GEOGRAPHY, CRIME AND SOCIAL CONTROL

by

JOHN LOWMAN

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Department of Geography

The University of British Columbia
1956 Main Mall
Vancouver, Canada
V6T 1Y3

Date 20th August 1983
ABSTRACT

The purpose of this dissertation is to describe and challenge some of the basic premises, implicit ontological and epistemological beliefs and, by extension, the political values which form the core of the geography of crime. While the discussion concentrates on published research undertaken by geographers, it also introduces relevant research conducted in kindred disciplines utilizing a spatial or environmental perspective (urban sociology and environmental criminology).

As a critical theoretical exegesis, the principal focus of the critique is the analytic separation of crime from the control of crime, which characterises much of the geographer's research manifesto. Geographers have tended to study either crime or (much less frequently) the judicial system without any systematic consideration of the impact of the control system on crime patterns. In explaining crime patterns geographers have focused their analyses on the criminal actor or, more commonly, the criminal event. In advocating the advantages of alternatives to the instrumentalist or positivist philosophy guiding the geography of crime, the discussion of interactionist and critical perspectives is designed to show how they facilitate an understanding of the way that control processes exercised by police, the courts, and by elected officials are vital to the explanation of crime patterns. The introduction of these alternative theoretical positions also serves to raise questions about the correctionalist impulse of much of the geography of
crime, and its technocratic purpose. The discussion of the philosophical, theoretical and political consequences of research strategies which treat crime and control as analytically separate entities lays the foundation for a geographic perspective on crime in its socio-legal context, for an examination of the effects of criminal justice policy on the actual geography of crime; in short, for an integrated analysis of crime and its control.

The effect of the "control environment" is conceptualized at three different levels. The first concerns the influence of various interpretations of official crime statistics on "scientific" images of who the criminals actually are. Conflicting interpretations are reviewed, particularly interactionist and critical perspectives which suggest that maps of crime based on official police statistics may be seriously distorted in a way that geographers have rarely considered; crime maps may be "mental maps" reflecting the selective activity of control agents as much as they represent officially sanctioned criminal behaviour.

The second effect of the control environment on criminal behaviour is examined in terms of "ecological labelling", the process through which law enforcement practices may (in part) help shape the "problem" status of various city neighbourhoods or subcultural groups.

The third level of analysis concerns the most direct impact of control practice on the configuration of crime. In terms of a geographic perspective at this level of analysis the relationship
between crime and control is systematized through the concept of "displacement". Displacement effects are defined as changes of criminal (or related) behaviour in response to changes in legislation, case law, law enforcement policies, or crime prevention programs. In this section the emphasis changes from an analysis of who the criminals are, to an analysis of what certain offenders do (particularly in terms of their adaptive spatial behaviour). A review of research demonstrating the wide-ranging occurrence of displacement phenomena is presented to supplement two empirical vignettes of crime in Vancouver (one on street prostitution patterns, the other on patterns of burglary) which demonstrate the spatial adjustments of offenders to changes in the "control environment".

The dissertation concludes by describing the implications of an integrated analysis of crime and control for a philosophical, epistemological and methodological reorientation of the geography of crime.
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Chapter 1

A PREAMBLE ON GEOGRAPHY, CRIME AND SOCIAL CONTROL

In very general terms there have been four major phases in the development of spatial perspectives on crime; the nineteenth century cartographic school, the Chicago social-ecological school of the 1920's and 30's, the factor analytic school of the 1950's and 60's and, most recently, the development of environmental criminology and the geography of crime. Between each of the first three of these phases there was a waning of interest in spatial perspectives, particularly following the gradual demise of social ecological theory after 1930 (as a result of the work of such critics as Robison, 1937 and Alihan, 1938). The development of factor analytic methods in the 1950's and 60's marked a resurgence of interest in spatial perspectives. And despite the devastating critique of Gordon (1967; see also Baldwin, 1979) some of the concepts of factorial ecology have been carried over to the most recent phase of interest in spatial perspectives, one in which geographers, for the first time, have become involved with the study of crime. The study of crime has emerged as a distinct, albeit embryonic, subdiscipline of geography, and environmental approaches have been characterized as representing a distinct perspective within criminology (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981A). By virtue of their mutual interests, the geography of crime and environmental criminology have tended to merge, and
geographers have become directly involved with mainstream criminology.

The argument to be developed in this dissertation is that the convergence of geography and criminology has been rather too selective on the part of geographers in their identification and use of companion perspectives and theories because it appears to have been guided by specific world views, epistemological persuasions and ontological beliefs. This tendency has been partly reinforced by environmental criminologists (and other researchers from related disciplines) who apparently share many of the same background assumptions and worldviews as a number of geographers interested in crime. It should be noted that this convergence is by no means complete, and the suggestion, at this stage, that the geography of crime is a coherent and unified perspective would be hyperbole. But some dominant themes have been established and a number of epistemological and ontological guidelines laid down, either explicitly or implicitly.

Towards a reconstruction of the geography of crime

The purpose of this dissertation is to describe and challenge some of the basic premises, implicit ontological and epistemological beliefs and, by extension, the political values which form the core of the contemporary geography of crime. Alternative philosophical positions are considered, and a conceptual framework developed to help reorient the geography
of crime towards a study of social control (particularly crime control) processes as well as the criminal actor or the criminal event.

For the most part the discussion concentrates on the research of members of the geographic discipline. But because this distinction is arbitrary in certain cases - academic disciplines may themselves be unwarranted abstractions or reifications of a kind - the discussion necessarily goes beyond the confines of geography to consider related sub-disciplinary areas which importantly inform, and are informed by the geography of crime.

As a critical theoretical exegesis, the principal focus of the critique is the analytic separation of crime and the control of crime - or more properly the analytic separation of crime and social control\(^1\) - that has guided the geographic research manifesto. Geographers have tended to study either crime or (much less frequently) the judicial system without any systematic consideration of the impact of legal and other social control measures on crime patterns. This does not mean to say that geographers have completely ignored the crime control system as an important explanatory variable, and a few examples mentioned in the geographic literature are discussed at various points in the text.

More importantly a number of geographers have recently pointed to the need for a unified geography of crime and control. Keith Harries, for example, in *Crime and the Environment* acknowledges that the effects of what he calls the
"criminal justice environment" in the genesis of crime patterns should not be entirely overlooked" (pp. 63-64, 116). Nevertheless, such considerations remain almost entirely beyond the scope of his discussion. In one of the few geographic studies illustrating the way that law enforcement can structure crime patterns (Shumsky and Springer, 1981), the evidence was introduced in order to show how a study of control as opposed to the criminal has "significant implications for the geographic study of the whole field of crime, deviance, and delinquency" (p. 88). But this insight has been largely neglected.

David Herbert also represents a significant exception to the geographical mainstream by suggesting that the social processes underlying crime patterns are of key explanatory significance, but goes on to lament that while the possibility of research into the "antecedents" of crime patterns has been identified, their importance remains largely untested in the geographic literature\(^2\) (1977, pp. 216-219; 1979, pp. 118-119; 1982, pp. 21-29). Although the themes of spatial ecology and the local environment fall most clearly into the domain of a geographical approach, Herbert suggests that it is increasingly evident that these cannot form the exclusive terms of reference for the geographer; as with other types of urban problem, the pattern of crime itself is merely the spatial outcome of a complex of social processes (1979, pp. 118-119; 1982, pp. 26-29). Thus he contends

"For crime studies, the socio-legal system is an 'antecedent' in its role as the critical
Herbert also moves beyond a criminal justice system perspective by suggesting that in order to understand crime patterns researchers must consider a variety of societal allocation processes, particularly those which give rise to persistent societal inequalities. Thus for Herbert, the main value in Peet's position (1975, 1976) in his debate with Harries (1975, 1976) over the relative merits of liberal and radical positions in the study of crime has been to remind geographers of the broader canvas against which any patterns of crime need to be viewed (1979, p. 118, 1982, p. 27).

In his most recent work, The Geography of Urban Crime (1982), Herbert provides a more detailed description of this broader canvas by delineating theoretical developments in criminology which have thus far received scant attention from geographers (pp. 21-25). For the most part geographers have looked to "traditional" criminological theories in developing spatial perspectives of crime utilizing concepts spawned in the days of the Chicago social ecologists (particularly the concept of social disorganization) or what are essentially developments of this early perspective - cultural transmission, differential association and the formation of subcultures. But in so doing they have largely ignored important developments in criminology, particularly the development of what Herbert terms
"the sociology of deviance", that is, theories focusing "on social controls and definitions, and on criminal law and the judicial system, rather than on offenders" (1982, p. 24).

While the more radical branch of deviance theory may be said to find its counterpart in geography (e.g. Harvey, 1973; Santos, 1975, 1978; Peet, 1978), only Peet (1975, 1976) has suggested such a perspective for the geography of crime. And similarly while interactionist and phenomenological perspectives have flourished in social geography (e.g. Relph, 1970, 1977; Tuan, 1971, 1975, 1976; Buttimer, 1974, 1975; Ley, 1974, 1977, 1978, 1980), they remain undeveloped in the geography of crime (with the exception of Ley, 1975).

Herbert laments that while radical geography brought a clear awareness of the need to investigate levels of analysis other than the local environment (the geographer's conventional concern) most human geography continues to focus on patterns, processes and responses within this immediate environment. Similarly he argues, "...most available geographies of crime...are firmly cast in this mould." (1982, p. 26).

Herbert's purpose, however, in his Geography of Urban Crime is primarily to review the existing geographic literature and related spatial studies of crime. His main concern is thus also restricted to patterns, processes and responses at the level of the local environment. But not being satisfied with this focus he does attempt to outline a research strategy "which both sets different approaches in their relative position within the overall framework and sets some context for
the crucial task of integrating various 'scales' of analysis" (1982, p. 26). In very general terms, Herbert posits a three-level model of the geography of crime:

**level 1 (Production)**

**SOCIAL FORMATION**

ideology, values, traditions, power and resources

**level 2 (Distribution)**

**ALLOCATIVE PROCESSES**

Resource Allocation: Socio-legal processes:
urban managers, police, judiciary,
differential access, social services,
inequalities. labelling, enforcement,

**level 3 (Consumption)**

**SPACE**

Patterns Responses
(crime areas) (spatial behaviour) (sub-cultures,
Processes meaning of
place)

Herbert notes that "...as the geography of crime has developed (Harries, 1974, 1980; Pyle et al., 1974) it has been contexted almost exclusively in the third level of analysis... Levels 1 and 2 possess no empirical research record of note but it is essential at this stage to assess their place in a research strategy for crime..." (1982, p. 16).

Herbert has thus set the stage for substantial shifts of emphasis in the geography of crime. But his contribution in
this respect remains at the programmatic level - if he is correct about the importance of such shifts, theoretical and empirical developments in these directions remain as important challenges still to be confronted. The purpose of this dissertation is to initiate just such an engagement. With reference to Herbert's conceptual framework for a geography of crime this study represents an attempt, both theoretically and empirically, to penetrate the "production" and "distribution" scales of analysis (levels 1 and 2); to outline the kind of analysis necessary for understanding how social formations and criminal justice allocative processes are essential for a more complete understanding of crime patterns.

A word of caution is necessary at this juncture. Herbert's conceptual framework is a useful heuristic for locating the type of analytic apparatus utilized in the geography of crime, particularly in terms of the level at which explanatory systems are constructed, and it is in this heuristic sense that I shall refer to it. But a shortcoming is its implication that geographic approaches to crime have been remiss only in terms of the level at which they operate. This is only part of the argument I wish to develop. More importantly, the analytic problems Herbert raises concern fundamental philosophical issues; geographers must respond to and accommodate the general critique developed in criminology and sociology during the past twenty years of the traditional crime perspective in these disciplines, for it is within this traditional perspective that the geography of crime is firmly
located. Accommodation of this critique, which Herbert suggests has many telling qualities (1982, p. 28), will not simply occur by incorporating different levels of analysis because the levels are not mutually exclusive. In other words all these levels of analysis will need to be taken into consideration irrespective of the scale of analysis. What this means is that considerations of the social formation and social allocative processes can not simply be tacked onto the third level of analysis where the geography of crime has been generally located. Rather, considerations of "production" and "distribution" should permeate the spatial analysis conducted at level 3. Consequently, Herbert notes that the model only "offers...a framework within which the relationships among different scales or levels of analysis can be recognized. What no diagram can do is to show ways in which different theoretical positions can be reconciled or integrated" (1982, p. 25). Nor indeed, one might add, can it show if such an integration is attainable. If the record in criminology is anything to go by - where alternative positions coexist with very little but polemical interaction between them - there is not likely to be an easy synthesis of the old and new perspectives within geography. As yet, the new perspectives Herbert is referring to have hardly been considered in the geography of crime, and it is to this task that the present study is directed.
Outline of the Dissertation

The dissertation begins with what Herbert calls the sociology of deviance literature and the critique of traditional criminology (Chapters 2 and 3) to set a foundation for a critique of the geography of crime and deviance (Chapter 4). At this point it should be noted that Herbert in his use of the term "sociology of deviance" includes "radical" or critical criminology, whereas in the criminological literature the term refers explicitly to what I shall subsequently term "verstehen" perspectives - phenomenology, symbolic interactionism, the labelling perspective and ethnomethodology. Chapter 2 thus considers verstehen perspectives and the critique of traditional criminology on which they are founded. My subsequent use of the term "sociology of deviance" is restricted to the verstehen perspectives as contrasted to radical criminology. Chapter 3 describes radical criminology and its theoretical and political break with the sociology of deviance.

The critique of the geography of crime develops aspects of the critique of traditional or "positivist" criminology registered by proponents of verstehen and radical perspectives. The discussion examines the theoretical and philosophical consequences of research strategies which treat crime and crime control as analytically separate entities. The implicit philosophy of social science guiding many geographic studies of crime is reconstructed by unearthing their
epistemology and methods. The term "reconstructed" is used advisedly here because geographers interested in crime have generally paid very little attention to the philosophical questions causing deep institutional rifts in criminology and elsewhere in geography. Even Peet's position (1975, 1976) in his debate with Harries (1975, 1976) remains at a programmatic level, a program, it is worth noting, that has led to very little action.

The critique developed in Chapter 4 argues that for the most part the geography of crime has followed a positivist or instrumentalist philosophy of social science and a "correctionalist" politic (correctionalist in the sense that "scientific" research is geared to producing knowledge which aids either the "correction" of criminals or the "fight" against crime). The theoretical consequences of these underlying political and philosophical tendencies will be examined by contrasting them to arguments from the sociology of deviance and radical theory which assign central importance to symbolic interaction and the social control process in understanding crime. The purpose of the remainder of the dissertation is to examine the effects of social control and criminal justice policy on the actual geography of crime; that is, to developing an integrated analysis of crime and justice.

The effect of the "control environment" is conceptualized in three different ways. The first concerns the interpretation of official crime statistics on criminological images of who
the criminals are. The traditional tactic in the geography of crime has been to take a prima facie interpretation of crime statistics. Alternative arguments developed in the sociology of deviance, however, can be interpreted as suggesting that crime statistics are systematically spatially skewed - that they do not represent rates of crime, but rates of control. Brantingham and Brantingham aptly summarize the importance of this debate for environmental criminology, and, by extension, for the geography of crime:

"The standard attack on official crime statistics is of critical importance in the spatial analysis of crime...if official statistics are systematically spatially biased samples of crime within a city, then all patterns produced by environmental criminologists are suspect, and in real economic terms, no prospects exist for obtaining better sources of data."

(1981, p. 23)

In Chapter 5 the various arguments concerning interpretations of official statistics are reviewed suggesting that they should be an object of study in their own right, and that they may seriously distort a crime rate map so that it becomes a mental map reflecting the actions of control agents as well as a depiction of sanctioned criminal behaviour.

The second effect of the control environment on the geography of crime is examined in terms of "ecological labelling" (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981A) suggesting ways that law enforcement practices may in part help shape the identity of various districts and subcultural (and sometimes criminal) groups. The argument in Chapter 6 develops out of
the discussion of crime statistics noting that a consideration not only of discretionary law enforcement but also of other informal selective practices of control personnel may be necessary for understanding the way that control processes indirectly shape crime or criminal residence patterns. Much of the police mandate, for example, is to generally keep order, and they interact with many citizens who do not eventually end up being formally defined as criminal. This is because the police can often maintain order without the need to resort to criminal law. But in so doing they select certain problem populations and in this sense control practices may have something to do with the genesis of "criminal areas" or "criminal subcultures". If this is the case, selective control practices play an important part in the geography of crime. The discussion of ecological labelling is extended to a consideration of the more general effects of police interactions with citizens which do not result in a criminal charge - on the formation of "subcultural groups" whose particular identity is partly constituted by their law-breaking activity.

The second part of Chapter 6 examines the more general impact of police patrol distribution in shaping crime patterns as opposed to the effect of their activity in the creation of crime (although it should be recognised that these two issues are necessarily related). The literature on the effect of both inter- and intra-jurisdictional differences of levels of policing on crime rates is reviewed. The review raises the
possibility that patrol patterns may tend to displace criminal activity, although the findings of available research are equivocal in this respect. More generally the discussion serves to introduce the concept of "displacement", the theme to be systematized in the final section of this dissertation.

The third effect of the control environment on the geography of crime concerns the most direct impact of control practice on the configuration of crime. Given that control personnel or crime prevention programs are not distributed evenly, one of the most potent devices for people to avoid the potential of criminal labelling is movement; mobility is an adaptive strategy through which criminal opportunities can be maximized and the possibility of the application of a criminal label minimized. What I am most interested in here is the concept of mobility as an adaptive strategy and the impact of law enforcement or crime prevention programs on patterns of social (particularly criminal) activity. These issues are taken up in Chapters 7, 8 and 9. The approach taken is processual (rather than the static type analyses characteristic of the geography of crime) focusing on the impact of changes in social control practices, particularly law changes, law interpretation changes or enforcement changes.

In terms of a geographic analysis at this level, the relationship between crime and control is systematized through a concept of "displacement". Displacement effects are defined as changes of criminal (or related) behaviour in response to changes in written law, case law or law enforcement.
Consideration of displacement phenomena is of fairly recent vintage in criminology with a more limited application than the one suggested here. In 1976 Thomas Reppetto published an introductory analysis of the displacement phenomena associated with "mechanical" crime prevention strategies, i.e. those aimed at reducing criminal opportunity or increasing the risk to offenders. In Chapters 7, 8, and 9 evidence is presented suggesting that displacement phenomena are associated with a wider range of criminal justice and other social control policies.

A review of research demonstrating the wide-ranging occurrence of displacement phenomena is presented in Chapter 7 to illustrate the subtle relationships between crime and control.

In Chapters 8 and 9 two original research vignettes are presented. The first of these develops from literature reviewed in Chapter 7 concerning the impact of law enforcement on the location of vice areas. The empirical vignette presented in Chapter 8 demonstrates the way control practices have been the most important factor to take into account in explaining changes of street prostitution in a contemporary Canadian city. In this case patterns of crime incidence reflect changes in the socio-legal reaction to prostitution rather than changes in the population of offenders. Indeed, the issue of just who the offenders actually were also changed. This example serves to illustrate the potentially broad applicability of the displacement concept -
displacement phenomena may not only be associated with mechanical crime prevention strategies. But even in the case of most mechanical strategies, discussions of displacement have remained hypothetical. For example, the suggestion that displacement effects are associated with environmental design strategies has never actually been demonstrated; as a result this issue becomes the subject of the second empirical vignette.

In Chapter 9 attention turns to "target hardening" crime prevention programs and the potential displacement effects associated with them. The study examines the impact of "Neighbourhood Watch" burglary prevention programs on crime rates, offering evidence which appears to confirm the hypothesis that although certain types of crime prevention program may deter or suppress crime in one area, it is partly as the result of displacement of activities to other targets or areas (or because of changes in time or type of crime commission).

The conclusion of the dissertation examines the implications of analyses of crime control practices for the development of theory in the geography of crime, and the new research avenues that such a consideration promises.
Notes to Chapter 1

1. Any separation of crime control from the wider institutions of social control can only be justified in terms of analytic convenience and manageability; the criminal justice system cannot be treated as a closed system.

2. Although, as we shall subsequently see in Chapters 5 and 6, there is a growing interest in many of these issues in the criminological and sociological literature e.g. Armstrong and Wilson (1973); Damer (1974); Baldwin, Bottoms and Walker (1976); Gill (1977); Mawby (1979); Bottoms and Xanthos (1981).
Chapter 2

THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE AND THE CRITIQUE OF TRADITIONAL CRIMINOLOGY

Preamble

David Herbert has noted that some of the most important theoretical developments of criminology in the past twenty years have been largely ignored by geographers interested in crime. Geographic perspectives have typically followed traditional criminological theory and paid little attention to developments of what Herbert calls the sociology of deviance literature and its theoretical implications for the geographic study of crime.¹

The sociology of deviance as described by Herbert (1982: 24-25) offers a theoretical unity in only one sense and that sense is negative. Its unity lies more in what it is opposed to than to what it is; a united front developing in the United States during the 1950's and 60's and in Britain in the late 1960's, against the traditional sociology of crime - especially varieties of what are referred to as "positivist" and "functionalist" theories of crime and society. The various perspectives constituting the sociology of deviance, and the critical or radical perspectives partly growing out of them, also share a common interest in the study of social control and controllers as well as (or instead of) the criminal. These
commonalities aside, the very great differences between the sociology of deviance and radical theory (the predominant form of critical theory) must also be recognised. They are perspectives at once united and divided, and, if the recent literature is anything to go by, the rifts continue to deepen (Downes and Rock, 1979). For the purposes of this discussion, then, the sociology of deviance, a largely humanistic project, is to be distinguished from a critical perspective which tends to focus on social structure. These two perspectives may be further subdivided.

The humanist tradition embraces symbolic interactionism, phenomenology and ethnomethodology. The symbolic interactionist position derives from George Herbert Mead's social psychology (eg. 1934, 1938), while the phenomenological position derives from Alfred Schutz' social phenomenology (eg 1970). Ethnomethodology is a hybrid drawing on both Schutz and Mead - there is much in common in the work of the two authors (but there are some important differences and the positions should not be conflated). Of these perspectives symbolic interactionism has received most attention in criminology, particularly through the development of the labelling perspective and related themes in North America and Britain since 1950.

The development of critical perspectives in criminology has been much more recent - mainly in the 1970's. The critical literature in both North America and Britain is predominantly Marxist and is referred to here as the "radical"
Other critical theorists (critical in the sense that they see crime as the product of social relations and the solution to crime in terms of the modification of social relations) may use Marxian analytic categories but disassociate themselves from a Marxist label (e.g., Reasons disclaimer to this effect on the cover of Quinney's Marxist analysis in *Class, State and Crime*, 1977). Critical theory in general (Marxist or otherwise) suggests that social science cannot be objective thus implying that the theorist/researcher must take a political stance. A third position partly related to the critical perspective is also worth noting at this point - "power-conflict" interpretations of crime and law are similar to critical perspectives in their vision of the role of power in the genesis of criminality, but reassert the possibility of objective social science and the development of a conflict analysis which is not politically partisan (e.g., Turk 1969, 1978; McDonald, 1976).

As with the sociology of deviance, caution should be taken in viewing the radical literature as a fully coherent entity. There is a great deal of disagreement in general in social science over the interpretation of Marx' writings, and a number of alternative interpretations are beginning to appear in the criminological literature; in the historical field Thompson (1977), although only peripherally interested in crime, has adopted a humanist interpretation of Marx implicitly in opposition to economic interpretations (Gordon 1971, 1973) and what can be described as structural functionalist

As in sociology in general, the structure/action issue distinguishes Marxist perspectives from each other; indeed most of the major philosophical debates around the appropriate methodologies and epistemologies for social studies seem to be reconstituted within Marxism such that the term, like the term science, has a highly problematic meaning (Hook, 1980). As Marxist perspectives flourish in criminology, particularly in Britain, these differences may become paramount, despite Hirst's claims (1973, 1975) that because "crime" is not a properly constituted analytic category in a Marxist theoretical framework it consequently cannot be an object of Marxist analysis. But to this point in time radical criminology has tended to operate at a structural level. It is thus not surprising that it is also over the structure/action issue that radical theory parts company with the sociology of deviance, dismissing it as too subjectivist by virtue of failing to incorporate any systematic analysis of ideology or other aspects of social structure (Taylor, Walton and Young, 1973; Manders, 1975; Reasons and Perdue, 1982).

The radical critique of the imputed subjectivism of the sociology of deviance does not entail a sweeping dismissal of the appropriateness of an interactionist level of analysis. Several advocates of a radical perspective stress the need to incorporate an interactionist level of analysis in any
sociological theory of deviance (e.g. Taylor, Walton and Young, 1973; Hall, et al 1978) and the sociology of deviance played an important part in stimulating and developing radical scholarship. As we shall see later the reaction to traditional criminology in Britain began with the formation of the National Deviancy Conference (the "York Group") which was instrumental in importing interactionist and labelling perspectives to British criminology. The York Group developed into at least two general followings - one of interactionism, the other of a radical perspective. Significantly the first collective publication of the group (Cohen, 1971) falls squarely into the interactionist framework (Ericson, 1974). And as much as the two followings are now in open disagreement over certain issues (see, for example, Downes and Rock, 1979) they are still united in their opposition to positivist and functionalist perspectives. But this is not the only point of agreement between interactionist and critical theorists.

Unlike the explicit focus on the criminal actor characterising traditional criminology, the process and effect of social control also find their place in the sociology of deviance and radical theory thus giving the two perspectives further common ground (indeed some researchers focus only on social control with very little consideration of the criminal actor). And in this sense, one of the major criticisms the two perspectives make of traditional criminology is the general failure to recognize the dialectic relationship between crime and control. This argument can be extended to the geography of
crime by suggesting that very little systematic consideration has been given to the effect of social control practices in modifying or moulding crime patterns. The foundation for this argument is laid in an examination of the philosophical position that distinguishes the sociology of deviance from traditional criminological theory, and in turn the mandate of critical theory in its break from the sociology of deviance.

The Emergence of the Sociology of Deviance

While it was noted earlier that the sociology of deviance developed as a reaction to the dominant perspectives holding sway on both sides of the Atlantic up to the 1950's and 60's, this is not to suggest that traditional perspectives are no longer important. Rather, the sociology of deviance has developed (often in polemical form) alongside established perspectives. The labelling perspective, informed by a symbolic interactionist epistemology, arose to challenge traditional perspectives which viewed deviance and crime simply as forms of social pathology, social disorganization, or in terms of social functions and dysfunctions. In contrast to the traditional perspectives which are predicated upon the idea that deviance leads to social control, the first phase of the sociology of deviance reversed the formula to suggest that deviance is often the consequence of social control, or at least may be amplified by control measures. This thesis became the central axiom of the labelling perspective taken to its
extreme in Becker's earlier writing - social groups create deviance and deviant behaviour is that which is so labelled (1963 p.9). While traditional perspectives had concentrated on the development of causal theories of deviant and criminal behaviour, symbolic interactionist theory (particularly labelling theory), changed the emphasis of analysis to social control as an additional or even primary element in its research manifesto. Each of the perspectives in the sociology of deviance retains a central place for the analysis of social control in the explanation of crime and deviance, and it is here that they forcefully break from the traditional perspectives.

In the United States the first brief interpretive ideas adumbrating the labelling perspective were presented as early as 1938 by Frank Tannenbaum with his comments on the definition and dramatization of evil in Crime and the Community (pp. 17-22). Tannenbaum discusses the manner in which the official reaction to crime and delinquency through the "dramatization of evil" operates as a self-fulfilling prophecy making a person become the thing he/she is described as being. Lemert's works on sociopathic behaviour (1948) and Social Pathology (1951) were the first attempts at crystalizing this point of view. But not until some ten years later did the position develop into what has variously been called the "labelling school" (generally), the "neo-chicagoans" (Matza 1969), and the West Coast School or The Pacific Seminar (Lemert 1972 p.15). Lemert lists the work of Kitsuse (1960), Goffman (1961), Erikson
(1962), Becker (1963) and Scheff (1963) as the most influential in describing and establishing a new perspective focusing on the moral order and social control, seeking to show how categories of deviance are created and applied to individuals and groups (1972 p. 15). While eastern establishment sociology in the United States was primarily concerned with the etiology of deviance, "the western looking sociologists...have given currency to such concepts as societal reaction, stigma, degradation, mortification of self, police discretion and typification, ideas which are especially suited to showing how agencies and institutions ostensibly organized for welfare, reform, rehabilitation, and treatment give form and meaning to deviance and stabilize it as secondary deviation" (Lemert, 1972 p.15).

The importance of several of these concepts for geographic interpretations of crime will be discussed subsequently in terms of area or ecological labelling (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981A p. 8). Some of these same interests were also taken up in other more recent theoretical ventures, particularly in the development of ethnomethodology.

During the late 1960's the ethnomethodological perspective emerged in North American sociology as a polemic against positivism and structural functionalism. The foundation of the ethnomethodological program was laid down by Garfinkel (1967) and subsequently elaborated by Cicourel (1968, 1972), Garfinkel and Sacks (1972) and Turner (1974). Ethnomethodology focuses on the conventions of the "commonsense" everyday world showing
how the meaning of social objects is socially constructed and reconstructed, and how reconstruction follows taken-for-granted rule systems. Ethnomethodology and social phenomenology refocus the concern of sociology to everyday life problematizing what traditional sociologists have taken for granted - the hidden meaning and structures of mundane existence. When compared to the labelling perspective, ethnomethodology provides a rather different insight into social control processes suggesting how the meaning of criminal and delinquent behaviour is constituted through social interaction and can not simply be "read-off" from criminal statutes. In Chapter 5 this issue will be taken up in a discussion of the implications of ethnomethodological studies of the working practices of the police for the interpretation of official statistics. While the ethnomethodological perspective tended to gain more currency in the sociology of deviance than did social phenomenology, the phenomenological position is similar by virtue of its concentration on the conventionality of the "commonsense" world. In short, these are attempts to make sociological sense of commonsense. In terms of deviancy theory ethnomethodology makes sense of legal categories by attempting to understand the commonsense notions that actually imbue them with meaning.

The Sociology of Deviance as Verstehen

In order to be able to understand the criticisms of
traditional sociology developed in the sociology of deviance it is necessary to situate this critique in a wider philosophical context. The characterization of the sociology of deviance as "verstehen" criminology suggests a very different kind of philosophical basis to that informing various traditional theories. In very simple terms verstehen means interpretive understanding, and the stress on the social construction of meaning so central to symbolic interactionism, social phenomenology and ethnomethodology stands in direct contradistinction to perspectives which attempt explanation in terms of deterministic causation. The debate between these two positions is fundamental in social science, and revolves around the issue of the appropriateness of the epistemology, ontology and method of natural science (or at least the social scientist's vision of natural science) for explaining human behaviour. The debate over the unity of science has its foundation in the enlightenment view of science, and subsequent reactions to it. A description of this debate serves to locate the sociology of deviance, and its reaction to traditional criminological theory.

The Verstehen - Erklären Controversy

The verstehen-erklären controversy in German social philosophy is a special case of a more general dispute over methodological approaches to the study of social phenomena. A description of this debate provides a useful context for a
discussion of the various tensions separating criminological perspectives. Erklaren is a perspective developed in the spirit of the Enlightenment suggesting that the methodological unity of natural and social sciences and the universal applicability of the general principles of scientific methods makes possible the development of empirically testable objective knowledge of social phenomena. This was the standpoint of not only nineteenth century positivism, but also of many subsequent forms of empiricism, behaviourism and naturalism. Those Marxists who believe in universal dialectical laws of nature, society and human thought also belong here (Markovic, 1972 p. 28).

The opposite tendency was first elaborated in Dilthey's Lebensphilosophie and developed by the neo-Kantians Rickert and Windelband, who suggested that the goals of social inquiry should not be the establishment of general laws of human behaviour, but the understanding of social actors' subjective motives and intentions (Markovic, 1972). This anti-Enlightenment and, in a limited sense, anti-scientific spirit came to expression in various brands of phenomenology, existentialism, symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, humanistic versions of Marxism (especially existential Marxism), and in the development of the Critical (or Frankfurt) School of German social philosophy.

While both erklaren (i.e. generic positivism) and verstehen positions claim to be empirical, they differ over the interpretation of empirical reality; they differ ontologically
and epistemologically (although it should be noted that Markovic, who I have partly followed here, does not see the two positions as irreconcilable). Verstehen perspectives give ontological status to human intentions and meanings, but these are largely excluded from the erklären perspective or black-boxed in a stimulus-response view of human motivation. Because of the stress on the understanding of the intentions and meanings of social actors, and the view that these are produced through human interaction rather than deriving from some pregiven cosmic order, verstehen perspectives deny the possibility of establishing general laws of human behaviour through a principle of causal determinism.

In very general terms the scientific mode of inquiry seeking to produce causal explanations for deterministic processes has produced more dispute in social science this century than any other issue. Although the philosophical motive of the Enlightenment was manifestly humanistic in its intentions, what at first was seen as a means of human emancipation came to be seen as a central instrument of human domination. Naturalistic explanations seeing man as propelled by external forces or compelled by pregiven internal forces leave him as a "psychic robot" or "judgemental dope" with apparently no free-will (Hollis, 1977). Man thus becomes an object rather than a subject, a form of objectification which may have far-reaching political implications. The reaction against the erklären position has thus been both philosophical and political. Husserl's criticisms of positivism were
developed by his disciple Schutz, and those of Schutz and Mannheim were built into the polemics developed much later in the sociology of deviance. Similarly Mead's attacks on crude behaviourism find their way into the sociology of deviance by virtue of the interactionist position informing it.

Philosophically the erklaren-verstehen debate revolves around the issue of free-will and determinism and has been recapitulated in many social sciences in the past thirty years - in geography the reaction to the "quantitative revolution" (so-called) of the 1960's has also recently been couched in terms of this debate (Ley, 1977, 1980, 1982; Ley and Samuels, 1978) and is paralleled by earlier developments in North American sociology.9

This, then, is the general philosophical backdrop against which the reaction of verstehen perspectives to traditional forms of sociological crime theory must be understood.

Verstehen Perspectives and the Critique of Traditional Sociology and Criminology

Having situated the sociology of deviance in the wider context of debates in the philosophy of social science, the discussion now moves to a consideration of the specific issues involved in the critique of the "traditional" sociologies of crime (varieties of positivism, structuralism and structural functionalism). The discussion begins with criticisms of structuralism and structural functionalism and then moves on to

30.
a consideration of positivism, and the suggested positivist elements of structuralism. Finally the political implications of these positions are examined.

In a paper on deviance, Phillipson and Roche (1976) identify five main criticisms which phenomenology and ethnomethodology might enter against traditional sociology (p. 141). The following five points are based upon their discussion:

1. The lack of connection and articulation between social theory and empirical research. This criticism is particularly applied to structural sociology which is depicted as a kind of sociological determinism in which social structures the theorist identifies by means of logical arguments are said to determine human activity. In wider sociology this sociological determinism is suggested as applying to certain versions of Marxism (particularly structuralist and economic determinist renditions) and to the work of Durkheim, Merton and Parsons, although all these theorists are sensitive to the problem of human consciousness and meaning (particularly Marx - depending on how his work is interpreted). Keat and Urry (1975, p. 138) referring more explicitly to an ethnomethodological critique of structuralism suggest that as much as social structures may be seen to cause human activity, it cannot be denied that human activities create social structures. There are parallels here with criticisms of functionalism and holism in human geography (Duncan, 1980; Duncan and Ley, 1982).
2. The gross inappropriateness and irrelevance of much of the rational ideal-type construction used to establish a theory-research connection (Cicourel's 1968 work on juvenile justice represents a good example of the development of this criticism).

3. Sociology's aspiration to be an empirical discipline concerned to understand and explain real and existent social phenomena is not served by its largely ignoring the key fact that such phenomena are meaningful for both the actors and the sociologist. In the same sense Keat and Urry (1975, p. 138) suggest that structuralist accounts fail to consider the subjective meanings actors place upon their experiences within suggested social structures; there is no adequate analysis of such meanings, how they are shared, and of how actors do not simply and directly respond to objective structural factors. This theme is also taken up in Cicourel's Social Organization of Juvenile Justice 1969 and partly in Matza's Becoming Deviant.

4. Traditional sociology does not show how meanings are constituted and negotiated between actors. Verstehen perspectives focus on this "social construction" of meaning.

5. Traditional sociology has been incapable or unwilling to make its own practices and research procedures the subject of research; research practices must be reflexive.

It is with these criticisms in mind that Phillipson and Roche conclude

"Phenomenology and Ethnomethodology discover a theme and a problem in the necessarily
intimate relation of the sociological observer
researcher and the observed actors in a common
lived world of meanings. The criticism of
conventional sociology is not merely that it
has never had the imagination to discover this
problem, but, more importantly, that this
problem is of central significance for
sociological research methodology."

(1976 p. 141)

Some of the more extreme practitioners of ethnomethodology
hold that sociology in general has no advantages whatsoever
over commonsense (Douglas, 1971). Positivist sociology, it is
charged, in general assumes that consensual norms underly laws
and that these will be clearly followed except by deviants who
are basically and consistently different from other members of
society (i.e. they offer a consensus model of law and
society). In contrast, ethnomethodologists argue that people
follow the procedural rules of everyday life, and these may be
at odds with the prescription of somebody else's norms encoded
into law (implicitly a pluralist model of society). Indeed the
procedural rules of everyday life actually give meaning to
formal rules and categories. Thus formal rules and categories
cannot be taken-for-granted as meaningful without documentary
interpretation of the structure of the rules of practical
activity. It is this argument that will be taken up in much
greater detail in chapter 5 on the meaning of official
statistics.

The ideal-typical form of positivism that practitioners of
the sociology of deviance have suggested underpins traditional
type is broadly consistent with the erklaren version of
German philosophy. Following Kolakowski (1972) there are
several basic postulates of logical positivism:

1. A hypothetico-deductive method.

2. The rule of phenomenalism - there is no real difference between essence and phenomena.

3. The rule of nominalism: no insight formulated in general terms can have any real referents other than individual concrete objects; the world we know is a collection of individual observable facts and science aims at ordering these facts.

4. As a consequence of 2. and 3. an essential difference between descriptive and normative statements is wrought; positivism refuses to call the latter knowledge.

One might wish to qualify Kolakowski's characterization of logical positivism as essentially following a hypothetico-deductive mode of reasoning to include an inductive-statistical mode and thus to describe what we might label as "generic positivism"; this would conform in general to a nomological mode of thinking and is quite consistent with the other claims Kolakowski identified. The hypothetico-deductive model is itself an ideal-type which in practice is nearly always informed by elements of inductive thinking. In general, the positivist perspective aims at discovering the cause of events. Three crucial aspects of causation can be outlined.

1. The establishment of external relations between two discrete events or objects.

2. Cause must be temporally prior to effect.

3. There must be a constant conjunction between
cause and effect.

While traditional criminological theory is often classified as positivist by its rivals, the use of the term to include emergent holistic perspectives such as those developed by Durkheim and Merton is at the best misleading, at worst incorrect. The reason for the classification of holistic perspectives as positivist lies in the attempt of varieties of structural functionalist theory to specify causal deterministic relationships between social structure and human action in what is perceived as classic scientific reasoning. But any holistic structuralist or functionalist argument breaches the positivist rule of nominalism; social structure can hardly be considered an individual concrete object. Functionalism also breaks the rule of phenomenalism; Merton's latent functions, for example, most definitely entail a distinction of essence and phenomena. The theoretical work of Durkheim and Merton is thus better classified (at least partly) as realist (in the sense outlined by Keat and Urry -- 1975, pp. 81-87 - referring to Durkheim). Traditional theory thus embraces a variety of approaches.

Similarly, verstehen criminology includes a number of perspectives.

**Perspectives Within Verstehen Criminology**

The sociology of deviance can generally be described as taking a verstehen position in its approach to the study of
crime and social control. It stands in stark contradistinction to the erklaren type position of positivism within criminology, although, as has been suggested, a number of critics of traditional theory have often tended to make the term positivism embrace positions that it really does not adequately describe. Nevertheless these structural perspectives do share a common ground with positivism to the extent that they are concerned with developing deterministic causal explanations. And it is the vision of causal determinism embodied in traditional criminological theory that prompted the likes of Matza's critique of the model of man underpinning both positivism and structuralism. His *Delinquency and Drift* (1964) thus begins with a critique of the "positive delinquent", the delinquent of traditional theory, and proceeds to reintroduce the classical notion of free-will offering a "soft" determinism acknowledging that man is free to choose albeit in a constrained way (1964, 1969). Matza is difficult to locate exactly within the sociology of deviance, although clearly his sympathy lies with interactionism. Similarly other authors can only be located generally in what I have described here as the verstehen approach. A number of distinct positions have emerged - my intention is simply to provide capsule descriptions of them by reviewing the major arguments of the most significant authors. These descriptions are necessarily inadequate for describing the range of arguments, and tend to mask certain differences. My purpose is simply to investigate the commonalities of the positions that make them compatible.
for the construction of criminological theory.

Symbolic Interactionism refers to a particular set of ontological assumptions and a methodology consistent with them. Mitchell (1979, pp. 176-177) suggests that the social metaphysics of symbolic interactionism rest on three basic premises: 1) that human beings act towards objects on the basis of meaning that those objects have for them (thus implicitly denying determinism to the extent that meaning is relative, not absolute) 2) that the meanings of such objects arise out of social interaction 3) these meanings are modified through an interpretive process used by a person in dealing with the objects he/she encounters. Given these premises, social structure is viewed as emerging from social interaction, and constantly in flux. Methodologically, the perspective is "naturalistic" in the sense that it stresses the study of interaction in particular social situations rather than experimental designs or survey studies (it should be noted however that it is not naturalistic in the philosophical sense). The perspective is phenomenalist in the sense that its methodological injunctions call for an attitude of respect for the phenomena under investigation - the researcher must gain first-hand knowledge of the social situation with which he or she is concerned, and depict it as it is understood by those who live in it (Mitchell, 1979, pp. 176-177). Subsequently the researcher describes the analytic elements of the setting through theoretically informed observation. It is the symbolic
interactionist focus on linguistic and gestural communication, especially the role of language in the formation of mind, self, and society (Theodorson and Theodorson, 1979, p. 430) that is taken up by ethnomethodology.

The interactionist position can be traced to Mead's social behaviourism, an attempt to correct the crudities of early behavioural psychology by showing that stimulus and response are meaningful only when viewed as part of a complete communicative system (Desmonde, p. 59).

Mead's conception of the human self suggests that self is a process rather than a structure, constituted by what he called the "I" and the "me"; according to Desmonde (1970, p. 60) the "I" is the response of a person to the attitude of others (a response partly shaped by a person's biological constitution), the "me" is the organized interpretation of the attitudes of others that one assumes oneself. Personality affects interaction of the I and me and Mead's formula suggests that human behaviour is constantly adjusted in accordance with the anticipated reaction of other people. The "generalized other" represents a person's interpretation of other people's attitudes incorporated into the me. Thus for Mead, an act is conduct constructed by the actor instead of a response solicited from her/him (as in crude forms of behaviourism) or the result of some preformed organization in him/her (Blumer, 1970, p. 283), as in the case in biological positivism.

Because of the symbolic nature of social interaction, objects have no intrinsic value - they are human constructions
dependent on the orientation and action of people toward them (Blumer, 1970, p. 287). As we shall see later this observation has become critical in the interactionist interpretation of legal categories, and in the amplification of deviance thesis inherent in the labelling perspective.

For Mead neither resorting to explanation of behaviour solely in terms of societal factors (such as roles, values or social structures) nor to psychological imperatives (motives, feelings and attitudes) is sufficient. Human beings respond directly to one another's actions, and this social interaction becomes a positive shaping force; established patterns of group life are dependent on the recurring affirmative definitions that take place in symbolic interaction. Thus "joint-action" becomes the most fundamental building block of society rather than the structure of social relations (although Mead did recognize their effect) or psychological essences (Blumer, 1970, pp. 286-289).

Social Phenomenology (or phenomenology of the natural attitude). Although the distinction between the phenomenology of the natural attitude and transcendental phenomenology was developed by Husserl, much of his work was devoted to the elucidation of transcendental phenomenology. Alfred Schutz (1970) was the first author to articulate the connections between phenomenological philosophy and social theory in a perspective drawing as much from Weber as from Husserl. Schutz adopted Husserl's conception of knowledge as
rooted wholly in the "lebenswelt" (lifeworld) in which individuals share intersubjective meaning. The connection with Weber lay in Schutz' development of the method of verstehen as an appropriate means of penetrating the lifeworlds of other people, and for understanding the intersubjective meanings they shared. Weber's work, because of its concentration on subjectivity, represented a bridge between phenomenological philosophy and sociology, the sociologist in Schutz' program becoming an interpreter of human motivations (cf Wagner's introduction to Schutz, 1970, pp. 1-11).

Schutz' social phenomenology focuses on the cognitive setting of the life-world, action in the social world, and the nature of social relationships. In a philosophical sense he sought to describe a phenomenological foundation for sociology, and in so doing to demarcate the province of sociological reasoning and methodology in the world of everyday life. It is important to note in passing the similarity of Schutz' project and that taken up by symbolic interactionists - both focus on mundane experience in terms of the order and meaning of the worlds of everyday life.

Schutz' investigation of the cognitive setting of the lifeworld examined the natural attitude of the social actors, the factors circumscribing the natural attitude and the nature of the stock of knowledge for actors' meaning construction in an intersubjective setting. Mead's notion of "joint action" is similar to Schutz' use of "intersubjectivity" - both suggest meaning is not absolute, but created through people's
interaction with each other. Schutz theory of social action centred on the subject's "intentions". It should be noted that the meaning of "intention" can be confusing in this context, since the subject is not necessarily aware of his/her intentions. Nevertheless, in the phenomenological program consciousness is always consciousness of something, and in this sense consciousness always has an "intentional object" (Schutz, 1970, pp. 150-152, 318-319).

Natural attitude phenomenology has two imperatives; the descriptive imperative shows what the phenomenon is (in a similar way that part of the interactionist program attempts to depict social situations as they are understood by those who live in them), the constitutive imperative shows how it is constituted (the interactionists theoretical account of the analytic elements of a social situation).

The central slogan of more recent phenomenologists echoed by symbolic interactionists "back to the things themselves" is a plea to get away from sociological abstractions not derived from social reality. As we shall see shortly, it was this belief that propelled criminological interest in these ontological and epistemological positions as attempts were made to understand crime, delinquency and general deviancy not from an "objective technical" position, but in the subjective terms of deviants themselves. It represented an expedition into the world of everyday deviant reality; to describe it, understand its structure, and represent its rationality when understood from a different point of view. The phenomenology of Schutz
suggests that the structures and hidden imperatives of everyday life are essentially taken-for-granted, and only by distancing ourselves from it can we ever begin to understand it. In this regard, the sociology of deviance turned to the investigation of the taken-for-granted imperatives underlying deviant realities and actions; only through the penetration of the taken-for-granted world could interpretive understanding (as opposed to causal explanation in its deterministic sense) of crime and deviance be constructed. Similarly ethnomethodologists, guided by symbolic interactionism, phenomenology and certain aspects of Wittgenstein's language philosophy, make the taken-for-granted aspects of the world of everyday life their central interest.

**Ethnomethodology** concentrates on the descriptive and interpretive elements of social phenomenology. Thus ethnomethodology can be viewed as a brand of phenomenology (Taylor, Walton and Young, 1973, p. 199) although Coulter argues that this relationship is not clear (1974, p. 123), and Baumann (1973) suggests that in a purely philosophical sense ethnomethodology is closer to its professed arch enemy positivism than it is to Husserlian phenomenology (the suggestion is that ethnomethodology is simply trying to specify a different set of correspondence rules between observational and theoretical terms than those suggested by positivist philosophy). Leaving aside for the moment the question of the philosophical status of ethnomethodology, its connection with
phenomenology, despite Coulter's argument, does seem sufficiently clear - both Garfinkel (who coined the term) and Cicourel (who is a self-acknowledged practitioner of the position) pay considerable homage to Schutz.

