A MINISTRY OF CULTURE IN ALL BUT NAME:
CANADIAN FEDERAL CULTURAL POLICY

By

CHERYL DIANE MITCHELL

B.A., The University of Toronto, 1982

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

in

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
(Department of Political Science)

We accept this thesis as conforming
to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
January, 1984

© Cheryl Diane Mitchell, 1984
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Department of Political Science

The University of British Columbia
1956 Main Mall
Vancouver, Canada
V6T 1Y3

Date January 11, 1984
This thesis examines the substance and process of Canadian federal cultural policy since 1949 and speculates about its future direction. While the substance lacks any comprehensive cultural blueprint, it does focus on stimulating the supply side of Canadian culture in major creative areas such as the performing arts, broadcasting and print. In the discussion, the paper notes the frequent use of two policy tools - the creation of cultural agencies and fiscal incentives. The framework designed to increase the supply side of Canadian culture has involved three processes: administrative centralization, political centralization, and an adherence to the arm's length principle with respect to the cultural agencies. As the assignment of ministerial responsibility for culture has moved increasingly into one department, namely, the Department of Communications, Canada really has a Ministry of Culture in all but name. The process involving the merger of the Arts and Culture Branch of the Secretary of State with the Department of Communications has also generated a tension between cultural and technological imperatives. Continuation of the substance lacking overall comprehensiveness is foreseen. Trends currently apparent also point to an increasingly interventionist, "take charge" attitude by the federal Government over its own cultural agencies.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Substance</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Process</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Implications</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This essay examines federal cultural policy since 1949: the substance, the process, and the implications for its future direction. In terms of substance, there has not been any overall federal cultural policy, except insofar as decisions not to have one policy constitute a policy. The Ottawa ship of state, while playing an increasingly larger role, has operated without any grandiose vision as to what cultural policy is to achieve. There have, of course, been the usual litany of rhetorical pledges to develop national identity (with no attendant explanation about what this means) and to promote national unity (with the meaning of unity left equally unclear). While a vision as to what should comprise the content of culture remains absent, government activity in this area does appear to have a focus, namely, the stimulation of the supply-side of Canadian culture. The substance of federal cultural policy aims at increasing the amount of Canadian culture available in major creative areas such as the performing arts, broadcasting, and publishing.

The substance of federal cultural policy is found in a series of decisions that have promoted the development of Canadian culture in a continent enveloped by American cultural omnipresence. The absence of one comprehensive policy in this area is unsurprising given that cultural policy is almost a contradiction in terms. Culture is unstructured, anarchic, and unplanned while policy is systematic, rational, and deliberate. Furthermore, it is hard to measure the success of cultural policy in clear-cut terms: the degree of
pleasure it indirectly gives to Canadians, how much it deepens a sense of Canadian identity, and how much it increases national unity are all impossible to measure quantitatively.

The framework designed to stimulate the supply-side of Canadian culture has involved three processes: political centralization, administrative centralization, and an adherence to the arm's length principle with respect to the cultural agencies. Political centralization continues because the federal Government, convinced of its duty to govern for the national interest, has not relinquished to the provinces jurisdictional control over broadcasting and telecommunications. It could very well be that centralized cultural policy has offset the centrifugal, possibly disintegrative, tendencies of economic decentralization. Administrative centralization has seen cultural policy, previously dispersed throughout several government departments, become more focused on one department, the Department of Communications. The arm's length principle is followed in order to give the cultural agencies independence from political interference.

The concluding part of the essay analyses the implications of trends in federal cultural policy in the fields of substance and process. It notes in particular that the substance and process contradict one another as they move in different directions. The process aims at rationalization, centralization, and co-ordination, and yet the substance lacks
any overall comprehensive cultural blueprint. The paper speculates as to whether this contradictory trend will continue, given the merger of the Secretary of State's Arts and Culture Branch with the Department of Communications. It will also analyse the implications for federal cultural policy of an increasingly interventionist mode of operation by the Minister of Communications in federal cultural agencies set up to be at "arm's length" from government. One question immediately raised is whether increased interventionism will lead eventually to the formulation of a comprehensive cultural blueprint that has been heretofore rejected.

The term "culture" is abstract and nebulous, lending itself to narrow or all-encompassing definitions. As Bernard Ostry, the former Assistant Under-Secretary of State, suggests, culture is everything:

It is what we do and the reason why we do it, what we wish and why we imagine it, what we perceive and how we express it, how we live and in what manner we approach death. It is our environment and the patterns of adaptation to it. It is the way we know ourselves and each other.¹

Specifically, this would include the arts, language, education, communications, sports and recreation, participation in external organizations such as UNESCO, ethnicity, citizenship and native programmes, social and physical science research, as well as the generalized mores, manners, and customs of all the diverse groups living in Canada.

A relatively arbitrary narrowing of the definition of culture is required in order to make the topic manageable
enough to be dealt with in the short space of this paper. The definition of culture adopted here restricts itself to intellectual and artistic activity in the creative and communicative areas of the arts, broadcasting, and print. This includes film, radio, television, libraries, the performing arts, museums, books, and magazines. The involvement of the federal Government in these areas has been primarily through two departments, the Department of the Secretary of State and the Department of Communications. In addition to the activities of these departments, the examination of federal cultural policy will be done through an analysis of two policy tools used - the creation of agencies and fiscal incentives. The ten major cultural agencies to be discussed are: Canada Council, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation(CBC), Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission(CRTC), Canadian Film Development Corporation(CFDC), National Film Board(NFB), National Arts Centre(NAC), National Library, National Museums, Public Archives, and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada(SSHRCC).

SECTION 1 - THE SUBSTANCE

State activity in the development of the supply-side of Canadian culture has seen all the prime ministers of this period (Louis St. Laurent, John Diefenbaker, Lester Pearson, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, and Joe Clark) subscribe to the
open, tolerant spirit of Louis St. Laurent:

national cultural policy...has been aimed at strengthening and developing our main cultures without attempting to impose either of them upon any Canadian. It is based upon the principle that private initiative has the main responsibility in most aspects of our cultural development. It has provided financial assistance to individuals, voluntary organizations and institutions in order to support them without attempting, however, to control their activities. This policy has also included the setting up of several public agencies which were deemed essential for the development and adequate expression of our cultural life.  

An examination of the substance of federal cultural policy, however, reveals that the desire of Louis St. Laurent to let private initiative have the primary responsibility for Canadian cultural development has not been fulfilled. Instead, the State has assumed an ever-increasing role. If there is a golden, continuing thread in the myriad of creations of federal cultural agencies, it is in this gradually heightened participation of the federal Government in Canadian culture. This state activism is indicative of the Canadian political tradition as a whole. Graham Spry of the Canadian Radio Broadcasting League could easily have been speaking for more than the cultural sector when he made his assertion, "the state or the United States". This trend toward increased state activism, though, has not been articulated in any comprehensive Canadian cultural policy because such a thing does not exist. Federal cultural policy has been characterized by the absence of cultural blueprints or master plans. It
reacts, in an ad hoc fashion, to problems and crises as they flare up in the Canadian cultural community.

