RUNAWAY YOUTH IN A SUBURBAN COMMUNITY:
A STUDY OF SOCIAL POLICIES AFFECTING YOUTHFUL HOME-LEAVING

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A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (SOCIOLOGY)
in
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
DEPARTMENT OF ANTHROPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY

We accept this thesis as conforming
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THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
November 1985
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ABSTRACT

Running away from home is one of the few options available to many youths experiencing discontent in home and community. Somewhat like a family version of going out on strike, running away is one powerful action available to one of the less powerful family members in the ongoing family politics. The runaway action mobilizes a variety of social control and helping agencies into action, and may serve to bring to light personal and family problems which otherwise may remain obscured from view. Furthermore, running away serves as an implicit challenge to public policies legislating the dependency of minors.

It is these youth policies which are examined in the present study. Substituting policy analysis for the more traditional approach to runaway research which focuses on individual and family pathology, the study asks: How is it that running away from home became criminalized when so many runaway youths appear to have legitimate reasons for running?

The dissertation focuses on two historical "moments"—the Progressive era at the turn of the 20th century when running away from home became a juvenile crime, and the "counter-culture" era during the late 1960s and early 1970s when running away became partially decriminalized in North America. An ethnographic approach is employed to facilitate analysis of runaway actions throughout the community and to follow policy development over time. The study may be viewed as a contribution to a "political economy of adolescence" through its interest in the roles of modern young people in the labour market, as students and consumers, and as political entities with particular rights and constraints.

In order to describe the workings of runaway youth policies in day-to-day family and agency practice, a two-part "macro-micro" organizational struc-
tinction is employed. Part I examines the history and development of runaway youth legislation and other youth dependency policies. Age-grading practices, child labour reforms, the introduction of universal, cost-free public schooling, and the invention of the juvenile court are explored as key elements in the criminalization of youthful home-leaving. Runaway houses, crises lines, free food and medical programs for young transients and other innovative runaway services which arose during the counter-culture era are discussed as elements of a new advocacy approach which has led to partial decriminalization of the act of running away.

Part II explores the effects of runaway youth policies on the lives and actions of runaways, parents, and agency workers in an upper-middle class Canadian community. Empirical data are provided from a two and one-half year ethnographic field study of runaway patterns in a suburb of Vancouver, British Columbia, which is given the pseudonym "Bayside."

Throughout the dissertation, the action of running away from home is viewed as a potentially constructive act and a constructive "statement"--aside from and in addition to whatever individual and family pathology may be in evidence. One of the constructive implications of the runaway action is its implicit challenge to blind observance of youth dependency policies. The challenge of contemporary runaway youth migrations and of the counter-culture runaway service reforms lead naturally to proposals for policy changes which would provide young people more autonomy and more potential productivity than that which is currently available.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The planning, field research, and writing of this study have extended over a number of years, and many friends, colleagues, and interested community members have contributed to it with their patience, sharing of resources, and volunteering of ideas and information.

I am particularly grateful to the agency workers, young people, and parents of Bayside (who remain anonymous) for their cooperation as informants in the study. Those who granted in-depth interviews were particularly candid and informative in sharing their experiences. This dissertation is dedicated to them.

Bob Ratner, my dissertation committee chairman, has been meticulous in his feedback and always ready with new approaches to old and new questions. Committee members Adrian Marriage and Neil Guppy have been most helpful in responding to various drafts of the dissertation and in providing fresh insights on the topic. This committee has been magnificently thorough in its work.

I have also benefited greatly from the comments from various readers of various drafts, chapters, and synopses whom I have consulted in Vancouver, Bayside, Bellingham, and Santa Fe. I am particularly grateful to Richard Wark, Arturo Gonzales, Chuck Noland, Scott Kirves, Susan Tiano, Paul David, and John MacDonald.

Rosellen, Zabrina, and Liam Aleguire allowed me considerable leeway over the years of Ph.D. study. Their patience in the face of many sacrifices is greatly appreciated.
Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Running away from home is one of the few truly powerful actions available to contemporary youths who are experiencing distress in their home and community environments. The runaway action inevitably achieves immediate results—some intended and some not intended by the runaway youth.

Not unlike a family version of going out on strike, running away is frequently the only way some young people can find to express and deal with a buildup of grievances or ongoing conflict. Running away from home is generally an important ploy or counter-ploy in the ongoing family politics. As a dramatic and consequential action by one of the less powerful members of the family (in terms of formal power allocation), running away is often one of the first steps toward autonomy by a child or youth who feels hedged in. It may be one of the few options available to express discontent.

Since runaway youths are sometimes victims of physical or sexual abuse and, therefore, have ample justification for their discontent, it is ironic that the action of running away from home has traditionally been against the law in Canada, the United States and other industrialized nations. This dissertation will explore the question: How is it that running away from home became criminalized, especially when so many runaway youths appear to have legitimate reasons for running?

The act of running away implicitly involves juveniles in a confrontation with public policies designed to maintain minors in the family home until the age of majority. Running away in the face of laws and regulations prohibiting such an action is, then, a revolt against legislated public order. Such a rebellious action has repercussions on various levels.

At the family level, the exit of a runaway youth creates a gap in the
family unit which must be explained to relatives and neighbors and somehow dealt with. The runaway incident creates an imbalance in the family structure and a crisis in the life of the family. On the community level, the runaway incident immediately mobilizes a variety of social control agencies and helping agencies into action. Family problems, school problems, delinquency problems, and mental health problems which may have been festering for months or years may be suddenly exposed to public view with the precipitous departure of a runaway youth. On the broader social policy level, running away from home represents both a law violation and a challenge to the logic and rationale of youth dependency policies.

It is these public policies legislating the dependency of minors which will be subjected to scrutiny in the present study. Virtually all studies of runaway youth have asked the same set of questions: "Why do young people run away from home?" "What could have been done to keep them from running away?" and "What can be done once they have left home?" I am taking the position that the answers to these questions are rather obvious. Minors run away from home for the same sorts of reasons that adult spouses and parents "desert" the family or "run away": discontent, unhappiness, abuse, and/or a desire to discover better alternatives elsewhere.

Our societal preoccupation with the presumed pathology of the runaway action tends to obscure questions which might well be posed about the runaway prohibition itself and other youth dependency policies. Very little analysis has been conducted on the rationale for the original runaway youth legislation and on the contemporary operations of social control measures against running away. Instead, almost all studies of runaway youth focus on the presumed pathology of runaways and their families. It is the intent of this dissertation to reorient the discussion of running away from a focus
on the troubles of youths and families to an alternative focus on the problems with policy.

This shift of focus from pathology to policy is an attempt to move backward to "first causes." Running away from home was made illegal, with punishments and consequences attached, due to a particular set of historical circumstances. The types of official agency reactions to the runaway act which are allowed and encouraged are grounded in those historical circumstances. Agencies take their cue from the runaway policy tradition; communities react with alarm based on a social reality which has been handed down over the years; researchers frame their research questions and research designs with this tradition and social reality as taken-for-granted material.

My intent here is to not take so much for granted, to see runaway youth policy as problematic rather than obvious—as something to be explored rather than assumed—and to suspend certain "everyday" assumptions in the process of this exploration. The idea that the "major problem" in regard to runaway youth is the problem of family and individual pathology is the primary assumption to be suspended in this study.

In suspending belief in the presumed authority of the pathological explanations, I am not, however, denying the existence of family and individual troubles of varying magnitudes in relation to runaway actions. I am merely setting aside that issue for a moment in order to allow room for another explanatory perspective. It is necessary to do this because the pathological perspective on running away has become so pervasive that its very existence and functioning obscures other "first causes" which may provide more explanatory power. (1)

Furthermore, the existence and dominance of the pathological perspective serves to limit and shape the sorts of solutions which can be offered to
families and individuals experiencing stress. A central goal of this research is to arrive at recommendations for programs which would improve the lot of runaways and their families and improve the effectiveness of the agency support network. Reorienting the discussion toward policy origins, policy maintenance, and policy effects will allow us to arrive at a set of recommendations which is less constrained by implicit pathological assumptions and thus more innovative and original.

The study is organized in two parts. Part I undertakes a review and analysis of runaway youth policies and the historical tradition of youth dependency. The policy discussion is evolutionary and takes the exploration beyond juvenile court legislation—the point at which runaway research normally ends when the issue of policy is discussed at all. A critical approach to policy analysis is employed, with the aim of examining taken-for-granted presumptions about runaway policy. Part II explores the effects of policy provisions on the lives and behaviours of runaways, parents, and agency workers. Empirical data are provided from a two and one-half year ethnographic field study of runaway patterns in an upper-middle class suburb of Vancouver, British Columbia, which will be called "Bayside" for the purposes of this dissertation. The empirical chapters explore how parties to runaway situations are affected by, guided by, and constrained by the public policies which have been set up as a framework for the official handling of such home-leavings, and in turn how the actions of community members affect policy as enacted in practice.
Runaway youth policies involve a rhetoric of benevolence which can be deceptive, since such policies entail potentially coercive and restrictive control measures. The original aim of such policies was to protect idle youths, who were not preoccupied with either work or school, from the dangers of the street. This continues to be the aim of contemporary runaway policies. A second aim of such policies has been to reinforce parental responsibility over minors—(including financial, moral, and leadership responsibility)—up to the age of legal adulthood. Runaway policies aim to return family problems back to the family when possible, so that substitute state parenting (foster homes, group homes, adoption, transfer of wardship) will not be necessary.

To remove a minor from the dangers of the street and return that minor to the parent who is legally, morally, and financially responsible for the supervision of the minor inevitably involves coercive measures. Young people are transported against their will, are retained in custody either in jail settings or in secure group home settings (a practice which has been modified somewhat over the past decade), and are taken into custody to await court hearings—all in the interest of protection of the youngster. It is frequently difficult for runaways to understand that the coercive practices are being undertaken for their own good, since they have already done what they felt was necessary for their own good, which was to leave and find a more positive setting for themselves.

It is in this sense that runaway youths are, by definition, implicitly engaged in a confrontation with public policy. The policy is designed to maintain young people in the family home—to discourage them from leaving
in the first place, and then to return them home if they do leave. Youths who run away are violating the letter of policy which stipulates remaining under parental care and supervision until the age of majority. When a parent kicks an offspring out of the house, or cooperates in finding the minor an independent living situation, the parent is also party to violating policy provisions. Since the potentially coercive control of runaway situations is formally written into law (in juvenile delinquency statutes and child welfare legislation) and includes punitive sanctions for violating the law, it is appropriate—though admittedly unorthodox—to refer to the runaway act as a "criminalized" behaviour.

The problem being highlighted in this study is that criminalizing the act of running away from home has made runaway youths victims of policies which were designed to help them. By making running away illegal, yet providing no real alternatives besides automatic return to the family home or a locked cell or closely guarded dormitory room, policymakers have constructed a situation wherein runaways inevitably become fugitives. The attractive alternatives (from the point of view of many runaways) are those which are illicit—including the street temptations which the policy was designed to divert youths from.

At this point, the cure sometimes becomes worse than the disease. Runaway policy in practice tends to funnel youths back into unhealthy home environments, or, alternatively, such policies may cause the youth to gravitate onto the street as a reaction to having "nowhere else to go." The outlawing of running away has led to the perpetuation and continuing success of informal, illegal, alternative street "services"—such as prostitution, pimping, drug dealing, and burglary as alternative income sources—and substitute relationship opportunities—as when a runaway youth finds
family-type relationships on the street—in urban youth ghettos which tend to be attached to the high crime nightlife districts of most major North American cities.

There would be no exaggeration, then, in the statement that runaway youth policies tend to be "iatrogenic" policies—i.e., that they tend through the very nature of their formulation to lead to further individual and social problems as they set about to solve the runaway problem. Runaway youth confront a double-edged dilemma when they hit the streets: 1) They are generally reacting to some sort of stress in their home or community, and must sort out their feelings about that and pursue meaningful healing actions in regard to that (primary) stress; however, 2) they also confront an unfriendly, unsupportive, and oppositional reception wherever they run (speaking here of the official, legitimate community reception, apart from the informal friendship or street contacts) due to the fugitive status of the runaway action. The first might be termed "primary stress" and the second type might be termed "secondary stress," following Edwin Lemert's (1951) distinction between primary and secondary deviance. In this and Lemert's version, the "primary" state derives from personal motivations and original life circumstances, while the "secondary" state derives from policy entanglements and from agency processing actions.

The benevolence of runaway policy tends, then, to reside more concretely in the rhetoric of the policy formulation than in the reality of policy results. The intentions of the policymakers—to reunite families and to protect children and young people from danger—were evidently quite sincere. But the policies as formulated do not lend themselves to a benevolent or liberating child-advocacy approach. The present study asks why that is so and seeks to formulate an alternative approach which would be more helpful
to runaways and their families.

The pathological perspective toward runaways and their families appears to be a key to the ironies of "iatrogenic" policy and "secondary (policy) stress." While runaway policy appears to be benevolent, in actual practice it is punitive and coercive and offers few satisfactory alternatives (with some limited exceptions—see Chapter 5). While runaway policy is formulated in its rhetoric as a way to heal families, it tends to exacerbate family and personal problems. While policy appears to promote family health and family unification, an underlying economic motivation is apparent: Governments prefer not to be responsible for the care and upbringing of older youths who have left home if possible and thus return them as quickly as possible to the family home. This economic conservatism on the part of state social service planners reinforces a common desire on the part of government to help families remain intact whenever possible. Thus, the conservative tendency on the part of the state not to intervene in family matters has led to policies which tend not to challenge parental authority and which tend not to offer constructive alternatives when family conflicts reach an impasse.

All of this would indicate that some underlying dynamic is at work which belies the surface benevolent intent of runaway policy. I am proposing that the pathological explanatory framework—the perspective which blames young people and families for the runaway problem—tends to obscure certain deep-running social contradictions. The result has been a scapegoating action whereby runaways and families have been seen as the cause of a problem which is really much more far-reaching.

The dominant style in North American social welfare and health services has been "to treat what we call social problems, such as poverty, disease,
and mental illness, in terms of the individual deviance of the special, unusual groups of persons who had those problems" (Ryan, 1971: p. 15). A piecemeal approach, which attempts to approach social problems by treating the individual, leads to avoidance of the issue of structural change through focusing upon the pathologies of individual clients and families.

Caplan and Nelson (1973) have pointed with alarm to psychological research on social problems which tends to focus upon "person-centered" characteristics (situated within the individual) while ignoring situationally relevant factors (external to the individual). They also refer to the "tendency to attribute causal significance to person-centered variables found in statistical association with the social problem in question" (p. 199). Caplan and Nelson note that "one of the more important but subtle political advantages of person-blame research is that it can permit authorities to control troublesome segments of the population under the guise of being helpful, even indulgent" (p. 208).

Such an approach to social problems has given rise to what some authors refer to as the "therapeutic state" (Hartjen, 1977; Kittrie, 1971). The therapeutic approach to the solution of social problems utilizes an illness model and "seeks to treat behavioural deviations as medical problems" (Hartjen, 1977: p. 267). Offensive behaviour is not seen as the result of evil intent, but rather the result of some kind of mental or emotional disorder, a form of illness. Under the therapeutic ideology, offenders against society are viewed as sick and capable of being cured. When the therapeutic approach becomes institutionalized as state policy, large numbers of citizens are affected by the taken-for-granted ideology, and numerous coercive control measures are made possible and are cloaked in benevolent, healing terminology.
In his book, *Blaming the Victim* (1971), William Ryan decries the ways in which blame is shifted to the victims of social problems as part of a mechanism to avoid confronting real causes:

The generic process of Blaming the Victim is applied to almost every American problem. The miserable health care of the poor is explained away on the grounds that the victim has poor motivation and lacks health information. The problems of slum housing are traced to the characteristics of tenants who are labeled as "Southern rural migrants" not yet "acculturated" to life in the big city. The "multiproblem" poor, it is claimed, suffer the psychological effects of impoverishment, the "culture of poverty," and the deviant value system of the lower classes; consequently, though unwittingly, they cause their own troubles. From such a viewpoint, the obvious fact that poverty is primarily an absence of money is easily overlooked or set aside.

(Ryan, 1971: p. 5)

Likewise, the "obvious" fact that the problem of running away from home is (at least from the point of view of the runaway) primarily a problem of not being able to find a legitimate alternative place to stay overnight and/or not being able to find legitimate full-time employment, also tends to be easily overlooked or set aside as not relevant. The pathological context of runaway youth policy fails to either address or solve the reactions to family stress being experienced by the runaway, or the street problems of exploitation and illegal opportunities which await youths who leave home.

A therapeutic state approach which attempts to solve social problems through individual therapy generally does not yield success therapeutically, because social problems cannot be solved on an individual level. The medical model approach to runaway problems, while presuming with its diagnosis/prognosis/treatment/follow-up procedures to cure the youth and the family of their behaviour deviations, has served merely to shift the blame. By focusing on individual and family pathology, state policies serve to divert attention from very real contradictions in the economy, in the compulsory school...
system, and in social welfare delivery traditions. It is these contradictions that will be examined in the chapters to follow.\(^{(5)}\)
The Historical Record

Rather than look for the root of the runaway problem in the motivations and behaviours of runaways and their families, which is the usual approach in runaway youth research, it is the intent of this study to examine the policies which have served to make running away from home illegal and subject to punitive sanctions. While it is true that the primary enforcement of the runaway prohibition has come through the juvenile court (since runaway acts, along with truancy, incorrigibility, and sexual promiscuity, are among those "status offenses" which are illegal for juveniles but not for adults), juvenile delinquency policy is actually only the tip of an iceberg which also includes child protection policy, runaway house funding, laws determining the "age of majority," child labour laws, and the introduction and success of free, public, compulsory schooling. The origins of most of these policies can be found in the Progressive era when extremely turbulent economic and social conditions had generated many aggressive and effective social reform movements.

This study isolates two historical moments for analysis. The first of these will be termed the "hegemonic moment" of Progressive social reform, extending approximately from 1880 to 1910, a period witnessing unprecedented entry of governmental agencies into the life of North American families and into the affairs of children and youth. The second historical period of interest will be termed the "counter-hegemonic moment"(6) of counter-culture innovation and youth rebellion, extending approximately from 1965 to 1975, a period during which grassroots street services to runaways emerged spontaneously in response to an unprecedented surge of youth transiency, representing a challenge to coercive state runaway policies which were proving ineffective. The hegemonic period is the context in which running away from
home became criminalized, and the counter-hegemonic period is the time during which attempts were made to decriminalize running away and introduce services to runaways and families which derived from an advocacy perspective.

Two issues of theoretical importance will be highlighted in the study: first, the inability of the labour market to accommodate youthful workers, and second, the tension between control perspectives and advocacy perspectives in the state response to runaway actions. Although runaway services and policies are generally presumed to be located in the area of juvenile justice and, more recently, child welfare, the basic roots of runaway youth policy run considerably deeper. In fact, a look at the historical record indicates that juvenile delinquency and child protection laws represent only a part of the agenda for controlling movements of youth. Running away, and the concomitant problem of youth idleness in urban centres, became a severe problem in North America during the late 19th century as children and youth were gradually coming to be excluded from the labour force and, being unemployable, had nothing substantial to do with their time. Since this was before the era when compulsory school laws became fully effective (which did occur to large degree by about 1920), hundreds of juveniles were experiencing a "slack time" during which they were neither working nor in school. Runaway youth prohibitions were established during this period to protect and control minors who were idle in the central core areas of the large industrial cities of the time.

During the counter-hegemonic moment in runaway policy history, the equation was suddenly turned around—at least for awhile. Counter-culture street agencies (including runaway houses, food programs, medical programs, telephone hot lines, and so on) arose spontaneously to meet apparent unmet needs. The observed need was for more advocacy and less control. This
counter-culture movement, part of a larger era now referred to as "The Sixties," led to a shift in runaway services—temporary in the case of Canada, but more permanent in the U.S.—toward an approach which was less pathological, less control-oriented, and more in tune with the expressed needs and desires of the runaway youth.

Two events, both occurring in 1967, signalled the emergence of the counter-hegemonic moment. Each event has had considerable effect on policy toward runaways, both in Canada and the United States. The first event was the U.S. Supreme Court's ground-breaking decision in the case of 15-year old Gerald Gault of Arizona in 1967. In this decision, the U.S. high court challenged the very basis of juvenile court philosophy, indicating that the fusion of therapy and punishment represented by the youth court's "kindly parent" framework did not justify the wholesale suspension of basic legal rights for juvenile defendants, and in fact was not justified based on any proven rehabilitative results from the court's work. By ruling that juveniles, like adults, should benefit from criminal law due process provisions and have access to legal counsel if desired when brought to court, the Supreme Court called into question the notion that juveniles were brought there to be helped and protected rather than to be held legally accountable for their acts. This court decision heralded a new, less pathological attitude toward juveniles in trouble—especially toward runaways and other "status offenders" whose actions would not even be seen as violations in adult courts of law.

The second event of significance occurred the same year when, on June 18, 1967, Huckleberry House in San Francisco opened its doors to transient youth visiting the city during that renowned "Summer of Love." Respecting the on-going decisions these youths were making for their lives, and granting them the dignity to determine their own direction, Huckleberry's—the first
of many runaway houses to open during that turbulent period of youth migra-
tion—assisted runaways through providing counseling, advocacy, and liaison
with police, families, and social agencies, as well as meals and a place
to stay. The idea that a runaway youth could be housed in a dignified setting
and be aided in reaching important life decisions was a new one in a culture
accustomed to locking its runaway children in jails, holding facilities,
detention centres, and juvenile reformatories as the primary available option
to returning them forcibly to the home environment they had just then intentionally left behind.

Yet while the innovations of the Sixties have led to substantial gains
in terms of the quality of services to runaways and in terms of the legal
accountability of state control measures, a true "liberative" advocacy per-
spective has not been reached, primarily because the labour market issues
have not been confronted. The implications of this study are that until
the issues of full-time jobs and independent housing for minors, and the
possibility of input by youths into their own affairs, are dealt with head-
on, runaway youth policy will remain the piecemeal, ad hoc approach it now
is.
Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework used in this study can be divided into four major rubrics which are utilized in the analyses that follow. They include: 1) Negotiated Order; 2) Political Economy of Adolescence; 3) Victimless Crimes; and 4) Agency and Structure. Each concept is outlined briefly below.

Negotiated Order. The act of running away and the subsequent developments following from that act are part and parcel of a family and community negotiation process. The "negotiated order" of running away involves youths, parents, and agency people (as well as neighbors, relatives, friends, employers and others) in a context of mutual decision-making. Each party to the runaway situation brings a unique set of expectations and vested interests to the setting. Much of the contention which swirls around runaway episodes derives from the differing perspectives which various participants bring to the situation.

However, the local decision-making process does not occur in a vacuum. Important state policy decisions impinge on the local community negotiated order, as does a long history of attitudes, customs, and social welfare procedures which are continually being utilized, refined, adapted, avoided, or circumvented. The process of policy formulation originally occurred in a negotiated context, as does the continuing process of policy maintenance and policy revision. From the negotiated order point of view, policy is not seen as a static status quo, but as a working power-consensus always in flux and always being developed and revised.

Negotiated order theory has been in a developing state in organizational studies initiated by Anselm Strauss, Norman Denzin and others dating back

Political Economy of Adolescence. This perspective deals with the place of young people in the politics of the family, with adolescents' roles in the economic structure, and with the evolution of adolescents' rights, political role, and economic usefulness over time. It also deals with the reinforcement within the political structure of economic realities related to age and family dynamics, such as who works where for what money and under what conditions; the impact of work life on family life; socialization and education in preparation for work; and any other issues which connect the youth age status with political and economic structures. The focus of the political economy of adolescence approach is historical and critical; it is an approach which looks beneath the obvious. The present approach strives to draw connections between the macroscopic level and the microscopic level (i.e., between broad societal issues and local, interpersonal issues) and, in doing so, to examine the relative constraints and opportunities impinging upon youth at various points in history.

A major tenet of this study is that the act of running away from home is in essence a political act, and that it is in fact one of the most powerful and noticeable actions which an adolescent can take. Running away is a confrontation with the status quo on various levels: As a rejection of the existing family arrangements; as a striking out to create better living arrangements and emotional arrangements (whether for a night or for a lifetime); and as a challenge to the state's authority to segregate children rigidly by age and otherwise intervene in and regulate private family matters
in ways the runaway sees as onerous.

There is no fully developed field in the political economy of adolescence. However, in pursuing such an approach I have benefited from revisionist historical writings on the adolescent life stage (Kett, 1977; Gillis, 1974); critical historical analyses of the juvenile court (Platt, 1969; Schlossman, 1977; Mennel, 1972; Schur, 1973; Hagan & Leon, 1977; Leon, 1978; Houston, 1972; Rothman, 1978), and of schooling and youth employment (Bowles & Gintis, 1976; Katz, 1971; Katz & Mattingly, 1975; Sutherland, 1976; Grubb & Lazerson, 1982; Cohen & Lazerson, 1972; Kantor & Tyack, 1982); writings on the 1960s counter-culture movement and surge of youth resistance (Roszak, 1969; Reich, 1970); labeling theory and other interactional "process" approaches in the sociology of deviance (Lemert, 1951; Schur, 1971; Davis, 1975); and the conflict approach in criminology (Taylor, Walton & Young, 1973; Chambliss, 1976; Reasons & Rich, 1978).

Victimless Crimes. In his 1965 book, Crimes Without Victims, Edwin Schur discussed the special problems of those who are arrested and given criminal consequences in situations of "victimless crimes" where there was no complainant and no clear harm to another person. In adult criminal codes, such "victimless crimes" would include drug abuse, public drunkenness, vagrancy, loitering, pornography violations, illegal abortions, and certain sexual acts between consenting adults. In juvenile delinquency statutes, the "status offenses," including running away from home, can be termed victimless crimes.

Schur (1965) found that these "morality crimes" or "nuisance offenses" have certain things in common: A) When there is harm involved, it is primarily self-harm, and there is generally dispute as to the extent of the
self-harm involved. B) Such crimes are difficult to enforce and to prosecute due to the private nature of the encounter between willing participants, due to the subjective nature of decisions about whether an act is truly troublesome, or illegal, due to the frequent lack of a complainant, and/or due to the consequent difficulty in obtaining evidence. (It might be added that prosecution of victimless crimes seldom acts as an effective deterrent to future incidents, resulting in "revolving door" punishment routines, both at the adult and juvenile levels.) C) As a direct result of such nuisance laws, participants in such acts almost invariably develop deviant images and deviant self-images, often enter into further deviant acts, and tend to enter deviant subcultures. D) The laws and enforcement procedures set up to eliminate victimless crimes actually function to perpetuate the proscribed activity; in other words, since cures are not made readily available, punishment followed by immediate return to the activity is common. E) Existence of such laws reinforces and publicizes the negative or allegedly negative aspects of the offenses and thus leads to general public ignorance of possibly healthful, harmless, or redeeming elements of such activities. F) The illegality of such acts, and the subsequent stigmatization of the participants frequently tends to drive victimless crime offenders into "secondary crime" (or secondary self-harm) either as part of the derived lifestyle, to obtain money for the illegal activity, or due to disease or other difficulties arising from the unregulated, stigmatized, and/or secret activity. All of the foregoing generalities apply to some degree to the action of running away and its consequences. (10)

Agency and Structure. "Agency" in this context refers not to social agencies but to the human contribution to social structure (i.e., actions by human agents) as in the formation, perpetuation, and revision of social
policy. A dialectical approach is used, following Anthony Giddens (1981; 1984), wherein the acts of citizens are seen in constant interaction with the constraints, opportunities and realities of social structure. The gap between action theory and institutional analysis is overcome through Giddens' notion of the "duality of structure": Structure on the one hand consists of rules and resources built into social systems; actors draw upon these rules and resources, by which they structure their actions; and it is through these actions that the structural qualities which generate social action are continually reproduced. However, unintended consequences emerge from social action which tend to divert social structure into new directions. The "unacknowledged conditions of action" tend to place new constraints on the actors' knowledgeability and capability; thus, such unexpected results of action play a key role in social change since they may decisively "divert" social action from a structured course (Giddens, 1981).

The primary use to be made here of the agency-structure dialectic will be in understanding "counter-hegemonic" actions in regard to runaway policy: actions taken by individuals and local groups in contradiction to policy, in circumventing policy, and in innovating new solutions to policy dilemmas. We will deal with the issue of counter-hegemonic actions by individuals trapped in the contradictions and constraints of existing social policies, and with the emergence of unintended consequences of action such as a) the criminalization of runaways through an intended benevolent policy, or b) the emergence of a strong counter-cultural movement following ineffective implementation of that intended benevolent policy. Of primary concern will be the interaction between innovations by community "agents" and the impact of such innovations on existing policy.
Analytic Procedures

C. Wright Mills (1959) proposed a relevant methodology for examining the impact of policy upon people. It is a method which juxtaposes history and biography in dialectical relationship. Through examination of the effects of historical constraints on people's lives, and of the reactions in turn of citizens to these policy realities, it is possible to obtain a more sophisticated, analytical view of social policy dynamics. Inspired by Mills' suggestions, I have chosen a "critical-ethnographic" approach in this research. The present method systematically places descriptive personal, family and community data into an analytic framework designed to examine runaway policies historically, critically, and in evolutionary perspective. While it is sometimes viewed as unorthodox to mix diverse types of data (e.g. social-psychological data and political-economic data) and diverse levels of analysis (e.g. historical and contemporary-empirical), the juxtaposing of macro, historical policy analysis with the real-life drama of the Bayside runaway stories is viewed here as a necessary method for avoiding overly stereotyped ways of viewing contemporary social services. (11)

In the present study, I will make a concerted effort to link the macro (historical/policy) level with the micro (biographical/interactional) level in order to pursue an analysis which demonstrates the effects of individual actions on public policy and the constraints and opportunities afforded by policy in its effect on individual lives. Mills wrote in *The Sociological Imagination* of the connection between "private troubles and public issues" and outlined a procedure for confronting the linkage between "history and biography":
Know that many personal troubles cannot be solved merely as troubles, but must be understood in terms of public issues—and in terms of the problems of history-making. Know that the human meaning of public issues must be revealed by relating them to personal troubles—and to the problems of the individual life. Know that the problems of social science, when adequately formulated, must include both troubles and issues, both biography and history, and the range of their intricate relations. Within that range the life of the individual and the making of societies occur; and within that range the sociological imagination has its chance to make a difference in the quality of human life in our time.

(Mills, 1959: p. 226)

Writing in the same vein and in specific regard to studies of adolescence, John Seeley wrote:

What I plead for, then, in the realm of theory, is the development and recognition of a study: the study of what is to be seen in the simultaneous dual perspective of history and life history. What it calls for ... is an enterprise in which we, jointly with [adolescents], as one interactive we, explore and explain what is for each of us and each of them the unique intercept of my life with our life, my history with the common history of all of us.

(Seeley, 1973: p. 28)

Moving between the micro and macro levels in reciprocating fashion permits and stimulates the formulation of unusual and novel hypotheses. Many of the actual, everyday effects of policy frequently were not anticipated by the framers of written legislation or bureaucratic memoranda. Likewise, individuals leading their everyday lives and bumping up against frustrating constraints and obstacles are commonly unaware of the historical development of the policies which affect them, and of the bureaucratic accidents and unintended consequences which lie behind many of the truisms of public and private life.

Rather than continuing to presume that runaway problems stem in toto from family pathology and youth pathology, it is possible with historical
distance to view the runaway phenomenon through different lenses aided by suspending certain taken-for-granted assumptions. An expected result of this study therefore, will be the redefinition of runaway policy through examination of the actions of adult policymakers in addition to and as opposed to looking only at the actions of adolescent runaways. With such distancing, it is possible to perceive of adolescence itself as a product of adult age-grading actions rather than primarily as a developmental stage or as a time for identity crises. Age stratification may then be approached with the same analytic seriousness we usually reserve for studies of social stratification, economic stratification, gender stratification, and racial/ethnic stratification.

One approach to the linking of macro-level and micro-level perspectives can be found in the occasional attempts to combine Marxism and ethnomethodology or phenomenology in a hybrid perspective (Chua, 1976; Smart, 1976; Dallmayr, 1973; Paci, 1972). Both approaches begin from a critical base. In the case of Marxism, the critical eye is turned on the economy and attendant cultural patterns, while in phenomenology the critique is of standard scientific and social scientific method. But each approach has a way of turning arguments around or upside down and looking at the world through new lenses. It is in this sense that the authors mentioned propose a union of the two. Since Marxist approaches have often been viewed as "too macro" (i.e., too economic determinist, thus ignoring important cultural and interactional aspects), and ethnomethodology and other phenomenological approaches have been critiqued as "too micro" (i.e., too apolitical, ignoring important societal dynamics such as class, race, gender, and wealth), a merging of the two might well counteract some of the shortcomings of each. Ralph Larkin has written a study titled Suburban Youth
in Cultural Crisis (1979) which is relevant to the present effort and which is one of the first empirical studies to attempt an integration of critical Marxist theory with ethnomethodological techniques—to "combine macro-theory with a study of intentionality and subjective awareness" (p. 232).

Although the present study does not derive either from an orthodox Marxism nor a throughgoing phenomenology, I have been influenced by each approach and have attempted a synthesis similar to that advocated by Paci and Larkin. The Marxist approach, which has gained influence in North American Sociology in recent years, has led me to approach running away from a political-economic perspective and to analyze ideological manipulations in the reigning pathological approach of the "therapeutic state." My exposure to phenomenology, a controversial approach in sociology and other disciplines because of its critique of standard methodology and its non-traditional conceptual framework, has led me to suspend my belief in easily taken-for-granted presuppositions (such as the inherent unemployability of modern youth and the idea that runaway causation lies primarily in family and individual pathologies), and to seek alternatives for these "everyday life" presuppositions.

The present study is, then, a "critical ethnography" which explores the workings of social policies toward runaway youths in North America with particular focus on the workings of policy in practice within one upper-middle class Canadian community. An ethnographic approach seeks a comprehensive description of a culture, subculture, or topic of interest. Ethnographers attempt to enter the life of the people being studied and to understand the world views and perspectives of the informants. The goal is holistic description of the community life or ideology formulation, rather than analysis of one isolated portion of that community life. A critical
approach to social policy study holds certain taken-for-granted assumptions in abeyance and seeks alternative explanations. This opens the door to new approaches to familiar subject matter. Thus a critical ethnography is a study which seeks holistic, "process" descriptions of communities and ideas, attempts to understand other perspectives "from the inside," suspends taken-for-granted presuppositions, and seeks innovative, creative alternatives for pressing social problems. (12)

Norman Denzin (1970) has outlined a concept of "triangulation" in social science research which stresses the cross-referencing of various research techniques bearing on the same population or subject matter. The purpose of triangulation is to obtain a more complete, more comprehensive analysis of social reality and to aid in overcoming biases and limitations which might accompany any one method or any one account. This study uses a triangulation approach by employing a variety of investigative techniques, and a variety of verbal accounts on the same runaway incident.

The goal of understanding the effects of public policy on the runaway negotiations in a single community necessitated consulting data which extend well beyond the boundaries of that community and which extend back in history. Provincial policies, national policies, North American trends, and historical influences upon present-day conditions needed to be explored. Triangulation was accomplished through the cross-referencing of: a) policy writings, legislative and administrative documents, and historical accounts dealing with the status of children, youth, and families in relation to social policy (Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5); b) published studies of age-grading procedures, child labour reform, compulsory schooling, juvenile court practice, and child welfare services (Chapters 2, 3, and 4); c) research on runaway youth and runaway services (Chapters 5 and 6); d) participant observation in the communities of
Bayside and Vancouver, British Columbia (Chapters 5 and 7); e) codable interview data from Bayside agency personnel, and analysis of this quantifiable information (Chapter 7); f) in-depth interview data from Bayside runaways, parents, and agency workers (Chapters 8 and 9); and g) available demographic statistics and community data from Bayside municipal government sources (Chapter 7).
Conclusion

The present study has as its goal a suspension of the taken-for-granted assumptions about the necessary pathology of runaway youths and their families. Without denying that family and personal troubles are often conspicuous in runaway situations, we will attempt to probe beneath and beyond pathology explanations to explore the social structural dynamics which underlie the runaway youth policies themselves. (13)

In doing so, it will become apparent that the social policies in question have fallen into place through a particular convergence of historical and biographical circumstances. As young people have become less useful to their adult mentors in an economic sense with the evolution of the factory system and through the effect of child labour prohibitions, idleness and street dangers have become more problematic. While the universal compulsory schooling movement and the innovations of the juvenile court and juvenile reformatory system moved in quickly to fill that void, adolescence became—during the Progressive era in North America—a time of relative non-productivity in economic terms.

Running away from home and being on the streets without parental supervision became criminal acts during that period. The reform motives underlying the criminalization of the runaway act were benevolent and well-meaning. But contradictions within the economic and political structures of the time led to the creation of policies which often did more harm than good. Children and teenagers were protected from abuses by greedy bosses in unhealthy and dangerous workplaces; then as one alternative, they came to congregate in unhealthy and dangerous urban centres, saloons, and gambling houses. They were then diverted to custodial school situations, which have had little connection with the workplace, where they would somehow learn the skills needed
to become productive workers. And when they ran away, they would be sent back to the same unsatisfactory home environment from which they had fled.

While the reforms of the counter-culture era injected a new tone of advocacy into runaway services and opened the door to ideas running counter to the tradition of youth dependency, the changes have not been fundamental or far-reaching. Little has changed structurally in the eighty years since running away from home entered the juvenile crime codes. Minors continue to be viewed as non-essential to the productive process and instead service the economy mainly as consumers and students. Schools continue to promote the idea that the curriculum is tied to the needs of the labour market—just as the turn of the century schools did—yet without particular substance to the school/workplace connection (see Kantor & Tyack, 1982). Runaway youth policies in Canada and in most states of the U.S. continue to reinforce parental authority even in situations where that authority is ill-deserved. Juveniles have no input into the creation of such policies and are not able to decide their own place of residence.

Runaway policy reforms which emerged during and after the late 1960s were reactions to the contradictions of a runaway service tradition which intervened "benevolently" in family life without concrete, rehabilitative solutions. Youth dependency and parental authority were maintained intact in the face of frequent evidence that runaway youths had solid reasons for running. Thus, the half-way solution has had only minimal effect and runaway youth policies continue to encourage the perpetuation of illicit underground sites of economic sustenance and quasi-family relationships in the form of inner-city street-scene youth ghettos.

The primary contradiction in runaway youth policy which will be explored in the dissertation is the contradiction between the control perspective
and the youth advocacy perspective. The reforms emerging during the Progressive era were stimulated by a new benevolence toward children and youth which focused on the need to protect minors from the dangers and temptations of rapidly expanding urban centres. Opportunism in the use of young people for their labour power was replaced by a protectiveness which projected a concern for the fragile, impetuous nature of adolescence. This new paternalism toward youth was supported by new ideologies receiving credence in universities and among philanthropists and social reformers. The new ethic of protectiveness coincided with the gradual removal of children and teenagers from factory work and the subsequent redirection of minors into the public school system.

Yet despite the benevolent rhetoric of the runaway policy reforms, adult domination of the labour market continues, and youth dependency remains an important foundation-stone for family policy generally. As the economic function of youth shifted from use of their productive capacities to their essential function as consumers and students, policies enforcing youth dependency continued to serve the needs and ideologies of adult policy-makers. In the process, the possibility of living independently or working full-time was virtually eliminated from the options available to minors.

In order to maintain youth dependency, even in the midst of such a protective and benevolent milieu, control, containment and coercive approaches were necessary. Because young people were being directed toward a new dependent status and a new level of confinement against their will, control strategies were essential to make runaway policies work. This control perspective has continued down to the present day, despite the attempts at reform during the counter-hegemonic period. It is the ambivalence in policy between control strategies and benevolent intentions which form the
main theoretical thread of this study.

While the recent runaway policy reforms have been far from complete—and emergency support services have receded from view now that the heaviest runaway migrations have subsided—the issue has drawn sufficient attention that certain concrete changes may be possible. In particular, the recommendations in Chapter 10 will propose that young people and their families ought to have input into policies which affect their lives; that provisions could be made for the possibility of independent housing options and increased autonomy for young people who have exhausted the potential benefits of living in the parental home; and that avenues might be explored for restoring the connection between youth and the world of productive work—including full-time employment and movement into career paths at earlier ages for those youths desiring such opportunities. (14)

Social structural constraints—including educational system vested interests, labour union power and regulations, and the inertia of tradition in the workplace—continue to mitigate against the possibility of such innovations. The chapters which follow will seek to uncover some of the sources of the resistance to change.
NOTES

1. Mention here of "first causes" should not be mistaken as indicating a search for simple cause and effect connections in the positivistic sense. The ethnographic approach seeks holistic descriptions of a community or a social issue. (In the present study both types of description are sought.) While it is possible to show that some events precede other events (e.g., that the gradual exclusion of children from factory work preceded full implementation of compulsory public schooling), it is not always possible to prove that one event caused the other (e.g., that compulsory schooling came about only because of labour market factors). Ethnographic descriptions generally point to numerous factors coinciding at any single time and space, and often utilize continuity and development over time to establish further insights.

Thus, the present study intends to demonstrate that while family and individual pathology is in a certain sense one of the "causes" of runaway actions in many instances, on a broader, more historical level there exist other social structural "causes" for the "runaway youth problem." Age-grading practices, child-labour laws, school attendance laws, juvenile court procedures and child welfare services together have led to a prohibition of running away from home. Labeling theorists would present the "obvious" assertion that there would be no "runaway youth" if running away from home had never been prohibited. A basic premise of this study, then, will be that--on a macro level--the "runaway problem" is "caused" by a convergence of political and economic conditions, including but not limited to: an historical tradition of child and youth dependence; the gradual exclusion of children and youth from the labour pool between 1850 and 1950; the rise of compulsory public schooling; the modern extension of adolescence which was accompanied by a new rhetoric about child and adolescent fragility; and the rise of social work and probation as new helping professions around the turn of the 20th century.

When viewing communities, families, and individuals, these "macro" insights are not always clearly in evidence. A goal of this study is to draw connections between the "macro" analysis and the "micro" community-family-individual realities. While on the macro level I am proposing that the exclusion of young people from the labour market was a key element leading to the necessity for runaway youth prohibitions, I am not posing the labour market issue as the "only cause" for runaway youth policy or for runaway youth actions. Neither is it my intent to imply by this that contemporary youths who run away from home are doing so because of their exclusion from the labour market, in any direct, "micro" sense. While some youths do leave home in search of work, such youths are not necessarily viewed as runaways by their families or potential employers. Other youths are so out of touch with the possibility of legitimate, full-time employment that the labour market issue would fully elude them. In short, the "macro" analysis is seldom imbedded in the consciousness of the "micro" actors. Still, certain contemporary, "micro" events--e.g., job-finding services of the counter-culture runaway houses; moves toward early emancipation legislation; and the Diggers' counter-culture economic independence projects--gave indication of an emerging awareness of the "macro" political-economic analysis during the late 1960s and early 1970s.
2. "Iatrogenic" is a medical term referring to physician-caused or hospital-caused illnesses, as when an additional disease is contracted from another patient in the hospital, or when surgery is mishandled and additional harm is incurred from the medical procedure itself. Thus, in the present usage, "iatrogenic" is used by analogy to refer to "secondary" social problems (e.g. illegal, dangerous "street" subcultures) which emerge as "side effects" of official attempts to "cure" the original social problem (e.g. youth runaway activity). This is not meant to imply that the "cure" causes the original "disease" (i.e., runaway youth policy does not in and of itself generate "primary" runaway actions). However, mismanaged policy can indeed make things worse rather than better, as when agency policy dictates returning a youth to an unworkable home environment and further runaway acts occur.

3. The term "contradiction" is employed to denote inconsistencies or paradoxes in societal organization — disjunctures at the social structural level (e.g., a benevolent policy which in its effects punishes and confines; or educational procedures which enhance cultural ignorance). The term "conflict," on the other hand, will be used to describe struggles between opposing interest groups — a dynamic occurring at the level of agencies, families, and clients (e.g., the runaway action as a cry for help or an assertion of autonomy; or runaway houses as innovations which stretched the boundaries of existing policy provisions).

4. As utilized by Kittrie and Hartjen, the term "therapeutic state" is meant to refer to that component of state policy which seeks control of disruptive elements through therapeutic means. Critics of the therapeutic state fear that the controls imposed over individual lives by the "therapy society" lead to unwarranted interventions into private spaces and constitute threats to individual rights. The phrase is not meant to imply that the state in general is run by therapeutic procedures. (See Hartjen, 1977: pp. 259-279)

5. When using terms such as "pathological perspective" and "therapeutic state," I am fully aware that agencies and studies differ in the degree to which they profess to use the medical model. However, it can be said that, taken collectively, these studies and programs seek problem/cure explanations within the realm of individual and family pathology and tend to ignore larger political-economic issues.

6. "Hegemonic" refers to a preponderance of influence and authority by one nation over another, as in colonialism and imperialism, or of the state over large segments of its citizenry or over particular groups within the populace. A "counter-hegemonic" trend, then, refers to revolt or reaction by a colonized or suppressed nation, or to tendencies within a population toward reaction and resistance to state policies, including — as in the usage here — the ad hoc, spontaneous replacement of unworkable state policies by new citizen-generated approaches. The term "moment" refers to a convergence of key social forces which shape a new or different epoch and set of conditions at a particular point in history. (These terms are normally embedded in broader discussions on theories of the state of the sort not elaborated upon in this study.)
7. "Control" and "advocacy" will be used throughout the dissertation to denote perspectives utilized in dealing with runaway situations. These two perspectives are being viewed as virtual opposites in terms of policy and services, yet they frequently coexist and intertwine in the handling of any single runaway incident. This study addresses the tension which results from the coexistence of the two divergent perspectives. "Control" refers to an approach emphasizing containment and forceful redirection of runaway youth, while "advocacy" denotes an advisory approach which respects the home-leaving youth's ability and need to make up his or her own mind about school, living situation, employment, and relationship matters. In later chapters, it will be necessary to distinguish between the "benevolent advocacy" approach which tends to be more paternalistic and protective in nature versus the "liberative advocacy" approach which is more truly counter-hegemonic, since it tends to challenge existing policies head-on, as seen in youth advocacy legal services and social casework leading to legitimation of independent living situations.

Some confusion in terminology may result from the introduction of a third concept, that of the "pathological perspective," which contains elements of both the control and the advocacy models, and which displays rather vividly the tension between control and advocacy as practiced in day-to-day agency work, and as it is revealed in written social policy. Terms such as "protective," "benevolent," and "therapeutic" will be used throughout the study as characteristics of the pathological perspective. These are meant to be distinct from "punitive," "containment," and "coercive" which are terms used to characterize the control perspective specifically.

8. Information on policies and services in both Canada and the United States will be used in this study for the following reasons: A) A number of the Bayside runaway youths traveled to the U.S. when on a run and thus were affected by state policies and services in Florida, California, Hawaii, etc.; likewise, since most Canadian cities are within 100 miles of the U.S. border, young people from the United States are quite able to explore Canada — although the border crossing situations do tend to discourage such international migrancy. B) Despite the clear differences between the U.S. and Canada in terms of their legal systems and federal/provincial or federal/state division of responsibilities, there is a continuing influence of American precedents on Canadian social policy and law reform — facilitated through mutual professional meetings, matriculation of Canadian professors in U.S. graduate programs, media diffusion, and so on. In fact, a rather comprehensive interchange between the two countries has been a fact of North American life since the colonial period. For example, the proximity of Toronto to New York City and Chicago led to mutual influence between Canadian and U.S. philanthropists and social reformers during the Progressive era when runaway policies were first put into place. C) Since virtually all writing and research on runaways in North America has emanated from the United States, neglect of that data would have meant ignoring most of the available material.

The existing cross-fertilization between the two countries is clearly important, whether in terms of runaway youth peer networks, social service networks, family law networks, or publishing outlets (although the influence of the U.S. on Canadian services and policies tends to be the stronger influence, due to the greater size and greater political influence of the United States.) In some regards, then, the dissertation represents a comparative study of Canadian and United States runaway policies. Care will be taken to clearly note when Canadian or U.S. statutes, regulations, or procedures are being referred to.
9. Negotiated order theory serves as a background and underpinning of the arguments and analysis throughout the study, even though specific elements of that negotiated order analysis may not be explicated in all chapters.

10. None of the foregoing should be interpreted as a denial of the original (primary) motivation of individuals engaging in adult or juvenile non-victiz-ing actions. By focusing on inadequacies in the social control response, a critique is generated which questions the effectiveness of coercive responses to personal "crimes." The context for the original action may still, however, be analyzed as a separate issue of concern, and the present analysis does not preclude such further analysis.

11. Approaches which explore the connections between microscopic and macroscopic levels of analysis have become somewhat more popular in recent years. See Knorr-Cetina & Cicourel, 1981, and Hechter, 1983.

12. A critical ethnography uses local field study methods to illuminate the effects of policy on individual lives in local communities, and introduces political-economic analysis to the study of issues in such local communities. "Critical," then, means analytical, reconstructive, and open to new explanations and solutions. Furthermore, the political-economic analysis generally includes scrutiny of ideological elements, such as -- in the present study -- investigation of belief systems pertaining to youth labour markets and the pathological nature of the runaway action.

13. In referring to the suspension of certain taken-for-granted assumptions, I do not wish to give the impression that I am presuming to suspend all taken-for-granted assumptions. It is the pathological perspective towards runaways and their families which will be (temporarily) suspended, so that other notions (such as those pertaining to youth advocacy and labour market dynamics) may be introduced more clearly and effectively. I am fully aware that other taken-for-granted assumptions will remain and that new assumptions will be brought in with the political-economic assumptions of the study. Bringing in this new perspective also does not imply that pathology (i.e. individual and family problems) do not exist in runaway situation, nor that such troubles should not be addressed vigorously by agencies. On the contrary, the principal reason for taking a political-economic approach here is to produce guidelines for making remedial services to runaways and families more effective, and to confront the issue of prevention of runaway stress. Likewise, it should be mentioned that a variety of other alternative views or perspectives might be applied to the runaway youth issue, aside from the pathological view and the political-economic view (including political-economic analyses of the causation of family stress and runaway actions). The labour market / youth advocacy focus is being emphasized here because its fundamentals have been largely neglected and because it yields new and unique insights into the runaway problem.

14. The labour market issue is central to the present analysis for several reasons: Running away was made illegal at a time when great numbers of urban youth were idle on the streets of North America due to their gradual exclusion from the labour force and to their not yet being accommodated in the compulsory school system; thus labour market issues were central to the original formula-
tion of runaway youth policies and have continued to be central motivations for such policies. Furthermore, when young people leave home, survival is of the utmost concern and, before long, financial sustenance becomes paramount; thus, runaways are severely constrained when unable to find profitable work to pay for their current living expenses. The importance of these issues should not, of course, rule out consideration of other explanatory frameworks which focus on why parents and offspring come into conflict in the first place, on the role of social welfare personnel and legislators in the creation and maintenance of social policies, on the North American approach to education and socialization, on values inherent in modern family life, and so on. However, elaboration on these other themes, while relevant, would go beyond the scope of the present study. In summary, then, the labour market explanation is particularly relevant to the runaway youth policy issue, though it is not the only relevant explanatory framework and though it may not be as relevant to analyses of other social welfare or social policy issues.
There is clearly a dialectical relationship between custom and policy so that, to a considerable degree, youths who run away are confronting not merely written legal sanctions, but also the will of a surrounding community which, through its conversations and its actions, makes clear that minors properly belong in the parental home. In turn, the community's will is perpetuated by a long-standing policy tradition which holds the same view.

In confronting policy, enforcing it in a particular way, using discretion, and, in some cases, violating the letter of the policy, youth, parents and agency personnel in turn affect the future of that policy. In fact they can, to some degree, be said to be "rewriting" the policy by their actions of running away or by responding to the runaway incident in particular ways. Thus policy is neither monolithic, static, nor totally inflexible.

It would be a mistake, however, to interpret the above as indicating that policy is formed by anything like a consensus of community opinion. Written policy is a product of negotiation and compromise which takes a dimly-understood policy tradition and updates it periodically in a piecemeal manner. Political realities, economic conditions, and prevailing moods and philosophies of the times affect the written statutes and regulations. Discretion in the application of social policy then allows government functionaries and community members to adapt a formal set of procedures to real-life circumstances. The process tends not to yield a comprehensive or fully sensitive set of policy guidelines.

Charles Lindblom (1959; 1965) has referred to this view of policy analysis as "incrementalism" or "The Science of Muddling Through." He proposes that under the "synoptic ideal" of governmental problem-solving it is presumed
that decision makers: 1) identify, scrutinize, and put into logical order those objectives they believe relate to the problem at hand; 2) survey all possible means of achieving those objectives; 3) exhaustively examine the expected consequences of employing each of the means to the objectives; and then 4) choose a particular policy or combination of policies which will be likely to achieve the closest approximation to the original objectives.

Lindblom's studies have demonstrated that this synoptic ideal is seldom if ever achieved. He has formulated an alternative view of the actual process of government decision-making as follows: Rather than conducting comprehensive surveys of the problem and examining diverse options for solution to the problem, policymakers "muddle through," reacting to pressures and making mutual accommodations, continuing policies without re-evaluating them, and adding on pieces to existing policy in piecemeal ways.

The idea that governmental decision-making is centrally coordinated is a myth, according to Lindblom. Rather, decision makers, proceeding incrementally from unique and restricted perspectives, work rather disjointedly, piecing together a patchwork quilt of policy with no real coordination or overall planning. Some of this is due to the necessary task of simplification which is meant to make decision-making more manageable. Analysis is drastically limited, and important possible outcomes and alternative pathways tend to be neglected: "The test of a 'good' policy is typically that various analysts find themselves directly agreeing on a policy, without their agreeing that it is the most appropriate means to an agreed objective" (Lindblom, 1959: p. 295).

The view of this study is that policymaking is a "negotiated order" process wherein multiple and often conflicting factors interact, leading to a rather unsteady, ever-changing, in-process conclusion. In such a state of unsteady consensus, unanticipated consequences (Giddens, 1981; Lindblom,
1965) periodically emerge which can have significant import. Lack of comprehensive planning derives from automatic reaction to diverse political pressures from various, not-always coordinated quarters. But incremental decision-making processes also, therefore, leave room for surprises and unanticipated new pressures. This is the opening for the "counter-hegemonic" reactions to be discussed in later chapters. However, the structural inertia of modern bureaucracies is difficult to overcome.

The first half of the dissertation follows the incremental, piecemeal growth of runaway youth policies in North America over the past century. Part I opens with an examination of age-grading policies and emancipation standards in Chapter 2. These legal provisions serve as the foundation for the youth dependency tradition. Parental authority — in particular the authority of the father — is sanctioned by the tradition of common law and is economically based. Recent court challenges and a few legislative innovations have brought to public notice the possibility of the enhancement of youth rights and some limitations on absolute parental authority. The chapter relates the ambiguous status of early emancipation procedures, which presents a key obstacle to any genuine liberalization of runaway youth policy.

Chapter 3 chronicles the contemporary exclusion of young people from the labour market and the attendant substitution of the public compulsory school as a new socializing agency. Mechanization in the new factories of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, pressures from labour unions to return adult male workers back to jobs being taken by their wives and offspring, and pressure from humanitarian reformers for improved safety and working conditions in the workplace combined to influence the eventual elimination of most juveniles from the full-time workforce. Compulsory schooling then developed to take up the slack presented by this imposed youth unemployment.

Juvenile justice reforms and the issue of status offenses are the focus of Chapter 4. The juvenile court, an American invention, was designed to correct
abuses from imprisonment of minors in adult jails and prisons. The hope was that a more family-type, benevolent courtroom procedure would lead to constructive, personalized rehabilitation process. The resultant suspension of normal due process rights in the youth courts has led to a continuing series of reform attempts. Moves to decriminalize the runaway act and other "status offenses" have meant diversion of clients into the child welfare system in recent years. This trend has met with mixed results since that system affords the minor even fewer due process guarantees than does the juvenile court.

The policy discussion concludes with Chapter 5, an analysis of the rise of counter-culture runaway services during the late 1960s. The runaway house movement in the U.S. became particularly significant as an advocacy service which was able to develop job finding, legal, medical, and independent living programs for youths who had left the parental home. The U.S. Runaway Youth Act of 1974 served to institutionalize (and partially co-opt) the runaway house innovation. Meanwhile, the major Canadian cities which had developed emergency runaway services during several summers around 1969 and 1970 have disbanded such programs as the peak runaway migrations have subsided. Canada has now returned to a "transportation and repatriation" system of runaway youth interventions which is largely devoid of advocacy intent.

In short, Part I surveys the rise of the runaway prohibition at the turn of the 20th century and describes the counter-hegemonic resistance and reform movement of the late 1960s which led to a partial re-evaluation and rewriting of runaway youth policy. Within this policy story lies the key to understanding how such policies might be liberalized further and what deep-running obstacles and resistance to such liberalization remain.
Chapter 2
AGE-GRADING PRACTICES

At the foundation of runaway youth policy are those laws and regulations which oversee a youth's passage to adulthood. Running away from home can only be criminalized through reference to age standards which specify when citizens may legitimately live on their own. This chapter will explore and analyze the age-grading standards relating to the age of majority which enforce and reinforce youth dependency and parental authority ideologies.

Certain citizens under certain conditions have traditionally been exempted from particular provisions of law. The mentally ill, mentally retarded, and the senile are in certain cases protected by legal provisions which—as part of that protection—stipulate that the incapacitated person shall be represented by a guardian. This guardianship procedure involves the removal of normal due process rights and holds in abeyance the privilege of speaking for oneself on legal and financial matters. Whether the guardian of the incapacitated individual is a family member, a friend, or a bureaucratic agency, the person in question is in essence a "non-person" before the law. Their interests are real, but their representation of self is greatly or totally limited. Similarly, criminal defendants who are judged to have been insane at the time of the criminal act, and those who are seen as unfit to stand trial or to understand the difference between right and wrong, are likewise excused from normal criminal trial procedures. The protective intent in such cases is similar. (See Bala & Clarke, 1981: p. 216)

Juveniles are protected from adult legal procedures in much the same way. Legal "guardianship" is instituted with either the parent or the state assuming decision-making duties for the minor. The entry into adult legal status—sometimes termed "coming of age" or "passage" into adulthood— involves
taking over one's own affairs, in a legal sense, following a period when others have been responsible for those affairs.

