WARTIME HOUSING LIMITED, 1941 - 1947;

CANADIAN HOUSING POLICY AT THE CROSSROADS

By

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to the required standard

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July 1984

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ABSTRACT

Between 1941 and 1947, a federal crown corporation called Wartime Housing Limited (WHL) successfully built and managed thousands of rental units for war workers and veterans. At the same time, an Advisory Committee on Reconstruction study (the Curtis report) described the enormous need for low and moderate income shelter throughout Canada and recommended a national, comprehensive, and planned housing program emphasizing low-rental housing. Instead, in 1944 - 1945, the federal government initiated a post-war program promoting home ownership and private enterprise; it neglected long-range planning and low income housing.

Thus, an interesting question arises. Why did the federal government not reconstitute WHL as a permanent, low-rental housing agency to meet the huge need for low income accommodation following World War II? The thesis arrives at an answer through four steps: a definition of the 1940s housing problem; an examination of the federal government's response; an evaluation of WHL's performance; and an elucidation of the reasons preventing WHL's transformation into a permanent low-rental housing agency.

By 1944, supply shortages, replacement requirements,
and overcrowding associated with pre-1939 conditions and the immediate wartime situation produced an immense unsatisfied housing need felt most keenly by low and medium income groups, even in urban centres like Greater Vancouver that had encountered no serious long-term problem.

In 1941 - 1944, federal reaction to the housing problem emphasized a directly interventionist, economy-related program in which WHL played a major role. When public pressure forced it to continue temporarily its WHL operations after 1944, the Dominion government demonstrated that it could participate directly in housing with the intention of meeting social need.

WHL was a smoothly operating, efficient operation according to the fulfillment of its program objectives and to the testimony of its officials and tenants. Negative response from vested interests could not diminish the success of this new player in the housing field.

WHL's reconstitution as a low-rental agency did not occur for several reasons: the resolution of a bureaucratic conflict between the Finance and the Reconstruction and Supply Departments; the consensus among Finance officials and the business community in support of market-related, indirect intervention; the divisions among groups agitating for improved housing conditions; and the ambivalence of many
Canadians towards home ownership and low-rental housing. The government exhibited a firm and continuing commitment to the market and a hesitant and temporary recognition of social need. Only a major attitudinal shift towards social need would ever bring about any fundamental change to housing policy. Since the 1930s, this market-oriented perspective has hindered advances in housing policy in the same way that for decades the poor law tradition had blocked government acceptance of unemployment relief.

Clearly, in 1944 - 1945, the federal government had the opportunity to include housing in the emerging social welfare system. It did not. Attitudinal changes making possible wartime advances in social security simply did not carry over to the housing field in any lasting way. Thus, WHL represented a successful but temporary experiment in publicly-built housing.
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INTRODUCTION

Beginning in 1941, a federal crown corporation called Wartime Housing Limited (WHL) built thousands of rental housing units for war workers and veterans. It was a successful yet temporary phenomenon. Six years later, Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) absorbed and dismantled the wartime company. Eventually, CMHC made possible the tenants' purchase of their WHL units.

In 1944, while WHL efficiently performed its construction and management operations, a report issued by the housing and community planning subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Reconstruction described the enormous contemporary need for low and moderate income shelter in Canada. The report recommended a nation-wide, comprehensive, and planned program emphasizing low-rental housing. Instead, the federal government initiated a post-war housing program that promoted private enterprise and home ownership and neglected long-range planning and low income housing.

Thus, an interesting question follows. Why did the federal government not reconstitute WHL as a permanent low-rental housing agency to meet the huge low income accommodation need following World War II?
In May, 1945, WHL president Joe Pigott suggested an altered function for the crown company:

If the Federal Government has to go on building houses for soldiers' families; if they have to enter the field of low cost housing which it is my opinion they will undoubtedly have to do, then there is a great deal to be said in favour of using the well-established and smoothly operating facilities of Wartime Housing to continue to plan and construct these projects and afterwards to manage and maintain them.¹

Indeed, in 1944 - 1945, the ministers of the Finance and the Reconstruction and Supply Departments discussed and rejected the feasibility of a Reconstruction-based low and medium income rental housing division to be administered by Pigott.

More recently, housing and planning specialists have noted the missed opportunity in dismantling WHL and its successor, the CMHC veterans' rental housing program. In 1975, Humphrey Carver contended that the "all too successful" wartime and veterans' schemes "should have been redirected to the needs of low-income families", but "the prospect of the federal government becoming landlord to even more than 40,000 families horrified a Liberal government that was dedicated to private enterprise and would do almost anything to avoid getting into a policy of public housing."² In 1983, Tom Gunton maintained that the federal government ignored most of the Advisory Committee on
Reconstruction recommendations, abandoned WHL, and instead "implemented only those reforms compatible with capitalist institutions. Massive subsidies were provided to create a private development industry while public entrepreneurship in land and housing development was shunned." For both Gunton and Carver, the federal government's commitment to the capitalist system precluded its direct participation in the housing field.

Before describing how in 1944-1945 the federal government missed an opportunity to reconstitute WHL as a low-rental housing agency, the following study must be placed within the context of Canadian housing history.

Previous historical writing about Canadian housing may be categorized into three broad interpretative modes common in planning history. Anthony Sutcliffe identifies these approaches as the "liberal-progressist", the marxist, and the functionalist. The "liberal-progressist" interpretation assumes that over time people find better ways of doing things. In Canadian housing history, this method sacrifices systematic analysis for description of personalities, events, model schemes, concepts, or architectural styles. For instance, Deryck Holdsworth depicts pre-1929 Vancouver's landscape of homes and gardens as a distinct improvement over older North American and British urban industrial societies, dwells on home ownership attitudes, and contributes substantially to our knowledge of west coast domestic
architectural styles. In her 1974 Master's thesis, Shirley Spragge notes that Torontonians recognized and confronted the housing problem long before the 1935 Dominion Housing Act and that they paved the way from philanthropy to public intervention. Lorna Hurl explores the application of the "philanthropy and five per cent" concept through the Toronto Housing Company (1912 - 1923) and the reform role of businessman G. Frank Beer. Jane Lewis and Mark Shrimpton favourably evaluate the policy-making behind the 1944 - 1950 housing development implemented by the St. John's Housing Corporation.

The marxist approach is concerned with class struggle and the drive towards fundamental social change. In Canadian housing history, this interpretation takes several forms. According to Alvin Finkel, interconnected business and government interests controlled the 1930s reform process to maintain their own dominance. Allan Moscovitch stresses the inequalities of capitalist society; since housing is a commodity, low income people live in the least satisfactory accommodation. Michael Doucet, Michael Katz, and others look at the specific relationship of housing, especially home ownership, to class structure. Milder in tone, Terry Copp and Michael Piva conclude that in our capitalist system pre-depression housing reform could only be remedial in character.

The functionalist method regards housing as a "residual
activity" in which a pluralist society does what it cannot achieve in cheaper, more individualistic ways. For example, Moscovitch argues that today's inequalities in housing derive from a post-war federal government policy deliberately made "residual" to the building industry. As well, this approach, which borrows extensively from sociological theory, is preoccupied with social equilibrium, especially with the concept of social control. This emphasis upon social stability has not materialized in Canadian housing history as forcefully as it has in the American literature: no Canadian historian has written a book like Gwendolyn Wright's *Building the Dream*, which identifies in American housing history two conflicting patterns of social order and non-conformity. Yet, references to social control theory do arise in the work of John Weaver, Shirley Spragge and Lorna Hurl.

Clearly, some studies in Canadian housing history do not conform neatly with any one of those three interpretations. The following thesis fits in varying degrees both the marxist and the functionalist categories. Because it explains why our federal government in 1945 did not find a better way of housing low income Canadians, this work is too pessimistic for the "liberal-progressist" mode. It is not marxist because it fails to consider Canadian society in
terms of class struggle. Still, it agrees with a marxist like Finkel: it argues that, in 1944 - 1945, the promotion of remedial reform by interconnected state and business concerns and the concept of housing as commodity thwarted the introduction of adequate, long-term, low income housing measures. Like functionalist writing on Canadian housing history, the study regards federal housing policy as a "residual" state activity. While it rejects the application of social control theory in examining federal response to public agitation over post-1944 housing conditions, it uses the concept while analysing WHL's tenant relations program.

The thesis addresses the issue of state intervention in Canadian housing. Thus, the substance of the work diverges completely from the non-historical concerns of two previous WHL studies. The first, completed by geographer C.E.J. Gould in 1977, examines alterations to WHL's standard plans and measures occupant reaction to uniform design in single-family dwellings. The other, finished by environmental designer Mary B. Galloway Scott in 1978, also looks at user adaptation of WHL housing. In addition, the thesis differs thematically from several other historical writings about Canadian housing. For example, Copp and Piva regard housing as an area of social reform. Doucet and Katz relate the tenure of dwellings to social stratification. As well, Katz has investigated housing in the context of family history.
Weaver, Spragge, and Hurl emphasize notable building projects. Moscovitch stresses inequalities in housing. As yet, no one has discussed in detail the connection between social values and domestic architecture as has Gwendolyn Wright in *Building the Dream*.

This thesis augments the "interventionist" tradition in planning and housing history, the origins of which may be found in post-war Britain. "Interventionist" writing turns on the concept of growing state intervention originally necessitated by the social impact of industrial urbanization and laissez-faire liberalism, ultimately inspired by the international diffusion of planning ideas, and eventually checked by the moderate nature of social reform. In Canadian planning and housing history, J. David Hulchanski's dissertation best develops the "interventionist" theme. Others have dealt less systematically with increasing government involvement in housing. This study begins with C.D. Howe's official 1947 definition of direct and indirect participation in housing. It takes the "interventionist" idea a step farther by adding Hulchanski's concept of "market welfare" and "social welfare" values: a government intervenes in housing to benefit either the market or the needy in society. Consequently, the major theme underlying this work embraces the attitudes behind state involvement as well as the types of public participation.
The following thesis questions the federal government's failure to redirect WHL's expertise into a permanent low-rental housing agency at the war's end. It arrives at an answer through four steps: (1) a definition of the 1940s housing problem; (2) an examination of the federal government's response; (3) an evaluation of WHL's performance; and (4) an elucidation of the reasons preventing WHL's transformation into a permanent low-rental housing agency. Finally, the study comments upon the implications of its conclusions for our understanding of the welfare state.
Footnotes


9 Alvin Finkel, Business and Social Reform in the Thirties (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1979), pp. 100-16.


14 Here, I use "functionalist" as Peter Burke defines it in Sociology and History (Controversies in Sociology, No. 10; London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980), pp. 42-43: the "function of each part of society... is to maintain the whole. To 'maintain' it is to keep it in 'equilibrium'."


19 Sutcliffe, "Introduction: British Town Planning and the Historian," pp. 5-6; in 1954, British historian William Ashworth published his PhD dissertation in which "he saw town planning as the product of a cumulative public intervention in the British urban environment" beginning in the early nineteenth century.

20 For example, see Anthony Sutcliffe, Towards the Planned City; Germany, Britain, the United States and France, 1780 - 1914 (Comparative Studies in Social and Economic History, No. 3; Oxford: Basil Blackwood, 1981).


23 This concept comes from current housing theory; see John David Hulchanski, Shelter Allowances and Canadian Housing Policy; A Review and Evaluation (Research Paper, No. 147; Toronto: Centre for Urban and Community Studies, University of Toronto, 1983), pp. 11-17.
Chapter 1

THE 1940S HOUSING PROBLEM

An acute housing problem troubled wartime and post-war Canada. It may be defined as an immense unsatisfied need for accommodation that derived from housing supply shortages, replacement requirements, and overcrowding associated with the depression and the war. Individuals in all income groups wanted housing, but low and medium income tenants felt the need most keenly.

The following definition of the housing problem has several objectives. First, it will clarify the long-term aspects of the problem. As well, it will explain how more immediate wartime conditions exacerbated continuing difficulties in housing. It will describe the shelter need experienced by low and medium income groups. Finally, it will explore the problem in both its national and local dimensions: the state of housing in particular urban centres often differed substantially from the country as a whole. Greater Vancouver is an appropriate case study for two reasons. It confirmed the national experience in the
enormity of its housing need by the war's end. Yet, in another way, it contradicted the general Canadian pattern: wartime and post-war deterioration in supply, more than long-term conditions, created the city's housing problem.

The wartime and post-war housing need in Canada was attributable partly to supply shortages arising from two lags in residential construction. The depression produced the first lag. House-building declined to a disastrous low in 1932 - 1934 before starting a gradual pre-war recovery (Table I). Later, between 1942 and 1945, wartime scarcities in skilled labour and building materials resulted in a less serious lag (Table I). By 1942, the estimated deferred residential construction for 1926 - 1941 equalled 232,000 dwellings.4 Two years later, the report of the housing and planning subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Reconstruction, generally known as the Curtis report, suggested that the 1941 - 1945 urban building deficit would amount to 45,000 units.5

Fluctuations in housing demand related to changes in incomes and family formation accounted for the 1930s construction lag. The building activity pattern for urban and rural dwellings throughout the depression decade followed the sudden contraction and the slow expansion of net national and personal incomes (Table I). In 1933, few
families earned sufficient income to build or purchase a home, whereas by 1939 many did. Similarly, marriage and net family formation rates followed the pattern of new dwelling completions (Table I). The preponderance of new houses over new families in the 1930s (excepting 1934 and 1939) points to the postponement of marriage until economic conditions improved. Between 1942 and 1945, labour and building material shortages depressed new construction despite rising incomes and climbing marriage and family formation rates.6

Overcrowding and doubling up also contributed to the 1940s housing need. They developed in many large cities before 1930 and intensified during the depression and the war. Pre-depression crowding accompanied by substandard accommodation led to urban blight. Slum conditions derived ultimately from industrial urbanization,7 which failed to benefit less skilled, low income workers who usually were unable to purchase or to rent hygienic and uncrowded dwelling space.8 Slum housing was already common before 1929 in certain working class wards of Montreal, Toronto, Hamilton, or Winnipeg.9 Nevertheless, other cities like Calgary or Vancouver exhibited little evidence of blight before the depression.10

Overcrowding and doubling up persisted and even advanced between 1931 and 1941. They grew in the early 1930s as residential construction, incomes, and marriages
Table I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Dwellings completed (thousands of units)</th>
<th>Value of private and public new residential construction (millions of dollars)</th>
<th>Net national income at factor cost (millions of dollars)</th>
<th>Personal income (millions of dollars)</th>
<th>Net family formation (thousands of families)</th>
<th>Marriage rate (rate per thousand population)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>4,652</td>
<td>4,665</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>3,131</td>
<td>3,192</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>2,597</td>
<td>2,603</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>2,128</td>
<td>2,175</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>1,680</td>
<td>1,770</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>1,872</td>
<td>1,950</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>2,051</td>
<td>2,139</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>2,314</td>
<td>2,407</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>2,732</td>
<td>2,875</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>7.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>2,732</td>
<td>2,875</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>2,892</td>
<td>3,070</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>3,172</td>
<td>3,350</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>3,985</td>
<td>4,192</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>5,937</td>
<td>7,522</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>8,183</td>
<td>10,183</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>9,016</td>
<td>9,929</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>9,887</td>
<td>10,926</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>10,582</td>
<td>10,926</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:


declined; they diminished somewhat as the economy expanded later in the decade and increased again during the war due to migrations and building slow-downs. In particular, doubling up rose dramatically in Halifax, Toronto, Hamilton, Winnipeg, Regina, Calgary and Victoria (Table II). Using 1941 statistics, the Curtis report estimated that the total urban re-housing need for doubled-up families amounted to 150,000 units.11

Overcrowding was common in 1931, especially for low income tenants.12 The Dominion Bureau of Statistics (DBS) arbitrarily defined overcrowding as having less than one room per person.13 The 1931 Canadian census reported that the average for the Dominion was 1.27 rooms per person.14 Every province except Saskatchewan had an average of more than one room per person, and Halifax, Montreal, Toronto, Hamilton, Winnipeg, Regina, Calgary, Edmonton, Vancouver and Victoria all had averages exceeding the standard. Yet these aggregate statistics are deceiving. Crowding seriously afflicted certain urban households, particularly ones with more than six persons, others paying rents of $15 a month or less, and still others of multiple family tenants.15 Indeed, the 1931 DBS housing monograph estimated "that at least 25 p.c. of the population in the majority of Canadian cities of over 30,000 lived in less than one room per person at the time of the 1931 Census...in some cities it is probable that
Table II

Housing Conditions in Selected Larger Canadian Cities, 1941 (by Percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected larger cities (1)</th>
<th>Doubled-up households (2)</th>
<th>Overcrowded households (3)</th>
<th>Substandard dwellings (4)</th>
<th>Owner-occupied dwellings (5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Halifax</td>
<td>17.2 (9.2)</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>36.5 (35.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montreal</td>
<td>7.5 (6.4)</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11.5 (14.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>19.1 (8.4)</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>43.8 (46.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton</td>
<td>12.4 (7.8)</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>44.0 (48.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winnipeg</td>
<td>15.1 (7.3)</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>43.9 (47.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regina</td>
<td>10.0 (4.5)</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>38.7 (50.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calgary</td>
<td>12.1 (5.2)</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>44.6 (51.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmonton</td>
<td>7.6 (4.3)</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46.3 (53.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vancouver</td>
<td>8.5 (5.1)</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>50.1 (51.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>10.5 (4.9)</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>45.8 (46.8)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:


Column 4: Canada, Advisory Committee on Reconstruction, Subcommittee on Housing and Community Planning [chaired by C.A. Curtis], Final Report of the Subcommittee, March 24, 1944 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1946), [referred to as Curtis Report], p. 105, Table 24. Substandard dwellings were in need of external repairs and/or lacking or with shared use of flush toilets and bathing facilities.

