PERCEPTIONS OF AN IMPERIAL CRISIS: CANADIAN REACTIONS TO THE "SEPOY MUTINY", 1857-8

by

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Abstract

In 1857 many native civilians and soldiers in northern India rebelled against British rule. The so-called "Sepoy Mutiny" sparked a world-wide debate about the nature of British imperialism and about the character of its Asian subjects. This study examines the scope and causes of reactions in the United Province of Canada, the "senior" colony of the Empire.

Contemporary newspapers are the main historical resource for both explicit reactions and implicit imagery about the conflict. All the perceptions were based on prejudices which pre-dated 1857. The war did not create any new images or even alter existing ones. Rather, it seemed to prove what Canadians had thought about India all along.

The main issues were the "character" of the Indians, the nature of British imperial government, the causes and justice of the revolt, the morality of the "atrocities" and of reprisals and, implicitly, what the war meant for Canada. All Canadians shared the racist assumption that Europeans were superior to coloured people. On every other issue Canada's anglophone and francophone communities differed sharply. English-Canadians rallied to the flag; French Canada responded with its traditional anti-British, isolationist perspective, a legacy of the Conquest of 1759.

The culminating reaction was that many British-Canadians volunteered to fight in India. Westminster responded by founding the 100th Royal Canadian Regiment. The first colonial regiment raised specifically for imperial service, it was meant to be the first step
in a conscious effort to tighten imperial unity. The plan was the product of a momentary crisis mentality which did not deflect the long term trend toward imperial de-centralization.

English-Canadians and French-Canadians saw almost every aspect of the war from different perspectives. Ethnic cleavage, far more than sectarian or class rivalry, was the distinctive feature of Canada's reactions to the "Mutiny".
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I dedicate this thesis to my fiancée, Jennifer McKim, who has lived with the thing for as long as she has known me, and who has been patient, helpful, and supportive the whole time.
INTRODUCTION

No bayonets flashed in the morning sun, no colours snapped defiantly in the lead. Their uniforms were disgraceful - the stuff had been mouldering in storage for twenty years at least, some said since the War of 1812 - and the fall of their boots was a bit uneven. The band tootling such un-martial favourites as "The Old Folks at Home" and "The Girl I Left Behind Me" was borrowed from another regiment. None of that mattered, though, to those townsfolk who waved or cheered or shouted encouragement to the scarlet ranks tramping through old Quebec. On this day, June 25, 1858, there was no prouder battalion anywhere in the Empire. This was Canada's "own", the 100th Prince of Wales' Royal Canadian Regiment of Foot. Brand-new, the first colonial regiment in the British Army, it was headed overseas.

Down at the docks, waiting to take them to England, was the steamship, "Indian". It was aptly named, for India was why they were there. Oh, the men joined up for their own reasons, recruits always have. Private Gorman dreamed of glory. Ensign Boulton wanted to see more of the world. Private "Hunter" - it was an alias - wanted to see no more of his wife. Lieutenant de Bellefeuille had his family's name to uphold. Private Lenny, serial number 851, should have been there, too, but he was not: a courtmartial got to hear about his ambitions. What made them all Royal Canadians was a savage little war half-way around the world. The "Sepoy Mutiny", a year old but still
raging on, was already known as a fabulous epic: greased cartridges and blowing from guns; the heroism at Delhi and the horror of Cawnpore; John Nicholson, Henry Havelock, and the Rani of Jhansi; the glory; the shame.... The war brought the regiment into being. As the first drafts marched away everyone still thought that India was where they would show what colonials were made of.

II

The question is not why Canadians joined the army. An individual might choose to fight for any country under the sun but his decision would have no national or historic significance. The question is not really even why they were wanted. Great Britain needed men for its war and there were men to be had in North America. London had other reasons, too, but that was cause enough.

The real question is did Canadian society sanction its young men going to fight so far from the home hearths, and why? A regiment might be no more than a bundle of individual motives but society gives it approval, gives it a purpose, gives it its marching orders. This sanction separates the soldier from the brigand. Sometimes the cause is a real threat to national interests or even to the state's survival, at other times it is an emotional or philosophical issue. This study seeks to trace the sources, type, and extent of the sanction to let Canada's youths fight Great Britain's wars.

Month after month bad news arrived from the East. All the while, Canadians were forming images of Asia: what Indians were like, what the
East India Company was like, what the fighting was all about. The sanction to get involved was the direct result of contrasting images, the near-blameless British versus the black-hearted heathens. The core of this essay, therefore, is the matter of image.

"Image" is a "Simile, metaphor; mental representation; idea, conception; character of thing or person as perceived by the public." No need to mystify the subject: as used here, "image" means "public opinion". Like opinion, image may be right or it may be wrong. Usually it just approximates reality. The definition is nice because it equates image to metaphor. One of the characteristic responses to the war was to see superficial similarities between India and Canada, to try to shoehorn Indian lessons into our domestic quarrels.

English-Canadians and French-Canadians rarely saw eye to eye on anything, it seems, especially imperial affairs. Not only did both sides use Indian metaphors against the other, but both also formed different images of certain aspects of the crisis. To understand the welter of images conjured by Canadians it is necessary to explore the Province's social cleavages, something this paper returns to time and time again.

Of course, the Mutiny was an imperial matter, which raises a line of questioning quite separate from imagery. England had to give its sanction, too, if Canadian enthusiasm was to be transformed into a fighting unit. In this case, British public opinion was not important; it was a decision of cabinet. Therefore, part of this paper looks at the British "sanction" as imperial policy: what did Whitehall want and what did the mechanics of founding the regiment say about imperial
relationships at that time?

The construction of this essay reflects the nature of the Empire. Much of this is about Canada's relationship with Great Britain, rather than with India, because the Empire was essentially a collection of separate bilateral arrangements between London and various colonies. Most of the colonies had nothing to do with each other: Canada shared nothing with India except British suzerainty. In 1857 the Province did not actively respond to India at all. We had a close relationship with England and the English dealt with India. Tremors from the East rattled London and we responded to that.

III

Canada's response to the war has a wider significance than just the founding of a regiment or the formation of transitory images. Its lessons can be applied to other times, to other places, and fills an important gap in Mutiny literature.

The summer of 1857 to the summer of 1858 was not a "typical" year - Canadians did not normally pay any attention to India - but it was a time when an impression of the East was seared into our consciousness. Old assumptions were tested, uncomfortable questions were asked, and new opinions were moulded. All these were done in a spirit of crisis. A question is thus raised: did the images fade with the headlines or did they live on to fundamentally set our perceptions of the East? Unfortunately, the scope of this study precludes a definitive answer. However, evidence suggests that the British view
of Indians hardened during the Mutiny and remained fossilized until well into this century. British policy followed suit, and when General Dyer ordered his troops to gun down hundreds of demonstrators at Amritsar in 1919 he was remembering the outbreak more than sixty years before. Surely Canadians, with less need to keep an eye on changes in Asia, had even less reason to change their minds. The legacy of 1857 probably lived on for decades in this country.  

The literature on worldwide contemporary responses to the Mutiny is remarkably sparse, even for England. The only significant collection of works on this subject is *Rebellion 1857: A Symposium*, edited by P.C. Joshi. Contributions deal with British, French, Italian, Russian, and Chinese reactions, all from a Marxist perspective emphasizing peasant and worker solidarity with the rebels. That thesis is unconvincing in all of them and the embryonic state of Canada's working-class makes the theme untenable for this study. More applicable is the recurrent finding that the bourgeoisie in each country interpreted the news from India from a nationalist perspective, stressing whatever accorded with their own histories or philosophies. The French, for instance, tended to side with the sepoys as an extension of France's anti-English nationalism. That particular example had an exact counterpart in Canada.

It is rather remarkable that the literature contains, say, the Italian reaction to the Mutiny, but no one has looked at what the "white" settlement colonies thought about it. After all, aside from Great Britain, Canada was the only place in the world which did more than just talk about the crisis. The other colonies were just as
interested and would have done the same if they had been asked to. 

Aside from a few purely domestic issues, the lessons of this study can probably be applied to other settlement colonies, including places as distant as Australia or South Africa. No doubt the images were the same because the assumptions—about coloured peoples, the worth of the Empire, and so on—are the same.

IV

Canada was the "senior" settlement colony of the British Empire. With more than two-and-a-half million people it dwarfed the rest. Still, it was small-time. Confederation with the Maritime colonies was a full decade away and seemed further; exploiting the vast North-West was still just a Toronto fantasy. The United Province of Canada constituted no more than today's Ontario and Quebec. This study is strictly limited to those two places.

The Province was fairly insular compared to, say, the Maritimes, whose seaborne trade spanned the world. It looked inward, its ambition was to carve out its own continental "empire" by peopling the North American wilds. Foreign affairs mostly meant keeping a wary eye on the Yankees.

Rural life dominated the Province. Clearing the forest was still the main thing for most people, though good land was running out. Urbanization was just beginning. Montreal, with close to one hundred thousand people; Toronto, about half as big; and Quebec, were the only real cities. Things were changing fast, though, in the wake of a
"boom" economy and a huge influx of immigrants. The number of workers in "industrial employment" nearly doubled in ten years, reaching one hundred and forty-five thousand in 1861. Inevitable class tensions rose, no doubt worsened by the short but deep depression in 1857-8. A few radical non-socialist newspapers such as L'Avenir or William Lyon Mackenzie's The Toronto Weekly Message catered to the disaffected. The radicals were staunchly anti-imperialist. Whether they truly reflected the views of the workers is hard to know. James Bryne's valuable analysis of British working-class reactions to the Mutiny assumes so. It seems unlikely that Canadian proletarian political consciousness was developed highly enough to foster solidarity with the rebel sepoys, especially after undeniable atrocities. Anyway, the workers were so few that the radical press could be said to be their spokesmen without it making much dent on the conclusions.

What made Canada unique was not so much class struggle as ethnic and religious trouble. As one politician said, "We have three populations in Lower Canada, the French Canadians, the Irish Catholics and the British Protestants." That was just as true for the Province overall. Although a minority, Britishers dominated the place: its economy, its politics, its civil appointments, and the top of the social pyramid. Most numerous in the west, they were disproportionately powerful in the east, too. That was the bastion of the French-Canadians, still the largest ethnic group in the country. Despite, or because of, the Conquest they had their own brand of nationalism, embodied in their language, laws, and religion. The victims of British imperialism, they were mildly anti-British and intensely isolationist.
This automatically set them against English-Canadians in an imperial emergency. Worse, they were Catholics in a country which had a middling kind of Protestant Ascendancy. Irish Catholics, also concentrated in the Lower Province, suffered more from this. Being Irish made them suspect anyway, but many English-Canadians - and Upper Canadian Irish Orangemen - also damned them as the dupes of Papist subversion. All in all, ethnic and religious divisions far overshadowed any incipient class struggle. In 1857 and 1858 Canada was even more divided than usual. An election, the quick collapse of two successive governments, followed by a dubious constitutional trick to entrench a third, widened the east-west, French-English split. Into this context landed the Mutiny debate.

The 1850's are neglected years in Canadian historiography. The struggle for Responsible Government was won, the build-up to Confederation had not yet begun. Writers have ignored the interval and for this period there is virtually no literature about Canadian thoughts on imperialism. Carl Berger's seminal *The Sense of Power*, a look at Canadian imperialist intellectuals, begins with Confederation, which surely injected a new sense of nationalism into the matter. He argues, in fact, that our imperialists were actually nationalists who saw the Empire as a vehicle by which Canada could quickly achieve greatness, a co-holder with Britain of much of the world. That was not the case in 1857. We were real colonials then. We wrapped ourselves in the Union Jack and felt suitably thrilled whenever England threw a few patronizing gestures our way.

J.M.S. Careless has said of the 1850's: "Canada, perhaps, never
before or since has been so British.\footnote{16} The huge influx of British immigrants in the first half of the century meant that a large and influential group of Canadians had not had time to shuck their British ideals for local ones. They were not nationalists because they felt that Great Britain and Canada were equally their home. A.W. Rasporich in "Imperial Sentiment in the Province of Canada during the Crimean War 1854-1856"\footnote{17} found that English-Canadians actually went beyond that: they romanticized the Empire into something nearly divine. He did not explain why but, to return to Careless' theme for a moment, was it not natural for overseas Britons to nostalgically remember the Old Country and glorify the political structure that linked them to it still? "Little Englandism" was not popular in the colonies.\footnote{18} Such was the intellectual milieu of English Canada at the time of the Mutiny.

Rasporich's article is valuable because it analyzes Canada's reaction to another imperial war around the same time as the Indian troubles. His conclusion - that English-Canadians flaunted an exaggerated patriotism while francophones pragmatically professed their loyalty as a way of reducing suspicions about their political ambitions - sounds familiar.\footnote{19} His methodology provokes some questions, though. He gives equal space to the Patriotic Fund, addresses to the Queen, celebrations at the fall of Sebastopol and on the day of prayer, and, finally, to the newspaper image of French and Russian autocracy. All had their equivalents in 1857 but there is a problem. Most were official functions, for which there is an etiquette of things one says or does not say. An address to the Queen is always patriotic; a sermon is always a sermon. One has to be rather picky to see any
difference between the right thing said in Toronto and the right thing said in Quebec. Victory celebrations hold the same trap. They are always good for a party and a bit of jingoism, but so is any other excuse: the fall of Delhi and completion of a trans-Atlantic cable a few months later sparked identical celebrations.

A victory bonfire does not very well express the quibbles and shades of opinion in issues, nor does it trace the clash of old biases with new facts, nor does it show how ideas grow out of social conditions, nor, indeed, does it even say why anyone thought the event was important. These sorts of things are the stuff of history. A much better source, the foundation of this paper, is the journalism of the day. Despite interpretive problems, newspapers provide the historian with a wealth of data, reasons, insights, and images, along with the usual complement of nonsense and personal quarrels masquerading as debate. For an image study, such as this one, journalism has an extra importance. In the 1850's, newspapers were the image-makers.
NOTES

1. A fuller introduction to the Mutiny will be found in Chapter 1.


3. Until 1948 or 1949 Mr. Stanley Delhi-Force Tytler was a living reminder of the way things were. He was born amid the squalor and disease and fighting of the Ridge and miraculously survived his infancy. He was the last known survivor of the Mutiny, dying at Vancouver, aged ninety-one. See Richard Collier, The Indian Mutiny, Fontana Books, London, 1963, p. 312.


5. The trouble is that workers rarely left written records so historians have to make-do with scanty evidence. This is so even in the most valuable contribution, James Byrne's "British Opinion and the Indian Revolt", pp. 291-312. Byrne derived working-class sentiments almost solely from either The Reynold's Newspaper, a non-socialist radical journal, or from a former Chartist, Ernest Jones, who wrote most of the newspaper's articles. Yu Sheng-Wu and Chang Chen-Kun, "China and India in the Mid-19th Century", pp. 337-352, strain credulity. Based on a few cryptic references to dark-skinned foreigners they claim that Indians and Chinese aided one another in joint anti-imperialist struggle by simultaneously fighting the Mutiny and the Second Opium War and that revolutionary-minded sepoys later joined with the Taipings in a sort of all-Asia liberation war.

6. The phenomenon of nationalist squabbling among the world-wide bourgeois is a tenet of Marxism, of course. In 1857 it was apparently true. Some analyses emphasize the middle-class reaction. The best is Edward M. Spiers, The Army and Society 1815-1914, Longman, London, 1980, pp. 121-144. As the title implies, this study emphasizes military matters such as reprisals, generalship, and enlistment. He has found evidence of significant differences in the private opinions of British middle-class thinkers but a near unanimity in their public utterances: those opposed to the spirit of vengeance prudently held their tongues. He extended this conclusion to all classes, describing men like Ernest Jones as isolated, if courageous, individuals who were bucking the popular spirit of their fellows. Middle-class writers often veered from opinion to opinion during the course of the war. The Times, The History of the Times, The Times, London, 1939, vol. II, pp. 309-319, would like one to believe that that was because this most influential paper switched its policies during the war. It is a self-serving argument, advanced to relieve the editor of The Times
of responsibility for the vengeance spirit and not entirely convincing because it rests on personalities.

7. Lord Panmure, Minister for War, wrote of colonial recruitment: "Your Majesty's servants are informed that many men may be obtained, especially in the Australian colonies, by this step." See Panmure to the Queen, Feb. 1, 1858, in Sir George Douglas and Sir George Dalhousie Ramsay, The Panmure Papers, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1908, vol. II, pp. 473-474. As it was, Australian militiamen replaced British garrisons there so that the regulars could go to India. In fact, the Duke of Cambridge worried that there would not be enough soldiers left to back up governmental authority! The Cape was commended for providing cavalry horses without the usual profiteering. In every colony men volunteered to serve in the war: Canada was special only because the British took up our offer.

8. As of July 1857 Canada was reported to have had 2,571,437 people. By comparison, Victoria, the most populous of the Australian colonies, had only 414,000 and New Zealand a mere 130,000. See The New Era, September 17, 1857.

9. This study does not include the Maritimes. Incidentally, though, two Nova Scotian papers, The Acadian Recorder (Halifax) and The Yarmouth Herald, were researched. On substantive issues they were broadly similar to Canadian journals. They paid a lot more attention to the West Indies, though. They frequently fleshed out their mutiny news with sailors' tales of the East, not necessarily making their news more accurate but certainly making it more colourful.


11. The economy surged from about 1853 until a world-wide "crash" in 1857-8 and then resumed growing in the '60's. The depression was to have some impact on colonial recruitment. Between 1851 and 1861 immigration jumped the population 37 percent, mostly in Upper Canada. Ibid., p. 259.

12. Stanley B. Ryerson, Unequal Union: Confederation and the Roots of Conflict in the Canadas, 1815-1873, Progress Books, Toronto, 1868, pp. 268-269. The figure was based on a census but precisely what "industrial employment" constituted is open to interpretation.

13. James Byrne in P.C. Joshi, pp. 291-312. Byrne's conclusions about the sentiments of British workers may be transferable to their Canadian counterparts. L'Avenir or The Toronto Weekly Message said much the same sort of thing as the radical papers he quotes in his essay. However, his main source, The Reynold's Newspaper, was rarely, if ever, cited in our journals.
14. Christopher Dunkin, 1865, quoted in Lower, p. 265. This social composition was unique to Canada and so limits the applicability of some of our Mutiny experiences to the situations of other colonies.


18. The central debate about mid-century British imperialism revolves about whether or not "Little Englanders" - those who felt that the Empire was a burden that Britain should divest itself of - really altered diplomatic policy. It is generally accepted that the more they talked the more the colonists clung to the advantages of the Empire. Nothing in this study disputes that view.

19. There was more unanimity about the Crimean War than on the Mutiny, though, because in the former Britain and France were fighting side by side.

20. In Montreal both festivities had flags, a parade, an artillery salute, illuminations (Dolly's Chop House always getting lit up most exuberantly), and bonfires. The martial element seems to have been part of the genre. Alternatively, both events might have been considered patriotic British achievements, the telegraph tying us to the Old Country and all that. It is interesting that while English-Canadian places celebrated both quite joyously, Quebec's festivities were muted both times.
CHAPTER I

THE MUTINY AND THE IMAGE-MAKERS

Journalists were, in a sense, the first "historians" of the Mutiny. Even as the fighting raged on they interpreted its causes, course, and consequences. Their accounts were, naturally, coloured by the pre-conceptions and emotions of the day, and they were too close to the events to have had much historical perspective. Equally important, their stories were influenced by the institutions of the world-wide newspaper business. Some of these structural factors were unique to the war and had an enormous impact on imagery. How the world learned about the Mutiny explains a great deal about what it learned.

Before going on to track the news as it twisted through the news-rooms of the world, one has to look at what really happened in the war. Historical interpretations are, of course, forever changing: they suffer evaluation and re-evaluation, revision, replacement, and resurrection. Kaye and Malleson\(^1\) in the 1870's pioneered the standard British explanation that interference in native society sparked a military mutiny that had neither national appeal nor civilian backing. Since 1947 Indian historians such as Chattopadhyaya and Chaudhuri\(^2\) have forged an alternative. To them the war was a nationalist rebellion characterized by civilian involvement and co-operation between Hindus and Muslims in a common cause. The rift extends even to terminology,\(^3\) though there are signs of a developing synthesis. Such a synthesis is briefly presented here as a prelude to a look at the newspaper industry.
and its imagery.

India was a patchwork of native states and British domains. Paramount power over all of the subcontinent and the government of British India was the East India Company. Once it had been a rather piratical merchant firm but a very conservative ruler, meddling in native life only enough to siphon off the land's wealth. Over the years, though, reforms had transformed the Company into a government only, an arms-length agent of the British cabinet. English political fashions, against which the Company had never been truly immune, got increased access to the government and the old hands-off policy began to erode. From the 1830's on, the British began to re-make India in their own image. Utilitarian doctrines called for a wholesale sweeping-away of native traditions which stood in the way of economic "Progress". The rise of evangelical Protestantism demanded an aggressive policy against Hindu and Muslim "superstition".

The British good-naturedly blundered through the complexities of native society, saving widows from sati and travellers from Thugs and babies from infanticide, built canals and began railways, finagled land from "feudal" holders to give to the peasants, let in missionaries and founded schools to free youngsters from the errors of their forefathers. They swept away legal sanctions against Christian converts. They found excuses, usually native "mis-rule", to annex many of the princely states. With the best of intentions they broke the social relationships of centuries. Under Governor-General Dalhousie the process accelerated in the last years before the Mutiny.

Great Britain could not hold India by force alone. There were only
forty thousand British troops there. Power relied on the aid of collaborators, of which there was no shortage in the stew of princes, races, religions, and economic interests, that was India. Too many of the collaborators, though, became alienated by the reforms. Too often the reforms struck at the heart of the caste system, seemingly by design, and the people began to suspect that the Christians were trying to break caste, to force everyone to convert.

The most important collaborators were the native soldiers, the sepoys. Their loyalty was held by their pay, special privileges, and a sense of martial honour. But they were men of their villages so they felt that same growing distrust of British intentions that others felt. They had their own grievances, too: proselytizing colonels, Britons contemptuous of "niggers", army reform that stripped them of privileges and extra pay. In 1856 Oudh was annexed. Most sepoys were recruited there and their patriotic ire was roused by its high-handed theft from its princes. The final provocation was the famous greased cartridge. Word got around that the new ammunition was smeared with pig or cow fat in a deliberate plot to break caste. The Bengal Army recruited mostly high-castes, the very people most sensitive about their religious and social prerogatives. They finally refused to take any more interferences from the British.

In February 1857 a regiment refused the cartridges and was disbanded; in March another refused orders and it, too, was disbanded. At Meerut eighty-five cavalrymen were publicly humiliated and jailed for not taking the ammunition. On May 10, their compatriots stormed the jail, burned the cantonment, and butchered every European they
could get their hands on. Delhi was taken. One by one the native regiments across vast stretches of north-central India mutinied until there was practically no Bengal Army left. At the time there were a lot of rumours about a conspiracy organizing the mutinies but there was no such plot. The pattern of risings was sporadic and apparently unco-ordinated.

Civilians joined in. In some places they led the revolt; more generally they used the collapse of authority to burn land registry offices and the like. They reinforced the mutineers in the defence of the great cities. The rebellion gained a political focus when the last of the titular Moghul Emperors was coerced into becoming the movement's figurehead. His edicts perhaps aided the remarkable co-operation shown between Hindu and Muslim communities in the struggle. His role also symbolized the essentially reactionary nature of the war. Old kings and old institutions were reinstated. Traditional "feudal" tenures returned. Dispossessed chiefs and princes raised their standards once more and the people seem to have rallied to them. The intellectual drive for the movement came from traditional society; it was quite unlike the western-oriented nationalist movement of the twentieth-century.

In Oudh and in a few other states local patriotism was a main-spring of revolt. Despite the Moghul Emperor this was not a truly national movement. The south, Bengal, and the Punjab held for the British. The reasons were as uneven as the impact of foreign reforms. The south had launched and lost its revolts against the outsiders long ago. The armies of Madras and Bombay - separate from Bengal's - were not nearly so freighted with Brahmins. The commercial class of Calcutta
needed the British. Many ryots had benefitted from land reform and peace. The Sikhs were even less keen about Hindus and Muslims than they were about the British. So much of the fighting was Indian against Indian. The Union Jack held on because most Indians still collaborated, or at least stayed neutral.

For both sides this was something of a race war and they slaughtered almost anyone of the other colour. Meerut set the pattern: wherever there was a rising European civilians, men, women, and children alike, were killed and their bodies mutilated. No instances of torture or rape were ever proven. The British, however, expected the worst - nothing was more horrid to their minds than the thought of a black hand on a pure white thigh - and retaliated ferociously. Villages were burned, cities sacked, captured sepoys were executed, civilian males were almost routinely murdered, and some soldiers refused to spare even the women. The vengeance fever was highest after several hundred Europeans were butchered at Cawnpore but it had been going on almost from the beginning.

The British won after fourteen gruesome months, though skirmishing continued in the Himalayan foothills well into 1859. When it was over the victors reflected on its causes. They decided that they would have to work with Indian society as they found it, to prop up indigenous leadership, to accept the survival of "superstition", for a while at least. The discredited Company was scrapped in favour of a regular colonial government. The attempt to revolutionize India stopped and the Raj fossilized. Right up until the end in 1947 the Raj retained the exotica of native princes and all. Perhaps the most lasting
impression of the Mutiny was the distrust it created between the imperial masters and their subjects in India. The war was a turning-point in Indian history.

At the time the outside world got only one side of the story. Practically all the news from India was written up by the small European community there, what is often called "Anglo-India". It was the dominant social group, a "caste" linked by skin colour, religion, and culture to the Paramount Power and which, whatever its internal squabbles, stuck together to lord over the natives. Ironically, our news came from a group in India which was determined to remain as un-Indian as possible.

Before 1857 most popular accounts about the subcontinent came from missionaries. They had endless stories about their adventures in the land of sati, thuggee, and "Juggernaut". Churches were foremost among those who wanted to smash traditional India and convert it to a progressive Christian civilization. During the war a scattering of missions gave Calcutta clergymen a tenuous conduit of news from upcountry. From them came many of the tales of mutilations, tortures, treachery, and deeds "too horrible to put to pen". The stories were mostly fabrications but they were accepted almost without question. A clergymen, presumably, told the truth.

Soldiers gave the best accounts of the fighting; they were the only Europeans on the spot. Some took the time to write to the papers; more often their letters home found their way into print. Soldiers shared all the usual prejudices of Anglo-India, made even harder by their tough-minded military perspective. Having taught the natives to
fear them, the soldiers felt degraded when forced to fear the natives.\footnote{5} Worse, in the little world of Anglo-India every soldier lost some friend, acquaintance, or loved one in the burning cantonments. The army lashed back with murder and pillage and made no secret of it. Many letters from the front righteously described reprisals and executions.

Indian journalists mostly just packaged the news that reached them from upcountry sources, adding their own slant to each story. A lot of it was pure speculation. Not one Indian newspaper sent a correspondent into the war zone. In fact, a lot of the news came out of Bombay, far from the fighting and the government, simply because it was a week closer to England than was Calcutta.

Habitually, journalists were the advocates of white interests against the natives and the "native-coddling" government. In the Mutiny this translated into wild demands for vengeance and a vitriolic campaign against Governor-General Canning's "clemency" to the insurgents. The world press could not offer an alternative viewpoint because their correspondents were drawn from among Indian journalists. For instance, \textit{The Times}' regular Calcutta correspondent was Meredith Townsend, editor of \textit{The Friend of India}.\footnote{6} The only correspondent sent to India from outside was William Howard Russell of \textit{The Times}. He did not get to the "front" until February 1858, when the war was winding down.\footnote{7} Until then Anglo-Indians had a monopoly on news.