The prohibition against running away from home is one aspect of this guardianship procedure. Since minors are expected to be legally under the protective wing of adult authority, running away from home represents a violation of that authority and thus threatens the legal guardianship arrangement.

This chapter examines the shifting and sometimes contradictory standards for child and youth dependency in an attempt to understand how flexible the standards are and how available they are to reform proposals. The reason for this analysis is that runaway youth by their actions are challenging age-grading standards and are substituting their own solutions for state-imposed legal guardianship arrangements. Likewise, youth advocates frequently find themselves in implicit or explicit conflict with age-grading procedures and may find themselves engaging in legal violations as they attempt to aid runaways in crisis. Thus, challenges to the youth dependency status quo sometimes occur at the courtroom level as when a family member attempts to prove that a minor is independent or "emancipated," when an offspring challenges a parent in court, or when young people assert more autonomy than is legally stipulated (e.g., the right to confidentiality in a medical clinic).

Nowhere is the incremental, piecemeal, patchwork nature of social policy evolution alluded to by Charles Lindblom more readily apparent than in the confusing and ambiguous guidelines which specify the State's recognition of a child's emerging adulthood. For example, in British Columbia today, age 15 is the passage point for being able to work legally; 16 is the driving age; 19 in the drinking age; 18 is the restricted movie age; 17 is the age
when one comes under the adult Criminal Code and leaves the jurisdiction of
the Juvenile Court. Age 17 is also the age of exit from child welfare juris-
diction, except for some long-time wards who may remain "in care" until
age 19. A young person can vote at age 18, can become married with parental
consent at age 16, and join the armed forces at age 17.

Children under 5 may not attend public school in British Columbia;
children ages 5 to 7 may attend school if their parents wish them to; children
aged 7 to 15 must attend school or at least receive a government-approved
education; and young people 15 and over may leave school if they do not
wish to go. Since 1973, persons in British Columbia aged 16 and over have
been able to give their own valid consent to medical treatment (though an
attempt must be made to contact parents). B.C. teenagers cannot be held
to binding contracts (with some exceptions), obtain credit, rent a car,
make purchases on the installment plan, buy or sell property, sue or be
sued, or make a valid will until reaching the age of 19. (Morgan, 1976;
BC-CLA, 1978; Bala & Clarke, 1981) Such a morass of differing age-grading
passage points means at the very least that no one but an expert can keep
track of all the necessary rules.

The sections to follow will examine 1) the evolution of the "age of
majority" concept over time and the legal principles underlying such a con-
cept; 2) the rarely-used common law procedures for becoming emancipated
prior to one's majority; 3) the question of medical treatment for minors
and whether parents need to be consulted prior to treatment; 4) incongruities
arising due to the existence of conflicting age-grading standards; and
5) recent moves toward allowing increased legal autonomy and an expanded
legal voice for minors.
The Shifting Age of Majority

While age 21 was for many generations the standard age for gaining legal adulthood, that passage point has gradually been lowered over recent years. Most U.S. states and Canadian provinces place the age at which all childhood restrictions are dropped at age 18; in British Columbia the final passage point is 19.

The existence of such age-grading laws derives from a traditional legal dependency for children and youth which has always been a part of family law. Minors are defined by legal precedent and in the continuity of legislation as less than full citizens, less than full legal entities. While such legal provisions are written as protective principles governing minors who are presumed not to fully comprehend the nuances of law and who are still dependent socially, the age-grading standards also have important political-economic bases. Leslie Morgan of the Vancouver People's Law School writes:

Traditionally the law has always accorded a special position to children. They were originally almost regarded as chattels, property belonging to their father and under his complete authority. Gradually reformers introduced the idea that children should be protected from their mistakes made through immaturity. There developed a body of common law doctrines and protective statutes dealing with children, infants or minors .... Most of these laws and decisions have as their alleged guiding principle the child's best interest, yet few accord the child any right to be consulted as to what his/her best interests are and often cases become contests among adults in which the child is almost overlooked. As well, many of the statutes are out of date and instead of helping the child they hinder him/her in his/her daily life.

(Morgan, 1976: p. 4)

Childhood legal dependency is grounded in certain basic principles of family and children's law: patria potestas (the power of the father over the child); doli incapax (the limitation of a child's responsibility due
to age); parens patriae (the state as kindly parent); and in loco parentis (the court as substitute parent acting in the child's best interests) (Bala & Clarke, 1981; Beaser, 1975).

The question of when the full legal personality shall be acquired and when one can become party to legal relationships, i.e., the question of the legal "age of majority," is a question inevitably having important political-economic implications:

Shifts in the nature of society throughout different historical ages resulted in different interest groups in position of power. Our legal system reflects these shifts in power arrangements. The law on the age of majority (adult status) is a good example of the different manner in which children have been regarded and treated in different historical periods. The Church of England viewed the changing age of majority as follows: "Historically, the concept is one of property rights in and power over children, as much as a duty to protect them."

(BC-CLA, 1978: p.5)

Thus, the specifics of the age of majority and the multitude of age-graded laws and regulations which have accumulated and become differentiated over the years have tended to shift over time with changing political-economic realities. As Phillipe Aries (1962) has shown, childhood as we know it is a recent phenomenon. In the Middle Ages, special vocabularies and special provisions for childhood were lacking. Children were viewed as small and less developed adults. They were economically dependent at first, but moved quickly through something like stages of apprenticeship toward the assumption of adult roles as they became physically more capable—generally as early as age 7, the age of majority recognized at that time by Church and State. Young people were not segregated into schools, youth activities, or special quarters, but rather were integrated into adult community life. They were treated much like servants and were useful as inexpensive labour.
With the advent of feudalism, different ages of majority came to be established depending on social class and function (Clark, 1968: p. 230). The young burgess was defined as fully of age when able to measure cloth and count money, the tiller of land when age 15 and able to push the heavy plow, and the soldier when age 21 and able to hold up a heavy suit or armor and lift lance or sword. Thus, those holding the status of knighthood did not attain adulthood until age 21 whereas persons of agricultural rank came of age at 15—much like the contemporary state of affairs where those seeking and having access to higher education enter full adult roles much later than those who drop out of high school and begin laboring jobs as teenagers. "Gradually, the knightly age of majority, age 21, filtered down and became the universal age for all classes" (BC-CLA, 1978: p. 5).

As bureaucracies emerged and became more and more complex, refinements were made in the age of majority, until today when the straightforward concept of a specific age for entering adulthood has been supplanted by an evolving mosaic of diverse and often mutually contradictory standards.
Early Emanicipation of Minors

Age of majority standards seldom include provision for "exceptions to the rule" for those minors who are able, with or without parental consent, to become independent earlier than the stated age. One seldom-used, little-known, and generally impractical counterbalance to these ancient youth dependency doctrines is the provision in common law for a court to determine that a youth has become "emancipated" prior to the normal age of majority--through the act of marriage, through joining the armed forces, and/or through becoming self-sufficient economically, normally at an independent place of residence. A court decision affirming emancipation as having taken place provides legal clarification for youth, parent and community that the person in question has attained an adult legal personality prematurely. "The parent relinquishes his (sic) rights to receive the child's services and earnings and to make decisions for the child. Parents are then relieved of the obligation to support, educate and care for the child" (SAC, 1980: p. 35).

There are numerous ambiguities, complications, and limitations in the emancipation procedures which limit their usefulness, especially for the runaway youth. Since the common law approach to emancipation was never widely adopted in England, and has received only minimal attention in Canada, the cases cited below involve United States common law precedents.

In the U.S. common law tradition: "The law imposes a certain bondage upon minor children, but it also permits release therefrom" (quoted in Beaser, 1975: p. 55). Ever since the 1864 case of Lackman v. Wood (25 Cal. 147) in California, "emancipation" has meant termination of parental control over and custody of the minor child. The relinquishment of parental control has, in some court cases, been seen as total emancipation (for all purposes), and
in other cases has been deemed partial (for specific purposes, e.g., for a minor's ownership of particular earnings, but not overall social and economic independence). Under the common law tradition, courts have decided emancipation cases on an individual, case-by-case basis, after looking at the particular facts presented. This ad hoc, after-the-fact procedure has made the common law emancipation determination less than generally useful since the context of the individual cases has not lent itself to the development of generalizable, fixed guidelines (Goldberg, 1980).

Emancipation is a legal lowering of the age of majority for a single individual on the basis of facts presented to the court regarding such issues as earnings and living arrangements. Historically, such an action has generally been linked to the issue of the child's economic usefulness to the parent. Relinquishment of parental control meant loss of an economic asset—an eventuality never taken lightly.

The term "emancipation"—which may seem to draw on the analogy of the release from the bondage of slavery—was actually borrowed for use in reference to slave emancipation from the analogy of its earlier use in legal determinations of child-parent relations. The concept derives originally from Roman law and referred to the enfranchisement of a son by his father prior to the son reaching the age of majority—a procedure originally accomplished through the ceremonial device of a simulated sale. The procedure was representative of the father selling his son's labour potential to the son for his own use. The Roman emperor Justinian later substituted a similar proceeding termed "manumission" before a magistrate to formalize the transfer (Black, 1968: p. 613).

The Roman emancipation proceeding has not been perpetuated. In its place courts under the common law tradition must make a determination of
whether emancipation has in fact occurred through an after the fact examination of the actions previously taken by parent and child. This means that family members cannot be sure that a minor's actions of moving out and taking a job will result in unchallenged recognition of the youth's adult status. Unlike a youth passing a driver's examination and then soon having a plasticized driver's license card arrive in the mail, the young person moving into a self-supported living arrangement does not receive any document and is not entered into any statistical registry.

Under common law procedures, the matter is legally up in the air until and unless the matter comes to court—and this rarely happens. When and if the matter does come to court, it will come there only through the accident of specific litigation, as when a minor living separately attempts to sue his or her parents for support or negligence, when a parent seeks to discontinue support payments to a child in the armed forces, or to an offspring who has set up housekeeping with a boyfriend or girlfriend, or when a dispute arises over whether parent or teenager is responsible for the payment of a hospital bill or other debt (Goldberg, 1980).

In a Missouri case, Dierker v. Hess (1873) (54 Mo. 246), a creditor of the father of a minor sought to seize property belonging to the minor which the minor had purchased through his own work. The creditor claimed that this property belonged to the parent as controller of his child's resources. The wording of the court decision emphasized the ad hoc, common-sense expectations of the common law emancipation determinations, as well as pointing up the economic basis of the parent-child relationship, as seen in law, and the protective nature of the court's function:
It is not necessary that the father, in order to give his minor son the privilege of receiving the fruits of his own labor, should proclaim that fact from the housetops, or accompany it by some token or ceremonial, as open and as odious as that which formerly attended the manumission of a slave; nor is it necessary, to accomplish that end, that the son should cease to be a member of his father's family; that the dearest domestic ties should be rudely sundered, and he be driven like some outcast from beneath the paternal roof.

The fact that the father has relinquished his claim to the son's earnings may be established either by direct evidence or be implied from circumstances; and where such relinquishment has been bona fide effectuated, it does not lie in the power of some prowling creditor to wrest from the son the gains he has achieved by honest industry, under the spurious and covetous pretext that the property belonged to the father.

(Quoted in Beaser, 1975: p. 63)

The court decisions do not make clear whether the relinquishment of parental control need be voluntary on the parent's part. In some cases those judged emancipated left with parental blessing and in other cases they had apparently left in the dead of night (Goldberg, 1980). In Rounds Bros. v. McDaniel (1909) (133 Kentucky 669) the court indicated that, should a parent decide that emancipation should not have taken place, the parent can exercise the parental right to revoke the emancipation—but to do so, the parent must act "within a reasonable time":

We do not mean to hold that every time a child who is old and strong enough to work becomes tired of or dissatisfied with his home he may leave ... and live at some other place and work for other persons, and thereby sever the obligation he owes to his parents and destroy their right to his services and wages. Minor children cannot in this way cancel the duty they are under to the parent, who by acting promptly may reclaim the services of the child and the right to his earnings, but the parent must interpose his authority within a reasonable time.

(Quoted in Beaser, 1975: p. 66)
The Kentucky court decision just quoted thus made clear that the rights of parents are paramount over the rights of offspring and reaffirmed the economic basis for the *patria potestas* (power of the father) principle. The authority of the parent to reinforce and re-establish the child's presence and productivity within the household has continued down to the present day in the pressure to return runaway youths to the parental home, often with little or no thought being given to what optimal environments might work better for the runaway. Yet the child-returning practices are anachronistic in the sense that the direct economic worth of child labour to the modern suburban home has decreased dramatically, and in most cases disappeared altogether. In fact, children nowadays are generally seen as an economic *liability* as opposed to being an economic asset.

One problem, then as now, has been the inevitable confusion or ambivalence about the reciprocal rights, privileges and responsibilities of the parent-child political unit. A minor moving out of the home might wish to emancipate in order to lead an adult life, marry, have credit accounts, and/or buy a house and car without having to ask for a parent's signature; yet that same youth may not wish to totally relinquish all future parental support. Likewise, the youth's parents may be willing to see the minor child become more independent and self-sufficient, but not wish to give up all part in the decision-making in the child's life.

Law has difficulty dealing with such subtleties, and the legal emancipation principle implies an all-or-nothing break in financial arrangements. Much of the problem lies in the continuing economic definition of the parent-child relationship. Children (and wives) continue to be seen in law and (with significant recent exceptions) in custom as private personal property of the father and husband, and the idea of family members as property seems
to die hard. The primary purpose of the emancipation court proceeding has been to settle financial disputes, rather than necessarily to facilitate smooth family functioning—an indication of the continuing economic basis of emancipation law.

In most U.S. jurisdictions, the act of marriage or entry into the armed forces is sufficient to establish a minor as emancipated, without the necessity of court procedures (SAC, 1980; Beaser, 1975). Furthermore, there are instances of partial emancipation for specific purposes written into statutes and regulations, as when minors are given confidentiality guarantees during treatment for venereal disease (see following section).

The unwieldy, ad hoc nature of the common-law emancipation procedures has been partly remedied in those U.S. states which have enacted statutes which allow courts to issue "declarations of emancipation". Eighteen states have enacted such legislation in recent years. The advantage of statutory procedures is that standardized requirements for the emancipated status have been written into law and the parameters of the new adult status are stipulated for all candidates. Nine of the states have statutes which convey "total" rights of majority (termed "general emancipation") which still, however, may actually be restricted by other statutes. The other nine states limit the effect of emancipation to such specific acts as engaging in contracts, conveying property, and participating in lawsuits (termed "selective emancipation") (SAC, 1980).

Statutory emancipation declarations are more workable than the previous common law tradition because they can be obtained before legal entanglements arise. This eliminates much family uncertainty about the future and about the specifics of the minor's legal status. Some states provide for issuance
of an identification paper for use by the emancipated minor. For example, in Oregon, the Department of Motor Vehicles is charged with issuing an appropriate identification card (SAC, 1980).

Even though, traditionally, emancipation decisions have been based in part on the parent's willingness to relinquish control and custody, only six of the 18 states which have emancipation statutes specifically require parental consent for the minor to be declared emancipated. This is an indication of some gradual erosion of the legal basis for parental sovereignty over the past several decades. A recent U.S. legal study commented that:

The fact that any jurisdictions allow declaration of emancipation without parental consent...may be an indication that states are willing to have courts take a more active role in assessing the ability of older children to function independently of their parents.

(SAC, 1980: p. 50)

The situation in Canada with regard to emancipation of minors is less explicit. Indirect references to self-support and parental support in various statutes appear to imply a possibility of partial emancipation from parental care and custody at age 16. The Criminal Code of Canada stipulates that it is a criminal offense for a parent or guardian not to provide the "necessaries of life" for a child under the age of 16 years. In Ontario, the province whose legal codes tend to serve as models for the other provinces, the recently-enacted Family Law Reform Act of 1978 reads:

16(1). Every parent has an obligation to the extent the parent is capable of doing so, to provide support, in accordance with the need of his or her child who is unmarried and is under the age of eighteen years...
(2). The obligation...does not extend to a child who, being of the age of sixteen years or over, has withdrawn from parental control.

This wording implies the possibility of legal emancipation in Ontario for self-supporting independent minors between the ages of 16 and 18 years of age. However, since the act neither defines "withdrawal from parental control" nor specifies how such withdrawal shall be demonstrated, it would appear to be a formal restatement of the common law provisions rather than constituting a new emancipation certification option. In summing up the apparent implications for Ontario families, Bala and Clarke suggest that:

A child who voluntarily departs the family home upon turning 16 cannot turn around and demand support from his (sic) parents. He must earn his own livelihood. Upon attaining the age of 18, a parent is under no legal obligation to support his child... and may even "turn him out" of the family home.

(Bala & Clarke, 1981: p. 218)

Nevertheless, in Canada as in the U.S., the emancipated minor seldom achieves full legal independence. Specific legal restrictions will generally emerge which limit the minor's ability to own a family residence outright, marry without parental consent, be served alcohol, attend certain movies, borrow money, obtain credit, or vote. Such a youth is a "child/adult"--a "person treated sometimes as an adult, sometimes as a child, the deciding factor being the particular legal context" (Bala & Clarke, 1981: p. 217, citing Marks, 1975).
While common law emancipation cases have evidently been rare in Canada, the issue of a minor's independence from parents has figured prominently in legal disputes about medical treatment. The two issues which have received the greatest attention are: 1) Can independent minors consent to their own medical treatment? and 2) Does notifying the minor's parent about the specifics of medical treatment constitute an allowable breach of the physician's pledge of confidentiality? (A third issue, that of who should pay for such medical treatment, the independent minor or the parent, was covered by the previous section on emancipation and would presumably correlate with the issues of consent and parent notification.)

A number of Canadian cases have produced findings on the issue of an independent minor's autonomous consent to treatment. Several court actions—Booth v. Toronto General Hospital (1910) (170 W.R. 118); Younts v. St. Francis Hospital and School of Nursing, Inc. (1970) (469 P. 2d 330); and Johnson v. Wellesley Hospital (1971) (2 O.R. 103)—found in favor of the right of youths living on their own in self-supporting capacities to consent to their own hospital treatment needs and the court decisions developed criteria for defining the emancipated status. The criteria involve residential independence and financial independence of the minor and/or marriage and/or entry into the armed forces as evidence of the emancipated status. Additionally, the medical treatment in dispute must clearly benefit the minor and the minor must be sufficiently mature to understand the nature and risks involved in the treatment (Bala & Clarke, 1981: pp. 266-271; Morgan, 1976: p. 10).

In 1970, however, the British Columbia Supreme Court upheld a ruling
by the B.C. Council of Physicians and Surgeons disciplining a doctor for "infamous or unprofessional conduct" when he inserted an inter-uterine device for a 15-year old female patient without parental knowledge or consent (Bala & Clarke, 1981: p. 269). This case (Re D. and the Council of College of Physicians and Surgeons of B.C. (1970) (11 D.L.R. 3d 570)) underscores the vulnerability of physicians who take it upon themselves to determine the fact of a child's independence from parents or who simply protect the confidentiality of the treatment of youthful patients.

The British Columbia legislature in 1973 enacted a statutory amendment to the Infant's Act which allows persons 16 or older to give their own valid consent to medical treatment provided the physician has attempted to notify the parents, or has obtained a second confirming opinion from another physician if the parents cannot be reached. In practice, however, many B.C. doctors appear to be providing treatment to youths 16 or over without contacting the parents since the introduction of this new legislation, on the rationale that the child's privacy should be guarded, particularly in sex related matters (Morgan, 1976: p. 10).

The B.C. Venereal Diseases Suppression Act provides for treatment of VD through public health facilities and guarantees confidentiality to anyone receiving such treatment regardless of age (Ibid.: p. 11). The Act also requires that any person having or suspecting they might have venereal disease must by law obtain treatment. This includes minors, thus placing them in a position of privacy—in contradiction to the other medical treatment consent policies.

Herbert Beaser found that in 17 of the 54 United States jurisdictions he studied, no cases or statutes existed covering the question of whether a minor could consent to medical care without parental knowledge and agree-
ment. However, 37 other states have enacted laws in recent years which give minors the right to consent to their own medical care, but only for specific situations, e.g. pregnancy, venereal disease, contraceptive services, or drug addiction services, or if the minor can be (informally) viewed as emancipated. Six states of the U.S. have adopted a "mature minor doctrine" (Beaser, 1975: p. 177). The New Hampshire clause is worded as follows:

Nothing contained herein shall be construed to mean that any minor of sound mind (and 12 years of age or older) is legally incapable of consenting to medical treatment provided that such minor is of sufficient maturity to understand the nature of such treatment and the consequences thereof.


A number of states also make provision for honoring the minor's own consent in cases of emergency medical care, and 11 states have specific provisions for confidential medical treatment for pregnant minors of any age (Beaser, 1975).

One particularly delicate issue is that of the assumed confidentiality of medical records. Since one of the most basic tenets of medical practice is the Hippocratic pledge not to relay confidences entrusted to the physician in the course of treatment, the parental consent obligation creates a clear ethical dilemma: Is the physician's primary responsibility to the young patient or to the patient's parents? Beaser notes the virtual absence of any U.S. case law dealing with the issue of what a doctor may disclose to the parents of minor patients, and comments that:

The paucity of cases on this important point should not be surprising. It is only recently that possible rights of children have been the subject of judicial scrutiny. And minors are more and more taking to the courts to assert such rights. From the
standpoint of parents, minors and physicians, this is too impor-
tant an area to be left uncovered by clear statutory provisions.

(Beaser, 1975: p. 194)

The Canadian Foundation for Children and the Law recently circulated
a "Brief on Medical Consent of Minors" (Justice for Children, 1980; Bala
and Clarke, 1981: pp. 10, 13, 268-9) which advocates that any child,
regardless of age, ought to have an absolute right to medical treatment
independent of parental knowledge and consent. The Foundation's brief
recommends applying this blanket principle to abortion, to contraception,
to the treatment of venereal disease, alcohol, and drug abuse, as well as
to other types of medical treatment. The brief asserts that breaches of
confidentiality in the existing legal requirements for doctors to inform
and/or seek consent from parents are violations of the child's reasonable
right to fair and equal treatment.
Incongruities in Age-Grading Provisions

Sometimes the essentially arbitrary nature of age-grading standards (i.e., arbitrary in that no one chronological age is perfectly aligned with developmental stages or social need) leads to confusing juxtapositions which work against the best interests of minors. Two of these awkward incongruities will be mentioned here.

In British Columbia, a 17-year old no longer comes under juvenile court or child welfare purview and thus cannot be legally considered a runaway (since runaway legislation does not exist in adult law). Since the corresponding age in the neighboring province of Alberta is 16, a 16-year old can leave Edmonton or Calgary as a legal adult and be picked up as a runaway child in Vancouver the following day. On occasion, such youths have been transported back to the home province by social welfare authorities, only to return home as a legal Alberta adult.

Another troublesome incongruity in provincial law pertaining to age of majority has to do with admission of minors to mental health facilities. Under the British Columbia Mental Health Act, provincial mental hospital involuntary admission procedures are identical for adults and minors. Involuntary commitment procedures involve an application for committal by a near relative, peace officer or other party, and two examinations by physicians--without court proceedings. Release after one year is automatic unless the authority for detention is renewed. However, in the area of informal or voluntary admissions, minors and adults follow very different mental hospital admitting procedures. Anyone under the age of 16 can be admitted "voluntarily" merely on the request of a parent or guardian (or, if neither parent is available, the nearest relative), as long as one physician has
examined the minor and found the minor to be mentally disordered. Unlike adult patients who are voluntarily admitted, the patient under 16 is not entitled to be discharged upon his or her own request, but only at the request of the person initiating the admission in the first place. This odd construction of age-grading standards means that a minor in B.C. has more protection if committed to a mental hospital involuntarily than if "voluntarily" admitted (BC-CLA, 1978).
An Expanding Legal Voice for Minors

Policies which are inconsistent, inflexible, or unfair to people with special considerations may very likely be challenged at some point in their evolution. Age-grading procedures have come increasingly under fire in recent years—from civil liberties advocates, from lawyers, and in a few cases from juveniles themselves. In fact, the challenges to be chronicled in the following section have coincided in time with the counter-culture runaway reforms to be detailed in Chapter 5 and other 1960's liberation movements.

The political turmoil of that era included self-help, group-pride protest efforts by Blacks, Native Americans, women, students, welfare recipients, prison inmates, the handicapped and other groups who almost simultaneously found their way to greater political influence. Each group protested its treatment at the hands of the dominant culture, and each group organized itself for better conditions and a fairer share of rights and benefits.

The situation with children and youth is quite different. Most of the agitation for children's rights and youth rights has come not from young people at all, but from adult representatives—people of mature years called "child advocates" and "youth advocates." Even in the course of organizing such advocacy movements, the young people themselves have only occasionally taken part—such is the inertia of a group which has seldom known political power or political protest. Only during the late 1960s and early 1970s did the youth age status group show some signs of political awareness, and it was among the runaway group and street youths that such awareness was most evident.
The remainder of this chapter will discuss some of the recent challenges to youth dependency doctrines which have emerged in North America over the past two decades: first, the issue of courtroom confrontations between parent and offspring, and second, children's rights proposals.

Hennepin County, Minnesota, Juvenile Court Judge Lindsay Arthur and his law clerk Thomas Kalitowski, in an article titled "Child vs. Parent: Residence, Education and Dates" (1973), asked the following pointed questions:

- Is the authority of a parent subject to challenge by a child?
- Is the Court open to hear a challenge by a child to a direction by her parents?
- Can a child herself petition the Court, or must her complaint be screened by an adult?
- Can a child refuse a reasonable place of residence determined by her parents?
- Can a child substitute her own reasonable educational program for a reasonable program determined by her parents?
- Can a child determine for herself the persons of the same or opposite sex or race with whom she will associate despite objections of her parents?

These concerns were stimulated by a juvenile case heard in their court which they outline as follows:

An attractive, intelligent, upper-middle class girl of unusual perspicacity celebrates her 16th birthday in juvenile court in a legal struggle with her parents. The situation is necessarily emotionally charged since it involves the most elemental relationships between parent and child: control of dates, and schools, and residence. The petitioner is the girl herself. Her parents are the respondents. She asks the Court to let her decide for herself where she will live, where she will go to school, whom she will date.

The petition alleges that the girl's parents are about to embark with their family on a sailing trip possibly around the world, possibly for as long as four years. The parents insist the girl accompany them. The girl wants to stay home and continue her same education with her same friends. The Court found as fact that the trip, which the parents have been planning for 19 years,
is an obsession with them. The parents will brook no interference with it; it is an integral part of their marriage. The Court also found that the girl's parents are shocked and disturbed by the fact that their daughter is heavily committed to a group of friends with diverse economic, racial and philosophical backgrounds. Also, they are worried by indications of her sexual intercourse with a boy who is younger than she, has a delinquency record, and is of a different race...a boy whom she met as part of a public school program "for geniuses" which her parents induced her to attend. Notwithstanding their strong desire that the girl go with them on the trip, the parents are even more committed to ending her relations with these friends, particularly the boy, whether or not she travelled with the family.

Once the wheels of the Court were set in motion, the instincts and judgments of both parent and child, who admittedly loved each other, were heavily tempered by the advice, admonitions and commands of attorneys. Examination and cross-examination, with their attendant accusations and exaggerations, took their toll. Inevitably the family was driven further apart. The parents never wished her a happy 16th birthday, to the girl's considerable distress.

The Court's determination in this case was described by Arthur and Kalitowski as follows:

Social counseling, ordered by the Court in the evenings, was ineffectual because of both the pressures and their brevity. It was apparent that family reconciliation through compromise was an impossibility. It became necessary for the Court to impose a solution on a family that was unwilling and unable to solve its own problem, knowing well that as a third party, the Court's solution would necessarily be less satisfactory than one which the parties arrived at themselves ....

The Court in its Finding of Facts found that while the girl's parents provided her a home which is by any measure well above average, they were unable to fully recognize the chaotic emotional needs of an intellectually gifted and spirited adolescent female. However, the Court found that it is required to accept whatever might be the parents' first preference as to their daughter's upbringing, other than a plan which is substantially detrimental to her welfare. Therefore, the Court concluded that because the trip would be an emotional disaster for the child, the Court would follow the parent's second choice: placement of the girl for an indefinite period with her maternal aunt in another state, notwithstanding strong objections by the girl.
One sign that the ancient concept of patria potestas is gradually receding into history is found in these infrequent but celebrated cases in which a minor challenges a parent in court, or sues the parent or other adult or adult institution (such as the school) for neglect, negligence, or financial support (McBee, 1975; Chernaik, 1976). Such incidents are becoming more common as young people reach for and are given slightly more adult legal autonomy through increasing awareness of children's rights issues, and due to the contemporary fragmenting of the "age of majority" standard through diverse informal exceptions and conflicting provisions. The 1978 enactment of the Family Law Reform Act in Ontario implicitly grants children the legal right to sue their parents:

67. No person shall be disentitled from recovering damages in respect to injuries incurred for the reason only that the injuries were incurred before birth.

Presumably, if a child injured in utero because of maternal neglect (e.g. drug, alcohol, or nicotine abuse) has legislative sanction to sue the parent, any child in Ontario, whether injured prenatally or not "is probably possessed of the same legal right" (Bala & Clarke, 1981: pp. 39-40).

Objections have been raised that the state has finally stepped much too far into the privacy of family life in sanctioning such potentially divisive lawsuits. In fact, several U.S. courts faced with such suits have begun to frame a doctrine of the "immunity of the family" which seeks to restrict from court legal matters stemming from emotional or psychological injury and limit such intra-family lawsuit proceedings to claims stemming from physical injuries suffered in automobile accidents, beatings, incest, nutritional neglect and other instances in which physical harm is easily proven. The intent of this emerging doctrine is to avoid litigation in
circumstances where a family's chances of being reunited would be unduly and adversely affected by the child taking the parents to court. Bala and Clarke concede that:

The thought of a child facing the parent in a court-room armed with all of the adversarial weapons found in the judicial arsenal is repugnant to most people. Yet the situation envisioned by the legislature in those jurisdictions where children have the legal right to sue their parents apparently is one in which the parents, through negligence, have injured their children. The Supreme Court of Canada made the following statement involving the claim of a five-year old child who was seriously injured when his father negligently backed his car over him: "However repugnant it may seem that a child should sue his own father, it would probably be equally repugnant that a child injured by his father's negligent act should have no redress for the damage suffered."

(Bala & Clarke, 1981: p. 39)

Periodically, civil libertarians and children's advocacy groups propose reform for aspects of the extensive age-grading collage. John Holt, writing in Escape from Childhood (1974: p. 236), covers the entire range of age-grading when he asks:

What would it mean to give a young person full legal and financial responsibility? Just what it now means for adults. It would mean that they would be accountable to their fellow citizens and the law for what they do. It would mean that they could sue others and be sued by them. It would mean that they could own, buy and sell property, make contracts, establish credit, borrow money and do all the other things an adult may now legally do.

Richard Farson in his book Birthrights (1974) proposes an across-the-board reform of the rules and privileges pertaining to childhood. Farson's proposed "Child's Bill of Rights" reads as follows:

1) THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION: Children should have the right to decide matters which affect them most directly.
2) THE RIGHT TO ALTERNATIVE HOME ENVIRONMENTS: Self-determining children should be able to choose from among a variety of living arrangements: residences operated by children, child exchange programs, 24-hour child-care centers, and living environments integrated with various school or employment opportunities.

3) THE RIGHT TO RESPONSIVE DESIGN: Society must accommodate itself to children's size and to their need for safe space.

4) THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION: A child must have the right to all information ordinarily available to adults—including, and perhaps especially, information that makes adults uncomfortable.

5) THE RIGHT TO EDUCATE ONESELF: Children should be free to design their own education, choosing from among many options the kinds of learning experiences they want, including the option not to attend any kind of school.

6) THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM FROM PHYSICAL PUNISHMENT: Children should live free of physical threat from those who are larger and more powerful than they.

7) THE RIGHT TO SEXUAL FREEDOM: Children should have the right to conduct their sexual lives with no more restriction than adults.

8) THE RIGHT TO ECONOMIC POWER: Children should have the right to work, to acquire and manage money, to receive equal pay for equal work, to choose trade apprenticeship as an alternative to school, to gain promotion to leadership positions, to own property, to develop a credit record, to enter into binding contracts, to engage in enterprise, to obtain guaranteed support apart from the family, to achieve financial independence.

9) THE RIGHT TO POLITICAL POWER: Children should have the vote and be included in the decision-making process.

10) THE RIGHT TO JUSTICE: Children must have the guarantee of a fair trial with due process of law, an advocate to protect their rights against the parents as well as the system, and a uniform standard of detention.

Such extreme proposals as this have few advocates at present. An Ontario law professor and lawyer have commented that such proposals win little sympathy ...

... either from the general public (in particular, parents), or from the country's lawmakers. One suspects this radical approach is destined to attract only the attention of philosophers, children's activists, and students engaged in the study of children and the law.

(Bala & Clarke, 1981: p. 217)
Conclusion

Numerous cracks are beginning to appear in the wall of parental sovereignty and youth dependency. While few observers would go as far as John Holt, Richard Farson, or even the Canadian Foundation for Children and the Law in proposing massive overhauling of the age-grading system, an increasing number of citizens are finding the rigid patchwork of regulations too inflexible and too often unfair to minors and other family members.

Cautious changes have already been implemented, and North American children and youth are now closer than they have ever been to becoming true legal entities. Much of the problem has stemmed from the lengthy period of extended adolescence which has evolved over the past century—a matter to be taken up in subsequent chapters. The delay in entering adulthood has expanded over the century, ironically coinciding with increasing pressure from media and advertising for young people to emulate adult maturity, adult sexuality, and adult consumerism at ever earlier ages. It is not surprising then, that the old strictures and the old dependencies would begin to appear obsolete.

Family members frequently have difficulty sustaining the necessary interest in one another and nurturance of one another over the necessary span of years to full maturity of each offspring. It need not be surprising that some family members need vacations from one another, and that others need and desire permanent separations—a matter which will become more apparent in the case studies of Part II. Based on the recent experience of those jurisdictions which have instituted statutory emancipation certification procedures, it would appear that more flexibility can indeed be fitted into the present age-grading mosaic.
The liberalization of emancipation procedures, of medical consent regulations, and of minors' status as potential litigants has coincided with liberation movements of the past two decades which have had as one goal greater self-determination by less-powerful groups. While there has been no true "youth liberation movement," adult civil libertarians and child advocates have been conscientious in their attention to the legal needs and rights of minors. The runaway services movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s was in large part a youth liberation effort which attempted to push back some of the overly restrictive boundaries of adolescent freedom of movement.

Since the age-grading prohibitions have been in large part economically based and tied to vested interests of adult guardians, change has been slow in coming. Part of the reason is that independent living situations for minors (one important aspect of legal emancipation) frequently necessitate the obtaining of full-time employment to pay for one's independent status. Yet the traditional conviction that youth cannot be accommodated in the adult labour market continues. Runaway prohibitions, then, continue to serve much the same function they served at the turn of the 20th century—regulation and control of a segment of the population which is neither working nor in school. These labour market issues and the question of youth unemployability will be the focus of the next chapter.
Chapter 3
CHILD LABOUR REFORMS AND COMPULSORY SCHOOLING

The action of running away is a two-edged statement. On the one hand, running away is an expression of discontent with the status quo in the parental home. On the other hand, the runaway action may also signify a challenge to the little-examined policies of youth economic dependency. Since the economic basis of runaway youth policy has been obscured by the therapeutic perspective which has dominated social service approaches to youths and families, it is necessary to put aside the pathological presuppositions of social policy to gain a fuller understanding of the dynamics which are at work. A look at the history of child and youth roles in the marketplace will aid us in gaining some perspective on the contemporary issues at hand.

While the rhetoric which supports legislation restricting the movement and activities of children and youth below the age of majority stresses humanitarian and protective considerations, some very real economic rationales undergird these seemingly benevolent policies. As Chapter 2 made clear, age-grading standards have shifted in response to wage-earning realities (e.g., age of ability to push a plow), and emancipation court proceedings take independent income as their prime consideration. In situations of parental neglect or adolescent incorrigibility, the issue of whether the State shall take over the parenting role has vital economic as well as interpersonal implications.

The double message of benevolent rhetoric overlaying an economic and adult-oriented reality is of modern origins. The child's function as an economic asset and as parental property was originally quite explicit. Only within the last century have we come to view children with a more
protective eye. As a child protection mentality has gradually emerged, dating from the late 19th century, the benevolent motives have become more dominant. Yet economic motivation has not disappeared either from our cultural values or from the letter of law and social policy.

An understanding of the economic usefulness of children and youths over time is essential to an analysis of the origins of runaway youth policy. Young people have moved from being essential to labour market operations and vital contributors to their family's sustenance, to a condition in the 1980s of being virtually non-essential to the productive process and useful to the economy only as students and consumers. Both in the previous role of indispensable worker and in the present role of consumer of media and advertising promotions, young people have been channeled into their economic function and controlled in it by the dynamics of the marketplace and by the actions of adult industrialists and policymakers.

Despite the benevolent intentions of the Progressive reformers in their desire to remove minors from the opportunistic dominance of greedy manufacturers, from the dangers and indoctrination opportunities in adult jails and prisons, and from the negative influences of street-corner loitering, the turn-of-the-century social service reforms themselves, almost by necessity, contained a strong element of the control and containment strategy. The tension between control and benevolence has been a central ambiguity in runaway youth policy and related youth dependency policies down to the present day. As will become clear in Chapter 5, that contradiction between dominance and advocacy has not disappeared, even with the counter-hegemonic runaway service reforms of the late 1960s.

In a very real sense, then, the notion of the child as economic property
of the parent (and sometimes of the state) has not died even with the virtual removal of children and young teenagers from the full-time, permanent labour force. Child dependency legal provisions reviewed in Chapter 2 continue to exclude minors from essential decision-making relating to their personal affairs. The media and advertising consumer role of children and youth has become as essential to the health of the North American economies as the use and exploitation of child labour once was. And runaway youth laws—even with recent liberalizations—continue to reinforce the centuries-old notion of ownership of the child by the parent. The idea of the child as economic property and the reality of minors as dominated by political-economic forces is still with us, despite the prevalence of benevolent child-welfare rhetoric.

This chapter outlines the labour market origins of runaway youth policy. While the specific statutory prohibitions against leaving home without parental permission prior to the age of majority are found in juvenile justice legislation (and sometimes in child welfare codes), the basis of the runaway prohibition runs much deeper than juvenile court procedures. Juvenile delinquency and child welfare stipulations against youthful idleness and youthful loitering on city streets and against association with criminal elements were found necessary due to the problem of youth unemployability which came about following the first wave of industrial mechanization and reform of factory conditions in the late 19th century.

The chapter begins with an historical review of the place of young people in the labour process and a discussion of the changes which led to their gradual exclusion from the workforce beginning in the latter years of the 19th century. A discussion follows of the cultural and ideological changes occurring around the turn of the 20th century which led middle
class intellectuals and child advocates to a more benevolent, protective view of children and youth. The final sections of the chapter chronicle the rise in dominance of the free, compulsory, public school as a new socialization agency—an institution which came into its own once young people were displaced from their labouring functions and no longer occupied with the world of work.
Early Labour Regulations

The earliest laws regulating labour were designed to move labourers toward work where they were needed. England's first vagrancy statute, enacted in 1349, made the giving of alms to any unemployed person of sound mind and body a crime. The 1349 law was drafted as the result of the Black Death plague which had wiped out perhaps half of the English population the year before. The supply of inexpensive labour had thus been greatly reduced as peasants began to flee the manors. Landowners were having a difficult time maintaining their holdings. Chambliss (1964: p. 69) notes that:

It was under these conditions that we find the first vagrancy statutes emerging. There is little question but that these statutes were designed for one express purpose: to force laborers (whether personally free or unfree) to accept employment at a low wage in order to insure the landowner an adequate supply of labor at a price he could afford to pay.

This early English statute was the first in a string of restrictive vagrancy and runaway statutes designed originally to control the available labour pool, and later utilized to regulate the movements of unemployed and/or criminally inclined adults or minors who could not be accommodated in the labour market once conditions had changed. Thus, a policy which began as an inducement aiming to move workers to the workplace evolved into a policy which would restrict the movement of the unemployed.

Vagrancy statutes, as prohibitions of "adult status offenses," are among those laws which regulate noncriminal, "nuisance" behaviours. Vagrancy laws are analogous to runaway laws, but operate on the adult level. Both enforce prohibitions against "victimless crimes" where no physical harm or loss has come to a particular complainant. To large degree, both vagrancy
and runaway laws are laws which establish "economic crimes."

During times of underemployment, these policies have been used to maintain a labour pool, as when "vagrant" peasants were moved to holdings needing workers in England or in the apprehension of runaway slaves or runaway apprentices. During times of overemployment, when potential workers who are unemployed, e.g. tramps, vagabonds, runaway minors, or criminals, are seen as nuisance elements creating a blight, eyesore, or potential danger to the community, such laws have been used to control the movements of such non-workers. (3)

One of the first labour union actions was the movement for a ten-hour working day which took hold in England and culminated in the Ten Hour Act of 1847. As new machinery made work in the textile mills increasingly meticulous and tedious, workers became more and more dissatisfied and the factory owners became more willing to raise wages. But when piece rates were raised, workers simply knocked off work earlier—such was their desire to enhance the non-working part of their lives. Even at the point when factory entrepreneurs were willing to pay them higher wages for longer work hours, the workers voted for shorter work days—such was their resistance to the new mode of factory work (De Grazia, 1962: p. 198).

But behind the Ten Hour Act, as with so much social legislation, lay dual motives. The struggle for shorter hours and the more manageable life which would come with that was also a tactic by workers to distribute the available jobs to a wider group of available workers. In the textile mills, the great majority of labourers were women and children working at lower wages than those the adult males would accept. While ostensibly the work hours legislation was to benefit the women and child labourers, all workers would be put on shorter work schedules, making room for employment of more
workers and thus the reentry of unemployed male adults into the workplace. An early labour union resolution predicted that work hours legislation would "equalize and extend labour by bringing into employment the many adult males who, though willing and ready to work, were obliged to spend their time in idleness, while females and children were compelled to labour 10 to 16 hours a day" (DeGrazia, 1962: p. 194).

Thus, benevolent concern for factory conditions was not the only reason for the emerging pressure for child labour laws. The goal of reducing the unemployment of adult male factory workers was also paramount. Stern, et al. (1975: pp. 102-103) write of 19th century America:

From the beginning of industrialization, there were some philanthropists and reformers who recognized that factory labor could be unhealthy for children. To these voices were joined in the early 1800's those of labor unions, which represented working men who did not want to compete for jobs against docile young children, and which also objected to the practice of requiring fathers to bring their children to work as a condition of their own employment.

In opposing the entrance of children into the nonagricultural labor force, labor unions were seeking not only to protect children, but also to protect the economic authority of fathers, which was being threatened by industrialization. Although a man had historically been manager of the family economic enterprise, he found himself being compelled to compete with children for his job as work was removed from the home to the factory. Furthermore, if wages were low, earnings from the job might not support his family. Therefore, when organizations of working men sought laws to limit child labor directly, they were seeking to preserve the dominant role of adult males.

The odd, and certainly embarrassing circumstances of family members competing against one other in the workplace came about because of the dramatic changes in the manner in which goods were produced. In the agrarian context, all hands were needed to bring in the harvest and to perform the manifold tasks which were necessary to work the land and the animals. Despite hardships stemming from crop failures or from living on marginal
income, family members were able to see the fruit of their labours from start to finish in the horticultural or agricultural context. Children were educated in a practical manner through being part of adult work and being on the edge of adult conversations. Both father and mother, as well as other family members and boarders, were available to the youngsters or always nearby. A variety of adult role models were present in children's lives. Short of romanticizing a life which yielded many hardships and disappointments, we can say that family life and work life were far more integrated than they were to become in the industrial stage to follow.
Youth Apprenticeship and Shifting Paternal Authority

Even in the "boarding out" situations of youth apprenticeship which were common in Europe and America during the 17th and 18th centuries, young people had consistent adult role models. The place of work and one's living space were likely to be in close proximity, and young workers could see the continuity and products of their efforts. However, by the late 18th century, strains and conflicts were developing between the young indentured servants and their masters, as the latter found the old boarding arrangements less to their advantage:

Many London masters were taking on boys only for their cheap labor, teaching them nothing, and then encouraging them to break their contract so that they might claim the forfeited premiums. Most adversely affected were those youths least able to defend themselves, orphans and pauper children who were apprenticed by parish authorities, under the Elizabethan statute of 1601, from the age 10 or 12 to 24.

(Gillis, 1974: p. 49)

The tradition of boarding out served an adolescence-prolonging function and preserved patriarchal authority over the young apprentices, since the master took over a close supervisory function in loco parentis. An ancient stricture governing the young indentured servants read as follows:

Taverns and alehouses he shall not haunt, at cards, dice, tables or any other unlawful game he shall not play, matrimony he shall not contract, nor from the service of his said master day or night absent himself.

(Quoted in George, 1964: p. 280)

The capitalization of agriculture which developed as a result of the enclosure movement led to a "more intensive use of wage labor" and a decline
of old patriarchal arrangements, including payment in board and room" (Gillis, 1974: p. 42). Young labourers were now in demand on a wage basis and "living in" with a master came to be seen as less profitable for the master than direct payment for services rendered. As apprenticeship declined, youthful independence, promiscuity, and earlier marriages increased:

Nights spent in socializing proliferated; young people, who now had pocket money from their own labors, indulged themselves in drink and dress in ways that horrified their elders .... Brawling, drunkenness, and resort to prostitutes appear to have been widespread.

(Ibid.: pp. 46, 50)

The patriarchal authority structures which regulated the adolescent age status began to break down seriously. Obligatory apprenticeship was abolished in England in 1814. "Masters continued to take on apprentices, not for the purpose of training but as a source of cheap labor" (Ibid.: p. 51).

Meanwhile, the competition from assembly line methods was leading to a decline in the crafts, and young workers embarked on wide-ranging migration to find work on a daily job rate basis, sometimes becoming permanent nomads. These "journeyman" craftsmen gradually developed a "tramping system" which aided in the distribution of labour to where it was needed, particularly in times of strikes or depressions. Journeymen's lodges or fraternities served as substitute families, and the resulting organization of migrating workers frequently led to political revolts and machine-breaking uprisings such as the "Tailors' Rebellion" of 1830 in England. Political authorities, fearful of the organizational impact of the journeyman lodges, increased enforcement of the vagrancy statutes.

Runaway apprentices were an ever-increasing problem as the tradition
of boarding out deteriorated. One commentator noted that these runaways were "driven into ill-courses, or become...altogether useless to the public and a burden to their relations .... through the ill designs and practices of their masters" (George, 1964: p. 278). Numerous youths from various social classes ran away to the new American colonies during this period (Libertoff, 1980). Also, English officials had taken to sending orphans and poor children to Canada and the United States as indentured servants as a cost-saving measure (Sutherland, 1976).

Home industries, such as weaving workshops, served as "half-way house(s) on the road to industrialization" and for a time restored some semblance of paternal authority to the biological family (Gillis, 1974: pp. 45-49). Children working in domestic industry could now remain with their families for longer periods of their youth since the local employment opportunity eliminated the need for boarding out or migration. However, even as these young home workers were becoming "boarders" in their own families, new familial arrangements were taking hold which led to considerable freedom and independence among young people. Complaints again arose from the older generation about youthful extravagance, precocious consumption, self-gratification, and "beggar weddings."

To large degree, this erosion of parental discipline was due to the disruption of inheritance patterns following the breakup of land due to enclosure. Many parents—especially the peasants and artisans—were "left with neither wealth nor trade for their children to inherit" (Gillis, 1974: p. 41). Thus, there was less family capital to hold as "hostage for the future" and as incentive for good behaviour. Moreover, as children and youth moved into wage transactions, their economic power and economic independence increased considerably. They were frequently called upon to
contribute to the support of their parents rather than remain totally dependent on an adult master as they had been in the board-and-room indenture situations.
Changes in Family Structure Due to Industrialization

As the family-based manufacturing centres were gradually supplanted by larger centralized factories, changes resulted which affected family and community life dramatically. Fathers began for the first time to go to workplaces outside the immediate vicinity of the family home, thus separating them from their families during the working day, whereas previously they had been able to do something like 24-hour fathering. Mothers were no longer centrally involved in the economic sustenance and production activities of the family and became more limited in their functions, primarily attending to household maintenance and the upbringing of young children. Also, increasingly complicated technology in the new factories meant that workers needed more sophistication and training, and this, along with other trends—such as the growing unemployability of children—led to the spread of compulsory, formal schools. (5)

These factors in combination meant a shift from a workplace where parents of both sexes, children, and extended family members all participated in the family's economic productivity, generally seeing the product progress from start to finish, to the modern situation we now tend to take for granted. Under the modern-day arrangements, the mother is in charge of the home, the father is the primary or sole wage earner and travels outside the family home to go to work, and the children are either with the mother or away at school most of the day.

In the early phases of industrialization, child labour (like female labour) was much in demand. Children could be hired more cheaply and they were more malleable to factory discipline than were adult males who were used to planning out their own day. John Gillis writes that:
In the first decades of the Nineteenth century, 80% of the workers in English cotton mills were children, but as heavier machinery was introduced, skilled adult male spinners took command. They tended to hire their own children as scavengers at the age of 8 or 9, promoting them to the job of piecing cotton as they matured, and finally teaching them to spin at the ages of 17 or 18. In this way the master spinner was able to preserve a great deal of paternal authority, preserving his family intact until the 1820s.

(Gillis, 1974: p. 56)

Thus, for a period of time, the familial interaction characteristic of the farm and of home industry were carried over into the factory setting. Families would typically move intact from country to city and all go to work together in a factory. Migrants from rural areas would come into industrial towns and "claim kin" who would help them find work. For a time, "the factory remained a source of extended family unity" and factory owners gained loyal and cooperative workers in the bargain. (Ibid.: p. 5). Meanwhile, paternal authority and supervision was maintained:

It is fathers or friends who work in factories, and they have all a common interest in checking immorality among the younger assistants, both boys and girls .... Now, even if none of their own children were working with them, yet they have all a common interest as fathers in discountenancing indecencies.

(quoted in Smelser, 1959: p. 190)

This period was short-lived, however. Families were not always able to stay together and "with the splitting up of the family, control went from the parents to the owners" (De Grazia, 1962: p. 199). Frequently the young person was more mobile and acted as advance scout for the family, or the minor may have been the only family member eventually employed in the factory. As cheap labour, children and youth came to be preferred as employees by the new entrepreneurs. Sometimes youths became the sole
economic support for their families. De Grazia proposes that:

The capitalist did not tear children from their mothers' laps; mothers sent their children to him .... Parents should have known better, perhaps, than to separate themselves from the children. ... The possibility of exploitation of children by grown men was not immediately suspected. However, it soon became clear that no compassion like that of parents for children ruled the heart of the factory owner. Whereas the adult could not be broken to factory work easily, the child's habits had not yet been firmly formed. He could be trained--by force if necessary--to heed the machine. After a time children became more valuable than adults. The first advantage was their cheapness, the second their adaptability to factory discipline. So they went from cotton mills to mines to potteries to the matchmaker's. Eventually Parliament rescued them. Eventually, but by then industry had found its labor force, and the next generation had been trained in proper work habits.

(Ibid.: pp. 199-200)

The result was a dramatic shift in the ways families operated. On the family farm or domestic industry, children performed the lighter tasks, the family worked together, and no thought was given to dividing up the income or removing women or children from the work so that men could carry it alone. The family worked and earned income as a unit. John and Virginia Demos write of the American situation:

Consider that most farm families are characterized by a high degree of internal unity. Children and adults share the same tasks, the same entertainments, the same friends, the same expectations. There is a continuum between the generations. The child appears not so much as a child per se but as himself a potential farmer; he is, then, a miniature model of his father ....

But when Americans began to move to the city, all this changed. City children, for example, do not often have a significant economic function within the family as a whole. .... Thus there develops in the urban setting an important "discontinuity of age-groups." Children and adults are much more obviously separated from each other than is ever the case in a rural environment.

(Demos and Demos, 1969: pp. 636-637)
Paternal authority had shifted once again, this time from home to factory employer. Around 1800 in America, children as young as eight left home to work in factories, living in dormitories or boardinghouses. "Sometimes the factories assumed a master-like role and undertook to oversee the education and moral guidance of their young workers, thus following the earlier conventions relating to apprenticeships" (Marks, 1975: p. 81). Smaller factories in New England employed the "English plan" or "family system" of employing entire families, while larger factories used the "boardinghouse system" where children lived and worked in the factory while their parents continued to live and work on the farm.

Some young people in North America left home, or left the master's home rebelliously. Runaway apprentice laws ceased to be enforced in America in the early 1800s, and sons who had left service were seen by courts as automatically emancipated, with the parents no longer required to provide for their support. The law, however, did not encourage complete emancipation of daughters who had run away from domestic service, due to the prevailing attitude toward sheltering young women. The legal doctrine of youth emancipation came into being in the early part of the 19th century in the United States through court disputes between creditors and parents over the possession of a child's wages and the parent's obligation to support a working child (see Chapter 2). During this period, prior to the Progressive reform movements which would bring new protections to bear, the maturation of children was legally recognized at ages much younger than today and full-time employment of children and youth was very common (Marks, 1975).
Child Labour Reform in North America

Between 1870 and 1910, dramatic changes took place in Canada and the United States in regard to child labour practices, social services, and adolescent dependency. A series of social and economic upheavals accompanying the burgeoning industrialization and rapid urbanization of the time gave rise to profound changes in the way children were viewed and treated. This was a time of uncertainty, alienation and dislocation during which fear and panic became translated into protective instincts and campaigns for urban rehabilitation.

From the close of the Civil War in 1865 to the end of the 19th century, Americans witnessed a remarkable surge of material development:

During this period American settlers and enterpreneurs filled up a vast area of land between the Mississippi River and California and had spanned the country with a railroad network of more than a quarter of a million miles. The number of farms, as well as the number of acres under cultivation, had doubled between 1870 and 1900, and the production of wheat, cotton, and corn had increased ... two-and-a-half times....

Between 1870 and 1900, the production of bituminous coal increased five times, of crude petroleum 12 times, of steel ingots and castings more than 140 times. The urban population jumped from 9.9 million to 30.1 million .... Chicago, for example, more than doubled its population in the single decade 1880 to 1890, and a growth rate for that decade alone of from 60 to 80 percent was not uncommon for the newer cities of the Middle West.

(Hofstadter, 1963: pp. 1-2)

This period of relative military peace was a period of domestic chaos unequalled in American history. The massive growth of population, fed by an unprecedented steady stream of new immigrants to the U.S. (eagerly invited and subsidized by a country requiring a rapid expansion of its labour force) resulted in an overnight burgeoning of city populations, which pressed
each city's resources beyond the breaking point. The shift from a predominantly rural to a predominantly urban lifestyle was facilitated by breakneck industrial growth and unchecked economic expansion.

The impressive material growth was achieved at an enormous cost in human values and led to considerable misuse of human and natural resources. Land and people were plundered. Farmers received pathetic returns for their labour. Workers and citizens had little protection from the greed and exploitation of industrialists on the make. It was a time of strikes, panics, depressions, and general urban and industrial disorder. The 31 years between 1866 and 1897 hosted five depressions totalling 17 years and saw only 14 years of relative prosperity. Financial and political power was concentrated in a few hands and businessmen of the day were notorious for their ruthless and exploitative methods. Growth and progress were exposing numerous contradictions in free market capitalism, and the resulting fallout of social problems was immense. While events were not nearly so large-scale nor dramatic in Canada, similar social and economic pressures were affecting Eastern Canada, particularly the Toronto area, and analogous pressures for social reform emerged almost simultaneously.

Into this cataclysm of economic tumult and individual and social hardship strode the Progressive reformers—whose own financial and cultural positions were threatened by the incessant series of crises, and who were still optimistic about the perfectability of humankind. The reforming impulse which arose during this period mobilized groups of Social Gospel clergymen, journalists, social scientists, and middle class professionals and businessmen into a powerful meliorist movement which eventually had its most concrete expression in the Progressive Party aims of the early 1900s. Professionals, civic minded gentry, and academic reformers, who
formed themselves into the American Social Science Association, the American Economic Association, and the American Sociological Society, utilized their university positions to promote reformist ends until political pressures caused them to moderate their views following a steady string of professorial firings and academic freedom crises (Furner, 1975; Haskell, 1977).

The problem of child labour became one of the first social reform issues of the period. The British Factory Acts of 1833 and 1847 had set a precedent in restricting child labour. By 1860, eight states of the U.S. had some kind of laws regulating the work of children (Abbott, 1938: p. 259). The first child labour law in Canada was passed in Nova Scotia in 1873. The British Columbia Factories Act of 1908 forbade employment of boys under 14 and girls under 15, except in fish canning and fruit packing; a 1923 amendment moved the boys' minimum age to 15 (Stewart, 1926).

By 1919, 35 U.S. states had set the minimum working age at 16 or higher, but with liberal exceptions. Between 1880 and 1930, the number of young people in the United States between ages 14 and 17 inclusive who were in school rose from 2.8% of that age group to 46.6%, while the number of children 10 to 13 years of age gainfully employed per 1,000 dropped from 121 in 1900 to 24 in 1930, and those 14 and 15 years old and gainfully employed dropped from 309 to 92 per 1,000 (Abbott, 1938).