According to Garfinkel:

"Ethnomethodological studies analyse everyday activities as members' methods for making those same activities visibly rational and reportable for all practical purposes i.e. 'accountable' as organizations of commonplace everyday activities."

(1967, p. 7)

Like phenomenology, ethnomethodology concentrates on the conventionality of the commonsense world. Special attention is paid to the "indexicality" of language and language categories. Language indexes the taken-for-granted rules underlying daily existence, rules which cannot be uncovered by simply studying the rules of language usage. The "etcetera assumption" refers to the unspoken implications of language that are taken-for-granted by its users; for example the term "delinquent" contains a particular, but only implicit, set of images about the social types who would be considered delinquent as well as referring to specific kinds of behaviour.

In general ethnomethodology suggests that social reality is an on-going practical accomplishment of the concerted activities of everyday life. The world of everyday life is assumed by its inhabitants to be known in common such that they treat its features as natural objective facts; these attitudes ensure that the world of everyday life is unquestioned and exempt from scrutiny (Mitchell, 1979). The critical and often
polemical thrust of ethnomethodology lies in the suggestion that sociologists are no different from other social actors in that they also take the mundane social world for granted, typically being more interested in the social structural arrangements which they presume are "behind" the appearances of mundane social reality (Mitchell, 1979). Symbolic interactionism, social phenomenology and ethnomethodology share in common the rejection of structurally based analyses which do not start from the conventions of everyday life. Although there are differences between the three perspectives, they are essentially compatible. The dimensions of this compatibility may now be specified more concretely.

**Integrative Elements of Verstehen Perspectives**

The most important philosophical unity of the three perspectives identified as constituting the sociology of deviance is that rather than attempting to develop deterministic causal explanations they seek to develop interpretive understanding. In this endeavor the various perspectives have three principal elements in common. According to Andrew Tudor, they are (1977, pp. 482-483):

1. The Postulate of Integrity of the Phenomenon: suggesting that the researcher must adhere to the categorical systems and descriptions inherent in everyday accounting procedures. It is an attempt to remain true to the state of affairs in the phenomenon under study (these statements are usually quite explicit as in Douglas, 1967; Cicourel, 1968; and

2. The postulate of the centrality of everyday life: this suggests that studies must begin with the phenomena of everyday life, a tradition beginning with Husserl in his reaction to Enlightenment philosophy. Douglas (1971) asserts that this beginning is also the end of study and that any more abstract level of analysis is unwarranted.

3. The postulate of the centrality of meaning: which specifies what can be counted as everyday life. The phenomena studied by the sociologist are defined by the meanings that actors give to their own and others' situations.

The Substance of the Sociology of Deviance

While much of the sociology of deviance has been concerned with the development of a theoretical critique of traditional criminology and to offering programmatic statements designed to reorient the epistemology and methodology of the criminological enterprise, a significant body of empirical research has followed the guidelines established by Matza (1964, 1969), Lemert (1951, 1967), Kitsuse and Cicourel (1963) and others in developing an interpretive understanding of crime and delinquency.

Two main bodies of empirical literature have developed, both of which generally follow an ethnographic methodology emphasizing the rewards of participant observer studies. The first body of literature has sought to understand the nature of
the interaction between rule-enforcers and "rule-breakers" attempting to show that informal "recipe" rules interact with formal legal rules in the process of labelling people as criminal or delinquent (Cicourel, 1967; Black, 1970; Briar and Piliavin, 1964; Werthman and Piliavin, 1967). "Recipe" rules refer to the taken-for-granted conventions of the world of commonsense. In some recent research studies these analyses have been extended to include other reporting agents as well as the police in their interaction with "offenders" (eg. Bottomley and Coleman, 1981). Ericson (1981, 1982), however, reasserts earlier positions which suggest that the context of police interaction with potential offenders is still the most important to probe in describing the process through which "offenders" are labelled criminal. Because this literature has very important implications for the interpretation of crime rate maps a detailed review is included in the discussion of policing in Chapters 5 and 6.

The second body of empirical research focuses on social interaction and informal rule structures within criminal and other deviant social worlds. The object of this (mostly) participant observer research has been to excavate and describe the "recipe" rules of action which pertain in these social worlds, such that an outsider would be able to learn these rules consciously (as opposed to the generally unconscious learning process of the social actors themselves) and be able to successfully negotiate the social worlds in question. Thus Becker (1963) describes the informal processes involved with
becoming a marijuana user; Polsky (1969) the informal rules of poolrooms and poolhustling; Reiss (1961) the social integration of "queers and peers"; Spradley (1970) the conventions of skid-row subcultures; Humphrey (1970) the conventions of homosexual conduct in tearooms; Boles and Garbin (1974) patterns of stripper-customer interaction; Gray (1973) the "turning-out" of teenage prostitutes; Milner and Milner (1972) the rules of the social world of "black-players" (prostitutes and pimps); and Prus and Irini (1980) the interaction of "Hookers, Rounders and Desk Clerks".

This list is by no means exhaustive in its comprehensiveness or its scope. Nor must we forget that the approach and its prerogatives are not solely a production of the 1960's and 70's; and similar efforts (unfortunately largely ignored in the geography of crime) characterised the Chicago School approach which, besides its ecological orientation, attempted to see deviant social worlds from the deviant's perspective: e.g. Shaw in his study of the "Jack-roller" (1930); Cressey in his study of the "Taxi Dance Hall" (1932); and Anderson in his study of "The Hobo" (1923).

The unifying themes of these various studies is contained in their explicit acceptance of the postulates of the integrity of the phenomena, the centrality of everyday life, and the centrality of the meaning social actors give to their own situations. These perspectives largely eschew theoretical concepts which relate to overarching social structures and pay little attention to the way in which broader social
relationships and ideologies provide the context for the social construction of meaning. The same critique is made, especially by radical theorists, of the body of literature focusing on the interaction of rule-enforcers and rule-breakers. While their criticism pertaining to the interpretation of official statistics is taken up in chapter five, we now turn to the more general application of the critique as a foundation for an understanding of the radical perspective and its break with the sociology of deviance.
Notes for Chapter 2

1. The review of theoretical criminology offered by Pyle et al (1974), for example, deals almost exclusively with the traditional literature. The sociology of deviance in the form of interactionist and labelling theory is almost completely ignored in this discussion.

2. In contrast to Herbert who tends to conflate the two positions (1982: 24-25).

3. The major works from North America usually associated with the labelling perspective (as identified by Box, 1971, Ch. 2; Gibbons, 1979, p. 149; and Ditton, 1979, p. 6) include: Lemert (1951, 1967, 1974); Erickson (1962); Kitsuse (1962); Goffman (1963); Kitsuse and Cicourel (1963); Becker (1963, 1964); Sudnow (1964); Matza (1964, 1969); Scheff (1966); Cicourel (1967); Douglas (1970A, 1970B, 1971); Schur (1971); Scott and Douglas (1972); and Rubington and Weinberg (1973); Some of these authors would probably characterize their work as interactionist as opposed to falling explicity within the labelling perspective. The labelling perspective is nevertheless largely interactionist in its conception (Matza, 1969, p. 37), even though its practitioners embrace a variety of theoretical positions (Ditton, 1979, p. 4; Ericson, 1975).

In Britain a broadly interactionist position has also developed. See for example, Wilkins (1964, 1965); Box (1971); Cohen (1971, 1973, 1974); L. Taylor (1971); Rock (1973, 1979); Rock and McIntosh (1974); Ditton (1979); and, while visiting Britain, Ericson (1975). The British literature owes much to American authors in its development.

4. Full citations to this literature are given in Chapter 3, footnote 6.

5. The interpretation is structural-functionalist to the extent that it suggests that criminal law functions to preserve the interests of a capitalist ruling-class. For this kind of argument see Greenberg's (1976) criticism of Hofferbert et al. (1974) and Horowitz' (1977) criticism of Spitzer (1975). The term "instrumentalism" is sometimes used to describe this view of law (e.g. Beirne 1979, 1980; Jacobs, 1980; Greenberg, 1981) but it should be noted that this use does not conform to the normal social scientific connotation of the term - see Gregory's (1978) and Agnew's (1977) discussion of instrumentalism in geography, and Keat and Urry's (1975) description of instrumentalism as a philosophical approach to social science more generally.
6. Some caution is necessary here with the designation of traditional criminological theory as positivist - later I suggest that the term should not be applied to certain forms of traditional theory, particularly varieties of structuralism which are better conceptualized as a form of realism.

7. The argument must ultimately be extended to include other social allocation processes - the literature concerning the general effect of public housing policy will be considered in Chapter 6.

8. The spirit is anti-scientific in the sense that it advocates will not adhere to a "positivist" model of science. But this is not the only definition of science, and more recent arguments suggest that natural science may be more like social science in its methods and development. Thus a realist view of science reintroduces an integrated science (Keat and Urray, 1976) by virtue of redefining natural science as a hermeneutic enterprise in the same sense that social science is.

9. While the sociology of deviance and its epistemological critique of traditional criminology has largely gone unnoticed in the geography of crime (although Ley's comments on street gangs - 1975- are clearly made with these types of criticism in mind), parallel criticisms of the positivist and instrumentalist approaches to social, urban and behavioural geography more generally have recently appeared urging the reinstatement of an approach which recognizes human intentionality, subjectivity and the nature of intersubjectivity: Relph (1970, 1972, 1976); Guelke (1971, 1974, 1976; Tuan (1971, 1975, 1976); Mercer and Powell (1972); Buttimer (1974, 1976); Ley (1977, 1978, 1980, 1982); Ley and Samuels, (1978). Although this literature has been criticized for its idealism, mentalism and subjectivism (Entrikin 1976; Gregory 1981), such criticism seems misplaced when applied to the work of Buttimer and Ley whose humanism is contextual, recognizing situational constraints, the boundedness of action and, in general, the limited nature of human free-will (Ley, 1982, p. 249). As we shall see in chapter 3 similar criticisms have been made of the sociology of deviance in terms of its lack of consideration of social structure and ideology. Again a broad-brush criticism of this type could be misplaced - a number of interactionist accounts clearly recognize the contextual nature of social interaction as both enabling and limiting (see particularly Ericson 1981, 1982) although these may still be criticized for not appreciating the full impact of wider ideological systems. The criticism is more justified when applied to earlier versions of the sociology of deviance, particularly ethnomethodological accounts and labelling perspectives in general.
Chapter 3

POWER-CONFLICT AND RADICAL THEORY

Reactions to Verstehen Criminology: Problems of Social Structure, Ideology and the Politics of Theory

It is hardly surprising that given the rigorous polemical statements of the various sociologies of deviance, some of the reactions to them have been no less extreme.¹ For the purposes of this discussion I shall concentrate on the two main criticisms made by radical theorists: 1) the argument that verstehen perspectives downplay or ignore social structure as influencing and shaping the process of intersubjective or interactive meaning construction, and 2) the suggestion that the sociology of deviance implies a conservative politics. It is over these two issues that radical theory breaks from the verstehen position which is suggested as offering an unwarranted relativism and pluralism (e.g. Taylor, Walton and Young, 1973, pp. 172-208). Similar criticisms have been made of each of the perspectives within the sociology of deviance at various times, and although some of these may be generalized, others apply only to particular perspectives. Thus the criticisms of the more extreme versions of the labelling perspective, which imply that to understand crime one need only to understand social control, cannot be generalized to phenomenology and ethnomethodology (which are interested in the

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part played by social controllers in the construction of meaning) nor indeed to the interactionist perspective in general.

In essence, most criticisms of the verstehen position, particularly of ethnomethodology and phenomenology with their stress on the sociology of everyday life, suggest that having problematized what traditional sociologists take for granted by identifying the hidden meanings and structures of everyday life it fails to link these to wider social formations and ideologies (Taylor, Walton and Young, 1973, pp. 172-208; Werkentin et al, 1974; Manders, 1975; McNall and Johnson, 1975; Bierne, 1979). In failing to do so these positions, it is charged, assume a conservative politic by default. Verstehen positions in general are suggested as being politically conservative to the extent that they imply people are free to develop their own reality, or, if they do not, it is because they have not overcome the normative restrictions that are maintained by mutual illusion (McNall and Johnson, 1975).

While this argument may be overdrawn to some extent (the examination of the conventions of police and other social control agents necessarily involves authority relations, and thereby power and social structure) the full implications of ideological distortion and the role of the state remain beyond much of the sociology of deviance. Matza is one author in this perspective who does consider the state; but, by his own admission, this analysis is deficient (see Weis, 1971).
Verstehen positions in general, like most traditional sociological theories of crime, are ahistorical and apolitical. Immediately this generalization needs some qualification for attempts have been made to account for the fact that man is born into a world which is already contexted by the histories and intersubjective constructions of others (Beng-Huat Chua, 1977). The often used catch-all term "social structure", or what Herbert calls the "social formation", relates to the all important social context into which people are born. Although structural explanations often do not account for the subjective history of humanity -- but rather posit structures, the result of some natural logic, to explain human activity -- they are designed to describe the effect of the social formation in somehow structuring the intersubjective process through which meaning is constructed, and attempt to show how human intentionality (and subsequently motivation) issue from this. Any specialized sociology is a set of perspectives which systematically preclude the asking of certain questions. The formulation of ideas about central problems depends upon what is taken-for-granted about the rest of the world (Rock, 1976, p. 146).

In redressing the weaknesses they identified in structuralism as a form of emergent holism, phenomenologists and ethno-methodologists tend to the opposite extreme; while macro-sociology takes as unproblematic the constitutive features of the small worlds which collectively make up the social structure, the micro-sociologist takes as unproblematic
the central institutions and structures that help give form to the small worlds they examine. These structures are made inaccessible because they are regarded as no more than an organizational background to encounters between social controllers and deviants; the microview has not encompassed the structural arrangements which organize the contexts of crime defining encounters since the largest describable unit is the group of labelling agents who are bound to face-to-face links (Rock, 1976, pp. 151-152). Of course what this criticism ignores is that the movement in the opposite direction, from a structural argument to an action perspective, is no less problematic (Giddens, 1979).

The verstehen perspective in general offers little understanding of law as a complex and variegated rule-system, constraining law-maker and ruled alike:¹

"Rather than convey a model of moral life as densely textured and intricate, they have constituted a kind of sociological flatland which contains no topographical features other than the boundaries which separate different regions."

(Rock, 1975, p. 151)

Rock argues that "flatland" must necessarily be pluralist in its vision of the moral order of society - the idea of people supporting simultaneous values, of normative systems being contradictory or ironic, is ruled out. The lives of the criminals of flatland are primarily organized around their deviance, cut off from or simply reacting to other moral systems. Deviance is thus given a distinctness and discreteness which jars with reality - for most of the time,
deviants are not deviant at all:

"On inspection, the policeman and delinquent, prison officer and prisoner, bailiff and debtor, judge and defendant, are the inhabitants of a world which is marked by pluralism and absolutism, consensus and dissensus, conflict and unity." (Rock, 1976, p. 158)

The pluralism and relativism of this sociological flatland have led Taylor, Walton and Young to argue that North American phenomenology (ethnomethodology) and "naturalism" (Matza redefines "naturalism" to mean phenomenological rather than positivist perspectives) lead to a position where the only "true" account of how the deviant phenomenon came into being, and what its "real" nature is, can be given by the deviants themselves (1973, p. 173). For the sociology of deviance in general, reasons become causes. But Taylor et al urge that a deviant's beliefs may be "false" in some sense, even if regarded by him/her as true; the overall danger is to deny the theorist any right to question the validity of deviant beliefs in her/his assessment of the actor's social situation. Matza, for example, overextends "the humanistic antagonism to the correctional perspective and suggests that to appreciate the deviant enterprise is to deny oneself the right to disagree or condemn." (Taylor, Walton and Young, 1973, p. 174).

Matza's accounts in Delinquency and Drift (1964) and Becoming Deviant (1969) are two of the best known and influential critiques of positivism in criminology; and Taylor Walton and Young's "radical" reaction to it displays well the main issue of contention that ostensibly led critical theorists
to part company from the sociology of deviance. Matza's account, by focusing on the deviant or criminal's understanding of the situation, particularly the part played by the criminal labelling process in consolidating a person's self-identity as deviant, fails to consider collective choice and action; "in dealing with the 'inner' man, the 'outer' man got lost." (Taylor, Walton and Young, p. 192). Despite offering what Taylor and his colleagues considered an illuminating sociology of motivation, Matza ignores its wider structural determinants. Importantly Taylor, Walton and Young note that Matza is not unaware of these problems: of his Delinquency and Drift and Becoming Deviant Matza says "each missed a key point, the relation between property and the state." (Weis, 1971).

In reference to ethnomethodology, Taylor, Walton and Young's criticism is of the same genre: ethnomethodology neglects the "wider etiological influences" which suggest that social organizations are not self-organizing in terms of their "constituent accent". The overriding practical aims and goals of most social organizations are given by the larger context of power and interest in the society in which they are contextually bound. Taylor et al view ethnomethodology as crudely empiricist recognizing and studying only one plane of social reality, individual consciousness:

"In rejecting general statements and concepts until they are reducible to member's consciousness, they falsely reduce all meaning to the meanings held by individual actors." (p. 206).
In response to this argument Coulter (1974) suggests that Taylor, Walton and Young misread ethnomethodology and phenomenology to the extent that the focus of these positions is not on individual consciousness but on intersubjectivity. This observation is strictly correct suggesting that it may not be impossible for verstehen positions to come to grips with social structure. But this does not alter the salience of Taylor, Walton and Young's criticism to the extent that part of ethnomethodology's mandate is a polemic against structural sociology, an argument suggesting that any reference to social structure is necessarily chimeric, an unwarranted abstraction. While it may be possible to reorganize verstehen perspectives to give a more adequate account of power and social structure (perhaps through a theory of reification) Taylor, Walton and Young are essentially correct in arguing that the sociology of deviance in general has ignored power and social structure in its broadest sense. While it has been suggested that it is possible to create these links (e.g. Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Freund and Abrahams, 1976; Beng Huat Chua, 1977) the task of fully elucidating them remains an important challenge to verstehen sociology and criminology. To date this problem of social structure has remained the concern of what is variously called conflict, critical or radical criminologists.
The Emergence of Power-Conflict and Radical Perspectives

While fully endorsing the critique of traditional criminology that sparked the rise of the sociology of deviance, radical criminologists have found verstehen perspectives wanting because of their imputed relativism and subjectivism. Radical criminology is thus doubly reactive.

At this point in the discussion some consideration will also be given to the development of "power-conflict" perspectives in criminology which emerged during the same period as the sociology of deviance, albeit with a much smaller constituency. In keeping with both the sociology of deviance and radical perspectives, the power-conflict position developed in opposition to traditional theory particularly as a critique of the consensus model of law and society suggested as underlying it. Like radical theory the power-conflict position is a macro-sociology, but the two can be distinguished in terms of their view of the locus and nature of power in society, and their disagreement over the normative nature of social scientific theory and research. These distinctions and disagreements will be clarified in the discussion of the emergence of the two positions.

While there are some early versions of a radical Marxist perspective in the criminological literature (Bonger, 1916; Rusche and Kirchhiemer, 1939) it was not until the 1970's that a widespread interest in Marxist theories developed. Some ten years earlier George Vold utilized a non-Marxist perspective in
parts of his *Theoretical Criminology*, while Turk's *Criminality and Legal Order* (1969) is much more influenced by Weber than by Marx. These two volumes were the first in the *modern* phase of conflict theory in criminology, (according to the terminology used here they are power-conflict perspectives) and although more recent conflict theorists have developed non-Marxist perspectives (e.g. McDonald, 1976) most of the subsequent literature in both Britain and North America is written from a Marxist perspective. The power-conflict perspective locates conflict in authority relations while the Marxist perspective locates conflict in social-class relations. A second issue that divides the Marxist from the power-conflict perspective as it has developed recently is a political one - the rejection of Marx is usually over the issue of the possibility of the social scientist's objectivity.

From a Marxist standpoint both the law and non-Marxist social science are described as ideologies supporting certain social power structures, despite the claim of many non-Marxist researchers that social science can and should be objective (and similar claims of legislators, implicitly supported by some social scientists, that law is impartial). While some non-Marxist conflict theorists may agree that the law is not impartial, they nevertheless maintain the position that social science can be objective (e.g. Turk, 1979).

For this discussion it is also worth drawing some kind of distinction between critical and radical perspectives. The essence of a radical perspective is that it is explicitly
geared to socialist or communist politics, and rejects progressive change in favor of revolutionary changes of society in terms of fundamental power structures. The distinction of a critical perspective lying somewhere between conflict and radical perspectives is wrought not only in terms of its criticism of traditional criminology, but also in its theory of practice. Radical theory seeks an overthrow of capitalism to produce a socialist society, whereas what I would term a critical perspective is suspicious of a socialist vision as being too utopian, especially in light of the experiences of "socialist" practice. Although a critical perspective may use Marxian concepts, it does not represent itself as Marxist.

The emergence of radical perspectives occurred at roughly the same time in Britain and North America. While the social climate of the 1960's set the context for the sociology of deviance and enabled its academic institutionalization, the suggested failings of the perspective provided an additional reactive springboard for the development of radical theory; the sociology of deviance in concentrating on the interaction between social controllers and the citizenry neglected to consider the broader social power structures determining who is to be controlled. It did not consider the effect of the ideological system rationalizing and legitimating the social formation in structuring social interaction. Realizing the shortcomings of the interactionist perspective, certain theorists in North America developed through an interactionist phase (e.g. Quinney, 1970) to a critical Marxist position.
(Quinney, 1972, 1974, 1977). Others adopted the Marxist mantle without any such transition. This, of course, has parallels in human geography at the same time, most notably David Harvey's transition from a liberal, behavioural position around 1970 to a committed Marxist position a few years later (Harvey, 1973).

In Britain, an essentially symbolic interactionist oriented group of young intellectuals split away from mainstream criminology to constitute the National Deviancy Conference, otherwise known as the "York group". They were initially united in their critique of traditional theory. But the commonly felt disenchantment with this positivist perspective soon gave way to an internecine battle, with some members of the York group retaining an interactionist type position (Rock, L. Taylor, etc.), others branching directly off into a radical perspective (I. Taylor, Walton and Young, 1973, 1975), although importantly retaining a place for an interactionist level of analysis. I shall return to this latter point shortly. For the moment it is sufficient to note that the York group has effectively disbanded. While its members would presumably still share a number of opinions, particularly in terms of their common interest in social control as well as crime, they are divided over certain political, ontological and epistemological issues, and it is to this and the wider philosophical debate in which these issues are situated that we now turn.
While the sociology of deviance has sometimes been characterized as the sociology of the underdog because it attempts to see through the eyes of the deviant, in a wider sense it has been suggested as politically conservative - as an apology for power structures. Again the rift between interactionist and critical theory is not even and discrete. David Matza, for example, in his critique of positivist criminology notes that positivism, by virtue of its analytic separation of crime and social control, adopts a largely correctionalist purpose; it attempts to do something about crime mainly in terms of controlling criminals, the control ranging from genetic engineering to the manipulation of socialization processes, but almost always focusing on changing the individual. Critical and conflict theorists move the emphasis to the social structure. Matza's (1969) position represents an intermediate phase; rather than "correct" criminals, he urges that we "appreciate" deviant behaviour and move towards a society which tolerates "diversity". But from a radical perspective this program appears to be implausible because of its failure to account for power. To the radical then, the move away from correctional criminology requires a specific politic, and Matza's vision of the tolerance of diversity is recast as the tolerance of "socialist diversity".

Explicit in the political thrust of critical and radical theory is the claim that all social science positions entail a...
political metaphysic even though some may claim that they do not. The positivist position in social science is a deliberate attempt at purging metaphysical considerations from scientific discourse; hence the claim that science is objective. But by adopting a correctionalist perspective, the positivist format is not politically silent; by accepting official categories of crime it inherently endorses the political status quo. In theoretical terms, the distinction between an observational and a theoretical language as wrought by positivism is collapsed by the argument that no observational term can be considered devoid of a theoretical component. To call someone a "policeman", for example, presupposes social definitions about the role expectations of being a policeman -- expectations which are socially constructed and thus changeable. Similarly, to call something a "crime" presupposes certain theoretical issues pertaining to systems of classification. The point is that sense data are socially ordered, and in this respect social science cannot be separated from society.

In a more particular sense, traditional criminology is suggested as producing technocratic knowledge. It cannot be considered objective because of its social implications: the maintenance of the present social structure and the loci of power within it.

It is over the issue of objectivity that power-conflict and radical theory part company - "non-partisan" conflict analyses (Turk, 1979) revitalize the positivist distinction between object and subject claiming that the formulation of a
conflict model of society can be achieved objectively without resorting to a partisan politic. In a recent paper, Thomas Barnard (1981) has outlined the main distinctions between what he calls conflict and radical criminology. His description of the conflict perspective corresponds to what I have termed the power-conflict position (the qualifying term is important to the extent that without it the designation of conflict positions could presumably include culture conflict - see footnote 8 in this chapter) and includes the work of Vold (1958), Turk (1969), Quinney (1970) and Chambliss and Seidman (1971).12

Following Barnard the basic principles of (power) conflict criminology may be summarized as:

1) One's "web of life" affects one's values and interests.

2) Complex societies are composed of groups with disparate and conflicting sets of values by virtue of differences in life conditions.

3) The behaviour of individuals is consistent with their values and interests.

4) Because values and interests remain stable, relatively stable behaviour patterns develop.

5) Laws are enacted in a process of conflict and compromise; each social group tends to promote its own values and interests.

6) Individual laws represent a combination of the values and interests of many groups (rather than specific values and

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interests of any one group), although law in general represents interests of higher status groups.

7) The higher the group status of an individual, the less likely the patterns of behaviour of that individual will violate the law.

8) The higher the status of an individual, the more difficult it is for law enforcement agencies to process that individual; bureaucrats and law enforcement personnel thus concentrate on lower status groups.

9) Because of the process of law enactment and law enforcement, the official crime rate of groups will tend to be inversely proportional to their political and economic position.

In general, Barnard suggests that conflict criminology does not attempt to explain individual crimes, but official crime rates.

Once again following Barnard, the central claims of radical theory can be listed as:

1) No consensus exists in society on basic values and interests of individuals - society is characterized by conflict over these issues.

2) Society is divided into classes of values and interests; the principal conflict is seen as that between capitalist and working classes.

3) Crime is defined as the action that violates basic human rights. Not only are the lower classes the victims of predatory street crime, but also of "ruling-class crime" -
unemployment, pollution and exploitation. Law is basically viewed as a tool of the ruling class in conflict with the working class (hence the concentration of law enforcement agencies on street crime in terms of both definition and enforcement).

4) Conventional criminology by accepting the legal definition of crime assumes a technocratic role in the control of the working class. The reformist impulse of traditional criminology aimed at making the criminal justice system more efficient and fair is suggested as reconciling the working class to the social structure by imposing capitalistic productive relations.

5) By rejecting legal definitions radical criminology examines all behaviour considered socially harmful; contradictions in the capitalist system are seen as the root cause of crime.

6) The "crime problem" can only be solved by changing the capitalist economic system through establishment of a socialist state. In this state "bourgeois law" will not be necessary; there is no consensus over the issue of whether some form of law is necessary.

7) Barnard suggests that radical criminology takes as its principal task the overthrow of the capitalist state, although clearly there is an equal concern with the explanation of both crime and social control.

While Barnard's description of radical criminology captures many of its elements, he tends to miss some of its
theoretical implications. These omissions may result from an over-extension of the differences between the radical and power-conflict perspectives - he tends to make the positions more discrete than they really are. As noted above, the principal distinction of the two positions is over the issue of objectivity and the political commitment of the supposedly "scientific" observer. For example Barnard's suggestion that conflict sociologists focus on power groups (a form of pluralism) is contrasted to the class analysis of radical theory when in reality the authors Barnard mentions as representative of the conflict perspective frequently refer to social class. A number of additional points applicable to both power-conflict and radical theory thus give them some common ground.

To begin with both perspectives suggest that crime cannot be fully understood outside its wider socio-historical context; the role of both power and conflict must be acknowledged in the genesis of crime; crime is thus an outcome of fundamental aspects of social order (not necessarily something lodged in individuals). Both perspectives acknowledge that social control organizations may contribute to the expansion of crime, especially when vested interests are played out in the process of law formation. And, most important of all for the purposes of the present discussion, both power-conflict and radical perspectives - like the sociology of deviance - stress the need for a sociology of law and social control in any criminological "explanation" or "understanding" of crime. But in agreeing on
this much, none of the perspectives have managed to resolve satisfactorily the structure-action issue, the issue which separates the sociology of deviance from both power-conflict and radical perspectives.

The Structure/Action Problem: A Theoretical Frontier

While the development of a radical perspective of crime and social control endorses the interactionist critique of positivist or traditional criminology, the radical interest in social inequality and the political ideology legitimating it becomes an overtly political enterprise.¹³ The radical position ostensibly reasserts volition as a necessary element to any philosophical model of humanity underlying social theory, suggesting the potential for all people to become free and sovereign artificers of their own actions (or at least this is the case with Taylor, Walton and Young's position in their 1973 and 1975 volumes). While the volitional element of human activity is implicitly denied in the positivist program (because of its search for determinate causal processes), radical theorists criticise interactionists for taking the argument to its opposite extreme; in labelling theory, for example, crime and delinquency appear merely to arise from the subjective impressions of crime labellers in transaction with "offenders". In so doing, authors in the radical perspective suggest that the process of criminogenesis is dislocated from its wider historical, social-structural and ideological
labelling theory failed to problematize the wider origins and contexts of crime definitions, and the ideological purposes they may serve in supporting a certain kind of (capitalistic) social structure. Similarly, labelling theory is suggested as being overly concerned with secondary deviation, that which is "caused" by the labelling process (Lemert, 1967); by stressing the amplificatory consequences of the criminal labelling process as exacerbating rather than suppressing criminality, little is offered to account for primary deviation (deviation that occurs prior to the mobilization of the criminal labelling process). Labelling theorists, as a result, fail to link primary deviation to wider social processes. The labelling perspective is thus challenged by radical theorists as implicitly supporting the political and ideological status quo of capitalist society.

In the context of the present discussion I am not so much interested in the political connotations of these various perspectives as their theoretical implications. This is not to suggest that the theoretical and political implications of social theory can be separated, for to do so would entail the claim that social science is or can be objective. The very fact that alternate ontological and epistemological positions coexist within social science suggests that a person's paradigmatic persuasions are not much different than religious beliefs. Since no proof exists as to the validity of any one ontology over another, the criminologist's choice of one or another will depend on certain beliefs about social
organization and human nature (even if these are not articulated). To this extent the practice of social science appears to be inherently subjective, intersubjective and political and, if this assertion is correct, then social science, if it is to be reflexive, must probe the dimensions of the taken-for-granted world (n.b. Ley, 1977). For the moment, however, I am concerned with the conceptual issues separating interactionist and radical perspectives. Marx' idea that humanity does make its own history, but not in conditions of its own choosing, seems paramount here.

On the one hand the suggestion has been made that a positivist view of society denies the power of human volition, while interactionist positions in general overemphasize it, and offer very little in the way of understanding how human activity is historically and ideologically limited. While verstehen perspectives capture the process of intersubjectivity and the social construction of meaning, they have not, as yet, managed to penetrate the conditions which limit and structure human action and interaction. By focusing on consciousness, verstehen methods cannot probe social structures and relationships which lie beyond the consciousnesses of the people in the social worlds they investigate so intimately. The main problem is that verstehen perspectives offer no satisfactory account of why different social worlds or subcultures should exist in the first place. Rather they study their interactions and conflicts after the social worlds have formed.
What is required here is a dialectical view of the relationship between the individual person and society in the broader sense, recognizing that a person is an ensemble of social relations. The individual is both apart from and a part of society. Social structure conditions human activity at the same time as that activity produces (or reconstructs) social structure. Humans are thus limited by their historical circumstances. Humanity only finds its full potential in the ever present possibility that it can transcend its historical situation. The critical issue theoretically is thus the interface between freedom and constraint. In general, structuralist positions have been overly concerned with constraint, verstehen perspectives with freedom. This is, of course, an oversimplification, but what it suggests is a need for a social theory which synthesizes structural and verstehen perspectives. It is an oversimplification to the extent that the verstehen perspectives are concerned with the constraints imposed on human activity by virtue of social interaction. But this is not usually conceived in terms of social formations. Berger and Luckman's *Social Construction of Reality* (1967) a humanist project, does attempt to conceive of human activity as dialectically related to social structure, but the success of the project has been questioned (see, for example, Hamilton, 1974, Ch. 9).

While Marx' dialectic may be seen as a solution to the structure/action problem, subsequent Marxists have been divided over the very same issue. Thus Althusser's (e.g. 1970A, 1970B)
structuralism is a Marxist framework in which the activity of humanity is reduced to the compelling dictates of structural logics (for the counterpart of this criticism in geography see Duncan and Ley's --1982-- critique of geographic Marxism). Thompson's humanist Marxism (e.g. 1977, 1978) in contrast is a theoretical system in which history is clearly made by a humanity continually struggling to overcome social structural and ideological constraints (see generally Gramsci, 1973).

Within criminology most of the radical literature has moved to the structural end of the equation viewing society as a struggle of class interests. Much modern radical criminology smacks of a modified structural functionalism in which the law is seen as the supporter of certain vested class interests rather than a codification of consensual values. But importantly, Taylor, Walton and Young (1973) propose a manifesto which combines "man in society" and "society in man" perspectives (n.b. Berger, 1966, Chs. 4 and 5), and Hall et al (1978), in their work on the British experience of mugging, attempt an analysis which works on both sides of the structure-action equation (though not without creating certain tensions in their argument - see McMullan and Ratner, 1982).

While none of these attempts of reconciling structural and verstehen perspectives has solved the many theoretical problems involved, I would highlight the attempt to do so as the most important concern of contemporary social science. (For another commentary and attempt at this synthesis see Giddens, 1979).
In acknowledging the necessity to address this issue, the practice and direction of the geography of crime appears to be in need of considerable revision. To date geographers have simply not considered the implications of alternative epistemologies which arose in criminology to challenge the wisdom and plausibility of traditional theory. With the exception of Herbert (1976), Ley (1975) and Ley and Cybriwsky, 1974), the geography of crime is rooted in a philosophical position which seeks to ascertain the "objective" causes of crime, or, failing this, at least to isolate variables by which crime may be predicted.

Verstehen and radical perspectives vastly extend the criminologist's theoretical concerns, however, and in so doing raise a number of complex issues. These do not simply concern the professional sociologist or criminologist, but must become, and are becoming, the direct province of social geography also. But they remain largely ignored in the geography of crime.

Although the exact theoretical resolution of the structure-action issue remains a mystery (to this author at least), the elements of a "fully social" theory of crime and deviance have been laid down by Taylor, Walton and Young (1973). While, Taylor, Walton and Young have not actually operationalized this model, it does suggest the levels of analysis a geographic study of crime should incorporate. While the model does not actually stipulate the theoretical interactions of the various elements, it does outline the

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necessary scope and formal requirements of a fully social theory of deviance (Taylor, Walton and Young, 1973, pp. 270-278).

1) The Wider Origins of the criminal act:

This refers to the structural origins of the criminal act involving the recognition of the "intermediate" structural questions that are traditionally the domain of sociological criminology: ecological areas, subcultural location etc. But it would also go beyond these intermediate questions to deal with the social context of inequalities in power, wealth, status and authority - a political economy of crime. From a geographic perspective this would become a political economy of the distribution of crime. In the geography of crime, Peet's position (1975, 1976) is developed at this level of analysis.

2) Immediate origins of the criminal act:

This calls for a social psychology of crime explaining the different ways in which "structural demands are interpreted, reacted against, or used by man at different levels in the social structure, in such a way that an essentially deviant choice is made." (Taylor, Walton and Young, 1973 p. 271)

From a geographic perspective this interest would translate into an investigation of areal differentiation of social groups as a reflection of social structure, and as a context for action. In the geographical literature Herbert and Evans (1973) study of delinquency in Cardiff does begin to address aspects of areal differentiation of attitudes and
values as contexts for action (see also Herbert, 1976, 1977A, 1977B). Subcultural analyses in general attempt to isolate the immediate origins of the criminal act.

3) The Actual Act:

The formal requirement at this level "is for an explanation of the ways in which the actual acts of men are explicable in terms of the rationality of choice or the constraints on choice at the point of precipitation into action" (Taylor, Walton and Young, 1973, p. 272). The demand here is for an account of the social dynamics surrounding the actual act, attempting to understand the relationship between individual choice and actions.

Set against the background of 1) and 2) is the criminal act problem-solving? instrumental? expressive? individual or collective? (p. 165). One geographic implication of this requirement will be elucidated in the discussion of displacement phenomena in chapters 6 through 9. Behavioural approaches to the geography of crime are constituted at this level of analysis (e.g. Carter and Hill, 1979; and the studies reviewed by Phillips, 1980; and McIver, 1981).

4) The Immediate Origins of Social Reaction:

The formal demand here is for a social psychology of the social reaction to crime. The subsequent definition of an act as criminal is the product of close personal relationships. The important point is that a degree of choice is exercised by those reporting and defining crimes, whether it be the police, the general public, business victims, or other
institutions agents such as school teachers etc.

The social psychology of social reaction would take "account of the contingencies and the conditions which are critical to the decision to act against the deviant" (Taylor, Walton and Young, 1973, 272-73). From a geographic point of view the vital question here becomes whether these contingencies and conditions are spatially differentiated - if they are, the meaning of a crime rate map becomes crucially problematic. This question is explored in chapter 5. Very little attention has been given to this element of analysis in the geography of crime (an exception is the paper by Shumsky and Springer, 1981. Symanski's (1981) book, also on prostitution, similarly examines the social psychology of social reaction).

5) The Wider Origins of the Social Reaction: delves into the structure of social control. It is essentially a "political economy" of social reaction examining the political and economic imperatives underlying the actual configuration of law and its differential enforcement. From a geographic viewpoint this element would translate into a study of the geographic structure of social control in a number of dimensions. Having considered the effects of differential law enforcement or personnel deployment on certain kinds of activities, the analysis would also take into account reasons for these differences in the first place. Again very little attention has been given to this level of analysis in the geography of crime. Harries (1974), Harries and Brunn (1980)
and Davidson (1981) do deal with spatial variations in the justice system, but their analyses remain at a descriptive level, and they do not link this level of analysis with the other elements.

Other considerations might also be included here, particularly the way place itself becomes an integral part of legal definitions (see, for example, Kress, 1980), and the process through which certain neighbourhoods become defined as "problem" crime areas (a problem to be encountered at the 6th level of analysis also).

6) The Outcome of the Social Reaction on the Deviant's further action

Despite Taylor, Walton and Young's reservations about labelling theory in its distinction of primary and secondary deviation (because it sees the criminal's consciousness and problems one-sidedly as a response to apprehension and labelling), they nevertheless acknowledge the need to incorporate into a general theory the consequences of the official reaction to crime.

In geographic terms this might translate into an inquiry into the part played by social reaction (criminal labelling or, as we shall see in Chapter 6, informal police activities in maintaining public order) in the formation of area based subcultures. What Brantingham and Brantingham term the process of "ecological labelling" (1981A) would be similarly important in this respect; ecological labelling concerns the process through which certain areas develop
reputations as loci of criminal residence or crime commission. In the geographic literature, Springer's (1974) research in Seattle, which, amongst other things, measures perceived crime danger, begins to address this question.

These suggestions should not be taken as complete but as substantially supplementing the geography of crime. In order to do this, however, it does appear that the geography of crime requires an alternative philosophical basis; the reason that many of these elements of analysis have not been followed lies in the philosophy of social science underpinning the geography of crime. While this philosophy has never been formally articulated in the geographic literature on crime, it seems to have firmly moulded the character of the research. Geographers have consistently focused on the immediate origins of the criminal act (element 2), or on the spatial context of the actual act (element 3). Some forays have been made into analysis of social reaction, but in so doing geographers have generally failed to probe the relationship between social reaction and criminality. In fact they have generally failed to take into account the interpenetrating nature of these various elements of analysis. The question now becomes, why?
Notes to Chapter 3

1. For general critiques of the sociology of deviance, and the labelling perspective in particular, see: Bordua (1967B); Akers (1968); Gouldner (1968); Stoll (1968); Gibbs (1969); Schur (1969); Haber and Smith (1971); Mankoff (1971); Davis (1972); Liazos (1972); Warren and Johnson (1973); Hagan (1974); Nettler (1974, pp. 202-212); Wellford (1975); and for a general evaluation of the perspective, Gove (1975).

2. Once again this generalization can portray a misleading impression of the literature. Most of the criticisms reviewed here are drawn from the literature of the early and mid-1970's. More recent interactionist work (e.g. Ericson, 1981, 1982) does attempt to be much more cognizant of structural forces, and how they shape the activities of both controllers and controlled. Rock, who enters the criticism of the sociology of deviance quoted here, is, in fact, one of the major figures in the development of the interactionist position in British criminology.

3. This criticism requires some qualification - in penetrating and exposing the taken-for-granted world researchers are revealing normative structures. But in that they are taken-for-granted they may not have been realized by the people who follow them; the most important feature of ideological systems is that they are taken-for-granted by their carriers, and sometimes even by their designers. Ideology itself may be an unintended consequence.

4. There is an interesting parallel in the geographic literature - see Ley's (1982) response to Gregory's (1981) misgivings about humanistic epistemologies in social geography. Ley suggests that structural considerations are not inimical to a humanistic epistemology (also in this regard see my footnote 8, Ch. 2). Plummer's (1979) defense of labelling perspectives against the radical critique, and Greenberg's (1976) reservations with regard to Werkentin et al's critique of the sociology of deviance similarly suggest that considerations of structure are not inimical to action perspectives.

5. A theory of reification may help to resolve the structure/action issue. Such a theory would attempt to explain the process through which social structures and ideology take on "reality" and influence action as they become an important component of the taken-for-granted world.

6. Much of the criticism of the "consensus" basis of traditional criminology has tended to herald a conflict position as a new development. Lynn McDonald's work on the Sociology of Law and Order (1976) is an important corrective outlining the long history of conflict
perspectives in criminology, sociology and political science. The generic conflict perspective is not new - it was rediscovered in the 1960's after a long period during which consensus theories predominated.

McDonald also notes a paper by Dahrendorf (1968), that seems to have gone almost unnoticed in the criminological literature, fitting very much into the mould of what I have termed the power-conflict perspective. Dahrendorf's paper, first appearing in English in 1961, developed a conflict perspective revolving around the social inequality underlining the distribution of power to sanction behaviour. He also explicitly rejects central elements of Marxian theory (McDonald, 1976, pp. 121-122).

7. The Marxian literature from North America includes: Gordon (1971, 1973); Quinney (1972, 1974, 1977); Greenberg and Stender (1972); Balbus (1973); Pearce (1973, 1976); Platt (1974); Centre for Research on Criminal Justice (1975); Krisberg (1975); Spitzer (1975); The Crime and Social Justice Collective (1976); Michalowski and Bohlander (1976); Reiman (1979); and Greenberg (1981).

Contributions from Britain include: Taylor, Walton and Young (1973, 1975); Hey (1975); Sumner (1976); Hepburn (1977); Thompson (1977); Hall et al (1978); Miles and Irvin (1979); National Deviancy Conference/Conference of Socialist Economists (1979); Carlen and Collison (1980); and Taylor (1981).

Other Marxian criminological perspectives include: Werkentin, Hofferbert and Baurmann (1974); Schumann (1976); and Beirne (1979, 1980).

8. A note on the cultural-conflict perspective of the Chicago School should also help to avoid confusion here.

The ecological model of social groups and urban form does embody a type of conflict perspective, in this case conflict of different cultural regimes thrown together in the North American melting pot. But the theory is at heart a consensus view: the cultures that collide are monolithic formations, social disorganization characterizing periods when cultures ecologically coincide, but disappearing once cultural consensus is re-established (hence the deliberate use of the melting pot metaphor in my description). In this model, conflict is an aberration, not a systematic aspect of social relations within a particular culture.

9. I introduce this distinction not so much to describe the literature as to locate my own position in the ones described. This position eschews neither structure nor action perspectives although their synthesis is still problematic.
10. The issues surrounding the debate have been keenly contested; as well as the two Taylor, Walton and Young volumes see Beyleveld etc. (1973), and Downes and Rock (1979). For a wider constituency in the debate see Platt etc. (1973).

11. For discussion of this point in the geographic literature see Olsson (1974, 1975) and Gregory (1978); and in sociology McHugh (1971), and Giddens (1976).

12. Although it should be noted that both Quinney and Chambliss subsequently moved to a Marxist position (Quinney, 1972, 1974, 1979; Chambliss, 1975).

13. Most of the criticism of radical criminology has been variously directed towards its partisan politics and its structural functionalist theoretical tendencies. See, for example: Sykes (1974); Chiricos and Waldo (1975); Turk (1975, 1979); Meier (1976); Hagan and Leon (1977); Akers (1979); Downes (1979); Klockars (1979); Schichor (1979); Toby (1979) and Stein (1980). The articles by Akers (1979), Klockars (1979, Turk (1979), and Toby (1979) are republished, along with a number of other critiques and rebuttals of these critiques, in Inciardi (1980). The volume by Downes and Rock (1979) contains six articles offering a variety of criticisms of the radical perspective.

14. In defending action perspectives a number of authors falling generally within the sociology of deviance perspective have simply reasserted the pitfalls of structural perspectives. For examples see Coulter (1974); Plummer (1979); and Rock (1979).

15. Counterparts of Thompson's humanistic and historical approach which discuss crime and criminalization are provided by Hobsbawn (1971, 1972); Hay (1975); and from an explicitly criminological perspective Pearson (1978). Thompson's *Whigs and Hunters* (1977) also explicitly deals with law and criminalization.
Chapter 4

The Geography of Crime: A Critique

Elements of the Critique

The geography of crime has been firmly cast in the mould of traditional criminology in several important respects. To begin with I outline five main propositions emerging from the interactionist and radical critiques of traditional criminology which may be applied to the geography of crime (and, by extension, to much of the work done in related ecological and spatial perspectives developed in the sociological and criminological literature\(^1\)). The subsequent critique is organized around these five themes:

1. Geographic research has mainly focused on the criminal or the crime; very little attention has been given to social control or the operation of the criminal justice system on the development or configuration of crime patterns. Where attention has been focused on the criminal justice system (e.g. Harries, 1974; Harries and Brunn, 1980; Davidson, 1981) for the most part the examination of laws, law enforcement and justice is analytically separated from the analysis of crime.\(^2\)

Rengert's work on "crime spillover" is unusual to the extent that, in part, it deals with interjurisdictional differences in levels of policing on crime rates. Also the geography of prostitution (Symanski, 1974, 1981; Shumsky and Springer, 1981)
has shown the importance of the control environment in shaping patterns of crime. But it is significant that Shumsky and Springer in realizing that law and law enforcement are the major "cause" of prostitute location note that "(g)eographers who study these phenomena implicitly seem to have accepted what might loosely be called the clinical theory of deviance. They concentrate on the characteristics of deviants themselves..." asking "what is there about them that leads them to do forbidden things?" rather than on the effect of the social reaction to deviance (p. 88). In this context Shumsky and Springer suggest that geographers have missed the importance of labelling perspectives in explaining patterns of crime.