Column 5: Curtis Report, p. 244, Table 57. 1931 percentages are in parentheses.
40 p.c. or more of the population occupied less than one room per person."16

In the 1941 census, as well, the average figures for crowding disguised the actual extent of overcrowding. While the average number of rooms per person in the largest cities exceeded one room,17 in reality, 26.1% of total households in Halifax, 24.4% in Montreal, 12.4% in Toronto, 10.7% in Hamilton, 19.0% in Winnipeg, 24.0% in Regina, 22.2% in Edmonton, 13.2% in Vancouver, and 11.1% in Victoria were crowded (Table II). Families with the smallest earnings, families of those individuals with the lowest average earnings, and families of five and more suffered most.18

The third element giving rise to wartime and post-war housing need was the deterioration of the existing stock of dwellings. As we have seen, slum conditions occurred before 1930 in some large cities. During the depression, the inability of owners to pay for improvements, as well as the age and construction of buildings, accelerated degeneration. By 1941, many occupied dwellings in the larger cities were substandard in that they needed exterior repairs and/or lacked or shared flush toilet and bathing facilities. Substandard housing particularly affected Halifax, Winnipeg, Regina, Calgary and Edmonton (Table II). An estimated total of 125,000 units represented the minimum housing replacement requirement in 27 principal cities.19
A decline in home ownership and an increase in tenancy between 1931 and 1941 accompanied the growth of housing need. The decrease in ownership already noticeable in the 1920s accelerated between 1931 and 1941 due to the depression and to mobility associated with wartime industrial urbanization. In 1921, 67.3% of total occupied dwellings in Canada, both rural and urban, were owner-occupied. Subsequently, by 1943, the percentage had fallen to 56.4%. The decline was evident in every province although less noticeable in British Columbia and Nova Scotia. The national and provincial aggregate figures were higher than the ones for urban centres, and, to make matters worse, the trend in home ownership in the larger cities most reflected the over-all decrease (Table II). Economic conditions also determined that, for families able to afford ownership, their homes would be moderate to low in cost. In 1941, two-thirds of owner-occupied homes in the major Canadian cities were worth less than $4000; 44.3% had a value under $3000.

By the beginning of World War II, the elements of the housing problem -- deferred residential construction, overcrowding and doubling up, and substandard accommodation -- were already in place. Wartime conditions heightened the existing problem, resulting in severe housing congestion. No
statistics for crowding are available for the years immediately following the 1941 census. Nevertheless, the vacancy rates for the 1930s and 1940s reveal the extent of the wartime shelter shortage. During the depression, the rate was about twice that of the wartime and post-war periods. The 1930s rate of 4% was considered desirable since it allowed for a range of from 2% to 6% depending on economic circumstances. It expanded in the early 1930s when incomes and marriages decreased and doubling up increased, and contracted later when building, incomes, and marriages grew and doubling up eased. The over-all wartime and post-war vacancy rate for rural and urban Canada was 2%, but rates of 1.5% and less were common in the major cities. A house-by-house survey by letter carriers in September, 1942 reported rates of less than 1% in Halifax, Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, Winnipeg, Regina, Calgary, Edmonton, and Vancouver.

The first major cause of housing congestion during the war was the unusual migration of population to urban areas. This migration represented the movement of war workers and their families to industrial areas and of servicemen's families to urban centres near armed forces bases. The 1941 census indicated the extent of inter-provincial migration between 1939 and 1941. Ontario had gained 46,077 migrants and lost 24,000, while British Columbia had received 26,914
and given up only 8,949. Quebec and Nova Scotia had accepted somewhat more migrants than they had lost. Alberta, Manitoba, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island were deprived of many more people than they admitted, and Saskatchewan forfeited 31,926 migrants, more than any other province. A 1945 report issued by the federal Department of Reconstruction and Supply concluded once again that Ontario and British Columbia were the major recipients of inter-provincial migrants between June, 1941 and April, 1944, while the prairie provinces, particularly Saskatchewan, were the major source.29

As the 1945 federal government report showed, migration drifted from non-industrial to industrial regions.30 The industrial employment that generated these migrations increased in all provinces between September, 1939 and July, 1944. Nevertheless, Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia ranked highest and exhibited the most increase in total industrial employment. In Ontario, industrial employment grew from 470,850 persons to 746,101, in Quebec from 358,209 to 577,414, and in British Columbia from 103,878 to 176,296.31 Munitions and explosives plants concentrated in Ontario and Quebec, the aircraft industry located in Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia and Manitoba, shipbuilding expanded in British Columbia, Quebec, and Nova Scotia, and the mechanical transport industry settled in Ontario.32

Between 1939 and 1944, the migration of war workers
substantially affected industry and housing in urban areas across the country. Industrial expansion occurred in every major city, but growth in Halifax, Quebec City, Brantford, Windsor, Fort William, Kingston, Vancouver, and Victoria was particularly significant. This migration aggravated the housing problem by increasing doubling up and overcrowding, by encouraging tenancy, and by reducing vacancies. Thus, until 1944, the problem centred upon war workers' accommodation.

Dominion government controls on materials and manpower placed additional pressure on housing shortages, particularly during the late war and post-war years when controls substantially curtailed house building. The scarcity of supplies and labour explains the 1942-1945 lag in residential construction. When the building industry began its post-war expansion in 1945, it still had to contend with shortages of materials and skilled manpower. In September, 1945, 3,025 out of 5,452 projects under construction in twelve cities faced obstacles to completion. Of the 3,025 projects, 2,597 met with problems in the provision of materials, and 1,188 encountered difficulties with the labour supply.

Manpower and materials shortages during and immediately after the war contributed to steadily rising building costs, thereby discouraging construction and adding to housing
congestion. Although the controls of the Wartime Prices and Trade Board kept prices from inflating as drastically as they had during World War I, the price index of building materials went up 41.9% between 1939 and 1945. The index of wage rates of construction workers grew by 31.1%. Costs continued to climb at the war's end. In all, they rose from a 1935 - 1939 base of 100% to 147% at the end of 1945, to 160% one year later, and to 175% by mid-1947.

Demobilization exacerbated housing shortages at the conclusion of the war. The accommodation of veterans became the major focus of the post-1944 phase of the wartime shelter problem. Although servicemen had returned home for a variety of reasons before V-E day, the final release of 620,000 personnel between June, 1945 and June, 1946 seriously aggravated the country's housing situation. Using results from a survey of 3,629 personnel awaiting discharge from August to October, 1945, the Department of National Defence (DND) conservatively estimated that in every 1000 individuals discharged, some 200 married and 120 single men faced a serious housing problem. The DND concluded that, if an average 40,000 men per month were released over the following months, housing difficulties would be compounded each month by about 8,000 married and 5,000 single men. Thus, the destination of discharged personnel was to have
great impact on the housing problem. The DND survey showed that British Columbia was the only province likely to gain ex-servicemen and that Saskatchewan was the one province likely to lose them, while the other provinces would receive about as many as they forfeited. While some cities would probably admit more men than they had given up through enlistment and others would be largely unaffected by demobilization, Vancouver stood to gain disproportionately more ex-servicemen than any other large urban centre.

The arrival of war brides who had married Canadian servicemen overseas strengthened the growth of family formation in the mid-1940s and exacerbated housing congestion. In 1957, O.J. Firestone estimated that 43,400 war brides entered Canada between 1943 and 1948, although a more recent source has claimed that DND recorded 47,783 wives to December 31, 1946.

In 1944, the Curtis report calculated that the actual accumulated urban building need between 1939 and 1945 amounted to 500,000 dwelling units. This estimate took into account several factors: (1) the liquidation of housing shortages due to the wartime construction lag, city population growth, and low vacancy rates; (2) the elimination of overcrowding and doubling up; and (3) the replacement of substandard housing. The report also asserted that low and
medium income tenants experienced the greatest housing need.

By the war's end, Vancouver encountered an immense housing need. Nevertheless, in contrast to the national experience, Vancouver's housing problem developed more from wartime rather than pre-war conditions.

The pre-1939 housing supply shortage was less severe in Vancouver than elsewhere. During the depression, the city underwent a building lag attributable to declining personal incomes. In 1933 and 1934, new house completions fell to disastrous lows of 199 and 190 units from a 1929 total of 1,956,44 before beginning a slow upward climb later in the decade (Figure 1). Although Vancouver statistics are unavailable, British Columbia figures show that, at the same time, personal income dropped from 403 million dollars in 1929 to 258 million in 1933 and improved steadily later in the 1930s and 1940s.45 Unlike the national situation, new house construction never exceeded new families between 1929 and 1946 (Figure 1). Still, housing supply expansion before the Great War and during the 1920s minimized the depression's construction lag. British Columbia's urban and rural housing stock grew by 131% between 1921 and 1949, while in Canada it multiplied 66%, in Quebec 86%, in Ontario 61%, in the prairie provinces 50%, and in the maritimes 37%.46
Figure 1

Correlation of Number of New Houses to Number of Marriages,
City of Vancouver, 1920 to 1947

Sources:
For the statistics from 1920 to 1944, see "A Memorandum Respecting the Housing Situation in the Vancouver-New Westminster Area Prepared by the Emergency Shelter Administration, Vancouver, B.C.," May 1, 1945, Public Archives of Canada, RG19, Ser. E3, Vol. 4017. For the number of new houses in Vancouver, 1945 to 1947, see Annual Summaries of the Building Reports, 1929 to 1948, Vancouver, Department of Permits and Licences, Building Department, Building Reports, 1929 - 1948, Vancouver City Archives, 125-A-1, Files 2 and 3. For the number of marriages in Vancouver, 1945 to 1947, see B.C., Department of Health and Welfare, Report of Vital Statistics, Nos. 74-78, 1945-1949, Table I.
Between 1921 and 1929, Vancouver witnessed a large increase in new houses, averaging about 2,100 units a year. As well, the city had experienced a building boom in the early 1900s; in 1912, it had added 3,520 units to its housing stock. Although pre-1929 construction helped to carry the city through the 1932 – 1937 building lag (Figure 1), it proved inadequate in coping with wartime and post-war housing congestion and with the 1942 – 1943 lag.

While overcrowding and doubling up became apparent in Vancouver between 1931 and 1941, they were less serious than in other cities. Doubling up rose from 5.1% to 8.5% over the decade (Table II), and, in 1941, crowding affected 13.2% of the city's total households (Table II). According to two housing reports released in 1937 and 1946, the overcrowding that did exist in Vancouver was concentrated in the downtown area bounded by Burrard Street, Clark Drive, Burrard Inlet, and 6th Avenue. Typically, crowding particularly affected low income tenants who could not afford better housing. Nevertheless, together with Victoria and some larger Ontario cities, Vancouver compared favourably with respect to crowding in low income accommodation.

The condition of Vancouver's housing stock ranked about the same as that of Montreal, Toronto, Hamilton, and Victoria, and better than that of Halifax, Winnipeg, Regina, Edmonton, or Calgary (Table II). In 1941, 27% of the city's dwellings were substandard in exterior repairs and in toilet
and bathing facilities (Table II). The highest incidence of deteriorated and insanitary housing occurred in the over-crowded downtown area.\textsuperscript{52}

In addition, the tenure of Vancouver's dwellings competed advantageously with other major Canadian cities. Although tenancy increased very slightly between 1931 and 1941, 50.1% of homes were owner-occupied in 1941, a higher percentage than in Toronto, Hamilton, or any western Canadian city (Table II).

Consequently, while Vancouver experienced some difficulties in the 1930s with a construction lag, overcrowding, and deterioration, its housing problem was less critical than that of other Canadian cities. Building growth from 1909 - 1913 and in the 1920s prevented serious overcrowding and degeneration as much as it diminished the lag's effects. This assessment of the city's housing situation confirms Deryck Holdsworth's characterization of Vancouver between 1886 and 1929 as a pleasant urban landscape of single family homes and gardens about which social reformers needed to waste "little reform rhetoric."\textsuperscript{53}

The 1940s housing problem in Vancouver, then, resulted more from immediate wartime conditions than from chronic difficulties. The migration of war workers to the city was one of those conditions, and housing such migrants charac-
terized the pre-1944 phase of the wartime problem. Vancouver's population rose from 267,000 in 1939 to 311,000 in January, 1944, an increase of 44,000 persons. The expansion of war industries largely accounts for this growth. For example, shipbuilding and aircraft industries employed about 20,000 and 10,000 workers respectively in 1944, advancing from almost negligible pre-war levels. Some of the growth is explained as well by the migration of families of servicemen stationed in or near Vancouver. In addition, the war did not interrupt pre-war migration of population from the prairies to the west coast. Between 1942 and 1945, an estimated 9,000 civilians moved to Vancouver from the prairie provinces.

The accommodation of returning veterans comprised the post-1944 phase of Vancouver's housing problem. While some ex-servicemen had already located in Vancouver before the war's end, demobilization in the late summer and fall of 1945 had the greatest effect upon the city. The DND survey expected Vancouver to receive significantly more discharged service personnel than the 30,000 enlistments from the city. A memorandum prepared by Vancouver's Emergency Shelter Administration on May 1, 1945 estimated that 40,000 veterans would come to the area. In August, Emergency Shelter suggested that 8,500 demobilized personnel were already in the city. Servicemen continued to return well
into the fall, with several hundred occasionally arriving on the same day. In addition, 240 British war brides had come to Vancouver by June, 1945, and federal housing officials expected about 2,400 before the end of the year.

A scarcity of building materials and skilled labour further complicated Vancouver's wartime and post-war housing problem. Construction lagged in 1942 and 1943 owing to the diversion of men and supplies to the war effort. Following the war, manpower and material obstacles halted the completion of projects. In September, 1945, for example, 702 instances of material and labour shortages prevented builders from finishing the construction of 1,769 houses.

Low vacancy rates during and immediately after the war revealed serious housing congestion. From 1.5% in rented dwellings in 1937, the rate dropped below .257% for all housing in September, 1942, reaching .004% in June, 1945. Statistics kept by the local housing registry revealed the nature of the vacancies situation. During 1943, its first year of operation, the registry handled an average of 1,600 applications per month but was unable to accommodate 10,500 of the 19,709 applicants. Circumstances gradually worsened. In December, 1945, the registry sought to accommodate an all-time high of 4,143 families, of which 3,483 belonged to servicemen. Not unexpectedly, the housing problem reached a crisis point on January 26, 1946,
when veterans occupied the old Hotel Vancouver and forced its conversion to a hostel for themselves and their families.

Vancouver's housing problem in 1945 was to satisfy the building need that, for the most part, developed during and immediately after the war. In May, 1945, the Emergency Shelter Administration stated that 25,000 houses would be required by the end of 1946. Low and medium income tenant families felt the housing need most sharply. A DBS survey in June, 1944, using a sample of 1,028 tenant families in Vancouver, concluded that, although three-fifths of those families wanted to own their own homes, less than one-third had definite plans for becoming home owners in the next few years. It discovered that "lack of income plays a major part in determining the proportion of Vancouver families planning to live in their own home." Furthermore, about 80% of those who would continue as tenants favoured low-rent housing projects, and 95% of tenants with annual incomes of $1,500 or less supported these housing developments.

Thus, during World War II, even urban centres like Greater Vancouver, where the pre-1939 housing situation was relatively satisfactory, had encountered an acute accommodation problem demanding federal government response.
Footnotes

1 Contrary to current practice among housing specialists, I have used "need" rather than "demand". The sociologist Leonard C. Marsh preferred to use "need" when he wrote the following report: Canada, Advisory Committee on Reconstruction, Subcommittee on Housing and Community Planning [chaired by C.A. Curtis], Final Report of the Subcommittee, March 24, 1944 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1946) [hereafter referred to as Curtis Report]. In 1950, O.J. Firestone, the former CMHC economist, described "need" as the requirements of "families who want homes but cannot afford to buy or rent one at prevailing prices"; see, O.J. Firestone, "Housing Need and Housing Demand," Royal Architectural Institute of Canada Journal, Vol. XXVII, No. 6 (June, 1950), p. 184. He defined "demand" as the requirements of "those whose assets and incomes enable them to buy a home or lease a place of their own at prevailing prices or rents." The two words are very different in their meanings. I have taken the Marsh usage because to a great extent the 1944 - 1945 housing requirements involved affordability.

2 The Curtis Report, p. 107, divided tenants into three rent groups: those paying more than $35 per month; those paying between $20 and $34; those paying less than $20. The report referred to the last two groups as medium income and low income tenant groups.

3 Throughout this thesis, "Greater Vancouver" means the metropolitan area of Vancouver, including the city, and "Vancouver" refers to the city itself.


5 Curtis Report, pp. 140-41.


7 A.E. Grauer, Housing; A Study Prepared for the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1939), pp. 33-34.

8 This idea is developed by Terry Copp in The Anatomy of Poverty: The Condition of the Working Class in Montreal, 1897 - 1929 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974), pp.
70-87. See also Michael J. Piva, The Condition of the Working Class in Toronto, 1900 - 1921 (Cahiers d'histoire de l'Université d'Ottawa, No. 9; Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1979), pp. 125-42.


11 Curtis Report, pp. 142-43.

12 For a quick overview of contemporary surveys and reports on overcrowding in Canada's major cities in the 1930s, see Curtis Report, pp. 237-42, Appendix A.


15 Ibid., pp. 455 - 62; Thomson, pp. 54A, 54B, Table No. 3.


17 Curtis Report, p. 94, Table 18.

18 Ibid., p. 93, Table 17; p. 94, Table 18; p. 99.

19 Ibid., p. 105.

20 Ibid., pp. 126-27.

21 Firestone, Residential Real Estate, p. 45, Table 1.

22 Curtis Report, p. 126.

23 Ibid., pp. 127-29.
24 Ibid., p. 126, Table 40.


27 Thomson, p. 64B, Table 6.


30 Ibid., p. 37.

31 Ibid., p. 54, Table III.

32 Ibid., p. 39.

33 Ibid., p. 57, Table VI.

34 Interdepartmental Housing Committee Document No. 73, Sept. 12, 1945, Public Archives of Canada [hereafter PAC], RG 19, Ser. E 3, Vol. 4017.

35 Canada, Department of Reconstruction and Supply, *Manpower and Material Requirements for a Housing Program in Canada*, prepared by O.J. Firestone (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1946), p. 30, Table 7.

36 Hazeland, p. 224.

37 *Manpower and Material Requirements*, p. 15.


39 Ibid., p. 36.

40 Ibid., p. 37.


43 Curtis Report, pp. 137-43. This figure is a total combining 114,000 units for current shortages, 194,000 units for overcrowding, 175,000 units for substandard housing, and 17,000 units for non-incorporated parts of metropolitan areas. "Urban" includes major and smaller cities and incorporated communities.


46 Firestone, *Residential Real Estate*, pp. 161-63. Firestone imputed this growth to British Columbia's economic expansion, which was delayed by comparison to older, established regions like Ontario and Quebec.

47 "Emergency Shelter," [fold-out table at end of report].

48 Ibid.

49 Vancouver, Building, Civic Planning and Parks Committee, [A Survey of the Housing Situation in Vancouver], (Vancouver, 1937), City of Vancouver Archives [hereafter CVA], PD 447; Vancouver Housing Association, "Housing Vancouver; A Survey of the Housing Position in Vancouver" (Vancouver, March, 1946), pp. 1-4.

