mountain Loucheux (Kutchin) seem 'the lowest of all people.' But I cannot help hoping that they are a 'chosen race.'" Under the guidance of Henry Venn, the C.M.S. developed a sophisticated approach to evangelism, one intended to soften the cultural clash and to bring Christianity swiftly to the centre of native life.

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6 C. McClellan, My Old People Say.

7 For a more complete analysis, the best place to begin is June Helm, ed. Handbook of North American Indians, vol. 6, Sub-Arctic. See also more detailed studies by McClellan, My Old People Say, esp. Chapters 2, 12, 17; Osgood, Contributions. Osgood, Han, Honigmann, Kaska Society.

8 CMS, Bompas to Secretaries, CMS, 6 December 1872.
Although the missionaries sought to restructure Indian customs, Venn and the C.M.S. cautioned their clergy to respect native societies. Venn argued for the rapid appointment of native catechists (lay leaders), even if they lacked religious training and theological insight. Similarly, the translation of the Bible into native vernacular remained the first order of business. Respecting native culture, the C.M.S. hoped, would prevent a complete societal breakdown while evangelism was underway. By adopting cross-cultural proselytizing, the church intended to make the new religion culturally relevant and comprehensible. Catechists and biblical translations allowed for the internalizing of Christianity, as opposed to the more disruptive alternative of imposing a religious order on an unprepared people. The C.M.S. planned to build upon the anticipated acceptance of their religious appeal, using Christianity to bring the natives closer to the modern, industrializing world. Victorian England, the centrepiece of western civilization, served both as inspiration and model for the C.M.S. missions. Their native communicants received more than a new spiritual interpretation; these "child-like" people were to be exposed to the morals, work habits and material comforts of the western world. Drafted primarily by Henry Venn, this C.M.S. formula provided the basis for missionary education and acted as a practical guide for missions throughout the non-European world. C.M.S. clergymen entering the Yukon River valley after 1859 came with zeal, a sense of purpose and with dedication to a program designed to elevate the heathens of the north out of their deprived state.9

9 The above description is based on Jean Usher. "Apostles and Aborigines: The Social Theory of the Church Missionary Society," Histoire Social/Social History, vol. 7 (1971), 28-52; see also Usher, William Duncan. Usher's description broadly conforms to the conclusions in
Proselytizing efforts commenced in 1859 when the Reverend William West Kirkby travelled to Fort Youcon. Despite a cool reception, Kirkby returned the following year, anxious to spread C.M.S. influence in the area before the Catholic missionaries arrived. The natives responded more favourably the second time and the clergyman recommended that a permanent mission be opened. In response to a wide-ranging appeal for volunteers, Robert McDonald, a half-breed resident of Red River, answered the call. McDonald commenced his teachings among the Kutchin, both along the Porcupine and Youcon Rivers and in the lower Mackenzie drainage area, in 1862. When McDonald fell ill several years later, William Carpenter Bompas, a London curate and avid follower of the Church Missionary Society, offered his services. Bompas then spent several years in the Mackenzie District, culminating in his appointment as Bishop of Athabasca in 1870. McDonald continued to direct most of his efforts toward the Yukon, although the arrival of several new missionaries eased his burden. T.H. Canham arrived in 1881 and worked at several stations, including Rampart House and Forty Mile. V.C. Sim served along the Porcupine River from 1881 until his death four years later. Robert McDonald’s brother Kenneth similarly worked in the Rampart House area for a short time before he retired in 1875 to join the Hudson’s Bay Company. John Ellington joined the missionary corps in 1886 and was assigned to work in the border mining region.

Robert Berkhofer, "Protestants, Pagans and Sequences."

10 T.C.B. Boon, "William West Kirkby;" CMS, Kirkby to Secretaries, 29 November 1862; CMS, Kirkby’s Journal, 25 May 1861-May 1862; W.W. Kirkby, "A Journey to the Youcan, Russian America."

11 This chronological survey is taken from several works. The place to start is T.C.B. Boon, *The Anglican Church From the Bay to the Rock-
Somewhat unhappy with his Mackenzie River charge, Bompas appealed on several occasions for permission to return to the Yukon missions. The Anglican church and the C.M.S. granted his request in 1891, naming him Bishop of Selkirk (later Yukon) and directing him to devote his energies to that district. From a rather small base, Bompas attempted to expand his ministry. He remained at Forty-Mile, assisted by his wife and fellow missionary Benjamin Totty. Bompas dispatched Canham and his wife to Fort Selkirk and newly arrived evangelists Mr. & Mrs. G.G. Wallis to Rampart House.

By the time the Klondike Gold Rush began, the C.M.S. had developed an extensive presence among the Indians. Despite, and even because of, the influx of miners, Bompas rigidly defended the need to maintain a distinctive native ministry. While meeting the prospectors religious needs through a series of new and separate establishments, the church endeavored to extend its ecclesiastical care of the Indians. By 1900, the Anglicans had significantly expanded their Yukon network. Bompas operated out of his new diocesan headquarters at Caribou Crossing (Carcross). Canham remained at Fort Selkirk. Totty moved to Moosehide, new recruit John Hawksley ministered to the Forty-Mile natives and the church operated a series of eight temporary missions along the Yukon River between Tagish and Dawson. In the midst of the expansion, the C.M.S. in London withdrew from further responsibility in the area, although by 1903 that participation consisted of only routine financial

contributions.\textsuperscript{12} Wedded to the belief that natives and whites required separate missions, the Anglican Church assumed control of the extensive network of native congregations and a growing number of churches targeted at the white population. In the half century from Kirkby and McDonald's first efforts, the church's presence had expanded significantly and most natives came, if only casually, under the extended arm of Anglican supervision.

Maintaining, let alone expanding, church operations proved burdensome. Accepting a native charge in the Yukon hardly aided a clergyman's climb through the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Distance from church power, combined with a firmly entrenched image of the North as a frozen and barren wasteland hampered recruitment efforts. Coming north, often with their wives, required men to devote several years to the church in harsh surroundings. V.C. Sim's death in 1885, attributed to the rigours of his work, offered graphic testimony to conditions in the field.\textsuperscript{13} Under such circumstances, the missionaries either offered the total dedication typical of Robert McDonald or W.C. Bompas or sought alternative post-ings. Idealism spawned in the parlour rooms on England often faded in the face of the northern social and physical setting. For those of middle class Canadian or English background, the transition often proved arduous. G.G. Wallis' reports from Rampart House commented more on "dust and desolation" than the prospects for mission work.\textsuperscript{14} Following

\textsuperscript{12} CMS, List of Missions in Selkirk Diocese, 1900. On the ending of the relationship with the C.M.S., see CMS, Bompas to C.M.S., 18 January 1897; CMS, Bompas to C.M.S., 3 May 1898.

\textsuperscript{13} Wesbrook, "A Venture Into Ethnohistory."

\textsuperscript{14} CMS, Wallis to Secretaries, 30 December 1892.
Wallis' resignation after only three years, Bompas requested that the C.M.S. send only "those of an inferior grade (who) in going to the far west generally rise a peg which is mostly pleasant to themselves and their neighbours." Rejecting middle class idealists, Bompas wanted men of commitment and "hardy constitution" willing to bring their wives and dedicate themselves to the solemn task at hand.15

Recruitment efforts occasionally failed. Kenneth McDonald stayed only a short time before leaving for more remunerative employment with the Hudson's Bay Company. Benjamin Totty stayed with the church, but was of questionable benefit. Totty either came with a serious ear injury or was infected with the malady shortly after his arrival. Reflecting his limited prospects for advancement with the Church, Bishop Bompas "arranged" for Totty to marry a local Indian woman who, in turn, was expected to care for him.16

Though of widely varying talents, the missionaries attempted to adhere to the policies enunciated by Henry Venn and the C.M.S. establishment. Robert McDonald translated the scriptures into the Kutchin language as quickly as he was able, obviously assisting his efforts to have the natives carry the gospel further afield.17 Cross-cultural communication proved a constant barrier, especially with missionaries newly arrived from England or Canada. R.J. Bowen found himself in charge at

15 CMS, Bompas to Church Missionary Society, 3 January 1895.

16 Laura Berton, Married the Klondike, p. 61; CMS, Bompas to C.M.S., 13 January 1896, tells the story differently, suggesting that Bompas had tried to nip a budding inter-racial romance but had failed.

17 F. Peake, "Robert McDonald," CMS, McDonald to Long, 31 January 1865; CMS, McDonald to Brother in the Lord, 25 June 1864; CMS, McDonald to Secretaries, 30 June 1870 re: efforts by Bompas and H.B.C. trader James Flett at translation.
Forty-Mile in 1895 even though he spoke not a word of the local native language. Similarly, when the Canham's moved to Fort Selkirk from the Porcupine River, they found their hard-earned linguistic skills of virtually no utility. As Venn directed, however, the early missionaries attempted to translate the Bible and, in order to make use of the translations, taught some of the Indians to read. Early translations and especially the compilation of written vocabularies proved particularly beneficial in easing the work of subsequent missionaries.

Overcoming linguistic barriers represented only the first challenge. To be effective, the missionaries had to get the word, in whatever language, to the Indians. Accomplishing this proved difficult and before 1896 evangelical efforts remained confined to the Porcupine, Forty-Mile and Fort Selkirk districts. The church maintained only casual contacts with the rest of the territory, not moving into the southern Yukon until after the Gold Rush. The church opened several mission stations, but native mobility and seasonal harvesting cycles limited the utility of central meeting places. Adapting their ministrations to suit native needs, clergymen took to regular itinerating. Based in Fort Youcon and later Fort McPherson, R. McDonald travelled extensively in an attempt to meet his goal of visiting each band at least once a year. His travels, like those of his brother Kenneth and W.C. Bompas, took him throughout the region, as far north as the Arctic Coast, south to Fort Selkirk and several hundred miles west of Fort Youcon. These regular visitations

18 Northern Lights, vol. 30 (August 1941).
19 CMS, Canham to Fenn, 17 February 1893.
20 CMS, Bompas to C.M.S., 3 September 1896 re: his insistence on being allowed to open a mission to the south.
declined as the mission network and transportation systems expanded. Because they greatly improved the effectiveness of the ministry, however, they were never totally dropped. The natives' unwillingness to settle at mission sites forced the clergymen to follow their nomadic congregations in order, as R. McDonald phrased it, to "prevent them losing what they have been taught."

The missionaries lauded the success of itinerating, although they probably mistook hospitality for a desire for Christian leadership. The sessions often took on the external characteristics of a camp revival. "Each day I spent in the Indian camps," Bompas reported in 1872, "was like a Sunday as the Indians were clustered around me from early morning till late at night learning prayers, hymns and Scripture lessons." Interpreting friendship as fervor, the clergy placed great faith in their solitary and transient proselytizing. Missionaries stayed only a few days with each band, their travels seldom bringing them to each band more than once or twice a year. Itinerating, whatever its weaknesses, kept Christianity in front of the Indians, encouraging them to consider at least the elementary principles of the pro-offered faith.

21 Ken Coates. The Northern Yukon: A History, pp. 38-43. The list of itinerating travels is very long. All trips were described in very vague terms. Church Missionary Record, vol. 14, New Series, no. 6 (June 1869), pp. 172-179; Church Missionary Intelligencer, vol. 7, New Series (1871), pp. 333-341; ibid., vol. 11, New Series (1875), p. 63; CMS, Bompas to Secretaries, 6 December 1872; CMS, Kenneth McDonald to Bompas, 30 December 1874; CMS, R. McDonald to Secretaries, 7 January 1870; CMS, R. McDonald to Secretaries, 30 June 1870.

22 CMS, R. McDonald to Dear Friend, 26 March 1877.

23 CMS, Bompas to Secretaries, 6 December 1872.
To enhance the insufficient mission and itinerating efforts, the church relied on the recruitment of native clergy, another of Henry Venn's central recommendations. The use of Indian catechists, even inadequately trained, served. Venn argued, to identify Christianity with the native population. Importantly, the new religion would no longer loom solely as an imposed standard of a foreign culture. Missionaries hoped the native clergy would also undermine the authority of local shamans who still controlled native spirituality. The attempt began with Kirkby's first visit to the Yukon valley. The missionary took pride in noting that "Doctor," a local shaman, "publically denounced his past faith." Kirkby put little stock in Doctor's theatrical conversion, but recognized the potential of offering alternative spiritual leadership.²⁴

The church expended considerable effort in subsequent years recruiting native catechists. Missionaries identified at least one individual in each band for special religious instruction. Once trained, the man held prayer sessions after the band left the mission station.²⁵ These leaders, one appropriately renamed Henry Venn Ketse, seldom worked out as intended. In 1875, McDonald noted that of eight catechists, only four proved of much use as religious leaders.²⁶ Though paid for their efforts — 5 pounds a year or double that if required to leave their band²⁷ — native catechists generally lacked commitment and basic under-

²⁴ CMS. Kirkby's Journal, 25 May 1861. 7 May 1862. entry for 8 July 1861.

²⁵ CMS. McDonald to Secretaries. 25 January 1876.

²⁶ CMS. McDonald to Secretaries. 25 January 1875.

²⁷ Bompaè report, Church Missionary Intelligencer and Record, vol. 11, no. 122 (February 1886), pp. 104-105.
standing of their intended role. Remuneration and the attending social status, however, ensured no shortage of potential candidates.

Since catechists worked beyond the purview of their ecclesiastical superiors, their contribution and impact is difficult to gauge. Shamans may have assumed the role of lay leaders, thus maintaining their supremacy as interpreters of the spiritual world. Apparently influenced by the missionary's power - itself an extension of the mystical technological and biological powers of European civilization - various men claimed they had been "commissioned by the Almighty to teach them (the natives)." Shamans doubtlessly resented the missionaries' and catechists' intrusion into their realm; that some would try to co-opt the new religion, as the "Doctor" seemed willing to do, is likely. There is as well some question as to what theological wisdom the catechists, shaman or not, were capable of imparting. Marginally literate, if at all, and possessing only a rudimentary comprehension of a complex doctrine, lay leaders lacked the knowledge to pass on a comprehensive description of Christianity. As catechists, former shamans likely mingled their animist spirituality with the rude framework of Christianity, using the latter to preserve or enhance their authority.

28 CMS. V.C. Sim to Secretaries. 9 January 1882.


The church's use of poorly trained catechists to spread their message raises questions about natives' adoption of Christianity. Anthropologist Anne Welsh argued that the Old Crow Kutchin accepted the faith with alacrity, "seeing in the various rituals and paraphernalia the probable source of the white man's power."\(^{31}\) Given haphazard contact, language barriers which slowed if not prevented meaningful communication of basic theological concepts, inconsistent evangelical work by missionaries of varying talents, and the Indians' commitment to their own interpretation of the spiritual world, widespread acceptance of Christianity seems unlikely. The natives appeared to adopt the external forms of the faith. Marriages, burials (usually a mingling of both traditions), baptisms, church services, prayers and hymns offered a ceremonial dimension largely absent in Athapaskan practices. Importantly, such rituals could be adopted without contradicting traditional beliefs. For the natives of North America, spiritualism was an integral component of their world view, defining their relationship with the ecology as well as other humans. The missionaries' appeals lacked a replacement for much of the animist and spiritual notions, concentrating instead on the more restricted relationship between man and a mystical deity. The transformation of the natives' world view, and hence the substance of their spirituality, was not yet a part of the church's mission. Had it been, effecting such a change was clearly beyond the linguistic and logistical capacities of the Anglican clergy.

Whatever the limits of their achievements, most missionaries confidently asserted the success of their efforts. Robert McDonald was initially restrained, noting in 1864 that he refused to baptize natives as they lacked sufficient knowledge of the ceremony.\textsuperscript{32} Catholic pressure on Anglican missions forced many clergymen to speed up the baptismal process. For the clergy, the rush for souls became of pre-eminent importance. Bompas claimed in 1874 that the Indians now had advanced knowledge and that he had baptized 35 adults and 80 children.\textsuperscript{33} As time passed, more natives sang the hymns (off-key as missionaries frequently noted), said the prayers and followed church ceremonies. Such outward manifestations, however, do not prove inner conversion and there is little evidence to suggest that many Indians made the transition. Exceptions existed, such as John Tt̓sietl̓a of Fort McPherson, ordained deacon in 1893.\textsuperscript{34} Before 1900, it is likely most Yukon Indians saw Christianity as a focus for celebration and ceremony, not as a repository of the true meaning of the spiritual world.\textsuperscript{35}

After 1900, the Anglican church attempted to place its scattered mission program on an expanded and firmer footing. They added several permanent missions and expanded itinerating into isolated corners of the territory. Bompas' removal of the diocesan headquarters to Carcross and the opening of a church under R.J. Bowen at Whitehorse gave the Anglicans a new presence in the southern Yukon. Following the death of Bom-

\textsuperscript{32} CMS, McDonald to Dear Brother, 25 June 1864.

\textsuperscript{33} CMS, Bompas to Secretaries, 17 July 1873.

\textsuperscript{34} Church Missionary Society Proceedings, 1893-1894, pp. 246-249.

\textsuperscript{35} For a statement on the status of the mission at century's end, see CMS, Bompas to C.M.S., 4 May 1898.
pas in 1906, Isaac O. Stringer, a young minister known for his work among the Inuit at Herschel Island, assumed the Bishop's mantle. Stringer reorganized the diocese, moving the base to Dawson City, expanding the use of native clergy and catechists and using theological students to conduct summer missions in poorly served areas. Stringer remained in charge until 1932, when A.H. Sovereign temporarily replaced him. Reorganization of the diocese followed, with the Yukon placed under Bishop Geddes of Mackenzie River. In 1941, the district became part of the ecclesiastical province of British Columbia.\footnote{35 T.C.B. Boon, \textit{The Anglican Church}, pp. 221-231; F. Peake, \textit{The Anglican Church in British Columbia}, pp. 179-191; Cody, \textit{Apostle of the North}; Peake, \textit{The Bishop Who Ate His Boots}.}

Throughout the first half of the century, the Anglican church continued its efforts to expand religious services for the Indians. Indeed, though the church provided required services for the white population, they maintained a strong and distinct commitment to their native communicants. The missionaries eagerly intervened in non-religious matters involving the Indians, appealing frequently to government agents or the police as deemed necessary.\footnote{37 Anglican Church, Diocese of Yukon, Yukon Territorial Archives (hereafter AC), Carcross Property file, Memo for the Minister re: Yukon Indians, c. 1907; Journal of the Synod of the Yukon, 1907 this role has scarcely been relaxed to the present. H.C. McCullum and K. McCullum, \textit{This Land is Not For Sale - Canada's Original People and Their Land} (Toronto: Anglican Book Centre, 1975); GSA, M74-3, 1-A-1, Stringer Papers. Stringer to Commissioners, Yukon Territory, 11 April 1912.} Few government officials welcomed the missionaries' activities outside their religious sphere. Yukon Commissioner Frank Congdon commented to the Deputy Minister of the Interior, "My complaint with regard to the missionaries is that instead of teaching the Indians self-reliance and independence, they aid most strongly in
making them medicants. I am daily in receipt of letters from Indians, written by a missionary, asking for all sorts of favours.38 To their credit, however, the Anglican clergy remained committed to the Indians' protection.

Though limited by budgetry and manpower shortages, the bishops attempted to maintain their field work.39 Acknowledging the indifferent results from itinerating, the clergy sought men who, often with their wives, would accept year round placement in Indian camps. In 1911, regular missions operated at eight places: Moosehide (Totty), Forty-Mile (A.C. Field), Selkirk (Canham and Hauksley), Whitehorse (Blackwell), Teslin and Champagne (C.C. Brett),40 Carcross (Canham), and Rampart House (Njootli). Lay leaders carried the gospel even further afield. Eleven years later,41 the mission network differed little, with six regular missions42 and five native catechists serving northern and eastern districts. Arrangement varied yearly depending upon the availability of missionaries and funds provided by the Missionary Society of the Church of England in Canada (M.S.C.C.).

38 RG10, vol. 4001, file 207, 418, Congdon to Pedley, 28 May 1903.

39 Getting financial assistance was not always an easy task and had plagued Bompas for years. CMS, Bompas to C.M.S., 4 May 1898; AC, New Series, file 2, A. O'Meara memorandum, 15 January 1908.

40 The two stations were usually administered by the same missionary who changed his base according to the Indians' seasonal movements. RG10, vol. 6477, file 925-1 pt.1, Bragg to Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 30 October 1913.