This overriding theme in the substance of federal cultural policy - of increased ad hoc state activism - can be seen through an analysis of the policy tools used by the federal Governments. Along with a democratization and decentralization programme, the two most frequently used tools have been the creation of cultural agencies and fiscal measures (such as tax incentives). After a brief look at the beginning of the development of federal cultural policy and the accompanying expenditures, these three policy tools will be examined by dividing the substance of federal cultural policy into four sections: (1) the democratization and decentralization programme in museums, performing arts, film, and book publishing; (2) the creation of three cultural agencies - National Library, Public Archives, and SSHRCC - to foster research and preserve information; (3) fiscal policy with respect to television, radio, film, and print; and (4) broadcasting policy, as reflected primarily in the CBC and CRTC.

Development of federal cultural policy began to intensify in 1949 with the setting up by the federal Government of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, and Sciences. It set the tone for subsequent federal cultural activity. Composed of soon-to-be Governor General Vincent Massey, Laval social scientist Father Georges-Henri Levesque, Montreal engineer Arthur Surveyor, and the president of the
University of British Columbia, Norman Mackenzie, it examined the state of Canadian culture in general and, more specifically, the work of federal agencies such as the CBC, the National Research Council, the NFB, and the National Gallery. With Arthur Surveyor dissenting, the Report was strongly in favour of public ownership and control of broadcasting. As the airwaves belong to the country as a whole, public and private broadcasters would have to operate in such a way as to promote the national interest. While a state role for Canadian culture was duly recognized, the Massey-Levesque Report refrained from recommending that there be a Ministry of Culture, even though it noted that "in most modern states there are ministries of 'fine arts' or of 'cultural affairs'". Instead, it suggested the establishment of a Canada Council for the Encouragement of the Arts, Letters, Humanities and Social Sciences. The council would be, in the phrase characteristic of federal cultural agencies as a whole, at "arm's length from government. Most of the Report's recommendations, including that of a Canada Council, were enacted.

Federal cultural expenditures made in response to the recommendations of this Royal Commission have, since that time, remained at a roughly constant percentage of the federal budget. From 1952 to 1980, federal cultural expenditures have averaged about 2 per cent of the federal budget. The range has been from 1.59 per cent of the budget in 1952-1953 (and the statistics at this time included recreation with
culture) to 1.73 per cent in 1969-1970 to 2 per cent in 1976-1977 to 1.8 per cent in 1980-1981. The CBC alone eats up approximately two-thirds of the total federal cultural expenditures. For example, in 1980-1981, the federal Government spent $1,102.2 million on culture, of which $733.8 (67.2 per cent) went to the CBC. If we exclude the CBC from the financial analysis, federal cultural expenditures between 1976 and 1981 were 0.7 per cent of the federal budget. It should be noted, though, that actual expenditures can sometimes be larger because the CBC, the arts programme of the Canada Council, the CFDC, the NAC Corporation, and the NFB generate their own revenues to augment the money given to them by Parliament.

Substantive federal cultural policy can be seen in the "democratization and decentralization" programme of the first Trudeau government (1968-1972). Trudeau had swept to power utilizing catchwords such as the "just society" and "participatory democracy", capturing the imagination of a public still glowing from Expo. He and Secretary of State Gerard Pelletier sensed a whole new era opening up in society where obstacles would be removed and access and creativity increased. Essentially, democratization meant giving the citizenry greater access to culture through the dissemination of cultural products - works of art would be taken to the people where possible (rather than remaining in Ottawa, for example) and performing arts companies would travel to small communities (instead of just to the large cities).
Democratization and decentralization were duly incorporated into the federal Government's 1970 cultural statement. Sensing the main themes and contradictions of Canada, the cultural policy's principal planks were pluralism (diversity), democratization and decentralization (equality) and inter-governmental and international co-operation (exchange).

One arm of democratization and decentralization involved museums. After the 1968 creation of the National Museums Act, which consolidated the country's four national museums (Natural Sciences, Science and Technology, Man, and the National Gallery) in order to rationalize the overall administration and create a holding corporation, a National Museums Policy was announced by Gerard Pelletier in 1972. It launched a touring programme complete with museumobiles (moving caravans) in order to heighten accessibility and a network of small exhibition centres in remote communities.

Democratization and decentralization were also applied to the performing arts. Prior to its Performing Arts Policy, federal Government initiatives in this area were confined to the creation of two cultural agencies, the Canada Council and the National Arts Centre. The latter had been the federal Government's major centennial project and had been given the mandate to "develop the performing arts in the National Capital region and to assist the Canada Council in the development of the performing arts elsewhere in Canada". While the Performing Arts Policy was released in 1975, three years after the death of the "d and d" programme, its goal
of increased accessibility echoed the orientation of this programme. The Performing Arts Policy pledged to improve working conditions for artists and remove economic handicaps. The Policy was to be implemented through changes to the social security, tax and pension status of artists, a greater role for the CBC and NFB, more touring, extra funding to the Canada Council, and a bigger capital assistance fund.  

Along with museums and performing arts, film was considered a useful vehicle in this democratization and decentralization programme. Consequently, in 1972 Gerard Pelletier introduced phase one of a National Film Policy which included (1) an advisory committee on film; (2) decentralization of production in the NFB; (3) airing of more NFB films on the CBC; and (4) an increase in the annual appropriation to the CFDC.  

A book publishing policy was also incorporated into the "d and d" programme. In 1972, the Secretary of State announced a policy which had as its two overriding goals a dominant role for the Canadian-controlled publishing firms and adequate distribution of Canadian writing across Canada. The policy included provisions to (1) give the Canada Council more money to aid publishers and increase translation; (2) create a standing committee on publishing; and (3) provide more money to export Canadian books and to purchase books for free distribution across Canada.  