50 Curtis Report, p. 93, Table 17.

51 Ibid., p. 95.


53 Holdsworth, p. 33. Holdsworth correctly claimed that in 1929 most Vancouver dwellings were single family homes, for, according to the 1931 Census, 79.44% were single houses. Still, Vancouver was not especially unique in this respect, as he believed, because single houses predominated in all the largest western Canadian cities, including
Winnipeg. Furthermore, the level of home ownership in 1929 was not about 80% as he thought. In 1931, 51.02% of Vancouver homes were owner-occupied, not very different from the other major western cities and from Toronto and Hamilton. See Canada, Census, 1931, Vol. XII, p. 550, Table 5, and p. 557, Table 13; Curtis Report, p. 244, Table 57.


55 Location and Effects of Wartime Industrial Expansion, p. 43.


57 Ibid., p. 1.

58 Ibid., p. 2.


60 For example, a regiment of 800 Seaforth Highlanders returned together to Vancouver and were released on Oct. 7, 1945; Vancouver Sun, Oct. 9, 1945, p. 13.


63 [Survey of the Housing Situation in Vancouver].

64 Thomson, p. 64B, Table 6.

65 "Housing Vancouver," p. 3.

66 Sun, Apr. 11, 1944, p. 13.


68 "Emergency Shelter," p. 3.

Chapter 2

PRE-1944 FEDERAL RESPONSE TO THE HOUSING PROBLEM

Federal government response to the wartime and post-war housing problem came in two distinct phases. Before May, 1944, the government targeted the housing of war workers and their families as its major priority. After that date, it shifted its attention to the accommodation of servicemen's dependents and veterans' families. This chapter discusses the government's pre-1944 response.

In reacting to the war workers' housing problem, the Dominion government participated directly in residential construction through its crown company, Wartime Housing Limited (WHL). Its motivation was economic; through the efficient provision of accommodation, it intended to facilitate industrial expansion and production to meet the challenge of war. Yet WHL figured as only one component of a larger, directly interventionist structure set up to handle the World War II housing problem. This wartime approach contrasted sharply with the indirect yet market-oriented
promotion of residential construction which the government began in 1935 and greatly curtailed after 1942. Although it did not have constitutional responsibility for housing, the Dominion government participated in house-building under its emergency powers; the provinces and municipalities, which perceived war workers' projects to be of national interest, acquiesced to the federal role.

The federal government has interfered with the housing market for almost fifty years. In the 1930s and 1940s, before it became as complex as it is today, intervention was either direct or indirect. Indirect participation had the subtle intentions of stimulating the economy, usually by lending or guaranteeing mortgage money, and of providing employment; it was (and is) "a short term stabilization tool." Direct intervention established a clearer control of the market through the construction, ownership, or management of housing and through the regulation of rents, labour, building supplies, permits, and building codes.

Whether direct or indirect, state intervention in housing benefited either the private sector or society as a whole. In the 1930s and 1940s, the government (as it does today) took a "market welfare" position when its programs and policies assisted private enterprise. It assumed a "social welfare" position when it targeted these programs
and policies to social needs. Thus, public policy on housing reflected in varying degrees one of two opposing philosophical approaches. The first viewed housing as an individual responsibility, a privilege, and a market commodity. The second regarded shelter as a collective responsibility, a right, and a basic social need.

Before the Second World War, the Dominion's role in housing may be characterized as indirectly interventionist. The Dominion Housing Act (DHA), passed by the R.B. Bennett government before its decisive defeat in 1935, provided financing for new homes in which the government, the lending institution, and the home owner advanced respectively 20%, 60%, and 20% of the land and house value and in which the home owner received a lower than usual interest rate for a longer amortization period. In 1936, the Mackenzie King government introduced a Home Improvement Plan (HIP) guaranteeing loans for house rehabilitation. The 1938 National Housing Act (NHA) superseded DHA. NHA Part I extended benefits to potential home owners of more limited income. NHA Part II made available (but never actually advanced) loans to limited dividend companies and to municipal housing authorities for low-rental housing projects. The National Housing Administration, Department of Finance, under its director F.W. Nicolls, supervised the NHA and the HIP programs.
The pre-war federal role may also be described as market-oriented. The initiative for the program came from national and provincial organizations representing the construction industry, the lending institutions, and the building suppliers. Clearly, for building and lending interests, federal government assistance was a critical factor in the construction industry's recovery during the depression. In 1935, the Canadian Construction Association, the National Construction Council, the Ontario Retail Lumber Dealers Association, the Investment Bankers Association of Canada, the Dominion Mortgage and Investments Association, and the Ontario Mortgage Companies Association urged Prime Minister Bennett and Finance Minister E.N. Rhodes to intervene. Subsequently, these organizations pressed Mackenzie King and his Finance Minister Charles Dunning to introduce HIP and NHA. Furthermore, in addition to assisting the private sector, the federal program benefited upper and medium income Canadians.

During the war years, federal housing policy shifted in emphasis from indirect to direct intervention. A major component of this policy, which responded to housing shortages caused by wartime industrial expansion, was Wartime Housing Limited.

The Economic Advisory Committee to the federal Cabinet initiated government-sponsored workers' housing in order to
encourage wartime industrial production; market (not social) need motivated public intervention. In November, 1940,\(^{10}\) the committee considered the provision of war workers' housing.\(^{11}\) It accepted the strong argument for publicly-built, temporary shelter for workers: housing shortages would impede war production, and private enterprise could not meet the short-lived demand for accommodation. Cabinet accepted the committee's recommendation for adoption of a war workers' housing program.\(^{12}\) Under the War Measures Act and the Department of Munitions and Supply Act, Privy Council ordered the creation of a wartime housing crown company reporting to C.D. Howe, Minister of the Department of Munitions and Supply.\(^{13}\) WHL's incorporation occurred on February 28, 1941.\(^{14}\)

At the same time, the Economic Advisory Committee considered the abandonment of its pre-war housing program to reserve financial, material, and manpower resources for the war effort. Despite the inevitability of public unrest and criticism, the committee argued that wartime Canada must accept doubling up and overcrowding as a price of war. The federal cabinet initially accepted the committee's recommendation to terminate NHA and HIP. Later, it bowed to pressure from the business community and others to continue at a reduced level its NHA lending operations for owner-occupied
house construction. Consequently, market considerations lay behind deliberations on both the pre-war and the wartime indirect programs.

Due to wartime conditions, the federal government's role in housing shifted substantially to favor direct over indirect participation. Between 1941 and 1944, the Dominion spent about $50 million on publicly-built war workers' housing. In the same years, its assistance to privately-built NHA housing (which was not intended for war workers) dropped to about $26 million from the 1935 - 1940 total of about $51 million.

Once it resolved its early bureaucratic confusion about defence housing operations, the United States government effectively accommodated war workers under the newly consolidated National Housing Agency by both direct and indirect means; unlike Ottawa, it did not rely exclusively upon the direct method. The Agency's Federal Housing Administration insured mortgages and gave priorities on supplies to builders for war workers' housing. It also provided public funds to builders in areas where private enterprise could not meet wartime housing demand. In addition, Defense Homes Corporation built publicly-owned accommodation. By 1945, the American program was responsible for over one million privately-financed units and for slightly less than one million publicly-financed units.

The difference in emphasis between the U.S. and
Canadian war workers' programs is attributable to the pre-war American situation. The federal housing bureaucracy in Washington, D.C., was more highly developed by World War II than the one in Ottawa. During the 1930s, several federal agencies had administered both private and public housing programs in the U.S. In 1942, after excessive bureaucratic fighting over defence housing, the American President, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, consolidated all the programs into the National Housing Agency; subsequently, this agency was well-equipped to deal with both private and public war workers' housing. Furthermore, the National Housing Agency balanced the demands of two well-established and warring lobbies. Public housing advocates, represented by the National Committee on the Housing Emergency, Inc., wanted some co-ordination between wartime and post-war low-rental housing policies. At the same time, a powerful, manipulative lobby of builders and realtors, spearheaded by the National Association of Home Builders, argued that the private sector alone could handle defence housing and post-war urban renewal. To some extent, the Agency defused the conflict by implementing both public and private programs. In Canada, the public housing proponents and the private sector lobby lacked the same organized power of their American counterparts.

Moreover, the American war workers' housing program
failed to influence the Canadian one in any fundamental way. WHL's incorporation occurred when the Americans were still formulating their policy. Early in 1941, a WHL official who visited Washington to inform himself about U.S. operations discovered a "very confused" situation with "many competing groups" having "no set form of policy and no centralization." He concluded that WHL could learn little from American efforts.

The Canadian government's instrument for direct intervention in war workers' housing was the crown corporation. During the First World War, the U.S. had experimented with a public company, the U.S. Housing Corporation, in building and managing accommodation for its war workers; although in many ways WHL resembled this corporation, no evidence exists to suggest that the American model inspired the Canadian company. Instead, at the Economic Advisory Committee's suggestion, the Department of Munitions and Supply shaped WHL in the mold of its nearly thirty wartime crown companies.

Despite the centralization of war workers' housing in the Dominion bureaucracy, WHL operated on a decentralized basis. It functioned more like a large independent builder in the private sector than a federal housing agency. WHL's organization and recruitment policy revealed its decentral-
ized, business-like character. Accustomed to enlisting businessmen to advise him or to mobilize war production, C.D. Howe hired as WHL president Joseph M. Pigott, a successful Hamilton contractor and the president of Pigott Construction Co. Ltd.27 Similarly, Howe appointed several "dollar-a-year" men representing the professions, business and labour to the company's first board of directors: W.L. Somerville, architect, Toronto; Charles David, architect, Montreal; William E. Tibbs, administrator, Halifax Relief Commission; R.J. Gourley, president, Beaver Lumber Co., Winnipeg; H.C. Wilson, general manager and director, Maritime Trust Co., St. John; W.T. Gagnon, president, Aird and Son Ltd., Montreal; and Ernest Ingles, vice-president, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, London.28

As with other Munitions and Supply crown companies, Pigott reported directly to Howe. However, given the enormity of the department's operation, the minister, who has been described as the impresario of a 30-ring circus spread across 3,000 miles,29 only wanted to know about major problems, not the administrative details of day-to-day WHL activities. In fact, with a head office in Toronto and 51 branch offices in 73 separate municipalities by 1945, WHL in itself was greatly decentralized.30

During the war, WHL directly intruded into the housing field. Its function was to construct, purchase, rent and manage economically and efficiently living accommodation
for war workers and their families wherever there was a serious housing shortage. First, WHL surveyed areas of war industry to determine housing requirements. Then, with Privy Council and Housing Co-ordination Committee approval, it went ahead with its building projects. It assembled land purchased through legal agreement from municipalities or expropriated from private owners, or it made use of federal land. Local architects and builders hired by WHL carried out war housing projects according to company designs and specifications. Munitions and Supply gave WHL priorities on building materials in which private builders did not share. Once a project was completed, the company rented and managed individual units. Between 1941 and 1944, when the last war worker's house was finished, WHL built across Canada 17,190 temporary houses, several staff houses, and many schools, fire-halls, pump-houses, garages, community centres, and office buildings. Two case studies of WHL projects in Greater Vancouver will serve to demonstrate how the company directly intervened in local housing markets. Although F.W. Nicolls argued that "Vancouver is an illustration of where private capital with proper encouragement could provide the necessary housing requirements without recourse to 100 per cent Government funds," in fact a WHL survey of the city and of North
Vancouver in June, 1941, determined that wartime employees of Burrard Drydock Co. Ltd. and North Van Ship Repairs Ltd. required housing. Orders-in-council passed late in 1941 authorized the expenditure of nearly a million dollars on 300 temporary single family homes and two staff houses. In 1942, privy council approved an additional 450 houses costing more than one million dollars. After construction was underway or completed, WHL reached agreements with both the city and the district of North Vancouver respecting land transfer, payment in lieu of taxation, services, and post-war disposal. Later, the company agreed to assist the city of North Vancouver in building one school and adding to another. WHL employed McCarter and Nairne, the prominent Vancouver architectural firm, as supervising architects for the North Vancouver and the other British Columbia projects. It awarded the building contract to the well-known local contracting company of Smith Brothers and Wilson. A WHL official, Norman B. Robinson, opened a regional office in North Vancouver to direct the construction and management of the British Columbia program.

In December, 1942, Privy Council authorized WHL to build 300 temporary houses in the municipality of Richmond for Boeing Aircraft of Canada Ltd. workers employed at a Sea Island plant. The federal government expropriated land for the development from Richmond residents. Subsequent to
the completion of construction, WHL reached an agreement with the municipality for water supply. The company also built a firehall and a community centre at Burkeville, as the project was called. Once again, McCarter and Nairne and Smith Brothers and Wilson carried out the construction of the project.

WHL was only one of the vehicles by which the federal government intervened directly in the housing market during World War II. Late in 1940, through order-in-council, the government instituted rent controls administered by the Wartime Prices and Trade Board (WPTB). The Board fixed rents, defined leasing and eviction controls, set up an appeal system, and in general regulated the rental housing market at first in selected areas like Vancouver and, after November, 1941, everywhere in urban Canada. Late in 1942, the WPTB became involved in making effective use of existing accommodation. Under a Real Property Administrator, the Consumer Branch worked with its own Women's Regional Advisory Committees as well as community and government bodies in 29 cities to set up housing registries where home owners could list spare accommodation and prospective tenants could apply for shelter. In addition, several federal boards and agents regulated prices, materials, labour, and construction permits. The WPTB and the Wartime Industries Control Board, Department of Munitions and
Supply, maintained control of the prices and the stock of building materials, while the National Selective Service,\textsuperscript{50} Department of Labour, adjusted the labour supply. Construction Control,\textsuperscript{51} Department of Munitions and Supply, restricted new construction, repairs, and alterations and imposed federal permit controls (in addition to municipal systems) upon most building projects. Moreover, in 1943, using an American program as a model,\textsuperscript{52} the National Housing Administration, Department of Finance, established a Home Conversion Plan through order-in-council.\textsuperscript{53} Under this plan, the Dominion government could lease, convert, and sublet buildings in certain cities seriously affected by the wartime housing shortage.\textsuperscript{54} Late in 1942, Privy Council authorized the creation of the Housing Co-ordination Committee.\textsuperscript{55} Although theoretically their committee was to co-ordinate various government activities in the housing field, it concerned itself mainly with the approval of WHL building projects; it never grappled with the general housing problem.\textsuperscript{56}

Municipalities and provinces acquiesced to this unequivocal intervention into housing under the federal government's wartime powers. Although the British North America Act gave constitutional responsibility for housing to the provinces,\textsuperscript{57} they demonstrated little or no interest in the provision of accommodation during or even before the
war. The municipalities perceived the wartime housing problem as a national emergency for which the federal government should supply a solution, and the provinces agreed. Accordingly, they permitted the Dominion to centralize control of housing matters in the federal structure. By contrast, in the U.S., where local housing authorities were firmly established owing to the public housing program, the federal government encountered considerable municipal resistance to Washington's centralization of planning for defence housing.

Thus, by 1944, the Canadian government had adopted a more directly interventionist role in the housing field than it had ever previously played.
Footnotes


2 Michael Dennis and Susan Fish, Programs in Search of a Policy: Low Income Housing in Canada (Toronto: Hakkert, 1972), p. 3.

3 John David Hulchinski, Shelter Allowances and Canadian Housing Policy: A Review and Evaluation (Research Paper, No. 147; Toronto: Centre for Urban and Community Studies, University of Toronto, 1983), pp. 11-17.


5 Canada, Statutes, 25 and 26 Geo. V, c.58 (1935), "An Act to Assist the Construction of Houses [Dominion Housing Act]."

6 The government retroactively authorized HIP by Canada, Statutes, I Geo. VI, c.11 (1937), "An Act to Increase Employment by Encouraging the Repair of Rural and Urban Homes [The Home Improvement Loans Guarantee Act]."

7 Canada, Statutes, 2 Geo. VI, c.49 (1938), "An Act to Assist in the Construction of Houses [National Housing Act]."

8 Alvin Finkel, Business and Social Reform in the Thirties (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1979), pp. 100-16. Local business communities usually supported HIP and NHA as well. In Vancouver, businessmen formed a committee to promote both programs in the city and around British Columbia; see, Vancouver Sun, Jan. 20, 1937, p.1; Jan. 15, 1938, p. 19; Jan. 29, 1938, p. 22; Aug. 10, 1938, p.2.

9 Under DHA, lending institutions advanced loans only to first-class credit risks; "Housing Loans Lagging Here," [unidentified newspaper clipping], Dec. 1, 1936, City of Vancouver Archives [hereafter CVA], Newspaper Clippings, M4289-1.


12 A.D.P. Heeney, Clerk of the Privy Council, to Dr. W.C. Clark, Nov. 28, 1940, PAC, RG 19, Vol. 3980, File H-1-15.

13 PC 1286, Feb. 24, 1941. See also PC 2842, April 24, 1941.


16 Firestone, Residential Real Estate in Canada, p. 488, Table 109.

17 Ibid., p.483, Table 106, and p.486, Table 108.


19 War Housing in the United States, p. 6.

20 For a quick summary of U.S. housing developments in the 1930s, see Curtis Report, pp. 60-77.

21 Funigiello, pp. 80-119.

22 Minutes, Meeting of WHL Board of Directors, March 4, 1942, p.9, PAC, RG 83, Vol. 70, Minutes, Vol. 1.


24 Twentieth Century Fund, Housing Committee, Housing for Defense; A Review of the Role of Housing in Relation to America's Defense and a Program for Action, prepared by Miles L. Colean (New York: The Fund, 1940), pp. 16-30. Formed in July, 1918, the corporation bought land, planned communities, and built and managed houses. The first tenants moved in after the armistice. Most planned projects were never finished. Eventually, the government sold the housing at a loss to itself. See also Frederick Lee Ackerman, "An Appraisal of War Housing," Pencil Points, Vol. XXI, No. 9 (Sept., 1940), pp. 534-45; Talbot F. Hamlin, "Architects and the Defense," Pencil Points, Vol. XXI, No. 9 (Sept., 1940), pp. 546-51.


26 For Howe's role in mobilizing war production, see Bothwell, pp. 61-62.


Bothwell, p. 62.

Minutes, Annual Meeting of WHL Shareholders, May 29, 1945, p.5, PAC, RG 83, Vol. 70, Minutes, Vol II.


Sun, June 16, 1941, p. 22; Vancouver Daily Province, June 21, 1941, p. 36, and June 28, 1941, p. 78; Minutes, Meeting of WHL Executive Committee, June 24, 1941, pp. 4, 7-8, PAC, RG 83, Vol. 70, Minutes, Vol. 1.