41 AC, New Series, file 1, Stringer, "Indian Work in the Diocese of Yukon," 14 September 1911.

To supplement permanent staff, the diocese began in the 1920's (and in a few instances earlier) to recruit students, principally from the Anglican Theological College in Vancouver. Their expenses paid in part by Department of Indian Affairs' stipends for day school teachers, the student ministers spent several months in such places as Ross River, Teslin, Carmacks and Champagne. Their evident enthusiasm, however, often failed to compensate for naive idealism and a lack of practical experience in dealing with Indians. Often laden with platitudes, the students' reports revealed how little they knew of their native communicants. More importantly, the students generally acknowledged the limited act of their ministries, the experience obviously of more benefit to the summer clergy than the natives. From the larger church perspective, the ventures did reassert Anglican territorial claims, an increasingly important goal given the Catholic Church's rising challenge in the Teslin, Lower Post and Mayo districts.

43 The program began in earnest in the 1930's but a few came north the previous decade. AC, Unsworth File, J. Unsworth, "Report of Students' Visit to Ross River, July 1923.

44 RG10, vol. 6477, file 925-1 pt.1, Hawsley to Mackenzie, 15 June 1933. They also served as day school teachers, as will be discussed later.

Native catechists were of greater importance in church plans to spread the gospel. Expanding on the practices of the earlier century, the Anglican Church continued to recruit and support Indian field workers. The use of catechists seemed especially expedient given the natives' continuing mobility and the church's inability to expand permanent missions. While some hoped this system would assist evangelical efforts, practical considerations governed the reliance on native lay leaders. The church expected catechists to supplement the low stipends through hunting and trapping. The fear that native leaders might rely too heavily on non-guaranteed church remuneration led Bishop Bompas to write to John Martin of Mayo that "You will not be expected to give all your time to your work at the Church but will be free part of the time to hunt and trap." The church clearly feared encouraging native dependence on limited diocesan coffers. Catechists typically received only a token remuneration, more to indicate their status to the community than as an alternative means of support. Anglican clergy used the native lay and ordained leaders primarily to fill in the blanks on the Yukon mission map, holding little faith in their ability to effectively spread the gospel.

46 AC, Martin File, Bishop to John Martin, 29 July 1935; GSA, M74-3, 1-A-4, Semple to Stringer, 10 July 1932; AC, Amos Njootli File, Stringer to Njootli, 26 January 1917.

47 "Jim," who may have been James Pelissa, received only $50 a year and had trouble collecting that amount. His problem was compounded by the fact that his initial agreement was with the Mackenzie River Diocese. AC, Swanson File, Cecil Swanson to Bishop, 30 July 1914.

48 In 1922, only Rev. Julius Kendi at Mayo received a full salary ($550). Native catechists received less: John Tizyz, Old Crow, $100; Joseph Kunnizzi, Peel River, $100; Richard Martin, Porcupine, $75; Johnathan Wood, Moosehide, James Pelissa, Ross River, $50. AC, MSCC #2 file, Stringer to Gould, 16 February 1922.
Catechists varied even more widely in effectiveness than missionaries and students. Some, such as Amos Njootli, remained active for many years but had only marginal influence on their congregations. Njootli's personal problems, the nature of which is only hinted at in the records, seriously undermined his mission. Others similarly allowed domestic turmoil to affect their work as lay leaders. The Reverend A.C. McCullum noted from Old Crow in 1930 that quarrels between catechist "Big Joe" (Kikavichick) and his wife created dissension within the band. Several native catechists enjoyed wide respect for their devotion, if not their complete theological understanding. Joseph Kunizza, John Tizya and especially Reverend Julius Kendi and his wife enjoyed considerable respect within the missionary fraternity.

More than any other, John Martin exemplifies the problems and prospects of utilizing native catechists. Raised in Fort McPherson and given early Christian training, Martin responded to Bishop Stringer's request that he take up residence among the natives of Ross River. Discouraged by his ecclesiastical immobility through the 1930's and the limited attention given his charge by church superiors, Martin petitioned for ordination as a minister in 1932. Bishop Geddes visited his

49 AC, Amos Njootli File, Stringer to Njootli, 26 January 1917; AC, Totty File, Totty to Bishop, 17 September 1918; AC, Amos Njootli File, Njootli to Bishop, 1 April 1917; Regarding his death in 1923, see AC, Eunice Njootli File, Eunice Njootli to I.O. Stringer, 20 February 1923.

50 AC, R.H., F.Y., and Old Crow File, A.C. McCullum to Stringer, 23 July 1930.


52 AC, John Martin File, Martin to Gaddes (Gaddis), 10 January 1934.
station two years later, but to Martin’s dismay refused ordination. Martin appealed once again, "I not trouble about where I go and stay but I want ordain Priest that all I want I told him (Geddes) and he told me I got to go to school for that." His plaintive plea, "I want to be Priest Please archbishop tell me what am wrong I may try learn more," cut to the heart of the catechist’s problems within the church. Inadequately trained, typically functioning without supervision in isolated corners of the territory, often far removed from families and friends, the catechists had few opportunities for upward mobility. Martin clearly sought improved remuneration and social status, among whites as much as within the native communities. Inadequate education prevented him and others from achieving that goal.

Martin moved to Mayo after his stint in Ross River. Rebuffed from advancement within the clergy, he seemed preoccupied with the possible material benefits of his position. Martin demanded a new set of furniture for his house, befitting his position as a community leader, and ran up considerable debts at the local Taylor and Drury store. His superiors repeatedly pointed out that material comforts and "white man's grub" did not go with the post, and directed him to pay more attention to his trapping. Requesting that Reverend Hughes of Mayo oversee the catechist, the Bishop wrote "You must remember that John Martin is only a native and while in many respects he may be a highly intelligent native yet in many situations he will have the outlook and behaviour of a


child." His superiors thought little of Martin's theological competence. His task was to ensure that prayers, services, and hymns—forms but not the substance of Christianity—remained in front of the Indians.

The Anglican clergy were a mixed lot, including missionaries of such diverse talents as William Bompas and Benjamin Totty, summer students of unquestioned enthusiasm and matching naivete, and native catechists with the ability of Julius Kendi and the problems of John Martin. Compounding this obvious diversity was the lack of continuity in religious leadership. With the exception of B. Totty, whose infirmity ensured that he remained at Moosehide, white missionaries moved regularly. Cecil Swanson's experience (only two years among the Little Salmon Indians before being assigned to a white pastorate in Whitehorse) was not uncommon. Reflecting later on his experience, Swanson wrote,

I felt that I should have been left there (Little Salmon) for at least seven years. It takes time to develop a trusting relationship with the Indians, and a lifetime to learn and use the language. The strength of the Roman Catholic missions is the continuity of pastorate by the fathers of the OMI, the missionary arm of the church. Short-term missionaries are useless.

Transiency, a malady endemic throughout Yukon society, affected the missionary corps. A constantly shifting church hierarchy ensured rapid movement through the ranks and constant mobility in the field. The brief and often ineffectual forays of the summer students into the back

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55 AC, Hughes File, Bishop of Yukon to Mr. Hughes, 22 August 1935.

56 The change in the Mayo band after his death suggests he had a positive impact. RG10, vol. 6478, file 935-1 pt.i, Binning Report, 7 July 1937.

57 Cecil Swanson, The Days of My Sojourn, p. 36.
country represented only an extension of a problem besetting the entire church effort. Catechists stayed longer, particularly if appointed to serve among their own people, but their insufficient preparation and generally unsophisticated comprehension of Christianity negated their longevity. Mobility, lack of language fluency, even with the biblical translations provided by McDonald, Bompaes, Canham, Hauksley and others, highlighted the variations in missionary talents and limited the church's ability to transmit their message. Their effort and institutional commitment remained constant, but it is doubtful that much of the message got through.

The nature and extent of native conversion is, of course, central to assessing the consequence of religious contact. Despite impressive baptismal lists and laudatory accounts of their own accomplishments, the missionaries recognized their work to be incomplete. Clergymen throughout the Yukon readily acknowledged the persistence of native spiritual beliefs and superstitions through to 1950. The missionaries could, and did, point to the natives' adherence to Christian rituals and a general acceptance of western moral standards. Most native groups adopted appropriate marital ceremonies, but only if a clergyman was conveniently available. Even then, missionaries disparagingly noted that such old practices as polygamy, trading of wives and discarding of partners continued. As Carmacks summer missionary Max Humphrey noted in

58 RG10, vol. 6478, file 930-1, Additional Memo re: Teslin Lake Indians, c. February 1909. As part of a general survey in 1908-1909 conducted by the Anglican Church and Canadian government to ascertain the need for increased education and mission work, police officers and missionaries were requested to provide summaries of conditions among local Indians. Virtually all reports explicitly note the continuing importance of native religion. See the reports in AC, New Series.
1932. "The Indians are quick to notice and respond to what is usually known as 'practical Christianity' but what is hard to overcome is the apparent apathy of the average Indian in church."\(^{59}\)

The persistence of native customs should not be surprising. Despite the substantial efforts, the Anglican missions had been uneven. Many natives, particularly in southern districts, saw missionaries infrequently. Language difficulties and lack of understanding prevented these sporadic contacts from bearing much fruit. Only in the Porcupine River area (and to a lesser extent at Moosehide and Dawson) could the church claim notable success. Most of the native catechists, including Ttsettlele, Richard and John Martin, Amos Njootli, Joe Kikavichick, Julius Kendi and John Tizya came from the Fort McPherson-Porcupine River district, an area long served by the redoubtable Robert McDonald.\(^{60}\) Even here, however, shamanism and a variety of non-Christian practices reappeared regularly.\(^{61}\) Acknowledging their inability to provide sufficient pastoral care for the Indians, the clergy accepted the more superficial

\(^{59}\) AC, Diocese-Synod File. Humphrey to Your Lordship and Members of the Synod. 1932. Examples of persistence are far too numerous to list. Most summer student reports and many internal documents of the Anglican Church echoed Humphrey's claim. See also letter from Rev. C.C. Brett. *Across the Rockies*, vol. 5, no. 7 (July 1914). Amy Wilson, a nurse in the southern Yukon in the late 1940's and early 1950's, noted repeated instances of dependence on old spiritual beliefs, especially as regards healing. A. Wilson, *No Man Stands Alone* (Sidney: Grey's Publishing, 1966). That ethnographers such as C. McClellan were able to piece together such a vivid reconstruction of pre-contact beliefs is a further indication of persistence. McClellan. *My Old People Say*.

\(^{60}\) There was a ten year hiatus following the departure of the Hudson's Bay Company from Rampart House in 1893. K. Coates. *The Northern Yukon*, pp. 41-42.

\(^{61}\) See various comments from Lucy, a nurse sent to Old Crow in the late 1940's. GSA, Lucy papers.
re-ordering of spiritual practises. Though never abandoning the hope for full conversion, missionaries aimed instead for outward conformity to church practises. Marriages, baptisms, burial rites, acceptable moral and social behaviour represented the clergy's goals and the limits of their accomplishments. Their hope for meaningful conversion - a fulfillment of the Christian spirit believed inherent in all men - rested on the preliminary restructuring of religious practises and social behaviour. Practicalities, however, ensured that missionaries tolerated such apparently minor deviations as burying personal effects with the deceased. As Reverend Ashbee noted, "It was a harmless belief on their part and showed they had, at any rate, a belief in life beyond the grave." It also illustrated the native interpretation of life hereafter remained prevalent. The conversion process proved much slower than the Anglican missionaries expected.

Realism forced upon the missionaries an uncharacteristic latitudinarianism in dealing with deviations from Christian practise. Though a reflection of their faith in the inevitability of full adoption of Christianity, it also illustrated a native desire to maintain their own spirituality. The resulting Anglican flexibility was amply demonstrated in 1917 when a Champagne native, Johnny Ned, attracted a cult following. Claiming to have had a vision and being miraculously blessed with the ability to speak English (he attended day school for several years), Ned preached a random amalgam of native and Christian beliefs. The charis-

62 AC, Ashbee File, Ashbee to Lord Bishop, 8 July 1926.

matic evangelist garnered much support in the southern Yukon through a series of revival-style meetings. One service at Champagne, for example, attracted over 200 adherents while a simultaneous Anglican meeting drew but a dozen. Ned's crusade withered abruptly, allegedly through the principal's immorality which led to an early death. The Anglican Church looked with disapproval at the threatening sect, but decided not to intervene. As Bishop Stringer commented, "For the most part his teaching is all right. However, he has some fantastic ideas and has mixed up some native superstitions with Christianity. I think it is better to recognize everything that is good in his teaching rather than attempt to antagonize him." The Yukon cult experience mirrored similar revitalization movements among other North American Indian groups and indicates the Anglican clergy's hands-off approach to the persistence of native spirituality.

The missionaries' early goal of converting the Indians to Christianity fell to the difficulties of northern evangelism and the tenacity of native spirituality. Inadequate staff and funding, nomadic Indians and isolation hampered Anglican efforts to restructure native religious beliefs. The Indians became nominal Christians, accepting the outward manifestations of the new faith, but did not surrender their previous religious identity. The two were not incompatible, for the natives apparently integrated their interpretation of the spiritual world with the

64 AC, Young File, Stringer to W.D. Young, 25 April 1917. GSA, M74-3, 1-0-18, "Re: Indian reported to have seen visions and spoken in unknown languages;" Swanson, Days of My Sojournin, pp. 40-49; AC, Bennett File, Stringer to Bennett, 13 July 1918.

external forms of Christianity. Given the unstructured form of pre-contact beliefs, the missionaries' message provided a framework, and ritualistic form, for dealing with religious matters.

The natives were not prepared to surrender their religion, even after almost a century of proselytizing. Linguistic and cultural barriers hampered the efforts of a rather indifferent missionary corps to transmit their message. More importantly, native spirituality was, in large measure, impervious to attack. It lacked rigid focus, depended on regional and personal interpretation and was inextricably interwoven with the natives' interpretation of the world. The manner in which the natives viewed their human, animal and geographic landscape related closely to their spirituality. Since the Christian missions offered no alternative world view, focusing instead on the limited goal of revising their relationship with the deity, the clergy missed the core of native religion. Indian spirituality continued because the natives' world remained substantially intact; the two were inseparable, and the Anglican missionaries had done little to draw them apart. The Indians remained ritualistic Christians, accepted the forms of the faith, especially in the missionaries' or catechists' presence. More than that, they remained Indians, possessors of a different and, to the Europeans, misunderstood interpretation of the world.66

Anglican evangelism, therefore, both failed and succeeded in its attempt to bring the natives into the European world. The acceptance of social Christianity, especially a vague acceptance of Christian morality, brought the natives closer to the pattern set down by the missionaries. The continuation of native spirituality, reinforced by the Anglican's ready admittance that their aboriginal communicants remained unprepared for a closer accommodation with the larger Canadian community, ensured that preliminary Christianization did not lead to integration. As late as 1950, native missions and white churches remained substantially distinct, a public acknowledgement of the continuing distinctiveness of the two Anglican communities in the Yukon Territory.
CHAPTER TEN

EDUCATION AND THE YUKON NATIVES

As with religion, the Anglican Church attempted to use education to speed and smooth the natives' integration. Often complementary, occasionally contradictory, spiritual and secular improvement represented the church's two-pronged approach to cultural homogenization. Combining schools with theology, lacing their curriculum with Christian values just as they often overburdened their ecclesiastical message with social instructions, the Anglican clergy believed they could breach the cultural and linguistic barriers between themselves and the Indians. They directed their effort at the children, the ones deemed most vulnerable to cultural transformation. In the realm of education, the Anglican church enjoyed veritable hegemony, proceeding unchallenged until faced with a significant threat from Roman Catholic and Presbyterian mission schools in the 1930's and 1940's.

Administrators intended education, even more explicitly than religion, to assist with the government's and church's declared goal of assimilating the natives. By opening the world to an intensely localized, allegedly backward people through the provision of requisite skills to compete in the modern economy, and highlighting the deficiencies of native society, many hoped that schools would enable the Indians to move swiftly from their heathen past. Again, the Yukon example illustrates that enunciated public goals of federal administrators and church leaders (and equally, entrenched historical interpretations of their intentions) do not equate with the regional reality. Despite established as-
simationist goals. Indian schools in the Yukon did not serve as the motor for cultural integration, functioning more as a divisive force within Yukon society and deviating significantly from the national directives of church and state.

Recent historians have abandoned the previously whiggish interpretation of the development of Canadian education. Adopting a more critical line, they question the elitist assumptions which governed the establishment of schools and examine the role of education in the emergent capitalist system. Of interest here is the body of literature which links economic and educational considerations under the rubric of cultural imperialism. Rejecting the notion of the educator as liberator, proponents argue that schooling served the interests of the internal or external colonizing power, functioning specifically to prepare the uneducated for participation in the capitalist-merchantile economy. Martin Carnoy, a leading scholar in this field, argues, "Western formal education came to most countries as part of imperial domination. It was consistent with the goals of imperialism and the economic and political control of the people in one country by the dominant class in another." He went on, "the transformation of unskilled man into valuable input for the capitalist production process became an important function of schooling in capitalist society." Educators expressed the values of their own culture and readily depreciated the interests of peoples com-


monly characterized as backwards. Anglican mission schools, laden with the aspirations of middle class England and Canada, clearly fit the cultural imperialist mold.

More useful than this basic formulation, especially in understanding the impact of western schooling on Indians, is the "colonial school" model defined by P. Altbach and G. Kelly. Assessing American missionary schools, they argue that education attempted to remake natives in the image of the white man, simultaneously usurping or degrading Indian society. The colonial school, replicated in Anglican and Catholic native programs in Canada and still functioning in Third World countries, aimed to assimilate the Indians in the interests and image of the dominant nation state. Such schools typically limited their offerings to language instruction and moral education, thus providing the perceived prerequisites for social integration. Flaws inherent in the system, however, limited their success, while broadening the negative impact of the programs. Restricted by the schools' aspirations, educators failed to bestow skills necessary for meaningful integration, providing little more than a depreciation of native culture. As a result, Indians thus educated found themselves unable to compete in a society for which they supposedly had been specifically groomed, and instead found themselves entrenched in a sub-cultural, dependent role.

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The colonial school notion provides a useful means of assessing the regularized education provided American Indians, and even the industrial/boarding school format employed throughout Canada. Where national policy clearly dictated curriculum, the over-riding hand of the colonizer is easy to identify. The Yukon, however, provides a more ambiguous setting. Though federally funded, native education remained in the hands of the Anglican church. Limited resources, however, restricted church efforts to an irregular day school program and several small boarding schools. As with their spiritual mission, the clergy found that problems of funding and staffing interfered with the application of the preferred program. Far from achieving national assimilationist goals, Anglican education both reflected and assisted the ongoing marginalization of the Yukon Indians.

Bible and slate were virtually indistinguishable from the start. To ensure the continuing transmission of religious teachings, Church Missionary Society workers sought to impart a modicum of literacy to their congregation. Missionaries translated Bibles and attempted to teach a few Indians in each band to read. Preliminary adult education marked the beginnings of a more sustained effort. Until the 1880's, however, limited staff prevented the church's educational offerings from proceeding beyond basic literacy, and that was limited to teaching a few In-

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5 Altbach and Kelly correctly distinguish the importance of a "national" component in the formation of a colonial education system (p. 43). The Yukon educational network lacked this over-riding control, but did not deviate in theoretical terms from accepted patterns and programs.

ans to comprehend phonetic translations of biblical passages. In the short term, efforts focused on the religious aspects of their mission. Education came later.

Inadequate funding slowed any attempted educational reform. Though Bishop Bompas repeatedly argued that "schooling is the most hopeful branch of mission work," the C.M.S. refused to provide the required monies. Bompas' problems emanated from his insistence that education be targeted at half-breed children, an acknowledged departure from C.M.S. practise. Answering the London Committee's repeated rejections, Bompas declared "such half-breed children are liable to become if untrained and left wild the bitterest enemies and most formidable obstacles to our mission, whereas if trained in the mission schools they may become our foremost and most useful friends." Bompas proceeded unassisted and in 1894 had four half-breed girls and two Indian girls living in his mission house. As the Diocese of Selkirk (Yukon after 1907) expanded through the decade, missionaries attempted to follow Bompas' lead, offering rudimentary education for Indian and half-breed children.

Limited C.M.S. funding offered little security, and church leaders sought more regular backing. Though reluctant to accept any responsibility in the area, in the 1890's the federal government finally succumbed to Bompas' incessant requests. Though the Department of Indian Af-

7 CMS, Bompas to CMS, 3 January 1894.

8 Bompas was assisted by his wife and Miss Mellot. Cody, Apostle of the North, 253-272; Boon, The Anglican Church, 222-223.


10 ibid., Duncan Scott, Memorandum to Deputy Superintendent General, 2 January 1908.
fares retained formal responsibility for approving the opening of schools and the appointment of teachers. In practical terms the Bishop of the Yukon handled most administrative duties. The church retained considerable discretionary power, the only expression of national interest being occasional visits by school inspectors or Indian Agents.