Owing to the huge geographic size of the country and the uneven development of cultural resources in the regions,
"d and d" necessarily entailed considerable financial cost. This heavy expenditure, combined with the onslaught of the recession and the near defeat of the Trudeau government in 1972, spelled the end to democratization and decentralization. Participation was dead and "only the inelegant words democratization and decentralization remained and only in the policies of the National Museums of Canada."\(^{13}\)

As was seen in the above section on the "d and d" programme, creation of cultural agencies - the Canada Council, the National Museums, the National Arts Centre - is a popular policy tool of federal Governments. Three other cultural agencies were established to serve, in a complementary fashion, the federal Government's objective of stimulating the supply-side of Canadian culture. In response to the Massey-Levesque Report and the recognized need to preserve valuable information, the National Library of Canada was created in 1953. The National Library collects books, maintains a Canadian Union Catalogue listing principal Canadian library collections, publishes *Canadiana* (the national bibliography) and co-ordinates the library services of government departments, branches, and agencies.\(^{14}\) The Public Archives of Canada, initially established in 1872, was enlarged by the federal Government in the 1950s to acquire and preserve historical material relating to the history of Canada and to provide a records management and microfilming advisory service to government departments and agencies.\(^{15}\) SSHRCC was created in 1978 in response to demands for an
autonomous funding body, separate from the Canada Council, for the humanities and social sciences to raise their image and rationalize research programmes and subsidiaries.\textsuperscript{16}

For film, the federal Government brought into existence two cultural agencies, the NFB and the CFDC. Initially established in 1939 to review Government film activities (particularly during the war) the NFB's revised 1950 mandate directed it "to initiate and promote the production and distribution of films in the national interest, designed to interpret Canada to Canadians and to other nations."\textsuperscript{17} The CFDC, created in 1968, was charged with the objective of fostering and promoting the development of a feature film industry in Canada. Being very much an investment instrument rather than a granting agency, it represented the first federal Government attempt to achieve cultural policy objectives by means of the private sector.\textsuperscript{18}

Alongside such creation of cultural agencies, federal Governments have often resorted to fiscal tools as vehicles for action in the Canadian cultural sector, particularly with respect to broadcasting, film, and print. Tax incentives and tax relief have been used as stimuli in the creation of Canadian culture; subsidies, as means to ensure distribution.

In broadcasting, the 1978 Bill C-58 made the cost of Canadian advertising in foreign media non-deductible. Canadian companies that placed commercials on American stations beamed into Canada could no longer deduct the cost for tax purposes. The goal of Bill C-58 was to help gain
revenue for the Canadian public and private broadcasters.\textsuperscript{19}

Further related to broadcasting was the 1983 strategy of the federal Government entitled \textit{Towards a New National Broadcasting Policy}.\textsuperscript{20} It has seen the Government use its two favourite tools - cultural agencies and fiscal incentives - in conjunction with one another. The mandate of the Canadian Film Development Corporation was broadened to allow it to administer the Canadian Broadcast Program Development Fund. This substantive initiative by the Department of Communications is a $35-million fund (sliding up to $60-million by its fifth year of operation) available to private broadcasters to help with programme costs. For every two dollars the private broadcasters raise in the private sector, the federal Government will add one dollar.\textsuperscript{21} The Memorandum of Understanding between the Minister of Communications and the CFDC's Board of Directors specifies that each project must meet Canadian content and pre-production distribution rules.\textsuperscript{22}

When it became apparent that phase one of the National Film Policy had not tackled the problems of production and distribution, the federal Government responded with tax measures. Reacting to the 1974 "Winnipeg Manifesto" of irate Canadian film-makers, phase two allowed them to write off 115 per cent, instead of just 60 per cent, of their losses. The CFDC mandate was altered to permit it to put more money into distribution and promotion, and negotiations began with the provinces (who have jurisdictional control
over theatres) to help distribute Canadian films. A second tax measure was the 1974 amendment to the Income Tax Act that offered a 100 per cent write-off to all investors in Canadian films. More than the creation of the CFDC, this capital cost allowance provision has been labelled the single most important factor in the growth of the Canadian feature film industry. There was an avalanche of criticism when the 1981 Finance Minister included in his budget the stipulation that this welcomed stimulus would be reduced from 100 per cent to 50 per cent (the stipulation was withdrawn).

In print, the federal Governments have also used tax measures, as well as subsidies. The latter - in the form of a postal rate subsidy - is in fact, next to the CBC, the largest expenditure made to Canadian culture. The federal Governments have always been concerned with access, with ensuring that all Canadians are "plugged in" to the national community. The postal rate subsidy gives remote rural areas access to information without prohibitive cost. Canadian magazines also benefit from tax measures. In 1956, the Liberal Government imposed a 20 per cent tax on advertising contained in Canadian editions of foreign periodicals. The Conservatives removed the tax the following year. From 1956 to 1976, the federal Governments battled with the demands of Time, Reader's Digest, and the American Government over taxation policy. Tax deductions for advertising in Canadian magazines were extended to the Canadian editions of these two magazines. The American representatives threatened not
to ratify the Canada-United States Automotive Agreement if the Canadian Government cancelled this provision. The Minister of Finance, Walter Gordon, wanted to call the Americans' bluff but his view was rejected by cabinet. In 1976, though, the federal Government, through S. 19 of the Income Tax Act, cancelled the tax deductions in the Canadian editions of *Time* and *Reader's Digest* in order to help Canadian magazines.

Having examined federal cultural policy in the three areas of the arts, film, and print, a fourth area of state activism can be seen in broadcasting. Here again, the federal Government has established cultural agencies - the CBC and the CRTC - to implement its objectives, such as the time-honoured Massey-Levesque view of public ownership of the airwaves.

The 1936 Canadian Broadcasting Act established the CBC as both regulator and producer, a structure which lasted until the introduction of television in the 1950s. By that time, there was considerable concern over the financing of the CBC. In true Canadian fashion, a royal commission was established in 1955 to investigate the matter - the Royal Commission on Broadcasting, chaired by Robert Fowler. The Government refused its recommendation that the Parliamentary funding of the CBC should be given on a long-term basis to allow the CBC the ability to engage in long-term planning. Once a dual system of authority in broadcasting was established in the late 1950s, further problems were created for the CBC, leading to yet another investigation - the
Fowler Advisory Committee on Broadcasting. Again, the federal Government refused this Committee's key recommendation - the reinstitution of a single authority over broadcasting. The Government wanted to continue having separate boards for the CBC and the regulatory agency, placing the CBC under the regulatory agency.

The CBC is conceived by the federal Government as the central vehicle in the development of Canadian culture, national unity, and national identity. The Clyne Consultative Committee on the Implications of Telecommunications for Canadian Sovereignty stated:

the CBC is an absolutely essential factor in the development and maintenance of a Canadian identity and in the fostering of a regional and national Canadian culture that is the principal defence of the social and cultural sovereignty of Canada.  

As with the other cultural agencies, federal cultural policy can be seen in the mandates. The CBC was directed

(a) to give a balanced service of information, entertainment, and enlightenment for people of different ages, interests, and tastes covering the whole range of programming in fair proportion;
(b) to be extended to all parts of Canada, as public funds become available;
(c) to be in English and French, serving the special needs of the geographic regions, and to contribute to the exchange of cultural and regional information and entertainment;
(d) to contribute to the development of national unity and to provide for a continuing expression of Canadian identity.