2) Geographers have tended to follow the consensus model of law formation suggested as underlying traditional criminological perspectives rather than the pluralist, power-conflict or class conflict models of interactionist, power-conflict and radical theory. Much of the geography of crime is an "abstracted empiricism" (Mills, 1959), approaching the problem of explaining crime and criminal residence patterns through the use of statistical measures associating official police data on crime with other "objective" social indicators usually drawn from official censuses. Such approaches create a theoretical foreclosure by starting with the "fact" of crime, an analytic starting point which only makes sense if it proceeds from a consensus model of law formation (i.e. that criminal law is a reflection of social consensus). While areal analyses could be used for theoretical developments of either
consensus or conflict perspectives, geographers have generally interpreted their findings in terms of traditional criminological theories which are built on a consensus model of society and law.

3) Geographers have adopted a correctionalist purpose in their work to the extent that much of the research is couched in terms of its policy implications, particularly in its utility for helping to do something about the "crime problem", a problem which is generally perceived as "getting worse." This correctionalist politic also implies that the geography of crime is based on a consensus model of law and society to the extent that this alliance with the forces of law and order is not seen as problematic even though it is a value judgement. The alliance is based on the commonsense notion that there is a social consensus as to what crime is and that it is a social problem. With the exception of the work by Symanski (1974, 1981), Harries (1974), Harries and Brunn (1981), Davidson (1981, Ch. 5) and Shumsky and Springer (1981) the meaning of law is largely taken for granted by geographers interested in crime.

4) Because of the analytic separation of crime and justice, geographers have tended to hypostatize crime - divorced from its social context\(^3\) (particularly its legal context) crime is treated as a distinct behaviour, the criminal as a distinct type of person.

5) While it would not be strictly correct to classify the geography of crime as positivistic (the term has such a wide
usage now that this characterization could be misleading or confusing), it does follow some important positivistic imperatives, and in very general terms fits into the erklaren as opposed to the verstehen mode of social inquiry. There is also a strong instrumentalist strain in the geography of crime—its authors have predominantly relied on quantitative techniques in an approach which might be best described as statistical instrumentalism.

A word of caution is necessary before proceeding with a more detailed discussion of the various elements of the critique. The geography of crime is neither a coherent nor a consistent body of literature, and the criticisms to be made here do not necessarily apply uniformly. I have attempted to be careful to isolate geographic perspectives on crime which implicitly or explicitly address one or more of the problems I have identified here. My purpose is not to dismiss the geography of crime as it has developed to date, but to display some of its inadequacies. A corollary of this effort is to take some of the more recent and innovative literature and show how the emerging themes can be unified into a perspective which acknowledges the intimate relationships between crime and social control.

The Analytic Separation of Crime and Justice

One of the most obvious characteristics of the geography of crime, when compared to recent developments in criminology,
is its analytic separation of crime and justice; and it is this same analytic separation that David Matza, one of the most influential spokesmen of the sociology of deviance, identifies as the main hallmark of what he characterizes as "positive criminology" (1964, Ch. 1):

"The most celebrated and thus the most explicit assumption of positive criminology is the primacy of the criminal actor rather than the criminal law as the major point of departure in the construction of etiological theories...the law and its administration is deemed secondary or irrelevant."

(Matza, 1964, p. 3)

While one might wish to argue that Matza's use of the term "positive" creates something of a straw-man, because it tends to lump together theoretical positions which are not consistently positivist, the analytic separation of crime and crime control is common to much traditional criminological theory. Similarly, while much of the geographic literature on crime simply describes crime patterns with only limited reference to theories of causation developed in traditional criminology and sociology, the descriptions produced rarely include considerations of social control processes. There are some significant exceptions, notably Herbert's programmatic statement considered earlier, and Harries and Brunn's Geography of Laws and Justice (1978) which directly considers areal differentiation of certain elements of the criminal justice system. But, as we shall see later, even this work does not represent or attempt to understand crime in terms of social control processes. Generally, geographers have confined themselves to analyses which measure the association of
indicators of crime (official statistics) and indicators of the local social environment.

In terms of social environment geographers have examined indicators which are thought to be related to criminogenesis, especially social and neighbourhood factors which might predispose certain individuals to crime (e.g. Lee and Egan, 1972; Egan, 1976; Pyle, 1974; Corsi and Harvey, 1975; Herbert, 1977B; Georges, 1978; Murray and Boal, 1979). Herbert and Evans (1973), Herbert (1976), and Evans (1977) have used area associational analyses as the base for more intensive social survey research, but again they do not consider the possible effects of social control processes in area differences in crime or delinquency rates in these studies. But elsewhere both Davidson (1981) and Herbert (1982) do include reviews of the work by Damer (1974), Baldwin, Bottoms and Walker (1976) and Gill (1978) on the effect of both policing and housing authority policy in the genesis of problem crime areas, particularly in terms of their labelling as such by outsiders, especially by "urban gatekeepers" and the news media. Taking an entirely different approach, Kress (1980) shows how law itself is an important environmental attribute; law importantly conditions human activity classifying space in such a way that some activities are criminal only if they occur in certain places. These same distinctions also influence law enforcement activity so that criminal behaviour carried out in private is much more likely to go unnoticed than the same activity in a public space. Also Carter and Hill (1979) consider the
criminal's perception of law enforcement activities in their choice of targets.

But while there are a few studies linking crime with various social allocation processes and law enforcement practices, geographers have not given sufficient consideration to the theoretical implications of these findings, particularly as they pertain to the interpretation of crime statistics. By and large law enforcement and the general structure of social control is not considered as importantly conditioning and shaping human behaviour (whether it ends up being called criminal or not). The emphasis of the geography of crime has been on crime or justice as opposed to crime and justice, and very little consideration has been given to the operation of the criminal justice system prior to the judicial stage, apart from area variations in law itself. For the most part the geography of justice has been restricted to the outcomes of the judicial response to, and handling of criminals.

The title of Harries first book *The Geography of Crime and Justice* (1974) is deceptive in this sense; he firstly examines variations in the incidence of (officially recorded) crime, and secondly variations in the judicial response to crime. The relationship of the two is not adequately considered, especially the notion that crime, or at any rate patterns of crime, may be in part a response to the operation of the criminal justice system. This argument may pertain not only in a literal sense, but also in the way the social scientist's perception of crime is influenced by official statistics, which

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have been suggested as being socially and thus spatially biased. The "and" in the title of the book is thus a conjunctive to describe the volume's contents rather than the theoretical imperative that it implies. Similarly Davidson's (1981, Ch. 5) consideration of the "distribution of justice" does not consider the role "justice" may have in conditioning crime patterns although he is concerned with such issues as the influence of crime type and a person's social status on sentencing variation; while crime and the "type" of criminal are considered to effect "justice", the reverse proposition finds little acknowledgement.

While in the work of Harries (1974), Harries and Brunn (1978), and Davidson (1981), the separation of crime and justice is largely implicit, other geographers have been explicit in this analytic dichotomization. Daniel Georges in attempting to "offer a sound scheme for the study of a geography of crime" says in answer to the question "what is the Geography of Crime?":

"Simply defined, the geography of crime is the study of the spatial manifestation of criminal acts. It is the study of the social and cultural organization of criminal behavior from a spatial perspective. It is not the study of the spatial organization and peculiarities of the judicial response to criminal behavior. Rather the geography of justice would examine the geographical, or spatial, variations in the criminal justice process i.e. the administration of law enforcement, sentencing, judges, juries and correctional institutions. Such a geographic approach would go beyond the scope of a geography of crime."

(1978, p. 2)
From the point of view of the sociology of deviance or critical perspectives this formula is too simplistic. In Georges' defence it may be noted that the study of social and cultural organization of criminal behaviour could easily be remodelled to account for the potential effect of crime control activities other than the "judicial response" (i.e. relating to the courts). But the meaning of the term "justice" is not defined by Georges and seems to include more than the court disposition of offenders (the judicial response). The geography of justice includes virtually the whole of the criminal justice process, with the exception, perhaps, of the process of actual law enforcement and the possible discretionary practices associated with it. But the suggestion made here is that the necessary or logical separation of the criminal justice process from the explanation of crime patterns may not be theoretically justified.

A note of qualification is necessary at this point. Aside from the statement made by Georges, the separation of crime from the "criminal justice process" has not been explicitly made by other geographers. With few exceptions (such as the Peet-Harries debate: Peet, 1975, 1976; Harries, 1975, 1976), students of the geography of crime have paid very little attention to the epistemological and ontological issues hotly debated within sociology, criminology and elsewhere in social geography. There have been few forays into the theoretical arena of discourse, and a certain dissatisfaction has been expressed in the literature over the failure of geography to
contribute to criminological theory (Dunn, 1980, p.21).

It may be, then, that Georges' analytic separation of crime and justice is not wrought through any theoretical imperative, but is more a matter of convenience. Convenient though it may be, it is the appropriateness of the strategy that is at issue.

2) The Consensus Model of Society and Law

The development of the sociology of deviance and power-conflict perspectives in criminology is partly based upon their view of traditional criminological theory as containing a consensus model of society, particularly in terms of its representation of criminal law as issuing from social consensus. Traditional criminology offered little in the way of a sociology of law in its understanding of crime, and virtually no sociology of the effects of the criminal labelling process. The sociology of deviance provided instead a pluralist model of society elaborating a particular strand of traditional culture conflict and subcultural theory which suggested that illegal behaviour could nevertheless be viewed as norm conforming. Criminal deviance could thus be understood in terms of the clashes of normative systems, with criminality explained as the result of the power of certain social groups to impose their normative systems on others.

Power-conflict perspectives offer a similar pluralist model of society but are more concerned with developing a
sociology of law than offering an insight into the consequences of labelling people as criminal. While the sociology of deviance examined the results of one group imposing its normative system on others, conflict perspectives turned to understanding sources of power, and the vested interests embodied in criminal law. As a form of conflict theory, Marxist perspectives have attempted to systematize the understanding of power and vested interests by interpreting them as class interests. The similarity in the three perspectives thus lies in their view of criminal law as issuing from a conflict of beliefs rather than a social consensus.

The rather compelling argument that there is a clear social consensus over a core group of criminal laws poses problems for any extreme conflict position (although most conflict positions acknowledge consensus of opinion over certain laws). But this observation alone is not sufficient to deny the importance of the suggestion that there is dissensus over criminal laws (particularly drug statutes, abortion statutes and laws pertaining to sexual morality, or the definition of delinquency). An understanding of the creation of law, and the forces and interests underlying it may be central to an understanding of who becomes labelled as criminal and, by extension, to the geography of crime. The appearance of consensus over certain laws may also be illusory since it is possible that consensus is ideologically produced - in Gramsci's terms consensus over certain kinds of laws may reflect hegemonic processes. For example, there is evidence
that the formation of certain drug laws rather than issuing from any public consensus, actually created it (Solomon and Madison, 1976-77; Small, 1978; and Green, 1979). It is in this sense that certain radical criminological theorists have suggested that a consensus model of society is a mystification. While the functionalist radical position that law only serves the interests of a ruling class seems to defy the reality of the situation, criminal laws are socially constructed, and function to preserve a certain vision of social order. Because this vision is not shared by all members of society, an understanding of the intentions, purposes and interests of law appears necessary to understand those who defy it. Law, then, cannot be taken-for-granted as if it were *sui generis* - law also requires explanation.

For other reasons (to be elaborated later) the law in the statutes should not be taken for granted as supplying the meaning of law enforcement in practice, even though it may create the boundaries within which a variety of interpretations develop. The way in which they develop may be contingent on the interests embedded in law or in the manner of law enforcement, and, as we shall see, all these various elements may become important in understanding crime patterns, and shed a rather different light on the process of criminogenesis.

The meaning of law may be complex, multi-dimensional and not necessarily obvious to those people coming under its jurisdiction. Where law is understood, certain people or groups may not agree with it, and even if they do, they may not
feel compelled to abide by it. This intricately textured reaction to law is only partially captured by the geography of justice.

Harries and Brunn's work, for example, discusses variations in law in the United States, but explains these in terms of different regional philosophies within the United States (1978, pp. 13-15). While this discussion is analytically sensitive to the social construction of law, it nevertheless implies that law issues from some social consensus which is regionally bounded. It does not consider a conflict model of law in more general terms and implies that regional philosophies are consensual and monolithic, while offering a pluralist model between regions (c.f. Duncan's, 1980, criticisms of monolithic or *sui generis* concepts of culture in geography). This formulation creates a theoretical tension in their work, because later they discuss variations of laws at local and state levels, and offer examples of the way differences in legal statutes can structure social activity (pp. 22-25). Here Harries and Brunn acknowledge the displacement effects that may be associated with formal legal boundaries, but offer no real sociology of law to explain the spatial patterns they describe. More importantly they tend to miss the behavioural significance of informal legal processes and boundaries, but to do this would require a different research methodology and epistemology in order to gain access to the world of experience. To do so requires a shift from an instrumental positivist to an interactionist or
phenomenological epistemology seeking to recognize the meaning of law as an intersubjective construction which cannot be simply understood by reading the criminal statutes. These considerations form the main impetus of the argument against the analytic separation of crime and the criminal justice system. For, as Harries and Brunn (1980, p. 25) acknowledge when discussing the importance of the geography of law:

"It affects not only when and where crimes occur, but where the arrest is made and the trial held. This applies to those operating at local levels or at an interstate scale."

By adopting a different epistemology, such themes become more complete and central to the geography of crime, but unattainable for an analysis which remains fixed at the phenomenal level.

Harries and Brunn in noting that crime and punishment are partly dependent on where a person engages in an activity (as opposed to being solely dependent on what the person does), rather than recognizing possible conflicts underlying the system instead seek to restore consensus and equal treatment in the face of the law. In identifying the evils of "spatial injustice" they devote their book to those suffering from it. What their argument amounts to is a plea that everyone be treated equally by the criminal justice system everywhere in the country, in effect creating an enormous consensus clearly demarcating the criminal from the non-criminal, and making the severity of reaction to the criminal ubiquitous. Laudable though this formula appears at first, it does not actually take into account the factors that might explain why the criminal
justice system is not uniform in its definition of, and reaction to offenders in the first place and, by extension, why the notion of consensus itself may be chimeric, a practical impossibility. Their objective is the creation of a formal justice, but they do not consider the widespread argument in criminology that formal justice does not guarantee substantive justice. More problematically the prerogatives and dictates of spatial justice are fully met in a Fascist state as long as it is uniformly Fascist. In a sense Harries and Brunn follow a classic positivist dictum in this formula separating facts (measurable differences in legal statutes, sentencing, jury selection, prosecutorial discretion and the like) from values (the meaning of social justice).

Most geographers interested in crime follow this same formula in attempting to produce objective descriptions of the distribution of crime and criminals, and, in so-doing take the meaning and effect of law for granted. While this strategy may not present problems in the analysis of a crime like murder, it creates extensive problems with a range of other legal categories, particularly delinquency. The point is that the meaning of the law is often context specific. This problem even obtains in those categories we might commonsensically think of as unproblematic - was Lieutenant Calley's behaviour at Mai Lai in Vietnam an act of war or the commission of murder? With the category delinquent the meaning is much more problematic since it has been claimed that the attribution of the delinquent label is sometimes more a reflection of a
person's social status or sexual gender than his/her actual behaviour (Werthman and Piliavin, 1967; Cicourel, 1967). The sociology of deviance has consequently focused on the idea of crime-as-status, rather than the crime-as-behaviour formula which pervades the geography of crime.

Within the geography of crime legal categories are hypos tatized. The focus on the criminal rests on the assumption that criminal behaviour is basically different from non-criminal behaviour and that law effectively draws a line which describes (rather than affects) this difference. The question becomes, by what criterion is this differentiation achieved? The only answer which seems to fit is that the criteria are given by a moral and social consensus. And to this extent the correctional and preventive impulse of the geography of crime appears commonsensically reasonable, logical and even objective!

3. The Correction and Prevention of Crime: Some Comments on Value-Judgements and their Theoretical Implications

The geographic interest in crime developed at a time when concern was being shown over the social relevance of the analytic directions being taken in human geography (e.g. Harvey, 1973; Buttimer, 1974). And what could be a more socially relevant issue than crime? In keeping with this concern geographers have frequently stressed the applicability of their findings for informing criminal justice policy and
helping to prevent crime. In this quest for social relevance a certain relativity has gone unnoticed and, with the exception of Peet's (1975, 1976) brief challenge to the "liberal" geography of crime, very little attention has been given to alternative answers to the question, relevant to whom? In answering this question, geographers have been fairly unequivocal regarding their technocratic function. In *Crime: A Spatial Perspective* (1980) Georges-Abeyie and Harries provide the logic for a criminal justice perspective. The book is divided into three sections, the first two concerning "pure analysis" identifying the purposes of a spatial perspective and developing empirical approaches within it. The third section concerns applications of spatial perspectives with contributions from criminal justice planner/analysts, a police department analyst, and a scholar interested in law enforcement applications of spatial analytical techniques.

"The underlying assumption is that the usefulness of academic approaches to analysis is reduced if there is no translation of principles and methods into operational modes." (Georges-Abeyie and Harries, 1980, p. 247)

In terms of the application of their research, the tenor of the argument is clear; in discussing "geographic prediction" Harries refers to models useful for criminal justice personnel, particularly in generating maps of predicted crime rates. Not only would these aid law enforcement and patrol pattern planning, but generally move the criminal justice system to greater efficiency (1974, pp. 120-121).
Even some of the more innovative studies conducted by geographers are consistently correctionalist in their purpose. Carter and Hill (1979, 1980) and Smith and Patterson (1980) move away from areal and ecological analyses to focus on the subjective dimensions of criminality in terms of criminals' mental maps and images of the city. But this research is nevertheless couched in terms of its policy relevance, particularly in terms of preventing crime.

At least part of this correctionalist impulse reflects sources of funding; to the extent that much criminological research is funded by the state, the interests of the criminal justice system are reproduced in academic research. Thus Pyle's *Spatial Dynamics of Crime* (1974) was devised "...to develop an improved method of collection, handling and analysis of criminal justice data within Summit County to the end that more effective law enforcement planning could be made possible."

But relevant though these programmatic considerations may be in the sociology of the research enterprise, and the situational requirements of the researcher in making a living, the criminal justice orientation adopted by geographers has tended to limit the kind of descriptions and explanations developed. By relying on official statistics geographers have typically taken the criminal justice system's own image of the crime problem for granted, and criticism of the system has been effectively denied - the only substantial criticism of the system has been directed at its inefficiency in terms of
detecting and processing criminals, or its differential treatment of offenders across political-legal space. There is very little sense given in the geographic literature that some forms of crime are not only "rational" in terms of the social context in which they develop, but might even be reasonable given certain social structural inequalities. At this point one can take the argument in two directions. The first direction is emotive to the extent that it rests on the idea that social science is necessarily political. From this perspective the following kind of question is posed: to what extent is it reasonable to attempt to make the criminal justice system more efficient in detecting and labelling people who steal as a result of physiological need in a society which implicitly condones systematic corporate fraud of the general public? The normal kind of response to this argument would separate facts from values, suggesting that the social scientist is only qualified to deal with objective facts, and is in no better position than the informed citizen in making value-judgements.

A second line of argument is also possible: if it is accepted that social science can and should be objective, the researcher qua researcher in his quest for objective knowledge ought not to make any alliance with the criminal justice system, for to do so may seriously bias the analysis. This does not mean to say that criminological research does not have policy implications, it almost inevitably does. Rather that the adoption of a "criminal justice perspective" has important
implications for theory construction, one which may not be warranted by any criteria other than the values of the researcher. There are no "scientific" criteria for perspectives which are ostensibly "objective" to become technocratically and politically partisan.

As much as the correctional perspective is value-laden, so are the sociology of deviance and radical conflict perspectives. The sociology of deviance has sometimes been called the sociology of the underdog for (in Matza's terms, 1969, Chapter 2) it attempts to "appreciate" deviance; to understand it from the deviant actor's perspective rather than that of those seeking to correct deviant behaviour. This attempt to appreciate the subject's viewpoint leads to a very different kind of understanding of deviant phenomena, as something constructed, through social interaction, rather than something to be "explained" by inner dispositions or external social forces. From the deviant's point of view rule-breaking may be norm-conforming, instrumental and rational. From this perspective the idea that something which is rational should or can be corrected becomes problematic.

The radical theorist often gives this formula a political edge by suggesting that the criminologist become partisan in favour of the underdog as a class subject, rejecting correctionalism outright as a form of technocratic intervention implicitly endorsing the political status quo and as supporting a criminogenic social structure. Both perspectives still contain policy implications, although they challenge the logic.
of traditional forms of intervention. It should also be noted that certain radical theorists also offer deterministic explanations (of a structural functional or economic variety) and that the critique of correctionalism itself is no resolution to the structure-action debate.


By treating crime statistics as observational categories for operational purposes, geographers have implicitly treated crime as a discrete phenomenon, a separate and easily distinguishable behavioural entity. With the abstract empiricist method of ecological analysis the criminal act is wrenched from its social context. While micro studies of the journey to crime and other elements of spatial criminal behaviour have been hailed as providing a better integration of "behavioural" and ecological approaches (Carter and Hill, 1979) both approaches, as will be shown shortly, involve the same general philosophical position. This is not to suggest that the move away from ecological perspectives is not useful - it does allow a number of entirely different types of question about spatial criminal behaviour to be asked. But the approach is still restricted to posing questions within the framework of a quantitative methodology. The resultant need for the use of operational definitions has the effect of abstracting crime from its social context. An example of this tendency is the literature on the "journey to crime."
Measures of the journey to crime speak, in a very general way, about different degrees of mobility of various adjudicated offenders. But because of the way this journey is abstractly conceived, criminal travel patterns are effectively torn from their social context; because of the operational measuring rod used, the journey to crime is conceptualized as being a discrete event. One has the impression of a criminal making sporadic single purpose forays from his or her home base with the explicit purpose of committing crimes. The idea that the journey to crime may be part of a multi-purpose trip, and the commission of crime may be incidental to some other purpose (perhaps a matter of being presented the opportunity to do so) seems to evade the conceptual tools of this literature. Consequently the "mean travel distances" mentioned by Phillips (1980, pp. 168-169) in his review of the journey to crime literature are actually the mean distances between offender residences and places of crime commission; to call them "travel distances" is strictly a misnomer.

The problem is created by converting data from official crime reports into literal descriptions of reality in accordance with the hidden mandates of an instrumentalist method. The "journey to crime" has to be interpreted in its social context, as do, for example, Brantingham and Brantingham in their "Notes on the Geometry of Crime" cautioning "(o)ne of the striking things about criminals, often forgotten, is that most of them behave as ordinary people most of the time" (1981B, p. 35). It may thus be a mistake to focus simply on
the criminal activities of "criminals" in order to understand
their spatial behaviour (an example is given in Chapter 9 when
discussing changes of patterns of burglary in response to crime
prevention programs; it may be the non-criminal activities of
the burglar population that has to be considered in order to
explain changes in patterns of burglary).

At this juncture it is important to point out that these
observations are not meant to minimize the importance of the
behavioural approach focusing on criminal mobility. This is an
important research direction, particularly to the extent that
if crime control activities do influence patterns of crime, it
is because mobility is a viable adaptive strategy for
offenders. Instead these comments are made to illustrate the
shortcomings of an abstract empiricism carried over from the
ecology of crime into the newer behavioural perspectives. The
problem with both perspectives is that crime and criminals are
treated as being something distinct from non-crime and non-
criminals. When crime is hypostatized, the door is open for
mythology and popular media conceptions of criminality to
subtly influence social theory. In this light, consider the
seemingly innocent statement by Smith and Patterson (1981) that
"policemen and criminals have chosen an action-packed lifestyle."

The view of "criminal lifestyle" that Smith and Patterson
seem to hold is more influenced by television than it is by
systematic research. It portrays criminal lifestyle as
something particularly distinctive to the point that it can be
considered a lifestyle in the first place. My point is not to suggest that certain lifestyles are not built around criminal activity, but that much crime is of an incidental nature. The suggestion that criminals have chosen an "action-packed" lifestyle is to miss the largely mundane nature of the lives of most criminals. The statement similarly belies the actual nature of the working life of the average policeman. A careful reading of observer research on police practices (Rubinstein, 1973; Manning, 1977; Ericson, 1981, 1982) suggests that only a small percentage of their time is spent actually dealing with criminals. Ericson, for example, suggests that while patrol police may spend much of their time anticipating trouble, not much trouble is forthcoming; only 5% of the patrol officer's time is spent in activity which leads to the laying of criminal charges. In fact paperwork consumes a greater percentage of time. Similarly Ericson's study of detective work (1981) shows most of it to be "routine" rather than "action-packed".

5. The Philosophic Bases of the Geography of Crime: The Deficiencies of Instrumentalism and Positivism

Having established the compatibility between the geography of crime and traditional criminology, the discussion to this point has attempted to show how elements of the critique of traditional criminology emerging since 1950 are pertinent to the geography of crime. While the geographic literature does contain the seeds of the arguments by which one might develop
the sociology of deviance and critical theory in geographic perspectives, it is significant that the potential of these themes has not been exploited in any systematic way. Why not? Apart from some wider considerations about the sociology of geography and the situational context in which research is undertaken, the geography of crime has followed a number of philosophical mandates. Because very little attention has been paid to the philosophy of social science guiding the geography of crime, it has to be unearthed - extrapolated from the programmatic statements and methodological guidelines laid down in the literature and shaping research.

In very general terms the geography of crime is variously instrumentalist or positivist. (For similar criticisms of instrumentalism in spatial analysis in geography more generally see Agnew, 1977, and Gregory, 1978. Gregory also includes an extensive critique of positivism. See also King, 1976.) The application of these two terms is not without some difficulty for they are used in different ways in different literatures and should not be conflated. Their exact use therefore requires careful specification.

Keat and Urry (1975, p. 63) distinguish two main senses given to the term instrumentalism; firstly, the term may refer to a general philosophy of scientific inquiry aiming to provide predictive and manipulative power over the physical environment (presumably this philosophy could also apply to social science and include the social environment); and secondly, the term may denote a view about the logical status of scientific theories.
as computational devices which generate testable predictions.

Runes treats instrumentalism as a form of pragmatism, noting that pragmatism is often conflated with empiricism (1977, p. 246). Instrumentalism specifically is associated with the philosophy of Dewey, which Runes suggests is scarcely distinguishable from experimentalism or operationalism (p. 147); experimentalism treats laws as predictions of future occurrences provided certain conditions pertain, while operationalism treats scientific propositions as predictions (Runes, p. 247). As a philosophy of science, operationalism holds that scientific concepts and research procedures are inseparable and that the means of measuring the concept constitute the definition of the concept (Theodorson and Theodorson, p. 284). This discussion will subsequently point to the consequences of the operationalist position in the geography of crime which tends to treat official statistics (the way of measuring crime) as constituting the definition of crime. The difference between operationalism and instrumentalism is that the latter takes a more moderate position by suggesting that the definition of a concept includes more than simply the means of measuring it, while operationalism holds that concepts are defined solely in terms of the procedures used to test them thus limiting a conceptual level of analysis (Theodorson and Theodorson, 1977, p. 209).

Although empirical geographic research has actually followed an operationalist model, geographers have frequently mentioned the technical problems associated with the meaning of official
statistics; the instrumentalist label is therefore more appropriate even though geographers have proceeded as if the mention of the problems involved with interpreting official statistics negated them.

In sum, the research practice of the geography of crime has followed an operationalist mode while the programmatic statements guiding research have been instrumentalist.

The designation of the form of instrumentalism underlying the geography of crime as positivist presents a number of problems, not the least of these being the exact meaning of the term positivism. Rather than representing a specific philosophy of social science, the term has been used to denote a number of such philosophies which find a common ground in their "scientific" approach to explanation. Used in this sense positivism corresponds to the erklären position in German social philosophy discussed in Chapter 2, and it is this meaning of the term that is intended here. Similarly the critiques of traditional criminology as a positivist enterprise developed in the sociology of deviance and radical criminology have used the term positivism in this catch-all fashion. Generally the term suggests a perspective geared to the formulation of deterministic causal laws of human activity. A distinction is wrought between observational terms (empirical phenomena), and the theoretical language used to describe the relationships between phenomena. Given the epistemological imperatives of its empiricist ontology, facts and values can be separated in a system which portrays the scientist's
observations as value-neutral. Science is cast as an objective enterprise.

While these characteristics describe positivism as a genre, some very different perspectives come under its umbrella ranging from the sociological positivism of Comte (c.f. Gregory, 1978) the biological positivism of Lombroso and Ferrero (1895), the behaviourism of B. F. Skinner (1971) the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle (Kolakowski, 1972) to the neopositivism of Laird Addis (1975) with its unusual attempt to address the problem of human free-will from a psychologically reductionist perspective. It is the problem of free-will and the status of metaphysical discourse that have provided the main stumbling blocks for positivism, and the main impetus for the development of verstehen perspectives.

The main reason for the dissatisfaction with positivism is its model of (wo)man, and most other criticisms in one way or another flow from this (see generally Hollis, 1977); if human activity conforms to deterministic laws humans cannot have the freedom to choose - humans have no free-will. It is the counter-intuitive nature of this model which has led to the great debates over the philosophical status of social science. For, as Hollis so ably demonstrates, every social theory needs a metaphysic in which a "model of man" and a method of science complement each other (1977, p. 3). If the "model of man" complementing a method of science is palpably deficient, the method of science itself is thrown into severe doubt. It is this doubt that led to the development of the sociology of
deviance through its misgivings with the model of "criminal man" constructed in traditional criminology. This same seed of doubt does not appear to have germinated in the geography of crime, where the problem of free-will has been avoided through an instrumentalist approach which seeks predictive statements and attempts to develop probabilistic rather than causal laws.

While instrumentalism and positivism may be considered as distinct perspectives, the similarities between the two are clear enough. Following the discussion of Keat and Urry (1975, pp. 63-65), positivism aims at providing explanatory and predictive knowledge while the instrumentalist perspective views theories as devices simply for generating useful predictions. In practice, however, the two approaches tend to generate the same kind of scientific activity, and it becomes easy to conflate them (Gregory, 1978). Similarly, Keat and Urry suggest that positivism and instrumentalism both recognize a distinction between theoretical and observational statements. The positions differ to the extent that positivists are concerned with the correspondence rules linking theoretical and observational terms (in order to be able to assign a truth-value to theoretical terms) while instrumentalists may not be worried that theoretical terms are properly scientific – instead they are shorthand statements about observables; their criteria of science are purely pragmatic ones. Most importantly of all instrumentalism and positivism reject any position which suggests that theoretical terms are to be interpreted as referring to actually existent,
even if unobservable entities. It is for these reasons Keat and Urry suggest that instrumental and positivist positions have been so closely intertwined in certain writers (1975, p. 65). Gregory (1978, p. 42) includes geographers as being among those for whom positivism and instrumentalism have become virtually indistinguishable (see also Olsson, 1972, for a discussion of these issues).

While these positions seem closely intertwined in much of the geography of crime, this may not be a conscious and deliberate choice on the part of its adherents. Rather, it seems, the philosophy of social science guiding much geographic research takes amorphous form in the worldviews and background assumptions of its authors. Why this should be so is an important and worthwhile question in the sociology of knowledge, but it remains beyond the scope of the present discussion which serves to outline the philosophical assumptions guiding the geography of crime, and the problems that are raised by creating a research field limited by them.

Instrumental and Positive Influences on the Geography of Crime

Having described the imperative moods of positivism and instrumentalism, the task remains to firmly locate the geography of crime within these perspectives. The discussion develops around a number of themes:
1) Most research has dealt with observable (and quantifiable) entities in a form of statistical empiricism. 

2) A distinction is made between observational discourse (description of patterns) and theoretical discourse (explanation or prediction of patterns).

3) Observational categories in the form of crime statistics conform to discrete behaviour types.

4) A number of authors see prediction as the primary goal of criminological research. 

Because these themes are interconnected a general discussion of them follows.

For the most part the geography of crime has been based on the analysis of official crime statistics. Crime categories are treated as observational terms, and although geographers have taken pains to point out the instrumental or technical problems associated with interpreting official statistics, very little consideration has been given to the argument that the problems involved with their interpretation are theoretical. The suggestion made here is that the positivist distinction of observational and theoretical languages is highly problematic. Since this assertion as applied to official statistics forms the subject of the next chapter (because it is intrinsic to any criminological analysis) the important point for the moment is that in geographical analysis the meaning of crime categories is taken as unproblematic (except in certain technical senses - and these usually refer to the meaning of crime rates rather than crimes). Alternative theoretical
perspectives suggest that crime statistics are objects of study in their own right, and our understanding of how they are constituted importantly influences both our understanding and explanation of crime. The problem this raises is that to refer to maps of crime rates as descriptions of the distribution of criminal or delinquent behaviour misses a number of theoretical assumptions about what crime and official crime statistics mean. It is this implicit assumption about what official statistics mean that leads to the subsequent analytic tactic of attempting to ecologically "explain" crime by various socio-economic census variables and other indicators. What is taken as a description in fact contains the theoretical premise that crime rates index criminal activities rather than crime control activities, for the subsequent analytic techniques used could not really be brought to bear on the latter possibility! And yet a substantial literature within criminology is devoted to this very possibility, some of which argues that crime rates are independent rather than dependent variables.

In a typical instrumentalist approach geographers have tended to make prediction rather than explanation the object of scientific inquiry. Harries (1974, pp. 115-121), for example, proposes three elements to a geographical perspective; geographic description, geographic analysis and geographic prediction. The descriptive element refers largely to mapping techniques which purport to display (in classic positivist fashion) the spatial distributions of observational categories - recorded crimes. The distinction between description and
analysis for Harries is that the former is essentially a process of ordering facts "...making the chaos of reality to some extent comprehensible...", while the latter "...involves testing a hypothesis and the development of bases for prediction." While Harries acknowledges the role of geographic analysis in developing causal theory, in typical instrumentalist fashion he is most concerned with the pragmatic potential of analytic approaches which promise predictive capacities: 

"Prediction, depending on the level of its reliability, may be the most valuable end product of any social science investigation. Even some success in prediction is often worthwhile, since it creates an awareness of tendencies within a system, without necessarily specifying either the parameters of those tendencies or underlying causes." (1974, p. 120) 

While Harries does not dismiss the possibility of developing causal theories from geographic analysis, the geographic literature, as noted earlier, has recently been accused of remaining relatively limited in its role of advancing criminological theory. This problem Dunn attributes to the difficulty of inferring explanations from areal observations (1980, p. 20). In a sense Dunn's observation is correct, but it begs the question as to why this problem should exist. The ecological fallacy (the problem of making inferences about individuals from aggregate data - Robinson, 1960) is certainly part of the problem and area analyses almost demand an instrumentalist approach. The invocation of probabilistic statements rather than causal statements is one
way of surmounting the ecological fallacy. But what this tactic cannot get around is the geographic inference problem (Olsson, 1974) whereby a number of different area processes may produce the same area effects. The problem of geographic inference is a component of the more general problem of equifinality which indicates that prediction and explanation cannot be synonymous. The search for prediction, and the methodology used to achieve it has been an important element in retarding criminological theory development in geography.

The research strategy of the geography of crime has largely been limited to the available technical instruments of quantitative techniques. In keeping with an instrumentalist philosophy, the rationale usually given to justify this strategy is on pragmatic grounds: the research funding needed to provide alternative measures to official crime statistics and census measures are indeed prohibitive. But the tendency to make official statistics in one way or another the sine qua non of the geography of crime rules out many other sources of information which might be helpful in developing theory about spatial aspects of crime. Participant observer and observer studies have a long tradition in criminology beginning with the Chicago School, and in wider social research can be traced back to Mayhew's studies (1862). Unfortunately most recent studies of this type have focused on morality crimes — e.g. Polsky (1969), Milner and Milner (1972), Humphrey (1975), and Prus and Irini (1980). Polsky's comments about the problems involved with participant observation are particularly pertinent for
they do tend to corroborate the apparent misgivings geographers share over the difficulty of this kind of research.

But to argue that something is difficult does not mean to say that it is impossible or comparably less worthwhile than the usual kind of associational analyses emerging from ecological approaches. While this may be true it is noteworthy that criminologists and sociologists have not managed to penetrate the worlds of burglars, robbers and rapists, except where these are expressions of distinct juvenile groups (thus Carter and Hill's interviews with felons, 1979, mark an important and innovative break with the ecological perspective). But in that juveniles may contribute the greater proportion of the burglary, and a significant proportion of the robbery offences (in terms of reported crimes), the suggestion that participant observers have only been concerned with "fringe" or "exotic" crimes seems less compelling.

A further important point given the emphasis of this study is that participant observation studies of crime control agents may also become central to our understanding of crime. Thus Ericson's work (1981, 1982), as we shall see in Chapter 6, offers a very different kind of understanding of crime rates, particularly the problem of the "dark figure of crime" in an analysis which is inaccessible to the technical protocols of social ecology and other types of areal analysis. Gill's (1977) participant observation study of youths in Liverpool suggests how the identification and formation of criminal areas (so-called) may become a self-fulfilling prophecy in certain
cases, as crime control activities themselves contribute to the creation of crime and exacerbate criminal activity.

The persistence of the instrumentalist direction of the geography of crime is all the more surprising given its intellectual heritage. While many geographers have observed that criminology itself partly developed through a manifestly geographic approach (in the studies of Guerry, 1833; Quetelet, 1842; Rawstron, 1839, 1843; and, to some extent, Mayhew, 1862; and Booth, 1903) the Chicago School of sociological criminology is paid the greatest homage as the principal mentor of the geography of crime (e.g. George, 1978, p. 3). As much as Chicago School sociology has had considerable influence in criminology (see Matza, 1969), it is the area analyses of Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay that give the main impetus to the geography of crime. It is their area analytic method that geographers have followed, usually disavowing the theoretical framework from which it issues (although surprisingly, Georges, 1975, pp. 11-15, revives the theoretical concepts of human ecology as a suitable framework for "a spatial and ecological perspective").

The persistence of the instrumentalist modus operandi in geography is surprising to the extent that the Chicago School, as mentioned earlier, was as much interested in understanding delinquency as it was in explaining it (and only, it appears, tangentially in predicting it). Geographers interested in crime (with the exception of Ley, 1975) have not attempted to develop the kind of methods used by Shaw in the Jackroller.
(1930) or by Thrasher in *The Gang*, (1936). In this sense the Chicago School perspective contained elements of both erklaren and verstehen perspectives, treating delinquents as both subjects and objects. Park and Burgess were as much influenced by the interactionist tradition as they were by biological science and the flavour of scientism contained in it. Yet this interactionist element (i.e. the attempt to interpret intersubjectively the phenomenon under study, as opposed to explaining the cause for it without considering its meaning) has been filtered out in the importation of Chicago sociology into geography - instead it is to the correctionalist, law as consensus, and area-associational analysis themes of the Chicagoans that the geography of crime has turned. Because Daniel Georges epitomizes this approach in *The Geography of Crime and Violence*, and has attempted to lay the "general ground rules" for the geography of crime, it is worth looking in some detail at his vision of the methods and purposes of such an enterprise.


The approach taken by Daniel Georges in his *Geography of Crime and Violence* seems to characterize much of the research conducted in the subdiscipline. As an influential publication of the Association of American Geographers, it is oriented toward both introductory and advanced students, and effectively
locates the geography of crime in a particularly rigid theoretical, philosophical and methodological grid.

As well as advocating the analytic separation of crime and justice (p. 2), the paper is unavowedly correctionalist (p. 20) and contains an implicit consensus model of law formation. The "ground rules" it lays down are a mixture of operationalism, instrumentalism and positivism, and the description of them effectively prohibits other kinds of philosophical approach. In short the ground rules contain an unfortunate and unwarranted theoretical foreclosure.

In laying out the ground rules for the geography of crime Georges opens with a statement so heavily loaded with philosophical prescriptions that its simplicity is deceptive (p. 18); "once a data source has been identified...". One might advocate as the initial stage of any form of scientific research the asking of a worthwhile question, or in more restricted positivist terms of constructing a testable hypothesis. Presumably in this version of the geography of crime the theoretical questions emerge from the data, but there is no guarantee given the nature of crime data sources mentioned (pp. 17-18) that such questions will be other than trivial, at least in terms of theory. The data sources Georges identifies are significant. He mentions the Uniform Crime Reports, Law Enforcement and Assistance Administration studies on victimization, the National Opinion Research Center Surveys, publications of the Office of Vital Statistics, the Public Health Services Statistical Abstracts, various state reporting...
agencies, local agencies such as hospitals, District Attorneys offices and police departments and also data provided by certain private organizations -- the American Bankers Association, the National Board of Fire Underwriters and the International Association of Arson Investigators. Nowhere is there any real mechanism for probing anything but street crime. Nor is there any way of considering data from informal sources or from participant observation. The idea of creating one's own data by interviewing convicts during their incarceration or after their release, a strategy used by Carter and Hill (1979), is similarly ruled out. These sources seem to be implicitly dismissed as unreal, unscientific, or unattainable. Georges' choice of data sources instantly reduces the research program to a form of routinized statistical instrumentalism.

Designed this way, the geography of crime is restricted, as Georges notes, to associational analyses of fairly large-scale geographic units.

The ground rules flowing from this strategy are almost purely instrumental and seriously limiting. The first ground rule suggests that "the subject to be studied is expressed in spatial form or can be analysed from a spatial perspective." Presumably by "subject" Georges means "data", for criminal behaviour is necessarily spatial, and, like almost any other social phenomenon can be analyzed from a spatial perspective. But as already noted, spatial analysis as an exclusive methodology bears limited fruit.
The second ground rule concerns various kinds of mapping techniques and once again the data sources appear to control the kind of research strategy one may adopt. The dot, rate, radial and zone maps Georges mentions conspicuously all deal with distributions of crimes, criminals or other social indicators at fixed points in time. Nowhere in the description of these maps is there any way of penetrating spatial processes since they all pertain to fixed spatial patterns. Moreover, there are few ways of penetrating the issue made central in this dissertation, the relationship of crime and crime control.

The third ground rule concerns the distinction between crime and violence. Georges makes this point because not all acts of violence represent violations of law. Quite why Georges should draw this distinction (it has no real bearing on the analysis) when he omits other similar considerations is unclear; expropriation is not theft, National and Provincial lotteries are not numbers rackets, and many corporate infractions are often dealt with under civil rather than criminal law.

The fourth and fifth ground rules relate to the sharpening and refining of the instrumental techniques laid out earlier. The fourth rule advocates the choice of the smallest spatial scale possible while the fifth recommends the use of suspect rather than arrest data. Here Georges comes close to breaking out of a statistical instrumentalist framework, in that his reason for using suspect data relates to the way arrest data may be biased by such factors as economic and social class,
race and ethnicity, and, by extension, how these biases may seriously distort crime rate maps. But having noted this problem, as many geographers do, Georges does not offer any resolution; while suspect data may provide more heads to count, Georges does not provide any theoretical or empirical justification for their being less biased than arrest data. To do so would be to leave the instrumentalist epistemology which structures and limits the inquiry.

In toto the instrumentalist program Georges lays out forecloses the possible use of a variety of other methodologies founded on alternative epistemological positions. The research manifesto limits the kind of questions to be asked in a geographic perspective of crime and, as a result, the kind of explanations possible. The potential connections of crime and crime control are rendered largely inaccessible in this approach which, by its choice of data sources, is restricted to official images of criminals (or suspects) and the official incidence of crime. A prima facie interpretation of official statistics is used because of the operational definition of crime as the officially recorded segment of it. If, however, official statistics are somehow spatially biased as a result of control activities, and a number of criminologists have implied that they are, just what is it that area associational analyses measure? Do crime rates provide an unbiased sample of the real amount of crime (can we ever ask the question whether there is a "real" amount of crime)? Or do these rates reflect the activities of crime controllers? Or both? These questions

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cannot be answered without treating official crime statistics as an object of study in their own right. Since geographers have paid little attention to these issues they become the subject of the next chapter.

In more general terms the discussion of official statistics marks a change of emphasis in the text. The key point emerging from the critique of the geography of crime concerns the theoretical and methodological problems created by the abstraction of crime from the socio-legal context in which it occurs. The task now becomes one of specifying the types of relationship between crime and control that need to be taken into consideration in the spatial analysis of crime. In Chapter 5 the discussion of official statistics addresses the effect of the "control environment" in specifying who the criminals are. In Chapters 6 through 9 the focus of the discussion changes to the effects of the "control environment" on patterns of crime and criminal residence. Needless to say the two discussions are intimately related to the extent that the identification of crime and criminal residence patterns depends on our conception of who the criminals are.
Notes to Chapter 4

1. Beginning with Shaw and McKay's work (Shaw et al, 1929; Shaw and McKay, 1931, 1942) and continuing in what is now a long tradition of areal studies of crime e.g.: Cohen (1941); Hayner (1946); Shannon (1954-55); Schmid (1960); Stott (1960); Scheussler (1961-62); Mays (1963, 1968); Boggs (1966); Sterne (1967); Wilks (1967); Slatin (1968); Amir (1971); Voss and Petersen (1971); Schmid and Schmid (1972). This list is by far from being complete. For reviews (including work of geographers) see Baldwin (1975); Herbert (1976, 1977A, 1982); and Davidson (1981).

2. The criticism should not be overextended at this point. The suggestion is that many geographers have not systematically examined the theoretical and empirical implications of the relationships between crime and justice. This is not to say that certain geographers have not recognized the potential importance of the links. Harries, for example, suggests that the effects of the control environment should not be overlooked (1980, pp. 63-64, 116). And, contrary to my earlier suggestion that he never considers these relationships in his 1974 volume (Lowman, 1982, p. 307), a passing reference to the relationships is made on pages 115-116.

3. Again there are some exceptions to this - Ley's work on gangs (1975) and his paper co-authored with Cybriwsky (1974) are contextual analyses of crime and delinquency. The stripped cars paper (Ley and Cybriwsky, 1974) is particularly useful for showing the shortcomings of an ecological perspective. In this case an ecological perspective would not be able to discover the micro-level spatial patterns identified by Ley and Cybriwsky.

4. This "managerial" theme has also been taken up by other social geographers; see, for example, Gray (1976); Williams (1979); and for a general review Robson (1979).

5. While Kress does not appear to be a geographer by training, the paper appears in a volume edited by the geographers Georges-Abeyie and Harries.

6. Surprising because there appears to have been a considerable demise of ecological theory in social science beginning with the critique of Alihan (1938). Apart from their use of the term "delinquency areas" it is debatable whether Shaw and McKay made much use of ecological concepts. In more general terms the Chicago sociologists offered a number of different explanations for the origin of natural areas (Morris, 1957, pp. 9-10). Georges also misses the implications of Robison's (1937) critique of Shaw and McKay which suggests that delinquency is unmeasurable.

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Chapter 5

Criminological Perspectives In Action: Interpreting Official Statistics

The discussion to this point has been couched in general theoretical and philosophical terms identifying three main perspectives in sociological criminology. It has shown how geographic research on crime and justice mostly builds on the premises and principles of what has variously been termed traditional or positivist criminology. The implications of the kinds of knowledge generated by interactionist and critical approaches remain largely undeveloped by geographers studying crime.

While interactionist and critical approaches are divided over a number of fundamentally important issues, they find common ground in recommending an approach to crime which is couched within a more general sociology of law and social control. They are united against the traditional perspective which, by focusing almost exclusively on crime or the criminal, implicitly denies the analytic importance of an inquiry into law and law enforcement practices. The main thrust of the critique of the geography of crime concerned this same tendency to separate crime and justice analytically.

Having described some of the implications of interactionist and critical perspectives for the geography of crime, the task of illustrating them in concrete analyses
remains. Because this is an essentially encyclopaedic task my purpose is to describe two main dimensions of the relationship between crime and control. The first of these examines the impact of control on who the criminals are. The second focuses on where the criminals are or where crime incidents occur.