Though Bishop Bompas confidently declared that schooling enabled "them to share in the blessings of civilization," the federal government did not hold such expectations. Ottawa reluctantly provided funding, and only after considerable debate within the bureaucracy about the efficiency of church-administered schools.11 The Anglican church, however, demanded that education remain in church hands, an appeal which culminated in a 1908 petition to the Department of Indian Affairs for funding for a native boarding school.12 Again, bureaucrats hesitated to entrench Anglican domination,13 but the church's political power prevailed. In what became a typical pattern, Frank Oliver, Minister of the Interior, granted the capital and operating budgets while asserting "I will not undertake in a general way to educate the Indians of the Yukon. In my judgement they can, if left as Indians, earn a better living." The con-


12 AC, New Series, file 1, Notes made from interview with Rev. Mr. O'Meara, re: Indians in the Yukon, 1908; ibid., file 2, O'Meara to Stringer, 6 January 1909; ibid., file 3, Memo for Archbishop regarding Yukon Indians Work, c. 1909; ibid., file 3, Draft: Proposed Requests Regarding Indians, c. 1908; ibid., file 1, Indian Matters: Recommendations of Messrs. Haukale and O'Meara, c. 1908; ibid., file 3, Requests regarding Yukon Indians, c. 1908; ibid., A.E. O'Meara to Stringer, 15 January 1908; ibid., file 1, Memorandum for Minister regarding Yukon Indians.

cessions. were "done as a matter of charity toward the Indians as poor citizens." Oliver wished to prevent a repeat of the maladministration which plagued native schooling in southern districts. As one of Oliver's subordinates suggested, boarding schools should "be considered merely as orphanages or refuges for neglected children." Ironically, though the government wished to avoid a systematic education for the natives, at least in 1910, public pressure exerted through the Anglican Church ensured at least a minimal level of service.

The day school program, expanded from one to five schools in 1910, and the residential school, opened in enlarged quarters in 1911, rested on false, or at best contradictory, premises. The Anglicans desired mission schools, but lacked the requisite financial resources. The federal government provided the money, but remained uncommitted to the need for native education in the district. To the Department of Indian Affairs, the Indians' continuing prosperity eliminated the need to alter social and economic patterns through a sustained educational effort, just as providing industrial skills was unsuited to the likely future prospects of the territory. Extensive education raised false expectations, provided unmarketable skills and cost the government a considerable amount of money. The willingness to leave the natives uneducated lasted until the late 1940's, when a major shift in federal programming led to more universal schooling. Writing in 1933, Indian Agent and former missionary John Hawksley commented:

14 AC, New Series, file 2, Notes of Interview, 26 February 1909.
15 DIA, vol. 3906, file 105, 378, Scott, Memorandum to Deputy Superintendent General, 21 January 1908.
The Indians, owing to changed circumstances, cannot afford to stay around those villages or leave their families while the men go away to hunt and trap. They are compelled to separate into small parties and live in the woods for the purpose of hunting and trapping in order to make a living. Opportunities for obtaining work from white people are very much reduced. To insist upon the Indian families staying in the villages (which has been suggested) would mean that some of them would have to receive help in the way of provisions. It appears to be a much wiser policy to keep them independent, earning their own living, and they are less liable to get into bad habits.\textsuperscript{16}

Maintaining only a marginal commitment to education, the federal government willingly left administration of the schools to the Anglican clergy. Themselves enthusiastic, the missionaries lacked the funding and staff necessary to offer the scale and quality of education desired. The resulting Indian school program varied widely by time and region and accomplished few of the Church's stated goals.

Day schools represented the clergy's greatest dilemma. The schools drained the diocese's limited financial resources without showing an appreciable return. Continuing native nomadism damaged efforts to sustain educational contact. Instead, the day schools operated opened only when natives were in camp and attended class. Government agents challenged the judiciousness of continued expenditures. "Whether such intermittent teaching is of any real value," John Hawksley wrote in 1926, "is open to question. Very little progress is possible under such conditions, it leads one to doubt whether the expenditure is justified."\textsuperscript{17} The clergy responded that education, however flawed, surpassed total neglect. Bishop Geddes claimed that "As citizens of a Christian country we have a

\textsuperscript{16}YG, vol. 9, file 1491, John Hawksley to A.F. Mackenzie, 29 August 1933.

\textsuperscript{17}YG, vol. 74, Hawksley to J.D. McLean, 20 November 1926; See also ibid., Russell Fernier, Superintendent of Indian Education to J. Hawksley, 27 October 1925.
duty or a responsibility to the native peoples of Canada" that could be discharged only through education. Reacting to a 1933 decrease in funding, Bishop Sovereign sanctimoniously declared:

In an intensive training, these teachers (summer students) have given to the Indian a knowledge of the written and spoken English, a training in simple Arithmetic, a knowledge of the rules of health and sanitation, a love of their country and their Empire and a true loyalty to their Empire's King. Moreover, they are taught the Ten Commandments and a knowledge of God, so that they might grow up as law-abiding citizens. Surely such a training is beyond estimation.

Isaac Stringer approached the matter more practically. Regular school attendance, he argued, contradicted the church's and state's determination to keep the Indians away from trading posts and urban centres. The church hoped only that seasonal schools would impart the seeds of learning which the children themselves would nurture. Limiting his claims, Stringer noted that due "to the start they received in schools quite a number of Indians in different parts of the Territory are able to write letters and read a letter, and also work out arithmetical problems such as are necessary for trading." Stringer also wrote to a recent recruit, "It is important that the regular day school should be held whenever possible; not only does it benefit the Indians educationally, but also it is a means of getting an influence over them, and of doing them good." Schools remained an extension, not just an

18 DIA, vol. 6477, file 925-1, pt.1, W.A. Geddes to Secretary, DIA, 23 January 1934.


21 AC, Middleton file, Stringer to Middleton, 25 April 1917.
adjunct of the religious mission. Combining education and proselytizing allowed the church to distribute the financial burden between school house and mission. They were also the only agency capable of providing schooling given the government's parsimonious budget.

The first day schools operated only in conjunction with permanent missions. The first such facility, opened at Buxton Mission (Forty-Mile) clearly held some attraction. Bompas claimed an attendance of 30 to 40 people, including many adults, whenever the natives visited the settlement. The clergy opened schools at Moosehide when the Gold Rush drew natives to that point and at Carcross when Bompas moved the diocesan headquarters there. Thomas Canham similarly maintained a school, albeit irregularly, while at Fort Selkirk. Extended government financing in 1910 allowed the church to place new schools at Champagne, Teslin and Whitehorse. Over the next forty years, the network expanded and contracted according to the availability of funds and suitable teachers. The system peaked at nine schools in 1916-1917 and shrank to as few as two in 1941-1942. Only those attached to mission stations attempted year-round programming, though even there Indian mobility often forced school closures. Moosehide and Selkirk generally maintained a class, but the schools at Champagne, Teslin, Little Salmon, Old Crow, Ross River and other locations seldom operated for more than a few months each summer. (Map 8)


23 ibid.
Restricted to an erratic network of schools, the Anglican Church consistently contacted less than half of the eligible student population. Initially, the schools had an important recreational function, the classes filling with adults, leaving little room for interested children. Though anxious to attract younger pupils, the missionaries nevertheless hesitated to discourage any interest in their offerings. During the 1909 summer session, the average age of Teslin students was 20 years and only 6 of 37 were of school age (6 to 16). The children who registered, furthermore, attended only sporadically, hampering educational efforts (Tables 20 and 21).

**TABLE 20**

YUKON INDIAN CHILDREN CONTACTED BY DAY SCHOOLS, 1920-1954
(FIVE YEAR AVERAGES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>AVERAGE STUDENTS ENROLLED</th>
<th>ELIGIBLE STUDENTS(1)</th>
<th>% ENROLLED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920-1924</td>
<td>97.2</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925-1929</td>
<td>140.4</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>51.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-1934</td>
<td>122.6</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935-1939</td>
<td>123.8</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940-1944</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-1949</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>57.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1954(2)</td>
<td>230(277)</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>62.8(75.7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


2. Figures in brackets represent average annual day school enrollment plus average enrollment of natives in territorial public schools.


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### TABLE 21

**DAY SCHOOL ATTENDANCE, YUKON INDIANS, 1900-1954 (AVERAGES)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Schools</th>
<th>Boys</th>
<th>Girls</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Average Attendance</th>
<th>% Attending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900-04(1)</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>56.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905-09</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910-14</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915-19</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>137.4</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920-24</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>97.2</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925-29</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>140.4</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>41.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-34</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>122.6</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>43.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935-39</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>123.8</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>51.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940-44</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>59.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-49</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>80.4</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>125.4</td>
<td>70.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-54(2)</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>105.4</td>
<td>124.6</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>206.7</td>
<td>89.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Two years only, 1901-02, 1902-03.

(2) 47 students per year (average) enrolled in territorial public schools are included in the tabulation.


Not until the implementation of Mother's Allowance and enforced school enrollment in the late 1940's did students attend regularly. Registration data illustrates that teachers encountered difficulties forming classes and ensuring the children came to school. 25

Inconsistent attendance represented the greatest deficiency in the day school program. Native mobility undermined systematic education, forcing teachers to begin virtually anew each season. The church’s insistence that schools be opened whenever possible only compounded the problems. When new schools opened at Ross River and Rampart House in

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25 DIA files contain many day school returns indicating attendance irregularities. ibid., Particulars regarding Indians of Teslin Lake by J. Bythell, 3 December 1909. Despite Bythell's enthusiasm for the school program, only 7 of 37 students attended more than half the classes. 16 showed up for less than 10 of the 33 sessions.
1916, the church hired recent graduates of the Carcross Indian Residential School as teachers. The Department of Indian Affairs challenged the appointments and that of Julius Kendi (hired to teach at Mayo though he spoke little English) on grounds of academic competency. In defense of Jacob Njootli at Rampart House, Bishop Stringer wrote, "He is perhaps not as well qualified to teach as most of our teachers, but he was the best man available. Again, at this place the Indians have to go off for weeks and months to hunt and fish, so that school can be held only when they come to the Post for a few weeks." Native teachers were seen in the same light as catechists; marginal instruction, however flawed, surpassed neglect. The government reluctantly accepted Stringer's appeal, although they provided significantly lower stipends for the three native teachers.

The enlistment of summer theology students beginning in the 1920's aided the Church's effort to expand the school network. Enthusiastic beyond their experience, the students received assignments to the most poorly-served areas, educationally and religiously. They seldom returned to an area more than two successive summers, compounding continuing educational irregularities. Even permanent missionaries added to the over-all transiency, circulating freely within the territory and often departing for friendlier climates. With the exception of Benjamin

26 DIA, vol. 3962, file 147, 654-1, pt.2, J.D. McLean to John Hauksley, 30 August 1916; ibid., Hauksley to McLean, 1 August 1916.
27 ibid., Stringer to Hauksley, 24 October 1916.
Totty (28 years), C.C. Brett (17 years at Teslin and Champagne) and Kathleen Martin (an interrupted 8 year stint at Fort Selkirk), teachers seldom remained long in one area.

Fear of excessive cost, particularly with minimal expectation of return, increased the government's reluctance to expand the school network. The Indian Agents repeatedly challenged church attempts to open new establishments and in 1933 even tried to withdraw funding for three seasonal schools. When Father Morrissett of the OMI requested school supplies in 1944 for Burwash, the officer in charge of Welfare and Training warned, "These could, of course, be provided, but our experience is that once this is done we receive a request shortly afterwards for teacher's salary, and rent of building, furnishings, etc." The government's reticence evaporated at war's end. New legislation requiring school attendance prodded the Department of Indian Affairs to expand educational facilities. The government conducted a series of educational surveys and where appropriate, as at Old Crow in 1950, opened new or long-closed schools.

While money was available for day schools, in the post-war period the government favoured the less expensive option of integrating the children into an expanding territorial public school system. All earlier attempts had been quickly, even rudely, rebuffed. In the early 1930's, several natives attended the Whitehorse public school, but for unknown

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reasons authorities revoked that privilege in 1935.\textsuperscript{32} A similar effort at Mayo fell in the face of exclusionist pressure. The Teslin Joint School, opened in the late 1940's and available to both native and white students, offered a more positive portent.\textsuperscript{33} The Teslin institution provided a model for the following decade, as public schools replaced native day schools. By 1955, 126 native children enrolled in territorial public schools while 198 attended a dwindling number of church-administered facilities.\textsuperscript{34}

Seasonality, limited attendance, native mobility and teacher transiency effectively undermined the restricted potential of the Anglican day schools. Children maintained only irregular contact with the education system even in such comparatively permanent settlements as Moosehide and Selkirk.\textsuperscript{35} With no standardized instruction and a teaching corps of widely varying quality, the impact of education was minimal. Even Archdeacon Canham, active translator and noted missionary, allegedly said that he placed "very little faith in the work that he was accom-

\textsuperscript{32} DIA, vol. 6477, file 925-1, pt.1, W.A. Geddes to Secretary, DIA, 6 February 1935.

\textsuperscript{33} DIA, vol. 6478, file 930-1, pt.1, R.J. Meek to IAB, 16 October 1948; Meek to IAB, 25 January 1950; Extract from Quarterly Report of R.J. Meek, 1 April - 30 June 1949.

\textsuperscript{34} Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Reports, 1950-1956.

\textsuperscript{35} Moosehide encountered particular difficulties attracting suitable teachers. Long-time missionary Benjamin Totty had serious hearing problems; AC, Totty, Stringer to Totty, 26 March 1918; DIA, vol. 3962, file 147, 654-1, pt.2, John Ross to Secretary, DIA, 18 December 1903. In the 1940's, M.J. Bridge operated the school. Parents complained about his teaching and the fact that the children were required to do work in his home. DIA, vol. 6477, file 927-1, pt.1, Agent's Report, Moosehide Indian School, May 1948; Meek to IAB, 29 June 1949; C.A. Clark Report re: Moosehide School, 11 July 1947; AC, Moosehide file #2, Bernard F. Neary to W.R. Adams, 6 July 1949.
plishing in the education of these Indian children and claims that they have not made any improvement since a few years." Acknowledging the limitations, teachers sought to offer only basic literacy and mathematical skills, preferring to mingle education with healthy offerings of practical Christianity and moral training. While a few teachers, exhibiting more enthusiasm than insight, waxed eloquently of the transformation they had wrought, most admitted their rudimentary accomplishments. The day school program lived up to the federal government's pessimistic forecast and served primarily as a means of financing an extension of the Anglican missions.

Day schools did not accomplish their fundamental purpose. Intended to effect a basic alteration of native knowledge and interests, the schools instead had a negligible impact. At best, the teachers provided a marginal literacy and elementary computational skills, but only to a

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36 DIA, vol. 3962, file 147, 654-1, pt.2, John Ross, Supt. of Schools to F.T. Congdon, 1904.

37 DIA, vol. 6477, file 925-1, pt.1, A.H. Sovereign to Secretary, DIA, 21 August 1933; AC, Parsons file, Arthur B. Parsons to Coldrick, 10 November 1933.

few of those in attendance. Throughout the territory, the schools functioned alternatively as community recreation, drawing most of the adults and many children, or as a baby-sitting service, the children in attendance only as long as their parents wished to remain in camp. Few natives committed their children to the intermittent program, undermining the church's best efforts on a strained budget. Importantly, the federal government did not share the clergy's dismay at the problems faced by the day schools. Bureaucrats and ministers deemed the Yukon an area of slow industrial development and foresaw little purpose in providing extensive education for natives likely to remain as hunters and trappers. In theory, and even according to Anglican intentions, the colonial schools sought to undermine native culture while offering the skills believed necessary for participation in the dominant society. Without federal moral, legal and financial backing, however, the Anglican church's enthusiastic program fell short, having only a marginal impact on its native students. The same cannot be said for the Carcross Residential School.

To most educators, residential schools offered the best means of effecting a scholastic and cultural transformation of native students. By separating children from family and environment for an extended period, ensconcing them in a "total institution" which offered guidance in all areas of moral and social development, boarding establishments provided an opportunity to turn out graduates vastly different (administrators said superior) to their parents and fellow natives. Altbach and Kelly's

description of the colonial school spoke directly to the residential institution, for it was this educational situation that theoretically allowed educators to shape their students according to an ordained mold. Though the Anglican Church's Carcross Residential School lacked much of the cultural imperialism typically associated with such facilities, it had a noticeable impact on those students passing through its portals.

Bishop Bompas established a boarding school at Forty-Mile in 1891, although most of his students were orphans or abandoned children. When Bompas transferred his diocesan base to Carcross in 1900, he initially left his small school behind, although he continued to pursue the project. Convinced of the need for a better boarding school, he appealed to the Department of Indian Affairs:

> I am wishing now to apply to the Government to open a new Indian Boarding School for orphan and other Destitute Indian children either at Whitehorse or here at Caribou Crossing and to maintain it themselves. I think this the only way to make the remnant of the Indian race in the next generation useful members of society.

The government rejected the request. Bompas then transplanted the Forty-Mile school to Carcross, offering a foster home to approximately two dozen children each year. When Bompas died in 1906, John Hawksley assumed responsibility for the school and the new Bishop, Isaac Stringer, continued his predecessors' campaign for government assistance.

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39 Altbach and Kelly, "Introduction."

40 Boon, The Anglican Church, 222-223; Cody, Apostle, 253-273; PAC, Bowen Papers, "Incidents in the Life of R.J. Bowen," p. 100.

41 DIA, vol. 3962, file 147, 654-1, pt.2, Bompas to Hon. J.H. Ross, 7 March 1903.

42 Cody, 310-336; YTA, Preliminary Manuscripts, "History of Choutta
The Anglican Church’s appeal for a boarding school came at a most inauspicious time. From 1871, when the federal government signed its first treaty with the Indians of western Canada, education and negotiated settlements went hand in hand. Modelled after eastern programs, the government organized boarding schools on reserves and, in 1883, opened an industrial school at Battleford. "It is self-evident," the government confidently declared, "that the prime purpose of Indian education is to assist in solving what may be called in the Indian problem, to elevate the Indian from his condition of savagery, to make him a self-supporting member of the state and eventually a citizen in good standing."* The goals remained intact for a long time but by the early 20th Century many educators and bureaucrats acknowledged the apparent failings of the boarding-industrial school format.

Typically wary of increased expenditures, the government especially feared further involvement in an allegedly flawed experiment. Senior Department of Indian Affairs official Frank Pedley suggested a more flexible program, arguing that "it would seem to be good policy at this

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juncture to attempt to devise a better system of Indian education, applying to each locality methods which would best achieve the desired result." Particular concern centred on the schools' inability to provide effectively for the "after life of the Indian." Advanced technical training of literary skills served little purpose for native children destined for life on a reserve or a trapline. The Anglican church acknowledged the deficiencies of the institution. A special committee of the Missionary Society of the Church of England in Canada (M.S.C.C.) recommended that teaching be limited to basic literacy and computational skills plus "such additional work as will fit the child to take his place as a workman in the locality in which he is to live." Minister of the Interior Frank Oliver offered more explicit criticism. In defense of the (less expensive) day schools, Oliver argued:

My belief is that the attempt to elevate the Indian by separating the child from his parents and educating him as a white man has turned out to be a deplorable failure....The mutual love between parent and child is the strongest influence for the betterment of the world, and when that influence is absolutely cut apart or is deliberately intended to be cut apart as in the education of Indian children in industrial schools the means taken defeats itself....To teach an Indian child that his parents are degraded beyond measure and that whatever they did or thought was wrong could only result in the child becoming, as the ex-pupils of the industrial schools have become, admittedly and unquestionably very much less desirable element of society than their parents who never saw the schools.

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44 Pedley to Tucker, 21 March 1906.

45 GSA. Memorandum on Indian Missions and Indian Schools, submitted on behalf of the Special Indian Committee of M.S.C.C., 14 March 1906. The concurrence of the Anglicans, Presbyterians and Methodist (the Roman Catholics refused to participate in an inter-denominational conference) with Pedley's comments is found in GSA 75-103, MSCC, "Memorandum of a Conference," 24-27 March 1908, S.H. Blake, Chairman.

46 GSA 75-103, Series 2-14, MSCC. Frank Oliver to A.C.C., 28 January 1908.
While both the federal government and the M.S.C.C. viewed boarding schools with disfavour, Bishop Stringer proceeded with his appeal. The 1907 Synod of the Diocese of the Yukon endorsed the project, as did T.G. Bragg, Superintendent of Schools for the Yukon. Resistance at the national level persisted nonetheless. J.L. McLean, Secretary for the Department of Indian Affairs, shared Oliver and Pedley’s reservations. He wrote, "The immediate protection of Indian children has too often been considered as the chief end in view, not the final results that are to be achieved and the usefulness of the education to be imparted to enable the children to support themselves when they are thrown upon their own resources." McLean directed B.C. Indian School Inspector A.W. Vowell and A.E. Green to visit the Yukon and assess the need for such a facility. Their report likely met with some resistance in Ottawa for their 1906 submission seconded Stringer’s request.