The European community in the East was absolutely staggered by the Rebellion. Time after time, whites were cut down by the "niggers"; in place after place the British flag was torn down. Alone amid a
hundred million brown faces, unable even to flee without native help, Anglo-Indian superiority crumbled into panic. They lashed back with pen and sword. Concluded Russell:8

The utterers of those sentiments have been so terribly frightened that they can never forgive those, or the race of those, who inflicted such terrible shocks on their nervous system (sic). They see no safety, no absolute means of prevention to the recurrence of such alarms, but the annihilation of every sepoy who mutinied, or was likely to have done so if he could.

Such were the people who provided the West with its news. Rebels never wrote to us, native manuscripts were rarely translated, and even "babus" were not often heard overseas. Ironically, the government of India provided the closest thing to an alternative to Anglo-India's viewpoint. The Company wanted calm. It set itself against the hysteria of the European community with a stream of optimistic and reassuring bulletins. That was the normal duty of any government, of course, and its statements were no more reliable than most. Newsmen everywhere just assumed that the Company was covering up its own mistakes. They preferred to believe the Indian press instead.

The government acted true to form by imposing press censorship. The so-called "Gagging Act" of June 13, 1857, licensed all presses in British India. A license could be revoked if anything printed impugned or incited hatred against the government, or if it strained relations with native princes. By this law The Bengal Hukaru, edited by an Englishman, was briefly closed and others were warned.9 But William Lyon Mackenzie exaggerated wildly when he claimed that, "In India they imprison the Editors, string them up, shoot them, torture them."10
A legal threat sufficed. In fact, Anglo-Indian papers got away with scandalous denunciations of the Governor-General. He was more worried about incendiary stories getting to the natives. The really vehement Indian presses were "underground", of course, or beyond reach in the princely states. The main effect of the "Gagging Act" was to smother the moderate native journals.

From India the news went straight to England. Important dispatches were sent by fast ship to Egypt and on to Malta or Trieste, whence they were cabled to London. Even so, world of the outbreak at Meerut took more than a month to reach the East India Company's head office on Leadenhall Street. A fuller explanation of events had to await the regular mail.

Fleet Street reprinted whole sections of Indian newspapers, augmenting them with India House bulletins and letters home from the troops. In the absence of any alternative, British journals tended to accept the judgements of their Anglo-Indian counterparts at face value. The Times and other papers railed on for whole columns about the need to restore Britain's honour and power and how the ungrateful sepoys should be strung up by the thousands. Working-class papers tried to pin the blame on the imperialist aristocracy in England but they were hamstrung by the undeniable savagery of the rising. In general, Britons shared Anglo-India's feelings about native revolts.

The rest of the world got its news from London, reprinting articles and adding editorials. The press in each country presented the news according to its own national viewpoint. The French, in particular, wrote long commentaries castigating the flaws of British
imperialism. They blamed London as much as London blamed Indians for the revolt. Not that the French had anything against imperialism; they were inordinately proud of the way they beat up Algeria and were helping the British in the China War. Rather, French nationalism was at its heart anti-English and it felt good to point out their rival's faults once in a while. In a sense, France was "Europeanizing" the news into something that had little to do with India. But for all that, French criticism was the most potent alternative to the Anglo-Indian perspective.

Then the news crossed the Atlantic. New distance-shrinking technology integrated Canadian journalism tightly into the outside world. Steamships regularly brought the mail from Britain and Europe, Montreal was linked to Boston by telegraph, and work was underway on a trans-Atlantic cable. Already the emphasis was on the "latest" from abroad. Foreign news was more often a barebones telegram than an in-depth analysis. Countering that trend was the habit of reprinting large sections of British and European journals, often in translation, usually without crediting the sources. Later on, our editors got their own bundles of Indian newspapers. Moreover, many papers had correspondents in such cities as London, Glasgow, or Paris. Those writers were not Canadians and they passed on the thoughts current in the place where they lived.¹² We had no correspondents in India, though one or two letters from Canadian officers fighting in the Queen's army in India were printed during the Mutiny. The upshot of it all was that our editors were superbly aware of what others thought of events - and on that they based their own editorials - but they had no independent channel of
information from the East. Canada was an image-importing country.

Even before the Mutiny, articles about India appeared in the Canadian press from time to time. Most were of the horrors-of-Hindu-superstition variety written by missionaries. Events such as the East India Company's seizure of the island of Perim, near Aden, in early 1857 were also reported. No doubt stories out of the Sikh Wars or the annexation of Oudh had earlier helped fix in Canadian minds some notion about the empire in the East.

Newspapers were not the only printed sources in this country. We got books and magazines from Europe and the United States, as well as from our own rudimentary publishing industry. But for the Mutiny newspapers were virtually the sole image-makers. Only newspapers could — indeed, were meant to — keep up with rapidly changing events. That is why this study is based on an analysis of newspaper sources above all else.


These journals represented a cross-section of the political, ethnic, religious, and class divisions of the United Province of Canada. They were published in big cities and small towns alike.
The Daily Globe was the intellectual leader of Canada West. Its plank was Reform, with the concomitant of more power for Upper Canada. It also paid keen attention to British politics, paradoxically supporting the radicals there while wholeheartedly upholding the imperial connexion. Editor George Brown was utterly contemptuous of The Times of London for its ignorance about colonial affairs. Like everyone else, though, he re-ran whole pages of the London paper, which then enjoyed priority at the Foreign Office and at India House. The appearance was that The Daily Globe took its cue from Printing-House Square, but that was a misleading quirk of the time. In 1857 and 1858 George Brown was wholly absorbed in domestic politics, elections, and his short-lived government. He reprinted many articles about the war from various British journals but he did not have time for more than a very few editorials. Therefore, The Daily Globe appears less often in this study than its prominence would normally demand.

Most of the smaller newspapers in Canada West aped The Daily Globe's line. The Hamilton Weekly Times, also used here, was more independent than most. In Lower Canada, The Montreal Weekly Gazette was a spokesman for the city's anglophone Tory merchants, and was rabidly imperialistic. The Quebec Gazette was also ultra-Tory by reputation but during the Mutiny it was one of the most outspoken critics of British reprisals. The Pilot was liberal in economics and moderate in tone. Virtually all Lower Canadian journals set themselves against George Brown's Grits in domestic politics. However, on imperial matters there was remarkable unity throughout the whole of the Province's anglophone press. The dominance of fairly recent British
immigrants was even more pronounced in journalism than in most other spheres of Canadian life. For them, Britain and Canada, colony and empire, were one. 15

Willion Lyon Mackenzie was quite the exception. The editor of The Toronto Weekly Message was once leader of the Upper Canadian rebels in 1837-1838 and he was still a radical non-socialist republican. His view of England as a leader of European monarchical reaction was shared by L'Avenir, a francophone "rouge", annexationist journal. 16 Both might be considered working-class newspapers.

The Christian Guardian was published by the Wesleyan Methodist Church in Canada. Its platform was predictable. The True Witness and Catholic Chronicle was not only a very strident voice for Catholicism but was also rabidly aggressive in promoting Irish rights, both in Canada and for the nationalist cause in the Emerald Isle. D'Arcy McGee, publisher of The New Era was a more moderate advocate of Irish-Canadian rights. Once a nationalist agitator, he had completely reversed himself and now sought to advance the Irish cause from within the framework of the Empire. He was no apologist, though. Even as he fervently proclaimed Irish loyalty he churned out the most damning indictments against the East India Company and of British imperial hypocrisy in general.

Some French-Canadian journals played much the same game. Le Journal de Quebec was willing to flaunt its loyalty - it was one of the "bleus" against the annexationist movement a few years earlier - for the pragmatic end of securing tolerance for francophone ambitions in the Province. 17 Le Courrier du Canada was at least as amenable to
British imperialism elsewhere. *Le Pays* and *Le Courrier de Saint-Hyacinthe*, though, came out strongly against the British in India and against the very idea of colonial recruitment for the army. Whatever their politics, all francophone papers were first and foremost French-Canadian nationalists. None could generate much enthusiasm for imperial adventures: they were more concerned about local affairs. In fact, they usually ignored the Mutiny altogether except when there was a big story or some choice ridicule of the British in a Paris journal.

Which foreign articles were reprinted was one of the distinctive differences between the anglophone and the francophone press in Canada. English-language papers usually borrowed from the British while francophones copied commentaries from Paris. The difference was more fundamental than just language. Half of the Province read England's side of the story; the others got the anti-English viewpoint of French nationalism. Both arguments fit nicely into Canada's own ethnic struggle: the Mutiny was a way to fight other "wars". The colony was probably just too fragmented to develop its own perspective. Some small synthesis might have evolved on the reprisals issue: Canadians generally seem to have been less bloody-minded than Englishmen.

The difficult task is distinguishing between those ideas which had an impact on Canadian thought and those which were read here but were not widely accepted. Reprints are the main methodological villains. Often one was run for its information or for its insights into what was thought abroad even though the editor disagreed with its tone or conclusion. Editors did not always say what they thought of an article.
Worse, they often failed to say where they got the story from. Generally, though, a maverick reprint stands out from the rest: editors tended to copy whatever accorded with their own writings.

In virtually all cases this study has been able to rely on firmer evidence than reprints. Correspondents, while not Canadians, have been treated as indicative of their editors' viewpoints, since no journal would put up with a contrary writer for very long. Mostly, though, this essay is grounded on "editorials" - taken here to mean any statement of fact or opinion originating in a domestic paper.

There remains the inevitable question: did the editors think what the people thought? The surest answer to that is to point to their circulations: if they did not satisfy their customers they went out of business. In the absence of any alternative news source it is reasonable to assume that newspapers not only mirrored public sentiment but led it, too. Journalism remains the best historical evidence for mid-nineteenth century public opinion, especially for the quickly-changing events of wartime.
NOTES


3. Traditional names like the "Sepoy Mutiny" or the "Indian Mutiny" imply that there was no civilian involvement. Terms like "revolt" or "rebellion", let alone the Marxist phrase "Indian War of Independence", imply a nationalist struggle. This study uses all these terms interchangeably, without reference to their strict historiographical connotations.

4. There was no conspiracy but there almost certainly was cow fat, sacred to Hindus, and pig fat, abhorrent to Muslims, on the cartridges. The Ordnance Department contracted for tallow without specifying what type. Contractors naturally would have supplied the cheapest: cow fat and, perhaps, pig fat. See Philip Mason, A Matter of Honour: An Account of the Indian Army, its Officers and Men, Penguin Books, London, 1974, p. 265. The whole episode also shows what a remarkably negative view of Christianity that the natives had: if you were no longer a Hindu or a Muslim you must automatically have become a Christian.


6. The Times, The History of the Times, The Times, London, 1939, vol. II, p. 309. When the revolt began, Cecil Beadon, Home Secretary to the Government of India, was temporarily filling in for Townsend. This was kept secret because Company servants were not allowed to contribute to the press. It was unfortunate for Canning, though, that Townsend resumed his duties. Beadon's appeals for calm gave way to Townsend's campaign against Canning's "clemency". Since The Times did not name its correspondents the change must have made its editorial policy seem erratic indeed, especially when it changed again after the paper sent out its own reporter from England.

7. Russell was famous for his exposés of army inefficiency in the Crimean War. His despatches from India were very critical of Anglo-Indian demands for vengeance and may have been partly responsible for the quick ebbing of that spirit. In 1860 he published his impressions in a volume now available as William Howard Russell, My Indian Mutiny Diary, Michael Edwardes, ed., Cassell and Co., London, 1957.


12. "I had no personal experience of Canada...," Glasgow correspondent, *The Pilot*, February 19, 1858, p. 2e. "Correspondents" were what we would call "stringers" today, permanent residents of a foreign city who regularly provided stories and opinion from their region.


18. This was generally true but not invariably so. The latest news, in whatever language, was always straight from London; French commentaries were slower in coming and looked at the broader issues. English-Canadian papers, in turn, would often reprint them in translation. Despite this diversity of opinion the fact remained that most in-depth articles about the Mutiny in English-Canadian papers came from Great Britain while most French-language readers got their commentaries from Paris.

19. *The True Witness* had some trouble with its Dublin writer, Rev. Dr. Cahill. He called on Irishmen to take advantage of England's plight by using civil disobedience to press for concessions to Ireland. *The True Witness* continued to publish him but pointedly distanced itself from him.

CHAPTER II

THE CANADIAN IMAGE OF INDIA, 1857-8

The public seem to know but little about this place....

Canadians in the mid-nineteenth century rarely had cause to think about India. We seldom went there, hardly traded there, had never warred there. The imperial connexion was with the United Kingdom, not with other parts of the Empire, and even that link seemed threatened by "Little Englanders" in the Old Country. The Province's few contacts with the subcontinent were mostly through the tales of missionaries or ex-British Army men.

The first cryptic telegram of the Sepoy Mutiny reached Canada in early July 1857. "Later news from India," it said, "shows that the insubordination of the native troops has assumed a very formidable shape." By mid-month the newspapers were full of shocking stories. Mutinies in the army had broken out all over Northern India, Europeans had been massacred at Delhi and Meerut, a native King had been proclaimed, and British power in the East had apparently collapsed. The war became the biggest foreign news event of the next two years.

Canadians were not entirely ignorant about India. A scan of domestic journals shows that several of them reprinted articles about the East in the last few weeks before the war. But none suspected trouble and the Mutiny came right out of the blue. Unfortunately, it began with a massacre at Meerut. From the start, then, Canadians felt a
fresh horror jostling with whatever old suppositions they had about India. To separate the old ideas from the new poses a methodological problem. The difficulty is compounded in the early weeks by an uncharacteristic silence among journalists, most of whom waited for more facts before risking a comment. For a while, too, the British Foreign Office downplayed the size of the Revolt. Not until the end of July was the first influential roar of hysteria - The Times' demand that Delhi exist no more - reprinted in Canada. There was a lull, therefore, of several weeks before the characteristic response to the war surfaced in Britain and in Canada. We may arbitrarily assume that in those early weeks our editors were writing from old preconceptions about the East.

In fact, Canada reacted to the first news with serene confidence. The Globe's very first statement had faith in the Empire.

The Hindoo population have experienced too long the blessing of British rule, as compared with the former misgovernment and tyranny of native monarchs, to have much sympathy with the disaffection of the few mutineering regiments.

Near the end of the month The Pilot was still expressing the same fading hope and citing precisely the same reason. "Under the sway of England," it said, "the Hindoo peasant eats his bread in peace - a state of things unknown to the country under its native rulers...." Whatever the sepoys might do in pursuit of their sectional ambitions, it was expected that the peasants would be faithful to the good master who had so improved their lot.

Although couched in the language of rational self-interest, the argument relied on a patronizing air of superiority over the Asians.
The Indians were incapable of responsible conduct in government but they made good, quiet followers. It was an early and very, very mild manifestation of the dominant image of the natives during the war: the limitations of " Asiatic character". Later, the moderation would disappear and the defects in the natives would be attributed to Satanic inspiration.

Already The Globe had issued a sterner verdict on the nature of the natives:

The Hindoo is an impulsive being, easily excited, and wild in his aimless anger - emotional as a child, and dangerous as a strong, unscrupulous, and crafty man. A small thing, therefore, may impel him to strange excesses.  

The tone of the passage was pitying and patronizing, for the hysteria had not yet begun. What The Globe was saying was that Indians had the less endearing characteristics of children: wilfulness and irrationality. These were dangerous in a fully-grown man. The notion that natives were inherently immature was a commonplace. For instance, the Edinburgh Review, reprinted in Canada, lamented that:

Henceforth we must regard the sepoy, in spite of all ancient experiences and associations, not as a laughing, playful, child-like, child-loving, simple-minded soldier; but as a ruthless murderer....

In a sense, the vision of the sturdy peasant was just another manifestation of this idea. Credibility and faithfulness were the endearing characteristics of native peasants, as well as of children. It was all evidence that Canadians felt that coloureds were racially inferior to us.

There still remained some difficulty comprehending how the poor,
skinny native, so grovelling and apathetic to our eyes, could so
suddenly turn into a ravening, murderous rebel. A foreign account, which
Le Courrier de Saint-Hyacinthe reprinted as "plein de profondeur",
expressed the dilemma:

Nous nous faisons, en effet, en France
une idée singulière de ces races
lointaines. Confondant l'énergie avec
la bonté, l'apathie avec la douceur,
notre imagination se représente l'Indien
comme une créature soumise, souple, et
même rampante, éloignée de toute cruauté

Meutres, perjures, crimes et supplices
de toutes sortes, paraissent peu de
des gens dont l'esprit de caste
et le déshonneur de la perte de leur
rang sont le seul frein.11

What reconciled the conflicting images was another age-old premise.
It was the idea of Oriental inscrutability. The Asian's grovelling was
a ruse to disguise the hatred which boiled within him. The deceit made
him even more sinister. The Rev. Dr. Taylor told a Montreal prayer
meeting that the Insurrection was "a more appalling exhibition of the
native perfidiousness of the Asiatic, and the direful passions he can
conceal under a smooth exterior, than anything the world has been
acquainted with previously."12

As the war fever in Canada increased, the rhetoric got stronger.
The defects of the Indian were increasingly ascribed to Satanic design.
But even in the first days of the war, and probably much further back
than that, Canadians already had a deep-seated conviction that the
coloured races were inferior to Europeans. To the world the Indian
presented a veneer of civilization, but deep inside he seethed with
primitive passions. Like a child he could be faithful and innocent,
but like a child he could not control his emotions. It was a dangerous flaw in a fully-grown man with the strength to do a lot of damage. It was even more dangerous since his every mannerism was intended to lure the unwary into overlooking his defects. In 1857 it appeared that he had been uncommonly successful in his trickery and the whole Empire was at stake.

The image was very fluid, adaptable to almost anything which could happen. If the Revolt had fizzled the image of the childish, happy peasant would have predominated. When worst came to worst, well, we knew all along that the weak-willed heathen could not control himself. The notion of Oriental inscrutability guaranteed that European racial self-confidence could never be rocked, come what may.

In fact, it appears that the Mutiny did not actually create any new images about Indians at all. It focussed a lot of attention on our prejudices, which the bitterness of war probably "hardened" in people's minds for many years or decades to come. But the Mutiny really only "proved" our old ideas about the East.

The Victorians had a penchant for talking about "character". The term was undefined but it connoted certain vague and beneficial attributes: vigour, honesty, ambition of a creditable sort, and so on. "Character" was a moral concept yet some of its components, like "energy", were physiological. In fact, "character" was considered a racial attribute, by and large. Most coloured peoples had weak "characters".

Most of the "proofs" that natives had poor characters were around for a long time before 1857. The war did not change the conviction; it
just focussed more attention on the matter and added more evidence to the "proofs". The Mutiny did add one new class of "proofs" to the list, which already included religious, governmental, and "blood" prejudices. The "atrocities" committed by the rebels on Europeans in 1857 overwhelmed every other aspect of the Revolt. Indian "atrocities" were nothing new - the "Black Hole of Calcutta" was legendary - but 1857 made them the dominant image of the East.

Asian religions had long seemed to be the most outstanding "proof" of native depravity. For years missionaries had railed in the pulpit and in the press against the evils of heathenism. They supplied the outside world with a lot of its knowledge about India. A Methodist journal, The Christian Guardian, ran five items on India in the two issues just before the first Mutiny news reached Canada, far more than any other paper. The spirit of the missionaries was revolutionary; they wanted to undermine Hinduism and Islam so that Christianity could spread across the East. The pace of their efforts had increased after the 1830's, when the evangelical movement which swept British Protestantism was accompanied by a crusade against the toleration of "superstitions". Since Indian society was inseparable from its religions, the attacks inevitably developed into a general anti-Indian bias.

On the very day that it printed the first telegraphed news of the insurrection, The Christian Guardian ran an article entitled, "Cruelties of Heathenism." The sick in India, it insisted, were left at ghats to die without aid or sympathy - and were smothered by potential heritors at the first sign of an inconvenient recovery. It reproduced from the New York Observer a poignant description of a Hindu mother sacrificing her daughter to crocodiles.
Hinduism most appalled our forebears. It was polytheistic, animistic, idol worship: the negation of everything Christian. The multitudes worshipped a menagerie of gaudy idols — crocodiles, monkeys, voluptuous women, multi-armed men, hideous monsters. Its theology and scriptures seemed a muddle. Hinduism harboured such things as temple prostitution, widow burning, garotte murders in the name of Kali, and the stories of mass suicide beneath the wheels of "Juggernaut" became legendary.

In Montreal, the Rev. Dr. Wilkes delivered a sermon to a prayer meeting. The Hindus, he said, "are polytheists; their gods counted not by thousands, but by hundreds of millions, and their worship obscene, bloody, cruel — many of their gods the embodiment of the vilest passions."15

But, for him as for most Canadians, Islam was the real threat. "The Mohammedan," he said, "though a monotheist, is dark, fanatical, fierce, a most bitter hater of everything bearing the name Christian."16 The image of Muslims as cunning and treacherous fanatics bent on destroying Christian civilization has been a staple of Western society since the Middle Ages.

This image was especially potent in 1857. The war came right out of the blue for the British and caught them flat-footed. Its suddenness, the way it broke out in different places at the same time, and the legend that British rule was due to end on the centenary of the battle of Plassey, all suggested that the Rising was a long-fomented plot. The docile and degenerate Hindus did not seem to be energetic enough to pull off such a coup on their own. So, ignoring the whole cow
fat issue and all the signs of spontaneous rebellion, many Canadians assumed the Mutiny was a Muslim plot.

Its authors and instigators are, we believe, to be looked for amongst the Moslem population of that vast country, and not amongst the Hindoos; the latter being but the tools by means of which the former hope to re-establish Moslem supremacy, and the authority of their false prophet, by replacing the Mogul dynasty on the throne of Delhi. Viewed in this light the bloody contest now raging in the East may be looked upon as but another act in the great drama wherein, in the Middle Ages, a Godfrey of Bouillon, a St. Louis of France, a Richard Coeur de Lion of England, and a Saladin played the most conspicuous parts....

By the writer's own admission, the religious image was part of a tradition going back a thousand years. The Mutiny added very little to it. If the war proved that the natives were depraved it was hardly news; the customs and ambitions of India's faiths had shown that long before. The religious "proof" of Asian debaseness was very important to Canada's image of Indians in general. The argument was convincing because it was grounded on the Victorian's faith in his own religion. All other creeds were errors at best and Satanic at worst. Yet the religious interpretation was not all bad. It offered the native the hope of improvement through conversion to Christianity. Despite his race, the native could acquire most of the moral elements of "character" which he so woefully lacked.

Asiatic governments provided another "proof" that native character was debased. "Utopian principles" of government would never work in India, alleged The Pilot, because of "the character of the millions of half civilized people they have to govern." As we have seen, The Globe
and The Pilot both felt sure that Indian peasants did not want to return to the wars and tyranny of native rulers. Even The Toronto Weekly Message declared that "military despotism is the only practical rule" for India. Of course, the British for years had used alleged native misgovernment as a pretext to annex princely states. Just the year before, in 1856, the King of Oudh had been deposed on that very excuse. The propaganda may still have been fresh in Canadian minds when the Mutiny came along. Anarchy in the revolted areas of 1857-8 clinched it. It is not clear from the evidence whether Canadians at that time could foresee the Asians ever acquiring enough "character" to govern themselves decently.

As stated before, "character" was largely a racial attribute. The idea that some races are physically and morally inferior was an old one but in the 1850's it was gaining new adherents. Comte de Gobineau had recently given racial inequality an intellectual justification. Science seemed to be giving it an empirical basis. In a marvelously quasi-scientific analysis, a French Navy doctor argued that climate and biology had degenerated the physical and moral fibre of India's residents:

Chairs molles, muscles grêles, forces digestives languissantes, nutrition et assimilation imparfaites, respiration peu étendue; circulation capillaire sans énergie; température du corps peu élevée; pouls parfois intermittent, habituellement rapide, toujours facile à déprimer; sang pâle; liquide, dépourvu de plasticité; disposition à l'engorgement des glandes et des viscères abdominaux, aux infiltrations et aux epanchements séreux; enfin, défaut de réaction de l'organisme.
Cette faiblesse radicale, ce relâchement des tissus contrastent avec la fougue des passions, les saccades d'activité physique et morale qui révèlent, chez l'Indou comme chez l'habitant des pays chauds, un défaut d'équilibre entre le sang et les nerfs.

Ainsi s'expliquent la fréquence des affections nerveuses et, au moral, la mobilité des sentiments et idées, les successions brusques d'exaltation et d'abattement que l'on remarque chez les habitants des pays chauds.

The good doctor believed that in finding evidence of physical weakness he had found the cause of a race's emotional defects. He confused religion with ethnicity when he postulated that, of all the Indians, "La classe musulmane, qui résulte du mélange de l'Irande, présente seule les attributes de la vigueur et de la santé." However, he seemed to offer empirical support for the suspicion that the Hindus were too indolent to revolt unless goaded into it by the Muslims. Although it was never explicitly stated, the anatomical argument also provided a fine justification for continued British rule in the East.

Every Canadian seemed to accept racial differences to some extent or other. Even that radical democrat, William Lyon Mackenzie, implicitly accepted the inequality of races, while denying the conclusions: "The inhabitants of Hindostan," he declared, "are not of the woolyhaired African species, but are in every respect as capable of civilization as the Celt or Anglo-Saxon." However, the genetic "proof" of Asian instability was never as popular as the religious evidence. Perhaps the talk sounded too much like American justifications for slavery, at a time when Canada offered refuge to escaped blacks. Or it might have been that science was just too absolute: unlike Christianity, genetics
offered no hope of redemption.

All of the arguments reviewed here were "proof" that native society was rotten to the core. All of these ideas were popular during the Mutiny but the war did not add much to the evidence for each. The great contribution of 1857 to Canada's image of Asians was the "atrocities".

From the outset of the fighting, Europeans, whether soldiers or civilians, men or women or children, in place after place, were massacred and their bodies mutilated. Francophone Canadians read of "les traitements d'une barbarie mouie que les cipayes font subir aux Europeens, des familles entières coupées en morceaux, des femmes soumises à tous les outrages, des enfants rôtis vivants au bout d'une baionnette." News of the most infamous massacre, at Cawnpore, reached Canada in October:

The Court yard in front of the Assembly rooms, in which Nena Sahib had fixed his headquarters, and in which the women had been imprisoned, was swimming with blood. A large number of women and children who had been cruelly spared after the capitulation for a worse fate than instant death, had been barbarously slaughtered on the preceding morning - the former having been stripped naked, and then beheaded and thrown into a well; and the latter having been hurled down alive upon their butchered mothers, whose blood rested on their mangled bodies. Only four escaped - the wife of a merchant and three others.

Atrocity stories, more than anything else, made the Mutiny a "war of race, a war of religion, a war of revenge." They were the products of shaken minds. When cringing, servile "niggers" suddenly smashed British power in northern India, the Europeans there suffered a
terrible psychological shock. Even worse was their utter helplessness. Alone amid a teeming, hostile population the whites could do nothing without native help, not even flee. Haunted imaginations turned every rumour into a sordid deed of rape, torture, and mutilation.

At first many journals in Canada were skeptical about the reports coming out of India. The Toronto Weekly Message insisted all along that they were invented at Printing-House Square and Fleet Street.27 But the sheer numbers and horror of the stories soon convinced most Canadians that the Indians were capable of any depravity. When a despatch arrived saying, "Three Regiments Burned," The New Era exclaimed that it was "monstrous and incredible."28 But it seems to have been believed, until another paper explained that the tents, not the men, had been torched.

The English-language press in Canada began to echo the journalistic firestorm at "Home". For example, a poet in Lennoxville offered his inflammatory "Cawnpore". It read in part:

For there in yonder courtyard gapes the very mouth of Hell,
Accursed through ages yet to come - the dark and silent well;
And there the stately palm-tree rears its horrid growth above,
Fat with the dashed-out brains of babes, and tears of those we love.