Such changes did not come without opposition, however. Enforcement of the early child labour statutes was virtually ineffective, and the factory inspectors were frequently in the pocket of industrialists. Resistance by business and industry was especially strong in the less-affluent Southern U.S. states. Court challenges by industrialists successfully staved off full enactment of U.S. federal child labour statutes despite two attempts to pass facilitating constitutional amendments (Zimand, 1944). However,
U.S. state laws prohibiting child labour and some federal laws covering certain specific types of work were eventually successful. By the end of World War II, child labour was virtually eliminated from the workplace in the U.S. and Canada. (6)

Motivations behind the child labour regulation movement were various. Reform efforts were the result of an alliance between humanitarian reformers who were deeply disturbed by the unhealthy and unfair conditions for children working in factories, and labour unions which were concerned that child labour depressed wages and represented unfair competition for adult male breadwinners. (Gaffield & West, 1978; Stern, et al., 1975). By 1920, unions, economists, and social workers in America were virtually united on the "paternal wage principle"—the notion that each adult male should receive enough pay to maintain a family of five (father, mother, and three children under age 14) (Stern, et al., 1975: p. 103).

Two other factors also contributed to the pressure for the regulation of children's employment: technology and immigration. With the advent of new machinery and labour saving devices, the need for children's labour declined, since the most unskilled jobs tended to be held by minors. For example, when pneumatic tube conveyor systems were introduced into department stores early in the 20th century, facilitating the automated movement of money, bills and receipts between the clerks on the floor and the bookkeeper upstairs, hundreds of young people who had served as "runners" prior to this technological advance were put out of work (Abbott, 1938).

Immigration was a topic of great concern to social reformers around the turn of the century since the children most likely to be exploited and trapped in an impersonal factory system were the children of new immigrants to the United States and Canada. These were also the children who most
often ended up as "street arabs" and vagrants following their exclusion from the industrial workplace.

Urban reformer and factory inspector Florence Kelley pointed out in 1907 that: "It is the recently immigrated families in the North and the poor whites in the South whose children are found at work" and she asserted that child labour laws "act as a check upon the immigration of the least desirable foreigners--those who come in the hope of exploiting their young children--and would somewhat deter the migration of the mountain whites in the South to mill towns" (Kelley, 1907: pp. 63-64).

The other side of this issue was, however, that child labour laws were most negatively received by poor immigrant families who needed the extra income from their children's earnings to meet a subsistence budget. Thus, immigrant families were doubly penalized: by receiving the lowest wages for the least stimulating work, and by child labour laws which reduced the family income further. Still, the abuses in the factories were real and children needed protection.

Despite the complaints of many Canadians and Americans around the turn of the century about the ways of the untutored immigrant families, it is important to remember that the newcomers had been enticed to North America in order to staff the expanding industries. John Commons, economist and labour expert of the Progressive era, wrote in 1907:

Had it been left to the initiative of the emigrants, the flow of immigration to America could scarcely ever have reached one half its actual dimensions .... It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that even more important than the initiative of the immigrants have been the efforts of Americans to bring and attract them. Throughout our history these efforts have been inspired by one grand, effective motive, that of making a profit upon the immigrants. The desire to get cheap labor, to take in passenger fares and to sell land have probably brought more
immigrants than the hard conditions of Europe, Asia, and Africa have sent us.

William Penn and his lessees ... sent their agents through western Europe and the British Isles with glowing advertisements, advanced transportation, and contracted for indentured service by way of reimbursement .... Victims of the Irish famine were assisted to emigrate by local and general governments and by philanthropic societies .... Several Western states created immigration bureaus, and Wisconsin, especially, in this way, settled her lands with a wide variety of races ...

(Commons, 1907: p. 236)

Commons pointed out that during periods of prosperity, the surge of immigration increases the supply of labour, but that protective tariffs prevented an analogous increase in the supply of products from abroad. Immigration and the tariff combined thus prevent wages from rising with the rise in prices: "This permits profits to increase more than wages, to be followed by overproduction and stoppage of business." In this way, Commons asserted, immigration "helps to create fortunes during a short period of speculation and intensifies the reaction during a period of stagnation" (Ibid.: p. 260).

Ethelbert Stewart, writing in the same era, noted that "The immigrant is, in the first instance, a wage reducer, either directly or indirectly .... As a prospective wage reducer he is met by the trade union in self defence ...

(Stewart, 1907: p. 226).

If the adult immigrant worker was a wage reducer, the children of that immigrant worker reduced wage standards to an even greater degree--and they tended to be obedient and impressionable, thus easy to guide and manipulate from a management standpoint. The economic arguments for child labour regulation were made as forcefully as were the humanitarian ones: "Cheap child labor would depress factory wages, and older workers would be driven out of the marketplace; moreover, as labor was cheapened, children would be forced to work to contribute to family support--and the cycle would thus be reinforced and perpetuated" (Marks, 1975: p. 87).
The Invention of Adolescence

During the Progressive reform era, important ideological changes were taking place in terms of how children and youth were viewed. These alterations, especially in the concept of adolescence, would have significant impact on the removal of minors from the workforce.

The notions of childhood dependency which we now take so much for granted developed in tandem with the evolving delay of young people's entry into the labour market. Likewise, the evolution of a new life stage termed "adolescence" has been viewed by numerous writers as a modern invention. In fact, a subsequent life stage termed "youth" is now frequently seen as an intermediate stage between adolescence and adulthood. All of these revisions in terminology reflect the gradual extension of legal and social minority to encompass a greater and greater number of years with the passage of time.

Joseph Kett points out that the institution of adolescence in North America was molded by middle-class Progressive reformers who found themselves "trapped between a threatening proletariat on one side and a hostile aristocracy on the other." This group of idealistic philanthropists, professors, and social workers (the latter originally being called "friendly visitors") spearheaded a massive reclassification of young people as "adolescents" and created institutions to segregate this group from casual contacts with adults-institutions which would have the capacity to socialize these pre-adults in ways appropriate to the peculiarities of the particular age-status (Kett, 1977: p. 216).

The primary theoretical basis for this reclassification and for the new adolescent institutions (e.g., the public high school) was found in
Psychologist G. Stanley Hall's treatise titled *Adolescence: Its Psychology and Its Relations to Physiology, Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion and Education* (1904). This ambitious work concluded that adolescence was "the awkward age," a time of turbulence during which misbehaviours and eccentricities could be viewed as "normal outgrowths of biological maturation rather than as inexcusable departures from a fixed standard of behavior" (Kett, 1977: p. 217). It was seen as a time when the harmony of childhood had been disrupted but the maturity and stability of adulthood had not yet been achieved.

Hall's theory of adolescence relied on the Social Darwinist concept known as "recapitulation." This approach to child development proposed that children pass through and retrace the steps the "race" has taken through the course of evolution. Adolescence, then, was believed to correspond with a period in prehistory marked by large-scale migrations, upheavals, and traumatic uprootings. Hall's doctrine justified the prolongation of childhood and minority—a trend already in motion at the time of his writings—on the basis that adolescents needed extra nurturance and time to live through the turbulence.

Kett points out a curious interplay of liberalism and repression in Hall's thought. This ambivalence about freedom and regimentation may have reflected both Hall's ambivalence about his own boyhood and contradictions existing in the cultural and economic milieu of 19th century North America. Wishing for adolescents the pastoral advantages of the farm and country life he had enjoyed as a boy, Hall assailed the modern machine mentality which ruthlessly subordinated youth "to the tool, machine process, finished product" (Hall, 1904: p. 173). The ambivalence came in Hall's calculated desire to free young people from the pressures of congested urban living—
by force if necessary. Hall and other reformers feared the negative impact which industrialization and urban blight would have on the young. These "child savers"—as they called themselves—proposed that children and adolescents be forcibly removed from the slum environment and be placed in more healthy surroundings—surroundings where educated, middle-class adults would serve as positive role models. In proposing to bring about health by forceful intervention, Hall's perspective and that of the Child Study Movement of which he was an integral part, shared the confusion between control and advocacy which was also typical of the compulsory schools movement and of the emerging juvenile court.

The idea of adolescence as a "moratorium" period was definitely a new and novel concept, and it has come to shape the thinking and actions of youth workers, educators, parents, and policymakers. In some ways, the concept was a reversal of previous thinking. Kett writes that "prior to the middle of the 19th century, contemporaries associated puberty with rising power and energy rather than with the onset of an awkward and vulnerable stage of life" (Kett, 1977: p. 17). Teenagers were now to be viewed as hot house plants needing extra time to flower properly—a notion made possible by the declining usefulness of child labour in the economy and leading to further extensions of the dependent years.

This shift in attitudes toward and expectations for adolescence which was promoted by Hall and the Child Study Movement provided ideological justification for prolonged public schooling—an innovation which has played a dramatic part in molding the nature of childhood and adolescence in the 20th century. It is to that schools movement that we now turn.
As restrictions on child labour took effect, heavy concentrations of "street arabs" took up residence on the streets of major cities in North America. With no jobs to keep them occupied, young people developed their own activities and countercultures in urban ghettos. The conditions on the street were as alarming to the reformers as the conditions in the factories had been, and this concern led to the development of standardized, compulsory, free public education—the next step in the series of late 19th century social reforms.

Compulsory public schooling had been linked to child labour reform from the start. The two policy reforms worked as a package to shortcircuit the possibility of idleness and trouble arising from the prospect of unemployed youths hanging out on street corners. Public schools had existed in certain parts of North America (e.g. Massachusetts) since 1800 and earlier. But compulsory attendance at these public schools was not put into law until the latter part of the century. Child labour reforms presented the rationale and the impetus for the successful inauguration of compulsory schools which would be publicly funded and publicly organized. Such schools would occupy the time and energies of youngsters otherwise idle on city streets, and they would also serve as training grounds for the special skills needed to function in the new-style factories of the time—both technical skills and social skills.

Reformer Florence Kelley asserted in 1907 that: "The best child labor law is a compulsory education law covering 40 weeks of the year, and requiring the consecutive attendance of all the children to the age of 14 years" (Kelley, 1907: p.67). But in order to hold the children, she noted
that schools must be made sufficiently interesting so as to compensate the
c child and the family "in lieu of the wages which the children are forbidden
to earn" (Ibid.: p. 68).

The early Factory Acts in England which first regulated child labour
frequently contained clauses relating to compulsory schooling. Schools
were also seen as meeting corporate needs. The argument of the founders
of England's charity schools in the early 18th century was that children,
having learned discipline at school, would be better adapted to routine
manual work later. But on a broader level, compulsory schooling was seen
"as a means of securing social discipline" from lower class workers and
their families who had not been acculturated into behaviour and lifestyles
acceptable to the dominant culture. Thus, much of the concern over
schooling had to do with "self-preservation .... protection of the better-
off members of society from the likely depredations of the lower orders"
(Seaborne, 1970: p. 12).

This was not an entirely new idea. Martin Luther had urged the estab-
lishment of public schools and compulsory attendance as early as 1524, as
a means to enforce right behaviour. Luther wrote in a letter to the German
rulers of the time:

I maintain that the civil authorities are under obligation to
compel the people to send their children to school .... If the
government can compel such citizens as are fit for military ser-
vice to bear spear and rifle, to mount ramparts, and perform
other material duties in time of war, how much more has it a
right to compel the people to send their children to school,
because in this case we are warring with the devil, whose
object it is secretly to exhaust our cities and principalities
of their strong men.

(Quoted in Rothbard, 1974: p. 12)
In an attempt to "inculcate obedience to a Calvinist-run government, and thereby to aid in the suppression of dissent" John Calvin established a number of compulsory public schools in Geneva in the mid-16th century and influenced the development of compulsory public schooling in Calvinist Holland in the early 17th century (Rothbard, 1974: p. 13).

Calvinist Puritan settlers in the colonies of New England adopted compulsory education early on. The Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1642 enacted a compulsory literacy law applying to all children. Five years later the colony established a system of public schools. The early Massachusetts regulations provided that, should parents be found unfit or unable to care for their children properly, the colony would be able to "seize the children and 'apprentice' them to itself to impart the required instruction" (Ibid.)—utilizing the parens patriae principle which would be employed two centuries later to justify similar family intervention by juvenile court or child welfare authorities.

The Massachusetts approach to compulsory schooling in 1642 was "embedded in the time-honored parental obligation to bring up one's children properly as good Christians" (Katz, 1976: p. 11) and expanded into surveillance of other areas of child rearing and home environment. In the mid-19th century in the U.S. and Canada, "as the strains of social diversity and the dangers of urban chaos became more widely felt, a new receptivity to a widespread system of publicly supported, publicly controlled common schools emerged" (Ibid.: P. 15). The schools movement of the 1800s was underpinned with much the same moralistic concerns that characterized the 1642 Massachusetts colony approach. As Michael S. Katz describes the trend:

For reformers like Horace Mann and Henry Barnard, the common school movement became a moral crusade. In their view, free
publicly supported common schools would unite Christian morality with democratic patriotism; the common school would stamp out the evils of ignorance, crime, vice, and aristocratic privilege; and finally, the common school would not only assimilate the immigrants but also transform them into virtuous, productive American citizens. (Ibid.)

Horace Mann, who served as Massachusetts superintendent of education from 1837 to 1848, was the most charismatic and fervent proponent of compulsory public schools. Mann viewed the potential for urban disruption in the mid-19th century with alarm and dismay. While a supporter of the industrial system, Mann foresaw a levelling function in education whereby labour would become less servile and less dependent upon management. Yet he rejected the notion of antagonism between classes and did not support the rights of workers to organize. Schools would serve the cause of social reform and amelioration, and compulsory attendance was necessary to assure that all children needing the constructive influences would be reached. His objectives were sweeping and ambitious: "... the removal of vile and rotten parts from the structure of society as fast as salutory and sound ones can be prepared to take their place" (quoted in Bowles & Gintis, 1976: p. 166).

Universal compulsory schooling was instituted in England through legislation enacted in 1870 (Seaborne, 1970: pp. 9-10). While the first comprehensive compulsory schooling law in the U.S. was instituted in Massachusetts in 1852, it was largely ineffective. By 1867, three U.S. jurisdictions had such laws on the books, and by 1890 27 states and territories had instituted compulsory attendance legislation. However, compliance was very lax. By 1918, every state in the union had joined the compulsory schools movement and attendance was much more complete (Katz, 1976).

In Canada, the first compulsory school attendance law was enacted in
Upper Canada (later to be known as Ontario) in 1871. However, free public schools had operated since the mid-1800s in Upper Canada with rather good attendance patterns. Still, complaints were heard that the most deprived and undisciplined "street urchins" could not be pulled into school even after 1871 (Prentice, 1975; Bamman, 1975). In British Columbia, school was made compulsory in 1873 (Stewart, 1926: p. 35).

The allowable school-leaving age has risen steadily over the past century. In England, the age was as low as 10 in some jurisdictions in 1880, and had gradually risen to age 16 by 1970 (Seaborne, 1970). In the U.S., the mean legal age for leaving school in 1900 was 14 and one-half years, and presently averages just over 16 years (with five states requiring school to age 18) (Katz, 1976). In Upper Canada in 1871, and in British Columbia in 1901, the school leaving age was 12 (Prentice, 1975; Stewart, 1926); and in British Columbia today the school leaving age is 15 (BC-CLA, 1978).

Thus, compulsory schooling has increased its coverage considerably as the years have passed, resulting in further expansion of the adolescent years over time. Such expansion has served to curtail both employment and unemployment among the young, as a part of their continuing exclusion from the adult labour market.
Schoolmen, "Street Arabs" and the Immigrant Poor

The 19th century rhetoric of school reformers was expansive and ambitious. Schools were intended to do much more than educate the youth. It was believed that schools would be a remedy for social pathology and urban unrest. Compulsory schooling would change society, not merely influence young minds. As early as 1835, social reformers were alarmed that children in the poor neighborhoods of Toronto were "growing up in idleness and vice, the pupils of old proficients in crime" (quoted in Houston, 1975: p. 30).

This concern for the delinquency or potential delinquency of inner-city youth was combined with fears of violence and civic unrest from workers who were new to Upper Canada and who might be influenced by labour organizers and/or political agitators. There was suspicion of the potential trouble which might be spawned by the uneducated mind, and educational reformers believed that if the younger generation of urban immigrants could be schooled in ways of responsible citizenship, this would quell the possible future unrest in cities and factories.

The tremendous wave of immigration to Canada and the United States had swelled the city populations and created a new urban lower class unfamiliar with North American customs:

There was an increasing concern with the lumpen-proletariat youths of these cities, youngsters who had run away from home or had been abandoned or orphaned but who were able to take advantage of the vast social slippages to live on the streets, unfettered by the rigid enforcement of school attendance laws, the need for work permits, or other restrictions which were later to limit the movement of youth.

Social reformer Charles Loring Brace, founder of New York's Children's Aid Society, described them as "the class of a large city most dangerous to its property, its morals, and its political life ... the outcast street-children grown up to be voters,
to be the implements of demagogues, the 'feeders' of the criminals, and the sources of domestic outbreaks and violations of the law."

(Lipschutz, 1977: p. 326)

Brace and the other Progressive reformers, who called themselves "child savers," embarked upon a campaign to rid the urban streets of the "street arabs" and to involve these poor immigrant youths in constructive activities and redirection. The primary programs used to reach these goals would be the juvenile court and the compulsory school. The two were integrally related, both in the participation of many of the same reformers in implementation of each, and in the joint use of parens patriae as a justification for intervention into private family life (Schlossman, 1977).

Free schooling was extended to immigrant children in order to inculcate them with American values and customs, and to "transform them into a stable, quiescent labor force" (Cohen & Lazerson, 1972: p. 67). The middle class, dominant culture bias of the common schools is evident from viewing the structure of public school organization.

Immigrant families themselves were not allowed—in fact were denied—access to school decision-making functions. While there was precedent, at least in the rural areas of Canada and the United States, for local control of local schools, this trend was truncated with the increased urbanization of the late 19th century and with acceptance of the policy of centralizing direction of the schools in large, increasingly bureaucratic administrative structures (Katz, 1971; Katz & Mattingly, 1975). As immigrants inundated Canadian and American cities, "local schools were removed from ward and neighborhood control, and given over into the hands of central boards controlled by the established city elites" (Cohen & Lazerson, 1972: p. 66).

This shift to centralized control reflected the prevailing Progressive
ideology of reform: efficiency, expertise, and non-partisanship. Yet considerable bigotry and class interest underlay the presumed non-partisanship. School centralization and bureaucratization had the effect and intent "of removing power and influence over schooling from the hands of the poor and the culturally different" (Ibid.). School writers of the time urged that school board members be "men who are successful in the handling of large business undertakings ... professional men of large practice ... college graduates" (Ibid, p.67)—a procedure which continues to the present day. Ethnic participation in decision-making and cultural diversity in curriculum were not options to be considered in a system intent on inculcating genteel middle class values and habit patterns.
The School as Factory

The Lancasterian system of public education (named after the English educator Joseph Lancaster, born in 1838, who developed the method) was a "monitorial" method of instruction which very much resembled the assembly lines of the period. Lancasterian education developed in charity schools in New York and other states, and was intended primarily for children of the poor. Following a factory model of instruction, literally hundreds of children were grouped together in a single large hall under the direction of a single teacher or "master" who sat on a raised platform facing the class. Instruction and drills were conveyed by monitors who had been selected from among the best students and trained to perform one specific aspect of the instruction. Students would march from one monitor to another over the course of the day, receiving instruction from each in turn.

The Lancasterian system was praised by DeWitt Clinton in 1809 as being "in education what ... machines for abridging labor and expense are in the mechanical arts" (Bowles & Gintis, 1976: p. 170). The Boston School Committee in 1828 found that the Lancasterian system disposed young minds to industry, "to readiness of attention, and to subordination, thereby creating in early life a love of order, preparation for business" (Spring, 1972: p. 74). Early 20th century educator Ellwood Cubberly found that the system replaced "idleness, inattention and disorder" with "activity, emulation, and ... military discipline" which was sorely needed by the poor children attending these charity schools (Bowles & Gintis, 1976: p. 170).

Even though the Lancasterian system died out in the early 20th century due to its inflexibility, such systems of coercive external control had set the stage for a public school system where discipline and obedience to
instruction were seen as higher qualities than unique and individual creativity, personal and cultural diversity, or controversy and free airing of differing opinions. Canadian educational historian Michael Katz comments:

We have still to see a movement driven by a desire to bring joy and delight to the life of the individual, to enrich experience .... This country has never, on any large scale, known vital urban schools, ones which embrace and are embraced by the mass of the community, which formulate their goals in terms of the joy of the individual instead of the fear of social dynamite or the imperatives of economic growth. We must realize that we have no models; truly to reform we must conceive and build anew.

(Katz, 1968: 214, 218)

The place of young people in the labour force remains problematic despite the influence of compulsory public schools. As part of a surplus "reserve labour army," rather than an active and essential component of the workforce, adolescents are kept waiting in the wings in relatively nonproductive roles, except for their now essential functions as consumers of popular media images and aggressively marketed teenage products. But unlike other members of the surplus labour force—women, the unemployed, welfare recipients, retirees, prisoners and the disabled—youth are almost never "called up to duty" as workers. Only once since the institution of child labour laws has young people's surplus labour potential been utilized. This was during World War II when U.S. teenagers went to work in war industries which were desperate for labourers. During the early 1940s, great numbers of American young people were drawn to major cities ....
The merit of child labor laws was relaxed, permitting greater numbers of youths to work illegally.

(Lipschutz, 1977: p. 330)

Between 1940 and 1944, the numbers of working boys and girls in the United States aged 14 to 18 leapt from 872,000 to an estimated 3 million young workers.

With this one exception, children and youth have remained isolated from the workplace. Grubb and Lazerson (1982) point out that schools have shown a curious reticence to become involved in direct employment training and placement programs. They also note that the specific relationship of schooling to the workplace has tended to become obscured except in regard to the school as a credentialing agency. Thus, the integral relationship between school and workplace which was intended by the early school reformers and the industrialists who advised them would appear to be somewhat ephemeral.

Certainly, schools are performing the function of inculcating discipline and obedience to instructions. But concrete job training integrally connected to future employment opportunities involving regular industry and business liaison contacts appears to be lacking. There is clear evidence that compulsory schooling serves the economy by diverting the energies of young people who cannot be accommodated in the labour force, rather than through discrete training in the specialized skills of the work setting. When this finding is added to the public school system's failure to even begin to level socioeconomic ranges and provide an equality of opportunity to students of all races, ethnic groups, and religions, it is apparent that the schoolmen's optimistic objectives have not been met.
Conclusion

The financial benefits of having a child were of utmost importance in pre-Progressive times—prior to child labour reforms and the introduction of the paternal wage principle. With the gradual removal of children and youth from the labour market from 1870 on and the advent of detached compulsory schooling, the economic advantage of having children waned and concerns for their care and protection increased.

The labour market shift was coincidental with the "invention of adolescence" by humanitarian reformers and psychologists—typified by G. Stanley Hall and the Child Study Movement. The two circumstances—youth unemployment and the rise of social attitudes toward a new adolescent dependency status—facilitated and reinforced one another. The result was that 20th century adolescence became a period of extended preparation for adulthood rather than immersion in productive activities.

This chapter has chronicled the shifts in paternal authority which have transpired as a result of the evolution of marketplace technology and workplace organizational structure. During the period when apprenticeship was a common option, paternal authority shifted from the biological family to the master. When the apprenticeship system began to break down and children were more often employed in home industries or local factories, authority over youths shifted back to the family, but young people found unprecedented types of independence and power through their new wage-earning capacity.

During the early periods of industrialization, young people became more autonomous and frequently worked in distant cities apart from their families. But at that point, rather than taking on their own authority,
working children and youth were dictated to by the factory owners and/or a father or uncle who might be working in the same workplace. Thus paternal authority shifted to the corporate hierarchy, with accompanying abuses and unhealthy conditions.

With the advent of child labour and compulsory schooling legislation, paternal authority and responsibility for the safety and upbringing of children and youth shifted in large degree to the State and its common schools. Children today frequently spend more of their waking hours under the supervision of school teachers and other childcare personnel than under the influence of their parents—and parents can be and have been prosecuted for keeping their children at home during school hours.

The tenacity with which industry resisted and actively opposed child labour reform in the United States is evidence of how important the deflated wages of youthful labourers were to business managers. Yet there were economic motives to the opposition to child labour as well, since young workers (and women workers) presented real competition to adult male workers whom, if employed, would draw higher salaries.

Likewise, the creation of compulsory schooling followed from a mix of motives. Beyond the humanitarian aims of equal opportunity for the children of all races, ethnic backgrounds, and social classes lay other, class-biased motives: the need to create a passive, docile worker who would take instruction without resistance, and the need to control an urban immigrant population which might revolt or come under militant political influences.

The compulsory schools movement was promoted by "schoolmen" who believed that universal schooling would lead to an equalizing of opportunity between rich and poor. The urban powderkeg would be defused by exposing the young immigrant street denizens to constructive influences and firm
discipline. Yet a century of experience with compulsory schooling has demonstrated that the class system of the public schools continues to duplicate the class system of the larger culture.

Bowles and Gintis (1976: p. 151) find an essential "correspondence between the social organization of schooling and that of work" and propose that the American educational system "works to justify economic inequality and to produce a labor force whose capacities, credentials, and consciousness are dictated in substantial measure by the requirements of profitable employment in the capitalist economy."

Families in the immigrant slum neighborhoods which were the subject of the reforms were the last to be consulted about the form or content of the schools, or about the efficacy of factory labour for their children of whatever ages. Nor, of course, were the children themselves consulted about policy issues affecting their lives so totally. Working people in Canada and the U.S. were frequently in opposition to public school proposals during those reform times, since the reformers' goals would remove the income being earned by their families' children and youth. They were also not so unlettered as to miss the paternalistic condescension with which their immigrant communities were being characterized in the efforts to establish universal schooling as a reality (Katz, 1968; Bowles & Gintis, 1976).

Canadian educational historian Neil Sutherland capsulizes the critics' disillusionment with the compulsory school record as follows:

Schools have not and do not offer "parity of competition." On the contrary, mass education has ensured--some say deliberately--that the old divisions of power and resources were maintained and extended into 19th and 20th century urban and industrial society.

(Sutherland, 1975: p. xviii)
Child labour reform legislation went well beyond the protection of children and the restriction of unfair labour practices and succeeded in eliminating child and youth employment altogether in exchange for a school system patently designed to emphasize the socialization of uniform citizenship and obedience values over and above concrete industrial skills training or expansive intellectual creativity (Katz, 1968; Kantor & Tyack, 1982; Grubb & Lazerson, 1982). (7)

Compulsory schooling reform brought with it the conviction that a new preparatory period was necessary for success in the modern industrialized world. The mixed success of public schools in the areas of industrial-related skills training and literacy, and the tendency of schools to reproduce existing social class structures rather than provide truly equal opportunities to students from diverse backgrounds, gives evidence that the preparatory period being required is one having social and disciplinary, rather than strictly technological implications.

With the adoption of child labour and compulsory schooling reforms, "the state compelled the extension of childhood—enjoining longer supervision, more protracted education, and the postponed assumption of adult economic roles" (Marks, 1975: p. 88). This extension of childhood, and the "invention of adolescence," brought with it a revised economic reality. Harry Braverman comments:

We cannot neglect the direct economic impact of the enlarged school system. Not only does the postponement of the school-leaving age limit the growth of recognized unemployment, but it also furnishes employment for a considerable mass of teachers, administrators, construction and service workers, etc. Moreover, education has become an immensely profitable area of capital accumulation for the construction industry, for suppliers of all sorts, and for a host of subsidiary enterprises. For all these reasons—which have nothing to do with either education or occupa-
tional training—it is difficult to imagine United States society without its immense "educational" structure, and in fact, as has been seen in recent years, the closing of even a single segment of the schools for a period of weeks is enough to create a social crisis in the city in which it happens.

The schools, as caretakers of children and young people, are indispensible for family functioning, community stability, and social order in general .... In a word, there is no longer any place for the young in this society other than school. Serving to fill a vacuum, schools have themselves become that vacuum, increasingly emptied of content and reduced to little more than their own form.

(Braverman, 1974: pp. 439-440)

Sociologist Ralph Larkin, in his critical ethnography of high school life titled Suburban Youth in Cultural Crisis (1979: pp. 58-59) points out that:

School, for the students ... has become merely a form of coerced consumption. Yet as ... the economy ... continues to be unable to use the total labor force, the necessity to keep students in school longer and longer compels them into choosing between dropping out prematurely and becoming members of the marginally employed reserve labor army or pursuing further studies in a career that they may never be able to practice.

Despite progress in truly protective legislation, the notion of the child as the economic property of the parent (and, by more recent extension, of the state) is not an idea that has disappeared. Nowhere is this economic connection more apparent than in contemporary approaches to child labour and compulsory schooling. Reforms in these two areas were adopted to solve 19th century problems--problems which were clearly of a one-time emergency nature. Although the 19th century crisis conditions have by now converted to new problems and conditions, we continue to utilize social policy standards designed during that earlier, uniquely different era. The slow, plodding, "incremental" nature of policy change means that no systematic, comprehensive, or regularly scheduled evaluations of child labour and
compulsory schooling policies have taken place.

Runaway youth who are bored or frustrated by school, yet who find job possibilities closed to them, are thus being treated with standards which are a century old and which have not been reevaluated in light of present conditions and current attitudes. Attitudes and customs continue to be molded by Progressive-era standards so that the question of structural reform seldom emerges.

The stability and effectiveness of the existing labour structure is taken for granted as a given, and exclusion of young workers from the labour force is assumed to be inevitable without further examination of the issue. Likewise, the efficacy of a school system which minimizes individualized learning and diversity of curricula in favor of a standardized, uniform approach to education is seldom questioned. Thus, structural verities such as the unemployability of minors and the fact of compulsory school which, from a different point of view, might be seen as limitations, are generally viewed—in the public mind and in policy formulations—as non-negotiable facts of civic life. It is the contention of this study that a diversity of employment options and schooling options could be opened up within the context of the current economic system. A variety of proposals affecting youth school and employment options, youth housing options, and input by youth and families into policy decisions will be made in the concluding chapter of the study.
NOTES

1. This statement is not meant to imply any obvious conspiracy to purposely disguise the economic basis of youth dependency with a benevolent social welfare rhetoric or with pacifying social programs. Clearly, both in the Progressive era and today, the reformers and the guardians of the economic status quo are different groups. What is described here is a contradiction between social structural conditions (the rise of benevolent policies toward minors and a new economic foundation for youth dependency policies). This could be seen as a social structural and policy contradiction, but not necessarily a conscious conspiracy of intent.

2. Ironically, the earliest child labour laws were statutes stipulating that children must work. In 1402, Henry IV drafted an English statute requiring children to engage in regular employment if not attending school. Elizabethan child labour laws and those brought to the American colonies by the Puritans and formally instituted in 1642 in Massachusetts and soon after in other colonies, compelled children to engage in productive toil since idleness was viewed as a sin, and because child labour was commercially profitable and an important resource to the family. Likewise, in 1791, Alexander Hamilton encouraged industry among young children, so that they would not be idle and a burden on the community. (Ensign, 1921; Abbott, 1938) A century later, the rules were being totally reversed and child labour was to be prohibited. Such has been the dependence of minors upon adult policymakers.

3. Vagrancy laws, like runaway laws, have been called into question in recent years by legal scholars and civil libertarians concerned with the non-criminal nature of the vagrancy act. Such preventive laws are thought to violate a defendant's right to due process, and tend to enforce standards of decorum and aesthetics rather than prohibitions against criminally-motivated harm. Other adult-oriented status offense laws which have been called into question in recent years in various jurisdictions include statutes controlling pornography, abortions, prostitution, homosexuality, other sexual acts between consenting adults, marijuana use and the production or sale of other drugs or alcoholic beverages, Sunday store openings, public drunkenness, and mental hospital involuntary commitment procedures.

4. "Journeyman" originally meant "day labourer" or craftsman working on a daily job rate basis (although it has now come to mean a workman or craftsman who has completed apprenticeship and works for full salary whether on a per-job basis or not). The Middle English meaning of "journey" was "a day's travel" which became extended to refer to "a day's work."

5. Stern, et al. (1975: p. 105) note that it is not at all obvious why this job training could not have been accomplished in the workplace itself, rather than at a separate school location. Other writers have suggested that the need for public, compulsory schools had more to do with socializa-
tion needs, e.g., the need to cultivate a cooperative, reliable workforce, than with the need to induce specific technological skills (Spring, 1972; Cohen & Lazerson, 1972; Foucault, 1979). Furthermore, some have questioned how direct the connection between school and work really has been, even in the case of vocational education (Grubb & Lazerson, 1982; Kantor & Tyack, 1982).

6. In addition to statutes regulating the age, work hours, and work conditions of minors in industry and agriculture, other general reforms of factory and workplace conditions directly or indirectly affect the employability of young workers and adult male workers. Limitations on work hours (e.g., the 40-hour week or 8-hour day) increase the total numbers of workers who can be employed in any given week, thus making room for more adult males in the workplace. Minimum wage laws serve to reduce the number of jobs available at the low-paid, unskilled level and may thus reduce the number of women and children employed.

7. Michel Foucault has proposed in his book *Discipline and Punish* (1979) that inculcating obedience values in the school was thought useful in preparing individuals for the subsequent discipline of the factory. The writings of the schoolmen of the Progressive era state such objectives quite explicitly.
Chapter 4  
THE JUVENILE COURT AND CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES

The modern-day exclusion of children and youth from the labour market was accomplished through the dual reforms of child labour laws and compulsory public schooling. However, these innovations by themselves were not enough to rid the streets of idle, transient, potentially troublesome juveniles. The institution of the juvenile court, a North American invention first attempted in Cook County (Chicago), Illinois in 1899, was an additional Progressive-era reform which was designed to serve similar purposes to those of the common schools: the teaching of correct behaviour through the positive influence of benevolent adult role models.

It is through the juvenile court statutes that runaway actions are made technically illegal. Running away from home is one of a number of "status offenses" whereby minors may be punished (arrested, confined, or redirected) even though they have not committed actual criminal acts. The related area of child protective services is also discussed later in the chapter, since both statutes have been used in controlling runaways.

Although runaway youngsters now account for a modest proportion of those juveniles brought before juvenile courts in Canada and the U.S., there are vitally important links between the problem of runaways and the earliest juvenile delinquency legislation. From the beginnings of the North American juvenile court system which emerged from Progressive reforms around the turn of the century, the legislation has been as much concerned with non-criminal (status offense) behaviour as with criminal behaviour; as much with neglected and dependent children as with criminal children; as much with the potentially criminal as with the actually criminal (Leon, 1978; Houston, 1972).
The juvenile court movement was from the time of its inception a preventive movement. The Progressive reformers who advocated the new juvenile delinquency procedures in the late 19th and early 20th centuries were attempting to decriminalize youthful offenses and move wayward youths from the purview of the adult criminal courts and prisons to the more benevolent, parent-like supervision of special juvenile court judges, "friendly visitor" probation officers, and humanely administered "reform schools." Young offenders would be dealt with, not in a punitive or retributive way, but as children who needed guidance and who were not yet fully responsible for their actions. In this regard, juvenile court philosophies followed the legal theories described in Chapter 2, which defined children and youth as less than full legal persons and as citizens needing special protections.

Progressive era juvenile justice reforms represented a two-pronged attack on the youth aspects of family and urban disorganization. On the one hand, reformers wished to bring youths who had committed criminal acts under a more benevolent state umbrella and remove them from adult court jurisdiction. On the other hand, they wished to deter pre-delinquent children and youths—those whose actions were troublesome but not yet clearly in violation of adult criminal statutes—from becoming criminals.

Thus, while criminally inclined youngsters were being moved from inmate to client status, dependent and neglected children and youths were brought under the purview of the delinquency definition for the first time. The result was a widening of the delinquency net. The rationale used by the reformers of the time was that adult criminals and misfits were made, not born, through exposure to deficient family and community influences. If they could receive proper guidance early enough, the result would be the saving of a child from a life of lawlessness and degradation.
This wide-net preventative approach meant that all of the following types of children and youths could be brought before a juvenile court judge:

A) **Youthful Criminal Offenders**: those minors found guilty of breaking existing federal, provincial, state, or municipal laws or statutes, i.e. criminal laws also applying to adult lawbreakers.

B) **Status Offenders**: e.g., those found begging, receiving alms or loitering; sleeping at night in the open air, wandering about late at night and/or not having any home or proper guardianship; and those found associating or dwelling with thieves, prostitutes, drunkards or vagrants.

C) **Neglected Children and Youths**: e.g., those left neglected by drunken or immoral parents, or by a parent serving time in prison, to grow up in conditions leading to an idle or dissolute life.

D) **Dependent Children and Youths**: e.g., illegitimate infants in foundling homes who had never had families; youngsters who, upon death or desertion by parents, had not been absorbed into extended family households; and children and youths housed in orphanages, children's shelters and other institutions, or working in private homes while supervised from such institutions.

*(NOTE: Neglected and dependent minors were not, however, termed "delinquents" and have always been treated with a different legal status, eventually coming under the aegis of the social welfare child protection agencies.)*

Thus, the potential population embraced by the new juvenile court regulations involved a wide swath ranging from the youthful murderer to the abandoned baby in a foundling home. Furthermore, the slate of "delinquent" offenses which was written to underpin the juvenile court jurisdiction covered a vast list of behaviours ranging from contravention of federal and provincial statutes to conduct in violation of conventional moral standards.

The wide range of ages being monitored, and the wide range of offenses and other behaviours receiving scrutiny in juvenile courts, in combination with what turned out to be the "almost unlimited power" conferred by the various U.S. state juvenile justice codes and by the Juvenile Delinquents Act of Canada upon juvenile court judges (MacDonald, 1980: p. 104) meant that the day-to-day supervision and future destinies of vast numbers of North American youngsters were potentially
subject in some way to the decisions of juvenile court officials. Furthermore, normal criminal due process considerations were suspended in the new children's courts to enhance the informal, family-like atmosphere which was desired. The best interests of the minors appearing before the courts were to be protected not by attorneys or by rules of evidence, but by the good will and professional competence of the juvenile court workers.
Runaways, vagrants and homeless youths formed a primary target for the Progressive era social service reforms. If these "lost youths" could be given new direction and guidance, the reformers believed society in general would profit: acute urban social problems would be alleviated and lives would be redirected profitably. By grouping neglected, dependent, and delinquent children and youths together under the same juvenile court umbrella, the reformers were expressing an explicit theory of human behaviour.

This theory proposed that adult crime could be traced to early parental neglect and disrupted family life, and that neglected and dependent children would inevitably go on to lives of crime and immorality. The family was seen as the key to understanding crime and immoral or antisocial behaviour, and runaways—being in the midst of family disruptions, and being visible embarrassments on urban streets—were prime candidates for the juvenile court's help. Thus running away from home and/or living on the streets was made one of the key provisions in the early juvenile court statutes.

Various "trouble sign" behaviours typically engaged in by dependent, neglected or delinquent children and youths were grouped together to comprise an overall, "omnibus" concept of delinquency. Minors found engaged in such pursuits were then capable of being "found in a state of delinquency"--a legal condition, which, at the turn of the century, was seen by the reformers and by the general public as far preferable to being found guilty of a criminal offense. The difference was that under the delinquency nomenclature, essential rehabilitative services would be available to youths otherwise condemned to the "schools of crime" available in adult prisons.
or to a life of dissolute pursuits on the street.

The Victorian-era social reformers were optimistic that their approach could wipe out crime, poverty, and immorality. The following prediction of the reformers' ideal moral order was printed in the Toronto Globe in 1863:

If the class of neglected children who, left to the natural course of things, will grow up lawless and depraved, and ripe for the commission of every crime, could only be taken care of and placed under influences favourable to their becoming reputable and useful members of society, it stands to reason that, the source from which our criminal population is constantly recruited being dried up, there would be vastly fewer criminals, and a great diminution of crime and of the trouble, anxiety, and expense, of which it is the fruitful cause.

(Quoted in Houston, 1972: p. 264)

The root cause of the pre-criminal vagrancy which worried the reformers was lack of healthful home influences. They sought to mobilize "kindly influences" as supplement and substitute for what was lacking in these young persons' families. These kindly influences would be introduced by stable, professionally qualified, middle class adults who would staff the reform schools and the new probation services to act as preferable quasi-parental role models. The surrogate parenting was to be "calculated to awaken the dormant affections natural to youth" (Houston, 1972: p. 266). Character prior to adulthood was viewed as malleable and pliable. The reformers were profoundly optimistic about the possibility of saving children by altering their environments.
Middle Class American Values for Working Class Immigrant Families

In writing of the populist and Progressive reformers who reoriented social services in North America between 1880 and 1920, social historian David Rothman (1978: p. 77) applauds the idealists of that time as "the first American reformers to perceive and to be outraged by the miseries that were endemic to the modern industrial system. The wretchedness of the almshouses—let alone the cruelty of separating the widow from her children, and the injuries inflicted by locking ten-year-olds in a stinking jail—were terribly real."

But Rothman, along with many other modern critics of the Progressive era who are able to benefit from several decades of hindsight, faults the Progressives for the way in which they went about correcting these problems. He pinpoints the trouble as residing in the reformers' paternalistic notions of benevolence which underlay the new social policy of "state as parent":

The design of each of the Progressives' programs assumed a non-adversarial relationship between the state and the client. Since the state, whether in the guise of the juvenile court judge or probation officer or welfare administrator, was to help and not punish the poor or the criminal, it was unnecessary—in fact it was counterproductive—to limit or to circumscribe officials' discretionary powers. Indeed, since no conflicts of interest divided the welfare of society from that of the dependent or deviant, Progressives were still more determined to endow the state with all necessary authority to fulfill its goals. The great discovery of the juvenile court, noted one reformer, was that "individual welfare coincided with the well-being of the state ..." The state could do good without sacrificing anyone's interests, without having to make trade-offs.

In each instance, therefore, enabling legislation and agency practice enhanced the prerogatives of state officials and reduced—and almost eliminated—legal protections and rights for those coming under their authority.

(Rothman, 1978: pp. 77-78)
As Rothman points out, this ignoring of the rights of disadvantaged clients did not stem merely from oversight or malice. Conditions in the overcrowded slums and inhumane sweatshops had reached such crisis proportions that the needs of the destitute immigrants were real and palpable while the rights of the poor were necessarily abstract and luxurious: e.g., "the right of the poor to sleep under the bridge or the right of the laborer to fix his own contract with an all-powerful corporation" (Ibid.: p. 69).

But to act forthrightly against social injustice does not settle all moral problems; in fact, new problems of a different variety are generated by the rehabilitative mechanisms which are introduced. Rothman, quoting Lionel Trilling, capsulizes the difficulty as follows: "Some paradox in our nature leads us, once we have made our fellow citizens the objects of our enlightened interest, to go on to make them the objects of our pity, then our wisdom, ultimately of our coercion" (Ibid.: p. 72).

Writing of English Canada at the turn of the century, Neil Sutherland (1976: p. 18) notes the tendency of social reformers to impose their own subcultural values on lower class immigrant clients: "So important did they look upon a 'right' family environment that the new Children's Aid societies felt they were justified in coercing all parents to conform to their notions." Such a view was not without self-interest, however:

Middle-class reformers also feared that badly brought up or poorly cared for children would menace the well-being of their more carefully reared offspring. In their efforts to help neglected, dependent, and delinquent youngsters, they displayed their belief that the children of the poor and of the working classes were in particular need of attention. Looked at "from a selfish point of view," explained Toronto dental reformer J.G. Adams, people could not "afford to neglect the children of the poor" and still let their own youngsters "sit in the same room, side by side, with
these neglected children and inhale the vile gases, constantly emanating from them, caused by their rotten teeth" or "drink out of the same cup these children have fouled with the poisonous pus" which exuded "from the gums around their abscessed teeth and roots."

(Sutherland, 1976: p. 19)

Revisionist historians have proposed that the saving of the child of the middle class family was done for the child's own sake, while the saving of the child of lower class families was done for the sake of society (Ibid.: p. 249, n. 36). As Anthony Platt (1969: p. 177) has noted: "The 'invention' of delinquency consolidated the inferior social status and dependency of lower-class youth."

These far-reaching new policies were rationalized as necessary to avoid urban chaos and deprivation on a massive scale. The positive results of the Progressive era reforms must, however, be considered in conjunction with the accompanying negative side effects. Platt (1969: Appendix) contends that juvenile justice reforms were far from liberating or humanitarian. The new policies brought new definitions, new dependencies and new punishments in their wake, and perpetuated the increasingly repressive approach toward youth which had been developing over the 19th century.

In fact, Platt has demonstrated that the emergence of the juvenile court did not, as has been commonly believed, represent a shift from a doctrine of retribution to a doctrine of rehabilitation. Children and youth had for decades before the reforms been treated more informally and with less punitiveness when before adult courts, according to Platt. Moreover, from the beginning of the 19th century, the lines between delinquent and dependent/neglected children had been intentionally blurred by court personnel to facilitate committal of non-criminal youths to reformatories. A number of juvenile
court commentators maintain that, rather than representing a dramatic shift to more benevolent treatment of youth, the reforms actually imposed additional jurisdictional categories leading to early identification and apprehension of even greater numbers of minors (Sutherland, 1976: pp. 141-42; Schlossman, 1977: pp. 210-11; Platt, 1969: pp. 183-202). As Platt has noted:

The rate of imprisonment has increased [since the inauguration of the juvenile courts], with minorities and girls its major victims. Disproportionate numbers of imprisoned youth come from working class backgrounds, and girls have a greater probability than boys of being in custody before or after trial, even though the overwhelming majority have not committed serious offenses.  

(Platt, 1977b: p. 80)
The Question of Status Offenses

The "omnibus" definition of delinquency used by the Progressive reformers to group delinquent, dependent and neglected minors under the same protective juvenile court umbrella was a definition of enormous scope. Canada's Juvenile Delinquents Act, the juvenile justice statute in use between 1908 and 1984, utilized the following wording:

2 (1) ... "Juvenile delinquent" means any child who violates any provision of the Criminal Code or of any federal or provincial statute, or of any by-law or ordinance of any municipality, or who is guilty of sexual immorality or any similar form of vice, or who is liable by reason of any other act to be committed to an industrial school or juvenile reformatory under any federal or provincial statute.

Such a definition was anything but precise. Reference to "any ... statute" and "any by-law or ordinance" meant that a young person could conceivably become a delinquent through violating any of a number of rather minor laws: curfew, missing school, running a red light, or driving a motorcycle on the pavement without being licensed, for example. Mention of "sexual immorality or any similar form of vice" established the court's jurisdiction over private behaviour and personal values in addition to its concern for lawbreaking activities.

Inclusion of the applicability of provincial statutes and other federal laws allowed a theoretically infinite number of offenses to be appended to juvenile court jurisdiction without necessity of amending the Juvenile Delinquents Act itself in any way. Reform school commitment was possible through provisions which could be appended to any other federal or provincial law besides the JDA. The possibilities for one's inclusion under such a sweeping definition were virtually endless. Furthermore, a minor's chances of challenging his or her receipt of the delinquency label are slim in a
courtroom environment where normal rules of evidence and procedure are sus-
pended.

Under juvenile justice legislation in Canada and the U.S., (1) many
behaviours which are not unlawful when practiced by adults are cited as
unlawful when practiced by minors. These behaviours have come to be known
as "status offenses"—since they are offenses only for those holding a certain
status, such as the status of being absent from home without permission,
the status of being overly promiscuous, or the status of being truant from
school. (2)

One of the earliest such provisions for regulating noncriminal mis-
behaviour in the young was the 1672 statute for the Massachusetts Colony
which read as follows:

If any Childe or Children above sixteene years old and of suffi-
cient understanding, shall Curse or smite their natural father
or mother, hee or they shall bee put to death; unless it can bee
sufficiently testified that the parents have beene very unchris-
tianly negligent in the education of such children, or so provoke
them by extreme, and cruel correction that they have beeene forced
thereunto to preserve themselves from death, maiming.

If any man have a stubborn or rebellious sonne of sufficient
yeares and understanding, viz. Sixteen yeares of age, which will
not obey the voice of his father or the voice of his mother, and
that when they have chastened he will not harken unto them; then
may his father and mother, being his natural parents, lay hold
on him and bring him to the Magistrates assembled in Courte and
testifie unto them, that theire sonne is stubborn and rebellious
and will not obey their voice and Chastisement, but lives in sundry
notorious Crimes, such a sonne shall be put to death.

As far as can be determined, no children in Puritan Massachusetts
suffered the ultimate Old Testament penalty of death for incorrigibility.
The existence of such statutes demonstrates the importance of parental
authority in law and reflects "the 17th century Protestant view that man
is essentially wicked and needs stern molding to social standards in order
to produce a godly society" (Wadlington, et al., 1983: p. 602).

Status offenses in the U.S. have generally included running away from home; habitual truancy from school; incorrigibility; unmanageability or being "beyond control" of the parent(s); unruly behaviour or disorderly conduct; and sexual promiscuity or immoral conduct. The existence of status offenses reflects the confusion between treatment and punishment which was (and is still) prevalent in juvenile justice policies (Allen, 1964). As long as the court was seen as a place of kindly guidance and direction rather than as a locus of criminal punishment, such provisions "made sense"—at least in their context.
Challenges to Status Offense Provisions

With growing concern for the lack of due process protections afforded youths and families in juvenile courts, status offense provisions have come under increasing scrutiny, criticism, and revision. Sociologist Edwin Lemert's comments to a U.S. Presidential commission in 1967 were typical:

Truancy, runaways, and incorrigibility already have been shown to be diffuse categories whose conversion into statutory foundation for jurisdiction by the juvenile court is made superficially plausible by unexamined assumptions that they are precursors to delinquency .... The weakness of such statutes ... is patent .... They lack common meaning from one jurisdiction to another, or between different judge's rulings in the same jurisdiction, they are not derived from any fixed criteria, and they assign blame or responsibility to children in many instances where blame or responsibility cannot be determined or where closer investigation would reveal their actions to have been reasonable normal responses to highly provocative or intolerable situations.

If the image of the juvenile court is to be changed from that of a multifarious problem-solving agency, and its function circumscribed to be more consistent with available means, then its statutory jurisdiction cannot be allowed to rest upon subjective definitions. Furthermore, if it is to avoid the risk of making delinquents by a labeling process, statutes whose vagueness in some localities allow almost any child, given compromising circumstances, to be caught up in the jurisdictional net of the court, must be altered.

(Lemert, 1967: p. 153)

Status offense procedures have been challenged in U.S. courts on both statutory and due process grounds. Wadlington, et al. (1983) cite cases which fault status offenses for statutory vagueness, neglect of equal protection considerations, sex based discrimination, neglect of defendant's right to counsel, and disregard of the "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. These challenges and concerns in the United States have led to a substantial reform movement during the 1970s, highlighted by the passage in 1974 of the federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act. Recent U.S. reforms
have attempted to achieve deinstitutionalization and decriminalization of status offenses; separation of status offenders from criminal delinquent offenders both in court and in detention, correctional, or housing facilities; and diversion of status offenders from formal juvenile court jurisdiction.

Herbert Beaser's survey of juvenile court statutes in the various states revealed that by 1975, 25 states in the U.S. had revised their definitions of delinquency and separated status offenders from young criminal offenders (Beaser, 1975: Table 2B). Status offenders, now variously referred to as "persons in need of supervision" (PINS), "children in need of supervision" (CINS or CHINS), "youths in need of supervision" (YINS), or "minors in need of supervision" (MINS), depending on the state, are afforded less punitive treatment and more rehabilitative services. By 1981, 20 states had enacted legislation prohibiting PINS, CINS, CHINS, YINS, JINS or MINS from being placed in training schools, jails, or other detention facilities (Wadlington, et al., 1983: p. 631).

The new U.S. provisions for PINS (etc.) retain status offenses within the purview of the juvenile court rather than eliminating them altogether. Various critics have claimed that this separation is not enough to remove the legal objections to overly vague and potentially arbitrary juvenile justice definitions (Katz & Teitelbaum, 1977; Quinn & Hutchinson, 1980).

Even into the early 1980s a "remarkable number of children were still being incarcerated for noncriminal conduct" (Wadlington, et al., 1983: p. 605). A recent casebook in children's law notes that:

The actual impact of semantic statutory distinctions was not mirrored by any real difference in treatment. As late as 1974 one major study found that of more than sixty-five thousand incarcerated juveniles, approximately half were status offenders. If anything, the rate of detention appears higher among status offenders (perhaps because of parental refusal to take the child back
into the home) than among delinquents. Although status offenses accounted for approximately one quarter of all juvenile court adjudications in the late 1960s and early 1970s, about half of all incarcerations stemmed from such cases. Further, the status offense jurisdiction of the juvenile court is applied far more frequently to females than to males. More than half of the minor girls who appear before juvenile courts do so in response to status offense petitions while only about twenty percent of boys coming to juvenile courts are charged with noncriminal misbehavior.

(Ibid.)

The more frequent sentencing of young women than young men on status offenses is a clear indication of sex role stereotyping on the part of U.S. and Canadian juvenile courts. Despite the absence of clinical or empirical evidence that young women as a group are more in need of supervision or treatment at a given age than are young men, female status offenders have been subjected to more time in juvenile or adult locked facilities than male status offenders, have been more likely to receive a delinquency or PINS label, less likely to receive probation, a suspended sentence, or discharge of probation, and more frequently sentenced to reform schools. Ironically enough, all of this is in the guise of protectiveness and rehabilitation.

Research demonstrates that in the case both of adult and juvenile criminal sentencing, females tend to be underrepresented perhaps because courts tend not to believe that females in our culture would really be instrumentally involved in violent, aggressive, or harmful actions which victimize others as opposed to serving as auxiliaries to crimes or being in the area innocently. On the other hand, female juvenile status offenders are overrepresented in the juvenile court and PINS systems, evidently due to the courts' desire to protect young women from the dangers of sexual promiscuity and lack of proper supervision (see, e.g. Milton, 1978; Chesney-
The chivalrous double standard of juvenile courts is analyzed by two Canadian legal writers as follows:

The police and other social agencies do not expect girls to be violent, but they are expected to be sexually promiscuous and there is more concern about the sexual promiscuity of girls. As a result, if a girl commits an assault, this is more likely to be viewed as abnormal behaviour to be dealt with by a psychiatrist or a counsellor, whereas for a boy this is viewed as typical "criminal" behaviour. On the other hand, sexual promiscuity by young females is viewed as a serious social problem, requiring official intervention to protect the child, whereas this type of behaviour by males is viewed as normal, and indeed perhaps even a healthy part of growing up.

(Bala & Clarke, 1981: pp. 172-3)

Status offenses tend to "fall between the cracks": they sit somewhere between delinquent behavior and parental neglect. Lack of clarity about who is most blameworthy, the parent or the child, adds to the ambiguous status of the category. Since runaways are de facto defendants by the time a case reaches juvenile court, the classification presumes that the minor ran away without sufficient cause. Recent concerns about youngsters termed "kickouts," "push-outs," or "throwaways" (Brennan, et al., 1978; Stierlin, 1974) stress the dilemma of youths who are forced out of their homes by rejecting or neglectful parents. One writer estimates that anywhere from 30% to 60% of the total number of youths categorized as runaways may be youths who were told to leave home (Blua, 1979). It would be difficult to lay blame consistently on either parents or youths in such households since the home-leaving incident has frequently been preceded by months or years of family strife. Certainly, many parents who kick their children out feel fully justified in doing so due to the consistent insubordination they have tolerated.

The juvenile court sentencing bias against status offenders when
compared to juvenile criminal offenders has derived from the following factors: Incorrigibility and other status offenses are primarily offenses for which parents are the referring source. The parents at this point in time have given up on the youth and have asked the court to assist in parental discipline. Thus, the parental home is less likely to be available as a resource to the youth. Institutional placement thus frequently serves as a (highly expensive) substitute living arrangement for youths who cannot go home.

Furthermore, status offenders tend to remain in institutions for longer periods than do juvenile criminal offenders. Agency informants in this study believe that the criminal offenders do a better job of "conning" the staff and adapt more cooperatively to the institutional setting in order to ensure an earlier release. Status offenders—already entrenched in uncooperative relations with adult authority figures—continue their incorrigible behaviour within the institution, giving the staff a harder time and thus netting longer stays there for disciplinary reasons under the customary indeterminate sentencing procedures.

As juvenile court challenges have accumulated—and as the ineffectiveness of court appearances and secure correctional settings for the rehabilitation of unmanageable behaviour has become more and more apparent—the responsibility for status offenders has gradually been shifted over to social welfare authorities, both in Canada and in the United States, through the diversion and referral processes. Yet critics have pointed out that this has not necessarily meant more enlightened or more successful treatment or living space options (Lemert, 1981; Spergel, et al, 1981; Austin & Krisberg, 1981; Scull, 1976).

In a 1976 U.S. survey of juvenile justice statutes, Aidan Gough and
associates found that no state had eliminated status offenses from its jurisdiction despite consistent pressure to reexamine the relevance of their inclusion (Teitelbaum & Gough, 1977: Appendix, pp. 297-309). A study published in 1980 (SAC, 1980) showed that a number of states had removed status offenders from regular juvenile court jurisdiction, but had either moved them to the dependent/neglected category or established new categories for them (e.g. "Child at Risk" in Maine). Washington State abolished status offense jurisdiction altogether in 1978, then under pressure from parent groups re-established limited jurisdiction in juvenile court over runaways in 1979.

In Canada, the Juvenile Delinquents Act (which had not been amended since 1925) has now been replaced by the Young Offenders Act of 1984. This new revision of the juvenile justice statutes eliminates status offenses from its purview altogether and also institutes other statutory and due process reforms. However, elimination of status offenses from Canadian federal law does not curtail the possible initiation or retention of such provisions in specific provincial codes, such as training schools acts, schools acts, or child protection acts (Weiler, 1978: p. 75). The newly drafted British Columbia Family and Child Service Act which was introduced into the province in 1980, eliminated an "unmanageability" provision which had led to referral of status offenders from social services jurisdiction into juvenile court, but retains running away as one of the acts justifying coercive apprehension under child protection procedures.