The discussion begins with the problem of who the criminals are by examining conflicting interpretations of official crime statistics. The discussion focuses on interactionist and critical interpretations of official crime statistics and their challenge to the *prima facie* reading characterizing traditional criminology and much of the geography of crime. The argument developed in the sociology of deviance suggests that a study of police activity is essential to an understanding of the meaning of official statistics, particularly the way they may be biased by police discretionary practices. The second argument advanced, mostly by critical theorists (although it should be noted that the two arguments are largely compatible), concerns the wider ideological system in which crimes are defined and statistics produced. In capsule form, this argument suggests that because law enforcement efforts are directed mostly at "street crime", and not at white-collar, corporate or other upper social echelon crimes, official statistics distort the real social distribution of criminals and other rule-breakers. These arguments are central to the geography of crime, because they suggest that official crime statistics are spatially biased to the extent that they are socially biased.
The discussion in Chapter 5 thus serves three purposes. Firstly, it attempts to make sense of crime statistics by reviewing the various interpretations of their meaning. Secondly, in so-doing, it illustrates in more concrete terms the theoretical issues that separate traditional, interactionist and critical perspectives within criminology. And thirdly, it serves to illustrate the implications of various interpretations of official statistics for the geography of crime.

**Geography and Traditional Criminology - Prima Facie Interpretations.**

In keeping with their instrumental-positivist philosophy of social science geographers have consistently opted for a *prima facie* interpretation of official statistics assuming that crime categories correspond to discrete behaviour types. Constrained in this empirically pragmatic way problems of interpretation occur because jurisdictional procedures sometimes distort the accuracy of data for index purposes. Because reporting systems are often imperfectly developed and subject to change, comparative analyses are difficult. In this version of bias, crime rates are problematic in terms of the imperfection of the technical systems generating them. But analyses are not so problematic as they might be were it not for a convenient tactic - research reports typically begin with a warning about the difficulties associated with interpreting
crime statistics, but then proceed unabashedly as if the statement of the problems resolved them (e.g. Harries, 1974; Pyle, 1974; Georges, 1978). While this strategy may be convenient it is rather unsatisfactory - the results are severely compromised if the source of bias in the official statistics is uneven (i.e. socially and spatially differentiated). For if official crime statistics are spatially biased, crime patterns, area associational analyses and all the research strategies and theoretical concepts emerging from them are severely jeopardised. Taken from a different epistemological perspective, this appears to be the case in formulations which suggest that official statistics may not be counted as evidence of "real" crime-rates, but must rather be treated simply as evidence of control rates (e.g. Ditton, 1979).

**Alternative Perspectives**

The problematic status of the representativeness of crime statistics has been expressed throughout the history of their use (for discussion see Bottomley and Coleman, 1981, Chapter 1). As long ago as 1842 Quetelet conveyed the same doubt that has subsequently plagued criminology - the measurement accuracy of official crime statistics leaves all analyses based on them suspect. But lacking data to the contrary, crime analysts have mostly proceeded as if official crime statistics were reliable and accurate (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981A, p. 23) and
geographers have been no exception in this respect.

In the 1950's and 60's, however, data began to appear which seemed to corroborate the worst fears about the reliability of statistics. On the one hand victimization surveys gave some indication of the deficiency of official statistics as an inventory of the real crime rate, while on the other hand self-report studies indicated that the higher probability suggested by official statistics of delinquent behaviour occurring among lower socio-economic groups may tell us much more about the criminal labelling process than it does about the criminal propensities of adolescents from different social strata.

Victimization surveys proliferated after the U. S. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice in the mid-1960's and were conducted not only in the U. S. but in Canada, Scandinavia, England, Switzerland, Germany, India and Tasmania (Box, 1981, p. 62). The purpose of victimization surveys has been to elicit from respondents information about whether they had been victims of crime and whether they had reported the offence to the police. While good arguments suggest that victimization surveys also under-report crime (Box, 1981, p. 62) they have uniformly uncovered a much greater amount of crime than official crime statistics - in Chicago, one of the first victimization surveys estimated that official police records cover only one quarter of the total volume of serious crime (Box, 1981, pp. 61-61; see generally Skogan, 1976). Sparks
(1976) estimates from a victim survey conducted in three London boroughs that only one in eleven crimes (all types) is reported to the police. What victimization data do not tell us is whether rates of reporting vary across space; this does not mean that they cannot be used to address this problem, rather that they have not been designed to (mainly because of the expense involved). The problem remains that even though victimization surveys tend to confirm the enormous magnitude of the "dark figure" of crime, official statistics may still nevertheless represent a spatially unbiased sample of the statistical universe.

In contrast, self-report studies may be interpreted as suggesting that official crime statistics are spatially biased to the extent that they over-represent lower class persons, but the results of different studies are actually contradictory on this score. Some of the earlier studies (Short and Nye, 1957, Gold, 1966) argued that the class differences suggested by official statistics were not reproduced in self-report studies designed to measure the incidence of delinquency admitted by respondents. But Short and Nye's study did confirm certain findings predicated by official statistics; males did commit more delinquent acts than females in almost every delinquency category (1957, p. 210). Gold suggests that official records exaggerate differences in delinquency. "About five times more lowest than highest status boys appear in the official records; if records were complete and unselective we estimate that the ratio would be closer to 1.5:1." (1966, p. 44)
Subsequent self-report studies of delinquency (self-report studies have rarely been applied to adults) have proven equivocal in their findings. Box (1981, pp. 65-84) offers an extensive review of forty self-report studies. Of these he suggests that 24 discover no difference in levels of delinquency between middle class and lower class youths while 16 argue that lower class adolescents are more delinquent than their middle class peers (p. 76). Such studies are also open to a range of criticisms, three of which Box extensively reviews (pp. 65-75): the validity of self-report measures in terms of the honesty of responses; the relevance and comparability of items used in self-report studies as indices of delinquency as compared with behaviour officially designated as delinquent (many of the studies seek responses for behaviour which would not usually be classified as delinquent in a legal sense); and the representativeness of samples of juveniles reporting - the willingness of a juvenile to respond to self-report delinquency surveys may reflect his/her involvement in delinquency.

Box' overall assessment of the findings of self-report studies leads him to conclude that:

"official statistics showing more delinquency amongst lower class adolescents are not supported by evidence revealed from self-reported delinquency studies, and since the latter are more reasonably valid than the former we should be very skeptical of those who continue to argue that delinquency is located at the bottom of the stratification system."

(1981, p. 80)
Other authors reviewing a range of self-report studies concur with Box's conclusion; for Tittle, Villemez and Smith (1978) the impression of the distribution of delinquency contained in official statistics does not represent its real social distribution. If this is the case a delinquency rate map has to be viewed with a great deal of scepticism. But the conclusions of Box, and Tittle, Villemez and Smith do not mark a consensus in the literature. Clelland and Carter (1980) reassess the evidence and conclude that the analysis of Tittle and his colleagues is faulty. In a recent self-report investigation, Elliot and Ageton (1980) criticize a number of other studies for their inclusion of mostly trivial and non-serious types of behaviour as indices of delinquency. Elliot and Ageton developed a self-report scale with 47 items reflecting "more serious offences". They conclude:

"class differences in total offences are significant and, while they are not large, they are in the traditionally expected direction, with lower class youth reporting higher frequencies."

(1980, p. 103)

While Box is aware of the problem of the overloading of some self-report studies with trivial "offences", he cites other studies which indicate no class differences in the more serious offences. Nevertheless, Elliot and Ageton's findings cannot simply be dismissed and serve to temper Box's conclusion; they show that lower class adolescents are likely to engage more frequently in delinquent acts, and in the more serious kinds. But, like Gold, they suggest that the differences are not nearly as great as the ones suggested by
the official statistics. This conclusion has significant implications for the interpretation of maps depicting delinquency rates and, by extension, to adult crime (most adult criminals begin their rule-breaking activities as juveniles). What this conclusion means for the geography of crime is that the process of producing crime and delinquency rates must become an object of inquiry in its own right. Imagine, for example, the changes to the analysis offered by Evans (1980) were he to have given credence to these alternative views of the distribution of delinquency. The question now becomes, what factor explains the discrepancy between self-report studies and official statistics. If the official statistics in delinquency are biased, what produces the distortion? For which categories of delinquency does this distortion apply? And if this distortion occurs in the case of delinquency, can it be generalized to adult crime? Thus the problem in general concerns which crime and delinquency categories are biased, how are they biased, and to what degree? These become the most important problems to address when sorting out the spatial implications of competing interpretations of official statistics.

While the problem of measurement accuracy forms one of the major themes of "environmental" criminology (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981A, p. 23, referring particularly to the work of Mawby, 1979, 1981) geographers have largely avoided the problem in their research, and where bias has been discussed it is mainly in terms of what I shall refer to as its
"instrumental" and **quantitative** aspects; i.e. that problems of interpretation arise from the **inaccuracy** of crime statistics as a result of such problems as differences in interjurisdictional recording practices. An alternative view suggests that the inaccuracies of crime statistics are produced by a **qualitative** bias through which control personnel select certain kinds of individuals (according to age, race, sex, and social status) as eligible for criminal labelling. In this case the bias of official statistics is interpreted as being a reflection of the activities of control personnel. The realization that official crime statistics are not simply problematic in terms of their under-representation of crime, but also in terms of the **degree** of their under-representation, led to the argument that the problem of interpretation is not simply a technical one - it is a **theoretical** problem. The implications of this challenge to the instrumentalist interpretation were developed into a range of positions. At one end is the position that certain kinds of crime rate are more a reflection of control activities than the real distribution of a distinct behaviour type, to one which suggests that all official crime statistics should be read only as control rates and have little or no bearing on the "real" amount of "crime". There are three main readings of crime statistics emerging from the general debate.

1) An "instrumentalist" (or **prima facie**) reading suggesting that the inaccuracy of crime statistics is technical - they are thus not spatially biased except by virtue of differences in recording practices. Operationally, crime
statistics are assumed to be uniformly incomplete, and the process of their construction not worthy of much scrutiny. This is the position taken in positivist criminology generally.

2) An "interactionist" reading which suggests that technical and qualitative aspects of bias can only be understood in the interactional setting in which crime statistics are produced. Depending on that setting, and its constitutive elements, crime statistics may or may not be spatially biased; the issue can only be resolved by examining the context in which they are socially constructed. The important implication is that the meaning of statistics may not be simply taken-for-granted by the researcher; they become an object of study in their own right.

3) A "contrological" reading of the statistics which suggests that they are a product of institutional imperatives and activities and can only be understood as such (Ditton, 1979, pp. 18-19). The interpretation of bias becomes moot in this perspective which views crime rates not as a reflection of social behaviour, but as a product of the institutional organization of that behaviour. By implication, however, the focus of a spatial perspective would shift from crime to the institutional processes of crime control in order to understand crime rates.

These distinctions are slightly different from the usually dichotomous terminology used in the criminological literature to distinguish the major interpretations of official crime rates:
"The contending arguments were fundamentally between what we can loosely term 'realist' as opposed to 'institutionalist' emphases. The former emphasized the virtues of completeness with which data represented the 'real crime that takes place'. The institutionalist perspective emphasized that crime could have valid meaning only in terms of organized, legitimate social responses to it."

(Biderman and Reiss, 1967, p. 2)

While the distinction made by Biderman and Reiss nicely captures the essential aspects of the challenge to a prima facie reading of official statistics (the interpretation dominating the first hundred years of criminology), such a simple distinction tends to gloss over a certain ambivalence in the institutionalist position and to use a very misleading terminology; for this reason I have distinguished the controlological position outlined by Ditton from a more generally symbolic interactionist position as together constituting the "institutionalist" position. The two positions are distinguished in their views of the utility of official statistics as indices of "real" social behaviour, the controlological position asserting that crime rates are independent of "criminal" behaviour, while the interactionist position recognizes the possible independence or interdependence of crime rates and control rates. While the difference between these positions has not been formalized in the literature, it can be justified to the extent that it is possible to show fluctuations in crime rates (especially property crimes with a systematic seasonal variation) which must be read as the interaction of institutionally organized recording behaviour with actual changes of criminal
behaviour. Those authors alleged by Ditton (1979) and Bottomley and Coleman (1976) to have misread the institutionalist position (by virtue of carrying over a concept of statistical bias from the instrumental-positivist perspective) may be incorporated under the interactionist title. The confusion appears to arise over the conceptualization of types of bias that may affect official crime statistics.

For the purposes of this discussion two general types of bias may be distinguished. "Instrumental bias" refers to the technical sources of bias flowing from differences in the way information is recorded and processed. "Essential bias" refers to the systematic effects of socially differentiated structures of meaning on the signification of behaviour as delinquent, criminal or deviant. The crucial difference between the two is this - while essential bias arises from the way behaviour is interpreted as being delinquent or criminal, instrumental bias arises from the way that this information is subsequently recorded.

Two subcategories of essential bias can be distinguished although they are clearly interrelated: "organizational bias" reflects the institutional and organizational imperatives of people who produce crime statistics – most importantly the police – in terms of both formal legal and administrative requirements, and the informal context of police occupational culture. "Discretionary bias" has usually referred to the impact of police discretionary power on the configuration of
crime statistics; the concept should be extended to include the
discretionary activity of other crime reporting agents
including the general public, but particularly other urban "gatekeepers" such as store detectives and school personnel. These various forms of bias must be seen as interactive in the process of constructing crime statistics.

The conceptual lesson to be learned through an understanding of discretionary and organizational bias is that the explanation of who is caught and who is prosecuted may become as important in the explanation of crime as the conditions or circumstances generating certain kinds of behaviour. Crime and delinquency are not necessarily discrete behaviours with a clear meaning; the law in the books is partly given meaning through social interaction even though it importantly shapes that interaction.

In order to overcome the instrumental biases of official statistics and the inferential problems of areal aggregate data, a number of studies have attempted to use official measures of crime residence to identify areas for more intensive research (in geography, Herbert and Evans, 1973; and in criminology, Morris, 1958; Baldwin, Bottoms and Walker, 1976). While this strategy may help overcome certain aspects of the instrumental bias of official statistics and allay the problems of the ecological fallacy, it does not necessarily account for essential bias (although the follow up study to Baldwin, Bottoms and Walker conducted by Mawby - 1979 - does attempt to address the problem of essential bias, but
not, as it turns out, definitively). Thus when Shaw and McKay (1931, 1942) used official statistics to identify delinquency areas for a more intensive analysis of the causes of delinquency, the etiology they provided failed to take into account the delinquent behaviour which self-report studies might have identified in other types of area. The literal interpretation of delinquency reports thus importantly shaped the theoretical formula emerging from it, and may be partly responsible for the circular argument contained within it; while social disorganization is offered as the principal explanation of delinquency, delinquency rates themselves are used as the principal indicator of social disorganization.

The Nature of the Challenge to Instrumentalist Interpretations: "Discretionary Bias" and the "Institutionalist" Position.

The essentialist critique of official statistics dates back (at least) to Shirley Robison's *Can Delinquency Be Measured?* (1937), a critique of Shaw and McKay's ecological studies of delinquency. The data presented in this study "definitely indicate that for the field of delinquency index-making is at present not feasible." (Robison, 1937, p. 209). This conclusion follows from her observation that "delinquency and non-delinquency are not mutually exclusive. The label delinquent depends on many subjective factors in the observer and the observed." (Robison, 1937, p. 195). Although this statement seems to have become a ubiquitous sociological
axiom, its subsequent adherents do not always recognize its pedigree. Nor did its original statement by Robison stem the tide of studies based on official crime rates.

The institutionalist interpretation of official statistics did not really mature until the appearance of self-report delinquency studies in the 1950's and research on police behaviour in the 1960's. As we have seen, while victimization surveys confirm the large amount of unreported crime, most self-report findings suggest that official statistics at least distort the real distribution of crime so that there is either little difference in the crime and delinquency rates of different social classes, or that official statistics greatly exaggerate the differences. If social class is areally differentiated, these findings suggest that official statistics may over-represent crime in some areas and under-represent it in others. The question becomes one of explaining the processes underlying this distortion. One such explanation concerns the effect of police behaviour on the configuration of crime and delinquency. The initial development of this argument appeared in studies of police encounters with juveniles which suggested that social status was as important a criterion as behaviour in the police decision to arrest and signify a juvenile as delinquent (e.g. Werthman and Piliavin, 1964).

The theoretical implications of findings like these were developed by Kitsuse and Cicourel who warn against viewing bias in official statistics simply as a technical or instrumental
problem. Rather, they assert, the problem concerns differentials in the definition of deviant behaviour (1963, p. 134). Current geographic theory sounds very much like the theory forming the target of their attack -- traditional deviancy inquiry treated rates of crime and delinquency as independent variables. In contrast, Kitsuse and Cicourel treat rates of deviant behaviour as dependent variables:

"the theoretical conception which guides us is that the rates of deviant behaviour are produced by the actions taken by persons in the social system which define, classify and record certain behaviours as deviant."

(1963, p. 135)

Similarly Donald Black (1970) makes rates of criminal behaviour an end rather than a means of study, advocating a position which:

"...treats the crime rate as itself a social fact, an empirical phenomenon with its own existential integrity...from this standpoint crime statistics are not evaluated as inaccurate or unreliable. They are an aspect of social organization and cannot, sociologically, be wrong."

From these perspectives the concerns of the deviancy theorist include not only how different forms of behaviour come to the attention of the criminal justice system, but also (and sometimes only) how individuals manifesting such behaviours are organizationally processed to produce rates of crime.

Since the introduction of these arguments has led to considerable debate in criminological and sociological circles, the discussion turns to two of the most controversial challenges to the instrumentalist reading of the statistics - Matza's work on "methodical suspicion", and Cicourel's on the
ethnomethodological study of delinquency statistics. These provide anchors for an analysis of the debate they were to subsequently evoke.

The Ethnomethodological Critique

In The Social Organization of Juvenile Justice (1968, 1976) Cicourel follows an ethnomethodological program to question the scientific "fact" of delinquency. In Cicourel's language:

"Ethnomethodological studies analyse everyday activities as members' methods for making those same activities visibly rational and reportable for all practical purposes ie. 'accountable' as organizations of commonplace everyday activities."

(1968, p. 7)

He replaces the usual sociological complaint about "bad" statistics and distorted bureaucratic record-keeping by making the procedures producing "bad data" an object of study.

Cicourel's study purports to show how the "problem of delinquency" is generated by the everyday activities of professionals and laymen in contact with juveniles. The decision-making activities that produce the social problem called delinquency are important because they highlight fundamental processes of how social order is possible (1968, p. vii). Thus the study of delinquents tells us as much about the articulation of notions of legality and justice as it does about adolescent behaviour. Furthermore
"the interaction of legal and non-legal rules implies that what is considered deviant by some members of the community (including the police) is not always obvious to the suspect or his supporters, and that what ends up being called justice is negotiable within the boundary conditions of established organizations."

(Cicourel, 1968, p. 22)

Cicourel directs his attention to "theories of delinquency employed by police, court and probation officers when deciding the existence of delinquency." It is a study of the "background expectancies" of the officials who channel juveniles in and out of the justice system. Criminological theory, Cicourel suggests, has followed common sense definitions of delinquency and crime in general, and has only questioned official statistics to the extent that they may grossly underestimate crime.

The explanatory power of traditional delinquency theory is thus contained in its neatness in providing retrospective accounts which fit both popular conceptions about how juveniles become delinquent, and how official delinquency rates are distributed (1968, p. 26-27). According to Cicourel, an adequate description depicting how persons come to be defined and processed as delinquent is rather different:

The data for demonstrating the cogency of the sociologists' program consists of his and members' descriptions of observed events, an account of the environment of objects attended, and the progressive transformations that can be affected by initial encounters between suspects and victims, suspects and the police, the writing of an official report based on interrogation and observation, subsequent probation interviews and reports, court performances and the like. The analysis of oral and written material presupposes a
seldom mentioned contextual relevance based on linguistic and practical reasoning principles as they are used in different social groupings.

(1968, p. 27)

Oral and written reports prepared by official personnel continually simplify or "round", abstract, and reinterpret the original act so that it fits the kind of logic used by officials accustomed to standardized recipes for explaining relationships between legal rules and social conduct (1968, p. 28). The major thrust of Cicourel's argument is that legal categories (such as "delinquent") do not correspond to the positivistic type system where the category represents some actual object. Rather, he argues, these categories are given meaning through social interaction.

Cicourel demonstrates that the juvenile justice system selectively assembles juveniles in the process of their being labelled delinquent:

"Persons involved in deciding matters of legality and justice carry with them a stock of knowledge about social types they encounter in different situations in the community, and their social actions reflect conceptions of what is normal, strange, acceptable, safe, likely, usual etc."

(1968, p. 45)

Part of Cicourel's empirical research attempts to examine the extent to which official records revealed or did not reveal the incidence and form of middle/upper class delinquency as compared with lower-income groups. In the study of a middle-class Chicago suburb he found a fairly high incidence of delinquency, much higher than suggested by the official statistics (1968, pp. 32-33). In the comparison of two
unidentified cities he also notes the influence of police organizational procedures on differences in the overall rates of deviance in the two cities, and in the same city at different times.

Cicourel uses these empirical findings to indicate the "indexical" nature of the label delinquent and to show how rates of delinquency are officially produced; each instance of invoking the label requires decisions which transform a truncated behavioural description of "what happened" in a particular incident into some precoded but almost never unidimensional category that enables police to invoke legal language. This invocation is often more a reflection of a juvenile's status or demeanor than his/her behaviour. The construction of official statistics may consequently be seen to employ improvised or ad hoc procedures for obtaining, labelling and presenting their information. Such procedures produce technical errors that may be controlled. But more problematically these procedures are integral procedures for arriving at and interpreting the end product, and cannot, in Cicourel's view, be corrected by statistical estimates of error.

As Cicourel sees it, the task posed the researcher is to examine the socially organized ways in which juvenile activities are translated into types of delinquency, an analysis which produces a very different picture to the one provided by an instrumental or positivistic type analysis of police statistics. What the latter does not recognize is that
all legal categories and procedures are bargained or negotiated. If the researcher ignores the socially constructed element of crime statistics he imposes a system of measurement by fiat, treating official reports as a literal depiction of "what happened". The implications of ethnomethodological research for the geography of crime are far-reaching as the emphasis shifts from putatively criminogenic social environments to social control activities, or perhaps more correctly social control becomes part of the social environment:

"My observations suggest police and probation perspectives follow community typifications in organizing the city into areas where they expect to receive the most difficulty from deviant or difficult elements to areas where little trouble is expected and where more care should be taken dealing with the populace because of socio-economic and political influence. The partition of the city into areas of more or less anticipated crime provides both police and probation officers with additional typifications about what to expect when patrolling or making calls in the areas. Thus the officer's preconstituted typifications and stock of knowledge at hand leads him to prejudge much of what he encounters, which an independent observer does not always 'see'. Thus particular ecological settings, populated by persons with 'known' styles of dress and physical appearance, provide the officer with quick inferences about 'what is going on' although not based on factual-type material he must describe sooner or later in oral or written form."

(Cicourel, 1976, p. 67)

This interpretation of bias has profound implications for the explanation of a delinquency rate map. Because the decision to process juveniles is often based on their social status, the rate map may be best interpreted as the product of
a self-fulfilling prophecy reflecting the beliefs of social control personnel as to where society's delinquent populations are located. In this sense it may be thought of as a mental map, an interpretation of behaviour rather than a description of it.

**Limitations of the Ethnomethodological Critique**

Cicourel's study shows that delinquency is not a discrete behaviour. But is this the case with all crime categories? The central problem that the critique raises concerns the meaning of law, the neglected part of the equation in the geographer's approach to crime. Following an ethnomethodological program Cicourel shows how the common sense rules of everyday-life dictate the interaction between police and public in deciding who the delinquents are. But such a view ignores the way more widely pervasive ideological beliefs mould this process. Indeed, ethnomethodology has been criticized in general for failing to incorporate an understanding of ideology (eg. Freund and Abrams, 1976; Beng-Huat Chua, 1977).

Ethnomethodology leaves the impression that meaning is constructed solely through the process of immediate social interaction, and has thus been suggested as offering an unwarranted and highly relative pluralism with an inadequate grasp of the relation between knowledge and social structure (eg. Taylor, Walton and Young, 1973, pp. 193-208). Young takes
the position that it is only in typical situations that the idiosyncratic values and ideologies of particular social control agencies assume paramount importance (1975, p. 87). Thus however dubious the positivistic acceptance of the criminal statistics, their wholesale rejection would be equally cavalier. The social actors faced with the task of assigning criminal labels may often have a very clear understanding of the kind of activity a particular law proscribes, as would be the case with murder or serious assault.

Barry Hindess highlights the unstated problem of "classification by fiat" this way:

"With respect to which categories do these difficulties arise? What proportion of cases must be decided in this fashion: 0.01 percent, 5 percent, 95 percent? If it is the last then the final tabulation is obviously worthless; if the first, then classification by fiat may be ignored as a source of error in the tabulation in question."

(1973, p. 18).

The result of this neglect is that ethnomethodology has demonstrated only the incompleteness of any set of categories and instructions. Hindess suggests that a positivistic critique of official statistics could be developed which would be perfectly consistent with the claims of ethnomethodology. In fact the ethnomethodological program is highly positivistic, Hindess suggests, directed at the absence of a set of correspondence rules linking legal categories and actual phenomena (Andrew Tudor, 1976, makes a similar point). But in noting the similarity of positivism and ethnomethodology, Hindess tends to minimize their differences. This may reflect
his desire to offer an alternative rationalist model in which he sees the problem of classification by fiat as only involving what he calls "alien" or ambiguous categories, those in which "technical" and "conceptual" instruments do not fit together; to this extent the problem of what the statistics mean is an instrumental problem not an epistemological one. But in making this argument, Hindess nevertheless suggests that official categories cannot be taken-for-granted by the researcher, and in so-doing paradoxically evokes certain epistemological issues - a prima facie reading of the statistics has generally led to a focus on the criminal rather than the law with obvious and important consequences for the type of explanation offered. Thus the problem is, at least in part, epistemological (the method of inquiry structures the type of explanation possible). The difference between positivism and ethnomethodology that Hindess largely minimizes is the latter's focus on meaning, particularly intersubjective meaning.

The important point is that in the ethnomethodological approach the meaning of legal categories is socially negotiated. In the instrumental positivist program, the meaning of legal categories is pregiven. Again a key insight is that crime is not all of a piece - crime is not a monolithic behavioural category. (Indeed, it would be a mistake to see a single crime category as being necessarily discrete). For some crime categories the problem of classification by fiat is paramount. In Hindess' sense the category "delinquent" is more alien than the category "murder" (although even the
classification of the taking of a human life may be dependent on the social context in which it occurs).

Further Elements of the Institutionalist Critique: Methodical and Incidental Suspicion

David Matza (1969), in discussing the implications of the statistical bias of official crime reports, lays a foundation for the understanding of an ideological element of bias. He suggests that the major source of systematic bias arises from the method of suspicion routinely utilized by the police when investigating crimes (1969, pp. 180-195).

However important the promise of protection by civil rights, the most important way in which a citizen's rights are protected is the expectation that under ordinary circumstances he or she will remain above police suspicion (1969, p. 182). To fall under suspicion, most members of society would have to go out of their way. But, conspicuously, this is not the case for certain groups. To illustrate this assertion, Matza draws a distinction between "incidental" and "methodical" suspicion.

Most people are subject to police attention only under special circumstances, particularly traffic offences. In these cases the method of suspicion is incidental. It is suspicion that flows from an incident of a citizen's apparent dereliction of legal duty (1969, pp. 183-184). But this is not the usual method of suspicion used by police in their routine criminal investigations. "Methodic suspicion", Matza claims, is the
customary mode, that which leads to the most profound source of systematic bias in the official statistics. This method of suspicion employs police knowledge of known criminals to expedite their apprehension and the subsequent clearing of citizen's complaints. Rather than a specific incident evoking it, suspicion arises from being "known to the police", "known" in the sense that a particular identity or resemblance produces attention. Matza terms this "bureaucratic suspicion" because it arises from the police need to account (both to higher officialdom and the public) for their activity. The method is "outgoing" in that it seeks a regular suspect in the hope that any one or a whole series of uncleared offences can be settled. The method is common, Matza suggests, in burglary and larceny investigations in an attempt to clear incidents reported to the police, or in drugs and other vice areas in the form of stop and search tactics, but only the stopping and searching of people who "look" suspicious. In this sense the method of suspicion continuously sustains criminal and delinquent identity.

Controlology: From Crime Rates to Control Rates

Kitsuse and Cicourel broke through an important theoretical barrier by suggesting that official statistics be treated as independent rather than as dependent variables. But is their focus on the production of crime statistics really meant to suggest that crime rates bear no relationship to
actual criminal behaviour? I think not, but one position advocated recently (based on a combination of the labelling perspective on crime and the institutionalist perspective on crime statistics) argues that official crime rates should never be interpreted as indexing the real distribution of criminal behaviour. In a recent monograph Ditton (1979) sets out to provide an integrated theoretical base for a reformulated labelling approach. Ditton's argument is based on the statement made by Lemert that:

"Older sociology...tended to rest heavily upon the idea that deviance leads to social control. I have come to believe the reverse idea, i.e., social control leads to deviance, is equally tenable, and the potentially richer premise for studying deviance in modern society."

Ditton makes this "potentially richer premise" the raison d'etre of criminology. Accordingly the neologism "controlology" is advanced to replace criminology stylistically and analytically. While Lemert viewed the argument that control leads to deviance as "equally tenable" as the reverse proposition, Ditton treats it as the only tenable position, at least in terms of providing an adequate base for a fully fledged labelling theory (1979, p. 9). Similarly while Wilkins' (1964) model of deviance amplification is based on Maruyama's (1960, 1963) cybernetic principles of mutual causality, Ditton's modification of it treats control as operating independently of crime, and of crime as being dependent on control. This stipulation has important
consequences for the "controlologist's" interpretation of official crime rates.

From Ditton's perspective the idea of a "dark figure" of crime becomes a theoretical nonsense as the conceptual status of official statistics becomes central to his version of labelling theory. Ditton claims that he accepts the epistemology laid out by Cicourel (1967), but, following Bottomley and Coleman (1976), he argues that most of the proponents of the labelling perspective have followed what I have termed an "instrumentalist" rather than an "interactionist" interpretation of official statistics. Ditton argues that labelling theorists, rather than follow Cicourel's epistemology, have unwittingly reproduced the same image of bias as that identified by traditional theorists; they have given similar credence to a conception of a "dark figure of crime". While the instrumentalist interpretation suggests the statistics are inadequate, labelling theorists added the argument that inadequacies were class biased.

"This may have seemed like a critical position; it is in fact an establishment one - and more than that, a conventionally positivist one. It may have seemed expedient to accept that there exists a 'dark figure' of crime...but that acceptance implied an inevitably conventional epistemological conception of the problem." (1979, p.19)

In its place Ditton registers what he calls a "qualified" theoretical "atheism" suggesting that the "dark figure" is not merely unknowable, but non existent; "...the atheist position holds that everything can be known about 'crime' from official
statistical collations of the constitutive reactions to and of it." (p.23) This "juristic" view holds that a given crime is not validly known to have taken place until a court finds someone guilty of that offence (Biderman and Reiss, 1967, p. 2); "'criminal activity' is the activity of calling activities crimes." (Ditton, 1979, p. 23) Following Kitsuse and Cicourel's (1963, pp. 247-8) recommendation that official statistics can only be used to analyze those that they were collected by not those they were collected of Ditton argues:

"...the construction of statistics is such that no acceptable deductions can be made about the 'motives' or 'intentions' of the accused from them...(T)he central implication of these conceptual observations is that variations in the official crime-rates are allowable as evidence of control-waves: but never of crime-waves." (1979, p. 24)

From this perspective crime is not an activity engaged in by an offender but one formulated in court by others.

At this juncture a number of observations concerning Ditton's formula are warranted since they serve to clarify an alternative theoretical position which nonetheless prescribes the analytic liaison of crime and justice. Such a position is predicated on a fundamental rejection of controlology in this crucial sense; variations in the official crime-rates may be allowable as evidence of control waves and/or crime waves. The important point is that the implications of official statistics should not be taken for granted - sometimes control may be a response to crime, at other times crime may be produced by control. Sometimes a change of social activity will be
registered in increased crime rates (such as the widespread adoption of soft drugs by American college students in the 1960's), sometimes law enforcement activity will create the appearance of a change of social activity when there is little -- as is suggested of the American marijuana panic created by Harry Anslinger and the Bureau of Dangerous Drugs in the 1930's (Schofield, 1971, pp. 45-47). To complicate the whole matter further, sometimes when there is an actual change of social activity, law enforcement activity may create a distorted picture of that change.

In terms of the creation and distortion of crime rates by the control process, Ditton lists four types of change: "constructed rises" stem from legislative or judicial moral enterprise in creating law; "fantasy rises...occur when a greater degree of attention is given to the deviant audience"; "book-keeping rises" (or "paper crime-waves") are a product of changes in the compilation and collation of statistics; "reporting rises" are produced by mass media coverage.

While Ditton chastizes Box (1971) and others for their inconsistency in using what he sees as a positivist interpretation of the bias in official statistics, his "juristic" formula simply disagrees with the nature of the correspondence rules linking theoretical concepts to crime categories and in this particular sense is no less positivist. The book-keeping changes of control rates Ditton refers to are precisely those taken into account by an instrumental reading of bias -- according to his own terms.
Ditton should stand accused of the same type of epistemological offences he attributes to Box! But Ditton would presumably reject the distinction of instrumental and essential bias made here as not theoretically viable to the extent that official statistics measure control and they measure it exactly. It is for this reason that Ditton suggests that labelling theorists have not made an epistemological break with positivism even though they pointed to the contextual sources of bias (such as social class) as remaining beyond an instrumental reading. And yet the distinction of instrumental and essential bias (which Ditton does not recognize) does suggest an epistemological distinction between the labelling perspective, formulated in terms of symbolic interactionism, and an instrumental positivist approach. Indeed the reformulation of labelling theory Ditton argues as necessary may have already occurred in the development of a general interactionist criminology.

Ditton's controlology has a further positivist trait in its nominalistic claim that crime rates do not reflect (criminal) behaviour; rather crime rates reflect the activities of those that produce them. While not wishing to deny the possibility of the latter statement, in what way is it useful to say that crime is not an activity engaged in by an offender but one formulated in a court by others? If this is true one wonders why a smuggler bothers to conceal his wares although Ditton would presumably argue that it is to prevent a crime occurring in the controlological sense. But without the law the profit from the smugglers enterprise would disappear; in
this sense law does lead to crime, but, phenomenologically, crime can be "an activity engaged in by an offender", contrary to Ditton's argument (1979, p. 23), and there can be a real quantitative rate of this type of crime in legalistic terms. While Ditton does not actually deny this kind of argument, he suggests that the quantity is unknowable in practice. But in rejecting the instrumentalist interpretation of crime rates as corresponding to some real amount of crime, he changes the formula to suggest that control rates measure real amounts of control. But they only do so in the same sense that crime rates reflect the real amount of crime and Ditton offers no good theoretical reason for choosing the one reading over the other. Most problematic in this formula is the implication that police control of the citizenry is only achieved through the use of criminal sanctions - there is no sense of Ericson's (1981) suggestion that the use of criminal procedure may often be the last resort of a policeman's effort to restore "law and order". (More of this very important point later). The implication of this is that while measurement of crime is important, the delimitation of the population of offenders may only be the first step in developing explanations or understandings of their behaviour; even if one were privy to a "real" figure for crime, the epistemological objection to positivism raised by the sociology of deviance extends beyond the problem of the bias of crime rates. For some of the reasons Ditton outlines, the real amount of crime, or at least its configuration, may still be importantly related to the
social control process. In Chapters 7 through 9 my purpose is to provide examples of just such a proposition.

These arguments about the limitations of controlology should not be taken as diminishing the importance of Ditton's description of the effects of control processes on the meaning and interpretation of statistics since the real amount of crime does remain, to all intents and purposes, unknown. But in lieu of any technique for measuring the "dark figure" even if one assumes that such an amount could be agreed upon (and Ditton gives good reasons to suggest that it could not) his suggested focus on control seems to raise similar kinds of problems to those it ostensibly resolves; consider, for example, the issue of bias in control rates and the "dark figure of control" created by police corruption and political influence.

Most problematic of all, Ditton's empirical examples designed to advance the merits of the controlological position refer to the control of petty pilferage from a bakery. One wonders in what sense a parallel can be drawn between the control personnel of the bakery (mostly the bakery management and only infrequently security personnel), who perform many other occupational functions as well as control, and the police whose primary occupational task is control (even if the way they exercise control is not always evidenced by their criminalization of offenders).

Additionally, much police work is generated by calls for action from the public (it is in this sense reactive to citizen calls rather than proactively generated by the police). In
Ditton's bakery, however, the one employee report to the management about illegal activity was ignored, and the "explanation" of the "control wave" against pilfering is located elsewhere. The question becomes how much the control practices in the bakery can be generalized to the police. Ditton does address this difference, but only to explain it away. What he terms "fantasy" rises in crime rates - i.e. when more crimes originally committed are discovered - are suggested as arising when certain kinds of crime are brought to public attention by control authorities and other "moral entrepreneurs". But differences in public reporting are completely and conveniently ignored with the exception of a passing reference as to how police community public relations campaigns may increase public reporting (p. 13); otherwise differential rates of public reporting are glossed over as an ideological construction.

Ditton's argument is important even though overextended and in Chapter 9 the discussion of the implementation of "Neighbourhood Watch" target hardening programs does document what may be interpreted as a "fantasy" rise in burglary rates. But the same study also provides evidence which suggests that other rises and falls in burglary rates reflect changes in burglar behaviour.

For the most part burglaries are reported to the police by the public; only very occasionally do the police capture a burglar in the act. In my study area rates of burglary fluctuate throughout the year, but not randomly, and various
statistical techniques confirm seasonal cycles which are readily apparent to the eye when the rates are graphed. In Greater Vancouver there are approximately twice as many burglaries in the winter months as in the summer. Strong seasonal cycles in crime rates have also been documented by other researchers (Heller and Markland, 1970; McPheters and Stronge, 1973, 1974A, 1974B). What these cycles suggest is differences in social behaviour as a consequence of some factor other than control. This is not to argue for a prima facie reading of crime-rates, but it is meant to suggest that a focus on control only may be misleading (or absurd) for it turns one of Ditton's main arguments into a non-sequitur:

"...it is impossible to re-read existing data to evidence a real crime-rise once any credence is attached to other types of interpretation (i.e. constructed, fantasy, book-keeping and reporting changes) which can be attached to crime-rate movement."

(p. 12)

In discussing the sociology of deviance my main objective has been to illustrate the limitations of a prima facie reading of crime-rates, and to lay the foundation for a geographic study of crime in the context of an understanding of control; the meaning of official statistics should not be taken as pregiven. But it has not meant to suggest that the context of control should replace the focus on crime, for it is not impossible to re-read official statistics as evidence of real crime-rates even when credence is given to some of the other types of interpretation that Ditton offers. The claim that this is impossible can only be made by avoiding the theoretical
implications of the much greater importance of "reactive" as opposed to "proactive" policing.

By largely ignoring the implications of the reactive-proactive distinction Ditton effects a theoretical foreclosure by rejecting the idea that at least some of the time crime-rates reflect changes in actual law-breaking behaviour. Elsewhere, as we shall now see, attention to this distinction has led other researchers to re-establish a counter claim for the fidelity of official statistics, questioning the extent to which their configuration is influenced by police activity.

Proactive and Reactive Policework: Problems With The Generalization of Discretionary Bias

The American studies appearing in the 1960's stressing the effects of operational stereotypes and the working philosophies of police officers significantly changed the image of bias inherent in crime statistics. But as various authors have pointed out most of the early evidence on police discretionary bias came from studies of proactive policework, where interactions with "offenders" are initiated by the police (Bottomley and Coleman, 1981, pp. 53-54). The studies of Briar and Piliavin (1964), Skolnick (1966), and Werthman and Piliavin (1967) involved police interactions with juveniles or enforcement of legislation concerning vice and narcotics, areas which reflect the maximum extent of police discretionary practices. But as Reiss and Bordua (1967) pointed out when
they drew the distinction between proactive and reactive law enforcement modes, the greatest proportion of policework is reactive to citizen complaints, especially that dealing with indictable crimes. The contribution of reactive policing is variously given as 73% and 83% in two different jurisdictions studied by McCabe and Sutcliffe (1975); 80% (Mawby, 1979); and 70% (Bottomley and Coleman, 1981).

Bottomley and Coleman argue that observations of police discretion in proactive situations were uncritically generalized to the rest of policework: "In the majority of reported crimes, therefore, we need to examine the role of other parties involved before being able to describe the kind of bias likely to be found." (1981, p. 54) Their observation reconfirms the suggestion made earlier that victimization surveys must be designed to establish whether crime reporting rates vary socially and spatially.

Like Mawby (1979, pp. 18-22), Bottomley and Coleman suggest that Matza's speculations about the bias produced by the preponderance of methodical over incidental suspicion conflates methods of suspicion with methods of detection and downplays the role of the public in reporting crime.

"There seems little doubt that methodical suspicion pervades the investigation of crime by the police and it certainly pervades the documents we have examined...The problem is that Matza glides rather too smoothly from his discussion of types of suspicion into a discussion of methods of detection."

(1981, p. 114)

Importantly Matza misses the large component of cases in which the police are provided with a suspect so that the method
of police suspicion is irrelevant. Bottomley and Coleman point out that in no more than 4 out of 10 cases in their sample was there any real possibility of the various kinds of police initiative being responsible for the identification of suspects (1981, p. 117) They extend this criticism to Sacks' discussion of "incongruity procedures" (1972, pp. 281-186) whereby police devote systematic attention to individuals who "look out of place" in particular ecological settings: the black in a white neighbourhood, the juvenile on the street late at night, the woman standing for long periods on a street corner etc. While Bottomley and Coleman do not question the use of the incongruity procedure, they do question its importance in generating arrest statistics. They conclude that Sacks' speculations are gratuitous in lieu of a consideration of the proportion of arrest statistics generated in this way (Bottomley and Coleman, 1981, p. 104). Significantly Sacks' examples - prostitution, gambling and numbers rackets, drugs and drunkenness - are all policed proactively. These examples once again miss the significance of public reporting and identification of suspects.

Greenwood and his associates (1977) make a similar kind of point of Werthman and Piliavin's (1967) discussion of policework with juveniles. While it may well be the case that officers interacting with juveniles in the San Francisco Bay area proceed by what Matza was later to term methodical suspicion, it is dangerous to generalize from this to other crime work, for to do so seriously neglects the importance of
information from reporting groups other than the police in generating suspects. The question now becomes what implications these qualifications to Matza's speculative formula have for the interpretation of crime rate maps?

In his *Policing the City* (1979) and "Police Practices and Crime Rates" (1981) Mawby tackles head on the effect of police practices on the geographic distribution of crime. In this sense his work is unusual for the majority of studies of police discretion have dealt with social space mostly in terms of age, race and class. Although these studies have important spatial implications to the extent that social space is expressed geographically, they have not been designed to test the spatial implications of the police bias of official statistics. And yet the spatial implications of such studies are clear enough as the above discussion should indicate, particularly in terms of what Sacks has called the "incongruity procedure" (1972, pp. 281-286). The discussions of Matza and Cicourel also suggest that police act towards citizens differently in different ecological settings, thus importantly influencing the geographical pattern of crime rates.

In answering the question as to how much crime rates reflect different law enforcement practices, Mawby offers an unequivocal conclusion:

"I anticipated that such an exercise would reveal that area differences in offence and offender rates were to a large extent due to different policing styles, and the differential involvement of the police, in contrasting areas of the city...In fact I found no such thing. An area analysis of policing patterns revealed that there was

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little or no evidence that differential policing affected the relative offender rates of contrasting residential areas. Similarly, although there was some suggestion that offence rates may have been affected by the extent of police presence, the distinctions found were between residential and other areas, rather than between different types of residential area.

Mawby (1979) draws this conclusion from an analysis examining four elements of the criminal labelling process: the discovery and reporting of crime, the detection process, police recording practices, and the handling of identified offenders. Furthermore, as well as considering areal differentiation in terms of official statistics on indictable crimes, other measures of deviance were included in the Sheffield study to see how well they reproduced areal differentiations appearing in official police statistics. As well as including from the police files measures of nonindictable crime (excluding traffic offences), Mawby considered crimes handled by agencies other than the police, notably the Post Office, which kept records of television license evasion and telephone kiosk vandalism (1981, p. 140). He also developed alternative data collection methods including a self-report study. Significantly the self-report study covered only 3 of 9 sample areas, but more of this later. From his analyses Mawby concluded that "area differences are evident no matter what statistics are used, which implies that the statistics cannot be dismissed as an artifact of police strategies."

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In general, Mawby offers a very different kind of understanding of the areal effects of police practice on crime rates than that implied by interactionist and controlological perspectives, and he rejects the amplification of deviance hypothesis:

"...the most striking conclusion...is that the role of the police in the discovery of crime in these residential areas is minimal, and that variation between areas does not fit the amplification hypothesis..."

(p. 98)

"It...appears that whether we consider offence or offender data, all reported offences, all detected offences, or only police detections, there is no evidence to suggest (let alone demonstrate) that police involvement in any way creates differences in crime rates between different residential areas."

(1979, p. 125)

This is an enormously important finding, if it is correct, in that it reasserts the credibility of a prima facie interpretation of crime statistics. It also serves to discredit the amplification of deviance hypothesis at the core of labelling theory. Closer scrutiny of Mawby's work, however, suggests that his conclusions are much too hasty; firstly, he does give evidence of a police impact on crime rates. Secondly, his methodology is not appropriate for an assessment of the labelling hypothesis, particularly to the extent that he misses the potential importance of informal labelling processes; while police discretionary practices and use of incongruity procedures may not be important in identifying criminals, they may play an important part in defining certain social groups as "deviant" by helping to reproduce that
identity. In other words an examination of police detection practices in producing suspects does not provide a full measure of the police impact on crime rates. Because of the apparent certainty of Mawby's conclusions, these two objections to them are worth developing in some detail.

To begin with Mawby's own data do not reject the possibility that proactive policing importantly influences the configuration of crime rates. He offers a variety of examples of a police impact, particularly in terms of "victimless" crime. For example, the amount of recorded drug use is directly related to extent and types of police activity (1979, p. 160) and evidence is given for a relationship between enforcement and offence rates for under-age drinking, and also of a sexual bias (1979, pp. 135-136). Police involvement in rates of family violence is similarly important. There was a clear and statistically significant difference in the proportion of offences cleared by "tic's" (offences "taken-into-consideration") in different offender rate areas, with a higher rate of this type of "indirect clearing" of offences in the high rate areas. But there was only a slight indication that offenders from high rate areas each committed a greater number of offences than those from low rate areas (pp. 109-110). It thus appeared to Mawby that the police were more likely to attempt to "clear their books" when they faced offenders from "disreputable" areas. Also offences cleared by "tics" constitute a fairly important proportion of the total clearance rate. In this way the contribution of the high rate
areas to the total proportion of cleared offences may be greatly exaggerated; 40% of the cleared crimes in Mawby's sample were accounted for by charges taken-into-consideration (1979, p. 109), while 28% of Bottomley and Coleman's sample could be accounted for in the same way (1981, p. 139). As Bottomley and Coleman put it:

"There seems to us to be some reason to regard many of these as the result of the application of methodical suspicion...there seems little doubt that such methods have a critical impact on clear-up rates, and, more important, may serve to bloat the records of established offenders."

But Mawby does not seem to include "indirect clearing" as a form of methodical suspicion thus allowing him to dispose of Matza's arguments perhaps too easily. These findings do show that indirect clearing may contribute to the definition of a criminal underclass.