PC 7535, Sept. 25, 1941; PC 9362, Dec. 2, 1941. These houses were located in the city of North Vancouver, between St. Patrick's and Queensbury Avenues, 2nd and 6th Streets, between Lonsdale and Forbes Avenues, Esplanade and 4th Street, and at St. George's Avenue and 3rd Street. For newspaper descriptions of the WHL projects in North Vancouver, see CVA, Newspaper Clippings, M 6764-2.

PC 3234, Apr. 23, 1942; PC 8726, Sept. 25, 1942. These houses were built in both the city and the district of North Vancouver between McKay and Mosquito Creeks, running from 2nd to 17th Streets. For the site plan for this project, see Canadian Architectural Archives, University of Calgary [hereafter CAA], Acc. No. 84A/80.18.

The following records are kept by the city clerk, Corporation of the City of North Vancouver [hereafter North Vancouver, City], and by the municipal clerk, Corporation of the District of North Vancouver [hereafter North Vancouver, District]: North Vancouver, City, Agreement between the City and H.M the King in Right of Canada Respecting the Sale of Land, Dec. 1, 1941; North Vancouver, City, Agreement between the City and WHL, Dec. 1, 1941; North Vancouver, City, Indenture between the City and H.M. the King in Right of
Canada, Respecting the Lease of Land, Dec. 1, 1941; North Vancouver, City, By-law No. 1631, WHL Collateral Agreement By-law, 1943; North Vancouver, City, By-law No. 1632, WHL Tax Sale Lands Purchase By-law, 1943; North Vancouver, District, By-law No. 1241, WHL Collateral Agreement By-law, 1943; North Vancouver, City, By-law No. 1242, WHL Tax Sale Lands Purchase By-law, 1943.

38 These were Bewicke School (1942) and the Ridgeway School addition (1944). For the agreement leasing land to WHL for Bewicke School, see the following at the city clerk's office, Corporation of the City of North Vancouver: North Vancouver, City, Indenture between WHL, H.M. the King in Right of Canada, and the Board of School Trustees, May 25, 1943. For the architectural drawings of these schools, see CAA, Acc. No. 84A/80.18.

39 John Young McCarter and George Colville Nairne opened an architectural office in Vancouver in 1921 and subsequently were responsible for many major buildings in the city, including the Devonshire Hotel, Spencer's department store, the Marine Building, the Georgia Medical-Dental Building, Seaforth Armouries, and the addition to the post-office, Hastings and Granville Streets (Federal Building), all of which were completed prior to World War II. See CAA, Oral History Program, [Transcription of Interview of J.Y. McCarter and W.G. Leithead by H. Kalman], OH/72 M16, Acc. No. 20A/77.69; Harold Kalman, Exploring Vancouver 2; Ten Tours of the City and Its Buildings (Rev. ed.; Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1978).

40 For the architectural drawings for the WHL administrative office in North Vancouver, see CAA, Acc. No. 84A/80.18.

41 PC 10862, Dec. 1, 1942; for a description of this project, see CVA, Newspaper Clippings, M8453.

42 Province, March 27, 1943, p. 5.

43 The following is kept by the Clerk's Department, Corporation of the Township of Richmond [hereafter Richmond, Township]: Richmond, Township, Agreement between H.M. the King in Right of Canada and the Township, Respecting Water Supply, Dec. 1, 1943.

44 The community was named after Stanley Burke, Sr., the president of Boeing Aircraft of Canada, Ltd.
For a quick summary of rent controls between 1940 and 1944, see the Curtis Report, pp. 37-40, 255-61.


The Vancouver registry, operated by two paid staff members and many volunteers, assisted tenants between 1942 and 1946; see, Sun., Oct. 7, 1942, p. 17; Oct. 19, 1942, p. 17; Dec. 19, 1942, p. 3; Province, Oct. 7, 1942, p. 11.


The Canada Year Book, 1942, xxxvi-xxxix; 1945, pp. 777-79.


PC 2641, Apr. 1, 1943. See also The Canada Year Book, 1947, p. 585.

For example, in 1943, the National Housing Administration opened a Vancouver office to begin with privy council authorization the conversion of up to 150 buildings; see, Sun., June 28, 1943, p. 13; PC 4579, June 4, 1943; PC 8305, Oct. 26, 1943.

PC 10797, Nov. 26, 1942.

Memorandum re. HCC, Russel S. Smart, Real Property Administration, to Donald Gordon, WPTB, Dec. 17, 1942, PAC, RG 64, Ser. 1030, Box 669, File 25-1-1.

Dennis Guest, The Emergence of Social Security in Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1980), pp. 7-8; Rose, p. 16; Howe, p. 217.

Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities, "The War-Time Housing Problem," Montreal, Jan., 1941, p. 16.
59 In British Columbia, the provincial government authorized legal agreements undertaken by the municipalities with WHL.

60 Funigiello, pp. 80-119.
Chapter 3

POST-1944 FEDERAL RESPONSE TO THE HOUSING PROBLEM

After May, 1944, federal response to Canada's shelter problem equally balanced direct and indirect participation in the housing field. The Dominion government augmented the indirectly interventionist and market-directed program which it had introduced in the 1930s and reduced earlier in the war. Coincidentally, it continued to intrude directly in housing through Wartime Housing Limited (WHL) and other means because conditions between 1944 and 1947 forced it to accept temporarily social responsibility for accommodating servicemen's and veterans' families. Once again, the provinces and municipalities generally supported federal involvement in what they perceived to be a national problem.

In 1944, the Dominion government reasserted its pre-war policy of indirect financial assistance to residential construction. It replaced the 1938 National Housing Act (NHA) with a new act to be supervised by the National Housing Administration, Department of Finance. Like the 1938
legislation, the 1944 NHA aided prospective home owners or builders through the provision of government loans to approved lending institutions. As well, the act supplied financial aid for rental housing construction. In particular, it made direct loans to limited dividend companies for low-rental housing projects, guaranteed a profit of 2 1/2% per annum to life insurance companies investing in low and moderate-cost rental housing, and authorized slum clearance grants to municipalities when a limited dividend company or a life insurance company agreed to construct rental housing on the site. Under these provisions, Housing Enterprises of Canada Ltd., a holding company formed by the major lending institutions, began the construction of moderate-rental housing projects in major urban centres across Canada, a total of 2,811 units by the end of 1946. Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) took over the housing and managed it when financial difficulties forced the company to stop operations. In addition to the 1944 NHA, the Veterans Land Act (VLA) Administration made financial assistance available to veterans when they purchased land and housing on a non-subdivision basis. Between 1946 and 1949, these provisions were responsible for 7,950 housing starts.

At the same time as it reaffirmed its indirectly inter-
ventionist pre-war policy, the federal government responded to the immediate post-1944 shelter problem by continuing to intercede directly in the housing field. It retained WHL, which had begun to wind down its activities by late 1943, and it directed the crown company to build more permanent, better quality houses for servicemen and veterans. Between 1944 and 1947, WHL completed 14,323 units. As well, the government directly provided housing under the 1942 Veterans Land Act. From 1946 to 1948, the VLA Administration started and completed 2,673 units under its subdivision plan. Furthermore, the Wartime Prices and Trade Board (WPTB) undertook two unilateral measures. Early in 1945, it set up the Emergency Shelter Administration. The Board controlled migration into certain congested areas, held sweeping powers of survey, inspection, possession, use, leasing, and eviction, and appointed Emergency Shelter administrators. The WPTB applied its extended powers only with municipal approval. In August, 1945, it widened the regulations to include all of Canada. In practice, Emergency Shelter administrators mainly undertook surveys and converted vacant and surplus buildings into temporary accommodation. By late 1946, they had provided a total of 7,000 leased units. Another highly interventionist WPTB measure was a July 25, 1945 order that suspended for an indefinite period evictions from all self-contained dwellings.
By mid-1945, the federal government needed a better co-ordinating mechanism than the Housing Co-ordination Committee to handle its many directly and indirectly interventionist programs, particularly as housing congestion intensified at the war's end. It set up by order-in-council an Interdepartmental Housing Committee responsible to the ministers of Finance and of Reconstruction and Supply. Then, in January, 1946, it consolidated in CMHC the NHA programs, the Emergency Shelter regulations, and the Home Conversion Plan. CMHC also maintained a close working relationship with the VLA Administration and with Reconstruction and Supply officials concerned with priorities on building supplies. In mid-1946, CMHC and WHL became more closely co-ordinated. Finally, on January 1, 1947, complete integration of the two crown corporations occurred.

The indirectly interventionist policy revealed in the 1944 NHA and in the creation of CMHC was market-oriented. NHA explicitly stated in its preamble that its objective was "to promote the construction of new houses, the repair and modernization of existing houses, the improvement of housing and living conditions, and the expansion of employment in the post-war period." Fearing post-war depression similar
to the 1930s, the federal government meant to use residential construction as a stabilization tool in smoothing the transition from wartime to peacetime economies. It is important to see the 1944 NHA in conjunction with the 1945 White Paper on Employment and Income, which rationalized after the fact much of the reconstruction legislation passed in 1944 and 1945. The act furthered the White Paper's goal of achieving high employment and income during reconstruction through the private investment of home owners, lending institutions, and limited dividend companies. CMHC, which eventually administered NHA and its direct lending program, was the "federal machinery for post-war housing expansion." As Albert Rose has concluded, the "emphasis on the expansion of employment in the post-war period makes it clear that the fundamental intention of the [NHA and CMHC] legislation was more economic - in terms of the avoidance of a post-war depression akin to that of 1919 - 21 - than a social concern with the well-being of all Canadians in terms of their housing requirements." By contrast, social concerns motivated the directly interventionist federal program. Public agitation over the serious nature of the post-1944 shelter problem, heightened in particular by the evictions issue, forced the federal government to assume temporarily and reluctantly a social responsibility for housing.
In the spring of 1944, public attention increasingly focused upon the threat of mass evictions in a period of extreme housing congestion. According to the October, 1943, WPTB rental regulations, landlords could give notices-to-vacate to their tenants only between April 30 and September 30; the Board banned winter evictions. Consequently, large numbers of notices accumulated for May 1, 1944. Given the low vacancy rates in cities across Canada, tenants faced with eviction could not find alternative accommodation. In addition, many of the tenants were the dependents of servicemen fighting overseas. MPs in the House of Commons brought the problem to the government's attention beginning in February. To these MPs and to WHL officials, the situation was especially critical in Toronto, Montreal, Winnipeg, Hamilton, and several smaller Ontario cities.

The federal government responded to the evictions situation not by altering the rental regulations but by expanding WHL operations to furnish housing for servicemen's families. Acting Prime Minister J.L. Ralston, the minister of National Defence, hinted at the new program on April 27 in the House of Commons. At a May 2 meeting, Ralston, Pigott, C.D. Howe, J.L. Ilsley, Dr. W.C. Clark, and others finally decided to initiate the WHL servicemen's housing program. The choice of solution to the evictions problem
was significant. Munitions and Supply and particularly Joe Pigott supported the direct federal provision of permanent low income housing through WHL. Little evidence exists to inform us about the extent to which Munitions and Supply and other WHL officials agreed with Pigott's position. Nevertheless, one element within the federal bureaucracy was willing and able to meet the evictions emergency. Although at this time, the WPTB opposed further direct intervention through rental regulations, it accepted new WHL construction as a remedy.

The May, 1944, concurrence between public agitation and government involvement was repeated many times over the next two years. It is possible to establish more clearly the motivation behind intervention by analysing the relationship between the concerns raised in a specific urban centre and federal response. Once again, Vancouver is a useful case study for two reasons: first, the surviving federal and local documentation is extremely rich; secondly, the flood of loud and militant protests coming from Vancouver contributed forcefully to the dissatisfaction voiced in other large Canadian cities experiencing housing congestion and evictions.

A variety of groups pressed the government to act on the post-1944 housing problem. No formal organization united them, although they sometimes overlapped, and some groups
were even bitter opponents in the broader political context. In a general way, the objectives of the organizations differentiated them. On the one hand, the veterans associations and the Citizens' Rehabilitation Council of Greater Vancouver sought an immediate remedy for the servicemen's and veterans' housing emergency; they were temporarily reform-minded. On the other hand, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), the Labor Progressive Party (LPP), the communist-led unions, and the Vancouver Housing Association (VHA) wanted a comprehensive program to solve the long and short-range aspects of the housing problem.

Veterans' organizations, such as the provincial command and local branches of the Canadian Legion, the Army and Navy Veterans of Canada, the Canadian Corps Association, the War Amputations Association, and the co-ordinating Vancouver Veterans' Council, supported by women's auxiliaries to various regiments, urged quick resolution of the housing emergency. In August, 1944, veterans made several recommendations: imposition of an evictions freeze for soldiers' families; use of vacant dwellings for temporary accommodation; provision of more WHL houses; construction of government-assisted housing developments by limited dividend companies; and conversion of the old Hotel Vancouver to a veterans' hostel. Within a year, they had adopted other
demands: a federal housing ministry; a low income housing program; new controls and priorities on building materials; a ceiling on real estate prices; and training of skilled building tradesmen.39

The motivation behind the veterans' agitation was moral. They held the just belief that the rehabilitation of discharged men required government assistance in housing as well as in employment, health care, and education. Canadians (including elected members of government and government officials) generally shared this view. To some extent, the leaders of veterans' organizations used the morality issue to arouse ex-service personnel to act on the evictions issue.40 As well, one or two veterans took some advantage of the housing controversy in their own political interests. Jack Henderson, the president of the Canadian Legion's provincial command, ran as a Non-Partisan Association-endorsed candidate for school board in the 1944 civic elections41 and as a Liberal candidate in Vancouver East in the 1945 federal election.42 James Sinclair was known as the Liberal "soldier M.P." for North Vancouver.43

The Citizens' Rehabilitation Council of Greater Vancouver44 concerned itself with the immediate problem of rehabilitating demobilized armed forces personnel. It represented a diversity of interests in the city - business,
professional, social welfare, labour, government, veterans, and church. Not surprisingly, membership sometimes overlapped with other groups like the veterans' organizations. In June, 1944, a local housing registry official explained the veterans' shelter problem to the Council whose members quickly set up a housing committee chaired by former Tory cabinet minister H.H. Stevens. The Council associated itself with rehabilitation and housing not only out of "a sense of gratitu[de]" to veterans but "because Canada's future stability and progress depend[ed] upon the combined effort of government and people in removing causes of dissatisfaction and unrest." Its role was conciliatory and cautionary. It assisted in the resolution of differences over legal agreements between Vancouver City Council and WHL, and it warned the prime minister and others of the potential danger in the city's housing situation.

The 1944 Curtis report, prepared for the Advisory Committee on Reconstruction, and the 1944 report of the British Columbia Post-War Rehabilitation Council influenced organizations that sought a comprehensive housing policy. The two most important such groups, the LPP and the CCF, used these studies to press for resolution of the long-term post-1944 housing problem. The Curtis report recommended a national housing and planning program to provide for town planning, home ownership, home improvement, slum clearance,
low-rental projects, and co-operative and rural housing. This program would require two separate Dominion housing and planning administrations, federal financial assistance, municipal and provincial administration, sensitivity to community concerns, and public, private, and co-operative ownership of housing. In particular, it would realize the accommodation needs of low and moderate income Canadians.

The section of the Post-War Rehabilitation Council report dedicated to planning and housing called for a provincial planning and housing authority, enabling legislation for regional planning and housing authorities, federal subsidies or loans to municipalities to undertake housing projects, and adjustments to the NHA to furnish subsidies for low-rental projects.

The LPP's motivation was ideological, since the party offered little in the way of material incentives and favourable publicity. Yet, despite its belief in the imminence of the socialist revolution, the LPP advocated policies on housing (and other issues) not very much different from those of the CCF. In particular, it supported low-rental housing projects assisted by federal funding, local housing authorities, slum clearance, and a federal ministry of housing.

Whereas the CCF achieved greater electoral success in the 1940s, the LPP employed more aggressive and militant
tactics, especially at the municipal level. In 1944 and 1945, party members like John McPeake and Elgin Ruddell were instrumental in forming the "5000 Homes Now" Committee and the Citizens' Emergency Housing Committee. Both groups took a spirited offensive on the housing issue, and Ruddell was later active in the revived Vancouver Housing Association. As well, the LPP initiated public rallies and picket lines at homes of soon-to-be evicted tenants. Finally, LPP members had gained the leadership of major British Columbia unions and the Vancouver Labor Council during the early 1940s. All of these organizations agitated for improvements in housing conditions. Some union leaders, including McPeake of the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers and Harold Pritchett of the International Woodworkers of America, also led protest activities.

Ideology motivated the CCF as well as the LPP. At its provincial and national conventions, in its election manifestos, and in its publications, this democratic socialist party committed itself to a comprehensive, planned program very much like the one recommended by the Curtis report. This program recognized the relationship between housing and planning, called for dominion, provincial, and municipal housing authorities, required federal financing, advo-
cated low-rental housing and slum clearance, supported private home ownership and co-operative housing, and proposed research into new materials and methods of construction.

Unlike the LPP, the CCF more successfully presented its housing program in electoral politics. It relied less upon militant tactics and more upon its elected members at all three government levels -- Helena Gutteridge in Vancouver, Dorothy Steeves, Laura Jamieson, Grace MacInnis, and Grant MacNeil in Victoria, and Angus MacInnis in Ottawa. Moreover, by 1944, the CCF had seriously challenged the old political parties in the Ontario provincial election, in the national opinion polls, and in its victory in the Saskatchewan election.

In particular, the British Columbia CCF women, like women elsewhere, actively promoted improvements in housing. Gutteridge generated a storm of housing reform activity while a city alderman between 1937 and 1939. A member of the city's special committee on housing, she helped to prepare the 1937 survey of Vancouver housing conditions and attempted to attract support from community, housing, and labour organizations for low-rental housing under NHA Part II. Beginning in the mid-1930s, Steeves continuously raised the housing issue in the provincial legislature and later served as a member of the British Columbia Post-War
Rehabilitation Council. Jamieson established co-operative houses for single working women during the war. Grace MacInnis advanced CCF housing policy in her writings and in speeches to public meetings and the Legislature.

Despite the similarity of LPP and CCF solutions to the housing problem, the two political parties did not act together on the issue. At the national level, the LPP wished to form a popular left-wing front with the CCF, but the social democrats rejected such a coalition. Bitter feelings extended from the national struggle into the local housing controversy. For example, CCF member E.S. Scanlon withdrew from the "5000 Homes Now" Committee because the LPP had infiltrated the organization and made it "a political football", while McPeake denied Scanlon's charges and asserted that the group was "broadly representative" of the public; in addition, Angus MacInnis refused to participate in the "5000 Homes Now" meetings.