Despite the controversy and research which has cast doubt on the efficacy and fairness of the status offense provisions, little real progress has been made in moving away from the coercive, containment perspective which has characterized the public policy reaction to juvenile "nuisance crimes" since
the Progressive era. The trend in Canada has been to move status offenders from the juvenile justice system to the child welfare system. In the U.S., PINS-type statutes have shifted status offenders to a less punitive side of the juvenile court jurisdiction where they are not as likely to be jailed alongside juvenile criminal offenders, but where they are still very much a part of the juvenile justice system. Throughout North America it is still typical for runaways to be transported against their will and confined in secure facilities without true family intervention or youth advocacy representation being a part of the service. Thus, little has changed since the Progressive era despite the reform attempts. Most significantly, the confusion and ambivalence between control and advocacy perspectives remains very much with us.

At its midyear meeting in 1980, the American Bar Association's House of Delegates backed off from recommending the removal of runaways and other status offenders from juvenile court jurisdictions (Slonim, 1980). During consideration of the most controversial of 23 volumes of proposed juvenile justice reforms—the product of nearly a decade's work by the 35-member Joint Commission on Juvenile Justice Standards of the A.B.A. and New York University's Institute of Judicial Administration (IJA/ABA, 1977)—the A.B.A. governing body voted 145 to 142 to defer action on Volume 21 entitled "Non-Criminal Misbehavior" after hearing warnings that "the public wouldn't accept the proposal" and that "social agencies aren't ready to fill the void" (Slonim, 1980).

Irving Kaufman, chief judge of the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals and chair of the Joint Commission, commented that "Our traditional system of juvenile justice is a failure" and argued in vain for the A.B.A.'s acceptance of Volume 21's recommendations that "cases involving children who are
unruly but who haven't committed a crime, should be treated outside the juvenile court system." The angry federal jurist declared that "Judges shouldn't be nursemaids for children who cross the street." Meanwhile, the Volume 21 reforms remain in limbo. (5)
Due Process Reforms

Over the past 15 years, civil libertarians, child advocates and law reform groups have called attention to the injustice of the juvenile court structure. To a large degree, this massive attack on the principles of juvenile justice has emerged due to the court's failure to fulfill its promises of individualized rehabilitation, personal guidance, and tailor-made case plans. However, the crucial critique of the juvenile court has come through higher court challenges beginning with the U.S. Supreme Court decision *In Re Gault* (1967) (378 U.S. 1) which found juvenile court procedure woefully lacking in basic due process provisions (see Johnson, 1973; Neigher, 1967).

Fifteen-year old Gerald Gault had been sent to the state industrial school by an Arizona juvenile court judge for a maximum of six years (i.e., up to the age of majority) for allegedly making obscene telephone calls. If prosecuted under adult law and found guilty of such an offense, the Gault boy would have been subject to a fine of $5 to $50, or imprisonment for not more than two months. Gault served six months in the training school before being released on probation. Under Arizona law, it was not possible to appeal a decision of a juvenile court. Thus, his parents filed a writ of habeas corpus with the Arizona Supreme Court and appealed through that route.

Three years after the original hearing, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in the Gaults' favour. The appeal had been based on facts indicating that Gerald had not been advised of his rights, had not been given proper notice of the charges against him, had not been given the right to legal counsel, had not been given the right against self-incrimination, had not been allowed
to face or cross-examine the only witness against him, had not received transcripts of the proceedings, and was denied the right of appellate review. (The court did not rule on the latter two points.)

The U.S. high court "held that since such terms as "juvenile hearing" and "State Industrial Home" were essentially euphemisms for "trial" and "prison," the juvenile was entitled to the same protective rights as an adult" (Johnson, 1973). Justice Abe Fortas, speaking for the 8-1 majority, asserted that the U.S. Bill of Rights and the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution were never meant to apply exclusively to adults. He denied that introduction of due process rights into the juvenile court would impair its effectiveness, noting that the current recidivism rates as high as 60% for juvenile offenders were hardly an indication of effectiveness. Fortas furthermore took issue with the notion that confession is good for the soul, pointing out that juveniles locked up as a result of their cooperation with the court had reason to feel double-crossed. Finally, he maintained that the confidentiality of juvenile court records was more myth than reality since such records were regularly made available to the FBI, the military, other government agencies and even to employers.

The Gault decision represented a ground-breaking shift in legal theory. U.S. and Canadian Court decisions in the 19th and early 20th centuries had consistently upheld the *parens patriae* principle that courts could take liberties with the rights of minors. As recently as 1955, the U.S. Supreme Court (*In Re Holmes* (1955) 109A, 2d 523, cert. denied 348 U.S. 973) had held that "since juvenile courts are not criminal courts, the constitutional rights granted to persons accused of crime are not applicable to the children brought before them." The Court had then claimed that the State was not seeking to punish Holmes, the defendant (who had been arrested for riding
in a stolen car being operated by another boy), but to salvage him and safeguard his adolescence.

In Re Gault served as a watershed for juvenile justice reforms which have gradually been implemented during the late 1960s, 70s and 80s. A U.S. Supreme Court case heard the year prior to the Gault decision, Kent v. United States (1966) (383 U.S. 541), had also affirmed the juvenile's rights to certain due process considerations: e.g., the right to a hearing on a waiver to adult jurisdiction decisions, the right to counsel, the right to access to records and reports, and the right to a written decision on such a waiver. Then in 1970, the same court ruled in In Re Winship (1970) (397 U.S. 358) that the requirement of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" ought to extend to juvenile court proceedings alleging delinquency (Sprowls, 1980: pp. 14-15). (Note: The Winship case findings did not apply to status offenders.)

In 1971, the California Supreme Court extended the U.S. Supreme Court's Miranda v. Arizona ruling on police questioning and advising of rights to encompass the questioning of juveniles. The California court ruled that police questioning of a juvenile must cease when the minor asks to see his or her parent (Haskell & Yablonsky, 1974: pp. 51-52). Yet the response to Gault and the other court decisions affecting juvenile court practice has entailed rhetoric and philosophy without being accompanied by much in the way of concrete due process changes. James Sprowls, in a recent study of compliance by juvenile courts in the U.S. with Gault, Kent, and Winship found that "these court decisions had little effect on the day-to-day operation of the juvenile courts" (Sprowls, 1980: p. 2).

The debate over due process in the juvenile court raises the issue of the ethical justification of youth dependency generally. One major problem has been the lack of input by juveniles and families into the
policymaking process and the inability of youths to protect themselves from misguided adult intentions. Jeffrey Leon comments:

A basic implication of the historical development of delinquency legislation for the prospects of reform is that the dependent status of children has rendered them vulnerable to a variety of measures imposed by interested parties for protective purposes, yet because at some point dependency translates into domination, children also may require protection from their "would be protectors." It is the provision of this latter type of protection that remains problematic.

(Leon, 1978: p. 51)
In line with the North American trend toward diverting runaway youth and other status offenders out of the juvenile justice system and into the social services sector, British Columbia juvenile probation officers in 1978 were told to discontinue bringing "unmanageability" cases (the term then in use for all status offense referrals) to juvenile court. This in-office edict came down as a result of a belief by correctional officials that such matters should be dealt with in the voluntary social service sector or as child protection matters and not be matters for judicial and correctional involvement.

Yet despite the virtual elimination of incorrigibility (and thus runaway) referrals to juvenile court in 1978 in B.C., many runaways and other status offenders continue to be processed through the correctional system via charges of breach of probation, or via criminal charges such as robbery or shoplifting, often receiving secure institution time as a result, thus solving the problem of runaways who are unwilling to stay put and remain under adult supervision.

However, runaways in British Columbia and most other Canadian provinces had for many years been under two jurisdictions: the juvenile court and the child protection laws. Since 1901, social workers, police, and probation officers in B.C. have had the authority to "apprehend, without warrant, and bring before a judge, as needing protection" minors who were found away from parental supervision and in dangerous company or surroundings. Between 1901 and 1980, the relevant legislation was the B.C. Protection of Children Act. In 1980, a new British Columbia Family and Child Service Act was put into effect. While the incorrigibility clause which had previously given
juvenile courts in the province the authority to prosecute juvenile status
offenders under a transfer provision was deleted from the new act, a clause
was drafted which continues to make runaway minors subject to coercive child
protection apprehensions. Under the 1980 act, "in need of protection" may
include, among other possibilities, that the child is "absent from his (sic)
home in circumstances that endanger his safety or well being." (Section 1).

Even prior to the probation departments' internal policy change on
unmanageability referrals in 1978, child protection legislation had been
utilized on a regular basis in the apprehension and coercive re-direction
of runaway children and youth for decades. Following the 1978 policy change,
the child protection statute was the instrument used exclusively for the
control of runaway behaviour. Thus, runaway youth in B.C. may be picked up by provincial or municipal authorities and held against their will without
benefit of attorney or the type of due process rights available in juvenile
or criminal courts.

Robert Burt (1972) points out that child protection apprehensions and
hearings lead to punitive sanctions, not unlike criminal hearings, and that
freedoms of both parent and child are curbed as a result of such hearings,
no less than in juvenile court proceedings. Burt thus proposes that due
process rights similar to those extended to juveniles as a result of the
Gault decision might be attempted in child welfare proceedings.

Until such rights are recognized, child protection apprehension—the
standard procedure for controlling runaway youth in most Canadian provinces—
will continue to be an even more coercive and controlling mechanism for
the containment of runaways than the juvenile court ever was (due to its
more frequent use). Youth in B.C. are certainly not free of the possibility
of coercive apprehension and redirection, despite the recent reforms of
the juvenile justice system.
Conclusion

Social reformers of the Victorian and Progressive periods had identified as targets requiring urgent public responsibility the least educated, least socialized immigrant working class populations, and in particular the children of these populations. This latter concern—tinged as it was with a newly developed concern for the fragile, flower-like character of youth—eventually transformed itself into a generic concern for adolescence itself as a crime-prone stage of life. In the words of Canadian reformatory warden Andrew Dickson: "The period bordering on adolescence shows most evidently a greater tendency to crime than any other. This obviously arises from the power and energy of the passions, and the as yet defective cultivation of the mind and training of the morals" (quoted in Houston, 1972: p. 267).

The reformers "devised institutional substitutes for a version of family life that they considered indispensable to moral and social development" and imposed these substitutes upon the young of the poor immigrant classes, maintaining these youths in a stage of official dependency at public expense (Houston, 1972: p. 274). Canadian historian Susan Houston notes that "by 1875 the reformatory was, in effect, the high school for the lowest classes" (Ibid.; see also Kett, 1977: p. 132, who uses precisely the same phrase for the U.S. situation).

"Homes" or "Ragged Schools"—a Canadian innovation of the 1860s—were set up to house non-orphaned, non-criminal children (the equivalent of today's "status offenders"). The publicists for these Boys' Homes and Girls' Homes "appropriated much of the sentimental rhetoric that, a decade earlier, had been used to promote the reformatory." The Homes "were to fill a crucial intermediate link 'between our Common Schools and our juvenile reformatories'"
according to the promoters of the concept (Houston, 1972: pp. 270-71).

The goal of the reformers was a continuum of child- and youth-caring institutions from publicly-financed Common schools, to Ragged Schools, to orphanages, to reformatories. These state-controlled agencies would meet the socialization and rehabilitation needs of children from all social groups, not merely the troublesome working class immigrant children. Institutionalization of children thus came to replace exploitation of children in the sweatshops and factories.

By 1900, the apparatus was in place for adolescent dependency to effectively spread to young people of all social classes through the imposition of school attendance, child labour, child welfare, and juvenile justice laws. Young people had become victims of new realities of the marketplace in a new industrial epoch which could no longer accommodate their labour. Then, as now, they had no political voice to protest their controlled confinement.

The juvenile court system in North America has generated a long string of reform efforts. Reform after reform (of the original reform movement) has attempted to bring more effective treatment and more just legal procedures to the children's courts. That these serial reform efforts have been so limited in their success attests to the structural rigidities which reformers in the 1980s confront—similar to those confronted by the reformers of the 1890s.

Through all of this reform effort, few voices have called for the dismantling of the juvenile court, despite ample evidence that it has been unable to fulfill the majority of its original goals. Fewer still have gone back to review the origins of the court in the labour market contradictions of the Progressive era and thought to suggest that the dilemma
of the juvenile justice system might have some relationship to the continuing unemployability of modern youth.

The original impetus for the creation of a young people's court was integrally tied to the economic misalignments of the late 19th century. Because of the civic turmoil of that era, masses of unemployed youths were creating a public nuisance with their loitering and potentially disruptive activities. The urgent justification for action on a juvenile court concept was the "immigrant problem" and the hope to redirect the energies of the young slub hangers-on who populated the city centres.

In responding to the crisis of youth unemployability, and to the subsequent turmoil of great numbers of idle youths populating the urban centres with little productive activity to occupy them, the founders of the juvenile court set out to treat the surface manifestations of the labour market problem. Perhaps they did all that was possible, given the constraints of the time.

However, the labour market contradictions which gave impetus to the new juvenile court structure remain unexamined, the juvenile justice system has been unable to reach its lofty rehabilitative goals, and serious abuses of the rights of minors to equal access to law have resulted. Clearly, the youth unemployability labour market ideology and the basic youth dependency age-grading approach have remained constant and, in fact, intransigent through all the various juvenile court and runaway services reform efforts.
1. The following is a compendium of a portion of the status offense items used in various U.S. state juvenile justice codes during this century (see Kassebaum, 1974 and Reed & Baali, 1972):

- Immoral or indecent conduct
- Knowingly associates with thieves, vicious or immoral persons
- Knowingly enters, visits house of ill repute
- Found on premises occupied or used for illegal purposes
- Patronizes or visits policy shop or gaming place
- Patronizes public poolroom, bucket shop, saloon or dram house
- Habitually wanders about railroad yards or tracks
- Jumps train or enters car or engine without authority
- Wanders streets at night, not on lawful business (curfew)
- Loiters, sleeps in alleys, vagrant
- Begging or receiving alms (or in street for purpose of)
- Habitually uses vile, obscene or vulgar language in public place
- Habitually truant from school
- Growing up in idleness or crime
- Engages in illegal occupation
- Makes indecent proposal
- Disorderly
- Given to sexual irregularities
- Uses intoxicating liquor
- Smokes cigarettes, or uses tobacco in any form around public places
- Addicted to drugs
- Operates motor vehicle dangerously while under the influence of liquor
- So deprives self as to injure self or others
- In occupation/situation dangerous/injurious to self or others
- Incorrigible; beyond control; refuses to obey parent/guardian
- Attempts to marry without consent, in violation of law
- Absents self from home without consent (runaway)
- Runs away from state or charity institution

2. The legal definition of "status" is: one's standing, state, or condition; social position; the legal relation of the individual to the rest of the community; a legal relationship with which law is concerned. The legal definition of "status crime" is: a crime, not in proscribed action or inaction, but in the accused's having a certain personal condition or being a person of a specified character (Black, 1979).

3. In regard to sentencing biases in the case of adult women defendants, see Simon, 1975 and Klein and Kress, 1976. Klein and Kress point out that to some degree this evident court bias stems from the fact that incarceration of larger numbers of women would create a burden on society due to the need for their labour for housekeeping and child-rearing duties. The generalizations in regard to female juvenile offenders derive in part from analyses of differential treatment at varying points in the juvenile court adjudicating process and in part from analysis of delinquency self-report studies. Recent Canadian studies (Landu, 1975; and Barnhorst, 1978) indicate that while young women probably do commit fewer delinquent acts, the true ratio of male to female delinquents acts--based on anonymous self report surveys--is probably
more like 2:1 than the official statistics ratio of 5:1. Furthermore, these self-report studies indicate that about half as many young women commit violent crimes and about half as many commit status offenses. Yet the officially reported male to female juvenile court status offense ratio in Canada is about 1:1. (In New York and Hawaii, about 60% of status offenders are reported to be females (Chesney-Lind, 1977: p. 121, n. 1).)

4. Status offenses have been totally eliminated from the purview of Canadian juvenile justice legislation with the enactment of the Young Offenders Act. Also eliminated from juvenile court jurisdiction were offenses against provincial and municipal legislation (e.g., motor vehicle offenses). John MacDonald suggests that by removing the wide range of offenses which came under the previous Juvenile Delinquents Act, the federal government was seeking to avoid future constitutional challenges to the new legislation. He further points out that:

With respect to the exclusion of status offenses from the purview of the young offenders legislation, the federal government was reflecting an emerging professional consensus that such behaviours were not properly within the scope of criminal law and were best dealt with within provincial child protection mandates. (MacDonald, 1984: p. 24)

The Young Offenders Act replaces the former "court as kindly parent" rehabilitation model with a "justice model" of juvenile justice. The newer model stresses due process and legal rights of young persons and reduces the amount of discretion given to juvenile court judges. There are also provisions for diverting large numbers of juveniles from prosecution in court.

Paul Havemann (1985) warns, however, that the new Canadian legislation has the potential for imposing new coercive strategies on the young and that the promise of due process and expanded legal rights (such as the right to counsel) might be difficult to achieve. He further notes that adjudication of status offenses and other non-criminal acts will continue to be carried out through child protection statutes and in other status offense legislation which can still be enacted at the provincial level. Havemann sees the new legislation as leading to a new polarization between young people and the government.

5. Reports of the Juvenile Rights Project of the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation have been in accord with the A.B.A. recommendations (see Guggenheim, 1978, and other Children's Rights Reports in the same series), while reports from the Community Service Society of New York City and Ad Hoc Task Force of the American Psychiatric Association Council on Children, Adolescents and Their Families urge the retention of the treatment/rehabilitation model in juvenile court practice (see Mayo & Israelowitz, 1980, and APA/CCAF, 1978). The Community Service Society does, however, agree that status offenses ought to be removed from juvenile justice codes, whereas the A.P.A. task force contends that a substantial number of young people passing through juvenile courts have been rehabilitated and that coercive intervention often "shores up" the status offender's family and provides it needed support. The A.P.A. report in fact urges that juvenile court
intervention be broadened to include more children at risk, e.g. the emotionally and the sexually abused, and children endangered by environmental conditions.

Note: Volume 21 was eventually published by IJA/ABA, but without the blanket status offense decriminalization provisions.

It should be pointed out that status offense referrals in U.S. juvenile courts have been declining in recent years, following introduction of the PINS, etc. diversion programs. The shrinkage of this group has been primarily responsible for the overall drop in juvenile court cases in the U.S.
Prior to 1967, the modus operandi for the official response to runaway behaviour involved control, containment, and coercive redirection. Any counseling and advocacy which was offered came from the initiative and discretion of individual social workers or police officers, but was not part of any jurisdiction-wide policy thrust.

The police have always been the front-line early warning system in dealing with runaway youth.\(^1\) Their motivations for being involved are twofold: They perform a) a "missing persons" function, and b) a crime and delinquency prevention function. Police officials reason that runaways, being without normal adult supervision and often without funds or income, might either find a need to steal or might fall prey to the criminal element and be victimized.

Since neither the missing persons nor the prevention functions involve actual law-breaking behaviour, police in many jurisdictions have become cynical about the worth of their involvement in runaway events, equating them with other family dispute situations which they tend to shun as unpredictable and not falling within the traditional law enforcement purview. Nevertheless, it is while within police custody that most of the "official runaways" (as opposed to "hidden runaways"—those not having official agency contacts) come to public attention and are funneled to probation or into the social services network (SAC, 1974a: p. 21). The evasive caution of runaway youths toward the police appears fully justified since the law enforcement system remains the primary referral source for runaway services—even following the counter-hegemonic reforms (Miller, et al., 1980: p. 90).

In addition to the police, numerous other individuals may become involved.
in runaway apprehensions and interventions: parents, friends, relatives, school teachers, counselors, nurses, social workers, probation officers, and runaway house or group home workers—to name a few. Since the counter-culture runaway service reforms, probation officers have been less visible in runaway youth services and runaway house staff and other youth advocates have been more in evidence.

In British Columbia, between 1969 and 1981—the time span of the present study—the following stages of intervention were typical: Police or other officials making contact with runaways, such as social workers or school personnel, generally try to talk the runaway into going back home or to some other safe and supervised place of residence (such as the home of a relative), especially if the contact is made late at night. Parents are normally contacted by phone. Runaways are transported home in official vehicles if parents are unable or unwilling to pick them up.

If return to the family home does not seem appropriate or feasible, placement in a group home or emergency shelter on an emergency basis will be arranged through seeking voluntary consent of parents and youth. Local juveniles are transported by police or child welfare workers. Out-of-province juveniles are held locally until transportation to the home province can be arranged and paid for by parents or by the child welfare agency in the home province.

If the minor is found to be in a particularly dangerous situation (i.e., involved in extensive prostitution or drug dealing and/or subject to retribution from street acquaintances), a formal apprehension under the B.C. child protection statute is likely to be undertaken. Police officers, probation officers, and child welfare workers are authorized under provincial child welfare legislation to apprehend minors who are unsupervised and
needing protection. Official apprehension gives the officials the authority to immediately place the minor in a substitute home environment even against his or her will, without parental permission being necessary—up to the time of the Family Court appearance. Child and parent(s) and social worker then appear before a provincial Family Court judge within seven days of the apprehension. Following a hearing on the matter, the judge decides whether the child will be returned to the care of the parents or guardians, placed with a friend or relative, or made either a temporary or permanent ward of the province (which generally will mean foster home, group home, or institutional placement).

Prior to 1978, chronic runaways were sometimes brought into juvenile court on unmanageability charges. These charges were generally laid by parents, with the more frustrated and determined parents being most likely to push for the unmanageability hearing. This hearing, when it was used, generally resulted in probation or institutional placement. (2)

Of course, runaways who are not discovered by police are likely not to enter into any of these procedures at all and in certain cases have no official contacts over the runaway incident whatever. It is very difficult to gauge the numbers of these "hidden runaways." The Bayside study uncovered a fair number of runaways who had missed official involvement in the social service/probation arenas, but it was unusual to have evaded all agency notice.

In the great majority of instances, runaway service and intervention begins and ends at the rudimentary level of informal street contact by police, often followed by transportation home or to an emergency shelter. When the youth is placed in an emergency shelter, the appropriate social worker is called upon to sort things out the next morning—i.e., to work
with the family and the youth to resolve conflicts and decide on future living space arrangements. This all generally occurs without formal apprehension procedures. Thus the practice is technically informal and voluntary, but is experienced as official and coercive by the young person and the family.

Having now described the typical responses to runaway actions—ranging from "hidden runaways" with no agency involvements through informal curbside counseling and on to formal apprehensions and court appearances—the remainder of the chapter will detail the changes in runaway service and intervention responses which came about during and since the counter-culture influences of the late 1960s.

While the particulars of runaway services and runaway policy differ in Canada and the United States, the countercultural influences developed at about the same time and took rather similar forms. The chief difference between the U.S. and Canadian approach to runaways lies in the eventual formalization of counter-hegemonic innovations through the U.S. Runaway Youth Act of 1974 and the subsequent funding of runaway house services and runaway research with federal monies. This U.S. funding and sanction of advocacy services continues to the present writing (although Reagan administration officials have attempted to alter some of the specifics of the 1974 juvenile justice reforms). However, the official Canadian governmental funding of runaway advocacy services was of a short-term, piecemeal, emergency nature. As a result, Canadian runaway services reverted back to a coercive, containment perspective when the pressure of heavy runaway youth migrations which had occurred between 1968 and 1972 subsided.
In 1970 and 1971, the Canadian Council on Social Development and local community welfare organizations across Canada held inquiries and produced reports dealing with the problems of transient, alienated, and runaway youth (CCDS, 1970a & b, 1971a & b; Patillo, 1970). Participants from the various Canadian provinces and cities concluded that the social needs of such youth (ranging in age from 13 to 24) were urgent, particularly in the areas of lodging, nutrition, secure (i.e. trustworthy) support and counseling, use of community services, health care, and drug use. The reason for such urgent need was the unprecedented increase in youth migration across the nation at the end of the decade.

A national Hostel Task Force was created in 1970 to stimulate the creation of new summer hostel facilities for Canadian youth, often using the armouries or school buildings already existing in various cities and towns across the country. The Task Force advised local communities on guidelines for hostel operation, financing, and objectives. The new federally-sponsored hostels supplemented youth hostels operated by the Canadian Youth Hostel Association, a private organization affiliated with the youth hostel groups in Europe and elsewhere.

The federal push to create and maintain hostel facilities across Canada (mostly in the summer months) continued into the mid-1970s and since that time has declined considerably.

Beginning in the spring of 1969, representatives of various social agencies in Vancouver held regular meetings to develop emergency shelter and nutritional services for transient youth who were converging on Canada's western metropolitan terminus each summer. These concerned agencies included
the city's Social Planning Department, Social Service Department, Police Department, Metropolitan Health Services, Catholic Family and Children's Services, Children's Aid Society, the provincial Department of Welfare, Vancouver Neighborhood Services Association, United Community Services, Y.W.C.A., Y.M.C.A., the Vancouver Inner City Service Project, and Cool-Aid. This monumental coordination effort was successful in opening up channels of communication and establishing working relationships between the city police and various other agencies and organizations working with youth, in preparing for the summer youth migrations which peaked around 1970 (Patillo, 1970).

Similar efforts were forthcoming in most other major Canadian cities at the same time, with emergency hostels, free food projects, youth counseling and street work services, free medical clinics and legal referrals, crisis phone lines, and drop-in centres cropping up and thriving for several summers, then tapering off as the influx of summer travelers diminished in the early 1970s. These local summer programs received a variety of types of local, provincial and federal funds to conduct their operations. They also relied heavily on volunteer help, individual donations, and various fund-raising ventures. Most of these services were free, although Project 69 in Toronto did charge 25 cents a night for lodging, and most of the projects accepted donations from youths using the service.

The following emergency youth services were assembled in various Canadian cities during the summers of 1968 and 1969 (Patillo, 1970): In Vancouver, Cool-Aid provided or made referrals for food, shelter, health care and counseling, and dealt with about 30 runaways per month. The Vancouver area had two crisis phone lines tailored to the needs of youth during this period. The YMCA operated a youth employment service, and the YWCA organized Crash
Pad (an emergency hostel for young women), a drop-in centre, and a crafts boutique where discussion of problems and relationships was encouraged in a workshop atmosphere. In Victoria, a Vancouver Island version of Cool-Aid provided shelter, meals, job referrals, and counseling to street youth. In Calgary, the Youth Aid Centre arranged lodging, meals, medical aid, legal aid, and counseling, and maintained three street workers downtown. In Edmonton, a drop-in recreation program called Middle Earth handled as many as 300 youths in a day for programming designed and carried out by the youths themselves. In Winnipeg, the Winged Ox Drop-In Centre provided hot meals to 50 to 100 youths per day, and CRYPT (Committee Representing Youth Problems Today) arranged hostel referrals at the YMCA and YWCA, and offered volunteer medical and legal help, and youth advocacy services. In Ottawa, the REALM drop-in centre provided food, shelter, and medical services. In Toronto, Project 69 and the Portland Street Hostel made meals and shelter facilities available to traveling youth, while The Trailer in Yorkville served as a mobile counseling unit and made referrals to medical, legal, and social services. In Montreal, Contact operated an open door, no-questions-asked crash pad, drug counseling, and liaison between parents and runaways, while YES (Youth Emergency Services) utilized a street work approach to counseling and referral and operated a medical clinic and a Job Co-op which placed 250 youths in jobs over a single three and one-half month period.

Many of these youth services emerged out of the energies of the young adult counter-culture and thus were staffed with young, empathetic "older brother and sister" figures. However, almost all had some real Establishment support from within city government and/or the relevant social agencies. The approach used was very much like that being developed in the street services and runaway house movement in the U.S. (In fact, there were direct
links between the U.S. and Canada in transient youth services due to the transiency across the border of minors and young adults.) A number of the emergency youth services of the period emphasized the importance of youth finding their own strength and self-sufficiency. The aims of the Trailer in Toronto were instructive in this regard, reflecting a youth advocacy stance:

- Ready availability of service to youth "on their own ground"
- Implementation of a "youth serving youth" policy
- Recognizing the need for structuring medical, legal, and social services to the pace and rhythm of youth's needs in an urban setting
- Emphasizing youth's right to self-determination

(Patillo, 1970: p. 66)
Runaway Houses (U.S.A.)

The North American youth migrations of the late 1960s and the resultant concern of concerned community adults during that counter-culture period led to the creation of a new social service phenomenon, the runaway house. The runaway house is an innovative U.S. advocacy service which offers temporary housing to young people on the run and simultaneously provides support services to runaways and their families—support toward independence in some cases, but more commonly mediation in reconciling with the family.

Shelter agencies work with the youth to reopen blocked channels of communication with parents, siblings, friends and school; provide counseling and education in areas of drug use, sexuality, pregnancy and venereal disease; and help in reestablishing broken community ties. Parental permission is generally sought to legitimize the youth's stay at the shelter, so that the helping agency cannot be charged with harbouring runaways.

Huckleberry's for Runaways, which opened its doors in San Francisco during the summer of 1967, was the first comprehensive runaway house to be established, and has served as a prototype for the many which followed. Huckleberry's was started by a young minister, Rev. Larry Beggs, who was concerned about the dramatic influx of young people migrating into the San Francisco Bay area from various parts of the country, most of them without definite places to stay and many of them underage.

A counter-culture agency in philosophy and in organization, the house has always been staffed by young adults able to relate to displaced youth and their parents equally well. Unlike many other shelter agencies, Huck's does not receive a large percentage of its referrals from official social agencies or police. One-third of the young people coming to Huckleberry
House come of their own volition, 20% are referred by parents, 13% by schools, and 8% by relatives. Only 5% are referred by police or courts, and only 5% by welfare agencies. Word of mouth publicity has conveyed the image of a place and a staff which can be trusted.

Services offered include meals and a temporary place to sleep (6 beds), a drop-in centre and crisis counseling on a 24-hour basis, a telephone hotline service, recreational outings, and access to medical help, legal and vocational counseling, and financial assistance. Over half of the youths served stay at least one night, and the average length of stay is 5.8 days. Because Huckleberry's is a crisis service, clients generally do not remain beyond two or three weeks. Referrals for longer-term residential placement elsewhere or aids to independent living are possible for some youths who cannot return home. Youths wishing to stay at Huckleberry House are required to telephone their parents to receive consent. This initial contact is designed to open the door to family counseling and reconciliation attempts if desired by the family members. Over half of the Huckleberry residents eventually return home. An important component of the Huckleberry's counseling approach is to aid young people in becoming aware of their personal power and to consider alternative options in their lives.

Relations with police and probation agencies, as well as juvenile court judges in San Francisco have always been tense, and are coloured by legal problems arising in relation to the runaway's dependent legal status and the staff's insistence upon confidentiality in its contacts with young clients. During its first year of operation, Huckleberry's was closed down by the police when, due to a staff mistake, parental permission was not requested on a particular runaway. The enraged parent contacted San Francisco police and a raid was made at the house, with several staff members jailed
and the young residents transported to San Francisco Juvenile Hall. Solid support from portions of the religious and social service community resulted in the release of the staff members and resumption of services. But the police-staff tension has never really subsided. During the late 1970s when Huckleberry's was asked by the San Francisco police to become part of a diversion program—which would have necessitated an open records policy—the staff refused to participate due to its procedure of confidential records. The police then threatened not to use Huckleberry House for their runaway referrals unless the staff complied with the new mode of operation. (See Miller, et al., 1980; Beggs, 1969).

Paralleling Huckleberry House as a pioneering runaway facility which has since served as a primary model for others is SAJA (Special Approaches to Juvenile Assistance) in Washington, D.C. (Butler, 1974). Run on a strictly collective basis, all decisions in SAJA are made by consensus, hierarchies are levelled out, and the young people served are included in the management of the operation.

SAJA is more than a runaway house, although that is how it started. Within several years of its founding, the SAJA operation had expanded to include many other enterprises useful to the survival and rehabilitation of runaway youths and consistent with the group's attitude of service to the DuPont Circle neighborhood where the collective is housed. Included in the SAJA operation are a job-finding cooperative, a free high school collective, a number of separate group homes for youths who are becoming independent, and a summer job program for low income youth from the local neighborhood. The work of the Job Co-op has led to the establishment of several "workers' cooperatives"—a bread and yogurt-making cooperative, a natural foods catering service, and a home repair co-op—which operate on a profit-
sharing, collective decision-making basis.

In addition, SAJA extends its nonprofit status to associated programs in which SAJA has an intimate interest, but which operate somewhat autonomously. These associated programs include a free people's law school, a day care centre (staffed in part by students from the alternative high school), farm projects for youth to escape the city environment and put hand to soil, a rental-finding service, a free school clearinghouse, and a National Institute of Mental Health-funded paraprofessional training program for youth workers from around the U.S. to learn organizing and counseling skills. At one point, SAJA proposed an alternative to the Washington, D.C. juvenile lock-up facility for youths arrested on status offenses or soft drug charges in order to divert these youths out of locked facilities.

SAJA has thus evolved into a counter-culture conglomerate of diverse but related service functions which continues to thrive through a collective administrative structure and through aggressive pursuit of grants and donations. This underlying spirit of aggressive collectivism is also instrumental in the success of SAJA's work with young people. SAJA is a "self-help" organization, and runaways are expected to take care of most of their own basic needs and work actively on orienting their lives in constructive directions. Runaway youth are seen by the SAJA staff as people who have taken their lives into their own hands and who need a chance to see how well they can do with their own resources.

While family conferences and other family and original-neighborhood liaison work is available (and about 75% of SAJA youths do eventually return home), the staff does not see itself merely as a referral route back to the parental family, which is the case with many runaway services—particularly
those in Canada since the decline of the turn-of-the-decade street services. In fact, SAJA has built up facilities for aiding youths in the direction of self-sufficiency and independent living if that is what is needed.

Unlike most runaway houses, SAJA's runaway house does not require that parental permission be obtained for a youth to be housed overnight. And, unlike Huckleberry's, which has experienced difficult relations with police ever since its founding, SAJA has never been challenged for "harbouring runaways." The historical reason for this circumstance is instructive. The SAJA founders had decided at the outset that parental permission was a needless obstacle, especially on the first night, since "kids who really needed help would be too angry and confused to want to establish contact with their parents right after they came to the house" (Butler, 1974: p. 11).

The policy was successful, largely through the accident of location. SAJA found the District of Columbia municipal government unwieldy and slow to respond—being presidentially appointed and congressionally controlled as the seat of the U.S. capital. Furthermore, the D.C. police and welfare authorities were primarily concerned with social problems arising in the Black community, and SAJA worked primarily with white, suburban youths. Most of these youths had run from D.C.'s nearby suburbs in the states of Maryland and Virginia which placed them under out-of-state missing persons and court jurisdictions. "Getting a District search warrant for an out-of-state runaway involves such a morass of red tape that few people ever come up with one" (Ibid.: p. 12). SAJA was able to stand pat on the "no information" confidentiality issue with both parents and police because of this accident of geography and because of political contacts which staff members had cultivated in the D.C. government and welfare bureaucracies. They also made sure that their landlord was sympathetic to the project to
lesser any chances of a politically-inspired eviction, and SAJA's location in the capital city also allowed for development of some key Congressional contacts.

The innovation of the runaway house in the United States denoted a radical shift in the standard approach to runaway youth, since it represented an important move away from coercive control toward support and advocacy. Runaway house staff work to aid the runaway in individual decision-making, act as mediators between the disenanchanted youth and the family if appropriate, and—in some cases—work in an advocate role to help the youth become independent from the family and economically self-sufficient. None of these roles were being effectively carried out by the coercive intervention agencies.

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, there was a burgeoning of grassroots services holding to these latter aims. The control perspective was virtually supplanted, at least for a period of several summers—but in some localities in the U.S. with some permanence—by an approach which sought to meet the young transients' immediate street needs in a way that respected their decision to leave home; this was an approach that went well beyond the official ride back to the parental doorstep. The creation of the runaway house was a major component of the counter-hegemonic trend. But there were a number of other components, and these will be detailed in the following section.
Other Counter-Culture Runaway Services (Canada & U.S.A.)

While the runaway house typified the new youth advocacy approach (and in fact served as a multi-service centre providing not merely lodging and counseling but, in some cases, legal, medical or educational assistance) there were other specific service innovations which emerged during the period between 1967 and 1972. Among these were:

Crisis Lines and Switchboards. Telephone counseling and referral services utilize trained volunteers to provide "door-opening" social service opportunities to potential suicides, victims of family violence or rape, and callers suffering from acute anxiety, depression, loneliness, or confusion. Switchboards directed especially to runaways were organized during this period. Several U.S. nationwide crisis line services, e.g. the National Runaway Switchboard and Operation Peace of Mind, continued to operate into the late 1970s and early 1980s (Kates, 1978; Miller, et al., 1980). A 1976 Opinion Research Corporation study (ORC, 1976: pp. 90-91) reported that only a very small percentage (2% to 3%) of runaways surveyed had ever used either local or national switchboard/crisis line services, however.

Brooks (1972) reported on a Phone-a-Home service operating in Westport, Connecticut as a service for teenagers who wished to leave home for a night. Upon obtaining a written release from parents, the youth in need was able to arrange to stay in the home of a community volunteer family. Members of the Phone-a-Home advisory board would then initiate counseling with the family. It was sometimes possible through contact with the service (and just through having such an option available) to resolve the family problems without the adolescent ever actually having to leave home (see also Anon., 1972).
Free Clinics. During the late-1960s, volunteer physicians, dentists, medical students, and drug counselors joined together to serve the needs of youths living "on the street" in the San Francisco area through the formation of the Haight-Ashbury Medical Clinic and the Berkeley Free Clinic. These early experiments served as models for other counter-culture medical clinics and drug counseling centres which were opened up throughout the U.S. and Canada. Several free medical clinics operated in Vancouver during the late 1960s. Emergency medical care was also available through youth service agencies in Calgary, Winnipeg, Ottawa, Toronto, and Montreal during the 1968-1971 heavy youth transiency period.

Operating with an open-door, drop-in, non-appointment philosophy, such clinics were designed to break down the formality of medical treatment and make health care more readily accessible to youth who might be especially vulnerable to certain medical problems or lifestyle risks (e.g., pregnancy, venereal disease, drug overdoses, hepatitis, etc.) yet who might also be especially cautious of Establishment agency structures and not wish the physician to telephone the parents or police. Birth control information, drug counseling, emergency medical care, dental referrals (sometimes for free dental work), and psychiatric and/or counseling services were and continue to be the emphases of these clinics. A mood of safety and confidentiality was built into the concept of such clinics and many of those in the U.S. continued in demand well after the initial impact of youth transiency subsided.

Food Projects. During the 1967 "Summer of Love" in San Francisco's Haight-Ashbury district, and for several summers thereafter, a group of young adult counter-culture residents calling themselves the Diggers (3) provided free mass meals in Golden Gate Park to hundreds of youths each
evening. The production of these meals (and of other Digger projects such as a free clothing "store") was a model of ecological inventiveness and efficiency.

A Digger truck farm project north of San Francisco supplied many of the organic vegetables for the meals and much of the rest of the food was scrounged each morning from chain supermarkets in the city which had agreed to donate dented merchandise and the trimmings from vegetables which, though quite edible, would otherwise have gone in the trash. A well-coordinated fleet of pickup trucks would make its rounds each day picking up and delivering donated materials. The Diggers believed that in a culture of such affluence and waste it was possible to live off the fat of the Establishment with very little cash capital invested. Such examples of sharing and cutting corners became hallmarks of a counter-culture which was reacting against what was seen as the moral emptiness of plush suburbs and which substituted instead a living-on-a-shoestring concept of communal satisfaction.

In other situations, as with the Berkeley (California) Emergency Food Project, church and government contributions were combined with private donations to provide emergency meals to street people. The Berkeley project served one hot meal six days a week and operated a referral service to other street-oriented agencies. Over a period of 19 months during the late 1960s, the Diggers Creative Society in Los Angeles provided 80,000 meals to runaways and other street youths in that city. (SAC, 1974a)

Legal Services. Runaway houses and other youth-serving agencies sometimes have volunteer lawyers or law students available to provide legal education and specific legal advice to runaways or street youths, either during regularly-scheduled legal clinic hours, or on a referral basis. During the 1968-70 period, such services were available at the Calgary Youth
Aid Centre, at CRYPT in Winnipeg, at YES in Montreal, and at the Yorkville Trailer project in Toronto (Patillo, 1970). Several agencies exist strictly to handle legal matters for teenagers, e.g., Youth Advocates, the Youth Law Center, and Potrero Hill Youth Legal Center, all in San Francisco (Miller, et al., 1980).

**Parent Advisory and Family Stress Services.** Telephone calls from worried parents to runaway crisis lines and runaway houses give evidence of the need for parental counseling to go hand in hand with the more common youth counseling approaches. Oakland, California, has both a Family Crisis Unit and a Parental Stress Service dealing with families in stress (Miller, et al., 1980). In Vancouver, the Crisis Intervention and Suicide Prevention Centre lists a separate telephone number for "Parental Crisis" calls, aimed at heading off potential child abuse situations.

**Detached Streetworker Services.** During the counter-culture period, numerous agencies in North America found that one of the most effective ways to reach and aid alienated and transient youth was through the use of street-workers, sometimes called detached youth workers. As the titles imply, these youthful and casually dressed agency workers detach themselves from the agency buildings where they are assigned and spend most of their time mingling with their clients and prospective clients on the street.

Because of their unique intermediate position, streetworkers inevitably spend much of their time acting as mediators between street youth and agencies. Before this kind of "middle-person" service is possible, sufficient rapport must be established so that the street clients know and trust the detached worker and trust that confidences will be carefully protected. This, of course, means that streetworkers by the very nature of their jobs
are privy to much knowledge of illegal and unsavory activities which they
cannot at that moment act upon.

Street work has become a marginal component of the social services in
most large metropolitan areas of North America and England (where the concept
originated). A series of agencies in Vancouver have used detached workers
in the downtown youth ghetto area over the past 15 years.
The New Youth Advocacy Approach

The innovations described in the previous section have several characteristics in common. Each of the projects emerged not from previously drafted legislation or regulations, but from pressing needs targeted by concerned community members. Each was carried out primarily by sympathetic young adults who knew the lifestyle of the adolescent runaway and the obstacles confronting anyone in that lifestyle. The new counter-culture programs were set up as voluntary services, not as punitive or coercive interventions. Finally, each of the programs allowed space for runaways themselves to have some part in planning and directing their own lives.

Such an all-encompassing advocacy approach was entirely new to the runaway intervention and services scene. It is not at all clear whether the new counter-culture programs would have fitted into the Progressive reform approach of the hegemonic period—such was the ambivalence between control and advocacy in that era. By 1967, however, the line between the two opposing strategies was less blurred.

Agency functionaries using control methods had always used discretionary "exceptions" to carry out their work; this was often the only way to bring flexibility to overly inflexible regulations. More often than not, the discretion used by coercive agency workers derived from an advocacy perspective. Such workers would find themselves approving an independent living arrangement, or helping a young client find full-time work, or going along with a plan for a student to drop out of school—all in contravention of existing policies. Thus, by the time of the counter-culture service innovations, the stage was already set for an advocacy approach. The previous standard agency runaway service workers had already begun using their
discretionary practices in an advocacy manner in many cases. This in itself was an indication that runaway youth policies as written were not operating properly and were in need of revision.

In coming up against the coercive aspects of runaway youth policy and doing their best to overturn or circumvent those policies, the youth advocates of the late 1960s were, in a sense, clarifying the nature and demands of the advocacy approach itself. The type of advocacy being promoted by Progressive-era reformers (and the type generally held in ambivalent tension with the control perspective) might be termed "benevolent advocacy," whereas the type of advocacy which the counter-hegemonic reforms were leading toward might be called "liberative advocacy."

Thus, with the innovations of 1967-1972, a new kind of policy tension was created. With the rise of counter-hegemonic protest and innovation, a more challenging liberative advocacy perspective emerged which has since come to stand in opposition to both the control/containment perspective and the benevolent advocacy approach. The enactment and development of the U.S. Runaway Youth Act of 1974—the legislation which took the counter-culture innovations in hand, funded them with government money, and in doing so altered their direction and impact—served as an important watershed for that tension between diverse approaches to runaways. The following section traces the course of that important legislation.
The Runaway Youth Act of 1974 (U.S.A.)

Despite the grassroots, emergency nature of the new advocacy services, in the U.S. these services have now been made part of official governmental policy. The U.S. Runaway Youth Act of 1974 (Title III of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act) took the concept of the runaway house and other advocacy services and turned them into federal law. The Act provided funds for the temporary shelter and care of runaway youth outside the law enforcement system, but in ways that ensured proper, informal relationships between police and runaway houses. Funds are provided through the 1974 Act for runaway houses, research, and other services such as crisis phone services and counseling programs. Funding through the Act continues to the present time.

The Runaway Youth Act represents a compromise between "alternative services" interests and state interests. Prior to the Act, most existing runaway houses were funded on shoestring budgets and staffed by counter-culture young adults attuned to the lifestyle of runaways being served. They were basically part of an underground service network, sometimes operating on the edge of legality. The Act was a product of collaboration between young U.S. Senate aides and a group of youth workers who were a part of this underground service network. The two principal drafters of the legislation were Mike Nemeroff, legal counsel to U.S. Senator Birch Bayh (chair of the Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency), and Bill Treanor, one of the founders of SAJA's Runaway House in Washington, D.C. (Moses, 1978). A principal aim of the legislation was to legitimate and fund the services already being delivered by this counter-culture runaway house network. By 1976, 123 runaway houses existed in the United States
(Ibid.); 66 of these runaway projects were receiving federal runaway services grants (US-DHEW, 1976).

Yet even with the advent of substantial U.S. federal funding to youth shelters, the great majority of runaway youths continue to shun contact with formal agencies—even the counter-culture inspired agencies. The typical runaway feels safer in underground fugitive settings or in "crashing" with friends or new acquaintances than in cooperating with even the most hip youth-serving agencies. Thus, despite the massive U.S. funding for runaway houses, runaway youths continue to be fugitives in their own land—an indication that little has changed in terms of the basics of youth dependency, even with the influence of the 1974 Act.

Anne Moses (1978) fears that the vision and the potential of the runaway house movement is being affected through the compromise of government funding and control. The "trade-off" implicit in the Runaway Youth Act has led to the prohibition of certain kinds of youth advocacy—advocacy of the sort which made runaway houses in the early counter-culture era especially effective.

Despite the advocacy trend in the U.S. legislation, much remains that has not changed. Unavailability of jobs to minors, the confusion and constraint of age-grading standards, lack of schooling and housing options, prohibitions against early independence, continuing lacks in due process provisions for minors, and the continuing fugitive reality of the runaway lifestyle are problems which have not been altered by the new legislation, nor by the new advocacy approach to helping youth.

The attempt by the coalition which promoted the Runaway Youth Act was to achieve federal funding for existing runaway centres without losing the unconventional nature of the underground runaway assistance network. But
the merger of official and unofficial helping approaches has clearly affected the substance and quality of service, despite the monetary benefits.

The required interaction of runaway houses with police and courts under the legislation has inevitably led to necessary accommodation with these agencies and means continuing interaction with coercive, containment approaches. Required reporting and accounting procedures have added an element of bureaucracy which was not formerly involved in the projects' operations.

The general concept of runaway advocacy service as well as the particulars of runaway house daily operations are now directed by federal legislation rather than by the more "organic" process of community initiative which was the case during the "flower child" era. As Moses points out:

The Runaway Youth Act has frozen a particular type of response into a legitimated, federally funded network, leaving little room for flexibility .... Whatever the shifting patterns of youths' needs for nonjudicial, untraditional help, the Runaway Youth Act constrains a runaway house from shifting its focus in response .... Runaway houses ... might better help their potential population by adopting a broader, all-youth-oriented view. .... A more inclusive reform than the Runaway Youth Act might be the removal of status offenders from court jurisdiction, or the establishment of time-out centers for all.

(Moses, 1976: p. 238)

The Runaway Youth Act, Moses contends, has achieved a "normalizing" model of runaway behaviour while retaining a "problemizing" approach which continues the notion of home-leaving as a social problem demanding therapeutic intervention. As a result of this contradiction, longer-range structural changes (two of which she cites at the end of the preceding quote) cannot be considered within the particular parameters of the legislation. Thus, although the merger of governmental sanction and funding with counter-culture innovation and flexibility has been accomplished in an impressively smooth
manner, the structural reality of youth dependency has been only minimally affected by the U.S. federal legislation.
Runaway Transportation and Repatriation Services (Canada)

The runaway house phenomenon has not caught on in Canada. The emergency hostel facilities mentioned earlier responded to the same needs in much the same manner as did runaway houses, but they were short-lived (i.e., they disappeared after the main press of transient youths subsided). Furthermore, they seldom undertook the kind of assertive family counseling role which was and is still being practiced at Huckleberry House and SAJA. There were a few exceptions to this: Roger Patillo reported that at CRYPT in Winnipeg between 1968 and 1970, volunteer counselors "acted as mediators between young people and adults (i.e., the police, Children's Aid, parents, etc.)" as did Contact in Montreal (Patillo, 1970: p. 65). Toronto's Portland Street Hostel served as a medium through which youths could "make permanent arrangements for themselves" (Ibid.: p. 66). And in the mid-1970s, Sunflower—a runaway house modeled on the U.S. design—opened in Vancouver, operating for several summers on LIP (Local Initiative Program) federal grants and the paid and volunteer energies of Simon Fraser University students. With the help of SFU Psychology Department consultation, family counseling was initiated with some of the runaways and their parents. However, in the course of becoming established under longer-term funding, Sunflower has now become mostly indistinguishable from standard group homes in the area and actually does not cater primarily to runaways, most often being used for group home wards whose social workers require a short-term transitional placement and/or evaluation of the young client's situation.

Joanne Kates (1978) claims that the relative lack of specific runaway services in Canada, when contrasted to the U.S. example, is due to lack of social service innovation stemming from a police mentality approach to
transient young people:

That is the crux of the attitude in most of Canada: Got a runaway? Call the cops and drag the kid home by the scruff of the neck. Don't worry too much about how the kid feels, or whether there's a need for a change in the environment that caused him to run away. Just send him back there. It's the law.

(Kates, 1978: p. 52)

While there is substance to Kates' critique, based on the litany of police treatment approaches she cites from virtually all the Canadian provinces and territories, accounts of insensitive handling of runaway apprehensions and other status offense actions continue to come to light in the United States as well. Runaway houses are not normally the facility chosen by the bulk of runaway youth, and decriminalization of status offenses is still not a reality in the U.S. or in Canada.

By the middle and late 1970s, the bloom had disappeared from the "flower child" era in both Canada and the U.S., and services to runaways had in most localities—especially in Canada—returned to rather straightforward missing persons police procedures. The counter-culture-based emergency shelters, food, and medical programs in Canadian cities closed their doors in the early part of the decade when continued funding became problematic, when staff and volunteers became exhausted by the pressure and low or absent pay, and/or when the press of numbers of transient youth was no longer sufficient to justify the time and expense.

While many of the U.S. food and street work projects closed for the same reasons, quite a number of the runaway houses, switchboards, and free clinics which had opened in U.S. metropolitan centres in the late 1960s continued on even if often on a more modest scale. Most of these received both a morale boost and a financial boost with the federal funding which
accompanied the passing of the U.S. Runaway Youth Act in 1974.

Analogous funding and support was not forthcoming in Canada, and in a
1978 article in Homemaker's magazine, Kates faulted Canadian social agencies
for their lassitude in meeting the needs of runaway youth. In a well-
researched account which stressed the huge numbers of Canadian young people
still trekking the continent, Kates presented the results of her coast-to-
coast survey of runaway services:

Nobody in New Brunswick even knows how many runaways they serviced
last year. These is no runaway agency in Nova Scotia. In the
words of the deputy minister of social services ... "Most parents
report a runaway to their local police department." Nobody in
the Northwest Territories knows how many runaways they dealt with
last year. In Newfoundland and Labrador, the police usually take
care of runaways. It works the same way in the Yukon; as James
David, director of social welfare, put it: "When our Branch is
approached by a parent or a guardian regarding a runaway teen-
ager, we advise that they make a report to the local RCMP."

.... Vancouver is the end of the road for runaways, and most of
them get picked up wandering around downtown. The police take
them to the Gastown Team department of the Human Resources
Ministry, and there they are given much the same treatment as
at the Calgary Crisis Centre. About 1,800 kids a year are
repatriated by the Gastown Team. The only problem with the
Gastown Team is its reputation: Ask teenagers who ran west about
their experiences getting caught in Vancouver, and they talk about
being dragged to 52 Water Street. They regard it as just another
kind of copshop ....

Quebec plans very strong future services for the young, but just
now, their service to runaways is as sporadic and as police-
dominated as the other provinces'.

(Kates, 1978: p. 52)

Kates' report is surprising when the state of runaway services in Canada
in the late seventies and early eighties is contrasted with the feed-ins,
crash pads, medical and legal clinics, and other street services which
municipal, provincial, and federal governments condoned and helped to fund
during the summers of heavy youth transient movements a short decade ago.
Taking the place of these innovative, grass roots, community-involving programs of the late sixties and early seventies is a philosophy and procedure taken directly from past policies: If children or youths run away, send them home immediately; it is the parents' responsibility.

The two runaway-oriented services located in the nearest proximity to Bayside runaways (other than U.S. locations, e.g., Blaine, Bellingham, and Seattle, Washington which have runaway houses, counseling centres and/or advocacy services available) are the Calgary Runaway Project and the Vancouver Gastown Team (now renamed the Ministry of Human Resources Emergency Services Youth Section and reorganized). Both concentrate almost exclusively on a single method of operation—transporting or repatriating the youth back home. The Calgary Runaway Project does make available some individual and family counseling in the course of reintegrating the youth back into the home, and apparently eases the repatriation process through a supportive and nonjudgmental approach.

But the Emergency Services unit in Vancouver operates under different constraints. Being an integral part of the Human Resources ministry—the statutory public assistance and child welfare agency for the province—the Vancouver crisis workers are unable to follow their cases beyond a single (normally after-office-hours) emergency contact. In the morning or on Monday, a different social worker—generally one from the youth's home area—is required by MHR policy to take over the family counseling and/or case planning for the youth. Such an arrangement has led to a steady flow of complaints from both sides, with crisis workers often being convinced that their careful laying of groundwork has been demolished by the mistakes of an insensitive social worker in the home community, or with home community social workers sometimes not agreeing with initiatives begun the night before
by someone familiar with the downtown realities but not with the suburban realities.

In addition, the chronology of the Gastown Team venture has always been a troubled and controversial history. Begun in 1973 by Dave Hayes, a former motorcycle policeman turned social worker who was alarmed by the numbers of underage youngsters on the streets at night, the Gastown Team always represented a purposeful blend of police and social work skills. Police officers, a probation officer, social workers and streetworkers patrolled the downtown area in teams, and youths found to be underage and on the street after 11 p.m. were brought into the office to be interviewed by Gastown Team workers. Other youths encountered by beat patrolmen not associated with the Team were also brought into the office and turned over to the Team for interviewing (which frequently approached interrogation intensity) followed by transportation home or to the Cypress House emergency shelter.

Whether the strongest pull in this cooperative venture was toward humanizing the police involved or toward militarizing the social workers is hard to judge. But clearly, from the word which was out on the street, neither element was humanized enough to suit the street kids. The 52 Water Street Gastown Team office served essentially as a holding facility for youths who had not asked for its "services." During certain periods of its history, some of the staff were not beyond using physical means to contain and control the youths awaiting their transportation home. A complaint was brought before the B.C. Civil Liberties Association in 1976 on behalf of youths who felt their rights had been violated at 52 Water Street. The resulting hearings led to revision of the Team's juvenile apprehension procedures.

Further reform came when the Gastown Team was moved under the Ministry of Human Resources umbrella in the late 1970s. Hayes was asked
to resign and was replaced by more traditional M.S.W. managers from elsewhere in the Human Resources system. The name of the controversial unit was changed in reaction to old connotations, and eventually the "team patrol" relationship with police and probation was discontinued.

What did not change, however, was the standard transportation-home/repatriation procedure and the badly coordinated referral procedure wherein the night-before and morning-after social workers continued frequently to operate on totally different premises with the same family. Staff changes brought in several crisis workers familiar with detached streetwork approaches, and this emphasis was instituted in 1979. Nevertheless, the streetwork component of the Emergency Services Youth Section (revised title for the Team) has chronic difficulty in obtaining adequate recognition, funding, or staff.

An element which has changed only slowly is the "child-saving" evangelism which motivated the original Gastown Team. The mission of the Team was to warn youths in the downtown area of the dangers of the street in no uncertain terms and then to remove the youth from the temptations there by transporting the minor back to the other province, or back to the home neighborhood in Vancouver or in the interior of B.C. The ineffectiveness of this approach was seen in the high recidivism rate of the Gastown Team's clients: between 50% and 70% of all youths apprehended after hours and sent home returned to the downtown area to be picked up numerous times. Even youths repatriated to other provinces were known to return with some regularity. One Nova Scotia minor returned to Vancouver three times after being sent home by the agency (Rowe & Levens, 1979). There were a number of youths known to the Team office who had been picked up and processed through that office as many as 40 or 50 times (source: field interviews by author).
In what some critics called a street-sweeping operation, the streets just would not stay swept. Gastown Team workers came to realize that they were known on the street as representatives of "52", and that this severely limited their effectiveness in streetwork since they were seen as an arm of the police. Yet despite the poor success rate in turning runaway youth around, the coercive/containment approach continues as standard operating procedure for dealing with runaways on the streets of Vancouver.
Conclusion

The foregoing sections have detailed the types of services to runaways which emerged during the late-1960s counter-culture period. Such an emergence of grassroots programs across the continent was unprecedented in the history of North American social services. Not since the U.S. New Deal had so many new social programs been put into place in so short a time. They were programs which emerged spontaneously due to felt need. Two factors evidently led to the counter-hegemonic response: 1) the heavy surge of transient and runaway youth beginning in the summer of 1966 and continuing into the 1970s; and 2) the inability of existing coercive runaway youth policies to meet the challenge of this youth migration.