One explanation for the numerous criticisms directed towards the CBC is this very mandate. The federal Government
has given the CBC an all-encompassing mandate to ensure that practically everything thinkable for a television station to broadcast is done. The mandate is arguably too broad, given the CBC budget and the intangible nature of some of its tasks (in areas such as Canadian identity and national unity, for example). One criticism, though, which is not likely due to the mandate is the bad relationship the CBC has with two fellow cultural agencies - the NFB and the CFDC. The CBC does not readily make itself available for the airing of these Canadian films. For example, in 1974 the CBC had only aired two of the then 112 CFDC films. For reasons that will become clear in the process section, this squabbling between agencies has been allowed to continue because of the federal Government's adherence to the arm's length principle.

To implement its determination that the CBC and private broadcasting stations serve the national interest, the federal Government has established regulatory agencies, the most recent (1976) of which is the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission. In addition to its powers over broadcasting, the CRTC has authority over federally-regulated telecommunications carriers such as Bell Canada and Telesat Canada.

While the initial years of the CRTC were characterized by a form of "spinelessness" with regard to the private operators and the United States, recent years have seen the CRTC adopt a more defensive, nationalist line, especially under the chairmanship of Pierre Juneau. The biggest development
was the introduction of Canadian content quotas for private and public Canadian radio and television stations. In prime time, private broadcasters must have at least 50 per cent Canadian content, with the CBC required to have 60 per cent all the time. AM radio must play at least 30 per cent Canadian music; FM radio a variable percentage. The introduction of quotas has encouraged, for example, the production of Canadian musical recordings, and reflects the aforementioned determination to increase the supply-side of Canadian culture.

One area of contention is the loose definition of what constitutes Canadian content, although a 1983 CRTC policy statement shows movement to a tougher definition. If the majority of a rock group are Canadian, for example, and play a foreign composition, this qualifies as Canadian content. CTV's "The Julie Show" classified as Canadian content because the hostess was Canadian, even though the vast majority of her guests were American. News programmes that cover foreign political events qualify as Canadian - that the perspective is Canadian is good enough. Similar content rules apply to sports broadcasts which feature foreign teams: they are "Canadian content" as long as the domestic broadcast licencee or production company has "significant production control and provides the commentators".

Canadian content rules have been undergoing revision and lately, tightening as well, since their introduction in 1974.
The rules define a Canadian as an individual who was, at all relevant times, either a Canadian citizen as defined by the Citizenship Act or a permanent resident within the meaning of the Immigration Act, other than a permanent resident who has lived in Canada for more than four years. 39

Certification of productions as Canadian is done by the CRTC, the CFDC, and the Canadian Film and Videotape Certification Office, the latter being part of the Cultural Industries Directorate of the Department of Communications. The CRTC has proposed a point system to determine Canadian content: the programme is Canadian if it has at least sixty out of ten points and if either the director, writer, or one of the highest paid performers is Canadian. 40

The CRTC is sometimes criticized as much as the CBC, particularly when it handed down its pay-TV decision in 1981. There was outcry that the decision hurt Canada's cultural and industrial interests because more than one pay-TV station meant less available concentrated revenue for the production of Canadian programmes. Then CRTC chairman, John Meisel, implicitly acknowledged this when he said the decision would create "a system congenial to Canadians because it will reflect their North American tastes". 41 The spirit of the revised 1968 Broadcasting Act did not list as one of its objectives the cultivation and reflection of North American tastes; the objective is Canadian tastes. This comment by Meisel does not imply a changing federal cultural policy but is rather a description of the preferences of Canadians. It
is questionable whether a line of distinction can be drawn anyway between North American and Canadian tastes because if Canadians choose North American cultural entertainment, then that is Canadian taste.

If we regard culture in the economic terms of supply and demand, then it appears that these substantive policy methods of the federal Government have been implemented to stimulate the supply side, on the assumption that the increased availability of Canadian cultural work would lead to increased demand. The supply side has been stimulated in film through the capital cost allowance; in television and radio, by Canadian content regulations; in the performing arts, scholarly pursuits, and literature by subsidies and grants from the Canada Council and SSHRCC. The stimulation of the supply side has been done to provide Canadians with choice. As the recently released National Broadcasting Strategy notes, choice is meaningless unless Canadians have the option of choosing Canadian.

SECTION 11 - THE PROCESS

The process of federal cultural policy has involved the continued political centralization of the federal Government in broadcasting and telecommunications, a trend toward administrative centralization, and an adherence to the arm's length principle with respect to the cultural agencies. This section will analyze these three characteristics of the
process.

While administrative centralization refers to the process within the Ottawa bureaucracy, political centralization refers to the dynamics of federal-provincial relations. The federal Government's cultural objective of centralized nationwide control over broadcasting has led to a jurisdictional struggle with the provinces. While the courts have always upheld the role of the federal Government in legislating over broadcasting, the constitution itself is unclear. The only reference to communications is telegraph lines, which are specified in S. 92(10)(a) as coming under federal jurisdiction.\(^44\)

The 1932 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada that radio communications are an exclusively federal regulatory jurisdiction remains unchanged. Somewhat anachronistically, the 1903 Railway Act continues to govern telecommunications in Canada, despite the massive technological changes that have occurred since that time. Between 1969 and 1982, a new telecommunications act has been tabled three times in the House of Commons but never passed. There has been speculation that the federal Government prefers to leave the old law in place rather than possibly suffer negative political ramifications of another jurisdictional battle with the provinces.\(^45\)

The federal Government has been reluctant to bring the provinces in on the development of communications legislation. Its 1968 domestic communications policy established Telesat
Canada as the monopoly carrier for all satellite communications and rejected any provincial role in this at all. A series of federal green and grey papers in the 1970s and a 1975 speech by the Minister of Communications Gerard Pelletier outlined the basic attitude of the federal Government:

It is not the intention of the Federal Government to divest itself of responsibility for broadcasting policy in Canada... it would be unrealistic to allow the fragmentation which would result... if... split federal-provincial jurisdiction were implemented... The Government intends to give full recognition to provincial and regional objectives and priorities, while continuing to fulfill its responsibility for this essentially national dimension... and protecting the interests of Canada as a whole.

Increasingly the federal Government has been willing to engage in consultation and to delegate administrative functions to the provinces but not anything of more jurisdictional significance.

It is as interesting as it is predictable that reactions to this centralized determination of the federal Government with respect to communications have divided along regional lines. Quebec, of course, has been furious; the Western provinces remain suspicious of seductive proposals for increased provincial participation in national policy-making (viewing them as traps and substitutes for direct transfer of legislative power); Ontario has been generally supportive of the federal role in broadcasting. It can be argued that the unyielding attitude of the federal Government ignores fundamental political realities about the decentralized nature
of Canada. On the other hand, it can be plausibly argued that the federal Government, operating in the national interest, sees those realities all too well and attempts to counteract them. It is the orientation of the federal Government that while there are many distinct regional societies in Canada, the national interest dictates at least a modest degree of centralization in broadcasting and telecommunications to preserve the overarching union. Political centralization does not, however, extend to the arts in general as no attempt has been made to question the jurisdiction of the provinces to set up cultural agencies to foster local and regional cultural expression.