The Vancouver Housing Association was the local wing of the Housing and Planning Association of Canada, which represented Canada's national low-rental housing and slum clearance lobby. Upon its formation in 1937, the Vancouver group began a survey of the city's housing conditions, but the war postponed its completion until 1946. Although influenced by the Curtis report, the VHA emphasized low-rental housing and slum clearance rather than a
comprehensive housing program. It demanded the consolidation of all housing and planning activities in one federal ministry and the creation of local authorities for the construction and administration of low-rental projects. As well, it advocated that, if the Dominion government refused to take the initiative, the municipalities should approach provincial governments to request federal financial assistance. Although, on the whole, concerns about low-rental housing needs motivated the VHA membership, clearly the participation of some individual members furthered their professional or political interests. For politicians like Helena Gutteridge, Grace MacInnis, and Elgin Ruddell, the VHA complemented and reinforced CCF and LPP positions on housing. In addition, the VHA incidentally advanced the professional careers and concerns of some of its members like Frank Buck, a professor at the University of British Columbia and a member of the Town Planning Commission, Jocelyn Davidson of the local CMHC office, and Leonard Marsh, who had written the Curtis report and who taught at the University of British Columbia after the war.

A great many community groups supported the drive for action on the housing problem. Most prominent were women's organizations, churches, professional groups, social welfare associations, and service clubs. These groups also participated in the housing campaign through their
representatives on the Rehabilitation Council.95

Newspapers and journals brought the post-1944 housing issue to public attention and demanded and offered solutions. The Sun, the Daily Province, and the News-Herald in Vancouver published stories, editorials, and articles on all aspects of the housing situation.96 Similarly, articles in popular magazines like Maclean's and Saturday Night, professional and business journals like Canadian Business, and the Royal Architectural Institute of Canada Journal, and political and labour publications like the CCF News and the Trades and Labor Congress Journal covered housing conditions and very often suggested answers to difficulties.97 Some government officials blamed the 1944 - 1945 agitation over evictions on inflammatory press coverage.98 In fact, the local press and popular and serious journals together increased public awareness of the housing problem and generated constructive responses to it.

Public protests about the housing question went to federal, provincial and municipal governments. The prime minister and the ministers of Finance, Munitions and Supply (Reconstruction and Supply), National Defense, and Pensions and National Health (Veterans Affairs), the WPTB chairmen, and even the IHC received letters, resolutions, telegrams, and delegations of officials from Vancouver organizations.99 The same groups also sent letters and delegations to the
provincial government and city council,\textsuperscript{100} which in turn exerted pressure upon the Dominion.\textsuperscript{101} In addition, CCF MLAs made demands upon the British Columbia Legislative Assembly,\textsuperscript{102} and federal ministers requested action from each other.\textsuperscript{103} Moreover, internal reports went directly from the Emergency Shelter Administration and local housing registry in Vancouver to top WPTB officials.\textsuperscript{104} Finally, federal officials and ministers directly confronted the local housing issue by reading critical editorials in Vancouver newspapers.\textsuperscript{105} The protests ultimately reached Ilsley and Howe for decision-making on emergency housing policy.\textsuperscript{106}

Between 1944 and 1946, the agitation of many Vancouver protest groups induced the federal government to respond with WHL housing projects and with WPTB measures. The protests began with the constitution of the "5000 Homes Now" Committee in March, 1944, increased as the May 1 eviction date approached, and swelled throughout the summer with public meetings,\textsuperscript{107} rallies and picket lines at the homes of evicted families,\textsuperscript{108} representations to all three governments, and lively press coverage. The Dominion government reacted by offering 100 WHL houses for veterans. With the nearing of the October, 1944, and the 1945 eviction dates, public concern intensified. In January, the federal govern-
ment imposed WPTB Emergency Shelter regulations and appointed the recently retired Air Vice-Marshall Leigh F. Stevenson as administrator.\textsuperscript{109} In Greater Vancouver, the summer months brought 769 notices to vacate for May and 1,976 notices from May to October.\textsuperscript{110} The immediate result was the formation of a Citizens' Emergency Housing Committee and an increase in eviction rallies and picket lines.\textsuperscript{111} Finally, the Dominion reacted, issuing a WPTB evictions freeze on July 25, proposing 1,100 more WHL units,\textsuperscript{112} and starting the construction of VLA housing. Agitation persisted into the winter as accommodation conditions deteriorated with demobilization. Undoubtedly, contemporary and past events like the V-E Day riots in Halifax\textsuperscript{113} and the 1930s strikes of the unemployed in Vancouver\textsuperscript{114} coloured the situation. When in January, 1946, the Vancouver City Council and the federal government failed to convert the old Hotel Vancouver into a hostel, several hundred veterans led by the New Veterans Branch of the Canadian Legion occupied the hotel with widespread community support.\textsuperscript{115} This crisis forced an agreement between city and Dominion, and the Rehabilitation Council took over the management of the Hotel Vancouver and Dunsmuir Hotel hostels.\textsuperscript{116} The final outcome of this dissatisfaction later in the 1940s was CMHC's construction of the Renfrew Heights and Fraserview developments under its veterans' rental housing plan.\textsuperscript{117} The federal government particularly favoured WHL
housing projects as a solution to housing congestion and public agitation. Yet, Vancouver City Council hesitated to conclude agreements with WHL. It opposed the payment of a nominal sum for tax sale lots conveyed to WHL, and it objected to the loss of future tax revenue incurred by the transfer of city land to the crown. Finally, the augmentation of protests and the intercession of the Rehabilitation Council's housing committee, led by H.H. Stevens, convinced the city to give in to WHL's terms. In September, 1944 and in July and September, 1945, three agreements for 1,200 houses resulted.

Thus, the federal government reluctantly acceded to the protest groups' demands for a resolution of the post-1944 housing emergency. The thrust for remedial measures came from the bottom-up (the protest groups), not from the top-down (the Dominion government). Arguably, by 1944 the vehicles for applying those measures, WHL and the WPTB, were in place in the federal bureaucracy. Still, the resistance of government officials, excepting those in WHL, delayed for too long a resolution of the post-war housing emergency. Furthermore, this resolution was only a temporary remedy to the immediate problem - WHL projects, an evictions freeze, and emergency shelter like the old Hotel Vancouver - rather than a comprehensive, planned, and long-term solution. In effect, the government listened to the most powerful protest
group, the veterans as well as the Rehabilitation Council, rather than to groups like the LPP, CCF and VHA.

Conceivably, historians might apply social control theory to this instance of federal reaction to public agitation over housing conditions. In the loose, rather simplistic sense of social control, it is possible that those in power (elected members and officials of government, in addition to local business and professional interests) did wish to maintain the social equilibrium. Certainly, the federal government did receive warnings of social unrest from various sources and admitted on occasion to acting due to the threat of disorder. Still, an expression of fear over disturbances is not exactly the same as imposition of social control. To date, no written evidence in which social control theory plainly influenced the federal government in the implementation of emergency housing measures is available. The strict sense of the social control concept associated with Talcott Parsons, in which deviant groups represent a threat to society by operating outside the main value pattern and in which the institution of control precedes and prevents social breakdown, seems inappropriate to the Vancouver situation. First, unrest over housing congestion and evictions indicated the collapse of control. Secondly, protest groups were not behaving in a deviant
manner in demanding improvements in housing. Their reasons for challenging governments were legitimate, and they enjoyed widespread support from the Vancouver community.

This case study of Vancouver suggests that, in responding to protest groups, the federal government took into its consideration social rather than market concerns about housing. It continued with the direct provision of WHL houses, issued the evictions freeze, and converted the old Hotel Vancouver because it recognized reluctantly the existence of a social need for accommodation. Thus, the emergency program contrasted strikingly with the government's long-range, indirectly interventionist, and market-directed housing policy.

As well, the study indicates that, despite their constitutional jurisdiction over housing, the provinces and municipalities accepted as necessary the directly interventionist role played by the federal government under its wartime powers. British Columbia cabinet ministers and Vancouver city council consistently referred representations from protest groups to federal ministers and officials. As both R.L. Maitland, the Attorney-General, and H.G.T. Perry, Education minister, charged, congestion and evictions were a "war problem" and a "national problem" with which lower levels of government lacked the resources to cope.
Clearly, in 1944 - 1946, the federal government demonstrated its ability to participate directly in housing and its awareness, however hesitant, of the social need for shelter.
Footnotes

1 Canada, Statutes, 8 Geo. VI, c. 46 (1944), "An Act to Promote the Construction of New Houses, the Repair and Modernization of Existing Houses, the Improvement of Housing and Living Conditions, and the Expansion of Employment in the Postwar Period [National Housing Act, 1944]."


4 Ibid., p. 489, Table 110.

5 Minutes, Meeting of WHL Board of Directors, Aug. 10, 1943, p. 3, Public Archives of Canada [hereafter PAC], RG 83, Vol. 70, Minutes, Vol. II.

6 Firestone, Residential Real Estate, p. 488, Table 109.


8 Firestone, Residential Real Estate, p. 489, Table 110.


10 The Canada Year Book, 1945, p. 893. These congested areas included Vancouver, Victoria, Ottawa, Hull, Toronto, Hamilton, and Winnipeg.

11 Ibid. In Montreal, local officials decided not to participate in the emergency shelter regulations.
12 "Housing Permit System Removed; Emergency Shelter Regulations Extended to All Canada," [unidentified newspaper clipping], Aug. 31, 1945, City of Vancouver Archives [hereafter CVA], Newspaper Clippings, M4289-5.

13 Firestone, Residential Real Estate, p. 498.


15 Canada, Wartime Prices and Trade Board, Canadian War Orders and Regulations, Vol. VII (1945), Order No. 537.

16 PC 3409, May 10, 1945. PC 5180, Dec. 19, 1946, dissolved the IHC.

17 Canada, Statutes, 9-10 Geo. VI, c.15 (1945), "An Act to Incorporate the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation [The Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation Act]."

18 Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, Annual Report, 1946, p. 4.

19 National Housing Act, 1944.


22 Mackintosh, pp. 10-11.


25 Ibid., pp. 28-29.

26 Canadian War Orders and Regulations, Vol. III (1943), Order No. 294.

28 Ibid.; Minutes, Meeting of WHL Board of Directors, May 10, 1944, p. 10, PAC, RG 83, Vol. 70, Minutes, Vol. II. The smaller Ontario cities were Windsor, Oshawa, Brantford, and St. Catherines.


30 Minutes, Meeting of WHL Board of Directors, May 10, 1944, p. 10, PAC, RG 83, Vol. 70, Minutes, Vol. I. See also "Report for Interdepartmental Housing Committee by Mr. Jas. A. Hall Representing Wartime Housing Ltd.," PAC, RG 2, Ser. 18, Vol. 9, File H-13.


33 E.R. Gold to Donald Gordon, Aug. 5, 1944, PAC, RG 64, Ser. 1030, Box 701, File 25-2, Vol. 1; Owen Lobley to Gordon, Aug. 24, 1944, ibid.

34 Here I refer to papers held by the federal archives at the PAC, in particular, the records of the Department of Finance (RG 19), the WPTB (RG 64), and the Privy Council (RG 2).

35 See, for example, Minutes, Special WPTB Meeting, July 23, 1945, Appendix A, p. 2, PAC, RG 64, Ser. 1030, Box 700, File 25-1-3. My own subjective observation is that more letters protesting the housing problem originated in Vancouver than in any other city.

36 For example, the women's auxiliary to the Royal Canadian Navy, the women's committee of the 28th Canadian Armoured Regiment, and the women's auxiliary of the Seaforth

37 The "old Hotel Vancouver" was located on the Eaton's site at Granville and Georgia Streets.

38 Sun, Aug. 4, 1944, p. 17.


41 Sun, Nov. 22, 1944, p. 10.

42 Ibid., Oct. 27, 1944, p. 15.

43 "Housing Set-Up Scored," [unidentified newspaper clipping], July 28, 1944, CVA, Newspaper Clippings, M4289-3.

44 The Rehabilitation Council wrote its own history in 1948; see "The Citizens Rehabilitation Council of Greater Vancouver Summary of Activities, 1940 - 1948 [hereafter referred to as Rehabilitation Council Summary of Activities"], Special Collections Division, University of British Columbia Library, Frank E. Buck Papers [hereafter referred to as "Buck Papers"], Box 11, File 15.

45 Minister, Meeting of the Rehabilitation Section of the Co-ordinating Council for War Work and Civilian Services, Feb 22, 1944, Buck Papers, Box 11, File 13.


48 City Ready to Back Housing Plan, Seeks Better Terms," [unidentified newspaper clipping], Aug. 1, 1944, CVA, Newspaper Clippings, M4289-3.


See Canada, Advisory Committee on Reconstruction, Subcommittee on Housing and Community Planning [chaired by C.A. Curtis], Final Report of the Subcommittee, March 24, 1944 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1946), pp. 9-22 [hereafter referred to as Curtis Report] for a quick summary of the recommendations. The subcommittee's membership included professionals, academics, and bureaucrats in economics, architecture, planning, sociology, housing, and municipal affairs from across Canada; it did not represent the business community and labour. C.A. Curtis, a Queen's University economist, chaired the subcommittee. Leonard Marsh was research adviser. Both F.W. Nicolls and Joe Pigott sat on the subcommittee.

British Columbia, Post-War Rehabilitation Council, Reports of the Post-War Rehabilitation Council; The Interim Report (1943) and Supplementary Report (1944) (Victoria: King's Printer, 1945), p. 150. This Council included MLAs from government and opposition sides of the provincial Legislature.

Ivan Avakumovic, The Communist Party in Canada; A History (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975), p. 272. Banned in 1940, the Communist Party regrouped as the LPP.

Ibid., p. 273.

Ibid., pp. 103, 135, 176.

Pacific Advocate, Nov. 25, 1944, p. 4, and Jan. 18, 1946, pp. 1,3.

The "5000 Homes Now" Committee grew out of the Consumers Council in March, 1944, but was disbanded the following September; Sun, March 1, 1944, p. 13, and Sept. 20, 1944. The Citizens Emergency Housing Committee formed the next summer; Sun, June 15, 1945, p. 26.

Sun, Jan. 5, 1946, p. 27.

Ibid., Aug. 7, 1944, p. 2.
60 Irving Martin Abella, Nationalism, Communism, and Canadian Labour; the CIO, the Communist Party, and the Canadian Congress of Labour, 1935 - 1956 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), pp. 80, 177-78. These unions were the International Woodworkers of America, the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, the Dock and Shipyard Workers, the Boilermakers and Iron Shipbuilders Union, and the International Association of Machinists.


64 Federationist, March 25, 1943, p. 4, and April 22, 1943, p. 4; CCF News, Sept. 30, 1945, p. 3.


66 Ibid., Jan. 18, 1945, p. 4, and Sept. 30, 1945, p. 3.


68 Ibid.


73 Vancouver Daily Province, March 18, 1936, p. 6; Sun, Nov. 2, 1938, p. 3.

74 Reports of the Post-War Rehabilitation Council, pp. 166, 199.

75 Laura E. Jamieson, "Co-op Living in Vancouver," Canadian Forum, Vol. XXIII, No. 267 (April, 1943), pp. 18-19; Federationist, July 1, 1943, p. 3.


77 Sun, March 31, 1944, p. 15.

78 Ibid., April 13, 1944, p. 11.


80 Vancouver Housing Association, "Housing Vancouver; A Survey of the Housing Position in Vancouver" (Vancouver, March, 1946).
81 Ibid., p. 56.
82 Ibid., pp. 51-55.
83 The VHA launched a campaign to urge city council to ask Ottawa for funds and for legislation to set up a local housing authority for a low-rental project only in March, 1947; Sun, March 25, 1947, p. 9.
85 Province, Jan. 31, 1947, p. 5.
86 Sun, Jan. 5, 1946, p. 27.
87 Buck Papers, Box 12, Files 2-6.
88 Province, Jan 31., 1947, p. 5.
89 Marsh was a ubiquitous figure in 1946 - 1947. He was a popular speaker, appearing at the CCF summer Camp Woodsworth, the Boag Labour School, or VHA meetings; see, CCF News, Aug. 7, 1947, pp. 5,6, and Sun, March 25, 1947, p. 6. In 1947, he directed a University of British Columbia housing survey in Strathcona, initiated by the VHA and carried out with federal, provincial, and city funding; see, Province, June 28, 1947, p. 5; VHA "Housing Review," July 11, 1947, Special Collections Division, University of British Columbia Library, Angus MacInnis Memorial Collection, 40B-10. A report on the survey was later published; see Leonard C. Marsh, Rebuilding a Neighbourhood; Report on a Demonstration Slum-Clearance and Urban Rehabilitation Project in a Key Central Area in Vancouver (University of British Columbia Research Publications, No. 1; Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1950). For a short biography of Marsh, see Michael Bliss, "Preface," in Leonard Marsh, Report on Social Security for Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), ix-x.


94 Minutes, Vancouver City Council, Building, Civic Planning, and Parks Committee, Vol. 9, March 6, 1945, pp. 375-76.

95 Minutes, Meeting of the Rehabilitation Section of the Co-ordinating Council for War Work and Civilian Services, Feb. 22, 1944, Buck Papers, Box 11, File 13.

96 See, for example, the series of articles by Don Carlson in the Sun, April 1, 1946, p. 1, April 3, 1946, p. 23, April 5, 1946, p. 12, April 8, 1946, p. 6, April 9, 1946, p. 6, April 13, 1946, p. 15, and April 15, 1946, p. 5.

97 For a listing of the articles in these journals, see John David Hulchanski, Canadian Town Planning and Housing, 1940 - 1950; A Historical Bibliography (Toronto: Centre for Urban and Community Studies, University of Toronto, 1979).

98 "Responsibility for Shelter" [memorandum from WPTB Chairman Donald Gordon], Dec. 7, 1944, PAC, RG 64, Ser. 1030, Box 708, File 25-14-18-1.

99 See the collection of representations from Vancouver groups on the subject of the old Hotel Vancouver in PAC, RG 19, Vol. 716, File 203C-17. See also letters on the subject of evictions in PAC, RG 19, Vol. 2730, File 200-2. As well, see Sun, July 29, 1944, p. 7, June 1, 1945, p. 3, June 13, 1945, p. 1, and June 25, 1945, p. 10.


103 See, for example, the 1944-1946 correspondence between Ian Mackenzie, Minister of Pensions and National Health, and J.L. Ilsley, Minister of Finance, in PAC, RG 19, Vol. 716, File 203 C-17.