Some of the counter-culture programs were oriented toward basic survival needs: food, clothing and shelter programs as well as medical and dental programs. Others were oriented toward mediation: legal aid programs, family counseling and parental stress programs, detached worker liaison. Still other programs were informational: crisis phone lines and switchboard services, job counseling.

None of these services were envisioned by the framers of runaway youth policy during the Progressive era. In fact, all of the counter-culture programs violate the basic intent of coercive runaway policies. While traditional runaway services held to a punitive, order-restoring policy posture, the counter-hegemonic services respect the runaway's desire for self-determination. The new approach to runaway services involves locally-operated, community-responsive services which stress support for the minor during a time of stress, rather than apprehension and confinement.

Furthermore, a number of the counter-hegemonic services have taken an overt advocacy posture and, in appropriate situations, counsel certain
youths toward independence or at least toward living situations outside the parental home. As such, the new counter-culture services represented a de facto contradiction of existing policy and, in fact, a virtual (if perhaps temporary) repeal of the standard runaway policy provisions.

During the past two decades many youth-serving agencies have moved from a position of merely providing for daily subsistence needs and emergency counseling toward a stance of aiding youths with longer term planning. Terms like "advocacy" and "youth advocacy" are appearing more frequently in the literature on youth services and in project grant proposals. Many runaway services and other youth-serving agencies (especially counter-culture agencies) are now equipped to appear with the young client in juvenile court, at employment interviews, or in meetings with welfare officials or other agencies.

The counter-culture runaway service reforms of the late sixties signaled a revolution in agency attitudes toward runaways. Prior to 1967, runaways were generally assumed to be delinquent or mentally ill (see Chapter 6). The runaway event was viewed as deviant and a dangerous violation of family stability. Runaway youths were routinely coerced to return home to parental supervision, with little attention being given to real complaints which runaways carried with them.

The new advocacy services emerged from a different base—a base which respected the young person's desire for self-determination. The runaway house movement and attendant "street services" of the counter-hegemonic period were based on a normalization process wherein runaway behaviour came to be viewed—in some quarters—as nonpathological behaviour.

Anne Moses writes:
The series of events which led to the passage of the Runaway Youth Act illustrates the process by which a form of behavior considered deviant can be brought into the range of behavior considered normal for purposes of treating that behavior in a nonpathological framework.

These developments ... reflect two major themes: (1) "normalization" of the official response to runaways, reflecting (a) the growing belief that the legal system does not help with the problems evidenced by status offenses and offenders, such as runaways, and (b) increasing acceptance of the usually non-pathological nature of runaway behavior; and (2) legitimization of an underground, alternative service by stamping the federal legislation in the mold of the (existing) unconventional organizations.

(Moses, 1978: p. 235)

The two themes of normalization and legitimization which Moses alludes to meant a shift to a perspective wherein the rights of minors to some self-determination of their living space and other essentials in their lives is now being respected, to some degree. Running away, at least under current U.S. policy, has been partially removed from the pathology presuppositions of former years. Yet the shift has been far from complete.

The reversion of runaway services in Canada back to a coercive transportation and repatriation approach is dramatic evidence of the tenacity of the youth dependency structures. During the press of heavy runaway migrations in Canada, service entities blossomed virtually "overnight" to meet the challenge of youthful need. Then, when the pressure was relieved, runaway services slid back to normal in Canadian jurisdictions.

In a sense, the Canadian runaway services experience is little different from the situation at the turn of the century. The "child savers" also were concerned about the pressure of youthful need and its effects on the health of the city core. The actions taken, then and now, were taken within the existing political-economic framework. During both eras, youth unemployment and the seeming inability to accommodate earlier emancipation, led
to dead-end options for runaway services. Without significant social structural changes—changes in youth access to self-determination opportunities, expansion of employment opportunities, and variety in housing options—the coercive approach to runaway behaviour persists as a "fall-back" solution. Until more liberative proposals are developed from the advocacy perspective, extended youth dependency will presumably continue as a taken-for-granted reality.
NOTES

1. "Runaway youth" as used in this chapter refers to citizens below the age of majority who travel away from home without the permission of a parent or guardian. This is a generally accepted legal definition. In the Bayside study data of Part II, the definition of "runaway youth" is broadened somewhat to include other young citizens also affected by social policies relating to home-leaving, or youths seen by community members as runaways or as prematurely emancipated (e.g., some youths who are no longer minors, but who are viewed as runaways; emancipated youths who had parental consent; youths who were kicked out, etc.)

2. See Chapter 4 for a recounting of the policy change within probation departments of British Columbia in 1978 which led to a de facto decriminalization of status offenses and a new procedure which would refer all such cases to the child welfare component of the B.C. Ministry of Human Resources (i.e., from the criminal justice side over to the social services side).

3. The Diggers named themselves after a hippie activist service group then operating in Amsterdam which, among other projects, provided free bicycles—painted a distinctive colour after being obtained from police lost-and-found sales or donations—which anyone in the city needing transportation could use and later deposit at well-marked communal bike depots. The Amsterdam group, which had also been active in Dutch political elections, had in turn taken the name from a group of 17th century agrarian anarchists in England who seized unused land for communal cultivation by the poor. This original group of Diggers had been quickly wiped out by aristocratic landowners who claimed the land as theirs.

4. Youth Advocates in San Francisco is the umbrella organization which developed out of and which now operates Huckleberry House.

5. Cypress House in Vancouver has received very positive reviews from runaways and from agency people. The emergency runaway shelter (utilized primarily by referrals from the Emergency Services team) was organized by a veteran of the Cool-Aid runaway service venture of the late 1960s. The Cypress House staff give their residents plenty of room to be by themselves and do not attempt forceful interventions. Since the shelter is used for short-term (generally single night) stays, there is no attempt to engage in mediation or rehabilitation. Thus, Cypress House is structured with advocacy aims implicitly in the background, but operates within the coercive framework of "transportation-home" runaway policies—i.e., serves as a way-station during the return trip to the parental home.
PART II

A COMMUNITY STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF

RUNAWAY YOUTH POLICIES

To fully understand the background and implications of runaway policies in Canada and the U.S., it has been necessary to explore the dynamics of youth dependency itself. The runaway prohibition is, after all, one part of a broader spectrum of public policies which categorize minor children (who are still referred to as "infants" in Canadian legal codes) as less than full legal entities. While such provisions are designed to protect the younger members of society who are thought not to be fully able to represent themselves in legal and financial matters, these laws have been challenged on civil libertarian grounds as provisions which discriminate against citizens on the basis of age. It is with this background in mind that runaway youth policy has been critiqued in Part I. A recapitulation of the substance of that critique follows.

The economic bases for the runaway youth prohibition have been obscured and forgotten in favour of a focus upon youth and family pathology. This pathological focus is, to some degree, related to the fact that the particular runaway youth who came to the attention of the Progressive reformers who established the runaway prohibition were children of poor, working class immigrants. These immigrant families had been actively recruited from Europe to staff the rapidly expanding industries in North America. They inhabited the least desirable dwellings in the already deteriorating sections of the newly developed cities. It was the children of these new immigrant families who were the focus of the "child savers" who promoted the juvenile court and compulsory public school innovations at the turn of the 20th century.
The Progressive era child-saving platform established institutions and agencies wherein immigrant youths would come in contact with adult middle-class role models who could guide such youths away from lives of immorality and crime. Because the avoidance of future adult crime was a prime consideration, such preventive programs were implanted into newly developed juvenile crime statutes. It is on such a basis that running away from home became criminalized.

While the criminalization of the runaway act and other non-victimizing "status offenses" emerged from a concern for prevention, juvenile status offenders became subject to the same sorts of criminal punishment available as consequences for juvenile thieves, rapists, and murderers. Critics of the juvenile court system have pointed out, in fact, that status offenders have traditionally received stiffer sentences than their juvenile criminal counterparts, on the average, often because such "incorrigibles" were not welcome back into the family home or because they misbehaved in reform school and were kept there longer on indeterminate sentences. Recent reforms of the juvenile court systems in Canada and the U.S. have led to a partial decriminalization of status offenses. However, runaways served by PINS (etc.) programs or by Canadian child welfare agencies are still subject to coercive apprehension and jail time.

Coercive interventions were believed necessary in redirecting runaway youth. Progressive reformers thought that only by force could the immigrant youths be removed from the temptations of the pool halls, street corners, and gaming parlours. Thus, a control/containment perspective came to be combined with the basic benevolent motives of the reformers. This ambivalence between coercive control and benevolent advocacy has continued down to the present day, and continues on despite numerous modern reforms in
A key to this control/advocacy ambivalence can be found in the forgotten economic base of runaway youth policy. Prior to the mid-19th century, the labour power of the young was prized for its usefulness to parents and families. The more able-bodied children a family possessed, the more help was available to bring in the harvest or to help out in the home industry. With the advent of massive growth in industrialization and urbanization from 1865 onward, the picture of youth labour changed considerably. Paternal authority had shifted from parental home to apprenticeship master and then on to the factory owner. Over-use of children and adolescents as cheap labour and other serious abuses of factory health and safety led to a series of child labour laws which were eventually successful in removing children and youth from full-time employment and redirecting them into the emerging system of free, compulsory public schools.

Runaway youth statutes arose during the period of transition between youth employability and unemployability as a control measure aimed at immigrant youths who were idle on urban slum streetcorners, neither working nor in school. Runaway policy, then, has always had a "street-clearing" emphasis and this goal of restoring social order and decorum has continued as its primary function. Other goals, such as the desire for family rehabilitation or enhancement of youth opportunity have emerged as subsidiary aims. But the economic contradictions implicit in a system which is believed unable to employ massive numbers of able-bodied potential workers have kept the runaway policies basically coercive and directed to the preservation of community decorum—rather than being truly rehabilitative or liberative.

The pathological focus of runaway youth policies has, then, tended to serve as a "cover" for the truly coercive intent of those policies and
as a distraction from the economic origins of the runaway prohibition. While the benevolence of the Progressive reformers—and of the modern juvenile justice system reform advocates—cannot be questioned, reformers are seldom in control of the central channels of power and influence. As a result, runaway policy—like other Progressive reform measures—was forged in an atmosphere of compromise.

For example, child labour prohibitions, which are a major structural precondition for the runaway prohibition, have evolved through negotiation, conflict, compromise, and accommodation by various and sundry philanthropists, University professors, social workers, labour union officials, government officials, and industrialists. No one party was alone in proposing the specific parameters of the child labour prohibition; whatever result emerged came from years of dispute and compromise.

Thus, it is no indictment of the Progressive reformers' intentions to point out that child labour laws are benevolent on the surface, but coercive at their base. Such a contradiction (which is basically the same contradiction that we have found in runaway youth policy and labeled "advocacy vs. control") is the result of the negotiated order of policy creation and maintenance. Reformers must take what they can reasonably obtain; therefore reforms tend to be less than fully restorative.

One result of the compromise solutions to the youth unemployability problem, then, is a pathological emphasis in runaway youth policy which merely glosses over the surface of the true "runaway problem." Beneath the surface is a crucial economic contradiction which has been obscured from public view: able-bodied potential workers have been excluded from productive employment with the now outdated justification that such exclusion is for the potential workers' own good. Because truly liberative and
truly rehabilitative solutions are unavailable—in fact are blocked—due to the structural conditions of youth unemployability, the pathological perspective is a benevolent remnant: one last sign of the reformers' good intentions. As is so typical of the "therapeutic state" social services approach, individual runaways and individual families are blamed for the existence of a social problem. Part I has been an attempt to reclaim the social problems nature of the runaway youth issue and explore the societal dynamics of that problem, aside from the surface concern for family and youth pathology.

The substance of a political-economic analysis of runaway youth policy and of youth dependency policies generally has now been presented. We will turn in Part II to the empirical data from the Canadian community of Bayside to explore the impact of runaway youth policies on the lives and behaviours of runaway youths, parents of runaways, and agency people who are called on for help. In moving to the "micro" level of description and analysis, an attempt will be made to thread the "macro" policy issues into the empirical discussion in a way that may show the day-to-day workings of public policy in a particular community.

An attempt is being made here to combine the advantages of critical political-economic analysis with those of ethnographic community study research. The intended mix is difficult to attain since critical analyses tend to remain at the broader policy level while ethnographic studies are typically focused on everyday interactions and customs. These two contrasting research approaches are being combined in an effort to bridge the macro and micro levels of analysis. There is a tendency for policy analysts to work at too high an abstraction level and to sometimes be out of touch with the effects of policy on the populace; likewise, ethnographers sometimes
become so engrossed in day-to-day details that broader historical, political, and economic dynamics may be overlooked.

Yet both the political-economic and the ethnographic approaches have maintained an investment in holistic, comprehensive description. Ethnographers aim to achieve descriptions of broad cultural trends and of entire communities. The political economic approach endeavors to unearth dynamics of public policy formulation which are far-reaching and embedded in long cultural traditions.

Combining the broader critical analysis of policy with the descriptive accounts from Bayside runaway negotiation sequences is a strategy designed to "cut through" some very persistent taken-for-granted assumptions. These assumptions can be capsulized as follows: Running away from home is primarily a sign of individual or family pathology; runaways should be returned to the family home where they belong; parents and children should and can live together amicably until the child's age of majority; young people cannot be accommodated in the modern capitalist labour market; school as presently structured is the most beneficial place for all youths up to the time of high school graduation; and extensive years of formal public schooling are necessary in order to learn skills necessary for housekeeping and for entering the full-time workforce. While there is an element of surface validity to each of these statements, it is my contention that none of them are satisfactory as universally valid statements. Part II will pursue a critique of such taken-for-granted premises.

Chapter 6 opens the empirical portion of the study with a review of the runaway research literature. Delineation of the "sick, bad, and free" assumptions underlying runaway research reveals some of the taken-for-granted assumptions of researchers. The advocacy liberalizations of the counter-
culture era are reflected in a new style of runaway youth research which stresses the runaway action as a potentially growth-enhancing or curative act. This style of research has increased in importance as research taking a pathological perspective has declined somewhat.

The community of Bayside and the runaway patterns in the town are described in Chapter 7. Particular focus is given to the ways in which Bayside agencies typically handle runaway situations and to the interaction between agencies. Statistical data from the Bayside study are presented in this chapter and demonstrate a great deal of diversity in types of home-leaving activity—many of which do not fit neatly within existing policy parameters.

Chapter 8 presents an extended case study relating the travels of Brian Peterson who ran away from his suburban parental home in the hills of Bayside and who within six months had made his way to life "on the streets" of Vancouver to a lifestyle he found much preferable. Analysis of this case study reveals that official and legal options available to such youths are severely limited.

Agency discretion is the focus of Chapter 9. Brief case studies are used as vehicles for analyzing the constraints and opportunities afforded community members by runaway youth policies. The negotiated solutions which result from runaway/family/agency interaction are indications of how written policy is actually being implemented on the community level. Chapter 9 stresses the use of youth advocacy approaches which Bayside youth workers and families have found effective. Such advocacy generally is accomplished informally without guidance from formal policy provisions and generally without sanction from the formal agency hierarchies.

Chapter 10 summarizes the findings of the study and sets out specific
recommendations for social structural changes which would address the "runaway problem" from a policy perspective rather than solely from the perspective of individual and family pathology. Three types of proposals are offered: those having to do with job creation and work-oriented innovations; provisions for independent housing and lifestyle autonomy options; and opportunities for increased input and participation in policy matters by youths and families.

A Methodological Appendix is included following the Bibliography. This appendix provides detail about the research procedures used in the Bayside empirical study, focusing in particular on sampling and interviewing techniques and on the problem of definitions.
A look at the standard research literature on runaways is revealing as much for what it leaves out as for what it includes. Virtually all runaway research has ignored the social policy aspects (except for occasional interest in juvenile court procedures), and almost none of the research has touched on the historical aspects of running away (Lipschutz, 1977, and Libertoff, 1980, being the notable exceptions).

Research into runaway youth problems routinely focuses on pathologically-oriented questions: "Why do kids run away?" "What can be done to stop them from running away?" and "What can be done after they've run away?" While such questions may appear straightforward enough on the face of it, they conceal several underlying unexamined assumptions: 1) that leaving the family home was basically a bad move; 2) that going wherever the runaway went was basically a bad move; 3) that if things had been better at home, the youth would not have wanted to leave; and therefore 4) that running away from home is a personal and social problem, based on the existence of trouble in the family unit.

As universally-valid generalizations, all of these assumptions can be challenged. Further, they imply several conclusions which can also be challenged as universals: a) that the family is necessarily a good and proper place to be and stay if you are a minor; and b) that wherever the runaway youth is headed is necessarily bad, dangerous, or otherwise less than healthy.

Sociologist/Criminologist Marshall Clinard (1984) points out that the way in which a social problem is defined—or that it becomes defined as a social problem at all—determines the manner of reaction and response to that social problem. For example, when marijuana use was confined
to the backstage area of jazz clubs or to the relative isolation of Black urban ghettos, it was not seen as a serious social problem demanding urgent attention. However, when the use of marijuana spread to high schools, colleges, and middle-class children's bedrooms, a general public alarm resulted. (1)

Likewise, running away from home has been with us for many generations—presumably since families were first formed. Children, youths, or apprentices who could no longer be supported by the family or by the master have traditionally had no option but to go elsewhere and find work to sustain themselves; offspring who were physically or sexually abused have frequently wanted to escape from an oppressive and unyielding family unit; and youths who were not doing well in school, or who preferred working with their hands, have often moved on into the workforce prior to the age of majority, and the obtaining of a full-time job has frequently meant setting up a household for oneself. Yet, when during the late 1960s numerous teenagers from middle class, upper-middle class and wealthy homes began to migrate across the country, a general alarm went up.

Our perception of just what the social problem is amounts to the actual "creation" of that social problem in terms of the parameters of the problem's perceived substance and the societal response deemed appropriate. Since the runaway problem is "seen" as a problem of family disorganization, rather than a problem of economic or labour market disorganization, only issues which are relevant to family pathology are included in the discussion of causation and problem evolution, and in the discussion of relevant services or coercive interventions to be channeled to runaways. Policy is then legitimized on that basis.

The overt, though unstated message is: Family is good; therefore
running away is bad. But the "forgotten" part did not disappear totally. The underlying, implicit message to runaways is: The labour market is stable and set for maximum effectiveness; therefore wanting to work when young is unreasonable, not a question to be considered. All of this becomes implanted in our social consciousness as information which "everybody knows."

Research into the social problem of running away from home has accepted the societal definitions for the problem without analyzing the foundation and superstructure of runaway policy. Thus, runaway research resides almost totally within the pathological tradition, subject to the same dynamics which affect and guide other components of the "therapeutic state."

Along with media accounts of runaway events, runaway research reports can be seen as the "information arm" of runaway youth policy. As such, runaway research contributes to the perpetuation of the pathological approach and serves the function of diffusion of the pathological perspective throughout society. This function is an important one, since a workable social policy must be reflected in commonsense societal and neighborhood attitudes. Thus, examination of the runaway research tradition at this point in the study is meant to shed light on the evolution and dominance of the pathological perspective.
Researchers with the Scientific Analysis Corporation of California divide the runaway research literature into three groupings reflecting a "vocabulary of motives" attributed to runaways: "the sick, the bad, and the free." The first and largest body of literature they cite treats running away as evidence of some form of mental or emotional disorder; the second takes an environmental approach and looks at running away as involving delinquent tendencies and law-breaking behaviour; and the third body or research views the runaway act as a liberating experience devoid of particular pathology (SAC, 1974b).

In reviewing these three research perspectives, all of which derive from the pathological runaway orientation rather than from a background of policy critique, the focus will be on images created by the researchers and by the three research traditions. The aim of this exercise is to find how the research orientations have reinforced the pathology perspective, and how the research approaches have shifted with the counter-hegemonic reforms.

"The Sick": Concerns with Individual Pathology. This body of runaway literature, the largest and earliest, sees running away as evidence of mental or emotional disorder. Using a psychopathological model, these researchers and therapists have viewed running away from home as an individual disorder with implications for successful alleviation via a psychotherapeutic approach. Such a perspective formed a dominant theme in the research literature from the 1930s to the 1960s, and more recently has come to share the stage with other less pathogenic perspectives (Walker, 1975; Brennan, et al., 1978).

The view of runaway as a personality disorder was made explicit in an
entry for "Runaway Reaction of Childhood (or Adolescence)" in the Second Edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (APA, 1968) as Section 308.3:

Individuals with this disorder characteristically escape from threatening situations by running away from home for a day or more without permission. Typically they are immature and timid, and feel rejected at home, inadequate, and friendless. They often steal furtively.

The original DSM manual (APA, 1952) made no specific reference to runaways, but did mention concern for "the expression of his (sic) emancipatory strivings and vacillations" under "Adjustment Reaction of Adolescence (Section 000-x85) and included a category for "Conduct Disturbance" (e.g. that manifested by truancy, stealing, cruelty, sexual offenses, use of alcohol, etc.) under "Adjustment Reaction of Childhood" (Section 000-x842).

The most recent revised edition of this standard diagnostic guide, DSM-III (APA, 1980), drops the term runaway from the status of section title, but still retains mention of the act in the text of Section 312.10: "Conduct Disorder, Undersocialized, Nonaggressive" where "repeated running away from home overnight" appears as one of four possible indicators, along with serious lying, nonconfrontational stealing, and chronic violation of important, reasonable rules. (2)

No mention is made of runaway actions or "runaway reaction" in the Canadian manual of psychiatric diagnoses (CBS, 1969). However, the Canadian diagnostic guide apparently makes room for such behaviour within such headings as Section 308: Behaviour Disorders of Childhood (Delinquency); Section 301.7: Adjustment to Adolescence (Antisocial Personality); and Section 307: Transient Situational Disturbances ("acute reaction to over-
whelming environmental stress" ... "without any apparent underlying mental disorders" ... "more or less transient disorders of any severity...").

The most persistent proponent of the psychopathological perspective in recent years has been psychiatrist Richard Jenkins who, as advisor to the DSM editors in the specialty field of child and adolescent psychiatry, was instrumental in seeing that "runaway reaction" was included as an official diagnostic category (APA, 1980; Jenkins, 1971; Brennan et al, 1978). Jenkins and his associates found that runaways had less organized personalities than other delinquent types and were more difficult to treat successfully due to the presence of greater pathology. They found runaways characterized by insecurity, depression, and impulsivity.

Clairette Armstrong, in a 1937 study of 660 runaway boys, described running away as a "psychoneurotic reaction" characterized by mental deficiency, subnormal intelligence, poor impulse control, and an unstable makeup (Armstrong, 1937). Other writers since that time have seen runaways as involved with unresolved Oedipal conflict pressures, severe narcissism, low self-esteem, acting-out behaviours, fear of rejection, impulsivity, lack of inner controls, over-concern with loss of control and ego surrender, the need to express hostility and revenge, depression, anxiety and strong inner tensions, and premature attempts to achieve independence and autonomy (Riemer, 1940; Leventhal, 1964; Walker, 1975; Brennan et al, 1978; SAC, 1974b; ORC, 1976).

Running away has been viewed as evidence of "severe individual and family pathology" (Walker, 1975) and runaways have been characterized as displaying "pre-psychotic symptoms" (SAC, 1974b). Robins found, in a 30-year follow-up of patients in a child guidance clinic, that runaways later experienced more adult arrests and convictions, more divorces, and more
psychiatric illnesses (Robins, 1958).

Riemer (1940) described runaways as sometimes antagonistic, surly, defiant, impulsive, assaultive, and disruptive, and at other times overly submissive and docile. Leventhal (1964) described runaways as anxious, fearful, failing in school, and having few or no friends. He concluded that running away served to supplement the control which youths found lacking in their lives by counterbalancing the controlling forces of other difficult-to-control persons.

Two Travelers' Aid social workers have analyzed running away in terms of "crisis flight" or "chronic nomadic flight behaviour" and judge the runaway youth to be pursuing an episodic manner of coping to regain a sense of control (Hiatt and Spurlock, 1970). Literature on loneliness indicates that escaping to "greener pastures" is often followed by disappointment when loneliness and isolation is repeated in the new environment, causing the runaway to flee the new situation and continue with sequential escape behaviour (Brennan et al, 1978).

"The Bad": Concerns with Delinquency. The connection between running away and delinquency is a sensitive issue, with some researchers pointing with alarm to the law-breaking behaviour of runaways, and others taking an advocate position in viewing the runaway as a generally law-abiding victim of intolerable environmental pressures. Much of the dispute can be clarified by specifying whether the delinquencies being considered occurred before or after the runaway incident(s). Since running away has been classified as delinquent behaviour in virtually all North American jurisdictions, and since the fugitive status of runaway youth under present policies leads almost inevitably to some lawbreaking behaviour as a means of survival and as part of the runaway youth "street scene" social and employment contexts,
drawing some connection between running away and delinquency is not a difficult feat.

Numerous authors have discovered that runaways tend to engage in anti-social acts and exhibit high levels of delinquent behaviour when compared to non-runaways (Brennan et al., 1978; Hildebrand, 1963; Robins, 1958; Stierlin, 1974; Riemer, 1940; Nye and Short, 1957).

Hildebrand (1963) maintains that the runaway can frequently be described as a "second generation delinquent" who comes from a home which is poorly maintained, with little attention and guidance being given to the child. He claims that runaways grow up in "hard core" families--those which ultimately breed delinquency. Hildebrand, a New York City detective doing graduate work in police science at the time of his studies, advocates early intervention into families where children are showing signs of maladjustment. He comments that "like the oak that grew from the acorn, the runaway is often the seed of the future felon" (Ibid.: p. 216). (It will be recalled from Chapter 4 that fear of future criminality has generally been the major justification for criminalizing status offenses.)

Hildebrand notes that the great majority of the 262 runaway cases he obtained through police missing persons records came from the "middle income group"--a finding which speaks against the common public perception (prior to 1967) of runaways as coming primarily from lower-class origins.

Shellow et al. (1967), in their study of runaways in a suburban county near Washington, D.C., found that multiple (repeater) runaways engaged in much more delinquent involvement than one-time or occasional runaways. The repeat runaways reported more conflict at home and in school and had more extensive arrest records. The researchers found the occasional runaway to be not significantly different from non-runaway youths in regard to the
number and seriousness of delinquent acts. Since this group of occasional
and one-time runaways formed the largest portion of the runaways they studied,
Shellow and associates concluded that delinquency is not a major factor
in the lives of most runaway youths. Other writers (e.g., Chapman, 1975;
Kaufman et al, 1969) have come to similar conclusions in reporting that
the great majority of runaways are nondelinquent.

Several studies of runaways have used self-report delinquency data
rather than rely on official arrest or juvenile court records. Self-report
questionnaires, administered confidentially to large groups of teenagers
from the general population (often in school settings) ask questions phrased
in the format: "Have you ever engaged in ______" for a variety of major
and minor delinquent offenses. These studies are thought to give more
accurate indications of true law-breaking behaviour among youths than studies
relying on agency statistics. A number of self-report studies (Walker,
1975: pp. 8-17; Brennan et al, 1978; Nye and Short, 1957) have produced
evidence of a high degree of delinquent activity among youths who have also
run away. Brennan and associates (1978: pp. 239-242) counter the Shellow
study with evidence that single-time runaways in their sample were actually
"much more delinquent than the nonrunaways."

Most of the studies cited above tend to aggravate the chicken-and-egg
dilemma by failing to distinguish delinquent behaviour occurring before
and after the first runaway act. One nationwide U.S. survey (ORC, 1976)
did make such a distinction in several survey questions and found that
significantly more runaways than non-runaways had been judged delinquent
prior to ever running away. This finding would indicate that running away
is frequently the "final act" in a long series of troublesome episodes
beginning early in the family's history.
"The Free": Running Away as Liberation. A number of authors have spoken out against reducing runaway behaviour to simple psychopathological or delinquency explanations. Adams and Munro (1979: p. 370) write in a recent article:

Evidence suggests that the majority of runaways today are not a group of pathological, "sick" individuals, nor are they an isolated segment of society, but part of a greater group recognizing need for change .... Both youth and adults are leaving what appears to be a system which does not provide adequate reinforcement for an individual's needs socially or intrapsychically. Runaway behavior is one alternative which, in part, seeks to find alternatives to this dilemma.

Adams and Munro's reference to adult runaway actions suggests a comparison of adolescent runaway situations with adult couple separations and divorce--circumstances which are indeed traumatic, but which have come to be accepted as commonplace and not necessarily pathological.

Shellow and associates (1967: pp. 3-4), in their monograph on suburban runaways, cite various studies which contend that "many of the individuals who are making their initial runaway will find the problem solved during and by this episode"; that "many cases of this type right themselves in time and the running away solves the problem"; and that running away has "fairly simple connotations" for most youngsters, and represents in most instances "a healthy mode of response to an intolerable situation."

Goldmeier and Dean (1973) propose that runaway actions are motivated by the interaction of several complex factors which cannot be reduced to purely psychopathological, or even situational explanations. They maintain that stresses pertaining to family relations, school adjustment, interpersonal communication and support networks interrelate to cause great difficulty--especially in regard to getting along with adults. Runaways studied by these researchers had "reasonably high self concepts," adequate
problem-solving capacities, and good relationships with peers.

Thus, it may be possible to view the runaway act as a situational response and a positive aspect of coping, where support is sought from peers rather than from the adult-dominated environment of the family or the school.

(Goldmeier & Dean, 1973: p. 545)

Deborah Walker (1975) cites authors who describe running away as equivalent to a summer holiday; an initiation into adulthood; an expression of a developing sense of selfhood and independence; or a positive step in problem solving. Brennan and associates (1978) cite alternative explanations which view running away as rejection of middle-class society by rebellious youths; as a search for fun and adventure; as an escape from the loneliness of their everyday home environments; and as part of a typical developmental process of growth and separation from parents. Lillian Ambrosino (1971) has pointed out that the need to escape, even temporarily, from the dreary routine of everyday stresses is a need which is found acceptable for adults, but not for the nation's young.

Adventuresome youths following a "wanderlust" inclination frequently justify their run simply on the basis of pleasure seeking, exploration, and a desire for freedom (Kaufman et al, 1969; SAC, 1974b). The more romantic accounts of the "flower child" migrations to San Francisco's Haight-Ashbury and other big city youth meccas in the late 1960s--prior to the decline in the character of that and other such districts with the subsequent increase in organized crime, serious drug abuse, and violence--fit into this explanatory framework. However, another justification which occasionally emerges is that running away can be a "test of one's ability to 'make it' in the real world, offering the wanderer exciting personal challenges and the excitement of experiencing new frontiers, both psychological and environmental" (SAC, 1974b: p. 13).
Pathological Versus Liberationist Viewpoints

The "sick, bad, and free" categories tend to refer back to three distinct types of social service approaches which are available to or are imposed upon runaway youths and their families.

They also reflect particular methodological approaches or sampling procedures. Runaway research focusing on individual pathology has been conducted primarily by psychotherapists and other clinical personnel using populations obtained through mental health clinic rosters. The delinquency of runaways has generally been studied using data from court records or probation office samples—again a special and limited group. And the studies which focus on the liberating nature of running away from home tend to emanate from researchers and journalists with a critical bent and an interest in children's rights concerns, who more often use first-person testimony of youths themselves and/or participant observation field work in developing a critique of agency practices. Certainly, the perspective of the researcher involved, the nature of the sample selection process, the methods used in obtaining and analyzing the data, and the type of environment where the study takes place has considerable influence upon what kinds of findings will result.

Concern with the location of blame and pathology permeates the available studies. As Shellow and associates have written (1967: p. 1):

An examination of the relatively sparse literature on runaways discloses two almost opposite points of view: One position asserts that running away is evidence of individual psychopathology, that runaways show serious personal disturbance manifested in impulsive, disorganized, and delinquent behavior. The other position, though not excluding the possibility of pathologically driven behavior, contends that most running away is best inter-
interpreted as an adaptive response to situational pressures, the origins of which may lie in ordinary family conflicts or even in general economic conditions.

The difference between these two positions seems to derive principally from differences in methodology: the samples selected, the instruments used, and the data collected. Perhaps the most important of these is selection of samples. The runaway from home is usually caught in one of three nets set up by society: the legal-correctional net, the mental health net, or the welfare services net. How the runaway act is interpreted depends in large part on which of these nets is used.

Beyond sample selection and methodology, what could account for the differences between the "sick, bad and free" perspectives? Of course, one answer might be that each of the three categories is valid for a particular segment of the runaway population; this explanation would argue for the diversity of types of runaway factors and situations, a diversity duly noted by Brennan and very evident in the present study. But by grouping the "sick" and "bad" explanatory frameworks together as representing a pathological perspective on running away, and contrasting these two with the "free" category as representing an advocacy viewpoint, it is possible to fit the discussion of research perspectives into the policy analysis of the present study.

It is especially germane to look at the chronology of these competing perspectives. The "individual pathology" and "delinquency" perspectives were predominant in the 1940s and 1950s, and have been partially supplanted by more "liberationist" perspectives in writings occurring since the mid-1960s. This shift has coincided almost precisely with other runaway developments, such as the advent of the runaway house movement in the U.S., and the surge of emergency street services in the U.S. and Canada which occurred in response to the new migratory pressures by middle-class, upper-middle class and upper class Caucasian youth. This shift in demand, services,
and research sympathies was a significant shift in attitudes and action which represents both a disenchantment with the more traditional approach to runaway policy and services, and the spontaneous creation of a new advocacy approach to replace the former coercive/control approach to runaways. It is this shift which I am terming the "counter-hegemonic moment" in runaway youth policy history.

This transition from an orientation focusing strictly on individual pathology to a more youth-oriented perspective which recognized possible legitimate reasons for running away also coincides with the recent awakening of concern over physical and sexual abuse—problems which have undoubtedly been with us since the beginning of family life, but which have only in recent years stimulated significant agency action. There has been at least a slight shifting of the power balance from parents to children over the past several decades, with child advocacy receiving greater emphasis as an element of social policy.

The irony of children choosing to live in poverty, danger, and uncertainty rather than return to an undesirable family situation has contributed to new explanations for runaway behaviour which point to the inadequate or damaging home environments from which many runaways are fleeing. And of course the fact that numerous recent runaway youth have come from upper-middle class or wealthy families has not escaped public notice: When a runaway youth leaves behind a boat, motorcycle, several cars, vacation equipment, and a large house which is useful for entertaining friends, observers more easily notice that things may well have become intolerable there in terms of strained relationships and family discord.

Bock and English (1973) have indicated that running away is frequently the most sensible course for a youngster suffering from
a troubled home situation. In fact, running away from intolerable and dangerous living conditions can be sensibly viewed as necessary to survival. Agency sources in Bayside agreed that "Running away from home is sometimes the first smart thing a kid has done." Beggs (1969) and Richette (1969) have written of the runaway act as an S.O.S. alert signal which calls attention to extremely stressful, hopeless, or cruel family conditions and which may lead to needed intervention—a process which Richette refers to as "the youthful art of self-rescue."

As was noted in Chapter 1, the therapeutic state seeks to solve social problems by treating individual deviance. In the case of runaway policy, focusing either on "teenager blame" or "family blame" approaches would have worked within the pathological policy framework. That an approach focusing on the pathology of individual runaways (see the "Sick, Bad, or Free" typology above) held sway for so long in preference to an approach which would have found clear and present danger in the runaway's family unit is one of several indications that runaway policy exists in large part to perpetuate parental authority over minors and protect the status quo of economic dependency of youth—rather than having the relieving of family member stress as its primary concern.

The Progressive-era policies aimed to remove youngsters from dangerous streetcorners, pool halls and taverns at a time when they were no longer readily employable. Policymakers wanted to re-establish parental authority which had been lost or strained and resolve the labour market contradiction of youth unemployability. Restoring family harmony and enhancing youth comfort and happiness in the home were secondary motives and provided runaway policy with a benevolent, advocacy gloss which was present but lay dormant throughout the 20th century until it emerged as a regenerated
strategy during the counter-hegemonic period of runaway policy reform. But the primary objective of runaway policy was to neutralize adolescent energies at a time when youths had very little in the way of productive activities to occupy their time.

One category of home-leaving youth which does not fit into any of the perspectives mentioned is that of "the prematurely self-supporting young adult." Numerous Bayside youths had emancipated from their parents and done quite well living and working on their own prior to the age of majority--some with and some without parental cooperation or consent. This type of youth seldom fits the pathological model.

"The sick" and "the bad" frameworks look to individual youth deviance for causal explanations. The newer "family blame" perspective extends the pathological notions to a larger social unit and in so doing sacrifices much of the previous policy support for parental authority and for parental economic responsibility for offspring.

While "the free" approach to understanding runaways may appear to be a non-pathological perspective, it is a reaction to the pathological view and thus is encapsulated in the therapeutic explanatory style. Statements such as: "They are not necessarily sick," "The problem will right itself in time," "It was a healthy response to an intolerable situation," and "They sought to escape from the dreary routine of everyday stresses" rely on a pathological framework as their base. Even the "wanderlust" and "developing a sense of selfhood" explanations pose the runaway event as a transient, situational problem. In brief, the "free" explanatory framework has at its base a benevolent advocacy rather than a liberative advocacy approach.

Only the "self-supporting young adult" category (dropping the "prematurely" as a pathological remnant) distances itself sufficiently from
the pathological framework to provide a true alternative. The advocacy approach of the counter-hegemonic era which gave rise to "the free" perspective in runaway literature certainly did open the door for acceptance of the idea of youths living temporarily or permanently on their own in healthy environments; of youths opting for better relationships and better environments; and of youths in certain situations making decisions on their own without the necessity of parental approval. The advocacy approach also opened the door for acceptance of a "family blame" perspective after years of individual-runaway-blame social service orientation.

"Family blame" is a perspective which tends to reverse the traditional effect of runaway policy by justifying home-leaving rather than aiming to move all runaways back into the family milieu. But there is no mechanism within the counter-hegemonic era advocacy approach to eliminate illicit and underground employment situations or to replace urban youth ghettos with healthier environments. Advocacy is extremely limited if youths remain unemployable in the legitimate job market and if living on one's own as a minor remains illegal and socially disapproved.

Thus, the counter-culture reforms alerted the general public to the runaway youth's point of view, approached the problem of runaways from a new angle, and created "stop-gap" measures benefiting youths and families in crisis. But, despite the ample funding of runaway houses and runaway research in the U.S., and despite the moves to shift runaway matters from probation to youth social welfare jurisdictions in the U.S. and Canada, the new advocacy perspective has had and can have only a rather superficial impact. The reason for this is that true structural changes have neither been proposed nor implemented as policy alternatives.

It is necessary, then, to distinguish between two types of advocacy
approaches in runaway youth matters: "benevolent advocacy" and "liberative advocacy." Benevolent advocacy was the approach of the Progressive reformers and is the perspective which underlies the "free" approach to runaway research. But a new, more structure-challenging approach has emerged from the "free" approach to research and from the counter-culture runaway service reforms. This liberative advocacy approach questions the necessity of rigid, detailed age-grading barriers, seeks out innovative youth employment and housing opportunities, and strives to give runaway youths more of a voice in matters affecting them. It is this latter perspective which might serve to challenge the pathological perspective with more permanent success than has the benevolent approach. It is this newer liberative advocacy perspective which underlies the proposals for structural changes that are advanced in the concluding chapter.
NOTES

1. The equation can also be turned the other way around: When a problem which some people see as troublesome does not become generally defined as a social problem, or not perceived as a particularly serious and far-reaching social problem, enforcement will be lax or nonexistent even when the problem is ensconced in legislation. This is the case with white collar and corporate crime, environmental pollution, the destruction of wilderness areas and endangered animal species, factory health and safety, nuclear armaments and nuclear waste disposal, all of which have received partial or half-hearted definition as social problems.

2. The list of runaway "motives" could easily be expanded to also include: the deprived, neglected, or abandoned; the abused; the rebellious; and the prematurely self-supporting young adult. However, the SAC typology will be retained since the categorization scheme is meant to describe the types of perspectives and research assumptions held about runaways by researchers. Also, each of the three perspectives ("the sick, the bad, and the free") reflects a rather coherent set of assumptions held by a particular group of researchers, policymakers, social workers, family members, and neighbors. The "sick, bad, and free" categories located by the California analysts are virtually identical to groupings found in other reviews of the runaway literature (see Brennan, et al., 1978; Walker, 1975; and ORC, 1976). They tend to represent and refer back to three distinct types of social service approaches which are available to or imposed upon runaway youths and their families. They also reflect particular methodological approaches or sampling procedures which have been commonly employed in runaway research.

3. This is the latest DSM revision which made headlines by dropping homosexuality from the status of a mental disorder (except where the individual's desire to become heterosexual is persistent and distressing, in which case it is the latter distress which is viewed as troublesome rather than the homosexuality itself—see Section 302 (APA, 1980)); yet runaway was retained as a diagnostic category, even if reduced in visibility.
Chapter 7
OVERVIEW OF BAYSIDE AND ITS RUNAWAY YOUTH

Bayside is a community very much like the typical sort of community which many of the "flower children" of the late 1960s ran away from. An upper-middle class suburb serving as a "bedroom community" for families of Vancouver executives and professionals, the waterfront town is expensive, exclusive, and insulated from most of the urban blight and disorder which tends to characterize large, metropolitan areas.

The prevalent mystique of exclusive residential peace began early on. Bayside originated around 1900 as a peaceful wooded retreat for those sturdy enough to push their way into the densely forested wilderness. William Armstrong, an early pioneer and developer, wrote that he intended to build "a village of good design according to the contours of nature." He further indicated: "I will reserve the entire waterfront as a public park for the estate. I will lay the foundations of a village of beauty with wise restrictions."

In 1912, the 700 residents of Bayside decided to break off from the District government which had begun developing industrial sections stretching out on the east side of the Klahanie River. Bayside, to the west of the river, incorporated as an independent, non-industrial, strictly residential municipality with its own autonomous governmental structure, leaving the area which is now East Bayside to follow the winds of manufacturing and shipping expansion.

Bayside faced falling tax revenues and heavy debt payments going into the Depression, but was rescued when, in 1930, the titled Guinness family in England purchased 4000 acres of raw land stretching across the Mistletoe Ridge foothills and carved an exclusive 1000-acre subdivision out of the wilderness. Guinness Heights, as the new development came to be known,
moved Bayside's splendor to its present mythical proportions in the public mind. The Guinness Corporation built a magnificent bridge across the inlet to Vancouver where a ferry had previously provided transport, and as new residents and capital flowed into the municipality, Bayside was stabilized as a plush suburban retreat serving as a refuge from the tense urban working environment of Vancouver.

In a community which values upward mobility, comfort, seclusion, and prominence, Bayside's children are imbued with such suburban success values from an early age. Numerous informants in the study commented upon the intensity with which teenagers were pushed to succeed in school and move toward high-paying professional or business careers. Such expectations to move on to the best college or university and equip oneself for high-status careers amounted to something like a "pressure cooker syndrome" which tended to complicate the work of teachers and youth workers in the exclusive community.

A second related theme was the neglect of quality family life and quality parenting which agency informants believed resulted from the preoccupation of parents busy with intensely involving occupational, professional, and social lives. The two interlocking patterns—intense pressure to succeed combined with neglectful or "absentee" parenting—coincided to create unique frustrations among Bayside's wealthier runaways. Emotional poverty amidst material plenty was seen by many interviewees as the peculiar Bayside family susceptibility.

Parental pressure to succeed in school is particularly constraining when the student is not interested in academic subject matter, lacks the necessary cognitive skills, or has dissimilar occupational goals from those of the parent. In a community such as Bayside, which gauges its educational
progress largely on the high percentage of its high school students who are admitted to major universities upon graduation, such parental pressures become peer pressures and community pressures as well, which accelerates the level of student stress.

Since school failure tends to be closely related to runaway behaviour, the pressure on upper-middle class suburban students to succeed in school clearly leads to high rates of school-connected runaway episodes in a community such as Bayside. Furthermore, adolescent misbehaviour—sure to lead to some degree of embarrassment, confusion, and consequences in any community—becomes especially visible and embarrassing in an intentionally orderly and prestigious community such as Bayside. And runaway youth policies are of the same genre as other preventive policies geared toward the maintenance of community decorum.

The chapter opens with a discussion of the youth services network in Bayside, with particular attention being given to the tension between control and advocacy approaches in agency services to runaway youth. The later sections of the chapter summarize the characteristics of runaways and runaway actions in Bayside based on the statistical findings from the youth, parent, and agency worker interviews.

The goal of this "community study of running away" is to draw connections between the legalistic and abstract formulations of social policy on the one hand, and the realities of family, community, and agency controversies on the other. In so doing, we will be attempting to bridge "macro" and "micro" levels in the search for how public policy affects people on the local level, and in turn how community members through their daily use of discretionary action affect those policies and their implementation.
Youth-Serving Agencies in Bayside

The inability of the labour market to absorb idle youths is especially troublesome in a suburban community where most high school students are expected to go on to college and succeed in high-paid professions or businesses. The protection afforded by such a set-apart community is contradicted by the pressure to succeed in academic pursuits at all costs. Just as runaway policy and services reflect confusion between benevolence and control, so also does the suburban community display a tension between the advantages which come from exclusivity and material comfort versus the environmental and social controls which place restrictions on freedom of movement.

The suburban runaway experiences a special trapped feeling: in the midst of material advantage and potential for successful future lives, such youths experience feelings of being over-controlled. Numerous Bayside runaways shun these material advantages—in some cases turning their backs on inheritances or routes to prestigious futures—in order to gain some control over their own lives.

Thus, the suburban refuge tends to reflect the contradictions of runaway policy and other protective, decorum-oriented policies: the ambivalence and tension between benevolence, advantage, and comfort versus the need for control, containment, and restrictions which are thought to be needed in order to maintain the suburban comforts. In the case of suburban runaway youths, this control manifests itself in a tendency to direct offspring in particularly narrow channels toward particular kinds of occupational success, while denying the youth access to alternative educational or job options. The resulting pressure derives from a limitation of options even
in the midst of a suburban ethic which promotes success and expansion of material comforts.

Included in the suburban values which Bayside has cultivated over the years is the idea of community and pride in community services. Even though quite a number of the agency people interviewed for the study cannot themselves afford to be residents of Bayside and thus commute in to the community to work, the agency workers almost uniformly appear to have a greater than average pride in the successes of educational, mental health, and social services in Bayside, and in their abilities to work together smoothly across agency lines, despite unevenness in policy constraints and differences in training and background.

This feeling of smooth accord is, of course—as in any community—marred by the dissonant notes of specific disputes. Not surprisingly, many of the negative reactions have concerned the actions or inactions of the community's largest, best-funded, and most powerful bureaucratic resource—and the agency having most contact with runaways—the B.C. Ministry of Human Resources (MHR) and its local office.

Throughout much of the decade, a running feud persisted between the local administrator of the MHR office and the local director of the private/nonprofit Family Services agency. A primary bone of contention was the MHR administrator's claim that the functioning of Family Services in the community represented a duplication of services since both MHR and Family Services provided family support and counseling. Because of MHR's dual role as service provider and as funding conduit for various private/nonprofit service providers, the local MHR office was able to effectively limit funds to a "competitor." Critics of the Bayside MHR stance toward Family Services maintained that there was no duplication of services since, in their
view, the services provided by MHR to families under stress were grossly inadequate. Family Services was seen by these critics as the superior family counseling agency, which utilized a full-family treatment approach and was receiving referrals of the "toughest" cases from throughout the community agency network, though generally not from MHR.

The work of the local MHR was criticized by a number of informants in the study in a manner typical of critical evaluations of large, impersonal bureaucratic agencies. Frequent concern was expressed that the local office tended to mishandle family matters requiring great delicacy, being too quick to intervene on certain trivial matters, yet too slow to act in situations of severe child neglect and abuse.

In the spring of 1978, an outspoken high school guidance counselor fired off an angry letter to the Bayside mayor detailing his dissatisfaction with the quality of MHR services in the community. The letter, which was inspired by a referral from the counselor to MHR which--like many before it--had been unsuccessful, made its way up the MHR hierarchy to the provincial headquarters of the agency in Victoria. A meeting was held in the Bayside MHR office with a variety of concerned and critical agency representatives, to try and heal the long-standing rift between MHR and other agencies. Dissatisfactions were aired, but a promised second meeting of the group never materialized.

Several changes did take place in MHR operations over the next two years, however, at least partly in response to the incessant community criticism of the local public assistance and child welfare office. In the fall of 1978, two "family support workers" were hired to work out of the Bayside MHR office as part of a newly-instituted program to help families stay together (a priority of the conservative Social Credit government which
was then in power). Both were young, alert paraprofessionals who began immediately to interact cooperatively with other Bayside agencies and to make supportive contact with some of MHR's "toughest" families. MHR's rating among the Bayside agency network rose considerably as the family support workers—the lowest social work personnel on the MHR hierarchy in terms of training, pay, or prestige—involved themselves assertively in inter-agency collaboration and creative family problem-solving. The approach of the family support workers was very much like that of paraprofessional detached street workers who had been much in evidence during the runaway youth migrations of the late sixties and early seventies.

During the spring of 1980, a major shake-up of the Bayside MHR staffing pattern occurred with very little notice. Partly a response to the Bayside criticisms and partly a reaction to broader agency contingencies, the shift in personnel was facilitated by the replacement of the regional manager by an administrator who came from out of town and set about "cleaning house" throughout the region. Molly Boston, the Bayside MHR manager who had been so controversial, was encouraged to take an early retirement and left provincial service. The three M.S.W. social workers who had handled child welfare cases were all moved to different offices in East Bayside. While many Bayside agency observers believed the shift must have been an attempt to straighten out what they saw a long-standing inefficiency and lack of productive help to families in Bayside, the official explanation which drifted down from MHR's regional office was that services to families in East Bayside were "in such a mess" that the social work team from Bayside was being moved to that community to raise the quality of its services.

The controversies in Bayside over MHR's functioning are relevant to the issue of control/advocacy tensions being developed in the present study.
As the largest, most bureaucratic agency serving Bayside families, the Ministry of Human Resources clearly has the greatest difficulty in being flexible, in innovating new approaches, and in diverging from the "letter" of social policy. The other Bayside agencies were smaller, more locally-controlled, and less constrained by large, bureaucratic hierarchies. As a result, the long-running schism between Bayside MHR and the rest of the Bayside agency network was delineated very much along control/advocacy lines. Ironically enough, even the police and probation offices in Bayside--overtly the most control-oriented agencies--were critical of Bayside MHR's overly punitive and insensitive approaches to families. These policing and corrections agencies were often in the forefront of youth advocacy innovations.

Bayside Police Department is independent and thus is organized from within the community by Municipal Council. Family Services is run from a main office in East Bayside which administers just these two offices. Probation, while a provincial service, is organized differently from MHR so that each local office has considerably more autonomy and room to innovate creative services. Schools, the other major agency dealing with runaway matters, are legislated provincially, but are administered from local school boards. Internally, guidance counselors and vice-principals in Bayside are given considerable leeway to operate in personalized fashion.

The Ministry of Human Resources, on the other hand, operates through an extensive hierarchy wherein local decisions are constantly reviewed by regional and provincial authorities. Furthermore, policies are transmitted downward in extremely literal fashion, and local adherence to provincial policies are reviewed with regularity and in a systematic manner. Thus, MHR as the largest, most tightly controlled and complex agency serving
Bayside families stands out against the more informal, locally-based operations of the other Bayside agencies.

MHR, as a result, has tended to function largely from a control/containment orientation, despite a prevalent rhetoric of protection of children and families, while the smaller, locally-controlled agency services have been more flexible, more innovative, and more oriented toward youth and family advocacy approaches. The introduction into Bayside of the two MHR family support workers was an exception to this trend and their presence and active advocacy orientation served as a bridge between the control and advocacy approaches then at odds in the community, and as a bridge between Bayside MHR and the other community services.

**Bayside Police and Probation Services.** The advocacy perspective of the locally-based youth services was never total nor without contradictions, however, and Bayside MHR was not the only office to experience tension and confusion over which direction to face: control of youth movements or advocacy in facilitating teenagers' own decision making. Several agency structural changes occurring during the late 1970s affected this control/advocacy tension.

During the early and mid-1970s, Marlene Hartnell, the community's primary juvenile probation officer, spent a good amount of time on "preventative work." Each Monday morning when she arrived at work (in this case from a Bayside home in one of the more expensive districts), Hartnell would make a phone call to Corporal Barney Cooper of the Bayside Police youth squad to find out what trouble among Bayside juveniles they had encountered over the weekend. Quite often there would be several runaway actions, with some youths going alone and others taking friends along. During certain periods, especially in spring and summer, the runaway activity seemed to
reach sometimes epidemic proportions.

Hartnell was under no formal obligation to make such phone calls, to keep up the constant liaison with other agencies that she always maintained, nor to engage in the extensive informal youth and family counseling which she voluntarily fell into—often with youths who were not on probation. Frequently she felt like a parent surrogate for many of her formal probationers and informal counsellees, and she frequently acted as intermediary between runaways and their parents. Her probation office work extended well beyond supervision of a caseload, court appearances, and the writing of briefs for juvenile court.

Hartnell's style was to involve as many community and agency resources as possible in as helpful and cooperative a spirit as was attainable, whether for inter-agency planning or in the case plan for a particular youth or family. However, toward the end of the decade, there was much less of this cooperative, volunteer spirit being shown by Hartnell. Her formal caseload had increased measurably, and she and the other probation officers in her office had almost no time for "preventative work."

The Monday morning phone calls to the youth squad (now renamed the "crime prevention unit") fell off to those needed to conduct official business. A policy revision on "incorrigibles" in 1978 meant that the Ministry of Human Resources was to be seen as "the agency with the mandate" to deal with runaways and other status offenders (see Chapter 4). This meant that all status offenders coming to the attention of the probation office would be automatically referred to MHR. Hartnell's advocacy and counseling with runaways came to a virtual standstill due to her heavier formal caseload, and the policy shift which now made work with runaways not only entirely informal but also technically outside of her mandate and
Similar changes occurred in the Bayside Police Department at about the same time when the "youth squad" became the "crime prevention unit" and took on other duties, such as presentations to school classes, embossing of identification numbers on valuables, "community watch" self-help programs, and monitoring of press coverage of departmental affairs. While the unit's function had always been seen as preventative, the new duties of the officers involved took on more and more public relations dimensions. The previous work which the small group of three officers had done with children and youth in trouble was now parceled out to beat constables from the general patrol unit.

Prior to this administrative shift, the specially-selected officers of the youth squad had operated from a small-town style of informality and discretionary counseling which valued resolution of troubles over formal criminal apprehensions. The squad was renowned in Bayside for its sensitive handling of delicate family matters. This group of officers under the previous structure had consistently used a non-punitive, advocacy approach despite their formal powers of arrest and coercion.

The administrative changes in probation and police services in Bayside left a gap in the community's services to runaways. Yet neither change was formally intended to move that agency from an advocacy to a control perspective in terms of dealings with status offenders. In fact, both changes were thought to have benevolent effects. In the case of the 1978 probation policy change, status offenses (generally capsulized in the formal charge of "incorrigibility" in B.C. juvenile court practice) were "decriminalized" through shifting jurisdiction for such offenses over to social services. This lessens the chance of coercive confinement or
coercive regulation for runaways (though not eliminating it, since child protection statutes can also lead to forced apprehensions of minors). In the case of the police department, the organizational shift was believed to represent a move toward a greater prevention emphasis. Nevertheless, in actual practice it meant the disappearance of an important preventative and remedial approach to policing through loss of the advocacy-oriented youth squad.

Despite the fact that in neither instance was there any clearly premeditated desire to eliminate an important advocacy service for juveniles, neither the informal, preventative community and family work by probation officer Hartnell, nor the small-town, big-brother approach of the superseded police youth squad were sufficiently recognized in the respective hierarchies to be retained as important services. The net result was loss of two important advocacy services which had been of considerable benefit to Bayside runaways.

**Special Youth Services in Bayside Schools.** Early in the decade, one of the Bayside High School shop teachers was delegated to research work study and work experience programs in Canada and the U.S. and to set up a work-related program in the district's secondary schools. Les Covington, the shop teacher turned program planner, set up a work experience program wherein students received credit for carefully selected and supervised part-time jobs (paid or volunteer) which became an integral part of their high school curriculum.

Covington had an easy manner with teenagers and their parents and his interest in them went beyond job placements. Frequently he took on a counseling or mediating role and he was a person who could listen empathetically without seeming to take sides in a family dispute. He also was a staunch defender of those youths from upper-middle class Bayside who
insisted that they preferred to work with their hands.

During the mid-1970s, the Bayside school district expanded a special program for students about to drop out of school which had begun as a project at Hilltop High School—the high school in the wealthiest district of Bayside, near Guinness Heights. The program now covers the district and provides both a boys' component and a girls' component. Work-Study (a pseudonym) is designed to serve those students unable or unwilling to continue in the regular high schools.

Utilizing an open classroom concept and a low teacher-student ratio, the special classrooms work to salvage the high school education of students who have become disenchanted and discouraged with school. Students in Girls' Work-Study and in Boys' Work-Study may work full-time or part-time and receive school credit for this work experience. Individualized learning packets allow students to advance through their remaining grades at their own pace, whether slower or faster than the norm. This means that students in the Work-Study components can do more than one year's school work in a calendar year if they are so motivated. In fact, Cindy Fraser, one of the runaways in this study, graduated from Work-Study with a high school diploma at the age of 16, one year earlier than most students in the regular high schools. Some parents and students believe that a Work-Study diploma is not equivalent to a "real" diploma, but a number of the programs' graduates have entered college programs, and several others have been able to transfer back into one of Bayside's three regular high schools.

Both Boys' Work-Study and Girls' Work-Study have enrolled a high proportion of runaways and former runaways. The teachers and teacher's aides in these programs double as personal counselors, sex educators and employment advisors--roles which go well beyond normal classroom duty. Therefore,
these teachers are much more integrally involved in the community social service network than a normal classroom teacher would be. Because of the unpredictable and often hostile behaviour of their student-wards, and because of the inevitable controversy over how best to deal with such "tough customers," the teachers in these special programs have not always been in smooth accord with the wishes of other agency people in Bayside.