There has been within the federal Government an increasing degree of administrative centralization. This process involves greater rationalization in what is essentially a ministry of culture. As will be discussed later, the arm's length principle with respect to the cultural agencies prohibits total rationalization and co-ordination. One can only speculate about this centralization but the Trudeau/Pitfield rationalistic approach to the bureaucracy, and a growing desire for co-ordination are amongst the most likely explanations. The rationalistic approach applied to culture and communications attempted to deal with difficult policy issues with "a fresh and comprehensive government apparatus" rather than with specific programmes. The administrative centralization process within Ottawa has not been cyclical but rather gradual movement toward concentration within
one department. This one department, which was for fourteen years the Secretary of State, is now, to an even greater degree, the Department of Communications. The Arts and Culture Branch of the Secretary of State is no longer separate from Communications.

Culture was dispersed in the 1940s and 1950s through many departments. To give some examples, the Department of Transport used to hold what is now the communications portfolio; the Public Archives was a sub-branch of the Department of Agriculture; the Ministry of National Revenue determined Canadian content in periodicals and oversaw the CBC; the Department of Citizenship and Immigration had in its portfolio cultural agencies such as the National Library and the National Gallery. The arts and culture concentration within Communications means that Canada really has a Ministry of Culture in all but name.

The process of administrative centralization essentially began in 1963 when Prime Minister Lester Pearson, riding high on a campaign victory pledge of "sixty days of decision", decided to tackle the problem of support for the arts and other cultural endeavours. Pearson chose the Department of the Secretary of State as his vehicle and transferred to it many cultural agencies: the Canada Council, the National Gallery, National Museums, National Library, Public Archives, Board of Broadcast Governors, CBC, NFB, Queen's Printer, and the Centennial Commission (later to become the National Arts
Centre). Its Arts and Culture Branch was assigned the task of providing advice and assistance to the Secretary of State in the formulation and development of policies and programmes for the achievement of national arts and cultural objectives; to promote effective co-operation among the federal cultural agencies in the achievement of these objectives; to administer certain programmes designed in support of these objectives, and to advise the Government on matters of State protocol.51

The Secretary of State was responsible until 1980 for the cultural agencies - he or she would speak in the House of Commons for them, approve their estimates but refrain from meddling in their internal affairs. Legal advisors for the Secretary of State held that the Department was responsible for broadcasting policy despite contrary claims made in 1978 by Bill C-24.52 The Department was the parliamentary spokesman for the CBC but had no powers of direction over it, except insofar as the minister could disapprove of its estimates. This exception, of course, is an extremely potent mechanism through which the minister can exert considerable clout over the direction and, indeed, the very survival of the CBC. It is for the minister to decide whether he or she can afford the political risks of seriously interfering in an agency designed to be relatively autonomous from the Government.

The 1969 Government Organization Act created a policy and coordinating Department of Communications, whose tasks were previously held by the Minister of Transport and the
Postmaster General. In addition, it included the telecommunications section of the Department of National Defence. Its mandate is to encourage

the orderly development and use of telecommunications in Canada by managing the use of radio communications, developing policies with respect to telecommunications, and carrying out programmes in satellite communications and related research.53

The central contradiction, to be elaborated upon later in this paper, emerged early in the life of the Department of Communications. To design policy for communications equipment without taking content into consideration was really to go only halfway down the road - the process was taken care of and the substance ignored. The 1980 reorganization sought to address this contradiction. The Department of Communications lost its responsibility for space research and development to the Science and Technology Ministry and was given the Arts and Culture Branch of the Secretary of State. With the Department now responsible for all ten cultural agencies, substance is no longer being ignored.

While the merger did not happen until 1980, the uniting of the Arts and Culture Branch in the Secretary of State with the Department of Communications was an idea tentatively put forward shortly after the creation of the latter Department in 1969. Many bureaucrats were against it, though, most notably Secretary of State officials Max Yalden and Andre Fortier. Both viewed a merger as too unwieldy and considered cultural content the exclusive domain of the
Secretary of State. 54 While eventually agreeing to experiment with the merger, senior bureaucrat Michael Pitfield also expressed scepticism: "I've never been convinced that software and hardware need to be married that closely." 55 Pressure to marry substance with process accelerated despite opposition, especially with the impetus given by the 1978 Report of the Communications Research Advisory Board (CRAB). This Board, comprised mainly of representatives from the private sector, criticized the Department of Communications both for its lack of comprehensive planning mechanisms and its failure to address questions of content. 56 The Conservative federal Government in 1979 acknowledged the impending marriage by giving one minister two portfolios, the Secretary of State and the Department of Communications. The subsequent Liberal federal Government furthered the trend by formally reorganizing the two Departments a year later. Until the merger occurred, the Department of Communications was, in the words of George Galt, "a set of hardware programmes in search of a policy." 57

This administrative centralization process involving the merger of the Arts and Culture Branch with Communications has led to an uneasy relationship between cultural and technological objectives. While cultural objectives are geared to the anarchic, free development of the individual artist's aesthetic or intellectual creations, technological ones have an industrially planned, mass market, mechanical orientation. An industrial orientation to culture can hurt
the development of that very culture. The uneasy relationship between these two objectives is exemplified within the Department of Communications. The Minister of Communications Francis Fox explained the underlying rationale for the merger:

> to ensure that communications policy is conducted with the highest concern for the cultural content and the cultural implications of communications technology...to make the cultural milieu more sensitive and more aware of the importance and the rapidity of technological progress in the field of communications. It is the Prime Minister's view that such progress should serve more and more to strengthen our culture and identity.58

This has not been the case. Subject matter is often divided into communications policy on the one hand and cultural policy on the other. One Department official even admitted that "'we're not in the business of culture; we're in the business of industry'".59 The Department's 1983 Broadcasting Strategy also reveals the industrial orientation with its comments on private sector entrepreneurship, export thrusts, and high economic stakes. Two organizations have voiced concerns. The Canadian Conference of the Arts sees the Arts and Culture Branch "becoming engulfed within the structure and activities of the Department of Communications and motivated not by cultural objectives but by industrial and technological priorities".60 The C.D. Howe Institute similarly notes that the Department appears more as a science-based unit promoting an increasingly important aspect of Canada's overall industrial strategy and less as a
culture-oriented unit responsible for managing the instruments whereby Canadian identity is shaped.