Oliver reluctantly complied with the recommendations, although he remained personally unconvinced. Completed in 1911 and located on a small farm near Carcross, the facility initially housed only thirty students, an increase over the twenty formerly handled in Bompas’ quarters. The new building, complete with dormitory and school facilities, remained in

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47 Vancouver School of Theology, Anglican Church Archives; Journal of the Synod of the Diocese of the Yukon, Whitehorse, 1907; Boon, p. 228.


49 DIA, vol. 3962, file 147, 654-1, J.D. McLean to A.W. Vowell, 4 April 1908. The comments came directly from a subordinates letter, ibid., Accountant, Memorandum to Deputy Superintendent General, 20 February 1908.

50 YTA, AC, New Series, file 2, Vowell and Green to Secretaries, DIA, 14 April, 1908.
use until destroyed by fire in 1939. The school operated out of several
different temporary quarters until 1954 when, after protracted debate as
to the best site for the institution, the government erected a 120 stu-
dent structure. The Anglican clergy had the boarding school long de-
manded, but problems persisted. They encountered difficulty securing
students, had difficulty defining the appropriate educational and social
program, and struggled to assist their graduates' re-entry into the In-
dian communities.\textsuperscript{51}

In attempting to fill the school, the clergy sought to satisfy two
divergent goals.\textsuperscript{52} Administrators wished to maintain Bompas' original
purpose of providing a home for the destitute and orphaned, but also
hoped to use the school as a training ground for the future leaders of
the Yukon Indians. Removed from the baleful influences of a backward
home environment and cloistered from the insidious depredations of avar-
icious whites, boarders would be educationally and morally prepared to
elevate families and communities. The school, it was hoped, would not
only improve the students, for they in turn were to serve as instruments
of "civilization" for the dispersed native population. To meet the dual
aspirations, clergy attempted to locate the poor and deprived, but also

\textsuperscript{51} ibid., Notes of Interview, 26 February 1909.

\textsuperscript{52} Gibbs, "History of Choutla School"; Church of England in Canada,
Choutla Indian School (Missionary Society, Indian Residential School
Commission, n.d.); A. King, The School at Nopass (Toronto: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1967), 36-38; The latter, a study of the school
in the 1960's, contains sketchy and unreliable historical sections.
On the debate to relocate the school, see DIA, vol. 5479, file 940-1,
pt.2, McGill to Deputy Minister, 25 November 1942; Geddes to McGill,
11 November 1942; AC, Carcross Property file; DIA, vol. 8762, file
906/25-1-001, C. Clark, "An Educational Survey with Reference to the
Relocation of Carcross Indian Residential School," 8 September 1950.
sought to recruit "the best both in health and intellect."  

Marketing the school proved more difficult than anticipated. Ongoing missionary efforts to "procure children" directed special attention at the off-spring of influential Indians. Bishop Stringer not surprisingly expressed dismay that "some of our best and most influential Indians object to sending their children away to school." Stringer carefully cultivated his territory-wide contacts, often allowing special conditions to win adherents. Administrators allowed the daughter of trader Poole Field to enroll in Carcross in 1918 because, as Stringer wrote, her father had "an immense influence over the Liard and Pelly Indians, and can do a great deal in getting children for our schools." Stringer and the Anglican clergy expended considerable energy in securing such well-placed children, but often found parents unwilling to part with their off-spring.

Convincing parents to accept the prolonged separation proved to be a major stumbling block in many instances. Children from the Stewart and Porcupine River areas, for example, stayed away for up to ten years as the school and the government would not authorize summer vacations to such distant posts. The affective bond between parent and child proved a serious restraint, but other factors also impinged upon the decision

53 History of Chouttla School, 12.
54 AC, Westgate file, Stringer to Dr. Westgate, 19 April 1923.
55 AC, Acquisition 79/52, Stringer to Johnson, 24 August 1918. He also arranged for the entry of half-breed Jeff van Gorder from Ross River at the same time.
to enrol students. Children had an important economic function in the Indians' nomadic lifestyle, particularly as they entered their teens, helping with harvesting or camp operations. Expectation of economic hardship, therefore, added to parental reluctance to accept the church's appeal. Occasionally children rebelled against their enforced departure, resisting the unknown in favour of the security of family. Such actions typically succeeded, but most children seem to have simply accepted their lot.

The missionaries' efforts succeeded to a certain extent, as they kept the school filled close to capacity. A number of parents obviously agreed with the clergy's argument that their children's future lay with literacy, advanced training and religious guidance. Many native catechists, already influenced by the church's teachings, sent their children to the school. The attempt to attract the "better" Indians, however, fell far short of its goal. Initial reticence increased in the 1920's when a series of deaths in the school and numerous stories about poor food and cramped quarters undermined the institution's respectability. The facility did considerably better as a home for destitute and orphaned children. Between 1930 and 1950, a minimum of 30% of all new students came from identified situations of family distress (Table 22).

57 AC, AC 79/52, Stringer to Johnson, 24 August 1923.

58 Re: the children of Amos Njootli, see AC, Amos Njootli file, Stringer to Njootli, 26 January 1947.
TABLE 22

STATUS OF PARENTS, NEW REGISTRANTS, CARCROSS RESIDENTIAL SCHOOL, 1930-1950

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Both Alive</th>
<th>Both Dead</th>
<th>Mother Dead</th>
<th>Father Dead</th>
<th>Both Dead</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% Family Distress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930-44</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-50</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Registration documents, Carcross School, RG10, vol. 6481, file 940-10, pt.4 to pt.6. The collection of registration forms does not appear to be complete.

(1) Destitution as can be ascertained from supporting documents. The number is likely understated considerably.

Missionaries, government agents and police officers readily identified children in need of special care and ensured that they were sent to the school. The Carcross School, then, continued to meet Bompas' original purpose, providing a home for many children who otherwise may have suffered. It was less successful in attracting the selected children whom the clergy hoped would serve as leaders for the Yukon Indians.

That despite missionary recruitment, care of the destitute and efforts by government agents to secure students the school often had excess capacity indicates continuing reservations among the Indians. Epi-

59 See for example correspondence re: the Chitzi children of Old Crow, sent to the school following their parents separation. DIA, vol. 6481, file 940-10, pt.5, J.E. Gibben to Secretary, IAB, 23 May 1945, 15 July 1946. There was some concern expressed that some parents would "dump" their children on the school's care. AC, Barlow file, Barlow to Bishop of Yukon, 18 March 1925. Such fears proved generally unfounded.


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demics, including an outbreak of influenza which claimed four lives in 1920, frequently hit the school. The death of children at the institution was not uncommon, although they often succumbed to tuberculosis or other diseases contracted long before their arrival. The school's reputation as a dangerous place for children gained greater currency with each death and serious illness, impeding further recruitment efforts. School administrators nonetheless succeeded in attracting a substantial, though seldom complete, complement of students up to 1950. The increase in attendance noticeable in the 1940's illustrates increased school capacity and, after 1945, the federal government's introduction of compulsory education.

Registration records reflect the church's difficulties in attracting suitable candidates. Ideally, educators wanted children as young as possible and sought to draw them equally from around the territory. Such a policy, they hoped, would have the greatest possible impact and would ensure that trained leaders would disperse throughout the territory. Although children as young as six years (and occasionally younger in the case of orphans) came to the schools, the average age at entry ranged from nine to eleven years. Most came to Carcross with little educational background, except for temporary sessions at the day school. (Table 23)


TABLE 23
Carcross School Enrollments,
Characteristics of Students,
1930-1950

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recorded Registrations</th>
<th>Average Age</th>
<th>No Schooling(1)</th>
<th>Less than One Year(2)</th>
<th>More than One Year</th>
<th>Previous Resident-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930-34</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935-39</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940-44</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-50</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Either identified as no previous schooling or simply no entry in the relevant blank on the registration form.

(2) Less than one season in a native day school.

Source: Same as Table 22.

Registrations in the pre-1944 period suggest that efforts to bring students from around the territory fell short. The southern districts accounted for most of the registrants, with more than 70% coming from Whitehorse, Teslin, Champagne, Carcross and Atlin. Importantly, children from these areas typically returned to their families each summer, maintaining at least minimal contact while enrolled in school. Following the introduction of compulsory education in 1945 (the element of compulsion was applied gradually), the geographic distribution shifted. Between 1945 and 1950, less than half (45%) came from the south while Old Crow, which had provided no children for the school in the preceding fifteen years, sent twenty-two, or almost one quarter of all new registrants. Indeed, the total number of students from the area north of Fort Selkirk increased almost three times (17 to 49). (Table 24)
### TABLE 24

**ORIGINS OF NEW REGISTRANTS, CARCROSS RESIDENTIAL SCHOOL, 1930-1950**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Carcross</th>
<th>Peel</th>
<th>Tahltan</th>
<th>Tagish</th>
<th>Big Salmon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930-44</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-50</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altin</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carmacks</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peel</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tahltan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tagish</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big Salmon</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mayo</th>
<th>Kluane</th>
<th>Moosehide</th>
<th>Teslin</th>
<th>Champagne</th>
<th>Old Crow</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930-44</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-50</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Same as Table 22.

Government intervention, and not relentless church appeals, provided the impetus for wider enrollment. It was not until after 1945 that the school attracted the number and range of students administrators had long anticipated.

Inconsistent registration failed to deter the Anglican Church from its educational objectives. To the clergy, the school promised to "elevate" the Yukon Indians. Despite their expectations, church boarding schools approached the education component of their program with limited goals. Neither government nor clergy saw the Carcross facility as either an industrial school or a scholastic institution. When recommending construction of the facility British Columbia School Inspectors Vowell and Green suggested:

At the present time, the simplest form of education, such as reading, writing and arithmetic, with instruction as to housekeeping, sanitary measures, and, it may be, carpentry, is all that, in our opinion, is necessary; to go beyond that would be rather to unfit them for their condition in life instead of aiding them to overcome such difficulties as may be
met with in their struggle for existence.\textsuperscript{63}

Educators did not intend to turn out industrial workers. Instead, in recognition of the fact that most would return to families and a harvesting lifestyle, different priorities took effect. Instead of "white" Indians, the school sought to make "better" Indians, schooled in the necessities of health, hygiene, nutrition. Christian morals and the Protestant work ethic, yet armed with the requisite skills of the hunter and trapper.

The school program featured an amalgam of education and practical training.\textsuperscript{64} Instruction in reading, writing and arithmetic typically occupied the morning, with the remainder of the day spent on work around the school and occupational lessons. Boys chopped wood, fished, hunted, worked in the carpentry shop and attempted agriculture. Girls assisted in the kitchen and with household chores around the school. Teachers expanded beyond such standard instruction, offering the girls training in moccasin making and beadwork, pursuits which would "be useful and profitable to them in after life." There were deviations from the pattern, including the installation of a student-run printing press, used to publish the church quarterly \textit{Northern Lights} for several years and an expanded industrial workshop. On balance, however, the teachers sought to provide necessary skills, albeit defined by Anglican clergy, for successful re-entry into Yukon society. The goal was not to turn out in-

\textsuperscript{63} AC, New Series, file 2, Vowell and Green, to Secretary, DIA, 14 August 1908.

\textsuperscript{64} For reports of the program in practice, see AC, Carcross School, file #2, Report of E.D. Evans, 29 April 1912; Report of W.T. Townsend, 31 March 1914; AC, C.F. Johnson, file 2, Report of Chas. Johnson, 31 March 1918, plus frequent reports in \textit{Northern Lights}.
ustrial workers for the Canadian economy.\textsuperscript{65}

Work-related instruction did not seek to disrupt existing skills, but in a major departure from typical native child-rearing practises, the school insisted upon a strict, often authoritarian code of discipline.\textsuperscript{66} Administrators restricted socializing within the school; under most principals, boys and girls seldom came in contact and enjoyed little access to the nearby Carcross community. As principal from 1918-1920, Dr. Grasset-Smith allowed virtually no interaction between the sexes, a level of control even other missionaries found objectionable.\textsuperscript{67} Breaches of school regulations, especially regarding theft or malicious damage were dealt with firmly. Facing a rash of thefts in 1940, H.C.M. Grant cut all the hair off any child who broke school ethics. As he succinctly noted, "It checked stealing at once."\textsuperscript{68} Programming varied as principals and staff passed swiftly through the school, but the rigid work schedule, limited socializing, firm discipline and forced adherence to the

\textsuperscript{65} The summary is based on ibid., "Report of the Superintendent of Indian Education." DIA, Annual Report 1909-1910, 351; DIA, vol. 3962, file 147, 654-1, pt.2, Ross to Congdon, 16 April 1904, Ross to DIA, 2 April 1906. T.C. Bragg to McLean, 1 May 1907, Bragg to Secretary, DIA, 21 April 1910; DIA, vol. 6479, file 940-1, pt.1, Stockton to Deputy Superintendent General, 29 November 1912, Stringer to Secretary, DIA, 31 March 1913 (a reply to Stockton's criticism), Hawksley to J.D. McLean, 7 January 1915; ibid., pt.2, Hawksley to A.F. Mackenzie, 25 March 1931; H.C.M. Grant to Superintendent of Indian Affairs, 5 February 1940; AC, Carcross School, file #1, E.D. Evans to J.D. McLean, 29 April 1912; "Report of Venerable Archdeacon T.H. Canham, 31 March 1913, DIA, Annual Report 1912/13, 618; GSA, 75-103, Series 2-14, MSCC, Collins to Blake, 27 April 1904, 13 March 1909, 11 February 1909; Northern Lights (various issues); "History of Chouttla School."

\textsuperscript{66} AC, Johnson file #2, Report of Chas. F. Johnson, 31 March 1918.

\textsuperscript{67} AC, Carcross file, C.E. Whittaker to Dr. Smith, 2 July 1919.

\textsuperscript{68} DIA, vol. 6479, file 940-1, pt.2, Grant to Superintendent of Indian Affairs, 5 February 1940.
teachers' guidance remained intact.

The combination of an apparently flexible instructional program and rigid behavioural control was fraught with contradictions. Educational concern for the student's later life was offset by the residential school regime. Social skills were, at best, not taught. At worst, they were repressed. The firm discipline and work schedules lacked relevance to the natives' mode of life, the environment to which they were shortly expected to return. Most importantly, the concerted effort to improve native hygiene and to inculcate modern work habits and values of necessity called into disrepute the mannerisms and standards of the children's parents. Ironically, though supposedly prepared to re-entry to native society, the students had been taught to abhor that environment, to look with disrespect if not disgust upon their families' customs.

Sent home for a variety of reasons, including graduation, parental appeal, disciplinary reasons, or because deemed incapable of learning, the children of the Carcross Residential School faced a traumatic transition.\(^{69}\) Removed from nomadism to the dormitory confines of the boarding school, students encountered a difficult task upon re-entry. Initially, the clergy saw the departure of students as the end of their work, each child representing a new mission worker assisting in the general improvement of the Yukon Indians. Expectations shortly turned to

\(^{69}\) On specific cases, see AC, Moosehide file, Sarah Jane Esau to Bishop, 31 August 1919; DIA, vol. 6481, file 940-10, pt.4, Grant to Dewdney, 17 November 1941, Phelan to Grant, 8 August 1938, Grant to Phelan, 24 August 1938, Binning to Secretary, DIA, 11 April 1938, Grant to O.C., RCMP, 2 March 1934, Meek to IAB, 18 August 1947; ibid., pt.4, T.B. Caulkin to Principal, 16 March 1935; Binning to Secretary, DIA, 15 December 1937; DIA, vol. 6481, file 940-10, pt.6, Meek to IAB, 19 August 1947; ibid., pt.4, Grant to Binning, 12 May 1938; ibid., pt.6, Meek to IAB, 4 April 1949.
despair as missionaries came to fear the consequences of attempted return to the realities of village life. An Old Crow commentator noted in 1926:

If Caroline Moses(') girl comes back, she is going into the filthiest hovel in the country....A dirt floor, two tiny windows which cannot be seen for the flies, stinking meat and fish being all over the cabin, the stench unspeakable, six people already there, and now a seventh, and under the willows on the dirt floor, all the filth of a long winter throwing off a deadly effluvia, in a stifling heat....Bishop, I plead with you not for humanity's sake, but for the sake of the Dear Lord who redeemed us, not to send a decent girl back to untold misery and evil, where she cannot help but curse the very day she was born.\(^70\)

Allowing for morally-inspired excess, the writer makes the point, reiterated repeatedly, that the Carcross students faced a difficult challenge.

While many graduates found it difficult to meld residential school values with village life, a few did considerably better. The clergy made much of these successes, closely following the careers of such individuals as James Wood, Jacob Njootli and Maggie Daniels who served the church as day school teachers or native catechists. Several others utilized their school skills to make a more complete entry into white society, settling near Whitehorse or Dawson and even applying for enfranchisement.\(^71\) Others attempted to follow up on their school experience in a less noticeable but perhaps more important way. The church took particular pride in the efforts of one student who, upon returning to Selkirk in 1939, effected a radical change in her family's habits and man-

\(^70\) AC, McCullum file, Wood to Stringer, 14 April 1926.

Such successes were few, noted by the church all the more for their uniqueness. Most of the children found themselves trapped, torn between school values and the realities of camp life. Many simply discarded the years of education and returned to their pre-school manners. For others, a longer, more painful transition ensued. As a summer missionary at Carmacks noted in 1934, "They are potential outcasts of their own people and are not quite up to the standards of the white intellect. In other words, they are 'betwixt and between' - a condition of pitiful helplessness."

Because the success of the residential school program rested on these students, the Anglican clergy maintained a close watch on their progress. Instead of reveling in the results of the venture, the graduates serving as educators in the camps, the clergy scrambled to protect them from the trials of readjustment. To preserve their investment, missionaries endeavored to keep the young people from the twin evils of village life and white dominated urban centres. Ironically, the Church ended up protecting the students from the very environment they were intended to reform. Most saw the inter-marriage of graduates as the best means of protecting those versed in the new morality and customs. This attempt to save the one group only highlighted their distinctiveness and

72 AC, Selkirk Children Reports, Robinson to Dickson, 7 March 1939.

73 AC, Carmacks - Little Salmon file, Report of Missionary Work carried on from May 23 to August 31, 1934 in and about Carmack. See also AC, Carcross file, C.E. Whittaker to Dr. Smith, 2 July 1919; AC, C.F. Johnson, Stringer to C.F. Johnson, 31 October 1917; DIA, vol. 3962, file 147, 654-1, pt.2, T.G. Bragg to Secretary, DIA, 23 June 1910; DIA, vol. 6479, file 940-1, pt.2, J.E. Gibben to Clarence, 12 January 1942; YG, vol. 11, file 2335, pt.6, Hawkins to Principal, Choutla School, 27 May 1933; AC, Old Crow file, McCabe to Coldrich, 11 December 1937; AC, McCullum file, E.D. Wood to Stringer, 14 April 1926.
compounded the difficulties of re-entry. Nonetheless, missionaries and school administrators encouraged suitable marriages, often over the graduates' protests. While few supported one theology student's recommendation that a separate village be established for the young people, most missionaries privately acknowledged that the residential school children could not be left entirely to their own devices.

The ambiguities of the residential school concept were apparent from the start and, prodded by the federal government, the Anglican Church attempted to modify its curriculum and training program. The clergy, however, refused to compromise their desire to provide a new outlook on life, health and work - all in a Christian framework. To do so would deny their central purpose and their aspirations for the Yukon Indians. The problems encountered upon re-entry, therefore, reflected the structure and purpose of the institution. Conflict between long-separa-rated children and parents, between school acquired ideas and those of the village, was as inevitable as it proved painful. Designed to provide a generation of leaders for the Yukon Indians, the Carcross School

74 AC, Whittaker Papers, Stringer to Archdeacon Whittaker, 20 February 1915; AC, Townsend file, Stringer to Townsend, 28 January 1916; AC, Bennett file, Stringer to Miss Bennett, 13 July 1918.

75 AC, Carmacks - Little Salmon file, Report of Missionary Work, 23 May to 31 August 1934.

76 The government did not abandon the residential school program. As a result of a Joint Parliamentary Committee on Indian Affairs established in 1946, it was decided to expand and alter the boarding school program. The Carcross School was enlarged in 1953-54 to accommodate 125 students, Anglican control was weakened and finally eliminated and a more assimilationist program was implemented. See GSA 75-103, Series 3-3, Indian Work Investigation Committee, 1946-1974, Indian Work Investigation Commission Report of the General Synod, Winnipeg 1946; M. Gibbs, "History of Chouttla School;" King, The School at Nopas."
instead produced children unsure of their place, uneasy in both native and white spheres, unclear as to their future place in Yukon society. 77

Residential schools in general and the Carcross facility in particular epitomize the colonial school concept. Altbach and Kelly argue that such institutions "represented a basic denial of the colonized's past and withheld from them the tools to regain the future." 78 Although administrators attempted to make the program relevant to the student's later life, moral and social programming demanded a rejection of parental values. In sum, the institution failed to provide an obvious route into either native or white society. Unlike the day schools, which adapted to seasonal movements and remained irregular and virtually inconsequential, the Carcross School forced major changes on its young inhabitants.