Linda Silver, the highly organized and streetwise head teacher in Girls' Work-Study (who comes to the program with social work and teaching experience) has never seen eye-to-eye with her boss in the school administration on how to best approach this type of student, but has always been able to appeal to other administrative levels when the two were at absolute loggerheads. Silver's approach to teaching rebellious drop-out students is decidedly unbureaucratic. In order to individualize instruction and meet student's unique needs, she is quite ready to take short-cuts and set new precedents.

When 16-year old Carrie Masters brought her suitcase with her to school early in the fall of 1977, it was clear that she was not intending to go home that afternoon. Silver noticed that Carrie's clothes were soiled and found out that the girl had been sleeping on the beach for several nights. The Work-Study teacher took Carrie home with her that evening. The girl lived in the teacher's home for about two months, and each morning and evening the two would take the 50-minute drive to and from the outlying community where Silver lived. Carrie obtained a part-time babysitting job as a beginning move toward financial independence from her family.

During her three runaway situations (one for five days, the second for two weeks, and the third lasting two and one-half months), and for 6 months spent with relatives in Idaho, Carrie never missed a day of school.
Sometimes she would stash her suitcases in the Work-Study classroom. Linda Silver's facilitative intervention in the case of Carrie Masters was typical of the advocacy approach taken by the Work-Study staff—an approach which emphasized lending a patient listening ear, respecting the space within which the students found themselves, and innovating solutions together which fit the situation at hand, even when that solution sometimes violated the letter of traditional regulations. Such an approach is student-oriented rather than rule-oriented, and thus Work-Study teachers were often at odds with others in the education or social services network.

School teachers, counselors and administrators are in many ways the logical "front line" workers in dealing with runaway matters—if they choose to include this as part of their scope of operations. I frequently heard of school people becoming involved in runaway situations in rather routine ways and then perhaps becoming the key resource to the family until resolution of the trouble.

A typical sequence had the parents phoning the school the morning after the run to see if the youngster had been seen that day: "He didn't come home last night, so I wanted to see if he came to school." In another standard scenario, word gets around the school student grapevine that a student has been absent because of having run away from home. Judicious questioning of other students by a teacher or counselor can unearth data on the crisis events which can lead to meaningful intervention by the school person or another agency.

School nurses are provided to the district by the area office of the provincial health unit and are able, in a number of cases, to provide effective counseling to runaways before, during or after their run. The school nurse's role is a much less visible one than that of teacher or
counselor, and students frequently can attain the kind of privacy and confidentiality they need when confiding their story in the nurse's office. Several Bayside school nurses have embarked upon a Lifestyles Education program which touches on diet, alcohol and drug abuse, sex education and other topics of vital importance to teenagers experimenting with lifestyle options.

The agency most in touch with runaways on a community-wide basis is the school system, primarily because this is the only agency having daily contact with most of the minors in the community. Since the sanctions available to schools in regard to the disciplining and control of runaways are minimal (suspension from school having little effect on a student who is already chronically absent), interventions by school people tend to be motivated from an advocacy, mediation perspective.

Group Foster Homes in Bayside. Due to the community mood to keep Bayside uncluttered with unnecessarily troublesome or disruptive influences, municipal zoning regulations have effectively prohibited the establishment of group homes within municipal boundaries. In recent years, social welfare personnel in the community have pointed out that this barrier to needed residential facilities in Bayside has meant that many of Bayside's problems are being "exported" to the care of other communities with more liberal zoning provisions, because of the fear of having problems imported to Bayside from elsewhere.

During the period relevant to the study, only two residential facilities existed to serve the needs of Bayside youth who could not live at home. Both of these have been designated as "foster homes" rather than "group homes" because of the zoning prohibition mentioned above and because such an arrangement was easier to administer and less expensive to fund under
MHR regulations. Nevertheless, both regularly housed five or more children or teenagers and were commonly referred to in Bayside as "group homes." They will be referred to here as "group foster homes."

Barbara Kinsman's group foster home began in 1965 when she began to take in occasional foster children. A single parent with seven offspring of her own, "Mom" Kinsman was one of those who took to parenting and substitute parenting very naturally. Eventually the household expanded with official and unofficial foster children, some of whom were brought home by Kinsman's natural children when found to be in trouble. The size of the household often worked to the children's advantage. As the commonsense "casework" methods of the home evolved over time, the natural Kinsman children and veteran foster children gained in their competencies at interpersonal support and group decision-making, taking an active part in regulating unwanted behaviours and in stimulating pride in mutual personal growth.

Mom Kinsman had herself been a runaway and foster child in England and had spent her childhood in a variety of substitute parenting arrangements. She had later received a nursing degree, but had only worked as a nurse for a few years before leaving for Canada with her husband. Her subsequent divorce left her to raise the seven children singlehandedly. With the addition of foster children and friends of various Kinsman siblings who might need a place to stay periodically, the youthful population of the house not uncommonly exceeded ten—a monumental parenting job for one mother with virtually no relief staff, especially considering the troubled life histories of many of the children and youths living in the home.

Following her divorce, Mom Kinsman was one of Bayside's very few welfare recipients (most of the others being other single parent mothers or disabled persons). Her feelings of shame and isolation because of this fact led
her to organize other welfare recipients into a series of support groups and mutual self-help projects: discussion groups; a welfare recipients' newsletter produced by hand on the Kinsman kitchen table; a food cooperative (which was soon closed down after pressure was placed on the co-op by local grocers); a clothing exchange depot; and a sheltered workshop for handicapped adults which has now become an active community service agency.

A woman of indomitable energy, Mom Kinsman was an innovative social services planner operating a low-budget operation strictly from within her own home. She was a natural at her job of parenting and enjoyed it immensely. She was neither overly strict nor overly permissive. All residents knew full well who was in charge, yet they frequently confided information with the foster mother which they had never revealed to anyone else. Kinsman understood youth culture at the youths' own level, and was able to discuss the teenagers' concerns frankly and with acceptance, yet without condoning behaviour she found counterproductive or damaging.

During the early 1970s, another group foster home emerged at the other end of the municipality. Reverend Jeremy Robinson, a local Anglican priest, took several boys in to his home when their parents left on holiday, and from there—much like Mom Kinsman—gradually moved into regular foster care when the urgent community need became apparent. Robinson, something of a workaholic, now has a regular contingent of four to six boys living in his home, despite a very busy schedule as pastor and community volunteer counselor and volunteer probation officer.

Rev. Robinson had taught at a private boys' high school and took to youth work quite naturally. His approach combined foster care with family counseling when possible—a natural combination due to his background in pastoral counseling and his high profile in the community. Since he
generally was highly respected by the upper-middle class or upper class parents whose children became his wards, Robinson was able to take on the role of mediator more easily than would an agency worker with a more traditional role.

It is not really possible to separate Robinson's group foster home residential care function from his other community activities since, especially in such a small community, his various activities inevitably blended together, supported one another, and served as information links for his picture of what was going on in Bayside. Rev. Robinson was never criticized for neglecting his parish work despite his being spread so thin.

Having inaugurated a volunteer "police counselor program" in East Bay-side and a modified version for Bayside, Rev. Robinson and the other two clergymen in the program spend a good portion of each week riding in RCMP or municipal police cars answering calls pertaining to family fights, child abuse, suicides and other matters requiring special sensitivity and interpersonal skills. It was not uncommon for him to be awakened in the middle of the night to go out on such calls with the police. In addition, he had taken on the duties of volunteer probation officer for numerous Bayside youths over the decade, and was a regular attender at juvenile court. He was also one of the most active members of community boards and inter-agency committees.

Rev. Robinson's place was known as a comfortable home to bring friends to and served as something of a neighborhood hang-out. Curfews and rules were somewhat flexible, yet school and work expectations were rigorously observed. Like Mom Kinsman, Rev. Robinson loved his work and thrived on the judicious handling of emergencies. His close relationships with youth in the community and his daily liaison with the local police also meant
that he was in a unique position to problem-solve some of the youthful law-
breaking in the community. However, like many in such positions, he knew
considerably more than he was able to act upon.

Although Bayside has never had a "runaway house," these two group foster
homes come very close to qualifying as that, along with the other functions
they served. Over the decade, a considerable number of runaways came through
their doors, or were associated with one of the homes through friendship.
Both houses were characterized by a cooperative spirit where youths aided
one another, enjoyed their stay, and could find time to reflect and restore
their spirit. Both houseparents were temperamentally suited to the work,
being crisis-oriented and able to gain energy during the constant emergencies
which tended to swirl around them.

* * * * * *

In reviewing the innovative, advocacy approaches to runaway youth
counseling and intervention described in this section, it is clear that
each approach was unique because of some diversion from standard, written
requirements of the agency worker's formal role. This is not to say that
the actions described were necessarily either illegal or even formally
improper. What is evident is a creative use of worker discretion to formu-
late more effective approaches than those found in written policy.

While Bayside youth squad officers had formal powers of arrest—and
this was well known to fugitive runaway youths—their best work was done
in an informal, friend of the family manner and their best results came
when their formal coercive powers were held in the background. Probation
Officer Marlene Hartnell did some of her most valuable preventative and
rehabilitative work outside the formal guidelines of her caseload and
juvenile court duties, as a mediator in family disputes and as a communication liaison between parents and offspring or between youths and other agency services in the community.

The teachers, counselors, vice principals, and school nurses who became involved in runaway matters through their day-to-day school contacts were generally going beyond or outside their formal mandate when they sponsored plans of action for the runaway and/or family and when they became involved with other agencies in intimate personal and family matters brought by students whose lives were in crisis. Similarly, both group foster homes in Bayside were in states of regular controversy for "unorthodox methods" when they appeared—to neighbors or to functionaries within the formal social services hierarchy—to be without sufficient adult controls and supervision. The advocacy approach taken by the two houseparents did not follow expected authority lines and thus was sometimes seen as lax, rather than as a different sort of discipline where youth input led to improved self-discipline.

The tenacity and dominance of the coercive/pathological perspective in runaway policy and services is apparent when we consider how easily creative intervention methods can be shelved or superseded. The preventative, advocacy strategies of the police youth squad and of Hartnell's individual counseling style with runaways in the probation department were ignored by their respective hierarchies when the need for administrative changes came about. Advocacy activities by Work-Study teachers and group foster home houseparents were constantly under fire from within their hierarchies as unorthodox and overly youth-oriented. Such programs continued despite their unorthodox nature primarily because they were the only programs which could handle difficult, rebellious, angry young people. However,
it is pertinent to note that by the time of this writing, both group foster homes have closed down due to frictions and difficulties in working with the Ministry of Human Resources hierarchy.
Characteristics of Runaways and Runaway Acts in Bayside

Recent research has identified runaway behaviour as a "highly diverse phenomenon, one that cannot be easily stereotyped" (Bartollas, 1981: p. 855). Runaway youth tend to come from a variety of social classes and backgrounds, demonstrate varying degrees and types of family stresses, a range in types of social experiences, diversity in level of delinquency and school failure, and a wide variety in types of family composition.

This finding in itself is notable, and makes a strictly pathological analysis of running away less convincing. The usual medical model approach to runaway research relies on observation of recurring commonalities, and the runaway phenomenon does not lend itself easily to nosologic classification. Much of the early runaway research was guilty of what Brennan and associates (1978: p. 41) have referred to as the "aggregative fallacy"—a tendency to lump dissimilar types of running away together and to treat runaway youth as an "essentially homogeneous group."

A difficulty with the pathological approach to runaway research and runaway services, then, is that while trouble exists in virtually every runaway situation, the type of trouble varies widely and exhibits itself in varying ways. Any generalization which is attempted—such as the notion that children run away because of abusive home situations, or the notion that runaways are chronic peripatetic wanderers and escapers—can easily be invalidated by counter-examples where such a condition does not hold.

Behind the confusion over definitions and diagnoses of running away behaviour is the fact that "runaway" is a description of a movement from parental authority to a temporarily "free" status, rather than being a description of a personality type or discrete behavioural pattern. Thus, "runaway" is a public policy distinction first and foremost.
During the Progressive era, the concern was with the existence of minors on the streets and in pool halls, rather than with any particular other behaviours (any of which could of course be dealt with through separate prohibitions against, for example, assault, theft or whatever). As a "status offense," running away is a prohibition against being in a particular state or condition—that being, in this instance, the condition of being detached from parental authority.

Detachment from parental authority is being viewed in this study as a political and economic matter, not necessarily a prima facie sign of individual or family pathology. While individual and family troubles abound with runaways and their families, and while running away tends to be a reaction to those troubles, attempting to solve those troubles by mechanically redirecting the youth back home has not worked effectively.

The reason for this failure of runaway policy appears to reside in our perpetual inability to define the parameters of the runaway issue. Since detachment from parental authority is the issue at hand, that ought to be the logical point at which to address the runaway problem. Thus, the tabulations to follow are presented as part of the exploration of family and community politics and economics rather than as a study of runaway pathology.
Personal Characteristics. The sample included 223 youths from 180 families who live or have previously lived in Bayside. Thirty-two of these families (17%) had experienced runaway incidents by more than one offspring, with several families having had as many as four runaway youths in the same household. A slightly larger number of females than males was tallied in the Bayside study, and the age of runaways at the time of the initial runaway incident ranged from age 8 to age 18. The greatest number of Bayside runaways (45 or 25%) first ran away at age 14.

Data on school performance reveals an extremely high 55% school dropout rate for runaway youths in the Bayside sample, with only 12% of the group having graduated from high school and with 33% still enrolled in school. On the other hand, legitimate employment rates were fairly high for the sample: 31% of the youths had been involved in some full-time employment (almost equal to the number still enrolled in school and considerably more than the number of high school graduates). Another 37% of the group had been involved in some part-time employment. Only 32% of the group—ranging in age from 10 to 25 at the time of the study—had never worked.

Income from illegal means was important in a number of instances, but was not the predominant means of support for very many Bayside youths: 19% were known to have engaged in some burglaries or other thefts (including repeated shoplifting); 17% were known to have dealt drugs; and 10% were known to have worked in prostitution (seven or 44% of the 15 youths with prostitution experience being males). Twenty per cent of the study population had spent time "living on the street" (primarily in the Granville or Davie street areas of downtown Vancouver), and 34% had been placed on probation at some point in time (although in only one case was running away a major reason
Socioeconomic status (SES) of runaways in the sample was estimated using a variety of measures. When considering area of family residence, runaway incidents were found to be spread rather evenly across all the populated areas of the municipality, and across neighborhoods having various SES levels.

A composite estimate of socioeconomic status, derived from consideration of parents' occupations, estimated income, estimated home market value, estimated average SES of neighborhood of residence, and informant SES estimates for the family, showed a spread of runaway incidence across the SES ranges: 14% of the sample came from upper class families, according to this composite estimate; 35% came from upper-middle class homes; 37% were from middle-class or lower-middle class households; and 14% had upper-lower or lower class backgrounds. The latter group included a number of female headed single-parent families on welfare where income levels had dropped significantly following separation and divorce from a management-level husband and father.

Family Composition. Approximately two-thirds (67%) of the runaways in the sample were from two-parent households, while about one-third (37%) have lived or do live in single-parent households. (These figures involve multiple coding, since various family compositions experienced during the course of runaway periods were taken into account.) Smaller numbers of runaway youths from Bayside had lived part of the time with relatives or other non-parent guardians (13%), in households involving stepparents (24%), as members of blended family households (where both adults brought children into family upon remarriage) (14%), or had been adopted (17%).
Family and Personal Crises. A variety of personal and family crises were discussed in the Bayside interviews as problems with the particular runaway or family. While the crises listed were not necessarily directly related to particular runaway incidents, they were mentioned as prominent difficulties in the family life.

Twelve per cent of the runaways in the study had suffered the effects of having a parent die during their childhood or adolescence. In the case of 15% of the sample, alcoholism or heavy drinking had been or was then a problem in the family. In 45% of the cases, the runaway had been physically abused. In no cases had criminal charges been laid against the perpetrator; however, the incidents had occasionally been made part of child protection and foster home placement court proceedings. In the case of 11% of the Bayside runaways, sexual abuse or incest had been reported to the agency informants. In 16% of the cases, the runaway youth had made suicide threats or attempts. In one of these instances, a completed suicide had taken place.

Types of Runaway Situations and Patterns. The Bayside statistics show a high incidence of early runaways: 20% of the sample were runaways prior to age 13. Age 15 was the year when the greatest number of youths ran away. The greatest number of Bayside runaways (30%) ran away on only a single occasion, while 11% ran away twice. Ten percent of the sample ran away about 10 times, while 27% of the youths had run away 11 times or more. Five percent of the sample had left home an estimated 50 times or more.

The majority of Bayside runaways stayed close to home and took short, local runaway trips. Only 10% of the Bayside sample had ever left the province of British Columbia on runaway ventures, and 18% had made at least one major, dramatic trip; 17% had left once and never returned home again; 12% were characterized by informants as drifting in and out of the parental
home when they pleased on their own conditions, while 21% were seen as chronic runaways.

Twelve per cent of the Bayside group had been kicked out of the parental home at least once; 23% had been involved in "not coming home" incidents, as opposed to leaving home. This latter group frequently stayed out all night or all weekend at parties in Bayside. Runaways, kickouts, and "not coming home" incidents appeared in various combinations, and "not coming home" from parties was often reported to be the first step into more extensive runaway patterns.

A number of incidents cannot be classified under the three headings used in the previous paragraph; however, they qualify as violation of the policy expectation that minors remain under parental supervision and authority: At least four youths in the study would not have run away on their own, but went along to give a runaway friend moral and material support. Two youths whose parents were separated or divorced moved themselves from one parent to the other in violation of court custody orders. One youth left his mother's home surreptitiously with the complicity of his father and moved in with the father, contrary to the divorce decree. At least one youth in the sample ran away from the parental home to find refuge with a relative nearby. Quite a number of Bayside youths have moved in with a relative with the parents' consent and assistance as a solution to nuclear family stress. In two cases, youths due to leave on a trip or a family move were not looking forward to going, and did not show up at the appointed time (termed "missed the boat" in this study).

Three youths, having established friendships and school situations they were comfortable with, decided not to go along when their parents moved out of Bayside—in two cases with the approval of the parents, and in the
other case without consent; the minors then set up independent housekeeping in apartments with friends, or with the families of friends. In 10 instances, young people moved out to live on their own with their parents' permission and sometimes with the parents' active assistance. In one family, both offspring in the house have been subsidized by the wealthy stepfather. The boy, who was kicked out at age 15, is given money while living on the streets of Bayside ("living here and there, under shrubs" according to the Bayside police). The girl moved in with her boyfriend at age 14, and her family pays half the rent on the young couple's apartment. The stepfather could not stand the behaviour of the stepchildren, and could not understand why they were not like his own well-behaved natural children who were then grown. According to informants, he preferred to pay them money rather than have to deal with their physical presence.

The issue of emancipation and living on one's own as a minor is especially relevant to the political-economic issues of the study. The Bayside statistics reveal that almost half of the runaways in the sample had lived on their own without adult supervision for one month or longer and that 29% of the Bayside runaways had lived on their own for over six months. Forty per cent of the sample had separated from their family with such finality at one time or another that they were considered (informally) emancipated by informants (i.e., self-sustaining and apart from parental authority for a substantial period of time).

In the case of 22% of the total sample, the emancipation process was problematic and accompanied by contentious interaction within the family. In the case of 5% of the sample, the move to independence was agreeably facilitated or at least not opposed, by the parents or guardians. Seven per cent of the emancipatees returned home at a later time.
Implications of the Bayside Runaway Profile

Runaway children and youth from Bayside were as likely to be female as male—really somewhat more likely to be female—despite the male delinquent runaway stereotype. That many Bayside minors ran away at relatively early ages, and that most of the sample stayed relatively close to home, indicates that the youth vagabond or rebellious delinquent escapist images are of limited utility in understanding the full range of runaway behaviour.

The high incidence of runaways who left home only once and who returned rather quickly attests to the "normality" of much runaway behaviour as a response to normal family pressures, and as a spontaneous taking of a "breather" from that pressure. On the other hand, the tenacity of those runaways who left once and never returned home, of those who moved into chronic disobedience patterns and defiance patterns, and who lived on their own outside family auspices, often becoming fully independent, is one further indication that the runaway action is a potent political weapon in the family negotiation arsenal.

The presence of parental kickouts in the data is particularly interesting since such actions cannot really be accommodated within the parameters of runaway policy. Since the goal of runaway policy is to return detached youth to parental authority, kickouts present an anomaly. Similarly, the small number of cases where parents actually facilitated the early emancipation of a minor or agreed to some other non-family living arrangement is evidence of occasional collusion between runaways and parents in subverting the intent of runaway policy. Such instances are indications of implicit family sentiments that current policy guidelines are unworkable or, at least in some cases, inappropriate. The large numbers of Bayside youths who have
successfully emancipated and succeeded in severing the dependency upon an unsatisfactory family situation is another indication that current policies are not serving the needs of many of the youths who make up the policy's target population.

From a political-economic perspective, the incidence of street life and illicit employment among runaways is not at all surprising. Illegal opportunities will flourish when legal avenues are curtailed. What is surprising is the large number of runaway youth from Bayside who have been successful at part-time or full-time work, despite the high rate of school failure in the group. This seems to indicate a readiness to work responsibly on the part of runaways who have dropped out of school.

The Bayside data indicates a rather even spread of runaway incidents across the various social class levels existing in the community. Likewise, runaway behaviour was not found to be concentrated predominantly in single parent families or "broken homes." In fact, cross-tabulations of the Bayside data revealed that runaway behaviour tended to be more serious and troublesome in intact nuclear families with two parents than with families having experienced divorce. Single parent, step-parent and blended family households in Bayside were not found to have experienced more serious runaway conflict and family turmoil than the first-marriage, original parent households. (6)

These findings contradict the "standard wisdom" that a high proportion of deviant behaviour and social problems stem from the break-up of marriages. It is likely, on the contrary, that second marriages are being formed with more care and experience than first marriages, and that intact nuclear families where the original two parents are experiencing constant conflict do not represent stability for offspring.
The search for the causes of deviance and delinquency in poverty and broken homes is part of the larger tendency to particularize social problems in the personal troubles of individuals. As the therapeutic state approach has become institutionalized and has come to be followed almost instinctively, certain less-powerful groups have been scapegoated as sources of their own problems. This "blaming the victim" approach has meant that juveniles, the poor, single parents, and the unemployed or otherwise powerless have tended to receive a larger share of social service attention without commensurate "return" in rehabilitation or improvement of conditions. The reason for this discrepancy may lie in the inability of person-focused social problems solutions to attack structural inequalities and contradictions.

Meanwhile, the poor and the powerless tend to be blamed for the bulk of the runaway incidents in the public mind, as well as for the bulk of the crime, delinquency, mental illness, substance abuse, and child abuse. Since the well-educated and the wealthy have ways to conceal deviant behaviour from public view, and ways to find private, discreet treatment or rehabilitation routes or expensive legal counsel, the idea of social problems residing primarily with the poor and powerless continues to have some face validity in terms of superficial statistics and concentration of agency efforts. That surprisingly large numbers of runaway youths would be found in an upper-middle class community such as Bayside, with all its material advantages, and that runaways in that community would be spread rather evenly across the various socioeconomic classes, gives indication that social problems are not restricted to the materially disadvantaged.

The runaway youth migrations of the late sixties, with the ample press coverage of the anomaly of middle class and upper class runaways tramping from coast to coast, posed a serious challenge to the particularizing tendencies of the therapeutic state.
The runaway epidemic of that counter-culture era was a signal that non-conforming behaviour is found in all social strata. More importantly, the movement of runaways during that turbulent time served notice that the non-conformists would, in extreme situations, make their wishes known. The runaway act is itself a confrontation of a policy which is (implicitly) deemed ineffective and inapplicable. When the confrontation was taken up by children of material advantage, the pathological orientation of social problems policy was challenged at its core, since by then the lower-class nature of the deviant phenomenon had become a fundamental social policy tenet. Moves toward modern reforms of runaway youth policy followed, once it became apparent that children of wealth and "substance" were also involved. (7)
NOTES

1. See Crestwood Heights by John R. Seeley et al. for a description of another Canadian Community which placed similar pressures on its young people (Seeley, et al, 1956).

2. See, for example, Hartnell's handling of the case of Ken and Letty in Chapter 9.

3. Seven 17-year olds and one 18-year old are included in the sample despite their being above the age of majority for running away from home in the eyes of B.C. juvenile legislation. They have been retained in the study because they were viewed as runaways by family and informants, and because of the similarity of their actions and reactions to those of other runaways who were legal minors (in terms of family strife, impulsivity of the act, immediately prior dependence on family, etc.).

4. The existence of personal and family troubles and crises in the lives of runaway youths--some of them very serious--does not invalidate the decision which was made in this study to focus on policy rather than on pathology. It is obvious that runaways and families of runaways frequently encounter serious problems and that the runaway action is generally a direct response to some of those problems. However, several points need to be made: a) the existence of a pathological perspective in runaway youth policy and services has not yielded significant therapeutic benefit to youths and families to any large degree; b) in fact, the therapeutic approach has served as a distraction and "cover" for deeper-running structural aspects (e.g. unnecessarily rigid age-grading procedures, and the unemployability of modern youth) which constitute more basic causes of the runaway youth problem; and c) other agency services do exist to deal with all of the problems listed in this section: suicide, alcoholism, physical and sexual abuse. Thus, using runaway youth intervention procedures to deal with such issues as adolescent mental health needs is not only a confusing duplication of service, but also a misuse of a policy whose primary intent is to retain the minor in the family home under parental supervision. To use coercive runaway intervention for other purposes is a further violation of due process and merely provides false hope for magical cures which are not within the capacity of runaway youth statutes.

5. A variant of this pattern comes from information learned from a youth interviewed informally at the Sunflower group home in Vancouver during participant observation for this study. This young man had returned from a brief stay at the provincial mental hospital at age 16 and found his parents gone. They had moved out of town and left no forwarding address or message for him. He took the hint and began living on his own.
6. Analysis of the Bayside statistics gave evidence of more signs of turbulence and family disruption in original two-parent, intact nuclear families than was shown in the "formally-disrupted" families--single parent families and/or families having survived a permanent parental separation and/or divorce. Since the groups being cross-tabulated are of substantial size (involving 80 intact nuclear families, and 74 families having experienced divorce or permanent separations), the findings are worthy of serious consideration. In considering formal family structure, these figures also represent a comparison of family social class, since the intact nuclear families rated consistently higher on socioeconomic class (SES) measures, averaging in the lower portion of the upper-middle class range, while the formally-disrupted families' average SES rank placed them on the border between middle class and lower-middle class categories. See subsequent discussion in this chapter on the tendencies to scapegoat the poor and powerless as the cause of their own social problems.

Despite the evidence of greater material advantages and the appearance of greater family stability, runaways from intact nuclear family homes tended to run away more frequently over a wider range of ages and to accumulate a greater total number of runs. Children of divorce were more likely to have run away only locally, while nuclear family youths were more likely to have ventured out-of-province, to have taken single, dramatic, long-distance trips, or to have run away once and stayed away permanently. Considerably more youths from first-marriage/two parent households had lived on their own for one month or longer, had severed family ties and emancipated themselves, or were viewed as "chronic" runaways. While youths from divorced families were more likely to have engaged in street life or prostitution, youths from original nuclear families were more likely to have engaged in theft. Runaways from intact nuclear families had consistently more contact with social agencies and therapy services, and were more likely to have been placed on probation. This group of youths also had experienced a much higher placement in group or foster homes than did the children of divorce (44% vs. 27%).

Runaways from intact nuclear families were more likely to have been institutionalized in correctional or mental health facilities, and made more use of special school programs such as Bayside Work-Study or special school programs outside of Bayside. This group also showed a considerably higher school dropout rate (61% vs. 46%), and a somewhat higher incidence of alcoholism in the family and presence of youth suicide attempts or threats. There was considerably more physical abuse reported in the intact nuclear family group (53% vs. 33%).

These findings suggest that the common assumption that social problems are more prevalent and more serious in single-parent homes, in families which have experienced divorce, and in the lower socioeconomic classes may not be well-founded, at least in terms of the Bayside data. This reversal of commonsense expectations opens up new ground for theorizing as to problems which may be peculiar to the intact nuclear family group. The "closed shop" nature of the nuclear family environment may bring with it strains which may call for more urgent and more traumatic escape strategies; and marital separation and divorce, while certainly qualifying as structural disruptions in the family unit, may be allowing for a "bleeding off" or "pressure
release" function which may in fact protect the family from long-range trouble which could have developed had an unhappy husband-wife team remained together. Such a conclusion would be a corollary to one of the major conclusions of this study in regard to runaways: That running away, far from being itself an example of pathology, can frequently be a sign of emerging health as a curative action and as a sign of emerging self-determination.

7. While this chapter has served, in part, as a critique of the suburban milieu of Bayside, I have not intended to underestimate or malign the ample cultural resources of the community. Certainly, many nurturant adult-run institutions exist in the town for young people to take advantage of. For whatever reasons, some youths are able to thrive in Bayside while other come to resent and rebel against their community, their school, and/or their family.
Chapter 8

CASE STUDY: THE OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO RUNAWAY YOUTH IN BAYSIDE

The runaway phenomenon is a context in which minors forcibly take things into their own hands. Whatever the stress or dissatisfaction in the home or community, running away generally opens up new doors, new opportunities for the youth in question. The act of running away is a rebellion against the controlling nature of the youth dependency system. The community and agency reaction following the runaway incident is, then, a reassertion of that control—a reinforcement of the adult authority ethic and of the reality of the youth's dependent status. But the minor frequently asserts control by running away again and the "tug of war" can continue indefinitely with the advantage constantly shifting with each new usurpation of the other's authority.

The image is one of a battle of wits between youth and adult authority. As such, it is directly analogous to the control-advocacy tension on the larger policy level. As youth asserts itself with greater and greater force, the political-economic constraints are exerted with ever greater force in return. The advocacy approach can sometimes short-circuit this battle, find common ground between youth and parent, and allow more room for youthful self-determination. The case study to follow details one such encounter as an example of the control-advocacy ambivalence in the context of a difficult to resolve Bayside youth-adult conflict.

Within a period of six months, Brian Peterson, a tall, mature-looking 13-year old youth who could easily pass for age 15 or 16, progressed from residence in an upper-middle class family home to full immersion in an urban underground street culture. The case study follows Brian's "deviant career path" step by step, and chronicles the actions and points of view of the youth, his friends and "business associates," family, and agency helpers.
Despite the control and direction which has been legislated to adults in official policy provisions, the case study demonstrates that considerable power over living arrangement details remains in the hands of the runaway youth. A major task of this chapter is to examine the negotiative nature of the runaway act and its aftermath. This is a story of a minor gaining power through unorthodox means.
Case Study

Mike Adams, the amiable vice-principal at Bayside Secondary school, had as one of his duties the locating of pupils who were not attending school. In early May 1979, Adams put out feelers among the students who habitually drifted in and out of his office and—as was his customary manner—attempted to tap the student grapevine to learn the whereabouts of Brian Peterson and Stuart Brighouse—13-year old boys who had not been to school for several weeks. The parents of both had informed Adams that the two had not been living at home for the same period of time and were last seen together. Adams quickly learned from his student sources that Brian and Stuart were living in a tent in the woods up by the railway tracks and he sent word through other students that he wanted them to come in to see him. The boys did come in the next day. Adams talked to them at length and then made a phone call to the local Ministry of Human Resources (MHR) office.

Jolene Jameson, a veteran child welfare worker in the MHR office, received the phone call and took the referral. She and Adams worked with the boys over a period of several days. The youngsters had lived successfully in the tent for over two weeks. Brian was afraid he would be beaten if he returned home. Friends of the two had been bringing them food. When the tent blew over one stormy night, Brian had found refuge at the home of a friend for a couple of days.

A meeting was held at the MHR office on Friday, May 4th, involving Brian's parents, Jameson, Adams, and Constable Ray Buley, a juvenile officer who was aware of Brian's runaway. Next day, Jameson arranged to take Brian with her to a home visit with his parents. Brian sat down and talked
agreeably. He promised to return to home and to school and went to retrieve his gear. However, Brian reneged on his promise, and he and Stuart were apprehended that night when Bayside police discovered them sleeping in a condominium complex under construction. Receiving a call from the police station, the Petathers took Brian home that night—his first night home in almost a month.

Brian went to school (from home) on Monday and kept an appointment with Jameson at the MHR office at 4 p.m. She then took him home and held another family conference. Parents and youth displayed a positive attitude toward the reunion. Jameson wrote in the case record that Brian "seems determined to work things out and finds a change in his father's attitude." But there was at least one hitch.

Later that week the social worker discovered that Bayside police had determined that Brian and some other youths were responsible for stealing a car and smashing it up, stealing some liquor in a break-and-enter situation, and public mischief. The matter was referred to the probation office and Brian was ordered to appear in juvenile court on June 20th. Jameson backed off from the case, hopeful for a successful resolution of tensions after encouraging Brian to find an interest to occupy him, such as developing his expressed talent as a drummer by joining a band.

By now, representatives of at least four community agencies—school, police, probation, and social welfare—were involved in the Peterson family affairs. A crisis had been met and resolved, for the time being, and tentative theories about "what had gone wrong" in the family had been formulated—the most recurrent one having to do with the adoption issue. Brian (who would turn 14 in July) and his two sisters, Irene (age 17) and Janie (age
15) were all adopted as infants. Several agency workers observed, that it was the adopted children who created problems for the parents whereas there were no reports of trouble with the one natural child in the family, Howard (age 22), who also lived at home and worked for his father.

Long-time residents of Bayside, the Petersons live in a large house in an exclusive residential neighborhood nestled in a scenic waterfront setting several miles from any commercial development. The father, John Peterson, owns and operates a private medical laboratory, and the mother, Irene Peterson, is a part-time commercial artist who works at home. This is the first marriage for both husband and wife, whose ethnic background is English-Canadian. The Petersons recently joined a nearby Mormon congregation, which has been active in assisting the family. Two church members, on their own initiative, have gone to the school and to Human Resources with offers of support.

Allusion is made in agency records to reports from school personnel three or four years ago noting that the girls would occasionally come to school with bruises and stories of physical abuse. No recent reports of this nature had come to light, however, and Brian's fear in early May that he would be beaten should he return home dissipated once he was integrated back into the family.

Jolene Jameson reported in her case notes that the "parents are older than would be expected" (with children of these ages—i.e., probably in their late fifties)—"but show better than average understanding of the kids' position, except for the role adoption might play." The Petersons could not conceive of the adoption aspect as in any way relevant to the youngsters' problems. They have evidently never employed a "bad blood alibi" for the youths' behaviour, nor, on the other hand, are they aware of reacting to
adopted offspring differentially. (Corporal Barney Cooper, head of the Bayside Police Crime Prevention and Juvenile Bureau, told me a few weeks after this that his office has less trouble than would be expected from single parent families, and more trouble from two-parent families with an alcoholic parent or with a history of adoption.)

In an interview which I arranged in early June with Mrs. Peterson, I learned that 15-year old Janie was the first family member to run away. The problem began with Janie wandering in quite late at night after being out with friends. Then she would periodically stay overnight at a girlfriend's without informing her parents. Mrs. Peterson was especially concerned that Janie and her cohorts spent considerable time hanging around the dimly-lit and poorly supervised fringes of the local roller rink—an area where a "bad element" in town tended to congregate. Tensions in the family reached a peak when Janie and a girlfriend left home and lived on the nearby Indian reserve for a week. "What the attraction is there, I don't know," said Mrs. Peterson. "Why would she stay away from this beautiful home and go down there?" The mother reported, however, that things had improved considerably since her daughter had taken a job at a local golf course cafeteria.

Brian's night-time improvising began in early March 1979 when he first stayed away all night, sleeping on the nearby golf course in his sleeping bag. A week or so later he stayed away for a weekend, and his excursions accelerated from there, on through the tent encampment in April. One early incident had particularly troubled Brian's mother. The boy had been told to be home by 9 p.m. on a particular evening but did not return until quite late. He arrived in an upset state and related a dramatic story that he had been "picked up by two men and manhandled," had been tied to the railroad tracks and
left there. Brian reported that he had eventually wrested himself free and made his way home. The police were called since the incident sounded quite serious, and when the constables arrived, Brian was able to give very elaborate descriptions of the features of the two abductors, the location of the rope, and other details. The officers decided to take Brian out to the area where he claimed the incident had occurred. Once there, he was unable to produce the rope as evidence and under further questioning his story began to break down. Finally, Brian admitted that he had fabricated the story to cover his late arrival home. The police constables impressed upon him the seriousness of making a false police report and brought it home by charging him with having done so. (This offense was later added to the other items which called for Brian's appearance in court on June 20th.) Brian's mother expressed concern in the interview that when the story was exposed, the boy showed no embarrassment and no feelings of remorse or guilt.

*  *  *  *  *  *  *

Assigned to the case in mid-May, Marlene Hartnell, Bayside's main juvenile probation officer, had little time to become acquainted with Brian and his family before the boy was gone again. He left home without warning on May 25th, having stayed there for less than 20 days. It was later determined that he had bypassed the uncertainty of sleeping in tents and abandoned houses and had made his way "over town" to Vancouver's Davie Street where a "street life" of available (and mostly illegal) employment, housing and excitement was known to be readily available for those youths willing to risk the dangers attendant upon such a life.

On Saturday evening, June 9th, Brian was picked up in Vancouver's West End near Davie Street by Vancouver police who suspected he had been working
as a prostitute. Evidently the police officers became quite accusative in trying to get him to admit to "hustling" and Brian became quite abusive to them in return. The officers returned him by car to Bayside, with Brian angry and withdrawn in the back seat. The Vancouver police officers delivered Brian to Constable Buley at the Bayside police station. Buley phoned the Peterson home, assumed he was talking to Brian's father, and reported Brian had been picked up and that he would be returning home. Buley let Brian out of the car when they reached the house, watched as he entered the front door, then drove away, taking it for granted from his phone call that the parents were home. However, the male voice Buley had talked with belonged to Howard, Brian's 22-year old brother; the parents were both out that night. Brian went in the front door and then, with very little delay, went right out the back door and was gone again.

In my interview with Mrs. Peterson on Monday, June 11th, she admitted to considerable confusion about what could be motivating her children to run away from home. She noted that, while Peterson family members had "the usual arguments," none of Janie's or Brian's exits were preceded by any big fights or announcements. Worried about the family's reputation, she asked with concern: "What will the authorities think? That this must be a terrible place for kids to live?" "We've tried everything," Mrs. Peterson claimed. "My husband has tried hitting Brian a good punch now and then or asking him politely. Nothing works." She commented that the agency people were very nice and well-meaning, but that none of the agency help seemed to be doing any good. "It might take a psychiatrist to find out," she added. "I've tried to impress him with the dangers of what he's doing. One problem is he is very good looking and appears several years older than his age. I worry, not so much that he might get involved with girls as
with men."

The mother had gotten some feedback on Brian's situation from Howard, who had talked to Brian at 17-year old Irene's graduation. Brian was hanging back at the edges of the ceremonies and had boasted to Howard that he was working at Mr. Mike's Steak House, a familiar street youth hangout on Davie, already had $600 in the bank, and had just returned from California. The mother believed the first claim might be true, but as for the latter two claims, said "He sometimes makes up stories." Brian had also told Howard that he had been living with a woman who was on parole and this worried the mother greatly. She told me, in reference to the Saturday night apprehension, that "The police can put him in a car and bring him home, but he won't stay."

Somehow, the Bayside police were unaware that Brian had left home again until I accidentally mentioned it in passing during a conversation with Corporal Cooper on Wednesday, June 13th. Perhaps Brian's jog through the house was so brief, or his back door escape was by now so predictable, that the Petersons saw no reason for further reports. Perhaps they were embarrassed to call again, having had so much agency contact already. But the Bayside juvenile bureau officers picked up on this failure as a sign that the parents may not have really cared very much about having Brian back.

The Court Appearance. A family support worker from MHR, Pierre Lecourt, had been assigned to Brian and his family at the end of May, but was unable to meet Brian, who had been out of town since then. To nearly everyone's surprise, however, Brian remembered his juvenile court date of Wednesday, June 20th and was responsible enough to appear on time and with representa-
tion. Lecourt, who sat next to Brian to give him quiet support and advice during the hearing (after introducing himself to Brian for the first time), later wrote in his case notes: "Brian showed up in the company of an older man who purported to be his legal counsel. This individual had apparently taken Brian in during his four-week run from home in what he described to be a philanthropic attempt to shelter him from the dangers of the street." On the basis of a very brief telephone conversation with the Petersons several days before the hearing, the man was now willing to offer Brian respite from his troubled home situation.

Further inquiry by the judge revealed that Brian's lawyer and proposed guardian, Jerome Roberts, was 38 years old, a member of the Alberta bar recently hired by one of Vancouver's leading law firms, with a newborn son and wife in the hospital. Roberts said he was a practicing Orthodox Jew and that due to his religious observances, Brian would need to return home for the weekends. Family court committee observers sitting in the waiting room had noticed that Roberts and his intended ward had come to court in a chauffered limousine which waited outside while the two were in court. Both had walked into court in tasteful three-piece suits.

Roberts offered to enroll Brian in the adult education campus of Vancouver schools to complete his high school diploma, and said the boy would be able to work as a clerk in a store of which Roberts was part owner. It was revealed that Roberts had made a request to Brian's parents in the earlier phone conversation that the boy be allowed to obtain a passport to go to Greece. Presumably on the basis of this and other curious references, coupled with the parents' obvious bewilderment at the entire turn of events, the judge chose to delay his decision in the matter for two days during which time the plan could be tested out. This meant that Brian
was released into the self-proclaimed attorney's custody—a situation the prosecutor, probation officer and family support worker were not entirely comfortable with. But things had moved very quickly, and Roberts had presented himself with such a self-assured air that they made no overt protest.

As soon as the two had left the courtroom, however, doubts in the minds of court workers began to magnify. References implying that Brian had seen the Roberts' baby born did not jibe with current maternity ward practices; the proposed school was for students over age 18; Brian had appeared glassy-eyed with an absence of affect, as if drugged or dazed; someone had noted alcohol on the lawyer's breath; and observers realized later from the color of the copy of the Criminal Code of Canada which Roberts carried, that it was several years out of date.

Telephone investigations that afternoon revealed that Roberts had never been a member of the Alberta bar and did not work at the stated law firm. Most of the other claims also evaporated upon further checking. That evening, Vancouver and Bayside police officers converged on Roberts' West End apartment, arrested Brian's new mentor for obstruction of justice and took Brian into custody to contemplate the events of the recent past overnight in the Bayside juvenile cell.

Adding to the confusion, the Peterson hearing had been the first case ever heard in Bayside by a new judge, Vincent Sanderson, who had just moved down from a rural British Columbia jurisdiction. Since court procedure prohibits any briefing of the judge before a hearing, Sanderson came to Thursday's rehearing without any knowledge of the previous night's events. It must, therefore, have taken him a moment to comprehend that the wispy, drawn person in front of him in jail garb was the same flamboyant "attorney"
who had stepped up to represent Brian the morning before. Since a different prosecutor was working the courtroom that day who was unsure of what to recommend, the hearing was delayed until Friday, at which time Brian was released in the custody of his parents, with his radius of activity restricted to Bayside and a nightly curfew set. One of the juvenile police officers who had been in on the arrest/apprehension proposed that the Peterson family situation was not at all promising, but Human Resources recommended trying it again at home—a reflection of the lack of recent evidence of neglect or cruelty by the parents, and of that agency's current policy of strong preference for maintaining family units intact. The most significant event of the morning for Brian's mother was an open mention in court of homosexual activities—a presumption that was, however, neither established nor admitted.

In a conference with Brian between the time of his apprehension and the Thursday and Friday court sessions, the probation officer and family support worker had been impressed by Brian's composed reaction to the bizarre chain of events which he had been involved in. He showed no obvious ill effects from the adventure. Brian seemed very candid about his recent activities, relating that he had thought that the pregnant woman he had seen around Roberts' apartment was the older man's wife until Roberts had propositioned him about a week before and had taken him downstairs to show him the stereo-outfitted prostitution layout. He claimed that he had taken exception to Roberts' overtures and was taking each new revelation in his stride. But when Brian resisted his advances, Roberts had decided to phone the boy's parents to arrange financial support, the principle being "if you won't kick in physically, kick in financially." This had led to the idea to appear with Brian in court.
The Return Home. With Brian relieved to be out of jail, and his parents relieved to have him safe, the Petersons had a storybook reunion, all showing each other considerable kindness and going out to dinner to celebrate Brian's return home. Indeed, Brian did quite well at home for more than a month. Pierre Lecourt from MHR met regularly with Brian and his parents for supportive counseling and took the youth to meet with the Bayside High principal who agreed to take him back in September if he was motivated to come, and suggested that Brian further develop his interest in drama by trying out for school productions.

Brian, who had worked for a short time at a neighborhood bakery in the Spring, now took on two paper routes, morning and evening. There were no flareups at home and the youth had abided by the terms of his probation and seemed content. He avoided invitations to party with his friends and, in fact, when his probation officer, Marlene Hartnell, gave him an opportunity to drop his curfew provision in advance of the month which had been stipulated (since she was about to go on holidays), Brian opted to leave the curfew arrangement as it was. Hartnell then allowed Brian to miss his normal Monday appointment at the probation office on July 23rd, telling him "It's a sunny day; why don't you go to the beach instead."

However, the next day the arrangement began to break down when Brian failed to do his evening paper route. When confronted by his supervisor, he lost the job. Since the morning route was for a different paper, he kept that one. On Friday of that week he broke curfew. Telling his parents he was going to bed, he went downstairs, then snuck out the bedroom window, met some friends and snuck back in at 2 a.m. However, his parents knew of his absence, since a friend had telephoned after 10 and they had gone down to look for him and discovered him missing. Brian's father confronted
him with the issue in the morning and Brian, reacting angrily to his father's reprimand, ran away again on that day, Saturday July 28th.

Reentry into the Street Life. Brian's path again led downtown to the West End of Vancouver, where during his forays of late May and June he had begun to learn how to survive on his own. A street buddy told him about the Emergency Services office in Gastown and on Sunday, July 29th, Brian went over there to seek monetary assistance. A youth worker of that office deduced Brian's age and drove him to Bayside, depositing the youth back home.

On Wednesday of that week, with probation officer Hartnell on vacation, Pierre Lecourt had Brian come in to the MHR office for a conference. Lecourt asked him to look at his tendency to act on impulse rather than with a premeditated strategy. Brian admitted reacting negatively and impulsively to his father whom he felt was punitive and did not really want him around. One test he had made of this was that when he ran away, his father did not call the police. Brian had read this as meaning his father wanted him gone. Lecourt talked with Brian a long while. It was evident that the boy was still very much attracted to the street life and envied his "street buddies" who had learned the tricks of disguising their age and appearance, finding employment and lodging, and evading detection. He still held to the story of his June California trip without making it clear why he had gone or who had paid the bill. Although he was aware of the prostitution scene downtown, he claimed to shun that aspect altogether. Lecourt and Brian made a concrete plan involving summer work and entering school in September, and Brian left for home.

Within two hours of leaving Lecourt's office on August 1st, Brian was
gone again, making a beeline to downtown, thus violating his probation order for the second time in a week. A friend of his mother's from the Mormon church ran into Brian later in the month in Vancouver's Robson Square area and talked with him briefly. Following up on this lead, Lecourt, who happened to be downtown on other business, crossed paths with the youth at the roller rink where Brian had taken a job renting out skates and supervising the rink. Brian had put a curl in his hair and evidently was working on changing his appearance. Lecourt meanwhile learned that Brian's sister Janie was also on the run again and had been living part of the time downtown in the West End. Since neither child was in any imminent danger, MHR elected to leave things as they were for the time being. Brian's friend from the tent encampment days, Stuart Brighouse, had also been living in the West End and had been seen doing some soliciting.

On September 20th, after Brian had been gone from home for 50 days, Bayside police picked him up for having broken into a friend's house. He was held at the regional juvenile lockup facility from September 20th to October 10th, awaiting the formulation of a satisfactory living arrangement plan. During this period, the agencies involved showed confusion over what to recommend. It was not clear whether this was a case of willful defiance and delinquency or one of inadequate care in the home. Thus the agency people were unsure whether to employ child protection or juvenile corrections procedures and whether foster care or containment was the proper route. A sampling of opinion from all involved agency personnel indicated that there was no hard evidence that things would not work if the family home was tried once again, so Brian was again released to his parents with the expectation that he would spend weekdays at school and weekends at Portage camp, an outward bound/life skills-oriented correctional facility.
Eight days later, on Thursday, October 18th, Brian stayed late after school to help with an art project. At 4:30 p.m., he suddenly remembered an appointment he had at the MHR office and dashed out. According to grapevine reports, he then ran into Ned Bradford, another "runner" who had been in considerable trouble, but had never been apprehended. "Ned" and Brian reportedly took off together and Brian has not been seen nor heard from since that date. A bench warrant has been out for Brian since late October 1979. (This case study was written in January 1980).

The latest MHR summary on the Peterson situation noted the ambivalence that both Brian and his sister Janie feel between the advantages of home and their attraction to life on the street. Nevertheless, for them the street life has always won out. Pierre Lecourt commented that since Brian and Janie were evidently reacting to matters in the family past rather than to any clear and repairable present family issues, it became a very slippery kind of situation in which to intervene.

* * * * *

Brian's path downtown was far from smooth, but within a short span of six months, this youth—still only 14, but appearing older—had made a dramatic progression from residence in an upper-middle class family home in Bayside to full immersion in the Vancouver street culture. The chronology of events demonstrates how single-minded his search for a new living arrangement really was. Brian ran away from home at least eight times between March and October 1979. In all, he was away more than he was home. Between his return on May 5th and his last bowing out on October 18th—a period of five and one-half months—Brian was living at home a total of 67 days, or less than two-fifths of the time. In addition, he was away from home a total of four weeks in various runs prior to May 5th, and has
now been away since October 18th.

The cumulative buildup of time away served Brian's need for attaining survival skills and for finding reference groups with which to identify and share resources. Each run added new contacts on the street and strengthened his determination to attain self-sufficiency. Thus, despite considerable effort by agency personnel and family members to reintegrate Brian into the family unit, the sequence from March to October was one of gradual preparation for his goal of full independence from the constraints of his family home—a chronology which now appears complete.

Especially worth noting is the fact that never once (after April) did Brian return home on his own volition. In each case he was delivered home by an agency employee or other adult. Although Brian did go along with family reunion attempts, he demonstrated by his runaway pattern a determination to construct a viable living situation away from his family.

This is a typical sort of pattern followed by many "street kids" who are now independent or semi-independent and thought to be "at risk" in downtown Vancouver and other metropolitan areas. Thus, an exploration of the dynamics of Brian Peterson's trek may serve to shed light on a rather widespread phenomenon.

The Pull of the City. The attraction of the street life of downtown urban areas for adolescents on the run has elicited great concern among parents, social welfare workers, and the public at large. Unfortunately, the image most commonly held is of "the street" as analogous to a large neon-lit magnet or vacuum cleaner which sucks up whatever loose adolescent happens by. This sort of fear-provoked approach misses the testimony of hundreds of youth who've happened by a street life scene and taken the next bus home. It also fails to take into account the complicated maneuvers,
the purposeful seeking out of contacts, and the extensive sequences of familiarization which youths like Brian Peterson undertaken en route to life on the street.

Brian clearly chose to live on the street and he implemented a gradually escalating plan of movement toward that goal over a period of six turbulent months. During that time of confusion for his family he became more and more directed and determined in his goal. Yet his was a negotiated solution necessitating months of ploys and counterploys for its achievement.

The Power of the Runaway Act. Despite the control and direction which has been legislated to adults in the official policy provisions affecting runaway juveniles, considerable power remains in the hands of the runaway youth. This is especially apparent when parents realize—as Brian's parents did—that no matter how many agencies, or police reports or threats are used, none of these alone or in combination will contain a youth who is determined to leave, nor reintegrate a youth who does not really wish to stay.

The case study relates a number of instances where adults gave Brian extra reign—e.g. in not accompanying him to pick up his gear to be sure he did return home on May 5th; in not escorting him all the way up to his front door on June 9th; in deciding on a two-week trial period with a new potential guardian at the hearing on June 20th; or in opting for a hands-off, wait-and-see approach in August when Brian had moved downtown where he obviously wanted to be and was seemingly in no immediate danger.

Such agency discretion in allowing Brian as much self-determination as possible reflects the typical agency ambivalence between control and advocacy. While considerable power is given to agency employees to carry
out punitive aspects of runaway policy, there is a tendency—in Bayside and elsewhere—to look for solutions which will achieve the consent of the youth and other family members. Obviously, a case plan which is agreeable to all parties concerned will have a greater chance of success.

In a sense, then, the agency representative—even while holding considerable potential punitive sanctioning power—tends to be very much a "bystander" in situations such as this—standing by waiting for the young person and parents to resolve their troubles, waiting for the family "glue" to take hold again. Perhaps "referee" is even more apt a word. As a mediator in the family negotiation process, the agency worker attempts to find common ground in the confusion and contention of the family dispute. Since blame is so often difficult to pin on one party or the other—the parent generally finding the child incorrigible and difficult, and the runaway finding the parent overly strict, unfair or unyielding—the referee role is a natural one for agency people to gravitate toward.

Yet there is nothing in written runaway youth policy which stipulates that agency workers should be either bystanders or mediators. These discretionary roles have evolved because of the difficulty agency workers have in enforcing unnecessarily punitive runaway procedures. Thus, a mediation perspective has evolved out of the inadequacy and ineffectiveness of punitive runaway policy.

Coming full circle, the assertiveness of runaway youth in pushing up against youth dependency policies is often successful enough as a negotiation strategy, so that punitive policy becomes ineffectual—an empty shell of a policy. At this point, the youth in question gains considerable power, moving from a position of one normally receiving the orders to one who can "call some of the shots." The youth may then be, perhaps for the first
time in his or her life, suddenly on a par with the adults, able to negotiate from a fairly equal power position. Running away from home, seen in this light, is an integral ploy in the continuing family negotiative sequence. It is a way for a legal minor to forcibly wrest some power away from the parent.

The Limitation of Available Options. While runaway adolescents do take things into their own hands to a considerable degree, the alternatives available to them are quite limited. What choices was Brian given? On occasion it must have seemed to him that it amounted to the choice of "Do you want to go home voluntarily, or shall we deliver you home?" Given the policy-dictated agency strictures, there are few other official alternatives which agency workers are allowed or encouraged to explore.

While certain other options do exist on agency agendas, none of those commonly employed seemed to fit Brian's situation. He was (initially) not delinquent enough to be detained in custody. He was not so abused or neglected as to justify protective removal from the home. Nor were his behaviours odd enough to call for a psychiatric evaluation or institutionalization. The agency workers who came to his aid were sorely constrained by the narrow focus of the policy provisions they are expected to work within. These provisions focus on responsibility--of children to obey their parents, and of parents to raise their children properly. In certain instances, allowance is made for transferring responsibility from the parents over to designated state agencies.

There is little provision for innovative and imaginative input into the decision-making process by the children and youths themselves, nor is there adequate allowance for mediating disputes between parents and children over future planning. In the case of runaways, the overt reason for running--
to get some space away from the parental home—becomes lost in the attempt
to determine prior causes for that.

In a sense, then, runaway youths are, almost by definition, solving
their own problems—despite the legal fact of parental authority and despite
the policies which give agencies intervention authority. As solvers of
their own life circumstances, runaway youths gain in self-determination.
They forcibly undermine the philosophy and the fact of youth dependency
by violating that dependency and overruling it. Agency people stand by
and attempt to mediate, being helpful if possible, but normally watching
to see how the family will work out its own dilemmas.

The "battle of wits" which the agency people observe very much from
the sidelines is a new episode in the family politics wherein a determined
youth asserts more autonomy and shows more strength. Moving to the
community level of analysis, the youth is challenging community policy
structures which are found to be overly confining. Even in the absence
of obvious physical or sexual abuse, Brian just did not wish to remain in
his family home; the legitimate options were severely limited; thus he
quickly found illegitimate options which were attractive to him. By doing
so, he challenged those policies which limited his options merely because
of his age. It is this challenge of age-status dependency policies which
makes the runaway act a very powerful ploy in the family and community
political dynamics.

Brian's motivation to run away was strong and may be a key to some deep-
rooted family pathologies. But this possibility is of little consequence from
a runaway policy perspective. Runaway youth policies have relevance to the
placement of family members in particular locations, not with family cures.
Clearly Brian Peterson needed release from family pressures, and current policy
just does not provide for that option.
The case study in Chapter 8 made clear how powerful an act running away from home can be. The negotiated "decision-making" engaged in collectively by Brian, his parents, and various community functionaries provides us with a prototype which fits numerous runaway episodes.

This sequence begins with the youth experiencing personal, family, school, and/or community stresses and not having sufficient outlets for resolution of those stresses. Feeling trapped, frustrated, and unable to find resolution, the youth is, in addition, politically dependent upon adults--parents, teachers, and adult authority in general. This dependency acts as a suppressing force on the potential runaway youth and--in his or her particular case--acts as a block to resolution of the acute stresses.

Feeling boxed in, the youth takes action, takes matters into his or her own hands, and runs away. Sometimes this is done with forethought, sometimes it is done rather impulsively. The last place most such youths think to go is to a social agency or a runaway house. The more likely choice is to a friend's house--some refuge which seems safe, private, and comfortable. Another common option would be a meadow, back lot, or vacant house where one might find that comfort and privacy. These alternatives will generally be chosen over the social agency or runaway house because of the need for parents and police not to ascertain the location. Being in a position of dependency on adult authority, the runaway youth is--even in these years following the advocacy runaway reforms--a fugitive from the law and from parental domination.

The next move in the runaway youth chess game is generally for the youth to return home or to be discovered by someone and returned home. This often occurs when the runaway youth runs out of money and resources.
necessary for independent survival. At this point either some negotiation takes place about the conditions which preceded the runaway incident or the parent reasserts control over the youth—generally both. If resolution of the issues is not forthcoming, the youth runs away again—once again taking matters into his or her own hands and resorting to something of an act of desperation.