104 For examples of housing registry reports, see PAC, RG 64, Ser. 1040, Box 215, File G.05.02. Also, see "A Memorandum Respecting the Housing Situation in the Vancouver - New Westminster Area Prepared by the Emergency Shelter Administration, Vancouver, B.C. [hereafter referred to as "Emergency Shelter"], May 1, 1945, PAC, RG 19, Ser. E 3, Vol. 4017.

105 Donald Gordon encountered a Vancouver *Sun* editorial critical of himself and the WPTB in Aug., 1944; see the records on the matter in PAC, RG 19, Vol. 716, File 203C-17.


107 *Sun*, April 11, 1944, p. 13, April 13, 1944, p. 11, Dec. 9, 1944, p. 15, and March 2, 1946, p. 15.


110 "Emergency Shelter." See also, Minutes, Special WPTB Meeting, July 23, 1945, Appendix A, p.2, PAC, RG 64, Ser. 1030, Box 700, File 25-1-3.

111 See, for example, *Sun*, June 5, 1945, p. 3, July 10, 1945, p. 3, July 18, 1945, p. 3, and July 19, 1945, pp. 1,2.


114 Ibid., Jan. 28, 1946, pp. 1,2.


117 Vancouver, Legal Department, [Agreements between the City of Vancouver and His Majesty the King in Right of Canada Represented by WHL], Dec. 31, 1947, and Nov. 22, 1948. The CMHC veterans' rental housing plan was a continuation of the WHL program; see Firestone, Residential Real Estate, pp. 484-85.

118 "City Ready to Back Housing Plan, Seeks Better Terms," [unidentified newspaper clipping], Aug. 1, 1944, CVA, Newspaper Clippings, M4289-3.

119 Vancouver, City Clerk's Department, [Agreement between the Corporation of the City of Vancouver, His Majesty the King in Right of Canada, and WHL], Sept. 25, 1944, July 1, 1945, and Sept. 1, 1945.


121 Jones, p. 164.


123 Minutes, Special WPTB Meeting, July 23, 1945, PAC, RG 64, Ser. 1030, Box 700, File 25-1-3.
124 Jones, pp. 166-67.

125 Maitland to Ilsley, Sept. 7, 1944, PAC, RG 64, Ser. 1030, Box 701, File 25-2, Vol. 2.

126 H.G.T. Perry was quoted in a letter from L.F. Stevenson to Gordon, Aug. 2, 1945, PAC, RG 64, Ser. 1030, Box 699, File 25-3.
Chapter 4

AN EVALUATION OF WARTIME HOUSING LIMITED

In response to the wartime housing problem, the federal government intervened in an unprecedented fashion through the direct provision of accommodation. It is reasonable to question how successfully the vehicle for this intervention, Wartime Housing Limited (WHL), performed its task.

Certainly, officials associated with WHL believed that it functioned very well. In a May, 1945 report to WHL shareholders, president Joe Pigott asserted that the corporation was "well-established" and "smoothly operating" and that it was doing an excellent and efficient job. Employees and directors published glowing articles about the company's construction method, house designs, site planning techniques, and tenant relations policy. Officials in the Department of Munitions (Reconstruction) and Supply recounted WHL's activities in a positive light and helped the National Film Board document on film the company's wartime contribution. The minister responsible for WHL, C.D. Howe, praised the corporation's competency and expressed his pride in its housing projects.
In addition, WHL tenants were satisfied with their housing. They made the modest houses comfortable, planted gardens, and participated in community activities. No hard evidence exists to suggest that they harboured serious grievances about WHL accommodation. Perhaps the inadequate housing conditions of the 1930s and 1940s caused them to appreciate more fully the simple but sufficient houses. In many cases, tenants purchased and improved their homes in the post-war years.

Still, a reliance upon the testimony of WHL officials and tenants is too subjective and biased a method for evaluating the company's performance. A better approach is to examine how well WHL fulfilled the objectives set out in the order-in-council that created it. The crown company's purposes were to increase the rental housing supply, to target its program to war workers in congested areas, to provide suitable living accommodation, to manage completed projects, and to maintain economy and efficiency in its operations.

WHL added substantially to the stock of rental housing. Between 1941 and 1947, it completed 31,192 units. By 1949, WHL and Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) started 49,611 units and finished 45,930 under both the war workers' and veterans' rental housing programs.

The WHL program initially targeted construction to war
workers and afterwards to soldiers' dependents and veterans, although in a few instances before 1944, it housed families of men serving overseas. As well, WHL carefully directed its projects to areas with housing need. It employed surveys of local conditions to determine the extent of that need before deciding to act.

WHL houses provided unpretentious but suitable living accommodation. Yet, their construction, design, and site planning may be characterized as progressive, experimental, and distinctive. For example, the company initially developed a bold solution to its major construction problem. Because it was expected to remove its housing at the war's end, it had to build temporary, not permanent, units. The houses were to rest upon posts or blocks, rather than basements, and they demanded a construction method that would facilitate their eventual dismantling and possible re-assembly elsewhere. Confronted with this requirement for a temporary structure, with a shortage of building materials, and with the need for speed and economy, WHL employed an inventive semi-prefabricated or "demountable" technique adapted from a method worked out three years previously by National Housing Administration (NHAA) director F.W. Nicolls. Instead of using a fully prefabricated approach in which fabrication and complete or partial assembly occur
in a factory, WHL workmen made standardized plywood floor, wall, roof, partition, and ceiling panels in a shop at the project location and erected and finished the house on site with remarkable rapidity. The "demountable" technique contributed to the prefabrication debate among experts and commentators on housing in the 1940s; although prefabrication was by no means a new phenomenon in Canada, many specialists viewed it as a quick and inexpensive solution to the shelter problem.

WHL construction did deviate from the semi-prefabricated method in time and place. In its North Vancouver projects, the corporation used standard building techniques since British Columbia plywood, in heavy demand by eastern war industries, was not available in sufficient supply on the coast. By 1944, WHL houses displayed a more permanent character, being built of frame construction and resting upon a foundation running around the periphery of the entire structure rather than upon posts or blocks. Although originally the homes were considered temporary, thousands survive to this day through improvements like the addition of a full basement and proper maintenance. Throughout its pre-1944 operations, WHL constructed its staff houses with normal building methods.

WHL house designs were plain and practical yet curiously distinctive. Across Canada, the company used the same
standard house types for both its two-bedroom and four-bedroom bungalows; later, it added a third two-bedroom type (Figures 2, 3 and 4). These basic, simple house plans included a living room, a kitchen with a dining area, bedrooms, a bathroom, and a woodshed. A limited assortment of wall finishes and colour combinations and an occasional reversal of plans provided some variety in exterior appearance. By 1944, the company had improved the interior and exterior design of the houses (Figures 5 and 6). WHL adapted the plans to its own needs from NHAA model homes developed in the early war years (Figure 7) and from the NHAA prefabricated units. In turn, NHAA model homes simplified 1930s "Cape Cod" or "saltbox" stylistic modes, already an innovative "reduction of forms to bare essentials" (Figure 8). Having pushed this reductive process to its logical consequence, WHL housing in North Vancouver and in other initial projects resembled the cabins of early Vancouver and of frontier Canada generally or the workers' cottages of British Columbia resource towns. Nevertheless, the country-wide uniformity of the architecturally unaffected WHL housing has rendered the "wartime house" almost as identifiable to Canadians as the grain elevator or the chateau-style hotel or railway station. In the late 1940s, CMHC architectural staff expanded the four WHL plan types
Figure 2

WARTIME HOUSING LIMITED
HOUSE TYPES

SINGLE FAMILY DWELLING: TYPE H1

SINGLE FAMILY DWELLING: TYPE H12

SINGLE FAMILY DWELLING: TYPE H22
Figure 3

HOUSE TYPE H-12 IN
NORTH VANCOUVER

Source: North Shore Museum
and Archives, North Vancouver (City)
Photograph Collection, No. 3420
Figure 4

HOUSE TYPE H-1 IN
NORTH VANCOUVER

Source: North Shore Museum
and Archives, North Vancouver (City)
Photograph Collection, No. 3419
Figure 5

HOUSE TYPE H-21
IN VANCOUVER

Source: Canada, Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, [Album of Photographs and Plans of Wartime Housing in Vancouver and Victoria], [1947], City of Vancouver Archives, Photograph Collection, 150-1
Figure 6

PLAN FOR HOUSE TYPE H-21
IN VANCOUVER

Source: Canada, Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, [Album of Photographs and Plans of Wartime Housing in Vancouver and Victoria], [1947], City of Vancouver Archives, Photograph Collection, 150-1
Figure 7

NATIONAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION
MODEL HOUSE NO. 501

Source: Public Archives of Canada,
National Photography Collection, Central
Mortgage and Housing Corporation
Collection, 1969-40
Figure 8
CAPE COD COTTAGE

Source: Canada, Department of Finance, Dominion Housing Act; Architectural Competition; Low-Cost House Designs (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1936), p.69.
Figure 9
POST-WAR SMALL HOUSE DESIGN

Area:
1st Floor: 615 sq. ft.
2nd Floor: 342 sq. ft.
Total: 957 sq. ft.

Cubic Contents:
13,975 cu. ft.

Minimum lot width:
with drive: 38' 8"
without drive: 36' 8"

DESIGN NO. 49-54
into a portfolio of high quality small-house designs utilized in veterans' developments like Renfrew Heights or Fraserview (Figure 9). The WHL hostel designs similarly possessed a characteristic uniformity, simplicity, and efficiency relieved somewhat by the suggestion of classical architectural detail around the main entrance.

While always functional, WHL site planning strove to be imaginative when circumstances permitted. The company preferred to build on serviced land to hasten project completion. Thus, the grid pattern often imposed a rigid street plan on a WHL community and reinforced the rather monotonous house design. Still, in Vancouver, the company put up infill housing among older, developer-built homes and added variety to streetscapes. When larger city blocks were available in municipalities like North Vancouver or Welland, Ontario, WHL introduced crescents or cul-de-sacs to relieve the over-all regularity. In fringe areas like Sea Island, where the company itself serviced the land, it adopted a free street pattern to lessen the impression of uniformity created by the house types. Whatever the road plan, WHL landscaped its housing projects and encouraged tenants to garden. When CMHC took over the veterans' housing program after the war, it designed communities like Renfrew Heights and Fraserview to follow the natural contours of the site.
Carefully designed WHL projects built around war industry were not unlike earlier planned industrial towns. Indeed, the provision of workers' communities or housing was a very old idea. European and American industrialists had been developing planned towns since the early 19th century. After 1900, when American industrialists began to assume a systematic approach to welfare work in industry, they promoted the planning of model towns all over the United States. At the same time, the concept of model industrial communities crossed the border into Canada. The American social historian of housing, Gwendolyn Wright, has revealed that the significant factor in creating these towns was the objective of imposing social control upon workers. In fact, industrialists in both countries sought to introduce housing and planning reforms that would defuse potential labour unrest and increase production through the fostering of a stable, contented and family-minded workforce. It is possible to speculate that planned WHL housing projects pursued a similar objective despite one very obvious difference: the federal government and its crown company rather than industry introduced the wartime communities. Certainly, the government meant to ensure efficient war production through the direct provision of workers' accommodation. Yet, no proof exists to assert that it or WHL consciously implemented social control theory in
the physical planning of its war workers' communities.

During the war, the management of WHL projects fell upon local voluntary advisory committees and hired personnel. This decentralization helped to defray costs and to limit the number of staff members. As well, it afforded the corporation a smooth entry into a community and assistance from local organizations. Usually, WHL set up a committee of prominent men in an area while initiating development. The committee's functions were to advise on potential or proposed sites, to help in negotiations for property acquisition and in the call for tenders, to establish an administrative office, and to hire staff. Under the direction of the largely autonomous committee, WHL employees looked after house allocation, rent collection, accounting, services, and maintenance, and reported to the Toronto head office. They solved physical and social problems in WHL developments through direct co-operation with community groups. After 1944, WHL decided that it could no longer ask committees to supervise projects on a permanent basis and subsequently increased its administrative staff.

WHL managed its operations with economy and efficiency. In 1941, the company started its activities with a $100,000 allotment from the federal government and with
permission to enter into commitments up to $10 million. By July, 1946, the government had advanced over $86 million to WHL. However, the company's assets amounted to more than $91 million, its houses and other buildings were worth over $72 million, and income through rentals receivable that particular month exceeded $95,000. Thus, WHL contrasts strikingly with the indirectly interventionist programs undertaken since 1946 by CMHC: the federal government has few assets to show for all its subsidization. The government apparently took a financial loss when after 1946 CMHC began to sell off WHL houses and veterans' rental housing program units. By 1952, CMHC had disposed of 29,452 houses for a total amount of $110.5 million.

Some observers complained that the construction cost per WHL rental unit nearly equalled the cost of a NHAA-financed owner-occupied house. However, as a House of Commons committee report noted in 1942, these critics did not realize that the WHL capital costs included local improvement expenditures. The WHL houses did rent at higher amounts than the NHAA monthly payments covering 20-year mortgage and tax payments.

An evaluation of WHL may take into consideration criteria other than the fulfillment of program objectives. Another possible criterion is the extent to which WHL was accountable to Parliament. In fact, MPs exercised little
control over the company, which had been created by an order-in-council rather than an act of Parliament. Still, although they claimed to have insufficient access to information about company activities, MPs repeatedly challenged C.D. Howe, the minister responsible for WHL, during question periods and debates. As well, in 1942, the House of Commons asked a committee on war expenditures to look into WHL's performance and, in July, the committee tabled a report generally favourable to the company. Over time, WHL and CMHC implemented some of the report's recommendations: the use of standard or ready-cut construction to reduce costs; the provision of low-cost accommodation for dependents of soldiers serving overseas; and the sale of houses to tenants desiring to buy them. Nevertheless, the corporation generally operated independently of Parliament: it was much more answerable to Howe and other government officials than to MPs.

Another criterion for assessing WHL is affordability. A certain confusion surrounds the income group for which WHL provided accommodation. The press and some MPs, including Howe, continually referred to WHL units as low-rental housing. Leonard Marsh, the housing expert who wrote the Curtis report, stated flatly that the corporation did not supply low-rental housing. The term "low-rental" implies the purpose of sheltering a low income group, which in 1944
paid under $20 per month rent and which was able to afford perhaps $12 per month.\textsuperscript{55} It also suggests some government subsidization to make housing accessible to low income tenants. Yet, WHL tenants enjoyed moderate incomes from stable employment in war industry and were thus able to afford the $22 to $30 per month rentals calculated by Pigott as necessary to recoup capital and operating costs: WHL had no intention of subsidizing its tenants. About 44\% of WHL tenants had previously paid rents below $20,\textsuperscript{56} but steady, modest incomes from war industry substantially reduced their affordability problem.

An additional criterion useful in evaluating WHL is its skill in tenant relations. In 1941, the corporation set up a Tenant Relations Department.\textsuperscript{57} The program undertaken by this department was significant for two reasons. First, it represented an initial, conscious attempt to introduce a systematic strategy of social control to a nation-wide federal housing scheme. Secondly, it denoted "a new phase of social engineering"\textsuperscript{58} more subtly paternalistic than previous social control experiments in housing in other countries.

Tenant Relations used social control theory in the Talcott Parsons sense.\textsuperscript{59} Department head Lionel Scott intended the program to reduce or eliminate behaviour that might deviate from accepted social norms. Or, as he
apparently told the WHL Board of Directors:

You are doing a job of plant-staffing...You want the men to stay on the job. You want your property cared for. The people in those homes have got to live normal, contented, stimulating lives, and take a pride in their community.60

Scott also realized that hundreds of migrants torn from families, friends, and familiar associations might not integrate well with each other or with the host community:

A few people drifting into a Town can be absorbed. When they come in lots of hundreds, maybe thousands, existing social agencies are unable to cope with them and they provide a fertile breeding ground for discontent, juvenile delinquency and social discord.61

Scott expressed these concerns about behaviour as it related to productivity, WHL's property, and the broader community within the context of fighting a world war:

The very care of the democratic way of life for which we are fighting lies in healthy, local communities alive to, and dealing with local problems, which in their total make up National problems. To keep our developments healthy physically, mentally, and socially is our job.62

Scott asserted that the work with tenants was not paternal-
istic. Rather, it was based "upon democratic principles":

...no superimposed programs, no pet projects are foisted upon the people. It [the work] is based upon the credo that to enjoy freedom we must accept responsibility, to have privileges we must assume obligations...Our job is to lead and to guide, and to make possible - by certain material and leadership contributions - a rich, balanced, decent and normal community life.

In fact, the program was paternalistic: leading and guiding with the purpose of instilling social norms are still a form of control. Probably it would be more accurate to describe the WHL tenant relations approach as subtly paternalistic. In any case, Lionel Scott's work represented the systematic application of sociological theory to the way in which working people lived.

A tenant relations program was not a new idea in 1941. Its application in WHL operations did represent its introduction to large-scale federal housing schemes in Canada. In the United States, industrialists had provided their model towns with "welfare secretaries" or "social secretaries" who acted as "moral police, statisticians, teachers, recreational planners, and counselors." Nevertheless, these "secretaries" behaved in a much more heavily paternalistic manner than WHL staff: Tenant Relations Department counsellors acted more like "recreational planners" than "moral police".
Scott shaped a tenant relations program that, like the rest of the WHL administration, operated on a partly paid and partly voluntary basis. By 1945, the department budget comprised 2 1/2% of gross rents or about $150,000 per year. It consisted of 35 hired staff members across Canada. Scott himself trained the community counsellors. He assigned them to housing projects where they established contact with local social agency heads, factory managers, civic officials, service clubs, and other community organizations and with WHL tenants. The counsellors brought together occupants and local groups as circumstances dictated. They also helped tenants set up a wide range of activities that the tenants themselves supported by fund-raising. WHL provided community centres, some equipment, and a monthly magazine for tenants called Home Life. Like the local advisory committees, the Tenant Relations Department ended with the war.