Other boarding schools operated in the territory, though none achieved the profile or importance of the Carcross facility. In 1920, the Anglican Church opened St. Paul's Hostel in Dawson City, providing a dormitory for half-breed children excluded by law from attending Carcross. The students attended Dawson public school, a matter of considerable concern in the town. The Hostel differed significantly in that clergy emphasized the children's white parentage, the explicit goal being...

77 Marginality is not an uncommon consequence of colonial education systems. See A. Memmi, The Dominated Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1956).

ing to allow the student "to fit himself to take his place in the community as a white man." The third boarding school opened in Whitehorse in 1946 under Baptist evangelist Rev. H.I. Lee. Funded as part of the federal government's post-war program to provide improved educational services, Lee's school placed considerable emphasis on industrial education and regular academic programs, much as Carcross began to do after 1945. A non-sectarian institution, the Whitehorse school was available to all those unable to enter regular public schools, including status Indians, half-breeds, enfranchised Indians and a few "poor whites." Lee attracted more than sixty students his first year, with children coming primarily from the Whitehorse and the Champagne areas.

St. Paul's Hostel and Reverend Lee's facility were markedly different institutions from the Carcross Residential School, one serving a distinct clientele, the other entering the scene following a reordering of federal educational priorities. St. Paul's indicates the commitment of both church and government to the sizeable half-breed population, while the funding of the Whitehorse school foreshadowed the establishment of non-sectarian (i.e. non-Anglican) industrial and assimilationist educa-

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tion in the post-war Yukon.\textsuperscript{81}

More important than these two later operations, particularly as the challenge persisted throughout the Twentieth Century, was the Catholic Church's attempt to enter the territorial educational field. The battle for the natives' affections began in the 1860's, but to the 1930's the Catholic Church made few inroads into the Anglican strong-hold.\textsuperscript{82} The latter claimed exclusive educational jurisdiction in the territory, citing its long history of uninterrupted missionary work to substantiate its claims. Responding to a 1902 rumour that the federal government was "considering" Catholic Indian schools, Bishop Bompas angrily wrote:

If the Government are laying a neat plot to take the Education out of our hands and give it to the Romanists it is a piece of unjust tyranny and heartless religious persecution which ought to be exposed. No other religious denomination than ours has ever made any attempt to...educate any Yukon Indian children or Indian adults except ours, nor would the Indians attend any other school than ours as they all belong to our church.\textsuperscript{83}

The Anglicans claimed few areas of exclusive jurisdiction across the country; they jealously guarded the ones they held.


\textsuperscript{83} DIA, vol. 3962, file 147, 654-1, pt.2, Bompas to Secretary, DIA, 18 June 1902.
Undeterred, the Catholic Church continued its efforts to break into the area, focusing initially on the Stewart River region as many of the Indians sporadically contacted Catholic missionaries in the Mackenzie River valley. In 1939, the OMI moved into Teslin Lake and Burwash, launching a direct challenge at the former site to an existing Anglican mission. The natives viewed the gathering doctrinal debate with amusement. Stikine Indian Agent Harper Reed noted after visiting Teslin, "They (the Indians) were found divided, some stated that the Mission that paid the highest 'wages' for any work done, would get their attendance. In fact the matter was looked on as a 'joke' in which the Indians would come off best." The battle for souls became a contest over education as each side sought the right to teach — some would say indoctrinate — the Indians, especially since the effort would be financed by the federal government.

The Oblate mission requested federal funding for a boarding school in 1940, claiming 549 adherents in the Yukon and Northern British Columbia. Rebuffed, they proceeded with plans to provide an alternative day school and interceded to keep Catholic students out of Carcross Residential School. At Teslin, Father Drean, OMI, allegedly kept children away from the Anglican school by taking the boys fishing or having them tend his nets. The confrontation became even more serious. Anglican mis-

84 AC, New Series, file 1, Totty to O’Meara, 20 August 1908; AC, Leigh file, G.F. Leigh to Bishop, 24 October 1927.
86 ibid., Reed to Secretary, IAB, 16 August 1939.
87 ibid., J.O. Plourde to H.W. McGill, 10 February 1940.
sionary Robert Ward claimed in 1941 that "the RCs have worked up some sort of male SS corps which goes about to the C of E households and attempts to browbeat them." Responding in kind two years later, Anglican Stanley Webb drew "up a list of some prominent(RC) errors and am starting an anti-R.C. campaign." The battleground soon shifted to education.

To support their demands for a residential school, Catholic clergy began in the mid-1940's to protest more vigorously the enrollment of baptized Catholics at Carcross, a contravention of the Indian Act. Unhappily provoked by the Anglican-Catholic contest, the Department of Indian Affairs reluctantly agreed in 1949 to open a Catholic boarding school in the region. Initially slated for Teslin, the government moved the facility to Lower Post, located along the newly opened Alaska Highway just south of Watson Lake. The Catholics, no less than the Anglicans, felt education and especially residential schools held the key to the ultimate success of their spiritual appeal. The confrontation continued.

88 AC, Teslin file. Ward to My Lord, 7 March 1941.
89 AC, Teslin file. Ward to Right Reverend W.A. Geddes, 9 July 1941.
The Anglicans feared that the "Roman Catholic might 'take a knight's move' and try to establish in the central Yukon." and sought to meet the challenge. The Catholics expanded efforts in the Mayo-Ross River districts, the resulting competition echoing the situation in Teslin a decade earlier. "The New Priest," wrote Norman Wareham of Mayo in 1950, "went all out for the Indians and is still taking advantage(sic) of every possible opportunity to bribe them into the communion of the Roman Church. The Indians at the village are one hundred per cent behind the Church of England." The establishment of Reverend Lee's school only confused the situation, with Catholics, Anglicans and now Baptists competing for native students. Uncharacteristically, Bishop J.L. Coudert, OMI, appealed that Lee's "propaganda" be stopped as it was "paralyzing both the Catholic and Anglican educational work in the Yukon."

Centring primarily on education, these doctrinal disputes emphasized body counts more than instruction. The confrontation between the Anglicans and Catholics in particular represented the culmination of a century-long battle over spheres of influence in the mission field. The battle for converts, unrelenting attempts to discredit the opposing faith and controversies over schools seriously undermined the educational and religious efforts of both denominations. Anglican missionary Robert


Ward and Indian Agent Reed both noted that the Teslin debates led to serious community and family dissension, a logical consequence of the vitriolic recriminations. By the late 1940's, the Yukon Indians had become pawns in the confrontation of faiths. The battle over educational jurisdictions stood at the centre of the controversy, as both Catholics and Anglicans recognized the importance of federal subsidies for schooling in permitting an expansion of missionary work. Not surprisingly, the confrontation served to discredit both education and religion in the eyes of the natives, limiting or reducing the questionable impact of institutional innovations.

The educational offerings of the Anglican church and, latterly, the Catholics and Presbyterians represented an attempted form of cultural imperialism. To the whites, education promised to lift the Indians from a heathen, non-industrial past and prepare them for integration into white society. Territorial realities, however, muted such bold aspirations. Limited settlement and cyclical development reduced the prospects for a deeply entrenched industrial order, just as the natives' affinity for the harvesting life reduced the appeal of the modern communities. Acknowledging this, both government and church shied away from a rigid, formal education system, resulting in a scattered, inefficient day school network of limited importance. Only in the Carcross Residential School did a reluctant government and enthusiastic clergy attempt a more complete transformation of students' values. Even here, the program reflected an awareness of the need to prepare students for a return to a non-industrial life-style. Conflicting goals led to disap-

96 AC, Teslin file. Robert Ward to Harper Reed, 7 March 1941, Reed to Secretary, IAB, 16 August 1939.

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pointing results, the graduates left uncomfortably "betwixt and between" two very different worlds. The post-war period witnessed a dramatic change in objectives. Two new boarding schools opened, the government provided funds for a major expansion of the Carcross facility and gradually imposed compulsory education. Native students entered territorial public schools and educational programming assumed an industrial-assimilationist format. Though by 1950 the changes were minimal, the alterations foreshadowed a vastly different educational environment, one which more readily depreciated native society, ignored the natives' essential nomadism and attempted a more inclusive transformation of Indian values and customs.

The Anglican Church's total mission, an inextricably linked combination of religion and education, did not achieve its lofty ambitions. In some ways, the church—like other denominations—seemed preoccupied with head-hunting, attempting to secure adherents and warding off incursions by competing denominations. Theirs was a paternalistic, even imperialistic, mission, but it stopped well short of being destructive. Drawing both from Henry Venn's appeals to respect native cultural forms and their own assessment of Yukon conditions, the Anglican clergy adopted a surprisingly latitudinarian approach to both religion and education, stressing practical Christianity and limiting schooling to preliminary instruction in literacy, hygiene and moral behaviour. In the end, the impact of external religion and federally-funded education rested upon the willingness of the Yukon Indians to respond to the messages.

Their own spirituality providing a comprehensive world view, the natives adopted the ritual forms of Christianity while holding to many of their religious beliefs. The two were not, as many missionaries asserted, mutually exclusive, but rather they mingled effectively. Similarly, the natives' continuing selection of a harvesting mode prevented the day schools from having an appreciable impact. The continuing vitality of trapping and hunting to the late 1940's restricted the appeal of Canadian education and kept the children away from the mission schools. The simultaneous collapse of the fur trade, termination of market hunting and rapid expansion of government educational and assistance programs after the Second World War altered conditions rapidly. De-secularized schools, enforced education, urbanization of the native population and major restructuring of the instructional component offered different prospects and problems than the comparatively, and even deliberately, ineffectual attempts of the Anglican Church before 1950.
The importance of the federal government is readily apparent throughout the study of native-white relations in the Yukon Territory. From initially imposing a judicial structure and supporting police force to the financing of educational programs, and assisting popular efforts to exclude natives from the towns, federal authorities played a major role in shaping inter-racial contact. Though they lacked the doctrinal commitment of the clergy, government agents from the North West Mounted Police, Department of Indian Affairs and other branches of government served as a buffer between the expanding European population and the natives.

The assessment of government activities with the Natives of Canada is usually based on studies of the origins and alterations of federal Indian legislation. Often laced with critical commentary on the paternalism and colonialism inherent in such legislation as the 1876 Indian Act,¹ these examinations of federal initiatives say little about the actual implementation of policy. The Yukon situation, however, suggests the federal agents often sought to modify national directives to suit territorial realities and, equally important, that the natives were reluctant to use proffered government services.

¹ R. Surtees, Canadian Indian Policy: A Critical Bibliography (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1982) is the best place to start.
The central tenets of federal Indian policy were clearly delineated, widely accepted and changed only slightly from Confederation to 1950. Four main goals predominated: promoting native self-sufficiency, protecting the natives from the evils of white society, encouraging conversion to Christianity and assimilating the Indians. Importantly, these national directives did not translate directly into local initiatives. In the Yukon, dispersed settlement, limited development, and a continuation of nomadic patterns interfered with the administration, and reduced the applicability of national programs. The Yukon experience departed significantly from the patterns that might be suggested through a narrow analysis of federal legislation. Although policy guidelines entrenched in the Indian Act never disappeared, government agents proceeded with surprising flexibility, altering their programs and emphasis to suit regional realities.

The administrative and constitutional structure of the Yukon Territory created special problems and unique possibilities for the Department of Indian Affairs and other federal agencies charged with northern responsibilities. From 1870 to 1896, the district was officially under the control of the North-West Territories administration, though limited development in the region largely precluded the exercise of that authority. The upheaval attending the Klondike Gold Rush, however, forced the

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government to adopt more direct measures. The federally-appointed administration established under Commissioner J. N. Walsh in 1898, however, soon encountered a major jurisdictional dispute with the government of the N.W.T. over the control of liquor revenues. To end the controversy, Parliament passed the Yukon Territory Act in June 1898, creating a separate political and administrative unit. The first council consisted of five federally selected officials. In response to demands for greater local control, the government gradually extended the principle of representative — but not responsible — administration, culminating in the establishment of a ten-man, elected council in 1908. Throughout, however, the Commissioner exercised the greatest authority, frequently overruling the elected council and acting as directed by his Ottawa-based superiors. With the end of the Klondike Gold Rush and subsequent economic decline, the federal government drastically reduced its financial commitment to the region, cut the size of the elected council to three members and consolidated administrative responsibility in the hands of the Commissioner (the latter was accomplished in 1920). The Yukon Territory retained this administrative form until the post World War II period, when the gradual devolution of political power led to the establishment of a fully elected council and, in the 1970's, cabinet government and a major reduction of the power of the office of the Commissioner.  

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As a consequence of this political structure, the federal government held considerable power in the territory. The Commissioner, Gold Commissioner, Indian Agent and the ranking officer of the North West Mounted Police (Royal North West Mounted Police after 1920) commanded considerable authority, much more than federal officials exercised in other parts of the country. Even more importantly, national officials and federal politicians had a unique opportunity to shape and control regional programmes, without interference from regional administrators. Since so much authority rested in federal hands, there were few constraints interfering with the application of national policies and programmes in the Yukon Territory.

In the early period, from 1870 to 1896, the Canadian government displayed little interest in the northern reaches of its newly acquired territories. Administrators and politicians focused instead on opening the fertile but unpopulated lands of the prairie south. Broken first by the cursory examinations of Geological Survey of Canada personnel in the 1880's, this neglect was forcefully interrupted through the intervention of William C. Bompas of the Church Missionary Society. Gravely concerned by the incursions of the rapacious mining population, Bompas repeatedly petitioned the government to dispatch a contingent of the North West Mounted Police. The federal authorities relented in 1894, though only partially out of concern over the effect of expansion on the Indians.  

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6 Bompas' petitions include DIA, vol. 3905, file 105, 378, Deputy Super-
Ottawa gave Inspector Constantine, commander of the first Yukon contingent, precise instructions on how to deal with the Indians. As official representative of the Department of Indian Affairs, Constantine received instructions "not to give encouragement to the idea that they (the Yukon Indians) will be received into treaty, and taken under the care of the government." Convinced that the northern district held few prospects for development or settlement, the government saw no need to alienate Indian lands through treaty. Preliminary relief measures were contemplated, but the government wanted it clearly understood that the Indians were to be accorded no better treatment than that offered any Canadian or immigrant. The government maintained its policy of negotiating treaties only where and when lands used by the Indians were required for permanent development. When such pressures were felt, as in the Mackenzie River valley in 1899-1900, the government provided benefits such as guaranteed access to game, annuity payments and reservations to compensate for anticipated dislocations. Before 1896, the same

intendent General to Hon. T. Mayne Daly, 18 September 1893; to Dear Sir, 26 August 1893; Bompas to Minister of the Interior, 5 June 1894, Native Races and Liquor Traffic United Committed to Hon. Sir Charles Tupper, 1894; CMS, Bompas to CMS, 15 May 1894. On the move of the NWMP, see PAC, MG30 E55, Constantine Papers; For a descriptive summary, see A.A. Wright, Prelude to Bonanza, 256-271. Concern for the Indians was secondary to the government's desire to assert Canadian sovereignty in the face of American incursions and to collect customs duties on resources being exported from the district. W.R. Morrison, "The Mounted Police on Canada's Northern Frontier, 1895-1940," (PhD, Western Ontario, 1971).

DIA, vol. 1115, Deputy Superintendent's Letterbook, 27 April 1894 - 16 November 1894, H. Reed to Charles Constantine, 29 May 1894.


Rene Fumoleau, As Long As This Land Shall Last: A History of Treaty 8

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concerns were simply not operative in the Yukon. The rapid influx of miners after the discovery of gold in the Klondike, the concentration of mining activity in the west-central Yukon, and the government's conviction that the territory could not sustain permanent development abrogated the need for an agreement. In a contradictory fashion, the possibility that another "Eldorado" lay somewhere in the district similarly dissuaded authorities from alienating any specific land for native use.

The unwillingness of the government to consider a treaty did not end discussion on the matter. Jim Boss, self-styled "hereditary chief of the southern Yukon Indians," submitted a request for land ownership negotiations in 1902. Boss demanded financial "compensation because of the taking possession of their (the Indians') lands and hunting grounds by the white people." Noting that natives encountering hardship received government relief, the federal authorities brushed Boss' claims aside. While individual Indians did not continue to press the issue, the Anglican Church picked up the treaty question. Reverent A.E. O'Meara, financial secretary for the Diocese of the Yukon, prepared a fairly comprehensive treaty claim on behalf of the natives between 1907 and 1910. Reflecting its missionary origins, the claim focused on a request for Anglican-administered day and residential schools in combination


10 This acknowledged reticence is best discussed in David Hall, Clifford Sifton: The Young Napoleonic (Vancouver: UBC, 1982).


12 Ibid., J.D. McLean to Jackson, 28 January 1902, Congdon to Sifton, 10 September 1904, Assistant Secretary: Memorandum to Mr. Pedley, 19 October 1904.

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with game preserves and community improvement projects. The penultimate proposal also called for the appointment of a full-time Indian Agent, better medical care and official recognition of native marriages. 

Importantly, before the document reached Minister of the Interior Frank Oliver, the request for treaty negotiations had been dropped. The clergy had correctly anticipated the government's reticence. Responding to the request, Oliver reiterated well-known government policy: "The Government seeks to protect the interests of all, whether Indian or white, but is not responsible for specifically protecting those of the Indian's." The Minister rejected the paternalism inherent in expanded government assistance, claiming that it "had been most harmful to the Indians by accentuating their original communism, that it is say, the natural dependance of the Indians upon others." To Oliver, the coming of the whites and the Gold Rush brought prosperity: acceding to the Indians' request would change native ways and, in his judgement, they would "if left as Indians earn a better living."

The government made it clear, first in 1894 and again in 1910, that Yukon conditions precluded the need for federal-native land negotiations. Subsequent to this debate, the signing of Treaty #11 with the Indians of the upper Mackenzie River basin brought a number of Yukon Indians.

13 AC, New Series, file 2, Memo for the Minister re: Yukon Indians, c. 1907; AC, Carcross Property file, Pedley to Oliver, 23 January 1908; AC, New Series, file 1, Notes made from interview with Reverend A.M. O'Meara re: Indians in the Yukon, 1908, Proposed requests regarding Indians, 1908, Indian Matters - Recommendations of Messrs. Hawkeley and O'Meara, 1908, Memo for Archbishop regarding Yukon Indian work, 1908.

14 AC, New Series, file 3, Requests regarding Yukon Indians, 1908.

15 AC, New Series, file 2, Notes of interview with Mr. Pedley and Mr. Oliver, 26 February 1909.
dians under treaty. The inclusion of the Liard Indians, due solely to the configuration of the Mackenzie drainage basin, hardly constituted a deliberate recognition of aboriginal title in the territory. The Anglican clergy continued their intervention on behalf of their native charges, but they abandoned the treaty concept. Following the 1908-1910 attempt, no significant effort was made for more than half a century to secure a comprehensive settlement with the government.

Though these preliminary discussions, the Yukon Indians remained consistently silent. They were not without advocates, as Anglican clergy frequently intervened with the authorities on their behalf. While native appeals were few, several requests for title to specific tracts of land on the basis of traditional occupation did emerge. In 1900, Jim Boss asked for a parcel of land on Lake Laberge, arguing that it "had been occupied by his people from time immemorial."

In 1933, Joe Squam.

16 Fumoleau, _As Long As This Land Shall Last_, 150-215; For a brief statement of the Yukon treaty issue, see "Land Entitlement of Indians of the Yukon and North West Territories" by Col. H.M. Jones, Director, Indian Affairs Branch, DIAND, file 801/30-0-1.


18 DIA, vol. 4001, file 207, 481, Congden to Pedley, 28 May 1903.

19 PAC, RG91, vol. 7, file 1331, Miller to Ogilvie, 10 April 1900, Commissioner to Deputy Minister of the Interior, 1 May 1900. Boss' request originated in a personal desire for access to the land in question. By 1917, he was the only native even vaguely connected with the property. When a shipping company cut wood on the land for its vessels, Boss demanded and received personal compensation. Yukon Government Records (YRG) 1, Series 5, vol. 1, file 1298. Miller to
"chief" of the Teslin Indians similarly claimed lands in the Wolf Lake district on the basis that he had "hunted and trapped over this ground since a child." In both instances, the individuals' motives were suspect. Boss' representation, however, succeeded and the government allocated a small reserve. Squam's claims met with a hasty rejection. More generally, the Indians did not hesitate to defend their interests, but they seldom based their appeals to government on inherent right of occupation. Instead, protests over game laws or inappropriate regulations focused on economic hardship or specific instances of white encroachment. That the natives did not systematically defend their right to game does not indicate lack of interest. Rather, it suggests the Indians' continued confidence that such unchallenged occupation would continue.