Thank God, our clouds are breaking! Hark to the cannon's roar
That wakens from a hundred palms the echoes of Cawnpore.
Sweet voices in your iron throats! Sweet incense in your wrath
That marks in storms of flame and blood the brave avengers' path!29
Even as moderate a paper as The Pilot admitted that:

No one can have read the tidings which have every now and then reached us from that far-off country, of the fearful treatment our fellow countrymen, and their wives and children, have received at the hands of the mutinous Sepoys, without having his blood curdle in his very veins, and a loud, deep cry for vengeance to those friends come from the very depth of his soul.  

Rape, far more than murders, caused this infectious frenzy of horror and hate. "And that those treacherous scoundrels the sepoys - whom the English despised because they were conquered, and, as they say so often, for their colour - should lay beastly hands on their women, those fragile symbols of purity and of repressed desire, raised them to a pitch of frenzied rage which has not been equalled in their history." The True Witness concluded:

(The) atrocious acts ... - are essentially and characteristically Asiatic in all their features. When the Oriental would express in the strongest manner, his scorn, hatred and defiance of his foe, he invariably seeks to accomplish his object by outraging the latter's female relatives.

Inquiries held just after the war and historical research since has failed to turn up even a single case of rape. It is therefore significant that people of the time not only assumed that the Indians naturally would commit the most unspeakable act, but also considered it as something characteristic of Asians.

The Quebec Gazette was so cautious that as late as November it was still insisting that the causes of the Revolt were unclear. Yet the same article confidently asserted that:

These atrocities are not merely Moslem Atrocities, but they are, and have been,
and always will be, a marked and characteristic trait of Asiatic character, and of all barbarous, half-civilized nations, - nay, even men belonging to those nations, who claim to head the march of civilization and moral improvement, have, at times, dimmed the brightness of their country's glory, by deeds as vile as those which are at present darkening English homes and English hearts with heavy clouds of death and dishonored memories.\textsuperscript{34}

The writer clearly was trying to be fair. So it is significant that he gave the Asian no hope of improvement. The very essence of the native was his defects.

The atrocities stripped the ethnic and "working-class" newspapers, rebel India's potential supporters, of arguments. D'Arcy McGee of The New Era wrote, "All intelligent Irishmen, from the days of Burke, have disapproved the East India Company's wars and aggressions in Hindostan, but no one worthy of the name, no Christian, no civilized creature, can hold any other sentiment than utter abhorrence for the murderers of babes and violators of women taken captive in this insurrection."\textsuperscript{35} The Toronto Weekly Message continued to fight against imperialism but it was left with only a negative argument. "There is cruelty on both sides in India - barbarity alike in invaders and invaded. Which have most reason to be cruel? The strangers who seek to trample on India for gain, or the natives whose home is there?"\textsuperscript{36}

As we have already seen, the francophone press in Canada, no less than its anglophone counterpart, was convinced that the Indians were physiologically and emotionally weak. The atrocities cost the rebels most of what moral support the French-Canadians may have had left to offer. As Le Journal de Quebec editorialized:
Du reste, les Indiens en massacrant tant de femmes, et d'enfants qui ne leur ont pas fait de mal, et se livrant décrire, ont perdu les sympathies des nations, en même temps qu'ils se sont attiré la haine implacable et vengeresse du peuple anglais tout entier. It ne s'agira plus maintenant de soumettre une nation qui combat pour la liberté et qui ne veut pas du joug étranger, mais de venger le sang et la honte de pères, des mères, des époux, des frères, des soeurs et des enfants innocents!37

For domestic historical reasons, which we shall examine later, French-Canadians tended to sympathize with any national struggle against British imperialism. However, the atrocities stripped them of their main positive arguments. No one could really think that the Indians would do a better job of governing themselves than the British did. All they could do was to show that the atrocities were not so bad as the British made out, and to show that the reprisals were as barbarous as anything the rebels had done. French-Canadians seemed to be saying that the sepoy cause was good but the sepoys themselves were not. It was hair-splitting at best and it was not very effective.

On nearly every other dimension of the Mutiny – the image of British rule in India, the reprisals, what Canadians ought to do, the rightness or wrongness of the war – English-Canadians and French-Canadians were adamantly opposed. The only thing that all Canadians, regardless of ethnic, sectarian, or class differences, agreed on was the image of the Indians. It suggests that the image was based on a very simple stereotype, one that all white Canadians could embrace without endangering their own domestic interests. The Mutiny confirmed
that the coloured peoples were inferior.

Most of the "proof" for this belief - the evidence based on blood, religion, or native "mis-rule" - had been around for a long time before 1857. The native was presumed to be degenerate both in body and in mind, with just a veneer of semi-civilization precariously containing the seething savage passions within him. It was a very flexible image for it explained both the rampaging sepoys and the apathetic do-nothings. The physical image of the Indian was no clue to what was going on in his immature mind. His every mannerism, his whole life, everything he said, his very weak and skinny body, was a disguise. That eternal deceit made him even more sinister and dangerous.

The war did not change any images. It only hardened pre-conceptions into convictions. The "atrocities" were the only new evidence raised by the fighting. The significant thing about them is that most of them did not happen at all. Anglo-Indians assumed that the natives would do the worst imaginable things and Canada, with the rest of the world, happily accepted the assumption. It is the best evidence of a common European racist philosophy which pictured coloureds as basely defective in "character".

The atrocities transformed a war for imperial domination into a crusade against the forces of eternal darkness. For some Canadians, as for the British, it had elements of a race war. Rallying to England's cause, The Montreal Weekly Gazette concluded that, "It has been a contest for the maintenance of our common race, for the existence of our common Christianity, and our common civilization."
NOTES

1. The Pilot, September 14, 1857, p. 2b.
   The author was referring specifically to the city of Delhi but he
   could have as truthfully meant all of India. The reams of histories,
   glossaries, and geographies of India which were printed in the
   newspapers suggest that readers had a lot of catching up to do.

2. This study is confined to the United Province of Canada, that is,
today's Ontario and Quebec. The Maritimes, of course, had more
seaborne contact with the East.

3. The term, "Sepoy Mutiny", is used in this study as synonymous with
"Indian Rebellion", "Revolt", "Uprising", or whatever. The choice
of terms is not meant to imply either that the events were solely
a military mutiny or a popular revolt. Modern historiography tends
to accept that there was civilian involvement in the war but not
that it was a truly nationalist revolution.


5. "India" is used here to denote the population of the subcontinent.
   It does not denote the land. Canadians had some idea of the diversity
   of the geography of the place but in general viewed it as intolerably
   hot and dusty or as a fetid jungle.


8. The Pilot, July 28, p. 2e.


    6, 1858, p. 1f.

11. Article from an unidentified French paper, reprinted in Le Courrier
de Saint-Hyacinthe, December 18, 1857, p. 2b.


    1857, p. 1f.


16. Ibid.
17. The True Witness, September 25, 1857, p. 4a.

18. The Pilot, August 3, 1857, p. 2e.


21. Ibid.


26. A term which was apparently much used by the British in India but which was not commonly used by British newspapers and was never published in Canada.

27. The Toronto Weekly Message, Jan. 15, 1858, p. 2b.

28. The New Era, January 26, 1858, p. 2c. The clarification was printed in The Pilot, January 26, 1858, p. 2a.

29. Poem by "J.J.P." of Lennoxville was written expressly for The Montreal Weekly Gazette, March 27, 1858, p. 1c.


32. The True Witness, October 9, 1857, p. 4a.

European women were violated - "not by men, but by sticks of burning tow and thatch thrust far into their bodies."

34. The Quebec Gazette, November 18, 1857, p. 2a.
CHAPTER III

CANADIAN IMAGES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY

Canadians mistook the nature of the East India Company. We saw a British government gone bad, gone native, "Hindooised." In fact, the Company had taken over the Moghul administration and ran it with fairly few changes. The government had always been at least as Indian as it was British.

Ironically, this misconception spawned a diversity of thought about John Company, not at all like the narrow stereotype of India itself. The subcontinent was far away, an exotic land of unfathomable people, quite beyond our ken. But India House seemed to be a British government and of that we had had much experience. Every Canadian had a political philosophy - based on class, religion, ethnicity, interest, democracy, or whatever - by which our own governments were assessed. In 1857 these made-in-Canada viewpoints were turned on India.

There were two main issues. What was the East India Company? And, was it aiding or stifling Christian civilization in India? A journal concerned with one question pretty well ignored the other.

Newspapers had a lively time applying their pet theories to India's affairs. Although laden with preconceptions, the images of the Company were not static. The Rebellion shook up our complacent acceptance of India House's every claim. "Backgrounder" reports which revealed Company blunders and viciousness blackened its name for everyone. After a few months John Company continued to evoke several different images
but all were equally discreditable.

What was the East India Company? Was it a business, a government, or just a front for Whitehall? Originally it had been a company of traders with a royal charter to govern. But over time it had been stripped of its trading rights. It continued to rule, sheer distance from London giving its servants a lot of independence. Changes to its charter, though, had made India House practically an extension of Whitehall.

The Company's role fixed its image. The Globe saw Leadenhall Street as but a "mouthpiece" of Whitehall. It was probably no coincidence that The Globe rarely criticized the Company. The omission would have been surprising otherwise; The Globe was a sworn enemy of another royal chartered company. Already-stirring Upper Canadian ambitions for the Northwest were blocked by the Hudson's Bay Company. But nobody, least of all The Globe, linked the two great firms.

Most journals went to pains to dissociate India House from Westminster. The New Era was typical: "We desire, as we think every friend of justice ought to desire, to separate the Company's responsibility altogether from that of the army engaged in the service of their sovereign. There are, in fact, two powers in India, both British." No doubt a newspaper which confined its attacks to a private company, albeit one closely tied with Westminster, was less exposed to charges of unpatriotism than if it had criticized the British government. Radical and French-Canadian papers naturally just lumped London and Leadenhall Street together as joint oppressors.

Journals tended to look at the Company's economic aspects rather than
its administrative features. They seem to have assumed that any
British government would be an improvement on any native effort. They
also feared that any private firm with such a huge public responsibility
might ignore duty in favour of profits. But partly, too, it was because
papers devoted to economic, class, or ethnic issues saw the Company as
a malevolent relic of the past. To them, John Company was an aristocrat.

"For our own part, we wish from our heart that England was well
rid of India, on almost any terms. That country has been to her a
continual source of anxiety, trouble, and expense, and what benefit she
derives from the connexion it is impossible for us to conceive."^4

The Pilot was referring to the British taxpayer's interest, for he
financed India's hidden costs of the army, navy, and diplomats.5 In
return, wrote correspondents, India House demanded loans from Parliament
and dispensed patronage.6 But what really angered this moderate
laissez-faire journal was the Company's trading monopoly, which
discriminated against other British entrepreneurs to enrich a small
group of Company directors. The Pilot made this point so often that one
wonders if the editor knew that the monopoly, except for the China
opium trade, had been abolished twenty-four years before or that
patronage had been replaced by competitive examinations in 1853! It was
a curious blind spot for a paper which was normally very well informed
about British politics and which had correspondents in both London and
Glasgow. It would seem that The Pilot's obsession with Free Trade and
free enterprise had blinded it to changes in India which, if not
complete, had at least dismantled the old oligarchy.

D'Arcy McGee, editor of The New Era, harboured an even more
obsolete image. He still saw the eighteenth-century depredations of Clive and Hastings. Most of his editorials were taken right out of Edmund Burke's accusations against Hastings!7 "The following atrocities described by Burke, have certainly not been exceeded even by the Sepoy villanies of 1857..." and so on.8 Burke, of course, was Irish. Beyond that, The New Era's institution was that little had changed in India since his day. The journal gave special prominence to reports that Company agents tortured Indian peasants who were reluctant to hand over taxes.

The Toronto Weekly Message took the concept of nabobs to its logical extreme. The point of India was to finance England's aristocracy, "to secure to the younger sons and relatives of Englishmen despotic power over a people 10,000 miles distant - to perpetuate a dominion founded on conquest which means wholesale robbery - pretended christians robbing Hindoos, Brahmins, and Mahometans of country and liberty, in order to enrich themselves by alien, slave labour while pretending to abolish the slave trade!"9

The result was doubly pernicious. This radical organ did not distinguish between India House and Westminster; the aristocracy used its wealth through government to oppress the working class at home and abroad. "No truth is more clear to us than that British colonies, like India, are held as a means of preserving an influence, to those who are the enemies of education and true religion at home, and of liberty everywhere."10

The French-Canadian image of the East India Company reflected their traditional distrust of everything British. In this respect they were
like their contemporaries in France whose enmity to India House was but an extension of their old rivalry with England. Francophones on both sides of the Atlantic saw India House and Westminster, and all other Britons, as one. They often lauded the civilizing role of British administration in India. But they adamantly rebuked British reprisals against the sepoys and roundly castigated revenue torture and other economic abuses. Underlying a lot of their criticisms was the notion that Britain was a nation of shop-keepers. Francophone accounts talked endlessly of money: the venality, corruption and exactions of the Company's officials, how reforms were delayed because they would reduce profits, how India was the treasure-house that financed England's European and overseas domination, and how either Britain was lost without India's wealth or the Mutiny would be beaten because England could buy mercenaries. The nation of shop-keepers, it seems, were pitied because they let materialism deflect them from higher ambitions. For Le Courrier de Saint-Hyacinthe the French actions in Algeria were, in an unspecified way, "une politique plus noble et plus élevée que celle Anglais vis-a-vis des ses sujets indiens." The problem was not imperialism per se; the problem was British imperialism.

Newspapers with social or economic grievances held up the East India Company as an example of all that was wrong with British society. To French Canada it represented Britain's imperial arrogance. To others it represented unfair privilege. None of these papers really cared about India; they were making a point about Canada and England. The Pilot complained because trading monopoly oppressed other Britons. The New Era saw in India the English rape and impoverishment of Ireland.
The Toronto Weekly Message saw the Court of Directors as another Family Compact, the little coterie of office-holders and moneybags who had dominated Upper Canada so thoroughly earlier in the century. None of the papers really knew or cared much about India; as we have seen, Indians were regarded as benighted creatures anyway. But nor were they just cynically using India House as a convenient allegory. Rather, each was applying to India what they deemed to be universal moral principles, principles which they all believed that the East India Company callously violated.

In the first months of fighting, information was scanty. Writers had to rely on their preconceptions. The outbreak of rebellion was evidence enough that the East India Company had blundered. So the press was naturally critical but, The Toronto Weekly Message excepted, fairly forgiving. Who would have thought pig and cow fat was such a big deal, anyway. Over the next few months, though, journalists overseas uncovered an uglier John Company. The plundering of Bengal after Plassey, revenue torture, grinding taxation, a criminally slow-working judicial system, unjustified wars, botched land tenure schemes, the ill-gotten gains of nabobs, bribes in Parliament, patronage, these and many other ills were aired more thoroughly than ever before. Editors in Canada reprinted these and quickly lost whatever complacency they might have had. Canadian images of John Company did not change in substance but they certainly got blacker and blacker. Even The Globe took a potshot or two at the Company.

John Company was also a missionary, albeit a reluctant one. Fomenting religious revolution could be unsettling for profits in India,
where religion was inextricably bound into the social system. But doing Christ's work bought political support in England. From the 1820's on to the Mutiny the Company repeatedly impinged on Muslim and Hindu orthodoxy. Missionaries were allowed into India, English education was introduced, practices such as suttee (sati) were suppressed, and the Company ceased funding Hindu festivals. European technology and science made their own inroads on Indian religious customs and thought. The Indian faithful became apprehensive: inheritance laws which to the British simply gave Christian converts equality with others were seen as a direct attack against Hinduism. Yet the Company was a fitful missionary at most. Institutions as important as the high-caste Bengal army were off-limits to missionaries. "Muscular" Christians did not appreciate the Company's caution. To them it was just weakness, a patronization of superstition. They promoted a wholesale religious, social, and economic revolution: the "Christianizing" and "civilizing" of India. Clergymen were respectable enough to have the ear of the press. So even before the Mutiny Christians had begun to give India House a bad image.

The Rebellion in 1857 was a momentary rebuff to these enthusiasts. Sepoys had obviously mutinied from religious fear and meddling missionaries were blamed.

Christian stalwarts counter-attacked at once. The blame, they said, really lay with the East India Company. It made a perfect scapegoat. Rich, reactionary, and harsh, it already had a lot of enemies. For clergymen and journalist alike it was easier to condemn John Company than one's own earnestly-held faith! Moreover, the Company had
made a lot of mistakes over the years, mistakes which were being exposed in the press every day. Its religious policy was just another evil among many.

For the one must recognize as clearly as the other that errors and crimes of British rulers in the East have been in some—a greater or less—measure the cause of this fiend-like insurrection.... Men professing Christianity among the Hindoos, have not led Christian lives, and by their example taught them the beauty of their religion. Nay, the Christian rulers of the land have winked at, and in some respects patronised, the horrors attendant upon the idolatrous worship of the natives. They discouraged rather than encouraged conversions to Christianity among the people, and especially among the troops: they acted as if they esteemed all religions alike. Toleration was alike a necessity and duty; but this was more than toleration—it was shameful weakness.

Nobody ever tried to define where toleration ended and weakness began. In fact, the religious issue was more than usually contradictory. A quick nod to the principle of religious freedom was invariably followed by a proposal for intolerance and upheaval. "We would not have them (India House) intolerant;..." preached a minister, but adding, "Surely Christian England will never again be found superintending the abominable rites of a heathen temple, or fostering the detestable institution of caste."17

Churchmen simultaneously evaded blame for the Mutiny and proudly claimed credit for it! "With the native soldiers, indeed, the missionary body have little or nothing to do;... In the mutiny of the troops and the tranquility of the populace, then, we possess a reconcilable two-fold evidence that the labours of the Christian
evangelist have not been in vain." Yet the same organ could stridently proclaim: "The great temple of Hinduism has begun to rock under the powerful shock of Christian truth. The united testimony of missionary agents has witnessed for a series of years that influences have been operating far and wide, shaking the confidence which had been entertained for ages in Brahmin superstitions. Who can doubt but that the recent uprising is a resistance on the part of Heathen idolatrous systems to the Christian religion;..." One Methodist minister made both these contradictory points in a single sermon!

The French-Canadian press paid little attention to the religious issue, compared to its deep involvement in economic and social matters. There was a tendency to list every adventure of every French Catholic priest or nun on the subcontinent. But the main religious element in French-Canadian accounts was simply the belittling of English-Canadian claims that God was on England's side. Practically all of the Francophone papers ran editorials or reprints ridiculing the Day of General Fast, Humiliation and Prayer observed in Great Britain during October 1857. An oft-reprinted dispatch from a London journal described how Britons solemnly went to church on this Fast Day and then returned home for a sumptuous holiday dinner. When a similar Fast Day was proclaimed for Canada in November L'Avenir commented, "Quelle Moquerie!" Our own Fast Day sermons were hardly even reported in the francophone press.

The True Witness was a lot harsher. Its one and only point was that British Protestants, whether they were at Westminster, India House or the lowliest ranks of the army, denied the basic principle of
religious freedom. This Irish Catholic journal thought the East India Company tried all too hard to convert the Indians: "let the public judge the phrenzy (sic) of the Indian Government and of the English intolerant folly to grease cartridges with the fat of pigs, cows, and sheep in order to force two hundred and fifty thousand men to become Exeter Hall and Connemara Protestants." The True Witness could not believe that Protestantism could convert by any other means. For this paper the Mutiny was a chance to hammer home the message that religious intolerance was the norm in British India. But the writers were not in the least concerned about the natives' religious fears - those were mere superstitions. Rather, the real crime was the intolerance shown by the Company and Queen's armies to the Catholicism of their Irish soldiery! In the end The True Witness had to support John Company against the sepoys. Although an unfortunate historical accident made Protestantism instead of Catholicism the main Christianizing force in India, that was still better than a heathen dominion. Unlike its Protestant counterparts, this paper did not see the Mutiny as heathenism's last gasp. Rather, Islam was fighting for dominance in the East; it was the Crusades all over. "That God may, in His mercy, be pleased to avert the impending danger should, we say, be the prayer of every Christian, irrespective of national origin; for it is not so much British rule, as Christianity itself, that is now menaced by the allied forces of Brahma and Islam." 

The Mutiny taught England a stern lesson, every paper agreed. For journals concerned with religion it was a divine lesson. "May we not reasonably derive these lessons from the recent mutinies - that the
policy of English rulers in encouraging the accursed opium traffic, and in many tamperings with idolatry, has met with a needed and signal rebuke from that jealous God who judgeth among the nations and will not give His glory to another." For the Protestant papers, at least, the main lesson was that the East India Company was inadequate for its mammoth task. Unable to resist the temptations of the East, particularly when they were profitable, John Company was a weakling who could never again be allowed to impede the spread of Christianity through India. Catholic views, though somewhat different, were no more complimentary. Images of the Company based on the religious issue were varied but all were discreditable.

Protestant journals demanded a complete change in the religious policies of post-Mutiny India. They expected Christianity to be vigorously promoted by the government. How that was to be done without force or intolerance was never explained. Any programme to abolish caste, such as was advocated, would have involved a monumental social upheaval in India. In the event, they were to be disappointed by British policy in India after the Mutiny.

Newspapers critical of the Company on social or economic grounds also expected changes as a result of the Rebellion. Radicals like L'Avenir or William Lyon Mackenzie, who sought nothing less than the dismantling of the British Empire, were to be disappointed. Practically no one else questioned Britain's right to rule India. Perhaps it was just a "political accident" that gave a few merchants so vast an empire. But England could keep what she had got: indeed, it was her duty to bring good government to the ungovernable and Christian civilization to
the benighted.

Company rule was quite another matter. Although Britons everywhere had drawn together in the disasters of 1857 - *The Pilot* no longer talked of abandoning India - the Company had been thoroughly discredited. There was not much thought given to alternatives. No credence was given the Company's claim that at least it had kept India out of the hands of politicians and in the hands of experts. There was no thought of double government, nor of tinkering with executive and legislative councils.

Throughout the crisis there had been another image looming in the background. It was an alternative which made John Company look so second-rate that it inspired criticism of the way India was run; it was an alternative which even had some prestige among the French-Canadians: the British Parliament. Direct rule from Westminster was really the only alternative to Company rule which Canadians even bothered to consider. In a sense, the shock of war had culled out any possibility of moderation. There was a new determination to hold India and to improve vigorously - perhaps almost forcefully - Indians, whether they wanted to or not. Hence there was a predilection for sweeping away all the past obstacles to a "forward policy."

"Let the British Government govern British India, & not have the progression or impeding of mighty monetary, manufacturing, agricultural, and educational interests, and measures of internal improvements, in the hands of a company of men who have already, in many instances, shown to the world at large their incapacity and lethargy."

*The East India Company evoked many images for Canadians - mercantilist relics,*
aristocratic oppressors, arrogant imperial overlords, niggardly shopkeepers, the bigoted persecutor of the Faith, weak-kneed succumber to temptation - but it had no real friends here. As early as December 1857, rumours reaching Canada said that the Company was to be abolished. The New Era typified the sentiments of many Canadian journalists:

"Every disinterested person is pleased that the Company's old humdrum system has come to an end - tumbled to pieces from want of cohesion."
NOTES

1. As *The True Witness* called it, October 9, 1857, p. 4e.


5. Ibid., Sept. 5, 1857, p. 2a.

6. Ibid., August 7, 1857, p. 2b., for example.


8. Ibid., December 8, 1857, p. 2c.


10. Ibid., August 14, 1857, p. 3d.


12. *Le Courrier de Saint-Hyacinthe*, July 24, 1857, p. __ (?). See also Sept. 15, 1857, p. 1a for the argument that England could always buy soldiers from her neighbours if necessary. *Le Journal de Quebec*, October 8, 1857, p. 1a also emphasizes that Britain will persevere, for it is strong by gold. It and *Le Courrier du Canada* emphasized France's expansion in Algeria, but most French journals in Canada paid close attention to French colonies, including the footholds in India.

13. See, for example, *The Globe*, November 10, 1857, p. 2d. "Our empire in the east has for years been hanging by a hair," it said, for the educated Indian had no outlet for his ambitions and the seniority system ensured that the sepoys remained crude and illiterate. The peasant alone would remain loyal because he knew the benefits of British peace and rule. In the early winter of 1857-8 it still was unclear whether or not the ryots of northern India had joined in the Revolt. The "babus", in fact, mostly supported Britain in the war. The expectation otherwise was probably another manifestation of the idea of the inscrutable Oriental and his hidden ambitions.
14. It may have been a permanent defeat for Christian activists in India. British Indian governments after the Mutiny did not risk rebellion again by promoting a Christian crusade. But this was not immediately apparent in 1857.

15. The accusations were very evident in British articles reprinted in Canada during the war. The Quebec Gazette, Nov. 18, 1857, p. 2a, incorporated excerpts from the Illustrated London News and the Revue des Deux Mondes to raise and refute the accusations.


17. Rev. Dr. Wilkes in a sermon to a prayer meeting, in Ibid., October 31, 1857, p. 4a.


24. Ibid., for example.


26. The Christian Guardian, August 12, 1857, p. 2a. Note the assumption that Britain is God's chosen agent for the conversion of India.

27. The Quebec Gazette, August 14, 1857, p. 2a.

CHAPTER IV

IMPRESSIONS OF THE MUTINY

Canadian thought on the war in India was mostly derivative. The "facts" came via England; commentaries were from British or European journals. Yet Provincial papers show evidence that we looked at some issues quite differently from our counterparts at Fleet Street or Printing House Square.

To understand Canada's viewpoint one has to look at the debates overseas. Unfortunately - and surprisingly - there has been little study of British reactions to the war, and still less that is any good.

James Bryne\(^1\) has identified the three main conflicts in the British bourgeois press as: the fight between the East India Company's supporters and its detractors, Christianity's role in India, and "Little Englanders" versus romantic imperialists. The content of his article, though, shows the importance of vengeance as an issue, as well as his contention that the working-class perceived the uprising as a popular rebellion rather than as a mutiny.

Edward Spiers\(^2\) is mostly concerned with society's perception of the army. He therefore emphasizes the cult of the generals, Havelock especially, and assumptions that the war was being well handled despite the evidence it was not. But he accords importance also to vengeance, the anti-Company crusade, and whether the war was a mutiny or a rebellion.

The Times, in its centenary apologia, concentrates on the vengeance
and anti-Canning campaigns it led, with mention of its espousal of the mutiny explanation.  

The issues raised in these various sources were the same mostly as those dealt with in British newspaper articles reprinted in Canada during the war. One exception was Bryne's notion of a conflict between imperialists and anti-imperialists. This was hardly raised in the reprints, after the first days at least, and since Bryne does not back up his assertion it might not have been an issue in England either. His claim that, "The East India Company had few friends left," was true enough, though, on both sides of the Atlantic. Army matters were much discussed but did not spark much acrimony. Vengeance and the causes of the revolt were certainly staples in the reprints. All in all, the issues in England were the issues in Canada.  

French-Canada was, as usual, a special case. It got a lot of its reports from Paris. Fournian has found that the French press was broadly critical of the British in India, not for ideological reasons so much as for traditional French antipathy to their cross-Channel rivals. His argument seems to apply just as well to French-Canadians. Francophone journals tended to focus on East India Company misdeeds, the likelihood that the fighting was a popular rebellion, and vengeance.  