While the Sheffield study is largely confined to residential areas, Mawby does suggest that police proactivity may be more common in the city centre and commercial and industrial areas (1981, p. 145); "...official offence rates in these areas may be magnified somewhat by the greater proportion of crimes there which are discovered directly by the police." (1981, p. 145) The term magnified is the important one here, for it represents what seems to be a much more realistic understanding of the potential effects of police practice; while crime rates are not totally an artefact of police discretion they may partly be, the extent of this bias
depending upon the kind of crime and the type of area it is committed in.

In combination these observations serve to qualify Mawby's implicit reaffirmation of a *prima facie* interpretation of crime rates. They can also be extended to question his rejection of the amplification of deviance hypothesis. Mawby tends to conflate arguments about the effects of police discretion with arguments about the amplification of deviance associated with the criminal labelling process. For a number of reasons, however, his methodology is not appropriate for assessing the amplification hypothesis:

1) Mawby never considers the possibility that the effect of policing on residential crime rates occurred before the point in time that his study was conducted. The amplification of deviance literature suggests that the criminal labelling process can act as an ongoing and self-fulfilling prophecy. To study patterns of crime incidence and criminal residence in Sheffield at one point in time may only provide a partial answer to the effect of policing. Remember that the amplification hypothesis posits an *actual* increase in crime as a response to the mobilization of the criminal labelling process. It may be that differential policing was responsible for amplification of crime in the high crime rate residential areas, and that what Mawby is describing now is the *result* of this process. The effect of policing on the pattern of crime incidence or offender residence may have occurred during the period of development of certain residential areas or at some
time more recently. The point of invoking a self-fulfilling prophecy is that at some time high rates in certain areas may reflect policing, and then become real through the amplification process. Mawby fails to consider this possibility by virtue of dislocating the pattern of crime from its historical context. Having realized this, one is left with an amplification hypothesis that is quite consistent with Mawby's findings.

2. Mawby concentrates on nine "contrasting residential areas" in Sheffield. But just how "contrasting" are these? It turns out that eight can be classified as "working class" (p. 186). While these were specifically chosen because of their variation in crime rate, the differences between areas containing different social classes is largely ignored. Certainly one area is characterized as containing a higher social class, but on what grounds could one consider this representative? We are left with the possibility that the role of the police in distinguishing between rates in working class areas is minimal, but may be significant if we compared areas of different social class. While Mawby does acknowledge this problem, it does not alter his conclusions. This is curious because many labelling theorists suggest that social class is one of the most poignant indicators of the differential operation of police discretion. Mawby does not really provide a way of testing this hypothesis.

3. In the American studies that Mawby uses as a reactive springboard for his own findings, race is one of the most
important variables in hypothetical statements about the operation of police discretion. One wonders how representative a city Sheffield is, particularly Mawby's nine areas which do not seem to contain much of a racial mix. Mawby thus provides no means of testing hypotheses about the relationship between race and the operation of police discretion. This limitation does not seem to temper his conclusions.

4. Mawby, like many of the other commentators on the effects of police discretion, concentrates on the impact of police practices on the identification of offenders. While this in itself is an important issue demonstrating the importance of reporting groups other than the police, much of the social impact of policework is ignored in analyses which focus mainly or exclusively on crime reports. While Mawby does consider other evidence besides police-reports, his analysis of the police is largely confined to their crime producing activity. As it turns out observational analyses of police work show that very little police time is spent processing criminals or criminal events. More time is spent in what Ericson (1981) refers to as "ordering the streets", an ordering directed mostly at certain "types" of people, or people who seem "out of place." Even if the process of methodical suspicion does not produce many adjudicated offenders, it may play an important part in the definition of subcultural groups, particularly those whose self-identity is reinforced by engagement in illegal activity. What Mawby does not consider in his rejection of the amplification hypothesis is the
indirect effect of police practices in producing deviant identity; Mawby has not progressed as far as it might seem in assessing the effect of police discretion in some of its more important dimensions. This subject will be taken up in Chapter 6. For the moment it is sufficient to note that Mawby's work does serve as a useful corrective at one level:

"The finding that area differences in one study cannot be 'explained away' suggests that differences elsewhere should be considered on a multi-dimensional level rather than being sceptically written off as due to policing practices."

(p. 183)

For the reasons outlined above, the effect of policing practices should not be sceptically written off either. The point emerging from the critique of Mawby's study is that there are a number of levels of analysis which must be taken into consideration in assessing the impact of the control system on both crime patterns and official crime statistics. The tendency has been to abstract crime reports from the wider context of policing in the attempt to assess the impact of police discretion on both crime amplification processes and on the configuration of official statistics. While consideration of reporting agents other than the police is essential to the problem of whether crime statistics represent crime rates or control rates, it is nevertheless essential to recognize the power of the police in moulding the "definitions of the situation" of other reporting agents. A discussion of the conceptual difficulties associated with the definition of police activity as either reactive or proactive serves to
demonstrate the potential importance of this line of thinking.

**Conceptual Problems with the Proactive/Reactive Dichotomy**

The two empirical vignettes described later in this monograph examine prostitution and breaking and entering, two crime types which at first do not appear unduly difficult to locate in the proactive-reactive classification of policework. As I shall subsequently illustrate, however, their classification in this manner proved to be anything but straightforward.

The difficulty with the proactive-reactive distinction is that it tends to abstract both policework and the reporting of crime from its situational context. The problem is that what has been traditionally classified as proactive policework often has reactive elements, while what has been traditionally classified as reactive police work has proactive elements. If, for example, we include charges taken into consideration as a form of methodical suspicion (as do Bottomley and Coleman), and given Mawby's observation that police seem more likely to clear their books when faced with offenders from "disreputable" areas, there is a sense of proactivity involved with indirect clearing. Similarly, as Bottomley and Coleman note, police may adopt a proactive mode of investigating crimes reported by the public (i.e. reports to which the police are essentially "reacting"). In addition to all of this, police have to interpret citizen reports, and so can importantly mould what
comes to be called crime. The police, then, may have a significant impact in influencing what are ostensibly reactive crime reports. To begin with, the communication bureau or equivalent may not dispatch a substantial number of calls (Ericson, 1982, p. 100). More importantly, patrol officers do not routinely accept citizens' definitions of situations as criminal - they are not simply reactive. Rather they translate these requests within the framework of police organization, employing recipe rules, legal rules and/or community rules to decide whether the matter could or should be transformed into police "property". Consequently many complaints are not officially logged, many calls for service are not dispatched, many dispatches do not result in an official report, many reports do not recommend further action or criminal designation, and regardless of designation, many reports are filed without further investigation (Ericson, 1982, p. 101).

The police in dealing with suspects, especially after proactive stops on suspicion, base their decisions on the status claims of the suspects in the matter under dispute; "As an organised force, the police have the power to 'make' particular definitions of citizens troubles - and to make them stick." (Ericson, 1982, p. 136).

It is in these senses that Ericson suggests that the police "make" crime. The patrolman is not an automaton who unreflexively follows citizen's requests for action according to some pre-established criteria:

"Patrol officers may deflect complaints so that official reporting is not required,"
report in a way that justifies their decision not to initiate a criminal occurrence, or report in a way that justifies the particular 'criminal' interpretation they give to an occurrence... We look at the patrol officer making his judgements within the complexities of the encounter. He takes into account who the citizens are, their claims within the context in which they are made, expectations within the police organization, and the resources (legal and otherwise) available to reproduce order."

(1982, p. 101)

Ericson offers a very different kind of image of policing than is contained in Mawby's, or in Bottomley and Coleman's work, which significantly, are not based on extensive observation of the police but mainly on scrutiny of police records. Ericson shows in contrast to Mawby "that from first contact to ultimate disposition of a case, the police have considerable power to define what is 'out of order' and to reproduce their organizationally filtered sense of 'order'." (1982, p. 137).

The proactive/reactive dichotomy tends to treat the activity of the police mechanistically, and in so-doing gives support to an instrumentalist reading of the statistics. But what this view fails to do is see the interconnection and ambiguities of reactive and proactive modes of policing.

In the case of the prostitution study reported below, what appears to be the classic proactive police enforcement of prostitution laws is reactive to the extent that waves of police interest in prostitution may be a reflection of campaigns by public pressure groups to "clean up the streets", or a response to local politicians who adopt a law and order
platform and thus encourage police proactivity to make it appear as if something is being done about the "crime problem". Examples of public pressure group activity are discussed in Chapter 8 examining the displacement of prostitution as a response to law enforcement activities, although in this case two phases of proactivity are described, only one of which is "reactive" in this sense. What Walter Reckless described as the "vice situation cycle" begins with an alarmist account exposing problematic social conditions by a newspaper agency or governmental investigation which "law and order" organizations respond to with various enforcement campaigns (1933, Ch. 9). In this way public consciousness of certain social problems is promoted, and the very definition of social problems may reflect the social reaction rather than any change in objective conditions (what Ditton would call a "reporting" rise). Similarly the level of public crime reporting may reflect enforcement or crime prevention policies (Ditton's "fantasy rise"). In the case of burglary, a crime customarily thought of as being reactively processed by the police, proactivity in the form of preventative target hardening programs may not only affect the actual incidence of crime, but the level of crime reporting by citizens also. An example of such an influence is given in Chapter 9.

Once again, these observations stress the need for a processual, interactional and historical understanding of the production of crime rates, one which puts crime and the reporting of criminal incidents in a wider social context.
Similarly the understanding of the police impact on crime rates should be conceptualized to consider the police role in the amplification of crime. This involves a much broader conceptual framework considering more than just the police role in producing official statistics. Ultimately this should consider the activity of a wide range of social control agents and urban "gatekeepers", a theme already developed by Armstrong and Wilson (1973), Damer (1974), Baldwin, Bottoms and Walker (1976), and Gill (1978) in their work on housing policy and the genesis of criminal areas.

Attention must also be turned to the social structural context in which these urban gatekeepers operate (including the police), a level of analysis not well-developed in the interactionist literature on official statistics and in the sociology of deviance generally. It is in this respect that critical theorists, while accepting the objections to a *prima facie* interpretation of crime statistics, enter certain qualifications to an interactionist interpretation. A review of the critical perspective on statistics serves not only to introduce some broader arguments about the way that official crime reports mould both scientific and public images of crime, but also serves to exemplify the differences between the sociology of deviance and critical theory in terms of the level of analysis at which they work.
Critical Theory and the Interpretation of Official Statistics:
A Return to the Problem of Structure and Ideology

The major argument of an interactionist interpretation suggests that official crime statistics do not necessarily represent the "real" distribution of crime and delinquency, rather they depend crucially on the operation of social control organizations in dealing with such actions. The critique shows that official statistics are social constructions and that administrative guidelines and conceptual categories used to produce and process crime and delinquency statistics are by no means unambiguous or definitive. But does this view incorporate all the analytic elements necessary to understand the configuration of official statistics?

In a paper entitled "The Critique of Official Statistics", Miles and Irvine (1979) suggest that it does not. In their view the instrumentalist reading of statistics as objective facts has been replaced by a perspective treating them solely as subjective judgements reflecting individual and organizational decisions. In the interactionist position society is cast as an environment in which individuals are free to create their own realities and practices - they have replaced a view of crime statistics as a "neutral snapshot" with one which treats them as a patchwork aggregation of the "impressionistic sketches of individuals." (p. 117)

This is not to suggest, according to Miles and Irvine, that no consideration has been made of social structure and
ideology in the institutionalist position. They note that Cicourel refers to organizational processes in shaping statistics, and these certainly provide a link to wider social ideologies (p. 118). Ericson's (1981, 1982) discussion of the organizational and societal contexts of policework (published after the Miles and Irwin paper) similarly provides these links. But even in these formulae, certain features of the production process of the statistics are taken as unproblematic - the "common-sense" notions of policeman, and their "recipe-rules" of action are not linked to more general social and economic organization. Nor do these accounts consider the way certain kinds of police organization developed in the first place (p. 118).

The interactionists (Miles and Irvine use the term "phenomenologists") offer a pluralist model of society which does not probe the structure of individual subjective experience in terms of wider systems of meaning as they are influenced by social class, power, or ethnicity. The state institutions which produce statistics are taken-for-granted in the interactionist program rather than being viewed also as social products which historically unfold:

"The structures and social relations of these institutions, and the formal categories of statistics they produce, are just as much a product of human interests and conflicts as are the different interpretations of these formal categories by their officials. Official statistics are, therefore, not just a social product but a particular product whose form and content are structured by much more than individual and organizational practices." (p. 119)
The point of their argument is that the state is not a technical and neutral arbiter of statistics, but is selective in its selection of statistics for publication. A critical analysis of the state is thus needed to understand how its economic and political functions are embedded in the production of official statistics (pp. 124-126): "Behind the veil of neutrality, official statistics thus form part of the process of maintaining and reproducing the dominant ideologies of capitalist society." (p. 126) In addition to this, the legislative is highly selective in the type of rule-infractions that are defined as criminal.

In the critical and radical literature the most well developed attempt to demystify the "veil of neutrality" veneering official statistics has occurred in what Taylor, Walton and Young (1975) term "expose criminology"; the practice of uncovering and showing the unexpected extent of upper world criminality especially in terms of corporation and government criminality. Taylor, Walton and Young suggest that no matter how useful such criminology may be in "demasking the crime-free facade of the ruling class", the underlying premise of such work is essentially a moral appeal (pp. 29-33). While their statement is somewhat contradictory -- their own work is partly based on the moral appeal of socialism - other critical theorists have given expose criminology a theoretical dimension by pointing to the political advantages of distinguishing "suite" crime from "street" crime (e.g. Goff and Reasons, 1978).

The main purpose of the critique is to expose a suggested
double-standard in law and to expose the ideology that allows such standards to coexist. This ideology is partly rooted in political economy, but it may have other dimensions as well. In terms of our understanding of official statistics, what is important here is that they rarely systematically contain details about anything other than "street" crime. Crime effectively becomes "street" crime, both by omitting any consideration of infractions of other types of criminal law, or by defining them out of the picture by removing them from the purview of criminal law to civil law instead (see, for example, Pearce, 1973, 1975, and Goff and Reasons, 1978).

The differentiation of white-collar and street-crime thus partly fulfills the ideological function of making the crime problem the "street" crime problem. Geographers unwittingly reproduce this neglect of upper level crime and its harmful consequence by concentrating on official statistical sources. If geographers were to produce a map of general crime which included white-collar and corporate offences, they might find that the classic centre-city-suburb crime residence gradient would be greatly qualified or even reversed if concentrating on "suite" offences only. One wonders what geographers and social ecologists might make of pockets of concentration of these upper-echelon offenders which might give a whole new meaning to the idea of "criminal areas".

**Official Statistics and the Geography of Crime**

In this review I have attempted to establish the relevance
of interactionist and critical interpretations of official crime statistics for the geography of crime. In so doing I have also tried to illustrate in concrete terms the kinds of issues distinguishing interactionist and critical perspectives discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. While interactionists focus on the interaction between control personnel and citizens (particularly citizens perceived as threatening public order) as the crucial element in the construction of official statistics, critical theorists have demonstrated the importance of understanding these interactions in terms of the wider socio-political context in which definitions of crime unfold. The critical interpretation suggests that the ability of control personnel to construct the meaning of crime is itself circumscribed by the structure of meaning contained in criminal legislation and wider political ideology. In the case of certain criminal statistics the impact of control personnel per se may be minimal. The question is which categories? The typical answer has been that crimes which for the most part are reported to the police by the public are those least influenced by control personnel, and thus the most representative of actual offender behaviour. But evidence presented in Chapter 9 suggests that even in the case of burglary, a crime generally reported to the police by the public, public reporting rates may themselves be influenced by control activity. There is thus no simple answer to the question.

What, then, are the implications of these arguments for the geography of crime? The answer, in a nutshell, is that a
prima facie reading of crime statistics cannot be assumed a priori. The suggestion that some statistics may reflect actual rates of criminal behaviour is no warrant to proceed by the assumption that they all do. I have always been baffled by disclaimers in the geography of crime which suggest that research results should be interpreted with caution. What does this caution consist of? Where crime statistics are interpreted as "real" indices of "criminal" behaviour, good reasons should be presented (preferably empirical findings) for their treatment as such. Only if this is done can the reader understand exactly what kind of caution should be exercised in interpreting research results.

These arguments should not be misread as suggesting that official statistics should not be used at all. Indeed in Chapters 8 and 9 I use official burglary and prostitution statistics when examining the relationship between particular control practices and crime patterns. In these analyses careful attention is given to the issue of interpretation suggesting that prostitution statistics mainly index control activity while burglary statistics reflect both changes in offender activity and control activity. What this suggests is that geographers might usefully begin to treat official statistics as objects of study in their own right.

One fruitful avenue of inquiry relates to the development of victimization surveys with a spatially differentiated data base to compare to official crime rates in order to assess the possibility that reporting rates vary among different social
groups. The victimization surveys developed to date do not allow the assessment of small-scale spatial variations in reporting rates.

Mawby's study is notable to the extent that it does attempt to answer questions about the effect of policing practices on the configuration of crime patterns. But while his findings are provocative, they are limited. Studies are needed replicating Mawby's purpose, but which are able to test for the effects of race and class. In addition, something more is needed in terms of conceptualizing the relationship between control practices and patterns of crime. Mawby's type of analysis focusing on the most immediate relationship between crime and control - essentially an examination of discretionary police practice in the production of crime rates - may not capture some of the more subtle aspects of the relationship, particularly to the extent that much police discretionary practice has little to do with criminality itself. Incongruity procedures and methodic modes of suspicion may have an effect on the spatial configuration of crime that an analysis of police reports of criminal incidents is unable to assess.

Thus while the implications of discretionary bias are fairly obvious, the consequences of stereotyping procedures for shaping patterns of crime are less immediate. The impact of stereotyping may become particularly difficult to trace by instrumental statistical methods once we acknowledge the potential effect of informal police practices and organizational decisions as contexts for social action and
perhaps as "crime producing", rather than by simply focusing attention on that small part of police activity which involves the processing of criminal charges. This argument is developed in the first part of Chapter 6 in a discussion of "ecological labelling". In the second part of Chapter 6 the discussion turns to a consideration of the effects of differential levels of policing, both between legal jurisdictions and within them, on offender activity. The discussion of intrajurisdictional differences in policing, particularly in terms of patrol allocation, is important to the extent that it is a logical corollary of the discussion of the effects of police discretion and stereotyping; these effects will be greatest in the areas to which police are allocated most.

In combination the material presented in Chapter 6 marks a major shift of emphasis in the overall argument as a transition is made from consideration of how control activity at a variety of levels shapes images of crime and criminals to a consideration of the way that control activity shapes patterns of offender behaviour. The emphasis thus changes from a consideration of the effect of the control environment on who the criminals are to its effect on what offenders do. My principal concern is to demonstrate the effect of control activities on patterns of crime (and, in some cases, criminal residence) and to introduce the concept of displacement as one useful unifying theme for an integrated geography of crime and control.
Notes to Chapter 5

1. A good indication of the problem of interpreting self-report studies comes with the realization that the findings published by Short and Nye (1957) are contradicted by their own research results appearing one year later (1958). Downes (1966) argues that the later findings confirm the class distribution of delinquency contained in the official statistics.

2. In his monograph on the "Ecology of Crime and Violence" (1978) Georges does mention the possibility that crime statistics may be biased by race and social status but nowhere is any methodological allowance made for the way these biases may distort his analysis.

3. Biderman and Reiss unfortunately term the prima facie interpretation of crime statistics as "realist" while I term it "instrumentalist". The "realist" position is actually positivistic in its interpretation of crime statistics, not "realist" in terms of the wider literature on the philosophy of social science (see particularly Keat and Urry, 1976).

4. In adopting an institutionalist perspective which treats official statistics as objects of study in their own right, Bottomley and Coleman (1976, pp. 34-35) suggest that somewhat paradoxically many scholars have not followed the perspective through to its logical or sociological conclusion; the institutionalist concentration on aspects of police bias, selectivity and discriminatory practice is suggested as not being far removed from traditional concerns.

5. In this particular statement one can clearly see that discretionary bias (as I have defined it) is partly constitutive of organizational bias.

6. Following Biderman and Reiss (1967) these authors use the term "realist" here; see footnote 3 (above) for a discussion of problems associated with this designation.
Social Control and the Structure of Social Life: Crime Control as a Context for Behaviour

To this point the discussion has focused on problems involved with the interpretation of official statistics and, by extension, of crime rate maps. In examining interactionist and critical perspectives in criminology, the main implication for geographic studies of crime is that rather than restricting analyses to the crime or the criminal, consideration must be extended to include control processes in a unified framework. Interactionist perspectives suggest that even at the most basic conceptual level an analysis of control processes fundamentally influences our understanding of official statistics, and all explanations that flow from their use.

Consideration of crime control practices also turn our attention to social allocation processes. Critical theorists have suggested that ideological biases underlie the production of statistics as most police efforts are directed towards "street" crime rather than "suite" crime thereby effectively locating the "crime problem" in society's lower strata; indeed crime control personnel may be allocated in such a way that the "lower class" crime problem becomes the crime problem in a self-fulfilling process. Because crime statistics are socially constructed, the process of their construction can be vital to an understanding of "criminality" because it is instrumental in

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moulding the researcher's "image" of crime in terms of what is to be explained.

The discussion now changes emphasis by turning to the influence of crime control and control allocation policies on actual behaviour. Rather than simply being reactive to and dependent upon the incidence of criminal behaviour, legal institutions and law enforcement practices form a context for behaviour. The simple legal distinction of public and private places, for example, forms an important context for social conduct and may be the most important criterion in the definition of certain acts as criminal. Both legal definitions and law enforcement practices thus structure social activity, and their effect in this respect must also be taken into consideration in understanding patterns of both criminal and related behaviour. Looked at in a slightly different way, legal statutes and law enforcement practices must be included as elements of the "social environment" in environmental and ecological perspectives.

Two themes are developed in this chapter concerning the influence of the allocation of control personnel on crime rates. The first theme develops out of the literature on the interpretation of official statistics by considering the way informal police practice provides part of the context in which the identities of certain social groups may be shaped as being "outside" the law. The discussion at this point shows how the configuration of crime may not only be influenced directly by law enforcement efforts, but also how it may be influenced
indirectly by informal police practices. The discussion of informal police practices also attempts to outline the theoretical links between the literature on official statistics and concepts of "ecological labelling" as a crime amplifying process. Ecological labelling refers to the process through which certain areas develop reputations for high rates of crime and other social problem behaviours, and how social policy and allocation practices not only respond to, but also help develop these reputations (the term ecological labelling was first used by Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981A, p. 26).

The second theme concerning the direct effect of police allocation procedures, examines the influence of police patrol distribution on criminal activity patterns. Some attention will also be given to the literature on "crime spillover" which attempts to examine the effect of the intensity of policing in one jurisdiction (as measured by expenditure on police or in terms of police manpower) on crime rates in adjacent jurisdictions.

These discussions in combination set the stage for the introduction of the displacement concept as one type of organizing theme around which an integrated geographic analysis of crime and justice may proceed.
I suggested earlier that Mawby (1979) tends to conflate research on discretionary bias and the deviance amplification literature. But this is not to suggest that police practices and deviance amplification processes are unrelated - the issue is how they are related.

What generally seems to be missed in the discussion of police discretion and the related discussion of the amplification of deviance is the importance of "non-crime" encounters between the public and the police. The literature to date has focussed almost exclusively on police encounters with members of the public who are eventually processed through the criminal justice system. Thus while Black and Reiss suggest that 72% of the police encounters with juveniles were citizen initiated (p. 66) elsewhere they suggest that "(p)olice control of juveniles follows an informal-processing or harassment model rather than a formal-processing model of control". (p. 74) It may be that informal interactions between police and various social groups are just as important as the formal criminal labelling process in the creation of criminal identity and subgroups. Thus criminal or delinquent behaviour may be importantly amplified by police activity which systematically focuses on certain social groups, even though it infrequently leads to criminal charges. Should such an
amplificatory process occur, the subsequent criminal activity that it engenders would be reactively reported. Official crime statistics, then, may not only be biased by police activity in the most obvious and direct sense - the link may be less in terms of the very small proportion of time police spend in interactions which end up in arrest (Ericson estimates this as occupying only 5% of a patrolman's time) than it is in terms of their more general (symbolic) social control practice. Thus while certain arguments about the importance of police discretion in biasing crime rates may be criticized for generalizing police proactivity to the reactive arena, the institutionalist view requires similar qualification. While the early research on bias is incomplete because it is restricted to police encounters with (proactively generated) suspects (Black, 1970, p. 744), subsequent studies stressing the essentially reactive nature of police work may be equally remiss by consistently focusing on the criminal event; the problem is to see only those encounters which result in a criminal charge as important in the discretion-amplification process.

Various studies of police patrol confirm the relative infrequency with which police contacts with citizens lead to criminal charges. In Chicago, Reiss estimates that less than 1% of the time spent in preventative patrol was occupied in interactions with citizens which resulted in the laying of formal criminal charges (1971, p. 96), while McCabe and Sutcliffe suggest that only 6% of police time is spent on
incidents that are finally defined as criminal or a breach of public order (1978, p. 9). Ericson cites a number of ethnographic studies of the police which similarly suggest that most police contact with individuals does not involve matters subsequently defined as criminal (Cumming et al, 1970; Punch and Naylor, 1973; Cain, 1973; Payne, 1973; Punch, 1975. For a review of field studies of police see Van Maanen, 1978).

While criminalization represents the formal labelling process, the general control of "problem groups" and "bad people" facilitated by a number of informal mechanisms may also be contributory to the deviance amplification process. Ericson (1982, p. 14) describes the criminal law from the point of view of the police as a residual resource, frequently something mobilized as a last resort in the process of maintaining order. And importantly, Ericson's studies are of general uniform patrol work (1982) and general detective work (1981) rather than just the proactive variety, although this comment applies more to uniform patrol officers than it does general detectives. Following Bittner (1970), Chatterton (1976), and Manning (1977), Ericson suggests that criminal law enforcement is not the goal of policework, but a tool used by the patrol officer to order the population; "...many encounters involve not a question of 'crime' and 'non-crime', but whether the police officer finds it necessary to use the criminal law to handle trouble." (1982, p. 38) The patrol officer's concern with law is thus as an all purpose control device - the broader the applicability, the better the law (Bittner, 1970, p. 108;
Ericson, 1982, p. 14). "In handling troublesome situations, any law will do. The fact that the person can be charged with something is usually sufficient for the officer's purposes. His legal resources are ample, but his resourcefulness is more important." (Ericson, 1982, p. 171).

Importantly then, and Mawby recognizes as much (1981, p. 45), the proactive policing model may represent the ideal model of policework. While it may not be particularly important in generating suspects and accused persons, forms of methodical suspicion and other elements of proactive policing may be vital in ordering the population (an ordering which is achieved by criminal labelling only in the last resort or in more extreme or easily defined incidents). This remark is not intended to minimize the symbolic importance of criminal labelling and its actual consequences, but to suggest that there is much more to policing than the processing of criminals. The police impact on the configuration of crime is much more complicated than direct measures of police discretionary practice indicate.

This point becomes much clearer in studies like those of Ericson which examine policing in general, rather than simply that small proportion of police activity which ends up in crime reports. But even in Bottomley and Coleman's study, which is largely restricted to crime incidents, evidence is given suggesting that the police make wide use of methodical suspicion and other proactive practices. They note, for example, that "it was apparent that police did use visible on-the-streets groups as a category of likely individuals" (1981,
p. 111) although such methodical suspicion may not be particularly important in the (direct) production of crime rates. They also give evidence that "incongruity procedures" play an important role in police work even though such tactics rarely lead to the identification of an offender (1981, p. 111, 117).¹ Mawby (1979) similarly notes that it is doubtful whether such practices have a standardized impact on the records of *indictable* crime.

In discussing Britain's "Sus" law (an all purpose law enabling police to question almost anyone on the street who looks suspicious) Bottomley and Coleman note that certain groups are more likely than others to come under police suspicion - juveniles, males rather than females, and blacks rather than whites.² Yet despite these apparent discretionary biases they note:

"we would maintain that because of the nature, discovery and detection of those offences which make up the statistics of crime, it would be quite possible for black youths to be regularly scrutinized, interrogated, searched and even arrested 'on suspicion', without this having any marked impact on the recorded statistics of *indictable* crime of the relevant group."

Or, at least, the effect on recorded statistics may not be in the direct sense that Bottomley and Coleman's research is designed to assess. But the indirect effect of such procedures as contexts for shaping the self-images of "problem" persons may accentuate the likelihood of their committing indictable crimes which are subsequently reported to the police by the public.

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Thus it is one thing to examine samples of crime reports as do McCabe and Sutcliffe (1978), Mawby (1979, 1981) and Bottomley and Coleman (1981) in order to assess the importance of certain groups in reporting and detecting crime, but quite another to extrapolate these findings to the amplification of deviance hypothesis as does Mawby. From a geographical point of view, an examination of the role of police discretion in the reporting and detection of crime does not tell us all we need to know about the police impact on the geography of crime rates - as already noted, it ignores the informal impact of police activity in shaping social groups and subcultures. In Luke Street (1977) Gill offers a lucid description of just such a process occurring in one of Liverpool's "problem" neighbourhoods.

Gill states that the original intention of the research culminating in the publication of Luke Street was simply to understand the lifestyle of a group of boys who regularly came into contact with the police and courts. But in this attempt Gill found himself necessarily drawn into issues of housing policy, policing, and urban stereotyping in understanding the production of behaviour that is subsequently officially registered as deviant; "This book is therefore as much, if not more, about how the policy-makers react to deviant minorities as it is about how members of those minorities react to the wider world" (1977, preface).

Gill's study significantly breaks ground with much work on delinquency in the post-war period which views such activity as
a subcultural response to working-class life. This emphasis in Gill’s opinion, has distracted attention from other factors in the organization of modern urban life which are productive of delinquent behaviour, and along with a number of other studies (Damer, 1974; Baldwin, Bottoms and Walker, 1976), Gill’s analysis attempts to specify these.

Given the interests of the present discussion in outlining the geographic consequences of the informal amplificatory consequences of police practices, Gill’s analysis is significant in the way it describes the formation of urban subcultures. As noted earlier, this process is usually described in social structural terms suggesting that delinquent subcultures are a product of the values provided through working class life interacting with the values of wider society. While Gill would presumably acknowledge that such a process may provide part of the context for the emergence of identifiable subcultural groups, a number of other considerations also need to be introduced into the analysis. In understanding the creation of Luke Street as a delinquent area he combines three sociological approaches: the ecological, the subcultural and the social reaction perspectives, with the processes which each describes being viewed as interacting and cumulative (1977, p.2).

In terms of the ecological perspective, Gill focuses on the policies surrounding the utilization and allocation of public housing, the typical tenure-type of so-called "problem" areas. In this analysis he shows how certain "types"
of people are allocated to certain "types" of housing, a filtering process which throws together individuals with particular social characteristics. In terms of the subcultural perspective his analysis describes the behavioural and attitudinal accommodations of people forced through this filtering process to live in low grade housing. Finally, Gill shows how various controllers, administrators and helpers deal with the areas so produced and in so doing exacerbate their difficulties - the process of "ecological labelling". The analysis shows how actual behaviour in these areas interacts with perception of that behaviour in a classic deviancy amplification spiral. While Gill does not attribute the geographic effect of all this - the creation of delinquency areas - to police practice, what he does do is show how that practice, in tandem with other factors, helps to produce the geographic pattern of delinquency residence.

In passing it is also appropriate to note that area correlational analyses of delinquency residence patterns cast in the instrumental positivist mould cannot hope to develop the kind of analysis offered by Gill, for the very concepts and measures utilized by the traditional ecological approach create a theoretical foreclosure by limiting the types of questions that such analyses can be expected to answer. To understand these processes, not only do we need different kinds of data, but a totally different form of epistemology and ontology transcending a phenomenal level of analysis.

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In terms of police practice Gill shows how stereotypes of a neighbourhood not only reflect the incidence of official behaviour but also become part of the production of such behaviour as they influence police deployment and activity (p. 62). Gill describes the main activity of Luke Street youths, given the lack of any recreational facilities in the area, as "hanging out". Most of their contact with the police came on the street because of the largely unstructured and public lives of the usually unemployed area youth (p. 124). The representatives of external authority were particularly sensitive to these youths' street behaviour, and patrolled it with varying intensity, although apparently fairly constantly. What Gill shows is that the effect of this systematic attention was of key significance in shaping the attitudes of area youths even though it appears that only a minority of the interactions would be subsequently recorded as criminal. The interactions represent the general police attempt to maintain order, and to this extent the law appears to have been a residual resource in the sense that Ericson and Bittner describe it, although in Luke Street one which might be used much more frequently than elsewhere. In this respect Gill is critical of previous observer studies which concentrate on deviant incidents in order to illustrate the general nature of subcultural attitudes, rather than analyzing them as important elements of on-going life which importantly affect and change human perceptions (p. 125); most descriptions of delinquent life miss its predominantly routine and mundane nature. What
to Gill is important about police/juvenile interactions is that they illustrate the unfolding socially constructed nature of delinquency. Rather than representing the usual course of events these occasional and sometimes dramatic incidents between youths and police were atypical, but instrumental in shaping the attitudes of both. The attitudes of delinquents were thus (partly) formed through their formal and informal interactions with the police (formal in the sense that the interaction led to a criminal label).

Systematic police surveillance and "ordering" of the youths became instrumental in the formulation or the reformulation of the youth's self-identities. This identity was reinforced by the youth's sense of injustice characterizing their relationships with the police; they suggested that the police initiated most of the encounters (although the police, of course, would suggest that it was initiated by the youths' presence on the street - in a sense a form of "incongruity procedure"). Thus very short incidents which might only take a minute to complete could have severe consequences for those involved, and could play a major part in structuring the future conceptions of the position in which the youths found themselves, especially because they stood out so clearly against the mundane backdrops of the youths day-to-day routines (pp. 125-126). These incidents were also the topic of much conversation among the youths. Their hostile contact with authorities thus may be said to be latent in the situation rather than in the individual (pp. 139-140). The police
reaction consistently reinforced the youths' self-identity as being outside the law (one of the few identities, Gill points out, left open to them - in this deprived environment juveniles enjoy few opportunities for excitement). Hostility to the police is one of the few ways juveniles can wrench some glory from their circumstances - there is a social incentive to being bad). During the few seconds that a public incident might last, both boys and police were victims of wider stereotypes, processes and beliefs (p. 143). Although the incidents were brief, they nevertheless had profound impact on subsequent social interaction, both between the youths, and between the youths and the police.

In the same sense that the delinquent identity unfolds, Gill shows how area identity emerges. In an analysis of events on "Guy Fawkes" night, he shows how the importance of this traditional and ceremonial night of conflict between police and youths reinforced the "outlaw" identity of the youths, and the identity of the area as disreputable (pp. 146-158). What the newspapers described from an "outside" perspective as spontaneous riots, Gill on the "inside" interprets quite differently - the conflicts were anticipated by both local residents and the police. The conflict was between the neighbourhood and the outside world highlighting themes of group identity and territoriality (p. 153). The newspaper accounts simply served to emphasize the "problem" status of the Crossley neighbourhood in which Luke Street lies.
In general Gill's *Luke Street* shows how "anti-social" attitudes are partly constructed in the interaction between youths and police. It shows how this interaction in the case of Crossley must be understood against the backdrop of housing allocation policy, and in the context of wider social structural issues:

"We can only understand the position of the boys if we go back forty years to the decision of the local planners to create a disproportionate number of large houses and flats in that part of the west end of Crossley."

(p. 185)

What is particularly important in the context of the present discussion is that the Luke Street youths' position vis-a-vis agents of social control became one of the central elements of their self-identity (p. 186). While this partly reflects the police interaction with youths that subsequently led to the processing of an incident as criminal, what Gill shows is the importance of non-crime interactions in the formation of delinquent identities.

To what extent may these observations be extrapolated to other social situations and contexts? Apparently Mawby believes that they can not, for he suggests that there is no evidence that the Luke Street pattern applies to high crime rate areas in general rather than extremely notorious estates (1979, pp. 30-31). But Mawby never really gives adequate consideration to the effects of non-crime incidents in general in defining "notorious" social groups, effects which may be further obscured if these groups are not spatially distinct.
Examination of a different kind of research literature suggests that these processes may not be restricted to these extremely notorious estates. This literature examines police activity generally rather than being restricted to its "crime-producing" activity.

In an analysis of Canadian police patrol activity Ericson (1982) offers a rather different picture of police practices than that given by research restricted to the analysis of crime reports. While the latter leave the reader with the impression of the police as a largely reactive agency (holding aside the problems of the reactive/proactive dichotomy mentioned above) and of crime reports as relatively free of police discretionary bias, Ericson's interactionist analysis produces a different understanding of the police role in maintaining social order and in "making" crime rates, one which is as much interested in non-crime incidents as it is with the criminal event.

Ericson describes the police as the most visible front line agents for ordering the population. He follows Foucault (1977) in regarding them as the extreme end of a "carceral continuum", - representatives of an ever present model of judicial legal ideology. General police patrol work creates a fixed presence in the community allowing the systematic surveillance of public, and occasionally, private life; "they patrol with a suspicious eye for the wrong people in the wrong places at the wrong times, reproducing a 'social penalty of time and place'" 5 (Ericson, 1982, p.8).
Far from being unsystematic and arbitrary, Ericson suggests that the focus of police work is based on established rules and produces regular results, and in this respect mentions the systematic nature of police stop and search procedures which systematically focus on certain social types. His analysis is designed to show what these rules are, at what level they operate, the contexts in which they evolve, and their formal and informal nature. Thus while legal rules create a certain kind of context within which police work takes place, this context has many other dimensions and textures, not the least of which is the organizational context of policing, and the translation of legal rules into practice within it. In his discussion Ericson shows how legal rules are enabling for the policeman in his/her daily reproduction of social order, rules which, as noted earlier, may often be used only as a final resort. These observations, remember, are based upon direct observation of police patrol activity with the understanding that police proactivity is not particularly important in producing suspects or in detecting offenders (1982, pp. 52-58)! But police proactivity does appear important in the police officer's attempt to maintain or "reconstruct" social order, an endeavour in which the laying of criminal charges may only play a secondary part.

Proactive policing is directed at lower status citizens in general - those who present the greatest (perceived) problems of public order (1982, p. 18) and in this "ordering" of the population the use of the criminal sanction is often
unnecessary. The mandate of the patrol officer thus lies in maintaining the boundaries of deviant enclaves and keeping the streets clear (or at least certain streets) of those who are at the most "offensive rather than offenders". Particularly in routine traffic stops (sometimes on pretext for other crime related inquiries) Ericson describes the process by which the police "reproduce order" through selective use of the law, but in a proactive sense which may contribute little to the actual criminal statistics. One must consider what the effects of these routine and systematic police procedures are in defining social group status and perceptions of the law.

These observations of routine police work lead Ericson to suggest that much too great an emphasis has been given to the reactive role of the police making their activities seem more like that of automatons rather than people who enact their environments as well as react to them:

"...we must also consider the internal dynamics of the police organization and the legal organization within which the police operate. There are major limitations in studies which concentrate on characteristics of the community.

These studies, following the work of Reiss and Black, tend to overemphasize the reactive role of the police and their dependence on the public. Reiss and Black's findings on reactive policing probably reflect their sampling methods...and their model is generally one of 'stimulus-response'. Many encounters, however, are long lasting and complex, with both sides trying to coerce, manipulate, and/or negotiate an outcome that serves particular interests".

(1982, pp. 19-20)
Manning (1979, pp. 24-26) similarly suggests that the significance of calls for service has been exaggerated in previous research.

A further criticism of the reactive/proactive dichotomy emerges from these observations, for this simple distinction does not acknowledge the police officer's interpretation of a citizen's complaint, or the interactional influence of the police officer's behaviour in moulding the citizen's interpretation of the incident which caused him/her to call the police in the first place; the meaning of what is considered a reactive crime report may have already been strongly influenced by the police.

The conceptualization of police discretion thus receives considerable modification in Ericson's account, illustrating how a number of normative systems interact to form the context of police behaviour. Because of the finding that many police decisions are only partly related to criminal law (because they spend very little time engaged in criminal law enforcement; "Most of their time is spent waiting or looking for trouble" 1982, p.23), the rules of police conduct in these non-criminal interactions become paramount. These are the "recipe" rules of police practice - the rules of action learned on the job in the context of the police occupational order. Even in incidents which become defined as crimes these recipe rules, interacting with formal legal rules, police administrative rules and the community context in which policing occurs, play their part in the outcomes of police-citizen interactions.
Legal rules and police organizational rules only produce general guidelines by which the line officer acts (Ericson, 1982, p. 24), with recipe rules for action helping to fill in the details over such matters as: when to stop on suspicion and in what circumstances; when "official paper" is necessary as opposed to notebook recording or nothing at all; how to prepare "official paper"; when and how to charge; how to deal with lawyers and Crown attorneys, etc. (1981, p. 25).

"Many of the recipe rules are known only among the line officers. The rules of the 'law in action' are fully known and thus predictable only to them, and not to police administrators, other criminal control agents, and the public. Patrol officers control the creation of these rules, their use, and knowledge about them in ways that fundamentally secure their power within the organizational 'order of things'."

(1982, p. 26)

These recipe rules, in part, reflect a policeman's worldview of social order, and assumptions about social types. Patrol officers, Ericson suggests, type community groups and members according to two basic criteria, their "political" and "minority" characteristics. Both reflect a group or person's support or opposition to the police. The political dimension of this stereotyping separating those that support the police (conservatives) from those that do not (liberal do-gooders) is not specific to any particular social group. But, noting a general tendency for the police to assume a "middle class view" of the world, the "minority" dimension of the typing is specific. Ericson notes a general police derision of certain ethnic and racial minorities as well as
citizens at the bottom end of society's "scheme of things" - those who do not appear to be seeking upward social mobility in a way that would indicate their identification with the values of middle-class respectability (1982, p. 66). The important point here is that stereotyping procedures are likely to produce systematic attention to certain social groups.

This stereotyping system is consistent with the kind of observations made by Matza and other American researchers. But while at first sight they may only minimally influence the bias of police statistics, they may be importantly consequential in the definition of groups within the social order and in the production of the crime that the statistics measure. Thus traffic checks, which are not considered in studies focusing exclusively on crime incidents, are important actions within the public order mandate of patrol policing even if they do not end up on the record. These stops are mostly proactive, and often involve detention of citizens for extensive investigative checks. Sixty-five percent of all citizen contacts with police observed by Ericson and his team of researchers came as a result of traffic checks, a vital part of ordering the streets. While these non-crime interactions may be important in informal group labelling and identity they may not have an ecological foundation apart from the "incongruity procedure", the appearance of being socially, and sometimes spatially, "out of place".

There is also the question of the compatibility of Canadian, American and British research into police
practices. Mawby uses British, and Ericson Canadian evidence, to evaluate American theory and empirical research. My own experience - which may not be representative - suggests that British police do not use traffic stops as extensively as Canadian and American police. Mawby's work in Sheffield is problematic because it does not test the two most important dimensions of police discretion mentioned in American studies - race and class.

Nevertheless when taken together the studies of Ericson and Gill do suggest that there is much more to the question of the police influence on crime-rates than the literature stressing the importance of public reporting indicates. For Ericson, the police are not simply reacting to citizens' calls for service, but have great interpretative latitude within the context of those calls:

"In ordering their lives, and the lives of others, they can choose to ignore possible criminal law violations, charge some persons and not others, charge for particular things and not others, and produce some facts while ignoring others. These decisions fundamentally affect what becomes officially known as police business."

Police discretion as understood by Ericson in the context of organizational prerogatives, may serve to define "problem" groups in a more general sense than is the case with Gill's analysis of ecological labelling processes. Gill's analysis shows how the development of area based subcultures reflect social policy and allocation procedures and how crime control activities serve to amplify crime. Ericson's analysis shows how police practices may have a more general effect in defining
certain types of people as problematic, and the indirect effect this may have on the configuration of official crime statistics if such stereotyping procedures similarly serve to amplify crime.

To this point the argument over the interpretation of crime statistics has almost come full circle. In chapter 5 the discussion began with the claim made by authors in the sociology of deviance literature that police discretion was responsible for the configuration of crime rates. Subsequently a number of authors have pointed out that police discretion is only significant in proactive investigations, and that because most investigations are reactively generated, the effect of police discretion on crime statistics is minimal. I have suggested that both positions do not sufficiently consider the impact of discretionary practices in the "ordering" mandate of police work, and that police activity may indirectly "produce" criminality which is subsequently reported by the public. We have thus returned to the idea that police activity does influence crime rates. What this means is that the problem of interpreting official statistics and police impact on crime rates is not simply a matter of whether it is the public or the police who report a crime. The relationship between crime and control is much more subtle, especially in terms of assessing the impact of control practices on crime patterns.

So far the argument has developed round the proposition that informal police activity may help to define subcultural groups, and suggested how, through the process of ecological
labelling, certain of these subcultures are area-based. To this point the discussion of police discretion has focused on the decision-making of the police line officer. The discussion proceeds by considering a second dimension of the effect of control practices in moulding actual patterns of criminal behaviour. This concerns police decision-making at an administrative level, particularly in terms of how and where to deploy police patrols. We have already seen in Gill's analysis how police officials responded to "trouble" in Crossley by assigning extra manpower to the area. But the argument that this tactic may have amplified problems in Crossley is not to suggest that police practices always amplify crime. In other situations police practices and manpower allocation procedures may deter or suppress crime, or they may change the pattern of its incidence. To this extent a geography of policing may sometimes be necessary for the explanation of crime patterns. In exploring this possibility the discussion is divided into two parts: the first part considers the effect of intrajurisdictional differences of police patrol deployment on crime rates and patterns; the second part considers the effects of interjurisdictional differences in levels of policing on crime rates and patterns.
Police Patrol and Crime Rate Patterns

1. Intrajurisdictional Effects

Harries notes that the relationship between intensity of law enforcement and levels of crime has attracted a fairly substantial literature (1980, p. 63) but the literature he cites deals largely with the impact of uniform patrol deployment on crime rates, and thus generally on patrol strategy rather than on the nature of discretionary bias: Press (1971); Swimmer (1974); Tittle and Rowe (1974); Wellford (1974); and Pogue (1975), on the relation between patrol intensity and crime rates; and Larson (1972); Elliot (1973); Sweeney and Ellingsworth (1973); and Chaiken (1975), on the "operational environment" of law enforcement.

An examination of this police science literature shows that little consensus of opinion has been reached concerning the effect of patrol deployment on crime rates. A comparison of the findings of two different studies of changes in patrol deployment will serve to suggest that no definitive statements about these relationships can be warranted without further careful empirical investigation.

Police patrol strategies have been based on two unproven but widely accepted hypotheses according to the Police Foundation study (1977). First, that visible police presence prevents crime by deterring potential offenders; and second, that the public's fear of crime is diminished by such police
presence. The fear of crime has been an emerging theme in the criminological literature recently. Springer's work (1974), is unusual to the extent that he utilizes a geographical perspective to throw light on this problem. Also Ley's, (1974) "stress topography" map of Monroe, a Philadelphia neighbourhood, is generated from a questionnaire mainly designed to measure perceived crime danger.

Between October 1st, 1972 and September 30th, 1973, the Kansas City Police Department conducted an experiment to measure the impact of routine preventative patrol on the incidence of crime and the public fear of crime. The experimenters concluded that "traditional routine preventative patrol had no significant impact on either the level of crime or the public's feeling of security." In the experiment three types of patrol areas were designated. In one, the reactive type, there was no routine preventative patrol - officers only entered one of these areas in response to a citizen call for assistance. In the second, the proactive type, police visibility was increased by two to three times its usual level. In the third type of area the usual patrol was maintained.

In summarizing the findings thirteen points were made suggesting that no statistically significant differences could be found between the areas in terms of such measures as a victimization study of the areas, departmental crime reporting, arrest patterns, community attitudes to the police, protective

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security measures taken by the public, traffic accidents, and police response times in answering calls for service.