The government's concern, illustrated in Oliver's comments, centred on maintaining the Indians in their now "traditional" role as hunters and trappers. From 1894 to 1950, there was little commitment to assimilation, except as a far distant goal unlikely of accomplishment. Instead, federal authorities attempted to preserve the "Indian way."


20 DIA, vol. 6761, file 420-21, Squam to Indian Department, 22 August 1922. Like Boss, Squam's claim to "chief" status was highly debatable. The request was given only cursory attention by the Department of Indian Affairs. RG91, vol. 9, file 1490, pt. J. Hauksley to Mackenzie, 1 October 1931; YRG1, Series 3, vol. 6, file 12-133, Jeckell to Hume, 21 November 1932.

21 When trapline registration was introduced in 1950, for example, the main native protest was over the annual $10 fee. YRG1, series 3, vol. 11, file 12-238. Meek to Gibson, 27 September 1950; Moses, Tizya and Netro to Meek, 24 July 1950. Petition from Chief William Johnson et al, 7 July 1950.
accomplish this, the government felt it had to keep the Indians from the questionable benefits of the mining industry and socially segregated from the depredations of an inherently avaricious white population. Instead of highlighting its assimilationist goals, the government emphasized the need to protect the Indians from destruction. In many ways, these central federal goals of assimilation and protection were inherently contradictory. As J. Chamberlin asserted:

From its (the Indian Act of 1876) initial promulgation, there have been those who have questioned the sanity of a piece of legislation which actively discouraged, and indeed in some areas positively prohibited, the assimilation of the Indian into the social and economic life of the non-native population, while at the same time being the centrepiece of a broad policy of moving the Indians towards full citizenship and full participation in Canadian life. By existing to regulate and systematize the relationship between the Indian and the majority society, the (Indian) Act codifies and often exaggerates the distinctions which it is its function eventually to eliminate.22

In the Yukon, the government selected protection, the preferred national option. They chose to leave the Indians as harvesters of game. Two policies, residential reservations and preservation of access to game, emerged as the practical manifestations of this larger program for the Yukon Indians.

The desire for a mechanism for social segregation first surfaced in 1896 with the commencement of the Klondike Gold Rush. William Bompas requested a small reserve near Dawson City to keep his native communica­ tants from the miners. Despite the contrary judgements of N.W.M.P. Inspector Constantine and Territorial Commissioner William Ogilvie, the Department of Indian Affairs eventually allocated a small plot of land. Importantly, they offered a 160 acre parcel located three miles down-
stream from Dawson, not as far away as Constantine and Ogilvie wished, but removed from the centre of white population. Further debate over this matter also illustrates the limited priority of Indian matters in the face of potential northern development. The government rejected repeated requests for an extension of the plot on the basis of Ogilvie's representation that "discoveries of gold have been made in that vicinity, and before I recommend any extension of the 160 acres, I will await the development of this ground, as gold mining ground." The federal government enacted this process of residential reserve allocation whenever lands were subjected to development pressure or natives moved too close to a white community. When lead and silver ore was discovered near Mayo in 1915, several Indians moved into the town, attracted by perceived opportunities. The government quickly laid out a native residential reserve two and half miles downstream from the new community - and on the opposite side of the river. The Mayo reserve met both of the government's criteria, removing the Indians from potentially valuable land and protecting the natives from white influence. Over the following years, Indian Agent John Hauksley lauded the positive results of the transfer. Securing such a reserve did not guarantee permanence.

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23 IAB, file 801/30-0-1, Constantine to Deputy Minister of the Interior, 19 November 1896; Extract from William Ogilvie's letter, 8 November 1896; Constantine Letterbook, Charles Constantine Papers, MG30, E55, PAC; Constantine to Dear Sir, 13 November 1896; AC, New Series, file 4, Smart to Bompas, 12 August 1897; IAB, file 801/30-0-1, McLean Memorandum, 26 April 1897; RG91, vol. 7, file 1187, McGee to Minister of the Interior, 27 March 1900.

24 RG91, vol 7, file 1187, PAC; Ogilvie to Secretary, Department of the Interior, 11 December 1900, Commissioner to Bompas, 27 September 1900.

25 DIA, vol. 4081, file 478,700, Hauksley to McLean, 7 April 1915; Moodie to Sir, 1 April 1915, ibid.; Brownlee to McLean, 19 October 1915.
If whites demanded access to lands granted the natives, the government arranged a hasty transfer of the Indian reserve. In the Whitehorse area, for example, the reserve site shifted four times between 1915 and 1921.²⁶ While the interests of the white population determined many reserve allotments, federal authorities occasionally permitted native needs to govern the location of reserves. In 1898 at Tagish,²⁷ and again at Little Salmon in 1915, the government preserved native access to community lands against white encroachment. As the federal surveyors responsible for laying out the Little Salmon parcel noted, however, "It is a matter of record that the Indians have not made any request for this reserve."²⁸ The Yukon situation paralleled experience elsewhere in Canada. Native reserves were constantly subjected to white encroachment and reallocation. The distinctiveness of the Yukon lay in the use of residential reserves, small parcels of land destined to serve as little more than seasonal homes. In the southern provinces, where hope remained that the Indians would become agriculturalists, the natives received larger land allocations.²⁹

RG91, vol. 46, file 29,967.

²⁶ IAB, 801/30-0-1, Hawsley to McLean, 25 November 1915; IAB, 801/30-18-8, Hawsley to McLean, 19 October 1917; IAB, 801/30-18-8, Bethune to Superintendent of Trusts and Reserves, 14 May 1958; IAB, 801/30-18-8, Meek to Indian Affairs Branch, 17 February 1948. The relocations were all due to white demands that the land grant be altered. By 1950, those Indians living near Whitehorse no longer inhabited the reserve.

²⁷ IAB, 801/30-3-5, Strickland to Officer in Command Upper Yukon, 16 August 1898; ibid., Pereira to White, 14 September 1898.

²⁸ RG91, vol. 46, file 29,995, C. Swanson to Commissioner, 1 September 1915; IAB, file 801/30-4-10, Brownlee to Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 19 August 1916; Report of Survey of Little Salmon Indian Reserve, c. 1916, ibid.
The government applied the residential reserve concept, typically according to the Mayo plan, throughout the territory. In addition to the Mayo, Little Salmon and Whitehorse allotments, the Department of Indian Affairs established reserves at Carcross, Teslin, Selkirk, Carmacks and Old Crow. The government's attempt to encourage native settlement on lands removed from centres of white population served as an integral part of a larger plan. Founded on the belief that the future of the nomadic hunting Indians lay in the preservation of their "natural" state, the plan served to enhance social distance between natives and whites and to keep the Indians on the fringes of the industrial economy. \(^{30}\)

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29 RG91, vol. 29, file 13.013, W. Bompas to Commissioner, 29 November 1904; IAB, file 801/30-0-1, J. J. Wright to Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, 4 February 1902.

30 DIA, vol. 6479, file 940-1, pt. 1, Brusar to Deputy Superintendent General, 17 June 1907; DIA, vol. 3962, file 147,654-1, pt. 1, Congdon to F. Pedley, 28 April 1903; DIA, vol. 4062, file 398,746-1, Secretary, Dawson Board of Trade to Rt. Hon. Frank Oliver, 19 August 1911. The latter document refers to a suggestion by the Dawson Board of Trade, seconded by Bishop Bompas, that the government import reindeer and hire the Indians to tend the herds. Like the other proposals, this one focused on keeping Indians and whites separate.
### TABLE 25

**RESIDENTIAL RESERVES**

**YUKON TERRITORY**

1896-1958*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Acreage</th>
<th>Year Granted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moosehide Creek #2</td>
<td>156.49</td>
<td>1900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lake Laberge #1</td>
<td>320.27</td>
<td>1900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McQueston #3</td>
<td>320.00</td>
<td>1904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carcross #4</td>
<td>160.03</td>
<td>1905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whitehorse #8</td>
<td>282.00</td>
<td>1921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carmacks #11</td>
<td>330.80</td>
<td>1926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teslin Post #13</td>
<td>65.23</td>
<td>1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nisutlin #14</td>
<td>207.40</td>
<td>1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burwash Landing</td>
<td>160.00</td>
<td>1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old Crow</td>
<td>112.80</td>
<td>1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six Mile Creek (Marsh Lake #5)</td>
<td>320.00</td>
<td>1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayo #6</td>
<td>456.00</td>
<td>1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selkirk #7</td>
<td>159.98</td>
<td>1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little Salmon River #10</td>
<td>587.00</td>
<td>1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teslin Lake I.R. #15</td>
<td>166.49</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Liard Bridge</td>
<td>120.10</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Champagne Landing #12</td>
<td>15.91</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Reserves active as of 1958.


Restricting access to white social and economic activities served little purpose without an alternative. The second component of the federal government's strategy, preserving native access to game, provided the desired substitute. Almost all missionaries, R.C.M.P. officers, and government agents despaired of the prospects of the Indians accepting "civilization." at least in the foreseeable future. Most observers accepted that the natives had to hunt and fish in order to survive. To achieve this end, native access to game resources had to be assured. Accomplishing this goal proved relatively easy, in practice if not in...
principle, for few whites competed for game stocks. Nonetheless, grave concern continued about the likelihood of this situation holding firm. Market hunters in the Mayo and Dawson areas competed aggressively with the Indians and the decline of game in those areas portended the threat of a wide-scale depletion.

While most could agree on the need to preserve native access to game, finding practical means to implement those desires proved difficult. As evident with residential reserves, native rights seldom gained high priority within the larger government establishment, frequently giving way to pragmatic concerns for future development. The parenthetical attention given the matter aided the natives' interest in the short term. Limited white settlement and restricted mining activity left the Indians substantially unchallenged in their harvesting pursuits. Several proposals were brought forward to entrench this native-land relationship, including Acting Commissioner Lithgow's 1907 suggestion that all the natives in the territory be removed to the Peel-Porcupine district, an area believed devoid of mineral resources.31 Not until the 1930's, when increased hunting pressure tied to an improving fur market threatened game resources, did suggestions for native-only game preserves receive serious consideration.

31 YRGI, series 3, vol. 2, file 12-14B, Commissioner of Y.T. to J.B. Harken, 16 March 1922; ibid., file 12-13C, Report by A. W. Elling, 16 January 1923. As part of the establishment of preserves in the North West Territories, part of the Peel River valley was incorporated into a game reservation. This 1923 action was not designed to address the needs of the Yukon Indians, but rather was to preserve the hunting grounds of the Peel River, Kutchin and other Mackenzie River basin native groups. Fumaleau, *As Long As This Land Shall Last*, 245-250; YRGI, series 3, vol. 2, file 12-4C, O. S. Finnie to Inspector Wood, 6 June 1925.
Preserves had been adopted, allegedly with success, for the Indians in the Mackenzie River valley. Again, however, the government hesitated to countenance such a proposal for the mineral-rich Yukon. A proposal for large scale game preserves first emerged in 1935. Harper Reed, Indian Agent for the Stikine district in Northern British Columbia, requested that the Department of Indian Affairs take action to protect natives in the upper Liard district from the perceived effects of white encroachment. R.C.M.P. reports failed to substantiate Reed's claims of over-trapping, but his proposal floundered on other grounds. Charles Camsell, noted northern surveyor and the Deputy Minister of the Department of Mines, made federal priorities for the Yukon abundantly clear when he noted:

If we are not going to reserve our northern regions exclusively for the use of the natives but are looking to encourage the opening up of these regions to the people of Canada generally, then I think we must limit the extent of the preserves to meet the pressing needs of the natives but no more.

Development - not native access to game - took precedence in the Yukon.

The federal government approached the question of Indian access to game in a contradictory fashion. When several white trappers began exploiting the Old Crow flats muskrat harvest in 1929 and when whites began to compete for fish and fur resources in the Little Atlin district in 1932, government agents swiftly protected native interests. There

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33 YRGI, series 3, vol. 8, file 12-15, Camsell to Gibson, 14 September 1935; ibid., Reed to Perry, 12 July 1935; DIA, vol. 6761, file 420-12, Binning to Jeckell, 18 October 1935; ibid., Jeckell to Director, Lands, N.W.T. and Yukon Branch, 18 October 1935; ibid., Summary: Proposed Yukon Preserve For Sole Use of Indians, 1938.

34 IAB, file 801/30-10-10, Hawksley to McLean, 23 August 1929; RG91,
were, however, clear limits on the level of intervention. The government maintained a solid commitment to protecting native hunting and fishing pursuits but recoiled at any suggestion that those rights be entrenched through game preserves or special hunting regulations.

The government's ambivalence finally succumbed to changing conditions and attitudes. Continuing white hunting pressure, particularly during the construction of the Alaska Highway in 1942-43, led to increased concern for the future of native hunting. In 1947, Indian Agent R.J. Meek requested the implementation of registered traplines, a program used to good effect in northern British Columbia. Under Meek's plan, the natives had first claim to trapping territories, with half-breeds and "old-timers" selecting before the allocation of the remainder of the traplines. Implemented by the territorial government in 1950, the registration program unfortunately came into effect just as a prolonged downward spiral in fur prices hit, draining much of the vitality from the trade. Trapline permits were clearly a second-best option to proposals for native-only game preserves, but to 1950 they represented the limits of federal munificence.

35 DIA, vol. 6761, file 420-12-2-RT-1, Meek to Indian Affairs Branch, 27 November 1947; ibid., Conn to Meek, 4 December 1947; DIA, vol. 6742, file 420-6-1-1, Gibson to Gibben, 17 December 1947; DIA, vol. 6761, file 420-12-2-RT-1, Meek to Indian Affairs Branch, Attention Hugh Conn, 17 January 1950.

36 Meek to Indian Affairs Branch, 27 November 1947, DIA, vol. 6761, file 420-12-2-RT-1; Conn to Meek, 4 December 1947, ibid., Gibson to Gibben, 17 December 1947, DIA, vol. 6742, file 420-6-1-1; Meek to Indian Affairs Branch, Attention Hugh Conn, 17 January 1950, DIA, vol. 6761, file 420-12-2-RT-1.
Federal authorities, seconded by the territorial administration, consistently supported the concept of leaving the Indians as hunters and trappers. The imperatives of northern development, however, impinged on the logical application of the preferred program. By definition, the Yukon served as a resource base for the rest of the country. The government could not countenance entrenchment of native access to game which, in turn, promised to interfere with northern development. Indian interests were regularly subordinated to the more pressing national concern for economic development. In the Yukon, native access to game even lost out to sport hunting, slowly being recognized as a potential growth industry. As R.H. Gibson noted:

> there has always been a fundamental difference in wild life management in the Yukon and the Northwest Territories. In the Yukon hunting for sport has been encouraged. In the Northwest Territories the wild life is reserved for those who depend on it for a living, chiefly our increasing population of Indians and Eskimos.\(^{37}\)

As of 1950, most of the Yukon Indians remained as hunters and trappers, resorting to towns only as season and need dictated. While the government's program of economic and social segregation appeared successful, more important forces had actually worked to keep natives and whites apart. Limited mining, restricted demographic pressure, a consistently strong fur market, and the natives' affinity for harvesting over industrial work ensured that the Indians remained as Indians. Gov-

\(^{37}\) YRGI, series 3, vol. 10, file 12-20B, Gibson to Hoffmaster, 23 January 1943. This program entailed significant costs. Increased hunting during World War II, largely by American servicemen and construction workers, seriously depleted game stocks in the Kluane Lake area. In December 1942, a sizeable tract of land in the district was set aside as a game preserve (eventually Kluane National Park). Importantly, natives were not permitted to hunt within the preserve. Robert McCandless. "Yukon Wildlife: A Social History," unpublished manuscript, YTA, Chapter 4.
ernment encouragement was less important. The government had, it seems, succeeded in spite of itself, its programs of residential reserves and economic segregation functioned more as symbols than effective policies. To a certain extent then, government programming for the Yukon natives seldom extended beyond accepting the status quo. Importantly, and only to the extent possible within its limited mandate, the Department of Indian Affairs attempted to solidify and entrench the natives' position as harvesters through government initiative.

Federal government programming for the Yukon Indians had strayed significantly from the national imperatives delineated in the Indian Act. The encouragement of self-sufficiency and providing protection from white society are evident in the policies discussed above. The government, however, shied away from a commitment to assimilation, allegedly the cornerstone of national Indian policy. The ready acceptance of "best left as Indians" from 1894 to 1950 stands in marked contrast to the cultural imperialism typically associated with federal Indian policy. This contradiction may have been inherent in the government's program, as the dedication to protection and self-sufficiency almost by definition interfered with attempts at assimilation. The guidelines in the Indian Act, however, also allowed for a certain flexibility, permitting government agents in the field and Ottawa to adapt national policy directives to local conditions. Given the limited development prospects for the territory and the substantial socio-cultural barriers (both native and white) to Indian participation in the industrial economy, the government's acceptance of the natives as hunters and trappers was no doubt the most logical and cost-effective policy. The administration of
Indian affairs in the Yukon did not focus exclusively on these larger issues; indeed, attempts at structuring residential reserves and preserving native access to game evolved as ad hoc responses to changing territorial conditions.

Government agents charged with supervising the Indians actually spent most of their time and the majority of their budgets on more mundane matters, especially on emergency relief and medical care for those who slipped below the margins of subsistence or health. Federal involvement, which fell outside the government's legal requirements as the natives were not covered by treaty, centred on one simple principle. Frank Oliver's comment that white expansion had been of unqualified benefit to the Indians aside, bureaucrats acknowledged that the arrival of the whites had been at best a mixed blessing. Through the introduction of new diseases and over-harvesting of resources, the whites had inflicted an array of social and economic ills. Intervention in the areas of welfare and medical assistance started in the pre-Gold Rush period with an unwritten but widely accepted obligation to offer amelioration to those Indians displaced or injured by white advancement. It is at this level that understanding of the administration of Indian Affairs in Canada is most deficient. In a recent article on the Canadian North, Peter Usher commented.

The government had sought to remove any encumbrance to land title and settlement and the police maintained law and order. Beyond these measures, however, the government failed to detect any responsibility on its part for those people over whose territories it had assumed control.38

While Usher's comment may apply to some northern districts, it is most certainly an inadequate representation of Yukon conditions.

Government involvement with such Indian matters commenced with the arrival of the North West Mounted Police in 1894. Though Inspector Constantine was enjoined from encouraging treaty negotiations, as official representative of the Department of Indian Affairs he carried authorization to provide necessary medical and relief assistance. With the establishment of the Yukon Territory as an administrative unit in 1898, many of the fiscal responsibilities passed to the office of the Commissioner, although police officers in the field continued to provide the actual aid. Following repeated representations by the Anglican Church, the government finally relented in 1914 and appointed a full time Indian agent. Long-time Yukon missionary John Hauksley received the posting. Hauksley treated his new position as an extension of his former duties, paying particular attention to the Indians' moral and medical condition. Far from an interventionist, the agent believed his greatest claim to be that "the Indians feel they have a place to go when they are...

39 M74-3, file 1-A-2, Pedley to Oliver, 23 January 1908, General Synod Archives, Anglican Church of Canada (GSA); As late as 1903, Sifton believed there to be only 700 natives in the Yukon. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates (1901 Session), vol. 11, 5449-5450; ibid., (1903 Session), vol. 3, 7270-7273.

40 YRGI, series 2, file 29-299, J. D. McLean to John Hauksley, 4 March 1914; DIA, vol. 1129, Superintendent General to Governor General in Council, 12 January 1914; GSA, M74-3, file 1-A-5-A, Deputy Superintendent's Letterbook, 4 February 1911 - 29 May 1914, Stringer to Martin; DIA, vol. 7155, file 801/3-10, pt. 1, Hauksley to McLean, 17 April 1929; ibid., Hauksley to McLean, 13 June 1919. See also Hauksley's reports in Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Reports especially 1915-1916, pp. 115-117 and 1917, p. 30. Hauksley's efforts were directed at improving native living conditions, especially as regarded sanitation, and controlling native-white interaction. The latter was accomplished through imposing curfews and restricting native access to the towns.
in trouble where they can be advised and helped; they appreciate it very much." 41 Following Hauksley’s retirement in 1933, the duties of Indian Agent devolved back to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Each year, the force delegated to one officer responsibility for territorial Indian matters, in addition to other assigned duties. Clearly, the limited priority given native affairs had slipped further. 42 From 1914 to 1946, the office of the Indian Agent served as little more than an administrative centre, dispensing relief, organizing medical and educational programs and reporting regularly to the Ottawa office. When R.J. Meek received an appointment as full-time agent in 1946, the position took on greater importance, largely due to Meek’s activism. 43 From Constantine to Meek, however, individuals responsible for the administration of Indian affairs found themselves preoccupied with assisting the Indians in adjusting to the ravages associated with white expansion.