That five percent of the Bayside runaways had run away from home and returned 50 times or more during their minority years is an indication both of the apparent irresolvable nature of some of these youth-adult conflicts and of the difficulty runaway youths have in extricating themselves permanently from adult authority. It is also an indication of the strength of the authority/dependency connection, even in the cases of some of the most dissatisfied youths.

Following return of the runaway youth on various occasions, it is common for parents, sometimes with mediation help from agency personnel, to reassert control in different ways to see what might work more effectively. It is also common for the parent and agency people to use discretion in backing off from certain authority moves, to attempt negotiated settlement of differences, and sometimes to open up new areas for autonomous decision-making by the minor. Following these concessions and changes in family strategy, tensions and conflicts either become resolved or the youth runs away once again.

It is apparent through all of this that much of the time the youth is "calling the shots." The runaway action is indeed a powerful act in the family and community power dynamics. Running away is a way for the aggrieved party to forcibly replace youth dependency policies with ad hoc youth-created initiatives.
Agency people in Bayside were fully aware of the power advantage which runaway youth were able to garner in their attempts to subvert the adult-created dependency policies. As runaways moved to increase their advantage in the family politics by taking a dramatic stand and by forcibly finding the comforts and breathing space they desired, agency personnel generally responded with caution, choosing to play a waiting game rather than to intervene forcefully.

The marginality of agency workers in runaway situations (see, e.g., Chapter 8) derives neither from powerlessness nor lack of concern, however. Agencies are granted considerable authority to intervene in family affairs and to move forcefully to redirect minors who are not under adult supervision; and agency workers generally self-select in such a way that most begin their careers with greater-than-average compassion. The "bystander" agency stance which is so often found in runaway youth matters derives instead from lack of real curative options. Because runaway youth policy was initially formulated with a "street clearing" orientation—an orientation which continues up to today—and because such policies harbour hidden economic motives, family rehabilitation, the enhancement of youth potential, and the expansion of youth opportunities have been subsidiary components, when they have been present at all.

Chapter 5 made clear how quickly the Canadian youth services approach reverted to a control/containment strategy when the pressure of large numbers of transient youth subsided in the early 1970s. This is one of many indications that the control perspective is the fundamental structural dynamic at work in runaway youth policy. The benevolent advocacy approaches have emerged due to the "greater-than-average compassion" of agency workers mentioned above. Youth advocacy approaches have been developed when it
has become clear that the more punitive, coercive options were not succeeding in stemming the runaway youth tide—-or advocacy approaches have been added on as "extra offerings" by agency workers who brought an advocacy orientation with them to their employment. In all instances, the advocacy perspective appears to derive from benevolent motivations which overlay the deeper structurally-based political-economic motives. Viewed from this angle, the benevolent advocacy approach has been a counter-hegemonic trend all along—even in the Progressive era origins of runaway youth policy.

This chapter will explore the discretionary actions used by parents and agency people in trying to find common ground with the youth who has exerted ad hoc runaway authority in the manner described above. By trying to meet the runaway youth "half-way" and initiate negotiated solutions which address everyone's needs, agency workers and family members are implicitly recognizing the power of the runaway action and are giving at least some degree of credence to the minor's desire for self-determination, even prior to the age of majority.

Discretion is, of course, a two-edged sword. Public policy could not operate without some allowance for flexibility and exceptions to the rule. In some cases, this discretionary option will be misused and needlessly punitive actions may result; in other instances, discretionary actions create an opening for a more benevolent or liberative case plan. Discretion is the key to the implementation of written policy and, as such, is a test of how relevant the policy is to the dynamics of everyday life. When too much discretion is necessitated (as when written laws are not enforced) the policy can be seen as irrelevant or unnecessary; on the other hand, when policy is written in a way that discretion is virtually disallowed, that policy can be seen as overly rigid. At any rate, discretionary actions
are unavoidable in the actual working of agencies.

Case studies from the Bayside runaway youth interview sample will be used in this chapter to highlight the dynamics of discretion in a community's response to runaway actions. The goal here is to better understand how runaway youth policy actually becomes implemented in the day-to-day family and agency context. This exercise is essential in accomplishing the macroscopic/microscopic analytic link aimed for in this study. Too frequently, policy is examined in a vacuum--apart from consideration of the real-life struggles and accomplishments of the citizens affected by the policy. Similarly, the pathological perspective of North American social policies all too often leads us to focus clinically on an agency client population without giving due consideration to the broader social dynamics of policy creation and policy perpetuation. In the analysis of the case studies to follow, establishing such a link between the macro and micro levels--between policy and community and between public issues and personal troubles--will be an important task.

While the extended case study in Chapter 8 focused on a situation which the Bayside adults all labeled a "failure" (though this sentiment would not have been shared by Brian Peterson himself), the case studies to follow are purposely chosen to represent successes. Through the description of situations where family members and/or agency functionaries and/or runaways themselves discovered and pursued solutions which worked for them, I would hope to highlight the use of discretion to make runaway youth policy more liveable and workable. In doing so, it may be possible to discover the ways in which community members are molding public policy so that it will work more effectively for them and how they are ironing out some of the oversights and obstacles in policy as written.
The accounts which follow were selected because: a) they are all descriptions of relatively effective reactions to the runaway challenge, from the viewpoint of most participants; b) they are situations known in sufficient detail that the dynamics of family and community negotiation are readily apparent; c) they encompass a variety of types of runaway situations and family and individual troubles; and d) they demonstrate in some detail the discretionary action (or inaction) available to agencies and families in Bayside. The chapter is organized into five sections describing discretionary actions in the areas of: 1) substitute housing and vacations from the family home; 2) family mediation; 3) youth advocacy services; 4) justifiable coercive interventions; and 5) non-intervention.

A primary goal of the case studies in Chapters 8 and 9 is to follow the workings of runaway youth policy in the lives of Bayside runaway youths. While it is not possible to witness runaways picketing or demonstrating for needed changes in youth dependency policies, it is evident that these policies are not working effectively and that youths and families often are aware of that inadequacy. The primary evidence, on the part of young people, is the act of running away itself. By taking matters into their own hands, runaways are subverting written policy provisions. Beyond this, other actions and statements by runaways and their parents give evidence of the failures of policy. Young people during interviews frequently demonstrated an awareness of having or not having certain rights and routes of appeal. One Bayside youth had gone to MHR and asked for a foster home, for example; others would refuse to speak to police, using legalistic diversions. The primary area of evident policy failure noted in the Bayside study was in the availability of options and the exercise of choice over one's own life. Wanting to hold more power over one's own life is an overarching theme in the case studies to follow and constitutes the primary critique of runaway policy by Bayside youths.
Substitute Housing and "Vacations"

One of the commonly employed strategies in social service work involves use of alternative living environments. Prisons, mental institutions, institutions for clients with special needs, group homes, foster homes, and adoption services all operate on the principle that new or revised "parenting" and changes in daily supervision can be rehabilitative and can lead to renewed opportunities for growth and development. The Bayside interviews yielded numerous situations where a "break" from the tensions of the family home—whether permanent or temporary—allowed for new options not available in the family home. The first case study involves relief being given by a local group foster home; the second case describes an out-of-state "vacation" from the family; and the third account relates an in-town, close-to-home sojourn.

Charles Barry. Charles Barry's parents sent him to a high tuition Anglican school for most of his elementary school years, and "that's where it all started" according to the boy's story. "I never had a choice, but at that time I was scared of my parents and I did what they said." Charles' father agrees with this assessment: "Underlying all the arguments has been the issue of authority—"Who's in charge?"" Charles reports that "Finally in Grade 7, I got myself kicked out—almost intentionally. It was the only way I could get free of the place .... I've been kicked out of every school I've been in." The father commented, in a separate parent interview, that Charles wasn't involved with "problem children." Nevertheless, Charles did his best to "find his way to trouble."

Charles first ran away at age 13. As he relates the story: "I came home late--11:30--after my curfew. My dad grabbed me and hit me. He said,
'You leave this room and I'll hit you again.' I called a friend to arrange a place to stay and then ran out the window of my room to the friend's house. I hid out from my friend's parents too. Then after two days, his mom found me." The second runaway incident came two weeks later when Charles didn't come home and also cut school. He was gone six or seven days, during winter, staying at friends' houses.

The family's move from Vancouver to Bayside was yet another blow to Charles. "I had to leave all my friends from over a nine year period. I just hated this place. I was the wrong age, it was the wrong place, the wrong setting, the wrong timing. All of it was just wrong. From then on, I ran away all the time." Charles became involved in an extensive number of break-and-entry crimes (termed "B and E's"), and quickly became a target of serious concern in the Bayside social service network.

When Charles was finally placed at Rev. Jeremy Robinson's group home, the family breathed a sigh of relief. While Charles' father had nothing positive to say about any other Bayside agency or service, he said of his son's group home situation: "The real help was Jeremy Robinson—he's the one person who was willing to make a commitment. I couldn't have done it without him. Probably Jeremy has done more talking with Charles than I have with the kid in the last five years." At last contact, the boy seemed determined to straighten up, and his anti-social behaviour had subsided considerably.

Charles had clearly felt "in a corner" for much of his childhood and youth. He and his parents were involved in a continual power struggle, and Charles began to "win" more frequently when he began to use the dramatic leverage of the runaway action. There was a pattern of heavy drinking by the parents, and a confrontational approach to discipline. Both parents
came to feel helpless when it came to controlling Charles; meanwhile, the boy felt a need to assert his own authority over his own life. Charles came to experience more self-control and constructive control over his milieu in the fresh setting of Jeremy Robinson's group home. Despite the relaxation of the "authority system," Charles was held accountable for his criminal actions by police and probation, and was watched closely for further violations by all concerned.

In this case, the family was well served by the available community agencies: the juvenile justice agencies kept track of Charles' true law-breaking behaviours and saw that he was held accountable; the group home setting provided a break from the negative environment of the family and participation in a new set of power dynamics wherein Charles found more room for "winning" through less disruptive moves. Charles needed a place to live, at least temporarily, where there would be less tension and conflict; the parents needed a vacation from the frustrations of parenting Charles, since the strategies they were attempting were not working.

And, most importantly, Charles' side of the story needed/demanded a hearing—even though he had become rebellious and troublesome. The discretionary actions entailed relaxing the adult-oriented runaway youth policies enough for the youth's frustrations to be heard. In the course of hearing him, the parents were able to back off from their overly stern authority and allow the group home houseparent to introduce some new strategies.

Cathy Sill. At age 15, Cathy Sill climbed out her bedroom window one night and drove with a casual boyfriend across the U.S. border and on to California where they stayed for two and one-half months. The two youths—who were both serious about making it on their own in California—lived
in an apartment for a month and one-half until most of their money was stolen. Then they lived on the beach for about a month. Her boyfriend, whom she really had not gotten to know all that well before the trip, could not find work and neither could Cathy; besides, neither had U.S. social security numbers. Her last several nights were spent in the Los Angeles airport parking lot, sleeping in the car. She watched people all day, with 50 cents left in her pocket, and realized "this wasn't what I wanted." She used the remaining money to phone her parents to send her a ticket home. Cathy comments:

My goal had been to get to St. Louis—to get a job and an apartment, to go to school and live normally, have a peaceful time. I'm a peace loving person; I couldn't take all those pressures. Maybe I'm especially sensitive—I'm glad I'm that way, but I hurt a lot.

Leaving home was a statement to them—a statement that "I'm more grown up than you think. I can do it on my own. You just watch me succeed. I can do it without you. I'm grown up enough. I don't need all these material things and physical comforts." You can go crazy with physical comforts. My intentions were to be on my own and start my own life. But I didn't have everything in place.

Cathy's home life and parent-child relationships were not particularly abnormal. She had a generally stable family situation, at least as viewed from the outside. She was well provided for, had plenty of advantages and opportunities, was always at the top of her class. Such a dramatic runaway act by such a model daughter and student left many Bayside people surprised. Cathy's father was "a kind of absentee landlord who ran the family from London" where he was an international banker, according to the view of one school counselor. He was home the equivalent of three or four months out of the year, and was traveling constantly. "The mother would take instructions from the father by long distance telephone and then she'd try to carry
it out. She tried hard to cope with raising the kids by herself, but she was a weak parent," stated the counselor. Cathy also felt hedged in being the only girl with three brothers. She felt a double standard whereby "they got away with murder" yet she had to follow all the rules. Her brothers and mother watched over her behaviour constantly.

From a policy viewpoint, Cathy Sill's fugitive status while finding her bearings in California appears quite unnecessary. She was a fully grown, rather mature young adult who was capable of working, of monitoring her own school progress, and of conducting healthy relationships. While any family therapist would have found interesting family dynamics to work with in this case, no one in the family had requested agency or professional help and this fact makes the pathological perspective rather moot. Once again, school and social agency people found themselves standing by while youth and parents found workable accommodations with one another. The only aspect of coercive runaway youth policy which might have been helpful here would have been possibly a return plane ticket--but her banker father was quite ready to front the money for that.

Lee Scott. Lee Scott's father had a violent temper and a drinking problem. The father had once taken a butcher knife and hacked up the kitchen cupboards during an argument with his wife. An engineer, Mr. Scott expected his sons to go to college. The sons, on the other hand, were very mechanically inclined and begged their school counselor to place them in trades courses. Lee felt blamed for more than his share of trouble, thinking he was being scapegoated for much of his two brothers' negative activities, and he was growing tired of the constant family bickering and his parents' occasional runken brawls.
Beginning at age 12, Lee regularly sought the solitude of his own improvised living arrangements, living first in a tree house for several weeks, then in an attic over a neighbor's garage. Occasionally he would be taken in for weeks at a time by a young couple who lived near his parents' house, and his parents came to accept this arrangement as the best available interim solution. Finally, Lee was placed in Rev. Jeremy Robinson's group foster home where he remained for most of three years. Lee now regrets the gaps in his education caused by his erratic living arrangements, but remains firm in his conviction that he did not need to "stay around all that fighting." Lee never once left the boundaries of his local neighborhood, yet was almost never home between the ages of 12 and 17.

Lee, now age 20, had been working in another province over the past few years and is living back in the parental home as a young adult. He and one brother may move to a cabin near the beach when they get some money together. I interviewed the parents and Lee separately, on different occasions. Mr. Scott is proud of having stopped drinking several years ago and of joining Alcoholics Anonymous. The family tensions have subsided considerably and everyone agrees that the substitute living arrangements for Lee—not only the placement at Rev. Robinson's, but also the time in the tree house and his stay with the young couple in the neighborhood—were essential and helped the family survive that difficult period. Mr. and Mrs. Scott are grateful for the chance Lee had to get away from the family strife and confusion; they believe that family members sometimes need vacations from one another, that it is not always possible to go on day after day without a break or a change of pace.

* * * * * *
In each of the three cases related above, the family home environment had become unbearably tense and frustrating for the runaway youth. The family had become like a powderkeg, ready to explode at any moment. Such pressure demands relief, and these youths chose to escape the family home for more pleasurable or more curative surroundings.

Runaway policy is ambivalent about such substitute living environments. While adoption and foster home placements are cornerstones of child protection and child welfare services, and while institutional living settings are well accepted as rehabilitative environments, runaway youths are considered "hard to place." Often the fear is that these youths will run away from the foster home or group home also. Substitute home placements are generally reserved for younger children who are more compliant; thus, runaway youths are generally not seen as likely candidates for foster home or group home placements.

This dilemma is one further indication that youth dependency policies are not working effectively. In essence, the substitute home placements work best when the minor is young enough not to push for input into how the placement will be run. Once the minor has begun to test out the possibility of finding his or her own living space, the dependency bonds have already been loosened, and the family-centered ideology begins to break down.

The need for vacations from the family unit was apparent in the Bayside interviews. While the unexpected absence of a child is embarrassing, a number of Bayside parents indicated that their child's leaving home was one of the first positive acts in a very turbulent family life. Clearly, the legitimation in policy of vacations for various family members as curative times of needed respite would benefit not only runaways but all
family members. Presently, such vacations are viewed primarily with alarm and panic, as witnessed by the use of such loaded terms as "missing persons," "deserter," and "runaway."

Because runaway youth policy was originally designed to deal with idle youths found to be in danger on congested urban streets, and continues to face the same challenge, the realities and parameters of runaway policy is shaped by that fact. These youths were unemployed, being neither occupied by school nor work. Boarding houses would have been an unrealistic option since the street youths had no money. Thus the primary options have been either for the state to pay for substitute living arrangements (foster homes or group homes) or for the youths to be forcibly returned to the parental home. The fact that substitute living arrangements for transient youths have never been proposed or developed prior to the counter-culture runaway house movement is one of many indications that the pathological orientation and rehabilitative rhetoric of the agency agendas is indeed empty rhetoric.

This absence of constructive state-funded living options (in Canada and in most areas of the U.S.) means that runaway youth policy implicitly condones and encourages the growth and perpetuation of urban street youth ghettos with their raft of illegal enterprises and underground employment opportunities. Until the need of home-leaving youth for optional sleeping arrangements is recognized, such unsavory underground options will undoubtedly continue to flourish.
During the in-depth interview with Cathy Sill, I asked her what community services would have been especially helpful to her. She responded: "Some sort of mediation service—somebody who would listen to all sides of the story." The problem of not being heard by adults is a frequent concern of runaway youths, and agency people often find themselves carrying messages back and forth between family members, getting family members together for talks, or refereeing arguments. Such family mediation is sometimes all the agency worker can accomplish—such is the nature of the "sidelines" role the helping professionals so often find themselves occupying. Two case studies will be used in this section, one describing a situation of early emancipation by a young couple, and the other relating an intervention into a serious child abuse situation.

Letty Jacobs and Ken Stanley. Bayside juvenile probation officer Marlene Hartnell refers to Letty Jacobs and Ken Stanley as examples of "successful runaways"—meaning runaways who "make it" on their own and who take responsibility for their own lives. In January 1978, Letty's family moved back to Toronto from Bayside. Letty stayed overnight at a girlfriend's house and purposely missed the plane the next day. Her parents sent her a ticket by mail and she did go to Toronto the following week. However, in February, Letty's boyfriend, Ken, sent her money which he had scrounged from friends for her to fly back to Bayside. When she arrived, the two left for a ski resort to the north where both obtained jobs, and they lived together there for about five months.

Letty had been involved in several brief, local runaway actions when she was age 14 and 15. Ken had a much more antisocial background. He had
come from a rather unstable family, and had lived in various foster homes and group homes—but had run away from them all. While on the run, he had committed numerous B and E's and was placed on probation. The year before he met Letty, he had lived on the street for about seven months, sleeping in cars and vacant houses. Moving from the working class suburb of Vancouver where he had lived to Bayside with his mother and stepfather had been a difficult transition: the "big hood from the other side of the tracks" didn't really fit into sophisticated Bayside. A psychiatric report had referred to him as a con artist and manipulator.

Marlene Hartnell became involved in the ski resort runaway/emancipation venture through her role as Ken's probation officer. Letty's parents phoned Hartnell from Toronto trying to locate their daughter, and there followed a constant string of phone calls as Hartnell acted as intermediary between the 16-year old couple and their respective parents. Letty was never on probation, but appeared on the records as a voluntary supervision case. The two runaways supported themselves and got in no trouble, and successfully "passed" as a legitimate couple. Hartnell chose not to use coercive policies to force the two youths back to Bayside, instead opting to serve in an advisory, supportive counseling role to both youths and parents. It took up lots of her time when she had an already active probation case-load.

In July, Letty's parents came out to Bayside for a visit and were able to talk their daughter into going back to Toronto with them. While she did miss six months of school while living with Ken and working at the ski resort, she graduated with her class in June 1980. Ken remained at the resort town through the summer of 1978, then moved to Vancouver where he became a carpenter's apprentice. He is doing well, is off probation and
has been in no further trouble. Thus, Ken has been functioning as a working adult, living on his own since age 16 (and has spent almost no time with either parent since age 15).

Despite her formal role in juvenile corrections, Hartnell preferred an advocacy approach. She knew how coercive intervention could easily backfire and push a youth deeper into resistance and rebellion. Thus, because of philosophy and temperament, she operated from a friendship and advisor basis. Aware as she was of some youths' ability to emancipate and begin working earlier, she tended to be supportive when a capable young client wished to move out to an independent living and working situation. She used discretionary approaches to find solutions which were agreeable to the parties involved, whether or not such solutions followed the letter of age-graded policies.

The casework in Letty and Ken's case was supportive and unofficial. Hartnell took a voluntary, preventive approach whenever possible, knowing that serious trouble later might be diverted through sensitive informal action early on.

Johnny Singer. Johnny Singer first ran away when he was 9 years old. He always ran away either because he had been beaten or was afraid he would be beaten. Johnny had three brothers, all of whom had also begun to run away prior to age 10. Jeremy was the youngest and the only one who had not been severely physically abused. He only ran away once. Johnny, the oldest brother, was the most worrisome to the community for his delinquent tendencies. Johnny had run away at least 30 times, and had been apprehended for assault, store larcenies, and house burglaries. He was referred to by a former teacher as an "academic misfit--too busy ripping other kids
off to do any work ... a hustler. Also a very good showman. He could run
the class if I'd let him."

Roland and Clayton, the other two brothers, generally ran away
together, and they had developed an in-tandem method for returning
their mother's abuse—shouting obscenities from outside the house when they
returned home late, and throwing rocks at the door. Roland and Clayton
have run away about 20 times, generally remaining in their own neighborhood.
The two would often steal from stores using a two-person con game distraction
technique to trick the store proprietor. They also burglarized houses.
Barbara Kinsman became involved in the family situation both as a foster
mother to Johnny and as a concerned neighbor. Her report on the family
follows:

The mother was quite violent. She harrased Mr. Singer before
he left her, and used the kids to harrass him. She vented much
hostility on the kids, yet relied on them to fulfill her needs,
such as getting her breakfast in bed, looking after her and
making her feel good. She needed them to excel; they should
take the place of her husband. When they did not live up to
her expectations, she beat them.

Therapy never worked for her; she would not look at her own
options. Therapy with Johnny was unsuccessful because the
mother kept butting in. He was in a therapeutic group home,
but Mrs. Singer kept interfering so much that they couldn't
work with him; after six months, she pulled him out and took
him home. She and Jimmy went to several counselors and to Bay-
side Mental Health, who all were quite severe with her, and
she always left screaming and dragging Jimmy by the ear.
Individual therapy with Johnny never worked because she always
butted in. Then the counselor would try to turn it into
family therapy and she would rebel. She believes she's a
really good mother.

I took him into care and he was at my home between ages 11 and
14. Toward the end I started sending him home on the weekends.
That was disastrous, and resulted in more runaways. Then he
ran away from my house when he was 14. He was living on the
street and getting heavily into booze and drugs. I'd run into
him almost everyday, downtown or in a park. He'd sleep in
empty houses or on the beach. After three weeks, he phoned
and asked to come back. I picked him up and brought him home. His mother happened by right then, spooked him and he took off. From then on he was on the streets, with some time in other group homes in Vancouver or up the coast, all of which he ran away from. He got involved in drug dealing and prostitution down on Davie Street.

The kids are violent in nature—verbally and physically. It was a pretty explosive situation. When Jimmy went back for weekends, he would begin to beat her. The other kids had to pull him off her. Their fear of her was so great that it was a year and a half after Johnny had been with me before he told me what had been going on at home. Then he told me of some pretty severe abuse. For example, she once bashed him with the telephone receiver when she caught him talking to his father. Johnny would always flinch when I put my hand toward him like to touch his shoulder, as if he was afraid of being hit—a reflexive reaction.

I didn't want to make the same mistake as the therapeutic group home and be competing with the mother. In order to keep Johnny I had to meet some needs in her that his loss etcetera, caused. So I became a supportive person in her life also. My helping the younger boys gained respect for me with Johnny; he was grateful and that helped keep him straight. The younger kids used to come to my place after their beatings and seek refuge with us. I would then go over and try to calm her down and talk with her. Eventually it got to where she would call me before she hit them and I'd try to cool her down over the phone. My kids also got involved. Sometimes I'd be on my way back from a beating incident and before I made it home, the Singer kids would be on the phone to my kids, saying it was happening again. My own daughter Sarah went and stayed over there with them for awhile.

Barbara Kinsman was operating in this tense situation as a "natural neighbor advocate." Of anyone in the community, she was probably the one most in a position to aid this family. Her approach was soft yet firm, open but not about to be manipulated. The help arose spontaneously because of a clear and present need, not from a particular agency agenda.

Alice Collins and Diane Pancoast (1976) have recently written about an advocacy approach to child abuse which is very similar to the strategy taken by Mom Kinsman in the Singer case. They propose that child welfare workers utilize "natural helping networks" already existing in the community
to mobilize a program of change for the family. In the Collins/Pancoast model, the "natural neighbor" (such as Mom Kinsman in the above example) becomes the primary change agent while the agency social worker remains in the background, taking on a consulting role rather than dropping into the centre of the situation so obtrusively.

A number of child abuse agencies in the U.S. and Canada are undertaking the training of volunteers who, following the training period, each take on a family and come to fill the role of friend of the family. The volunteer works with the overtaxed parent in finding ways to reduce stress in the household, in taking the children to the park to give the parent some time alone, and in doing paraprofessional counseling. While this approach does not use "natural neighbors" who already exist in the family milieu, it has many elements in common with the Collins/Pancoast model.

The "natural neighbor" advocacy approach might be applied to a number of other service areas as well as that of child abuse. It is particularly applicable to runaway youth services since runaways, by and large, tend to remain in their own town--often in the same neighborhood--most frequently staying at a friend's house; runaways tend to shun runaway houses and other formal agency services; and many runaway situations reflect temporary discomfort or stress which often can be worked out without formal agency intervention. The Connecticut "Phone-a-Home" service mentioned in Chapter 5 (Brooks, 1972) is one example of an approach to helping runaways which mobilizes natural helping energies already existing in the community. Such approaches remove the service a step back from the pathological orientation of client-authority interactions and tend to serve as vehicles for personal empowerment. Such empowerment leads to fuller capacities for making life
decisions in the event of future crises.

*   *   *   *   *   *   *

While it is true that Marlene Hartnell acted in her official capacity as a probation officer in becoming a mediator between Letty and Ken and their parents, she did so very much "on her own time." Preventive work was never a top priority in the probation office—in terms of the official policy stance—and when the 1978 memo was circulated ordering the diversion of "incorrigible" cases over to the B.C. Ministry of Human Resources, Hartnell no longer had a mandate to work with runaways at all. While mediation appears to be a vital and obvious role for an agency person to play, it is often a low priority in contrast to the more formal duties of courtroom presentations and probation supervision. This is another indication of the almost "accidental" nature of the advocacy perspective.

Similarly, Barbara Kinsman was acting as an individual friend of the family in the Singer family situation, rather than strictly in the role of group foster home houseparent. Her initiatives with the family involved calculated risks and it is likely that MHR would not have backed her up if they had known the extent of her interventions. One major difficulty in implementing the "natural helping network" model is that it involves partial or total abandonment of the pervasive emphasis on the agency as expert. Movement to a focus on the natural healing potential residing within families and within neighborhoods themselves would entail a dramatic change in ideology. Until such changes are brought about, family mediation will remain a part-time, extra-support venture for agencies. Advocacy which seeks to modify the social structural realities of a youth's dependency status remains a seeming threat on a variety of levels. The intransigence of youth dependency continues on despite the recent reforms in policy.
Youth Advocacy Approaches

An advocate "takes the part of" a friend or client--i.e., represents the other in semi-official or official settings--but without "taking away" the other's authority and without removing that other person's sense of self-determination. In fact, the advocacy approach, when properly implemented, can return power to individuals who have been feeling powerless. Being a person with greater knowledge of agency and political access, the advocate can open doors to the client which will give that client new strength. Thus, advocacy at its best begins from superior knowledge and access without being patronizing or condescending.

The following cases describe situations where agency workers opened up new opportunities for runaway youth through an advocacy approach. In all of these situations, the adults worked in a non-punitive, non-coercive way and allowed the runaway a major share in the decision-making process.

Don Rivers. Don Rivers lived on the streets of Vancouver for most of his adolescence. He chose to leave street life behind, selected his own foster home, which happens to be in Bayside, and is presently one of the most capable and interested students at Bayside High School. Don was the last of seven children of an alcoholic mother on welfare. The earlier six children "were adopted out or given out to relatives--she didn't really want them" according to Don. His mother is a Canadian Indian; his father was French-Canadian. The father left when Don was four years old. The father of Don's older siblings was a different man--a first generation Pole from Montreal.

Don complains that there was no structure in his home and no supervision. "What I needed was rules, and my mom didn't set them." He got
tired of coming home from school to a mother who was consistently drunk and who could not speak with him articulately: "It made me want to be away a lot." He remembers being sexually abused by a male baby sitter when he was 5. Around age 9, he was beaten with a pipe several times by his mother. Don became involved in rather heavy drug usage between ages 11 and 13. He had a very active street life, especially from age 15 to 17. His schooling was spotty, though he did benefit from a streetfront alternative school in Vancouver for several years. He and his mother lived in a public housing project in Vancouver's East End district. Due to the lack of structure in his home, Don came to spend more and more time on the street. Yet despite the underground, illicit style of his life, Don has kept a summer and part-time job in a museum gift shop from age 14 to his present age of 18.

A turning point came for Don when he overdosed on drugs and was hospitalized last year. The psychologist who saw him recommended a foster home, since life with his mother was too unstable; when he did try to stay home and look after her, he could not handle the responsibility and frustrations. He chose a foster family in Bayside where his older sister had lived years before. Things are going smoothly. He finds the upper-middle class Bayside teenagers a bit snobbish and status conscious, but he has learned to fit in. Don is active in the high school drama club and has fallen in love with acting. He reads books on psychology and the mind, has developed an interest in computers, and may sign up for a dance class. Now 18, Don has joined the Navy Reserve and began training this summer. The foster home situation is comfortable and Don has stabilized his life considerably.

Don Rivers had lived the life of the "street kid" fugitive and had learned to survive the dangers and hardships of that life. Among other
survival skills, he learned to avoid police, social workers, and other agency functionaries. He and his street friends distrusted the social worker/police teams from the MHR Emergency Services office at 52 Water Street (whose patrol car they referred to as "52 Pickup"). While living on the street, Don was involved in burglaries, prostitution and heavy drug use, and he had routine contacts with police, probation, MHR, and some psychiatric counseling. Transportation home would not have been an answer for Don Rivers, and control/coercion methods in his case would be superficial and insensitive to the complexities of his situation. The kind of intervention which worked well with Don (the alternative storefront school, the foster home in Bayside, the psychologist sessions) were advocacy-perspective services—encounters which respected the youth's ability to make up his own mind and be a part of planning his own life.

_Cindy Fraser_. Cindy Fraser was a very precocious 14-year old who was known frequently to boss her mother and father around, and who was not happy at home. She developed early boyfriend relationships, and in several instances moved in with the older boy she was dating at the time. Cindy was seen as sometimes uncontrollable by her parents. On one occasion, when she was living in a house with a group of older youths, her father set up surveillance in an automobile outside the house to gather evidence so that the Bayside police could then go in and make an arrest.

Following one of her attempts to make a go of it at home, Cindy was kicked out by her father. As she described it:

_That last time I left home was over a fight with my dad. It was over my friend Jed's drinking. We had come in the night before about 3 a.m. and Jed had been drinking. He didn't want to go to the group home where he lives so late, so he slept over at our place. Eleven o'clock the next morning, dad finds that_
he has slept over and lights into him--gives him a big lecture. I spoke up and said: "Why bother him? Don't bug the poor guy." Dad tells me: "You have a big mouth. Don't be such a smart alec." He then tried to throw me out the front door, and he would have succeeded except my brothers pulled him off me. (He's hit me quite a number of times. Once he pushed me down the stairs. Luckily, they were carpeted and I didn't get hurt too bad. I have no respect for him. He doesn't have any reasoning.) Then my mom grabbed me and took me to the back door and tried to calm me down. She walked me out to a place I knew as a kid to get me away from dad, then she went back to check out things inside. A bit later she came back out and said: "Dave" (my brother) "says you can stay with him until I'm on my own." (My mom was getting ready to leave my dad at that point.) I told her in no uncertain terms: "I don't want to live here." I've been at my brother's house since then.

Cindy became independent rather quickly, and entered the Bayside Work-Study high school completion program, receiving her high school diploma at age 16—the youngest graduate in recent memory. She worked steadily at a local restaurant from age 14 on to support herself while going to school. Often she worked the same dinner shift with her mother, who was also a waitress there. They were sometimes mistaken for sisters; however, Cindy generally succeeded in reversing the roles, almost appearing to parent her mother, who was considerably less secure than the daughter.

The young woman of 16 finally did move back in with her parents, despite the history of conflict, during her final year at Work-Study, and the family relations became more amicable. For the past six months, Cindy has had the same steady boyfriend—a high school student at Bayside High who lives with his parents. Cindy's Work-Study teacher reports: "She always had nice boyfriends. She's doing okay. I'm not really worried about her future at all. This kid has strength, determination, and takes responsibility for her own needs."

At various times, Cindy Fraser's early independence had alerted the energies of police, school, and MHR personnel, who were concerned with the
"adult" lifestyle which she had pursued as early as age 14. Yet it is apparent in retrospect that Cindy knew very well what she was doing and knew how to find healthy environments (for work, school, and relationships). Very little intervention was required by the agency people with whom Cindy had contact. Their role was generally that of "cheerleader" or "referee"—generally facilitating growth through talking and allowing Cindy to find her own most appropriate route.

This is a case where the age-grading guidelines may be much too rigid to fit the circumstances of the particular minor in question. When youth dependency standards are so standardized that exceptions to policy are difficult or impossible to obtain, young people with the drive and initiative of Cindy find themselves living in an unwarranted minority status. The discretion used by various Bayside agencies served to inject flexibility into the age-grading system.

Tim Royce. Tim Royce first ran away at age 14, and since that time has spent lots of time on the street in Vancouver. He worked as a fairly committed drug middle man (courier); agency informants presumed he had not become involved in prostitution. He continued to have rather good relations with his mother and grandparents, and developed a steady relationship with a girl who was younger than he and also living on the street. For awhile he shared a basement apartment located near Granville Street with his girlfriend, who, though young, could pass for 18 or 19. Tim was befriended by a streetworker from the Emergency Services office. The detached worker knew of a vacant apartment near his own home, which was near downtown but also close to other neighborhoods which were not so crime-prone. A meeting was held involving Tim, his mother, the Vancouver detached worker, and the
Bayside family support worker. An independent living situation was approved in the new apartment, even though Tim was only 16.

In this case example, MHR sanction was given to a youth's emancipation, even though he had been involved in illegal drug trafficking, had been embroiled in street life, and was involved in a romantic relationship which his family did not fully approve of and saw as "irresponsible." The strategy was to work with Tim rather than against him in an attempt to gradually aid him to pull out of the street life. This type of advocacy approach relies heavily on agency discretion in "bending" or circumventing the letter of policy, on involvement of all relevant parties in decision-making to assure success of the resulting decisions, and thus, to restore feelings of power in decision-making to youths and other family members.

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Advocacy services are modern innovations which do not fit the traditional pathological perspective toward social services. The "medical model" approach which has dominated social work, human services, and the mental health professions for over a century presumes that through science we can find ways of healing human deviance and alleviating human misery. Such optimism now appears unjustified as the human sciences and helping professions become more and more fragmented and consensus on strategies becomes harder to reach.

One of the newer models for personal and social healing is the model which stresses self-help. In medicine, such a self-help approach stresses prevention and intelligent home remedy care. In the area of drug abuse and alcohol addiction we find an emergence of self-help groups and a trend of recovering addicts aiding other addicts. And in various fields, we find
a stress on advocacy—an approach which stresses self-sufficiency and self-determination via representation by an informed advocate having knowledge of community services, legal procedures, and communication skills.

Such advocacy services undermine the expertise assumptions of the human services and call into question the traditional theories of helping. As such client-centered services gain a stronger foothold, important ideological changes are taking place as professional expertise in many instances gives way to a new concern for self-help.

The benevolent advocacy which was typical of the youth reforms of the Progressive era was advocacy of a paternalistic sort. Because of the economic realities of the time, it was difficult to envision ways in which youth might become independent from their families. Minors were being displaced in the factories of the time and the only readily available sustenance appeared to be with their family home. But times have changed, and alternative living options might now be more feasible, especially in an affluent community such as Bayside. A structure-challenging type of liberative advocacy is increasingly more possible as the economy prospers. However, few disadvantaged groups have increased their stature without numerous battles, demonstrations, and negotiations. Youth appear far from that point of active, organized protest. Until that time comes, adult advocates will undoubtedly be leading the way in challenging the seldom-revised age-grading standards.
A major premise of this dissertation has been that victimless crimes and nuisance offenses need not be a part of criminal legislation (juvenile or adult) and, in fact, that criminalizing such variations in behaviour tends only to aggravate the situation further. The other side of this issue is that when criminal and victimizing acts are committed by runaways, such acts should be responded to swiftly and consistently, with consequences and punishments following which are appropriate to the offense. The distinction to be made here is one of criminalizing only truly victimizing acts and not criminalizing offenses to social decorum or to the values of one segment of society. When coercive, control strategies were limited to responses to criminal actions in Bayside, the results were quite superior to the use of punitive sanctions in the attempt to control lifestyle options. The following case studies provide examples of justifiable coercive interventions—situations where police and probation are able to use their expertise and be effective.

Dick Foster. Dick Foster's mother admits to having erred in marrying so young and in taking on an abusive husband. "I was afraid to leave him for fear he might kill us," the mother asserted. She and her son finally did leave after eight years of a very turbulent marriage, and she was able to have her first husband—a gun collector with a tendency to misuse guns (he was known to shoot his weapons into the fireplace on occasion)—committed to a mental hospital. There had been early indications of trouble with Dick, but Mrs. Foster felt "that a couple of years of no shouting, no screaming, and no physical abuse would solve it." So she delayed in taking Dick to a counselor or a psychiatrist in hopes things would work
themselves out. The mother remarried two years following the first separation, and despite the calmer home environment, Dick's rebellious behaviour continued. He was a disturbance in the elementary classrooms and the stepfather notes that "there was more of the normal youthful exuberance in Dick than would be expected."

As Dick reached teenage years, the abnormal exuberance evolved into very antisocial behaviour characterized by fights, extensive runaway trips, and heavy drug use. For a two year period (ages 13 to 15), Dick was one of the most belligerent delinquents and uncontrollable youths in Bayside. At one juvenile court session, the judge threatened: "If you don't agree to go home, I'll have no choice but to send you to Willingdon" (the Vancouver lock-up facility). Dick replied: "Okay, send me to Willingdon, I won't go home." The judge complied.

Dick's mother and stepfather were at a loss to understand where they had gone wrong, and agency people reported that they were excellent parents, though Mrs. Foster admits to being touchy at times and putting too much pressure on the boy. Dick was placed at Jeremy Robinson's group home and has done remarkably well there. His delinquent behaviour has dropped off and the runaway pattern has subsided. The parents feel they "used the police to good advantage" in bringing clear and certain consequences to play, and are grateful to all the Bayside agencies for the constructive counseling, parenting skills training, and guidance provided. In the youth interview, I noted a remaining gloss of braggadocio in Dick as he related tales of past fights, violence and toughness. But the overt changes have caused him to be referred to in agency circles as one of Bayside's remarkable turnaround success stories.

This was a situation in which agency policy and agency services worked
to good advantage, from the point of view of the parents (and from the point
of view of the youth, in most regards). Coercive agency constraints were
used effectively when the law had been broken. A substitute living arrange-
ment took the pressure off both sides of the family powder keg, and Dick
received guidance from a parent figure who was not fed up and "stressed
out." Advocacy services were then possible, in the form of supportive
counseling, once Dick was out of the home and in a neutral environment and
felt more free to relax and talk. The vacation from the family worked well
for both parents and youth.

*Randy Izor and Friends.* The juvenile police officers in Bayside prior
to the departmental reorganization demonstrated a preference for preventative
work. With the potential threat of punishment and consequences always in
the background, they found the best approach in youth and family matters
was that of interested helper rather than the tough cop role. Police appear
to have more success in handling one-time, adventurous runaway incidents--
especially those instigated by younger children--than they do with runaway
exits by youths involved in long-term family feuds. Generally such one-
time adventures were responded to with humour and sensitivity, as part of
the officers' missing persons duties. Complicated family troubles involving
emotional outbursts and unpredictable changes do not fit easily into normal
police practice, and police officers are generally law-conscious and thus
uncomfortable when treading into areas where it is unclear whether criminal
laws have been breached, or when they believe social service personnel
could handle the situation with more effectiveness.

One illustration of such a one-time adventure is the runaway incident
involving Randy Izor and two other 13-year-olds from the same 8th grade
class who hopped the ferry to Vancouver Island in the spring of 1979. Randy had stolen $20 from his mother's purse and seemed to be the initiator of the escapade. After reaching the island, the boys wandered around the port and ended up sleeping in a cabin cruiser which was docked near the ferry terminal. Next morning, the boys were picked up by the RCMP, who scolded them sternly and held them in jail until one of the mothers was able to come across the 'strait' to pick them up.

A more serious incident involved Buddy Downing and two other boys who ran away from a residential treatment centre. Buddy, at age 9, had been ringleader for a number of similar escapades, most of them involving travel to other communities. This time, the young boys stole a $30,000 sailboat and attempted to navigate the bay with it. Somehow the boat caught fire and the boys abandoned the sailboat, took a rowboat and paddled to shore. These kinds of "emergency" episodes are handled in a natural way by police officers, and when law-breaking is involved, coercive measures are justified. But police tend to shun involvements which place them in a role of arbiter of family disputes.

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Police personnel prefer to remain in their areas of expertise. Perhaps the common tendency of police officers to shun involvement in suicides, family quarrels, and runaway youth episodes is justified. Such events do not follow normal crime patterns and tend to harbour surprises for the responding officers. Also, police are aware of their lack of expertise in the delicate handling of such matters. Yet, as was pointed out in Chapter 4, the police officer continues to be the first official agency to normally come in contact with runaway youths (SAC, 1974a). Until running
away from home is fully decriminalized, the dominance of control/coercive strategies in dealings with runaway youth will presumably continue. And since child protection statutes in Canada tend to perpetuate prohibitions against runaways and provide coercive apprehension procedures, it would appear that removal of status offenses from juvenile justice statutes may not be sufficient to aim runaway services towards a liberative advocacy orientation.
Non-Intervention

Edwin Schur's 1973 book, Radical Nonintervention: Rethinking the Delinquency Problem, proposes that much of the crisis in the juvenile court can be credited to the tendency to intervene unnecessarily in the affairs of families and juveniles. In tracing the development of the juvenile justice system, Schur outlines the history of abuse of citizen's rights to self-determination due to a tendency on the part of juvenile justice authorities toward excessive surveillance of private spaces. His recommendation is for juvenile authorities to do as little as possible up until the point when coercive intervention is clearly justified. A number of cases in the Bayside sample clearly fit Schur's model of "radical non-intervention." In both of the case studies to follow, the young people in question moved at their own appropriate speed to establish independent lifestyles apart from the family home, without significant agency involvement.

Liz Bertram. Liz Bertram was another Bayside teenager who was able to live independently and take responsibility at a young age; she has been primarily on her own since age 13. Liz first ran away at age 12 following an argument with her father during which he called her a "slut": "My girlfriend and I had gotten reputations as being loose. People would call us things like this behind our backs, but we were not promiscuous, and were not really aware of this reputation." Liz left home a half hour after the confrontation with her dad, went to the local bowling alley, met some friends there, and slept that night in a girlfriend's home, keeping out of sight of the friend's parents. Liz was away from home for three other single-night stays during this period, and once slept in a friend's van for two weeks. She was age 12 at the time.
That summer, after she had turned 13, Liz and a girlfriend were at the beach when two boys drove up asking: "Do you want to go to Revelstoke?" (a town in the interior of B.C.). They said "Sure", did go, and ended up staying six months, working as waitresses and living in hotel or motel rooms and lying about their ages when necessary. This was the beginning of several years of adventure and independent living which took Liz and various young friends to Vancouver Island, Calgary, and various towns in British Columbia, through many legitimate jobs, all with only very occasional adult supervision. During this period, Liz was evidently never involved in delinquent activities or illegal employment ventures, and had virtually no contact with police or social agencies. (The only exception was in Revelstoke, as the B.C. winter set in, when Liz became homesick and was nearly out of money. She phoned home and asked her father to phone the RCMP and have her picked up as a runaway. He did so. The police—who knew she and her friend were underage, but had never bothered them—at first hesitated and joked with her, but finally did buy her a bus ticket home.)

At age 16, Liz was living back with her parents for awhile and had developed a close relationship with Jeff, one of her most regular traveling companions. She worked in a packaging factory and each weekend drove her parents' VW to an outlying town where she visited and stayed the weekend with Jeff. "My folks got pissed off each time I went out there, but they finally gave up and gave me the car." During that year, Liz was kicked out of the family home after an argument with her father (who called her a "slut" again). Up to this time, she had seen the ever-revolving living arrangements as "fun and games--just adventure." Now with things breaking down at home again and with Jeff established for awhile in a steady job, she felt herself at age 16 truly embarking on adulthood. Liz continued
working full-time or part-time, living on her own or with friends, and completed her high school diploma through the Bayside Work-Study program at age 18. Last I heard she had broken up with Jeff and was working in the northern part of the province as an (underage) barmaid. As usual, she is reportedly doing okay.

Runaway youth policy had very little effect on the life or movements of Liz Bertram. Her parents saw no need to report her absence from home to the police, and she was careful enough to avoid any constraining agency contacts despite her young age and relative freedom of movement. When living and working in Revelstoke, Liz had phoned her father and asked him to send her a note saying she had her parents' permission to live on her own and was not a runaway; he did so. In fact, Liz never did consider herself a "runaway" and shunned my use of the word during the interview, referring instead to "leaving home" and "going out on your own."

It is difficult to say what good any formal services or sanctions would have done in this instance. There was never any real request for help or cry for help, either from the adolescent, parent, or school. Liz took care of herself, acted responsibly, gained a great deal of work experience, and saw a good bit of Canada. She has a high school diploma and a steady job, and her main criminal act has been to lie about her age. The premature emancipation process was informal but effective and no agency action was required.

Wendy McDougal. Parents are not always at odds with home-leaving youth, and there are numerous cases where the family is in agreement about the efficacy of an independent living arrangement. Wendy McDougal consulted both her separated mother and father and the two step-parents before moving
out on her own at age 15. Her mother assisted her in finding an apartment and helped her move. Her father, living 30 miles to the south, was concerned about Wendy's decision to drop out of school, but did not stop the move.

Wendy was not happy when her mother moved to Bayside, where the new stepfather lived and worked. They moved from a small, rural town on the Fraser River delta, and she felt isolated in the Bayside school and social scene. Academic expectations were much higher, and she found the Bayside students to be too sophisticated and snobbish for her taste. She decided to drop out of high school at Grade 11 and go to work. Wendy found an apartment in East Bayside (a less exclusive suburb), lying about her age to the telephone company and landlady. She has two part-time jobs and works seven days a week to pay the bills.

Wendy feels relieved to have the increased freedom of movement and the private space, and believes she is responsible enough to handle the difficulties which arise from being on her own. She notes in passing that in the working-class, farm community where she spent most of her youth, leaving home is called "moving out," not "running away," and is generally done when one has a full-time job and leaves school to pursue that job—at whatever age.

Despite the need to live "on the edge of the law" in terms of lying about her age, Wendy McDougal successfully emancipated with parental cooperation, without any formal agency sanction or court proceeding. In fact, Wendy has had no agency contact whatsoever (I learned of this situation and obtained the interview through Wendy's step-sister, rather than through an agency referral). The transition was carried off quite well with only intra-family negotiations taking place. During the course of this study, I have learned of numerous situations similar to this in Bayside and other
communities, where young people have moved out on their own prior to the officially stipulated age. Such transition decisions, being carried out without fanfare and outside the controversy of court procedures or agency actions, give some indication of the unworkability of rigid, age-grading standards and to the need for availability of more options for youths and parents who may not be able or may not wish to live together successfully for the required number of years.

* * * * *

The runaway act not only challenges the rigid age-grading system and the cultural patterns of youth dependency; it also alerts us to re-examine some of the basics of family life. While there has been serious concern over the expanding divorce rate and concomitant warnings about the "breakdown of the family," such statistics do not necessarily tell the whole story. The high divorce rate may also give indication that participants in a marriage find it easier to leave an unsatisfactory partnership now than they would have in previous eras; in fact, certain divorces clearly lead to liberating and healthy futures.

Likewise, the expanding frequency of runaway youth activity does not necessarily spell doom for the family as we know it nor necessarily mean failure for the runaway youth. A point which has been stressed throughout this study is the powerful nature of the runaway act and the possibility that runaway youth are in many instances able to find growth-enhancing experiences while away from the family home.

The action of running away, like the action of divorcing one's spouse, can be taken as an implicit statement about the breakdown of the modern family; but both can also be seen as indicators of the impossibility of
meeting all of modern society's expectations regarding family functioning. Several centuries ago, when the average life expectancy was half what it is today, it was easier to stay with a marriage partner for life, simply because life was shorter, but also because there were fewer employment and socialization options readily available. Our continuation of the traditional expectation that husbands and wives should stay together for life is just as unrealistic as is our similar expectation that young people and parents should enjoy the company of one another and find the relationship continually productive for the duration of the children's minority. While such an ideal may well be a positive one to aim for, considerable stress and real abuse is generated through the expectation that all families must fit the traditional model of family harmony.

Liz Bertram and Wendy McDougal are "pioneers" of a sort. Through their assertions of competence and their demonstrations of self-sufficiency, they have challenged the basic rationale of standardized youth dependency in very basic ways. While their actions are admittedly unorthodox, the Bayside data indicates that more and more young people are going out on their own at earlier ages and surviving successfully. While it might be preferable for such youth to have more adult guidance and support than they are getting, the situations they have left behind frequently leave much to be desired. Viewed from this standpoint, early emancipation appears to be the more productive opportunity and deserves careful consideration by adult policymakers as a more readily available, legitimate option for minors.
Conclusion

In a number of the cases detailed above, agency workers and family members would agree that no intervention at all was required or justified. Agency people often discover that they need to be as sensitive to the issue of whether or not to do anything at all as they are to the question of which type of intervention to employ. That some situations suggest a no-intervention approach helps explain statistics which show that many parents do not report the runaway actions of their children to the police, and that many runaway youths do not utilize runaway houses or other runaway-oriented services. In both cases, the family member is making an implicit statement that State involvement in the family matter is neither necessary nor desired.

However, there are various types of intervention, and the type which most runaways, and many parents, tend to shun is the type which takes charge of family matters in a coercive way, by moving teenagers around in police cars without their permission, or which confines a youth in a jail cell without a criminal act having been committed. The parents interviewed in this study were not generally angry at the State for intervening; they were angry when the intervention did not work, was accomplished in a crude manner, or when it was too slow in coming. They were pleased when agencies came on the scene and helped out—but only when that help worked. That help worked when the coercive strategies were restricted to situations of actual law-breaking behaviour, and when sensitive and considerate advocacy approaches were taken in regard to living situations, school situations, and other matters not bearing on criminal activities.

It is clear from the above examples that agency people in Bayside are frequently using a youth-advocacy and family-advocacy approach, irrespective
of their formal agency function (i.e., whether probation officer or therapist) and sometimes in contravention of the letter of the written policies which guide them. The agency people who were interviewed and observed in this study used a good deal of discretion in handling runaway matters. The discretion often led to innovative solutions which might not have been discovered had the agency functionary complied strictly with the formal policy guidelines.

Discretionary activities on the part of the agency personnel have lent increased flexibility to the written runaway youth policies. Such innovation and "bending of the rules" has opened up new areas of advocacy and allowed, for a closer approximation of some of the Progressive reformers' more idealistic aims. In particular, the emergence of a youth advocacy stance which respects a minor's autonomy and right to self-determination, yet which provides concrete guidance on how to maneuver through legal procedures, school applications, and learning how to meet one's financial obligations (to name only a fraction of the possible concerns), signals the advent of a new, less pathological approach to runaway youth.

The counter-hegemonic moment did open up new possibilities for youth, families and agencies. While many of the counter-culture runaway service innovations have been co-opted, modified, or eliminated altogether, the grassroots energy which was exhibited during the late 1960s and early 1970s led to an expansion of available options for young people. For many—perhaps most—minors, the idea of working at a full-time job, beginning a family, or going out on one's own at an early age may appear ludicrous. Yet some youths find it necessary due to adverse family home conditions to move out prior to the officially stipulated age; and others appear to mature early and find ready confidence in their survival skills.
In the attempt to pursue a "political economy of adolescence" we have discovered that minors exist in a state of legal dependency which has always been justified on the basis of young people's economic usefulness to adults. We have found that the youth dependency doctrine is supported by a comprehensive network of youth services including the compulsory public school, the juvenile court, and child protective services—all of which tend to perpetuate the dependent status and deny youth input into youth services policy. Basic to the political economy of youth dependency is the continuing unemployability of adolescents, in the sense of full-time productive work opportunities. It is this exclusion of youth from the adult labour market which forms the linchpin holding all of the other aspects of youth dependency in place.

The agency workers and family members in Bayside who have discovered curative and liberative alternatives to the tradition of punitive runaway statutes represent a remnant of the 1960s counter-hegemonic moment which gives evidence of enduring. As runaway intervention strategies continue to be challenged, each new law reform commission report casts further doubt on the legal, ethical, and pragmatic justifications for the youth dependency policies. In a sense, runaway youths can be seen as being in the forefront of change—in the vanguard of those wishing to see youth dependency policies either eliminated or very radically modified.

Discretionary actions such as those detailed in this chapter have tended to be precursors of formal bureaucratic changes to come. Youths, families, and agency helpers are molding policy in ways that make that policy more relevant to their situations. Chapter 10 will present more permanent policy changes which would strike more deeply at the outmoded age-grading standards.
Chapter 10

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In considering the "runaway youth problem" in North America, this study has endeavored to shift the focus from an emphasis on family pathology and youth pathology to an interest in the problems with runaway youth policy itself. Implicit in such a shift is the idea that the actions of legislators, labour union officials, industrialists, educators and other policymakers are as important in creating and perpetuating the runaway youth problem as are the actions of runaways and their families.

Likewise, it has been noted that the North American approach to social welfare has tended in many cases to "blame the victims" of social problems for their own unpleasant situations when it appears that changing the social structural constraints underlying that social problem would be difficult or unfeasible. Person-blame approaches which rely on the medical model of diagnosis and treatment thus dominate the discussion of runaway youth policy while social structural questions are largely ignored.

It has been our goal here to unearth some of these structural questions and introduce them for discussion, so that the runaway youth issue might be viewed from a fresh perspective. We have thus purposely suspended the pathological orientation which has always dominated the discussion of runaway youth and have substituted an analysis and critique of runaway youth policies. The dissertation has taken an historical turn in discussing runaway youth policy because insights about the purposes of policies are available in the attitudes of those who originally created the policies and in the political-economic realities of those earlier times.
Summary and Conclusions

Our first task was to illuminate the policy origins of the agency practices affecting runaways. We discovered that policies affecting runaways extend well beyond juvenile court legislation—the point at which most runaway research stops, when it examines policy considerations at all. In fact, from an historical vantage point, it became apparent that juvenile court and child welfare control sanctions and services perform an auxiliary, back-up role to the broad thrust of runaway youth policy.

The most basic set of social policies affecting the movement of runaway minors emerges from the legal codes which enforce age-graded youth dependency. It was pointed out that citizens below the legal "age of majority" are not considered full persons in the eyes of the law. The passage to adulthood is preceded by a dependency period wherein young people are placed under adult authority structures which supervise every aspect of their existence. Running away from home is both a violation of such legal codes and a "silent protest" against the youth dependency practices.

Our modern exclusion of young people from the labour market—necessitated by the abuses of child labour in North American factories during the late 19th century, by the pressure from labour unions for the return of jobs to adult males, and by the increasing mechanization of the workplace which made child labour less in demand—is the second issue of relevance. This important historical shift in young people's economic usefulness to adults has led to a modern ambivalence in social policy between control and advocacy in dealing with adolescent problems.

On the one hand, it was necessary to control, contain and redirect the energies of thousands of young people made unemployable by
the new marketplace realities, many of whom were left drifting and aimless on the streets of the congested new cities. On the other hand, revisionist ideologies promoted by social reformers and academics of the period held that adolescence was, psychologically speaking, not a time for adult labour at all, but a time to reflect, experiment, and grow without normal adult pressures. Adolescence came to be viewed as a time of necessary turbulence and searching, a time when guidance by kind and knowledgeable adults was especially important to proper development.

The contemporary compulsory school system came into being, then, with two clear objectives in mind: 1) to occupy the energies of children and youth who were unemployed and unemployable; and 2) to socialize these young people in ways which would respect their vulnerability and fragility as well as the future needs of factories for compliant, willing workers. The middle-class social reformers of the Victorian and Progressive eras focused particular attention on the young of the working-class immigrant families who, it was felt, presented a particular threat to social order in the crowded U.S. and Canadian cities. It was with these immigrant youths in mind that the first comprehensive runaway laws were established.

However, child labour laws and compulsory schooling were not sufficient to facilitate the movement of an entire age-segment from workplace to classroom. Juvenile court and child protection reforms came into being as further moves to control and socialize the immigrant children and youth. "Status offenses" covering runaway, truancy, and other "victimless" youth nuisance crimes were enacted. These "status offenses"—being crimes only when committed by children, but not criminal if committed by legal adults—have come under consistent challenge in recent years. But such offenses were central to the benevolent, preventative, "kindly parent" intent of
the new children's court.

In the course of setting policies and standards for the control and socialization of working class, immigrant children and youth, the social reformers of the Progressive era extended the reforms to encompass all children and youth of all socioeconomic classes. The ideology of the Child Study Movement taught that it was crucial for all young people to be protected from the pressures of adult responsibilities. As public school gradually came to replace the factory as the place where young people congregated, adolescence became stretched to accommodate a longer and longer period of socialization, and a greater and greater delay in youth's entry into the workforce.