To summarize: Indian atrocities aside, the main issues for everyone were the causes and nature of the revolt, John Company's culpability, Christianity's place in India, vengeance and Canning's "clemency". Implicitly, every writing also contained advice on another issue: how best to govern India in future. England's right to sovereignty in India was hardly an issue at all.
For all the shouting to and fro, nobody anywhere really knew what to make of the war. Exploding into headlines from out of nowhere, it provoked all sorts of bewildered responses: fury, jubilation, despair, sympathy, vengefulness, shame, and a thousand "I-told-you-so's". It was all over before any consensus evolved.

Pig and cow fat, lotuses, and chapatties were to become the stuff of legend. At the time they got surprisingly little attention as journalists sought deeper reasons for revolt. The Pilot suggested land tenure problems, many blamed Company greed, while The Globe looked to native character. Others accepted that religious fear lay behind the cartridge issue and rival explanations were muscled out in the fight between missionaries and "idolatry". The Christianity issue has already been discussed in Chapter II above, as has the debate over the East India Company.

Then there was the conspiracy theory. The Russians, bent on avenging Crimea, were supposed to have egged the Muslims, born schemers, and the Hindus, born dupes, into revolt. It was, said Rev. Dr. Wilkes, "a Russian mine exploding too late." Not everyone accepted this. The Quebec Gazette, for one, thought that the random pattern of mutinies, their weak leadership, and the apparent lack of strategy precluded a long-planned plot. Le Journal de Quebec scoffed that: "Il est probable que, s'il y a du vrai, il y a aussi beaucoup d'exagération dans ces accusations; mais en les admettant tantes que la feuille anglaise le formule, il reste à se demander pourquoi la Russie a pu trouver un accès si facile parmi les populations de l'Inde...." French-Canadians reprinted dozens of articles from Europe decrying this
blatant search for a scapegoat. They wanted the blame placed where it rightly belonged: on British blunders. English-Canadians, though, could not believe that the Indians would willingly reject the benefit of British rule. Someone had to have goaded the natives into it, and logically that someone was Russia, a traditional competitor for empire in Asia and recently an enemy in war. While nothing was certain, Russian meddling was close to being a "certainty".

More difficult to pinpoint than the causes was the nature of the uprising. Was it a sepoy mutiny or a revolt of the people? The Home government, The Times, and their ilk dismissed it as a purely military affair. Opposition politicians, the British liberal press, the French press, and many soldiers in the field felt it was a popular rebellion. The mutiny theory won out only after all was calm.

French-Canadians were predisposed toward the notion of a popular struggle for national liberation. Among anglophones, only The Toronto Weekly Message said from the start that the Indian masses had risen. The rest hoped it was just a mutiny, expected the peasants to show enough good sense not to follow the sepoys, and crossed their fingers. As the months passed, the press generally moved away from the mutiny theory toward that of a sepoy-led but widely popular rebellion. The Pilot illustrated this trend. In August it accepted that the fighting was a mutiny, probably incited by plotters. But by October: "We fear... that though the soldiers are the immediate actors in the rebellion, the people of India generally, Hindoos and Mahometans, sympathize with them and wish them success."

The issue on which Canadian sentiments seemed to differ significantly from British opinions was the question of punishment for rebels.
In essence, this meant reprisals.

From the beginning, British troops and their native allies in the field had exacted a terrible vengeance. Villages were burned, cities looted, men flogged, hanged, or shot. The blowing from guns became legendary. At "Home" many Britons shared the blood-lust, especially after Cawnpore. The Times howled that Delhi must be razed and "Every tree and gable-end in the place should have its burden in the shape of a mutineer's carcase." A London correspondent observed, "We are not a bloodthirsty people in general, but on this occasion, a desire for revenge deep-seated and deadly in its purpose is everywhere apparent.... Men set their teeth and speak fiercely when talking of India now."

Readers everywhere knew of many British crimes because, in the twisted spirit of that time and place, the murderers proudly proclaimed them. All newspapers carried letters and articles graphically detailing reprisals. "The hanging and flogging still go on.... Our new levy now receiving the prisoners from Cashmere shot 78 the day before yesterday, and are keeping the native officers to be shot in here, to make an impression." The 10th Regiment even murdered fifty loyal sepoys just because of their skin colour. A Canadian officer serving in India wrote home of the spirit there:

You can easily judge what demons we shall prove when once brought in contact with these rascals. There are some who require that we should make them suffer the same tortures, (sic) to which they submitted (sic) us. But I am not of this opinion. Let us at least show ourselves civilized, let us spare the woman (sic) and children, but no quarter must be given to those taken in arms, and who have participated in these horrible atrocities.
To talk of killing women and children was rare. But The Morning Star (London) claimed that ten thousand men, women, and children were butchered at Cawnpore and an equal number at Delhi. Even if the figures were suspect there was evidence enough of slaughters. Had the victims been Christians or whites the uproar would have been tremendous. In that sense, readers were guilty of at least condoning the practices.

Some of the craziness was transmitted to Canada. The Montreal Weekly Gazette's poet-contributor penned these stirring lines:

That flame that burns till recompense
be taken for the slain,
And Delhi's walls be numbered with
the "Cities of the Plain".
Why tell us of forgiveness?
Ours is no idle song:
The cry of tortured children -
of the "unutterable wrong"!
Ho! Men of England, nerve your arms
upon the blood-stained sod,
And strike, if ever England struck,
for justice and for God.
Not this the time for charity
for you accursed brood.
With a mighty shout to Heaven
goes up the cry of blood.
Close thicker round the standards -
grasp tighter yet the sword;
For man must be the bearer of
the vengeance of the Lord.

Historians have made much of this blood-lust. The bulk of British journals were infected with it. Yet one must remember that even in London there was a large segment of opinion opposed to indiscriminate reprisals. The liberal press, in particular, worked hard to quell the murderous spirit. The fire-breathers were reprinted in Canada. But so, too, were the moderates and it was they who Provincial editors chose to follow. Perhaps it was our remoteness from the crisis, perhaps Canadian society was more liberal than that of the "Old Country",
but practically all Provincial journals aped the stance of one section of British opinion. French-Canadians, less encumbered by fond sentiments for England, were especially vociferous in ridiculing reprisals.

And yet, a lot of our moderation was just sloppy thinking. That some punishment of rebels was in order was never doubted. But we never tried to define the line between mass punishment and terrorism. We never distinguished between what law allowed and justice required. The military punishment for mutiny was death. If every sepoy prisoner could be shot for mutiny should every civilian rebel be hanged for treason? Were all rebels to be held responsible for the atrocities of a few? Above all, what proof was required that someone was a rebel, and not just an innocent bystander trapped in the war-zone?

Canadians opposed indiscriminate reprisals. Our journals openly derided British cries for wholesale revenge. Yet we often used very similar language. "Reprisal", "vengeance", and "retribution" were all used as synonyms for "punishment". One writer advocated severe punishment "in the eastern fashion" but not if it was indiscriminate. He did not specify what he meant by that but, whatever Moghul India's actual record, it connoted arbitrary "justice" and a gruesome demise. In practice, we condoned flogging, hanging, or shooting all men of fighting age found in the war zone - no one even seems to have demanded any form of trial. "Indiscriminate" reprisals were just those against old men, women, and children. We advocated leniency but we settled for that.

The True Witness was making this distinction when it demurred:

"As yet there is not a single well authenticated instance of the
slightest violence offered by the British troops to the women or children of the mutineers, or indeed to any except the mutineers themselves, who have richly deserved the doom that has been awarded them.\textsuperscript{22}

Canadian equivocation was best shown at the recapture of Delhi. General Wilson opened the city to looting and a general slaughter of its men. \textit{The Montreal Weekly Gazette}, while regretting that the victims "doubtless included some innocent men among the many guilty," applauded the proclamation to spare the women and children.\textsuperscript{23} \textit{The Pilot} concurred, arguing that a massacre would have occurred anyway and otherwise would have included women and children.\textsuperscript{24} Perhaps \textit{The Quebec Gazette} was the ultimate apologist, accepting crimes in the small but not the large scale, for Britons but not for Indians:\textsuperscript{25}

Aware as we are of the overpowering influence which the excitement of a battle-field creates and sustains in the breasts of British soldiers, we were quite prepared to hear of wholesale slaughter while under the power of that excitement, and even of hearing of detached and isolated instances in which the supplications of the aged man, the prayers of the kneeling woman, or the unconscious smile of the tender infant, would fail to avert their dreadful doom - fail to strike a respondent chord in the bosom of unmanly, unhumanized miscreants. We were prepared to hear all this, but we were not prepared to hear of the instances brought by the English papers, in which the British soldier has tarnished his name and fame, by becoming a cold-blooded, unfeeling, and barbarous murderer.

So, although Canadians were far less prone to vengeance-mongering than Britons, and although our journals adopted the tone of the more
liberal section of the British press, our writers, too, had been swayed by Indian atrocity stories and could maintain their stance only by hair-splitting.

In keeping with their stance against indiscriminate reprisals, Canadian journals did not join the critics of Governor-General Canning's "clemency" proclamation. The furore was mostly a British affair, our editors reprinting each attack and rebuttal but rarely commenting. The Pilot did, but equivocated by praising Canning's intent while criticizing his timing as maybe encouraging more mutinies.

How the war was being run was also dealt with by second-hand reports. Fulsome tributes to Havelock were exceptions: even some French-Canadians extolled this hero to the stars. There were plenty of instances of army bungling yet, oddly enough, everyone seemed to assume that this was not Crimea repeated.

But what to do with India after the war? It had cost too much in blood and treasure to give up now. Canadians were too engrossed in our own squabbling Provincial Parliament to give the India Bill much thought. Yet the statements of the previous months implicitly held recommendations for India's future. These can be reconstructed.

One thing was certain: the East India Company had to go. Long suspect, it was now utterly discredited. Beyond that, Canadians - constitutional trail-blazers in the nineteenth-century Empire - paid no attention to the new order in India. Only The Pilot's Glasgow correspondent ventured to say that the legislation was poor as it divided responsibility and continued patronage.

Obviously, Christianity had to have a bigger role in the new India.
The proselytizers had won the argument. Besides, "the promotion of even worldly interests are best secured by the spread of the Gospel."\textsuperscript{30} The army would henceforth recruit only converts (kept in line by more Queen's troops than before). Caste had to be uprooted. Of course, no one would be forced to convert but education and missionary work would soon bring sweet reason to the sub-continent.\textsuperscript{31}

An integral part of the civilizing process was technological advance. Railways, telegraphs, factories, and commerce were the engines which broke down petrified customs and superstitions. Canadians measured India's progress under the British by these statistics\textsuperscript{32} and seem to have assumed the process would continue. Indeed, they probably hoped it would be pushed even faster.

Canadians thus promoted a forward policy of change for India. British officialdom thought otherwise. Far from fomenting a social revolution on the sub-continent, Westminster propped up the existing order and slowed change. This is not to say that Canadians were out-of-touch: in the heat of war the British public also demanded change. But when public attention drifted away from India the bureaucrats could get to work, unimpeded by scrutiny. They did not want to "civilize" the place so much as they wanted security.

The new order in India was based on certain decisions about what the uprising meant. During the war there was far more uncertainty, far more competing theories, than there were hard facts. Quickly afterward, however, some beliefs crystalized into "knowledge". It became accepted that the war was just a giant mutiny, not a civil rebellion. Blame was found in the army structure, which was top-heavy...
with high-castes and which had lax discipline. There was a new aware-
ness that behind the cartridge issue lurked native fears about the pace
of Western intrusions into their society. British reprisals were
quietly forgotten but Indian atrocities were not. Cawnpore was
remembered as a warning for all time. It was a memorial to the sacrifices
made by Britons in 1857. It was a monument to the glories of British
arms. Above all, it was a warning that the white peoples of the
Empire had to maintain their vigilence, for the dark-skinned millions
could no longer be trusted. The war-time zeal to prevent another
outbreak by Christianizing and civilizing India faded into determination
to keep control of the existing social order.
NOTES


8. The Quebec Gazette, Nov. 18, 1857, p. 2a.


10. It was the line of their non-British sources, too. A Frenchman in India, reprinted in Le Courrier de Saint-Hyacinthe, Nov. 10, 1857, p. 1c, claimed that the war was "une révolution formidable de la part des populations en général..."


15. Letter from a civil service officer at Sialkote, reprinted in Ibid., Oct. 8, 1857.

17. "E.J.", letter from Calcutta, August 21, 1857, printed in The Montreal Weekly Gazette, Dec. 26, 1857, p. 4b. Although identified as a Canadian officer, "E.J." was not fully named. The reference to the dead women and children of the regiment suggests that the writer was Lieut. Edmond de Lotbinière Joly, of H.M. 32nd Regiment. The Quebec native was later killed at Lucknow. See Le Courrier du Canada, January 4, 1858, p. 3a. Alternatively, the writer may have been Lieut. E.J. Badgley, of Montreal, who served in the Mutiny with the 1st Royal Regiment, the 53rd Regiment, and in 1859 was still fighting the rebels as a member of the 9th Oudh Military Police. Judging from a letter from him at that time he was still dead set against clemency for the rebels. See The Montreal Weekly Gazette, Feb. 19, 1859, p. 3b and 3c, and The Quebec Military Gazette, reprinted in The Globe, Feb. 4, 1858, p. 2a.


20. For example, "Ces cris de fureur, poussés par quelques écrivains brittaniques ont fait le plus grand tort à la cause de l'Angleterre, dans une luttes semblable à celle ou elle se trouve engagée..." Le Journal de Quebec, Nov. 7, 1857, p. 2e. The Pilot's campaign began on Aug. 22, 1857, p. 2d, with an appeal from the Glasgow correspondent. He continued on Sept. 17th, p. 2c - "But all wholesale fire-raising..., & c., is Satanic work at best, and not to be commended or even justified in or by Christian men" - and Oct. 21, 1857, p. 2d. The paper editorialized in favour of Canning's much-criticized "clemency" on Nov. 6, 1857, p. 2a. The Quebec Gazette took up the issue after the sack of Delhi by the British.


22. The True Witness, Oct. 9, 1857, p. 4a. Ironically, this paper was forever reprinting references to British atrocities against the Irish in Cromwell's day and in 1798.


27. The Pilot, Nov. 6, 1857, p. 2a.

28. Spiers, pp. 132-133, explains the cult of Havelock as a result of middle-class aspirations. The middle-class, Non-Conformist hero
showed that men of his class could out-perform aristocrats even in that traditional preserve of the upper class, the military. Le Courrier de Saint-Hyacinthe, Jan. 29, 1858, p. 1a, called his loss "douloureuse" as he was the "plus brillant des généraux anglais de l'Inde".

29. The Pilot, Jan. 21, 1858, p. 2d.


31. For example, The Pilot, by no means the most vociferous of journals suscribed to all these views. See J. Plimsoll, M.D., a frequent contributor, Nov. 10, 1857, p. 2d; on army reform; the Glasgow correspondent, Nov. 19, 1857, p. 2b on caste; and an editorial, Nov. 17, 1857, p. 2a on education.

CHAPTER V

RESPONSES TO THE MUTINY IN CANADA

So intimately are our lives and interests linked together with those of the people of the rest of the empire, that this blow has fallen near, if not upon ourselves. Men in our great towns have watched here day by day with almost breathless suspense for the news from before Delhi and the other scenes of insurrection, conning the lists of killed and wounded, lest perchance dear friends or relatives were numbered among the fallen. This contest, then, has been ours as well as those of our brethren in Britain. It has been a contest for the maintenance of the position of our common race, for the existence of our common Christianity, and our common civilization.1

Canadians had no real economic, political, or strategic stake in India. We certainly felt no affinity to the superstitious lot who lived there. But English-Canadians felt a "blood" kinship to the British in India. The Pilot and Rev. Dr. Taylor spoke of them as "our countrymen;" The Globe and The Quebec Military Gazette wrote of "Our empire."2 In a sense, the Province did not respond to India's woes at all. It rallied to England, which did react to the shock waves from the East. Inter-colonial solidarity did not enter into it, except perhaps for the radical fringe.

Still, in the summer of 1857 through the spring of '58 India was big news. In September, more than half of The Pilot, not counting the advertisements, was devoted to the Mutiny. Montreal's Theatre Royal
advertised its "Grand Pictorial Illustrations of the WAR IN INDIA." There were public lectures in India. Amateur versifiers churned out titles such as "Cawnpore" or "The Relief of Lucknow; or Jessie Brown." Books on the war appeared early in the new year. "So much interest is attached to this country at the present moment," noted one paper, "that almost everything else is set aside and people talk of nothing but India."

Opening the Provincial Parliament at Toronto, the Governor-General, Sir Edmund Head, declared that:

The people of Canada, as they have sympathized with the danger and sufferings of their fellow-subjects, will in like manner rejoice at the vigour which has checked this rebellion, and will appreciate the steadfast courage and perseverance which have distinguished our countrymen in the east.

It is a source of pride to the British Colonies that with Havelock and Outram is associated the name of Inglis, and that we have sent from Canada some who fell gallantly fighting at Delhi and Lucknow.

Then, as now, political speeches were not exactly store-houses of fact. They were concerned with images; safe expressions of lofty sentiments. As such they indicated all the "right-thinking" of the day.

Government made another symbolic gesture. By Royal Proclamation, Friday, November 27, 1857, was declared a "Day of General Fast, Humiliation and Prayer" in Canada. Montreal and Toronto responded well. "The day set apart as a general fast, and for prayer for the restoration of peace in India, was very generally observed, outward (sic) at least, in this city. Business was mostly suspended, and service was
held in nearly all the churches, and sermons suitable to the occasion were preached by the pastors of the several congregations, and as far as we can learn these services were numerously attended.\textsuperscript{10} In Montreal even the synagogues held special services.\textsuperscript{11}

The occasion seems to have fared less well in Quebec City. Not even the "extra-britannique" Quebec Gazette reported any observances in that largely-francophone city. French-Canadians, despite the urgings of Catholic bishops, probably ignored Fast Day. Certainly francophone newspapers did not take it seriously; most mischievously ran an account claiming that on England's Fast Day churchgoers returned home to a holiday feast.\textsuperscript{12} L'Avenir called the whole business, "La farce blasphématoire.... Quelle moquerie!"\textsuperscript{13} French-Canadians did not share their anglophone countrymen's fond sentiments for the "Old Country".

At any rate, the Indian Relief Fund offered a more concrete expression of sympathy for British victims of the war. Money was sometimes raised by benefit concerts or exhibitions, more often by prayer meetings. In Montreal three such events in October attracted two thousand Protestants each.\textsuperscript{14} The London Free Press (Canada West) wrote of a Methodist assembly: "The audience appeared to be attentive and devout, and demonstrated their interest in the object of the meeting by contributing, as we understand, the sum of thirty dollars towards the fund for the relief of sufferers in the East."\textsuperscript{15}

The most exuberant expression of sentiment came with the news that Delhi had been recaptured. In Montreal flags were hoisted, buildings illuminated, the volunteer artillery fired a salute, and a
Pilot Extra was snapped up. Toronto was more subdued but flags were strung over King Street.

Smaller English cities in the Province celebrated in the finest style. In Hamilton the artillery fired a twenty-one gun salute and in the evening Court House Square reverberated to the assembled militia bands and "feu de joie." In Sherbrooke, too, windows were lit up, bonfires blazed, and the militia and firemen paraded. Even little Perth, C.W., managed a celebration:

With the arrival of mail on Saturday evening, came the telegram announcing to us the much-wished-for fall of Delhi. As the Protestants of this part of the country since the commencement of the revolt in India have watched the progress of events there with the deepest interest and with earnest desire that "the wrong might be righted," you may be sure that the news caused no little excitement. Bonfires were lighted, rockets, Roman candles and other fireworks discharged, while guns and pistols cracked in every direction, and the Perth brass band paraded the streets, making them resound with good and loyal tunes; and when they concluded, hearty and loud British cheers were given for the Queen and the British soldiers in India. The rejoicings were kept up till very close on Sunday, when all dispersed with a hearty round of cheers.

A more pernicious clue to Canadian sentiments was the temporary popularity of a new word. "Sepoyism". It was synonymous with "vandalism" and its inspiration was the same: a group of people identified with wanton destruction. An attempt to derail a train, therefore, was labelled, "Sepoyism in Canada."

Sometimes "sepoy" was just a silly slander. It could be used against any foe, whether or not he had anything to do with India.
The Montreal Herald denounced a rival as "... the organ also of the rebellious Sepoys." In return, it was renamed the "Montreal Sepoy" by an enraged letter-writer. On a matter completely unrelated to India, another paper protested "A 'Sepoy' attack upon this journal..." The Toronto Weekly Message, which decidedly was pro-sepoy, even used the term against Her Majesty's Government in Canada! "There are a set of Sepoys in public office in Canada..." "Sepoyism" had a more dangerous use, though. Specious similarities between the villains overseas and domestic groups were used to stir up ancient hatreds in Canada.

Wrote The Christian Guardian:

Like causes are generally productive of similar effects in every place; and if the encouragement and support given to the false religions of India, with a view the more effectually to govern the people, and the insult, direct and indirect, which Christianity has thus endured, has been so signally avenged, it is not unreasonable to expect that the jealous God will everywhere vindicate his honour, when the claims of his truth are disregarded. We make this remark in view of the favour with which that counterpart of the Indian superstitions, Popery is at present regarded, by many of the Politicians of our country;...

The Bowmanville Statesman (C.W.) carried the argument on to specifics:

Will the representatives of Canada listen any longer to the Sepoy cry of such men for Separate schools? Has not the same hue and cry been reiterated over and over again by the Indian Sepoys? and does not the same motive actuate the papal Sepoy as did the Indian? Do any doubt that the papists would attempt the extirpation of
every Protestant to-morrow, if they had the least hope of success? And we ask, is that government really loyal to Britain, that would foster in Canada separate scholastic institutions, to a people who abuse every privilege granted them, and stealthily employ their sectarian institutions to poison the youth under their care.

The "sepoys" were French-Canadians, mostly. There was a shallow analogy between their religious claims and the cartridge issue. And just as British India had "pandered" to ungrateful idolatry, so Parliament had been manipulated into serving as the unthanked defender of French culture in Canada. More fundamentally, their loyalty was questioned, and had been since the Conquest. They lacked the "blood" ties requisite for loyalty to the "Mother Country".  

In truth, the francophone press did not exactly support Britain in the war. It halfheartedly upheld England as the champion of civilization in the heathen East. There were no alternatives. But French-Canadians denounced East India Company misrule, took a pessimistic view of British chances in the war, and damned the English lust for vengeance. Besides, they felt a lurking satisfaction in England's humiliation.

French Canada, too, saw the struggle overseas as an analogy. For it, the war "ce n'est pas seulement une révolte de soldats, mais un vrai (sic) révolution qui s'étend chaque jour davantage et gagne peu à peu la population...."  

Itself a conquered nation under British domination, French Canada understood that the Indians were fighting a just war for national liberation - although the connections were never made explicitly. Had atrocities not stripped the rebels of their moral
authority — and had the outcome been different — French-Canada might have made the analogy more explicit. In a sense, French-Canadians reversed the usual comparison; they imposed on India viewpoints fashioned at home. It was, in fact, a nationalist perspective. It owed nothing to London's lead, quite unlike the sentiments of their anglophone countrymen.

The Irish were Catholics, of course, and they too had ancient grievances against the English. A massive immigration of paupers escaping the famine of the '40's had engendered further ill-will in Canada. The bogey of "sepoyism" haunted them, too. Loyalists in the colony waited to pounce on any Irish sedition.

Irishmen here kept up their old juggling act. Their journals existed to combat "Orangeism" in Canada but tried to dampen suspicion by loudly proclaiming Irish loyalty to the Crown. India got the same mix of criticism and patriotism.

D'Arcy McGee, editor of The New Era, railed against the East India Company but was politic enough not to condone the rebels' methods. "All intelligent Irishmen, from the days of Burke, have disapproved the East India Company's wars and aggressions in Hindostan, but no one worthy of the name, no Christian, no civilized creature, can hold any other sentiment than utter abhorrence for the murderers of babes and violators of women taken captive in this insurrection." As insurance he frequently hailed the glory of the British army.

He also denied that Irishmen were pro-sepoy. "Some of our exchanges are making the most of a so-called "Irish" meeting in New York, to sympathize with the Sepoys. It is assumed as an evidence of
the animus of the Irish millions in the States, although the hall it was held in (the Stuyvesant Institute) will hardly contain three hundred persons. That number out of 250,000 natives of Ireland in New York and Brooklyn, cannot surely be called a representation."31

The True Witness and Catholic Chronicle staunchly defended British rule in India, preferring even a Protestant India to a heathen one. But it was saddled with an extremist Dublin correspondent, Rev. Dr. Cahill. He went so far as to call on Irishmen to seize the chance India offered, to boycott the army until man-short England gave in to reforms in Ireland.32 The editors distanced themselves from that one.

On his main theme, though, they backed him up with reprints and editorial comments. With world attention rivetted on India the good clergyman zeroed in on... the Irish problem in India! He wailed on endlessly about British army discrimination against its own Irish Catholic soldiers.33 It was as if Indians did not exist, and the land was just a backdrop for the long-running Irish drama.

Like French-Canadians, the Irish here seem to have had a perspective on the war in India based on their ethnic and religious relationship with the English. Their comments were bitter, their protestations of loyalty even shriller. If the analogies between India and Ireland were not made more explicit it might have been for pragmatic reasons: "The cause of Ireland against England is a good and holy cause, and can only be injured by any attempt to connect it with that of the Bengal Sepoys."34

The Toronto Weekly Message got its analogies from the editor's
personal predilections. William Lyon Mackenzie saw the climax of his own career, the rebellion of 1837-8, reflected in the Indian Revolt.

The British, he insisted, had deliberately goaded Indians into revolt, as a pretext to suppress reforms. The "proof" was that the Crown had done just that to Canada in 1837 and to Ireland in 1798. It was inherent in the nature of imperialism. "It is with India was it was with Canada, no reasoning, no experience, no example has any effect upon the conservative aristocracy, and their relatives, the contractors, directors, financiers, brokers, &c., who rule the empire."

"Meantime the war will carry off the dollars from Canada, disorder the national credit, and make money tight here and in Britain."

His conclusions were radical; the mentality behind them typical. Like his countrymen, Mackenzie saw India as history repeated. And he cared about India because of its cost to us.

Westerners, Canadians included, looked to the East from a Western perspective. Where we saw differences, we drew contrasts. Contrasts we interpreted as Indian failings. To make sense of India we sought similarities. We got analogies instead; analogies in which that backward land seemed to relive our own history some decades or centuries late. To correct Indian failures, to give them the benefit of our experience, we exported to them our religion, ideas, technology, and economy.

Remaking India in a Western mould was Britain's prerogative. Canadians applauded. The tone of all our journals was clear: India under the British was rated by its "progress"; that is, by the extent of its Westernization. In concrete terms that meant railways,
trade, and churches. In a more general sense it meant that India was experiencing events which we had undergone in our more advanced history. India was a kind of belated Canada. To smug English-Canadians the British achievements there were parallel enough. To disgruntled Irish and French-Canadians it harkened to their own degradation under the British. To Mackenzie it was Canada's rebellion re-lived.

We cared about India but not for India's sake. Mackenzie cared because it financed a repressive aristocracy. The Pilot worried about the moral costs to Britons of East India Company monopoly and patronage. Reprisals were the loss of Christian morals. English-Canadians saw in the Mutiny the danger of pandering to untrustworthy peoples; Irish and French-Canadians hoped it taught England a lesson in humility. Canadians were concerned about India, but mostly for its effects on Canada and Great Britain.
NOTES


4. For example, The Globe, Jan. 23, 1858, p. 21. It noted, though, that: "The Hall was by no means as well filled as it might be...." In Montreal, a Mr. J. Plimsoll, M.D., lectured on one or two occasions.