The final criterion for judging the WHL program is the degree to which it employed intergovernmental co-operation. In fact, WHL introduced the principle of joint responsibility between governments in rental housing projects. Arrangements for the disposal of houses and for services and payments in lieu of taxation on crown land normally required some sharing between WHL and municipal governments. In the
pre-1944 agreements, the crown company alone took responsibility for the housing and agreed to remove it soon after the war's end. However, sharing occurred with respect to services and payments in lieu of taxes. A municipality conveyed land to WHL for a nominal sum and supplied services to a housing project in return for an annual payment per house; when necessary, the company installed services on the land and turned them over to the municipality for operation or maintenance. In the post-1944 agreements, WHL and the municipality both took responsibility for disposal of property and retained similar arrangements for services and payments in lieu of taxation. If the corporation sold any houses in the first ten years, it undertook to pay the municipality a predetermined amount for the land. At the close of the 15-year amortization period, the municipality could purchase any unsold houses, and the company consented to pay the municipality an annual amount equalling the normal taxation on unsold houses. The role of the provincial government was to authorize municipal participation by enabling legislation. Unfortunately, the 1949 - 1964 federal-provincial partnership in housing put to use only in a perfunctory way the experience of intergovernmental cooperation gained through the WHL program.

Thus, WHL achieved some success in fulfilling its objectives and in dealing with affordability, tenant
relations, and intergovernmental affairs, although owing to wartime circumstances, it was not sufficiently accountable to Parliament. Yet, groups outside of the Munitions (Reconstruction) and Supply Department regarded WHL with mistrust and dissatisfaction.

Finance Department staff members as much as any group beyond government reacted to WHL with suspicion and bitterness. They were concerned that the corporation would overstep its guidelines and start to build permanent rather than temporary housing in competition with the NHAA and the construction industry. Their misgivings came from two sources: fear of socialism and bureaucratic rivalry.

Competition between the NHAA and the WHL originated in the cabinet decision to create WHL and hampered relations between Finance and the company throughout the war years. When the order-in-council establishing WHL was brought down, the NHAA had already made its own preparations for defence housing.\(^{76}\) NHAA director F.W. Nicolls thought that the agency, with its qualified staff, its knowledge of small house construction, and its understanding of coast-to-coast housing requirements was best equipped to handle the wartime task.\(^{77}\) The possible abandonment of all National Housing Act programs only added to the NHAA's disappointment. The inability of the two bureaucracies to work together in the initial stages of WHL's organization suggests the beginning
of a rivalry; although NHAA staff members moved to Toronto to assist the new company, WHL eventually continued on its own "by mutual consent", and the NHAA employees returned to Ottawa. This early antagonism persisted in frustrating work relations between WHL and Nicolls until the war's end.

Both NHAA and Wartime Prices and Trade Board (WPTB) officials feared that WHL would begin to build permanent rather than temporary housing. After the committee report about the WHL program was tabled in the House of Commons in July, 1942, Howe announced that the corporation would construct "a reasonable number of houses" in cities with a serious housing shortage. However, Finance Department officials and agencies like the WPTB firmly believed that WHL should provide only temporary housing in remote areas and leave permanent housing in Toronto, Hamilton, Winnipeg, Vancouver and other cities to private enterprise and the NHAA. Thus, they were outraged when WHL and Hamilton negotiated an agreement by which the company would build permanent houses, charge rents undercutting the local housing market, and possibly sell the houses to tenants after five years on better financial terms than were possible under the National Housing Act. The conflict was settled eventually at the ministerial level, and WHL worked out a less offensive agreement with the city of Hamilton.
Behind the concerns of Finance Department officials lay a very real fear of socialism. Finance minister J.L. Ilsley rejected the direct provision of housing by a peacetime government as socialistic and dangerous; he firmly believed in the private sector's capacity to supply housing. He could countenance WHL only as a temporary solution to the wartime and veterans' housing emergency. When he corresponded with Howe in 1942 over permanent housing in Hamilton, he pointed out the "grave danger" of WHL's proposal as a precedent for the post-war housing program. WPTB personnel also regarded WHL plans for Hamilton as a "dangerous and far-reaching programme" that would end in the "socialization of all our housing", "with probable disastrous results to our present economic policy of private home ownership."

While municipalities regarded wartime and post-war housing conditions as a national problem requiring a federal government solution, WHL encountered many local obstacles to the implementation of its programs. By May, 1945, Pigott reported to WHL shareholders that, on the whole, smooth municipal relations had replaced earlier "very troublesome" dealings. In fact, many municipal governments reserved "hostility", or at best "passive tolerance", for WHL projects. Often, they simply resented the intrusion of a large-scale federal project into a local community. For example, general public antagonism greeted a WHL scheme for
New Glasgow, Nova Scotia. Complaints about a housing type ill-suited to winter conditions, about the attraction of "undesirables" from outside the area, and about the unpopular awarding of a war industry contract reached Howe in Ottawa, and he determined that the project should be relocated in Halifax.

Usually, city governments expressed unhappiness about the quality of WHL housing and requested more permanent structures owing to accommodation shortages. In particular, they were apprehensive about the deterioration of WHL temporary housing into slums if it was not removed after the war. From their perspective, inferior housing would diminish land values and tax assessments. For example, Hamilton's city council preferred permanent houses. Again, in Vancouver, Mayor J.W. Cornett asserted that "we should go in for the permanent class of home." Vancouver aldermen and officials looked upon WHL's North Vancouver housing as an "eyesore" and as "packing cases." Nevertheless, they called Burkeville a "big improvement" and insisted upon similar housing when in 1944 Vancouver negotiated a WHL agreement.

In general, municipal governments grumbled over the loss of tax revenue resulting from WHL agreements. Previous experiences with the 1919 soldiers' housing scheme and recent opposition to the tax exemption clause of the
National Housing Act Part II reinforced this response. Sometimes altercations over services erupted if municipalities thought that the payments in lieu of taxes were inadequate. The reeve of Richmond and local WHL staff members fought for two years over a school agreement for Burkeville children and drew Pigott, Howe, and the provincial education minister into the conflict. Yet, other municipalities like the city of North Vancouver settled without difficulty on agreements for Bewicke and Ridgeway schools, for a fire hall, and for Heywood Park.

Lending institutions, builders, suppliers, and property owners acknowledged that WHL did an admirable job of building war workers' housing in remote areas, but they repudiated any suggestion that the corporation should construct permanent housing in cities in direct competition with private enterprise. In 1942, the Dominion Mortgage and Investments Association and the Ontario Retail Lumber Dealers Association expressed special concern about the proposed agreement to build permanent WHL housing in Hamilton. They maintained that private industry could furnish permanent homes in cities with National Housing Act assistance and with the same priorities on building materials as WHL. The private sector anticipated a reluctance in
WHL to step aside after the war and to permit private enterprise the resumption of its normal peacetime operations. As well, it recognized the bureaucratic competition between the Finance Department and WHL.

In addition, local property owners and builders frequently resisted WHL projects. Organizations like the North Vancouver City and District Property Owners Association expressed concerns about property values if, at the war's end, WHL did not remove its non-taxpaying houses. As well, local builders usually strongly opposed WHL. Vancouver's Building Contractors' Association, affiliated with the National House Builders' Association, resisted the construction of WHL housing in the city. The arguments advanced against the crown company were many: the units would deteriorate into slum housing; the company received priorities on building supplies unavailable to builders; WHL's priorities would delay the completion of hundreds of partly constructed houses; and returning soldiers deserved better quality, owner-occupied housing than WHL homes. The Association promoted better access to priorities on building materials for its members and National Housing Act assistance for home ownership. Municipal governments like Vancouver City Council supported equal access to materials and argued that builders could do a better job of house construction than WHL. They also suggested that private enterprise could handle the housing
situation if given adequate supplies and labour.\textsuperscript{106}

While one might have expected the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) to support WHL's directly interventionist activities, such was not the case. As the wartime voice of the Canadian public housing lobby, the CCF responded with hostility to WHL almost from the company's inception.\textsuperscript{107} It based its opposition on several grounds.\textsuperscript{108} First and most importantly, the CCF saw WHL as a threat to its drive for a planned and comprehensive national housing program undertaken jointly by federal, provincial, and municipal housing authorities. It regarded the NHAA as an agency that potentially could introduce this national program. However, the federal government reduced NHAA's responsibilities when it established WHL. Secondly, the CCF contended that the NHAA was capable of building temporary as well as general housing in the war years and that a decrease in residential construction could cause "a whole host of social problems before the war is over, and after it."\textsuperscript{109} Thirdly, WHL directors were not accountable to Parliament, particularly with respect to expenditures. Fourthly, if WHL housing were not removed after the war owing to accommodation shortages, the poorly built projects would degenerate quickly into slums. Fifthly, the cost of building a rented WHL unit exceeded that of an owner-occupied National Housing
Act house. (Of course, the July, 1942 committee report on WHL disputed this assertion.) The British Columbia MLA Dorothy Steeves added other issues to these points. She called the crown company "dictatorial" because it could serve three days notice-to-leave to its tenants. Furthermore, the WHL tax exemptions burdened the local taxpayer. The post-war disposal of WHL houses caused some worry to tenants, and eventually Steeves began to demand that the homes be sold off immediately to occupants. The only good feature of the WHL program from Steeves's perspective was the Tenant Relations Department.

It is doubtful if the federal government could have undertaken the direct provision of housing at this time in a more efficient manner than it did through WHL. Yet, as a new player in the housing field, the crown company encountered considerable negative response from vested interests in the federal and municipal governments and from advocates both of private enterprise and democratic socialism. Much of the hostility originated in the federal Cabinet's 1941 decision to create WHL and to reduce NHAA's role simultaneously. Perhaps the Dominion government might have diminished some of this dissension and some of the housing shortage by allowing builders special financial assistance and priorities to construct permanent, low-cost housing for war workers and veterans in large Canadian cities. Still, the government could never have eliminated the conflict between
WHL and its critics. The American approach, which successfully employed both public and private means, was similarly beset by bureaucratic rivalries and by reproaches from public housing and builders' lobbies.¹¹⁵
Footnotes


3 See Thomson's report prepared for the Department of Munitions and Supply; J. de N. Kennedy, History of the Department of Munitions and Supply; Canada in the Second World War (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1950), Vol. I, Sec. II, pp. 480-89. See also, "Wartime Housing," a National Film Board of Canada documentary film directed by Stanley Jackson, 1941, 16 mm., colour print, PAC, National Film, TV, and Sound Archives.


6 See, for example, Vancouver News-Herald, March 18, 1942, p. 9.


9 PC 1286, Feb. 24, 1941.


15 For a quick summary of prefabrication, see, Canada, Advisory Committee on Reconstruction, Subcommittee on Housing and Community Planning [chaired by C.A. Curtis], Final Report of the Subcommittee, March 24, 1944 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1944) [hereafter referred to as Curtis Report], pp. 297-98.
16 Workers needed an estimated 16 man-hours to put up a small house, and they were capable of completing a group of 20 houses and turning them over to the tenants in 30 days; see Knott, "Prefabrication", p. 142.


20 Kennedy, Vol. I., Sec. II, p. 484.

21 Sun, Sept. 7, 1944, p. 5; Kennedy, Vol. I., Sec. II, p. 484.


24 WHL termed the house types H-1/H-2, H-11/H-12, H-21/H-22, and H-41/H-42. H-11/H-12 was the four-bedroom bungalow, H-41/H-42 a later addition. H-2 reversed H-1. For written and illustrated descriptions of the house types, see: Thomson, pp. 252-54; Coon, pp. 3, 7; Somerville, "Planned Homes For Our Munitions Workers," p. 12. For a film record, see the documentary "Wartime Housing."
25 Coon, p. 3; Thomson, p. 252.

26 Canada, Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, [Album of Photographs and Plans of Wartime Housing in Vancouver and Victoria], [1947], City of Vancouver Archives [hereafter CVA], Photograph Collection, 150-1.


30 For example, see, "Blueprint of Buildings for Cariboo Gold Quartz Mining Co. to Be Erected at Wells, B.C.," Cariboo Gold Quartz Mining Co. Ltd. Papers, CVA, Add. Mss."280, Vol. 42, Folder II.

31 Canada, Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, Small House Designs; Vol. I: Bungalows; Vol. 2: One-and-a-Half-Storey; Vol. 3: Two-Storey (Ottawa: n.n., 1949). Sam Gitterman, CMHC's chief architect, was responsible for the design excellence of these houses; Humphrey Carver, Compassionate Landscape (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), p. 110.
Kalman, p. 212, H28. On p. 199, H6, Kalman asserts that the reduction of the Cape Cod cottage led logically and shortly "to the radically non-historical creations" of architects like Peter Thornton, R.A.D. Berwick, C.E. Pratt, and C.B.K. Van Norman. On the basis of evidence presented here, one might add that that reduction also led to the traditional-looking, post-war developer-built house that he himself identified in Fraserview (p. 212).

"Wartime Housing." The No. 4 Temporary building that still stands behind the Confederation Building, Ottawa, and that housed CMHC in its early years resembles the staff houses; see Carver, p. 103. The North Vancouver staff houses apparently had a 4-column portico; see drawing for "Alterations to Front Entrance Doors & New Canopy to Staff Houses, Wartime Housing Ltd., Feb. 2nd, 1943." Canadian Archives, University of Calgary [hereafter CAA], McCarter Nairne Collection, Acc. No. 84A/80.18

For WHL site planning, see H. Peter Oberlander, "Canada's Planning Experience in Housing Her War Veterans," American Society of Planning Officials Planning (1949), pp. 198-201; Somerville, "Planning Wartime Communities" and "Site Planning for Wartime Housing."

Wartime Housing Ltd., Site Plans for Vancouver Projects 1, 2, and 3A, B and C, CVA, unclassified documents.

[Site Plan for WHL Project No. 3, North Vancouver], Oct. 5, 1942, CAA, McCarter Nairne Collection, Acc. No. 84A/80.18. Project No. 3 was in the Mosquito and Mackay Creeks area.

William Storrie of the engineering firm Gore and Storrie handled plans and specifications for roads, sewers, and water; WHL then let contracts for the work and employed supervising engineers to superintend construction; Thomson, p. 248.

The landscape architect H.B. Dunnington-Grubb advised WHL on landscaping matters, and Burwell Coon directed the contracted work from head office; Thomson, p. 248. Dunnington-Grubb lectured in landscape design at the University of Toronto School of Architecture; "Contributors to This Issue," RAIC Journal, Vol. XIX, No. 9 (Sept., 1942), p. 196.

Examples are Lowell in the U.S., Essen in Germany, and Saltaire, Port Sunlight and Bourneville in Britain.


42 Ibid., pp. 178, 184-85; Haggen, pp. 218-19; Grimmer, p. 219; Stelter, pp. 42-43.


44 In North Vancouver, WHL made Dr. D.J. Millar chairman of the local advisory committee when Norman Robinson arrived to initiate a housing development; see, *Province*, Sept. 5, 1941, p. 5. To date, no evidence has been found to confirm that such a committee existed in Richmond, which may help to explain the uneasy relationship between WHL and the Richmond municipal government.


46 PC1286, Feb. 24, 1941.

47 Mansur to Campbell, Aug. 28, 1946.

48 Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, *Annual Report*, 1952, p. 21. Joe Pigott thought the sale of this housing "a tremendous waste of money through selling these properties at a loss" when he had carefully worked out WHL rentals to provide a net earning, to make possible the disposal of units after 10 years, and still to recover company costs; see, Pigott to J. de N. Kennedy, Jan. 3, 1949, PAC, RG28, Ser. A1, Vol. 7; Minutes, Annual Meeting of WHL Shareholders, May 29, 1945, pp. 3-4, PAC, RG83, Vol. 70, Minutes, Vol. 2.
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49 For example, see Hansard, Vol. III (1942), p. 2568. CCF MP A.M. Nicholson gave the average cost of a WHL house in Hull as $3,379, according to a return brought down in the House of Commons; another return gave the average cost of a NHA-financed house as $3,750.

50 "First Report of Subcommittee No.1," p. 542. The report noted that local improvement expenditures amounted to $705 per housing unit.

51 Ibid., p. 540. The ranges for WHL and NHA monthly payments were respectively $22 to $30 and $20.38 and $26.50. As explained above in footnote 48, WHL calculated its rentals for 10 years, while NHA's amortization period was 20 years.


53 Interestingly, the committee also suggested: (1) a nation-wide campaign using volunteer workers to find surplus accommodation for home-seekers; (2) a conversion plan for older single family homes; and (3) the construction of permanent homes under NHA in urban centres experiencing housing shortages; see "First Report of Subcommittee No.1," p. 543.


55 Curtis Report, pp. 107, 113.

56 Ibid., p. 263, Table 62. In 5 combined cities (Halifax, Peterborough, Hamilton, Windsor and North Vancouver), 43.6% of WHL tenants had previously paid rentals up to $20 and 28.4% had paid $21 to $25.


60 H. Marsh, p. 20.


62 Ibid., p. 3; H. Marsh, p. 25.


64 Ibid.

65 Marsh, p. 25. Scott, an Englishman of about 40 when he worked for WHL, was educated in London, Vienna, Munich and Paris, moved to Dayton, Ohio, in 1928, and eventually set up his own consulting business in housing and decorating in Toronto. He developed a singular expertise in connecting psychology and sociology with environmental design.

66 Wright, p. 178.

67 H. Marsh; Scott, "Community Housing," and "Some Facts about Community Centres."

68 Minutes, Annual Meeting of WHL Shareholders, May 29, 1945, p. 4, PAC, RG83, Vol. 70, Minutes, Vol. 2. Pigott thought the "money well spent" and "producing good results."

69 H.V. Collins was the counsellor in North Vancouver; Sun, Oct. 3, 1942, Mag. Sect., p. 11.

70 These activities included pre-natal clinics, kindergartens, play schools, garden clubs, craft groups, grandmothers' clubs, sports, Red Cross committees, choirs, stamp collectors' clubs, orchestras, credit unions, and so on. Scott estimated that of these activities 32.2% focused on babies, children, and young people, 16% on health and welfare, 12.7% on community service and war work, 12% on sports, 11.6% on miscellaneous adult activities, 9% on education and study groups, and 6.5% on social functions; Scott, "Some Facts about Community Centres," p. 24. For a film record of some of these activities, see the documentary "Wartime Housing."

71 North Vancouver and Burkeville both had community centres. Burkeville's was (and is) a converted barn; see News-Herald, Nov. 6, 1943, p. 3. The North Vancouver centre was sold off in 1947; see, "Community Centres, Report of Disposition of Buildings and Operations," Nov. 15, 1947, RG56, Vol. 59, File 2-31; see also, Sun, Oct. 6, 1947, p. 15.
72 CVA holds *Home Life and Community Interests*, Vol. III, Nos. 2-6 [1942], Vol. IV, Nos. 1, 3, and 6 [1943], and Vol. V, No. 1 [1944]. It also has a few issues of the North Vancouver project's magazine; see *High Tide*, Vol. 1, Nos. 1-4 (May 15 - Aug. 21, 1943).