The tension within the Department of Communications has been described as "high-tech" versus "highbrow", a tension which has been exacerbated by what the highbrows (such as the Canadian Conference of the Arts) sees as a software/hardware imbalance. Given its original mandate, the Department of Communications appears biased toward equipment, a bias in no small part explained by the worldwide acclaim given to some of its technological creations. This bias has spilled over to the area of content with the establishment of a Cultural Industries Directorate within the Department. To the highbrows, the technological orientation - its mechanization and commercialization - is implicit in the very term "cultural industries".

The 1981-1982 Report of the Communications Research Advisory Board disagrees with the highbrows on the alleged tension between cultural and technological imperatives as it refuses to see the two as polar opposites. Writing approvingly of the merger, CRAB argues that the scientific and artistic cultures are usually considered as opposites. The rational versus the creative. But good science is very much a creative process; discovery comes from insight more than from random experimentation. In a department where technology and art are becoming increasingly intertwined, the traits common to both "cultures" need to be made more explicit...

In sum, CRAB considers the merger to be good for technology...
and art, providing that the process involves smooth integration at the top policy level. The Federal Cultural Policy Review Committee also upholds the idea of art and technology being viewed in complementary terms and therefore encourages the development of an arts and technology programme within the Department of Communications.66

This trend toward greater administrative centralization has seen continued adherence to another key element in the process - the arm's length principle. The Canadian Conference of the Arts held that this principle, which describes the relationship between the Minister of Communications and the cultural agencies which report to him or her, is

> the most public and visible means available to government to demonstrate its commitment to excellence and to confirm its recognition that standards of excellence must be determined by professionals in the field, not by politicians in Parliament.67

In 1970, Secretary of State Gerard Pelletier pledged the support of the federal Government for the arm's length principle:

> In our view, there is no alternative to individual creative initiative and a government should not only respect the freedom of the artist and scholar, but also provide for the independence of public institutions so that the specialists who direct them may base their actions on professional rather than political criteria.68

This degree of independence and autonomy, otherwise known as the length and strength of the arm, varies from agency to department, and from agency to agency. While a department
is really just an extension of the minister and hence subject to considerable control, an agency is more autonomous. The differences will become clearer in the upcoming discussion on Crown corporations.

The Massey-Levesque Report subscribed to the arm's length approach and therefore disapproved of the idea of annual votes of money to arts institutions. This has since been the case though - annual appropriations are given to the cultural agencies. Regarded as a manifestation that the arm is becoming shorter, this fact has created unease in the cultural community. Unease deepened with the release of the (Lambert) Final Report of the Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability. Its proposal for ministers to control cultural agencies through "ministerial directives" is seen by some as a challenge to the political freedom of the agencies. The whole Lambert approach dismayed the cultural community because

the commitment to far-reaching, all-encompassing central planning and programming and the desire for 'sameness' in systems for federal direction, control and accountability could undermine the cultural agencies.

The arm's length principle has been a difficult one for federal Governments to implement. Too short an arm provokes criticisms but too long an arm creates problems of its own. A long arm results in the different organizations pursuing similar goals within mandates which are not necessarily well related or coordinated.
This clearly limits the capacity of any government to pursue overall cultural objectives, to mobilize resources for that purpose and to harmonize policies with other levels of government.70

In essence, the arm's length process affects the substance of federal cultural policy. Criticisms of a lack of comprehensiveness may in fact be due to the process itself.

The arm's length relationship between government and a cultural agency depends in part on the classification of the agency. The typical method by which the federal Government attempts to develop Canadian culture is to establish crown corporations, giving them mandates that allow them to act in a nonpartisan, relatively autonomous manner. All corporations are ultimately accountable to Parliament through the Minister but the amount of control placed on each depends on the type of corporation. There are three main types of corporations: departmental (administrative, supervisory or regulatory services), agency (quasi-commercial trading and service operations), and proprietary (financial/commercial/industrial operations and the supply of a public service).71

A minister cannot supervise the administrative budgets of proprietary corporations; he or she can only approve their capital budgets. The minister can, on the other hand, exert direct financial control over departmental Crown corporations. Agency corporations must have their capital budgets approved by Cabinet and their operating budgets by the Minister and the President of the Treasury Board.
Proprietary corporations are the most autonomous and departmental ones the least. The CBC, NAC, and Teleglobe Canada are proprietary; the CFDC, agency; SSHRCC and National Museums, departmental. The indispensability of money gives the federal Government considerable power over the cultural agencies - it can increase or decrease the supply. As the 1982 Federal Cultural Policy Review Committee noted, "rewards are as coercive as punishments, even if less painful to those coerced". 72 The money threat can distort the activities of the agencies. For example, because SSHRCC must abide by the financial management requirements of the Treasury Board, it has been forced "to accept an allocation of resources that diverges increasingly from what its own judgement or that of its academic advisors might dictate". 73

Another method by which an arm's length relationship can be reduced is through the federal Government's ability to select board members for cultural agencies. Indeed, as the Federal Cultural Policy Review Committee and the Lambert Commission observed, "the most potent instrument in the hands of the designated Minister or Governor in Council is the power to appoint and change boards". 74 Cultural considerations - that is, those based upon the individual's proven abilities in cultural service and credibility among members of the cultural community - have sometimes been overshadowed by non-cultural ones. There have been several instances where board memberships are given to party loyalists as rewards, consolation prizes, and status
The CRTC illustrates a central strength and weakness in the federal cultural policy decision-making process. The arm's length principle preserves the integrity of a non-political agency and yet hinders efforts by politicians to develop and coordinate cultural policies and objectives. Created in 1975 as a coordinating and regulating body for the broadcast system, the CRTC also makes important policy decisions on programme content, industry structure and the introduction of new technologies. It has sometimes opposed Cabinet and complicated the conduct of federal-provincial relations. For example, the CRTC refused to sanction the 1976 Canada-Manitoba agreement on cable television. In response, the federal Government retaliated by passing Bill C-24 in 1978 which gave the Minister of Communications the power to vary the decisions of the CRTC. The 1983 Broadcasting Strategy has reiterated the determination of the federal Government to have the power to issue broad policy directives to the CRTC. In a sense, though, the troubles with the CRTC were the federal Government's own fault. The House of Commons has been a wasteland in terms of formulating policies to deal with broadcasting and telecommunications. Nature abhors a vacuum - someone had to make the decisions and consequently the CRTC stepped in to do what the House of Commons had itself abdicated.

Despite coordination difficulties generated by the
arm's length principle and occasional deviations in the areas of financing and representation on boards, the principle has been generally adhered to by the federal Governments. Such adherence has led to the development of another characteristic of the federal cultural process: the willingness to listen to interest groups. Indeed, as Bernard Ostry points out, the federal Government decided in the 1960s to have organized "loyal oppositions". The Government subsidizes groups to criticize government, to advise and comment, and to provide the Minister with contacts in the artistic community. Such groups include the Canadian Broadcasting League, the Canadian Museums Association, and the Canadian Conference of the Arts.