7. The Pilot, Sept. 14, 1857, p. 2b. Only local politics could compete for ink with the Mutiny. Other news - a royal wedding, Orsini's attempt on Napoleon III, numerous shipwrecks, even the China War - were mere respite. This was nothing unique to Canada or even to the British Empire. According to The New Era's Paris correspondent, Oct. 15, 1857, p. 2c: "Our journals continue to fill their columns with matters relating to the Sepoy insurrection.... Even the once pleasing heading Variété now only leads you into an ambush of Sepoys."

8. The Montreal Weekly Gazette, March 6, 1858, p. 3b. Col. John Inglis, who commanded the garrison at Lucknow after Sir Henry Lawrence's death, was from Nova Scotia - a fact which got surprisingly little attention in British North America. Lieutenants James Bradshaw and Edmond de Lotbinière Joly, both of Quebec, were British army regulars who fell at Delhi and Lucknow, respectively. Responding to the Throne Speech, the Hon. Mr. Patton agreed that the war in India "had excited the very strongest feelings throughout the country, and enlisted the sympathies of almost every man in it for the parent state." He and the Hon. Col. Prince both waxed eloquent on the malevolence of the sepoys and the heroism of British defenders - The Christian Guardian, March 6, 1858, p. 1g.

9. The Canadian Proclamation followed Britain's example of a month before. The text of the Proclamation was printed in The Pilot, Nov. 10, 1857, p. 2b.


12. Le Journal de Quebec, Nov. 7, 1857, p. 1a, for example.


16. The Pilot, Nov. 13 and 14, 1857, p. 2a and 2b, respectively.

17. The Toronto Leader, reprinted in Ibid., Nov. 17, 1857, p. 2e.

18. The Hamilton Spectator, reprinted in Ibid.


23. The letter, which attacked The Montreal Herald as a Yankee annexationist rag, was signed "British Bayonet". Printed in The Pilot, Nov. 26, 1857, p. 2e.


28. Frequently a tirade against an individual francophone would use arguments used against his nationality in general. A letter signed "Britannia" in The Quebec Gazette, Nov. 2, 1857, p. 2d, is an example: "The redacteur en chef of the newspaper "Le Canadien," a political journal basking in the sun of Government patronage, and whose "Institutions, Langue et Lois" would long ago have been among the things of the past, were it not for the protection which it enjoys under the aegis of the British Crown, and its regard for the rights and liberties of its people of all nationalities - this grateful - (sic) loyal colonist adorns the columns of his Government organ with a tissue of unfounded calumnies against the British..."
people and soldiery, which none but a renegade would have dared to utter even in this "free country."


31. *Ibid*.


33. For instance, Rev. Dr. Cahill, "On the persecution of Catholic soldiers in India - confiscation of their pay - Cruelty to their Children", *Ibid.*, Aug. 7, 1857, p. 1a. This theme was also taken up by a reprint from *The Weekly Register, Ibid.*, July 17, 1857, p. 1e, and an editorial, *Ibid.*, Aug. 28, 1857, p. 2a. *The True Witness and Catholic Chronicle*’s editorials were not so prone as the imported commentaries to forget that Indians were involved in India’s problems. The paper viewed the crisis more as a religious crusade - Christianity versus Islam and Hinduism - than as an ethnic matter. Still, the Irish analogy kept cropping up. An editorial even insisted that the cartridges were, indeed, polluted, to force the sepoys "to become Exeter Hall and Connemara Protestants." *Ibid.*, Aug. 28, 1857, p. 2a.

34. *Ibid.*, Oct. 2, 1857, p. 5a. In the end, some papers such as *The Hamilton Banner* and *The Fredericton Head Quarters* (New Brunswick), decided that *The New Era* was a closet sepoy. See *The New Era*, Oct. 24, 1857, p. 2b, and Nov. 24, 1857, p. 2d, for its denials. Ironically, the most inflammatory Irish rhetoric was imported by mainstream English-Canadian journals. Prefaced "a sample of the blasphemies of a few of the more rabid of the Irish journals," *The Pilot*, Feb. 16, 1858, p. 2c; *The Globe*, Feb. 22, 1857, p. 3b; and others ran an excerpt from *The Irish News* (New York). It truly was vitriolic, yearning for "Himalayan heaps of English slain, and Ganges' generous flood incarnadine with English blood."

The Toronto Mirror also reprinted a little ditty from the Dublin Nation:

> But the Sepoys have hoisted their banner of green,
> And they fight for their own native land,
> May our green flag, too, come into view,
> And our foes fly off from our stand.
>
> Captain Dan.


35. *The Toronto Weekly Message*, Sept. 11, 1857, p. 2a and, in a reprint introduction, p. 4a. Mackenzie sometimes got very specific in his comparisons. On the reprisals issue: "So it was in Canada in 1837-8, the Montreal Herald and like journals demanded that the
Canadians be utterly annihilated as a race..." Ibid., Sept. 18, 1857, p. 3c.

36. Ibid., Sept. 18, 1857, p. 2d. He made the same stand Aug. 14, 1857, p. 3d: "No truth is more clear to us than that British Colonies, like India, are held as a means of preserving an influence, to those who are the enemies of education and true religion at home, and of liberty everywhere."

37. Ibid., Sept. 14, 1857, p. 3b.

38. For instance, Indian "feudalism" seemed an imperfect version of Britain's own aristocracy. So land reform in the eighteenth-century sought to remake talukdars and zemindars into a proper gentry. When Britain's middle-class was able to exert its strength a new concept was exported. Now aristocrats were but parasites on the industrious classes. In some areas of India, therefore, native "aristocrats" were dispossessed. The Daily News, reprinted by The Pilot, Sept. 14, 1857, p. 2a, characterized sepoys as aristocratic idlers who enlisted "to lord it over the industrial classes."

39. Always allowing, of course, for the disruptive effects of Asiatic character. Some people saw atrocities, for instance, as symptomatic of half-barbarous peoples in all ages and places but most saw them as an Asian trait poking up through the veneer of Westernization.

40. "But all wholesale fire-raising in cities, demolition of villages, destruction of crops, blowing from guns, &c., is Satanic work at best, and not to be commended or even justified in or by Christian men." Glasgow correspondent, The Pilot, Sept. 17, 1857, p. 2c. Opposition to reprisals was almost always based on morality; rarely on pragmatic grounds such as less tension after the war.
In 1857 many Canadians dramatically expressed their solidarity with the British Empire. They volunteered to fight in India. Horse Guards, the British Army headquarters, made use of the Province's martial ardour but in a way quite unlike what the volunteers had intended.

England seemed desperately short of troops. Enlistment standards were lowered and thousands of Britons took the Queen's shilling but still more were needed. All sorts of stopgaps were rumoured. Whitehall reputedly beseeched Napoleon III for aid. The Danish Army was asked if it could spare any officers willing to serve five years in India. One hundred Austrian cavalrmen were said to have volunteered. A British Foreign Legion of mercenaries was touted. Someone estimated that one hundred and forty thousand unemployed Americans were willing to fight; another report claimed that the Niagara depot was already enlisting both Canadians and Americans.

As usual, Provincial opinion about Great Britain's plight was split along ethnic lines. French-Canadians were mischievously delighted by all the stories. They especially liked the thought of England so humbled that it needed French help, or at least a foreign legion with a French contingent. English-Canadians bridled at the very thought.

So English-Canada came to the rescue. First to offer their services were the officers and men of Provincial militia batallions. The Ottawa Field Battery volunteered in August; the Brockville Rifles
followed early the next month. The Guelph Rifles, No. 2 Rifle Company of Montreal, the York Field Battery, and the Toronto Foot Company of Volunteer Artillery tagged along in October. Lieutenant Pattison of the Toronto Volunteer Rifles called for men to join up; a veteran of 1812, Colonel Milo M'Cargar of the Grenville militia proposed to raise one hundred men. And: "The Toronto Colonist says that the colored population of Canada West contemplate forming a regiment for service in India or Canada."

The response from London was very gracious but non-committal:

The several offers have been laid before Her Majesty, who has been pleased to express the high gratification which it has afforded her to receive these additional proofs of the loyal and patriotic feelings which animate the inhabitants of Canada. Reasons may exist, which at present would make Her Majesty's Government hesitate before entertaining proposals which would involve the withdrawal of any portion of the Militia of the Province....

Nothing more was heard for some months. Horse Guards could not decide what to do with the colonial offer.

Actually, many Canadians were dubious about the venture too. No one knew how London might use the men. Would they go overseas or just replace British garrisons in North America? Would selected militia units be called up separately or would a Canadian expeditionary force be formed? God forbid that the only option be the regular army: life in the ranks, if not exactly hell, was not the best use of our valued Canadian youths. Above all, who would pay?

The militiamen were much commended for their spunk. There were
only a few grumbles, that, "Ils feraient mieux d’aider à défricher leur vaste contrée." Some supporters feared that the officers might have volunteered just to reap the credit, expecting their offer would not be taken up. If they were called up and evaded their commitment it could be embarrassing for the whole colony. All in all, the objections were pretty weak. Even so radical a journal as L'Avenir was half-minded. "Nous n'avons pas d'objection à ce que nos volontaires aillent en masse et à leurs frais et dépens montrer leur prouesse dans le guerre des Indes. Mais nous protestons hautement contre le projet de taxer le peuple canadien pour aider aux tyrans de l'Inde à maintenir leur cruel et barbare despotisme." It need not have worried. By convention the Provincial government would have to give its approval before its militia could go off to fight for Britain. But it had no intention of paying for the militia's little adventure.

More worrisome were the myriad young civilians tempted to run off to war. Toronto alone was said to have had more than five hundred men anxious to join up. No doubt some burned to serve Queen and Empire or to avenge Indian crimes. Others, of course, had less patriotic motives. For some the appeal was:

partly for the sake of the "fun of the thing," as they would call it, and partly, with the more intelligent particularly, for the sake of expanding their ideas, by visiting foreign lands.

An awful lot more needed the money. The country, the whole Western world in fact, was in the grips of economic depression.
Under ordinary circumstances, we should deem it the duty of the public press rather to discourage than encourage this species of enthusiasm, which seems to be growing and extending day by day. But when we know that the streets of our towns, as well as those of the neighboring American cities, are and must continue for a great part, if not all, the coming winter to be filled with people lacking employment; that they must suffer a good deal of privation and hardship ere better times come round, and be tempted to all sorts of evil courses to get the food with which their industry will scarce supply them, we cannot but feel that men can be spared from Canada better now than at any other time, and if they wish to serve their Queen, and sustain their fellow countrymen in so great and noble a struggle as that in which British arms are now engaged in Hindostan, we must wish them heartily God speed.20

They could not all go overseas with our tiny militia companies. Nor was the regular British Army much of an alternative. It had a minimum ten-year enlistment term and the soldier's lot was a harsh one. When the economy turned around the New World would need its young men to develop the continent. So Canada's would-be soldiers needed a different arrangement. The trick was to get it, without Canada having to pay for it.

"They must form a distinctive corps from the line. Ours must be Canadian corps, and the promise of promotion from the ranks for merit must be one of the incitements to them to do their duty. Their terms of service too must be shortened to say two years, or till the restoration of order in India. On these terms we are satisfied one or two effective corps might be raised in Canada...."21 The Montreal Weekly Gazette knew that colonial society was more egalitarian than the
Old Country's, and the army would have to recognize it, too. But there was no sign that the corps had to be distinctively Canadian as an expression of "national" pride.

Nationalism was more evident in a proposal from The Quebec Military Gazette. It wanted a "Royal Canadian Army." The editors seem to have envisaged Canada raising three regiments, including one of French-Canadians. Nova Scotia and New Brunswick together might add another. These would replace most of the British garrisons in North America, except those of Quebec, Halifax, and the Royal Canadian Rifles. Since this scheme would spare several British regiments for India the paper apparently expected London to pay for the colonial units. It went on to say: "si nous devons devenir un État, il nous faut une force armée, et si nous voulons assurer notre indépendance, cette force doit être proportionnée à cette fin."23

Canadians, English or French, were not ready for either an army or an expeditionary corps. One journal quite rightly protested that French-Canadians would have been branded as traitors had they proposed an army for independence.24 Our money would be better spent if given to the Indian Relief Fund than if given to the army, said another.25 Britain was no friend to our prosperity if the flower of our youth was taken for defence.26 Involvement in wars in which we had no direct interest would strain imperial unity. We needed our soldiers at home to ward off the United States.27 One simply insisted, "Nous répétons qu'il est du devoir d'une métropole de défendre ses colonies contre les ennemis."28 We had lots of excuses for a sudden bout of non-interventionism.
The real reason we did not want any soldiers was that we did not want to pay for them. No one really believed that Great Britain would pay for our army. Many suspected the Province would be saddled with the bills if either the militia or other volunteers went to India. Soldiering was not for Canada, anyway; our contribution to Empire lay elsewhere. "Leave to Britain Imperial deliberations, for embassies and the power and responsibility of the sword; the Colonies have enough to do for some generations to come, in extending a belt of civilization from the coal fields of Cape Breton, to the coast of Vancouver's Island.... Every penny expended by Canada in playing at soldiers is a penny worse than wasted."  

Meanwhile, the War Office was trying to decide what to do with our volunteers. There were several arguments against using them at all. Whatever their rank, many of the militiamen were gentlemen, often professionals, mostly British-Canadians. A battalion was often as much a social club as a fighting force and the officers would pay substantial expenses to belong. In the United Kingdom integrating such gentlemen-soldiers into the war had been a headache. The Commander-in-Chief of the army was against the very idea: "I also hope you will on no account give way to Volunteer Corps, of which I see so much said in the newspapers. These never will answer; they are unmanageable bodies, and would ruin our Army."  

Not all the men of our volunteering units meant to go overseas, either. Too many had businesses or families to leave. This problem was minor, though. The gaps could have been filled by the many young civilians clamouring for action. Besides, the men need not have been
sent to India; they could have relieved regular garrisons in Canada or elsewhere.

There was one very good reason to accept Canadian volunteers. Diplomacy. During the Crimean War there was a lot of talk about raising a regiment or two from the Province. When the British sought approval for the project from the Canadian government, our cabinet declined to give it. A memorandum explained:

Should the War be protracted or the course of events render it necessary to employ the whole Military force of the Empire in the East, the Committee have too much reason to believe that attempts similar to those from time to time made on Cuba, and in the years 1838-1839 on Canada would be made by the party alluded to.

In other words, fear of the United States caused the Canadian government to scotch plans for an expeditionary force to the Crimea. But in Canada many people believed that the British had snubbed us. As the story went, our offer was returned unanswered, on the insultingly thin excuse that it was addressed to the wrong office.

This time the Americans were on our side. So Colonial Secretary Labouchere wrote to the Prime Minister:

The Canadian Artillery Corps at Kingston in Canada have volunteered to go to India. Panmure wishes me to write to say that the General declines their offer. I confess I have great doubts of the wisdom of this step, and am afraid that it will be ill-received in Canada. I cannot imagine why means cannot be found of employing colonists who make such an offer. I feel sure that the effect of doing so would in the colony itself be most useful.
Palmerston's response was, "Why should not the Canadian Artillery be gratified by a couple of years' service in India?" At that time the need for men dovetailed nicely with the need to humour the colonials.

But when Delhi was re-taken the immediate panic for more men subsided. Horse Guards could look to the future. It had already decided to permanently build up the size of the army by adding fifteen second battalions. For this it wanted regular recruits, men ready to sign on for the regulation ten-year enlistment term. Canada's militia, and most of our other volunteers, had meant to serve only for the duration of the war.

The volunteers never did get a definite yes or no from London. Their offer just lapsed with the crisis. But they had already had some impact, for they had shown that the colonies were willing to fight for the Empire. That must have encouraged the War Office to go ahead with a scheme it had been quietly nurturing since June, long before the volunteers spoke up. The British Army wanted a Canadian regiment of the line. It would be something quite new in imperial defence arrangements.

Colonials were by no means rare in the British Army. Quite a few Canadians were already fighting in India: among the officers were Capt. Butt, 79th Highlanders; Lieut. Joly, 32nd Regiment; Capt. McGill, 60th Rifles; Lieut. Forsyth, also of the 60th; Lieut. Bradshaw, 52nd Regiment; Lieut. E.J. Badgly, 1st Royal Regiment; Lieut. McKay, 97th Regiment; Lieut. Sewell, 86th Regiment; Assistant Surgeon Sewell, Bengal Fusiliers (East India Company Army), and Assistant Surgeon H.T. Reade, V.C., 61st Regiment. Joly, Bradshaw, and McKay died there.
But there were no colonial regiments of the line, none which Horse Guards could post to India or anywhere else overseas. Militia-men signed up for local defence only and colonial governments could stop their use elsewhere, as Canada did during the Crimean War. The British Army maintained a few distinctively colonial units, such as the Royal Canadian Rifles, but they too were restricted to local use. The odd colonial unit had, in time, been raised to the status of a regular regiment of the line: the New Brunswick Fencibles, for instance, had become the 104th. But at no time had there ever been a colonial regiment founded specifically for use in the Empire beyond the colony itself.

The idea of one, though, had been kicking around for some time. The panic for men in June 1857 caused London to seriously consider two different schemes.

"I am all for raising a black regiment from the Negroes in Canada," wrote Prime Minister Palmerston, "and for sending it as soon as formed to the West Indies to take the place of a West India regiment to be sent on to India. If we find no great difficulty in raising a black regiment in Canada, we might go on to raise a second...." Blacks were thought to bear tropical heat better than Europeans could, hence their value. The Toronto Colonist reported this scheme in October as the idea of escaped American slaves living in Canada, but it was probably initiated by London much earlier. In any event, nothing came of it.

The other proposal rudely interrupted the August vacation of Canada's Governor, Sir Edmund Head:
I was quietly refreshing myself in Cornwall when I got a letter from Mr. Labouchere saying that serious thoughts were again entertained of raising a regiment in B.N. America; and desiring me to see Lord Panmure and the D. of Cambridge on the subject. Much to my disgust I came up yesterday (from Bodmin in 12 hours). I have not yet seen Lord Panmure, but I have just come from the Horse Guards where I have talked the matter over with the Duke of Cambridge and General Yorke.

It is evident that H.R.H. is very anxious the thing should be done: General Yorke, I can see, on the other hand does not like encroaching too much on the patronage of the Horse Guards and would give nothing to the Colonists but the subalterns' commissions. The Duke proposes to write to you confidentially & ask you to consult de Rottenburg & prepare a scheme. This scheme if it is ready, I am to see when I pass through London in October. It will not of course be made public or communicated to the Canadian Government until approved and settled here.43

Clearly the impetus for this project came from England, not Canada. Our militiamen had not even offered their services that early in the war. But the volunteers might have forced the issue. While London hemmed and hawed for months the offers flowing from this country showed that Canadians were ready to fight for Queen and Empire. In February 1858 a royal warrant authorized recruiting in the colonies for the imperial army.44

London's decision to recruit colonials was an aberration of the times. In the panic for men the War Office was willing to experiment. For a while it found itself with two conflicting policies - policies which would have led to two very different models of an army.

Westminster's long-term intention was to rid the British taxpayer
of imperial defence costs. In 1846 the Colonial Secretary Lord Grey, had announced that the imperial garrisons in the Australian colonies were to be reduced, and military installations would henceforth be maintained by the colonists. If they wanted any additional imperial protection the colonies would have to pay the extra costs. Alternatively, they could raise their own local forces, in which case London would provide expertise to help them. It was thus a policy not only of reducing British expenditures but also of encouraging colonies to undertake their own defence.45

The idea was pursued fairly vigourously, even though problems and delays kept cropping up all over the Empire due to local circumstances. A little later on the plan was extended, with some modifications, to Canada.46 At the time of the Mutiny the Colonial Secretary sent a circular to the colonies urging them to upgrade their militias so that the hard-pressed army would be relieved of some of its burden.47 In 1861 a select committee of the House of Commons was set up to recommend changes to the proportion of defence costs borne by the colonies and the United Kingdom. It concluded that colonial responsible government implied a responsibility to look after their own defence. Basically, the British taxpayer was to be liable only for the costs of the navy, the defence of areas kept for purely "imperial" reasons - such as Gibraltar and Halifax - and for the retention of a mixed bag of poorer dependencies. The imperial garrisons were yanked from Australia and New Zealand; only serious external threats kept them in Canada and the Cape for a few more years. By 1871 the only British soldiers in Canada were guarding the naval stations of Halifax and Esquimalt. The
end result of this policy was to create "national" armies in each of the major colonies.

The Canadian regiment was an experiment in quite the opposite direction. Colonials were expensive - just getting them to England was a cost in itself - but in the scare of the Mutiny money was no object. So far, it was just another of those little interruptions in the trend toward "retrenchment". But Governor-General Head saw the regiment as the first step to a much grander policy, a military pattern new to the Empire.

Great Britain is, as it were, placed in the centre of a circle: every man who emigrates to Canada or Australia has hitherto ceased to be available for any military purpose other than the defence of the single and distant point on the circumference which he may have adopted as his new home.

But if a regiment for general service can be, from time to time, drawn from one (of) these outlying points, it will be so much gained: the population, not of Great Britain & Ireland, but of the whole Empire may contribute in some degree to the military strength of the whole.... The increase of the larger Colonies may thus tend to augment the active military force of England, and the inhabitants of each may be available for something more than the passive protection of its own soil. In this case, the British Army would grow with the growth, and strengthen with the strength of her Provinces as well as with her own, and would be so constituted as to represent them & combine in itself elements contributed by each.49

His scheme anticipated by several decades New Zealand's contribution of ships and men to the Royal Navy. No doubt, too, he expected the colonies eventually would pay for their share of the imperial army.
Head's vision would have been a truly imperial army: an amalgam of "national" regiments under one flag, serving anywhere in the Empire, in war and in peace.

At least one journalist at the time was able to guess at the scope of this scheme and its political impact on imperial unity - even if he attributed it to the wrong person.

Lord Panmure, by bringing forward the establishment of a Canadian regiment .... might even have thought that it would not be a bad idea to have a regiment from every colony under the British crown, representing that colony in the army of the Parent State, sharing alike its toils and triumphs, its deadly struggles and its glorious victories; and proving no mean links in the chain which binds indissolubly the home feelings and the interests of Great Britain and her dependencies. 50

The experiment got underway on Wednesday, March 3, 1858. The Canada Gazette formally proclaimed that:

... Her Most Gracious Majesty The Queen hath been pleased to approve of the raising within this Province of Canada, of a Regiment of Infantry, consisting of One Thousand rank and file, to be styled "The 100th," or "Prince of Wales' Royal Canadian Regiment,"....
NOTES

1. Reporters gave varying reasons for the recruiting shortfall. The London correspondent for The Pilot, Aug. 21, 1857, p. 2d, wrote that: "The lower orders, and from these we get our soldiers, do not feel an interest, a personal interest, in either quarrel (India and China Wars), and then the climate of India deters young men from embarking in its hazards." The Glasgow correspondent in the same journal, Oct. 12, 1857, p. 2b, and The New Era, March 4, 1858, p. 2b, blamed British social policy for depopulating those traditional pools of recruits, the Highlands and Ireland.

2. Le Journal de Quebec, Aug. 11, 1857, p. 2c.


6. "Most of these men are good shots and far better material for making soldiers than the artizans of Manchester or the street boys of London. They will fight, they will endure hardship, they will obey intelligently. As to the legality of enlisting them we take that to be unquestionable, as the Indian States or Rajahs are not officially known to our government; and even if it were not, no sane official in this country would interfere to prevent these poor fellows earning a livelihood, and thus save them from doing mischief here this winter." The New York Herald, reprinted in The Montreal Weekly Gazette, Oct. 24, 1857, p. 3c.

7. The Toronto Weekly Message, Aug. 14, 1857, p. 2c. This report was probably incorrect. A Royal warrant authorizing recruiting men in Canada was not issued until February 1858. It was even less likely that American citizens would have been taken. Washington had protested that its neutrality had been violated when Americans were recruited on United States soil by the British Army during the Crimean War.

8. To follow this rumour, see Le Journal de Quebec, Aug. 11 and 29, Oct. 8 and 31, 1857, pp. 2c and 1d, 1a and 1c, respectively.

9. Ibid., Aug. 22, 1857, p. 2c; and The Quebec Gazette, Sept. 9, 1857, p. 2c.


15. Unnamed journal quoted in The Montreal Weekly Gazette, Oct. 31, 1857, p. 4a, said, "We also trust that the young men in question mean what they say, and that if their offer should be accepted there will be no backing out on their part." The Gazette added that it was relieved so many men had volunteered. "It is not now a question of Col. Prince or Col. Rankin seeking éclat by offering what they could perform, but we have men offering to serve, not asking to command."

16. L'Avenir, Nov. 2, 1857, p. 3b.


21. Ibid.

22. The Royal Canadian Rifle Regiment was a British Army unit comprised of soldiers who were settled in Canada. It was limited to service in the colony.

23. The Quebec Military Gazette, reprinted in translation in Le Journal de Quebec, Sept. 15, 1857, p. 1a. The emphases were certainly added by Le Journal. Unfortunately, the extant collection of the Military Gazette is very incomplete. Its proposal must be reconstructed from fragments quoted or reprinted in other journals. The passage quoted in this study only sounds revolutionary: no doubt the Military Gazette meant that if Canada became independent it would need an army, and a sizeable one, to fend off the United States.

26. Le Courrier de St.-Hyacinthe, March 9, 1858, p. 2a.
27. The New Era, reprinted in translation by Ibid.
29. The Quebec Chronicle, reprinted in The Acadian Recorder (Halifax, N.S.), March 27, 1858, p. 2c.
30. L'Avenir, Oct. 1, 1857, p. 3c, derided this aspect of the militia. "Les volontiers sont partout, aux bals, aux promenades, aux sociétés savantes, esperons aux talons, sabres au côté, et avec tout le baggage du costume ridicule et absurde qu'ils portent. Rien le plus ridicule que de voir parader partout ces hommes grossiers et ignorants qui se croient quelque chose, parce qu'ils sont revêtus de l'habit de la soldatesque."
32. The Ottawa Citizen, reprinted in The Quebec Gazette, Sept. 11, 1857, p. 2e.
34. The anecdote was recounted by Mr. Justice Haliburton, of "Sam Slick" fame, in Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, vol. 82, July 1857, p. 121. The insult was also recalled in a letter-to-the-editor in The New Era, March 6, 1858, p. 2c. The Quebec Gazette, Aug. 14, 1857, p. 1e denied the story was true but conceded that it was widely accepted in the country.
36. Palmerston to Panmure, Sept. 25, 1857, in Ibid.
37. There was also some small pressure from the British press in favour of colonial help for the war effort. For instance, Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, Vol. 82, July 1857, p. 121 had written: "And we cannot help adverting to what we consider a gross oversight - to use the mildest expression - on the part of our government, in not appealing to the loyal colonies for assistance in the prosecution of an important war. Would it not have been the natural, prudent, and patriotic course to have recruited our armies from the masses of the western population - from men of our blood and kindred, fellow-subjects of the Queen, and inheritors of all


40. Stanley, p. 214. The 104th Regiment had since been disbanded.


42. The Toronto Colonist, reprinted in The Montreal Weekly Gazette, Oct. 24, 1857, p. 6h, described the "Emancipation Societies, composed for the most part of escaped slaves, and free coloured men.... and we have understood that they contemplate offering to raise a regiment, either to go to India, to serve in Canada, or to be employed in any way, or for any period, that may be deemed most advisable by the Imperial Government." The newspaper was describing a volunteer unit; London's plan was probably for a regular black regiment. It may have been considered as early as June. Lord Panmure to Lord Clarendon, June 1857, in The Panmure Papers, Vol. II, p. 392, asked if a black regiment in Jamaica could be spared " - in which case, I could manage to send it directly to India, and replace it by a new corps to be raised in Canada."