Let us compare these findings to those of a New York experiment conducted some twenty years earlier. "Operation 25" had among its various goals the purely experimental purpose of determining what would constitute adequate policing in a busy New York precinct (Ficklin, 1970). The experiment began on September 1st and concluded on December 31st, 1954. It was an example of what has been termed saturation patrol, but also included establishment of a special Juvenile Aid Bureau, a special Narcotics Squad, increases in the regular precinct detective squad and in traffic and emergency service personnel. The precinct chosen was described as a "crime-ridden urban area" (p. 342) containing a mixed population of more than 120,000 persons of whom roughly two thirds were non-white.

Prior to the experiment the uniformed force included 188 patrolmen. By importing probationary patrolmen directly upon graduation from the Police Academy, this number was increased to 440. In place of fifteen sergeants for supervision of patrol there were thirty-three, five captains in place of one, and an additional Deputy Inspector assigned to supervise the operation. Instead of 27 men being turned out for one tour of foot and radio patrol duty, the experimental force numbered 99. The precinct's detective squad was also strengthened by the addition of two sergeants, eleven detectives, and eight patrolmen to the existing thirty-three man unit. Besides
creation of a Narcotics Squad, a further task-force was constituted to investigate vice, gambling and liquor-law violations (Ficklin, 1970, pp. 343-346).

Results of the experiment were claimed as dramatic. During the experiment only 488 felonies were reported compared to 1102 for the same four month period a year earlier, a decrease of 55.6 percent. Importantly, in New York as a whole, there was only a 4.7% decline in the same period. The number of misdemeanors actually rose, but the authors hide this fact by suggesting that the total number of crime complaints, both felonies and misdemeanors, declined by 27.5%, or from 1757 to 1273. This statistical ploy helps to mask an increase by averaging it away; misdemeanor complaints rose from 655 to 749. And the important implication this has for our discussion of crime rates is that this increase may represent a better apprehension rate rather than a change in social behaviour. This certainly was the case with the incidence of disorderly conduct, dangerous weapons, and narcotic offences, those which are almost always recorded as the result of police instigated action. Similarly juvenile referrals increased dramatically from 135 in the equivalent four month period in 1953 to 372 during the experimental period. Summonses for traffic offences also showed an overall increase (Ficklin, pp. 344-348).

In noting the impact of Operation 25 in reducing certain crime levels Lohn Ficklin concludes

Operation 25 was, in essence, a practical test of police theory, the theory being that an adequate police force properly supervised can effectively reduce crime and maintain law and
order, peace, and security in an area of any kind. The experiment...was an unqualified success.

(1970, p. 351)

Compare this statement to that made by The Police Foundation, from an apparently impressive list of the non-effects of patrol differentials. The Kansas City experimenters were moved to making some extravagant claims:

The experiment (showed) that routine preventative patrol in marked police cars has little value in preventing crime or in making citizens feel safe...The results of the preventative patrol experiment...repudiated a tradition prevailing in police work for almost 150 years... (making it) necessary to develop viable alternatives to the obsolescent concept of preventative patrol.

(1977, pp. 118-119)

Unfortunately the experiments are not strictly comparable to the extent that the Kansas City study only concerned preventative uniform patrol. But this difference is not sufficient to explain their diametrically opposed findings. Also, the Kansas City study is characterized by a serious methodological flaw, one which makes its findings problematic; in the process of assessing the effects of changing patrol densities, no members of the public were asked if they perceived these changes in police allocation. If they did not, it is hardly surprising that crime rates did not reflect experimental changes in patrol density. The issue is complicated by the possibility of a time-lag between patrol density change, perception of that change, and its subsequent impact on criminal activity. The problem is that if something is not perceived as real, it may not to be real in its

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consequences. In addition some of the patrol/no patrol areas were so small that change in patrol allocation would not be noticeable. Since police responded to calls for serve in the no patrol areas, in marked cars, no area was actually without visible patrol. On top of all of this one has to incorporate the various arguments described in chapter 5 concerning the impact of discretionary bias - the effect of police bias is necessarily related to police patrol intensity. The New York City study actually provides evidence demonstrating this rather obvious relationship despite the researchers' attempts to select evidence which showed that crime decreases as police density increases. And where the authors did show that criminal activity decreased, the possibility that it was simply displaced to another area was not entertained.

With the exception of the recent work on crime "spillover" (Hakim and Rengert, 1981), geographers have tended to gloss over the general confusion issuing from such studies by avoiding any systematic consideration of police patrol deployment on levels of crime. The general assumption apparently guiding the geography of crime is that patterns of patrol deployment have little effect. Carter and Hill, for example, suggest that their findings in Criminals' Images of Urban Areas (1979) are consistent with the position emerging from the Kansas City study that different methods of employing police patrol forces resulted in no statistically significant differences in subsequent crime levels (Police Foundation, 1977). While this conclusion is very convenient for the
interpretation of crime rate maps, the evidence for the confirmation of the Kansas City findings is rather slim. Carter and Hill in comparing perceptions of "criminals" and "non-criminals" note that both groups associated "strong police protection" with "low crime incidence", but that "criminals" do not associate "hard marks" (i.e. difficult targets) as strongly as non-criminals with "strong police protection". In that they do not, it appears that some criminals are not very concerned about levels of policing in their choice of targets, and in turn, that levels of policing presumably do not influence levels of crime. But if this is so, why would Carter and Hill's criminals associate low crime-rates with strong police protection? And apparently criminals do associate hard marks with strong police protection, just not as strongly as non-criminals. Taken in this light, Carter and Hill's findings seem to be consistent with the findings of Operation 25!

One useful insight for the geography of crime to emerge from these contradictory findings is that the importance of patrol and enforcement strategies in the configuration of crime rates cannot be dismissed.

A final anecdote serves to stress the potential importance of enforcement differentials. Donald Rumbelow, in I Spy Blue (1971), illustrates some of the consequences of the piecemeal implementation of police patrol. He suggests young thieves went to great lengths to avoid nineteenth century London's City Day Police, formerly the City Patrol, founded in 1784. The movement of young thieves from Whitechapel to Aldgate occurred 217.
at 8 o'clock when the Day Police went off duty. But the establishment of patrols was piecemeal. The Solicitor-General of that time noted the success of certain patrols when he introduced to Parliament the London and Westminster Police Bill. He proposed a similar plan;

"but to extend generally to every part of the town, and its environs; for if it were to be confined to the heart of the city, it would drive the robbers to the out-skirts, and if it were only to be applied in the out-skirts, it would bring them all to the centre."

(1971, p. 104)

Rumbelow offers an example of this effect created by the structure of the jurisdictional boundaries of the various patrols. The formation of the New Police outside the City of London may have caused an increase of criminal activity within the city. A city watchman of that time suggested that an increase of "bad characters" had occurred on his beat. Moreover

"when there was a quarrel among them the other night, a policeman came up and drove them through the Bar, saying, 'Ye shant stand here; go into the City with you rows!' Sir Peter Laurie said that he had heard that a police magistrate had directed the policeman to drive all bad characters into the City. If there was any truth in this, it was an imprudent - an improper observation. He desired the watchman present to drive all the bad characters out of the City instead of apprehending them in future. 'We can play at tennis-ball,' said the Alderman in an undertone."

(Quoted in Rumbelow, 1971, p. 114)

While this example serves to illustrate the potential effect of patrol deployment on patterns of criminal activity, it also raises the next topic of concern, the effect of
interjurisdictional differences in levels of policing on crime patterns. In the case of the New Police, jurisdictional differences were responsible for the piecemeal implementation of patrols with the result that adaptations of criminal activity appears to have relocated it to areas and times when police patrols were absent. The question now becomes whether criminal behaviour adapts to less obvious interjurisdictional differences in policing, a problem taken up by the recent research on what has been termed "crime spillover".

**Interjurisdictional Effects: Policing and Crime Spillover**

The term "crime spillover" has been used in general to describe interjurisdictional "externalities" with reference to the effectiveness of levels of policing or to differentials in the distribution of criminal opportunities (Hakim and Rengert, 1981, p. 14). For the most part the literature has concentrated on the spillover of criminal activity in response to "mechanical" law enforcement or crime prevention programs (mechanical in the sense that they are directed towards reducing criminal opportunities or increasing the risk to the offender), or to the way in which crime rates are statistically related to intercommunity differences in policing, for it is suggested that increases in local manpower may increase the crime rate in neighbouring jurisdictions. Intercommunity differences in policing are measured either in terms of
expenditures on police (Mehay, 1977; Hakim et al, 1979) or arrest rates (Fabrikant, 1979).

While the spillover literature is closely related to attempts at assessing the effectiveness of patrol strategies, it is particularly interesting because it attempts to assess the effect of policing on changes in patterns of criminal activity. The police patrol literature is less useful in this respect, for evaluations of patrol strategies have generally ignored the possibility that in achieving the reduction of crime rates in one area, crimes may simply be displaced to other areas (McIver, 1981, p. 32). Such displacement has been termed a form of spillover by Hakim and Rengert (1981), but most of the spillover literature (including the papers in the volume edited by Hakim and Rengert, 1981) examines the effect of police activity more generally rather than focusing on particular patrol strategies. And it does so in order to evaluate the spatial consequences of police activity.9

The balance of the evidence suggests that interjurisdictional variations in levels of policing do influence crime rates (for discussion see McIver, 1981). Mehay (1977) suggests that crime rates are related to intercommunity differences in police manpower; increases in local manpower increase the property crime rate (but not the violent crime rate) in neighbouring jurisdictions. Deutsch et al (1979) argue that police activity levels displace crime from the suburbs to the central city of Atlanta. Fabrikant (1979), from an analysis of police records of juvenile offenders, found that
different arrest rates clearly affect the location of juvenile robberies. Hakim et al give evidence of a spillover of auto theft and residential burglary in an interjurisdictional analysis of police efforts (as measured by police expenditures per capita) and crime rates. But in contrast to this list of findings McPheters and Stronge (1981), in a study of spillover in the Boston metropolitan area, conclude that the influence of neighbouring enforcement activity on local crime may be negligible (McIver, 1981).

Although the methodological approach of these studies is limited to the extent that they generally use cross-sectional as opposed to time-series data (Mehay, 1981, p. 79) the weight of the evidence suggests that control activities do play a part in structuring patterns of criminal activity. Similarly the discussion of ecological labelling, of general police discretionary practices in ordering the streets, and the possible displacement of criminal activity associated with police patrol deployment has suggested that control activities do help to shape the spatial expression of illegal behaviour. The concept of displacement is particularly interesting in the context of the present discussion because it meets the theoretical requirements for an integrated geographic analysis of crime and control. The empirical significance of displacement phenomena has been characteristically associated with crime prevention strategies, particularly as a consequence of environmental design programs. In keeping with this general approach, Hakim and Rengert restrict the term displacement to
crime spillover associated with prevention programs (1981, Ch. 1). In Chapter 7, I suggest that the displacement concept can be extended to cover a much wider range of effects, and generally serve as one effective unifying theme for an integrated geography of crime and control. The subsequent discussion, and the research vignettes presented in chapters eight and nine, serve to demonstrate the empirical and theoretical significance of displacement phenomena.
Notes to Chapter 6

1. See Rubington's *City Police* (1973) for plentiful evidence of police use of incongruity procedures.

2. Police harassment of black youths is an abiding complaint of the United States' black population - see, for example, Ley (1974) who develops a "stress index" for Monroe, an inner city Philadelphia neighbourhood. The questionnaire on which the stress index is based includes a question on police harassment.

3. In the geographic literature Gray's (1976) study of public housing allocation procedures in terms of the labelling of people and estates is relevant here.

4. In a personal communication referring to his inner city neighbourhood study of Monroe, David Ley has noted that the local Philadelphia news media refrain from reporting the names of gangs in their crime stories precisely because gangs and gang members achieve status by making the news. Sometimes gang activities may become so problematic that an individual case-worker is assigned to a particular gang membership. Ironically this response to the problem behaviour of the gang actually enhances their status (from their point of view).

5. The quotation is taken from Foucault (1977).

6. For a general discussion of this theme see chapters 2 and 4 in *Reproducing Order* (1982).


8. My thanks to Dr. Paul Brantingham for bringing this example to my attention.

9. Most of the literature is written by economists; eight of the eleven authors contributing to the Hakim and Rengert volume (1981) are economists. But Rengert is a geographer, and one who acknowledges the analytic link between crime and control.
The concept of displacement of phenomena was first introduced to criminology in connection with mechanical crime control strategies. Thomas Reppetto (1976) offered the first systematic discussion of displacement by examining the argument that crime prevention or enforcement programs which stress opportunity reduction or increased risk to offenders are without value because they merely displace crime by shifting its incidence to other times, forms or locales. Given the cost of such programs, particularly in terms of broad environmental design strategies as envisaged by Angel (1968), Jeffery (1971), and Newman (1972), they are likely to be piecemeal in their development, and less than comprehensive in their geographic extent. While preventative or enforcement programs may serve to suppress crime in the areas in which they are implemented, it may be simply at the price of increasing crime rates in other area.

Reppetto identified five modes of displacement potentially associated with "target hardening" or "risk increasing" crime prevention programs: spatial (the literal form of displacement from area to area); temporal (change of characteristic time of crime prevention); tactical (change of modus operandi rather than target); and target displacement (a shift to another target within the same area); or a combination of these four.
displacement types (1976, pp. 168-169). Reppetto suggests that the ultimate value of mechanical crime prevention programs appears critically dependent on their capacity to avoid large-scale displacement effects. But his conclusion in this respect is equivocal. At one point he asserts that there are definite limits to various displacement possibilities, especially in terms of those crimes which are so opportunistic that their prevention in one circumstance is unlikely to lead to their occurrence in another (1976, p. 166). Elsewhere he cites a study of saturation policing in New York City (Press, 1971) noting that burglary rates showed no change in either the experimental or boundary areas, but that as robbery rates declined in the "saturated" precinct, they increased in adjacent areas (Reppetto, 1976, p. 175). Unfortunately Reppetto offers little empirical evidence to throw light upon the problem.

While in general there are few studies of displacement effects as such, a number of other authors have recently suggested their significance (Winchester, 1978, p. 118; Mayhew et al, 1976, pp. 5-6; Harries, 1980, pp. 100-101). Gabor (1978) has described several studies which examine displacement, but laments that none of their authors actually specify the criteria by which the effect can be identified. Importantly the studies he cites only consider displacement as a result of preventative design strategies or levels of police surveillance (Press, 1971; Chaiken, Lawless and Stephenson, 1974; Lateef, 1974; Tyrpak, 1975; Waldt, 1975). To date,
displacement phenomena have only been considered as they pertain to "mechanical" crime prevention and law enforcement strategies.

My contention is that displacement phenomena may be associated with a wider range of criminal justice strategies and other varieties of social control policies. An examination of various types of displacement effects in a variety of historical and contemporary social situations serves to illustrate the importance of control policies in providing contexts which shape social activity. The search for displacement effects thus provides a guiding theme for developing a critical geographic appraisal of the effects of social control policy, particularly for examining the relationship between law, law enforcement and (criminal) behaviour. In attempting to describe the effects of social control processes on actual behaviour, displacement serves as an organizing concept around which some of these relationships may be systematized. The subsequent discussion will therefore not be restricted to mechanical criminal justice strategies.

For the purposes of this discussion displacement refers to changes in patterns of (criminal) behaviour in response to social control practices. The purpose of my discussion in this and the two chapters that follow is to demonstrate the broad applicability of the concept applied in this way to a variety of criminal justice strategies. In this chapter a number of examples of such effects are reviewed including typological and temporal displacements as well as purely spatial effects.
The three cameos presented in the second part of the discussion focus on spatial displacement phenomena. The first examines the spatial impact of environmental design programs in nineteenth century London; the second examines the migrational consequences of nineteenth century Poor Law policy in England, while the third discusses a number of different descriptions of the impact of law change and law enforcement changes on patterns of prostitution.

In Chapters eight and nine two further studies of displacement are presented. The first, described in Chapter 8, builds on the review of studies of prostitution by showing how patterns of street prostitution in Vancouver, British Columbia, changed as a result of both changes in law interpretation and law enforcement. The second example, presented in Chapter nine, examines the effects of the implementation of "Neighbourhood Watch" burglary prevention programs in Burnaby and Vancouver, demonstrating the kind of displacement effects Repetto suggests as accompanying "mechanical" crime prevention strategies. In combination the various examples reviewed here together with the two research vignettes presented, demonstrate how the displacement concept can be extended to include a wider range of crime control activities (and, in the case of poor law, to related control activities also).

The research vignettes presented in Chapters eight and nine also serve to emphasize some of the problems involved with the interpretation of official statistics for the spatial analysis of crime discussed in Chapter 5.
While most of the examples of displacement described represent the unintended consequences of various crime and social control policies, we must not forget that certain types of policy may deliberately attempt to relocate unwanted activities as was the case with Sir Peter Laurie's informal "tennis-ball" policy referred to in Chapter 6. The distinction of intended and unintended displacement effects is complicated by the possibility that other purposes may underlie the stated intentions of various laws or law enforcement policies; the covert intentions of certain policies may reflect the desire simply to displace certain behaviours in lieu of their prevention or suppression. Of course, any assertion to this extent would be enormously difficult to prove.

With these various considerations in mind, a tentative scheme can be developed to describe the potential displacement effects associated with a variety of crime control strategies (Table 1 and 1A). The scheme distinguishes intentional and unintentional forms of three types of displacement; the typological, spatial, and temporal forms identified by Reppetto (1976). Two main types of criminal justice strategy are identified, although these are better thought of as elements of an integrated system which itself is linked to other institutional structures. The first type (Table 1) falling under the title "social engineering" has two components; (a) general programs aimed at the perceived social causes of crime (the preventative component) and (b) programs aimed at "rehabilitating" offenders either in the community or in
Table 1

POTENTIAL DISPLACEMENT EFFECTS ASSOCIATED WITH "SOCIAL ENGINEERING" STRATEGIES.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criminal Justice Strategy</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Intentional Consequences</th>
<th>Unintentional Consequences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Typo-Logical</td>
<td>Spatial</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Temporal</td>
<td>Spatial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Typo-Logical</td>
<td>Temporal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORRECTIONAL</td>
<td>Individual Post-Hoc Treatment of identified offenders in institutional or community settings</td>
<td>Rehabilitation oriented imprisonment, community corrections, probation, parole.</td>
<td>&quot;Corraling&quot; displacement from society</td>
<td>Temporary elimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREVENTATIVE</td>
<td>Reduction of criminal intention through social programs or institutional change</td>
<td>General programs aimed at the perceived social causes of crime; unemployment, education family services psychiatric counselling etc.</td>
<td>A centrifugal effect created by attractive programs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1A
POTENTIAL DISPLACEMENT EFFECTS ASSOCIATED WITH "MECHANICAL" STRATEGIES.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criminal Justice Strategy</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Intentional Consequences</th>
<th>Unintentional Consequences</th>
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<tr>
<td>SUPPRESSIVE</td>
<td>Reduction of criminal</td>
<td>Police patrol strategies by</td>
<td>Displacement from</td>
<td>Change to other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>opportunity by increasing</td>
<td>increasing risk of</td>
<td>jurisdiction (covert?)</td>
<td>criminal enter-prize</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>risk of detection</td>
<td>detection</td>
<td>or area</td>
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<tr>
<td>PREVENTATIVE</td>
<td>Reduction of criminal</td>
<td>Environmental design, target</td>
<td>Displacement from</td>
<td>Crime displaced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>opportunity through</td>
<td>hardening strategies etc.</td>
<td>jurisdiction (covert?)</td>
<td>criminal to other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>environmental design</td>
<td></td>
<td>or area</td>
<td>areas times</td>
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<tr>
<td>PUNITIVE</td>
<td>Reduction of criminal</td>
<td>Incarceration</td>
<td>Temporary elimination</td>
<td>Crime displaced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>intention through deterrence</td>
<td></td>
<td>Discovery of new M.O.</td>
<td>to other times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>strategies</td>
<td></td>
<td>and/or criminal contacts</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELIMINATIVE</td>
<td>Geographic elimination</td>
<td>Transportation deportation</td>
<td>Displacement from</td>
<td>Crime displaced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of offender or</td>
<td></td>
<td>jurisdiction</td>
<td>to other areas</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>literal elimination</td>
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<td></td>
<td>natural life imprisonment</td>
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</table>

230.
institutional settings - the "correctional/suppressive" component. The second type (Table 1A) referred to as "mechanical strategies", is comprised of four components; (a) "Suppressive" - law enforcement strategies aimed at increasing the risk of detection to offenders; (b) "Preventative" - target hardening and environmental design programs designed to reduce opportunities to commit crime; (c) "Punitive" - policies aimed at deterring the potential offender by punishment of the adjudicated offender; (d) "Eliminative" - policies aimed at the geographic elimination of the offender.

At this juncture it is worth stressing the point that these various components of the two major types of strategy identified are not mutually exclusive, but are often combined. Mechanical preventative programs may be interwoven with mechanical suppressive strategies - the Neighbourhood Watch program examined in Chapter 9 not only aims at hardening targets, but also at increasing the risk to offenders by marking valuable household items thereby facilitating the easier identification of stolen goods. Imprisonment may be seen both as a social engineering strategy aimed at rehabilitating offenders, and as a mechanical punitive strategy aimed at punishing them; at different times the relative importance of either of these components may be stressed.

An attempt has also been made to distinguish intentional and unintentional displacement effects acknowledging that some programs ostensibly designed to suppress crime may in fact be designed covertly to displace it.
Temporal Displacement: An Example

Although the possibility of temporal displacement has received little attention in the criminological literature, one example has been described by Hunt and Weiner (1977) in their assessment of the impact of a juvenile "curfew". A curfew is a police enforced ordinance which restricts opportunity for crime by inhibiting movement of all juveniles outside their parents custody after a specific evening hour (Hunt and Weiner, 1977, p. 407). A curfew of this type was implemented in Detroit during the summer of 1976 as a reaction to "unusually high criminal activity by juveniles, particularly by growing youth gangs" (p. 407). A curfew was imposed between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.. Hunt and Weiner examined the profile of juvenile crime activity for the month of August, 1976, the most intensive period of publicity and police enforcement of the curfew.

For comparative purposes the researchers computed the daily juvenile crime profile during the month of August by averaging the data for 1971, 1973, 1974 and 1975. They provide an aggregate profile for Part 1 offences (homicide, robbery, rape, assault, burglary, larceny and auto theft) and two individual measures, one for robbery, the other for burglary. The robbery and burglary profiles are reproduced in Figure 1. The solid line represents the average profile, the dotted line the incidence of crime during the curfew period. Hunt and Weiner conclude that although crime levels abated during the curfew period, the overall rate of crime through the day did
Figure 1. Temporal Displacement of Juvenile Offences*  

**DISTRIBUTION OF BURGLARY**

* (from Hunt and Weiner, 1977)

**DISTRIBUTION OF ROBBERY**
not change; the criminal activity previously occurring in what became the curfew period was simply displaced, particularly to the period between two and four o'clock in the afternoon. This effect obtained for both robbery and burglary and for the aggregate measure of part one offences. The authors thus note that while the curfew appeared to be successful, the displacement of criminal activity was the unintended consequence.\(^2\)

**Typological Displacement: Two Examples**

Again, although the possibility of typological displacement has received little attention in the criminological literature, two examples have been described.

Gooberman in his study of "Operation Intercept" (1974), indicates how a period of intense surveillance at the U. S. - Mexican border designed to stop the flow of marijuana into the U.S. did have this effect. Described by U. S. Bureau of Customs officials as "an unprecedented historic effort" they urged that Operation Intercept "proved for the first time we could effectively interdict the flow of marijuana into the U. S." (Gooberman, p. 1). By curtailing supply, it was hoped that the difficulty of obtaining marijuana coupled with its higher price would lead to an overall reduction of illegal drug use in the United States. The Attorney General at that time, Richard Kleindienst, was reported as saying that the administration would like to make marijuana smoking as
expensive as heroin, for few youths would experiment with it at that price (Gooberman, p. 4). The youths Kleindienst had in mind were those forming the campus and middle-American youth drug-culture. What the Operation Intercept policy did not recognize was the diversity of marijuana using groups, the degrees to which shortages effect them, and the differences in availability of substitute illegal drugs to them; the unintended consequence of the enforcement campaign was that the users of marijuana experimented with other drugs. In Reppetto's sense, a typological displacement occurred, but it occurred differentially - in New York, white users largely turned to hashish, amphetamines and certain hallucinogens while ghetto-users turned to heroin. For the ghetto-users, the control of marijuana supply (a physically non-addictive drug) led to the development of a more intractable problem in the use of an addictive drug. Gooberman interviewed a number of addicts who suggested that they first used heroin during the marijuana shortage following Operation Intercept.

In another study Letkeman (1974, p. 89) suggests that a form of typological displacement has resulted from the intensification of alarm system usage and target hardening strategies adopted by business establishments. His informants (Canadian Penitentiary inmates) argued that the increased difficulty of burglarizing banks led to a rise in the number of bank robberies and, further, that the general widespread use of alarms has meant that the burglary of business establishments in general has given way to armed robbery. Robbery in this
case becomes the unintended consequence of target hardening programs. McDonald (1976), in a study of armed robbery, offers a related argument to explain the proliferation of bank robberies in the U.S.A. in the early 1970's. The main reason for this increase may have been the coincidental proliferation of suburban branch banks which were typically provided with only minimal security systems (McDonald, 1975, p. 329; also Conklin, 1972, p.40). The verification of these arguments is, of course, likely to be the subject of debate for some time to come.

Geographical Displacement: Three Cameos

Whilst the possibility of displacement effects has been raised as a potentially critical obstacle to the implementation of environmental design crime prevention programs, there is not much evidence available to demonstrate the spatial impact of other crime control and related strategies. But there are some indications. Three cameos are presented to demonstrate the manner in which certain behaviour patterns represent adaptations to or are modified by social control policies and institutional activities, and how law and law enforcement practices provide important contexts for behaviour. Most criminological literature concerned with the effects of criminal law has, however, focused on its capacity in deterring crime, or on the unintended consequences of criminal labelling in amplifying crime by producing "secondary deviation".
Perhaps one reason for the crystallization of this deterrence-amplification continuum is the disciplinary concentration on criminal acts or activities of criminals. Such a view seems to miss the implications of a variety of marginal and non-criminal activities which nevertheless reflect the way law structures social life, and the way criminal activity may adapt and respond to enforcement efforts. My concern is thus to examine how social activity is adaptive to or modified by law and law enforcement practices. While such a concern includes deterrence and deviance amplification, it also includes behaviour moulded in such a way that it is ambiguous in terms of the law, behaviour moulded to protect an individual from the scrutiny of the law, and behaviour designed to influence the creation of law or the focus of law enforcement.

In the search for empirical precedents, I have consequently not simply focused on criminal activity, but also on behaviour that might be said to take place in that grey zone at the "edge of the law".

The three vignettes selected from secondary sources presented below describe not only the displacement effects associated directly with criminal justice policy, but also the spatial impact of related policies designed to control and contain (or sometimes disperse) what are perceived as "problem" (i.e. potentially criminal) social groups. Two of the vignettes describe consequences of nineteenth century British social policies designed to control the "dangerous classes". The third examines the spatial impact of specific law
enforcement policies aimed at suppressing vice, particularly prostitution, in early twentieth century North America.

A. Environmental Design as Social Engineering: A Nineteenth Century Allegory?

Crime prevention through environmental design has been hailed by its practitioners as a product of the twentieth century; its pedigree is usually traced back through Newman (1972) and Jeffery (1971) to Jane Jacobs (1961). But environmental design is, in a sense, a child of the nineteenth century (if not earlier) re-dressed for twentieth century consumption. While the example cited here may represent more of a parody than an allegory, it does suggest that a crude environmentalism does little to change anything but the surface appearance of social problems. While some types of crime may be suppressed by restricting opportunity, crime itself may only be the epiphenomenal expression of some deeper social malaise. To this extent nineteenth century programs of street development deliberately routed through London's "rookeries" not only enhanced transportation facilities but also offered the ancilliary benefit of slum clearance. But as a result slum problems, particularly crime, rather than being alleviated were simply displaced.

According to H. J. Dyos (1957), the Commissioner of Sewers for Finsbury wrote to the Privy Council in 1835 to say that an extension of Farringdon Street would not only create a
communication link between north and south London, but also that such an improvement was "far more important as relating to the health of that part of the capital through which it would be made, by the removal of a description of buildings that have long been a hotbed of disease, misery and crime." Dyos gives evidence that officials in Westminster shared such views over the proposed development of New Oxford Street through St. Giles and this general attitude was epitomized by the Select Committee on Metropolitan Improvements of 1838. In their second report, the Committee did not "confine themselves to the single purpose of obtaining increased facilities of communication" but suggested that "other public benefits might in some cases be derived simultaneously with that principal object", in particular the partial clearance of the St. Giles' "rookery" by means of an extension of Oxford Street (Dyos, 1957, p. 262). Street improvements were thus seen as including positive social effects, improving public health and morals. Dyos suggests that the lines taken by new streets were generally determined by their effectiveness in clearing as many slum dwellings as possible. Street improvement during these years was seen as the only effective large scale method of rectifying some of the worst features of urban growth. But such a naive expectation conspicuously failed to obliterate slums "which were generally merely displaced, often in aggravated forms, to other localities." (Dyos, 1957, p. 264).

Henry Mayhew, a nineteenth century commentator, lends support to Dyos' hypothesis that street developments displaced
the conditions they were routed to alleviate. Mayhew noted:

About twenty years ago a number of narrow streets, thickly populated with thieves, prostitutes, and beggars were removed when New Commercial Street was formed.  

(1852, Vol. 4, p. 313)

He acknowledged the value of this development as "leaving a wide space in the midst of a densely populated neighbourhood, which is favourable to its sanitary condition, and might justly be considered one of the lungs of the metropolis." One thus cannot deny the impact of urban redevelopment as ameliorating physical living conditions, but, according to Mayhew, this did not effectively change the lot of the displaced population.

The rookery in Spitalfields we proposed to visit is comprised within a space of about 400 square yards...and contains 800 thieves, vagabonds, beggars, and prostitutes, a large proportion of whom may be traced to the old criminal inhabitants of the now extinct Essex Street and Old Rose Lane.

(1862, Vol. 4, p. 313)

According to Mayhew, some 150,000 persons of "bad character" inhabited England and Wales in 1848 and constituted what were referred to at that time as the "criminal" classes (1862, Vol. 3, p. 377). In 1857 there were some 8,600 prostitutes known to the police in London, but because of the inadequacy of police statistics, he gives credence to estimates that there were 80,000 prostitutes in the metropolis at this time (p. 225). While not for now dwelling upon the reasons for this large surplus population, it is hardly surprising that urban cosmetic surgery failed to improve their lot. What is particularly interesting, given the themes of this dissertation, is the effect the system of social control had on
the movement of this population and the discrepancy between the
goal of the policy and its actual effect. This becomes the
topic of the second vignette.

B. **Social Control and Migration: The Spatial Effect of Poor
Law Policy in Nineteenth Century England.**

Of the 16 million people in England and Wales in 1841
Mayhew suggests that 12% (2 million) lived by pauperism,
mendicancy or crime. As noted above, Mayhew suggests that
150,000 of these constituted the "criminal classes" (excluding
paupers and mendicants). While we may question this rigid
classification (many beggars may also have been thieves), and
the reliability of the statistics used, there did appear to be
a huge unemployed underclass in Britain at this time.
Significantly, many of this group were juveniles (1862, Vol. 3,
p. 393). In Mayhew's opinion, juvenile vagrancy acted as one
of the main suppliers of the criminal class and constituted one
of the most dangerous elements of society:

That vagrancy is the nursery of crime, and
that the habitual tramps are first the
beggars, then the thieves, and, finally, the
convicts of the country, the evidence of all
parties goes to prove.

(1862, Vol. 3, p. 398)

This was the culmination of a massive period of social
readjustment which made vagrancy even more prevalent in Great
Britain than in certain earlier periods. The mobility of the
working classes and their feudal predecessors had been
controlled by the Poor Laws since the thirteenth century. The increasing mobility of the working classes in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries led to the establishment of "casual wards", the free hostellries of the unemployed work people.

But vagrancy, for Mayhew, expressed a telling contradiction. On the one hand the hostellries were necessary to provide food and shelter for unemployed workers:

> The mere fact of a man's seeking work in different parts of the country may be taken as evidence that he is indisposed to live on the charity or labour of others; and this feeling should be encouraged in every rational manner. (1952, Vol. 3, p. 368).

But on the other hand it was his opinion that "the establishment of these gratuitous hotels has called into existence a large class of wayfarers, for whom they were never contemplated". (1862, Vol. 3, p. 368); such places encouraged erratic spirits and compounded what Mayhew thought was the prime cause of vagabondage, the lack of inculeation of a habit of industry.

Mayhew identified three classes of vagrant of which the smallest was considered to be those temporarily out of work. A second class was constituted by the Irish as a result of the potato famine, but this was not as criminally inclined as the remaining class, the "habitualized vagrants", those for whom vagrancy had become a way of life.

Whether Mayhew is correct as to the decisive role of the casual wards in generating vagrancy is open to conjecture (Jones, 1972, for example, offers a very different type of
explanation for conditions in nineteenth century England). But one does experience a sense of *déjà vu* reading Mayhew's account which adumbrates many elements of more recent sociological theory and contemporary popular opinion; lack of socialization has been a consistent feature in sociological accounts of deviance, and the "welfare bum" is still subject to the wrath of the American hardhat. In suggesting "bad companions" as one of the main causes of vagrancy (1862, Vol. 3, p. 378), he offers a hint of the later development of differential association and subcultural theory.

Although not using the concept, Mayhew suggested that the intensification of vagrancy was the unanticipated consequence of the casual ward program. He also illustrated the way that the organization and functioning of these wards moulded patterns of seasonal migration. Again this pattern effect can be interpreted as an unintended consequence of the poor relief system. What Mayhew's description deftly illustrates is the way in which patterns of vagrancy must be understood in the context of the poor relief system.

Mayhew was particularly struck by the unequal spatial and temporal distribution of vagrants throughout the Poor Law Unions of England and Wales. To explain this distribution Mayhew presented and attempted to corroborate the opinion of an experienced vagrant. According to this informant, the vagrants moved to London in large bodies at the end of December when the winter refuges opened up. The regular vagrants left London during April and early May. Mayhew's informant suggested that
the movement of the vagrants was explicitly connected to Casual Relief policy:

A very large portion of the wandering beggars and thieves would remain in town if they were allowed to remain longer in their nightly haunts; but after the closing of the refuges, the system of not permitting them more than one night in the same union forces them to be continually on the move: so they set off immediately they have made themselves known at all the workhouses. The boys will mostly go in small gangs of two or three. Before they start, they generally pick up from some other band whom they meet in the London wards the kind of treatment and relief they will receive at the country unions, and they regulate their journey accordingly; and they will very often go one or two days march out of their way, in order to avoid some union that has a bad character among them, or to get to some other union where the accommodation is good, and the work required of them very slight.

(1862, Vol. 3, p. 400)

A recognizable circuit developed with young vagrants travelling through Essex and Suffolk northwards to Leeds. The Mendicity Asylum in Leeds was particularly popular because after providing a night's lodgings, boys might be given threepence, fourpence or even sixpence according to the apparent worthiness of the applicant. From Leeds they travelled in different directions, some through Durham and Northumberland, others to Manchester where a Quaker society furnished similar treatment to that received in Leeds. Those travelling North rarely entered Scotland since the vagrants fared very poorly beyond Berwick receiving little more than barley cake. From Northumberland they travelled through Cumberland, Westmoreland and Lancashire, then branching off into Cheshire and North Wales or Staffordshire and Derbyshire,
and then south to Birmingham, a favoured meeting place. In Birmingham:

they make a point of tearing up their clothes, because for this offence they are committed to Warwick Gaol for a month, and have a shilling on being discharged from the prison. It is not the diet of Warwick Gaol that induces them to do this, but the shilling. Frequently they tear up their clothes in order to get a fresh supply.

The rationale for this behaviour allows us to fully appreciate the extreme poverty of the youths in question:

From continually sleeping in their clothes, and never washing their bodies or changing their shirts...they (the clothes) get to swarm with vermin, to such an extent that they cannot bear them upon their bodies...I have seen the lice on their clothes in the sunshine, as thick as blight on the leaves of trees. When their garments, from this cause, get very uncomfortable to them, they will tear them up, for the purpose of forcing the parish officers to give them some fresh ones. (1862, Vol. 3, p. 401)

From Birmingham they travelled back through Northampton and Hertford to London. By this time the London refuges would be again opening for the winter, or if the boys were early they would be forgotten in the surrounding unions and receive benefit there. A smaller Autumn circuit also existed through Sussex, Hampshire and Wiltshire. The timing of this migration coincided with the hop picking season "It is not hard work, and there are a great many loose girls to be found there." (1862, Vol. 3, p. 401).

The movements of the Irish vagrants conformed to a different pattern - they were mostly to be found on the roads from Liverpool and Bristol to London. By the end of June "the
roads must be literally covered with the Irish families tramping to London." The Irish tramps, it was suggested by Mayhew's informant, lived solely by begging. In contrast the English tramps lived by a mixture of begging and stealing.

For these contemporary commentators the poor relief system came to exacerbate the very condition it was designed to relieve. Here Mayhew's informant was unequivocal:

As the refuges are managed at present, I consider they do more harm than good. If there were no such places in London in the winter, of course I, and such as are like me, would have been driven to find shelter at our parishes; whereas the facilities they afford for obtaining a night's shelter - to the vagabond as well as to the destitute - are such that a large number of the most depraved and idle classes are attracted to London by them.

(1862, Vol. 3, pp.399-400)

I have known many an honest, industrious, working man, however, made a regular beggar and vagrant by continued use of the casual wards. They are driven there first by necessity, and then they learn that they can live in such places throughout the year without working for their livelihood.

(1862, Vol. 3, p. 400)

In many senses Mayhew's etiological account is grossly inadequate. With the advantage of hindsight we might conclude that the existence of the casual wards of the workhouse was not the only, or even the main factor involved with the proliferation of vagrancy. But it seems reasonable to conclude with Mayhew that the relief system was important in creating and maintaining a certain migratory lifestyle.

To do away with the workhouses would not have done away with the circumstances that made such a lifestyle more a...

246.
reflection of necessity than of volition. Who, after all, would have chosen the workhouse given Mayhew's descriptions of it, if their freedom of choice was anything but enormously curtailed?

No one can imagine, but those who have gone through it, the horror of a casual ward of a union; what with the filth, the vermin, the stench, the heat, and the noise of the place, it is intolerable.

(1862, Vol. 3, p. 402)

Of the Asylum for the Houseless Poor of London - opened only in the winter and offering only bread, water and warm shelter - Mayhew wrote:

It is impossible to mistake the Asylum if you go there in the dark, just as the bump in the wire cage over the entrance door is being lighted. This is the hour for opening; and ranged along the kerb is a kind of ragged regiment, drawn up four deep, and stretching far up and down the narrow lane, until the crowd is like a hedge to the roadway...There they stand shivering in the snow, with their thin, cobwebby garments hanging in tatters about them. Many are without shirts...A few are without shoes; and they keep one foot only to the ground, while the bare flesh that has had to tramp through the snow is blue and livid-looking as half cooked meat...The only sounds heard are the squealing of the beggar infants, or the wrangling of the vagrant boys for the front ranks, together with a continued succession of hoarse coughs, that seem to answer each other like the bleating of a flock of sheep.

(1862, Vol. 3, p. 428)

And while seeming to pass harsh judgement on vagrants, Mayhew was even harsher on those who might have seen themselves as architects of their own good fortune:

"...get down from your moral stilts, and confess it honestly to yourself, that you are what you are by that inscrutable grace which decreed your birth place to be a mansion or a
cottage rather than a "padding-ken", or which
granted you brains and strength, instead of
sending you into the world, like many of
these, a cripple or an idiot."
(1862, Vol. 3, p. 429)

Mayhew was clearly not unaware of structural inequalities
in society and keenly aware of the possible relationships
between social relief policy (as a form of social control) and
social behaviour.

C. Vice Crusades and the Dispersal of Segregated Areas

In contrast to much of the literature on the geography of
crime, geographers interested in prostitution have been more
keenly aware of the impact of criminal legislation and
variations in law enforcement protocol on patterns of "vice"
(Symanski, 1974, 1981; Shumsky and Springer, 1981). In
addition, a number of researchers in other fields have noticed
the importance of law enforcement differentials in patterns of
prostitution (Reckless, 1933) and the importance of spatial
mobility as an adaptive strategy enabling prostitutes to
continue their trade despite the efforts of law enforcement
personnel (James, 1975). A review of this literature is
particularly useful in terms of the present discussion not only
because it serves to set the stage for the empirical vignette
to be presented in the next chapter on patterns of prostitution
in Vancouver, but also because observations of changes in
patterns of prostitution in other cities at other times has
prompted two students of the geography of crime to observe that
(in the case of prostitution anyway) "law and patterns of law enforcement...determine spatial distribution more than any other factor." (Shumsky and Springer, 1981, p. 88). I do not propose to offer an exhaustive review of the literature on patterns of prostitution but instead to reinterpret some particularly pertinent examples in terms of the displacement theme developed here. And given the observation in Chapter 4 that geographers have tended to be rather too selective in their adaption of the ecological aspects of the work of the Chicago School sociologists, the discussion begins with a review of Walter Reckless' observations about the impact of law enforcement on patterns of prostitution in Chicago during the first quarter of the twentieth century.

Walter Reckless' *Vice in Chicago* (1933) outlines a classic example of displacement following the activities of the Chicago Vice Commission and the closure of the segregated "red-light" district in 1912 (for further discussion see Haller, 1970). This was the era of the great crusades against vice, and Chicago was the first of a number of American cities to close its segregated area. Reckless' study examines the general effects of twenty years of suppression on commercialized vice. Of the various questions he set out to answer, his concern with documenting the relocation of prostitution as opposed to its actual suppression is of particular interest here.

Reckless notes that up until 1912 prostitution was never actually legal, but was permitted to exist by public officials
and police who were practically unanimously in favour of the informal segregation or toleration of commercial sex (1933, p. 5). "American police, called upon to enforce laws made by one part of the community for the benefit of another have been, like windmills, only active when the wind was blowing." (1933, p. 235). One such wind was provided by a series of anti-vice crusades which led to the abandonment of the system of toleration. This was not a clear-cut change of philosophy, rather a series of openings and closings of the district, with progressively more intensive attempts to use formal sanctions against prostitutes and vice resort owners. But despite the public furore excited by a federation of moral forces, Reckless notes that there was very little public reflection on the tactics used in vice suppression or upon their results (1933, p. 8). As to the deterrent effects of the law enforcement campaign, Reckless is unequivocal

"Vice continued in America after the breaking up of the segregated vice areas, but due to the change in law enforcement policy, the character of the commerce in women changed. The problem has assumed a new form; it has not ceased to exist."

Instead, as a reaction to law enforcement policies, the vice area dispersed. The dispersion appears to have been affected by resort owners to make the process of law enforcement much more difficult; additionally Reckless notes that the prostitution resorts took on an ephemeral character, remaining open for an average of about six months in any one location (1933, p. 18).
The period of active vice suppression appears to have precipitated a number of other changes, particularly in loosening the grip organized crime had traditionally held on prostitution. While dispersal of the locations of prostitution facilitated escape from law enforcement activities, ironically it must have made it considerably more difficult for organized crime to retain control of prostitution. Thus there appears to have been a rise of a new unregimented class of professional, semi-professional and amateur prostitutes working on an independent and clandestine basis (1933, p. 137). Yet vice activity, far from dying out in the red-light district, persisted, albeit in restricted form as organized crime developed political influence and thereby consolidated police support and graft. This is not to say that the suppression era spawned organized crime. Rather that "if commercialized vice did not disappear with the passing of the segregated district, it is also true that the difficulties of dealing with vice, now that it was organized, entrenched, and protected, were greatly increased." The very attempt at intensifying law enforcement seemed to make the problems of enforcement more intractable!

Reckless also documents an increase in Negro prostitution, and while this importantly reflects differential (racist) law enforcement patterns (pp. 13-15) he also mentions the effect of the enormous migration of blacks to the northern metropolitan centres in swelling the prostitute ranks. Thus pattern changes produced by other factors complicate the pattern of displacement initiated by the suppression movement. Also the
dispersal of the red-light district did not produce the displacement of resorts and prostitutes into respectable neighbourhoods as the segregationists predicted (pp. 10-12, 231-233). This may have led Reckless to a conclusion that in one important respect seems inconsistent with the remainder of his analysis.

"My impression is that the changes in the problem of commercialized vice in Chicago in large part have been due to modern urban trends and to underlying causes of modern city growth, and only in small part to law enforcement drives. At no time in the twenty years of attempted vice suppression in Chicago have the forces of public suppression been constant, uniform, or at a maximum."

(p. viii)

But even if suppression attempts were not uniform, the evidence provided by Reckless is that law enforcement efforts did have a considerable impact, particularly in terms of displacing vice from the segregated area. He confirms this by arguing that general urban trends and law enforcement carried equal weight in bringing about the decentralization of prostitution (1933, p. 30). While evidence is given that some resorts were located outside the segregated area before 1910 (1933, p. 140) these were apparently anomalous outliers - elsewhere he suggests that there was an almost complete concentration of resorts in the downtown area at that time (1933, p. vii). The influx of blacks after 1910 complicates the pattern of displacement to some extent, for they would have presumably located away from the segregated area and the police problems it might bring. This is not to suggest that black and white prostitutes were segregated - prior to 1910 Reckless
notes that black women did ply their trade in the segregated
district (1933, p. 25).

In general, while Reckless' study does illustrate the
importance of law enforcement practices in helping to initiate
changes in social activity patterns, it also illustrates the
complexity of the problem of making causal inferences about
displacement phenomena. If, however, we add to these findings
the weight of other studies of law enforcement and prostitution
patterns, the causal relationships appear to be virtually
indisputable. Significantly, some of this other research has
been contributed by geographers.

In a study of San Francisco's zones of prostitution
between 1880 and 1934, Shumsky and Springer⁴ identify three
major changes in patterns of prostitution, all of which seem
explicable primarily in terms of the control environment. Some
of these changes occurred at a very localized level involving
subtle changes in the segregated area. But most importantly
the analysis shows that during the vice crusades of the early
twentieth century, the campaign against prostitution
effectively dispersed the red-light district. Although Shumsky
and Springer do not refer to Reckless' study, their results
suggest that the effects of the vice crusade in San Francisco
were almost identical to the experience in Chicago (the one
main exception appears to be that the red-light district in San
Francisco was almost entirely broken up whereas in Chicago it
was only partly dispersed).

253.
Further support for the importance of the impact of law and law enforcement on prostitution patterns comes from the work of Symanski (1974, 1981). In his first study of prostitution, Symanski demonstrates that "the location of brothels and the activity spaces of prostitutes cannot be understood apart from legal, quasi-legal, and brothel-owner regulations". In his book, The Immoral Landscape (1981), he reviews a whole series of examples of how patterns of prostitution in a variety of national contexts are importantly shaped and reshaped by control measures (see especially chapters 11 and 12). Like James (1975), Symanski shows that mobility itself is the most important adaptive strategy available to the prostitute in circumventing the problems posed by various laws and both formal and informal law enforcement strategies.