Overall, then, the process has seen continued political centralization in the areas of broadcasting and telecommunications. The trend toward administrative centralization has meant greater rationalization of federal cultural policy. This greater rationalization, as seen in the linking of culture to communications, has had mixed results. Federal cultural policy has gained by the greater clout of a strengthened department. However, federal cultural policy's linking to technological imperatives has generated a tension between the two and leaves open the possibility of the latter dominating the former. Lastly, the arm's length principle has been adopted to ensure the independence of the cultural agencies from political
interference but, as seen in the case of the CRTC, can occasionally prohibit the Minister from implementing policy objectives.

SECTION III - IMPLICATIONS

The concluding section of this essay is speculative in nature as it attempts to determine where federal cultural policy is heading in the areas of substance and process. Three aspects of federal cultural policy will be used as illustrations. To understand federal cultural policy in terms of its future requires an understanding of whether it has been successful to date, as this would influence the survival or the curtailment of present trends.

The stated cultural objectives of the federal Government have been both few and vague. It would seem that, in essence, the objective of federal cultural policy has been to stimulate the supply side to ensure that Canadians have choice, that they have the option of choosing Canadian as well as foreign entertainment. The objective has had to take into account the market realities of living next door to the American cultural giant. This has been done by the Government taking moderately defensive measures to allow Canadians exposure to their own culture. In the words of CBC President Pierre Juneau, the Canadian content regulations were introduced to ensure that Canadians can turn on their television sets and know what country
they are in. The overall national defensiveness of the various cultural policies have also been seen in the creation of the CFDC and the stimulative tax measures.

There is certainly more Canadian content on television and radio than in the pre-quota days but it is questionable whether the cultural governmental process has helped or hindered the implementation of this policy objective. There is a lack of uniformity and consistency with respect to the overall definition of Canadian content in the cultural agencies. As mentioned earlier, the CRTC proposed a tighter definition in order to strengthen the development of Canadian productions and yet the other agencies do not have to adopt it. For instance, the CFDC "will take into consideration the definition established by the CRTC" but insists that it is "autonomous in its decisions, including decisions on Canadian content". Not only does this confuse cultural producers attempting to qualify but it handicaps the federal Government's efforts to co-ordinate a uniform definition. The disarray continues here because of the independence given by the Government to the cultural agencies. This disarray may be prompting the federal Government to shorten the arm. It is evident that in this area of Canadian content, the substance and the process are not moving together in a complementary fashion.

Quotas may have been placed on television and radio but
in the feature film industry they remain absent. The refusal by the federal Government to place quotas on American feature films is significant, especially when it is taken into consideration that 102 countries did place quotas on these films. The national defensiveness manifested in some other cultural areas is not present here. If the stated objective is to give Canadians the option of going to the theatres to see Canadian films, it seems paradoxical that the substance and process of federal cultural policy has been on the creation of art rather than on its distribution as well. The reluctance of successive federal Governments to deal decisively with the distribution problem for Canadian films is particularly seen in their refusal to copy the United States in forbidding the integration of production/distribution companies with theatre chains. The process, as reflected in the regulations governing film distribution, is inadequately designed to achieve the substantive goal of ensuring the availability of Canadian films.

A third instance is the postal rate subsidy which, as was mentioned in section one, is the second largest federal cultural expenditure. This subsidy is given to foreign as well as Canadian publishers. Foreign distributors simply drive their books and periodicals over the border to Canadian postal stations. A policy which pays handsome dividends to non-Canadian publishers instead of using this money for grants for example, to Canadian authors, is
not appropriately designed to wholly meet the objective of stimulating the Canadian periodical and book publishing industry.

These three instances of the substance and process of federal cultural policy not moving in tandem to achieve stated cultural objectives put in perspective trends evident in this government sector. One trend - the substance contradicts the process - is a cause of some of the outlined weaknesses in implementing cultural objectives. Two other trends - the software/hardware imbalance (otherwise known as the highbrow/high-tech tension) - and the increasingly interventionist mode of operation by the Department of Communications - merit further attention in terms of their implications for the future direction of federal cultural policy.

The trend which has seen the substance of federal cultural policy contradicted by the process is actually two-fold in nature. The first aspect revolves around cultural policy itself being a contradiction in terms with culture being anarchic and policy, orderly. The substance of federal cultural policy has been characterized by the absence of any overall comprehensive plan (and hence mirrors most closely the reality of culture per se). The substance deals with culture sector by sector rather than by cultural blueprint. The process, on the other hand, aims at rationalization, centralization, comprehensiveness, and co-ordination. The two do not move in tandem, except
insofar as the arm's length relationship allows cultural agencies room to breathe (although even this exception shows signs of breaking down somewhat, as will be seen later).

At a second level, the substance is in disequilibrium with the merger that has occurred within the process, namely, the joining of the Arts and Culture Branch (content) with Communications (form). The merger seeks to marry the substance with the process yet the union of an untrammelled, anarchic cultural substance with an orderly, bureaucratic process might injure the nature of one or the other. The current Minister of Communications Francis Fox commented on the merger using this marriage analogy:

We're the only country in the western world that has gone this way and the process is far from complete. Marriage is the right word - two separate entities joined together at the policy level. 82

But can the two entities be joined without the one sacrificing to the other? The merger has already seen a software/hardware imbalance. Nevertheless it is hard to imagine a return to the pre-marriage days even if, in the words of George Galt

Form without content fitted into a peculiarly Canadian tradition: for many years, the country had enjoyed a broadcasting system unmatched anywhere for its technical excellence and for its overwhelming weight of foreign programmes. 83

The pre-marriage days illustrated a perceived weakness in federal cultural policy and therefore federal Governments will likely maintain the current merger.
A second trend in federal cultural policy - the software/hardware imbalance - shows no significant signs of abating and has both positive and negative implications for the implementation of cultural objectives. The imbalance is positive in that at least the marriage has strengthened the clout of the Arts and Culture Branch. Association with high-tech gives the highbrow's requests for funding greater legitimacy as the accompanying economic benefits can be more readily seen. The imbalance is negative insofar as it carries the real risk of the highbrows being almost completely smothered by the high-tech constituency.