43. Head to Eyre, confidential, August 22, 1857, P.R.O., P.R.O. 30/46/18, quoted in D.G.G. Kerr, Sir Edmund Head: Scholarly Governor, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1954, p. 137. Lieut.-General Sir Wm. Eyre was commander of imperial troops in Canada. Labouchere was the Colonial Secretary. Baron de Rottenburg was Adjutant-General of Militia in Canada.

44. Lord Panmure had informed the Queen that: "Your Majesty's servants are informed that many men may be obtained, especially in the Australian colonies, by this step." But apparently attention
was directed instead to the scheme for a Canadian regiment. See Panmure to the Queen, Feb. 1, 1858, in The Panmure Papers, Vol. II, pp. 473-4.


46. Ibid.

47. Labouchere's "Defence of the Colonies" circular was printed in The New Era, Nov. 10, 1857, p. 2e.

48. Tunstall, pp. 829-834.

49. Head to Stanley, May 1, 1858, P.R.O., C.O. 42/613, quoted in Kerr, pp. 141-142. Lord Stanley was the new Colonial Secretary.

50. The Quebec Gazette, March 3, 1858, p. 2d.

A dramatic burst of military fervour was Canada's most notable — and surprising — response to the Mutiny in India. The volunteers of 1857, and the men of the 100th Regiment after them, were anxious to brave distance, climate, disease, and sepoys' bullets for Queen and Empire. It was a spirit not to be expected in that supposed age of "Little Englandism," especially for a colony with so little direct interest in fighting half-way around the globe.

The response was Canadian; the form was British. Rather than take flash-in-the-pan volunteers, London opted for a colonial regiment to help flesh out the larger army that the Mutiny had shown was needed in peacetime as well as war. It was an experiment unlike anything else in Canada's long relationship with the Empire.

Had the volunteers been taken, the result might have been comparable to the contingents sent to the Boer War. The men were much the same: middle-class or "gentlemen" militiamen, mostly, anxious to show their patriotism in a brief and glorious adventure. The ranks of the 100th, by contrast, were for "regulars" only. Who were these men who signed up to follow the flag for ten long years? And how was the regiment received by the public? In 1858 Canada was not the Dominion which so confidently claimed the twentieth-century for itself. The colony was only just beginning to feel its strength, to cast expansionist eyes westward, and to talk of the Confederation which ultimately would
re-order imperial affairs.

The Proclamation founding the regiment came at a time when the Mutiny had inflamed old quarrels. English-Canadians were infused with a rally-round-the-standard patriotism; French-Canadians pointed to the East as another failure of British imperial policy. Arguments for and against a Royal Canadian Army had worsened things. Inevitably, the 100th became yet another contentious issue.

Most English-Canadians were pretty keen about the idea of a Canadian Regiment. It was partly a matter of interpretation. Many people assumed that the Mother Country was paying a compliment to her strong and worthy offspring. England founded the regiment not just to get men for India but as a gesture of confidence in the colony and as a response to the volunteers. Many remarks pointed to this motive. "It was supposed a great compliment was to be paid to Canada by this military movement...," wrote one newspaper. Another smugly decided, "This is no empty compliment to Canada." Added yet another, "There is no doubt that our provincial vanity is, to some extent, gratified by having a Regiment almost if not altogether composed of Canadians." The Quebec Gazette spoke warmly of:

The gratitude due Lord Panmure for his kindness in extending to Canada the boon of enabling men to embrace the profession and "pittance" of a soldier.

His Lordship uses no argument, makes no appeal; he grants that which was appealed for, and grants it to Canadians on the same terms that Englishmen, Irishmen, and Scotchmen, receive it, and having received it cherish with a love and defend it with a zeal, the amount of which their enemies best can tell.
As is evident in this statement and many others, Canadians believed that the 100th Regiment was the product of the clamour for action raised by the volunteers of the previous autumn. No one seemed to consider that a regular regiment was a rather inappropriate response to amateur soldiers. Perhaps the prestige of a regular army unit, especially one honoured as "The Prince of Wales' Own", overshadowed that of any contingent of county militias.

The belief that England was complimenting Canada by "granting" it a regiment probably reflected the colony's changing role in the Empire. Canada was still just a colony, dependent on Great Britain for protection, a considerable volume of trade, and for a cultural alternative to the Americans. "Little Englandism" was a philosophy found in the Old Country much more than in the colonies. The occasional encouraging gesture from Westminster was still much appreciated here. But Canada was also an important colony, a growing place with potential and aspirations on a continental scale: within a decade Confederation would revamp imperial relations. The notion of a compliment was held by that section of society which had an image of the Province as a place important enough for the British to humour.

The regiment's supporters, like the volunteers before them, were anxious to exert Canada's strength in the imperial cause in the East. But it was not so much an imperialist philosophy as it was plain rally-round-the-flag patriotism. Nor was it a very clearly expressed nationalist sentiment. Carl Berger has argued that Canadian imperialists of later decades were actually nationalists. They saw the Empire as a forum in which Canada could pursue a greater destiny, a shortcut to
world power since Canada and the other "white" Dominions could run the Empire in partnership with Great Britain. It is possible that some Canadians were thinking that way in 1858, if in an embryonic way. If so, none were saying it very clearly. The "big thinkers" in those days still dreamed of unifying British North America and of expanding across the continent, not of foreign muscle-flexing.

The regiment's opponents were more obviously nationalistic. They recognized that Canada was not England and that our destiny was to develop our chunk of North America. These critics were numerous, as even The Quebec Gazette had to admit. Among them were many of the anglophones who had objected to the idea of a Canadian Army, and for many of the same reasons. Also opposed were most of the Irish and French-Canadians, the bulk of the population.

Most francophone journals just ignored the regiment; they kept it out of the news as much as they could and so, presumably, reduced its "visibility" to the French-Canadian public. The rest of the French-language newspapers actively discouraged enlistments. They often utilized the practical arguments raised by some anglophones against recruiting here, but their real reason seems to have been an emotional dislike of things British. They had a distinctive attitude moulded by the Conquest: an insular and self-sufficient nationalism which tried to avoid outside entanglements. A British Army regiment raised in the colony for foreign service was contrary to every French-Canadian value.

During the Canadian Army debate many anglophones had objected to the colony spending money on defence:
Leave to Britain Imperial deliberations, for embassies and the power and responsibility of the sword; the Colonies have enough to do for some generations to come, in extending a belt of civilization from the coal fields of Cape Breton, to the coast of Vancouver's Island.... Every penny expended by Canada in playing at soldiers is a penny worse than wasted.

But the 100th was paid for by London, so that many English-Canadians who objected to a Provincial army were quite happy to see the colonial regiment. For French-Canadians, though, the regiment's true "cost" was in men rather than in dollars. Their insular nationalism emphasized that the colony was a very small and weak place in a big world. Every man enlisted was another lost from the task of developing the Province.

French-Canadians protested the raising of the 100th far more than they had objected to Canadian volunteers going to fight in India. The volunteers, of course, would have been back within a year or two: regulars were "lost" for a decade at least.

The cost in men was not just in hands lost to the Province. There was also the misery of soldiering, of the social degradation which was as bad as the dangers of the field. A description of flogging
prompted a bitter reminder: "Jeunes gens intelligents du Canada engagez-vous donc dans le 100e régiment de l'humaine et libre Angleterre!... Voilà en échantillon des tortures auxquelles elle les soumet, et une preuve de son respect pour la vie et la dignité de ses serviteurs!"  

Social differences between Canada and England were a favourite weapon of the regiment's critics. For instance, a letter-to-the-editor signed "Young Canada" systematically demolished recruiters' promises. It savaged the claim that life in the ranks was as rewarding as were many, many commercial jobs, discounted the vaunted "probability" of any private ever reaching "the highest grade" of the army, and called the pension a "miserable pittance." The letter took special aim at British snobbery:

"Now is the imperial Government in earnest? Does it really think that any sane man in "this Canada" will throw away the prime of his life, and submit to be lorded over by Chaw-les and Frew-wick? - Guess not! Any military system attempted in this country must have for its basis promotion by merit - only. The young men of Canada are too democratic in their ideas for any other."

The Montreal Weekly Gazette had made exactly the same point about a merit system in connection with a Canadian contingent for India. Another observer now applauded, "Nous désirons que cette lettre ait de l'écho dans l'esprit et dans le coeur de toute notre jeunesse."

Half of the officers of the 100th were to be British, some transferred from other regiments or from the half-pay list, others promoted from the Lucknow garrison. Worse, they were to be the
seniors of their ranks. The adjutant, Lieutenant-Colonel, and the
Colonel were all British - although the Colonelcy was a purely
honorary post and the real commander, Lieutenant-Colonel de
Rottenburg, had strong connections with the colony. Horse Guards
could hardly have given all the commissions to Canadian officer-
candidates, who were all quite inexperienced. Still, at least one
colonial journalist was miffed by the "insult".

How much the 100th or "Prince of
Wales" is a Canadian Regiment may be
learned from the fact that the chief
appointments are to be made in England
.... We are fully justified in styling
the present attempt to raise troops in
Canada, and pay a compliment to her
people - an abortion.

This reaction smacked of the Crimean "insult". Both were products of
the snobbery issue - indeed, "Young Canada" had remembered the 1855
fiasco as another proof of his contentions. Both "insults" depended
on the very high opinion that colonists had of their homeland, and
on the perception of a social gulf between colony and metropolis. The
insults were made all the more heinous by inflated expectations of a
compliment.

At any rate, Canadian officer-candidates, at least, were not
fazed by the rigid class system incorporated into the 100th Regiment:
many of them were the social elite of the colony. The selection
process ensured that.

Half the officers - one major, six captains, eight lieutenants,
and a handful of ensigns - were to be residents of Canada. They had
to get a personal recommendation from the Governor, pretty well
excluding all but the social elite. Then they had to prove their
military competence to a Board of Officers drawn from the imperial garrison. Finally, in a quaint custom long since dropped in England, they had to raise a certain number of recruits for the regiment.  

Lieutenants had to supply at least forty men passed and attested, captains needed eighty, and the major had to find two hundred.  

Ensigns, the lowest commissioned rank, did not need any. The commissions were granted without purchase, as was normal for newly-formed regiments.

The Brant Expositor, for one, was not impressed:

Why, the raising of 80 men by each of the six Captains would cost double the price of a commission, so that in a pecuniary point of view, no advantage is offered to Canadians in that respect. The conditions altogether are so preposterously outrageous, that a man must indeed have lost all dignity and self respect if he condescend to accept a commission so hampered with absurd stipulations. Red tape and ignorance of Canada seem to prevail at Horse Guards.

Another observer was far more content:

It is a recognition, in the highest quarter, of the loyal ardor of Her Majesty's subjects here, and in a substantial way. For in no manner could anyone in England enter the army as a Major, Captain, or Lieutenant; whereas in this case, the major, the six captains, the eight lieutenants, will be gazetted to those positions at once.

Apparently a lot of other people were enthusiastic about the offer, too. One newspaper reported that one hundred and fifty applications for commissions had been received; another said that more than a hundred would have to be refused for lack of space. Yet another exulted that:
The Proclamation for raising the 100th Regiment has excited a remarkable fervour among the young gentry of the Province. We understand that upward of 600 applications for permission to raise men, have been received from candidates for commissions, over and above the number required. It will be necessary to raise two or three Canadian regiments to satisfy the martial spirit that has been evoked in this class of recruits.26

Actually, regimental records show only twenty-four serious candidates. But these include only those whom the Governor recommended. No doubt there were many, many who never got that far. The Canadian Premier, John A. Macdonald, referred two candidates to the authorities and at least one of them does not show up in the records.27

Nineteen were chosen.28 Probably all but three were born in Canada or had long resided here.29 Four of the lieutenants were French Canadians.

Most of them were scions of the Provincial elite. British officers were expected to be gentlemen, of course, and the Governor was unlikely to personally know any but the upper crust. Three of the candidates were born in the innermost circles of the "Family Compact", the oligarchy which had controlled Upper Canada in the 1820's and '30's.30 One of the French-Canadians was the son of the Seigneur de Mille Isles, another was a son of the Seigneur de Beauport. Both families had served in the British Army since the eighteenth-century.31 Ensign Ridout came from a prominent Loyalist family and was son of the Cashier of the Bank of Upper Canada; Major Dunn's father had been the Receiver-General of Canada.32 Captain Price was the scion of a lumber baron, from one of the richest families in the land.33 At least
two more officers were the sons of colonels; another came from an old family top-heavy with judges and lawyers. Almost half of the Upper Canadian officers were former Upper Canada College boys.

So tight was the circle from which these gentlemen sprang that some were related by marriage. Major Dunn's father had wed the sister of Lieutenant Duchesnay. It seems that two or three of the ensigns were connected in this way, too. Ensign William Clarke seems to have been Captain John Clarke's son. Perhaps those detractors who demanded that the regiment be fitted to a Canadian, rather than a British, mould ignored the fact that the upper crust of both societies were pretty much the same. Top British families had always thought of the army as not only an honourable career but also as a splendid sort of "finishing school" for sons, and no doubt some of the 100th's commissions were used this way, too.

There were a few apparent exceptions to this web of wealth, power, and prestige. Captain George Macartney had been a postmaster at Paris, C.W., for the past twenty-one years. But he was also a long-time militiamen, having served in the rebellion of 1837. Captain John Clarke had entered the army as a lowly schoolmaster-sergeant. After eleven years, some of them in India, he left the service as a sergeant-major. Another candidate had served twenty-nine years, rising from the ranks. No doubt in all these cases their military experience was too good for the regiment to pass them by.

Some of the would-be officers had already been blooded. One had served in the Ceylon Rifles and the 21st Regiment and had fought in the Crimea with the Scots Greys. De Bellefeuille had warred in
Africa and in the Crimea with the French Foreign Legion. Another French-Canadian, Louis Casault, had also fought with the Foreign Legion and was wounded at Sebastopol. Alexander Dunn was Canada's native-born hero: winner of the Victoria Cross at "The Charge of the Light Brigade." With that reputation he was everyone's choice for major and managed to raise the mandatory two hundred followers.

Most of the rest were militia officers. Captains Terrence Smythe and John Fletcher were the commanders of units which had volunteered to fight in India. Both had also been militia volunteers during the troubles of 1837-9. Another had volunteered for the regiment that Canadians had hoped to send to the Crimean War. None of the ensigns had, or needed, any military training.

Canadians seemed to think that their officer-candidates were pretty good. The Mail declared that the regiment was well officered. Successful candidates got fulsome tributes in the newspapers. And, of course, the perception of an "insult" to Canada by the inclusion of British officers was an inverted expression of confidence in our own "boys". In fact, though, Canadian military talent seems to have been a bit thin. The rules had to be bent to give some of the locals a chance. Alfred Rykert, for instance, got a commission without any military experience whatsoever. At least he only got a lieutenancy; Richard Price, with only eighteen months as a ranker in the militia, got a captaincy! Ensigns were tested purely on their classical educations. Candidates for higher posts were supposed to have been given the usual test for military competence by a Board of Officers. But Horse Guards later had one officer re-write it, "the examination
to which he appears to have been subjected on the raising of the 100th Regiment being by no means as minute or extending to the same points as that laid down in Her Majesty's Regulations as qualifying an Officer to be promoted to the rank of Captain.\(^{54}\)

There was one other little quirk in the selection of officers.

The parliamentary correspondent of *The Montreal Herald* reported:

> Le bruit court parmi les députés bas-Canadiens qu'une lettre d'un certain M.P.P. adressée au Gouverneur... et qu'elle avertissait Son Excellence de ne pas donner de commissions aux Canadiens-français à cause de leur déloyauté.

The Governor paid no attention and the French-language press just let the matter die. But it shows the deep ethnic animosities which could impinge on any matter involving officialdom.

So the officers were chosen. They still had to get recruits.

Surely it was a comment on the times that we have to follow the officers to learn anything about the men - regimental records do not have even a list of their names! For more we must look to memoirs, newspapers, parliamentary papers, and proceedings against deserters.

Ensign Charles Boulton later recalled the splendid sight of the first recruiter - himself - in the Peterborough area, Canada West:

> My father supplied me with what necessary funds I wanted, lent me his waggon and a pair of horses, and I engaged a friend who played the bag-pipes, the only musical instrument I could procure in the neighbourhood, for recruiting purposes. With an old-fashioned uniform, lent me by an officer who had early settled in the country, I started off to visit the neighbouring villages to recruit; and I need hardly
say that I was the envy and admiration of every youth of my own age who witnessed my progress through the country. At the end of a fortnight I had got together twenty of as fine, young, backwoods fellows as one could wish to see.  

It was done on only a slightly more heroic scale in the cities, too. Although provincial wages were higher than those in the Old Country, the army offered only the regulation pay, the usual free kit, and the normal three pound bounty.  

But officer-candidates could offer as much extra money as they wanted from their own pockets. So the notorious skulduggery of the recruiting-sergeant came to Canada. Private Henry Gorman, whose memoirs are our only voice from the ranks, said that Major Dunn was offering an extra three pounds bounty to anyone enlisting for him. The money did not show up until Gorman had complained all the way up to Colonel Rollo, Quartermaster-General of the forces in Canada and the man responsible for organizing the 100th. "I am sure," said Gorman, "there were not many others who enlisted who received any of the extra bounty."  

As always, liquor was a great persuader. Amid other regimental records is a lawyer's letter regarding one Joseph Breault, a French-Canadian, who "was made intoxicated and in that state induced to enlist...." He was fourteen years old. Another rather pathetic testimonial to recruiting techniques was the obituary for "Scotch Will", a Brantford derelict, who, "having become connected with the enlisting parties around town, had scarcely drawn a sober breath for a month or two."  

One officer-candidate was particularly sordid in his quest for names:
A young married man of the name of Sheriff, a medical student in Montreal, had after a week's dissipation and drunkenness been enlisted for Mr. Hays, it came to the knowledge of his wife, an interesting young person, who upon hearing the step her husband had taken went nearly deranged; she used her utmost endeavours with Mr. Hays to let her husband off and prevent him being attested, and to get him to pay smart [money], Mr. Hays prevented this, and Sheriff was sworn in, when to all accounts he was labouring under delirium tremens, he was brought to my office by his wife, in the hope that I would let her husband off. She was in great agony of mind and hysterical; I had given her a chair, and she was sobbing and begging hard for me if possible to let her husband off. To calm her I said, "I will see what can be done when your husband is brought before me for final approval." Mr. Hays, who was in the room without my knowledge, (there being upwards of thirty persons in the room) rushed through the crowd gathered round the table, and in a loud authoritative tone addressed me. "You cannot let him off, he is my recruit, and I will hold him, I have a receipt for him, here it is, and that is sufficient for me."

So what kind of men were these heroes marching off to fight for Queen and Country? The evidence above tends to confirm The Toronto Colonist in its suspicions that they were the denizens of "tap-rooms." Another suggested that:

The regiment will be well officered; but we are doubtful if the rank and file will impress the people of Britain, whither they are to be sent as soon as organized, with a very favorable opinion of our Canadian population. The class of men popularly known as "hard cases" compose the majority of the recruits, and we fear the regiment will soon get the cognomen of the "hard hundredth."
Le Pays was the most angry. Citing The Globe it claimed that at least two-thirds of the men were past offenders against the law.\textsuperscript{64} It reported a wild succession of crimes being committed by the recruits assembled at Montreal: supposedly they insulted respectable ladies on the streets, robbed and beat up passers-by, even tore apart a house, and it all climaxed when two recruits murdered a soldier of the 17th for a bottle of whiskey.\textsuperscript{65} Although reprinted in some other francophone papers, the stories were not substantiated by other journals, were never mentioned in the anglophone press, and do not appear in regimental records.\textsuperscript{66} Perhaps Le Pays had raised inveterate dislike of the British Army into a personal vendetta against the 100th.

The conduct of the Royal Canadians was very important to the colony. The men were the Province's "representatives" abroad. They had to live up to a self-image which Canadians cherished of themselves and which we wanted projected overseas, particularly to Great Britain. Our soldiers were not really different from those raised in the Old Country but we wanted them to seem so. In short, we wanted England to think we were better than we really were. The colony was on the verge of doing great things but it would require co-operation and understanding from the British; the regiment was an opportunity to show doubters in the metropolis how loyal and competent we really were. There was more than just banquet-hall rhetoric to Lieut. Rykert's declaration that, "the argus eyes of the country were now fixed upon the Regiment - indeed every soldier in it felt them to be so...."\textsuperscript{67}

Lots of remarks show the importance of the regiment's public relations role. "We hope that men of good character only will be
enlisted into this corps," said one, "so that Canada may never be ashamed, to exhibit her military representatives, at home or abroad."

"From the information we receive," continued another, "we believe the 100th will very soon be filled up, and filled up with a very superior class of men, the recruiting authorities being very particular on this head, and solicitous of sending to England a corps that will reflect credit on Canada...." The 100th regiment presented a really good appearance in line... exhibiting a specimen of Canadian soldiers, which will, we have no doubt, be properly appreciated by the powers that be on their arrival in England."

Actually, their landing at Liverpool was rather less than impressive. For lack of any other uniforms, the 100th wore old Canadian Militia attire which had been kept in storage since 1837 - some said the War of 1812! Naturally the cloth was rotten: every uniform shed an epaulette, a tail - for these were the pigeon-tailed "coatees" not seen in England for many a year - or at least the pompon from the forage cap. The knapsacks had been freshened up with a coat of tar, which left a black smear on the scarlet coats.

We were a sight for the gods on landing at Liverpool. A mob of comically clad creatures like nothing that had been seen on the streets of that city within the memory of that generation of its citizens. Many were the inquiries as to who and what we were and from whence we came. In some way the impression prevailed that we were from the scenes of the slaughtered garrisons, women and children in India, and much sympathy was shown us by the Liverpudlians. They did not laugh at or deride us, that treat was reserved for our reception by the troops in camp at Shorncliffe. We
certainly contributed to the gaiety of that camp. It was one continuous roar of boisterous laughter from the time we reached the camp grounds until we arrived at the lines assigned us.\textsuperscript{72}

Obviously, the regiment's public relations work had suffered a setback, thanks to the army's usual degree of administrative efficiency. The Times published a letter, signed "One Who Was With the 100th," complaining that their only welcome from Liverpool was the swearing in of extra policemen!\textsuperscript{73} A rebuttal letter said there was no cause for welcome: it attributed colonial patriotism to exorbitant pay, claiming that the regiment had cost six times as much to form in Canada as it would have cost in England, due to higher colonial labour rates. In Parliament, it mentioned, an M.P. had moved for accurate cost figures as a result.\textsuperscript{74} The Times itself was not overly-complimentary, saying the men were of "heterogeneous character" and mostly "raw material," despite some "fine soldierly men."\textsuperscript{75} Fortunately, once properly uniformed and drilled the regiment proved very smart and shone when the Duke of Cambridge inspected them. A letter home exulted: "This has been a proud day for Canada. The men of the 100th Regiment have opened the eyes of the people of England, who were evidently unprepared to see such soldiers from a colony...."\textsuperscript{76}

Our greatest boast was their physique. Boulton said their average height was five feet seven inches, Gorman claimed five feet eleven inches, while Major-General Sir Sam Steele recalled seeing men break down in tears because they could not make the six foot requirement of one detachment.\textsuperscript{77} Apparently we wanted the good folks in England to have an image of Canadians as super-men.\textsuperscript{78}
The occupational and educational standards of the men seemed fair enough, too. Of a batch of forty Montrealers, "the greater part are artizans, a few are clerks, one or two are persons who held respectable situations before enrolling themselves, and the least number is composed of labourers." Of some Toronto recruits: "The state of their education is also satisfactory - 42 being able to write well, 1 badly, and only 14 could not sign their names. Of the whole number, only three were recognized by the Magistrate or his Clerk as having ever appeared as accused parties at the Police Court." Boulton and Gorman both recalled that the ranks held a fair number of educated men, including college graduates. Hard evidence is not easy to come by, though. The only occupations listed in the regimental records were a young man who helped his father's blacksmithing business, a dissolute medical student, and the chief warden of a military prison.

A reporter observed among the recruits, "many whose feet fell to the ground with the true military tread, and whose heads were carried in the upright position, which marks the trained followers of the fife and drum, and the colors of the country." Gorman noted among them "a considerable sprinkling" of old soldiers or veterans of "old country" militias which were sent into service in the Crimean War. If he was typical, many more were Canadian militiamen. He and the three buddies who enlisted with him were all members of the London (C.W.) Volunteer Field Battery.

Probably a lot more were off farms. Some small places provided a disproportionate number of recruits. Tiny Alton and Orangeville each
supplied a soldier: that may have been as many as nearby, and much larger, Brampton, added. 86 Stratford, a "petite localité du Haut-Canada," reputedly contributed more than thirty! 87 Richmond, near Ottawa, was a special case. An earlier 100th, the Prince Regent's County of Dublin Regiment of Foot, which had fought in Canada during the War of 1812, was disbanded there in 1818. Many of the veterans settled to farm the district. In 1858 their sons and grandsons flocked to join the new 100th. So many enlisted that London later declared the Royal Canadians to be the lineal descendant of the old 100th and the 1813 battle honour, "Niagara", was inscribed on the new colours. 88

The Three Rivers Inquirer remarked that, "The scheme seems to find favour in the eyes of our French Canadian population here." 89 If so, it must have been a local aberration. The 100th was very much an "English-Canadian" regiment.

It is quite apparent that Upper Canada will furnish the "lion's share" of the men who will compose this regiment; and the paucity of French Canadians enlisting would tend to support the idea that the military spirit, so characteristic of the French nation, has virtually died out, or been frozen out, of the bosum of its Canadian descendants. 90

Even some of the Lower Canadian officers did their recruiting in the Upper Provinces. 91 Thirty years later, then-colonel Terrence Smythe recalled that the regiment was originally composed of Upper Canadians, with very few French-Canadians. 92 A newspaper breakdown of enlistments in various cities seemed to confirm the impression. Of the men assembled to that time, "295 were enlisted in Toronto; 123 in London; 110 in
Montreal; 70 in Kingston; 70 in Hamilton and Stratford; 28 in Ottawa; 36 in Niagara; and 17 in Quebec." Of sixty-nine recruits whose names appear in regimental records, no more than nine were obviously identifiable as francophones.

All this sounds true to form. To this day the number of francophones in the Canadian armed forces is disproportionately small. In 1858 the recruiting was for a British Army unit, something quite contrary to French Canada's isolationist nationalism. Most of the francophone newspapers froze regimental news out of their columns, or stridently condemned it. Of course, journalists might have been voices in the wilderness, neither leading opinion nor reflecting it. But in view of all the evidence it seems unlikely that French-Canadians felt the Royal Canadians were, in any sense, "theirs".

Gorman's detachment got a rather cold reception on its arrival in Montreal. "Here we were greeted by a mob of hoodlums who jibed and jeered and pelted us with mud and snow slush." It may or may not have been an isolated incident. Certainly the regiment got an enthusiastic reception from the public elsewhere in the Province. The first recruiting party in Quebec caused "quite a sensation"; in St. Catherines they met with "unlooked for success". And as the first contingents moved out, The Toronto Colonist reported:

Considerable interest was evinced along the line of march as the gallant little band went forth to "brave the battle and the breeze," in whatever clime the military destinies of the Empire may have occasion to marshal its sons against the foe - There was much cheering, some white handkerchiefs were waved by fair hands from windows, and when the cars moved
off there was a burst of feeling from the crowd which might be termed enthusiasm, and at which the brave boys who had "taken the shilling" seemed highly delighted.97

In his narrative, Gorman made the interesting point that the Crimean War had aroused a spirit of military enthusiasm in the colony.98 Certainly the militia movement here got a boost at that time. During the Mutiny Canadian journalists were continually harking back to the events of 1855, especially the proposed Canadian regiment, almost as though the two wars were connected. It seems plausible that a "martializing" process begun during the Crimean War was carried on and intensified by the gripping news coming out of India so soon afterward.