With these observations in mind the stage is set for an examination of patterns of prostitution in Vancouver. My purpose in this analysis is not simply to show the empirical importance of a consideration of the control environment in understanding crime patterns, but in so-doing to demonstrate the importance of the theoretical implications of this change of focus as discussed in chapters 1-6.
Notes to Chapter 7

1. Through the observation of unintended consequences a number of links with the wider criminological and sociological literature can also be forged at this point. Henshel (1976) discusses labelling theory in terms of the amplification of deviance as an unintended consequence of the effort to suppress crime. A wide-ranging literature has suggested that drug law serves to increase crime by artificially raising black market prices thereby creating professional criminal organizations to reap the harvest produced by conditions of false scarcity (e.g. Lindesmith, 1965; Chambliss, 1977). A further criminogenic subculture of addictive drug users develops relying on illegally derived wealth to supply the funds necessary for maintaining a drug habit. Thus drug laws, designed to deter crime, may actually increase it.

Robert Merton (1936) noted that in some of its numerous forms the problem of the unintended consequences of purposive social action has been treated by virtually every substantial contributor to the long history of social thought, but never in any systematic way. Merton was the first to explicitly do so. A program of structural-functional sociology emerged from this early insight explaining unintended consequences in terms of the "latent" functions of social institutions and various social relations.

2. Most discussions of displacement imply that the amount of crime displaced will be less than the magnitude of crime prevented. In the case of the displacement of burglary discussed by Hunt and Weiner it is possible that the overall burglary rate increases as a result of displacement. This amplificatory effect might occur if burglaries were displaced to a time period when the opportunities to commit burglary were more plentiful.

3. My thanks to Dr. Paul Brantingham for bringing this example to my attention.

4. Shumsky is a historian, Springer a geographer.
Chapter 8


A Changing Legal Milieu

On Saturday, March 11, 1978, a headline in a Vancouver newspaper exclaimed, "Hookers out in force with new legal immunity." A few days later another article appeared claiming, "Now hookers can smile at detectives they feared."

"Vancouver is right now the most open city for hookers in North America... 'Sheila' is a 21 year old red-head. Tall, attractive, neat, she dresses like a million dollars.

She plies her trade - openly - on the corner of Georgia and Hornby five or six nights a week. And she plans to do it for a long time to come.

As cities go, she says Vancouver is one of the best places on the continent for working girls. 'Vancouver's a playground... the police vice-squad estimates there are 650 female prostitutes, and 200 male ones in the Greater Vancouver area now. That figure will climb to 1500 in the next few months.

And many of them will be from the rest of Canada and the U.S., drawn here by the city's reputation...

Hookers are going to go where they get the fewest hassles so, of course, they are going to come here. They know they've got no fears of repercussion at all in Vancouver."

(Vancouver Sun, 11th March, 1978)

Two months prior to the publication of this article, a special police task force had some hundred prostitution cases
awaiting litigation. At that time, the streets were by no means safe for the prostitute plying her trade, as a concerted effort was made to clean up Vancouver's streets. The uninformed observer might be tempted to conclude that sometime in the intervening period prostitution must have been legalized in Vancouver. But in fact prostitution was legal throughout this period. Instead a series of interactions occurred between the police, courts and prostitutes which had the effect of transforming the interpretation of prostitution law. The effects of this change in interpretation has been to turn what was a highly prohibitive legal milieu into one which is highly conducive to the practice of street prostitution. But, as we shall see, the change in interpretation of street prostitution offences was itself occasioned by the impact of certain law enforcement decisions. In a two year period in Vancouver new areas of street prostitution developed and their visibility increased.

These spatial shifts rather than being occasioned by some change in the characteristics of prostitutes reflect instead the variability of law enforcement practices, court decisions, and modifications of the interpretation of law. In this case, then, the catalysts of changes in patterns of street prostitution in Vancouver can be identified largely in terms of the control response to prostitution with little consideration of the conditions involved with a person's becoming either a prostitute or a client (n.b. Shumsky and Springer, 1981, p. 88).
In addition, the official statistics pertaining to street prostitution are highly ambiguous. An examination of police statistics for Vancouver leaves one with the impression that street solicitation offences declined in the period 1975 - 1978 (Fig. 3, p. 282) While this is indeed true, the implication that street prostitution declined is erroneous - both newspaper accounts, and social workers, prostitutes and police officers interviewed informally all suggest that street prostitution increased dramatically in the same period.

What the analysis reveals is that the behaviour of prostitutes was intimately tied to the meaning of law, court decisions, and the behaviour of law enforcers, although not in a way necessarily consonant with the intentions of law enforcement efforts. The study highlights how contradictions in the meaning and purpose of prostitution law create a problematic legal milieu in which the consequences of certain kinds of enforcement policy are in direct opposition to their intended purposes.

Following the argument developed in chapter five, to understand the meaning of official statistics the institutionalist perspective draws attention to both the legal and occupational milieu in which the police operate; what I now propose to show is that these same concerns can be central to an understanding of (criminal) activity pattern changes, for it is only in the light of these background contexts that prostitute behaviour can be understood in this particular case. The discussion first examines the purpose of
prostitution statutes, and then the occupational context of policing to lay a foundation for the interpretation of changes in patterns of street prostitution in Vancouver.

Prostitution Statutes - Ideology as Law

Although in Canada the act of prostitution is legal, several clauses of the Canadian Criminal Code specify prostitution related offences. Sections 193 and 194 relate to the keeping and patronizing of a common bawdy house, whilst section 195 deals with soliciting and procuring. It is the ideology of the latter which is important and in this case vital to understanding the unfolding consequences of prostitution law enforcement. Of soliciting, the code says: "Every person who solicits any person in a public place for the purpose of prostitution is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction." (Martins Annual Criminal Code 1977, pp. 176-179).

This soliciting law is overtly sexist, the commentary in the 1977 code continuing:

"Since prostitution can only be carried on by a female a person impersonating a female having engaged upon arrangement in bringing about sexual gratification to another male cannot be convicted of soliciting for the purpose of prostitution (emphasis added).

Besides being exempt from the soliciting law as a prostitute, male patrons are also exempt from prosecution in a heterosexual contract. The underlying rationale of this law demands close attention. Why, if prostitution is legal, should its public
preparation be illegal, and why should men be exonerated from all responsibility? The Wolfenden Commission Report (1963), which in part dealt with prostitution, is instructive here.\footnote{1}

The Commission argued that it is not the duty of the law to concern itself with immorality as such; the law should be confined to those activities which offend against public order and decency, or expose the ordinary citizen to what is offensive or injurious (p. 143). From the point of view of the law, a person's body is private property, the individual enjoying complete control of its use. (Hence it is not an offense to \textit{use} drugs, only to \textit{possess} them.) It is only when the use of one's body affects public order and decency that it comes under the purview of criminal law. Soliciting in public for the purpose of prostitution is thus deemed to be a public nuisance. Soliciting in a private place is legal, as is a sex for money transaction.

Since many other forms of public soliciting are legal (e.g., collecting for charities or recruiting for various religious and political institutions), it is reasonable to conclude that it is only the adjudged immorality of prostitution that makes public soliciting for that purpose illegal. To this extent, despite the assertion that the law does not deal with immorality as such, a plausible argument can be made that solicitation laws represent a codification of moral standards.

The morality enshrined in prostitution law, however, runs much deeper. The Wolfenden Commission took great pains to
stress that if the intent of the law is to punish prostitution per se on the grounds that it is immoral conduct, then it would be right to provide for punishment of the men involved in the purchase, as well as the women providing the goods. What are we to make of this argument? The relationship between prostitute and client is reciprocal - each needs the other in order for the act of prostitution to take place. Without the customer, there is no prostitute; men are thus just as responsible for the soliciting that occurs in public places as are the women who offer their services. On this score, the Wolfenden Report appears to be little more than an apologetic. The prostitute, the report says, parades herself habitually and openly (1963, p. 143). Her continued presence thus affronts the sense of decency of the ordinary citizen more so than the presence of prospective customers. This does not deny that male customers offend public decency by approaching women who are not prostitutes, or by publicly securing sex for money. As there is no difference between the behaviours of prostitute and client, it is difficult to justify legal discrimination against the one or the other. But, as noted in chapter five, police discretionary bias can operate in such a way that status can become a better predictor of the attribution of the criminal label than behaviour. So it is with the prostitute and client - there is a considerable difference in their status. But in the case of prostitution this is not solely a matter of police discretion, it is the
underlying ideology of the law itself. As Abraham Flexner suggests:

The professional prostitute, being a social outcast, may be periodically punished without disturbing the usual course of society; no one misses her while she is serving out her turn — no one, at least, about whom society has any concern. The man, however, is something more than partner in an immoral act; he discharges important social and business relations, is as father or brother responsible for the maintenance of others, has commercial or industrial duties to meet. He cannot be imprisoned without deranging society.

(Quoted in Davis, 1966)

A double moral standard attributing different statuses to men and women has become enshrined in law. The question now becomes, what is it about the nature of human society that causes it to give rise to, and maintain an institution which it simultaneously condemns. In answering this question, Freda Adler argues:

Given the sexual freedom men have reserved for themselves, and the code of premarital chastity and post-marital fidelity they have imposed on women, prostitution is the only mechanism which would permit the coexistence of these two mutually exclusive and contradictory ideals. Without prostitution their foundations in fantasy would be exposed, and they would fall of their own weight.

(1975, p.57)

Adler quotes the nineteenth century moralist William Lecky's observation that the prostitute is ultimately the most efficient guardian of virtue:

He (Lecky) contended that but for the social function she performs, the stability of the family, and the preservation of the very social institutions dependent on abstinence would be in jeopardy.

(Adler, 1975, p. 57)
Society at once supports and denigrates prostitution treating it with a mixture of pity, scorn, persecution and fascination (Davis, 1966, p. 262). This same confusion seems to apply to prostitution law which in Canada does not actually prohibit the act of prostitution, but does prevent a person from making a living by it. Whatever the root causes of prostitution, it is a behaviour which has proven highly resistant to repressive measures (Reckless, 1933; Shumsky and Springer, 1981; Symanski, 1981).

Because of the great difficulty the courts and police have experienced in challenging prostitution, a prophylactic mentality now prevails. The legal strategy adopted in Canada is aimed at controlling the public expression of prostitution and its unchecked expansion. Because paradoxical social attitudes are reflected in the criminal law, the act of prostitution being legal, the problem of its regulation is tackled tangentially. Laws pertaining to "public soliciting" and "living off the avails" are difficult to enforce, however, because they deal with activities in which the participants are consenting. The police in enforcing prostitution law must consequently rely almost exclusively on proactive investigations. The character of these investigations in the context of police occupational culture also merits some consideration. Bearing in mind Reckless' work which indicates the importance of public pressure group activity on law enforcement practices, the local political context against
which police enforcement practices unfold must also be brought into the analysis.

Police Culture, the Politics of Police Administration and the Translation of Law in the Books to Law in the Streets

By tracing the genesis and the meaning of prostitution laws, we identify the legal parameters within which people act, and by which they organize their relationships with each other. In this case the law is the major component of the urban social environment moulding relations between police and prostitutes. But government is by people, not law, with the result that the law can only be understood as it is administered. By extension, criminality can only be fully understood in light of the varying interpretations and administrations of law.

Given the regulatory function of the Canadian prostitution law, the visibility of the street walker has become the main criterion for police action, and often only in response to the campaigns of political pressure groups. Even when prostitution is visible, action is not necessarily taken since charges against prostitutes may be traded-off for information relating to other areas of criminal investigation; by bartering information the prostitute is often able to avoid arrest (Adler, 1975, Ch. 3). Thus in some respects, it is to the advantage of the police to have prostitution laws, but not to enforce them; theoretically, a contradiction in terms. In this
sense prostitution law is an all purpose device in the sense that Bittner (1970) and Ericson (1982) convey (as discussed in Chapter 5) - prostitution law becomes an instrument for "ordering the streets". In this way legal rules are shaped through the context of the police organization and its function in practice. It is the tensions produced by this metamorphosis of legal statutes into practical instruments that leads J. H. Skolnick to ponder what he considers the fundamental dilemma of police administration. Are the police, he asks, principally an agency of social control, with their chief value the efficient enforcement of the prohibitive norms of substantive criminal law? Or are the police to be an institution falling under the hegemony of the legal system, with a basic commitment to the rule of law, even if this obligation may result in a reduction of social order? (Skolnick, 1975, p. 1) In fact, the police function in both these capacities in different contexts and at different levels, but they are primarily an agency of social control (Ericson, 1982). Since police activity is not solely geared to the specification of law then, by definition, their administration of law is sometimes arbitrary. The question becomes what social order, or whose vision of it are they maintaining? It is clear that police operations are not solely shaped by the dictates of law. They are also partly shaped by various political pressures, and by the police occupational culture. On top of all these influences, social opinion may be divided about, or contrary to the purposes of law.
Skolnick argues that the goals of democratic society can sometimes undermine the capacity of the police to respond to the law (1975, p. 6). The recent movement towards equalizing the status of women in western societies generally may have provided a context in which challenges to the inherently sexually biased prostitution law could be received favourably in the criminal courts. Any police campaign against prostitution, especially if given extensive press coverage, might provide an occasion for just such a challenge and may partly explain some of the Appeal Court rulings to be described shortly which made prosecution of street prostitutes in Vancouver almost impossible as the situation stood in 1978.

The influence of the women's movement aside, public sentiments about prostitution are clearly equivocal, and this together with the fact that it is an activity engaged in by consenting adults (aside from the problem of juvenile prostitution) implies that the routine enforcement of prostitution law is fraught with difficulty. Freda Adler's comments about prostitution law in practice apply well to the Canadian experience:

The legal apparatus associated with the arrest, prosecution and sentencing of prostitutes is a morass of contradictions within contradictions. It is a Gordian knot of procedural ruses and subterfuges contrived to harmonize that which authorities do not wish to carry out with that which they cannot afford to ignore. The result is often a ceremonial ritual dance performed by the police and courts, each stepping to the mandatory measures of the law but improvising sufficiently to express their concepts of justice.

(1975, p. 221)
In that the premises and design of criminal law are often impractical for enforcement purposes, the police tend to identify with a guiding concept of social order. This is not to deny that they perceive law and social order as one and the same, but that they are frequently forced to make arbitrary administrative and enforcement decisions. What processes shape these decisions and which groups benefit from various enforcement policies? To answer these questions with reference to prostitution, some general observations about police administrative decision-making are required.

The cajoling of various pressure groups creates a volatile milieu in which the police operate. Groups with conflicting interests may each hold potential power to influence the police. A city council is not necessarily a monolithic interest group, different members representing different interests, all with potential power to cut back police budgets. Police are consistently exploited by competing politicians and organizations; many politicians pursuing the "safe-streets" vote place impractical demands upon the police (Sikes, 1975, p. 123). Many police departments are greatly influenced by monied interests and right wing groups (Sikes, 1975, p. 123) and are themselves characteristically right wing in their attitudes.\(^5\) Little wonder then that it has been suggested that rich neighbourhoods characteristically have the fastest police response times (Sikes, 1975, p. 124).

Furthermore, the actions of the police department make headline news - police administrators are thus always sensitive
to, and sometimes preoccupied with, public relations (H. K. Becker, 1970, p. 33). Public relations practices often amount to little more than an attempt to show that administrative decisions are apolitical. Bristow and Gabard suggest that the interests of political pressure groups, especially merchants, are often more important than the issue of public relations simply because these groups are heeded more by city councils. But then, as one police chief they cite maintains, "if press relations are good, public relations are good" and the public always outlasts the council (Bristow and Gabard, 1961, p. 62). Thus many competing groups, each wishing to impress its own vision of social order, complicate the business of police management. Not the least of these visions are the desires and values espoused by the police themselves. If policies are not popular within the police department, their implementation may often be subject to the "poor memories" of officers (Bristow and Gabard, 1961, p. 58). It is police officers who convey their vision of the social reality of city streets to superiors who make the policy decisions. In the case of prostitution, certain values typical of police culture can be instrumental in shaping administrative policy.

Vice investigation (drugs, gambling, pornography and prostitution) is among the most prestigious areas of police work because it is proactive (Skolnick, 1975, p. 102). It is proactive police investigation that preoccupies books and movies, and is often given high profile by the news media. Compared with other forms of police-work, vice control is often
interesting, demanding and allows an outlet for real ingenuity and problem solving in the detectional sense. The informer is the indispensable foundation of much proactive work, but not necessarily in prostitution law enforcement.

In practice it is difficult for the police to prove solicitation charges because the clients of prostitutes are generally hesitant to appear in court. Thus proactive investigation is the usual means of apprehending prostitutes or other people associated with the trade who might be "living off the avails of prostitution". The police disguise themselves as potential clients, and arrest the prostitute for public soliciting once the deal has been established. This is a difficult task since the officer must not express the first interest in a transaction. The practice also requires frequent personnel turnovers - undercover officers soon become known to the prostitutes. Moreover, in court convictions are difficult to obtain because of varying interpretations of what constitutes a public place, and what constitutes soliciting. This method of investigation, however, only snares individual prostitutes - it does not disrupt the organizations that may back them. Investigations against these organizations require large-scale and well-coordinated team police efforts. By virtue of their scale, sophistication of techniques, the need for guile in gaining information and the detectional appeal all these engender, large-scale investigations against criminal organizations are regarded by police as one of the most prestigious forms of police work. It was one such large-scale
investigation that seems to represent the "efficient" cause of changes in the geography of street prostitution in Vancouver.

Keeping in mind the meaning and purpose of prostitution law and the factors impinging on the enforcement of that law, the discussion turns to a consideration of the circumstances which led to the conspicuous expansion of street prostitution in Vancouver. The narrative begins with the closing of a well known Vancouver cabaret club in 1975 as the result of a suppressive crime control strategy (see Table 1A) and proceeds to describe the activity displacement that this closure seems to have occasioned.

Street Prostitution in Vancouver: A Narrative

Few people outside city council or police administrative echelons know why the investigation of a notorious cabaret club in downtown Vancouver was initiated at the particular time that it was. The news media offered little more than innuendo on this score, a number of articles suggesting that Monique Layton's report to the police on prostitution in Vancouver was instrumental (e.g. Vancouver Sun, 26th September, 1976).

Layton, a University of British Columbia anthropologist, named two cabaret clubs as centres of the prostitution business (1975). Though the report was not made public until September 1975, its contents were likely known to the police before that time. But this information could hardly have been new; the police knowledge of the city scene is extensive, even
if it may be biased. What is certain is that one of the cabaret clubs flourished for twenty-five years before the police attempted to close it (the second club burned down before any police investigation was initiated).

Although Layton's report may not have provided new information, it did formalize common knowledge. The power of the printed word may have made it much more difficult for the police to ignore the social reality of the cabaret clubs, and the possibility that their owners were living off the avails of prostitution. It was also suggested that the contents of Layton's report were made public by the Vancouver press, thus making it even more difficult for the police to ignore club activities. This assertion was later denied by a spokesman for the press (Vancouver Sun, September 7th, 1976) who suggested that although Layton's report was covered, none of its substantive contents were disclosed. One of the club owners offered an entirely different scenario. He suggested that a personal feud with a vice-squad detective led to the detective urging the then new police-chief to instigate an undercover operation against his club (Vancouver Sun, December 22nd, 1977).

Personal feud or not, this argument is plausible in a different sense. Assuming that proactive investigation is the most prestigious category of police work, what better opportunity to mount a large-scale undercover operation? It required a large team of skilled investigators using the most up-to-date surveillance techniques and equipment in an
environment which most people frequented purely for entertainment. The defence, in the subsequent trial of the owners of one of the clubs, frequently alluded to the lavish conduct of the police in the course of their undercover operation which lasted from May until December 1975 (Vancouver Sun, April 23rd, 1977). The defence innuendo was that the police made as much mileage out of the investigation as they could. Since the operation was estimated to have cost one million dollars (Vancouver Sun, April 23rd, 1977), it is reasonable to conclude that there may have been some substance to this allegation. Defence attorneys characterized undercover detectives as "King Farouks" constantly "flashing large money rolls" and generally enjoying a "champagne life-style" (Vancouver Sun, October 19th, 1976). The liquid diet of brown-cows and golden cadillacs was supplemented by the vivacious atmosphere of the club: "I pretended to be excited", said one of the detectives later of an incident at the club during which a prostitute stripped for him. He arrested her and another woman as they left the club (Province, September 29th, 1976).

On December 22nd, 1975, the three owners of the cabaret and three employees were charged with living off the avails of prostitution and "conspiring to produce a public mischief and thereby corrupt public morals" (Vancouver Sun, April 23rd, 1977). The adamant attitude of both the police and the Crown is demonstrated by the Court's dismissal of the latter count which does not even appear in the Canadian Criminal Code.
The trial, which began in September, 1976, lasted for over six months, and all but one of the defendants were convicted of living off the avails of prostitution (Vancouver Sun, May 11th, 1977). The essence of the Crown's case was that both club owners and employees profited from earnings made through prostitution. The cabaret charged a $2.95 admission fee, and then, the Crown argued, the prostitute had to tip the maitre d' and doorman $2.00 each, and pay $2.00 or $3.00 for a table. If the prostitute left with a "trick", she had to pay again the $2.95 door charge for re-admission to the cabaret. She might thus pay the cover-charge three or four times a night. The club's annual door revenue of $185,000 attests to the high rate of turnover and profitability of the club's patrons. In addition, the club would provide credit card holding customers with cash at a 20% interest rate to purchase the sexual favours of a prostitute (Vancouver Sun, April 23rd, 1977). One undercover police officer borrowed cash in this way, stating as he did so that it was for the purpose of paying a prostitute. He was given it without hesitation (Vancouver Sun, November 30th, 1976).

Forty-five witnesses testified in the course of the trial, including three prostitutes who frequented the club. Here we see exemplified the position of the prostitute in vice-related investigations; the defence suggested that the only reason one of the women testified was because the police had arranged to drop a heroin charge against her. They further suggested that she had fabricated evidence in her testimony to facilitate this
bargain. In summation, the Judge stated he was satisfied that this was not the case (Vancouver Sun, April 23rd, 1977). The two brothers owning the club were each fined $50,000 and sentenced to sixty days in jail. The doorman was fined $7,000 and awarded the same jail term, whilst the two remaining employees were each fined $1,500 and awarded the token sentence of one day in jail. All five launched immediate appeals against the convictions. The cabaret charges had been laid in December 1975. Despite the Canadian principle of law that states a defendant is to be considered innocent until proven guilty, the club's liquor licence was suspended by provincial authorities on January 1st, 1976.

Similar actions may have been initiated by the police against the second cabaret club mentioned in Layton's report but it was destroyed by fire before any action was taken. The owner was charged with arson but was not convicted.

The average nightly prostitute population of each of these cabarets was estimated at between fifty and one hundred (Vancouver Sun, April 23rd, 1977). The essence of the Canadian prostitution statutes is regulatory: to keep the prostitute out of public mind and sight. The effect of the cabaret action, however, achieved just the reverse; the prostitutes could no longer enjoy the protected soliciting havens provided by the cabaret clubs. Their use of these clubs may have represented an adaptation to the legal statute which prohibits public solicitation for the purpose of prostitution. But it appears that although certain prostitutes were prepared to adapt to the
law in order to circumvent it, the law was insufficient to deter these same women when their adaptive strategy was rendered useless. It may be that the women chose to work the clubs and not the streets for different reasons. But, whatever the reasons, the effect was the same once the two clubs were closed - the prostitutes were displaced onto the streets, intensifying the very activity the law is designed to control.

By the time the trial of the cabaret club owners and employees was drawing towards a close in September 1976, the press was giving increasing coverage to the development of a new "social problem" in Vancouver - the inundation of certain streets by "ladies of the night" (Vancouver Sun, September 24th, 1976). While there were established areas of street prostitution in Vancouver's "transitional areas", two new locations developed in downtown Vancouver's most heavily trafficked streets. Informal interviews with various police personnel, social workers and a limited number of prostitutes confirmed that one of the areas had hitherto never been characterized as an area of street prostitution (Davie Street), while in the other (the Georgia-Hornby intersection), street prostitution was infrequent and limited. After the closure of the two cabaret clubs both of these areas became conspicuous and locally renowned as containing not only the most, but also the most expensive prostitutes. 6

By the summer of 1976, local resident and business groups began to apply pressure to the City Council and the Police, lobbying for a "clean-up-the streets" campaign (a lobbying
which was conspicuously absent when street prostitution was confined to the less salubrious areas of the downtown core). A well-known apartment owner in the area newly invaded by displaced prostitutes, for example, made submissions to the British Columbia Police Commission urging that something be done about the large numbers of prostitutes on Davie Street, the main West End thoroughfare (Vancouver Sun, September 24th, 1976). The problem appears to have intensified as the area was gradually taken over by juvenile prostitutes and transvestites.

The problem of street prostitution outlasted the cabaret club trial. In September 1977 the Vancouver Police published a report on "Street Prostitution in the West End of Vancouver". Figure 2 identifies the five main areas of street prostitution mentioned by Corporal G. A. Forbes, the author of the report. They are largely consistent with the other sources consulted as to the extent and location of street prostitution in Vancouver between 1976 and 1979:

1. The 1000 - 1100 block on Granville
2. The Hastings - Columbia Area
3. The Keefer - Gore - Georgia Area
4. The Davie Street Strip
5. The Georgia - Hornby Intersection

The first three areas represent the traditional loci of street prostitution before the closing of the cabaret clubs. The fourth area developed only after the closure of the clubs, while the fifth expanded enormously after that time. By 1979 the two new areas had almost eclipsed the other three areas in terms of their importance. Forbes also established a hierarchy of price and "quality" (which most cab drivers would have
Figure 2. Areas of Street Prostitution in Vancouver

Note: the two cabaret clubs mentioned in the narrative were located between areas 1, 4 and 5. (For notation see p. 276)
confirmed at this time) with the Granville, Hastings and Keefer areas forming the lowest tier. Forbes estimated that about 100 prostitutes worked these three areas, mostly heroin addicts charging about $30 a "trick". The Davie Strip formed the intermediate rank with about 80 prostitutes charging between $40 and $80 per "trick". The Georgia-Hornby nightclub area was established as the top echelon with some 200 professionals charging between $50 and $100. An additional 280 women were estimated to be working in off-street prostitution - body rub parlors and the like. An inverse relation between price and heroin use was suggested by Forbes, the problem being most typical of the prostitutes ranked lowest. He also estimated that about 200 males providing sex for money worked in Vancouver; of 80 checked on Davie, 61 were juveniles (Forbes, 1977).

One of the first attempts made by the police to alleviate the problem which their own law enforcement efforts had apparently unwittingly caused, was to take the precedent-setting step of charging the clients of prostitutes with soliciting in public for the purpose of prostitution, as well as the prostitutes themselves. One man made legal history in October 1976 by pleading guilty to soliciting an undercover policewoman, the first conviction of its kind to be registered in Canada (Vancouver Sun, September 2nd, 1976). The police, however, were not so successful with the second man they charged, the judge claiming that a man could not solicit since he had nothing to sell. The result of this decision was the

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perpetuation of the inherent sex bias of Canadian prostitution law.

Between January 1st and July 31st, 1977, 226 vice-related charges were laid. According to Forbes, 146 of these were processed by the time of the report's writing, bringing 72 convictions. The inefficiency of these proceedings in reducing the level of street prostitution resulted in the creation of a special task-force on prostitution in 1977. Local media suggested that the task-force was a direct response to political pressures applied by hoteliers and local merchants on Davie and Granville streets that street prostitution had become too visible following the cabaret trial; the closure of the cabaret was held as being directly responsible for the increased level of street prostitution.

Task-force activities began in September 1977 and continued until February 1978 when the main investigative strategy was rendered inoperative by a precedent setting court decision which ruled that the interior of a car was a private, not a public place. The task-force strategy involved a hired or second-hand car set up with a tape recorder and camera in the rear. A police-officer would use this car to cruise the streets looking for a likely pick-up (an activity the police termed "trolling"). Having made a "catch", the officer would try to solicit from the prostitute certain key words and phrases, such as the offer and price of a trick. From this modus operandi it is difficult to interpret just who is doing
the soliciting, and would almost certainly, if falling under the jurisdiction of American law, represent entrapment.

During the six month period approximately 240 street soliciting charges were laid. In the six months prior to the inception of the task-force 56 street soliciting charges were laid. In a ten week period representing the zenith of task-force activities, 140 prostitutes were arrested. Of these, 51 were repeaters, and 74 were on welfare.9 (The collecting of welfare may represent a strategy designed to avoid the possibility of being charged with living off the avails of prostitution.) One commentator noted the expense to the taxpayer of welfare recipients who already had an income. This financial loss, however, was nothing compared to the cost of the cabaret investigation, the task-force, and the legal proceedings they engendered. For, ultimately, the Appeal Courts overturned all the cabaret convictions, and issued two decisions which effectively made it impossible for police to charge street prostitutes with solicitation offences.

In December 1977, in overturning the cabaret convictions, the judge argued that the Crown had simply not proven their case. He reasoned the evidence was that the management gave no special or preferential treatment to prostitutes who frequented the club. For example, the Crown did not establish that any male leaving the club would not have to pay the door admission price if he returned later the same evening. No prostitute received payment from the management, and it was not established that the club only lent money for the purpose of
prostitution. Thus, to all intents and purposes, the two million dollars spent on the cabaret undercover operation and court case was a waste of money.\textsuperscript{10} But, much worse, it was a high price to pay for the creation of a much more severe problem, in terms of the law, the amplification of street prostitute activity. The Crown unsuccessfully appealed the overturning of the cabaret convictions.

The task-force on prostitution also foundered in appellate court.\textsuperscript{11} A local prostitute appealed her solicitation conviction on the grounds that the interior of a car was not a public place. Also raised was the question of who was soliciting whom? For the officer to manage to induce the prostitute into his car in the first place, he must have given her some encouragement. The appeal was upheld, and, as a result, 100 charges of soliciting made by the task-force prior to this time had to be dropped. In addition, the term solicitation was reinterpreted - a woman must do more than offer sexual service and quote a price; she must harass the client by not accepting "no" for an answer (Vancouver Sun, February 7th, 1978). Thus not only were cars ruled out-of-bounds for enforcement purposes, but also the alternative strategy of travelling on foot since few prostitutes would reach the point of harassment in their approaches to men. With these decisions the legal environment in Vancouver became highly conducive to the practice of street prostitution. The purpose of the prostitution law - to hide and contain prostitution - appears to have been thwarted. The process
began with the simple displacement of prostitutes from their protected soliciting havens, the cabaret clubs.

Figure 3 shows the number of street soliciting charges laid in the period 1974-1978. The diagram is annotated to indicate the pivotal elements of Vancouver's unfolding prostitution story. The year 1974 is used as a cut-off point simply because a change of police recording practices made it impossible to obtain month by month totals for earlier periods. The annual totals from 1973 onwards have been reconstructed; in 1973 there were 800 soliciting charges compared to 624 in 1974, 310 in 1975, 123 in 1976, 320 in 1977 and 68 in 1978. A puzzle occurs because street prostitution, according to official statistics, was a much greater problem in 1973 and 1974 than at any time since - including the period in 1976 and 1977 when Vancouver's news media were describing it as a "new" social problem. Did the media manufacture this "problem?" In their *Policing the Crisis*, Hall et al. discuss a variety of senses in which the news media can be seen to manufacture crime waves (1978, pp. 67-69, 223). Without going into the details of their analysis, its implications are important in the context of this study.

At the simplest level, the newperson's sense of newsworthiness structures what is considered news - prostitution was considerably newsworthy in the period under scrutiny here, but its news value may not actually reflect changes in the streets so much as changes in various images of the streets. In this sense the media serves to orchestrate
Figure 3. Soliciting Charges in Vancouver 1974 - 1978
public opinion, and can be instrumental in creating the image of a crime wave. Certainly the Vancouver media orchestrated public opinion by being highly critical of police enforcement efforts, but all the evidence suggests that the media's coverage of the "new" problem in Vancouver was a response to the actual spread of street prostitution. In reality, the problem of street prostitution was new only in certain areas—notably the Georgia-Hornby intersection and the Davie strip. Vancouver's prostitutes proved themselves able locational decision-makers in their migration to the streets choosing areas of heavy pedestrian traffic, as the Davie Street strip is the main thoroughfare of the most populous square mile in Canada, the West End apartment block area of Vancouver. The Georgia and Hornby intersection is one block from the city's peak-value intersection, but a better location because of the concentration of nightclubs on Hornby.

The large number of street solicitation charges laid by the police in 1973 and 1974 may have something to do with heroin-use patterns. Rather than representing a response to the dictates of prostitution law, these earlier enforcement levels may represent police attempts to regulate the heroin traffic. Although more information is needed to substantiate this hypothesis, there are indications of its plausibility. And again they suggest the need for an understanding of law enforcement practices in the interpretation of crime statistics and patterns.
Layton's report on prostitution in Vancouver in 1975 suggests that at that time many street prostitutes were addicts. Her study of prostitutes implied an almost inevitable convergence of prostitution and drug addiction. It appears that in Vancouver this convergence is no longer inevitable, since police reports distinguish prostitution areas according to heroin-use patterns. The two new street prostitution areas are occupied by women who do not display much of a penchant for heroin (as the Forbes report suggested). The earlier close association of street prostitution and heroin-use may have meant that enforcement of street-prostitution laws served both to identify female addicts and create a pool of potential informers in the process of discovering heroin-traffickers. The reduction in the number of street-soliciting charges in the period 1973-1976 may indicate a decreasing incidence of street prostitution as a reflection of declining heroin use. The decline of both heroin quality and use in Vancouver, however, rather than suggesting a reduction of the number of prostitutes, may reflect a decline in police interest in enforcing soliciting laws - I simply do not have sufficiently reliable data to confirm either hypothesis. Whichever is the case, it would not seem to alter the interpretation of changes of street prostitution patterns as a form of displacement effect.

In short, the effect of the closure of the two cabaret clubs was that the prostitutes - whose activities in the clubs were consonant with the dictates of the law - simply moved onto
the (public) streets, apparently undeterred by soliciting laws which they could no longer circumvent. Law enforcement efforts designed to curb this derivative problem were rendered almost totally ineffective as landmark court decisions defined and redefined the meaning of both "solicitation" and "public place". Thus not only did the areas of street prostitution in Vancouver spread, but, as prostitutes migrated into the city to take advantage of the increasingly permissive legal environment, the number and density of prostitutes increased, during the period that the official statistics on street prostitution registered a dramatic decline.
Notes to Chapter 8

1. Although the Wolfenden Commission is an English report, it serves to demonstrate the basic philosophy of the Canadian law to the extent that Canadian law is based on English law.

2. For discussion of these attitudes, and their relations to women's crime, see Adler (1975), Simon (1975), Smart (1976), and Deming (1977).

3. This question is raised by Davis (1966, p. 203) but I have cast it in a different context.

4. For a discussion of this philosophy see Layton (1975).

5. For analysis of police "culture" see Neiderhoffer (1967), Rubinstein (1973), Koenig (1975), Manning (1977) and Ericson (1981, 1982).

6. Although it has not been possible to obtain completely reliable quantitative estimates of the changes, a research study of prostitutes in the Georgia-Hornby area (the one infrequently used by prostitutes prior to 1976) shows that in the summer of 1978, 37 prostitutes worked this one street intersection alone. This number was tabulated by Mr. Dale Sands from an unpublished time-lapse photographic study of the microspatial movement of prostitutes. He points out that many more prostitutes worked along Georgia Street out of the range of his camera and were thus never recorded because the women have fairly well-defined territories.

7. By definition a male cannot be a prostitute.

8. This finding is peculiar to the extent that neither legal nor lexical definitions of solicitation depend on the sale of anything!

9. This information was given by C.B.U.T. T.V. in the program "Pacific Report" aired on January 2nd 1978.

10. In some cases, the investment of money in particular police operations becomes a self-fulfilling syndrome - if the money is spent it must be justified by the laying of charges. In July 1977, one of the cabaret owners was convicted of trying to bribe a liquor board official in an attempt to retrieve the cabaret's liquor licence (Vancouver Sun, July 6th, 1977). In March 1978 this conviction was also overturned by the Appeal Court. The cabaret owner was charged with offering a bribe involving two bottles of liquor and a cake, and sentenced to 30 months in prison.
As Justice E. E. Hinkson said in summary, the gifts made simply "did not bear the corrupt complexion" (Vancouver Sun, March 25th, 1978).

11. The analysis is somewhat incomplete at this point. As important here as the context of police administration is the context of action in the criminal court system. With the exception of the decision regarding the prosecution of the prostitute's patron, all County Court decisions in Vancouver, upheld the Crown's, and consequently the police's, position. At the Appeal Court level, however, every decision was reversed. Regrettably, because of the difficulty of obtaining information about behind-the-scenes decisions (often so influential in court cases) no attempt is made here to analyze the courtroom as an arena of social action.

12. There is a slight margin of error in the statistics reported here - police recording practices group soliciting offences with charges for "living off the avails of prostitution". Very few of the latter kind of charge are laid, however, with the number rarely exceeding two or three in any given month.

13. A general impression has formed in Vancouver that during the period 1975-1979 the importance of heroin has declined. Prior to that time Vancouver was considered to have the largest heroin-using population in Canada with an estimated 10,000 addicts. Now both police sources and researchers at Vancouver's Drug and Alcohol Abuse Unit suggest that this number has decreased considerably.
Chapter 9

Target Hardening Crime Prevention and the Problem of
Displacement Phenomena

To this point the discussion of displacement phenomena has
served to illustrate the broad applicability of the concept for
organizing an investigation of the impact of control practices
on patterns of crime. In the final analysis to be presented we
return to the problem of displacement phenomena associated with
crime prevention programs, the first type of crime control
strategies speculatively identified as generating displacement
effects. Although this dissertation has suggested a much wider
application of the displacement concept, it seems appropriate
to include an analysis which directly addresses the problem in
terms of the effects of target hardening strategies because the
literature mostly remains at the speculative level (Reppetto,

The study presented here examines the impact of British
Columbia's "Neighbourhood Watch" burglary prevention program.
In general the program aims at reducing burglary opportunities
and increasing risk of detection through "Operation
Identification", the engraving of all valuable household goods
with an identity number.

It should be noted that the criteria for selecting this
empirical vignette differ from the criteria used to select the
other examples presented in the dissertation. The examples
culled from secondary sources were introduced because they demonstrate the relationship between control practices and criminal activity patterns. The vignette on street prostitution similarly demonstrates the way that certain spatial behaviour patterns are dialectically bound to law enforcement practices and law changes. For the street prostitute, movement is an adaptive strategy (James, 1975; Symanski, 1981, Ch. 11) and was similarly for the vagrants Mayhew described. In one case it was the pattern of behaviour, in the other, a change of pattern which demanded explanation and initiated the analysis. In contrast the study of Neighbourhood Watch begins with the control practice in order to assess its subsequent effect on offender activity patterns. In terms of the present study a problem thus arises which makes this analysis somewhat different from the other examples I have described: only if Neighbourhood Watch (particularly through its sub-component Operation Identification) is effective in preventing burglary will the analysis be likely to identify changes in patterns of burglary. If the program is unsuccessful in terms of its own raison d'être - if it does not prevent burglary to some extent in the areas in which it is implemented - there will be no activity displacement. But if it is successful to some extent, the question becomes, do burglars adjust their activity to circumvent the problems Neighbourhood Watch presents them or are there some unspecified intervening variables?
This question is important for two reasons:

a) Burglary is often conceptualized as a highly opportunistic crime, particularly for the juvenile offenders who constitute the greater proportion of known burglars (eg. Reppetto, 1976). If Neighbourhood Watch does displace burglary in any way (except the typological sense) the offence might not be opportunistic in the sense that much of the literature conveys. Various types of displacement, if they do occur, represent adaptive burglar behaviour and thus a greater degree of intentionality in the offence than is sometimes supposed.

b) Residential burglary is usually an offence reported to the police by the public. Although there is a proactive element in Neighbourhood Watch to the extent that it is a program initiated by the police, it is not the police who discover the crime in the same way that they discover street prostitution offences. While crime statistics of proactively policed offences may be more a reflection of police activity than the actual incidence of criminal behaviour, the analysis of Neighbourhood Watch portends to show that the relationship between control and crime practices is not restricted to offences which are for the most part recorded as a result of proactive policing (the more general difficulties of the proactive/reactive dichotomy not withstanding).

Because the analysis is designed to test the impact of Neighbourhood Watch on burglar activity patterns (instead of being directed toward the explanation of an already established pattern change) the problem of causal inference becomes
particularly complicated. If Operation Identification is successful in reducing burglary in the homes in which it is implemented a number of different types of displacement may occur; there may be a change in types of crime commission, time of crime commission or the place of crime commission. Or the program may simply prevent burglary in the areas or homes in which it is implemented without any other attendant change in burglar behaviour. The evidence presented, however, will suggest that of the various outcomes, the last of the above is the least likely - some burglars do adapt their behaviour to circumvent the problems that Operation Identification creates for them, at least, that is, when it creates any problems for them at all.

Evidence will be offered to suggest that the Neighbourhood Watch program in general has prevented burglary, but that this effect is short-lived, and at the cost of crime displacement. Geographic displacement appears to occur in the initial phases of a program's implementation; i.e. when its geographic extent is necessarily piecemeal. As the program is implemented more extensively displacement effects appear to occur at the smallest spatial scale as some burglars select targets not protected by Operation Identification - a target displacement. Other burglars do not appear to be affected by the program in their choice of targets and enter homes protected by it. Some of these burglars may simply refrain from stealing marked items.
Because the adaptations of offenders to Neighbourhood Watch and Operation Identification may produce area
displacement, target displacement, or some non-spatial
adjustment, the combination of different types of displacement
may be important in their aggregate effect, but so small
individually that they are difficult to recognize and
distinguish from the apparently random fluctuations that
classify burglary time series data.

Yet with all these qualifications taken into account, it
does appear from the evidence available in the municipalities
of Burnaby and Vancouver that Neighbourhood Watch and Operation
Identification do occasion changes in burglar behaviour.
Evidence will be presented to suggest that target displacement
occurs as burglars select homes not protected by Operation
Identification and that neighbourhood displacement occurs when
highly localized Neighbourhood Watch programs are intensively
implemented. But all of these are fairly short-term effects to
the extent that a kind of temporal displacement occurs -
Operation Identification appears to become ineffective,
probably because the marking of household items does not
greatly increase the risk to offenders over the long term
because it is difficult to trace the owners of stolen goods
even when the goods are marked with an engraver.¹ There is no
central police information system recording the owners of
marked items. Because of the type of data available it must be
recognized that the evidence for these effects is variable and
in no sense is it conclusive - it is, however, both suggestive

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and cumulative.

"Neighbourhood Watch" in British Columbia

In 1976 Neighbourhood Watch, the first crime prevention through environmental design program to be implemented in the Canadian province of British Columbia, was introduced on an experimental basis in Burnaby, the urban municipality immediately east of the city of Vancouver.

Following the initiative of the Burnaby R.C.M.P. detachment in liaison with the British Columbia Police Commission most of the other provincial police forces, at the behest of the Police Commission, soon followed suit (Robinson, 1977). The Vancouver City Police Department was one of the first to do so following the success reported by the personnel responsible for the pilot project in Burnaby. Because of this success, the Burnaby project was extended to cover the remainder of the municipality. My analysis will concentrate on the Burnaby and Vancouver programs, although the emphasis on each will not be quite the same.

The examination of the Burnaby program is designed to show the objectives of Neighbourhood Watch. But because of differences in the way the Vancouver Police Department records reports of burglaries compared to the Burnaby Department, much of the empirical analysis will focus on the impact of Neighbourhood Watch in Vancouver - the method of recording offence statistics in Burnaby is not sufficiently detailed for
the purpose of ascertaining small scale displacement effects. Conversely the method of recording burglary statistics by the Vancouver Police Department allows for the collation of very detailed statistics aggregated to units equivalent to two city blocks. But unlike the Burnaby project, very little information about the implementation plan for Neighbourhood Watch is available for Vancouver. Compared to Burnaby the program in Vancouver appears to have been implemented in a rather haphazard fashion; it has proved impossible to trace the phases of the implementation and the coordination of the personnel responsible for it. What evidence is available has been collated by one of the officers responsible for the first phase of the program in part of Vancouver's West End, a predominantly high rise residential area adjacent to the central business district. Because of a program funding problem its implementation in this area was completed some six months before being extended to surrounding locales. The analysis of Neighbourhood Watch in Vancouver thus focuses on this small test area in an attempt to assess the impact of the strategy and certain types of displacement effect that may be associated with it.

Given the information available, the Burnaby program will identify the intention of Neighbourhood Watch, and the rationale for its implementation in British Columbia in the first place. To the extent that both Burnaby and Vancouver programs were coordinated by the British Columbia Police Commission the rationale underlying the Burnaby program can be
generalized to describe the Vancouver project. Some of the findings of the Burnaby Police' assessment of their general program will also be discussed in order to assess its crime prevention effectiveness, indications of target displacement, and to act as a backdrop for the analysis of the effectiveness of the Vancouver West End project.

Unfortunately the police assessment of the test project in Burnaby does not address the problem of displacement; rather the study focuses exclusively on the deterrent effect of the program as compared to a "control" area of the same size and roughly similar characteristics in terms of its residential composition. The areas are not contiguous with the result that it is almost impossible to discern geographic displacement effects that might be associated with the experimental program (sufficiently detailed data are simply not available from the Burnaby police for an analysis of this kind). The analysis thus turns to an examination of the effects of the Neighbourhood Watch program intensively implemented in the West End of Vancouver, for which detailed geo-coded police data are available, to see if areal displacements occurred. Because no information concerning the pattern of the implementation of the Vancouver program in general is available, the analysis is restricted to the West End project.
"Neighbourhood Watch": the Rationale.

As noted earlier, "Neighbourhood Watch" (with its sub-component "Operation Identification") is a "target hardening" strategy aimed at both reducing the opportunity for burglary and increasing the risk to the would-be breaking and entering offender (the terms "burglary" and "breaking and entering" are used interchangeably here). According to the booklet describing Neighbourhood Watch to the public, the program consists of three elements.

1. Neighbourhood Watch - a program of cooperation among families in your area to make your entire neighbourhood more secure

2. Property Identification - a method of safeguarding your valuable property with non-removable identification (Operation Identification)

3. Home security - a program to protect your home and family through upgrading of the home itself, and tips on personal security within the home."

(British Columbia Police Commission, p. 1)

The program aims at developing a "co-operative community effort" between the police and members of the public to reduce crime "at the grass roots" level. As well as "target hardening" strategies, the program is based on the idea that the police cannot reduce crime without the active involvement of the public; to this end the booklet stresses the concept of community cooperation:

"Neighbourhood Watch is a program of mutual assistance among neighbours...Get to know your neighbours. Introduce them to the concept of Neighbourhood Watch. Get involved. A neighbourhood where people are alert to the
potential of crime and willing to look out for one another's interests is a neighbourhood where crimes are least likely to occur...Good neighbours working together through Neighbourhood Watch can prevent crimes in their area the most effective way - before it starts."

(British Columbia Police Commission, p. 1)

The philosophy of the program clearly derives from the approach first articulated by Jane Jacobs (1961).

In terms of target hardening, "Operation Identification" aims at discouraging the burglar before he/she enters a home. The information booklet describes three basic steps in the target hardening process:

"1. Electric engraving pencils are available at your local police agency free of charge. Borrow one of these engravers for a day or two and simply engrave your social insurance number on all items of value in or about your home. These markings cannot be removed, and if the item is stolen it can easily be traced. But, what is more important, burglars hesitate to steal easily traceable goods, and proper identification may well discourage the theft before it takes place.

2. Highly visible tamper-proof decals are also available through your local police. Applied to your valuable items, these decals will further discourage theft by warning burglars that the item has been properly identified and will be easily traced if stolen. It will also alert police that the item has been engraved.

3. Larger decals for use on windows or exterior doors of your home are also available from your local police. They serve to discourage break-ins by warning would-be burglars that the contents of your home have been properly identified and will be easily traced if stolen."