While a certain degree of wariness must be present in using deterministic words, it does appear inevitable that, given the merger of software and hardware under the umbrella of one Department, the imbalance will continue. The symbiotic relationship that exists between substance and process is not one of exactly equal dependence. The technological equipment can exist and be sold on the international market without any accompanying content. The substance, however, can rarely be communicated without hardware apparatus - for example, video art requires a computer video terminal to be shown. The imbalance that the highbrows perceive appears endemic to a Department whose raison d'être was exclusively hardware in orientation. Given the centrality of high-tech exports to an evolving Canadian industrial strategy, too much optimism about the
vitality of arts and culture within the high-tech Department of Communications appears unwarranted. However, the imbalance may not always be so prominent though, given the significant political weight of the Arts and Culture Branch. Most of the Minister's letters come from the cultural community and hence provide the Minister with the impetus to rectify at least some of that imbalance. It is conceivable that the highbrows' political weight will lead to a change in process - perhaps by increasing the amount of staff within the Department allocated to the Arts and Culture Branch (currently, this Branch comprises less than five per cent of the total Departmental staff). Another possible method to alter the imbalance is to decrease the resources allocated to hardware and thereby increase the relative importance of the other.

A third trend evident in this discussion of federal cultural policy has been the increasingly interventionist mode of operation by the Department of Communications, particularly since the 1980 merger. Since that date, federal cultural policy has manifested a "take charge" attitude to the cultural agencies. Parallel to the interventionist process in the activities of the public cultural agencies has been a heightened willingness to encourage a greater role for the private, as opposed to the public, cultural sector. The Government is attempting to assert itself more clearly over its own agencies while it provides stimulation to private sector cultural entrepreneurs.
The willingness to stimulate the private cultural sector can be seen as a return to the original intentions of Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent in the 1950s to let private initiative be the primary driving cultural force. The subsequent two decades, though, had seen a considerable amount of state cultural activity, which either represented an abdication of responsibility by the private sector or a reluctance by federal cultural policy-makers to trust private cultural entrepreneurs to develop Canadian culture. The trend of the Government attempting to implement cultural objectives through the private sector was briefly in the limelight in the 1960s with the creation of the CFDC but was not further developed until the 1980s. Efforts to restrain government expenditures in recessionary times have led to the picking up of this trend again. To cite an example, the recently announced Department of Communications policy, Building for the Future: Towards a Distinctive CBC, seeks to increase Canadian cultural production through a much greater use of independent producers. These producers will be further assisted by the private sector-oriented Canadian Broadcast Program Development Fund.

Greater intervention by the federal Government in its own cultural agencies necessarily entails less adherence to the arm's length principle. The Minister of Communications is now in the process of giving himself the
This year alone has seen the Minister send back several CRTC policy decisions for reconsideration. Building for the Future more closely integrates the Department of Communications with the CBC. The Department will realign the CBC senior management functions through legislative amendments to the Broadcasting Act and it will review the CBC's perceived lack of adequate accountability to Parliament. A third notable aspect of the CBC policy is the power given to the Minister to determine the leasing of CBC facilities to independents. All of these moves on the CBC send a clear signal of heightened intervention in what is supposed to be the most autonomous of all the cultural agencies, a proprietary corporation.

A final point to consider in this analysis of federal cultural policy is whether the trends outlined above will eventually lead to the formulation of a cultural blueprint. The objectives of a Canadian cultural blueprint are very hard to imagine except in the vaguest of terms - to increase national unity and deepen Canadian identity. These terms are so abstract as to be almost meaningless criteria from which to measure federal cultural policy. The ad hoc, sector by sector approach by the federal Governments is deeply entrenched and has the support of the most recent study of cultural policy. The formulation of a cultural blueprint is unlikely, given the diverse nature
of Canada as a country that simultaneously incorporates federalism, regionalism, bilingualism, and multiculturalism. In recognizing the inappropriateness of designing a monolithic cultural policy, federal Governments have manifested an understanding of the country's diversity. Questions as to what Canadian culture should be comprised of are left to the artists themselves, with the federal cultural policy focus on the providing of a framework in which these artists can thrive.
FOOTNOTES:


2 Ibid., p. 68


8 Ibid., p. 25


10 D.P. Schafer, op. cit., p. 47

11 Ibid., p. 144

12 F.T. Pasquill and J. Horsman, op. cit., p. 34

13 B. Ostry, op. cit., p. 118


15 Ibid.


17 Treasury Board, op. cit.

18 Canadian Conference of the Arts, A Strategy for Culture, (Ottawa: Canadian Conference of the Arts, 1980), p. 146. Hereafter referred to as the CCA.
23. D.P. Schafer, op. cit., p. 32
24. Treasury Board, op. cit.
25. CCA, A Strategy for Culture, p. 146
27. Frank W. Peers, "Tensions over Communications" in The Future of North America: Canada, The United States, and Quebec Nationalism, p. 95
29. Ibid., p. 188
31. Treasury Board, op. cit.
35. P. Audley, op. cit., p. 168
36. Ibid., p. 261
37. Ibid., p. 261
CRTC, Proposed Definition of a Canadian Programme.

P. Audley, op. cit., p. 261


Department of Communications, Towards a New National Broadcasting Policy.


G. Galt, op. cit., p. 20

R. Brian Woodrow, et. al., op. cit., p. 31

Ibid., p. 36

Ibid., p. 30

Ibid., p. 41

G. Galt, op. cit., p. 15

B. Ostry, op. cit., p. 127

Ibid., p. 130


G. Galt, op. cit., p. 19

Ibid., p. 19


Ibid., p. 17


Susan Crean, Learned Societies Conference, University of British Columbia, 1983

CCA, More Strategy for Culture, p. 4

P. Audley, op. cit., p. 123

G. Galt, op. cit., p. 26

Ibid., p. 26

Ibid., p. 26


FCPRC, Report, p. 52
67 CCA, A Strategy for Culture, p. 64
68 B. Ostry, op. cit., p. 192
69 CCA, A Strategy for Culture, p. 64
70 FCPRC, Discussion Guide, p. 18
71 Canada Tax Foundation, op. cit., p. 288
72 FCPRC, Report, p. 28
73 Ibid., p. 30
74 Ibid., p. 43
75 Ibid., p. 43
76 John Meisel and John Reid (MP), Learned Societies Conference, University of British Columbia, 1983
77 CCA, A Strategy for Culture, p. 30
78 Ibid., p. 115
80 P. Audley, op. cit., p. 244
81 Ibid., p. 128
82 G. Galt, op. cit., p. 17
83 Ibid., p. 20
84 Ibid., p. 26
85 Department of Communications, Building for the Future: Towards a Distinctive CBC, (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1983)
86 Department of Communications, Towards a New National Broadcasting Policy.
87 Department of Communications, Building for the Future.
88 FCPRC, Report.
BIBLIOGRAPHY:


Canadian Conference for the Arts. Direction Canada: A Declaration of Canadian Cultural Concern. Ottawa: Canadian Conference for the Arts, 1973


Department of Communications. A Special Program of Cultural Initiatives. Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1983

Department of Communications. Towards a New National Broadcasting Policy. Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1983

Department of Communications. Building for the Future: Towards a Distinctive CBC. Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1983