73 Kennedy, Vol. I., Sec. II, pp. 485-86; see also, Curtis Report, pp. 36-37, 264-65; Thomson, pp. 235-38.

74 WHL maintained nation-wide uniformity in these agreements subsequent to working out a suitable basis for them with the Quebec provincial Cabinet in July, 1941; see Thomson, p. 237.


78 Hansard, Vol. IV (1941 - 1942), pp. 3844-47.


88 Correspondence re: WHL Project in New Glasgow, N.S., June, 1941, PAC, RG19, Vol. 2734.


90 Cornett to J.W. Fry, Mayor of Edmonton, July 30, 1943, CVA, 34-C-1, Vol. 56, 1943, File on Housing.

91 "City Officials Inspect Wartime Housing Site," [unidentified newspaper clipping], April 14, 1943, CVA, Newspaper Clippings, M8453.

92 "Housing Official Back," [unidentified newspaper clipping], April 24, 1943, CVA, Newspaper clippings, M4289-2.


94 Correspondence re: Burkeville school issue, in Richmond, Corporation of the Township, Clerk's Department Records, File 2216; Sun, June 29, 1945, p. 4. Pigott acknowledged WHL's difficulties with Richmond in Minutes, Annual Meeting of WHL Shareholders, May 29, 1945, p. 5, PAC, RG83, Vol. 70, Minutes, Vol. 2.

95 See above, p. 48.

96 North Vancouver, City, Council, Minutes, No. 16 (1942 - 1945), March 20, 1944, p. 137, item 9.

97 Ibid., May 25, 1943, p. 75, item 5.


102 Sun, April 29, 1942, p. 17, and June 18, 1943, p. 16; Province, June 18, 1943, p. 1.

103 These associations were groups of small builders. The national organization was founded in 1943. Later, it became the Housing and Urban Development Association of Canada (HUDAC). See, Financial Post, June 4, 1983.


105 During the war, Quality Homes Corporation and Vancouver Titles Ltd. encountered problems getting loans from mortgage companies because the companies feared that shortages in materials might delay the completion of house construction. They proposed a plan to city council for building low-cost housing and asked for equal priorities on building materials once war needs were met, support from lending institutions, and NHA authorities, and endorsement and tax sale lots from the city. See Quality Homes Corporation and Vancouver Titles Limited, "A Plan to Build 1000 Low Cost Houses in Vancouver Annually," 1942, CVA, Photograph Collection, 163-1.

106 Sun, June 9, 1942, p. 13, and June 10, 1944, p. 2.


111 Federationist, March 18, 1943, p. 3.


113 Ibid., Sept. 30, 1945, p. 3; Province, Aug. 27, 1945, p. 19.


CONCLUSION

By 1944, a tremendous demand for housing, particularly for low income groups, existed in Canada. Coincidentally, the federal government demonstrated its expertise in the direct provision of war workers' and veterans' housing. Why, then, did the government not convert Wartime Housing Ltd. (WHL) into a permanent low-rental housing agency after World War II? As the first Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) president D.B. Mansur speculated in 1945, the government could have created in the Department of Reconstruction and Supply a national public housing authority separate from CMHC that fully utilized WHL's experience in the housing field. Conceivably, this national authority could have met low income housing needs by several alternative means including direct supply and indirect financial assistance.

Late in 1947, C.D. Howe, the minister responsible for CMHC, summed up the federal government's position on housing. He clearly stated that the government would not countenance the long-term direct provision of housing except in emergencies. According to Howe, the "fundamental
principle" of Dominion policy was the government's commitment "to create more favourable credit conditions that would encourage residential construction."\(^4\) The Dominion Housing Act, the Home Improvement Plan, and the 1938 National Housing Act (NHA) established the principle of indirect intervention in home building before the war; the 1944 NHA reaffirmed it.

Howe justified the federal position on a constitutional basis. The Dominion pursued indirect intervention "since housing is a function of property and civil rights, a matter within the jurisdiction of provincial and municipal governments."\(^5\) In addition, "subsidization of low-rental housing...is rightly a responsibility of municipal and provincial authorities" for "they are the parties directly responsible for social welfare."\(^6\) Thus, although the federal government had radically intervened in the nation's accommodation under its wartime powers, normally constitutional reasons precluded it from being held accountable for housing. Still, Howe admitted that the low-rental housing problem was "of such magnitude that no one level of government can see it through."\(^7\) The solution would be the active co-operation of all three governments. The Dominion was "anxious to work out with the provinces and municipalities a basis for handling the long-term problem."\(^8\)

In fact, the constitutional argument conveniently
excused federal action on low income housing much as it had delayed the introduction of unemployment relief. While the Dominion government resisted direct participation on the grounds of constitutional responsibility, in practice it has intervened unequivocally and permanently in housing since World War II. CMHC still owns and manages rental units turned over to it nearly forty years ago by Housing Enterprises of Canada Ltd. Certainly, the federal government has played the most active and visible public role in the housing sphere since the war's end. Some observers have argued that, if motivated, the government could have surmounted the jurisdictional difficulty. Without doubt, other factors discouraged the Dominion's entry into the public housing field.

To some extent, the resolution of a 1944 - 1945 bureaucratic conflict between the Departments of Finance and of Reconstruction and Supply determined federal policy. Originating in earlier disagreements about WHL, the struggle concerned the type of government intervention in rental housing; as well, it represented a conflict between the "market welfare" and "social welfare" approaches to housing. Confident of private enterprise's capability and fearful of socialism, Finance officials argued for indirect federal participation in supplying rental housing through the 1944 NHA: federally-assisted limited dividend companies
could build the low-rental housing called for in the Curtis report. By contrast, Reconstruction officials like WHL president Joe Pigott acknowledged the private sector's inability to supply low-rental housing and advocated long-term direct federal intervention. Yet, while Finance minister J.L. Ilsley and his officials shared the same position, Howe did not adhere to Pigott's viewpoint. He was not opposed to WHL's construction of permanent rental housing, but, at the same time, he expected the crown company's eventual liquidation.

The adversaries made at least two attempts to settle the conflict. During the winter of 1944 - 1945, Reconstruction and Supply proposed assuming Finance's responsibility for rental housing, slum clearance, and urban renewal provisions covered by the 1944 NHA. The Department's intention was to establish a housing section administering low and moderate income rental projects. Joe Pigott would be director of housing development. No doubt, WHL would have reported to this new housing section. However, Howe and Ilsley failed to negotiate an arrangement satisfactory to both parties. They could not agree on the division of financial responsibility for rental schemes. As well, Ilsley fretted about the possible advancement of socialism under Pigott's administration. Howe, who was more interested in
meeting the housing demand than in political philosophy, regarded WHL as a more effective rental housing program than the "unworkable" NHA schemes. Finally, he suggested to Ilsley that Finance retain the NHA's entire administration. Pigott left WHL a few months later. His resignation removed from the conflict the strongest proponent of permanent direct federal participation.

Later in the same year, a committee composed of officials from Finance and Reconstruction and Supply reconsidered the practicability of reallocating housing authority between the two departments. However, the committee's central concern was to co-ordinate all government housing operations. Committee members accordingly recommended to Howe and Ilsley the consolidation of all programs into one department reporting to a single minister. Howe and Ilsley accepted this proposal, and they entrusted the task of consolidation to Finance's new creation, Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation.

The conflict's final resolution came about within CMHC. The corporation's major functions and objectives reflected Finance's perception of the Dominion's role in housing. CMHC's job was to administer NHA activities and to provide discounting facilities for lending institutions. Its main purpose was "to stimulate private enterprise to serve as large an area as possible of the housing field,
thus reducing the pressure for publicly assisted housing.\textsuperscript{24} Then, in 1946, after the overburdened Ilsley handed responsibility for CMHC to Howe,\textsuperscript{25} the corporation developed a more directly interventionist short-term solution to the post-war housing emergency; it devised its veterans' rental housing plan. At the same time, fearing that it would permanently remain the landlord of thousands of rental units, CMHC began to sell WHL and veterans' houses to its tenants.\textsuperscript{26} Thus, the conflict's outcome by 1947 was Howe's stated policy of long-range indirect intervention oriented towards the market and temporary direct participation aimed at social need.

Another significant factor underlying federal policy was the consensus between the Finance Department and the business community about the Dominion government's role in the housing field.\textsuperscript{27} Private sector organizations like the influential Dominion Mortgage and Investments Association and Finance shared many convictions: the industry could meet the enormous need for shelter; the national housing schemes should provide employment and stabilize the economy during both the depression and reconstruction; the Dominion should not participate directly in housing; the federal government should make home ownership more attractive to more citizens through increased financial assistance; the government should also encourage rental housing construction with
financial help to builders and limited dividend corporations; and the Dominion should only involve itself in public housing indirectly with the close co-operation of the provincial and municipal governments.

Yet, the relationship between business and Finance went beyond shared attitudes. For example, organizations representing lending institutions and builders submitted briefs to government. As well, Finance requested insurance companies to form Housing Enterprises of Canada Ltd., a limited dividend company for moderate-rental housing construction, and it consulted with business over drafting legislation. The industry and the Finance Department had developed their accord in the 1930s and reaffirmed it in the 1940s. This consensus determined that the main thrust of government involvement in housing would be indirectly interventionist and market-oriented.

This interpretation of the relationship between Finance and business confirms the analyses of other observers. Although it skirts the issue of class struggle, the investigation substantiates Alvin Finkel's conclusions about the interconnection of government and the construction industry. As well, the examination reinforces and augments the assessments of Humphrey Carver and Tom Gunton: federal commitment to private enterprise prevented permanent direct government provision of housing. Finally, the enquiry
finds itself in agreement with Lawrence B. Smith, a housing specialist associated with the Fraser Institute and an opponent of direct public intervention. Smith acknowledges (approvingly) that the 1935 - 1954 federal housing policy "sought to encourage the private sector rather than to replace it with direct government involvement."\(^3\)

Protest groups also contributed to the evolution of federal housing policy. Finkel has argued that during the depression "radical alternative" groups like the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), the trade union movement, the farmers' organizations, and Social Credit lacked sufficient power and organization to influence government decision-making.\(^3\) By 1944 - 1945, well-constituted protest groups like the CCF, the Labor Progressive Party, the trade unions, and various community and housing associations exercised greater strength. Indeed, by 1943, the CCF presented a dynamic political challenge to both the Liberals and the Conservatives, and, in 1945, returned servicemen exerted no small influence on the government.

Yet, as the Vancouver case study illustrates, differing goals among the protest groups allowed the federal government to defuse agitation without ever resolving the long-term housing problem.\(^3\) The government offered remedial
reforms like WHL projects to ease the 1944 - 1947 emergency. The powerful organizations interested in veterans' needs were content with these temporary measures. Other groups like the CCF that wanted more fundamental changes in housing policies were dissatisfied. Still, while the CCF's popularity in 1944 caused the Liberal administration to introduce other social welfare measures, it could not force the government to relinquish its firmly entrenched, market-directed approach to housing. Nevertheless, the CCF continued to press the government for a national housing program emphasizing low-rental projects. Eventually, the 1949 NHA amendment introducing the federal-provincial partnership in rental housing resulted. This, too, was a remedial reform which never met the low income housing need. Throughout the life of the federal-provincial partnership, Ottawa remained committed primarily to policies that fostered home ownership and promoted private enterprise.

Finally, the general ambivalence of Canadians about home ownership may have helped to account for housing policy developments at the war's end. Probably, the majority favoured ownership, but, perhaps fearful of post-war depression, many prospective owners believed that they could not afford to buy a house. In 1941, while more dwellings were owner-occupied than rented throughout Canada, the reverse was the case in urban areas. As a Vancouver survey
indicated, most renters preferred to own; nevertheless, the affordability problem discouraged them from buying and caused them to support low-rental housing projects. Doubtlessly, in 1944 - 1945, the Liberal government shrewdly calculated that its long-term program of indirect intervention promoting home ownership and its short-term plan of direct participation supplying rental housing would match the hesitant mood of Canadian voters.

Thus, for several reasons, the federal government did not reconstitute WHL as a permanent low-rental housing agency following the Second World War. Ordinarily, federal officials excused the Dominion from playing a more aggressive role in the housing field on constitutional grounds. Yet, there were other explanations. The resolution of a bureaucratic conflict between the Finance and the Reconstruction and Supply Departments and the consensus among Finance officials and the business community determined the direction of public intervention in the housing field. As well, the divisions among groups agitating for improved housing conditions and the ambivalence of many Canadians towards both home ownership and low-rental housing allowed the federal government to introduce remedial rather than more fundamental reforms. These explanations together indicate the government's firm and continuing commitment to the "market welfare" viewpoint and its reluctant and
temporary recognition of social need. Only a major attitudinal shift to a "social welfare" approach would ever bring about any fundamental change in its housing policy. This market-oriented perspective has hindered advances in housing policy in the same way that for decades the poor law tradition had blocked government acceptance of unemployment relief.  

Historical literature about the origins of the Canadian social security system present a confused picture about housing policy's relationship to the welfare state. Dennis Guest includes housing legislation in his survey of depression and wartime social welfare advances. However, he asserts that, in the 1940s, the main thrust of Canadian housing policy pointed towards home ownership and private enterprise. The veterans' housing program supplemented this principal objective. Housing policy continued to neglect the needs of low income families. According to Alvin Finkel, housing figured as an element in the welfare state's groundwork laid in the 1930s. Nevertheless, the interconnection of government and construction industry interests dictated remedial, not fundamental, social reform. In other words, Guest and Finkel view housing as part of the welfare state, and yet both see housing policy as market-related.

The evidence presented in this thesis dispels the
confusion. Although the federal government could have included housing in the emerging social welfare system through a WHL-inspired low-rental agency, it did not. The attitudinal changes making possible wartime advances in social security simply did not carry over to the housing field in any lasting way. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, long-range housing policy remained market-oriented rather than need-related. In housing matters, the welfare state was a "market welfare" state. Accordingly, WHL represented a successful but temporary experiment in publicly-built housing, and the 1944 NHA was not part of the burst of wartime social legislation. Instead, NHA assisted in the introduction of Keynesian theory to Canadian economic policy: the government regarded housing as a stabilization tool to ease the country through the reconstruction period. Experts writing in the 1970s confirm this analysis of housing and the welfare state. Michael Dennis and Susan Fish, who support the "social welfare" approach, assert that the federal government used housing as a stabilization tool, and they decry inadequate government action on pre-1972 low income housing. L.B. Smith, a proponent of the "market welfare" philosophy, applauds the 1940s and 1950s market-directed policies and repudiates the 1970s need-oriented programs.

In 1944 - 1945, the Canadian government had the
opportunity of implementing the Curtis report's major recommendation - a comprehensive, planned national housing program emphasizing low income accommodation. When it created CMHC, the government could as easily have channelled WHL's expertise into the constitution of a national low-rental housing agency. A single federal authority could have administered and co-ordinated both agencies and initiated a comprehensive nation-wide housing plan. Instead, the government disregarded the Curtis report's suggestion and maintained its pre-war commitment to private enterprise and home ownership. In retrospect, federal affirmation of the "market welfare" approach has restricted state activity in public and social housing and precluded the introduction of a national housing plan for forty years. Only a shift in attitude fully recognizing the social need for housing will bring about any significant change in federal policy.
Footnotes

1 Inexperience is often used to explain government delay in introducing social reform. James Struthers dismisses this explanation with respect to unemployment relief in No Fault of Their Own; Unemployment and the Canadian Welfare State, 1914 - 1941 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983), p. 210. Lack of experience cannot be used to excuse federal disinclination in 1944-1945 towards involvement in low-rental housing.

2 D.B. Mansur to W.A. Mackintosh, July 30, 1945, Public Archives of Canada [hereafter PAC], RG64, Ser. 1030, Box 700, File 25-1-4.


4 Ibid., p. 217.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid., p. 220.

7 Ibid., p. 221.

8 Ibid.

9 Struthers, pp. 209-10.

10 Howe also asserted that community planning was "primarily a provincial responsibility"; C.D. Howe, "Community Planning in Canada," Royal Architectural Institute of Canada Journal, Vol. XXIII, No. 11 (Nov., 1946), p. 267. On the other hand, Tom Gunton has argued that "in practice all levels of government have exercised planning powers"; see "Origins of Canadian Urban Planning," City Magazine, Vol. VI, No. 1 (Spring, 1983), p. 32. A good Vancouver example of federal planning is Granville Island.

11 Here I refer to CMHC-owned housing on West Broadway and West Fourth Avenues, Vancouver, built by Housing Enterprises of Canada, Ltd.

12 Gunton, p. 32.


16 An example is the controversy over Hamilton's WHL housing. Howe was able to accept Finance's viewpoint over Pigott's if Finance objected; see Dr. W.C. Clark to Donald Gordon, Nov. 9, 1942, and C.D. Howe to J.L. Ilsley, Nov. 2, 1942, PAC, RG19, Vol. 3980, File H-1-15.


18 Correspondence re: Division of Responsibility of the National Housing Program as between the Departments of Finance and Reconstruction, Nov. 30, 1944 to March 12, 1945, PAC, RG19, Vol. 709, File 203-1A-1.

19 Writers often describe Howe as one who had "an engineer's capacity to get things done" but an "ignorance and contempt of political theory"; see Bruce Hutchison, The Incredible Canadian (Toronto: Longmans, Green, 1952), p. 215.


24 Ibid., p.1. See also D.B. Mansur to W.A. Mackintosh, July 30, 1945, PAC, RG64, Ser. 1030, Box 700, File 25-1-4, p. 1.


31 See above, pp. 2-3.
32 Lawrence B. Smith, Anatomy of a Crisis; Canadian Housing Policy in the Seventies (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1977), p. 10.

33 Finkel, pp. 154-66.

34 Michael Dennis and Susan Fish, Programs in Search of a Policy; Low Income Housing in Canada (Toronto: Hakkert, 1972), pp. 1-15.

35 Canada, Statutes, 13 Geo. VI, c. 30 (1949), "An Act to Amend the National Housing Act, 1944." The idea of intergovernmental co-operation in providing low income housing dates back at least to 1914; Hurl, p. 43.


37 Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Eighth Census of Canada, 1941; Vol. IX: Housing (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1949), p. 95, Table 20. 56.7% of dwellings in Canada were owned, and 43.3% were rented. In urban areas, 41.2% were owned as opposed to 58.8% rented.

38 See above, p. 32.


40 Struthers, pp. 208-14.


42 Finkel, pp. 1-4, 100-16.


44 See above, pp. 62-63.

45 Dennis and Fish, pp. 2-4.

46 Smith, pp. 3-4, 9-12, 15, 34.
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