An empirical study of runaway youth patterns in the Canadian suburb of Bayside used these policy insights to evaluate the effectiveness of agency services toward runaways. Throughout the policy analysis and throughout the community study of Bayside, the issue of control versus advocacy was found to be a continuing policy tension. Runaway policy, by its very nature, seeks to control the movements of minors, and thus is inevitably punitive and coercive. But due to the traditional benevolence toward the young, based on the adolescent vulnerability ideology, the coercive procedures are generally rather half-hearted. Also, due to the size and maturity of the older adolescent, young people frequently will not be controlled and consistently push up against policy to exert their own self-determination.

This forceful challenging of the rationale and reality of runaway youth policy by the youths affected was seen in most vivid perspective during the counter-culture runaway services revolution of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The Canadian version of this counter-hegemonic trend led to a spontaneous creation of emergency runaway services in major cities.
from Victoria to Montreal. The U.S. version led to the emergence of a new social service phenomenon, the runaway house, and auxiliary services meeting runaway needs for food, clothing, medical and dental attention, legal information, and advocacy counseling.

The ideology and methodology of runaway youth research also shifted with these counter-culture advocacy developments. Rather than continuing to search for the answer to the runaway youth problem in the difficulties of the runaways themselves, numerous commentators began to see the positive and powerful aspects of the runaway act. Pathological definitions, such as those which categorized running away as a mental disorder, came to be supplanted by new notions of running away as an act leading somewhere constructive: to greater autonomy and independence, to self-exploration, sometimes to self-sufficient living situations and full-time work. Running away came to be seen by some as more often a solution than a problem.

In the upper-middle class community of Bayside, British Columbia, strains between the control perspective and the advocacy perspective were readily apparent. These strains were already present in the protective policies which had always kept Bayside an exclusive, expensive refuge from urban blight. Control and benevolence existed side-by-side in the community in such areas as the pressure on the Bayside young to succeed and do well in school--so that later material benefits would accrue to them.

This intense pressure to succeed in school and go on to college was one of the central factors leading many Bayside adolescents to drop out of school and/or run away from home. Another was the difficulty many of the traditional nuclear families in Bayside had in staying together amicably over the extended number of years necessary to raise the modern child to
legal and educational maturity. It was evident in the Bayside data that young people were "divorcing" themselves from their families, except that minor children are not allowed to initiate formal divorce proceedings—another taken-for-granted example of age discrimination.

The Bayside findings on socioeconomic status and running away from home serve to counteract our cultural tendency to find social problems to be more prevalent among the poor and the powerless. Bayside is an exclusive suburb serving upper-middle class and upper class families; yet a high incidence of home-leaving was uncovered in the study. (See Methodological Appendix.) Also, the incidence of runaways in Bayside was spread rather evenly across the various social class categories existing in the community.

Furthermore, the analysis of runaway patterns in Bayside revealed that single parent families, families which had experienced divorce, blended and stepparent families, families on welfare, and poor families did not exhibit family problems in excess of those found in the wealthier, two-parent, first-marriage nuclear families. In fact, on a number of indices, the nuclear families exhibited more signs of serious family stress than did the "structurally disrupted" families. Since the nuclear, first-marriage families averaged considerably higher in SES ranking, this finding was another indication that the idea that social problems reside with the poor and powerless may not be a valid stereotype.

A limitation on legitimate options for the runaway youth was apparent in the Bayside study. Because of the tradition of punitive and controlling runaway policies, agency worker's hands are frequently tied and such options as independent housing or full-time employment are in violation of those policies which aim to maintain minors under daily parental supervision.
Because of the overly rigid constraints of traditional runaway policies, agency workers in Bayside and elsewhere have found ways to make runaway services and runaway intervention more flexible and more attentive to the realities of family and community dynamics. Through the judicious use of discretionary innovations, agency workers sometimes can act as family mediators and help the runaway and parents in their conflict resolution. However, agency functionaries more often find themselves "on the sidelines," watching the family work out their problems, without any clear agency intervention role being appropriate.

This "observer role" which agency people frequently find themselves occupying is one of the indicators of the relatively ineffectual stance which agency employees, parents, and other adults often gravitate toward in reacting to the runaway action. Running away from home is a powerful ploy in the family and community negotiation sequence, and runaway youths are frequently the ones holding the "highest card" in the runaway negotiations.

Runaway youth are both pushing up against rules they have found overly constraining and also challenging the rationale of youth dependency policies at their very base. Families and agency workers, in finding that their intervention options are limited by the ineffectiveness of punitive procedures, are tending to move toward more benevolent strategies with runaways--especially since the liberalization which took place in the counter-culture reform period.

This liberalization and the accompanying discretionary thrust of runaway services normally involves "benevolent advocacy"--a type of advocacy very similar to that envisioned by the Progressive reformers when the runaway prohibition was first put in place. Benevolent advocacy moves beyond
coercive policies (even while being in dynamic tension with the coercive/control perspective) in its focus on protecting the interests of the child or youth and in taking on a mediation role.

But what the counter-culture runaway reforms moved us toward is a second brand of advocacy which might be termed "liberative advocacy." This type of advocacy would assist youths beyond the rigid age-grading strictures toward more autonomy and independence, if and when they find themselves ready to take on a greater share of responsibility for their own lives and direction.

Under existing policies—even those liberalized by the counter-hegemonic reforms—it is difficult for parents and agency workers to find room to innovate options which open up new possibilities for housing alternatives or employment alternatives, or opportunities for a greater voice in policy-making. These are the sorts of structural changes which will be proposed in the Recommendations section to follow.

* * * * * * * *

In attempting to formulate a "political economy of runaway youth policy," the study has by necessity expanded into the "political economy of adolescence." A key focus has been the condition of youth dependency which has become extended over the years, due in large part to the unemployability of modern youth in the full-time, productive workforce.

A "critical ethnography" approach was used wherein accounts of runaway youth interactions in a single suburban community were placed in juxtaposition with commentary on the evolution of youth dependency policies. Through this juxtaposition, we have been able to uncover several basic, taken-for-granted presuppositions and expose them to critical scrutiny. Among the
assumptions questioned in the study have been the idea that the primary cause of the runaway youth problem lies in area of individual and family pathology, and the notion that youth cannot be accommodated in the adult labour market.

In facilitating the macro-micro interface wherein the issue of public policy was linked to the troubles of citizens in the community of Bayside, both levels of analysis (i.e., the policy level and the community interactional level) have opened up fresh insights into the problem of running away from home.

On the macro level, it has become apparent that the Progressive reformers responsible for the criminalization of home-leaving were acting under formidable obstacles. Economic crises and urban disorder were at the base of the constraints the reformers faced, but other less global barriers stood in their way, such as the need to influence legislation and the need to accommodate the reforms to the vested interests of industrialists, school superintendents, and reformatory administrators. The opportunities available to the Progressive reformers have also become more evident through this analysis. These idealistic professionals had an opportunity to make significant headway toward their goal of eliminating crime, disease, poverty and urban misery, and their reforms opened up new occupational endeavors, such as probation and social work, which have had far-reaching impact on North American social life.

On the micro level, Bayside runaways, parents, and agency personnel clearly face obstacles and challenges, the most pertinent being the need to work around coercive and outdated runaway youth policies. However, other constraints have come to light, such as the difficulty many family members find in the attempt to live together amicably for the full stretch of time until legal adulthood arrives. The need for temporary or permanent vacations
from one another was a need readily apparent in the Bayside runaway inter-
views. While the desire for permanent, full-time employment was not always
in evidence, due to youth's unfamiliarity with envisioning themselves in pro-
ductive roles, youths desiring to live on their own generally need to earn
their own keep, and the labour market issue becomes extremely important at
that point.

Among the opportunities facing community members in regard to working
within runaway youth policies are the opportunity to formulate more satis-
factory living and lifestyle arrangements through judicious use of discre-
 tionary action, and the possibility of finding peace of mind and renewed
focus in an alternative living arrangement. Another opportunity which should
be mentioned is the chance for minors to begin to take more responsibility
for their own lives, despite the restrictive age-grading prohibitions.

It is unlikely that the panoply of age-grading standards will come
tumbling down in the near future. The counter-hegemonic runaway reforms have
been largely co-opted, institutionalized, or forgotten—especially in Canada—
and the bloom has definitely gone off the "flower child" idealism. The
possibility of a youth revolt or other noticeable action which might bring
media and governmental attention to the seriousness of the age discrimination
being encountered appears quite remote. Despite the discrimination and lack
of input into their own affairs, young people in general are comfortable in
a material sense and are generally oblivious to the dynamics of their minority
status—unlike other minority groups which have mobilized their political
power in recent years.

Nevertheless, the counter-hegemonic trends are real and they are far
from negligible in their impact, even in the 1980s. Each new law reform
commission in Canada and the United States takes an ever-closer look at the
wording and the functioning of youth dependency provisions. Reforms over the past two decades have in many cases overturned or called into question not only the runaway prohibition, but all other status offenses, the common law emancipation procedure, and the rights of juveniles to confront their parents, their school, or other allegedly negligent institutions in courts of law. Young people are much more likely to be represented in juvenile court by an attorney then they were prior to the counter-culture era, and the right to confidential medical treatment without parental knowledge or consent is expanding rapidly.

In fact, it is the lawyers and drafters of legislation who appear most aware of the age discrimination which has accompanied our modern "extended adolescence." The group which has not shown any signs of giving up ground includes those with vested economic interests in the continuing exclusion of youth from the adult labour market. It is in this sense that the present study has inevitably focused on economic and labour market issues in the attempt to understand the runaway phenomenon. Until something changes in the area of youth and the workplace, it is unlikely that the situation of runaways and other dependent youth will change to any significant degree.

While certain of the counter-cultural reforms have been taken over by government and this has involved some element of co-optation, this was, after all, the intent of the reforms. Had they not been "co-opted," that is had they not been funded by government, little long-term benefits would have derived from the counter-hegemonic pressure. The continuing law reform efforts show no signs of abating, thus placing age-grading standards more and more under legal scrutiny. This development, combined with the institutionalization of runaway houses and other non-coercive approaches to runaways, gives evidence of a new, if tentative, direction toward liberative advocacy.
A major problem which has been highlighted by this study is the tendency to systematically ignore the structural basis of runaway youth policy. The labour market realities and the political-economic basis for the laws, regulations, and customs affecting runaway youth have become obscured in favour of pathological causation beliefs which focus on micro-level individual and family troubles. This pathological perspective has been influential both in runaway youth research and runaway youth services.

On the other hand, nowhere have I intended to imply that personal and family troubles do not exist in runaway situations. That would be denying the obvious. While admitting the existence of pathology on some levels, and to some degree, depending on the particular case, I have wanted to shift the focus to an area which has been almost totally neglected in runaway writings: the labour market realities of youth unemployability. Family and individual pathology has served as a handy foil in the cultural obscuring process which has served to direct us away from economic causation as an available explanatory framework. As in other fields of social policy, blaming the individual, in fact "blaming the victim," has served to divert attention from political-economic realities.

Those political-economic realities can now be understood in greater detail. The new protectiveness toward children and youth which emerged during the late 19th century, and which was brought into theoretical reality by G. Stanley Hall and the Child Study Movement, came about—or at the very least was allowed to blossom—because of the emerging "social fact" of youth unemployability.

When children and youth were needed in the factories—needed there by
the factory owner as inexpensive, malleable manual labour, and needed there by the working class family as a source of income to put food on the table—there was no great push to protect offspring from the dangers of the outside world. The protective ideology came into its own when a set of facilitating circumstances emerged at about the same historical period:
a) a fragmenting of the family structure as fathers and husbands came more and more to commute to the workplace and have less daily contact with home and children;  
b) emergence of daily schooling for children, an innovation which took them away from the home for hours out of each day;  
c) growing confusion and ambiguity in the role of wife and mother as family members left the house each day and as the housewife duties came to be reduced in scope and importance;  
d) the gradually emerging fact of child and youth unemployability as child labour laws, mechanization of the workplace, and union pressures for the return of adult males to jobs held by minors all began to take effect;  
e) the rapid growth in the final two decades of the 19th century of universities and colleges with departments of psychology and sociology which could develop and promulgate new theories of socialization;  
and  
f) the emergence of an active group of social reformers, philanthropists, researchers, and social workers which became alarmed at the widespread damage to human resources which had come in the wake of rapid-fire industrial growth and urbanization. The North American family, especially the poor immigrant family, clearly needed help during this time of economic stress, urban chaos, and changing roles and duties.

Revisionist historians have surfaced over the past several decades to shed new light on the Progressive era in North America, and to re-examine the motives of turn of the century social reformers. While this study benefits from these revisionist writings and follows their trend to large
degree (in pointing to political-economic motives in child labour reform, school reform, juvenile justice and child welfare reform, and in looking at middle-class biases in the reformers' approach to lower-class immigrant families), I have no desire to dismiss the work of the Progressive social reformers or to demean the significant accomplishments for which they were responsible or to which they contributed (e.g., creation of the civil service, anti-monopoly laws, factory health and safety regulation, removal of child labour abuses, removal of children and youths from adult prisons, and the introduction of vocational education).

What is troublesome about policies affecting children, youth, and families, including runaway youth policies, is that measures which were rushed into enactment due to emergency conditions at the turn of the century have become codified, traditionalized, and institutionalized; further, that policies intended for the benefit and control of a particular segment of society—poor immigrant families—have become universalized and now affect all youths from all strata (though the policies should be critiqued in either event). The emergency runaway youth policies were thus instituted with a permanence not allowing for formal, regular revisions, and have therefore become part of our permanent social policy framework. As such, these youth dependency policies affect all minors with little allowance for individual exceptions. It is in this sense that the present study has gone beyond runaway youth and runaway policy to consider the structure and dynamics of adolescence as a life-stage, not merely the plight of youth on the run; a deep-running youth dependency tradition underpins runaway youth policies.

Even though it is true that the Progressive-era social reformers viewed their reforms as permanent (after all, their goal was to divert wayward children from lives of crime and remove children from adult prisons—missions
which ought to continue on indefinitely), I am referring to the reforms affecting minors as "emergency measures" for two reasons: 1) the problem of children and youth idle on the streets was a problem arising from the severe economic and urban disruptions of the time—conditions which were new in their impact and for which precedents and pre-tested solutions did not exist; and 2) the problems of youth idleness and family/community disorganization were eventually resolved or certainly greatly reduced in impact as children and youth were absorbed into public schools in much greater numbers in the early decades of the 20th century, as cities and factories become better organized and more concerned for the welfare of employees and employee families, as labour unions gained in strength and ability to protect workers, as government regulation in various areas came to lessen abuses, and as immigrant families came to find more stability and became more integrated in the North American urban setting. (And, of course, to most of the above points should be added: "... much to the credit of the Progressive reformers.")

Policies intending to deal with the idleness of youth on the streets and with the potential danger of criminal associations and opportunities became obsolete as the urban problems and urban congestion lessened, and as unemployed youth and children matriculated into the free, public, compulsory schools. Yet the policies continued on without re-evaluation—re-evaluation which would have been justified in light of new conditions.

Child labour laws, while certainly benevolent in their intent and while certainly effective in reducing or eliminating serious abuses in industrial working conditions, also succeeded in eliminating all possibility of substantial full-time employment opportunities for youths below a given age. A 1975 article in the Minnesota Law Review noted:
The child labor laws now in effect in most states were originally enacted to protect children from hazardous work, long hours, and low pay. Economic and social circumstances have changed. Now the inability of young people to find any work is a major social and economic problem. The child labor laws enacted to deal with the undeniable abuses of child labor during the 19th and early 20th centuries are not suitable for the 1970's. Safe jobs, appropriate for young people, are closed to them because of needlessly cumbersome and restrictive child labor laws. Furthermore, minors' legal rights in other fields are currently being expanded and redefined by the courts and society generally. Yet in child labor laws young people still encounter restrictions and legal burdens which can be justified only by an antiquated paternalism that denies the individual needs and capabilities of young people.

(Anon., 1975: p. 603)

That the "antiquated paternalism" guiding youth dependency policies would be more conservative and less open to input and innovation in the labour market realm than in other areas of concern provides substance to the economic causation perspective of the present study. Such economic conservatism appears very fixed at this point in time, so that ideas about youth entering the full-time productive labour force at earlier ages are extremely controversial, if not unmentionable. The broad idea of the necessity of youth dependency, and the related conviction that young people cannot or should not be accommodated in the labour market is indeed a deep-running, taken-for-granted cultural belief. The full-time employability of adolescents would indeed appear to be "the last reform" which could be expected in the youth rights field.

I have not, in this thesis, undertaken a full analysis of the reasons for the absence of a re-evaluation and restructuring of family policy following stabilization of communities and more complete school enrollments in the early part of this century. However, several points can be made here as a beginning to that analysis: à) Once it became clear that children
and young people could no longer be accommodated in the full-time labour force, compulsory school laws and policies which maintained parental responsibility and authority over minors appeared to serve the best interests of the North American economies. b) Once communities had stabilized and urban slum neighborhoods were less chaotic and less riot-prone, the family social control policies (child welfare, juvenile justice, compulsory schooling, etc.) which had aided in creating that stabilization were retained partly as a safeguard in perpetuating that new stability. c) Since full employment has never been viewed as a condition which would fit naturally within the North American political-economic context (Grubb & Lazerson, 1982), policy measures directed toward the control and direction of unemployed groups (e.g., young people, welfare recipients, housewives, the handicapped, street criminals, minority families, and poor families) have been retained in lieu of any more innovative proposals. d) Due to the American aversion to welfare-state policies and the pervasive ambivalence toward aggressive social welfare programs—especially those programs which would lower excessive incomes and reduce status differentials—North American social policies have in general served to put out evident brush fires rather than seek true societal readjustments; thus social policies tend to be designed to stabilize emergency situations without initiating serious long-range social planning. e) Finally, numerous critics have noted that Canada and the United States have never had comprehensive family policies; instead, leding form the previous point d), our social policy efforts in the family area have been haphazard, uncoordinated, and inequitable (Task Force, 1978; Keniston, 1977; Grubb & Lazerson, 1982a).

Since flexibility, updating, and innovation of new approaches were not built into the policy-making process, creative new approaches and challenges
to existing social policy needed to come from outside normal policy-making channels. During the Great Depression, Civilian Conservation Corps camps and other job creation projects benefited numerous unemployed youths and adults. This can be seen as "exception to the rule" innovation by government during a time of crisis. A decade later, under the press of a wartime economy, child labour restrictions were lifted or ignored so that minors could work in World War II defense plants—often moving from hometowns to cities which were sites of wartime industries, and in many cases living in government-sponsored housing with little chaperonage. Such discretionary ignoring of the formal rules or emergency readjustment of the rules has been possible within the existing policy framework (Lipschutz, 1977).

But neither the Depression nor the World War II precedents have made any permanent impact on youth employment policies, on compulsory schooling policies, nor on juvenile court and child protective procedures. Instead, policies continued basically as designed during the Progressive social reform era—-with a social control emphasis which served to keep young people out of full-time employment and to occupy their energies in the meantime. Likewise, family policies remained which continued considerable governmental hegemony over family life—not merely in cases of serious child abuse or neglect, but also in situations of parent-adolescent strife, school truancy, adolescent consenting sexual activities, and youth incorrigibility, as well as running away from home and/or setting up independent living situations while a minor.

Contradictions and ambiguities which were implicit in runaway youth policies from their origins have continued to affect services to home-leaving youths down to the present day. Since the primary stimulus for the policies was the need to move idle youths from street corners into productive
activity, with or without the cooperation or consent of those youths, a necessary emphasis was placed on control, containment, transportation home and other negative sanctions and coercive strategies.

Yet at the same time, the initiators of these policies were sincere in their concern for the plight of immigrant children and youths who were not seen as responsible for their idleness, for their poverty, nor for the criminal associates and unhealthy environs available to them on the streets and in the pool halls. Thus emerged a set of benevolent policies intending to represent, support and advocate for children and youth--but which, by necessity, used control, containment and coercion as the primary motivating tools. These were benevolent/coercive policies, and they continued as that until the "counter-hegemonic" challenge to runaway policies in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

J. Milton Yinger (1982: p. 9) has written that "Countercultures can be seen as calls for help in stressful times, in periods when the cultural support systems, the myths and symbols, are operating inadequately, when faith in them is gone and seems unlikely to be regained." Since runaway youth policy contained no self-correcting mechanisms, and since input was not sought from youngsters and families affected by these policies, the message that the cultural support systems were operating inadequately was conveyed vividly by spontaneous action: the tramping feet of thousands of vagabound youth, and the grassroots response which was generated in the form of advocacy street level services for runaways and families. That counter-culture runaway services represented a challenge to traditional policy was made clear when Huckleberry House was raided in 1967 and staff and residents were placed behind bars. Despite the advocacy intent of the Progressive reformers and the benevolence written into the spirit and letter
of runaway policy, the control aspect has always been paramount.

The "counter-hegemonic" period led to substantial shifts in the strategies toward runaway youths and other status offenders—temporarily in the case of Canada, and more permanently as change was solidified in the 1974 runaway legislation in the U.S. Yet the fugitive status remains. Runaway houses, where they exist, still tend to serve a coercive function in many cases; sometimes they tend to be used as temporary stopping places for youngsters who are being moved from one foster home or group home to another rather than primarily serving runaways; frequently they are shunned by young people "on the road" who, even in the U.S. where supportive policies exist, fear detection and wish to make it on their own.

A shift from a predominantly control stance to a potential advocacy stance has been accomplished in U.S. runaway policy, and Canadian runaway policy has taken some tentative moves in that direction. But even from a benevolent advocacy position, available options tend to be severely limited. The proposals and suggestions which follow are intended to expand the discourse on home-leaving youth and widen the horizon for individual and family alternatives through outlining suggested structural changes deriving from a liberative advocacy perspective.
Recommendations

The recommendations emerging from the findings of this study are arranged in stair-step fashion from the more concrete, readily attainable solutions, through innovations which would entail considerable study and planning, and then on to more far-reaching proposals. The proposals fall into three categories: 1) job creation and work-oriented innovations; 2) provisions for independent housing options; and 3) suggestions for increased policy input by youths and families.

Level I - Readily Attainable Innovations. Recommendations at this level involve expansion of currently existing programs and/or redirection of existing programs into new directions.

- Expansion of high school work-study programs (options which allow for part-time employment by students and which draw connections between classwork and job problems). Extension of work-study programs to junior high school students.

- Revitalization of trade, vocational, and business courses in public and private schools through closer coordination with business and industry representatives, and through more extensive career counseling.

- Introduction of youth resident input into the organization and operation of existing group homes and runaway houses through the use of resident councils, youth positions on governing boards, etc.

- Expanded utilization of existing "loopholes" in family policy and age-grading procedures: early emancipation procedures (whether common law or statutory); requests for exceptions to agency and school policies; formally or informally allowing independent living arrangements with occasional agency input or supervision; earlier admission of home-leaving youths to G.E.D. high school equivalency testing and to night school and/or adult school programs.

- Encouragement of reasonable use of youth-initiated lawsuits in cases of abuse or neglect by parent, school, or employer.
- Reorientation of high school student councils, youth club boards, and other youth-member political bodies toward more advocacy activities which would benefit the youth age-group.

**Level II - Feasible Innovations Requiring Study and Planning.** The following proposals might be successfully implemented following the organization of citizen task forces or agency, industry or school committees which would sketch out the goals and the methods to be employed.

- Initiation of youth internships by business and industry. Some of these positions might be connected with school work-study programs, while others might be reserved for school dropouts. Such internships (following the typical apprenticeship pattern) would involve on-the-job training for the young intern and allow her/him to try out a potential career direction, while providing the employer with a less expensive worker during the internship period.

- Youth job creation and training opportunities by business and industry, as a public service venture and profit-making venture. Projects to be initiated might involve the remodeling of older houses in the community and subsequent sales of those houses; the making of adobe bricks, manufacture of log cabin logs, or other building components; design and manufacture of solar energy panels; clothing design and manufacture; operation of child-care centers; etc.

- Youth job creation and training opportunities by government. Projects might include trail-making, tree planting, and other conservation or recreation work in wilderness areas; highway and other civil engineering work; archeological digs and historical preservation work; museum and archival work; and work with senior citizens programs and recreation programs.

- Creation of aggressive liaison programs with labour unions to break down union resistance to youth labour and to cooperate in finding ways to expand employment opportunities for both young and older workers in particular fields. This would involve conversion of the normally reactive stance taken by labour unions to a more proactive approach whereby unions would become more involved in policy development and policy change.

- Pressure on school districts to take leadership in youth job creation, liaison with business and industry, practical job training programs, off-campus educational programs (internships, field trips, classes in industrial settings, community-based educational programs in hospitals, nursing homes, law courts, wilderness settings, etc.), workshops in youth job preparation, résumé writing and job search strategies, grant proposal writing and funding of special programs.
- Formation of study groups to explore possibilities of diversion of school tax money to employment-oriented programs, internships, and community-based off-campus programs; and to explore such other innovations as school voucher programs which allow students and parents to choose from a variety of school options—public and private—and have the tax money due that student diverted to the chosen school; proposals for lowering the legal school-leaving age; proposals for optional acceleration of studies so that high school graduation might be accomplished at an earlier age; and proposals for wholesale curriculum and personnel policy revisions.

- Creation of youth boarding houses to bridge the gap between dependence on family or the State, and independent adulthood. These semi-independent living quarters would be managed by the young residents in coordination with adult advisors who would provide minimal chaperonage and optional counseling when needed. Such a residence might also double as a boarding home for handicapped young adults which would expand the awareness and human relations skills of the young semi-independent residents.

- Initiation of cross-age contacts for high school students and dropouts. Such programs as volunteer work and recreation leadership in nursing homes and retirement centres, and cross-age tutoring with elementary school students would introduce family-type communication opportunities outside the nuclear family experiencing stress at the particular moment. Students organizing and operating a daycare centre could easily serve as a job creation and money-making operation.

- Legitimated vacations from one's biological family. Actual options would vary, and state funding might be made available. One possibility would be an "exchange program" where parents of teenagers could trade kids for a month. Another is the Phone-a-Home service mentioned in Chapter 5 where a volunteer family would take in a youth having trouble in his/her own family. Vacations for wives, husbands, and younger children might also be included as options.

- Appointment of minors to various governmental bodies and policy-making committees on the municipal level (school boards, school governance committees, recreation boards, police commissions, housing committees, etc.), provincial or state level (labour commissions, social service commissions, education department committees, criminal justice committees, etc.), and federal level (law commissions, federal task forces, etc.)

- Reduction of the voting age.

- Extension of the governmental hearings to school settings when the issues being discussed are relevant to children and/or youth.
- Creation of a youth interest group and youth lobby. Such a group could generate political-economic involvement for an age-status group currently without representation, and currently without any forum for discussion of age-group related issues. The group could also initiate seminars, debates, and public meetings, and might publish a newsletter or magazine to publicize youth self-advocacy issues. (One project might be an Adult Study Movement, a counterpart to Hall's turn-of-the-century group, which would study and give youth's view on the adult-run institutions which affect us all.)

- Extension of the "natural helping network" concept from child abuse interventions, where Collins and Pancoast (1976) and others have urged its use, to other social service, family service, and educational areas, such as runaway situations and school tutoring. The social worker or school counselor would get in tune with the family and neighborhood existing resources, and utilize friends and neighbors already involved in the life of the family.

- Introduction of mediation services to troubled families. Such mediation would allow all family members a say and respect each member's needs and preferences. The service would not be as lengthy, involved, nor expensive as family therapy, and would not bring as much resistance. Also, it would not be defined as therapeutic, rather as political in terms of family politics and family dynamics. Upon family member request only. (See Chapter 5 innovations in this area.)

Level III - Plausible "Utopian" Solutions. Following are the more idealistic recommendations, therefore the ones demanding the most study and reflection. The term "utopian" is used in the most optimistic sense, not meaning "out of reach," but rather "stretching our capacities to meet our ideals." These are meant to be suggestions which could conceivably be attained if we felt strongly enough about them and mobilized the necessary support.

- Suspension of age-grading standards and affirmative action legislation prohibiting discrimination against the young in all areas of activity: employment, schooling, housing, civil and criminal court proceedings, and other legal and financial matters. Such changes might be accompanied by a new set of optional protective policies which would provide state-financed advocates, advisors, or legal guardians when appropriate to aid in legal or financial representation. Protective statutes prohibiting child abuse, rape, incest, sexual harassment, assault, fraud, and other criminal activities would continue to protect children and youth as they also protects adults. Other types of situational legislation protecting the young against particular dangers (e.g. use of children for pornography posing) could also be enacted on an individual basis. (3)
Studies of routes to full employment need to be initiated so that entry of new young workers into the labour force would be possible without the displacement of adult workers. Businesses can be coerced and enticed to level out wages and reduce exorbitantly high salaries at the top and in the middle ranges. When automation replaces human workers, companies can be ordered to initiate job development programs to increase the number of workers in other areas of the company—thus involving workers in corporate diversification and expansion efforts rather than consigning replaced workers to unemployment.

Other avenues which might be explored include federal grants for job creation; increased use of part-time and seasonal employment positions; promotion of "job sharing" where two or more people share a single job position; extension of employee benefits to part-time workers; flexible work shift scheduling and 24-hour plant operation; provision of on-job-site child care facilities; sensitivity to needs of male parenting and need to accommodate child care and family obligations of both male and female worker-parents; examination of capital expenditures and distribution of profits so that a portion of each might go to create new employment opportunities; re-invigoration of the apprenticeship concept; aggressive employee retraining and career-change counseling; study groups to brainstorm routes to new employment concepts.

All of the above innovations would facilitate movement toward full employment (a concept which would include more contented part-time workers and ease of combining worker and parent roles). However, the largest and most rapid contributions to full employment will come from introduction of a notion of fairness—which must involve reduction of excessively high incomes, reduction of excessively high profits, and distribution of profits and capital to job creation and employee satisfaction programs. Of course, an important side effect of full employment programs would be the removal of the rationale that young people cannot work because they would compete with adult workers. (It is of course essential that young people not be hired at excessively low wages and that they be allowed to advance as they acquire further skills.)

Changing the structure of youth unemployability is indeed a tall order. While such a policy revolution is unlikely to come about in the near future, it is only through proposals such as these that the idea of the possibility of change might be initially implanted into the civic consciousness. Since the feasibility of such policy changes is dependent on finding the right method of implementation, the following possible options are offered as possibilities:
Individual Youth Initiative Approach. Short of wholesale policy alterations, there are initiatives which individual minors and small groups of youths can undertake to make themselves more autonomous and more employable. The routes to formal and informal emancipation are not presently blocked by great bureaucratic obstacles and, as the Bayside statistics show, numerous youths are successfully living on their own. While it is true that the primary part-time or full-time job opportunities now open to young people are unskilled, poorly paid jobs in the private service sector—e.g., babysitting, fast-food restaurants, service stations, car washes, store clerk—entrepreneurial opportunities are available in these areas.

Fast-food restaurant managers and assistant managers are generally selected from the ranks and rapid upward mobility is often possible in such chains where not only is the food fast, but so also is the turnover of employees. Likewise, young people are certainly capable of organizing collectives or business partnerships wherein they might combine their efforts in innovative enterprises which meet a need no one else is presently meeting—such as childcare and recreation projects for that period between 3 p.m. and 5 p.m. when children are out of school but working parents are not yet home. In brief, many opportunities for entrepreneurial innovation exist for youth even under the present policy strictures and economic realities.

Social Problems/Welfare State Approach. Grubb and Lazerson (1982a: p. 156) point out that "So long as society regards youth as a stage of life between childhood and adulthood and creates institutions whose purpose is to move young people from one stage to the other, there will be a youth problem." Much of our contemporary malaise about "what to do about kids today" would be curtailed if young people were able to choose to work full-
time in productive capacities which extend beyond the role of student. In a context of full employment, students would be able to choose between school and work based on the advantages and disadvantages of each (e.g., need for further training vs. need to help out family finances for awhile); schools would then be confronted with some healthy competition, which could lead to better quality control and constructive innovation in education. Youthful crime, hijinks, vandalism, rudeness, and antisocial behaviour stemming from lack of constructive challenges during the adolescent years would presumably become greatly reduced as the adolescent years were allowed to be more useful and productive.

Such policy changes would open up attractive avenues for youths and would counter the illicit street temptations of the urban youth ghettos. It might be proposed that the current high rates of teenage suicide, teenage unwed pregnancies, teenage mental illness, and teenage violence are related on some level to the fact of adolescent nonproductivity and youthful idleness. If such understandings were to gain impetus, changes in youth age-grading policies might be promoted as part of a social problems-solving/welfare state approach.

**Labour Union Expansion Approach.** Another way to facilitate changes in age-grading policy would be to educate existing labour unions on the wastefulness of teenage nonproductivity and promote innovation of youth-serving employment projects by organized labour. Motivations for such projects might include the labour unions' traditional bent for a public service, activist role; the possibility of recruitment of young union members; and the expansion of opportunities for workers of various ages through job creation and expansion of the union's vitality in the community.
While there are certainly obstacles to this approach in terms of labour unions not wanting increased job competition for their older members, such objections can be overcome through the innovation of new public service and profit-making projects which do not compete for existing jobs.

Civil Liberties Approach. Age-grading standards can be challenged in court as discriminatory. Such a strategy might well lead to policy change (as was the case following the Gault decision) through the judicial route. Court challenges and appeals take money, time, and effort, but the results would benefit numerous minors.

Youth Militancy Approach. This approach, while seemingly the most appropriate, appears least likely to be initiated. Most other interest groups, when aggrieved, mobilize their forces and attempt to overturn current policies. When group members represent themselves at the barricades of political protest, they give a more convincing presence than when the aggrieved party is represented by an advocate. Indeed, the most angry reformers of the age-grading structures appear to be adults calling themselves "child advocates." It is this anomaly of the absence of self-representation which we will address in the final section of the dissertation.

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Such attempted solutions as these would admittedly confront monumental obstacles. W. Norton Grubb and Marvin Lazerson (1982a), in a recent critique of U.S. youth policy, point out that there has always been a strong reticence to intervene directly in the existing labour market. When such intervention has been attempted by government policy planners, it has been
intervention of a strictly educational nature—job training programs and enhancement of existing vocational education curricula. However, even such educational programs have been only marginally successful due to the inability of educators and industrialists to achieve a satisfactory liaison, and due to the tendency of educational programs to be somewhat distant from actual job placement activities.

The few efforts in the post-World War II period to intervene to affect youth labour markets directly have been vigorously opposed. Attempts to reduce job discrimination against minority youth, efforts to upgrade the quality of jobs available to youth, and expansion of public service employment opportunities for youth have all met with very limited success. Objections to such programs have generally revolved around the notion that private labour market incentives might be lessened by the introduction of public monies, or that publicly-sponsored job development might intervene with profit-making opportunities in the private sector. Grubb and Lazerson comment:

Public employment has been resisted as a step on the road to socialism, and has been consistently pushed into activities that would not compete with the private sector. The absurdity of this restriction is sometimes obvious: at the same time that youth employment levels are high, some areas (especially central cities) suffer from dilapidated housing, housing shortages, and poor public facilities, but the mobilization of human resources to meet obvious social needs has been resisted as encroaching on the prerogatives of the housing and construction industries. The limits on the state facing a capitalist labor market has thus forced youth policy into indirect and inappropriate solutions, since the more forthright approaches to the underlying employment problems have been politically limited.

(Grubb & Lazerson, 1982a: pp. 172-3)
Meanwhile, employment and training programs have had little impact on youth unemployment. The training received by youth enrollees generally has uncertain effects on future earnings and future employment. Such job training programs often take young people already designated as failures and try to "generate quick results without the ability to shape employment opportunities" (Ibid.: p. 173). One key dilemma has been how to provide substantial opportunities for lower-class and minority youths in a society with deep and permanent class divisions. Thus, the inability to intervene in the adult labour market has been the downfall of most youth employment training programs because that lack of intervention has often made such training irrelevant.

An objection might be raised that young people — and runaways in particular, who may well lack the necessary education and nurturing to do well in full-time jobs — might not avail themselves of the opportunities for paid employment, creative school options, and other productive endeavors recommended above. Yet a large part of the reason for youthful apathy and passivity when confronted by creative challenges is the environment of non-productivity in which contemporary teenagers are encased. This study has demonstrated that young people, even runaway youths on the street, do indeed seek creative and productive outlets for their energies and have already compiled sometimes impressive job records and/or school achievements. (4)

Others might inquire how sensible the preceding recommendations are, given the current strain on governmental resources. Clearly, many of the recommendations above would introduce new strains on governmental budgets in a time of fiscal austerity. However, the alternative is to continue on with present policies which are costing us as much, with little rehabilitation of runaway youths or families in evidence. (5)
Feasibility of the Recommendations

It would be fruitless to make proposals which have no possibility of implementation. On the other hand, if proposals—even "utopian" proposals—are never made, there is certainly no possibility for productive changes in policy. Grubb and Lazerson (1982a: p. 167) have commented that "Promoting full employment as a cornerstone of family policy makes little sense without understanding why the United States has so consistently failed to achieve full employment." So it is reasonable to ask: What chance do the above recommendations have of becoming persuasive given our present political and economic structures?

One obstacle to the success of any proposals which would expand the role of youth in the labour market (and the other proposals above are intimately related to that as well) is the current high rate of unemployment and high levels of unemployability in various segments of the economy. This condition can be traced to the phenomenon which James O'Conner (1973) terms the current "fiscal crisis of the state." The fiscal crisis has evolved because "every economic and social class and group wants government to spend more and more money on more and more things. But no one wants to pay new taxes or higher rates on old taxes." O'Connor (Ibid., p. 1) warns that "Society's demands on local and state budgets seemingly are unlimited, but people's willingness and capacity to pay for these demands appear to be narrowly limited."

The result of this contradiction is a chronic inability on the part of federal, provincial, state, and local governments to meet their obligations. Youths suffer from this fiscal crisis whether as wards of custodial public schools which face increasingly tighter budgets or as members of
the entry level workforce in the competitive economic sector. Certainly, the idea of youth asking for an even greater portion of the pie during tight economic times appears, on the face of it, unrealistic.

The crux of the matter is that youth are not in fact asking for changes. Since the turmoil of the Sixties died down, all has been very quiet on the counter-culture/youth advocacy front in terms of active protest and innovation. And even during the counter-hegemonic period, adult advocates carried out much of the footwork of political protest for youth. Youth are, in fact, the most silent members of the "surplus labour force"—that "reserve army" of potential workers who can be called on during times of economic expansion, but who are occupied with state-funded programs (school, welfare, unemployment compensation, etc.) during times of economic quietude.

Labour unions have continued the pressure for fair wages and benefits, despite a recent falling off in union membership. Local, provincial, state, and federal employees have focused their collective bargaining activities on wages, and upon such qualitative issues as job control and the nature of public service. Farm workers' unions have attempted to organize groups of low-paid field workers in the face of dramatic opposition from growers. Welfare rights organizations have pushed for equitable agency treatment for all and adequate subsistence-level benefits. The women's movement has pushed for equal pay and equal opportunity for advancement, irrespective of gender. Racial and ethnic group organizations have kept the pressure on since the early civil rights protests and have made substantial gains for their members. Groups representing the handicapped have made efficient use of vocational rehabilitation monies and have pushed such reforms as wheelchair building access. But youth have never asked for more or better jobs as part of any organized movement.
Because of the presumed need for a certain level of unemployment in a capitalist economy—the need for a "standing reserve army" of surplus potential labourers—the idea of increasing the involvement of teenagers in the productive process may be a futile hope. Except for a few initiatives during the counter-culture period, youth have never found the tools or motivation to organize themselves into a politically persuasive force, and have never developed self-consciousness as a protest group. Meanwhile, other segments of the surplus labour population (e.g., women, the handicapped, ethnic minorities) appear to have first claim on potential job opportunities.

O'Connor's hope for a resolution of the current fiscal crisis resides in the possibility of a political alliance between state workers, monopoly sector workers, competitive sector workers, and the surplus potential labour force—a unified movement which would cut across "all divisions within the working class" (p. 255). Short of such a development, the divisions between the particular labour groups, and the fiscal crisis, could well deepen.

Certainly, in light of the more urgent demands from other groups which are more needy in a basic materialistic sense, the idea of "youth liberation" may be—to echo Bala and Clarke—a luxury likely to be engaged in only by philosophers, child advocates, and family law scholars. Thus, until the necessary political pressure is mounted to alter the conditions of the youth age-status, all of the foregoing will remain an exercise in consciousness-raising.

But this is not to demean the importance of the present effort. Changes in policy must be preceded by concrete proposals; concrete proposals must derive from real political pressure and true social needs; and such political pressure and social need may come only gradually into the public consciousness—especially when important shifts in ideology are entailed.
1. Reference here to "economic causation" requires some discussion. Several authors have warned against using strictly economic explanations in the analysis of the minority legal status of minors. For example, Sutton (1983) showed that the denial of procedural rights to minors as prerequisites to incarceration did not emerge merely as a result of industrialization and modernization, but through a combination of semi-independent socioeconomic, cultural, and political factors. Similarly, Boli-Bennett and Meyer (1978) have concluded that the increasing differentiation of the social role of children from that of adults in national constitutions is only weakly related to advances in technological development and more strongly related to increases in the general authority of nation-states.

I have no intention of taking an "economic determinist" position toward youth dependency in general, nor even for understanding the evolution of the juvenile court or compulsory school system. Such developments clearly emerged through the intersection of various cultural trends--some political, some economic, some religious, some educational, some familial. The "economic causation" alluded to in this study applies only to the particular issue of the runaway youth prohibition.

Upon analysis of the origins, maintenance, and intractability of the basically coercive runaway prohibition, it becomes clear that the labour market issues stressed in this study have been instrumental in causing the "runaway youth problem" (as opposed to causing individual runaway youth actions, which is a very separate issue). As long as able-bodied minors are excluded from the full-time productive workforce, the runaway youth problem will undoubtedly continue and youth dependency policies will continue to be controversial.

The idea that the labour market cannot accommodate young workers continues on as the major obstacle to the true reform and ultimate reversal of the runaway prohibition. Other issues (e.g. Progressive-era ideologies about adolescent fragility, the rise of the social work and probation professions, and the centuries-long attempts to impose compulsory public schooling) aid us in understanding the specifics of the evolution of the policies. However, the exclusion of young people from the labour market is the single most essential explanatory variable illuminating the social-structural underpinnings of the runaway youth prohibition.

2. The Minnesota Law Review article points out that:

There has been a surprising lack of legal scholarship on child labor laws. For example, the Index to Legal Periodicals has listed no articles on the topic for the last 15 years, except for notes on implied actions for damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act. (Anon., 1975: p. 575)

This is one further indication that the exclusion of young people from the full-time workforce has become a taken-for-granted phenomenon, an issue seldom opened up for discussion or negotiation.
3. It should be pointed out that Section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees all residents of Canada equality before and under the law and the equal benefit of the law. Furthermore, the Charter specifically forbids discrimination against persons on various grounds which include age. John MacDonald (personal communication, 1985) predicts that the courts will likely be interpreting the "age" provision of the equality section of the Charter in due course. He predicts that the relevant issue for judicial consideration in this regard will be "the extent to which age discrimination as provided for in particular laws or public policies can be demonstrably justified as a reasonable limitation in a free and democratic society." This issue relates to the Limitation Clause in Section 1 of the Charter.

4. A further note may be in order. Nothing in the foregoing discussion should leave the impression that I am discarding the notions of maturity or responsibility. Clearly, one function of age-grading statutes has been to monitor the emerging growth of the child and adolescent due to the conviction that not all humans are ready or able to accomplish adult tasks at younger ages. The preceding political-economic analysis does not supercede realities of developmental stages or of inadequacies or limitations at certain ages. The present critique has been focused on the fact of inadequacies in age-graded policies and have suggested a loosening up of those strictures. In making these recommendations I don't mean to ignore the differences in individual readiness to take advantage of available options which do certainly exist.

5. It is also important to stress that the recommendations of this chapter have been offered with the proviso that they not be allowed to open up new dangers of child and youth labour exploitation. Cautionary provisions need to be written into whatever recommendations are considered and policing of workplace conditions must continue.
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"Bayside" has a population of about 38,000 primarily Caucasian residents. Located on the waterfront of British Columbia, Canada, the community is a relatively affluent "bedroom community" serving families of Vancouver executives and professionals. The city is large enough to have its own police department and its own social agency offices which are, to greater or lesser degrees, relatively autonomous from supervisory offices in East Bayside, Vancouver, and Victoria.

A "snowball sampling" technique was used in the study whereby informants were contacted by referral from earlier informants. In this way, trust was maintained throughout the informant network, since no one was interviewed who had not heard about the study from a community person they already knew. The sample of runaway youths, parents of runaways, and agency personnel grew in number and variety as increasingly more informants were contacted in this word-of-mouth referral fashion.

One advantage of the snowball sampling procedure was that numerous runaway incidents not on particular agency records and not known to particular agency informants were located through the "branching" nature of the referral process. Since a variety of agencies were contacted—including Bayside police, probation, Ministry of Human Resources, family counseling agencies, group home houseparents, school teachers, counselors and administrators in six Bayside schools, public health and school nurses, and city planners— it was often possible to obtain more than one agency's version of a runaway incident. By contacting all the agencies in Bayside dealing with runaways, it was possible to learn how the various agencies operate in runaway matters, how they coordinate with one another, and what the overall community approach to running away is.
An aim of the study was to contact or learn something about every runaway youth in Bayside over the past 10 years—a potentially exhaustive sample of 100% of the community's runaway population. Memories of Bayside informants extended to runaway incidents dating from 1969 on. The first interviews were conducted with agency workers, then parent and youth interviews were arranged through agency sources. However, as the snowball sampling progressed, some of the later youth or parent interviews were arranged through non-agency informant referrals (i.e., through other parents or other runaway youths). The study yielded information regarding 223 youths from 180 families in Bayside. The runaway situations (and other unorthodox living arrangements) by Bayside youths which were described encompass approximately 1,975 individual incidents stretching over the 11-year period.

Interviews with agency workers, runaways, and parents, and participant observation in agency settings and community meetings took place over a two and one-half year period, between June 1978 and August 1980 (with some follow-up research since that time). Agency contacts included 19 primary agency informants (six of whom contributed especially large blocks of time to the study) and 22 secondary agency informants—involving a total of almost 100 hours of interviewing time. In addition, approximately 70 to 80 hours of participant observation were spent in community forums, agency meetings (e.g., those of the community's Group Home Subcommittee and Youth Services Committee), and Juvenile Court hearings.

Thirty-two in-depth interviews were conducted with 25 runaway youths or former runaways from Bayside. The youth interviews ranged from a half hour to two hours in length, with the exception of one four-hour interview; 11 of the youth interviews were tape-recorded. In four of the interviews, youths brought a friend along (something which I had been informed occasionally
occurs in therapy or counseling sessions at the Family Services agency); in each of these instances, the friend had also been a runaway and agreed to be interviewed, extending the "snowball sampling" network further. In addition, 17 interviews were conducted with 14 parents of runaways or former runaways; one of the parent interviews was tape-recorded. One parent agreed to be interviewed as long as a friend came along for support. All of the face-to-face parent interviews continued for two to three hours. Three of the parent interviews were conducted by telephone; each of these telephone interviews continued for a half hour or longer.

In eight instances it was possible to obtain interviews from a youth, parent, and at least one agency person, all of whom had been involved in the same runaway incidents. Three of these youths were female and five were male. These instances, and others where it was possible to obtain more than one version of the details of a runaway incident and family situation, have been particularly helpful in the reconstruction of negotiation scenarios related in Chapters 8 and 9. For about half the sample of 223 runaways, anywhere from two to four accounts about the same runaway incident(s) in varying degrees of detail were obtained. The overlay of at least two accounts of the same incident(s) in 134 of the cases (60% of the sample) is seen as an important guard against undue bias from reliance on any single version. (1)

Tabulations of those data which were quantifiable were reported in Chapter 7. Findings on runaway incidence in the Bayside study exceeded the expectations of agency informants, even those who deal regularly with runaway situations. Even so, the Bayside figures should be viewed as low estimates of the existing situation, since there is evidence that further snowball sampling would have continued to turn up even more runaway situations
in Bayside. Statistics in Chapter 7 on such sensitive items as sexual abuse, physical abuse, and suicide attempts can be taken as possibly low estimates of the existing situation, whereas tabulations on such items as "single-parent household" or "street life" can be taken as closer estimates since these are areas of "common knowledge."

Socioeconomic status (SES) of the families of runaways in Bayside was estimated through joint consideration of occupation, estimated yearly family income, estimated home market value, and informants' estimates of a family's SES level. The socioeconomic level categories were adapted from the Blishen scale for Canadian occupations (Blishen & McRoberts, 1976). Classification of parents by occupation/profession located the greatest number of runaway youths' families (43%) in the upper-middle class occupational range (60 to 69 on the Blishen index).

Names of runaways and other family members, names of agency personnel, and place names for Bayside and adjacent communities are disguised in this report. All other place names (e.g., Vancouver, Calgary, etc.) and names of agency units within and outside Bayside (e.g., Ministry of Human Resources, Family Services, etc.) are recorded accurately. (2)

On the matter of definitions, community notions of what constitutes "running away" were used as a guide rather than holding to pre-set researcher definitions or legal definitions. (However, see Note 1 in Chapter 5 for the legal definition used in that chapter.) Thus, youths over the age of majority in terms of criminal law (e.g., 17, 18, or 19 year olds in B.C.) whose actions were seen as running away by informants in terms of impulsivity and family strife were included in the Bayside sample even though legally "of age."

On the other hand, a number of other Bayside youths were included in
the study despite their denial of the term runaway, in the absence of a furtive or dramatic departure, or in situations where the youth departed with parental permission (or urging). Public policy legislates against any non-adjudicated living arrangement where the child or youth is living outside the daily auspices of the parental home. Thus, quite a number of other types of situations are violations of the spirit and letter of runaway youth policy taken in the broader sense, even when not in technical violation of the standard legal definition of "away from home without parental permission."

The following actions are included in this study even though they do not follow the standard stereotype of the runaway act. They are included in the data base because each action violated policies which would maintain youths under parental supervision and parental authority up to the age of majority:

-- Minors who are kicked out of the family home by the parent/guardian ("kickout") and others who are kicked out just as they themselves were leaving in anger (simultaneous runaway and kickout)

-- Minors who fail to come home on time from a party and who stay away overnight or over the weekend ("not coming home")

-- Minors who accompany a friend who is running away out of concern for the friend, but who do not consider themselves to be runaways ("accompanying a runaway")

-- Minors who run from one divorced parent to another without court sanction ("running from parent to parent") or who run away to the home of another relative

-- Minors who are informally emancipated before the age of majority with their parents' approval and/or assistance, or at least without overt parental opposition ("agreeably facilitated emancipation") (Some of these youths are subsidized by the parents)

-- Parent-sanctioned moves to the home of a relative or friend when the home situation is so volatile that trouble is seen as imminent ("agreed-upon move")

-- Minors who are abandoned by their parents or guardians, or where the parent moves and the youth chooses to stay behind in the same town
-- Situations where the minor is expected to travel with the family or to travel somewhere at the family's direction, and opts to remain behind ("missing the boat")

The variety in types of "runaway" situations, as indicated by the foregoing list, serves as a counter to the common stereotype of runaways as fleeing incorrigibles whose parents are uniformly anxious for their return (in itself an odd contradiction). It was apparent in the Bayside community runaway study that many diverse types of adaptations to stress are involved, many of them not fitting neatly within policy categories.

It is important to note that despite the use of the term "runaway" throughout the study, it was common in talking with young people for many to shun the use of the term or to deny its applicability to them. This was often due to the pejorative nature of the term and sometimes due to sincere beliefs that "I didn't run away; I moved out" or some similar revision. By the same token, a number of the parents also felt the term not applicable to their children's situations, generally because their family situation did not match that of media accounts they were familiar with (e.g., that it was not a single, dramatic, permanent run, or that it was not secretive, or that the parent knew exactly where the child was staying, etc.). Other runaway studies have found the same sort of resistance on the part of subjects to the term "runaway" (e.g. Brennan et al., 1978).

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

Participant observation in the community of Bayside and use of in-depth interviews were key methods in the development of this critical ethnography. The participant observation element evolved naturally during the course of setting up and undertaking the runaway incident interviews early in the study. In the course of becoming part of the agency network in Bayside, at least in
regard to talking with agency workers about runaway youths and their families, I found that I was being regularly invited to community and agency meetings and was frequently present in agency offices while events relevant to runaway youths I knew about might be erupting. (This happened on several occasions with happenings in the Brian Peterson case — see Chapter 8.) General information on Bayside and its agency network was recorded in a general section of notes. New developments on individual runaways or families were noted on summary sheets on each runaway minor which were kept in a separate notebook.

The in-depth interviews followed a format used in what are sometimes called "ethnographic interviews." An ethnographic interview seeks to elicit information relevant to the world-view of the informant. Open-ended and basically non-directive in nature, this type of interview aims at allowing maximum freedom in topic-setting and directionality to the informant. The interviewer typically opens the interview with a general statement about the research interests, perhaps with some broad guidelines about areas to be covered, and then gives the informant maximum rein in the conversation. Obviously, in the Bayside interviews runaways, parents, and agency people differed greatly in the amount of detail they were able to recall or were willing to reveal. Some of this difference apparently had to do with personal style, some with readiness to confide, and some with ease and experience with interview situations.

Coding sheets which listed the basic information to be elicited were filed by name and pseudonym, filled out as completely as possible, and expanded on when interviews with other informants yielded new information on that individual. When particular details on the sheets were not forthcoming from the in-depth interviews, further probing questions were used. During the analysis stage of the study, the 223 coding sheets were grouped into similar types and case studies were selected based on criteria listed in Chapter 9 above. Quantifiable information was analyzed by computer, using the same coding sheets as resource,
and cross-tabulations were run (see, e.g., Note 6 in Chapter 7 above).

While the community of Bayside is certainly not representative of all North American communities, and not likely to be fully representative of the various upper-middle class communities in Canada and the U.S., Bayside is being treated as a microcosm of the larger social welfare system which can demonstrate how that larger system operates on the local level. Social services in any local community are reliant upon and constrained by a long history of policy development and professional evolution, and local agencies must work within those constraints and guidelines. Thus, social services on the local level present a contour of the nationwide and continent-wide social welfare network and present the picture of that network in capsulized form. Bayside's resources are organized around and circumscribed by social structural constraints which are formulated over time and in distant places. It is with this view of microcosm / macrocosm in mind that the goal of linking "personal troubles" with "public issues" may be achieved.

The reader might well ask how typical a community Bayside might be for a study of runaways, since it is a protected, suburban, upper-middle class municipality. While, of course, different sorts of runaway patterns will be found in communities having different socioeconomic distributions, it needs to be pointed out that runaways tend to "lose" their social class in a very real sense when they depart from the family home. Runaways are very much on an equal footing when they "hit the streets" -- especially when their cash runs out and they need to innovate new means of material survival. While runaways do not necessarily hide their community of origin from their friends, and while they may tend to group together by home community groupings at times, I found no evidence that they attempt to retain or flaunt their social status while on the run or on the street. On the contrary, runaways whom I interviewed frequently wished to discredit the materialistic values of their parents and
enter a less snobbish, preferably classless milieu. At the very least, there exists a threat that a runaway will lose his or her social class by severing the family ties; one cannot always go back to the upper-middle class home and ample material resources. Still, I would not maintain that Bayside runaway youth are representative of all runaways in Canada and the U.S. I have purposely chosen an upper-middle class community as focus for the study because such runaways break the common public stereotype of the runaway as a lower-class delinquent type; thus the Bayside sample opens up possibilities for renewed understanding of the various types of runaway patterns which social policy must deal with. The irony of materially well-fixed youth on the run has been a starting point for a re-analysis of runaway youth patterns and policy where the original analysis has so often become mired in dated or inaccurate delinquency stereotypes.
NOTES

1. The following tally of multiple contacts shows the number of principals to the runaway incidents (agency workers, runaways, and parents) who contributed information about the runaways in the sample:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of informants having knowledge:</th>
<th>Number of runaway youths:</th>
<th>Percent of total:</th>
<th>Cumulative percent:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14 informants gave information in 1 instance</td>
<td>1 instance</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 informants</td>
<td>1 instance</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>3 instances</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Participant observation and interviews were conducted outside Bayside as well and the information yielded from this peripheral research also benefited the study either directly or indirectly.

Between 1978 and 1980, eight in-depth interviews were conducted with adults whom I had met in various social situations in Vancouver. All of these adults had been runaways or had emancipated themselves as minors; all were pursuing higher education or were employed in stable jobs; most had families and were "doing well." Several of these interviews were tape-recorded.

A British Columbia Ministry of Labour grant supported research on runaways in Vancouver during the summer of 1978. During that summer I worked as a volunteer childcare worker at Sunflower, a runaway house and group home in East Vancouver, conducting informal interviews with a number of runaways and former runaways and observing the operation of the agency. Participant observation, including some interviewing, was also conducted that summer at the B.C. Ministry of Human Resources Emergency Services office (formerly termed the Gastown Team), and in the Davie Street/Granville Street nightlife areas of Vancouver. Several in-depth interviews with juvenile prostitutes
and other "street people" were conducted during this time.

In addition, previous employment and academic experience has alerted me to the issues of running away, emancipation, counter-cultures, and delinquency, and has provided insights into the effectiveness of various social service agency arrangements. This has included employment as a juvenile hall correctional counselor, probation department boys' ranch group counselor, welfare caseworker, director of a community youth centre, and teacher-counselor with youths having problems with drugs and the law. This agency work has been carried out in California, Washington, New York, and British Columbia. The initial impetus for the study came during late summer 1967 when I attended an open house of the newly-organized Huckleberry House in San Francisco and was startled by the irony of a social service agency which was seen by many other community agencies as being on "the other side" of the law.