One group that does not seem to have been very enthusiastic was the Canadian government. True, it had agreed to let the British Army recruit here. London, recognizing the new situation engendered by colonial self-government, would not have proceeded otherwise. But at no time did the Provincial government take official notice of its "own" regiment. It did not send any representatives to the dinners sponsored by the militia in honour of the departing officers, there was no send-off ceremony, there was not even a congratulatory telegram. Surely some flowery rhetoric of support was not beyond the Province's jurisdiction! The only indication of any official interest in the 100th was a motion before the Provincial Parliament.

By the by, what about Mr. Ferres' motion regarding the Provincial present, to its "own regiment," of a stand of colors, band instruments, and mess plate? Now is the time to agitate the matter; surely the 100th will not be allowed to leave Canada without some token
whereby the country from which it hails may be ever present in the minds of the men destined to "fight and fall" in its ranks....

Apparently the motion died. The Royal Canadians got their mess plate and colours from the Queen. The failure of the Provincial government to offer even a token of support to the regiment was possibly a political decision. The cabinet may have wanted to avoid getting into the furore over the regiment that had antagonized the Province's English and French communities.

Later it was assumed that the Canadian cabinet had been a moving force behind the "offer" of a regiment. Gorman said that the call for soldiers was made "through the Canadian Government." In 1887 The Canadian Militia Gazette declared that:

The great statesmen who has led the Canadian people for half a century secured, with the aid of his great colleague the late lamented Sir G.E. Cartier, Bart., the concurrence of the Canadian House of Assembly and Legislative Council, and the upshot was that the Governor-General, Sir E.W. Head, was authorised to accept at the hands of the people of Canada a regiment raised by its officers....

And, around the same time, The Indian Daily News made the completely erroneous statement that, "The regiment was made over to the British government by Canada as a free gift during the mutiny." The notion was probably part of the mythologizing of imperial unity, which caught on as the nineteenth-century drew nearer to its close.

A significant characteristic of the regiment, though one which did not seem to bother anyone, was that most of the Royal Canadians were not really native "Canadians" at all. In a batch of Toronto
recruits reportedly "there were 14 English, 4 Scotch, 9 Irish, 2 Yankees! 9 Canadians, 6 Germans and Swiss, and 2 French."

Another detachment had fifty-seven men: "Of these, 33 were natives of Ireland, 9 of England, 5 of Scotland, 7 of Canada, 1 of Nova Scotia, 1 of France, and 1 (an Irish Yankee) of the United States."

Lieutenant-Colonel De Rottenburg officially recorded that of eight hundred and sixty-five men assembled in England, three hundred and seven were Irish, two hundred and sixty-eight were Canadians, one hundred and ninety-seven were English, and ninety-three were Scottish.

He continued:

I have to observe that numbers of men returned to England, the Irish are people who went to Canada to settle, and others, although not absolutely born Canadians have been residents there for a number of years.

In other words, the Royal Canadians were mostly immigrants. Since they were young - the upper age limit was thirty - most had probably not been in the country long. The proportion of Irish, incidentally, was about the same as in the rest of the British Army.

Moreover, they would have been failed immigrants. The native-born Canadians likewise were probably evading financial ruin. Unemployment was high; the whole Western world was in an economic depression. Enlisting might have been a desperate step but it was better than destitution. As The Globe suggested: "The hard times, however, may have as much to do in sending new men "in search of the bubble reputation," as love of a military life."

"The present condition of stagnation both in the Province and in the United States is eminently favorable to recruiting," said another, looking to the
bright side, "and will of itself be sufficient to ensure the success of the attempt." A "mere appeal to lack of employment and suffering" is what another called recruiting.

As always, of course, there were other motives, too: to flee the monotony of the farm, a wife, or a life of missed chances. Boulton was off to see the world. No doubt, too, there was a thirst for glory, to be part of the great struggle which had been the focus of attention for the better part of a year. The Pilot, for one, enthusiastically advised, "To young men possessed of good health, energy, and talents, India now offers a field for enterprises such as perhaps the world has never seen before."

The chance to avenge the Empire's honour in India was not mentioned very often during recruiting. Unlike the militia volunteers of the previous autumn, the rankers of the 100th could not expect the pick of the fighting, some quick glory, and then a triumphant and early return home. The regular-army boys were in it for ten years, come what may. So soldiering was sold as a career.

Still, the lure - or spectre - of India was always apparent and sometimes was raised. As one long-winded journalist noted, "want of a shilling - a bellyful of beer - or the enticements of a tap-room, are not the only strings in human nature which can be harped upon to produce a soldier" and he vehemently denied that India should not be Canada's war:

Out upon such an assertion, when the bloody sacrifices, and the innumerable atrocities, committed on the homes, the honor, the existence, of English men and women, in a far off land, are
yet ringing in our ears. Out upon such an assertion, when we are every day hearing of deeds of daring courage, indomitable endurance, and never dying honor, performed by handfuls of British soldiers combatting against terrific odds, in the cause of all that is dear to the Briton's heart. Out upon such an assertion, when we listen to the taunting, but distant boast, of the soldiers we have beaten so often, and can beat again — well may it be said of these men that "distance lends enchantment to the view" — let them come nearer and they will soon find how stern and rugged is the reality.

While recruiting in Canada, fighting raged on at Lucknow. Word of the final victory there — which many assumed meant the war was all but done — did not reach the Province until around the beginning of May, when recruiting was nearly completed. Desperate fighting in central India, Rajputana, and the Himalayan hill country continued well into the following spring. Men joining the 100th could still hope to help avenge the humiliations of the Mutiny.

Plenty of remarks show that Canadians thought their "boys" were India-bound. Once organized, it was said, "the regiment will proceed to England, and with as little delay as possible to the seat of the war in India or China." The New Era wrote sarcastically of "deux régiments destinés à s'aller faire éventrer par les cipayes ou à se fondre et se dessécher au soleil de l'Hindoustan." At farewell dinners colonels freely predicted that the war was not over and the Royal Canadians would get into it yet. Even a poem linked vengeance for Indian atrocities to the purpose of the 100th.

In September, when the regiment was in England, came a report
that it was under orders for Malta, "and unless war comes to a
speedy close in India, in all probability the East will be the
destined field for their first brush with an enemy." All seemed
confirmed when The Times, which had a very close relationship with
the British government, said the 100th was about to proceed to India
for active service. Gorman remembered that, "Orders to embark for
foreign service at Portsmouth on two days' notice were joyfully
received, and hopes ran high that India would be our destination." Captain Smythe wrote home that, "Malta or Gibralter will probably be
our first halt, and then on to India."

As it turned out, they never got to India. In June 1859 they
were dumped at Gibraltar. The Mediterranean was a quiet station;
new units had been sent there to free more experienced regiments to
help finish off the sepoy rebels. But by then the war was
over, anyway. The 100th languished in garrison duty on the Rock until
1863, when it was transferred - to equally tiny and quiet Malta. In
1866 they were brought home to Canada to protect against the threat
of Fenian raids.

Back in 1858 a permanent recruiting depot had been set up in
Toronto. The recruiting officer reported:

On my arrival in Toronto, I found so many
young men willing to enlist, and who came
to the Fort for that purpose, that I
considered it quite unnecessary to make
any exertions.... His Excellency the
Governor General has spoken to me on the
subject, and adverted to the feasibility
of raising a Second Battalion. I gave as
my opinion that there would be no difficulty
in obtaining the required number of men.
Lieut.-Col. De Rottenburg had also thought that, "any vacancies in the regiment would be recruited for in Canada, and that the officers also would likely be taken from Canada. Therefore in the course of a few years the regiment would be entirely Canadian."  

But in 1862 the Toronto depot was closed. Recruiting in Canada was deemed to cost too much, though the only real additional expense was the transportation of recruits to the United Kingdom. Governor-General Head's grand vision of a British Army drawn from all parts of the "white" Empire proved a short-lived aberration in the longer-term trend of forcing self-governing colonies to defend themselves. The Treasury, not imperial unity, was Westminster's real concern except in times of panic as in 1857-8. The farcical result was that when the Royal Canadians were stationed in Canada in 1866 they got drafts of recruits sent from England! Meanwhile, the ten year stints of the original Canadian recruits expired, and most took their discharges. By the time it sailed again for England in October 1868, the Royal Canadian Regiment was Canadian in name only.

The regiment slogged on nevertheless. It eventually got to India and stayed there for a longer unbroken stretch than any other unit of the Queen's army before or since. In 1881 the army was re-organized, and many regiments were merged together in "shot-gun marriages". The Royal Canadians were merged with an old East India Company regiment - the 109th, formerly the 3rd Bombay Europeans - to form an Irish regiment! It was rather awkwardly named, the "100th Prince of Wales's Leinster Regiment (Royal Canadians)".

The Canadian connection, long forgotten in the 100th, returned
to the fore as the disgruntled battalions tried to dissolve their forced merger. A movement to "re-patriate" the 100th into the Canadian Army got going in the 1880's and continued fitfully for another forty years! The regiment finally saw action in the Boer War and then in a succession of famous battlegrounds in the Great War. But in 1922 the Irish Free State got independence and the British Army's Irish regiments lost their reason for being. There was a last effort to re-patriate the 100th - there was talk of making it a kind of Canadian Guards regiment at Buckingham Palace - but by then Canada had its own battle-scarred regiments to be proud of. And, as always, it would have cost money: the Royal Canadian Regiment was a classic example of imperial sentiment being continually undercut by practical considerations of cost. In 1922 the regiment was placed on nil strength, its mess plate and records were returned to the Dominion, its colours were laid up in Windsor Castle, and the last manifestation of Canada's involvement in the Sepoy Mutiny faded away.

The 100th Regiment was not one of the great units of the British Army but that should not detract from its importance in 1858. In a so-called era of "Little Englandism" it was a monument to imperial unity.

Recruiting, like just about every other aspect of the Mutiny debate, laid bare the central Canadian problem of competing nationalisms. French-Canadians reacted to the Conquest by turning to isolationism. They did not support the British Empire and certainly they had no intention of joining the British Army. British Canadians, though, had a rally-round-the-flag patriotism that was patently colonialist. By itself, perhaps, recruiting might not have become an emotional issue
emotional issue if it had not followed months of discussion about India which had already inflamed our ethnic divisions.

The Canadians who enlisted were mostly fairly recent immigrants from the United Kingdom, especially from Ireland. It could not have been any other way. Except for the francophones, Canada was a land of immigrants. Far from being in any way "un-Canadian", the regiment reflected the social reality of English Canada at that time.

Many of the recruits joined up because they needed work. But that could not have been their only motive. It was a dangerous vocation they had chosen. They knew that the regiment was raised because of the Mutiny and nearly everyone expected that it would soon be fighting in India. Moreover, every indication is that the men were anxious to brave the dangers of the East. Theirs was the chance to avenge the painful memories of Delhi, Cawnpore, and Lucknow.

No colonial regiment had ever before been raised specifically for imperial duty. Sir Edmund Head intended that the 100th should be the first step toward a new type of imperial army, one in which the colonies shared the burden of empire with the Mother Country. It did not work because Westminster's long-term policy was to reduce defence costs, even at the risk of loosening imperial unity to some extent. But for a brief few years the regiment had the potential to bind together the Empire to an unprecedented extent.
NOTES

1. The Brant Expositor (Brantford, C.W.), March 9, 1858, p. 3b. The paper was criticizing features of the regiment - but the notion of a compliment was as often raised by critics as by supporters.

2. Unidentified Canadian journal, reprinted in The Acadian Recorder (Halifax, N.S.), March 20, 1858, p. 2c.

3. The Trois Rivieres Inquirer (Trois Rivieres, S.E.), reprinted in The Montreal Weekly Gazette, April 10, 1858, p. 1g.

4. The Quebec Gazette, May 7, 1858, p. 2b. It was answering critics of colonial recruiting, hence the reference to a soldier's "pittance".

5. Ibid., March 3, 1858, p. 2b. Again, the paper felt obliged to rebut a critic, this time The Toronto Colonist. Detractors implicitly recognized the popularity of the notion of a British compliment to Canada by their attempts to discredit the idea. Their argument was best summarized in The Montreal Weekly Gazette, March 27, 1858, p. 3c. Ironically, it was written in a pro-recruiting letter-to-the-editor which sarcastically paraphrased the criticisms of an unidentified Montreal "Anglo-Rouge" journal. "The hard fact," so says the paper, in this, which it calls "a brass and copper affair," is that simply the Imperial Government want men for the suppression of the Indian revolt; and therefore it is no compliment to Canada but a mere business transaction."


7. The Quebec Gazette, March 1858, p. 2d, said, under the title of "Recruiting in Canada": "In an article on this subject the Toronto Colonist assumes a strongly antagonistic position, consonant, no doubt, not only with its own opinions, but with those entertained by many others. These opinions must not, however, be taken as the opinions of a people."

8. Irish-Canadian journals seem to have had a similar "England-leave-us-alone" attitude, and for somewhat similar historical reasons. Still, here as on the Emerald Isle, the Irish flocked to the colours in 1857. This does not mean that the journals were out of touch with their readers. Times were bad and the army was the traditional refuge for destitute Irishmen. In the crunch, sentiments, though earnestly still held, gave way to the need to fill one's stomach.
9. The Quebec Chronicle, reprinted in The Acadian Recorder, March 27, 1858, p. 2c. This article on the Canadian Army debate was reprinted more than a month after its first issuance, by which time the debate over the 100th had begun. Clearly the Recorder thought the argument applicable to both debates.

10. For instance, The Pilot, Feb. 26, 1858, p. 2e, declared:

Quite different is the proposed Royal Provincial Regiment, the expense of which is, of course, to be met and borne by England, from the impracticable plan of a Canadian army, to be enrolled and equipped, at the cost of the colony, which was mooted by certain office seekers, and denounced and opposed by the whole Franco-Canadian press, and by a majority of the English journals in this Province.

11. Le Courrier de St.-Hyacinthe, March 16, 1858, p. 2a. It suggested instead giving men free land on condition that they marry and work it. The colony would grow and Great Britain would be enriched in the process.

12. Ibid., March 30, 1858, p. 2b. It was commenting on an article entitled "A Cawnpore in England" reprinted in translation on the same column from The Northern Daily Express (Newcastle, U.K.).

13. See The New Era, March 16, 1858, p. 2c for the letter and p. 2g for the recruiting advertisement it was based on.

14. Ibid. Naturally, supporters of recruiting denied that the soldier's lot was so bad as all that. The Three Rivers Inquirer, reprinted in The Montreal Weekly Gazette, April 19, 1858, p. 1g, stated baldly, "The condition of the British soldier is greatly improved, and offers a fair inducement to those young men to enlist, who want permanent employment." The Quebec Gazette, March 3, 1858, p. 2d, was more strident:

... many men from the ranks have received commissions... look at the efforts made and making, to furnish our soldiers and their children with an education, where wanted, equal to that of any of the schools of Canada... extensive libraries and reading rooms in every garrison... the increased pay which attends good conduct... the one half additional pay granted
when in the field of action...
annuities and gratuities for long
and meritorious services...
Victorian Crosses for Valor...
pensions for past services, various
in amount, yet in all cases forming
a reserve fund of no mean importance.


16. Le Courrier de St.-Hyacinthe, March 30, 1858, p. 2a.


18. Some considered Baron de Rottenburg a kind of Canadian by
association - he was Adjutant-General of Militia in Canada, had
soldiered here with some distinction during the troubles of
1837, and his father had been administrator of the government
in Upper Canada during the War of 1812. See Henry J. Morgan,
Sketches of Celebrated Canadians and Persons Connected with
Canada, Hunter, Rose & Co., Quebec, 1862, pp. 699-701. The
adjutant, Lieut. John Lee of the 17th, had been serving in Canada
and had helped organize the 100th. See J. Castell Hopkins, ed.,
Canada: An Encyclopedia of the Country, Toronto, 1898, Vol. IV,
p. 466B. The Colonel was Major-General Viscount Melville,
K.C.B., general commanding the troops in Scotland, Governor of
Edinburgh Castle, and Aide-de-Camp to the Queen. See The
Montreal Weekly Gazette, July 17, 1858, p. 1h. Regimental
Commander-in-Chief, another purely honourary post, was, of course,
the Prince of Wales.

19. The Brant Expositor (Brantford, C.W.), March 9, 1858, p. 3b.

20. "Young Canada" in The New Era, March 16, 1858, p. 2c, recalled
when, "the offer of the Canadian Government to raise troops was
treated by the Imperial Authorities with silent contempt; as
was also the volunteered aid of our gallant militia companies.
And now it would be mean, to the last degree, for any spirited
Canadian to take notice of their paltry overtures."

21. Actually it had been proposed again during the Mutiny as a
quick way to get soldiers. But the offer was withdrawn before
anything was done. The New Era, Oct. 10, 1857, p. 2c.

22. These conditions were stipulated in the founding proclamation,
in The Canada Gazette, March 3, 1858, P.A.C., C series, R.G. 8,
Vol. 1019, RL3303, p. 3.

23. The Brant Expositor, March 9, 1858, p. 3b. An officer-candidate
was allowed to pay recruits an extra bounty, out of his own
pocket, to sign up under his name. Probably this is the expense
the article refers to - the extra payments would quickly have
become absolutely vital for getting men. It was also another advantage that the rich families of the colony had over poorer competitors for commissions.


25. Unidentified journal or correspondent reprinted in *The Acadian Recorder* (Halifax, N.S.), March 20, 1858, p. 2c; and *The Toronto Colonist*, reprinted in *The Pilot*, March 1, 1858, p. 2c.


27. A Captain McLeod Moore of Ottawa wrote to Macdonald about getting a commission and the latter re-directed him to contact the Governor-General or Horse Guards. Macdonald later wrote to his mother that he had gotten a company (ie. a captaincy, presumably for "an old soldier"). If true, that officer's name would be on the records, of course. See J.K. Johnson, ed., *The Letters of Sir John A. Macdonald* Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa, 1968, Vol. II, pp. 31 and 40.

28. The actual numbers of each rank varied slightly from those advertised in the original Proclamation. The successful candidates were:

**MAJOR**

Alexander Dunn, Toronto, late H.M. 11th Hussars

**CAPTAIN**

Charles Clarke, Toronto, York Militia Cavalry  
John Clarke, Montreal, Montreal Artillery  
George Macartney, Paris, C.W., Volunteer Militia Rifles  
Richard Price, Quebec, Megantic Volunteer Rifles (ranks)  
Terrence W. Smythe, Brockville. C.W., Brockville Rifles

**LIEUTENANT**

L.C.A.L. De Bellefeuille, Montreal, late Fr. Foreign Legion, Voltigeurs de Deux Montagnes  
Charles Carriere, Ottawa, Ottawa Rifles  
Louis Casault, Quebec, late French Foreign Legion  
Philip Derbshire, Toronto, W. Kent Militia (U.K.)  
Henry Duchesnay, Beauce, militia (ranks)  
John Fletcher, Montreal, No. 2 Montreal Rifles  
Alfred Rykert, St. Catherines, ---------------  
Brown Wallis, Port Hope, C.W., Durham Light Cavalry
ENSIGN

Thomas Baldwin, Toronto, ---------------
Charles Boulton, Cobourg, C.W., ---------------
William Clarke, ?, ---------------
Henry Davidson, Hamilton, ---------------
John Ridout, Toronto, ---------------

29. Captain Charles Clarke was born and raised in India. Captain John Clarke had entered the British Army back in 1836. Lieutenant Philip Derbishire may or may not have been an immigrant: in 1855 he volunteered for the Canadian regiment being considered for the Crimean War yet at the same time he got a commission in the English militia. See P.A.C., C series, R.G. 8, Vol. 1019, R13354, p. 51; R13318, p. 18; and R13373, p. 80, respectively.

30. Robert E. Saunders, "The Family Compact Defined", in Earl, D.W., The Family Compact: Aristocracy or Oligarchy?, Copp Clark Publishing Co., Toronto, 1967, pp. 15-20, identifies Ensign Charles Boulton's father, D'Arcy, and his grandfather, Chief Justice Robinson, as two of the eight members of the "elite of power" in Upper Canada in the 1820's and '30's. Ensign Ridout and Major Dunn were descended from men identified as being in the "elite of office" during the oligarchy's heyday. Saunders identifies the "elite of power" and the "elite of office" as the inner circles of the Family Compact as narrowly defined. The power of the Family Compact stemmed from its virtual monopoly of government offices, more than from commercial wealth.

31. For the former, L.C.A.L. De Bellefeuille, see The Canadian Militia Gazette, Vol. IV, No. 24, June 13, 1889, p. 188. For the latter, Henry Theodore Duchesnay, see J.H. Burnham, Canadians in the Imperial Naval and Military Service Abroad, Williamson & Co., Toronto, 1891, p. 226. The military traditions of both families are frequently mentioned in Benjamin Suite, Histoire de la Milice Canadienne-Francaise 1760-1897, Desbarats & Cie., Montreal, 1897, especially pp. 17, 45, and 49.

32. Morgan, pp. 730-1 and 701-2, respectively.


34. Ensign Thomas Baldwin was son of Col. Baldwin, late of H.M. 50th and the Emperor of Brazil's service, farmer, magistrate, militiaman, and politician. See Morgan, pp. 773-5. Another colonel's son was Lieutenant Brown Wallis, a law student. See The Montreal Weekly Gazette, May 8, 1858, p. 3b. Not all of Ensign Charles Boulton's family were magistrates: a maternal grandfather had been a Brigadier-General in the East India Company. See The Canadian Military Gazette, Vol. IV, No. 26, June 30, 1892, p. 200.


37. Ridout's family was connected to the Boultons and the Baldwins, according to Morgan, p. 731. There were two prominent Baldwin families in the colony but Morgan says, p. 734, that they were distantly related.

38. See *The New Era*, Feb. 20, 1858, p. 2c.

39. Officers, of course, did not have to serve ten years; they could get out whenever they wanted. Incidentally, these lists of wealth, prestige, and connections in the 100th are probably not exhaustive.


41. He had since become a militia captain and adjutant of the Montreal Artillery. Moreover, he spoke fluent Hindi and French. *Ibid.*, R13318, p. 18.

42. Henry Bruce joined the 82nd Regiment in 1825, became an ensign some years later, and was adjutant when he resigned in 1854 and came to Canada. He had since been a major in the militia. He resigned his captaincy in the 100th Regiment for unstated reasons in July 1858. See *Ibid.*, R13327, p. 33 and Vol. 1020, R13890, p. 117.


44. He had served five years with the Foreign Legion and the Chasseur d'Afrique corps, seeing action in the Kabyle campaign in Algeria. At the outbreak of the Crimean War he had tried to get a commission in the British Army. Rebuffed, he re-entered the Foreign Legion and won medals from both the French and British governments. He had been back in Canada only since December. See *Ibid.*, Vol. 1019, R13351, pp. 46-6.


46. He had been a senior lieutenant in the 11th Hussars, quite the swank regiment, but his army service had only totalled three years. He really was everyone's choice: Bruce had been aiming for the majorcy but as soon as Dunn entered the race Bruce deferred, accepted a captaincy instead, and transferred forty
excess recruits to Dunn's name. Charles Clarke added nineteen more to Dunn's total. *Ibid.*, R13477, p. 128; R13482, pp. 123-5; and Vol. 1020, RL3613, p. 5.

47. Smythe commanded the Brockville Rifles; Fletcher commanded No. 2 Company, Montreal Volunteer Rifles and was drill and musketry instructor for the Canada East militia. See *Ibid.*, Vol. 1019, R13326, p. 30 and R13317, p. 21, respectively.


49. *The Mail*, March 31, 1858, p. 2e.

50. Especially, of course, if they were hometown boys. For examples, see the tribute to Dunn in *Ibid.*, May 19, 1858, p. 1h or to Brown Wallis in *The Montreal Weekly Gazette*, May 8, 1858, p. 3b.

51. The scholarship-holder at Trinity College was said to have studied military matters on his own account and that seems to have satisfied the Board of Officers. P.A.C., R.G. 8, Vol. 1019, R13374, pp. 82-3.

52. *Ibid.*, R13353, p. 49. *The Quebec Military Gazette*, quoted in *The Quebec Gazette*, March 17, 1858, p. 2b, protested that "in making such an appointment... His Excellency Sir E. Head has deliberately set himself to contravene the publicly expressed desire of her Majesty, of her government, and of her English people; and that he has made use of the boon accorded by her Majesty to her loyal Canadian subjects, who tendered their loyal services eight months ago, for the purpose of gratifying his own personal predilection and desire of patronage."

53. Ensigns were examined in subjects such as English, French, and the classical languages, drawing, arithmetic, the history and geography of England, Rome, and Greece, and so on. See Ridout's examination, P.A.C., C series, R.G. 8, Vol. 1019, R13367, p. 62. The candidates did not do very well: two were disqualified by the test and another two got through only on their second try. French was a big problem but was deemed indispensible. On the other hand, at least three of the higher officers knew some Hindi.

54. *Ibid.*, Vol. 1021, RL5867, p. 59, Horse Guards to Lieut.-Gen. Williams. The word "points" in this passage is conjectured from the handwriting. Fletcher had passed his captaincy test in 1858 but settled for a lieutenancy when he could not raise enough men for a higher post. Later, when he was to be promoted, the question arose as to whether he had to re-write the captaincy exam. That was when Horse Guards discovered that the tests in Canada were irregular. In any event, he passed the regulation examination and was promoted to captain.
55. The Montreal Herald, reprinted in translation in Le Minerve (Montreal), which added this editorial,

Il semble que la guerre de 1812 avait fermé la bouche à ce reproche de déloyauté. N'importe, si c'est ainsi que le gouvernement anglais prétend recruter des troupes dans le B. Canada, pour aller mourir pour lui sur les champs de bataille, il peut perdre toute illusion.

The whole was then reprinted in Le Journal de Quebec, March 20, 1858, p. 2e.

56. Charles Boulton, Reminiscences of the North-West Rebellions, Grip Printing and Publishing Co., Toronto, 1886, p. 15. Ensigns did not have to raise men but Boulton was taking no chances.

57. For comparative purposes, Sessional Papers (British) 1857-8 (458) XXXVII, p. 385, recorded some daily average wages in Canada. With board and lodging farm labourers made 1s.8d. in Canada East; 2s.6d. in Canada West. Quarrymen without board and lodging made 4s.6d. in Canada East and 5s. in Canada West.


59. He also deserted. The lawyer continued, with a hint of threat, "Should... Joseph Breault be arrested as a deserter, it will be the means of turning all the young Canadians in this part of the Country into enemies whilst at present there cannot be found a more loyal people." P.A.C., C series, R.G. 8, Vol. 1021, R21284, p. 179.

60. The Brant Expositor, April 27, 1858, p. 2c.

61. The Adjutant-General had to order Andrew Hays three or four times to leave the room before he would do so – and then was back again not five minutes later with another drunken recruit in tow. Another uproar ensued. No doubt it was these incidents which cost Hays his chance for a commission. "Smart money", referred to in the quoted passage, was a payment to buy one's self out of the service. Whether or not Mr. Sheriff was finally enrolled is unknown. P.A.C., C series, R.G. 8, Vol. 1020, R13645, Adjutant-General to Eyre, pp. 35-7.

62. "... any poor devil who can do nothing else can take the recruiting serjeant's shilling, and the population of Canada are offered the same tempting inducements which enliven the tap-rooms of St. Giles' and the village alehouse during the English fair." The Toronto Colonist, quoted in The Quebec Gazette, March 3, 1858, p. 2d.
63. The Mail, March 31, 1858, p. 2e. To attract respectable, forward-looking recruits the paper suggested that the Province give every soldier a hundred acres of land after ten years' service.