The most important of these duties involved the dispersal of relief payments or emergency supplies. A mythology developed in the 1900–1950 period concerning the natives’ willingness to accept relief. (The image persists to the present.) The standard account is that the Indians readily surrendered to the convenience of government assistance, abandoning more rigorous pursuits in favour of graceless supplication at


42 YRG1, series 2, file 29,299, Jeckell to Chairman, Dominion Lands Branch, 17 November 1933; RG91, vol. 9, file 1490, pt. 7, T.E.L. MacInnes to R. A. Gibson, 23 July 1938. That the R.C.M.P. would accept such a task is in keeping with their tradition of handling a variety of government duties in frontier settings. See Carl Betke, "Pioneers and Police on the Canadian Prairies, 1885–1914," Canadian Historical Association, Historical Papers (1980), 9–33.

43 McCandless, "Yukon Wildlife."
the Indian Agent's table. Those administering the relief program in the Yukon almost universally shared this belief and their attitudes played a major role in shaping the program. As the Yukon experience demonstrates, the vision was a misleading portrayal of native interest in government handouts.

Federal authorities initially refused to accept any obligation for native suffering, doggedly maintaining that the arrival of the white man had been of considerable benefit to the Indians. Functioning without an official commitment, police officers provided only occasional relief supplies to truly destitute individuals. Faced with the potential starvation of a small band of Indians at Moosehide in 1900, however, the government was forced into more substantial and precedent-setting action. N.W.M.P. Inspector Z. Wood of Dawson authorized immediate dispersions of food to contain the crisis, applying for official permission later. The government insisted that "whenever possible the Indians should be required to perform labour or supply game, skins or other commodities in return for the provisions issued to them." In the short term, however, police officers were enjoined to "provide against anything like destitution."
From 1900, the government provided parsimonious relief assistance to those who could demonstrate need. Few took the offer, limiting the welfare rolls to a few widowed, aged or infirm natives. The relief system occasionally responded to more widespread destitution, as occurred in 1905 near McQuesten and 1912 in the southern Yukon, when game stocks unexpectedly declined. While few laid claim to the government's munificence, the police officers in charge of the program before 1914 believed that the availability of relief rendered the Indians beggars. As the Commanding Officer of the Whitehorse Detachment commented in 1908, "It is evident that the government assistance given to sick and destitute Indians at Whitehorse is most injurious to the well-being and morale of the Indians." He then proceeded to ascribe alcohol abuse, prostitution and general laziness to the "pernicious effect" of relief. As a counter-measure, the police imposed controlling mechanisms to protect against anticipated abuse. Inspector Horrigan noted in 1912 that "young


49 RG18, vol. 352, file 128, Superintendent "H" Division to Asst. Commissioner, 1 June 1908. See also Report of Inspector Routledge, 1 December 1902, NWMP, AR 1902, 89. Not all police officers shared this view. Several argued for greater government assistance. RG18, vol. 272, file 267, Superintendent "B" Division to Asst. Commissioner, 31 January 1904.
husky Indians asking for provisions were asked to split some stove wood. Needless to say in every case they found that after all they did not require provisions. This plan has worked admirably in weeding out the undeserving cases. Those in need found government assistance available but, self-righteously convinced that the Indians were inveterate malingerers, police officers closely regulated their disbursements.

Under Hauksley, the relief program expanded considerably. The new Indian Agent relied on his former missionary colleagues to assist him, also allowing police officers and even fur traders to allocate supplies when deemed necessary. Even with the expanded networks, there is no indication that the natives found the relief system desirable. Facing the rigorous government strictures on assistance, only those truly destitute applied for aid. The Indians were hardly different from those few whites whose sustenance depended upon wild game. When resources played out or grubstakes dwindled, white trappers and prospectors similarly fell back on meagre government handouts. Sustained by a viable, remunerative hunting and trapping economy and facing little pressure to abandon their nomadic pursuits, the Indians found little attraction in eking out a marginal existence on the social and physical fringes of white communities. The relief system provided an important safety net.

50 Report of Inspector Horrigan, 30 September 1911, RNWMP, AR 1911, 212.
51 Report of Superintendent Moodie, 30 September 1913, RNWMP, AR 1914, 274; YRG1, series 2, file 29.299, McLean to Hauksley, 4 March 1914; Stringer to Townsend, 9 February 1915, AC, Carcross File; GSA, M74-3, file 1-A-5A, Stringer to Martin, 13 November 1916; Report of Corporal Hocking, 6 March 1914, RNWMP, AR 1915, 740; Stringer to Chambers, 17 May 1916, AC, Chambers file; Stringer to W.D. (Young), 25 April 1917, AC, Young file. Allowing fur traders to disperse relief supplies lead to occasional cries of conflict of interest. In those areas without police or missionary stations, however, the government permitted the resident trader to determine need.
for times when other means of support failed. In offering such aid, the government hardly assumed a great responsibility; it did, nonetheless, recognize its obligation to compensate those who suffered through white incursions. This willingness to assist the Indians was not a declared national objective. Instead, as with much government activity on the natives' behalf, federal authorities responded to local exigencies. In these administrative areas, as with broader policy concerns, regional realities conditioned the scope and effectiveness of federal Indian programming.

While few natives appear to have suffered significant economic distress, many more felt the ravages of European diseases (easily a majority of those on relief accepted aid due to illness). Wanting to compensate the Indians for the depredations of white society, the government provided a surprisingly comprehensive medical care program. N.W.M.P. surgeons offered assistance to natives whenever medical needs dictated. By 1906, the government replaced the ad hoc reliance on police personnel with a more permanent system. The Department of Indian Affairs placed four doctors on permanent retainer. The doctors then made their services available to Indians as required. When authorized by an appropriate government official, Indians could visit the doctor, receive free medicines and other aids and even be hospitalized without charge.\^52

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\^52 Auditor General of Canada. *Annual Report*, 1902-1903, J-78; ibid., 1904-1905, J-62. The natives obviously patronized the service. Doctors were paid $2 per authorized consultation. In 1901-1902, the two busiest doctors, NWMP assistant surgeon G. Madore and medical doctor L.S. Sugden received $1516 and $1113 respectively from the government, accounting for close to 1300 visits between them.
The federal government's commitment to medical care became particularly evident during epidemics, a common occurrence among the Indians from the early 19th Century. Recognizing these diseases as white imports, the government moved swiftly to prevent or limit the devastation typically associated with the attacks. As with most government programs for the Indians, other considerations also conditioned government response. Diseases carried by the nomadic Indians threatened the more sedentary white population, and it served everyone's interest to prevent the dispersal of illness. Thus, containing the epidemics in the Indian camps functioned as an important form of preventive medicine for the entire territory. Though motives may have been mixed, the government responded quickly to each appearance of a potential epidemic. Quarantines served to limit the spread of disease and grants of food rations and medical care assisted those under surveillance. This system, imposed regularly throughout the territory, worked in combination with regular medical attendance to provide a surprisingly comprehensive medical care package for the Yukon Indians. These relief and medical care measures deviated from the central tenets of government Indian policy. They served primarily to alleviate damages inflicted by white expansion, and did not represent an attempt to improve the Indians.


In contrast to the haphazard and unenthusiastic application of national Indian policy, the government enforced federal law with much more certainty of purpose. From 1894, when the first representatives of the North West Mounted Police reached the Yukon River valley, through to 1950, federal authorities insisted that the national police force bring the natives under the protection and scrutiny of the Canadian legal system. Handling the natives was usually a small component of the North West Mounted Police's work in the territory, particularly during the Klondike Gold Rush when their efforts focused on policing the mass influx of miners and camp followers. Nonetheless, the police had more extensive contact with the Indians than any other federal agency.\(^5\)

The police undertook Indian work in the north with little enthusiasm. In contrast to the "superior" Indians of the southern plains, the Yukon natives were viewed by the North West Mounted Police officers as a "lazy and shiftless lot," an image that did not change much over time.\(^6\) Consistently prodded by missionaries and government representatives, however, the police reluctantly accepted a supervisory role over the native population. Over the next half century the force attempted to maintain a vigilant watch over its native charges.


Restricted by the small number of policemen, vast distances, and scattered native population, the North West Mounted Police could often give no more than a cursory glance to Indian activities. Posts were established primarily with the needs of the white population in mind (although several were opened with a view to stopping native traffic in liquor). The network of posts was supplemented by an extensive patrolling system, with police officers undertaking extended journeys through poorly served areas in order to deliver mail, to provide relief or medical supplies, to assert Canadian sovereignty, or to investigate reported crimes. The North West Mounted Police therefore provided wide-ranging coverage throughout the territory, though the back country districts were generally poorly supervised.57 (Map 9)

Working under such limitations, the police took care not to push the letter of the law too strongly. When dealing with Dawson City prostitutes, for example, the North West Mounted Police gave in to public pressure and allowed the "ladies" to ply their trade in specified districts.58 The police were particularly lenient with natives, an acknowledgement of the latters' generally law-abiding nature and a recognition of the impracticality of providing direct supervision over the dispersed Indian population. Every effort was made though not always successfully, to convince governments to exclude the natives from the strictures of territorial game laws. When individual natives did breach the offic-

57 Morrison, "The Mounted Police." The approach was the same as that adopted to good effect in the south. R.C. McLeod, The North West Mounted Police and Law Enforcement, 1873-1905 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975).

58 Hal Guest, "The History of Dawson City, Yukon Territory."
cial regulations, the police treated the offenders with discretion.\textsuperscript{59} Like other government agencies, the North West Mounted Police believed that the Indians should remain as harvesters, an attitude revealed both in their flexibility concerning game regulations and their willingness to comply with extra legal attempts to keep the Indians out of the towns.

The natives generally respected the North West Mounted Police and acknowledged that the policemen frequently acted on their behalf. Missionaries and government agents similarly believed the police to be a positive influence. In 1931, John Hawksley requested that the Fort Selkirk detachment be reopened. The departure of the police, the Indian Agent argued, had led to a serious increase in drinking and violent behaviour.\textsuperscript{60} Inspector Horrigan's intervention in 1909 in a near battle between the Blind Creek and Pelly River Indian bands illustrated a more direct approach. Horrigan's hastily arranged trial and threat of incarceration for the band leaders led to an acceptance of a negotiated peace.\textsuperscript{61} In this and other cases, the natives accepted the police's enforcement role.


\textsuperscript{61} R.N.W.M.P., \textit{Annual Report}, \textbf{1909}, pp. 243-244. For a more readable, if less reliable, account see National Museum of Man, Canadian Ethnology Service Archives, Poole Field Letters, Field to Dear Jack, c. 1909.
Map 9: NWMP Posts, 1903

- Major Posts
- All Other

0 150 Miles
The Indians did not, however, offer unquestioning obedience to all the dictates of the North West Mounted Police's rule. The continual flaunting of liquor laws is but the most obvious sign that the natives did not always adhere to police direction. When the North West Mounted Police opened an establishment at Dalton Post, the Indians simply ignored the authorities, crossed into American territory and consumed their alcohol beyond the control of the police. Similarly, the force's occasional inability to punish offenders restricted their effectiveness. Knowing themselves to be far from the Dawson courts, the Old Crow Indians repeatedly and publically ignored proscriptions on gambling and drinking. The natives had correctly perceived a weakness in the Canadian legal system, in this case the government's unwillingness to transport suspected transgressors long distances for minor offenses. The federal government moved to resolve the problem by appointing Anglican clergyman A.C. McCullum as Justice of the Peace (he left the area before the commission arrived). The threat of punishment, particularly incarceration, was a powerful deterrent to native "criminal" behaviour. With that deterrent removed, however, the Indians were willing to ignore the local police, at least as regards minor crimes of social control.


63 RG65, vol. 774, file 5589, Thornthwaite to Superintendent of Indian Affairs, c. 1927, Allard to Commissioner, 5 February 1927; vol. 609, file 2657, Extracts from report of Corp. Thornthwaite, 8 November 1927.

64 YRG1, Series 2, vol. 34, file 33,989, Minute of Privy Council, 13 February 1928.
From the beginning, the police were prepared to believe the worst of the northern natives. Following the murder of a miner in the southern Yukon in 1891, Superintendent Sam Steele noted, "The Indians of this country are as treacherous as any in the North-West Territories." The initial expectations did not come to pass, as the incidence of serious crime among the Yukon Indians remained noticeably slight. It is, of course, difficult to assess the actual extent of native crime, especially given the glaring gaps in the police network and incomplete court records. Indian offenses against whites were generally recorded; indeed, the tendency was to inappropriately attribute most unsolved minor thefts to the Indians, therefore overstating such activity. Conversely, incidents involving natives received attention only if violence threatened. Prospectors' reports such as the 1921 rumour that the White River Indians were planning a raid on the Tanana Indians led to the commissioning of special investigative patrols, most of which demonstrated the miners' accounts to be faulty.


The number of recorded crimes involving natives remained small throughout the period in question. There were, of course, occasional murders, assaults, and thefts. Most often, however, these acts of violence were directed toward other natives. The murders of Pelly Jim by Jackie Mackintosh in Whitehorse in 1926 and Paddy Duncan's slaying of Martin Kane at Champagne the next year were rare events and like most others involved excessive consumption of alcohol. Natives were seldom implicated in serious crimes against whites (and the reverse was also true). A notable exception occurred in 1899 when two prospectors were attacked, apparently without provocation. One died while the other, feigning death, escaped to the Tagish detachment of the North West Mounted Police. The five perpetrators were soon apprehended and within five weeks were in the Dawson jail awaiting the gallows.69 This case notwithstanding, the low incidence of inter-racial crime is a further indication of limited contact between natives and whites in the Yukon. It also suggests that the early North West Mounted Police expectations were misplaced.

Indications from police court records point to a consistently low crime rate (though a caveat must be entered that reported and punished crime represents an unknown portion of actual offenses). The 744 prisoners at the Dawson jail during 1900 included only seven Indians and three half-breeds. Three years later, only 2 of 365 were native and in 1904 the comparable figures were 7 out of 292. Even following the decline of Dawson City population following after 1904, which left the police free to devote more attention to the natives, the incidence of na-

PLEASE NOTE: PAGES 311 AND 312 ARE NONEXISTENT
tive crime remained low. In 1909, the number of native convictions rose to 19 out of 171, 32 of 233 in 1912 and only 13 of 197 in 1916. The Whitehorse Police Court register for 1900-1949 reveals a similar trend (see Table 26).

<p>| TABLE 26 |
| CRIMES INVOLVING NATIVES |
| WHITEHORSE POLICE COURT, 1900-1949 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Whites Supplying Liquor</th>
<th>Indians Supplying Liquor</th>
<th>Possession of Drunk Liquor</th>
<th>Theft</th>
<th>Assault</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900-04</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1905-09</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910-14</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915-19</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>1925-29</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-34</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935-39</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940-44</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-49</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Whitehorse Police Court Register, 1899-1949, P.A.C., RCMP.

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70 Figures are from N.W.M.P. (and R.N.W.M.P.) Annual Reports.

71 RG18, Whitehorse Police Court Register, 1900-1950.
Court records, confirmed by police reports, suggest that the Indians were non-violent (especially toward whites) and law-abiding. The preponderance of convictions, both in Whitehorse and Dawson, involved native consumption of alcohol, an offense treated by the police more as a nuisance than a serious breach of the law.

Due in part to the positive relationship between Indians and the police, the courts treated native offenders leniently. Aware that punishments for the numerous alcohol-related offenses were of limited deterrence and reluctant to blame the natives for depredations allegedly inflicted by Euro-Canadians, court officials viewed penalties for this offense as little more than a drinking tax. The natives rarely challenged the charges, with most entering a guilty plea, paying their fines, and taking their leave. For natives, penalties for alcohol-related offenses usually consisted of a $5 to $10 fine, although repeat offenders faced short-term imprisonment. The courts and police dealt more firmly with whites accused of giving alcohol to the Indians. In such instances, the standard sentence included a $100 fine (again a tax given the high profits from bootlegging), six months in jail or both. Repeat offenders faced even more serious penalties.72

The North West Mounted Police encountered few difficulties with the natives, except regarding the consumption of alcohol. Under the Indian Act of 1876, natives in Canada were barred from consuming alcoholic beverages.73 The permanent interdiction was designed to protect the natives


from the deleterious influences of liquor while simultaneously protecting the Euro-Canadian population from the unpredictable actions on inebriated Indians. R.C. McLeod, *The N.W.M.P. and Law Enforcement*, p. 32.

Whites in the Yukon, particularly government agents and Church of England officials accepted widely-held truisms that alcohol debauched the Indians and instigated unsociable and violent behaviour. They therefore insisted that the police take action to control the liquor trade. From 1894 to 1950, the bulk of police activities relating to the natives revolved around the ongoing and largely unsuccessful attempt to prevent native consumption of alcohol, an effort directed largely at the whites supplying the Indians.

Although acknowledging the limited impact of their efforts, the police maintained their vigilance. Reports of native alcohol use were expeditiously investigated, particularly when violence or death was believed attached to the drinking, and all police patrols gave special attention to the availability of liquor in remote districts. Efforts to regulate the trade concentrated on two areas, Dalton Post and Teslin.

RG10, vol. 3906, file 105,378, Bompas to Honourable Sirs, 26 August 1893; PAC, MG30, E55, Constantine Papers, Constantine to O.C., Regina, 20 November 1896; PAC, CMS, Bompas to C.M.S., 24 May 1895; RG10, vol. 3906, file 105,378, Bompas to Tenn, November 1893, Bompas to Minister of the Interior, 5 June 1896, United Committee on Native Races and the Liquor Traffic to Sir Charles Tupper, January 1894.


Most patrol reports, except for those dealing with the Porcupine River area, included comments on local liquor traffic. For one such example, see YRG1, Series 7, vol. 33, file 33,937, pt.9. Report of Superintendent H.H. Cronkhite re: Patrol from Dawson to Coffee Creek, 7 March 1929.
The former was close to Haines, Alaska, where lax American enforcement ensured a steady supply of liquor. The Teslin Indians, similarly, had comparatively easy access through Atlin, British Columbia. Reports of blatant abuse of alcohol in both areas led to Royal North West Mounted Police decisions to open small detachments in Dalton Post (1918) and Teslin (1925), both designed specifically to halt liquor traffic. Such efforts were, by police report, successful in limiting the public consumption and sale of liquor, but the officers were not so naive as to believe they had eliminated the "evil." Wherever the police moved to restrict the use of alcohol, the Indians apparently responded by moving their drinking to private quarters. Police enforcement of laws restricting native access to alcohol, however, did little more than push drinking out of the public view and back into the cabins and tents of the Indians and their white drinking partners.

Through their legal and ancilliatory activities, the North West Mounted Police were actively involved with Indians throughout the Yukon Territory. Their attitudes and actions mirrored those of the larger bu-

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79 RG18, vol. 352, file 128, Superintendent "H" Division to Asst. Commissioner, RNWMP, 1 April 1900. On the high priority ascribed this problem by the police, see PAC, MG30 E98, Z.T. Wood Papers, Report re: Law and Order in the Yukon, 14 May 1909.
reaucracy and they perceived their role as a buffer between the encroaching Euro-Canadian population and the still unprepared natives. The Indians accepted their leadership, both due to respect for the force and out of a healthy fear of imprisonment. There were, nonetheless, strict limitations on the power of the police, imposed by the vast distances, the small number of officers, and the police's many responsibilities. This was particularly evident in the attempts to regulate alcohol use which, despite a half-century of regular vigilance, continued as an important recreational activity among the Indians. In general, however, federal police work in the north, like so many government programs to 1945, served as a palliative, structured to keep natives and whites apart and to counter the baleful effects of Euro-Canadian expansion.

To the end of World War II, the federal government's program for the Yukon Indians departed in several significant aspects from declared national policy. Many of the elements laid out in the Indian Act, including encouraging self-sufficiency, protecting the natives from white society and supporting the Christianization of the "heathens" found their way into practice, albeit often by default. In contrast, there was no commitment to assimilation. The authorities remained dedicated to keeping the Indians as Indians, supporting their continuing desire to hunt, trap and avoid absorption into the industrial economy. The low priority ascribed to Indian matters by the federal government prevented any entrenchment of this status in the form of game preserves or guaranteed access to animal resources, but the emphasis remained intact. While the government shied away from imposing its assimilationist model on the Yukon Indians, they offered assistance to overcome the difficulties at-
tending white expansion. Somewhat surprisingly, the medical and welfare
benefits available to the natives began well in advance of similar gov-
ernment programs for other Canadians, a faint but nonetheless clear pre-
cursor of the safety net provisions of the post World War II welfare
state.