(British Columbia Police Commission, p. 2)

The purpose of this target hardening is to upgrade a residence to a point of "minimum security" that would
discourage most burglars from breaking in. The information booklet notes that "it is impractical and virtually impossible to make your home completely burglar-proof" but that most burglaries are relatively unsophisticated "crimes of opportunity." The point of minimum security is that where destructive force must be applied to gain access to a residence. On the strength of the apparent effectiveness of several highly localized experimental programs the information booklet suggests that "Neighbourhood Watch...will, with your cooperation, drastically reduce the incidence of burglary in your area."

Should this information booklet be correct about the opportunistic nature of burglary (it points out that most burglars are under seventeen years of age despite the fact that the only illustrations of burglars are caricatures of a masked adult "professional") then not only should Neighbourhood Watch take the opportunity out of the crime and reduce the number of burglaries, but it should also be unlikely to result in any form of displacement. While the experience of these small-scale intensive programs suggests that they reduce burglary drastically, the displacement effects associated with them have scarcely been researched, particularly when the programs are extended to cover entire municipalities such as Burnaby and Vancouver.
Towards the end of 1975 the Burnaby R.C.M.P. studied the effectiveness of a number of crime prevention programs to see which might be usefully implemented in their jurisdiction. The choice of Neighbourhood Watch was based on the success of similar strategies, particularly the ones in Monterey, California, and Revelstoke, Ontario. In Monterey, 5,500 homes were labelled and approximately the same number left untouched. In the twelve years since the implementation of the program, 2,500 break-ins occurred in the unprotected homes while there were only 29 burglaries of protected residences (Time Magazine, January 26th, 1976). The astonishingly disproportionate magnitude of these figures suggests that a displacement effect may be associated with the program, but without information pertaining to the burglary rates prior to its implementation this must be a highly speculative observation.

The Revelstoke program was conducted on a much smaller scale than its Monterey equivalent. The Ottawa police marked all valuables in the 135 homes in Revelstoke and placed large signs at the entrances to the community indicating that the area was protected by "Operation Identification". Homes were marked with stickers to indicate their participation and extensive news media coverage was given. While the police expected the program to decrease burglaries by 25%, not
one of the homes participating in the program was burgled in its first eighteen months of operation \(^2\) (Burnaby R.C.M.P. p.2)

By virtue of these findings, and other reports of the success of similar programs, the R.C.M.P. decided to implement a pilot project in Burnaby in order to ascertain its effectiveness in a different municipal setting. Following the general failure of other programs which had relied on literature mailed to residents requesting their participation, Neighbourhood Watch was chosen because it involved a direct contact between police or volunteer workers with every household in the pilot project area, and subsequently with as many households in the remainder of the municipality that could be physically contacted (an attempt was subsequently made to contact them all). The police believed that such an approach could effectively overcome the main problem of their less intensive "Stop Thief" program that preceded Neighbourhood Watch - namely, public apathy. To encourage public involvement it appeared to the project organizers that in the implementation of any program the police must display positive crime prevention activity and must initiate public response. To this end Operation Identification appeared to be the solution on three grounds:

"a) The program is police-oriented and can be easily controlled.

b) Marking is permanent - apathy cannot erase it.

c) The program can be easily evaluated." (Burnaby R.C.M.P. p. 3)
Unfortunately, the problem of displacement was never considered in the evaluation of the pilot project and, as it turns out, an evaluation in these terms is anything but easy. Indeed, rather than using the pilot project to test the effectiveness of the program, plans were made before the pilot project began to extend the program to the remainder of the residences in Burnaby. Had the pilot project proved unsuccessful the police could have presumably aborted the program elsewhere. As it turned out the pilot project appeared to provide dramatic results in terms of its deterrent capacity. The test area was located in a "high-crime" area and contained approximately 800 residences. Between January 7th and 31st, 1976, 95% of the homes in the area were visited by 47 teams made up of representatives of the R.C.M.P. (both auxiliary and regular members) and members of the local Rotary Club. The Burnaby police evaluation of the test area operation over a three month period claimed a 79% reduction in break-ins. (Burnaby R.C.M.P., p. 8).

Almost immediately after the completion of Operation Identification in the test area the program was extended to the rest of Burnaby. For organizational purposes the municipality was divided into three "areas", and each of these subdivided into "districts" of approximately 200 homes. The districts were further subdivided into "units" of about 10 homes, with a community volunteer responsible for the implementation of the program in each unit. Three thousand volunteers attended training sessions held at Simon Fraser University run by the
Operation Identification staff. Volunteers worked their immediate neighbourhoods only, and loaned an engraver to each household, supplied the resident with a copy of an Operation Identification booklet and small decals to apply to marked property. The large house decals were handed out after the volunteer had checked that household valuables had been engraved (Burnaby R.C.M.P., pp. 10-12).

By early September 1976 some 30,000 of the estimated 48,500 residences in Burnaby had been completed. Most of those residences not completed were low-rise and high-rise apartment units which characteristically have lower breaking and entering rates than single family or two family dwellings.

Effects of the General Municipal Programs

During the 1970's in the United States hundreds of millions of dollars were spent on crime prevention programs like Neighbourhood Watch and Operation Identification. The initial elation over their apparent success has given way to a widespread skepticism:

"...the fact is that most security surveys and target hardening programs, are so undermanned or disorganized that they make hardly any impact. The L.E.A.A. survey of 206 such programs found that in only one of five such programs did police contact more than 10 percent of the households in their jurisdictions."

(Krajick, 1979, p. 10)

"A large part of the problem is that police agencies around the country have adopted a standard battery of crime prevention programs half-heartedly, or as part of a general public
relations and public education effort whose results will never be reflected in any crime statistics."

(Krajick, 1979, p. 7)

This wholesale indictment of crime prevention programs suggests that when poorly implemented they have very little effect. But evidence presented below shows that the Burnaby and Vancouver Neighbourhood Watch programs, particularly the small-scale pilot projects, were more carefully implemented than their American counterparts to the extent that program personnel contacted a much greater proportion of households. The argument will nevertheless be advanced that because of differences in their implementation, the Burnaby program was more effective than the Vancouver program in general (with the exception of the Vancouver West End Pilot Project).

Figure 4 shows the number of reported residential burglaries for the Burnaby municipality as a whole. Neighbourhood Watch began in 1976 when there was a total of 1217 burglaries, while in 1977 there were 1002. In 1978 the overall number returns to 1217. In 1979 a recording change appears to take place; the number of residential burglaries falls to 453, but, significantly, the number registered in the "other breaking and entering" category rises from 165 in 1978 to 1125 in 1979 and their relative proportion of the total number remains equivalent through 1981.³
Figure 4.

BURNABY RESIDENTIAL B & E's 1974—1981

Residential B&E Annual Total
1024
(Other B&E's 218)

Res. 1315
(Other 185)

Res. 1217
(Other 167)

Res. 1002
(Other 194)

Res. 1217
(Other 165)

Res. 453
(Other 1125)

Res. 557
(Other 1377)

Res. 709
(Other 1720)

The changes of reported residential burglary rates between 1974 and 1978 for six month periods are shown below:

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<tr>
<td>Jan.-June</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>567</td>
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<td>July-Dec.</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>782</td>
<td>692</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>650</td>
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The first six month period in 1974 represents the first use of the current crime recording system and shows the lowest rate of any of the time segments represented here. The highest segment rate is the latter part of 1975. In the latter part of 1976, the first six month period of the widespread implementation of Neighbourhood Watch in Burnaby, we see the second highest rate in the series. In 1977, the first full year of the program in operation, the rates were the lowest in the five year period apart from the first six month segment. In the latter part of 1978 the rate climbs again to be the third highest level in the series. The trend of this series appears to suggest an attenuation of the burglary rate following the first extensive implementation of Neighbourhood Watch by the end of 1976. Particularly noticeable is the flattening of the winter peak in 1977-78. But in November 1978 we find the highest single month rate at any time since the start of the series. It is tempting to conclude from the changes in rates that Neighbourhood Watch was successful for a period of about 18 months until the end of 1978. Then what appears to be a change in the definition of "residential" and "other" breaking and enterings makes interpretation difficult.
Figure 5 illustrates residential burglary rates in Vancouver between 1974 and 1981. Neighbourhood Watch began in Vancouver in 1976, but was not comprehensively implemented in the way that it was in Burnaby during this same year. Some areas in Vancouver were not canvassed until 1977 or even later. (In both municipalities the programs have been available on a continuing basis - if a citizen approaches the police department engraving pens are made available. But the implementation of the program was most effective and extensive when citizen groups, and sometimes police officers, actively canvassed an area as was generally the case in Burnaby.)

The Vancouver burglary time series data are very difficult to interpret with regard to the impact of Neighbourhood Watch. To begin with, every year witnessing a drop in the burglary rate (1975, 1977, 1979) is followed by one with an increase in the rate - and vice versa - with the exception of 1981. Neighbourhood Watch began in 1976, and active canvassing continued through 1977 into 1978. There is a reduction in the overall burglary rate in 1977, but in 1978 the rate rises to be the highest in the first five year period for which data are available. As in Burnaby the drop in 1977 is produced by the "flattening" of the winter season rate "peak". But this rate reduction occurs before the completion of a widespread implementation of Neighbourhood Watch in Vancouver. By the end of 1976 the program in Burnaby was two-thirds complete. While it is impossible to gauge the exact figure in Vancouver, it was nothing like this extensive (the implementation of the program
Figure 5.

VANCOUVER RESIDENTIAL B & E's 1974-1981

No. S REPORTED RESIDENTIAL B & E's


6020 5749 6290 5991 6680 5566 6918 8037

Res. B & E's Annual Total
in the test area of Vancouver's West End did not occur until the summer of 1977). From the trend of the Vancouver statistics, no clear pattern emerges as to the deterrent effectiveness of the program - the rate did go down in 1977 slightly, but then it was lower still in both 1975 and 1979.

Two complications should be born in mind when attempting to interpret the meaning of these time series data. The first concerns the potential effect that a program like Neighbourhood Watch has on the reporting of burglary as opposed to its actual effect on burglar behaviour. Evidence presented from a victimization survey conducted during the implementation of a burglary prevention program in Portland, Oregon, suggested that the percentage of burglaries reported to the police increased during the period the program was implemented (Schneider, 1976). In Ditton's terms (1979), the implementation of Operation Identification produced a "fantasy-rise" in crime rates. Because victimization surveys suggest that only a fraction of the actual number of burglaries are reported to the police - the number is usually estimated at between one-third and one-half (Skogan, 1976) - the interpretation of the Vancouver and Burnaby burglary time series profiles is complicated by the possibility that increased reporting rates hide actual reductions in the amount of burglary. We shall return to this problem in the discussion of area displacement effects presented below.

The second complication arises from differences in the Vancouver and Burnaby programs. In general terms the Burnaby
program appears to have been better organized than the one in Vancouver. An evaluation of the effectiveness of the first year of the program in Burnaby was conducted by the local police whereas very little in the way of evaluation of their own program was conducted by the Vancouver police. Two pieces of evidence are available which reflect the differing degrees of success of the two programs. The first is in terms of their apparent effect in increasing risk to offenders. An examination of changes in clearance rates tends to demonstrate the different effectiveness of the two municipal programs:

### Table 2
Percentage of Burglaries Cleared in Vancouver and Burnaby Police Jurisdictions

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Vancouver % cleared*</th>
<th>Burnaby % cleared*</th>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>17.0</td>
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</table>

*reports unfounded or cleared by charge

In Burnaby following the introduction of Neighbourhood Watch in 1976, clearance rates approximately doubled for a
three year period and then dropped again in 1980 and 1981 to the level obtaining before the introduction of the program. In Vancouver no particularly significant difference in clearance rates appears to have occurred. The differences may reflect the varying success of the two programs.

A second indication of their varying success would be in terms of the percentage of households adopting the program - the more households adopting the program, the less the possibility of geographic or target displacement occurring. A victimization survey conducted by Simon Fraser University's Criminology Research Centre in 1979 included a question on the respondent household's participation in Neighbourhood Watch. Estimates based on the survey sample suggest that 43.2% of the total number of households in Vancouver participated in Neighbourhood Watch, 63.3% in Burnaby. If the Burnaby program is more effective than its Vancouver counterpart by virtue of greater participation, then the Burnaby program is more likely to be successful in preventing burglary. This greater degree of success may be apparent in the burglary rates for Burnaby which appear to show a reduction in 1977 and 1978 following the introduction of Neighbourhood Watch. Whatever success the Vancouver program had, evidence for it may be lost in fluctuations in the burglary rate which occur for entirely different reasons, particularly if the smaller percentage of households adopting the program in Vancouver created the greater likelihood of target or geographic displacement. In either case, the displacement of burglary to unprotected homes.
will obscure the deterrent effect of the program in homes protected by it. For the moment, it is sufficient to note that the potential effect of displacement combined with reporting changes brought about by the program make it very difficult to assess the deterrent effectiveness of Neighbourhood Watch from the municipality level data. It is nevertheless tempting to conclude from the Burnaby data that the program had some deterrent effect and the evidence for the deterrent capacity of small scale programs such as the one in Monterey appears to be unequivocal. What of the evidence for displacement? We begin with evidence for target displacement in Burnaby and then proceed to the problem of geographic displacement as the result of the West End pilot project in Vancouver.

Evidence for displacement

(1) Burnaby and the Evidence for Target Displacement

The Burnaby R.C.M.P.'s evaluation of the first year of the Burnaby-wide program (July 1976 - June 1977) includes a detailed description of the numbers of break-ins to residences protected by Operation Identification as compared to the number in unprotected residences. Unfortunately in only 59% of the cases through this one year period could it be ascertained from the original crime report form whether a residence was protected by Operation Identification or not. Of the 665 break-ins for which information could be ascertained, 329
occurred in protected residences and 336 in unprotected residences (Burnaby R.C.M.P., 1978 appendix 1.). For the month of June 1977 a survey of the residential burglary crime reports which did not include information about Operation Identification was conducted by visiting the victimized household to check for stickers. The survey showed that 67% of these residences were not protected by the program. While it is impossible to attain an exact figure for the number of residences protected by the program in Burnaby, we do know that 30,000 of the 48,500 residential units were contacted by program staff by September 1976 (Burnaby R.C.M.P. 1978). Most of the residences not contacted were apartment buildings which typically experience a lower burglary rate than single and two family homes (apartments are more difficult to burglarize). If the figure for the "unknown" reports for June is indicative of the proportion for the rest of the twelve month period, a further 313 break-ins occurred in unmarked residences. The cumulative totals would then read 483 break-ins to Operation Identification protected residences, as compared to 649 to unprotected residences.

It should be reiterated, these figures are based on a generalization of the June 1977 ratio of marked to unmarked properties which were not recorded as such on the crime reports - there is no way of knowing whether such a generalization is reliable. Nor is there anyway of establishing the ratio of residential burglaries in apartment building units as compared to single and two family dwelling units. The very fact that
not much of an attempt was made to implement Operation Identification in apartment buildings is an indication of their comparatively lower break-in rate in general, and confirmation that opportunity does have something to do with the burglar's choice of target.

In addition to the aforementioned problems, it is impossible to tell how many of the 30,000 residential units contacted by the Operation Identification personnel actually responded by adopting the program, although the program evaluation report conveys the impression that a large majority did. If this is the case, and if we assume a 70% adoption rate, by September of 1976 the greater proportion of single and two family dwellings in Burnaby had adopted the program (the victimization survey data reported above suggest that 63% of the total households in Burnaby had adopted the program in 1978 - by this time there were still households in Burnaby never contacted by program personnel. The Simon Fraser Criminology Research Centre Victimization Survey showed that in 1979 76% of single family houses had adopted the program, but only 44% of the apartments). If all of these assumptions are correct one is left with the conclusion that while a greater proportion of single and two family dwellings had adopted the program, by far the greatest number of break-ins occurred in those units which had not adopted the program. Had the rate of burglary for protected residences been equivalent to the rate for unprotected residences, there would have been 1052 break-ins to protected residences, and 1701 burglaries in Burnaby as a whole.
between June 1976 and July 1977. This latter figure is significantly higher than the burglary rate in Burnaby for any 12 month period for which data are available. Had the rate in unprotected residences been the same as the rate in the protected residences, there would have been 781 burglaries in Burnaby, a rate lower than at any time between 1974 and 1978. There were in fact 1122 burglaries reported in Burnaby between July 1976 and June 1977. These hypothetical figures, together with the different rates of victimization of unprotected and protected residences, suggest that Operation Identification does prevent burglaries, but at the expense of a greater victimization of unprotected residences— a target displacement occurs.

From the geographic point of view what this means is that target displacement of the sort described here may occur instead of or together with geographic displacement (depending upon the percentage of residential units which adopt the program in the first place, and the geographic extent of the program's coverage). The geographic displacement might thus be between neighbourhoods or within them.

From the evidence presented to this point, a plausible argument can be made suggesting that target displacement was associated with the Burnaby program once it had been fully implemented. While the pilot project was claimed as being highly successful in reducing crime no means of assessing its effect in displacing burglary to other areas was included. This effect would presumably be most intensive in the vicinity
immediately adjacent to the test area, but in lieu of more
detailed statistics this hypothesis simply cannot be tested.
But the statistics for such a test are available in Vancouver.

(2) The West End Program in Vancouver: Evidence for Areal
Displacement

Neighbourhood Watch was introduced to Vancouver's West End residential district late in 1976. The program was first advertised in a series of neighbourhood meetings at local community centres and at gatherings of the West End Ratepayers Association in January, February and March 1977. Two police constables responsible for implementing the program also contacted apartment owners and other local groups in the hope that they would cooperate. From May to August 1977, six students were hired to help introduce the program on a door to door basis. Canvassing began in the English Bay area of the West End, and by the end of the summer the team hoped to complete the area between Denman, Burrard, Davie and the English Bay shoreline (see Figure 6, p. 319). By September 1st, 1976, 80% of the households in the area had been contacted.

In September the program suffered a temporary setback when funding for it was suspended by city council. The door to door campaign was discontinued, and residents who wanted to enter the program had to do so of their own initiative by borrowing marking pens from the local library.
The interruption of funds in this way has created a fortunate circumstance for examining the spatial impact of Neighbourhood Watch in Vancouver to the extent that an area where Operation Identification was systematically implemented by a system of door to door canvassing is juxtaposed to an area where the program worked on a purely voluntary basis as noted earlier; a survey of similar programs in the United States suggests that many more households adopt such programs when police or their representatives directly contact householders as opposed to implementing them on a purely voluntary basis - only ten of sixty-five projects surveyed by the United States Law Enforcement Assistance Agency had managed to enroll more than 10% of the households in their jurisdictions into Neighbourhood Watch or equivalent programs, the citizen contact programs being most effective (Krajick, 1979, p. 13).

In order to assess the impact of Operation Identification, we must ascertain the deterrent effects of the Neighbourhood Watch program in the test area. As noted above small scale intensive programs have been shown to be successful elsewhere as was the case with the Monterey program (Time Magazine, January 26, 1976) and the results claimed for the first three months of the Burnaby pilot project indicate a 79% reduction in burglary. Also the available evidence from Burnaby suggests that Operation Identification protected homes are not burglarized at the same rate as unprotected homes. Although I have not been able to conduct interviews with burglary offenders, Michael Robinson (1978) interviewed convicted
burglars in Vancouver and Richmond (another municipality in the greater Vancouver area). Four of the eight offenders he talked to indicated that they avoided premises protected by Operation Identification. While it is difficult from the overall burglary rate in Vancouver to establish the deterrent effectiveness of the general program, the method of its implementation in the test area is one which elsewhere has had a considerable measure of success in recruiting residents, and thus in its general potential for deterring would-be burglars. With these considerations in mind it seems reasonable to argue that what appears to be target displacement as a result of the general Burnaby program may translate into an areal displacement in the case of geographically restricted pilot projects.

The Neighbourhood Watch Pilot Project Area is shown in Figure 6. In searching for displacement effects, burglary rates in three areas adjacent to the project area were examined (West End West, West End North, and West End East). While the Vancouver Police statistics enable the reconstruction of burglary rates for small areas such as these, the records contain no information about which victims were protected by Neighbourhood Watch. Unfortunately, therefore, no assessment of target displacement within the project area can be made. The analysis proceeds on the assumption that while target displacement could occur in the test area (not all the residences contacted would have adopted Operation Identification), it would in this case be more likely to occur
geographically - a search for unprotected targets would make some burglars concentrate on unprotected areas, especially in the West End of Vancouver where the project area is located within a distinct neighbourhood.

The burglary rates for the four areas depicted in Figure 6 are shown in table 3. In the project area the average number of burglaries per month during the 24 month period prior to the implementation of Neighbourhood Watch (January 1975 to December 1976) was 10.6. During the first twelve months of Neighbourhood Watch (1977) the monthly average declined by some 20% to 8.0. This rate reduction may be indicative of a deterrent effect of the program, especially if reporting rates increase as a result of its implementation. The rate during the first six months of 1977 was particularly low, however, (just over two burglaries per month) while the rate from July through December was much higher. Again increased reporting may be responsible for part of the change.

In 1978, the rate increases to 15.75 burglaries per month, a rate much higher than the pre-program level. But by this time the distinction between levels of adoption of Operation Identification in the project area and surrounding areas would have been significantly reduced - it is noteworthy that the rate in the surrounding areas also increased to a point where it was higher than levels in 1975 and 1976. Once again, this increase may reflect changes in burglary reporting, but such an explanation would not seem to explain the magnitude of rate increases. From her assessment of Operation Identification in
Table 3
Number of reported burglaries in the West End of Vancouver

### West End North

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<tr>
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\[ \bar{x} = 36.3 \]
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Score standardized against a base of 100 in 1975:

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### West End South

(Project Area)

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Score standardized against a base of 100 in 1975:

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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</table>

\[ \bar{x} = 15.7 \]

321.
### Table 3A

**Number of reported burglaries in the West End of Vancouver**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>1</td>
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### West End East

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<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
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<th>Oct</th>
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<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Average (x̄):**
- West End West: 6.6
- West End East: 7.4
Portland, Schneider notes that each increase in reporting (as measured by a victimization survey) was accompanied by an increase in the rate of official burglary (1976, p. 138). But the increase in reporting which she attributes to the introduction of Operation Identification, if it can be extrapolated to the Vancouver situation, would not be sufficient to explain the rate changes occurring in the West End - Schneider shows a 20% difference in reporting rates while the rate in the project area in 1978 is double the rate it was in 1976, the year immediately prior to the introduction of the program. But in the residential area Schneider studied, only 17% of the households had adopted Operation Identification - in the West End project area the rate of adoption was much higher. The Simon Fraser University Criminology Research Centre Victimization Study estimates that 43.2% of households in Vancouver adopted the program - in the project area the percentage is likely to be higher because of the systematic method of team canvassing used. In the West End there were three follow-up visits if the first one was made when no-one was at home. For most of the project area, every residence was visited (the 20% not visited were in a small four block area in the south east corner of the project area - the number of burglaries in such a small area is so low that a meaningful analysis of displacement in this area could not be made). There was, then, likely to be a much higher rate of adoption of the program in the West End test area than elsewhere in Vancouver, some of which was not canvassed systematically or
not canvassed at all. The rate increase in the project area in the latter part of 1977 and the general increase in the West End in 1978 (as more homes in West End North adopted the program), may be at least partly attributable to reporting changes, especially in light of Schneider's evidence that it is adopters of Operation Identification who are responsible for increased reporting (1976); adopters of the program reported 80% of burglaries, non-adopters 65%.5

Alternatively, the rates may have changed for entirely different reasons. If burglary rates were increasing in the West End, the introduction of Operation Identification could simply slow the rate of increase. In this case the program would have a deterrent effect, but one hidden by the simple comparison of different rates at different times. From the available data this possibility is difficult to account for. The point is that the deterrent effect of the program cannot simply be measured by comparing rates during the program with rates before the introduction of the program - random fluctuations and seasonal variations make the process of extrapolating rates difficult. The overall rate in the project area is nevertheless lower in 1977 than in the preceding two year period or thereafter. This is not, however, the case in West End North. A comparison of the rates in the two areas tends to confirm the conclusion that Operation Identification reduced burglaries in the project area, but only at the expense of an increase in West End North in the latter part of 1977 (Table 3 and Figure 7). When the rates are standardized
Residential Breaking and Entering in Vancouver's West End:
A comparison of Rates in the Neighborhood Watch Project Area and West End North

--- West End North
--- Project Area

Beginning of Neighborhood Watch

Intensification of N/W in project area

Period of displacement ?

No. S. REPORTED RESIDENTIAL B & E's

10  20  30  40  50  60

against a base of 100 in 1975 (Table 3) what becomes striking is the similarity of rates in West End North and the Project Area in 1976, 1978 and 1979, but the anomaly between the two in 1977, the year the test project was introduced.

In attempting to identify displacement effects I have focused on rate changes in the three areas immediately adjacent to the English Bay Project Area (see Figure 6). A short description of each of these areas is warranted.

The area to the northwest of English Bay is largely comprised of high rise apartments. It has characteristically had a very low burglary rate averaging approximately 1.5 break-ins per month (Table 3). It is physically separated from the main part of the Neighbourhood Watch project area except at the south end of Denman Street. During 1977 the burglary rate remained the same as the year before. It seems reasonable to conclude that no displacement of burglary into this area occurred.

The area to the east of the project neighbourhood consists of a mixture of low rise apartments, duplexes and single family dwellings, but for the most part is a commercial area. Many of the residential burglaries occurring in this area may be from the rooms of the numerous hotels but, unfortunately no statistics are available to show exactly how many of the burglaries in this area are of this type. For the two years prior to 1977 the monthly average was 7.6 while in 1977 it was 7.4. In 1978 it rose to 15.0, but by this time the area could have been expected to contain more adopters of Neighbourhood
Watch. This abrupt increase occurs at the same time as the sharp increase in rates in the program area. In terms of displacement one might not expect to see much of an effect in this area for two reasons: first, the area as defined only borders the program neighbourhood for a distance of four blocks and two of these were not canvassed by the program personnel; second, where the two areas do border each other, they are separated by the North End of the Burrard Street bridge, and this forms a natural boundary to the West End area. Not only is this a physical boundary, but may also form a boundary to social group activity spaces - the schools in the West End area lie to the north of the project area, and since most burglars are juveniles (over 80% of the known burglary offenders in Vancouver between 1978 and 1981 were juveniles), their already developed activity spaces may determine the direction of any displacement of targets as a result of Neighbourhood Watch (in this respect see Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981B,).

This leaves us with the area immediately adjacent to the project area to the north. For the purposes of this analysis data have been collected for the area six blocks to the north of the project neighbourhood - a number of studies of burglars have suggested that most burglaries occur relatively close to the offender's home, usually within one mile of it (for a review, see Philips, 1980; Davidson, 1981; Herbert, 1982). The area described as West End north should thus be large enough for any area displacement to be recognizable. West End north is separated from the project area by Davie Street, the main
West End thoroughfare providing access to both areas. Davie Street is a commercial strip, and a focal point of activity for both West End north and the project area. The two areas are thus very much one neighbourhood with a similar mix of high rise apartments and houses; the two schools servicing the project area are both north of Davie Street. If Neighbourhood Watch did indeed displace burglary, then it is to the area north of Davie Street that the effect would be most likely to be noticed. While the evidence is not exactly unequivocal, a displacement of burglary does appear to have occurred.

In the 24 month period prior to the implementation of Neighbourhood Watch in West End South, the average monthly burglary rate in West End North was 23.5. During 1977 the rate rose to 27.5. But one must be careful here, the monthly rate for West End North in the twelve months prior to the development of the program in West End South was 27.0. During 1976 and 1977 the rate did not appear to change much. Not, that is, if we consider the average monthly rate for the whole of 1977. The picture changes considerably if we examine the month by month changes of rates in West End North as the team of two policemen and six students gradually canvassed the area to the south from May 1977 onwards. Prior to this time there was an average of 15.5 burglaries per month in West End North. But from May onwards the number increases substantially to 36.5 burglaries per month - a rate much higher than in any six month period in the previous thirty months for which records are available. As the Neighbourhood Watch program in
West End South was implemented through the summer months, residential burglaries appear to have been displaced northwards. In 1978, when Neighbourhood Watch canvassing was extended into West End North, the burglary rate may be inflated by reporting changes, especially if most of the increase in reporting is attributable to adopters of the program as Schneider suggests. A victimization survey would be needed to test this hypothesis. But whatever the case, the highest rates in West End North for the six year period shown in Figure 7 occur in the six month period immediately following the implementation of the test program in the project area.

As well as this evidence for geographical displacement of burglary offences, anecdotal evidence suggests that a different form of displacement occurred within the project area. The police officers responsible for the program noted that after the intensive summer campaign a change had occurred. While a number of homes protected by Neighbourhood Watch had been broken into, no marked items had been taken - instead the burglars removed cash and jewellery (West End Courier, September 15, 1977). Unfortunately, it has not been possible to gain access to the original crime reports where this information is recorded and so it is not possible to establish if this kind of change did in fact occur.

Implications of the Analysis

Neighbourhood Watch does seem to be effective in reducing
reported burglary, particularly when implemented intensively in small areas, a finding confirmed by the experience in Monterey, California. Where the plan is implemented at a wider scale, evidence from the Burnaby R.C.M.P. (1977) and the Schneider study (1976) suggest that Operation Identification reduces the rate of burglary for those adopting the program, but evidence in Burnaby suggests that the preventative effect is minimized by target displacement. In the case of a smaller scale program, target displacement appears to assume a geographic dimension as some burglars concentrate on unprotected areas as a way of concentrating on unprotected homes. While it should be noted that the evidence does not allow for strong conclusions in this respect, it is consistent with the Burnaby findings to the extent that target displacement appears to have assumed a recognizable areal form. Other burglars may simply adapt their behaviour by refraining from taking marked items, others are not deterred at all. Whatever deterrent effect the program has is probably short-lived. In Vancouver the program did not seem to affect the clearance rate for burglary offences, while in Burnaby the effect was temporary. In keeping with this finding the Burnaby program seemed to have a more noticeable effect in reducing the overall burglary rate, despite the evidence for target displacement, than did the program in Vancouver. Because the Burnaby program was extensively implemented in an eight month period its effect in suppressing the overall rate of burglary would be more noticeable than in Vancouver, where it took two years to
implement the program – Vancouver is a much bigger municipality in terms of both area and population.

The evidence for both target and geographic displacement suggests that the opportunistic aspect of burglary may be a little different from the way it is often conceptualized. The suggestion that burglary is a highly "opportunistic offence" portrays the burglar, particularly the juvenile burglar, as taking advantage of opportunities that are happened upon "in the spur of the moment" (eg. Hakim and Rengert, 1981, p. 12). The usual speculation has been that if police prevention practices do displace burglary, it will be the activity of older burglars that is displaced. This view may misconceive the nature of juvenile burglary. Obviously certain kinds of target hardening will influence targets chosen. But opportunity is relative. Juveniles may well intend to commit a burglary and choose the easiest opportunity available. But to remove certain opportunities may only change the nature of the way opportunities are perceived by those wishing to exploit them - opportunity may be all important in the choice of target, but much less so in the decision that there is going to be a target in the first place. The potential of target hardening for displacing burglary is thus probably greater than has generally been thought. Target displacement appears to be the most likely adaptive strategy, although a form of typological displacement may also occur if burglars refrain from taking engraved items concentrating instead on clothes, money and jewellry. In the case of small scale intensively
implemented programs, target displacement may assume a more recognizable areal form.

I shall return to the more general implications of the analysis in the conclusion to the dissertation.
Notes to Chapter 9

1. The Department of Manpower and Immigration, however, is not allowed to supply social insurance numbers to the police. As a result the use of these numbers does not allow the police to trace the owners of all stolen goods even when they are engraved.

2. The Revelstoke community was described as a "high-crime-rate area" experiencing 17 burglaries in the year prior to implementation of Operation Identification. The finding is suspect to the extent that all these burglaries could be hypothetically attributed to one person who might simply have moved out of the area for reasons unrelated to any crime prevention scheme.

3. Whether this is a reporting change is, of course, an empirical question still to be resolved.

4. Because of the change in recording practice the first records (particularly of the first month) may not be reliable. Some of the reports for early 1974 may have been filed for December 1973.

5. Both these reporting rates are higher than those found in other victimization surveys (see generally Skogan, 1976). The finding does raise the possibility that reporting rates vary geographically.
Chapter 10

Conclusions: Towards an Integrated Geography of Crime and Control

In introducing verstehen and critical perspectives to the geography of crime, two major interacting themes have emerged. The first concerns the conceptual and theoretical problems associated with the positivistic and instrumentalist philosophical underpinnings of geographic perspectives. The second concerns the problems associated with the analytic separation of crime and justice that such a philosophical orientation entails. The principal implication of verstehen and critical perspectives for the geography of crime is the need to understand crime in the context of social control (and ultimately in terms of wider social allocation processes). The theoretical and empirical links between crime and control are developed at three conceptual levels.

1) Crime statistics and images of crime
2) Crime control activity and the genesis of subcultures
3) Crime control and the configuration of "offender" behaviour patterns as systematized through the concept of displacement.

In developing the conceptual and empirical links between crime and social control I have attempted to move beyond the "abstracted empiricism" characteristic of much of the geography of crime and other spatial perspectives developed in sociology.
and criminology, to an analysis of crime in its socio-legal context. Implicit in the advocacy of such an analysis is the argument that geographers must consider the implications of interactionist and critical perspectives in developing a unified geography of crime and justice in order to understand the influence of social control practices on the geography of crime.

In the discussion of interactionist and critical perspectives I have not managed to resolve the theoretical tensions which separate structure and action perspectives. But what I have tried to do is show that both perspectives must be used in the development of social theory in general, and criminological theory in particular (be it from a geographic perspective or otherwise). Rather than offering a solution to the structure action problem, Taylor, Walton and Young's (1973) model for a fully social theory of deviance has been introduced as a guideline for specifying the analytic elements necessary for a geographic perspective on crime in its socio-legal context. I have tried to show how this socio-legal context is important both in shaping our images of who the criminals are and where criminal activity occurs.

In discussing images of crime I have shown how certain interpretations of official statistics make the understanding of crime rate maps (or maps of offender residence) problematic, particularly if official statistics are more a reflection of control activities than the actual incidence of criminal behaviour. Evidence presented suggests that official crime
statistics may sometimes depict the "real" incidence of crime fairly accurately, but at other times they more accurately portray control activity. In a general sense official statistics may be biased in two ways. The first type of bias is produced through the selective interaction of control personnel with offenders. The second form of bias occurs at an ideological (i.e. structural) level in terms of the separation of "street" crime offences from "white-collar" and corporate offences; because of the differential levels of enforcement of "lower class" and "upper class" offences, the "crime problem" becomes the "street" crime problem. This distorted image of crime is entrenched by the selective publication of crime statistics which generally only include the "lower class" offences.

Because the criminological literature is equivocal over the problem of how crime statistics should be interpreted, the main implication of the discussion in Chapter 5 is that it is unwise to proceed with a *prima facie* interpretation unless very good reasons can be presented for doing so - because the crime statistics so central to the geographer's research manifesto may be spatially biased, they must become an object of study in their own right in the spatial analysis of crime.

The discussion of the impact of control activity in "producing" crime is extended in Chapter 6 to an examination of the impact of informal police practices on the genesis of subcultural groups (i.e. those police interactions with members of the public which do not result in the definition of a crime.
or, as Ericson, 1982, phrases it, with persons considered "more offensive than offending" as the police carry out their mandate to "reproduce order"). The discussion of observational studies of policing (Ericson, 1981; 1982) and of Gill's study of Luke Street (1978) shows how police activity itself can contribute to the development of stereotypes of certain social groups as being outside the law, and how, through symbolic interaction, this identity can become the self-identity of the group in question. Gill's analysis is particularly important for showing how social control interacts with other social allocation practices (in this case public housing policies) to produce the social context in which subcultures unfold. Social allocation practices form part of the structural context in which the stereotypes of certain groups as "problem" groups emerge. While in this dissertation much of the discussion has concentrated on the legal and criminal justice milieu, this focus is not meant to suggest that the "legal environment" is the only level of analysis to be developed in what Herbert (1977, 1979, 1982) refers to as an understanding of the "antecedents" of crime patterns. The analysis must be linked to a much broader study of social allocation and control practices in general. The argument developed in this dissertation is thus simply an introduction to a much more general project - a critical geographic perspective on crime and control.

Having discussed the effects of the control environment on images of crime and the production and identification of
"problem" groups, the emphasis of the analysis changes to an examination of the influence of control practices on spatial patterns of "offender" and "problem group" behaviour. Put a slightly different way, the change of emphasis marks a transition from a consideration of the internal relations of crime and control, to a consideration of their spatial manifestations.

Analysis of the influence of control practices on patterns of criminal behaviour has been systematized through the concept of displacement, one which meets both theoretical and empirical requirements for a geographic perspective on crime in its socio-legal context. Displacement phenomena are defined as changes of social activity in direct response to social control practices. In generating explanations of crime distributions geographers have generally focused on the crime or the criminal. The discussion of displacement phenomena serves to introduce a processual analysis to show how offenders react to crime control and prevention strategies.

The various examples of displacement culled from secondary sources are introduced to establish the empirical importance and phenomenal dimensions of the relationship between crime control and actual offender behaviour. Although in most cases the change of offender or "problem" group behaviour described represents the unintended consequences of social control strategies, the importance of the use of space as a means of social control must also be incorporated into a comprehensive analysis of the control milieu. Nor is the discussion limited
to changes in spatial behaviour; because spatial displacement represents only one form of the offender's response to law enforcement or crime prevention efforts, any attempt to assess the spatial consequences of control efforts must also consider other types of offender adaptation (including the actual deterrent effectiveness of various control efforts). Movement is only one of a number of adaptive strategies available to the offender (or the "offensive").

The empirical vignettes presented in Chapters 8 and 9 represent an attempt to initiate a unified geography of crime and control organized around the displacement theme developed in Chapter 7. These analyses attempt to fulfill several theoretical and empirical objectives emerging from the critique of the geography of crime which are best outlined in a general discussion of the findings and implications of the two studies.

The study of changes of street prostitution in Vancouver indicates how the displacement of prostitutes was occasioned by an enforcement strategy not actually directed at them or the problem of solicitation itself. Previous literature on crime displacement (Mayhew et al, 1976; Reppetto, 1976; Winchester, 1978; Gabor, 1979) has speculatively dealt with the effects of enforcement strategies or crime prevention campaigns on the activities they are aimed at controlling. While the police investigation of the Vancouver cabaret club represents a "mechanical" crime strategy (as defined in Chapter 7 following Reppetto, 1976), its effect in terms of the intentions of the investigation were anything but mechanical, and a more
intractable type of law enforcement problem was created instead. The enforcement strategy produced an activity pattern change, the displacement itself occasioning the very definition of subsequent activity as illegal and, by extension, the nature of a new law enforcement problem. What the Vancouver prostitution example shows is that the spatial relationships between control activities and patterns of offender behaviour are not necessarily as direct as the relationships identified in the sparse literature on displacement restricted as it is to target hardening crime prevention programs and the allocation of patrol police.

But the analysis attempts to do much more than this. It also shows how the configuration of the crime that was "produced" in the interaction of the controllers and the controlled (and between different organizations of controllers - the courts, the police and ultimately various levels of the legislature) must itself be understood in the wider ideological context of the law and visions of social order. In the enforcement of solicitation laws, the prostitutes became the object of control, not the patrons, as a court decision that a prostitute's client could not "solicit" reaffirmed both the sexism of the soliciting law, and what had been taken-for-granted images of "who the offenders are".

This analysis could not be achieved without making the construction of official statistics an object of scrutiny. In this case the official statistics on street prostitution represent a control rate, and an interactionist analysis is
required to understand their meaning. In addition, an examination of the social relations embedded in the law - the structural context in which social interactions take place - is necessary to understand "who the criminals are": in this case women rather than men despite the fact that both are involved in public solicitation.

In passing it is also worth noting the way that the tactics used by controllers to reproduce public order have been deliberately aimed at displacing the prostitutes back into the clubs - to re-place them. Since the court decisions defining the interior of a car as a private place and solicitation as a persistent or harassing behaviour, the legal tools available to the police have made the re-creation of order extremely problematic. Because of changes in the interpretation of soliciting laws, place itself is no longer the critical variable in distinguishing the criminality of a behaviour even though the illegality of solicitation is still ultimately dependent upon the place in which it occurs.

In the discussion of street prostitution the analysis begins with a pattern change, and then attempts to explain the reasons for the change and its subsequent consequences for the interaction of crime control personnel and "offenders". In the second vignette the strategy is quite different. In the study of burglary in two municipalities in British Columbia, one based upon official statistics, the analysis begins with a control strategy and then attempts to assess its consequences. A further comment on the interpretation of these
statistics seems warranted in order to re-emphasize the importance of the suggestion that official statistics are forged through an interaction of crime and control. Because the enforcement of street soliciting offences is usually proactive most researchers would probably not find it too difficult to accept the idea that, at least in some cases, the official statistics pertaining to this particular offence reflect control activities as much as crime. But what is the most satisfactory interpretation in the case of burglary which is reactively policed? The analysis presented in Chapter 9 suggests that the answer is not as simple as one might initially think. Evidence introduced from another study of Operation Identification (Schneider, 1976) shows that such programs may have a significant effect on reporting rates. In this way control practices once again influence crime rates. This makes the interpretation of changes of municipality level burglary rates particularly difficult. While the marked seasonal regularity of burglary time series data suggest changes in the actual incidence of burglary rather than control activities (unless for some reason reporting rates are considerably higher in the winter months) the spatial variation of reporting nevertheless remains an open question. At the neighbourhood level the analysis might proceed with the assumption that reporting rates are uniform, but in the case of this analysis the introduction of Operation Identification complicates the picture because of its effect on reporting. All of these considerations have to be taken into account in
attempting to determine the effect of Operation Identification on burglar activity. But even with all these factors taken into consideration the evidence appears to suggest that offender behaviour does adjust to control activities, in this case at the most intimate of spatial scales, the choice of target.

At this point the analysis of burglary is incomplete - in a sense it has only just begun. Because very little research into displacement effects has been conducted, and because the displacement concept has proved informative in instigating an analysis of crime and justice, the burglary analysis is important to the extent that it appears to confirm speculations about displacement phenomena associated with "mechanical" criminal justice strategies. But the analysis has remained at the phenomenal level in an attempt to ascertain whether displacement does in fact occur. Having offered evidence to suggest that displacement of burglary activity does occur in response to prevention programs, the question becomes, what implications this has for a more general understanding of the nature of burglary? Because prostitution is work, a way of life and a general means of subsistence, it is not surprising that prostitute behaviour reacts and adapts to law enforcement efforts. Indeed, prostitute behaviour is intimately bound to control activity (Reckless, 1933; Symanski, 1974, 1981; James, 1975; Shumsky and Springer, 1981). But burglary, particularly juvenile burglary, may be more a matter of "style" than lifestyle; it is not "work" in the same sense that prostitution
is, and presumably constitutes only a small portion of the offender's time-budget. Nevertheless the suggestion that burglaries are displaced by Operation Identification implies that the burglar's activity is not opportunistic in the sense that is often conveyed in the literature. While the choice of target does appear to reflect relative opportunity, the choice that there is going to be a target in the first place is less affected by target opportunity structure.

From a correctionalist standpoint, one might argue that a more comprehensive implementation of Neighbourhood Watch might reduce burglary, but in the long run the program does not appear to be particularly successful anyway. In addition, a more efficient program may create a typologicl displacement to a different type of offender activity. Such speculation could only be resolved by moving beyond a phenomenal analysis to consider the meaning of burglary to the offender. It is in this sense that the analysis is incomplete. Incomplete though it might be, it does show that phenomenal and interactionist analyses are not inimical to each other - indeed they can be used to inform each other. Questions raised at the phenomenal level of analysis can often only be resolved by shifting to an interactionist level. Because my purpose in the analysis of burglary has been to show that a supposedly opportunistic crime is nevertheless sensitive to control efforts I have not attempted to extend it to a general discussion of burglar motivation except to suggest that the burglar's motives, particularly the juvenile's, are not well understood beyond the
obvious material interests involved. Such an understanding will ultimately be vital to an analysis of the relationship between crime control and the incidence of burglary.

Some Final Observations

Throughout the text I have tried to suggest profitable research directions and theoretical developments in a general attempt to philosophically and empirically reorient the geography of crime. I have suggested that geographers should pay much more attention to the problem of interpreting official statistics, and develop to a greater degree interactionist and critical perspectives on the relations between crime and justice. I have attempted to specify these relationships at a variety of philosophical and conceptual levels, and to demonstrate their empirical importance at a number of different scales of analysis - from the seasonal migration of nineteenth century vagrants around England in response to Poor Law Policy, to the adjustment of target selection by burglars within a neighbourhood as a response to Operation Identification. In each of the empirical examples I have presented, the relationship between crime and control has been conceptualized in terms of the offender's response to control practices. In the discussion of official statistics and ecological labelling I have suggested that control definitions and practices influence scientific images of who the criminals are in a variety of ways. It should be noted that the perspectives
employed are not necessarily appropriate in every situation. In the case of homicide, the official statistics are less equivocal and the effects of stereotyping and the discretion of control personnel are less significant than would be the case with juvenile delinquency, public order and morality offences where the importance of the control environment seems paramount. But even in the case of the many property crimes discovered by the public or control personnel other than the police the influence of control culture interacting with broader structures of meaning can be crucial to an understanding of the construction of official statistics (eg. Cameron's, 1969, study of bias in the selection of shoplifters by store detectives; and Schneider's, 1976, study of burglary reporting behaviour).

The discussion of displacement and the examples presented are similarly not meant to suggest that patterns of crime are explicable only in terms of the control environment. Other social allocation systems, distributive networks and cultural differentials play a vital part in the social geography of the city and differential rates of crime. The present study is, however, mainly restricted to a discussion of the relationship between crime and control. As such, the displacement theme is presented as one useful way of conceptualizing the relationships between crime and control but not the only one; it is not a paradigm or an integrated theory, but a perspective.
In closing, one further element of the relationship between crime and control not mentioned in this dissertation requires comment. What I have not attempted to do in any systematic way is show how control activity itself may be shaped by the social groups that are to be controlled. In the case of the so-called "street crimes", the ability of offenders to influence legislation is probably minimal (except in the case of organized crime), and their ability to influence law enforcement practice (other than through police graft) not much greater. But the picture may change dramatically if we consider the legislation and enforcement of both civil and criminal laws against "white-collar" and corporate offenders—the geography of crime is actually the geography of street crime, an emphasis for which there is no theoretical warrant.

Of particular interest to the geography of crime as I see it is not only the adaptations that powerful groups make to the legal environment, but also the influence they may exercise on spatial variations in the definition of what is legal and what is criminal; statutes such as environmental pollution law, tax law, and other areas of legislation where the influences have yet to be identified. What influence do industrial interests have on the geography of toxic waste disposal, or on the level of pollutants routinely discharged as a result of general industrial activity? In what ways do corporations adjust their activities spatially so as to prevent activity from being defined as illegal? And what input do corporations and white-collar interests have to the configuration of national and
regional differences in law in the first place? Of course geographers interested in industrial location have developed analyses sensitive to regional variations in public policy (and thus legal statutes), but what I have in mind here is an analysis which probes the way white-collar and corporate interests are negotiated into legislation in such a way that the legal environment becomes an enabler rather than a constrainer of activity.

Although the questions posed here are certainly tentative, and require elaboration, I suspect that the empirical findings they ultimately engender will, like the examples presented in this dissertation, demonstrate the need to move beyond a focus on crime and the criminal to a consideration of "offender" behaviour in its socio-legal context; a unified geography of crime and justice. The purpose of this dissertation has been to provide the foundation for just such an approach.
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