64. The Globe, cited in Le Pays, April 15, 1858, p. 2e.

65. Le Pays, April 2 and 15, 1858, both p. 2e, and April 27, p. 2f.

66. Within the army the regiment seems to have had a quiet reputation, with a very low rate of desertions. But as late as 1887 Capt. Fletcher was refuting newspaper claims that the recruits were all drunkards. See The Canadian Militia Gazette, Vol. III, No. 23, Dec. 8, 1887, p. 180.

67. Lieut. Rykert in a banquet speech, paraphrased by The Mail, June 9, 1858, p. 2d.

68. The Mail, March 10, 1858, p. 3b.

69. The Toronto Colonist, reprinted in Ibid., April 7, 1858, p. 1d.

70. The Quebec Gazette, May 26, 1858, p. 2c.


72. Ibid., p. 52. Punch, Vol. XXXV, July 24, 1858, p. 33, also had fun with the 100th's misfortune. It reported: "Tuesday. LORD CLANRICARDE called attention to one of those beautiful little bits of management which make our Army so proverbial for its admirable administration. The Canada Regiment, the 100th came over the other day, and it was necessary to clothe it, and clothes were accordingly sent down. But when the garments came to be examined, it was found that they were without buttons. Of course, it was nobody's fault."

73. Letter, in The Times (London, U.K.), July 6, 1858, p. 12d. The Stipendiary Magistrate in Liverpool denied signing on any special constables and attributed the 100th's cold reception to a lack of publicity. The Times, July 9, 1858, p. 12a.

74. Letter, in The Times, July 8, 1858, p. 5f. Actually, except for transportation costs to England, the 100th cost no more than any other British Army unit.

75. The Times, July 17, 1858, p. 9e. A short time before, though, it ran an article, reprinted in The Montreal Weekly Gazette, June 19, 1858, p. 4e, which enthusiastically welcomed the innovation of this colonial regiment.

76. Correspondence of The Montreal Weekly Gazette, reprinted in The Mail, Oct. 6, 1858, p. 3a.
77. See Boulton, p. 18; Gorman in Whitton, p. 66; and Steele cited by Capt. J.F. Cummins, "The 100th Royal Canadians", in The Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol. II, No. 4 (July 1925), p. 353. The Canada Gazette, P.A.C., C series, R.G. 8, Vol. 1019, R13303, p. 3 stipulated a minimum height of five feet four inches. Some recruiting officers might, however, have tried to score extra "marks" by getting more statuesque followers.

78. The level of British ignorance about Canada was quite amazing, according to Gorman. He said that Irish soldiers were forever pestering the 100th for stories of hair-raising encounters with Indians and wild beasts in the forest. The Canadians complied with no concern for facts. The Irish would not accept, though, that Canadian hares turn white in winter to match the snow - one of the few truths in the lot - and words were exchanged, then blows, and then a general riot developed all over camp. There were a number of severe injuries as a result. Gorman in Whitton, pp. 58-9.


80. The Globe, March 25, 1858, p. 3d.

81. Boulton, p. 25; Gorman in Whitton, p. 69. Of course, those rankers may have been well-schooled but dissolute.

82. Private William Amor, age 18, wrote for his discharge, saying, "As for me Sir I would rather leave the Service than have the chance of obtaining a commission no one knows Sir what a soldier is except those that rank as Private Soldiers in her Majesty's Service." (sics) He claimed 136 desertions out of 1056 men enlisted and concluded, "I hope and I trust that I shall be so fortunate as to get my discharge and then it will be warning to me never to be so foolish again." His father backed him up by writing to Eyre. "Honorable Sir, I have great need of him haveing (sic) made arrangements to make Implements for the next provincial fair...." See P.A.C., C series, R.G. 8, Vol. 1020, R13774, pp. 95 and 90, respectively. The medical student was the drunken Mr. Sheriff from the Hays incident, although it is possible that he was able to get dismissed from the rolls. Chief Warden Naylor became the regimental sergeant-major. See Ibid., R13477, p. 131 and R13654, p. 189.

83. The Quebec Gazette, May 7, 1858, p. 2b.

84. Gorman in Whitton, p. 46.

85. Ibid.
86. W. Perkins Bull, *From Brock to Currie*, The Perkins Bull Foundation, George J. McLeod Ltd., ?, 1935, p. 208, lists some recruits from these places. It may not be complete, though. This source also lists the number of other men from Peel County, Ontario, who served in British and foreign wars between Waterloo and South Africa.
6 served in the Crimean War
1 served in the Indian Mutiny
15 served in the U.S. Civil War
2 served in the Franco-Prussian War (medical corps, both sides)
1 served in the Afghan War
3 served in the Spanish-American War
1 served in the Boxer Rebellion
Unfortunately it is not stated if all these men were natives of Peel County or - as is likely - settled there after their military adventures. See p. 540.

87. An unidentified journal, reprinted in *Le Journal de Quebec*, May 1, 1858, p. 2e.

88. Whitton, p. 45 and Cummins, pp. 352-3. It is not clear how many of the recruits were descended from the veterans of the old 100th. The emotional link was probably enough to bring in a disproportionate number. But the decision in 1875 to declare the Royal Canadians to be descended from the "Prince Regent's" might just have been an excuse to give a battle honour to a regiment which had not yet been in action after nearly twenty years of garrison duty.


91. Ibid. The article continues to say that Price and Cassault were "busy reaping where the harvest is plentiful"; on April 21, 1858, p. 2d, the paper makes it plain that Price, at least, was recruiting in the Upper Province.


93. *The Quebec Chronicle*, reprinted in *The Mail*, May 5, 1858, p. 1h. The Toronto figure may also be read as 258 or 256 - the microform is marred - but the conclusion is not altered.

94. This figure includes only those whose registration number suggests were recruited in Canada in the years 1858-1862. It excludes cases which might have come from the regiment's depot at the Isle of Wight, which opened after 1860 or so.
95. Gorman in Whitton, p. 47. Of course, if *Le Pays* is reliable, earlier contingents of the 100th had made themselves unwelcome in Montreal.

96. *The Quebec Gazette*, March 22, 1858, p. 2c; and *The St. Catherines Constitutional*, reprinted in *The Montreal Weekly* March 27, 1858, p. 2b. In both places, some of the sensation might just have been the novelty of recruiting parties.


98. Gorman in Whitton, p. 45.

99. *The Quebec Gazette*, June 11, 1858, p. 2c. The motion was also mentioned in *The Mail*, March 31, 1858, p. 2e.

100. Gorman in Whitton, p. 45. Of course, Governor Head was part of the Canadian government, and he was a guiding light of the project.


103. *The Globe*, reprinted in *The Brant Expositor*, April 2, 1858, p. 2c. Whitton, p. 68, said that a number of soldiers from the disbanded German Legion (British Army) had settled in Canada after the Crimean War and that some enlisted in the 100th.


105. *Sessional Papers* (British), 1857-8 (458) XXXVII, p. 385. The exact wording of De Rottenburg's handwritten passage is partly conjectural - the writing was bad - but the meaning was clear enough. His figures broadly agreed with those in the newspaper reports above. Newspaper reporting on the 100th was often inaccurate: but, in this case, their more-specific breakdown of "national" groups may be more accurate than De Rottenburg's rigid categories of British groups and "Canadian".

106. Again, in later decades a myth grew that they were "practically every man Canadian born". The quote is in Cummins, p. 354, but it was much bandied about.
Another pathetic reminder of the nature of some recruits remains in a letter from a Mrs. Lacey to General Eyre.

i have taken the liberty of addressing you on behalf of myself in cause of my husband enlisting in the 100 regiment under her majestys service. i apply to you as a feeling gentleman to look in to my distress in a strange country if you could assist me in getting home to England i will be truly thankfull i have been married twelve years and i think it very hard to be parted now without any provocation he has enlisted under a false name in the name of hunter his proper name is Lacey i wrote to his excellency the governor general and he told me you are the gentleman i should apply to and he gave me your address i hope....

Official inquiry seemed to confirm that her husband, also from England (and over-aged at thirty-three), had run off into the army. Sadly, what, if anything, was done remains a mystery. P.A.C., C series, R.G. 8, Vol. 1021, R14957, pp. 21 and 18.

Boulton, p. 13. "I had just left Upper Canada College, and, with youthful enthusiasm, was anxious to see something of the world; and a military career seemed to offer a coveted opportunity for gratifying my tastes."

The Pilot, Feb. 24, 1858, p. 2a.

Some of the earliest reports suggested the 100th would be bound to British North America. All other colonial units, even British Army units like the Royal Canadian Rifles, had been permanently stationed in the land of their origin. But the innovative nature of the 100th was soon recognized and the assumption of Indian service naturally followed.

An unidentified Canadian journal, reprinted in The Acadian Recorder (Halifax, N.S.), March 20, 1858, p. 2c.

The New Era, reprinted in translation in Le Courrier de St.-Hyacinthe, March 9, 1858, p. 2a. Le Courrier agreed with the sentiments expressed by D'Arcy McGee. Sickness, war, and desertions would diminish the regiment since it was "destine à
aller aux Indes et à changer dans tous les cas d'émisphère." See March 16, 1858, p. 2a.

117. Col. Dyde of the Canadian Active Force (militia) made this speech at a dinner for Baron de Rottenburgh; Col. Munro of H.M. 39th said much the same thing at a farewell for Capt. Price. See The Montreal Weekly Gazette, June 19, 1858, p. 3f, and The Quebec Gazette, July 4, 1858, p. 2e, respectively.

118. "The Hundredth Regiment" by "J.C." of Montreal apparently was reprinted from The Liverpool Mercury (U.K.) in The Mail (Niagara), August 4, 1858, p. 4a.

Heart sickening tales from India
Of deeds too vile to name
Arouse in every manly soul,
   A burning martial flame;
It needs not bounty nor reward
   To swell the mustering throngs,
Enough that men with hearts have heard
   Of Englishwomen's wrongs.

St. Lawrence banks, Ontario's shores,
   Resound with fife and drum,
Their vanguard stands in England now,
   The cry is, "Still they come;"
They came to fight for England's Queen
   For liberty and law.
The new world's hardy pioneers,
   The hope of Canada.

And that the Prince in after years,
   Who calls the corps his own,
May find the hundredth of the line
   The bulwark of his throne.


121. Gorman in Whitton, p. 64.


123. Boulton was just as glad the regiment did not get further than the Rock. The war in India had petered out but tensions with France were high and there was the possibility of another grand European war. See p. 19. Still, he always described the 100th
as a regiment "which was being raised in the colony for service in India." See p. 13.

124. The Times, December 5, 1861, p. 7d printed a letter, signed "A Voice from the 100th or Prince of Wales's Royal Canadian Regiment", which read in part:

Our country (Canada) is now threatened with war. Send us there to defend our homes. We may not all be born Canadians, but it is our adopted country. We supplied Old England with a battalion on purpose to help her in the East. Now, when our country wants help let us go there.... We detest Yankees and their institutions far more than you do; we are proud of being citizens of the British empire, and will fight for the integrity of that empire; and, if you like, will annex Maine, so as to give the North American colonies a good winter harbour.

For a description of this period in the 100th's history, see Whitton, pp. 65-81 or Boulton, pp. 19-34.

125. Capt. Clarke to the Military Secretary, Nov. 23, 1858 - P.A.C., C series, R.G. 8, Vol. 1020, R14346, p. 172. Clarke, Lieut. Fletcher, and four sergeants had been returned to Canada to establish the recruiting depot.

126. Baron De Rottenburg's speech at a dinner given in his honour, reported in The Montreal Weekly Gazette, June 19, 1858, p. 3f.

127. Whitton, p. 86. See pp. 82-6 for a description of the 100th's stay in Canada, 1866-8.

128. Terrence Smythe, the 1858 captain, became colonel of the 100th and was the last Canadian in it. The last fifteen or twenty others left the regiment in November 1879, at Muritsur, India. See his letters in The Canadian Militia Gazette, Vol. III, No. 23, Dec. 8, 1887, pp. 180-1.

129. See Cummins, pp. 357-359.

130. Ibid., p. 359.

131. Ibid., p. 360. The regiment was not disbanded. Technically, it was placed on nil strength: that is, as an honour it was retained on the Army Rolls but it had no officers or men. The regiment's original stand of colours had long before been returned to Canada as an honour to the Dominion. It hung for many years in the Parliamentary library in Ottawa and later at The Royal Military College, Kingston.
CONCLUSION

The Royal Canadian Regiment climaxed our Province's obsession with the Sepoy Mutiny. It was a dramatic response but it was only one of many. In fact, it was unlikely that a thousand young Canadians could have been enlisted so quickly if months of bad news and horrifying images had not jolted them out of complacency. More than anything else, those images justified making that distant struggle "our" war.

The images were not actually new. Even before 1857 our newspapers sometimes printed stories from India and there were books and articles about it as well. Most of them were written either by missionaries vindicating their work or by India House justifying some annexation or other: none were very complimentary to the natives. Our pre-conceptions explain why the Mutiny, for all its hysteria, did not create or change any opinions. It merely "proved" what we already thought, or what we were willing to believe. In so doing the images were "set" firmly in the public mind and it is unlikely that opinions changed much for decades to come.

The most important image was that of "Asiatic character". Indians were depicted as semi-barbarous people with just a veneer of civilization. The Hindu seethed with primitive, superstitious passions which could be easily manipulated by others, for the poor fellow was as credulous as a child. The Muslim was a schemer, a dark
fanatic. This image of Islam has been a tradition in the West probably since the Middle Ages. Indians looked harmless enough, feeble-bodied and cringing creatures, but that was a deception which made them all the more dangerous. The notion of "Oriental inscrutability" explains why our images did not change. We expected that the peasant would be as apathetic as he looked and stay quiet; but if he revolted, well, we suspected all along what he was like deep down. The image was so flexible it could be proved by whatever happened.

Religion was one of the main "proofs" of Asian inferiority. Hinduism seemed to be a nightmare of sati, Thuggee, and appalling monsters worshipped as gods. Islam was the fanatical enemy of Christendom. The rest of native society did not redeem the Indians, either. Much was made of the idea that they could not govern themselves. That had been a favorite excuse for British annexations in the past and anarchy in the revolted areas seemed to clinch the fact.

Atrocities were the other great "proof" of Asian character. From the first news of Meerut our new awareness of the East was tinged with terrors as every week we read more tales of tortures, killings, mutilations, and "deeds too vile to name". Rape was the worst of all, for white women were symbols of purity and good; for black heathens to defile such temples was to overthrow all that we valued. Except for the killings, none of the stories were verified later. The boatloads of young ladies fleeing India minus their noses and ears disappeared into thin air. Anglo-Indians had invented those stories, or at least passed on the wildest rumours, because they thought the "niggers" capable of any depravity. The point is that Canadians
believed them. All those old stories about Thugs and "Juggernaut" prepared us for the worst.

Every Canadian, even avowed democrats, accepted to some extent the idea that coloureds were inferior. The theory that some races were genetically, and hence permanently, inferior was just coming into vogue, with the help of some impressive-looking, quasi-scientific "evidence". It was not widely accepted, though, possibly because it smacked too much of American ideas about negroes. Much more popular, and promoted by churches, was the explanation that the native was still primitive but that he could yet be tamed by Christianity.

Our analyses of India's government were a bit less crude than our stereotypes of the people. Canadians knew what British governments were supposed to do, so we could rate the East India Company's performance. There were two issues. What did the Company do for Indians? And, what did the Company do to Britons?

For most of the English colonists, this was a religious matter. Until the heathen was converted not much could be done for him. Missionaries were forever complaining that the Company tolerated idolatry so much that it actually seemed ashamed of Christ. The clincher was that the army was off-limits to missionaries, with the lamentable results that the sepoys were then demonstrating. For many Canadians the Mutiny became a crusade. It was the last convulsive throes of dying superstitions but only if the panderers on Leadenhall Street were pushed aside could the Cross inherit the East.

Others were more concerned about the damage that the Company was doing to England. They envisaged a gang of aristocratic nabobs who
used the taxpayer's bayonets to plunder Bengal, pocketed the cash, and then returned the favours by stacking all the lucrative posts with their relatives. To radicals, India was both an allegory for Canada's own plight and also the financial underpinnings of the whole imperial system. The image was partly correct but it was mostly outdated, owing more to the days of Clive and Hastings than to 1857. At least one paper seemed to think that the Company still monopolized all Indian trade!

French-Canadians naturally agreed that imperialism was bad for England and worse for the colonies. They went on to show how the Company had ruined India. They exposed the rape of Bengal, the collapse of native industry, the corruption of Company officials, and the use of torture to extract taxes from the peasants. Again, the stories were often a hundred years old, with the implication that nothing had changed since. While anglophones conceded that the Company had not lived up to true British ideals, francophones were saying that no British deeds ever did.

Henceforth, all agreed, Christianity would have to be pushed more vigorously—though heaven forbid that we should be intolerant!—and the Company had to go. Direct rule from Westminster was the only alternative considered. It was not good enough for our own fair land but it was better than what the Indians had had. Not even the French-Canadians dreamed that India would be better off independent. Whatever the ills of British imperialism, they had to admit that any Christian government was better than anything the natives could come up with.
Nobody really cared about India, anyway. To criticize the Company was to advance the cause of Christianity, to undercut an unfair oligopoly, or even to strike a blow against the whole imperial system, but these were justified as being good for Canada or Great Britain, not India. In the end it did not matter that no one thought the Company was worth saving. Men still rallied to the Union Jack, driven by more compelling images.

At first, English-Canadians thought that the fighting was just a mutiny. But as the months passed there was mounting evidence that the peasants had risen, too. There was still no consensus by the middle of 1858. By contrast, French-Canadians were sure from the start that the war was a nationalist uprising of all the people united against foreign oppression. The victims of the Conquest could identify with that kind of a struggle. Sometimes they equated it to the Rebellion of 1837-1838. India became a metaphor to be used to fight the Province's domestic "war".

For all that, the colonists—except for a few radicals, annexationists, and other denizens of the "lunatic fringe"—rushed to proclaim their loyalty to the Empire. French and Irish-Canadian newspapermen did so as persistently as anyone else. However viciously they denounced imperialism, they always said that they had the true interests of Canada and England at heart; let the damn Yankees invade again and we would show them our patriotism, just as we did in 1776 and 1812! This stuff was meant to disarm those true-blue Britishers who suspected everyone else of subversion. It was a pragmatic kind of loyalty. The empty boasts were meant to buy acceptance,
and eventually more political power, for the colony's non-English people.

Overshadowing every other aspect of the Mutiny was the spectre of the atrocities. They appalled everyone. They robbed the rebels of any moral support. French-Canadians enjoyed tweaking John Bull but in the end they had to admit that civilization in India depended on the British. Radicals were likewise hamstrung, grumbling lamely that it was better that thieving imperialists died than the rightful inhabitants of the land. Most of the colonists howled with rage: the butchers had to be punished.

In England at the time the papers were calling for groves of gibbets and for whole cities to be razed. None of our journals ever went that far. Many condemned that kind of talk. They demanded "retribution" or "sanguinary punishment" or some such fuzzy thing, but, they said, they abhorred indiscriminate slaughter. The distinction is still not clear; a lot of crimes were glossed over by the wordy whitewash. They applauded when General Wilson ordered that every man in Delhi be killed because he spared the women and children. They even condoned the stray murder of infants or old women, so long as it was not systematic. Any differences between English opinion and English-Canadian thoughts were more apparent than real. For French-Canadians the reprisals were the ultimate proof of what they had been pointing out since the Mutiny began: the hypocrisy of British imperialism, the hideous gap between its high-blown ideals and its reality.

Later, francophone papers would evoke an image of the wild-eyed
soldier, intoxicated with blood and loot, to discourage their people from enlisting. English-Canadians acted on a different image. All of the atrocities merged in time into the horror of the well at Cawnpore. It made the war "just", if ever there had been any doubt. More to the point, it made intervention by Canada a duty to humanity. Ultimately, it was the image which raised the 100th Regiment.

II

It was probably inevitable that some colonists would want to fight in India. Canadians had volunteered for Crimean War service; at century's end their sons were broiling in South Africa. When the Province's militia battalions began offering themselves for active service in August 1857 they were probably just making a gesture. It got them honour even if they were not called up. Certainly the officers had to explain that offers did not automatically commit all members to go overseas. The rush of units volunteering in October was, no doubt, more serious, for by then the news from Cawnpore had arrived. Hordes of amateurs were reported to be anxious to join the expedition. Young men being young men, they longed to escape the farm, live perilous adventures, win a little glory, and along the way give the heathens a good licking in the Queen's name. Most of them probably had nothing better to do anyway, since the depression had thrown them out of work.

The idea was popular. French-Canadians grumbled but they accepted that any volunteers who wanted to die of heat-stroke could do
so provided England paid the bills. Anglophones were far more enthusiastic. The fewer unemployed we had, the fewer trouble-makers we had. More to the point, the cause was good and the force would be a credit to the Province. Colonists were handier with guns than were the gutter-sweepings of Dublin or Glasgow. If we kept the men together as a distinctively Canadian brigade we would show the Motherland what worthies her colonial sons were. Perhaps there was a kernel of Canadian nationalism in that, but it smacked more of colonial inadequacy. The Province felt it had to prove itself to England.

The British cabinet was inclined to gratify the colonists because it might do wonders for imperial relations. Army headquarters, though, did not want amateurs who would hog all the good fighting and then go home. It needed regulars since a bigger standing army would have to police India in future. The Canadian government, which could have vetoed any plan, left the decision to London, probably from fear of antagonizing voters in one ethnic group or another no matter what happened. Thus the imperial government looked to its own interests and came up with something quite new. The 100th Regiment became the first colonial regiment raised specifically to serve wherever the Empire needed it.

The army was thinking only of getting the men it needed right away. The man behind the scheme, Sir Edmund Head, had a grander vision: nothing less than a new type of army and a more unified Empire. He hoped to see all the "White" colonies contributing men - and eventually, no doubt, money - so that the army would be progressively strengthened as the colonies grew. Instead of local
militias under local command guarding their local districts, there would be a truly imperial army under one command and one flag to answer the call wherever it was needed. The Colonies would have become more aware of each other as their contingents stood side-by-side in common cause. His lofty ideals were doomed by imperial reality, not only in England but in the colonies, too. As soon as the crisis was over, Britain returned to its long-term policy of reducing its defence costs. The taxpayer at "Home" did not want to pay even the minor extra costs of recruiting in the colonies. The colonies, in turn, wanted more, not less, control over their destinies. Though embryonic, local "nationalism" was growing. Confederation was less than a decade away.

It should have been harder to fill a regular regiment committed to a ten-year enlistment term than an irregular force to serve only "for the duration". Army life was notoriously hard. That a thousand men signed up in a few months was a testimony to Canada's dedication to the Empire. Some of the recruits, it is true, were drunks, drifters, and losers, but the regiment proved to be one of the best-behaved in the whole army. Probably more men were driven into it by the depression than by drink. Fewer than a third of them were Canadians by birth. The rest were mostly from the United Kingdom, from Ireland especially, and since they were young they must have been fairly recent immigrants. These were probably the ones who could not make a go of it in the New World. To the Irish, in particular, the army was more familiar as a refuge of last resort than it was to native Canadians. Still, patriotism whipped to a fury by the bloody
image at Cawnpore was also a motive. British immigrants naturally were the first to be drawn by a call to the Union Jack. English-Canadians were not far behind. It is significant that French-Canadians, though the bulk of the workers and of the unemployed, hardly numbered in the ranks.

As French-Canadians saw it, the army was stealing our future by taking away the young men needed to build up the colony. One paper got hysterical, accusing the recruits of crimes more at home in Delhi than in Montreal. It was an emotional issue for francophones because the army was the most British part of the British imperial system that they felt was so oppressive. To enlist was to collaborate with the enemy.

Anglophone Reform papers sometimes also complained about the regiment, but not because they were isolationists like the French-Canadians. When they said that our youths should stay home they reasoned that a stronger colony, someday stretching all the way to the Pacific Ocean, would strengthen the Empire more than any number of regiments. What really angered them was that most of the senior officers of the regiment were British. It was, they said, an insult to Canadians. Perhaps this was a spark of nationalism; more likely it was touchy colonialism. They were gratified by England's gesture of confidence in the Province but they were miffed that the confidence was less than complete.

Still, most English-Canadians interpreted the regiment as a signal honour. They were embarrassingly gratified that the Mother Country let us have our own regiment, with a Canadian name and everything.
In turn, we were very concerned that we make a good impression in the Old Country. By far most of the debate was about how we could raise a "better grade" of recruit, men who were better than anyone enlisted in Britain, men who would show that the colonies were well worth favouring. The effusive loyalty was genuine but it was also pragmatic. The fact was, as part of the British Empire we needed London's goodwill and co-operation if we were to thrive and win more control over our own affairs.

III

Underlying the whole of Canada's response to the Indian Rebellion - perceptions, power relationships, and actions - were two social facts. They were far more important than, say, class divisions. One made some of our reactions applicable to other settlement colonies; the other was uniquely Canadian. First, Britons the world over felt that they were a "nation" of shared "blood" and common interests. Second, French-Canadians had their own and very different sense of nationality.

English-Canadian loyalties extended far beyond the borders of our little colony. Most of the people, including the most influential names in politics and journalism, had immigrated from the Old Country. They retained their British ideals, desires, and perceptions. As much as they loved their adopted home, they staunchly preserved their pride in being British.

The Empire was what let them be both Britons and Canadians.
It was part of their identity and they clung to it. There were few "Little Englanders" in the colonies. This sense of belonging to a Greater Britain made even the most distant Briton their "countryman". It was popular in those days to express this common nationality in terms of blood: Britons were the dominant "race" of the Empire. In this sense, Anglo-Indians were the fellows of English-Canadians in a way that the Province's francophones were not.

England was the focus of the Empire in both a practical and an emotional way. The colonies often did not deal with each other directly. Politics, trade, and news tended to move between the colonies via London. At the same time, Canadians responded not to events in India so much as to England's response to happenings in the East. At heart, our response was patriotism to the Union Jack.

A threat to Anglo-Indians did not affect the English Montrealer's material interests. But it affected his national honour every bit as much as it did the Londoner's. Beyond that, a threat to the Empire imperilled his identity in a way that the stay-at-home Englishman could not appreciate. If events in the East impelled Great Britain to act, then it compelled us to aid Britain. English-Canadian nationalism was fundamentally interventionist.

However, in the Province the French-Canadians were too numerous to ignore. They had their own brand of nationalism. It was a product of the Conquest and of continuing British efforts to assimilate them. French-Canadian politicians worked in the Canadian Parliament to protect their language, laws, and religion. Lower Canada, in particular, was their bastion. French-Canadian nationalism was isolationist because
their energy was taken up by the struggle to keep what they already had. They had no reason to favour British imperialism and they would not let imperial needs come before the interests of Canada. In fact, to charges that they were disloyal they replied that they had the Province's true interests at heart. On imperial matters it was unlikely that the francophones would agree with their anglophone countrymen.

Canada, therefore, was still fighting the Battle of the Plains of Abraham with words. That is why there was so rarely a single "Canadian" opinion: there were usually at least two, often with the Irish-Canadians adding a third somewhere in the middle. India became another arena in which to stage the old fight because on an imperial matter both English-Canadians and French-Canadians felt that their identities were at stake.

For French Canada the dominant image of the Indian Mutiny was of haughty Britannia crushing her hapless victims. It was not an image to encourage enlistments in the army. For English-Canadians the cause was summed up by Cawnpore. When the 100th Prince of Wales' Royal Canadian Regiment of Foot marched off in that summer of 1858 it was an expression of English-Canadian resolve that the wrong must be righted. The regiment had the solid sanction of the British half of Canadian society; our history, continuing right up through the later crises of the Boer War and the conscription issue of two World Wars, suggests that no more was possible.
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