After 1945, federal programming took a dramatic shift, ushering in a
new era of government-native relations. While the administration of na-
tive affairs before the war evolved from a pessimistic assessment of
territorial prospects, the striking increase in interventionism after
1945 reflected new national imperatives. The post-war commitment of the
Mackenzie King-led Liberal government to a national social welfare sys-
tem foreshadowed major new directions in government programs for all
Canadians.80 While much of the increased intervention stemmed from na-
tional policies, including Mother’s Allowance introduced in 1945, other
specific Yukon programs originated in recognition of changing regional
conditions. The construction of the Alaska Highway and the Canol Pipe-
line during the war altered social and economic realities and a precipi-
tuous decline in fur prices after 1948 undermined the viability of the
natives’ harvesting pursuits.

Much of the “new” policy involved a simple expansion of existing pro-
grames. This period, 1945-1950, saw the extension of medical care offer-
ings outside the Dawson-Whitehorse corridor, a tuberculosis survey, a
special tuberculosis wing addition to the Whitehorse General Hospital.

80 Dennis Guest. The Emergence of Social Security in Canada (Vancouver:
University of British Columbia Press, 1980); Ken Coates, “The Alaska
Highway and the Indians of the Southern Yukon, 1942-1950: A Study in
Native Adaptation to Northern Development,” paper presented to the
40th Anniversary Symposium on the Alaska Highway, Fort St. John, B.C.,
July 1982.
the hiring of a Public Health nurse to administer routine medical services and offer health education, an immunization program and special native dental clinics. The government also fleshed out relief measures, particularly in the aftermath of the collapse of the fur trade.\textsuperscript{81} Indian Agent R.J. Meek tried to divert the natives from the welfare rolls, instead "assisting the Indians to be self-supporting and reliant." "Whenever possible," Meek stated, financial aid was "given to Indians to assist them in possible worthwhile fields of endeavour, in preference to direct relief."\textsuperscript{82} The government moved with equal haste to expand educational offerings. Two new boarding schools opened between 1946 and 1950 and funding for day schools increased significantly. Importantly, the federal emphasis also shifted away from casual literary and basic computational skills, the new educational programs emphasizing industrial and technical training instead. As before, the myriad of medical and welfare programs available to Indians far exceeded those provided the white population. (Table 27)

\textsuperscript{81} RG91, vol. 65, file 813, Gibben to Keenleyside, 4 September 1947; DIA, vol. 8762, file 906/25-1-005, pt. 1, Quarterly Report of R. J. Meek, 1 October to 31 December 1949; Public Accounts of the Government of the Yukon Territory, 1949-1950, 41; Amy Wilson, No Man Stands Alone (Sidney: Gray's Publishing, 1965) is the memoir of a nurse who served along the Alaska Highway in the late 1940's and early 1950's. Though somewhat overstated, the volume provides a good indication of the variety of health care programs available to the Indians.

\textsuperscript{82} Canada. Department of Mines and Resources, Indian Affairs Branch, Annual Report, 1949, 200; DIA, vol. 6761, file 420-12-1-RT-1, Meek to Kjar, 15 March 1950. See the IAB, Annual Reports for 1949, 1950 and 1951 for details on the programs offered. Employment prospects included work on the federal experimental farm at Haines Junction, or several native housing projects. Most of the Indians assisted by Meek found short-term work as dog-team drivers or wood-cutters.
TABLE 27

FEDERAL EXPENDITURES ON YUKON INDIANS,
1900-1950 (YEARLY AVERAGE – $)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Relief &amp;</th>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Residen.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900-04(1)</td>
<td>4503</td>
<td>2139</td>
<td>6642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905-09</td>
<td>5725</td>
<td>2996</td>
<td>8721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910-14</td>
<td>1302(2)</td>
<td>18007(3)</td>
<td>2251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915-19</td>
<td>3946</td>
<td>11698</td>
<td>3072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920-24</td>
<td>3425</td>
<td>12276</td>
<td>2333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925-29</td>
<td>3614</td>
<td>13296</td>
<td>3058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-34</td>
<td>2785(6)</td>
<td>2872</td>
<td>20972(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935-39</td>
<td>1011</td>
<td>4366</td>
<td>15459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940-44</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>4844</td>
<td>11145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-49</td>
<td>7227</td>
<td>23988(9)</td>
<td>17884</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Four years only. Net expenditures in 1900-1901.
(2) Indian Agent hired in 1914.
(3) Includes expenses relating to Rampart House small-pox epidemic, 1911-12 - $25,000; 1912-13 - $15,100.
(4) Expenditure of more than $40,000 for construction of Carcross Residential School, 1911.
(5) Does not include incidental expenses.
(6) Indian Agent retired in 1933, not replaced until 1946.
(7) Expenditure in excess of $48,000 in 1930-31 on construction.
(8) New Indian Agent appointed 1946.
(9) Expenditures increased by almost three times, 1946-47 to 1947-48.
(10) On November 1, 1945, Indian Health Services were transferred to the newly created Department of National Health and Welfare.

Source: Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Reports, 1900-1950.

Of all the new federal initiatives, the introduction of Mother’s Allowance had the greatest impact in this period. To qualify for the variable (by age of child) monthly allotment, one only had to be a resident of Canada and have children under the age of 16 registered and attending school. The latter requirement was not immediately applied in the Yukon, though as the school system expanded the government enforced the regulations with increasing severity. Unlike most Canadians, including Indians in the provinces, the Yukon natives did not receive a regular cash payment. Afraid that the Indians’ nomadic lifestyle would
lead to profligate waste of the federal grant. The government insisted upon issuing payments "in kind." Offering food and clothing instead of a cheque allowed the government to dictate native purchases. Seeing little value in native eating habits, authorities insisted that canned milk and tomatoes and prepared baby foods be included in individual allotments. The program had even larger implications than significant alterations in diet and material culture. The requirement that children attend schools regularly, applied with increasing vigour (especially after 1950), forced difficult choices between seasonal mobility and a more sedentary existence calculated to ensure a continuation of payments. The government expanded the day school and residential school programs in the same period, drawing more children into its educational network and more families into permanent residence near the towns.

The federal government had embarked on a new direction in social programming after 1945, for all Canadians and not just the Indians. For the natives of the Yukon, this activism had marked consequences. Mother's Allowance, pensions for the aged, reserve house projects, educational support, employment programs, expanded welfare and medical care offered greatly enhanced government assistance and led to a general abandonment of the nomadic lifestyle. Through the 1950's and following decades, government intervention increased as the federal bureaucracy sought new ways to improve the natives' condition. For the Yukon Indians, it was only after 1945 that the federal government's native policy approached the interventionist-assimilationist program long assumed to

83 IAB, AR 1946, 211; Guest, The Emergence of Social Security in Canada, pp. 128-133.
typify government-native relations.\textsuperscript{84}

The policy guidelines sketched in the Indian Act provided a framework within which government-Indian relations in the Yukon functioned. Importantly, regional and national administrators enjoyed considerable latitude in relating national imperatives to local conditions. Of the four main elements of national Indian policy, encouraging self-sufficiency (though in non-agricultural and non-industrial pursuits) and protecting natives from the white population dominated Yukon programming. Residential reserves - not negotiated treaty reserves - and protecting access to resources - but not granting game preserves - were the central tenants of Indian Affairs' administration in the territory. Although natives were constantly subordinated to a pressing government concern for development, limited mining activity precluded any significant conflict over land or resources. The government avoided assimilation, altering its educational program and expectations considerably and doggedly asserting as late as 1950 that the hunting and trapping offered the best prospects for the Yukon Indians. For their part, the natives agreed with the government's position. The majority continued to prefer the still-economical pursuit of game over the meagre returns from government handouts.

Government Indian policy in the Yukon both reflected and enhanced the natives' continuing marginalization. Residential reserves represented a response to white exclusionist pressures and the Indians' expectation of a seasonal home near population centres. Similarly, limited federal initiatives to protect native access to game indicated the continuing importance of harvesting in the Indians' economic life. Like religion and education, federal government programs did not serve to draw the Indians closer to the centre of the white-dominated regional order. Instead, white exclusionism and the natives' affinity for the harvesting lifestyle undermined the practicality of any program that did not take into account Indian nomadism and the limited social and economic accommodation between the races.
CONCLUSION

Though the image of Indians on the margin, excluded through prejudice from full participation in Canadian society, is deeply embedded in our national consciousness, it is an incomplete portrait. The present day Yukon and its history reflects the superficial reality of that image. In most northern communities, natives and whites live apart, the former either on government reserves or in informal ghettos in the less desirable sections of the towns. The different experiences facing natives and whites emerge in employment prospects, education, social activities, political organizations, health, and standard of living. The current situation remains one of grave concern, as is amply reflected in recent Indian activism and land claims negotiations.

The Yukon example, however, illustrates the numerous forces responsible for the emergence of distinct Indian and Euro-Canadian societies throughout the north. As this study has shown, the natives emerged on the margins of the white order through a combination of choice and exclusion. A commitment to the hunting-gathering lifestyle on economic and cultural grounds conditioned native responses. Because their belief and social systems rested on harvesting practices, the natives continually opted for a non-industrial rural environment. Any attempted accommodation reflected the Indians' desire to satisfy still limited desires for the material products and technology of southern industrial economies. Though these needs pulled them closer to the Euro-Canadian economic system, the viability of the fur trade and market hunting to the 1950's ensured that the natives continued their harvesting practices.
Euro-Canadians welcomed the Indians' placement on the outer fringes of their economic and social order. The extractive industries of the territory had few permanent openings for unskilled workers, especially natives deemed incapable of regular work routines. The Indians still served a useful economic purpose, functioning as a casual labour pool, providing needed, low-cost assistance on a seasonal and temporary basis. Prevailing social attitudes re-enforced economic segregation. The standard image of the North American Indian as drunken, diseased and demoralized received sufficient confirmation in the Yukon to entrench those attitudes in extensive exclusionist programmes. Because of their perceived limited economic utility, the natives were not wanted within the stoutly defended Euro-Canadian social world.

From before the Gold Rush to 1950, the relationship between natives and whites remained substantially unaltered. Put simply, the groups moved in different worlds. There was some accommodation, but only at points and times deemed mutually advantageous. The dominant force in maintaining this equilibrium was the fur trade. The sector changed significantly from the comparative formality of the Hudson's Bay Company era to the freelance competition of the 1920's and 1930's, but the natives retained their pre-eminent role in the industry. By choice, the Indians continued to enjoy the comparative freedom and acceptable returns of the only permanent industry in the Yukon. The volatility of alternate occupations in mining and transportation made the continued reliance on fur trade the most logical selection for natives permanently resident in the region. The continued importance of the fur trade, a common feature throughout Northern Canada, stabilized native-white rela-
tions. So long as harvesting pursuits remained viable, natives sought little accommodation with the emerging Euro-Canadian society. For their part, whites saw limited value in drawing such "primitive" people — evidenced by their allegedly subsistence lifestyle — into a closer relationship.

The strength of the fur trade encouraged the development of two distinct economic and social sectors. In the mining camps, Whitehorse and Dawson, whites dominated, forcing the natives physically and socially to the fringes. The Indians in this environment served primarily as casual labourers, called upon to counteract temporary aberrations in labour supply. The fur trade districts were different. Here, natives sustained the economy, far outnumbering the few white traders and trappers. Within the changing fur economy, the social dynamics remained constant. The back-country saw the vast majority of permanent native-white marriages, a marked difference from the casual exploitive sex of the towns. The logic of the fur trade, from the H.B.C. period to 1950, demanded close inter-personal relations, reflected in the continued practice of fur traders taking native wives. Marked by lasting accommodation, the fur trade community stood in stark contrast to the exclusionist and segregated urban-industrial society.

Despite the striking continuity of native-white relations, the various Indian groups faced numerous changes. The transition from H.B.C. "monopoly" trade to the wide-open competition of the 1920's represented a substantial challenge to native marketing practices. The natives responded positively to the many economic changes, profiting from the move to more vigorous competition and accepting on a limited basis employment
in non-harvesting ventures. Major technological innovations also affected the native way of life. The introduction of repeating rifles, steel traps, and the outboard motor expanded the hunters' range and decreased the required time away from camp. The Indians gradually absorbed manufactured clothing and processed foods into their outfits, with obvious affects on material culture, use of native products and harvesting needs. Though largely ineffectual, church and government programmes challenged native customs while offering skills and values designed for the white man's world. Though the natives' material culture, value systems and social patterns underwent notable transition during the period in question, their belief in the viability of the harvesting lifestyle remained largely unchanged. By choice, the Indians of the Yukon sought to remain as hunters and fishermen.

Native-white relations shifted significantly after 1945. By now dependant on a variety of Euro-Canadian commodities, the natives suffered economically from the serious post-war slump in fur prices. Such declines had occurred before, but never with such an extensive impact. Before 1945, the natives accepted the loss of barter income as unavoidable and temporary and turned back to subsistence hunting or sought irregular work in the towns. After the war, the Canadian government offered sizeable transfer payments and direct subsidies and was only too eager to encourage the natives' transition from bush to town. The availability of Mothers' Allowances, pensions and employment programmes at the precise time that the fur trade collapsed proved of considerable attraction to the cash-poor Indians. Faced with government edicts concerning the enrollment of children in schools, the natives found little
choice but to accept placement on carefully sequestered government reserves.

The restructuring after 1945 altered the substance of native-white contact in the territory. Indians remained on the margins of Euro-Canadian society, but several key elements had changed. The government ignored the wishes of the white population and sought to bring the natives into the dominant society, an effort that proved largely unsuccessful. The fur trade no longer supported the natives' material needs. Importantly, the Indians were losing their ability to determine for themselves their place within Yukon society.

The experience of the Yukon Indians reflects conditions among other northern native groups. Charles Bishop's ethno-historical study of the northern Ojibway and Hugh Brody's impressionistic examination of north-eastern British Columbia similarly point to the persistence of native harvesting practices and values. The northern Ojibway faced many of the same acculturative forces as the Yukon Indians and their lifestyle and settlement patterns reflected that contact. Bishop demonstrated that native society underwent significant changes before 1945 as a consequence of their contact with whites, alterations in the fur trade, government programmes and the introduction of new technology. Though the northern Ojibway faced different pressures than the Yukon Indians because of the extended time frame of contact and the over-harvesting of game, they similarly maintained their reliance on hunting and fishing into the mid-Twentieth Century. Like the Yukon, the combination of ex-

1 C. Bishop, The Northern Ojibway and the Fur Trade, esp. chapters 3-5.
2 Hugh Brody, Maps and Dreams.
panded government programmes, new mineral development, more roads and a declining fur trade after World War II forced many residential and lifestyle changes on the Ojibwa. In a different geographic context, Brody's impassioned defense of native values in northern British Columbia rests on the conviction that those attitudes remain viable to the present. Throughout the north, harvesting remained profitable, if variable, and the natives retained their cultural and economic attachment to the land. The natives were not living artifacts, non-economic people caught in the bounds of "traditional" society. Instead, their material, moral and spiritual culture reflected extensive and on-going native adaptation to multi-facted contact with Euro-Canadians.

While the Yukon situation shares a great deal in common with other northern districts, it stands in noticeable contrast to conditions in the south. In the latter areas, agricultural settlement, other resource developments, urbanization and over-hunting undermined the harvesting option. Stripped of the ability to continue hunting, southern natives in Canada faced dispossession or ghettoization on government sponsored reserves. Unlike the north, where the continuation of seasonal mobility undercut the influence of agents of acculturation, southern natives found themselves cloistered with missionaries and often dependant on government agents. Under the restrictions of bureaucratic control, the southern natives were far more vulnerable to the entreaties of Christianity and Canadian education, though not as much as missionaries or government agents wished or believed. Though both missionaries and officials of the federal government were active in the north, their impact

3 Jean Usher, William Duncan of Metlakatla, J. Gresko, "Native 'Rites' and White 'Rites'".
was diminished by isolation. The northern Ojibway signed a treaty with the Canadian government in 1905 and as a result experienced comparatively regular contact with government agents. Even in this instance, however, continued native mobility and the isolation of the Osnaburgh reserve limited the impact of these official activities. The Yukon Indians did not sign such a treaty and despite the continuing efforts by Indian agents and missionaries they remained largely outside the influence of government and religious leadership.

While the study of native-white relations reveals a great deal about native society, it is also of importance in understanding the Euro-Canadian population and the evolving structure of territorial society. From Hudson's Bay Company exploration to 1950, the persistence of exclusionist attitudes is clearly evident. The Euro-Canadian population rejected any close accommodation with the natives. They urged the government to segregate schools and hospitals, insisted that the church maintain separate Indian missions and offered the natives no permanent place within their communities. Fur traders and a few "squam men" stood apart from this general pattern, their choice of occupation forcing them into a unique social niche and usually inviting the disdain of the white populace.

Government agents and church officials shared the general disapproval of the native lifestyle and bemoaned their pattern of living. Contrary to stated national policy goals, however, they did little to change the

4 Bishop, pp. 84-87.
5 The Indians of the upper Liard technically came under the control of Treaty 11. The Yukon natives did not, however, sign the treaty and received few benefits before 1945. Rene Fumoleau, As Long As This Land Shall Last (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart).
situation. Realistically assessing their own limitations and acknowledging the Indians' reluctance to accept their direction, the would-be agents of cultural change became defenders of the status quo. Though for different reasons, government agents and missionaries came to echo the general opinion that the natives were best left as harvesters and that the territorial socio-economic equilibrium be left unchallenged.

The findings of this study point to the need for continued study, both of the application of national initiatives for the natives in specific local and regional contexts and of the social and economic history of Canada's northern territories. The continued Euro-Canadian focus of much of the literature obscures the diverse nature of the regional order and in particular ignores the natives' roles as participants in the northern economy and as members of territorial society. More broadly, there is compelling evidence of the need for a truly regional historiography. Following Morris Zaslow's impressive lead, most historians of the Canadian North focus on federal policy making and the extension of federal influence over Canada's northern territories. This examination needs to be balanced by the perspective from within, by a systematic analysis of the nature and evolution of the regional economy and society. This discussion of native-white relations in the Yukon Territory is only a preliminary step toward what will hopefully become a territorial perspective on the history of the Canadian North. Further studies are needed to compliment the well-established Ottawa-focused school of northern historiography and provide a more complete understanding of this long-neglected region.
The regional approach advocated here has become increasingly popular of late, particularly among Western Canadian and Maritime historians. These studies are of more than parochial interest, more than simply the story of one of Canada's many parts. Together, as part of a broader, systematic effort at regional history, they add significantly to contemporary understanding of the entire country. Canadian regionalism, multiculturalism, and class-based diversity -- "limited identities" to use the phrase popularized by J.M.S. Careless -- continue as the dominant themes in Canadian historiography. Some would argue that such fragmentation of historical inquiry is damaging to any sense of "national history." The opposite seems more to the point. The vitality of these "limited identities," both historically and in the contemporary setting, represents one of the major foundations of Canadian development. The regional outlook, noticeably absent in the historiography of the Canadian North, is clearly an essential element in the continuing appraisal of Canada's history.

The current study ends in 1950, in the midst of marked transitions in native and Euro-Canadian economic activity, territorial social structure and government programming. Conditions continued to change thereafter. Economic diversification, particularly in mining and tourism, brought many more whites to the north. That in turn stimulated an expansion of the road system and placed even greater pressure on limited resources. Government intervention increased, with particular emphasis on enforcing edicts designed to "improve" the native way of life. The Indians moved onto government reserves and accepted the directives to send their children to integrated schools. Brought into closer contact with white set-
lements before the towns were prepared to accept them, the natives were further relegated to the physical and social fringes. They lived, and continue to live, outside Euro-Canadian residential areas, a poignant reminder of the social gap between native and white in the north.

The often oppressive hand of government and the erosion of the fur trade reduced the positive force of native adaptation. Placed by decree rather than choice, inhabiting a niche that offers the benefits of neither harvesting nor Euro-Canadian economic practices, the natives have been trying since the 1960's to counter their ghettoization. Though the politicization of the Yukon Indians owed a great deal to government sponsored awareness programs, Indian activism signalled an attempt to redress the imbalances of the past two decades (though their historically inaccurate lamentations include a more all-embracing condemnation of white society).

Native claims focus on the desire to regain control of resources, thereby re-establishing the natives' positive relationship with the land. While the Indians seem determined to assert a long-acknowledged right to a harvesting lifestyle, their demands face significant roadblocks. The opposition includes the bulk of the Euro-Canadian population, a group dominated by an extractive, development mentality that deems the land a commodity, not a way of life. Ably represented by the territorial government, the whites wish to resist the alienation of large tracts of land for exclusive native use. Appropriately, the current conflict mirrors decades-old differences concerning the north. The Indian seeks to regain the cultural benefits of a harvesting lifestyle while the Euro-Canadians continue to search for new means of developing...
the mineral potential of the northern lands. Though recent indications suggest a settlement of the land claims dispute is at hand, the history of the Yukon suggests that native-white relations in the territory will not be easily altered through signatures on a government sponsored document.
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